

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE CYPRUS CRISES OF 1964,
1967, AND 1974: A POLIHEURISTIC PERSPECTIVE

A Master's Thesis

by

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Ankara

August 2014

To my family

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE CYPRUS CRISES OF 1964,
1967, AND 1974: A POLIHEURISTIC PERSPECTIVE

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
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ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyzes Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus crises of 1964, 1967, and 1974. It summarizes the Cyprus question in the 20th Century. The thesis examines the Cyprus crises and Turkey's ultimate decisions in each crisis by 'poliheuristic' decision making model. The decision making processes of Turkish leaders will be analyzed.

By comparing the crises, this thesis studies how Turkish decision makers decided to use force in 1974, whereas refrained from using force against Cyprus in the previous crises of 1964 and 1967. The thesis argues that during each Cyprus crisis, Turkish decision makers framed some of the policy options as 'non-compensatory' which resulted in the decision not to intervene in Cyprus during the 1964 and 1967 crises, and resulted in the intervention decision during the 1974 crisis.

Key words: Cyprus question, Turkish foreign policy, Poliheuristic theory, Foreign policy analysis

ÖZET

1964, 1967 ve 1974 KIBRIS KRİZLERİ KARŞISINDA TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASI: 'POLIHEURISTIC' YAKLAŞIM

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Bu tez 1964, 1967 ve 1974 Kıbrıs krizleri karşısında Türk dış politikasını incelemektedir. 20. yüzyıldaki Kıbrıs meselesini özetler. Tez, 'poliheuristic' karar alma modeli ile Kıbrıs krizlerini ve Türkiye'nin nihai kararlarını araştırmaktadır. Türk liderlerin karar alma süreçleri incelenecektir.

Bu tez, krizleri kıyaslayarak Türk karar alıcıların nasıl 1974'te kuvvet kullanmaya karar verdiğini, fakat geçmiş 1964 ve 1967 krizlerinde Kıbrıs'a kuvvet kullanmaktan nasıl kaçındığını araştırmaktadır. Tez, Kıbrıs krizleri sırasında Türk karar alıcıların bazı politika seçeneklerini 'telafi edilemez' olarak nitelediğini, bu nitelemenin ise 1964 ve 1967 krizlerinde Kıbrıs'a müdahale etmeme kararıyla, 1974 krizinde ise müdahale etme kararıyla neticelendiğini savunmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Kıbrıs meselesi, Türk dış politikası, Poliheuristic teori, Dış politika analizi

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CHAPTER I:

INTRODUCTION

The ‘Cyprus question’ is one of the most serious issues in Turkish foreign policy, and there is no doubt that the Cyprus question is a continuing problem which affects Turkish foreign policy and Turkish relations. Although the Cyprus question attracts less attention today than in the 1990s, it still affects Turkish foreign policy. In other words, the Cyprus dispute remains as a continuing question. For instance, there were recent tensions between Turkey and Greek Cypriots over oil exploration in disputed territories surrounding the island. In order to understand the dynamics of such current situations, it is crucial to examine the early stages of the question. Toward that end, this thesis will examine Turkey’s foreign policy decisions during the Cyprus crises of 1964, 1967 and 1974. In examining these

cases, this thesis will explain factors affecting Turkish decision makers' reactions to the crises.

With regard to this information, the *research question* of the thesis is:

How did Turkish decision makers decide to use force during the 1974 crisis, whereas during the 1964 and 1967 crises Turkish decision makers refrained from using force?

Although there is a range of research on the Cyprus question, there is little focus on decision making processes of the leaders. The majority of the literature focuses on the *why* question with regard to Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus, and neglects to study *how* 'the decision' was made during the Cyprus crises. However, in order to examine and explain the crux of the matter, we need to study the foreign policy decision making process of the leadership. Only Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Özkeçeci-Taner (2004) have focused on the 1974 Cyprus crisis as a case for foreign policy analysis and tried to explain *how* these decisions were made. Their work studied the 1974 Cyprus crisis as a case for decision units' effect on decision making processes. Recently Şirin (2012) began to explore the "*how*" of the Cyprus question with his study of the 1959 Zurich and London agreements and *how* the contracting parties reached the agreements, deciding to establish the Republic of Cyprus. Despite the contributions of these scholars, the literature has not fully examined the question of *how* decisions have been made with regards to Cyprus. This thesis will contribute to the literature by examining and comparing decision making processes in the aforementioned crises.

As stated earlier, although the core of the Cyprus question has changed over time, it still is alive and affects Turkish foreign policy today. The most important change of last fifty years was Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974. When intercommunity conflicts erupted in Cyprus in the early 1960s, Turkey considered intervention as an option to settle the dispute, but did not ultimately decide to intervene in during these crises. The 1974 intervention and its aftermath have attracted more attention in the literature, which has largely overlooked the connection to the decision making process of these other crises. This is why the thesis is interested in studying not only the 1974 crisis but also the 1964 and 1967 crises.

This thesis argues that researching Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus during 1960s may improve our understanding of Turkey's decision to intervene in 1974. Although there are studies focusing on the 1974 intervention and its aftermath, 1960s is neglected in the literature. The thesis argues that, by studying a neglected period of history, we will find the roots of the intervention decision. Focusing on *how* Turkish decision makers reached their final decisions during each Cyprus crisis, this research will contribute to the literature by examining the roots of intervention decision.

To analyze the crisis the thesis will adopt Poliheuristic decision making model first introduced by Alex Mintz (1993). The model argues that decision making process consist of two processes. In the first stage leaders employ 'non-compensatory' decision making strategy, which eliminates policy alternative(s) 'unacceptable' on a key dimension. In the second stage of decision making process, leaders adopt more rational approach towards remaining policy options

and choose the best remaining option. According to the Poliheuristic model leaders generally consider ‘political’ dimension as the key dimension during the first stage of the decision making process since each political actor’s primary aim is remaining in power. However, the model does not have a binding rule to adopt political dimension as the key dimension. Instead, the researcher may choose another dimension as the key dimension (e.g. military or economic).

With this in mind, this thesis hypothesizes that: During each Cyprus crisis, Turkish decision makers framed some of the policy options as ‘non-compensatory’ which resulted in the decision not to intervene in Cyprus during the 1964 and 1967 crises, and resulted in the intervention decision during the 1974 crisis. To investigate this hypothesis, the thesis will study historical events from the establishment of Republic of Cyprus in 1960 to 1974.

During the 1964 crisis Prime Minister İsmet İnönü confronted with both domestic and international problems. First of all, Turkey had a crisis related to forming a new government since the second İnönü coalition was dissolved in December 1963. Secondly, Turkey faced with intercommunity clashes on Cyprus in late December 1963. Although Turkey threatened to use force against Cyprus unless the conflict does not end on the island, Turkey couldn’t take such a decision during the 1964 crisis. The thesis argues that ‘systemic’ considerations were dominant on the İnönü administration decision not to intervene in Cyprus during this crisis.

In 1967 the Cyprus crisis took the public attention once more time when bloody clashes erupted on the island in November 1967. This time Süleyman Demirel was the prime minister of Turkey. Although the Demirel administration –

like its predecessor the third İnönü coalition- stated its intention to use force against Cyprus, did not take intervention decision in 1967. Instead the administration adopted a diplomatic approach towards the crisis. The thesis argues that Demirel's focus was more '*political*' in nature and the administration's priority was increasing economic development in Turkey.

The year 1974 witnessed the most dramatic change in modern history of the island. When the Greek National Guards achieved a successful coup against the Makarios administration on Cyprus, Turkey not only threatened to use force but also realized this threat by sending its troops to Cyprus in July 1974. During the 1974 crisis another coalition was in office in Turkey: Ecevit-Erbakan coalition. The Ecevit administration realized that different from the previous crises the 1974 crisis created suitable '*systemic*' conditions for intervention. As a result the administration did not miss this opportunity to 'restore the state of affairs' of the island.

The thesis is composed of five main chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the historical framework of the thesis. This chapter gives information on the roots of the 'Cyprus question' and discusses the events up to 1963. Chapter 3 introduces theoretical and methodological aspects of the thesis. It starts with introducing 'poliheuristic' theory and continues with discussing its roots, its assumptions, and the studies adopting the method. Chapter 3 also explains the method of study while building a poliheuristic decision matrix for Turkish decision makers during the Cyprus crises.

Chapter 4 and the following two chapters study Turkish foreign policy during each Cyprus crisis from 1964 to 1974. Each chapter focuses on only one

crisis, discussing Turkey's internal and external relations as relevant. These chapters analyze each crisis step-by-step and give detailed accounts of the crises. This section applies the poliheuristic decision-making model described in the Chapter 2 to analyze Turkish decision makers' approach to the Cyprus crises.

Chapter 7, the conclusion, compares and contrasts each crisis to find which motives shaped Turkish decision makers' attitude towards the Cyprus crises during this period. This chapter first analyzes similarities among the crises, then examines significant differences.

CHAPTER II:

POLIHEURISTIC THEORY AND METHOD OF STUDY

3.1. Poliheuristic Theory: An Introduction

Currently there are two schools of thought in political decision making: rational choice school and cognitive psychology school (Mintz 2003: 1). The well-known assumption of the rational choice school is that ‘nations are led by rational, forward-looking, expected-utility-maximizing leaders’ (Redd and Mintz 2013: 12). However, decision makers, who do not have perfect information with which to make a rational choice, do not always try to maximize benefits in reality. They even regularly choose ‘irrational’ options, leading some scholars to turn to alternative theories such as the bounded rational cybernetic approach (Below 2008: 3). An influential theory of the cognitive school, cybernetic theory assumes that individuals confront constraints which limit their memory and recall abilities, and as a result decision makers develop decision procedures to deal with cognitive

limitations and the decision environment (Redd and Mintz 2013: 13). However, these approaches may not be mutually exclusive in reality: focusing only on rational choice approach may explain preferences of the decision maker, or concentrating solely on cognitive aspects of the issue may explain processes and beliefs (DeRouen and Sprecher 2004: 56). The poliheuristic theory, as an alternative to these schools, is a bridge between rational and cognitive approaches (Mintz and DeRouen 2010: 78).

The thesis will examine the Cyprus crises and the decisions made by the Turkish side through the ‘poliheuristic’ decision making model. Before discussing the core assumptions of ‘poliheuristic’ theory, it is crucial to clarify the meaning of the term ‘poliheuristic’. The term ‘poliheuristic’ has two components: “[1] poly (many) and [2] heuristic (shortcuts), which alludes to the cognitive mechanisms used by decision makers to simplify complex foreign policy decisions” (Mintz et al. 1997: 554). The poliheuristic decision making model addresses not only the personality of the decision maker, but also the inter-state (system) and domestic variables. Domestic and inter-state variables may vary (e.g. the role of ‘Super Powers’, alliances, current political/economic situation, and elections). The poliheuristic decision making model explains both the *why* and the *how* of a leader’s decisions. The theory argues that decision makers adopt more than one decision strategy while making decisions (Mintz and DeRouen 2010: 78).

Mintz and Geva (1997) state five characteristics of poliheuristic theory: i) nonholistic: decision makers use simple heuristics, and foreign policy decisions are based on elimination or adoption of policy alternatives on the ground of one or a few dimensions; ii) dimension based: if the policy alternatives do not meet a

certain threshold of the 'key dimension' (e.g. political, economic), these policies will be eliminated; iii) noncompensatory: the policy alternative which is unacceptable in the key dimension with higher scores in other dimensions cannot compensate low scores in the key dimension, since the alternative will be eliminated in the first stage of decision making; iv) 'satisficing': according to theory decision makers try to find 'acceptable' decisions, thus they do not just focus on maximizing utilities; lastly v) order sensitive: the theory "implies that the choice of a particular alternative may depend on the order in which particular dimensions (diplomatic, political, military, economic) are invoked" (Mintz and Geva 1997: 87).

The poliheuristic decision making model, although it was first introduced by Mintz (1993), offers an alternative to existing models (e.g. rational actor, cybernetic model). The poliheuristic model claims that there is a 'two-stage' process before making a decision:

The first stage of poliheuristic theory involves a noncompensatory, nonholistic search. It uses decision heuristics and primarily corresponds to cognitive school of decision making. The second stage involves analytic processing of surviving alternatives. It corresponds to rational choice theory. Cognitive heuristics are more important in the first stage of the decision, whereas rational choice calculations are more applicable to the second stage of the poliheuristic decision process (Mintz 2004a: 4).

In the first stage the decision maker eliminates the options which are unacceptable to his/her situation; in the second stage, the decision maker selects an option from among the remaining options while aiming to maximize his/her utility and to minimize risks (Mintz 2004a: 6-7). The model posits that decision makers eliminate the alternative options that do not meet their conditions by using 'cognitive shortcuts'. Before making a decision, political leaders consider

(explicitly or implicitly) political factors and consequences of their actions (Mintz 1993: 601). Since the poliheuristic decision making model assumes that domestic politics is the 'essence of decision', alternatives that have negative value on the domestic dimension will be eliminated in the first stage and the remaining alternatives will be evaluated in the second stage (Mintz 2005: 97). In other words, the poliheuristic theory emphasizes the 'political' aspect of foreign policy decision making. "The assumption is that the policymaker measures costs and benefits, risks and rewards, gains and losses, and success and failure in terms of political ramifications above all else" (Redd and Mintz 2013: 17).

Thus, the model defines a key dimension that must be satisfied to adopt a policy alternative, and the alternatives are not evaluated according to their total ratings (Brule 2005: 102). In this context, every leader, regardless of his/her nationality or ideology, uses a non-compensatory decision process to simplify the decision making process (Brule 2005: 100). The non-compensatory decision making process implies that there is no 'substitution effect' between dimensions (Dacey and Carlson 2004: 40); thus if a policy alternative is unacceptable under the key dimension (such as unacceptable in military dimension), then a high score in another dimension (such as in economic dimension) cannot compensate for being unacceptable by military means, and this alternative will be eliminated by the decision maker. In other words, the model tries to explain the acceptable alternatives for the decision maker. For instance, during a foreign policy crisis, if the public strongly opposes doing nothing to deal with the crisis, the leader most probably rejects passive policy options such as 'do nothing'. As a result, the leader will consider proactive policy options such as 'apply sanctions', or 'use

force' (Mintz 2005: 97). Although leaders consider first their own political survival, Mintz (2004a: 7) argues that before making decisions on war and peace, decision makers might consider the policy alternatives that their adversary has and eliminate policy alternatives infeasible for not only oneself but also for the adversary.

In the poliheuristic theory, "the decision maker adopts heuristic decision rules that do not require detailed and complicated comparisons of relevant alternatives, and adopts or rejects undesirable alternatives on the basis of one or a few criteria" (Mintz 1993: 599). Time pressure and complexity of the decision environment are other burdens on the decision maker, guiding him or her to use cognitive heuristics to eliminate some unacceptable policy alternatives and to have more simple decision matrices (James and Zhang 2005: 35). Additionally, during international crises, decision makers might have multiple and conflicting goals, and this is why – according to the poliheuristic theory – decision makers compare policy options in several (unevenly weighted) dimensions (Ye 2007: 319).

Although compensatory models do not necessarily recognize political motivations in use of force decisions, it is very unlikely that a decision maker would make the decision to use force if it would cause political losses for the decision maker, regardless of the use of force decision's high rankings in other dimensions (DeRouen and Sprecher 2004: 58). For instance, Mintz (2004a) studied Turkey's decision to veto deployment of United States (US) forces on its soil before the Iraq War in 2003. Mintz (2004a) argues that although military and

economic benefits of the deployment were huge, Turkish decision makers eliminated the deployment decision mainly as a result of strong public opposition.

As noted above, domestic politics is the ‘essence of decision’ and non-compensatory political loss aversion can be operationalized in several ways as listed by Mintz (2004a: 9): threat to a leader’s survival; significant drop in public approval for a policy; significant drop in popularity; lack of support for a particular policy (e.g. use of force or sanctions or peace); the prospect of electoral defeat; domestic opposition; threat to regime survival; intraparty rivalry and competition; internal or external challenge to the regime; potential collapse of coalition/government/regime; threat to political power, dignity, honor or legitimacy of a leader; demonstrations and riots; and the existence of veto players (e.g., pivotal parties in a parliamentary government).

To sum up, by eliminating some of the alternatives the decision maker will be left with ‘acceptable alternatives’ in the second stage of the decision making process (Dacey and Carlson 2004: 40). In the second stage, the decision maker chooses the alternative policy option which maximizes benefits and minimizes risks. Thus, the decision will be a combination of discarding unacceptable alternatives in the first stage, and later choosing the best alternative from remaining alternatives in the second stage (Mintz 2005: 97).

In order to examine a case, the researcher must first construct the decision matrix of the leader. While constructing the matrix the researcher needs to define: i) the policy alternatives that the leader has; ii) the dimensions in evaluating the matrix; iii) implications of each dimension; iv) ratings for each alternative at each dimension; v) the total weight of each dimension (Mintz 2005). The researcher,

however, may adopt assumptions of the poliheuristic theory without being bound to construct a decision matrix for the leader. In the poliheuristic literature, four general dimensions appear to be important in decision matrices: i) political; ii) economic; iii) military; and iv) diplomatic (James and Zhang 2005: 41). The next section will discuss some of the previous research which adopted the poliheuristic theory.

3.2. Poliheuristic Literature

The poliheuristic decision making model is quite new to academia when we compare it with the other foreign policy analysis models (e.g. *operational code*); however there are various studies which already adopted this model. The assumptions of the poliheuristic theory have been tested by multiple methods (e.g. case studies, experimental analysis, formal and statistical models). This section will review some of these works.

As stated earlier, Mintz (1993) established the principles of poliheuristic theory and studied the Persian Gulf War. Mintz (1993) argues that the decision of the United States to attack Iraq was a result of non-compensatory characteristics of the decision making process. After examining related documents and written accounts, Mintz (1993) discusses the political dimension as the most critical dimension in the decision making process. Mintz (1993: 606-607) argues that the US President Bush had three policy alternatives: i) use of force; ii) containment; and iii) withdrawal; according to the non-compensatory principle, the President did not consider the withdrawal alternative since it would be politically damaging

for his presidency. Although Mintz (1993) discusses the two-stage nature of decision making processes, his analysis did not clearly state any distinction between the first stage and the second stage of decision making. However, later works –as discussed below- examined the cases in two stages. For instance, Mintz and DeRouen (2010) studied President Bush’s decision to end Operation Desert Storm during the Persian Gulf War. Mintz and DeRouen (2010: 85) argue that during the first stage of the decision making, the Bush administration eliminated the option to continue the war, and in the second stage of the decision making focused on minimizing risks and maximizing benefits.

Brule (2005) studied President Carter’s small rescue mission decision during the Iran hostage crisis and argued that poliheuristic theory is a useful tool to predict foreign policy decisions of leaders. Brule’s (2005) argument was based on the core assumption of the poliheuristic theory: since leaders try to stay in the office, domestic politics is the essence of the decision. Brule (2005: 103-104) discusses that President Carter had eight different policy alternatives during the first stage of the decision making, ranging from continuing negotiations to mining Iranian ports. Brule (2005: 104-105) states that Carter’s political future was bound to the solution of the hostage crisis and the American public was demanding more ‘direct action’; under these conditions Carter aimed to rescue hostages both safely and immediately. This is why, during the first stage of the decision making process, Carter eliminated alternatives that do not meet the threshold in the political dimension. As a result there were only two remaining alternatives on the table: i) large rescue mission and ii) small rescue mission. In the second stage of the decision making process, Carter evaluated remaining policy options in

military and strategic dimensions and decided to deploy a small rescue operation (Brule 2005: 107). Brule's research indicates that "using the tenets of the poliheuristic theory in a forecasting framework, analysts can reduce the uncertainty of their predictions with limited information" (2005: 111). This argument is, again, based on the non-compensatory principle of the poliheuristic theory.

It seems like leaders have the full control over foreign policy decisions. However, according to Redd (2005), advisers also have an undeniable impact in the decision making process. Redd (2005) studied the influence of advisers on the decision to use force in Kosovo during the presidency of Bill Clinton. During the Kosovo crisis President Clinton had three objectives (ending ethnic cleansing, preventing spread of the conflict, and preserving the credibility of NATO) and six policy options ranging from sending ground forces to 'do nothing' (Redd 2005: 133). Redd (2005) argues that during the crisis, public support for the President was decreasing and in the Congress there were debates over the reluctance of the President to take action towards the crisis. Clinton's sex scandal was another political problem. Redd's study discusses that during the decision-making process Clinton's attention was on defending himself from prosecution (as a result of the sex scandal), and among the Clinton administration Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was the most influential adviser (2005: 140-141). According to Redd (2005: 139), Clinton eliminated 'passive' policy alternatives since they might damage him politically and the remaining alternatives were: i) air strikes; and ii) sending ground troops. Redd (2005) argues that Albright had a role shaping the foreign policy of the Clinton administration towards the Kosovo crisis at three

points: i) since Clinton was reluctant to focus on foreign crises as long as the public was not concerned with those crises, Albright made Clinton aware of public opinion on the Kosovo crisis; ii) during the first stage of the decision making, Albright was again effective to guide the President to eliminate ‘passive’ policy options; iii) since sending ground troops would be politically risky, Albright proposed an air strike option as the best choice. Redd’s study (2005) aptly points to the impact of advisers during crises.

The majority of works adopting poliheuristic theory study foreign policy decision-making processes in democratic nations, yet this does not mean that the theory is not applicable to other regime types. For instance, Kinne (2005) applied poliheuristic theory to decision making processes of authoritarian regimes. It is important to note that there is not a definite sort of ‘autocratic regime’ in politics, just as we have a variety of democracies. Kinne (2005) defines three types of autocratic regime: i) single party autocracies; ii) personalist autocracies; and iii) military autocracies. Kinne’s (2005: 118) argument is that regardless of the political structure of the country we study, each leader tries to stay in power - which is actually the core assumption of the poliheuristic theory. In order to demonstrate his hypotheses, Kinne (2005) examines one case study for each autocratic regime (i.e. Saddam Hussein’s decision to remain in Kuwait during the Gulf crisis, Pakistan’s decision to not to send troops to Iraq as a part of the ‘war on terror’, and Gorbachev’s changes in Soviet foreign policy). Studying the cases, Kinne (2005:126-127) finds three policy implications for democratic states in their dealings with autocratic regimes: i) each authoritarian regime has its own structure, and lumping them in one category (e.g. ‘axis of evil’) might be

misleading; ii) while dealing with autocratic regimes, leaders of democratic regimes would do well to focus on the subjective characteristics of their counterpart (e.g. in a single party regime, the focus will be on the leader and his/her relations with his/her party); and iii) though some policy decisions made by autocratic leaders may seem 'irrational', however, even in autocratic regimes, domestic politics is the 'essence of decision' although 'domestic politics' might have different meanings. Kinne (2005) also supports the predicting aspect of the poliheuristic theory argued by Brule (2005): by knowing the structure of the regime, decision makers will be able to construct the opponent party's decision matrix and policy priorities which in non-compensatory conditions will enable forecast of possible decisions.

Although the above mentioned case studies mainly focused on 'use of force' decisions, some scholars adopted poliheuristic theory to examine decisions in 'low' politics. For instance, Below (2008: 2) studied decisions on ozone depletion and climate change among the US presidents. According to the study, the Montreal Protocol (on ozone depletion) was a success while the Kyoto Protocol (on climate change) was a failure, and the role of the US was dramatically different towards each protocol (supportive for the Montreal Protocol and 'postpone' for the Kyoto Protocol). The exact aim of Below's (2008) study tests the bounds of applicability of poliheuristic theory to cases different than 'use of force' decisions or decision outside the realm of 'high' politics. Below (2008) argues that when confronted with the environmental, each president used the non-compensatory principle of the poliheuristic theory in the first stage of the decision making and tried to stay in power. Additionally, the study also reinforces the

theory's assumptions regarding the second stage of decision making: leaders try to maximize benefits and minimize risks.

DeRouen (2003) conducted an interesting case study and examined the decision *not* to use force in Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam in 1954. When the French could not deal with the situation in their former colony, they requested military support from the US, giving the Eisenhower administration three policy alternatives: i) invasion involving ground troops; ii) air strike; and iii) status quo (continuing covert operations and supplying materials) (DeRouen 2003: 17). In fact, President Eisenhower listed three conditions to support the French militarily: i) 'a legal right' for support which was already met when the French requested assistance; ii) 'support from free world' which could be met, according to Eisenhower; and iii) 'favorable action by the Congress,' which was the most difficult condition to achieve (DeRouen 2003: 19). During the first stage of the decision making process, Eisenhower did not even consider sending ground troops as an option, thus this option was eliminated since public opinion was overwhelmingly against this option (DeRouen 2003: 20). According to DeRouen (2003: 21-22) the second stage of decision-making was lexicographic in nature, and in this stage the political dimension was still crucial. The air strike option did not get support from the President. The study indicates that although Dien Bien Phu was strategically important and an air strike would have changed the situation in favor of the French, the Eisenhower administration chose the status quo option since the political costs of an air strike decision would still be high. Additionally, a poll circulated after the decision showed that the public opinion was supporting

the policies of the administration even though Dien Bien Phu, the last stronghold that the French had in Vietnam, was lost to the Communists (DeRouen 2003: 23).

Keller and Yang (2009) studied the role of 'empathy' in the decision making process. The primary aim of the study was to shed light on why some crises escalated to armed conflict while other crises were solved peacefully (Keller and Yang 2009: 170). Keller and Yang (2009: 173) argue that achieving success in international negotiations depends on negotiating parties' understanding of each other's domestic constraints and the available policy alternatives the other party has. Keller and Yang (2009) discuss that empathy may occur during both stages of poliheuristic theory; on the other hand, if empathy enters in the first stage of the decision making process, then the chance of easing the crisis will be higher. Additionally, if a 'symmetric empathy' exists among the conflicting parties, then the leaders may be able to reach an agreement while discarding demands that are unacceptable to their opponent (Keller and Yang 2009: 174). In order to illustrate the importance of empathy Keller and Yang (2009) used two case studies: the first case (the US decision vis-à-vis China after the Tiananmen incident) showed that empathy had a role in President Bush choosing to form a foreign policy which would consider Chinese domestic politics; in the second case (the US decision vis-à-vis Iraqi invasion of Kuwait) both Bush and Saddam Hussein were unable to have empathy and they failed to understand the domestic factors each leader confronted, which eventually prevented the leaders from easing tensions.

By combining the social contextualist perspective with poliheuristic theory, Şirin (2012) examined the role of identity in negotiation decision making

during the 1959 Zurich-London agreements on the Cyprus dispute. As stated earlier, poliheuristic theory argues that during the first stage of decision making, leaders may also eliminate policy options that are unacceptable to their opponent. Şirin (2012: 425) discusses that the poliheuristic theory did not state *how* leaders decide to make this decision to eliminate options unfeasible to their adversaries. According to Şirin (2012) during the negotiations of 1959 Zurich-London agreements, Turkey, Greece, and the United Kingdom shared a common identity (affiliation to the West) which enabled the leaders of these three countries to eliminate policy options (with high rankings in political dimension) in favor of reaching an agreement on the Cyprus dispute. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots did not have any common identity and they were reluctant to sign the agreements until the mainland countries presented the situation as a ‘take-it-or-leave-it option’ (Şirin 2012: 431).

James and Zhang (2005) studied Chinese foreign policy decision during crises in the period from 1950 to 1996. Differing from above mentioned studies, they collected data from International Crisis Behavior Project and found nine cases (with available and sufficient data) out of fourteen crises concerning China. James and Zhang (2005) examine the core assumptions of the poliheuristic theory (decision are taken after a non-compensatory search and decision making process consists of two stages) with a comparative analysis of Chinese decision-making during international crises. James and Zhang (2005: 39) argue that each case had different characteristics and state the primary aim of their study as examining whether China decides to use force during these crises. The findings of the study confirm that Chinese decision makers are loss averse in political terms during the

first stage of the decision making (eight out of the nine crises) and that the decision process consists of two stages (five out of the nine crises). Additionally James and Zhang (2005: 45) argue that during the second stage of decision making, the political dimension is not always the most salient dimension and the decision may be based on either utility calculations or lexicographic evaluations.

The assumptions of poliheuristic theory were tested by a large-N quantitative study conducted by DeRouen and Sprecher (2004). The study was based on data from International Crisis Behavior with a sample size of 710. DeRouen and Sprecher (2004: 59) argue that the poliheuristic theory can explain the initial decision to use violence during a crisis and the rate of response to a crisis trigger will be affected by the impact of the crisis trigger on the leader's survival in political terms. The findings suggest that domestic political losses have a negative effect on use of force; "in other words, potential political loss, measured as a potential threat to a regime, is initially a constraint on the use of violence" (DeRouen and Sprecher 2004: 64). Another assumption of the poliheuristic theory (decisions based on rational calculations in the second stage) is also supported by the research. DeRouen and Sprecher (2004: 65) discuss that enduring rivalries do not result in violence automatically; there might be some sort of mechanism (e.g. mediation efforts) that works to prevent violence.

The assumptions of poliheuristic theory have also been tested by experimental studies. For instance, Christensen and Redd (2004) conducted such a study by comparing bureaucratic politics model and the poliheuristic theory. The study examined how the existence of advisers may influence foreign policy choices during decision making processes. Christensen and Redd (2004: 71)

considered a president (leader) as an autonomous unit in the process who is able to take the final decision. The experiment tested the impact of political advice on the decision maker during a crisis in which the leader had three policy alternatives: i) do nothing; ii) sanctions; and iii) use of force. Thus, the aim of the experiment was testing the non-compensatory assumption of the poliheuristic theory (Christensen and Redd 2004: 75). The results of the study supported the non-compensatory principle of the decision making process: negative political advice concerning the use of force had an undeniable impact on the decision maker's choice not to select that policy option (Christensen and Redd 2004: 82).

Mintz (2004b) conducted an experimental study among high-ranking officers of the US Air Force and the sensitivity of these officers to political advice under familiar and unfamiliar decision tasks. Mintz (2004b: 93) states that when confronting an unfamiliar decision task, decision makers tend to have a two stage decision making process (first dimension based, and then alternative based), whereas under familiar decision tasks, decision makers rely more on their own experience and less on new information. Mintz (2004b: 98) defines 'alternative based' strategy as "whereby the decision maker reviews sequentially all items for a given alternative across different dimensions" and 'dimension based' strategy as "a process whereby the decision maker focuses on a given dimension and reviews all the alternatives along this dimension and repeats the process for another dimension". The study had two different scenarios. The 'familiar' scenario was a military dispute between two small islands over a uranium field, and there are four available policy alternatives (i.e. use of force, containment, sanctions, and do nothing); the 'unfamiliar' scenario is establishing a new naval base in the Pacific,

and the alternatives are four fictitious islands (i.e. Alpha, Beta, Charlie, and Delta). Mintz (2004b: 100-101) argues that the results of the study support the assumptions of the poliheuristic theory (decision making process consist of two stages and non-compensatory principle has a definite impact on the final decision) and the Air Force commanders tend to use more dimension-based strategy when confronted with an unfamiliar decision task.

3.3. The Method of the Study

This thesis will study the Cyprus crisis during the 1960s and 1970s using the poliheuristic model. As discussed in the previous pages, the poliheuristic model consists of two stages. During the first stage the decision maker analyzes the situation and uses decision heuristics; as a result of this process the decision maker eliminates some 'unfavorable' options in this stage. In the second stage the decision maker weights the remaining options and chooses the option maximizing utility at the same time as minimizing risks.

The five characteristics of the poliheuristic model demonstrate that the model presupposes that the decision makers use some dimensions to shape their final decision. As a result, it is crucial to build a poliheuristic decision model before studying a decision. Mintz (2005: 95) stated that building a poliheuristic model consists of two steps:

1. Identify the decision matrix of the leader (e.g., the alternative set, dimension set, and implications of each alternative on each dimension).
2. Apply PH [poliheuristic] calculations to the decision matrix to explain or predict the ultimate choice.

While constructing the matrix the researcher needs to define: i) the policy alternatives that the leader has; ii) the dimensions in evaluating the matrix; iii) implications on each dimension; iv) ratings for each alternative at each dimension; and v) the total weight of each dimension (Mintz 2005). The researcher may, however, do the research adopting assumptions of the poliheuristic theory without being bound to construct a decision matrix for the leader. In the poliheuristic literature, generally four dimensions appear to be important in decision matrices: i) political; ii) economic; iii) military; and iv) diplomatic (James and Zhang 2005: 41). It is important to note that the decision matrix may consist of as many dimensions as the case requires. Alternatively, the researcher may choose not to weight each dimension numerically, as DeRouen (2003) did in his study of Eisenhower's decision not to use force in Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

Accordingly, for constructing the decision matrix the researcher should answer a question similar to this: “What are the possible policy options that the decision maker has on the table?” For instance, the policy options may vary from using sanctions to doing nothing. As a result, there aren't any certain types of policy options specified by the poliheuristic model. After deciding the policy options, the researcher should define dimensions to evaluate each policy option. Defining the dimensions the researcher confronts a question similar to this: “What are the dimensions that affect the decision maker’s decision?”. As stated earlier, although the dimensions are not specified by the model, in the poliheuristic literature, generally four dimensions appear to be more common in decision matrices, and these are: i) political; ii) economic; iii) military; and iv) diplomatic.

In this chapter the thesis will construct the decision matrix to study Cyprus crises. At this stage it is important to note that this thesis will utilize Brule's (2005) research design with modifications required by the Cyprus case. In other words, the thesis will use Brule's (2005) methodology to analyze the Cyprus case. Brule (2005), while studying President Carter's small rescue mission decision during the Iran hostage crisis, first discussed the available policy options before the president. Secondly, he evaluated these options under three dimensions: i) domestic political; ii) military; and iii) strategic. Brule's study considered 'domestic political' dimension to be the 'key dimension' for President Carter and as a result, during the first stage of the poliheuristic model the President eliminated six options out of eight that were threatening continuation of Carter's presidency. To illustrate the noncompensatory character of the President's decision, Brule rated each policy option under three dimensions.

This thesis argues that during each crisis Turkish decision makers had four policy alternatives on the table: i) military intervention; ii) air strike; iii) diplomatic efforts; and iv) do nothing. Before discussing the dimensions for evaluating these policy options it might be helpful to elaborate on these policy alternatives. First of all, 'military intervention' refers to full scale military intervention involving ground forces and results in occupation of territory. 'Air strike', on the other hand, refers to a limited military operation performed by air forces. An 'air strike' decision aims to cease intercommunity clashes on the island by attacking some strategic targets on Cyprus. The third policy option, 'diplomatic efforts', refers to using peaceful methods to calm the situation on the island. 'Diplomatic efforts' include engaging with other 'guarantor states' by organizing

bilateral talks or conferences, requesting mediation from a third party (e.g. the US) or an organization (e.g. NATO, the UN). Lastly a ‘do nothing’ policy alternative refers to allowing Turkish and Greek Cypriots to settle the dispute among themselves without the participation of Turkey. In other words, by choosing the ‘do nothing’ option leaders expect that the intercommunity conflict would calm down as a result of negotiations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities.

This thesis argues that Turkish decision makers checked these policy options under three dimensions: i) *systemic*; ii) *domestic politics*; and iii) *military*. It is important to discuss the dimensions in more detail before analyzing the Cyprus crises. One of the dimensions is *systemic* since the Cyprus crisis erupted during the high tension years of the Cold War, and there were other influential actors (i.e. the US, the Soviet Union). Additionally, during the Cyprus crises Turkey take into consideration reactions of ‘Super Powers’ and other actors (e.g. the UK, the UN, NATO). As Turkish decision makers prioritized maintaining Turkey’s relations with its allies, during the Cyprus crises Turkish leaders assessed the approaches of third-party countries before making a decision regarding Cyprus. The other dimension is *domestic politics*. As stated earlier, poliheuristic theory argues that domestic politics is the ‘essence of the decision’. Furthermore, since political leaders try to stay in power, leaders consider policy alternatives as a means for securing their office. Additionally, during the Cyprus case (which will be discussed in more detail in following chapters) Turkey had an unstable political situation which increased the importance of this dimension in the eyes of Turkish leaders. The last dimension is *military*. Turkey’s capacity to

intervene in Cyprus was another crucial dimension, because if Turkey had decided to send ground forces to Cyprus it would be Turkey's first unilateral use of force (except from joining the coalition of Korea War). Additionally, Turkey's military capability and readiness was a question for Turkish decision makers to consider.

After defining policy options and the dimensions to evaluate these options, the decision matrix appears as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Decision matrix of Turkish Decision Makers

	Dimensions			
Policy options	Systemic	Domestic Politics	Military	Total (Average)
Military Intervention				
Air strike				
Diplomatic efforts				
Do nothing				

By constructing the decision matrix of Turkey, the thesis deems that during each crisis Turkish decision makers (İnönü, Demirel, and Ecevit) had the same policy options and dimensions to evaluate these policy options. Using the same decision matrix for each crisis will equip the thesis to compare and contrast Cyprus crises during the 1960s and 1970s.

3.4. Studying the Cyprus Crises

Before examining the Cyprus crises, the thesis gave some relevant historical information on the issue in Chapter II. The aim of that chapter was to enable the reader to understand the context of the thesis more clearly. In the following chapters the thesis will apply the poliheuristic decision model on each case in chronological order, discuss the policy alternatives, and analyze dimensions affecting these policies.

As we already know, the term ‘poliheuristic’ has two components: “[1] poly (many) and [2] heuristic (shortcuts), which alludes to the cognitive mechanisms used by decision makers to simplify complex foreign policy decisions” (Mintz et al. 1997: 554). As the components of the term demonstrate, studying the cognitive mechanisms used by Turkish decision makers during the Cyprus crises is a crucial aspect of this thesis. This purpose in mind, the thesis will try to understand the heuristics used by decision makers by studying their speeches about the Cyprus crises during the 1960s and 1970s.

Additionally, the poliheuristic decision making model addresses not only the personal attitudes of decision makers, but also the inter-state (system) and domestic variables. Domestic and inter-state variables may vary (e.g. the role of ‘Super Powers’, alliances, current political/economic situation, and elections). As a result, in order to understand the domestic and global variables the thesis will study the 'behind the scenes' situation of the Cyprus crises.

In order to frame the context and analyze the cases, the thesis will refer to
i) the speeches and memoirs of Turkish decision makers on the Cyprus crisis

during the 1960s and 1970s; ii) session records of Grand National Assembly of Turkey (in order to study the discourses of politicians and any relevant actors on Cyprus) iii) the periodical daily *Milliyet* newspaper; iv) books/chapters/articles on the Cyprus crises.

CHAPTER III:

THE CYPRUS QUESTION

This chapter of the thesis will conceptualize the Cyprus question while giving some historical background information on the subject. This thesis discusses demands for *enosis*, the union of Cyprus with Greece, as one of the key causes of Cyprus question. However, *enosis* is not an issue of the 20th century; it has roots in the 19th century. After independence from the Ottoman Empire, modern Greece's first president, Count Ioannis Kapodistrias, called for the union of Cyprus with Greece in 1828. Kapodistria's call triggered a minor uprising in Cyprus demanding *enosis* among Greek Cypriots (Mallinson 2005: 10). In 1878 British rule was established on Cyprus. Although the Ottomans allowed the British to rule the island 'temporarily' on their behalf, the United Kingdom considered Cyprus as a base for the defense of the Mediterranean route to the Near East and Far East. However, the British soon realized that the island lacked the capacity to be a naval

base and the British authorities compensated for this with the occupation of Egypt in 1882 (Dodd 2010: 3). When World War I erupted and the Ottoman Empire sided with Germany, Britain offered Cyprus to Greece if the latter would join the alliance against the Central Powers; however Greece did not declare war until 1917 and the offer was withdrawn (Mallinson 2005: 11). Actually, when the British offered Cyprus to Greece, the Greek Government was influenced by King Constantine, a pro-German, and was affected by Greece's unpreparedness for waging a war (Dodd 2010: 4-5). Thus, post-war Cyprus remained in British control despite Greek and Ottoman claims to rule the island.

In 1931, the British colonial administration proposed a temporary levy which caused tension on the island; the bishop of Kition even declared union with Greece, and the Government House was burned down during riots on 21 November. In response to these events, British authorities introduced repressive measures, deported two bishops and two communist party leaders, and eventually banned the Communist Party in 1933 (Mallinson 2005: 11). While there were demands for *enosis* in Cyprus, the island was not on the agenda of Turkey (Çufalı 2009). On the contrary, Turkey during this period wanted to maintain good relations with both Greece and the United Kingdom. Turkey was aware of the Italian threat in the Mediterranean and considered British presence on the island a guarantee for the stability in the region (Dodd 2010: 9).

Up until World War II, Cyprus remained calm, and during the war British authorities recruited 37,000 Cypriots (one third of them Turkish Cypriots), even using the slogan 'for Greece, for freedom'. At the end of the war demands for *enosis* increased, and there were arguments both for and against *enosis* in London

(Mallinson 2005: 11-12). After World War II, Greece criticized Turkey for not carrying out its contractual obligations during the war; it was then that the friendship between Turkey and Greece began to weaken (Firat 2008a).

During the 1950s the destiny of the island changed dramatically with growing demand for *enosis* among Greek Cypriots. In January 1950, for instance, the Church of Cyprus arranged a referendum during a Sunday Church service; because of insufficient participation, the referendum continued to the next Sunday. The result showed that 96% of the participants were in favor of *enosis*; however Turkish Cypriots did not participate in this referendum, thus their votes were missing (Firat 2008a: 596). In October 1950, Michael Mouskos, elected as Makarios III, became the archbishop of Cyprus. Makarios, empowered with the referendum results, pressured the government in Greece to take a more active role for *enosis* (Mallinson 2005: 20).

While efforts were underway in both Cyprus and Greece to achieve *enosis*, 1950 was an election year for Turkey. Although the Cyprus issue was one of the prior matters among Greeks, in the election campaign of 1950, there were no references to Cyprus in the election manifestos of either the *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP – Republican People’s Party) or the *Demokrat Parti* (DP – Democrat Party); in June of 1950 the foreign minister of newly founded DP government, Fuat Köprülü, even declared that there was no Cyprus question at all (Firat 2008a: 598).

When the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos visited Ankara in 1951 and mentioned the Cyprus issue, the Menderes government declared that a solution would be found within the framework of Turkish-Greek friendship. In actuality,

during the 1950s Turkey did not have the capacity to formulate policy without NATO approval; its priority was maintaining the friendship of Britain and Greece within the Western Alliance (Firat 2008a: 598). Turkey's policy towards Cyprus was based on supporting the continuation of the Western Alliance. At this point, it is important to discuss the attitude of the United States towards the Cyprus dispute, since the US had the leading role within the Alliance. On the one hand, many in the United States were skeptical of one of the most influential political organization AKEL, and its relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). On the other hand, American attitudes were, in general, supportive of anti-colonial movements and there were a Greek lobby promoting sympathy for Greek Cypriots and their struggle for *enosis* (Dodd 2010: 13). Turkey became involved in the Cyprus question after the pro-*enosis* movements began to gain momentum among Greeks in the mid-1950s (Hale 2002: 130).

In 1954, Greece attempted to place the Cyprus issue on the agenda of the United Nations, but this attempt failed. Despite the sympathy for Greek Cypriots the United States ceased its support for *enosis*—mainly for strategic reasons—and informed Athens that it could not assist Greece in the United Nations (Dodd 2010: 17).

In 1955, the *National Organization of Cypriot Fighters* (EOKA) began armed attacks against British authorities on the island. EOKA was established by George Grivas, who had been born in Cyprus and later joined the Greek Army. Grivas' career began to shine during the Greek Civil War (1945-1949) when he formed a unit (called as 'Khi') for hunting down Greek Communists (Holland 1998: 29). Differing from most anticolonial uprisings of the 1950s, the struggle

against British rule on Cyprus was intended to achieve *enosis*, not independence (Adams 1972: 96).

Britain organized a tri-partite conference in London (consisting of Britain, Turkey and Greece) to discuss the question. In August 1955, Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes stated that to shape the destiny of the island, focusing only on the ethnic factor was insufficient. He insisted on considering geographic, economic, political and historical facts; Menderes also declared the status quo, British rule, the most favorable option. According to Menderes the other options were: i) if Britain would evacuate the island, then the island should revert to Turkey (which was the former ruler of the island), ii) *taksim*, the partition of the island between Turkey and Greece, or iii) self-determination of the island under British rule (Göktepe 2009: 379).

The Conference failed to solve the Cyprus question and talks quickly broke down after the events of 6-7 September (1955) that took place in Turkey. Firat (2008a: 602) discusses that the events of 6-7 September had two important connections to the Cyprus question: i) when Turkey felt under pressure on the Cyprus issue, it began responding by exerting pressures on the minorities living in Turkey; and ii) the events greatly damaged the Turkish-Greek friendship. Mallinson (2005: 5) argues that Britain's motive during the conference was to divide Turkey from Greece, and Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots to maintain its authority on the island. According to Mallinson (2005: 25) Turkey should not have been invited by the British to the conference since Turkey clearly had no claim to Cyprus because it handed the island over to the United Kingdom in the Lausanne Treaty.

Also in 1955, Greece's second attempt to place the Cyprus issue on the agenda of the United Nations was rejected. In Cyprus, Makarios insisted that Britain had to accept the principle of self-determination unconditionally; he was also against Turkey's participation in the negotiations, and he wanted an amnesty for EOKA activists. British authorities started to perceive Makarios as an obstacle to reform on the island and decided to exile him to the Seychelles Islands in March 1956 (Firat 2008a: 603). Makarios was accompanied by three church representatives (Göktepe 2009: 380). In July 1956, Lord Radcliffe, a constitutional expert, went to Cyprus to prepare a new constitution but he could not find any Greek Cypriot counterpart to discuss the issue (Firat 2008a: 603). Radcliffe's plan was based on the principle of self-determination, but it was rebuffed by Greeks who stated that the plan did not specify a final date to implement the principle of self-determination; on the other hand, Turks supported the plan, assuming that it would prepare the groundwork for future negotiations (Göktepe 2009: 381).

In December 1956, Menderes declared that *taksim* was Turkey's official policy, and İsmet İnönü, opposition party leader since 1950, supported this stance; there were demonstrations using 'Partition or death' as battle cry (Firat 2008a: 604). In the same year, Greece applied once more to the UN, and that year Britain also applied to the UN by accusing Greece of supporting terrorism on Cyprus; the two applications were merged into one agenda item in February 1957; the UN General Assembly called for a peaceful, democratic and just solution (Firat 2008a: 605).

The 1956-1957 Suez operation had profound effects on Britain's attitude towards Cyprus: after this operation the US became the guardian of the Western interests in the Eastern Mediterranean through the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, and the strategic importance of Cyprus for Britain had diminished since Britain could manage with just military bases on the island (Fırat 2008a: 6003-4). Before 1956, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden stated that Cyprus was of strategic importance to protect oil supplies to Britain and thereby avoid unemployment and hunger; however, the Suez crisis caused a sharp decline in Britain's influence in the Middle East region and it was forced to adopt a more realistic role (Hakkı 2007: 11). This change directed Britain to find a different answer to the Cyprus question since there were growing numbers of sabotages and attacks against British authorities.

After the Suez crisis, British Prime Minister Eden resigned and was replaced by Harold Macmillan. The new British government followed a more liberal policy towards the Cyprus issue: Hugh Foot was appointed as governor to the island and Makarios was allowed to go to Athens (Göktepe, 2009: 381). It is important to note that, above mentioned Radcliffe Plan was not the only plan tailored by Britain: there were two more plans, the Foot Plan of 1957 and the Macmillan Plan of 1958. Both plans were in favor of the continuation of British rule on the island. The Foot Plan proposed a transitional period of 5-7 years before the final solution and during this period the British rule on Cyprus would continue. Additionally, the Foot Plan assured that there would be no solution until both parties agreed on a solution. The state of emergency would be lifted and Makarios could return from exile (Fırat 2008a: 606). The Macmillan Plan, just

like the Foot Plan, proposed a transitional period and did not indicate the possibility of *enosis* (Mallinson 2005: 32). During the NATO meetings of 1958, allies also discussed the Cyprus dispute and offered a conference to discuss the issue with the participation of Turkey, Greece, Britain, and another NATO member. However, the offer was rejected by Greek authorities, who accused the United Kingdom of taking the side of Turkey (Göktepe 2009: 383). In sum, no plan tailored by Britain solved the Cyprus question.

Behind the scenes another important event took place in Cyprus in 1958. Turkish Cypriots founded *Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı* (TMT – Turkish Resistance Organization) to defend Turkish Cypriots against further EOKA attacks which started to take place in the summer of 1958. Yet TMT had another function: laying the basis for *taksim* of the island (Fırat 2008a: 606).

By the end of 1958, the atmosphere was suitable for an agreement because the governments and the public opinion of both Turkey and Greece were exhausted from the question; secondly, NATO and UN members supported efforts to resolve the dispute; and lastly, British authorities hoped that successful negotiations would improve British-Turkish and British-Greek relations (Göktepe 2009: 385). At the NATO meeting of December 1958, Greece and Turkey declared that they abandoned their former positions (*enosis* and *taksim*, respectively); this change of stance was a consequence of events that took place in Cyprus in 1958: i) the armed struggle between Turks and Greeks, which lasted throughout the summer of 1958, was threatening to cause a war between Turkey and Greece; ii) such a war in the southern flank of NATO may have served the interest of Moscow, which was supporting AKEL (a left-wing party on Cyprus)

and Makarios; iii) at this point, the United States was applying pressure to find a solution; iv) Turkey and Greece, which were still dependent on the West economically and militarily, did not have many options other than agreeing to the independence formula (Fırat 2008a: 607-8).

The year 1959 began with negotiations on the Cyprus dispute, and when the preparations were completed, the delegations of Turkey and Greece, headed by their prime ministers, met in Zurich in February 1959. During the negotiations there was a deadlock on military issues, but the parties could reach an agreement on the future of the island, and Menderes and Karamanlis, the prime ministers of Turkey and Greece respectively, signed the documents which would establish the Republic of Cyprus.

Later, Makarios declared that he failed to persuade other Greek Cypriot leaders, and if the documents were not renegotiated he would not sign the documents. However, this negative development was solved by the efforts of Greek prime minister, Karamanlis, who informed Makarios that Greece would sign the current documents, and that if Makarios would not sign, then Greek Cypriots would not have the backing of Greece (Fırat 2008a: 609-10). In mid-February 1959 the London Treaties were signed by the prime ministers of Britain, Turkey and Greece and by Makarios and Fazıl Küçük on behalf of the two communities of Cyprus.

The significance of the treaties were that: i) an independent republic was founded on Cyprus, and it was a mid-way solution with regard to *enosis* and *taksim* theses; ii) the president of the republic would be a Greek Cypriot, and the vice-president would be a Turkish Cypriot; iii) the president and vice-president

could singly or conjointly veto any decision or legislation regarding foreign affairs, defense, or security; iv) a proportion of 70-30 is defined and at all levels of public administration (and in the Council of Ministers), all positions would be allotted to Greeks and Turks according to this proportion; v) one of the cabinet posts responsible for foreign affairs, defense, or finance would be assigned to a Turk; vi) Turks would have separate municipalities in the five largest towns, and in four years' time the president and vice-president would decide whether to continue this practice; vii) signatory parties provided their guarantee to the state of affairs created by these treaties.

According to McCaskill (1991: 23), after the London-Zurich Agreements the United Kingdom, the United States and other NATO members considered the Cyprus dispute to be 'settled'. As a result the allies underestimated the impact of intercommunity clashes between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Putting the Cyprus dispute aside, the allies turned their attention to other international disputes. Actually, the United States hoped that the republic would survive despite having internal disputes (McCaskill 1991: 24).

On 27 May 1960, Turkish armed forces took over the Menderes administration. The military administration of 27 May issued a statement that it stood by the London Treaties; the new government's program, released in July 1960, declared that Turkish-Greek relations were expected to develop since the Cyprus question was solved by the treaties (Firat 2008b: 719). The new regime restored power to civilians in 1961. From 1961 to 1965 Turkey was ruled by coalition governments formed by İsmet İnönü.

After its formal establishment in 1960, the Republic of Cyprus began to have internal disputes. Although the London Treaties established an independent Cypriot state, the constitutional mechanism of the island did not work properly and it caused disputes between Turks and Greeks. For instance, there were a number of disagreements over issues such as the collecting of taxes, municipality borders, and the proportion of involvement in governmental services at the very beginning of the newly established Republic of Cyprus (Fırat 2008b: 720).

When the governmental problems caused ineffectiveness, the Greek Cypriot side proposed changes in the constitution which perpetuated the conflictual situation. Although there was tension between Turks and Greeks on almost every issue, armed attacks against Turkish Cypriots in late December of 1963 triggered intercommunity conflicts on the island, resulting in casualties on both sides.

Turkey's first reaction to the crisis was designed to alleviate the situation on the island. However, the conflict did not cease and continued to cost lives on both sides. As a result, Turkey stated its intention to intervene in Cyprus. Accordingly, the United States' President Lyndon Johnson sent a harsh diplomatic message to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü, known as the 'Johnson Letter'. In this letter the United States called into question its commitments under the NATO charter to defend Turkey against the Soviet Union. With this letter, while trying to prevent the war, the United States made Turkish decision makers realize the limits of the alliance between Turkey and the United States. The Johnson Letter undoubtedly damaged the relationship between these two NATO allies. The Johnson Letter was taken as a serious intervention in Turkey's sovereign affairs

and caused a worsening of relations between the two countries (Adams 1972: 101). Dean Rusk, then the United States' Secretary of State, declared that the United States understood that the letter caused a shock in Turkey; however, the exact aim of the letter was preventing the war between Turkey and Greece (Şahin 2002: 62-3). According to this view, the American authorities' aim was preserving status quo on the island. Additionally, 1964 was a presidential election year in the United States. President Johnson was worried about international disputes taking place in locations such as Congo, Cyprus, and the Dominican Republic, and in each crisis Johnson was calling his advisers to 'stop' these disputes (Şahin 2002: 20). Thus, in this context, the United States was viewing the Cyprus crisis not only as an international issue but as a domestic one, which may have also affected American attitudes.

After receiving the letter, Turkish politicians recognized the importance of having communication with the other countries outside the Western Bloc. Aydın (2000: 119) argues that events surrounding the Cyprus crisis forced Turkey's leaders to recognize that their strict commitment to a pro-Western alignment in changing international system had left Turkey isolated from the rest of the World. The Cyprus question then forced Turkey to reevaluate its foreign policy. Although during Khrushchev started the process of rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Turkey, this process gained a faster pace when Khrushchev was ousted from power in 1964. The new leadership in Moscow decided to improve its relationship with Turkey while hoping to divide the Western Alliance, and Turkey responded to this proposal eagerly (Harris 1972: 126). According to Constandinos (2011: 24) soon after the Johnson Letter, Soviet support began to drift from

Cyprus towards Turkey as the Soviet Union sought to exploit the troubles caused within the American-Turkish relationship. Actually, in October 1964 Turkish Foreign Minister, F. Cemal Erkin, stated that Turkey would enhance its relations with the non-aligned countries (Milliyet 15 Oct. 1964). Additionally, Erkin visited Moscow in late October 1964 and the duration of the visit extended (Milliyet 1 Nov. 1964) and during the meetings Soviet Foreign Minister Kosigin stated that being members of different blocs was not an obstacle for developing cooperation between Turkey and the Soviet Union (Milliyet 4 Nov. 1964). During the same visit, the head of the Soviet Journalist Association declared that the current Soviet government make did not any 'territorial demand' from Turkey (Milliyet 3 Nov. 1964) which was a definite sign of the Soviet attempt to enhance relations with Turkey.

The 1964 crisis entered a period of calmness after reaching its peak in August 1964. Although Turkey revised its intervention decision after receiving the Johnson Letter, it used its air forces to settle intercommunity conflict on the island in August 1964.

In 1967 a military coup took place in Greece and as the Greek junta controlled the military forces on Cyprus, Makarios had no other option but to put a certain amount of confidence in the junta (Constandinos 2011: 26). The Greek military junta, with its lack of domestic support, wanted to show some external success to Greek public in order to hide domestic problems. In this case, Cyprus was considered an example of external success; however, Greek forces in Cyprus caused a crisis by attacking Turkish-Cypriot villages and the two countries were again on the brink of war (Firat 1997).

President Johnson sent Cyrus Vance, former United States Secretary of the Army, to ease the tension and prevent the war from erupting. Actually, at this time the United States' focus was on Greece rather than Turkey. During the 1967 crisis Turkey warned Vance that if he were to deliver another Johnson Letter to Turkey, Turkish authorities would not accept him as a mediator (Bölükbaşı 2001: 183). Vance, recognizing Turkey's stand on the issue, pressured the Greek junta and Makarios. Vance's mission to persuade the Greek junta to withdraw Greek forces from the island was successful. On the other hand, it could be argued that if a democratically elected government was in power in Greece during the 1967 Cyprus crisis, the Cyrus Vance mission could not have been successful and a war would have broken out between Turkey and Greece (Hart 1972: 141). In other words, if the Greek junta had external support for its policies, then the 1967 crisis may have led to war.

In early 1968, Foreign Minister Çağlayangil and his Greek counterpart, Panagiotis Pipinelis, met secretly in Switzerland and reached an agreement on starting bi-communal talks to settle the Cyprus dispute (Gürün 1983: 420). The talks between the two communities of the island started in June 1968 in Nicosia (Lefkoşa). However, the negotiations between representatives of Turkish Cypriots (Rauf Denktaş) and Greek Cypriots (Glafcos Clerides) continued until September 1971 without finding a solution. Instead, the talks reached a stalemate in 1971. Although the talks were going nowhere, they resumed in June 1972 and continued until June 1974, just before the coup against the Makarios administration (Ertekün 1984: 25-26).

In reality, the island was de facto partitioned after the 1967 crisis. In December 1967, Turkish Cypriots claimed their own rule under the title of 'Provisional Turkish Administration' (PTA) to manage daily affairs of their community (Bilge 1975: 177). Although Turkish Cypriots founded their own 'provisional' administration on the island, the world continued to recognize the Greek Cypriots as the legal government of Cyprus, though no Turkish Cypriots were present in the government. In fact, Greek Cypriots argued that they had the right to govern both communities on the island (Borowiec 2000: 60).

Following the 1967 crisis, the Cyprus question entered a period of calmness. However, the status quo changed 'once and for all' in 1974. In June 1974 Makarios sent a letter to the Greek Junta and demanded the withdrawal of Greek officers from the National Guards, since these personnel were committing acts that undermined the authority of the Makarios administration. Additionally, Makarios argued that the EOKA-B organization opposed his rule and their activities were funded by the Greek Junta (Gürün 1983: 421-422).

In July 1974 Greek National Guards organized a coup against the Makarios administration. There were claims that Makarios was death. However, later the World learned that Makarios was still alive and in the UK.

In response to the coup against the Makarios administration, Turkey first proposed joint intervention with the British. However, when the British authorities refused to intervene, Turkey decided to act alone and intervened in Cyprus to restore the 'state of affairs' of the Cyprus Republic (Dodd 2004: 4). The US administration tried to pursue Turkey not to use force against Cyprus. However, the Ecevit administration considered intervening in Cyprus a solution to the

dispute. Turkey's military intervention had two phases. While the first phase ended the coup, the second phase resulted in changes in the demographic structure of the island. Turkey's intervention divided the island into two creating a Turkish Cypriot zone in the north of the island.

In 1975, the Turkish Cypriots established a 'federated state' in the north of the island. The primary aim of this move was facilitating a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal state on Cyprus. However, the initiative did not reach this outcome during the U.N.-sponsored talks in Vienna. The only positive result of the Vienna talks was a voluntary 'regrouping of populations'.

Although the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities continued to negotiate a de facto solution to the Cyprus dispute, the international community sustained its recognition of Greek Cypriot authorities as legal representatives of the whole island. It was under these conditions that, in 1983, Turkish Cypriots proclaimed the establishment of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

Following this declaration, negotiations continued with the help of De Cuellar, the UN Secretary-General. In 1986 a framework agreement was drafted which proposed a federal, bi-communal, bi-zonal state. TNRC responded positively to the proposal while still demanding much stronger federative rights for both communities. Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, refused the proposal by demanding some preconditions: withdrawal of Turkish forces from Cyprus, repatriation of Turkish settlers, and replacement of the Guarantee Agreement with international guarantees.

During the 1990s another important actor entered the negotiations for settlement on the island: the European Union (EU). Prior to the Greek Cypriot application for membership, the EU took a more passive role towards the Cyprus dispute. However, during the 1990s the EU emerged as a crucial factor for shaping Turkey's attitude towards the Cyprus dispute. The rationale behind this 'European impact' was related to Turkey's foreign policy objective to become a member of the EU after the Cold War (Uslu 2001).

The early 2000s saw another initiative by the UN. The secretary-general of the UN, Kofi Annan, proposed a plan for reunification of the island. Although both communities of the island had nationalist governments during that period, the attitudes of the Turkish Cypriots had changed after the landslide victory of *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP – Justice and Development party) in Turkey in 2002. The Annan Plan was voted upon by the two communities in simultaneous twin referenda in 2004. The results were: a Greek Cypriot 'no,' and a Turkish Cypriot 'yes'. Although the Annan Plan could not reunite the island, Cyprus became a full member of the European Union in 2004 (Ker-Lindsay 2009: 157-160).

CHAPTER IV:

THE 1964 CYPRUS CRISIS

Although the Republic of Cyprus had internal disputes following its establishment in 1960, public opinion in Turkey was not focused on Cyprus during this period. Following the 27 May coup Turkey had its own internal problems and the political atmosphere was unstable. Following the coup, Turkey was ruled by coalition governments under the premiership of İnönü, each coalition dissolving within a year.

When the governmental problems caused more ineffectiveness on Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot side proposed changes in the constitution which perpetuated the situation on the island. Although there was preexisting tension between Turks and Greeks on almost every issue, in late December 1963 an incident triggered intercommunity conflicts on the island, and there were casualties on both sides.

Turkey did not make its first response until January 1964 since the second İnönü coalition was just dissolved in December 1963.

During the early stages of the 1964 crisis, Turkey responded with a ‘show of force’. Although this reaction resulted in an end of ethnic conflict on the island in January, the situation got worse the following months. As a result, Turkey announced its intention to intervene in Cyprus to restore order and establish status quo by the treaties. At this stage, the US administration took the initiative and prevented Turkey from intervening in Cyprus by sending the famous Johnson Letter. The letter definitely had an impact on Turkey’s decision-making though it did not stop Turkey from bombing some targets on Cyprus in August 1964. Following Turkey’s ‘air strike’ decision the parties returned to the negotiation table to settle the Cyprus dispute. In this chapter, the thesis will study Turkey’s decision making process during the 1964 Cyprus crisis from December 1963 to August 1964.

4.1. The 1964 Cyprus Crisis

When İnönü traveled to the United States in order to attend the funeral of Kennedy in late November 1963, the second İnönü coalition government was dissolved. The dissolution of the coalition happened after the local elections which took place in mid-November 1963. The main opposition party, *Adalet Partisi* (AP – Justice Party), achieved a landslide victory against İnönü’s *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP) and Ragıp Gümüşpala, leader of the AP, stated that he was ready for the post (Milliyet 20th Nov. 1963).

At the beginning, İnönü tried to find a solution and sustain the coalition. However, İnönü's attempts to save the coalition failed, and İnönü resigned on 2 December 1963, declaring that he would not form a coalition again. At this point President Cemal Gürsel intervened and had several meetings with the leaders of political parties those had representatives in *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi* (TBMM – Grand National Assembly of Turkey) to solve the political crisis the country faces. Gürsel first proposed forming a coalition under the leadership of AP. Although Gümüşpala accepted this post, he later refused to form the government (Milliyet 15th Dec. 1963). Then, İnönü was again assigned to form the third İnönü coalition on 14th December. During the rest of December of 1963 İnönü was trying to form a government. On 18th December 1963, CHP offered *Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi* (CKMP) to join in forming a coalition government; however, CKMP did not accept this offer. İnönü finally could form the third coalition government under his premiership in January 1964 with the participation of nonpartisan politicians, and he secured the vote of confidence in the Turkish parliament (Milliyet 5th Jan. 1964).

While Turkey had a domestic political crisis and the efforts to save the second İnönü coalition were proving fruitless, Makarios proposed a plan to implement some changes in the Cyprus constitution on 5th December 1963. This proposal was immediately refused by Turkey in an official response. Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin gave Turkey's official response to Makarios' plan on 16th December, consigned to Makarios by the ambassador of Turkey to Cyprus (MMTD 1963: 510). While İnönü was assigned to form the government, bloody incidents between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots took place on Cyprus on

21st December. The event triggered tension between communities and clashes spread through the island. There were even attacks on the residence of Fazıl Küçük, the Vice President of Republic of Cyprus (Milliyet 24th Dec. 1963).

When the situation in Cyprus was not calming down, Turkish Air Forces (TAF) flew over Cyprus in a warning mission; the Turkish fighter jets did not bomb any targets. This flight mission did, however, cease the clashes on the island. The same day Turkish Naval Forces (TNF) sailed to Mersin, the city in the south-eastern coast of Turkey (Milliyet 26th Dec. 1963). On this issue, İnönü (MMTD 1964c) stated in the Turkish Parliament that Turkey wanted to intervene in Cyprus according to the Guarantee Agreement, and when the other parties (Britain and Greece) realized this initiative they decided to cooperate to reconstitute the public order on Cyprus. According to İnönü, this air mission was designed to warn the Greek Cypriots. After consulting with President Gürsel, İnönü stated that there was no attempt to send military forces to Cyprus. Instead he counseled the audience to be patient (İnönü 2004: 467). Additionally, İnönü accused supporters of intervention of not knowing the full meaning of war (İnönü 2004: 468).

January 1964, Makarios declared that he wanted to abrogate the Guarantee Agreement. After forming the government and receiving the vote of confidence, İnönü sent a letter to foreign premiers and discussed Turkey's actions and position with regard to Cyprus. In this letter İnönü emphasized Turkey's commitment to international law (İnönü 2004: 472-4). It is important to note that İnönü sent this message after formally convening the coalition, since before that time he was an inverted prime minister. Britain proposed a meeting of foreign ministers of the

guarantor states, and the meeting started on 15th January 1964 in London. During this conference, known as the London Conference, Rauf Denktaş, speaking on behalf of Turkish Cypriots, declared that the 1960 agreements failed to provide security to Turkish Cypriots and the only solution would be establishing a federal state consisting of two communities (Milliyet 17th Jan. 1964). During the conference, a plan to station a NATO force under the British command was discussed, and Britain requested the US to take a more active stand (Milliyet 28th Jan. 1964a). However, Greek Cypriots opposed this plan (Milliyet 28th Jan. 1964b). Thus, in October the efforts to station an international peace keeping force failed. İnönü made a statement to *International Press Institute* stating that Turkey has some rights and responsibilities according to 1960 treaties, and that he could not foresee what Turkey would do if the bloody situation did not end on the island (İnönü 2004: 491-2).

February 1964, the London conference ended without any concrete solution for the Cyprus dispute. During an interview with a foreign journalist İnönü stated that the most practical solution was dividing the island between Turkey and Greece, but the international and intra-alliance relations had forced leaders to establish an independent republic in 1959 (İnönü 2004: 497-9). İnönü made a statement to *New York Times* in which he declared that Turkey's aim was providing security to Turkish Cypriots and that he considered establishing a federative state on the island to be a solution (İnönü 2004: 499-501). On 7th February, Denktaş came to Turkey and insisted that Turkey should intervene in Cyprus to protect Turkish Cypriots (Milliyet 8th Feb. 1964). The US undersecretary of state, George Ball, visited Ankara and had meetings with both

İnönü and Erkin. Ball later went to Cyprus and tried to find a way to end the dispute. While Makarios did not accept Ball's proposal, Turkey continued its preparations: in İskenderun port, Turkish platoons stepped aboard landing crafts, and Turkish battleships harbored in Karataş (Milliyet 15th Feb. 1964). The UN Security Council met to discuss the current events taking place in Cyprus. However, these meetings were abortive actions since any offer or opinion was rejected by the Greek Cypriot delegation (Milliyet 28th Feb 1964). On 21st February there was an attempt to assassinate İnönü, and the assailant was caught immediately.

March 1964, the UN Security Council approved resolution 186 on 4th March and recommended creation of a UN peace keeping force on Cyprus. İnönü made a statement to *Der Spiegel* and stated that the situation will deteriorate in Cyprus (Milliyet 5th Mar. 1964; İnönü 2004: 525-8). Although İnönü was sanguine about the future of the Cyprus question, he called the current situation on the island a civil war while answering a question (İnönü 2004: 532). Turkey delivered a note to Makarios and declared that if the security of Turkish Cypriots was not provided for, Turkey was preserving its right to intervene in Cyprus (İnönü 2004: 533-4). On 16th March, TBMM delegated authority to the İnönü administration to use force towards Cyprus if it is needed¹. In domestic politics *Adalet Partisi* abandoned calling for an early election (Milliyet 23rd Mar. 1964). In Cyprus, Makarios terminated the posts of two Turkish Cypriot ministers (Milliyet 29th Mar. 1964). The partial election for the Senate was announced: elections would be held in 24 provinces of Turkey in June 1964 (Milliyet 31st Mar. 1964).

¹ This was a closed session. However, after 50 years we still do not have the records of this session.

April 1964, Makarios wanted Turkey to remove its troops from Cyprus which was stationed according to the 1960 treaties (Milliyet 2nd Apr. 1964). İnönü stated that relations between Turkey and Greece were moving in the direction of degradation (Milliyet 14th Apr. 1964). İnönü made a statement to *Time* that the Cyprus crisis may cause to the dissolution of the Western Alliance (Milliyet 16th Apr. 1964). The vice-patriarch was denaturalized and expelled from Turkey (Milliyet 22nd Apr. 1964). İnönü had a meeting with the secretary-general of the NATO, Dirk Stikker, and declared that Turkey was discontent with the Western Alliance (Milliyet 29th Apr. 1964).

May 1964, 30 battleships gathered in İskenderun port to hold a landing drill, and this drill was the largest military drill that Turkish armed forces have held until 1964 (Milliyet 6th May 1964). Johnson assigned Senator Fulbright to gather information on the Cyprus issue, and Fulbright visited Turkey (Milliyet 8th May 1964). The vice-prime minister of Turkey, Kemal Satır, stated that Turkey had the capability to occupy Cyprus within six hours (Milliyet 11th May 1964). At the NATO council, Erkin stated that Turkey may accept the mediation of NATO (Milliyet 14th May 1964). The main opposition party leader, Gümüşpala, attacked the İnönü administration on the grounds of the Cyprus question (Milliyet 18th May 1964). Makarios declared that Turkish Cypriot hostages were killed by some irresponsible Greeks (Milliyet 30th May 1964).

June 1964, the UN Secretary-General stated that the situation on the island was not moving in the direction of settling (Milliyet 5th Jun. 1964). The US President Johnson sent a letter to İnönü inviting İnönü to Washington in order to discuss the Cyprus issue; as a result Turkey revised its intervention decision

(Milliyet 6th Jun. 1964). İnönü asked TBMM for a vote of confidence on the Cyprus question (Milliyet 19th Jun. 1964) and despite the small margin of victory, the vote of confidence passed (Milliyet 20th Jun. 1964). İnönü went to the US and declared that a solution was possible although the current situation was tough (Milliyet 22nd Jun. 1964). İnönü requested the US to pursue a more active policy on the Cyprus issue and declared that Turkey was ready to accept a ‘double-enosis’ formula which will divide the island between Turkey and Greece (Milliyet 26th June 1964). Johnson had also invited Greek Prime Minister Papandreou to Washington, but bilateral negotiations could not take place between Turkish and Greek delegations. İnönü visited London and Paris (Milliyet 27th June 1964).

July 1964: While in Paris, İnönü mentioned his last contacts both in Washington and in London and stated that Turkey gained strength from a point of law (Milliyet 1st Jul. 1964). On the other hand, there were claims that Greece deployed 3,000 soldiers on the island (Milliyet 13th Jul. 1964). The Commander of Turkish Air Forces, İrfan Tansel, declared that Turkey would send airborne troops (Milliyet 15th Jul. 1964). The Greek government admitted to the claims of having landed Greek forces on Cyprus (16th Jul. 1964). While deployment of troops continued on the island, Makarios declared that Greeks would achieve their aims (Milliyet 26th Jul. 1964). Throughout July 1964, parties met in Geneva under the auspices of the UN to find a peaceful and lasting solution for the Cyprus dispute.

August 1964, Turkey asked Greece its reason for deploying military buildup along the Turkish Border, declaring that Turkey was not threatening Greece (Milliyet 2nd Aug. 1964). All these efforts did not end the strife on the island and the clashes expanded (Milliyet 7th Aug. 1964). TAF executed a mission

to patrol Cyprus (Milliyet 8th Aug. 1964) and bombed some military targets (Milliyet 9th Aug. 1964). These air strikes ceased fire on the island between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots (Milliyet 10th Aug. 1964). İnönü informed the UN Security Council that Turkey stopped the mission of TAF (Milliyet 12th Aug. 1964).

4.2. Analyzing events

The above chronology points out that on 21st December 1963, Turkey had both a domestic crisis and an international crisis. In domestic politics the second İnönü coalition government was dissolved, and in international relations there were demands from Makarios to implement changes in the constitution of the Cyprus Republic at the expense of Turkish Cypriots' rights granted by the agreements. Intercommunity clashes were occurring on the island. Turkey had to decide whether or not to intervene in Cyprus in order to provide security to Turkish Cypriots. At this point the poliheuristic decision model may contribute to an understanding of Turkey's decision. As discussed above, the poliheuristic decision model consists of two stages; here the thesis will evaluate Turkey's air strike decision, and how Turkey decided not to intervene in Cyprus with the poliheuristic decision making model.

4.2.1. First stage of decision making

In the first stage of poliheuristic decision model, decision makers eliminate the policy alternatives which have a low value in the key dimension. The thesis argues

that in this stage ‘systemic dimension’ was considered the key dimension by the İnönü administration. Before applying the first stage of poliheuristic decision model to the 1964 Cyprus crisis, it might be helpful to discuss CHP’s and İnönü’s approaches to foreign policy.

Long before the eruption of the Cyprus crisis in 1963, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* released its official foreign policy views in 1961. The document’s front cover states a proverb from İnönü: “Turks are faithful to their friendship, loyal to their engagements”. The document states that CHP adopted the motto “peace at home, peace in the world” as a principle which was also an article of the 1961 Constitution (CHP 1961: 3). The document considered NATO as a crucial part of Turkey’s security by indicating the current balance of power between the Western Bloc and the Soviet Bloc (CHP 1961: 11). As a result, CHP declared that it is impossible to envisage Turkey acting neutral (CHP 1961: 12). Turkey’s commitments to the West is not limited to the NATO, the document argues and states that CHP wants Turkey to be a part of the European Economic Community (CHP 1961: 14-15). On the Cyprus issue the document argues that although the Zurich-London agreements have some deficiencies, Turkey is fully committed to “practice the agreements and has ambition to defend the rights of Turkish Cypriots and Turkey’s interests on Cyprus” and declared that CHP will not tolerate destruction of established status quo on Cyprus (CHP 1961: 22).

It is important to note that *Adalet Partisi* also emphasized and adopted the motto “peace at home, peace in the world” as a principle for foreign policy (Tevetoğlu 1963: 1). Fethi Tevetoğlu, Senator from AP and president of the Turkish NATO Parliamentarians Group, after defining Greece as friend and ally,

on the Cyprus issue stated that the roots and continuity of Turkish Greek friendship is bound by the continuation of established status quo on Cyprus (Tevetoğlu 1963: 7). Accordingly, both CHP and AP, before the eruption of conflict on Cyprus considered status quo as the basis for continuity of peace.

In accordance with these policies, as the thesis will discuss in more detail, from the very beginning of the Cyprus crisis, İnönü insisted on solving the question within the framework of 1960 treaties and when a party offered negotiation İnönü accepted the offer. Actually, İnönü's commitment to international agreements was quite related to his attitudes towards foreign policy. In general İnönü was in favor of cautiousness in foreign policy. For instance, during late 1930s –according to İnönü- Atatürk was planning to use military to solve the “*Sancak (Hatay) question*”, and İnönü opposed this plan, there were discussions among them. While being against Atatürk's plan İnönü was considering the latest issues taking place in Europe, according to İnönü declaring a war may have some negative impacts on Turkey's foreign relations (İnönü 1985: 283-5).

Furthermore, İnönü had intentions to solve the Cyprus dispute by peaceful methods and according to İnönü (1961: 45) solving disputes through negotiations requires two conditions: an agreement on i) the existence of the dispute and ii) the decision to solve the problem by the parties. In this context, İnönü argues, the success of the Lausanne Treaty was due to Turkey's realist approach and its policy to delay some issues for the sake of the peace agreement. Those delayed issues, such as Turkish straits and Hatay, later solved through negotiations (İnönü 1961: 50-51). Additionally, although there were some opportunities to solve the Hatay

question by using force, Turkey did not take this decision. Turkey as a successor of an empire refused every opportunity to acquire territory during the Second World War (İnönü 1961: 51-51). These views demonstrate that İnönü had an approach to prioritize negotiation over using force as a means of solving disputes.

When 1964 crisis emerged and authorities could not stop the violence among Turks and Greeks, Turkey considered intervening in Cyprus as an option. The chronology also supports this argument. Nonetheless, intervention remained as ‘last resort’ in İnönü’s agenda and he decided to exhaust other alternatives (Bölükbaşı 1993: 512). According to Toker (1992: 195-196) İnönü was reluctant to take the intervention decision and he was describing intervening as “putting a spoke in a hive” and if Turkey could pursue the United States to accompany itself, Turkey might solve the Cyprus question in favor of itself.

In order to settle the dispute by negotiation Turkey first consulted with guarantor states (Greece and the United Kingdom). However, when attempts to solve the crisis during the London conference failed and when the Soviet Union sent two diplomatic letters and warned Western powers not to interrupt domestic politics of Cyprus, it became less possible to solve the dispute among Western countries. On this subject İnönü stated that:

As long as the negotiations were continuing the problem was lasting and since there wasn’t any public order on the island the incidents were repeating. This is why the United States and guarantor states agreed recently on appealing the United Nations. We decided to settle the dispute through negotiations (MMTD 1964c: 11).

Additionally, İnönü realized that the Cyprus dispute already became an international issue which almost every nation follows carefully. İnönü argued that

establishing security and public order on Cyprus was requiring commitment of great powers. He declared that only after this commitment it would be possible to find a solution to reorganize the lives of both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots (MMTD 1964c: 12). In other words, İnönü considered internationalization of the dispute as a step towards settlement.

However, internationalization of the dispute and establishing a UN peace force in Cyprus did not end the conflict on the island. As a result, Turkey informed Makarios that “they would move if attacks on Turkish Cypriots did not stop”² (FRUS 2000: 51). During these tough days TBMM granted the İnönü administration the right to intervene in Cyprus whenever it was required.

Although İnönü claimed that if the intercommunity strife did not end on the island the Western Alliance would be dissolved (Milliyet 16th Apr. 1964), İnönü continued informing NATO from his policies with regard to Cyprus. Thus, if İnönü was supporting a military intervention then he probably would not discuss it with other NATO members, especially with the US.

On the contrary, on 4th June 1964 Turkey informed the US Ambassador to Turkey, Raymond Hare, that Turkey would intervene in Cyprus, and Hare - on behalf of his country - asked for a 24 hour delay for the decision³. Actually, a close look at published documents reveals an interesting story. When Turkey informed the US ambassador Hare about the possibility of Turkish intervention, Hare asked for an ‘urgent’ meeting with Erkin. During this meeting Erkin stated that since Makarios still was intent on pursuing his objectives without considering

² Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts, March 12, 1964

³ According to Bölükbaşı (1993: 516) Foreign Minister Erkin “opposed to leaking of the government decision to the Americans” but İnönü decided to inform the US administration.

their consequences, the Cabinet would meet at 8:30 pm. to discuss the current situation, and there was a possibility they could decide to intervene. When Hare asked Erkin whether Turkey would revise its decision if Greece proposed a formula which meets Turkey's needs, Erkin declared that Turkey could accept only federation or a 'double enosis' formula⁴ (FRUS 2000: 103-4).

This telegram was also sent to the US embassy in Greece and the US Ambassador Labouisse wrote that the Greek government was "still holding a line of enosis. We continue to believe there is no chance of Greek support partition or federation of Cyprus, as apparently demanded by Erkin"⁵ (FRUS 2000: 106). In other words there was almost nothing to negotiate between Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus dispute since both parties were holding their position as the last stronghold.

Before the Cabinet meeting Ambassador Hare had a three hour conversation with İnönü. In Hare's words:

Argument was tough and sometimes got on very sensitive ground with Inonu holding ground firmly and saying not only Cyprus but also our relationship could hinge on agreement with Turkish decision. When Inonu made another move to join Cabinet I said was certain what I had been told would be great disappointment to President who has stressed importance of consultation and was only being given opportunity to agree or disagree on single proposition. This could hardly be called consultation⁶ (FRUS 2000: 106).

After this conversation, as already known, Hare asked for 24 hours delay to make US views known on the issue. As a result the US President Johnson delivered a letter to İnönü on 5th June 1964. This letter, called the "Johnson

⁴ Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, June 4, 1964

⁵ Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Embassy in Turkey, June 4, 1964

⁶ Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, June 5, 1964.

Letter” had important effects on Turkish foreign policy. The letter, basically stated that i) Turkey did not fulfill its responsibilities (negotiating multilateral action with other guarantor states) to intervene unilaterally; ii) if Turkey faced a Soviet attack as a result of its intervention, then the NATO and the US may not protect Turkey; iii) Turkey could not use American military aids to intervene in Cyprus since this equipment was given to Turkey to defend itself; and iv) Johnson invited İnönü to Washington to discuss the situation (Şahin 2002: 13, for the letter see FRUS 2000: 107-110⁷). The tone of the letter was considered a bit harsh. According to an American diplomat, Johnson did not like foreign policy issues and since 1964 was an election year in the US, that was presumably why Johnson wanted to stop a conflict within the Western Alliance (Şahin 2002: 20).

Turkey replied to the Johnson Letter, and in general the content of the letter was: i) the Johnson Letter frustrated Turkey; ii) Turkey informed the US about its actions towards Cyprus regularly; iii) the US did not try to prevent Greeks from attacking Turks on the island; iv) the Johnson Letter called into question the effectiveness of the alliance between Turkey and the US; v) if NATO operated in this way, then it needed a treatment since deserting a member state after a military attack is against the essence of NATO; and vi) İnönü accepted Johnson’s invitation (Şahin 2002: 78-9). This response indicated that Turkey decided not to intervene in Cyprus.

Bölükbaşı (2001: 123) argues that İnönü’s requesting consultation from the US was a sign of his unwillingness to intervene. Actually, Bölükbaşı’s argument makes great sense when considering the documents discussed above as testament

⁷ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, June 5, 1964

to İnönü's reluctance to use force. Another document sent from Ball to Johnson states that the Greek government realized the danger of Greek-Turkish warfare and the communist influence that was gaining strength on Cyprus. The document continued:

There were strong indications that Papandreou would like to have the USG [the United States government] force a settlement on the GOG [Government of Greece] that it could accept only with the excuse of outside pressure.

Ankara

On the Turkish side, Inonu is doing everything possible to maneuver us into taking responsibility for bringing about a settlement. The Turks are clearly frightened of the Cyprus situation. They are perplexed and sad. They also want us to force a settlement on them – provided adequate face-saving aspects can be devised⁸ (FRUS 2000: 132).

Apart from the İnönü administration's approach towards the crisis, the Western states, especially the US, were trying to prevent any military action which could cause war in the southern flank of the NATO. Additionally, the US was afraid that a possible war between Turkey and Greece which would result in the Soviet involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean through Cyprus (Göktepe 2005: 432). The US administration under these conditions had to act and prevent any possible war among its two NATO allies. This was the reason why, from the very beginning, the US undersecretary of state, the secretary-general of the NATO, and other high ranking officers and politicians visited Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. This pressure also resulted in organizing a couple of international conferences, the UN Security Council, and NATO council meetings.

Each attempt to solve the problem by any of these actors caused more internationalization of the Cyprus problem day by day. For instance, during the

⁸ Memorandum from the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson, June 11, 1964

last days of the London conference Britain tried to include the US in efforts to solve the dispute. However, this action paved the way for the Soviet Union's involvement in the Cyprus question (Aziz 1969: 173). As a result, the Soviet Union became another factor in the systemic dimension either when Turkey attempted to intervene in Cyprus or when the NATO powers tried to solve the problem within the NATO framework. As an example of Soviet involvement, during a United Nation Security Council meeting in February 1964, the Soviets' delegate accused NATO of forcing Cypriots to accept their solution on the crisis and argued that the intervention of foreign powers in domestic problems of Cyprus was the real cause of the crisis (Aziz 1969: 177-178).

Although the London conference encouraged the Soviet Union to have a more active role in the Cyprus crisis, it was not the root of the relationship between the Soviets and the Cyprus. During the 1960s the Soviets formed ties with Cyprus on economic and cultural basis. For instance, students from Cyprus went to the Soviet Union for education and many of them became supporters of Communist ideology, although some might have had ties with Europe's strongest Communist party, AKEL, before going to the Soviet Union (Michael 2011: 102). Throughout the 1964 crisis the Soviets supported Cyprus against 'foreign invasion' both by sending letters to leaders of the US and Turkey, and by supplying arms to Cyprus (Michael 2011: 106).

After the London conference the United States became gradually involved in the Cyprus crisis. The Johnson Letter was definitely the most vivid example of US involvement. However it was not the only or the last attempt made by the United States to prevent war between its allies. For instance, the US

undersecretary of state, George Ball, visited Ankara on 10th June 1964 after visiting Athens a day earlier (Milliyet 11th Jun. 1964). Ball's visit was designed to prevent a war between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, as was the case with other US actions.

It is important to note that the 1964 Cyprus crisis took place when the tension between Western Bloc and Eastern Bloc was high and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) still was a new issue. Both crises (Cuban Missile and Cyprus) had a definite impact on Turkey and led Turkey to reconsider its commitment to the Western Alliance. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Jupiter Affair reminded Turkey that it could easily become a theater of war between 'Super Powers' and the US might make a decision without consulting Turkey (Benli-Altunışık and Tür 2005: 106). The second crisis, however, showed Turkey that its ally may call into question the NATO commitments in case of an attack which was actually the fundamental aim of the NATO treaty (Benli-Altunışık and Tür 2005: 107). Thus, Cold War conditions had an effect on Turkey's decision.

Nihat Erim, who gave a first-hand account of Turkey's policy towards Cyprus, argues that although there were some signs of US approval of Turkey's intervention, İnönü wanted official assent before making an intervention decision (Erim n.d.: 243). Additionally, İnönü was considering the consequences of an intervention decision which may cause unexpected results for Turkey. On the Cyprus issue, Erim argues, İnönü did not want to put Turkey in danger while trying to save the lives of 120,000 Turkish Cypriots (Erim n.d.: 383). In case of an armed intervention the possibility of Greek retaliation was unknown, because the Soviets' response was unknown to Turkish decision makers (Erim n.d.: 382). In

other words, although the situation on Cyprus was against Turkish Cypriots, since armed conflict was still continuing Turkey could not act without considering the consequences of intervention decision.

As a sign of İnönü's reluctance to use force, although the US did not propose any concrete plan for settlement on Cyprus İnönü discussed the situation with the US President Johnson and:

Prime Minister Inonu again expressed his thanks for the President's help, but added that every time during recent months when there seemed to be hope for a peaceful settlement, something had developed to block it. [...] He agreed with the President that there are no gainers in war, but pointed out that Greece appears to be acting under the impression that it can win an easy victory on Cyprus⁹ (FRUS 2000: 147).

The thesis argues that international relations had an impact on İnönü's decision during the 1964 Cyprus crisis. According to poliheuristic theory İnönü eliminated a 'military intervention' option in the first stage of decision making since this option failed to satisfy the 'key dimension' (i.e. systemic dimension). As İnönü considered the 1959 agreements as a result of international and intra-alliance pressure, during the 1964 Cyprus crisis international pressure (especially the US opposition to any kind of military intervention) prevented İnönü from making a decision to intervene in Cyprus.

4.2.2. Second stage of decision making

In the second stage of poliheuristic decision model, a decision maker uses analytic evaluations and tries to maximize gains by minimizing losses. Since the 'military intervention' alternative was eliminated in the first stage, İnönü had three

⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 22, 1964

remaining policy options: i) air strike; ii) diplomatic efforts; and iii) do nothing. This thesis will evaluate each policy alternative according to remaining dimensions: *domestic politics* and *military*.

Domestic Politics dimension: İnönü was a leader who characterized himself as responsible statesman for the Republic of Turkey. After the 1960 coup, for instance, general elections took place in 1961 and the CHP couldn't have the majority to form a government. Actually, İnönü was expecting that the CHP would win the election, he would become President, and the Secretary-General of CHP, İsmail Rüştü Aksal, would form the government. İnönü's aim was, according to Toker (1992: 25), "to get the train back on the tracks" and after that resuming his political career in the Senate and supervising national issues. Nevertheless, this expectation never came true and everybody expected that the CHP would remain as opposition party in the TBMM. However, according to Heper (1998: 221):

İnönü was willing to form a coalition with AP so as to maintain cordial relations with the military and not to tempt them to stay in power indefinitely. İnönü was again making an important political sacrifice in order to save the regime.

Hıfzı Oğuz Bekata, who once served as minister of İnönü coalition governments, also supports Heper's arguments and states that during tough times of the first İnönü coalition between CHP and AP, he suggested İnönü resign from premiership. İnönü responded by emphasizing his role for the republic and implied that he would not be able to resign (Bekata 1992: 10). Accordingly, during the 1964 crisis İnönü refrained from endangering Turkey while trying to settle the Cyprus dispute.

From the very beginning of the crisis there were demonstrations in favor of Turkish Cypriots and military intervention. Among Turkish youth there were several demonstrations, one including 5000 university students gathered to protest Makarios and the latest events on Cyprus (*Milliyet* 25th Dec. 1963). There were also charity campaigns for Cyprus. For instance, *Kızılay* (Turkish Red Crescent) organized one such campaign (*Milliyet* 2nd Jan. 1964).

Although during the parliamentary session on 24th December 1963 the main opposition party claimed that they would not use the Cyprus crisis against the İnönü administration, this promise did not last long. For instance, during the TBMM session of February 3, 1964, Zeyyat Kocamemi from *Yeni Türkiye Partisi*, discussed his and other MPs' Cyprus visit and his first-hand knowledge of the situation on Cyprus. Kocamemi argued that Turkish Cypriots were encircled by Greek Cypriots and they lived under the threat of death. He also stated that since Greek Cypriots held all the communication instruments on the island, the international community heard only the views of Greek Cypriots and did not notice the condition under which Turks suffer. He told the Parliament that during his visit, Turkish Cypriots asked him whether a difference exists on Cyprus policy among political parties of Turkey and he replied negatively (CSTD 1964: 214-217).

Contrary to Kocamemi's views, there was strong opposition to the İnönü administration from the very beginning. For instance, even before the İnönü coalition got the vote of confidence, in the Senate on 3 January 1964 *Millet Partisi* and *Adalet Partisi* charged that İnönü wasted the opportunity to intervene in Cyprus which was granted by London and Zurich agreements. Moving one step

further, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil argued on behalf of AP that the İnönü administration had a lack of power to handle both the domestic and foreign policies which Turkey needed (CSTD 1964: 185).

On the Cyprus issue, Çağlayangil argued that during parliamentary sessions İnönü previously blamed *Demokrat Parti* (DP – Democrat Party) for signing the London and Zurich agreements, which İnönü considered against the interest of Turkey. Çağlayangil added that during these sessions İnönü declared that the only possible mechanism in case of an attempt for *enosis* was intervention together with the UK. By analyzing these session records, Çağlayangil stated that “... İnönü illustrated the current situation during those days. Though he both identified the problem and expressed the solution I could not explain why Mr. Prime Minister does not take the decision when his predictions come true” (CSTD 1964: 188-189)

To reply to those criticisms, İnönü stated that Turkey would not have the right to intervene whenever it wished. Under current conditions, an event should take place first, and then the guarantor states had to negotiate, organize a conference, and reach an agreement. If this negotiation mechanism did not work then Turkey would be able to intervene unilaterally. He continued:

So did us. Additionally, raid, occupation, sudden actions are the military moves that will be taken by someone who attacks or intend to attack. [...] You mention sudden actions and say that ‘sudden action is required’. This agreement [the Guarantee agreement] doesn’t allow this kind of action. Even if the agreement allows this kind of action, international law and [...] developed international affairs will not allow sudden actions (CSTD 1964: 197)

However, opposition parties gradually started to criticize the government for its policy towards Cyprus During the TBMM session of February 5, 1964,

Adalet Partisi accused the government for not informing the Parliament on its policies and backed the proposal for discussing the Cyprus issue in the Parliament. However, Kemal Satır stated -on behalf of the government- that discussing the Cyprus issue in a public session was against national interest of Turkey (see MMTD 1964d). During a meeting in February 1964 with US Ambassador Hare, Foreign Minister Erkin “commented some Greek moves had been displeasing to Turkey, but government exercised restraint despite heavy pressure on it to act, including severe criticism by Parliamentary opposition”. Hare said that the US administration has appreciated this effort¹⁰ (FRUS 2000: 20).

It is important to note that 1964 was an election year for the Senate; the election results indicate that there was discontent over the İnönü administration: *Adalet Partisi* could win the majority of seats (Milliyet 9th Jun. 1964). Actually, the elections took place when the İnönü government was busy with the Cyprus dispute. As a result, while the main opposition party leader, Ragıp Gümüşpala, was able to carry on a successful election campaign, İnönü could not support the CHP’s election campaign. Actually, AP’s victory was not a surprise since this party also dominated the last local elections that took place in mid-November 1963.

Since the dissolution of the second İnönü coalition happened during Kennedy’s funeral ceremony, before visiting to Washington to discuss the Cyprus issue İnönü asked for vote of confidence and explained the Cyprus problem to MPs during a closed session of the TBMM (Milliyet 16th Jun. 1964). The days

¹⁰ Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, February 11, 1964

before the vote of confidence witnessed one of the tough days of İnönü coalitions and İnönü only narrowly got the vote (Milliyet 20th Jun. 1964). In other words, the future of the government was hung by a thread.

Military dimension: If Turkey decided to intervene in Cyprus, did Turkey have the capability to carry out this military operation? Although it would not be an easy task for Turkey since Greek platoons stationed on Cyprus clandestinely, Turkey gave the impression that it might carry out this operation. At least the US had the impression that Turkey might be able to create a 'safe zone' for Turkish Cypriots on the island. However, since the 'military intervention' option was already eliminated, the question of Turkey's capability becomes less pertinent at this stage.

At this point how the Turkish army viewed Cyprus strategically is worth discussing. Writing in 1964, Necati Irmak studied the geostrategic position of the island. First and foremost, according to Irmak (1964: 19-20), Turkey is the closest country to the island and this is why Turkey becomes the most vulnerable country in case the island was occupied by an aggressor state (in this scenario Cyprus becomes 'what Cuba means to security of the US')¹¹. Additionally, since Makarios expressed his intent to pursue his objectives by any means, the Soviet Union might use this opportunity to get military bases on the island and pose a threat to NATO and CENTO members (Irmak 1964: 21). Furthermore, NATO members get nearly 75% of their oil needs supplied from the Middle East, and Cyprus is located between these oil suppliers and NATO consumers (Irmak 1964: 21). In

¹¹ It is interesting to note that not only Irmak as Turkish security personnel foresaw the possibility of 'Cubanization' of Cyprus, but also the Greek Prime Minister Papandreou thought the same consequence for Cyprus if Turkey intervenes in Cyprus and the Soviets come to help Cyprus (see FRUS 2000: 122-123).

other words, according to Irmak, Cyprus has a critical location not only for Turkey but also for other members of the Western Bloc. This is why ignoring the events taking place on Cyprus might have serious consequences for all parties.

In this dimension, a ‘do nothing’ alternative had no effect. Also ‘diplomatic efforts’ did not have any contribution to maximizing utility. As a result, the only relevant alternative was ‘air strike’ since the other military policy option (‘military intervention’) was eliminated in the first stage of decision making. In this context, an air strike might cease the strife on the island and increase the credibility of the government as had happened earlier in December 1963, though the first one was a limited operation without any targeted attack.

4.2.3. The Decision

İnönü stated during a TBMM session on 4th September 1964 that the Members of the Parliament (MPs) knew ‘why’ Turkey did not intervene in Cyprus. İnönü declared this during a closed session; MPs were informed about the ‘reasons’. However, we still do not know the context of these sessions¹².

Table 2 shows the decision matrix of İnönü.

¹² It might worth stating that every closed session taking place in 1964 are still unpublished by Turkish parliament though decades passed.

Table 2: Decision matrix of İnönü

	Dimensions			
Policy options	Systemic	Domestic Politics	Military	Total (Average)
Military Intervention	1	4	1	6 (2)
Air strike	2	3	2	7 (2,3)
Diplomatic efforts	4	2	-	6 (2)
Do nothing	3	1	-	4 (1,3)

On the *systemic* dimension, the alternatives are scored from highest to lowest according to their impact on Turkey's stand in the international arena and the decision's effect on Turkey's foreign relations. On the *domestic politics* dimension, alternatives are ranked according to their ability to satisfy public opinion while improving the situation on the island in favor of Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. On the *military* dimension, they are scored according to their ability to successfully achieve military objectives.

Under the *systemic* dimension the most favorable option that emerged was 'diplomatic efforts' since solving the question by peaceful methods will be ranked higher since this option would not cause a war in the region. Thus, this alternative would ease the pressure from third parties (i.e. the US or the USSR). The chronology showed that Turkey received strong criticism from 'super powers' when it announced its intention to intervene as a solution. It is important to note that the early 1960s witnessed high tension of the Cold War. Definitely, as a member of the Western Bloc, Turkey was also affected by this tension negatively. As a result Turkey had to reconsider its 'use of force' decision.

On the other hand, under the *domestic politics* dimension the ‘military intervention’ option ranked as the best option since the audience and the opposition parties were expecting some kind of action towards Cyprus in order to provide security for Turkish Cypriots. Thus, the administration had to choose a policy option which would not damage the government.

Under the *military* dimension the ‘air strike’ option scored as the best policy alternative since Turkey’s capacity to carry out a full scale military operation was relatively lower than the ‘air strike’ decision.

It is important to note that the 1964 crisis supported the assumptions of the poliheuristic decision making model. First of all, according to the model, the administration identified a ‘key dimension’ (i.e. *systemic*) in the first stage of the decision making process and eliminated the policy options the administration considered ‘unacceptable’. At this stage the İnönü administration eliminated ‘military intervention’ as an option though this option was ranked as the second best policy option. In other words, the administration’s decision supported the ‘non-compensatory’ principle of the poliheuristic model.

In the second stage the İnönü administration evaluated remaining policy alternatives according to their total ratings. Here the most favorable decision emerged as ‘air strike’ which was the ultimate decision of the İnönü administration.

İnönü, one of the founders of the Republic of Turkey, considered himself responsible for the future of Turkey. This responsibility led İnönü pursuing a foreign policy based on diplomacy and negotiation. This is why, despite strong

criticism against its policies towards Cyprus, the İnönü administration continued to seek international support for Turkey's views. After realizing the fact that the status quo was changing against the interest of Turkey, the İnönü administration declared its intention to intervene. The intention stopped by the US president's well-known letter. It could be argued that with this move the administration had two objectives: i) finding a face-saving justification not to use force; and ii) avoiding endangering Turkey while trying to save Turkish Cypriots on the island.

CHAPTER V:

THE 1967 CYPRUS CRISIS

The Turkish Air Forces' mission resulted in an end of intercommunity conflict on the island in August 1964. However, Turkey's 'air strike' decision did not pave the way for settlement of the Cyprus dispute. The Cyprus dispute entered a period of peace though the parties were far away from finding a lasting solution.

Although from time to time the Cyprus dispute emerged as an international issue to be dealt with, the Turkish public gradually lost interest in the Cyprus dispute in the following years. Nevertheless, Greece continued to pursue *enosis* and support Greek Cypriots even with supplying arms.

The Cyprus dispute entered a new phase when a coup took place in April 1967 in Greece. The 'Greek Junta' ruled the country until 1974 and during its rule the junta considered achieving *enosis* a way to cover domestic problems. In late 1967, the Cyprus dispute was renewed, and again Turkey and Greece were on the

brink of war. During the whole month of November (1967) tension was high between Turkey and Greece. During the crisis Turkey several times announced its intention to intervene in Cyprus as a solution, but did not make the final decision. Instead, Turkey favored ‘diplomatic efforts’ as a policy option. In this chapter, the thesis will study Turkey’s decision making process during the 1967 Cyprus crisis from April 1967 to November 1967.

5.1. The Aftermath of the 1964 Crisis

Turkish decision makers ordered the Turkish Air Forces to cease fire when the situation on Cyprus calmed and intercommunity conflict ended. After this decision Turkish decision makers again returned to the negotiation table to find a peaceful solution to the Cyprus question. As discussed in the previous chapter, İnönü was favoring non-belligerent foreign policy and considering himself responsible for the future of the Republic. This is why, actually, İnönü decided to continue negotiations immediately after the air strikes.

Negotiations continued in August 1964 in Geneva under the auspices of the US mediator Dean Acheson. It is important to note that during the first Geneva negotiations Turkey accepted the so called ‘Acheson Plan’ as a basis for discussion in July 1964. According to the plan Turkey would have a base on the Karpas peninsula in the north-east of the island. The base would have Turkish sovereignty, as was the case for the British bases on Cyprus. In return for the base, Cyprus would unite with Greece which would end the demands for *enosis*. Additionally, Turkish Cypriots would have ‘minority’ rights, which would mean a

retreat from their rights according to London and Zurich agreements. Nonetheless, Turkish Cypriots would establish their autonomy in two or three areas where they were forming the majority. The plan was actualizing *enosis* with some adjustments in favor of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. However, Makarios had objections to the plan and declared that his aim was to unite Cyprus as a whole with Greece, not just part of it (Firat 1997: 136-137).

As the first Geneva negotiations demonstrate, Turkey was ready to discuss a plan though it might change the established status quo against Turkish Cypriots. Actually the same approach continued during the second Geneva talks which took place just after Turkey's air strike decision. This time, however, the situation was slightly different from the previous proposal. The Greek side changed its stance and offered Turkey the chance to 'lease' a base which was smaller than the first one. Since Turks and Greeks did not sit down at the same table to discuss the situation on Cyprus, Acheson transmitted this proposal to Turkish delegates. According to the 'second Acheson Plan' Turkey would lease a base on the island for fifty years. Furthermore, the autonomous Turkish Cypriot zones were removed from the plan. Turkish delegates immediately refused the proposal since they considered it to be far from meeting both Turkey's security needs and Turkish Cypriots' rights (Bölükbaşı 2001: 139).

Greece also considered the Acheson Plan 'unacceptable' though it could have accepted the plan if it were proposed a few year earlier. Greek authorities, in accordance with Makarios, favored the 'independent Cyprus' formula and refused the plan (Iatrides 2003: 91).

According to Bölükbaşı (2001: 140) İnönü did not make the decision to intervene since the Geneva talks still were continuing, and as a result there was hope of reaching an agreement through negotiations and mediation. Also the previous chapter supports this view. However, the talks were ultimately fruitless.

Additionally, İnönü was a leader of the government whose dominance in the parliament was hanging by a thread. During the days that followed the Geneva talks, İnönü tried to convince the opposition parties that the Cyprus crisis was an inter-alliance (NATO) dispute and US support for a lasting solution was mandatory. Conversely, the main opposition party, *Adalet Partisi*, did not share İnönü's views and accused İnönü of seeking support from the United States (Bölükbaşı 2001: 141).

The US mediation efforts failed when parties reached a complete deadlock instead of an agreement on the Acheson Plan. Besides, the United Nations appointed another mediator due to the sudden death of the former UN mediator, Sakari Tuomioja. The new mediator, Galo Plaza, prepared a report on the Cyprus dispute. The report argued that only the two communities of the island could find a lasting solution for the dispute. As a result, other parties (Turkey, Greece or another country) should not interfere in this dispute. Additionally, since the intercommunity clashes took place on the island it became almost impossible to reestablish the status quo according to the London and Zurich agreements. The report proposed that Cyprus should become fully independent¹³ but had to agree not to unite with another country. Although Greece and Greek Cypriots considered the report constructive, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots reacted negatively since the

¹³ In other words, there would be no 'guarantor state'.

report expressed the impossibility of restoring the status quo prior to 1963. The above-mentioned report was also discussed in the UN General Assembly in December 1965 and the result was approval of the report¹⁴. As a result, the UN General Assembly approved the independent status of the Cyprus Republic which was totally against Turkey's views on the issue (Fırat 2008: 733-734). It is important to note that during each negotiation the two communities of the island had generally echoed the views of 'mainland' guarantor states, though to varying extents. As the events suggests this 'tradition of echoing' resumed when Galo Plaza proposed his report (Mirbagheri 2010: 156).

Before and after the UN General Assembly session, Turkish public opinion again focused on the Cyprus issue. For instance, Foreign Minister Çağlayangil proposed bilateral negotiations between Greece and Turkey to settle the dispute. Additionally, Çağlayangil asked NATO members to participate in efforts to resolve the conflict on the island (Milliyet 4th Dec. 1965). During the UN General Assembly session, Çağlayangil stated that Turkey would not stand idly by if Greek Cypriots attempted to massacre Turkish Cypriots on the island. He illustrated that the presence of Greek platoons on Cyprus was a stumbling block to finding a peaceful solution (Milliyet 12th Dec. 1965). When the UN General Assembly resolution resulted against the wishes of Turkey, Çağlayangil stated that Turkey would not be bound by this resolution and Turkey would not accept the mediation of Galo Plaza (Milliyet 19th Dec. 1965).

Following the UN General Assembly resolution, opposition parties demanded to discuss the issue in the parliament. Although the Demirel

¹⁴ Only four countries alongside Turkey voted against the report and these countries were: The US, Iran, Albania, and Pakistan (Fırat 2008b: 734)

administration was just formed in November 1965, it found itself in the middle of the Cyprus dispute. During the parliamentary sessions the speaker of the parliament, Ferruh Bozbeyli, stated that the issue would remain separated from domestic politics. The political parties declared that Turkish foreign policy should be revised after the UN General Assembly resolution. It is important to note that almost every party accused the US administration for preventing Turkey from intervening in Cyprus. Nihat Erim stated on behalf of the CHP that the parliament should release the Johnson Letter in order to avoid the misunderstanding that there was not any US pressure on Turkey in 1964 (Milliyet 28th Dec. 1965). The Demirel administration, however, rejected the CHP's proposal to release the Johnson Letter since the letter might be used to support anti-Americanism (Milliyet 29th Dec 1965a). In the Senate, the senators adopted a similar attitude towards the Cyprus dispute. Some senators demanded the release of the Johnson letter. Senator Ahmet Yıldız argued that although there were some technical difficulties in carrying a military operation without informing NATO, Turkey had the capacity to intervene in Cyprus back in 1964 (Milliyet 7th Jan. 1966).

Although the Demirel administration did not want to release the Johnson letter, the newspaper *Hürriyet* published the letter in January 1966. On the same day the government decided to officially release the Johnson letter and İnönü's response to Johnson (Milliyet 14th Jan. 1966).

Later in 1966, public opinion and the media gradually lost interest in Cyprus dispute. For instance, when Turkish Cypriot leader Dr. Fazıl Küçük, who was Vice President of Cyprus Republic, attempted suicide, the press printed the event as a headline (Milliyet 29th Jan. 1966). However, when Dr. Küçük healed a

weak later the press did not pay much attention (Milliyet 6th Feb. 1966), though the Cyprus issue remained important for a while due to the dispute among political parties.

Rauf Denktaş, who was one of the leading figures among Turkish Cypriots and who was in ‘exile’ in Turkey, published a book in 1966 to demonstrate his thoughts on Turkey’s foreign policy in the Cyprus dispute. Denktaş (1966: 8) argued that finding a solution through diplomacy had become impossible and since Turkey did not have a common foreign policy it could not achieve any objective on Cyprus. Although Greece was supporting Greek Cypriots and even supplying arms, Denktaş continued, Turkey was still pursuing ‘legitimate’ ways to support Turkish Cypriots who definitely needed Turkey’s help (1966: 9). After listing the objectives of Greek Cypriots, Denktaş argued that there was only one objective to achieve, and that was revoking the Guarantee Agreement (1966: 39). Denktaş not only complained about the current situation but also declared a solution: “Greeks want *enosis* but they want to achieve this objective without confronting war with Turkey. When Turkey will risk confronting war with Greece and declare it directly, Greece will retreat” (1966: 46)

5.2. Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy of Turkey

5.2.1. Domestic Politics

As the previous chapter demonstrated, the third İnönü coalition mainly focused on the Cyprus dispute throughout 1964. During the same year important changes

took place in the domestic politics of Turkey. First of all, the leader of a main opposition party, Ragıp Gümüşpala, died in June 1964 and the party congress choose Süleyman Demirel for the post after a contentious election in late 1964. Demirel's *Adalet Partisi* brought down the İnönü administration in February 1965 as its first accomplishment. During the budget negotiation in parliament, opposition parties voted against the proposal and as a result the third and last İnönü coalition lost its legitimacy to rule (Çaylak and Baran 2010: 433-434). Actually the third İnönü coalition could have been brought down at any time, but Demirel chose to wait for an appropriate time while securing his position both within the party and among the generals (Ahmad 1993: 137). In the following days Turkey was ruled by a caretaker 'supra-party' government formed under the leadership of Senator Suat Hayri Ürgüplü. Since Demirel was not a member of the parliament at that time he became deputy prime minister and did a kind of 'internship' (Çaylak and Baran 2010: 437).

When the elections took place in October 1965 *Adalet Partisi* not only secured enough seats to form the government but also won a landslide victory. Although CHP lost the elections it still was the second party after AP. Additionally, for the first time in history of Turkey *Türkiye İşçi Partisi* (TİP - Labor Party of Turkey) won 15 seats in the parliament thanks to the election law which was favoring minor parties vis-à-vis major parties such as *Adalet Partisi* and *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*. As a result of the election, the parliament consisted of six parties and only *Türkiye İşçi Partisi* was 'new' in the parliament.

Türkiye İşçi Partisi, the only party with a Marxist orientation in the Turkish parliament, blamed the West and the US in particular for the difficulties

Turkey faced in both domestic and international arenas (Giritli 1969: 354). TİP also accused the US administration of pursuing ‘imperialistic’ policies with regard to Cyprus dispute. As İsmet Giritli argues, TİP became a base for opposition to the US: “Why, they asked, should the US not support a struggle for freedom and human rights in Cyprus as it did in Korea? Why in particular should it not support the country that had fought with it in Korea and was its faithful ally in the Atlantic Alliance” (Giritli 1969: 357).

Actually, the rise of *Türkiye İşçi Partisi* was a result of the changes in Turkey’s domestic politics. Politics in the 1960s was quite different than in the previous decade. First of all, the 1961 constitution introduced a liberal environment in politics that Turkey had not experienced before. Ideological politics were present in daily politics and left-wing thoughts were gaining ground in universities. In response to the rise of leftist ideas, right-wing parties also became more active in politics. Although Turkey pursued pro-American policies during the 1950s, during the 1960s an opposition grew and anti-Americanism became an issue¹⁵ (Ahmad 1993: 139-141).

At first leftist organizations expressed their discontent with domestic politics and the influence of these groups outnumbered other radical groups. However, when the Cyprus crisis erupted and a sense of disbelief in the US emerged among the public, the focus of criticism shifted to foreign policy. These organizations accused the West of pursuing imperialist aims and being a stumbling block to modernizing Turkey. In other words, Turkey’s backwardness was a result of Western powers’ policies. In this context, the US was the main

¹⁵ It is interesting to note that during the 1960s Greece also witnessed anti-Americanism (Iatrides 2003: 91).

cause of Turkey's troubled times. Even in early 1965 anti-Americanism was so high that when İnönü could not get the vote for the budget and resigned from premiership, some argued that it was an act of conspiracy tailored by the US (Harris 1972: 129-132).

However, it is important to note that anti-Americanism was not limited to radical organizations or student demonstrations. There were criticisms of the US administration even among Turkish intelligentsia. For instance, just after İnönü's decision to use military force in August 1964, the journal *Forum* stated that the future of the US administration's attitude towards Turkey was more critical than the Cyprus dispute. *Forum* argued that since Turkey was not a 'satellite' the US could not dictate Turkey to follow its policies at the expense of Turkey. Additionally, *Forum* declared that the US policy of leaving Turkey alone in case of Soviet threat was totally a mistake¹⁶ (Forum 1st Sep. 1964).

President Cemal Gürsel's health condition deteriorated in 1966. Although the president went to the United States for treatment, efforts to cure his illness were unsuccessful. As a result, Gürsel returned to Turkey and GATA (*Gülhane Askeri Tıp Akademisi* – Gülhane Military Academia of Medicine) issued a report indicating that the president could not resume his post. At this point, Demirel considered Cevdet Sunay, Chief of Staff, the 'most suitable candidate' for presidency since he was against military involvement in politics and supportive of the parliament. Sunay was elected as the fifth President of Turkey in 1966 (Çaylak and Baran 2010: 440).

¹⁶ The Johnson Letter was then 'unknown' in Turkey, though its content and impact on Turkey's decision not to intervene in Cyprus was 'well-known'.

5.2.2. Foreign Policy

After the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) Turkey realized that it could be a target of the Soviet Union. Although Turkish decision makers started to revise their policies, they could not form a neutral foreign policy since they considered Turkey incapable of pursuing such policies. On the other hand, Turkish decision makers wanted to warm up frosty relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union in 1963. However, this process of rapprochement was halted by the eruption of the Cyprus crisis in late 1963 (Göktepe 2010: 412).

Although the Cyprus crisis affected the rapprochement process between Turkey and the Soviet Union, it could not prevent it totally. When Turkey realized that it could not rely on its allies in case of war, Turkey declared its intention to open a new page in bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. Obviously, Soviet authorities continuously wanted to improve bilateral relations with Turkey since the death of Stalin in 1953, and the Cyprus crisis paved the way for rapprochement. The first important step taken by Turkey was when Turkish Foreign Minister, Feridun Cemal Erkin, visited Moscow and signed some agreements related to cultural affairs (Göktepe 2010: 415).

This rapprochement process continued during the Demirel administration. Indeed, Demirel's foreign policy had four dimensions: i) securing Turkey through diplomatic relations; ii) funding Turkey's economic development with foreign sources; iii) establishing good relations with neighboring countries; and iv) finding supporters for Turkey's Cyprus policy in the international arena. Actually,

to achieve these aims the Soviet Union emerged as a suitable candidate for broadening the scope of Turkish foreign policy (Bölükbaşı 2001: 158). First of all, the Soviets had the capacity to foster development in Turkey. For instance, the Soviets provided financial and technical aid to Turkey to realize huge projects such as iron and steel industry in Erdemir, aluminum industry in Seydişehir, and a petroleum refinery in Aliğa (Arcayürek 1985: 125). Secondly, the Soviets were backing Greek Cypriots' views in 1964, which was encouraging the Makarios's administration to act more independently. As a result, a change in the Soviet policy might lead to a decrease in tension on Cyprus. Thirdly, establishing cordial relations with the Soviet Union would result in a decrease in Turkey's threat perception from its northern neighbor.

Despite having a more neutral foreign policy Turkey did not cease to participate in NATO. On the contrary, Turkey remained a part of Western economic and military institutions besides establishing ties with 'other' countries. The change in Turkish foreign policy was a result of putting Turkey's interests first (Giritli 1969: 360). In other words, beginning in the mid-1960s Turkey pursued a foreign policy serving mainly its own interests.

The Cyprus crisis affected Turkey's relations with the West in general and the United States in particular. For instance, in 1962 the Kennedy administration proposed establishment of a nuclear naval force under NATO, known as the Multilateral Force (MLF), and Turkey was one of the supporters of this proposal. However, the attitudes of the US administration during the Cyprus crisis of 1964 in general and the Johnson Letter in particular changed Turkey's pro-American foreign policy and its decision to support every US foreign policy. In January

1965 Turkey announced its withdrawal from the MLF. Actually, other European NATO members were also not supporting the MLF, and realizing this fact had some effects on Turkish decision makers to revise their policies (Erhan 2008: 691-692).

In 1967 the Republican People's Party, now in opposition in Turkey, organized a panel and discussed the advantages and disadvantages of being a NATO member. According to this panel Turkey should remain in NATO but it should change its bilateral agreements with the member countries in order to gain more freedom of action (Harris 1972: 141-2).

However, arguments on whether Turkey would stay in NATO or end its membership and act more neutral continued in public debate. Proponents of withdrawal from NATO argued that Turkey maintained a huge army which diverted crucial resources from spending on development. Additionally, supporters of this view stated that in case of a nuclear war between opposite blocs, Turkey would be a victim of nuclear attack and thus be affected severely. Furthermore, according to these adherents, as a result of the balance of power between rival super powers the United States would not allow the Soviet Union to dominate the Middle East politics of which Turkey was considered a part. On the other hand, supporters of continuation of Turkey's membership to NATO argued that Turkey still had a lack of national resources to defend itself. Obviously, according to proponents of continuation of membership, withdrawal would lead to a shift in the balance of power in the favor of Greece, since Greece would continue to get Western military aid while Turkey would not get any support. Moreover, Turkey was getting economic assistance from Western powers,

especially from the US, and if Turkey decided to withdraw then the future of the aid would be in question (Hale 2000: 151-152).

Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East also changed during the same period. Actually, the major shift in Turkish foreign policy happened after the AP's landslide victory in 1965 general election. First of all, *Adalet Partisi* had a conservative orientation and wanted to reorganize foreign policy according to its political views. Secondly, authorities of *Adalet Partisi* wished to normalize Turkey's relations with its Arab neighbors which had deteriorated during the *Demokrat Parti* governments. Additionally, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the world witnessed *détente* between rival blocs, and Turkey used this relatively stable period to improve its relations with its neighbors. Furthermore, when Galo Plaza's report on Cyprus was discussed in the UN General Assembly in 1965, Turkey realized that it could not get support from its neighbors. According to Turkish decision makers, Arab states at the UN General Assembly voted in favor of 'Christian Greeks' at the expense of 'Muslim Turks' which stirred Turkey to revise its policies towards the Middle East (Armaoğlu 2000a: 194-195).

The 1967 Arab-Israel war, or the 'Six Days War' gave an opportunity for Turkey to deepen its relations with the Arab world. When the first rumblings of war were heard in April 1967, Turkey adopted a neutral attitude towards events that took place between Arabs and Israel. In general, Turkey's tone was constructive and in accordance with the previous UN resolutions which prohibited armed conflicts as a mean of solution. At this stage, Turkey still did not blame any party for escalating crisis. Furthermore, during the course of the war Turkey tried not to abandon its 'neutrality policy' by supporting only UN resolutions.

However, when the war ended with a definite Israeli victory, Turkey sent in-kind aid to its Arab neighbors which cost Turkey nearly 500,000 million US\$. Additionally, in the aftermath of the war, during both NATO and UN meetings Turkey declared that acquiring land through using force was a violation of international law, which was an implicit way of accusing Israel. It is important to note that during sessions of the UN General Assembly Turkey acted with Arab countries while its NATO allies were siding with Israel. In other words, Turkey's policies and its Western allies' policies clashed on the 1967 Arab-Israel war. (Armaoğlu 2000b: 218)

Turkey became more reluctant to allow the use of its facilities for non-NATO operations after the 1964 Cyprus crisis (Kuniholm 1991: 39-40). During the course of the Arab-Israel war of 1967 Turkey strongly opposed utilization of military bases in connection with the Middle East disputes. Accordingly, Foreign Minister Çağlayangil, declared that the US authorities could not use these bases without getting explicit permission from Turkey. It is important to note that all opposition parties joined the government in supporting this 'restriction on US actions' policy. Actually, the origin of this policy lies in late 1965, when a US reconnaissance plane crashed in the Black Sea. Although the US administration suspended these flights immediately, Turkish authorities asked Washington to stop such reconnaissance activities (Harris 1972: 165-166). Additionally, during the course of the war, there were demonstrations in Istanbul against the US Sixth Fleet. Demonstrators argued that the Sixth Fleet was responsible for Turkey's decision not to intervene in Cyprus in 1964 and they saw the Fleet as symbol of American imperialism (Harris 1972: 169).

5.3. The 1967 Cyprus Crisis

When the calendar reached 1967 Turkey was faced with another Cyprus crisis. Before discussing the 1967 Cyprus crisis in more detail it might be helpful to know the dramatic changes that took place in Greece in 1967. The most important switch was in domestic politics when the Greek army brought down the government and established a ‘Colonels’ regime’ better known as the ‘Greek junta’ in April 1967.

When the junta in Greece controlled the military forces on Cyprus, Makarios had no option but to place a certain amount of confidence in the junta (Constandinos 2011: 26). The Greek military junta, because of its lack of domestic support, wanted to show some external success to the Greek public in order to hide domestic problems. In this case, Cyprus was considered a source of external success; however, Greek forces in Cyprus caused crisis by attacking Turkish Cypriot villages and the two countries were again on the brink of war (Firat 1997). Although the junta was a result of domestic politics of Greece, it affected Greece’s foreign policy until restoration of democracy in 1974.

May 1967, Athens informed Ankara that Greece wanted to achieve *enosis* by peaceful means (Milliyet 6th May 1967). Three stick of dynamite exploded near the house of Dr. Fazıl Küçük on Cyprus, and the explosions affected three houses of Dr. Küçük’s aides (Milliyet 20th May 1967). As the Middle East was approaching an Arab-Israel war in the summer of 1967, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affair published a notification to declare that Turkey supports efforts to

ease the tension in the Middle East (Milliyet 29th May 1967). Additionally, Turkey declared that it would not allow the US to use military bases against the Arabs (Milliyet 30th May 1967).

June 1967, war erupted between Arab countries and Israel, and Foreign Minister Çağlayangil repeated Turkey's policy of not allowing its bases to be used in the war (Milliyet 6th Jun. 1967). The president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, sent a message to President Sunay and thanked him for Turkey's attitude and support for Arab countries (Milliyet 15th Jun. 1967). In New York, Çağlayangil met with the Secretary-General of the UN, U Thant, and representatives of Eastern Bloc countries to discuss the future of Cyprus (Milliyet 25th Jun. 1967). Turkish youth in İstanbul organized a demonstration against the US (Milliyet 25th Jun. 1967b).

July 1967, the Greek Prime Minister, Konstantinos Kollias, had an interview with *Milliyet* and declared that establishing *enosis* was the best solution for Cyprus. He compared the relationship between Greece and Cyprus to a mother-daughter relationship (Milliyet 10th Jul. 1967). As a reply to Kollias' *enosis* proposal, Çağlayangil stated that Turkey could not consider *enosis* as a basis for bilateral talks (Milliyet 11th Jul. 1967). Although Turkish response was negative, Greece continued to declare *enosis* a 'sacred objective' and said they would achieve *enosis* though Communist countries opposed the idea (Milliyet 12th Jul 1967). During July 1967 some intercommunity clashes happened on Cyprus.

August 1967, intercommunity clashes continued on the island. Çağlayangil declared that Turkey would never accept *enosis* as a *fait accompli* solution (Milliyet 14th Aug. 1967). However, Greek authorities continued to announce that

they would continue to pursue *enosis* (Milliyet 17th Aug. 1967). Turkish Cypriot *mucahits* (civil fighters) organized a demonstration without permission in Ankara and the police suppressed the group (Milliyet 24th Aug. 1967). Demirel declared that the Cyprus issue could not be solved at the expense of Turkey (Milliyet 30th Aug. 1967).

September 1967, Demirel and Kollias agreed to hold negotiations to discuss Cyprus near the two countries' border (Milliyet 5th Sep. 1967). The negotiations took place on 9 and 10 September, and these negotiations are known as Keşan-Alexandroupolis (Dedeğac) meetings. İnönü, as the leader of the main opposition party, declared that the CHP supported the government on the Cyprus issue (Milliyet 10th Sep. 1967). Turkey repeated its objection to *enosis* and declared that Turkey also did not consider *taksim* a solution (Milliyet 12th Sep 1967). Demirel visited Romania and the two countries agreed to strengthen their partnership in various areas (Milliyet 18th Sep 1967). After Romania, Demirel had a long visit to the Soviet Union in September 1967. Turkey and the Soviet Union agreed to continue cooperation on economic issues. Regarding Cyprus, both parties agreed that a lasting solution could be found through peaceful methods and that Cyprus should remain united and independent (Milliyet 30th Sep 1967).

October 1967, Çağlayangil stated at the UN General Assembly session that the latest developments might lead to a break of the peace on Cyprus (Milliyet 4th Oct 1967). Chairman of *Millet Partisi* (Nation Party), Osman Bölükbaşı, was denied a visit to Cyprus by Cypriot authorities and Bölükbaşı declared this event a 'scandal' (Milliyet 19th Oct 1967). Demirel visited Iraq to sign agreements on

trade and cooperation, and he declared that Turkey's ties with its Arab neighbors were improving (Milliyet 25th Oct 1967).

November 1967, Rauf Denktaş attempted to enter Cyprus illegally and he was caught by Greek Cypriot authorities (Milliyet 1st Nov 1967). British Foreign Minister George Brown, stated that the United Kingdom would talk with the Makarios administration about setting Denktaş free (Milliyet 3rd Nov 1967). Turkish youths organized demonstrations to protest the detention of Denktaş, and during these protests clashes happened between police and demonstrators in Ankara. The police took 30 youths into custody (Milliyet 12th Nov 1967). The Greek Cypriot authorities set Denktaş free and he returned to Turkey. Denktaş stated that *enosis* was de facto achieved since the Greek army was present on Cyprus (Milliyet 14th Nov 1967). Greek platoons under the command of Grivas attacked Turkish Cypriot communities. This massive attack alarmed Turkey (Milliyet 16th Nov 1967). Although the conflict ended the following day, the parliament issued an act to send military 'oversees' and the government sent a diplomatic note to Greece accusing Greece of destabilizing Cyprus (Milliyet 18th Nov 1967). Turkey declared that if the Greek army did not leave Cyprus immediately Turkey would intervene in Cyprus (Milliyet 19th Nov 1967). Ankara warned that if Athens would not give a guarantee of withdraw of its platoons from Cyprus, Turkey would intervene within one or two days (Milliyet 23rd Nov 1967). The US administration sent Cyrus Vance as a special envoy to mediate the crisis. The tension started to deescalate when Greek authorities considered removal of Greek soldiers from Cyprus (Milliyet 26th Nov 1967). The parties reached an

agreement on removal of Greek platoons stationed illegally according to the founding agreements of Cyprus (Milliyet 30th Nov 1967).

Although Turkey and Greece reached an agreement, Makarios had some objections to the agreement. The crisis was fully resolved when Makarios agreed to implement the agreement (Milliyet 5th Dec 1967).

5.4. Analyzing events

When the Cyprus crisis erupted as another international crisis in 1967, Turkey had experienced single-party rule under Süleyman Demirel's *Adalet Partisi* since the October 1965 elections. Although the Demirel administration faced the dispute as early as just one month after forming the government, the following months were relatively peaceful and Cyprus did not demand the attention of Turkish public opinion. This thesis will now study the approach of the Demirel administration to the renewed crisis on the island. As discussed earlier, the poliheuristic decision model consist of two stages; here the thesis will evaluate Turkey's decision in 1967, and analyze how Turkey decided not to intervene in Cyprus using the poliheuristic decision making model.

5.4.1. First stage of decision making

In the first stage of the poliheuristic decision model, decision makers eliminate the policy alternatives which have a low value in a key dimension. The thesis argues that in this stage 'domestic politics dimension' was considered the key dimension by the Demirel administration. Before applying the first stage of the poliheuristic

decision model to the 1967 Cyprus crisis, it might be helpful to discuss AP's and the administration's approaches to foreign policy.

Before the 1965 general elections *Adalet Partisi* published an election manifesto. The document stated that: "For building up and developing our country, for not wasting lives, efforts, and energy of Turkish citizens we need total peace, security, and stability in domestic and foreign policy" (AP 1965: 31). As a result of this aim, Turkey should pursue a foreign policy away from 'adventures' to direct its energy to development within its borders, the document continued (AP 1965: 31).

Regarding the Cyprus issue the document argued that *Adalet Partisi* 'sincerely' wanted to solve the Cyprus dispute through negotiations with Greece on the basis of existing agreements and wanted to defend Turkey's and Turkish Cypriots' interests. The document declared that the AP's approach should not be considered 'weakness' since the AP was ready to retaliate against any act against Turkey's wishes (AP 1965: 32).

It is important to note that even the foreign policy chapter of the manifesto of *Adalet Partisi* discusses Turkey's development and creating domestic stability in Turkey. This was not a coincidence since the document's focus was on development and stability. The manifesto demonstrates that AP's priority was domestic politics, even discussing foreign issues. This is why the thesis argues that the 'domestic politics dimension' was the key dimension in decision making process of the Demirel administration during the 1967 Cyprus crisis.

In 1972 *Adalet Partisi* published a book covering its rule from 1965 to 1971. The foreign policy chapter of the book showed the AP's foreign policy priorities. For instance, the document argued that although Turkey considered NATO as a guarantee for its security and stability, it still did not hesitate to review its relations with the US on bilateral basis (AP 1972: 47). The document discussed that Turkey improved its relations with its neighbors during the AP rule. Additionally, by improving cordial relations with the Soviet Union, Turkey started to establish positive relations with other Eastern Bloc countries. The document argued that establishing peace and stability in the Middle East region requires preservation of Arab countries' 'legitimate' rights and interests. Additionally, the AP indicated that the UN would pave the way for peaceful settlement in the Middle East (AP 1972: 48). Actually, this approach was quite different from the previous administrations' foreign policies. First and foremost, the former 'adversary' (i.e. the USSR) became a source of economic development and a balancing factor for Turkey's relations with the West. Additionally, Turkey turned its face to East and sought new ways to cooperate with its 'brother' (i.e. Muslim) neighbors. During the 1960s the existence of the Arab-Israeli conflict established a basis for cooperation for Turkish decision makers. Although Turkey refrained from providing full support for the 'Arab cause', it still adopted policies favoring Arab countries.

On the Cyprus dispute the document argued that (AP 1972: 49):

Solving our national cause, the Cyprus dispute, according to Turkish community and Turkey's rights and interests was always our unchangeable aim. [...] The AP government responded the 1967 Cyprus crisis intently and with determination. As a result, previous five years were relatively peaceful on the island.

According to these views, the Demirel administration followed a foreign policy to sustain development in Turkey. Additionally, in the Cyprus dispute the administration adapted a peaceful but ‘determined’ method to settle the matter.

During the first stage of the decision making process, the administration analyzed attitudes of the Turkish public towards the Cyprus dispute. As the chronology showed there were demonstrations with or without permission to support Turkish Cypriots in various cities of Turkey. Furthermore, during some of these demonstrations the police had to use force to suppress demonstrators. As the demonstrations spread the administration even declared that “it is impossible to achieve a national cause by illegal demonstrations” (Milliyet 25th Aug 1967). Additionally, during various sessions of the parliament, opposition parties stated that Turkey should act to stop conflict on the island though it might have to use force to end this dispute. For instance, after the UN General Assembly session of December 1965, Osman Bölükbaşı argued on behalf of MP that “as long as Turkey does not risk confronting war with Greece we should admit that we lost Cyprus cause” (MMTD 1965: 21). İsmail Hakkı Yılanlıoğlu argued on behalf of CKMP that Turkey should use its right under the agreements to intervene since Turkish Cypriots could not live under common rule on the island (MMTD 1965: 26).

The AP promised the masses stability and economic development. The İnönü coalitions were fragile and could not dominate the parliament except for the first coalition formed with *Adalet Partisi* - though this coalition was dissolved when AP withdrew from the coalition after just six months. The İnönü coalitions were followed by a ‘caretaker’ and ‘supra-party’ government under the

premiership of Senator Suat Hayri Ürgüplü which ruled the country until the October 1965 general elections. As a result, there was a demand for stability in Turkey and the AP emerged as a suitable candidate for this post.

Actually, to win the elections *Adalet Partisi* had to represent interests of many different social backgrounds. Demirel often described the AP as a mass party representing different classes to secure enough vote to win the elections. The AP considered itself as a party for ‘social justice’ and the way to achieve this justice was “through a real increase in the national income” (Levi 1991: 140). In other words, the AP’s most important goal was economic growth in Turkey.

Following its formation in November 1965, the Demirel administration pursued development-focused policies. Different from the previous governments, the Demirel administration dedicated its energy to strengthening the Turkish economy with investments, whereas the İnönü coalitions had been busy with both domestic (coup attempts) and foreign (Cyprus) problems. This is why the AP government wanted to foster development while preserving domestic and foreign peace.

Although Demirel’s *Adalet Partisi* won a landslide victory in the 1965 elections, there were quarrels between Demirel’s fraction and that of Sadettin Bilgiç within the party. Sadettin Bilgiç ruled the AP following the death of Ragıp Gümüşpala and then lost the party leadership to Süleyman Demirel. Despite losing the leadership to Demirel, Bilgiç remained in the AP but refused to become a minister in the Demirel administration (Komsuoğlu 2008: 145). However, Bilgiç and his supporters composed an opposition group within the party. After the 1965 elections, Demirel formed the cabinet and the names of members of the cabinet

were read in the parliament. When all the names were read, the parliament remained silent and no one showed any gesture of ‘approval’ for the cabinet. The MPs changed their approach while announcing the government program in the parliament (Arcayürek 1985: 17). In other words, Demirel witnessed a sign of opposition from his party from the first day of his premiership.

Since the Demirel administration was confronted with the Cyprus dispute just after forming the government, and since there was criticism for the previous governments for not taking any risk to solve the dispute, the Demirel administration decided to eliminate the ‘do nothing’ policy alternative during the first phase of the decision making process.

5.4.2. Second stage of decision making

In the second stage of the poliheuristic decision model, a decision maker uses analytic evaluations and tries to maximize gains by minimizing losses. Since the ‘do nothing’ alternative was eliminated in the first stage, the Demirel administration had three remaining policy options: i) intervention; ii) diplomatic efforts; and iii) air strike. The thesis will evaluate each policy alternative according to the remaining dimensions: *systemic* and *military*.

Systemic dimension: Although the rapprochement process between Turkey and the Soviet Union started during the third İnönü coalition, the process gained a fast pace during the Demirel administration. Actually, the Demirel administration not only established cordial relations with the Soviet Union but also cooperated with the Soviets on economic matters. For instance the Soviets extended credit for

constructing some of the noticeable projects in Turkey and provided technical assistance to Turkey.

During the Demirel administration, although Turkey did not shift its foreign policy from the West, the administration established relations with the Soviets and Arab countries to maintain Turkey's economic development (Komsuoğlu 2008: 165). It is important to note that though the basis of Turkey's new foreign policy was economic, Turkey had the chance to inform third parties about its policies directly thanks to improving relations. For instance, the attitudes of the Soviet Union were relatively more 'supportive' for Turkey on the Cyprus dispute. As Mehmet Ali Aybar discussed at the parliament, the Soviets abstained during the vote for the Plaza report in 1965 at the UN General Assembly and this was a change in the Soviet policy: during the 1964 crisis the Soviets warned Turkey not to intervene and this warning was 'reminded' of in the Johnson Letter. However, later the Soviets – still being against foreign military presence on the island - adopted a policy supporting a bi-communal solution for Cyprus (MMTD 1965: 31-36). As a result of improving relations with the Soviet Union during the 1967 Cyprus crisis, there was almost no reference to the Soviet Union as a threat (Göktepe 2005).

Following the Greek attacks against Turkish Cypriot villages in November 1967, the US administration adopted a more balanced approach and did not send a 'harsh letter' to any party. Actually the US administration had two options to decrease tension: i) inviting President Sunay and King Konstantin to Washington to discuss the situation with President Johnson; or ii) sending a special envoy to the conflict area. The administration chose the second option and appointed Cyrus

Vance for the post (Bölükbaşı 2001: 184). Vance immediately started ‘shuttle diplomacy’ in the region.

However, before appointing Vance for the mission, the US administration sent messages to Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey and asked for reducing “the threat for peace”¹⁷ (FRUS 2000: 647). Ambassador Hart delivered the message to Foreign Minister Çağlayangil and he especially expressed that he did not bring a ‘letter’ which could be subject to conversation. During the visit Çağlayangil informed Hart that “tortures like the ones used in the Middle Ages have been [used] against the Turkish community” including burning alive an 80 year old man. Additionally, as the situation on the island worsened at the expense of Turkish Cypriots “the Turkish public opinion and the Turkish community have been incurably aroused against the Turkish Gov[ernment]”. When the ambassador declared that the “prospect of a war between two allies was a nightmare for us all”, Çağlayangil replied that going “through this nightmare once and for all is preferable to seeing a nightmare every night”¹⁸ (FRUS 2000: 648-650).

Since Turkey left the door open for peace negotiations by sending a diplomatic note to Greece, the US administration had a chance to solve the dispute by diplomacy. Actually, Cyrus Vance was not alone in this duty: Manlio Brosio, secretary general of the NATO, and Jose Rolz-Bannett, special representative of the general secretary of UN, helped Vance in dealing with the situation. Brosio and Vance’s focuses were on mainland countries while Rolz-Bannett concentrated more on Cyprus. The strategy was something similar to this one: The US would

¹⁷ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus, November 17, 1967.

¹⁸ Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, November 18, 1967.

first find a solution between mainland countries and then would forward it to Cyprus (Sönmezoğlu 1995: 24-25).

Cyrus Vance witnessed strong criticism in the Turkish public. Demonstrators did not allow his plane to land in Esenboğa airport. The public considered the 'Vance mission' another step taken by the US to prevent Turkey from pursuing its 'just' decision to intervene in Cyprus (Bölükbaşı 2001: 185). The demonstrators argued that the US had prevented Turkey from using American arms on Cyprus in 1964 though Greece was now using such arms to massacre Turkish Cypriots on Cyprus. President Sunay declared Turkey's intention to end the dispute 'once and for all' (Purcell 1969: 383).

Although Greece immediately called Grivas back to Athens and Grivas resigned from commanding Greek forces on Cyprus, Greece did not reply to Turkey's diplomatic note before 22nd November. When Greece replied to the note, the tone was negative about withdrawing its forces from Cyprus. Since Turkish decision makers were 'determined' to solve the dispute 'once and for all' the Vance mission put more pressure on Greece.

Actually, Vance knew that both Turkey and Greece were receiving aid from the US and these countries were in need of foreign aid to maintain their economic and military development. During the 1967 crisis, the US press published some articles which argued that if war erupted then the US might cease sending aid for these countries. The US administration decided to avoid further deterioration of relations with Turkey in 1967. As a result, the US pressured Greece more since this country was somehow isolated from the rest of the world and could be influenced more easily (Sönmezoğlu 1995: 25-26). Additionally,

Greek decision makers considered Cyprus a secondary foreign and security issue when a strong party (i.e. the US) forced them to choose a policy (Coufoudakis 2003: 117).

Vance, recognizing Turkey's stand on the issue, pressured the Greek junta and Makarios. Vance's mission was successful in persuading the Greek junta to withdraw Greek forces from the island. On the other hand, it is argued that if a democratically elected government were in power in Greece during the 1967 Cyprus crisis, the Cyprus Vance mission could not have been successful and a war would have broken out between Turkey and Greece (Hart 1972: 141). In other words, if the Greek junta had external support for its policies the 1967 crisis have may lead to a war. It is important to note that the 1967 crisis happened just after the Arab-Israeli war which had resulted in regional instability. This is why the US pressured even more to prevent another devastating war in the region (Coufoudakis 2003: 115)

Before the eruption of the renewed crisis in 1967, the Demirel administration announced its intention to solve the dispute through negotiations between Turkey and Greece. The administration, however, stated that Turkey's right to intervene remained valid in case of a massive attack against Turkish Cypriots.

When the Cyprus crisis was renewed in 1967 Demirel, who criticized İnönü for not being determined to solve the dispute by any means, acted as İnönü and pursued a cautious foreign policy from the very beginning (Hale 2000: 153). Since the clashes were ended the following day the 'urgency' to intervene decreased. On the contrary, deciding to intervene might turn the international

opinion against Turkey. Furthermore, once the US administration's pressure was directed towards Greece, Turkey might benefit from this opportunity to change the balance in its favor.

Military dimension: Turkey warned Greece that it would retaliate if the situation on the island did not change in favor of Turkish Cypriots, and if the attacking troops did not cease fire and retreat. Definitely, it was not the first time such a warning had been issued by the Turkish government. However, the message reached the 'audience' as the US administration got involved and tried to prevent the war between its NATO allies.

Turkish intervention would result in establishing 'de facto' *taksim*, as Greek military presence established 'de facto' *enosis* which was argued for previously by Denktaş. Turkey declared that if Greece would not withdraw its troops, Turkey would get even and send Turkish platoons to balance out Greece. Actually, this act might have triggered a war between Greece and Turkey which was a 'nightmare' for the US administration.

However, Turkey's capability to intervene 'successfully' in Cyprus was a question for the Demirel administration which was definitely 'unknown' to both Greece and the US during that time. Arcayürek (1985: 118-119) argues that although Turkey wanted to make the decision to intervene in Cyprus, its 'readiness' was a big question for the administration. For instance, when the cabinet met to discuss the current situation the chiefs of staff were also present. Demirel declared the administration's intention to intervene in Cyprus, then commander of ground forces, Refik Yılmaz, asked what the target would be. The administration realized the fact that the army was not prepared for such an

operation. Next Demirel, accompanied by foreign and defense ministers, visited Turkish General Staff and there they once again saw that the army did not have the required equipment to intervene.

Additionally, the presence of Greek army on Cyprus would make the military operation more difficult for Turkey. Besides, Greek National Army strengthened itself with the equipment and training provided by the Greek army. After being confronted with the crisis, Turkish generals argued that an amphibious landing would be one of the most difficult military operations and emphasized the need for required materials: landing crafts, helicopters, and air landing brigades. Turkey was not materially ready for such an amphibious operation. Although there was an effort to build up military industry in Turkey, the military industry was far away from producing its own landing crafts (Yavuzalp 1996: 115-116).

Despite all efforts to build up military industry, the Turkish army had other needs to operate more efficiently. For instance, there was a need of housing for officers, border stations, and military barracks. The Demirel administration granted huge amounts of money after 1965 elections to provide these facilities for the army at the same time establishing factories for military purposes (AP 1972: 43-44).

The US administration was so devoted to preventing a war between its allies that US Secretary of State, Rusk, sent a message to the US ambassadors in Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey stating: “The stakes are such that the future of our

bilateral relations are secondary to the prevention of hostilities between Greece and Turkey”¹⁹ (FRUS 2000: 660)

The first impression of the US ambassador to Turkey, Parker Hart, was that Turkey would not decide to use force as long as another bloody event would not take place on the island. Additionally, according to Hart, Turkey was accusing Grivas of causing troubles on the island²⁰ (FRUS 2000: 644).

5.4.3. The Decision

In the second stage the Demirel administration evaluated remaining policy alternatives according to their total ratings. Here the most favorable decision became ‘diplomatic efforts’.

Table 3 shows the decision matrix of Demirel.

Table 3: Decision matrix of Demirel

	Dimensions			
Policy options	Systemic	Domestic Politics	Military	Total (Average)
Military Intervention	1	4	1	6 (2)
Air strike	2	2	2	6 (3)
Diplomatic efforts	4	3	-	7 (2,3)
Do nothing	3	1	-	4 (1,3)

¹⁹ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassies in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, November 23, 1967.

²⁰ Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, November 15, 1967.

On the *systemic* dimension, the alternatives are scored from highest to lowest according to their impact on Turkey's stand in the international arena and the decision's effect on Turkey's foreign relations. On the *domestic politics* dimension, alternatives are ranked according to their ability to satisfy public opinion while improving the situation on the island in favor of Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. On the *military* dimension, they are scored according to their ability to successfully achieve military objectives.

Under the *systemic* dimension the most favorable option that emerged was 'diplomatic efforts'. Solving the question by peaceful methods will be ranked higher than other alternatives since this option would not cause a war in the region. Thus, this alternative would ease the pressure from third parties (i.e. the US or the USSR). It is important to note that although there was rapprochement between Turkey and the USSR, the Soviets were still not supportive for a military operation against Cyprus.

On the other hand, under the *domestic politics* dimension the 'military intervention' option ranked as the best option since the audience and the opposition parties were expecting some kind of action towards Cyprus in order to provide security for Turkish Cypriots. Thus, the administration had to choose a policy option which would not damage the government. However, since the Demirel administration's priority was economic development a war could damage Turkey's development plans severely. This is why the administration tried to find a non-military solution for the crisis.

Under the *military* dimension the 'air strike' option scored as the best policy alternative since Turkey's capacity to carry a full scale military operation

was relatively lower than the ‘air strike’ decision. Although Turkey realized its dependence on foreign military aid during the 1964 crisis and started to develop its own military industry, the current level of industrial achievements were still quite limited to produce required military equipments for a landing operation.

It is important to note that the 1974 crisis supported the assumptions of the poliheuristic decision making model. First of all, according to the model, the administration identified a ‘key dimension’ (i.e. *domestic politics*) in the first stage of the decision making process and eliminated the policy options the administration considered ‘unacceptable’. At this stage the Demirel administration eliminated the ‘do nothing’ option though this option had a high score under the *systemic* dimension. In other words, the administration’s decision supported the ‘non-compensatory’ principle of the poliheuristic model.

In the second stage the Demirel administration evaluated remaining policy alternatives according to their total ratings. Here the most favorable decision emerged as ‘diplomatic efforts’ which was the ultimate decision of the Demirel administration.

Pursuing a policy based on diplomacy was a priority for the Demirel administration. However, since both the public opinion and the hawks within the parliament were demanding a ‘strong response’ the administration had to find a face-saving policy. At this point, the administration tried to force Greece to withdraw its military forces from Cyprus, which was exceeding legal limits granted under prior agreements. It could be argued that with this move the administration had two objectives: i) calming the anger of both public and hawks; and ii) preventing Greek troops from attacking Turkish Cypriots.

CHAPTER VI:

THE 1974 CYPRUS CRISIS

During the 1967 Cyprus crisis Turkey achieved almost all of its objectives while ‘unauthorized’ Greek forces had to retreat from Cyprus. Additionally, Turkish Cypriots who suffered from Greek attacks during the 1967 crisis would receive compensation. Furthermore, Grivas, one of the leading supporters of *enosis*, had to leave Cyprus. However, as was the case with the 1964 crisis, the 1967 crisis did not lead to a permanent solution in Cyprus.

Following the crisis the Demirel administration again focused on domestic politics. However, during the following years Turkey witnessed popular demonstrations which gradually became ‘acts of terrorism’. When the authorities could not handle the worsening situation, the army took the initiative and the Demirel administration stepped down from the government in 1971. Subsequent

administrations were ‘supra-party’ governments until the formation of the Ecevit administration in 1974.

The Ecevit administration adopted a pro-active foreign policy and did not hesitate to take actions that might damage relations between Turkey and the US. Additionally, during these years Turkey’s relations with Greece were problematic due to conflict regarding to Aegean Sea. Under these conditions a coup took place on Cyprus against the Makarios administration in July 1974. Turkey again declared its intention to intervene in Cyprus to restore the state of affairs of the Republic. This time, Turkish decision makers choose the ‘military intervention’ policy option and decided to use Turkey’s military might to settle the Cyprus dispute. This chapter will discuss Turkey’s decision making process during the 1974 Cyprus crisis from January 1974 to August 1974.

6.1. The aftermath of 1967 Crisis

During the 1967 crisis, as opposed to the previous crisis, more NATO members participated in efforts to find a peaceful solution. The US, the UK, and Canada proposed a plan for the immediate withdrawal of Greek forces after the eruption of the crisis. The internationalization of the Cyprus dispute continued when both the secretary general of NATO and the representative of the secretary general of the UN entered these efforts. Later, under pressure Greece agreed to withdraw its ‘unauthorized’ forces from Cyprus which was the most crucial demand of the Demirel administration. However, the 1967 crisis made it obvious that settling the dispute through spontaneous acts was fruitless and even more dangerous for peace

on the island. As a result, the parties decided to pursue further negotiations (Bilge 1975: 175-176).

In the end, the 1967 Cyprus crisis was solved mainly in favor of Turkey. First of all, Greece agreed to withdraw its troops from the island which were illegally deployed according to the agreements. Additionally, Grivas would not return to Cyprus and as a result his influence for the Greek 'national clause' (i.e. *enosis*) would be more limited. Furthermore, Turkish Cypriots who suffered from Greek attacks during the 1967 crisis would receive compensation (Milliyet 30th Nov 1967). Accordingly Turkey achieved almost all of its objectives.

In Greece the Colonels' handling of the 1967 crisis was recognized as a 'failure'. Thus, King Constantine tried to utilize this opportunity to bring the Colonels' regime down. However, his attempt at counter-coup was unsuccessful and as a result he had to abandon the throne and flee abroad. This abortive coup showed that although royalist forces were more competent than the Colonels', they were still unable to stage a coup against the military regime. As was expected, the event was followed by a purge within the army to eliminate royalist officers (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2010: 143-144).

In early 1968, Foreign Minister Çağlayangil and his Greek counterpart, Panagiotis Pipinelis, met secretly in Switzerland and reached an agreement on starting bi-communal talks to settle the Cyprus dispute (Gürün 1983: 420). The talks between two communities of the island started in June 1968 in Nicosia. However, the negotiations between representatives of Turkish Cypriots (Rauf Denktaş) and Greek Cypriots (Glafcos Clerides) continued until September 1971 failing to find a solution. Instead, the talks reached a stalemate in 1971. Although

the talks were going nowhere, talks restarted the next year in June 1972 and continued until June 1974, just before the coup against the Makarios administration on Cyprus (Ertekün 1984: 25-26).

The negotiations could not reach an agreement between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. According to Eroğlu (1975: 45) the Greek side had two guiding principles during the negotiations: i) Greek Cypriots had the majority on the island and thus Turkish Cypriots had to ‘quit claiming’ to be recognized as equal with Greek Cypriots and accept just minority rights; ii) accordingly, democratic rule and the charter of the UN also support the argument of majority rule.

However, the island was de facto partitioned after the 1967 crisis. In December 1967, Turkish Cypriots claimed their own rule under the title of ‘Provisional Turkish Administration’ (PTA) to manage daily affairs of their community. Actually, the PTA did not emerge as a result of the 1967 crisis. Instead, the roots of this administration could be found in the 1964 crisis when Turkish Cypriots drifted away from the governmental institutions. As a result, in 1964 Turkish Cypriots formed a ‘General Committee’ to deal with problems and make decisions on an ad hoc basis (Bilge 1975: 177). Turkish Cypriots argued that since they could not trust their Greek neighbors for their security, they established their own ‘enclaves’. These enclaves not only provided security for Turkish Cypriots but also founded the basis of governmental institutions (Stavirinides n.d.: 58).

Although Turkish Cypriots founded their own ‘provisional’ administration on the island, the world continued to recognize the Greek Cypriots as the legal government of Cyprus while Turkish Cypriots were not present in the

government. Additionally, Greek Cypriots argued that they had the right to govern both communities of the island (Borowiec 2000: 60).

After the 1967 crisis, although Makarios continued to support *enosis*, he began to consider that *enosis* could not be achieved immediately; this was the argument of groups opposing Makarios (Stavrinides n.d.: 66). This attitude resulted in growing opposition towards Makarios among the Greek junta. Additionally, the Colonels tried to ‘get rid of’ Makarios and attempted to assassinate him at various times. The Greek junta dispatched Grivas to Cyprus to overthrow Makarios and to prepare suitable atmosphere for *enosis* (Kassimeris 2010: 94).

Actually, there was a decrease in support for *enosis* among Greek Cypriots. Between 1960 and 1964 when the memories of EOKA’s triumph over the British rule were still alive on the island, Greek Cypriots were more ambitious to achieve *enosis*. However, when the situation calmed on the island after the 1964 crisis and intercommunity clashes decreased, the attention of Greek Cypriots turned toward their welfare (Stavrinides n.d.: 67-68). The improved standard of living among the Greek Cypriot middle class led to demands for better education, a fashionable house, a car, and luxurious products (Stavrinides n.d.:75). In other words, while *enosis* remained a political objective the Greek Cypriot community focused more on improving their daily lives in the 1960s.

In 1967 *Patris*, a pro-Grivas newspaper, published a top secret document: the Akritas Plan which scheduled *enosis* step by step. Actually, the plan was tailored in 1963 by Greek Cypriot leaders and Greek army. *Patris* claimed that Makarios established a secret organization and appointed Interior Minister

Yeorgadjis as the head of the organization. The plan argued that ‘the final objective’ would remain unchanged until achieving *enosis*. The plan stated that international public opinion was against any kind of oppression. That was why the organization had to first create the impression that the Cyprus dispute was not solved. Although the Makarios administration did not deny the existence of the plan, the administration had to abandon it when the Greek community could not establish its dominance over Turkish community ‘within a day or two’ (Stavrinides n.d.; 59-60).

6.2. Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy of Turkey

6.2.1. Domestic Politics

In 1968 Turkey witnessed a popular demonstration which was actually synchronous with the world. As was the case in other countries, in 1968 university students started to protest against the status quo in universities. Gradually, the focus of the protest turned to demand more democracy and rights outside universities and at this point different social groups participated in the demonstrations. In Turkey, although the movement started in mid-1960s and reached its peak in 1968, the movement did not cause more freedom and democracy as it did in the West. Instead, the movement became more ideology-oriented and had biases which decreased popular support for the movement. Opposing views started to clash in the streets in 1969, costing lives on both sides.

As a result, the government, which had antipathy toward socialist revolutionary movements, used force to end protests (Göktolga 2005: 945-947).

Çaylak and Baran (2010: 448) argued that student demonstrations aimed to topple the government which they considered to be acting against the revolution (i.e. coup of 27 May). The unavoidable rise of violence was getting public attention and the parliament discussed the issue for months. Additionally, the ‘commando camps’ had a negative impact on the spread of violence. The ‘commando camps’ were actually established to ‘counter communist threats’ and during these popular movements the camps got support from *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (National Action Party).

In 1969 Demirel’s AP won another general election and secured the right to form the government. Different from the previous cabinet, Demirel tried to form the cabinet without paying attention to the ‘opposition group’ within the AP. This act triggered the process of division within the party (Arcayürek 1985: 313-315). The AP under these conditions could not prevent division of the party in 1970. The ‘opposition’ fraction established *Demokratik Parti* (Democratic Party) and caused the AP to lose ground in the parliament. It is important to note that the right wing in the parliament gained a fragmented outlook with the establishment of new parties. For instance, in addition to the *Demokratik Parti*, Necmettin Erbakan also formed his own party in 1970 (*Milli Nizam Partisi* – National Order Party). After seizing control of the CKMP in 1965, Alparslan Türkeş renamed the party *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* and aimed to get votes of middle class citizens (Ahmad 1993: 144).

Although the right wing had a fragmented presence in the parliament, the same was also true for the left. The CHP reoriented itself as left-of-center prior to 1965 elections and it maintained this approach in the 1969 elections. However, as was the case for the AP, there was an ‘opposition group’ in the CHP and this group gathered around the leadership of Turhan Feyzioğlu to form the *Güven Partisi* (Reliance Party) (Ahmad 1993: 144). Founders of the *Güven Partisi* were opposing the CHP’s policy of ‘left-of-center’ and by representing the ‘conservative’ group within the party. *Güven Partisi*, which campaigned against both the AP and the CHP, could only get 15 seats in 1969 elections (Çaylak and Baran 2010: 446-447). Before the elections the Demirel administration changed the electoral law and abolished the ‘national remainder system’ which was favoring minor parties. As a result, the TİP could only get two MPs though it got nearly the same percentage of votes as in the 1965 elections (Ahmad 1993: 145). Levi (1991: 145) argued that the change of electoral law was a ‘mistake’ since the small parties of the extreme right and left which lost their representation in the parliament radicalized and adopted terrorist tactics.

The events got worse when demonstrators started to use violence as means. There were even attacks against foreign missions in Turkey. For instance, in 1969 the car of the US ambassador to Turkey was burned by protesters (Çaylak and Baran 2010: 453), and in 1971 protesters abducted the Israeli consul in İstanbul (Ahmad 1993: 151). Since efforts to end violence on the street had failed, the army took the initiative by delivering a memorandum warning the Demirel administration in March 1971 (Göktolga 2005: 948).

The coup was a natural result of the Turkish army's attitude towards the politics of Turkey. First of all, during the 20th century the army considered itself as the principal guardian of the regime and ideology of Turkey. As a result, the army had the right to intervene in politics and even to stage a coup when it was 'required'. This understanding, however, led the army to the conclusion that the army had 'superiority' over other institutions (Erdoğan 2005: 744-745).

Additionally, contrary to popular belief the army's influence in politics was not limited to the periods of military rule. Instead, the army preserved its presence even after restoring democracy. By implementing changes to the constitution, the Turkish army established material mechanisms to control or influence politics after each coup (Erdoğan 2005: 747-748).

Actually, this was an appropriate situation for the coup since the political parties were fragmented, opposite groups were clashing in streets, and economically the Turkish Lira was devaluated in 1970. The memorandum of 12 March in summary stated that: i) terror was rising; and ii) there was a need to achieve reforms of the 1961 constitution under a 'supra-party' government. Additionally, the memorandum indicated that if the government could not handle the issue the army would take initiative (Fedai 2010: 492-493).

The political parties' reactions were divergent. Demirel resigned immediately and adopted a 'wait-and-see' policy while asking his party members to remain calm. Although İnönü's CHP had a negative attitude as its first reaction, the CHP changed its policy from criticism to support for the 'supra-party' government formed under Nihat Erim, a MP of the CHP. However, İnönü's

attitude bothered Bülent Ecevit, who was secretary general of the CHP at that time, and as a result Ecevit resigned from his post (Zürcher 2004: 258).

Ecevit, who was one of the leading figures in the CHP, played a crucial role in designing the party's election campaigns. For instance, starting with the 1965 general elections the CHP adopted a 'left-of-center' policy which demonstrated a shift from the party's previous statements. As a result the party reoriented itself as 'social-democrat' party. Although the slogan (left-of-center) at first did not seem as a success, it gradually attracted the attention of the masses. This was a result of two factors: i) social changes within Turkey; and ii) a new and dynamic figure in the CHP, Bülent Ecevit. After resigning from his post Ecevit challenged İnönü's leadership and defeated İnönü in the 1972 party congress. This was a dramatic success for Ecevit as he became the third leader of the party, following Atatürk and İnönü (Tachau 1991:109).

Although Erim ruled the country for just under a year, he implemented changes to the 1961 constitution. These changes limited previously granted freedoms. The Erim government amended 44 articles in total and the constitution became less liberal. The amendments ended autonomy of universities, radio, and television; the press faced restrictions; the *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu* (National Security Council) gained the power to issue 'binding' advices to governments (Zürcher 2004: 260).

When the term of President Sunay came to its end in 1973 Turkey faced the question of electing a new president. The army wanted to impose its candidate, Faruk Gürler, who was a general. The AP's candidate was Tekin Arıburun, who was also a former commander. *Demokratik Parti* nominated Ferruh Bozbeyli, who

was the chairman of that party. The CHP neither nominated a candidate nor participated in elections to show that it would not support Gürler's candidacy. During election cycle, Gürler could not get the required amount of votes in the parliament. As a result, the political parties tried to find another candidate who would be both 'approved' by the army and 'neutral'. Fahri Korutürk, an ex-admiral, was considered a suitable candidate for the post and was elected as the new president. The parliament achieved a democratic triumph by electing Korutürk and by not electing the army's candidate (Fedai 2010: 497-498).

The general elections took place in 1973. According to election results, the CHP under its new leader Ecevit won the elections though it could not secure enough seats to form the government on its own. Ecevit, at this point, decided to wait and see the results of local elections which would take place just after the general elections in late 1973. As a result, the 'supra-party' government of Naim Talu continued since Demirel's *Adalet Partisi* could not form a coalition. The local election results supported the general election results and the CHP emerged as the top party from both elections. Ecevit, after realizing the popular support for his party, decided to form a coalition and at this point Erbakan's *Milli Selamet Partisi* (National Salvation Party) was considered a suitable partner to form the government.

6.2.2. Foreign Policy

During the 1960s Turkey wanted to reorganize the status of the US military bases in Turkey. The agreement was reached in 1969. According to Demirel, by signing

the agreement the US administration acknowledged that these bases were the property of Turkey. Additionally, Turkey had the right to restrict the US military activities in case its national security required such a decision. Most importantly, the US administration agreed not to use the bases against a third country without getting permission from Turkish authorities (Erhan 2008: 697).

During the late 1960s Turkey's economy was severely affected by the US decision to limit foreign aid as a result of domestic pressure to balance the US budget. For instance, Turkey received nearly 155 million US dollars in 1967 and 105 million US dollars in 1968 as foreign aid from its Western allies. As Turkey's foreign income decreased dramatically, Turkey had to devalue Turkish Lira but Demirel decided to postpone this decision until the general elections of 1969 (Erhan 2008: 700).

Cultivation of opium poppy was a problem between Turkey and the United States. During his presidential campaign Nixon stated that he would end the usage of drugs in the United States. Beginning in 1969 there was a campaign against Turkey which was accused of supplying 80% of opium used in the United States; however, the total amount of opium produced in Turkey was below the demand in the United States (Erhan 2008: 701-702). The relations between Turkey and the United States deteriorated even more when the 'supra-party' Erim government implemented a ban on opium production in 1971 and later, in 1974, Ecevit's government revoked the ban (Hale 2002: 154).

In 1969 Muslim countries reacted to the burning of the Al Aqsa mosque in Kudüs (Jerusalem) and decided to organize an international conference to discuss the issue. Saudi Arabia and Morocco took the initiative to organize the conference

and Turkey also received an invitation letter. President Sunay declared that Turkey was a secular country and he did not have any intention to attend, but the government could decide whether to attend the conference or not. Sunay's statement was a clear warning shared by the army. At this point, Demirel stated that the conference was not religious and there would not be any barrier to attending a conference on political issues. Demirel argued that attending the conference would be in accordance with Turkish foreign policy. As a result, Turkey decided to attend the conference as an observer. The conference was held in Rabat and made two critical decisions: i) Israel should retreat from all occupied territories; and ii) the establishment of a secretariat to organize the conference annually at the foreign ministerial level (Firat and K rk         2008: 791-792).

The fourth Arab-Israeli war erupted in 1973. During the course of the war Turkey declared that it would not allow the US to use  ncirlik base to support Israel. The war had two critical consequences: i) Israel lost the war; and ii) Turkey maintained its cordial relations with Arab countries while some Western countries faced the 'oil embargo' imposed by *OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries)*. Later in 1974 Turkey benefited from its relatively friendly relations with Arab countries. Turkey got support from Arab countries in the 1974 Cyprus crisis. For instance, Libya supplied fuel and tiers for Turkish Air Forces to continue its flight operations on Cyprus (Firat and K rk         2008: 795).

During the 1970s Turkey and Greece had disputes related to Aegean Sea. Actually, the root of the dispute lies in Greece's intention to expand its territorial sea from 6 miles to 12 miles. According to Turkey such a decision would prevent Turkey from reaching open seas through the Aegean Sea. Additionally,

prospecting for oil in Aegean Sea was another problem between Turkey and Greece which took place just before the 1974 Cyprus crisis (Fırat 2008b: 750-753).

6.3. The Cyprus Crisis of 1974

In 1974 the Cyprus dispute entered another phase for settlement. This section discusses the 1974 crisis chronologically starting from the formation of the Ecevit administration in late January 1974. Since only the Ecevit government could make the radical decision for a military intervention in Cyprus, it might be helpful to study the days just before the decision.

February 1974, one of the first statements of the new government was on revoking the ban on cultivation of opium (Milliyet 2nd Feb 1974). Foreign Minister Turan Güneş stated that Turkey was politically engaged with the West, but it would maintain its security outside NATO and establish relations with Third World countries. Additionally, the Foreign Minister stated that Turkey had concerns related to the *enosis* demands on Cyprus following the death of Grivas (Milliyet 6th Feb 1974). During the rest of February, focus was mainly on economic problems and issuing amnesty for prisoners.

March 1974: The Ecevit administration declared that the government would let the planting of opium continue for ‘maintaining the quality of the product’ (Milliyet 10th Mar 1974). Turkey declared that it would allow planting opium in limited areas with tight governmental control. The administration stated that negotiation between Turkey and the US might be helpful on the subject

(Milliyet 12th Mar 1974). Two representatives from the US congress visited Turkey to discuss the opium issue. The representatives declared that they would try to end US aid for Turkey if the latter would revoke the ban (Milliyet 15th Mar 1974). The main opposition party leader, Süleyman Demirel, argued that Turkey was an independent country and stated that the administration did not fulfill any of its election promises (Milliyet 19th Mar 1974). Turkey organized a NATO military drill in the Aegean Sea and according to news sources the US and Italy decided not to participate in the drill as a result of Greece's objections (Milliyet 30th Mar 1974).

April 1974, Defense Minister, Hasan Işık, stated that Turkey wanted to resolve the disputes related to Aegean Sea through negotiations between Turkey and Greece (Milliyet 5th Apr 1974). Prime Minister Ecevit declared that Turkey wanted a just solution for the Aegean problems and did not want to cause tension (Milliyet 8th Apr 1974). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that Turkey would continue prospecting for oil in Aegean Sea (Milliyet 10th Apr 1974). Foreign Minister Turan Güneş accused Greece of creating 'artificial' problems and argued that Turkey believed in solving disputes through negotiations (Milliyet 12th Apr 1974). Greece proposed not prospecting for oil in the Aegean Sea until finding a solution for the dispute between Turkey and Greece. In response, Güneş stated that Turkey would not allow the Aegean Sea to become the 'Greek Lake' (Milliyet 23rd Apr 1974).

May 1974, Defense Minister Hasan Işık stated that Turkey had to find a separate army outside its NATO forces (Milliyet 6th May 1974). In reply to a request from an AP senator to give guaranty to Western allies, Turan Güneş stated

that actually the West had to give guaranty to Turkey and inform Turkey, for instance, about its policy towards the Middle East. During the same Senate session opposition parties accused the Ecevit administration of isolating Turkey (Milliyet 10th May 1974). On Cyprus militants of the Greek National Guard threatened to attack a Turkish Cypriot village (Milliyet 11th May 1974). In replying to a question on Greece's 'seriousness' about engaging in war with Turkey, Turan Güneş stated that Greece believed the US would intervene in case of a war between its allies. However, Güneş argued, that the US administration did not want to take part in this dispute (Milliyet 25th May 1974). Turkey started prospecting for oil in Aegean Sea and the mission was escorted by Turkish warships. Greece, as a response, ordered a Greek fleet to patrol the Aegean Sea while Greek Air Force prepared for possible operations (Milliyet 30th May 1974).

June 1974, the Foreign Minister of Greece, Spyridon Tetenes, claimed that it was impossible to reach an agreement on the status of the Aegean Sea as long as Turkey did not accept the first three articles of Geneva Convention of 1958 (Milliyet 2nd June 1974). Turkey stated that it would not allow Greece to expand its territorial sea from 6 miles to 12 miles (Milliyet 12th Jun 1974). Turkey declared that Turkey's condition would not be worse than Greece's in case of a war (Milliyet 17th Jun 1974). The Secretary General of NATO, Joseph Luns, stated that a conflict in the Aegean region might cause bitter consequences and proposed bilateral talks between Turkey and Greece (Milliyet 20th Jun 1974). Although foreign ministers of both Turkey and Greece had meetings to discuss the Aegean issue they could not reach an agreement. Additionally, the US Foreign Minister, Henry Kissinger, stated that it would be better to wait for avail before deciding to

act as mediator between the allies (Milliyet 21st Jun 1974). Turkey proposed Greece organizing periodical bilateral talks between Turkey and Greece to solve the existing disputes. However, the proposal was rejected by Greece. On this issue Ecevit argued that since current mechanisms were fruitless to settle problems, Turkey had proposed an alternative mechanism (Milliyet 27th Jun 1974). Ecevit blamed the Greek junta for pointing at Turkey as ‘nightmare’ to gain public support for their rule (Milliyet 29th Jun 1974). The Prime Minister of Greece, Adamantios Androustopoulos, argued that the real cause of dispute in the Aegean region was Turkey. Furthermore, he stated that Turkey was sustaining the dispute by threatening Greece (Milliyet 30th Jun 1974).

July 1974, the Ecevit administration regulated planting of opium in seven cities (Milliyet 2nd Jul 1974). The Nixon administration summoned the US ambassador to Turkey, William B. Macomber, to discuss Turkey’s decision. There were claims that the US administration would end its aid program for Turkey since Turkey had not even bothered to inform the US of its decision (Milliyet 6th Jul 1974). On the Aegean problem, Turan Güneş stated that Turkey’s current maritime law was incompetent to deal with the problems with Greece. Güneş argued that Greece did not want to start bilateral talks on the Aegean dispute because Greece decided to achieve its aims thorough negotiations in the UN maritime law conference (Milliyet 11th Jul 1974). Turan Güneş argued that the US had been giving aid to Turkey prior to the ban on opium cultivation. Ending the aid, he added, as a result of revoking the ban was not logical (Milliyet 12th Jul 1974). The US Senate decided to end the US aid for countries that could not prevent drug smuggling (Milliyet 13th Jul 1974). Ecevit stated that this decision

would not affect Turkish foreign policy since the country would continue to pursue policies serving its interest and security (Milliyet 13th Jul 1974). On 15th July a coup took place on Cyprus against the Makarios administration. Ecevit declared that the coup was tailored by Greece. Turkish Chief of Staff, Semih Sancar, stated that the event was expected. London warned that Turkey and Greece should act carefully. The US and the Soviet Union emphasized the sovereignty of Cyprus (Milliyet 16th Jul 1974). Ecevit discussed the situation on the island with leaders of other political parties. Additionally, Turkey asked the UK for cooperation in solving the crisis. When the UN and NATO requested patience from the Ecevit administration, Turkey replied that the focus of the international community should be on Greece and pressure on the Greek junta (Milliyet 17th Jul 1974). Ecevit went to London to discuss the issue with the British authorities (Milliyet 18th Jul 1974). Ecevit declared that time was running out and an urgent reply was required (Milliyet 19th Jul 1974). Turkey started its military operation to restore the state of affairs of Cyprus on 20th July. A ceasefire was declared on the island on 22nd July and the Turkish army ended its operation. Ecevit stated that from then on nobody could act against Turkish Cypriots' rights on the island anymore (Milliyet 23rd Jul 1974).

6.4. Analyzing events

When the Cyprus crisis erupted into another international crisis in 1974 Turkey had maintained a coalition government rule under Bülent Ecevit's *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* since late January 1974. This thesis will now study the approach of the Ecevit administration to the renewed crisis on the island. As discussed earlier,

the poliheuristic decision model consists of two stages; here the thesis will evaluate Turkey's decision in 1974, and how Turkey decided to intervene in Cyprus with the poliheuristic decision making model.

6.4.1. First stage of decision making

In the first stage of the poliheuristic decision model, decision makers eliminate the policy alternatives which have a low value in the key dimension. The thesis argues that in this stage the 'systemic dimension' was considered the key dimension by the Ecevit administration.

Following the 12 March memorandum Turkey was ruled by 'supra party' governments. The first such party, the Erim administration, imposed a ban on opium cultivation, which was causing tension between Turkey and the US during the late 1960s and the early 1970s. When Turkey imposed the ban the relations between Turkey and the US entered a period of cooperation. However, after the 1973 elections Ecevit formed a government with Erbakan's MSP and Turkey adopted policies neglecting relations with its ally.

After its formation in late January 1974 the Ecevit administration decided to revoke the ban on opium cultivation. Although the motive of the administration was based on domestic politics, the issue turned out to be an international problem between the United States and Turkey. Actually, this problem was not a surprise for the administration which was favoring 'determined' and 'independent' foreign policy (Ecevit 2010, Bölükbaşı 2001: 216).

Besides, Turkey had disputes with Greece on the Aegean Sea. As the chronology demonstrates, the Ecevit administration was devoting its efforts to dealing with the Aegean dispute. Although Turkey could not negotiate the dispute bilaterally with Greece, Turkey still tried to find a diplomatic solution when a third party (i.e. NATO) intervened and offered to resolve the dispute.

As the chronology shows, Turkey –after unsuccessful attempts to negotiate- started to consider Greece a ‘troublemaker’ and accused the Greek junta of not trying to find a peaceful solution. According to Turkish decision makers Greek authorities were blocking efforts for peaceful settlement by refusing to negotiate. Ecevit (2010: 75) argued that he decided to negotiate the disputes with the Greek side though he did not have much hope of achieving an agreement. Additionally, Ecevit stated that he confronted criticism from opposition parties when the negotiations ended without any concrete progress.

The opium crisis, as the chronology demonstrates, attracted US interest immediately and the Nixon administration tried to prevent Turkey from legalizing opium planting. However, the US attempts were fruitless. As a result, the US Senate played the ‘foreign aid’ card which actually did not sway the Ecevit administration though Turkey’s economy might have benefitted from this aid.

In 1974 the US witnessed one of the most scandalous domestic affairs of its political history: the Watergate scandal. Additionally, during the same period Kissinger was busy with peace negotiations in the Middle East following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 (Hale 2000: 155).

In June 1974 Makarios sent a letter to the Greek Junta and demanded the retreat of Greek officers from National Guards since these personnel were committing acts against the authority of the Makarios administration. Makarios argued that the EOKA-B organization was against his rule and their activities were funded by the Greek Junta (Gürün 1983: 421-422).

After the coup Ecevit went to London to discuss the situation on the island. Actually, Ecevit wanted a discussion with the British authorities on the basis of 'military intervention' to reestablish the state of affairs of the Cyprus Republic. During his visit, Ecevit emphasized the need for 'urgent' action before it became too late. In 1976 Ecevit (2010: 76) stated that although he did not have great expectations for cooperation with the British, he had to negotiate the issue with the British authorities. Ecevit argued that by this move he wanted to secure Turkey's right to intervene before the international community.

When the US administration wanted to take part in negotiations, Turkey refused this demand since the US was not a guarantor state. Instead, Turkey and the US had separate talks on the issue. The US Secretary of State, Kissinger, appointed Joseph Sisco for this post. Although Sisco was told to 'do everything' to prevent Turkey's decision to intervene in Cyprus, Sisco knew that his chances of convincing Ecevit were limited. When meeting with Ecevit, Sisco offered 'normalization' of US aid and warned Turkey of possible Greek retaliation. However, Ecevit proposed a different plan: i) Sampson and other Greek officers should leave the island; ii) Turkey would deploy the same amount of troops on Cyprus as Greece did; iii) Turkish Cypriots would have control of an area along the coast; and iv) negotiations to establish a federal system would begin. Although

Sisco agreed to mediate this plan with Greece, he could not reach Greek authorities and spent 36 hours achieving nothing in Athens. When he had the chance to discuss Ecevit's plan, the Greek junta rejected the plan and only offered replacement of the officers who participated in the coup. As a result, Sisco's mediation did not lay a foundation for negotiations (Bölükbaşı 2001: 238-240).

During his visit Ecevit got the impression that the British authorities were neither trying to prevent Turkey from intervening nor giving permission to intervene. As Ecevit described the situation in the parliament:

In London during our meetings with either the British or the Americans, I got this impression: Of course, they did not give us the green light to intervene in Cyprus, but there wasn't the red light at all. However, they have concerns that the world would consider these countries as agreed with Turkey on intervention [...] We accepted this normal. (MMTD 1974: 24)

It is important to note that in the same speech on Greece Ecevit stated that:

Turkey's misfortune is that it's surrounded by countries that Turkey is friends with. Despite showing eagerness and goodwill Turkey couldn't establish friendship with only one country, Greece, which is Turkey's ally in NATO. Greece did not leave a 'breath area' for Turkey in the Aegean Sea and it would definitely do the same in the Mediterranean Sea. As a result, before the new regime takes root [on Cyprus and] Greece's military advantage increases totally by deployments of troops illegal to international agreements, a definite solution had to be found for this situation (MMTD 1974: 21)

Ecevit's words show that the coup against the Makarios administration on Cyprus triggered Turkey's reaction. When the National Guards brought down the Makarios administration and established a new rule under Nicos Sampson, a former EOKA member known for his hatred of Turks, the authorities in Turkey realized that the 'state of affairs' of the island had also collapsed. The new 'government' on Cyprus claimed that they would treat Turkish Cypriots equally and Turkish community would live peacefully on the island. However, Turkey did

not take this commitment seriously since Sampson was not the right person to keep this promise while hating Turks. At this point, it is important to note that once Makarios fled from Cyprus, he declared that Turks were in danger on the island and the coup was a direct attack against the independence of the Republic of Cyprus (Ertekün 1984: 32). As a result, the Ecevit administration considered a more radical action required to reestablish the state of affairs of the island and save Turkish Cypriots from fear of massacre.

The Ecevit administration was confronted with the Cyprus dispute while having other international disputes with Greece and the US, and just after its relations with the US had deteriorated. Additionally, since the state of affairs of the island was collapsed, which was the ‘required’ condition for intervention according to Guarantee agreement, the Ecevit administration decided to eliminate the ‘do nothing’ and ‘air strike’ policy alternatives during the first phase of the decision making process.

The administration eliminated ‘do nothing’ as a policy alternative which could not find a way to provide security for Turkish Cypriots. The ‘do nothing’ option actually became less pertinent since the coup created insecurity for Turkish Cypriots ending the chances to continue negotiations between two communities. The administration also eliminated the ‘air strike’ policy alternative since this alternative could not restore the state of affairs of the island. The administration realized that an air strike operation could only last a couple of days. Such a operation, however, could not force the ‘new’ government to step down from the office in Nicosia.

6.4.2. Second stage of decision making

In the second stage of the poliheuristic decision model, a decision maker uses analytic evaluations and tries to maximize gains by minimizing losses. Since the ‘do nothing’ and ‘air strike’ alternatives were eliminated in the first stage, the Ecevit administration had two remaining policy options: i) intervention; and ii) diplomatic efforts. This thesis will evaluate each policy alternative according to the remaining dimensions: *domestic politics* and *military*.

Domestic Politics dimension: Although the opposition parties expressed their support for the government when the latter decided to intervene in Cyprus, the opposition parties were critical to the Ecevit administration’s foreign policy. For instance, Demirel accused the administration of trying to ‘veil’ the economic problems with international crisis, especially with the Aegean dispute.

Ecevit cooperated with Erbakan’s MSP to form the government. However, the two parties had little in common though some argued that they both had ‘leftist’ orientations. Ecevit believed that the coalition would remain in the office for long time. He even declared that the CHP and MSP would serve Turkey like two brothers. In order to form the government both parties compromised some of their principles. For instance, in 1974 PTT (Turkish Post Office) did not publish special stamps on the anniversary of abolishment of the Caliphate (Arcayürek 2006: 82-83). A sign of fragility of the coalition, Ecevit wanted to resign from premiership in May 1974 but later changed his mind (Milliyet 21st May 1974). However, after the 1974 Cyprus crisis Ecevit resigned in September 1974.

As the Ecevit coalition government was fragile, the best solution would be ‘early elections’ and a strong one-party government under the leadership of Ecevit. Actually, a ‘success’ in the Cyprus dispute would definitely increase the popularity of ‘Karaoğlan’ and secure enough seats in the parliament for this purpose.

Military dimension: When the renewed Cyprus crisis erupted in the summer of 1974, Turkey was technically prepared to intervene in Cyprus. It is important to note that during the previous crises, although Turkey wanted to make the decision to intervene, its military capability to pursue such a policy was questionable. For instance, while Turkey had only six helicopters, two landing crafts and 150 parachutes in 1967, in 1974 Turkey had 100 landing craft, 100 helicopters and 15000 parachutes (Bölükbaşı 2001: 235).

Turkey was preparing for intervention when the Cyprus crisis first erupted in late 1963. In the following years Turkey increased its military capability and was formulating its military plans again and again. Each crisis led the Turkish army to become more coordinated and strengthened for a possible military operation. Besides, Turkey became capable of waging war on two fronts: i) on Cyprus, against Greek National Guards and Greek army; and ii) in Thrace and Aegean Sea against Greece (Evcil 1999: 16).

Turkey had another advantage for military intervention: *Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı* (TMT – Turkish Resistance Organization). Although TMT did not have heavy weapons or any established supply chain mechanism to support an attack, they were defending Turkish villages against Greek attacks on Cyprus throughout the Cyprus crises. There were two strongholds of TMT: one was covering the area

of northern Lefkoşe (Nicosia) and the other was Serdarlı, located in the north-east of Lefkoşe. These strongholds and other villages would increase probability of the success of the Turkish army's operation by scattering the Greek National Guards around these zones. During the early stages of the operation, the Turkish army expected that Greek National Guards would surround these zones and the Turkish army would complete its landing operation more successfully (Evcil 1999: 21).

Turkey started to consider Greece as a threat to its security when Greece claimed to expand its territorial sea from 6 miles to 12 miles in the Aegean Sea. According to Turkish decision makers the latter option would change the Sea into a 'Greek Sea' and prevent Turkey from accessing open seas freely (Ecevit 2010). When Turkey considered the coup on Cyprus to be a coup tailored by the junta, Turkey feared that its southern borders would also be under threat from Greece (Birand 1987: 38-39).

After the coup against the Makarios administration, the Greek junta started to deploy additional troops to the island to strengthen its military presence. Turkey considered that increased Greek military presence on the island would lead to de facto *enosis* which might make it impossible to restore the preexisting regime. As a result, defending the rights of both Turkish Cypriots and Turkey would be relatively difficult.

6.4.3. The Decision

In the second stage the Ecevit administration evaluated the remaining policy alternatives according to their total ratings. Here the most favorable decision became ‘military intervention’.

Table 4 shows the decision matrix of Ecevit.

Table 4: Decision matrix of Ecevit

	Dimensions			
Policy options	Systemic	Domestic Politics	Military	Total (Average)
Military Intervention	3	4	2	9 (3)
Air strike	2	3	1	6 (2)
Diplomatic efforts	4	2	-	6 (2)
Do nothing	1	1	-	2 (0,6)

On the *systemic* dimension, the alternatives are scored from highest to lowest according to their impact on Turkey’s stand in the international arena and the decision’s effect on Turkey’s foreign relations. On the *domestic politics* dimension, alternatives are ranked according to their ability to satisfy public opinion while improving the situation on the island in favor of Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. On the *military* dimension, they are scored according to their ability to successfully achieve military objectives: restoring the ‘state of affairs’ of Cyprus and securing the lives of Turkish Cypriots.

Under the *systemic* dimension the most favorable option that emerged was ‘diplomatic efforts’. As was the case during the previous crises, solving the

question by peaceful methods will be ranked higher than other alternatives since this option would not cause a war in the region. Thus, this alternative would ease the pressure from third parties (mainly from the US). The 1970s witnessed relatively low tension between Eastern Bloc and Western Bloc which had an impact on Turkish decision makers' ultimate decision. Although the US Secretary of State, Kissinger, did everything to stop Turkey, the US public attention was on Watergate scandal.

On the other hand, under the *domestic politics* dimension the 'military intervention' option, again, ranked as the best option since the audience and the opposition parties were expecting some kind of action towards Cyprus in order to provide security for Turkish Cypriots. Thus, the administration had to choose a policy option which would not damage the government. Additionally, the CHP-MSP coalition was not stable to serve Turkey 'for long time' as claimed by Ecevit. Any discontent among Turkish public would have disastrous political consequences for Ecevit's CHP.

Under the *military* dimension the 'military intervention' option scored as the best policy alternative since Turkey's primary aim was 'restoring state of affairs' of the Cyprus Republic and other alternative (i.e. 'air strike') could not force the 'new' Greek government to step down from government. During the previous Cyprus crises Turkey's military readiness was a big question for Turkish decision maker. In 1974, however, after nearly ten years Turkey had the military capacity and strategy to intervene in Cyprus.

It is important to note that the 1974 crisis supported the assumptions of the poliheuristic decision making model. First of all, according to the model, the

administration identified a ‘key dimension’ (i.e. *systemic*) in the first stage of the decision making process and eliminated the policy options that the administration considered ‘unacceptable’. At this stage the Ecevit administration eliminated the ‘do nothing’ and ‘air strike’ options even though the ‘air strike’ option had a high score under the *domestic politics* dimension. In other words, the administration’s decision supported the ‘non-compensatory’ principle of the poliheuristic model.

In the second stage the Ecevit administration evaluated remaining policy alternatives according to their total ratings. Here the most favorable decision emerged as ‘military intervention’ which was the ultimate decision of the Ecevit administration.

After recognizing the reality of the coup, Turkish decision makers demanded an urgent meeting with the British since the UK was one of the ‘guarantor states’. Although it seemed that the Ecevit administration tried to use diplomacy to find a solution, in reality the administration proposed the British intervening in Cyprus jointly to restore the state of affairs of the Republic. It could be argued that with this move the administration had two objectives: i) checking the possibility of joint intervention with the UK; and ii) meeting the requirements for unilateral intervention (i.e. consultation among grantor states) which was one of the criticisms against Turkey in the Johnson Letter in 1964.

6.5. The Aftermath of the Military Intervention

Following Turkey's military operation, the Turkish army successfully placed nearly 7% of the island under its control²¹. As a result of the military operation, the Greek governments in both Greece and Cyprus collapsed. In Greece Karamanlis was invited to restore democracy, and in Cyprus Klarides assumed the leadership of the Greek Cypriot community since Makarios was abroad.

After Turkey's intervention the UN Security Council adopted a resolution to end armed conflict and requested a ceasefire among belligerent parties. Turkey complied to this request on 22nd July 1974 at 5:00 pm local time (Milliyet 23rd July 1974). Although the parties agreed to a ceasefire, minor clashes continued on the island. Turkey also continued to deploy troops to strengthen its military presence on Cyprus.

The negotiations started among the three guarantor states (Turkey, the UK, and Greece) on 25th July 1974 in Geneva, Switzerland. The Turkish side argued that Turkey might continue to supply resources to its military presence on the island until a final solution could be found. Additionally, Turkey argued that since the two communities wouldn't have a common ground to live together, each community should have its own autonomous zone until a final agreement. To resolve the Cyprus dispute once and for all representatives of both communities of the island had to be present at the negotiation table. The Greek side, on the other hand, expressed that the Turkish army had to retreat to its position on 22nd July.

²¹ Once Turkey started its military operation the US administration had three goals: i) preventing a war between two NATO members; ii) obtaining cease-fire; and iii) starting negotiations. Later, the US Secretary of State, Kissinger, argued that the US administration achieved its most important objective: eastern flank of NATO remained not damaged and Greece and Turkey remained on friendly terms with the US (see Kissinger 1999).

Although the Turkish army did not retreat, the parties reached an agreement on following issues: First of all, the Treaty of Guarantee was still valid. Additionally, guarantor states agreed that none of the belligerent party had the right to expand its territory after 30th July. Greek forces had to retreat from Turkish Cypriot enclaves. The negotiations to reestablish the state of affairs of the island had to start on 8th August with the participation of representatives of both communities (Gürün 1983: 428-429).

Although the second phase of negotiations started on 8th August, the parties could not find an agreement. Turkey argued that the Greek side did not have any intention of solving the dispute through negotiations. Although the democracy in Greece and the new administration in Cyprus were just restored, Turkey insisted that the Greek side was pursuing its former policy on disputes between Turkey and Greece. Actually, during the year of 1974 Turkey had disputes with Greece over the Aegean Sea, and these disputes reinforced Turkey's stand against the Greek side during the second phase of negotiations (Fırat 2008b).

Since Turkey considered it almost impossible to reach a solution to the Cyprus dispute through negotiations, Turkey started its second military operation on 15th August 1974²².

²² The thesis did not discuss the second military intervention in more detail since the second operation was a strategic/tactical decision.

CHAPTER VII:

CONCLUSION

This thesis studied one of the continuous questions of Turkish foreign policy: the Cyprus question. The focus of the thesis was on Turkey's ultimate decisions during the 1964, 1967, and 1974 crises. To make the subject more specific, this thesis studied each crisis to analyze *how* Turkey decided to 'use force' in 1974 while refraining from taking this decision during the previous crises. In other words, the thesis analyzed decision making processes of Turkish leaders during these Cyprus crises.

To study the crises this thesis adopted poliheuristic decision making model. The poliheuristic model enabled the thesis to analyze different aspects of decision making. For instance, the model addresses not only the personal attitudes of decision makers, but also the inter-state (system) and domestic variables. Domestic and inter-state variables may vary (e.g. the role of 'Super

Powers', alliances, current political/economic situation, and elections). As a result, this thesis studied different components of the Cyprus crises from 1964 to 1974.

The poliheuristic decision making model argues that leaders weigh losses and gains, rewards and risks when making a decision. The model analyzes each political decision in two stages. While cognitive heuristics are more important in the first stage of decision making, leaders adopt rational choice calculations in the second stage. Leaders define a 'key dimension' and eliminate options that do not satisfy leader's political objectives in the first stage of decision making process. These eliminated policy options usually have low value in the key dimension. Although the eliminated policy option may have higher scores in other dimensions, these high scores do not compensate low score in the key dimension. This principle constitutes 'non-compensatory' characteristics of the model. In the second stage, leaders evaluate remaining and choose the best remaining policy option.

This thesis utilized Brule's (2005) methodology and research design with modifications required by the Cyprus case. The thesis argued that during each crisis Turkish decision makers had four policy alternatives on the table: i) military intervention; ii) air strike; iii) diplomatic efforts; and iv) do nothing. There were three dimensions to evaluate these policy options: i) *systemic*; ii) *domestic politics*; and iii) *military*. By constructing the same decision matrix for the Cyprus crises, the thesis analyzed *how* Turkey reacted during each crisis.

The thesis argued that at the heart of the Cyprus question was Greek and Greek Cypriot demands for *enosis*, the unification of Cyprus with Greece. As the previous chapters demonstrated, Greece and Greek Cypriots had a desire for

enosis just after the independence of Greece. Although there were minor uprisings and demands for *enosis* among Greek Cypriots, this desire did not gain momentum until the 1950s. During the 1950s, however, the Greek community of the island started to demand *enosis* more vigorously. Additionally, in 1955 Greek Cypriots established EOKA and the future of the island became a question for the British authorities who had been ruling the island since 1878.

When the armed conflict between Greek Cypriots and the British authorities escalated after 1955, the UK considered revising its policy towards the Cyprus problem. Although the British authorities proposed some changes to the status of the island, these proposals did not satisfy the Greek community since their ‘national cause’ was *enosis*. As a result, armed conflict continued on the island and the Greek community furthered their demand for *enosis*.

Turkey and Turkish Cypriots did not have a clear objective for Cyprus. Actually, Turkey first supported status quo on the island when the issue emerged as an international problem. Gradually, however, Turkey changed its policy to support *taksim* of the island between the Greek and Turkish communities. Additionally, Turkey considered it possible to solve the dispute within the framework of NATO. Finding a solution within the framework of NATO, according to Turkey, would maintain the friendship between Turkey and Greece which was established in the 1930s.

Later the parties agreed on an ‘independence formula’ for Cyprus while granting sovereign military bases for the UK and setting a balance between Turkish and Greek communities in governmental positions. As a result, the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960. Although the Republic was an

independent state, there were three 'guarantor' states (the UK, Greece, and Turkey). The constitution of Cyprus generated a system providing 'veto' power for the Turkish community via the Vice President of the Republic who had to be a member of Turkish community.

After becoming independent Cyprus experienced internal disputes related to governmental duties. Although the London Treaties established an independent Cypriot state, the constitutional mechanism of the island did not work properly and it caused disputes between Turks and Greeks. For instance, there were a number of disagreements such as disputes over collecting of taxes, municipality borders, and proportion of involvement in governmental services at the very beginning of the newly established Republic of Cyprus.

When the governmental problems caused ineffectiveness, Makarios proposed amendments to the constitution which perpetuated the conflict-ridden situation. Although there was tension between Turks and Greeks on almost every issue, in late December 1963, just after Makarios' proposal, an incident triggered intercommunity conflicts on the island with casualties on both sides. This remarkable event internationalized the Cyprus dispute when Turkey threatened to intervene in Cyprus as long as the conflict continued.

Turkey showed determination to settle the dispute by using force in 1964, but later abandoned this policy once the US took initiative and warned Turkey not to intervene. Although the causes of the dispute were not solved by this initiative, a war between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus was averted. As a result, the renewed Cyprus dispute emerged in 1967 when Greek Cypriot forces attacked two Turkish Cypriot villages. Again a war between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus was

averted when the US successfully mediated crisis. Actually, in 1967 the US administration also coordinated the UN and NATO's mediating efforts to settle the dispute. However, as was the case with the 1964 crisis, the 1967 crisis did not find a permanent solution for the Cyprus dispute. Although the following years witnessed relative calm on the island, in 1974 the Republic experienced the most dramatic event in its history when a coup took place against the Makarios administration. Considering the situation de facto *enosis*, Turkey reacted to the coup by intervening in Cyprus. The intervention was intended to restore the state of affairs of the Republic though it caused establishment of a new status quo on the island.

This thesis applied the poliheuristic decision making model to the Cyprus crises of 1964, 1967, and 1974. The thesis revealed some similarities and differences among Turkish decision makers' approaches to the crises.

Table 5 shows the overview of Turkey's reactions during the Cyprus crises.

Table 5: Overview of Turkey's reactions during the Cyprus Crises

Crisis	Time Frame	Type of Government	Leader	Two stage process	Key dimension	Non-compensatory principle used	Eliminated Policy	Turkey's major response
1964	Dec. 1963 - Aug. 1964	Coalition (CHP + nonpartisans)	PM* İnönü	Yes	'Systemic' (Peak of the Cold War)	Yes	'Military intervention'	'Air strike'
1967	Apr. 1967 – Dec. 1967	One Party (AP)	PM* Demirel	Yes	'Political' (Domestic stability + economic expansion)	Yes	'Do nothing'	'Diplomatic efforts'
1974	Jan. 1974 – Aug. 1974	Coalition (CHP+MSP)	PM* Ecevit	Yes	'Systemic' (Coup on Cyprus + Detente)	Yes	'Do nothing' and 'Air strike'	'Military intervention'

* PM: Prime Minister

First of all, during each crisis Turkey was not prepared for or expecting a crisis on the island. In late 1963 when Cyprus witnessed intercommunity conflicts, Turkey had internal problems with the dissolution of the second İnönü coalition. Turkey could not formulate an official policy towards the crisis until after forming a third coalition under İnönü. In 1967, although Turkey had a one-party government under Demirel's *Adalet Partisi*, the Demirel administration was not prepared to confront an international crisis. Although the Demirel administration confronted with the Cyprus question just forming the government in 1965, the administration was not expecting a bloody conflict on the island in 1967. Instead, during the same period the administration was busy with establishing new economic ties with its neighbors. In 1974, Turkey was ruled by another coalition government under the leadership of Ecevit. The 1974 crisis erupted when the Ecevit administration was busy with revoking the ban on opium cultivation. Until the coup on Cyprus the Ecevit administrations' priority was revoking the ban on opium cultivation. Even the day the coup took place in Nicosia, Ecevit was on the way to go Afyon to attend a rally to announce Turkey's decision on the ban.

Secondly, during each Cyprus crisis the international community was motivated to prevent a war between Turkey and Greece over the Cyprus dispute. In 1964, the US administration took the initiative by sending a harsh letter to İnönü and warning of possible consequences of an intervention decision. Although Turkey decided not to intervene in Cyprus during the 1964 crisis, the İnönü administration used the letter as a face-saving instrument in domestic

politics. In 1967, the Demirel administration expressed its intention to intervene in the island if Greece and the Greek community would not take a step backward from pursuing *enosis* while attacking Turkish community. During the 1967 crisis, again the US administration had a pivotal role in deescalating the crisis. Turkey responded to US mediating efforts cautiously and warned the US administration not to send a message similar to the Johnson Letter. As a result, the US pressure was focused on Greece and Greek community. Additionally, the US administration also coordinated the UN and NATO efforts for peaceful settlement on the island. In 1974, Turkey considered the coup against the Makarios administration the cause of the collapse of the Republic. The Ecevit administration expressed its intention to intervene on the island in order to restore the regime. Although the US administration adopted the same method used in the 1967 crisis by sending Sisco as mediator, this effort had no impact on Turkey's decision. Actually, in 1974 Turkish authorities did not give much credit for US mediation to solve the dispute. Instead, the Ecevit administration felt the need to act immediately to restore order on the island.

During each crisis the priorities of Turkish decision makers differed in the first stage of the poliheuristic decision making process. The İnönü administration in 1964 considered the 'systemic dimension' the key dimension. The thesis argues that since international relations had an impact on İnönü's decision, he eliminated the 'military intervention' option in the first stage of decision making. İnönü considered the 1959 agreements as a result of international and intra-alliance pressure, so during the 1964 Cyprus crisis international pressure (especially the US opposition to any kind of military intervention) prevented İnönü from making

a decision to intervene in Cyprus. In 1967, the Demirel administration contemplated the ‘domestic politics dimension’ as the key dimension. Demirel’s *Adalet Partisi* had promised economic development and stability for its supporters during its election campaign. As a result, its main focus was on the economy and not on foreign policy. Since the Demirel administration was confronted with the Cyprus dispute just after forming the government, and since there had been criticism for the previous governments for not taking any risk to solve the dispute, the Demirel administration decided to eliminate the ‘do nothing’ policy option during the first phase of the decision making process. In 1974, the Ecevit administration considered the ‘systemic dimension’ to be the key dimension. It is important to note that Ecevit’s CHP was quite different than the CHP under İnönü’s leadership as far as its dealings with international relations. While İnönü was cautious not to endanger Turkey by taking a risk in foreign policy, Ecevit tried to pursue an ‘independent’ and ‘active’ foreign policy. As a result, the Ecevit administration eliminated the ‘do nothing’ policy alternative since this alternative could not find a way to provide security for Turkish Cypriots. Additionally, the administration eliminated the ‘air strike’ policy alternative since this alternative could not restore the state of affairs of the island.

In the second stage of the decision making process Turkish decision makers took different policy options. In 1964, in the second stage İnönü evaluated remaining policy alternatives according to their total ratings. Here the most favorable decision became ‘air strike’. In 1967, in the second stage the Demirel administration evaluated remaining policy alternatives according to their total ratings. Here the most favorable decision became ‘diplomatic efforts’. In 1974, in

the second stage the Ecevit administration evaluated remaining policy alternatives according to their total ratings. Here the most favorable decision became ‘military intervention’ since it was the best option according to all three dimensions.

Although Turkish decision makers did not consider ‘military dimension’ the key dimension in any of the Cyprus crises, this dimension had a definite impact on the leaders’ ultimate decisions. When the situation worsened and intercommunity clashes took place on Cyprus, Turkish leaders announced the world that ‘military intervention’ option was on table. Even İnönü’s last and highly fragile coalition threatened to use force against Cyprus as long as the conflict continued on the island during the 1964 crisis. However, Turkey’s capacity to carry out full scale military operation was quite limited during the 1960s. In lieu of full scale military operation, the Turkish army during the crises of the 1960s responded with ‘show of force’. For instance, in the early stages of the 1964 crisis the Turkish Air Forces flew over Cyprus and the Turkish Naval Forces sailed to Mersin, a strategic location with access to national railway in the south-eastern coast of Turkey. The same ‘show of force’ operation took place also in the 1967 crisis.

Despite Turkey’s readiness and capacity to carry out full scale military intervention, the world leaders feared that Turkey would use force to settle the dispute on Cyprus. The Western bloc countries, especially the US, at this stage took initiative to prevent Turkey from intervening in Cyprus, and Greece from retaliating against Turkey. The US initiatives were successful in 1964 and 1967 and war was averted among NATO members. In 1974, however, Turkey had the required military equipment and strategy to intervene successfully in Cyprus

which encouraged Turkish decision makers to act ‘immediately’ to restore order on the island.

Lastly, it is important to note that the closed sessions of TBMM are not published by Turkish authorities. For instance, during both the 1964 and 1967 crises the parliament held closed sessions to discuss the situation on the island and formulate a foreign policy. However, these sessions still remain ‘unknown’ to the public. On the other hand, the closed session during the 1974 crisis was already published by Turkish authorities.

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