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MASTER’S THESIS**

**ANALYSIS OF GREEK FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS
TURKEY IN THE LATE 1990S THROUGH CONFLICT
RESOLUTION FRAMEWORKS**

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APPROVAL PAGE



DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this master's thesis titled as "Analysis of Greek Foreign Policy Towards Turkey in the late 1990s Through Conflict Resolution Frameworks" has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honor.

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ABSTRACT

Master's Thesis

Analysis of Greek Foreign Policy Towards Turkey in the Late 1990s Through Conflict Resolution Frameworks

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Despite a number of crises and tensions in bilateral relations in the 1990s, rapprochement began between Greece and Turkey in the late 1990s. Frequently mentioned reasons regarding improvement of relations in the late 1990s include the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy, political dialogue process initiated by the two Foreign Affairs Ministers, George Papandreou and Ismail Cem and growing social empathy on both sides as a result of devastating earthquakes which hit Izmit and Athens in 1999. Greece, for the first time, supported Turkey's EU accession process which resulted in Turkey's granting of EU candidacy status in the Helsinki Summit in 1999. However, despite improvement of relations between the two countries in areas concerning low politics, problems related to high politics including the Cyprus and the Aegean disputes have remained unsolved.

Accepting the contribution of the above-mentioned factors to the improvement of Greece-Turkey relations in the late 1990s, this thesis intends to explain the scene behind the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey by employing three conflict resolution frameworks: Peter Wallensteen's approach with a particular attention to the seventh mechanism, Frank R. Pfetsch's approaches regarding conflict resolution and the track two diplomacy.

Keywords: Greek Foreign Policy, Greek-Turkish relations, rapprochement, conflict resolution.

ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

**1990'lı Yılların Sonlarında Türkiye'ye Yönelik Yunan Dış Politikası'nın
Anlaşmazlık Çözümü Yaklaşımları ile Analizi**

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Doksanlı yıllar boyunca ikili ilişkilerdeki birçok kriz ve gerilime rağmen, 1990'ların sonunda Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasında yakınlaşma başlamıştır. Doksanlı yılların sonuna doğru gelişen bu yakınlaşmanın arkasında, Yunanistan'ın dış politikasının Avrupalılaşması, Türk ve Yunan Dış İşleri Bakanları olarak İsmail Cem ve George Papandreu tarafından başlatılan siyasi diyalog süreci ve 1999 yılında İzmit ve Atina'yı vuran deprem felaketi sonucu iki halkın birbirine yakınlaşması sayılabilir. Yunanistan ilk defa Türkiye'nin AB üyelik sürecini veto etmemiş ve Türkiye'nin 1999 yılında Helsinki Zirvesi'nde AB adaylık statüsünü kazanmasını desteklemiştir. Ancak, ikili ilişkilerdeki bu yakınlaşmaya rağmen, Kıbrıs ve Ege Sorunları hala çözüme kavuşmamıştır.

Bahsedilen bu nedenlerin ilişkilerin gelişmesine katkısını kabul ederken, bu tez aynı zamanda yakınlaşmanın arkasındaki perdeyi aralamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu amaçla, anlaşmazlık çözümündeki yaklaşımlarıyla bilinen Peter Wallensteen ve özellikle yedinci mekanizması, Frank R. Pfetsch'in yaklaşımları ve gayriresmi diplomasi (track two diplomacy) ile ilgili yaklaşımlardan faydalanılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yunan Dış Politikası, Türk-Yunan İlişkileri, Yakınlaşma, Anlaşmazlık Çözüm.

ANALYSIS OF GREEK FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY IN THE LATE 1990S THROUGH CONFLICT RESOLUTION FRAMEWORKS

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ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN-ISIS	Association for Southeast Asian Nations
ISDS	Institute for Strategic and Development Studies
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EC	European Community
EMU	European Monetary Union
EOKA	Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston
ERNK	National Liberation Front of Kurdistan
EU	European Union
EYP	Greek Intelligence Service
FYROM	Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia
ISIS	Institute for Strategic and International Studies
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDP	New Democracy Party
NEACD	North East Asia Cooperation Dialogue
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PASOK	The Panhellenic Socialist Movement
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
SEECF	South East European Cooperation Process
SIIA	Singapore Institute for International Affairs
SRM	Socialist Republic of Macedonia
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
TSK	Turkish Armed Forces
UN	United Nations
UNFCYIP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
US	United States
WWI	First World War
YDAS	General Directorate for International Development in Greece

INTRODUCTION

Bilateral relations with Turkey occupy an important place in Greek Foreign policy, since both countries share a common geography and history. The two neighbours' common history dated back to Greeks' War of Independence from the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. Since then, bilateral relations were described by successive periods of tension and stability. Despite the short period of rapprochement in the early 1930s initiated by Venizelos and Atatürk, relations reached its lowest level in the 1960s when Cyprus problem broke out. The bitter relations continued during the 1980s, particularly throughout Andreas Papandreu's term in Greece. Despite a short break in Davos in 1988 which was short lived, the Davos spirit did not have any long-lasting positive result on bilateral relations. In the 1990s, the two countries came to the brink of war many times in the Aegean Sea.

A new era emerged in Greek-Turkish relations by 1999 which was so called as the Greek-Turkish rapprochement. This new era was marked with the establishment of dialogue mechanisms, public and personal initiatives. Following the earthquakes which hit Izmit and Athens successively in 1999, the two countries established closer relations as never seen before. The sense of pain and sorrow brought the two countries together in the spirit of friendship and cooperation. Friendship and likeness between the Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreu and his Turkish counterpart Ismail Cem also contributed to this growing spirit on the two sides of the Aegean. Rather than chasing long standing problems, both countries focused on low politics issues and they aimed to develop relations in all low politics areas. The newly elected Prime Minister Kostas Simitis introduced a new approach to the Greek foreign policy making and left traditional hard line policies of PASOK and aimed to Europeanize Greek foreign policy-making and to develop the image of Greece within the EU. Although he was tested early on its relations with Turkey by the crisis over the Imia (Kardak) islets and the Ocalan affair and failed, he then managed to stabilize the relations with Turkey. The Ocalan Affair not only brought internal changes in Greek government but also it signed a new period of alternative approaches regarding Greek-Turkish relations. In Helsinki Summit in 1999, Greece left its veto policy and recognized Turkey as a candidate country to the EU.

Despite those developments, key differences between Greece and Turkey have remained unsolved and concerns over high politics issues continue. It seems that both sides adopted a tactical thinking in time rather than focusing on core issues of conflict. This thesis aims to analyze the reasons behind the shift in Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkey in the late 1990s and contributes to the literature by explaining the change through conflict resolution frameworks.

In the first chapter, the focus is on the leading factors shaping Greek foreign policy towards Turkey in the late 1990s. Within this scope, Europeanization of Greek foreign policy is defined along with Simitis' role as the leadership factor and Greek support for Turkey's candidacy to the EU in Helsinki Summit in 1999. Following that, the second part of this chapter concentrates on conflict resolution frameworks of Peter Wallensteen and Frank R. Pfetsch. The shift in Greek foreign policy-making in the late 1990s is explained mainly within the scope of conflict resolution approaches such as Wallensteen's seventh mechanism approach and Pfetsch' approach. In this part, the track two diplomacy and its implementation are also defined as a part of conflict resolution mechanism. In the third part of this chapter, the change in the Greek-Turkish relations in the late 1990s is analyzed through above-mentioned factors in the first part and the conflict resolution frameworks.

The second chapter includes a general overview of Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkey in the 1980s. In this regard, the focus is on Greek Foreign Policy-making under Andreas Papandreou's government. This period is explained in a detailed way which was mainly characterized by growing nationalism and Greece's isolation in world politics. In this chapter, Cyprus Issue and the Aegean Disputes are covered as major developments between Greece and Turkey during the 1980s. In the end of the chapter, the Davos process towards reconciliation is explained, which was short lived and did not have long lasting results on bilateral relations.

The third chapter explains the major developments in Greek foreign policy in the beginning of the 1990s and the mid of 1990s and their impact on relations with Turkey. In this respect, regional threats to the Greek security in the 1990s, the Macedonia Crisis and the formation of Greek-Serbian Axis towards the Muslim Arch under the leadership of Turkey are explained.

The fourth chapter addresses Greek foreign policy in the late 1990s focusing on the rapprochement between the two countries. The factors contributing to the rapprochement between the two countries are explained in details including firstly, the rebalancing attempts of Greece in order to develop its relations with the West in the late 1990s, secondly, the effects of capture of Abdullah Ocalan in the Greek embassy in Nairobi, Kenya in 1999, thirdly, the constructive impact of the foreign affairs ministers, George Papandreou and Ismail Cem, and fourthly, the effects of the Seismic Diplomacy and changing societal perceptions between the two nations.

In the final chapter, Greece-Turkey rapprochement in the late 1990s is analyzed through conflict resolution frameworks. The study concludes that whereas rapprochement of the late 1990s led to progress in bilateral relations regarding low politics issues, the high politics issues have remained unsolved since both sides still continue to preserve their core positions on critical issues.

CHAPTER ONE

GREEK FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY IN THE LATE 1990S AND RELEVANT CONFLICT RESOLUTION FRAMEWORKS

1.1. LEADING FACTORS SHAPING GREEK FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY IN THE LATE 1990s

1.1.1. Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy

In its broadest sense, Europeanization refers to responses of actors to the impact of European integration.¹ In particular, Europeanization can be defined as a process of “internalization of environmental inputs” by the members of the EU, which involves “the redefinition of functions, relationships, boundaries, values and cultural traits, regulatory patterns that shape the internal dynamics of the political system”.² Accordingly, the term includes “a set of processes through which the EU political, social and economic dynamics become part of the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies”.³ Economides argues that Europeanization is “not simply adaptation or socialization nor is it integration or neo functionalism, but rather the gradual formation of collective identity, which is just as applicable to country specific foreign policies within European foreign policy as it is the domestic context.”⁴ Tsardinis and Stavridis suggest that Europeanization process include four approaches. The first one is based on the impact of the EU membership, in other words, ‘EUisation’ which finds itself mostly in comparative politics. The second one involves bargaining of national interests under the EU framework which finds itself in realist paradigm. The third approach is based on cooperation and interdependence and the best example is the EU integration.⁵ Lastly, the fourth

¹ Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis”, **Keele European Parties Research Unit Working Papers**, Working Paper 7, 2001, p. 1.

² P. C. Ioakimidis, “The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment”, **South European Society and Politics**, Vol.5, 2000, p. 73.

³ Ladrech, p. 4.

⁴ Spyros Economides, “The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy”, **West European Politics**, Vol.28, 2005, p. 472.

⁵ Charalambos Tsardinidis, Stelios Stavridis, “The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy: A critical appraisal”, **European Integration**, Vol.27, 2005, p. 219.

approach involves redefinition of ideas and interests, which finds itself mostly in constructivist paradigm.⁶

Greece became a full member of the European Community (EC) in 1981, after becoming an associate member with the Athens agreement, which was signed between Greece and the EC in 1961. A year after the collapse of the seven year-long military governance, in 1975, Greece applied for full membership under the leadership of Constantine Karamanlis, who later became the prime minister. As Ioakimidis explains, Karamanlis saw the membership as a must to achieve political stability, consolidate democracy, and guarantee its external security and to modernize the Greek economy.⁷ Greece had long been considered as the black sheep of the EU for its economic underperformance and inconsistency with the EU foreign policy.⁸ However, after the second half of the 1990s, a massive change occurred in both economic and foreign policy areas. As it is stated, Greece was transformed to a full and respected EU member as well as a NATO ally.⁹

The process of Europeanization of Greek foreign policy has not only taken a long time, but also it was a twisted process as it included westernization and modernization. Since the second half of the 1990s, from the Papandreou years and the dissolution of Yugoslavia onwards, this process has also involved normalization. Additionally, it is also called as the period of post rehabilitation which involves denationalization and multilateralization of the Greek national interests.¹⁰ According to Keridis, following the Balkan crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, Greek foreign policy began to be shaped by growing realism and flexibility as a result of the broader modernization of the Greek political system and culture.¹¹ Particularly, the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy preferences and interests has taken place in two key areas; Turkey and the Cyprus issues. It is argued that while Europeanization includes a top down approach in itself, the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy

⁶ Ibid., p. 220.

⁷ Ibid., p. 76.

⁸ Economides, p. 471.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Dimitris Keridis, "Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization", **A NATO Fellowship Final Report**, Cambridge, June 1999, p. 32.

mainly involves a bottom up approach.¹² In that sense, while the Greek foreign policy making has been Europeanized through the EU membership, Greek policy makers also Europeanized the substance of their foreign policies. Accordingly, there is a view that the Greek willingness to join the Union came from security oriented reasons after the fall of the colonel's junta in 1974, rather than from reasons related to democratic consolidation and economic growth. In this regard, the EC was seen as a system of political solidarity that guaranteed the external security of Greece considering its relations with Turkey in the region. This view was also reflected in the statements of the Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis such as "Europe offers us security" and "our frontiers will henceforth be defended by the united Europe."¹³ When Greece applied to membership of European Economic Community on 12 June, 1975, it both hoped to consolidate its democracy and strengthen its ties with the Western Europe as well as decreasing US political and economic influence on itself.¹⁴

Hence, the desire to join the EC was mainly driven by foreign policy and security considerations. But, according to Economides, willingness for Westernization which was clarified as the aim of accession has to be considered as well.¹⁵ This approach was reflected in the 1977 general election campaigns by Karamanlis as "we belong to the West".¹⁶ Moreover, besides developing a sense of identity and belonging as required by Greek security considerations mainly driven by its problematic relationship with Turkey, there was also a dominant view on the Greek side that Turkey was favored by the US as a result of convergence of their interests towards the region.¹⁷ On 17 August, 1974, Greece also declared its withdrawal from NATO's military wing.¹⁸ Additionally, any military action against Turkey represented a dangerous option since the Greek army was not prepared and fully equipped after the seven years of military junta. Similarly, the increased reliance on the US and the NATO had to be reduced.¹⁹

¹² Economides, p. 472.

¹³ Ibid., p. 473.

¹⁴ Christian Lekl, "The Accession of Greece", *CVCE*, 2016, p. 2.

¹⁵ Economides, p. 473.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 474.

¹⁸ Lekl, p. 2.

¹⁹ Eirini Karamouzi, "Managing the Helsinki Spirit in the Balkans: The Greek Initiative for Balkan Cooperation 1975-1976", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol.24, 2013.

Hence, Karamanlis saw the EC as a guarantee for Greek security and economic interests, while developing democratic consolidation inside. In order to balance the increased US influence in Greece, Karamanlis tried to convince the Greek nation that they belonged to the West in terms of both identity and foreign and security interests. Meanwhile, the EC membership would also reconcile rising anti-Americanism within the country, hence the country would be able to locate itself in the anti-communist bloc without making differentiation between Europe and the US. As Economides states, through Europeanization of Greek foreign policy, mainly the westernization of Greece's international role and its security interests can be materialized, which would balance its position within the East-West balance of power. The EC membership was regarded as a mean to balance the US within the context relations with the West, while it was also perceived as a means for westernization. In the longer term this would turn into Europeanization process by projecting the Greek security interests and goals.²⁰

During the first period of Greek membership between 1981 and 1985, it did not affect the process of EU integration of Greece or the PASOK's rise to the power. Applying the terms of accession continued to become the main objective.²¹ During the second period between 1985 and 1995, Greece turned out to be a trouble maker in terms of foreign policy coordination. In the final period, since 1996, the EU gained its transformative role in Greek foreign policy making. As Tsardinidis and Stavridis explain, all the key issues were handed to multilateral framework of the EU. As they state, Europeanization has not only become "a tool for promoting better Greek national interests but also as a mechanism for better influencing the way" the European foreign policy was conducted.²²

The most critical point is to what extent it is possible to talk about Europeanized Greek foreign policy.²³ Triantaphyllou points out that through time Europeanization can be observed "in all aspects of the Greek polity whether these are political, economic, social or religious."²⁴ There is no doubt that there is a clear change

²⁰ Economides, p. 475.

²¹ Tsardinidis and Stavridis, p. 225.

²² Ibid., p. 226.

²³ Ibid., p. 218.

²⁴ Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, "The Priorities of Greek Foreign Policy Today", **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, Vol.5, No:3, 2005, p. 331.

in terms of style.²⁵ According to Tsardinidis and Stavridis, the new Greek foreign policy is based on more conciliation and less confrontation, in other words, rather than personalized policies, it is based on more coalition building initiatives.²⁶ It is a different strategy altogether. Greece's national interests are better served via multilateral efforts, mainly in the EU, rather than unilateral or bilateral ones.²⁷ In Greece, both intended and responsive Europeanization came together as a unitary process based on the idealization of modernization under the leadership of Prime Minister Simitis after the second half of the 1990s.²⁸

After Simitis government came into power in 1996, two issues, modernization and Europeanization became the main priorities of his agenda.²⁹ Hence, there is a difference between the terms of Karamanlis and Simitis which is important in terms of understanding the underlying conditions for modernization/Europeanization and their influence on the foreign policy field.³⁰ This difference was particularly felt during the terms of Papandreou due to his restraining influence on the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy. Two major external developments isolated Greece from the EU at that time; the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Greek response to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. This marginalization was later transformed into the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy under the leadership of Simitis. As Koliopoulos and Veremis stated while PASOK was pursuing change, under Simitis' leadership motto it turned into modernization.³¹ According to Featherstone, the impact of the EU on Greece under PASOK was much more visible as the domestic and foreign policy-making changed and new issues were "increasingly examined through the lens of Europe."³²

The change in Greek foreign policy in line with Europeanization of its foreign policy can best be seen in its foreign policy change regarding Turkey-EU relations.

²⁵ Tsardinidis and Stavridis, p. 224.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 218.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Economides, p. 477.

²⁹ Gizem Cakmak, "Greek -Turkish Relations in the post Helsinki Period: Is Europe a framework providing détente?".

³⁰ Economides, p. 477.

³¹ John S. Koliopoulos, Thanos Veremis, **Modern Greece, A History since 1821**, Wiley-Blackwell Publications, 2010, p. 193.

³² Kevin Featherstone, "Europeanization and the Centre Periphery: the case of Greece in the 1990s", **South European Society and Politics**, 2007, p. 35.

Greece's shift in its foreign policy in favor of supporting Turkey's EU candidacy in Helsinki Summit of December 1999 can be defined as a turning point in Greece-Turkey relations. Greece was against Turkey's membership to the EU because Greek ruling elites believed that Turkey has a revisionist foreign policy which constituted a challenge to the status quo. Due to this belief, as it is pointed out by Agnantopoulos, between the years 1986 and 1998, Greece adopted negative conditionality towards Turkey based on two principles: "the obstruction of EU-Turkish contractual relations and the freezing of EU financial assistance to Turkey".³³ Thus, prior to the Helsinki Summit, Greece vetoed Turkey's candidacy to the EU and successfully blocked EU loans to be granted to Turkey. However, since the Helsinki Summit Greece has been supporting Turkey's EU membership and Europeanization of Greek foreign policy has contributed to this change in Greek perspective. Greek ruling elites understood that preventing Turkey accession to the EU was counterproductive because had not led to a reduction in the security challenge that was perceived to be constituted by Turkey. Greek foreign policy-makers were convinced that a Turkey which is a candidate country for EU membership would a less dangerous country for Greece. Accordingly, it was thought that an EU candidate Turkey had to act in line with EU institutions and would be under EU supervision.³⁴ This was believed to create a more fertile ground for the resolution of conflict between Greece and Turkey. In addition, prospect of future membership to the EU was viewed to motivate Turkey to materialize a number of political and economic reforms that would cause an abandonment of its revisionist behavior.³⁵

1.1.2. The Simitis Factor: Leadership Matters

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of communism, new threats emerged while old threats re-emerged for Greek foreign policy. With the dissolution of Yugoslavia by the early 1990s, Eastern European countries became the focus point of international politics. For the EU, focus of attention shifted rapidly from Greece,

³³ Apostolos Agnantopoulos, "The Europeanization of national foreign policy: explaining Greek support for Turkey's EU accession", **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, Vol.13, No. 1, 2013, p. 74.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 75.

³⁵ Ibid.

Spain and Portugal to the Eastern European countries and their economic development and democratic consolidation meant the end of preferential treatment to Greece by the EU.³⁶ Meanwhile, economic underperformance of Greece also came under criticism of the Union by the beginning of 1990s. Despite transfer of major EU funds, negative economic indicators such as massive budget deficits, high inflation and rising unemployment placed Greece at the bottom of EU economic rankings. As a result, some members even began to question the decision of accepting the Greek membership.

The questioning of Greek membership in NATO and the EU was intensified by the Greek attitude during the collapse of the Yugoslavia due to its opponent standing and intervention in Yugoslavia wars.³⁷ It contributed unflattering picture of Greece, as Strobe Talbott stated “Greece is reminding the world that it too is a Balkan country, the inhabitant of a region where history often induces hysteria.”³⁸ Domestically, there was no space left for the New Democracy government to pursue an active foreign policy since it held a slim parliamentary majority and mainly focused on staying in power. Hence, the government was not only vulnerable to manipulation by public opinion, but also by individual politicians, who could exploit this situation for their own ambitions. Following the dissolution of Yugoslavia and Macedonia’s emergence as one of the breakaway republics; foreign and domestic policy converged.

The Greek security concerns against Macedonia intensified following its first constitution, which was perceived as a potential future claim on the country’s territory. These security concerns were turned into a national hysteria, due to provocative use of symbols by the new Macedonian regime and as they were exploited by the domestic policy makers, diplomatic issues were left to the background. Economides explains the situation as “long sustained by the Cold War inspired notion of westernness, Greeks were now floundering in a crisis of national identity inspired by a desperately poor neophyte neighbor in a fluid international context in which uncertainty reigned”.³⁹ The international pressure on Greece had also intensified rapidly as both the EU and the US opposed the Greek decisions of non-recognition of Macedonia and

³⁶ Economides, p. 478.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Vangelis Calotychos, **The Balkan Prospect: Identity, Culture and Politics in Greece after 1989**, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, p. 51.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 480.

its attitude towards Serbia. The domestic political scene inside and the mismanagement and presentation of the Greek interests damaged the country's international standing seriously.

After the end of Bosnian war, Papandreou term ended and a more pragmatic and technocratic leader, Simitis came to power.⁴⁰ Koliopoulos and Veremis states that the PASOK party showed an instinct for survival by choosing Costas Simitis since Papandreou was no longer able to rule the party.⁴¹ As Simitis was subjected to humiliations by Papandreou and was never liked by him, he managed to start a modernizing spirit within the party.⁴² As Simitis represented European normalcy against Greek exceptionalism, this shift was also noticed by voters.⁴³ Koliopoulos and Veremis describe him as “an individual without a spot of corruption on his record and singularly uncharismatic, the quiet academic outfoxed the establishment of party bureaucrats.” Although he did not suppress the opponents within the party, he pursued a different policy making which was previously under the influence of the old guard.⁴⁴

Simitis was elected by 2,732 votes against 2,324 votes for Akis Tsochadzopoulos, who was the most dedicated supporter of Andreas Papandreou when he was alive and the stalwart of old guard after his death.⁴⁵ In order to consolidate the election result, Simitis called for general elections in September 1996 and PASOK had taken 41.49 percent of the votes and 163 seats against the 38.12 percent of the votes of New Democracy and 108 seats.⁴⁶ Having the burden of the foreign policy of the previous terms, Simitis promised rehabilitation, in other words initiation of a modernization process, in both domestic and external policy making. One of his aims in this regard was to restore healthy ties with the EU and to pursue an active policy towards its Balkan neighbors, while aiming a domestic reform program.⁴⁷ This would mean a bottom up form of Europeanization which could be defined as projection of Greek interests on the EU foreign policy agenda. In order to achieve this, firstly, the Greek foreign policy had to be subjected to a process of normalization. It also required

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 481.

⁴¹ Koliopoulos and Veremis, p. 189.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Keridis, p. 40.

⁴⁴ Koliopoulos and Veremis, p. 190.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Economides, p. 481.

the denationalization and multi-lateralization of Greek foreign policy which meant conversion of the Greek national interests from bilateral issues into multilateral issues in complying with the values and interests of the EU.⁴⁸

The handling of the Kosovo crisis in 1999 by Greece was a good example of rehabilitation and normalization in terms of foreign policy making and convergence between Greece and the EU. Outbreak of the Kosovo Crisis was not only a regional crisis for Greece, but also forced it to reconsider its relations with Serbia. During the Kosovo Crisis, the main challenge for the Simitis government was to persuade its public in favor of Serbia, while pursuing an internationally acceptable policy.⁴⁹ In this regard, Simitis established a balance between internal demands and an internationally acceptable foreign policy. The decision about Greek military participation in the Operation Allied Force was declined by the Greek government, however NATO's operation was supported and NATO forces were allowed free passage. By this policy, Greece succeeded to act in harmony with the EU and the rest of Western world despite the domestic opposition.

This balanced position adopted by Simitis was far different than the one adopted by his predecessor Papandreou, which was ethnocentric and uncompromising.⁵⁰ Simitis had followed a compromise policy carefully and realized that consensus approach would better serve the realization of long term interests. The policy was based on rehabilitation and normalization of the relations within the context of Europeanization and was pursued by a view of avoiding marginalization from the region. Dokos describes this shift in Greek foreign policy making as; “in the 1980s...reactionary policies, unreliability and unpredictability were the dominant characteristics of Greek foreign policy...since the mid-1900s and early 21st century the pattern has been of a more pragmatic, reliable, rational, multidimensional foreign policy, placing emphasis on multilateral diplomacy.”⁵¹ Keridis also explains the change as “exhibiting a growing realism and flexibility as result of the broader modernization of the Greek political system and culture.”⁵² The transformation of

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 482.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 485.

⁵⁰ Thanos Dokos, “Who Lost Greece? The Geopolitical Consequences of the Greek Crisis”, **Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) Policy Paper**, No.18, 2012, p. 8.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Keridis, p. 32.

Greek foreign policy particularly towards Kosovo, Cyprus and Turkey also strengthened the international credibility of Greece as a European actor. In January 2003, Greece was granted the Presidency of the EU Council. During its presidency Greece experienced eastward enlargement of the EU and faced with the economic questions and a series of issues about the EU's external relations, nevertheless it managed to follow a more coherent and enhanced policy towards the Western Balkans region.⁵³

Normalizing relations with Turkey was the second example to indicate the change in Greek foreign policy making. Two important steps were taken in the foreign policy field; firstly, conscious attempts were made in terms of emphasizing interests rather than rights, secondly, instruments of soft power in Southeastern Europe and the Aegean were began to be employed. As Economides stated, the crisis which broke out in the Aegean in 1996 was the first major test for the Simitis government since they came to power.⁵⁴ The crisis escalated very quickly and brought the two countries to the brink of war. The main reason of the conflict was the group of rocks in the Aegean Sea known as İmra (Kardak). The tension between the two countries rose when a group of Turkish journalists removed the Greek flag from the islet and this act was followed by placing the Greek flag again. With the impact of sensationalist media on both sides, the armed forces of the two countries sent their navies to the Aegean Sea. The possibility of war between Greece and Turkey was prevented by mediation efforts of the US.

On the Greek side, the government failed the crisis management. However following that crisis, the Simitis government sent the first signals of a changing foreign policy making and an attitude towards national interests.⁵⁵ Melakopides describes Simitis' rhetoric as calm and constructive and "founded solidly on such 'cosmopolitan' values, as moderation, communication, mediation, peaceful resolution of disputes, caring, generosity, and ecological sensitivity".⁵⁶ He focused on a well-adapted diplomatic campaign to convince the EU members that the borders of the Greece were in fact the borders of the Union itself and to defend the Greek rights even against

⁵³ Economides, p. 486.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 482.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Costas Melakopides, "Turkish political culture and the future of the Greco-Turkish rapprochement", **Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) Policy Paper**, 2002, p. 5.

Turkey in this regard is in fact defending the Union's interest itself.⁵⁷ Most importantly, by this policy Simitis aimed to present the Greek interests as the EU interests and any threat against the territorial integrity of Greece as a threat to integrity of the EU. Simitis also aimed to overcome the prejudice in the EU that Greece was not a western state but a Balkan state.

Attempts to normalize bilateral relations with Turkey constituted a concrete example of transformation in the Greek foreign policy. Following instability and the crisis in the Aegean Sea, the earthquakes which struck both Turkey and Greece in August and September 1999, brought the two countries closer.⁵⁸ For Greece, the critical result of this development in the form of rapprochement process was a gain-for the Greek diplomacy. Economides explains it as "for Greece, immense kudos was gained for its proactive policies and good behavior and this political capital was stored for future use".⁵⁹

Since 1981, Greece had been the main reason why Turkey would never become a member of the EU. Due to the Aegean disputes and the Cyprus issue, Greece was following a veto policy against the Turkey's membership. However, as rapprochement with Turkey and the Europeanization of the Greek foreign policy and security interests gained momentum, Greece decided to support Turkey's candidacy to the EU rather than vetoing it.⁶⁰ Çakmak explains the reason for removal of Greek veto at Helsinki Summit in 1999 by the fact that the Europeanization of bilateral disputes by engaging Turkey on the path of the EU would serve Greek interests better. According to her, Turkey would be transformed to a less threatening country for Greece under EU's transformative role and the power of military would also be decreased. Hence, the mutual conflicts which were taken at EU level would be solved during the accession negotiations of Turkey.⁶¹ For instance, Helsinki Summit put some conditions on Cyprus Issue and Aegean Disputes. As Çakmak stated, "with articles 4 and 9 emphasizing the fact that Turkey's eligibility for EU membership after Helsinki depended on resolving two issues: its border conflict with Greece, and the Cyprus dispute. Article 4 states that The European Council will review the situation relating

⁵⁷ Economides, p. 482.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 483.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 484.

⁶¹ Çakmak, p. 12.

to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004.”⁶²

Overall, contrary to the image of ‘black sheep’ of the Union during the early 1990s considering its foreign policy on the issues of dissolution of Yugoslavia and the non-recognition of Macedonia, after the election of Kostas Simitis as prime minister, Europeanization became the main force of Greek foreign policy making in order to regain its status as a respected member of the Union. Simitis’ aim was to transform Greece into a role model for its neighbors “as a European country in the Balkans, not a Balkan country in Europe.”⁶³ Accordingly, the priority of Simitis’ agenda was to make Greece a member of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Hence his approach carried both political and economic aspects. Secondly, he fully understood that it was highly likely impossible for Greece to fulfill its full integration to the Union without solving its bilateral problems with Turkey.⁶⁴ Thus, Greece left its veto policy for Turkey’s candidacy at the Helsinki Summit on 10-11 December 1999 and has since then followed an engagement policy towards Turkey.

1.1.3. Helsinki Summit in 1999: A Turning Point in Greek-Turkish Relations

Despite the Simitis governance demonstrated signs of promoting Turkey-EU relations, divisions within the PASOK party did not let it at the beginning.⁶⁵ Hence, as newly elected Prime Minister, Kostas Simitis failed to transform Greek foreign policy understanding when he faced the pressure of populist policy supporters inside. On first days of his presidency, the EU asked for Simitis’ cooperation in order to lift the Greek veto against Turkey on the EU financial aid. However, 32 deputies from the ruling PASOK party sent a letter to Simitis explaining that it could not be accepted to open to discussion the Greek-Turkish disputes and the removal of the Greek veto on the

⁶² Ibid., p. 13.

⁶³ Mustafa Kutlay, “A political economy approach to the expansion of Turkish-Greek relations: interdependence or not?”, *Perceptions*, 2009, p. 115.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Bahar Rumelili, “Avrupa Birliği ve Bölgesel İhtilafların Çözümü”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol.4:16, 2007, p. 68.

union's financial aid.⁶⁶ Because of that internal opposition, the Greek veto against Turkey continued.

On the other hand, when the EU decided to exclude Turkey from the list of candidate states in Luxembourg Summit in December 1997, it had deepened the mistrust in Turkey against the EU that the EU was siding with Greece in the Mediterranean region against Turkey. For this reason, Turkey decided to suspend its relations with the EU as a response to its decision of excluding Turkey in the Luxembourg Summit.⁶⁷ As Tayfur stated, from Turkish point of view, the EU was siding with Greece against Turkey and choose her as strategic partner in the region while sacrificing its friendship with Turkey.⁶⁸ However, after the outbreak of Ocalan crisis in February 1999, the three leading anti-Turkish deputies had to be resigned from the government and the moderate George Papandreou was appointed as the new minister of foreign affairs.

Besides, civil contacts reached a peak point following the earthquakes which hit Izmit and Athens successively in August and September 1999 and Greece lifted its veto and accepted Turkish candidacy to the EU at Helsinki Summit, 1999.⁶⁹ The Ocalan crisis did not turn into a war between the two countries and could be carried out in prudential manner. Following that, a new period for détente began which was shaped by step by step reconciliation approach. The two foreign affairs ministers of that period, George Papandreou and Ismail Cem initiated a diplomatic process in the spring of 1999. The main aim was to give up zero sum understanding of the past and to consider common interests, which could lead to a win-win situation.⁷⁰ According to Tsakonas, the acceptance decision of Turkey's candidacy, in Helsinki, in December 1999 was a breakthrough in terms of Greek-Turkish relations, after thirty years of

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 63.

⁶⁷ Ibid, p.65. Similarly, the statements which were describing Turkey as non-European increased the distrust within the country and both at public and political level, Greece was started to be perceived as a threat again. The common idea regarding to Greece in that period was 'a neighbour/so-called ally made a habit of hostility against Turkey' and 'spoiled child of Europe' due to Greece's policy by using the EU as a lever against Turkey. For this reason, both in Turkey and Greece, Europe served differentiation of the two countries while it was also a main factor in identity formation. Bahar Rumelili, "Avrupa Birliği ve Bölgesel İhtilafların Çözümü", **Uluslararası İlişkiler**, Vol.4:16, 2007, p. 67.

⁶⁸ Fatih Tayfur, "The Turkey/Greece/Cyprus Security Complex and the EU Enlargement: Implications for the Euro-Mediterranean Relations", **EuroMesco Paper** 28, 2004, p. 12.

⁶⁹ Rumelili, p. 68.

⁷⁰ Theodore A. Coulombis, Alexander E. Kentikelenis, "Greek-Turkish Relations and the Kantian Democratic Peace Theory", **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, Vol.7:4, 2007, p. 518.

conflict, since they managed to change long followed logic of Greek-Turkish relations by linking Turkey's EU engagement to the resolution of Aegean Disputes and the Cyprus Problem.⁷¹ According to this new policy thinking, Turkey's engagement with the Union would eliminate the Turkish threat against Greece. For this reason, Greek politicians thought that they had to support Turkey's candidacy to the Union. This policy thinking also legitimized the Greek foreign policy in promoting Turkey-EU relations.⁷²

Meanwhile, the acceptance decision also became an instrument for the Greek politicians, who were supporters of alternative policy options towards Turkey. While the hard line politicians expected that Greece would be able to take more compensation from Turkey during the candidacy process, the moderates expected that, Turkey would be fully compatible with European values and norms by commitment of the EU.⁷³ As Kentikelenis and Couloumbis stated "Greece also gained because it began a process of engaging its eastern neighbor into a path of 'Europeanization' that could result in a drastic improvement of neighborly relations"⁷⁴ and both sides got their shares of the pie. Turkey gained since it secured its candidacy status, while Greece escaped from being scapegoat of the Union since the other 14 members of the Union were hiding their Turkish scepticism behind Greek vetoes.⁷⁵ However, most importantly, despite the reconciliation process, resolution of the high politics issues were suspended temporarily since they were less likely to be resolved in the short term.⁷⁶ Lesser also stated that the public initiatives which were adopted following the seismic diplomacy suppressed rising nationalism in both countries. However, the most noteworthy result was achieved with the attempts of policymakers in Greece and Turkey, who engaged in reconciliation for their own strategic reasons.⁷⁷

As Rumelili stated, the acceptance of Turkey's EU candidacy helped Turkey's transformation, particularly in foreign policy making.⁷⁸ After the Helsinki Summit,

⁷¹ Panayotis Tsakonas, **The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek-Turkish Relations: Grasping Greece's Socialization Strategy**, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010, p. 26.

⁷² Rumelili, p. 68.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 69.

⁷⁴ Couloumbis and Kentikelenis, p. 518.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 519.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 530.

⁷⁷ Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey, Greece, and the U.S. in a Changing Strategic Environment: Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Europe", **RAND**, 2001, p. 6.

⁷⁸ Rumelili, p. 68.

Turkey adopted zero problem policy in the region and this policy also reflected itself in bilateral relations with Greece. Turkey realized that its membership in the Union was connected with its relations with Greece and also agreed on to take the bilateral disputes to the International Court of Justice if the bilateral negotiations failed. Besides these, Turkey also deepened the rapprochement process with its neighbor through the promotion of confidence building measures and also supported the Annan Plan for the reunification of the island, Cyprus.⁷⁹ As it is stated, the Union provided a common platform for both Greece and Turkey to watch the benefits of reconciliation by sharing common norms and values under the EU framework.⁸⁰ Most importantly, by Helsinki Summit in 1999, the Union started to show Greece as a role model for Turkey for being a mature and rational European state.⁸¹

Since Greece became a full member of the EEC in 1981, the veto power that Greece held and the unanimous nature of the Union led to a stalemate in the EU-Turkey relations. Greece did not allow the normalization and development of bilateral relations between the Union and Turkey without settlement of the main issues which included Greek-Turkish disputes over the air space and continental shelf of the Aegean Sea and the Cyprus problem. This Greek policy approach later turned into a policy of conditionality. In addition to that, in the beginning of the 1990s, with the outbreak of Bosnian crisis and Greece's pro-Serbian standing and its name dispute with FYROM, Greece was seen as 'black sheep' and 'awkward squard' in the Union since it was blocking the consensus by using its veto power.⁸² Also as Kutlay stated, the EU was used as a platform against Turkey by Greece. From Greece's membership to the Union in 1981 until the end of the 1990s, Greece used its veto card against Turkey to maintain its position in regard to its vital interests. For this reason, Greece always vetoed EU financial aid towards Turkey as well as Turkey's application for candidate country status at Luxemburg Summit on 12-13 December 1997.⁸³

However, with the acceptance of Turkey's candidacy, Greece relieved from being burden of vetoing country. According to Grigoriadis, Greece took this strategic

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 72.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Çakmak, p. 9.

⁸³ Kutlay, p. 115.

move since it was likely not possible Turkey's accession to the Union.⁸⁴ Besides, while the former image forced Greece to present Turkey as non-European in order to validate its Europeaness now evolved into presenting Turkey as 'possible but inadequate European' as a result of its new policy of engagement.⁸⁵ According to Grigoriadis, "the new position of Greece as regards the future of Turkey-EU relations is a product of a strategic reinterpretation of Greek-Turkish relations."⁸⁶ Its EU membership is no longer an advantage for Greece, contrary, development of Turkey-EU relations is vital for Greece since Turkey's obligation to meet Copenhagen criterias would lead a political reform within Turkey which would also lead reconsideration of Turkish foreign policy towards Greece.⁸⁷

Agnantopoulos also points out that "the Helsinki decision earmarked a shift in Greek strategic thinking towards a logic of inclusion, which highlighted the positive effects that the deepening of Turkey's EU vocation would have on Greek security interests, by tempering Turkey's 'aggressive' behavior and creating the conditions for an eventual resolution of Greek-Turkish conflicts."⁸⁸ Since 1999, Greece has pursued a 'peace offensive' with Turkey, aimed at reducing tensions over the Aegean, and predicated on actively supporting Turkey's European future as a basis for advancing the cause of rapprochement between the two countries. In this regard, it was adopted more relaxed attitude towards bilateral cooperation particularly in low politics field and a strong attitude to avoid any risk of an escalation of tension in the Aegean by implementing confidence building measures.⁸⁹ He also argues that bilateral cooperation which formed the basis of the Greek Turkish rapprochement in low politics field was also a part of the EU model of functional integration in the scope of conflict resolution.⁹⁰

⁸⁴ Ioannis Grigoriadis, "The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations", London School of Economics and Political Science, **Hellenic Observatory, 1st PhD Symposium on Modern Greece: "Current Social Science Research on Greece"**, London, 21st June 2003, p. 10.

⁸⁵ Apostolos Agnantopoulos, "The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework and an Empirical Application in Greek-Turkish Relations", **2nd LSE Symposium on Modern Greece**, June 10, 2005, p. 32.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 9.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Agnantopoulos, p. 67.

⁸⁹ Agnantopoulos, p. 24.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 30.

Accordingly, bilateral cooperation in low politics field resulted in growing interdependence between the two sides which led to the redefinition of common interests that was likely to end up with cooperation in high politics issues.⁹¹ Tsakonas explains that major shift in Greek foreign policy towards Turkey was abandonment of long followed strategy of 'conditional sanctions' and adoption of new flexible strategy of 'conditional rewards'. Tsakonas also adds that with this new strategy of conditional engagement of Turkey, Greece did not only upgrade its national concerns to the European level, but also prevented the possibility of Turkey's challenge against Greek interests.⁹² He describes the newly emerged situation as "a European context advantageous to Greece, where the European norms of behavior and certain European style 'rules of the game' had to be followed by Turkey".⁹³ Economides also adds that "enlargement to Turkey will inevitably have to include satisfactory resolution of the Aegean Disputes, enlargement to Turkey is now a European concern and not only a Greek one."⁹⁴

According to Melakopides, "the grounds for Greek optimism included two Helsinki-related facts. First, Cyprus' accession was now explicitly de-coupled from the prior solution of the Republic's political problem....Second, should EU candidates not have solved their "border disputes" with any Member-state of the Union, Helsinki demanded their submission to the International Court of Justice by 2004."⁹⁵ On the other hand, since the Greece's bargaining power was up to Turkey's willingness to join in the EU, this power would automatically decline if Turkey was left isolated as happened after the Luxemburg Summit.⁹⁶

1.2. CONFLICT RESOLUTION FRAMEWORKS

1.2.1. Approaches of Peter Wallensteen and Frank R. Pfetsch

In this section, the focus will be on the approaches of Peter Wallensteen and Frank R. Pfetsch regarding conflict resolution. In the world of national interests, the

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Tsakonas, p. 25.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 26.

⁹⁴ Economides, p. 484.

⁹⁵ Melakopides, p. 3.

⁹⁶ Ziya Onis, "Greek-Turkish Relations and the European Union: A Critical Perspective", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 6, 2001, p. 39.

main methods of international conflict management are the traditional methods: diplomatic, economic and military means of influence and the use of force.⁹⁷ As tools of power politics, these methods are used in order to address the conflict. For instance, in order to prevent escalation, states use threat of use of military force, economic sanctions, withdrawal of foreign aids and use of direct military force in order to establish demilitarized zones.⁹⁸ Negotiation is also another method in order to balance conflicting interests of the states which can be the basis of an agreement since it is possible to define the shared interests and the conflicting one during the negotiations.

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According to Wallensteen leading causes of conflict are the unresolved territorial disputes between states and such conflicts can only be resolved by participation of the conflicting parties.¹⁰⁰ Wallensteen suggests a number of strategies, which he calls as ‘the seven mechanisms’, to be applied in conflicts in order to reach a solution.¹⁰¹ These seven mechanisms are: changing of main positions by one side or both adversaries, dividing of conflicting values/ interests, bargaining or horse-trading in return for compensation, creating a shared rule/control, handing over the control to another party if the conflicting parties can not share the control, applying of conflict resolution measures, and leaving to the future the incompatibilities if no solution is reached between the conflicting parties.¹⁰²

Wallensteen explains the seven mechanisms in details by applying them to the recent conflicts between states. The first mechanism to transcend disagreement is the changing of main positions by conflicting parties. Some perceptions and values have to be given up by adversaries for the sake of a resolution. Wallensteen gives example of peace settlement between Iran and Iraq which had engaged in a highly destructive war for eight years.¹⁰³ As stated by a western official, both sides were “testing the

⁹⁷ Paul C Stern, Daniel Druckman, **International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War**, National Academy Press, Washington, 2001, p. 3. In the post-Cold War era, the use of power to resolve the conflict turned into multilateral action as seen in the NATO intervention in Kosovo since any unilateral state action might create new causes of conflict.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 3.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

For instance, negotiations took place between the US and the Soviet Union to prevent military confrontations in the Cold War era.

¹⁰⁰ Peter Wallensteen, **Understanding Conflict Resolution**, Sage Publications, 2002, p. 97.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 107.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

ground and tiptoeing in zigzags toward a peaceful settlement” as both had been hurt so badly to agree that they must put an end to the war.¹⁰⁴ Hence, both adversaries dropped their main demands and decided to implement a cease fire by August 1988 since there was almost no chance of winning for either sides, which meant that ending the war was the most reasonable option. Following that, both sides came to discuss the key demands including recognition, responsibility and compensation. Both sides accepted to recognize each other, to resolve the issue of responsibility and to drop the demand of compensation.¹⁰⁵

The second mechanism is the division of the conflicting values. With regards to geopolitical view, it means division of the contested territory between the conflicting parties which is in fact rarely applied. Wallenstein points out Munich Agreement of 1938 and the Hitler-Stalin Non-aggression Pact of 1939 as two distinct examples.¹⁰⁶ Munich Agreement of 1938 was signed between Britain, France and Nazi Germany in which Britain and France allowed Germany to annex Czechoslovakia in order to prevent the outbreak of a war. The German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 1939, which is also called as the Hitler-Stalin Pact, divided the Eastern Europe into two parts as German and Soviet spheres of influence.¹⁰⁷ Although it is less likely to see such agreements today, it can be applied for the unpopulated areas, particularly for maritime disputes.¹⁰⁸

The third mechanism is bargaining or horse-trading. It is defined as “we give away on this issue if you will concede on that one; we agree to compromise on one if you will agree to do the same on the other.”¹⁰⁹ In geopolitical consideration, it means to accept control over one area in return for control over another area. This is particularly applied while drawing new borders. With respect to settlement between Iran-Iraq, both sides accepted to recognize borders drawn by the 1975 accord. As Wallenstein states, “both sides had to leave some areas to gain access to others. The

¹⁰⁴ Louis Wiznitzer, “Iran, Iraq edge slowly toward peace settlement in Gulf war”, *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 23, 1983.

¹⁰⁵ Wallenstein, p. 107.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

¹⁰⁷ German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, <https://www.britannica.com/event/German-Soviet-Nonaggression-Pact>

¹⁰⁸ Wallenstein, p. 108.

¹⁰⁹ Gavin Kennedy, **Kennedy on Negotiation**, Gower Publishing, Hampshire, 1998, p. 33.

occupied territories, in a sense, were traded against each other...”¹¹⁰ Wallenstein also adds that this mechanism is well implemented when the bilateral relations were better, particularly the bilateral relations between the major powers. In regard to their vast interests such as arms and nuclear weapons reductions, this mechanism is most likely to be taking place.¹¹¹ Wallenstein gives the example of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) deal in 1987, in which the US accepted to eliminate all its cruise missiles (Tomahawk) and ballistic missiles (Pershing II) in exchange with the Soviet Union’s SS-20 missiles.¹¹² For the first time, the superpowers agreed on reducing their nuclear weapons and utilizing extensive on-site inspections.¹¹³

The fourth mechanism is creating a shared rule. Wallenstein makes a distinction considering conflicts between major powers and those between non-major powers.¹¹⁴ With regards to conflicts between major powers, he indicates history of shared organizations such as the United Nations (UN). The American and Soviet leaderships agreed on the details of the organization during the negotiations of 1944-45. As he states; “the UN has, as we have indicated, set standards for resolution of geopolitical conflicts (notably the inviolability of boundaries of states) which has had a profound impact on relations between states.”¹¹⁵ Establishment of joint organizations such as inspection teams for arms control agreements as done in the INF agreement in December 1987 were the outcomes of such kind of understanding. In the case of conflicts between non-major powers, creation of such organizations has been less likely. The agreements between India and Pakistan regarding nuclear installations, the agreements between Israel and Egypt and those between Israel and Jordan are such examples. While some of those agreements had satisfactory outcomes, others failed as in the cases of agreements between Israel and Egypt and those between Israel and Jordan. Wallenstein adds that the success of those agreements is most likely to be bound up with the Palestinian issue and the bilateral relations between Israel and Syria.¹¹⁶ Most of the Arab world believes that Israel does not want peace in the region

¹¹⁰ Wallenstein, p. 108.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at A Glance, (15.06.2014), <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty>

¹¹⁴ Wallenstein, p. 109.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

and Israel's military interventions in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip and the policy of increasing settlement expansion demonstrate that there is no hope for the resolution of Palestinian-Israeli conflict and even there is fear of a 'Greater Israel'.¹¹⁷

If the parties fail to create a shared rule, the fifth mechanism, to leave control to another party, comes out. This is the most frequently used mechanism in interstate relations today. From the view of a major power, it means neutralization or creating buffer zones. Considering the former one, Wallenstein gives the example of reintegration of Austria in 1955. According to him, both East's and West's concerns were satisfied by its neutralization.¹¹⁸ However, there is also a failed agreement lasting more than three decades; Cyprus. The 1960 agreement made Cyprus an independent and neutral state as non-aligned with its neighbors. Both Turkey and Greece accepted that they would not forcefully annex Cyprus into their own territory which was seen as a step for neutralizing the island. In fact, the Greek Cypriots constituting the majority of the population were demanding to reunite with Greece (enosis), whereas the Turkish Cypriots constituting the minority of the population, sided with Turkey, favored the division of the island (taksim). However, by the signing of 1960 agreement, Cyprus became an independent state, and none of these objectives were achieved. Despite constitution of the Republic of Cyprus balanced interests of both sides, it also gave Greece and Turkey the right to interfere in its internal affairs. Immediately afterwards, by 1963, the tension in the island increased. In 1964, the UN forces were deployed in the island and from 1974 onwards Turkish troops preserved their existence on the island. Because of the conflicting interests, the solution of the Cyprus problem by the inhabitants of the island is less likely. These cases show that neutralization is not that easy to apply and may be influential as long as the neighboring states maintain it. Regarding Turkish operation in 1974, Turkish authorities pointed out that the operation took place because the island was about to reunite with Greece. As Wallenstein suggests, "rather than deterring action, the neutral status of the island spurred the action."¹¹⁹ Hence, keeping the conflicting areas as neutralized, may also pose new dangers.¹²⁰ Likewise, while the buffer zones offer a strategic flexibility to

¹¹⁷ Farooq Mitha, "The Jordanian-Israeli Relationship: The Reality of Cooperation", **Middle East Policy Council**, Vol.17, 2010.

¹¹⁸ Wallenstein, p. 110.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

be used as a means of conflict management, they can turn into active and offensive means of intervention for the states too.¹²¹

The sixth mechanism to overcome disagreement is about the involvement of conflict resolution mechanisms. Conflicts are approached in a legal manner rather than political and the conflicting parties do not solve the issue by themselves but through ad hoc mechanisms which are created for particular occasions such as arbitration courts. According to Wallensteen, it is of primary importance whether the applied mechanism has legitimacy within the international system and among the conflicting parties or not.¹²² The difference of conflict resolution mechanism from other mechanisms is that it brings a procedural and argumentative level to the resolution which makes the outcome more acceptable. One of the legal means of conflict resolution mechanism is the arbitration, where the conflicting parties bounded themselves to accept the outcome. Regarding the conflicts where arbitration method is applied, Wallensteen gives examples of the conflict between India and Pakistan over the Rann of Kutch area in 1968 and the conflict between Egypt and Israel over the Taba area in 1988. In both cases arbitration prevented further tension. According to Wallensteen, this mechanism is most applicable to territorial conflicts. He gives a brief analysis of the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia in this regard. The conflict on border between the two sides was resolved by signing of the Algiers Peace Agreement in December 2000. To handle that, a special commission was created and 17 paragraphs out of 47 paragraphs in the final peace agreements were related to this commission.¹²³ By this means, the two years war between the two countries ended.¹²⁴

The seventh mechanism to transcend incompatibility is leaving the conflicting issues to the future without change on the main positions of the parties as Wallensteen defines.¹²⁵ The parties are not expected to reach a settlement within a certain time. Hence, additional time is gained and the parties maintain their positions within this time.¹²⁶ Otherwise, as Fisher et al. argue, the more negotiators bargain over positions,

¹²¹ Lionel Beehner, Gustav Meibauer, "The Futility of Buffer Zones in International Politics", **Foreign Policy Research Institute**, Spring 2016, p. 2.

¹²² Wallensteen, p. 111.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ethiopia to Sign Peace Treaty with Eritrea, Associated Press, **The New York Times**, December 7, 2000.

¹²⁵ Wallensteen, p. 112.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

the more they lock themselves into these positions and it is harder to find a common ground to reconcile their interests.¹²⁷ In this thesis, mainly this seventh mechanism will be underlined to explain improvement of relations between Greece and Turkey in the second half of the 1990s even though core issues of conflict between the two sides remained unresolved.

Another scholar working in the field of conflict resolution, whose perspective will be mentioned here is Frank R. Pfetsch. According to Pfetsch, the role of resources is also important. He suggests taking into account actor-related and issue-related resources in negotiating political conflicts. In addition to them, Pfetsch views behavior techniques as highly important in conflict resolution. Regarding behavior techniques, Pfetsch argues that firstly personal and political bargaining should be separated. Secondly, there should be a focus on interests, but not on fixed values. Thirdly, both sides should have mutual gains and to benefit from the agreed decision. Fourthly, with regards to objectivity, fair standards and procedures should be applied, and lastly, during the negotiation phase, best alternative should be figured out to be applied.¹²⁸ He lists instruments of negotiation techniques with regards to actor-related resources as follows;

- Use of power, influence and leadership capacity,
- Increase of consensual potential through coalitions,
- Setting of quotas and proportions,
- Enlargement or differentiation of subject matters,
- Exchange or linkage,
- Delay through submission to committees or ratification,
- Escape into generalizations or ideologization.¹²⁹

With respect to issue related resources within the context of negotiation techniques, Pfetsch suggests method of differentiation of the issues.¹³⁰ The differentiation of the disputed issues is frequently used during the negotiation process. As Pfetsch states; “the temporal prolongation and the choice of the years of reference also increased the chance of negotiating. In this context, it should be dealt separately with undefined issues.”¹³¹ The parts which are agreed upon and the parts to be decided

¹²⁷ Roger Fisher, William Ury, Bruce Patton, **Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In**, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1991, p. 5.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 70.

¹²⁹ Frank R. Pfetsch, **Negotiating Political Conflicts**, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, p.68.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 72.

¹³¹ Frank R. Pfetsch, “Power in International Negotiations: Symmetry and Asymmetry”, **4th Biennial of Negotiation**, 2011/2, p. 51.

later should be separated from each other in order to reach a solution.¹³² He also suggests a practice as reconciliation of interests. By defining interests clearly, the demands may be made compatible. He gives 'orange example' to clarify his point;

Two sisters are fighting over an orange. There is only one orange and both of them want it. During the argument it becomes clear that one girl wants to make an orange cake and only needs the peel. The other girl wants to make orange juice and only needs the flesh. Both wishes can be fulfilled without either side giving up anything. The demands are compatible.¹³³

For setting the complex issues aside to reach partial solutions, Pfetsch gives the example of the Arab-Israeli conflict in which this approach has been applied.¹³⁴ The conflict is divided into individual relationships between Israel and its neighbors such as the conflict between Israel and Egypt, Israel and Syria, Israel and Palestinians. While the relations in the former one are normalized at the moment, relations between Israel, Syria and Palestinians still remain tense.

By exchange and linkage method, Pfetsch gives example of Common Agricultural Policy of the EU. In this sense, while agreeing on a proposal, a member country is granted compensation in other fields. By applying this method, it is likely to achieve a possible settlement for opposing interests.¹³⁵ Pfetsch also emphasizes roles of the parties who are engaged in prolonged negotiations.¹³⁶ After some time, the parties may begin to develop friendly relations. Working together during prolonged negotiations also helps to constitute the basis of mutual trust.¹³⁷

He also emphasizes the role of strategies and tactics to be applied. It is always more likely to face deadlock condition or rise of tension during negotiation phases. In order to overcome such conditions, postponing the issue or gaining time may be the best alternatives.¹³⁸ As an example, he points out Jacques Delors, who was the the President of the European Commission between the years 1985 and 1995. During his presidency, Delors visited all the capitals of member states in order to figure out ways for future common action. However, later on, he decided to postpone focusing on

¹³² Pfetsch, 2007, p. 72.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 74.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Pfetsch, p. 54.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Pfetsch, p. 77.

foreign and security policies and concentrated on financial issues of the European Monetary Union (EMU).¹³⁹

Reframing may also be another strategy to be applied. Rather than focusing on tactics of the negotiator, general conditions may be redefined.¹⁴⁰ Even though parties do not change their view of the conflict, it helps them to understand the constraints that bound them and to reconsider the need of hostile exchanges.¹⁴¹ Particularly, with respect to the hardest conflicts to solve, redefinition of the context may be the only way out. In this sense, mostly territorial conflicts which form the basis for opposing interests cannot be solved easily and cannot be differentiated as it is in the case of negotiation phases of conflicts having economic dimension. In such conditions, Pfetsch offers two options to be applied as part of solution.¹⁴² First way is to hand over the issue to a third party and second way is redefining the context and dividing it between the conflicting parties. As he explains;

Through the changing of position, reformulation, and varying attribution of importance, for example by introducing new goals, incorporating additional goods, or reformulating the problem, the perception of a negotiation issue can be changed. Reframing can facilitate the quest for a solution, as it moves away from the categories of right and wrong, just and unjust or gain and loss.¹⁴³

He also points out that classifying the nature of the decision as binding and non-binding is also related to the position of the decision maker. According to him, while binding decisions are the result of pragmatic positions, non-binding decisions represent more radical and extreme positions.¹⁴⁴

1.2.2. Track Two Diplomacy and Its Implementation

According to one view, track two diplomacy was introduced by Joseph Montville, who was a well-known diplomat within the American diplomatic

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 78.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 79.

¹⁴¹ Jacob Bercovitch, Richard Dean Wells, **Conflict Resolution in the Twenty First Century: Principles, Methods and Approaches**, The University of Michigan Press, 2009, p. 43.

¹⁴² Pfetsch, p. 79.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 85.

community.¹⁴⁵ Montville developed the term as a result of frustration and disappointment created by the ineffective communications between the US and the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁶ While he was searching for alternatives against the binding nature of official diplomacy, he developed a unique model of diplomacy operating on two different, but complementary tracks. When the first track fails because of psychological barriers, then the second track comes into play because of its non-binding nature.¹⁴⁷ According to another view, the term ‘track two’ was firstly used in 1982 referring to diplomatic methods apart from the official governmental system. As Capie mentions, “it refers to non-governmental, informal and unofficial contacts and activities between private citizens or groups of individuals, sometimes called citizen diplomats or non-state actors.”¹⁴⁸

In its broadest sense, track two diplomacy refers to the interactions which take place outside an official negotiation. Hence, as Kaye states “while ‘track one’ refers to all official, governmental diplomacy (bilateral or multilateral), track two describes all other activities that occur outside official government channels.”¹⁴⁹ Louise Diamond and John McDonald also define track two diplomacy as “non-governmental, informal and unofficial contacts and activities between private citizens or groups of individuals, sometimes called as non-state actors”.¹⁵⁰ According to Fisher, track one actors are those who actively participate in diplomatic and governmental interactions and track two actors are those who carry informal efforts in the political domain.¹⁵¹ Kaye also states that track two diplomacy involves citizens who engage in ‘policy-related, problem-solving dialogue’ in which they may discuss “elements of the overall political relationship, solutions to arms control problems, resolution of regional conflicts, issues of trade policy, or other areas of competition”.¹⁵² Kaye also makes difference between hard track and soft track two exchanges. In the former one the main

¹⁴⁵ Sarah E. Graham and John R. Kelley, “U.S. Engagement in East Asia: A Case for ‘Track Two’ Diplomacy”, **Foreign Policy Research Institute**, Vol.1, 2009, p. 82.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ David Capie, “When does track two matters? Structure, agency and Asian regionalism”, **Review of International Political Economy**, Vol.17, 2010, p. 294.

¹⁴⁹ Dalia Dassa Kaye, Talking to the enemy, Track two diplomacy in the Southeast Asia, **RAND**, 2007, p. 5.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ronald J. Fisher, “Coordination Between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy in Successful Cases of Pre-negotiation”, **International Negotiation**, Vol.11, p. 69.

¹⁵² Kaye, p. 6.

aim is to help governments while negotiating political agreements, for instance the Oslo talks between Israeli and Palestinians at the beginning of 1990s is an example for it which resulted in a formal peace process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).¹⁵³ On the other hand, soft track two dialogues mainly aim the exchange of ideas, views and the perceptions of the parties in order to understand the other side's standing better. Likewise, soft track two dialogues are also policy related and aimed at problem solving. According to Montville, track two diplomacy comprises of informal interactions between the opposing groups or the nations which are in conflict by psychological factors.¹⁵⁴ The noteworthy part of track two activities is the problem solving workshops which aim to find mutual solutions to move toward peace. Later he suggests that interactions aim to influence the public opinion in favor of conciliatory policies.¹⁵⁵

Kelman and Cohen point out that track two activities are important in terms of their contributions to pre-negotiation, negotiation or post negotiation phases of the peace process.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, it is expected to have communication with governmental officials for track two participants since they may be senior governmental officials, active or retired military personnel or journalists etc. so that their ideas can be exchanged in informal ways and reflect the ideas of official policy makers.¹⁵⁷ The rising interest in track two activities and the conflict resolution showed itself as the arrangement of the session of Secretary's Open Forum under the roof of Department of State in September 2002.¹⁵⁸ The Secretary's Open Forum is a unique platform to discuss the current issues regarding to foreign affairs and to consider future alternatives for policy making and implementation. The session comprised of members of the foreign and security policy makers alongside with the representatives of conflict resolution organizations who were brought together under the umbrella of the Alliance for Peace-Building.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Fisher, p. 69.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Kaye, p. 7.

¹⁵⁸ Fisher, p. 71.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

In the Southeast Asia, ASEAN-ISIS (Association for Southeast Asian Nations) is at the center of track two diplomacy for more than twenty years including members of Malaysian Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS Malaysia), the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, the Singapore Institute for International Affairs (SIIA), the Thai Institute for Security and International Studies and the University of Philippines' Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS).¹⁶⁰ More recently, it has included think tanks from ASEAN members in Brunei, Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. As registered NGO, ASEAN-ISIS aims on promoting cooperation among its members and transmitting its advices to the ASEAN Secretariat, besides that, representatives of regional governments are invited to the meetings to discuss ASEAN issues. The annual meeting of Asia Pacific Roundtable which is a track two conference held in Kuala Lumpur brings together scholars, officials and analysts from the region.¹⁶¹ Referring to its problem solving function, Capie defines it as a forum where "trial balloons can be floated."¹⁶² Whether track two dialogues are successful in terms of their results depends on the access of political elites to the political leaders and also depends on the socialization, in other words, acceptance of the ideas by the broad segments of the society. Socialization helps building of political support at bilateral or multilateral levels while in conflict scenarios, it means change of standing toward an adversary.¹⁶³ For instance, ASEAN led for regional security dialogue at track two level and between the years of 1993 and 1995 at least 93 non official meeting were organized in order to discuss regional security issues while this number has increased to 217 by 2005.¹⁶⁴

Simon views track two as dealing with issues that are 'too sensitive' for governments, "developing alternative scenarios for various courses of action' and 'guid[ing] decision makers in 'choice of appropriate norms'".¹⁶⁵ Tan See Seng describes this process as 'thinking the unthinkable', noting that "pride themselves on dealing with issues deemed sensitive or even taboo by governments and consequently

¹⁶⁰ Capie, p. 295.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid., p. 296.

¹⁶³ John Robert Kelley, **Agency Change: Diplomatic Action Beyond the State**, Rowman and Littlefield, London, 2014, p. 57.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Capie, p. 296.

excluded from the official diplomatic agenda”.¹⁶⁶ Peter Katzenstein also argues that such activities help shaping “the climate of opinion in national settings in which security affairs are conducted” providing alternative opinions for the decision makers.¹⁶⁷

Cuhadar and Dayton add that under the roof of track two diplomacy, representatives of adversary parties are brought together by an informal third party and search for solutions considering the underlying roots of the conflict.¹⁶⁸ They also point out that contrary to official diplomacy, track two diplomacy focuses on the social dimension of the conflict, while searching for solutions.¹⁶⁹ It is essential to go beyond zero sum thinking and to describe conflict a mutually shared problem for the parties participating in track two interactions. Such kind of interactions may help to identify basic human and psychological needs of the groups which should be addressed. According to them “advocates of track two work claim that it can have many positive benefits to peace processes, including providing a safe, off the record and sustained venue for dialogue among adversary groups, engaging adversaries in dialogue” when official peace processes remained deadlocked.¹⁷⁰

Cuhadar and Dayton also describe track two interactions along two dimensions. Firstly, in terms of types of participants involved in the activities, which includes political leaders acting unofficially, influential elite groups who do not hold official positions or people from the grassroots sector. Second dimension is related with the stage of the conflict that track two interaction takes place such as preventive, pre-negotiation, negotiation and post-agreement peace building stages. There is also another distinction with respect to forms of track two diplomacy, whether it is an outcome-focused initiative or a process-focused initiative. Outcome focused initiatives are taken by official diplomats and they aim to achieve political agreement while process focused initiatives are taken at grass roots and elites level and work on building trust and mutual understanding between the adversaries.¹⁷¹ Cuhadar and

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 297.

¹⁶⁸ Esra Çuhadar and Bruce W. Dayton, “Oslo and Its Aftermath: Lessons Learned from Track Two Diplomacy”, *Negotiation Journal*, April 2012, p. 157.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 158.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

Dayton give example of the Geneva Initiative which was taken under the leadership of former foreign affairs minister of Israel, Yossi Belin and brought together both Israeli and Palestinian elites and focused on building relationships at the grassroots level.¹⁷² In this regard, too many initiatives have been undertaken since the 1980s, which brought together hundreds of Israelis and Palestinians including youth groups, academic researchers, teachers, journalists, bureaucrats, artists, environmentalists and business groups. While some of them focused on building relationship and communication between the parties, others are more focused on specific issues such as the managements of water resources or the political future of Jerusalem.¹⁷³

Graham and Kelley classify track two activities in two ways; events that direct the parties to start communication which did not exist before and the dialogue processes which are in search for problem solving but never ending.¹⁷⁴ In both types of track two, measurement of success by political outcomes is critical.¹⁷⁵ One of the well-known cases is known as the ‘ping pong diplomacy’ which had taken place between the US and China in the beginning of the 1970s and helped normalization of bilateral relations. During the April of 1971 when the American and Chinese national ping pong teams were on tour in Japan, the delegates from both sides had a chance to meet and to start a dialogue process which was followed by the US President Nixon’s historic visit to China on the following February. This rapprochement process culminated by the sport teams was also proclaimed by Chinese President Chou En Lai as “never before in history has a sport been used so effectively as a tool of international diplomacy”.¹⁷⁶ This event also helped China’s re acceptance into the international community and restored its seat on the United Nations Security Council.¹⁷⁷

The power of track two events lie in their symbolism which show themselves as turning points in diplomatic relations, particularly in public opinions. On the other hand, despite they have resounding effects; it is also possible to overestimate the power of them, particularly when the parties in conflict fail in deepening the process.¹⁷⁸ A

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 159.

¹⁷⁴ Graham and Kelley, p. 82.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Stuart Murray, “Moving Beyond the Ping-Pong Table: Sports Diplomacy in The Modern Diplomatic Environment”, **Public Diplomacy Magazine**, Winter 2013, p. 13.

¹⁷⁸ Graham and Kelley, p. 82.

well-known example in this regard is the Pyongyang's hosting of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra in February 2008.¹⁷⁹ Live broadcasts took place on TV which indicated the event as a triumph for art diplomacy. The concert also launched a public diplomacy initiative and several US government officers accompanied the Philharmonic during the visit including the former US Secretary of Defense William Perry, who accepted the invitation of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) deputy nuclear negotiator Lee Gun.¹⁸⁰ However, only months after the invitation, the North Korean government decided to resume on the nuclear program. Hence, events alone could not be successful enough to fulfill the actual promises.¹⁸¹

However, there is also *raison d'état* for track two diplomacy in the absence of conflict as well.¹⁸² Likewise, Graham and Kelly challenge the widespread belief that opening dialogue channels is useful only in conflict resolution.¹⁸³ As Kelley argues 'track two dialogue can contribute to the reorientation of bilateral and multilateral relations toward policy coordination and enhanced confidence in non-conflict settings: by shaping elites "perceptions, by maintaining open communication channels, by enabling the pursuit of joint projects."¹⁸⁴ Instead, they note that track two dialogues may also contribute to the orientation of the relations toward policy coordination and mutual confidence by shaping elites' perceptions, maintaining communication channels and developing joint projects.¹⁸⁵ Hence it is important the elites' role in the track two arrangements since they are the main actors who are responsible for change.¹⁸⁶

Track two dialogues are nonbinding and based on voluntary participation, and are generally conducted by NGOs. They remain unofficial even if governments may fund initiatives organized by them or send officials to participate.¹⁸⁷ Sometimes official diplomatic communications are necessary for the parties to talk, however, due to domestic sensitivities the parties refrain themselves to engage in these dialogues.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 84.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Kelley, p. 56.

¹⁸³ Graham and Kelley, p. 85.

¹⁸⁴ Kelley, p. 56.

¹⁸⁵ Graham and Kelley, p. 85.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Kaye, p. 8.

Because of this, adversaries apply for unofficial channels known as track two diplomacy.¹⁸⁸ In the non-binding nature of track two, participants do not feel constrained by the political costs; on the other hand, policy change depends on those elites' access to political leaders by force of socialization of the ideas at the public level.¹⁸⁹ According to Davidson and Montville, track two interactions are essential since they provide a secure space for the parties with minimal political risk due to the rule of non-binding to discuss non-negotiable issues.¹⁹⁰

Graham and Kelly also state that permeability of the tracks depends on the success of track two in bringing a normative change, shaping expectations and sharing information.¹⁹¹ It also reveals the second purpose of track two activities as supporting and developing track one diplomatic contacts.¹⁹² For instance, as founded in 1993, the North East Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) is a forum to discuss regional security issues with the official and non-official representatives of China, Japan, Republic of North Korea and the US. This setting is both a means of policy coordination and a process of conflict resolution.¹⁹³ Through two ways, track two dialogue contributes to development of mutual understanding between the adversaries, firstly, by providing an informal platform for participants to break down their psychological barriers and secondly by helping individuals to understand each other's red lines and threat perceptions.¹⁹⁴ It is also noteworthy that track two diplomacy maintains the dialogue process even though the official process fails. Particularly, they can be more important in times of crisis, when no other platforms for dialogue exist.¹⁹⁵

Yaffe, Bonin and Mohagheghi also argue that track two interactions are more likely to be acceptable for searching alternative policy options since official track one diplomatic interactions face with more pressures.¹⁹⁶ Since track two dialogues bring

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 1.

¹⁸⁹ Graham and Kelley, p. 85.

¹⁹⁰ Benjamin Bonin, Amir Mohagheghi and Michael Yaffe, "Implementing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East", **The Nonproliferation Review**, Vol.20, 2013, p. 141.

¹⁹¹ Graham and Kelley, p. 86.

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 86.

¹⁹³ Kelley, p. 57.

¹⁹⁴ Dalia D. Kaye, "Track Two Diplomacy and Regional Security in the Middle East", **International Negotiation**, Vol.6, 2001, p. 60.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 66.

¹⁹⁶ Bonin, Mohagheghi and Yaffe, p. 137.

together different experts on a confidential basis with the rule of non-attribution, they can easily discuss problematic issues and develop alternative guide lines that are nonbinding in itself.¹⁹⁷ Besides that, track two participants are able to transmit their ideas to official channels which is likely able to influence track one discourse.¹⁹⁸ As Sharp adds “track two may require an unusual window of opportunity to have influence on policy makers”¹⁹⁹ According to Yaffe et. al. “in some cases, track-two dialogues may even feed into a more formal track-one process”.²⁰⁰ Yaffe et. al also points out that some of the confidence building interactions are similar with the activities which are undertaken by the countries in the region on a multilateral or unilateral basis.²⁰¹

From the view of recent constructivist scholars of IR, track two actors are influential in terms of changing state behavior through the transmission of norms. According to Capie, the literature of socialization defines unofficial track two activities as “one of the defining features of institutions where non-coercive processes of persuasion can reshape the interests and identities of actors”.²⁰² Secondly, recently there has been a debate on the benefits of unofficial diplomacy. Contrary to constructivists and institutionalists, who argue that such activities facilitate cooperation and trust building among the governments, realists claim that any track two interaction is not influential in terms of regional security.²⁰³

According to De Vries and Maoz, the need for track two diplomacy arose from the gap in the conflict resolution methodology with respect to resolution of intractable conflicts.²⁰⁴ It involves dialogue meetings, workshops and official and non-official meetings between the adversaries in the scope of problem solving approach. Since it provides public support for peaceful conflict resolution and prepares the ground for

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 138.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Nathaniel Allen, Travis Sharp, “Process Peace: A New Evaluation Framework for Track II Diplomacy”, **International Negotiation**, February 2017, p. 96.

²⁰⁰ Bonin, Mohagheghi and Yaffe, p. 138.

²⁰¹ Ibid., p. 141.

²⁰² Capie, p. 292.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Maya De Vries and Ifat Maoz, “Tracking for peace: Assessing the effectiveness of Track Two Diplomacy in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict”, **Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict**, Vol.6, 2013, p. 62.

direct official negotiations, this kind of approach is considered more influential contrary to traditional methods.²⁰⁵

However, De Vries and Maoz also argue that concerning to the extent of influence, it is seriously limited.²⁰⁶ For instance, the interactions between Israelis and Palestinians did not reduce the hostility between them or improve the possibility of reaching an agreement. The reason behind this limited influence is lack of political support at the governmental level, another reason is the lack of representativeness since track two participants do not represent the wider public opinion.²⁰⁷

As Sharp argues “standard evaluation approaches tend to distinguish between outputs produced, outcomes attained, and impacts achieved.”²⁰⁸ Similarly, some scholars such as Rouhana distinguish ‘micro-objectives’ and ‘macro-goals’ in Track II diplomacy.²⁰⁹ Such distinctions help to differentiate the immediate outputs of a Track II dialogue and its longer-term impacts. As Sharp states “differentiating between Track II diplomacy’s outputs, outcomes, and impacts gives the researcher flexibility in defining what constitutes success and evaluating how a particular Track II process affects conflict resolution.”²¹⁰

1.3. ANALYZING GREECE-TURKEY RELATIONS IN THE LATE 1990S THROUGH CONFLICT RESOLUTION FRAMEWORKS

Despite a number of crises and tensions in bilateral relations in the 1990s, a rapprochement occurred between Greece and Turkey in the late 1990s. Frequently mentioned reasons for improvement in relations in the late 1990s include the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy, political dialogue process initiated by Foreign Affairs Ministers of the two states George Papandreou and İsmail Cem, adoption of a series of confidence-building measures by the two countries such as prior notification of their scheduled annual NATO exercises, growing social empathy on both sides due to devastating earthquakes in the two countries in 1999 and reciprocal

²⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 63.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 70.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Sharp, p. 8.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

aid and rescue support provided by them. Above all, Greece for the first time supported Turkey's EU accession process which resulted in Turkey's granting of EU candidacy status during the Helsinki Summit in 1999. However, despite improvement of relations between the two countries in late 1990s in areas concerning low politics, problems related to high politics including the Cyprus and the Aegean disputes remain unsolved.

Accepting the contribution of the above-mentioned factors to the improvement of Greece-Turkey relations, this thesis intends to explain the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey in the late 1990s by employing three conflict resolution frameworks: Peter Wallensteen's approach with a particular attention to seventh mechanism, Frank R. Pfetsch's approach and track two diplomacy. Pfetsch's method approaching conflictual problems are differentiation of the issues²¹¹ and reconciliation of interests. He suggests to put aside conflictual issues and reach mutually satisfactory solutions.²¹² In Helsinki Summit of December 1999, both parties got their share of the pie. While Turkey secured its EU candidacy status, Greece also gained since it engaged Turkey into path of europeanisation. Besides both parties agreed on to settle Aegean Disputes through negotiations, if necessary, both parties agreed to resort to the International Court of Justice for resolution.²¹³ Pfetsch also emphasizes the importance of long-term negotiations which contribute to the development of friendly relations between states and building mutual trust.²¹⁴ According to some scholars the post period following the year of 1999 is different than the previous ones considering to number of factors which started engagement between Greece and Turkey. As Kuşku stated, despite most of the issues remain unsolved, the latest detente began to evolve into a rapprochement.²¹⁵ Heraclides also adds that by force of mutual trust, the Aegean dispute and the other outstanding bilateral differences may become 'desecurited' and more close to a settlement.²¹⁶ The problematic issues such as Aegean and Cyprus fell off the agenda. Cooperative arrangements in low-key politics issues were also expected to diminish the mutual threat perception.²¹⁷ The developments at public level

²¹¹ Pfetsch, p. 72.

²¹² Ibid., p. 74.

²¹³ Couloubis and Kentikelenis, p. 518.

²¹⁴ Pfetsch, p. 54.

²¹⁵ Kuşku, p. 5.

²¹⁶ Heraclides, p. 6.

²¹⁷ Kuşku, p. 6.

in the post-earthquake area also contributed rapprochement process between the two states which is given in details in the seismic diplomacy part. Besides all, Pfetsch suggests postponing the problems and gaining time.²¹⁸ In deadlock conditions during negotiations, Pfetsch also advises strategy of reframing which means redefinition of context.²¹⁹ Despite the parties continue to keep their positions, they can understand the constraints that bound them.²²⁰

Similarly, Wallensteen advises leaving the conflicting issues to the future is a way of transcending incompatibilities.²²¹ While gaining time, the parties also maintain their positions and do not bound themselves to reach a settlement in a certain time. Particularly, after the second half of the 1990s, rather than reaching deadlock on high politics issues, both Greece and Turkey agreed on to cooperate in social, cultural and economic areas.²²² During that period, conflictual issues such as Aegean disputes and Cyprus Problem remained frozen.²²³ It is applied step by step approach is based on to focus on solvable issues firstly and leaving more conflictual and complicated issues such as Cyprus and Aegean Disputes for later.²²⁴ Ifantis adds that despite of the spirit of rapprochement, there is no real attempt to address the fundamental differences between Greece and Turkey. He also adds that it is not possible to expect either country to take too many risks without having a good expectation regarding the outcome.²²⁵ Triantaphyllou adds that there is a cold peace between the two countries and it is unable to go beyond high-level bilateral political contacts.²²⁶ It is applied step by step approach is based on to focus on solvable issues firstly and leaving more conflictual and complicated issues such as Cyprus and Aegean Disputes for later.²²⁷

²¹⁸ Pfetsch, p. 77.

²¹⁹ Ibid., p. 79.

²²⁰ Bercovitch and Wells, p. 43.

²²¹ Wallensteen, p. 112.

²²² Cakmak, p. 5.

²²³ Nora Fisher Onar, Othon Anastasakis, "Sustaining Engagement? On Symmetries and Asymmetries in Greek-Turkish relations", **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, Vol.13, 2013, p. 401.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Kostas Ifantis, "Whither Turkey? Greece's Aegean Options", **Turkey's Accession to the European Union. An Unusual Candidacy**, Ed. Constantine Arvanitopoulos, Springer, Heidelberg, 2009, p. 130.

²²⁶ Dimitris Triantaphyllou, "Greek-Turkish relations and the perceptions of their elites", (31.01.2017), <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/greeceatlse/2017/01/31/greek-turkish-relations-and-the-perceptions-of-their-elites/>

²²⁷ Ibid.

Track two diplomacy refers to activities outside of official negotiations.²²⁸ The participants such as senior government officers, journalists, students etc. are actively contributes the process.²²⁹ During the post earthquake period, both peoples displayed willingness for rapprochement which means public opinion is no longer a barrier for political accommodation.²³⁰ As Koukidakis stated “following the earthquakes, friendship groups and multiple contact were created and the media in both countries spread the feeling of mutual gratitude within their populations.”²³¹ Accordingly, cooperation between local governments, NGOs, universities, various institutions and think tanks increased. Despite there is no development regarding high politics issues between Greece and Turkey, it contributed importantly maintenance of peace and stability.²³² The true impact of the earthquakes on Greek-Turkish relations may be seen at public level as the result was the rapid formation of contacts between the two nations. As Ker Lindsay stated “many Greeks and Turks immediately put past prejudices aside and such was the power the of the shift in relations between the two that those had previously been at the forefront of criticism of the other country became strangely silent.”²³³ The mutual recognition between the two nations allowed policy makers to deepen a process of rapprochement which was already started.²³⁴

Despite the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey were better than ever, the rapprochement had less effect on high politics issues since both sides continue to keep their positions. Adopting a gradualist approach, the two countries focused on ‘micro’ or ‘low politics’ issues such as trade and tourism alongside with cultural and civil society interactions and left the ‘macro’ or ‘high politics’ issues such as the Aegean Disputes or Cyprus issue to the future.²³⁵ In order to decrease the tension between the parties, focusing on micro issues provided a good basis for the

²²⁸ Kaye, p. 5.

²²⁹ Ibid., p. 7.

²³⁰ Faruk Sönmezoglu, Gül den Ayman, “The Roots of Conflict and the Dynamics of Change in Turkish-Greek Relations”, **Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation**, Ed. Christos Kollias, Gulay Gunluk Senesen, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2003, p. 47.

²³¹ George Koukoudakis, “Explaining the Endurance of Greek-Turkish Rapprochement Process”, **Uluslararası İlişkiler**, Vol.11, No. 44 (Winter 2015), p. 91.

²³² Ibid., p. 96.

²³³ James Ker Lindsay, “Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: The Impact of Disaster Diplomacy?”, **Cambridge Review of International Relations**, Vol.14, p. 229.

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 230.

²³⁵ Şuhnaz Yilmaz, Ziya Onis, “Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Rhetoric or Reality?”, **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol.123, 2008, p.125.

rapprochement.²³⁶ As it is stated “this incremental rapprochement had a very low cost as neither side had to give up its vital interests’ and ‘touching the core of bilateral problems will be neither automatic nor easy.”²³⁷ It is also argued that the rapprochement between the two countries was fragile and an ‘epiphenomenon’ of actual bilateral relationship since both sides continued to keep their own positions regarding to high politics issues.²³⁸ At this point, more decisive actions had to be taken to upgrade common interests. Rapprochement between the two countries in the late 1990s should have been accompanied by resolving existing security problems in order to settle an enduring form of reconciliation.²³⁹ As it is pointed out by Anastasakis and Onar, in the case of Greece and Turkey, the main issues have still been swept under the carpet.²⁴⁰

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Thanos Dokos, Fatih Tayfur, “Greece and Turkey”, **EuroMesco Papers**, 2004, p. 6.

²³⁸ Thanos Dokos, Panayotis Tsakonas, “Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-Cold War Era”, **Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation**, Ed. Christos Kollias, Gulay Gunluk Senesen, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2003, p. 16.

²³⁹ Onar and Anastasakis, p. 401.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 402.

CHAPTER TWO

GREEK - TURKISH RELATIONS DURING THE 1980S

2.1. INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, Greek-Turkish relations are not based on mutual cooperation, trust, understanding and friendship. Their geographic location, historical heritage, pro-Western stand and apparent necessity for collective defense against outsiders such as the Soviet Union have so far not helped the two neighbors to develop close cooperation and mutual friendship. From the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 to the middle of the 1950s, cooperation had taken its place in the relations of the two countries. However, since then relations started to be deteriorated and both sides had started to accuse the other side. Since the mid-1950s, Greek-Turkish relations have become a source of concern in terms of peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean region, as well as a matter of internal division in the NATO.

In addition to the Cyprus Issue, disputes over the sovereignty issue in the Aegean Sea and the Turkish claims regarding the negative role of Greece in its relations with the EC complicated the relations between Greece and Turkey. This chapter will focus on the background of problematic relations between Greece and Turkey with a special attention on the 1980s.

2.2. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS

The history of Turkish-Greek relations demonstrates that the cooperation periods between the two countries are both fragile and unpromising.²⁴¹ Except for the two terms, relations between the two countries had been tension-ridden and daunted by several disagreements and crises that would have dragged the two neighbors into a military confrontation.²⁴² There were two exceptional periods of rapprochement in Turkish-Greek relations prior to the 1990s; first in the 1930s and the second one was during the first half of the 1950s. During the 1930s, there was a common threat from

²⁴¹ Eda Kuşku, "The Shadow of Past Rivalry: Limits of post 1999 Dynamism in Greco-Turkish Relations", *Caucasian Review of International Relations*, Vol.2, Summer 2008, p. 157.

²⁴² Melek Fırat, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Değişim", *Beş Deniz Havzasında Türkiye*, Ed. Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, Ankara, Siyasal Yayınevi, 2006, p. 259.

Italy and both countries were supported by Britain to collaborate against it. The two rivals of the WWI quickly ameliorated their relations and this rapprochement resulted in the establishment of Balkan Entente in 1934. During the first half of the 1950s, there was a common threat from the Soviet Union and both Greece and Turkey sought the support of the US.²⁴³ Two developments demonstrated that when the two countries perceived a common external threat, they could cooperate, particularly when they were supported by an external power such as the US. However, later developments showed that the mode of friendship was not durable since they did not arise from domestic reasons, but from external conditions.²⁴⁴

There are several reasons behind popular antagonism towards Turkey and the Turks in Greece. According to Malikouti, Greek-Turkish relations have been shaped by memories of shared history, Greek versus Turkish nationalism within the Ottoman realm, formation of Greek and Turkish nation states, Cyprus issue as well as long standing bilateral disputes.²⁴⁵ Contrary to old regional disputes of Greece with its other neighboring countries, its problems with Turkey are the most complicated ones since the political problems are evaluated in the light of historical facts.²⁴⁶ As Malikouti states; “Greek-Turkish relations were informed throughout most of modern history and certainty since The Greek War of Independence (1821-1830) by a deep sense of malaise, associated with feeling of suspicion and hostility both states felt towards each other.”²⁴⁷ The memories of 500 years dominance of Greek territory by the Ottoman Empire as well as the invasion of Turkish territories by Greek armies at the end of First World War still affect the policymakers and the public in both countries.²⁴⁸ As a result, the national historical narratives still continue to affect respective national identities in Greece and Turkey. According to Heraclides, rewriting of history by non-nationalist historians and social scientists is essential to make rapprochement really possible between the two countries. It will be possible then to evaluate history far from

²⁴³ Mustafa Aydın, “Crypto-optimism in Turkish-Greek relations. What is next?”, **Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans**, Vol.5, 2003, p. 227.

²⁴⁴ Fırat, p. 2.

²⁴⁵ Evgenia Malikouti, “Greece towards Turkey’s EU accession: Official Policy and Public Opinion”, p. 4.

²⁴⁶ Marcia Christoff Knopp, “Greece and Turkey: can they mend fences?”, **Foreign Affairs**, Vol.11, No.1, p. 7.

²⁴⁷ Malikouti, p. 4.

²⁴⁸ Kuşku, p. 157.

ethnocentric and nationalist views.²⁴⁹ Heraclides also points out that, it is almost impossible to build reconciliation between Greece and Turkey when one side continues to view the other as a threat.²⁵⁰

Mutual perceptions are very effective in decision making process. According to Aksu, the ideas and actions of the actors, who are involved actively in the process of decision making are affected by perceptions, thus there is high need to manage the process as rational as possible.²⁵¹ The history that penetrates into national thinking of both countries causes cooperation periods to be more fragile and short-termed.²⁵² According to Aydın, in both Greece and Turkey “history is not past; indeed the past continues to live in present.”²⁵³ Therefore, the main obstacle that prevents the solution between the two countries is the mistrust between the two nations that stems from history.

This situation results from the fact that both Greece and Turkey acquired their national identities through fighting against each other. It is almost impossible to understand modern Greek history without taking conflicts with Turkey into account. Present Greek territories had been ruled by the Ottoman Empire for 500 years. Modern Greece emerged out of a struggle against the Ottoman Empire. From the Turkish perspective, the Greek Independence War was a rebellion act which was provoked and carried out by the help of great powers of the nineteenth century, who used Greeks for their own aims in order to disintegrate the Ottoman Empire. In the same line, modern Turkey had gained its nation state status by defeating the Greek occupants in the Western Anatolia, in the aftermath of the First World War. For Greeks, this is perceived as ‘Asia Minor Catastrophe’, whereby Turks accept it as ‘The War of

²⁴⁹ Alexis Heraclides, “The Main Obstacles to Greek Turkish Rapprochement”, **Proceedings of the International Conference on Turkish Greek Relations: Issues, Solutions, Prospects**, 9 March 2006, Istanbul, p. 62.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 59.

²⁵¹ Fuat Aksu, “Turkish-Greek Relations, From Conflict to Détente: The Last Decade”, **Turkish Review of Balkan Studies**, Annual 2001, p. 167

According to Aksu, ‘in this case, the controversies have been brought up and there is a modification in the adjectives that are being used; for example, ‘enemy’, ‘source of threat’, ‘aggressor’, ‘invader’, ‘barbaric’, ‘uncompromising’, ‘clamorous’ and ‘country that impedes the national interests’’. For more details see Fuat Aksu, *Turkish-Greek Relations: From Conflict to Detente the Last Decade*, p. 171.

²⁵² Tarık Oguzlu, “How Encouraging Is the Latest Turkish-Greek Reconciliation Process?”, **Journal of Contemporary European Studies**, Vol.12, 2004, p. 98.

²⁵³ Aydın, p. 224.

National Liberation’.²⁵⁴ The vision of Megali Idea (Great Idea) based on Pan Hellenism also dominated thoughts of both political leaders and public for many years in Greece. Sonyel suggests; “Megali Idea envisages the recapture of Istanbul from the Turks and the creation of a large Greek state reminiscent of the Byzantine Empire.”²⁵⁵

As the neighbors that stuck on historical antagonism, relations between Greece and Turkey is also complicated with crises. Indeed, according to Oğuzlu, “each party conceives the other as a prospective threat or a challenge to its identity and interprets each of its actions; accordingly, creating a vicious circle where the national perceptions and negative images concerning the other dictate our vigilant attitude and which in turn also aggravates the attitudes of each to the other.”²⁵⁶ Büyükçolak also maintains the impact of mutual perceptions between Greece and Turkey and adds that the mutual perception as ‘threat element’ between Greece and Turkey stems from the history and the disagreements, due to their geographical location.²⁵⁷ However, this perception is much more ‘Greek’, since the Greek security analysis give larger space to Turkey than Turkey does for Greece.

On the other hand, the Greek vision is based on alliance with the West against Turkey.²⁵⁸ This is because Greece is a small country which formed the base of anti-Turkish policies after 1974. Therefore, Greece follows a policy of engaging the third countries into its bilateral problems with Turkey. Büyükçolak explains the reasons of this policy as “the uncompromised attitude of Greece in the Aegean Disputes with Turkey could stem from the pressure of the comparison of Turkey’s and Greece’s asymmetrical powers.”²⁵⁹ Another reason can be explained as the role of Turkish

²⁵⁴ Ibid. Heinz Kramer explains that the mutual perception of the two countries stem from the historical heritage. Greece gained its independence through the war against Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, during the National Liberation War, Turks defeated Greeks and caused the disappearance of ‘the Megali Idea’ of Greeks. These events prevent the trust between Greece and Turkey. For more details see, Mehmet Büyükçolak, Yunanistan’ın Stratejik Analizi. Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Yunanistan’ın Savunma Politikaları, Güvenlik Stratejileri, Askeri Doktrini ve Silahlı Kuvvetleri, p. 83.

²⁵⁵ Salahi Sonyel, **The Turco Greek Imbroglia, Pan Hellenism and The Destruction of Anatolia**, Center for Strategic Research, Ankara, 1999, p. 27.

²⁵⁶ Aydın, 2003, p. 226.

²⁵⁷ Mehmet Büyükçolak, “Yunanistan’ın Stratejik Analizi. Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Yunanistan’ın Savunma Politikaları, Güvenlik Stratejileri, Askeri Doktrini ve Silahlı Kuvvetleri”, **Türkiye’nin Komsuları**, Ed. Mustafa Türkeş and İlhan Uzel, Imge Kitabevi, Ankara, 2002, p. 82.

²⁵⁸ Büyükçolak, p. 82.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 83.

enmity in regard to Greek national identity.²⁶⁰ This enmity brings together all fragments of the Greek nation together. In order to reconcile and bring two nations together, the discourse of historical enmity of each nation should be reconstructed. In this regard, only a prolonged effort and intensified collaboration can abolish the effects of history. Because, the history of ethnic conflicts have indicated that short term measures could not provide the eradication of memories of history, while it is also wrong to reduce the existing Greek-Turkish confrontation to mutual misunderstandings.²⁶¹

According to Büyükçolak, the other factor to affect bilateral relations is the Turkish Operation to the Northern part of Cyprus.²⁶² Greece was disappointed during this operation, since it did not take any support from NATO allies. The absence of diplomatic and logistic support at that time made Greece feel as it was not capable of defending itself against any threat from outside. Therefore, Greek security analysis changed in the aftermath of Cyprus Crisis in 1974. According to Büyükçolak, Greece understood that it had to follow a more unilateral defense policy and multilateral foreign policy.²⁶³ Until the beginning of the 1950s, the issue of minorities had been the main source of conflict between the two countries. However, since the 1950s, due to the end of British imperial administration on Cyprus, a conflict started regarding the status of the island. Even though the 1960 treaties established a status quo binding Britain, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, this established status quo started to deteriorate due to the inter-communal clashes that began in 1963. Until 1974, these clashes continued and bilateral relations continued to deteriorate. It was realized that it had become more difficult to establish stability on the island. During this process, the Turkish side claimed that they were excluded from the constitutional bureaucratic

²⁶⁰ According to Büyükçolak, Turks are one of the unifying elements of Greek national identity. According to him, 'the identity icon' of Greeks stems from the Turkish enmity. According to a survey of 1992 that includes 5 countries 81 percent of Greeks saw Turkey as a threat towards themselves while 51 percent of Turks saw Greeks as a threat towards themselves.

For more details see Mehmet Buyukcolak, Yunanistan'ın Stratejik Analizi. Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Yunanistan'ın Savunma Politikaları, Güvenlik Stratejileri, Askeri Doktrini ve Silahlı Kuvvetleri, p. 85.

²⁶¹ Aydın, p. 226

²⁶² Büyükçolak, p. 84.

²⁶³ Ibid.

mechanisms that were established through 1960 treaties and started to form their own mechanisms.²⁶⁴

The developments in Cyprus, in the 1960s, triggered the tension between the two states and throughout the next decade, disagreements included continental shelf and treatment of national minorities.²⁶⁵ Deteriorating relations due to the Cyprus issue had a spill-over effect over the disputes in the Aegean Sea and other problems between Greece and Turkey.²⁶⁶ Particularly, since the beginning of the 1970s disputes over the Aegean Sea started between Greece and Turkey.²⁶⁷ Since then, Greek-Turkish disputes became one of the main reasons of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the NATO alliance. Despite the disputes were hidden by the Cold War environment, the potential for confrontation started to threaten the regional security balance as well.²⁶⁸

The problematic relations during the 1960s reached its climax in 1974 with Turkish military operation to the Northern part of Cyprus which brought the two countries to the brink of war.²⁶⁹ The Turkish military operation to the Northern part of Cyprus in 1974 was a milestone in Greek security planning against Turkey in the aftermath of the Second World War era. According to Tournikiotis and Tsakonas, it

²⁶⁴ Fuat Aksu, "Turkish Greek Relations and the Cyprus Question: Quo Vadis?", **UNISCI Discussion Papers**, May 2010, p. 209.

²⁶⁵ James Ker Lindsay, **Crisis and Conciliation: A Year of Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey**, I.B. Tauris, London, 2007, p. 20.

²⁶⁶ Ioannis Grigoriadis, "The Changing Role of The EU Factor in Greek Turkish Relations", **London School of Economics and Political Science Hellenic Observatory 1st Phd Symposium on Modern Greece**, London, 21st June 2003, p. 1.

²⁶⁷ Ker Lindsay, p. 20.

Despite the Treaty of Lausanne described the borders between Greece and Turkey, international law was at nascent stage at that time. Almost fifty years after the Lausanne Treaty, a number of new developments had opened way for the emergence of bilateral disputes between two countries. According to result of the UN Conference on the Law of Sea in 1958, it was described that "a state could claim a continental shelf that covered the seabed adjacent to its coastline, including islands, to a depth of two hundred meters". Hence, a state could claim that it could extent its continental shelf beyond the limits of its territorial waters. When the two states had conflict over their continental shelves, the convention described that they would try to agree on an acceptable regime between themselves. Greece had signed this convention of UN. However, Turkey had refused to agree on this convention when considered the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. Instead, Turkey claimed that "their continental shelf should be considered as the seabed that constituted the natural prolongation of the Anatolian peninsula". At the beginning, these different views did not show a serious problem. For more details see James Ker Lindsay, *Crisis and Conciliation: A Year of Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey*, p. 20.

²⁶⁸ Theodore Couloumbis and Kostas Ifantis, "Altering the Security Dilemma in the Aegean: Greek Strategic Options and Structural Constraints. A Realist Approach", **The Review of International Affairs**, Vol.2, Winter 2002, p. 1.

²⁶⁹ Aydın, p.227.

constituted the foundation of new security thinking in Greece.²⁷⁰ Besides, Greece's closer proximity and smaller population contrary to Turkey intensified Greek security fears against Turkey.²⁷¹ Since then, Greece and Turkey plunged into a costly arms race in order to constitute balance of power.²⁷² According to Ifantis, for the vast majority of Greek elites and public opinion, the Cyprus crisis was not only a traumatic experience, but also the basis for new thinking in security policy.²⁷³

This event was also important in terms of indicating the limits of the NATO and US support and limits of internal balancing efforts which resulted in high defense expenditures. Hence, it pointed out the need for external balancing to deter the Turkish threat. On the other hand, this led Greece to start considering integration into European structures as an instrument of external balancing measure against Turkey. According to Ifantis, "for over 25 years, this policy was expressed through a series of Greek vetoes to any European policy designed to institutionalize further the EU-Turkey relationship."²⁷⁴ Since the 1980s, the West became a reference point in relations between the two states. Both Greece and Turkey tried to clarify their problems through the West, particularly the US. Greece evaluated NATO membership as a guarantee against Turkey and tried to use it in order to reduce Turkey's importance in the alliance. Furthermore, after Greece acquired the membership status of EC in 1981 and started to use its membership against Turkey.²⁷⁵

²⁷⁰ Antonis Tournikiotis, Panayotis Tsakonas, "Greece's Elusive Quest for Security Providers: The Expectations-Reality Gap", *Security Dialogue*, Vol.34, 2003, p. 303.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Couloumbis and Ifantis, p. 1.

²⁷³ Kostas Ifantis, "Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations: A View from Greece", *Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations*, Ed. Nathalie Tocci, **IAI-TEPAV Report**, July 2007, p.59. According to Security Studies, states to balance the threat perception have two choices, according to Tournikiotis and Tsakonas, "either balance against the threat in order to deter it from attacking or defeat it if it does or bandwagon in order to either appease it or to profit from it by sharing in the spoils of its victory.". On the other hand, combination of this internal and external balancing is also possible. For more details Antonis Tournikiotis and Panayotis Tsakonas, *Greece's Elusive Security Quest for Security Providers: The Expectation-Reality Gap*, p.305. In the last three decades, both Greece and Turkey confronted due to number of disputes including disputes over sovereignty such as continental shelf, territorial waters and air region in Aegean Sea. Both countries are first among the countries in NATO and EU in terms of their defense expenditures. According to Kollias, "in the last two decades, Greece allocated an average % 6 of GDP to defense and Turkey about % 4.7 compared to NATO average of % 3.3". For more details, see Christos Kollias, *The Greek – Turkish Conflict and Greek Military Expenditure 1960-92*, **Journal of Peace Research**, Volume 33, 1996, p. 217.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Aydın, p. 227.

During the 1960s and the 1970s, the EC was following a policy of keeping an equal distance to both Greece and Turkey and their bilateral disputes. However, after Greece's integration into the Community in 1981, this policy began to change. Since then, the EC started to state that bilateral conflicts were no longer conflicts between the two countries that EC could view from outside. On the contrary, according to Öniş, EC started to state that "the conflict was now between an insider and outsider with direct and profound interest to the community itself."²⁷⁶ Öniş also points out that, the critical question on behalf of EU was "whether to treat Turkey as a natural insider or an important outsider."²⁷⁷ On the other hand, following EC membership, Greek foreign policy began to be pro-European rather than pro-American. Therefore, for Greek security planning, the importance of US-Greek bilateral relationship started to decrease.²⁷⁸

By 1987, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou started to use all the advantages of being a member of the Western club against Turkey. Turkey became isolated from Europe at that time and was also lacking foreign public opinion support because of its military government. Accordingly, Turkey tried to put an end to this loneliness by getting closer to the US that was indifferent to democracy and human rights in its foreign policies at that time. On the other hand, invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979 and Iranian Islamic Revolution made Turkey more important for the US in the region as a strategic partner. After the military government came to power in September 1980, the likelihood of military cooperation with the US increased as well. In the second half of the 1980s, a concept of 'strategic cooperation' was developed in Turkish-American relations, which meant intensification of military cooperation with the US. However, with respect to bilateral political relations, there were serious problems. Turkish-Greek conflicts and Cyprus issue were among the most problematic issues in the Congress.²⁷⁹

On the other hand, the main motivation behind Greece's EU policy was to keep Turkey outside of the Community which makes Greece feel more secure and safe. From 1981, until the second half of 1990s, all political parties in Greece agreed on

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 9.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Kuşku, p. 4.

²⁷⁹ Şükrü Sina Gürel, **Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1993)**, Umit Yayıncılık, Ankara, 1994, p. 91.

Turkey's exclusion from the EU. The continuity of the conflict in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus had best served to the Greek purpose of increasing the gap between Turkey and the EU. From 1982 until 1986, Greece tried to block all attempts of the EU-Turkey Association Council, which was suspended by the EC after the military coup in Turkey in 1980.²⁸⁰ The EC's involvement in Greek-Turkish relations was not intensive as it occurred in the form of declarations until the end of 1980s. Therefore, the Community was less willing to go beyond ordinary expressions rather than having a concrete role as involving in the disputes between the two countries.²⁸¹

Even following the Greek application for the EC membership on 12 June 1975, the EC stated that they would not let any situation that would favor Greece since they did not want to be involved in Turkish-Greek disputes over the Aegean and Cyprus issues.²⁸² According to Aydın, "Community's hand off policy was supplemented by a more active but still balanced stance on the Turkish-Greek dispute, apparently intending to reflect an overall sense of equal distance from both sides."²⁸³ However, after Greece joined the Community in 1981, EC's relations with Turkey changed in favor of Greece.²⁸⁴ By any chance, the EC member states did not want to see Turkey as a full member of the community since Turkey was big and struggling with problems in itself. Therefore, they may have chosen to hide behind Greece.²⁸⁵

2.3. GREEK FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING TOWARDS TURKEY DURING ANDREAS PAPANDREOU'S TERM (1981-1989)

Greek-Turkish relations under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou can be summarized in two words: tension and crisis. This characteristic of the bilateral relations was not only the natural outcome of the events; but also became the two basic principles of Greek policy against Turkey after 1981.²⁸⁶ While he was in opposition, Papandreou accused the New Democracy Party (New Democracy-Nea Demokratia)

²⁸⁰ Oğuzlu, p. 99.

²⁸¹ Aydın, p. 235.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Gürel, p. 92.

²⁸⁶ Fahir Armaoğlu, 20. yy. Siyasi Tarihi, p. 955.

which was the ruling party under the leadership of Karamanlis for giving concessions to the Turkish side, when Karamanlis decided to discuss the Aegean issue. Papandreou accused the Karamanlis government of making Greece's sovereignty rights as a bargaining issue and claimed that any negotiation with Turkey was indeed unnecessary since there was nothing to negotiate. Towards the election in 1981, although he softened his attitude in many issues, he insisted on his uncompromising attitude towards Turkey.²⁸⁷

On 18 October 1981 elections, PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement-Panhellinion Sosialistiku Kinema) under the leadership of Papandreou won 48% of the votes and 175 seats out of 300 in the parliament.²⁸⁸ By winning 39% of the votes and 115 seats, New Democracy Party which had been in power since 1974 became an opposition party. Both during his campaigns and in his government agenda which he read after the elections, Papandreou, as the leader of PASOK, built his entire foreign policy on hostility towards Turkey. He even requested protection against Turkey in the NATO meeting in December 1981.²⁸⁹

With the election of PASOK as the ruling party under the leadership of Papandreou in 1981, Greece started to follow a nationalist policy by putting the Greek identity in front of the European identity and started to follow populist economic policies which constituted a burden for the EC. Contrary to Karamanlis' policy of "Greece belongs to West", Papandreou followed a populist policy of "Greece belongs to East".²⁹⁰ He emphasized a nationalist identity at the domestic level and followed a strategy based on Turkish threat.²⁹¹ Van Coufoudakis points out threat perception in Papandreou's foreign policy as "the major threat facing Greek security was from the East (Turkey) not from the North (the Soviet Union and other communist Balkan countries)".²⁹² He adopted a hard line policy towards Turkey and refused any negotiation with the Turkish government. According to him, "Ankara was simply using the talks to engage in expansionist activity and Greece had made a mistake by

²⁸⁷ Richard Clogg, **Modern Yunanistan Tarihi**, Iletisim Yayinlari, 2004, p. 234.

²⁸⁸ Armaoğlu, p. 956.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Fırat, p. 3.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Nicholas Rizopoulos, "Pride, Prejudice and Miyopia, Greek Foreign Policy in a Time Warp", **World Policy Journal**, Vol.10, Fall 1993, p. 22.

even acknowledging any issues other than the continental shelf.”²⁹³ He also emphasized that “Greek sovereignty over the continental shelf had been defined by relevant international conventions and that he could not talk with Turkey as long as it was occupant in Cyprus and it denied recognizing Greek rights in the Aegean.”²⁹⁴

Prior to coming to power, Papandreou was against Greek membership to the EC and supported the view that Greece should have left the NATO. However, after he came to power, he changed this attitude and started to utilize membership of the NATO and the EC for his anti-Turkey attitude which was forming the center of his foreign policy-making. By winning 1981 and 1985 elections and being in power until 1989, Papandreou ruled PASOK and continued to keep relations between the two countries at the lowest level until the crisis in March 1987. He also claimed that Greece should have tactical nuclear weapons. Otherwise, Greece would be open to any threat that came from Turkey. With such claims, Papandreou aimed to activate anti-Turkey sentiments at public level.²⁹⁵ In fact, Papandreou’s policy as indicating Turkey as a main threat was an intentional policy towards the West. By indicating Turkey as expansionist and a threat, Papandreou aimed to leave Turkey alone in the international arena and to realize his goals by luring the US, the Council of Europe and the European Commission to the Greek side.

Besides, when an American Council Committee visited Athens for an official visit in January 1985, Papandreou linked Greek-American relations to Greek-Turkish relations. He claimed that Greek-American relations would improve if America sides with Greece in its disputes with Turkey. Council Committee listed the wishes of Greece as follows: Turkey’s acceptance of the responsibility of Aegean air defense belonging to Greece, acceptance of 10 miles Greek airspace in the Aegean, acceptance of armament of Limnos Island by both Turkey and NATO and reporting of Turkish military craft's flights in the international Aegean airspace to Athens.²⁹⁶ By these requests, Papandreou aimed to bring the Aegean Sea only under the control of Greece.²⁹⁷

²⁹³ Ker Lindsay, p. 24.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ Gürel, p. 92.

²⁹⁶ Armaoğlu, p. 956.

²⁹⁷ Ibid. In every occasion, Papandreou claimed that Turkey had expansionist aims towards Greece. He was claiming that giving concession was not a solution to solve bilateral problems since Turkey would

Meanwhile, the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea stipulated that a state could declare twelve nautical miles of territorial waters. Greece signed this agreement by December 1982. However, if Greece applied this, the percentage of the Greek zone in the Aegean would rise from 35 percent to 65 percent, while Turkish zone would have risen one percentage, from 9 percent to 10 percent.²⁹⁸ According to Turkish government, the agreement would turn the Aegean Sea into Greek sea. Hence, this issue had become another source of conflict between the two countries.²⁹⁹ Moreover, Papandreou wanted Turkey to accept these requests listed above unconditionally. About the Cyprus issue, Papandreou insisted on a unitary Cyprus which would leave the sovereignty and the control of Cyprus to the Greek Cypriot governance. In other words, a Cyprus that was governed by the Greek majority rather than a federal one. He kept the relations with Turkey in these lines, until he lost power on 6 November 1989.³⁰⁰

Against these policies of Papandreou, Turkey tried to initiate a dialogue with Greece. Turkey tried not to involve in a situation that could be used against Turkey. In the elections of 6 November 1983 in Turkey, Motherland Party under the leadership of Turgut Ozal came to power. The main characteristics of Prime Minister Ozal's government included adopting a liberal economy domestically, developing a foreign policy based on the US and trying to develop relations with Greece. In order to soften Papandreou's aggressive policies, Turkey wanted to change the image created by Papandreou's propagandas by proposing dialogue. Ozal tried to moderate

continue to want more from Greece. Papandreou developed "New Defense Understanding" based on the threat comes from East. He claimed that the threat that comes from the north (from the Soviets) was not important. Besides, he aimed to utilize NATO membership against Turkey, to legalize the armament of the islands in that zone. 1974 Cyprus crisis and 1976 Aegean crisis showed Papandreou that there is no possibility of war between Greece and Turkey no matter how tense the relations between the two states became. He believed that it was only possible to go war if one side wants to change the status quo radically. Contrary Turkey was in favor of the status quo in Aegean based on Lausanne Treaty. Papandreou managed to keep the relations at the lowest level and escalated the tension at any time to test the limits of Turkish side. Thus, escalating tension, insistence on Greek claims and blaming Turkey in international arena were the general instruments of Papandreou's policy. However, his policy was also including softening his attitude and starting a dialogue, which led no real progress when Turkey's limits were really pushed. By this policy, Greece was aiming to constrain Turkey in its area and to prevent Turkey to develop its maneuvers. For further details see Sukru S. Gürel, p. 93.

²⁹⁸ Ker Lindsay, 2007, p. 25.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Armaoğlu, p. 956.

Papandreou's aggressive policies with his friendly policies.³⁰¹ To put it differently, he aimed to counter Papandreou's escalation policy with his peaceful policies.³⁰²

2.4. MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY IN THE 1980S

2.4.1. The Cyprus Conflict

There are many prolonged and communal conflicts in the world today. Many of them remain in political and diplomatic deadlock and traditional methods of conflict management are often ineffective.³⁰³ The Cyprus issue has been subjected to round of talks in which technical committees and working groups tried to achieve a solution. However, none of these talks contributed to a solution, since a zero sum thinking has dominated the negotiation processes.³⁰⁴ As Bahcheli states, the Cyprus issue was internationalized in time and has been on the agenda of international community for more than forty years.³⁰⁵ The UN has actively involved in the issue and its efforts through its peace making and peace keeping capacity encouraging the parties to find a sustainable settlement.³⁰⁶

The Cyprus conflict actually dated back to the beginning of the 1880s. When Britain took over the control of the island in 1878, unification of the island with Greece (Enosis movement) was started to be supported by Greece.³⁰⁷ The Greek Cypriot community initiated an armed struggle through establishing the EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston) and waged a guerilla warfare against the British dominance on the island³⁰⁸. Britain faced two major problems on the island; first was

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Faruk Sönmezoglu, **II. Dünya Savaşından Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası**, Der Yayınları, 2006, p. 408.

³⁰³ Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, Lenos Trigeorgis, "Cyprus: An Evolutionary Approach To Conflict Resolution", **The Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Jun. 1993), p. 340.

³⁰⁴ Amanda Paul, "Cyprus and the Never-Ending Search for a Solution", **Caucasus International**, Vol.3, No: 4, Winter 2013-2014, p. 132.

³⁰⁵ Tozun Bahcheli, The Potential For Conflicts In Greek-Turkish Relations, (26.04.2018), http://www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/03_jb00_24.pdf, p.3.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Van Coufoudakis, "Greek Turkish Relations 1973-1983, The View From Athens", **International Security**, Vo.9, Spring 1985, p. 190.

³⁰⁸ Nathalie Tocci, Tamara Kovziridze, **Europeanization and Conflict Resolution: Case Studies from The European Periphery**, Academia Press, Gent, 2004, p. 66. See also Halil Erdemir, "The Origin of the Cyprus Question: The British Policy on the creation of Cyprus Republic", **Perceptions-**

the Greek idea of Enosis and the second one was keeping the two communities on the island in harmony. However, particularly, the second one, keeping the two communities in harmony proved to be very difficult when the Turkish Cypriots began to resist the Enosis movement of the Greek Cypriots.³⁰⁹

The Greek side's desire of Enosis grew rapidly in the 1950s when the Archbishop Makarios came into power. After Makarios was elected as Archbishop, he made a statement in favor of enosis as: "I take the Holy oath that I shall work for our national aspirations and shall never waver from our policy of annexing Cyprus to mother Greece".³¹⁰ The Enosis movement in Cyprus reached to its peak with the plebiscite held on 15th January of 1950 by the Greek orthodox churches on the island. The majority of the Greek Cypriots voted in favor of Enosis³¹¹ while the Turkish Cypriot community chose to live under the British regime. In 1958, the Greek side shifted its standing from Enosis to the independence of the island from the British rule. In 1959, London and Zurich Agreements were signed between the parties which established the Independent Republic of Cyprus and the British rule in the island ended in the same year.³¹²

The constitution of Cyprus was based on these two international agreements. The first one was the Zurich Agreement, signed on 11th February of 1959 between Greece and Turkey, setting out the basic articles of the constitution and established bi-communal constitutional framework for Cyprus and recognized the equality of the two sides. Second one was the London agreement, signed between Greece, Turkey and Britain, including a memorandum and former agreements. Besides, these agreements also consisted of the texts of a third agreement, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty

Journal of International Affairs, Dec.2001- Feb.2002, Vol.6, p. 3. On a press conference held on 16 July 1955, Makarios stated that "The Cyprus question does not constitute a political issue between Britain, on the one hand, and Greece and Turkey on the other. The Cyprus issue is purely a of self-determination and concerns the British Government and the Cypriot people only, and it can be extended so as to concern the Greek Government, whenever the latter, in interpreting the feeling of the Greek and especially the Cypriot people, acts as the people's mandatory for the safeguarding of the island's right of self-determination." For further details see Halil Erdemir, *The Origin of the Cyprus Question: The British Policy on the creation of Cyprus Republic*, p. 4.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Yusuf Aksar, "The European Court of Human Rights and The Cyprus Problem", **Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi**, Vol.50, No.3, 2001, p. 144.

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Elena Baracani, "The Impact of the EU's Democratic Anchoring on the Settlement of the Cyprus Crisis", **Standing Group on International Relations Sixth Pan-European International Relations Conference Turin**, 12-15 September 2007, p. 15.

of Guarantee which constituted the basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus.³¹³ Turkey became one of the guarantor states of the island alongside with Greece and Britain. These Treaties also gave right to Turkey and Greece to deploy a small army to the island. Hence, Turkish army returned to the island for the first time since 1878.³¹⁴ The Treaty of Guarantee aimed to guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and precluded the possibility of the island's political or economic union with any state. The three guarantors had the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of the island in compliance with the Treaty.³¹⁵

The 1960 Constitution formed the basis of the Republic of Cyprus which constituted a bi-communal structure through the complex system of power sharing and community representation.³¹⁶ Basic articles of the constitution recognized the two communities as equal parties.³¹⁷ The Agreements introduced a 'partnership government' which led to a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice president to be elected by their respective communities.³¹⁸ Each has a power of veto on any law regarding foreign affairs, defense or security.³¹⁹ The executive cabinet would involve seven members from the Greek Cypriot community who would be appointed by the Greek president and three members from the Turkish Cypriot community appointed by the Turkish vice president. The judicial system was also characterized by the bi-communal system. In addition, separate communal chambers dealing with educational, religious, personal and cultural issues were established. In

³¹³ Aksar, p. 145.

³¹⁴ Coufoudakis, p. 195.

³¹⁵ The treaty of Guarantee is one of the establishing treaties of the Republic of Cyprus and signed by the UK, Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus and includes four main articles. According to Article 1, while the Republic of Cyprus accepted the territorial integrity, independence and security of the island, on the other hand it also accepted not to participate in any political or economic union with any other state. According to Article II, Greece, Turkey and UK recognized the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus as well as the state of affairs established by the basic articles of the constitution. According to article III, Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus accepted to recognize the UK sovereignty of the areas and its guarantee to use. According to Article IV, Greece, Turkey and the UK were accepted as the guarantor powers in compliance with the provisions of the treaty.

³¹⁶ Tocci and Kovziridze, p. 67.

³¹⁷ Aksar, p. 145.

³¹⁸ Patricia Carley, "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future of Greek-Turkish Relations", United States Institute of Peace, **Peaceworks**, No.17, August, 1997, p. 2.

³¹⁹ Aksar, p. 146.

five largest towns, separate municipalities for the Greek and Turkish communities were established.³²⁰

Despite the establishment of Republic of Cyprus in 1960, it was clear that the militant groups were not disarmed as the units were still active but just hid their weapons.³²¹ Unfortunately, the internationally recognized regime was collapsed after three years, when President Archbishop Makarios proposed thirteen amendments regarding the 1960 constitution. The main aim behind the amendments was removal of critical constitutional provisions that organined the bi-communal structure of the Republic and to create a unitary state with minority rights given to Turkish community.³²² As Aksar stated, these amendments proposed: “(i) to have the Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President elected by five Greek Cypriot dominated House of Representatives as a whole (not by the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot members separately); (ii) to remove their veto powers: (iii) to reduce the Turkish-Cypriot component in the civil and military arms of government: (iv) to abolish separate community voting on fiscal, electoral and some other matters: and (v) to unify the municipalities”.³²³ The adoption of these amendments would automatically shift the balance of power in favor of the Greek Cypriots.³²⁴ The final purpose of the plan was to achieve enosis through self-determination. Accordingly, the Greek Cypriot side also considered the Turkish Cypriot community as a minority with no right of self-determination. As a response, these proposed constitutional changes were rejected by both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community.

After the constitution became unfunctional, alarming years (between 1963 and 1974) for the two communities started.³²⁵ In December of 1963, first clashes between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots began. During the following years, 20.000 Turkish Cypriots particularly, in Nicosia and Larnaca, had to flee from their villages (103 villages) to safer areas.³²⁶ On the other hand, in this period, the Republic of Cyprus

³²⁰ Tocci and Kovziridze, p. 68.

³²¹ Harry Tzimitras, Mete Hatay, “The Need for Realism: Solving the Cyprus problem through linkage politics”, **Turkey Project Policy Paper**, No.9, October 2016, p. 2.

³²² Baracani, p. 15.

³²³ Aksar, p. 145.

³²⁴ Ibid., p. 147.

³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ Tzimitras and Hatay, p. 2

turned into a de facto Greek Cypriot state.³²⁷ On March 4th of 1964, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 186 and based on that, it deployed peacekeeping troops (UNFCYIP) on the island.³²⁸

In the early 1970s, tension emerged between Greece under the junta government and the Greek Cypriot government in Cyprus as there was increasing Greek interference into the domestic affairs of the island. The tension reached its climax on 15 July 1974 when the Greek National Guard attempted a coup against the Makarios' regime to replace him with Nikos Sampson.³²⁹ In the meantime, the violence and the massacres targeting the Turkish community increased. Since, the international community remained inactive in order to take an action, Turkey carried out a peace operation on 20th July, 1974 based on its rights granted by the Treaty of Guarantee.³³⁰ As a result, the island was officially partitioned in 1974 following the military operation of Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) to the island. While Greek Cypriots perceived it as an invasion, Turks perceived it as a peace operation.³³¹ The roots of the problem can be found in the bi-communal structure of the island. Despite Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities lived together for more than four centuries, both communities continued to exist as two separate ethnicities which brought the situation of deeply divided society to the forefront.³³²

The Turkish military operation lasted in three weeks in two stages. According to many experts, the second stage was unnecessary since it resulted in gaining more territory on the island. As a result of this operation, 37% percent of the island came under the control of Turkish military forces. Still, about 40.000 Turkish troops continue to remain on the island. On the other hand, the intercommunal conflict caused thousands of deaths as well as thousands of displaced persons.³³³ Turkey undertook the operation decision at the cost of alienating its allies, particularly the US. Following the operation, the US decided to impose an arms embargo on Turkey.³³⁴ On the other

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Tocci and Kovziridze, p. 69.

³²⁹ H. Philip Gordon, Henry Barkey, "Cyprus: The Predictable Crisis", **National Interest**, Winter 2001, p.84.

³³⁰ Tocci and Kovziridze, p. 69.

³³¹ Paul, p. 130.

³³² Ibid.

³³³ Ibid., p. 131.

³³⁴ Melike Baştürk, "The Issue of Cyprus in the EU Accession of Turkey", **Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union**, April 2013, p. 16.

hand, Turkey claimed that, as a guarantor power, it took the decision of military operation in order to end the aggression towards the Turkish minority in Cyprus. However, the military operation was recognized as invasion by the international community rather than a right-protecting operation.³³⁵ Turkey continued to maintain its military presence on the island on the purpose of protecting the Turkish Cypriot community on the island as well as to gain leverage in negotiations for a final settlement.³³⁶

After the Turkish operation to the island, the EC member states called for ceasefire between Turkey and Greece and supported negotiations in Geneva. The two sides met in Geneva in August 1974 and agreed on exchanges of the prisoners and UN protection for the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey also proposed a bi-zonal federal system as a solution.³³⁷ Following that the UN Security Council invited the guarantor powers through resolution 353 in order to start negotiations to restore peace on the island. Two conferences were held in Geneva in 1974, the second conference had also representatives from both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. However, fruitless talks resulted in the establishment of Turkish Federated State of Cyprus by a unilateral declaration in February 1975.³³⁸ The intergovernmental talks continued during the summer of 1975 under the leadership of the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. However, once more, three rounds of talks which were held in Vienna failed. However, it was agreed on by both parties a creation of two ethnically pure regions on the island as the Turkish Cypriots in the North and the Greek Cypriots in the South of the island.³³⁹

In May 1979, the two sides agreed on to hold a meeting again within the UN framework. At this time, Denktash and Spyros Kyprianou who was successor of Archbishop Makarios signed the 'Ten Point Agreement' which included the following main conditions;

1. Priority should be given to the resettlement of Varosha [suburb of Famagusta and a tourist Mecca] by the Greek Cypriot refugees, 2. Avoid any action prejudicial to the intercommunal talks, 3. The demilitarization of Cyprus, and 4. The independence, sovereignty, territorial

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Ibid., p. 4

³³⁷ Tocci and Kovziridze, p. 69.

³³⁸ Birol Yeşilada, Ahmet Sözen, "Negotiating A Resolution to the Cyprus Problem: European Union Membership Blessing or a Curse?", *International Negotiation*, 7, 2002, p. 265.

³³⁹ Ibid., p. 266.

integrity and nonalignment of the Republic are adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other state and against any form of partition or secession.³⁴⁰

As Necatigil stated, while the Greek Cypriot community thought of a unitary federal state with a strong central government and no internal borders, the Turkish Cypriot community thought of a weak federation as decentralized with clear territorial borders in order to preserve their homogeneity and security.³⁴¹

Despite these negotiations fundamental differences continue to remain among the two communities. These fundamental differences include the issues of Turkish troops, the exercise of fundamental freedoms, the degree of centralization of the federal system and the return refugees.³⁴² After a year, an Interim Agreement was proposed by the UN Secretary General which was also accepted by the two sides. However, after then, no talks were held with the parties until the year of 1984 due to Kyprianou's opposition.³⁴³ On February 1982, Papandreou went to Southern Cyprus as the first Greek Prime Minister.³⁴⁴ In his speech, he emphasized that Cyprus was the part of Hellenism and the bi-communal talks would not solve the problem. He also emphasized the necessity of an international conference. Meanwhile, he tried to keep alive the Enosis soul as making statements such as "Cyprus is a part of our territory which is under occupation."³⁴⁵

On February 1983, in the elections of Southern Cyprus, Spyros Kyprianou was elected as the prime minister and with the influence of Andreas Papandreou, the Greek Cypriot government started to follow a more rigid policy. In accordance with Papandreou's policy, the Greek Cypriot administration started to make the issue internationalized. Followingly, the UN General Assembly accepted the 37/253 resolution on 13 May 1983.³⁴⁶ As in the former resolutions, that decision also stated the unity of the island and emphasized the sovereignty right of the Republic of Cyprus. It also underlined the definition of the 'Cypriot Community' and the pullback of 'Occupation' forces. As a response to this decision, the Turkish Cypriot community

³⁴⁰ Yeşilada and Sözen, p. 266.

³⁴¹ Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis, p. 345.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Yeşilada and Sözen, p. 266

³⁴⁴ Şükrü Sina Gürel, **Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1993)**, Ümit Yayıncılık, Ankara, 1994, p. 95

³⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 96

³⁴⁶ Armaoğlu, p. 959

decided to declare the self-determination right of Turkish Cypriot community.³⁴⁷ On 15th November of 1983, by a unilateral declaration of independence issued by Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC), the Turkish Cypriot community declared its independence under the name of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.³⁴⁸

As per the articles of the Independence Declaration, it was stated that the Turkish Cypriot community used its right of self-determination as entitled in the UN Human Rights Declaration, the UN Agreement and the other international treaties.³⁴⁹ As Tzimitras and Hatay stated, today, while the republic of Cyprus is internationally recognized, the TRNC which was established by a unilateral declaration is recognized only by Turkey and has relied heavily on Turkish aid and the Turkish military.³⁵⁰ Hence, the developments following the Turkish operation made the division of the island more concrete and led to the emergence of two different economic, political and social systems.³⁵¹

In order to soften the reactions against the Independence Declaration, Denktas proposed to initiate negotiations. However, the Greek Cypriot community was insistent on the continuation of the 1960 Constitution and leaving only % 23 of the island to Turkish Cypriots. As a response, in April 1984, Turkey and the TRNC rose their mutual representatives to the level of embassies.³⁵² PASOK continued to keep Cyprus issue as the main priority of the Greek Foreign Policy and searched for multilateral and bilateral measures in order to prevent the recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state. Papandreou also declared that it would cease its diplomatic relations with any state that recognized it. Moreover, until the end of 1983, the PASOK government also rejected to involve in any trilateral negotiations between Greece, Turkey and Britain over the Cyprus issue, only accepted negotiations through the British Government and the UN.³⁵³

Dialogue process between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides continued in Vienna in August of 1984. Between the years of 1984 and 1986, UN Secretary General

³⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 960

³⁴⁸ Aksar, p. 150

³⁴⁹ Armaoğlu, p. 960.

³⁵⁰ Tzimitras and Hatay, p. 3.

³⁵¹ Tocci and Kovziridze, p. 71.

³⁵² Armaoğlu, p. 961.

³⁵³ Coufoudakis, p. 213.

Javier Perez de Cuellar drafted three agreements; the 1984 working points, the 1985 integrated documents and the 1986 draft framework agreement. These proposals were based on the idea of a federation involving two provinces in which the Turkish province would constitute %23-30 of the whole island. The federal administration would deal with foreign and security policies, federal finance, monetary, infrastructure and social policies. The negotiations also included issues of 'three freedom', the withdrawal of Turkish military forces, the resettlement of Varosha and the reopening of Nicosia airport. While the Turkish Cypriot side agreed on the first and the third draft agreements for the formation of federal administration, both Papandreou and Kyprianou rejected them.³⁵⁴

During the following years, Turkey had to struggle with the outcomes of an isolated TRNC in the north and tried to gain recognition of it. As Basturk stated, "Cyprus was mostly appropriated by Turkish people in the mainland and even called 'yavru vatan' which means the baby land."³⁵⁵ Similarly, the Cyprus issue not only concerns the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, it also involves the relations between Turkey and Greece. While the Cyprus issue is a national cause or 'milli dava' for Turkey, it is enosis or unification with the mainland, for Greece.³⁵⁶ Meanwhile, between the first and the second Turkish Operations, the Greek colonel regime in Greece collapsed and the new Greek President Constantine Karamanlis applied for the EC membership. The pro-European administration in Greece and the Turkish military existence on the island led to a front leaded by France in the EC siding by Greek Cypriots while other member states, such as Germany and the UK preferred to pursue an unbiased policy regarding the island.³⁵⁷

Hence, it became impossible to achieve the enosis since Greece became an EU member in 1981. Otherwise it would mean violation of the sovereignty of an associate state by a member state. Hence, since 1981, Greece, as being member of the EU, tried to affect the EU policies in its favor while Turkey remained inactive to move further in EU relations. Since then, the EU could not keep its neutrality towards the issue, even if in the principle it tried to maintain a balance approach between the two allies.

³⁵⁴ Tocci and Kovziridze, p. 78.

³⁵⁵ Baştürk, p. 16.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Tocci and Kovziridze, p. 69.

Particularly, in the Cold War climate, the EC paid attention not to alienate Turkey from the periphery of the West. However, the undertaken military operation of Turkey of 1974 strengthened Greece's hand in order to accuse Turkey of being an aggressor state. Hence, in December 1989, the European Commission took a decision on the Turkey's application as the application procedure would be incomplete if there is not made any progress regarding to disagreements between Turkey and Greece and also the Cyprus issue. So, despite Turkey desperately tried to separate the issue of Cyprus from the accession process, it failed. The German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stated that "the Turkish train remains on the rail line to Europe, but the path to full membership goes via the human rights situation, the Kurdish situation, relations with Greece, the Cyprus situation and naturally over several economic problems." Such statements in addition to Greece's position caused alienation of Turkish citizens from the EU. As a result, no gain could be achieved in the Cyprus issue.³⁵⁸

Meanwhile, since 1974, a consensus emerged between Greek policy makers and the public opinion that Turkey pursues a revisionist policy against Greece, and threatens its national security and aims to change the existing status quo in Cyprus, the Aegean and Thrace in its favour.³⁵⁹ In this regard, in order to eliminate that threat, successive Greek governments followed a policy of containment which was based on two pillars; maintaining military deterrence against Turkey and promoting international support to increase Greece's diplomatic leverage.³⁶⁰ With the advantage of being an EU member, the Greek policy found a way of implementation; through policy of conditionality, Greece blocked Turkey's relations with the EC. For instance, in 1986, Greece vetoed the resumption of the Association Agreement between the EC and Turkey as well as the EC aid to Turkey.³⁶¹

When the talks restarted in August 1988 between Denktas and the newly elected Greek Cypriot President Vassiliou, there was a sense of optimism for the settlement of the issue since the Greek Cypriot President Vassilou was known as more moderate than his forerunner Kyprianou. In July 1989, the UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar proposed formation of a new 'common home' for both sides that would be

³⁵⁸ Baştürk, p. 17

³⁵⁹ Agnantopoulos, p. 14

³⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 16

³⁶¹ Bahar Rumelili, "Transforming Conflicts on EU borders: The case of Turkish Greek Relations", **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol.45, March 2007, p. 114

based on political equality rather than majority or minority demands. Moreover, a new constitution would create a single, bi zonal and bi communal federal Cyprus.³⁶² Besides, the new state would represent a single international personality and a citizenship based on the political equality of the two communities. The negotiations in order to evaluate the proposals of the Secretary General continued until 1990 and resulted in a summit in March 1990. However, the Summit failed when Vassiliou rejected Denktas' demand of the right of self-determination. However, Security Council Resolution 649 proposed an agreement based on Secretary General's proposals. It also stated that the parties should refrain from any action that could deteriorate the situation.³⁶³

2.4.2. The Aegean Disputes

The Aegean disputes have been a constant source of conflict between Greece and Turkey as well as for their allies, particularly within the NATO context. For instance, while conducting aeronautical exercises within the framework of the NATO, a number of problems occurred negatively affecting the South Eastern flank of NATO. As far as the disputes remained unsolved, both Greece and Turkey continue to accuse each other and to adopt mutual uncompromising positions, socializing their publics into the rhetoric of historical antagonism. Hence, resolution of these disputes seems to be essential for the stability of the region. These disputes include continental shelf dispute, territorial waters dispute, airspace dispute and demilitarization of the Aegean Islands.

The period of 1981-1987 was the worst period of Greek-Turkish relations due to the Aegean problems. In Heraclides' words, "Papandreou was a strong believer in Turkey as a threat and as a revisionist state in the Aegean, Cyprus and beyond and he acted accordingly, bringing official contact with Turkey to a halt and initiating an unprecedented anti-Turkish diplomatic campaign in all conceivable venues."³⁶⁴ From the beginning of 1982, Greece started to claim that it was no longer necessary to

³⁶² Tocci and Kovziridze, p. 78

³⁶³ Ibid., p. 79

³⁶⁴ Alexis Heraclides, "Negotiating the Aegean Dispute: In Quest of Acceptable Principles and Points of Convergence", **Turkish Review of Balkan Studies**, 12, p. 116.

continue the dialogue with Turkey on the Aegean problems. According to Papandreou, the main condition to initiate dialogue between the two countries was the retreat of Turkish soldiers in Cyprus. Besides, Greece also claimed that it would not negotiate anything concerning its sovereignty and territorial integrity such as Greek territorial waters in the Aegean.³⁶⁵ Papandreou supported the view that there is no problem in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey except for the continental shelf dispute that had to be settled by the International Court of Justice.³⁶⁶ Contrary to Greece's policy as 'one problem one solution', Turkey supported the view that there were other problems in the Aegean Sea which should be resolved through bilateral negotiations.³⁶⁷

After Papandreou came to power, he started to arm the Aegean Islands which had to be disarmed according to the Lausanne Treaty. Towards the end of January 1982, just before Papandreou's visit to the Soviet Union, Greece started to conduct seismic exploration in the international waters around Thasos Island. This move of Greece was confronted with the protest of Turkey. As a result, on 22 June 1982, an agreement to start the negotiation process was signed between the two parties to avoid any further tension.³⁶⁸ Meanwhile, Papandreou tried to expand the territorial waters of Greece to twelve miles in Moscow by gaining the support of the Soviet Union, but he failed.

In the beginning of March 1984, while navy forces of the both countries were conducting military maneuver, it was claimed by Greece that Turkish Naval Forces started firing at a Greek battle ship and at some other Greek boats in the north of Samothrace Island.³⁶⁹ Therefore, Greece protested Turkey and called back the Greek ambassador from Ankara.³⁷⁰ Turkey refused the Greek claims. After a while, it was understood that the situation occurred because the Greek government was misinformed about firing. Yet, later this misunderstanding was frequently used by Prime Minister Papandreou, who built his entire foreign and domestic policy strategies on Turkish threat during these years.³⁷¹

³⁶⁵ Sönmezoğlu, p. 407.

³⁶⁶ Aydın, p. 228.

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

³⁶⁸ Sönmezoğlu, p. 408.

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

³⁷¹ Ibid., p. 409.

After this incident, in August 1984 the problem of Limnos Island broke out. Limnos problem began with the Greek proposal in order to build one of the operation headquarters of NATO on that island. Turkey rejected this since it would be a violation of agreements regarding the disarmament of islands.³⁷² Both countries put forward some different arguments about the zones that the maneuvers would take place in. Greece claimed that for the safety of the area, disarmed Limnos must be armed just like it was done for the Straits in 1939 despite Montreux Agreement's ban on armament of the coastal areas.³⁷³ For a while, this problem continued between Turkey and Greece in the NATO meetings by vetoing each other's proposals. While it was a clear violation of the Lausanne Treaty by Greece, NATO declared the impartiality of the organization and thus indirectly rejected Greek side's proposals.

Within the NATO, several proposals were put forward in order to find a solution to the conflict. During the meeting of NATO Defense Planning Committee, between 3-5 December in Brussels, the matter was decided to be left 'untouched'.³⁷⁴ As a result, Greece decided not to join the NATO military maneuver on 17 September 1983 and continued its problematic attitude in the organization. Meanwhile; Greece started the de facto armament of the island. Furthermore, in the beginning of 1985, Greece began to move its military troops from where they were deployed on the border of Warsaw Pact member Bulgaria, to the border of Turkey. Lastly, Greece signed a bilateral agreement with the US that allowed the US aircrafts to use Limnos and gained de facto success.³⁷⁵

Following this crisis in March 1985, when Ozal proposed to start a dialogue, Greek side stated that they may only accept this proposal under two conditions. Firstly, the existence of Turkish military forces on the Cyprus Island had to end. Secondly, Turkey should no longer support its views regarding the Aegean issues. When Prime Minister Ozal was in the US in April 1985, he repeated his proposal for dialogue again and even offered a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborhood, Negotiation and

³⁷² Baskın Oran, **Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Yorumlar, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, Vol.2, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2002, p. 110.

³⁷³ Sönmezoğlu, p. 409.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

Cooperation.³⁷⁶ None of these efforts had any effect on Papandreou and Greece. Turkey received no positive response from Greece.³⁷⁷

In the meantime, even though Andreas Papandreou won the elections of 2 June 1985, he lost his majority in the parliament. During the first period of his second governance, Greece started to have serious problems, due to the populist economic policies applied previously and EC decided to intervene directly.³⁷⁸ Following that, Greek Prime Minister adopted more softened policy towards the US and decided to side with it in order to use the relationship against Turkey.

Similarly, though he did not make any change in his policies towards Turkey, he changed his style and began to use a softer discourse. On the other hand, Turkey once more suggested negotiating with Greece about the bilateral problems between the two countries. However, Ozal also declared that Turkey would never accept 12 miles territorial water that was claimed by Greece.³⁷⁹ Through the year of 1986, Greece increased its military operations as well as the number of military forces deployed on the islands in order to strengthen its own position in the Aegean. It also established Aegean Ministry and Islands Supreme Forces. In the same period, Ozal also hardened his attitude towards Greece and he started to blame Papandreou openly.

The greatest tension between the two countries occurred in March 1987. When Greece permitted North Aegean Oil Company to explore oil around Thasos Island in the international waters, a very big crisis broke out, almost bringing the two states to the brink of war.³⁸⁰ Turkey claimed that this Greek attitude was against the Bern Protocol of 1976. Yet, Greece declared that this agreement was only effective as long as the negotiations between the two countries continued and since the negotiations ended, the agreement was not effective anymore and could not be applied. Following that, Turkey also started to search for oil in the region by sending its exploration ship Seismic 1 to the west of Lesbos Island on 26 March 1987 to collect seismic data.³⁸¹ This time, Greek armed forces went on full alert, and that Turkish exploration act was

³⁷⁶ Armaoğlu, p. 957.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Sönmezoğlu, p. 409.

³⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 410.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

criticized openly by the Greek media backed by domestic public opinion.³⁸² The next day, Papandreou requested political support from Bulgarian Prime Minister, Jirkov. He responded his request with an insurance regarding the Greece-Bulgaria borderline.³⁸³ The tension escalated further when Greece declared that they would sink the Turkish ship if it went on exploration in the area.³⁸⁴

Papandreou held NATO, particularly the US, responsible from the crisis. He attempted to suspend the communication lines of the American base in Nea Makri and sent his foreign affairs minister to Bulgaria in order to evaluate the developments together with his Bulgarian counterpart.³⁸⁵ Also, he informed firstly the ambassadors of the Warsaw Pact states and then ambassadors of NATO in Athens.³⁸⁶ Papandreou claimed that Turkey violated the continental shelf of Greece and declared that Greece would take any measure to protect its sovereignty rights. Armaoglu points out that, in his 27 March speech, Papandreou stated: “if Turkey continues with such aggressive policies, Greek armed forces will teach Turkey a very hard lesson.”³⁸⁷ According to Armaoglu, there were similar headlines in the Turkish newspapers which reported the event as “hands on the trigger”, “war clouds on Aegean” and “we will burn anyone who touches”.³⁸⁸

Seeing this tension, the NATO decided to intervene.³⁸⁹ Besides, Turkey also decided to decrease the tension and in his speech on 27 March, Prime Minister Ozal stated that if Greece stopped searching for oil in the international waters and retreated to its own territorial waters, Turkey would also do the same.³⁹⁰ On 28 March, both Greece and Turkey announced that they would not allow their war ships to go beyond their territorial waters.³⁹¹ The crisis ended when Papandreou accepted this proposal

³⁸² Turkey and Greece, Time to settle the Aegean Dispute, **International Crisis Group**, Briefing No: 64, 19th July 2011.

³⁸³ Oran, p. 113.

³⁸⁴ Sönmezoğlu, p. 410.

³⁸⁵ Clogg, p. 235.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ Armaoğlu, p. 957.

³⁸⁸ Ibid.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 958.

³⁹¹ Oran, p. 113.

due to the pressure coming from the US and the NATO³⁹² and both parties put an end to oil exploration activities in the area.³⁹³

2. 5. THE DAVOS PROCESS: TOWARDS RECONCILIATION?

Like the similar crises in the past, the two leaders, Papandreou and Ozal, decided to come together again after the crisis in 1987. The sign of a moderating atmosphere was visible when Papandreou congratulated Ozal after he was reelected in the November 1987 elections.³⁹⁴ Hence, the fear of war once again caused intensification of efforts in order to develop bilateral relations.³⁹⁵ In the beginning of the year 1988, a new dialogue process was built between Turkey and Greece. On 30 and 31 January, Turkish Prime Minister Ozal and Greek Prime Minister Papandreou came together in Davos, in Switzerland, thereby starting a diplomatic process between the two countries that aimed at reconciling the parties before moving to a new cycle of negotiations to solve the deep-rooted disagreements.³⁹⁶ However, during this process both Turkey and Greece were criticized because both countries avoided negotiating about real problems. Therefore, it was claimed that they attempted to initiate just a 'dialogue'.³⁹⁷

On 31 January 1988, a document called Davos Declaration was signed. This declaration did not solve the real problems between the two countries but both parties accepted the terms to be applied as 'good intention', 'a common ground for actions', 'economic cooperation' and 'search for permanent solutions'.³⁹⁸ 'Davos Spirit' led the two states to form a Political Committee and a Common Cooperation Committee at ministerial levels. By the help of Political Committee, both countries' Ministers of Foreign Affairs and by the help of Common Cooperation Committee, Ministers responsible for economic affairs came together in May and September 1988 in Athens

³⁹² Armaoğlu, p. 958.

³⁹³ Sönmezoğlu, p. 411.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 411

³⁹⁵ Volkan Vamik, Norman Itzkowitz, **Turks and Greek: Neighbors in conflict**, The Eothen Press, 1994, p. 197.

³⁹⁶ Armaoğlu, p. 958.

³⁹⁷ Gürel, p. 94.

³⁹⁸ Armaoğlu, p. 958.

and Ankara.³⁹⁹ Both meetings came up with no results. After the meeting in Athens, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mesut Yılmaz expressed outcome of the Athens meeting by saying “nobody should wait for any unnecessary expectations”.⁴⁰⁰

Though in Turkey, the process was exaggerated too much, ‘Davos Spirit’ did not lead to any real progress.⁴⁰¹ Meanwhile, during this process, both sides agreed avoiding any attempts to change forcibly the present status quo in the Aegean and the Cyprus. This incident was supported by the Memorandum of Understanding signed during the visit of Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs to Athens in May 1988.⁴⁰²

At the beginning, both sides were hopeful regarding the process. For instance, Turkey set free estates of Greeks, who left Istanbul during the Cyprus crisis and Greece recognized the association agreement between the EC and Turkey.⁴⁰³ Moreover, Turkey lifted up the visa requirement of Greeks, while travelling to Turkey. This caused an increase in the number of Greek tourists visiting Turkey.⁴⁰⁴ However, the process could not bring concrete results in the long term. Turks believed that the process remained unsuccessful since Turkish enmity was accepted as an unchanged truth at all levels of Greek public and became an autonomous psychological power.⁴⁰⁵ With respect to bilateral policies, no progress was achieved. In terms of common cooperation, except for expressing some wishes, no actual projects were decided to be applied.⁴⁰⁶

Similarly during the Davos process, the Turkish side perceived three threats from the Greek side. Firstly, the foreign ministry of Greece opposed any plan related to resolution of the continental shelf issue, unless it was brought to the International Court of Justice. Secondly, unless Turkey accepted the Greek views on the Cyprus issue, any collaboration on any issue would remain futile. Thirdly, the Greek media heavily criticized the Greek government, since they began the process without taking guarantee in any issue. Indeed, Greece put forward a condition for the negotiations: Turkey had to withdraw its military forces from Cyprus unconditionally or let the

³⁹⁹ Gürel, p. 94.

⁴⁰⁰ Armaoğlu, p. 958.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Sönmezoğlu, p. 411.

⁴⁰³ Vamık and Itzkowitz, p. 198.

⁴⁰⁴ Clogg, p. 236.

⁴⁰⁵ Vamık and Itzkowitz, p. 199.

⁴⁰⁶ Gürel, p. 94.

Greek Cypriots to turn back to Magosa in Cyprus.⁴⁰⁷ For the Turkish side, the acceptance of any condition would mean to accept that Greece was right and Turkey was wrong. Moreover, it was uncertain whether Greece would demand more or not even after Turkey accepted these conditions.⁴⁰⁸

This spirit was also short-lived, due to Papandreou's lack of willingness and the political scandals that stemmed from his electoral defeat in 1989. Moreover, Ozal's isolation at home, due to the loss of domestic support as well as the rejection of Turkey's appeal for the EU membership in December 1989 caused the process to remain uncompleted.⁴⁰⁹ Therefore, according to Koukoudakis, "since the whole rapprochement effort was linked to those two personalities it was bound that their popularity was going to influence it accordingly."⁴¹⁰ However, despite of this situation, the process was important in terms of participation of not only the state actors but also the civil societies. The process was also important since it demonstrated the importance of the EU factor. It became clear that without any positive sign from the EU regarding Turkish membership, such initiative to begin a deep transformation process in bilateral relations was almost impossible.⁴¹¹

On the other hand, one of the main characteristics of the Davos initiative was that it was an opportunity for civil society organizations to express their views regarding Greek-Turkish relations. According to Bertrand, "NGOs of both countries started advocating the Turkish candidacy to EU membership with the idea that inside the club the Turkish government would respect the rules, i.e. international law (for the benefit of Greece) and human rights at European standards (for the benefit of Turkish citizens)."⁴¹² On the other hand, this situation caused formation of more active Turkish NGOs, as Bertrand stated as "a way to exit from their face-to-face with the state and an access to EU fora and support."⁴¹³ From the point of view of journalists'

⁴⁰⁷ Vamık and Itzkowitz, p. 199.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁹ Ziya Öniş, Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Rhetoric or Reality?", **Political Science Quarterly**, Volume 123, Spring 2008, p. 124.

⁴¹⁰ George Koukoudakis, "The Role of Citizens in the Current Greek-Turkish Rapprochement", **Paper for the 56th Annual Conference of Political Studies Association**, Reading 2006, p. 8.

⁴¹¹ Öniş and Yılmaz, p. 2.

⁴¹² Gilles Bertrand, "Greek-Turkish Relations: From Cold War to Rapprochement", **Observatory of European Foreign Policy**, EUTR 5/2003, EU-Turkish Relations Dossier, (10.10.2013), <http://www.iuee.eu/pdf-dossier/12/iPFzMjayLiR2fMmgJ0QG.PDF>

⁴¹³ Ibid.

associations, rapprochement with Greece was part of a move towards greater freedom of speech on other 'national' issues like the Kurdish question or the role of the National Security Council in politics.⁴¹⁴

Particularly, Davos was very important in terms of rapprochement from 1980s onwards.⁴¹⁵ The Davos process was extraordinary in terms of resolution of disputes since it attempted to resolve legal and political disputes in an atmosphere of mutual trust. Hence, this process can also be named as informal diplomacy although the participants were formal diplomats.⁴¹⁶ On the other hand, according to Koukoudakis, Turkey did not also want to continue the tension in the bilateral relations due to its problematic relations with Syria, Iran and Iraq, and the Kurdish issue in its internal policy as well as its problematic relations with Bulgaria. Moreover, Turkey was also intending to apply for the EU membership and was in need of Greek support in this process. On the other hand, within the country, Ozal started modernization of the economic structure which could easily be affected by any negative development in foreign policy.⁴¹⁷

Furthermore, according to Koukoudakis, both Greece and Turkey were likeminded in order to initiate the rapprochement process, since both Turkey and Greece wanted to concentrate on their fiscal policies, which were negatively affected by the costs of arms race. The impact of defense spending on the economies of both countries was a heavy burden. According to the US Department of Defense, "in 1987, Greece was spending 6.2% of its GDP in defense and was ranked second among the NATO member countries and Turkey was spending 4.4% of its GDP and was ranked 4th among NATO member states."⁴¹⁸

In fact, the Davos Declaration did not produce any visible outcome. One political and one economic, the two committees were founded in order to create a common ground for actions and ministers of Foreign Affairs of the both states would meet twice a year. Economic Committee in Ankara and Political Committee in Athens gathered in May 1988. The Vougliameni Memorandum (Athens, 27 May 1988) involved confidence building measures, tension reduction measures and good

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ Koukoudakis, p. 7.

⁴¹⁶ Vamık and Itzkowitz, 1994, p. 198.

⁴¹⁷ Koukoudakis, p. 7.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

neighborliness measures. This agreement was the only significant progress achieved at that time.⁴¹⁹

In the same year, on 13-15 June 1988 the two leaders came together for a second meeting following Ozal's visit to Athens.⁴²⁰ However, particularly, the most significant progress was Ozal's official visit to Athens which took place after 46 years.⁴²¹ In his visit, he made a heart touching speech and emphasized the mutual parts of the history of both states and stressed the cooperation period during Atatürk and Venizelos' time.⁴²² Following Ozal's visit to Athens, Istanbul Agreement was signed on September 8, 1988.⁴²³

At the beginning of the year 1990, in Greece, New Democracy Party came to power and to the contrary of expectations that Ankara-Athens relations might soften, it did not happen. New Greek government signed a Defense and Cooperation Agreement and stated that this was a guarantee against any Turkish attack.⁴²⁴ Moreover, Greece also vetoed 700 million dollar credit that was to be given to Turkey by the EU in the fall of 1990 with the claim that there was a constant violation of the Greek airspace.⁴²⁵ On 27 September 1990, in New York, during the UN meetings, the parties could not reach any concrete conclusion.⁴²⁶ On the other hand, the tension and crisis created by Papandreou demonstrated the Greek public what kinds of troubles were ahead. Therefore, from the first day, New Democracy Party was tended to find solutions for the conflicts and did not adopt Papandreou's crisis policies. In compliance with it, the relations were at least normalized between the two states.⁴²⁷

The Gulf crisis of 1990 and the close Turkish-American relations were also influential in the softening policies of the Greek government. Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis which turned into a civil war in 1992 and Balkan crisis did not create a direct crisis in bilateral relations, but when Greece cooperated with aggressive Serbia and tried to build a block against Turkey, Turkey responded to these actions of Greece with

⁴¹⁹ Bertrand, 2013

⁴²⁰ Sönmezoğlu, p. 411.

⁴²¹ Ker Lindsay, p. 28.

⁴²² Vamık and Itzkowitz, p. 197.

⁴²³ Fuat Aksu, "Ege Sorunlarının Geleceği ve Türkiye, AB Üyelik Sürecince Türkiye'nin Seçenekleri", **Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi**, Vol.3, July 2005, p. 271.

⁴²⁴ Sönmezoğlu, p. 411.

⁴²⁵ Ibid.

⁴²⁶ Ibid., p. 412.

⁴²⁷ Armaoğlu, p. 958.

a similar attitude and a “new struggle this time in the Balkans” started between Turkey and Greece.⁴²⁸



⁴²⁸ Ibid.

CHAPTER THREE

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN GREEK FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY AND MID-1990S AND THEIR IMPACT ON RELATIONS WITH TURKEY

3.1. ADDITIONAL REGIONAL THREATS TO THE GREEK SECURITY IN THE 1990S

The 1990s saw huge changes in the political map of the geography where Greece was located, thereby forcing the Greek policy-makers to allocate greater energy to emerging nearby threats, particularly coming from the north. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, Greece had focused on the so-called threat from the East, literally Turkey and designed its foreign policy so as to place pressure on Ankara to accept the Greek thesis on a variety of problems ranging from the Aegean Sea to the Cyprus. For decades, those problems provided Greek politicians the required political agenda that helped them to divert public attention away from economic and structural problems. However, since the early 1990s, particular events and crises that followed the collapse of Yugoslavia, abruptly changed the political agenda. Attention of the Greek public shifted to the newly established republics as well as to ethnic conflicts threatening both the territorial integrity of the Greek state and the Greek national identity.

Those problems were new and unprecedented and forced the Greek policy makers to re-identify the threats to the Greek state and to develop new strategies to cope with them. Suddenly, Turkey was seemed to drop from the top of the list of enemies or the threat which Turkey posed to Greece was started to be perceived in combination with the new ones. Greek politicians regarded the Albanian insurgency and the emergence of a Muslim state, i.e. Bosnia Herzegovina in the middle of the Balkan region as the birth of a dangerous Muslim axis surrounding Greece and acted accordingly by forging cordial relations with aggressive Milosevic government in Serbia. In addition, independence of the Macedonian state angered Athens and led it to adopt an economic blockade on Macedonia which was harshly criticized even by its closest European partners. As a result, while Greece lost its fervent with the problems of the Aegean Sea and the Cyprus, it started to spend higher energy to apply its similar recalcitrant policies, this time against its northern neighbors.

Nevertheless, Greece's Balkan policies remained ephemeral to a large extent and without any concrete results. Yet, this policy can be regarded as a political development that paved the way for the coming rapprochement with Turkey in the late 1990s. It also illustrated how the subsequent Balkan crises led the Greek policy makers to reevaluate traditional premises of the Greek foreign policy and their visible results.

3.1.1. The Macedonia Crisis

It was expected that dissolution of the Soviet Union would result in granting a leading role to Greece in the Balkan region. However, the rising of nationalist movements in the region as well as in its domestic context affected Greece negatively and caused loss of that opportunity.⁴²⁹ Like other European countries, Greece was caught unprepared to the collapse of Yugoslavia whose foreign policy was based on non-interference and non-violability of the existing borders. The dissolution of Yugoslavia had three critical outcomes for Greece; the emergence of an independent Macedonian state with possible territorial claims against Greece, a ground for Turkish penetration into the Balkans and the possibility for the emergence of a Greater Albania.⁴³⁰ Hence, the Greek response to the developments in the region was short-sighted, counter-productive and based on the maintenance of pro-Greek elements in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Albania and as well as in Bulgaria.⁴³¹

Historically, Greece's security is linked to that of the Balkans. Due to its geographical location in the Balkan region, any instability would bring serious consequences for Greece's own security as well. Hence, Greece has been highly sensitive to the developments in the region.⁴³² However, since Greek policy towards the FYROM and other Southern Balkan countries was determined mostly by domestic political aims along with perception of security threats resulting from instability in the

⁴²⁹ Thanos Veremis, "Greece, The Balkans and The European Union", **ZEI Discussion Papers**, 1998, p. 10.

⁴³⁰ Stephen Larrabee, "Greece's Balkan Policy in a New Strategic Era", **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, Vol.5, September 2005, p. 405.

⁴³¹ Ibid.

⁴³² Ibid.

region, the situation got complicated for Greece even posing threat to its territorial integrity.⁴³³

By the end of the 1980s, with the collapse of Yugoslavia, Greece faced with a region plunged into ethnic conflict that was risky for its security.⁴³⁴ Tito's death in 1980 and the instability of the government in Belgrade triggered nationalist and secessionist movements in the republics.⁴³⁵ Although the collapse of the Soviet Union did not affect Greece too much in terms of security, the disintegration of Yugoslavia did. Collapse of Yugoslavia caused Greece to have uneasy relations with the NATO and the EU, due to its problematic relations with the FYROM along with Greece's Serbian affiliation.⁴³⁶ In the beginning of the 1980s, The Socialist Republic of Macedonia started to be affected by the nationalist movements of post-Tito period as well. Efforts towards international recognition not only for the recognition of the ethnicity, but also for the constitutive components such as its historical roots and name had been initiated.⁴³⁷

However, the independence declaration also raised serious problems regarding the ground of newly established state. While the Slav Macedonians were claiming their own distinctiveness in terms of ethnicity, culture and language; Greece and Bulgaria rejected any of these claims and did not accept the existence of Macedonian statehood.⁴³⁸ Greece denied the existence of a separate Macedonian nation and named the people living in the Macedonian part of Greece as 'Slavophone Greeks' to present them as Greeks, who speak Slavic language.⁴³⁹

⁴³³ Misha Glenny, "The Macedonian Question: Still No Answers", **Social Research**, Vol.62, Spring 1995, p. 152.

⁴³⁴ Larrabee, p. 408.

⁴³⁵ Nicolaos Zahariadis, "Nationalism and Small State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response to the Macedonian Issue", **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol.109, Autumn 1994, p. 660.

⁴³⁶ Fotios Moustakis, Michael Sheehan, "Greek Security Policy After the Cold War", **Contemporary Security Policy**, Vol.21, 2000, p.105.

⁴³⁷ Evangelos Kofos, "Greece's Macedonian Adventure: The Controversy over FYROM's Independence and Recognition", p. 1, (26.04.2016), <http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/downloads/library/Kofos19990705.pdf>

⁴³⁸ Radoslava Stefanova, "Preventing violent conflict in Europe: The Case of Macedonia", **The International Spectator**, Vol.32, 1997, p. 104.

⁴³⁹ Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the Balkans", **International Security**, Vol.15, Winter 1990-1991, p. 76.

3.1.1.1. The Onset of the crisis

The elections in 1990 brought the nationalist party; Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization to power in the FYROM with the majority of the votes. The party initiated a campaign for territories in Greece and Bulgaria, and published currency using White Tower, the symbol of Thessaloniki, as well as passed legislation about using of Vergina emblem on its flag.⁴⁴⁰ All these actions were taken in order to strengthen the newly established state sovereignty. Although Macedonian president Kiro Grigorov was not part of them, he also supported their campaign since Greece rejected recognition of the newly established state.⁴⁴¹ After FYROM declared its independence, it increased its propaganda by using nationalist symbols such as Vergina Star on its flag, White Tower that symbolizes the city of Thessaloniki in Greek Macedonia on its currency, changed the names of streets with Slavic versions of Greek cities and started to make statements as “the illegal occupation of parts of Macedonia since 1913” as well as used illustrations showing the region of Greek Macedonia in chains.⁴⁴² These acts of Skopje were interpreted as hostile intentions against its territorial integrity by Greece. Such movements and claims began to raise concerns among Greeks and Bulgarians.⁴⁴³

Indeed, successive Greek governments were in common view that Yugoslavia was a useful buffer state for them. Hence, Greece neither rejected the constitutional framework of the Former Soviet Republic of Yugoslavia nor questioned its internal administrative structure. Interestingly, the Greek general consulate continued to function in Skopje as keeping its de facto relations with the Republic, despite the consulate was officially accredited to the federal government in Belgrade. Meanwhile, official Greek policy was based on the denial of the existence of a Macedonian nation. In fact, this denial was not against the right of Slavic people to establish a separate state in Soviet Republic of Macedonia but for the Macedonian name which was regarded as a constitutive component of Greek cultural heritage.⁴⁴⁴

⁴⁴⁰ Nicolaos Zahariadis, “External Interventions and Domestic Ethnic Conflict in Yugoslav Macedonia”, **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol. 118, Summer 2003, p. 266.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴⁴² Zahariadis, p. 662.

⁴⁴³ Kofos, p. 1.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid.

Official Greek policy was based on the usage of the name of Slav Macedonians to identify the Makedonci of the Soviet Republic of Macedonia and its supporters in the Diaspora. On the other hand, historians in the Soviet Republic of Macedonia (SRM) were using Macedonian Slavs when they were writing about Macedonian history before the 1870s and the era of Macedonian national emancipation.⁴⁴⁵

3.1.1.2. Macedonia Climbs to the Top of Greek Foreign Policy Priorities’ List

In the beginning of the 1990s, the Macedonian question became the number one issue in Greek Foreign Policy after FYROM’s declaration of independence in 1991. Usage of the name, Macedonia, by the new state and the claims related to cultural heritage of Alexander the Great which belonged to Greeks started a conflict between Greece and the FYROM which continued for almost five years. Geographic location of the new state, its name and its claims regarding to its own cultural heritage raised concerns in Greece and it was perceived as a threat to Greek national distinctiveness. As a response to such claims, Greece started to emphasize its own cultural and ethnic identity. The mobilization of Greek nationalist movements had a double effect; reevaluation of the past made Alexander the Great an integral part of Greek cultural heritage and caused activation of Greek ethno-cultural identity.⁴⁴⁶ A consensus emerged which brought together the traditional wings of Greek nationalism such as the Army and the Church with the Socialist PASOK Party and the successor of the leftist party, Synaspimos.⁴⁴⁷ Others tended to handle (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement) the issue within the framework of nationalist fundamentalism. However, their view regarding Greek policy towards the developments in the Balkans also affected the formulation and conduct of official Greek policy.⁴⁴⁸

The official Greek policy towards the issue did not change suddenly despite the nationalist movements in the SRM. The New Democracy (NDP) government under the leadership of Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis and Foreign Affairs Minister

⁴⁴⁵ Kofos, p. 2.

⁴⁴⁶ Anna Triandaflydou, Anna Paraskevopoulou, “When is the Greek nation? The role of Enemies and Minorities”, *Geopolitics*, Vol.7, 2002, p. 93.

⁴⁴⁷ Kofos, p. 2.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid.

Antonis Samaras followed traditional Greek policy on Yugoslavia through coordinating with the US and member states of the EC to maintain the survival of the Yugoslav Federation. However, when it was realized that the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia was irreversible, Greece intensified its attention to secure guarantees against any change on its northern borders.⁴⁴⁹ Contrary to the Cold War period, Yugoslavia was no longer a buffer zone for Greece to constrain Macedonian irredentism.⁴⁵⁰

Greek concerns intensified by the end of the 1980s as the nationalist ideology of 'Macedonianism' included all Slav speakers (Greek Macedonia and Pirin Macedonian region of Bulgaria) in the wider Macedonian region.⁴⁵¹ When Greece realized that most of the member states of the EC were ignorant of the Balkan issue, they decided to cooperate with Belgrade and Sofia around a common approach regarding emerging problems in the Southern Balkans. Greece's major concern was the spread of hostilities across the territory of the SRM (Socialist Republic of Macedonia). However, Greece found no common ground either with Belgrade or with Sofia.⁴⁵²

On December 16, 1991, the Council of Ministers of EC held a meeting to consider the recognition issue of Former Yugoslav Republics in Brussels. The Foreign Minister of Greece, Antonis Samaras, clearly identified their policy as an objection to the use of the name 'Macedonia', possible future territorial claims and the propaganda coming from Skopje concerning the FYROM. At the end, Samaras could persuade the Council to accept the Greek position and to include it in the final declaration.⁴⁵³

The declaration of the EC foreign ministers on December 17, 1991, regarding Yugoslavia was almost a turning point for the Macedonian issue. The declaration stated the main criteria for the international recognition of the FYROM which were also the main points raised by Greece. Basically, as Kofos stated, it was required that "for constitutional and political guarantees ensuring that (the applicant state) has no territorial claims towards a neighboring community state (Greece) and that it will

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 4.

⁴⁵⁰ Larrabee, p. 408.

⁴⁵¹ Kofos, p. 4

⁴⁵² Ibid.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

conduct no hostile propaganda activities versus a neighboring community state including the use of a denomination which implies territorial claims”.⁴⁵⁴

At the European Council Meeting in Lisbon on June 27, 1992, Greece managed to impose the Greek view of “under a name which does not include the term Macedonia” in accordance with the December 1991 declaration.⁴⁵⁵ This development mobilized the hardliners in Skopje and in August, the FYROM adopted the 16 point star of Vergina as their emblem on their national flag and in September, new school books were published including the claims regarding to ‘Greater Macedonia’ and Hellenic culture, while Greece intensified its embargo on fuel and commodities.⁴⁵⁶

Until the mid-1992, Greece acquired most of its requests within the Council of EU. In the meantime, Macedonian president Kiro Grigorov’s refusal delayed recognition of the country. However, he tried to secure the recognition of the country by applying to the UN membership. The UN Security Council accepted this request conditional on two points; firstly, the flag having the ancient Macedonian emblem of Vergina Sun had to be removed for Greece’s right to maintain its cultural heritage and secondly, the condition that the new member state would be accepted under the provisional name of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.⁴⁵⁷ The Security Council legitimized this decision for the interest of peace and good neighborhood relations in the region as well as against any possible Greek reaction.⁴⁵⁸ However, the acceptance of the country under the temporary or provisional name of FYROM posed a problem regarding the existence of the republic both temporally and spatially.⁴⁵⁹ President Gligorov reacted to it as “we are not former and we are not Yugoslav anymore.”⁴⁶⁰

In the following weeks, with the efforts of Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance, the UN took the mission from the EU to bring the two sides for an agreement. In May 1993, a

⁴⁵⁴ Andreas Demetrius Floudas, “Pardon? A Conflict for a Name? FYROM’s Dispute with Greece Revisited”, p. 4, (26.04.2016), <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=1D6DC6CBC0E5E405A9ED8A278DFD99E3?doi=10.1.1.598.6662&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁷ Kofos, p. 5.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁹ Loring M. Danforth, *The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1995, p. 156.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid.

draft treaty was prepared by the mediators in New York, which was based on the opinions of the two sides. The mediators were so hopeful that even their proposal name 'Nova Makedonija' (the one proposed by Pinerio, but now in Slavic version) would be accepted. However, the efforts of Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance with support from the US gave no result regarding the solution.⁴⁶¹ The costs of the disagreement were political in the long term for Greece, while they were economic and social for the FYROM.⁴⁶²

3.1.1.3. The PASOK Government and Hardening of the Greek Stance

In Greece, New Democracy Party leader, Mitsotakis' first priority was to decrease the public excitement and to surpass the effect of Samaras' dismissal in the party.⁴⁶³ Indeed, there were differences within the ruling New Democracy Party, between the traditional conservatives led by Prime Minister Mitsotakis and the maximalist ones led by Foreign Minister Samaras who opposed any usage of the name, 'Macedonia'.⁴⁶⁴ However, Mitsotakis who acted in line with the EU and tended to recognize the country, miscalculated the level of rejection by the Greek public for recognition and paved the way for his governance coming to an end.⁴⁶⁵

Inside Greece, Mitsotakis faced with a similar situation again, when the UN mediators Vance and Owen presented him the compromised version of the draft treaty including the name issue on May 1993. However, at this time, most of the MPs of his party warned him not to sign the proposed draft. Otherwise, they would lose the majority in the parliament and would be forced to resign. In September 1993, his deputies asked him to terminate the government.⁴⁶⁶ The elections held in October brought Andreas Papandreou back to the power.⁴⁶⁷

Papandreou expressed first signs of his hard-liner policy regarding the Macedonian issue after two days he came to power as he declared that they would

⁴⁶¹ Kofos, p. 6.

⁴⁶² Ibid.

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁴ Larrabee, p. 409.

⁴⁶⁵ James Pettifer, *The New Macedonian Question*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1999, p. 23.

⁴⁶⁶ Kofos, p. 8.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

close the borders if Grigorov would not change his uncompromising attitude towards Greece.⁴⁶⁸ On 24 October, in his parliamentary speech, he stated that they would not let the use of their own national symbols. Besides, foreign affairs minister Papoulias stated that there was not only a name dispute between the two countries, but also there was a threat towards Greece's territorial integrity.⁴⁶⁹

Papandreou-led PASOK government also accused Mitsotakis of handling the issue in the form of 'endotiki' (yielding). Papandreou stated that Greece would follow its hardliner position regarding the name issue. He claimed that unless Grigorov gave up his uncompromising position regarding the issue, there was no hope for negotiations under the leadership of the UN. He had a convenient majority in the parliament which supported him, contrary to Mitsotakis' position.⁴⁷⁰

Hence, Greece's Balkan policy diverged sharply from the policies of Brussels and Washington. When the war in Bosnia became more intense, EU members became anxious about the uncompromising Greek policy regarding the Macedonian issue, decided to recognize the FYROM by 1993 despite all attempts of Athens.⁴⁷¹ Indeed, according to Triandafyllidou and Veikou, the logic of Greek policy at that time was expressed as; "the feeling of alienation that Greeks at times expressed towards the West was accentuated by the controversy between Greece and the FYROM, and the inability of other EU countries to appreciate Greece's sensibility on the issue."⁴⁷²

Meanwhile, most of the member states of the EU and the US recognized the FYROM, meaning that they were supporting the Security Council's decision dated back to 1993 regarding provisional name; the FYROM.⁴⁷³ Furthermore, six EU member states; Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherland and the UK accepted to initiate full diplomatic relations with Skopje just before the Greek presidency of the Community by December 1993. Greece protested this development since it violated the CFSP of the Union and located Greece in a more inflexible position at the bilateral

⁴⁶⁸ Melek Fırat, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Yunanistan Dış Politikasının Yeniden Biçimleniş Süreci", **Beş Deniz Havzasında Türkiye**, Ed. Mustafa Aydın and Cagri Erhan, Siyasal Yayınevi, Ankara, 2006, p. 63.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁰ Kofos, p. 8.

⁴⁷¹ Fırat, p. 47.

⁴⁷² Anna Triandafyllidou and Mariangela Veikou, "The hierarchy of Greekness: ethnic and national identity considerations in Greek immigration policy", **Ethnicities**, Vol.2, 2002, p. 194.

⁴⁷³ Kofos, p. 8.

negotiations regarding the issue. Massive movements in Greek cities broke out in order to condemn the desertion of Greece by its allies.⁴⁷⁴ In February, political parties of Greece, except for the Greek Communist Party, participated in a nationalist demonstration in Thessaloniki, which emphasized that Macedonia was Greek.⁴⁷⁵ When the US also accepted the same position in February 1994 and took the decision of initiating diplomatic relations, Greece began to apply an embargo on the FYROM excluding humanitarian aids.⁴⁷⁶ The embargo decision not only increased the internal economic problems of FYROM, but also the possibility of social unrest.⁴⁷⁷

According to Glenney, since then the Greek policy turned out to be self-defeating. First, the Greek standing regarding the issue deteriorated its reputation inside the EU. Moreover, the Greek resistance regarding name, flag and constitutional issues also increased the possibility of an internal collapse within the country. If any war had broken out in Macedonia, that would cause Bulgarian, Albanian and Turkish penetration into Greece which was the worst situation for Greece.⁴⁷⁸ Hence, this policy of Papandreou caused him to be condemned by the West and placed the country in a negative situation in Europe. Hence, “the embargo made its mark on international perceptions as proof that Greece’s Macedonian policy was bullying and aggressive.”⁴⁷⁹

The embargo decision of Greece faced with condemnation from the Union. Even the membership of Greece was questioned and some of the EU members suggested the removal of Greece from the Union. Greece initiated an intensified diplomacy in order to explain its right to impose sanctions in accordance with the international law and

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁵ Firat, p. 47.

⁴⁷⁶ Prodromos Yannas, “Greece’s Policies in the Post-Cold War Balkans”, **Crisis in the Balkans, Views from the Participants**, Ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos, Kostas G. Messas, Westview Press, 1997, p. 162.

Greece closed its consulate in Skopje in 16th February 1994 and the Thessaloniki Harbor for trading activities except for food and pharmaceuticals. For further details see Ibid.

⁴⁷⁷ Moustakis and Sheehan, p. 103.

⁴⁷⁸ Glenney, p. 154.

According to Moustakis and Sheehan, Greece overreacted to the developments in its northern border and pursued a policy which was short sided and led to the alienation of pro-Greek elements in the issues related to Albania, FYROM and as well as Bulgaria, particularly under the foreign ministry of Antonis Samaras. The main misperception in this regard was that these countries were real security threats against Greece so Greece should deteriorate them.

For further details see, Fotios Moustakis and Michael Sheehan, *Greek Security Policy After the Cold War*, p. 103.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

the EC law.⁴⁸⁰ On February 22, 6 EU countries (England, France, Italy, Netherland, Germany and Denmark) warned Greece to end the sanctions.⁴⁸¹ When Greece continued with the sanctions, on April 23, EU Commission applied to the European Court of Justice against Greece for its 'illegal' sanctions on Macedonia.⁴⁸² In its decision, the Court stated that it was the violation of the rules of the Community and the Common Commerce Policy.⁴⁸³ Hence, Greece became isolated within the Union and even the president of the EU Commission at that time, Jacques Delors stated that he would be happy to see Greece leave.⁴⁸⁴ Similarly, the Greek action against Macedonia also widely condemned by the international community and Greece made the headlines. The Los Angeles Times writer William D. Montalbano wrote that "even Greece's best friends say the embargo is improvident, incendiary for the powder keg Balkans and embarrassing for the Athens government."⁴⁸⁵ It was also claimed that Greece was following an uncompromising policy in order to hide its economic failures from its public opinion.⁴⁸⁶ Similarly, the Economist mentioned that the embargo decision was applied in order to protect Prime Minister Papandreou from domestic criticism after the US decision of recognizing Macedonia.⁴⁸⁷

Meanwhile, Papandreou's miscalculation on the impact of the embargo caused much more criticism inside Greece and Greek public began to object to Papandreou's policy.⁴⁸⁸ Economic and commercial interests regarding emerging new markets of the Balkan region forced the government to change its policy. Besides, Greek academicians also emphasized the importance of the handling of the issue in a more moderate way rather than ultra-nationalism.⁴⁸⁹ Hence, criticisms were directed to the negative impacts of the ultra-nationalist Greek position, which also negatively affected country's relations with its EU partners and the international community.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁰ Floudas, p. 7.

⁴⁸¹ Firat, p. 48.

⁴⁸² Ibid.

⁴⁸³ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁴ Greece vs. Albania, London, The Economist, September 17, 1994.

⁴⁸⁵ John Shea, **Macedonia and Greece: The Struggle to Define a New Balkan Nation**, McFarland and Company Inc. Publishers, London, 1997, p. 296.

⁴⁸⁶ Firat, p. 48.

⁴⁸⁷ Shea, p. 296.

⁴⁸⁸ Kofos, p. 9.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid.

Fortunately, a surprising development provided Athens with the required pretext to free Greece from this negative image that it exposed to the world because of the Macedonian question. High tension between the two countries started to deescalate because of forest fires in Macedonia in August 1994. When Skopje wanted assistance from Greece, Greek government replied positively.⁴⁹¹ On September 13, 1995, foreign ministers of the two countries signed the Interim Accord for the normalization of the bilateral relations.⁴⁹² Immediately after, the EU dropped the legal action against Greece. However, the Accord did not bring a final solution to the main problem; the name issue.

The confrontation between Greece and the FYROM over the issue of recognition and name was an example of how nationalism affected the Balkan region. In Greece, this confrontation activated a nationalist wave that had not been seen for years and continued to remain as an unsolved issue that may initiate a regional conflict in the future.⁴⁹³ It was clear that the new government under the leadership of Kostas Simitis learned important lessons from the policy of Andreas Papandreou and chose to pursue a more pragmatic policy regarding the issue and achieved important gains, particularly about the resolution of three problematic issues: article 49 of Macedonian Constitution that was perceived as a threat regarding Greece's territorial integrity, the national flag which had Vergina Star that was considered as a Greek national symbol unquestionably and Macedonia's official name. With the signature of the Interim Accord in 1995, in 1996 Macedonia amended its constitution to end Greek concerns and accepted the removal of Vergina from its flag.⁴⁹⁴ In addition, the two sides accepted to continue talks with respect to the name issue. Adoption of a more cooperative approach in Greek foreign policy-making also affected the academic circles in Greece in a more positive way.⁴⁹⁵

Since 1995, commercial relations between the two countries have increased. Greece became the fourth largest investor in the country after Germany, Italy and

⁴⁹¹ Firat, p. 50.

⁴⁹² Floudas, p. 8.

⁴⁹³ Ibid., p. 1.

⁴⁹⁴ Stefanova, p. 109.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid.

Turkey, with \$19 million.⁴⁹⁶ 47 of the 67 companies are joint ventures.⁴⁹⁷ Moreover, the FYROM and Greece realized that it was beneficial for both to improve stable and closer relations. For instance, Thessaloniki harbor could reduce FYROM's dependency to Serbia for shipments of its products. Besides, the FYROM realized that Greece as a member country of the NATO and the EU with an advanced economy could facilitate its European integration process. Greece also realized that engagement of FYROM with the EU through financial and political ties could change FYROM's behavior into a more moderate one. Meanwhile, developing economic relations could also decrease the bilateral tension related to the name issue. To prevent internal instability in the FYROM, Greece had continued to support FYROM's transition to a stable market economy which is also in accordance with Greece's interest.⁴⁹⁸

3.1.2. The Formation of a Serbian-Greek Axis

Developments in the Balkan region directly affected Greece and Turkey due to their geographical location and historical ties with the region. All the countries in the region shared common historical legacy with Greece and Turkey which affected Balkan countries' perception towards each other as well as caused competition and skepticism about each other's ambitions.⁴⁹⁹ The end of the Cold War and the post-Communist changes in the Balkan region posed new challenges for Greece and Turkey both at societal and security level.⁵⁰⁰ The most significant result of the post-Cold War period was the two countries' potential to influence their unstable neighbors.⁵⁰¹

Since Turkey and Greece had different ideas regarding managing the crises in the Balkans, a chain of events started which reflected their aims in the region, in the post-Cold War era. Despite that they were engaged in the western institutional

⁴⁹⁶ Moustakis and Sheehan, p. 104.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁹ Othon Anastasakis, "Greece and Turkey in the Balkans: Cooperation or Rivalry?", **Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of Detente**, Ed. Ali, Carkoglu, Barry M. Rubin, Routledge, New York, 2015, p. 46.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 47.

While at security level, the dissolution of the Yugoslavia and emerge of new states added new military threats, at societal level, both countries became destinations for refugees and immigrants. For further details, see Othon Anastasakis, "Greece and Turkey in the Balkans: Cooperation or Rivalry?", p. 47.

⁵⁰¹ Ibid.

structures, they tended not to cooperate in accordance with them. On the contrary, they located themselves in the opposite camps. While Turkey supported Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo, Greece supported Orthodox Serbians.⁵⁰² Accordingly, in the first half of the 1990s, Greece's foreign policy towards the region was unilateral, anti-western and nationalist, while Turkey's foreign policy had multilateral pro-western and cooperative dimensions. The main reason behind the Greek foreign policy at that time was the fear of encirclement by Turkey in the region.⁵⁰³

After the collapse of Yugoslavia and the following wars, in the beginning of 1990s Greece found itself in a region which was highly unstable.⁵⁰⁴ Greece established a military strategy against the threat coming from the East from 1974 until the mid-1990s, despite it was a member of the NATO. Since then, it had to shift its attention towards its Northern borders due to the unstable situation in the Balkans in the post-Cold War. However, Greece failed to formulate an effective policy towards the region rather than being part of the resolution and until the mid-1990s it even became remarkable part of the problem. According to Ifantis, “the complexity of actors, roles, policies and perceived interests resulted in Greece which led to a policy without basic direction, coherence and well assessed goals.”⁵⁰⁵ It is certain that the Turkish factor played a decisive role in Greece's mismanagement of the Balkan crises and to make things worse, drove Athens to side with the aggressor Serbia.

3.1.2.1. The Turkish Factor

After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Turkish foreign policy regarding the Balkan region changed. Turkey started to pursue a foreign policy based on the interests of the Turkish and Muslim population in the region. Turkey claimed that the Muslim population was threatened by the Serbian and the Croatian expansionist policies and

⁵⁰² Tarık Oğuzlu, “The Latest Turkish Greek Détente: instrumentalist play for EU membership, or long-term institutionalist cooperation?”, **Cambridge Review of International Relations**, Vol.17, 2004, p. 346.

⁵⁰³ Tarık Oğuzlu, “How Encouraging the Latest Turkish Greek Détente?”, **Journal of the Contemporary European Studies**, Vol.12, 2004, p. 100.

⁵⁰⁴ George Pagoulatos, “Greece, The European Union and 2003 Presidency”, **Notre Europe**, December 2002, p. 15.

⁵⁰⁵ Kostas Ifantis, “Greece's Turkish Dilemmas: There and Back Again”, **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, Vol.5, 2005, p. 381.

Western states remained indifferent to these developments.⁵⁰⁶ Hence, to protect the rights of the Muslim population, Turkey focused on initiatives by the UN and the NATO. The Turkish military participation in the UN activities in this respect was criticized by both Serbia and Greece. They claimed that these acts of Turkey signaled Turkey's revisionist aims regarding the region, which depended on reestablishing the Ottoman legacy there.⁵⁰⁷ However, while Turkey conducted its policy through international organizations such as the UN, the NATO and the OSCE, it tried to avoid any act which could be understood as a sign of 'neo-Ottomanism'.⁵⁰⁸

In fact, the Balkan element is one of the main components of Turkish identity and foreign policy-making. The presence of large Muslim populations in Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia and their historical ties with Turkey effected the formation of Turkish foreign policy regarding the Balkan region. Moreover, due to domestic pressure, Turkey had to define itself as the protector of the Balkan Muslims. Hence, Turkey established bilateral and multilateral relations with the region. According to Yavuz, "The ethnic-cleansing of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Serb forces created a serious set of problems for Turkey".⁵⁰⁹ The fact that Serbian nationalist ideology identifies all Muslims, whether they are Albanian, Bosnian, Pomak, or Gypsies as 'Turks' made the Turkish public more sensitive to the premeditated destruction of the Bosnian Muslims.⁵¹⁰ Besides, a large number of Turks of Bosnian origins whose number is estimated between two or four million live in Turkey.⁵¹¹ The case of Bosnian Muslims was the first time in Republican Turkish history as Ankara considered the protection of Muslims outside its borders as an integral duty of its foreign policy.

For instance, establishment of a no-fly zone over Bosnia and limited military intervention as well as the lifting of the embargo decision partly were proposed by Turkey to the NATO in 1992. Turkey also activated the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to establish a contact group at the UN regarding the Bosnian issue.

⁵⁰⁶ Mesut Özcan, An overview to Turkey's policy in the Balkans and the Middle East in the 1990s, p. 32.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸ Mustafa Aydın, "Turkish Foreign Policy at the end of Cold War: Roots and dynamics", **Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yılığ**, Ankara, 2005, p. 25.

⁵⁰⁹ M.Hakan Yavuz, "Turkish identity and foreign policy in flux: The rise of Neo-Ottomanism", **Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol.7, 1998, p. 37.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹¹ Anastasakis, p. 52.

According to Yavuz, Turkey tried to mobilize the international organizations in order to support the Bosnian government and pursued the policy of US President Clinton's "strike and lift" option.⁵¹² At the end of its efforts, Turkish government realized that European actors remained inactive, and hence Turkey decided to send its own military forces to Bosnia and forced other members of the OIC to support this decision.⁵¹³ Turkey also developed its relations with Albania, the FYROM, Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania. Bulgaria was the only neighboring country among them, accommodating Turkish population about 800.000 people.⁵¹⁴ Contrary to Jirkov's period, Turkey established close relations with the post-communist Bulgarian regime and signed the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, Cooperation and Security with Bulgaria in 1992.⁵¹⁵ The close relations between Macedonia and Turkey also had a historical dimension since there is a Turkish community in Macedonia. However, there were more significant reasons for Macedonia's close relations with Turkey. Problematic Greek-Macedonian relations forced Macedonia to develop closer relations with Turkey.⁵¹⁶

Throughout the history, Albania had close relations with Turkey. There are Turkish citizens of Albanian origin in Turkey who have kept their connections with Albania. A kinship existed between the Muslim population in Albania and Turkey as well. However, political development of relations between Albania and Turkey also arose from Albania's problematic relations with Greece, due to the existence of Greek communities in Albania and Albanian communities in Greece and mutual territorial claims towards each other.⁵¹⁷ Moreover, Greeks were the largest minority in Southern Albania despite that their exact number was disputable between Greek and Albanian authorities.⁵¹⁸ The bilateral relations were deteriorated due to the Greek claims regarding treatment of the Greek minority in Southern Albania and accordingly

⁵¹² Yavuz, p. 37.

⁵¹³ Ibid., p. 38.

⁵¹⁴ Anastasakis, p. 53.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

⁵¹⁶ İlder Turan and Dilek Barlas, "Turkish-Greek Balance: A Key to Peace and Cooperation in the Balkans", **East European Quarterly**, Vol.32, Winter 1998, p. 481.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid., p. 480.

⁵¹⁸ Julie Kim, "Albania: A Country Background Report", **CRS Report for Congress**, The Library of Congress, June 2000, p. 4.

Albanian fear of irredentist Greek claims towards the Southern part of Albania, treatment of Albanian worker migrants in Greece and border clashes.⁵¹⁹

The rising power of Turkey as a political and military power in the Balkans by the beginning of 1990s was perceived as a Turkey's initiative to create an "Islamic Arch" in the region, particularly by Greece.⁵²⁰ Statements of Turkish Prime Minister then, Suleyman Demirel like "from Adriatic to China, a Turkish world" raised concerns in Russia, Greece and other Balkan countries.⁵²¹ Since the beginning of 1990s, Ozal started to follow an active policy based on Ottoman heritage in order to be leader of the Muslim and Turkic world.⁵²² Pointing out the developments in the Balkan region after the end of the Cold War, Ozal referred them as they "opened new horizons for Turkey"⁵²³ and emphasized the importance of this former Ottoman region, particularly emphasizing the Muslim population there. Ozal claimed that the vision of Ottomanism in terms of multireligious, multilingual and multinational system was the best solution for the region which was experiencing instability.⁵²⁴

3.1.2.2. Greece's Response to the Islamic Arch: An Orthodox Axis

Bosnian War stood out in the global agenda of the international community at the beginning of 1990s and the Balkan region turned into an area of power sharing struggle. At the same time, Greece began to pursue a policy towards the region different than its Western allies. While the EC was following a hard-line policy against

⁵¹⁹ Ibid. After the bilateral relations saw the lowest point in 1993 and 1994, relations between Albania and Greece started to improve again in 1995. Greek president Kostas Stephanopoulos visited Tirana on March 21, 1996 and signed a Treaty of Bilateral Friendship that signs the beginning of new era based on bilateral cooperation. For Further details see Julie Kim, Albania: A Country Background Report, p. 4.

⁵²⁰ Baskın Oran, **Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Yorumlar, Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2002, p. 513.

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² Paula Sandrin, "Turkish Foreign Policy after the End of Cold War: From Securitizing to Desecuritising Actor", **LSE European Institute Doctoral Discussion Papers**, 2009, p. 7.

⁵²³ Yılmaz Çolak, "Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: Collective memory and cultural pluralism in 1990s Turkey", **Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol.42, 2006, p. 592.

⁵²⁴ Ibid. According to Yavuz, neo Ottomanism has two dimensions as; "the rearticulation of Turkish nationalism and increased political and cultural tolerance for diversity as in the Ottoman past; the elimination of economic borders among the Balkan, Caucasian, and Middle Eastern countries, but respecting the political boundaries of the countries in the ex-Ottoman space." For further details see Yılmaz Çolak. Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: Collective memory and cultural pluralism in 1990s Turkey, p. 588.

Serbs during the War, Greece began to support Serbia due to its historical and cultural ties with Serbs and did not apply the embargo decisions against Serbs which was adopted by the EC.⁵²⁵ Hence, Greece's decision of not applying sanctions against Serbs due to both its decreasing economic performance and its policy in favor of Serbs for pragmatic reasons started to deteriorate its relations with the West. Greece was in rivalry with Turkey in the Balkan region since Turkey developed its military and economic relations with Albania, Bosnia and Macedonia, which were having problematic relations with Greece. Greece had to keep an 'Orthodox Axis' contrary to the 'Islam Axis' in the region and Russia and Serbia emerged out as the natural allies of that policy.⁵²⁶

After Papandreou came to power, he began to follow a hard-line policy towards the region, as on the one hand he pursued an uncompromising attitude towards the Macedonian issue, whereas on the other hand, he increased Greek support to Serbia. This situation not only raised Macedonian concern about the possibility of Greek-Serbian common plan against itself, but also caused condemnation of Greece by the international community since its policy caused the increase of instability in the Balkan region.⁵²⁷

Due to rising Turkish activism in the region and Albanian and Macedonian nationalism by the beginning of 1990s, Greece saw that Serbia and Greece were bounded with historical ties, since both countries were Orthodox and allies in Balkan and World Wars. Particularly, both countries had a common aim of preventing Turkish penetration into the Balkans and possible Bulgarian nationalism. Furthermore, the ties were also strong at the societal level in both countries. As Tachis Michas stated, "it was largely a bottom up phenomenon with deep sociological and cultural roots rather than an elite driven top-down events".⁵²⁸

Hence, Greece tried to establish a balance between its NATO obligations and its relations with Serbia. It did not condemn Serbian atrocities as the US and the EU did and rejected the use of force against Serbs until 1994 when Greek policy began to be hardened.⁵²⁹ While Western states saw the NATO intervention to Yugoslavia as

⁵²⁵ Firat, p. 33.

⁵²⁶ Ibid.

⁵²⁷ Ibid., p. 45.

⁵²⁸ Larrabee, p. 409.

⁵²⁹ Firat, p. 47.

legitimate and necessary because of Serbian hostilities, Greek media and public opinion viewed the intervention in a more sensitive way because of the traditional and historical affiliation with Serbs, despite that Greece is a NATO ally.⁵³⁰ Hence, this situation indicated that the existence of different cultural logics can have an impact on the political events.

Unlike the Western evaluation of the events in Bosnia and Kosovo, Greek understanding of events was the outcome of a specific historical and cultural relationship. Greece saw Serbia as a close ally while perceiving Albanians, who were migrant workers in Greece as closely linked with crime and instability.⁵³¹ Despite Greece is a NATO ally and a member of the EU, according to Brown and Theodossopoulos, the NATO intervention to Serbia created a perception in Greece that “ethnic self (NATO/Europe) appears to be at war with an ethnic friend (Serbia) on behalf of a mistrusted ethnic order (Albanians).”⁵³² On the other hand, the conflict between Greeks and Macedonians was serious indicating ethnic nationalism and irredentism. According to Danforth, “the desire to create ethnically pure and homogeneous nation states” was the reason of the conflict between Serbs, Croats and Muslim Bosnians as well.⁵³³ Milosevic’s discourse was based on the Greek reproduction that Serbia as a small country was resisting the global new order of America.⁵³⁴

The Greek affiliation with Serbia had also historical basis arising from the existence of Pan Orthodox sympathies. During the time of Serbian atrocities, Greece allowed Serbia to receive supplies in regardless of UN declaration of embargo.⁵³⁵ Since the Bosnian state was thought to be siding with Turkey and was viewed suspiciously for siding with Serbia, Greece thought that its security would be bolstered against Turkey as well as against countries that Turkey was having close relations with.⁵³⁶ Due to the threat perception from Turkey and other countries in the Balkan

⁵³⁰ Keith Brown, Dimitrios Theodossopoulos, “The Performance of Anxiety: Greek narratives of war in Kosovo”, *Anthropology Today*, Vol.16, February 2000, p. 8.

⁵³¹ Ibid.

⁵³² Ibid.

⁵³³ Loring M. Danforth, “Claims to Macedonian identity: the Macedonian question and the breakup of Yugoslavia”, *Anthropology Today*, Vol.9, August 1993, p. 3.

⁵³⁴ Ibid.

⁵³⁵ Turan and Barlas, p. 481.

⁵³⁶ Ibid.

region, siding with Serbia was seen as a counterbalance in the region. Besides, due to the historical and orthodox ties with Serbia, Greece became an active supporter of Serbian interests in the region, even though Serbia was accused of causing the tragedy in the region by the international community. At the end, Greece found itself isolated within the international community particularly within the EU.⁵³⁷

The existence of mutual distrust and suspicion between Greece and Turkey brought two outcomes. Firstly, any move by one party in the region which concerned both parties' interests was perceived by the other party as a step that should be responded. Secondly, both parties took preemptive actions against each other.⁵³⁸ According to Turan and Barlas, "the competitive relationship has not only aspired but expanded to cover areas which might have not been covered if the relationship were less or non-competitive".⁵³⁹ For a while, two loose axes emerged in the Balkans after the dissolution of Yugoslavia; one part was including Albania, Macedonia and Turkey and other part was including Greece, Serbia and Russia.⁵⁴⁰ According to Anastasakis, in the beginning of 1990s "Greek foreign policy was strongly influenced by a neo realist nationalist and populist approach with a propensity for pressure and bilateral action."⁵⁴¹ However, "Greek foreign policy appeared to be not so confident and less in tune with the international community as opposed to Turkey's which was more balanced and synchronized with the international community's policy."⁵⁴² Greece's relations with the EU were deteriorated as well as with other Balkan countries. On the contrary, Turkey managed to benefit from this situation by building bilateral relations with the region and following an active policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina while supporting multilateral actions in the region.⁵⁴³

⁵³⁷ Anastasakis, p. 52.

⁵³⁸ Turan and Barlas, p. 477.

⁵³⁹ Ibid., p. 480.

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁴¹ Anastasakis, p. 51.

⁵⁴² Ibid., p. 53.

⁵⁴³ Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR

GREEK FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY IN THE LATE 1990S: RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES

Following the earthquakes struck Istanbul and Athens successively in 1999, it initiated a dialogue period between the two countries whose people and governments have outstanding disputes. In this chapter, not only the role of seismic diplomacy is examined but also the role of other factors, constructive impact of the two foreign ministers, Ocalan affair and the new Greek foreign policy strategy as rebalancing relations with the West are also examined. The results put forward the role of those factors in the basis of developing rapprochement.

4.1. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES

Greek-Turkish relations is described as “one of the most difficult and sensitive issues for the ruling elite on both sides of the Aegean Sea.”⁵⁴⁴ Since the establishment of Greece in the 19th century, bilateral relations were mainly marked by mistrust and tension. However, there were also periods of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey.⁵⁴⁵ The first rapprochement took place between Kemal Ataturk and Venizelos in the 1930s.⁵⁴⁶ The second term was introduced by the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and his Turkish counterpart Turgut Ozal when they held a meeting in Davos, 1988 with the aim of establishing a dialogue process between the two sides.⁵⁴⁷ But, the Davos spirit expired in a short time since Papandreou government had to deal with financial scandals and Papandreou’s illness, whereas Ozal had to deal with internal party opposition and the issue of constitutional referendum.⁵⁴⁸ The last rapprochement in 1999 was motivated by a combination of factors including Greece’s

⁵⁴⁴ Mustafa Kutlay, “A Political Economy Approach to the Expansion of Turkish-Greek Relations: Interdependence or not?”, *Perceptions*, Spring-Summer 2009, p. 91.

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 92.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 93.

⁵⁴⁸ Geoffrey Pridham, “Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement”, *Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences*, edited by Dimitri Constans, Palgrave Macmillan, 1991, p. 85.

rebalancing of its relations with the West, the Greek Embarrassment following the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, constructive impact of the two foreign affairs ministers and changing societal perceptions.”⁵⁴⁹

4.1.1. Rebalancing Relations with the West: Greece’s Political Turn in the Late 1990s

Greece experienced a number of tensions with its Balkan neighbors except for the Serbia and with its Western allies including the US. However, by the mid-1990’s, Greek foreign policy began to shift to a more pragmatic direction, particularly after Simitis became the prime minister in 1996.⁵⁵⁰ Under Simitis’ leadership, Greek foreign policy started shifting from its traditional line in contrast to the earlier periods of leadership by Konstantinos Mitsotakis and Andreas Papandreu. The reasons behind this shift were varied. First of all, Greece became isolated from the region due to its policies until 1996 because it supported Serbs and followed an uncompromising attitude towards the FYROM contrary to the EU policy. Secondly, these policies caused some Balkan countries to develop closer relations with Turkey such as Macedonia and Albania.⁵⁵¹

In order to correct this negative situation, Greece started to use its EU membership and NATO membership in favor of its interests starting with the 1996. It started to use its economic advantages arising from its EU membership in the region as well as tried to be in harmony with the EU policy in order to solve regional problems and security related crises.⁵⁵² Moreover, the rapprochement in Greek-Turkish relations in the second half of the 1990s affected the two countries’ Balkan policies. Both Greece and Turkey realized that they shared a common interest for sustainable peace

⁵⁴⁹ Alexis Heraclides, “The Greek-Turkish Conflict: Towards Resolution and Reconciliation”, **Turkish-Greek Relations: The security dilemma in the Aegean**, edited by Mustafa Aydın, Kostas Ifantis Routledge, London, 2004, p. 77.

⁵⁵⁰ Stephen Larrabee, “Greece’s Balkan Policy in a new strategic era”, **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, Vol.5, September 2005, p. 410.

⁵⁵¹ Mehmet Buyukcolak, “Yunanistan’ın stratejik analizi: Soguk Savas sonrası dönemde Yunanistan’ın savunma politikaları, güvenlik stratejileri, askeri doktrini ve silahlı kuvvetleri”, **Türkiye’nin Komşuları**, ed. Mustafa Türkeş, İlhan Uzel, Imge Kitabevi, Ankara, 2002, p. 114.

⁵⁵² Ibid.

and stability in the region. This common interest increased the convergence and abolished the political rivalry in the region.

After the Dayton Agreement (1995), Greece developed a more balanced, multilateral and technocratic policy towards the Balkans and concentrated on establishing close economic relations with the region. After the Interim Agreement with the FYROM, economic and diplomatic relations were established. Similarly, relations with Albania were also developed after signing agreements which allowed the opening of Greek schools in Albania and Albanian immigrants' gaining of legal status in Greece.⁵⁵³

The Crete Balkan Summit in 1997 signified the multilateral aspect of Greek Balkan policy. During the NATO strikes to Yugoslavia in 1999, Greece was careful to keep a balance between its responsibilities as a NATO member and its public sensitivity. Thus, according to Anastasakis, "Greece tried to act as an intermediary between Serbian interests and the EU by arguing against the international isolation of the Serbian people and trying to keep the channels of communication open".⁵⁵⁴

With the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey tried to reestablish its relations with Serbia. However, Serbian actions in Kosovo deteriorated bilateral relations again. Due to the existence of Turkish population in Kosovo, Turkey supported the intervention of international peace forces in Kosovo to prevent a situation which occurred in Bosnia and also stated its willingness to participate in such a force. Turkey supported intervention of NATO to Kosovo by providing bases and aircraft as well as accepting refugees from Albania.⁵⁵⁵

Greece's situation during the Kosovo crisis was one of the most uncomfortable one since the Greek public opinion strongly opposed to NATO bombings over Serbia. However, Greece carefully managed this process and accordingly cooperated with its allies.⁵⁵⁶ Indeed, there was a certain objection of Greek public opinion against the NATO intervention to Kosovo and certain sympathy for Serbs existed stemming from

⁵⁵³ Othon Anastasakis, "Greece and Turkey in the Balkans: Cooperation or Rivalry?", **Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of Detente**, Ed. Ali, Carkoglu, Barry M. Rubin, Routledge, New York, 2015, p. 54.

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁶ Fotios Moustakis, Micheal Sheehan, "Greek Security Policy After the Cold War", **Contemporary Security Policy**, Vol.21, 2000, p. 105.

geopolitical, historical and cultural reasons. According to Sitara, it arose from, "mythological constructions and ideological stereotypes as the historical relationship with the orthodox Serbs and a nominally anti-imperialist ideological construction of profoundly nationalist orientations".⁵⁵⁷

In the beginning of the Kosovo crisis, Greece started taking measures in order to help financial problems of Albania and the FYROM. Total amount of the Greek humanitarian aid for the refugees from Albania and the FYROM was about 3 billion drachmas.⁵⁵⁸ Besides, the humanitarian relief operation (FOCUS) which was initiated by Greece, Switzerland and Russian Federation contributed to the end of the conflict. The initiative evaluated the impact of the conflict in terms of environment, public health and the economy in the area and gave assistance to the poor people of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, particularly in Kosovo and Metohia.⁵⁵⁹

Moreover, the events occurred in Kosovo such as ethnic cleansing, rising number of refugees and devastation of economies played an important role in terms of Greek involvement in the region. Greece started to prioritize stabilization of economic and political conditions in the region, particularly in the FYROM, Albania and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As a member of the EU and the NATO in the Balkan region, Greece started to take initiatives and coordinated with other EU member states for economic and political stability.

As Moustakis and Sheehan state, Greek policy had three pillars in the region including the maintenance of the existing borders, economic reconstruction and democratic stability.⁵⁶⁰ Accordingly, the Greek policy also involved engagement of the Balkan states into the Euro Atlantic alliance. Greece's participation in the EMU also increased its role in Southeastern Europe since a stable economy could play a more active role in the region. While Greece's economic involvement in the Balkan

⁵⁵⁷ Maria Sitara, "The relationship between science, ideology and politics in modern Greece: The case of scientific discourse during the Kosovo War", **1.st PhD Symposium on Social Science Research in Greece Panel: Popular Culture, Ideology and the Media**, p. 3, (26.04.2016), <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5c6d/e78efb7caa15d53fa6782d88a2b0487cb949.pdf>

⁵⁵⁸ Fotios Moustakis and Micheal Sheehan, "Greek Security Policy after the Cold War", **Contemporary Security Policy**, Vol.21, 2000, p. 105.

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid.

countries was rising, Thessaloniki also started to play an important role in the process due to its strategic location and infrastructural potentials.⁵⁶¹

Hence, after a difficult period (1992-1995), Greece started to pursue a multilateral policy in accordance with the EU, the OSCE, the NATO and the WEU. It started to play an active role in the transition process of its northern neighbors to democracy and free market economy. After normalization of its relations with Albania and the FYROM, Greece also started to follow respective policies towards Bosnia and Kosovo and actively joined peacekeeping operations in both Albania and Bosnia.⁵⁶² The Greek participation in military peace operation in the FYROM in May 1997 and NATO exercise in Albania in 1998 underlined Greek harmony in the process.⁵⁶³ Moreover, with the NATO and the EU enlargement in the region, Greece found a chance to materialize its own strategic aims through its role in the enlargement process, supporting EU involvement in the Balkans in order to secure peace in the region.⁵⁶⁴

Due to the situation in Kosovo, Greece and Turkey shared a common concern that the conflict could have a spillover effect over the whole region. Hence, the two countries accepted to cooperate on security issues concerning the southern Balkans. Greece also provided troops for the NATO Force in Kosovo (KFOR) and assisted refugees from Kosovo.⁵⁶⁵ After then, both countries became supporters of the current status quo as well as non-changeability of the borders in the Balkans.⁵⁶⁶ Indeed, Greece and Turkey accepted a multilateral approach and cooperated for the stability and the reconstruction of the region before 1999.⁵⁶⁷ Both Greece and Turkey became active supporters of multilateral actions through the EU, the UN, the NATO and the OSCE. To sum up, the two countries realized the importance of cooperation and interdependence in the region. Following the cooperation process in Kosovo, both Greece and Turkey decided to cooperate on bilateral issues related to economy, trade, tourism, environment, culture, multilateral cooperation and combating crime. In

⁵⁶¹ Ibid., p. 106.

⁵⁶² Theodore Couloumbis, Domestic sources of Greek Foreign Policy, (24.06.2016), <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=53485214AFB0269EE9FE91CEBF997E07?doi=10.1.1.392.9737&rep=rep1&type=pdf>, p. 7.

⁵⁶³ Ibid., p. 8.

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁵ Anastasakis, p. 55.

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁷ Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey, Greece, and the U.S. in a Changing Strategic Environment: Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Europe", **RAND**, 2001, p.5

addition to the signing of relevant agreements, the two countries also developed civil society initiatives.⁵⁶⁸

Moreover, use of soft power also gained importance in Greek foreign policy making. Since modernizers under the leadership of Kostas Simitis came to power in Greece in 1996, Greek foreign policy shifted towards a more cooperative one.⁵⁶⁹ According to Anastasakis, Kostas Simitis was “a pragmatic reformer committed to multilateralism and functional cooperation while his foreign minister George Papandreu was an enthusiastic supporter of Greek-Turkish reconciliation.”⁵⁷⁰

In order to end Greece’s diplomatic isolation, Simitis began to develop relations with Greece’s Balkan neighbors as well as with the EU. The agreement on Omonia Five with the Albanian government led to the improvement of bilateral relations with Albania.⁵⁷¹ In March 1996, the two countries signed a Friendship and Cooperation Agreement during the visit of Greek President Constantine Stephanopoulos to Trina, as the first visit by a Greek President to Albania.⁵⁷² The Agreement included initiatives regarding closer economic and military cooperation, regulation of the problems related to Greek minority in Albania and illegal Albanian immigration to Greece.⁵⁷³ According to this agreement, many Greek language schools would be opened and a Greek language faculty was to be established at the Gjirokaster University in Albania.⁵⁷⁴ In this direction, Greece began to recognize the status of Albanian migrants in exchange for Albanian support for fighting cross border crime, while Albania accepted opening Greek language schools in Southern Albania.⁵⁷⁵

In the meantime, the Kosovo crisis in 1999 was a serious test for the Simitis government, because NATO bombings to Serbia activated strong anti-Americanism and pro-Serbian sentiments within the Greek public.⁵⁷⁶ The majority of Greek population, almost 96 percent was opposing to the NATO bombings in Serbia.⁵⁷⁷

⁵⁶⁸ Anastasakis, p. 58.

⁵⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 55.

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁷¹ Larrabee, p. 410.

⁵⁷² Ibid.

⁵⁷³ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁴ Miranda Vickers, “The Greek Minority in Albania – Current Tensions”, **Balkans Series**, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, p. 4.

⁵⁷⁵ Larrabee, p. 410.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 411.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid.

Indeed, Simitis had to keep a balance between sensitivity of Greek public and its responsibilities to the NATO. At the end, despite strong opposition by the Greek public, Simitis government decided to support NATO air strikes to Serbia. Since then, particularly after Milosevic's death, Greece's policy towards Serbia began to be in accordance with the EU policy. Greece became the strongest supporter of Serbian democratization and its integration to the EU in the Union.⁵⁷⁸ The Greek support became more tangible when the two countries signed a Memorandum of Cooperation in 2010 to accelerate EU integration process of Serbia.⁵⁷⁹

In the second half of the 1990s, Greece had two main goals; shaping its foreign policy to guarantee its national priorities in the Balkan region and its relations with the EU and secondly, to create a more stable region around its borders.⁵⁸⁰ Hence, Greece was trying to be a reference model for the regional states while emphasizing its mediatory role. Greece voluntarily supported enlargement of the NATO and the EU towards the region for its national interests. Thus, according to Exadaktylos, "it is important to examine the so-called transformative power of the EU to comprehend the impact of the EU factor on the relaxation of a tightened foreign policy environment, making it possible for Greece to transform its own policy agenda".⁵⁸¹

According to Exadaktylos, while Greek foreign policy was identified with "hostility towards the neighboring states and a rhetorical, symbolic, nationalistic, formalistic and at times perochical and populist style of policy", a radical transformation occurred under the leadership of Kostas Simitis, who defined himself as a modernizer and a Europeanist.⁵⁸² The shift in Greek foreign policy showed itself as Greek involvement in multilateral institutions and initiatives such as the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP).⁵⁸³ According to Exadaktylos, Simitis' vision regarding Greek foreign policy towards the region was more pragmatic, problem

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁹ Snežana Janković, Friendship Greater than Diplomacy, Fostering and Backing a European Serbia, p.13, Interview with Szeana Jankovic, (24.06.2016), <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/images/stories/pdf/Snezana-Jankovic-Grcka.pdf>

⁵⁸⁰ Theofanis Exadaktylos, "Uncharted Waters: Greek Foreign Policy Agenda during the process of and in the aftermath of the EU Eastern Enlargement", **3rd Hellenic Observatory PhD Symposium: Contemporary Greece: Structures, Context and Challenges**, London, June 2007, p. 8.

⁵⁸¹ Ibid., p. 5.

⁵⁸² Ibid., p. 12.

⁵⁸³ Othon Anastasakis, Dimitar Bechev, Nicholas Vrousalis, "Greece and its Northern neighbours: Conflicts and Mutual Influences", **Greece in the Balkans: Memory, Conflict and Exchange**, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009, p. 4.

solving and an issue oriented one.⁵⁸⁴ Hence, one of the important characteristics of Greek foreign policy towards the Balkan region in the second half of the 1990s was the tendency for a multilateral foreign policy making rather than a bilateral one. Meanwhile, it is important to underline the role of Europeanization of foreign policy. This process involved removing of veto policies and rapprochement in bilateral relations.⁵⁸⁵

4.1.2. The Capture of Abdullah Ocalan and the Greek Embarrassment

As Karakatsanis describes, “the year 1999 marked a harsh swinging of the pendulum between enmity and friendship in Greek-Turkish relations”.⁵⁸⁶ The capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK was one of the most serious crises between Greece and Turkey that could have brought them to the brink of war.⁵⁸⁷ Even though majority of the crises between the two countries were related to the status of the Aegean Sea, this crisis had nothing to do with the Aegean.⁵⁸⁸ The Greek military and political authorities’ supporting policy for the PKK intensified Turkey’s worries about its national security and territorial integrity. It was partly eased when the PKK commander Semdin Sakik was captured in Syria and Abdullah Ocalan was captured in the Greek consulate in Kenya in 1999.⁵⁸⁹

The capture of these leaders revealed international connections of the PKK, including those with Greece. Naturally, the unveiled connection between the terrorist organization and the Greek authorities led to further escalation of tension between the two countries. However, appearance of Greece as a country assisting a declared terrorist organization, along with its failure to run its relations in a clandestine way prompted domestic opposition’s protest thereby paving the way for the dispersal of grey clouds over the Greco-Turkish relations in the days to come.⁵⁹⁰

⁵⁸⁴ Exadaktylos, p. 12.

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁶ Leonidas Karakatsanis, **Turkish Greek Relations: Rapprochement, Civil Society and the Politics of Friendship**, Routledge, New York, 2014, p. 189.

⁵⁸⁷ Bertrand, p. 3.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁹ Fuat Aksu, “Turkish Greek Relations from Conflict to Detente the Last Decade”, p. 17, (24.06.2016), http://www.turkishgreek.org/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=54&func=startdown&id=14

⁵⁹⁰ Firat, p. 63.

After the capture of Sakik in Syria, Ocalan had to leave the country as the political pressure of Turkey over Syria increased.⁵⁹¹ He stayed temporarily in Syria, Armenia, Russia, Iran, Italy and Greece. This process also revealed that a number of external actors were involved in the issue. Particularly, Greece made statements that they did not consider PKK as a terrorist organization and they respected their struggle in the context of human rights and democracy. While Turkey accused the Greek side of supplying logistical and economic support to the PKK and keeping PKK militants in its refugee camps, Greece denied its relations with Ocalan and his terrorist organization. Constantine Stephanopoulos (a former Greek President) stated in his book 'The Greek Paradox' that "Greece is involved in no malevolent action against Turkey. The assumptions that our country supports the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in an active way are unfounded and for this reason, Turkey could not find any standing proof to justify its accusations."⁵⁹²

Through adopting the motto of "my enemy's enemy is my friend", Greece planned to surround Turkey and tried to force Turkey to remain inactive in the Middle East. Thus, Greece tried to improve its bilateral relations with those countries that Turkey had problematic relations with.⁵⁹³ In this regard, Greek Defense Minister of the time, Gerassimos Arsenis, stated that they were cooperating with countries which were not members of the NATO, but living problems with Turkey.⁵⁹⁴ As a result of this policy, Greece signed a Defense Agreement with Syria in 1995, with Armenia in 1996 which included training of military personnel and sharing of intelligence.⁵⁹⁵ Both Syria and Armenia were accepted as following hostile policies towards Turkey in the MGSB Report of Turkey (Paper of National Security and Policy) dated back to October 31, 1997.⁵⁹⁶

Syria's support for the PKK increased after 1995 when Turkey started to harden its policy towards Syria, due to the disputes over Hatay and the issue of allocation of

⁵⁹¹ Aksu, p. 18.

⁵⁹² Ibid.

⁵⁹³ Buyukcolak, p. 86.

⁵⁹⁴ Alan Makovsky, "The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy", **SAIS Review**, Winter/Spring 1999, p. 7.

⁵⁹⁵ Buyukcolak, p. 87.

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid.

transboundary rivers' water.⁵⁹⁷ When Turkey and Israel had an agreement for military partnership in 1996, Syria decided to develop its relations with Greece and Armenia.⁵⁹⁸ After a short trip to Europe, Ocalan was captured in the Greek embassy in Nairobi, where he was protected by Greek officials. After then, the Greek role in the issue was covered by the media leading to a diplomatic crisis between Greece and Turkey. The crisis affected both Greek and Turkish domestic and foreign policies. According to Kotzias, "the Greek government in particular, suffered politically after the opposition's claims of amateurism, incompetence and weakness in dealing with Turkish aggressive policies."⁵⁹⁹

According to Kotzias, these forced trips of Ocalan pointed out what 'pax Americana' really meant.⁶⁰⁰ According to him, it was the American support for Turkey that forced Ocalan to leave Syria.⁶⁰¹ He was smuggled to Russia via Greece, however, when he was spotted there by the Israeli Intelligence agents, this information was passed to Turkish authorities and under the pressure from Turkey and the US, he was offered different destinations rather than Russia.⁶⁰² Similarly, European countries also refrained from damaging their relations with the US. Hence, Ocalan could not find asylum either in Italy or in Greece or in any Western country. That is why, on February 22, 1999, he decided to go to Nairobi with the help of Greek officers.⁶⁰³ However, when Ocalan was captured in Greek embassy in Nairobi, Greece had to accept the accusations of Turkey. According to Kotzias, "the government was for a period in the awkward position of receiving accusations equally from the Kurds and the Turks."⁶⁰⁴ In Greek view, the Turkish side exploited the situation in order to prove the Kurdish terrorism and to sentence Ocalan to death. However, although the death sentence was approved on November 25, 1999, Turkey seemed unwilling to carry out the decision.⁶⁰⁵ Similarly, after Turkish officials captured Ocalan in Greek embassy in

⁵⁹⁷ Mevlut Bulut, Turkey and The Alliance of Civilization, Master's Thesis, University of Vienna, June 2009, p. 62.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁹ Konstantin Kotzias, Greek Turkish Relations, *The Free Library*, 2014, (24.06.2016), <https://www.thefreelibrary.com/GREEK-TURKISH+RELATIONS.-a062204899>

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁰¹ Ibid.

⁶⁰² Global plot that lured Kurds' hero into trap, *The Guardian*, 21 February 1999, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/feb/21/kurds1>, (26.04.2016).

⁶⁰³ Kotzias, 2014.

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid.

Nairobi, Turkey accused Greece of supporting terrorism. Even Suleyman Demirel, the Turkish President then, called Greece as an 'outlaw state' and suggested to include Greece in the list of countries supporting terrorism.⁶⁰⁶ Yet, Turkey did not adopt concrete measures to punish Greece and did not turn it into a legal issue against Greece. This was most probably since Turkey gave great importance to its membership in the EU.⁶⁰⁷

According to Akalin, in line with the "my enemy's enemy is my friend" motto, Greece also followed a policy based on toleration of terrorist activities in its territory.⁶⁰⁸ Relatedly, the annual reports on terrorism by the US State Department, not only described Greece as a hosting state for international terrorist attacks, but also emphasized Greece's failure for taking measures against combating terrorism and tolerating the terrorist groups, particularly the ones against Turkey's interests.⁶⁰⁹ For instance, the camps in Lavrion and the Greek part of Cyprus were used for political indoctrination and explosive training.⁶¹⁰ Similarly, Abdullah Ocalan also expressed his appreciation for Greek support. In his interview with Greek Cypriot newspaper, *Simerini*, on September 13, 1998, he expressed his thanks to Greece and Greek Cypriot people for their support.⁶¹¹ In another interview with Mega TV, on September 15, 1998, he proposed a joint military doctrine among Middle Eastern countries including Greece against Turkey similar to the one between Greece and Greek Cypriot administration in Southern Cyprus.⁶¹² He added that even if Greece was not a convenient country for conducting PKK activities against Turkey geographically, they would start to establish training camps in Southern Cyprus by August 1994.⁶¹³ Similarly, it is no coincidence that Ocalan was carrying a Southern Cyprus passport when he was caught in February, 1999.⁶¹⁴ This situation also explains Ocalan's choice of Greece to seek asylum when he was forced to leave Syria in October 1998.

⁶⁰⁶ Gulden Ayman, "The Dynamics of Conflict and Cooperation in Greek Turkish Relations: A Comparative Analysis," p. 20.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁸ Hakkı Akalın, *On the Way to Another War*, Net Ofset Matbaacılık, Ankara, 1999, p. 171.

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁶¹⁰ <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/SDE.htm>, (26.04.2016).

⁶¹¹ Akalın, p. 174.

⁶¹² Ibid.

⁶¹³ Ibid., p. 175.

⁶¹⁴ Fikret Bila, Greece becomes an accomplice to Turkey's coup attempt, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/greece-becomes-an-accomplice-to-turkeys-coup-attempt.aspx?pageID=517&nID=109243&NewsCatID=586>, (02.02.2007).

PKK was conducting its operations in Greece through two ERNK (PKK's propaganda wing, *National Liberation Front of Kurdistan*) offices, two Kurdistan Committees, one Kurdistan Cultural Center and a Kurdistan Red Crescent Office that were all subsidiary wings of the PKK.⁶¹⁵ Through these offices, PKK founded a network in Greece that helped its logistical and operational needs for its activities in Turkey.⁶¹⁶ On April 5, 1994, PKK opened a representation office in Athens called as ERNK Representation in Athens and the Balkans.⁶¹⁷ Many Greek politicians were present in the ceremony such as Panayiotis Sgouridis as Deputy Speaker of the Greek Parliament and four other members of parliament including Dimitris Vounatsos, Michaelis Galaneanos, Giannis Spathopoulos and Maria Mahera Haralambidis.⁶¹⁸ Similarly, many Greek politicians, journalists and retired generals visited PKK camps in Syria and also gave joint press conferences in the Bekaa valley.⁶¹⁹

In addition, two magazines of PKK started to be published in Greek; the Kurdish Report and Foni Tou Kurdistan (The voice of Kurdistan).⁶²⁰ PKK also distributed these magazines in Syria, Lebanon and Northern Iraq for propaganda purposes. Besides, the Greek media published articles, interviews and reports supporting the PKK activities. Moreover, PKK militants were trained in Greece for conducting terrorist attacks in Turkey.⁶²¹ Since the middle of 1994, many PKK militants expressed that they were trained for bomb attacks and sabotage techniques in these camps with the support of Greek authorities.⁶²²

According to statements by the captured militants, one of these training camps was established on Evia Island to the North of Athens and the other one was established around the town of Agrinion.⁶²³ Besides them, Lavrion Refugee Camp was used by PKK militants coming from Europe for theoretical training on political and military

⁶¹⁵ Akalin, p. 175.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid., p. 176.

⁶¹⁸ Ibid.

⁶¹⁹ Magdalena, Kirchner, **Why States Rebel: Understanding State Sponsorship of Terrorism**, Barbara Budrich Publishers, Toronto 2016, p.182. There were contacts between Ocalan, while he was staying in Syria and Lebanon, and the Greek Government under the head of Papandreou during 1981-89. Relatedly, a Greek delegation including several parliament members, press members and Prime Minister Papandreou's adviser Haralambidis visited Ocalan in Lebanon on October 17, 1988. For further details, see Hakki Akalin, *On the Way to Another War*, p. 180.

⁶²⁰ Akalin, p. 178.

⁶²¹ Ibid.

⁶²² Ibid.

⁶²³ Ibid.

issues.⁶²⁴ Besides, the camp was a logistic center for the militants between Europe and Turkey.⁶²⁵ The camp was also allowed to use for organizing fund raising activities by Greece. The illegal immigration to Europe via Greece was one of the main financial sources of the PKK. According to Akalın, “extortion of money from asylum seekers and illegal immigrants during their temporary stay in Greece’s refugee treatment camps is also another pitiless method of fund raising of the PKK.”⁶²⁶ The Patras Harbour of Greece which operates ferry services between Italy and Greece also became a center for human trafficking activities of PKK.⁶²⁷

After strict measures against the PKK in France and Germany in 1993, in their press statements, Government’s Spokesman Venizelos and Foreign Minister Pangalos, described PKK’s activities as “a struggle for independence”.⁶²⁸ Greek support for the PKK also became visible in its refugee policy.⁶²⁹ While Greece accepted illegal immigrants asking for asylum, mostly of Kurdish origin from Turkey in order to manipulate them for propaganda activities against Turkey, it refused immigrants coming from Iraq, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Srilanka etc.⁶³⁰ Even, it was also claimed that the Greek Orthodox Church funded Kurdish rebels while the head of the church, Archbishop Christodoulos denied the accusations and claimed that they only supplied food to Kurdish refugees and nothing more.⁶³¹ The Greek government’s support for the PKK intensified when the government permitted the PKK to open an official representation office in Athens as “PKK Representation of Balkans” on April 30, 1998.⁶³² Akalın points out that, this was for the first time that the PKK had opened an official representation under its own name in another country.⁶³³

Ocalan was caught nearby the Greek embassy in Nairobi of Kenya in February 1999 and brought back to Turkey by the Turkish Special Forces. While the Greek government’s hawkish wing was disappointed, Turkey found an opportunity to prove

⁶²⁴ Ibid.

⁶²⁵ Hürriyet, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/pkk-teror-okulu-39068660>, (19.03.1999).

⁶²⁶ Akalın, p. 179.

⁶²⁷ Hürriyet, 19 Mart 1999.

⁶²⁸ Akalın, p.180.

⁶²⁹ Ibid.

⁶³⁰ Ibid., p.181.

⁶³¹ Paul, Wood, Greece dogged by Ocalan affair, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/287232.stm>, (27.02.1999).

⁶³² Akalın, p.181.

⁶³³ Ibid.

its long-time claims for “a European country’s support to the terrorist groups in Turkey”.⁶³⁴ The Turkish President Demirel called Greece as a “Rogue State” and stated that Greece violated the provisions of international law and took its place among the countries supporting terrorism.⁶³⁵ He added that if Greece did not change its policy, Turkey would apply its legitimate rights in accordance with the principles of the UN.⁶³⁶ He underlined that “Greece which is among the greatest supporters of PKK should be added to the list of countries that support terrorism... Turkey would use its legitimate right of self-defense which results from the international laws if Greece did not stop these actions”.⁶³⁷

When Ocalan was captured in the Greek consulate in Nairobi, the links between the Greek intelligence services and PKK were revealed. According to Karakatsanis, this event also indicated “the existence of a parallel political realm in Greece... aligned behind the patriotic bloc, where operating in the name of the state but not necessarily in line with official government decisions”.⁶³⁸ After Ocalan’s capture in the Greek embassy, the problem for the Greek government under the leadership of Simitis, who represented the modernist and European side of the PASOK Party, was keeping the issue as a secret in order to avoid mobilization of nationalist and anti-Turkish sentiments in the party. Pangalos stated that “the fundamental question was to find out whether Greece should or should not grant Ocalan political asylum; the answer was no because it would have hurt the Kurdish cause, the cause of security, stability and peace in the region and would have turned the Kurdish question into a Greek Turkish dispute”.⁶³⁹ Hence, Greece decided to transfer him to Nairobi as the first step before other South African destinations.⁶⁴⁰

Ocalan’s press statements during his trial also revealed how he received assistance from the Greek Intelligence Service (EYP) and Greek government after he had to flee from Syria.⁶⁴¹ As a response to domestic reactions in Greece, Simitis

⁶³⁴ Ibid., p. 182.

⁶³⁵ Sami Kohen, Turks take hardened stance after Ocalan, **The Christian Science Monitor**, February 26, 1999.

⁶³⁶ Aksu, p. 19.

⁶³⁷ Ibid.

⁶³⁸ Karakatsanis, p. 189.

⁶³⁹ Roberto, Aliboni, Daniela, Pioppi, “The Ocalan Affair Revisited”, **The International Spectator**, Volume 35, July-September 2000, p. 43.

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁴¹ Aksu, p. 21.

government explained that the situation had gone beyond their initiatives and they would punish those who were responsible for the issue. As a result of this statement, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theodore Pangalos, Minister of Internal Affairs, Alexos Papadopoulos and the Minister of Public Order, Philippos Petsalnikos had to resign.⁶⁴² The Report of Attorney of Athens on the issue emphasized that “this action has caused Greece to stand in a very difficult position and it is only natural for the Turkish population to resent Greece and for tension to be built between the two countries.”⁶⁴³ According to Ayman, “While Turkey was debating how these acts could be brought up to international platforms, the Simitis government moved fast to clean the debris of the Öcalan affair”.⁶⁴⁴ Hence, the crisis also gave Simitis an opportunity to remove the officers in PASOK who supported the policies against Turkey and hence he was able to form a new group.⁶⁴⁵ He used this event to remove the nationalist-populist figures from the party who were involved in the crisis and opened the way for modernization.⁶⁴⁶ Besides, during the crisis, the New Greek Prime Minister Simitis faced a difficult situation as balancing between the old left wing and the modernist wing of the PASOK. According to Kotzias, “many old supporters of the late Andreas Papandreou, Greece’s long serving populist leader have portrayed the rebel Kurds as noble guerrillas fighting for independence from Turkey just as Greeks did in the nineteenth century”.⁶⁴⁷

Following the crisis, the official Greek policy was based on supporting Kurdish independence while at the same time condemning terrorism. Kotzias points out that, “Papandreu is less sharp and punchy than Pangalos and members of the ruling party PASOK often called him ‘georgaki’ a rather patronizing diminutive”.⁶⁴⁸ However, being foreign affairs minister of Greece meant a difficult test particularly in terms of the relations with Turkey and the EU. Hence, the Kosovo Crisis was the first serious exam of Papandreou to pass.⁶⁴⁹ Simitis thought that he could restore the international

⁶⁴² Ibid.

⁶⁴³ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁴ S. Güliden Ayman, “Springtime in the Aegean”, *Privateview*, Spring 2000, p. 56.

⁶⁴⁵ Aksu, p. 23.

⁶⁴⁶ Gizem Çakmak, “Greek -Turkish Relations in the post Helsinki Period: Is Europe a framework providing détente?”, p. 12.

⁶⁴⁷ Kotzias, p. 192.

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid.

image of Greece which was severely damaged during the crisis and to reshape its foreign policy.⁶⁵⁰ Agnantopoulos also states that “Papandreou held a genuine belief in the possibility of Greek-Turkish reconciliation and actively pursued a policy of rapprochement that focused on cooperation in non-controversial issues together with his Turkish counterpart Ismail Cem”.⁶⁵¹ He adds that appointment of George Papandreou as a foreign affairs minister after the Ocalan crisis was a major reason behind the Helsinki U-turn.⁶⁵²

As a sum, after the Ocalan Crisis, the Greek government decided to improve relations with Turkey while excluding the Kurdish issue from the bilateral relations. Particularly, the national aim of joining the Eurozone forced the government to follow a policy in harmony with its EU allies. Simultaneously, Greece tended to cooperate with its Western partners in the Kosovo crisis. Leaders of both countries evaluated this crisis as a warning and realized the necessity of engaging cooperation based on mutual trust. Hence, Turkey was satisfied with the steps taken by the Greek government and supported Simitis’ efforts to improve the Greek-Turkish relations.⁶⁵³

4.1.3. Constructive Impact of the Two Foreign Affairs Ministers

The reconciliation process between the two countries was strongly supported by the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey, George Papandreou and Ismail Cem.⁶⁵⁴ Çakmak states that the reconciliation at governmental level started with the appointment of the moderate George Papandreou as the Greek foreign affairs minister who adopted a similar standing to that of his Turkish counterpart Ismail Cem.⁶⁵⁵ Kinzer describes Papandreou as a conciliatory leader who believed in a chance to change the bilateral relations positively and in that respect he had similar characteristic with his

⁶⁵⁰ Ioannis Grigoriadis, “The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek Turkish Relations”, London School of Economics and Political Science, **Hellenic Observatory, 1st PhD Symposium on Modern Greece: "Current Social Science Research on Greece"**, London, 21st June 2003, p. 3.

⁶⁵¹ Apostolos Agnantopoulos, “The Europeanization of national foreign policy: explaining Greek support for Turkey’s EU accession”, **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, Vol.13, 2013, p. 79.

⁶⁵² Ibid.

⁶⁵³ Aksu, p. 23.

⁶⁵⁴ Stavros Mavrogenis and Ilan Kelman, “Perceptions of Greece-Turkey Disaster Diplomacy: Europeanization and the Underdog Culture”, **Balkanistica**, Vol.26, 2013, p. 92.

⁶⁵⁵ Çakmak, p. 5.

Turkish counterpart, Ismail Cem.⁶⁵⁶ According to him “both men are foreign educated intellectuals who shun demagogic statements”.⁶⁵⁷

According to Lindsay, the mutual dialogue between Cem and Papandreou for redefinition of mutual interests and to find concrete measures in non-contentious areas were the root causes that lied in the recent rapprochement.⁶⁵⁸ At the heart of these dialogues, the necessity of mutual cooperation for more stable and peaceful Balkans, preservation of existing borders and engagement of unstable states to the EU laid. Hence, both emphasized the need for measures to promote closer relations between the two states. The two leaders realized that cooperation between them served their purposes to a larger extent than competition. The policy making based on zero-sum understanding was to be replaced by a policy of concentration on mutual gains at regional levels in the Balkans, Mediterranean, the EU and the NATO.⁶⁵⁹ As Nora and Anastasakis state “Over the course of the past 15 years, this undoubtedly created a dynamic and multifaceted bilateral relationship and allowed the two countries to look at their common border not exclusively as a dividing line but as a space for cooperation”.⁶⁶⁰

The cooperation between Greece and Turkey under the leadership of two foreign affairs ministers began by April 1999, two months before the earthquakes that shook both countries.⁶⁶¹ When the Kosovo crisis began to threaten the stability of the Balkan region and was followed by the waves of the refugees, the foreign ministers of both countries decided to cooperate and had a phone conversation on 4th April, 1999 in order to coordinate humanitarian aid.⁶⁶² On 24th May, 1999, the Turkish foreign affairs minister, Cem wrote a letter to his Greek counterpart Papandreou in order to widen their cooperation in other areas such as combating terrorism.⁶⁶³ A month later,

⁶⁵⁶ Stephen Kinzer, **Earthquakes Help Warm Greek-Turkish Relations**, The New York Times, 13.09.1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/13/world/earthquakes-help-warm-greek-turkish-relations.html>

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁸ James Ker Lindsay, “Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: The Impact of Disaster Diplomacy?”, **Cambridge Review of International Relations**, Vol.14, p. 228.

⁶⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁰ Nora Fisher Onar, Othon Anastasakis, “Sustaining Engagement? On Symmetries and Asymmetries in Greek-Turkish relations”, **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, Vol.13, 2013, p. 401.

⁶⁶¹ Ayten Gündoğdu, “Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of Transformation?”, **Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal**, Vol.5, 2001, p. 107.

⁶⁶² Mavrogenis and Kelman, p. 81.

⁶⁶³ Ibid.

Papandreou answered that letter by accepting the proposal and included the issues such as economy, tourism, culture, environment, organised crime and trade in the agenda. With that spirit, first round of discussions was held in Ankara and Athens in July 1999 and it was underlined that the role of resolution culture by the Greek decision makers and the issues of mutual interest could lead to a win-win process.⁶⁶⁴ As Mavrogenis and Kelman stated, “their main goal was to end the zero-sum game culture that was long established in Greek foreign policy.”⁶⁶⁵ The exchanged letters showed the change in the Greek perception of Turkey. As Papandreou stated, “both Greece and Turkey have rich cultural traditions. Building a multicultural Europe means that we need to enhance our cultural identities and understand each other’s specificity”.⁶⁶⁶

Other attempts for cooperation before the earthquakes included the decision to create South-eastern European Brigade (SEEBRIG) for peacekeeping operations in the Balkans in 1998, and a military cooperation during the NATO operation to Kosovo in 1999.⁶⁶⁷ For the first time in history, Turkish military planes flew over Greece in order to carry humanitarian aid to Kosovo. Hence, as Gundogdu explained, a deeper process forced the two countries to come together which affected by the transformation of Europe and the global politics, the end of the Cold War and the need to respond to the new political realities.⁶⁶⁸ During the Kosovo Crisis the two foreign affairs ministers decided on the establishment of NGOs in Greece, Turkey and particularly in Cyprus to increase mutual contact and initiated a series of meetings at foreign ministerial level to collaborate in tourism, environment, culture and education fields.⁶⁶⁹ These efforts gained momentum after the earthquakes as a result of seismic diplomacy.⁶⁷⁰

Hence, the disaster or the seismic diplomacy is not the real initiator of the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, but it is the catalyst that contributed the process.⁶⁷¹ As Kinzer stated, “Greek-Turkish relations had been improving slowly for

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁶ Gundogdu, p. 107.

⁶⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 108.

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁹ Eleni Papagaroufali, “Disasters that Matter: Gifts of Life in the Arena of International Diplomacy”, **Outlines Critical Practice Studies**, No.2, 2010, p. 49.

⁶⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁷¹ Ker Lindsay, p. 230.

several months, but it took earthquakes in both countries to push them towards a more heart-felt friendship”.⁶⁷²

4.1.4. The Seismic Diplomacy: Changing Societal Perceptions

As Alexander Welt states, “state identities and interests are important parts constructed by social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics.”⁶⁷³ According to him, people’s actions are based on meanings and meanings are based on interactions and so the ground of international relations is socially constructed, not given.⁶⁷⁴ He adds that “a world in which identities and interests are learned and sustained by inter subjectively grounded practice, by what states think and do, is one in which anarchy is what states make of it”.⁶⁷⁵ As Gündoğdu states, social constructivism plays a crucial role in the emergence of the history of negative images, prejudices and stereotypes about the ‘other’.⁶⁷⁶ Besides, it should be also taken into consideration that both countries gained their independence as a result of the liberty wars in which they fought against each other. According to Öniş and Yılmaz, the extent of the improved Greek-Turkish relations in the late could be measured through two elements; public opinion on both sides and the defense expenditures.⁶⁷⁷ The nature of the public opinion on both sides was one of the serious obstacles to improvement of bilateral relations. It seemed difficult to overcome the existing bilateral distrust and deep-rooted stereotypes.

In this context, the capture of Ocalan in the Greek consulate in Nairobi, caused a serious reaction by Turkish public and Greece was highly criticized for giving support to terrorism. However, contrary to expectations, this crisis led to changes in societal perceptions in both sides with the elimination of hardliners from the Greek government. As Gündoğdu suggests, “the elimination of the hardliners gave a strong hand to the moderates within the ruling PASOK party, who favored rethinking Greek-

⁶⁷² Kinzer, 1999

⁶⁷³ Maja, Zehfuss, **Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 39.

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 40.

⁶⁷⁶ Gündoğdu, p. 108.

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 140.

Turkish relations and avoiding other crises in order to ensure Greece's further integration with EU".⁶⁷⁸ According to Ayman, "this resulted in strengthening of those within PASOK, who believed that Greece's political profile could be improved only by following legal rules and norms governing international relations".⁶⁷⁹ This change towards Turkey in Greek politics was also reflected in a more positive perception of Turkey by the Greek public.

The earthquakes which hit both countries in September 1999 also contributed to a positive environment among the two societies and led the people of two countries to change their historical perception vis-à-vis each other.⁶⁸⁰ On August 17, 1999, the Marmara region of Turkey was struck by a strong earthquake killing over 18000 people and left 200 thousand people homeless in the most populated and industrialized region of Turkey.⁶⁸¹ Eighty countries including Greece which was one of 'historical enemies' of Turkey responded it with immediate and effective humanitarian assistance with thousands of Greek citizens and members of NGOs started blood transfusion even body organs campaign.⁶⁸² Following that disaster, a month later, on September 7, 1999, the northern urban area of Athens was hit by a series of earthquakes which caused the death of 150 people and devastated hundreds of houses and industrial buildings.⁶⁸³ This time, Turkish people and their government responded it with prompt assistance.

Both attempts made by civil society and NGOs after the disasters were represented as the cases of seismic diplomacy. During the whole year, the media on both countries placed emphasis on the brotherly responses and improving relations which was initiated by the civil societies of both countries.⁶⁸⁴ The earthquake disasters became a bridge between the government and the people.⁶⁸⁵ After the earthquakes, the media on both sides challenged the dominant discourse of 'enemy' and instead supported activities of civil society. As Mavrogenis and Kelman stated perceptions

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 110.

⁶⁷⁹ Ayman, p. 56.

⁶⁸⁰ Gündoğdu, p. 106.

⁶⁸¹ Eleni Papagaroufali, "Disasters that Matter: Gifts of Life in the Arena of International Diplomacy", **Outlines Critical Practice Studies**, No.2, 2010, p. 43.

⁶⁸² Ibid.

⁶⁸³ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 44.

⁶⁸⁵ Mavrogenis and Kelman, p. 90.

and views of the 'other' took place "with far more positive coverage than in the previous generation."⁶⁸⁶ On the other hand, the shift in media discourse also gave chance to leaders to expand the cooperation. Mavrogenis and Kelman suggest that "to a large extent, they were pushed forward at a pace faster than they would have liked, which had the potential for derailing the entire rapprochement process."⁶⁸⁷

Therefore, natural disasters may turn out as an important catalyst for improving bilateral relations. As Comfort explains, "the challenge is to use that opportunity to guide actions at micro level of disaster management so they will support and to substantive change at the macro level of greater cooperation among nations previously in conflict as they discover common goals in the reduction of risk or response to disaster."⁶⁸⁸ Mavrogenis and Kelman suggest that "disaster diplomacy is one such topic that examines the potential for disaster related actions to trigger political changes".⁶⁸⁹ According to Papagaroufali, "disasters are social constructions, defined by existing, politically and economically informed cultural norms."⁶⁹⁰ The mass destruction and loss of life as the results of disasters bring up the implementation of universal norms and values and question of mutual perceptions at public level. As the sudden need of external assistance in the disaster region requires cooperation, disasters also hold a potential for positive change in relations between states that live in climate of distrust.⁶⁹¹ She also adds that within framework of laws and norms that govern the international community, disaster reduction provides a common focus for nations that confront shared risk.⁶⁹² Since the impacts of disasters occur at regional levels, having shared risk brings common awareness and responsibility with it. All the steps taken in this manner through mutual collaboration and interaction are called as disaster diplomacy.⁶⁹³

In the case of Greek-Turkish relations, the earthquakes became a catalyst for social change to overcome the mutual negative perception which led the two nations

⁶⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 94.

⁶⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁸ Louise K. Comfort, "Disaster: Agent of Diplomacy or Change in International Relations", **Cambridge Review of International Affairs**, Vol.14:1, p. 291.

⁶⁸⁹ Mavrogenis and Kelman, p. 75.

⁶⁹⁰ Papagaroufali, p. 47.

⁶⁹¹ Comfort, p. 277.

⁶⁹² Ibid., p. 293.

⁶⁹³ Ibid., p. 292.

to live in a world of mistrust.⁶⁹⁴ As Mavrogenis and Kelman stated, particularly in Greece, there is an ‘underdog national culture’ through the construction of the image of ‘the other’ which is based on introversion, xenophobia and conspiracy theories. The ethnocentric and nationalistic behaviour also has had an impact on foreign policy making, particularly while addressing critical national issues.⁶⁹⁵ The existence of that underdog culture prevented consolidation of previous rapprochement attempts.⁶⁹⁶ However, the social empathy at public level following the earthquakes forced political leaders to consider more moderate political actions.⁶⁹⁷

The unusual warming relations between Greece and Turkey after the destructive earthquakes which hit Istanbul and Athens successively raised expectations in regard to the improvement of Turkish-Greek relations.⁶⁹⁸ As Bahcheli states public opinion in Greece and Turkey was the driving force behind improvement of bilateral relations and played a decisive role.⁶⁹⁹ After the earthquakes, the Greek and Turkish media started to make broadcastings of ordinary citizens and the voluntarily response of the Greek people and government in order to help earthquake victims positively influenced both Turkish public and government.⁷⁰⁰ During the following weeks, both Turkish and Greek media gave headlines of friendship which was initiated by public and the NGOs. Bahcheli described the condition as “the enthusiastic and generous response of the Greek people and government to assist Turkey’s earthquake victims struck a positive chord among the Turkish public and Ankara”.⁷⁰¹

Therefore, it was the impact of the disaster itself which led to a process of transformation that made them so important.⁷⁰² As Lindsay states; “disaster diplomacy is a process if citizen diplomacy that has legitimized and generated popular support for an official process that had already been put in place several months earlier.”⁷⁰³

⁶⁹⁴ Mavrogenis and Kelman, p. 76.

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 79.

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁷ Şuhnaz Yılmaz and Ziya Öniş, “Greek-Turkish Relations, Rhetoric or Reality”, **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol.123, 2008, p. 129.

⁶⁹⁸ Tozun Bahcheli, “The Potential for Conflicts in Greek-Turkish Relation”, (24.06.2016), www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool, p. 1.

⁶⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁰¹ Ibid.

⁷⁰² Ker Lindsay, **Crisis and Conciliation: A Year of Rapprochement Between Greece and Turkey**, I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd., 2007, p. 70.

⁷⁰³ Ker Lindsay, p. 216.

Comfort adds that “the extraordinary influx of money, food, medicine, tents and volunteers from communities in Greece to the disaster devastated cities of Turkey following the Marmara earthquake on 17 August 1999 illustrates this concept in practice.”⁷⁰⁴

As Lindsay states “within 24 hours of the start of the fund raising effort the Greek people had donated 24 million drachmas.”⁷⁰⁵ However, the most surprising aid campaign was undertaken by the Greek Orthodox Church as the former advocate of anti-Turkish feelings and announced that the collections of Sunday services would be used for disaster relief.⁷⁰⁶ While the Bishop of the island of Rhodes led a campaign for humanitarian aid, the Prefecture of Kefallinia and Ithaki opened bank accounts for the victims.⁷⁰⁷ Besides, the municipalities of Athens, Thessaloniki, Piraeus, Patras and Iraklion led the foundation of a coordinating unit, named as *Operation Solidarity*, in Athens.⁷⁰⁸ As Lindsay explains “to a country that had long believed that Greece and the Greeks sought to destabilize the Turkish state, the pictures of massive amounts of aid now being collected for their benefit at a time of weakness proved to be a watershed in their perceptions at their neighbors.”⁷⁰⁹ He adds that “by now, the spirit of friendship that had been developing between the people was becoming a tidal force”.⁷¹⁰ It was time to build mutual cooperation on the basis of spirit of solidarity and to leave bad memories behind.⁷¹¹ The Greek daily newspaper Eleftherotypia made news of it and pointed the extent of friendship that Turkish and Greek people reached and how the earthquakes served the breakdown of the mutual prejudices.⁷¹² The newspaper also called the leaders of both countries to support the warmth in relations and sign of a non-aggression pact without the use of a mediator.⁷¹³

⁷⁰⁴ Comfort, p. 282.

⁷⁰⁵ Ker Lindsay, p. 221.

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁷ Eugenia, Vathakou, “The autopoiesis of conflict transformation: an example of a ‘butterfly effect’ in Greek-Turkish relations”, **Territorial Conflicts in World Society: Modern Systems Theory, International Relations and Conflict Studies**, edited by Stephen Stetter, Routledge, 2007, p. 67.

⁷⁰⁸ Ker Lindsay, p. 221.

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 222.

⁷¹⁰ Ibid., p. 224.

⁷¹¹ Ker Lindsay, p. 71.

⁷¹² Ker Lindsay, p. 225.

⁷¹³ Ibid.

Koukoudakis also adds that friendship groups and other contact groups and the media helped spreading the feeling of mutual gratitude within their own public.⁷¹⁴ During the whole year, both Turkish and Greek media spoke of the Greeks' friendly response to the disaster victims. Gundogdu adds that "they spoke of an unexpected process of —improving relations between the two —historical enemies and presented the —Greek-Turkish rapprochement as the product of —seismic diplomacy, initiated by the —peoples of both countries after the earthquakes."⁷¹⁵ Most importantly, politicians in both countries supported the idea that the NGOs have to be independent from politics and focus on their roles, developing the citizen diplomacy.⁷¹⁶ On the Greek side, two special agencies, the General Directorate for International Development (YDAS) and the Committee on NGOs were established. The Greek government supported the collaboration of the Greek NGOs with their Turkish counterparts.⁷¹⁷

As the interaction increased between Greece and Turkey, proliferation of pro-rapprochement groups and movements occurred. The Davos spirit which was led by Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and his Greek counterpart Andreas Papandreou in Davos by 1988 failed since it was seen as a top down approach of the leaders by the public. On the contrary, after the earthquakes of August-September 1999, both Turkish and Greek people supported voluntarily the improvement of bilateral relations.⁷¹⁸ Koukoudakis suggests that this rapprochement process between Greece and Turkey was much more hopeful than the previous ones due to high degree of citizen involvement.⁷¹⁹ The previous rapprochement periods were mostly focused on interstate relations and handled by short term political realism. There was no citizen involvement and no public support.⁷²⁰ As he states, "various rapprochement efforts have been made in the past (1931-1941, 1946-1953, 1988) but all of them proved to

⁷¹⁴ George Koukoudakis, "The Role of the citizens in the current Greek–Turkish rapprochement", **Paper for the 56th Annual Conference of Political Studies Association**, 2006, p. 12.

⁷¹⁵ Papagaroufali, p. 47.

⁷¹⁶ Ibid., p. 50.

⁷¹⁷ Panayotis Tsakonas, **The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek-Turkish Relations: Grasping Greece's Socialization Strategy**, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010, p. 112.

⁷¹⁸ Bahcheli, p. 7.

⁷¹⁹ Koukoudakis, p. 14.

⁷²⁰ Ibid.

be lull before the new storm”.⁷²¹ Therefore, it became obvious that the citizen involvement and the idea of bottom up approach have to be promoted.

Media coverage in both countries gave place for serials and movies which were demonstrating mutual prejudices. The Turkish serial ‘Yabancı Damat’ (The Frontiers of Love) and the Greek movie ‘Politiki Kouzina’ (Kitchen of Istanbul) were examples of some of the most watched TV shows.⁷²² The Turkish serial ‘Love Without Borders’ (‘Yabancı Damat’) played its role in changing societal perceptions in both sides. The serial recorded high ratings on Greek television during the year of 2015 which meant that media played a constructive role to overcome the long-standing biases. The serial gained popularity and was shown twice a day on the Mega Channel during that year.

4.2. Ankara-Athens Rapprochement and Its Outcomes

According to Koukoudakis, two things came up as the most important achievements of this dialogue process.⁷²³ First achievement was increased society contact which he describes as “the increase of the interaction and socialization and of the so called human touch between the societies of the two countries aiming to delete prejudices and suspicion that exists for the other...”⁷²⁴ Second achievement was the long term benefits gained. In this regard, for the first time in history, a bottom up approach was adopted towards Greek-Turkish rapprochement.⁷²⁵ According to Lindsay, “the two foreign ministers became legitimized in the eyes of Turkish and Greek populations”.⁷²⁶ According to George Papandreou, people’s support was a strong message to the policymakers for the improvement of relations. He states that “tragedy generated a genuine feeling of human warmth between two peoples involved in historical strife...these acts short circuited elaborate diplomatic strategies and exerted powerful on our governments to move ahead boldly”.⁷²⁷ Koukoudakis also adds that “the involvement of citizens in the rapprochement effort between Greece and

⁷²¹ Ibid., p. 1.

⁷²² Ibid., p. 12.

⁷²³ Ibid., p. 13.

⁷²⁴ Ibid.

⁷²⁵ Ibid.

⁷²⁶ Ker Lindsay, p. 225.

⁷²⁷ George Papandreou, “Principles of Greek foreign policy”, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Winter 2001, p. 6.

Turkey will lead eventually to its legitimization as a policy in the minds of the electorates in both countries...”⁷²⁸ The intensification of mutual contact at public level between Greece and Turkey helped legitimization of official diplomacy rather than being initiator.⁷²⁹

Besides, the conciliatory role of media between policymakers and public helped the rapprochement in all directions; bottom up and top down.⁷³⁰ These efforts were followed by more concrete acts.⁷³¹ For instance, in that period, forty four Greek and Turkish municipalities signed the agreement of town twinning projects.⁷³² In accordance with the soul of these initiatives, Greek foreign minister, Georges Papandreou stated; “Some want to say that what we are living through today in our Greek-Turkish relationship is simply a fairy tale... And yet it is not. Because our people demand it! I therefore say this: it is time to dare the impossible.”⁷³³

The initiatives also included removing the nationalist discourse from the schoolbooks aiming to change historical context on both sides of the Aegean.⁷³⁴ As Cakmak states, “for many years Greeks were regarded as unfaithful, unreliable and spoiled while Turks were presented as barbaric, uncivilized and expansionist warriors.”⁷³⁵ As Heraclides states “the respective original abstract images of what is a Turk or a Greek were so unreal and abominable that almost any contact with real Turks and Greeks respectively could not but have a positive effect, undermining, at least for a while, the negative stereotypes”⁷³⁶ Lastly, the most surprising act was Ismail Cem’s proposal for the establishment of Joint Greek Turkish Disaster Relief Force.⁷³⁷

As a result, the year of 1999 was remarkable in Greek-Turkish relations as the two states agreed on beginning a new rapprochement period despite of the chapters of suspicion and antagonism of their mutual history.⁷³⁸ This new era reflects in “positive sum interdependence in the context of a common European future and engagement in

⁷²⁸ Koukoudakis, p. 13.

⁷²⁹ Ker Lindsay, p. 230.

⁷³⁰ Koukoudakis, p. 13.

⁷³¹ Papagaroufali, p. 50.

⁷³² Ibid.

⁷³³ Ibid., p. 55.

⁷³⁴ Koukoudakis, p. 15.

⁷³⁵ Çakmak, p. 16.

⁷³⁶ Alexis Heraclides, “The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: National Narrative and Identity”, **Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe**, October 2011, p. 25.

⁷³⁷ Ker Lindsay, p. 226.

⁷³⁸ Onar and Anastasakis, p. 401.

new areas of economy, trade, civil society relations”.⁷³⁹ Although, high politics issues such as Cyprus Problem and the Aegean Disputes are still frozen, there was a worthy success in economic, societal and cultural fields. The bottom up initiatives reflected themselves as mutual interaction at the foreign ministerial level which was concluded with agreements in different areas and supported by increased civil society contact at the public level.⁷⁴⁰ This time, rather than reaching deadlock in high politics issues, both parties decided to cooperate on low politics issues including culture, tourism, cooperation on crime, human trafficking and illegal immigration.⁷⁴¹ Larrabee also describes the new situation as the breakdown of old stereotypes while it provided domestic support for the diplomatic initiatives.⁷⁴² On the other hand, Keridis points that the promising developments were not only as required by the new geostrategic environment but also were the results of institutional and cultural changes both in Greece and Turkey.⁷⁴³ Tsakonas suggests two reasons for the governmental support for civil society activities; firstly, to deepen the rapprochement process by bringing the two societies closer and secondly, to transfer European norms and procedures into Turkey.⁷⁴⁴ He adds that ‘Greek decision makers viewed the unprecedented engagement of wide segments of Greek and Turkish societies resulting from cooperation between Greek and Turkish NGOs as an excellent means of promoting Turkey’s Europeanization and of cementing the Greek-Turkish rapprochement.’⁷⁴⁵ Koliopoulos and Veremis also add “Grassroots participation was introduced into a bilateral relationship that had in the past always remained at the official level. It was from the reserves of goodwill in Greek public opinion that Prime Minister Simitis had to draw in order to endorse Turkey’s European Union candidacy”.⁷⁴⁶

Many Turkish and Greek institutions, universities, municipalities and NGOs organized events to promote mutual understanding and socialization.⁷⁴⁷ Some of these

⁷³⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁴¹ Çakmak, p. 5.

⁷⁴² F. Stephen Larrabee, “Greek–Turkish relations in an era of regional and global change”, **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, Vol.12, 2012, p. 473.

⁷⁴³ Dimitris Keridis, “Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization”, **A NATO Fellowship Final Report**, June 1999, p. 6.

⁷⁴⁴ Mavrogenis and Kelman, p. 92.

⁷⁴⁵ Tsakonas, p. 112.

⁷⁴⁶ John S. Koliopoulos, Thanos Veremis, **Modern Greece. A History Since 1821**, Wiley-Blackwell Publications, 2010, p. 193.

⁷⁴⁷ Ibid.

activities were also supported by the European Commission. For instance, the Greek-Turkish civic dialogue initiative in 2003 organized by AEGEE Ankara was financed by European Commission and more than 5000 participants exchanged their thoughts and memories with each other under this event.⁷⁴⁸

Greece and Turkey were the only two NATO countries whose military expenditures continued to remain increased in the post-Cold War era. However, there was a sign of a slight downward trend as a response to the recent improvements in bilateral relations. In regard to Greece, this came as a result of the pressures of the EMU and transition to Euro currency. Similarly, Turkey also decreased its military expenditures to apply the fiscal discipline in the aftermath of the economic crisis experienced in February 2001. What is remarkable in that sense is that when one side decided to cancel its military orders, it had an immediate effect on the other side. When Greece announced that it postponed a purchase worth 5 billion Euro for 60 Eurofighter jets in March 2001, only a month after, Turkey also announced that it postponed 32 military projects worth 23 billion Euros.⁷⁴⁹

⁷⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 13.

⁷⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 141.

CHAPTER FIVE

EXPLAINING GREECE-TURKEY RAPPROCHEMENT OF LATE 1990S THROUGH CONFLICT RESOLUTION FRAMEWORKS

5.1. ANALYZING GREECE-TURKEY RELATIONS IN THE LATE 1990S THROUGH CONFLICT RESOLUTION FRAMEWORKS

According to Mayer, the conflicting parties may put limits on communication or avoid dealing with important issues when the tension rises rather than ceasing communication. Keeping direct contact rather than breaking of all direct communication is much more important to promote long term engagement. As Mayer states, even the nations involved in hot conflict need keeping direct contact because otherwise ceasing communication increases the tension. During the escalation of disputes, it is much more productive to focus on less controversial issues rather than the conflict itself. The earthquake diplomacy and initiatives taken by Greek and Turkish governments which were encouraged by their people improved relations in a positive way, which were ruptured due to Ocalan and Imia (Kardak) crises. Therefore, citizen contacts and social interactions became the pioneers of re-establishing direct communication about controversial or conflictual issues. Public initiatives on both sides of the Aegean strengthened the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey in the late 1990s.

The transformation of Greek foreign policy in the second half of 1990s reflects examples of Pfetsch' conflict resolution behavior techniques. As Pfetsch defined, this technique focused on interests rather than on fixed values. Greece gave up its uncompromising attitude and supported normalization of relations with Turkey. As described in the Helsinki part, Greece not only its image in the West but also more integrated Turkey to the EU served to its interests. Another conflict resolution technique Pfetsch describes is having mutual gains and utilising the taken decision. Accordingly, at the Helsinki Summit, both Turkey and Greece got their share of the pie. While Turkey gained long-awaited candidacy status, Greece managed to link the resolution of Cyprus Issue and Aegean Disputes with Turkey's EU orientation. Hence, as Pfetsch explained, demands of both sides were made compatible. Besides, while focusing on low politics issues that both Greece and Turkey agreed upon, the high

politics issues were left aside to be decided later. As Pfetsch defines, rather than increasing the tension, both parties tended relaxation of tension and postponed the controversial problems as the best alternative.

The shift in the Greek foreign policy-making also shows another conflict resolution strategy of Pfetsch's, reframing or redefinition of the context. As Pfetsch explains "Through the changing of position, reformulation, and varying attribution of importance, for example by introducing new goals, incorporating additional goods, or reformulating the problem, the perception of a negotiation issue can be changed".⁷⁵⁰ Reframing can facilitate the quest for a solution, as it moves away from the categories of right and wrong, just and unjust or gain and loss."⁷⁵¹ The track two diplomacy also provided more comfortable and non-binding ground for political leaders of both states. As Pfetsch states, the nature of the decision as binding and non-binding is also related to the position of decision makers.⁷⁵² The non-binding nature of the track two diplomacy allowed leaders to extend cooperation. For instance, the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister, İsmail Cem proposed establishment of a joint diasaster force between Greece and Turkey.

Similar to Pfetsch's technique of leaving the conflictual issues aside; Wallensteen also suggests corresponding strategy to reach a solution. Out of his seven conflict resolution mechanisms, one of them is about leaving the incompatibilities to future if no solution is reached between the conflicting parties. Both sides decide to pursue this strategy without changing their main positions. The parties do not bound themselves to reach a settlement within a certain time and continue to direct communication on more comfortable ground. While time is gained, the parties also continue to preserve their positions and do not restrain themselves to take binding decisions on controversial issues. In this regard, Greece and Turkey left the contentious issues aside and focused on cooperation on low politics issues.

As Mayer defines, for the long-term conflicts, there are many ups and downs that communication goes through.⁷⁵³ The hot conflict periods are followed by long

⁷⁵⁰ Pfetsch, p.79.

⁷⁵¹ Ibid.

⁷⁵² Ibid., p.85.

⁷⁵³ Bernard Mayer, **Staying with conflict: A Strategic Approach to Ongoing Disputes**, Jossey Bass, San Francisco, 2009, p. 132.

periods of minimal direct communication. The Greek-Turkish relations during the 1990s also went through tension and uncertainty. The Imia (Kardak) crisis and the capture of Ocalan in the Greek embassy in Kenya both deteriorated relations and revealed the lack of trust between the two neighbouring countries. With the Kosovo Crisis, the two foreign affairs ministers initiated the low politics process and it was followed by the earthquake diplomacy which mobilized the civil society and extended the rapprochement in all fields.

Territorial conflicts are the most conflict prone and the most difficult ones to resolve. They can easily escalate into inter-state wars. So, the path to peace is difficult. Similarly, the Greek-Turkish relations have also shaped by territorial disputes in Aegean Sea for many years. Despite the recent rapprochement, the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey is still an open question. However, with the recent rapprochement it is also obvious that the normalization of bilateral relations resulted in many achievements in low politics and made it easier to find a solution to the Cyprus Issue and Aegean Problems through the transformation of Greek foreign policy making. In the Helsinki Summit, both sides accepted the submission of border disputes in the Aegean Sea to the International Court of Justice. Besides, as explained herewith, Greece managed to include Cyprus in the EU enlargement. Greece not only eliminated Turkish threat, but also legitimized its policy in promoting Turkey-EU relations. Moreover, Greece escaped from being the scape goat of the Union since the EU members were no longer to hide their Turkish skepticism behind the Greek vetoes. Greece realized that EU membership solely was not enough and supported Turkey-EU relations since, Turkey had to undertake political reforms in order to meet Copenhagen Criteria, which would also lead reconsideration of Turkish foreign policy towards Greece.

As a sum, despite the high politics issues have continued to be unsolved, both Turkey and Greece engaged in reconciliation process for their own strategic reasons. As Pfetsch explains, demands of both conflicting parts were made compatible. This new era in foreign policy making is also proof of the behavior techniques which were suggested by Pfetsch. According to him, personal and political bargaining should be separated which similarly points the difference between the Andreas Papandreou's and Kostas Simitis' terms. After Imia (Kardak) and Ocalan Crisis, bilateral relations

worsened dramatically, but also forced Greece to reconsider its relations with Turkey. Within the realm of changing dynamics in the region, Greece adopted a more compromised policy and began to follow consensus approach contrary to Papandreou's term.

Simitis' leadership played a crucial role in the transformation of the Greek foreign policy making. He initiated a modernization process in both domestic and foreign policy making. He aimed a normalization process in its relations with the region within the context of Europeanization, which would better serve the realization of national interests in the longer term. Secondly, rather than focusing on fixed values, he favored focusing on interests. Thirdly, he believed that both sides had to benefit from the agreed decisions as it was the case when both sides' demands were made compatible and both Greece and Turkey got their shared pie from the rapprochement.

The changing relationship between Greece and Turkey was also suitable with Pfetsch's method of differentiation of the conflictual issues which are most likely applied during the negotiation process. Greece applied this method successfully and made progress in low politics issues, while leaving undefined high politics issues aside. Greece successfully managed to separate low politics and high politics issues during the post earthquake era and managed to put confidence building measures in low politics in practice. On the other hand, Greece also managed reconciliation of interests which was also suggested by Pfetsch and supported Turkey's EU membership in order to encourage political reforms within Turkey. By the exchange and linkage method, Pfetsch describes the mutual support between two conflicting sides in accordance with their own benefits. Reaching an agreement is linked to compensation on another issue. Greece and Turkey also managed this method in Helsinki Summit successfully by linking their benefits, while reaching a political agreement.

Lastly, in accordance with Pfetsch's approach, not to face dead lock condition or escalation of tension, both sides postponed the conflictual issues aside to gain time. During the post earthquakes era, both Greece and Turkey focused on low politics issues which were easier to agree on rather than cooperation in the realm of high politics. By this means, both sides gained time and managed to leave Kardak (Imia) crisis and other Aegean problems behind which were most conflict prone problems.

On the other hand, in accordance with Pfetsch's strategy, reframing, Greece and Turkey realized the constraints that bound them and decided to reconsider their policies against each other. By reconsidering their needs and goals, reframing strategy aims to assist conflicting parties to evaluate their problems from different perspectives suggesting new possibilities for resolution. Both during the post earthquake era and in Helsinki Summit, Greece reformulated its foreign policy and introduced and incorporated new interests by replacing the strategy of conditional sanctions with the strategy of conditional rewards and moved the case away from gain or loss.

Lastly, we should take a glance at track two diplomacy. As examined earlier, track two diplomacy was firstly introduced by Joseph Montville, a well known American diplomat. Within the framework of Soviet-US relations, Montville mainly aimed a model against the binding nature of official diplomacy of track one. He suggested that when track one diplomacy fails or faces a dead lock condition, track two diplomacy would step in because of its non-binding nature.⁷⁵⁴ Track two diplomacy is comprised of non-governmental, informal and unofficial contacts and its participants include private citizens, groups of individuals, senior military officers, diplomats and non-state actors. They may be retired officers as well as people closely working with governmental circles. The parties of track two diplomacy may be in conflict by psychological factors. Track two diplomacy includes problem solving workshops to identify existing problems involved in their conflicts and to find potential solutions. Most importantly, track two interactions aim to influence public opinion towards a more conciliatory policy approach. Besides, contrary to official diplomacy, track two diplomacy also focuses on the social dimension of conflict and tries to develop a conflict resolution facility among the participants. Track two workshops aim civil society building which was also witnessed in Greece and Turkey during the post earthquake period. The success of track two diplomacy depends on making them accessible to the official process of diplomacy.

Track two diplomacy initiatives, sometimes, are complementary tasks to track one and sometimes they develop alternatives to official diplomacy. As explained earlier, there had been several negotiations on track two basis during the post

⁷⁵⁴ Graham and Kelly, p. 82.

earthquake period between Greece and Turkey. They were mainly dedicated to resolve low politics issues. Besides, public initiatives also aimed to remove psychological barriers between the two nations. Many initiatives were taken at grass root level for reconciliation. Rather than focusing on realist concepts such as balance of power, it is aimed at dialogue and communication for resolving conflict. However, as mentioned previously, the success of track two diplomacy depends on its transfer to elite circles. As Fisher explained,

Real peace is not just made between elites, however important elite engagement must be, but those representatives of wider segments of societies which have been engaged in long standing and bitter conflicts must also be prepared to participate in reconciliation efforts and to receive the outcome of such efforts.⁷⁵⁵

Track two diplomacy is also classified in two ways; parties come together to start communication, which did not exist before or they are in search of problem solving but never ending. For instance, during the April of 1971, delegates of US and China came together when their ping pong teams were on tour in Japan and this meeting opened the door for President Richard Nixon's visit to China in February 1972. This event was recorded in the history as ping-pong diplomacy. Later, President Nixon mentioned this case in his memories as "I had never expected that the China initiative would come to fruition in the form of a ping-pong team."⁷⁵⁶

Since track two workshops are based on voluntary participation and decisions are non-binding, they are generally conducted by NGOs. Even if elites from government circles participate in those workshops, the decisions remain unofficial. As Davidson and Montville state, "track two interactions are essential since they provide a secure space for the parties with minimal political risk due to the rule of non-binding to discuss non-negotiable issues."⁷⁵⁷ Besides, both sides understand red lines and the threat perceptions.

In the Turkish-Greek case, both Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister İsmail Cem and the Greek Foreign Affairs Minister George Papandreou actively participated and supported track two diplomacy during the post-earthquake period. They legitimized

⁷⁵⁵ Peter Jones, **Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and Practice**, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2015, p. 17.

⁷⁵⁶ Evan Andrews, "How Ping-Pong Diplomacy Thawed the Cold War", April 8, 2016, <https://www.history.com/news/ping-pong-diplomacy>, (10.06.2015).

⁷⁵⁷ Bonin, Mohagheghi and Yaffe, p.141.

their policies through public initiatives taken within the scope of track two diplomacy. Turkish Foreign Minister Cem, together with his Greek counterpart, became the driving force behind the rapprochement. Despite the influence of track two diplomacy in high politics remained limited, many initiatives were taken at low politics. Even in 2001, the two foreign ministers organized a joint visit to Israel to show the Israelis and Palestinians that foes can be friends. The bottom up approach was resulted in soft security confidence building measures in the form of bilateral agreements signed between the two countries in January and February of 2000. Soft security CBMs include regular meetings between NGOs, academics, citizens, media and its impact on bilateral relations and change of history books. In terms of high politics issues, the track two diplomatic efforts remained limited. It could not achieve any agreement either in Aegean Disputes or in Cyprus issue. As mentioned herewith, in the Turkish – Greek case, only micro goals were achieved but macro goals were not materialized.

Regarding its effects in bilateral relations, many experts also claim that they should have been more realistic rather than being symbolic. According to those track two skeptics, since there is no clearly defined aim or task, they remained not useful at all. It can be said that expectations were kept low, since tackling with the most difficult issues was avoided. Despite growing sympathy on both sides, main issues remained unsolved. The Aegean Dispute continues. There are still confrontations between Turkish and Greek Armed Forces both at sea and in airspace over the Aegean Sea and in the Eastern Mediterranean. Disagreement on Cyprus Issue remains. Southern part of Cyprus began accession talks with the EU without any settlement on the issue and became EU member in 2003 as representing the whole island.

In the case of Greek – Turkish relations, In accordance with above mentioned details, this thesis mainly intends to explain the rapprochement process between Greece and Turkey which took place in the second half of 1990s within the realm of conflict resolution mechanisms. Many examples are given to illustrate the relation between these mechanisms and the transformation of Greek-Turkish relations and Greek foreign policy making.

5.2. AS A CASE: THE GREEK-TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT BEHIND THE SCENES

Rapprochement in Greek-Turkish relations began after the earthquakes which hit Turkey and Greece successively in August and September of 1999. In fact, bilateral relations were improving slowly for several months before the earthquakes. However, the tragic events brought the two countries closer than ever before, which resulted in earthquake diplomacy. Initiatives at public level in both countries contributed to the development of mutual relations. The Greek support for Turkey at the forthcoming Helsinki Summit and the acceptance of Turkey's candidacy to the EU signed a new era in bilateral relations. However, improved relations have not paved the way for solution on Cyprus problem and Aegean Disputes. Despite positive atmosphere in bilateral relations, the uncertainty continues to remain. The rapprochement started after the second half of the 1990s did not manage to solve the deep-rooted Cyprus issue and the Aegean problems. Despite various solutions tested throughout the years, none of them had any lasting results. As Kostas Ifantis said "Nobody can credibly claim that the Aegean Cold War is historically over."⁷⁵⁸

However, nobody denies the importance of the latest rapprochement which brought the societies of both countries closer than ever before and contributed to the improvement of economic cooperation and political bilateral relations. For the first time in history since 1974, bilateral relations witnessed a decade without any crises. Particularly, considering Imia (Kardak) Crisis of 1996 which brought the two countries to the brink of war and the capture of Ocalan which deteriorated relations more deeply, finally normalization of relations was witnessed.

The conflictual relations for years not only damaged the two countries at economic level but also at political level. At economic level, both Greece and Turkey has had huge defense expenditures regardless of their economic and fiscal budgets. According to research of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), while Turkey was the third among the main conventional armament importers, Greece was ranked as sixth.⁷⁵⁹ At political level, Turkey could not facilitate its

⁷⁵⁸ Koukoudakis, p. 82.

⁷⁵⁹ www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers, (26.10.2016).

European prospects due to its problematic relations with Greece, while Greece was alienated by Western countries due to its uncompromising manner towards the surrounding region.

However, the new security environment in the Balkan region after the Cold War and the emergence of new security threats forced Greece and Turkey to reconsider their relations towards each other. As the Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou said “Greece has made an effort to take the lead in promoting stability, cooperation and democracy in the Balkans. Given this basic, but determined foreign policy outlook, it would have been incongruous to exclude Turkey.”⁷⁶⁰

After the emergence of new security threats and the geopolitical realities of the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, both countries realized that zero sum policy in the bilateral relations was actually damaging and political cooperation was much more advantageous. For this reason, the two countries started to follow step by step approach towards rapprochement. They started to cooperate on low politics issues such as immigration, environment, drug trafficking, international terrorism etc. with the aim of a spillover effect into the realm of high politics in which security issues and long-term solutions have to be decided. By this means, both governments would better cooperate on low politics which can facilitate cooperation on high level politics.

The first result of the step by step approach include nine bilateral agreements which were signed between Greece and Turkey, aimed at cooperation on low politics issues such as tourism, finance, technology and science, sea transport, culture, customs, protection of investments, protection of environment, international organized crime and illegal immigration. The cooperation was also expanded in agriculture, energy and natural disasters. Economic cooperation between Greece and Turkey increased; both foreign direct investments and visiting tourist numbers in Greece and Turkey reached high levels. As Koukoudakis said, “The trade volume increased 312% over the period 2000-2008. While the Greek exports to Turkey increased from 266.2 million dollars in 2001 to 1.15 billion dollars in 2008, Turkish exports to Greece expanded from 590.3 million dollars to 2.42 billion dollars during the same period.”⁷⁶¹

⁷⁶⁰ George Papandreou, www.archive.papandreou.gr, (26.10.2016).

⁷⁶¹ Ibid., p.88.

More than one million people visited Greece and Turkey in 2012. The development of economic relations indicated the role of interdependence of interests which contributed to the cooperative climate between the two countries as well as the role of non-state actors in foreign policy making process. Constantine Papadopoloulos stated;

The stronger economic relations between Turkey and Greece are likely to have positive effect on bilateral relations. In so far as economic exchanges continue to flourish, they may well create the conditions for a greater multiplicity of opinions-born primarily of the new communities of common interests that will emerge- and hence a greater resistance to any comprehensive deterioration of relations. By themselves, however, they will not dislodge conventional politics from its pivotal role as the ultimate determinant of the quality and future of the relationship.⁷⁶²

However, indeed, the main realm of rapprochement between the two countries lied in the decision of redefinition of strategic interests and reevaluation of the political standings. Accordingly, the shift in positions results from mainly strategic reasons. The changing atmosphere in the Balkan region and military operation in Kosovo in 1999 forced the two countries to cooperate. In sum, the changes in European and global politics and the need to adapt to them are the main reasons behind the transformation of bilateral relations. As the end of Cold War meant s the collapse of the former system, both countries experienced disorientation and found themselves in a security gap. As Van Coufadakis puts it, “During the Cold War, the Soviet threat provided a convenient heuristic device to explain events, to assess emerging threats, and to formulate foreign and defense policies, even though many times such simplistic explanations only distorted interpretation of events. The post-Cold War era created great uncertainty as to the role of states and their institutions.”⁷⁶³

This newly emerged environment and the sense of loss coming from past affected the bilateral relations. Since the state system was in flux, the actors had to redefine their roles. Both Greece and Turkey were feeling isolated by the Western states. While the Balkan crisis triggered the feeling of insecurity for Greece besides the Turkish threat, Turkey was also sharing the same feeling of isolation and thinking that it had s lost its strategic priority for NATO. This feeling reached to a climax in Luxembourg Summit in 1997 when the European countries excluded Turkey from the list of candidate countries. The collapse of Yugoslavia led to rise of strong nationalism

⁷⁶² Ibid., p.89.

⁷⁶³ Tsakonas, p.74.

in Greece and the political influence of church. Similarly, Turkey filled the gap left by its European partners with the strategy of creating a Turkish World extending from Adriatic to China. According to Greece, Turkey decided to play a leading role in the Balkans which increased the feeling of insecurity in Greece. This kind of neo-ottomanist policy was considered as a proof of Turkey's expansionist aims and irredentism. The fluctuations in foreign policies of Greece and Turkey were indeed natural results of the post Cold War era and indicated their search for strategic orientation.

Accordingly, the Kardak (Imia) Crisis in 1996 point—the case of strategic disorientation. The roots of the crisis also lied in the social context. The historical background of negative images and prejudices about the other is the main reason of the escalation of crisis. As Paul Kowert stated the crisis not only occurred because of what was involved but also who was involved.⁷⁶⁴ Considering Greek-Turkish history, both countries achieved their sovereignty as a result of wars of liberation they fought against each other. This historical enmity repeated itself through history books and media. The crisis also had s the side of domestic context. While during the era of Andreas Papandreou, Greece was viewed with concern by its Western partners, within Turkey, Islamist politics was rising following the electoral victory of the Welfare Party in 1995. Hence, both countries were being considered as unstable and weak. This perception is the main reason behind the critical rethinking in Greek and Turkish foreign policies. Besides, the strong pressure of the EU and US on Greece, after the Imia Crisis, forced Simitis government to give up the long running policy of no talks with Turkey. Similarly, another case in Greek-Turkish relations which led to a major shift in bilateral relations was the Ocalan crisis, which was about capturing of Ocalan in Greek embassy in Naiorbi in 1999. Not only Turkey accused Greece of giving support to terrorism, the Greek government was also faced with domestic and international criticism. The three Greek ministers; Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos, Interior Minister Alekos Papadopoulos, and Public Order Minister Philipos Petsalnikos were dismissed. Particularly, Pangalos was known for his populist and aggressive stance against Turkey. So, the dismissal of that group paved the way for

⁷⁶⁴ Gündoğdu.

moderates within the ruling PASOK party under Simitis' leadership. Simitis was in favor of redefinition of bilateral relations and aimed to deepen Greece's integration to the EU.

Accordingly, both the Imia and Ocalan crises in the post Cold War era caused significant changes in foreign policy making of the two countries, particularly in Greece. Both countries engaged themselves in the process which resulted in the redefinition of interests, roles and positions. As George Papandreou put it,

The harrowing war in Kosovo brought home to the Greek people the importance and necessity of good, neighborly relations. Fear and suspicion have long since given way to a policy of regional cooperation, based on mutual understanding and common interests.... Greece has made an effort to take the lead in promoting stability, cooperation, and democracy in the Balkans. Given this basic, but determined, foreign policy outlook, it would have been incongruous to exclude Turkey.⁷⁶⁵

It is not possible to talk about a permanent Greek-Turkish détente. Because, the view of national identity under threat is still dominant in both countries. On the other hand, the earthquakes paved the way for reform at the elites' level. Both Greek and Turkish governments gave value to the demands of their public, while formulating their foreign policies and they legitimized their foreign policies in the eyes of their people. Although unresolved problems continued, the process indicated that only through self examination and prejudice-free approach it is possible to find solutions acceptable for both sides. The rapprochement process also showed that the problem-solving process could only start after building mutual trust.

Besides all, one of the essential part of this process is the altercasting strategy, which means transformation of state identities. On the base of this strategy lies convincing other to assume a new identity by treating as if it already had that identity. This strategy was followed by Greece at the Helsinki Summit. Greece changed its strategy towards Turkey and gave up its veto policy and supported Turkey's candidacy to the EU. As the Greek Foreign Minister George Pandreou said "Helsinki was...a culmination of the new phase in Greek foreign policy. What instigated this fundamental change in our foreign policy? Three major elements can be credited: political forces engulfing the region in the post-Cold War period, new realities of the

⁷⁶⁵ George Papandreou,
<http://archive.papandreou.gr/papandreou/content/Document.aspx?d=6&rd=7739474&f=1360&rf=1307380017&m=2913&rm=22535870&l=1>, (26.10.2016).

‘globalized’ world, and a reevaluation of Greece’s national interests.”⁷⁶⁶ In accordance with altercasting strategy, Greece realized that it was not in her favor to describe Turkey in negative terms such as barbaric or uncivilized. On the contrary, Greece must start a dialogue with a European Turkey rather than alienating her. As Papandreou suggested “It is in Greece’s interests—more than any other member of the EU—that Turkey moves closer to Europe. Turkey’s approach to Europe will be an important factor in the creation of a climate of cooperation, which is an essential pre-condition if we hope to solve the differences between us.”⁷⁶⁷

After Simitis’ re-election in April 2000, this new Greek policy continued. The campaigns during election also showed that there was no sharp difference between PASOK party and its main rival the New Democracy (NDP). During the election campaigns, the NDP leader Kostas Karamanlis also supported Turkey’s integration to the EU which meant Turkey’s EU integration was beneficial for Greece. Another remarkable side of electoral campaigns is that neither PASOK nor NDP used hate speech against Turkey in contrast to their previous campaigns.

Despite Greece supported Turkey’s candidacy, she also expected some concessions from Turkey about unresolved issues. As the Greek Defense Minister Akis Tsochatzopoulos stated “there is no prospect for Turkey’s accession to the European Union if [it] does not contribute and make concessions on Cyprus.”⁷⁶⁸ Papandreou also reminded that Turkey must solve Cyprus problem as a candidate country seeking entry into the Union. In accordance with that, Turkey’s accession partnership with the EU also included resolution of border disputes in the Aegean and the solution of the Cyprus problem. The lack of any commitment of Turkey on those issues would fall short of the Greek expectations. Those positions of both states prevented a greater transformation in bilateral relations based on institutionalized norms of cooperation. Hence, rather than entering a new era in Greek – Turkish relations, it continued the same manner as it existed between crisis and rapprochement, so a greater rapprochement still seems unlikely. It took not long time that confrontation on airspace and in Aegean Sea had begun and dogfights increased. Peace talks on Cyprus Issue

⁷⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁷ Gündoğdu.

⁷⁶⁸ Ibid.

lasted with no agreement. While neither party takes military action up to now, a cold peace between the two countries has continued to exist. Contentious issues are still unresolved, while both sides are restricting themselves from taking highly provocative actions. Both parties are deeply concerned with the other side's action and mutual suspicion still exists.

The main reason behind Greek support in Helsinki towards Turkey and even the adoption of Europeanization strategy is to gain legitimacy in international arena and consolidation in itself. By following this strategy, Greece not only aimed to gain international support, but also showed that it could promote its aims against Turkey. The new Greek strategy gained acceptance within Greece after seeing the short and medium-term gains achieved at Helsinki such as Cyprus' EU membership. Through this new strategy, dialogue is accepted as a new and legitimate tool to normalize relations. In the best-case scenario, Greece would achieve its aims, in the worst-case scenario; there would be equal distribution of the gains between Greece and Turkey. A consensus was reached in domestic arena regarding the role of the EU in bilateral relations. However, its role is limited to balancing Turkey and promoting Greek national interests in a more effective way rather than as a mean for the resolution of bilateral problems. Accordingly, after Turkey's acceptance to the Union, Greece was insistent on adding Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue to the short and medium-term priorities of Accession Partnership. At the end, the EU added the Greek side's demands under the head of 'Enhanced Political Dialogue and Political Criteria'. In this way, both the Greek expectations were met and Turkey's sensitivity was taken into consideration.

On the other hand, through track two diplomacy which just began after the tragic earthquake disaster which hit successively both countries in the summer of 1999, cooperation on low-politics or low-confrontation issues occurred. The most remarkable result of this cooperation is that the decision makers on both sides realized that there are much more opportunities on low politics issues, which could be strengthened by the introduction of new fields. Accordingly, the bilateral relations were boosted at economic and civil society levels. The Greek decision makers mobilized this engagement to promote Turkey's further integration into the EU and the Greek-Turkish rapprochement. By this means, Greece aimed preservation of

rapprochement roots in both societies even if the relations got deteriorated and European norms and standards were adopted in the domestic political arena of Turkey. Within these conditions, not only the improved economic interdependence makes the relations more stable but also it would provide the necessary conditions for the sensitive high politics issues which are to be addressed in the next phase. According to Tsakonas “the establishment of a limited or transparent security regime instead of a comprehensive one appeared to Greek decision makers as the best way for the two countries to avoid the catastrophic losses that would result from war, and manage two particular kinds of gains namely crisis stability and arms race stability.”⁷⁶⁹

Under the leadership of Simitis government, Greece decided to pursue more rationalist policy towards Turkey, since its traditional policy failed. Not only Greece was alienated by western countries, but also Greece gained no actual benefit from its existing policies. Hence, there was a need for a new strategy to achieve gains regarding Aegean and Cyprus issues. On the other hand, Turkey’s transition to a more democratic order became integral part of its road map to the EU membership, but also Cyprus’s membership to the EU was secured and setting a time frame for the resolution of Aegean Disputes became a prerequisite for Turkey’s EU accession. As Tsakonas mentions the Greek strategy “pointed convincingly to a better harbor and a safe journey”.⁷⁷⁰ By this means, the tension in the Aegean Sea was kept under control; Greece took advantage of the results of cooperation with Turkey on low politics issues.

As a conclusion, it can be said that despite the recent progress in bilateral relations which is better than ever, the high politics issues continue to impede rapprochement since both sides did not change their leading positions on critical issues.

⁷⁶⁹ Tsakonas, p.9.

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid., p.97.

CONCLUSION

This thesis intends to explain the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey in the late 1990s by employing three conflict resolution frameworks; Peter Wallensteen's seventh mechanism, Frank R. Pfetsch's approaches regarding conflict resolution and track two diplomacy. According to seventh mechanism of Wallensteen, parties leave conflicting issues to the future without changing their main positions. They are not bounded with certain time or certain rules, besides, the parties gain additional time. Otherwise, the more parties insist on their interests, the more they lock themselves on their positions and it becomes harder to find a common ground. This is the case witnessed in Greek-Turkish relations in the late 1990s. They left the deep rooted problematic issues aside and mostly focused on low politics issues as explained in this thesis. During this rapprochement period, neither Greece nor Turkey changed their main positions on core issues of conflict such as the Cyprus Conflict and the Aegean Disputes. The Cold War between Greece and Turkey has continued to exist at the high politics level. For this reason, no agreement has been achieved either on Cyprus Issue or on Aegean Disputes.

On the other hand, Pfetsch points out reconciliation of interests and making demands compatible within the scope of conflict resolution. Through this understanding, both parties may get their share of the cake. This method was mostly applied by Greece during the rapprochement period. In the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Greece supported Turkey's candidacy and left its veto policy. By this means, both parties' demands were met. While Turkey was recognized as an EU candidate, Greece improved its image in the West and consolidated democracy within the country. Greece also guaranteed its gains regarding the Cyprus Issue and the Aegean Disputes. Pfetsch also suggests exchange and linkage method, which means that reaching an agreement also brings compensation along with. He describes the mutual support between two conflicting sides in accordance with their own benefits. Each party has had diverse interests and objectives which in return has made the conflict resolution process complicated. Greece and Turkey also adopted this method in the Helsinki Summit successfully by linking their benefits, while reaching a political agreement. In addition, Pfetsch emphasizes the role of the parties who are engaged in prolonged

negotiations. According to him, working together during prolonged negotiations also helps to constitute the basis of mutual trust between the conflicting parties. Besides, like the seventh mechanism of Wallenstein, Pfetsch also suggests that postponing the issue and gaining time is the best alternative in deadlock conditions. As mentioned in this thesis, this strategy was mostly used by Greece in the late 1990s and rather than carrying on Andreas Papandreou's nationalist policies which resulted in the isolation of Greece in the region, Greece began to give importance to develop friendly relations with its neighbours and accordingly developed its economic, social and cultural relations with them. Moreover, the rapprochement period between Greece and Turkey may also be explained by the Pfetsch's method of differentiation of the conflictual issues. Greece successfully managed to separate low politics and high politics issues during that period.

This thesis also analyzes track two diplomacy within the scope of Greek-Turkish relations. The term was firstly developed by Montville as a result of frustration and disappointment created by the ineffective communication between the US and the Soviet Union. He developed track two diplomacy against the binding nature of track one diplomacy. When track one diplomacy or official diplomacy fails or faces a deadlock condition, track two diplomacy steps in because of its non-binding nature. Track two diplomacy hosts non-governmental, informal and unofficial contacts and includes private citizens, senior military and government officers, diplomats and NGOs. Track two diplomacy aims to influence public opinion in a more conciliatory way. Track two diplomacy workshops were initiated at public level between Greece and Turkey in the post earthquake period and were supported by the Foreign Affairs Ministers, Ismail Cem and George Papandreou as well. They actively participated in the workshops and supported them. In this regard, they legitimized their policies in the eyes of their people through the initiatives taken within the scope of track two diplomacy. Accordingly, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Cem, together with his Greek counterpart, Papandreou, became the driving force behind the rapprochement.

However, despite the progress in bilateral relations in the late 1990s, the high politics issues have continued to impede the sustainability of this rapprochement. Both Greece and Turkey have continued to preserve their core positions on the Cyprus Issue and the Aegean Disputes, and uncertainty continues to remain about solution of these

leading conflicts. As mentioned in this study, the rapprochement could not manage to solve the deep-rooted conflictual problems between Greece and Turkey. While the rapprochement of the late 1990s brought the two societies closer more than ever and contributed to the development of relations in low politics areas, that spirit did not have any long lasting results in high politics issues. However, nobody can deny the results of the positive atmosphere created in the late 1990s in bilateral relations. By the seismic diplomacy following the earthquake disaster, the two nations came together through various initiatives taken at public level. Both Greek and Turkish media challenged the dominant discourse of 'enemy' and supported civil initiatives on both sides of the Aegean. The economic relations were improved and highest indicators were recorded in terms of bilateral trade. For the first time in the history of bilateral relations since 1974, a decade without any crises was witnessed. The political leaders also supported the positive atmosphere and their policies within the scope of step by step approach were also legitimized in the eyes of their people. Through various agreements, they aimed cooperation in low politics areas such as tourism, finance, technology and science, sea transport, culture, customs, protection of investments, protection of environment, international organized crime and illegal immigration.

Despite all that progress, the main reason of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey lies in the decision of redefinition of strategic interests and re-evaluation of political standings. Accordingly, the main reason behind the shift in Greek foreign policy comes from strategic and tactical reasons rather than the results of the rapprochement process itself. As mentioned in the thesis, Greece aimed to end its isolation from the West and developed a new strategy to balance the Turkish threat. In this respect, Greece not only Europeanized its policy, but also adopted a leadership role in the region by promoting stability, cooperation and democracy and supported Turkey's accession in the EU. The main reason behind Greek support in the Helsinki was to gain international legitimacy through the scope of its Europeanization strategy. Greece not only improved its image, but also guaranteed its short and medium-term gains regarding the Cyprus Issue and the Aegean Disputes. Cyprus membership to the EU was secured and solution of the Cyprus conflict has become a prerequisite for Turkey's EU accession. As a result of the Greek strategy, not only the tension in the

Aegean was kept under control of the EU, but also Greece enjoyed the results of cooperation with Turkey on low politics.

As a result, it is not possible to talk about a permanent rapprochement in Greek-Turkish relations. The cold war continues on the both sides of the Aegean. Still, no long-lasting results have been achieved with respect to the deep-rooted problems the Cyprus Issue and the Aegean Disputes and there is no transformation in bilateral relations based on institutionalized norms of cooperation. Still, both sides are deeply concerned with the other side's action and mutual suspicion continues to dominate the relations.



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