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**ANALYSIS OF TURKEY-RUSSIA RELATIONS SINCE
THE EARLY 2000S THROUGH COMPLEX
INTERDEPENDENCE APPROACH**

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE



DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this master's thesis titled as "Analysis of Turkey-Russia Relations since the early 2000s through Complex Interdependence Approach" has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honor.

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ABSTRACT

Master's Thesis

Analysis of Turkey-Russia Relations Since the Early 2000s Through Complex Interdependence Approach

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The historical background of Turkey-Russia relations consisted of a number of contradictions, which often led to conflicts. The Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire had been engaged in many wars from 16th century to 20th century. Throughout the Cold War period, Republic of Turkey was a loyal member of the US-led Western Block and NATO, while Soviet Union led the rival Eastern Block. With the ending of the Cold War, potential for cooperation among the two countries considerably increased in the 1990s and this relationship has then evolved into complex interdependence by the 21st century. This study seeks to analyze Turkey-Russia relations in the 2000s through complex interdependence approach. It is argued that the characteristics of complex interdependence approach including non-hierarchy among issues, multiple channels of interaction and diminishing role of the military forces have prevailed in Turkey-Russia relations since the early 2000s. The study attracts attention to both spheres of conflict such as Syrian, Ukrainian and Libyan crises and spheres of cooperation such as economic relations, energy issues, as well as conflict resolution. It is pointed out that due to complex interdependence among them, the two countries have managed to compartmentalize divergent issues in their bilateral relations and have not allowed contradictory issues to manipulate their collaboration in some critical issues.

Keywords: Russia, Turkey, complex interdependence approach, Turkey-Russia relations, Syrian crisis, Ukrainian crisis.



ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

2000’li Yılların Başından İtibaren Türkiye-Rusya İlişkilerinin Karmaşık

Karşılıklı Bağımlılık Yaklaşımı ile Analizi

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Türkiye-Rusya ilişkilerinin tarihsel arka planı, sıklıkla çatışmaya yol açan çeşitli çelişkilerden oluşmuştur. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Rus İmparatorluğu, 16. yüzyıldan 20. yüzyıla kadar birbirlerine karşı çok sayıda savaşa girmişlerdir. Soğuk Savaş dönemi boyunca Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ABD liderliğindeki Batı bloğunun ve NATO’nun sadık bir üyesiyken, Sovyetler Birliği rakip konumunda olan Doğu bloğunun liderliğini yürütmüştür. Soğuk Savaş’ın sona ermesiyle, iki ülke arasındaki işbirliği potansiyeli 1990’lı yıllarda oldukça artmış ve daha sonra 21. yüzyılda bu ilişki karmaşık karşılıklı bağımlılığa evrilmiştir. Bu çalışma, 2000’li yıllarda Türkiye-Rusya ilişkilerini karmaşık karşılıklı bağımlılık yaklaşımı ile analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Karmaşık karşılıklı bağımlılığın; konular arasında hiyerarşinin bulunmaması, çoklu etkileşim kanallarının varlığı ve ordunun ilişkilerde azalan rolü gibi özelliklerinin Türkiye-Rusya ilişkilerinde 2000’li yılların başında beri görülmekte olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Çalışma; hem Suriye, Ukrayna ve Libya krizleri gibi çatışma alanlarına hem de ekonomik ilişkiler, enerji konuları ve anlaşmazlık çözümü gibi işbirliği alanlarına dikkat çekmektedir. İki ülkenin ilişkilerinde farklı konuları ayırtırmayı başarmasına ve çelişkili konuların kritik bazı konular üzerinde işbirliğini bozmasına izin vermediklerine işaret edilmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Rusya, Türkiye, karmaşık karşılıklı bağımlılık, Türkiye-Rusya ilişkileri, Suriye krizi, Ukrayna krizi.



**ANALYSIS OF TURKEY-RUSSIA RELATIONS SINCE THE EARLY 2000S
THROUGH COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE APPROACH**

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ABBREVIATIONS

BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
EU	European Union
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
IS	Islamic State
IR	International Relations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JDP	Justice and Development Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
PJSC	Public Joint Stock Company
PKK	Kurdistan Workers Party
TNC	Transnational Corporation
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMDs	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization
YPG	Kurdish People's Protection Units

INTRODUCTION

The current international system demonstrates the breakdown of rigid foreign policy tendencies of countries, which seemed obvious prior to the 21st century. The ideas about the structure of the modern international system, taking into account the bi-, uni- and multi-polar forms seem old-fashioned and incomplete to understand and systematize the processes that happen at this level of the development of political processes. The basis of these changes today is the increasing interdependence among various countries, regional blocks, and sectors of the world economy. The economic sanctions, the construction of economic blocks, restrictions on the use of markets and technology transfers, investment and withdrawal of investment, and other political manipulations with economic aspects between countries are the main forms of influence now. Increasingly, the global market is playing a bigger role in international relations.

In addition, as the roots of many conflicts lie in misunderstanding and unwillingness to make concessions and compromises, the problem of peaceful coexistence has become a vital topic at the present time. Moreover, international politics include actors with their own views and interests in the further development of events. All of these should be taken into account in foreign policy making. Otherwise, it leads to misunderstandings and strained relations. The experienced politicians, having in mind the mutually beneficial cooperation as one of the most beneficial strategies, try to find a common ground in foreign relations. Cooperation can be called as the process of solving problems and a strategy of behavior in a conflict, which are characterized by the desire of the parties to take into account the interests of each of the parties. Cooperation pushes sides to find a mutually satisfying solution. The fact that the parties pursue goals that cannot be simultaneously satisfied is the cause of most international conflicts in the international arena.

The changing world order always implies the search for new combinations in building relationships. At this historical stage, political processes are ‘tightening up’, which also prompts an increase in the desire to seek new alliances and partnerships, often unusual, illogical, and unstable. Of course, the process of searching for a new counterpart does not negate the desire to preserve old associations. With the realization

that the new world order is beginning to take on new outlines, competition for leadership in its formation in the world and certain regions has intensified. In addition, those forces that claim leadership should act under the slogans of a more just world and regional order, which requires allies and blocs.

Therefore, the regrouping of forces in the international and regional contexts had inevitably begun. In this setting, the nature of defending national interests, and the forms of conflict and cooperation began to take on a different look. Turkey has become more active in the regional and international context, enabling it to enter into cooperation with other actors and creating a 'complex interdependence'. Especially, Turkey's relations with Russia since the early 2000s demonstrate the characteristics of complex interdependence. Complex interdependence approach is applicable when states seek to cooperate despite having separating factors in some other areas.

Turkey-Russia interaction occupies a vital place in the foreign policy of both states. The legal framework of economic cooperation between the two countries includes about 20 documents. There are the Agreement on trade and economic cooperation (1991), the long-term program for the development of trade, economic, industrial, scientific, and technical cooperation (1997), the Agreement on cooperation in the field of energy (1997), on promotion and mutual protection investments (1997), and on maritime transport (2010). Despite all the agreements and programs, bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the Turkish Republic are far from ideal one. Their contradictory relationship has attracted the attention of many researchers over the years the interaction of two states. The historical background shows that the conflicting relations had often led to open confrontation. However, their relationship flowed into a friendlier atmosphere with special frequency by the early 2000s. Therefore, Turkey-Russia relations enlightened greater topics in world politics. First of all, significant economic interdependence can arise among states with various political perspectives in the form of disparate regional integration schemes, driven by the support of private actors or interests. Second, growing economic interdependence can coexist with ongoing political conflict and geopolitical rivalries, as evidenced by the Syrian, Ukrainian, and Libyan crises. An important strategy that emerges is the tendency to separate economic problems and geopolitical rivalries in order to avoid

the negative consequences of the gap. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to analyze Turkey-Russia relations through the prism of complex interdependence approach.

The thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter will examine the theoretical framework features of complex interdependence approach and foreign policy analysis. All characteristics of this approach, including non-hierarchy among issues, multiple channels of interaction, and diminishing role of military power will be closely examined one by one in the first chapter. In addition, selected case studies will be discussed in order to understand the approach in practice. The explanation of Sino-American relations, Sino-Pakistani relations, as well as EU-Russian relations contribute to the explanatory value of this approach.

The second chapter will deal with the historical background of bilateral relations between Russia and Turkey. More precisely, the second chapter will analyze the relations between the two states in the 1990s. Obviously, bilateral relations have always had ups and downs. Therefore, the chapter will scrutinize both spheres of bilateral relations, including cooperation and contradiction. Relations between states are based on mutual interests, which are preceded by factors that directly affect the development of relations. Consequently, this chapter will cover factors behind shaping Turkish and Russian foreign policy behaviors towards each other.

The third chapter will examine the compartmentalized foreign policy approach in the formation of Turkey-Russia relations in the 21st century. A compartmentalized foreign policy approach is increasingly employed in contemporary international relations. Cooperating in some spheres, states may confront each other in other fields. The most prominent fields of cooperation and conflict are analyzed in the third chapter. Fields of cooperation include economic cooperation, energy cooperation and partnership in the spheres of tourism and culture. Moreover, special attention is paid to personal interaction between the political elites of the two countries at different levels. However, bilateral relations have also faced some stumbling blocks. Most of the obstacles between the Russian Federation and the Turkish Republic are located in close neighborhoods. Obviously, the Syrian and Libyan conflicts, as well as the Ukrainian crisis have constituted challenges for bilateral relations.

Lastly, the fourth chapter will evaluate the impact of complex interdependence approach on Turkey-Russia relations since the early 2000s. The chapter will examine

developments in bilateral relations in the 2000s through the characteristics of complex interdependence. More precisely, the explanatory value of the features of complex interdependence approach concerning Turkey-Russia relations in the 2000s will be evaluated. At the end of the thesis, relevant concluding remarks will be presented.



CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE APPROACH AND FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

1.1 LEADING CONCEPTS IN COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE

Throughout history, multiple approaches evolved within the discipline of International Relations (IR) due to the changing world orders. Most theories became old-fashioned, while new theories arose in consequence of the exhaustion of the obsolete ones. One of these refreshing theories is complex interdependence theory. As a concept, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye put complex interdependence forward in the 1970s to describe the nascent nature of global politics.¹ The concept assumes that relations between states are becoming deeper and more complex. These increasingly complex networks of economic interdependence undermine state power and strengthen the influence of transnational non-state actors. Using the analytical construction of complex interdependence in their critique of political realism, Keohane and Nye explores how international politics has changed due to the growing complex interactions and interdependence between states.²

Political realism occupies a central place in international politics. Power is a key concept in political realism that remains to have one of the vaguest and uncertain definitions.³ Such uncertainty is convenient for critics of political realism, as it allows them to interpret ‘power’ in the most convenient way for them. One of such problematic places is the question of the correlation of power and force in political realism. Power in political realism has its source in the unchanging nature of people. Therefore, an irreducible desire for domination is an integral part of power.⁴ Political realism reduces the number of actors in the international arena. Moreover, the internal and foreign policy of the state in the interpretation of political realists look like

¹ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, **Power and Interdependence (second edition)**, Harper Collins Publisher, 1989.

² Ibid, p. 330

³ Stephen Walt, “The enduring relevance of the realist tradition”, **New York: W.W. Norton Company**, 2002, p. 222

⁴ Sergey Kucherenko, “Власть и насилие в реализме Ганса Дж. Моргентау, (Power and Violence in the Realism of Hans J. Morgenthau)”, **Russian Sociological Review**, Vol.18, No: 4, 2019, p. 320.

unrelated to each other, and the states themselves look like interchangeable mechanical bodies, with an identical reaction to external influences.⁵ The desire to rely on the eternal and unchangeable objective laws of international interaction made political realism the hostage to its own approach.⁶ The unchangeable approach has been criticized due to the trends and changes, which increasingly determine the nature of modern international relations dominating the international arena. This caused criticism of political realism from adherents of other approaches, such as the representatives of the theory of complex interdependence.

Theorists have recognized that different and complex transnational interdependencies and connections between societies and states are increasing, while military power and the balance of power are decreasing, but continue to be important. Putting forward the concept of complex interdependence, Keohane and Nye also noticeably distinguished interdependence and dependence when analyzing the role of power in politics and relations between international actors. Considerable attention was paid to the work of Keohane and Nye in the study of M. Suhr, which analyzed the interdependence and liberal institutionalism in detail as an approach to modern international relations.⁷ According to M. Suhr, a growing number of international actors become vital for the functioning of the international system. “This process of transnationalization, or intersocietalism, and broadening of the substance of foreign policy promoted an equivalent process of transgovernmentalism.”⁸ The authors of the complex interdependence theory talk about the emergence of new features of the international political process, emphasizing the strengthening of mutual influence between countries or between actors in different countries. Hence, non-hierarchy, multiple channels of interaction and diminishing role of the military forces are the characteristics of the theory. In the next sections, the focus will be on these three aspects.

⁵ Pavel Tsygankov, “Международные отношения (International relations)”, **New school (Novaya Shkola)**, 1996, p. 150.

⁶ Ibid. p. 3.

⁷ Michael Suhr, “Robert Keohane – a contemporary classic”, **The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making**, 2005, p. 96.
<https://hostnezt.com/cssfiles/internationalrelations/Future%20of%20international%20relations.pdf>, (01.11.2021)

⁸ Ibid. p.98.

1.1.1. “NON-HIERARCHY” AMONG ISSUES

Living in the era of interdependence makes foreign policy issues increasingly crucial. The policies of countries are interconnected, even if they are purely internal. Although it may seem that the policy is aimed at solving the problems of one country, any governmental activity and even laws can have global and regional consequences. These consequences have stimulated consulting agreements between countries through liberal institutions such as the European Community and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The absence of hierarchy allows international politics to be consistent with internal laws and problems determined by pluralistic, developed nation-states.

Bilateral relations develop under the influence of foreign policy acts of the states. The achievement of a ‘common sense’ in the implementation of their policies by states is ensured primarily by diplomacy, in the general context of international law. The evolution of international relations is characterized by the increasing dependence of states on each other in solving a variety of internal and external problems. The very fact of the growing network of dependencies (economic, scientific, technical, technological, etc.) as a consequence of the formation of global markets means nothing more than a change in the external conditions for the manifestation of sovereignty, but does not reduce its significance in any way.⁹

The external conditions are becoming more complex, weightier, and the state cannot ignore them when implementing its functions and obligations in both domestic and foreign policy. The more diverse the state's relations with the outside world are, the more significant the external factors are for the state. This is a general assumption, although, the degree of dependence of the state on external international life is differentiated in political, economic, informational, technological and other dimensions.

Modern international relations are based on interdependence. According to Klepatsky, “mutual dependence concerns not only economic relations: trade, finance and the organization of production on a global scale, but also political and social

⁹ Leonid Klepatsky, “Роль государства в международных отношениях в эпоху глобализации. (Role of the State in International Relations at the Age of Globalization)”, **Bulletin of the Russian State University, Series: Political Science. History. International Relations**, 2009, p. 134.

relationships between organizations and individuals around the world.”¹⁰ At the present stage of the development of the world economy, stock borders erased to some extent. The economy is becoming more global. All countries have become a part of one world market. Therefore, every single country depends on the processes that take place in other countries. Thus, in August 2007, the stock markets of many countries were caught up in the crisis that swept the world markets.¹¹

Mutual dependence is becoming multilateral. Structures force states to build their relations with the outside world accordingly. There is an increasingly obvious trend in international relations when states seek to avoid unilateral dependence, including in the most sensitive area – in the field of national security. Throughout history, states’ officials mostly paid attention to high politics. The current situation forces to erase the boundaries between foreign and domestic policy.¹² As history shows, foreign policy modifies due to a variety of factors, such as economic growth, a shift in the distribution of power resources, as well as other players in the international arena, who can also affect the agenda.¹³

Economics and politics have always been linked closely. The second half of the 20th century was the period when special attention was paid to economic factor of world politics. The economic crisis of the 1970s showed that high-level politics is powerless over economic growth.¹⁴ One of the most significant characteristics of international relations is that the core of IR consists of political interactions. Accordingly, international relations represented competitive struggle and comparability of interests, aims and values due to the absence of a legitimate center of power. History demonstrated that the center of the world policy analysis constituted clashes over power and the allocation of resources.¹⁵

Certain conditions have appeared that contributed to the emergence of such concepts as ‘global trade’ and ‘globalization of the world economy’, since the second half of the 20th century. The process of exchanging services and goods between states

¹⁰Ibid. p. 137

¹¹Lyubov Bondareva, “The impact of international economic relations on the development of the country’s economy”, **Vologda Readings**, Vol. 7, No: 1, 2007, p.30.

¹²Keohane and Nye, p. 33.

¹³Ibid. p.34.

¹⁴Bondareva, p. 31.

¹⁵Ibid. p. 31.

was becoming the most dynamically developing element of international economic relations at the same time. National economic problems have risen to the global level, requiring the mobilization of global resources and consideration of global economic interests. In addition, the importance of economic factors immeasurably increased in the international community, developing a new quality of IR. Firstly, after the Second World War, relatively new actors such as banks, global economic organizations and transnational corporations entered the world arena, taking a vital place in the international arena, including the sphere of power relations. The interests of national economic entities go beyond the national-state framework.¹⁶

Secondly, European economic integration qualitatively changed interstate relations in Western Europe after a period of constant wars. The processes of economic integration are also developing in other regions of the world – North and South America, Africa and the Asia-Pacific region. In 1995, there were 23 trade associations in the world, by 2007 there were 148.¹⁷ Many of the most economically successful regions – Western Europe, North America and Southeast Asia – have clearly emerged on the world stage.¹⁸

Thirdly, the priority goals of state policy in the international arena are changing in many ways compared to past historical periods. It is increasingly not the struggle for territories and spheres of influence that comes to the fore, but the desire for more profitable use of capital and access to sources of raw materials. Concepts of energy and economic security have appeared. In addition, oil has appeared as a qualitatively new force factor in the world since the 1970s.¹⁹ Other minerals can perform the same function in the future.

Moreover, technological and scientific progress led to the elimination of hierarchy among issues and caused an increase in the number of problems in the diplomatic agenda. According to Nye and Keohane, the changing world includes cyberspace, which is “itself a ‘place’, elsewhere and nowhere”.²⁰ The technological

¹⁶Yuri Shishkov, “Интеграционные процессы на пороге XXI века. (Integration Processes on the Threshold of the XXI Century (Vol. 1))”, **Moscow, III-millennium**, 2001, p. 15.

¹⁷Jed Greer and Kavaljit Singh, “A Brief History of Transnational Corporations”, **Global Policy Forum**, 2000.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Keohane and Nye, p. 33.

²⁰Ibid. p. 82.

sphere changes rapidly at a high rate. Technological progress is an endless process that involves the development, testing and integration of groundbreaking solutions in the daily life of humankind.²¹ Active development of technological innovations contributes to the development of the production organization.²² It is based on scientific discoveries, knowledge, and achievements. The technological revolution has led to the fact that the processes of creating and distributing the products have become a commodity.²³ High-tech branches of international production cooperation began to develop, which required maximum freedom of international movement of huge flows of nodes, parts, components of future finished products.

The efficiency of any country's economy depends on scientific and technological progress. "The information revolution has vastly increased the number of channels of contact between societies."²⁴ Recently, developed states have been paying special attention to a unified technical and scientific policy. It includes targeted actions that contribute to the comprehensive promotion of the scientific and technical spheres, in their interaction.

In the 20th-21st centuries, the interdependence and interconnection of various countries acquired a deep and comprehensive character in both economic and political relations. The internationalization of political, economic, cultural and many other aspects of the life of social organisms functioning as nation-state macrostructures has become a common manifestation of the growing interaction between the countries. Interethnic communication has changed at various historical stages – from the moment of the origin of the idea of the international division of labor up to the modern multilevel and complex system of international relations, from bilateral to regional and global levels.²⁵ The rapprochement of countries at the economic level became possible due to the sharp reduction of distances owing to rapid technological progress in the field of transport and telecommunications infrastructure, as well as the development of international entrepreneurship, considering the entire world space as a single field

²¹Mahmut Gareev, "Угрозы современного мира. (Threats of the modern world)", **Russia's National Priorities**, Vol. 11, No: 1, 2014, p. 9. <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/ugrozy-sovremennogo-mira>

²²Ibid. p. 9.

²³Shishkov, p. 10.

²⁴Keohane and Nye, p. 84.

²⁵Shishkov, p. 14.

for business.²⁶ Economic relations have gone beyond the borders of individual countries, gaining more and more independence from the interests and efforts of various states.

While in the Cold War era, the security problem was predominant, nowadays the problems of space, energy, environment, and epidemic diseases become critical and widespread issues that attract the attention of every actor in the international arena. In the next section, multiple channels of interaction will be examined.

1.1.2. MULTIPLE CHANNELS OF INTERACTION

The original approach of Nye and Keohane to the problems of state foreign policy in the context of the formation of a new world order is worth emphasizing. States are the leading and most important actors in the international system according to the realist approach. According to Keohane and Nye, international relations become transnational because the assumption that states are the leading units has been challenged.²⁷

In the international system, all phenomena arise because of the interaction of the elements of this system and the connections between them. The elements of the IR include both individuals and various social communities (ranging from small social groups, ending with social institutions), united by social ties and relationships.

The dynamics of international relations, especially between any two actors, always reveal the specifics of personal relations at the level of heads of state, members of the government as a significant (in some cases dominant) factor. The personal and individual aspect, the specificity of individual-personal relations are factors of world political processes, which are difficult to predict, constantly experiencing influences of different directions of political forces.

Moreover, at the beginning of the 21st century, the structure of world politics is quickly becoming more complicated. Non-state actors are starting to play an extremely remarkable role in global governance processes. International non-

²⁶ Ibid. p. 15.

²⁷ Keohane and Nye, p. 25.

governmental organizations (NGOs) have occupied a special place among them.²⁸ According to Dahan & Don, NGO is a factor that plays the role of one of the most important link in the mechanism of interaction between states.²⁹

The role of NGOs in solving global governance problems revealed itself in different forms. Nowadays, these structures are actively engaged in humanitarian assistance, protection of human rights and environmental protection, ensuring peace and security, participating in educational programs, sports projects, etc. NGOs bring to the attention of the world community and the governments ordinary people's demands and desires, exercise civil control over the activities of state bodies and maintain the active participation of the masses in political and public life at the local and international levels. They analyze and give an expert assessment of various issues, including trying to draw public attention to significant global problems at the present time.

By the beginning of the third millennium, global non-governmental organizations had established themselves legitimately as influential participants in international relations, despite the fact that the world political system is based on the principle of the primacy of states. In addition to humanitarian, environmental and human rights organizations, there are many other transnational non-governmental structures operating in the international arena today, solving a wide variety of tasks and having a different impact on the course of international processes.³⁰

One of the most important conditions for the full and active participation of NGOs in the processes of global governance is their interaction with nation-states. These relations take a variety of forms such as interaction, even opposing each other. For the most part, international non-governmental organizations prefer to cooperate with states, which brings them mutual benefits. NGOs receive legal and financial support from the country's politicians, and the latter uses the capabilities of primarily information, to improve the efficiency of the public administration system. An important function of international non-governmental organizations is their role in

²⁸Aleksey Naumov, "Международные неправительственные организации и проблемы глобального управления. (International non-governmental organizations and global governance issues)", **Public Administration. Electronic Bulletin**, Vol. 39, 2013, p. 48.

²⁹Nick Dahan et al, "Role of nongovernmental organizations in the business – government – society interface", **Business & Society**, Vol. 20, No.: 10, 2009, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650309350141>

³⁰Naumov, p. 51.

establishing links between states and non-state segments. In the international arena, NGOs can act as intermediaries between states or various state structures in solving certain critical situations. At the same time, the activities of NGOs are even more effective than the efforts of the state, since they concentrate all their energy on solving individual specific problems (humanitarian assistance, mine clearance, women's and children's rights, population issues, environmental and development protection, etc.), which allows not to disperse focus by using all their resources in one direction.³¹

Besides, transnational corporations (TNCs) also play a great role in the international relations as actors on the international arena. TNC is “any enterprise that undertakes foreign direct investment, owns or controls income-gathering assets in more than one country, engages in international production”.³² TNCs participate in every single significant process in the world economy. They directly and indirectly take part in the global political processes. TNCs act as the main force that shape the modern and future appearance of the world. They act as direct participants in the entire spectrum of world economic relations, as ‘engines’ of the world economy.

Multinational companies, on the one hand, are the products of quickly developing and more interconnected international economics, and on the other hand, they themselves represent a powerful mechanism for influencing them. Intensively influencing international economic relations, corporations create new economic and political relations and transform their existing forms. TNCs take a greater part in the fate of the country, in the international arena, participating in economic and political relations. The trading, vigorous production and investment activities of TNCs enable them to play role of an international regulator of production and distribution of products, as well as to exert a certain political influence on the world community and individual states.

The main feature of TNCs is the global character of operations. The global market has a great importance for TNCs. Therefore, the expansion of TNCs is carried out on a global scale. Their combined potential is quite comparable to the global economy as a whole. The main distinguishing characteristics is supranational activity,

³¹ John Clark, “The State, Popular Participation, and Voluntary Sector”, **World Development**, Vol. 23, No.: 4, 1995, p. 594.

³² John Smetanka and Thomas Biersteker, “Distortion or Development? Contending Perspectives on the Multinational Corporation”, **Contemporary Sociology**, Vol. 10, No.: 2, 1981, p. 244. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2066893>

which has a qualitative impact on all processes taking place in the countries of their location, primarily economic and political; which creates and manages supranational or national and international ties and relations.

TNCs are the ‘supporting structure’ of the entire modern world economy. They are active participants in the formation of a single political space of interaction and interpenetration among countries, peoples, and national economies. Through their activities, they contribute to blurring the boundaries between the economy and politics, between the domestic and foreign policies of states.³³ The actors of international relations differentiate in their shapes and forms, but all of them are crucial for the development of IR agenda. According to Keohane and Nye, “they act as transmission belts, making governmental policies in various countries more sensitive to one another”.³⁴

The nature of international relations is comprehensive, including exchange or transfer of both information and other resources, such as material and spiritual values through various communication channels. Keohane and Nye deny the usual understanding of power in IR, which supposes the presence of specific resources from the state. The scholars propose their own explanation of power in conditions of complex interdependence as the ability to achieve its goals by the state. This ability is defined by the position of the state in the structure of interstate and transnational relations, where international institutions play a special role. In addition, face-to-face meetings of officials lead to the rapprochement between states. The boundaries between domestic and foreign policy become vague through multiple channels of interaction.³⁵ In addition, this action tends to unite states and helps to understand the policy-making processes of each state. In the next section, diminishing role of the military forces will be examined.

³³Anastasia Krasavceva, “Роль транснациональных корпораций в мировых политических процессах глобализирующегося мира. (The role of transnational corporations in the world political processes of the globalizing world)”, **Bulletin of St. Petersburg University. Political Science. International Relations**, Vol. 6, No.: 3, 2007, p. 417.

³⁴ Keohane and Nye, p. 26.

³⁵ Ibid. p. 27.

1.1.3. DIMINISHING ROLE OF THE MILITARY FORCES

The end of the bipolar world system has led to a significant change in the principles of strategic stability in the world. Global and regional security issues are shifting from clearer issues of war and peace to less defined and more complex political, financial, and economic, ethnonational, demographic and other problematic issues. Armies and military forces have existed for a long time. Almost all countries have a professional army. The most acute socio-economic conflicts and political contradictions are characterizing the current stage of world development. Significant changes are taking place in the policy of developed countries related to the preparation and use of military force. These changes should be considered as a response of states to the changing reality of the world, as a way of their adaptation to new conditions of existence. However, given the speed of development of the modern world, is an army or other military forces are the real necessity? The question is complicated. While some would say that the army is necessary, some others would suggest that it is useless.

The armed forces of countries are actively involved in politics to ensure economic and other interests. Thus, after 1945, the United States of America (USA) resorted to military force or the threat of its use more than 300 times, including about 200 times committed to direct armed aggression on the territory of other countries in order to resolve problematic situations that threatened American political and economic interests.³⁶

The active desire of states to ‘show their muscles’ continued in the post-Cold War period when states invoked national security to control international agenda and certain masses.³⁷ The Cold War was a period when the threat seemed inevitable and permanent. That is why the idea of national security was constituted the basis of nation-states’ policies. However, “as the Cold War sense of security threat slackened, foreign economic competition and domestic distributional conflict increased.”³⁸ Therefore, unpredictable historical events forced ‘national security’ to share its relevance in international politics with the idea interdependence among nation-states.

³⁶Michael Ryhtik, “Государствостроительство во внешнеполитической стратегии США. (Nation-building in the US foreign policy strategy)”, **International Processes**, Vol. 1, No.: 2, 2003, p. 95.

³⁷Keohane and Nye, p. 6.

³⁸Ibid. p. 7.

Keohane and Nye created a foreign policy strategy based on the rejection of coercive measures such as military forces in solving problems in the atmosphere of tensions. The reflection of this policy is the impact on the mass consciousness of citizens of one country or on the whole world community regarding interdependence.

According to statistics, classical military actions in their traditional sense between states accounted for only 18-20% of the total number of armed conflicts in the period after the 1940s.³⁹ Armies are currently used significantly less often as an instrument of armed interstate confrontation than ever before. More than sixty years after the end of Second World War, out of about two hundred armies in the world, only 10-15% actually fought, and mostly in internal conflicts.⁴⁰ In addition, the troops of almost 50 states carry out peacekeeping functions.⁴¹ There has been a transition to a more prudent, measured use of military force, excluding immediate military interventions in internal conflicts of foreign states, and more active use of non-military methods of pressure.

Nowadays one of the commonly used methods of pressure are economic sanctions. They are a relatively new instrument of the foreign policy of states and other participants such as international organizations in international relations.⁴² The question of the effectiveness of sanctions, as well as their impact on the economic and political life of both the countries subjected to these measures and the states that imposed them, remains debatable. According to Allen and Lektzian, economic sanctions have side effects on the public health comparable to major military conflicts.⁴³ The objects and subjects of economic sanctions are changing but their goal is stable. The goal is to force a country with which, for whatever reason, there is less likelihood to fight, to behave correctly, from the point of view of the organizer of the blockade by ruinous restrictions in the economic sphere.⁴⁴ Sanctions found widespread

³⁹Viktor Serebryanikov, "Место и роль армии в современных исторических процессах. (The place and role of the army in modern historical processes)", **Military-Philosophical Bulletin**, Vol. 1, 2008, p. 29.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴²Enrico Carisch and Loraine Rickard-Martin, "Understanding Sanctions. In United Nations Sanctions on Iran and North Korea: An Implementation Manual", **International Peace Institute**, 2014, p. 1. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09648.6>

⁴³H. Susan Allen and David Lektzian, "Economic sanctions a blunt instrument?", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 50, No.:1, 2013, p. 123. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258155467_Economic_sanctions_A_blunt_instrument

⁴⁴ Carisch and Rickard-Martin, p. 1.

use since 1990s, when “the Security Council adopted thirty-nine resolutions imposing sanctions on nine countries and two groups (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola and al-Qaida)”.⁴⁵

The beginning of the 21st century was marked by the further development of another revolution in military affairs, which began at the end of the 20th century. The increasing role of high-precision non-nuclear weapons, intelligence and information tools have given the developed countries of the West an undeniable advantage when they use military force to solve their foreign policy tasks. Nuclear weapons continue to play the role of the main factor of strategic deterrence in the world so far. Therefore, military force was dangerous to use because of the threat of nuclear weapons.⁴⁶ The invention of nuclear weapons and their first use in 1945 forever changed the nature of the war, making a large-scale clash between nuclear powers impossible and thus displacing wars to the world periphery.

Changes in the world economy, the level and conceptual orientation of technical development in the last third of the last century created the preconditions for radical changes in the very concept of military construction.⁴⁷ Firstly, there is a departure from the past system of mass armies, which is the characteristic of the industrial era. The lagging behind of the armies of a number of states from the requirements of the time led to a catastrophic drop in their combat capability, a significant backwardness in the military-economic and military-social spheres. The effectiveness of such armies has fallen sharply with the advent of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), high-precision destruction systems, and the latest defense technologies.⁴⁸ According to Danyk Y., Maliarchuk T. and Briggs C., “implementation of technologies in innovative ways in all spheres of life facilitate and shape the basis for the transformation of theoretical and practical paradigms of war and conflict”.⁴⁹ Therefore, the war in its common nature is vanishing and the hybrid wars have become

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Keohane and Nye, p. 28.

⁴⁷ Igor Korylov, “Тенденции развития вооруженных сил ведущих государств мира в условиях меняющихся политических реалий. (Trends in the development of the armed forces of the world’s leading states in the context of changing political realities)”. **Army and Society** Vol. 1, No.: 3, 2010, p. 23. <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/tendentsii-razvitiya-vooruzhennyh-sil-vedushchih-gosudarstv-mira-v-usloviyah-menyayushchih-politicheskikh-realiy>

⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 21

⁴⁹ Yuriy Danyk et al, “Hybrid War: High-tech, Information and Cyber Conflicts”, **Connections**, Vol. 16, No.: 2, 2017, p. 15. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26326478>

more common. In the modern world, strategies that allow states to impose their will on the enemy are changing. Current alternative strategies outline a departure from the desire to physically crush the enemy and occupy adversary's territory, while preserving the traditional destructive potential in the arsenal of states, which was repeatedly in demand in the wars of the past.⁵⁰

Significant changes in the use of military force occur under the influence of information technology. Therefore, the usual battlefield transformed into a combat space that can acquire planetary scales in recent years. Modern information technologies are penetrating deeper into all spheres of society. This process is becoming so large-scale that it affects the vital interests of states, especially in the field of information security. Thus, a giant geopolitical rift in recent years, a completely new alignment of forces, significantly changed forms and methods of counteraction are clearly visible. In this regard, new approaches to the organization of defense and ensuring national security in general are required, taking into account the new nature of threats.⁵¹

One of these threats is a drastic climate change. Modern political science is in the process of transformation due to the variety of threats in the international arena. There is a race between two components of the global process: the growth of global threats fraught with catastrophe, and an adaptation process aimed at mitigating these threats. It is extremely dangerous to link the future of humanity with development in the previous direction of the last centuries. This direction has already exhausted its potential in many ways. A vital aim is the conscious formation of a policy for creating a global security system based on an interdisciplinary and political science understanding of planetary processes, as well as the creation of security systems of individual regions and states.⁵² In the process of evolution, people continuously change the structure of relations in the system of relations between people and nature. The most common approach in environmental policy is formulated as "nature as an object of use".⁵³ People are the basis of the idea of the environment as a sphere of human

⁵⁰Ibid. p. 10.

⁵¹Gareev, p. 10.

⁵²Nathan Jones and John P. Sullivan, "Climate Change and Global Security", **Journal of Strategic Security**, Vol. 13, No.: 4, 2020, p. 2. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26965514>

⁵³Oleg Artukhin, "Political aspects of counteraction to ecological and climatic threats", **State and Municipal Administration. Scientific Notes**, Vol. 7, No.: 2, 2011,

existence, which has possible and acceptable conditions for their development as part of the human community.⁵⁴ The transformation of ecological discourse is characteristic of the modern political process. It is necessary to strengthen the connection between science and production at the international level, and strengthen the expertise of the effectiveness and quality of interstate scientific developments. The consequences of irresponsibility can be unpredictable and irreversible.

In addition, international economic welfare is worth mentioning among modern issues of the international sphere. In the field of economic security, priority should be given to the creation of a technologically advanced modern economy as the main condition for the stability, and viability of the state, its military and national security as a whole. Speaking about the impact of the global crisis on international relations, of course, it should be emphasized that today the world community and international relations as a whole are experiencing a 'moment of truth'. According to Ahmad K., the global financial crisis of 2008 proved that "humanity today needs an urgent paradigm shift from elite oriented; free market fundamentalism based economic system to a human centric, just and equitable economic frame".⁵⁵ The complex interweaving of interests of various countries and the inability to realize them in the conditions of the financial and economic crisis that has erupted make them interdependent.⁵⁶ Therefore, a joint struggle is a necessity because of the problems that have arisen and are still emerging. In the next section, complex interdependence approach in foreign policy will be explored.

1.2. COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE APPROACH IN FOREIGN POLICY

After the ending of the Second World War, a new international reality began to take shape in the world. The activities of intergovernmental organizations

<https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/politicheskie-aspekty-protivodeystviya-ekologicheskimi-klimaticheskimi-ugrozam>

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Khurshid Ahmad, "Global Economic Crisis Need for a Paradigm Shift", **Policy Perspectives**, Vol. 8, No.: 2, 2011, p. 5. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42909284>

⁵⁶Ibid. p. 6.

intensified, and the process of improving the norms of international agenda was in full swing at this time. The efforts of one powerful state or even a community of such states could not solve most of the global problems. A thoughtful and balanced cooperation of the main civilizational entities was necessary. After the collapse of the bipolar system, the issue of a new world order arose most acutely. The increasing complexity of international relations in the late 20th – early 21st century suggests that the traditional models of a ‘bipolar’ or ‘multipolar’ world were outdated. The use of traditional approaches pushes strong states to actually unilateral military actions (the US invasion of Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.), and weak ones attempting to defend themselves from such interference (North Korea, Iran). All this leads to the escalation of conflicts, destabilization in certain regions of the world and the expansion of the set of threats to national security associated with the proliferation of WMDs, and confirms the need to search for new models of the world order that will be able to ensure stability.

Theory of complex interdependence includes global governance approaches considering the consolidation of international cooperation and the transformation of the international system. The anarchic system of sovereign nation-states is considered as a multilevel system with the inclusion of non-state actors. “Dependence means a state of being significantly affected by external forces...Interdependence refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries...”⁵⁷ “Political leaders often use interdependence rhetoric to portray interdependence as a natural necessity, rather than as a situation partially created by policy itself.”⁵⁸ Keohane and Nye created an objective and comprehensive concept of the analysis of international relations. The concept allows adapting some realistic methodological approaches to solve the tasks set within the framework of the neoliberal paradigm.

In the late 1970s, when Keohane and Nye came up with their revolutionary concept, it described the system of relations that was suitable for developed industrial countries.⁵⁹ Nowadays these changes in the system of international relations seem obvious and evident because they have already affected most of the world. In promoting their international interests, states base more on coordinating the efforts of national economic actors than on actions in the traditional foreign policy sphere.

⁵⁷ Keohane and Nye, p. 8

⁵⁸ Ibid, p.7.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

The interdependence can be symmetrical or asymmetrical. The degree of dependence may depend on the sensitivity and/or vulnerability of states. When something happens inside a state, the event can have consequences for others. It is important to note one nuance: this is not an interdependence between states as institutions, but it covers participants in interactions, types of activities, problems arising both inside and outside of states.

Complex interdependence approach is acceptable to most of the modern world. However, is it a symmetrical or asymmetrical interdependence? According to Neuss B., relationships between the USA and the European Union (EU) represent asymmetrical interdependence.⁶⁰ The author argues that the EU is a “hegemonic if not imperial power, able to successfully set European norms in both its own region and beyond.”⁶¹ The author emphasizes the fact that the last time the USA encouraged cooperation with only European leader – the Federal Republic of Germany. While now the USA promote cooperation with the “new” Europe in different spheres. Disagreements and disputes in trade between the USA and Europe took place in the 1970s, in the 1980s, and in the 1990s.⁶² They could affect the agricultural sector, in which the EU has traditionally adhered to a more protectionist policy than the USA. However, according to Neuss B., up to 2009, “no two economic regions were as closely intertwined as these”.⁶³ According to Portansky A., relations between the USA and the EU are currently in the worst state in the entire post-war period.⁶⁴ Washington's trade protectionism has led to a deterioration in bilateral relations.

Even before the election, former American President D. Trump declared his priority to focus on bilateral relations with each of the EU countries while weakening relations with Brussels, which caused a disapproving reaction from the EU. After two years of D. Trump's presidency, the key content of his foreign policy – demonstration of opposition to China – had become quite clear.⁶⁵ Trump's negative attitude to the state of multilateral institutions as such, in particular the World Trade Organization

⁶⁰Beate Neuss, “Asymmetric Interdependence: Do America and Europe Need Each Other?” **Strategic Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 3, No.: 4, 2009, p. 111. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26269171>

⁶¹Ibid. p. 121.

⁶²Alexey Portansky, “США – Европа: союзнические отношения под угрозой. (The USA – Europe: Allied relations under threat)”, **Modern Europe**, No.: 6, 2019, p. 31.

⁶³Neuss, p. 113.

⁶⁴Portansky, p. 32.

⁶⁵Ibid.

(WTO) and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), affected the deterioration of relations between the USA and the EU. The EU is acutely concerned about the policy of the former American administration. Remaining deeply connected and dependent on the USA in many areas, the EU should take actions in accordance with any scenarios for the development of transatlantic relations.⁶⁶

Another example of interdependence approach in foreign policy could be the relationships between Turkey and Greece. The bilateral relations between two states at the political and economic levels are subject to various factors of influence. For the first time since the landing of the Turkish military in Cyprus in 1974, a well-established communication mechanism was built between the governments of the two states.⁶⁷ However, a number of problems obstruct the expansion of bilateral dialogue with stable and occasionally expanding economic cooperation at the political level. The main problems are the Cyprus issue and mutual claims of sovereignty in the Aegean Sea.⁶⁸ The settlement of these issues seems to be mandatory not only for the development of bilateral relations, but also for the maintenance of security in general, since the clash of interests of these two states in the Aegean Sea can lead to the destabilization of the entire region.⁶⁹ In Turkish-Greek relations, the division into economic and political relations is clearly expressed. The political instability undermines confidence in the economic field. The generally stable growth in economic relations was the general trend in Turkey-Greece relations, despite long-term political disputes in 1999-2017.⁷⁰ Therefore, one should not overestimate the degree of influence of political relations on the economic sphere of cooperation.

As history and practice shows, interdependence in foreign policy in the contemporary international relations is widespread and undeniable. However, “the growth of economic and ecological interdependence does not provide clear,

⁶⁶Neuss, p. 113.

⁶⁷Boris Potzhveriya, **Turkey's Foreign Policy after the World War II**. Moscow: Nauka publ, 1976, p. 20.

⁶⁸Fuat Aksu, Confidence Building, Negotiation and Economic Cooperation Efforts in Turkish-Greek Relations (1990-2004), **Turkish Review of Balkan Studies**, 2018, p. 40. URL: <http://www.turkishgreek.org/yayinlar/makaleler/makaleler-1/item/120-confidence-building-negotiation-and-economic-cooperation-efforts-in-turkish-greek-relations>

⁶⁹Alexandra Atrashkevich, “Turkey and Greece: Political and Economic Relations within the Conflict Circumstances (1999-2017)”, **Vestnik RUDN. International Relations**, Vol. 19, No.: 4, 2019, p. 680. DOI: 10.22363/2313-06602019-19-4-675-689

⁷⁰Ibid. p. 680

deterministic guidelines for foreign policy.”⁷¹ States accustomed to dominating the international arena must learn to cope with their hegemonic habits in accordance with the changing world.

1.3. COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE AND SELECTED CASE STUDIES

The aim of this section is to show the wide prevalence of complex interdependence approach in the modern world. All the above-mentioned characteristics describe the approach in a detailed way. Summarizing the facts, complex interdependence is an approach that has new features of the international political process, including the strengthening of mutual influence between countries or between actors of the international relations. Complex interdependence approach has been employed to explain bilateral relations in a number of cases including USA-China relations and EU-Russia relations. Each of these case studies will be briefly mentioned in the following paragraphs.

The first case study analyzes the transatlantic relations between the USA and China. According to Zhao and Liu, by 2010 the USA and China reached the increasing level of mutual interdependence with some challenges of bilateral relations in the era of globalization.⁷² “Globalization is a double-edge weapon ... [that] can promote cooperation but also it may cause new conflicts”.⁷³ The authors argue that the complex interdependence approach can assist in the understanding of fragile Sino-American relations. The article examines the relations starting from the rising Cold War confrontation, describing the history of bilateral relations under the presidency of most significant figures of previous years. The authors discuss the great value of strategic dialogue and political trust, the economic rapprochement and military exchange creating mutual trust between China and the USA. All these aspects are the main characteristics of the complex interdependence approach, proving the applicability of the approach to Sino-American relations. In addition, the authors stress the importance of the Taiwan issue, confirming that the problem is a critical for bilateral relations.

⁷¹Keohane and Nye, p. 242.

⁷²Quansheng Zhao and Guoli Liu, “Managing the Challenges of Complex Interdependence: China and the United States in the Era of Globalization”, *Asian Politics & Policy*, Vol. 2, No.: 1, 2010, p. 5. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1943-0787.2009.01164.x>

⁷³Ibid. p. 2.

One way or another, the authors claim that complex interdependence approach is the most useful in understanding comprehensive Sino-American relations.

Complex interdependence approach is used to interpret China-Pakistan relations. According to Iqtidar Hussain, Israr Hussain & Iqar Hussain Qambari, despite the ideological differences, the relations between China and Pakistan developed steadily and mainly in the military and political spheres.⁷⁴ Thus, both China and Pakistan determine the value of the bilateral strategic partnership through the prism of their state interests. Islamabad is expecting that the investment opportunities of the world's second economy and Beijing's support in the international arena will help Pakistan to flourish. China has a purpose to reinforce its position in the Muslim world, while considering the territory of Pakistan as a trade and logistics bridge to the Middle East, Central Asia and Western Europe. "The Sino-Pak relationship has exemplified a nonviolent coexistence, win-win cooperation, and noninterference policy."⁷⁵

The same approach is also used to explain EU-Russia relations. The EU and Russia are unequal partners in almost all spheres. According to Havlik, their coexistence in the 21st century is called "the cohabitation of an elephant and a Russian bear"⁷⁶, describing their dissimilar economic and geographic positions in the international arena. The freezing of political contacts negatively affected the EU-Russia economic cooperation. In the first nine months of 2020, the EU's share in Russia's trade turnover continued to decline, while the dynamics of imports from the EU was only slightly worse than the average.⁷⁷ According to Knobel and Firanchuk, the share of APEC countries continued to increase, primarily due to the stable growth of China's share in trade turnover, supplies to which decreased by only 14%, and imports increased by 1%.⁷⁸ Over the past seven years, the EU's share in Russian trade has decreased. Russia is changing the vector of active trade from the EU zone to China.

⁷⁴Iqtidar Hussain et al, "History of Pakistan-China Relations: The Complex Interdependence Theory", **The Chinese Historical Review**, Vol. 27, No.: 2, 2020, p. 147, DOI: 10.1080/1547402X.2020.1831176

⁷⁵Ibid. p. 163

⁷⁶Piter Havlik, "Россия и Европейский союз. (Russia and the European Union)", **Modern Europe**, Vol. 1, No.: 13, 2003, p. 33.

⁷⁷Alexander Knobel, and Alexander Firanchuk, "Внешняя Торговля России В 2020 Году: Предварительные Итоги. (Russia's Foreign Trade In 2020: Preliminary Results)", **Macroeconomics**, Vol. 27, No.: 12, 2020, p. 11.

⁷⁸Ibid. p. 12.

If in 2019 the volume of exports and imports amounted to \$ 262 billion, then in 2020 it was already \$192 billion, which does not meet the interests of the parties. Despite the decline in trade turnover, the EU remains the main foreign trade partner of the Russian Federation and an investor in the Russian economy. According to Simionov, the recent EU-Russia relations are close to the realist paradigm with some aspects of complex interdependence.⁷⁹ Having mutual interests, but still terrifying each other with their military capabilities and harsh words, the EU and Russia cohabit in the modern world. Moreover, Russia looks for the ways to cooperate and argue with the member states of the EU than the EU itself.⁸⁰ Therefore, the complex interdependence approach in EU-Russian relations brings changes in the paradigm, proving bilateral relations as “a very challenging cooperation”. The EU is a consistent geopolitical competitor of Russia in the post-Soviet space, which Russia reasonably considers the sphere of its interests.⁸¹ The modern EU is also a geopolitical opponent of the Russian Federation. The conflict of values between Russia and the EU is deepening nowadays. However, mutual economic interests, the benefits of the international division of labor and cooperation will inevitably push both sides to economic cooperation. Cooperation between Russia and the EU in the field of cooperation on climate and the environment can also be fruitful. The strengthening of cultural ties between European countries and the Russian Federation contributes to the positive image of Russia in the eyes of the European citizens. Thus, an exhibition of paintings from the collection of Morozov brothers was successfully held in Paris.⁸² As history shows, science is outside politics because contacts between European and Russian scientists were not interrupted in the conditions of sanctions.⁸³

The recent contradictions between the EU and the USA on a number of issues can also contribute to the rapprochement of the EU with Russia. The USA bears the main burden of spending (22%) on the maintenance of NATO, despite the fact that

⁷⁹Loredana Simionov, “The EU and Russia Shifting Away From the Economic Logic of Interdependence – An Explanation Through The Complex Interdependence Theory”, **European Integration Studies** No.: 11, 2017, p. 125. <https://doi.org/10.5755/j01.eis.0.11.18501>

⁸⁰Ibid. p. 126

⁸¹Lubov Sidorova, “Россия И Европейский Союз: Проблемы Взаимодействия. (Russia And The European Union: Problems Of Interaction)”, **Greater Eurasia: Development, Security, Cooperation**, No.: 7, 2022, p. 531. <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/rossiya-i-evropeyskiy-soyuz-problemy-vzaimodeystviya>

⁸²Ibid. p. 531.

⁸³Ibid. p. 534.

Germany spends 2% of GDP, France – 1.5%, Great Britain – 1.8%⁸⁴. The US desire to increase the contribution of European countries to the NATO budget runs into their resistance. Moreover, the USA contributed to Brexit – the UK's exit from the EU, which led to its economic weakening. In addition, the USA tried to prevent the construction of the Nord Stream-2 in the interests of suppliers of American liquefied gas. The future of cooperation between these countries largely depends on US policy. The new administration of the US President Biden is forced to change its attitude towards the EU, given the growth of anti-American sentiment in Europe.

As history shows, complex interdependence is not a universal approach. The paper of Akkas and Altiparmak evolves question about the USA and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC) relations: whether it is still interdependence or unilateral dependence.⁸⁵ “With the increase in alternative energy sources to oil and self-sufficiency in energy needs in the USA, there has been a decrease in the country’s dependence on the Gulf region.”⁸⁶ However, in the current conditions, it is too early to talk about the unilateral dependence of the GCC countries and the USA, since the economic relationship between GCC countries and the USA has increased.

It is difficult to coexist in the contradictory world, which often leads to a clash of interests of states. Therefore, it is important to be aware of how to act in conflictual situations, through which to achieve the goals set, how to defend interests more effectively, while remaining in good relations with the opponent. Being in a conflictual situation, each state chooses its own style of behavior, depending on the importance of the goals and good relationships with the other side. At the same time, cooperation at least in one sphere allows states to solve the conflict and find common ground increasing the degree of trust. The benefits of cooperation are undeniable: each side gets the maximum benefit with minimal losses. However, this way of moving towards a positive outcome of the conflict is stony in its own way. It requires time and patience, wisdom and the ability to express and argue position without rupturing of bilateral

⁸⁴Alla Sekacheva, “Кризисные явления в экономике европейского союза на современном этапе его развития (Crisis Phenomena in the European Union Economy at the Present Stage of its Development)”, **The World of New Economy**, Vol. 15, No.: 1, 2021, p. 92. <https://doi.org/10.26794/2220-6469-2021-15-1-91-99>

⁸⁵Erhan Akkas, and S. Orhun Altiparmak, “The Reshaping Oil and Arms Trade between the United States and GCC: Is the Theory of Complex Interdependence Still Prevailing?”, **Journal of Asian and African Studies**, 2021, p. 1. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096211058880>

⁸⁶Ibid. p. 2

relations, developing alternatives and an agreed choice of them during negotiations for a mutually acceptable solution. The reward for common efforts is a constructive result that suits every side of the conflict, the optimal way out of the conflict found together, as well as the strengthening of partnership.

The participants aim cooperation at maximizing the realization of the conflict of interests. Unlike confrontation, cooperation involves a joint search for a solution that meets the aspirations of all conflicting parties. The lack of joint search for a solution is obvious nowadays. However, it is possible with prompt and exact root cause of the issue that gave rise to the contradiction, understanding of both foreign and latent reasons of the conflict, the will of the parties to act together to achieve a common objective for all.



CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKEY-RUSSIA RELATIONS

2.1. FACTORS SHAPING FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE TWO STATES

According to Levin, international relations are diverse, comprehensive, and equally binding for all subjects of international law.⁸⁷ Each state is a subject of international law that conducts its foreign policy on the world stage. In this connection, it must be considered as an integral system and it is hardly possible to understand the foreign policy of a particular state isolated from the system of international relations that determines its foreign policy within certain limits. Foreign policy is one of the integral functions of any state, which determines its direction of action, since states are part of the international community and a subject of international law and international relations. Foreign policy is an objective necessity of the existing social development. According to Hudson and Vore, the changing world order after the Cold War led the international community to pose a question about “how we should go about understanding today's world.”⁸⁸ Foreign policy, on the one hand, is the course and choice of the state's authority. On the other hand, in modern world a choice is not sufficient, since cooperation and interaction of subjects of international law are necessary.

The individuality of states determines their behavior within the international system. There are different factors that influence foreign policy making. The current socio-political situation in the Eurasian space has a huge potential for development. It opens up wide opportunities for economic cooperation for all states of the region. One of the illustrative examples of such interaction is the active economic cooperation between Russia and Turkey. This chapter will cover different elements and factors shaping Russian and Turkish foreign policy towards each other. Moreover, the leading developments of Turkish-Russian interaction will be explained.

⁸⁷Dmitry Levin, “International law, foreign policy and diplomacy”, **Moscow: International Relations**, 1981

⁸⁸Valerie Hudson, and Christopher S. Vore, “Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow”, **Mershon International Studies Review**, Vol. 39, No.: 2, 1995, p. 210. <https://doi.org/10.2307/222751>

2.1.1. FACTORS BEHIND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING TOWARDS RUSSIA

Every single state is a unique part of the modern world with its peculiarities and different national interests that shape the international agenda. Speaking about Turkey, it is a state located between Southeastern Europe and Western Asia. Its geographical location determines its foreign policy focus that is aimed at peaceful coexistence in such an advantageous position. According to Leonard A. Stone, “the practice of Turkish foreign policy... is a complex process that involves an intricate and varied blend of participants and determining factors.”⁸⁹ The development of foreign policy was influenced by the cultural and national characteristics of the people, the nature of the government of the country's leaders. In this context, historical peculiarities seem to be one of the fundamental factors in shaping the country's policy.

Alongside with the historical peculiarities, there are much more different factors, which have shaped Turkish foreign policy: Turkey is surrounded on three sides by the seas; it possesses the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles Straits, which together connect Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea through the Marmara Sea and the Aegean Sea. In addition, Turkey plays the role of a bridge at the junction of Europe and Asia with the presence of both spiritual and material ties between Europe and the Balkans, the Middle East and Asia. Turkey balances between focusing the attention on Islam and Turkish identity and on European culture.⁹⁰ The ambivalence of such relations affects the development of Turkey's foreign policy. One of the most important factors is its geographical location that played a significant role in shaping Turkey's foreign policy towards Russia. Sharing the same geographical position at the junction of Europe and Asia, Russia and Turkey got closer. Moreover, similar stages of development, from empires through revolutions and civil wars to their current nation-states were decisive factors in the development of bilateral relations. At the same time, relations between Russia and Turkey have undergone significant changes in their five-

⁸⁹A. Leonard Stone, “Turkish Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity”, **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 6, No.: 4, 2004, p. 71. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26328622>

⁹⁰E. Fuat Keyman, “A New Turkish Foreign Policy: Towards Proactive “Moral Realism””, **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 19, No.: 1, 2017, p. 56. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26300479>

hundred-year history, which were associated both with internal transformations of these states and with changes in the international context as a whole.

Over time, behavioral factors began to overlap with structural factors. Among them, a balancing policy, pro-Western policy, and various decision-making mechanisms. The policy of balancing can be observed mainly in relation to countries with weak defense and economically weak structures. Looking at history, the Ottoman Empire experienced difficulties with ensuring the security of its borders, since it entered into an alliance with England in 1870, and during the First World War – with Germany.⁹¹ The same policy continued during the War of Liberation and during the establishment of the Republic.

During the early of independence times, Turkey signed a friendship and neutrality treaty with the USSR (the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), and avoided participating the Second World War, it was liquidated because Turkey signed an alliance with Europe and later became a member of NATO.⁹² According to Sergey Moshkin⁹³, the USSR had some influence on the Turkish desire to become a member of the alliance. He states; “After decades, it is difficult to imagine whether Turkey would have joined NATO so quickly if the USSR had not exerted unprecedented political and diplomatic pressure on it in those years.”⁹⁴ The territorial dispute concerning Kars, Ardahan and Artvin, and alleged aspirations of foreign Armenians to return to their historical homeland should have put pressure on the Turkish side to resolve the issue in favor of the USSR.⁹⁵ Although the USSR was at the zenith of its power after the war, the Soviet leadership failed to achieve territorial concessions from Turkey. The so-called ‘Russian threat’ existed for Turkish authorities in the bilateral relations. During the history, it was one of the behavioral factors determining Turkish foreign policy. Turkey found another way out of the situation. Membership in NATO, which united yesterday's enemies and friends, had become such an emergency door. According to Moshkin, Turkey, once friendly to the USSR, has taken its rightful place

⁹¹Ilgar Mamedov, “Русско-турецкие культурные и исторические связи (15-21 века). (Russian-Turkic cultural and historical ties (15-21st Centuries))”, **Slavic Almanac**, 2019, Vol. 3, No.: 4, p. 260. <https://doi.org/10.31168/2073-5731.2019.3-4.1.13>

⁹²Ibid. p. 261.

⁹³Sergey Moshkin, “Рука Москвы в истории вступления в НАТО. (“The Hand Of Moscow” In The History Of Turkey Entry To NATO)”, **Political Expertise: Politex**, Vol. 5, No.: 4, 2009, p. 245.

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Jamil Hasanli, “USSR – Turkey: Cold War testing ground”, **Adilogly**, 2005, p. 17.

in NATO, having received the status of a potential enemy in the USSR for many years.⁹⁶

NATO welcomed Turkey with open arms. Since joining the alliance for about 60 years, it has been considered the ‘pot of gold’ of the military-political bloc of Western states. NATO highly appreciated the entry into its ranks of the country with the largest army in Europe.⁹⁷ Moreover, according to Pearson and Burwell, the relationship between Turkey and the USA had a direct impact on the relationship between Turkey and NATO and vice versa.⁹⁸ In addition, the membership in NATO helped Turkey to keep in touch with the EU. Furthermore, geostrategic position of Turkey at the southern borders of the USSR, controlling the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits and having access to the Mediterranean and Black Seas seemed beneficial for the alliance.

However, according to Burak Bekdil, today’s relationship between NATO and Turkey are not as bright as it was in the beginning.⁹⁹ Turkey has strengthened its position on the international arena pioneering in military sphere consolidating its ties with countries unfavorable to NATO. Turkey was the first member of NATO who purchased Russian S-400 missiles in 2017 and held a joint military exercise with Syria in 2009.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, NATO-Turkish relationships has been affected by the historical events. “NATO restrained Turkey’s options” referring to the northern Cyprus issue in 1974 at every opportunity¹⁰¹.

Recently, Turkey has become more independent and autonomous. As a member of NATO, together with the USA and its other Western allies Turkey can deny unfavorable ideas and make independent decisions if it is necessary. According to the document voted in the Turkish parliament on March 1, 2003 during the war between Iraq and the USA, Turkey refused the American initiative.¹⁰² During the military

⁹⁶Moshkin, p. 246.

⁹⁷Ibid, p. 247.

⁹⁸W. Robert Pearson, and Frances G. Burwell, “Turkey and NATO: New Images and Old Questions In The Evolution Of U.S.-Turkish Relations In A Transatlantic Context”, **Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College**, 2008, p. 62. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12097.8>

⁹⁹Burak Bekdil, “Turkey and NATO: From Loveless to Hateful Marriage”, **Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies**, No.: 760, 2018, p. 2. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep16960>

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹Pearson and Burwell, p. 63.

¹⁰²Ibid.

conflict between Russia and Georgia, Turkey, putting forward the Montreux Convention, stood against the American desire to send its navy to the Black Sea¹⁰³.

With the ending of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, a comprehensive foreign policy began not only with its legal successor, Russian Federation, but also with Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and other post-Soviet republics.¹⁰⁴ According to Kudryashova, Turkish influence on Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Chechnya and Dagestan can be explained by their cultural, religious and ethnic proximity.¹⁰⁵ Turkey has begun to rediscover its closest partners. Similar representatives turned out to be countries in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, on the north of the Black Sea and even countries from Pakistan to Indonesia showed good will, behaving benevolently.¹⁰⁶

In Turkey, the USSR was perceived as a powerful state capable of challenging any country. Today the situation is reversed. According to Mamedov, the danger may arise due to the weakness of Russia, whose future directly depends on how much it will be able to accelerate its socio-economic development.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, Russia remained one of the closest partners for Turkey. One of the reasons for this warm relationship is the change of the ruling parties in Turkey. At the same time, with the change of the political regime in Russia, instead of the threat of war on its part, the need for cooperation and interaction began to increase. In parallel, Russia began to be perceived not as an enemy, but as a trading partner. The 1990s was the period of prosperity of bilateral trade. Due to the profound crisis of the Russian economy, a sharp increase in demand for consumer goods from abroad has begun. Turkey with its developed food and textile industries has become one of Russia's main trading partners in the 1990s. Only in 1993-1997, Turkish supplies to Russia increased 4 times, and

¹⁰³A. Michael Reynolds, "Turkey's Troubles in the Caucasus", **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 10, No.: 4, 2008, p. 15. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26330808>

¹⁰⁴Simen G. Aamodt and Lars Haugom, **Tilting towards Russia, but anchored in NATO: Turkey's foreign policy activism and its implications**, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2019. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25806>

¹⁰⁵Yulia Kudryashova, "Укрепление российско-турецких отношений: суть и перспективы. (The Intensification Of Russian-Turkish Relations: The Essence And Prospects)", **Bulletin of the Moscow State University of International Relations**, 2012, p. 40

¹⁰⁶Stone, p. 72.

¹⁰⁷Mamedov, p. 268.

this was without taking into account officially unaccounted trade ('luggage trade'), the volumes of which were also very significant.¹⁰⁸

Starting from the Ottoman period to the present day, the perception of Russia in the ruling circles of Turkey has been changing. The attitude and mood towards Russia was changed depending on the steps taken by the people who were in power at a given time. With the coming to power in 2002 of the Justice and Development Party (JDP), aspirations for change, criticism of past implementations, as well as the search for new, alternative directions begin to manifest themselves in Turkish foreign policy.¹⁰⁹ The foundations for the implementation of a new approach in Turkey's foreign policy have been laid. There are different features of the new policy. The policy of Zero problems with neighbors assuming friendly and positive relations in Turkey's "immediate vicinity; that is to say, in its relations with neighbors."¹¹⁰ The policy implies the minimize interference in the internal affairs of neighboring countries. While the tasks of ensuring democratization and peace are being set in other countries, Turkey set a course for ensuring stability in the country, alongside with active peace policy.¹¹¹

In addition, Turkey has presented itself as the center of Turkic culture. The development of Turkey is inseparable from the processes taking place in neighboring countries and, one way or another; they also have their negative or positive impact. An example is the Gulf War. Turkey has changed its view on foreign policy and moved away from the position of non-interference. In addition, Turkey shifted away from pro-Western position in this crisis. Moreover, the development in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia have shown this specifically. Turkey could not remain uninterested to the conflicts in Iraq, Nagorno-Karabakh, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, and the war in Chechnya. Great powers, primarily the USA, have discovered Turkey's important position. In addition, this has provided an opportunity in foreign policy to

¹⁰⁸Alexandr Khodunov, "Российско-турецкие отношения на рубеже 1990-2010 гг. (Russian-Turkish Relations in the 1990s and 2010s)", **A Word To Young Scientists**, No.: 4, 2016, p. 86.

¹⁰⁹Shadi Hamid, "From Erbakan to Erdoğan: The Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy", **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 6, No.: 1, 2004, p. 117. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26328859>

¹¹⁰Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. "Policy of Zero Problems with our Neighbors", <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/policy-of-zero-problems-with-our-neighbors.en.mfa#:~:text=In%20this%20context%2C%20the%20discourse,them%20as%20much%20as%20possible> (24.04.2022)

¹¹¹ Ibid. p. 118.

take actions that are more detailed. The level of respect and trust for Turkey has increased both in the region and in the world as a whole.

2.1.2. FACTORS BEHIND RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING TOWARDS TURKEY

Russia is a peculiar and unpredictable state with its characteristics and a centuries-old history. According to Billington, “no nation ever poured more intellectual energy into answering the question of national identity than Russia.”¹¹² Russia is a federation consisting of 22 republics, 9 territories, 46 oblasts, 3 federal cities, 1 autonomous region and 4 autonomous districts. On the territory of state representatives of more than two hundred nationalities live.¹¹³ Despite the fact that Russian is the mother-tongue of more than ninety percent of the population, the peoples of Russia speak more than 300 languages and freely profess all world religions and traditional national beliefs.¹¹⁴ Therefore, Russia is a multinational country. Multinationalism of the country was one of the peculiarities of its foreign policy. The multinational nature of Russia has been formed for centuries, including the accession of the Finno-Ugric and Turkic nations to Russia.¹¹⁵ The magnetic force of attraction included the similarity of cultures and languages. It attracted the Turkic-speaking regions to each other. Cooperation with Turkey, as one of the brightest representatives of such Turkic-speaking countries, was viewed in a favorable light for conducting foreign policy.

However, according to Isachenko, “trust is of secondary importance, as is the quality of personal relations between the Turkish and Russian presidents. More important is the interdependence between Russia and Turkey.”¹¹⁶ The relations between Turkey and Russia include the complexities of the interweaving of history

¹¹²H. James Billington, **Russia in Search of Itself**. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004.

¹¹³Dugarova, Tatyana et al. “Сохранение и развитие языков народов России: проблемы и перспективы. (Preservation and Development of the Languages of the Peoples of Russia: Problems and Prospects)”. **Bulletin of Vyatka State University**, Vol. 137, No.: 3, 2020, p 77. <https://doi.org/10.25730/VSU.7606.20.042>

¹¹⁴Ibid. p. 78.

¹¹⁵Mamedov, p. 270.

¹¹⁶Daria Isachenko, **Turkey and Russia: The Logic of Conflictual Cooperation**. Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik, 2021, p. 5. <https://doi.org/10.18449/2021RP07>

including relations between the two peoples, combining common interests due to similar internal and external conditions, with confrontation and competition of the states.¹¹⁷ Many parallel and mirror events speak of the similarity and complementarity of the historical destinies of Russia and Turkey and their peoples. It was rather a pattern that after the simultaneous collapse of the Russian and Ottoman Empires, the new states that emerged on their ruins helped each other and developed a new ideology. Kemalism in Turkey, like socialism in Russia, became the answer to the search for ideological and value self-determination after the collapse of empires, when it was necessary to create new states on other foundations.¹¹⁸

At the same time, there is a lot of dividing things in the long history of Russian-Turkish relationships. During the history, the Ottoman Empire was one of the most hostile states towards the Russian Empire. According to calculations, there were 10 wars between the empires, starting from Peter the Great and up to the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878, including the Crimean War, when the Ottomans fought against Russia in alliance with Western powers.¹¹⁹ For Russia during this period, the most important foreign policy priorities were the Eastern question, the struggle for the Straits, and the protection of the Slavic population of the Balkans. However, rapprochement of the states became especially dynamic after the collapse of the bipolar system and with the beginning of geopolitical contacts between Russia and Turkey in the post-Soviet space and in the Middle East. The transformation of relations between Russia and Turkey had a serious impact both on the states and on the region as a whole. The beginning of intensive changes in relations between Russia and Turkey can be considered after the collapse of the USSR.¹²⁰ Geopolitical competition in the post-Soviet space, the problem of terrorism and economic cooperation were the main areas of interaction.

The history of bilateral relations full of wars and confrontations necessitates the question: “what has made Ankara and Moscow set aside their differences and work

¹¹⁷Mamedov, p. 271.

¹¹⁸Mamedov, p. 269.

¹¹⁹B. Duygu Sezer, Turkish-Russian Relations a Decade Later: From Adversity to Managed Competition, *Perceptions*, Vol. 4, No.: 1, 2001, p. 7.

¹²⁰David Bdoyan, “Периоды трансформации в российско-турецких отношениях. (The transformation periods in the Russian-Turkish relations (1991–2016))”, *MGIMO Review of International Relations*, Moscow, 2017, Vol. 4, No.: 55, 2017, p. 167. <https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2017-4-55-165-182>

together in spite of their history of enmity?”¹²¹ Analysts suggest that there are three options of developing relations between the states. These are “energy policy interests, disaffection from the West, and the personal chemistry between the presidents.”¹²²

Russia has huge reserves of natural resources. Turkey, in turn, has a significant potential in the transportation of hydrocarbons to European countries, which has been actively implemented since the early 2010s.¹²³ Since then, by laying pipelines on its territory, Turkey has gradually increased the volume of transit of hydrocarbons to the countries of Southern Europe from Russia and other states. Therefore, Russian-Turkish interaction beneficially complements the bilateral relations. Due to the development of transit, Turkey is gradually strengthening its role in the global energy market.¹²⁴ In turn, it is obvious that Russia is interested not only in the profit received from the sale of raw materials, but also in promoting its interests in the Middle East through strengthening its influence over the region.

In these conditions, energy cooperation within the framework of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey, and the EU has a particular importance. The strong dependence of the participants in this relationship, their confrontational moods require the achievement of a strategic compromise. Despite the long-term dependence of European countries on energy supplies from the Russian Federation, the events of recent years have complicated relations between Russia and the EU, but not between Russia and Turkey. On the contrary, in recent years Turkey has only strengthened cooperation with Russia, which allows it to strengthen its position in its relations with the EU. According to Telegina and Khalova, Turkey is trying to conduct a balanced foreign policy with the countries of Russia on the one hand and the EU on the other hand¹²⁵. At the end of the day, it allows Russia to strengthen its role as a leading energy player on the Eurasian continent. According to Isachenko, “when Moscow and Ankara initiated the Blue Stream pipeline project in the late 1990s, energy was assumed to be the main driving force behind the cooperation.”¹²⁶

¹²¹Isachenko, p. 5.

¹²²Ibid. p. 6.

¹²³Elena Telegina and Gulnar Khalova, “Энергетическая политика Турции на современном этапе (Turkey’s energy policy at the present stage)”, **Energy Policy**, Moscow, 2021, p. 44.

¹²⁴Bdoyan, p. 167.

¹²⁵Telegina and Khalova, p. 49.

¹²⁶Isachenko, p. 5.

As for the alienation of the West, both Russia and Turkey have been criticized for their foreign policy actions. “Russia’s relations had been fraught since 2014 because of the Crimean question and Turkey’s had worsened as a result both of its policy in the Middle East and of domestic developments in Ankara.”¹²⁷ Overall, the rapprochement of Turkey and Russia seemed as the mutually beneficial collaboration in such conditions. Moreover, the unique relationship between the leaders of both countries was conducive to the rapprochement of the two countries in the international arena.¹²⁸ According to Isachenko, the style of leadership of two presidents was one of the important conditions for their rapprochement, as well as their personal relations.¹²⁹

In addition, the desire for economic prosperity through economic cooperation should be mentioned as one of the factors behind Russian foreign policy-making towards Turkey. Despite some political differences of opinion, economic relations have been actively developing and have had a positive impact on bilateral relations in general.¹³⁰ As the real picture of Russian-Turkish foreign economic activity shows, more than 80% of Russian exports are returned back by Turkish consumer goods and the machine-building industry.¹³¹ Trade turnover is increasing and the market economy is being freed from government restrictions, new investment projects are being concluded and implemented.

However, according to I. Kusa, “Turkey and Russia are certainly not friends or allies, but over the years they have managed to reach a unique and stable set of agreements and mutual understandings in different regional playgrounds.”¹³² The basis of Russian-Turkish relations is the emerging international context. Turkish analysts called the Turkish-Russian relations of the 1990s a ‘golden age’, the core element of which was the disappearance of Russia's image as a country dominated by territorial and ideological expansionist aspirations and aggressiveness¹³³. In modern conditions,

¹²⁷ Ibid, p. 6.

¹²⁸ Bdoyan, p. 167.

¹²⁹ Isachenko, p. 5.

¹³⁰ Bdoyan, p. 167.

¹³¹ Natalya Budarina and Ilyas Ibragimov, “Россия и Турция: новые тенденции и перспективы на современном этапе. (Russia and Turkey: new trends and prospects at the present stage)”, **RUDN Journal of Economics**, 2020, p. 449. <https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-2329-2020-28-3-440-449>

¹³² Ilya Kusa, “Turkey Quietly Positions Itself Between Ukraine and Russia, with a View to Boosting Its Regional Leadership”, **Wilson Center**, 2022, February 9, Retrieved March 19, 2022, from <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/turkey-quietly-positions-itself-between-ukraine-and-russia-view-boosting-its-regional>

¹³³ Mamedov, p. 270.

Russia and Turkey found themselves in a similar situation like a century ago. Relations with the West are deteriorating, sanctions are being imposed against states, and their interests are being ignored. In both countries, there is a need to formulate and articulate a new identity. The politics of rivalry, domination or unilateralism seems unpleasant for both sides. Cooperation and partnership seem to be a preferable and promising geopolitical and historical-cultural choice.

2.2. LEADING DEVELOPMENTS OF TURKISH-RUSSIAN INTERACTIONS IN THE 1990S

The main aim of the politicians, scientists and other people interested in the IR is to find a balance in the bilateral relations of the actors. Stable international system should be a priority task in the foreign policy of the states. However, the fact that international contradictions are one of the main elements of international relations is worth mentioning.¹³⁴ Therefore, international relations is a system with contradictions and conflicts, mutual developments and agreements between actors in the international arena. As a number of disagreements between actors in various spheres of interests arises, the environment of tension increases. Unfortunately, it is institutionally uncontrollable process in the current system. The lack of objective control over the scale of the proliferation of emerging threats that can harm security leaves actors alone within an aggressive environment. That calls into question their positive development, and in special cases, the security of existence.¹³⁵ Therefore, in order to solve the issues raised by the errors of the past, the world community needs to unite with the tasks of the future.

The relations between Turkey and Russia resemble the relations of two siblings. Having close ties, brothers are behaving towards each other in different ways. Treating each other with respect and love, in some cases they could not resist teasing each other. Having some influence on the rest of the region, Russia and Turkey are the great and middle powers accordingly. "Russia and Turkey have been involved in

¹³⁴Dmitriy Kavitsky, "Конфликты в международных отношениях. (Conflicts In International Relations)", **Bulletin of the Moscow State Linguistic University: Social Sciences**, Vol. 834, No.: 1, 2019, p. 122.

¹³⁵Mark Kunets, "Dialectics of system of the international relations", **European Science**, 2015, p. 1.

remarkable redefinitions of their foreign policies while navigating through turbulent times in the Post-Cold War era.”¹³⁶ In view of this, the chapter will analyze the main contradictions and spheres of cooperation in Turkish-Russian relations.

2.2.1. DEVELOPMENTS, WHICH LED TO CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO STATES

The fact that international conflicts usually mean a case of sharp opposition of two or more countries is commonly known. This opposition is the result of internal confrontation. Assuming that international relations is a system, conflicts are a distortion of this system. For some researchers, an international conflict is a confrontation caused by a clash of political interests of foreign countries.¹³⁷ An international conflict is primarily a political position that generates some contradiction between states. Russia and Turkey have a long history of relationships full of ups and downs. This part of the chapter will cover the dark side of bilateral relations.

Due to the long history of wars between the predecessors of Russia and Turkey, it is impossible to deny the competition and contradictions between the interests of states. Most of the conflicts were intertwined with the geographical location of both states and their neighboring countries. Turkey sets an ambitious goal to become a center of power in Eurasia and at the same time has a course to establish a constructive policy of establishing long-term relations with Russia. According to Mamedov, Russia views Eurasia as a zone of its natural interests, and Turkey – through the prism of its cultural and historical ties.¹³⁸

In the period of Cold War, foreign policy of Turkey and the entire strategy of ensuring the country's security was based precisely on the fact that its geographical proximity to the USSR made it strategically important for the West.¹³⁹ However, after the collapse of the USSR, the imaginary bubble of such prejudices burst and Turkey

¹³⁶ Inan Rüma and Mitat Çelikpala, “Russian and Turkish Foreign Policy Activism in the Syrian Theater”, **Uluslararası İlişkiler/International Relations**, Vol. 16, No.: 62, 2019, p. 65. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26664886>, (01.03.2022)

¹³⁷ Kavitsky, p. 122.

¹³⁸ Mamedov, p. 271.

¹³⁹ Igor Torbakov, “Turkey and Post-Soviet Eurasia: Seeking a Regional Power Status”, **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 7, No.: 2, 2005, p. 115. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26328734> (01.03.2022)

found itself in complete uncertainty about its security. With the formation of liberal democratic states in Eastern Europe, Western Europe received a buffer zone between itself and Russia, while Turkey still felt threatened by the unpredictable situation in the immediate vicinity of its borders. Therefore, new horizons were opening up for Turkey. The formation of new independent states in the Caucasus after the ending of the Cold War raised the importance of Ankara, but at the same time created serious risks for it.

The collapse of the USSR saved Turkey from the age-old Soviet danger, but at the same time created a vacuum of power on its borders.¹⁴⁰ After the collapse of the USSR, Turkey played a very important role in some Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, establishing political ties with them. Turkish influence on Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Chechnya and Dagestan is explained by their cultural, religious and ethnic proximity.¹⁴¹ According to Onis, “a closer bond with people of common historical descent was a means of overcoming Turkey's traditional fear of isolation and insecurity.”¹⁴² ‘Pan-Turkic’ aspirations of Turkey were undermining the security of Russia. Moreover, the support of Turkic-speaking part of former Soviet Republics did not end in words. According to Torbakov, Russia had repeatedly accused Turkey of supporting “both morally and financially the Chechen separatists during the first Chechen war.”¹⁴³ That was one of the grand tensions between Turkey and Russia. At this time, Russia interpreted these events as the threat to its security. That is why Russia was trying to limit Turkey's aspirations to the regions of the Black Sea and the Southern Caucasus, as well as to its regions in the Volga region and Northern Caucasus. At the same time, Turkey has become an important counterweight to Russia's dominance in the Caucasus region.¹⁴⁴ Turkey expected to receive significant economic benefits from strengthening ties with the newly independent states. Turkey has also actively lobbied for the construction of gas and oil pipelines that would allow the Caspian region's energy resources to be supplied to the

¹⁴⁰ Mustafa Aydin, “Turkey and the Caucasus states”, **Caucasus and Globalization**, Vol. 1, No.: 1, 2006, p. 52.

¹⁴¹ Torbakov, p. 116.

¹⁴² Ziya Onis, “Turkey And Post-Soviet States: Potential And Limits Of Regional Power Influence”, **Middle East Review of International Affairs**, Vol. 5, No.: 2, 2001, p. 68.

¹⁴³ Torbakov, p. 122.

¹⁴⁴ Alexander Rondeli, “The forces of fragmentation in the Caucasus”, **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 2, No.: 3, 2000, 65-76. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26299987>, (02.03.2022)

world market through its territory.¹⁴⁵ Thus, by mid-1992, Ankara had made a bold bid for political, financial, cultural, military and economic influence in the region.

Similar competition may arise in some areas of the Balkans. The Balkan peoples themselves often experienced the mutually exclusive influence of different countries and their development models. Among them are the Ottoman Empire – Turkey, and the Russian Empire – the USSR, and Austria-Hungary, and then Germany and the EU.¹⁴⁶ After the collapse of the USSR, the breakup of Yugoslavia had created a wave of formation of newborn independent states. The newly formed Balkan States tried to independently represent and defend their interests. However, the countries of the Western Balkans have tried to overcome the ‘buffer barrier’ and have moved forward in terms of coordinating economic policy and the institutional side of interaction with a united Europe.¹⁴⁷ These events were of great importance both for Europe and Asia, and for the international context as a whole. The ethnic and religious conflicts that broke out simultaneously, some of which have not been resolved up to this day.¹⁴⁸ They were both one of the prerequisites and one of the important consequences of the transformation of the Eurasian space.

Russia has special relations with Serbia and the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the other hand, Turkey has special relations with Albania, the Muslim part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Albanian population of Northern Macedonia, with partially recognized Kosovo. According to Bechev and Secieru, “the Balkans are a fertile ground for external authoritarian powers to exert influence.”¹⁴⁹ The unstable situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, disagreements over Kosovo, and potential destabilization in the Serbian Sanjak and Southern Serbia could affect Russian-Turkish relations.¹⁵⁰ On the one hand, the Balkans are perceived through the prism of the historical heritage of the Ottoman Empire. The Muslim population of the

¹⁴⁵ Aydin, p. 52.

¹⁴⁶ Entina, Ekaterina. “Балканы вчера и сегодня. (The Balkans yesterday and tomorrow)”, **Modern Europe**, 2015, p. 10.

¹⁴⁷ Olga Vorkunova, “Балканы И Кавказ: Феномен Региональной Трансформации (The Balkans And Caucasus: The Phenomenon Of Regional Transformation)”, **Bulletin of the Moscow State Linguistic University: Social Sciences**, Vol. 1, No.: 838, 2020, p. 10.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 11.

¹⁴⁹ Dimitar Bechev and Stanislav Secieru, “Russia And Turkey In The Balkans: Parallel Tracks. In Fire And Ice: The Russian-Turkish partnership”, **European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)**, 2021, p. 52. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep34006.9>, (02.03.2022)

¹⁵⁰ Mamedov, p. 271.

countries of the Balkan Peninsula has a positive attitude to this. Muslim minorities (including Turkish Diasporas) in the Balkans see contemporary Turkey as a protector of their ethno-confessional concerns, which reinforce Ankara's desire to play the role of their patron.¹⁵¹ On the other hand, among the Orthodox peoples, the period of Ottoman rule is associated with the loss of their own statehood, and the struggle for independence is considered a heroic page of national history. For this reason, the active policies of Ankara in the region often raises fears of a return to the times of Turkish domination.¹⁵² The issue of prevention of the domination attracts attention of Russia in the Balkan region. Moreover, there are state entities with a predominance of the Orthodox religion in the Balkans, potentially gravitating towards Russia and being its historical allies.¹⁵³ However, the most important issue is the geostrategic position of the Balkan Peninsula. The proximity of the region to Southern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa determines Russia's interest in the Balkan Peninsula.¹⁵⁴

This state of affairs led to geopolitical competition and tension in Russian-Turkish relations. Moreover, one of the sensitive spheres leading to tension concerns the different perception of the terrorist organizations. Undoubtedly, both countries can agree on the fact that terrorism is the most acute, the most cruel and urgent problem that poses a threat to the whole world due to its scale, intensity, inhumanity and cruelty. However, the issue about the exact designation, accuracy and scope of this concept is questionable. As for the Turkish government, it is clear that Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) is a terrorist organization. Nevertheless, according to Ahmedov, the Russian authorities convinced Turkey that they could not put the PKK on the list of terrorist organizations, since they did not officially recognize the existence of the PKK as an organization.¹⁵⁵

Therefore, as history demonstrates, bilateral relationship is a coin with two sides. Having disputes in the goals of foreign policy, the cooperation in other spheres

¹⁵¹ Irina Svistunova, “Балканская Политика Турции: Роль Этно-Конфессиональных Меньшинств (Turkey's Policy in the Balkans: The Role of Ethnic and Religious Minorities)”, **Contemporary Europe**, Vol. 97, No.: 4, 2020, p. 61. <https://doi.org/10.15211/soveurope420206171>, (02.03.2022)

¹⁵² Ibid, p. 62

¹⁵³ Yuri Morozov, “Балканы в стратегии России. (The Balkans In Russia's Strategy)”, **Modern Europe**, 2000, p. 52.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 53.

¹⁵⁵ Teub Ahmedov, “Российско-Курдистанские отношения в 2000-2018. (Russian-Kurdish Relations in the 2000–2018)”, **Modern Scientific Thought**, 2019, p. 188.

is still possible. Living in a rapidly changing world, states are forced to have some spheres of cooperation.

2.2.2. DEVELOPMENTS, WHICH LED TO COOPERATION BETWEEN TWO STATES

The world is becoming more complex and the relationship between the subjects of international relations is becoming unclear and hardly defined. However, no matter how complex the world is, each country aims at solving issues of universal security, the coexistence of states in the international arena in favorable conditions for each other.¹⁵⁶ International policy is aimed at development of human society, growing mechanisms for coordinating the concerns of subjects of world politics, impending and resolving regional and global conflicts. All of these aims are important factors of stability and peace in international arena, ensuring the development of equality in international relations.

Relations between states can take various forms, which is proved by the relations between Turkey and Russia. Despite some clash of interests, economic and cultural ties have become intensified. According to Ibragimov, economic relations between Turkey and Russia have deepened since the early 1990s.¹⁵⁷ Repeating the history of pioneering in recognition, Turkey was one of the first countries who recognized post-Soviet republics and admitted Russia as the successor of the USSR. The signing of the treaty by 1992 the Agreement on the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey was a pivotal moment in the developments of bilateral relations.¹⁵⁸

Nowadays the intensification of economic interaction characterizes the global policy. At this time, the leading powers are consolidating their influence in weighty regions. The growing cooperation between Turkey and Russia demonstrates a

¹⁵⁶ Degoev, Viktor and Vasiliy Peskov. “Основные направления современных международных отношений. (The Main Trends of Modern International Relations)”, **Social and Humanitarian Knowledge**, 2012, p. 2.

¹⁵⁷ Evren Balta, “From Geopolitical Competition to Strategic Partnership: Turkey and Russia after the Cold War”, **Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations**, Vol. 16, No.: 63, 2019, p. 69. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26771801>

¹⁵⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Agreement on the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey”, 23.03.2022.

transformation in which supremacy of the West and the USA hegemony are challenged by the rise of new powers.¹⁵⁹ In this context, the focus is on the interaction between Russia and Turkey. Both countries are key states located on the border of Europe. They have created a proactive economic partnership, especially over the past decade, and a model of growing interdependence, which stands in stark contrast to the highly conflicted relations between the two countries over several centuries.

The existence of interdependence when one of the states has an economic advantage over the other is paradoxical. In Russian-Turkish relations, Russia is a stronger partner because of Turkey's dependence on Moscow for its energy resources.¹⁶⁰ Cooperation in the oil and gas sector has certainly become the core in building good-neighborly partnership relations between Russia and Turkey. The construction of the Blue Stream pipeline was an ambitious decision for solving the problems of energy hungry Turkey.¹⁶¹ The construction of the Blue Stream was a pivotal moment in the history of the development of modern gas transportation technologies. As part of the intergovernmental agreement, the Gazprom Company has signed a contract with the Turkish firm Botaş for the supply of 365 billion cubic meters of gas to Turkey.¹⁶² These events also demonstrate cooperation at the level of organizations. This unique gas transmission facility has no analogues in the world. The gas pipeline with a design capacity of 16 billion cubic meters of gas per year passes directly from Russia to Turkey through the Black Sea, bypassing third countries.¹⁶³ After the construction of the Blue Stream gas pipeline, 65% of all natural gas consumed by Turkey is supplied from the Russian Federation.¹⁶⁴ The interdependence of Russian supplies and Turkish purchases clearly shows that the states have chosen a long-term vector for the development of bilateral relations. This scheme of interdependence is vital from the point of view of limiting the options for negotiations

¹⁵⁹ Alimusa Ibragimov, **Turkey and Russia: Cooperation despite the Clash of Interests**. *Post-Soviet Studies*, Vol. 1, No.: 1, 2018, p. 70. <https://doi.org/10.24411/2618-7426-2018-00018>

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 70.

¹⁶¹ "Blue Stream: Bridge under Troubled Waters". *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 18, 1998, p. 35. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26726886>

¹⁶² Alexandr Kalashnikov, "Голубой Поток как важный фактор развития российско-турецких отношений. (Blue Stream as an Important Factor in the Development of Russian-Turkish Relations)", *Power*, 2, 2021, p. 100.

¹⁶³ *Ibid*.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p.101.

of a more vulnerable partner, which can also call into question the logic of the 'strategic partnership' created between the two states.

Mutually beneficial Turkish-Russian relations can also be considered in the concept of soft power through the cultural ties. According to Nye, the traditional power component of the foreign policy should be substantially transformed towards the 'correct' use of power resources and the active involvement of nonviolent forms of influence in the foreign policy strategy.¹⁶⁵ The cultural aspect is one of the most beneficial spheres. Russian Language Centers have been operating in Turkey since 2006, the functioning of which has begun to expand in recent years as part of the implementation of the Federal Program.¹⁶⁶ According to the Agreement signed by both sides, "the parties encourage direct cooperation between universities, organizations of cultural and art workers of the two countries."¹⁶⁷ The interaction of the states is implemented by attracting attention to the learning of the languages and expanding the availability of information about cultural heritage of both states.

Moreover, sphere of tourism as a tool of soft power has deepened bilateral relations. The Russian-Turkish dialogue in the field of tourism and mutual investments in the hospitality industry is being actively implemented, including from the perspective of the prospects for the development of all-season tourism.¹⁶⁸ Since 1990s, Turkey and Russia are actively contributing to the economics of each other due to tourism sector. After the collapse of the USSR during the 1990s, Turkey became a travel destination for many Russian 'shuttle traders' who brought consumer goods to Russia from Turkey. International trade in the form of so-called 'shuttle trade', 'suitcase trade', 'luggage trade' or 'trading tourism' became widespread after 1990 while the transition from a socialist to capitalist system took place.¹⁶⁹ In 1997, the trade

¹⁶⁵ Joseph S. Nye, "The Changing Nature of World Power", **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol. 105, No.: 2, 1990, p. 178. <https://doi.org/10.2307/215102>

¹⁶⁶ Zhanna Paveleva, "Фактор мягкой силы в отношениях между Россией и турецкой республикой на современном этапе (A Factor of Soft Power in Relationship between Russia and Turkish Republic at the Present Stage)", **Skif. Questions of Student Science**, Vol. 12, No.: 40, 2019, p. 364.

¹⁶⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Agreement on the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey", 23.03.2022.

¹⁶⁸ Paveleva, p. 367.

¹⁶⁹ Irina Mukhina, "New Losses, New Opportunities: (Soviet) Women In The Shuttle Trade, 1987-1998", **Journal of Social History**, Vol. 43, No.: 2, 2009, p. 341. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20685390>

turnover between Russia and Turkey amounted to approximately \$12 billion, of which the share of merchants accounted for \$8 billion.¹⁷⁰

Therefore, Turkish citizens are increasingly attracted to Russia as a place of business and commerce. Turkish business has actively infiltrated the Russian economy. Turkish companies have made significant investments in the production of consumer goods, the construction industry, the brewing industry, the retail sector, etc.¹⁷¹ According to Mihrabli, Turkish contractors made their entrance to former Soviet Union countries' construction markets for the first time in 1990s.¹⁷² Sphere of construction was damaged by the economic crisis of mid-1970s. Therefore, the move from domestic market to the international one was one of the problem-solving decisions. Moreover, the opportunities were more profitable. Russian Federation was one of the leading countries among international market with a share of 19.6%.¹⁷³ Hence, the investments and moving to the international markets required personnel. Adherent to have business with compatriots, Turkish investments intensified the movement of people.

In addition, joint participation in international organizations has promoted the development of a friendly environment. One of these important organizations is the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC). The fact that Russia and Turkey together set the stage for this cooperation demonstrates strong intent for promotion of beneficial relations between the states. Its mission "to further encourage the participation in the BSEC process of economic cooperation of other interested states, international economic institutions as well as enterprises and companies."¹⁷⁴ The Organization was created to promote cooperation, preserve peace, stability, and

¹⁷⁰ Sergey Ryazantsev and Ahmet Ichdulgu, "Туризм между Россией и Турцией: тенденции и перспективы. (Tourism between Russia and Turkey: trends and prospects)", **Tourism: Law and Economics**, 1, 2014, p. 3.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, p. 4.

¹⁷² Erikan Mihrabli, "Turkish Companies' Past, Present and Future in Russian Construction Market, Their Future Plans and Expectations after Economic and Political Crisis in Russia in 2014" (No. 3302067). **London South Bank University & International Business Academy**, 2015 https://www.academia.edu/29392217/Turkish_Companies_Past_Present_and_Future_in_Russian_Construction_Market_Their_Future_Plans_and_Expectations_after_Economic_and_Political_Crisis_in_Russia_in_2014

¹⁷³ Ibid, p.27.

¹⁷⁴ BSEC. "Black Sea Economic Cooperation: Our Mission". Black Sea Economic Cooperation. <http://www.bsec-organization.org/our-mission> (25.03.2022)

prosperity of the countries located in the Black Sea basin.¹⁷⁵ The strengthening of Russian-Turkish ties in the second half of the 1990s and the international situation made it necessary for the countries to cooperate. So far, collaboration of Russia and Turkey within the structure of the BSEC is mutually beneficial and has invested to the growth of trust in bilateral relations.

Two directions represent the economic component of Turkish foreign policy in the Black Sea region: foreign trade and energy. The common features of Turkey's trade turnover with the countries of the Black Sea region are raw material imports. Thus, an agreement was indicated to increase the volume of natural gas supplied from Russia to Turkey through existing and newly created gas pipelines to 14, then to 30 billion cubic meters per year.¹⁷⁶ Therefore, the cooperation between the states within the organization has positive side effect and has clout on the bilateral relations. Economic cooperation between Russia and Turkey can contribute to the relative alignment of the levels and rates of development of the countries of the region. According to Vartanyan, the BSEC participants, primarily Russia and Turkey, consider their regional economic cooperation as a contribution to the formation of a pan-European economic space.¹⁷⁷

Overall, Turkey and Russia are trying to coexist in the atmosphere of interdependence demonstrating their strength through spreading their values, culture and ideology. The image of perception of both states is maintained at a high level through the formation of public opinion regarding public, interpersonal and intergovernmental interaction.

¹⁷⁵ Egnara Vartanyan, "Россия и Турция: Партнерство в рамках Организации Черноморского экономического сотрудничества (Russia and Turkey: Partnership within Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization)", *Nauchnyy dialog*, No.: 5, 2018, p. 168. DOI: 10.24224/2227-1295-2018-5-165-178. (In Russ.).

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 170.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 175.

CHAPTER THREE

CONTEMPORARY TURKEY-RUSSIA RELATIONS

3.1. COMPARTMENTALIZED FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH IN THE FORMATION OF RUSSIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Mutual understanding is an invisible thread that connects the participants of communication. It inextricably connects them and helps them to solve complex issues so that the interests of both sides are taken into account. It is hard to achieve complete mutual understanding between people. However, it is even more difficult to be on the same page for the countries with even similar foreign policy aims. There is no secret that friendly international relationships arise through various obstacles. According to Secieru et al, Russia and Turkey have many similarities in their foreign and domestic policies.¹⁷⁸ “Both ... make extensive use of anti-Western nationalist rhetoric, scapegoating the US and to a lesser degree Europe, to mobilize grassroots support.”¹⁷⁹ Nevertheless, actors of international arena cannot reach an agreement on certain issues immediately. This chapter will cover spheres of tension and cooperation in the formation of relations between Turkey and Russia in the 21st century.

3.1.1. SPHERES OF TENSION

The changing international context has often led to geopolitical competition and tension in Turkish-Russian relations. However, conflicts do not automatically cause severance of diplomatic relationships. They may be just spheres of tension. The clash of interests in different spheres historically determined strong military, political and economic influence of the countries in their regions. Most of the clashes concern the foreign-policy building towards neighboring states. All subjects of international relations are called upon to carry out good-neighborly relations. Russia and Turkey are

¹⁷⁸ Stanislav Secieru et al, “Russia and Turkey Compared: Conflictual Camaraderie. In Fire And Ice: The Russian-Turkish partnership”, **European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)**, 2021, p. 7. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep34006.5>

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 7.

also trying to build their foreign relations on these principles. While Turkey and Russia are not neighbors, they share a common neighborhood. For the states, the principle of good neighborliness is very important for preserving state sovereignty in full and for cooperation with partner states based on common pragmatic interests.¹⁸⁰ However, diverse perceptions of the situations in different events darken bilateral relations.

One of these spheres of tension has occurred in the Middle East region. Regional developments have always attracted the attention of other states. The Middle East has always been a place of serious contradictions, where the interests of most countries located in this region and abroad collided. Today, the situation in the Middle East is increasingly plunging into chaos. Under the guise of the chaos, many countries, in an attempt to strengthen their influence and under the cover of protection of their interests, intervene into domestic affairs of the Middle East states under various pretexts. The Arab Spring served as a good excuse for the start of active involvement by some countries, which later turned the Middle East into a patchwork quilt, cut by the inept hands of politicians and torn by conflicts until now.

3.1.1.1 THE LIBYAN CONFLICT

February 2022 marked the 11th anniversary of the starting of the protests in Libya, which led to the crash of the authoritarian regime of Muammar Gaddafi and the collapse of the country. On February 15, 2011, demonstrations began, which quickly turned into an armed uprising with the support of NATO countries.¹⁸¹ Since then, Libya has been a field of armed struggle between internal and external players in the absence of unity of most state institutions. There were different motives of Turkey and Russia to take part on the stage of the military conflict.

Despite joining to NATO, Turkey has tried to discard the influence of the West in taking its decisions if there was a contradiction between the West's approach and Turkey's national interests. The country is trying to change itself into a state that carries out foreign and domestic policy separate from its Western partners. In this regard, Ankara seeks to develop economic and military cooperation with African

¹⁸⁰ Bdoyan, p. 169.

¹⁸¹ S. Clinton Hinote, "After Defeat: A Time To Rebuild." *Æther: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2022, p. 23, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48651804>.

countries. Turkey is taking various steps in an attempt to find its own path of development. One of the important steps was the opening of a Turkish military base in Somalia. Thereby, Turkey became the sixth country in the world to have a military presence on the African continent after the USA, Great Britain, France, Japan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).¹⁸²

In 2015-2016, Turkey's rapprochement with African countries was aimed at softening Turkey's foreign policy isolation in the Middle East, associated with Ankara's interventionist policy and the associated deterioration of relations with Iraq, Syria, and Egypt.¹⁸³ At the same time, there is also an element of a long-term strategy in the activation of Turkish-African ties. Ankara, following the countries of the EU, the USA and China, wants to participate in the development of natural resources and to realize its economic ambitions in Africa. Therefore, Libya was a door to the African continent. However, Turkey has long adhered to the tactics of limited involvement. Its activity was mainly realized in the diplomatic plane. However, in January 2020, the Turkish parliament agreed on the dispatch of military specialists and advisers to Libya, which marked the beginning of Ankara's direct involvement in the Libyan conflict on the side of Tripoli.¹⁸⁴ The decision to move to openly support and assistance to the Government of National Unity was a reaction to attempts by some external actors to remove Ankara from the settlement of Libyan problems altogether.

As for Russian position, it shares the opinion that Libya is a region strategically important in terms of influence within the context of the Middle East and North Africa. Moreover, the military-strategic position of Libya plays a vital role. Being located near important maritime communications, Libya occupies a critical strategic position and connects the countries of Western Europe with the Middle East. However, the Russian position was not clear on the crisis in Libya. After the EU recognized Gaddafi's power as illegitimate, it became clear that he would fall eventually. In these circumstances, it would be beneficial for Russia to take an active part in assisting the rebels. Instead,

¹⁸² Timur Ganiev and Vladimir Karyakin, "Гражданская Война В Ливии: Ход Боевых Действий И Интересы Сторон (Civil War in Libya: The Course of Hostilities and the Interests of the Parties)", **Arhont**, Vol. 3, No.: 18, 2020, p. 14.

¹⁸³ Ibid. p. 16.

¹⁸⁴ Timur Ahmetov, "Россия и Турция в Ливии: разрушая – строим, борясь – сотрудничаем. (Russia and Turkey in Libya: building while destroying, cooperating while fighting)", **New Literary Review**, Vol. 4, No.: 132, 2020, p. 320.

Russia has taken the position of sitting on two chairs.¹⁸⁵ According to Katehon think tank, Russia traditionally maintains contacts with both centers of power in Libya – in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, previously it was more sympathetic to Haftar and Saleh.¹⁸⁶ Moscow is interested in stabilizing the situation in Libya, fighting terrorist groups, and renewing contracts that were signed and implemented during the reign of Muammar Gaddafi.¹⁸⁷ Therefore, according to the official statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, it maintain the policy of non-interference in the affairs of Libya and “vigorously support the consolidated decision made by Libyans ... to hold nationwide elections.”¹⁸⁸

The decision to revive work in the Libyan direction was dictated primarily by Russia's desire to gain a foothold at the negotiations, during which the political future of Libya will be determined. The logic of this course is clear: the desire of Russia consolidate its position in the Middle East. Then this will allow it to acquire communication channels in areas traditionally important to it: in large infrastructure projects, exploration and mining, and the sale of weapons.¹⁸⁹ The interests of external actors in the Libyan crisis remain unchanged. It is important for Russia to reduce the influence of the USA and its allies on the situation in the region. As for Turkey, it is vital to find way to the continent and to be taken into account.

3.1.1.2. THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

Another conflict that could damage the bilateral relations of Turkey and Russia is the Syrian crisis. According to Rūma and Çelikpala, “2010s marked the disagreements between Moscow and Ankara ... on fight against Islamic State (IS),

¹⁸⁵ Anatoliy Hazanov, “«Арабская весна» и позиция России (Arab Spring and Russia’s Position)”, **Bulletin of the Moscow State Linguistic University. Social sciences**, Vol. 2, No.: 741, 2016, p.315.

¹⁸⁶ Katehon, “Libya: After 11 Years Of Chaos, Another Political Crisis”, <https://katehon.com/ru/article/liviya-posle-11-let-haosa-ocherednoy-politicheskoy-krizis> (13.04.2022)

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Russia's stance on the situation in Libya”, 17.12.2021, https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/vnesnepoliticeskoe-dos-e/krizisnoe-uregulirovanie-regional-nye-konflikty/pozicia-rossii-po-situacii-v-livii/?lang-center=en (13.04.2022)

¹⁸⁹ Ahmetov, p. 322.

conflict in Ukraine, Crimean status referendum and the Syrian civil war.”¹⁹⁰ The Syrian issue was one of the first problems in Turkish-Russian relations after the 2000s. Starting in March 2011, the Syrian civil war has overshadowed Turkish-Russian relations. It has been a sticking point in their relations. The issues related to the Syrian crisis are acute now. They also clearly denote the duality of the whole nature of modern Turkish-Russian relations. On the one hand, Syria is part of Ankara's sphere of influence, whose foreign policy is aimed at creating a ring of friendly zones that were previously part of the Ottoman Empire within the framework of Ahmet Davutoğlu's concept of “Strategic Depth.”¹⁹¹ That is, by analogy with the near abroad of Russia, talks about the near abroad of Turkey or the post-Ottoman space are existing. On the other hand, the complicated nature of the Syrian civil war has led the President of Turkey Erdogan to understand the need to involve Russia and Iran in its public part in its resolution.

The Syrian crisis is a complex and contradictory political process. This conflict has led to a serious humanitarian crisis. According to UNICEF, 13.4 million people, including almost 6.1 million children, need help in Syria due to military operations and almost 13 million of children were killed.¹⁹² The situation in Syria is gradually getting out of control. The interference of external forces in the conflict is increasing. “The tragic civil war in Syria has been the theatre of these ambitions of these two states in highly controversial ways.”¹⁹³

The Russian Federation had close relations with Syria since the Soviet times. The state has a great geopolitical importance for Russia. In 1971, a Soviet military base was located in the Syrian port of Tartus, which provided Russia an access to the Mediterranean Sea.¹⁹⁴ The military base in Tartus is Russia's only foreign military base outside the CIS. In addition, Russia and Syria have common economic interests. According to the Federal Customs Service of Russia, the foreign trade turnover of the

¹⁹⁰ Rüma and Çelikpala, p. 67.

¹⁹¹ Alex Irhin and Larisa Nelina, “Россия И Турция На Пороге 2018 Года: «Большая Игра» На Ближнем И Среднем Востоке. (Russia And Turkey On The Noon Of 2018: The Great Game In The Middle East And The Near East)”, **Scientific notes of the Vernadsky Crimean Federal University. Philosophy. Political science. Cultural studies**, Vol. 4, 2018, p. 110.

¹⁹² UNICEF. “Syrian Arab Republic Appeal”, <https://www.unicef.org/appeals/syria> (05.04.2022)

¹⁹³ Rüma and Çelikpala, p. 65.

¹⁹⁴ You Han, “Сирийский кризис: проблемы и перспективы урегулирования. (The Syrian crisis: problems and prospects of settlement)”, **Society: politics, economics, law**, 2016, p. 2.

Russian Federation and Syria in 2012 reached \$655.9 million.¹⁹⁵ The large part of Russian exports to Syria were carried out within the framework of military-technical cooperation. However, the Syrian crisis has negatively affected trade relations. In 2013, bilateral trade turnover decreased by 42.6% compared to the previous year.¹⁹⁶ Having the background of fruitful relationships with the Syrian authority, Russia announced the support for the legitimate Syrian president.

Turkey, on the opposite side, “has openly declared its policy for a regime change in Syria and enthusiastically acted with those who wanted to topple down the Ba’ath regime.”¹⁹⁷ Ankara has decided to sacrifice the existing ties with Damascus and to rely on the opposition forces. Moreover, the understatement and incorrect perception of the PKK was one of the reasons for foreign policy of Turkey towards Syria. According to James and Özdamar, PKK actions from the Syrian territory, as well as, Syrian support to the whole organization, were great obstacles in the negotiation process.¹⁹⁸

According to Irhin and Nelina, the main contradictions between Russia and Turkey in the Syrian settlement have gone through two stages of evolution.¹⁹⁹ The first covers the events starting from the beginning of the Russian intervention in the conflict until July 2016. The upper point is an attempt at a military coup and the removal or physical destruction of Erdogan and the JDP.²⁰⁰ This was a period of complete rejection by the Turkish elite of Russian foreign policy in the Syrian issue. This was a difficult time for Russian-Turkish relations, when the two states were on the verge of a military conflict. Only the strategic vision of both elites in the face of external pressure made it possible to avoid a catastrophic scenario of a military clash for Moscow and Ankara.

The second is from the moment of the attempted military coup to the present. This is a period when the Turkish leadership is moving away from its initial attitudes

¹⁹⁵ Federal Customs Service of Russia. <https://customs.gov.ru/activity/mezhdunarodnoe-tamozhennoe-sotrudnichestvo/mezhdunarodnye-dogovory,-zaklyuchen/siriya> (05.04.2022)

¹⁹⁶ Han, p. 2.

¹⁹⁷ Rüma and Çelikpala, p. 67.

¹⁹⁸ Carolyn C. James and Özgür Özdamar. “Modeling Foreign Policy and Ethnic Conflict: Turkey’s Policies Towards Syria.” **Foreign Policy Analysis**, Vol. 5, No.: 1, 2009, pp. 17–36, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24909869>.

¹⁹⁹ Irhin and Nelina, p. 116.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

of rejection of Russian interference in the Syrian issue and attempts to find points of compromise with Russia and Tehran in contrast to the policies of the USA and Saudi Arabia. However, Turkey supports the Syrian opposition not for the selfless defense of democracy, but for reasons that are more strategic – to eliminate security challenges by Kurdish groups operating in northern Syria and by ISIS and to build relations with the newly formed government after the fall of Assad's power.²⁰¹ Ankara seeks to encourage the establishment of a government in Damascus that can guarantee political and social stability in Syria by maintaining good relations with Turkey. Thus, the main aim for Turkish diplomacy is to establish friendly ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, without neglecting other political forces of the opposition.²⁰²

Pursuing various goals on the scene of the Syrian conflict, relations between Russia and Turkey remained at the same level until November 2015. At the political level, Russia adhered to the position of non-interference in the internal Syrian conflict from the outside and firmly supported the right of Syrians to decide their own fate. At the military level, at the request of Bashar al-Assad, Russia began mass air operations in Syria against the ISIS.²⁰³ The end of November 2015 was the month of serious tension in Turkish-Russian relations. On November 24, 2015, the Turkish Air Force shot down a Russian Su-24 aircraft over Syrian territory.²⁰⁴ The result of this tragedy was a seven-month crisis in relations between the two countries. The mass losses in trade turnover forced states to return the bilateral dialogue to its former state as soon as possible. The trade turnover between Russia and Turkey in 2015 amounted to \$23.4 billion, and in the first four months of 2016, it fell by more than \$18 billion, to \$4.8 billion.²⁰⁵ Russia's exports to Turkey decreased by 43%, while imports from Turkey more than doubled.²⁰⁶ Moreover, for the Russian side the creation and future activation of Turkish Stream was a great deal that also led to the positive solving of the crisis in

²⁰¹ Baygerim Aktaulova and Nazerke Baygozhaeva, “Кризис в Сирии и региональная политика Турции (The crisis in Syria and Turkey's regional policy)”, **Bulletin of Kazakh Federal University: Section History**, Vol. 3, No.: 60, 2012, p. 5.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid, p. 2.

²⁰⁴ Ivan Starodubtsev, “Идлибский кризис в российско-турецких отношениях (The Idlib crisis in Russian-Turkish relations)”, **Russian Council**, 2020, p. 1. <http://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/idlibskiy-krizis-v-rossiysko-turetskikh-otnosheniyakh/> (05.04.2022)

²⁰⁵ Yana Milyukova et al, “Семь месяцев в ссоре: сколько Россия и Турция потеряли на конфликте (Seven months in a quarrel: how much Russia and Turkey lost in the conflict)”, **РБК**, 28.06.2016, <https://www.rbc.ru/economics/28/06/2016/577157b89a7947239346aba3> (05.04.2022)

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

a short-term period.²⁰⁷ The creation of an additional route for gas supplies from Russia to Turkey has had a positive impact on bilateral economic relations. Therefore, the current actions of the Turkish leadership in Idlib should be characterized as a rather risky game that can negatively affect the economy and domestic policy of the country.²⁰⁸ Any humanitarian and political crisis is a bleeding wound on the body of humanity. Realizing this, the countries are moving towards rapprochement and meeting each other halfway in negotiations.

3.1.1.3. THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS

The 2015 jet crisis between Turkey and Russia gave an impetus to the activation of Turkish-Ukrainian relations. Kiev and Ankara have realized the role they play in each other's foreign policy, being strategically important partners. The improvement of economic relations also contributed to the deepening of relations. In the period 2014-2016, Turkey's share in the structure of Ukraine's exports was 7%, and imports was 2.3%.²⁰⁹ During this period, the trade turnover between the countries amounted to \$4.6 billion.²¹⁰ The countries' cooperation was aimed at developing bilateral relations in the political, economic, humanitarian and military spheres. Cooperation in the military sphere is increasing due to the growing turnover of military equipment and technologies, the joint development of various projects.²¹¹

Both countries derive significant benefits from this cooperation. For Ukraine, this is financial assistance, military training and the provision of military equipment. The first Ukrainian-Turkish contract for the supply of Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) worth \$ 74 million was signed in 2018.²¹² In accordance with its terms, Ukraine has received the first arms supplies in 2019. In 2020, a second contract was

²⁰⁷ Starodubtsev, p. 6.

²⁰⁸ Idid, p. 5.

²⁰⁹ Viacheslav Tsivaty, "Украина - Турция: политико-дипломатический диалог геополитических соседей начала XXI века (институциональное измерение). (Ukraine-Turkey: the Political and Diplomatic Dialogue of the Geopolitical Neighbors Beginning of the XXI century (the institutional dimension))", **Post-Soviet Issues**, Vol. 4, No.: 2, p. 113.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Kanarova, p. 1537.

²¹² Andrey Frolov, "Турецкие ударные БПЛА в украинской армии – реальна ли угроза? (Turkish attack UAVs in the Ukrainian army – Is the threat real?)", **Russia in global politics**, No.: 10, 2021, p. 2.

signed, which also included six UAVs, three upgraded control stations.²¹³ That allowed to increase the flight range to 300 km. As for Turkey, it is a string desire to receive the Ukrainian Zaslou-L protection complex, which was developed back in Soviet times.²¹⁴ Russia is extremely cautious about such agreements, but it is not afraid of these actions since it was considered that the new purchase of weapons will be a wasteful and time-consuming way to build up Ukraine's military power.

The rapid developments of events in the international arena made it impossible to have time to adjust the course of foreign policy. The position of the Turkish Republic was extremely inconsistent. However, as well as the initial position of the Ukrainian authorities. The previously stated course of rapprochement with the EU, which abruptly changed to alignment with Russia, has confused both social masses on the territory of the state and the atmosphere abroad. Mass protests in Ukraine in January 2014 resulted in clashes between armed radicals and law enforcement agencies.²¹⁵ In Crimea, the events escalated into large-scale socio-political modifications that happened on the territory of the peninsula in February-March 2014.²¹⁶ According to Kanarova, after the referendum in the Crimean Peninsula and the non-recognition of these actions by the West, Turkey declared its support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine.²¹⁷ At the UN General Assembly, where the resolution "Territorial Integrity of Ukraine" was adopted on March 27, 100 UN member states including Turkey voted in favor of the resolution.²¹⁸

The new wave of Ukrainian crisis that took place in February 2022 also became an accelerator that created rough tensions on the international arena. However, the position of Turkey towards the status of Crimean Peninsula and Sevastopol has stayed stable. The visits of Turkish officials to Ukraine confirmed Turkey's intentions to provide assistance with humanitarian measures to support the interests of its

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Kanarova, p. 1537.

²¹⁵ Makmut S. Chakmak, "Позиция СМИ Турции в отношении вхождения Крыма и Севастополя в состав Российской Федерации. (Turkish Media Position towards the Crimea and Sevastopol Entering into the Russian Federation)", **Humanitarian vector. Series: History, Political Science**, Vol. 3, No.: 39, 2014, p. 149.

²¹⁶ Ibid. p. 150.

²¹⁷ Valeriya Kanarova, "Украинско-турецкие отношения в 2014-2019 гг.: динамика, тенденции, перспективы (Ukrainian-Turkish relations in 2014-2019: dynamics, trends, prospects)", **Post-Soviet Studies**, No.: 7, 2019, p. 1536.

²¹⁸ Reynolds, p. 290.

compatriots living in Crimea.²¹⁹ At the Crimean Platform summit in August 2021, Erdogan, in a conversation with Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky, noted that Ankara had supported the Crimean Platform since the first days of the summit's initiation and would also support this work in the future.²²⁰ However, there was a danger that radical nationalist forces in Kiev might try to use the position of the Crimean Tatars in order to involve Turkey in the Ukrainian crisis and oppose it to Russia. Turkey's reaction to the events in Crimea was restrained and to some extent has been uncertain. On the one hand, it did not accept the results of the referendum, as did the whole West, due to the presence of a Western vector in its foreign policy. On the other hand, it did not join Western sanctions against Russia. Turkey did not consider the sanctions as an appropriate tool to sacrifice a high volume of trade. It seems that Turkey will not accept anyone's point of view on this issue until the last moment, since it needs to maintain relations with both Western countries and Russia. The Republic of Turkey continues to pay great attention to this issue, since along with the economic aspect, 'soft power' and humanitarian cooperation occupy a prominent place in Turkish foreign policy, through which Turkey promotes its policy to other countries.

Overall, according to the Director of Security Studies at the pro-government Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research Murat Yeshiltas, Turkey has geostrategically sided with Ukraine.²²¹ This does not promise much success for the Turkish mediation mission that the state and the rest of the world is trying to impose on Russia. The ambivalence of Turkey's position on the Crimean issue also lies in the fact that the Turkish Republic is a NATO member and a candidate for the EU. Its position will be taken into account in the relations of these two structures with Ukraine and Russia. According to Dalay, Turkish-Russian relations are competitive and even possible hostile.²²² Supporting Ukrainians but trying not to lose Russian amicability,

²¹⁹ Chakmak, p. 149.

²²⁰ Marina Sovina, "Эрдоган вновь отказался признавать Крым российским. (Erdogan again refused to recognize Crimea as Russian territory)", **Lenta**, 22.09.2021, https://lenta.ru/news/2021/09/22/erdogan_krym/ (16.04.2022)

²²¹ Murat Yeshiltas, "Türkiye'nin Ukrayna Sınavı (The Ukrainian Exam of Turkey)", **Sabah**, 02.04.2022, <https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/perspektif/murat-yesiltas/2022/04/02/turkiyenin-ukrayna-sinavi> (13.04.2022)

²²² Galip Dalay, "Ukraine's wider impact on Turkey's international future", **Chatham House**, 10.03.2022, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/03/ukraines-wider-impact-turkeys-international-future> (13.04.2022).

Turkey is playing on both sides, risking the loss of confidence among the population of the ruling AKP and the strengthening of opposition forces in the domestic political context. Turkey hesitantly entered the anti-Russia camp in this crisis but the question is how far it will become integrated.²²³ The ruling party of Turkey should be careful in its decisions, realizing that it will have to harvest the fruits of its labor in the near future. Turkey finds itself in the position of a country in limbo, when the steps it takes turn out to be risky for itself in the context of a possible reaction from Russia and influence on Russian-Turkish relations.²²⁴

Such a shotgun approach on this issue of the Republic of Turkey is desirable for Russia. Since it does not infringe previously reached agreements in many areas of the Turkish-Russian dialogue and ensure an opportunity for further cooperation in the region. According to Reynolds, “Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has emphasized that Turkey “will not fall into a trap” and permit others to turn the Crimea problem into a Turkish-Russian crisis.”²²⁵

Compared with the period of bipolar confrontation of the Cold War, the world turned out to be in a more fragile state, when conflicts, especially armed ones, became worse and more difficult to resolve. However, the world is not divided into white and black sides. The world order is no longer a confrontation area between two blocs, as during the Cold War. The complexity of the world order provides an opportunity to be on different sides of the barricades in conflict situations, but to continue interaction and cooperation in other areas. Relations between Turkey and Russia, as a confirmation of this statement, are developing along a trajectory that is not a straight line and do not fall to zero even in the most prolonged and severe conflicts.

3.1.2. SPHERES OF COOPERATION

The change of the world at the end of the 20th century, the development of local and international conflicts raised the question of the development of international cooperation and integration processes in a new way. These realities also acquired a number of new features at the turn of the century. Significant changes related to

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Starodubtsev, p. 6.

²²⁵ Reynolds, p. 292.

cooperation and integration processes have occurred both at the global and regional levels. Speaking about cooperation in the modern world, it is contradictory. It does not exclude, but assume the occurrence of conflictive situations. However, the most important point is how the conflicts are resolved. Cooperation and the development of integration processes presuppose that such a resolution will be carried out only by peaceful means. By the beginning of the 21st century, cases of the use of military power and coercion by military means are decreasing. Now, cultural, economic, religious and public diplomacy have played leading roles in foreign policy as worthy alternative tools to the methods of force to solve political problems on the world stage.

Current situation in Turkish-Russian bilateral relations shows that their relations represent the theory in a decent way. Turkish-Russian relations enlightened wide topics in world politics.²²⁶ It can be argued that the changing balance of military-strategic threats has determined the course of Russian-Turkish relations both during and after the Cold War.²²⁷ According to Davutoglu, “Turkey has exemplary good neighborly relations with Russia, and there are currently no bilateral problems between our countries.”²²⁸ The history of relations between the two countries shows that in most regional conflicts the interests of Moscow and Ankara coincide and are opposite to each other.²²⁹ Despite such obvious antagonism in many areas, Russia and Turkey prefer to avoid openly hostile relations. On the contrary, in almost every trouble spot, both countries continue intensive negotiations at different levels in order to avoid military confrontation. The economic, energy and military-technical sphere of Russian-Turkish cooperation does not have such nodes of contradictions as interaction in the geopolitical space.

²²⁶ Anna Garanina, “Международное сотрудничество и процессы интеграции. (International cooperation and integration processes)”, **Current problems of humanities and natural sciences**, Vol. 1, No.: 2, 2009, p. 170.

²²⁷ Aktürk, Şener. “Relations between Russia and Turkey Before, During, and After the Failed Coup of 2016.” *Insight Turkey*, vol. 21, no. 4, 2019, p. 110.

²²⁸ Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s foreign policy and Russia”, **Russia in global politics**, 28.02.2010. <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/vneshnyaya-politika-turczii-i-rossiya/> (22.03.2022)

²²⁹ Fedor Lukyanov, “Турецкий подъём и будущее Евразии. (The Turkish Rise and the future of Eurasia)”, **Global Affairs**, 01.10.2020. <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/tureczkij-podyom-budushhee-evrazii/> (18.04.2022)

3.1.2.1. ECONOMIC COOPERATION

The proclamation of friendly relationship between countries has promoted cooperation in different spheres. The economic sphere is one of the great promising areas of cooperation between the two countries. In the 2000s, mutually beneficial economic interests began to dominate bilateral Russian-Turkish relations. Current situation proves that growing economic interdependence can coexist with ongoing political conflict and geopolitical rivalry, as evidenced by the Syrian and Ukrainian crises.²³⁰ Relations between Russia and Turkey have a serious economic foundation. The implementation of a number of joint strategic projects by Russia and Turkey in recent years has led to debates about the creation of a sustainable partnership between the two countries, strengthened by mutual trade and economic interests.

The Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey have been occupying a leading position in mutual trade for quite a long time. Russia is the third export market for the Turkish Republic after Germany and China.²³¹ In return, Turkey ranks 7th among Russia's main foreign economic partners.²³² From January 2021 to May 2021, the trade turnover between the countries amounted to \$11.3 billion, showing a significant increase of 30.9% compared to the same period in 2020.²³³ Exports amounted to \$ 8.8 billion (an increase of 29.6%), imports – \$2.5 billion (an increase of 35.7%).²³⁴ The economy is an important factor of soft power in promoting the interests of countries. The economic impact as a tool of soft power should not be underestimated. It definitely improves the country's reputation. Moreover, economic relations is one of many channels of cooperation among countries. Despite the fact that there may be some kind of economic imbalance between the states, it also exerts its influence through complex interdependence. From this position, economic diplomacy can manifest itself best. This is not just negotiations on trade or investment agreements. It is a projection of values characterizing the society.

²³⁰Ibragimov, p. 70.

²³¹Budarina, p. 442.

²³²Ibid.

²³³Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Turkey. “Торгово-экономические отношения. (Trade and economic relations)”, <https://turkey.mid.ru/ru/countries/bilateral-relations/trade-economic-cooperation/> (18.04.2022)

²³⁴Ibid.

3.1.2.2. COOPERATION IN THE ENERGY SECTOR

Cooperation in the energy sector constitutes a great part of bilateral relations as well. The speedy development of the global energy complex results in an increase in the influence of energy not only on the world economy and geopolitics, but also on the system of international relations. Of course, Russia and Turkey are engaged in this process, being one of the largest producing and hub countries respectively, exporters and importers of transit hydrocarbons in the world. The overwhelming share of Russian exports to Turkey consists of energy and raw materials. Turkey occupies one of the leading places in terms of purchases of Russian natural gas.²³⁵

Cooperation in the field of nuclear energy has also developed within the framework of a joint project for the construction of Turkey's first nuclear power station Akkuyu in Mersin province with an investment volume of over \$20 billion.²³⁶ The commissioning of the first unit is scheduled for 2023 by the 100th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey. This tendency of close cooperation in the field of resources shows the presence of a trend in international relations – energy diplomacy.²³⁷ The internal energy policy of energy-consuming countries is related to state regulation in the energy sector, aimed at developing national fuel and energy complexes and markets, improving environmental standards and much more.

In the producing countries, in addition to energy consumption, special attention is paid to forming positive conditions for the development of the extractive industry, including by attracting foreign investment. International energy policy is increasingly influenced by geopolitical factors that take into account the special role of the energy complex in world geopolitics.²³⁸ Today, the situation on the world energy markets determines the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy of the state, and companies, often jointly with the state, use political methods and means to achieve their energy

²³⁵Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Turkey.

²³⁶Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Turkey.

²³⁷Philip H. Abelson, "Energy Diplomacy." *Science*, Vol. 192, No.: 4238, 1976, p. 429, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1741335>. (18.04.2022).

²³⁸Bulat Khalitov, "Энергетическая дипломатия и политическая коммуникация. (Energy diplomacy and political communication)", *News of higher educational institutions. Energy problems*, Vol. 9, No.: 10, p. 114.

interests.²³⁹ In the modern world, states should strive for a global energy dialogue, establish a stable balance of interests of consumers and producers of energy resources, and prevent the emergence of crises and shocks in the domestic political life of countries and in international relations because of the energy instability of the world. Unfortunately, energy resources, along with economic means, become instruments of containment and the imposition of their interests in the international arena.

In addition, pipelines connecting the two countries are among the most outstanding areas of mutually beneficial cooperation and deserve special attention. One of them is the Blue Stream Pipeline Project that was completed in 2003.²⁴⁰ According to Coote, “until 2003, Russian gas had been delivered to Turkey only by the western route, called the TransBalkan Pipeline, running through Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria into western Turkey.”²⁴¹ After the launching Blue Stream have become one of the most abundant sources of gas for Turkey. As part of the agreement signed during the construction of the gas pipeline, it was planned to supply in total 360 billion m² of gas cubic meters from 2000 to 2025.²⁴² Another prominent pipeline project is Turkish Stream Pipeline that was completed in 2020.²⁴³ According to Kalashnikov, the total volume of design capacities of the first stage of the Turkish Stream and Blue Stream, focused exclusively on the Turkish market, amounted to 31.75 billion m² per year by 2021.²⁴⁴ Looking closely at these factors, Turkey has every chance to become a key partner of Russia in the energy sector in the long term. Russia also indirectly contributes to the development of the Turkish fuel and energy sector and the establishment of Turkey as a regional hub.

²³⁹ Khalitov, p. 115.

²⁴⁰ Bud Coote, “Russia Launches Blue Stream Pipeline To Secure Turkish Gas Market.” **The Caspian Sea and Southern Gas Corridor: A View from Russia**, Atlantic Council, 2017, p. 7, JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep03709.6>, (3.06.2022).

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Kalashnikov, p. 101.

²⁴³ Erdal Tanas Karagöl and Mehmet Kizilkaya. “The Turkish Stream Project In The EU-Russia-Turkey Triangle.” **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2015, p. 57. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26299675>. (3.06.2022).

²⁴⁴ Kalashnikov, p.102.

3.1.2.3. PERSONAL RELATIONS AS A TOOL OF COOPERATION

Economic cooperation and cooperation in energy sector are not the only spheres of cooperation between Russia and Turkey. The sincere personal relations of the two leaders, Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, sometimes warm up the cooling relations. In the early 2000s, with the election of President Vladimir Putin in Russia and the coming to power of the JDP in Turkey, a gradual transition of Russian-Turkish relations from competition to a multifaceted partnership began.²⁴⁵ Personal diplomacy and interaction between the leaders have always been an instrument in solving problems and crises, the so-called silver bullet.

The close relations of the leaders is a meaningful tool. The level of trust between the heads of world powers is a sensitive barometer of measuring the state of the modern world order and its security.²⁴⁶ Authorities of governments, especially the leaders of the countries, take an active part in the implementation of the national foreign policy of modern states, including widely using diplomatic forms and means. This is especially important in conditions of fierce confrontation between individual great powers and the constitutional powers of presidents. The long-term practice of maintaining trustful personal relations between the heads of world powers allows establishing their influence on interstate relations. Various examples of official and unofficial contacts between the top officials of Turkey and Russia indicate such an existing dependence. According to Murat Ulgul, “Ankara increasingly relies on personal diplomacy in its relations with foreign countries.”²⁴⁷

The active position of both politicians, their focus on finding compromise solutions, on developing a constructive dialogue, as well as personal affection – all this have objectively become the driver of Russian-Turkish relations since the early 2000s. Back in 2004, one of the most significant state visits of the President of the Russian Federation to Turkey took place, which resulted in the signing of a number of

²⁴⁵ Bdoyan, p. 170

²⁴⁶ Yuri Razhivin, “Неофициальная дипломатия лидеров мировых держав как барометр состояния межгосударственных отношений и миропорядка. (Informal Diplomacy Of World Powers Leaders As A Barometer Toward Assessing The Current State Of Affairs And Modern World Order)”, **Arhont**, Vol. 1, No.: 10, 2019, p. 1.

²⁴⁷ Murat Ülgül, “Erdoğan’s Personal Diplomacy and Turkish Foreign Policy”, **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 21, No.: 4, 2019, p. 161.

intergovernmental agreements, as well as the “Joint Declaration on strengthening Friendship and Multifaceted Cooperation.”²⁴⁸ The Turkish leader's return visits took place in the following year, 2005, as well as in 2008. According to Uğul, “the relationship, between two self-confident leaders who face little institutional and bureaucratic restriction, illustrates the effectiveness of personal diplomacy.”²⁴⁹ This style of diplomacy has an effect of a ‘quick fix’ to international problems because leaders interact with each other without barriers and mediators.²⁵⁰

Personal relationships based on personal affection, on common styles of public administration, on the desire to develop equal and mutually beneficial conditions of cooperation in politics and in the economy have resulted in positive dynamics of the progress of relations. Close relations between leaders affect the international arena and it has a positive impact on solving problems and achieving foreign policy objectives. Therefore, the jet-crisis of 2015 was solved through Turkish president’s personal desire to eliminate the problem in bilateral relations. On March 10, 2017, the Turkish President arrived in Moscow, where Vladimir Putin received him in the Kremlin.²⁵¹ In fact, the meeting was aimed at restoring Russian-Turkish relations. At the meeting, the Russian and Turkish presidents laid the foundation for a new ‘low’ restart of Russian-Turkish relations after the downing of a Russian military aircraft.

Later, the leaders of Russia and Turkey met about 10 times during 2017.²⁵² Such frequent bilateral contacts of the Russian leader occur only with two states – Kazakhstan and Belarus – close neighboring countries. That also demonstrates close personal and political affection. Moreover, sincere interaction assists in searching a common ground in disparate positions towards one crisis. Turkey and Russia have found areas of common interests in the Syrian crisis despite supporting opposite sides of conflict.²⁵³

²⁴⁸ Official webpage of the President of the Russian Federation. “Совместная Декларация Об Углублении Дружбы И Многопланового Партнерства Между Российской Федерацией И Турецкой Республикой (Joint Declaration on strengthening Friendship and Multifaceted Cooperation)”, **Kremlin**, 5.12.2004, <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/3933> (19.04.2004)

²⁴⁹ Ülgül, p. 176.

²⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 161.

²⁵¹ Irhin and Nelina, p. 112.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Mehmet Y. Dikbayır, “A Quick Look into Erdoğan-Putin Diplomacy in 2018,” **TRTWorld**, 7.01.2019, <https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/a-quick-look-into-erdoganputin-diplomacy-in-2018-23128> (19.04.2022)

Moreover, according to Davutoglu, “Turkey views Russia as an invaluable partner, an important global power and a key player in terms of regional cooperation.”²⁵⁴ Being fully aware of the consequences of any crisis, the states are trying to act together, despite the support of different sides of the conflicts. The same happened in the Syrian crisis. The causes of the Syrian civil war and subsequent events are caused by internal contradictions: religious and ethnic contradictions, failed reforms of Bashar al-Assad, low socio-economic development of society, weak health care system, and alienation of the ruling elite from the people.²⁵⁵ However, it is also impossible not to notice the presence of external influence and the presence of hydrocarbon resources in Syria, thanks to which anti-government protests could turn into a civil war, the fact of the influence of regional and non-regional countries on it.

Russia and Turkey play one of the main roles in resolving the Syrian crisis. From the beginning of the civil war, Moscow and Ankara have tried to make political and diplomatic efforts to support the parties of the conflict. Russia supplied weapons, equipment and ammunition to the Syrian army, trained military specialists and sent military advisers.²⁵⁶ The main position of the Russian government on the Syrian issue proceeds from the fact that military force should be used only under the control of the UN in accordance with international law.²⁵⁷ In addition, according to the concept of the foreign policy of Russia, interference in the internal affairs of the state in order to change the political regime is unacceptable.²⁵⁸ Moreover, Syria is currently the only real ally of the Russian Federation in the Middle East.²⁵⁹

As for Turkish position, having in mind the policy of “Zero Problems with Our Neighbors”, “Turkey wanted to eliminate all the problems from its relations with neighbors or at least to minimize them as much as possible.”²⁶⁰ In addition, Turkey

²⁵⁴ Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s foreign policy and Russia. Russia in global politics, 28.02.2010. <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/vneshnyaya-politika-turczii-i-rossiya/> (22.03.2022)

²⁵⁵ Oleg Khlopov, “Инициативы и роль России в урегулировании сирийского конфликта (Initiatives And The Role Of Russia In Solving A Conflict In Syria)”, Current problems of our time: science and society, No.: 3, 2019, p. 25.

²⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 26.

²⁵⁷ Official webpage of the President of the Russian Federation. “Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации. (The concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation)”, Kremlin, 30.11.2016, <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/41451> (24.04.2022)

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Boris Dolgov, “Сирийский кризис (2011-2021): развитие конфликта (The Syrian Crisis (2011-2021): Development of Conflict)”, **Islamic studies**, Vol. 12, No.: 3, p. 10.

²⁶⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. “Policy of Zero Problems with our Neighbors”, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/policy-of-zero-problems-with-our->

aimed at saving the integrity of the Syrian sovereignty and territory²⁶¹, that is, Ankara's intervention in Syria's affairs was more indirect. Turkey openly declared the unacceptability of Bashar al-Assad's power, provided assistance to the US-led anti-terrorist coalition operating in Syria, but avoided direct military confrontation with the Syrian government.²⁶² To some extent, Turkey played by the rules of hybrid warfare in Syria until the coup attempt in 2016. The course of Erdogan's foreign policy became more rigid after these events. Armed military operations triggered the deterioration of bilateral relations. According to Rudnitsky and Sbitneva, Turkey actually pursued exclusively the goal of solving the Kurdish issue.²⁶³ However, the fighting in Syria has demonstrated the need to return to the negotiations that began back in 2012.

Moreover, the threat of the spread of ISIS outside Syria has become a reality; the migration crisis has worsened. The flows of refugees overwhelmed Europe and Turkey. In this situation, the peace talks were a life-saving breath of air for the parts of the conflict and for their neighbors. Peace negotiations, being a complex process, did not always end fruitfully; some of them did not have any impact at all. However, despite all the differences, the parties were united in the fact that the territorial unity of the country should be preserved.²⁶⁴ In addition, the sides of the conflict agreed on the delivery of humanitarian aid to the population, as well as on the establishment of a truce. Most of the peace talks included the presence of Turkey and Russia that again prove their interdependence in this region. Both countries desired to act as intermediaries in the Syrian theatre. Despite using different tools in solving the crisis, Astana peace talks as an alternative conflict resolution process for the Syrian crisis provided the ground for the cooperation of Turkey and Russia.²⁶⁵ It supported resolution of ceasefire by the UN Security Council.

neighbors.en.mfa#:~:text=In%20this%20context%2C%20the%20discourse,them%20as%20much%20as%20possible (24.04.2022)

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Artem Rudnitsky and Alina Sbitneva, "Конфликтное взаимодействие Турции и Сирии: история и современность (Conflict interaction between Turkey and Syria: History and modernity)", **Conflictology/nota bene**, No.: 2, 2020, p. 28.

²⁶³ Ibid, p. 29.

²⁶⁴ James Dobbins et al. "A Peace Plan for Syria III: Agreed Zones of Control, Decentralization, and International Administration". **RAND Corporation**, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep02449> (24.04.2022)

²⁶⁵ Noah Boncey, "What's at Stake in the Syrian Peace Talks in Astana?", International Crisis Group, 27.01.2017, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/What%27s%20at%20Stake%20in%20the%20Syrian%20Peace%20Talks%20in%20Astana_%20_%20Crisis%20Group.pdf (24.04.2022)

Organized with the participation of Iran, Turkey and Russia, as well as participants of the fighting, the first round of negotiations ended with an agreement reached on the formation of a trilateral mechanism for monitoring the truce in Syria, which was assumed by Russia, Turkey and Iran.²⁶⁶ A lot of work has also been done to separate the opposition and terrorist groups by their locations. Despite the fact that the power circles of modern Turkey will not change their position regarding the legitimacy of Bashar al-Assad's presidency, Turkey realizes that its foreign policy towards Syria will be changed and softened. In the context of the realities that exist today, political and expert circles realize that constant clashes on the border require a large amount of resources and undermine the domestic stability of nearby regions. Therefore, profitable participation in the peace talks has been effective in promoting Turkish interests.

The same idea applies to Russian participation. Russian involvement in the negotiations confirmed the status of a key regional player in the Middle East due to its military presence in the region, successful combat operations against terrorists, and active diplomacy during the peace talks. The protracted Syrian conflict revealed many problems of the region and its neighbors. However, Russia and Turkey will try to continue to make all necessary efforts to stabilize the situation in Syria, provide humanitarian assistance and facilitate the country's return to peaceful life.

3.1.2.4. OTHER SPHERES OF COOPERATION

Turkey has tried to mediate between the Russian and the Ukrainian delegations regarding the ongoing Ukrainian crisis. In the hope of a quick and peaceful resolution of the conflict, the president of Turkey welcomed the negotiators in Istanbul in 2022.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation. "Совместное заявление министров иностранных дел Исламской Республики Иран, Российской Федерации, Турецкой Республики по согласованным мерам, направленным на оживление политического процесса с целью прекращения сирийского конфликта, Москва, 20 декабря 2016 года. (Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of Turkey on agreed measures aimed at reviving the political process to end the Syrian conflict)", Moscow, 20.12.2016. https://archive.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2573489 (24.04.2022).

²⁶⁷ Ali M. Alhas, "Istanbul peace talks quickest way to end Ukraine war: Turkish president", **Anadolu Agency**, 22.04.2022, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/istanbul-peace-talks-quickest-way-to-end-ukraine-war-turkish-president/2570554> (24.04.2022)

Pursuing a flexible foreign policy, Turkey tries to preserve allies from both sides of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The Turkish government also provided a platform for the meeting of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba in Antalya by March 2022.²⁶⁸ Maintaining contacts with both sides of the conflict, Turkey stays in dialogue with them and tries to ensure de-escalation of the conflict. According to Topcu and Pozdnyakova, Turkey will continue to follow its course of 'active neutrality' as long as possible.²⁶⁹ Europe is approving the policy of Turkey that emphasizes Ankara's support for Ukraine curbing Russian political ambitions throughout the region. Taking a cautious position in this crisis, having a great dependence on Russian raw materials Turkey has no other choice.

Turkish-Russian interdependence has also manifested itself in tactical cooperation in the Turkish purchasing of Russian S-400 advanced air and missile defense platform.²⁷⁰ The cooperation of Turkey and Russia on the settlement of the situation in Syria has contributed to the political and economic rapprochement of these two countries. The rapprochement between Russia and Turkey, based on trust and respect, led Turkey to sign a document on the purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia. The document on the acquisition of the S-400 missile system was signed on September 12, 2017. It meets the geopolitical interests of both Russia and Turkey.²⁷¹ This rapprochement between Turkey and Russia has caused serious alarm in NATO. NATO leadership considered the cooperation between Russia and Turkey a dangerous step because Turkey has become the only NATO member that has established close military cooperation with Russia.²⁷² Turkey attempted to decrease Western influence and this discourse in its foreign policy, as relations with the West soured. All these projects and cooperation agreements have a significant effect on strengthening and

²⁶⁸ Elmas Topcu and Natalya Pozdnyakova, "Война в Украине. К чему приведет "активный нейтралитет" Турции (The war in Ukraine. What will Turkey's "active neutrality" lead to)", **Deutsche Welle**, 31.03.2022, <https://www.dw.com/ru/vojna-v-ukraine-k-chemu-privedet-aktivnyj-nejtralitet-turcii/a-61306460> (24.04.2022)

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Sinan Ülgen, "The S-400 Dilemma." **Redefining the U.S.-Turkey Relationship, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace**, 2021, p. 5, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep33410.5>. (24.04.2022)

²⁷¹ Sergey Malgavko, "Россия и Турция подписали контракт на поставку С-400 (Russia and Turkey signed a contract for the supply of S-400)", **RIA Novosti**, 12.09.2017, <https://ria.ru/20170912/1504029157.html>, (03.06.2022)

²⁷² Rauf Hasanov, "Российско-Турецкое Военно-Политическое Сотрудничество В Современную Эпоху (Russian-Turkish Military-Political Cooperation In The Contemporary Era)", **Azimuth of scientific research: Economics and Management**, Vol. 1, No.: 34, 2019, p. 28.

developing bilateral relations and, rather, reinforce cooperation in the geopolitical space of Russia and Turkey.²⁷³

Moreover, Turkish-Russian cooperation revealed itself in regional interaction. Turkey maintains trade relations with the subjects of the Russian Federation. They are Moscow and the Moscow Region, St. Petersburg, Republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories, Rostov and Vladimir regions.²⁷⁴ Bilateral trade and economic ties with other Russian regions are also actively developing. In addition to commodity supplies and investment cooperation, the main forms of bilateral cooperation include the exchange of delegations of representatives of regional authorities and business circles, the organization of exhibitions and fairs, cultural events, the establishment of twinning ties between cities.²⁷⁵

In addition, a huge flow of Russian tourists gives a boost to the Turkish economy every season. In 2019, Turkey ranks the sixth in terms of inbound tourist traffic among more than 200 countries in the world, of which 20% of tourists are citizens of Russia.²⁷⁶ In 2022, looking forward to welcome more tourists at this difficult time, Turkey tries to strengthen the cooperation in this sphere. However, because of the economic crisis after the pandemic, as well as the political crisis in Ukraine, the aviation and tourism sector have suffered. Turkey and Russia have attempted to solve these problems. One of these solutions was the creation of new airlines with new airways. Hence, it created two airlines, Mavigok Airlines and Southwind, primarily for the Russian tourists.²⁷⁷ Southwind Airlines is based at Antalya Airport, and Mavigok is based in Alanya Airport.²⁷⁸ Actions of Turkey's authorities contribute to easing the tense situation in the international arena.

²⁷³ Irhin and Nelina, p. 113.

²⁷⁴ Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Turkey.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Aleksandr Sinitsin, "Туриндустрия Через Призму Драйверов И Барьеров Бизнеса. (Tourism Industry Through The Prism Of Drivers And Business Barriers)", **Center For Socio-Economic Research**, 2020, https://rostourunion.ru/assets/files/docs/2020_csr_report.pdf (25.04.2022)

²⁷⁷ "Anex, Rusya için yeni bir havayolu kurdu", **Turizm gazetesi**, 21.04.2022, <https://www.turizmgazetesi.com/haber/anex-rusya-icin-yeni-bir-havayolu-kurdu/82432> (25.04.2022)

²⁷⁸ "Турция фактически помогает РФ обходить санкции на авиаперевозки (Turkey actually helps the Russian Federation to circumvent sanctions on air transportation)", Gordon, 05.05.2022, <https://gordonua.com/news/worldnews/turciya-fakticheski-pomogaet-rf-obhodit-sankcii-na-aviaperevozki-smi-1607546.html>, (06.06.2022)

Any bilateral relations are impossible without conflictive situations, as countries pursue and defend their national interests while manifestation their own course of foreign policy. As in interpersonal relationships, conflict is a point of growth for the partners, the same idea implements in international relations. Various approaches to building relationships affect conflict areas and areas of interaction.

Therefore, the current Turkish-Russian bilateral relations are in balance now with their spheres of cooperation and spheres of tensions. The existing model of cooperation between Russia and Turkey in the international arena is in a state of equilibrium and is currently more at the stage of cooperation. However, this situation is very shaky, which is argued by the presence of both a space of cooperation and a significant plane of contradictions that has fundamental foundations. That is, any significant change in the current balance can lead to a rapid deterioration of Russian-Turkish relations, which will be quite a natural historical course of events.

CHAPTER FOUR

TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE

4.1. IMPACT OF COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE ON TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE 2000s

Elements of complex interdependence approach have clearly manifested themselves in the international relations of the 21st century. Speaking about the theory of complex interdependence in simple words, if two or more states are simultaneously dependent on each other, they are in a relationship of interdependence. More precisely, if the well-being of one state depends on cooperation with another state, the first depends on the second. In this respect, it would be fair to suggest that contemporary Turkish-Russian relations can be explained through complex interdependence approach with a focus on characteristics including non-hierarchy among issues, multiple channels of interaction and diminishing role of the military forces.

4.1.1. “NON-HIERARCHY” IN TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

During the whole work, the repeating idea is that the world is changing and the nature of international relations has become more complex. Countries and their foreign policies towards each other prove to be interconnected and interrelated. Moreover, the closer the connection between countries and their political courses, the more anarchy is observed among the issues.

Over time, various events on the international arena led to the changes in the structure of international relations. At this historical stage, states proceed from the need to build a complex structure of international relations, which relies on the interaction of leading centers of power in the interests of jointly solving global challenges facing the world community today.²⁷⁹ Especially, it is important for the

²⁷⁹ Vladimir Avatkov, “Россия и Турция переход к полицентрической системе международных отношений (Russia and Turkey transition to a polycentric system of international relations)”, **Scientific and analytical journal Observer**, No.: 11, 2018, p. 38. <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/rossiya-i-turtsiya-perehod-k-politsentricheskoy-sisteme-mezhdunarodnyh-otnosheniy> (26.05.2022)

Russian Federation as it does not consider center as the sole actors of international relations, within the framework of the emerging international system, believing that regional powers and regional dynamics also have a direct impact on world processes and should not be excluded from them.²⁸⁰ In this regard, Russia is actively cooperating with various regional centers of power. Special attention is being paid today to the Middle East, namely to states whose international influence within the framework of the complicated world is expected to increase.

Turkey is one of these regional actors of attraction. It is currently strengthening itself as much as possible both within the regional space and on the world stage. Russia is interested in finding allies in the conflict-ridden Middle East and it has been cooperating with Turkey hoping that Turkey would become one of these centers of power of the world order.²⁸¹ In this regard, Moscow and Ankara have had a new impetus to build a strong partnership. For example, a trilateral cooperation between Russia, Iran and Turkey to find a solution to ongoing civil war in Syria was formed.²⁸² These three states initiated Astana Talks by early 2017, as they are the ones to be closely involved in the developments in Syria. At the same time, it is important to note that Russia managed to take an almost impossible step forward through seating the main geopolitical rivals – Turkey and Iran – at the same negotiating table.²⁸³ The participation of the Republic of Turkey in such processes, as well as cooperation with Russia in general, increases the authority of the state in the international space. Consequently, the two states' actions are currently helping to strengthen the position of each other in the region and in the international arena. Today, there is an intensification of bilateral cooperation between Russia and the Republic of Turkey, which throughout history could not be called an ally of Russia. Nevertheless, within the conditions of the emerging world order today, Turkey is of particular interest to Russia, as well as Russia to Turkey. In this way, mutual support of the states promotes beneficial relations through cooperation in different spheres.

²⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 40

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Mekki Uludag, "Syrian Civil War: Important Players and Key Implications – A Factsheet." **Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses**, Vol. 7, No.: 7, 2015, p. 7. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26351370>. (20.05.2022).

²⁸³ Ibid.

Mutual friendly political relations are inextricably linked with bilateral trade relations and interaction with the international economy. As the global trade has become interconnected, the states become interdependent. The modern practice of unification and interrelation of world politics and economy, the processes of international political and economic integration, the processes of formation of regional associations clearly emphasize that global politics and economy constitute one integral system. In addition, global politics should act as a tool for the encouragement of political and economic relations among states.

In this way, Turkey and Russia are natural partners due to their close geographical location having some common grounds in shaping foreign policy. Trade, tourism, construction and energy are the areas of Russian-Turkish economic cooperation. Since Black Sea is the only border between Turkey and Russia, it is necessary to develop cooperation between the two countries in the economic sphere, especially in such areas as industry, transport, agriculture and construction. Oil, petroleum products, natural gas, coal and various metals and metal products dominate the products of Russia's exports to Turkey, which account for more than 70% of the total volume.²⁸⁴ Russian imports from Turkey include textiles, food, household appliances, as well as machinery and equipment. Turkey and Russia are in mutually beneficial relations and complement each other's economic policies. In the sphere of economy, they complement each other just like salt and pepper. Russia's economy is based on oil revenues, while Turkey is a major consumer of Russian natural gas (second after Germany), which is supplied via two pipelines: Blue Stream and Trans-Balkan. Today, 30% of Turkey's gas imports are supplied from Russia.²⁸⁵ Given that any restrictions will have a negative impact on national economies, a positive condition is the course towards convergence of the economies of both countries. Moreover, major infrastructure projects such as the TurkStream pipeline help to bring the two countries even closer to each other. Energy cooperation is the most important factor in strengthening of the stabilization of political and economic ties between the two countries. Despite the fact that Turkey's main trading partner is traditionally the

²⁸⁴ Polina Berezhnaya, "Экономическое сотрудничество между Россией и Турцией (Economic cooperation between Turkey and Russia)", **Economics and business: theory and practice**, Vol. 5-1, No.: 63, 2020, p. 84. <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/ekonomicheskoe-sotrudnichestvo-mezhdu-rossiy-i-turtsiy> (20.05.2022)

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

EU countries, in particular Germany, with which Turkey has strong ties in many areas, economic relations with Russia are no less important both from the political and economic side. Russia has actively and successfully interacted with Turkey in the energy sector. Large-scale energy projects are an important factor in mutually beneficial relations. Thus, the Blue Stream gas pipelines with a capacity of 16 billion m³ per year, the Turkish Stream with a capacity of 31.5 billion m³ per year, as well as the Akkuyu nuclear power plant under construction, promote bilateral relations to a new level.²⁸⁶

It is also important that Ankara and Moscow continue to maintain balanced bilateral relations due to the unstable geopolitical situation and ongoing problems in the global economy. The global economy is a fragile system that is subject to frequent fluctuations depending on changing conditions in the international system. One of these conditions was the pandemic of COVID-19 that affected all spheres of activity in each country. The pandemic forced to restructure economic and social order that has been created for decades.²⁸⁷ According to McKinsey analysts, “the shock to our livelihoods from the economic impact of virus-suppression efforts could be the biggest in nearly a century.”²⁸⁸ According to the United Nations (UN), the pandemic pushed “more than 34 million people into extreme poverty in 2020.”²⁸⁹ The pandemic had a negative impact on job seekers, on stock markets, travel industry, and many more. Moreover, the pandemic pushed the economy of most states into the pit. According to the BBC News, “the global economy shrunk by 4.4% in 2020.”²⁹⁰ The decline in global economy is equated to losses during the Great Depression.²⁹¹ However, the pandemic served as a springboard for pharmaceutical companies. AstraZeneca, Moderna and

²⁸⁶ Habibe Ozdal, Irina Zvyagelskaya and Irina Svistunova, “Россия И Турция – Партнёры Или Соперники? (Are Russia And Turkey Partners Or Rivals?)”, **Peace and Security**, 2021, <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/moskau/18043.pdf> (23.05.2022)

²⁸⁷ Kevin Sneader and Shubham Singhal, “Beyond coronavirus: The path to the next normal”, **McKinsey**, 23.03.2020, <https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-services/our-insights/beyond-coronavirus-the-path-to-the-next-normal> (23.05.2022)

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ United Nations, “COVID-19 to slash global economic output by \$8.5 trillion over next two years” <https://www.un.org/en/desa/covid-19-slash-global-economic-output-85-trillion-over-next-two-years> (23.05.2022)

²⁹⁰ Lora Jones, “Coronavirus: How the pandemic has changed the world economy”, **BBC News**, 24.01.2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51706225> (23.05.2022)

²⁹¹ Ibid.

Novavax have seen significant rises in share value for 30.8%, 715.5% and 224.9% accordingly.²⁹²

Moreover, according to Bekdil, the pandemic offered Turkey an opportunity to deliver aid and to enter into a major international arena to show off. Turkey has sent medical kits to 57 countries to show solidarity in the fight against coronavirus, including two consignments of supplies to the US.²⁹³ According to Koca, the Minister of Health of Turkey, “Turkey has supported more than 80 countries and some international organizations by making donations and issuing special permissions for import and export to 65 countries.”²⁹⁴ In this regard, the political dialogue between Russia and Turkey has remained traditionally intensive, despite a number of restrictions related to the coronavirus pandemic. Cooperation between the two countries in the field of pharmaceuticals continues to develop. Since the beginning of the pandemic, Russia and Turkey have been actively cooperating in the struggle against COVID-19. The Russian Direct Investment Fund continues to work on the organization of supplies to Turkey and production in its territory of the world's first registered vaccine ‘Sputnik V’ against the coronavirus. According to Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, “Turkish pharmaceutical companies have already prepared for localization of production and plan to start production of Sputnik V in the coming months at several enterprises.”²⁹⁵

The cooperation in this field clearly shows the erasing of the border between foreign and domestic policy. The pandemic has indeed united everyone in the face of one threat. This has not happened before, even during the Second World War. The main thing is that the pandemic has put an end to the intoxication of the feeling that everything is going on and developing as steadily as before and humanity is protected from such catastrophes. The coronavirus pandemic has revealed all the weaknesses of

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Bekdil, Burak. “Turkey: Post-Coronavirus Challenges Are Likely to Hurt.” *The COVID-19 Crisis: Impact and Implications*, edited by Efraim Karsh, **Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies**, 2020, p. 251. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26356.56>. (23.05.2022).

²⁹⁴ Fahrettin Koca, “Turkey’s Management of COVID-19: Measures and Strategies of Health Policies.” **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 22, No.: 3, 2020, p. 58. JSTOR, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26956176>. (27.05.2022)

²⁹⁵ The Russian Government, “Состоялось 17-е совместное заседание Смешанной межправительственной Российско-Турецкой комиссии по торгово-экономическому сотрудничеству (The 17th joint meeting of the Joint Intergovernmental Russian-Turkish Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation was held)”, 30.07.2021, <http://government.ru/news/42921/> (24.05.2022)

the current relationship model, which has clearly not been able to adapt quickly to its unforeseen consequences. According to Koca, COVID-19 caught countries unprepared without exceptions because the spread of the disease was impossible to keep under control.²⁹⁶ That is why the joint actions are important in the time of common threat. The recovery of the global economy is based on mutual understanding and trust in each other. Thus, Russia and Turkey took mutual steps towards each other in order to restore and increase the pace of the economy. On the background of the recovery of economic activity of the countries, the Russian-Turkish trade turnover is gradually growing after a decline of 19.5% in 2020.²⁹⁷ According to Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, in the period from January to June 2021, the trade turnover grew by 40.4% compared to the same period 2020.²⁹⁸ Turkey remains one of Russia's largest trading partners in the field of agriculture: in January – June 2021, the turnover of agricultural products increased by 21% compared to the same period in 2020 – up to \$2.7 billion.²⁹⁹

Moreover, having in mind that states are not the only actors of international relations nowadays, but also TNC, banks and various international, regional and sub-regional organizations, there is greater opportunity for Turkey and Russia to cooperate. In this case, banking system is worth mentioning. In 2012, one of the largest universal banks in Russia and Eastern Europe Sberbank acquired Turkish private bank Denizbank.³⁰⁰ The deal served as an aid to increase exports and imports from both sides, and served as a tool to attract the number of Russian tourists to Turkey, since services were provided to Russian tourists traveling to Turkey (loans, cards, cash transfers, currency exchange).³⁰¹ An even greater advantage was the service of Russian companies operating in Turkey and Turkish companies operating in Russia. Access to a large number of Turkish companies operating in Russia and Russian companies operating in Turkey made available by offering favorable conditions when making transactions by both sides.

²⁹⁶ Koca, p. 55.

²⁹⁷ The Russian Government.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Analyst Presentation “Denizbank Acquisition”, **Sberbank**, https://www.sberbank.com/common/img/uploaded/ir/docs/analyst_presentation_denizbank_acquisition_ru.pdf (27.05.2022)

³⁰¹ Ibid.

Despite the selling of Denizbank to Emirates NBD in 2019³⁰², Turkey and Russia are still close to each other in cooperation in the banking system. Due to hard conditions in which Russia is currently located, citizens of the Russian Federation are experiencing difficulties when making payments with bankcards outside of Russia. However, having mutually beneficial aims in foreign policy Turkey and Russia are seeking for arrangements out of this situation. Thus, along with Ziraat Bankasi, Vakifbank and Is Bankasi, Denizbank has also joined the acceptance of cards with the Russian payment system 'Mir'.³⁰³ Then again, the Turkish side is taking these steps not only out of kindness, but also due to the direct dependence on the number of tourists in the summer period. In 2020, 12.7 million foreign tourists visited Turkey, which is 71.7% less compared to 2019.³⁰⁴ According to the Institute of Statistics of Turkey, Turkey's tourism revenues in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic decreased by 65.1% to 12 billion 59 million \$420 thousand, compared to 2019 (\$34.5 billion).³⁰⁵

Russian-Turkish relations are developing at the present stage in a special political context. The activism of regional powers is the result of a transitional period in the system of international relations, which gives medium and small countries great opportunities for maneuver. Turkey clearly stands out for its special willingness to defend firmly its interests in various parts of the world. The rapid growth of political contacts, trade, economic and humanitarian ties between Russia and Turkey over the past 15 years has shown that common interests and interdependence do exist between them and it is difficult to see any clear hierarchy in bilateral relations. Thus, the basis for cooperation between the two countries is quite solid.

³⁰² "Russia's Sberbank closes deal to sell Turkey's Denizbank to Emirates NBD", **Daily Sabah**, 31.07.2019, <https://www.dailysabah.com/finance/2019/07/31/russias-sberbank-closes-deal-to-sell-turkeys-denizbank-to-emirates-nbd> (31.05.2022)

³⁰³ Darya Rybak, "Россиянам стало проще расплачиваться в Турции (It has become easier for Russians to make payments in Turkey)", Lenta.ru, 31.05.2022, <https://lenta.ru/news/2022/05/31/mirumir/> (31.05.2022)

³⁰⁴ Andrey Schetin, "Россияне стали лидерами по турпотоку в Турцию в 2020 году (Russian tourists have become leaders in the tourist flow to Turkey in 2020)", Interfax Tourism, 29.01.2021, <https://tourism.interfax.ru/ru/news/articles/76449> (31.05.2022)

³⁰⁵ Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, "Turizm İstatistikleri, IV.Çeyrek: Ekim-Aralık ve Yıllık, 2020", 29.01.2021, <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Turizm-Istatis-tikleri-IV.Ceyrek:-Ekim-Aralik-ve-Yillik,-2020-37438> (31.05.2022)

4.1.2. MULTIPLE CHANNELS OF INTERACTION IN TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

The changes taking place in the 21st century have led to the transformation of the modern system of international relations into a different state, different from the one that was characteristic of the system in the last decade of the 20th century. The new system of international relations is manifested in the desire of international leaders to regulate international relations based on their own ideas and interests.³⁰⁶ Along with this, the chaotic nature emanating from the system of international relations itself is also increasing. Therefore, as one of the most prominent channels of interactions between the two states is through personal relations at the different levels. The dynamics of socio-political relations, economic and military cooperation through personal relations at the level of heads of state, members of the government is a significant factor, in some cases even the dominant one in determining progress in international relations. The concept of political leadership is of key importance for understanding the ongoing political processes both within the country and in the international arena. However, the personal aspect is difficult to predict. The specificity of personal relations that is revealed by contemporary world political processes is constantly experiencing many influences of various political forces.³⁰⁷ Interpersonal and intergovernmental leadership factors are inextricably linked with each other. Understanding the degree of this correlation determines the trajectory of the development of the system of international relations and political processes within the country and within the international system. Increasing social inequality, fundamentalism, local wars, the crisis of democracy and the pandemic and other global challenges of the 21st century immeasurably increase the role of personal qualities of politicians in general and heads of state in particular in international relations.

³⁰⁶ Margaret G Hermann, "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders." **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 24, No.: 1, 1980, p. 8. JSTOR, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600126>. (5.06.2022)

³⁰⁷ Andrei Odínokov, "Современные Российско-Турецкие Отношения: Персональный Аспект. (Modern Russian-Turkish Relations: Personal Aspect)", *Historical and socio-educational thought*, Vol. 11, No.: 3, p. 68.

Despite the fact that the current financial and economic system in the world is in 'survival mode'³⁰⁸, the presidents of both Russia and Turkey have made significant contribution to the development of their countries' performance in the international arena. According to the results of 2014, the total volume of trade turnover between the countries was \$44 billion, and by 2015, Turkey confidently took the fifth position in the ranking of Russia's foreign trade partners.³⁰⁹

Moreover, under the presidency of Erdogan, Turkey has created the most favorable climate for external investment capital, including Russian investment capital. The Turkish state guarantees freedom in the disposal of the extracted profits for the investor, as well as in the receipt of other income from the implementation of investment activities. Therefore, the investor can use the profits both ways: within the framework of the national economy of Turkey and by withdrawing them from the country.³¹⁰ Moreover, any investor who has invested capital in the Turkish economy is entitled to compensation for the incurred losses, which were the result of illegal actions (or inaction) of executive authorities at all levels of its localization.³¹¹

Consequently, until 2015, personal relations between Putin and Erdogan, based both on personal affection, on common styles of public administration, on the desire to develop the most equal and mutually beneficial conditions for cooperation both in politics and in the economy, resulted in positive dynamics for bilateral progress in relations. However, friendly relations sometimes undergo changes because of the tense situation in the political context. A striking example is the events of 2015. First, in September in Moscow, Putin and Erdogan together solemnly opened the building of the cathedral mosque rebuilt with Turkish help³¹², and then in November of the same

³⁰⁸ Mariia Mayorova and Lebedeva Ekaterina. "Личностный и страновой факторы лидерства в международных отношениях: теоретические подходы. (Personal and country factors of leadership in international relations: theoretical approaches)", **News of the Tula State University. Humanitarian sciences**, 2022, <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/lichnostnyy-i-stranovoy-factory-liderstva-v-mezhdunarodnyh-otnosheniyah-teoreticheskie-podhody> (23.05.2022)

³⁰⁹ Odinov, p. 69.

³¹⁰ Ibid, p. 70.

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Pavel Felgengauer, "Между скандалом и дракой. Политика мужской дружбы (bromance) Владимира Путина и Реджепа Тайипа Эрдогана трещит по швам из-за Сирии. (Between a scandal and a fight. The policy of bromance of Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan is bursting at the seams because of Syria)", *Novaya Gazeta*, 05.02.2020, <https://novayagazeta.ru.turbopages.org/novayagazeta.ru/s/articles/2020/02/05/83788-mezhdu-skandalom-i-drakoy>, (05.06.2022)

year, Turkish armed forces shot down SU-24 fighter in the border area of Syria.³¹³ However, the personal relations between the Presidents of Russia and Turkey, Putin and Erdogan, made it possible to find a harmonious way out of controversial situation. Taking a step forward, the Turkish president made a phone call and expressed his condolences to the relatives and friends of the dead pilot of the plane.³¹⁴

The stable working relationship between the leaders of Russia and Turkey seems unnatural. Caucasus, Syria, Crimea, Central Asia are the stumbling blocks for the fruitful cooperation of the states. Both the declared and hidden interests of Moscow and Ankara are opposite on these territories. The presence of a huge conflict potential now forces traditional historical competitors to treat each other with special thrift and caution. In addition, Putin assessed his relations with Erdogan during the annual press conference in 2020.³¹⁵ According to him, they had opposite views, but the Turkish leader was a man who kept his word.³¹⁶

Moreover, the mediation efforts made by Russia and Turkey in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020 also embodied the confirmation of friendly relations between the leaders of the two countries. On the morning of September 27, 2020, armed clashes resumed between Azerbaijan, on the one side, and Armenia and the unrecognized Republic of Artsakh, or the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, on the other side, which quickly turned into a full-scale war.³¹⁷ The new stage of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict lasted 44 days and ended with the announcement of the statement of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the Russian Federation on November 10, 2020.³¹⁸

³¹³ Emre Ersen, "Evaluating the Fighter Jet Crisis in Turkish-Russian Relations", **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 19, No.: 4, p. 85, 2017, <https://www.insightturkey.com/articles/evaluating-the-fighter-jet-crisis-in-turkish-russian-relations> (05.06.2022)

³¹⁴ Official webpage of the President of the Russian Federation. "Владимиром Путиным получено послание Президента Турции Реджепа Тайипа Эрдогана (Vladimir Putin received a message from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan)", Kremlin, 27.06.2016, <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52282> (06.06.2022)

³¹⁵ "Личные отношения Эрдогана и Путина помогают в спорных ситуациях. (Personal relations between Erdogan and Putin help in controversial situations)", News.ru, 27.12.2020, <https://news-ru.turbopages.org/news.ru/s/politics/peskov-lichnye-otnosheniya-erdogana-i-putina-pomogayut-v-spornyh-situaciyah/>, (05.06.2022)

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ Gevorg Avetikyan, "Война 2020 Года В Нагорном Карабахе: Региональное Измерение. (The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war: the regional dimension)", **Paths to peace and security**, 2020, p. 182, https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/magazines/puty_miru/2020/02/11_Avetikyan.pdf (05.06.2022)

³¹⁸ Ibid, p. 183.

Despite the fact that Turkey, historically and culturally related to Azerbaijan, has taken an emphatically anti-Armenian position throughout the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Turkish leader highly appreciated Moscow's mediation efforts to sign an agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, Erdogan said that Turkey, together with Russia, would monitor compliance with the ceasefire. Later, the joint Russian-Turkish monitoring Center for monitoring the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh was opened in Aghdam in January 2021.³¹⁹ Thus, the joint efforts of Russia and Turkey gave the unrecognized republic the opportunity to save the territories that was controlled by the Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh until September 27, 2020.³²⁰

In addition, another channel of interaction between Turkey and Russia is the relations between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov and Mevlut Cavusoglu, which is quite natural. In fact, the leading functions of foreign ministers are to maintain friendly relations with other states and to implement the country's foreign policy. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Russia and Turkey meet and call each other on a regular basis to discuss critical issues. One of the most recent meetings was held under the hospitality of Turkish side on March 10, 2022, as a prelude to the trilateral meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Ukraine and Turkey to discuss the situation in Ukraine.³²¹ Thus, playing the role of an intermediary the Republic of Turkey is trying to maintain close relations with Russia despite condemnation of its military actions on the territory of Ukraine.

The systematic development of relations continues in the field of industry, in particular aviation and shipbuilding, information and communication technologies. Such large Russian investors as Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works, GAZ Group are successfully operating in Turkey and in the field of power engineering – Public Joint Stock Company (PJSC) Power Machines is involved in the implementation of projects for the construction and modernization of energy facilities in Turkey.³²² Turkish

³¹⁹ “В Карабахе открылся российско-турецкий мониторинговый центр. (Russian-Turkish monitoring center opened in Karabakh)”, TASS, 30.01.2021, <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/10584995>, (05.06.2022)

³²⁰ Avetikyan, p. 189.

³²¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. Türkiye-Russia-Ukraine Trilateral Foreign Ministers Meeting, 10 March 2022, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-rusya-ukrayna-uclu-disisleri-bakanlari-toplantisi--10-mart-2022.en.mfa>, (05.06.2022)

³²² The Russian Government.

industrial companies, in turn, have a positive experience of working in Russia, primarily in economic zones.

Turkey is also a profitable partner for Russia in the field of mechanical engineering. Mechanical engineering is one of the most important sectors in Turkey, especially in terms of national income, exports, employment, competitiveness and investment. Russia, which is an important market for equipment manufacturers all over the world, acquires a significant part of the equipment as part of its investments in Turkey, and this is an important indicator of cooperation between the two countries in this area.³²³ Moreover, the pandemic has not greatly affected this industry, which underlines the importance of mechanical engineering for both countries. The export figure of Turkish equipment manufacturers in 2020 amounted to \$18.4 billion, and in 2021, this figure reached \$23 billion.³²⁴ Important areas of cooperation in mechanical engineering between Russia and Turkey include the construction of nuclear power plants, the defense industry, joint investments in energy/natural gas, as well as investments in the metallurgical industry.

According to Linklater, “the existence of multiple channels leads one to predict a different and significant role for international organizations in world politics.”³²⁵ One of the most prominent organizations that connects Russia and Turkey is BSEC. BSEC is an organization that began its work in 1992.³²⁶ The organization regulates the relations of neighboring countries on the Black Sea. The initiator of its creation was Turkey, which sought, regardless of other players, to build its own structure in the region, where it would play a leading role. This organization is still functioning today and is considered one of the examples of successful cooperation between the states of the Black Sea region. In the context of the organization, the Black Sea is considered as a transport corridor that opens alternative transport and trade routes to Eastern and Northern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia for the countries of the Black Sea

³²³ Türkiye'nin Makinecileri/Makine İhracatçıları Birliği. Сотрудничество России И Турции В Области Машиностроения (Cooperation Between Russia And Turkey In The Field Of Mechanical Engineering). <https://www.makinebirlik.com/images/d/library/dfc83846-43bb-4b57-8777-bced09cebdb4.pdf>, (05.06.2022)

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ Andrew Linklater, *International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science*, Volume 4. Front Cover, Routledge, 2000, p. 2177

³²⁶ Yannis Valinakis, “The BSEC: Incentives For And Obstacles To Cooperation.” *The Black Sea Region: Challenges And Opportunities For Europe*, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 1999, p. 7. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07042.7>. (05.06.2022).

coast, especially for Turkey. In this scenario, the opening of the Kavkaz-Samsun railway-ferry line on February 19, 2013 seems to be in a favorable light.³²⁷ This transport corridor has been operating since 2010 in a test mode. In 2012, 18 ship calls were made to the port of Kavkaz and 64,790 thousand tons of cargo were transported³²⁸. The Kavkaz-Samsun railway-ferry line has proved its importance. Therefore, it was officially opened in 2013. The Minister of Transport of the Russian Federation Maxim Sokolov and the Minister of Transport of the Republic of Turkey Binali Yildirim attended the ceremony³²⁹ that can also be manifested as a channel of cooperation on the level of ministries of transport.

Moreover, the construction of Russian-Turkish customs logistics centers in the Krasnodar Territory and the Rostov Region also plays an important role in bilateral relations.³³⁰ The creation of logistics terminals and facilitation of the border crossing process is a strategically important step for the development of transportation of Russian goods to Turkey and Turkish goods to Russia due to the simplified paperwork process and ensuring that all interested services are aware of the nature of cargo. For Turkey, the creation of such logistics centers also represents a certain benefit, since in the case of the normal functioning of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, Turkey has the opportunity to deliver goods more efficiently and quickly, including to the Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Thus, in Turkey's foreign policy, the Black Sea region began to be perceived primarily as the focus of the most important communications. In addition to strengthening trade and economic ties, the BSEC pays attention to countering such threats to regional security such as pollution of the Black Sea basin, organized crime, and drug trafficking and terrorism.³³¹

Moreover, the cooperation on different levels manifests itself in the cooperation between Turkey and different sub-regions of the Russian Federation. The

³²⁷ Ministry of Transportation of Russian Federation. 19 февраля в Самсуне (Турция) официально открыта железнодорожно-паромная линия Кавказ-Самсун. (On February 19, the Caucasus-Samsun railway and ferry line was officially opened in Samsun (Turkey)), <https://mintrans.gov.ru/press-center/news/5640>, (05.06.2022)

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Mikhail Agadzhanyan, "Северо-Западный Кавказ в поле экономического и дипломатического внимания Турции, (Northwest Caucasus in the field of Turkey's economic and diplomatic attention)", *Geopolitics*, 30.03.2013, <http://www.geopolitics.ru/2013/03/severo-zapadnyj-kavkaz-v-pole-ekonomicheskogo-i-diplomaticheskogo-vnimanija-turcii/>, (05.06.2022)

³³¹ Valinakis, p. 8.

increased development of foreign economic and investment relations between Russia and Turkey is a trend direction. Moreover, their intensity depends very much on the specific region of Russia. Therefore, the number of Turkish investors who are implementing projects in the Republic of Bashkortostan is growing.³³² Consul General of the Republic of Turkey in Kazan, Ismet Erikan confirmed that the Republic of Bashkortostan has entered the group of priority areas of Turkey's interests.³³³ As for Bashkortostan, it has already reached the 7th place in the supply of products to Turkish markets.³³⁴ In addition, the reverse process is also increasing – a factory was built and is operating on Bashkir land, Turkish companies are building roads and bridges in Bashkortostan.

The regular political dialogue established between Moscow and Ankara needs to be developed by deepening its intellectual foundations. Bilateral relations can receive a new impetus by strengthening the contribution of civil society institutions, scientific institutions, inter-parliamentary and cultural contacts. This will contribute to overcoming the burden of history, the formation of new thinking and even a new language as part of the process of expanding the exchange of views between the two societies. Deepening such interaction will also help to create a more active and lively basis for political cooperation.

Strengthening mutual understanding is necessary not only at the official level, but also in the sphere of cultural and human exchanges between the two countries. Taking into account the consequences of the cooperation in different spheres between Turkey and Russia, cooperation in sport and culture between the countries are also developing. Russia and Turkey have reached an understanding on the implementation of the cooperation program between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey in the field of education, science, culture, youth exchanges and sports. This program includes the exchange of information about ongoing or planned sports,

³³² «Турция ждет открытия в Башкортостане Почетного консульства: на инвестсabantue «Зауралье-2022» обсудили развитие российско-турецких деловых связей (Turkey is waiting for the opening of an Honorary Consulate in Bashkortostan: The development of Russian-Turkish business ties was discussed at the investment forum “Trans-Urals-2022”», Kugarchin Vesti, 03.06.2022, <https://kugvesti.ru/articles/ekonomika/2022-06-03/turtsiya-zhdet-otkrytiya-v-bashkortostane-pochetnogo-konsulstva-na-investsabantue-zauralie-2022-obsudili-razvitie-rossiysko-turetskih-delovyh-svyazey-2829799> (05.06.2022)

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Ibid.

cultural, scientific and educational events.³³⁵ The Dean's Office of the Faculty of Distance Learning of the Anatolian University has prepared a project 'Educational Portal: Turkish as a native language', which provides an opportunity to study Turkish remotely.³³⁶ The portal, designed for Turkish citizens living abroad, as well as foreign citizens who want to learn Turkish language and culture, combines modern learning technologies (electronic lessons, video lessons, audio files and texts), allowing people to learn Turkish remotely regardless of place and time, in accordance with individual learning speed.

4.1.3. DIMINISHING ROLE OF THE MILITARY FORCES IN TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Since ancient times, the army has occupied a primary place in the life of any state. The Holy Roman Empire had existed for many years at the expense of a well-armed, trained and combat-trained army.³³⁷ In the 21st century, questions about the role and influence of the military power of a certain state on the international agenda are very controversial. The main difference between various points of view is how the place and role of the army is determined in the political life of the state and in the international context.³³⁸ In addition, one of the important issues is the role of the army in bilateral relations between certain countries.

Speaking about Russia and Turkey, since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey (the Ottoman Empire), military power has played a very important role. Therefore, in the period from the 17th to the 19th century, relations between the two states were heated to the limit, which resulted in constant

³³⁵ Electronic fund of legal and regulatory documents. Программа Сотрудничества между Российской Федерацией и Турецкой Республикой в области образования, науки, культуры, молодежных обменов и спорта (Cooperation Program between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey in the field of education, science, culture, youth exchanges and sports), <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/902173770>, (05.06.2022)

³³⁶ Consulate General Of The Republic Of Turkey In Kazan. Образовательный Портал: Турецкий – Родной Язык. (Educational Portal: Turkish as a native language), <http://kazan.cg.mfa.gov.tr/Mission/ShowAnnouncement/341061>, (05.06.2022)

³³⁷ Igor Kopylov, "Армия и политика в современном мире. (The Army and politics in the modern world)", Vol. 2, **Power**, 2011, p. 80. <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/armiya-i-politika-v-sovremennom-mire>, (06.06.2022)

³³⁸ Ibid, p. 81.

bloody wars.³³⁹ During the Cold War, the Republic of Turkey was a loyal member of the US-led Western Bloc and the NATO³⁴⁰, performing an important function within the alliance: “a foothold on the southern flank of the confrontation with the USSR.”³⁴¹ After the end of the ideological confrontation, Ankara found itself to some extent at a crossroads. On the one hand, the collapse of the USSR opened up great opportunities for the promotion of Turkish influence in new countries of a related language and close culture. On the other hand, despite the fact that “strategic collaboration between Turkey and the USA was not established on an already-existing relationship”³⁴², the Western influence had still existed and pushed Turkey for pro-Western decision-making process.

However, at the present stage, forceful methods of implementing foreign policy are becoming less relevant, yielding to the methods of economic diplomacy. There are many economic tools to achieve political benefits by restricting or encouraging a dependent country. They are economic sanctions, variation of customs and tariff duties, trade wars and embargoes, restriction of export-import operations, freezing of accounts, forced withdrawal of capital from the countries, construction of administrative and sanitary-epidemiological barriers, issuance of loans, foreign direct investment, activities of TNCs on the territory of a foreign state, as well as many other economic instruments.³⁴³ To date, in order to maintain the competitiveness of the country's economy in the international arena, the most effective methods of conducting economic diplomacy have been direct investment and writing-off of external public debt. It is through economic tools that political goals are achieved in the modern world.³⁴⁴

A great example of implementing economic sanctions as a deterrent tool in controversial situations is one of the developments regarding the Syrian crisis the jet-crisis between Russia and Turkey in 2015. In its response to this development, despite

³³⁹ Mamedov, p. 269

³⁴⁰ Ömer Taşpınar, “Turkey: A Partner in Crisis”, **Great Decisions**, 2018, p. 57, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26593697>, (07.06.2022)

³⁴¹ Lukyanov.

³⁴² Aylin Güney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present.” **Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2008, pp. 471-87. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40262588>, (10.06.2022)

³⁴³ Viktoriya Volkova, “Основные Инструменты Экономической Дипломатии (The Main Tools Of Economic Diplomacy)”, **Bulletin of Master's Degree**, Vol. 2-1, No.: 113, 2021, p. 64, <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/osnovnye-instrumenty-ekonomicheskoy-diplomatii>, (10.06.2022)

³⁴⁴ Volkova, p. 65.

having great military power from A to Z, Russia had concentrated all the effort on economic sanctions. Therefore, Russia banned the import of a number of Turkish products by January 1, 2016, reduced the number of work permits for Turkish road carriers, suspended negotiations with Turkey on an agreement on investment and trade in services, and introduced a ban on charter flights between the two countries by December 1, 2015.³⁴⁵ The concept of economic confrontation is applicable to such actions, when countries affect only each other's economic spheres. Undoubtedly, Turkey had suffered economically after the Russian government imposed restrictive measures. According to Ersen, the loss in Turkish economy amounted between \$9-11 billion due to Russia's sanctions.³⁴⁶

Theoretically, sanctions represent the most optimal alternative to diplomatic and military measures of influence. At the same time, sanctions do not always lead to the desired effect, and sometimes even lead to opposite results, i.e. activation of undesirable actions on the part of the object of sanctions and self-harming of the economy for the country that imposes sanctions. Therefore, the restrictions had a negative impact on both, Turkey and Russia. Thus, by imposing restrictions against Turkey, Russia has also experienced the consequences of the economic confrontation. According to Central Bank of Russian Federation, inflation in Russia amounted to 16.9%, while after the lifting of sanctions on Turkey, it almost decreased threefold.³⁴⁷ Due to these facts, Moscow and Ankara decided not to mutually undermine the economies of the countries and to resolve the crisis through peaceful negotiations, without the use of military power, although they had it at their disposal.

Vice versa, having military technologies at their disposal, Russia and Turkey have tendency to cooperate in the military sphere. One of the highlights of this interaction was the purchasing of the S-400 missile system by Turkey from Russia despite the negative reaction of Western countries. The Turkish armed forces are large and fairly well armed. The fact that "the Turkish army is one of the largest armies in

³⁴⁵ "Санкции в отношении Турции и экономические связи двух стран (Sanctions against Turkey and economic ties between the two countries)", **RIA Novosti**, 01.12.2015, <https://ria.ru/20151201/1333890194.html>, (10.06.2022)

³⁴⁶ Ersen, p. 92.

³⁴⁷ The Database of The Bank Of Russian Federation. "Ключевая ставка Банка России и инфляция. (The key rate of the Bank of Russian Federation and inflation)", **The Bank of Russian Federation**. https://cbr.ru/hd_base/inf/, (10.06.2022)

NATO” is often repeated.³⁴⁸ The state is actively developing its military-industrial complex, and is increasingly trying to provide itself with weapons, including high-tech ones. However, in a number of areas, especially the most complex and expensive, there are serious shortcomings that are incompatible with a serious military power with high ambitions. In such situations, non-Western countries such as Russia has offered assistance making the West nervous. The contract with Russia for the supply of the missile system was concluded in 2017, where the cost of the two regiments amounted to about \$2.5 billion.³⁴⁹ The speed of the signing of the contract seemed highly fast for such transactions. Moreover, later, at the request of the Turkish side, deliveries under the contract were accelerated by 8 months.³⁵⁰ For Russia, Turkey's purchase of military weapons is seen only on the positive side. The split in NATO alliance, the rapprochement with Turkey have been beneficial arguments for the Russian Federation. The mutual desire of Moscow and Ankara to seek understanding and cooperation is supported by the existing tension in the relations of both sides with Western countries. In addition, Turkey is trying to use it to its advantage. While remaining in the southern flank of NATO, it is simultaneously trying to encourage the US and European powers to consider Turkish interests. In this regard, ties with Russia are an additional tool for balancing the West and integrating Turkey into the global agenda.³⁵¹

Moreover, one of the most important elements of Russian and Turkish foreign policy activities remains countering the spread of terrorism and extremism, which pose a potential threat to their own stability and territorial integrity. International terrorism has become a ubiquitous agenda and one of the most significant threats at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. International terrorism is a serious challenge to modern public life and national security of states. Currently, it is not possible to solve this problem because in the process of development of society, terrorism acquires new properties and forms. The development of secular statehood based on international law is still of great importance for the neighboring regions. Considering the conflicts in the

³⁴⁸ Aleksandr Ermakov, “Турецкий гамбит. (The Turkish Gambit)”, **Russian Council**, 21.10.2021, https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/turetskiy-gambit/?sphrase_id=91196028, (10.06.2022)

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Habibe Ozdal, Irina Zvyagelskaya and Irina Svistunova.

Middle East as a threat to the security of their countries, Turkey and Russia were initially on opposite sides of the so-called ‘barricades’. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, they had held different views on the situation.

Turkey and Syria are sharing a border. Since the establishment of the Republics, the border was the connection and the separation point in their relations.³⁵² From the second half of the 20th century until 1998, Syria supported the PKK, allowing it to place its training camps on Syrian territory.³⁵³ In 1998, the Adana Agreement between Turkey and Syria was signed, binding the Syrian government to suspend its support of the PKK.³⁵⁴ Eventually, the situation at this period is significantly different. Mutually accusing each other of non-fulfillment of obligations, the parties to the agreement take steps to ensure their own security. Therefore, the Turkish side constantly reminds that the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) are the ‘Syrian branch of the PKK’, which means they threaten Turkey’s security.³⁵⁵

However, in the end, Moscow and Ankara agreed that Syria should preserve its integrity, which is a priority in the process of peaceful settlement of the Syrian crisis.³⁵⁶ Thus, meetings are held in the international arena with the aim of concluding truce agreements or at least a ceasefire in certain territories. In 2020, one of the last major military operation of the Syrian Arab Army took place in Idlib. The offensive on the opposition region ended with new Russian-Turkish agreements and the signing of an additional Protocol to the Memorandum on Stabilization of the Situation in the Idlib De-Escalation Zone dated September 17, 2018.³⁵⁷ The scope of the agreement

³⁵² Armenak Tokmajyan and Kheder Khaddour. “The Syrian-Turkish Border: Shaper of Mutual Relations.” **Border Nation: The Reshaping of the Syrian-Turkish Borderlands, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace**, 2022, p. 2. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep40263.5>. (10.06.2022).

³⁵³ Aleksandra Halturina, “Турецко-сирийские отношения в контексте соглашения в Адане 1998 г. (Turkish-Syrian relations in the context of the Adana Agreement of 1998)”, **Russian Council**, 16.04.2019. <https://russiancouncil.ru/blogs/akhalturina/34645/>, (10.06.2022)

³⁵⁴ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti İle Suriye Arap Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında Terör Ve Terör Örgütlerine Karşı Ortak İşbirliği Anlaşması. <https://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d23/1/1-1009.pdf>, (10.06.2022)

³⁵⁵ Halturina.

³⁵⁶ Dolgov, p. 6.

³⁵⁷ Additional Protocol to the Memorandum on Stabilization of the Situation in the Idlib De-Escalation Zone dated September 17, 2018. Russian Embassy in the Republic of South Africa. https://russianembassyza.mid.ru/web/russianembassyza-ru/vnesnaa-politika/-/asset_publisher/5pcvHA1rTPqJ/content/dopolnitel-nyj-protokol-k-memorandumu-o-stabilizacii-obstanovki-v-zone-deeskalacii-idlib-ot-17-sentabra-2018-g-?inheritRedirect=false, (10.06.2022)

according to the protocol included the creation of a security corridor and joint Russian-Turkish patrols along this corridor.

In addition, the events in Libya, repeating the fate of its neighbor Syria, are also the sphere of interaction between Turkey and Russia. Again, Russia and Turkey are opposing each other in this region supporting different sides of the combating forces. Russia supports the Libyan National Army of Khalifa Haftar, and Turkey militarily supports the internationally recognized Government of National Accord under the leadership of Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. However, neither Russia nor Turkey use any weapons against each other, although they have any weapon at their disposal. Over time, the cooperation in obviously contradictory situations leads to a change in the balance of power in the international arena. Thus, a political situation is becoming beneficial for the opposing parties to the conflict through contracts and negotiations.

Moreover, there is also the idea of worldwide hysteria about nuclear war. According to Linklater, states being in fear of the threat of nuclear war, are trying to solve their controversial issues without resorting to armed forces.³⁵⁸ Despite the fact, that such a point of view has the right to exist; at the same time, it does not seem possible to use nuclear weapons universally. Moreover, the use of military power shows that the state has not comprehended the idea of the supreme war. “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”- proclaimed by Sun Tzu in the Art of War.³⁵⁹ Can we say that this hysteria has bypassed Russia and Turkey? Having transformed their relations over the past twenty years, Turkey and Russia today have the opportunity to develop a bilateral dialogue and at the same time begin to contribute to ensuring peace and prosperity among their common geographical neighbors.³⁶⁰ Fundamentally, the interests of Russia and Turkey largely coincide, which creates prerequisites for further development of dialogue and cooperation. Both countries are

³⁵⁸ Andrew Linklater, “International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science”, Volume 4. Front Cover, Routledge, 2000, p. 2177

³⁵⁹ Sun Tzu Quotes, **Goodreads**. https://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/1771.Sun_Tzu (06.06.2022)

³⁶⁰ Dmitry Trenin and Memduh Karakullukçu, “Перспективы Сотрудничества России И Турции В Неспоконном Регионе (Prospects For Cooperation Between Russia And Turkey In A Troubled Region)”, Moscow Center Carnegie, https://istina.msu.ru/download/7337089/1dzyxR:b_IRbmeYWYZAtDZPewyl0XhccM4/ (05.06.2022)

interested in economic growth and political stability of their states and among their common neighbors. Both Ankara and Moscow are wary of external interventions, especially military ones, in these neighboring regions. Moreover, it would not be an exaggeration to say that Russia and Turkey have common concerns and similar painful historical experiences. These experiences push the states to interact and to cooperate with each other.



CONCLUSION

This research intends to analyze the relations between Russia and Turkey in the 2000s through the concept of complex interdependence put forward by Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane. While its emergence dated back to the 1970s, the complex interdependence approach is quite refreshing and expressing the new features of the changing shape of world politics in the 21st century. This thesis brings the approach to light in the sphere of examining the relations between Turkey and Russia in the 2000s. The contemporary international system includes intertwining global and sovereign interests. At the same time, interests express the reasons for the actions of countries, social groups, their desire to change their position, and their well-being in the conditions of geo-competition. The national interests of the countries are seeking to be materialized in an international context where international relations are more complex and deep. The foreign policy of a country is the outcome of a combination of internal and external dynamics. The changing order encourages the emergence of new centers of influence and actors in international relations, integration processes, and changing values. The process of transformation of the system can be chaotic because it is prone to self-regulation. Turkey and Russia, as components of the current world order, have increasingly interacted in regional and global processes, which in return have presented them with both opportunities and challenges for cooperation.

The development of Turkey-Russia relations, which have a history of more than 500 years, had been quite complex. On the one hand, there have been periods of confrontation and conflict caused by differences in geopolitical and regional goals and objectives. On the other hand, there have been venues of partnership and cooperation related to common economic and political interests. In contemporary international relations, economic factors are playing increasingly important roles, which is also reflected in Turkey-Russia economic relations. The increase in the pace of commodity turnover between the two countries is a confirmation of this idea. The foreign policy of both countries is based on compliance with international rules and legislation, which implies, along with openness to dialogue and cooperation, the full protection of national and state interests. Complex interdependence approach is revealing itself in this sphere.

Moreover, the characteristics of the theory of complex interdependence clearly manifest themselves in the relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation in the 21st century. At the present stage of globalization, quite promising cooperation has been developed between the two countries in almost all spheres of the economy and other vital sectors. For many years, they have continued active cooperation, in improving the economic situation, increasing trade turnover between the countries, in the field of tourism, culture, and energy, as well as in the development of diplomatic relations and many other areas. The development of diplomatic relations plays a great role in bilateral relations. Due to the fact that there is a special attitude of Turkish ruling elites towards their Russian counterparts and vice versa, relations are developing at a special level. The friendly attitude of ruling elites towards each other is expressed in the frequent exchange of visits and even more frequent telephone conversations between the heads of states. This fact proves that the personal qualities of the heads of states and the political elites play a vital role in the development of relations between Turkey and Russia. The characteristics of 'non-hierarchy' among issues and multiple channels of cooperation dominate these spheres of cooperation in bilateral relations.

The retrospective of diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey is undulating. The moments of decline in a so-called 'friendliness' are dictated largely by the desire for the unconditional leadership of the Turkish state in the Black Sea region, the proximity of borders with Russia, and a sufficiently strong counterweight on its part. In addition, the historical periods of confrontation between the two countries have left their mark on the current stage of development of international cooperation between the two states. At the same time, periods of searching for new points for interaction and increasing the level of mutual understanding are caused by economic relationships in many areas, which are again facilitated by the proximity of borders. Thus, territorial proximity to a certain extent is a strong argument in favor of establishing relations between Turkey and Russia, as well as the economic interests of the two countries. On the other hand, these same factors are the starting point for inciting conflict. The search for balance and dialogue are the key points of the new format of relations between Turkey and Russia.

The idea that Russian-Turkish relations have experienced ups and downs in relations is not new. However, during this period, we see that the countries do not cease to engage in dialogue to improve bilateral relations in various areas.

Despite quite stable foreign policy ties, there are always external factors that can significantly worsen the situation. Until recently, such factors were mainly called the discrepancy of interests in the zones of military conflict. However, 2020 has made its own adjustments, and coronavirus disease froze foreign relations between states to large extent. The pandemic of COVID-19 became a challenge for the whole world and bilateral relations. The pandemic in 2020 and its continuing consequences in 2021 were the catalysts for the revision of diplomatic and partnership relations between countries. The problematic issues within states came to the fore, and the 'concern' with external friends began to lose relevance. Of course, this was a temporary effect of changing landmarks. Moreover, the pandemic caused an unprecedented crisis in national health systems. It turned out that no country was able to urgently mobilize resources; no country was able to quickly cope with the pandemic. The pandemic had changed the rules of the game, led to a weakening of the cohesion of the 'collective West' and the erosion of a number of democratic principles that many states found it possible to violate in the process of combating the epidemic. The geopolitical center was weakened, and at the same time, the rise of regional powers began. The economic downturn initiated by the outbreak of the pandemic affected the ability to provide public services and finance various sectors of the economy, including the security sector.

The existence of strong relations in the sphere of economy and other spheres between Russia and Turkey does not mean a complete coincidence of foreign policy courses. The differences in the views of the two countries on international conflicts can be clearly traced to the period since the beginning of the 21st century in the surrounding regions. They constituted challenges to the degree of relations between Russia and Turkey. Despite both states having always advocated non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, both countries have broken promises and went against their principles of non-interference. This strategy is largely dictated by the goal of the ruling parties to become leading countries in their regions. However, this process has involved certain risks and has clearly provoked an increase in tension between

both states. Therefore, in the Syrian conflict, Russia spoke three times at the UN Security Council against external interference and a violent change of power in Syria. At the same time, Turkey had entered into the confrontation and expressed a clear position of disagreement with the Russian position. Moreover, the Syrian crisis has repeatedly become a serious test for Turkey-Russia interstate relations. The crisis has clearly demonstrated how the political views of the leadership of the countries differ both in goals and in methods of achieving them. It has exposed many contradictions between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey in the context of political aspirations. The war in Syria has revealed all the differences that are the result of the foreign policy of states, hidden under productive economic cooperation. The Russian jet fighter shot down by Turkey in 2015 was the apogee that revealed the sharp corners of interstate conflicts. However, compromises were reached as the result of difficult negotiations and the work of competent departments and officials.

However, the analysis of Turkey-Russia relations showed that despite the temporary isolation from each other due to different factors, the dialogue has continued. Its focus is on solving specific problematic issues, which is facilitated by an objective view of the current situation. It is important that both sides understand the importance and value they represent to each other. Thus, mutual understanding and cooperation in the international arena will flourish and develop. The further development of relations between Russia and Turkey will depend on the chosen vector, whether the countries will succumb to provocations or will they cooperate in resolving regional and bilateral issues.

Moreover, despite some contradictions in the conduct of their foreign policies, Turkey and Russia have confirmed their intention to intensify their partnership. At this stage, promising political, economic, trade, and military-defense projects are dynamically developing. The positive development of bilateral relations is also noticeable: the restoration and growth of trade turnover in the conditions of the pandemic, the growth of investments on both sides, the ability to find compromise through mutually beneficial political solutions, effective cooperation in the field of energy, on the Turkish Stream and the construction of Akkuyu nuclear power plant. There are also compromises even in conflict zones such as in Syria through the Astana Peace Process. Cooperation also occurred in the territories of neighboring states such

as Azerbaijan and Armenia through the operating Russian-Turkish center for monitoring the ceasefire on the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

To sum up; considering global, regional, and geopolitical changes, as well as taking into account the intensity of modern border disputes and claims; we can talk about a qualitatively new geopolitical status of Russian-Turkish relations, which focuses on all the diversity of contradictions and interactions. The rapid growth of political contacts, trade and economic and humanitarian ties between Russia and Turkey over the past 15 years have shown that common interests and interdependence do exist between them and it is difficult to see any clear hierarchy in bilateral relations. Thus, the basis for cooperation between the two countries is quite solid. Due to complex interdependence between the two states, both countries have managed to compartmentalize divergent issues in their bilateral relations and have not allowed contradictory issues to manipulate their collaboration on some critical issues. 'Per Aspera ad Astra' Turkey and Russia are interacting through different channels of cooperation in different spheres in spite of critical issues. In this regard, complex interdependence approach applies to their relations due to their compartmentalized foreign policy towards each other.

For successful coexistence, it is necessary to look for common ground and to try to understand the views of the opposite side. It is not necessary to focus on contradictory issues. Undoubtedly, coexistence in the international arena is impossible in a complete idyll. Nevertheless, as history and practice show, it is possible to take certain steps, as well as to make concessions for the development of positive bilateral relations. At the end of the day, there are no relations between countries based on pure love or hate, but there are relations based on mutual interests.

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