

EFFECT OF 12 SEPTEMBER 1980 COUP ON TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY



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PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been collected and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work, as required by these traditions and the rules of ethical conduct.

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ÖZET

Bu araştırma, 12 Eylül Askeri Darbesini detaylı bir şekilde ele almak ve 12 Eylül Askeri Darbesinin Türk dış siyasetine olan etkisini incelemek amacıyla hazırlanmıştır. Araştırmanın amacı doğrultusunda yöntem olarak literatür taraması yönteminden yararlanılmıştır. Araştırmada, öncelikle 12 Eylül Askeri Darbesini ortaya koyan nedenlere değinildikten sonra, 12 Eylül Darbesi sonrasında Türkiye'nin, diğer ülkelerle olan ilişkileri ifade edilmiştir. 12 Eylül 1980 Askeri Darbesinin Türkiye ile diğer ülkeler arasındaki siyasi ilişkilere etkisi değerlendirilmiş ve bu doğrultuda, Türkiye'nin dış siyasetindeki etki ve değerlendirmeler yorumlanarak ifade edilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, dönemin gazete arşivleri ve kaynakları incelenerek değerlendirmeler yapılmıştır. Araştırma sonucunda 12 Eylül 1980 Darbesi'nin Türk dış siyaseti üzerinde önemli etkileri olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Darbe sonrası dönemde Türkiye, daha sert bir dış politika izlemiş, Batı ile ilişkilerinde sorunlar yaşamış ve Sovyetler Birliği'ne karşı daha sert bir tutum benimsemiştir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Darbe, 12 Eylül 1980, Askeri Darbe, Dış Siyaset, Türkiye

ABSTRACT

This study aimed to examine the 12 September 1980 coup d'état in detail and to evaluate its impact on the Turkish foreign policy. Therefore, literature review method was utilized in this study. Firstly, the reasons leading to the 12 September 1980 coup d'état were mentioned and then, Turkey's relations with other countries after the 12 September 1980 coup d'état were analyzed. The impact of the 12 September 1980 coup d'état on the political relations between Turkey and other countries was evaluated and the effects and evaluations on Turkey's foreign policy were interpreted and expressed. In this context, evaluations were made by analyzing the newspaper archives and sources of the period. As a result of the research, it was determined that the 12 September 1980 coup d'état had significant effects on Turkish foreign policy. In the post-coup period, Turkey followed a more strict foreign policy, had problems with the Western countries, and adopted a tougher attitude towards the Soviet Union.

Keywords: Coup: 12 September 1980, Military Coup, Foreign Policy, Turkey

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANAP	: Anavatan Party
AP	: Adalet Party
CHP	: Cumhuriyet Halk Party
CIA	: Central Intelligence Agency
DPT	: State Planning Organization
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
METU	: Middle East Technical University
MGK	: National Security Council
MHP	: Milliyetçi Hareket Party
MİT	: National Intelligence Agency
MSP	: Milli Selamet Party
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD	: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
USA	: United States of America
TGNA	: Turkish Grand National Assembly

1.INTRODUCTION

In the literature, the 12 September 1980 coup d'état and the foreign policy issues of that period were mentioned in the memoirs of the journalists of the period, articles in the magazines and mostly in the newspaper agendas rather than scientific publications. Particularly, the Turkish foreign policy during the military regime, relations with America, Soviet Union and European countries and their perspectives on the coup d'état are mostly found in the newspaper headlines. In this context, an important source of information is the book series, which compiles Uğur Mumcu's articles in newspaper. He witnessed the anarchist environment and kept abreast of the agenda. Information from newspapers, such as Cumhuriyet, Milliyet and Hürriyet, which are still published, is also included. Many newspapers could not be published during the coup d'état; therefore, news was almost monopolized at that period. However, written sources of many people, such as Hasan Cemal, Alparslan Türkeş and Kenan Evren, who interpreted the events from different perspectives, were reached and we attempted to evaluate and analyze the period accordingly. The publications of Milliyet and Hürriyet newspapers, which were archived in some libraries, were obtained by photographing, and the archive of Cumhuriyet newspaper was accessed electronically. The articles reflect the situation of the Turkish people, whereas the headlines reveal Turkey through foreign eyes.

The 12 September 1980 coup d'état happened less than 50 years ago; therefore, it is a subject that has not been included in the scope of historical events. As there are lawsuits still pending and for some people, it is not yet finalized, this coup d'état is not considered worthwhile. In some places, sources written in line with non-objective opinions have been reached, but a common view has been included by scanning many sources for correct information.

While explaining the domestic political situation, the statements of military and politicians of the period, as Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit, Kenan Evren, were utilized. The subject was deepened by using the books of Mehmet Ali Birand, who has published his research on domestic politics, titled "*12 September 1980 at 04:00*" and "*12 September Turkey's Milestone*". Since 1978, many documentaries have been made about the coup d'état years. For this purpose, it will be better to hear firsthand the ideas and criticisms of the people who lived in that period.

In theoretical terms, the coup has a concept of anarchy. On this subject, realists and neorealists have different arguments. Realists indicate that if there is anarchy in a state and it has progressed enough to disrupt the order, the concept of anarchy definitely originates from the system. Hans Joachim Morgenthau was a realist. Neorealists suggest that anarchy is not a part of a country. The two opposing views create contradictory opinions about a coup, and while trying to explain the reasons that lead to a coup, they offer us alternatives. According to realism, the common feature of all states is that they all attach importance to economic and military values above all else. For this reason, it suggests that no state can cooperate with another state and will always keep its own interests in the foreground. Chaos due to World War II made realism rise because of these views. For the pioneers of neorealism, theory of Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, the theorist of the neorealist approach known as the Munich School, stands out. According to neorealists, the self-interested and destructive effect of anarchy in the state system has a large share in the relations between states. If the international system is accepted as a whole, Kindermann suggests that this system consists of smaller subsystems.

According to the realists, while seeking a solution at the point of "structural anarchy" or the "absence of a central authority" to help solve the problems and perceiving this as a result, neorealists do not stop at being a determining factor in the foreign policy of the countries, but neorealists consider the concept of terrorism based on a reason and change the foreign policy of the countries. they are seen as an important solution point when explaining. Therefore, when the coup is associated with the situation in Turkey and foreign policy, it might be considered that anarchy was the cause. In neorealism, the state's greatest goal is to be permanent by expanding its territories as much as possible and to making other countries known their presence. This issue will be tried to be resolved in the light of Neorealism in the context of internal and external factors.

2. FACTORS LEADING TO MILITARY INTERVENTION

On March 12, 1971, the Turkish Armed Forces published a notice and submitted a memorandum to the Parliament and the Government. The memorandum was broadcasted through radio, and it was clearly stated that if the necessary actions were not taken, the Turkish Armed Forces would exercise its constitutional duty to protect and defend the Republic of Turkey and take over power itself. On the very same day, the Turkish Government resigned. With this memorandum, the army brought down the government without dissolving political parties, suspending the Constitution, or dissolving the parliament.

Attempts were made to ease the political climate after the 1971 Turkish military memorandum; however, they were in vain. İsmet İnönü stated that politicians were the reason for military interventions in Turkey and that the interventions would increase. İnönü said: *"Turkey sometimes enters restoration period. During such periods, the army intervenes and stays for a while. After some time, we, politicians, mess things up again, and the military intervenes again. This will continue, and these reconstruction periods will be more frequent"* (Birand, 1985: 13).

The political situation in Turkey had become increasingly unstable as İnönü had predicted. Political conflicts, harsh statements, unenforced laws, deterioration in economy and increased terrorist activities exacerbated the situation. Turkey changed government seven times between 1973 and 1980 and instability was also evident in other areas. Another important factor was the rural-to-urban migration in the 1970s. In the decade 1970-1980, the urban population increased from 38.45% to 43.91%, whereas the rural population decreased from 61.55% to 56.09%. People migrating to urban areas built shanty towns, and the rapidly increasing number of shanty towns caused economically disadvantaged population to search for alternative options. These shanty towns became subject to occupation and pressure of various ideological groups, which resulted in the rise and development of terrorism and anarchy as a social and demographic factor (Dursun, 2005: 53).

The 12 September 1980 Turkish coup d'état had several reasons, including political assassinations, political instability, anti-secular actions and discourses, ethnic and sectarian conflicts posing a risk for civil war, unemployment, and economic

problems, such as the black market (Mücek, 2009: 118). It is noteworthy that while internal dynamics, such as economy, politics, and terrorism, played an important role, the allegation of external dynamics provoking and supporting various groups cannot be ruled out. Especially, the economic interests and plans of the United States and Germany have become prominent during the 12 September 1980 Turkish coup d'état.

The media also played a crucial role during the coup d'état. Some newspapers were closed between 1970 and 1980, and the number of newspapers has declined in comparison to previous years. Despite the decline in the number of newspapers, magazines started increasing. Ideological magazines were published in addition to women's magazines (İnuğur, 1992: 469). Media of the period might be divided into two categories in general. The first category consisted of centrist, left centrist and left-leaning newspapers, such as *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Günaydın*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Dünya*, and *Aydınlık*, whereas the second category consisted of right-leaning newspapers, such as *Tercüman*, *Bayrak*, *Yeni Asya*, *Son Havadis*, *Sabah*, *Milleti Orta Doğu*, and *Milli Gazete* (Kabacalı, 1994: 323). According to Kabacalı, although it was considered as a newspaper in the first category, *Hürriyet* published expressions legitimizing and affirming army and intervention in the 1971 Turkish military memorandum and subsequent processes (Özerkan, 2009: 65).

During the 12 September 1980 coup d'état, newspapers close to MHP, AP, and MSP have featured the leaders' declarations and used provocative language to report the declarations of opposition leaders, which has increased the tension among people. Moreover, high cost of living and increase in prices were often presented together with anarchism news. Economic instability was published on the front page of the dissident journals.

2.1. Economic Instability

There was economic pressure on Turkey due to the arms embargo imposed on Turkey, especially by the United States, due to 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, and the subsequent global problems caused by the oil crisis. Inflation continued to rise, production has declined and the foreign trade deficit increased (Ince, 2016: 198).

The biggest economic crisis occurred in 1977. Price increases ranged from 100% to 200%, and 1977 was known as "the year of the highest price increases". The amount of foreign currency sent by people working abroad and exports decreased, and for the

first time, prospective pilgrims marched in protest in Ankara due to the foreign currency shortage (Milliyet, November 7, 1977: 12). The foreign currency shortage caused delays in payment of interest and principal amount of loans taken from foreign countries, and this situation damaged Turkey's reputation. Turkey was put on a banking blacklist by international banks due to the economic instability and crisis, and the European Investment Bank had also ceased project loan payments. The repayment of the loan, which was taken by the Turkish Maritime Bank from the Bank of Tokyo and worth 1.5 million dollars, could not be made. Furthermore, salary checks of the officers working abroad bounced, and they did not receive money for some time (National Security Council, 1981: 28).

The IMF delegation visited Turkey in September and brought some suggestions within the scope of the economic recovery plan. The IMF delegation considered as devaluation as the first step and requested lowering the value of Turkish lira, taking stabilization measures, reducing the foreign trade deficit and abandoning heavy industry investments. The delegation stated that, otherwise, it would not be possible for other countries to issue credit to Turkey (Hürriyet, 2 September 1977: 5).

The required laws could not be enacted in the parliament due to political impasse and incompatibility. The procedures for preparation of the annual budgets pursuant to Article 15 of the law of SPO were not carried out. Four days before November 30, 1977, the Government demanded issuance of the plan in haste. Therefore, some of the technicians stated that it was against the law and quit their jobs and some were dismissed (Hürriyet, 26 November 1977: 1). The plan issued by the remaining technicians was presented to Parliament on the evening of November 30, 1977.

The reason for the peak of the economic difficulties in 1977 was considered as the failure to maintain the previous economic plans and determination of a program in the opposite direction. The financial environment indicated that issuance of a program to which the planners were objecting in haste would be inadequate to solve economic crisis. The program was deemed insufficient as price increases could not be controlled; the balance of payments could not be resolved; the public would be deprived of the estimated expenditures and the government project stock would be expanded due to political choices and therefore, it would create a demand for funds on a scale that the economy could not afford (National Security Council, 1981: 30).

After the elections in 1973, the ever-changing government, coalition governments, joint statements that would raise tension, domestic terrorism and anarchy, ethnic and religious conflicts become prominent as interconnected factors for a country's prosperity. The struggle for power between Demirel and Ecevit, the reflections of parties, such as MSP and MHP, forming coalitions with the government parties among people, and the tensions experienced in the parliament, could not provide stability due to the constant changes in the economic policies created by opposing views.

Financial environments have pointed out that global liberalization policies have become widespread, especially after the 1980s. The high devaluation practiced in South America was avoided in Turkey especially by the CHP governments; however, it was one of the first conditions offered by the IMF and other countries for opening a loan. At the end of the 70s, where terrorism and economic instability persisted, the decisions of January 24 were announced in 1980. Some problems and disruptions were experienced during implementation and as a result, the 12 September 1980 Turkish coup d'état occurred. The Chief of the General Staff General Kenan Evren expressed that the decisions of January 24 to be implemented carefully. It can be stated that economy, terrorism and politics were intertwined and therefore, a crisis would affect them.

2.2. Terrorist Incidents

Terrorist incidents started to become a current issue in Turkey at the beginning of 1970s and gradually increased. People started following these incidents with anxiety and uneasiness. Fear engulfed people. However, it was considered that the 12 September 1980 Turkish coup d'état brought peace and was therefore accepted by the

public.

The country was divided into right-wing and left wing. People were murdered and there were terrorist incidents every day. In such an environment, politicians were always accusing the other party of the events and the tension was always high due to their statements.

İlber Ortaylı stated that the political polarization at that time was not caused by supporters of the two major political parties, DP and CHP and that those events occurred due to extremists. He also claimed that the radical left groups who unfurled the red flag and the radical right groups who unfurled the green flag were few in number;

however, their conflict caused terror in Turkey (Ortaylı, 2015: 224).

Thirty-three people were killed in the Taksim Square on May 01, 1977, which is known as the Taksim Square massacre or Bloody First of May (Hürriyet, May 2, 1977: 1). It was claimed that foreign agents started the events and 130 people were injured due to open fire. A total of 470 people were detained; however, no connection with the incident could be found (Gündeş, 2010: 137). The Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel was informed by the MİT that these events were preparations for a military coup d'état, General Namık Kemal Ersun, the Commander of the Turkish Land Forces of the time, was forced into retirement (İnce, 2016: 199). In Turkey, a total of 157 people were killed and 1667 people were injured due to the terrorist incidents at the end of 1977. There was no specific place or target for terrorist attacks, and terrorist incidents occurred everywhere, including coffee houses, schools, political party buildings and headquarters. The majority of the murder cases remained unsolved, and the terrorist attacks and incidents also changed. People were killed by ambush or kidnapping rather than mutual confrontation. The incidents in high schools had increased and many high school students died in terrorist attacks (Hürriyet, 1978, Encyclopedia Yearbook, 1978: 102).

In 1977, the government was finally formed by the AP-MSP-MHP coalition for the last time and inaugurated after winning a vote of confidence on August 1, 1977. Due to the decisions of 30 August, General Kenan Evren was appointed as the new Commander of the Turkish Land Forces. The fact that the previous Chief of Defense General Semih Sancar was not interested in the national issues and the Chief of the Defense was to be changed in March 1978, appointment of General Kenan Evren as the new Commander of the Turkish Land Forces caused relief within the army. For the soldiers were particularly disturbed by anti-secular statements and behavior of Necmettin Erbakan. The AP-MSP-MHP coalition was falling apart due to disagreement between the MSP and the MHP, and a new search has begun before the upcoming elections. Terrorism was getting worse due to the current situation and casualties had been increasing rapidly (Alatlı, 2002: 242).

One of the concerns of Bülent Ecevit was a military coup attempt by the MHP supporters and sympathizers within the army. Therefore, he considered that it was necessary to change the MC government as soon as possible. CHP required more support to form a government without a coalition. On December 11, the required help

emerged, and resignations started in the AP. Everyone expected an AP-CHP coalition.

On January 5, 1978, a new government was formed with 11 deputies, who announced that they would resign from the AP and support the CHP. The deputies who resigned to be in the ministry and caused government reshuffle, received a lot of reaction, and this has become a subject of debate in the Parliament.

Assigned to form the new government, Ecevit referred to the problem of terrorism in his first statement: *“Our first goal will be to ensure life safety in the country.”*

While the government programme was being discussed with quarrels, violence and terrorist incidents have been rising on the streets. Meanwhile, newspapers published news about bank robberies, killed police officers, bomb blast ripped through coffeehouses, bombing of a high school, killed students and injured people in many cities (National Security Council, 1981: 33).

On August 10, 1978, in one of the provincial districts of Ankara, Balgat, 3 leftist coffee houses were blasted away and 5 people died and 14 people were injured (Milliyet, 11 August 1978: 1).

The Bahçelievler massacre occurred on October 9, 1978. In this incident, which was allegedly organized by Abdullah Çatlı and a team of 5 people, including Haluk Kırcı, Ercüment Gedikli, Mahmut Korkmaz and Kürşat Poyraz, seven university students, members of the Workers' Party of Turkey, were assassinated in Bahçelievler, Ankara (Hürriyet, 10 October 1978: 1).

Ecevit's government emphasized that their first goal was to ensure the life safety in Turkey; however, he could not be successful like the previous governments. Moreover, he was considered unsuccessful and was defeated in the next elections. Although there were various terrorist incidents, the most important one was the Maraş massacre. It started when the film “When will the sun rise?” was released in Çiçek Cinema, which was attended mostly by right-wingers, on December 19, 1978, in Kahramanmaraş. A bomb was thrown at the cinema. The very next day, leftist Akın Coffee House was blasted away with automatic rifles. On December 21, two teachers

were killed and a bomb was placed in the house of another. The events have become a social concern. By December 24, there were up to 100 casualties and the events had also spread to other provinces (Birand, 1985: 68).

The events in the streets did not stop despite the curfew, the demonstrations continued, the arson of buildings and the shooting of ambulances could not be prevented. The Governor of Amasya brought forward the connections with the U.S.A. due to the incidents that spread to the surrounding provinces and said: "Wherever Paul Hanze, the CIA Ankara Desk Chief of the USA, goes, there is mess" (İnce, 2016: 203).

Not only Turkish people were concerned about the incidents, but also other countries were concerned. Even the German Chancellor Helmut Schmits prepared a special briefing, and especially added the topic of Turkey to the Guadeloupe Conference to be held at the end of January. The army also started to get fully involved in the incidents, but was complaining that it was not completely in control. In this context the time and form of the intervention began to be discussed rather than its necessity. The gradual loss of control by the government, the increase in internal and external pressures, the economic collapse and the fact that terrorism could not be controlled were the beginning of the intervention on behalf of the army. According to Mehmet Ali Birand, there were two reasons for the 12 September 1980 coup d'état not to occur in July 1979: the government launched a comprehensive economic aid campaign by all international banks and states, and the partial elections to be held in October (Birand, 1985: 70).

By the end of 1978, the polarization and public anxiety caused by the Maraş massacre had increased. Killings and events during the year turned into mass events, and the casualties approached 1200 at the end of the year. Another remarkable point was the modern weapons and ammunition used by the right and left organizations in their actions. It was not clear where and how the organizations obtained such weapons, and how the activists, most of whom were students, found the money to buy the weapons. It was claimed that bank robberies were the source; however, it was only a claim (National Security Council, 1981: 63). Despite allegations, the increase in the bank robbery news published in the newspapers could be associated with this situation.

2.3. Depression Year: 1979

1979 started with brand new hopes for Turkey and Turkish people. However,

contrary to expectations, anarchy, terror and economic depression gave signals of increasing gradually. Due to terrorist attacks, labor revolts, bombed banners and casualties in various parts of the country, the Minister of Internal Affairs resigned on January 2, 1979.

The economic data were not promising either for the public or private sector. Therefore, economic environments stated that 1979 would be a year of manufacturing bottleneck for the Turkish economy. A period, where the price of fuel oil was constantly increasing, disagreements about iron and steel imports could not be resolved, manufacturing stopped due to power cuts and lack of raw materials, workers were sent on leave, and strikes increased in unions and workplaces.³¹⁴ Politics was not stable in an environment of anarchy and economic depression. The Government and the main opposition party could not reach a consensus on tax law (National Security Council, 1981: 68).

On February 1, 1979, Abdi İpekçi, the editorial writer and executive editor of Milliyet Newspaper was murdered due to an armed attack in his car in Nişantaşı while he was returning home from the newspaper. This was a shock for Turkish people and people living abroad. The murder suspect, Mehmet Ali Ağca, and Yavuz Çaylan, who helped him, were caught on June 25, 1979. However, the third suspect Mehmet Şener could not be found (Hürriyet 1980 Encyclopedia Yearbook, 1980: 138).

All political party leaders and non-governmental published condolences messages and cursed terrorism. The Chief of the General Staff, General Kenan Evren sent the following message to Burhan Felek, the President Turkish Journalists Association:

"I am deeply saddened by the murder of Abdi İpekçi, a valuable member of the Turkish press, whose place will be filled with great difficulty, as a result of a heinous murder. In fact, this attack targeted our free press, freedom of thought and therefore our democracy. On behalf of myself and the Turkish Armed Forces, I condemn this despicable rape with hatred, share your pain, have God's mercy on the deceased, and express my condolences and patience to you and to the valuable members of the Turkish press."

Prime Minister Ecevit and the opposition party leader Süleyman Demirel published messages of unity against terrorism. People started to hope due to these

mutual "unity" messages. However, during the budget negotiations of the Ministry of Customs and Monopolies in the Senate, there were quarrels between the parties in the Parliament, fights occurred, they even pulled guns at each other, and some deputies were injured. The group statements of the parties after the meeting used strong language. Soon after, this negative situation in the parliament was also observed on the streets (Milliyet, 3 February 1979: 8). The martial law continued due to the anarchy and terrorist incidents. The opposing party was criticizing this situation; however, the government was trying to explain the necessity to continue martial law (National Security Council, 1981: 75).

Martial law on the one hand and budget negotiations on the other, the economic depression had reached its peak. Foreign currency could not be found, strikes continued, manufacturing stopped due to absence of raw materials, and factories continued to shut down. Diesel oil, heating oil, gas and gasoline were no longer available. Agricultural activities in rural areas were adversely affected by the lack of diesel oil, and transportation problems arose in the cities. The Prime Minister stated that the markets would revive shortly, the price increases would have a positive effect and there would be no devaluation. However, Demirel claimed the economy was out of control (Milliyet, 10 March 1979: 12).

There were many articles about the Turkish economy in the foreign press, one of the most important ones was the commentary of The Washington Star newspaper in the U.S.A.:

Much has been written about the "breaking triangle" or "line of depression" that began in Pakistan, passed through the Middle East, and ended in the horn of Africa.

Turkey is the last pillar of this circle of instability. This strategically located ally is on the brink of the abyss. We must make great efforts so that Turkey does not become the "Sick Man of Europe" again, as it once was. Otherwise, it would be a great tragedy" (The Washington Star, April 8, 1979: 5).

The biggest armed robbery in the history of the Republic of Turkey occurred in this year. Police raids, factory robberies, and raids to coffee houses of opposing views continued. Before May 1, the Istanbul Martial Law Command had unequivocally announced that no rallies or mass marches would be allowed under any name or form, such as "celebration" or "commemoration". Martial law would be abolished on April

29, 1979, was prolonged for two more months and the Secretary General of DİSK had said that they would be in Taksim on May 1. After the announcement of curfew in Istanbul on May 1 by Martial Law Command, the preparations for the protest march were made for Izmir (Milliyet, 30 April 1979: 1).

DİSK reiterated that they would celebrate May 1 in Taksim. Temporarily removed from DİSK, Maden-İş, Bank-Sen and Baysen, Devrimci Toprak-İş and Haber-İş unions announced that they would celebrate May 1 in İzmir. Public meetings were held in two separate areas in İzmir, and incidents occurred in public meetings held in Çorum, Artvin, Rize and Samsun (Hürriyet 1980 Encyclopedic Yearbook, 1980: 142).

The terror incidents did not stop during the summer and included acts, such as the bombing and firing at the party headquarters and police stations in volleys. During the time, where deputies were “transferred”, the opposition party targeted the President and stated that he “started to take side” and “lost his impartiality”. In response to these accusations, the President's response was widely discussed and was considered a kind of “warning”, especially in the foreign press.

The political crisis continued without a break and the economy continued to reach a dead end at the same speed. Economic negotiations could not be carried out in the parliament due to conflicts and obstructions, fruit and vegetable prices were increasing due to the shortage of fuel, strikes began in public and corporate enterprises, price increases continued, and devaluation persisted. Ration cards were issued for gasoline, and the foreign-trade deficit reached 905 million dollars (National Security Council, 1981: 89). On August 8, 1979, at the opening of academic year at METU, some of the students raised their left fists and started singing the Internationale rather than the national anthem, and this event caused a great reaction in Turkey. Prime Minister Ecevit said: “Our state cannot allow such a behavior” and Demirel claimed that the government was behind the events (Milliyet, 10 August 1979: 9).

Started with new hopes, 1979 was rapidly heading towards the 1979 Turkish Senate elections and the Deputy Midterm Elections to be held in October, amid the bloody events, assassinations, economic depression and political depression. Undoubtedly, especially the economic crisis would have an effect at the ballot box.

2.4.14 October 1979 Turkish Senate Elections and Deputy Midterm Elections 5

1979 would experience an election that would cause a significant change in Turkey. Implemented pursuant to the 1961 Constitution, the bicameral system included Senate of the Republic and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Pursuant to this constitution, one-third of the members of the Senate of the Republic would be elected by elections to be held every two years. In the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, by-elections had to be held to replace the deceased deputies. Therefore, the election of the members of the Senate of the Republic and the by-election of the Deputy were to be held on 14 October 1979.

The economic problems that emerged in the 1970s escalated with the effect of the embargoes encountered as a result of the 1974 Cyprus Operation. Moreover, the terrorist incidents and the difficulties in the supply of basic needs affected the election results. Ecevit, who came to power in 1978, lost people's confidence due to these negativities. Before the upcoming 14 October 1979 elections, the AP leader Demirel said: *"They can't even herd four geese, they will lose three of them in the evening"* and the other was *"We found everything somehow, we didn't make you suffer"* (Hürriyet 1980 Encyclopedic Yearbook, 1980: 151). The President said: *"...The heinous games managed from inside and outside will be devastated and condemned by the patriotism and steel will of our people. They will interfere with voting, they will not be able to get away from the clutches of the law"*, and he conveyed the message that election security was under the guarantee of the government and the state (Cumhuriyet, 11 October 1979: 1).

However, while some newspapers claimed that there was no election security and that the people could not vote safely under these conditions, they wrote that the elections could not be held in a pessimistic and frightening environment. Moreover, the leaders of the political parties continued to escalate the tension in their election speeches and did not hesitate to use harsh expressions (National Security Council, 1981: 95).

Contrary to the expectations, the elections were completed almost uneventfully. The AP won all of the parliamentary elections held in 5 provinces, Manisa, Muğla, Aydın, Konya and Edirne, and in the Republican Senate elections of 50 senators held in 29 provinces, the results were as follows: AP won 33, CHP won 12, MSP won 4 and MHP won 1. A decrease of approximately 7.4% was observed in the number of voters

and the rate of participation in the elections compared to the previous election. Furthermore, when the results of 29 provinces where elections were held were evaluated, the AP increased its votes by around 266 thousand, while the CHP lost nearly one million of its votes (Hürriyet 1980 Encyclopedic Yearbook, 1980: 151).

In the face of the new balances after the election, Prime Minister Ecevit submitted his resignation to the President and said that Demirel should form the government. Ecevit said the following regarding his resignation:

"The task of forming a new government should be given to the leader of the main opposition party. The results of the October 14 elections and their reflection in the national assembly necessitate a change of government and our country cannot afford a government crisis at the moment... There is no need for an interim government or an early election... We leave a treasury in need of 70 cents to the government that will be formed later, not a Finance where the Central Bank's checks are not accepted in foreign countries, but a Finance with greatly expanded foreign exchange opportunities and prestige... I hope that it will help him to emerge in line with democratic beliefs." (Milliyet, 17 September 1979: 1).

Pointed out by Prime Minister Ecevit to form the government, Demirel said: *"The government has not resigned, but the nation dismissed them. People are not going to cry over this government, are they as scarce as hen's teeth?... It is not possible to call them a government. It was already built on intrigue and tricks. They have ragged the country into misery. They screwed everything up"* (Hürriyet, 17 October 1979: 1).

Upon the resignation of Bülent Ecevit on October 16, 1979, President Fahri Korutürk gave the task of forming a government to AP leader Süleyman Demirel on October 24. Supported externally by MHP and MSP, the AP government was approved by the President on November 13, 1979, and took office officially on November 25, 1979 by receiving a vote of confidence in the parliament. The parliamentary vote of confidence, for which Demirel was Prime Minister for the sixth time, happened with a little difference. Of the 438 deputies, 229 gave affirmative vote and 208 gave dissenting vote.

2.5. Army's Warning Letter dated January 2, 1980

The parliamentary arithmetic had changed, and the country's politics could not

reach a reconciliation, especially after Ecevit resigned. A government could be formed, albeit temporarily, with the contributions of Necmettin Erbakan, who announced that he supported the newly formed minatory government of Demirel “reluctantly”.

However, the number of people who wanted a coup d'état in the army was increasing day by day. In his message published for the Republic Day, General Kenan Evren mentioned that his duty was to "protect" the republic and he made plans for the future. He wrote the following in his diary for the October 29, 1979:

“Meanwhile, the number and insistence of the commanders’ demanding intervention are increasing. However, we agree with Saltik Pasha on this issue. An intervention right before or after an election will raise question both in Turkey and in other countries. When I asked, it was stated that the new government will be formed towards the end of November. I will be at the NATO Military Committee meeting in Brussels at the beginning of December. It seems inevitable that we will gather the commanders and make an important interim decision when we return. Sending a warning letter to civilians would be the most appropriate solution. Thus, we will have given a 'memorandum' and we will have done this duty” (Oran, 1989: 27).

Evren continued his program as planned. On 12 December, a message was conveyed from Brussels to Turkey: *“Our Chief of General Staff will depart for Istanbul tomorrow.”* Although it seemed like an ordinary informative message, it was also a sign for Army Commanders and some Corps Commanders to gather in Istanbul (Birand, 1985: 129). As planned, the Chief of General Staff, Force Commanders and some Corps Commanders came together in Selimiye, Istanbul on 13 December. General Bedrettin Demirel said that an intervention should be made as soon as possible because *“People were dying every day,”*. However, General Kenan Evren said that *“the conditions should be favorable”* and suggested that a *“warning letter”* should be submitted. His suggestion was widely accepted. Evren made the following note regarding this subject in his diary: *“We should let these politicians ruin themselves so that when we intervene, no one inside or outside can say anything. Let them know that we are one hundred percent right to intervene.”* The meeting was not prolonged in order not to attract attention, and the routine consultation meeting was completed after two hours. The preparations were completed on December 17, and submitted to the Naval Forces Commander General Bülent Ulusu. After a few minor corrections, another meeting was held in the Chief of the General Staff's room on December 26. At the meeting, it was once more expressed

that the letter would be presented to the President by the Chief of General Staff and that it concerned all constitutional institutions. It was discussed whether the letter should be read over the radio; however, it was declined as it would remind people of the 12 March Memorandum. Directly submitting the letter to the President and him conveying the message to the politicians was deemed more appropriate (Oran, 1989: 28).

The purpose of the Chief of General Staff, who routinely came to the President's office every Thursday, was different when he presented for the meeting on Thursday, 27 December at 17.30. After the speech of courtesy, the meeting would continue with the main issue. When the President asked about his general impressions, the Chief of General Staff expressed his intention as follows (Alatlı, 2002: 454):

"Mr. President, I have traveled a lot in the past few weeks. I spoke with almost everybody, including almost all the Corps Commanders. I don't need to tell you how worried people are about the situation. We summarized the conversations we had with and wrote a letter."

After his speech, he submitted the one-page letter of introduction (Annex-13), the two-page text of the declaration and the six-page memorandum to the President. President Fahri Korutürk did not openly support General Kenan Evren, who expected his support. Reiterating his support for democracy, The President said that he would meet with Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit. This was what General Kenan Evren wanted. On the same day, President Korutürk phoned the Chief of General Staff at 11 pm. Korutürk wanted to buy time and said this intention directly to Kenan Evren as follows: *"New Year's Eve is upon us. Announcing this letter while is preparing for the celebration, will have a negative effect both in Turkey and around the world. Christmas will be ruined. Do you mind if I wait a few days?"* Kenan Evren replied by saying "it would not be a problem" and the President said that he wanted to personally meet the Force Commanders who signed the declaration. A meeting was scheduled for December 31, 1979, Monday at 5 p.m. (Birand, 1985: 140).

On December 28, the Prime Minister and the President had a regular meeting; however, the President never mentioned the letter. Meanwhile, Ecevit was receiving reactions from both within the party and from Demirel due to his statements of reconciliation and joint action with the government. Upon seeing the mutual statements, the President called Kenan Evren and said that it would draw attention if he would go

to visit the General Staff, so it would be better if the Chief of General Staff and Force Commanders came to the Villa. Commanders entered the Çankaya Mansion through the Guard Regiment gate at 4:00 p.m. The meeting lasted for 1.5 hours, and the President saw that the Force Commanders agreed and were willing to agree with the Chief of General Staff. He understood that an intervention was inevitable and that the likelihood of it occurring within the scope of chain of command was quite high. At the end of the meeting, he immediately gave instructions. He was to meet with Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit immediately on the morning of January 2, 1980, at 11:00 (Alatlı, 2002: 460).

The critical time for the meeting, which was known only to the Chief of Staff, Force Commanders and the President, and took place in “ordinary” environments at “ordinary” times, would be January 1, 1980. Because a journalist, Cüneyt Arcayürek, realized that this meeting was not at all “ordinary”. When he turned on the radio to listen to the news on the first day of the New Year at 19:00, Hürriyet newspaper reporter Arcayürek considered that the interview, which he considered was hidden among other news, was different from the other news. The meetings were on Thursdays, which was normal, however, it was not normal for the force commanders to attend the meeting. Arcayürek said: “We were already expecting a coup d’état,” and tried to gather information by calling the press agent of the Çankaya Mansion, Bülent Ecevit and a few others; however, could not succeed. Finally, he called the Commander of the Naval Forces, Admiral Bülent Ulusu, and asked a precise question: *“Did you convey current the conditions and the possible solutions ‘verbally’ to the President or did you give a ‘written text’?”* The answer was quite clear: *“It was written!”*³³⁷ The very next day, he announced that a warning letter was also submitted in the headline of his newspaper dated January 2, 1980.

On the same day, President Fahri Korutürk submitted the cover letter of General Kenan Evren and the article titled “The Opinion of the Turkish Armed Forces” to the general presidency of all political parties. At 11:00 a.m., Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and the leader of the opposition party, Bülent Ecevit, were invited to the Çankaya Mansion. During the meeting, which lasted 35 minutes, Demirel claimed that they were a very new government, and they were not the addressee of the letter. Bülent Ecevit stated that the letter was entirely the responsibility of the current government (Birand, 1985: 149).

In his statement after the meeting, Demirel said: *“As a government that has faced all these difficulties in Turkey, we set out with sincerity to seek measures against them and became the government with a vote of confidence in the*

parliament in the 14 October elections, in line with the general desire of the nation. We are not responsible for the current situation in Turkey. Because it was not possible to do everything like this in 30 days. Now, there is a situation here. I don't want to name what it is. I do not want to express how to act from now on either. The matter will be analyzed calmly.” (Arcayurek, 2006: 84). On the other hand, Ecevit said: *“I wished that a serious communication could be established between the two major parties before we come to this. A positive response would be given to our well-intentioned and constructive calls on this issue. However, unfortunately, this opportunity has been missed. As you can imagine, this letter contains the concerns of our Armed Forces, like many other segments of society and the vast majority of our nation, in the face of acts of violence, terrorism, threats to democracy, the state and the integrity of the country, and some hopes in this regard”* (Hürriyet, 2 January 1980: 1).

Another institution that heard about the warning letter and rumors of intervention on January 1 and reported it on January 2 was the British Embassy in Ankara. A telegram sent from the Embassy to London, Washington, Athens and NATO Headquarters, and it was reported that the Chief of Staff and Force Commanders met with the President and submitted a warning message. There was a portion of the letter quoted in the telegram and it was also mentioned that Hürriyet newspaper received an opinion from a military source (Alatlı, 2002: 468).

The next day, on January 3, at 5:00 p.m., General Kenan Evren attended to the weekly meeting with President Korutürk. He was quite upset when he heard that Demirel felt very sorry when he received the letter and was thinking of resigning. *“We didn't give the letter to change the government or to create a crisis. We did not submit the letter in particular and only to the government. We wanted to draw the attention of all parties and constitutional institutions, including the government,”* he said. The most important reason why Kenan Evren thought this way was that they did not people to think that they forced the government to resign first and seized the administration after the crisis (Hürriyet 1980 Encyclopedic Yearbook, 1980: 146).

After the letter emerged, the meeting traffic of the politicians increased; however,

no result could be achieved. On the other hand, Kenan Evren and the force commanders carried out nationwide tour and held meetings (Devletoğlu, 2010: 268). The latter one on one hand and uncertainty on the other, various developments occurred in the economy as well (Oran, 1989: 29).

2.6. Decisions of 24 January

There were many remarks that the Decisions of 24 January were effective and even the most important factor leading up to the 12 September coup d'état.

The military intervention at the end of the three-year period, where the terrorist incidents had peaked, was considered to precede the economic measures, for the Decisions of January 24 to be implemented, a stable administration (many people considered this to be military administration) would be required.

The Turkish economy, which had been in trouble since the early 1970s, due to the high price increases of oil-producing countries, caused the balance of foreign payments to be turned upside down in 1977, and foreign currency transfer was officially stopped in February. As of February 1977, until the Decisions of 24 January, five economic stability programs were issued; however, none of them were fully implemented. They were as follows:

"Anti-inflation package - August 1977" issued by the Demirel government;

"Structural Change Program - March 1978" issued by the Ecevit government;

"Money Credit Measures Package - September 1978" prepared by the Ecevit government

"Economic Strengthening Program - March 1979", also prepared by the Ecevit government

Finally, *"Decisions of 24 January - January 1980"* prepared by the Demirel government (Çölaşan, 1983: 7).

Increased in 1978 and stagnated by the 1979 crisis, Turkish economy paved the way for the 12 September coup d'état, and it was estimated that the decisions allegedly prepared and imposed by the IMF could only be implemented completely by a "dictatorship" (Mucek, 2009: 116). Of the aforementioned five economic packages and programs, the longest-lasting one was the Decisions of 24 January, and it was claimed

that the others were not taken seriously even by the staff who prepared the programs.

However, taking the 24 January decisions was as difficult as their implementation. The decisions were taken by the Demirel government, but Ecevit's government was particularly sensitive about devaluation; therefore, they could not be implemented. In February 1977, when the Central Bank totally lost its function and effectiveness, Turkey's prestige in foreign economic environment had decreased and it became impossible to get loan. While there was a shortage of foreign currency, prices were extremely high in the black market. Meanwhile, the Ecevit government has been trying to apply for aid and loans through NATO and OECD in order to overcome the economic stagnation. Various agreements were offered provided that they agreed the decisions by the IMF.

In December 1978, IMF Country Director for Turkey, Charles Woodward paid a visit to Ankara and said: *"Turkish economy is stagnated. Serious measures must be taken."*³⁴⁶ (Çölaşan, 1983: 8). The government sought support from Germany and France and faced the IMF condition. This agreement was not accepted by the Ecevit government because the conditions of IMF included devaluation. In the face of the economic stagnation and the government's failure to come to an agreement with the IMF, the opposition party leader Süleyman Demirel said: (Çölayan, 1983: 8): *"The government has been preparing a 50 billion lira increase package. The government's economic policy has failed"*. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Ecevit's reply showed his economic stance: *"It is unfair for the Western countries to associate aid with the conditions causing devaluation. We will not yield. The indifference of the Western countries to our economic problems will show its effect on our foreign policy."*³⁴⁷ The situation in the U.S.A was no different. The U.S.A. asked Turkey to accept IMF conditions unconditionally. The U.S. Secretary of State Edmund Muskie stated that Turkey should stop fighting the IMF and make a definitive agreement. *"Turkey should either accept the Free Market Economy or should not call the Western countries anymore"* said Muskie (Alath, 2002: 486).

Despite all the efforts, the government could not resist any longer, and as a result of the negotiations with the IMF in Paris, started the multiple exchange rate system. The value of one dollar was determined as 47 Lira and 10 Kuruş. New price increases were applied to fuel, alcoholic beverages, iron and steel (Milliyet, 27 June 1979: 8).

Economic stability could not be fully achieved, and the tension continued increasing every day in the political environment. Being able to continue the government with the support of some independent deputies in the parliament, Ecevit could not fulfill some of the heavy conditions offered by the IMF. During by-elections of 14 October 1979, economic instability, terrorist incidents, political disagreements, decline in production, black market and shortages also affected the results.

The Justice Party was the winner of the by-election of 14 October 1979, which was held under difficult conditions. It was the Justice Party that won the five vacant seats and also prevailed in the Senate. President Fahri Korutürk gave the duty to form a government to Süleyman Demirel, the leader of the Justice Party, instead of Ecevit, who resigned due to the results. Demirel had to first determine the government employees and take action. Therefore, the AP formed a minority government and received support from right-wing parties, such as MSP and MHP. He had determined his colleagues in his mind and started contacting people. The first job was to meet with İsmet Sezgin and appointed him as the Minister of Finance. Meanwhile, the State Planning Organization (DPT), headed by SPO Undersecretary Bilsay Kuruç, who was assigned during the CHP period, was busy preparing the 1980 program.

Attaching importance to the issue of economic measures and bureaucratic staff, Demirel invited his old friend Turgut Özal to Ankara. During the meeting held on November 26, 1979, Demirel stated that he wanted to work with Özal, and that he wanted him to be the President of the Central Bank or the Undersecretary of the SPO. However, Özal did not accept either position, expressing that he wanted a more authoritative task with the following words:

“The highest office of the bureaucracy is the Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry. If you give me this task, I will accept it. We can run the economy from here. Besides, the Planning must be in my hands. If you entrust me with the position of Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry, I can also take care of Planning as a proxy. You're going to get the Undersecretary of Planning anyway. In that case, I also become the Deputy Undersecretary of Planning” (Çölaşan, 1983: 47).

Demirel, who stated that he would consider the proposal, would announce Turgut Özal as the Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry at the High Planning Council in a meeting held the next day. On 3 December, along with a news report in the

newspapers, it was announced that SPO Undersecretary Bilsay Kuruç was dismissed and Turgut Özal was appointed as proxy. On the first day he started working,

Özal gathered the SPO experts, whom he knew to be right-wing, in his room and made the following speech (Milliyet, 3 December 1979: 1):

“Look, let me tell you something. You are all valuable people working in this organization. You have come to the administration, or you will come later. Don't hold a grudge against anyone. I'm not saying that you should forget the injustices done, but don't do the same things and don't let anyone either. There is very good potential in planning. Take advantage of it. Do not dismiss anyone unless they are extremely militant and communist... (Çölaşan, 1983: 56)” However, a few days after this speech, many branch managers were dismissed, the Head of Coordination Department was dismissed and the contracts of 38 experts were terminated (Milliyet, 4 December 1979: 11).

On the day Özal started his duty, a delegation headed by Charles Woodward, Head of the IMF Türkiye Desk came to Ankara and held a series of meetings with Özal. The IMF commission had various conditions, and the foremost was the exchange rate adjustment. Woodward reiterated that a rate of 47 liras was not enough, and that the exchange rate should be adjusted to 65-70 liras. However, considering the deficits of the SEEs, he said that a raise package of 160 billion liras was also a must.

After the IMF delegation left Ankara on 17 December, positive statements were reflected in the press, and it was stated that the talks were productive. The details of the new economic program agreed with the IMF had begun to be determined by Özal and his team. Devaluation and big hikes would be made, and decisions would be blown up in an instant.

On December 24, the full text of the new program was completed, including the price increase decrees and devaluation decision texts, but the figures were not written.

Everyone, including senior bureaucrats, was intrigued. In such an environment, the warning letter of the Army fell like a bomb before New Year's Eve. A few days before the announcement of the economic program, Özal suggested Demirel that the program should first be reported to the Army with a briefing, and the suggestion was accepted. On 8 January 1980, Turgut Özal, Hasan Celal Güzel, Mahir Barutçu, Kaya Erdem and Hüsnü Doğan were in the delegation for the briefing to Chief of General Staff Gen. Kenan Evren, the force commanders and around 30 generals and admirals.

At the end of the meeting, which was stated to be fruitful for both parties, General Kenan Evren said the following:

“You explained to us the economic issues and the economic situation to us very well. In fact, in my opinion, you explained it more clearly than we expected. It was very clear for the first time. Thank you very much. In fact, these issues should be announced to the public on radio and television as well. It would be very useful...” Moreover, Hasan Celal Güzel stated that the soldiers listened to Özal with 'admiration' and that they were 'very pleased'. This was an expression showing how was the meeting.

After the army's warning letter, the positive result of the briefing given to the soldiers relieved Prime Minister Demirel. Meanwhile, Özal constantly talked to Demirel about the announcement of the decisions. However, Demirel always said: “It’s not time yet. Let us wait, Turgut” and kept him waiting. On 20 January 1980, he explained the situation to the President and explained the importance of accepting the package after it was presented.

During the session of Council of Ministers on 24 January 1980, Thursday Demirel asked Turgut Özal to sit on his left side and after explaining the difficulties in the economy, he gave the floor to Özal. While everyone was waiting for the explanation of contents of the package, Özal first explained the exchange rate (Çölaşan, 1983: 117): *“The value of the Turkish lira was regulated again, and one dollar is worth 70 lira right now.”* Voices began to rise in the hall, and people reacted. However, the fact that every matter to be discussed was approved by the President accelerated the signing process (Doğan, 1994: 44). Meanwhile, after the briefing given to the army, Demirel wanted this decree that a dollar was worth 70 liras to be announced on the radio, as Kenan Evren asked (Doğan, 1994: 130).

The titles of the Decisions of 24 January, which would cause many criticisms in terms of the determination process, IMF effect, explanation and implementation, were as follows: Daily exchange rate was introduced, and the Turkish Lira was devalued against the US Dollar. The value of the Turkish lira dropped by 2.7% (\$1=70 Lira).

The share of the state in the economy has been reduced, and purchases to support agricultural products have been limited, as practiced in SOEs,

Subsidies have been removed, excluding transport, energy and fertilizers, Foreign capital was encouraged, foreign trade was allowed,

Incentive systems, such as tax refunds, customs exemption and low interest credit were introduced within the scope of export.

However, the contents of the titles were not considered as constructive as the titles, as the Council of Ministers was discussing every title. Especially, while discussing the price increases, the deputies reacted. The Deputies were surprised by the 7-fold price increase in fertilizer; however, the increase rate in sugar rekindled the discussion (Çölaşan, 1983: 137). Another important issue after the devaluation of the Turkish lira against the dollar was the decision on SOEs. The abolition of the state support of around 100 billion liras on SOEs also had a great impact on economic environments. As a result, the prices of the products and services of SOEs were greatly increased. The price of gasoline rose from 22.50 liras to 31.40 liras, diesel oil and gas increased from 10 liras to 19.30 liras, bottled gas increased from 125 liras to 182 liras, a ton of hard coal increased from 3500 liras to 7000 liras, cooking coal increased from 5600 liras to 11500 liras. A ton of newsprint paper rose from 18000 liras to 41000 liras, a kilogram of caster sugar increased from 16.50 liras to 32 liras, and a bottle of 70 ml raki increased from 160 liras to 280 liras. The Turkish Electricity Administration applied a 100% increase and Turkish State Railways announced a 300% increase. These increases were followed by seaways, airlines and PTT (Hürriyet 1981 Encyclopedic Annual, 1981: 95). As the decrees were published in the Official Gazette and Demirel held a press conference for three consecutive days, people started reacting.

Necmettin Erbakan: "These decisions are not required for the economy, but they are orders of the IMF."

Alparslan Türkeş: "Today's situation has been reached by the irrational economic policies followed so far."

Bülent Ecevit: "The economy, even the state, has been handed over to great interests. The government wants to apply an outdated South American model in Turkey with more objectionable measures", Turhan Feyzioğlu: "Those who ruthlessly criticize even compulsory devaluation while in opposition are now devaluing" (Milliyet, 27 January 1980: 1).

While the reactions in domestic politics were like this, business circles were concerned about the decisions. Those who thought that Turkey was going towards a communist regime turned all their assets into cash, transferred their money out of Turkey

and fled. Everyone was talking about decisions. The decisions even left behind the terrorist incidents. The terrorist incident that took place on the same day and killed 8 people remained in the background. Businessmen expected stability and were saying “*What are you waiting for? The country is in danger!*” to the generals they encountered (Alatlı, 2002: 487). Some people considered that the military should intervene mainly because of terrorism. On the other hand, some business circles, who were worried that the decisions would not be implemented effectively, were in expectation due to the idea of stability.

Returning from the Council of the Socialist International in Vienna, the Chairman of Republican People's Party, Bülent Ecevit made an important statement regarding the decisions. While Ecevit stated that he was expecting a military intervention, he shared his foresight with the public:

“The economic and social policies that are being followed are models that cannot be implemented without a dictatorship. For this reason, I am concerned that the government is trying to establish the dictatorship.” (Arcayurek, 1986: 376).

Yalçın Küçük had similar ideas. He stated that this economic model was not a miracle, and its implementation could only be sustained with dictatorship:

“If income distribution deteriorates, wages are rapidly reduced, and the Turkish lira is constantly devalued, it is not a miracle to increase export. However, if it is necessary to do these quickly, it is absolutely necessary to shed blood” (Little, 1998: 91).

It was claimed that one of the main purposes of the new economic model, which started to be implemented with the Decisions of 24 January 24, was to “guarantee the payment of foreign debts”. Accordingly, instead of the import substitution model, which had been implemented since the end of the 1950s, a new capital accumulation model based on external trade began to be implemented. People criticized that expanded trade, also known as external trade, would cause the country's economy to open to foreign exploitation.³⁶³ Changing the economic model was considered as “being dragged” to “imperialism” system. In this context, it was known that, especially the USA, has transformed various countries through military administrations. The 1973 Chilean coup d'état has been associated with the process in Turkey afterwards (Değirmenci, 2011: 62). Due to the allowance of imports, the industry in Chile almost disappeared,

unemployment increased accordingly, the debt became permanent due to foreign indebtedness and lack of production. The country has become dependent on the IMF, the wealth was centralized and the wages in the social field were suddenly reduced. This caused the military administration to take place as the executor of the 'economic prescription' given to them (Dolay, 1983: 19).

It was widely debated that the decisions of 24 January were harsh, and that after the failure of implementation of these decisions, it was stated that they would be implemented with the 12 September coup d'état, and that the US and the CIA were behind these decisions, and that the 12 September coup d'état was effective in the implementation of these decisions directly (Yetkin, 1985: 214). Furthermore, a similar 'South America' analogy/interpretation came from the former Prime Minister, the opposition party leader Bülent Ecevit. He said: *"Since this economic model will put workers, peasants, all wage earners and low-income people under a heavy burden and increase unemployment, it can only be implemented with a strict dictatorship and may drag Turkey into a situation similar to the South American countries of that period"* (Alatlı, 2002: 494). However, what really surprised Ecevit was the reaction of the military to his criticisms of the government. Ecevit expressed his surprise as follows (Milliyet, 29 November 1990: 7):

"Something very strange happened when I started criticizing. I received a reaction from some commanders rather than the Demirel Government. The Second Chief of General Staff, General Haydar Saltık gave his opinion saying, 'Does Ecevit compare us to the armies of South America?' through a friend of mine.

...The reaction of the army surprised me when I criticized the Demirel Government. At first, I could not understand why the commanders had a chip on their shoulder. How could I have known in the early 1980s that when they will seize the power a few months later, they would put Mr. Turgut Özal in charge of the economy with broad powers and support him so that he could implement the 'Decisions of 24 January' freely?"

The opinion of the Army on the Decisions of 24 January 24 was positive from the very beginning. It could be summarized by Turgut Özal presenting the Decisions of 24 January to the Chief of General Staff firstly with a briefing, then widely accepted by the soldiers and was meticulously implemented after the 12 September coup d'état,

while keeping Turgut Özal apart from other politicians and letting him continue his duty. On May 22, 1980, The Second Chief of General Staff General Ali Haydar Saltık indicated that there was no alternative for Decisions of 24 January and that the system offered in the decisions was logical but insufficient. He also underlined that "the system must be operated seriously" in order for the decisions to be implemented.

Hence, the decisions that needed to be "seriously implemented" but could not be taken in parliament began to be taken after the 12 September Turkish coup d'état. Since the current government was a minority government, necessary changes in the laws, such as tax law, the abolition of the cigarette monopoly, collective agreements, strike and lockout laws, unions, transfer of mines to private companies, free zones and port operations, etc. were sent to the Parliament, but they could not be enacted due to their few number. Achieving the desired result from the Decisions of January 24 and completing the requests specified by the IMF depended on the enactment and implementation of these laws. And after the 12 September Turkish coup d'état, all the laws submitted to the Parliament were approved (Cemal, 1986: 32).

In his first conference after the coup d'état, the Chief of the General Staff General Kenan Evren stated that the Decisions of 24 January would be implemented, and they would follow the program. General Kenan Evren said the following in his press release on September 17, 1980 (Doğan, 1994: 62):

"...It is widely known that the Turkish economy is in great trouble. Inflation is increasing, and there is decline in production and instability due to the inability of our industry. The stabilization program, which was implemented to save our country from economic depression, to alleviate the problems of Turkish people, to open new business fields for the increasing workforce and providing economic development, will be carried out. Social goals will be achieved in no time by facilitating economy to work within natural laws.

We will try to get support of the OECD countries and international economic and financial institutions for the economic stability program implemented by Turkey. Necessary legal regulations will be made for Turkey to get out of the economic crisis in a short time. In the resolution of these problems, the patience, fortitude and self-sacrifice of our nation, both individually and as a whole, will be our main assurance above all the necessary economic measures to be taken." (Hürriyet, 17 September 1980: 7).

In his memoirs published in Milliyet newspaper ten years after the coup d'état, Kenan Evren stated that he was still thinking the same regarding the Decisions of 24 January. Evren said: *"I had no doubt that the Decisions of 24 January would end in failure were it not followed by the 12 September 1980 coup d'état"* and he defended that the coup d'état was necessary for the implementation of the decisions (Milliyet, 23 December 1990: 9).

In the light of all the information and explanations, the Decisions of 24 January paved the way and was a very important milestone for the 12 September 1980 coup d'état, as suggested. Turkey was in a grave situation especially in the eyes of the U.S.A. and Europe, namely Germany due to the financial difficulties experienced, the imposed embargoes and the economy dragged into a bottleneck. It was almost dragged to the point of making loan agreements with the IMF and foreign banks. And as a result, Turkey was about to enter a new era, especially economically, socially and politically. For the military was about to seize power in Turkey.

2.7.12 September 1980 Turkish coup d'état

Served as the 6th Corps Commander and Chief Martial Law for 14 months between 1979 and 1980, General Nevzat Bölügiray stated that the causes of terrorism in Turkey might be divided into two as direct and indirect. According to Bölügiray, direct factors included the inadequacy of the security forces, education and labor problems, the ambitions of other countries towards Turkey, and legal and judicial inadequacies.

Indirect factors were education, economy and the imbalance in income distribution, social condition, justice, and administrative weakness (Bölügiray, 1989: 618).

All these factors could be seen in Turkey. There were many considering that terrorism or sanctions of the IMF, particularly the Decisions of 24 January were the reason for the coup d'état. Emre Kongar suggested that 'only' economic reasons could not be considered adequate for military intervention. According to him, inflation, stagnation in foreign currency and devaluation were frequently experienced in Turkey. Even after the coup d'état, the military had not considered getting involved in economic decisions. The main reason was the disagreements on the basic rules of the regime (Kongar, 2012: 136).

One of these disagreements, which was also an important example of political disagreement causing the 12 September 1980 coup d'état, was the crisis in the Presidential election. The presidential term of President Fahri Korutürk was to end on April 6, 1980. On March 22, the parties started their election tours.

In the first round of presidential elections, there were 352 blank votes and 15 invalid votes. Meanwhile, Independent Deputy Nurettin Yılmaz received 80 votes. In the third round of presidential elections, Hasan Celalettin Erman was a candidate from CHP and polled 81 votes. In the same election, Muhsin Batur polled 38 votes, Naci Gacıroğlu polled 11 votes, Hasan Akkuş polled 19 votes, İsmail Hakkı Köylüoğlu polled 16 votes and Kemal Kayacan polled votes (Alatlı, 2002: 522). AP and CHP determined their candidates as a result of intra-party negotiations.

Sadettin Bilgiç was the candidate of the AP, and the candidate of the CHP was Muhsin Batur, the former commander who had signed the 1971 Turkish military memorandum. Parliament could not reach an agreement on either candidate. Sadettin Bilgiç was not approved by the members of AP, and therefore, supporting Muhsin Batur could not be expected of the members of AP. The same was valid for Muhsin Batur. Election tours were held continuously; however, the arithmetic in the assembly did not change. Sadettin Bilgiç polled 210 votes at one time, on the other hand, Muhsin Batur could only poll 303 votes at the most. None of the candidates could poll the 318 votes necessary to be elected. The parties could not come to an agreement. CHP suggested establishment of a broad-based (CHP-AP-MSP) reparation government, Demirel wanted a constitutional amendment and a presidential system (Birand, 1985: 182).

President Korutürk quitted his duty of the President of the Republic on April 6, 1980. On the same day, Evren wrote *“The legal period of President Korutürk ended today and İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil was replaced by proxy. They have been trying to elect a new President since the 22nd day of the last month. They might try as hard as they could; however, nothing will come out of this parliament. Thus, the necessary environment for an intervention is gradually formed. I consulted with the commanders, especially General Haydar Saltık. The inspections I've conducted for three months have made it clear that our army is ready, even impatient. As for the nation, they have had enough. There is only one thing remaining for the government to devour itself and it is the election of the president, or rather not being able to elect one”* to his diary (Oran,

1989: 31).

As a matter of fact, as Evren said, the president could not be elected until the 12 September 1980 coup d'état. Moreover, the soldier started working in 1978. Firstly, upon the command of the Second Commander General Haydar Saltık, the "Special Working Group" consisting of two people was preparing the "Flag Plan". The number of group members was recently increased to 6 to accelerate the work. The plan was prepared thoroughly, including which bakery would be open during the coup d'état, from where and how cards would be given to journalists. The only remaining information was when the coup d'état would occur (Birand, 1985: 200).

On his instructions submitted on May 05, 1980, Kenan Evren, who was to attend the NATO Military Committee and SHAPE practice in Brussels on May 7, instructed the Second Chief of General Staff Haydar Saltık to complete all preparations and to issue radio and television announcements until his return. He said, "*We can no longer tolerate the country being dragged into disaster.*" and that "this work" had to be done. Everything was going as planned. When he returned to Turkey on May 13, he told reporters that the parties had to resolve the presidential issue. The next day, his statements were in the headlines. This was what Kenan Evren wanted (Milliyet, 4 November 1990: 9).

On 27 May, Gün Sazak, a former MHP minister, was killed as a result of an On 27 May 1980, Gün Sazak, a former MHP minister, was killed as a result of an armed attack. This situation caused more tension and more confusion in the already chaotic environment. The next day, anarchist activities occurred in Çorum. On 28 May 1980, the security forces did not intervene with the demonstration of approximately 100 MHP members on the streets. Some leftists responded in order to protect the vandalized shops and prevent looting, and violence surged (Alatlı, 2002: 555). The events could be taken under control on 07 June 1980 and a total of 8 people, 2 police officers and 6 civilians, died. Many people were injured, and many houses and workplaces were vandalized. The Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren said that the police was responsible for these incidents; however, the police blamed the military, and described the police's attitude as biased (Milliyet, 4 November 1990: 9).

Speaking at the Extended Martial Law Meeting on June 16, Kenan Evren said: "*None of the laws that had to be enacted were approved by the Parliament. It is*

impossible for us to fight terrorism in this way.”. This was a fair warning for Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and the opposition party leader Bülent Ecevit.

Finally, General Kenan Evren commanded distribution of the Flag Plan to “All Army Commanders” by special couriers on 17 June 1980. The date was indicated as 11 July 1980 at 04:00 (Oran, 1989: 35). At the same time, political developments occurred. Bülent Ecevit and Necmettin Erbakan were holding meetings one after the other. Erbakan was trying to form a joint government with the CHP and overthrow the AP. Standing out with its statements targeting the AP until the last day, the MSP supported the government in the vote of confidence held on 2 July 1980, and helped the AP to receive 227 votes of confidence against 214 (Hürriyet, 3 July 1980: 1).

Meanwhile, the anarchic events in Çorum started again, and people were agitated with unfounded allegations. On July 4, 1980, during the Friday prayers, a person stood up in each mosque and said: *"What are you waiting for? Communists bombed the Aladdin Mosque!"*. Afterwards, the events would escalate, and many people considered that this event was the last milestone before the 12 September coup d'état. Newspapers reported that casualties were increasing every day. There were news that a total of 25 people died and more than 100 people were injured, many houses and workplaces were burned, and people would not let the security forces, firefighters and ambulances to reach the site (National Security Council, 1981: 167).

Due to the fear of a mass murder, people started to mount guard in the regions where Alevi citizens lived, for 24 hours a day. On the second day of the events, corpses were found among the barricades and ruins due to the curfew and the casualty was increasing. The curfew was lifted at the end of the third day, people started to immigrate from Çorum and the events were finally taken under control (Hürriyet 1981 Encyclopedic Yearbook, 1981: 47).

There was conflict on one side and the political agenda was focused on the vote of confidence in the parliament. The army, which was preparing for a coup d'état, was also following the events closely. The vote of confidence delayed the “Flag Plan”. Kenan Evren noted this change as follows in his diary on 08 July 1980 (Oran, 1989: 35):

“I revoked the Flag Plan and ordered the Corps to regroup. A coup d'état on the 2nd day of month, nine days after the government received a vote of confidence, would lead to misinterpretations. I want it to be smooth. Someone might say: 'Look, the

CHP could not overthrow, the army did'. Better late than never.'".

As of this day, political and important people have been murdered. CHP Istanbul Deputy Abdullah Köseoğlu was murdered on July 15, 1980. One of the past prime ministers, Nihat Erim was murdered on July 19, 1980. On July 23, 1980, the chairman of the Maden-İş and the former chairman of DİSK Kemal Türkler was murdered as a result of armed attack (Milliyet, 9 November 1990: 9).

In the last Martial Law Coordination Meeting (August 3, 1980) before the coup d'état, the regional Martial Law Commanders criticized the agenda and the events and complained about the inadequacy of the scope of the martial law and the workload. While complaining that every issue, including fuel lines, bus breakdowns, riots in prisons, was expected to be resolved by martial law, they said that the state had to strive with all its institutions. The Minister of Internal Affairs also said that the security forces were insufficient in terms of equipment. Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel admitted that Turkey was in such a chaos both due to the disqualification of the police and the incompetence of the law.

Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren summoned the new Second Chief of General Staff General Necdet Öztörün and the Force Commanders on 9 August 1980 and informed them that the date of the coup d'état was 12 September 1980. He also ordered the completion of preparations immediately and redistribution of the postponed Flag Plan. He also considered the likelihood of Süleyman Demirel calling an early election and wanted to act beforehand. He wrote the following to his diary: *"12 September 1980 is Friday. It is before the weekend. Moreover, I think it's a good choice for getting the approval of the public. Didn't the 1960 Turkish coup d'état and 1971 Turkish military memorandum occur on Friday just because it was weekend?"*

The Chief of General Staff General Kenan Evren had the floor to read his speech on August 30, 1980, for Victory Day. The Minister of Defense, who read the copy of the speech, understood that something was going on, and said: *"A nod is as good as a wink to a blind horse."* A part of Evren's message was as follows (Oran, 1989: 38):

"Our nation feels deep sorrow as our parliament has been unable to work for months and have been rendered unable to perform an important task as the elect a President. Without doubt, it is impossible to reconcile the expectation of peace and tranquility only from the martial law commanders and their accusation for not being

able to realize it shortly. Indeed, as in all countries where anarchy prevails, the struggle is waged as a nation, and only in this way can it be overcome... Aiming to destroy the democratic order and integrity by chaos, the ignorant anarchist traitors will, of course, be punished as they deserve. Like their counterparts that once attempted to arise in our history, they will be smashed under the Turkish Armed Forces and drowned in the sins of the blood of their brothers, and the Great Turkish Nation will celebrate many more holidays with prosperity and happiness forever in trust created by the Armed Forces (Birand, 1985: 253).

After the Victory Day celebrations, the leaders of the political parties and the protocol attended the ceremonies held in Anıtkabir and in the Office of Commander in Chief. However, it was noted that MSP leader Necmettin Erbakan or no one from MSP attended. When a journalist asked this question to Kenan Evren, he said: *"I want to know this. The Chief of General Staff asking whether Necmettin Erbakan is against 30 August or not?"* (Hürriyet, 31 August 1980: 1). In response to the question that was in headlines of the newspapers, Erbakan replied: *"We are neither supporting nor opposing Victory Day. We are directly in it. August 30 is the day of raising of our faith... We looked for a plane to attend the funeral of a religious man who died in Of. Therefore, we could not attend Victory Day celebrations."* Evren was not satisfied with Erbakan's statement and said: *"Being in it rhetorically is not enough. Chairman of MSP, Necmettin Erbakan should act like he is in August 30."*

While 12 September 1980 was approaching, Turgut Özal started to make statements that frequently set the agenda not only on economic issues but also on political issues. His statement on 6 September 1980 had many messages: *"If the economic program can be implemented seriously in two or three years. Moreover, if the political stability, which is quite necessary in Turkey, can be ensured through early elections or normal elections, the desired goal can be achieved. If the government and the Economic Program is changed, such a situation will lead Turkey into trouble!"* (Milliyet, 31 August 1980: 7). On the day, where Özal made a statement about the continuation of Decisions of 24 January and the requirement of a 2-3-year "stability", a march to "Save Jerusalem" was held in Konya and attended by Necmettin Erbakan and other members of MSP. Marches, where people were carrying green flags of caliphate, protested the National Anthem and showed that they wanted sharia with slogans and banners, were held. Moreover, no action was taken by the courts regarding the events

that were widely covered in the press (National Security Council, 1981: 183).

On the same day, Bülent Ecevit made a speech at the General Assembly meeting of the Turkish Petrol-İş Center, and gave the impression that he was aware of the events (Milliyet, 7 September 1980: 4):

“It is as if there was a match in Turkey. The political parties and politicians are on the pitch. A majority of society is watching from the tribune. If society is watching and the politicians are the players on the pitch, only the politicians will undress and be on the pitch. If the public remains seated in the tribune, democracy cannot be achieved. In a country where democracy is considered and practiced like this, politics will gradually turn into an ugly and meaningless game. (Birand, 1985: 260). (...) It will turn into a fight that consumes the patience of society. Just like in Turkey. I'm afraid, in the end, someone will come out, blow the whistle and say 'Game is over! Everybody goes home!' and democracy, which has turned into a meaningless game, will end like this. Get down to the pitch from the tribune. Determine the policy and strategy of the labor movement within the framework of the Constitution and laws (Birand, 1985: 262).”

While people considered that Ecevit asked people to go out to protest, the march of the supporters of Sharia law attended by Erbakan had put the society in another turmoil as an anti-secular uprising attempt. On the other hand, the Flag Plan continued. On September 11, 1980, at 16.45, the Chief of General Staff went to meet with the Deputy President for an ordinary meeting. Everything was normal. At the end of the meeting, all bases of the Air and Naval Forces in Turkey were alarmed. Five minutes after the bases in Turkey were alarmed, General Thompson, the head of JUSMMAT (Joint US Military Mission for Aid to Turkey) was alarmed. The General said, "Okay, I guess it's happening this time". American soldiers and their families were asked not to go out until further notice.³⁹⁶ Before retiring to his room, Kenan Evren summoned the Second Chief of General Staff Necdet Öztörün and warned him not to be put in a difficult situation during the meeting of the leaders. He specifically stated that he wanted a trusted officer to be sent to the leaders. Finally, he retired to his room and wrote the following lines in his diary on September 11, 1980: *“It's*

23.45. Now, they brought the news. Final preparations have been completed. They said that the teams to gather the leaders were also coming, and they gave an oral report. Now, I can get some rest. But I am not sure if I can sleep. Nothing is left to

chance. As a matter of fact, people are fed up with anarchy and are waiting for our intervention. General Tahsin Şahinkaya just returned from America this morning; everything is perfect..." (Oran, 1989: 17).

The coup d'état occurred, and all communication channels (radio, television, telex and telephone), including TRT, were taken under control by the soldiers.

Journalists calling the Martial Law Command were told the same thing: *"Listen to the radio at 04:00!"*

At exactly 04:00, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chairman of the National Security Council General Kenan Evren's message broadcasted.

As was said in statement no. 1, on September 12 at 13.00, General Kenan Evren's speech was aired. People waiting the clarification seemed satisfied generally. Aside from a few people, the press also expressed satisfaction. The intervention was also welcomed in other countries. As of 1979, "strict stability" has always been mentioned in the statements about Turkey in the leading European capitals, especially in the USA. In fact, during Kenan Evren's visit to America between 7-18 June 1979, US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski expressed Washington's demand clearly by saying *"...We want a stable Turkey. The events are not going in this direction!"* (Birand, 1985: 99). CIA station chief in Turkey, Paul Henze was among the first to report the intervention. Henze conveyed the message:

"Our children succeeded" to CIA Director Leon Panetta, and conveyed the same message to US President Jimmy Carter in Panetta (Gündeş, 2010: 200). In the following days, Henze also stated that the intervention should be supported in his report to the White House (Birand, 1985: 300).

The influence of Germany should not be ignored in the intervention process. It was stated that the coup d'état in Turkey was the demand of the capital circles, who hold the real economy, especially in the Federal Germany. In this context, Germany was more dominant than Washington, accustomed to Turkey due to history, and NATO made it a priority (Çutsay, 2018: 48).

The uneasy waiting in the IMF and OECD was replaced by relief with the 5th statement of the NSC. In this statement, it was announced that the IMF program and the Decisions of 24 January would continue to be implemented exactly. Özal being responsible for the economy was also appreciated. Speaking at the Executive Board

meeting of IMF, Belgian Jacques de Groote said: *“In the recent weeks, Demirel has started to soften for the implementation of the Decisions of January 24. However, these decisions require strict discipline. It will be much easier with the military administration.”*

The biggest expectation of people after the coup d'état was the cessation of terrorism and it actually did. One of the Martial Law Commanders of the period, General Nevzat Bölügiray explained the reasons why terrorism and anarchy ended within a week under certain headings. How come everything was calm as of 12 September 1980 coup d'état although all forces, practices and personnel were the same? According to him, the reason was that the state was standing against terrorism, rather than political parties, the Parliament enacted laws quickly, the security forces took a more active role, the courthouses worked quickly and effectively, and terrorist organizations hide, and even dissolved, due to the unexpected coup d'état.

A new era has begun in Turkey, and the formations and structures whose influence has been felt even today have been associated with 12 September 1980 coup d'état. A new order began to be built in all political and social areas, especially in the economy. From the very beginning to the end of the construction process, all authority would belong to the National Security Council and its president, Kenan Evren.

2.8. National Security Council

The administration of the state had now officially changed. The Commanders of the Land Forces, Air Forces and Naval Forces and the Gendarmerie General Command took part in the National Security Council under the presidency of the Chief of General Staff General Kenan Evren. General Evren assumed the Presidency of the Council, which would hold the legislative power, and the Presidency of the State (Birand, 1985: 304).

Other members of the National Security Council were Land Forces Commander General Nurettin Ersin, Air Force Commander Tahsin Şahinkaya, Naval Forces Commander Nejat Tümer and Gendarmerie General Commander Sedat Celasun (Bölügiray, 1989: 647).

After the announcement that the Chairman and the members of NSC had taken over the administration on 12 September 1980, they visited Anıtkabir and wrote a

special note in the official memorial book. The Chairman of NSC, Kenan Evren wrote the following on behalf of the council:

“Our great leader, today, when the Turkish Armed Forces, who are the loyal and indomitable guardians of the Republic you founded and the principles you set and whom you have always trusted, had to seize the administration of the country in order to put a stop to those who cannot protect the regime and its principles and who are pushing the strong Turkish State, which you left in national unity and solidarity, into darkness and weakness day by day, and to make your principles and democracy work again, we commemorate you once again with gratitude and gratitude and bow to your presence with respect.”

On September 18, 1980, the Chairman of NSC, Kenan Evren started his duty as the President after taking his oath in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. After Evren, the members of the NSC began their duties by reading the Oath of Council Members.

Oath of the Chairman of NSC and the President Kenan Evren:

“Great Turkish Nation,

In my capacity as the President, the Chairman of National Security Council and the Chief of General Staff, I have dedicated myself to the Turkish Nation in order to solve all the problems that the Republic of Turkey is facing, adhering to the principles of Atatürk, the principles of justice, law and human rights and without being influenced by anything other than my conscientious convictions and without expecting anything in return.

I will work for the happiness, unity and solidarity of the Homeland and the Nation; I will resist any threat to the Independence of the State, the integrity of the Homeland and the Nation; I will work for a new Constitutional arrangement based on the unconditional sovereignty of the Nation and the principles of a democratic and secular Republic; I will protect and glorify the glory and honor of the Republic of Turkey and fulfill the duty I have assumed with all my strength and existence. I swear on my honor and dignity that I will work.” (National Security Council, 1981: 203).

The mandate of the National Security Council ended on December 7, 1983, with the formation of the Presidency Council of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey following the general elections held on November 6, 1983. Evren, the Chairman of the

NSC, was elected as the 7th President of Turkey following the new Constitutional referendum held on November 7, 1982, with 91.37% of the votes in favor of the new Constitution.

Explaining the goals and policies of the NSC under the new administration to the local and foreign press, the Chairman of the NSC Kenan Evren listed these goals under six headings in his speech on September 16, 1980:

"To preserve the National Unity",

"To establish security of life and property by preventing anarchy and terrorism",

"To make state authority dominant",

"To ensure social peace, national understanding and unity",

"To operationalize the secular Republican regime based on social justice, individual rights and freedoms and human rights.",

"And finally, to restore civilian will after completing the legal arrangements in a reasonable time" (Hürriyet, 17 September 1980).

The National Security Council was always committed to Atatürk's principles, which it expressed at every opportunity, during the preparations of a new Constitution. Until a new Constitution was adopted, the National Security Council concentrated the legislative and executive powers on itself with the authority granted by the 1961 Constitution.

Moreover, to prevent violence and terrorism, which was the first target of the intervention, Martial Law No. 1402, which was granted to martial law commanders, was amended and the powers of the commanders were expanded. With these powers, the commanders were authorized to control all printed and spoken publications, to stop and control all kinds of demonstrations, marches and meetings, to close down associations, to determine the working hours of entertainment venues and to close them down if necessary, and to make use of all public personnel if deemed necessary.

As the Chairman of NSC and President, Kenan Evren constantly emphasized that various measures were taken and planned for the future in order to improve the situation in the country before and after the coup d'état. As mentioned, the first measures were taken in terms of anarchy in terms of social events. In addition, economic measures, which had been unstable, were implemented with discipline,

especially within the scope of the Decisions of 24 January, measures were taken for the cultural and social structure for the sake of social cohesion, and finally political measures were planned to be implemented for a return to the democratic system.

2.9. Economic Measures

Ecevit said that he had made various agreements to get the country out of the economic bottleneck when he was Prime Minister, but that these were suddenly stopped or stopped, and that after the intervention, the aid taps that were suddenly cut off were opened. Ecevit, who approached the situation with skepticism, used the following statements:

“After a great struggle, we signed a comprehensive aid agreement with the IMF and the OECD in early 1979, but the procedures to ensure the flow of this aid were constantly being delayed. I was worried that when the military coup d’état took place, the aid would be cut off completely and Turkey would be in a lot of trouble. But the opposite happened, the flow of foreign aid accelerated after the military coup d’état. Apparently, some foreigners who were holding the aid taps in their hands had waited for such a situation to turn on the faucet.” (National Security Council, 1981: 207).

The Decisions of January 24 taken before the 12 September military coup d’état continued to be meticulously implemented. It was widely accepted that the economic measures implemented were particularly to the detriment of fixed and low-income earners. Emre Kongar argued that income inequality had increased, and the future of the country had been mortgaged. The state cut spending on services such as education, health and housing (Milliyet, 4 August 1989: 9). Health expenditures, which were 4.2% of the 1980 budget, were reduced to 2.9% of the 1983 budget. In general, Kongar argued that the Decisions of 24 January were to the detriment, rather than the benefit, of the people in economic and social terms, and claimed that the state deviated from the principle of 'social state' and the future of the country was given to foreigners.

However, the Chairman of NSC and President Kenan Evren seemed particularly determined to continue the implementation of the Decisions of 24 January without any hitches. The fact that Turgut Özal, who presented the Decisions of 24 to the military before September 12, 1980 and who was the determinant of the decisions, was not detained like other politicians and even became Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the economy was an indication of the NSC’s trust in Özal and the Decisions of January 24.

In this context, it has always been claimed that Özal, January 24 and the US triangle were connected, and that therefore, the 12 September 1980 coup d'état was carried out.

In the documentary titled "Özal'lı Yıllarlar" (*The Years of Özal*) prepared by Mehmet Ali Birand, Soner Yalçın and Serdar Akinan, Kenan Evren gave the following answer to the allegations that the 12 September 1980 coup d'état was carried out to implement the Decisions of 24 January: *"No, we did not intervene for January 24. We intervened to eliminate the anarchy and terror environment the country was in."*

There were also those who disagreed with the thesis that the 12 September 1980 coup d'état was carried out for anarchy and terror. One of these was Mahir Kaynak, a former head of the MIT Department. In response to a question on this subject, Kaynak said the following: *"In my opinion, 12 September 1980 was a great defeat for Turkey. No one should consider it as a victory, because a part of Turkey, which cannot even be expressed as a percentage, only supported the terrorists. This was also revealed in the vote on the Constitution. Apart from that, an army of 700,000 people, 100,000 police, MIT and a whole State were against the terrorists. In the end, we dealt with them by changing our regime! (...) Anarchy stopped only because it finished its task; today, all measures are in place, but terrorism continues in the Southeast!"* (Kongar, 2012: 32).

The NSC council and Evren continued to give messages about economic measures in their speeches during their travels. In his speech in Diyarbakır on October 14, Evren emphasized that there had been a lot of economic hardship in recent years, but that a new era had begun, and that savings should come to the fore, domestic production should increase, and the goods produced should be sold abroad. In Konya, he said: *"We will save in every field. We will save on electricity, water, fuel, bread, anything we can think of, we will save on everything"*, and in an interview with the German Der Spiegel magazine, he said: *"In order to protect the internal peace and security of a country, economic stability is absolutely necessary. People must be saved from inflation and high prices"* (Milliyet, 21 September 1986: 4).

The figures presented in the booklet published by the National Security Council suggested that the economy, which had continued its downward trend in 1979 and until the third quarter of 1980, started to rise with the atmosphere of confidence that emerged after the 12 September coup d'état. Although the figures given in the section on agricultural production seemed insufficient, it was shown that there was an increase in

industrial production after September 12, especially in PVC, fertilizer, lignite and diesel fuel. However, the highest increase was seen in tractor production with an increase of 111% (Habora, 1989: 117).

After September 12 coup d'état, the economy relaxed with the opening of foreign credit facilities and production started to increase with the revival of exports. Accordingly, the unemployment problem, which tended to decrease relatively, was considered as a reason for social relief. It was emphasized that the Mixed Economy model was adopted in line with the rational and planned use of existing resources and that the model should be reinforced with measures to be taken in other areas (Milliyet, 18 October 1981: 1).

The increasing trend of anarchy, economic instability and political turmoil in Turkey, especially after 1975, was considered as the first signs of neoliberal change (National Security Council, 1981: 233). The 1973 Chilean coup d'état by General Pinochet was the first sign of neoliberal change (National Security Council, 1981: 233). The view that the neoliberal transformation, which continued with the rise to power of Margareth Thatcher in the UK in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in the US in 1980, was completed regionally with the 12 September 1980 coup d'état and the subsequent rise to power of Turgut Özal, forms the basis of the claims that the intervention was carried out within the scope of the Decisions of 24 January.

2.10. Social and Cultural Measures

The National Security Council aimed to stabilize economic policies after first sanctioning anarchy and terrorism. As the Decisions of 24 January had already been taken before the coup d'état, all that remained was to implement the decisions. In this context, NSC were quite determined and willing.

However, there was one more issue on the agenda of the NSC, which was an important topic: the measures to be taken in the social and cultural fields. In this context, education and training was considered first and foremost. Due to the fact that education and training had moved away from Kemalism, teachers were politicized, and students were not educated according to the facts and needs of the country, some measures needed to be taken. After the 12 September coup d'état, incidents at schools decreased by 97%. However, some legal measures still had to be taken. Some laws and regulations were prepared by the NSC. These included Education and Training Compensation Law,

Turkish Academy of Sciences Law, Turkish Teachers Assistance Institution Law, National Education Personnel Law, Basic Education Law, School Hostels Law, Private Education Institutions Law, National Education Organization Law, National Education Institutions Disciplinary Regulation, Ministry of National Education Dress Code, Open Regulations, such as the Education Regulation, Student Discipline Regulation (National Security Council, 1981: 248).

After the coup d'état, the total number of heavy and light weapons seized in the operations was enough to equip an army according to the Turkish Armed Forces. Such domestic unrest and turmoil could only be brought about by turning brother against brother. In their publications, the TSK and the NSC drew attention to this situation and emphasized the importance of education. It was stated that internal unrest was caused by social and cultural deformation and that the current situation has been brought about by deviations from the Kemalist education system.

In a speech on September 16, Kenan Evren stated that all the teachers from primary schools to universities were moving away from Kemalism and polarizing students with rightist-leftist and even reactionary ideas (Habora, 1989: 122). To prevent polarization and incidents at and to regulate universities, the Higher Education Law No. 2547, which has been still widely debated today, was adopted on November 6, 1981

In this context, the NSC organized a "Revolutionary History Council", and new textbooks and curricula were prepared and put into practice as a result of the issues discussed. All textbooks were revised with a Kemalism approach, Atatürk book series were published, and movies based on Atatürk's principles and revolutions were made. Painting, poetry and essay competitions on Atatürk and Kemalism were organized in order to attract students' attention and interest (National Security Council, 1981: 250).

The laws enacted and the education system aimed to redesign the social structure, and the banned publications were considered "harmful publications".

2.11. Democratic Government and New Political Structure

On the day of the coup d'état, all political parties were dissolved, Demirel and Ecevit were sent on exile to Hamzakoy, Erbakan and Türkeş to Uzunada. Politicians who were taken from their homes on the morning of the intervention were treated with the utmost courtesy and all their requests were met in the places where they were taken.

Only Alparslan Türkeş could not be found, and he surrendered himself after 3 days (Yaşlı, 2019: 21). The leaders, who had been under surveillance for about 20 days, were released on the condition of "not practicing politics and not drawing the public into political polemics". They were also banned from making statements and declarations.

Answering questions from foreign press members, General Haydar Saltık, Secretary General of the National Security Council said that Demirel and Ecevit would return to politics like other citizens once their political bans are lifted (Cemal, 1986: 107). The expressions "Mr. Demirel" and "Mr. Ecevit" that he used in his speech attracted attention, and it was considered that his statement created the perception that the leaders could become the General President again, so it was necessary to make a written statement the next day. In summary, the statement read: *"...headlines and phrases appeared in some parts of the press which gave the impression that Mr. Demirel and Mr. Ecevit could return to political life as party leaders once the bans were lifted. At this meeting, it was explained that Mr. Demirel and Mr. Ecevit would be able to continue their political activities like other citizens when political activities were freed, but that they would not be the leaders of any party."* (Milliyet, 30 October 1980: 7).

Following the announcement of the National Security Council, Bülent Ecevit announced his resignation as the Chairman of CHP Chairman. Ecevit, who said he would return to journalism, was banned from broadcasting on the "political" grounds. The other leader mentioned in the NSC statement, Süleyman Demirel said he would not resign. Staying away from the political agenda, the National Security Council set some stages for the transition to a parliamentary democratic order. The first of these stages was the enactment of the Constituent Assembly Law in June 1981. While the existing legislative activities in the parliament were being carried out by the NSC, with the Constituent Assembly, it was envisaged that the legislative activities would be carried out by the members of the parliament and a step towards a democratic system would be taken.

The Constituent Assembly, which included members of the NSC, would also carry out the work on the new Constitution together with the Advisory Council, which was composed of 160 members. After the new Constitution was submitted to the people in a referendum, the Political Parties and Election Laws would be drafted. Finally, the suspended political parties would be allowed to operate again and general elections would be held after a specified period of time, with the aim of transitioning to a parliamentary democratic system and handing the government back to civilian

administrators (National Security Council, 1981: 254).

Despite the fact that Kenan Evren was the Head of State, it was necessary for the NSC to appoint a Prime Minister as administrative affairs had to continue in the country. For this purpose, Prof. Dr. Turhan Feyzioğlu, the Chairman of the Republican Trust Party, came to the fore. However, when discontent arose within the Army, saying "*We have gathered the leaders of all political parties, it would not be right to make the president of a small party the Prime Minister*", Kenan Evren and the NSC abandoned this idea and decided on another name that would be supported by the Army and acceptable to everyone. This name was the former Marine Commander of the Forces was Admiral Bülend Ulusu, who had retired in August just before the 12 September 1980 coup d'état. (Birand, 1985: 213). On September 20, 1980, the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers were announced at a press conference and the government began to function.

The political program planned within the framework of the strategy prepared by the NSC was carried out as planned. The Constitution, which was prepared and finalized by the Constituent Assembly and the Advisory Council, was submitted to the referendum on November 7, 1982. Kenan Evren urged the public to vote 'Yes' in the referendum during his trips before the referendum. In the referendum, 'Yes' and 'No' votes were to be cast. 'Blue' ballots meant 'No' and 'White' ballots meant 'Yes'. Journalist Hasan Cemal summarized the perceptual state of the "blue-white" colors before the referendum by saying "*'blue' was not used even in cartoons. Because it was forbidden.*" He explained in his memoirs and later in his book that 'blue', the color of the 'No' preference, was not even used by name or as a color and was later banned by 'order' (Cemal, 2012: 3).

Adopted on September 23, 1982, by the "Consultative Assembly" and on October 18, 1982, by the National Security Council, the Constitution was submitted to a referendum on November 7, 1982. Of the 20,690,914 voters across Turkey, 18,885,488 voted in 82,489 ballot boxes. While 43,498 votes were invalid, 17,215,559 of the 18,841,990 valid votes were 'Yes' and 1,626,431 were 'No'.

The acceptance of the Constitution in a different way was actually seen as an expected result. Although an acceptance rate of 60-70% was expected in general, the fact that the rate exceeded 90% was attributed to certain reasons. Claims that those who

would vote 'No' with a 'blue' colored 'No' envelope would be seen and tagged due to the thin envelope, that they would be declared as "traitors", etc. were claimed to have influenced the voters. (Alkan, 1986: 144). İlber Ortaylı, on the other hand, argued that the 1982 Constitution was a failed imitation and finds the claims that the public was intimidated unrealistic. According to him, the reason for the high rate of acceptance was that the Turkish people had never read the text of the Constitution and accepted it by evaluating it according to the conditions of the day (Ortaylı, 2015: 230).

As a result of the Constitution, the political immunity of the NSC members was strengthened and Kenan Evren became President. In the following period, preparations for the General Elections of November 6, 1983, the first democratic elections, were underway. Political bans were gradually lifted, new parties were established and preparations for the elections began. The three parties that were allowed to participate in the elections were the Motherland Party - ANAP, founded by Turgut Özal, who resigned from his post as Deputy Prime Minister on July 15, 1982, about 4 months before the constitutional referendum, the Nationalist Democracy Party - MDP, which claimed to be the continuation of the September 12 spirit and was headed by retired General Turgut Sunalp, and the People's Party - HP, a leftist party founded by Necdet Calp after the bans.

Turgut Özal's party ANAP, which made its name with the Decisions of 24, served as Deputy Prime Minister in the 12 September 1980 coup d'état and was the first party to be established and approved after the coup d'état, came out as the first party in the elections. Following ANAP, which received 45.14% of the votes, HP and MDP received 30.46% and 23.27%, respectively. The distribution of seats in the 400-seat parliament was as follows: 211 ANAP, 117 HP and 71 MDP. Since one of ANAP's deputy candidates in Bingöl was vetoed, the number of seats dropped from 212 to 211 and the number of seats in the parliament was finalized as 399.

İlber Ortaylı states that the strict economic program implemented during the 12 September coup d'état had two phases, the first phase was the period of bitter prescriptions until the banker crisis in 1982, and the second phase was the rapid and spectacular rise of Özal, the owner of these economic policies, after he won the elections with ANAP. (Ortaylı, 2011: 137).

Interrupted on September 12, 1980, the democratic system resumed on

November 6, 1983. Özal's duties before and after the coup d'état, his non-participation in the banker crisis that erupted, his resignation, his founding of a party and his coming first in the first general elections were considered as a continuation of global neoliberal policies and the first of the economic steps that would ensure full integration with the capitalist western world instead of the protectionist and import substitution approach.

This new approach marked the beginning of the "deregulation" period in Turkey, as in the rest of the world after 1980. With this, the state withdrew from its determinant role in the market and left the responsibility mainly to the free market conditions. The "Social Responsibility Theory" applied between 1945-1980 was abandoned and neoliberal "Free Market" view was adopted as a requirement of the policies (Özgen, 2004: 468).

The overwhelming economic measures taken in a turbulent political environment, the decisions that had to be implemented in a long-term and disciplined manner, and the economic system that relaxed with the name at the head of economic decisions again as a result of the military administration that was able to implement these decisions, stand before us as a short summary of the Özal years and the global transition in Turkey.

What happened on September 12 and in the process that followed was described with terms such as "revolution", "coup" and "revolution". Kenan Evren responded to the question by saying that he did not find it right to describe what was done as a "coup":

"I don't call it a coup d'état; the current government was seized for a while, for a short period of time, and when that period of time was completed, it was returned to the Democratic Parliamentary System. Some people say it in a different way: They call it a 'coup'; they call it a 'revolution'. It is an expression; because people who come with a 'Revolution' do not leave by themselves once; they leave with a new 'Revolution'. Therefore, it is not possible to say 'Revolution'!"

According to journalist Türker Alkan, September 12 was a 'coup d'état'. On the other hand, it was not possible to define September 12 as a 'reformation' or 'revolution'. Alkan stated that 'reformations' or 'revolutions' are phenomena that occur with the active participation of large masses and bring about radical changes in the nature of the social, economic and political structure.

3. FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY AFTER 12 SEPTEMBER 1980

3.1. Determining the Fundamentals of Foreign Policy

In his speech after the coup d'état of September 12, 1980, Kenan Evren is stated the following about the foreign policy to be adopted by the military government:

“In our relations with countries abroad, we will act based on the principles of mutual benefit and respect, taking into account our national interests. We will prioritize regional peace and cooperation. As a member of NATO, we will act in accordance with the objectives of the alliance. We will continue our cooperation with friendly and allied countries. At the same time, we will stand at an equal distance from all parties to contribute to peace in the Middle East.” (Evren, 1981: 14).

After the September 12, 1980 coup d'état, Kenan Evren had full authority in foreign policy and gave importance to the recommendations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this period, Evren and his military administration pursued a course consistent with the classical Turkish foreign policy and acted in line with Turkey's national security and interests (Çakmak, 2010: 54).

Especially under the influence of the Cold War period, Turkey maintained close relations with western countries. During this period, Turkey, as a member of NATO, acted in accordance with the objectives of the alliance and maintained close relations with the United States. In addition, Turkey closely followed the developments in the Middle East and worked to contribute to peace in the region. Turkey also attached importance to regional cooperation in order to ensure political stability in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Moreover, the 12 September coup d'état also caused certain changes in Turkish foreign policy. For instance, Turkey's concern about Iran's post-Islamic Revolution influence led Turkey to pursue an active foreign policy in the region. In addition, Turkey's problems with Greece in the Aegean Sea also occupied an important place on the foreign policy agenda. In this period, Turkey held various negotiations with Greece to prevent conflicts and solve the problems (Armaoğlu, 2019: 18-19).

After the September 12, 1980 coup d'état, Kenan Evren had full authority in foreign policy and gave importance to the recommendations of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. In this period, Evren and his military administration pursued a course consistent with the classical Turkish foreign policy and acted in line with Turkey's national security and interests. He said:

“In foreign policy, our Government will maintain the traditional peaceful attitude of our Republic, the foundations of which were laid by Atatürk the Great. To this end, efforts will be made to maintain and develop relations with all countries based on the principles of independence, sovereignty, respect for territorial integrity, non-interference in their affairs and equality of rights. Our Government will pursue a policy aimed at contributing to peace and security in the region and in the world to the extent possible and, as a fundamental element of this policy, will support the process of détente necessitated by international conditions. We believe that all countries should show the utmost care and diligence for the success of this process. Bilateral and multilateral agreements in all fields to which Turkey is a party are valid. Within the framework of the principle of reciprocity, our Government will fulfill its obligations arising from all agreements.”

Accordingly, it explained the basic principles and objectives of the Turkish government in foreign policy. These principles included maintaining the Republic's peaceful stance, maintaining and developing relations based on the principles of independence, sovereignty, respect for territorial integrity, non-interference in the affairs of its workers and equality of rights. In line with these objectives, Turkey aimed to cooperate with all countries and contribute to peace and security in the region and the world.

It was also emphasized that Turkey was bound by international treaties. It was stated that Turkey would fulfill its treaty obligations within the framework of the principle of reciprocity. The text also stated that Turkey supported the détente process and believed that all countries should pay utmost attention and diligence to this process.

Accordingly, it emphasized Turkey's peaceful and cooperative foreign policy and stresses that Turkey respected international treaties.

3.2. Relations with the United States

Turkish-American relations have been shaped by various events throughout history and the 70s are considered to be one of the most turbulent periods of these relations. In particular, events such as the poppy crisis, the Cyprus Peace Operation and the arms embargo imposed by the United States on Turkey created tension in Turkish-American relations. In addition to these, the pre-coup environment in Turkey, where public order could not be maintained, also led to a weakening of relations (Güldemir,1986:131).

The poppy crisis started when Turkey decided to limit the use of poppy produced in Afghanistan. However, this decision was seen by the United States as a threat in the fight against drug trafficking and economic pressure on Turkey increased. The Cyprus Peace Operation was a military operation carried out by Turkey to protect the Turkish minority in Cyprus. However, this operation was condemned by the United States and an arms embargo was imposed on Turkey.

Turkish-American relations entered a very tense period in the 70s due to these events. However, relations improved in the following years and the cooperation between the two countries was strengthened again. Nowadays, Turkey and the United States cooperate in many areas and maintain their relations in line with common interests (Oran, 2010: 38).

After the September 12 coup d'état, Turkish-American relations soared because the United States saw Turkey as a buffer against the Soviet Union's expansionism and Turkey was a member of NATO. In the post-coup period, the US provided Turkey with military, economic and political support. Thanks to this support, Turkey's strategic importance in the region increased after the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan and served US interests in the Middle East.

However, these close relationships have led to some criticism. Some argued that US pressure for democratic and human rights reforms in Turkey prior to the coup was not sufficient and that the US supported the coup. There was also criticism that the US has not responded adequately to human rights violations committed in post-coup Turkey.

Even today, there is a debate about whether there was an American involvement in the 12 September coup d'état. However, there is no conclusive evidence on this issue. Although the rise in Turkish-American relations took place after the coup d'état, the main reason for the development of relations was Turkey's strategic importance and NATO membership.

After the September 12 coup d'état, the American belief that order and stability would return to Turkey led to a rapprochement in Turkish-American relations. During this period, Turkey's days of anarchy were a cause for concern for both Turkey and the United States. The 1979 Khomeini Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of the same year marked an important turning point for America's Middle East strategy. These developments created uncertainties in the region that

America could not have foreseen. Therefore, the importance of Turkey as an ally for the US has increased. America played an active role in reorganizing and stabilizing Turkey. In the same period, the foreign policy of Ronald Reagan, who became the US president, led to a rapprochement in Turkish-American relations. During this rapprochement process, military, economic and political cooperation between Turkey and the US increased. During this period, the US provided Turkey with financial and military aid. At the same time, it began to better understand Turkey's strategic importance (Balçı, 2013: 163).

Another indicator of the rapprochement in Turkish-American relations during this period was the increase in economic aid to Turkey. While Turkey was going through a difficult economic period in the early 1980s, the US supported the Turkish economy by providing economic aid to Turkey. This aid was an important source for Turkey's economic development. Moreover, Turkey's strategic location between East and West was an important factor for America's strategic interests in the Middle East and Asia. Therefore, the US tried to protect its interests in the region by strengthening its cooperation with Turkey. However, it should be noted that this rapprochement has also brought about some controversial issues in Turkish-American relations. In particular, issues such as human rights violations and post-coup arrests in Turkey have led to criticism of America's relations with Turkey. (Gönlübol and Kürkçüoğlu, 1986: 605).

Besides the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA), another important factor that brought Turkish-American relations closer between 1980 and 1983 was the political and economic instability in Turkey after the military coup of September 12, 1980. During this period, Turkey was seen in the Western world as a prominent country in the fight against terrorism and extremism. In addition, Turkey was an important ally for the United States due to its strategic location and neighboring the Soviet Union. However, Turkish-American relations were not limited to positive developments. Especially in the second half of the 1980s, there were frictions between the two countries due to the US Congress' reduction of military aid to Turkey and some problems related to Turkey's position in NATO. Nevertheless, relations between Turkey and the US have regained a positive momentum since the late 1980s.

To ensure security in the region, To avoid instability and Ability to respond quickly to US military operations.

However, Turkey has opposed the deployment of an Agile Force unit on Turkish territory. Turkey argued that if this contingent moves from Turkish territory to other countries, it should have the right to take action to ensure regional security. In addition, Turkey was also concerned about a permanent military presence in Turkey. Therefore, there were disagreements with the United States on this issue, which Turkey fought to protect its regional security interests.

During the Reagan administration, which succeeded Carter as president, the US tried to increase Turkey's role in the Gulf policy. However, during the Demirel administration, which was the democratic administration of Turkey before the September 12 coup, the US request to facilitate the use of bases and infrastructure related to the Agile Force was met with a negative response. During the military administration established after the coup, Turkish-American relations gradually improved. During US Secretary of State Haig's visit to Turkey, it was confirmed that Turkey and the US would act together on Gulf policy. Greece, Cyprus, NATO and terrorist organizations were also discussed during the visit (Slany, 2011: 543).

The MoU aimed to strengthen military, political and economic cooperation between Turkey and the United States. Under the agreement, Turkey would be able to use US military equipment and the US military would be stationed in some bases in Turkey. The agreement also envisaged the provision of financial and technical assistance by the US for Turkey's economic development. The MOU has been recognized as an indicator of the importance the US attaches to Turkey in its Middle East policy. The US saw Turkey as an important ally to stabilize the Middle East and continues to maintain close relations with Turkey to protect its interests in the region. However, the MoU has caused some controversy in the Turkish public opinion.

Some people argued that the agreement would undermine Turkey's independence and serve the interests of the United States. On the other hand, supporters of the agreement argued that it was important for strengthening Turkey's strategic position in the Middle East and Caucasus and contributing to its economic development.

According to the details of the agreement, there are many reasons behind the US decision to modernize airports and build new ones in Turkey. Some of these reasons include the need to use bases in Turkey, which is strategically located for America's

military presence in the Middle East, the aim of taking measures against a possible southward advance of the Soviet Union, the need to increase the US military presence in Turkey after the US lost two important allies in Afghanistan and Iran, and economic reasons such as the protection of Western oil. Moreover, the agreement also authorizes the US to use bases in Turkey. This serves the purpose of maintaining America's military presence in the Middle East and protecting its strategic interests in the region. The Wohlstetter Doctrine also reveals that there is a strategic reason for America's military presence in Turkey. Albert Wohlstetter, for whom this doctrine is named, stated that it was important to strengthen Turkey during the period of military government to protect Western oil.

In conclusion, America's military presence in Turkey was important to protect strategic interests in the region and to take measures against potential threats such as the Soviet Union. Therefore, America's bases and airfields in Turkey served the US military presence in the Middle East.

3.3. Relations with Europe

3.3.1. Developing Turkish-European countries relations in the framework of the EEC

It is true that European countries initially accepted the September 12 coup as an "intervention in democracy". However, this view changed significantly in the following years and the coup administration was criticized for its actions such as human rights violations, political repression and censorship practices.

Moreover, in the process of Turkey's accession to the European Union, there has been close cooperation with European countries and institutions to press for democratic reforms and progress on human rights issues. Therefore, the change in relations with the 12 September 1980 coup d'état could also be linked to pressures on Turkey's democratic initiatives.

After the September 12 coup d'état, human rights violations, political repression and censorship practices caused a great reaction in European countries and led to a serious crisis in Turkey-Europe relations. European countries started to impose visas on Turkish citizens and emphasized that Turkey needed to make progress on democratic reforms and human rights in its EU accession process (Çakmak, 2010: 52).

Greece's full membership of the European Union has also affected the dynamics in Turkey-Europe relations. Greece and Turkey have differing views and conflicts over historical issues, especially Cyprus, the Aegean, minorities and the FIR line. Greece's accession as a full member of the European Union was seen as a formidable obstacle in Turkey's accession process to the European Union, and Turkey's proximity to Europe diminished (Ari, 1995: 60).

The European Parliament, which was conducting investigations into Turkey's democratic transition and full membership of the EC, sent Austrian parliamentarian Ludwig Steiner, rapporteur on Turkey for the Political Commission of the Consultative Assembly, and Spanish Socialist parliamentarian Yanez Barnuevo, a member of the Consultative Assembly. They arrived in Turkey between 6 and 8 January 1981, and the two had various contacts in Turkey. Ludwig Steiner, who made a statement to the newspapers after his contacts in Turkey, revealed Europe's attitude towards the situation with the statement "*Turkey has no choice but democracy*".

This provides information about the developments in Turkey after the visit of the European Parliament representatives to Turkey. Following this visit, the National Security Council and the Council of Ministers, led by Turkey's President Kenan Evren, met to discuss what should be done to realize Turkey's full membership of the European Economic Community (EEC).

Pursuant to the Decisions of 25 March 1981, Turkey's full membership of the EEC would be possible only after the restoration of democracy. This required the fulfillment of all obligations and internal harmonization preparations stipulated by the EEC in the process of restoring the democratic order.

Moreover, it provided information on Turkey's application for full membership, which was an important step in the process of Turkey's integration into Europe. However, the implementation of the decisions set out in the text and the completion of the necessary preparations for Turkey's full membership of the EEC would face many challenges. The political, economic and social conditions in Turkey also play an important role in this process.

In this context, it provided information on four important decisions taken at the meeting of the European Parliament on April 10, 1981, held to discuss the situation of Turkey. At the meeting, the four parliamentary groups took different decisions.

The Liberals stated that no decision should be taken before a delegation was sent to Turkey. This emphasized the need for a more detailed examination and discussion of Turkey's situation.

The socialists have proposed that relations should be suspended if Turkey did not return to democracy. This reflected the idea that the European Parliament should suspend relations with Turkey if it did not act in accordance with its democratic standards.

The communists suggested that no delegation of inquiry should be sent to Turkey. This was opposed to the idea that Turkey should be examined by the European Parliament, emphasizing that there should be no interference in Turkey's internal affairs.

The radicals have proposed that the Turkish-EEC Treaty should not be implemented until Turkey returned to democracy. This reflected the idea that the European Parliament should impose economic sanctions on Turkey unless it complied with democratic standards.

This showed the different aspects of four important resolutions adopted by the European Parliament at its meeting to discuss Turkey's situation. These resolutions have played an important role in Turkey's relations with Europe and illustrate the difficulties in Turkey's democratization process.

As Bülend Ulusu Government stated the process for Turkey's transition to democratic order would be a little longer and the Turkish people would take their own decisions in order not to be influenced by external influences. Furthermore, Turkey officially announced that it would apply for full membership after the transition to democratic order at the European Parliament's Association Council Meeting.

As a result of this change, the European Parliament changed its harsh attitude towards Turkey and adopted a more constructive approach. The European Parliament stepped up its efforts to support Turkey's application for full membership of the EEC. However, to monitor Turkey's progress in democracy and human rights, the European Parliament also stated that Turkey should be included in the negotiation process before its application for full membership of the EEC. In this process, it was emphasized that Turkey should align with the norms and standards of EEC member states, undertake democratic reforms and make progress on human rights.

The early 1980s marked a turning point in Turkey's relations with the European

Economic Community (EEC). The "Von Hassel Report" prepared by German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss stated that the military regime in Turkey was an obstacle for EEC membership and emphasized the need for Turkey's democratization. This report led to a consensus among the EEC members to restrict aid to Turkey (Tekin and Altunsoy, 2010: 139).

On January 22, 1982, the European Parliament decided to suspend all financial aid to Turkey. The decision was accepted with the condition that it could be reconsidered only if Turkey went through a process of democratization. This decision disappointed many people who had hoped that Turkey would receive economic aid from the EEC.

Following this decision, Turkey faced economic difficulties. Turkey's economic difficulties led the country to accelerate the democratization process. With the 1983 elections, Turkey adopted a democratic form of government. Following these developments, the EEC resumed its aid to Turkey.

In this context, the European Parliament's calls for democratization and sanctions against Turkey were discussed. The European Parliament, which had sent various fact-finding missions and prepared reports for Turkey to accelerate its democratization process, organized meetings to intimidate Turkey. The text states that the European Parliament also criticized undemocratic practices such as the constitutional referendum and the closure of political parties during the Bülend Ulusu Government. The declaration adopted on October 13, 1983 calls for the acceleration of Turkey's democratization process and the protection of democratic principles.

3.3.2. Relations with Greece

It was indicated that Turkish-Greek relations faced difficulties after the coup d'état. It was also stated that Greece withdrew from NATO's military wing after the Cyprus Peace Operation and was uncomfortable with the transfer of its rights in the Aegean Sea to Turkey despite its NATO membership. Since Greece perceived Turkey as a threat, it made attempts to re-enter the military wing of NATO but could not achieve a positive result until 1979.

The statement on Turkish-Greek relations made at a press conference held by the members of the NSC following the 12 September 1980 coup d'état was entioned. At

the meeting, while responding to a question asked by a member of the foreign press about the future of Turkish-Greek relations, Kenan Evren stated that Turkey's relations with Greece had experienced some problems. However, Turkey would make every effort to overcome these obstacles and hoped that Greece would return to NATO.

In the meeting of 27 September 1980, during the announcement of the program of the Uluşu Government, it was stated that negotiation methods would be pursued through talks in order to reach fair solutions that would respect the rights and interests of the parties in Turkey-Greece relations. It was also emphasized that the rights and interests in the Aegean were of vital importance for Turkey, and that the status of the Aegean islands, which was determined by the treaties, should be respected and the treaties concerning the rights of the cognates in Western Thrace should be respected.

The Rogers Plan was a plan issued in 1979 and presented by US Secretary of State William Rogers to find a solution to the Aegean conflict between Turkey and Greece. The main objective of the plan was to reach an agreement with Turkey for Greece to rejoin the NATO. The plan included a series of proposals, particularly on the sovereignty of islands in the Aegean Sea, airspace and how to share military command areas.

The most controversial aspect of the plan was that it included a statement that said Greece's claims to Turkey's sovereignty in the Aegean were unacceptable. Therefore, Turkey did not accept the plan, and this once again caused tensions in relations between the two countries.

The Rogers Plan was a solution plan proposed by the United States to resolve the disputes between Turkey and Greece and was subsequently accepted by the Turkish and Greek governments. The extent to which the promises made regarding the implementation of the plan were realized and whether these promises were directly reflected in the agreement have not been clearly stated.

After signing the treaty, Turkey gave up its veto power and Greece returned to NATO, causing Turkey to lose a political trump card. Moreover, the agreement resulted in a limitation of Turkey's rights in the Aegean Sea and an increase in Greece's sovereignty rights. This caused reactions in Turkish public and political circles and Turkey's relations with Greece remained strained for many years.

As a result of the dialogues between Ankara and Athens, tensions in the Aegean

have eased, but the problems have not been completely resolved. The maritime jurisdiction, airspace and territorial waters of the islands in the Aegean were still unresolved. The Cyprus issue has also remained one of the most important problems in Turkish-Greek relations. However, with the return to the NATO, military cooperation between Turkey and Greece also began. In this process, various negotiations and agreements were signed between Turkey and Greece. For example, confidence-building measures were taken between the two countries with the "Agreement on Reducing Mutual Threat Perception and Enhancing Military Security" (KTA) signed in Istanbul in 1988. This agreement laid the foundation for military cooperation between the two countries.

While Andreas Papandreou was Prime Minister, Turkish-Greek relations became quite tense. Papandreou's basing his election propaganda on the Turkish threat in the Aegean and his non-compromising attitude on issues concerning Turkey caused relations to reach a breaking point. Especially the Cyprus and Aegean issues remained unresolved due to Papandreou's belief that he wanted to turn Turkey into an "uncompromising imperialist country". This led to Turkey's weak position in the international arena in front of NATO, the EEC and the Council of Europe. However, relations improved in the following years with various negotiations between the parties.

Papandreou's attitude also caused debates within NATO. While some NATO countries had difficulty in understanding Greece's attitude, Turkey considered Papandreou's move as "provocative" and evaluated it as an attempt to increase the tension in Turkish-Greek relations. These debates within NATO further increased the tension in Turkish-Greek relations. However, afterwards, NATO acted as a mediator to prevent a direct clash between Turkish and Greek soldiers and tried to defuse the tension.

These events led to tensions between Greece and Turkey regarding the protection of the rights of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace. Turkey has repeatedly warned Greece about the protection of the rights of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace and stated that Greece should act in accordance with international law. Moreover, Turkey took diplomatic initiatives to protect the rights of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace and frequently criticized Greece on international platforms. These events added further tension to the already tense atmosphere of Turkish-Greek relations.

This joint declaration marked a turning point in Turkish-Greek relations. This step taken to reduce tensions between the two countries and to restore friendly relations paved the way for a successful Foreign Ministers' meeting in Ottawa. At this meeting, Turkey and Greece signed agreements on a number of issues. These included the demarcation of land and maritime borders, the status and demilitarization of islands in the Aegean Sea, and the flight routes of aircraft. These agreements marked a turning point in the relations between the two countries and contributed to the development of relations in the following years.

Ilter Turkmen and Yannis Haralambopoulos, who met in Montreal on the promised date, "agreed to discuss the procedure as well as the method of negotiations on the problems between the two countries and to submit their recommendations to their Governments" and decided to meet in Brussels in December. The meeting of the officials who came together at the NATO meeting held in Brussels on December 1-2, 1982, turned into a duel. Greek Prime Minister Papandreou accused Turkey of violating Greek airspace in the Aegean with the pamphlets he distributed at the meeting and also argued that Limni Island could be armed. In the face of these allegations, NATO Commander-in-Chief Rogers, Secretary General Luns and Admiral Falls agreed that Greece was not fulfilling its responsibilities in the region.

He stated that a decision taken by NATO could not be implemented and that the activities of Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou in Western Thrace continue. After visiting Xanthi, Papandreou took action to give the pasture in the region to Greek citizens. This caused the reaction of the Turkish villagers in the region and incidents flared up again. Gendarmes intervened to disperse the Turkish villagers.

This statement demonstrated the ethnic tensions and conflicts in Western Thrace. Western Thrace was a region in northern Greece where the Turkish minority lived. The Turks living in the region claimed that they were under the domination of the Greek minority and conflicts arose from time to time for this reason.

Failure to implement NATO's decision could undermine confidence in international efforts to resolve the conflict in Western Thrace. However, solving this problem would require the joint efforts of the international community and local leaders.

The negotiations between Turkey and Greece for the solution of problems between the two countries and the Cyprus problem were also mentioned. The officials of the two countries met first in Paris and then in Ankara and decided to cooperate. However, it was decided to hold another meeting in Athens for a solution and this process would take place after the end of the term of office of the Uluşu Government.

For the Cyprus problem, the United Nations General Assembly decided in 1979 that the situation on the island should be resolved between the two communities. Negotiations were held between Turkish and Greek Cypriot officials, but Greek Cypriot Leader Kyprianou declared that they would not accept a bizonal solution. Turkey, on the other hand, proposed the establishment of a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal state in Cyprus.

This statement showed the difficulty and length of the efforts to resolve the problems between Turkey and Greece and the negotiations to resolve the Cyprus problem. The solution of these problems requires mutual understanding and compromise between the parties. Cyprus problem. In order to solve these problems, mutual understanding and consensus should be established between the parties.

The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was declared in 1983 and recognized by Turkey. However, this step created more tension than contributing to the solution to the Cyprus problem. The United Nations Security Council also adopted resolutions condemning this step. The Cyprus problem has also been an ongoing bone of contention internationally.

In 1985, Greek Cypriot Leader Spyros Kyprianou was replaced by Yeorgios Vasiliou and attempts to find a solution between Turkey and Cyprus increased. In 1988, the "Framework Document" prepared by the Special Representative Diego Cordovez, appointed by the UN Secretary-General, was accepted by the Turks; however, rejected

by the Greeks.

In the 1990s, the Cyprus problem remained unresolved and conflicts between the parties continued. In 2004, Greek Cypriots voted yes, and Turkish Cypriots voted no in the referendum on the establishment of a united federal state in Cyprus. This was not a step towards a solution to the problem.

Today, the Cyprus problem persists, and the international community continues to work towards finding a solution.

Information is given about the situation and events of the Cyprus problem between 1981 and 1983. The events mentioned are as follows:

On August 5, 1981, the Turkish Cypriots submitted their proposals to the Greek Cypriot side regarding the borders of the island and Varosha. Greek Cypriot leader Spyros Kyprianou did not respond to this proposal and remained silent.

The Cyprus problem could not be resolved, and the silence of the Greek Cypriot leader and the harsh attitude of Andreas Papandreou, who won the elections in Greece on October 18, 1981, made the problem even more complicated.

Papandreou's stance in Turkey-Greece relations was also valid in the Cyprus problem and he advocated the idea that the Cyprus problem should be solved by UN resolutions and the international community.

On February 13, 1983, Spyros Kyprianou won the Greek Cypriot presidential election. This election was an important step in the globalization of the Cyprus problem.

These events can be seen as an important turning point for the settlement of the Cyprus problem. Despite the fact that the Cyprus problem is still unresolved, it has been negotiated many times through various initiatives of the international community and various plans for a solution have been presented.

Information is provided at the 37th UN General Assembly on May 13, 1983, which can be considered as the cornerstone of the Cyprus problem, and the harsh decisions taken. The events mentioned are as follows:

The 37th UN General Assembly on May 13, 1983, is considered a milestone for the Cyprus problem.

At the meeting, tough decisions were taken both for Turkey and the Turkish

Cypriots. Greek Cypriot leader Spyros Kyprianou suggested the withdrawal of all occupation forces on the island.

Kyprianou's proposal was approved by the Non-Aligned Contact Group with 103 votes in favor.

The fact that the Republic of Cyprus is an important member of the Non-Aligned movement had a major influence on this decision.

This decision is considered an important step towards a solution to the Cyprus problem. However, the Cyprus problem is still unresolved, and negotiations are ongoing.

Information was also provided on the rejection of the resolution by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community following its adoption at the 37th UN General Assembly and the call by Rauf Denktaş, the leader of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, for a referendum on the declaration of independence. Other events mentioned in the text are as follows:

Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community rejected the UN resolution by considering it "unbalanced and unilateral".

Rauf Denktaş, the leader of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, announced that they would apply for a referendum to declare independence in Cyprus due to the UN resolution.

On June 17, 1983, the Turkish Cypriot community adopted the law on self-determination with the decision taken by the Assembly of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

This decision has been considered an important step towards independence for the Turkish Cypriot community.

These developments indicated a new era for the settlement of the Cyprus problem. However, negotiations continued between Turkey and the Greek Cypriots to declare independence in Cyprus and to take the necessary steps for the solution to the Cyprus problem.

The Turkish Cypriots declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on November 15, 1983, a step that was supported by Turkey. While the Turkish Republic

of Northern Cyprus was considered an unrecognized state in the international arena, it was recognized and supported by Turkey. However, this step made the solution of the Cyprus problem more difficult, and Turkey was subjected to international pressure. It also affected Turkey's position in NATO.

3.3.3. Relations with Balkan countries

Towards the end of the 1980s, relations between Turkey and Bulgaria improved significantly. One of the most important reasons for this development was the regime changes in Eastern European countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the democratic reforms in Bulgaria. During this period, the volume of trade between Turkey and Bulgaria also increased.

Moreover, another factor that had a positive impact on relations between the two countries was the enlargement of the European Union. Bulgaria made efforts to join the EU and Turkey negotiated for EU membership. In the process, political and economic cooperation between the two countries further developed.

During the visit between February 24-27, 1982, Turkish President Kenan Evren and Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov signed several agreements to improve relations between the two countries. These agreements included increasing trade between Turkey and Bulgaria, enhancing tourism activities and increasing cultural interaction.

The migrant problem between Turkey and Bulgaria was also discussed. During the visit, agreements were made for the migration of Turks living in Bulgaria to Turkey. Due to these agreements, facilitating measures were taken for Turks migrating to Turkey.

However, with the end of the agreements on migrants, families have been left behind. This problem has occasionally caused tensions in relations between Turkey and Bulgaria. However, in recent years, relations between the two countries have improved significantly. These developments have helped to increase cooperation between Turkey and Bulgaria and to solve the migrant problem.

Turkey's complete disallowance of migration was not only about preventing the entry of communist ideas and agents. For many years, Turkey had been struggling with high unemployment rates while at the same time implementing various policies aimed

at changing the economic and social structure of the country. As part of these policies, the aim was not to increase the number of ethnic minorities in the country. Therefore, the number of immigrants from countries such as Turkey and Bulgaria was limited. However, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989, a large number of Turks from Bulgaria migrated to Turkey.

Due to Kenan Evren's refusal to allow all Bulgarian Turks to migrate to Turkey, great propaganda started in Bulgaria and with this propaganda, which lasted until 1989, Turks were tried to be assimilated. In this direction, the Bulgarian government changed the names of Turks, forbade them to speak Turkish, prevented them from practicing their religion and caused them to be tortured in police stations.

This was a very difficult period for the Bulgarian Turks. Subjected to this propaganda, Turks struggled to preserve their identity and culture. In this process, Turks living in Turkey and other countries supported the Turks in Bulgaria and defended their rights.

In 1989, a new government came to power in Bulgaria and started working to protect the rights of Turks. In this process, Turks were freed to take their names and speak Turkish again, were allowed to practice their religion freely and human rights violations such as torture were ended.

Today, despite the fact that the living conditions of Turks are better in Bulgaria, they still face some problems and difficulties. However, the presence and culture of Turks in Bulgaria is one of the riches of the country and it is important that this culture is preserved and supported.

After Kenan Evren visited Bulgaria, Turkish-Bulgarian relations took an economic step forward. Foreign Minister İltis Türkmen, who visited Bulgaria on February 9-11, 1983, held talks on the security of the Balkan peninsula, industry, industry, economic, commercial, transportation and cultural cooperation. In addition, Todor Zhivkov, who visited Turkey on June 6-9, 1983, at the invitation of Evren, made contacts for cooperation on various issues and took initiatives for the reunification of the broken Turkish families living in Bulgaria. During his visit, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Petir Mladenov mentioned that Evren's constant use of the term "*our compatriots*" when referring to "Bulgarian citizens of Turkish consciousness" disturbed Zhivkov.

Romania was another Balkan country with which we had bilateral relations

during the Nation Government period. The first contact between the two countries, which considered each other as neighbors even though they did not share a common border, took place with the visit of Stefan Andrei, the Romanian Foreign Minister, to Turkey. Stefan Andrei visited the Orta Anadolu Refinery close to Kırıkkale, which the Romanians had started to build, and after this visit, he met with Kenan Evren and informed him that President Ceaușescu had invited him to Romania. In addition, at the end of this visit, a Cultural Agreement was signed between the two countries envisaging cooperation in various cultural events.

Kenan Evren accepted Ceaușescu's invitation on April 5-8, 1982. During Evren's visit, economic issues such as the development of bilateral trade relations to 500 million dollars and cooperation in mining and oil exploration were discussed. In this context, the "Agreement on the Establishment of Direct Connections between Turkish and Romanian Ports on the Black Sea" was signed and the development of maritime trade between the two countries was envisaged.

Ceaușescu visited Kenan Evren on May 20-23, 1983. During this visit, issues such as the renovation of Karabük Iron and Steel Facilities, the opening of the Ro-Ro Line, the use of coal resources in thermonuclear power plants, the latest status of the Central Anatolian Refinery and cooperation in the establishment of the Kapulukaya Hydroelectric Power Plant were discussed.

Turkish relations with the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia also demonstrated that there was cooperation between the two countries during this period. In particular, both Turkey and the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia shared the same views on the peaceful resolution of the Iraq-Iran war and the establishment of a state for the Palestinian people. Moreover, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia gave one of the biggest reactions to Armenian terrorism, which organized attacks on Turkish embassies all over the world and killed ambassadors. When Turkish Ambassador in Belgrade Galip Balkar was assassinated by Armenian terrorists on March 9, 1983, Yugoslavia was at the forefront of investigating the situation and initiated activities to stop terrorism all over the world.

3.3.4. Activities of Terrorist Organizations

Discussed in the previous chapters, the Armenian terrorism reached its peak in the period between 1980 and 1983. The organization known as the Armenian Secret

Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) killed Consul General Mehmet Baydar and Consul Bahadır Demir in Los Angeles in 1973. In the following years, these assassinations continued to be organized by ASALA, Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA) and Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG).

Until the Ulusu Government, in other words between 1973 and 1980, many of Turkish diplomats, such as Daniş Tunalıgil, Ambassador to Vienna; İsmail Erez, Ambassador to Paris and his office driver Talip Yener; Oktay Cirit, Chief Clerk at the Embassy in Beirut; Taha Carım, Ambassador to the Vatican; and retired Ambassador Beşir Balcıoğlu, Ambassador to Madrid Zeki Kuneralp and his wife Necla Kuneralp, Ambassador to The Hague Özdemir Benler's son Ahmet Benler, Paris Tourism Counselor Yılmaz Çolpan, Athens Ambassador Attaché Galip Özmen and his daughter Nesrin Özmen, were killed by Armenians (Türkmen, 2010: 155-156).

The first person to be killed by Armenian terrorism during the Ulusu Government was Şarik Arıyak, the Consul General in Sydney. According to the Hürriyet newspaper, Şarik Arıyak, who had been threatened beforehand, requested police protection and it was decided that Engin Enver would accompany him as a Protection Officer. On December 17, 1980, Şarik Arıyak and Engin Enver were shot with a machine gun by two motorcyclists as they were about to get into car after leaving the house. After this assassination, a woman called the Australian Associated Press and stated that the JCAG had committed the murder, that the incident had nothing to do with the ARA and that they would continue with these murders. (Hürriyet, 18.12.1980).

The terrorists, who had announced that they would continue their murders, first killed Reşat Morali, Labor Counselor in Paris, and Tecelli Arı, Religious Officer, on March 4, 1981, and then, Mehmet Savaş Yergüz, Consulate General Secretary in Geneva, on June 9, 1981 (Milliyet, 10.06.1981; Evren, 1981:345).

In 1981, apart from assassinations, Armenian terrorists carried out various acts. On January 14, 1981, a bomb was planted in the car of Ahmet Erbeyli, a Finance Counselor in Paris. On April 3, 1981, Cavit Demir, Labor Counselor in Copenhagen, was seriously wounded by Armenian terrorists. First in Paris on June 1, 1981, and then in Copenhagen on September 16, 1981, the Turkish Airlines Office was bombed by the Secret Armenian Liberation Organization. On September 24, 1981, the Consulate General of Turkey in Paris was invaded by 4 Armenian terrorists and during this

incident, Security Officer Cemal Özen was killed and Kaya İnal, the Consul General of Turkey in Paris, was seriously wounded. On October 25, 1981, Gökberk Ergenekon, Second Secretary at the Embassy in Rome, was attacked by Armenian terrorists and returned to Turkey afterwards. Finally, on November 20, 1981, the Consulate General of Turkey in Los Angeles was bombed by Armenian terrorists.

During the Uluşu Government period, the activities of Armenian terrorist organizations and the assassinations reached a peak in 1982 and 6 Turkish diplomats were assassinated by Armenian terrorists in a single year. Kemal Arıkan, Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles, was the first of these names to be assassinated on January 28, 1982. After the assassination of Kemal Arıkan, it was admitted that the main purpose of the assassination was to "incite the Turkish people to indignation". Furthermore, following this incident, important political figures in the United States worked to bring all countries together to fight against terrorism (Turkmen, 2010: 224-225).

The next target of the terrorists, who said that they would continue the assassinations was Orhan Ragıp Gündüz, Turkish Honorary Consul in Boston. On March 22, 1982, a bomb was placed in his house and Gündüz survived the attack but was later killed in an assassination attempt by the JCAG on May 4, 1982. Upon this incident, the Advisory Council gathered. The meeting started with the commemoration of Orhan Ragıp Gündüz and the number of victims of Armenian terrorism was announced as 21 since 1973. It was also stated that the deaths in recent years had mostly occurred in North America and the USA and that these locations had been specifically chosen for Armenian propaganda, and that efforts were being made to increase the security of the missions abroad (Türkmen, 2010: 234-235). In the Joint Declaration issued after the NATO meeting held on May 17-18, 1982, international terrorism was condemned for the first time and it was stated that the whole world should mobilize on this issue.

The next target of Armenian terrorism was Erkut Akbay, Administrative Attaché in Lisbon, and his wife Nadide Akbay. On June 7, 1982, Erkut Akbay was shot 5 times and died at the scene (Evren, 1981: 187). Nadide Akbay, who was seriously wounded, was immediately taken to a hospital for surgery; however, she fell into a coma. She was brought to Turkey; however, could not recover from the coma, and she died on January 8, 1983. JCAG claimed responsibility for this attack in Lisbon (Tercüman, 08.06.1982).

Following the assassinations, ASALA attempted to strike for the first time in Turkey on August 7, 1982. Two Armenian terrorists, Zohrap Serkisyan and Levon Ekmekçiyen, organized a bomb attack at Esenboğa Airport, killing 8 people and injuring 72 others. One of the terrorists, Zohrap Serkisyan, died at the scene, while Levon Ekmekçiyen was captured. ASALA stated that this attack was conducted for the release of 85 captured Armenian terrorists and warned many countries, such as the UK, the USA, France, Canada, Switzerland, and Sweden, that if their demands were not met, the events in Ankara would be repeated in these countries as well. (Hürriyet, 08.08.1982).

Moreover, the Armenian terrorists had come to Ankara 15 days before this incident and planned the attack in the hotel where they stayed. In his speech on TRT after this hideous incident, Kenan Evren criticized the western countries that welcomed Armenian terrorists by saying: *"Armenians who have been involved in all kinds of evil deeds and intrigues under the guise of innocence with the protection and guarantee of various foreign countries of which they are citizens, and who have supported and encouraged these organizations materially and morally for their personal interests, and all countries that allow terrorist groups to shelter in their countries, almost giving them a legal personality, and even caressing these blood-crazed monsters for fear that terrorist acts will spread to their own countries, should know that the Turkish Nation; is the dignified guardian of the unity and integrity of the country within the borders of the Misak-ı Milli, which was drawn with our War of Independence, standing firm like granite rocks that crush and destroy the raging waves despite the tiny particles that the sea can tear away. The Turkish nation has given many victims for this cause for centuries and is sworn to give many more victims.* (Evren, 1981: 225).

Twenty days after the incident in Esenboğa Airport, Armenian terrorists attacked Staff Colonel Atilla Altıkat, the Military Attaché of the Turkish Embassy in Canada. While he was in his car in Ottawa, Atilla Altıkat was shot 8 times and killed. In order to find the terrorist who committed the murder, Canada organized an investigation called "Red Leaf" and a suspicious person was released after being detained. A person who called Canadian Radio said that the murder was conducted by an organization called JCAG and that there would be more murders to come (Hürriyet, 28.08.1982).

The government increased security measures at the embassies to prevent the news of deaths, and on the other hand, started the trials of the captured persons.

Levon Ekmekçiyan, a member of the ASALA terrorist organization who was responsible for the massacre in Esenboğa Airport and was detained, was brought to the Ankara Martial Law Court No. 3 on September 8, 1982, and was sentenced to death at the end of the trial. Following this verdict, Armenian terrorists killed Bora Süelkan, the Administrative Attaché of the Burgas Consulate, on September 9, 1982. ASALA took the blame for the murder of Bora Süelkan, the first victim in the Eastern Bloc (Tercüman, 10.09.1982).

At Süelkan's funeral ceremony, İltar Türkmen stated that ASALA officials said: *"ASALA's aim is to influence Armenians all over the world, to make the world adopt the so-called Armenian cause, to use the Armenian Republic in the Soviet Union as a steppingstone, to separate Turkey from the Western world and to plunge Turkey back into turmoil"* in an interview with a magazine" (Türkmen, 2010: 276).

1983, the last year of the Ulusu Government was an important period for Armenian terrorism. The Armenian propaganda, which they had been carrying out since 1973, continued throughout the first half of 1983. The first event of this year in terms of Turkish-Armenian relations was the execution of Levon Ekmekçiyan, a member of ASALA who was responsible for the Esenboğa Airport massacre and whose death sentence was finalized, on January 29, 1983. After the execution of Ekmekçiyan, the Armenian terrorists attacked a tourism agency named Marmara in Paris. In the bombed attack on the agency, the death toll was announced as 1 dead and 4 wounded French citizens. After this attack of ASALA, another Armenian terrorist organization, JCAG, killed Galip Balkar, Turkish Ambassador in Belgrade. The seriousness with which the Yugoslavian Government handled the incident, and its attitude was highly appreciated in Turkey and was an important development in terms of the world's united action against terrorism. Furthermore, after this incident, Turkey decided to take the matter to NATO and make a presentation on the need for NATO to adopt a more active policy on the prevention of Armenian terrorism (Evren, 1991: 125).

The Armenian terrorists continued their attacks when the whole world acted in unison against terrorism and Armenian terrorism started to be discussed. On July 14, 1983, Dursun Aksoy, Administrative Attaché of the Embassy of Turkey in Brussels, where international organizations, such NATO and EEC have their headquarters, was shot twice and killed. ASALA first claimed responsibility for this attack, and later JCAG and EDO also reported their involvement in the attack (Cumhuriyet, 15.07.1983).

One day after this incident in Brussels, the Orly Airport in Paris was attacked by terrorists. Armenian terrorists bombed the passengers waiting in line for luggage to be boarded on a Turkish Airlines flight. As a result of the investigations, it was concluded that the bombs were Czech-made Semtex bombs and were hidden among the passenger luggage. The casualties of this massacre at Orly Airport were announced as 5 dead and 63 wounded (Milliyet, 16.07.1983).

After this massacre at Orly Airport, the entire Western world organized the 2nd World Armenian Congress in Lausanne between 21-24 July 1983 in order to resolve the Armenian issue. In the congress, “This war will continue as long as Turkey does not recognize the so-called Armenian issue in 1915 and does not take into account the rights of the Armenian people; Western aid to Turkey prevented the realization of Armenian rights; The attitude of the USSR enabled Turkey to act more easily on the Armenian question; other liberation movements in the region should be supported by Armenians; It was emphasized that an alliance between the Armenian and Kurdish peoples is necessary and the struggle of the Cypriot-Greek peoples against Turkey should be supported by the Western states.

3.4. Relations with the Soviet Union

Turkey tried to establish a close relationship with the USA after the coups d'états before September 12, thus the relations with the Soviet Union, one of the biggest global competitors of the USA, were adversely affected during these periods. The September 12 government had a similar approach, though not exactly the same. After the 12 September 1980 coup d'état, the Soviets were not satisfied with the fact that leftist ideas, which had spread rapidly in Turkey before September 12, were discouraged and even banned after the coup d'état. However, as NSC adopted a multilateral policy in foreign policy, and it would not be wrong to say more moderate relations were established between Turkey and the Soviets during this period of military rule compared to the previous periods.

Especially the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 reinforced the position of Turkey in the Middle East policy. Furthermore, the fact that Afghan refugees seeking asylum in Turkey did not pose a problem in relations between the two countries provided an advantage for the soldiers who would take over the government almost a year later (Oran, 2010: 34).

The government program announced by the Uluşu Government at the meeting on September 27, 1980, explained the relations with the Soviet Union as follows:

"Our government would like to establish friendly relations and close cooperation with all our neighbors. Within this context, special attention will be paid to the development of our friendly relations with the Soviet Union."

The foreign policy studies on the Uluşu Government period generally emphasized that Turkish-Soviet relations had become stagnant. However, İlder Turkmen, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the period, disagreed with this view, and in a panel discussion with Fahir Armaoğlu and Mehmet Ali Birand, the popular journalists of the period, he said: *"I would like to emphasize that we attach great importance to our relations with the Soviet Union. The stable development of good neighborly relations with the Soviet Union is also in Turkey's interest and our relations with the Soviet Union are always evaluated. It is impossible to establish a parallelism between bilateral relations and views on international issues. If such parallelism is established, the bilateral relations of many countries would suffer great damage."* (Armaoğlu, 2019: 287).

Turkmen's statement indicated that Turkey and the Soviets, which had been undergoing a reconstruction process since the beginning of 1980, would develop political relations as well as economic cooperation. The first economic contact with the Soviets during the Uluşu government was realized approximately two weeks after the coup d'état. The Soviet Union Ambassador Alexei Rodionov requested a meeting with the new government. In the meeting, Rodionov stated that the Soviets would adopt a stance that *"the new Turkish Government would maintain the Turkish-Soviet relations, the foundations of which had been laid by Atatürk and Lenin, would develop further"*. In return, Evren stated, *"Turkish foreign policy has always been based on peaceful principles and we wish to improve our relations with the Soviet Union"* and then the representatives of the two states exchanged views on the Iran-Iraq war (Evren, 1981: 78).

The second contact between the Soviets and Turkey was made with Shackou, the Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, who visited Turkey between March 6-13, 1981 (Cumhuriyet, 10.03.1981). After the meeting with the Soviets in Ankara under the leadership of Shackou, an agreement was executed

to increase the capacity of Seydişehir Aluminum Plant. The agreement was signed by Şahap Kocatopçu, Minister of Industry and Technology, on behalf of Turkey, and Shackou, Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, on behalf of the Soviet Union (Cumhuriyet, 11.03.1981). Under this agreement, the Soviets agreed to send the necessary goods and equipment to increase the capacity by the end of 1982 (Official Gazette, 09.03.1981, S: 17274, p. 2).

During Shackou's visit, it was also unanimously decided that the thermal power plant to be built in Çan would be constructed in the Keles district of Bursa, as the thermal power plant would pollute the environment and the air, pursuant to the decision taken with the " Agreement on the Development of Turkish-Soviet Economic and Technical Cooperation" between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Turkey on July 9, 1975 (Official Gazette, 10.03.1981, S: 17275, p. 1).

Another important issue in relations with the Soviets was the negotiations on the Arpaçay border. As it was well known, the Turkish-Soviet land border was drawn by the Treaty of Moscow signed between the two countries on March 16, 1921. A series of negotiations were held regarding the redrawing of the borders in the Arpaçay region and the maintenance of bridges and similar properties on the Arpaçay (Ahuryan) River. As the region was rich in natural gas, uranium, and other natural resources, the two countries decided that it would be in their interests to reach an agreement before any possible future problems. Established for this purpose, Joint Turkish-Soviet Commission for Demarcating the Territories convened on June 11-July 9, 1981, February 11-March 16, 1982, and October 6-November 5, 1982 and conducted negotiations on the maintenance of the border and the bridge.

The other political relationship between the two countries was realized after the United Nations General Assembly in September 1981. On September 30, 1981, following this meeting, Turkmen first had a meeting with US Secretary of State Haig and then had a 35-minute meeting with Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister (Milliyet, 01.10.1981; Cumhuriyet, 01.10.1981).

As a result of the improving relations, Ilter Turkmen, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, went to Moscow on November 27-December 3, 1982, with the invitation of the USSR. Turkmen was welcomed in Moscow by Andrey Nikolayevich Tikhonov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and by Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign

Affairs of the USSR (Cumhuriyet, 29.11.1982). A joint statement was issued after the negotiations in which it was stated that the USSR and Turkey would cooperate on equality, independence, territorial integrity, and non-interference in internal affairs. They also discussed the developments in the Middle East, namely the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and the Israeli action against the Palestinian camps. It was stated that both states did not approve of this and that these problems could be solved by Israel's withdrawal from the Arab territories it had occupied since 1967 And the establishment of a state by the Palestinian Arabs..

Approximately three months after İlder Türkmen's visit to Moscow, the green light given by Turkey to the Agile Force created a fluctuation in Soviet-Turkish relations. The developments in Turkey and the movement in Eastern Anatolia for the formation of the so-called Agile Force, which was formed by the US for the defense of the Middle East and the Gulf, disturbed the Soviets. Georgi Markovic Kornienko, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, who came to Turkey on March 3-4, 1983, was hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During his meetings, Kornienko expressed his concern about the improvement of the airports in Eastern Anatolia as a result of the cooperation between Turkey and the USA within the scope of the Agile Force and the placement of Pershing missiles in these airports, which the Pentagon had planned to place in Germany first (1983 History, pp. 112-114).

Another issue discussed during the negotiations was the proposal of NATO member states not to use force in accordance with the disarmament proposal of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact. İlder Türkmen stated that Kornienko's suggestion was based on the fact that *"Turkey had always regarded disarmament initiatives positively and found the Prague proposals of the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact to be concise and worthy of examination"* (Cumhuriyet, 05.03.1983).

3.5. Relations with Middle Eastern States

After the September 12 coup d'état, Turkey's ties with Europe almost severed, Turkey's foreign policy gradually shifted towards establishing good economic and political relations with the Middle Eastern countries (Golsunbol and Kürkçüoğlu, 1986: 606).

The government program announced by the Ulusu Government at the meeting held on September 27, 1980, explained how relations with the Middle Eastern countries

would be established and what kind of foreign policy would be adopted as follows:

“Efforts will be made to strengthen our relations with Islamic countries, with whom we have deep-rooted historical and traditional ties, with a close friendship and brotherhood. The relations with the Arab countries, Iran and Pakistan will be carried out with an understanding in line with the requirements of the neighborhood and geographical proximity in addition to these strong ties. Turkey's approach to the conflicts in the region will be based on the principles of justice and equity, self-determination of every nation, and rejection of annexation of territory by force. We will resolutely continue our attitude towards the Middle East problem and our support for the just cause of the Palestinian people within the framework of these principles.”

Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that Turkey's attitude towards rapprochement with the Middle East between 1980-1983 was the result of the Ulusu Government's policies regarding the US and especially the Wohlstetter Doctrine. Kenan Evren's statement *"Turkey can do without the Western countries"* confirmed the process of Turkey's rapprochement with the Middle East in this period (Güldemir, 1986: 96).

The aforementioned Wohlstetter Doctrine should be emphasized since it laid the foundation for many of Turkey's relations in the Middle East. The United States, wishing to prevent Soviet and especially communist expansionism in the Middle East under the influence of the Cold War period, aimed to keep the southern part of the Soviet Union together from China to Turkey, including Pakistan, through a project called "Green Belt". Served as the Chairman of the National Security Council until 1981, Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski had emphasized the necessity of this strategy, and the common characteristics of the states included in this strategy were that they were not governed by democracy and that they were allies of the United States.

Having started to establish good relations with the Green Belt countries as a result of its relations with the US, Turkey's relations with the Gulf countries in the Middle East were shaped in line with its relations with the US. Turkey has acted with the policy of "the defense of the Gulf countries belongs to the Gulf countries" since the 1960s, especially with regard to the defense of the Gulf countries (Oran, 2010: 124). However, the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the US and Turkey on November 29, 1982, shows that this policy has changed. The US agreed to construct airfields in Eastern Anatolia, which it considered to be a key point for Gulf defense,

which would allow it to intervene immediately in a crisis in the Middle East and Gulf countries and was authorized to use these airfields if it received permission (Milliyet, 30.11.1982).

3.5.1. Relations with green belt member countries

After the September 12 coup d'état, Turkey started to establish good relations with the Green Belt countries with the encouragement of the US, and the best relationship Turkey established under military rule was with Pakistan. Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq and Kenan Evren visited each other many times. After the September 12 coup d'état, Zia-ul-Haq was the first president to visit Turkey and he visited between January 12-14, 1981 at the official invitation of Kenan Evren (Milliyet, 12.01.1981). The two leaders met in Ankara and exchanged views on the Iran-Iraq war that started in September 1980, developments following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and US-Pakistan relations (Evren, 1981: 194-198).

Gaining new momentum, Turkey-Pakistan relations were strengthened with the "Agreement on Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters" signed between the two countries on June 23, 1981, and the "Technical and Industrial Cooperation Agreement" signed on November 12, 1981. Afterward, Kenan Evren visited Pakistan between November 22-27, 1981 in order to repay the visit of Zia al-Haq. This was Evren's first visit abroad after becoming president. Evren was warmly welcomed by both the people and the state officials and Zia-ul-Haq gave him the highest civilian award in Pakistan, the Nishan-e-Pakistan. During his visit, Evren also visited the camp of refugees who fled Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion and took refuge in Pakistan. Seeing the Turkmen and Kyrgyz refugees among the refugees, who were in a very difficult situation, Evren stated that up to 4,000 refugees could be taken to Turkey (Evren, 1981: 459-461).

Furthermore, Evren and Zia-ul-Haq were not only the leaders of two countries that got along well, but they were also good friends. Zia-ul-Haq, who was going to visit Syria and Jordan, was interrupted by the death of Evren's wife Sekine on March 3, 1982, and came to visit Evren on March 10, 1982, to offer his condolences in person (, 1981: 97-98).

After his visit to Pakistan, Evren authorized the establishment of a committee to resettle the families of Turkish descent among the refugees on the Afghanistan-Pakistan

border in Turkey. This committee's efforts to identify the families to be taken to Turkey achieved a concrete result with the law adopted on March 17, 1982.

Hence, Turkey both lessened Pakistan's obligations to some extent and prevented the Turkish descendants on the border with Afghanistan from being abandoned to die. A large part of the migrants settled in the province of Tokat with the volunteering of the province (Evren, 1981: 254).

Turkey's relations with Saudi Arabia, one of the countries in the Green Belt, continued at the same level after the September 12 coup d'état. Following the 12 September 1980 coup d'état, which ended democratic life in Turkey, Saudi King Kenan Khalid was one of the first people to send a message to President Kenan Evren. (Güldemir, 1986: 78; Oran, 2010: 125).

The most remarkable issue in Saudi Arabia-Turkey relations during the military government period was the Muslim World League. Founded in Meccan in 1962, the organization attempted to impose the principles of Sharia on all Muslim countries and paid the salaries of Turkish imams, who served abroad from 1982 to 1984, worth \$1100, pursuant to an agreement signed between the military government and Saudi Arabia. The most interesting fact about the 12 September government, which never stopped talking about Kemalism, secretly carried out relations with this organization, which published the insulting book "Er-Racülüs-Sanem" (The Magnificent Man" about Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Mumcu, 1993: 172).

After the oppressive 12 September regime was replaced by democracy, journalist Uğur Mumcu began to focus on this issue. In his first article published on February 10, 1987, under the title "Reformist Hodja (!)...", Mumcu explained the organization's stance against the September 12 period and democracy through the accounts of names within the organization, and in his subsequent articles, he wrote about the organization's economic influence on the communities in Turkey (Cumhuriyet, 10.02.1987). Having been revealed to have made an agreement with a Sharia organization, Evren initially denied these allegations, but then said, "Every government has chosen this path, which is the lesser of two evils," and stated that he would sign the Rabita Agreement again if he had to do it all over again (Cumhuriyet, 28.03.1987; Mumcu, 1993: 306).

3.5.2. Iran-Iraq War and Turkey's Foreign Policy

The September 12 coup d'état was immediately followed by the Iran-Iraq War when Iraq abrogated the Algiers Agreement and attacked Iran. As Turkey had borders with both Iran and Iraq, it adopted a neutral foreign policy by deciding not to sell weapons and war materials to either country and not to allow the transfer of ammunition through its airspace (Evren, 1981: 165- 166).

The adoption of a neutral policy was undoubtedly influenced by neighborly relations as well as common interests. Such reasons as the absence of serious conflicts between Turkey and Iraq until this period, the fact that the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline was an important economic leverage for both Turkey and Iraq, and the fact that both countries were struggling with the PKK pestilence made it easier to find common ground (Hale, 2014: 179).

The situation was different for Iran. The political and ideological differences between Iran and Turkey have caused conflicts between the two countries. For example, on 10 November, the Iranian delegation visiting Turkey refused to visit Anıtkabir and did not allow the Iranian flag to be flown at half-mast (Türkmen, 2010: 21). These differences between Iran and Turkey have been overshadowed by economic relations. Turkey's role as a gateway for Iran and as an important ally in of exports forced Iran to opt for closer relations with Turkey. Moreover, the possibility that the Kurds to launch a fight for independence with the support of Iran by taking advantage of the authority gap in Iraq, and the possibility of this attempt to spread to Turkey, prompted Turkey to establish good relations with both countries (Hale, 2014: 179-180).

After the 12 September 1980 coup d'état, Turkey started to play an active role in the Middle East and Islamic states and participated in the Islamic Conference Summit in Taif between January 25-28, 1981 under the leadership of Prime Minister Bülent Ulusu. Until this period, Turkey had preferred to participate in these meetings at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but as a result of the policies adopted, the participation of Foreign Minister İlder Türkmen and Prime Minister Bülent Ulusu in this meeting gave a clue to Turkey's Middle East policy. At this meeting, Prime Minister Bülent Ulusu was among the names elected to the nine-member Islamic Peace Committee, which was established to resolve the Iran-Iraq War (Evren, 1981: 224). Turkey played an active role in this committee and made many official visits to Baghdad and Tehran.

As the attempts of the Islamic Peace Committee were inconclusive and the war was growing, Sadli Klibi, the Secretary General of the Arab League, came to Turkey between January 6-9, 1982, and requested Turkey to mediate by meeting with the two countries in private. Accordingly, Evren wrote a letter to President Khamenei of Iran and President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, asking them to send representatives to Turkey to discuss the war. Thus, firstly, on July 23, 1982, Khamenei's special representative met with Evren in Bandirma. In general terms, the meeting focused on the withdrawal of both countries from the occupied territories and the possibility of a ceasefire if special conditions were met (Evren, 1981: 200-207). One week after this meeting with Iran, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hamadi came to meet with Evren. Kenan Evren mentioned in his memoirs that at the end of the meeting, the Iraqi government was more eager to end the war than Iran and that they stated that they could make a ceasefire in accordance with the decision of the arbitration committee to be established in the region.

This initiative initiated by Evren for a ceasefire continued with the visit of Prime Minister Bülent Ulusu and Foreign Minister İlder Türkmen to Iran. After Iran regained its lost territories, Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan visited Turkey on February 17, 1983. Assessing Iran's course in the war, Taha Yasin claimed that Iran became stronger in the war because the United States supplied Iran with weapons. Evren, who had very close relations with the US at the time, told Taha Yasin that this claim was unfounded. However, with the "Iran–Contra" affair that broke out in 1986, it was revealed that the US had supplied arms to Iran, and Evren wrote in his memoirs that he was disappointed by this attitude of the US (Evren, 1981: 97-98).

During the ongoing Iran-Iraq War, Peshmerga and PKK militants on the Iraqi side opened fire on Turkish soldiers patrolling the Iraqi-Turkish border, killing one officer and two soldiers. On May 10, 1983, following this incident, Turkey decided to organize a cross-border operation in the region. Turkey carried out this operation with the permission of the Iraqi government to avoid being considered an invader by the world, including Iraq. Furthermore, a statement was made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to prevent false news in the world's public opinion. At the end of the statement, the general purpose of the operation was indicated as follows: "Turkey seeks first and foremost peace, tranquility and security in its region and has no other objective other than this.

Pursuant to the agreement between the two countries, Turkey agreed to advance a maximum of 5 kilometers from the Iraqi border and to conduct a 72-hour operation and the operation started on May 27, 1983 (Evren, 1981: 206-207). In the operation organized pursuant to the agreement, one person was killed and Turkish forces withdrew from the region after the successful operation on June 2, 1983. Afterwards, Iraq shot down an Iraqi airplane that was flying over the border. Turkey sent a delegation to Iraq on September 27, 1983, to discuss the situation and as a result of the contacts, the Special Representative of the President of Iraq came to Turkey on October 6, 1983. During this meeting, it was concluded that the plane had crossed the Iraqi border and was shot down because its nationality could not be determined. The two countries decided to cooperate in investigating the situation of our soldiers who parachuted from the plane that was shot down (Cumhuriyet, 27.10.1983-28.10.1983).

After the war escalated and Iraq's bombings on the Iranian border, Lavasani, the Director of Political Affairs at the Iranian Foreign Ministry, visited Turkey. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that during the meeting between Lavasani and Turkmen, mutual relations and the situation of the war were discussed, and also said that "*Turkey's mediation to stop the war is out of the question at this stage*". Thus, after the Islamic Peace Committee, Turkey's attempts to mediate failed.

During this period under the shadow of the war, Turkey gained good momentum with its economic initiatives. Furthermore, with the agreement signed with Iraq in 1981, the capacity of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık Oil Pipeline was increased and a step was taken that would make a great economic contribution (Türkmen, 2010: 19). Moreover, an agreement for the construction of a new line parallel to the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık line, which would enable Iraq to transport liquefied petroleum gas to the Mediterranean Sea, was signed on October 19, 1983.

3.5.3. Relations with Israel

Israel's declaration of Jerusalem as its capital a few weeks before the coup caused the September 12 government's relations with Israel to be formed in an unhealthy environment from the beginning (Milliyet, 25.07.1980).

Turkey's good relations with the Arab states between 1980 and 1983 also played a significant role in the deterioration of relations. After Israel's declaration of Jerusalem as its capital, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, of which Turkey was a

member, emphasized that Turkey should take a stance in its bilateral relations with Israel. Upon this request, state officials came together on October 28, 1980, and the situation was evaluated. At the meeting, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in compliance with the request of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, found it appropriate to suspend relations with Israel. However, Kenan Evren, who always had the last word in foreign policy during this period, said that this decision was excessive and decided to downgrade the ambassadorial relations to the level of second secretary (Evren, 1981: 132- 133). This decision was implemented on November 26, 1980, and Turkey started to establish diplomatic relations with Israel at the level of second secretary (Armaoğlu, 2019: 639).

Another problem in the disrupted Turkish-Israeli relations was Israel's aggressive policy in the Middle East. This aggressive policy started with Israel's invasion of Lebanon on May 30, 1981 (Akşam, 30.05.1981). Turkey provided medicine and medical supplies to Lebanon in response to the Israeli attack. Following this attack, Israel bombed the Osirak nuclear power plant near Baghdad on June 8, 1981 (Milliyet, 09.06.1981; Oran, 2010: 150). Having good relations with Iraq, Turkey has condemned this attack with a statement made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Israel continued its attacks in the Middle East and its next target was the Golan Heights in Syria. On December 14, 1981, the Golan Heights was annexed by a resolution approved by the Israeli Parliament. After Syria considered this move as a declaration of war, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a statement saying that "Israel is solely responsible for the increasing tension in the region" and that it did not recognize this annexation (Milliyet, 15.12.1981-16.12.1981).

On April 11, 1981, an Israeli attacker bombed the Omar Mosque, one of the holy sanctuaries in Jerusalem, injuring 15 people and killing 2 people. The attack caused protests throughout the Islamic world. Following this hideous incident, nine Arab countries suspended their operations and closed their airports. On behalf of Turkey, Foreign Minister Turkmen organized an invitation to the ambassadors of Islamic countries in Ankara and expressed Turkey's grief for this Israeli attack (Milliyet, 12.04.1982).

Being in a constant state of aggression in the Middle East for some time, Israel invaded the south of Lebanon on June 6, 1982. Like the rest of the world, Turkey took a

stance against this invasion and declared in a statement that Israel should leave Lebanon (Oran, 2010: 128; Cumhuriyet, 08.06.1982). After the Israeli invasion, 27 Turkish citizens were wounded, and 12 Turkish citizens were killed in an Israeli airstrike on civilian vehicles at the border in order to evacuate the region. Following the attack, a meeting was held with the Israeli Charge d'Affaires in Ankara and material and moral compensation was demanded. Turkey also sent tents, blankets to the region.

The Israeli occupation of Lebanon spread to the Palestinian camps in September. Meanwhile, hundreds of innocent people were killed in the Israeli attack on the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut (Oran, 2010: 150). To protest this attack, the member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference announced September 24, 1982, as the "Day of Solidarity with the Palestinians". As a member of this organization, Turkey also joined the protests, and prayers and sermons were recited in mosques in Turkey on September 24 (Cumhuriyet, 24.09.1982). Furthermore, the committee, which was established to seek the rights of the Palestinian people, was given a mandate by the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference "To achieve a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East, Turkey will participate in all draft resolutions to be adopted by the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference" (Oran, 2010: 150-151).

Despite Turkey's poor relations with Israel between 1980 and 1983, the two countries cooperated in the activities of Armenian terrorist organizations. During the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, Israel seized documents related to the attacks of Armenian terrorist organizations in Beirut camps. These documents were handed over to Turkey by the Israeli government. The fact that Turkey received the documents related to the Armenian terrorist organizations, which had been assassinating Turkish diplomats and attacking various institutions for some time, helped to stop the Armenian terror to some extent during this period (Armaoğlu, 2019: 725).

Having received evidence of Armenian terrorism, Evren wrote a letter to Emin Cemayel, the President of Lebanon, containing extremely bitter words (Evren, 1981: 124). The letter was delivered by Foreign Minister Turkmen during his visit to Lebanon. Turkmen met with President Emin Cemayel and Prime Minister Şefik Wazzan and discussed the measures to be taken against the Armenian terrorists raised in the camps and the development of Turkish-Lebanese relations. The Lebanese authorities stated that " Lebanon is the country that has suffered the most from terrorism and anarchy in recent

history and that it is determined to never tolerate terrorism and subversive activities" and that they would pay attention to the issue.

3.5.4. Relations with other Middle Eastern States

The Middle East relations of the Ulusu Government were not limited to the above-mentioned countries, but cooperation was ensured through various agreements with other Middle Eastern countries. For example, Evren visited Kuwait between March 20-25, 1982, and signed an Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation Agreement with Kuwait. Kenan Evren's visit to Kuwait gave him the title of being the first Turkish head of state to visit Kuwait in history (Yankı, 29 March-4 April 1982, p. 574, p. 16).

Another country that Turkey cooperated with during this period was the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Kemal Cantürk, Minister of Trade, visited Jordan between March 27 and April 3, 1982 and signed a Protocol on Commercial and Economic Cooperation in Amman at the end of this visit. In addition, Prince Hasan, the Jordanian Crown Prince, who visited between July 7-11, 1982 to meet with İltis Türkmen, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, exchanged views on the current situation in the Middle East. (Güldemir, 1986: 79). As a result of this meeting, a Labor Agreement was signed between the two countries. To improve relations with Tunisia, the two statesmen have visited each other many times. On September 29, 1981, the two countries first signed a Long-Term Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation Agreement, thereby advancing economic relations. Afterwards, Beji Caid Essebsi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tunisia, who came to Turkey on May 5, 1982, upon the invitation of İltis Türkmen, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, held discussions with the aim of developing economic cooperation. After this visit, Tunisia and Turkey signed "Air Transport Agreement, Consular Agreement, Convention on Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters and Extradition of Criminals and Convention on Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters (Güldemir, 1986: 79).

During the 12 September government, Turkey's relations with Islamic states improved considerably, but relations with Syria became very tense. The main reasons for these tense relations between Turkey and Syria were smuggling, terrorism and the PKK. In addition, Syria's national policy of reclaiming Hatay and hosting terrorists who organized attacks on the Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline also led to strained relations (Yankı, 29 March-4 April 1982, p.574, p. 17; Hale, 2014: 181).

The fact that the borders of the two neighboring countries cover a large area prevented the prevention of arms smuggling that had been going on for years. The September 12 government, which gathered all the power with the coup d'état, closed many border gates such as Ceylanpınar, Mürşitpınar and Şenyurt to prevent smuggling activities. Another way the government tried to prevent smuggling was to discuss the issue with Abdülhalim Haddam, the Syrian Foreign Minister, who came to Turkey on June 9, 1981. During the meeting, it was emphasized that the two countries should act jointly to prevent smuggling (Evren, 1981: 124).

The issue of smuggling was also discussed during the visit of İlder Türkmen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Syria between March 23-30, 1983. Türkmen stated that the rate of smuggling had decreased to a certain extent with the joint action of the two countries and that Syria and Turkey had decided to act to solve this problem fundamentally through economic and social cooperation (Türkmen, 2010: 341-342).

Another relationship developed with Syria during this period was related to the terrorists who fled to Syria after the 12 September 1980 coup d'état. As a result of the negotiations initiated for the return of the terrorists who took refuge in Syria to Turkey, a delegation of 5 people led by the Khalid El-Malki, the Syrian Minister of Justice, came to Ankara to meet with the Minister of Justice Cevdet Menteş. The negotiations resulted in the signing of the "Convention on Extradition and Mutual Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters" on June 15, 1981 (Milliyet, 16.06.1981). However, as this agreement did not cover political refugees, Turkey could not fully utilize this agreement for the fight against terrorism (Türkmen, 2010: 20).

The main reason for the tension between Turkey and Syria was that Syria hosted Armenian terrorists and the terrorist organization called PKK. The PKK played an active role in Syria in July 1979 when Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the terrorist organization, entered Syria and established relations there (Hale, 2014: 181). The Greater Syria policy adopted by Hafez al-Assad, a Syrian statesman, when he took over the state in 1971 was considered to be related to this issue of hosting the PKK. Assad, who wanted to create Greater Syria rather than a policy of Arab nationalism, had close relations with terrorist organizations in order to lower the guard of the countries he considered as his rivals. Therefore, he placed the PKK, led by Öcalan, in the Bekaa Valley in order to disturb Turkey. The PKK terrorists, who received various training in the Bekaa Valley, organized a conference for the first time on July 15-26, 1981, and decided to prepare

militarily to return to "Turkish Kurdistan (Oran, 2010: 130-132).

Having been informed about these terror-related developments, Turkey wanted to use the Convention on Extradition and Mutual Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters with Syria, calling on Damascus to extradite the terrorists, but the answer was "there are no terrorists on Syrian territory, and the Turkish nationals who do exist are political refugees". Meanwhile, the PKK continued to expand and operate in many countries such as Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. To ensure its own security, Turkey signed the Border Security and Cooperation Agreement with Iraq in 1983 (Türkmen, 2010: 20).

3.5.5. Relations with Asian States

After the September 12 coup d'état, the soldiers, who expressed that they would adopt a peaceful and multilateral policy in foreign policy at every opportunity, carried out their activities in this direction. The Asian countries which Turkey established the best relations with during the Uluşu government were Pakistan and China. The relations with Pakistan were mostly related to the Middle East policy and were explained in the previous section. It would be fair to say that the development of relations with China during this period was realized with the encouragement of the United States (Güldemir, 1986: 70). Hence, relations between the two countries, which had been engaged since 1971, improved from 1980 forward. Li Xiannian, the President of the People's Republic of China, described the developing relations as "China and Turkey are countries belonging to the emerging world. They shared the same destiny in the past and have the same goal for the future: To maintain their independence. Therefore, they have common interests."

Having established good relations in politics with the encouragement of the US, Turkey, and China also developed good relations in the economic field during this period. Firstly, on May 10, 1981, Kemal Cantürk, the Minister of Trade, went to Beijing upon the call of the Minister of Trade of the People's Republic of China (Milliyet, 10.05.1981), a Trade Protocol was signed at the end of the one-week visit to increase the trade volume of China and Turkey.

Another contact between the two countries was established between 15-23 December 1981 through the visit of İlder Türkmen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and his delegation to Beijing. At a dinner organized by Huang Hua, the Chinese Foreign Minister, to celebrate the 100th anniversary of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's birth and the

10th anniversary of Turkish-Chinese relations, the officials discussed the Iran-Iraq War, the situation in Afghanistan and the Cyprus issue (Turkmen, 2010: 219-221). Furthermore, Turkey and China signed a 130 million dollar "Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation Agreement" at the end of this visit (Milliyet, 19.12.1981).

Kenan Evren also mentioned the establishment of good economic relations with China in his memoirs: *"Due to its population of over a billion people, China, is a really important country for us, especially in terms of economic and commercial relations. If we can sell one grape to everyone living in China, it would be worth a billion grapes."* (Evren, 1981: 164).

Turkey's military relations with China reached a peak with Evren's visit to the Far Eastern countries between December 12-26, 1982 (Güldemir, 1986: 128). The People's Republic of China was the first country on the visit program. Therefore, Evren visited the People's Republic of China between December 13-17, 1982, and became the first Turkish President to visit China. Evren was accompanied by Zhao Ziyang, the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China, and they discussed Cambodia, Afghanistan, Soviet troops on the border with China and nuclear weapons. After Kenan Evren's visit to China, Turkey-China relations showed a major improvement (Evren, 1981: 45-46).

The culture was another area of Turkey's relations with the People's Republic of China during this period. Zhu Muzhi, Minister of Culture of the People's Republic of China, who visited Turkey between April 7-13, 1983, visited the first exhibition of Chinese export products in Turkey (Cumhuriyet, 08.04.1983). Moreover, Yaşar Kemal's *Ince Mehmed*, which has been translated into many languages, was translated into Chinese by Li Xiande and became an important building block of the bridge of friendship between Turkey and China (Milliyet, 08.04.1983).

During the Ulusu Government, Wu Xueqian, State Counsellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, paid a visit to İtler Turkmen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, between October 16-19, 1983. During this visit, military issues of interest to both countries were discussed and Wu Xueqian made the following statement at the end of the visit: *"Our views on international problems are either identical or similar"* (Güldemir, 1986: 128).

Another major Asian state, Japan, was understanding of the change of

government following the 12 September 1980 coup d'état and left the door open for further relations. Japanese attitude caused Japan to be considered as one of the countries that the military, which took over a country in a very difficult economic situation, would seek loans. Therefore, Turgut Özal, the State Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, visited Japan between February 7-11, 1981 (Evren, 1981: 235). Özal's meetings in Japan resulted in the signing of an 80-million-dollar loan agreement between Turkey and Japan (Milliyet, 14.02.1981).

After Özal's visit to Japan, Japanese-Turkish relations continued with the visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe, who came to Turkey on August 8-9, 1983. The main purpose of the visit was to grant a 65-million-dollar loan to Turkey by the Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) for the Altinkaya Dam and Hydroelectric Power Plant project, the construction of which had begun in Turkey. This loan was granted to Turkey at 4.25% interest, with the condition of repayment over 19 years after a 7-year interval (Türkmen, 2010: 388). Shintaro Abe also met with Kenan Evren to discuss the Iran-Iraq War. Shintaro Abe stated that Japan would face a fuel shortage if the war continued, and expressed his wish that Evren's mediation attempts to end the Iran-Iraq War would end positively (Evren, 1981: 291).

The relations of Turkey with other Asian countries between 1980-1983 were shaped within the framework of Evren's visit to the Far East between December 12-26, 1982. As mentioned before, the first stop of the tour was the People's Republic of China, between December 13-17, 1982. After the People's Republic of China, Evren visited Indonesia. In Jakarta, a meeting was held with the delegation led by President Suharto and the two countries signed an Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement that would last for 5 years. Pursuant to this agreement signed on December 18, 1982, Turkey undertook to sell wheat, cotton yarn, carpets, raisins, figs, hazelnuts and various ceramic goods to Indonesia, while Indonesia undertook to sell products such as pepper, coffee, rubber and coconut to Turkey, thus establishing economic ties between the two countries.

South Korea was the third stop of the tour, between December 20-23, 1982. Welcomed by President Chun Doo Hwan in South Korea, Evren visited the factories producing various technological devices in Seoul. Evren said that the factories he saw there were at a level to compete with Japan and asked for technological cooperation with South Korea. In the following months, Choong Hoon Cho, President of the Air Industry and KAL of the Republic of Korea, visited Turkey to discuss cooperation in

the aircraft industry.

During the 12 September government period, Bangladesh was another Asian country that Turkey was in contact with. Ilter Turkmen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, traveled to Bangladesh on March 9-10, 1981 and was authorized to sign the Agreement on Military Training Cooperation between Turkey and Bangladesh.

Furthermore, during this tour, Kenan Evren visited Bangladesh between December 23-24, 1982. In his memoirs, Evren mentioned the poverty and the pathetic situation in Bangladesh and added that there was a close bond between Bangladesh and Turkey (Oran, 1989: 128; Evren, 1981: 57-61). Bangladesh was the first country to recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus after Turkey, proving the close bond Evren mentioned in his memoirs. However, Bangladesh could not withstand the pressure that followed this decision and abandoned its recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus after a while.

4.CONCLUSION

The military interventions in the political arena have been quite frequent in Turkey's political history and the 12 September 1980 coup d'état was one of the most important of the interventions. After the coup d'état, Turkey's foreign policy also underwent a series of changes.

Post-coup Turkish foreign policy was shaped under the military regime. The military regime led by Kenan Evren controlled Turkish foreign policy both at domestic and international level. During this period, Turkey stood by its Western allies and, as a member of NATO, occupied an important strategic position, especially against the Soviet Union.

However, Turkey's relations with some Western countries were strained during the military regime. Especially, Turkey's relations with the EU weakened due to the suspension of the European Convention on Human Rights, human rights violations and arrests. Moreover, relations between the US and Turkey were also strained, notably due to the arms embargo imposed by the US on Turkey after the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation.

These interventions interrupted the democratic process and undermined human rights and freedoms. They have also increased political instability and slowed economic development. The frequent interruption of democracy by military interventions means a violation of fundamental values such as the rule of law and the protection of human rights and has a negative impact on the international community. Therefore, democracy in Turkey needs to be strengthened, the rule of law upheld and human rights more effectively protected.

The 12 September 1980 coup d'état is considered one of the darkest periods in Turkish history. Following the coup d'état, thousands of people were arrested, tortured, and even killed. The country had to struggle with violations of democracy and human rights for a long time.

There are many factors that are believed to have contributed to the coup d'état. Some of these are political polarization, economic crises, and terrorist incidents. It is also believed that the organization called Counter-Guerrilla played a role in the coup.

Counter-Guerrilla is a secret organization fighting against leftist organizations in Turkey and was effective in carrying out the coup d'état.

The relationship between the coup d'état and the United States has also been widely debated. Some researchers believe that the coup was supported by the United States. Tahsin Şahinkaya, who returned to Turkey the day before the coup, and Haydar Saltık, the spokesperson of the National Security Council established after the coup, were alleged to have connections with the United States. However, these allegations have not been fully proven.

The aftermath of the coup has caused concern among western allies of Turkey. In particular, human rights violations were criticized by countries, such as the United States and the European Union. However, Turkey remained a NATO member after the coup and its relations with the United States continued.

It is true that after the 12 September 1980 coup d'état, Turkey became closer to the United States. During this period, Turkey's NATO membership continued and the strategic importance of the US to Turkey did not change. Moreover, the fact that Turkey was an important buffer against the Eastern Bloc countries increased the US interest in Turkey.

The Green Belt Project and the Agile Force Project also played an important role in Turkey's rapprochement with the United States. The Green Belt Project was a project initiated by the US to combat radical movements that were destabilizing the Middle East and the Caucasus. Turkey was included in the project and worked in close cooperation with the US. The Agile Force Project was a US-backed project to modernize Turkey's internal security forces.

However, Turkey's rapprochement with the United States cannot be considered as a situation that occurred only due to the 12 September 1980 coup d'état, as there was no such period in which the relations with the United States were completely problematic. US-Turkey relations had experienced various problems in various periods before the coup. For example, during the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974, the US imposed an arms embargo on Turkey, which strained relations.

Due to these projects, the military government also established good relations with the Middle Eastern states. Previous military interventions in the history of the Republic of Turkey have been followed by a policy of turning its back on the Middle

East and Islamic states. However, after September 12, 1980, this policy was reversed. Developments such as Turkey's participation in the committee established to end the Iran-Iraq war in the period between 1980-1983 and the participation of both Bülent Ulusu, the Prime Minister, and İltis Türkmen, the Foreign Minister, in the Islamic Conference Summit prove this. Moreover, during this period, Turkey established good relations with Islamic states, and downgraded its relations with Israel to the level of second secretary as a natural consequence of this policy.

The military government's relationship with the organization called “Rabitat-al Alem al-Islami” is also noteworthy in its Middle East policy. As it is remembered, the soldiers argued that one of the main reasons for the September 12 coup was the increasing Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey. It is clear that the relationship of the commanders who evaluated disrespect to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's memory as an unforgivable act with the organization named “Rabitat-al Alem al-Islami” cannot have a “sincere” explanation. This organization published a book titled “Er-Racülüs-Sanem” (the Magnificent Man) containing insults to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

The violence that the September 12 government to people in prisons and the distance from politics affected relations with European countries.

Especially the torture of people in prisons has been condemned by European countries, and as a result, there have been ruptures in relations. In addition, the attitude towards the intervention without regard for democracy has been similar. In particular, the attitude taken by the EEC has been that membership procedures will not be carried out until democracy is restored in Turkey.

The biggest mistake made by the military in foreign policy between 1980-1983 was undoubtedly approving Greece's return to NATO's military wing without obtaining any written concessions. With the Rogers Plan prepared by NATO Supreme Commander William Rogers, Greece returned to NATO's military wing, and Turkey lost a significant advantage both internationally and in the Aegean.

The 12 September 1980 coup d'état had a significant impact on Turkish foreign policy. Following the coup, Turkey's foreign policy underwent a series of changes.

Firstly, in the post-coup period, Turkish foreign policy was harder. In the pre-coup period, Turkey was pursuing a policy that supported peace and stability in the region. However, in the post-coup period, Turkey started to intervene more aggressively

in regional events due to the instability at the domestic level.

This has led to Turkey's perception as a regional power and increased claims of regional leadership.

Secondly, in the post-coup period, Turkey's relations with the Western countries have experienced a series of problems. In particular, allegations that the United States of America supported the coup led to a strain in Turkish-American relations. Moreover, Turkey's problems with democracy and human rights have also created problems in its relations with Western countries.

Thirdly, it is noteworthy that in the post-coup period, Turkey adopted a tougher stance towards the Soviet Union in its foreign policy. Turkey perceived the Soviet Union as a threat in the region and therefore adopted a tougher stance in its relations with the Soviet Union. In the post-coup period, this attitude hardened and Turkey started to act more actively against the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, the 12 September 1980 coup d'état had significant effects on Turkish foreign policy. In the post-coup period, Turkey pursued a tougher foreign policy, experienced problems in its relations with the Western countries and adopted a tougher stance against the Soviet Union.

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