

COMMERCIALIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTION IN THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
OTTOMAN EMPIRE: PROPERTY ACQUISITION AND
LOCAL NOTABLES

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by
BEDİRHAN LAÇİN

Department of
History
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
July 2024

BEDİRHAN LAÇİN

COMMERCIALIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
IN THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY OTTOMAN EMPIRE:
PROPERTY ACQUISITION AND LOCAL NOTABLES

Bilkent University 2024

To my mother, father and Özge



COMMERCIALIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN THE
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY OTTOMAN EMPIRE: PROPERTY ACQUISITION
AND LOCAL NOTABLES

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

BEDİRHAN LAÇIN

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY

THE DEPARTMENT OF
HISTORY
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

July 2024

COMMERCIALIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN THE
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY OTTOMAN EMPIRE: PROPERTY ACQUISITION
AND LOCAL NOTABLES

By Bedirhan Laçin

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Özer Ergenç
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Mehmet Kalpaklı
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Mehmet Veli Seyitdanlıoğlu
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Yunus Koç
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Hülya Taş
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

Refet S. Gürkaynak
Director

ABSTRACT

COMMERCIALIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY OTTOMAN EMPIRE: PROPERTY ACQUISITION AND LOCAL NOTABLES

Laçın, Bedirhan

Ph. D., Department of History

Advisor: Prof. Dr. Özer Ergenç

July 2024

This dissertation analyzes the transformation of agrarian relations and their impact on the commercialization of agricultural production in the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth century in the southern Balkans and western Anatolian hinterlands. It examines the process by which the growth of the illicit wheat trade as an empire-wide development, influenced by changes in the urban-rural trade structure and the level of foreign and domestic demand, gradually reshaped imperial wheat policy. It examines shifts in land tenure and the emergence and consolidation of local elites in the context of landed-estate agriculture. This is achieved through a comprehensive prosopographical study of land tenure and local elite phenomena in Karaferye from the late fifteenth to the second half of the eighteenth century. By the eighteenth century, the analysis is extended also to the Selanik province, with a special focus on Selanik hinterland and in western Anatolia to Bergama in the context of çiftlik investments and illicit wheat trade. This micro-level examination allows for the

observation of concurrent changes and continuities in land tenure and the impact of shifts in taxation practices on rural indebtedness and on the labor forms in different regions. It is argued that the growth of the çiftlik market and direct purchases, facilitated by the economic incentives of investor local elites and notables, led to the commodification of wheat through the illicit trade.

Keywords: commercialization, wheat, illicit, çiftlik, local elites and notables, land



ÖZET

18. YÜZYIL OSMANLI İMPARATORLUĞU'NDA TARIMSAL ÜRETİMİN TİCARİLEŞMESİ: MÜLK EDİNİMİ (TASARRUF-TEMELLÜK) VE YEREL GÜÇ SAHİPLERİ

Laçın, Bedirhan

Doktora, Tarih Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Özer Ergenç

Temmuz 2024

Bu tez, on sekizinci yüzyıl Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda tarımsal ilişkilerin dönüşümünü ve bu dönüşümün Güney Balkanlar ve Batı Anadolu hinterlandında tarımsal üretimin ticarileşmesi üzerindeki etkisini analiz etmektedir. Kentsel-kırsal ticaret yapısı ile dış ve iç talep düzeyindeki değişikliklerden etkilenen imparatorluk çapında bir gelişme olarak yasadışı/yasak buğday ticaretinin büyümesinin imparatorluk buğday politikasını kademeli olarak yeniden şekillendirdiği süreci incelemektedir. Toprak mülkiyetindeki değişimleri ve yerel elitlerin ortaya çıkışını ve konsolidasyonunu çiftlikler bağlamında ele almaktadır. Bu da on beşinci yüzyılın sonlarından on sekizinci yüzyılın ikinci yarısına kadar Karaferye'deki toprak mülkiyeti ve yerel elit olgularının kapsamlı bir prosopografik çalışmasıyla gerçekleştirilmiştir. Analiz, on sekizinci yüzyıla gelindiğinde, Selanik vilayetine, özellikle de hinterlandına ve Batı Anadolu'da Bergama'ya da odaklanarak çiftlik yatırımları ve yasadışı buğday ticareti bağlamlarında genişletilmiştir. Bu mikro düzeydeki inceleme, toprak

mülkiyetindeki eş zamanlı değişimlerin sürekliliklerinin gözlemlenmesine ve vergilendirme uygulamalarındaki değişimlerin kırsal borçluluk ve emek biçimleri üzerindeki etkisini farklı bölgeleri karşılaştırarak analiz etmeye olanak tanımaktadır. Yatırımcı yerel elitlerin ve eşrafın ekonomik girişimleri sonucu genişleyen çiftlik piyasasının ve doğrudan buğday alımlarının ölçeğinin büyümesinin sonucunda buğdayın yasadışı ticaret yoluyla metalaşmasına yol açtığını ileri sürmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: ticarileşme, buğday, yasak, çiftlik, yerel elit ve ayan, arazi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my sincere thanks to all those who have supported me throughout this long journey of obtaining my PhD.

First and foremost, I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to my precious advisor, Prof. Dr. Özer Ergenç for his guidance at every step of my academic career. I cannot thank him enough for patiently allowing me to benefit from his immense knowledge of Ottoman History with his fatherly support, which has nurtured me in countless ways since 2014 when I started to follow in his footsteps as an amateur but an eager master's student. His selfless advice has guided me through both professional and academic challenges in Istanbul and Ankara. Whenever I needed his help, his deep support helped me to overcome challenges I faced throughout my entire studies. He had been my mentor and I always felt privileged to have his encouragement. Therefore, I am and will always be honored to be one of his students and will strive to be worthy of his guidance.

I am deeply grateful to my thesis committee members: Mehmet Kalpaklı, Mehmet Veli Seyitdanlıoğlu for his consistent support and generosity during my monitoring committees, and Yunus Koç and Hülya Taş for all their invaluable comments. I also thank all the professors in the History Department of Bilkent University, whose courses cherished me during my education and in particular to Oktay Özel and Evgeni R. Radushev, for their helpful advice to my enquiries at the initial stage.

I would also like to thank Fikret Yılmaz, who has always been welcoming and generous with his knowledge and kept his doors open whenever I asked for his help.

I am also grateful to Baki Tezcan for his valuable guidance and suggestions during my stay at UC Davis, made possible by the TÜBİTAK 2214/A International Research Fellowship (grant 1059B142000471) from October 12, 2021, to July 12, 2022. I also thank Ali Yaycıoğlu for his time and comments during our sessions in the US.

I would like to extend my sincere thanks for my decade-long friends, Tolga Şahin, Göksel Baş, Tahsin Şahin, Mevlüt Can Demir, Fevzi Burhan Ayaz, and Mehmet Ali Çelik, for their sincere friendship. The hours-long academic talks with each one of them and their valuable support throughout this journey will always be remembered.

I take this opportunity to acknowledge the staff of the Archives of the Prefecture of Macedonia in Thessaloniki, especially Αικατερίνη Γιαννουκάκου/Aikaterini Yannoukakou, for their assistance during the pandemic. I would also like to thank Mehmet Emin Köktaş, Dean of T.C. Sabahattin Zaim University, and Beytullah Kaya, Chair of the History Department, for their help during my research.

I would also like to thank to my little brother and sister, M. Emin and Halenur, whose constant love strengthened me and to my mother Filiz, and my father, Ercan for their patience in dealing with a difficult child like me, who was once a handful but has finally found peace.

Finally, my deepest and warmest gratitude goes to my dearest wife Özge, whose unwavering support and belief in me have been my strength since 2010 when our paths crossed forever. Her love and care have been essential throughout this journey, providing me with the strength I needed and helping me navigate difficult times with her serenity. I cannot thank her enough for everything.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ÖZET.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	ix
LIST OF TABLES.....	xi
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xii
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. Revisiting Commercialization Phenomenon: Çiftliks and Local Notables.....	3
1.2. Methodology and Sources.....	17
1.3. Chapter Outline.....	25
CHAPTER II: SHIFTING SANDS: THE EMPIRE'S EVOLVING WHEAT POLICY AND ILLICIT WHEAT TRADE.....	27
2.1. Commanding the Wheat in the Empire.....	31
2.2. The Wheat Demand of Western States.....	38
2.3 Disintegration of <i>Akreb Bazar</i> System.....	43
2.4. The Normalization Process of <i>Yasak</i> on Wheat.....	50
2.4.1. Permission of Wheat Sale for The Mora Peninsula and Balkans.....	53
2.5. Ottoman Wheat ‘Liberalization’: Introduction of <i>Bid‘at</i> Tax on Permitted Wheat Sales.....	67
2.6. Not The Beginning but The End: Revisiting the Wheat in 1838 Convention.....	83
CHAPTER III: LOCAL ELITES IN THE MAKING: THE TODOR MUSACHI (TODOR MUJAK) AND HIS DESCENDANTS (LATE 15TH-LATE 17TH).....	89
3.1. The Emergence of Local Elites.....	92
3.2. The Albanian Frontier Lord: Todor Musachi and His Sons.....	100
3.3. The Family Waqfs of Gazi Mehmed Bey and Tuzcu Hacı Sinan Bey.....	104
3.4. Emergence of Çiftliks In the Sixteenth Century: The Genesis.....	112

3.5. Conflicts Over the Trusteeship: Unveiling the Local Elite Networks.....	123
3.6. Çiftlik As Commodity and Property: The Expansion.....	132
3.6.1. The Encroachment of <i>askerî</i> and Local Elites: The First Wave of Land Alienation.....	138
3.6.1.1. Musachis As Landed-Elites (1600s-1650s).....	150
3.7. The Çiftlik Portfolio of New Elite Consortium.....	156
CHAPTER IV: THE CONSOLIDATION OF LARGE ÇİFTLİK AGRICULTURE	172
4.1. Investing in Large Landed-Estates	177
4.2. Rural Indebtedness and Security Concerns	193
4.3. Legal Status of the Peasants	205
4.4. Change in Tax Collection Methods: From <i>Maktu'</i> to <i>Ta'sir</i>	210
4.5. Legal Aspect of Çiftlik Establishment.....	216
CHAPTER V: EXPORTING THE STAPLE FROM THE PROVINCES: THE SHADOW TRADE OF WHEAT	225
5.1. Actors, Dimensions and Distances.....	225
5.1.1. <i>Selem</i> in Gelibolu.....	230
5.2. <i>Mütemevvilâns</i> of Karaferye.....	234
5.3. The Consortium of Selanik Local Notables	250
5.4. Bergama as the Gate of Anatolia to the Commercial Markets.....	268
5.4.1. Putting the Tax Flow Ahead of Sustenance.....	275
5.4.2. 'Master of Wheat Lands'	283
5.5. On the Quantities.....	296
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION	299
APPENDICES.....	313
BIBLIOGRAPHY	324

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 The <i>mîrî rûsûm</i> collected from each dock after the permission of 1722 ..	65
Table 2 Four Claimed Legal Lineages of Mehmed Bey and Tuzcu Hacı Sinan Bey: The Successors of Todor Musachi (1695-1732)	126
Table 3 The Deeds of Land Purchase in Karaferye (1712-52)	189
Table 4 The amounts of wheat sold illicitly based on available incidences	297
Table 5 The villages include çiftliks, the name of their holders and their sizes recorded in the detailed extraordinary tax register of Karaferye in 1691, MAD. 8485	314

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Family tree of Gazi Mehmed Bey and Tuzcu Hacı Sinan Bey, sons of Todor Musachi	313



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

During the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire experienced a twofold transformation driven by internal and external factors. Changes in internal dynamics, alongside the influence of external demands, reshaped both the fundamental land tenure systems and its production relations of the pre-modern era. I argue that, because of these simultaneous developments, the *akreb bazar* (nearest marketplace) system, which was the core regulatory mechanism of the timar system, was replaced by one primarily directed towards commercial markets. The prohibitions of this market system were violated as a result of the expansion of the illicit wheat trade. This new trading mentality was accompanied by a change in pricing mechanisms, which led those controlling the illicit trade to involve peasants in production in order to obtain more agricultural surplus. This process of change had its impact on the emergence of actors who began to operate for the commercial markets by organizing their investments in accordance with the foreign demand.

In the classical age, agricultural production conducted on a small scale, with autonomous independent producers, finds its best description available in the *çift-hane* system. Simply defined as the portion of arable land, which varies in size from 60 to 150 dönüm in terms of productivity, cultivated by a peasant household with a pair of

oxen during the day, it constitutes the nucleus of the production unit in the broader scheme of the timar system.¹

The *çifthane* system was helpful in forming the basis of the agrarian economy with provisionist mentality which was built upon the consolidation of the commercial exchange between rural and its immediate urban areas. While the former provided cereals and animal products, the latter supplied finished goods. The reciprocation between the two could only be bypassed after their needs were fulfilled. Only then the remaining produce could be channeled to other regions or outside of the empire but with imperial permissions, which were not very often granted. As the *akreb bazar* had a set price for certain products under the effective price ceiling mechanism (*narh*) system, in the absence of external demand, the level production was limited by only for its immediate urban center. The surplus production, as a result, remained limited. Whereas the prices in the distant commercial markets were determined by supply and demand dynamics and the subjects tend to regulate their economic incentives for meeting the ever-growing demand in the name of driving profit from higher prices for their products.

The transformation of the old structure was pronounced not only in the nearest marketplace system but also in the *çift-hane*. From the seventeenth century, agricultural production expanded into landed-estates formed by the combination of these *çift-hanes* in various legal or manipulative ways. What furthered the consolidation phase of these processes was the change in the method of tax collection, which led to the slippage of administrative and fiscal control in *miri mukataas* to local

¹ Halil İnalcık, "The Ottoman State: economy and society, 1300-1600", in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, Halil İnalcık with Donald Quataert (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 145-148. I thank to Mohamed Moussa for sharing his thoughts on an earlier draft of this chapter.

investor elites in almost every part of the empire and the growing external demand. As a result, it made it easier the encroachment of local wealth owners (*mütemevvilân*) to amass the peasants' arable land into large estates. Each locality has its own distinct economic and social character and, as a result, experienced different but converging paths of transformation in land tenure and tax collection. This shift ushered in a new agricultural market economy, driven primarily by foreign demand, marked the direct influence of Western European production on the Ottoman agricultural sector. The more tax farming meant, the more opportunity there was for credit in a monetizing economy for investors to draw on the output of peasants as much as their financial capacity allowed them to do so. Credit also facilitates the creation of debt bondage, leading to the exploitation of remaining autonomous peasant households in the illicit wheat trade. This process has been accompanied by the consolidation of large *çiftlik*s since the beginning of the eighteenth century.

1.1. Revisiting Commercialization Phenomenon: Çiftlik and Local Notables

The historiography of the Ottoman rural economy in the context of the development and underdevelopment paradigm of broader world history has been dominated by the studies of the 1970s and 80s. They have dealt with the processes of commercialization of agricultural products in different contexts. The main axis is the increasing investment in landed property for profit by local notables, who became more powerful in the eighteenth century. These investments took the form of production units called *çiftlik*s (landed estates). Consequently, the labor inherent in these units and its organization, the resulting product, and the landlord's and the state's respective claims on the revenue constituted the concern of these studies as the four main determinants of the rural economy. However, after the eighties, due to the change

of academic inclinations, such economic and social history-oriented studies fell out of the field of interest and the subject remained in the shadow of other studies without being further elaborated in this period. This dissertation, in a way, is a continuation of that unfinished endeavor with new empirical data on the interrelated economic incentives of the three pillars of the subject: landholders, peasants and the state.

During this period of scholarly interest, the application of the Marxist approach to Ottoman historiography in the 1970s proved fruitful in understanding this commercialization phenomenon. It became an important unit of analysis that allowed scholars to contextualize the Ottoman Empire within a global framework and to analyze the emergence of capitalist relations.² The debate gained momentum with attempts to revise the points raised by Wallerstein's World Systems Theory on the one hand, and to position this vast political entity in the face of the expanding world economy by challenging the main assumptions of the so-called decline paradigm on the other.³ With the application of world systems theory, the emphasis has turned to the impact of growing markets as an external factor on the internal feudal character of the Ottoman agrarian structure. Hence, the rise of the world market led to the peripheralization of the empire in the international division of labor by inflicting transformative changes upon its existing agricultural structure, a process pronounced with the expansion of çiftliks under the control of local elites and notables to the detriment of old prebendal system.⁴ From this point forward, the interrelationship between local power holders and çiftliks began to be examined in conjunction with one another.

² Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World-Economy: Some Questions for Research," *Review* 2, no. 3 (1979): 389–98.

³ Çağlar Keyder and Huri İslamoğlu, "Agenda for Ottoman History," *Review* 1, no. 1 (1977): 31–55.

⁴ Reşat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy: The Nineteenth Century* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988).

The analysis focused on two key processes: subjugation by foreign capital and peripheralization in the face of the ever-growing 'core region' from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century.⁵ At some point in time during this long process, the empire soon found itself integrated as periphery into the world system. As a central paradigm, dependent on the processes by which the landed investor moved to seize the source of wealth in the form of land from the peasants, the theme continued along two contours, namely the emergence and expansion of a landed propertied class, emphasizing the dispossession of the latter for their benefit. The developments that prepared the ground for the emergence of these units were perceived only in terms of external factors, without considering the changes in internal dynamics. In a sense, the correlation between the expansion of *çiftlik*s and market integration was at the forefront of the discussions regarding the integration process. Although not the central paradigm of their analysis, commercial viability through illegal means was superficially touched upon, building on the early studies of Stoianovich and Gandev.⁶ In his seminal work, Braudel equated the expansion of the grain-growing *çiftlik*s in the Empire with that of the Poles when they were oriented towards export in the context of the second serf theory.⁷ It had its repercussions on another proponent of the second serfdom theory, namely Sadat whose claims were in line with the bondage of dispossessed peasants on land under the heavy exactions not only in terms of in kind and in cash but also of extra services in the expanding *çiftlik*s of *ayans*. Albeit limited, Sadat furthered the previously scant emphasis on commercialization of *çiftlik* agriculture by

⁵ Immanuel Wallerstein, Hale Decdeli, Reşat Kasaba, 'The incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world-economy' in Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (ed.) *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 88-101.

⁶ Traian Stoianovich, "Land Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy," *The Journal of Economic History* 13, no. 4 (1953): 398-411. Christo Gandev, "L'apparition Des Rapports Capitalistes Dans l'économie Rurale de La Bulgarie Du Nord-Ouest Au Cours Du XVIII Siècle," *Etudes Historiques*, 1960, 207-17.

⁷ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. Vol. 2, (University of California Press, 1995). pp. 724-725.

substantiating the presence of illegal inclinations of trade in certain products such as cotton, wool, corn, tobacco and wheat.⁸

While the essence of their arguments rested upon the premise of exploitative feudal features' prevalence like the process experienced with the second serfdom in Eastern Europe as a result of increasing external demand, they implicitly stressing the uniformity of such developments in the Ottoman Empire without much hesitation and considering the distinct characteristics of each locality. Accordingly, the presence or absence of plantation-like production units in the hands of capitalist urban investors becomes a key indicator in this analysis, marked by transformation of peasants into wage laborers through dispossession by usurpation. As feudal mode of surplus extraction precedes in European transition to that of market-oriented capitalist, searching for if not similar but converging paths in that transition constituted the main arguments regarding *çiftlik* expansion.

In this line of argumentation, equally important appears as the unveiling the production relations among landowners and peasants. It is at this point that the concept of landed-estates (*çiftlik*s) begins to attract further scholarly attention by means of their origins, expansion and consolidation in the more recent studies. Subsequently, the Ottoman Empire's economic integration into the global system became increasingly defined by its role as a peripheralized supplier of raw materials. The presence of large-landed estate as production units, therefore, is regarded as a crucial factor to determine whether they were focused on growing a single type of crop aimed at domestic or, more importantly, for foreign markets, with extensive use of any kind of labor except

⁸ Deena R. Sadat, "Rumeli Ayanları : The Eighteenth Century," *The Journal of Modern History* 44, no. 3 (1972): 346–63. Based on French National Archives, Sadat points out that how wheat was illicitly sent from Archipelago by French merchants including the information where to meet and the contacts. However, Sadat did not share the sources regarding any of the mentioned information.

autonomous peasants since only then can a concrete conclusion be drawn in the context of the transition from feudal to capitalist mode of production.

The focus has shifted more to understand the origins of these units and the types of production relations implemented within them. The available studies have already pointed out the different approaches on the chiftlicization phenomenon, namely; as above discussed Marxist theory which considers the formation of these units as an essential step towards transition from feudalism to capitalism, the World System Theory; attributes the importance to the ever-growing world capitalist market which eventually impacted on the agrarian structure of the empire (periphery) in the form of *çifliks*, which were seen as units supply the import demand of the core regions for agricultural goods, Ottomanist theory; that gives prerogative in the expansion of these units to the institutional (timar system) and fiscal (spread of tax-farming) changes in the empire while considering the effects of the external factors.⁹ As argued by Veinstein's more nuanced and summarizing approach to the process by discussing various possibilities, while both internal and external factors were effective, the weight of the former was greater.

While some of these points still await in-depth scrutiny and will be addressed in the related part of this dissertation, McGowan, drawing his empirical base from Manastır court registers, offers a more elaborate analysis by distinguishing between titular and physical dispossession of peasants through peonage in the formation of such units while giving the weight to the latter as the method of *çiftlik* formation. By highlighting the correlation between the expansion of *çifliks* and regions that could potentially support the export of products, he argues that their size varied in different

⁹ Gilles Veinstein, 'On the Çiftlik Debate' in Keyder, Çağlar; Tabak, Faruk (eds.), *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991). pp. 35-37.

settings and that most of them were not on the scale of plantation-like estates, even though these zones accommodated a few large çiftliks.¹⁰ McGowan claims that the southern Balkans experienced an expansion in the number and size of çiftliks earlier than the northern regions, particularly from the late seventeenth to the nineteenth century, which he views as a period of market-oriented *çiftlik* formation.

Although the term çiftlik was as old as the empire itself, its character along with the composition of its holders has changed since the sixteenth century.¹¹ Hence, another concern of the scholars became understanding the origin of these units and how they emerge and expanded. Barkan takes the formation phase of these units as the reflection of degenerating *miri* land regime and state control from the second half of the sixteenth century.¹² In a similar vein, İnalcık contend that the expansion of such production units is nothing but the signals of decline in the old order.¹³ Their endeavors created their own stigmas for the trajectory of the empire in general and land tenure in particular. This line of thought was related to the perception of the *dirlik* system, which by no means allows the proliferation of such units. If they did, as İnalcık implies, it could only be possible with, for example, the lands that were either abandoned (*mevat*), on waqf or leased state lands (*mukataa*), thus opposing the argument of peasant dispossession through usurpation.¹⁴ However, their expansion was not the decline of

¹⁰ Bruce McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

¹¹ Op.cit. p. 38.

¹² Ömer Lütfi Barkan, ‘Türk toprak hukuku tarihinde Tanzimat ve 1274 (1858) tarihli arazi kanunnamesi’ In idem *Türkiye’de toprak meselesi*, (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1980). pp. 367-368.

¹³ Halil İnalcık, “The Ottoman Decline and Its Effects upon the Reaya,” in *Aspects of the Balkans: Continuity and Change*, ed. H. and Jr Birnbaum & S. Vryonis (The Hagu, Paris: Mouton, 1972). pp. 351-352.

¹⁴ Halil İnalcık, “The emergence of big Farms, çiftliks: State, landlords, and tenants,” in *Contributions a l’histoire Economique et Sociale de l’Empire Ottoman* (Louvain: Peeters Press, 1983), 105–26. İnalcık continues to hold the same argument by elaborating upon Gandev’s points raised in his study on Vidin regarding organization of the çiftliks to meet the demand of central European markets again on *mevat* lands. Balkans and Anatolia seemed to follow different patterns. For instance, çiftliks as investment tool had already been the case in Salonica and Thessaly hinterland in the beginning of the seventeenth century. İnalcık’s insistence on the *mevat*-originated çiftliks came from his empirical base, mainly from

the agrarian structures but its transformation due to the change in tax collection methods and market demand. They would expand regardless of the legal status of the villages against the constraints of the land regime that would be less of a concern especially in the eighteenth century as opposed to the prioritization of the tax flow.

Change in the composition of the army forced the center to find a solution to finance growing central army in annexing the timars (fiefs) to the vizier and sultan's hass to farm out their revenues.¹⁵ The expansion of tax farming process further exacerbated by the fixed incomes of treasury and devaluation of the akçe resulting the increase of frequency in extraordinary levies, puts extra-load for the tax paying subjects especially even burdensome for jizye (head-tax) payers between the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century.¹⁶ Under these circumstances, the wealth owners turned increasingly to acquire tax farms in different parts of the empire and

Anatolia where experienced a phase of peasant flight during the Jelali rebellions. His claim over leased state lands (*mukataa*) which were not under the cultivation of autonomous peasants but awaits reclamation with its suitable condition to raise imperial revenue, was based on his empirical findings in Vidin where the process of leasing out of lands led to the emergence of *çiftlik* owner elite group in later periods. His studies drawn upon survey registers also impacted on the development of his later arguments on the establishment process of *çiftlik*s as one can observe, there were conspicuous evidence of such *mukataa* lands in these registers. However, the southern Balkans and Western Anatolia, even inner parts of the Anatolia will accommodate *çiftlik*s with large tracks of lands irrespective of the legal status of villages, whether timar, zeamet, hass or waqf in the eighteenth century but respective that of peasants who appeared gradually losing their autonomy and claims over their once independently cultivated arable lands. It should also be mentioned that this process again was not uniform and only culminated towards the end of the eighteenth century. While both methods can well be effective, but they were amongst the two out of many given the impossibility of finding uniform processes in different geographical settings. Thus, the discordance arises from overemphasize of the effectiveness of the *dirlik* system especially in later periods on the one hand, and the availability of further studies with empirical base. The latter should be the main goal of prospective studies. Besides, the traces of the intactness of the *çift-thane* system were quietly observable even in the beginning of the nineteenth century, let alone the eighteenth century. In the latter period, the *tevzi defter*s are the main indicators of this trajectory, as there are a number of samples in which the tax levies of *avarız* and *nüzul* were allocated on the basis of *çift*s for the *çiftlik*s of local elites and notables. The effectiveness of the structure is another aspect that needs scrutiny. These two different trajectories between the regions manifested clearly itself in the expansion phase of the illicit wheat trade. While the *çiftlik*s began to be cited not only in prohibition *firman*s but also in locally produced court registers implying the instrumentalization of these units in this trade started much earlier in Balkans compared to Western Anatolia. One can state the same line of perception was the case for Barkan.x

¹⁵ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, 'Öşür'. In idem *Türkiye'de toprak meselesi* (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1980). p. 803.

¹⁶ Linda T. Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire 1560-1660* (Leiden: Brill, 1996) p.8.

increasingly strived to fill the void left by the withdrawal of once effective timar system. The primary concern of the wealthy subjects to make use of their land investments, without any doubt became in the form of çiftlik units. During this period, already oppressed peasant communities found themselves further squeezed by the illegal levies imposed by the örf members, particularly provincial governors and their retinues, who sought additional income, as revealed in the *adaletname* of 1609 published by İnalçık.¹⁷

This change appears as the natural result of the transforming timar system. In both theory and much in practice, especially from the first decade of the seventeenth century, the sale of the arable lands must have been commenced as a result of the mentioned process, as the investment of local elites and notables. It was this process in which the agglomeration of these pieces would be concentrated in the form of çiftlik units. This economic incentive was not invented by the subjects for the first time at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when their presence became more pronounced in certain areas, nor in the sixteenth century, when one can see the proliferation of such, albeit smaller in size, in certain local settings. It was an ongoing process from the early sixteenth century onwards, and during this long period there were institutional changes within the Empire on the one hand, and transformations of social and political structures outside. Besides, one can see clear references to the existences of çiftlik units albeit too limited in number, before the sixteenth century. When their effects converged in a given period, between late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, they cut vertically the existing internal structures and led to the emergence of such, but this process did not eliminate old structures rather they transformed it.

¹⁷ Veinstein, 'On the Çiftlik Debate', p. 42.

In practice, the provisions of the *şer'i* and customary law did not grant private property rights over arable land. Although the actual ownership of miri land was not "categorically" recognized until the promulgation of the Emlâk-ı Sırfa Nizamnamesi in 1874, Ergenç argues that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, peasants began to perceive and treat their usufruct and tenure rights over their land as private property.¹⁸ In this process, long-term usufruct rights across generations played a crucial role in overcoming the limitations posed by the absence of private property rights over land.¹⁹ What strengthened the process of land commodification was that the claim to the usufruct began with the *sahib-i arz tezkiresi/temessükü* (the certificate of permission to use the land by landowner), but could not be terminated by a third party.²⁰ The cumulative result of these earlier developments in land tenure, Ergenç contends, were crucial to understanding the forms they took in the nineteenth century, as the previous two centuries were the preparatory phase that gave birth to the articles inserted in various regulations and codes in the nineteenth century.²¹

The relative security over long term land usufruct must have been a factor in the increase in land investment by urbanites. Especially after the implementation of the *malikane-mukataa* (life term tax farming) system in 1695, the extension of credit relations and cash reserves available to investor local notables facilitated their land acquisition investments. Allocation of state revenues with certain immunities from the interventions of provincial officials further empowered local men of power to join this

¹⁸ Özer Ergenç, "XVII ve XVIII. Yüzyıl Anadolu'sunda Toprak Tasarrufu ve Mülkiyeti Üzerine Değerlendirmeler," in idem, *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları: Şehir, Toplum, Devlet* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012), p. 217.

¹⁹ Ergenç, "XVII ve XVIII. Yüzyıl Anadolu'sunda Toprak Tasarrufu ve Mülkiyeti Üzerine Değerlendirmeler," p. 217.

²⁰ Ergenç, "XVII ve XVIII. Yüzyıl Anadolu'sunda Toprak Tasarrufu ve Mülkiyeti Üzerine Değerlendirmeler," p. 240.

²¹ Ergenç, "XVII ve XVIII. Yüzyıl Anadolu'sunda Toprak Tasarrufu ve Mülkiyeti Üzerine Değerlendirmeler," p. 241.

newly calibrated revenue extraction system.²² Moreover, the secondary tax farmers of the *malikane mukataa* system and that of imperial waqfs even assumed the rights and powers granted to the first owners, which gave them more authority than in the case of the earlier *iltizam* contracts.²³ With the passage of time, local elites and notables participated in the network of the new tax collection method as minor tax farmers operating in their respective localities.²⁴ Geared with this new financial means, they could further extent their involvement in the local credit networks especially by advancing loans to peasants.²⁵ Furthermore, the widespread adoption of the *malikane-mukataa* system, which, as Ergenç notes, extended *serbestiyet* even to the smallest village.²⁶ Defined upon the two legal principals as *maktû'u'l-kadem* (exclusion of local administrators from tax units) and *mefrûzü'l-kalem* (exclusion of taxes from the control of local administrators), *serbestiyet* further eased the encroachment of these new tax-farmers into rural communities.²⁷ The expansion of the *serbestiyet* through *malikane mukataa* system over all types of agricultural land enabled the formation and expansion of *çiftlik*s with large arable lands in favor of the wealthy.

²² Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2012), pp. 106–16. Halil İnalcık, "Military and fiscal transformation of the Ottoman empire, 1600–1700", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 6. (1980), p. 329.

²³ Mehmet Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikane Sistemi," in idem, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Devlet ve Ekonomi*, vol. 3 (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2012), p. 108.

²⁴ Bruce McGowan, "The age of the ayans, 1699-1812," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, Halil İnalcık with Donald Quataert (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 661.

²⁵ İrfan Kokdaş, "Money, peasant mobility, *çiftlik*s, and local politics in Salonika, 1740-1820," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 34 (2014), p. 137.

²⁶ Özer Ergenç, "XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Taşra Yönetiminin Mâli Nitelikleri," in idem, *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları: Şehir, Toplum, Devlet* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012), p. 382.

²⁷ For *serbestiyet* see Özer Ergenç, "Osmanlı'da 'Serbest Dirlik' Uygulamasının Boyutları ve Bunun Mali-İktisadi Faaliyetlerin Düzenlenmesindeki Yeri," in idem, *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları: Şehir, Toplum, Devlet* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012), pp. 204-206.

Eventually, it has come to the level that the century is referred to as the “age of the ayans”.²⁸ Current literature on the subject has proven this denomination thanks to a number of engaged studies. In traditional interpretations, their empowerment has been viewed as the dissolution of imperial authority and the decline of the Ottoman Empire's political power, as their sole source of power was the oppression of subjects in their respective localities.²⁹ The growing influence of local magnates, on the other hand, is often seen as an indicator of declining central control.³⁰ However, Yaycioğlu relocates them as active agents reshaping the broader scene of social, economic and administrative contours in their respective localities, often in ‘partnership’ with the imperial governance.³¹ Nagata's detailed analysis of the Karaosmanoğlu notable family highlights the importance of establishing waqfs for protecting and transferring wealth, ensuring the continuation of their properties across generations.³² However, their economic power as he argues, rested more on tax farming operations than on their investments in çiftlik.³³

On the other hand, our knowledge of less visible local magnates with respect to their origins and economic activities is rather limited and some others has superficially analyzed. While an attempt in locating and finding such families is constrained by the existing archives, general arguments drawn upon that material is

²⁸ Bruce McGowan, ‘The age of the Ayans, 1699-1812’, In *An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, edited by H. Inalcik and D. Quataert, 759-946. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 637-758.

²⁹ Yücel Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda âyânlık*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2014).

³⁰ Halil İnalcık, “Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration,” in *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Islamic History*, ed. Thomas Naff and Roger and Owen (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), 27–52.

³¹ Ali Yaycioğlu, *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016). p. 118.

³² Yuzo Nagata, “Ayan in Anatolia and the Balkans during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: A case study of the Karaosmanoğlu family.” In A. Anastasopoulos (Ed.). *Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire, Halcyon Days in Crete V: A Symposium Held in Rethymno*, Antonis Anastasopoulos (ed.), 10-12 January 2003 (Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2005). pp. 269-295.

³³ Yuzo Nagata, *Tarihte âyânlar: Karaosmanoğulları üzerine bir inceleme*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997).

further restricted. Yet, as Khoury rightly argues most of our knowledge have been derived by the ones who had their political effect clearly felt by the center and through which one tries to define features of provincial power holders.³⁴ Even if it is challenging to detect smaller local elites and notables, analyses of their economic and political undertakings would be illuminating the socio-economic fabric of micro-centers, or localities since they were actively engaging in any sector of their respected regions. The number of the microcenters were numerous but overshadowed by the prominent ones whose numbers are few.

Recent studies have broadened our knowledge on both the internal workings of these fiscal entities in different local settings and their importance in the political economy of the Ottoman agrarian structure. Our understanding has deepened, particularly concerning the internal mechanisms and labor organization within these units, as well as their position within the local agrarian structure. Additionally, insights into the identities of landholders, the mechanisms driving their expansion, and the role of the state in the *çiftlik* market have become more comprehensive. By stressing the economic role of rural hinterland of Salonica, Kokdas argued how the peasant's sought protection from banditry and over taxation by settling in the *çiftliks* and the importance of sharecropping contracts (*muzaraa*) in these units.³⁵ His findings also corroborates with the analyzes of Papastamatiou who analyzed the probate-inventories of Salonica from 1697 to 1770 concluded that the investors of landed estates mainly conducted by military urban elites of Salonica intensified in the regions' hinterland.³⁶ As for the

³⁴ Dina Rizk Khoury, "The Ottoman Centre versus Provincial Power-Holders: An Analysis of the Historiography," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 138.

³⁵ Kokdas, "Money, peasant mobility, çiftliks, and local politics in Salonika, 1740-1820," pp. 135-146.

³⁶ Demetrios Papastamatiou, "The structure, content and development of large estates in the environs of Salonica during the period 1697-1770," in *Festschrift in Honor of Ioannis P. Theodorides. II. Studies on the Ottoman Empire and Turkey*, Evangelia Balta, Georgios Salakidis, and Theoharis Stavrides (eds.) (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2014), pp. 375-402.

internal workings of *çiftlik*s, Parveva demonstrated that in the district of Sofia, farmhands such as *ter oğlanı* (hired workers) and *ortakçı* (sharecropper) seemed to be made use of by the *çiftlik* holders.³⁷ The relationship between tax-farming and the expansion of *çiftlik*s in imperial waqf is discussed by Öncel who stressed the contention between absentee (Esma Sultan) and local landlords (Ali Paşa and his entourage) over the control of *mukataa*.³⁸ Lastly, Yıldız discussed the redistributive role of the empire not as a passive watcher but as an effective actor regulating *çiftlik* market amongst the local notables of Yenişehir.³⁹

However, the above arguments of 1970s and 80s often relied on scarce empirical data and most of the points raised left unsubstantiated, limiting their ability to comprehensively explain a-the long-term transformation of land tenure patterns, b-production relations and labor forms in and outside of the *çiftlik*s, and c-the formation and consolidation of landed estates as three interrelated processes within the context of commercialization of agricultural production through the illicit wheat trade. Apart from the need to analyze new settings with new empirical data for each point covered so far, a detailed study is still awaited on the existence of a strong correlation between a-indebtedness of the peasantry by local elites and notables, b-capitalization of peasant debt in the acquisition of property by lenders local notables to establish large landed-estates as investments. The main aim of the study and its contribution will be achieved through substantiating mentioned processes taking place in the eighteenth century in different local settings.

³⁷ Stefka Parveva, “On some features of the portrait of *çiftlik* hired workers in the seventeenth–mid-eighteenth century,” *Études Balkaniques*, 4 (2015), 23–74.

³⁸ Fatma Öncel, “Land, tax and power in the Ottoman provinces: the *malikane-mukataa* of Esma Sultan in Alasonya (c. 1780-1825),” *Turkish Historical Review*, 8 (2017), 54–74.

³⁹ Aysel Yıldız, “Politics, economy, and *çiftlik*s: the history of four *çiftlik*s in Larissa (Yenişehir-i Fener),” *Turkish Historical Review*, 11 (2020), 28-65.

First, the demand for Ottoman wheat among Western European states increased significantly due to rising prices driven by supply and demand imbalances within the continent. Despite the Ottoman Empire's prohibition on wheat exports, this surge in demand led to the growth of an illicit wheat trade during the eighteenth century. Second, this external demand, primarily from England and France, coincided with a transformation in the Ottoman Empire's tax collection methods. Third, while large landed-estate agriculture played a role in the commercialization of wheat, it was not the sole factor. The commercialization process had already begun in the 1690s, primarily through the accumulation of yields from autonomous peasantry via direct purchasing methods. These points, specifically the last one, further challenges the previous claims that the Ottoman empire was peripheralized through subjugation built upon the following line of premises as single type of crop was enforced on the peripheralizing empire's lands where experienced enserfment of the peasant communities in çiftlik units under the urban investor capitalists. The illicit wheat trade had been conducted only on one-direction, from the empire to the Western states. Therefore, the rise in raw material exports like wheat did not necessitate the compulsory import of finished products for the empire. Fourthly, the establishment of large çiftliks was mostly done in a legal way, namely by acquiring the peasants' arable land, practically by combination of multiple çifts through purchase, but what is reflected as legal may not be "fair". Although there are strong indications that the çiftthane system remained physically intact during the eighteenth century, its effectiveness diminished over the century as local elites and notables consolidated these multiple çifts and established çiftliks, gradually gaining increasing control over production and labor. From this point onward, the question of which party exerts

influence over the yield of what was once protected by the timar system matters most and determines whether çiftthane was in its form of classical period or not.

Another point must be addressed in this literature is the temporality aspect of the historical processes. By the end of the eighteenth century, considerable portion of the autonomous peasant cultivators had been absorbed into these units. The initial biased approach in early literature regarding the transformation of land tenure and production relations in these units was to view the process as uniform and standard.

Drawing conclusions by examining developments in the nineteenth century led to the mistaken belief that the situation had always been the same in preceding centuries. However, scrutiny of the two centuries before the nineteenth reveals a different picture, whereby in the early eighteenth century, while çiftliks, which accommodated large tracts of arable land, were being consolidated, so-called free villages and autonomous peasants still existed per se.

1.2. Methodology and Sources

In translating the data into a historical narrative, the following methodological path was followed. First, representative documents were selected from an extensive pool of sources and subjected to content analysis. Although the aim is to communicate in the language of the Ottoman Empire, this is not a mere source fetishism, but rather an attempt to approach a large amount of empirical data in a very detailed analytical way by engaging in critical evaluation rather than taking them at face value. In other words, while each centrally produced document reflects the mentality of the imperial circle of justice through either explicit or implicit references, the formulaic and abstract nature of these points casts shadow on the hidden agenda that reflects recognition of the de facto situations occurring in the empire. Second, the primary

sources of general character such as firmans have been cross-checked with other primary sources, composed administrative and fiscal registers, for example with the more organic source, locally produced court registers, to check the implications of a given order on a certain state of doing for the regions under scrutiny. Third, the data obtained from this analysis was then generalized to the period and the *memalik-i mahruse* using the inductive method. Hence, it is argued that the conclusions were valid in certain parts of Rumelia and Western Anatolia, while they may not be valid for the Arabian Peninsula and Eastern Anatolia.

The analysis will be conducted on two levels: macro and micro. At the macro level, I will examine the broader implications and effects of the expanding illicit wheat trade on the Ottoman Empire's wheat policy across its domains. I will then turn to the micro level to examine the patterns observed at the imperial scale. At the micro level, I will conduct an in-depth analysis of Karaferye, the wider hinterland of Salonica and Bergama in Western Anatolia in the context of the economic incentives of local elites and notables in capitalizing peasant's debt to acquire property and in their ventures in the illicit wheat trade. The town of Karaferye will serve as the focus of our analysis, as it offers a microcosm for conducting a chronological analysis of the fundamental tenets of rural economy. These include the emergence of local elites, the impact of rural indebtedness on property acquisition, and the establishment of *çiftlik*s over the two hundred years leading up to the eighteenth century, due to the superior level of detailed data available. This allows for an in-depth analysis, making it particularly representative of such developments in other regions as unit of analysis by providing an opportunity to evaluate whether other regions may have experienced similar processes before the eighteenth century.

The main reason was related to the purpose of the study; one of the central arguments is that developments in the eighteenth century were due to changes in the internal dynamics and demands of the western states that had entered the manufacturing phase in Europe. These demands were most intense in Rumelia and Western Anatolia due to their proximity to the commercial markets. From the beginning of the seventeenth century, *çiftlik* units were established in the rural hinterland of Karaferye. By the eighteenth century, the most prominent landed elite families in the town had their roots before the 1480s. However, the lack of data on other regions limits similar analyses. Thus, examining these patterns from the sixteenth century onward not only delineates the dynamics of *çiftlik* establishment and consolidation in three phases represented by three centuries but also allows for an in-depth investigation into whether similar trajectories unfolded in the broader regions of Salonica and Bergama in Western Anatolia prior to the eighteenth century. This investigation is particularly necessary since these regions experienced similar processes as Karaferye in the consolidation of local elites and notables, the use of debt in large-estate formation, and the commercialization of agricultural production through the illicit wheat trade in the eighteenth century.

For the mentioned aim, there are available primary sources that this study heavily relies on. But it is important to acknowledge at the beginning that the practical realization of the objectives is significantly affected by the inherent limitations and pitfalls present in the available documents. Therefore, it will try to minimize the limitations by using as many different sources as possible, again in the context of the realities of the time in which they were produced.

First, for each of the regions under study, the available miscellaneous documents in the various fonts of the Ottoman archives have been used in related parts

from the second half of the seventeenth century onwards. Also, various mhimme registers, and maliye ahkam registers specific to the eighteenth century were used for all the regions under study. In addition, the wider hinterland of Salonica and Bergama in western Anatolia will be examined specifically for the eighteenth century.

All available cases in the series of court registers of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and the first quarter of the nineteenth century of Karaferye in 126 court registers in total were analyzed. Most of them (112 defters) located in Macedonia Prefecture Archives in Selanik, 13 of them were in the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Directorate of State Archives Ottoman Archives and one defter numbered 2A located in ISAM. This is especially necessary to analyze long-term patterns and to conduct prosopographical research, such as revealing local elites and their family ties, as well as their affiliations with other local elites, their capital transfers over generations, and the transformation of land tenure. Since Karaferye was the only town in the wider Selanik region whose legal affairs were handled by its own court, it has separate court registers that have the potential to serve as a reference point for the aforementioned process. For the sixteenth century, the available material on Karaferye also consisted of detailed and summary tax surveys (mufassal ve icmal tahrir defterleri) covering the period between 1499 and 1567 (8 defters), a waqf survey, a revenue register, an inspection register, and two timar (military fief) allocation registers. For the seventeenth century, a detailed and a summary avarız register (mufassal ve icmal-avarız tahrir defterleri) were helpful to support other materials.

As for the Selanik hinterland, unlike Karaferye, there were not any independent court registers of the other Selanik towns, as all were a kadıship under the jurisdiction of Selanik court. Among the court registers of Selanik located in Macedonia Prefecture Archives in Selanik, 26 of them were used for the broader hinterland of Selanik to

scrutinize its local notables' economic incentives together with mhimme registers. For the Bergama region in Western Anatolia, again various mhimme registers alongside with miscellaneous documents constitute the main body of the primary sources. Lastly, from the Home Office department of British National Archives, the register numbered 42/53 was used.

On the other hand, one cannot still escape without gaps in analyses during lengthy period. The situation reflects to some extent, the signs of a happy marriage, but not without problems.⁴⁰ If a unit of archival material is fragmented and incomplete, especially to follow certain individuals, it causes more trouble than it helps. In addition to the type of registers and documents available for the seventeenth century, waqf documents, dated to seventeenth and eighteenth centuries provide indirect and direct data in building connections with that of previous centuries over certain names. Even if it does not provide detailed information on each century, it allows to keep track on both the features of proprietorship in certain villages and on the families' venture in the *longue duree*.

However, this study has deliberately distanced itself from the memoranda of the reformist elites and the chronicles of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, leaving the narratives of the central bureaucrats in the background but focusing on the local dynamics. Since there are many aspects that can be considered as weaknesses in the explanations of the central bureaucrats, such as their narrow filters, and the possibility of the incoming information that might have been also filtered for political reasons, and they themselves filter what would otherwise be outspoken could lead to the end of their career or any further step in the claims of a

⁴⁰ Amy Singer, "Tapu Tahrir Defterleri and Kadı Sicilleri: A Happy Marriages of Sources," *Tarih Arařtırmaları Dergisi* 1 (1990): 95–125. The problem here is the absence of court registers in the sixteenth century together with survey registers for Karaferye.

bureaucrat as follower of his patron could harm him. In other words, this will be the attempt of diverging the focus from the capital Istanbul and urban centers to the rural hinterland of the provinces.

In this quartet of economic interrelationships, this dissertation delves into the different forms of labor in land disposition, since even if the landowners disappeared, the cultivators and their legal status would continue, but one would see the gradual eradication of peasant autonomy in favor of the landowners in relations of production. This overall picture will be a prelude to understanding the history of Ottoman agriculture in the nineteenth century. These discussions will be touched upon in the concluding section.

By not limiting its analysis to the eighteenth century regarding the impact of the illicit trade of wheat later in the next century, it argues that contrary to what has been suggested in the literature, it was the illicit trade of wheat that laid the groundwork for the Anglo-Ottoman convention of 1838 regarding invalidation of monopoly in wheat which came to represent the beginning of the collapse of the provisionist/command economy in the nineteenth century. In this context, the 1838 treaty is not the beginning, but the form and outcome of a long-term development in wheat and the shape it took in the realities of nineteenth century.

Despite the very existences of large *çiftlik*s, equating commercialization phenomenon over the existence of production units like *grundherrschaft* (plantation) is the immediate result of disregarding the very impact of illicit trade in this process and would automatically overlooking the inclusion of the still autonomous peasant's yield into the illicit wheat trade on the one hand, and thus led to the reduction of what defined as a typical Balkan *çiftlik* was a rental operation and that their owners were

not entrepreneurs.⁴¹ The expansion of illicit wheat trade, it is by nature aimed at profiting, led its main instigators, mostly local elites and notables, encompassing all the strata from judges to the villagers to search for ways to get profit. The empires' pricing mechanism was also propelling factor for the escape of the wheat due to the higher price offerings of the foreign merchants. To do that, they not only inclined towards çiftlik establishment but also increasingly purchase the yield of other autonomous peasants to make as much profit as they could. It is true that the latter were more of a result of tax farming operations that allowed first-hand interference and direct contact with privileges for the peasants' yield, most probably, by joining them into this operation not only as exploited static actors but also as unequal partners. Although the establishment of large çiftliks contributed positively to the surplus, the commercialization of agricultural produce through the illicit wheat trade was not restricted to the formation of large estates.

The expansion of the illegal wheat trade can be characterized in two periods. This periodization was based on the inference from the considerable number of prohibitions and such related documents issued during the period. While many of them point to the expansion of the activity, they lack detailed information about the actors, the amounts sold and the identities of foreign merchants.⁴² Hence, the selected exemplary ones will be utilized with respect to the unit of analysis in this dissertation. The first phase, spanning roughly from 1690s to the 1720s, when large çiftliks were

⁴¹ McGowan, 'Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600–1800', p. 79.

⁴² The firmans in general character apart from locally recorded ones that came to be registered in mühimme registers refer broader regions that contains also these regions and issued little earlier. It is certain that these general ones were recorded in the court registers of a given region where the illicit activity takes place. But because of the missing series of the defters, or pages which might also be the case, one fails precisely setting the date. It is both impossible and unnecessary to establish precise dates, as the periods observed here are consistent with the general situation, as reflected in many other similar documents whether locally or centrally produced.

not yet dominant, investors commercialized the wheat by buying the yield of independent peasant producers through direct purchasing methods, such as *selem* and debt bondages alongside their own modestly sized *çitliks*. The second phase, beginning around the post-1720s, saw *çitliks* increasingly used for surplus extraction, although direct purchasing methods remained an important tool. The second phase was distinguished by a notable increase in the permissions granted for the sale of wheat, which occurred concurrently with a reduction in the issuance of prohibitions.

It must be mentioned that as the ‘integration’ was taken as concomitant only with the large estate formation for agricultural commodities with a reductionist approach in the previous literature, the timing of the integration perceived to be started earlier than Western Anatolia. When wheat is concerned, the integration of Western markets and the empire was based on mutual commercial interests rather than one economic zone dominating the other. Since in Western Anatolia, the lack of large agricultural estates compared to Balkans at the turn of the century was offset by direct purchasing methods applied to get the yield of still autonomous peasants. This method had been increasingly used throughout eighteenth and nineteenth century. The dimension of this change has been perceived differently, especially in the interrelationships between production units and their extent and, more importantly, the type of peasant labor used in these units. Additionally, it will be possible to examine the existence and variety of labor forms, rather than only the illegally dispossessed serf-like labor typically attributed to the units in these arguments specific to eighteenth century.

Finally, this dissertation adds another layer of analysis to understand the three interrelated processes that shaped the rural economy of the eighteenth century, namely peasant indebtedness, the consolidation of large estates, and the expansion of the illicit

wheat trade, specific to the three phases of imperial responses to these newly emerging dispositions that overstepped the bounds of customary law and sharia. Conceptually, these are prohibition, expansion, and normalization, in that order. The first is an attempt to prohibit the activity in question in order to contain it. In the second phase, as the prevalence of that activity increases, so do the prohibitive actions of the empire. In the third phase, the bureaucracy, having failed in its attempts to eradicate it, tacitly recognizes and normalizes this activity by legalizing it through the imposition of new taxes. These phases unveil in each of the above-mentioned determinant process at varying degrees and will be touched upon in related sections.

1.3. Chapter Outline

This dissertation analyzes the transformation of agrarian relations and emergence of different forms of land tenure within the framework of *çiftlik*s (landed estates), local elites and notables, and commercial agriculture with Karaferye, Salonica and Bergama in the Western Anatolia serving as primary case studies in the eighteenth century. It consists of four main chapters.

The first chapter illustrates the widespread nature of illicit wheat (*hunta* or *buğday*) trade in the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire, amidst evolving urban-rural trade dynamics. It explores the shift from the empire's command economic policy regarding wheat, driven by foreign and domestic demand. It examines the process of expansion in the illicit wheat trade at the macro-level and it analyzes the impact of these changes on the transformation of the rural structure of the empire.

The second chapter delves into the emergence of landed-estates, local elites, and the consolidation of their social, economic, and cultural capital in a chronological order. It places particular emphasis on the period spanning from the late-fifteenth

century to the late seventeenth century in Karaferye. Special attention will be given to the administrative posts, held by the members of the elite families, *çiftlik* portfolios and analysis on their forms of capital transfer.

The third chapter builds on the second by examining the economic dispositions and the administrative and political effectiveness of local elites in Karaferye. It examines the formation of large estates (*ekabir çiftlik*s) in the eighteenth century, shaped by changes in tax collection methods and rural indebtedness. This chapter analyzes different labor types on these estates and traces the changing legal status of peasants, and legality of establishing *çiftlik*s during the eighteenth century.

The fourth chapter shifts focus to the commercialization of agriculture through the illicit wheat trade, using detailed case studies from Karaferye, Selanik, and the Bergama region of Western Anatolia. It explores how the expansion of the large *ekabir çiftlik* market and changes in trade mentality among the subjects drove these activities. It examines common themes from Karaferye, particularly the impact of peasant indebtedness on the large *çiftlik* investments of local notables in these regions. The concluding chapter engages in discussion of the findings and analyzes on the cumulative result of the preceding chapters on the following century

CHAPTER II

SHIFTING SANDS: THE EMPIRE'S EVOLVING WHEAT

POLICY AND ILLICIT WHEAT TRADE

‘... ve bu kesretin bir killeti dahi olmak melhûzıyla akıbetkarinizi fıkır itmeyerek kitaben ve sünneten ve icmâen adavetleriyle memur olduğumuz harbi keferesiyle ---- memnu olan zehairin bey’ ve şirasını ifrat üzere eylediğiniz samia-i mülûkaneme tevessülден olub reha ve gala ızrârdan olmağla biri ma’dum oldukta aheri mevcud olmak adet-i cariyauallahîye idüğü cümle indinde müsellemler ve hazret-i Yusuf ala tebennîya ve aleyhi efdalü’s salavat ve’s-selam zamanında yedi sene reha ve yedi sene kaht-u gala olduğu nass-ı kerîm-i furkaniyye ile müsbet ve müberrihin olub...’.⁴³

At first glance, the above group of sentences, constitute a part in a document, may appear to be ordinary phrases dropped on paper by the tip of a certain man's pen seating in one of the *kalemiye* bureaus, simply reflecting to the importance of a staple food in terms of its availability or non-availability. Again, one would also immediately figure out that the very reason of the above-quoted endeavor was the sale of the wheat illicitly to the foreign merchants. It is very-well known that the seat of the empire came in the first place in wheat acquisition with its crowded population. But there were also others whose demand, one quit rightly to think, led to the issuance of such orders in

⁴³ Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Directorate of State Archives Ottoman Archives (hereinafter, BOA) C.İKTS 34/1653 (Evasıt-ı Zilhicce 1168 / September 1755). ‘...with ignorance that this abundance could have a scarcity, without pondering on the aftermath, we have been appointed by the premises of Quran, of sunna and of the consensus of ummah against the enemies of Islam, whom we are charged to confront, to observe your excessive indulgence in sale of wheat of which was prohibited came to my ears, as abundance and scarcity might be incentives for harm and it is a divine tradition that when one falls, the other rises; this has been recognized and accepted through divine law, as was the case during the time of Prophet Yusuf, peace be upon him, where seven years of abundance were followed by seven years of famine, as stated in the noble Qur'an...’.

excessive numbers especially in the eighteenth century. One year prior to the issuance of this somewhat critical order, and in the preceding years, the yield of Rumelia was reported to be overabundant. However, in this particular year, the yield was not that much plentiful, and there is no guarantee that the crop will be abundant or even existent in the following year. Therefore, the *hinta bid'ati* (newly invented tax on the export of wheat) was abolished out of compassion for the plight of the peasants, as a precaution against possible crop failure in the following year.⁴⁴ What was the process that led to the abolition of this tax even though it was declared to be beneficial to the treasury? In the first place, what were the underlying processes that led to the imposition of this tax under the terminology of *bid'at*. This term accounted for newly emerged acts, and it had not been contained before by the provisions of *örfi* and *şer'i* law.⁴⁵ Were there other similar shifts that challenged the old rules of wheat policy? What were the reasons for the process understood in the wording of this edict, which is even more religiously motivated and rigorously condemns the activity than the previous ones? Could it be that only the traditional responses of the state changed, and did the subjects actively involved in this process remain unaffected? If not, what became more pronounced in the economic dispositions of the subjects that differed from those of previous periods?

This chapter explores the dichotomy between old and new policies in imperial wheat policy as reflecting a deeper split within the commanding 'old order'. At times, these policies conformed to traditional practices, while at other times, due to contextual factors, they conflicted with newly emerging approaches. This split also

⁴⁴ Ibid. '...bu mülahazâta mebnî hinta bid'atî rûsumundan ezmâne-i salîfede hazine-i amireye katî vafîr menafî' adet olur iken mutlaka teb'a-yı refah-ı ibadullah için ref' olunup...'.
⁴⁵ Halil İnalcık, *Adaletnameler, Belleten* II 3-4, 1965. pp. 53-54. *Bid'at* is newly emerged state of doing that is contrary to the law, custom, *şer'i* law and the imperial registers.

manifested itself in the process of landed estate expansion and peasant indebtedness. As for the subjects, they were also involved in this change as shapers of the process with their own economic tendencies. The extent of this have reached a level that characterizes a new group of entrepreneurs in their attempt to create capital.

The eighteenth century is often regarded as a transitional period leading into the nineteenth century, during which the emergence of the modern state became increasingly apparent. However, it has equally been overlooked, perhaps due to the perception of the century as a time characterized by practices that may not be readily understood at first glance and can be mistakenly regarded as static and unchanging. However, the strength of certain reflexes from the past sometimes hampers our understanding of the changes that, while not unique to the eighteenth century, have become more pronounced. The undeniable nature of change also applies to this century, but the transformation was not without its conflicts reflected in the governing mind of the empire of which are also manifested in this opaque process. It is important to note that the pains, which are characterized by prohibition or recognition of newly emerging dispositions were not isolated events, but rather a result of the broader transition. The analysis will begin by examining the path of wheat policy in the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth century, especially in relation to its expanding process of illicit trade, resulted with the issuance of such a document in 1755.

The unstable nature of the Mediterranean climate, which was occasionally apt to drought, led wheat to fall in the category of a scarce commodity (*kit meta'*). Especially after sixteenth century, the empire began much more concerned about controlling trade of certain products in her domain. For wheat, it followed a much stricter policy to confine the export of certain products and made a great effort to keep the policy intact to prevent possible negative outcomes of bad harvests and to minimize

the risks of inadequate production of some raw materials. In the primary sources, these type of strategic products were called as *memnu' meta* and thus their export was *yasak* (prohibited).⁴⁶ There were eight crucial basic commodities in the empire which were subject to export prohibition most of the time unless occasional permission was granted: cotton, gunpowder, weapon, horse, leather, wax, cotton waste and wheat.⁴⁷ Moreover, such products strategic in the sense that their exportation ban would also provide leverage to the empire against its political rivals.

In pre-modern Empires and states, including the Ottoman Empire, the economic foundation rested on the integration of rural areas and cities.⁴⁸ Rural regions contributed cereals and animal products, while cities supplied finished goods. This mutual exchange could only be bypassed after meeting their respective needs. Once these needs were fulfilled, commodities could then be channeled to other regions or outside the empire. Evaluating the bureaucratic and military success of the fief system during the classical period one can assert that its effectiveness relied on maintaining this interdependent relationship between rural and urban areas.

In this production distribution system, the actors of long-distance trade were officially appointed merchants who holds the *berat* of the Sultan to bring necessitated products from abroad into the *memalik-i mahruse*. The rest could not carry out the long-distance trade without the certificate, which was a regulation concordant with the mentioned system.

⁴⁶ Zeki Arıkan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İhracı Yasak Mallar (Memnu Meta)” in *Prof. Dr. Bekir Kütükoğlu'na Armağan*, İstanbul: 1991, pp. 279-306.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 291-299.

⁴⁸ Özer Ergenç, *XVI. Yüzyılda Ankara ve Konya*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012). p. 116.

2.1. Commanding the Wheat in the Empire

The Ottoman Empire tried to prevent illicit trade of wheat implicitly in two ways: first, establishing a network of supply chain for feeding Istanbul. It was made obligatory for any merchant carrying cereal to the city to be officially appointed to prevent produced wheat from being bought by *madrabaz* (scalper) or foreign merchants; second, building systematic roads as well as maintaining and safeguarding them.⁴⁹ In the economic policy of the Empire, supplying Istanbul with wheat without interruption was a priority. Insomuch that the grand vizier himself inspected bakeries and the quality, reserve and prices of wheat and bread on a weekly basis.⁵⁰ The aim was to supply wheat and bread at affordable prices for subjects to preclude any possibility of famine in such a crowded capital.⁵¹ This attitude also applied to every province and locality of the empire, prevalent in the form of a provisionist economy, leading to a policy of maintaining a continuous supply of cheap commodities of a good quality in which exportation was mostly restricted and importation was fostered.⁵² For this reason, to feed the capital, the Empire commissioned acquisition agents (*mübayaacı*) or independent merchants who were bringing the required amounts of cereals to the central grain market of Istanbul, *kapan*. They were also called as *kapan tüccarı* (kapan merchants) and granted official licenses to make purchases from designated official docks in cereal production zones especially from the Danube and Black Sea regions for Istanbul.⁵³ If the demand was not able to be fulfilled then these

⁴⁹ This policy also called as *ocaklık* (designation of certain regions for their capacity to dispatch constant allotment of specific goods or services). For instance, cereals of Deşt-i Kıpçak and livestock of Wallachia was spared only for Istanbul's subsistence. See "Ocaklık", İA, 33, İstanbul 2007, pp. 317-318

⁵⁰ Halil İnalcık, "The Ottoman State: economy and society, 1300-1600", p. 183-184.

⁵¹ Tevfik Güran, "İstanbul'un İaşesinde Devletin Rolü (1793-1839)," İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası 44, no. 1-4 (1986).

⁵² Mehmet Genç, "State and the Economy in the Age of Reforms: Continuity and Change" *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey* (ed. Kemal H. Karpat), (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2000), pp. 180-188.

⁵³ Op, cit., p. 252.

agents went to western Anatolian and coastal areas of Mediterranean regions.⁵⁴ As the century progressed, population growth forced the empire to devise solutions to maintain the grain distribution chain from soil to customer.⁵⁵ Recognizing the importance of timely grain delivery, the imperial navy remained on standby during hardships. Consequently, in addition to privately (*sermayeli*) and state-financed (*iştirâ*) grain acquisition, privateer ships were increasingly leased for timely transport to needy regions and new granaries constructed to make ready wheat and flour in eighteenth century İstanbul.⁵⁶

The entire process was under the strict control of the *kapân naibi* (market viceroy) who determined the quality, quantity, type of the wheat and ship tonnages for the purchases as well as granting a license to the *kapân* and independent merchants.⁵⁷ For the latter, the judge of İstanbul issued licenses, whose verdicts were checked by the imperial council, upon request. It took the form of a decree that granted permission for the judge and judge's regent in the acquisition region to let and to help merchants purchase the material. Moreover, local notables could be appointed as *mübayaacı* and they were charged with the responsibility to help during the transport and loading. After the process ends, the judge issues the verdict containing the quantity and type of the cereals bought by the merchant to be shown when the ship arrives back in İstanbul market.⁵⁸ The imperial purchases were conducted by the two price control mechanisms of *mirî* and *rayic*. During eighteenth century, these prices remained almost

⁵⁴ Feridun Emecen, "XVI. Asrın İkinci Yarısında İstanbul ve Sarayın İaşesi İçin Batı Anadolu'dan Yapılan Sevkiyat", *Tarih Boyunca İstanbul Semineri, Bildiriler*, İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1989, pp. 197-231.

⁵⁵ Rhoads Murphey, "Provisioning İstanbul: The State and Subsistence in the Early Modern Middle East.," *Food and Foodways* 2, no. April 2013 (1988): 217-63.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 223-232.

⁵⁷ Salih Aynural, *İstanbul Değirmenleri ve Fırınları*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2002). p. 34.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 57.

unchanged.⁵⁹ Moreover, the increasing pace of the inflation which further climbed after the start of the war in 1787 led to the depreciation of Ottoman gurus almost half of its value against Venetian ducat and England sterlin.⁶⁰ In the aftermath of all these turmoils, the empire established Grain Administration for achieving steady supply of grain into the Istanbul. Until that time, the imperial purchases continued through stationary *miri* prices in transactions between wheat producing areas and the Empire, where a town as a whole unit was made responsible to provide a certain number of cereals (*tertip nizamı*). It was not regulated in accordance with the fluctuations in supply, bargaining was not involved, and fixed prices remained unchanged for an extended period of time.⁶¹ Through *rayic* price, it was expected that purchases would be made over standing market prices, but it did not occur. Since the peasants did not have possibility of selling their crops at market prices, obligated to sell at much lower prices, they became unsatisfied with these policies reflection of which became the expanding of illicit wheat trade from the empire. Already decreased value added up with low purchasing prices are the main propellers of the choice of peasants and local capital holders in engaging illicit wheat trade to maximize their gains. Furthermore, to oversee production equilibrium, experiencing an imbalance during times of the absence of raw materials and of severe droughts, or huge population displacements necessitated measurements. The states and empires, exposed to the Mediterranean climate zone, were likely to experience severe droughts since rain falls mostly in autumn and spring while summers suffer from lack of rainfall.⁶² Regarding this, the

⁵⁹ Lyne M. Şaşmaz, "Policing Bread Price and Production in Ottoman Istanbul, 1793-1807," *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 24, no. 1 (2000): 21–40. pp. 22.

⁶⁰ Fatih Yeşil, "İstanbul'un İaşesinde Nizâm-ı Cedîd: Zahirî Nezâreti'nin Kuruluşu ve İşleyişi (1793-1839)." *Türklik Araştırmaları Dergisi* 15 (2004): 113-142. See the footnote numbered 11 in p. 118.

⁶¹ Güran, "İstanbul'un İaşesinde Devletin Rolü (1793-1839)." p. 250.

⁶² Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. Vol. 1, (University of California Press, 1995). p. 238.

Empire was not immune to the problem of harsh conditions of droughts experienced by both Italy and Spain in the sixteenth century.⁶³

Nevertheless, as far as the Ottoman Empire was concerned, the “true” Mediterranean climate as Braudel suggests was influential in the coastal regions of Aegean, Mediterranean and Western part of North Africa.⁶⁴ Thus, climate of inner parts of Western Anatolia and Balkan Peninsula was not completely under the effect of Mediterranean climate zone. That is why long-lasting severe droughts were not experienced by a lack of rainfall during summer and thus, the regions experienced famine could be supplied from other places that experienced good harvests or were able to store cereals from previous harvests if they were not struck by a locust invasion. Notwithstanding the fact, for the Empire, that monitoring the supply of wheat should not be left merely to occasional displacements from one trouble-free place to another distressed area.

The empire sent numerous orders to prevent illicit wheat trade in the eighteenth century. However, these attempts did not go beyond being ineffective warnings. In the illicit trade, the operation rarely occurred along the designated traditional routes. Instead, actors by-passed official roads. By the eighteenth century, the international necessities of supply and demand inevitably led to the integration of states and empires’ economies with each other. This development was crucial in the emergence of Smyrna as a commercial hub for its surroundings and inner Anatolia in the eighteenth century, as mohair yarn from Ankara and silk from Bursa, essential

⁶³ Lütü Güçer, XVI-XVII. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Hububat Meselesi ve Hububattan Alınan Vergiler, (İstanbul: Sermet Matbaası, 1964), pp. 8-10. He shares forty incidences of famines experienced in the Ottoman Empire between the years of 1578-1637. The main reason of the evidenced incidences by the empire’s documents was droughts mostly in coastal regions of Aegean Sea together with Archipelago of which did not last long.

⁶⁴ Op. Cit., p. 232. He sets the limit for “true” Mediterranean climate zone by considering olive tree and palm groves’ cultivation habitat in the Levant.

materials from each area respectively, began to be exported from the port of Izmir.⁶⁵ This development influenced the organization of inner trade routes while minor ports located at the vicinities of the city fell into obsolescence since the Ottoman political authorities made the use of Izmir's port compulsory for merchants rather than using minor ports such as Kuşadası. However, these 'abandoned' minor ports, possessing suitable anchorage, became a send off point for wheat for Europeans.⁶⁶ The above-mentioned control mechanism did not successfully circumscribe the illicit trade of wheat since it was cultivated close to the ports.

Increasing external demand for Ottoman wheat pushed up prices in the Empire. It may be that acquisition of wheat from the Empire was still advantageous for European states. Only if the prices were half of their native country's then they were compelled to buy from other places since the main motivation of long-distance trade of merchants was to purchase low-priced product so as to sell with high prices.⁶⁷ What Braudel argued was also reflected in the documents referring to the sale price of wheat by illicit actor who purchased from peasants with lower prices and sold to foreign merchants at two times higher to the small islands in Aegean Sea from where it was destined to Europe.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Elena Frangakis-Syrett, *The Commerce of Izmir in the Eighteenth Century*, (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992). p. 9.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁶⁷ Braudel, 'The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II', p. 576.

⁶⁸ AE.SMST.III., 2/51 (29 Zilhicce 1184 / 15 April 1771). "*Hassa hasekilerinden bundan mukaddem Yenişehir ayanlarından zahire mübaya'asına memuriyet ile ol canibde iken vefat eden İbrahim Hasekinin mühürlü bir adet sandık derûnunda kati vafır akçası olduğunu ve zikr olunan akçeyi haseki-i mumaiyleh hayatında müste'min taifesine fûruht eylediği zehair ile ahaliden ucuz buğday alup iki kat bahasıyla adalar kayıklarına verdiği zehair bahasından cem' eylediğini ve ba'zı mahzenlerde kendi malı olmak üzere vafır mevcut hintası olduğunu...*". For instance, in Istanbul, the fixed purchasing market price (*narh*) per Istanbul bushel was equal to 20 *akçe*, foreign merchants were paying 60 to 70 *akçe* per bushel. Sureiya Faroqhi, "İstanbul'un İaşesi ve Tekirdağ-Rodosçuk Limanı", *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar*, II (Ankara, 1980), p. 149.

It can be stated that the Empire's price and purchasing policy in favor of the capital left subjects vulnerable to promises of more advantageous options in the form of foreign demand especially in the sixteenth century when the Italian city-states and Spain experienced famine caused by climatic disasters. In Levantine trade, the Ottoman Empire and Republic of Venice were competing over the resources of wheat since the foundation of the former. As being one of the maritime city-states and having a strong navy, Venice had been the sole actor in Levantine trade in the consolidation of its intermediary position for the goods flowing from the eastern part of the Mediterranean to Western states and vice-versa until the emergence of a strong Ottoman presence in the beginning of the sixteenth century.⁶⁹

Except legal bilateral commercial agreements between the two, there was also trade of two types concerning prohibited goods and the other avoiding customs and duties on import-export.⁷⁰ Weaponry and raw materials of military importance became also the subject of illicit trade since Venice could occasionally obtain permissions to export wheat.⁷¹ When Venice failed to do so as it was the case in 1594, it appealed to large-scale importation of Baltic wheats instead of trying to obtain it through the Empire. This incident implies the performance of Ottoman control over the wheat

⁶⁹ Halil İnalcık, 'The Ottoman State: economy and society, 1300-1600'. p. 55.

⁷⁰ Maria Pia Pedani, "Ottoman Merchants in the Adriatic, Trade and Smuggling", *Acta Histriae*, 16, 1-2, (2008), p. 163-167.

⁷¹ H. Saito, "Venice after the Battle of Prevesa (1538). The Smuggling of Greek Wheat and the Confiscation of the Cargos of Captured Foreign Ships" *Mediterranean World*, 17. Tokyo (2004), pp. 79-103. Because of the 1537-1540 war between Venice and Ottomans, serious food crisis emerged in Venice. Since Ottomans prohibited wheat export especially during wartime in addition to periodic bans in peacetime, Venice tried to overcome food shortage by 1) negotiating with a merchant who illicitly acquired wheat from Florence who had wheat export permission, 2) by confiscating Ragusan ships and 3) occasional permission granted for the merchant by the Sultan to buy Greek wheat thanks to the diplomatic activities of a French ambassador. One can infer from this instance that the Ottoman control over export and import of necessary materials in the classical period was effective to the extent that Venice was obliged to handle the problem by other means other than preferring to send off the merchandize directly from the Empire's coastal regions.

supplies in the sixteenth century.⁷² As for the studies focused on such trade from Ottoman Empire, as early as the first decades of the sixteenth century, the activity was present.⁷³ To a large degree Istanbul, Edirne, Bursa and Aegean coastal areas began to suffer from high prices and consequently chronic crop failures in the sixteenth century due to massive illicit trade of livestock and wheat.⁷⁴ It should be stated that the illicit wheat trade was not a new phenomenon but it became consolidated in the eighteenth century for the reasons discussed in the following part. For that capacity, it would not be naïve to periodize the illicit journey of wheat in the Ottoman Empire as 1- the period between fifteenth and end of the sixteenth centuries, the time when the classical state apparatus operating efficiently compared to 2- throughout the eighteenth through to the 1838 when classical period's institutions began to lose their functionality that led to the diminishing central control over provinces especially in the eighteenth century.

The former period was marked mainly by unstable Mediterranean climatic setbacks for Levantine states especially Italy and Spain. While the empirical base of the Braudel still necessitates scrutiny for the 'Ottoman/Muslim' part of the Mediterranean regarding for instance the influx of Baltic grain into the ports of the sea due to the dearth experienced in 1590s, a process accounts for Northern invasion of English and Dutch vessels, the climatic setbacks for the Italian city states seemed the

⁷² Daniel Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550-1650*. Vol. 5. (University of Washington Press, 1954), p. 37.

⁷³ Mücteba İlgürel, "Hububat Kaçakçılığı", CIEPO XIV. Sempozyumu Bildirileri, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2004, pp. 361-369.

⁷⁴ Mustafa Akdağ, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluş ve İnkişafı Devrinde Türkiye'nin İktisadî Vaziyeti", *Belleten*, v.XIII, 51, (1949), p. 512. See Halil İnalcık, 'The Ottoman State: economy and society, 1300-1600', p. 183-184. İnalcık suggest the main cause of the crop failure in Anatolia as the formation of çiftliks that led to the deviation from grain cultivation to animal breeding.

case.⁷⁵ Thus, the main actors appeared to be mostly the Italian city-states.⁷⁶ It was also probable that the part of the load might have well been channeled through Venice into the inner parts of the continent. Whereas the latter period shaped more around changing economic characteristics of both Western European states, namely England and France and Ottoman Empire. The former's demand for wheat had an impact on Ottomans' socio-economic situation as neither the volume nor prevalence and motivations of the incidence with respect to its actors was not that of eighteenth century. Nevertheless, the latter period has been overlooked in the historiography of the empire in parallel with the transformation of land tenure patterns with respect also to the growth of *çiflik* market.

2.2. The Wheat Demand of Western States

From the sixteenth century onwards, Western Europe was experiencing an economic expansion wave that led to the development of capitalist relations of production and soon after, dissolution of feudal mode of production. Although the dispositions vary regionally in Europe, the progress in population, production and long-distance Atlantic trade of western Europe halted in the seventeenth century and began to be referred as century of stagnation and crisis including whole continent until the second half of the eighteenth century.⁷⁷ During the period, on the continent, there

⁷⁵ Colin Heywood, "Beyond Braudel's 'Northern Invasion'? Aspects of the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Fish Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century," *International Journal of Maritime History* 26, no. 2 (2014): 193–209. He states the revision of certain arguments of Braudel, especially in the flow of grain to the Mediterranean ports, relying on the revisionist studies that show that the actual material transferred was luxury goods instead of grain. My assertion regarding the climatic setbacks and the inability of the region to produce grain was based on the findings of this dissertation that in the eighteenth century the ships of English and French merchants arrived for Ottoman wheat. The "belated" invasion was primarily the result of the demand for wheat. p. 198.

⁷⁶ Ibid, pp. 182-187.

⁷⁷ For a detailed discussion on industrial revolution debate See Jan de Vries, "The Economic Crisis of the Seventeenth Century after Fifty Years", *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, V. 40, No. 2, 2009, pp. 151-194. See E. J. Hobsbawm, "The Crisis of the seventeenth Century", *Past & Present*, V. 6, No.1, 1954, pp. 44–65.

emerged economic divergences between northwestern, southern and eastern regions.⁷⁸ Since as early as sixteenth century, English entrepreneurs applied putting out system especially in textile industry in rural areas of the cities where labor was cheap as opposed to Italian city-states and increased output of woolen fabrics that dominated world markets in eighteenth century.⁷⁹ By the sixteenth century, land enclosures in Britain give rise to a landless peasant groups who were began to be employed as wage-laborer in manufacture and agriculture that contributed to the commercialization of the produce that created pressure to find new markets for the finished products. In France, around 1720s, feeding an increasing population, at about twenty million, became the main problem of the country.⁸⁰ In the sixteenth century, French aristocracy made its peasantry tenant farmers. In the seventeenth century, because of the continent-wide stagnation and depression, while some of the aristocrats turned to feudal obligations the others increased the land rents.⁸¹ Mounting pressures on peasantry led them to seek ways in which they could market their extra produce, but underproduction prevented the opportunity, while in Britain, the situation was just the reverse as having the privilege of agricultural productivity especially from the second half of the eighteenth century.⁸² Increasing manufactural production coupled with population growth eventually led to a decrease in rural population of certain western European states while urban population was increasing greatly. By 1800, over twelve million Europeans lived in cities, up from approximately six million in 1650.⁸³ This situation

⁷⁸ Jerome Blum. "The rise of serfdom in Eastern Europe." *The American Historical Review* 62, no. 4 (1957), pp. 807-836.

⁷⁹ Robert C. Allen, *The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 274.

⁸⁰ Pamuk, Şevket. 100 soruda Osmanlı-Türkiye iktisadî tarihi, 1500-1914. Vol. 55. Gerçek Yayınevi, 1988. p. 115.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

⁸² Mark Overton, *Agricultural Revolution in England: The Transformation of the Agrarian Economy 1500-1850*, (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.)

⁸³ Steven M. Beaudoin, "Current Debates in the Study of the Industrial Revolution", *OAH Magazine of History*, V. 15, n.1, 2000, pp. 7-13.

coupled with decreasing cultivated lands in western Europe forced certain states to import foodstuffs for certain states. Britain was the most successful amongst western European states in coping with the problem of supplying necessary amount of subsistence for its urbanized population while France faced with the difficulties in the eighteenth century.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, in Britain, farm output growth paused between 1740-1800 since population and income were growing rapidly that was pushing up the demand for food, in other words, English demand grew faster than English supply.⁸⁵

It is fair to assert that whole western European states experienced to some extent proto-industrialization and eventually complete industrialization that reached its apogee in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, growing urban population due to the industrialization and population as a whole would have crippled the labor spared for agricultural production and thus led to the rise in cereal prices across the continent as 283 percent in Denmark, 259 in Austria, 210 in Germany, 163 in France between 1730s and 1810s.⁸⁶ Consequently, certain states of Western Europe began to look for wheat to meet their domestic demands and thus encountered Ottoman Empire where export of wheat was prohibited since its foundation except for short-term permissions for certain states at particular times. This is the one side of the coin unfolded through the primary documents pertains to the eighteenth century of the Ottoman Empire's subjects about the illicit trade of wheat to the France and England. However, the import demand of these states for wheat in the eighteenth century was far from being of no-

⁸⁴ Robert C. Allen, *The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective*, p. 30.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

⁸⁶ Jerome Blum, *The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 241-242. Blum shares population increase chart in millions between 1750 and 1850, the population went up in most of the European countries; in Germany from 18.9 to 35.4, in France from 22.0 to 34.9, in Denmark from 0.8 to 1.5, in Austrian Monarchy from 18.3 to 34.9, in Russia from 24.0 to 66.3. He argues possible reasons of the price increase in wheat as the gradual effects of the increase in money supplies and de-valued silver coins. Also, he mentions the sharp price increase in land in the eighteenth century as being far more than the rise in manufacturing goods' prices.

account story to be disregarded.⁸⁷ This is attested by the abundant prohibition edicts of wheat on the one hand and the issued firmans due to the realized illicit activities in various localities of the empire.

In the eighteenth century, it appears that France depended on foreign wheat due to occasional risks of famine caused by wars and bad harvests.⁸⁸ Such need once again arose when there was a scarcity of wheat in Western Europe in 1710. As far as the year is concerned, the dearth and the immediate need of wheat must have been the result of Great Frost of 1709, or *le grand hiver* that struck most of the Europe by drastic drops in temperature for at least three-months in winter.⁸⁹ England and France both commissioned their ambassadors to seek permission from the empire to purchase wheat, one month after the other. To meet the demand of England, 18,000 *İstanbuli keyl* (462,5 tons) of wheat were collected from the tax sources of Sultan Süleyman soup-kitchen, located in Gelibolu. This wheat was stored in granaries and about to rot due to the lack of demand for wheat in Gelibolu.⁹⁰ After one month, the Swedish ambassador in the empire once again requested assistance due to the suffering of the Swedish ambassador in France caused by scarcity.⁹¹ In all likelihood, it was the result of this scarcity that France pushed the empire to get considerable amount of wheat in return of a eighty-two anchors destined for the Imperial arsenal in 1710.⁹² While some may argue that this is a diplomatic tactic to obtain wheat, or most probably short-term distress of wheat supply, the demand remains as an important factor would unveil in every occasion during the course of the eighteenth century.

⁸⁷ Deena R. . Sadat, "Rumeli Ayanlari : The Eighteenth Century," The Journal of Modern History 44, no. 3 (1972): p. 349.

⁸⁸ Edhem Eldem, French Trade in Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century (Brill: Leiden, 1999). p. 108.

⁸⁹ W. Gregory Monahan, "Lyon in the Crisis of 1709: Royal Absolutism, Administrative Innovation, and Regional Politics," French Historical Studies 16, no. 4 (1990): 833–48.

⁹⁰ MHM.d. (Bâb-ı Âsafî Divan-ı Hümâyûn Sicillatı Mühimme Defterleri) 116/1213, (Evail Zilkade 1121 / January 1710).

⁹¹ MHM.d. 116/1335, (Evahir Zilhicce 1121 / February 1710).

⁹² Eldem, p. 110.

By the middle of the century, securing official permission through personal connections and the exchange of costly gifts with the empire proved to be a cumbersome process for French merchants, especially during times of wheat scarcity. Additionally, the occasional permissions granted for wheat export were insufficient to meet the demand and resorting to illicit options appeared more effective for France. This is evident in Olivier's travel account, though its reliability as a statistical source is questionable, indicating a significant amount of wheat acquired by France, averaging 933,852 (24,000 tons) bushels between 1750-1754.⁹³ While the exact percentage of illicit wheat trade remains unknown, considering the challenges in obtaining imperial permission, the substantial volume suggests a noteworthy portion must have been illicitly gathered. In fact, even if not conclusive, the records kept by the Ottomans, which will be discussed in the relevant sections, show that this reported amount is not at all an exaggeration. Moreover, the request for 80,000 bushels (2056 tons) of wheat in exchange for two warships in 1750s with the mediation of Baron de Tott from the empire not only highlights France's necessity but also establishes a precedent for wheat acquisition.⁹⁴ Furthermore, the same amount of wheat was requested again due to the scarcity in France almost twenty-four years later.⁹⁵ Ottomans accepted the request because of the perceived good intentions of French nation towards the empire and for the benefit of treasury by reminding the previous acquisition. After one month, the wheat was loaded onto the French captain's ships whose names and their loads were registered in the docks of Golos and Selanik.⁹⁶ the tumultuous times of French Revolution, Olivier contend that 'the French nation was threatened by famine and must not forget the wheat shipment of Ottomans even their

⁹³ Ibid, p. 109. The amount was converted into the equivalent of Istanbul bushel (25.7 kg.).

⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 110.

⁹⁵ C.HR. 113/5607 (27 Zilkade 1187 / 9 February 1774).

⁹⁶ C.HR. 158/7856 (Muharrem 1188 / March 1774).

sources was not abundant'.⁹⁷ As seen, mere official permissions must not have been enough and alternative way of wheat gathering resonated in the form illicit trade in the empire. Thus, a detailed analysis of the Ottoman response to this request will be the focus of the following sections.

2.3 Disintegration of Akreb Bazar System

While the timar system was still operating at capacity in the classical period, the organizational form that affected the ways of agricultural production and distribution was based on a close rural-urban interrelation. Historians contend that from the beginning of the seventeenth century, timariods gradually disappeared from the composition of the army, making way for salaried soldiers due to the changing dynamics of warfare. But were there other processes that accompanied this transformation, and if so, what were their implications for the agrarian structure and how did they take place? The system that created the fiefs had an economic basis rooted in the interaction between the rural and urban spheres, and its essence was based on the obligation to transport the product to the nearest marketplace.⁹⁸ Surprisingly, this aspect of the historical record has received little attention especially in following centuries. The link between the *reaya* and the timariod, integral to the fief system, encompassed the entire production cycle - from cultivation to storage and eventual market transactions.

In the Ottoman Empire, the perception of distance was primarily based on proximity to and distance from the capital, categorized into four main classifications. According to a *kanun* in the *kanun-ı cedit* text, the cities of Akşehir and Konya were

⁹⁷ See footnote number 78 in Eldem, p. 111.

⁹⁸ Lütü Güçer, *XVI-XVII. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Hububat Meselesi ve Hububattan Alınan Vergiler*, (İstanbul: Sermet Matbaası, 1964), pp. 57-58.

considered *mesafe-i vusta* (middle distance), while Aleppo and Damascus were *mesafe-i ba'id* (long distance), and regions like Basra, Bagdad, and Yemen were labeled as *gayet eb'ad* (too distant).⁹⁹ The fourth category is *akreb* (close distance), formed the nucleus of the *akreb bazar* (nearest marketplace) system.

In this production distribution system, instead of transporting crops to the *ba'id bazar* (distant market), each villager in a specific *dirlik* (fiscal district) of a mounted soldier was obligated to take their crops to the nearest marketplace. They were typically located in the town or district centers, within a day's journey from the center production zone. This provision, essential to the timar system, was strictly controlled by kanunnames (law books) issued at various times until the late seventeenth century. The legal provisions reiterated in these law books clearly enforced the system's functioning. Considering kanunnames, not only as a reflection of the Empire's economic mindset but also as indicators of the prevailing circumstances, it becomes apparent that they indisputably express the Empire's aim to establish and maintain a trade network regarding wheat. Suffice it to mention a few of these provisions;

“The reaya, in accordance with the ancient law, shall be obligated to transfer its *öşr* and *sâlâriye* to the nearest bazaar. For the purpose of this provision, 'bazaar' refers to a designated location wherein the sale of grain is conducted and is considered permissible under *şer'i* law, irrespective of the quantity being sold’.¹⁰⁰ More than one-day journey was regarded as distant and it was also made clear in Budin kanunname

⁹⁹ ‘*Re'âyâ, öşür ve sâlâriyelerin akreb bazara iletmek kanun-ı kadîmdir. Ve bazardan murâd galle satılır bazardır ki, anda kalîl ve kesir galle satılmak câiz ola...*’ in Ahmet Akgündüz, Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri-11: III. Ahmed I. Mahmud ve II. Mahmud Devri Kanunnameleri (1703-1839). Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2016. p. 124.

¹⁰⁰ Ahmet Akgündüz, Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri-3: Yavuz Sultan Selim Devri Kanunnameleri. Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1991, pp. 319-320. This same article was inserted regarding Rumeli Eyaleti Kanunnameleri in Akgündüz, Ahmet. Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri-5: Yavuz Sultan Selim Devri Kanunnameleri. Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1993, p. 461.

that ‘the reaya shall not be forced to bring the produce to distant markets within two to three days’ [walk] instead of the nearest one’.¹⁰¹ More nuanced historical source one might state as fatwa compendiums answers a question-like request that ‘[what if a given] waqf reaya agreed to bring the tithe to the nearest bazar; could trustee ask for reaya to bring the öşr to the ba’id bazar’, the answer was no by provincial mufti Pir Mehmed Efendi.¹⁰² These provisions constituted main pillars of the system and serves as an essential part of the provisionist economic mentality, which remained effective until the beginning of the seventeenth century.¹⁰³

In the eighteenth century, as production and trade relations changed, the subjects of the Empire followed the course. With this change and increased foreign demand as well as continuous domestic demand, distressing the *akreb bazar* system that began to struggle as early as the last decades of the seventeenth century. Empire officials of various ranks and the local elite and notable families called muteberan/ayan/hanedan found alternative instruments to acquire extra capital or to make use of their official positions in credit and usury relations to control surplus and land assets in the form of *çiftlik* units in the illicit wheat trade. In a way, capital holder local elites replacing not only the political and social spheres of influence in their respective places but also began to take up the duties once conducted on the premise of timar system by timariots, namely building organic economic relations directly

¹⁰¹ ‘...akreb-i bazara getürtmeyüp iki üç günlük mesâfe ba’id bazarlara getürtmek müzayakasından...’ in Ahmet Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri-5: Kanunî Sultan Süleyman Devri Kanunnâmeleri* (17 Şevvâl 926-30 Eylül 1520/20 Safer 974-7 Eylül 1566). *Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı*, 1992, p. 301.

¹⁰² ‘Bir vakıf karye ahâlisi öşürlerini ber-mûceb-i emr-i sultânî akreb pazara getürmeğe râzılar iken mütevellî râzı olmayub ba’id bazara getür demeğe kâdir olur mı? *El-cevab: Olmaz*’. Ahmet Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri-9: I. Ahmed, I. Mustafa ve II. Osman Devirleri Kanunnâmeleri* (1012/1603-1031/1622). *Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı*, 1996, p. 440. In discussing the land

¹⁰³ Mehmet Genç, “State and the Economy in the Age of Reforms: Continuity and Change” *Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey* (ed. Kemal H. Karpat), (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2000), pp. 180-188. Provisionist economy is a policy of maintaining a perpetual supply of cheap goods in good quality in which exportation was mostly restricted and importation was fostered.

with the peasants when it comes to production and transfer of the products for transaction not in the nearest one this time but in commercial ones, or distant foreign markets. This process was concomitant with the change of the army composition and the diminishing effectiveness of the timariots and has been evolving since the last decades of the sixteenth century and became much more pronounced in the seventeenth and especially from the second half of the seventeenth century. By the eighteenth century, the consolidation of this process substantiated almost in every locality to the detriment of classical institutions. Already the foreign merchant capital diffused in the agricultural sector to meet their demands and this could only be realized by the transformation of the institutions (tax-farming, timar) and the economic perception of the subjects by leaning towards capital accumulation.

Since it is a trade that went beyond the prohibitions of the classical Ottoman order, this study also refers it as *yasak* (illicit) in Ottoman jargon. That is, the custom (kanûn-ı kadîm) has changed, and the newly emerging dispositions (hâdis) have formed the basis of a new custom. In alignment with this, the provisions of the rules marked the commencement of a gradual process that implicitly took into account trade relations from a global perspective. The transformation of the *akreb bazar* system concerning wheat distribution can be observed through precautions such as prohibition orders, which helps us by providing the essence to read between the lines' to follow and understand the process of transformation. Moreover, these efforts signify the initial stage of the expanding shadow economy.

Some documents, defines the distance taken indirectly. Reported by the judge of Sandıklı in 1721, as the production have been scarce for two years, they were having further trouble due to some profiteers were collecting wheat from their town in addition to the ones they have been collecting from İzmir and Kuşadası only for selling

them to foreign merchants with pack horses and camels.¹⁰⁴ Sandıklı town was located about three-days walk from İzmir and Kuşadası where they were most probably sending off the wheat. After about two and a half years, this method of direct purchases from distant towns of the villagers to sell from docks located at İzmir seemed be continued by *ayandan zi-kudret ve bazı muhtekiran* and such give harm to the provisions of soldiers stationed for war with Iran.¹⁰⁵ This is another way of accumulation but later in the century, it will be accompanied by çiftlik-produced ones by the actors who could afford it.

Some others, on the other hand, referring clearly with respect to distance. Such prohibition order was sent to the Gelibolu in 1729 for the illegal actions of the *çiftlik*, *anbar ashabı*(granary owner), local notables and other officials -most of the time these functions embodied in one person- clearly provides logistics operation of their illicit activity by stating ‘apart from selling their own wheat, they were also getting the wheat from towns located at distant places through carts and camels and selling these, too to foreign merchants’.¹⁰⁶

The above analyzed same order arrived at Salonica court in 1730, again specifically referred to the *çiftlik* owner local notables and other officials, quotes the actors and the methods in the same order ‘apart from selling their own [wheat], they were also getting the wheat from towns located at distant places (through carts and camels and selling these, too to foreign merchants.¹⁰⁷ Again the definition of distance

¹⁰⁴ İE.DH. 28/2471, (15 Safer 1134 / 5 December 1721). ‘...İzmir ve Kuşadası kazalarından maada kazamızdan vesair kazalardan muhtekir taifesi hinta ve dakik işira ve mekkari develeri ve bargirlerine tahmil ve aher mahallere nakl ettirmekten mücerred muradları götürüp harbi kefare taifesine fûruht itmeleriyle...’.

¹⁰⁵ MHM.d. 132/156, (Zilkade 1136 / August 1724).

¹⁰⁶ MHM.d. 135/1003, (Evail Şaban 1141 / March 1729). ‘...çiftlik ve anbar ashabı ve ayan-ı vilayet ve iş erleri taife-i mezbura kendü zahirelerini virdiklerinden ma'ada mesafe-i ba'ide kazalardan olan zehairi dahi araba ve develer ile nakl ve anı dahi kefareye fûruht eyledikleri...’.

¹⁰⁷ Selanik Kadı Sicilleri, hereinafter referred to as SKS. They are kept in Thessaloniki, Greece, at the Historical Archive of Macedonia (Historiko Archeio Makedonias, Hierodikastikoi Kodikes). The first

in both cases violate the provisions of the akreb bazar. Additionally, they indicate that the actor was selling their own stored wheat from their own çiftliks or vice versa, which reflects the exploitation of offerings. The buyer is willing to collect as much as possible, which is reflected in the effort to went beyond coastal areas into the hinterland of the regions. These actions are an attempt to overcome the limitations of the nearest market system. In this capacity, they can also be seen as an indication of the magnitude of the demand. It is also clear that the organization required financial and political capacity that was likely beyond the reach of most peasants.

Especially after the 1720s, the prohibition orders increasingly began to include the phrase *çiftlik* owners in their definition of actors' means participating in this trade. Moreover, the empire as were not able to remedy the situation by attuning a superficial reference in its prohibition orders after certain began to detail the profiles and the methods in the trade. This is the reflection of elevated sense of the empire as a first reaction against expanding illicit wheat trade. The more detailed firmans were written from scribal office with the intelligentsia of centrally appointed agents (tatars and mostly mübaşirs) who investigated (*teftiş ve tefahhus*) illicit wheat traffic in a given regional setting covertly and overtly (*sırren ve 'alenen*). In fact, this is a direct reflection of the peculiarities of the eighteenth century in the composition of these orders, as a gradual result of the fact that, from the beginning of the century, especially since 1695, çiftliks with large plots of land came to cover rural hinterland of various regions. However, the process seems to have been slower in Western Anatolia than it was in the Balkans, where çiftliks were mentioned in prohibition decrees somewhat

number refers to the number of the defter, the second to the page number and the third to the place of the case in that page. 43-79/B2 (20 Cemazielevvel 1143 / 1 December 1730). '...çiftlik ve anbar ashabı ve ayan-ı vilayet ve iş erleri taife-i mezbura kendü zahirelerini virdiklerinden ma'ada mesafe-i ba'ide kazalardan olan zhairi dahi araba ve develer ile nakl ve anı dahi kefereye fûruht...'.¹

earlier.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, prior to 1720s, one would see the increasing rate of European merchants' arrival to the shores of Balkans and Western Anatolia for illicitly purchasing wheat that was also reflected in the prohibition firmans.

Various spatial settings undergo identical activities simultaneously and with the same instruments, indicating the parallel rational economic inclinations of the actors in Balkans and Western Anatolia. Moreover, the use of camels alongside carts and pack animals indicates a diverse composition of logistics. It also suggests a lack of sophisticated agricultural development, which was not the case in Western Europe. In short distances, products were transferred only by carts due to the immediate need to transport them to markets, as agricultural output increased.¹⁰⁹ As Ortaylı suggests, camels were primarily used for long-distance trade of expensive products, rather than subsistence items, until the nineteenth century and their load capacity was lower than

¹⁰⁸ For instance, a prohibition firman sent to Gelibolu does not provide any reference to çiftlik that aims to prevent judges to sell the wheat to foreign merchants instead of Sakız and Midilli islands MHM.d 115/2466 (Evail Safer 1120 / April 1708), another one aimed to curb the illicit sale from Çandarlı MHM.d. 119/1043 (Evasıt Şaban 1124 / September 1712), and a general order was sent by specifically referring to the Gelibolu region by condemning ashab-ı zehair for filling the cellars of müste'min and harbi kefare kalyonları (foreign merchant galleons) who came from efrenc diyarı (from Europe) does not refer to çiftlik units MHM.d 119/1356-1374 (Evail Muharrem 1125 / February 1713). Whereas, occasionally the ones issued specifically for a town located in Balkans like for instance to Kelemerye located in Selanik province most of the time cites çiftliks earlier than Western Anatolia MHM.d 116/1111 (Evasıt Ramazan 1121 / November 1709) and in Yenişehir located in Thessally where the çiftlik ashabı was selling wheat from Golos dock. Such cases were abundant and pointing to the absence of çiftliks prior to 1720s and somewhat early citing of the term in Balkans compared to Western Anatolia can be multiplied in the mentioned context. Again, for an early instance of prohibition firman of wheat sale order for Efrenc sefineleri send to the ports of various Balkan towns including Selanik, the çiftlik phrase was missing SKS. 8-87/1 (Evail Recep 1113 / December 1701). This inference stems from the observation of numerous cases. In the archives, various miscellaneous registers and particularly in the mühimme registers, and court registers of Manisa, Selanik and Karaferye numerous cases of illicit wheat trade surface in the eighteenth century, far surpassing the frequency seen in the seventeenth century. Many of these cases are briefly mentioned in the firmans issued at the time and their copies circulated to various locations simultaneously. However, relying on each of these identical references proves unproductive. Therefore, this study focuses solely on selected cases and will use the related records where appropriate that provide detailed insights among the multitude in the context of this study. Thus, references lacking substantial information or copies of the original firmans are omitted if they do not contribute to contextualizing the essence of the activity. One of the earliest prohibitions firman arrives to Manisa in 1722 BOA, MKS. 181-25/A1 (Evahir Safer 1135 / 20 November 1722) while that of Selanik in 1701 as mentioned above and somewhat earlier than Karaferye where the first recorded firman appears in the court registers in 1714.

¹⁰⁹ İlber Ortaylı, "Devenin Taşıma Maliyeti Eğrisi Üzerine Bir Deneme," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, 1973. pp. 181-190.

that of carts. Thus, in the Ottoman case, the use of a wide range of transportation methods by illicit wheat actors' logistic apparatuses reflects both an increase in output and the valuable nature of wheat in this trade.

2.4. The Normalization Process of Yasak on Wheat

The above account of the wheat surprisingly aligns with the journey of Ankara mohair and its yarn in certain aspects from the late seventeenth through the early eighteenth century. Moreover, the simultaneous occurrence of similar developments for these two different products can be attributed to the expansion of the global market and its initial impact upon the empire. However, each has distinct and unique characteristics.

Before the second half of the seventeenth century, European merchants were purchasing directly or through their proxy agents inside Ankara since it was prohibited to sell the product before fulfilling the demands of Ankara artisans. The production and distribution were regulated by the *mültezims* of *damga* and *cendere ve boyahane mukataası* to prevent loss in taxes and to be able to implement official prohibition policy on certain merchandize. For instance, a merchant who purchased mohair from Ankara had to pay taxes at defined points in that specific locality.¹¹⁰ If the merchant left the city, from which routes they were obliged to follow was determined as well and if they wanted to use a given sea route after the main arteries, from which dock (Istanbul and Salonica) the merchant export their product was also determined by the Empire.¹¹¹ These were the mandatory routes for all merchants. If they failed to travel

¹¹⁰ Hülya Taş, "İhtisâb Mukâta'ası Verilerinin Şehir Ekonomisi Açısından Anlamı: Ankara Örneği." Uludağ Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 8, no. 13, (2007): pp. 409-436.

¹¹¹ Özer Ergenç, "İç Anadolu'nun Kuzeybatı Ucundaki Sof Üretim Alanının İzmir ile Bağlantısı," in idem, *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları: Şehir, Toplum, Devlet* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012), p. 295.

on those then they were precluded by *mültezims* and if they did not pay the tax for a given product, their merchandize was subjected to confiscation. For these very reasons, the imperial routes of the commercial activities remained the same throughout the years.

Following the increased demand from Western European states for mohair yarn instead of mohair cloth in the latter half of the seventeenth century, merchants found themselves compelled to meet this demand. To do so, they started participating illicit trade of the product through İzmir. The situation escalated to the point where the empire could not effectively address the issue through confiscation alone. Consequently, İzmir evolved into the primary export hub. If the ban on mohair export persisted, the treasury would suffer from a loss of tax revenues. Merchants would resort to bribing officials to overlook the illicit trade, leading them to pursue alternative routes to transport their goods.¹¹² Facing this reality, the state had no choice but to acknowledge the new circumstances. In the eighteenth century, it consolidated the mukataa under the *damga mukataası*, expanding its jurisdiction from Ankara to İzmir. In accordance with foreign demand for mohair, a new tax called *çıkar bacı* began to be levied from the second half of the seventeenth century, which became the main source of income for *damga mukataası* throughout the eighteenth century.¹¹³ Thus, the regulation regarding mohair reflects the effort to regulate the already expanded illicit trade of mohair. However, this normalization process was not unique to processed products like mohair. It is striking how a subsistence product like wheat, once prevented from being traded by strict prohibition measures as early as sixteenth

¹¹² Ibid, 296.

¹¹³ Özer Ergenç, “Çıkar Bâcı”, ve Bu Verginin Geniş Boyutlu Ticâret Faaliyetinin Bir Göstergesi Olarak Anlamı” in idem, *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları: Şehir, Toplum, Devlet* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012), pp. 318-323.

century, gradually became a commodity to be exchanged and became the subject of world markets through the initiative of the empire.

Apart from being a strategic product for feeding the population, especially the capital and garrisons, it had never been subjected to the provisions of free trade until The Anglo-Ottoman convention of 1838. Only occasionally, it was treated as a commodity by the Empire when the foreign states officially demanded permission to purchase wheat in exchange of the price. If they failed to do so, then made use of second option, illicit undertakings. However, unique permission firmans that will revise existing arguments on this briefly mentioned process on wheat exchange requires meticulous analysis. It clearly highlights the potential benefits and harms of a prohibited activity on agrarian structure that was becoming more and more widespread by 1720s. Above all and most importantly, this order, in a way, legalizes the de facto situation of wheat production and its illicit trade in 1722.

Even though Genç does not identify the main reason as the expansion of the illicit wheat trade, he aptly argues that in the general development period of the Ottoman economy in the eighteenth century, which covered roughly 1710-1765, the agricultural sector followed the same trajectory as the manufacturing sector.¹¹⁴ Consequently, what was the general policy on wheat as prohibition in the seventeenth century became the exception in the eighteenth century.¹¹⁵ His general assessment on the application of *resm-i miri* on formerly prohibited at times products such as cotton, yarn, wool and leather in the eighteenth century as a signifier of development period regarding the eighteenth century empire's economy was also the case for wheat. The freer trade produces the more revenue for the empire with the collection of taxes. What

¹¹⁴ Genç, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Devlet ve Ekonomi”, p. 210

¹¹⁵ Ibid, p. 211.

marked the process that gave way to the occasional lifting of imperial prohibitions by the empire to collect *resm-i miri* was the increasing illicit wheat trade from the last quarter of the seventeenth century as a result of the increasing foreign demand.

But inferring production levels from state finances, especially in the case of an agricultural product that was banned for export and thus hardly the subject of any *mukataa* except for officially sanctioned sales, is bound to miss the point. Moreover, the increasing number of bans, especially on wheat, does not necessarily indicate underproduction, as Genç suggests when he refers to the second period (1760s-1800s) as a contraction in production following the first period of development in the agricultural sector.¹¹⁶ On the contrary, not only the prohibition firmans was far exceeding in frequency in the first period but also illegal wheat trade continued with the same frequency in the second period of his scheme, too.

2.4.1. Permission of Wheat Sale for The Mora Peninsula and Balkans

At this stage of inquiry, two unique firmans reflecting a shift in the empire's economic policy regarding the subsistence of its subjects will be analyzed in detail. The promulgation of these permission orders by means of their temporal and spatial concerns not only help resolve predicaments regarding the extent of the illicit wheat trade that led to the issuance of these permissions but also mark a change in the attitude of the empire towards the activity. In this sense, they are in direct opposition to previous and consecutive prohibition orders. The first was issued in 1720 and granted free trade authorization for the Mora peasants. The second was specifically granted for non-Muslim peasants in 1722 who were living in the vicinities of docks located in Balkans and made up almost all the rural population in Balkans, to sell their wheat to

¹¹⁶ Ibid, p. 212.

the foreign merchants. The permission firman for the peasants of Mora in 1720 was most likely the inaugural instance of such a decree in the eighteenth century, and possibly even in the preceding century, given the absence of any reference for such permission in the Mora firman. In contrast, the 1722 firman for Balkans did contain such a clear reference to the Mora firman. Both documents were granted on the grounds that the peasants would be able to pay their head and customary taxes from their cultivation in a region where the lands of towns and villages were fertile and produced abundant yields. Both were the result of the already expanded illicit wheat trade in the empire. Over the course of the century, similar permissions were granted to subjects of the empire in localities, which can be understood through either direct or indirect references in the orders. However, the 1720 and 1722 orders established the foundation for the subsequent ones. With regard to this matter, the initial permission firman to be examined is that of the Balkans.¹¹⁷

‘Memalik-i mahrûseti’l mesâlik-i şahânemde sakin ve mütemekkin olan ehl-i zimmet reayanın reftiyelerine mazrûb olan cizye-i şeriyye ve tekalif-i kanuniyyelerini eda için iktiza iden akçeyi hırsaset ve ziraat ile hasıl eyledikleri mahsulatlarının semeninden tedarike muhtaç oldukları emr-i bedihi olub ve Rumeli canibinde olan nevahi ve kuranın arazileri münbit ve mahsuldar olmağla bi-bereketi’llahi teala mahsulleri vefret ve kesret üzere hasıl olunur iken Bahr-i Sefid canibinde Rumeli kıyısında olan iskelelerden harbî kefereye zehair fûruhtu memnu’ olmağla sevhili deryaya karib olan nevahi ve kura reayaları hezar ve ta’abb ve meşakkat ile hasıl eyledikleri mahsullerin iskelelere nakl ve fûruht idemediklerinden mahsulleri anbarlarında baki kalub vilayet-i Rumelinde hususen sevhil-i derya olan mahallerde der anbar bulunan zehair iki sene dayanmayub çürüyüp telef olmağla tekalif-i raiyyetlerini edaya ve lazım gelen akçeyi bi’z zaruret istidane ve istikraz veçhi üzere tedarike muhtaç olduklarından murabahacı taifesinden zuufi mertebede ribh ile akçeler alub ve mahsullerinin revacı olmamak cihetiyle edasına dahi kudret ve istitaatleri olmamağla istikraz eyledikleri akçe devr-i daim ile terakki ve izdiyad bularak hadd-i itidali tecavüz idüb medyun-ı mustağrak olmalarıyla fukaranın hallerine zaaf-ı külli târî olub ekseri hırsaset ve ziraati terk ve ocak-ı kadimelerini bıragub diyar-ı ahire fîrar eylediklerinden memleket-i sultaniye şeref-i harab ve nice ma’mure mahaller aşiyana yümm ü gurab olub ve nizam-ı memleket arz-ı müşevveş ve ihtilal olduğundan başka...’.

¹¹⁷ BOA. MHM.d. 131/13, (Evail-i Rebiülevvel 1135 / December 1722).

After citing familiar prohibition policy for Rumeli, which is the preparatory effort of the ground for legitimation to lift the ban, it continues by listing the justifications one after another; getting more crops demands storing that much in granaries, but the peasants settled in towns and villages where located close by shores were not able to transfer and sell their crops to the docks, and eventually their crops awaiting in their granaries due to the vulnerability of regions located nearby shores in Rumeli where wheat rot and perished after two years. Consequently, unable to profit from their harvests, the peasants reluctantly but inevitably turn to moneylenders with high interest rates, whose interest rates have risen incessantly, and as their harvests have devalued, they have been unable to cover their recurring debt obligations, ultimately drowning them in debt cycles. After all these setbacks, it would lead to the catastrophe in fertile arable lands in the localities with the dispersion of peasants from their *ocak-ı kadîm* (patrilineal settlements of Ottoman peasants).

The firman turns its attention to Anatolia, as if to explain that such a permit could have been granted for the places located nearby shores in Western Anatolia if the soil was fertile and was not rocky.¹¹⁸ Moreover, the subjects of the region are bound to get wheat from Rumeli as even their production has been scarce for two years but transporting grain by ships from Rumelia was *memnu* '(prohibited) for the fear that it would be sold to foreign merchants.

'...Anadolu kıyısında olan nevahilerin ekseri sengistan olub mezruatlarının mahsulatları kendülere kifayet eylemediğünden gayrı bir iki senedir mahsulleri dahi olmayub cihet-i maişetleri için iktiza iden zahirelerini Rumeli kıyısından tedarike muhtaçlar iken müste'min taifesine fûruht olunur mülahazasıyla sefain ile zehair nakli men'-i külli birle memnu' olmağla bu keyfiyete Anadolu kıyısında ibadullahın dahi zaruret ve müzayakalarına müveddi olacak bir halde olub bir vechle memnu' olması bast ve temhid olunan vücuh ile nice mahzurun müsteni' olduğundan maada bu husus zikr olunduğu

¹¹⁸ The word 'sengistan' defines a piece of land where the soil contains too many stones, or dry and solid large pieces of soil blocks to the extent that the tilling was too hard in the context.

sevahilde vaki ayan-ı vilayet ve müteayyinan-ı memleketden bazıları cerr-i nef' celb-i menfaate vesile ittihazı ile reayanın mahsulatlarını semen-i kalil ve baha-i rahis ile iştirā ve iskelelerde der anbar ve ihtikar idüb mani ve müzahim olanları dahi edna mertebe şey ile itma' ve ihda ve iddihar eyledikleri zahirelerin fırsat buldukça sırren ve hufyeten müste'min taifesine fūruht ile mübalağa-i kesire intifa itmeleriyle bu takdirce bu emrin suret-i zahirede memnu' olması fakat reaya fukarasının zaruret-i hallerine bais olmakdan ve ayan-ı memleket kesb-i emval-i vafire itmelerinden gayrı bir nesneyi münteç olmayub...'

Observations causing distress on wheat are made explicit further by explaining the activities of local notables who were purchasing peasants' yields at very low prices, and store in their granaries destined for foreign merchants, through which they could make high profits. In addition, the order clearly points to the fact that at the present time the ban on wheat only causes problem for peasants but provides benefit only for local notables. With the authorization of the firman, soon the empire itself will set out to harvest gains for its treasury.

A few points need to be examined; in the sources of illicit wheat activity analyzed so far and prospective ones, we see less emphasis on çiftliks for wheat from Western Anatolia in the early eighteenth century compared to that of Rumelia. It seems that actors in the former region reached as far into the interior of Western Anatolia as their capital allowed and tried to accumulate wheat purchasing from autonomous peasant holdings. This is because the *çiftlik* is a means of investment and may have emerged later in the region with relatively less fertile soils. In fact, as will be shown in detail in the next chapter, the traces of çiftlik formation in Rumelia, especially in rural Selanik, dates as early as late fifteenth century. As the centuries progressed, this method of direct purchases from peasants continues in Western Anatolia, alongside with *çiftlik* ownership, which will again be analyzed in the related section.

'...dahi ve fi'l vasıl müste'min taifesine zehair fūruhtu men' olunmuş eyyam-ı harb vakitlerde taife-i mezbureyi tazyik için ihtiyar olunmuş bir emr-i kanun olub mani'-i şer'isi olmadığından başka mahruse-i İstanbul ve havali ve cevanibinde sakin ve mutavattın olan ibadullaha Bahr-i siyah canibinden ve

Bahr-i sefid tarafından boğaz içinde iskelelerden gelen zehair kifayet itmekle boğaz haricinde olan mahallerden iştirasına taleb oldukça zehair fûruhtunun bu taraflarda zahirenin killetine ve izdiyad iş'ara bais olması dahi muhtemel olmayub fûruhtuna müsa'ade ile münasib olan iskelelere canib-i miriden birer emin nasb ve ta'yin ve Mora iskelelerinden tahsil olunduğu minval üzere zehairin her bir kilesinden iştirida idenlerden birer mikdar resm-i miri tahsili ferman surette canib-i miriye fevaid-i 'azime ve menafi-i kesire husulü mukarrer olduğundan başka reaya fukarası dahi zahirelerini iskelelerde fûruhtuna murahhas olmalarıyla reayadan mukaddema etrafa müteferrik ve perişan olanları dahi ocak-ı kadimelerine ricat ile ziraat ve hırasatlerine ---- ve iştilal idüb bais-i 'umran-ı buldân olan zer' ve hars ile memalik-i mahruse ma'mur ve ibad ve reaya dahi fûruht eyledikleri zehairin semeninden cizye-i şeri'yye ve tekalif-i sairelerin eda idüb murabahacı taifesinden akçe istikraz eylemekten müstağni olmalarıyla anların dahi hallerine refah ve nizam gelüb saye-i merhamet-i daye-i şehriyârîde istiglal üzere olan fukara ve raiyyet mecburü'l kıvvat olacağı zahir ve işkar ve ale'l husus Anadolu kıyılarında olan iskelelere dahi sefayin ile zehair nakl ve fûruht olunmağla o caniblerde olan ibadullah dahi mübtela oldukları zaruret ve müzayakadan ---- olacakları bedidar olub ---- ve bu hususun bir dürlü mani'-i şer'isi olmadığına alemü'l ulemai'l mütebahhirin efzâü'l fuzalati'l münevverin bi'l fil şeyhü'l islam ve müftüi'lenam olan Mevlana Abdullah edemallahü teala fezailuhu fetva-yı şerife virmeleriyle...'.

As clearly mentioned, it continues by referring to the legal aspect of the prohibition, being devised and put into action to leverage against its rivals in the context of customary law and that was not against şer'i law. Moreover, it clearly underlines the abolishment of the current *yasak* (being in the state of prohibition) on wheat would not cause harm to the subsistence of subjects living in İstanbul and its surroundings as the wheat from Black Sea region and the docks located in the Bosphorus would be sufficient. To this end, any demand for wheat outside of the mentioned regions would not lead to scarcity and eventual raise in the price of the product. Thus, the wheat sale was permitted from the appropriate docks, each of which would be supervised by a trustworthy *emin* who will monitor the process.

Before explaining the procedures of the operation, the firman envisages the potential benefits of such permission. It would not only be beneficial for treasury with *miri rüsum* but also help re-settlement of the dispersed peasants into their places as they were permitted to sell their wheat in the docks, they would again restart cultivation

which is the utmost mean serve to the regions' prosperity and could pay their taxes without borrowing from usurers.

Şeyhülislam Abdullah Efendi's fetwa allows wheat to be sold in the following regions and associated places, excluding the docks located inside the Bosphorus, which account for almost all the docks in the Balkans.¹¹⁹

It makes also clear the conditions and the objective for such permission;

'...eyyam-ı müsalaha ve mütarekede Rumeli canibinde ve cezair-i mezburede olan reaya vesair zehair ashabı mezruatlarından hasıl eyledikleri mahsullerini alenen iskelelere nakl ve diledikleri kimesnelere fûruht eylemeğe mezun ve murahhas olub rızalaştıkları baha ile aleneten fûruht ve sefaine tahmil oldukda...'

'... iştirâ idenlerden hintanın her bir İstanbuli kilesinden 15 sağ akçe ve şair ve hububat sairenin her bir İstanbuli kilesinden 12 sağ akçe resm-i miri tahsil ve emin biriyle ahz ve kabz ve her sefineye tahmil olunan zehairiye ecnas ve mikdarı ve sefayın ve kapudanlarının isim ve resimleri tasrih olunarak tarihleriyle bir hoşça zabt ve tahrir...'

'...bu husus mutlak ibadullahın refah-ı hallerine bais olmak maslahatı için ihtiyar olunmuşken muhtekiran taifesi yahud iskelelere tayin olunan eminler bu vechle zuhur iden ruhsat ve müsa'adeyi vesile-i celb-i menfaat ittihaz idüb reayanın bey' için iskelelere getürdükleri zehairi yedlerinden baha-i rahis ile ahz ve ihtikar ve müste'min taifesine kendüleri fûruht eylemek dai'yesine düşmeyüp reaya fukarası vesair zehair ashabı getürdükleri zahirelerini kendüleri fûruht edüp bir vechle taarruz ve müdahale olunmaktan ittika ve tayin olunan resm-i miri için reaya fukarası ve zehair ashabından bir akçe ve bir habbe mütalebe olunmayub iştirâ idenlerden tahsil olunmak...'

'... ve bu husus asitane-i saadetinde zehairin killetine bais olmak ihtimali olmayub ancak maazallah'u teala bu makule halde zuhur iderse yine ref ve men olunmak şartıyla divan-ı hümayunum tarafından ahkamı tahrir olunmak babında...'

¹¹⁹ A copy (suret) of the firman was dispatched to the various towns and docks located in the Balkans as follows; *'bir sureti: Gümülcine ve Kavala ve Orfan kadılarına ve iskelelerine, Selanik mollasına ve kadılarına ve Beşikler ve tevabi iskelelerine, Yenişehir-i fener mollasına ve Platimana ve Ermiye kadılarına ve Platimana ve Golos ve Çay ağzı ve Ermiye ve tevabi iskelelerine, İzdin, İsterçe kadılarına ve iskelelerine, Saline ve Kolhisar, ve İne bahtı sancağında vaki kadılar ve ora iskelelerine, Talanda ve Tuzla ve Ağrıboz ve Atina kadılarına ve ora iskelelerine, Narda ve Karlılı kadılarına ve ora iskelelerine, Delvin sancağı Dıraç ve Sıyad, Karaliç kadı ve ora iskelelerine, Avlonya sancağında olan iskeleler kadılarına, Cezayir-i bahr-i sefidde Midilli, Koca adaları vesair mahsuldâr cezireler kadılarına ve ora iskelelerine'*. However, another copy was also issued for İskenderiye but with a marginal note (der-kenar) it was abolished because of the infertile rocky soil of the region.

As seen, the order granted official and free trade of wheat for the non-Muslim peasants of Rumeli during times of peace and in the absence of scarcity by transferring their wheat to the mentioned docks to sell at a price they determine to the merchants. In return, the merchants are obliged to pay the *resm-i mirî* for each *İstanbuli kile* of wheat 15 akçe and for each that of barley and grain 12 akçe to the treasury on the grounds that all the load regarding the name, profile of the ship captain, together with type and just amount of the product are kept recorded, in accordance with the same of which had been operated in Mora docks before.

Here, a separate parenthesis is necessary to explain the reference to the Mora peninsula in this permit, where it was clearly acknowledged that the first such permit for the sale of wheat was granted since there was not any reference to the existence of such previous permission in the Mora of 1720.

It is obvious that after two years' experience in Mora, now more experienced bureaucracy applied the same provisions under the light of the previous application methods also for the Balkans in 1722. Therefore, not only did the processes mentioned in the order not come out of nowhere, but they had been still ongoing. With this aim, the first permission of wheat export that formed the basis of 1722 was issued first for Mora in 1720 when corresponds exactly after five years from the reconquest for all the peasants, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, contrary to the 1722.¹²⁰ First of all, after conquering the island from Venice, the empire undertook a new survey in 1716 to fix the rural setting to revive the lands because of detrimental effects inflicted upon the peninsula during the war.¹²¹ Existence of *çiftlik*s were not a surprise and they would

¹²⁰ MHM.d. 129/810, (Evahir-i Rebiülahir 1132 / 10 January 1720).

¹²¹ Fariba Zarinebaf, Jack L. Davis, John Bennet, A Historical and Economic Geography of Ottoman Greece: The Southwestern Morea in the eighteenth Century, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* (American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2005). pp. 40-49.

come to cover most of the lands as the century progressed. Reclamation of the regions with populating the vacant lands and tax exemption were the instruments applied during the revival. It must have been due to the positive outcome of such activities that the agricultural production began to recover and even surplus production was achieved, so much so that in 1720, the sale of wheat to foreign merchants was permitted for the benefit of the Mora peasants for the first time after the reconquest. The operation covers the payment of *resm-i miri* as it was applied in the 1722 order but with slight difference in the amount of tax levied on wheat, 12 akçe for each *İstanbuli kile* and for barley and others 9 akçe. The lower level of taxation can be regarded as the empire's strategy to increase the prospective purchases by the *müste'min* and in return, the revenue because of the vulnerable situation of the peninsula, which had just recovered from the adverse effects of the war. It also implies that the more foreign merchants came to purchase wheat the more tax would be collected which would lead again to the reclamation of previously deserted but fertile parcels and bring prosperity to the peasants who in return could easily pay their taxes (... *cezirenin elyevm hâlî olan mahalleri dahi şenlenüp memleket ma'mur ve abadan ve vedia-yı halik-i kibriya olan reaya fukarası dahi --- refah ve itminan olub...*). The reasons for granting such permission closely mirrored those of 1722 as follows; just for the benefit of peasants instead of profiteers who shall not capitalize on (*vesile-i celb-i menfa'at ittihâz idüp*) the permission to buy wheat from peasants at lower prices (*baha-i rahis*) to sell foreign merchants (*müste'min taifesine*).

While the immediate benefit of selling wheat was apparent, equally significant was the state of affairs in the peninsula at the time. Following the war, increased sensitivity toward the island, located at a distance defined by the Empire as *serhad*, paved the way for granting privileges (*imtiyaz*), as the empire aimed to prevent the

dispersion of peasants and maintain control over the island and its subjects to avoid the risk of losing the peninsula again. Prudently, even if it was granted to Mora due to the mentioned special circumstances, the permission to sell wheat and grain to *müste'min taifesi* constituted the basis for 1722. Moreover, because of the considerable distance, the produce of the peninsula was not transported to other regions of the *memalik-i mahrûse* and remains within the region where the stored wheat that was cultivated by the 'sweat of their brow', spoils after one year (...*fi'l asl cezire müstakil ve mukarrer bulunup bilâd-ı islamiyeye ittisal ve iltisakı olmamak cihetiyle berü tarafa dahi fûruht idemeyüp arak-ı cebîn ile hasıl eyledikleri zahireleri seneyi tecavüz eylemezden evvel anbarlarında çürüyüp bi'l külliye telef ve zayi olduğundan...*).

The Imperial Divan, like other firmans, sometimes adopts a very harsh tone in its condemnations or validation of various legal or illegal activities, which it prepares the ground for respectively prohibiting or allowing a certain occurrence or activity. This attitude corresponds not so much to protection of the peasantry as to the center's legitimization effort of the sale in the name of both customary and religious law by overemphasizing objective as being the protection of the peasantry. It is this tone that is adopted when it depicts the current situation of wheat production and its illicit trade in the peninsula before ordering the permission of wheat sale to the foreign merchants by the peasants. In this character, the firman indulges in hyperbole that if there were no sales to foreign merchants, the entire population of the peninsula would leave the island at once, and that those who sell lose more than their earnings due to the penalties imposed by the kadi when they are caught, and that some even stop cultivating to avoid such a situation, which would not happen if the wheat permission was granted.¹²² Just

¹²² Ibid, ‘‘... bazıları tama’-ı ham eylemek hasebiyle cesaret eyleyüp leb-i deryada olan gizlû yerlerde gecelerde hufyeten zahiresin fûruht eylese dahi hükkam tarafına gamz ve nifak ile ahz ve tecrim olunup sattığı zahirenin tamam bahasını cerime namıyla virdikten sonra zuuf-u mertebe dahi ziyade virmele

the reverse was the case when it prohibits the wheat export by condemning the wrongdoings and negative outcomes of such wheat sale by local notables and profiteers. Doubtless the attempt was the effort in ensuring the imperial perception of justice that aims the protection of the ruled from the military elite (from the smallest level, *subaşı* to the highest, central bureaucrats), there emerges the concern of the center as the third in this equation previously analyzed by Ergene as the justice being resonated also as the protection of mutual interests of the servants.¹²³

Turning back to the 1722 permission, the main benefit aimed in the aftermath was solely for the benefit of peasants. This permission is believed not to cause scarcity in the empire but if this become the case or if a war breaks out then the permission can be again revoked. If there was not a danger of scarcity, the permission would still remain in effect. Such excuse emerged soon after due to the expedition preparations for Iran in 1720s, the sale prohibition was once again revoked two months after this permission; however, it seems the main motivation was more of a failure of the intendent outcome with the permission than it was solely the war conditions.¹²⁴ The empire's fears came true, as it was the profiteering local notables who took much of the wheat from the peasants at lower prices and brought it to the docks and sold it to the foreign merchants. Even they went farther inland (more than a day's walk) from the hinterland of the authorized docks to collect wheat, well beyond the legal limits

halas olamayub ve bazılarının dahi kat'a haber ve agahı yoğ iken bu töhmet ile tecrim olunduğundan cerimeden kendiyü tahlis için 'elimde zahire bulunmasun' diyü ekseri bais-i umran-ı buldan olan hırsat ve zıraati terk ve ferâmuş ile ancak kendülere sedd-i ramak olacak mertebe ile kana'at idüp cezire-i mezburenin arazi-yi münbiti hırsatten ve zıraatten hali ve mu'attıl kalduğundan...''.

¹²³ Boğaç Ergene, "On Ottoman justice: Interpretations in conflict (1600-1800)," *Islamic Law and Society* 8 no 1 (2001): 52-87. Ergene argues that, within the Ottoman administrative system, justice was seen as shielding rural and urban producers from military elite abuses. Conversely, some ruling elites viewed justice as recognizing the mutual rights and duties between the Sultan and his servants, focusing on protecting the privileges and entitlements of those deemed deserving.

¹²⁴ MHM.d 131/216, (Evasıt Cemazielahir 1135 / 9 March 1723).

that were set in accordance with the *akreb bazar* system (...*muhtekirân taifesi bu ruhsat ve müsaadeyi cerr-i nef' ve celb-i menfa'ate vesile etmek için sevhil-i bahre karîb kasabat ve kuranın mahsulatına adem-i kana'at ile dahi/a ilerüye tecavüz ve sahil-i bahre katî vâfir ba'id mesafesi olan mahallere varub reayanın yedlerinde bulunan mahsulatı iştirâ...*). After about nine months, it was ordered that the copy of the firman was sent for each of the previously authorized dock.¹²⁵

Even if it was prohibited, the order requested the records of what had been sold from which docks until the promulgation of prohibition order and commanded the transfer of collected tax revenue from the sales to the capital by a *mübaşir* (centrally appointed official). So, did the wheat sale actually take place after the permission was executed is an important question since it is often not possible to get information about the outcome of the orders. For this decree, the answer is affirmative. After the issuance of the 1722 decree in December, the *miri rüsûm* collected from the same year's harvest is recorded specific to 1723 (Table).¹²⁶ But in this document, the year of the income

¹²⁵ MHM.d 131/926, (1 Rebiülahir 1136 / 29 December 1723).

¹²⁶ MHM.d. 132/1478-1487 (15 Zilhicce 1136 / 4 September 1724). The total amount of collected *miri rüsûm* was recorded separately for each dock regarding the year 1723 (1135) in different regions under the title: *Maktu-i resm-i hinta ve şair ve hububat-ı saire der iskeleha-i elviye ve kazaha-i mezkurin der canib-i Rumeli der canib-i miri emin-i kaza ve deruhde-i bendegan-ı ber-muceb-i telhis ve ferman-ı ali evamir dade*. The data has not been arrived yet from Delvin region and the amount of wheat sold from this town remains unknown, specified with a marginal note. It refers to the revocation of the prohibition, but thanks to the abundant harvest, the permission to sell wheat from the mentioned docks was given. Their *resm-i miri* was under the control of the owners of each *mukataa* unit to which the revenues of the docks are tied. For example, the revenue from the sale of wheat and other grains to foreign merchants from Salonica Dock was under the control of Selanik Baruthane Nazırı (Custodian of Selonica Gunpowder Factory) Abdurrahman Ağa. '*Beşikler ve Selanik ve Yenişehir ve Ağrıboz ve İnebahtı ve Karlılı ve Narda ve Avlonya ve Delvin sevhillerinde vaki' elviye ve kazalarda vaki iskelelerden alenen sefaine tahmil olunan hinta ve şair ve hububat-ı sairenin resm-i mirileri tahsili ferman olunmuş iken bundan akdem sefer için mübayaa zahiresi iktiza ider diyü balada tahrir olunan iskelelerden zikr olunan iskelelerin cümlesinden müste'min vesair tüccara zehair fûruht olunmamak üzere emr-i şerif gönderilüp men' olunmuş idi lakin bi hamdullahi teala bahr-i sefid iskelelerinde zehair mübayaaasının lüzumu olmayub ve reaya fukarasının hasıl eyledikleri mahsulleri vefret ve kesret üzere olub bey' ve şira ider kimesne olmaduğundan mahsulleri anbarlarında kalub tekaliplerin edada 'usret çekmeleriyle vech-i sabıkı üzere mahsulleri iskelelere gelen müste'min vesair tüccar sefinelerine mukaddema izin verildiği üzere alenen fûruht ve resm-i mirilerin tarik-i miri için tahsil olunmak üzere her birine balada isimleri tahrir olunan kimesnelere mâl ve kalemiyyesin virmek üzere kayd ve zabtları için mufassal ve müverrih evamir-i şerife verdikde asl-ı telhis ve ferman-ı ali üzere baş muhasebeye hüfz ve divan-ı hümayun tarafına alenen zehair fûruhtuna izin virildiği müş'ir-ü ilam ve haber için verilen kaime mucibince işbu mahalle kayd olundu.'*

was registered as 1723 (h.1135) with a marginal note in each ledger specific to the authorized docks, meaning the tax was collected in the two months period from the permission to the resumption of the prohibition again in the February of 1723.

The wider hinterlands of Western Macedonia, Western Anatolia, southern Tırhala, Salonica, and Thessaly became the main points of illicit wheat selling points. These regions also the main zones of agricultural produce of whose yield destined for the capital and other regions in need. On the other hand, there is no information for which price the peasants sold their products, and how much of the sale was conducted by the peasants themselves instead of profiteering local notables. When the projected amounts considered, it appears that local notables sold most of it. Moreover, the organization of transfer this amount of wheat again is cumbersome for a peasant household that may wanted to get rid of transfer transportation cost for a quick gain by selling in their places to the capital holders especially for their small amount of wheat. As for the foreign merchants, in the absence of prohibition, they must have been paid less since there was not an extra payment, or *miri rûsûm* spared for the empire and the amount of wheat that was sold in this case would have been much higher. In a way, permissions might have been hindering foreign merchants whose expenditures must have been less in the time of prohibition when *miri rûsûm* was not the case. Thus, empire's policy was also another stimulus for the expansion of this activity as merchants had already been willing to get what they desperately needed in order to mitigate distress in their nations while paying less.

Table 1 The *mîrî rûsûm* collected from each dock after the permission of 1722

Location	Tax income (guruş)	Amount of wheat in kile ¹²⁷
Selanik, Beşikler and Alçaklar	17.500	140.000
Tuzla, Ağrıboz, Atina, Narlı	18.000	144.000
Platimana, Golos, Çayağzı, Ermiye	15.000	120.000
Narda	1.100	8800
Avlonya	300	2400
Anatolikoz (Mora)	559.5	4476
Total	51.900	419.676

Considering the permissions in the context of what has been analyzed so far, many necessary conclusions can be drawn. First, as clearly seen by both firmans, the process prepared the milestones for the permissions was the expanding illicit wheat trade because of the foreign demand. Second, they are completely different from the official demands of foreign states, but purely came out of the incentives of the bureaucracy (defterdarlık and divan-ı hümayun), taking into account the current state of illicit wheat trade which came to the extent that the ears of the Sultan cannot stay idle anymore but take the necessary measurements. Before the issuance of the firman, the official demands surely added up expansion process of this activity until it gave birth to such permission. The sound reached to the ears and its repercussions came to

¹²⁷ The *miri rûsum* equivalent of the amount of wheat that could probably be sold was projected in the table. In other scenarios, barley and other grains would have been sold in larger quantities because the *miri rûsum* for their one kile was 12 akçe. I thank to colleague Georgios Liakopoulos for his help in locating the ‘Anatolikoz’ dock.

the center through tatars (agents) whose duty was reporting the actors and the ways of conducting this trade and most of the sources mention their presence appointed from the center.¹²⁸ Secondly, even if superficial, productive capacity of Balkans is higher than Western Anatolia, which also implies late *ekabir* çiftlicization compared to Balkans, and thus proves the possible reason that *çiftlik ashabı* phrase emerged earlier in sources issued on the activity in Balkans. Thirdly, it fortifies the argument that until the 1720s, the weight of çiftliks in this trade was less than that of direct purchases, i.e. the illicit wheat trade was still carried out through the acquisition of the yields of small independent producers. Even in this detailed and lengthy firmans, there is not a single reference to the term of *çiftlik*. On the contrary, after these dates, there is hardly any document of a prohibition order or document produced out of the activity that no longer refers to *çiftlik*. Lastly, in this permission firman, the so-called *müste'min* and *harbî kefare taifesi* do not strongly imply anything other than England and France, whose demand for wheat prior to 1720s had been well documented and the ones after the period will be so. Lastly, they aptly argue that the sale of wheat to the foreign merchants would bring prosperity to the well-being of peasants and led them to be occupied with what they had been expected, cultivation.

In the 1720 permission, the statement indicating unapprovingly that the peasants are primarily concerned with cultivating only enough to meet their subsistence needs (*ancak kendülere sedd-i ramak olacak mertebe ile kana'at idüp cezire-i mezburenin arazi-yi münbiti hırasetten ve zira'atden hali ve mua'attıl kaldığından*) suggests the potential for surplus through reclaiming the fertile but uncultivated and abandoned lands. As the century progressed, these lands would be effectively utilized by capital owners throughout the empire, primarily in the form of

¹²⁸ Aynural, “İstanbul Değirmenleri ve Fırınları”, p. 216.

çiftlik units, which is another method of çiftlik establishment on the abandoned lands in the context of Mora. However, this was neither the only nor the most common way, and even in the wider Ottoman regions it is an exception. It is expected to see dispersed peasants in a war-torn region, but the southern Balkans and Anatolia did not experience such a transfer and most of the çiftliks were established on the existing *timar*, *zeamet*, *hass* or *vakıf* villages. As a result, formerly autonomous peasants, who had previously cultivated small plots for subsistence, would gradually be drawn into the large tracts of land within the çiftliks through legal means such as sale-proper of peasant lands or voluntary relocation or extralegal means in the form of extortion methods such as indebtedness, forced relocation. However, their legal status would be changed, making them more vulnerable to landowners, alongside the continued existence of autonomous peasants. Thus, once deserted, vacant but fertile land would be brought back into cultivation, leading to increased yields in the regions. This factor, among others, would serve as a driving force for local notables to invest in the establishment of the çiftliks. As reported in the firman of 1720, the main propelling effect for such revival of the lands is thought to be the sales of the yield to the foreign merchants.

2.5. Ottoman Wheat ‘Liberalization’: Introduction of *Bid’at* Tax on Permitted Wheat Sales

After the second half of the eighteenth century, European states considered introducing the free domestic trade of grain that would allow agricultural growth by fixing regional imbalanced supply and demand chains on wheat. In France, two school of political economy camps involved in discussing regarding the policy, those in favor with liberal approach and those against, conservatists. Between 1763 and 1770, short lived - free trade experiment of the France ended up returning to the old restrictive

policy.¹²⁹ On the other hand, the Ottoman empire has never considered such free trade policy. However, while the above analyzed orders lack the ability to accommodate a full liberal economic policy, it stands in direct contrast to Murphey's eighteenth-century depiction of completely tight control over wheat, its distribution, and its regulation in the empire.¹³⁰ Moreover, if the change in the attitude of the empire from a strict regulator than more of a less conservative observant in price control mechanism marks the beginning of more 'liberal'-(with defined boundaries rather than complete freedom) like economic policy as suggested by Ağır; then the permission of wheat sale to European states first in 1720 for Mora, and then finally in 1722 for the Balkans unequivocally indicates and marks the outset of the mild approach much earlier than the available related studies had discussed, almost at least fifty-years before and even before the liberal approach of its European counterparts, thirty-years prior.¹³¹

It appears that the ideas and agenda of the reforming elites at the end of the century in their approach to grain issue, seemed not too different than that of these permission firmans, but rather there emerges continuation of the previous approaches in the bureaucracy since the illicit wheat trade has continued throughout the eighteenth to the first decades of the nineteenth century. The firmans explicitly highlight that granting permission directly to peasants, rather than to intermediary local notable profiteers, would benefit the peasants themselves. This could lead to increased cultivation as peasants incorporate previously uncultivated lands, ultimately making it easier for them to pay their taxes as they could achieve higher yields and then sell them to the foreign merchants to make profit. The primary motivation behind granting such

¹²⁹ Steven Kaplan, *Bread, Politics and Political Economy in the Reign of Louis XV* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975).

¹³⁰ Murphey, "Provisioning Istanbul: The State and Subsistence in the Early Modern Middle East." p. 220.

¹³¹ Seven Ağır, "The Evolution of Grain Policy: The Ottoman Experience," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 43, no. 4 (2013): 571–98.

permissions stemmed from the increasing illicit wheat trade. This line of argumentation, reflecting the prevailing central bureaucratic mindset at the time, would resurface almost eighty years later with slight changes in the reformist memoranda presented to Selim III by the ruling elites. However, this time, their primary concern was to increase the purchasing price of grain from designated supply areas where peasants might otherwise abandon their lands, leaving them uncultivated and impoverished.¹³² This trend of abandonment resulted in underproduction, leading to a supply deficit for the capital's grain needs. While not explicitly stated in the firmans, the supply of capital has always been at the forefront of grain policy of the empire. The difference between the memoranda and the permission firmans lies in the former's pronounced emphasis on fixing the purchasing price of grain and recalibrating compulsory procurement quotas. Nevertheless, the expectation by both in essence was that, thanks to these measures, the illicit wheat trade would be curbed out and that the peasantry would experience improved well-being and increase cultivation. In return, peasants and wheat owners would have been encouraged to sell their yield to the empire because of increased yield.

Furthermore, although these firmans may not be considered a bilateral treaty, their provisions during the early decades of the eighteenth century align with the convention of 1838 and serve as a significant milestone for the emergence of such due to their direct implications almost a century prior. Behind the process of the permissions, there was past experiences of expanding illicit wheat trade, its current situation, and future expectations in the minds of bureaucracy who gave the final form by substantiating these three states of wheat in the form of firmans. Furthermore, the reformist's ideas reflected in their memoranda had never been put into effect, but these

¹³² Ibid, pp. 591-592.

permissions were executed by the empire and exploited by the actors, but mostly by local notable profiteers.

The approach of the reformists reflected in their memoranda was seemingly parallel to that of the bureaucratic mindset, with an explicitly exuberant tone in their commendations of certain actors whether it was local notables, or acquisition agents to prepare the grounds for the issuance of such permission, as discussed above. We know that a certain memorandum submitted to the Sultan is also intended to put its author in a favorable position in the eyes of the Sultan. Tatarcık Abdullah Efendi was right to propose an increase in the purchase prices of wheat as a solution to the supply problem, and in order to achieve this, he seemed to use the bureaucratic mind he had grown up with to present a catastrophic scenario, which did not happen in neither in Balkans nor Western Anatolia, where he argued that the peasants would leave their lands if the lower purchase prices continued.¹³³ This is the same bureaucratic mindset that is reflected in the above mentioned firmans.

The period between 1690s-1720s marks the birth pangs of the expanding activity in the form of policy changes experimenting restrained *serbestiyet* in wheat trade by imperial bureaucracy. Contrary to the western liberal policies, what shaped Ottoman experience was the co-existence of the *zaruret* (necessity) due to the constant wheat demand by the foreign markets and changing economic dispositions of its subjects who increasingly captured by the lure of profit more than their predecessors. It was formulized by the wordings of *zaruret-i hallerine* referring to the necessity of peasants due to their failure in getting profit from expanded illicit wheat trade. For this specific premise, the boundaries of this *serbestlik* are also drawn very deliberately. It

¹³³ Ibid, 585.

is not freedom in its current sense, but rather a formulation of a right defined by necessity of the realities of the period under certain criteria. In other words, it approximates to the the original meaning of this Persian word, *ser*-(head) *best* (strapped). As if the spirit of the eighteenth century was reflected in the Ottoman wheat policy. The imperial reflex in loosening ties on previously prohibited activities and placing bans on these again was the response to the expanding monetary economy of the eighteenth century. At the same time, the fear of scarcity came to be shaped through centuries' old experiences had always been present. It is not by surprise that the empire was trapped between the two opposing concerns and faced with dilemma in this transformative and transitive period. Consequently, the demand forced the Ottomans to recognize the state of the world and the empire has chosen gradually the other end, one that is defined as Ottoman pragmatism, in the case of wheat; the obligation to derive advantage from legalizing the illicit trade in wheat, or fixing the rates in previously placed taxes which proved impossible to eradicate, to levy taxes and even newly invented (*bid'at*) ones.

Dilemma unfolded once again when the English and French fleets arrived with eighty ships and anchored near Mora, where local notables, tax farmers and *voyvodas* had already loaded them with wheat by breaking the prohibition of wheat sale again and the demand of the states stemmed from the scarcity in their homelands, once again (... *Frengistan ve İngiltere caniblerinde kaht-u galâ vuku'una binaen seksen kadar sefain-i küffar cezire-i mezbureye gelüp ayan ve voyvoda ve mültezimleri tam-ı hamlarından naşı mevcut olan zehairi sefain-i mezkureye fûruht eylediklerinden...*).¹³⁴ The petition of the Mora inhabitants and in return the final decision of the empire perfectly captures this ambiguity. Considering the number of

¹³⁴ MAD.d. 10212/143 (18 Rebiülevvel 1182 / 2 August 1768).

ships, the inhabitants must have felt overwhelmed about the extent of illicit wheat trade that skyrocketed the price of one kile of wheat to 3,5 guruş and barley and other grains to 2 guruş (... *cezire-i mezkurede hintanın beher kilesi üç buçuk guruşa ve filmik(?) ta'bir olunur hububatın kilesi yüzer paraya ve şairin ikişer guruşa rayiç ve ahali-i cezire mekulatları perakendeye muzdarip ve zaruret-keş olmalarıyla...*). Faced with the danger of scarcity due to the high prices, the Mora residents requested the total prohibition of illicit wheat sale to *müste'min* in the August of 1768. The subsequent persistence of demand in the face of observable price increases, especially from 1760 onwards, is a factor that further expands foreign demand and accelerates the flight of wheat in the face of higher inflation rates by the end of the century.¹³⁵

What is the amount of siphoned wheat that put the subsistence in danger, if the information in the petition is right? It would be possible to make a superficial estimation on the amount of wheat and the profit of the illicit actors. If we consider the fact that English and French merchant ships will pass through Atlantic shores to reach their homeland and if not transfer their load from land in for instance from Marseilles, or alike docks, they will need more durable and more cargo capacity. Normally, an 8000 kile cargo capacity of a *kalyon* and similar in its overall dimension to *filuka* most of the times was referred to the foreign merchants who engaged in illicit wheat trade.¹³⁶ In the permission firman of 1720 to Mora, we clearly see that foreign merchants give 1000 guruş for a ship loaded with 4000 kile of grain (...*dört bin kileyi mütehammil bir sefineye zahire tahmili için bin guruş akçe verildiği olub...*).¹³⁷ If the presumptions were actually the case then eighty-*kalyon* could have loaded at minimum

¹³⁵ Genç, 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Devlet ve Ekonomi', p. 213. Genç summarizes the fiscal condition of the empire as

¹³⁶ Murphey, "Provisioning Istanbul: The State and Subsistence in the Early Modern Middle East." p. 253.

¹³⁷ MHM.d. 129/810, (Evahir-i Rebiülahir 1132 / 10 January 1720).

320,000 kile and at maximum 640,000 kile in total. In return, the profit would have been range from 80,000 to 160,000 gurus. This educated guess could have been far from reality in the absence of statistical periodic registers on the one hand, but when it is compared with the other incidents shared in the following chapters, the amount appears close by means of the load and highlights a pattern.

Found itself trapped between the expectations of the ‘world markets’ and centuries’ old command economic policy on wheat distribution, what would be the most suitable response against such demand by the empire? As much more seasoned with this kind of demands until now, but many times without noticing due to illicit transfers, the empire consciously sets the policy by letting foreign merchants to purchase in return of the *resm-i miri*. The grounds for such permission were almost the same with the previously issued ones; transferring the yield from the peninsula is hard due to the long distance to the capital and the yield rots in one year if it was not sold.

By referring to the previous permission and its reasons granted in (h.1135) 1722 when the Balkan non-Muslim peasants was authorized to sell, it further provides valuable insight the wheat policy towards Mora between 1720 and 1735/6 in which occasionally the permission and prohibition came to be issued by retaining enough amount of wheat for the inhabitants and letting the remainder to be sold to foreign merchants. During the above-mentioned period in Mora, an extra 6 akçe began to be levied in the name of *resm-i bid‘at* on each *kile* sold.

One year before the 1768 permission, one could see that a permission of wheat sale for Mora residents was once again granted. This time, the center sought to benefit from the *resm-i miri* prices as 6 akçe for a kile of wheat and 2 akçe that of barley and other grains alongside with 10 para (30 akçe) and 5 (15 akçe) para *resm-i bid‘at*

prices respectively.¹³⁸ When compared with the *resm-i bid'at* of 1768 which was 6 akçe, they appeared quite high which must have been the result of a relatively less amount of wheat purchased by the foreign merchants as 10,000 kile of wheat and 4000 kile of barley and other grains in 1767. It must have been due to the fact that by reducing the *resm-i bid'at* to one-fifth, the center aimed to increase the revenue from the projected sales in 1768. The right to collect *resm-i miri* from the authorized wheat sales in addition to the newly imposed extra tax, as the order reveals, began to be controlled as life-time tax source from 1722 onwards,

‘...bundan akdem cezire-i mezburede hasıl olan hinta[nın] cezireye kifayet mikdarı alıkonulup küsuru müste'min taifesine fûruht olunmak üzere beher kilesi altışar akçe resm-i bid'at alınmak üzere otuz beş tarihinde malikane tevcih badehu tevarih-i muhtelifi ile def' ve ref' ve tekrar kırk sekiz tarihinde ifa ...’.

Like in the previous year of 1767, the holder of the *malikane-mukataa* was Mehmed Ağa, who was the warden of then the governor to Anatolia, Hamza Paşa with 7580 guruş annual tax amount (...*el-yevm yedi bin sekiz yüz elli guruş mâl ile hala Anadolu Valisi vezir[im] Hamza Paşa edamallahu teala iclalihunun kethüdası olan dergah-ı muallam kapucu başlarından Mehmed dam-ı mecdihunun malikane uhdesinde olduğu baş muhasebeden der-kenar olunmağla...*).¹³⁹ The revenue of the tax source destined for two occasions; 2019 guruş was destined for the treasury and the remaining 5831 guruş was saved for the salaries of *örfi* and *şeri* officials in the castles located in the peninsula (castle guards, imams and preachers). After the permission, the first attempt was the levying taxes so that the *mültezim* could manage the process in the docks as well as collect the taxes. Previously before, during the first expansion phase of the trade, the foreign merchants were either anchored at the

¹³⁸ C.ML. 503/20433 (2 Muharrem 1181 / 31 May 1767).

¹³⁹ “*Mukataa-i resm-i miri-i hinta ve hububat-ı saire der iskeleha-i cezire-i Mora vacib an gurre-i muharrem sene 1182 der uhde-i Mehmed Ağa ber vech-i malikane.*”

offshore where the small boats and vessels carried the wheat from the shores, or they went nearby islands in or near archipelago. By providing legal status for such trade, the empire also placed the ‘revenue’ under the control of a mültezim who would take the necessary measures to safeguard the operation process. The surplus production and its sale would benefit not only the inhabitants but also the treasury on the eve of the war in 1768.

Identifying the obligated parties for the taxes again provides important clues about the center’s intervention in the commercial activity for which it granted constrained freedom. The tax to be paid by the foreign merchant is clearly stated as *resm-i miri*, but the addressee of *resm-i bid‘at* is not specified in the permission firmans that suggests this levy was the case much later. The discrepancy was finally resolved with two prohibition firmans, dated 1746 (earliest reference to *resm-i bid‘at*) and 1755 both clearly points out that this extra levy came to be paid by the sellers, whether peasants or local notables, directly to the treasury.¹⁴⁰ While in the former, this levy was coined as *resm-i bid‘at* like in the Mora case of 1768, in the latter, the connotation of *hinta bid‘ati* were used.¹⁴¹

As their functions were identical, they came to be used interchangeably. However, both firmans dispatched to the coastal towns in the Balkans and Western Anatolia indicate that permissions were extended with additional levies beyond Mora much before 1768. The term has become a commonplace in document jargon,

¹⁴⁰ BOA, Karaferye Kadı Sicilleri, hereinafter KKS. 9024/36/B1-37/A1 8 Receb 1159 / 27 July 1746).

¹⁴¹ BOA, C.İKTS 34/1653 (Evasıt-ı Zilhicce 1168 / September 1755). ‘...*hinta bid‘ati rüsumundan ezmane-i salifede hazine-i amireye kat-ı vafır menafı’ ait olur iken mutlaka beka-yı refah-ı hal-i ibadullah için ref’ olunup...*’. The term ‘*hinta bid‘ati*’ has been revealed in the context provided. When analyzing the available data on the former illicit wheat trade, it becomes clear that ‘*resm-i bid‘at*’ corresponds to ‘*hinta bid‘at*’. This is because there is a direct reference in the document to this tax on the peasants in the 1755 firman and on the local notables in 1746. From this point onwards, this tax will be referred to as *hinta bid‘ati*.

indicating an increase in the permission of wheat sales. Nevertheless, there remains the possibility of its reinstatement following a prohibition phase in the foreseeable future. The imposition of additional taxes on peasants reflects the persistence of archaic wheat policies designed to discourage them from selling their yields, even when permitted to do so. Should the seller persist in their actions, which symbolize the impact of insurmountable foreign demand and the economic inclinations of Ottoman subjects, it can be assumed that the tax would serve as a deterrent, with any failure intended to benefit the treasury. Despite the advantage for the treasury, the center made it clear that this tax was abolished in favor of the sellers, whether peasants or local notables. It is crucial to acknowledge that this process was not uniform but rather exhibited a pattern of unevenness. The frequency of permissions' removal and reintroduction over time remains unclear. However, it is evident that the practice had become widespread with the introduction of new tax types and on new regions.

It is clear that the foreign merchant fleet had already arrived at the gates of the empire. It must have been because of their desperate need for wheat that they came to the nearest point where they could buy wheat instead of infiltrating most of the inner parts of the Aegean Sea or the ports of Salonica, which many times before this year had again supplied their needs through illicit wheat trade, as quickly as possible. The empire found the request of the inhabitants for prohibition unreasonable, as the yield reported by some *ehl-i vukuf* (who has the proper knowledge of the wheat condition in the peninsula) was actually sufficient and the remaining surplus can properly be channeled and that would be beneficial for the inhabitants of the peninsula by the report of *defterdar* (chief accountant). Therefore, the request was rejected for the reasons such as the possibility of losing the crop which would go bad after one year in the hands of the peasants who could pay their taxes with the sale as well as the crop of

the *çiftlik* owners whose crop would also go bad, all of which explicitly implies surplus production and the willingness of the center to make use of the offerings from the wheat sale.

‘...bu surette ahalinin istida’ları üzere külliye men’ olunduğu halde cezire-i merkumede hasıl olan hinta senesi aherine dayanmayub külliye telef olacağı ve kezalik ahali ve reaya yedlerinde mevcud bulunan hintaları fûruht olunmadığı surette gerek mazarrat-ı miriye ve gerek bazı kesen uhdellerinde olan çiftliklerin mahsulatı fûruht olunmamağla reayanın üzerlerine edası lazım gelen tekaliflerini virmeğe mübteda-yı meşakkat ve ashab-ı çiftlikatın dahi mahsulatı fûruht olunmayub ala halihi ve kat’i ile bezl-i ilzam ve hasılatlarına kesr ü noksan terettüb ideceği zahir olduğundan maada fi’l asl Mora ceziresinde hasıl olan zehairi kocabaşı ta’bir olunan hufyeten kefare [kendü taraflarından mübayaa ve diledikleri gibi müste’min keferesine fûruht iderler iken şimdi o makule kocabaşılara zehair fûruhtuna ruhsat verilmeyüb herkes kendü zahiresini değer bahasıyla talibine fûruht eyledikleri cihette bu defa’ diyar-ı ahere bazıları fermanım olan kocabaşılardan bir iki nefer müfsidler kezalik bazı deavi zımnında der saadetime ihzar olunan koca başılardan zaim oğlu vesair elyevm asitane-i saadetimde sîrren ve alenen ikametleri sebebiyle ahali-i cezireyi ikdar ve tekdir kaydıyla bu vechle arzuhale cesaret eylediklerini ashab-ı vukuf haber virmeleriyle...’.

Some crucial observations can be inferred about the policy of the empire in general and the condition of the peasants in Mora, which was clearly stated by the firman upon their petition, failed to generate income from their yield but the kocabaşıs through illicit wheat trade, secretly against the prohibition orders aimed at themselves, as *ehl-i vukuf* reports, requested the total prohibition of wheat sale.¹⁴² In return, the center allowed the peasants to sell their crops directly to the foreign merchants. Moreover, in contrast to the firmans of 1720 and 1722, the yield of the *çiftlik* holders was specifically mentioned in this order, which indicates that the production of the *çiftlik*s had now begun to be cited to be made use of, which implies that these units

¹⁴² The connotation stands for the dignitaries of non-Muslim communities see Özcan Mert, "Keşan Ayanlığına ve Kocabaşılığına Giriş", *Tarih Dergisi*, 42, 2005, pp. 111-136.

cover the rural scene in Mora as well. Finally, the permission was given only after by keeping enough for the inhabitants and then to sell the surplus.¹⁴³

The increasing frequency of the permission firmans marks the transformation of the empire's approach and the economic incentives of its subjects, which was characterized by economic rationality, to the notion of *ekl u bal*, which refers to food materials in Ottoman parlance, from a morally protected material to a commodity to be capitalized across all strata. The market has been gradually taking over the idealized way of distributing grain throughout the empire, if not uniformly, then certainly enough. It is also the reflection of conjunctural and incipient integration of the empire's economy into the foreign markets.

This point was further materialized by the imposition of the *resm-i bid'at* on the authorized sale of wheat. Its absence in the first permission order of Mora in 1720, and then in 1722 for the Balkans serves as a significant indicator of the political orientation in the face of the process of expansion of this trade. While in the lexicon the term *resm-i bid'at* simply carries the meaning of "new tax", it conveys much more nuanced implications when considered in the context drawn thus far, not merely as a static definition of a given order at a particular time, but rather as part of a broader historical process. In fact, the biggest indicator of normalization is the imposition of *hınta bid'atı*, as it was perceived as *bid'at-ı hasene* that was not against religious law and would not have a negative effect on old practices, and if it was beneficial to society

¹⁴³ Ibid. ‘‘...husus-u mezbur vezir-i müşarileyh ma’arifeti ve ma’arifet-i şer’ ve cümle ayan ve ahali ma’arifetleriyle görölüp cezire-i merkumede hasıl olan hıntadan nefis-i cezireye kifayet idecek mikdarı hınta ve hububat-ı saire ahali ve reaya yedlerinde tamam olmak ve lüzumu olmayan ziyadesi mukaddema sadır olan emr-i şerifim mucibince kemafl-l-evvel verilmek hususu isti’lâm için emr-i şerifim suduru iftiharü’l ümerai’l ekabir bi’l fiil baş defterdarım İbrahim Sarım dam-ı ulüvvühuya telhis olunmağla mucibince işbu emr-i celil-i muktedirim ısdar ve ile irsal olunmuştur...’’.

and the empire, it would soon become part of *adet-i kadime* (old tradition) regarding wheat sale; otherwise it would not have been imposed.¹⁴⁴

In the first phase, the sale of wheat was prohibited and remained so in the name and capacity of *kanûn-ı kadîm* (old rules). In the second phase, however, the demand of the foreign merchants and the subjects of the empire forced the old rules and let the empire grant occasional permissions for the sale in return for *resm-i miri*. In the last phase, the empire also acknowledged the situation and demanded additional taxes by imposing new ones on the formerly prohibited activities in the century. As briefly touched upon above, it was a century in which all practices based on *kanûn-ı kadîm* were challenged, giving rise to new innovations (*bid'at*). It took approximately twenty-four years after the issuance of initial permission of 1720 to Mora for the empire to assume a regulatory role, which unfolded with the levying of another tax as *hunta bid'ati* in 1746, in addition to the *resm-i miri*. In a sense, *resm-i miri* now representing the 'old' *bid'at*; reflecting the newly emerged disposition towards illicit wheat trade in the 1720s. Over time, however, the expanding nature of the activity necessitated imposition of yet another newly invented tax, but this time it was the empire that set the *bid'at* instead of its subjects, or further acknowledged the new disposition. Consequently, *resm-i miri* in a way transitioned into the *kanun-ı kadim* within the context of illicit wheat trade over the course of eighteenth century.

As clearly stated long before the 'reformist' Ottoman bureaucrats' compendiums issued at the end of the century when Selim III promulgated a series of renovative policies, whose aim was in parallel with the permission grants, the empire's

¹⁴⁴ Özer Ergenç, "Continuity and Change in the Ottoman Early Modern Era: An Analysis of 'Adet-i Kadime and Hâdis'" in *Crafting History: Essays on the Ottoman World and Beyond in Honor of Cemal Kafadar*, Rachel Goshgarian, Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, Ali Yaycıoğlu (eds.) (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2023), pp. 559-560.

cadres were well aware of the fact that even if issued only for the Mora and the Balkans, loosening the ties of strict prohibition of wheat export would bring prosperity to the well-being of peasants and salvation of the peasants through the elimination of profiteer local notable intermediaries' grasp. On the other hand, the main difference of the orders from the reformist compendiums regarding illicit wheat trade were their silence about the possible imperial pricing mechanism in forced purchases, *miri* or *rayic*, both of which prove low from the market and foreign demand pricing which eventually led the escape of the product from the empire. This must have been the result of the activity that has only recently come to a degree at the level that drags the attention of the center. By the last decade of the eighteenth century, as the empire's bureaus became much more acquainted with the reality, their solutions have also become sophisticated with the inclusion of the detrimental effect of the imbalanced pricing mechanism both on the supply chain and peasants' well-being, which has finally resonated within the memoranda of the reformists at the end of the century.

Conditions gave way to the permission do not only encompass the state of abundance during that specific period as it clearly mentions the general characteristic of the Balkan lands as fertile, or as a quick precaution to make use of stored wheat which soon decompose in imperial granaries but aims primarily an effort to prevent potential revenue loss for wheat, which had long been destined for foreign merchants. This policy, on the other hand, was consistent with the state's perception of justice which founds its utmost form in the protection of peasants who were the main source of wealth and prosperity, which was clearly admitted by the empire itself. To eliminate harm for the source of prosperity necessitated precautions but it never gave up with that of treasury. Otherwise, in times of plenty, subjects might prefer selling the product directly without paying taxes which was the case substantiated so far. This approach

aligns with the empire's strategy, like *çıkar bacı*, in trying to maximize revenue from what would otherwise be sold illegally, benefiting the empire through the levying of *resm-i miri* and *hınta bid'ati* or *resm-i bid'at*. The latter can be regarded as the equivalent of *çıkar bacı* that authorizes the peasants in the time of permission with increasing frequency in the eighteenth century. In a way, it reflects the consequences of a large drain that has reached attention-grabbing levels and cannot be contained, with each party taking their share from it. This process is the staple food-side of the normalization process of product that has increasingly been the subject of world markets in the empire.

The price differentials between Western Europe and the empire undoubtedly played a pivotal role. Otherwise, if the prices of *miri* and *rayic* for the wheat acquisitions were satisfactory, the illicit wheat trade would not have reached such an extent. Moreover, the constant demand from outside has made this tendency of the subjects inevitable.

It can be stated that the villagers hardly participate in this activity as the main beneficiaries as they lack the resources for storage, obtaining products, and managing logistics. Indeed, it seems impossible for the peasantry to provide the capital for storage, to have the means to obtain the product and then affording the logistics. On the other hand, without claiming that the peasants have not benefited in any way, it can be rightly argued that the most difficult task of all for them is to be able to bypass the already professional and capitalized local actors and their offers in their respective regions. Those who do this work were either abusing their official duties or local notables who had savings and were engaged in activities that can diversify their portfolios. Although the empire acknowledges the reality in its order, it surprisingly grants free trade of wheat only to the peasants. But the question arises, why it

intentionally bestowed the permission? It is evident that the center was well aware of the difficulties the reaya would face in carrying out this task and clearly warn those in charge carrying out the duty for possible interlopers. Scrutinized earlier, exceeding the borders of nearest marketplace system necessitates financial and political means which is beyond the capacity of most peasants. In other words, the state tacitly knows that this activity will eventually be carried out by the local notable çiftlik and warehouse owners, whose possibility of involvement is passionately explained at the beginning of the edict, even if unwillingly, it allows them to do it. If they engage in illicit trade, the empire will fail to collect taxes. The fact that he allowed it to be free, knowing that the local notable usurers would undertake it, is nothing but his desire to get a share from this shadow economy that it could not totally prevent. Prohibiting the sale of wheat after two months from the permission was nothing less than a very clear acknowledgment of the de facto situation in all its aspects.

In the initial phase of the illegal wheat trade, the empire-imposed bans on main instigators attempting to export the product due to increasing foreign demand. Some attempted negotiations with officials in an effort to find common ground. In the subsequent phase, subjects began exploring illegal opportunities through different routes such as bribery, or use of force. Unable to cut off the illicit trade, the empire gradually drags it to the legal constraints. These three phases unfolded respectively during the eighteenth-century. Consequently, the nearest marketplace system gradually disintegrated over the course of the eighteenth century while the subjects of the empire had rationally equated their economic incentives with that of the world market.

A cursory examination of the archives reveals that the frequency and prevalence of the illicit wheat trade declined toward the last quarter of the eighteenth

century and especially after the 1820s.¹⁴⁵ In general, however, the fact that we do not have data for some periods does not mean that they do not exist, and that prohibition edicts were sent continuously during this period, too. At first glance, the decline in the number of prohibition edicts might seem to indicate that the illicit trade had been completely prevented and cut off like a knife, but the observable cessation of issuance suggests the normalization of the activity over time.

2.6. Not The Beginning but The End: Revisiting the Wheat in 1838 Convention

The Anglo-Ottoman convention of 1838 played a pivotal role in legitimizing a shadow trade that had been ongoing for over a century. Since that line of argument is consistent with the data presented so far, that liberal attempt attributed to 1826 came also short for accounting again such free policy regarding wheat.¹⁴⁶ Unlike mohair, illicit wheat trade was not regulated by any *mukataa* continuously and did not become a focal point of so-called liberal economic policies until 1839. Nevertheless, the gradual trajectory of illicit wheat trade finally mirrored that of mohair, but it took much time because of its character as for being a staple food and holding a moral value.

In the nineteenth century, the foreign merchants offered much higher prices for wheat, and they continued to purchase wheat at a rate of 14-15 gurus per *kile* (bushel), surpassing the market value of 9 gurus per bushel.¹⁴⁷ Higher rates than this pricing rate had persisted for at least a century before. The treaty offered a convenient avenue for

¹⁴⁵ AE.SSLM.III 191/11478 (1216 / 1802). Some might argue that the situation was caused by the Revolutionary or Napoleonic Wars. However, as this piece of document proves, the import demand of France was high and continued to be so at the onset of the wars, too.

¹⁴⁶ Donald Quataert, 'The age of reforms, 1812-1914'. In *An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, edited by H. Inalcik and D. Quataert, 759-946. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). p. 764.

¹⁴⁷ Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı - İngiliz İktisâdî Münasebetleri LI (1838-1850)* (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1976). p. 29. While emphasizing the Convention's impact primarily on Egypt, it maintains the argument of rupture see Roger Owen, 'The 1838 Anglo-Turkish convention: An overview', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 1992. pp. 7-14.

the England and later for other European states, including France, who also sought to be subject to its provisions. Their objective was to siphon off wheat to their countries at a lower cost, which was not the case in illicit trade, leading them to employ various diplomatic maneuvers to achieve this goal. The British were asked to provide a written commitment not to purchase wheat during scarce years. However, they declined to do so and only gave a verbal assurance through their ambassador that they would buy wheat during plentiful years.¹⁴⁸ In this capacity, Britain was able to issue an article which ruled out wheat monopoly of the empire.¹⁴⁹ Another benefit of legalizing commercial exchanges for wheat is the elimination of intermediaries, which reduces commission costs and prevents delays caused by these actors.

In 1800, a British middleman in Selanik sent a report to the Duke of Portland on the production capacity of wheat in the Ottoman Empire for possible purchase with imperial permission and preventing any possible interference of France for this trade with bribes.¹⁵⁰ It is certainly no coincidence that the regions that will be examined in detail in the following chapters with regard to the illicit wheat trade were included in this report as regions capable of producing abundant harvests of all types of grain, but especially wheat. The regions that were mentioned in the report and that are the subject of analysis in this thesis were Macedonia, the Gulf of Selanik, Kesendire, Golos, Çandarlı and similar coasts in Western Anatolia. Apart from these regions, the fact that such a report was prepared by a British official who was looking for suitable places

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 28. The British were asked to provide a written commitment not to purchase wheat during scarce years. However, they declined to do so and only gave a verbal assurance through their ambassador that they would buy grain during plentiful years.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 8. The second article in the treaty eliminates bans on wheat export from the empire.

¹⁵⁰ British National Archives, Letter from James Lee of The Grove, Hackney [Middlesex], HO (Home Office) 42/53 pp. 307-308 (14 November 1800). '*Resident many years a Levant factor at Salonica, think to have some knowledge of the productions of these ports/parts? considerable portion of which is Grain of all sorts, especially Wheat of which the Province of Macedonia, the Gulf of Salonica, Cassandra, Volo[s], and all that Coast as well as Sandarle and other parts in the Asia side produce annually/occasionally? very abundant...*'. I am thankful for the effort my colleague Eyüp Ensar Dal made to send me the voluminous records that also contain this document.

to purchase wheat is another indication that they were preparing for future purchases through illicit trade, as the sale of wheat to the foreign states was still prohibited in that year, so the demand of the Western states that continued into the nineteenth century, it can be argued that the Napoleonic wars during the first decades of the century added up their need for grain and livestock.¹⁵¹

The existence of this article concerning wheat acquisition alone indicates that England and France's dependence on Ottoman wheat persisted in the nineteenth century.¹⁵² Consequently, it adapted to the prevailing conditions, finding its structure clearly defined by the treaty's provisions regarding wheat. The curtain was finally lifted from a shadow trade that had steadily escalated for over a century. In a way, the legitimization effort aimed to lift the bans by abolishing the monopoly on wheat, essentially transforming a prohibition into an accepted practice. The only constant was the consistent demand from Western European states for Ottoman wheat. By the second half of the nineteenth century, thanks to the construction of railroads, considerable amount of wheat was dragged from formerly unutilized regions' lands and continued to be exported to the Western states. However, the difference from the previous century was the scale thanks to the farther inclusion of the wheat producing most inner parts of Anatolia such as Konya, Ankara and eastern Aydın provinces into the already commercialized product from the late seventeenth century.¹⁵³ It should also be recalled the case of Bergama to highlight the pattern of distance before the railroads from where the most-inner part of Anatolia, namely from Karahisar and Konya wheat had already been dragged to be exported for the islands but mostly to the foreign

¹⁵¹ Quataert, 'The age of reforms, 1812-1914', p. 828.

¹⁵² Ibid, pp. 28-42.

¹⁵³ Donald Quataert, "The Commercialization of Agriculture in Ottoman Turkey, 1800-1914," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 1, no. 2 (1980): 38-55. p. 40-41.

merchants as early as 1726. Given the change in this trade that was now legally recognized, if not fostered, by the state itself and technological advancement in logistics, one would expect increase in supply if there were not severe crop failures. Since railroads replaced camels and pack animals for the expansion and transportation, obviously increased the amount of formerly uncultivated lands in remote regions by stimulating agricultural production. Thus, even if the scale and the legal aspect was not comparable with that of nineteenth century when mechanization increasingly replacing old methods rather than cultivation, the commercialization of ‘Ottoman’ agriculture had taken place before commercialization of agriculture in ‘Ottoman Turkey’ of the nineteenth century in the context of wheat.¹⁵⁴

Similar to the Ottoman legalization of the existing situation due to the extent of illicit trade in mohair, the treaty's article ‘normalized’ the wheat demands of Western European states during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, adapting to the circumstances of the nineteenth century. In this process, since wheat was a strategic staple food and held moral value in the collective memories of the imperial mind and its subjects, it could not be expected to be recognized as much early as mohair and must await nineteenth century. Thus, the treaty of 1838 lacks the ability to represent the beginning of the collapse of a tradition aimed safeguarding provisionist policy that had been preserved for centuries by thinking of it in the context of a paradigm of rupture. On the contrary, it is merely the last form that the continuity of this trade, seen as increasing over a century, took in the conditions of the nineteenth century. In other words, the integration of western and the empire’s markets with

¹⁵⁴ For another similar claim regarding the uncommercialized state of eighteenth-century Ottoman agriculture see Çağlar Keyder, ‘Introduction: Large-scale commercial agriculture in the Ottoman Empire? In Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (eds.), *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991). pp. 1-13

respect to wheat has already been established through the chain of an ‘illicit trade network’. Neither the tendencies of the West European merchants to satisfy their demands in the form of the illegal wheat trade nor the reaction of the Empire were new phenomena, but rather the long-standing demand was formalized and took on a legal appearance with the convention. The emphasis on liberal wheat policies has always been related to the end of the century. The irrepressible nature of the illicit wheat trade at the beginning of the eighteenth century led the center to promulgate constrained *serbestiyet* that marked the beginning of liberal-like wheat policy much earlier than suggested by the literature, in the early decades of the century. Thus, contrary to the claim that the so-called Western domination of Levantine trade occurred in the nineteenth century, the increasing presence of Western merchants in Levantine trade apparently began in the eighteenth century when their wheat demand progressively unfolded but without a dominance in the sense of the nineteenth century.

Several factors contributed to the increase of this trade in the second period (1690s-1830s). Firstly, the demand during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, primarily from Italian city-states, was relatively small and different from later periods. Secondly, the effectiveness of central control in curtailing this trade played a pivotal role. Thirdly, the increased demand from the late seventeenth century onwards coincided with the relative ineffectiveness of imperial institutions. During the eighteenth century, the demand for agricultural products from England and France increased, eventually impacted in the form of a smoother wheat policy of the empire from the first decades of the century. This was compounded by the decline in the rural

population of Western states due to the profound industrialization and the failure to meet their wheat demand solely through domestic production.¹⁵⁵



¹⁵⁵ Although beyond the scope of this thesis, the flow of Ottoman wheat as a foodstuff, which led to a serious reconsideration and modification of the empire's strictly conservative wheat policy, highlights the need to reassess arguments in the historical narrative that heavily emphasizes the agricultural revolution achieved in Western Europe in the eighteenth century, which became a precursor to the Industrial Revolution. In the absence of drastic population increases in the continent, the presence of European merchants in the Mediterranean for illicitly purchasing wheat throughout the century and as a one-way trade, from the empire to the continent suggests the revision. This reassessment is particularly important within the Western European-oriented perspective of linear historical development.

CHAPTER III

LOCAL ELITES IN THE MAKING: THE TODOR MUSACHI (TODOR MUJAK) AND HIS DESCENDANTS (LATE 15TH- LATE 17TH)

A discernible trend emerges when the genealogical lineages of affluent landowning elite notable families in Karaferye was analyzed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹⁵⁶ Noted for their simultaneous engagement in large-scale commercial enterprises and their interaction with the prevailing socio-economic conditions, these families embarked on a trajectory that culminated in their becoming proprietors of substantial landed estates, commonly referred to as "ekabir çiftlik." An illustrative case study pertains to the interconnection between two prominent local families, Sarıcazâde and Lanbazâde, celebrated for their endeavors in the realm of çiftlik entrepreneurship during the latter period.¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, these families share a

¹⁵⁶ There are clear differences between the local magnate families that emerged in the eighteenth century and those whose roots go back to the 1600s or even earlier. These are evident in their means of ascent, whether through horizontal or vertical lines, in the acquisition of cultural, economic, and political privileges. Because of the scope of this dissertation, the difference between the terms, "elite" and an umbrella term, "notable" in the context of the briefly touched upon ones in this dissertation and others will be analyzed in another study based on new empirical findings that unravel the economic and cultural development of certain local magnate families in different parts of the empire like the joint endeavor conducted first with seminal introduction by Antonis Anastasopoulos, "Introduction" in *Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire, Halcyon Days in Crete V: A Symposium Held in Rethymno*, Antonis Anastasopoulos (ed.), 10-12 January 2003 (Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2005), XI-XXVIII.

¹⁵⁷ The Lanbazâde family, whose patrimony was given after by the conversion of the founder of the family, a non-Muslim Christian named "Lanbo" to Islam around 1600-1610. They established their roots in the city by occupying high positions throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but the conversion of the founder obscured the family name, and it was only by examining all available

maternal lineage with individuals from the "örfiyye," who, during the fifteenth century, garnered recognition for their service to the state and, consequently, were rewarded by the Sultan with grants of land. The enduring stewardship of land rights, sustained across generations, effectively transmuted these holdings into family endowments, thus laying the groundwork for the future socio-political, economic, and military privileges and priorities of their progeny. The examination of the various manifestations of this process, a focal point underscored in numerous scholarly investigations specific to the local elites and their place in agrarian relations, will undoubtedly become feasible through a comprehensive analysis informed by novel empirical data across diverse geographical regions of the empire. Only after that we would become much more informed and thus could diffuse into the problem of proprietorship in land.

In alignment with the Ottoman state's policy of coexistence and collaboration, these families seamlessly integrated into Ottoman administrative structures and observed the conversion of their descendants to Islam, further consolidating their socio-economic and political capital. Consequently, these individuals constituted the local aristocracy, whose legacy was passed down to the Ottoman Empire, with their descendants in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries inheriting this noble tradition. Subsequent generations bore witness to conversions to Islam, thereby strengthening their social and political stature during the fifteenth century. Collectively, the successors of the family in later centuries represented the regional elite-ship, whose legacy was subsumed into the Ottoman realm, and whose descendants in the following

related documents that it became possible to unravel it. The family is briefly mentioned here to emphasize the fact that they are united with Musachi's descendants. Due to the scope of this dissertation, their social, economic, and political ventures will be analyzed in detail in another forthcoming study.

centuries continued to uphold this if not ‘aristocratic’, but privileged tradition. In a political entity where, private property did not exist, such as the Ottoman Empire, the *mîrî* land regime itself might have assumed the role of aristocracy in the sense of Western states. It is imperative to acknowledge that not all descendants of the former seignorial families who entered Ottoman service followed this specific trajectory. Nevertheless, it remains an established historical fact that this path presented significant opportunities for those who were able to pursue it.

The rationale for the inclusion of diverse individuals within this study is twofold: firstly, to enhance the existing body of scholarly work to unravel old local elites and secondly, to introduce novel dimensions to our understanding of local elites. This chapter shares certain thematic parallels with Lowry and Erünsal's account of the Evrenoszâdes, yet it distinguishes itself by delving into a meticulous examination of their economic and social impacts, particularly during subsequent centuries. The affluence accrued by later generations is intricately linked to the prestige established during the initial era. As elucidated in the forthcoming section, the progenitors of these families did not originate from the formative years of the state; instead, they hailed from the seigneurial families of annexed territories, positioning them as active agents during the expansionary phase. During the consolidation period, they laid their roots in the "kaza" of Karaferye where they settled and integrated into the complex tapestry of the Ottoman administrative framework. By the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the descendants, whose agrarian and political relations I will thoroughly examine, boasted the lineage and acumen required to ascend as both entrepreneurs and "ekabir" landowners. Notably, it is worth highlighting that two of the most influential families in the region traced their maternal lineage back to an Albanian nobleman named Todor

Musachi. This kinship has undoubtedly been the source of several privileges that have had a positive impact on their social, cultural and economic capital.

3.1. The Emergence of Local Elites

*Cümle eltâf-ı Hüdâ'dur ammâ
Lutfa bir vâsıta'dır sıdk-ı ricâ*¹⁵⁸

The above quoted verse is from the *divan* (collection of poetry) of es-Seyyid Râmiz Mehmed Efendi, who was a member of prominent Sarıcazâde family in Karaferiye (modern Veria in Greece).¹⁵⁹ As an educated man, another title he held was *müderriş*, a professor of (Islamic) law.¹⁶⁰ The title was given after completing his education in one of the *medreses* (colleges of law) in eighteenth-century Edirne.¹⁶¹ In addition to teaching, he assumed the post of deputy judge in 1744.¹⁶² Moreover, Ramiz

¹⁵⁸ "...all the grace belongs to Allah but hearty prayer is [also] instrumental for [divine] favor...", (The translation is mine). Fatih Polat, "Râmiz Mehmed Efendi Divânı", Unpublished Master Thesis, Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi, 2003. p. 332.

¹⁵⁹ Yannis Spyropoulos, Stefanos Poullos, and Antonis Anastasopoulos, "Çiftlik, Landed Elites, and Tax Allocation in Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Veroia," *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, no. December (2020). Sarıcazâdes' in the context of expansion of their landed estates in the eighteenth-century Karaferiye are analyzed by the mentioned study by using tax allocation (tevzi) registers. Although tevzi registers are valuable sources to follow landholding pattern in Karaferiye specific to eighteenth century, they are not providing detailed information on the networks of the actors and on the previous centuries alone. For another study regarding çiftlik phenomenon in the eighteenth century Karaferiye see Antonis Anastasopoulos Eleni Gara, "The Rural Hinterland of Karaferiye: Settlements, Divisions, and the Çiftlik Phenomenon (Seventeenth-Eighteenth Centuries)," *Halcyon Days in Crete VIII A Symposium Held in Rethymno 13-15 January 2012 VIII*, no. January 2012 (2015): 261–91.

¹⁶⁰ "Râmiz," in *Türk Dünyası Ortak Edebiyatı: Türk Dünyası Edebiyatçıları Ansiklopedisi*, c.VIII (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Yayınları, 2007). 285. According to the study, he became müderriş of a medrese in Karaferiye. Moreover, he was appointed in a "hareket-i hariç" medrese in Edirne, which is the second grade of the first stage (ibtida-i hariç) in medrese ranking though it does not share the dates. See for "hareket-i hariç", Mehmet İpşirli, "Medrese", TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi.

¹⁶¹ Filiz Kılıç, ed., *Tezkîre-i Şu'arâ-Yı Şefkat-i Bagdâdî*, T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Kütüphaneler ve Yayımlar Genel Müdürlüğü Eser (Ankara, 2017). p. 130. "... Ramiz is a müderriş of Edirne..." Op.cit, p. 329. Ramiz lists the names of forty-three dervish lodges in Edirne with small verses on each. This can be deemed another proof of his presence during his madrasah education in Edirne.

¹⁶² Karaferiye Kadı Sicilleri Greek, hereinafter referred to as KKS.g. The court records of the Karaferiye used in this study located in General State Archives of Greece, through online access: <http://arxiomnimon.gak.gr/browse/index.html?cid=175573> The first number stands for the defter number, the second refers to the page, and the third number refers to the place of the case in the page. This document is the notification of Rumelian Military Judge, Mehmed Esad, who assigns a surrogate judge post in Karaferiye to es-Seyyid Mehmed Ramiz Efendi, on the D-072/16-3 (1 Rebiülâhîr 1157 / 14 March 1744). He was referred to as "...fahri'l müderrişini'l kirâm es-Seyyid Mehmed Râmiz Efendi kâimeab...". The designation "D-02" appears on the website in reference to the number of the first defter.

Mehmed had many çiftliks alongside his family members. His relatives, comrades and associates, Rüşdî Ali Efendi, and his brother Şeyhî Mustafa Efendi were other educated-landed elites. The last two were the members of another prominent local elite family in the eighteenth century Karafeye, the Lanbazâdes, whose existence has remained obscure, primarily due to the impermanent nature of Ottoman calligraphy during a long span of time and the newly found relevant documents. At the turn of the eighteenth century, as an ideal way of securing wealth and socio-political influence, Lanbazâde brothers became the grooms of an intra-elite marriage with the cousins of Sarıcazâde es-Seyyid Ramiz Mehmed Efendi. Furthermore, all three possess familiar taste in literature since they were amongst the renowned poets of the eighteenth-century Rumelia and had penned divans.¹⁶³

In a modest town like Karafeye, his immodest portfolio and literary personality helped him reach out to the highest authority in Salonica province, the governor of Rumelia and another literato of Rumelia, *düştûr-i Aristo-zuhûr* (the one who possesses Aristo way of thinking) Vizier Ratib Ahmed Pasha son of famous Vizier Topal Osman Paşa.¹⁶⁴ Thanks to the favor of the governor, he seemed to be forgiven from exile because of his involvement in a conflict of notable factions that disturbed the order in the town.¹⁶⁵ Thus, the kinship ties extended their partnerships

The reason is the misplacement of D-087 (1077-1080 / 1667-1669) within an incorrect date range of eighteenth century. In accordance with standard practice, this item should have been included among those dated to the seventeenth century.

¹⁶³ Râmiz, Rüşdî and Şeyhî are most probably the pen names of es-Seyyid Mehmed Efendi, Mustafa Efendi and Ali Efendi, respectively. Locally and centrally produced documents for the mentioned individuals write down their pen names alongside their real names and their family names while referring to these individuals. Besides, they are mentioned as Ottoman poets with separate studys dedicated to each in tezkires, which is a genre in ottoman literature provides brief information on poets in the Ottoman Empire. See Furkan Öztürk, ed., *Tezkire-i Silâhdâr-Zâde* (Ankara, 2018), and Kılıç, *Tezkire-i Şu'arâ-Yı Şefkat-i Bagdâdî*, 2017.

¹⁶⁴ İzzi Süleyman Efendi, *İzzi Tarihi*, Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı p. 688.

¹⁶⁵ For his political affiliation which was based on his “intellectual” capital see Polat, “Râmiz Mehmed Efendi Dîvânı”. pp. 140-144. Ramiz written many complimentary verses on Ratib Ahmed Paşa to be forgiven from the exile. It is understood that with the intervention of the governor, he was forgiven and turned back to Karafeye after spending eight months in exile. It makes one to argue that Ramiz Mehmed

into realm of capital accumulation that would only be fortified by cultural capital by joining in poetry circles with the Vizier himself who had penned a *divan* of his own. What is of interest regarding the close affiliation of both men of letters was the intellectual conduit between these two, Akovalızâde Şeyh Ahmet Hatem Efendi(d.1168/1755) who was a renowned poet and religious scholar of eighteenth century and the mentor of Ratib Ahmed Paşa. Also, Ramiz Mehmed seemed to spend a certain amount of time right beside Akovalızâde in his last years to be his pupil. When Akovalızâde established a cash-waqf in the quarter of Çelebi Sinan Bey in Karaferye in 1752, he appointed Ramiz Mehmed to manage the waqf and its assets as trustee (mütevelli).¹⁶⁶ The buildings of the waqf consists of a *darülkurra* (a complex where the Holy Qur'an was taught) including a masjid, and for the expenditures, Akovalızâde bequeathed 398,400 akçe for *muamele-i şer'îyye* (interest) at 15% rate, which was to be controlled by Ramiz Mehmed. During the procedure, Rüşdî Ali, son of judge Abdülhalim Efendi who were known as Lanbazâdes, was assisting the case as *müvella* of Karaferye.

Were the gains of these unique intellectual local elites solely the result of the God's grace, who endows if asked with sincerity, as far as Ramiz Mehmed's verses are concerned? What were the distinctive factors at play that prepared the way to give birth to such an educated-landed elite class in the eighteenth century Karaferye? What about the socio-economic roles of the women members played in shaping the future of these families? How exactly did the most important item in their portfolios, the

and Ratib Ahmed Paşa seemed to join into the poetry circles and accompanied by his comrades, Lanbazâde Rüşdî Ali and Şeyhi Mustafa. For the conflict amongst rival ayan factions and the involvement of Ramiz see Antonis Anastasopoulos, 'Lighting the Flame of Disorder: Ayan Infighting and State Intervention in Ottoman Karaferye, 1758-59,' *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 8 (1 & 2) (2002). 73-88.

¹⁶⁶ VGMA.d (Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü Arşivi Defterleri), d. 626-1/16-17. In the current literature, the father of Akovalızâde Şeyh Hatem Efendi was mentioned as Akovalı Şehdî Osman Efendi but in his waqf deed, his father's name registered as Mustafa Ağa.

çiftlik, emerge and come under their control? Finally, how could they utilize administrative posts such as judgeship and surrogate judgeship for at least two generations in harvesting political capital? As the findings of this chapter will suggest, the gains were not only the result of his hearty prayers but also the accumulated economic, social and cultural capital weaved across centuries transferred generation by generation until it gave birth to local elites such as Ramiz, Rüşdi and Şeyhi.

After the application of malikane-mukataa (life term tax farming) system, the expansion of the ekâbir çiftlik units gained pace with large tracts of arable lands. But in the late fifteenth, and increasingly in the second half of the sixteenth century, there are strong indications that çiftlik not in the sense of *ekâbir* ones but as investment instrument with too smaller scales began to emerge and expand. The three-tier pattern of land tenure were characterized in the context of landed-estate formation in the Karaferye appears as follows; proliferation of çiftlik with small sizes of arable lands from the beginning of the sixteenth century, even though there are a reference for the existences of private-property çiftlik, emergence of the ones or the extending of the previous ones that came to be attached with larger arable land in the seventeenth century, and consolidation of çiftlik with large tracts of arable lands in the eighteenth century respectively by the size of the building infrastructure and attached arable lands. Although the data is missing regarding the sizes of the çiftlik units in Thessaly in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this briefly mentioned characteristic of Karaferye appeared to be the case in Manastır and Thessaly with the same trajectory.¹⁶⁷

It would be wrong to place the entire weight of the analysis of economic and social

¹⁶⁷ For Manastır see Bruce McGowan, 'Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600–1800'. For Thessaly see Sophia Laiou, "Some Considerations Regarding Çiftlik Formation in the Western Thessaly, Sixteenth-Nineteenth Centuries," in *The Ottoman Empire, the Balkans, the Greek Lands: Towards a Social and Economic History*, ed. Elias Kolovos, Phokion Kotzageorgis and Sophia Laiou (Piscataway, NJ, USA: Gorgias Press, 2010), 255–78.

developments on a group representing a very small part of vast political entity, but their wealth and influence from the second half of the seventeenth century to the second half of the eighteenth century is undeniable. Given the presence of old local elite families for over three hundred years, who have survived through marriage alliances with more recent prominent families and have had members in religious, civic, and askeri (military) posts for generations, Karaferye diverges from the same pattern of analysis. This highlights the importance and possibility of other existing patterns in different local settings.

As for the early *çiftlik* units, they endured in the following centuries and came under the control of the local elites of the time. During the second half of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the size of the arable lands dedicated to the *çiftlik* units owned by the holders who had been the local elites of the town expanded to the extent that by 1691, the arable lands of the *çiftlik* units came to cover more than half of the residential villages. Although their arable land sizes were not comparable with that of *ekabir çiftlik*s which came to cover the rural scene from the beginning of the eighteenth century in Karaferye, compared to sixteenth, the arable land sizes of the of 1691 *çiftlik*s were bigger. In this sense, the *malikane mukataa* system was another effective way of revenue extraction that added up to already existing portfolios of local elites of Karaferye. By the eighteenth century, the long-established landholding patterns, tax farms and intra-elite marriages were the three determining factors behind the emergence of such personas as Ramiz, Şeyhi and Rüşdi as the members of most powerful local elites of the region. Moreover, the local family endowments (*vakfs*) played a significant role in the formation of *çiftlik* units and transfer of the wealth for three centuries. While Sarıcazâdes were the legal trustees of the Mehmed Bey waqf since the 1720s, Lanbazâdes were holding the trusteeship of the Tuzcu Hacı Sinan Bey

waqf as early as 1690s thanks to their maternal lineages. Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, their maternal and paternal ancestors had been members of influential local elite families and had produced ulema and örf officials, which most likely had an impact on the career paths of these three prominent actors of eighteenth century Karaferye. The two waqfs had been operational from the last decade of the fifteenth century, and the founders of the waqfs, Gazi Mehmed Bey and Tuzcu Hacı Sinan Bey, were the grandson and great grandson of an Albanian frontier lord, Todor Musachi, respectively. As a result of the intra-elite marriages, we see the members of the Lanbazâde and Sarıcazâde families as trustees of the Tuzcu Hacı Sinan Bey and Gazi Mehmed Bey waqfs in the eighteenth century respectively.

As will be analyzed in detail, çiftliks as an investment tool began to proliferate first in the villages controlled by the Gazi Mehmed Bey waqf and then expanded to other villages of the region, including the villages of Tuzcu Sinan Bey waqf by 1550s. Once established, they became embedded into the socio-economic fabric of the region. By the first decade of the eighteenth century, the Lanbazâde and Sarıcazâde families became the biggest landholders in the çiftlik market, which had been already matured in previous centuries. Moreover, the proliferation of the çiftlik units was not unique to Karaferye in the sixteenth century; this was also the case in other towns of the Salonican hinterland, namely Yenice-i Vardar (Giannitsa), Avrethisar (Neo Gynaikokastro), Serfiçe (Servia), Kesriye (Kastoria), Kelemerye (Kalamarya) and Vodine (Vodena). By the second half of the seventeenth century, the dominant type of agricultural production unit in the Salonican rural hinterland centered on the çiftliks, whose proliferation dates a century earlier.

This part aims to add another dimension to the *çiftlik* debate by examining pre-malikane *mukataa* period of Karaferye by analysing the proliferation in sixteenth and

expansion in seventeenth centuries. Over scrutinizing economic and social undertakings of the local elites over a long period of time it aims to analyze continuity in property-acquisition and capital formation. In a way, it attempts to highlight common themes regarding land tenure between pre and post eighteenth century. Undoubtedly, this analysis will chiefly focus on unraveling the complex interconnections among the local elites, reaya, and the state structure. These entities, actively contributing to the establishment of this framework, concurrently undertake roles as both instigators and actors in diverse circumstances.

In the Salonican countryside, the Evrenos family revived Yenice-i Vardar through establishing waqfs in the lands once assigned to as private-property, which helped the continuation of the family and its wealth over centuries. In a similar vein, in the sixteenth century, but much smaller in wealth and family size, Todor Musaschi family experienced parallel development in Karaferye.¹⁶⁸ Ultimately, the “Karaferye of the Musaschi family” approximates “Yenice-i Vardar of the Evrenoszâdes” in terms of the foundations they established in the Karaferye region and thus protecting and transferring their wealth and acquisitions for centuries.

During sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, different branches appeared out of the same lineage. While some of them unified through intra-elite marriages, others either faded away due to natural causes, or precluded from trusteeship because of their lower ranks in the lineage hierarchy. Though it did not occur often, some trustees might have dispensed the trusteeship to their successors while they were still alive (*kasr-ı yed*). Yet, legal lineages survived across centuries. By the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the trusteeship of the two waqfs was maintained by women who

¹⁶⁸ Heath W. Lowry, İsmail Erünsal, “The Evrenos Dynasty of Yenice-i Vardar: A Postscript,” *The Journal of Ottoman Studies* XXXIII, no. Prof. DR. Muammer Kemal Özergin Hatıra Sayısı-I (2009): 131–208.

were descendants of Todor Musachi but were married with the Lanbazâde and Sarıcazâde families. Not only the lineage, but also the waqf properties survived and grew. Amongst the most promising revenue sources, there were two villages under the property of each waqf. While Asbuga (Mikroguz) and Çernova villages belong to the waqf of Mehmed Bey, Aya Marine and Kıravate villages belong to the waqf of Tuzcu Hacı Sinan Bey. By the last decade of the seventeenth century, the waqfs' villages contained a considerable amount of çiftlik units. In a way, this chapter will conduct a micro-historical analysis on the economic and social capital of the local elite families composed of family waqfs and landed-estates to point out the continuation of local elite and çiftlik phenomena in Karaferye by scrutinizing two and half centuries.

In the first part of this chapter, after a brief inquiry on the socio-economic and political actions of the members of Todor Musachi family in the sixteenth century, their family waqfs will be analyzed in detail to reveal their portfolio specific to waqf properties. In the second part, after touching upon the proliferation of çiftlik units throughout Karaferye in the sixteenth century, this chapter will turn to the waqf villages in terms of their productive and fiscal capacity to show the impact of çiftlik expansion on the revenue of the villages. In the third part, it will scrutinize the çiftlik market of seventeenth century. In the fourth part, it will analyze the conflict amongst the descendants of Todor Musachi over the trusteeship of the two waqfs to unveil the networks amongst the old and new local elites. In the last part, the çiftlik phenomenon of the region will be analyzed with specific reference to the successors of the Musachi family and their relative local representatives at the end of seventeenth century. Overall, an analysis of the development of the çiftlik market in Karafaria over three centuries will be presented. The aim is to use this local setting as a reference point, as

far as the available data allow, and to draw parallels with other areas of research where these processes are observable but less well documented.

3.2. The Albanian Frontier Lord: Todor Musachi and His Sons

Before the conquest of Albania by the Ottomans, seigneur families were influential in the region's administration.¹⁶⁹ After dealing a heavy blow to the most potent seignior, Balcha II in 1385, the Ottomans followed a policy of reconciliation with the divided seigniors who came to accept Ottoman suzerainty.¹⁷⁰ The latter sustained their control over the lands they had possessed before being dragged into the margins of the timar system by the first half of the fifteenth century.¹⁷¹ As a member of this seigneur family group, Todor Musachi must have joined the ranks of the Ottoman military structure together with his sons. His surname “Muzak” stands for Musachi family and came to be referred to as “Muzak” in Ottoman parlance.¹⁷² The history of the family goes back to 1280 in Albania.¹⁷³ After recognizing the sovereignty of the Ottomans, children of the local seigneurs were sent to the palace as hostages to be “Ottomans” as a policy of the ghulam system. As a result of this orientation process, they occupied the administrative cadres and were appointed as officials in the timar system with the title of “bey.”¹⁷⁴ It is likely that Yakub Bey son of Todor Musachi was one of the hostages raised in the palace. Then appointed as

¹⁶⁹ Halil İnalcık, “Arnavutluk’ta Osmanlı Hakimiyetinin Yerleşmesi ve İskender Bey İsyanının Menşei,” in *Fatih ve İstanbul* (İstanbul, 1953), 153–75. 155.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 154.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 159–160.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 161. The family seemed to be different from the ones who were called ‘Muzarak’ and migrated from Albania and settled to Trabzon.

¹⁷³ Athanase Gegaj, *L’Albanie et l’invasion turque au XV e siècle*, Paris: 1937. 25. According to Gegaj, the first known member of the family stated as Andre Musachi (1280-1319), who was lord of Berat region and appointed as marshal of Albania granted by King Charles I of Naples(1226-1285).

¹⁷⁴ Halil İnalcık, “Stefan Dušan’dan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’na: XV. Asırda Rumeli’de Hristiyan Sipahiler ve Menşeleri,” in 60. Doğum Yılı Münasebetiyle Fuad Köprülü Armağanı (İstanbul, 1953), 207–48. 227.

sanjakkbeyi of Albania in 1437 and at the same time disposing the province of Premedi.¹⁷⁵ Yakub Bey was also one of the famous commanders of Murad II and died in 1442 during the Hungary campaign.¹⁷⁶ His brother Kasım Paşa became *sanjakkbey* of the same district in 1452. Another brother of these two, Süleyman became *subaşı* of Belgrade after 1449.¹⁷⁷ Another son, Hacı Bey son of Todor Musachi seemed to settle in the center of Manastır town located in the Sanjak of Iskenderiye, where his waqf was still operating in 1530.¹⁷⁸

The last son of Todor Musachi was mentioned as Mehmed Bey, who was holding a *zeamet* in Karli[ili] during Süleyman I.¹⁷⁹ It might be possible for Todor Musachi family to have more than one member in the name of Mehmed. However, this Mehmed Bey, the main protagonist of this part of this chapter, was the grandson of Todor Musachi, who settled and put down roots in Karaferye.¹⁸⁰ Like his father Yakub Bey, Mehmed Bey and his successors served in official positions of the Ottoman Empire for at least twenty-eight years, long enough to spare a fair amount of capital for later investments. According to available data, his career in state cadres started in the sixteenth century. Since economically well-grounded waqfs of Mehmed Bey and his successors were established long before his official positions in the

¹⁷⁵ Halil İnalçık, *Hicrî 835 Tarihli Sûret-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1987). XVIII.

¹⁷⁶ İnalçık, “Stefan Duşan’dan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’na: XV. Asırda Rumeli’de Hristiyan Sipahiler ve Menşeleri.” 228.

¹⁷⁷ İnalçık, “Arnavutluk’ta Osmanlı Hakimiyetinin Yerleşmesi ve İskender Bey İsyanının Menşei”, 161.

¹⁷⁸ T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 367 Numaralı Muhâsebe-i Vilâyet-i Rûm-ili Defteri ile 94 ve 1078 Numaralı Avlonya Livâsı Tahrîr Defterleri (926-1520 / 937-1530) Tıpkıbasım, Defter-i Hâkânî Dizisi: XII, Ankara: 2008. 335, 354. The record as follows; Vakf-ı Hacı Bey bin Todor Muzak: 1 Hamam: 2500 kıst, Manastır’da olan cami’ine ve medresesine vakf eylemiştir (Vakf-ı Hacı Bey bin Todor Musachi: 1 bath (hamam) with annual revenue 2500 akça, [Hacı Bey] endowed [the bath] for [his] religious school (medrese) and mosque (cami’i) located in Manastır).

¹⁷⁹ İnalçık, “Stefan Duşan’dan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’na: XV. Asırda Rumeli’de Hristiyan Sipahiler ve Menşeleri.” 228.

¹⁸⁰ BOA, TT.d. (Tapu Tahrir Defteri) 140 fol. 5 (25 Zilkade 936/ 21 July 1530, 1529). The note verifies that the Mehmed Bey is the one this study scrutinizes. Under his zeamet register, the note states that “mezkurun tasarrufunda Karaveriye nahiyesinde 29381(?) akçelik zeametden mazul olmağın virildi”.

Empire, what was accumulated by his father might have formed the start-up capital for his investments.

Prior to 1529, Mehmed Bey was enjoying a *zeamet* in Karaferye in 1519.¹⁸¹ After eight years, he received a promotion to be the governor of Kırkkilise sanjak in 1527.¹⁸² Two years later, however, he was reduced to a *zeamet* holder in Kırkkilise sanjak in 1529 and seemed to occupy the same official rank for three years,¹⁸³ as after three years, Mehmed Bey joined the German Expedition of Suleiman I against the Hapsburg Empire again as a *zeamet* holder, in 1532.¹⁸⁴ Unfortunately, Mehmed Bey no longer appears in the records after 1532; either he might have passed away after or during the campaign, or the available registers have remained silent but his successors pursued the footsteps of their ancestor in the official military cadres as timariots.

Among the successors of Mehmed Bey, three individuals were disposing of timars in the sixteenth century Karaferye, namely Haşim, Mustafa, and Ataullah. The earliest timar record belongs to Haşim, who was disposing of a village in 1530.¹⁸⁵ Ten years later, Mustafa and Ataullah joined Haşim as timariots. This time, Haşim's timar was composed of the revenues of five villages, and the total revenue was three times

¹⁸¹ BOA, TT.d. 70 (926/1519) fol. 171. “The *zeamet* of Mehmed son of Todor Muzak, Hasan son of Saltık: they dispose the tax of the timar together and they engage in campaigns: The village of Serviher where two Muslim(reaya), one *nim-çift* (half-farmland) 122 non-Muslim(gebran), twenty-three single(*mücerred*) and twenty-three widow (*bive*) households live. The total revenue was 20100 akçe and Mehmed Bey was disposing 16400 akçe of the *zeamet*. For how long he had disposed of this *zeamet* before his *zeamet* in Karlı in 1529 and the amount of revenue from his 1519 *zeamet* in Karaferye until 1529 remains unknown.

¹⁸² BOA, MAD.d (Maliyeden Müdevver Defterler) 251, (1 Cemazielevvel 933/3 February 1527) fol. 14. The note as follows “Liva-i Kırkkilise be-nâm-ı Mehmed Bey bin Todor Muzak”.

¹⁸³ See the footnote 30.

¹⁸⁴ BOA, TS.MA.d. (Topkapı Sarayı Müze Arşivi Defterleri) 10645 (939/1532) fol. 20. The revenue of his *zeamet* was 29382 akçe, the same amount with that of 1529 in Karlı sanjak. Mehmed Bey accompanied by eight *cebelu*(mounted soldiers) and three henchman(*hidmetkâr*) during the campaign. The defter is undated part of an inspection register (*yoklama defteri*) of the expedition. For a recent study, which dates the defter see Muhsin Soyudoğan, “Cebelülerin Toplumsal Kökenleri Üzerine,” *Alnteri Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 5, no. 2 (2021): 139–69.

¹⁸⁵ BOA, TT.d. 424 (936/1530) fol. 373. He was disposing of Futre village where twenty-two non-Muslim (gebran), four (*mücerred*) and two widow (*bive*) households live and yields 2545 akçe.

higher than the previous amount.¹⁸⁶ Following the record of Haşim's timar in the register, Mustafa's villages were registered. They yield 485 akçe more than Haşim's share.¹⁸⁷ In the same year, the last timar composed of the revenues of two villages belonged to Ataullah.¹⁸⁸ After two years, Haşim and Mustafa continued to hold timars in Karaferye. While timar revenues of Haşim and Mustafa in the timar and zemaet allocation register of Rumelia dated 1542 slightly changed from the amount in 1540, Ataullah was not allocated any timar.¹⁸⁹ Haşim, Mustafa and Ataullah, descendants of Todor Musachi fulfilled the duties expected of a fief holder by participating in the war upon the call of Sultan Suleiman I for the Siege of Esztergom in 1543.¹⁹⁰ According to the inspection register of 1543, they were registered as *amed*, that is "he came" in Persian, which notifies a timariot who was present at the campaign. On the other hand, Haşim most probably was the oldest among the three since he was the only Musachi holding a timar in 1530. That might also have been the reason of Haşim and Mustafa's absence later in the Siege of Van in 1548, when Ataullah was present around the castle of Mardin for the inspection as the only Musachi.¹⁹¹ Unless death was the cause,

¹⁸⁶ BOA, TT.d. 433 (ca. 1540s) fol. 800-802. The revenues of the villages of Haşim's timariots were Anavartarya 595, Mavroyani 465, Kırporos nam-ı diğer İzmekeşi 1233, Yuzçani 3635 akçe, and in the village of Kutleş, Haşim's share was 1610, make the total 7538 akçe. In Kutleş, 356 akçe was registered as the share of a certain Ataullah who might have been the Ataullah son of Todor Musachi. The defter was approximately dated by Lowry and Erünsal, "The Evrenos Dynasty of Yenice-i Vardar: A Postscript." 134.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, fol. 803-804 and 819-820. Mustafa's timariot includes the revenues of the villages; Glaçko 1923, Biranişte 2081, Hıropan 2168 and Vasilika 889, Gon(?) 481, Liziko 481 akçe, all of which amounts to 8023 akçe in total.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, fol. 811-812. Ataullah was disposing the villages of Rabsomanik and Vromopigad, which yields 4439 and 1204 akçe, respectively and in total, 5643 akçe.

¹⁸⁹ BOA, MAD.d. (1541-1542/948-949) 34, fol. 103 (26 Cemazielahir 949/13 September 1542), The revenue of the Haşim's timar was 7619 and all the villages previously held by Haşim in 1540 were the same in this defter. For timar allocation register of Mustafa see fol. 104 (25 Rebiülevvel 949/ 9 July 1542). This time, two villages allocated to Mustafa, Rahova in Karaferye and Susiç in Zihne, both amounts to 7250 akçe in total.

¹⁹⁰ BOA, KK.d. (Kamil Kepeci) 285 (949/1543) fol. 123. "Haşim son of Todor Muzak, the village of Anavartarya and et.al: 7619 akçe, Mustafa son of Todor Muzak, the village of Glaçko and et.al: 7542 akçe, Ataullah bin Mehmed Todor Muzak, the village of Rabsomanik and et.al: 5999". The villages here were the same in the previous registers and the total revenues slightly changed. I thank to colleague Göksel Baş for letting me know that the defter belongs to the Siege of Esztergom.

¹⁹¹ BOA, A.DFE.d (Bab-ı Asafı Defterhane-i Amire Defterleri) 34 fol. 175 (Evasıt-ı Zilhicce 955/Mids of January 1549). "Ataullah bin Mehmed Todor Muzak, the village of Rabsomanik and et.al: 5999".

Haşim and Mustafa might have retired due to growing too old to bear a long-distance campaign. Under the light of these, Ataullah and Mustafa might have been the nephews or brothers of Haşim.¹⁹² But it is certain that Attaullah was the son of Mustafa.

3.3. The Family Waqfs of Gazi Mehmed Bey and Tuzcu Hacı Sinan Bey

*Ser-nüvişte ne ise dünyâda
Zâhir olur dem-i temennâda*¹⁹³

The spirit or the tactic of the time of the classical age when it comes to protect the properties that were granted as *temlik* to the old seigniors and state officials in the fifteenth and increasingly sixteenth century was the endowment of their assets to avoid confiscation.¹⁹⁴ As Barkan claims, such stipulation of future family members can well be regarded as will of the founder. The grandson and great-grandson of Todor Musachi followed the same route with other contemporary warlords.

Waqfs as charitable trusts in Islamic societies were the foundations built by the wealthy benefactors to fulfill the public needs in perpetuity. There were two categories

The village and the revenue amount of his timar was the same amount with the one allocated during the Siege of Esztergom. The register must probably have been compiled during the return path.

¹⁹² The template of “son of Todor Musachi” was being used as a patronymic, rather than specifying immediate father and his son. The recording style of the defters overclouds to understand where exactly the place of those in the family lineage since there is no available data like a family tree produced by the later successors. What is more challenging in this prosopography analyzes is the usage of different template for the same person. For instance, Haşim was recorded as “Haşim son of Mehmed Todor Muzak” in the survey-register of 1530 but “Haşim son of Todor Muzak” in 1540 and as “Haşim son of Todor Muzak” in the timar inspection register of 1543. Thus, it would be fair to discern from the fact that “Mehmed”, who was implying Gazi Mehmed Bey, son of Gazi Yakub Bey, son of Todor Musachi, also used as a patronymic when referring to the members of the Musachi family. As may be seen in Table 1, it is clear that Haşim was the son of Tuzcu Sinan Bey, who was the grandson of Mehmed Bey.

¹⁹³ “...whatever [one's] destiny is in the world, appears in [their] every breath and will....”. (The translation is mine) Polat, “Râmiz Mehmed Efendi Dîvânı”, Unpublished Master Thesis, Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi, p. 332.

¹⁹⁴ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, ‘Türk-İslam toprak hukuku tatbikatının Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda aldığı şekiller: Şeri miras hukuku ve evlatlık vakıflar’. In idem *Türkiye’de toprak meselesi*, (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1980). pp. 211-215.

of assets that were the subject of the foundation (*waqf*). The first is the buildings composed of mosque, lodge, religious school, soup kitchens, library, bridge, fountains which directly serve the needs of the public and are called charitable foundation (*müessesat-ı hayriyye*).¹⁹⁵ The second category was the income sources (*akar*) such as agricultural fields, shops, rooms, cash, and mines, which would enable constant revenue to maintain the well-being of the waqf buildings and services. Since the intent of a founder (*vâkıf*) is to sustain the facility eternally in the name of God, s/he bequeaths a variety of assets (*mevkûf*) based on their wealth to generate income for the charity expenses.

As for the legal process of establishing a waqf, the binding provisions are that the candidate must hold the legal proprietorship of a given building and revenue yielding asset and those must be immovable.¹⁹⁶ Then, in the presence of the local judge, after orally designating the property to be endowed, the waqf deed is prepared in accordance with the terms of the founder and recorded by the local judge with the presence of witnesses. The founder could appoint himself or any other individual as trustee (*mütevelli*) who oversees protection, maximization and distribution of the income extracted by the revenue sources for the staff and maintenance of the waqf buildings.¹⁹⁷

According to the purpose of the founder, waqfs might be classified into two groups: charitable and family waqfs. One of the many aims of the latter may also be providing public services as the endowed facilities continue to provide services and would need maintenance and thus capital. Yet the motivation seems to be to make use

¹⁹⁵ Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, “XVIII. Asır Türk Vakıflarının İktisadî Boyutu,” *Vakıflar Dergisi* 18 (1984): 6.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 6.

¹⁹⁷ Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, “XVIII. Asırda Türk Vakıf Teşkilatı,” *Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi* 12 (1982): 177.

of the opportunity in securing wealth from confiscation so that the successors of the founder would benefit from the assets for generations to come. Stipulation of the later family members as trustees is the clear indicator of that aim. Established in the last half of the fifteenth century, this was the case for the waqf of Gazi Mehmed Bey and the waqf of his grandson, Tuzcu Sinan Bey. Both not only endowed considerable amount of cash¹⁹⁸, number of rooms and fertile arable villages, but also stipulated their successors as trustees. Even if the only available waqf deed now belongs to the waqf of Mehmed Bey, judging by the assets and appointment of trustees as family members, both waqfs carry the features of both cash by asset and family waqf by stipulation.¹⁹⁹ In a way, they may have been hybrid waqfs. In proof thereof, their lineages survived and continued to hold the trusteeship of the foundation for centuries. However, not all family foundations last a long time over the same founder lineage either because the assets fall short of providing the necessary revenue or the lineage dies out. In the case of Gazi Mehmed Bey and his grandson, Tuzcu Hacı Sinan Bey, neither of these two happened.

¹⁹⁸ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Edirne Askerî Kassamı'na Ait Tereke Defterleri (1545-1659)," *Belgeler* 3, no. 5-6 (1966): 31-36. Although the provisions of Islamic law regarding the establishment of foundations prohibit the donation of cash as it is a movable asset, this practice came to be tolerated in the fifteenth century in Ottoman territories. In the literature, foundations where cash asset endowed came to be referred as cash waqfs (nukud-ı mevkufe). After Ebussud's fatwa on the legality of cash waqfs in the sixteenth century backed by the Suleyman I, Ottoman Empire legally recognized the endowment of cash asset. The debate on whether cash waqfs comply with Islamic rules arises from the prohibition of interest in Islam. Since these waqfs were managing the endowed cash by advancing it as credit for needy individuals in return of the principal amount plus interest. See for the cash waqfs of Bursa obtaining economic interest Murat Çizakça, "Cash Waqfs of Bursa, 1555-1823," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 38, no. 3 (1995): 331.

¹⁹⁹ BOA, TT.d. 986 (mufassal defter ca. 904-906/1499) fol. 40. The waqf of Tuzcu Sinan Bey seemed to have 200,000 akçe cash asset together with 500 piece animal but they were recorded as *zayi' olmuş* (dispersed). While the following defters after 1499 do not have the information on the revenue and expense items of Tuzcu Sinan Bey, they provide that of waqf villages. For that only the villages of Tuzcu Sinan Bey waqf will be analyzed. The date of the defter determined by the record (fol. 71-74) pertains to the villages of Sal, Vulçiste, Cemirohor and Altıra, allotted as hass to Mesih Paşa who lived during the reign of Bayezid II and died in 1501. He was appointed as grandvizier after late Çandarlızâde İbrahim Paşa circa 1499. Thus, the defter must have been compiled during his term of office in vezierate in 1499. The defter was not complete but the waqf part of the defter seems intact. For Mesih Paşa see Hedda Reindl, II. Bayezid ve Çevresi: Hükümdarın Adamları (İstanbul: Arvana Yayınları, 2014). 115-117.

The successors of the family continued to occupy *askerî* posts, which would be regarded as one out of a few effective options available for the subjects to climb higher in the socio-economic ladder of a regional setting in the sixteenth century. In the case of Todor Musachi family, not only tax-exempt status but also the potential gains in political and social capital after the term of office seemed to be granted and later furthered by the state cadres. As a manifestation of this privileged career, a tax farming petition for the tax unit (*mukataa*) of the hass of Mehmed Paşa in Karaferye would be illuminating. Eight people of the town formed a consortium for the tax-farm in 1550.²⁰⁰ In the petition, which was prepared in the presence of Mevlana Muhyiddin, then the judge of Karaferye, tax farmers stipulated that Haşim bin Mehmed would be the agent (*emin*) for the tax unit with a daily stipend of 20 akçes.²⁰¹ To make their stipulation effective in the eyes of the central bureau, Haşim was presented as the local notable (*ayan*) who is worthy of the responsibility for the duties of supervision for this tax farm by the blessing of all the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the town. Moreover, eight other local notables of the town center not only vouched for the tax farmers but also for Haşim as the competent individuals who could take good care of the tax unit the three-year total income of which was 720.000 akçe, and it was included in the hass of Mehmed Paşa.

The well-funded waqfs of the family can be seen as the materialization of the cumulative sum of the previous acquired opportunities. As stated earlier, Todor Musachi family impacted Karaferye like Evrenoszâdes had in Yenice-i Vardar, though

²⁰⁰ BOA, MAD.d (957/1550) fol. 107. In the document, the agent's (*emin*) name was written as "Haşim son of Mehmed". The name "Haşim" was a unique one, which for the best knowledge of the author, in all the available survey and timar allocation registers of Karaferye in the sixteenth century, was not used for any individual and any name include "Haşim son of anybody", let alone "Haşim bin Mehmed". "Haşim bin Mehmed" most probably have been the abbreviated version of his name, which was previously used in his timar register and implies Haşim in this piece of the document as "Haşim son of Mehmed [Todor Musachi]".

²⁰¹ Ibid. Fol 107.

on a much smaller scale. In Ottoman cities, foundations became the driving force behind the urbanization process by providing facilities to help build economic, social, and commercial infrastructure.²⁰² In 1530, the three out of seventeen muslim quarters bear the names of members of the Todor Musachi family in the town of Karaferye.²⁰³ The situation manifested itself also in the establishment of four waqfs by the Todor Musachi family in the region.²⁰⁴ Established between 1499 and 1568, the largest of the foundations in terms of donated assets and the amount of revenue extracted belonged to the Todor Musachi family in Karaferye.

With the presence of then the kadı Mehmed of Karaferye, Mehmed Bey bin Yakub Bey bin Todor Musachi founded his waqf in 1488.²⁰⁵ The properties under his ownership were granted to him between 1481 and 1487, as evidenced in his waqf deed. The deed clearly states that Sultan Bayezid II gave him these properties as his own. The facilities were composed of a mosque, a religious school, a soup kitchen, and a teacher-house. For the expenditures of the facilities he bequeathed several assets as income sources the property rights of which belonged to Mehmed Bey: Hasbuga/Asbuga and Çernova villages, thirteen-eyed mill located in Hasbuga, one bath in Manastır, and one bath in İlbasan castle, both of which were known as "Mehmed Bey baths", sixty rooms located near-by his waqf's mosque and religious school, and ten *dönüm* of orchards for cultivating pickles for the soup-kitchen. After

²⁰² Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Vakıfların Bir iskan ve Kolonizasyon Metodu Olarak Kullanılmasında Diğer Şekiller", *Vakıflar Dergisi*, 2, 1942, 354-365.

²⁰³ BOA, TT.d. 424 (936/1530) fol.280-283.

²⁰⁴ For Mehmed Bey, Tuzcu Sinan Bey (grandson of Mehmed Bey) and Bayezid Çelebi (great-grandson of Mehmed Bey) waqfs; BOA, TT.d. 986 (mufassal defter ca. 904-906/1499) fol. 35-45, for Gülşah Hatun (mother of Mehmed Bey). The information ascertained from his waqf deed on the last waqf established by the family member was Gülşah Hatun, mother of Mehmed Bey. In the tax survey register of 1540s, there were two quarters in the town of Karaferye in the name of Gülşah Hatun. The one was recorded as 'mahalle-i Gülşah Hatun bint Yakub Bey', the other was without a father name. The former most probably have been the daughter of Yakub Bey bin Aştin. As there were two Yakub Beys; the one was Musachi and the other one was Aştin.

²⁰⁵ BOA, TS.MA.e 673/6-1-2 (Evvel Rebiülahir 893/ March 1488).

the total revenue of the two villages, the second-highest revenue yielding asset was the interest acquired by the bequeathed cash, 200,000 Sultan Bayezid Han piastres (akças) for interest (ribh).²⁰⁶ When the staff and miscellaneous expense items that were projected in the waqf deed examined, the most significant share with 15 akçe daily wage belongs to religious scholar (müderri) of the waqf. After that comes the daily meat expense with 12 akçes per day. These expense items have had the biggest share in the expenditures from the foundation year onwards. In addition to the expense items and the total value of the assets bequeathed, judged by the appointed staff for maintaining the facility, it was a medium-sized waqf as a bookkeeper (kâtib) and a revenue collector (câbi) was appointed to assist the trustee in managing revenue collection from the waqf's assets.²⁰⁷

Even though the account book of the Mehmed Bey Waqf has not yet been discovered, the information compiled from four of the eight survey registers on both the annual income and expenditures of the Waqf would allow us to analyze the financial condition of the Waqf for three fiscal years: 1499, 1530, and 1540. Considering the period of about fifty years, from the year of establishment to 1540, the net income of the Mehmed Bey Waqf had increased from 15,508 to 17,090 akças.²⁰⁸ In the waqf deed, the amount of money bequeathed for loans was set at 200,000 akça. However, ten months and fifteen days after the establishment of his

²⁰⁶ The equivalent of the cash amount was 3996 Venetian ducat in 1487.

²⁰⁷ Yediyıldız, "XVIII. Asırda Türk Vakıf Teşkilatı." 178. In the small-sized waqfs, generally, trustees collect the revenues and do the bookkeeping. In medium and large sized waqfs, the trustee appoints a bookkeeper and revenue collector.

²⁰⁸ BOA, TT.d. 986 (904-906/1499) for the revenue fol. 36/b, for the expenditures fol. 38, TT.d. 167 (icmal 936/1530) for the revenue fol. 144, TT.d. 424 (mufassal defter of TT.d. 167 936/1530) the scribe mistakenly gives the sum of the revenue as 40928, rather than 47369 akçe, for the expenditures fol.417, and TT.d. 433 (mufassal- 946/1540) for the revenue fol. 883/3, for the expenditure fol. 883/4. Based on the expenditure list (including staff salaries and miscellaneous) stipulated by the Mehmed Bey in his waqf deed, the total was expected to be 29760 akçes in a year. The first available annual revenue registered in 1499 was 38188, and the expenditure in the same year was 23720 akças. If we had assumed the revenue of 1499 also for 1488, still the net revenue would have been 8428 akças.

waqf, Mehmed Bey used 15,000 akçe of this amount to buy a başhane (where the heads of livestock were processed) located in the Vefa district of Istanbul, which was included in his other endowments.²⁰⁹ For this reason, the amount of the cash deposit is registered as 185,000 akçe in the rest of the available survey registers.²¹⁰

Despite the increase in the revenue of the two bathhouses, both remained the third highest revenue yielding asset in the following accounting years. In addition to the previous amount of total cash (with 9.8% interest rate) in lending, the waqf began to use an extra 9000 akçe (with 10% interest rate) in lending in 1530. Thus, the sum of the revenue from interest amounted to 18,900 akçe in total. However, the share of the interest in the total amount of revenue decreased by 7.35% vis-à-vis 1499 due to the rise in the revenues of the villages. While the revenue of Asbuga (Makrigoz) village increased to 15,698, Çernova, with a slight decrease, amounted to 5,095 akçe in 1530 and their share of the total revenue reached to 49.54%.²¹¹ Regarding the revenue of the bathhouses; the one in the Manastır recorded as ruined so did not yield any revenue but the revenue of İlbasan bathhouse reached up to 6000 akçe, which constitute 14.30% of the total revenue. In 1540, the revenue of the villages still had the biggest share, with 45.18% of the total amount. The total revenue extracted from the two villages increased 1081 akçe more from the amount in 1530. As for the revenue of interest from the two separate cash deposits, its share in the total amount decreased

²⁰⁹ BOA, EV.VKF. 15/48/2 (29 Safer 894/1 February 1489). The başhane yielded 220 akçe annual revenue from 1499 to 1540, located near Şeyh Vefa mosque in Istanbul. For that reason, in the survey registers of 1499, 1530 and 1540.

²¹⁰ In 1499, the share of the revenue from interest (cihet-i istirbah) in total is 52.37% with 20,000 akçe (with 10.8% interest rate), and the revenue of the three waqf villages; Hasbuga with 2468 akçe, Makrigoz with 2920 and Çernova with 5830 akçe, constitute 29.3% of the total amount of revenue. The third highest revenue yielding asset with 2900 akçe and with a total share 9.95% was two bathhouses located in town of Manastır and İlbasan.

²¹¹ Hasbuga/Asbuga and Makrigoz were registered as two different villages in the survey-register of 1499 and 1519. In 1530, they began to be registered as one with a note stating: "Asbuga, in other words, Makrigoz." When referring to Makrigoz village, this note came to be used occasionally throughout the seventeenth. By the eighteenth century, the village came to be referred as "Makrigoz/Mikroğuz".

to 39%, with the same interest rate and cash amount as that of the previous register but it remained as the second higher revenue yielding asset for the waqf. The bathhouses with 6000 akçe accounted for 12.40% of the total revenue. Thus, together with interest and the bathhouses, the villages constituted the main source of the revenue.

What might have been the economic gain in managing the waqf villages of Mehmed Bey and Tuzcu Sinan Bey waqfs for the successors in addition to the revenues of the waqf buildings? The legal status that the Mehmed Bey waqf were subjected to regarding the disposition of the village revenues would be the answer, though there was no information with that of Tuzcu Sinan Bey waqf. In the register of 1499, the note attached to the waqf of Mehmed Bey designates that the revenues composed of poll tax (cizye), hive tax (kovan ‘adeti) and miscallenous taxes (*yava ve beytü’l mal ve mal-i gaib ve mal-ı mefkud*) were spared for the state treasure.²¹² The remaining revenues such as öşür (one-tenth of the total revenue extracted by agricultural production), ispenç etc. were left for the waqf’s disposition. As the çiftlik units in the waqf villages came to cover almost one-fifth of the total arable lands in the rural hinterland of Karaferye by the end of the seventeenth century, it became much more attractive to dispose the revenues of the villages for the successors of the Musachi family. This must have been the main reason that the legal lineages came out of Todor Musachi strive fiercely to each other over legal means to take the trusteeship of the two waqfs until about 1730s, it was finally the year when conflictual relations finally eased and gave way to truce through mediation of marriage politics. Before

²¹² BOA, TT.d. 986 (ca.1499) fol.35. The note was as follows: “Vakf-ı Mehmed Bey veled-i Todor Muzak mülkiyete hükm-ü hümayun vardır tekkesine ve medresesine vakf itmiştir şimdi vakf üzere mutasarrıf olur cizyesi ve kovan ‘adeti ve yava ve beytü’l mal ve mal-i gaib ve mal-ı mefkudu begligindir”.

proceeding to the conflict, it would be beneficial to analyze the emergence of what constitute the grounds for the struggle amongst the families.

3.4. Emergence of Çiftlik In the Sixteenth Century: The Genesis

The question of why subjects tended to organize production in çiftlik at this very early stage needs to be addressed. Most likely, these units were still on the fringes of the dirlik system, and apparently still constrained by both the size of the arable land and by numbers, but certainly not by ownership, since we have seen that non-askeri owned these units? Their numbers were apparently increasing from the beginning of the sixteenth century in the villages and especially from the second half of the century when the available survey registers examined in chronological order, but the period between the 1560s and 1600s must have played a decisive role for the expansion of those who went beyond by their arable land sizes as at the beginning of the seventeenth century, one can observe that they became much more visible and continued to do so but with larger arable lands. The latter period is much easier to follow due to the availability of sources compared to the intermediate period. What may have fueled the early emergence phase had much to do with mere efforts to extract surpluses and sell them in the still efficiently functioning nearest marketplace system.²¹³ After paying the tithe and the ispenç, there is not much left for saving seeds and for one's own needs. They provide for subsistence, for example, to purchase technical tools for cultivation when they went to the akreb pazar. It can be argued that after the transfer of the sahib-i arz's share of the produce to the akreb pazar, the subjects have the desire to obtain additional income from their extra produce. However, despite the desire to overcome

²¹³ See for similar small-scale market orientation was observable in-north central Anatolia in the sixteenth century H. İslamoğlu İnân, 'Peasants, commercialization, and the legitimation of state power in sixteenth-century Anatolia'. in Keyder, Çağlar; Tabak, Faruk (eds.), *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), pp. 57-76.

the provisionist system, the scale of supply was limited by the requirements of the akreb bazar system, and since the dirlik system had not yet lost its effectiveness, both production needs and marketing remained limited. This logic seems plausible, especially after a long-term analysis of the waqf villages.

Apart from the waqf villages of Mehmed Bey and Tuzcu Sinan Bey, one could realize the expansion of landed estates in the villages of Karaferye even with a simple look at the available survey registers starting from 1499 to 1568, respectively. However, they had not been the dominant mode of production in the rural hinterland since they seemed to include small plots of arable lands. In 1568, 36% of the total villages (155) included çiftlik, baştine, or both units. The total number of the çiftlik (148) and baştine (63) units was 211. While 52% of the total çiftlik units were registered as *çift* (which varies in size from 60 to 150 dönüm plot of land), only two baştine units were recorded as *çift*.²¹⁴

Except the one under the property of Mehmed Bey waq, from 1499 to 1568, there was not a single *çiftlik* unit registered independently and detached from the villages. Instead, they proliferated by covering a particular part of the land in a village rather than absorbing the whole available arable lands of a given village as a big çiftlik complex. The emergence of these units was independent of the fiscal status of a village, which might have been allocated as *tımar*, *zeamet*, *hass* or waqf. Each unit was under the control of a certain owner or disposer, and they were registered in two ways: either simply by the name of the owner or by the name of the owner as well as the name of the person who was disposing it, such as “çiftlik-i Sinan Voyvoda” or “çiftlik-i Hasan Çaşnigir der yed-i Salih.” The latter type was quite common which implies the actual

²¹⁴ Halil İnalcık, ‘Osmanlılar’da Raiyyet Rüsûmu’ *TTK Belleten XXIII*, (1959), pp. 581-582. The ones registered without the note “Ç” (Çift) may imply that the size of the relevant unit is smaller than a normal çift.

owner (*mutasarrıf*) handed over the usufruct to a second party. In this scenario, the owner was sharing the taxes and the yield with the second party who was currently exploiting the *çiftlik* unit and the cultivators.²¹⁵ Moreover, there were *baştines*²¹⁶ under the dispositions of non-Muslim individuals and were recorded with the same template. In the second scenario, the template recording the *çiftlik* under the usufruct of second person may point to the fact that the second person was the family member of the actual owner who might have passed away or simply handed over the usufruct to his/her relative.

Many of the *çiftlik*s were in possession of the members of the Ottoman *askeri*, and commoners disposed of some in the sixteenth century. Often the registers include the titles of the individuals, which allow us to elaborate on the profession of a given individual. Based on that, most of them were under the disposition of *askeris* as under the recording of the *çiftlik*s, notes were stating, “a *timariot*” (*merd-i timar*). However, others were also registered without that phrase and thus imply the units came to be held by non-*askeri*, or *reaya*. Among those, there were also Muslim women disposers.²¹⁷

In 1488, the two villages bequeathed by Mehmed Bey for his *waqf* were Asbuga and Çernova. In the deed, there was no village registered as “*Makrıgoz*”. After about eleven years, another village appeared under the *waqf* property, *Makrıgoz* as *haric ez defter*, which implies either another village or a plot of land adjacent to the

²¹⁵ Laiou, “Some Considerations Regarding *Çiftlik* Formation in the Western Thessaly, Sixteenth-Nineteenth Centuries” p. 261.

²¹⁶ For *baştina* see İnalçık, *Hicrî 835 Tarihli Süret-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid*. XXX. They can be regarded as the *çiftlik*s of Muslim subjects but under the disposition of non-Muslim subjects.

²¹⁷ See the footnote 179 in İnalçık. XXX-XXXI. Like *Karaferye*, the expansion of landed estates under the disposition of non-*askeri* subjects seemed to be the case in the *sanjak* of Arvanid in the last decades of the sixteenth century, which has explicitly been stated by İnalçık especially from the last decade of the sixteenth century.

Asbuga village was reclaimed and registered as the property of the waqf. The last survey-register, which recorded Asbuga and Makrıgoz as two separate villages were 1519.²¹⁸ From 1530 onwards, however, the two villages came to be registered as one; “Asbuga nam-ı diğır Makrıgoz”.²¹⁹ Although the main reason still stay out of our current comprehension, the villagers may have returned to the main village of Makrıgoz due to the tax burden from Asbuga. Moreover, the çiftlik units in 1499 located in Asbuga, which must have been suitable for growing rice from the beginning, but çiftliks might have proliferated later in Makrıgoz village where must have been more suitable for growing agricultural products other than rice.²²⁰

Amongst the four villages of the waqfs, Makrıgoz was not only the first village experienced chiftlicization but also it contained the highest number of çiftlik units throughout Karaferye until 1568. While Çernova did not include any units, Aya Marin and Kıravate came in second and the third by revenue and the number of çiftlik units respectively amongst the waqf villages. In 1499, the number of çiftliks was five of which were registered with different names, and three of the çiftlik holders held the title *çelebi* in Asbuga village.²²¹ Given the titles, the men of wealth, or pen seemed to prefer investing in the land estate market, especially for the ones located in the waqf

²¹⁸ From then on, the two-villages registered and referred to in the following registers as alias or nam-ı diğır “Asbuga, in other words, Makrıgoz”.

²¹⁹ BOA, TT.d. 424 (936/1530) fol. 407-409.

²²⁰ BOA, TT.d. 986 (ca. 1499) fol. 35-37. Even if it may not provide a full-fledged explanation as to why the çiftliks, which were geared to produce wheat and barley expanded in Makrıgoz; in 1499, the three villages had mills, but only Asbuga included a rice mill (dink-i çeltük), as the name implies, specifically geared to grind rice and cracked wheat (bulgur).

²²¹ Ibid, fol.35-36, the village of Makrıgoz registered as haric ez defter with 2920 akçe revenue and include 43 hane(houselholds), 8 widow(bive) which makes approximately 223 residents. Asbuga registered with 2468 akçe including 7 Muslim and 6 non-Muslim hanes and the number of residents was about 65. Çernova had 85 hane (households) and 3 widow (bive) with 5830 akçe and include approximately 428 residents. The five çiftliks were registered in the village of Asbuga with the names of Mansur Çelebi, Hızır Çelebi, İsa Çelebi, Reis Serhac(?) and Kasım Fedai. The simple estimation of population is based on the commonly used multiplier of five residents per hane (household). For bive(widow) and mücerred(single), the multiplier is used as one resident but nim(half farmland) left outside the sum. Total number of residents approximately amount to 716.

villages of Mehmed Bey. On the other hand, the total amount of revenue in the waqf villages of Tuzcu Sinan Bey was 6560 akçe and both villages did not include any çiftlik units in the mentioned year.²²² After about twenty years, while the waqf villages of Mehmed Bey produced 3094 akçe more, that of Tuzcu Sinan Bey waqf remained almost the same.²²³

As the number of çiftlik units increased in the villages of Makrigoz, Aya Marine and Kıravate, the revenue followed the course. By 1530, while the number of çiftlik units in the village of Makrigoz (nam-ı diğer Asbuga) reached twenty-one, the increase in the amount of revenue was 64% vis a vis 1519.²²⁴ The trend in the number of çiftlik units and in revenue was also the case in Aya Marin and Kıravate villages of which produced 3356 akçe more from the previous amount.²²⁵ Even though revenue decreased by 3,025 akçe from the previous amount in 1530, the number of çiftliks and the disposers in Makrigoz and Çernova remained the same in 1540.²²⁶ In the same

²²² Ibid, fol.38-39. While Ayamarin registered with 4470 akçe with 53 hane and 10 bive. Kıravate produced 2090 akçe and had 20 hane and 3 bive. The total residents of the two villages was 275.

²²³ BOA, TT.d. 70 (icmal 926/1519) fol. 185. Makrigoz had 40 hane (household), 10 nim (half-farmland) and bive 3 (widow) and producing 5292 akçe. Asbuga was registered with 7 hane(households), with 4259 akçe. Çernova had 70 hane(households) , 11 mücerred(single) with 4801 akçe. The total number of residents in the waqf villages were about 599. Ayamarine had 22 hane, 10 mücerred and 7 bive with 4610 akçe. Kıravate was registered with 11 hane 4 mücerred and 2 bive with 1868 akçe. The total number of residents were 188.

²²⁴ BOA, TT.d. 424 (936/1530) fol. 407-409. Makrigoz had approximately 322 residents: 63 hane (non-Muslim households) together with 5 mücerred (single) and 2 bive (widow) with 15698 akçe revenue. The village of Çernova had 81 hane (non-Muslim), 5 non-Muslim mücerred (single), 2 Muslim mücerred (single) and 2 bive (widow), which approximately makes 414 residents. Its revenue was 5095 akçe and total number of the residents in the waqf villages was about 736.

²²⁵ Ibid, fol.405-406. Aya Marin had 197 residents: 38 hane, 5 mücerred, 2 bive and produced 8248 akçe revenue. Three çiftlik appeared first in this year and two of the çiftliks were under the control of Hasan bin Kavad reis-i çeltük, the other one disposed by Memi Çelebi bin Bayezid Bey (merd-i timar). Kıravate had 53 residents: 10 hane, 1 mücerred, 2 bive with 1586 akçe revenue and one çiftlik under the control of İsa bin Ali (merd-i timar). The total number of residents was 250.

²²⁶ BOA, TT.d. 433 (946/1540s) fol.875-876. Makrigoz had 52 hane and 10 mücerred where approximately 270 residents live and the revenue was 12673 akçe. Çernova had 53 hane, 16 mücerred and 1 bive makes approximately 282 residents. The revenue was 9201 akçe. The total number of the residents in waqf villages amounted to 552.

year, as the çiftlik units in Aya Marine amounted to four, Tuzcu Sinan Bey villages yielded 2808 akçe more revenue in total.²²⁷

According to the last available detailed survey register of Karaferye, the number of çiftlik units amounted to twenty-nine in Makrıgoz, the composition of the disposers further diversified with the participation of three women disposers in 1568. Inferred from the names and titles of the disposers, which were composed of çelebis, kadıs, beys, imam, hacc and a voyvoda, it can be suggested that non-askeri by profession inclined towards investing in çiftlik units, too. While Ayşe Hatun and Mehri Hatun were disposing of one çiftlik for each, Rabia had three çiftliks under her disposition in Makrıgoz.²²⁸ If Ayşe Hatun was not the same person, then there was another woman named Ayşe Hatun who was disposing a çiftlik unit in the Vara village, which was allocated as the timar of a certain Kalender.²²⁹ The waqf villages of Tuzcu Sinan Bey continued to yield more revenue with having two new çiftlik units for each.²³⁰

As it is analyzed, unlike Çernova and Kıravate, Makrıgoz and Aya Marin experienced considerable increase in their revenues from 1499 to 1568. In or around

²²⁷ Ibid, fol.874-875. Aya Marin had 237 residents: 46 hane, 5 mücerred, 2 bive and four çiftlik units with 10364 akçe revenue. While the previous çiftlik holders remained the same individuals, certain Eyüb bin Bahadır became the fourth çiftlik holder. Kıravate had about 62 residents: 12 hane, 2 bive and one çiftlik with 2278 akçe. This time certain Ali Bey was disposing. The total number of residents of the two villages reached up to 299.

²²⁸ BOA, TKGM.d. (Tapu ve Kadastro Genel Müdürlüğü Defterleri) (ca.976/1568) 414 fol. 92-93. The defter was the evkaf defteri (survey-register of waqfs) and most probably dated in 1568. Because the data provided was identical with TT.d. 723 (1568), which was approximately dated by Lowry, Erünsal, "The Evrenos Dynasty of Yenice-i Vardar: A Postscript." 134 as 1555. According to the defter of 1568, Makrıgoz had 1 çift (farmland), 1 nim (half-farmland), 51 hane(household) and 19 mücerred (single). The number of residents was about 274 and the revenue was 13835 akçe. Çernova had 57 hane and 61 mücerred, all of which makes about 346 residents and the revenue produced was 9483 akçe. The total number of waqf residents were about 620.

²²⁹ BOA, TT.d. (ca. 976/1568) 723 fol. 811.

²³⁰ Ibid, fol.1030-1031. Aya Marin had 119 residents: 20 hane, 19 mücerred and produced 9620 akçe. In addition to the same four çiftlik holders, now certain Mehmed bin İsmail appeared to control the fifth. Kıravate had 63 residents: 11 hane and 8 mücerred with 3472 akçe. The number of çiftlik amounted to three. In addition to previous Ali Bey, now certain Mustafa had two çiftliks but they were under the control of certain Eyüb and Yakub. Total number of residents was 182.

the village of Asbuga, a paddy area was located named *nehr-i* (paddy) of Asbuga.²³¹ Likewise, there was another paddy area named *nehr-i*(paddy of) Aya Marin which yielded more revenue than Kıravate. It may be speculative to suggest that the soil structure of the paddy was fertile. Yet, it can be concluded that at least the irrigation must not have been a problem around the area where the number of çiftliks proliferated since paddy cultivated in the landform of wetlands. Moreover, they were not the only examples of this explicit pattern. Another village, Yançiste had similar features. Like Makrigoz and Aya Marin, it had a paddy area most probably located close-by the village and recorded in the section of paddies in the survey-register of Karaferye as *nehr-i* (paddy of) Yançiste.²³² Allocated to certain Hasan and Ali as timar, the village of Yançiste included two çiftlik units and producing 8998 akçe revenue in 1530.²³³ By 1540, the number of çiftliks increased to nine and the revenue amounted to 11,752 akçe.²³⁴ After about fifteen years, despite a slight decrease in the revenue, the number of çiftlik units amounted to eleven, which was the second-highest number after Makrigoz in 1568 throughout Karaferye.²³⁵

In the case of the waqf villages and a timar village of Yançiste, the çiftlik units appeared to contribute to increased production. In addition to the individual investors, certain waqfs of the town as fiscal institutions preferred to expand their portfolio through investing in çiftlik units. In 1530, the waqf of Hacı Ayna located in the quarter of Ayoyatani had three çiftliks, one orchard, and 80,000 akçes in cash assets. However, he must have thought çiftlik units would be a lucrative investment, as he purchased

²³¹ BOA, TT.d. 424 (936/1530) fol. 262.

²³² Ibid, fol.260.

²³³ Ibid, fol. 349-350.

²³⁴ BOA, TT.d. 433 (1540) fol. 812-813. This time it was allocated as timar village of certain Yusuf [bin] Solak.

²³⁵ BOA, TT.d. 723 (1568) fol. 803. It was allocated as a timar to certain Mali. The village produced 11,000 akçe revenue.

two of the çiftliks later with the waqf money.²³⁶ Like the mentioned Hacı Ayna, Mehri Hatun, who appeared to have a cash waqf advancing credit with 15% interest, chose to invest in the çiftlik market but she preferred the one located in Makrigoz in 1568.²³⁷ Thus, they seemed to be perceived as commodity and property to be invested in by the sixteenth century well-off profit seeking Karaferye locals. As it was the case in sixteenth century, the villages will contain several çiftlik units, each was under the control of individuals, but the arable land parts of these units came to cover larger acres of land and become one of the most valuable assets in the portfolios of the local elites in the following centuries.

Until the promulgation of the 1858 Land Reform, land in the empire was not legally considered private property. However, the de facto disposition patterns of land observed in rural settings began to surpass the legal categories that equate *miri* to private property, especially from the seventeenth century onwards. It is evident that the units in the survey registers were subject to *miri* rule. However, there is one instance that diverges from this uniformity. It not only points to the fact that the emergence of çiftlik units can be dated back to pre-1488, but also emphasizes the bundle of land rights was the case in the early sixteenth century as well when defining the term çiftlik.

‘Çiftlik-i Şahuban bint Ferhad Ağa merfu’ül öşr merhum Sultan Bayezid han aleyhe rahmetihi ve’l gufran mezkur Asbuga nam karyeyi Mehmed Bey ibn-i Yakup Bey’e temlik idüp ve karye-i mezbureyi mezkur Mehmed Bey vakf eylemezden mukaddem mezkur çiftliği karındaşı Sinan Bey bin Yakup Beye

²³⁶ BOA, TT.d. 424 (936/1530) fol. 415. The note attached to the register of the çiftliks were as follows, “Çiftlik-i İbrahim Bey der karye-i Altunlar tâbi’-i Karaferye: zikr olan çiftlik sonradan vakf akçesiyle alındı, Çiftlik-i Mahmud Çelebi der Karaferye, zikr [olan] çiftlik dahi sonradan vakf akçesiyle alındı”. Amongst the two purchased çiftliks, one was registered as “the çiftlik of İbrahim Bey located in the village of Altunlar”. In the part related to the village of Altunlar of the same register, we see the same çiftlik, which was registered as “çiftlik of İbrahim”. It is likely that the subject of sale in this case was the income, or use-right of the revenue from the çiftlik unit, or usufruct of the çiftlik.

²³⁷ BOA, TT.d. (ca. 976/1568), fol. 1038. She bequeathed 12.000 akçe and from its murabaha(interest), projected to gain 1800 akçe annual revenue. The waqf was not available before the year 1568 in the registers.

*merfu'ül öşr hibe eyleyüp şerayit-i hibe ile temellük olduğuna hüccet-i şeriyeleri ibraz olunup badehu Sinan Bey'den satılup haliya Hatun-u mezbureye intikal eyleyüp ol zamandan ila bu zamana merfu'ül öşr malikiyyet üzere taht-ı tasarrufunda olduğu eelden temessük-ü şeriyeleri mucibince defter-i cedid-i hakaniye kayd olundu.*²³⁸

In this quotation from the survey register, it is evident that Mehmed Bey owned this çiftlik unit as private property well before establishing his waqf in the village of Asbuga (Makrıgoz). It is uncertain whether it was subjected to the legal borders drawn for the village and for other present çiftliks in the Asbuga village discussed above, the separate demarcated part for drawing legal borders suggests that it was not subject to the same legal status as with the others. This particular çiftlik was bought and sold multiple times. First, Mehmed Bey granted it to his brother as private property, and then it was resold to a certain Şahuban. Its tithe-exempt status suggests that its legal provisions closely aligned it with private property among all waqf assets. This status was maintained for nearly 220 years, even when it was re-included in the waqf assets of another prominent local notable of Karaferye in 1715. In a geography where the *miri* land regime is in effect, a person who intends to establish a foundation cannot do so unless he or she has full ownership of the land or that of the *çiftlik*. Although it was established in *timar*, *hass*, or *zeamet* lands, the building parts of a *çiftlik* was still subjected to private property provisions but the attached lands to the facility were not mentioned in the waqf deed of the founder, thus cannot be endowed. After almost two and a half centuries, the member of the prominent local notable family of Karaferye, Eminzâde el-Hac Ahmed Ağa endowed considerable number of his assets to establish a waqf in Karaferye.²³⁹ Before Ahmed Ağa, it must have probably been exchanged

²³⁸ TT.d. 433 (1540) fol. 876. This part on this çiftlik in the defter will be requoted without a change in the following survey register in 1568.

²³⁹ VGMA.d. 989/158-161/120 (Şaban 1128 / July 1716).

several times until Ahmed Ağa became the last owner who finally froze it with his waqf. Among his assets, we see this *çiftlik* unit as well. The inclusion of the above excerpt regarding the legal status of this *çiftlik* verbatim in Eminzâde el-HacAhmed Ağa's waqf deed was worth stressing how a piece of production unit remained intact by provision for at least two and a half centuries with the same status amongst the waqf assets, one may attribute to the effectiveness of the legal constraints when it comes to an exception. After citing the data from the Selanik waqf defter of 1568 regarding the production capacity of *Asbuga nam-ı diğer Makrigoz* village, it stresses that the *çiftlik* was among the waqf asset of the Mehmed Bey waqf. It continues to cite the related part on the mentioned *çiftlik* as follows;

‘...çiftlik-i Şahuban bint Ferhad Ağa merfuü’l öşr merhum Sultan Bayezid Han tabe serahu mezbur Asbuga nam karyeyi Mehmed Bey bin Yakub Bey’e temlik idüp karye-i mezbureyi Mehmed Bey vakf itmezden mukaddem mezkur çiftliği karındaşı Sinan Bey bin Yakub Bey’e merfuü’l öşr hibe idüp temellük olunduğuna hüccet-i şeri’ye ibraz olunup badehu Sinan Bey’den satılıb mezbureye intikal ve ila yevmina haza merfuü’l öşr mülkiyet üzere tasarruf olunduğu mastur ve mukayyed olmağın ben dahi malikane merfuü’l öşr mutasarrıf olduğum tahminen iki yüz doksan dönüm tarla ve bir bağçe ve üç çiftçi odalarına havi lede’l ahali ma’lumü’l hudud çiftliği hasbeten lillahi meliki’l samed vakf sahih-i müebbed ve habs-i sarıh-i muhalled ile vakf ve habs...’

As seen, an asset with proper private property came to be controlled with other waqf assets of the Mehmed Bey but he discarded this unit from endowing in 1488 for the sake of his brother Sinan Bey. Along with the recording of its buildings as three cultivator rooms and an orchard and this time recording with the size of its attached land, which was 290 dönüm, strongly suggests that this *çiftlik* with its land had been privately owned for centuries as stressed by also Ahmed Ağa who claimed his disposition of the *çiftlik* as *malikane*. In this context, the term *malikiyyet üzere* in 1568 was replaced now by *malikane* in 1715 both of which imply full ownership over an asset. Since such cases are clearly exceptional, and the size of *çiftlik*s on miri lands

still remained within the size defined by the *çifhane* system, change in the *miri* land regime had not yet begun in the "classical" period. Moreover, as Barkan states, scarce number of *hassa çiftliks* suggests that the available çiftlik units did not emerge through the incorporation of the lands to the *hassa çiftlik* reserved for timariods, the absence of which in all the available survey registers of Karaferye was also the case.²⁴⁰ In some cases, we see these units under the control of certain individuals with titles as sipahi or sipahi-zâdes even such cases are scarce and does not refer like the ones Barkan observed. For instance, in the village of Sadine, the timariod of this village Yunus was holding a çiftlik unit but again without any mention of the term *hassa çiftlik*.²⁴¹ Furthermore, İnalçık contends that such land grants (temlik) in the sixteenth century had not reached the extent that they undermined the state land and led to the concentration of large tracts of arable land under the control of one landlord, attributing it to the capacity of the sultan's centralizing power.²⁴² Thus, it can be stated that these units organically emerged with the initiation of profit driven individuals, whose endeavors alike became much more visible in the following century. Although it would continue as a means of investment for individuals in their economic inclinations, both the prevalence and size, and more importantly the composition of proprietorship, would begin to change in the seventeenth century. Before moving into

²⁴⁰ Ibid, pp. 368-369.

²⁴¹ TT.d. (ca. 976/1568) 723 fol. 825. The note was recorded as follows: '*çiftlik-i Yunus sipahi-i karye-i mim*'.

²⁴² Halil İnalçık, 'The Ottoman State: economy and society, 1300-1600'. p. 122 and p. 126. See İnalçık, 'Hicrî 835 Tarihli Sûret-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid', pp. XXIX-XXX. The existence of only two çiftliks that were not *reaya çiftliks* in the Arvanid sanjak, the oldest tahrir book so far, indicates that the miri land system, which had been established in earlier periods, had not yet degenerated in the early stages in Arnavudluk, too. İnalçık attributes the fact that the owner of these farms, apparently a non-Muslim named Yako, was not a *reaya* to the fact that a separate Çiftlik-i Yako was recorded in his name. İnalçık is correct in claiming that these farms did not belong to the reaya, as it is in line with our observations of the farms registered in the names of many individuals that we have identified in the Thessaloniki tahrirs, and more specifically in the Karaferye tahrirs, whose non-reaya status is evident from their handicaps. In addition, İnalçık mentions that such farms or bastinas were widespread in Arvanid towards the end of the sixteenth century. This is exactly the same for the Thessaloniki countryside.

the analysis with regard to çiftliks phenomena of the seventeenth century, it would be necessary to historicize what we call as the local elites of the town, in other words, to identify these actors and their portfolios.

3.5. Conflicts Over the Trusteeship: Unveiling the Local Elite Networks

Determining and specifying local elite networks will be conducted as retrospective from the end of the century to the beginning for two practical reasons; first, the members of the elite families were much visible in the last two decades compared to the beginning of the century. The second was to present the continuity in the transfer of wealth and prestige for the identified members of the Musachi descendants whose women members appear to build marriage alliances with the member of *ulema* or *örf'i* officials who were again privileged local elite family members in the town in the mentioned period. It is not a coincidence that as early as the beginning of the seventeenth century, they surface especially in legal procedures related with property acquisition mostly as landed-estates and credit relations in the economic and financial web of relations in the community as financiers.

Like other waqf founders who sought ways to secure family wealth for their successors elsewhere in Ottoman dominions, Gazi Mehmed Bey, and Tuzcu Sinan Bey also stipulated the women members as trustees only if the male heirs died out. In the case of Mehmed Bey waqf, the second condition persisted, and the lineage of Mehmed Bey continued through his apparently only daughter, Hanzâde (see Table 1). When the women subjects married, they were either referred to with their husband's patronymic or their names alone and most of the time without reference to their ancestral affiliation. Therefore, the family name and their identities has been obscured for the successors of Todor Musachi in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As for the

Tuzcu Sinan Bey waqf the lineage continued over his son and daughter. Due to fact that Tuzcu Sinan Bey was the grandson of Mehmed Bey, later the successors of Tuzcu Sinan Bey also had a right to assume the trusteeship of their ancestor's waqf. Occasionally the rightful heirs had to share the trusteeship of the waqfs. Nevertheless, one party often contested to preclude the other from the post by asserting the lousy management of the waqfs' assets or accusing the other of being lower rank in *vâkıf*'s lineage hierarchy.

The inspection of the waqfs was under the responsibility of the judge.²⁴³ If the local men of power allied or subdued the head of the judiciary, then who would decide whether the assets were managed well or not? In this case, the only substantial evidence pleadable against a rightful heir was the litigators' claim of "lower rank" of the contested party in lineage. However, what would happen if the two parties were equal in lineage rank? The central bureau indeed inspects the available waqf deeds and survey-registers to decide. However, the bureau's decision depends upon the judge's deed produced in a local setting. In the case of Mehmed Bey and Tuzcu Sinan Bey waqfs, the deeds prepared by the judge are the only source that lists the lineage of a successor until the founders. Then the claimed lineage in the deed is approved or disapproved by the trustworthy Muslims of the region during the court proceeding. After the hearing, the judge prepares the deed, which is the final decision based on the claims and testimonies. But there is always a possibility for the men of power to manipulate the claims of consultees since the legal successors could dismiss another legal heir even though they were equal in the lineage rank. The Musachi family had existed in Karaferye without fading out for centuries; as a result, three different branches of the founders' lineage emerged. Each as a faction backed up by their

²⁴³ Ergenç, 'XVI. Yüzyılda Ankara ve Konya', p. 108.

relative local powerholders competing for the trusteeship. The lineages, which eventually merged with the most powerful local notable families of Lanbazâdes and Saricazâdes, became successful in securing the control of the trusteeship and thus the assets. Therefore, only by close examination of the Saricazâdes and Lambazâdes through retrospective analysis, can the activities and affiliations of both the women successors of the Musachi family and the previous socio-economic actions of these ‘local elites’ who appeared to occupy higher post in the *kaza* affairs in the seventeenth century be illuminated. Every identified individual in these webs of relations were the members of either ulema posts or notability thus they constitute a subject matter of an analysis that focusses inevitably on privileged social groups.

Table 2 Four Claimed Legal Lineages of Mehmed Bey and Tuzcu Hacı Sinan Bey: The Successors of Todor Musachi (1695-1732)²⁴⁴

a. Kudret Hatun bint-i Salih Efendi 1695 (1107)²⁴⁵	b. Abdülhalim Efendi ibn-i Kudret Hatun 1732 (1144)²⁴⁶	c. Ayşe Hatun bint-i Rukiye 1731 (1144)²⁴⁷	d. es-Seyyid Ahmed Efendi bin es-Seyyid Mustafa 1695 (1107)²⁴⁸
1. Todor Musachi 2. Gazi Yakub Bey 3. Gazi Mehmed Bey 4. Hanzâde Hatun 5. Zahide Hatun 6. Şaban Çelebi 7. Mustafa Efendi 8. Ahmed Efendi 9. Salih Efendi	1. Todor Musachi 2. Gazi Yakub Bey 3. Gazi Mehmed Bey 4. Hanzâde Hatun 5. Tuzcu Sinan Bey 6. Haşim 7. Bayezid Çelebi 8. Şaban Çelebi 9. Mustafa Efendi	1. Todor Musachi 2. Gazi Yakub Bey 3. Gazi Mehmed Bey 4. Hanzâde Hatun 5. Tuzcu Sinan Bey 6. Zahide 7. Hanzâde 8. Ayşe 9. Rabia	1. Todor Musachi 2. Gazi Yakub Bey 3. Gazi Mehmed Bey 4. Hanzâde Hatun 5. Tuzcu Sinan Bey 6. Haşim 7. Bayezid [Çelebi] 8. Seyhan[Hatun] 9. Ahmed Efendi

²⁴⁴ Only column *a* pertains to the trusteeship of Mehmed Bey waqf, *b*, *c*, and *d* belong to the Tuzcu Sinan Bey waqf. In column *d*, the lineage order provides the information that Tuzcu Sinan Bey was the grandson of Gazi Mehmed Bey. Based on this, the same order is placed into column *b* and *c*. After the first Hanzâde who was the only daughter who could produce lineage, the lineage continued through her daughter Zahide and Tuzcu Sinan Bey. The claims regarding their descent were recorded and formed by reciting immediate fathers or sons of the claimants who were the last individuals in the line but among the columns, the immediate affiliation would result in determining wrong familial ties, unless checked with other data. According to the information that was cited in *c*, there emerge two strong possibility of which was almost impossible to unveil all of them with the current data at hand; the first is that more than one person with the same name and title was the case and there was the tendency of giving their predecessors' name to their children amongst the local elites of Musachi lineages and the second there must have been family members who were not recorded in these lineages based on the claim of Rukiye and trustworthy Muslims present in the court as follows; *the trustee before Rukiye was her uncle's son Salih Efendi and before him his brother Mustafa Efendi and before them their uncle, Ebubekir Efendi (...mezbure Rukiyeden mukaddem dayısı oğlu Salih Efendi müteveli mezbur Salih Efendiden mukaddem karındaşı Mustafa Efendi olub Mustafa Efendiden mukaddem dayıları Ebubekir Efendi vakf-ı mezbura evladiyet ve meşrutiyet üzere müteveli olub...)*. When all the information considered, the uncle of Rukiye actually refers to her mother's uncle who appears as Ahmed Efendi. Ebubekir Efendi's name was not present in the lineages. There were two Mustafa drawing on the available documents. The name of the first appears calligraphically in these lineage claims and in some documents of the seventeenth century as Müsli, but in the same period, it was written clearly as Mustafa. For that, 'Mustafa' will be used. The second one was properly recorded as Mustafa, and he appeared to be named with his grandfather's name since Ahmed Efendi was the son of first Mustafa and Salih Efendi and the second Mustafa Efendi were brothers when the above quoted information considered together with the lineage order. All the family members before Şaban Çelebi, Ayşe, and Seyhan had been living in the sixteenth and fifteenth centuries. The following members had lived in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively.

²⁴⁵ BOA, TK.GM.d. (ca.976/1568) 414/92-93, Since the documents is not paged in accordance with the defter, date of a given document will be shared, (1 Safer 1107 / 11 September 1695).

²⁴⁶ BOA, TSMA.e (Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi Evrakı), 453/52, (26 Zilkade 1144 / 21 May 1732).

²⁴⁷ BOA, C.EV. 316/16054, (11 Rebiülevvel 1144 / 13 September 1731).

²⁴⁸ BOA, TK.GM.d. (ca.976/1568) 414/92-93, (10 Rebiülevvel 1107 / 19 October 1695).

10. Kudret Hatun	10. Ahmed Efendi-Asiye Hatun 11. Salih Efendi 12. Kudret Hatun 13. Abdülhalim Efendi	10. Fatıma-Mustafa Ağa 11. Abide 12. Rukiye 13. Ayşe Hatun	10. Mustafa Efendi 11. Hızır 12. Hatice 13. Ahmed Efendi

In the summer of 1706, Kudret Hatun, daughter of Salih Efendi, found herself once again entangled in the legal intricacies surrounding her trusteeship over the Mehmed Bey Waqf.²⁴⁹ Her adversary, müftü Ömer Efendi, persistently contested her rightful ownership of the waqf, leading Kudret to seek permanent relief from the incessant interventions. Faced with the burden of repeatedly proving her legality against Ömer's claims, Kudret decided to take decisive action. She approached the *defterhane-i amire*, the central registry office, to ensure that her lineage and trusteeship were officially recorded, thus safeguarding her position against future challenges based on false claims.

This request for validation was not borne out of a singular conflict but was part of a protracted struggle involving multiple parties and spanning several decades. The origins of the dispute trace back to September 1695 when Ömer Efendi first attempted to seize control of the trusteeship. Kudret, supported by her husband, kadı Mehmed Efendi, and armed with testimonies from reputable Muslim individuals, successfully invalidated Ömer's claims. Despite his acknowledgment of the lack of merit in his assertions, Ömer persisted in opposing Kudret's authority over the waqf.

The conflict extended beyond the Mehmed Bey Waqf to the Tuzcu Sinan Bey Waqf, where Ömer collaborated with another rightful heir, Rukiye Hatun, against Kudret whose father was also another prominent member of the community as being

²⁴⁹ BOA, TK.GM.d. (ca.976/1568) 414 fol. 92-93. (15 Rebiülahir 1118 / 27 July 1706).

judge Salih Efendi.²⁵⁰ Rukiye, previously expelled from trusteeship by Kudret's efforts, sought to challenge Kudret's authority over the Mehmed Bey Waqf. In this period, she was again dismissed from the trusteeship of Tuzcu Sinan Bey waqf by another rightful heir, kadi es-Seyyid Ahmed Efendi.²⁵¹ His trusteeship in the waqf would be challenged again after twenty-two years by the daughter and husband of Rukiye and this will be last proceeding he was included as most probably he passed away after that or there were missing documents.²⁵² The legal proceedings that followed revealed a complex web of familial ties, legal maneuverings, and shifting alliances. With this respect, it was understood that Kudret's political power was not only rested on his judge father but also on her husband, judge Mehmed Efendi whose lineage goes back to early seventeenth century when the family he belongs to occupying elevated status with their seats in ulema class. This family came to be referred to as Lanbazâdes after the first decade of the eighteenth century that emerged as a result of much more complex and intricate developments than they appear in this patrimony on the social and political plane of the Ottoman social structure.²⁵³

Amidst this tumultuous backdrop, the Sarıcazâde family emerged as a significant player, leveraging marriage alliances to consolidate power and influence. Compared to Lanbazâde family, they were a late comer to the vibrant social life of the town as notable family. When exactly Sarıcazâdes began to dispose the trusteeship of the Mehmed Bey waqf remains unknown. Though the family had already been making

²⁵⁰ BOA, MŞH.ŞSC.d (Meşihat Şeriyye Sicili Defterleri) 1088 fol. 35/b (25 Cemazielevvel 1106 / 11 January 1695).

²⁵¹ BOA, TK.GM.d. (ca.976/1568) 414/92-93, (10 Rebiülevvel 1107 / 19 October 1695). Instead of *müfti* Ömer Efendi, this time Rukiye Hatun had the support of her husband, *fahru'l kudat* Mahmud Efendi bin Mustafa Çelebi who was *muvaqqit* of Trikala.

²⁵² Ibid, (17 Rebiülevvel 1129 / 1 March 1717).

²⁵³ BOA, AE. (Ali Emiri) SAMD.III 51/5088 (27 Ramazan 1127 / 26 September 1715). This was the first document has registered the patrimony of the family as Lanbazâde while referring to the mentioned kadı Mehmed Efendi.

use of the tax farm opportunities in Rumelia. The first member of the family was *Karaferiyeli* Sarıca Ali, later came to be referred as Ali Ağa who appeared to control the tax farm of Osman Paşa hass, which contain Velvendos and Dubnik tax units (mukataa) in 1696.²⁵⁴ But their political and economic capacity lead them to build marriage opportunity with Atike Hatun who were the mother of Ramiz Mehmed Efendi and the descendant of Todor Musachi, holding the legal right to the trusteeship for the waqfs. Their involvement added another layer of complexity to the conflict, reshaping the dynamics of the struggle for trusteeship.

Lanbazâde and Sarıcazâde families also became relatives through the marriage of Lanbazâde Rüşdi Ali Efendi with Fatıma Hatun and Şeyhi Mustafa Efendi with Emine Hatun who were the daughters of Sarıcazâde el-Hac Mehmed Ağa and cousins of Ramiz Mehmed.²⁵⁵ It must have been realized with an intra-family decision that the trusteeship of Tuzcu Sinan Bey waqf left for Lanbazâdes, and that of Mehmed Bey waqf to Sarıcazâdes. If the supposed agreement had not been realized, then Lanbazâde and Sarıcazâde families would have continued to be in conflict because of the trusteeship of Atike over Mehmed Bey waqf. This inference stemmed from the fact that Atike accused for the first time the judge “Lanbo-oğlu/Lanbazâde” Mehmed Efendi because of his indifference for the maintenance of the buildings of Gazi Mehmed Bey waqf for ten years in 1725.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁴ BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d. (Bâb-ı Âsafî Divan-ı Hümâyûn Sicillatı Mühimme Defterleri) 103 (7 January 1696 / 1 Cemazielahir 1107) case number: 755. The word “Sarı” or its derivative “Sarıca” seemed to be used as a title for their blond hairs, see “Râmiz Seyyid Mehmed Efendi” in Furkan Öztürk, ed., *Tezkire-i Silâhdâr-zâde* (Defter Emîni Silâhdâr-zâde Mehmed Emîn), T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Kütüphaneler ve Yayımlar Genel Müdürlüğü Eser (Ankara, 2018).

²⁵⁵ BOA, D.BŞM.MHF. (Bâb-ı Defterî Başmuhasebe Muhallefat Kalemi Evrakı) 85/85 (Safer 1204 / October 1789).

²⁵⁶ KKS.g. D-063/4 (18 Rebiülahir 1138 / 24 December 1725). After the proceeding, Lanbazâde Mehmed Efendi was not expelled from the trusteeship, and it seems Atike became another holder of the trusteeship. In the document, her mothers’ name was specified as Rukiye. KKS.g. D-075/62/4-63-64-65 (1 Muharrem 1162 / 22 December 1748). This document was the waqf deed of Şerife Atike, who assigned the trusteeship to her children; now referred to as Sarıcazâde es-Seyyid Mehmed Ramiz

As a result of ongoing disputes, Lanbazâde and Sarıcazâde families who were the grooms of the Todor Musachi lineages seemed to choose consensual relationship rather than conflictual through building marriage alliances amongst their children, the mothers of both local elite families were the successors of the Todor Musachi. In terms of portfolio, these two powerful families should be thought of as one family since after the death of Sarıcazâde el-Hac Mehmed, all the assets including çiftlik came under the control of Lanbazâde Rüşdi Ali Efendi and Şeyhi Mustafa Efendi thanks to their Sarıcazâde wives.²⁵⁷ Ultimately, through strategic alliances and legal maneuverings, the conflict over waqf trusteeship culminated in a resolution that established them as dominant local elites by the mid-eighteenth century. This resolution marked not only the end of a prolonged legal feud but also a significant consolidation of power within the region. Moreover, the end of the struggle corresponds to the 1710s-1720s when they were concentrating their land acquisition and then establishing çiftlik suggest the effectiveness of holding the trusteeship of the waqfs for the necessitated capital

Efendi, es-Seyyid Ali Efendi and Şerife Emine Hanım, respectively. In her waqf deed, her father's name was referred to as es-Seyyid el-merhum (the deceased one) Mahmud Efendi. When the above-mentioned two documents are considered, it appears clearly that Atike was the daughter of Rukiye Hatun and Mahmud Efendi, representing the other faction competing against the Lanbazâde faction between 1695-1706. As the first document was subject to the trusteeship of Mehmed Bey waqf, she was referred to by her mother's name since Rukiye Hatun was the descendant of the waqf's founders. In the second document, on the other hand, her own waqf was subject to the legal case and thus her father's name came to be used.

²⁵⁷ Op.cit.

formation.²⁵⁸ Thus, the combined wealth of the two families led them to be the most powerful local elite of the town until 1760s.²⁵⁹

As the political and economic power of the families increased, they seemed to take initiatives to further increase their social and symbolic capital in order to gain additional privileges. This situation manifested itself in the form of titles; *seyyid* and *şerif* titles were attached to their names along with their patrimony. Normally, these two titles were used for the descendants of the Prophet, but over time, their widespread use diminished their nobility and came to convey a sense of civic respect along with certain immunities from taxation.²⁶⁰ What Canbakal observed in Ayntab, where she coined the term *seyyidization*, seemed to be the case for the local elites mentioned so far. The center's attempts to eliminate the false ennoblements from the second half of the seventeenth century proved futile with the rise of locally powerful figures in the next century that coincided with increase of the *nakibüleşraf*'s position in local political hierarchy.²⁶¹ The members of the Sarıcazâde family, whose maternal lineage

²⁵⁸ BOA, C.MF. (Cevdet Tasnifi Maârif) 80/3954 (4 Safer 1171 / 18 October 1757). Şerife Atike dispensed her right over trusteeship of Gazi Mehmed Bey waqf for her children; es-Seyyid Mehmed (Ramiz), es-Seyyid Ali and Emine, because of her very old age. After Atike, her children and the successors of the Sarıcazâde family continued to hold the trusteeship. If Atike Hatun was at about her seventies while dispensing the trusteeship to her children, then the family agreement, which is discussed above, between Lanbazâdes and Sarıcazâdes might have taken place over the waqfs after the marriage of Sarıcazâde el-Hac Ahmed Ağa and Atike Hatun at around 1720s-1730s.

²⁵⁹ Spyropoulos, Poullos, and Anastasopoulos, "Çiftlik, Landed Elites, and Tax Allocation in Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Veroia." 20. This study formed a detailed chart, which shows the total amount of the tax shares of çiftlik holders based on the tevzi registers throughout Karaferye. In the chart, the shares of Rüşdi Ali and Abdülhalim was shown. As scrutinized before in this dissertation, they were the prominent members of Lanbazâde family. Because of the marriage alliances, the tax shares of Lanbazâde, Sarıcazâde and Arnavud Hasan and his sons showed sharp changes most probably because of the reasons as follows: After Sarıcazâde el-Hac Mehmed Ağa passed away at around 1762, his çiftlik passed onto the control of Lanbazâdes, which explains the sharp increase in the shares of the family. Again, after the last members of the Lanbazâde family passed away in 1789, their shares seemed to be taken over by Arnavud Hasan and his sons later on, which explains the sharp increase of their shares in 1797.

²⁶⁰ Hülya Canbakal, *Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town: 'Ayntāb in the seventeenth Century* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2007). pp. 77-83.

²⁶¹ Hülya Canbakal, 'On the 'nobility' of Provincial Notables' in *Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire, Halcyon Days in Crete V: A Symposium Held in Rethymno*, Antonis Anastasopoulos (ed.), 10-12 January 2003 (Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2005), pp. 45-47. Canbakal contends that the

goes back to Musachis, while the founder of the family, Ali, was never referred to as es-Seyyid suggests devoid of paternal lineage, too. Furthermore, some of the Musachi members in the seventeenth century had also acquired seyyid titles that again questionable given their descent. Forging lineages to the Prophet for acquiring the titles, or even without the need to produce one seems inter-imperial phenomenon. It is also obvious that it has little to do with the expectation they already had in abundance; political prestige, income, and the expectation of upward social mobility rather than, one may argue, fortifying their civic virtue.

3.6. Çiftliks As Commodity and Property: The Expansion

The availability of seventeenth-century court registers allows sound research for tracing the transformation in land tenure patterns and comparison with that of the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries by means of its expansion, proprietorship, the compounds, and the formation way of landed-estates along with their dispositions in the portfolios of capital-owning investor elites. As Gara rightly argues, the property acquisition cases reveal that the majority of çiftliks -with modest sizes- becoming more visible in the portfolios of urban and rural elites who appeared to be members of *ulema* and were also active in moneylending activities, with only a few controlled by non-Muslims.²⁶² Among these elite families, Musachi's descendants and their relative other local elites of the town stand out in çiftlik market, credit relations and local politics in the first place. Some members also came to hold respected offices such as müftü-ship

increase in the number of seyyids can also be regarded as the center's policy to promote the tightening of the links between the local notables and the center.

²⁶² Eleni Gara, "Moneylenders and landowners: In search of urban Muslim Elites in the Early Modern Balkans", in *Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire, Halcyon Days in Crete V: A Symposium Held in Rethymno*, Antonis Anastasopoulos (ed.), 10-12 January 2003 (Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2005), 144-146. Again, as Gara pointed out, the fact that there is more than one personality with the same name jeopardizes the unraveling of family ties. While it is difficult for some to definitively identify the profiles, many of those identified help to highlight the elevated status of the Musachi descendants throughout the century.

or kadışip in the local setting. If the frequency of court cases points to the extent of landed-estate market, then it would be fair to assert that seventeenth-century çiftlik market cap is smaller than the next century. There remains another characteristic of the seventeenth century çiftlik market awaits few remarks in general and three of the villages that each of them appears to contain a çiftlik with large tracks of arable land compared to the approximate average of the others.²⁶³

The extensive deliberations among Ottoman scholars on the vagueness of the term "*çiftlik*" render it unnecessary to re-examine in the present study.²⁶⁴ Based on the data available, I adopt McGowan's definition of *çiftliks* as production units owned by affluent local notables, namely *ayan* and *eşraf*, whose primary occupation was not agriculture.²⁶⁵ This definition distinguishes *çiftliks* from small-scale rural enterprises that are defined in the Ottoman sources as *çiftliks* within the confines of the "çift-hane" system.²⁶⁶

²⁶³ Based on all the available legal procedures in the court registers of Karaferye regarding çiftliks, the range of the arable land sizes of the çiftliks exchanged between the parties whose profession were not cultivation varies between 200 to 500 dönüm. There are only one çiftlik sale case that records 3000 dönüm of cultivated and uncultivated lands together with meadow in the Davud Paşa's *hass* village, Fatma bint Mustafa Efendi, descendant of Musachi sold to her husband Mustafa Ağa in Mavrangel in KKS.g. D-07/103/4- (12 Zilhicce 1029 / 8 November 1620), and there are only two cases that records çiftliks with 1000 dönüm in Alabori certain Mehmed Çavuş sold to his sister Ümmühan in KKS.g D-012/88/1- (Evahir Zilhicce 1036 / September 1627), and certain Hati Hatun sold to her three sisters her çiftlik with 1200 dönüm in Branyat villages in KKS.g. D-011/24/2-(Evahir Şaban 1026 / September 1617). Other available cases that records çiftliks with more than five hundred dönüm of adjacent arable lands as follows: Ahmed Çelebi sold to Hızır Beşe with 500 dönüm of land in Eflahlar in D-07/37/1- (Evahir Rebiülahir 1029 / March 1620), Ali Halife sold to İsmihan Hatun with 500 dönüm of adjacent land and 30 dönüm of grassland in Kodunyani D-012/130/3-(Evasıt Rebiülahir 1037 / December 1627), Zülfikar Bey sold with 500 dönüm of arable land to Abdullah Çelebi in Vulçiste in D-015/15/1- (Evahir Ramazan 1037 / June 1628), Manol veled-i Kirmihal sold with 700 dönüm of arable lands to İsmail Efendi in Kodunyani in D-020/13/1- (11 Zilkade 1060/ 5 November 1650), Platisa veled-i Manol sold with 700 dönüm of arable lands to his two sons in Kolura in D-028/236/2 (14 Şaban 1084 / 24 November 1673), Süleyman Çelebi sold with 800 dönüm of land to Mehmed Bey bin İbrahim in Yavornıçe in KKS.g. D-031/75/2-(10 Safer 1093 / 18 February 1682).

²⁶⁴ For a detailed discussion see Papastamatiou, Demetrios, "The structure, content and development of large estates in the environs of Salonica during the period 1697-1770," pp. 375-76.

²⁶⁵ McGowan, "The age of the ayans," p. 681.

²⁶⁶ For a discussion of the *çift-hane* system see -İnalçık, Halil, "The emergence of big farms, çiftliks: state, landlords, and tenants," in idem, *Contributions a l'histoire Economique et Sociale de l'Empire Ottoman* (Louvain: Peeters Press, 1983), pp. 105-108.

It is clear that the arable land and most probably with their building infrastructures, the *çiftlik*s grew in size during the seventeenth century compared to the previous but these were still smaller than those in the eighteenth century. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, in these villages, we observe that *çiftlik*s grew in number under the ownership of different local elites but each of them contains small arable lands. This might have been the effect of growth of the *çiftlik* market due to the inclusion of new investors in addition to the present ones. Or, it may also have been due to the division of the lands that were passed on to the children of consortium of local elite families like Musachis and their relative local elite families who had been holding *çiftlik* units containing large tracks of arable lands, due to death, or bequeathal. The last possibility was the attempt to shrink the sizes to establish more than one unit to harvest extra gains from their sale to other investor elites. In all the scenarios, land tenure pattern and political hegemony appeared to have been considerably affected, if not shaped, by these local elite families who as the epitome of these centuries long processes became the most privileged group by the end of the seventeenth century.

Despite these changes, their legal status in the *miri* land system and their function as investment assets stayed consistent over time, albeit with varying degrees. Although debt related land sales of peasants to the investor local elites who then establish *çiftlik* with large tracks of arable lands became widespread only in the eighteenth century, there were references, though few, on the land sales out of indebtedness in the seventeenth century though immediate *çiftlik* establishment was missing. Moreover, the absence of large tracks of arable land sale *hüccets* because of debt by the peasantry to a local elite can be attributed to factors such as the relative success of the institutions in keeping the provisions intact, the financial capacity of the investor and the peasantry was either able to live and produce with less debt, or that

their capacity to repay their debts has not yet reached a level that would be crippling, or that the marginal benefit from land sales has not yet reached a level that would convince them. All these factors would not unfold simultaneously, but if they intersect, it is possible that we would see the sale. On the basis of at least the debt part of these arguments, we can justify the fact that it was in the eighteenth century, as discussed in the next section, that the peasants sold a large number of plots of land to the investor elite and that this elite subsequently established large *çiftlik*s on these plots of land.

Given the smaller land sizes and dispersed in character rather than concentration of large tracks of land in a *çiftlik* under the control of a local elite compared to eighteenth century and yet to the formation of village-*çiftlik*s that contains whole the available arable land in a given village, these debts were yet to put unbearable burden for considerable amount of peasant communities in the seventeenth century. Therefore, in the absence of significant peasant relocations due to disasters, natural or man-made, it would be imprudent to attribute *çiftlik* formation solely to debt or credit relations, as there were also instances where peasant communities managed to repay large sums of their debts, which likewise does not account for the absence of exploitative mechanisms typically employed by capital holders.²⁶⁷ Hence what determines one factor as the dominant in character over others was its extent that necessitates historical scrutiny.

Another determinant factor was the commercialization of agricultural production. Although direct purchase of wheat from autonomous peasants persists in the climax of illicit wheat trade, this process was concordant with the land sizes of the *çiftlik*s; as a result, the noticeable difference in the eighteenth century will be of their

²⁶⁷ Credit relations revolve around debt liabilities across all strata are probably much more determinant than it surfaces and are organized in a chain of financial dependencies in which lenders are also debtors, of whose repercussions again become more pronounced in the eighteenth century.

commercial use through the illicit wheat trade.²⁶⁸ That is, the demand and internal dynamics has yet to reach the extent that exert influence on investors to invest in landed-estates by forcing organization and relations of production. Comparison across centuries would be possible by delving into the transformation of land tenure and labor in the context of *çiftlik* expansion until the end of the seventeenth century further. It is argued that the local elites in the *çiftlik* market, with the identified members of Musachi's descendants, had been one of the privileged group at the top of the town's socio-economic hierarchy. As far as Musachi's descendants are concerned, their prominence in the sixteenth century continued into the seventeenth century, but their dominance over the economic, political, and social contours of the town became more pronounced after the second half of the century, or they became more represented in the documents.

The provisions of the *miri* land regime regarding full ownership of these units did not de facto prevent the owners from using them as their private property. In other words, they are both commodities as investment instruments and property in the sense that they are subject to certain legal treatments other than only sale. From the first decade of the seventeenth century, these units had already become an investment instrument. This is evidenced both by the large number of *çiftlik* sale cases, the majority of which were exchanged between non-reaya by profession inferred from their titles as well as identified members of capital owner elite families and the accommodating character of *miri* land regime in the sale of land's usufruct on certain ground.

²⁶⁸ Unlike eighteenth century, in all the available seventeenth century court registers of Karaferye, there was not any case of prohibition firman regarding the prevention of illicit wheat trade. It implies strongly that even if few activities went unnoticed, it surely had not reached to the extent that the center became more concerned by taking measures that resonates in the form of dispatching prohibition orders and firmans for punishing the wrongdoers.

Judging by the titles, the çiftliks came to be exchanged between parties amongst the capital holder elites in the market as early as 1602. Since the same procedure applied in the following decades for the çiftlik sale cases in Karaferye and other parts of the empire as well, it would be enough to analyze the earliest sale case in the seventeenth century. While a certain Mahmud Bey paid 32,800 akçe to the heirs of deceased Mustafa for the core of the çiftlik where the equipment and buildings (barn, mills, cabinets for cultivators, draft animals, livestock) supported cultivation, he paid another 2,200 akçe for the usufruct (*hakk-ı tasarruf*) of 300 *dönüm* plot of land located in a place called Kirbazi lands for a çiftlik unit located in Yançiste village in 1602.²⁶⁹

Unlike the above case, the çiftlik sale case of 1617 evidently refers to the core of the unit as “çiftlik”. The inheritors of a certain Hamza Bey sell their çiftlik located in the waqf village of Mehmed Bey, Makrigoz to cover the debts of their deceased father in an auction held in *sûk-ı sultânî* (main street). Certain Manol and Toma purchased the çiftlik by paying 25,000 akçe in total. While they paid 15,000 akçe for the equipment and the buildings all of which were called as “çiftlik”, paid another 10,000 akçe for *hakk-ı tasarruf* (usufruct of the land) with the permission of *sahib-i arz* for 200 dönüm of land adjacent to the çiftlik.²⁷⁰

Early in the first decade of the seventeenth century, all the parties who appear as the city-dwellers instead of peasants pawning their çiftliks in their credit relations

²⁶⁹ KKS.g. D-02/26/4 (Evasıt Cemazievvel 1011 / Mid October 1602). The case was unique amongst the other sale cases as the properties subjected to sale were the same with that of other çiftlik sales but the complex was not referred to as çiftlik ta‘bir olunur (known as çiftlik), which was a common phrase in çiftlik sales. The core of the çiftlik includes 3 farmer huts, 1 room, 1 hayloft, 1 barn, 1 cart, 2 fence, 4 oxen, 4 cow, 3 donkey, 1 water boffola, 5 hıml wheat and 200 akçe in the hands of farmers, 7 hıml sown wheat, 4.5 hıml barley, 2 hıml straw and tools for cultivation. See for hıml of Karaferye D-04/81/5 (1613)- One hıml of Karaferye equals to 10 bushels of Istanbul (256 kg).

²⁷⁰ KKS.g. D-05/38/2 (Evahir Rebiülevvel 1026 / March 1617) The core of the çiftlik contains 5 farmer huts, 1 hayloft, 1 barn (with pergola), 3 oxen, 4 hıml wheat, 2 hıml barley, 8 dönüm threshing floor, and the devices of cultivation.

were quite prevalent.²⁷¹ It is obvious that they invested in these rural properties but when a need arises to certain amount of credit, they make use of their investment to rise ready cash. In this legal procedure, another common point was the absence of the information as to the arable land attached to the unit, because of the prevailing *miri* land regime. The stipulation regarding the pawning process as follows; if the debtor fails to pay back the debt, the creditor could sell the *çiftlik* to recover his money. These cases point to the property characteristic of these units clearly. On the other hand, the rarity of such cases and their almost complete disappearance after the second half of the century suggests that pawning is now an established financial operation of the growing *çiftlik* market.

3.6.1. The Encroachment of *askerî* and Local Elites: The First Wave of Land Alienation

Already from the first decade, the *askeri* strata who holds a certificate from the Sultan for certain duties, namely timariots, janissaries and *şeri* officials infiltrated into the villages to acquire lands to establish *çiftlik*s concerned the center. Presumably tax burden of the peasants especially exacerbated with the additional extraordinary levies during the period that witnessed two long-lasting wars in the seventeenth century increased their debts. In return, they might have thought as the most effective way to escape from this additional levy by selling their arable lands to the investor local elites. In the beginning of the seventeenth century, the diminishing revenues of *örf* officials,

²⁷¹ KKS.g. D-07/116/1-(Gurre Muharrem 1029 / December 1619) Ali Bey from the quarter of Çanşnır pawns his *çiftlik* in the village of Dolbani for 1000 akçe at 10% interest 1200 akçe in one year. KKS.g. D-07/135/6 (8 Muharrem 1029 / 15 December 1619) Mahmud Bey from Camii-i Atik quarter pawns his *çiftlik* in the İstavroz village in return of his debt 3000 akçe plus 300 akçe interest. KKS.g. D-012/51/1-(Evail Şevval 1036 / 24 June 1627) Ali Bey from İsa Bey quarter pawns his *çiftlik* in the village of Servihor in return of his 12.000 akçe debt to kadi İbrahim Efendi.

namely provincial governors and their retinues devised newly illegal taxes in the name of *bid'at* to compensate their losses in the transforming timar system. Considering that the scale of this dual process and the interaction between its components rest on various factors—such as the constant threat of brigandage in the Balkans—it is reasonable to suggest a correlation between the extent of land incorporated into *çiftlik*s and the effectiveness of these processes. In simpler terms, the heavier the tax burden and the more significant the security concerns faced by peasants, the greater their inability to pay debts and protect their holdings. Consequently, this leads to a larger proportion of their land parcels being subsumed into *çiftlik*s for better living conditions in safer units.

In the village of Platiçe, where a significant number of *çiftlik*s would subsequently be established, one can observe the pattern of formation of these units and their relative security facilitation. This is evidenced by the early investment in first as *çift*s by *fahri'ül kudat* Mahmud Efendi.²⁷² Although his main occupation was not related to agriculture, Mahmud Efendi's two *çift*s with orchards in the village were the result of his investment. Gradually, as the number of these *çift*s under the control of a particular investor increased, they collectively formed a *çiftlik* unit. The appointment of a certain Yorgi Martini as a *subaşı* (*çiftlik* steward) to supervise production and secure the lands (...*iki çiftimi cümle tevabi ve bağlarıyla gözedüb mahsulünü eküb bana teslim eylemeye subaşı nasb eyledim...*) serves as evidence of an already established pattern of production relations within these units as early as 1603. By the nineteenth century, the role of the *subaşı*s in *çiftlik*s had been institutionalized in

²⁷² KKS.g. D-02/71/2 (Evasit Safer 1012 / July 1603). For this and other functions of *subaşı*s as contractors in Tırhala see Alp Yücel Kaya, 'On the *çiftlik* regulation in Tırhala in the mid-nineteenth century: economists, pashas, governors, *çiftlik*-holders, *subaşı*s, and sharecroppers'. In E. Kolovos (Ed.), *Ottoman rural Ottoman rural societies and economies: Halcyon days in Crete VIII: A symposium held in Rethymno 13-15 January 2012*, Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2015). pp. 346-350.

especially financing the peasants as another layer of surplus extraction between the actual owner of the çiftlik and the peasants, although their presence was evident much earlier.

It is also important to note that this process had gradually been evolving alongside with searching for legal grounds in the early stage of the expansion, for both parties -peasants and customer to their lands' usufruct, capital owners. Although when the imperial institutions' effectiveness, such as kadışip, and timar system had been still if not in complete force, but certainly effective, subjects left without much choice other than concentrated on making full use of the opportunities provided by the law.

This inference seems warranted by the issuance of two fetvas and a firman regarding a waqf village in 1619 and addressed to the kadı of Florine where the soup-kitchen of the waqf located.²⁷³ The waqf was established by Yakub Bey bin Aştin by the endowment of his two villages as private-property, Reşani and Kavaslı.²⁷⁴ As his patrimony suggests, he was the descendant of famous Albanian seigneur family. Given the *serbestiyet* status of the waqfs, Kavaslı must have been targeted with the foresight that it would provide a more comfortable control for the çiftlik investors. In the petition, the kadi made clear that in the past there had been only non-Muslim peasants in the village, where the timariods, janissaries, and others had taken over the peasants'

²⁷³ KKS.g. D-010-20/1-2-3-1619-1620 '... nefs-i Florinada vaki' Yakub Bey imareti evkafının mütevellisi olup darende-i ferman-ı hümayun Mustafa nam kimesne meclis-i şer-i şerife gelüp evkaf-ı mezbureden Karaferye kazasına tabi Kavaslı nam karyede ve tevabi'inde mukaddema zımmi reyalardan gayrı kimesne olmayub sonradan sipahi ve yeniçeri ve bazı kimesneler gelüb fuzulen karye-i mezbure reayasının ellerinden yerlerin alub çiftlik ihdas idüp vakf öşürlerin dahi tamam vormeyüp her biri başka virüb vakfa ve reayaya külli zulm ve tadiyahatdır diyü men' ve def' olunmak için emr-i şerifim ricasına arz olunduğu eelden buyurdum ki...'. These three linked cases were undated. Since the calligraphic style is the same as in other available cases, this approximate date was arrived at by looking at the dates of the immediately preceding and following cases.

²⁷⁴ BOA, TKGM.d. (ca.1568) 414 fol. 94/a-94/b. The waqf had not appeared in the survey register of 1499-1500 and it was available in the icmal register of 1519. Even if the waqf part seems intact when compared to the following defters, it may have been due to the fact that the former was an incomplete defter in which the folios on the waqf might have been missing or the waqf had yet to be established before 1519.

lands and established *çiftlik*. This disturbed the trustee because of the loss of income from the collection of the tithe. The nuance of the case unfolds with the order that emphasizes the grounds on which the legality of this action can be used to determine whether the usufruct of the peasants' lands under the control of *çiftlik*s was returned to the peasants by the elimination of *çiftlik*s. If there were no *çiftlik*s in this village in the past, and if they were established without the consent of the *sahib-i arz* and the villagers, according to the premises of the order, it orders that the alleged wrongdoers be sent back to their old places and that the right to dispose of the land they had taken over be returned to the villagers to reiterate the proper flow of the tithe.²⁷⁵ What was more intriguing were the two fetvas produced from a questioning of the legality of the land transfers through *hibe* (grant) and *bey'* (sale) respectively from a father to his daughter, and to another person which seem to be related to this specific case, as they were attached just above the relevant order and pertinent to a waqf peasant.

Even if the peasants were the addressee in front of the legal opinion, when it was considered with the above case, it is probable that other investors took part in this process. Two consecutive legal questions constitute the fatwas were as follows: 'is it permissible for waqf village dweller, Zeyd to give a piece of land to his daughter Hind, as dowry without the permission of *sahib-i arz*?' 'If so, then can Zeyd sell his lands to another person without the permission of landowner?'.²⁷⁶ Here, the content is more

²⁷⁵ Op. cit, '...hükm-i şerifimle vardıkda --- muvacehesinde hakk üzere teftiş idüp göresin şöyle ki mezburların arz olunduğı üzere kadimden ol karyede çiftlikler olmayub ve sonradan gelüp sahib'ül arzın ma'arifeti ve reayanın rızalarıyla çiftlik etmişler değiller ise fi'l vaki' fuzulen varub çiftlik ihdas idüp vakfa ve reayaya şer'en zarar ve taaddi mukarrer ise mezburları ol karyeden kaldırup evveliden sakın oldukları yerlerine gönderüp zıkr olunan yerleri gerü karye-i mezbure reayalarına zabt ve tasarruf itdiresin...'.

²⁷⁶ KKS.g. D-010-20/1-2 (1619-1620). 'Vakf karyede sakın olan Zeyd kızı Hind'e cihaz deyü bir mikdar tarla virse sahibü'l arz ma'arifeti olmadın virmeğe kadir olur mu? El-cevab: olmaz ---- sahibü'l arz temessükü lazımdır. Bu suretde Hind-i mezbureye tarlayı sahibü'l arz ma'arifeti olmadın ahire bey' itmeğe şer'en kadir olur mu? El-cevab: olmaz.'.

surprising than the presence of two fatwas on usufruct transaction. It is widely implemented procedure for a legally disputed case by a kadı in time of legal disputes to search for legal opinion of a mufti. However, as an early example of towards contentious land transfers by the peasants and searching for blessing the şer'i provisions imply that in the initial phase of çiftlik expansion, the parties had not yet been alienated to stay in legal boundaries due to the effectiveness of kadışip and timar system. In other words, they had had to legally conduct the transfer through the *sahib-i arz* permission. Therefore, these questions can be read as the natural result of an effort by both parties to leave no avenue untried to realize the land transaction, other than opting for other extra-legal or illegal means of which they do not yet hold the capacity to exert pressure to outperform. But it is not to say that kadışip as the representation of law as well as local elites of the empire totally undermined the effectiveness of this institution, that is, they would still make use of legal channels in such land transfers in the later periods, but this later attitude must do more with manipulation to the extent that their power led them than trying to be just during the transfer. Moreover, a considerable portion of those who made these investments were individuals with prior experience as judges or muftis and expertise in law or local elites whose network contains legal experts. This long-termed same occurring can be attributed to the early çiftlik formation of the town that played its role as attraction center both in and outside of the town and both by investor local elites and peasant communities.

The çiftlik market embedded somewhat earlier in Karaferye's agrarian structure, which implicitly acknowledged by the center. It assumed the role as attraction center both in and outside of the town and both by investor local elites and peasant communities. In the same year with the above legal procedure, another order regarding the collection of head-tax together with *nüzül* as 240 akçe in total form each

household (a tax unit sum of more than one real house) in hass villages of Serfiçe district belong to the waqf of Sultan Suleiman but recorded also in Karaferye court mentions very short but crucial development in the process of *çiftlik* formation and help elaborate upon production relations in these facilities. It points to a characteristic of a time when the occupational groups corresponding to the terms; military and notables were relatively homogeneous through citing *müteferrika*, *çavuş*, *zuema*, *erbab-ı timar*, *altı bölük halkı* as *askeri* and *ayan-ı vilayetden bazı zi kudret kimesneler* as the powerful notables.²⁷⁷ The line between the two became even more blurred over time, most likely the umbrella term *ayan* came to include those who once belonged to the former as they cease to function as service nobility and will *ayan-ize* as the time progress. In this early phase of *çiftlik* agriculture, both striving for labor by hiding non-Muslim peasants in their *çiftlik*s and prevent the smooth collection of the head-tax in 1620.²⁷⁸ This firman appear as the first of a series of such firmans; aims to prevent non-Muslim peasant's taking shelter in *çiftlik* units of *askeri* and local elites. It was recorded much earlier than the same discussed by McGowan for Manastır in 1634 but points to the similar trajectory of labor need in regions where *çiftlik* market was growing.²⁷⁹ Almost half a century later, almost the same firman arrived with the same context that clearly indicates the continuation of the resettlement of Serfiçe peasants to the villages, towns and *askeri çiftlik*s of Karaferye.²⁸⁰

The firman of 1620 orders that if ten years have passed since their relocation and they were registered in the extraordinary household of the new places, they could

²⁷⁷ KKS.g. D-10/52-(8 Safer 1029 / 14 January 1620) '...bazı zimmi taifesi müteferrika ve çavuş ve zuema ve erbab-ı timar ve altı bölük halkı vesair askeriden ve ayan-ı vilayetden bazı zi kudret kimesnelerin çiftliklerine ve ---- yanlarına varub kendülerin setr idüp cizyeleri talep olundukta mani' olurlar imiş...'

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ McGowan, 'Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600–1800', p. 149.

²⁸⁰ D-087159/1 (Evasit Zilkade 1079 / April 1669).

not be resettled in their old places. It would be fair to think of this process as parallel with the expansion of *çiftlik* market that became center of attraction for the peasants in relatively remote sub-districts and again the need of labor in the *çiftlik* units. Although the extend of these relocations would be detrimental to the bargaining power of peasants against the landed-elites, the constant need for labor in growing *çiftlik* market also provide leverage for peasants. As in the case of the *çiftlik* market, these relocations became much more pronounced and expanded by the eighteenth century in the Selanik hinterland.²⁸¹ In this period, the process gained pace with the establishment of large landed-estates.

The process is also observed at the smallest village scale and was evidenced three years before the issuance of the firman in 1620. It may have been the *çiftlik* owners referred in 1620 who went to court in 1617 to stop the villagers of Dolbano from leaving their villages.²⁸² The *çiftlik* owners Hatib Mahmud Çelebi and Alaybeyzâde Mehmed Bey brought Braşki, Dimitri and Şefekli before the kadi and asked that "these villagers want to leave the village after selling their houses and lands and we ask them; have they been offended by us". The villagers replied that 'our taxes are too much and there are only eight men left, so we do not have the capacity to pay the taxes and we have sold our [places and lands], otherwise we have no complaints against anyone'. The marginal note attached to the case reveals the same questioning of the subaşı appointed by timariots as to whether these officials were taking anything from these villagers, and the answer was again negative. It is also likely that these villagers originally lived in other villages but came to the *çiftlik*s of these complaints

²⁸¹ İrfan Kokdaş, *When the countryside is free: urban politics, local autonomy and the changing social structure in Ottoman Salonika, 1740-1820*, Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, Binghamton University, 2013, pp. 83-84.

²⁸² KKS.g. D-011/1/5 (Gurre Cemazielevvel 1026 / 16 May 1617).

to cultivate their lands. Apart from the fact that the iftlik owners needed constant labor as they themselves were not cultivating as city-dwellers, there were other villagers who continued to live in their places while others who found better alternatives could leave and settle in other villages or iftliks. With some reservations, under the light of these empirical data, it can also be suggested that peasant flight might not and necessarily have been solely the result of the immediate result of dispossession but as a result of negotiation to get leverage in exchange of their labor. The significance of these conflicts and confrontations lies in a process wherein one party either gains or loses influence at varying times and across different periods in alignment with their respective agendas. The central authority maintained its own records to monitor such developments and restore equilibrium if disrupted, often prioritizing tax revenue. As noted elsewhere, the balance of power tended to shift increasingly in favor of landholders as the century progressed, particularly culminating at the end of the eighteenth century. However, it is imperative to elucidate the timing and circumstances surrounding the peaks and troughs as comprehensively as possible.

Moreover, in contrast to the initial phase of land acquisition, in the eighteenth century the primary addressee of the local elite was the center. This was due to the fact that the units contained a significant portion of arable land in nearly every locality of the empire, resulting in the disruption of rural tax collection. The aftermath of the order yet to be discovered but the implication of the above-fatwas and their contents suggest that the peasants, in this case, most probably have willingly given up their usufruct in their lands through selling without coercion, if the peasants were the ones asked for a legal opinion. In the scenario based on the second firman, peasants by settling in iftliks would evade from paying head-tax but in exchange of their labor. Although it is difficult to determine the total gain to each party, or which party got the most out of

this exchange, the bargaining power of the peasantry appears to be still very much intact in this early phase of expansion.

What we see as the reflection of degeneration (a state of ‘becoming’ rather than a lament) of the *askeri* strata and the term itself-from defining active officials- on the part of miri land system was the emergence and formation of the civic or non-askeri originated capital owning class whose de facto property holding character was characterized with landed-estates but the connotation *askeri* does not refer to their active-duty characters. Therefore, the connotation *askeri* in the firmans issued in increasing frequency towards the end of the seventeenth century that urges the kadi and other örfi officials with the present danger of the peasant relocation into the ‘askeri çiftlik’ had its roots with such and other above analyzed inclinations of the timariots and janissaries or other officials all which accounts for *askeri* class.²⁸³ This group was not alone in this endeavor of course as one could see figures holding exchanging çiftlik with each other by bearing the titles *çelebis*, *efendis* etc or women of which points to the one as not taking place in *askeri* duties. The latter group as *ayan-ı vilayet*ten bazı zî kudret kimesneler would replace gradually both the duties of the ones once had been conducting proper-military services. The generic of the prologue in all the firmans issued throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries remained seemingly at first sight unchanged; *ayan-ı vilayet* came after military officials always, but de facto in all levels of hierarchy, this group has already begun to replace the effectiveness as well as the posts from the beginning of the seventeenth century onwards.

²⁸³ KKS.g. D-087/148/1 (Evail Ramazan 1077 / March 1667). It orders the relocation of the villagers of a zeamet in Selanik to their old places who fled to the hass villages and askeri çiftlik of Karaferiye if ten years had not passed and that they were registered to the extraordinary tax household of their new locations.

Indeed, the very small number of cases of peasant displacement or sale of their properties at first glance paints a picture of a desperate community. However, the peasantry was neither observant group nor devoid of instruments in forging alternative channels, range from legal to illegal means. Determining the comparative effectiveness of these factors specific to certain periods proves challenging though closer look at the sources would help to conduct sound analysis. The presence of indebtedness as a widespread natural financial practice in a monetizing economy, an axis cutting across all strata, played a significant role in this process. Additionally, in certain instances, like the peasants of Podrom hass village (Mihrimah Sultan waqf) who had borrowed perhaps the highest amount of debt 380.000 akçe managed to settle their debts entirely in 1672.²⁸⁴ However, they often turned to rejection with the expectation of partially resolving their debts and functioning of such relies on challenging debt claims through credible witnesses. While it is true, as this thesis highlights, that in some cases, local notables may have influenced these witnesses, it is equally valid to suggest that trustworthy Muslims, acting as witnesses for peasants, facilitated settlements (*sulh*) due to the latter's alleged inability to repay debts in full or counter to the creditor's claims, at least this was the case for the peasants of Menlik, Gırçal and İsfince in 1672.²⁸⁵ Disputes between creditors and debtors sometimes

²⁸⁴ KKS.g. D-028/162/1 (9 Zilhicce 1082 / 7 April 1672). Certain city-dweller and credit investor Hüseyin Bey son of Abdullah, who most probably was a convert given the 'Abdullah' nomination as his father, had lent huge sum of 380.00 akçe for the peasants of Podrom village that belong to the Mihrimah Sultan waqf. Although peasants reiterated that they had paid this amount in full partly as cash and partly in kind as sesame, wheat and millet, Hüseyin Bey rejected the claims of litigants. Upon the testimonies of trustworthy Muslims who claimed that 'the mentioned peasants had paid their debts in full as stated and Hüseyin Bey stated in our presence that 'I will give their debt receipts when they come to the city'. The court gave the verdict in favor of the peasants and ordered Hüseyin not to interfere with the same claim.

²⁸⁵ KKS.g. D-028/165/1-2 (28 Zilhicce 1082 / 26 April 1672) The same Hüseyin Bey had lent this time to the peasants of Menlik village another waqf village of Mihrimah Sultan 154.200 akçe. The peasants could pay 34.000 akçe of their total debt. As they were unable to pay the rest, Hüseyin Bey and peasants agreed on the payment of 75.000 akçe in total as *bedel-i sulh*. If Hüseyin Bey was right in his claims, then he would have renounced of his 45.200 akçe. D-028/168/1 (5 Muharrem 1083 / 3 May 1672) Again Hüseyin Bey had lent 75.500 akçe to the peasants of İsfince who repaid 10.500 akçe but they could not

favored the debtors. To resolve the debt, they claimed inability to pay, and then paid the *bedel-i sulh*, which was considerably less than the actual debt, immediately. In such cases, the lender had no option but to accept, or else the value of the money would diminish gradually, causing losses due to inflation, especially considering the typical long-term repayment of peasant debts. Equally relevant was the use of desertion as an effective political bargaining tool, posing a threat not only to the landed elites but also to the perceived authority of provincial officials, such as timariots and other town officials who had no other choice but accept to ease the tax burden to resettle peasants in their places.²⁸⁶ Furthermore, the policy of writing off the interest on peasants' debts and extending their repayment duration over a prolonged period adhered to the principle of *evlâ ve enfâ*.²⁸⁷ When the timariot of Kıfaliçe village, Çeribaşı Mustafa Bey went to the court to settle the disagreement between the villagers who left their villages due to their debt burden, the verdict was to reconciliation attempt in accordance with the above-mentioned principle in 1682.²⁸⁸ The villagers and timariot Mustafa demanded *hüccet* that exempts the villagers from all the taxes except their *cizye* obligation which would be paid as one *cizye* household in three years installments. The *hüccet* was granted with the agreement of local notables and peasants (*ittifak-ı ayan-ı vilayet ve reaya*) on the grounds that such action would be beneficial to both the peasants and related parties (...*karye-i mezbure ahalisi cem' olunup kadimi karyelerine iskan ittirilmek reaya fukarasına vesair ashâb-ı hukuka enfâ' olmağla*...).

do so for the rest. Hüseyin agreed on 39.000 akçe as *bedel-i sulh* by renouncing 26.500 akçe of his debt receivable.

²⁸⁶ KKS.g. D-031/1/1 (27 Safer 1092 / 18 March 1681)-The peasants of Kıfaliçe village deserted their villages because of a heavy tax burden. They imposed a condition over their sipahis that they would return only if they paid a *jizya* and only an extraordinary levy for three years. Their request was accepted.

²⁸⁷ Özer Ergenç, "Osmanlı'da 'Enfâ'" Kuralının Devlet ve Re'âyâ Arasındaki Mâlî İlişkiler Açısından Anlamı" in idem, *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları: Şehir, Toplum, Devlet* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012). pp. 429-437.

²⁸⁸ KKS.g. D-031/1/1 (27 Safer 1093 / 7 March 1682).

This principle aimed to implement the most favorable and profitable approach for the benefit of both the Muslim community and the treasury in resolving any dispute amongst communities and the center, especially in tax collection processes.²⁸⁹ It intended to legitimize the solution found, even if it does not fully comply with the rules in force. If the problem cannot be solved within the framework of the existing rules, the solution is considered to be functionally useful. It has been regarded as a means of compromise in financial operations, but at the same time there is always a danger that it may replace the rules.

Often, the peasantry had a tendency for settling in *çiftlik*s owned by local elites and notables from the early decades of the seventeenth century. While this provided labor for the elites, it would also likely provide better living and working conditions for the peasantry, a trend that was detrimental to the empire and was deemed illegal because it resulted in the loss of head-tax and extraordinary taxes.

Nevertheless, as the next chapter discuss, among these villages, the peasants of Gırçal would sell almost all their arable and grazable land to the local elite at the turn of the eighteenth century, because of their insurmountable accrued debts. Similarly, the villagers of Podrom sold their lands in the second half of the eighteenth century. This development would extend to many others alike, suggesting that the sales were the result of accumulated debt burden, if not only arise from getting away with extraordinary taxes that tied to the holding property. Hence, what these two exemplary cases clearly demonstrate is the impact of the deteriorating financial situation of the peasantry in the beginning of the eighteenth century when large tracks of arable lands

²⁸⁹ Op. cit. p. 438.

dragged into the çiftliks, if not solely due to the facilitations of local elite and notable çiftliks.

3.6.1.1. Musachis As Landed-Elites (1600s-1650s)

Musachi women formed marriage ties with other influential local elites not only in the late 1600s but also earlier. Similarly, some Musachi men held significant positions like muftis or kadıs in the town's economic and political life in the early seventeenth century or possibly earlier. This early involvement in such roles likely paved the way for their descendants to occupy similar positions in the eighteenth century. This continuity is noteworthy. Although documents become more detailed about the economic activities of these individuals in the latter half of the century, they offer a valuable glimpse into their standing in the community's hierarchy.

Apart from the *askeri*, and other local elite figures, women members of the community also took an active part in the land investments in the form of çiftlik units. However, these individuals must not have been peasants whose profession scarcely allow such capital accumulation but the members of a privileged group among others. Among them, Musachi's member Rabia Hatun daughter of Ayşe (Table-1) seemed an active investor in the *çiftlik* market. She appears to have been holding the trusteeship of Tuzcu Sinan until conflict arisen by *mürtezika* (salaried waqf personnel) who demanded preacher Mahmud Çelebi in the waqf administration in 1613.²⁹⁰ While the main assertion is mismanagement of the waqf, it is understood that Rabia had the trusteeship at intervals as trustee until deputizing him in her stead.²⁹¹ During this

²⁹⁰ KKS.g. D-04/18/4-5 (Evail Safer 1022 / April 1613). The kadi most likely misplaced this case when he copied it to the original defter. Normally it should have been registered before the case of Mahmud's appointment. There is also an inconsistency in the dating of cases on the same page, for example, a case with a later date was registered after the recent one.

²⁹¹ KKS.g. D-04/16/5 (Evasit Safer 1022 / April 1613). Although the name of his father in the available cases was recorded unchanged as Ahmed Çavuş, in this document, Mahmud's title was *bey* but in all

period, alongside with the villages, Tuzcu Sinan Bey and Mehmed Bey waqfs appear to have been generating income with their rooms and mills.²⁹² For the former, the rooms were added into the portfolio of the waqf, which seemed to be purchased later on and endowed, were rented.²⁹³ Taken together with the income of the villages, it is not unreasonable to claim that the income of the foundation benefited Rabia's land investments that unveils with a debt contract as a result of her purchase of a çiftlik in the timar village of Alabori from the member of *silahdaran* Mehmed Bey after three months of her trusteeship appointment.²⁹⁴ This is a pure investment in a commodity and does not arise from a vis major such as settling debts owed by oneself or one's family members, or a transaction such as a wife of a deceased timariot taking over her husband's assets. Although the land size attached was not mentioned, judging by the considerable number of the components and the price of the çiftlik, it must not have been below five-hundred *dönüm*. More importantly, Rabia was not able to pay off at once the price of 50.000 akçe. Instead, there remained 16.300 akçe deficit of which was contracted with a term of two months and this contract was also recorded as *mukavele*. The guarantor of this debt was Mahmud Bey bin Ahmed Çavuş, who was her proxy in this case and whom she had appointed as the deputy trustee of Tuzcu Sinan Bey's foundation before.

The villages belonging to the sultan's and vizier's *hass* or imperial foundations in the region actually had more arable land than timar and zemaet villages. The çiftliks

the documents refer him as the deputy trusty of Tuzcu Sinan Bey waqf his title appears as *çelebi* or *çavuş*.

²⁹² KKS.g. D-04/28/5 (28 Rebiülevvel 1022 / 18 May 1613). Ten waqf mills of the Mehmed Bey rented for a year with 3100 akçe to a certain Panayot.

²⁹³ KKS.g. D-04/21/1 (Evail Rebiülevvel 1022 / May 1613). Among the waqf properties, Tuzcu Sinan Bey waqf had not had any room registered in all the survey registers. These rooms must have been endowed by the trustee later. The deputy trustee Mahmud rented the shops to a certain Hırsomane for thirty years, with an *icare-i mu'accele* (down payment) of 600 akçe, followed by *icare-i müe'cceler* of 56 akçe every three months and a renewal of the contract every three years (to redetermine the rent).

²⁹⁴ KKS.g. D-04-61/6-62/1 (22 Cemazielevvel 1022 / 10 July 1613).

established in these high-revenue yielding villages - probably also due to the fertility of the land - were much larger in terms of land size than the others. This is a trend one would observe in the following century. The rationale for the assignment of villages with high incomes to the Sultan and his entourage reflected also in terms of landed-estate formation process. The officer in charge of revenue collection and administration of these villages was the *voyvoda* in the provincial level, a position appointed by the absentee holder. This could be a vizier on a campaign or in remote provinces or a high bureaucrat residing in the capital. At the kaza level, this post has the potential to enhance economic and political standing.

In 1617, the *voyvoda* of Davud Paşa hass in Karaferye was the notable Mustafa Ağa. It is noteworthy that he seemed to be married *fahrü'l muhadderat* Fatıma Hatun, daughter of Rabia Hatun and Mustafa Efendi, who were descendants of the Musachi lineage.²⁹⁵ In the court procedure, her brother was present as her proxy, another ulema member of the community, *müderriş* Ahmed Efendi. Of particular interest is their investment in the çiftlik market, a venture that indicates their socio-economic influence. After passing of certain Selaniki Hasan Beşe without heir, his çiftlik with 2000 *dönüm* of land and grassland located in the Davud Paşa hass village of Mavrangel, the Musatafa Ağa son of Mehmed Ağa registered the title-deed of this unit to his wife (*mezbure râgibe olduđu eclden*) in exchange of 30.000 akçe. However, neither the building appendices of the çiftlik nor their price was mentioned. Moreover,

²⁹⁵ KKS.g. D-011/21/1-(Evahir Recep 1026 / August 1617). The Mustafa Efendi in lineage column of *b* and Rabi Hatun *c* appear to be married as the name of this specific Ahmed Efendi was cited as follows; *fahrü'l müderrişin Ahmed Efendi ibn-i el-müvella-yı mezbur*. In this document, there is only one among others could account for the aforesaid *müvella* with the title of *efendi*, Müslî/Mustafa Efendi. The titles of the women, most of the privileged ones were cited with *fahrü'l muhadderat* (the representative of purity and honesty) especially in waqf deeds but also in others indicating the social standing of a person. This defter was misdated and catalogued as 1620-1621 on the website. It must be a part of a defter (must be D-06) dated between 1617-18, given the first and the last cases' dates. This inference was based on the recording of her father's name.

in the same month, Fatıma acquired a rural house (menzil) in the same village with having his brother as proxy in the case from his husband but again the land attached to the facility was not mentioned, if not it did include any – though a rare occurring.²⁹⁶

After almost three years, they went to the court for most probably the same çiftlik but this time the parties in the exchange switched, while the price, and the court attendees remained the same.²⁹⁷ Only difference was the size of land and grassland attached to the unit as 3000 dönüm and there was not any separate price for the buildings recorded even though they were separately sorted, unlike many çiftlik sale cases. It is probable that as being influential members of the community, and inter-family sale and purchase, they were able to go beyond of common procedures.

The Musachi's another almost century old relative family was Mevalizâdes whose earliest member in Karaferye was Mehmed Efendi, and the members of the family appear to be educated in Islamic law given their frequently cited titles as kadı. Moreover, as the patrimony suggests he was the son of mevali kadı whose sons were more privileged to gain ulema posts than others. Since 1610s, the family members especially with his wife Fatıma began to take active roles in renting their assets and extending credits to the peasants.²⁹⁸ The first identified intra-elite marriage realized

²⁹⁶ KKS.g. D-011/20/4- (Evahir Receb 1026 / August 1617).

²⁹⁷ KKS.g. D-07/103/4 (12 Zilhicce 1029 / 8 November 1620). The discrepancy regarding the brother and her father's name resolves with this case as her husband was referred to as Mustafa Ağa but her father's name this time recorded as Mustafa Efendi and her brother's (karındaş) name was referred to as Ahmed Çelebi who was again her proxy, clearly.

²⁹⁸ KKS.g. D-05/1/1 (Evahir Şevval 1025 / November 1616). *Eşrefü'l kudat* Mevalizâde Mehmed rented his mill located nearby İnepınarı to Yorgi from Ayo Dimitri quarter for 1000 akçe a year. D-05/9/5 (Evail Rebiülevvel 1026 / March 1617) His wife, a certain Fatıma reclaimed her debt given to 1050 akçe from Niko. D-012-19/5 (Evail Ramazan 1036 / May 1637) His wife while holding the trustee of Ayşe Hatun waqf, lend 5000 akçe with %20 interest to the residents of Podrom monastery in return, they pawn their private-property mills located in Menlik subdistrict. D-012/121/5 (Evahir Rebiülevvel 1037 / December 1627) Again Mevalizâde, most probably Mehmed Efendi lend 2000 akçe to Semerci Dimo Yano with %10 interest. D-012/154/1(Evail Receb 1037 / March 1628) The peasants of Arkodohor left their villages because of the heavy debt burden and tax obligations such as head-tax and extraordinary taxes. Above all, *eşrefü'l kudat* Mevalizâde [Mehmed] Efendi cited before other local elites, Alaybeyzâde Mehmed Bey, Kopanalı Mahmud Bey(as the century progress, his descendants will

between son of Mevalizâde Mehmed, *müftü* Mustafa Efendi who seemed to pass away in 1681 leaving due of 400 gurus̄ to his heirs when he lends to the villagers of Kastaniye, with the grandmother of Rukiye Kadın (Table-1).²⁹⁹

Another member of the family perhaps more influential political, economic and cultural position than the others was Ebubekir Efendi son of İbrahim Efendi whose affiliation and earlier career remains in dark due to the availability of documents, but his son and then the mufti of Karaferye, who became visible in the second half of the century. In all their addresses and praise of him, the official documents have never been stingier in praising him than they have been to other elites. With no surprise, he was another descendant of Musachi family, brother of Abide and Asiye Hatun.³⁰⁰ The latter was also the mother of two another influential kadıs of the town, Salih Efendi and Mustafa Efendi, sons of Ahmed Efendi (Table 1).³⁰¹ When the local elites and

be cited as Kopanalizâde) and others as his proxies came to the court with the peasants to annul the interest from their debts and agreed on repayment in three-years and villagers gave their approval.

²⁹⁹ KKS.g. D-031/40/2-(28 Şevval 1092 / 10 November 1681). Her proxy in this case was her husband kadı Mahmud Efendi, who, as scrutinized in the previous part, will assist Rukiye in getting into quarrel with the other Musachi lineages between 1695-1734. Given the personalities that there was again only Rukiye Hatun whose husband was kadı Mahmud Efendi was the Musachi Rukiye. This document recorded Rukiye Kadın as the daughter of her grandmother Fatıma whose husband was Mevalizâde Mustafa Efendi, most probably due to the Abide's death before 1672 since in that year her brother, who was recorded as the esteemed müfti of the Karaferye in the seventeenth century, Ebubekir Efendi rented her two-eyed watermills for five years after his sister Abide died with a 5000 akçe installments in a year located close by leather shops in the Debbaghane site to Kel Milaki and Hiroso D-028/180/5 (4 Cemazielahir 1083 / 27 September 1672). If that line of thought is pertinent, then Rukiye's grandmother married second time unless the Mustafa Ağa who was the husband of Fatıma came to be known also as Mevalizâde Mustafa Efendi. The second scenario seemed not the case as Mevalizâde Mehmed Efendi seemed to live in the same generation with the husband of Fatıma. The last possibility was the often-encountered inclination of giving the predecessor's name to their grandchildren. Thus, there might be another Fatıma in the lineage whose husband was Mevalizâde Mustafa Efendi.

³⁰⁰ KKS.g. D-028/180/5 (4 Cemazielahir 1083 / 27 September 1672). For instance, in the seventeenth century court records, there was only one Ebubekir Efendi who had been holding Mehmed Bey waqf's trusteeship (the proof of his lineage affiliation) and had a sister named Abide Hatun was the esteemed mufti of Karaferye, Ebubekir Efendi but his name was not recorded in any of these available descents (Table 1). Moreover, there must have been intra-family marriages for instance amongst cousins themselves but again it is not always possible to determine who married to whom as most of their husbands and wives' names were not recorded. For instance, based on the claim of Rukiye daughter of Abide, on her cousins' and uncles' trusteeship, her cousin was Salih Efendi and Mustafa Efendi and their uncles were Ebubekir Efendi.

³⁰¹ KKS.g. D-087/83/3 (24 Şevval 1079 / 27 March 1669) This manumission document was produced after Asiye Hatun passed away by her older sons, Mustafa Efendi and Salih Efendi. They were both

notables, whose titles composed *celebi*, *efendi* and *beşe* of the town came to the court to rent summer pasture close by to the town-center, they contracted it with 15.000 akçe in the presence of *umdete'l ulemai'l azam* mufti Ebubekir Efendi.³⁰² In town affairs, his effectiveness extended beyond legal spheres but also to the performing of apportionment of *nüzül* taxes. When the *şühûdü'l-hâl* was examined, what comes forward was the presence of four individuals, but three of them was Musachis, Ebubekir Efendi and his two nephews, Salih Efendi and Mustafa Efendi.³⁰³

The economic incentives were quite observable when his obligations for paying the price of raising thirty-two pack animals were recorded in 1669. In the type of his disposition over considerable number of villages as some of them were through trusteeship (*taht-ı tevliyetinde olan*) and among them his predecessors' two village as Makrıgoz and Çernova of the Mehmed Bey waqf. He seemed to get the trusteeship of the waqf of Yakub Bey son of Aştin, most probably because of the heirs died out or his sheer ability to certify, to which Reşani and Kavasle villages belong. Another village was Dıhalori that was also belong to a waqf. The number of the villages in the second category that was coined as the ones under his control (*uhdelerinde olan*) were quite high of whose numbers were seven.³⁰⁴ His investments continued in another town of Selanik, Yenice-i Vardar from the village of Büyük Fornos where he purchased a

recorded as *fahri'l kudat*. In this period, there was not another mother who had two sons whose profession was kadi. With this chain of proofs, it is clear that Ebubekir Efendi was the uncle of these two that had been stated also by Rukiye (Table 1) and this could only be possible that this Asiye Hatun was the sister of Ebubekir Efendi. Her absence amongst the lineage list is another proof of their sons' trusteeship for the waqfs because of her death. For the trusteeship of Mustafa Efendi in Tuzcu Sinan Bey waqf, KKS.g. D-087/117/2- (26 Zihicce 1079 / 27 May 1669). Hence, the second time marriage of Fatıma Hatun seems possible given the fact that her daughter Abide was the sister of Ebubekir Efendi son of İbrahim Efendi, who might have been the first husband of Fatıma Hatun.

³⁰² KKS.g. D-028/169/1 (25 Muharrem 1083 / 23 May 1672).

³⁰³ KKS.g. D-87/87/1 (21 Şevval 1079 / 24 March 1669). Their names were recorded as follows; '*umdete'l ulemai'l eazım ve efza-u fuzalati'l izam Ebubekir Efendi hazretleri, mefahirü'l kudati'l kiram Allame Efendi hazretleri, fahri'l kudat Mustafa Efendi ibn-i Ahmed Efendi, umdete'l kudat Salih Efendi ibn-i Ahmed Efendi*'.

³⁰⁴ KKS.g. D-087/96/1 (3 Zilkade 1079 / 4 April 1669). The villages under his control were Altunlar, Loziçe-i Bala, Kutleş, Barış, İkserlivad, Komaniç and Arkodohor.

çiftlik with 400 dönüm of attached land for 15.000 akçe.³⁰⁵ Before he went beyond the reach of the sources, his last investment was to a house located in the Cami-i Cedid quarter of Karaferye for 60.000 akçe from the heirs of a deceased.³⁰⁶ The absence of Ebubekir Efendi in the lineage was due to the fact that he most likely died without leaving any children, as his nephews continued to hold the trusteeship. Because when his wife Afife Hatun daughter of a certain Mustafa Ağa died in 1668, there were no heirs, as her sons and daughters were not recorded, but only her husband Ebubekir Efendi and her sister, a certain Atike.³⁰⁷ What have been inherited by the successors of these local elite figures will be the same with what they inherited from their predecessors though it is impossible to quantify the properties but easy to qualify social, cultural and political capitals.

3.7. The Çiftlik Portfolio of New Elite Consortium

During the long-lasting episodic wars fought between Holy League and Ottoman Empire between 1683 and ended with the defeat of the latter and sealed with the signing of Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, the empire could regroup four times.³⁰⁸ In addition to these factors, for about twenty years if one considers the first preparations before the campaign, each of which necessitates immense logistics and mobilization of resources from various regions. The demand of the army resonated also in the seventeenth century court records of Karaferye as well as in other towns of Selanik, the orders demanding wheat, livestock, saltpeter, and pack animals were in abundance

³⁰⁵ KKS.g. D-087/134/1 (4 Rebiülevvel 1080 / 2 August 1669).

³⁰⁶ KKS.g. D-028/204/1 (3 Muharrem 1084 / 20 April 1673).

³⁰⁷ KKS.g. D-087/67/2 (22 Rebiülahir 1079 / 29 September 1668).

³⁰⁸ Virginia Aksan. *Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged*. (New York: Routledge, 2013). p. 18

since the district accommodate high revenue yielding soil(hass)³⁰⁹, the town and its locality were designated as *ocaklık* to meet the demands of the Empire.³¹⁰ The demand of the empire during the wars must have imposed extra tax load onto the subjects in kind and in cash. The long-lasting Cretan before the second siege of Vienna Hapsburg wars, which were perhaps the most influential triggers of the developments that would mark the financial situation of the Empire at the end of the seventeenth century, had an economic impact in Karaferye and elsewhere in the Balkans, and materialized in the form of increased demand for supplying staples for army, too. Immediately after waging the war, extraordinary tax orders arrived at the court, unexpected but a must tax means extra burden for every five hane must give 5 guruş.³¹¹

During peace times, on the other hand, the capital and the garrisons located at the borders were always in need of a constant flow of goods. When it comes to meet the demands and to find profitable property to invest in an early modern economy, the able and wealthy subjects of the empire left without much choice but to tend towards forming facilities where they could organize production more systematically. Similarly, these must have been propelling factors behind the proliferation of the çiftlik units as the core of agricultural production in the sixteenth century as well or even before. Even if the external demand is negligible compared to the eighteenth century except scarcely given official permissions to the states, the domestic demand must have been another factor in çiftlik formation early in the seventeenth century.³¹²

³⁰⁹ Anastasopoulos and Gara, "The Rural Hinterland of Karaferye: Settlements, Divisions, and the Çiftlik Phenomenon (Seventeenth-Eighteenth Centuries), pp. 262-263.

³¹⁰ The *ocaklık* here is not used as an administrative division rather a region where was specifically designated to supply certain staple goods because of its peculiar capacity.

³¹¹ KKS.g. D-018/157/2 (1 Şevval 1055 / 20 November 1645). There is ample evidence of such domestic demands in wartime.

³¹² BOA, TSMA.e. 759/36 (undated). The document shows the occasional permissions given by the judges of Salonica and Karaferye for a Venetian merchant to get wheat for his six vessels destined to Frengistan (western states) and the style of the calligraphy was most probably belonged to the last decades of the sixteenth century.

Furthermore, the struggle of legal heirs for controlling the waqf assets had coincided with the last years of exhausting campaign suggest their aim towards eliminating the negative effects of potential capital loss with the revenue of the waqfs exacerbated by the imperial demands of staple goods during the campaign by engaging in struggle to hold the trusteeship to make use of the waqf assets. As they were the holders of at least half of the arable lands, they became the principal addressee of the domestic demand. Therefore, it would be fair to assert that capital holders sought extra gains through establishing *çiftlik*s which is in other words, looking for new sources of extra income to compensate their expenditures. And to what extent did these units contribute to the economic situation of their owners? In other words, have they been successful investors? The fact that some of the region's elite families are having problems paying their tax obligations is the biggest proof that they have not experienced a complete financial revolution. We will address this issue in the upcoming sections.

These demands also seemed to put pressure on the landowners, which was then transferred to the peasants, trapping them in cycles of debt and facilitating the establishment of *çiftlik*s in the eighteenth century. There is no specific documentation of peasants selling their land and immediately being transformed into a *çiftlik* by an investor capital holder in the seventeenth century. However, it can be assumed that this, even if marginal, may have been one of the effective ways of establishing *çiftlik*s in the seventeenth century, as the indebted peasantry could be observed in the rural hinterland of Karaferye especially in the second half of the seventeenth century. Again, the scale of the eighteenth century, as represented by the size of the arable land in the *çiftlik*s established due to indebtedness, far exceeded that of the seventeenth century, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

Keeping in mind the pitfalls in using survey registers as population censuses, a general observation might be drawn upon the previously calculated numbers based on a simple multiplier. When the population in Makrigoz considered, from 1499 to 1568, it decreased by 4.86%. The rate was 33% for Aya Marin and Kıravate villages. Ideally, one would have expected a substantial decrease in the population since the number of çiftliks increased in the villages and thus the units must have expanded to the detriment of raiyyet çiftliks. As a result, we must have seen a decrease in the *hane* of non-Muslims as they began to be registered in the çiftlik units. It is likely that these units must have emerged first by the reclamation of the vacant arable lands of a given village since not only the arable lands of the çiftlik were too small, but also the numbers of the units were much less compared to the end of the seventeenth century throughout Karaferiye.

One can observe that the same situation was the case in waqf villages. As proof thereof, while twenty-one out of twenty-nine çiftlik units of Makrigoz village was çift, all the five çiftliks of Aya Marine and all the three of Kıravate were registered as çift in 1568. It implies that the arable land part of the units had not expanded yet to the detriment of villagers' lands. However, the labor force was most probably met by sharecropping through haymanes(hired farm laborers) in the sixteenth century since the village households/raiyyet had also their own plot of land demanding constant labor force at the same time of the year. When extra labor required, haymanes as regional mobile group might have been used as an extra hand to be employed in the Salonican hinterland as early as the second half of the sixteenth century.³¹³ By 1691,

³¹³ BOA, TT.d. (ca. 976/1568) 723 fol. 846. In the temlikname (letter of conveyance) of Vizier Mustafa Paşa, certain villages together with their taxes were granted to Mustafa Paşa. In the letter, together with reaya(villagers), the *haymane* (mobile workers) was also mentioned as the subject of the grant in the villages.

however, when the çiftliks came to dominate most of the available arable lands in the town, -most probably the arable plot of lands under the control of villagers-, haymane reaya began to be registered in the çiftlik units where the avarızhane liability alone constitutes 51,6% of the total avarızhane of Karaferye.³¹⁴ The rate not only confirms the expansion of the arable lands and concentration of the population in the çiftlik units but also points out as how the wealth in the form of çiftlik units centered on the portfolios of local elites.

According to the detailed avarız register (mufassal avarız) of 1691, 56% of the total number of residential villages -48 out of 85- include çiftlik and menzil units throughout Karaferye(See also Table 5).³¹⁵ One can observe that çiftliks were characterized by their small land sizes compared to eighteenth and slightly larger than the sixteenth century. The defter, which recorded the real land sizes of the menzils and çiftliks, the largest çiftliks in Karaferye extended over 1,500 dönüm of land in 1691, while the average land size of the 232 çiftliks was 191 dönüm. Every village of the town recorded with a marginal note, which points out topographic feature of all the villages. Thus, both çiftlik and menzil units predominantly concentrated in the villages

³¹⁴ BOA, KK.d. icmal summary register of Karaferye (1102 / 1691) 2738 fol. 4-5. In the “manuel” of the defter, the total number of extraordinary household (avarızhane) of the town center and rural hinterland was registered as 1025,75. There were three categories of the tax unit used in determining the extraordinary-household(avarızhane) tax rate for non-Muslim residents of the rural hinterland of Karaferye. The first is based on the number of households who resides in çiftlik units; every five nefer of haymane reaya makes one extraordinary-household and the total number was 106,5 avarızhane. The second category is based on the size of the arable lands in çiftlik and menzil units as “one extraordinary-household for every 120 dönüm of land” and makes the total number 422,50. The third is based on the landform of the villages; every five zimmi reaya(non-Muslim villagers) nefer who resides in *sengistan* (rocky) villages including *derbentçiyan* (who tasked with the control of mountain passes) makes two extraordinary-household and makes 279,3 in total. However, there were recorded also the number of çift in each çiftlik unit but the size or number of each çift remains obscure.

³¹⁵ BOA, MAD.d. (mufassal 10 Ramazan 1102 / 7 June 1691) 8485. The survey completed after eight days on 15 June 1691 during the reign of Suleiman II. The total number of villages was 116. While 85 villages were residential at the time of the survey, 31 villages were registered as deserted, or uncultivated (hâli) because of plague and excessive taxation (*tekalif-i şakka*).

where plain landform accommodates large arable lands.³¹⁶ The total size of arable lands of the *çiftlik* and *menzil* units of the 48 villages were 50939 dönüm (4682.82 hectares).³¹⁷ While 85.13% (43.452 dönüm) of the arable lands located in *çiftlik* units, that of 14.85% (7485 dönüm) was in the *menzils*, which were under the control of non-Muslim subjects throughout the rural hinterland.³¹⁸ In other words, most of the available arable lands came under the control of *çiftlik* units of whose use-right predominantly in the hands of the Muslim local elites. But the most distinguished one among other elites was the family members of Todor Musachi and Lanbazâdes since arable land size of the *çiftlik* units under the control of the two waqfs alone corresponds to 16.2% of the arable lands in the whole region with 8250 dönüm (758.42 hectares) by 1691.³¹⁹

What is striking is that the *çiftlik* portfolios of Lanbazâdes and the identified family members of Todor Musachi family was not limited only to the revenues of the four waqf villages. As the absence of the *çiftlik*s accommodating large tracts of arable

³¹⁶ Based on the notes, the landform of the Karaferye villages can be categorized in four; a-sengistan ve dağlık (rocky and mountainous), b-ziyade sengistan ve dağlık (too rocky and mountainous), c-hassa tarla ve menzil (suitable arable lands), d-ziyade hassa tarla ve menzil (very suitable arable lands).

³¹⁷ BOA, KK.d. (icmal 1102 / 1691) 2738 fol.4. In the detailed register, each unit was registered alongside with the total dönüm of arable lands (münbit olan tarlalar) they possessed. One dönüm equals to 919.3 square meter.

³¹⁸ BOA, MAD.d. (mufasssal 10 Ramazan 1102 / 7 June 1691) 8485. Menzil was a complex where a house, plot of arable land (tarla) and means of cultivation located and predominantly owned by non-Muslim residents. Inferred from the register, while bağ(orchard) includes very small plot of land and located in high hills or outskirts of the hills, menzil contain fair size of arable lands, which implies the landform relatively plain. The rate is another signifier of the continuation in the demographic and economic features of the region from the previous centuries since most of the time non-Muslims buy and sell bağ(orchards) and menzils and the Muslim subjects buy and sell *çiftlik* units in the estate sale cases of the seventeenth century Karaferye. While bağ(orchards) were located mostly at high altitudes, or in the outskirts of hills, *çiftlik*s located at the plains. Even if there are other parameters at play, the settlement pattern was also affective in shaping the estate portfolios of the communities later. For another study attests this settlement pattern to early-demographic growth see Anastasopoulos and Gara, 'The Rural Hinterland of Karaferye: Settlements, Divisions, and the *Çiftlik* Phenomenon (Seventeenth-Eighteenth Centuries).' p. 270.

³¹⁹ Ibid., For Kıravate fol. 19-20, for Ayamarin fol. 23 for Makrıgoz fol. 24, for Çernova fol.31.

lands in the present villages of Karaferiye at this stage was the case, as a result, they invested in the available ones located in other villages.

Except Kudret Hatun, members of Sarıcazâde family and Atike Hatun, every individual mentioned in the cases of conflicts for the trusteeship of the waqfs were holding çiftlik units either in the waqf villages or in the other villages of the town. A certain family members had six çiftlik units in the waqf villages and the total arable land size was 1740 dönüm.³²⁰ On the other hand, the total size of the arable land in the çiftlik units under the control of the family members located in other villages is 2680 dönüm (246.37 hectares).³²¹ If the ones in the waqf villages they were directly controlling excluded since they were already controlling the revenues of 8250 dönüm of land located in the waqf villages through trusteeship, the total arable land size under their control together with the ones located in the other villages amount to 21,45% of the total arable land size of the whole rural hinterland. Having the control of the revenues of considerable number of çiftlik units, as well as the continuation of political effectiveness in holding ulema offices, these relative local elites formed one of the most powerful interest groups in the town.

Although it would be too assertive to generalize the patterns analyzed with respect to waqf villages also for the other villages of sixteenth century Karaferiye, the continuity in landholding patterns especially in waqf villages is striking. Since the four

³²⁰ Ibid, fol. 19-20 Kıravate: Salih Efendi el-Kadı (father of Kudret Hatun) 60 dönüm, fol. 23 Ayamarin: Mahmud Efendi el-Kadı (husband of Rukiye Hatun) 300 dönüm, Salih Efendi el-Kadı: 280 dönüm, Lanbuzâde Mehmed Efendi (husband of Kudret Hatun) 350 dönüm, fol.24 Hasbuga nam-ı diğer Makrıgoz: Salih Efendi el-Kadı 500 dönüm, Mahmud Efendi el-Kadı 250 dönüm.

³²¹ Ibid, fol. 14-15 in Mevzi-i (site) of Karaçalı: Mahmud Efendi el-Kadı 250 dönüm, Lanbazâde Ali Çelebi (brother of Lanbazâde Mehmed Efendi) 250 dönüm, Ahmed Efendi el-Kadı(trustee of Tuzcu Sinan Bey waqf)-ma biraderan Hızır Beşe ve Ali Çelebi 170 dönüm, fol. 19 Heropan: Müftü Ömer Efendi(associate of Rukiye Hatun) 700 dönüm, fol. 21 Yançiste: Salih Efendi el-Kadı 250 dönüm, Lanbazâde Ali Çelebi 250 dönüm, Rukiye Hatun 160 dönüm, Kodunyani: Salih Efendi el-Kadı 150 dönüm, fol. 22-23 Servihor: Mahmud Efendi el-Kadı 300 dönüm, fol. 32 Alabori: Mahmud Efendi el-Kadı 200 dönüm.

waqf villages provided additional income and contained a substantial portion of arable lands in the form of çiftlik in 1691. Moreover, the timar village of Yançiste, which has been analyzed with the waqf villages in the previous part fits well into that pattern. In 1568, Makrıgoz village had the highest number of çiftlik units with twenty-nine. Again in 1691, not only it has the highest number of çiftlik units with twenty, but also the arable lands in these twenty çiftlik units had the biggest arable land size with 5150 dönüm (473.43 hectares) in the whole rural area of Karaferiye in 1691.³²² As for the villages of Tuzcu Sinan Bey waqf, while Aya Marine had five units in 1568, Kıravate include three units. In 1691, the number of the units increased to seven and eight respectively. While the former has 1910 dönüm (175.5 hectares), the latter has 1145 dönüm (105.25 hectares) of arable land in 1691. Amongst the four villages of the two waqfs, only the village of Çernova did not have any çiftlik units in 1691 as it was the case in the sixteenth century. Unlike Makrıgoz, Aya Marin and Kıravate where large arable lands lie, Çernova village was in rocky and mountainous topography, which was only suitable for accommodating small plot of bağ (orchard).³²³ Moreover, the other village Yançiste analyzed together with the waqf villages fits again well into the pattern. In 1568, it had eleven çiftlik units. By 1691, the number of çiftlik units decreased to eight but they contain 1581 dönüm (145.33 hectares) of arable land.³²⁴

This continuity allows us to draw a line of land tenure pattern across centuries.

The çiftlik units which can be observed as proliferating even if they cover too small

³²² BOA, KK.d. (icmal 1102 / 1691) 2738 fol.5.

³²³ BOA, MAD.d. (mufassal 10 Ramazan 1102 / 7 June 1691) 8485, fol. 31. The marginal note states the landform of the Çernova as follows “karye-i mezburun arazisi dağ ve sengistan olub hassa ve menzil yerleri olmayub içinde bağları ile kayd ve tahrir olundu”. The rocky landform must have been the reason why another mezraa was spared for the use of the Çernova villagers in the sixteenth century, see TT.d. 424 (936/1530) fol. 391, The villagers of Çernova were cultivating mezraa-i (arable plot of land located further away from a certain village) Kalomisito located close-by the Lutros village, included in the zeamet of Katib İshak Bey with 200 akçe hasıl (the total revenue). The hasıl in this context most probably implies the tax extracted from the village due to cultivation of the mezraa.

³²⁴ Ibid, fol.21.

arable lands and still remain in the level of the sizes of *çifthane* when one analyzes the survey registers in chronological order from 1499 to 1568, the rocky Çernova village did not include any unit neither in the mentioned period nor in 1691. As analyzed, this pattern was observed in other analyzed villages and for others as well.

Compared to 1568, the composition of the *çiftlik* holders became more diverse by 1691. The general picture of landholding becomes much clear when the *çiftlik* holders are sorted by their titles in the order was as follows; *çelebi*, *ağa*, *beşe*, *efendi*, women, without title, *zimmi*(non-Muslim), *erbab-ı timar and sipahi (timariot)*, *hace-müezzin-imam and seyyid* respectively.³²⁵ When the size of the all arable land of Karaferiye under the control of individuals sorted by their titles, the order is as follows; *çelebi*: 8756 dönüm (17.2%), *ağa*: 8150 dönüm (16%), *beşe*: 7235 dönüm (14.16%), *efendi*: 6050 dönüm (11.8%), women: 3831 dönüm (7.5%), without title: 2720 dönüm (5.33%), *zimmi*: 2660 dönüm (5.22%), *erbab-ı timar and sipahi*: 1560 dönüm (3.06%), *bey*: 1050 dönüm (2.06%), *hace-müezzin-imam*: 940 dönüm (1.8%), *seyyid*: 500 dönüm (1%).

As it is seen, now the holders composed mainly of the local gentry of the town and they were non-askeri by profession since the phrase *merd-i timar*, which implies the holder of a given *çiftlik* somewhat related to a timariot, or its derivative was not used for the *çiftlik* holders anymore. Instead of that phrase, the *erbâb-ı timar and sipahi* came to be used and might correspond to *merd-i timar* of 1568 but the size of the arable land under their control was only 3.06% percent with 1560 dönüm. What constituted the minority group in the *çiftlik* market of the second half of the sixteenth century now became the biggest landholders in Karaferiye. Moreover, another aspect

³²⁵ MAD.d 8485.

of the land ownership pattern is that the majority of the *çiftlik*s continued to be controlled by members of the *ulema*, as was the case in the middle of the century; if one considers the title of *efendi* as a signifier of a person with an educated background, then this group by far surpassed the others.

The emergence of this new group, which took over the role of the timariots in production relations, also undertook several other functions previously required of the timariots. The shift between these two groups is consistent with a broader trend, namely the increasing cash needs of the central treasury, as noted above. In particular, from the second half of the seventeenth century onward, the *cebelü bedeliyyesi* (compensation for raising additional mounted soldiers), which had initially been retained for local needs within the sanjak and province, began to be widely used as compensation for the failure of the timariots to mobilize and provide extra mounted soldier for any valid reason.³²⁶ By the end of the seventeenth century, the transfer of this fee to the central treasury coincided with the consolidation of power by local power groups. It is probable that the increasing obligation of the local notables in the eighteenth century to supply the center with equipped soldiers and various military forces was facilitated by the economic activities undertaken in the seventeenth century in the form of *bedel*. These activities allowed the payment or indirect fulfillment of the fee that the feudal lords were supposed to cover. Such activities included the collection of title deed fees from land purchasers by the timariots. It was the new local elite and gentry, who acquired land and established *çiftlik*s, that began to control not only the land usufruct but also the previous responsibilities of the timariots.

³²⁶ Hülya Taş, "Osmanlı maliyesinde "Bedel" uygulaması üzerine bir değerlendirme." *İkinci İktisat Tarihi Kongresi Bildiriler-1, 24-25 Haziran 2010*, (Elazığ: Fırat Üniversitesi İnsani ve Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi Yayınları, 2013). pp. 291-311.

The arable land size of the çiftlik units in the detailed defter is recorded with the phrase *hassa tarla*, which implies the plot of land adjacent to the unit was subjected to the legal provisions of *miri* land regime and that the çiftliks had been proliferating in the timar lands.³²⁷ As analyzed in the previous part, the sale cases of the çiftliks confirm the legal status of this adjacent arable plot of land per se. Application of the two legal procedures for the different parts of the çiftlik unit was also prevalent in *tereke defters* (probate inventories), which registers the properties (debts, receivables, moveable, and immovable properties) of a deceased person to be legally apportioned amongst the legal heirs. Analyzing the probate inventory (*tereke*) of reis-i çeltük (paddy officer) Mehmed Ağa, son of Behram, who was one of the çiftlik holders registered in the detailed extraordinary register of 1691 would be illuminating. He passed away in 1697 by leaving his heirs empty-handed since the value of his property fell short for his debts (*duyûnu terekesinden ezyed olduđu*).³²⁸ In 1691, he had four çiftliks in four different villages. The total amount of arable lands of the units was 1770 dönüm.³²⁹ Although the properties in the core of the four çiftlik units together with a small plot of lands under the name of *yurt ve harman yeri* (threshing floor) were registered, none of the previously recorded arable land parts of the unit in 1691 was mentioned in his probate inventory.

In most of the çiftlik sale cases, like the ones analyzed so far, the two components of a çiftlik unit were always subjected to a separate legal proceeding. Unlike the properties on the land, the subject of sale regarding the arable land part of

³²⁷ İnalçık, 'Hicrî 835 Tarihli Sûret-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid', p. XXX. İnalçık refers the term as implying a parcel of land left for the timariod. The term *hassa tarla* in this context should be thought as *hassa çiftlik* since it was recorded with land parcel under each çiftlik unit. In this sense, most of these units must have been de jure belong to the timariods disposition but came under the control of the centuries-old local elites in the town.

³²⁸ KKS.g. D-040/63-64 (2 Muharrem 1109 / 21 July 1697).

³²⁹ BOA, MAD.d. (mufassal 10 Ramazan 1102 / 7 June 1691) 8485. He is the only Mehmed Ağa who had four çiftliks in four different villages of Makrigoz, Istavroz, Manoşpita and Biranyat.

the çiftlik unit was the use-right instead of bare ownership. Therefore, the probate inventories of a deceased çiftlik holder did not record the arable land part of the çiftlik units since the private property provisions were valid only for the buildings and other personal properties. Yet, the land located or remained in the core of the çiftlik unit was recorded in the probate inventories as yurt or harman yeri, which cover small lands and were recognized as the private property of the deceased. When the çiftlik units of the above-mentioned Mehmed Ağa would be subject of a sale again, the usufruct of the arable land part adjacent to the çiftlik units will also be included in the sale. Alternatively, if the debt of Mehmed Ağa had not exceeded the value of his assets, his heirs would have continued to hold the çiftlik units and their adjacent arable lands. While the sale cases somehow recognize the de facto situation, a term in this context that can be coined as de facto private property, the probate inventories still abide by the legal norms of the still operating *miri* land regime.

Indeed, seemingly two different procedures in the legal documents were the reflection or recognition of the long-historical process behind the emergence and expansion of arable land parts of the çiftlik units in the legal proceedings. These units began to proliferate as early as 1488, if not earlier. At the beginning of their expansion in numbers, they contain a small plot of arable lands. The arable land of these units enlarged either through the purchase of lands, reclamation of adjacent plots, appropriation by force, or seizure in return for a debt from the villagers and came to be exchanged between the men of power in time.³³⁰ In this process, when the local

³³⁰ In both scenarios, the villagers became renters of the arable lands circumscribed by çiftlik units for an indefinite period. It is hard to make general assumptions in the sixteenth century to understand how exactly the çiftlik units formed because of lack of available data. However, throughout the seventeenth century, the wealthy men of the town were (voyvodas, muftis, kadıs, eşraf and ayans) either personally or through their waqfs advancing credits in considerable amounts, especially for villagers. Although not often, the villagers had trouble paying back the debts and thus lost what they put up as collateral. In many cases, the collateral of debtors was either their menzils, orchards, tarla (small plot of lands), houses, or in few cases, çiftliks.

elites saw the source of wealth in the form of çiftlik units, they made use of every possible means to expand the size of their wealth, which was the size of the land itself in their çiftlik units, without hesitation. When the internal and external factors inflicted changes upon the very operative mechanism of state institutions, the local men of power seized the opportunity to further their power base by using the authority gap. In the seventeenth century, the change in the context of the expansion of çiftliks was the “gradual alienation of timariots” from their formerly designated duties, which went hand in hand with the inclusion of arable lands by the çiftlik units. The owners of these units became the new actors acting in the margins of the “old” timar system. Put differently, the representative of the old timar system, the timariots were degraded into a notary in time while the “new actors seized the actual control of the lands.” Every consent given by the timariot or whoever was granted *berat* to control the land, for the arable part of the çiftlik units (*sahib-i arz izniyle*, or *sahib-i arz ma‘arifetiyle*) in çiftlik sale cases is the confirmation, reproduction, and reconsolidation of the fact in which the landholding pattern was being shaped through centuries.

During each transfer of the usufruct, a fee called *tapu resmi* (title-deed fee) had to be paid to the *sahib-i arz*. This process by pushing the limits of the legal field as far as their powers allow, led to the emergence of a land transfer economy. But the group who collects land parcels was mostly the economically and politically privileged group, *zi kudret kimesneler*, *mütemevvilan* who were getting the most benefit out of this economy as they began organizing production in production units, çiftliks. Eventually, the holders of the çiftlik units, or the interest group of the town, took up the duties formerly dispatched to timariots in their çiftlik units, except participating in campaigns as soldiers. From this point onwards, these new landowners became non-askeri by origin. In a way, they became de facto *sahib-i arz* (timariot) of the lands they

controlled in the form of *çiftlik* units, or they were the “new” landowners who were trying to act in the margins of the “old” but still operating *timar* system.

In a land regime where the arable lands were not subject to the provisions of private property, the duration of the usufruct (*hakk-ı tasarruf*) of the *çiftlik*s under the control of the long-lasting local elite families became the essential factor that surpassed the above-discussed legal procedures and forced the constraints in *miri* land regime. Suppose their lineage continues and their financial situation does not deteriorate. In that case, the usufruct over the arable lands (*hassa tarla*) of their *çiftlik*s- though still *miri* nominally- turns into de facto private property by *çiftlik* owners after generation to generation, no matter whether they are *askeri* or non-*askeri* by origins and no matter whether within *timar* system or not from the seventeenth-century conditions onward. Furthermore, when *çiftlik*s became the subject of a sale, the customers would be another interest group rather than the ordinary folk. As a result, not only the sources of wealth but also the de facto integrity of these *çiftlik*s came to be protected amongst the local power-holding individuals who emerged as the new rural gentry. Concerning the *çiftlik*s of the family members in their *waqfs* villages; they had been passed over to the successors of the family for at least two centuries. As this part discussed, the consortium of old and new elites had the control of 21.45% of the whole arable lands in these villages through such *çiftlik*s by the end of the seventeenth century.

Upon close scrutiny, it becomes apparent that changes in land tenure were perceptible as early as sixteenth century. However, the *çiftlik*s were only relevant to a small number of local elites and their arable lands were characterized by small sizes corresponding to those defined by the *çifthane* formula. During the seventeenth century, a transitional period occurred in which the rural landscape was transformed

to benefit of landed estates and thus to the local elites. Even if Gara gives the prerogative to the tumultuous period of the town in 1640s which prepared the way to the expansion of these units by the increasing tax load on the shoulders of peasants, as the findings suggest, çiftlik phenomena had been observable before this date and peasant relocation was taking place to the çiftlik units because of alleged tax load. Despite this, a significant portion of autonomous reaya holdings remained in place, which would only be dragged to the *ekabir* çiftliks from the first decades of the next century with incomparably larger tracks of arable lands. What remains essential was the perceiving of these çiftliks as an investment tool across centuries by the elites and notables.

The general assessment on land tenure in the town can be discerned by mufassal avarız defter of 1691, which recorded the real land sizes of the menzils and çiftliks, the largest çiftliks in Karaferiye extended over 1,500 dönüm of land in 1691, while the average land size of the 232 çiftliks was 191 dönüm. However, the average land size of the fourteen çiftliks that will be analyzed in the following part was 2,670.78 dönüm. As it provides the end picture of the land tenure characteristics in the rural hinterland until the end of the seventeenth century, the fact that the amount of arable land of the çiftliks was still relatively small compared to the later periods suggests certain arguments. First, the peasant's indebtedness has not yet reached to the point that put pressure on them to sell their land and buildings to local elites. If that is the case, then they could still possess the means to pay off their debts and manage to sustain their subsistence or a proportion of them have done so. As a result, in the first period, the accessibility of extensive arable lands for appropriation by local notables must have been constrained due to factors like the institutional capacity of the timar system, which might not have diminished in effectiveness as significantly as it

did in the eighteenth century. While the transition from smaller peasant holdings of the sixteenth century to larger *çiftlik*s had commenced, it had not reached the magnitude observed in the eighteenth century. This is also reflected in the *defter* where multiple *çiftlik*s belonging to specific landowners are scattered in various villages and can be attributed to the lack of *çiftlik*s with large plots of land and insufficient reclamation practices. In the next century, the picture of rural hinterland would undergo dramatic change by means of the concentration of arable lands under small number of elites and notables' *çiftlik*s. The next chapter will analyze the establishment of large estates in the context of changing fiscal dynamics of the empire on the one hand, and the impact of outer factors on the other.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONSOLIDATION OF LARGE *ÇİFTLİK* AGRICULTURE

The land tenure transformation entered a new phase by offering more benefits to the landholder elites and notables and less to the peasants.³³¹ Two crucial developments paved the way for the establishment of landed estates with large-tracks of arable land; the application of *malikane* system and the increase in the foreign demand for the Ottoman wheat. As analyzed in detail in the previous chapter, the descendants of Todor Musachi, namely Lanbazâdes and Saricazâdes as partners in their portfolios and relatives would continue to hold their privileged position in the political fabric of the town until 1760s. The latter's investments on arable lands by capitalizing indebted peasantry to establish large-çiftliks were the cumulative result of their past capital and the developments of the eighteenth century. Drawing on the increasing prevalence of peasant indebtedness suggest the presence of unrecoverable debts have reached such an extent in the eighteenth century that peasants began selling their buildings and lands to local elites and notables, who would then establish çiftliks with large tracks of arable lands to engage in the wheels of the shadow economy. But local elites and notables were not immune to the need for credit, finding themselves trapped in debt to *sarrafs* (moneylenders), a process known as the "debt cycle". On the

³³¹ Another version of this chapter will be published in the journal of Turkish Historical Review with the title "The Establishment of Large Çiftliks: Indebtedness and Property Acquisition in eighteenth-Century Karaferye (Veria)". I am very grateful to Antonis Anastasopoulos for his invaluable comments on the draft of the article and for sparing his time whenever I asked for it.

part of the lender local powerholders, this can be read as a balancing factor of their coercion vis a vis peasant community.

McGowan's observation highlights Karaferiye's distinctive chiftlicized status in the Balkan region especially in the eighteenth century, leading to studies exploring the process of landed estate formation in further detail. His observation regarding the creation of a *çiftlik* in Greece, driven by the collective indebtedness of peasants, finds resonance in a firman dispatched to Karaferiye. It underscores the transition of free villages into *çiftliks*, achieved through methods such as intimidation, over taxation, and the escalation of villagers' indebtedness but the measures primarily aimed at ensuring the seamless collection of taxes rather than safeguarding the interests of independent cultivators during the eighteenth century.³³² The formation of *çiftliks* in the region can be traced back to the early decades of the seventeenth century, marked by limited commercial viability and the active engagement of the *ulema* class in this market.³³³ Later in the eighteenth century, *çiftliks* became much more visible and that %59 of the villages were fully and another %4.6 of them were partly chiftlicized in the second half of the century.³³⁴ The extensive use of allocation registers (*tevzi defterleri*) provided further insights to the nature of chiftlicization in Karaferiye by analyzing the impact of estate formation on tax distribution among the local populace.³³⁵ While the

³³² Antonis Anastasopoulos. *Imperial institutions and local communities: Ottoman Karaferiye, 1758 – 1774*. Unpublished PhD. diss., Cambridge University, 1998. p. 61.

³³³ Gara, "Moneylenders and landowners: In search of urban Muslim Elites in the Early Modern Balkans", pp. 144-146.

³³⁴ Anastasopoulos and Gara, 'The rural hinterland of Karaferiye: settlements, divisions, and the *çiftlik* phenomenon (seventeenth-eighteenth centuries),' pp. 261-91. This study analyzes the particular *çiftliks* in the villages of Sadine and Rabsomanik. The former case is about the sale of an already established *çiftlik* and there is no information on the practices of its establishment. The latter case is related to the establishment of a *çiftlik* through land purchase from peasants and thus, will be used in this study.

³³⁵ Spyropoulos, Yannis; Poulis, Stefanos; and Anastasopoulos, Antonis, "*Çiftliks*, landed elites, and tax allocation in eighteenth-century Ottoman Veroia," pp. 1-35. The Sarcazade family has already been examined in this study in the context of the expansion of landed estates in eighteenth-century Karaferiye, together with other notables and ayans who owned *çiftliks*, through the analysis of *tevzi* registers. However, the *tevzi* registers lack the data that would allow for a detailed analysis of how the estates were formed and the production dynamics by the owners and cultivators. Also see Anastasopoulos, and

argument regarding the dispossession of peasants in favor of the establishment of *çiftlik*s through tax distribution is valid, the references to the existence of *çiftlik*s as early as the 1680s, through *tevzi* registers, do not suffice to accurately form a detailed picture, particularly in the latter half of the seventeenth century.³³⁶ The main reason for this is that, while these registers, which cover an extended period, help trace the long-term expansion of *çiftlik*s, as they contain detailed information such as the identities of the *çiftlik* owners in the region, their share in the tax rates of the *kaza*, and the number of *çiftlik*s they owned, they do not contain any information on how *çiftlik*s were established. Another assumption of the studies based on this source type is that *çiftlik*s became widespread in the eighteenth century as these "mufassal (detailed) *tevzi* registers," to use Uluçay's apt phrase, began to be kept from the second quarter of the eighteenth century onwards in Karaferye.³³⁷ Thus, when the available registers are examined in order, the phenomenon of chiftlicization is inevitably dated to that century. However, the data in the region's *mufassal avariz* (detailed extra-ordinary

Gara, "The rural hinterland of Karaferye: settlements, divisions, and the *çiftlik* phenomenon (seventeenth-eighteenth centuries), pp. 275-278.

³³⁶ For instance, Anastasopoulos, Antonis; Poullos, Stefanos; Spyropoulos, Yannis (2019). 'The spread of *çiftlik*s (large estates) in the eighteenth-century Ottoman Balkans: The case of the district of Veroia,' in Rogojanu, Dumitru-Cătălin; Boda, Gherghina (eds.), *Istorie, Cultură și Cercetare III, History, Culture and Research III, Târgoviște, Cetatea de Scaun*, pp. 90-109. In this study, the ratio of *çiftlik*s to villages was found to be 1.06% in 1683 and 8.64% in 1698. However, it should be noted that by 1691, the ratio had already reached 55.81% as discussed below. The reason of the discrepancy in the percentage of chiftlicization in Karaferye lies in the availability and characteristic of the archival sources. Detailed *tevzi* registers would be prepared in the eighteenth century whereas the ones in seventeenth century was in *icmal* (summary) form. See Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi, hereinafter BOA. MAD.d (Maliyeden Müdevver) 8485 (10 Ramazan 1102 / 7 June 1691). I would like to thank my colleague Mehmet Ali Çelik for sharing the *defter* with me. See KKS.g. D-40-25-26/1 (15 Şaban 1107 / 20 March 1696). This *defter* continued to be utilized by both the *hazine* bureau (treasury) and the kadi of Karaferye, who incorporated the data from this *defter* into their preparation of a *tevzi* register. For instance, in a *tevzi* *defter* dated 1696 that allocates the shares of the *avarizhanes* among the neighborhoods and villages under Gevher Sultan's *hass*, the villages of Manoşpita, Platiçe, Servihor, Istavroz, and Veştice are listed. The owners of *çiftlik*s recorded in 1691 *defter* were almost identical with the ones documented in this *tevzi* register.

³³⁷ Uluçay, M. Çağatay, 18. ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri (İstanbul: Berksoy Basımevi, 1955), p. 52. We see a parallel development in record keeping technic regarding the *tevzi* registers of Karaferye and Saruhan. In Saruhan, *tevzi* registers were being kept in the form of *icmal*, which does not provide for instance the number of *çiftlik*s in the villages and owners of each *çiftlik* unit in the seventeenth century. This was also the case in the seventeenth century *tevzi* registers of Karaferye.

tax) register for 1691, which assigned a tax assessment unit based on the size of the land in *çiftlik*s and *menzils* (houses with appendages), shows that 55.81% (48 villages) of the total 86 inhabited villages of the *kaza* had *çiftlik*s at that time, and 85% of their arable lands were located in *çiftlik* units controlled by the local Muslim elites while the remaining 15% was located in the *menzil* units.³³⁸ Thus, almost half of the residential villages contained *çiftlik*s under the control of different local elites, while 38 villages did not contain any *çiftlik* units but rather *menzil* units with attached arable land.³³⁹

Despite their precision, the analysis pertaining to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has predominantly relied upon already established *çiftlik*s without delineating the possible methods by which these units were formed and operated with the help of concrete cases. While studies on the Ottoman Empire and Karaferye highlight the importance of indebtedness in the formation of *çiftlik*s, there is a lack of empirical data except for indirect references to its specific role in the process. Thus, in this part analyzing land purchases of the local notables of Karaferye from peasants to establish *çiftlik*s in depth. Although not conclusive, the findings suggest that the existence of indebtedness in a specific land acquisition case, alongside the concurrent emergence of a debt cycle involving villagers, local prominent figures, and financial intermediaries such as *sarrafs* (moneylender). These findings, as explained in the relevant section, have the potential to serve as an instructive example for others due to

³³⁸ The mufassal avarız defter of 1691 records both *menzils* in the villages and in the quarters (mahalle). The former includes arable lands, and the latter includes mostly orchards. As the defter attains an *avarız* tax unit for each 120 *dönüm* of land whether it is in *çiftlik* or *menzil*, it recorded every *menzil* in the villages, too.

³³⁹ The defter does not include the ten villages of the Mihrimah Sultan Waqf, as they were *hass* villages exempt from extraordinary levies. See for the villages BOA. C.EV. (Cevdet Evkâf) 80/3992 (13 Cemazielahir 1125 / 7 July 1723). Villages subject to Menlik *kaza* at these dates: Podrom, Gırçal, İnesel, İne Kasrı, Vulçışta, İsfice, Kapsıhor, Seli, Uskutina, and Kopanova.

the reasons provided. Furthermore, the establishment method of these units has a notable impact on the legal status of the peasants.

In the first part, fourteen title deeds (*hüccet*) issued by the kadi of Karaferye on the purchase of arable land held by the peasants will be analyzed together with the allocation registers (*tevzi defterleri*). The *hüccets* hold substantial significance, not only as clear evidence of the methods employed by various local notables to establish *çiftlik*s but also for their ability to shed light on the concept of indebtedness, by providing valuable insights into the diverse payment methods used by local notables with peasants. The second part will consider the underlying reasons for the land sales, and in the third part, the legal status of the peasants and the operation of the established *çiftlik*s will be analyzed. The earliest of the available eighteenth-century land purchase deeds is dated 1712, and the latest is dated 1752 and the deeds concentrate on the mid-century. Interestingly, the court registers of Karaferye from the previous century do not contain any records of the establishment of *çiftlik*s through such land purchases. The relative scarcity and infrequency of land ownership transfers in the seventeenth century compared to the eighteenth century may explain this disparity. A snapshot of the region's chiftlicization practices from the last decade of the 15th to the last decade of the seventeenth centuries, which represents the first chiftlicization period of Karaferye can be gleaned from the *mufassal avarız* register of Karaferye dated 1691. As the defter records the size of all the available *çiftlik*s in the villages, it enables direct comparisons between seventeenth and eighteenth century *çiftlik*s of Karaferye. Although there is no significant disparity in the rate at which villages transformed into *çiftlik*s between the two periods, the crucial divergence seems to lie in the size and methods used for their establishment.

4.1. Investing in Large Landed-Estates

Dâ'imâ eyle tefekkür vakt-i hâl-i rihleti

*Sanma bu dâr-ı fenâyı kimseye cây-ı
sebât³⁴⁰*

The archival sources on the emergence of landed estates of different kinds lead to some general observations, while the practice, or tactic, of establishing *çiftlik*s through the purchase of arable land from peasants and the organization of production in these units has not been fully explored in the literature. Drawing on the case of Manastir, McGowan listed six ways of establishing a *çiftlik*: the expansion of the size of the private *çiftlik* reserved for the timariot's own use; the seizure of the peasant's real estate and land, or their communal land such as meadows and pastures; the seizure of the land of the peasant who abandoned it due to heavy taxation and indebtedness; the evacuation of the peasant's land due to tax collectors, gangs, or constant coercion; the taking of land pledged by the peasant in return for debts; and, finally, the taking of land by purchase or some other kind of transaction.³⁴¹ The examples of this study appear as the result of the last two scenarios.

The method of establishing *çiftlik*s through purchasing the lands of peasants was practiced in a total of fourteen villages; seven of which were timar villages. (Table 1) The revenues of the remaining seven were allocated to the members of the dynasty as *havass-ı hümayun*; five of these seven villages were in the *nahiye* (subdistrict) of Menlik, which was within the borders of Karaferye, and their revenues were allocated

³⁴⁰ “..think of the ending always [as] this graceless earth shall be left to no one...”, (The translation is mine). Polat, “Râmiz Mehmed Efendi Dîvânı”, p. 326.

³⁴¹ McGowan, ‘Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600–1800’ p. 136.

to the foundation established by Mihrimah Sultan in Üsküdar.³⁴² Except for the villages of Rabsomanik and Yavornıçe, the remaining twelve villages subject to the purchase deeds did not previously include any *çiftlik*s.

In the sale deeds, the property of peasants subject to the transaction is called *menzil* (house), a facility where urban and rural residents live with the necessary buildings for living, production, and storage. In all the land sale deeds at hand, the contents of the *menzils* and the size of the land at their disposal were itemized by name and recorded according to size, generally from largest to smallest. Although the court registers of Karaferye have purchase, sale, and pawning cases on *menzils* in abundance, two of them are helpful for characterizing urban and rural *menzil* facilities. After their father, Aleksandre, had passed away, his daughter Dukena and his son Şişman Yorgaki went to probate to determine their shares in the *menzil* of the deceased and the share of his later-born son Konstantin who lived in the Makariotisa quarter of the Varoş, a term that describes the urban setting where non-Muslim residents lived, in 1702.³⁴³ The privately owned part of this facility included two rooms upstairs, a privy, a living room and downstairs a room, a privy, and a barn together with an orchard of half a *dönüm*.

With regard to rural *menzils*, a certain Seji, son of Yako, sold (*bey' bat-ı sahih-i şer'i*) his *menzil*, which included a room, a hayloft, and a threshing floor, all of which were privately owned, in the village of Vosova to Mustafa Ağa ibn-i el-Hac Ali Ağa for 2,365 *akçe* in 1748.³⁴⁴ However, the usufruct of fifty *dönüm* of land attached to the

³⁴² For detailed information on Menlik see Anastasopoulos and Gara, "The Rural Hinterland of Karaferye: Settlements, Divisions, and the *Çiftlik* Phenomenon (seventeenth-eighteenth Centuries)," p. 265.

³⁴³ KKS.g. D-044-3. (Şaban 1113 / January 1702).

³⁴⁴ KKS.g. D-075-20/2. (25 Şaban 1161 / 20 August 1748).

facility was subjected to a sale of 2,700 *akçe*. After buying this *menzil*, Mustafa Ağa purchased the *menzils* and a total of 1,600 *dönüm* of 36 peasants in the same village as a landholder (Table 1). It, thus, becomes clear that landholders invested in *menzils* located in a rural setting.

Like the *çiftlik*s, the buildings of the *menzils* were all the private property of the peasant, and the peasants held the usufruct of the arable lands attached to this living unit, which most probably corresponded to the size of the land defined by İnalçık in the *çift-hane* system.³⁴⁵ However, there exists a variation in the size of the land owned by the peasants in all available purchase deeds, and some of the peasants had no land at all at their disposition. For instance, a total of seventy-seven peasants from the village of İne Kasrı sold their lands to the *müderri*s (religious scholar) and member of the Sarıcazâde family es-Seyyid Ramiz Mehmed Efendi, but eleven peasants did not possess any land attached to their *menzils*. It is likely that landless peasants of the village joined into production as, one may assume, farmhands in a plot of land that extended over 60 *dönüm*, which was purchased collectively by the peasants of the village.

Drawing on the average land size of the peasants in the village, which is 49.25 *dönüm*, the land size of thirty-seven peasants was below the average and only eight peasants had over 100 *dönüm*. While the biggest land size that a peasant had was 205 *dönüm*, the smallest was 4 *dönüm* (four peasants had this size of land).³⁴⁶ Therefore, the typology of the small peasant producer idealized in the *çift-hane* system dissolves in these examples—at least in the eighteenth century.³⁴⁷

³⁴⁵ İnalçık, Halil, "The *çift-hane* system and peasant taxation," in *From Empire to Republic: Essays on Ottoman and Turkish Social History* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1995), pp. 61–72.

³⁴⁶ KKS.g. D-075-29-30-31/1 (8 Şevval 1161 / 21 October 1748).

³⁴⁷ We observe the same situation in Niş and Leskofça where *baştina* was the main category of land use. See Yücel Terzibaşoğlu, "Landed estates, rural commons and collective agriculture in Ottoman Niş and Leskofça in the 19th century," *Turkish Historical Review*, 13, (2022), pp. 343–371.

Returning to the *menzils*, the peasants had the right of disposition over this land. The wealthy owner buys the right to dispose of these small plots of land, forming a complex of several plots of lands, or *çifts*. Once they were brought together, in a way, the *menzils* of the peasants constituted the building infrastructure of the *çiftlik*. This is reflected clearly in the parlance of the documents. Fındık Yazıcı Zülfikar Ağa, who was one of the *çiftlik* owners in the village of Eflahlar, registered in the *mufassal* extra-ordinary tax register of 1691, passed away in 1704.³⁴⁸ Since he had the title of *ağa*, he was clearly not a peasant, who cultivated the land himself, but engaged in sharecropping contracts to hire required labor power for cultivation.³⁴⁹ Following his death, his inheritors appealed to the court for revaluation of the price of the properties of his *çiftlik* that they had sold in two groups (eighteen farmer roofs and two warehouses) to the other *çiftlik*-holders of the same village. When referring to the *çiftlik* of the deceased, the landed estate was referred to as “*çiftlik* tabir olunur menzili i kebir.”

After the purchase of the lands in the relevant village, the *çiftliks* of the investor landholders appear for the first time in the *tevzi* books that cover periods ranging from eight months to two years. While the names of some were recorded under the village without the word “*çiftlik*” shortly after the land purchase—indicating that these notables’ tax obligation was recorded in the relevant *tevzi* register, the name of others, even if they had made the purchase, was not recorded in the relevant village nor did their *çiftliks* appear for the specified period. The person who purchased the lands of the Rabsomanik peasants on July 2, 1746, was es-Seyyid Mehmed Ramiz Efendi. The first time we see Ramiz Efendi establishing a *çiftlik* in the village where he purchased

³⁴⁸ KKS.g. D-045-12/1. (19 Safer 1116 / 23 June 1704).

³⁴⁹ For instance, five *nefer haymane* (mobile labour group sometime settled in this particular *çiftlik*) were registered in his particular *çiftlik*. See BOA. MAD.d 8485 (10 Ramazan 1102 / 7 June 1691) p. 32.

the lands is in the distribution record, which was composed eight months after the date of purchase, along with two other pre-existing *çiftlik* owners in the village.³⁵⁰ Interestingly, Ramiz Efendi's *çiftlik* does not appear in the few *tevzi* records of the *kaza* during these eight months.³⁵¹ Despite the landholders' inclination to minimize their tax liabilities, the primary cause for the eight-month delay can be attributed to the necessary time required to update the information within the registers. This situation was the case in all the other examples at hand.

Members of the Sarıcazâdes, among the notables of Karaferye and active investors in the *çiftlik* market, made purchases that exemplified the concentration of large plots of land under the control of a landholder. With investments in seven villages, four of which were timar, two of which belonged to Mihrimah sultan's waqf, and one *hass* village, they were the family that used this method extensively. Sarıcazâde el-Hac Mehmed Ağa, his brother Ahmed Ağa, and his nephew Mehmed Ramiz Efendi were the largest investors with a total of 1,389,264 *akçe* (11,577.2 *guruş*), which amounted to 26% of the provincial expenses of the *kaza* of Karaferye for the year between April 1757 and March 1758.³⁵² In order to illustrate both the recording technique and the content of such deeds, an analysis of the land investments of one of the prominent members of the Sarıcazâde family, es-Seyyid Mehmed Ramiz Efendi, in the village of İne Kasrı in the Menlik *kaza* and his uncle el-Hac Mehmed Ağa's investments in the village of Galahto, a timar village, will suffice.

³⁵⁰ KKS.g. D-073-41-42-43. (18 Rebiülevvel 1160 / 30 March 1747).

³⁵¹ KKS.g. D-072-1-2. (7 Muharrem 1157 / 21 February 1744). Before Ramiz Efendi purchased the land in the village and established a *çiftlik*, for example, in the distribution record for *avariz* and *bedel-i nüzul* dated January 30, 1746, two *çiftlik* owners, Hristo zımmi and Memoş Ağa, and a third group of "villagers" are mentioned in the village of Rabsomanik. The latter indicates the existence of independent peasant households that a *çiftlik* unit had not yet absorbed.

³⁵² KKS.g. D-081-85-90 (17 Receb 1171 / 27 March 1758). The total provincial expenses allocated to the *kaza* amounted to 44,342 *guruş*.

The content of the transaction is summarized with a marginal note which states that the inhabitants of the village of İne Kasrı sold their private and timar lands to Seyyid Mehmed Ramiz Efendi (*İne Kasrı nam karye ahalileri emlak ve arazilerin Seyyid Mehmed Ramiz Efendiye bey'e yledikleri hüccettir*).³⁵³ The document ends after specifying the total amount es-Seyyid Ramiz Mehmed Efendi paid. Ten of these peasants had only *menzils* and no arable lands at their disposal, which implies that they were joining into the production in the lands of others or certain landholders as farmhands. At the end of the document, it becomes clearer that these immovable properties had two different legal statuses: while Ramiz Mehmed Efendi would enjoy the *menzil* buildings as free property, he would have the usufruct alone of the lands with the permission of the *sahib-i arz*. For the latter, he paid 54 *akçe* for each *dönüm*, amounting to 174,096 *akçe* for 3,224 *dönüm* of land. The amount assigned for each *menzil* was 2,768 *akçe*, and he paid 210,368 *akçe* for a total of 76 *menzil*. In total, Ramiz Mehmed Efendi paid 384,464 *akçe*. Like the others, Ramiz Mehmed Efendi would be recorded in the allocation register with a "*çiftlik*" belonging to him above his name in the relevant village, possibly by combining these pieces of land or by automatically combining more than one "*çift*" since he bought all the ones already existing in the village.³⁵⁴ However, his name first appeared as a taxpayer in the village of İne Kasrı in the allocation register two years after he had actually purchased the land.³⁵⁵ On the other hand, the fact that it did not appear as a *çiftlik* under his control for such a long time is probably because some of the registry books before this date do not exist or some pages of the existing books are missing.

³⁵³ KKS.g. D-075-29-30-31/1 (8 Şevval 1161 / 21 October 1748).

³⁵⁴ KKS.g. D-082-25 (15 Şevval 1172 / 11 June 1759). For the first time it appears as a *çiftlik* see D-076-58- masarif-ı vilayet (15 zilhicce 1163 / 15 November 1750). After the land purchase, he was registered as a taxpayer for the first time in the village of İne Kasrı.

³⁵⁵ KKS.g. D-076-29 (12 Cemazielevvel 1163 / 19 April 1750). His name does not appear in this *masarif-i vilayet* book.

As early as 1735, the *çiftlik* holding local notables of Karaferye were trying to minimize tax shares of mainly their *çiftlik*s, by imposing their *masarif-i vilayet* tax that was collected based on *avarız-hane* tax units onto the villages where they did not possess any property at all;

‘...kaza-i mezbure tâbi kuranın ekserisin ayan-ı vilayet çiftlik idüp on hanesi olan karyeye yarım hane ve beş altı hanesi olan karyeye rub ‘ hane vaz ‘ ve çiftlik olmayan kura kaza-i merhumda ancak on beş yirmi harabe karye kalub ve kura-yı mezburenin her birinin onar on birer haneleri var iken çiftliği olan karyelerin tekalifin ayan-ı vilayet zikr olunan karyeler üzerlerine tahmil eylediklerinden...’³⁵⁶

Such undertakings by the landholders reached such an extent that the *naib* of Karaferye, Mevlana Mustafa complained about the failure to collect the *masarif-i vilayet* tax of the same year properly and as a result, the center ordered the preparation of a new *avarız defter* to regulate the *avarız* tax shares of each Karaferye village (*hala bu sene-i mübarekede masarif-i vilayet olmak üzere yetmiş iki kise akçe tevzi eyleyüb bir dürlü edasına kudret ve liyakatları olmamağla her bir ayanın çiftlik eyledikleri kura ve varoş ve gerek çiftlik olmayan kuraya suret-i defter-i mevkufat mucibince nizam verilmeğe muhtaç olduğu kaza-yı mezbure naibi Mevlana Mustafa zide ilmihu arz itmeğın...*).³⁵⁷ As seen, the firman aimed to systematically realign the distribution of tax shares allocated to villages, with particular attention paid to the *çiftlik*s held by landowners.³⁵⁸ When the *avarız* tax was regularized in the course of the seventeenth century, ownership of *mülk* or *miri* land was added as a condition of liability to the tax in order to broaden the tax base by eliminating the distinction between *askeri* and

³⁵⁶ KKS.g. D-067-43/1 (5 March 1735 / 10 Şevval 1147).

³⁵⁷ KKS.g. D-067-43/1 (5 March 1735 / 10 Şevval 1147).

³⁵⁸ With this regard, the new *avarız* register was compiled after about seven months and it would become reference for the *tevzi* registers in later periods. The total *avarız-hane* number of Karaferye increased from 833 to 853 after this register. Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi, hereinafter BOA, KK.d. 2890 (29 Rebiülahir 1148 / 18 September 1735) p. 22.

reaya.³⁵⁹ In the available deeds, the landowners, after purchasing the land and establishing their *çiftlik*s, became liable to the *avariz* taxes for the usufruct of land they had acquired from the peasants. Simultaneously with the expansion of their *çiftlik* portfolios, landholders actively pursued strategies to lower the tax rates for which they were responsible. These actions can be seen as a response by landowners to the state's efforts to broaden the tax base through the expansion of the *avariz* tax.

Among the investments of the Sarıcazâdes was a village with a concentrated area of fruit-bearing trees.³⁶⁰ Ramiz Mehmed Efendi paid 20,000 *akçe* for *menzils* and 40,000 *akçe* for 596 *dönüm* of land, including 256 *dönüm* of chestnut groves, to sixteen peasants of Galahto village, which was registered as deserted (*hali*) in 1691 but this might have been a temporary situation as the village appeared to be inhabited in 1687 and 1695.³⁶¹ Although the chestnut groves were recorded separately for each peasant in the deed, only the usufruct of the land was transferred. The lands with fruit-bearing trees within and outside of the city boundaries were considered private property; in the village, they were treated as state-owned (*miri*), presumably because there were no chestnut trees left where previously ones stood. Or, it may have been the result of the effort aiming to alienate *miri* status of land to *mülk* by planting chestnut trees.³⁶² As was the case with his *çiftlik* in Rabsomanik, it took nine years to be registered with a *çiftlik* under his control in Galahto.

Apart from the *ayan* families, the members of the *kapıkulu* demonstrated a tendency to align themselves with the land-owning *ayan* families, effectively

³⁵⁹ Oktay Özel, "17. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Demografisi ve İskân Tarihi İçin Önemli Bir Kaynak: Mufasssal Avârız Defterleri", *XII. Türk Tarih Kongresi (Ankara, 12-16 Eylül 1994), Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler*, c. III, Ankara 1999, pp. 739-740.

³⁶⁰ KKS.g. D-077-51 (1 February 1752 / 15 Rebiülevvel 1165).

³⁶¹ KKS.g. D-035-3/2- (25 Safer 1099 / 31 December 1687), D-040-6 (7 Safer 1107 / 7 September 1695).

³⁶² For the detailed analysis on such endeavors of the subjects see Imber, Colin. "The status of orchards and fruit-trees in Ottoman law" In *Studies in Ottoman History and Law*, 207-216. (Piscataway, NJ, USA: Gorgias Press, 2010). pp. 763-774.

undergoing a process of *ayan*-ization. Just as the janissaries within the garrison engaged in various sectors of the urban economy, such as acquiring shops and participating in trade and crafts, their captains, known as *serdars*, exhibited a propensity to invest in rural properties. Among these individuals, Serdar el-Hac Mehmed Ağa ibn-i el-Hac Ali Ağa stands out as an important example, substantially expanding his *çiftlik* portfolio through investments in a total of three villages. Serdar Mehmed Ağa, who was a member of the 44th janissary regiment and a sergeant, or *çavuş*, was appointed as the *serdar* (head of the janissary garrisons) of Karaferye in 1747.³⁶³ About a month after his appointment, he purchased 3,455 *dönüm* of land and 11 *dönüm* of gardens from fifty-six peasants residing in the village of Podrom for 564,720 *akçe*.³⁶⁴ Serdar Mehmed Ağa paid the price called "semen-i mülk" for all the peasant *menzils* and a separate price called "bedel-i arazi" for the land, which implies two different forms of property acquisition again. However, although these two sums were recorded separately, each peasant got 40 *guruş* for the privately owned buildings and 40 *guruş* for the land; in other words, all the peasants' buildings and land were sold for the same price regardless of the size of the land and the content of their *menzils*, leaving each peasant with 80 *guruş* from this sale.³⁶⁵ We face the similar situation in another investment of Serdar Mehmed in Yavornıçe village. Although there is no record of any debts owed by the villages before the purchase of the properties, this may have resulted from collective indebtedness, and the total amount that Serdar Mehmed Ağa paid was probably divided equally among the peasants.

In cases of land sale in Vosova, İne Kasrı, İnesel, Toplanı Bratanişte, and Kučka villages, the price of a *dönüm* of land was predetermined, resulting in all

³⁶³ KKS.g. D-073-25/2 (10 Safer 1160 / 21 February 1747). This case is the earliest official letter that grants *serdar*-ship to Mehmed Ağa.

³⁶⁴ KKS.g. D-073-121-122-123-124 (14 Rebiülevvel 1160 / 26 March 1747).

³⁶⁵ KKS.g. D-073-122.

peasants receiving a uniform price based on their land size and *menzil* value. Likewise, in Braza, Galahto, Rabsomanik, Gırçal, Ritinyani, and İspurlita, even though the price of a *dönüm* of land was not fixed, each peasant received a proportionate share of the total purchase amount. This is due to the price of the *menzil* and land being presented as a combined sum at the deed's conclusion, rather than a set price for a *dönüm* of land and *menzil* regardless of the land size and components of the *menzil*, as seen in the previously mentioned Podrom and Yavornıçe cases. It implicitly suggests that distinct forms of indebtedness—as the reason for the sales—is the explanation for the difference in these two groups of transactions. In the former group, indebtedness appears to be individual, while in the latter group, the debt must have been collective, with peasants selling varying sizes of their lands for a fixed price of 40 *guruş*. Another explanation may be that peasants in the first group had more effective bargaining power. If so, these observations corroborate McGowan's assertion on Ottoman villages as fiscal collectivities, which is discernible not only in the nature of indebtedness but also in the shared ownership of cultivable lands.³⁶⁶ This is exemplified by the cooperative transaction of sixty *dönüm* of land that was cultivated collectively by the peasants of İne Kasrı and subsequently sold to es-Seyyid Ramiz Mehmed Efendi, mentioned earlier.

After sixteen months, the name of Serdar Mehmed Ağa appears in Podrom, a village belonging to Mihrimah Sultan's waqf, which before this date did not have any *çiftlik*s, in the 1748 Karaferiye allocation register compiled for the cost of delivering

³⁶⁶ McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe*, p. 158. The debt types discussed here approximates to the categories of peasant debt as communal and private in Papastamatiou, Demetrios 'Tax-farming (*İltizam*) and collective fiscal responsibility (*maktu*) in the Ottoman Southern Peloponnese in the second half of the eighteenth century' in Kolovos, Elias; Kotzageorgis, Phokion; Laiou, Sophia; Sariyannis, Marinos (eds.), *The Ottoman Empire, the Balkans, the Greek Lands: Toward a Social and Economic History. Studies in Honor of John C. Alexander*, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2007), p. 292.

wheat to the state *hinta mübayaası*.³⁶⁷ However, the village was not included in two other allocation registers compiled during this period, one for provincial expenses and the other for another imperial wheat purchasing.³⁶⁸ The first time that Serdar Mehmed Ağa appears as one of the *çiftlik* owners of Podrom is in the 1759 allocation register for the cost of draft animals, which suggests that the liability for the taxes belonged to the Serdar Mehmed Ağa.³⁶⁹

Serdar Mehmed Ağa's other investment was 46,080 *akçe* for 120 *dönüm* of land that he had purchased from three peasants in the *timar* village of Yavornıçe, in which he previously had a *çiftlik*.³⁷⁰ Here too, the manor house and the land subject to the sale are recorded separately as "semen-i mülk" and "bedel-i arazi" respectively. He likely made such an investment to expand the lands of his existing *çiftlik* in the village. The size of land he purchased in this case is considerably smaller than the size of land he purchased from the villagers in Podrom. This can be explained by the fact that the village of Yavornıçe had already been almost entirely chiftlicized by 1691, having left only a few *dönüm* of land under the control of "independent" peasants.³⁷¹

Serdar Mehmed Ağa made another land investment in İnesel, a village belonging to the Menlik *nahiye*, this time 'in partnership' with Küçük Ahmed Beşezâde Ali Bey, whose epithet suggests that he was the son or other descendant of a janissary. These two investors paid a total of 1,170,000 *akçe* (582,000 *akçe* for the *menzils* and 588,000 *akçe* for the lands) to 51 peasants for the *menzils* and a total of 4,000 *dönüm* of land

³⁶⁷ KKS.g. D-073-119 (15 Receb 1161 / 11 October 1748). On *miri mübayaa* system regarding wheat in the eighteenth century see Ağır, Seven, "The Evolution of Grain Policy: The Ottoman Experience", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 43/4, Spring 2013, pp. 571-598.

³⁶⁸ KKS.g. D-073-62-69 (21 Cemazielevvel 1160 / 31 May 1747)-provincial expenses, 98-100- (15 Cemazielahir 1161 / 12 June 1748).

³⁶⁹ KKS.g. D-82-26 (15 Şevval 1172 / 11 June 1759).

³⁷⁰ KKS.g. D-073-120 (11 Cemazielevvel 1160 / 21 May 1747).

³⁷¹ BOA. KK.d icmal avarız defteri-2738/3A 1691. A total of 1,020 *dönüm* of land in the village was located within eight *çiftlik*s owned by notables in the region.

that they had in their possession.³⁷² Approximately two months later, the names of Serdar Mehmed Ağa and his associate Ali Bey began appearing in the village's allocation register for provincial expenses.³⁷³ However, only Serdar Mehmed's name appears in connection with a *çiftlik* in the village for the first time in 1759.³⁷⁴ Probably Serdar Mehmed bought his share from Ali Bey and became the sole owner of the *çiftlik*.

One year and nine months after his first appointment as *serdar*, Serdar Mehmed Ağa was again appointed as the *serdar* of Karaferye.³⁷⁵ The investments he made in *çiftliks* may have been the result of the economic and political gains he made during his tenure as *serdar*. But as he came from an apparently wealthy family and he possessed landholdings even before his appointment as *serdar*, it may be that his family status helped him obtain the position of *serdar* that opened up for him new investment opportunities in landownership. As can be seen, in three and a half years, Serdar Mehmed Ağa paid half the price for the lands he bought as a shareholder, and the total amount he invested in establishing *çiftliks* reached 1,195,800 *akçe* (9,965 *guruş*). This sum shows the considerable amount of his investment, as it corresponds to 22.5% of the provincial expenses of the *kaza* again for the year 1757-58, which is close to the amount of the Sarıcazâdes' investment in the same period.³⁷⁶

Another case, that of Memoşağazâde es-Seyyid Mustafa Ağa's purchase of 4,923 *dönüm* of land from 28 peasants residing in İspurlita, of which 115,000 *akçe* paid for *menzils* and the other 115,000 *akçe* for *miri* land, is the second largest acreage

³⁷² KKS.g. D-076-45-46 (16 Şevval 1163 / 18 September 1750). The *dönüm* of land sold by the peasants were recorded separately in the *hüccet* and amounted to 4,129 in total. The *qadi* or *naib* may have rounded this number or ignored the fractions since all the land in the village was sold.

³⁷³ KKS.g. D-076-58 (15 Zilhicce 1163 / 15 November 1750).

³⁷⁴ KKS.g. D-082-26 (15 Şevval 1172 / 11 June 1759).

³⁷⁵ KKS.g. D-075-3/3 (1 Zilhicce 1161 / 22 November 1748).

³⁷⁶ KKS.g. D-081-85-90 (17 Receb 1171 / 27 March 1758). The total provincial expenses allocated to the *kaza* amounted to 44,342 *guruş*.

investment among the available land purchase deeds.³⁷⁷ The lowest price of land per *dönüm* was 23.35 *akçe* in this village. Presumably, the lands allocated to the village belonged to two hamlets, Brosol and Kozamara, which the price per *dönüm* was lower due to their distance from the village and lower productivity than the lands of other villages. Since the 1691 *avarız* survey of the village of İspurlita states that “the village does not have any land but is rather rocky” (*sengistan*),³⁷⁸ (*karye-i mezbûrun arazisi olmayub ziyâde dağ ve sengistan olmağla aynı nefer kayd ve tahrir olundu*) it is possible that the land of the above two hamlets was allocated for İspurlita.

Table 3 The Deeds of Land Purchase in Karaferye (1712-52)

Village	Land Purchaser	Number of Pieces of Land Sold	Size of Land (Dönüm)	Amount Paid (Akçe)	Village Status	Date of Sale
Gırçal 379	Sarıcazâde el-Hac Ahmed and his brother el-Hac Mehmed Ağa ibn-i el-Hac Ali Ağa	36	10,000	300,000	Mihrimah Sultan waqf	12 December 1712
Rabso manik 380	Sarıcazâde es-Seyyid Mehmed Ramiz Efendi ibn-i el-Hac Ahmed Ağa	14	1,694	190,000	timar	3 July 1746

³⁷⁷ KKS.g. D-075-80-81 (11 Rebiülevvel 1162 / 1 March 1749). Also included in the amount paid for the *menzils* were 263 *kurna hinta* (wheat), 61.5 *kurna* barley, 74.5 *kurna alef*, 41 *kurna* rye, 27 *kurna erzen*, 53.5 *kurna sisam*, and 69.5 *kurna* chickpeas, which were cultivated in the fields in the hamlets.

³⁷⁸ BOA. MAD.d (Maliyeden Müdevver) 8485 (10 Ramazan 1102 / 7 June 1691). p.39.

³⁷⁹ KKS.g. D-060-29-30 (13 Muharrem 1136 / 13 October 1723).

³⁸⁰ BOA, MŞHŞSC.d 9024, 8b/3-9a/1 (13 Cemazielahir 1159 / 3 July 1746).

Podrom ³⁸¹	Serdar el-Hac Mehmed Ağa	56	3,466	564,720	Mihrimah Sultan waqf	26 March 1747
Yavorn içe ³⁸²	Serdar el-Hac Mehmed Ağa	3	120	46,080	timar	21 May 1747
Vosova ³⁸³	Mustafa Ağa ibn-i el-Hac Ali Ağa	36	1,600	85,644	Mihrimah Sultan waqf	20 August 1748
İne Kasrı ³⁸⁴	Sarıcazâde es-Seyyid Mehmed Ramiz Efendi ibn-i el-Hac Ahmed Ağa	77	3,251	384,464	Mihrimah Sultan waqf	21 October 1748
Ritinya ni ³⁸⁵	Sarıcazâde el-Hac Mehmed Ağa ibn-i el-Hac Ali Ağa	35	1,413	240,000	timar	29 January 1749
İspurlit a ³⁸⁶	Memoşağazâde es-Seyyid Mustafa Ağa	28	4,923	230,000	timar	1 March 1749
Braza ³⁸⁷	Sarıcazâde el-Hac Mehmed Ağa ibn-i el-Hac Ali Ağa	25	993	123,600	timar	20 February 1750

³⁸¹ KKS.g. D-073-121-122-123-124 (14 Rebiülevvel 1160 / 26 March 1747).

³⁸² KKS.g. D-073-120 (11 Cemazielevvel 1160 / 21 May 1747).

³⁸³ KKS.g. D-075-20 (25 Şaban 1161 / 20 August 1748). In addition, 150 *kurna hunt* and 30 *kurna rye* were also sold within the *menzils*.

³⁸⁴ KKS.g. D-075-29-30-31/1 (8 Şevval 1161 / 21 October 1748).

³⁸⁵ KKS.g. D-075-67-68 (9 Safer 1162 / 29 January 1749).

³⁸⁶ KKS.g. D-075-80-81 (11 Rebiülevvel 1162 / 1 March 1749).

³⁸⁷ KKS.g. D-076-19 (13 Rebiülevvel 1163 / 20 February 1750).

İnesel 388	Serdar el-Hac Mehmed Ağa and Küçük Ahmed Beşezâde Ali Bey (iştiraken)	51	4,000	1,170,000	Mihrimah Sultan waqf	18 September 1750
Toplani 389	Mustafa Ağa ibn-i el-Hac Ali Ağa	74	1,123	132,000	Hass-Hatice Sultan	1 February 1752
Galahto 390	Sarıcazâde el-Hac Mehmed Ağa ibn-i el-Hac Ali Ağa	16	852	60,000	timar	1 February 1752
Bratanişte 391	Osman Ağa ibn-i Halil Ağa and Halil Bey bin Hasan Ağa	28	951	240,000	timar	1 March 1752
Kuçka 392	Sarıcazâde El-Hac Mehmed Ağa bin Ali Ağa and Ali Bey	14	327,2	91,200	hass	2 March 1752

When we narrow the lens down to the village level, what we see is consistent with the general picture. Six years had passed from the last case of land purchase in the villages of the Mihrimah Sultan waqf, by the time the legal trustee (*evlâdiyet ve*

³⁸⁸ KKS.g. D-076-45-46 (16 Şevval 1163 / 18 September 1750).

³⁸⁹ KKS.g. D-077-46-48 (15 Rebiülevvel 1165 / 1 February 1752).

³⁹⁰ KKS.g. D-077-51 (15 Rebiülevvel 1165 / 1 February 1752).

³⁹¹ KKS.g. D-077-52-53 (14 Rebiülahir 1165 / 1 March 1752).

³⁹² KKS.g. D-077-55 (15 Rebiülahir 1165 / 2 March 1752). Turning of this *hass* village into *çiftlik* has been mentioned before through using *tevzi* registers in Spyropoulos, Yannis; Poulis, Stefanos; and Anastasopoulos, Antonis, “Çiftliks, landed elites, and tax allocation in eighteenth-century Ottoman Veroia,” p. 17.

meşrutiyet üzere) of the foundation, Cigalazâde İbrahim Bey, petitioned the Divan to set free the waqf villages from the interventions of the *eşraf* and *ayan*.³⁹³ After stating the illegal way of transforming a whole free village into a *çiftlik* (*müstakil bir karyenin çiftlik itibarıyla zabt olunması hilâf-ı kanun iken*), the firman that was issued in reply to the petition mentions the landholders some of whose investments are detailed in Table 1, namely Sarıcazâde Mehmed Ağa, Serdar el-Hac Mehmed Ağa, Ali Ağa and [Ramiz Mehmed] Efendi, and Karacaoğlu Manol and Toma, as usurers giving money to the peasants in return for buying their private and *miri* lands, meadows, and pastures (*emlak ve arazi ve çayır ve mera*).³⁹⁴ It continues with the number of villages that were chiftlicized under each name. Even if the voices of the landholders are hard to discern, a quote from the firman suggests that they converted entire villages into their landed estate (*işbu karyeler bizim çiftliğimizdir ancak taraf-ı vakfa ispençe ve öşr verimiz*). As seen, they not only continued to apply this method of property acquisition in other villages of the waqf, but new investors (Manol and Toma) joined in, implying that the same method was used for the chiftlicization of the waqf villages after 1752. Even if the center made its stance against *çiftlik* formation in the waqf villages very clear by ordering that “the aforementioned waqf villages [shall] be reinstated into free village status at the disposition of the waqf, as they had been in the past” (*...bu makule vakfın karyeleri çiftlik itibarıyla zabt olunması hilâf-ı defter-i hâkanî ve kanuna mugayir ve gadri mucib olmağla...çiftlik itibarından men‘ ve ber müceb-i defter-i hâkanî karye itibarıyla cânib-i vakıftan zabt...*), these units were not abolished nor were new ones

³⁹³ KKS.g. D-080-47 (12 Cemazielevvel 1169 / 13 February 1756).

³⁹⁴ Karacaoğlu Manol and Toma do not appear in Table-1 and appear to have joined the *çiftlik* investment at a later stage, as evidenced by this firman, which was issued four years subsequent to the most recent available purchasing deed.

prevented from being formed in the following years.³⁹⁵ These indicative legal proceedings reflect the attitude of the imperial state and the efforts of an imperial waqf in the same administrative setting. The firmans provide a concise summary of çiftlik formation; however, they fail to allow for a comprehensive examination of the process. Therefore, it becomes imperative to further narrow the scope of our analysis down to the village level.

4.2. Rural Indebtedness and Security Concerns

Although the available purchase deeds suggest that the last of the ways for establishing a *çiftlik* listed above by McGowan, namely the taking of land by purchase or some kind of transaction, was common, there are indications that the underlying motive was peasant indebtedness. Indeed, in the early modern period, the underlying motive behind the sale of arable land by dozens of peasant inhabitants of a village must have been to fulfill a need rather than to make a profit. For many, the only source of livelihood was the land under their control, and the local notables were not in the least bit reluctant to turn this opportunity into an investment.

This view reconciles with the historical context of the eighteenth Ottoman Empire and with Karaferye in particular. As previously mentioned, the expansion of iltizam (tax farming) not only broadened revenue collection but also consolidated debt and credit relationships within the bottom-up revenue extraction system of the monetized economy in the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth century. This led to a scenario where contractors and communities, unable to meet their debt obligations promptly, turned to loans.³⁹⁶ Consequently, from the highest administrative levels

³⁹⁵ Except el-Hac Sarıcazâde el-Hac Mehmed Ağa, the other local notables' çiftlik establishment continued with the same manner discussed above in the waqf villages with the inclusion of two other local notables namely, Arnavud Hasan and Mustafa in 1759. See, p. 118.

³⁹⁶ Yaycıoğlu, 'Partners of the empire: The crisis of the Ottoman order in the age of revolutions'. p. 96.

down to the village level, a cycle of indebtedness commenced.³⁹⁷ Factors such as over-taxation, famine, and banditry likely contributed significantly to the accumulation of debts among the peasant population.³⁹⁸ Meanwhile, tax farmers, assuming the role of moneylenders, effectively trapped peasants in a cycle of debt.³⁹⁹

The scenario outlined above serves as a clear illustration of the situation faced by lesser (compared to the prominent local notables of the century) tax-farmer local notables in Karaferiye. One of the biggest investors in land acquisition, Sarıcazâde el-Hac Mehmed Ağa, also found himself entangled in this cycle of debt. By mid-January 1749, he was confronted with the obligation to repay a substantial debt of 10,000 *guruş* to the *sarrafs* Mardoros and his associate, Kirforek (...*sarrafs teb'asından Mardoros ve şeriki Kirforek nam zimmiler südde-i saadetime arz-u hâl idüp hala Karaferiyede ikamet üzere olan Sarıcazâde el-Hac Mehmed Ağa dimekle ma'ruf kimesne zimmetinde iki kıta' temessük mucibince bin yüz altmış iki Saferi tarihinde on bin gurus alacakları olub...*).⁴⁰⁰ It becomes apparent that el-Hac Mehmed Ağa was somewhat hesitant to settle this debt, which had been accrued prior to 1749 with an interest rate of 24% over two years, resulting in a significant total debt of 14,800 *guruş* (...*bu ana gelince devr-i şer'i olunmuş senelerin murabahası dahi dört bin sekiz yüz guruşa balığ ve meblağ-ı mezburi mal-ı yetim ve mal-ı vakf olduğundan...ancak edasında tekasül üzere olduğundan gadr ve hayf murad eylediğin bildirüb...*). Leaving aside the early Gırçal case, the total amount of land investments of the Sarıcazâde family between 1746 and 1752 amounted to 9077,2 *guruş*, which was close to the mentioned debt.⁴⁰¹

³⁹⁷ Ibid.

³⁹⁸ Papastamatiou, 'Tax-farming (*İltizam*) and collective fiscal responsibility (*maktu*) in the Ottoman Southern Peloponnese in the second half of the eighteenth century', p. 292.

³⁹⁹ Ariel Salzmann, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: rival paths to the modern state*. Vol. 28, (Brill: Leiden, 2004). p. 147.

⁴⁰⁰ KKS.g. D-070 33/1-2 (15 Şaban 1164 / 9 July 1751).

⁴⁰¹ Although Sarıcazâde el-Hac Mehmed Ağa was the borrower in this case, members of this family, like el-Hac Ahmed Ağa and his brother left their *çiftlik*s to their children or nephews throughout the eighteenth century. For this reason, the investments of the family members are not analyzed separately.

It is conceivable that he borrowed this sum not solely for his obligations as the regional *ayan*, such as advance payment of *tevzi* taxes on behalf of the peasants or town dwellers. Rather, it is plausible that he directed these funds towards land investments, potentially establishing *çiftliks* through capitalizing on the indebtedness of peasants. The historical sources do not allow to ascertain whether he or his family members ultimately repaid this debt. Nevertheless, this circumstance serves as compelling evidence of the pervasive nature of bottom-up indebtedness, a phenomenon manifesting itself across all societal strata.

Considering the six cases related to one Mihrimah Sultan waqf village as a process concerning the relationship between indebtedness and the sale of land will help us elaborate on the process of the other thirteen cases regarding *çiftlik* formation. Like other imperial foundations, this waqf used tax farming as the method for revenue collection. The trustee of the waqf, Cigalazâde İbrahim Bey, who was based in Istanbul, had granted the tax farming of Gırçal village to Fesli Ağa.⁴⁰²

On October 13, 1723, a total of thirty-six peasants, including the residents of Gırçal village and other villages of Menlik, who also had fields in Gırçal village, in the presence of Katib Osman who was appointed by the judge of Salonica to assist the case, and Fesli Ağa litigated a case against el-Hac Ahmed Ağa ibn-i el-Hac Ali Ağa on the grounds that he seized an estimated 10,000 *dönüm* of their fields and meadows (...*Gırçal karyesi bundan akdem bizim mülk-ü müşteramız olub ve karye-i mezbure sınırı dahilinde vaki taht-ı tasarrufumuzda olub tahminen on bin dönüm tarlalarımızı ve çayırlarımızı bi-gayr-ı hakk vaz-ı yed ider...*). This case seemed parallel with the cases at hand as Ahmed Ağa replied that he purchased rather than appropriated the

See for the *çiftliks* transfers amongst the family members of Sarıcazâdes during the course of the eighteenth century Spyropoulos, Yannis; Poullos, Stefanos; and Anastasopoulos, Antonis, “Çiftlik, landed elites, and tax allocation in eighteenth-century Ottoman Veroia,” pp. 14-19.

⁴⁰² KKS.g. D-060-29-30 (13 Muharrem 1136 / 13 October 1723).

menzils on December 12, 1712 for 500 *guruş*. After about three months, he bought the usufruct of lands with the permission of the *sahib-i arz* for 2,000 *guruş* in partnership with his brother el-Hac Mehmed Ağa, and they held the purchase deed that was issued by the then judge of Karaferye Bosnevî Yusuf Efendi.

...on dokuz aded kiremid pûşîde ve bir saz pûşîde menzillerini ve yurd yerlerini hüsn-i rıza ve ihtiyarlarıyla bi-sıfkate vahide tedavül-i eyadi ile beş yüz guruş semene medfu' ve makbuza bin yüz yirmi dört senesi Zilkade-i şerifenin on üçüncü gününde [12 December 1712] ga'ib 'anil meclis karındaşım Mehmed Ağa ile ale'l iştirakü's-sevi bize bey' ve teslim idüb dahi ber-vech-i muharrer iştira ve kabz ve kabul ittiğimizden sonra köy-i mezbureye tabi 'yyet ile taht ve tasarruflarında olub köy-i mezbure sınuru dahilinde vaki' tahminen on bin dönüm tarla ve çayırlarını hüsn-ü rızalarıyla sahib-i arz ma'arifetiyle iki bin guruş bedel mukabelesinde bin yüz yirmi beş senesi Martın sekizinci gününde [19 March 1713] ferağ ve tefvîz biz dahi tefevvüz ve kabul ittiğimizden sonra...'.

Ahmed Ağa underlined the ownership claim by stressing that he had been cultivating and holding the properties and paying the tithe and customary taxes to the waqf for eleven years (...köy-i mezbure mülk-i müşteramız olub zikr olunan tarla ve çayır hakk-ı hukukumuz olmağla tarih-i mezburdan on bir seneden berü zira 'at ve hırsat idüb canib-i vakfa 'aşar-ı şeri 'yye ve rüsum-ı 'örfiyyemizi eda idüb ana binaen zabt ve tasarruf ıderiz...).

When the plaintiffs were questioned, they admitted that they had received 500 *guruş* for the buildings, 2,000 *guruş* for the *bedel-i ferağ* (transfer) of the lands, and in total 2,500 *guruş* from Mehmed Ağa for some expenses. Despite the peasants' continued refusal to accept the legality of the deeds in the hands of Ahmed Ağa and his brother Mehmed Ağa, the court ruled in favor of the two brothers by reminding the villagers that there was a ten-year limitation period for land transactions after which it was not possible to litigate a case, and that they had sold their land with their own consent and with the permission of the *sahib-i arz*.

‘...on sene mürur iden arazî da ‘vasının istima‘ı memnu‘ ve [ayrıca] hüsn-i rızaları ile arazilerin sahib-i ‘arz ma‘arifetiyle ferağ ve tefvîz eyledikleri vaki‘ ise men‘ ve def‘ musarrah olmağla zikr olunan bina ve arazi mezburan Ahmed Ağa ve Mehmed Ağa yedlerinde kemakan mülk-i müştera ve hakk-ı müfevvezleri olmak üzere hükm olunub...’.

Together with the fields and meadows, almost all of the arable and grazable land in the village was sold to two family members who would later become known as the "Saricazâdeler"—most likely after the death of their father, Sarıca Ali.⁴⁰³ The investments of these particular elites can be also read as the cumulative result of their fathers’ ventures in tax-farming that allow him to be cited as *mütemevvil* (wealth owner) towards the end of the seventeenth century.⁴⁰⁴ Almost a year after the sale of their lands, the brothers went to court to settle the dispute of some of the peasants who were causing problems in getting back their property on the grounds that they regretted selling their lands (*biz ferağımıza nâdim olduk*). Nevertheless, the court again questioned the validity of the sale by reciting the sales of the peasants as voluntary and that with the consent of the *sahib-i arz*.⁴⁰⁵ Following the Gırçal case, the two brothers seemed to continue acquiring *çiftlik*s jointly in the villages of Radani, Tırhalep and Milova but through which method they established or purchased these *çiftlik*s remain obscure with the absence of *hüccets*.⁴⁰⁶ Nevertheless, considering the choice of arable

⁴⁰³ Spyropoulos, Yannis; Poullos, Stefanos; and Anastasopoulos, Antonis, “Çiftlik, landed elites, and tax allocation in eighteenth-century Ottoman Veroia,” p.14. In the 1720s, the only notables and *ayan* family in Karaferye with brothers whose father's name was “el-Hac Ali Ağa” and whose names were Ahmed Ağa and Mehmed Ağa were the Saricazâdes. In some documents, members of prominent families of the region may not be mentioned with their family names as the *kadı* and the locals were aware of who they were.

⁴⁰⁴ BOA. A.DVNSMHM.d. 103 (7 January 1696 / 1 Cemazielahir 1107) case number: 755. *Karaferyeli* Sarıca Ali appeared to control the tax farm of Osman Paşa hass, which contain Velvendos and Dubnik tax units (*mukataa*) in 1696. Also see KKS.g. D-041/ 18/2-19/1. When the army was on the campaign of Vienna, the center demanded the sending of *zahire bedeli* (wheat price) as *nüzül* tax from Karaferye and ordered the payment from the wealthy member of the community who did not go to the campaign. Among them, Sarıca Ali was mentioned as one of the wealth owner members of the community.

⁴⁰⁵ KKS.g. D-059-72/2-(Evail Rebiülevvel 1126 / March 1714).

⁴⁰⁶ Spyropoulos, Yannis; Poullos, Stefanos; and Anastasopoulos, Antonis, “Çiftlik, landed elites, and tax allocation in eighteenth-century Ottoman Veroia,” p. 15.

land investment of the family through purchasing of the arable lands, one would think of the same method applied to their other *çiftlik*s. The first instance of the village of Gırçal being identified as a *çiftlik* under the ownership of el-Hac Mehmed Ağa appears in the *tevzi* register dated 1746.⁴⁰⁷ Approximately two years later, control of the *çiftlik* transferred to es-Sarıcazâde es-Seyyid Mehmed Ramiz and his brother Ali Efendi, possibly through an inheritance from their uncle.⁴⁰⁸ Although the exact date of the establishment of the *çiftlik* after 1712 is unknown, the fact that the *menzils* and lands subject to the purchase were identical in terms of their legal treatment, as is shown in the other examples, and that it emerged as the only *çiftlik* of the village in the possession of the same family member suggest the existence of a *çiftlik* in this case. After the purchase of the lands, the established *çiftlik* remained in the hands of members of the family even after 1773.⁴⁰⁹

So, why did the peasants of Gırçal sell their *menzils* and lands in 1712? It should be noted that four of the thirty-six peasants who held lands and *menzils* seemed to live in Gırçal and the remaining were settled in other villages in Menlik. The reason was the result of the second sale of these lands by the first buyer kadi Mahmud Efendi, who was the lender of a huge part of the debt of the Gırçal villagers, who in return sold

⁴⁰⁷ BOA. MŞH.ŞSC.d (Meşihat Şerriyye Sicili Defterleri) 9024, 15b/1 (21 Recep 1159 / 9 August 1746). The *tevzi* register was kept for *miri mübayaa* of 14,000 *kile* of wheat.

⁴⁰⁸ KKS.g. D-073-127 (15 Recep 1161 / 11 July 1748). The *tevzi* registers are important for genealogical study, but due to the dynamics of the local area or for other reasons, they may tend to misrepresent the degree of closeness of family members due to personal familiarity, as in this case. Except in the *tevzi* records, Ramiz's father is recorded as "el-Hac Ahmed Ağa" in all legal proceedings in the region. Existing literature refers to Ramiz's father as his uncle "el-Hac Mehmed Ağa." See VGMA (Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü Arşivi- Defter No.624/ Sayfa No: 419/ Sıra No: 393). The name "Ramiz Mehmed Efendi" in the vakf deed of his foundation is recorded as "Es-Seyyid Mehmed Ramiz Efendi ibn-i el-Hac Ahmed Ağa ibn-i el-Hac Ali Ağa eş-şehir bi-Sarıcazâde..."

⁴⁰⁹ ISAM (Center for Islamic Studies), Karaferiye Kadı Sicilleri, hereinafter KKS.i 2a-38/b (7 Zilhicce 1186 / 1 March 1773). The *çiftlik* was registered in the name of Ramiz Efendi, but he had already passed away before 1773, which implies that it was at the disposition of his descendants. For the transfer of his *çiftlik*s to the member of his family See Spyropoulos, Yannis; Poullos, Stefanos; and Anastasopoulos, Antonis, "Çiftlik, landed elites, and tax allocation in eighteenth-century Ottoman Veroia," pp. 18-19. ISAM, KKS.i 2a-134/b (21 Zilhicce 1169 / 16 September 1756). In the masarif-i vilayet document, the village appeared to be divided into two in 1756 under the control of Ramiz Mehmed and his brother Ali Efendi as Gırçal-ı Cedid and Gırçal-ı Atik most probably due to its large arable lands and population.

their properties to Mahmud. After that, he sold these lands to the villagers living in other villages of Menlik. The lands were exchanged twice in nine months until they were handed over to the brothers, who completed the purchase in March 1713. As a result, we see that the villagers were holding lands in Gırçal village but originally from other villages of Menlik.

As stated by the two brothers, if we go back, we will encounter three cases of considerable unpaid debts concerning peasants from Gırçal. What added up to their tax and debt burden by dealing the last heavy blow was the failure of their harvests just in advance of their debts (...*bir kaç senedir bi-emrillah mahsulleri olmayub medyun ve fakir olduklarından...*).⁴¹⁰ The first one is 21,000 *akçe* of principal debt and 15% of interest, which amounted to 24,150 *akçe*, taken by six peasants from the Asiye Hatun waqf in 1704.⁴¹¹ The second debt case, dated 1712, has the same provisions as the first by means of the lender and the amount, but this time eleven peasants borrowed money.⁴¹² Among these, Kiryako, son of Avram, Nikola, son of Barış, Toma, son of Kiro, and Milhori, son of Yorgi, were also present in the first debt case. After the change of trustee, one of the routine procedures was to have receivables registered in the court registers. In this regard, in the first debt case, the legal trustee was Afife Hatun, but in the second one, we see Mahmud Efendi ibn-i Ebubekir Efendi as the legal trustee of the Asiye Hatun waqf. Both debt cases imply they were taken long before the date of their registration in the current register; one may assume the peasants were overwhelmed by unpaid debts and trapped in a cycle of debt.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ KKS.g. D-045-52/2 (10 Recep 1116 / 8 November 1704).

⁴¹² KKS.g. D-052-13/1 (15 Safer 1124 / 24 March 1712) The names of the 7 villagers of Gırçal who were named as the debtors in both of the debt cases are as follows: Kosta veled-i Yuvan, Niko veled-i Barış, Kara Toma veled-i Kiro, Dimitri veled-i Tanaş, Todor veled-i Sotiri, Yorgo veled-i Argir, ve Milhoro veled-i Yorgi.

Two months had passed since the second debt, and the villagers took out a third.⁴¹³ While three peasant debtors were present in all the debt cases, seven of the debtors in the second case were present in the last one too. This time, the lender was not the waqf but judge Mahmud Efendi ibn-i Mustafa, and the content of the debt is revealing, albeit implicitly, about the relations of production at the village level. As the peasants seemed to borrow money by putting up wheat as collateral for the high sum of 4,500 *guruş* (...*reaya-yı mezburun zimmetlerinde cihet-i karzdan ve malumü'l mikdar buğday semenlerinden ba'di küllin hesâb dokuz kise olmak üzere dört bin beş yüz gurus hakkı olub...*), the judge seemed to invest in the peasants' surplus, while not definitive, probably through a *muzaraa* contract. The debt in question is delineated into two distinct components as stated by the peasants: the debt proper (*cihet-i karz*) and the price of wheat (*buğday semeni*). While the former directly pertains to the debt itself, the latter seems to represent an obligation originating from the apportionment of wheat between the parties. It raises the question as to why peasants would need to purchase wheat from the kadi when they were the primary producers of such a crop. This inquiry suggests that the price of wheat signifies a debt incurred due to an arrangement, such as *muzaraa*, between the kadi and the peasants, where an apportionment agreement likely entailed the obligation to acquire wheat. In this system, the investor provided a wide spectrum of materials such as seeds, oxen, and capital for miscellaneous expenditures necessary for cultivation, while the peasants contributed their labor power and oxen.

Particularly prominent in the eighteenth century, the elites possessing wealth and land, who sought to capitalize on their land investments and extract gains from

⁴¹³ KKS.g. D-052-35/3 (20 Rebiülahir 1124 / 27 May 1712).

agricultural output, initiated *muzaraa* contracts with peasants.⁴¹⁴ These contracts enabled both parties to prearrange cultivation and harvest terms by delineating their respective shares and contributions. This practice endured throughout the eighteenth century, finding extensive application across a spectrum of economic classes range from modest investors, likely the one mentioned above to the affluent notables, functioned as a mechanism for effective land utilization.⁴¹⁵

Although the amount of the villagers' debt was declared by kadi Mahmud Efendi as 4,500 *guruş*, the villagers claimed that they had already paid 720 *guruş* back to him. To settle the dispute, with the mediation of local people, as is the standard wording in such cases, they agreed that 1,500 *guruş* would be written off and, since the villagers could not pay this high amount at once, they would pay 1,000 *guruş* installments per year for a total debt of 3,000 *guruş*. In addition to the two debt cases of the Asiye Hatun waqf, the total debt of the peasants of Gırçal village reached the sizable amount of 3,402 *guruş*. It is reasonable to think that they had to sell their private and *miri* properties to the first the lender kadi Mahmud Efendi who retained the properties and lands for some time before selling them to the other villagers of Menlik.

Two brothers purchased these lands precisely seven months later due to these debt sums. As can be seen, the same seven people from the first debt case borrowed again two months later. It is difficult to determine whether the double borrowing was in effect undertaken by these people on behalf also of other inhabitants of the village since it is possible that in such cases, some of the village members participated in the lawsuit as proxies on behalf of others. Also, the amount in the third case is quite high,

⁴¹⁴ Özer Ergenç, "XVIII.Yüzyılda Osmanlı Anadolu'sunda Tarım Üretiminde Yeni Boyutlar: Muzâra'a ve Murâba'a Sözleşmeleri," *Kebikeç* 23 (2007): 129–39.

⁴¹⁵ Yaycıoğlu, *Partners of the empire: The crisis of the Ottoman order in the age of revolutions*, p. 96.

raising suspicions that the people whose names appear in the lawsuit were there on behalf of other village residents in the context of collective borrowing.⁴¹⁶ In light of the above information, not eleven in the second debt case, but thirty-six peasants sold their *menzils* and land in the village of Gırçal to the two brothers, seven months after the last debt case, in 1712. It would appear that the accumulation of unpaid debts, the need for financial support to conduct cultivation as well as paying the head tax to the state and tithe to the waqf administration, including *muzaraa* obligations, put an unbearable financial burden on the peasants who took recourse to borrowing from wealthy members of the local elites such as a *kadı* and the waqf.

In 1672, the peasants of Podrom and Gırçal managed to fully repay significant debts, the highest recorded for any village in the seventeenth century. However, by the eighteenth century, these peasants had sold their properties, which were mentioned earlier. This shift suggests a marked change in the financial circumstances of the villages between the two centuries. The ability to pay off debts in the seventeenth century implies a fair economic capacity. If, in the eighteenth century, they sold their land and buildings not out of financial distress but to alleviate their tax burden, this further indicates sustained economic strength across both centuries, despite the fiscal challenges posed by prolonged wars faced in the seventeenth century. Moreover, the possibility of the peasants borrowing money from other sources exists. However, it is unlikely that such substantial loans would go unrecorded in court registers which contain even modest debt contracts. Therefore, the absence of court records for large debts contradicts the hypothesis of a second significant borrowing from another lender.

⁴¹⁶ After the mid-eighteenth century, collective borrowing seemed to continue for the villagers of Karaferye. See Anastasopoulos, *Imperial Institutions and Local Communities: Ottoman Karaferye, 1758-1774*, p. 118.

Finally, the debt case of this village draws attention to the nature of financial relations between families and the importance of marriage in the transfer of wealth and property. In the second debt case of this village, the *kadı* Mahmud Efendi ibn-i Mustafa, who lent the large sum of 2,500 *guruş*, was to become the father-in-law of the abovementioned el-Hac Ahmed Ağa ibn-i el-Hac Ali Ağa in the 1720s. Thus, in this case, the region's notables had established financial relations prior to solidifying their affiliation via a marriage alliance and furthering the foundations of wealth partnerships. Considering all the above, the peasant community could pay both Asiye Hatun's foundation and Mahmud Efendi's debts by selling their *menzils* and the usufruct of their *miri* lands to el-Hac Ahmed Ağa and his brother el-Hac Mehmed Ağa.

In addition to indebtedness, another factor that may have led the peasants to sell their land to the wealth- and power-holders of the region was security concerns.⁴¹⁷ In the eighteenth century, to create new sources of income to meet their increased expenditures, the governors began to levy unlawful taxes under the name of *tekalif-i şakka*.⁴¹⁸ After a while, this demand gradually became an instrument of oppression on the taxpaying subjects by making unlawful increases to some of the legally collected taxes. On the other hand, to rein in the pressure, the *kadis* were given broad powers to maintain order in the local towns under their control. As this was an empire-wide problem, the town of Karaferiye experienced its share of it. Due to changing dynamics during the century, local notables took de facto control or exerted influence in the towns to the extent that their power allowed it, which, in turn, must have pitted the

⁴¹⁷ McGowan, "The age of the ayans", p. 681.

⁴¹⁸ Gergana Georgieva, "Administrative structure and government of Rumelia in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: The functions and activities of the Vali of Rumeli", in *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760-1850: Conflict, Transformation, Adaptation*, (eds.), Antonis Anastapoulos and Elias Kolovos, Proceedings of an International Conference Held in Rethymno, Greece, 13-14 December 2003, (Rethymno, Department of History and Archaeology of the University of Crete, 2007). pp. 6-7.

ehl-i örf against the local notables. In short, the conflict became a conflict of interests, with the local notables maintaining the balance between the two groups acting to gain control of the resources. A firman sent to the *kaza* states that the town and villages of Karaferye subject to the Hatice Sultan *hass* (for example, the village of Toplani in Table 1 belonged to this *hass*) were disposed as *serbestiyyet üzere*, and ordered that the *ehl-i örf* be prevented from taking extra money in the name of horseshoe supply (*nal baha*), grain supply (*zahire baha*), robe supply (*kaftan baha*), and inspection by evoking the law of Mehmed II.⁴¹⁹ While the term *ehl-i örf* may lack precision, the firman in question explicitly identified various officials such as the governor of Rumelia, governor of Salonica, *mütesellim*, *müfettiş* (inspector), and *yasakçı* as individuals belonging to the *ehl-i örf* category who were engaged in the illegal collection of the aforementioned taxes. In another case, the *ehl-i örf* intervened in the Menlik district villages, which were subject to Mihrimah Sultan's Waqf and again were *serbest* owned by demanding excessive taxes.⁴²⁰ In this case, Mustafa ibn-i Şaban, the timariot of the village of İskiliç, which is mentioned among the villages subject to the Menlik *nahiye*, in 1756, stated that the *ehl-i örf* were not satisfied with half of the *niyabet rüsum* and tried to appropriate all of it, and made a request to prevent this.⁴²¹ It is possible that the timariot Mustafa, having failed in his efforts to prevent the interventions, found the solution in granting the village of İskiliç to Sarıcazâde es-Seyyid Ramiz Mehmed Efendi for one year.⁴²² Alternatively, the timariot might have granted the village before to other individuals and Ramiz Mehmed became the next leaser. However, if the assumption that timariot was not able to stand against illegal actions of *ehl-i örf* and granted the village to Ramiz Mehmed then he might have

⁴¹⁹ KKS.g. D-071-15 (1 Cemazielahir 1143 / 12 December 1730).

⁴²⁰ KKS.g. D-073-73-74 (1 Rebiülahir 1160 / 12 April 1747).

⁴²¹ KKS.g. D-080-22 (20 Şaban 1169 / 20 May 1756).

⁴²² KKS.g. D-080-23 (20 Şevval 1169 / 18 October 1756).

fairgrounds for doing so as the order sent to the notables of the region for the protection of the inhabitants of the town and *derbend* villages mentions es-Seyyid Mehmed Ramiz Efendi at the very beginning, before and above other notables, showing that Ramiz had such power.⁴²³ Although available cases were not able to point out the effects of security concerns of the peasants in selling their arable lands to powerholders of the Karaferye directly, the condition of indebtedness opened up new horizons of opportunity for those with wealth and power to invest in *çiftlik*s. When comparing the size of these *çiftlik*s to those of the prominent Karaosmanoğlu family from approximately the same time period, it becomes evident that these *çiftlik*s were significantly larger.⁴²⁴ Thus, it is clear that the size of these *çiftlik*s has the capacity to serve as the examples of large-landed estates in the eighteenth century.

4.3. Legal Status of the Peasants

Drawing on the cases from western and central parts of Anatolia, Ergenç pointed out to the dispositions concerning the cultivation of arable land under *miri* land law, particularly during the eighteenth century, and that such arrangements may be described as quasi-ownership.⁴²⁵ Here, it is important to clarify that the dissolution of the *miri* land system at the usufruct level should not be seen as a necessary condition for the investments that resulted in the development of large *çiftlik*s owned by one or more individuals. Furthermore, when the family members who had founded the *çiftlik*s passed away, the *çiftlik*s did not perish with them but came under the control of either

⁴²³ KKS.g. D-076-44/2 (13 Şevval 1163 / 15 September 1750). Also, for the close relation between peasants' search for security from bandits and seeking shelter in *askerî çiftlik*s see Kokdas, 'Money, peasant mobility, *çiftlik*s, and local politics in Salonika: 1740-1820,' *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 34, p. 140.

⁴²⁴ Nagata, 'Tarihte âyânlar: Karaosmanoğulları üzerine bir inceleme', pp. 105-107.

⁴²⁵ Ergenç, "XVII ve XVIII. Yüzyıl Anadolu'sunda Toprak Tasarrufu ve Mülkiyeti Üzerine Değerlendirmeler," pp. 215-46.

their descendants or new local notables. In this case, the peasants, who carried out the production with their labor, became the “independent variable” of the *çiftlik*. On the other hand, the legal status with which the peasant participated in the organization of agricultural production is challenging to articulate and can only be discussed by evaluating each *çiftlik* separately. Yet, there are legal proceedings that allow insights into the way in which a single-landholder *çiftlik* was established and operated. Such proceedings provide the necessary means to discuss such *çiftliks* in parallel with others by the same landholder.

If the existing peasants remained in place after selling their properties—and there is no evidence to suggest otherwise at present—the *çift-hane* system would have operated in a different guise under complete control of the landholder over the surplus.⁴²⁶ At first glance, it is reasonable to think that peasants obtained economic and political benefits from chiftlicization: protection by a powerful landowner that could even lead to relief from their tax obligations for a short time. Except for the head-tax (*cizye*), new landholders were liable to pay *avarız*, *öşr*, and *ispençe*. The *avarız* tax was tied to land or building ownership, so peasants became automatically exempted from it after selling their private and *miri* property. Unlike *avarız*, *öşr* and *ispençe* were collected by the *çiftlik* owner from the peasants, giving the upper hand to the former. After paying the regular taxes, the landholder and the peasants divided the remaining surplus according to the arrangements that they had agreed in advance of the cultivation, *muzaraa* or a wage for each peasant.

Initially, before selling their arable land, independent peasants may have participated in production through *muzaraa* contracts with the property owners.

⁴²⁶ Laiou, ‘Some considerations regarding *çiftlik* formation in the Western Thessaly, 16th-19th Centuries,’ p. 270.

Muzaraa is a partnership based on Sharia law, and the rights of the parties are defined before the contract begins. After the sale of their lands, such partnerships may have continued for a short period of time, as the landowner had to gain a surplus in the name of profit from his investment after separating the *öşr* and *ispençe* amounts for the state. In the case of *muzaraa*, the parties must have been on an equal legal footing, as the contracts lasted from one to a maximum of three years, giving the peasants relative security from total bondage to the landlord, and the obligations of the peasants ended after the termination of the contract. If the assumption in the case of Gırçal is correct, it is likely that the peasants who participated in this *muzaraa* later participated in production, whether as wage laborers, sharecroppers, or tenants, all of which were economically, legally, and politically inferior to the landowner. Undoubtedly, this new mode of production must have gradually imposed an additional tax burden on the peasants as the investor landholder sought to profit more. Over time and space, its impact would have varied.

Upon the request of es-Seyyid Ramiz Mehmed Efendi, a firman was issued that suggested that the “independent” peasant seemed to evolve into a new group dependent on the *çiftlik* owner and now participating in this new form of production with the status of “wage laborer” (*ecir*).⁴²⁷ After listing the *çiftlik*s of Ramiz Mehmed in various villages, some of which were established by purchase of peasant land and others may have been possibly bequeathed by his uncle el-Hac Mehmed Ağa and his father el-Hac Ahmed Ağa, it is understood that he was paying his taxes as required:

‘...mumaileyhin Karaferiye kazası toprağında hane-i ‘avarıza bağlı tekalif alınmak icab ider Gırçal ve Uskuterina ve Branyat ve Milova ve Rabsomanik ve Mikroğuz ve Libanova ve Tırhaleb ve Servihor nam çiftlikler emlak ve

⁴²⁷ KKS.g. D-80-3-5 (Zilkade 1169 / October 1756). Given the availability of documents, it was not possible to see whether Ramiz Mehmed transferred farmhands as workers from other villages. This term *ecir* can also be regarded as an umbrella term for any labor form available except the once autonomous peasants in the *çiftlik*s.

arazileri olmağla avarız ve imdad-ı hazariyye vesair emr-i şerif ile vaki' olan tekalifden tahammülüne göre hissesine isabet ideni edada kusuru yoğ iken...'.

Yet, due to interventions by the *voyvoda* and other local notables, his *çiftlik* was ruined and the wage laborers were suffering. The firman orders the prevention of such illegal actions: (...*voyvoda ve mütegalibe-i 'ayandan ba'zıları kendü nevsleri için emr-i defterden ziyade akçe tevzi' ve cebren tahsil da'yesiyle çiftlik ecirlerini ahz ve habs ve der-zincir ile rencide ve ta'addi ve çiftliklerinin harabına ve ecirlerinin perişan olmalarına bâdi oldukların bildirüb...*).⁴²⁸

In the *çiftliks* listed in the firman, peasants seemed to continue to cultivate the land as *ecir*, i.e. wage laborers. We, thus, see a development on the same plane as İnalcık's point that sharecropping, a more traditional form of labor, was replaced by day labor in *çiftliks* in western Anatolia, which could foster market integration.⁴²⁹ Even if the data at hand regarding the mentioned change in the status of the peasants are restricted only to the nine *çiftliks* of Ramiz Mehmed, *çiftliks* that were established by purchasing method in other cases may have changed the peasants legal status into wage laborers, too. The Salonican countryside, that was highly *chiftlicized*, was not different than western Anatolia in its capacity to integrate trade networks.⁴³⁰ An important consideration that arises is whether Ramiz Mehmed hired wage laborers (*ecir*) to compensate for the potential requirement of additional labor in his *çiftliks*. Put it differently, did the physical displacement of former peasants take place instead of the mere transfer of their titles (*tapu*) to new proprietors, i.e., the *çiftlik* holders?⁴³¹ The

⁴²⁸ KKS.g. D-80-3-5 (Zilkade 1169 / October 1756).

⁴²⁹ İnalcık, "The Emergence of Big Farms, *Çiftliks*: State, Landlords, and Tenants," p. 119.

⁴³⁰ Sadat, "Rumeli ayanları : The eighteenth century," pp. 349-350.

⁴³¹ McGowan contends that when direct coercion is not an option, one effective method for achieving titular dispossession (keeping the cultivator in place but imposing stricter conditions) is to start a cycle of debt by lending to the cultivator while using the threat of breaking the contract to gain complete control over them and that widespread practice is known as peonage. For a discussion of titular and physical dispossession of peasants see McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe*, pp. 62-66.

contract of sale between the peasants and Ramiz Mehmed involved the relinquishment of the *menzils* they resided in and the lands they cultivated. Post-sale, the peasants most probably continued to reside and cultivate in the same properties, but with a modified legal status. However, given that no data is currently available on the possible relocation of the peasants to neighboring towns or villages, peasants after the sale continued to cultivate with modified legal status, which in this case as wage laborers.

The way the *çiftlik*s were disposed of suggests that once they were established, their actors treated them as separate fiscal units and even disposed of them as such. Although it would be beyond the scope of this study to claim this for all the *çiftlik*s under examination, the fact that at least one of them, which was established by purchase, was subject to such disposition can lead us to consider the same for the others established through the same practice. Again, the fact that Ramiz Mehmed Efendi's *çiftlik* in the village of Rabsomanik, which he established about eight months after purchasing the lands, was leased eleven months after it was established, is illuminating in this regard. The contract (*mukavele*) was prepared in the presence of the *kadı* referring to Ramiz as the owner of the *çiftlik* (*es-Seyyid Mehmed Ramiz mutasarrıf-ı çiftlik-i mezbûr*). Ramiz Mehmed leased the *çiftlik* for two years to the *kocabaşı* (non-Muslim notable) İstamat for 1,400 *guruş* on the grounds that he would pay the taxes of *tekalif-i örfiyye* and *şakka* demanded from the share of this *çiftlik* together with providing the seeds for cultivation and the share of *subaşı* (overseer of the *çiftlik*) Salih who, we may assume, would continue to manage the production process in the *çiftlik*:

‘...iş bu bin yüz altmış bir ve altmış iki senelerinde Karaferye kazasında vaki‘ mutasarrıf ve mütemellik olduğum Rabsomanik çiftliğimde seneteyn-i mezkureteyn tarafından bi-avnihi te‘ala hasıl olan mahsulatın zer‘ olunan tohumu ve çiftlik-i merkumede tarafımızdan subaşıımız olan Salih Subaşı’nın ber vech-i ‘örf-i kadîm subaşılık ondahlığı ve çiftlik-i mezburenin sinin-i

*mezkureteyn tarafından vilayet tarafından isabet iden tekalif-i 'örfiyye ve şakkası işbu darende-i hurûf aşnamız Karaferye Varoşu kocabaşısı İstamat tarafından eda olunmak şartıyla iki sene tarafından hasıl olan mahsulatı yalnız bin dört yüz guruşa icâr ve iltizam ol dahi ber minval-i muharrer isticar ve kabul...'*⁴³²

After paying 864 *guruş* to Ramiz Mehmed, nine days later, İstamat gave another 256 *guruş* from his remaining debt that would be paid in one month. It is clear that in all level of economic activity, the Muslim elites of the town were the dominant group but it does necessarily prevent business partnerships, though small scale with non-Muslim members of the community. In this particular case, the economic relationship of the Muslim landowner and *ayan* with the leading member of the non-Muslim community, the *kocabaşı*, in the *çiftlik* market not only points to the nature of wealth and power in the *kaza*, but also suggests that ethnic or religious distinctions, typically seen as potential barriers to intercommunity relations, may have had a relatively minor impact on the economic plane.⁴³³

4.4. Change in Tax Collection Methods: From *Maktu'* to *Ta'sir*

In the empire, tithe and production-based taxes from the villages were collected either through the *maktu'* or *ta'sir* methods. Each method had distinct fiscal functionality depending on the specific tax collection procedure within a particular tax unit. But the empire had the leverage to impose and change the one for another whenever it sees fit in accordance with the revenue raising or to provide constant flow of taxes. Like it was the case in extending the term for the discharge of peasants' debts,

⁴³² KKS.g. D-073-93/2 (17 Rebiülevvel 1161 / 17 March 1748). This document has been discussed and published in French translation in Antonis Anastasopoulos, 'Notables musulmans et chrétiens dans les Balkans du xviii^e siècle: Attestation (*temessük*) d'affermage du *çiftlik* de Ramiz Efendi à Rabsomanik au *kocabaşı* Stamatis', in Elisabetta Borromeo and Nicolas Vatin (eds), *Les Ottomans par eux-mêmes*, (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2020), 391-396.

⁴³³ Anastasopoulos, 'Notables musulmans et chrétiens dans les Balkans du xviii^e siècle: Attestation (*temessük*) d'affermage du *çiftlik* de Ramiz Efendi à Rabsomanik au *kocabaşı* Stamatis'. p. 395.

and exempting the interest arose from the debt-proper, this change was based on the principle of *evlâ ve enfâ*‘.

In the context of *çiftliks* through end of the eighteenth century, the empire aimed to recalibrate its tax share from the agricultural production. The primary concern of the center with regard to the establishment of *çiftliks* was the possible disruption of tax disbursement and the illegal way in which some *çiftliks* were formed. This concern is made evident by a firman issued in 1795. Although its primary focus was Keşan and Edirne, it was addressed to other kadışhips in Rumelia in August, as well as Anatolian provinces a month later. As one of the many kadışhips in Rumelia with a highly chiftlicized rural area, the firman was sent to Karaferye and recorded verbatim into the court register.⁴³⁴ The firman provides an apt depiction of the process involved in establishing *çiftliks*, as examined in this study, wherein landholders likely acquired peasant lands, potentially as a means of resolving debts, among other possible considerations. It also reminds its illegality and how the *çiftlik* owners imposed their tax obligations onto the peasants and recorded the taxes of the village where *çiftliks* were established as *maktu*‘ (lump-sum).

‘... kadim karyede sonradan çiftlik ittihaz olunması mugayir-i defter-i hakani ve münâfi-i kanun olduğuna binaen öteden berü memnu‘ iken... bazı karyeler reayasının bazı murabahacı makulelerine deynleri olmağla reaya-yı merkume bazı mahkemelere varub “bizim filan ademe şu mikdar deynimiz vardır ol deynimizi eda için mutasarrıf olduğumuz emlak ve arazimizi filan ademe şu mikdar baha ile fûruht ve kasr-ı yed eyledik ve nakden şu mikdar akçe aldık” diyerek ve akçeye mikdar tayin iderek hakimden hüccet ahz idüp hüccet mucibince emlak-ı mezbureyi iştira iden kimesne dahi ol karyeyi çiftlik ittihaz ve kadimi mukayyed olan tekalifden bir mikdarını tenzil ve kura-yı saire üzerine tahmil itmek sevdasında olduğu mesmu‘ olmağla... kura reayası emlakini kimesneye fûruht itmek ve fûruht itti diyü hüccet virmemek ve

⁴³⁴ KKS.g. D-102-40-41 (Evail-i Safer 1210 / August 1795). This firman has been published in Greek before in Vasdravellis, Ioann. K. (ed.), Ιστορικά Αρχεία Μακεδονίας. Β’. Αρχείον Βεροίας-Ναούσης 1598-1886 [Historical archives of Macedonia. II. Archive of Veria-Naoussa, 1598-1886] (Thessaloniki: Society for Macedonian Studies, 1954), no: 245, pp. 237-239. I thank to Antonis Anastosopoulos for sharing the information regarding this reference.

kadimi kura bir vakitte çiftlik ittihaz olunmamak vechiyle bir karyenin tekalifi maktu' kayd ittirilmemek matlub-ı hümayunumdur diyü...'.⁴³⁵

The aim of the decree was to protect free *reaya* from losing their lands. It would be fair to assert that there would have been no problem if the sale of land and buildings had not taken place due to *reaya* indebtedness. The instruction to kadis to abstain from recording purchases in their court registers and refraining from issuing *hüccet*, even when transactions occurred, illustrates another prevailing trend of the era. This trend involved the amplification of methods of extortion for amassing landed property, achieved by bestowing an appearance of legality upon sales through their registration in court registers. This might have been the method exploited by the ayans of Karaferye.

Indeed, the purchase of land as an investment became more prevalent in the eighteenth century.⁴³⁶ Retired soldiers and members of the *ulema* began to engage in the agricultural sector by purchasing land to utilize their capital in the commercializing agricultural economy of the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire. Over the course of time, the practice of acquiring land and subsequently establishing agricultural enterprises evolved into a process that gained implicit acknowledgement from the state. Thus, despite occasional warnings, the central government did not take significant measures to address the agricultural production system deeply embedded in the social and economic structure of each region. This system, although intended to protect the land usufruct of *reaya* from being alienated by the large landholders, was not effectively curbed by the government.

⁴³⁵ BOA, AE.SSLM.II. 262/15185 Evail- Safer 1210 / August 1795; BOA, C.ML. 23/1069 (Evail-i Rebiülevvel 1210 / September 1795). Two *ilams*, or court decrees, dated 1796 based on these firmans were used before by Yıldız, "Politics, economy, and *çiftliks*: The history of four *çiftliks* in Larissa (Yenişehir-i Fener)," p. 33.

⁴³⁶ Ergenç, "XVII ve XVIII. Yüzyıl Anadolu'sunda Toprak Tasarrufu ve Mülkiyeti Üzerine Değerlendirmeler," pp. 240-241.

This approach of the center is proof of an economic mentality that prioritized the flow of taxes over the exact status of landownership (*çiftlik* or other) in a region, which was an intent expressed implicitly in the firman over stressing the abolition of *maktu'* tax (lump-sum) levy. There was a parallel process of transformation between different forms of land disposal and taxation types. From the classical period to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was the forms of tax collection that accompanied this transformation and in which the imperial center itself, as an actor shaping this process, took part as a regulator not only in distribution but also in recalibrating the method of collecting the taxes. This is because the priority was to collect taxes in an orderly and, if possible, lossless manner. The amount of taxes being collected in *maktu'* is estimated based on the average of prior years. It eliminates the fluctuations in the amount of tax to be collected regardless of the production levels in related seasons.

If the production levels were high and *maktu'* tax method was in effect, then the center would have renounced collecting prospective high tax amount unintentionally. This tax collection system presents the potential to mitigate disputes between tax collectors(landholders) and taxpayers(peasants) through providing relative security to the latter.⁴³⁷ After the conquest of Crete with exhausting and long-lasting siege, the center's sensitive approach to the island can be seen in collection of the agrarian taxes as *maktu'* as one would see the cultivation of profit making commercial crops.⁴³⁸ This was an attempt similar to the one discussed for the Mora in 1720, to ease the tax load as well as ensuring the constant flow of taxes. Nevertheless,

⁴³⁷ İnalçık, "Military and fiscal transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–1700". p. 334.

⁴³⁸ Eugenia Kermeli, "Caught in between Faith and Cash: The Ottoman Land System of Crete, 1645-1670," in *The Eastern Mediterranean under Ottoman Rule: Crete, 1645-1840 (Halcyon Days in Crete VI, A Symposium Held in Rethymno, 13-15 January 2006*, ed. Antonis Anastasopoulos (Crete University Press, 2008), 17–49. pp. 38-39.

it concurrently results in a reduction of the state's portion of for instance, the *öşr* tax during years of heightened revenues. In *ta'şir* system of tax collection, which specifically encompasses the *öşr* tax—a levy imposed on agricultural produce at a fixed rate (1/10, 1/9, 1/8) at the end of the harvest season, proportional to the quantity of yield. What is effective in this type of tax collection is the harvest time. It is a way of collecting the tax after the appearance of the product. Lump sum tax collection has no temporal sensitivity. It can be collected at any time of the year. This "any time of the year" was effective in empowering the ayans and giving them economic control over their regions as *çiftlik* owners. Because they could pay the taxes that the reaya had to pay, either directly to the center or by lending them money without waiting for the harvest. While the reaya had to wait for the harvest, the ayans could keep cash on hand and advance the necessary amount, giving the prerogative in controlling these collective fiscal entities. At the turn of the nineteenth century, it was precisely this effort of Tepedelenli Ali Paşa to achieve the fiscal control in the province over local notables by demanding the *maktu'* type of tax collection through dispatching his agents from the center.⁴³⁹

In essence, this approach permits the determination of tax rates based on the actual volume of produce, ensuring that the state's share aligns with the realized agricultural output. Thus, the decree to abolish the lump sum tax collection system is grounded in the state's implicit recognition of the surplus production within the *çiftliks*.⁴⁴⁰ Furthermore, *çiftliks* can be considered as relatively organized facilities that

⁴³⁹ Dimitris Dimitropoulos, 'Aspects of the working of the fiscal machinery in the areas ruled by Ali Paşa. In A. Anastasopoulos & E. Kolovos (Ed.). *Ottoman rule and the Balkans, 1760–1850: Conflict, transformation, adaptation. Proceedings of an International Conference Held in Rethymno, Greece, 13–14 December 2003*, (pp. 61-72) (Rethymno: University of Crete, Department of History and Archaeology, 2007). pp. 67-69.

⁴⁴⁰ Especially when the central treasury was in need of revenue for the implementation of the reforms initiated by Selim III under the program of Nizam-ı Cedid. See for the effort in finding revenue sources

ensures the smooth flow of agricultural produce to the imperial state.⁴⁴¹ Thus, the empire contented itself with regulating the existing agricultural market, provided that the granaries of the garrisons, the bakeries of the capital, and the grain carts of the army remained full during campaigns and there were no disruptions in production.

This active regulation included the management of *çiftlik* distribution process among the notables of a given locality.⁴⁴² Nonetheless, the fiscal abuses of *çiftlik* holders led the Ottoman state to take measures such as a firman that arrived in Karaferye in 1735 demanding the registration of the actual number of *avarız* households, especially in the *çiftlik* units owned by Muslim members of the local elite.⁴⁴³ As stated in the firman, the *çiftlik*-holding local notables imposed their tax obligation onto the villages that did not include any *çiftlik* units. If they did not have the power of absolute subjugation, then *eşraf* and *ayan* tended to negotiate with the other *ayan* and representatives of village communities' smaller shares of tax for the villagers of their villages by hiding the actual number of the villagers in their *çitliks* and imposing their tax shares onto other villages. In this way, they could understate the production level and reduce the amount of *avarız* and *örfi* taxes their villages had to pay. Based on the decree, after about seven months, a new *avarız defter* was prepared. Thus, rather than abolishing an agrarian economy that was overwhelmingly centered on *çiftliks*, the empire tried to make sure that the flow of taxes would happen without any problems.⁴⁴⁴

Cezar, Yavuz, *Osmanlı maliyesinde bunalım ve değişim dönemi (XVIII. Yüzyıldan Tanzimat'a mali tarih)*, (İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1986). pp. 135-140.

⁴⁴¹ The court registers of Karaferye abound with *tevzi* registers prepared for state purchases (*miri mübayaa*) in cash and in kind, especially for wheat destined to the capital.

⁴⁴² Yıldız, "Politics, economy, and *çiftliks*: The history of four *çiftliks* in Larissa (Yenişehir-i Fener)," 28-65.

⁴⁴³ KKS.g. D-067-43/1 (10 Şevval 1147 / 5 March 1735).

⁴⁴⁴ BOA. KK.d. 2890 (Cemazielevvel 1148 / September 1735).

It allows a two-dimensional analysis within the context drawn so far: Level one - monetization - to obtain more taxes by favoring one type over another; Level two - searching for the *evlâ ve enfâ* ' for the community; this is the purpose of social reconciliation. A lump sum tax (maktu') is often imposed on communities (village, quarter, etc.) to provide relief to economically disadvantaged members by levying the tax communally rather than individually, thereby promoting social reconciliation and solidarity. Since the local power holders had ready cash in their pockets, they paid the required taxes of the communities in advance and instead of the peasant communities. Then they turned to peasants for either their yield or properties. In the eighteenth century, it was recognized that local magnates played a crucial role in ensuring the flow of necessary taxes. This method of taxation, which resembles the avariz tax, involves converting individual taxes into a fixed sum for the community. This system, based on compromise and tolerance, is adaptable and focuses on efficient tax collection by setting a predetermined amount based on the average of previous years rather than pursuing individual taxpayers. Hence, this approach of changing the method of tax collection from the villages containing many çiftliks or completely absorbed by a çiftlik unit was the empire's attempt at normalization against the ever-expanding production units, regardless of the legal status of the villages.

4.5. Legal Aspect of Çiftlik Establishment

In the case of Karaferye and as reflected in general edicts, whether the imperial waqf villages or timar villages, the conversion of a previously independent village into a çiftlik or the establishment of çiftliks in these villages was considered unlawful in the eighteenth century as it hindered the smooth flow of taxes for the empire. Nevertheless, these agricultural facilities expanded in not only Selanik and Western

Anatolia, but also in their inner hinterlands. The most common method has appeared and can also be thought for other localities was the purchase of the peasants' lands by recording the transaction in the presence of the local judge who issues a *hüccet* to the court register. Prior to the general firman of 1795 which addressed to the all the towns of Balkans and Anatolia proves the sale of peasants' lands out of debt through the issuance of kadi hüccets as an empire-wide development in the establishment of çiftliks, analyzed in the above part, had been the case from the beginning of the century. In urban settings, the judges were expected to uphold the rule of law and to prevent any illegal wrongdoing. In the event of a failure in enforcement, they were required to forward the matter to the capital. From the end of the sixteenth century, a gradual process of absence of other provincial officials in their respective administrative units increased not only the importance but also the effectiveness of the kadıs as representatives of the central authority.⁴⁴⁵ As the culmination of this process was the eighteenth century, the rising power of local elites and notables would increasingly begin to fill the power void with the withdrawal of other provincial officers. Thus, kadı found itself confronted with the expectations of a rising and surely eager entrepreneur group of powerful individuals. Could the kadi or *naib* of Karaferye have been subjected to such pressure during the sale of peasant lands and then the establishment of çiftlik processes? The examination of a çiftlik case in Siroz, linked to Karaferye through retrospective analysis, will help to elucidate not only this question but to reveal the ineffectiveness of the center's prohibition efforts.

The peasants of *derbent* village of Kurşova of whose revenues were included in the *zeamet* spared for a certain *reisülküttab* Abdullah Efendi, in Siroz were brought to the court and questioned (*ba'de'l mura'faa ve'l istintak*) by then the kadı of the town

⁴⁴⁵ Ergenç, 'XVI. Yüzyılda Ankara ve Konya'. p. 107.

loan was the proof of the proper sale of land usufruct. If İbrahim Ağa were on the labor and the yield of the peasants not to their lands. The marginal note of *baş muhasebe* attached to the document cites the general verdict of previous Rumeli governor late Yahya Paşa that prohibited the turning of an autonomous *timar* and *zeamet* villages through the sale of peasants' land to *ümera* and *ayan* to the *çiftlik* in 1748. One year before the issuance of this verdict, the Paşa was appointed to watch over the collection of *avarız* and *cizye* taxes from the sanjak of Delvine where the *çiftlik* owners prevent the payment of taxes by the peasants, who most probably dwell in their *çiftlik*s.⁴⁴⁹ As a result, the general firman was issued again in 1748. By reiterating this, the autonomous status of Kurşova village was recovered.

The judge of Siroz at that time who initiated or oversaw the legal proceedings upon the petition to recover the autonomous status of village, with his signature and seal at the end of the document was Esirizâde Abdülbaki. Before ten years, he was the judge of Karaferye, appointed in 1746 and served nineteen months in the town until the termination of his office in 1748 when he requested *taşra çıkma izni* to move to the capital with his family for awaiting further duty.⁴⁵⁰ There might have been other procedures of land transfer but it is clear that his one year and seven months of judgeship in Karaferye coincided with the *çiftlik* investment of a local elite in Karaferye, the head of the janissary garrisons then, Serdar Mehmed Ağa in two villages, namely Podrom and Yavornıçe. This method of *çiftlik* formation will continue in the time of the kadı before and after the Esirizâde. However, as discussed

⁴⁴⁹ BOA. C.ML. 322/13294 (20 Muharrem 1162 / 10 January 1749).

⁴⁵⁰ KKS.g. D-073/5 (Gurre Zilhicce 1159 / 15 Aralık 1746). The procedures in this document include the *mektub* (verdict) of Rumeli military judge that notifies the appointment of Esirizâde as the kadı of Karaferye. In the *kismet kağıdı* (duty notification) that notifies the reappointment of a kadı to his post again see KKS.g. D-073/93/1 (1 Rebiülahir 1161 / 31 March 1748). He requested permission of arrival to the capital four months before his termination of judgeship in Karaferye see BOA. C. ADL. 79/4773 (7 Rebiülahir 1161- 6 April 1748). His duty ended in the July of 1748 with the appointment of another judge, a certain Mustafa Salim to Karaferye see KKS.g. D-075/4 (30 Recep 1161 / 26 July 1748).

in detail above, he did not, or could not, make a single request for the reinstatement of autonomous status of çiftlized villages while he was in the office. This situation was the result of a local elite consortium's political effectiveness in Karaferye at that time whose main challenger had yet to arrive to the town. In the absence of a powerful rival, they to some extent exerted influence on the court. Most probably zaim İbrahim Ağa was devoid of the backing a consortium of local notable faction in Siroz or the time Esirizâde send the petition corresponded to the demise of his power over local politics. The process of land sales was legal but includes more complex relations.

Upon examination of the names of the *şühûdü'l-hâl* (witnesses present in a court proceeding) in the land purchase hüccets discussed previously, a noticeable pattern emerges. Namely, it appears that individuals involved in one another's land purchase cases were frequently called upon to act as witnesses in such proceedings.⁴⁵¹

The literature has analyzed the place of these group of individuals in legal proceedings in various localities through the use of a variety of court cases. For Ergene, some members of local notable families had appeared as witnesses.⁴⁵² His stance was that the group can be regarded as experts and that some of them had been remunerated for their role during the court proceedings.⁴⁵³ Canbakal asserts that a

⁴⁵¹ There other lesser landowners who were present in most of the purchase cases, as a an example of most prominent ones would be sufficient. For instance, in the land purchase cases of Sarıcazâde Ramiz Mehmed in Rabsomanik and İnekasrı, Serdar Mehmed Ağa was among the witnesses. In Ritinyani, Galahto and Kučka cases of Sarıcazâde Mehmed Ağa; Sarıcazâde Ramiz Mehmed, Zaim Mustafa Ağa, Serdar Mehmed Ağa and Çavuşzâde Mustafa Ağa were present in the first case, in the second, again Ramiz Mehmed, Zaim Mustafa Ağa, and Eminzâde Ali Ağa was present, in the last case, their relative local elite family member, Lanbazâde Şeyhi Mustafa Efendi and the son of Zaim Mustafa Ağa, Mehmed Ağa was present. These powerful figures were cited with respect to their prominence as exalted ayans and ulema in a court proceeding regarding the derbend affairs of Karaferye in KKS.g. D-076/44/2 (3 Şevval 1163 / 6 September 1750) as *fahrü'l müderrisini'l kiram* es-Seyyid Ramiz Mehmed, Çavuşzâde es-Seyyid Mustafa Ağa, Zaim Mustafa Ağa, voyvoda-i sabık Hüseyin Ağa, Eminzâde Ali Ağa and Serdar el-Hac Mehmed Ağa, respectively.

⁴⁵² Boğaç Ergene, *Local Court, Provincial Society and Justice in the Ottoman Empire: Legal Practice and Dispute Resolution in Çankırı and Kastamonu (1652–1744)* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003). p. 29.

⁴⁵³ Ibid. p. 29.

cohort of witnesses, including members of local notable families, frequently participated in legal proceedings. These individuals, she argues, acted as both witnesses and experts, exerting influence in accordance with their agendas.⁴⁵⁴ Jennings' observations regarding the Kayseri court also followed this same line of argument, although he maintains that witnessing did not constitute a select group.⁴⁵⁵ However, he advances the argument that the group may have been composed of individuals with knowledge of specific cases who maintained public scrutiny as a limiting force on the decisions of a kadi.⁴⁵⁶ In the view of Taş, the over-representation of this group as a concise class of individuals whose presence was not technical but practical represents an error.⁴⁵⁷ Furthermore, her analysis diverges from the Ergene in its characterization of these individuals as remunerated experts, providing specific services in the context of a court case. It also challenges the notion that the group can be equated with a regularly constituted jury.

However, the land purchase hüccets of local notables examined so far were distinct from the proceedings of everyday affairs. Rather, they were the result of the luxurious investments of a limited number of local elites and notables. The profiles of witnesses in these deeds would be consistent with Nagata's observation that the group was composed of privileged members of the community who held elevated political positions, both recognized at the center and in local politics.⁴⁵⁸ Furthermore, in these

⁴⁵⁴ Canbakal, 'Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town: 'Ayntāb in the 17th Century', pp. 129-141.

⁴⁵⁵ Ronald C. Jennings, "Kadi, Court, and Legal Procedure in 17th C. Ottoman Kayseri: The Kadi and the Legal System," *Studia Islamica* 48 (1978). p. 144-146. See also for this group not being considered 'select' individuals Karen Barkey, "The Use of Court Records in the Reconstruction of Village Networks: A Comparative Perspective," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 32, no. 1-2 (1991). p. 209.

⁴⁵⁶ Ronald C. Jennings, "Limitations of the Judicial Powers of the Kadi in 17th C. Ottoman Kayseri," *Studia Islamica* 50 (1979). p. 163.

⁴⁵⁷ Hülya Taş, "Osmanlı Kadı Mahkemesindeki 'Şühûdü'l-Hâl' Nasıl Değerlendirilebilir?," *Bilgi* 44 (2008): 25-44.

⁴⁵⁸ Yuzo Nagata, *Muhsin-Zâde Mehmed Paşa ve Âyânlık Müessesesi* (İzmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1999). p. 27.

hüccets, some of the witnesses were affiliated with each other, either through business partnership or through kinship, and the majority of them were political allies.⁴⁵⁹ It seems probable that their presence was intended to exert pressure on the kadı during the sale procedure. This was achieved by arriving at the court case with their large entourage, which included numerous locally powerful figures. The intention appears to be deterring the kadı. In this context, the witnesses in the case of the land purchase hüccets of Karaferye illustrate both the close affiliation of allied parties and the potential for exerting influence during the court proceedings. Therefore, it can be argued that Esirizâde Abdullah was unable to submit any petitions, either for these land exchanges or for the abolition of the large çiftliks subsequent to these acquisitions.

It can be reasonably assumed that the town in question experienced occasional shifts in power dynamics from the late fifteenth century onwards. Despite the emergence of new political entities, the descendants of the Musachis continued to occupy prominent positions within the political landscape and exerted control over the economic resources of the region. During the sixteenth century, members of this old Albanian seigneurial family occupied the most privileged status that the empire offered to residents of a small town, namely, *askerî* posts in the strict sense of the word. In the seventeenth century, the majority of its members assumed prominent roles within the *ulema* posts. It was during this century that they began to act as active investors in the çiftlik market. By the end of the century, they further consolidated their privileged positions through matrimonial alliances with other prominent magnate families,

⁴⁵⁹ The local elites and notables scrutinized in land investments would together challenge against a rising another local notable of Karaferye that will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. For instance, Lanbazâde and Sarıcazâde family members were either together or separately in other affiliated land investor elites' cases were attendees as *şühûdü'l-hâl*

namely the Lanbazâdes and Sarıcazâdes. The combination of these three families marked the period in the town as the most powerful consortium of relative elites until the second half of the eighteenth century. The çiftlik units, which first emerged in the sixteenth century, constituted the fundamental source of wealth for the Musachis in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Some of these units were under the control of the waqfs of Todor Musachi's grandson and great-grandson, Gazi Mehmed Bey and Tuzcu Hacı Sinan Bey. Moreover, the two waqfs contributed significantly to the descendants' wealth for over two and a half centuries, as they were among the most luxurious holdings from the late fifteenth century onwards.

Without any doubt, it is a fundamental law of nature that all beginnings must eventually reach their end. This was also the case with the Karaferian elites, as Ramiz wrote the above quoted verse in his *divan*, he became the first amongst his comrades to experience what he had written about, namely, eternal rest. The world was not left to him either. Though it remains unknown whether he was seeking forgiveness for his past actions or for religious obligation or both, he went to hajj but passed away on the way back in 1759 without living with another honorific title for the remainder of his life, *el-Hac*.⁴⁶⁰ After Ramiz, his comrades, Lanbazâde Rüşdi and Şeyhi brothers will continue to hold the assets and their family until they would join to Ramiz in 1789. Part of their life and hometown story ends at this point but the rest including their marks on the landholding patterns of the region will be dealt with the changing socio-economic characteristics of the eighteenth century in another study.⁴⁶¹

⁴⁶⁰ BOA, TSMA.e 832/51/2 (undated). For the death of Ramiz on his way back from *hac*, see TSMA.e 832/51/14 (1173 / 1759/1760). The same date of death was previously given by Spyropoulos, Poullos, and Anastasopoulos, "Çiftlik, Landed Elites, and Tax Allocation in Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Veroia." p. 20.

⁴⁶¹ The socio-economic gains of the power holders were by no means independent of interest-based conflicts against each other. This process will be detailly dealt with in another study due to the scope of this dissertation. What has to be touched upon here was about these consortiums of local elites, namely



the main contenders and prominent ones among others, Sarıcazâdes, Lanbazâdes and Eminzâdes who were backed up by other lesser notables who will challenge the new comer to the Karaferye town from Albania, based in sub-district of Katrin located to the south eastern littoral of Karaferye, namely Arnavud Hasan and his sons, Halil and Mehmed. Previously, the family was first studied by Anastasopoulos, 'Imperial institutions and local communities: Ottoman Karaferye, 1758 – 1774'. This family will be referred to as Katrinlizâdes in the documents increasingly from the second half of the eighteenth century and Katrinli hanedanı from the end of the eighteenth century onwards. The mentioned local elites send petitions about the alleged wrongdoings of their rival who was the founder of the Katrinli family, Arnavud Hasan from 1730s onwards and it was the result of their petitions that Arnavud Hasan came to be referred to as *eşkiya* based in Katrin. These points will briefly be discussed in the related part of the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

EXPORTING THE STAPLE FROM THE PROVINCES: THE SHADOW TRADE OF WHEAT

5.1. Actors, Dimensions and Distances

This chapter will substantiate the outlined phases by scrutinizing the activities of the involved actors from the Balkans and Western Anatolia. Furthermore, the extent of illicit trade and the actors' economic and political capital will be explored by analyzing their investments in rural properties and in the illicit wheat trade. As observed in the case of Karaferye, local notables in other regions under scrutiny utilized debt and credit relations to acquire peasant properties and establish large-*çiftlik*s. While the focus will remain on developments occurring outside the capital, it will not be assumed that the capital's role and influence are insignificant. Although the 1720 and 1722 permission *firmans* provided detailed information on the state's changing economic understanding, there is no detailed information on the course of the illicit wheat trade on which these policies were based in the local regions, since the edicts were produced in the center. It would therefore be beneficial to examine the circumstances in the localities before and after the issuance of this permissions. Finally, in all the regions under examination, the illicit wheat trade was not a marginal activity but rather an integral part of the economic incentives of the subjects from the

beginning to the end of the eighteenth century. In other words, this part will try to put flesh on the bones.

For wheat, subjects living in vast regions of the Ottomans were unhesitant to fulfill the external demands. Especially the ones whether custom officials, coast guards, purchasing agents, local gentries (eşraf and ayan), ayans and lesser ayans, of whose manipulative apparatus are intact, tried to get profit through risking their asset and venturing even their lives. It is, by essence, as much risky to overcome setbacks like adverse weather, transportation technology, or logistics and preservation methods along with inevitableness of challenging the states' agents demands who are in desperate need to supply the capital and the army, as it is profitable. In the first phase before 1720s, the çiftliks has not been constituting the considerable portion of wheat acquired but rather direct purchases through manipulative means the most common was making use of peasant indebtedness to buy their yields at lower prices. In the second phase after 1720s, çiftliks began to account considerable amount of the wheat in the portfolios of the actors.

In the southern part of the Balkans, namely southernmost of Thessaly and Salonica hinterland were the abundant wheat production areas (the fact that was acknowledged by the number of official documents while referring to these regions) and their immediate coastal areas accommodate suitable loading point for the instigators of illicit wheat trade. From west to the east, Golos, Katrin, Libanova, Selanik dock, and Kelemerye were the main illicit export zones. In the Western Anatolia region, the Izmir-Aydın-Manisa zone is another most active part of the empire and four main docks emerged for the illicit wheat trade, conducted from north to south: Gulf of Saros, Çandarlı, Güzelhisar, Çesme, and Kuşadası, all of which appear as the most suitable points for this type of activity as they were located away

from official ports, thus outside the control zones of state officials, and provided suitable anchorage. If there were no suitable piers for anchoring, it was also common to transport wheat in small boats to the merchants' ships anchored off the coast. For this activity, they took advantage of the secrecy of the night.⁴⁶² Even if all the points were located close by the shores, there were strong references for the acquisition of the yield from their most inner hinterlands, even from Karahisar and central Anatolia, Konya.

The circulation of wheat, along with other commodities, integrated the empire's agricultural economy to global markets. However, achieving dominance in Western markets, or vice versa was not feasible for this specific product due to its nature as a one-way commercial activity—from the empire to other world markets. In contrast, cotton, for example, was sent as raw material, processed, and then returned to Ottoman markets as textile products at lower prices than locally processed ones, disrupting the existing textile industry in the Ottoman Empire.

Like other prohibited activities, participants in the illicit wheat trade confronted the risk of imprisonment, asset confiscation, and exile. However, the inherent characteristics of this trade limit the likelihood of state detection, particularly in distant regions from the center or beyond the effective reach of the empire. Consequently, numerous activities of this nature likely went unnoticed as the documents were produced only if the actors were able to be captured. Nevertheless, the mildness of the penalties levied upon individuals apprehended or reported to be involved in this activity over an extended period implies its pervasive prevalence.

⁴⁶² In Narda and Tırhala, some non-Muslim peasants and from their three *çiftlik*s were selling to *harbi kefer*e and *müste'min* in the night BOA. MHM.d. 116/1013 (Evahir Recep 1121 / October 1709) and local notables who built granaries and sold the wheat during the night in Ağrıboz BOA. MHM.d. 115/2980 (Evasit Recep 1120 / October 1708). Such examples can be multiplied.

Absence of death penalty in the cases on the other hand, implies again its widespread nature otherwise, a massacre must have been put into action to curb this activity. As a matter of fact, through some sources, as with the ones analyzed in the context of normalization, explicitly acknowledging the longstanding engagement of specific local notables. In the following section, selected cases from the Balkans and Western Anatolia regarding activities of lesser figures will be analyzed to discuss the process and extent of this shadow trade embedded in the socio-economic fabric of the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire.

This incident exemplifies to what extent illicit wheat trade was an established phenomenon amongst the public as they felt the need to warn other villagers not to act contrary to empire's orders. This situation would most probably be caused by pronouncing of the orders concerning prohibition of wheat trade, which were sent to peculiar regions where illicit activity was widespread in the presence of a given regions community by a kadi(judge). Contrary to ordinary crimes, this act was deemed to be the ultimate reason of regions' famine in the empire and that is why it was made public and written in most of the documents pertaining to the activity. In the document dated on 1722 it was stated that 'through the docks encompassing Mediterranean shores to Ağrıboz, an order concerning wheat selling without permission to *müstemin ve harbî kefare* was conveyed by el-Hac Yusuf Ağa to Siroz(Serres) and inhabitants of the town were invited to Islamic court and the order was read in the presence of the them'.⁴⁶³

An order sent to Monastery Island located in Gulf of Saros was about imprisonment of Monks in 1751.⁴⁶⁴ They were jailed in Imperial Arsenal's prison

⁴⁶³ BOA. C.DH, 32/1591, (10 Rebiülevvel 1144 / 12 September 1731), "...ve cümle ahali-yi kaza meclis-i şer'e da'vet ve muvacehelerinde feth ve kiraat olundukta..."

⁴⁶⁴ BOA. MHM.d, 121/1501.

'albeit wheat and all sale to *harbi ve müstemin taifesine*(non-muslims) banned by all means, they disregarded the order and sold wheat to two non-muslim galleys'. However, after interrogation, as they were found innocent and loyal to the empire, the monks were released. Under the witnessing of certain Kapudan Süleyman, it was understood that they warned muslim villages against non-muslim ships came for wheat.

An order was sent to Izmir stating that 'whenever they find a chance, *çifilik* owners in Anatolian shores together with dock chieftains(*iskele reisleri*) disobeying Sultan's order prohibiting wheat selling to *harbi kefare ve müste'min* community' and again, the order was also read by the judge of Izmir, Yusuf, 'after saving the order into the court register, in the presence of all of the inhabitants' in 1722.⁴⁶⁵ As the latter case shows, the empire officials were involved in illicit trade of wheat let alone taking necessary precautions to prevent it. This partaking of officials had also been the case in high-level offices such as vizierate also in the sixteenth century.⁴⁶⁶ Occupying ranks of vizierate, and such might have provided immunity to the extent that one could act to the detriment of prohibition policy of the empire in the sixteenth century. Even this was not enough to act comfortably since they were seeking Sultan's blessing to make wheat selling to foreigners licit. In the eighteenth century, however, one might not necessarily need to get the approval from the Sultan and did not have to be inner circle

⁴⁶⁵ BOA. AE.SMHD.I, 132/9695, (13 Safer 1135 / 23rd November 1722), "...ferman-ı 'âlîşan sicil-i mahfûza ba'de'l kayıt cümle muvacehelerinde feth ve kiraat..."

⁴⁶⁶ M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Rüstem Paşa ve Hakkındaki İthamlar", Tarih Dergisi, 8(11-12), 1954, pp. 11-50. In the reign of Kanûnî, according to the Rüstem Pasha's petition regarding problem of supplying the Istanbul, Vizier Haydar Pasha was not only selling wheat harvested from his estates but also purchasing peasants' wheat with low-prices to sell foreign merchants with high-prices.

of the imperial household rather it was even more favorable to be at a relative distance from it.⁴⁶⁷

5.1.1. *Selem* in Gelibolu

Diverse portfolios of the actors seemed to compensate idle periods instead of relying on only one product which it otherwise would generate no income. Animal husbandry constitutes another part of their portfolio, especially in a region where accommodates relatively large meadows like Gelibolu peninsula. The situation is perfectly reflected in the activities of an *ayan* of Gelibolu region, Aynacızâde Mehmed who was deemed to be a profiteer due to giving ten, or fifteen *akçe*s to the villagers before the harvest for his effort in getting the produce once the harvest completed in 1729.⁴⁶⁸ Moreover, he was bringing wheat from Rodosçuk by deceiving the officials that ‘I was transferring the wheat to my çiftlik’ to Kavak dock to sell foreign merchants. The trick here is that he requested and seemed to force peasants to give their produce instead of their debt’s payment back to him. Before the harvest, he most probably provided credit for the expenditure necessitated in cultivation or else. Instead of getting the payment in *akçe*, he wanted to get the surplus which he must have

⁴⁶⁷ Palmira Brummett, *Ottoman Sea Power and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery* (State University of New York Press, 1994). pp. 131-143. Brummett states the lack of evidence regarding wheat trade on individual merchants in the sixteenth century. The part in her study dealing with illegal wheat trade with Italy include information on famous Ottoman pashas who were in the inner circle of the Sultan’s households or chamber like Rüstem Pasha, made use of their *hass* that allows accumulation of the yield.

⁴⁶⁸ BOA. MHM.d, 135/1096 (20 Ramadan 1141 / 19 April 1729), “...Rodosçukta sakın Aynacıoğlu nam kimesne fi’l asl muhtekir ve muameleci taifesinden olup reaya fukarasına on on beşer akçe verüp hasat vakti geldiğinde reayanın hasıl eylediği mahsulatın ahire fûruhtuna rıza vormeyüp ‘sizlerden olan alacağımıza tutun bana verin’ deyü cebren ellerinden alup bu tarikle reayayı perakende ve perişan eylediğünden ma’ada Rodosçuk etrafında olan zehairini ‘çiftliğime nakl ederüm’ deyü cem’ ve boğazdan taşrada vaki’ Kavak iskelesine götürüp müste’min keferesine fûruht eylediğinden naşi...”. In the document, his name written as Aynacıoğlu but in the following documents, as Aynacızâde, so the latter connotation will be used in the chapter.

thought would have been much profitable to sell to the foreign merchants above the amount of akçe he disbursed to the peasants.

He was interned and then waited from the center further commands. The order came after about two months.⁴⁶⁹ The officials investigated his wealth to confiscate, which was composed of 13.713 sheep and 7358 goats, but it is stated he will be forgiven only condition that 13.713 sheep taken by the empire and a warning thanks to his regret having done the activity.⁴⁷⁰ However, it is understood that the animal herd was not totally belong to him and some of them belong to the villagers even if Mehmed claims the opposite.⁴⁷¹ However, he paid as a redemption 13.000 gurus and forgiven.⁴⁷² As it is seen from the document, Mehmed had 13.713 sheep and 7358 goats that would again be regarded as he was earning his fortune from animal husbandry, but he involved in illicit wheat trade to get extra profit. Even if the exact volume of sold grain was not stated in the document, from the recovery price one might guess that the amount is high. When this incident concerned, and heard, either he might have possessing estates cultivating wheat in quantities to the extent that it could led the empire to receive information and decide confiscating his wealth as he channeled them to the foreign merchants. Or as the considerable number of small cattle shows, he

⁴⁶⁹ BOA. İE.DH., 24/2158, (10 Zilkade 1141 / 7 June 1729) “... bundan akdem harbî kefare taifesine verilmesi memnu’attan olan zehair fûruhtu töhmeti ile müttehem Gelibolu ayanından Eynecizâde’nin emval ve eşyası ahz ve kabz ve tahrir mübaşir olunan...”

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., “... min haysi’l mecmu’ on üç bin yedi yüz on üç re’s ağnam ile yedi bin üç yüz elli sekis keçisi bulunmağla mirî için ahz ve kabz olunduğu der devlet-medarıma i’lam olunmuştu lakin merkum Eynecizâde fîmaba’ad hilâf-ı emr-i şerîf olmağla zehair fûruhtu etmekle bundan tevakkî ve ictinab etmek şartıyla zabt olunan eşyasından balada zikr ve tahrir olunan kurada bulunan 13.713 ras ağnamını bedel-i afv olmak üzere taraf-ı miriye teslim taahhüd edüp...”

⁴⁷¹ BOA. C.ML., 774/31585. 27th Zilkade 1141(24th of June, 1729) “...Gelibolu ayânından Aynacıoğlu dimekle ma’ruf olan Mehmed müste’mîn kefereye zahire fûruht ile müttehim olmağla dergah-ı alî kapucubaşîlarından mübaşir ta’yin olunan İsmail Ağa kulları ma’arifetiyle cümle emval ve eşyası zabt ve tahrir ve kendüsü ahz ve habs olunmak ferman olunduktan sonra bedel-i afv olmak üzere taraf-ı miriye edasına müteahhüd olduğu on üç bin gurus gurus mukabelesinde mübaşir tarafından gelen defter mucebince ba’zı kurada olan on üç bin yedi yüz on üç re’s koyunları ve geçileri müstakilen kendüsünün olmayup bazı çoban taifesi ve kura ahalilerinin iştirakleri olmak hasebiyle...” 4

⁴⁷² Ibid., 774/31585.

might spend his earnings from animal breeding on buying grain from villagers to sell with much higher prices to foreign merchants. In any case, as both possibilities imply illicit wheat trade by any means to European merchants seemed to be much more profitable.

Judging by the application, direct purchases of Aynacızâde in Gelibolu and its immediate transfer to foreign merchants through Saroz Strait from the peasants in return of his payment 14 to 15 akçes before the harvest and his request of the yield must have been conducted through the method, even if it was not clearly stated in this specific case, which was characterized by *selem* and made use of by the actors who has sufficient capital. Almost contemporary account clearly reflected in, and one would see as its extensive application by the capital holders who engaged in illicit wheat trade in the domain of Aynacızâde. It evidently highlights interdependent characteristic between direct purchases of the yield through *selem* and its immediate sell to foreign merchants;

‘‘Dergâh-ı mualla kapucubaşlarından olub harbî ve müste‘min taifesine zahire fûruhtunun men‘i için mübaşir ta‘yin olunan Ali Paşazâde Mehmed dame mecdihuya ve Keşan ve İpsala ve Evreşe ve Gelibolu naiblerine hüküm ki,

*Bazı sefain ashabı Malkara, ve Keşan ve İpsala, ve Evreşe, ve Gelibolu kazalarına varub zehair için selem tarikiyle akçe virüb enva‘-ı zehairi iştira ve Muarız denizinde yatan müste‘min sefinelerine fûruht idüb bu hususun men‘ ve def‘i için bi‘d-defaat evamir-i şerif ile tenbih olunmuşken mütenebbih olmamalarıyla bu makule selem tarikiyle akçe virenlerin akçeleri ve iştira olunmuş hintaları ma‘arifet-i şeri ve senki kapucubaşı mumailayhsin ma‘arifetinle teftiş ve tefahhus ve miri için ahz ve kabz ve ashabı dahi ahz ve habs ...’’.*⁴⁷³

Selem is the method of advance payment for the future yield of the villagers.

The investor seeks profit realization to purchase at a lower price than the marketed

⁴⁷³ BOA. MHM.d. 137/95 (Evasıt Şaban 1142 / March 1730).

wheat after the harvest, by consequently selling the crops at higher prices to the foreign merchants. The important difference from the sale-proper (bey') is that the money can be deferred, whereas in *selem*, the money must be in cash.⁴⁷⁴ Considering the buyer's projected profit as it depends on temporality, and the method itself was the exchange of goods on credit for cash payment, this type of financial relationship is the reflection of a perfectly rational investment tendency.

On the other hand, the motivation of the peasants appears to have been driven by an immediate need for cash, which they may have used to invest or to improve their financial situation following a poor harvest. With this capacity, eliminating the risk of future yield loss in case of a bad harvest would also benefit the peasants. Such financial relationships may provide relative security for peasants who have limited techniques, such as effective crop rotation and diversification of plants, to mitigate the adverse effects of climate. Selling their yield in advance of the harvest may cause them to miss out on potential profits if prices rise or drop steeply but due to imperial pricing policy, this is not likely to be the case. In a political entity and economic mentality where a free-market economy has not yet been established, illicit wheat trade appears to offer relative security for the peasants and provides an opportunity to profit quickly from their yields. In a sense, while it serves as a credit to the peasants, it creates an arbitrage opportunity for investors to sell it at a higher price to foreign traders.

Direct purchases were the most common way of obtaining the produce of existing independent peasants at a time when large-scale farms were not yet widespread. The 'idle' capital that had not been penetrated by *çiftlik*s was thus utilized. Establishing such production unit was a form of investment that required not only

⁴⁷⁴ For the provisions of *Selem* see Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, "Osmanlı tarih deyimleri ve terimleri sözlüğü." *İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1971*), pp. 160-161.

economic capital but also political power. Instead of spending on establishing çiftlik units in most probably early stages of their career, those aspiring investors who did not yet have enough capital to do so, but eager to the offerings of foreign demand, entered into organic financial relations with the peasants through *selem* contracts. Although the available examples relate to Gelibolu and its wider hinterland, the fact that it served both to maximize revenue from the crop and that there is strong evidence of direct purchases in the prohibited wheat trade in other regions suggests that the practice must have been widespread. For instance in the Balkans, probably before the time of harvest through *selem*, certain Salih Ağa ‘in addition to his own, he was also purchasing wheat at a cheap price from peasants and then selling to *kefere taifesi* through Velestin and Izdin docks’ in 1717.⁴⁷⁵ This action led inhabitants to have distress (*müzayaka*) and Salih Ağa was found by centrally appointed sergeant and even if he was confined to bed and too ill to be punished, it was ordered to be brought to the court in Velestin.

5.2. *Mütemevvilâns* of Karaferye

The illicit wheat trade in Karaferye, which accommodates fertile alluvial plains in its rural hinterland, was characterized by çiftlik plots of land as discussed in the preceding two chapters. This phenomenon, as examined in the relevant sections, mirrored processes in other regions. The activity became particularly visible in the eighteenth century due to the expansion consistent with trends in other areas . It is worth stressing that no prohibition edicts were recorded in the court registers of the region throughout the seventeenth century. This absence suggests that large çiftlik plots had not yet been established, foreign demand was minimal, or the activity had not

⁴⁷⁵BOA. AE.SAMD.III., 43/4249, (29 Safer 1129 / 12 February 1717), “...bundan akdem Velestin ve İzdin İskelelerine kendi zahiresinden gayri re'ayadan ucuz baha ile zahire alup kefere taifesine fûruht edüp ol havalide olan ibadullahın zaruret ve müzayakalarına ba'is ve badi olduğu yakinen haber olundukta bunun gibi emr-i kerihle cesaret eden mezkur Salihin...”

reached a level that warranted the central authority's attention. Moreover, the first prohibition firman arrived aimed at all the towns of Selanik province amidst the large-scale land acquisition investments of local elites of the town were by no means coincidence. It was precisely one and a half years after Sarıcazâdes acquired extensive tracts of arable land with the intention of establishing a *çiftlik* in Gırçal village, the first prohibition as a result of the expanding illicit wheat activity arrived at the court in 1714.⁴⁷⁶ The temporal scope of the investment, which encompasses a maximum of two harvest cycles, may have contributed to the accumulation of sufficient yield. Following a two-month interval, another prohibition was dispatched to the town in the same year, suggesting an increase in the frequency of foreign merchants.⁴⁷⁷ This allows to argue that the yield of the landed-estate investments was utilized in providing the external demand for wheat. Since the activity was not prevented despite several warnings, the center holds liable Osman Paşa, the *mutasarrıf* of Selanik, in a harsher tone, urges him to take the necessary measures that if it cannot be prevented, he will be responsible for it. The empire before issuing the permissions of 1720 and 1722, seemed to hold on its old commanding policy because in this firman, it still holds on enforcing the imperial purchases would be remedy for preventing the sale of wheat to foreign merchants at much higher prices from abundant wheat source in the Balkans. In this capacity, for the need of the *mücahidin* stationed in the castles located alongside the Tuna riverbed where experienced scarcity due to wars in previous years, Karaferye town was obliged to dispatch 13,333 kile wheat and 20,000 kile barley in exchange of 50 akçe and 20 akçe for each kile, respectively.

⁴⁷⁶ KKS.g D-054/17/2 (8 Recep 1126 / 20 July 1714).

⁴⁷⁷ KKS.g D-054 25/2 (24 Şaban 1126 / 4 September 1714).

Throughout the eighteenth century, the center kept sending prohibition firmans to the various towns of Selanik.⁴⁷⁸ The addressee was most of the time *karye ahalisi* (peasants), *çiftlik ashabı* (çiftlik owners) and *karye zabitleri* (village ‘policers’), who were the main groups in production and its distribution of a given locality. While many of the cases lacks detailed data on the actors, the consolidation of large-estate agriculture in the rural hinterland must have increased the yield and the landowner local elites and notables of the town to make use of their land investments in illicit wheat trade. There were three active points in Karaferye, if the actors did not send off the wheat from Selanik dock, namely, Libanova village, and sub-districts of Çitroz and Katrin, all of which located close-by to the shores.⁴⁷⁹ The river of İnce Karasu that runs through the town and down to the Aegean Sea most likely eased the transportation as the bridge named Ince Karasu came to be mentioned in an order again as illicit wheat point.⁴⁸⁰

The documents from the second half of the eighteenth century offers much detailed information on the actors and their activities from the town of Karaferye. The incident, carried out by a *kapucubaşı* who rose to the pinnacle of political and economic power in the latter half of the eighteenth century, coincided with the decline

⁴⁷⁸ Available prohibition orders were as follows KKS.g D-065/10/1 (26 Cemazielevvel 1144 / 26 November 1731). This order was also sent to naib (surrogate judge) of Vardar-ı kebir town. BOA, KKS, 9024/36/B1-37/A1 8 Receb 1159 / 27 July 1746). As the century progress, there emerge new points of wheat sale from the villages located close by to the Aegean Sea, such was the village of Kıdahiye mentioned as the point where abundant wheat was sold illicitly to the foreign merchants KKS.g D-096-43/1 (27 Cemazielahir 1190 / 13 August 1776). A general firman urges the landed elites and notables who accumulated considerable amount of wheat to send them upon the request BOA, 9027, 68-A/2 (Evahir Rebiülahir 1202 / January 1788). During the war against France, another general firman was clearly stating the continuation of wheat sale even to the infidel France (...*bu hengamda that-ı hükümetinizde vaki sevahilden kati külli zehair sefineler ile elden ele Fransalıya bey ve firuht olunmakda idüğü bi’l ihbar vasıl-ı sami’-yi mülükane olduğu...*) BOA, KKS, 1092/40/B4 (1217 / 1803).

⁴⁷⁹ KKS.g D-065/41 (12 Safer 1145 / 4 August 1732). Katrin holds a strategic importance as it was a menzil station for the imperial postal services see Anastasopoulos, Gara, “The Rural Hinterland of Karaferye: Settlements, Divisions, and the Çiftlik Phenomenon (Seventeenth-Eighteenth Centuries). p. 273.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

of the previously mentioned local elites' influence during the same period. By the end of the eighteenth century, he was a wielder of considerable power in the vicinities of Selanik, Yenişehir, Elason (Alasonya), Katrin and Veria (Karaferiye) named Katrinli Halil Ağa son of Arnavud Hasan found an important place in the report of a *tatar* (agent) who was appointed to investigate the already established illicit wheat phenomenon by 1791. But there emerges a consortium of local notables who were selling wheat from Mora to infidel's ships and the *tatar* listed each in six localities extending from Tekfurdağı to Mora.⁴⁸¹ While each of these local magnates' economic incentives deserves in-depth analysis in the context of this ever-expanded shadow economy, the one marked the eighteenth century of Karaferiye will be the focus of this study. The *tatar* had only observed an instance and the detailing of the actors in his report would substantiate the claim of an already established shadow economy. The local magnates of the many localities were constantly provisioning the internal demand for wheat especially for the need of Istanbul and they hold certificates to bring the yield to the ports. These purchases were also conducted at much lower prices for wheat than the commercial markets and at the same time main reason of the illicit wheat trade. To continue their operation, they must also fulfill such expectations not to call the attention of the center. Nevertheless, the wheat owners found suitable opportunity thanks to the official assignment to transfer portion of their yield to the foreign

⁴⁸¹ BOA. HAT. 267/15600 (1791). 'Kulunuz Tekfurdağından Moraya 'azimet ve gerek 'avdetimde ol havalide olan agavat bir taraftan küffâr sefainine zahire fûruht eylemektedirler hatta Piravişte Çorbacısı Halil Ağa ve Katrinli Halil Ağa ve Yenişehirde Mehmed Bey ve Nakibzâde ve İzinde Beyzâde Oğlu ve Ağrıbozda Haşim Bey ve Morada Değirmenaltı nam iskelede Hasan Bey ve Gustunda Hasan Efendi kullarının harbî kefereye peyderpey) zahire verdikleri meşhudum oldu mumaiyleh Haşim Beye bu kâr-ı mekruha ne için cesaret ediyorsun der 'aliyyeye irsal ediniz dediğimde geçimimiz ancak kefereye zahire fûruhtuyuladır deyü cevap verdiği tatar-ı merkum takrir ider. Fi'l-hakika bu sevahilin ashab-ı nüfuzu bu kâr-ı mekruhu 'adet etmişlerdir İstanbul külli zahiresi Karadenize münhasır iken el-haletihazihi Karadeniz ve Tuna zahirelerine ordu-yu hümayûn müşterek olmağla beher hal Akdenizden külli zahire celbi karz mesabesinde idiğü ve madam ki bunlar kâr-ı mekruha cesaret iderler celb-i zehair mümkin olmazsa maazallah-u teala İstanbul ahalisinin sefalet ve zaruretlerine mucceb olacağı ve bunlardan bu kârın men'i içlerinden bir kaçının te'dibleriyle menut olmağla cesaret edenlerden kangileri idiğü bilinmek için taraf-ı hümayûnlarından mu'temed ve mevsuk taharriye kadîr.

merchants. In 1791, among the names of the illicit wheat actors discussed above, Nakibzâde appear also as one of the local notables in Yenişehir to dispatch large quantities of cereal for provisioning the Istanbul by hiring ships in the same year.⁴⁸²

The ascendance of the Arnavud Hasan as the predominant actor in the illicit trade, necessitating substantial financial resources extending beyond Selanik into the Teselya region, can be attributed to their accumulated economic and political activities in Karaferye since the early eighteenth century. By the 1750s, Arnavud Hasan Ağa and subsequently his sons, Halil and younger one Mehmed had assumed the voyvodaship of Katrin.⁴⁸³ By 1770s, most probably due to the family's efforts, Katrin had become independent from the town of Platimana and emerged as a separate town which was a village at the first half of the century, incorporating the sub-district of Çitroz.⁴⁸⁴ The family not only secured tax farms of the mukataas in both Katrin and Çitroz but also expanded their wealth and çiftlik holdings through these endeavors.⁴⁸⁵ In kaza affairs, Halil Ağa came forward as the representative of Platimana town.⁴⁸⁶ But, what was the outcome of the political landscape in Karaferye, where the establishment of a new magnate family emerged in a region previously dominated by a consortium of old local elites for two centuries before the eighteenth century?

It is beyond doubt that the transfer of wealth and the changing of power balance from the old local elites to a newcomer were a gradual process, although they were not

⁴⁸² Georgios Salakides, "The Provisioning of Istanbul with Wheat in Turbulent Times: Yenişehir in Thessaly at the End of the 18th Century," *Balkan Studies* 43, no. 2 (2002). p. 136.

⁴⁸³ Anastasopoulos, 'Imperial Institutions and Local Communities: Ottoman Karaferye, 1758-1774'. p. 2. Arnavud Hasan was already *voyvoda* of Katrin before 1740s.

⁴⁸⁴ Anastasopoulos and Gara, 'The Rural Hinterland of Karaferye: Settlements, Divisions, and the Çiftlik Phenomenon (Seventeenth-Eighteenth Centuries).' p. 287.

⁴⁸⁵ Anastasopoulos, 'Imperial Institutions and Local Communities: Ottoman Karaferye, 1758-1774' p. 42.

⁴⁸⁶ Anastasopoulos, 'Imperial Institutions and Local Communities: Ottoman Karaferye, 1758-1774' p. 84.

conflict-free. While the focus was not on the political conflict between different local magnates, which would constitute another subject for a future study, it would be helpful to briefly discuss the trajectory of the rising power of Arnavud Hasan and his endeavors in building his dynasty. The tension was already on the rise at the first decade of the eighteenth century when Arnavud Hasan made his first appearance in the scene who had arrived at then the village of Katrin located in the town of Platimana from Albania with several men under his command in 1730s.⁴⁸⁷ The year approximately given for the arrival of Arnavud Hasan in this firman was accurate, as evidenced by the first record of him in the court registers, which mentions him as *eşkîya* in Katrin in 1731 in the petitions of residents to the vezir Osman Paşa of Rumeli.⁴⁸⁸

Since 1730s, his incursions alarmed the residents of Karaferye, especially the old local elites. Sending his man, Premedili Arnavud Mehmed with four-five hundred *arnavud taifesi* under his command, Hasan aimed to oppress the established power balance in the town by demanding a key position that allows to have ready armed group and political leverage against any contenders, the *bekçîyan-ı bölükbaşılık* (head of the security company) of Karaferye through openly threatening the surrogate judge by plundering the town who had no choice but to provide *mürasele* (official letter of appointment) in 1746.⁴⁸⁹ From 1730 to 1746, it is obvious that he has been bothering the local elites. As the century progress, so the Arnavud Hasan's effectiveness diffused

⁴⁸⁷ BOA. AE.SMHD.I. 199/15728 (Evahir Rebiülahir 1159 / May 1746). '...on beş seneden berü Arnavudluk memleketinden gelüb Karaferye kazasının civarında vaki Platimana kazasına tabi Katrin karyesinde mütemekkin olan reis-ı eşkıya Arnavud Hasan nam kimesne...'. This same firman arrived and registered to the court register after one month BOA. KKS. 9024/35/A1 (15 Cemazielevvel 1159 / 5 June 1746).

⁴⁸⁸ KKS.g. D-065/16/1-2-3-4-5 (Gurre Cemazielahir 1144 / November 1731).

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid. 'kaza-i mezburun bekçîyan-ı bölükbaşılığını isteriz ve akd-ı memleketi harab ideriz' diyü sabıka kaza-i mezburda naibü'ş şeri olan Hasan zide ilmiHUDAN mücbiren ve kerhen yüz elli nefer ile kaza-i merkumun bölükbaşılığı müraselesin aldıktan sonra dört beş yüz nefer arnavud taifesi Karaferyeye geşt-ü güzar ve reaya fukarasını nice dürlü taaddiyat ile tekdir ve ızrar...'.

into the town. The process gave birth to two camps, old local elites and the burgeoning of a new local magnate family. The former had no choice but to consider him with his retinue a serious threat on their way and tried to prevent him by sending petitions about the wrongdoings of the latter and demanded an exile for Hasan.

After three months, the *kaza* people, composed of thirteen local notables, nineteen residents of Varoş quarter, eleven villagers from eleven villages (most of them include the *çiftlik*s of these local notables), nine villagers from Menlik and six from *tuzcuyan* villages went to the court for the pledge concerning any expenditure would be made for covering any cost inflicted by then escapee Arnavud Hasan in 1746.

⁴⁹⁰ The local notables in this procedure was ally of the old local elite consortium in Karaferye, opposing to the expanding control of the newcomer. Among them, the first name registered was the es-Seyyid Mehmed Ramiz Efendi who were followed by for instance, Memoşagazâde, one of a large *çiftlik* investors discussed in the relevant chapter. Needless to say, their fear was to lose the income sources they derive much of which through *çiftlik*s.

The conflict escalated to the extent that the old elite families with their ally villagers finally found the solution by ransacking and burning down the *çiftlik* of Arnavud Hasan located in his power base, Katrin.⁴⁹¹ It is reasonable to argue that the incident in question occurred shortly after the aforementioned pledge was finalized, and that the *sulh* settlement procedure was completed within a relatively brief period of time. Before the incident, they went to settle down some issues with Arnavud Hasan Ağa to Katrin couple of times. Then Hasan Ağa was the *voyvoda* of the Katrin and most probably he had secured this post in early 1740s, if not earlier. Between

⁴⁹⁰ BOA. KKS. 9024/13/B2-14/A1 (15 Receb 1159 / 3 August 1746).

⁴⁹¹ KKS.g. D-073/14/1 (9 Muharrem 1160 / 21 January 1747).

Karaferiye and Katrin, there often emerges disagreement for the expenditures of Katrin *menzil* post that must have been supplied by half from each town with horses, bales, and officials, as it has been the *kanun-i kadim*.⁴⁹² The mentioned meeting might have been related with the *menzil* affairs but last time when they went again, Arnavud Hasan was absent in his seat and they burned the çiftlik of Hasan in Katrin together with its stored grain and appendages, all of which was worth in total 18.810 guruş.⁴⁹³ The leading family in the opposition party of the local elites was the Sarıcazâde el-Hac Mehmed Ağa, whose steward a certain Hasan Ağa was involved, his nephew es-Seyyid Mehmed Ramiz Efendi, Memoş, Mustafa, Manoş and Yusuf together with certain villagers. Without any doubt, this incident disturbed the order between the towns of Karaferiye and Katrin. With the mediation of certain individuals and with the blessing of Vezir Mustafa Paşa, the enmity was settled in the provincial court of Selanik. The Sarıcazâde party and Hasan agreed upon the compensation price for the losses of the latter as 2500 guruş in total. During a relatively long period of conflict that was at least one year, there occurred many expenditures in the town of Karaferiye. Including this and as a result of the burning of Arnavud Hasan's çiftlik, and for several expenditures during the *sulh* (settlement) procedures between the parties, a unique apportionment register was prepared specifically for the total expenditures out of this long process of conflict that amounts to 14.315 guruş in total, covering the time period from February 1746 to March 1747 (thirteen months) were divided amongst Karaferiye urban and rural residents.⁴⁹⁴ At the beginning of the apportionment registers, the first name was Abdülhalim Efendi, who was the Lanbazâde and then Sarıcazâde el-Hac

⁴⁹² KKS.g. D-073/15/2 (20 Muharrem 1160 / 1 February 1747) There were many such disagreements regarding the expenditure of *menzil* in Katrin recorded in court registers during the eighteenth century. This must have been another result of the rising power of Arnavud Hasan Ağa in Katrin.

⁴⁹³ KKS.g. D-073/14/1 (9 Muharrem 1160 / 21 January 1747).

⁴⁹⁴ KKS.g. D-073/41-42-43 (18 Rebiülevvel 1160 / 30 March 1747).

Mehmed Ağa was registered who was followed by Eminzâde Ali Ağa and others as the local notables. These families can be read as the representatives of old elite consortium who challenged the Arnavud Hasan. Even if the biggest share was on the shoulders of local elites, they most probably had given the cash amount in advance also for the shares of the villagers. The incident had its repercussions in the capital, too. As Katrin belonged to the *mukataa* of Gazi Mustafa Paşa waqf which was under the control of *babüssaade ağası* Beşir Ağa, who was also the *nazır* of *haremeyn-i şerifeyn mukataası*, the result of the settlement was brought to the Mahmud Paşa court in Istanbul by Beşir Ağa which notifies the settlement was reached among the parties.⁴⁹⁵

Before securing the voyvodaship and then the tax farms of the revenue sources in the same local setting for at least two generations, his career seemed to be built upon by irregular Albanian armed forces, if the accusations were the case. With this operation, it is clear that his encroachment to the group of villages of Çitroz that was under the control of the *babüssaade ağası* and the villages and çiftliks of Menlik that was under the control of Mihrimah Sultan waqf became much easier through forcefully seizing the 15.000 guruş of the peasants.⁴⁹⁶ At the end, unlawful or not, it was about getting the most out of town's offerings; land and to till that, the labor power. However, the above-mentioned violations had only a negligible impact on the potential grounds for Arnavud Hasan's removal. The center was proactively monitoring the conflict, with the objective of gaining an understanding of the prevailing circumstances. Although Ahmed, his fellow bölükbaşı, was ordered to be dismissed from his *bölükbaşılık*, the

⁴⁹⁵ KKS.g. D-073/85/1-2 (7 Receb 1160 / 15 July 1747).

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid. '...dariüssadeti'ş şerifem ağası nezaretinde olan Çitroz karyesi reayasından ve Mihrimah Sultan evkaflı çiftliklerinden ve kurasından vesair kura ve çiftlikler reayalarından ber-muceb-i defter on beş bin guruşdan ziyade hilaf-ı şer'i şerif akçe ahz...'.

primary reason was not due to his and Arnavud Hasan's alleged oppression. Instead, it was specifically on the grounds that the protection of the towns in Rumeli was left to the collective undertaking of the town residents, rather than to *martolos* companies.

This somewhat plaintful petition was sent by the kadıs of Karaferye, Yenice-i Vardar, Vodine and Ağustos, upon the appeals of petitioners in the towns. In each town at least that was very the case in the former, as discussed in detail, there must have been established a political power balance amongst many local elites. Some of them, as in Karaferye, must have been at the top of the town hierarchy for two centuries. It must also have been burdensome to deal with a new and eager but above all, the able late comer and gave up the privileges they had. Moreover, the indebtedness of peasantry who had been in alliance with their current local elites might have resorted to false claims to get rid of their debts. The case that was issued in 1746 raise suspicions about this tactic and the profile of the debtor who must have been Arnavud Hasan Ağa since not only timeline corresponds to the first appearance of Hasan but also a certain *muameleci* Hasan Ağa had lend certain amount of akçe to the peasants of Ağustos fifteen years ago and since then, he was getting excessive amount of their akçe in the name of interest.⁴⁹⁷

Like it was the case in imperial jargon reflected in the permissions firmans analyzed before, the local elites send their petitions and put the sufferings of the peasants at the forefront of their accusations of Arnavud Hasan. They were very aware of the fact that the assertion of protection of the peasantry would be effective to prevent their main contender. Hence, they seem to be clinging to this claim as they have faced with such orders sent against them before and know very well what the empire claims

⁴⁹⁷ ISAM. KKS.i 2A/99/A1 (Evahir Şevval 1159 / 14 November 1746).

to be vulnerable. In the end, the empire recognized the de facto situation that it could control and that was able to maintain relative stability in the region by granting it a share. This was a natural consequence of a tacit contract between the center and the local magnates in the localities.

The establishment of large *çiftlik*s played a pivotal role in the expansion this trade in Karaferye from the beginning of the century. However, the Katrinli family, who had been actively engaged in illicit wheat trade for at least twenty-four years prior to the investigation report of the tatar in 1791, emerged as a significant player in this illicit trade. In 1767, he was again selling wheat to English and French merchants' ships. Interestingly, this time corresponds approximately to the period in which the family started to dominate biggest shares in the *çiftlik* market in Karaferye.⁴⁹⁸ Hence, as their land portfolio extends so their engagement in the illicit wheat trade followed the course. This same pattern can be observed in the case of other local elites, such as Saricazâdes' extensive investments in agricultural properties, which commenced almost one and a half years before the issuance of the first prohibition firman, as recorded in the court registers of Karaferye. The document continues as follows: 'as it was forbidden to sell and load wheat to *harbî kefere* by sending specific sultanîc orders several times to every region from the very beginning in order that it is to be recognized, from the residents of Katerin town located in the vicinities of Selanik, Arnavud Hasan Ağazâde Halil and his comrades apart from their own estates' crops, they were purchasing wheat secretly from the villages located in the vicinities of Selanik and Yenişehir and through using five to ten small-boats they were transporting

⁴⁹⁸ Spyropoulos, Poullos, and Anastasopoulos, "Çiftlik, Landed Elites, and Tax Allocation in Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Veroia." p. 20. In 1764, the family became the biggest shareholders amongst all the *çiftlik* holders of the Karaferye.

them to a couple of English and French ships of which were at anchor in offshores'.⁴⁹⁹

The document exemplifies illicit wheat trade organization in Rumelia, where Katrinli Halil Ağa acquired most of his wealth from cultivating grains on his çiftliks near the sea and then transferring them to European merchants who offered higher prices. In this operation, direct purchasing methods, most likely through *selem* contracts, one may argue, were frequently used especially for acquiring the wheat from distant rural settings.

Recording of the order into the register and execution of that order are completely different cases. Sometimes the effectiveness of local elites is directly proportional to the loss of kadi's power, or the effectiveness of kadi is directly proportional to the ineffectiveness of local elites. A third possibility is that the kadi also benefited from this trade, for example, although we have seen in the general orders that the kadis also took part in this trade for some regions, we have not come across such data for this *kaza* so far. Most probably, like in the case of çiftlik establishment through issuing hüccets in the kadi court, kadis found themselves to look away or were forced to do so. Only after getting powerful enough then they processed the petitions by commencing legal procedure in his court.

Direct purchase methods most probably through *selem* was effective to operate as debt bondages for the yield of the peasants not only in Karaferye and Selanik hinterland but also in other nearby provinces by Halil Ağa. His sphere of influence stretched to the Teselya as his illicit wheat undertakings necessitate extracting as much

⁴⁹⁹ BOA. C.BLD. 7/311 (Evahir Rebiülahir 1181 / September 1767). “*Harbî kefereye zahire bey ve fûruht olunması öteden berü evamir-i şerife-i ekîd ile her bir mahalle defaat ile tenbih ve te’kid olunup bu emr memnu ve sonra cesaretten tehaşi ve tevakkî-i tam olunmak iktiza eder iken Selanik civarında Katrinli kasabası sükkânından Arnavud Hasan Ağa zâde Halil ve rûfekasının sahil-i bahride olan çiftlikleri mahsullerinden maada Selanik etrafı ve Yenişehir kenar kuralarından hıfyyeten iştirâ eyledikleri buğdayı beş on kıta sagir sefinelerle peyder pey deryanın açıklarında lenger endaz olan birkaç kıta Firanca ve İngiltere sefinelerine nakl ve bey’e cesaret eylediklerini...*”.

yield as possible. The situation perfectly reflected in the petitions of ‘the inhabitants of Kokinopulos village located in Alasonya (eleven hours on foot to Katrin) came to the court and demanded to pay their debts to Katrinli Hasan Ağa oğlu Halil Efendi and to the resident of Alasonya el-HacAhmed Ağa by ten-year installments due to the financial difficulties’.⁵⁰⁰ His influence extended beyond the boundaries of his immediate power base, encompassing Karaferye and Katrin, as well as the wider Teselya region. This was the result of his economic incentives to accumulate as much wheat as possible, which he then illicitly sold and made a profit from. It is clear that he had extended certain amount of credit for the villagers who might have experienced consecutive crop failures which would be caused by labor scarcity from untimely deaths in a family, or constant severe droughts. For this reason, as the financial difficulties came to the extent that they were no longer able to raise capital to pay their debts and eventually gave up from their yield or from their properties for their subsistence but mostly for the benefit of Katrinli Halil Ağa.

It is clear that Karaferye and its surrounding area were integrated into the commercial markets as the supplier of wheat through a shadow trade. However, due to the nature of the activity, it is often difficult to determine the quantity of wheat sold, which restricts the ability to provide a comprehensive account of the operation's scale. As was the case in Aynacızâde of Gelibolu, previously discussed, the redemption amount, following the center's ability to hear from an incident, provides some insight into the illicit activity being conducted. Most probably upon the report of the above-mentioned tatar in 1791, the center demanded the dispatch of 80.000 kile (2050 metric

⁵⁰⁰ BOA. AE.SMST.III. 75/5593 (Evahir Zilhicce 1178 / June 1765).

tons) of wheat to the capital from Katrinli Halil Ağa to be forgiven.⁵⁰¹ Given this huge amount of redemption fee, the actual amount of his illicit undertakings must have been much higher. Again this was only one occasion that the center heard of his activity during longtime involvement of Halil Ağa in this trade throughout eighteenth century.

Following the demise of Katrinli Halil Ağa, soon followed by his younger brother, Mehmed Ağa, the majority of his assets, which were primarily comprised of landed estates, served to substantiate the aforementioned arguments. His property record (muhallefat defteri) includes elaborate information about his wealth as follows: ‘the deceased Halil's property record was valued at 8,108 guruş, while his two estates were worth 70,600 guruş, his shops were worth 20,500 guruş, the revenues of his waqfs were worth 4,241 guruş, and under the possession of his son Salih Bey, two estates, an orchard, a mill, and a house were worth 102,500 guruş, the two estates, valued at 60,000 guruş, were under the possession of his wife Fatıma, while two other estates, also valued at 60,000 guruş, were under the possession of his other wife Ayşe, and the total value of Halil's properties was 325.949,5 guruş’.⁵⁰²

However, the center was intrigued by the fact that such a property holder's wealth could not have been limited only to these immovable assets, which barely covered his total debt. For the center, it seemed implausible that someone of his wealth

⁵⁰¹ BOA. HAT. 187/8828 (undated). It must have been issued at the end of the eighteenth century during the time of Selim III given that the marginal note was written by the sultan himself which was the typical habit of the sultan.

⁵⁰² C.ML. 425/17223 (4 Cemazielevvel 1220 / 31 July 1805). ‘...muhallefatından hülasa ettirildikte müteveffa-yı mumaileyhin muhallefatı bahası sekiz bin yüz sekiz guruşa ve iki kıta çiftlikleri bahası yetmiş bin altı yüz guruşa ve mülk dekakini bahası yirmi bin beş yüz guruşa ve vukuf akaratı bahası dört bin iki yüz kırk bir guruşa cem’an bir yük üç bin dörtyüz kırk dokuz buçuk guruşa ve müteveffa-yı mumaileyhin oğlu Salih Beyin üzerinde olarak iki kıta çiftlik ve bahçe ve değirmen ve hane bahası bir yük iki bin beş yüz guruşa ve müteveffa-yı mumaileyhin kerimesi Fatıma hanımın üzerinde olarak iki kıta çiftlik bahası altmış bin guruş ve diğer kerimesi Ayşe hanımın uhdesinde olarak iki kıta çiftlik bahası dahi altmış bin guruşa ki ceman iki yük yirmi iki bin beş yüz guruşa balığ olup gerek müteveffa-yı mumaileyhin muhallefat ve çiftlikat ve mülk vukuf dekakini ve akaratı ve gerek oğlu ve kerimeleri üzerlerinde olan çiftlikat ve bahçe ve değirmen ve hane bahasının mecmu üç yük yirmi beş bin guruşa...’.

would pass away with such substantial debt. Moreover, as the reports suggested, many people were aware that Katrinli Halil Ağa's cash was approximately between 2,000 to 3,000 kise akçe, or 834,000 guruş to 1,250,000 guruş, apart from his immovables. After the death of a wealthy individual, it must have been common for heirs to attempt to conceal liquid assets, as the moveable assets composed of money, jewelry and valuable items were the easiest to hide from the authorities. Consequently, following petitions from Tepedelenli Ali Paşa, the center agreed to transfer the deceased's properties, along with half of his tax farms, to his son, Salih Bey as the other half was being administered by *nizam-ı cedit*.⁵⁰³ But the central bureaucracy was hesitant to leave profitable tax farms and enormous wealth to the control of whom it regarded incapable compared to his father. Tepedelenli Ali Pasha's insistence on the transfer seems to have played an important role in clearing the doubts. The reason for the Tepedelenli's interest arises from his endeavor to get a foothold in Karaferye where profitable çiftlik markets dominates the rural hinterland through capitalization his kinship with Katrinli Halil Ağa to transfer his immense çiftlik shares in the town. Katrinli Halil Ağa established a marital alliance with the governor of Yanya, Tepedelenli Ali Paşa, through the marriage of his daughter, Naime to the son of Tepedelenli, Veli Paşa.⁵⁰⁴ The union established through this marriage alliance resulted in the transfer of a considerable amount of çiftlik shares of Katrinli Halil Ağa and his younger brother Mehmed Ağa to their sole male heir, Katrinli Salih Bey, the son of Katrinli Halil. Subsequently, the most of his çiftlik shares in Karaferye were

⁵⁰³ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁴ BOA. C.ML. 36/1609 (19 Şaban 1237 / 11 May 1822). This piece of document was about the monthly pension to be given to the children and wives of Veli Paşa. The word 'ayal' holds two meaning, the first one is wife and the other is the ones need caring, mostly children. As Naime Hanım was the daughter of Katrinli Halil Ağa, in this context the word 'ayal' carries the meaning of one of his wife. '*Maktul Veli Paşanın der-saadetde olan ayalı Avlonyalı İbrahim Paşa kerimesi Merih Hanıma bin beş yüz ve diğer ayalı Katrinli Halil Ağa kerimesi Naime hanıma kezalik bin beş yüz ve mumailerh Naime Hanımın kerimesi Esma Hanım'a bin...*'

inherited by his son Salih Bey, Tepedelenli Ali Paşa and his son Veli Paşa.⁵⁰⁵ Following the death of Tepedelenlis, these shares were transferred to the *emlak-ı hümayun* in the nineteenth century.⁵⁰⁶ Therefore, the arrival of Tepedelenli Ali Paşa and his son, Veli Paşa to the Karaferye was the result of the marriage alliance with the Katrinli dynasty. Until the elimination of Tepedelenlis, Katrinli Salih Bey continued to pursue his career as one of the prominent local notables of Karaferye in alliance with the Tepedelenlis even after the persecution of the former.⁵⁰⁷

The transfer of Katrinli Halil's property was conditional upon Salih Bey and the other heirs agreeing to pay the amount corresponding to the alleged cash sum and other properties, totaling 1,000 *kise* akçe, or 417,000 guruş.⁵⁰⁸ This amount was set in accordance with his total wealth, which the center took into account when determining that the cash assets secretly stored were not considered an exaggeration given the family's tax farms and çiftlik shares at the end of the eighteenth century. As discussed, the çiftlik shares played a significant role in the illicit wheat trade, which, along with his tax farms in and outside of his voyvodaship, greatly contributed to the accumulation of Katrinli Halil Ağa's immense wealth.

⁵⁰⁵ KKS.g. D-104/14 (Evahir Rebiülevvel 1227 / March 1812). This document was the apportionment register of *masarîf-ı vilayet* that contains the names of Tepedelenlis. While Ali Paşa was referred to as '*alaka-i veliünni'am efendimiz hazretleri*' his son Veli Paşa was registered as '*alaka-i devletli Veliyüddin Paşa hazretleri*'. The fact that these two connotations refer to the Tepedelenlis was previously mentioned in Anastasopoulos and Gara, "The Rural Hinterland of Karaferye: Settlements, Divisions, and the Çiftlik Phenomenon (Seventeenth-Eighteenth Centuries), p. 274. But the reasons unraveled in this dissertation that how Tepedelenli infused to the town remained obscure until now.

⁵⁰⁶ KKS.g. D-109/6-7 (Rebiülahir 1241 / November 1825). In this *masarîf-ı vilayet* Register, the former shares of Tepedelenlis were transferred to the control of the center after their execution.

⁵⁰⁷ This process, however, belongs to the nineteenth century and will be dealt with in a separate study that is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

⁵⁰⁸ BOA. C.ML. 722/29545 (13 Rebiülahir 1220 / 11 July 1805).

5.3. The Consortium of Selanik Local Notables

In addition to opening a very important door to understanding the extent of this trade in the hinterland of Selanik (corresponds to the towns of Yenice-i Vardar, Serfiçe, Vodine, Kelemerye, and Avrethisar), a case regarding the province provides valuable insights into the transportation and storage of wheat, tracing its journey from production to sale to foreign merchants.⁵⁰⁹ One of the significant aspects it reveals, in addition to highlighting certain political-economic characteristics of the hinterland in the context of illicit wheat trade, is the involvement of the most powerful land and capital-holding Salonica local notables and the financial nexuses reaching out to the capital they established. On the other hand, viewing it as merely the tip of the iceberg and leaving aside would have prevented a full understanding of the extent of this trade in the region and the contribution of families to their portfolios. On the other, one would not have grasped the simultaneous development across Balkans and Western Anatolia that establishes a phenomenon rather than one-time occurring. As with the previous local men of power scrutinized so far, the role of the forbidden wheat trade in the capital accumulation of the most powerful local families in Selanik at a time when they were just beginning to gain power would not have been understood. I will now try to explore the bottom of this iceberg.

As early as the first decades of the eighteenth century, illicit wheat activity from broader Selanik hinterland dragged the attention of the center, corresponding to the same time with that of Western Anatolia. Moreover, the demand again came mostly from Europe, namely England and France.⁵¹⁰ The pace of landed-estate expansion

⁵⁰⁹ The judicial matters in the mentioned towns were handled in Selanik court whereas Karaferye has separate court and thus has its own court registers.

⁵¹⁰ BOA. MHM.d 119/1066 (Evahir Şaban 1124 / September 1712). The phrase *efrenc taifesi* refers specifically to the European states whose presence well-documented until now.

was the case much earlier in Balkans and Selanik in general than Western Anatolia. Aspiring came forward among others to engage in this activity alongside with tax farming investments. While some of them succeeded in expanding their portfolio diversifying with one of the most valuable properties of the century later, çiftliks, the others failed to do so.

Just about two months before the Great Frost of 1709 hit the Europe and crippled the agricultural production in the continent, in the September of the same year, a total of six *France* and *Venedik* galleons came to the port of Selanik and three of them has already been loaded with grain and wheat the other three was awaiting for their load of wheat by Müderris Süleyman, and his son-in-law amongst local notables, Mustafa Efendi together with Hüseyin Çavuş oğlu Ahmed, Küçük Hasan, el-Hac İbrahim, and Gümrükçü (customs official) Ebubekir.⁵¹¹ The Müderris Süleyman and his kin were first targeted by the Empire a year and a half ago, but it seems that profit outweighs fear of punishment, and now they have been joined by other profiteers.⁵¹² It can be argued that the presence of this specific person in the somewhat important legal cases of Selanik under the *şühûdü'l-hâl* with the title of *fahrü'l müderrisin* Süleyman Efendi as early as 1695 suggest strongly that he was the one in the illicit trade and that religious dignitaries with their elevated status came to partake in the activity alongside with local notables.⁵¹³

⁵¹¹ BOA. MHM.d. 116/994 (Evasit Recep 1121 / September 1709). Although not entirely conclusive specific to this case, it indicates that Çavuşzâde Hüseyin, a member of the Çavuşzâdes. This assumption is not far-fetched given the activity of the most powerful members of this family in the forbidden trade of wheat in the later period. Müderris Süleyman and Mustafa Efendi was forgiven on the condition that they would not continue selling wheat to foreign merchants MHM.d 116/1121 (Evail Şevval 1121 / 12 December 1709).

⁵¹² BOA. MHM.d. 115/2321 (Evahir Zilhicce 1119 / March 1708).

⁵¹³ SKS. 1-3/B1 (13 Şevval 1105 / 7 January 1694).

Considering the titles of those identified, they seemed to occupy higher positions such as being a member of *ulema* or an official in customs among those in the social and economic life of Selanik. This point is further materialized after ten years from the above incident when the *mübaşir* Mustafa Ağa gathered local notables of Selanik and went to the court to supervise their vouching for each other in order to prevent the activity. Among them, Müderris Süleyman Efendi (most likely with his bridegroom Mustafa who was together with Süleyman Efendi), was recorded first and foremost among others as one of the ayans of Selanik.⁵¹⁴ Moreover, Gümrükçü Ebubekir Efendi was also mentioned among them, again he had been together with Süleyman ten years ago in the illicit activity. Some of these powerful figures will appear in another illicit activity in the near future, too. They were accompanied by villagers from three villages located close by to the sea in Pazargah in this legal case. On the same day as the Pazargah case, the Muslim villagers and landowners of the town of Kelemeriye were subjected to the same legal procedure.⁵¹⁵ After four days, the court convened again for the non-Muslim villagers in Kelemeriye again with the presence of the same local notables.⁵¹⁶ In three of these legal documents, the claims made by the local notables almost led one to believe that it was not them but the villagers who were conducting the illegal wheat trade. It seems that they tried to divert attention by stating that it has been a while since the villagers' wheat has not arrived in Selanik (...*ancak kura-yı mezkure ahalisinden mukaddema zehair gelüp fîruht olunur idi bir mikdar müddetten berü gerek zabitleri ve gerek reaya tarafından zehair*

⁵¹⁴ SKS. 29-160/A2 (12 Rebiülahir 1131 / 4 March 1719) 'Mahmiye-i Selanik ayanından ve eşrafından umdete'l müderrisini'l kiram faziletli Müftü Süleyman Efendi, ve Nakibü'l eşraf es-Seyyid Mahmud Efendi ve Müderris Mustafa Efendi ve Hatib Süleyman Efendi, ve mefahirü'l eşbah Şeyh Ali Efendi, ve Hazinedarzâde Ahmed Ağa ve Hazinedarzâde Osman Ağa ve Gümrükçü es-Seyyid Ebubekir Ağa ve Abacızâde Ahmed Ağa ve Hazinedarzâde Mehmed Ağa ve el-Hac Nebi Ağa...' Hazinedarzâde family was another powerful local notable family in Selanik whose elevated status has been visible since 1694 as early as that of Çavuşzâdes, and Hamzazâdes.

⁵¹⁵ SKS. 29-161/B1 (12 Rebiülahir 1131 / 4 March 1719).

⁵¹⁶ SKS. 29-162/A1 (17 Rebiülahir 1131 / 9 March 1719).

gelüp fūruht olunmadığından emr-i mezkureye cesaretleri ----- mezburlardan emin olmadığımız eelden...). Whereas ten years ago it was these protagonists who were seeking profit from this trade.

This not only indicates the extent of which the activity embedded in Selanik and its wider hinterland, but also clearly shows that the most prominent members of the Selanik community have been involved in this trade for years. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the main perpetrators of this activity ten years ago appeared as the main actors in a collective legal arrangement to eliminate it.

If these capital seekers fully loaded their ships, it would amount to 48,000 kile of wheat, given the capacity of a *kalyon*. The consortium of local notables of Selanik was also accompanied by Hüseyin Çavuşzâde Ahmed who seemed to be another son of Çavuşzâde Hüseyin Ağa and the family was one of the most prominent among others in the eighteenth century Selanik. However, as early as 1695, the Çavuşzâde family seemed to occupy a higher status in the vibrant community of Selanik as the brother of Çavuşzâde Hüseyin Ağa, Ahmed Ağa, came to be referred to as *ayan* and, as the inheritance of their father who was also registered as Çavuşzâde Mehmed Ağa suggests, they had occupied an important place in the community much earlier.⁵¹⁷ Before 1703, when his tax office in Sidrekapsi was renewed, Hüseyin Ağa had been the chief officer of the Selanik Wood Hass and the *cizye* collector of Selanik.⁵¹⁸ During this period when Çavuşzâde Hüseyin Ağa was controlling the Sidrekapsi mines mukataa still through *iltizam*, he had already disposed the *adet-i ağnam mukataa* of

⁵¹⁷ SKS. 1-82/B2 (25 Cemazielahir 1106 / 10 January 1695) In a çiftlik renunciation case in the village of Harmanköy of Vardar town, his name appears in the şühûdü'l hâl (court witnesses) as fahrü'l ayan Ahmed Ağa ibn-i Çavuşzâde Mehmed Ağa.

⁵¹⁸ Mustafa Altunbay, Osmanlı Döneminde Bir Maden İşletmesinin Tarihi Süreci: Sidrekapsi, Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2010, p. 67.

Selanik as *malikane* in partnership with his brother Çavuşzâde Ahmed Ağa whose other partner was another local notable residing in Karaferye, Eminzâde el-Hac Ahmed Ağa.⁵¹⁹ In addition, Selanik Salt mukataa was under the control of his brother Çavuşzâde Ahmed Ağa as *malikane* again in partnership with Eminzâde el-Hac Ahmed Ağa. These capital holder family members infused almost every revenue source available for only the able ones that could generate income. After his brother's death, the treasury most likely demanded payment for his *muhallefat*, but Çavuşzâde Hüseyin Ağa made it clear that his brother's (*karındaşım*) wealth consisted only of the amount of salt acquired during his office, which was 90,000 thousand salt sack and that he had neither cash nor property registered under his ownership.⁵²⁰ Hüseyin Ağa had no other choice but to borrow from usurers in order to pay the 10,416 guruş required by the treasury for his brother's *muhallefat*. With his petition to the center, he requested to sell the salt stacked by his brother Ahmed Ağa while he was in the office of saltern *mukataa* as *malikane* in turns weekly with the new *emin* for the Selanik saltern mukataa starting from the August, most probably to compensate the mentioned price.

Until now, it is clear that the family's collective portfolio has been made up of diverse sources of income and controlled as tax revenues. It seems that each investment they made paved the way for the next one. Moreover, a plausible answer to the question of why they are still involved in the illegal wheat trade is nothing more than an indication of the profitable or investible nature of the activity. Since their portfolio includes not only tax farms and *malikane* of various mukataas, but also a

⁵¹⁹ KKS.g. D-044-24/1-2 (3 Rebiülevvel 1114 / 28 July 1702). In this zapt temessükü, the signature of the *malikane* holders were stated as 'el-fakir Ahmed ve Hüseyin eş-şehir [bi] Çavuşzâdeler'. The Selanik adet-i ağnam *malikane mukataa* revenue was composed of the revenues in the towns of Yenice, Vodine, Ustrova, Karaferye and Ağustos. Among those, Yenice and Karaferye units was granted to Eminzâde el-Hac Ahmed Ağa annually for 1600 guruş and 1500 guruş, respectively.

⁵²⁰ AE.SAMD.III. 192/18580 (18 Rebiülevvel 1124 / 25 April 1712).

considerable number of çiftliks, illicit wheat trade appears as an option to capitalize on the production in their çiftlik units. The financial ties between the brothers first appeared two months before the above-mentioned petition of Çavuşzâde Hüseyin Ağa who had seized his brother's property after his death, as Ahmed Ağa died without any child. Since the center was aware of his interference, ordered the proper registration of his assets (...*Selanik adet-i ağnam emanetine ve ber-vech-i malikane memleha mukata'asına mutasarrıf olan Ahmed Ağa dimekle ma'ruf kimesne hala bila veled fevt olub hanesinde olan muhallefatının cümlesini yine Selanikte sakın Çavuşzâde Hüseyin Ağa dimekle ma'ruf kimesne zabt idüp...*)⁵²¹ Alongside with the receivables amounting to 500 *kese akçe* (208,333 guruş), the scale of his agricultural investments which comprise twenty-two çiftliks, the smallest of which are five-*çift* in size, 18,000 sheep, a herd of unbroken horses, water boffola and black cattle amounts to 3000 and 300,000 Selanik bushel of wheat and various grains stored in his granaries, fortified with livestock, cannot be underestimated (...*ve zimem-i nasda beş yüz kise mikdarı akçesi olduğundan gayrı ednasında beş çifti olmak üzere yirmi iki çiftlik ve on sekiz bin koyunu ve üç bin kadar sair hergele ve camus ve kara sığır ve Selanik kilesiyle üç yüz bin kile hinta ve şair vesair mahsulatı ve vafır eşya-yı sairesi olduğu istima olunmağla...*). The reference to the size of his çiftliks is another crucial nuance. Normally, *edna* refers to the amount of tax collected (*cizye*) or to the productive capacity of a piece of land (in tithe) in ottoman parlance, but here it was used to refer specifically to the size of a *çiftlik*. If a *çift* is considered to be an average of 100 *dönüm* of land, then the smallest of its çiftliks includes 500 dönüm of land. Even if this specific reference in the document was written intentionally to indicate the size of the lands of these çiftliks, this size remains, for example, among the previously examined large

⁵²¹ MHM.d. 119/603 (Evasit Safer 1124 / March 1712).

çiftlik in Karaferiye. However, it would indicate that if the smallest was of this size, then others must have been larger, which would also be seen as the reason for the considerable amount of grain stored in his granaries.

It is also clear that the partnerships of these two brothers continued in every branch of economic activity, but not in the illicit wheat trade is questionable. If this considerable amount of wheat was not stored to be transported to the capital, as was not the case in Arabzâde and with others, it was most likely destined for foreign merchants whose demand had been previously met by his nephew Hüseyin Çavuşzâde Ahmed.

The most active investors of Selanik until 1720s namely Çavuşzâde Ahmed Ağa and Çavuşzâde Hüseyin Ağa could secure the control of seemingly profitable mukataas as *malikane*. Since Ahmed Ağa had no children, his assets passed on to his wife, Ayşe Hatun, and the Çavuşzâdes and their investments continued through Hüseyin Ağa's lineage for the rest of the century.

Most probably, one might think that at least part of his immense portfolio had remained under the control of his brother, such most of the time happens just before the officials arrive for registering the property of the deceased. After acquiring enough capital, Çavuşzâde Hüseyin Ağa started his families journey in holding Siderekapsi mines *mukataa* as *malikane* for two generations which then came to be associated with the family alongside with tax farms of different mukataas.⁵²² Although there is no information about the aftermath of his brother's *muhallefat* but given their partnership in different sectors, either it might have been bequeathed to Hüseyin Ağa, or he

⁵²² Elena Grozdanova, Stefan Andreev, "Aperçu historique sur la metallurgie dans les zones centrale et orientale de la peninsule balkanique au cours des XVe- XIXe s.", *Etudes Balkaniques* 28/1 (1992), pp. 63-64.

expropriated it. Until Sidrekapsi came to be operated as *malikane* in 1710, Çavuşzâde Hüseyin Ağa with an interval had already acquired the revenue as being the tax-farmer from the year of 1698.⁵²³ It can be argued that his younger son's, Çavuşzâde Ali Ağa inheritance of the *malikane* in 1719 and later as the sole owner after purchasing the other half share of the *mukataa* from his older brother Mehmed Ağa in 1726 was greatly enhanced by his father's a decade of experience in managing the diverse tax sources.⁵²⁴

Despite a later prohibition order sent specifically to Selanik, the activity was neither stopped nor prevented in the following decades, and it seems that Çavuşzâde Hüseyin Ağa, most probably in partnership with his deceased brother Ahmed Ağa, was not the only one had involved in this illegal business; his son, Çavuşzâde Ali Ağa, would follow in his father's footsteps in this illicit investment, as he did later in the century when he secured the tax farm of Sidrekapsi for life. Thus, not only their *mukataa* investments as tax farms and later as *malikane*, but also their agricultural investments in the illegal wheat trade, first as direct purchases and then mostly through their *çiftlik*s, went hand in hand. The diversification of portfolios by the same family members both at the beginning of their careers and by later members through involvement in the illicit wheat trade, even after they had consolidated their prominence in the region, suggests that this trade was an ongoing commercial venture both for the family and for the region as a whole. Moreover, the Çavuşzâdes were not the only landed-notable family in the region involved in this trade.

The general order regarding investigation of illicit activity in all the docks and towns of Rumeli was issued and also found again a place in Selanik court registers in

⁵²³ Altunbay, "Osmanlı Döneminde Bir Maden İşletmesinin Tarihi Süreci: Sidrekapsi", p. 28 and p. 73.

⁵²⁴ Ibid, pp. 80-81.

the July of 1731.⁵²⁵ After about two months, a new order but with much detail was registered in the court register again that appears as the result of the investigation of agents whose reports based on the claims of the trustworthy knowledgeable residents, referring directly to the methods of actors and their superficial profiles as *çiftlik* owners who allied with dock chieftains and eagerly sell whenever they can to foreign merchants (...*çiftlik ashabı tama'-ı ham'a tabi'iyet ve sevdâ-yı cer-i men'a'fiyet ile kendü hallerinde durmayup iskele reisleri ile ittifak ve fırsat buldukça hilaf-ı emr-i aliyye harbi kefere ve müste'min taifesine zehair fûruht ettikleri husus-u mezbura vukuf-u tamı olan sekan-ı sıhhati'l kelimat ihbarıyla...*).⁵²⁶

The briefly sketched portrait was embodied and came to the surface due to the partaking of a certain el-Hac Arif Mehmed by unfolding the actors who most probably have been the ones referred in the above-quoted orders.⁵²⁷ The empire was finally able to detect who was carrying out this long-standing activity after in Selanik or/and it had already accumulated enough on the extend and the method of conducting this trade across the empire and this was, indispensably, just the shape or the incidence it took in Selanik. It can positively be stated that both scenarios seemed to be the case until now and more importantly, it helps to eliminate the obscure nature of these general edicts by providing necessary clues.

The duty was given to admiral (*kapudan paşa*) Canım Hoca Mehmed Paşa who was expected to dispatch four *firkate* to capture the Arif with his brigands from his

⁵²⁵ SKS. 44-66/B2 (3 Muharrem 1144 / 8 July 1731)

⁵²⁶ SKS. 44-104/B2 (20 Rebiülevvel 1144 / 22 September 1731). Another information source was, sometimes, the captured foreign merchants during their illicit wheat trade. For instance, when a French ship was captured that was loaded with 1900 kile of wheat from Kesendire town located in Selanik, their loads were seized by paying the price of their wheat load and their fourteen crew members were ordered to be questioned to give the name of their suppliers MHM.d. 115/2692 (Evail Rebiülahir 1120 / June 1708).

⁵²⁷ SKS. 51-75/A2-76/B1 (Evail Cemazielahir 1147 / November 1734). There are two dates in the firman and the second specifies the date and registered as 'vasıl' (arrived) on 7 November 1734. The former will be used since the order of the case registered before the following cases.

seat and his assets without leaving any of them unregistered. For a long time, Arif has been constantly selling the wheat to *müste'min* from a place outside of Selanik where he constructed a tower and resides with seventy to eighty irregular troops of nomad musketeers (...*ez cümle Selanik havassı sükkânından Arif nam kimesne Selanikin berü taraflarında olan sevahilinde bir kulle bina ve o takribiyle harbi ve müste'min sefaini tarafına celb ve nice müddetten berü mesfurlara ila nihaye hınta fûruht...*).

After a couple of days past since the notice, the men of admiral arrived at a place called Gargara where the tower of Arif Mehmed located in 1734.⁵²⁸ The name of the quarter appears during the redefining and reordering attempts of the empire for the *yörüks* who began to be referred as *evlad-ı fatihan* in 1691 with tax immunities in return of their certain services.⁵²⁹ It seems the name was given by one of *evlâd-ı fatihan*, flock (*cema'at*) called Gargara in the town of Kelemerye where most of the Selanik notables' *çiftlik*s reside.⁵³⁰ Before the officials surrendered the tower, Arif was reported to think that the pirates had come and recruited his men who engaged in combat with the officials, but Arif could not come out alive. His property was confiscated as ordered before with the presence and help of his rightful heirs, mother Hüsniye Hatun, and sister, Fatıma Hatun and a close relative, Müderris Mustafa Efendi. Although the total value of each item was not specified in this case, his portfolio was diverse.⁵³¹

⁵²⁸ SKS. 51-82/B2-83/A1-84/B1 (7 Cemazielahir 1147 / 4 November 1734).

⁵²⁹ M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, *Rumeli'de Yürükler, Tatarlar ve Evlâd-i Fâtihân*, Istanbul, 1957. p. 255.

⁵³⁰ Ibid, p. 264.

⁵³¹ The muhallefat of Arif composed of a half share of a *çiftlik* in Merkofna village, and buildings of storage for cultivators and granaries in the village of Tırbanye alongside with two concubine and an acem slave, forty-two cattle, five hundred-forty-five different type of sheep herd, fifteen horses and three donkeys and the other portion of his wealth concentrated in cash as he possesses a number of different types of gold coins range from 2 eşrefi altun, 11 zer-i mahbub, 347 yaldızlı altun to 44 fındık altunu in value order.

It seems that he was the owner of a considerable amount of wealth, which appeared with the firman that further detailed the incident, issued at the end of November of the same year.⁵³² Therefore, the center was no longer willing to let his illegal activity, which had been going on for twenty years (...*maktul-i mezbur yirmi seneden berü harbi kefereye zehair fûruhtuna cesaret üzere olub...*), go unpunished because of the size of the assets attributed to Arif Mehmed, and sought to expose those with whom Arif Mehmed had established financial and political relationships. First concern was to confiscate the actual assets of Arif. According to the intelligence received, his total property which amounts to 166,000 to 208,000 guruş in total, had not been the only ones recorded with the presence of his heirs. Rather, the main part was seized by his relative Tuzcu Mehmed Efendi together with his partner and patron local notables immediately after his death from his house and the tower by claiming that ‘there was nothing more than [what has been] confiscated’. The second was to find out who were the actors (...*ancak bu habasete merci’ kim idüğü [ma’lum] olmadıkça bir zabtiye idhal olunması ‘asir olmağla husus-u merkum tefahhus olunarak Selanik havalisinden muksim-i mel’anet ve ayan makulesinin dahi zahirelerin fûruhta sahib-i cesaret Gargara nam mahalde kulle bina idüp anda mukim olan Arif...*).

The records that most likely had been present in the tower of Arif and probably had been seized by the *mübaşir* helped to investigate the incident in detail, but it fails to help in locating his considerable size of assets. However, the center was able to get intelligence about the local power holders of whose yield had also been sold by Arif who appeared to be a middleman on behalf of the capital owners, personally carried out the operation of taking the product from the interior, transporting it to the piers and

⁵³² SKS. 51-89/A1-90/B1 (Evahir Cemazielahir 1147 / November 1734).

storing it near the coast for shipment abroad. By no surprise, his masters were the leading members of the most prominent local notable family members, Çavuşzâde Ali Ağa and Hamzazâde Ali Efendi of Selanik as they were the ones with his relative Tuzcu Mehmed who seized his property with his Jewish *sarraḥ*, though his name was not mentioned (...*hilaf-ı şer' hareketinde müttefiki olan Hamza oğlu Ali Efendi ve Çavuş oğlu Ali Ağa dimekle ma'ruf kimesnelerin ve maktul-ü mezburun sarraḥı olan [space] ve [space] yahudilerin bi'l cümle ma'lumları olduğu mütehakkık olub...*). Although the center ordered the imprisonment of the two Alis in the castle of Kelemerye and dispatched the *sarraḥ* to the capital, the fact that Ali Ağa continued to hold the *malikane-mukataa* of Sidrekapsi during this period suggests that they were able to avoid punishment. The family of Hamzazâdes was yet another prominent local notable family whose members appeared to be investors in Sidrekapsi *mukataa* like their associate-cum Çavuşzâdes, though with a much smaller scale as Hamza Efendizâde Ali acquired the tax farm of Sidrekapsi in 1717 for a year.⁵³³ Moreover, they were also extending credits to the peasants which constitutes the first phase of the method of land acquisition of local notables to establish çiftlik in the eighteenth century.

As seen, their partnerships were not limited to tax farms but also actively engaging illicit wheat trade which came to be seen the most efficient way of profit rising from their yields. Even after emphasizing that there was no *örfi* or *şer'i* impediment to allowing the sale of wheat in the permission edict of 1722 that directly given to the Balkans where the wheat and grain sale was realized from the Selanik

⁵³³ SKS. 29-92/A2-93/B1. (27 Rebiülahir 1129 / 10 April 1717). Hamza Efendizâde Ali had the tax farm of Sidrekapsi for 1717 as *emanet*. The paternal name of the Ali sometimes appeared to be used as Hamzazâde Ali.

port, is now returning to its old reflexes in the usual way.⁵³⁴ It must have been probably because of the size of the amount sold and the involvement of the most influential families of the region are the reasons for this reflex of the state.

Unsurprisingly enough, the analysis conducted thus far was triggered due to the prohibited wheat trade about a year earlier by the consortium consisting of most prominent local notable family members of Selanik, with Çavuşzâde Ali Ağa at the forefront amongst other influential *çiflik* holder local notables including his close-associate Arif whose title appears this time as *yörük*.⁵³⁵ Although definitive document is absent, since it is a well-known fact that nomads breed transportation animals such as mules and camels to supply the army, especially in times of war, it is wise for capital owners to act together with Arif. Considering the above-quoted reference that the Arif was conducting illicit wheat trade for twenty years who was selling the wheat also on behalf of the mentioned most prominent notables and presence of Çavuşzâde Ali Ağa's father in the early illicit activity confirms that the consortium since then, if not earlier, had been acting together. If that reasoning is the case, then the total amount of wheat sold might have been projected for their previous undertakings. It also records how much of the product illicitly send off by each involved separately as follows, Çavuzâde Ali Ağa with 50,000 kile, Abacızâde Ahmed Ağa 30,000, Dar oğlu Ahmed 20,000 and Yörük Arif 50,000, which makes up 150,000 (3840 metric tons) kile in total. Compared to the consortium of 1719, only one member was included also in this incident, namely Abacızâde Ahmed Ağa.

⁵³⁴ Ibid., ‘...hunta vesair zehairin harbi kefare ve müste'min taifesine fûruhtu nice ---- ---- olmak hasebiyle bu madde şer'en memnu' ve binaen-aleyh matakaddemden evamir-i şerife ile bi'l husus ol taraflardan medfu' ola gelüb...’.

⁵³⁵ MHM.d. 139/1451 (Evasıt Cemazielahir 1146 / November 1733). A *hutut* (another decision) has been issued on the case but it was not an annulment but the re-registration of this specific case into the fortress registers as follows: ‘*terkin-ba ferman-ı ali terkin olunup ve emr-i şerif yazılup kal'a bende kayd olunmuştur*’. Because the main actors were ordered to be jailed in the castle of Kelemerye town.

‘...hala Selanik sakinlerinden Hüseyin Çavuş oğlu Ali Ağa dimekle ma’ruf kimesne elli bin ve Abacı oğlu Ahmed Ağa dimekle şehir kimesne dahi otuz bin ve Dar oğlu diğer Ahmed dahi yirmi bin ve Yörük Arif nam kimesne elli bin keyl hintayı hilaf-ı emr-i ali kefereye bey’ ve fûruht eyledikleri ... mezburların bu güne memnu’ ve merfu’ olan halete cesaret eylemeleri gereği gibi te’dib ve güçsmallerine muktezi halattan olduğuna binaen bu husus kemal-i dikkat ve taharri ile teftiş ve tefahhus olunub...’.

Once again as usual procedure in such cases analyzed before, the request of investigating the amount of wheat sold with its sale price and stored in the granaries of the actors stemmed from the fact that the center would project with such information the production capacity as well as to set the limit in its punishment, if it chose to impose fine, as was the case for several others (*...bu ana dek keferet taifesine virdükleri hinta ve şair vesair zehair ne mikdardır ve hala der anbar ne mikdar zehairleri vardır dersaadetime vuku’-u sıhhati üzere defter ve defteriyle arz ve ilam olunmak fermanım olmağın...*).

The fact that Abacızâde Ahmed Ağa became one of the guarantors as a local notable during these procedures to prevent the illicit wheat activity and then possibly others joined him in the prohibited activity is another aspect of a gradual process of recognition. In other words, hiring a guarantor at a time when there was no prohibition is the second measure after the direct act of prohibition, but in the end, it cannot be prevented. There are also sub-relationships and sub-processes that cannot be explained because of the impossibility due to the offerings of the sources. However, as seen in the consortium of Çavuşzâde Ali Ağa, Abacızâde Ahmed Ağa took part as an instigator instead of a preventer of which was attributed by the empire during the surety proceedings taken place in Selanik court in 1719.

The existence of an active communication process between the actors through correspondence is the biggest indicator of the normalization of this trade as the consortium gets into touch with the foreign merchants whenever the yield was

abundant to be purchased, during the imperial fleet set sail for a campaign to sell as much as they could (...ve bundan ma'ada kefare ile haberleşüp bu sene-i mübarekede zahiremiz kesret ve vefret üzere olmağla donanma-yı hümayun sefer-i sultaniye dahl olduktan sonra satılub kusur zahirelerin dahi almak üzere mükatebe eyledikleri mevkuf kimesnelerin ihbarlarıyla rütbe-i tahkikata reside olmağın...)⁵³⁶ It is a strong indication that a relationship like that of the Arabzâdes with French consul with that of a similar intermediary seemed to be substantiated but through this time with that of English consul by these notables, especially Çavuşzâde Ali Ağa as the leading figure of the group. His probate inventory has the capacity to provide detailed data which help to reveal financial threads that has been ordered before by the center to be unraveled in their illicit activity when the Arif was shot to death.

After Ali Ağa passed away, it is understood that the treasury had undertaken a series of operations as a normal procedure for such a tax farmer about a month before the preparation of his probate inventory with the presence of his heirs and the kadı of Selanik.⁵³⁷ He had left a debt more than the value of his property (*terekeşi düyununa kifayet itmeyecek*) but the treasury's first concern appeared to be his debts out of the wheat price as being zahire mübayaacası (wheat purchasing agent) of Selanik and other neighboring towns which was mentioned as the first item which then be followed by the ones related with his yearly payments of *malikane* contracts. The appointment of the most prominent notable as wheat acquisition agent was another characteristic of the century and prevalent in almost every town of the empire. Most of the time, they became the ones whose size of çiftlik portfolios surpass that of others. But the third item points directly to financial network weaved around the shadow economy of the

⁵³⁶ Ibid.

⁵³⁷ D. BŞM. MHF. 41/1 (12 Recep 1164 / 6 June 1751).

wheat trade as it clearly mentions that the debt owed to some *müste'min taifesi* (foreign merchants) in Selanik and to certain *sarrafs taifesi* (moneylenders) in Istanbul which could only be further substantiated through debt part of his probate inventory. According to the document, while the claimant recorded as English consul (*konsolos-u İngiltere*) implies the above quoted *müste'min* with 387,000 akçe in his probate inventory, his debts to Avram and Sahef Jewish moneylenders with 432,000 akçe and most probably to Aşkos jew with 129,000 akçe and to Jewish Havel with 300,000 akçe implies that of the sarrafs mentioned in the document in Istanbul. His debt represents a significant aspect of his *muhallefat*, which serves as an implicit recognition of the activity by the center.

The financial situation and investment pattern of the Çavuşzâdes of Thessaloniki, a local power with a large share of farms in its investment portfolio and at the same time indebted to moneylenders, is not dissimilar to that of the Sarıcazâdes of Karaferye, who were both lenders to peasants and debtors to moneylenders.

Until this point, the cases clearly indicate the existence of economic and political networks among various levels of social strata that can be sniffed out in other cases but due to the availability of documents, cannot be furthered. What has come to the surface with the incident of Arif Mehmed revealed an embedded activity that carried out by a tightly knit group of individuals with financial ties including local notables, and their capital provider moneylenders whose presence was previously mentioned in the Arif's case without their names. On the other hand, the substantial sums of money attributed to him, despite his intermediary status for the actual capital owner notables, indisputably indicate the well-established nature of this trade. Although not definitive given the further availability of sources at hand, the debt of an

actor in the illicit wheat trade to a British consul is more significant than its amount, as it suggests that Britain was the customer of the wheat.

In the aftermath, the younger son of Hüseyin, Çavuşzâde Ali Ağa remained in control of the *mukataa* until his death in 1751, despite his debt, the value of his *tereke* is the second largest and far exceeds other contemporary wealthy Salonicans.⁵³⁸ Although the debt may suggest the failure of investments, it also necessitates the analysis of process prepared the grounds neatly. Upon the order of the center, not only Sidrekapsi and other mukataas of Çavuşzâde Ali Ağa, but also all the movable and immovable property alongside with his duty in *zahire mübayaası* were ordered to be left without any interference from *miri* officials for his son Ahmed Ağa who inherited the assets in Selanik so that they could pay off their father's debt.⁵³⁹ It can be regarded as the transfer of the capital accumulated for at least two generations to the next one which alone proves the debt may not account for the total loss of assets for the future

⁵³⁸ SKS. 79/60-66 (16 Şaban 1164 / 10 July 1751), Cited before in Phokion Kotzageorgis and Demetrios Papastamatiou, "Wealth Accumulation in an Urban Context," *Turkish Historical Review* 5, no. 2 (2014): 165–99. This study dealt with wealthy individuals of Selanik by using fifty-seven probate inventories by capitalizing upon mostly the debts and receivables parts. His agricultural investments in the form of çiftlik among other forty çiftlik holding Salonicans has been scrutinized through their probate inventories before cited by Papastamatiou, Demetrios, "The structure, content and development of large estates in the environs of Salonica during the period 1697-1770," in *Festschrift in Honor of Ioannis P. Theoharides. II. Studies on the Ottoman Empire and Turkey*, Evangelia Balta, Georgios Salakidis, and Theoharis Stavrides (eds.) (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2014), pp. 375-402. While probate inventories are valuable sources providing a wide spectrum of information, they limit analyses to elaborating them only as they were the product of a financial journey of a particular individual, they lack offering detailed processes in which capital accumulation methods of that person or family surface over a long period of time and therefore must be fortified with other available sources, a fact mentioned by these studies as well. Ultimately, individuals or families who have left strong historical traces mediate the understanding of processes and should not be ignored in favor of and on behalf of 'underrepresented' classes and groups in society, but this does not mean that the latter are less representative; rather, the nature of the material should be examined in detail and carefully, only then can the opaque veil on the underrepresented be lifted. Available valuable studies mostly analyzed the family over their tax farm investments in Sidrekapsi. However, except their tax farm investments in Sidrekapsi, their other ventures in diverse tax farms scattered around many towns of Selanik in partnership with other capital holders, the process of family's agricultural investments in çiftlik and illicit wheat trade undertakings has not been scrutinized. The financial partnership between different petit local notables in the imperial scale in different regional settings is alone necessitates attention and analyzing the emergence and development of each inter-related mentioned local notable families in the broader Selanik hinterland who has unique as well as common features in their economic dispositions is beyond the scope of this study and such will be scrutinized in another study.

⁵³⁹ D. BŞM. MHF. 41/1 (12 Receb 1164 / 6 June 1751).

generations as much as the *muhallefat* records do not register every moveable fortune of a deceased, if that person especially was wealthy, given the unique characteristic of the political fabric of different urban and local settings.

Given the innate nature of debt in the financial threads of the Ottoman society from village level to the capital that has been detailly scrutinized in the case of Karaferye and for other towns of Selanik, it is hardly possible to find a capital holder without leaving any debt. Nevertheless, the main point here is the partaking of earliest members of the family in the illicit wheat trade activities simultaneously with their tax farm office as a form investment choice. For the only alternative to the low-income forced purchases of the empire was to look away from the capital to the higher prices offered by foreign merchants in order to make use of their *çiftlik*s. Moreover, after Çavuşzâde Hüseyn Ağa, his son Ali Ağa took up where his father left in the illicit wheat trade, too. Furthermore, after his death, son of Ali Ağa, Çavuşzâde Ahmed Reşid Ağa will continue to hold the Sidrekapsi *mukataa* as *malikane* for more than forty years with just a year of consignment.⁵⁴⁰ As clearly substantiated, this spatial and temporal trajectory was the case in Western Anatolia and the actions of the Çavuşzâdes in Selanik and those of the Arabzâdes in Western Anatolia followed nearly identical chronological paths of development. While French nation was on the demand side mostly from the former, the British merchants were that of the latter. Above all, at almost the same time, the regions became places where wheat emerged as market commodity, with the main contenders being the mentioned families.

Considering the attributed wealth of a middleman, the scale of the illicit wheat trade must have been much profitable for the holders of main *sermaye*, which have

⁵⁴⁰ Altunbay, “Osmanlı Döneminde Bir Maden İşletmesinin Tarihi Süreci: Sidrekapsi”, pp. 100-101.

been quoted and directly referring to the profit seekers in the illicit wheat trade we have seen in the firman aimed to curb the activity of Bergama *voyvoda*, Veli Ağa in 1726. It would be incorrect to attribute all the wealth solely to this factor, just as it would be inaccurate to assume that probate records or estates provide a comprehensive representation of a person's actual possessions. The fact that a significant part of Arif Mehmed's property was taken by his partners, the ayans, after his death is by no means an exception in the empire; on the contrary, such cases are not uncommon.

The members of Salonican urban investors maintain their families' pride after the second half of the century. Even if the profiles remain obscure due to the offerings of the documents, the activity would continue without losing any pace. Moreover, the center enlarges the repertoire in addressing the situation even more dire. Term *kaht-u galâ* which is used to indicate periods of famine, also refers to a sharp decline in production compared to previous years, although this decline is relatively brief, particularly if the area in question was a center of intensive forbidden wheat trade, such as Selanik. During periods of so-called underproduction, such as in 1780, illicit wheat actors continued to operate by selling stored wheat in granaries at elevated prices rather than dispatching it to regional markets.⁵⁴¹

5.4. Bergama as the Gate of Anatolia to the Commercial Markets

Upon closer examination, it becomes evident that illicit trade was a profitable enterprise. Although in the current literature there is no empirical data on how this product was commercialized, available studies indicate that the *ayan* families of the eighteenth century relied heavily on *iltizam* and later *malikane* contracts to raise capital. However, the benefits they gained from the illicit trade in wheat have not yet

⁵⁴¹ BOA. C.İKTS. 45/2228 (Evasit Safer 1195 / February 1781).

been fully explored. During the eighteenth century, it was observed that certain members of powerful local families in specific regions participated in the wheat trade early in their careers to acquire capital. Subsequently, this forbidden trade helped extending their economic, political, and even military power later on by constituting another most important revenue-generating item in their portfolio.

Bergama acted as a gate to the commercial markets for the wheat of its immediate environs and even the wheat of Central Anatolia. Three stages of illicit wheat trade undertakings by three different Bergama local notables *voyvoda*, namely Lengerli Hasan Ağa, Veli Ağa, Arabzâde el-Hac İsmail Ağa, in chronological order, illuminate how the activity was embedded in regional dynamics and actors' dispositions of the *voyvoda*-ship by highlighting its widespread and income-generating nature in the eighteenth century. The activities of the actors can be periodized by the fabric of agrarian structure of the region as pre-and post *çiftlik* domination which corresponds to pre- and post 1730. The post normally allows the collection and management of revenue sources within the jurisdiction of *hass*. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, it seemed to evolve into a position of managership which surpassed its conventionally drawn borders and became prerogative constituting the last step in the way of becoming prominent power in the wider hinterland of Aydın region. Whether through direct purchases from a given region's hinterland or directly from *çiftlik*s located close-by to the seats of a powerful figure, collecting and storing the wheat necessitates managerial capacity as well as means to circumvent political and administrative constraints.

Earliest illicit wheat activity of the mentioned post in the region belongs to the *voyvoda* of Bergama called Lengerli Hasan Ağa, who was selling wheat to *harbî kefere* ships secretly through the dock known by the community of that region as

“Denizdeğirmeni,” located in Menemen Güzelhisarı. But this was not his only disservice in 1709.⁵⁴² It was heard that he was sending words to the villagers of Şakran, Kilise, and Tekke situated in the mentioned town, cautioning them to 'load their wheat to kefer ships,' and through this, he was taking their akçes under the name of benefit”.⁵⁴³ To capture him, a decree was issued to Captain Vezir İbrahim Paşa, who appointed Kapucular Kethüdası (commander of the Porte’s cavalry unit in the localities) İbrahim. He saw Lengerli Hasan’s seven men from the mentioned villages loading wheat onto a Venice galley with Candarlı castle warden and captured them. Then they moved to capture Lengerli, but he shot the warden in the head with his brigand composed of six hundred men and refused to come to the court.⁵⁴⁴ As seen, he was earning his wealth through mediating the exchange of wheat between two parties: the empire’s villagers and foreign merchants. After securing the office of *voyvoda*, who was supposed to collect imperial revenues and safeguard the tax sources of the empire, turned out to be a local magnate who possessed six hundred men in his command and could afford to suppress villagers and get their wheat surpluses to sell to foreign merchants.

A separate parenthesis first should be opened for understanding the evolution of the post and its impact on the extent of the illicit wheat activity in the context of Bergama region. This trajectory was the case, though much later, in the rising of Katrinli dynasty to the power first through obtaining the voivodship of Katrin in Karaferiye. The analyses on the transformation of the fiscal administration in the

⁵⁴² BOA. İE.BH., 15/1326, (20 Rebiülahir 1121 / 29 June 1709) “...hala Bergama voyvodası olan Lengerli Hasan nam kimesne kefer sefinelerine Menemen Güzelhisarı kazasına ta’bi Denizdeğirmeni dimikle ma’ruf limana getirdiü...”

⁵⁴³ Ibid., “...ve yine kaza-yı mezbure ta’bi Şakran ve Kilise ve Tekke nam karye ahalisine tarafından haberler gönderiü kefer sefinelerine zahire tahmil edin deyü tenbih ve bu takrib ile ‘avaid namıyla akçelerin alup...”.

⁵⁴⁴ BOA. MHM.d,116/895, (Evasit Cemazielahir 1121 / August 1709).

Ottoman provinces in the eighteenth century will help to highlight how Lengerli Hasan Ağa increased his influence in the region - and later that of his successors - through the *voyvoda*-ship. The change in the way the *miri mukataas* were administered had its impact on the development of the post into a rent-seeking instrument, used not only by the higher administrators but also in partnership with their lower-ranking 'servants', such as the *voyvoda*.⁵⁴⁵ Prior to the fief system ceased to function over the course of seventeenth century, revenues of the provinces and towns had been under the control of beys and sipahis in return for their certain services. As the composition of the army and the needs of the treasury changed, the former *miri mukataas* increasingly became the subject of tax farming under the control of the *mültezim* who assumed the administrative authority of former sancak beys.⁵⁴⁶ However, due to their lack of knowledge in military and administrative matters of the local fabric where the revenues allocated to him, they were accompanied by centrally appointed *voyvoda* who could take care of the collection process. The pace of this development further expanded after the application of life-term tax farming of the mukataas after 1695. In the eighteenth century, however, the latter became the dominant method of tax collection and the owners of the *malikane* most often delegated their authority to local personalities who were able to collect and manage the tax sources. This chain delegation of authority to a lower level, which is seen at every level (from governor and vizier to their *mütesellim*, or from grand vizier and members of imperial household to their *voyvoda*, from *malikane* holder to his *mültezim* and from timariod to his *subaşı*) has been characterized by the transfer of de facto powers to local power holders.⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴⁵ Eftal Batmaz, 'İltizam sisteminin XVIII. yüzyıldaki boyutları', *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, XVIII(29), p. 48.

⁵⁴⁶ Özer Ergenç. "XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Taşra Yönetiminin Mali Nitelikleri." *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 10 (1986), pp. 90-91.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 95.

From the beginning of the eighteenth century, the transformation of fiscal administration in Bergama followed the same steps with many others scattered in various towns of Anatolia; they were either given as *mukataa* by the treasury in the form of a *voyvoda*-ship through *iltizam* or, as was common in the eighteenth century, as *malikane*.⁵⁴⁸ In the first phase of this process, the *voyvoda* ship and the tax farm of the region were controlled by two different officials. But as the century progressed, those who became *voyvoda* also began to receive the tax farm - formerly belonging to a separate individual - which meant that they became, so to speak, the sole owners of the region by uniting the fiscal and administrative authority in one person, who most often happened to be the local powerful figures. After this merge of the fiscal and administrative authorities that would become an established phenomenon regarding Bergama and elsewhere, the connotation of the region also began to be referred as *Bergama voyvodahğı*. As the first seeds of this development seem to have been sown in the first decade of the century, the actors of the process in which *voyvodalık* emerges necessitates analysis with the available data at hand.

The development sketched above is echoed in three successive documents, two of which were produced on false claims, and helps to explore some aspects of Lengerli's early career, as well as to understand the transformation of Bergama's fiscal administration at the turn of the eighteenth century. Although the revenues of the docks of Karacadağ and Çandarlı were under the jurisdiction of the *malikane-mukataa* of Bergama and were controlled by a certain Ahmed, Nazır of Middilli island Bardak Ahmed Ağa who was the brother of Vizir İsmail Paşa intentionally claimed that the docks actually belong to the *malikane-mukataa* of Ayazmend and controlled by his brother. However, it was understood that he used false witnesses to substantiate his

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 92.

claims in the local court.⁵⁴⁹ As the Bergama region is a hinterland for the Çandarlı dock because of its short distance, it became the main point for the illegal transfer of wheat to the foreign merchants. Thus, this conflict can be read as the agenda of an interest group policy to control the docks where became main entrepot for illicit wheat trade during the eighteenth century. Given the privilege of *serbestiyet* granted through *malikane mukataa* status of the region where had been already under the life-term lease prior to 1706, the members of the *örf* could not interfere neither to the administration nor to the revenues which provide relative comfort for the *voyvoda*.

It must have been the reason for the future Bergama voivodas' accumulation of political and economic power that was the control of the tax farm of Bergama *mukataa*. This control served as a steppingstone for obtaining the necessary instruments to become *voyvoda* of the region. In the event of a conflict over the jurisdiction of the mentioned docks, with false claims from the other party regarding control of revenues between the *malikane mukataa* of Bergama region located in the wider province of Hüdavendigâr and that of Ayazmend, Lengerli Hasan Ağa appears as the tax farmer of the sub-*mukataa* of Ayazmend under the Bergama *mukataa* for the years 1706 and 1707 before being appointed as *voyvoda* after approximately one and a half years.⁵⁵⁰ Before holding the post in Bergama, Hasan Ağa served as the *voyvoda* of Ayazmend and was also a tax farmer.⁵⁵¹ While he was still the tax farmer for

⁵⁴⁹ See for the docks as they were actually under the control of Bergama *malikane-mukataa* and the nazır of Midillis' false claims, MHM.d. 121/563 (Evasıt Şaban 1125 / September 1713).

⁵⁵⁰ AE.SAMD.III 23/2216 (17 Rebiülevvel 1120 / 6 June 1708) This and the following document was related with the false declaration of nazır of Midilli Ahmed Ağa. "... Ayazmend mukata'asını bin yüz on altı senesinde nazır-ı mumaiyleh Ahmed Ağa tarafından memhur temessük ile Kürdoğlu İbrahim zabt eyleyüp mali olan bin guruş ve yüz gurus kalemiyyesini Bergama voyvodası olan Salih ahz ve kabz eylediğine hüccet-i şeriyye ibraz ve on yedi senesi malini Bergama voyvodası olan tarafına virmek üzere vezir-i mükerrer devletlü İsmail Paşa hazretleri tarafından Lengerli Hasan Ağa zabt idüp mal-ı mirisini ve faizi vezir-i müşarileyh hazretlerinin Ayazmend kazasında olan at ve katarlarına sarf eyleyüp ve on sekiz senesini dahi mezbur Hasan Ağa bila temessük zabt etmek üzere iken...". Bardak Ahmed's claims over the illegal interference of *voyvoda* Salih in Bergama to the revenues of the docks as reflected in the petition in AE.SAMD.III 23/2224 (17 Rebiülevvel 1120 / 6 June 1708).

⁵⁵¹ BOA. İE. ML. 112/10688 (12 Rebiülahir 1119 / 13 July 1707).

Ayazmend, a certain Salih held the position of *voyvoda* in Bergama, and Lengerli Hasan Ağa collected the revenue on Salih's behalf. Hasan Ağa became the *voyvoda* of Bergama in 1709 and held the position until 1718.⁵⁵² Step by step, he could progress towards greater opportunities. His first appearance as Bergama *voyvoda* was due to his involvement in illicit wheat activity in 1709.

Almost a year after his tax farming duty of 1707, Lengerli Hasan Ağa engaged in illicit wheat trade. However, he was able to secure the *voyvoda* post, which provided the necessary means to raise capital through illicit wheat trade, not only for himself but also for future generations in the region from 1709 onwards. In the early stages of his, Lengerli Hasan Ağa, served as the tax farmer of the sub *mukataa* of Ayazmend. However, he later ascended to the position of *voyvoda*, presumably gaining control over the tax farm of the region as well. It is understood that two posts came under his control as the documents do not mention of any separate *mültezim* for the revenue.

Not only Lengerli, but also Veli Ağa and subsequently Arabzâde İsmail Ağa, took advantage of this transformed version of the post. However, the merge of the tax farm institution with the voyvodaship of Bergama reached its zenith during the tenure of the most prominent *voyvodas* from the local notable Arabzâde family by means of the extent of their capital accumulation.

Contradiction arises from the center's approach of prioritizing a constant flow of taxes, as evidenced by the lengthy tenures of officials involved in prohibited activities. Additionally, the use of a harsh tone in orders exaggerates the degree of illegality beyond what is necessary. As it was a century of mutual compromise, it is likely that the center did not immediately remove Hasan Ağa from office as long as

⁵⁵² BOA. İE. AS. 82/7403 (29 Cemazielahir 1130 / 30 May 1718).

the required taxes for the treasury were paid without loss. It seems that he was able to continue his duties as the *voyvoda* of Bergama despite his illicit activity.⁵⁵³

5.4.1. Putting the Tax Flow Ahead of Sustenance

Although the imperial bureaucracy had clearly acknowledged the lower level of production capacity in Western Anatolia compared to Mora and Balkans in the 1720 and 1722 permissions, the illicit wheat trade from the former must have reached to the extent that finally the center preferred to get its share from the revenues of Ayazmend, Çandarlı and Güzelhisar docks, from north to the south respectively covering not only Bergama but also a considerable part of hinterland where agricultural production in fact is productive in (h.1138) 1726.⁵⁵⁴ As was the case in the Balkans and Mora, the approach of the Empire, even if it was not a permission, serves as an implicit sign of the process of recognizing the de facto situation that is gradually emerging. The order that came to Bergama was first of all aimed at protecting the villagers who used to profit from selling their wheat to the islands of Midilli and Sakız as well as to the ships from Izmir and Karaburun. Nevertheless, some wrongdoers do not allow the vessels that carries the yield of the peasants to sell, and as a result, the wheat in the hands of the villager rots in their warehouses, making it difficult for them to pay their taxes and depriving the treasury of revenue. The mentioned docks were under the jurisdiction of Bergama *mukataa* and were held as *malikane*.

‘Ber-vech-i malikane Aydın muhassılı Abdullah Paşa’nın uhdesinde olan Bergama ve tevabi mukata’ası aklamından Ayazmend ve Çandarlı ve Güzelhisar hassları mukataa-yı mezbur tarafından zabt ve Ayazmend iskelesinin hububat gümrüğü ve Çandarlı iskelesinin resm-i kilesi mukataa-yı mezbureye hasıl kayd olunmağla hasıl olan aşar ve hububat Ayazmend ve

⁵⁵³ BOA. MHM.d, 117/578, (Evasıt Safer 1124 / March 1712). This firman referring him as *voyvoda* of Bergama ordered him to capture three individuals because of their wrong doings to the hass peasants.

⁵⁵⁴ BOA. MHM.d. 133/1026 (Evahir Zilhicce 1138 / August 1726).

Çandarlı ve Güzelhisar iskelelerinden Midilli ve Sakız ve İzmir ve Karaburundan gelen kayıklara fûruht ve mal-ı miri bu vechle tahsil olunageldiğinden başka reaya fukarası dahi mahsullerin zikr olunan iskelelerde fûruht ve üzerlerine lazım gelen tekaliflerin eda iderler iken bazıları zahire olan kayıkların reislerini tutub tecrim eylediklerinden bir ferd zahire fûruht idemeyüb ve ahire fûruhtu dahi mümkün olmadığından herkesin zahireleri anbarlarında çürüyüp ibadullahı zarar ve mal-ı mukataaya kesri mucib olduğundan muhassıl-ı mummaileyh ile zikr olunan kazaların kadıları arz eylediklerinde bu mukabelede bin yüz otuz sekiz senesi ibtidasından mal-ı mukataaya üç bin gurus zam ve fakat Midilli ve Sakız ve İzmir ve Karaburundan gelen kayıklara ve yedlerine emr-i şerif verilen müste'min taifesine zahirelerin fûruht eylemelerine kimesne muhalefet eylememek için emr-i şerifim verilmişdi feth-i hakaniden berü Midilli ve Sakız cezirelerine iktiza eden hinta ve şair ve koyun ve kuzu ve sığır ve odun ve saman vesair me'kulat ve melbusat Ayazmend ve Çandarlı ve Güzelhisar ve Edremid ve Kömür iskelelerinden nakl oluna gelüb cezirelere ahalisinin maişetleri anda münhasır iken ... zikr olunan iskelelerin zahire fûruhtuna izn ve ruhsatı müşi'r verilen emr-i şerif ancak Midilli ve Sakız ve İzmir ve Karaburundan gelen kayıklara ve yedlerine emr-i şerif verilen müste'min taifesine fûruht olunmak üzere tasrih olunub bila emr-i şerif harbi kefereye zahire fûruht eylemesine müsa'ade olmadığından gayri fûruht olunandan zehairden resm-i miri tahsili dahi ferman olunduğu yoğ iken arz ve mahzar ---- üzere mecmu' zahireyi kefereye fûruht idüp...'

'...hala Bergama voyvodası olan Veli Ağa demekle ma'ruf kimesne bin yüz otuz sekiz senesi ibtidasından maru'z-zikr iskelelerde zahire fûruht idüp resm-i miri tahsil eyleyüp 'ferman vardır diyü' bu vakte gelinceye dek mücerred celb-i mal için Midilli ve Sakız cezirelerine hinta vesair zehair virdirmeyüb iskelelere tarafından ademler ta'yin ve Konya ve Karahisar ve Germiyan taraflarından gelen buğday ashabından baha-i yesir ile iştira ve zikr-i mürur iden iskelelerden yüz elli miktarı keferiye kalyonu ve şehdiye sefinelerine zehair tahmil ve resm-i mirilerin ahz itmekle cezayir-i mezburede kaht-u gala vuku'una ba'is olub sabıku'l zikr iskelelerden nakl olunan koyun ve kuzu ve sığır ve odun ve saman vesair emti'anın resm-i gümrükleri kadimü'l eyyamdan berü Midilli gümrüğü tarafından ahz olunur iken mezkur Veli iskele-i mezkureden nakl olunan koyun ve kuzu ve sığır ve odun ve saman vesair hububat ve emtiadan beşte birin ahz ve bunun emsali zulm ve ta'addisinin inayet ve nihayeti olmayub... mezburun kefereye zehair fûruht eylemesi men' ve def'...'

From the date of the silence of the documents on Lengerli Hasan Ağa after 1718 and until the emergence of the new voyvoda in 1726 suggest that Lengerli was holding the post during the interval. As for the illicit wheat activity from the region, new voyvoda Veli Ağa came to the stage by his interference in the sales destined for the Midilli and Sakız islands and illegally levying the *resm-i miri* in return of his illicit

sales to one-hundred fifty ships of *harbi kefere* composed of kalyons and *şehtiyes*.⁵⁵⁵ As analyzed, it is also worth stressing that the mentioned docks also became entrepot for the wheat of central Anatolia, namely Konya and also for that of Karahisar (inner Aegean region) and Germiyan (southern Aegean region) regions. Veli Ağa had been purchasing at a lower price the wheat came from these regions and sell to the foreign merchants. It is also understood from the firman that he was making use of his official position to the maximum level by levying *resm-i miri* on the wheat he sold to foreign merchants and seizing the one-fifth of the customs which was normally controlled by Midilli dock. Such actions of Veli Ağa led to the scarcity of the islands.

Normally, the emphasis here, since the conquest, is on the effort of legitimizing the permission given by the empire, as in others, to meet the needs of wheat, barley, sheep, lambs, cattle, wood, and straw for the islands of Midilli and Sakız⁵⁵⁶, with the sale of these commodities from these docks from their first conquest. Instead of *resm-i miri* levy on each kile sold, this time as the docks under the life-time lease of Bergama *mukataa* by certain Abdullah Paşa, the annual tax amount was immediately increased. It is fair to argue that the the empire acknowledges the actual amount of wheat destined for foreign merchants which is as higher and with this premise the empire strictly ordered the investigation of the amount sold to foreign merchants, and the identification of the merchants.

First, the state made use of this incident as an excuse for such an increase in *mal* of the *mukataa* by 3000 guruş to eliminate the bad effect of already frozen

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁶ It should also be considered that while illicit wheat trade was operated in the Balkans and Western Anatolia, the regions were also constantly supplying the need of the empire. For instance, the prohibition order in 1730 issued for Salonica mentions that the island came also to be supplied by Rumeli through Salonica docks when the need arises as the annual wheat production in the island would suffice for the consumption of the dwellers for just one week and their annual need range from at most 50,000 to 60,000 kile of wheat see BOA. MHM.d. 135/1488 (Evail-i Şevval 1142 / April 1730).

malikane mukataa contract price of the *mukataa*. Second, the excuse of the need of the mentioned islands, and referring to the possible benefit for peasants' sell instead of Veli Ağa and alike and the order regarding the investigation of the amount of the wheat illicitly sent to foreign merchants implies that the empire aspires to see the revenue capacity from the sales is again the reflection of the attitude of the empire in the face of constant demand on the one hand and its effort in calibrating the possible future income, on the other. Furthermore, this attitude of prioritizing tax collection of the center points to the implicit but unambiguous partnership between *muhassıl* Abdullah Paşa and the Bergama *voyvoda* as he has the authority to appoint Veli Ağa as *voyvoda* for management of the taxes and administrative duties in the region. If that is the case then the center would have looked away by any means for such expropriation of the yield by the Veli Ağa and his superintendent Abdullah Paşa, only if the taxes of Bergama had been paid properly to the treasury.

The amount of the wheat sold illicitly by Veli Ağa as reflected by the considerable size of the illicit fleet necessarily dragged the attention of the center as it ordered the preparation of intelligence by its exhaustive list of requests regarding his illicit trade; the first concern was to determine his profit and then prepare the grounds for confiscating his wealth. Judging by its delicate approach in calculation, the empire seems to project considerable amount of profit out of his illicit wheat trade. First, it wanted to know the amount and the market price of the wheat that Veli Ağa sold so that the profit he acquired from the sale can be excluded from the total amount of capital he used for the purchase of the wheat. Over the profit from his total gain after the sale, it ordered to the *mübaşir* to apply confiscatory in essence, %20 interest rate, which was above the *şer'i* rates, as a redemption. If the final amount exceeds his profit, the remaining was ordered to be given by Veli Ağa together with his partners who

were stationed in the mentioned docks. After determining the total gain out of the sale and the applied interest, this amount will be cut from his total asset and the remaining wealth of Veli Ağa would be appropriated by the *muhassıl* of Aydın Abdullah Paşa in the name of *miri*.

Second, the *mübaşir* was asked to provide how much wheat Veli Ağa sold to foreign merchants, how much did the foreign merchants paid for each kile of Veli Ağa, how much *resm-i miri* did he collect, which type of grain sold, at which price and to whom, at which price did Veli Ağa purchased the wheat arrived from Konya, Karahisar, Germiyan, Güzelhisar and Aydın between the time of the order and its arrival to the *mübaşir*.⁵⁵⁷

This effort of the center after specifying his total gain consisted of *resm-i miri* and the total amount of gain by the wheat illicitly sold, by urging the *mübaşir* to be careful and just while recording the true amounts of how much was paid for the initial purchase of wheat from the peasants and from the mentioned regions by Veli Ağa in total and the total amount of his gain from selling to the merchants was to be able to calibrate the just redemption amount. Above all, it can also be regarded as the reflection of the Empire's aim to know exact productive capacity of the region in the illicit wheat trade for its future policy regarding fixation of his future shares.

‘...fûruht eylediği zehairin mikdar ve bahaları gereği gibi teftiş ve tefahhus ile haber alınub ol tarafda rayiç olduğu üzere sermayesi içinden ifraz ve onu on iki hesabı üzere kendüsüne faidesi dahi tayin ve ihrac olunduktan sonra küsuru --- muhassıl-ı mumaileyh tarafından Bergama voyvodası olan mezbur yedinden miri için tahsil ettirilmek fermanım olmağın...’,

‘...kendülerinin ashabından iştirâ eyledikleri üzere asl-ı sermaye hasıllarından aşağı varmayub ve kendülerinin iktiza iden masrafları için onu on iki hesabı üzere kendülere faide ifraz olunub küsur kalan faizi her ne mikdar akçeye balığ olursa mezbur Veli ile iskelelerde olan ademlerinden tamamen taleb ve eğer edada inad ve taallül iderlerse cümlesi kalebend olunub...

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid.

kefereye fûruht eyledikleri zehairin mikdar-ı bahaların noksan göstermek ve asıl iştırâ eyledikleri zehairin sermayesini aldıklarından ziyade yazmak misillü hıyanet ile miriye gadri muceb olur hareket...’.

It must have been the result of the detailed report requested above regarding Veli Ağa’s illicit wheat trade, as three years later a firman was sent to the judge of Bergama just like in response to the information requested, with the information that the voyvoda of Bergama was illicitly selling wheat.⁵⁵⁸ It appears that it refers directly to Veli ağa since he was the still *voyvoda* of Bergama in 1730.⁵⁵⁹ It would also highlight that he could either pay the redemption price or the center disclaimed the retribution. After stressing the prohibited nature of this trade with many times announced by officials, as it was a normal procedure in such prohibition orders, it provides crucial information on the operation of sale in Bergama. The addressees this time was accompanied by the term *çiftlik ashabı* but in a positive meaning as they were counted amongst the negatively affected group alongside with peasants by this trade since it aims to curb the wrongdoings (*şena’at ve irtikâb*) of *örf* members, (*mütesellim, voyvoda, subaşı, evkaf zabıtları ve iskele emînleri, ve ayan ve zi-kudret*). This group of wrongdoers have been selling wheat from Bergama since last four or five months to the three-hundred ships specifically composed of *şehitîye*, and *filikas* and for each ship they were getting 200 *guruş* in the name of *ağalık* (kind of a *bad-ı heva* tax which will be the case in future illicit activities from the region), and each load of wheat in kile was loaded in return of 30 *para* (90 *akçe*) to the foreign merchants (...*Bergama tarafından dört beş aydan berü üç yüz kadar şehitîye, [kalyon] ve filikalara ikişer yüz guruş ağalık ile beher İstanbuli kile hintayı otuzar paraya tahmil olunduktan ma’ada...*). Before giving the warning by stressing its reliability, it reports that at this

⁵⁵⁸ BOA. C.DH. 284/14196 (Evahir Safer 1142 / September 1729).

⁵⁵⁹ BOA. MHM.d. 136/1143 Evasıf Cemazievvel 1143 / November 1730).

very time ten ships composed of *şehitiye* and alike comes alongside the Bergama to load wheat, continues. Just as requested three years ago, by giving the detail of the wheat load, the type of ships and the name of their captains who appeared to have French names suggest the load most probably was taken by France but few of them as follows; *kalyon* of captain Kuri with 8000 kile, and *kalyon* of captain Bermon with 8000 kile, ship of captain Fevri with 6000 kile, *şehitiye* of captain Martin 5000 kile, *filika* of captain Mişon with 6000 kile. First of all, these were the ones that the mübaşir could learn and let alone others, the total amount is a considerable, 33,000 kile. Assuming that he was able to distinguish between the loaded ships and the boats that transported wheat from the shore among the 300 ships, or that the information provided to him was accurate, his information seems accurate as the capacity of each ship load of *kalyon*, *şehitiye* and *filika* were almost consistent with the information provided in the literature and touched upon before. It is also probable that every ship in the fleet was not fully loaded and every one of them was *kalyon* or *şehitiye* allowing 8000 kile of wheat load. Hypothetically speaking, considering the total amount of wheat illicitly sent based on the smallest cargo load amongst the mentioned ships plus in case the fleet had already been loaded by its half capacity with other products, in this scenario then the other half of their capacity would accommodate up to 600,000 kile of wheat in addition to the *ağalık* that makes up 30,000 guruş alone. The ships must have periodically come to the shores of Bergama instead of coming all at once as the report also mentions still there awaiting ten ships approaching to load wheat from the region. Foreign merchants are also experienced how to get the wheat without any notice to officials.

‘...--- kapudan Kuri kalyonuna sekiz bin, ve kapudan Bermon kalyonuna dahi sekiz bin kile ve kapudan Fevri şefinesine altı bin kile hinta ve kapudan Martin şehitiyesine beş bin kile ve kapudan Mişon filikasına altı bin kile hinta fîruht ve tahmil olunduğundan gayrı hala Bergamaya varub hinta tahmil eylemek

üzere on pare şehtiye ve sefain-i saire ol taraftan vukuf-u tamı olanlar i'lam etmeleriyle...'

From the perspective of the empire, the times of turmoil like in this case necessitates the capture of Bergama *voyvoda* to be jailed. However, such orders became like a dream that never came true. Or, the empire began to realize, unless voluntarily, the effective services of these local men of power. Veli was not alone this time, the order focused on also the southern part of Manisa around Yuntdağı located at about ten hours walk distance from Bergama. The actor in the former was Köse oğlu Şerif Ağa, who must have been one of the early members of later famous *mütesellim* family of Manisa, Kösezâdes whose family ties seem to benefit Karaosmanoğlus later in the second half of the eighteenth century.⁵⁶⁰ While Veli Ağa was conducting the sale through Yukaru Çandarlı and Ayazmend docks, Şerif Ağa was making use of Yenice-i Kula harbor. It becomes striking if this information considered together with the above intelligence that each of these figures were selling 40-50,000 kile of wheat annually from their respective domains (...*Manisa sakinlerinden Köse oğlu Şerif Ağa demekle ma'ruf kimesne Yenice-i Kula limanından ve hala Bergama voyvodası olan Veli dahi Yukaru Çandarlı ve Ayazmend iskelelerinden beher sene harbi kefereye kırk ellişer bin kile hinta bey' ve fûruht eyledikleri ihbar olunmağla...*).

Definitive numbers are hard to discern but it strongly indicates that in the case of Veli Ağas' wheat traffic (most probably with his entourage and the producers) reaching up to 40-50,000 kile (1025 to 1280 metric tons) in a single year suggest that the amount of his previous activities in one year was at least the same. When it is compared with the load of French captains alone which was 33,000 kile, the above

⁵⁶⁰ Uluçay, '18. ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri', p. 17. This inference based on Uluçay' analyzes of the family members. In the document, the region and the patrimony were consistent with the information provided by this study. He must have been elder member of the ones cited in the study.

hypothetical assessment does not seem too redundant when it comes to project the dimension of this trade. Nevertheless, as will be touched upon later in the chapter, they fell short to project the profit of both sides.

5.4.2. 'Master of Wheat Lands'

The Bergama region, owing to its fertile soil, is home to many *hass* villages. Given this, it is reasonable for local notables to leverage the agricultural output by capitalizing on the *voyvoda* office. Approximately fifteen years after Lengerli Hasan Ağa's dismissal, a new family emerged as the most prominent local notable in the region, Arabzâdes, whose members continued to rule the region through the *voyvoda* office and through which they benefited from many tax farms of *dirliks* and other revenue sources in the region until the 1770s.⁵⁶¹ Furthermore, they fiercely contested the control of mukataas in the Manisa and Aydın regions against their rival family, Karaosmanoğlus, extending their competition to the regulation of trade in agricultural products with Western European states.⁵⁶²

The only notable difference between the two periods in Bergama was the expansion of çiftliks, as the available documents do not mention any çiftliks associated neither with Lengerli Hasan Ağa nor Veli Ağa and in the early years of Arabzâde İsmail Ağa. This does not necessarily imply that they did not possess any, but rather that the wight of the çiftliks in their portfolio may not have been extensive enough to attract the center's attention. It must have been the reason that in the available documents they were ordering the peasants to bring their produce and sell to the

⁵⁶¹ Vehbi Günay, "Batı Anadolu'da Âyânlık Mücadeleleri ve Bergama Voyvodası Sağancalı Veli," *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi* 21, no. 2 (2006): p. 102.

⁵⁶² Gilles Veinstein, "Ayân de La Région d'Izmir et Le Commerce Du Levant (Deuxième Moitié Du XVIIIe Siècle)," *Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de La Méditerranée* 20, no. 1 (1975): 131–47.

merchants. As discussed, they were also seizing the produce arrived from even inner part of central Anatolia. In the case of Arabzâde, while they were controlling the surplus of probably autonomous peasants which had not yet been integrated into çiftlik units, çiftliks constituted considerable part of Arabzâdes' portfolio later in the century.⁵⁶³ Additionally, apart from the crops extracted from their land holdings, the actors were actively involved in purchasing wheat from the peasants, either before or after the harvest. The primary goal was to accumulate as much as their capacity allowed to stock in their granaries.

The *voyvoda*-ship in this particular region where was covered with hass villages provide fiscal and economic administrative leverage and immunities through the principle of *serbestiyet*. As seen, in the first decade of the eighteenth century, the revenues of the region came to be controlled through *malikane-mukataa*, which must have led to the proliferation of voyvoda office-based local notables in the region. This post not only allowed its holder to build organic relations with the peasants but also provided utmost control over everything on the soil through the office of tax farm. From the cultivation to the last station where the yield was marketed, it supervises the whole process. With this capacity Peyssonnel was right to place Arabzâde İsmail Ağa on top of the administrative district but together with its benefits while he was referring to the political condition in Western Anatolia. In the illicit wheat trade, the benefit was the exploitation of the agricultural surplus.

The first appearance of Arabzâdes happened when the *voyvoda* Veli Ağa was still in the office. The attempt was the illicit wheat trade activity of Araboğlu İsmail Ağa, whose reputation came to the ears of the center in 1725 as being *mütegallibe* of

⁵⁶³ Günay, pp. 113-114. Ten çiftliks of Arabzâdes were seized by another local magnate, Sağancalı Veli after the death of Arabzâde Veli Ağa in 1770s

the Bergama region.⁵⁶⁴ As a result of his illicit activity, his camels used in transport of wheat ordered to be confiscated in the name of *miri* with his comrades. It would be fair to argue that during his early career, capitalizing on illicit wheat trade would lead him to harvest enough economic and political power to acquire the *voyvoda*-ship of Bergama later on. With a complete similar trajectory in terms of route, method, and profile of the actors, İsmail Ağa was selling wheat from Denizdeğirmeni located in the vicinity of Çandarlı to English ships in defiance of previous prohibition orders.⁵⁶⁵ The process gave way to the labeling of İsmail seemed to start three years before. Even if his patrimony was not stated, certain İsmail Ağa was illicitly selling the wheat from the same Çandarlı dock with complete similarity with the mentioned regards, which implies he was Arabzâde.⁵⁶⁶ Together with his partner in Çandarlı dock, Hüseyin this time he killed the warden of Çandarlı castle by saying that ‘who are you and why are you interfering in my business’. Even mübaşir was scared and subjugated by their ferocity during his duty to oversee the situation.

To deceive the officials, he was asserting that ‘I was selling the wheat to the vessels of Sakız, Karaburun, Midilli, and İstanköy and the *müste’min taifesi*’ instead of unauthorized merchants. In times when bribery was not the solution, such attacks, to the extent of their power, are noteworthy both as an indication of the extent of their trade in the region and as an example to their future rivals to maintain their position. Recalling the recalibration of revenues in 1726 for this specific region, the empire had aimed the peasants to sell their wheat to these same islands and officially permitted foreign merchants. It would be fair to argue that these illicit activities of the local notable voyvodas instead of the peasants prepared the way to the interference of the

⁵⁶⁴ BOA. MHM.d, 132/1099 (Şevval 1137 / June 1725).

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁶ BOA. MHM.d, 130/1279 (Şevval 1134 Temmuz 1722).

empire in the region. As it was the case in 1720 and 1722 when the empire reluctantly acknowledged such permissions would benefit men of power instead of peasants, the empire was regardless but gave the permission which again due to getting the benefit through levying taxes. The process of normalization was occurring in a similar manner in nearly all regions.

Turning back to İsmail again, there are indications pointing to the rivalry between İsmail and the then Bergama *voyvoda*, Veli. After four months İsmail continued selling wheat again from the same docks, specifically from Denizdeğirmeni illicitly. The empire sent *mübaşir* who came to be assisted by the Bergama *voyvoda*. But İsmail together with Mustafa and Süleyman was accompanied by one-thousand and five hundred men gathered from fourteen surrounding villages with arms rejected to give away İsmail and others to be jailed in a castle and they prevented the *voyvoda* to come to negotiate in the center of Şakran village by refusing to pay 15 kîse (6250 guruş) retribution due to their involvement again in illicit wheat traffic.⁵⁶⁷

However, most of the crowd must have composed of peasants whose interest overlapped with the capital holder local notables, most probably before the harvest, selling their produce which soon fill the cellars of merchants' ships. The *voyvoda*'s office will only further tighten the contribution of the office to this bond of mutual interest in the near future.

There is not a word of *çitlik*s attributed to him or others in any of these documents and thus until now they always point to the method of direct purchases

⁵⁶⁷ BOA. MHM.d. 131/74 (Evail Rebiülahir 1135 / January 1723) Two months ago, it was first sent to the court of Manisa. BOA, Manisa Şeriyye Sicilleri, hereinafter MŞS. 181/46-47 (Evahir Safer 1135 / November 1722), cited before in Derviş Öksüz, '181 Numaralı Şeri'yye Sicillerine Göre Lale Devri'nin İlk Yıllarında Manisa'da Sosyal ve Ekonomik Hayat', Unpublished Master Thesis, Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi, 2016. Again İsmail's patrimony was not stated but the place, the point of the sell and under the above analyzed processes so far suggest he must have been Arabzâde İsmail.

through either by subjugation of the peasant surplus or building mutual organic financial relation through most probably *selem* contracts. As argued in related parts under the light of the sources, in the first two decades of the eighteenth century, *çiftlik*s were rarely referred in this trade but rather supply was met by direct purchases from distant places. The empire was too sensitive and exaggerative towards any slippage of its authority, over the wheat sources. Although the Archipelago came to be emphasized in the literature as the transit point for the wheat destined for Western Europe, but foreign merchants seemed to come with their ships and vessels directly, too. In the second half of the century, western Anatolia was dominated by two rival local notables, each of whom had control over different types of products, but especially their distribution, with interregional and international connections. Moreover, it was not enough just to be present; it was equally important to establish political and social ties to make the most of what the region had to offer. It seems that it was the consuls who built this kind of linkage.

It is evident that Western states utilized channels involving consuls who endeavored to negotiate with the Ottoman Empire to obtain permission for wheat exports. However, most of the time, as discussed previously, they ended up seeking alternative means to fulfill their demands. Illicit trade appeared to be the method they predominantly resorted to. In this situation, consuls acted in accordance with the political and economic realities of the region to secure most of the offerings for the good of their nations.

Drawing on the correspondence mostly between Peyssonnel father and son in mid-eighteenth century, who were French consuls in Izmir, Veinstein argues that the commercialization of agriculture in line with European trade was not an established phenomenon in Izmir and its hinterland. Furthermore, their effectiveness in agriculture

was mostly attributed to their official post and credit relations and usury on peasants, allowing them to easily obtain products. This assertion seems to be based on Peyssonnel's witnessing of wheat acquisition from Arabzâde İsmail Ağa, where he observed the situation as peasants "bringing their wheat in carts to the French ships" and such references. It is true that in Western Anatolia and elsewhere, credit and usury establish financial bonds between local notables and villagers, giving the former the prerogative in the disposition of the output. However, this doesn't necessarily imply the direct subjugation of peasants into serfs in their *çiftlik*s. In other words, without establishing *çiftlik*s, the surplus can still be controlled through manipulative means such as indebting the peasantry and making use of the surplus through illicit wheat trade without necessarily eliminating peasant autonomy by resettling in clearly demarcated production units.

However, especially after the mid-eighteenth century, it is also apparent that even if different forms of labor and land tenures operated simultaneously, gradually the tide began to turn in favor of landed estates as the dominant form of land disposition, witnessing the loss of small producers' autonomy. Although not as much as expanded like it was in Balkans, Western Anatolia in mid-eighteenth century also came to be dominated by *çiftlik*s which had a significant impact on illicit wheat trade, but this does not imply it was the sole propelling factor rather introduces another dimension to the situation.

The letters between Charles de Peyssonnel and his associate-cum trade partners Karaosmanoğlu Hacı Mustafa Ağa and Arabzâde İsmail Ağa as the leading figures in two most prominent local notable families above all with others clearly demonstrates economic and political powers within the grasp of these two rival magnets. It was Karaosmanoğlu Ataullah Ağa's interference in the mukataas of Bergama that

increased the tension that turned into a major conflict between Araboğlu Mehmed Aga and Ataullah in 1765.⁵⁶⁸ In a sense, the production and eventual marketing of profitable resources - mostly to foreign markets - is an example of capital-oriented conflict of interests in Western Anatolia. The magnitude of the conflict was also due to the economic, political and military power of the two sides to dominate two very crucial products in the time that they have been the subject of world markets, or commodity to be capitalized on. In this regard, while the former mostly controlled cotton production and its trade, the latter focused on wheat, allowing them to manipulate prices for both products through maneuvers such as delaying delivery and quoting high prices to make extra gains.⁵⁶⁹ These tactics sometimes jeopardized the progress of trade between the French nation and the Ağas. Hence, it is no coincidence that Arabzâde İsmail Ağa was referred to as ‘the master of wheat lands.’⁵⁷⁰ Once an eager but petit *müteğallibe* contending against rivals and among others turned now into most prominent and capable local notable who commands wheat in the region.

His characterization appears to be accurate, particularly concerning wheat. It is also fair to assert that it has been a long process during which the region through the voyvodaship gained experience with its previous contenders in becoming as a supply zone of wheat. The first illicit wheat trade activity in the region dates back in the first decade of the century and it gained pace especially after the mukataas of Bergama became the subject of *malikane-mukataa*, and Peyssonnel had come across with the end-product of this process.

⁵⁶⁸ Uluçay, M. Çağatay, 18. ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Saruhan’da Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri (İstanbul: Berksoy Basımevi, 1955), p. 18.

⁵⁶⁹ Veinstein, “Ayân de La Région d’Izmir et Le Commerce Du Levant (Deuxième Moitié Du XVIIIe Siècle).” p. 139.

⁵⁷⁰ Veinstein, pp.135-136.

In the 1753 harvest, Arabzâde İsmail Ağa, who made his first appearance in the 1720s suggests he has been involved in illicit wheat trade for more than thirty years, played a crucial role in meeting the French import demand for wheat, as reflected in Peyssonnel's account.⁵⁷¹ Under normal circumstances, the French most of the time had been illicitly purchasing wheat from the southern Balkans, particularly from Thessaly and the Gulf of Selanik. However, this year, they also utilized channels in Western Anatolia. This indicates that they acquired wheat wherever it was available but more importantly, the two regions, the Balkans and Western Anatolia, seemed to compensate for each other's shortages, meeting the French demand for wheat from the hinterland. In 1753, the city of Selanik experienced inflationary wheat prices not due to severe crop failures but because of wheat allocation manipulations by local power holders.⁵⁷² This must have been the result of mobilizing consul Peyssonnel to illicitly acquire wheat from İsmail Ağa.

As a seasoned supplier for years, now İsmail Ağa appeared to get voyvodaship of Bergama that could further his methods to acquire wheat from his domains. In addition to the sale-proper of the product, the Araboğlu's Armenian steward's manipulation of the wheat trade, strategically causing delays to extract concessions from French merchants and captains who anchored and awaiting to load their ships as soon as possible in Çandarlı dock. These intentional delays lead to agreements on price increases and various gifts, ultimately increasing the agha's profits, *ağalık*. The steward's maneuvers, such as regulating producers' deliveries, enable the Araboğlu to raise total *bad-ı heva* 29 to 33 para (99 akçe) on each shipment; from 4 to 7 para to

⁵⁷¹ Veinstein, pp. 138-139.

⁵⁷² Basil C. Gounaris, "Reassessing Wheat Crises in Eighteenth-Century Thessaloniki," *The Historical Review/La Revue Historique* 5, no. 2008 (2008): p. 63.

ağalık and for the peasants from 25 to 26 para.⁵⁷³ The peasants' share of the 'spoil' in this context, on the other hand, must have referred to the ones who were doing the physical work of carrying the product to the ships rather than being disbursed to the ones cultivating the land. Even if these prices seemed to be extra profits, as the price of wheat for each kile was not mentioned in this case, when it is compared with the case of Veli Ağa, it becomes likely that these were very close to the amount of each kile of wheat's price of those sold in the case of Veli Ağa, which was 30 para (90 akçe). If this is the case, then in the account of Peyssonnel, what was stated as the *bad-ı heva* actually the real price of each kile of wheat. If that is the case then, the share of the mentioned peasants actually refers to the price of each kile actually sold instead of the return of the transfer cost for loading the wheat into the ships. In any case, the shadow economy has its own rules and unique 'provisions' since the greater weight of the risk was on the shoulder of the subjects than it was on foreign merchants who are vulnerable and seem to have accepted these extra payments because of the extent of their needs. This economic strategy contributes to price rises and surely works against the interests of French merchants, as complained by the consul. Still, illicit option appeared to be cost efficient and effective for the foreign merchants.

As previously mentioned, when permission was granted or the sale of wheat was authorized, such as in the Mora in 1720 and from the 1722 of the Balkans onwards, the state instructed the *mültezim* to collect an additional payment called *resm-i bid'at*. This tax was imposed in addition to the *resm-i miri* per bushel of wheat load and was valid in the aforementioned scenarios. Similarly, western merchants could deal directly with a single person without the need for a permit. Furthermore, if the merchants choose to wait for official authorization, or sale authorization, they have to

⁵⁷³ Veinstein, p.138.

establish common ground with each peasant who brings their yield to the docks, despite differing price expectations in addition to the *resm-i miri* and *resm-i bid'at*. However, if they engage in illicit trade, they must only negotiate the price and convince solely a local elite or a notable who leads the shadow economy in his domains. In this case, the merchants would agree to pay a fee called *ağalık* (first appeared in the case of Veli Ağa in 1729 and most probably even before and continued with Arabzâde İsmail Ağa), which corresponds to the *resm-i bid'at* instead of purchasing through officially granted permissions. From a macro perspective, the imposition of extra levies on wheat trade is observed at an imperial scale, symbolizing the legal scene. Conversely, from a micro perspective, it proceeds in perfect tandem at the local level, reflecting the illegal scene. Over the same line of thought it can be stated that internal and external demand have led to the convergence of economic mentality between the center and the periphery. This has enabled actors within the same large entity, despite their perceived differences, to work towards the same goal with different agendas. The center is most likely to have led this development. Because it is well aware that the size of the illicit trade has reached a level that forces it to grant sales permits. Since it knew that it would be sold illegally in any case, it wanted to maximize the benefit of such permits and had to impose extra taxes. In any case, the former is law-making and therefore more bookish in its approach to establish legitimacy, the other is naturalistic and local and therefore more vulgarized, but both are fundamentally motivated by nothing more than profit maximization.

These accounts perfectly reflect the *de facto* situation in the seat of Arabzâde İsmail Ağa, as he was well-equipped and motivated to meet foreign demand even after the mid-eighteenth century. After about five years from the harvest of 1753 discussed above, he again called center's attention because of his engagement in illicit wheat

trade. However, this time the amount of wheat stored in his granaries must have been the real concern as it was 500,000 *İstanbuli kile* of (12.850 metric tons) wheat destined to *harbi kefere* and *müste'min*.⁵⁷⁴

Given that wheat was being sold abroad at various points and almost simultaneously, only one region in the vast domains of the empire, namely Bergama and its hinterland, had the potential to export about 1,000,000 keyl (25.600 tons) of wheat in four years. Therefore, this substantial amount seems to confirm the account provided by Paris that between 1750 and 1754, France gathered 933,852 keyl (24,000 tons) of wheat from the empire. Moreover, such amount must have been gathered gradually, but it could not have taken more than two years at most. Otherwise, the stored wheat in the granaries would spoil without acclimation technology after that period as it was stated before regarding the stored wheat in Western Anatolia. If we add the transfer duration of the product from the region to its final destination before getting spoiled, it must have been gathered in one and half year period at most, that accounts to two harvest period. Therefore, if any part of it had spoiled, it would have been mentioned in the document. But rather the center ordered the transfer of the existing wheat in the granaries to be sold at *narh-ı cari* (*miri* market price) in *kapan-ı dakik* (Istanbul's central grain market).⁵⁷⁵ Thus, the account of Paris regarding the amount of French wheat acquisition appeared to be the case if one only considers only the Bergama region as the main point of wheat sale without projecting the amounts

⁵⁷⁴ BOA, MAD.d. 8510-67/3-68/1 (9 Cemazielahir 1171 / 18 February 1758) in Güran, "İstanbul'un İaşesinde Devletin Rolü (1793-1839)." p. 253 in the footnote 29. The author shares only the summary of the case.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid, "...der anbar eylediği hintadan el-yeym mevcut olan hintaları maarifetinle her ne havalide bulunursa ala eyyi hal zabt ve aceleten Çandarlı İskelesi mahzenlerine nakl ve ol havalide bulunan sefaine der akib tahmil ve merkumun kendi mu'temed ademleriyle asitane-i saadetimde kapan-ı dakikde narh-ı cari üzere bey' olunmak için...".

from the Balkans. This inference also corroborates with the crop failure experienced in Selanik town in

The document informs us that the amount resulted from his cultivation in his çiftliks, and what he collected from villages through making use of his *voyvoda* position and tax farming of dirliks and hass villages.⁵⁷⁶ Even though Peyssonnel's account aligns with this scenario only in terms of the second sources of accumulation, İsmail, who was reported to own many çiftliks around Bergama and Çandarlı dock, did not seem to have a *çiftlik* portfolio extensive enough to accumulate this amount in two years. This stored wheat again was gradually sent to Sakız island and to foreign merchants from his granaries in Çandarlı dock which was located four hours away from Bergama.⁵⁷⁷ In most of the cases, sources do not refer specifically to the nationality of foreign merchants but with the light of the above, this must have been destined to France or England or both.

Considering the extra payments, part of it destined for the peasants, probably in the initial stage, there was not much difference between the profit of those who organized whole operation with his entourage and those who produced the product. It is very likely that the producer's share is not very small, and the profits were shared, though not equally for the peasants who had not yet settled on the çiftliks. There would certainly be sharing, but this time the ayan, who now owned the land that he had not

⁵⁷⁶ BOA, MAD.d. 8510-67/3-68/1 'Hala Anadolu valisi Sadr-ı Esbak Vezir Ali Paşa 'ya ve bu defa' bu husus için der-saadetimden mübaşir ta'yin olunan zide mecdihuya hükmü ki hala Bergama voyvodası olan Arabzâde el-Hac İsmail'in Bergama nevahisi ve Karim ve Yürecik ve Değirmendere ve Ayazmend vesair kurb u sevahil olan kazalarda kendi zira'at ve hırsaset idegeldikleri çiftlikleri ve etbasının dahi çiftlikleri olduğundan gayri kaza-yı mezburlarda vaki' ze'amet ve tımar ve hass ve evkâf ve emlakı bi'l cümle that-ı iltizamında olmak takribiyle kendü ziraat ve hırsasetinden maada aşar-ı şeriyyelerinden dahi kat-i vafır hinta cem ve mahzenlerinde der anbar ve hala ol vechle mevcud beş yüz bin İstanbuli kileden mütecaviz müddehar hintası olub...'.
⁵⁷⁷ Ibid, '...Bergama'ya dört saat mesafe Çandarlı İskelesine peyder pey nakl ve der anbar ve daima kayıklar ile Sakız vesair adalara irsal ve fûruht eylediğinden gayri iskele-i mezburdan hilaf-ı rıza-yı hümayunundan kefare sefinelerine dahi ziyade baha ile fûruht eylemek üzere olduğunu yakinen ihbar ve inha etmeleriyle...'.

previously owned, would have a greater share of the profits that would come from having a greater control in the product. This was probably the reason why the Bergama voivodas mentioned so far did not become a powerful family like Arabzâdes in the region. The purpose of the argument is not to state for sure that there had been a perfect harmony between the producers and those who have the power to market it in the region, but rather to analyze the situation before the different processes led to a break in the dimension of interest relations between the two parties in favor of the former and its overall implications likely to have been the case. The Arabzâdes were able to concentrate the trade, which was previously conducted through large venues and cooperation, in a single hand. This factor must have played a role in increasing their profits compared to their predecessors, making them the most powerful family in the region until 1770s.

A novel type of portfolio holder, which is sometimes the subject of state disapproval but never relinquishes its aspirations, arises from necessity. It is crucial to acknowledge that these groups demonstrate a certain degree of variability in their characteristics across different localities. The loss of the center's influence over the provinces does not necessarily result in the transfer of political power to the magnates. This implies the capacity to make decisions without seeking the sultan's approval. It is evident that they lack the capacity to make independent political decisions, even when they play an active role in the process of obtaining capital by successfully circumventing prohibitions. In other words, they seem to remain within, if not constrained by, the notion of *ulû'l-emre itaat*, a concept in Islamic jurisprudence that refers to obedience to the steward of the supreme order of Allah.⁵⁷⁸ Consequently, the

⁵⁷⁸ Özer Ergenç, “Osmanlı klâsik düzeni ve özellikleri üzerine bazı açıklamalar”, in idem, *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları: Şehir, Toplum, Devlet* 329-342, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012), p. 335.

portfolio owners of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not evolve into capitalists and remained, throughout their history, solely as brokers. Consequently, they were unable to attain the capitalist dimensions observed in Western societies and were unable to participate in the process that facilitated the Industrial Revolution. It is not the quality of production that causes them to become privileged portfolio owners; rather, it is their ability to take control of the current offerings. The Western world has initiated a process of technological change in the production sector. However, the portfolio holders analyzed thus far employed debt strategies, which resulted in the acquisition of either the yield, the land of the peasants, or both. Their actions had become involuntary, resulting in the intermediation of their available resources for the purpose of obtaining excess returns through the utilization of the most effective instruments available.

5.5. On the Quantities

From the second half of the eighteenth century, especially after the start of Ottoman Russian War of 1768, although one can find prohibition firmans and documents alike on the illicit wheat activity, their frequency was on the decrease compared to the first half of the century. As detailly analyzed, the imperial wheat policy starting from the 1690s began to favor constrained freedom for wheat sales for peasants as a result of ever-expanding illicit wheat trade. But as the century progress, other groups were also granted permission such as wheat owner local notables who at the first decade of the century often referred to as profiteers. Recalling the incidences of Katrinli Halil Ağa of Karaferye and Nakibzâde of Yenişehir, they were also answering the imperial purchase calls of the center simultaneously with their illicit wheat undertakings. The report of the *tatar* had reached to the center including these

local magnates' names as they have been engaging this mushbooh activity for years. Hence, one crucial reason was the normalization of the activity on the part of the center that gradually found no solution but to prioritize wheat or tax flow to the capital and other needy occasions what it could extract from localities. This was also in accordance with the fact that the permission of wheat sales for the subjects was on the increase. Absence of such firmans, therefore, refer much to the recognition of the empire than it was to its ability to curb out the activity.

Table 4 The amounts of wheat sold illicitly based on available incidences⁵⁷⁹

<i>Amount in kile</i>	<i>Region</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Occasion</i>
419.676	Balkans	1722	The first permission firman for Balkans
600.000	Western Anatolia	1729	Bergama <i>voyvoda</i> Veli Ağa
150.000	Selanik	1733	Local notables of Selanik
500.000	Western Anatolia	1758	Bergama <i>voyvoda</i> Arabzâde el-Hac İsmail Ağa
933.852	Balkans and Western Anatolia	1750- 1754	The account of traveller Paris
320.000	Mora	1768	The permission firman of Mora in 1768
80.000	Selanik	1790s	Redemption fee for Katrinli Halil Ağa

⁵⁷⁹ These quantities are based on both informed and actual occurrences. The other many occurrences of such were not included for two reasons: either they did not offer any detail as to the amount, or the amount of illicitly sold wheat was minimal, range from 1000 to 10.000 kile compared to the ones included in the table.

So far, the available data on the amount of illicitly traded wheat is divided into two groups even if the incidences are too scarce: those that show precise quantities and those based on informed projections. As discussed by Aynural, the annual grain requirements of Istanbul, which had a very large population of at least 500,000 inhabitants, are thought to have been between 3.6 and 5 million bushels.⁵⁸⁰ Only from the regions of the Balkans and western Anatolia, which are discussed in detail in this study, is there at least 1 million bushels of prohibited wheat traded per year, a fifth of the amount needed by Istanbul in the same century, as shown in the list above. Accordingly, even if it lacks the detailed and only the reported quantities are shown other than unnoticed ones, or the smaller quantities identified so far, it is highly likely that considering that the prohibited trade was also carried out from other regions at the same time, at least half of the wheat imported to the capital in a year was sold abroad through the illicit trade.

⁵⁸⁰ Aynural, “İstanbul Değirmenleri ve Fırınları”, p. 4.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This dissertation analyzed the commercialization of eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire through illicit wheat trade in conjunction with the economic incentives of main instigators of this trade in the eighteenth century. First, Western European states experienced a significant increase in demand for Ottoman wheat due to price hikes caused by supply and demand imbalances within Europe. Despite an Ottoman ban on wheat exports, this demand led to a flourishing illicit wheat trade in the eighteenth century. Second, it led to the evolution of classic Ottoman wheat policy to revisit its prohibitory policies on wheat by granting constrained sale permissions to the subjects. However, these permissions were not the same with the official grants for the foreign states after their official request. Rather, it came out as a result of an organic gradual process of widening commercial markets that drags the Ottoman subjects who became interested in supplying this demand through illicit undertakings. Third, it coincided with changes in tax collection methods, namely the emergence of life-term leases of the tax farms. Fourth, the impact of this demand led to the change in production relations and agrarian structure of the empire by accelerating the establishment of *çiftlik*s. The local notables increasingly involved in land investments to be able to acquire as much wheat as they could to sell at much higher prices to the foreign merchants. Although large agricultural estates played a crucial part in wheat

commercialization, this process had already started in the 1690s, mostly through direct purchases from independent peasants through *selem* or some from partnership. The produce of both the *çiftlik*s and independent peasant producers was marketed simultaneously through illicit trade. This calls into question not only the assumption that the Ottoman Empire was marginalized by forced monoculture, but also the biased approach to the commercialization of agricultural production phenomenon, which presupposed that peasants would be placed in large *çiftlik* units under the control of urban investors. As has been clearly demonstrated, direct purchase methods played a decisive role in the accumulation of peasant harvests in the granaries of local elites and notables even after the large landed estates covered the rural hinterland in various localities of the empire in the eighteenth century. The illicit wheat trade was unidirectional, from the Ottoman Empire to the West, without requiring imports of finished goods. Such returns from the import destination to the empire, for instance, in the form bread, flour or hardtack was not the case. Fifth, the establishment of large *çiftlik*s mainly involved legally acquiring peasants' lands by merging multiple *çift*s, though this legality did not always equate to fairness. While the *çiftthane* system remained physically intact, its effectiveness waned as local elites consolidated multiple *çift*s, gaining more control over production and labor through the end of the eighteenth century. Sixth, indebtedness was an established phenomenon in the economic fabric of the localities encompassing all strata, the one end was the *sarrafs* and the other end at the bottom was village communities. In between these two ends, local elites and notables acted as intermediary transmitter of credit extenders to the peasants while at the same time being indebted to the immense cash deposit holders, *sarrafs* at the capital. Moreover, credit provided local capital owners to be direct buyers of wheat in a system based on the flow of produce from the peasant to the center. This financial

network as the century progress made peasants more vulnerable in securing their properties because of their debt and tax obligations.

As a result of increasing foreign demand led the empire to revisit its restrictive old wheat policies. The subjects of the empire with rational economic mind were lured with the higher price offerings and engaged in illicit wheat trade. The extent of this activity determined the policies of the empire. With the passage of time, the empire became more inclined to drive benefit from what it failed to fully prevent by changing its prohibitive wheat trade policy by beginning to grant permission of wheat sales to the peasants and then extended it to the other groups.

Records facilitated to draw conclusions about the empire as a whole by highlighting the absence of *çiftlik* phrase prior to 1730s, which was consistent with the data of micro-centers. It corresponds exactly to the time as clearly scrutinized when the *ekâbir* *çiftlik*s came to be established in Karaferye and Salonican hinterland. The situation in Western Anatolia even if we cannot detail like the Balkans because of the absence of court register series, was also the case but later than the latter. The findings supported the introductory claims that, even though it was not the only factor, the expansion of large *çiftlik*s furthered the expansion of the illicit wheat trade by increasing the yield to the Western States.

But this trade might offer benefits for peasants, too. Instead of sending their products under market prices for imperial purchases imperial purchases or fulfilling *avarız* requirements, they may have been selling for illicit wheat contenders since total exploitation otherwise would have disrupted existing relations of production structure and eventual incapacitation of wheat flow to the foreign merchants. This interdependence is substantially based on mutual benefit, but the main benefiter is capital owners. If that is the case then in the absence of total exploitation of the

peasants, let it be in the process of agricultural production or transfer of the output to the market, it explains the absence of effective mechanisms which make use of the income derived from surplus to be invested in different sectors like industrial output as it was the case in western Europe. It shares the income that it would have allocated for investment with the villagers in order to endure this trade, so it cannot allocate it to other investments because it does not cut the share of the villagers to the extent that the strictness would no led to the dispersion of rural population. This may be beneficial for trade, but it is also an obstacle to expanding the portfolio, only further. Lack of what lead to such absence? The possible answer to this question may be found in the concept of *ulû'l-emre itaat* (obedience to the supreme authority) and its effectiveness in shaping the collective behavior of the subjects, as mentioned earlier.

The difference in the size of the *çiftlik*s over the centuries is not so much due to changes in ownership, but rather to the size of the arable land associated with them. Thus, from the late fifteenth century to the eighteenth century, it can be assumed that they were used for economic activity by the population as a source of income. Over time, land that had previously been held by the military became increasingly available to non-military individuals. The sixteenth century saw the emergence of *çiftlik*s with smaller plots of land, while the seventeenth century witnessed the spread of those with slightly larger plots. Finally, by the eighteenth century, *çiftlik*s with significantly larger arable land became the most common form of production in the Ottoman countryside. The growth of arable land is a development that went hand in hand with both financial changes throughout the empire and demand. This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that while there was domestic demand in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, external demand was not reflected in the documents, while the latter for grain

increased in the eighteenth century and thus the expansion of the arable lands followed the course simultaneously.

By discussing the importance of focusing on the continuities as well as ruptures to fully grasp two interrelated phenomena, this dissertation analyzed two-hundred years of Karaferye in formation of *çiftlik*s and consolidation of the power of local elites. The region served as an exemplary unit of analysis by offering detailed data to examine the land tenure transformation over three distinct centuries from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. It has also indicated that the *çiftlik*s of various sizes began to emerge within the timar or military regime in the Ottoman realms. Not an insignificant number of “*hassa çiftlik*s” of the timariots of the sixteenth century appear under the conditions of the late sixteenth century onward to have gradually developed into de facto *çiftlik*s either under still their hands or predominantly in the hands of civilian elites of non-askeri origin. The case study of four villages that belonged to two major waqfs in the district of Karaferye reveals that by 1691, the arable land in the *çiftlik*s of the waqf villages constituted 16.2% of all the arable lands in the rural hinterland of the district.⁵⁸¹ The present chapter has also substantiated that the *çiftlik*s and the local elites of Karaferye were mostly the end products of the long-term socio-economic developments rather than being an immediate consequence of the application of *malikane* system.

In this process, the family waqfs established by the successors of the old frontier lords also played a crucial role in establishing *çiftlik* units and transferring the wealth to future generations. On the other hand, Todor Musachi was not the only

⁵⁸¹ Long before the eighteenth century, the imperial center placed the local elites with their considerable amount of *çiftlik* units into the center of taxation, which was reflected by the data compiled in the detailed and summary extra-ordinary tax registers of 1691, both of which will form the basis of taxation practices of *tevzi* registers in eighteenth century Karaferye.

Albanian seigneur family. There were two other former Albanian noble families' successors who put their roots down in the town: Yakub Bey, son of Aştin, and Mustafa Bey, son of Pavlo Kurtik.⁵⁸² The future members of these former Albanian seigneur families did not appear in any survey registers of timar allocation records thus yet neither their wealth nor their political competence was comparable with that of Todor Musachi family of whose members continued to occupy *askeri* posts up until 1547.

As revealed clearly, marriage alliances enabled interest groups to sustain and further their wealth and political power in their domains. In the first half of the seventeenth century, Musachi's women united with other privileged figures of the town and were actively partaking in property acquisition in the form of çiftlik units and credit relations by extending loans to the peasants. This process continued with the ascension of their successors' again in the elevated cadres but mostly by holding the kadışip and or being müderris, müftis. From the second half of the seventeenth century, they retained their seats if not at the top but surely effective until the climax of their political, economic and social full-fledged union with Lanbazâdes. This coalition led to the formation of a wealthy interest group. Later in the first decade of the eighteenth century, the consortium became much more vigorous with the inclusion

⁵⁸² BOA, TKGM.d. (ca.1568) 414 fol. 94/a-94/b, "*Evkaf-ı Yakub Bey [bin] Aştin: Karye-i Reşani producing 3930 akçe and Karye-i Kavaslı: Vakf-ı merhum Yakub Bey bin Aştin karye-i mezburenin yavası ve kaçgunu ve beytü'l mal ve mal-ı gaib ve mal-u mefkudı ve bad-ı hevası ve müteveccihatı mülk namesi ve ahkam-ı şeri'yyeleri mucibince vakf için zabt olunur diyü defter-i atikde mukayd olmağın haliya defter-i cedide vech-i meşruh üzere sebt olundu*, the village was producing 3565 akçe." This was the only waqf which had two villages under its control other than Mehmed Bey and Tuzcu Sinan Bey waqfs in the town. As it is seen, the legal status of the village regarding the taxes left for the waqf administration was just the reverse of Gazi Mehmed Bey waqf since the important revenue sources of a village such as öşr and ispenç taxes were not left for the waqf. Moreover, the revenues of the villages was too small compared to the waqfs of Gazi Mehmed Bey and Tuzcu Sinan Bey. fol. 95/b, "*Vakf-ı Mustafa Bey ibn-i Sinan Bey eş-şehir Pavlo Kurtik*". This waqf finantly fell into the category of a small waqf. The assets were as follows: 10,000 akçe cash managed by 15% interest (rihb), seven piece (kıt'a) tarla, one orchard and one mill all of which produce 2750 akçe annual revenue. See for Aştin and Pavlo Kurtik families İnalçık, "Arnavutluk'ta Osmanlı Hakimiyetinin Yerleşmesi ve İskender Bey İsyanının Menşei." 159-161.

of Sarıcazâde family by marrying a member of Todor Musachi family, Şerife Atike Hatun, who also bridged Lanbazâdes and Sarıcazâdes. The family ties were consolidated further with the marriage alliances of Lanbazâde Rüşdi and Şeyhi Mustafa with the daughters of Sarıcazâde el-Hac Mehmed. Therefore, the three families as one unity became the most wealthy and influential local elite until the second half of the eighteenth century.

Contrary to the caricaturized assumptions on the activities of the women subjects in economic ventures as frozen agents, female descendants of Gazi Mehmed Bey as trustees, and active investors in the çiftlik market in the late seventeenth century, proved otherwise. When they assumed the trusteeship, which some of them did, they seemed competent in fulfilling the duties expected from the trustee. When their trusteeship was challenged, they made use of legal channels without hesitation, either in cooperation with their family members of legal positions in the Ottoman bureaucracy or alone. Thus, they contributed to the waqfs' survival and their families' economic well-being.

Except the mountainous village of Çernova, the chiftlicized waqf villages, Makrıgoz, Kıravate, and Aya Marin formed a considerable part of the families' wealth. Unlike the hassa çiftliks within the timar regime or çiftliks of certain civilian individuals of pre-Ottoman local aristocracy within the malikane-divani system in certain parts of Anatolian and Northern Syrian provinces of the sixteenth century, the çiftliks of seventeenth century not only increased in number but also their arable lands, which still appeared to maintain their nominal status of *miri* came to cover 85.13% of all the available arable lands in the inhabited villages throughout the seventeenth century. Two persisting features of sixteenth century çiftliks had passed to later centuries. First, they were perceived as a commodity and property to be invested in by

the sixteenth-century profit-seeking residents. The second was that they had an impact on increasing production and the revenue.

As this extensive prosopographical examination revealed, alongside immovable capital, the successors of the Musachi family could transfer administrative and social capitals into the eighteenth century. The ulema member of the families of the seventeenth century hold elevated positions in the town's hierarchy was a social and cultural capital inherited by the successors. Combining economic and social capitals brought by their ancestors with that administrative/political one opened a new venue to strengthen their hold in the eighteenth century. Their future grandsons as being the member of most powerful local elites added up the accumulated economic capital by opening new venues in for instance in joining to ulema cadres. What social capital meant in the context of the Musachi family was that the heroic stories of Gazi Mehmed Bey, his father, Gazi Yakub Bey, and his grandfather, Todor Musachi, on the conquest of the adjacent territories alongside charities through the family waqfs might have been still in circulation. The narratives are not only passed from generation to generation but re-produced by the family members as well as in the collective memory of the town dwellers. Thus, their elevated 'elite' status at every period came to be reproduced as well. Consequently, it became another factor that might have distinguished them from others. The denomination of *zaim* title seemed to be replaced by *gazi* after the second half of the eighteenth-century documents referring to the Mehmed Bey waqf.⁵⁸³ For the titles in Ottoman parlance, this was another signifier

⁵⁸³ It might have been another Mehmed Bey who built a waqf and had the title Zaim. However, there is a valid thought-provoking data behind the assertion. BOA, C.BLD. 96/4759 (15 Cemazielahir 1250/19 October 1834), The document was about a verdict ('arz-ı i'lam) produced by the surrogate judge (na'ib) of Karaferye and dispatched to Ministry of Evkaf (evkaf nezareti). In the verdict, certain Ali bin İbrahim was suggested as a şeyh for the soup-kitchen of the Gazi Mehmed Bey waqf instead of the late Ebubekir bin Mustafa. His request accepted by the ministry but in the order (ferman), the ministry used the name for the waqf as Zuema(plural of zaim) Mehmed Bey. Thus, it would be fair to acknowledge Zaim Mehmed Bey waqf as the Gazi Mehmed Waqf.

reflecting an individual's previous careers and professions from the times of Ottoman conquest. In a way, the imperial bureaucracy's jargon reflects the narratives in the region. However, it has been a well-known situation that the old frontier lords came to be defined with the title Gazi. Nevertheless, it was as effective as continuing the waqfs and the assets since the very social capital must have motivated other powerful families of the region, like Sarıcazâdes and Lanbazâdes, to seek marriage opportunities with the women members of the Todor Musachi Family, or vice versa.

By the eighteenth century, the process of large-landed estate formation gained a new pace reflected in the investments of prominent landowners in fourteen villages in Karaferiye. The consolidation phase was characterized by the increased çiftlikization with large tracks of arable lands. The peasants who were once independent cultivators transformed into wage laborers (*ecir*) in some cases after selling their properties was determined by the way the çiftliks were established. Although a comprehensive analysis of all villages is not possible with the current available data, a detailed investigation revealed that in some cases, local elites were able to take advantage of peasant indebtedness and security issues for their own benefit. Moreover, the suggestive debt case of Sarıcazâde el-Hac Mehmed Ağa with the *sarrafs* clearly indicates not only the existence but also the effective role of the debt cycle phenomenon in the formation of çiftliks eighteenth-century Karaferiye.

The establishment of çiftliks as a means of investment in the eighteenth century went hand in hand with the introduction of the *malikane-mukataa* system by the empire to collect *mukataa* revenues and with the wider spread of tax-farming as a form of revenue collection in *timars* and waqfs.⁵⁸⁴ In the case of Karaferiye, tax-farming

⁵⁸⁴ In Bosnia, for instance, the establishment of çiftliks in the eighteenth century did not displace the *timar* system in the region. See Gelez, Philippe. "The End of the Timar System in Bosnia, eighteenth - 20th Century." *Osmanlı Araştırmaları / The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, no. 60 (2022): 97-138.

opportunities in the villages of the Mihrimah Sultan waqf became the precursor for investor landholders to establish *çiftlik*s because of the *serbestiyyet* that the *malikane* system opened up even though the opposite was also sometimes possible, namely that someone first established a *çiftlik* in the area and then became interested in obtaining the *iltizam* of the waqf villages so as to expand his *çiftlik*s. Yet, the particular *hass*, *zeamet*, *timar* or waqf legal and fiscal status of some villages oftentimes delayed and complicated the establishment of *çiftlik*s. For instance, the waqf villages of Mihrimah Sultan in Karaferye (villages located in the Menlik *nahiye*) were the last to be chiftlicized in the eighteenth century. Detailed analysis on Selanik hinterland and Bergama region also highlighted the same pattern of land tenure transformation in the eighteenth century.

As Öncel has shown, the chiftlicization of villages in Alasonya, which belonged to the Esma Sultan waqf and were administered through the *malikane-mukataa* system, started in the first half of the nineteenth century and continued increasingly under the mounting pressure of Tepedelenli Ali Pasha and his associates.⁵⁸⁵ Although they are two different places in time and space, the late chiftlicization of villages that belonged to the pious foundations of members of the imperial dynasty can be understood as the result of the elevated sense of protection that imperial waqf villages enjoyed. If this is the case, *çiftlik* formation in *timar* villages suggests that local wealth-holders were more willing and successful in taking advantage of the opportunity and power gaps created by the transformation of timars into sources of revenue for absentee revenue holders, at least in the Karaferye region.

⁵⁸⁵ Öncel, "Land, tax and power in the Ottoman Provinces: The malikane-mukataa of Esma Sultan in Alasonya (c.1780-1825). 54-74.

Thus, the decisive factor here was obtaining the *iltizam*, which was a means of gaining a foothold in these villages.

El-Hac Ahmed Ağa, el-Hac Mehmed Ağa, and Ramiz Mehmed Efendi, members of the Sarıcazâde family, were able to enlarge their investment portfolios and control the villages in the region by obtaining the *iltizams* of some *zeamet* and *timar* villages and later of the Menlik *mukataa* subject to Mihrimah Sultan's pious foundation. As early as 1723, el-Hac Ahmed Ağa received the *iltizam* of Kutleş *zeamet* for three years.⁵⁸⁶ The evidence attesting to his possession of the administrative rights over the Menlik *mukataa* through tax farming is the removal of his brother, el-Hac Mehmed Ağa, from this position in 1748 due to his detrimental impact on the peasants. Possibly his considerable debts to the *sarrafs* may well have played a role in this attitude. Additionally, the acquisition of substantial land parcels within the boundaries of this *mukataa* by his nephew, es-Seyyid Ramiz Mehmed Efendi, who subsequently established *çiftlik*s in the village of İne Kasrı, further supports this claim, considering his uncle's concurrent tenure as the administrator of the *mukataa*.⁵⁸⁷ Not only members of this family, but also Serdar el-Hac Mehmed Ağa obtained the tax farm of the Menlik *mukataa* in 1751, where he had previously purchased land and established a *çiftlik*.

As observed, the size of the average land purchased to establish *çiftlik*s (2,670.78 *dönüm*) in the eighteenth century was considerably large compared to that of Karaferiye in 1691 (191 *dönüm*). The distinctive features of land tenure during the respective time periods had a notable influence on the formation and nature of *çiftlik*s. The first phase of *çiftlik* formation in the region seemed to be marked by limited land transfers and the absence of financial changes throughout the empire that could have

⁵⁸⁶ KKS.g. D-061-4/2 (15 Cemazielevvel 1135 / 21 February 1723).

⁵⁸⁷ KKS.g. D-073-34 (1160 / 1748).

accommodated more frequent transfers. This context led to the subsequent period of *çiftliks* characterized by variations in *çiftlik* sizes and their transformation into a more prevalent investment instrument in the eighteenth century. Consequently, the limited prevalence of land transfers during the seventeenth century contributed to the emergence of smaller scale *çiftliks*. However, by the eighteenth century, the expansion of land transfers and subsequent development of *çiftliks* alongside with new tax collection method, namely *malikane-mukataa* system had reached a stage wherein the state began to acknowledge and assume the role of a regulator within the *çiftlik* market, rather than diminishing its presence.

The consolidation of large *çiftlik* agriculture under the established local elite and notable's control facilitated the expansion of illicit wheat trade. Although the capital owners prior to 1720s were actively partaking in acquiring the yield of the peasants mostly through direct purchase methods, after 1720s, in the second phase, large *çiftliks* began to account for accumulation of yield as well. What has been observed at the macro scale represented by evolving imperial wheat policy was in parallel with the developments in the micro level. The in-depth analysis revealed the degree of commercial integration of the micro unit of analysis through illicit wheat trade activities of the local elites and notables of Karaferye, Selanik urbanites, and Bergama and their broader rural hinterlands. They acted as portfolio holders not only their diverse investments in various tax farms and landed holdings shows, but also their active engagement in the illicit ones.

For instance, if the investigation order regarding Arnavud Hasan who was a latecomer to the Karaferye but became the most powerful local notable, was the sole document under our use then we would be left with binary argument as the zero-sum, centralization and decentralization. The center was aware of the developments

occurring in the provinces. If there was an established order and if it saw indications that the one in power was capable of doing what he needed at the time, such as the payment of taxes, the security of the territory, and revenue sources etc., the center would recognize the current state of affairs by granting once disfavored titling, “*chief gatemen of the Sublime Abode*” (*dergâh-ı ali kapucubası*) and “*chief of the imperial stable*” (*mirahur-ı evvel*).⁵⁸⁸ One can observe a tacit contractualization, not centralization or vice versa, but a combination of the two, in the rising of local magnates.⁵⁸⁹ None of the local elites have political power based on the freedom to make independent decisions and institutional security. On the contrary, they need to be recognized by the center without exception to ensure their economic and political legitimacy. Exceeding the limits does not break the contract between the center and the provinces, as long as developments are kept under control, such as the failure to collect taxes, the emergence of excessive security weaknesses, or the result of massive population displacements in the region.

What the empire sees when it looks at the activities of the actors is, no doubt, different from what a modern historian sees, since its policy is aimed at controlling the order of the people under well-protected domains. Therefore, it is comprehensible that it stamped the actors who were strongly driven by rational economic dispositions as profiteers, usurers and *yaramaz* local elites and notables with a negative meaning of these words. The fact that those who were once considered corrupt were soon appointed to certain positions because of their military and economic competence is again a manifestation of the dualism in the eighteenth-century imperial bureaucracy,

⁵⁸⁸ Yaycıoğlu, ‘Partners of the empire: The crisis of the Ottoman order in the age of revolutions’. p. 76.

⁵⁸⁹ For a revisionist approach to the confined centralization and decentralization paradigms in Ottoman historiography over scrutinizing postmasters as contractors in the eighteenth century see Choon Hwee Koh, “The Ottoman Postmaster: Contractors, Communication and Early Modern State Formation,” *Past and Present* 251, no. 1 (2021).

but in a different form, in keeping with the spirit of the times. However, what the modern historian sees when he looks at the documents that reflect the Empire's approach to what it considered illegal activities as a measure of self-defense is equally different. It is also possible to understand the evolution of what constituted good faith in measures taken at the outset of a problem that step by step over a long period of time by the Empire to what historians perceive rather objectively compared to its non-counterpart object of study with consideration of the realities of the time, without labeling good or bad, but as normalization in the name of profit.



APPENDICES




Figure 1 Family tree of Gazi Mehmed Bey and Tuzcu Hacı Sinan Bey, sons of Todor Musachi

Table 5 The villages include çiftlik, the name of their holders and their sizes recorded in the detailed extraordinary tax register of Karaferye in 1691, MAD. 8485

Village	Çiftlik Holder	Arable Land Size of the Çiftlik in dönüm	Haymane	Çift
Mevzi-i Karaçalı	Mahmud Efendi el-Kadı	250	3	2
Mevzi-i Karaçalı	Şerife Fatıma Hatun	150	1	1
Mevzi-i Karaçalı	Şerife Fatıma Hatun	150	2	1
Mevzi-i Karaçalı	Eminzâde Ahmed Ağa	150	2	1
Mevzi-i Karaçalı	Lanbuzâde Ali Çelebi	250	2	2
Mevzi-i Karaçalı	Çelebizâde Abdülmuceb	180	2	1
Mevzi-i Karaçalı	Ahmed Efendi el-Kadı-ma biraderan Hızır Beşe ve Ali Çelebi	170	2	1
Mevzi-i Karaçalı	Hasan Beşe ve Ali müşterek	300	3	2
Mevzi-i Karaçalı	Mustafa Çelebi ibn-i Mehmed Çelebi	160	2	1
Mevzi-i Karaçalı	Reşidzâde kızı Ümmühan	125	1	1
Mevzi-i Karaçalı	es-Seyyid Abdülkadir Efendi el-Hatib	150	2	1
Mevzi-i Karaçalı	Çavuşzâde Mehmed	80	1	1
Mevzi-i Karaçalı	Anbarizâde Ali Çelebi el-Müezzın	40		
Mevzi-i Karaçalı	Havak Dımo oğlu Akder	180	3	1
Mevzi-i Karaçalı	Kosta veled-i Manol	160	2	1
Kolura	es-Seyyid Yahya Efendi el-Nakib	150	2	1
Kolura	Mehmed Çelebi ibn-i Ahmed Beşe	250	3	2
Kolura	Balıbeyzâde Ahmed Çelebi	150	2	1

Kolura	Toma Pilavcı zımmi der yed-i Todor	300	4	3
Kolura	Kostantin veled-i Pulastra	100	3	1
Kolura	Manol veled-i Toma	250	3	2
Kalniyani	Sipah Mehmed Efendi merhum tasarrufatı Şaman Ahmed Ağa ve İbrahim Ağa biraderân	500	5	4
Yavatoz	Ayşe Hatun	260	3	2
Yavatoz	Alaybeyzâde Hasan Ağa	280	3	2
Yavatoz	el-Hac Alizâde İbrahim Ağa	180	3	2
Yavatoz	Eminzâde Mustafa Ağa	100	1	1
Yavatoz	Alayzâde Hasan Çelebi	150	2	1
Yavatoz	Ramazan Beşe	50		
Kaligurapigad	Alaybeyzâde Hasan Ağa	150	3	1
Kaligurapigad	Hasan Beşe	100	2	1
Kaligurapigad	Kukunduzzâde Mehmed Çelebi	80	1	1
Kaligurapigad	Ali Sipahi	150	3	1
Süleyman Obası	Mustafa Sipahi ibn-i Abdülkadir Bey	120	2	1
Süleyman Obası	Serdar ?	250	2	2
Kumköy	Hasan Çavuş an Çavuşan-ı Dergah-ı Ali	250	3	2
Kumköy	Ahmed ibn-i Mustafa	80	2	1
Kumköy	Mustafa Efendi merhum Fatıma Hatun	80	2	1
Kumköy	Giritli Mehmed Bey kızı Afife Hatun	50	1	1
Kumköy	Mahmud ibn-i Mustafa	60	1	1
Kumköy	Kürek Hasan Beşe	85	1	1

Asumate	Hasan Çavuş an Çavuşan-ı Dergah-ı Ali	350	4	3
Asumate	Hati zevcesi	60	2	1
Asumate	Musas	50	1	1
Asumate	el-Hac Abdülhalim el- Müezzın	80	1	1
Asumate	Mahmud Çelebi	60	1	1
Asumate	Acemzâde Ali Çelebi el- Müezzın	65	1	1
Asumate	es-Seyyid İbrahim maa biradereş	200	1	
Yançiste	Salih Efendi el- Kadı	250	3	2
Yançiste	Lanbuzâde Ali Çelebi	250	3	2
Yançiste	el-Hac Mustafa ibn-i Ahmed Bey	280	3	2
Yançiste	Hasan Çelebi ibn- i Ahmed Bey	180	2	1
Yançiste	Osman Çelebi	185	2	1
Yançiste	Rukiye Hatun	160	2	1
Yançiste	Fatıma Hatun	136	2	1
Yançiste	Mehmed Çelebi	140	2	1
Koduniyani	Salih Efendi el- Kadı	150	2	1
Koduniyani	Ebubekir Efendi	150	2	1
Koduniyani	Sekban Hasan	120	2	1
Koduniyani	Yusuf Beşe	120	2	1
Istavroz	Mehmed ibn-i Halil	220	3	2
Istavroz	Mahmud ibn-i Mustafa	300	3	2
Istavroz	Mustafa Ağa reis- i çeltük	250	3	2
Istavroz	Mehmed Ağa reis-i çeltük	260	3	2
Istavroz	Mustafa Çelebi	180	2	1
Istavroz	Kasimbeyzâde Ali Çelebi	230	3	2
Istavroz	Ahmed Ağa Çavuşzâde	230	3	1

Ayamarin	Mahmud Efendi el-Kadı	300	3	3
Ayamarin	Ebubekir Efendi el-Müderriş	300	3	3
Ayamarin	Salih Efendi el-Kadı	280	3	2
Ayamarin	Afife bint Ali Çavuş	150	2	1
Ayamarin	Ahmed Çelebi ibn-i Mustafa Efendi el-Kadı	250	3	2
Ayamarin	Serdar Mustafa Çavuş	280	3	2
Ayamarin	Lanbuzâde Mehmed Efendi	350	4	3
Likoviçiste	Ahmed Ağa Çavuşzâde	300	4	3
Likoviçiste	El-Hac Hasan	150	3	2
Likoviçiste	Mustafa bin Mahmud	150	2	1
Likoviçiste	Hasan Çelebi Ormankıranzâde	160	2	1
Likoviçiste	Eyüb Çelebi	165	2	1
Likoviçiste	Bayram Beşe	80	1	1
Bıranıyat	Mehmed Ağa	550	5	4
Bıranıyat	Ahmed Çelebi Yusufzâde	280	3	2
Bıranıyat	Mehmed Çelebi el-İmam	166	2	1
Bıranıyat	Topal Ahmed	190	2	1
Bıranıyat	Ali Ağa	170	2	1
Tağramon	Ahmed Ağa ve İbrahim Ağa	450	5	4
Tağramon	Ali Çelebi ibn-i Abdurrahman	150	1	
Tağramon	Ümmügülsüm Kadın	150	2	1
Tağramon	Kasımzâde Ali Çelebi	60	1	1
Tağramon	Dina zımmi oğluyla müşterek	85	1	1
Hasbuga nam-ı diğer Makrıgoz	Ahmed Ağa ve İbrahim Ağa Çavuşzâde	350	3	2
Hasbuga nam-ı diğer Makrıgoz	Fatıma Hatun ibnite Mehmed Efendi	200	2	2

Hasbuga nam-1 diğer Makrigoz	Hüseyin Çelebi	300	3	2
Hasbuga nam-1 diğer Makrigoz	Ayşe Hatun	200	2	2
Hasbuga nam-1 diğer Makrigoz	Salih Efendi el- Kadı	500	6	3
Hasbuga nam-1 diğer Makrigoz	Mehmed Efendi el-Kadı	180	3	2
Hasbuga nam-1 diğer Makrigoz	Fatıma Hatun	120	2	1
Hasbuga nam-1 diğer Makrigoz	Abdulahhab Çelebi	250	3	2
Hasbuga nam-1 diğer Makrigoz	İbrahim Çelebi	250	3	2
Hasbuga nam-1 diğer Makrigoz	Mahmud Efendi el-Kadı	250	3	2
Hasbuga nam-1 diğer Makrigoz	Mustafa Ağa Eminzâde	400	4	3
Hasbuga nam-1 diğer Makrigoz	Mehmed Ağa reis-i çeltük	660	5	5
Hasbuga nam-1 diğer Makrigoz	Ahmed Ağa	250	3	2
Hasbuga nam-1 diğer Makrigoz	Kasım Bey merhum kızı Hadice sagire	100	2	1
Hasbuga nam-1 diğer Makrigoz	Hüseyin Bey ulufeciyan	60	1	1
Hasbuga nam-1 diğer Makrigoz	Eminzâde Süleyman Ağa	360	4	3
Hasbuga nam-1 diğer Makrigoz	Ali Çelebi ibn-i Yahya	100	2	1
Hasbuga nam-1 diğer Makrigoz	Bılaso oğlu Şimo zımmi	130	2	2
Hasbuga nam-1 diğer Makrigoz	Yano zımmi	300	3	3
Hasbuga nam-1 diğer Makrigoz	Dimo veled-i Manol	250	3	2
Platiçe	es-Seyyid Abdülkadir Efendi el-Hatib	150	2	1
Platiçe	Ali Beşe ibn-i Abdullah	250	3	2
Platiçe	Serdarzâde Mustafa Çelebi ibn-i Mehmed Beşe	200	3	2
Platiçe	Abdulahhab Çelebi el-imam	150	2	1

Platiçe	Zülfikar Bey	200	3	2
Platiçe	Hızır Beşe ibn-i Mustafa	300	3	2
Platiçe	Hasan Efendi el-Kadı	150	2	1
Platiçe	Ahmed Beşe Davudzâde	200	3	2
Platiçe	Bayram Beşe ibn-i Mehmed	150	2	1
Rahova	Abdullah Ağa erbab-ı tımar	150	2	2
Rahova	Halil ibn-i Mustafa	150	2	2
Rahova	Rabia Hatun	100	2	1
Rahova	Ebubekir ibn-i Salih	150	3	1
Rahova	Mehmed Çelebi ibn-i Hasan	150	2	1
Rahova	Mehmed ibn-i İsmail	140	2	1
Rahova	Arnavud Ali Çelebi	120	2	1
Pujarid	Kiremitçizâde Mehmed Beşe	300	2	2
Pujarid	el-Hac Bayram Beşe	150	2	1
Pujarid	Sarı Ahmed kızı	80	1	1
Holvon	İbrahim Ağa müteferrikagan-ı Dergah-ı Ali	350	5	2
Neşi	Arnavud Ahmed Çelebi el-müezzin	280	3	2
Neşi	Ali Beşe	80		
Neşi	Ahmed Ağa ibn-i Mustafa Efendi	150	2	1
Kifaloniçe	Arnavud Ahmed Çelebi	300	3	2
Pıravatar	Ahmed Ağa ibn-i Mustafa Efendi	150	2	1
Pıravatar	Osman Çelebi ibn-i Hasan Efendi	80	1	1
Pıravatar	Yahya Efendi	80		
Reşani	Mehmed Çelebi Arvazâde	100	2	1
Paşıkoy	Hasan Çelebi ibn-i Ahmed	200	3	2

Paşıkoy	Adile Hatun	80	2	1
Paşıkoy	Kasımpaşalı Ahmed Ağa	200	3	1,5
Paşıkoy	Kasım Çelebi kızı	80	2	1
Paşıkoy	Ayşe Hatun	100	3	1
Paşıkoy	Müezzinzâde Ali Çelebi	60	1	1
Paşıkoy	Kalfazâde Mustafa Çelebi	50	1	1
Paşıkoy	Mustafa Çelebi	80	1	1
Paşıkoy	Hasan Efendi	80	2	1
Heropan	Müftü Ömer Efendi	700	6	4
Heropan	Memiş Çelebi	150		
Heropan	İbrahim ve Ali ber-vech-i iştirak	250		
Ohtomon	es-Seyyid Yahya Efendi el-Nakib	150	3	2
Ohtomon	es-Seyyid İbrahim	150	2	2
Ohtomon	Mehmed Çelebi el-Müezziz	150	2	2
Ohtomon	Mustafa Beşe	100	2	1
Ohtomon	Mahmud Bey el- merhum kızı Fatıma Hatun	30	1	1
Altunlar	Ali Sipahi	50	1	1
Kıravate	Mustafa Ağa reis- i çeltük	250	4	3
Kıravate	Hasan Çelebi	150	2	1
Kıravate	Hasan Çelebi	100		
Kıravate	Mehmed Çelebi ibn-i Mustafa	55	1	1
Kıravate	Salih Efendi el- Kadı	60	1	1
Kıravate	Baba Yorgi	150	3	2
Kıravate	Daşko Manol	80	3	1
Kıravate	Mehmed Efendi ?zâde	300	3	3
Yavriniçe	es-Seyyid Mehmed ibn-i Yahya Efendi el- Nakib	150	2	1
Yavriniçe	Mustafa Çavuş çavuş-ı yeniçeriyân	150	3	1

Yavriniçe	el-Hac Bayram Beşe	150	2	1
Yavriniçe	Mehmed Bey	100	2	1
Yavriniçe	Arnavud Ali Bey	120	2	1
Yavriniçe	Süleyman Bey	120	2	1
Yavriniçe	Hasan Çelebi ibn-i Mehmed Çelebi	80	1	1
Yavriniçe	Kosta zımmi Katılmako zımmi	150	2	1
Veştice	İbrahim Ağa müteferrikagan-ı Dergah-ı Ali	350	4	2
Veştice	Fatıma Hatun	80	1	1
Veştice	Salih bin Hasan	150	2	1
Veştice	Hasan Ağa	150	2	1
Veştice	Ali bin Hasan	100	1	1
Veştice	Hasan bin Abdullah	30	1	1
Kavaşle	es-Seyyid Şeyh Mustafa Efendi	150	1	1
Tırhovişte	Çavuşzâde Ahmed Ağa ve İbrahim Ağa	260	3	2
Tırhovişte	Mustafa Ağa reis-i çeltük	250	3	2
Tırhovişte	Ahmed Sipahi Yahyabeyzâde	200	3	1
Tırhovişte	Hasan Çelebi ibn-i Mahmud Efendi	65	3	2
Tırhovişte	İbrahim Subaşı	100	2	1
Monoşpıte	Mehmed Çelebi ibn-i Mustafa	250	3	2
Monoşpıte	Mehmed Ağa	300	3	2
Monoşpıte	el-Hac Osman el-İmam	250	3	2
Monoşpıte	Mehmed Bey erbab-ı tımar	150	2	1
Monoşpıte	Ali Çelebi ibn-i Hüseyin	150	2	1
Monoşpıte	Ahmed Çelebi es-Seyyid	130	2	2
Monoşpıte	Mehmed Çelebi es-Seyyid	200	2	2
Monoşpıte	İbrahim Çelebi ve Mehmed Çelebi ber-vech-i iştirak	250	3	2
Monoşpıte	Hasan Hacı	60	1	1

Monoşpıte	Mustafa Ağa zevcesi	250	3	2
Monoşpıte	Şehbaz	150	2	1
Monoşpıte	el-Hac Mustafa	180	3	2
Servıhor	Mahmud Efendi el-Kadı	300	3	3
Servıhor	Fatıma Şerife Hatun bint es-Seyyid Mustafa Efendi	150	3	2
Servıhor	Zülfıkar Yazıcı	250	3	3
Servıhor	Serdarzâde Mustafa Çelebi	250	3	2
Servıhor	Rabia Hatun	120	2	1
Servıhor	Hatice Hatun ibnite Ali Bey	120	2	1
Dobre	Acemzâde Ali Çelebi	45	1	1
Doksara	Manastır der tasarrufu zımmiyan	50		2
Çaknohor	Ahmed Çelebi be kaza-i Platimana	50	1	1
Milova	Hasan Çelebi	300	2	2
Tırhaleb	İbrahim Ağa Yazıcı	150	1	1
Tırhaleb	Mehmed bin Mustafa	150		
Alabori	Şeyhzâde İbrahim Beşe	200	3	2
Alabori	Hasan Beşe ibn-i Hüseyin Beyzâde	150	3	2
Alabori	Ali Çelebi el-Müezzın	250	3	2
Alabori	Sipahi Sinan Bey ve Mehmed ibn-i Abdi müşterek	390	4	2
Alabori	Ali Çelebi Yahya Beyzâde	200	4	2
Alabori	Mahmud Efendi el-Kadı	200	2	2
Alabori	Zaimzâde Mehmed Bey sagire kızı Emine	150	3	1
Alabori	Mahmud bin Hasan	150	2	1
Alabori	Ömer Bey el-merhum der yed-i Bakiye Hatun	250	3	2

Alabori	Dimo zımmi veled-i Manol	250	3	2
Alabori	Manol veled-i Kostantin	260	3	2
Praki	Hızır Beşe ibn-i Mustafa	1200	6	6
Eflahlar	Hızır Beşe ibn-i Mustafa	1500	7	5
Eflahlar	Zülfikar Bey	350	5	2
Eflahlar	Ahmed Beşe ibn- i Davudzâde	250	2	2
Eflahlar	Fatıma Hatun	150	2	2
Tırbande	Mustafa Çelebi ibn-i Allame Efendi	60	1	
Tırbande	Mustafa Bey ez- Zaim	100	2	1
Tırbande	Mustafa Beşe ibn-i Salih	120	2	1
Tırbande	Abdûlbaki Efendi el-Kadı	150	2	1
Tırbande	Abdûlbaki bin Halil	150	2	1
Tırbande	Abdülhalil Beşe	120	2	1
Sadine	Hamza Sipahi ibn-i Ahmed erbab-ı tımar	100	1	1
Mavrangel	Kara Ali	150	2	1

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Directorate of State Archives Ottoman Archives
(Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi- BOA)

BOA. AE. SAMD.III 51/5088, 43/4249, 192/18580, 23/2216, 23/2224

BOA. AE.SMHD.I. 132/9695, 199/15728

BOA. AE.SMST.III. 2/51, 75/5593

BOA. AE.SSLM.II. 262/15185

BOA. AE.SSLM.III 191/11478

BOA. C.ADL. 79/4773

BOA. C.BLD. 7/311, 96/4759

BOA. C.DH. 32/1591, 284/14196

BOA. C.EV. 316/16054, 80/3992

BOA. C.HR. 113/5607, 158/7856

BOA. C.İKTS: 34/1653, 45/2228

BOA. C.MF. 80/3954

BOA. C.ML. 503/20433, 23/1069, 322/13294, 722/29545, 36/1609, 774/31585,
425/17223

BOA. C.TZ. 150/7482

BOA. İE.AS. 82/7403

BOA. İE.BH. 15/1326

BOA. İE.DH. 28/2471, 24/2158

BOA. İE.ML. 112/10688

BOA. KK.d. 285, 2738, 2890

BOA. MAD.d. 251, 34, 107, 8485, 8510

BOA. MHM.d. Defter Number: 115, 116/1335, 128,129,130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 136, 137,139, 140,141,142

BOA. MŞH.ŞSC.d. Karaferye Kadı Sicilleri, Defter Number: 1089, 1088, 1090, 1091, 1092, 1087, 1093, 3021, 9025, 9026, 9028, 9027, 9024.

BOA. MŞH.ŞSC.d. Manisa Kadı Sicilleri, Defter Number: 181

BOA. TK.GM.d. 414

BOA. TT.d. 70, 140, 424, 433, 986, 167, 723

British National Archives: HO (Home Office)-42/53

ISAM Library, Karaferye Kadı Sicilleri, Defter Number: 2A.

İstanbul Üniversitesi Nadir Eserler Kütüphanesi: Es-seyyid Mehmed Râmiz Efendi, *Divan-ı Râmiz*, Demirbaş No: NEKTY00407

Macedonia Prefecture Archives in Selanik, Karaferye Kadı Sicilleri (through online access),DefterNumber:02,03,04,05,06,07,08,09,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94,95,96,98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,112.

Macedonia Prefecture Archives in Selanik, Selanik Kadı Sicilleri, Defter Number: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 10, 25, 27, 28, 29, 43,44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51, 52, 52A, 67, 91.

Secondary Sources

Ağır, S. (2013). “The Evolution of Grain Policy: The Ottoman Experience”, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 43/4, 571-598.

Akdağ, M. (1949). “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluş ve İnkişafı Devrinde Türkiye'nin İktisadî Vaziyeti”, *Belleten*, v.XIII, 51.

Akgündüz, A. (1991). *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri-3: Yavuz Sultan Selim Devri Kanunnâmeleri*. Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı.

Akgündüz, A. (1991). *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri-5: Yavuz Sultan Selim Devri Kanunnâmeleri*. Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı.

Akgündüz, A. (1992). *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri-5: Kanunî Sultan Süleyman Devri Kanunnâmeleri (17 Şevvâl 926-30 Eylül 1520/20 Safer 974-7 Eylül 1566)*. Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı.

- Akgündüz, A. (2016). *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri-11: III. Ahmed I. Mahmud ve II. Mahmud Devri Kanunnameleri (1703-1839)*. Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı.
- Aksan, V. (2013). *Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged*. New York: Routledge.
- Allen, R. C. (2009). *The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Altunbay, M. (2010). *Osmanlı Döneminde Bir Maden İşletmesinin Tarihi Süreci: Sidrekapsi*, Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, İstanbul Üniversitesi, p. 67.
- Anastasopoulos A., and Gara, E. (2015). The rural hinterland of Karaferye: Settlements, divisions, and the çiftlik phenomenon (seventeenth-eighteenth centuries). In Elias Kolovos (Ed.). *Ottoman rural societies and economies: Halcyon days in Crete VIII. A symposium held in Rethymno, 13-15 January 2012*, (pp. 261-291). Rethymno: Crete University Press.
- Anastasopoulos, A. (1999). Imperial institutions and local communities: Ottoman Karaferye, 1758 – 1774. Unpublished PhD. diss., Cambridge University.
- Anastasopoulos, A. (2002). ‘Lighting the Flame of Disorder: Ayan Infighting and State Intervention in Ottoman Karaferye, 1758-59,’ *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 8 (1 & 2). 73-88.
- Anastasopoulos, A. (2005). “Introduction.” In *Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire, Halcyon Days in Crete V: A Symposium Held in Rethymno*, edited by Antonis Anastasopoulos, 10-12 January 2003, XI-XXVIII. Rethymno: Crete University Press
- Anastasopoulos, A. (2020). “Notables musulmans et chrétiens dans les Balkans du xviii^e siècle: Attestation (temessük) d’affermage du çiftlik de Ramiz Efendi à Rabsomanik au kocabaşı Stamatis”, in Elisabetta Borromeo and Nicolas Vatin (eds), *Les Ottomans par eux-mêmes*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 391-396.
- Anastasopoulos, A., Poullos, S., and Spyropoulos, Y. (2019). ‘The spread of çiftliks (large estates) in the eighteenth-century Ottoman Balkans: The case of the district of Veroia,’ in *Rogojanu, Dumitru-Cătălin; Boda, Gherghina* (eds.), *Istorie, Cultură și Cercetare III, History, Culture and Research III, Târgoviște, Cetatea de Scaun*, pp. 90-109.
- Arıkan, Z. (1991). “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İhracı Yasak Mallar (Memnu Meta).” In *Prof. Dr. Bekir Kütükoğlu’na Armağan*, 279-306. İstanbul.
- Aynural, S. (2002). *İstanbul Değirmenleri ve Fırınları*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Barkan, Ö. L. (1966). “Edirne Askerî Kassamı’na Ait Tereke Defterleri (1545-1659),” *Belgeler* 3, no. 5–6: 1-479.

- Barkan, Ö. L. (1980). "Öşür." In *Türkiye 'de toprak meselesi*, p. 803. İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları
- Barkan, Ö. L. (1980). "Türk toprak hukuku tarihinde Tanzimat ve 1274 (1858) tarihli arazi kanunnamesi." In *Türkiye 'de toprak meselesi*, 291-375. İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları.
- Barkan, Ö. L. (1980). Türk-İslam toprak hukuku tatbikatının Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda aldığı şekiller: Şeri miras hukuku ve evlatlık vakıflar. In Barkan, Ö. L. *Türkiye 'de toprak meselesi*, (pp. 209-230). İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları.
- Barkan, Ö. L. (1942). "Vakıfların Bir iskan ve Kolonizasyon Metodu Olarak Kullanılmasında Diğer Şekiller", *Vakıflar Dergisi*, 2, 279-386.
- Barkey, K. (1991). "The Use of Court Records in the Reconstruction of Village Networks: A Comparative Perspective," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 32, no. 1-2, p. 209.
- Batmaz, E. (1997). 'İltizam sisteminin XVIII. yüzyıldaki boyutları'. *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, XVIII(29), 39-50.
- Beaudoin, S.M. (2000). "Current Debates in the Study of the Industrial Revolution", *OAH Magazine of History*, V. 15, n.1, pp. 7-13.
- Blum, J. (1957). "The rise of serfdom in Eastern Europe." *The American Historical Review* 62, no. 4, pp. 807-836.
- Blum, J. (1978). *The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Braudel, F. (1995). *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. Vol. 2, University of California Press.
- Braudel, F. (1995). *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. Vol. 1, (University of California Press, 1995).
- Brummett, P. (1994). *Ottoman Sea Power and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery*. State University of New York Press.
- Canbakal, H. (2005). 'On the 'nobility' of Provincial Notables' in Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire, *Halcyon Days in Crete V: A Symposium Held in Rethymno, Antonis Anastasopoulos (ed.), 10-12 January 2003*, Rethymno: Crete University Press.
- Canbakal, H. (2007). Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town: 'Ayntāb in the seventeenth Century, Leiden, Boston: Brill, 77-83.
- Cezar, Y. (1986). *Osmanlı maliyesinde bunalım ve değişim dönemi (XVIII. Yüzyıldan Tanzimat'a mali tarih)*, İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık.

- Çizakça, M. (1995). "Cash Waqfs of Bursa, 1555-1823," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 38, no. 3, 331.
- Darling, L. T. (1996). *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire 1560-1660*. Leiden: Brill.
- Demetrios, P. (2014). "The structure, content and development of large estates in the environs of Salonica during the period 1697-1770," in *Festschrift in Honor of Ioannis P. Theodorides. II. Studies on the Ottoman Empire and Turkey*, Evangelia Balta, Georgios Salakidis, and Theoharis Stavrides (eds.), İstanbul: The Isis Press, pp. 375-402.
- Dimitropoulos, D. (2007). Aspects of the working of the fiscal machinery in the areas ruled by Ali Paşa. In A. Anastasopoulos & E. Kolovos (Ed.). *Ottoman rule and the Balkans, 1760-1850: Conflict, transformation, adaptation. Proceedings of an International Conference Held in Rethymno, Greece, 13- 14 December 2003*, (pp. 61-72) Rethymno: University of Crete, Department of History and Archaeology.
- Eldem, E. (1999). *French Trade in Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century*, Brill: Leiden.
- Emecen, F. (1989). "XVI. Asrın İkinci Yarısında İstanbul ve Sarayın İaşesi İçin Batı Anadolu'dan Yapılan Sevkiyat", *Tarih Boyunca İstanbul Semineri, Bildiriler*, İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi. 197-231.
- Ergenç, Ö. (1986). "XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Taşra Yönetiminin Mali Nitelikleri." *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 10.
- Ergenç, Ö. (2007). "XVIII.Yüzyılda Osmanlı Anadolu'sunda Tarım Üretiminde Yeni Boyutlar: Muzâra'a ve Murâba'a Sözleşmeleri," *Kebikeç*, 23, 129-39.
- Ergenç, Ö. (2012). "‘Osmanlı’da ‘Enfâ’ Kuralının Devlet ve Re’âyâ Arasındaki Mâlî İlişkiler Açısından Anlamı." In *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları: Şehir, Toplum, Devlet*, 429-442. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Ergenç, Ö. (2012). "‘XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Taşra Yönetiminin Mâlî Nitelikleri.'" In *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları: Şehir, Toplum, Devlet*, 367-383. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Ergenç, Ö. (2012). "‘‘Çıkar Bâcı’, ve Bu Verginin Geniş Boyutlu Ticâret Faaliyetinin Bir Göstergesi Olarak Anlamı." In *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları: Şehir, Toplum, Devlet*, 318-323. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Ergenç, Ö. (2012). "İç Anadolu'nun Kuzeybatı Ucundaki Sof Üretim Alanının İzmir ile Bağlantısı" In *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları: Şehir, Toplum, Devlet*, 291-299. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Ergenç, Ö. (2012). "‘XVII ve XVIII. Yüzyıl Anadolu'sunda Toprak Tasarrufu ve Mülkiyeti Üzerine Değerlendirmeler.'" In *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları: Şehir, Toplum, Devlet*, 215-242. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.

- Ergenç, Ö. (2012). ‘‘Osmanlı’da ‘Serbest Dirlik’ Uygulamasının Boyutları ve Bunun Mali-İktisadi Faaliyetlerin Düzenlenmesindeki Yeri.’’ In *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları: Şehir, Toplum, Devlet*, 204-215. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Ergenç, Ö. (2012). *XVI. Yüzyılda Ankara ve Konya*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Ergenç, Ö. (2012). ‘‘Özer Ergenç, Osmanlı klâsik düzeni ve özellikleri üzerine bazı açıklamalar’’ In *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları: Şehir, Toplum, Devlet* 329-342, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Ergenç, Ö. (2023). ‘‘Continuity and Change in the Ottoman Early Modern Era: An Analysis of ‘Adet-i Kadime and Hâdis’.’’ In *Crafting History: Essays on the Ottoman World and Beyond in Honor of Cemal Kafadar*, edited by Rachel Goshgarian, Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, and Ali Yaycıoğlu, 559-560. Boston: Academic Studies Press.
- Ergene, B. (2003). *Local Court, Provincial Society and Justice in the Ottoman Empire: Legal Practice and Dispute Resolution in Çankırı and Kastamonu (1652–1744)*, Leiden and Boston, Brill.
- Ergene, B. (2001). On Ottoman Justice: Interpretations in Conflict (1600-1800).’’ *Islamic Law and Society* 8 no 1, 52-87.
- Ergene, B. (2012). On the Use of Sources in Ottoman Economic History. *Int. J. Middle East Studies* 44, 546-548.
- Faroghi, S. (1980). ‘‘İstanbul’un İaşesi ve Tekirdağ-Rodosçuk Limanı’’, *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi*, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar, II, Ankara.
- Frangakis-Syrett, E. (1992). *The Commerce of Izmir in the Eighteenth Century*, Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies.
- Gandev, C. (1960). ‘‘L’apparition Des Rapports Capitalistes Dans l’économie Rurale de La Bulgarie Du Nord-Ouest Au Cours Du XVIII Siècle,’’ *Etudes Historiques*, 207–17.
- Gara, E. (2005). ‘‘Moneylenders and landowners: In search of urban Muslim Elites in the Early Modern Balkans’’, In *Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire, Halcyon Days in Crete V: A Symposium Held in Rethymno*, Antonis Anastasopoulos (ed.), 10-12 January 2003, Rethymno: Crete University Press.
- Gegaj, A. (1937). *L’Albanie et l’invasion turque au XV e siècle*, Paris.
- Gelez, P. (2022). ‘‘The End of the Timar System in Bosnia, eighteenth - 20th Century.’’ *Osmanlı Araştırmaları / The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, no. 60. 97-138.
- Genç, M. (2000). ‘‘State and the Economy in the Age of Reforms: Continuity and Change’’ In *Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey* (ed. Kemal H. Karpat), Leiden; Boston: Brill.

- Genç, M. (2012). "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikane Sistemi," in idem, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Devlet ve Ekonomi*, vol. 3, İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat.
- Genç, M. (2012). *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Devlet ve Ekonomi*. İstanbul: Ötüken, pp. 106–16.
- Georgieva, G. (2007). "Administrative structure and government of Rumelia in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: The functions and activities of the Vali of Rumeli". In *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760-1850: Conflict, Transformation, Adaptation*, (eds.), Antonis Anastapoulos and Elias Kolovos, *Proceedings of an International Conference Held in Rethymno, Greece, 13-14 December 2003*, Rethymno, Department of History and Archaeology of the University of Crete.
- Goffman, D. (1954). *Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550-1650*. Vol. 5, University of Washington Press.
- Gökbilgin, M. T. (1954). "Rüstem Paşa ve Hakkındaki İthamlar", *Tarih Dergisi*, 8(11-12), 11-50.
- Gökbilgin, M. T. (1957). *Rumeli'de Yürükler, Tatarlar ve Evlâd-i Fâtihân*, İstanbul.
- Gounaris, B. C. (2008). "Reassessing Wheat Crises in Eighteenth-Century Thessaloniki," *The Historical Review/La Revue Historique* 5.
- Grozdanova, E., and Andreev, S. (1992). "Aperçu historique sur la metallurgie dans les zones centrale et orientale de la peninsula balkanique au cours des XVe- XIXe s.", *Etudes Balkaniques*, 28/1, pp. 63-64.
- Güçer, L. (1964). *XVI-XVII. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Hububat Meselesi ve Hububattan Alınan Vergiler*, İstanbul: Sermet Matbaası.
- Güçer, L. (1964). *XVI-XVII. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Hububat Meselesi ve Hububattan Alınan Vergiler*. İstanbul: Sermet Matbaası.
- Günay, V. (2006). "Batı Anadolu'da Âyânlık Mücadeleleri ve Bergama Voyvodası Sağancalı Veli," *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi* 21, no. 2.
- Güran, T. (1986). "İstanbul'un İaşesinde Devletin Rolü (1793-1839)," *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 44, no. 1–4.
- Heywood, C. (2014). "Beyond Braudel's 'Northern Invasion'? Aspects of the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Fish Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century," *International Journal of Maritime History* 26, no. 2, 193–209.
- Hobsbawm, E.J. (1954). "The Crisis of the seventeenth Century", *Past & Present*, V. 6, No.1, 1954, pp. 44–65.
- İlgürel, M. (2004). "Hububat Kaçakçılığı", *CIEPO XIV. Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, pp. 361-369.

- Imber, C. (2010). "The status of orchards and fruit-trees in Ottoman law" In *Studies in Ottoman History and Law*, 207-216, Piscataway, NJ, USA: Gorgias Press.
- İnalcık, H. (1953). "Arnavutluk'ta Osmanlı Hakimiyetinin Yerleşmesi ve İskender Bey İsyanının Menşei," in *Fatih ve İstanbul*. İstanbul. 153-75.
- İnalcık, H. (1953). "Stefan Duşan'dan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na: XV. Asırda Rumeli'de Hristiyan Sipahiler ve Menşeleri," In *60. Doğum Yılı Münasebetiyle Fuad Köprülü Armağanı*, İstanbul, 207-48.
- İnalcık, H. (1959). "Osmanlılar'da Raiyyet Rûsûmu" *Belleten* XXIII, 581-582.
- İnalcık, H. (1965). Adaletnameler, *Belleten*, II, 3-4.
- İnalcık, H. (1972). "The Ottoman Decline and Its Effects upon the Reaya," in *Aspects of the Balkans: Continuity and Change*, ed. H. and Jr Birnbaum & S. Vryonis, The Hagu, Paris: Mouton.
- İnalcık, H. (1977). "Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration," in *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Islamic History*, ed. Thomas Naff and Roger and Owen, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. 27-52.
- İnalcık, H. (1980). "Military and fiscal transformation of the Ottoman empire, 1600-1700", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 6, 283-337.
- İnalcık, H. (1983). "The emergence of big Farms, çiftliks: State, landlords, and tenants," in *Contributions a l'histoire Economique et Sociale de l'Empire Ottoman*, Louvain: Peeters Press. 105-26.
- İnalcık, H. (1987). *Hicrî 835 Tarihli Sûret-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, XVIII.
- İnalcık, H. (1995). "The çift-hane system and peasant taxation," in *From Empire to Republic: Essays on Ottoman and Turkish Social History*, İstanbul: The Isis Press, 61-72.
- İnan, H. İ. (1991). "Peasants, commercialization, and the legitimation of state power in sixteenth-century Anatolia". in Keyder, Çağlar; Tabak, Faruk (eds.), *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 57-76.
- Ioann. K. V. (ed.) (1954). *Ιστορικά Αρχεία Μακεδονίας. Β'. Αρχείον Βεροίας-Ναούσης 1598-1886* [Historical archives of Macedonia. II. Archive of Veria-Naoussa, 1598-1886] (Thessaloniki: Society for Macedonian Studies), no: 245.
- İzzi Süleyman Efendi, İzzi Tarihi, Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı.
- Jennings, R. C. (1978). "Kadi, Court, and Legal Procedure in 17th C. Ottoman Kayseri: The Kadi and the Legal System," *Studia Islamica*, 48, p. 144-146.

- Jennings, R. C. (1979). "Limitations of the Judicial Powers of the Kadi in 17th C. Ottoman Kayseri," *Studia Islamica*, 50. p. 163.
- Kaplan, S. (1975). *Bread, Politics and Political Economy in the Reign of Louis XV*, The Hague: Nijhoff.
- Kasaba, R. (1988). *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy: The Nineteenth Century*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Kaya, A. Y. (2015). 'On the çiftlik regulation in Tırhala in the mid-nineteenth century: economists, pashas, governors, çiftlik-holders, subaşı, and sharecroppers'. In E. Kolovos (Ed.), *Ottoman rural Ottoman rural societies and economies: Halcyon days in Crete VIII: A symposium held in Rethymno 13-15 January 2012*, Rethymno: Crete University Press.
- Kermeli, E. (2008). Caught in between Faith and Cash: The Ottoman Land System of Crete, 1645-1670. In *The Eastern Mediterranean under Ottoman Rule: Crete, 1645-1840 (Halcyon Days in Crete VI, A Symposium Held in Rethymno, 13-15 January 2006*, ed. Antonis Anastasopoulos, Crete University Press. 17–49.
- Keyder, Ç. (1991). "Introduction: Large-scale commercial agriculture in the Ottoman Empire?" In Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (eds.), *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1-13
- Keyder, Ç., and İslamoğlu, H. (1977). "Agenda for Ottoman History," *Review* 1, no. 1, 31–55.
- Khoury, D. R. (2006). "The Ottoman Centre versus Provincial Power-Holders: An Analysis of the Historiography," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kılıç, F. (2017). ed., *Tezkîre-i Şu'arâ-Yı Şefkat-i Bagdâdî*, T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Kütüphaneler ve Yayımlar Genel Müdürlüğü Eser. Ankara.
- Koh, C. H. (2021). "The Ottoman Postmaster: Contractors, Communication and Early Modern State Formation," *Past and Present* 251, no. 1.
- Kokdaş, İ. (2014). "Money, peasant mobility, çiftliks, and local politics in Salonika, 1740-1820," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 34.
- Kotzageorgis, P., and Papastamatiou, D. (2014). "Wealth Accumulation in an Urban Context," *Turkish Historical Review*, 5, no. 2, 165–99.
- Kütükoğlu, M. S. (1976). *Osmanlı - İngiliz İktisâdî Münasebetleri (1838-1850)*, İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi.
- Laiou, S. (2010). "Some Considerations Regarding Çiftlik Formation in the Western Thessaly, Sixteenth-Nineteenth Centuries," in *The Ottoman Empire, the Balkans, the Greek Lands: Towards a Social and Economic History*, ed.

Elias Kolovos, Phokion Kotzageorgis and Sophia Laiou, Piscataway, NJ, USA: Gorgias Press. 255–78.

- Lowry, H. W., Erünsal, İ. (2009). “The Evrenos Dynasty of Yenice-i Vardar: A Postscript,” *The Journal of Ottoman Studies XXXIII*, no. Prof. DR. Muammer Kemal Özergin Hatıra Sayısı-I 131–208.
- McGowan, B. (1981). *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600–1800*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McGowan, B. (1994). ‘The age of the Ayans, 1699-1812’, In *An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, edited by H. Inalcik and D. Quataert, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 637-758.
- McGowan, B. (1994). “The age of the ayans, 1699-1812,” in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, Halil Inalcik with Donald Quataert (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Monahan, W. G. (1990). “Lyon in the Crisis of 1709: Royal Absolutism, Administrative Innovation, and Regional Politics,” *French Historical Studies*, 16, no. 4, 833–48.
- Murphey, R. (1988). “Provisioning Istanbul: The State and Subsistence in the Early Modern Middle East.,” *Food and Foodways* 2, 217–63.
- Nagata, Y. (1997). *Tarihte âyânlar: Karaosmanoğulları üzerine bir inceleme*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu.
- Nagata, Y. (1999). *Muhsin-Zâde Mehmed Paşa ve Âyânlık Müessesesi*. İzmir: Akademi Kitabevi.
- Nagata, Y. (2005). Ayan in Anatolia and the Balkans during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: A case study of the Karaosmanoğlu family. In A. Anastasopoulos (Ed.). *Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire* (pp.269-294). Rethymno: Crete University Press.
- Öncel, F. (2017). “Land, tax and power in the Ottoman provinces: the malikane-mukataa of Esma Sultan in Alasonya (c. 1780-1825),” *Turkish Historical Review*, 8, 54–74.
- Ortaylı, İ. (1973). “Devenin Taşıma Maliyeti Eğrisi Üzerine Bir Deneme,” *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, 81-190.
- Overton, M. (1996). *Agricultural Revolution in England: The Transformation of the Agrarian Economy 1500-1850*, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Owen, R. (1992). “The 1838 Anglo-Turkish convention: An overview”, *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 7-14.
- Özcan, M. (2005). “Keşan Ayanlığına ve Kocabaşılığına Giriş”, *Tarih Dergisi*, 42, 111-136.

- Özkaya, Y. (2014). *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda âyânlık*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu.
- Özel, O. (1999). "17. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Demografi ve İskân Tarihi İçin Önemli Bir Kaynak: Mufassal Avârız Defterleri", *XII. Türk Tarih Kongresi (Ankara, 12–16 Eylül 1994)*, Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler, c. III, Ankara.
- Öztürk, F. (2018). ed., *Tezkire-i Silâhdâr-Zâde*. Ankara.
- Pakalın, M. Z. (1971). "*Osmanlı tarih deyimleri ve terimleri sözlüğü*." İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, pp. 160-161.
- Pamuk, Ş. (1988). *100 soruda Osmanlı-Türkiye iktisadî tarihi, 1500-1914*. Vol. 55. Gerçek Yayınevi.
- Papastamatiou, D. (2007). "Tax-farming (İltizam) and collective fiscal responsibility (maktu) in the Ottoman Southern Peloponnese in the second half of the eighteenth century" in Kolovos, Elias; Kotzageorgis, Phokion; Laiou, Sophia; Sariyannis, Marinos (eds.), *The Ottoman Empire, the Balkans, the Greek Lands: Toward a Social and Economic History. Studies in Honor of John C. Alexander*, İstanbul: The Isis Press, 292.
- Papastamatiou, D. (2014). "The structure, content and development of large estates in the environs of Salonica during the period 1697-1770," in *Festschrift in Honor of Ioannis P. Theocharides. II. Studies on the Ottoman Empire and Turkey*, Evangelia Balta, Georgios Salakidis, and Theoharis Stavrides (eds.), İstanbul: The Isis Press. 375-402.
- Parveva, S. (2015). "On some features of the portrait of çiftlik hired workers in the seventeenth–mid-eighteenth century," *Études Balkaniques*, 4, 23–74.
- Pedani, M.P. (2008). "Ottoman Merchants in the Adriatic, Trade and Smuggling", *Acta Histriae*, 16, 1-2.
- Polat, F. (2003). "Râmiz Mehmed Efendi Dîvânı", Unpublished Master Thesis, Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi.
- Quataert, D. (1980). "The Commercialization of Agriculture in Ottoman Turkey, 1800-1914," *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 1, no. 2, 38–55. 40-41.
- Quataert, D. (1994). "The age of reforms, 1812-1914". In *An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, edited by H. Inalcik and D. Quataert, 759-946. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Râmiz Seyyid Mehmed Efendi, In Furkan Öztürk, ed., *Tezkire-i Silâhdâr-zâde (Defter Emîni Silâhdâr-zâde Mehmed Emîn)*, T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Kütüphaneler ve Yayımlar Genel Müdürlüğü Eser (Ankara, 2018).
- Râmiz, (2007). In *Türk Dünyası Ortak Edebiyatı: Türk Dünyası Edebiyatçıları Ansiklopedisi*, c.VIII (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Yayınları. 285.

- Reindl, H. (2014). *II. Bayezid ve Çevresi: Hükümdarın Adamları*, İstanbul: Arvana Yayınları, 115-117.
- Sadat, D. R. (1972). "Rumeli Ayanları : The Eighteenth Century," *The Journal of Modern History* 44, no. 3, 346-63.
- Saito, H. (2004). "Venice after the Battle of Prevesa (1538). The Smuggling of Greek Wheat and the Confiscation of the Cargos of Captured Foreign Ships" *Mediterranean World*, 17, Tokyo, 79-103.
- Salakides, G. (2002). "The Provisioning of Istanbul with Wheat in Turbulent Times: Yenişehir in Thessaly at the End of the 18th Century," *Balkan Studies*, 43, no. 2, p. 136.
- Salzmann, A. (2004). *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: rival paths to the modern state*, 28, Brill: Leiden, 147.
- Şaşmaz, L. M. (2000). "Policing Bread Price and Production in Ottoman Istanbul, 1793-1807," *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 24, no. 1, 21-40.
- Singer, A. (1990). "Tapu Tahrir Defterleri and Kadı Sicilleri: A Happy Marriages of Sources," *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 1, 95-125.
- Soyudoğan, M. (2021). "Cebelülerin Toplumsal Kökenleri Üzerine," *Alinteri Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 5, no. 2, 139-69.
- Spyropoulos, Y., Poulis, S., and Anastasopoulos, A. (2020). "Çiftlik, Landed Elites, and Tax Allocation in Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Veroia," *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, no. December.
- Stoianovich, T. (1953). "Land Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy," *The Journal of Economic History* 13, no. 4, 398-411.
- T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 367 Numaralı Muhâsebe-i Vilâyet-i Rûm-ili Defteri ile 94 ve 1078 Numaralı Avlonya Livâsı Tahrîr Defterleri (926-1520 / 937-1530) Tıpkıbasım, Defter-i Hâkânî Dizisi: XII, Ankara: 2008. 335, 354.
- Taş, H. (2007) "İhtisâb Mukâta'ası Verilerinin Şehir Ekonomisi Açısından Anlamı: Ankara Örneği." *Uludağ Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 8, no. 13, 409-436.
- Taş, H. (2008). "Osmanlı Kadı Mahkemesindeki 'Şühûdü'l-Hâl' Nasıl Değerlendirilebilir?," *Bilig*, 44, 25-44.
- Taş, H. (2013). Osmanlı maliyesinde "Bedel" uygulaması üzerine bir değerlendirme. *İkinci İktisat Tarihi Kongresi Bildiriler-1, 24-25 Haziran 2010*, (pp. 291-311), Elazığ: Fırat Üniversitesi İnsani ve Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi Yayınları.

- Terzibaşoğlu, Y. (2022). "Landed estates, rural commons and collective agriculture in Ottoman Niş and Leskofçe in the 19th century," *Turkish Historical Review*, 13, 343–371..
- Uluçay, M. Ç. (1955). *18. ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri*. İstanbul: Berksoy Basımevi.
- Veinstein, G. (1975). "Ayân de La Région d'Izmir et Le Commerce Du Levant (Deuxième Moitié Du XVIIIe Siècle)," *Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de La Méditerranée* 20, no. 1, 131–47.
- Veinstein, G. (1991). 'On the Çiftlik Debate' in Keyder, Çağlar; Tabak, Faruk (eds.), *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Vries, J.d. (2009). "The Economic Crisis of the Seventeenth Century after Fifty Years", *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, V. 40, No. 2, 151-194.
- Wallerstein, I. (1979). "The Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World-Economy: Some Questions for Research," *Review* 2, no. 3, 389–98.
- Wallerstein, I., Decdeli H., and Kasaba, R. (1987). 'The incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world-economy' in Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (ed.) *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 88-101.
- Yaycıoğlu, A. (2016). *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Yediyıldız, B. (1982). "XVIII. Asırda Türk Vakıf Teşkilatı," *Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 12.
- Yediyıldız, B. (1984). "XVIII. Asır Türk Vakıflarının İktisadî Boyutu," *Vakıflar Dergisi*, 18, 6.
- Yeşil, F. (2004). "İstanbul'un İaşesinde Nizâm-ı Cedîd: Zahirî Nezâreti'nin Kuruluşu ve İşleyişi (1793-1839)." *Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi* 15. 113-142.
- Yıldız, A. (2020). "Politics, economy, and çiftliks: the history of four çiftliks in Larissa (Yenişehir-i Fener)," *Turkish Historical Review*, 11, 28-65.
- Zarinebaf, F., Davis, J. L., and Bennet, J. (2005). A Historical and Economic Geography of Ottoman Greece: The Southwestern Morea in the eighteenth Century, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies, American School of Classical Studies at Athens*.