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THE IMPACT OF 2003 US-led INVASION

Bilkent University 2016

THE IMPACT OF 2003 US-led INVASION ON THE RISE OF TERRORISM IN IRAQ

A Master's Thesis

by
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Ankara
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To my parents

THE IMPACT OF 2003 US-led INVASION ON THE RISE OF TERRORISM IN
IRAQ

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

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
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Asst. Prof. Dr. Can Emir Mutlu

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
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
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ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT OF 2003 US-led INVASION ON THE RISE OF TERRORISM IN IRAQ

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The thesis argues that the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq has created the contributing factors for the rise of radicalism and the rise of violent organizations in Iraq. In this study, military and political aspects of the US practices in Iraq after the invasion are scrutinized to highlight the contributing factors that have led to radicalism and emergence of an alleged state, the ISIS, and violent organizations. The study illustrates how the US-led invasion for "War on Terror" has turned out to be a contributing factor for radicalism and terrorism. Firstly, the conditions that promote terrorism are highlighted depending on the large-N studies in the literature. Secondly, how the US political and military practices in Iraq have paved the way for these conditions are analyzed based on two indicators, namely political discrimination and seeking for revenge. In addition, the problem that how these two indicators influenced people's decision to join the violent organizations is highlighted. As a result of this study, I find that the US involvement in Iraq in the name of "War on Terror" has contributed to the rise of terrorism.

Keywords: Iraq, ISIS, Middle East, Terrorism, United States

ÖZET

2003 IRAK İŞGALİNİN TERÖRİZMİN ARTMASINA ETKİSİ

Ağalday, Burak
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Can Emir MUTLU

Haziran 2016

Bu çalışma, ABD önderliğinde 2003 yılında gerçekleştirilen Irak işgalinin, ülkede artan radikalleşme ve yükselen şedit örgütler için zemin hazırladığını ortaya koymayı hedeflemektedir. Çalışmada, IŞİD ve diğer örgütlerin doğuşuna ve radikalleşmenin yükselmesine katkı sağlayan faktörlerin aydınlatılması amacıyla ABD uygulamalarının askeri ve politik yönü mercek altına alınmıştır. Böylelikle, ABD'nin “Teröre Karşı Savaş” amacıyla gerçekleştirdiği işgalin, nasıl radikalizm ve terörizmi tetikleyen bir değişkene dönüştüğünü açıklamayı amaçlamıştır. İlk olarak, terörü besleyen koşullar ‘geniş katımlı’ çalışmalardan yola çıkılarak tartışılmıştır. ABD'nin askeri ve siyasi uygulamalarının bu koşulları nasıl ortaya çıkardığı, ‘siyasi dışlama’ ve ‘intikam alma duygusu’ gibi iki değişken üzerinden irdelenmiştir. Bu kapsamda, bu iki değişkenin şedit örgütlere katılım konusunda insanların kararlarını nasıl etkilediği tartışılmıştır. Sonuç olarak, “Teröre Karşı Savaş” adı altında gerçekleştirilen ABD işgalinin terörizmin artmasına katkı sağladığı görülmüştür.

Anahtar Kelimeler: ABD, Irak, IŞİD, Ortadoğu, Terörizm

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This thesis is dedicated to my mother who always encourages me to follow the way that I am happy with, and who always asks how many years left to complete my studies which makes me laugh each time. Her presence and simple questions inspire me and allow me to leave the complexities of the world. The thesis is dedicated to my mother since I want her know that I completed one more degree and there is still a long way to go which will push her to ask me again “What will you be at the end?”

This thesis is also dedicated to my father who passed away years ago, and left his legacy of being open-minded and productive for me. His ideas will always stay alive and flourish as long as my descendants and I keep breathing.

I would first like to thank my advisor, Can Emir MUTLU, for his kind assistance to my thesis. Beyond that, I am very glad to write my thesis with him as he drained all the academic dogmas in my mind and stimulated me into producing unorthodox ideas. He guided me in an academic equilibrium that I produced my own work through his spot-on critical questions.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons [....] History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom's fight. (Bush, 2002)

The speech quoted above introduces the genesis of 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. After the September 11 Attack, President of the USA, George W. Bush, stated the foreign policy orientation of the US in the first decade of the 21st century by assigning his country as a responsible power in fighting terrorism in the name of democracy.

The US, alongside with the UK, invaded Iraq on March, 20 2003. The occupation lasted nearly a decade and ended in 2011. In this period, the world witnessed great catastrophes in Iraq which does not require any substantiation. More than 150,000 civilians lost their lives (Iraq Body Count, n.d.). About 4 million people have been internally displaced or fled Iraq by 2007 (UNHCR, 2007).

The US spent nearly \$3 trillion for the war in Iraq by 2008 (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008). The number is greater than the GDP of 183 members of the UN and approximately

equal to total GDP of 127 countries in the world¹. 165 million people can be paid \$1000 per month for a year considering that one billion people live under \$ 1.25 per day in the world.

The statistics of the war and the visualization of economic consequences are to indicate the level of disaster in Iraq. Putting the tangible results aside, it is difficult to speculate on indirect impacts of the war. The rise of terrorist organizations, sectarian conflicts, tribal rivalry, political instability and crime rates have somehow been related to the US invasion indirectly.

The September 11 Attack has started a new era in the political history; the remaining superpower of the unipolar world system has been challenged not by nation-states but by a violent organization. The other significant aspect of this attack is that the defensive policies of the violent organizations in 20th century have transformed to offensive acts against so-called aggressor states such as the US.

In the last decade, how the US has retaliated against the attacks has led people and scholars to a controversy on the innocence of the attack. The US-led coalition invaded Iraq, which was seen as a dangerous regime and the supporter of Afghanistan-based organization Al-Qaeda by the Bush administration, without legitimate reason accepted by the United Nations (UN) and United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Conspiracy theories, which blame the US for the September 11 Attack and shed light on the US's political economic interests in the Middle East, have revived persuasively. Whether these conspiracy theories are correct or not are beyond the scope of the thesis. The reality is that the September 11 Attack actually happened and the US-led coalition invaded Iraq in the name of War on Terror. In

¹ The calculation is made based on the World Bank statistics on GDP at market prices. The countries are sorted in ascending order and the first 127 countries' GDP are aggregated.

2003, the US and the UK, which were left to their own devices by the international society, intervened in Iraq to overthrow the Iraqi regime led by Saddam Husain. The invasion and its consequences have inspired curiosity in the academia, as well. The number of women murdered and raped has become focal point of the feminist studies (Enloe, 2010). The ethical and legal bases of the invasion have drawn the attention of scholars studying the international law (Yoo, 2003). A new field for security studies has emerged (Byman & Pollack, 2008). The nexus between the invasion and Iraqi oil reserves has raised a topic for political economists (Jhaveri, 2004). The international relations theorists have focused on the explanation of the war from the perspective of power relations, spread of democracy, identity and hegemony (Halper & Clarke, 2005; Mearsheimer, 2005). As a result, the US-led invasion of Iraq sparked the zeal of academics in all field of social and human sciences since it is a new area of study and contains variegated phenomenon to conduct research.

In the thesis, I study the indirect impact of the Iraq war influenced by the US political and military practices. Although the US invaded Iraq to obliterate terrorism and so-called evil regimes, the process has ended up with the emergence of new violent organizations in Iraq such as the ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham), which currently controls half of the Iraqi territory. Therefore, how the US invasion has contributed to the emergence and acceleration of terrorist groups in Iraq is the main focus of the thesis. In this respect, I focus on two indicators discussed in the literature, namely the political discrimination and seeking for revenge. The effects of these indicators on people's decision to join the violent groups are studied to tender the contribution of the US invasion to rising terrorism.

In Chapter 1, I introduce the literature on definition and causes of terrorism. Defining terrorism is significant in the sense that claiming whether terrorism has increased after the invasion requires the meaning I attribute to terrorism. Presenting a wide spectrum of definitions of terrorism from the literature also allow me to build a comprehensive meaning of terrorism. In addition, various definitions help the readers understand diverse results of similar quantitative and qualitative analysis on causes of terrorism since the meaning attributed to terrorism may affect the results to a great extent. In the section, I also introduce the studies on causes of terrorism under four subtitles, namely structural, psychological, rational and critical approaches.

In Chapter 2, the historical background of Iraq before 2003 is examined to flash the change and continuities in Iraqi state. In this section, political, economic and societal conditions of Iraq before the invasion take place. The historical background is limited to the Ba'athist Regime having started in 1968. The reason to limit the time frame with the Ba'athist Regime is that the political, economic and societal dynamics of modern Iraq are very much influenced from the regime.

Chapter 3 presents the studies on Iraq after the invasion. The US's political and military practices, the profiles of violent organizations, political, economic and societal dynamics of Iraq after the invasion are saved for the third section of the thesis. The section contains the issue of how the Sunni tribes were discriminated in rebuilding the Iraqi state and which practices were performed by the US military in Iraq. Therefore, the studies presented in the section provide basis for the discussion section.

In Chapter 4, I discuss the impacts of the US's political and military practices on rising terrorism in Iraq based on two indicators, which are policies leading to seeking

for revenge and political discrimination in rebuilding process of Iraqi state institutions. Synthesizing the studies discussed in the first three sections, I contribute to the literature in the last section through the two indicators I discuss and the data I gather from primary and secondary sources.

In general, I assume that two indicators I picked from the literature have impact on people's decision to take part in violent organizations in Iraq as they have in other areas discussed in the literature.

Basic limitation of the thesis is the current situation in Iraq which prevents researchers from conducting in-depth field research and accessing the primary sources. In this regard, the thesis is limited to the literature and relies on secondary sources.

The time frame ranges from Ba'athist Coup D'etat of 1968 to 2011 when the US officially withdrew from Iraq. The reason is that the state institutions which were affected by the invasion were formed after the emergence of the Ba'athist Regime, particularly under the leadership of Saddam Husain. In addition, since I study the impact of the US practices on terrorism in Iraq, the scope is limited with the withdrawal of the US from Iraq.

1.1. Methodology

The thesis seeks to highlight the significance of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq on the rising terrorism in Iraq. The military and political policies of the US are the main indicators to illustrate how the misleading policies can create conditions of possibility for terrorism instead of terminating it. In that sense, two indicators are scrutinized which are the political discrimination of certain Iraqi groups by the US in

the process of rebuilding the Iraqi political institutions, and the security mistakes by the US forces in suppressing the insurgency.

Political discrimination is discussed in relation to replacement of the Sunni bureaucracy and military with the Shiite cadres and loyal Sunnis. I discuss the parallel between the previous ruling elites of Iraq been kept out of the new Iraqi state and the profile of rulers of the violent organizations in Iraq to underline the relationship between the misleading policies and rising terrorism.

The security mistakes by the US forces in suppressing the insurgency play a significant role in supporting the creation of psychological factors contributing to terrorism. The soldiers' manners against the Iraqi population have contributed to the humiliation and seeking for revenge against the perpetrators not only by Iraqi people but by other so-called jihadist organizations as well. This has increased the number of foreign fighters as well as Iraqi people joining the violent organizations in Iraq. In that respect, the entries in forums, coverage in the media, the official books and magazines of the violent organizations in Iraq, NGO's reports and the interviews with the fighters are indicated as proofs to humiliation and seeking for revenge.

How to refer the insurgent groups or alleged terrorist organizations is a critical point in terms of the credibility, reliability and transparency of the thesis. If I call the ISIS or another violent organization in Iraq as an insurgent group, then I will probably be accused of being biased or subjective. On the other hand, in case they are referred as terrorist organizations, the thesis is likely to receive appraisal. I personally do not favor either standpoints. For this reason, 'violent groups' is an appropriate phrase to refer to the organizations in Iraq due to their methodology. The phrase also provides a broad umbrella going beyond ethnic and sectarian definitions. Therefore, any

organization which harms civilians for any kind of aim will be called ‘violent organization’ throughout the thesis.

The impacts of the US’s policies on rising terrorism in Iraq are qualitatively discussed. Two indicators for rising terrorism, which are the main focus of the thesis, are derived from the qualitative and quantitative studies in the literature. Therefore, the theoretical frame of the thesis is based on the previous studies on the causes of terrorism. For the political discrimination in Iraq following the invasion, I utilize the historical studies to illustrate how certain groups were kept out of the political process. To identify the impact of humiliation and revenge-seeking, I analyzed the discourse in all the statements made by any member of the ISIS until 2014. In addition, I searched for some terms such as ‘revenge’, ‘humiliate’, ‘humiliation’, and ‘vengeance’ in news databases. I presented the statements of Iraqis in the news to support my argument.

1.2. The Significance of the Thesis

The stated objective of the War on Terror was to eliminate terrorism and to topple down the regimes supporting the violent organizations. However, the current situation in Iraq and in the Middle East in general demonstrates shortcomings in achieving this objective. Iraq’s political unity is being challenged by terrorist groups such as the ISIS. The political order inherited from the US is yet to be stabilized due to tribal rivalry. Crime rates are accelerating. Iraq’s economy shrank despite its oil reserves. Therefore, it is difficult to claim that the US has succeeded in democratizing Iraq and eliminating terrorism. In this respect, I argue that 2003 US-led invasion has contributed to rising terrorism in Iraq due to the US’s political and military misled practices. Even though, there would be many causes for the dramatic

increase of terrorist incidents in Iraq, the thesis presents a multidisciplinary analysis of this increase by underlying the significance of two variables, one psychological and one structural cause. The thesis is significant because of two reasons. The literature on revenge seeking as a contributing factor for terrorism is under developing. This thesis might fulfill the gap in the literature. Secondly, the thesis contributes to the literature on undesired effects of invasions in spreading democracy by indicating that mismanaged invasions would create reverse results than expected.



CHAPTER 2

STATE OF THE ART OF THE LITERATURE ON TERRORISM

In this chapter, I review the literature on the definitions of radicalism, terrorism, and the roots of terrorism. Going through the literature on these subjects will reveal the gap that the thesis aims to fill. My objective in the chapter is to discuss variegated definitions and understandings of terrorism alongside with radicalism. I also introduce the spectra of roots of terrorism in the literature. The roots of terrorism are categorized under three subtitles, namely structural, psychological and rational approaches. Finally, I highlight more recent approaches to terrorism studies.

Why do people radicalize? How does terrorism flourish? Why do individuals join violent organizations? Which conditions contribute to terrorist organizations' recruitment process? What happened in the last century and in the last decade has brought the terrorism studies to the kernel of the social sciences. Academics, scholars and researchers' enthusiasm to explain the root causes of terrorism has widened the literature.

Psychologists, political scientists, economists and psychiatrists have tendered diverse answers to these questions. The reasons for different approaches can be due to the selection of variables, cases and definitions. Divergent variables and cases may result in dissimilar results. However, how scholars define terrorism and radicalism also is a significant element for dissimilar conclusions since the results are mostly dependent

upon the definitions in social sciences. When an academic inquiry about which actions are considered to be terrorism, who is a terrorist, they begin to struggle the definitions of terrorism. In this respect, I, firstly, review the literature on definition of radicalism and terrorism, which would allow me to underline the gap in the definitions and to restructure my own understanding of radicalism and terrorism and then I go through the causes of terrorism by scrutinizing the studies in the literature under structural, psychological and critical approaches.

2.1. On Radicalization

Before introducing the debate on radicalization in the literature, I would like to start with an easier way of understanding the term. The Oxford dictionary defines radicalization as “[t]he action or process of causing someone to adopt radical positions on political or social issues.” Based on this definition, we can generate another question; what is ‘radical’ position? When I look up in the dictionary the definition of a radical, it brings forward four definitions and the most relevant one for the main inquiry of my thesis is that “relating to or affecting the fundamental nature of something; far-reaching or thorough.” Academics working on radicalism and the radicalization process provide various perspectives on the term. The most parsimonious explanation is to connect the process of getting radicalized with acquiring extreme ideas and beliefs (Mandel, 2010; Sinai, 2012). Some authors define the term in a very contextualized fashion, in almost case-specific ways (Ashour, 2009; Demant, Sllotman, Buijs & Tillie, 2008; Horgan & Bradock, 2010; Kortweg, Gohel, Heisbourg, Ranstorp & De Wijk, 2010; Mccauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Olesen, 2009; Volintiru, 2010). Ashour (2009: 5) states that “[r]adicalization is a process of relative change in which a group undergoes ideological and/or

behavioural transformations that lead to the rejection of democratic principles (including the peaceful alternation of power and the legitimacy of ideological and political pluralism) and possibly to the utilisation of violence, or to an increase in the levels of violence, to achieve political goals.” Kortweg *et al.* (2010) also associates radicalism with democratic structures by considering the process of radicalization as a threat to democratic elements. Jensen (2006) does not offer such a complicated definition but he also underlines the process as which might end up with political violence. This perspective is observable in some other studies with small nuance (Horgan & Bradock, 2010; Mccauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Olesen, 2009). In addition to the definitions that connect radicalization and political violence or extremism, there are also sociological approaches to the term. Demant *et al.* (2008: 12-13) defines the term as “a process of de-legitimation, a process in which confidence in the system decreases and the individual retreats further and further into his or her own group, because he or she no longer feels part of society.” Sedgwick (2010) reviews the literature and concludes that the term is used in three separate contexts; security, integration context, and foreign-policy contexts. Therefore, it seems that the definitions vary according to the context and the disciplines. Bott, Leets and Markey (2006) introduce more than 80 definitions of radicalization within a span of a manuscript. This is sufficient to illustrate the variegation in the literature.

Although it is hard to obtain a single definition for any concept in social sciences due to divergent opinions of academics, it might be possible to compromise on a laconic definition of radicalization which can be formulized for each individual context. For the purpose of this project, radicalization refers to a process of developing unorthodox ideas and beliefs. The relativity of the term leads me to characterize it as unorthodox in relation to a normalized majority. If one accepts what a majority

within a society think or believe to be common as an orthodoxy, then having different ideas and beliefs than the society might make a person radical. The definition is also far from associating radicalization with political and religious actions and ideologies. It admits the state of flux of the term since unorthodox notions can change across time and space.

Having the definition of radicalization at hand will help and contribute to the results of this thesis since the results on why people radicalized in Iraq will have their reference in this chapter.

2.2. On Terrorism

The other important concept for this project is terrorism. It also has multiple definitions. For example, Easson and Schmid (2011) introduce more than 250 definitions for terrorism. If one begins to dig from the root of the term, terrorism, one may find out that the word comes from '*terrere*' which means 'to frighten' in Latin. However, terrorism has gained new meanings over time, which is due to particularly political uses of the term. The term is not only defined by academics, but the states also refer to terrorism in their laws as a crime. Moreover, some states have more than one definition of terrorism in their domestic codes. For instance, the United States Code (22 USCS 2656f) defines terrorism as a "premeditated, politically motivated violence against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents" whereas FBI separates international terrorism and domestic terrorism and refers to domestic terrorism as actions "... intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping [...]" Such a diversity of definitions also exist within academia.

Crenshaw (1995) argues that terrorism is a secretive method of brutality on the purpose of amending certain population's attitude and adds that terrorism is not collective violence, it is actions of limited number of people. Crenshaw's approach to terrorism, by nature, ignores terrorist activities of states by attributing the violent activities on small groups. Jenkins (1985) puts that terrorism is the use of force that seeks political alteration. The definition is more inclusive in the sense that states' actions can be considered as terrorist activities. However, the definition achieves its inclusionary characteristic due to its simplicity. Laqueur (1987) also has very similar understanding of terrorism in which the definition lacks the purpose of political change as a nuance. Schmid (1983), in this respect, generates a comprehensive perspective. For Schmid (1983: 70), "terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets." The definition contains individual activities which Crenshaw (1995) does not include; underlines more objectives and clarifies target that Jenkins (1984) and Laqueur (1987) ignore. Nonetheless, who clandestine is leaves a question mark for identification of terrorists in Schmid's definition because this engenders a relative connotation which allow a party to legitimize itself. Nacos (2002: 17) finds out that "...latest shift in the definition of terrorism works in favor of violence perpetuated by governments ...". In addition, Olivera (1998) focuses on the changing definitions across time and illustrates how this process reveals the "legitimate violence." As the term becomes more politicized and tool for legitimacy, some authors stand more radical. Krumwiede (2004: 70) puts that "[i]n the light of the diversity of the phenomenon 'terrorism' and the multiplicity and differential weight of relevant conditions for

concrete cases, it is impossible to formulate substantial general hypotheses with broad validity, that is, hypotheses which are valid for all cases or at least most cases.” Bigo (2005) even goes further and claims that terrorism does not exist since it does not suit to use it in social sciences.

Perhaps, a scale that indicates the type of perpetrator (state or individual) or measures the aim of activity (political or social) might place Bigo’s argument at the very edge. Thus, Bigo goes “radical.” Definitions that serve states’ good and legitimacy make me skeptical about my own definition and even thesis. In this respect, I place myself alongside Bigo in my approach to terrorism as a concept. Yet, if we avoid elucidating terrorism, then what violent states and organizations do might stay opaque. That is why social sciences need to label such states and organizations. To me, terrorism is the action that intimidates innocent civilians by any means and creates prejudicial fear on non-target population.

Defining terrorism by including state actions will affect the result of the thesis because the genesis of results are relevant to what states did in Iraq.

2.3. On Structural Causes of Terrorism

Why do people join terrorist organizations? What kinds of conditions lead individuals to participate in violent groups? These are the research questions that form the core of mainstream terrorism studies. The responses evinced in the literature are delineated in three subtitles, namely structural, rational and psychological causes of terrorism.

The structural causes approach refers to the conditions that frame individuals and are immune to direct impact of individuals. Geographical location, modernization, type

of political system, economic conditions, societal and historical background are some of the variables discussed by the structuralist scholars. Wilson and Piazza (2013), in their quantitative analysis of 161 countries between 1970 and 2006, compare the role of political system on terrorism and find that single-party authoritarian regimes are less prone to domestic and international terrorism than democracies and military autocracies. Also, military autocracies are less likely to experience terrorism comparing with democracies. The authors address the reason for this conclusion by underlying the effectiveness of preventive institutions of authoritarian regimes against terrorism. Turk (1982) argues that terrorism is more likely to emerge in totalitarian regimes, however brutality of these regimes in counter-terrorism restrains individuals to join violent organizations. In addition, harsh restrictions displace people in these regimes toward more democratic countries. Lastly, totalitarian regimes are inclined to sponsor terrorism in other states. Turk's argument is reductionist in the sense that terrorism in democratic countries is the result of what totalitarian regimes do.

Poverty is the other structural cause of terrorism in the literature. Enders and Hover (2012) study the impact of real GDP per capita (GDPpc) and income inequality on terrorism and conclude that increasing real GDPpc reduces domestic and transnational terrorism. They also discover that high levels of income inequality rises the probability of terrorism. However, if increase in individuals' wealth is followed by income inequality, then domestic terrorism could ascend. The authors' methodology cause suspicion on clarity of the results. Firstly, the results are consistent when the income exceeds \$1000 GDPpc for domestic terrorism and \$2215 GDPpc for international terrorism. However, the amount for domestic terrorism is nearly an academic's wage in Egypt whereas it is below the payment per child in

Germany. Therefore, it is hard to arrive at a conclusion based on disparate states. The authors may overcome the problem by analyzing purchasing power parity instead of GDPpc so that the relativity would be accomplished in comparison. Last but not least, the authors make a distinction between international terrorism and domestic terrorism when the nationality of actors and the location of the incident do not match. Yet, mobility is becoming easier and terrorist organizations can easily recruit people from foreign countries. Hence, the nationality of the organization rather than individuals should be taken into account. Piazza (2011) approaches the economic inequality from a different perspective by highlighting the role of minorities. He claims that economic discrimination against the minorities increases the likelihood of terrorism more than the impact of state's overall economic status. So, the author approves the role of aggregate poverty on violence and contributes to this claim by adding the minorities into equation. Burgoon (2006), in his study for countering terrorism, suggests that welfare policies are able to diminish transnational and domestic terrorism since the policies contribute to reduce poverty and economic inequality. Meierrieks and Gries (2012), however, put that the causality between terrorism and poverty is non-monolithic and shifts over time and across space. The shift is a result of alteration of ideological and geographical patterns meaning that big political events such as Cold War affect the causality between poverty and terrorism. For instance, Latin America was the territory suffering from terrorism in Cold War era while African and Middle Eastern countries have been negatively influenced from violence in the post-Cold war. The link between economic well-being and terrorism is challenged extensively in the literature. Abadie (2006) does not connect economic variables and violence while he finds positive causal relationship between transition from authoritarianism to democracy, climate, geographical location and

terrorism. Krueger and Maleckova (2002) indicate that members of Middle Eastern terrorist organizations come from advantaged families which reduces the direct impact of poverty on terrorism. Maleckova (2005) refers to the link between poverty and terrorism as stereotype and argues that perpetrators of international terrorism belong to middle and upper classes of their societies. Berrebi (2007) conducted a research on members of Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad between 1980 and 2002 and found that higher education and economic wealth are positively correlated with joining the organizations and with performing suicide bombing. Krueger (2007), however, values education and income as a part of solution against violence even though he does not accept these two indicators as root causes of terrorism.

In line with the nexus of terrorism and economy, some scholars indirectly refer to the significance of 'money' not only in societal level but also in governmental level. Azam and Thelen (2008) argue that foreign aid reduces terrorism when donors trigger beneficiary governments to fight terrorism through this aid. In their regression analysis, they put that foreign aid matters when it is earmarked for education in beneficiary state. What one can deduce from this explanation is that education is taken for granted as a counter-terrorism strategy. However, whether education is a cause of terrorism needs deeper analysis because considerable amount of studies in the literature argue that education is not part of the genesis of terrorism. Gupta (2006) studies Al-Qaida members and Palestinian violent organizations and finds that Al-Qaida members are highly educated and Palestinians who join terrorist groups have a higher education level than the general population. Krueger and Maleckova (2002) analyze the members of violent organizations in the Middle East and conclude that no causal relationship between education and terrorism exists.

Krueger (2007) also finds no connection between literacy rate and tendency to violence.

Tangle point of discussion on education and poverty stems partially from how the terms are defined. What the qualifications of an educated person are can alter the results utterly. From a Western perspective, a university degree might be the level of education whereas literacy counts so much in some societies. In addition, variegated curriculums in various countries raise a new question: what do people learn in schools to avoid terrorism? The similar questions can be asked also for poverty. The relativity of terms, education and poverty, complicates the results and produces diverse data for studies.

Culture, social and historical background of societies have drawn structuralists' attention, as well. Lacqueur (1999) cites Basque region, Northern Ireland, the Middle East and Africa as the regions containing culture of violence. He adds that the culture of violence accelerates when it combines with poverty, unemployment and political ambitions. Shabad and Ramo (1995) present the historical and cultural remembrance as the root of culture of violence in their study of Basque region in Spain.

The relationship between domestic armed conflict and political discrimination has recently gained popularity in the literature. Asal, Findley, Piazza and Walsh (2015), in their regression analyses between 1946 and 2005, illustrate that political exclusion of ethnic group increases the likelihood of armed conflict and the contingency of clash accelerates when the region in which the ethnic community resides contains oil. For the same duration, Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010, p. 88) finds three indicator which increases the possibility of conflict between an ethnic group and government. Firstly, if "[...] representatives of an ethnic group are excluded from

state power, especially if they experienced a loss of power in the recent past [...]", they are likely to dissent. Secondly, "higher mobilizational capacity" is contributing factor to ethnic group's resistance. Finally, if a group experienced conflict in the past, the likelihood of contention would increase. Choi and Piazza (2014), in their study on 130 countries between 1981 and 2005, indicate that domestic terrorism and terrorist casualties rise. Douma (2006) also demonstrates the role of political exclusion on domestic conflict by highlighting two cases, Niger and Senegal.

Building on these debates in the literature, this thesis aims to contribute to the impact of political exclusion on domestic clashes. The project will focus on Iraq after the US-led invasion of 2003 as its main case study. The exclusion of Sunni Iraqis, which form a minority in Iraq, from the state apparatus will be indicated in the project. Although the literature primarily focuses on ethnic groups, this thesis seeks to raise a new discussion by emphasizing political exclusion of a sectarian group.

In brief, structuralist approach focus on the conditions which are out of individuals' control and which impact individuals' life. As indicated, type of regime, economic welfare, level of education, culture, social and historical memory, geography and country's location are some variables assessed in the literature. In this project, a structural variable which is political exclusion will be a reference point for explaining terrorism in Iraq.

2.4. On Psychological Causes of Terrorism

Psychological motivations of terrorism are perhaps the most vibrant research area in mainstream terrorism studies. Different from the structural explanations of terrorism which highlight the role of external factors, psychological causes refer to the impact of the cognitive process on decision-making. Therefore, what individuals think to

commit violence is the basic question for the scholars studying psychological reasons of terrorism. The question finds three diverse responses in the literature. Firstly, a group of scholar claims that mental diseases push the individuals to violence (Cooper, 1977; Pearce, 1977; Taylor, 1988). These studies are in general conducted by psychiatrist and medical doctors who specialize on criminal behaviors. Secondly, a congregation of academics argues that innate desires such as desire for excitement and glory and personal characteristics contribute to the process of joining terrorist organizations (Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Cottee & Hayward, 2011; King & Taylor, 2011) Finally, some scholars underline the role of external factors on cognitive process of decision-making (Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Bloom, 2007; Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003; Rabbie, 1991; Speckhard, 2004; Sprinzak, 1991; Stern, 2003; Whittaker, 2001). This group occupies the largest range of spectra in the literature. Among the main topics are the group identity and its influence on individuals, humiliation, grievance and identity conflicts that lead individuals to join violent organizations.

Cottee and Hayward (2011, p. 966) emphasize the existential indirect causes of terrorism and underline three motives which are “the desire for excitement”, “the desire for ultimate meaning” and “the desire for glory.” The aim of this study is not to illustrate the existential motives as the necessary condition for terrorism or it is not to legitimize the violence through innate features of human being. They conduct the study to point out the necessity of adding existential reasons to the equation. Bartlett and Miller (2012) also cite Muslim and non-Muslims’ youth’s perceptions about challenging Western states as exciting and heroic.

Bartlett and Miller (2012) formed three data sets composing of 61 homegrown terrorists, 28 radicals and 70 young Muslims to assess radicalization process and the way that push individuals to perform violent actions. They found that in-group peer pressure and honour might render terrorism. Although the data set is limited in number and to Canada and European countries, the study gives a clue about the tendency of a group of youth in Western countries. King and Taylor (2011) conduct a theoretical study on radicalization process by comparing and contrasting Borum's Pathway, Wiktorowicz's Theory of Joining Extremist Groups, Moghaddam's Staircase to Terrorism, The NYPD's Radicalization Process, Sageman's Four Prongs. What they (p. 602) observe is that all five explanations of radicalization process share three steps which are "group relative deprivation, identity conflicts, and personality characteristics." While first two steps are associated with the external factors, the latter is inborn effect on terrorism. What is common with Bartlett and Miller (2012)'s article is the group dynamics. Crenshaw (1992) puts that individuals become a group member when they abide by the group's rule of admission. Unorthodox groups such as violent organizations expect individuals to commit a criminal action in return for recruiting the individual to the group. To Crenshaw (1992), this is a significant motivation behind violent actions of some terrorists. Della Porta (1988)'s study substantiates Crenshaw to a certain extent. Della Porta (1988: 159) observes that 41.6% of the 1214 Italian militants had personal links with more than eight group members before participating in this violent group. Post, Sprinzak and Denny (2003) interview 35 secular and religious extremists particularly from the Middle East and cite peer pressure as the dominant motivation for joining the violent organizations. Atran (2008) posits that willingness to belong something greater, acceptance by peers, and seeking out adventure push individuals to violent

organizations where they enjoy brotherhood. Post (2005) studies collectiveness in an organization and individuals' psychology in a group. He concludes that group identity outweigh individual identity and help individuals legitimize what they do psychologically. Abrahms (2004) points out the impact of exclusion from a society on individuals and claims that those individuals tend to join terrorist organizations where they are valuable.

The other motivations consist of the impact of external factors on human psychology. Bloom (2007) argues that the suicide bombers in Sri Lanka, Chechnya and Palestine were people whose family member had been killed by the state. So, these individuals expressed their feelings by retaliating against the state. Hubbard (1971) identifies five characteristics of skyjackers based on his interviews which are lack of social achievement, violent father, religious mother, sexually passive and having younger sister. Among these traits are at least two external factors namely violent father and religious mother. If we scrutinize the others, we might somehow correlate the other three traits with external conditions. Also, labeling skyjackers as terrorist might deviate a researcher. Yet, what we signify is that a person having the aforementioned characteristics has a tendency to threaten other people's life. Ferracuti and Bruno (1981), in their sample of 908 right-wing terrorists in Italy, characterize nine features such as loyalty to traditions, destructiveness, sexual roles and so on. Both studies reveal the typical characteristics of violent individuals without going deeper. Even though it is hard to deduce the reason behind the individuals' violent actions or structure causal relationship between these traits and brutality, the studies present data for some further studies. Another scholar, Davis (2003), conducts a research on prisoners and finds that individuals in prison for long years are quite likely to prefer martyrdom with which terrorist organizations would easily provide. As indicated in

the study, regardless of what a person experiences in prison, prison per se becomes an external factor. Lastly, humiliation which derives from personal reminiscence, constitutes a dormant position in the literature. Gilligan's (1996) illustrates the relationship between shame, humiliation and terrorism, and claims that individuals are more likely to join the violent organizations when they are humiliated and ashamed. How the humiliation caused by transgressors, organizations or states galvanizes vengeance is also studied in the literature (Juergensmeyer, 2000; Stern, 2003; Volkan, 1997). However, the relationship between humiliation and terrorism is not studied quantitatively and comprehensively. Hence, the claim needs more substantiation through field studies and quantitative analysis.

Indeed, the lack of quantitative methodology, particularly large N studies, is observable for the psychologist approach to terrorism compared with the structuralist understanding.

The rationalist approach to terrorism stresses individuals' preferences in decision-making process. How a terrorist maximizes the utility and calculates the cost and benefit of an action are the essence of rationalist studies. Therefore, one can integrate the rational explanations with psychological roots of terrorism. However, the reason I form this subsection separate from psychological causes is that rationalist studies underline the end goal whereas psychological viewpoint highlights the process. Thus, a terrorist features the consequences of his/her actions in the rational theory while the life experiences that lead a person to terrorism come to stage in psychologist standpoint.

Rationalist studies presuppose that terrorists are rational. In this context, rationality gains a meaning beyond a moral sense. Rational person is considered an individual

acting to achieve a goal. Therefore, whether s/he succeeds or his/her reason does not serve the good are not criteria to determine the rationality of the actor.

Landes (1978) elucidates the preferences of skyjackers and concludes that the action provides more utility than the other means for the actor which is the terrorist in this case. So, skyjackers maximize their benefit through an action that works more. To the author, the likelihood of committing air piracy is high when the terrorists experience prison sentence. By this explanation, Landes manages to combine the rational and psychological description of terrorism. Crenshaw (1998), also, argues that terrorists are logical in their calculation of cost-benefit. She points out that terrorists have no choice except terrorism or failure of other methods lead them to terrorist organizations or violent actions. As a substantiation, she indicates Ireland after Parnell's constitutionalism and Palestine-Israel issue after Arabs' fight against Israel as an example. Moreover, alternatives to violence might not be effective or might consume time. In such case, terrorism becomes attractive address to visit.

Crenshaw distinguishes between costs and benefits of terrorist movements. Targeting innocent people and drawing people's attention to attend the organization are the costs of violent operations. On the other hand, terrorists may bring subjects to public agenda and stimulate any mass revolt against authority, which are addressed as the benefits of terrorism by the author.

Terrorists are rational actors (Bjorgo, 2005; Caplan, 2006; Crenshaw, 1998).

However, this should not be understood only as rationality for the sake of terrorists' own good. Bjorgo (2005) stress that so individuals in an organization serve the groups' benefit if the action compensates the personal losses by providing welfare to the group. Caplan (2006) also puts that a person might commit a violent action in

return for money if s/he is poor and seeks profit for his/her siblings, children and parents. Furthermore, Abdel-Khalek (2004) studies suicide bombers of Palestinian organizations and offers twelve reasons for the self-destructive action. Eight reasoning of Abdel-Khalek directly have reference in Landes (1978) and Crenshaw (1998)'s argument of no-alternative-solution and the failure of previous methods. For instance; the failure of the negotiations, the silence of international community, Israel's brutal activities, air, sea and land blockades against Palestine are cited as some of the reasons for suicide bombers. In addition to these, three causes overlap with the cost-benefit calculation since the causes have their bases in religion and religious legitimacy maximizes the benefit and eradicates the costs. Among twelve reasons, only the eighth reason which emphasizes the oppressed feelings is associated with the psychological viewpoint. Eleven causes of suicide bombing can be appropriately studied under rational perspective on terrorism.

The thesis will utilize a psychological reason which is revenge-seeking to elucidate terrorism in Iraq. As indicated above, the literature has scarcity of large-N studies. For this reason, I will focus on the experimental researches to study the subject.

2.5. On Critical Approaches to Terrorism Studies

As a reaction to the studies on root causes of terrorism, a recent constellation has emerged to study terrorism critically. The proponents of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) have dissented the 'mainstream' or 'orthodox' terrorism studies ontologically and epistemologically. On the eve of the CTS's premises, it is better to see how this group of scholars defines the CTS. It would be appropriate to claim that the CTS adherents are far from fusion in understanding the CTS. Smyth, Gunning, Jackson, Kassimeris and Robinson (2008: 2), in the introduction of the new academic journal

‘Critical Studies on Terrorism’ argue that “[...]the term ‘critical’ is deliberately employed as a means of provoking debate, signaling one’s dissatisfaction with some of the biases and practices currently present in the field, and indicating a series of normatively derived research priorities[...]” and “[...] challeng[ing] the dominant knowledge [...]” On the other hand, Egerton (2009: 59) does not differentiate between CTS and orthodox terrorism studies but he distinguishes “[...]good and bad research and good and bad theorising.” The meaning he attributes to the CTS is related with the nexus between emancipation and terrorism. Egerton (2009: 66) argues that:

Emancipation in the context of a critical approach to terrorism requires an understanding that terrorism takes a number of different forms and is perpetuated by a variety of actors. It must then locate the victims of terrorism, the individuals whose voices are often silenced and thus whose terror remains unreported.

Variegated understanding of CTS notwithstanding, the critiques of CTS scholars against mainstream terrorism studies follow a similar direction. Jackson (2007: 246) introduces CTS with the following questions: “who is terrorism knowledge for, and what functions does it serve in supporting their interests?” In his article that puts the core commitments of the CTS, Jackson (2007) comes up with four criticisms which are lack of historicity, state-centricity, scarcity of neutrality and dependency upon theory of problem-solving. By lack of historicity, the author implies that orthodox terrorism studies, especially having published after 9/11, are poor of historical background of terrorism. Also, these studies are written from the perspective of states neglecting state terrorism. Moreover, the author accuses advocates of orthodox terrorism studies of being biased since they work for state or get financial support for their studies. Lastly, Jackson directs his criticism towards the mainstream studies by claiming that the application of theory of problem-solving on terrorism studies is

misleading because the theory takes status quo for granted. To the author, the causes of terrorism are not the reality out there, but they are constructed through time, therefore alleged causes of terrorism hidden the focal point which is the main reasons generating root causes. Building partially or completely on these four criticisms, CTS proponents present arguments akin to each other. Gunning (2007) denounces three core points. Firstly, the author asks who terrorism knowledge is for and indicates how the term, terrorism, is highly politicized. To Gunning (2007: 383), what is done by violent organizations “[...] can be explained without the term ‘terrorism’ [...]” as he could achieve not to refer to terrorism in his own study of Hamas and Hizbollah. Stokes (2009) contributes to this argument by kindly asking if the Middle Eastern countries were avocado-exporters, would Western countries have meddled in the region’s political affairs? He claims no. Burke (2008: 38) goes further and suggests that “[a]ny ‘critical’ terrorism studies must keep this radical instability and inherent politicization of the concept of terrorism at the forefront of its analysis.” Secondly, Gunning (2007) argues that orthodox terrorism studies are conducted on recycled data which reiterate itself and this drives the field into a vicious circle. Lastly, he criticizes mainstream terrorism studies of being positivist owing to the general tendency to problem-solving theory which is accused of taking the reality as given. Burke (2008: 42) goes in parallel with Gunning’s (2007) second and third arguments and introduces CTS as a “[...] signal [to] the end of a particular kind of traditionally state focused and directed ‘problem-solving’ terrorism studies.”

The literature on CTS contains also critiques on the position of CTS advocates. Jones and Smith (2009) claim that CTS does not offer a new field of study or perspective due to the following reasons. Firstly, CTS’s critiques on state-centrism is just a presumption with no sufficient evidence which makes the claim a logical fallacy.

Secondly, accusing orthodox terrorism researchers of conducting research far from the region and not based on any interview with the target groups is a baseless point of CTS's critique. Thirdly, trying to be self-reflexive leads CTS to be stagnated with the discourse, language and the opacity of terms. Fourthly, empathizing the terrorist intimates that 'all violence is terror', therefore the idea of necessity of putting ourselves in terrorists' position is not goodwill of CTS. Lastly, taking the reality as given is challenged by CTS, however this does not constitute a new phenomenon since strategic theorists already denoted the similar point. Weinberg and Eubank (2008) also express conceptual and methodological opposition against CTS. They argue that state terrorism exists in the literature and it is not a recent term that CTS proposes. The authors add that orthodox terrorism studies, which are criticized for relying on newspapers and secondary sources, are no longer conducted superficially. The meaning attributed to problem solving theory by CTS is also criticized because the authors claim that the studies focusing on structures which take the reality as given had disappointing results.

Horgan and Boyle (2008) do not pose such a harsh critique that seeks to refute CTS entirely. However, they underline the challenge, which is to engender a concrete theoretical position in the field, and offer CTS advocates to review the literature without theoretical or ideological prejudices to cope with this challenge.

In addition to these critiques on the literature, I would raise a few points about CTS. Firstly, radical opposition requires new concepts to shape a theoretical framework. However, CTS proponents do not avoid using 'terrorism' and even go further by defining the term. Gunning (2007: 384) have an answer to this argument: "[u]sing the term also increases the currency and relevance of one's research in both funding

and policy circles, as well as among the wider public. It is because of this particular constellation of power structures that a ‘critical’ field cannot afford, either morally or pragmatically, to abandon the term ‘terrorism’.” But then, this explanation limits CTS as being just another perspective instead of alternative point of view. Also, it is a declaration of admitting the rules of game instead of making new rules for the field. Secondly, Gunning’s (2007) opposition to orthodox terrorism studies is a well-structured argument. However, while the author draws readers’ attention to the recycling data of orthodox terrorism, he gets stuck at overgeneralizations and more significantly, he enforces the argument by referring mostly to Andrew Silke which can be understood as recycling data in CTS. Lastly, reference to ‘emancipation’ would limit the scope of CTS due to the ideological bias that the term ‘emancipation’ may leave on the studies.

2.6. A Quick Glance at the Literature on Terrorism

The prosperity of academic studies and approaches in the field is a sufficient indication for not getting stuck in one definition or explanation. The results can always change in accordance with the inputs such as a case, time and space. In this project, I remain distant to present any variable as the constant cause of terrorism. Each variable gains significance for each single case. So, the debate on the causes of terrorism is also an opportunity for counter-terrorism since each study offers a new insight which helps policy-makers to fight terrorism. The thesis intends to win a seat in the literature as it combines the invasion with structural and psychological variables.

In the next chapter, I present a short history of Iraq to highlight the conditions before the invasion. Therefore, how the invasion changed the daily-life politics and society

and created the conditions that triggered violence in Iraq will be observed clearly in the following chapters.



CHAPTER 3

A HISTORY OF IRAQ

As the thesis seeks to contribute to causes of terrorism in case of Iraq, it is essential to discuss the historical background of the country in order to expand on the role of two indicators discussed in the thesis, namely political exclusion of minorities and humiliation. In this section, brief political, economic and social synopsis of 1968-2003 period is taken into account. The main motivation behind selecting this period is because the recent dynamics of Iraq have largely been shaped under the Baath rule, particularly Saddam Husain. Moreover, the subsections specify various topics that are relevant for the discussion of rising terrorism in Iraq. The first subsection highlights the Baath rule from 1968 to 1979. Secondly, the childhood of Saddam, his characteristics, political thoughts and his ruling style from 1979 to 2003 are scrutinized. The third part illustrates the Iraqi foreign policy in this period and how the foreign policy choices of Iraqi leaders have influenced the historical flow of Iraqi communities. Fourthly, the ethnic, sectarian and ideological conflicts inside communities, inter-communities and between the state and communities are indicated to observe the historical chasms among groups in Iraq. Lastly, the economic and social statistics are interpreted mainly to view Iraq's yesterday and today.

It should be noted that I do not aim to build a nation's history based on the last forty years. Nor do I limit the roots of recent dynamics with the last decades. However, I

intend to elucidate mainly Saddam's policies on the formation of current Iraq by admitting the role of each single event on this process.

3.1. Baath Rule

Dawisha (2009) has a point-shot subtitle to define the duration from 1968 to 2003, which is "The State Rules without Rules." Indeed, one should eschew to characterize only this term as nadir of Iraq's history. This is definitely not for legitimizing any action of the Baath Party or cursing any other period. Yet, this is because how historiography trend may deviate readers' perspective. To be clear, whether Saddam was a benevolent leader would be answered differently in times of his challenge to Islamic regime of Iran. Therefore, I aim to present the historical events based on the literature on Iraq by seeking no rigid adjectives. I also intend to criticize such point of views that I encountered when I review the literature.

In 1968, Iraqi people got up in a state having a new regime. As Dawisha (2009: 209) puts, "[I]f the population showed little more than cursory interest, it was because this was the seventh announcement [Communique' Number One announcement of removal of the government of 'Abd al-Rahman 'Aref] over the last decade heralding a military coup." The Baathist coup, however, broke the equilibrium of the results by succeeding as the former three attempts failed and three hit the mark. The key actor of the coup was Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, who had played a significant role also in 1963 coup attempt of Baath Party, alongside with Saddam Husain.

The ideological motivation of Baath Party deserves mention to spot the fulcrum of the party's activities. Fattah and Caso (2009) elucidate the history of Baath in the Middle East and Iraq. Baathist thoughts flourished in Syria between the WWI and WWII as a liberation movement in fight against French and the upper echelons of

Syria. The ideology gained a new momentum after the WWII by being politicized on unique components. Pan-Arabism was placed at the center. Baath supporters criticized the colonial period of Arab countries and emphasized the union of Arabs. The movement was also a socialist one in the sense that, according to the Baathists, the prosperity of Arabs should benefit the Arabs. It was also anti-imperialist against the colonial power. Whether Iraqi Baath reflected these features is matter of discussion and is left to the reader throughout the section, it is worth noting that even the internal affairs of the party indicated no sign of unity. Domestic competition among top leaders was observable. The founder of militant branch of Baath, Ali Salih al-Sadi, was the persona non grata for Abdul-Salam Aref, Hardan al-Tikriti and Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr. However, 1963 Baath-led coup also caused the register of al-Tikriti and al-Bakr in the black list since Aref was seeking his own governance with no influence of Baathist any more. So, the party counted on tribal and personal affiliations instead of ideological motivations between 1963 and 1968. After the Jr. Aref (Abdul-Rahman Aref) was toppled down in 1968, the new government followed the same policies to consolidate its power considering the internal and external clandestine attempts that the predecessor governments had experienced.

Marr (2004) assigns a section on the process of consolidating power. Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was established as the new face of the government. It had five members, but the identity of the members was a signal of caution. All the members were Baath Party associates. They had military background and they were all from the city of Tikrit. The party had only 5000 members when the Baath seized the power. The limited grassroots of the party led the leaders to grab the key positions in the army and state institutions. Saddam got on the stage as the second leader of the coup and the implementer of the new policies that would keep the party

in power. As official cleaning was going on, many trials were also executed against the opponents, pro-westerns, so-called spies of western countries, Iran and Israel, and former ministers. In addition, possible competitors were kept out of the governance. Al-Takriti was assassinated and Mahdi Ammash was appointed as ambassador to be away from the Iraqi politics. Therefore, not only the non-Baathists were dismissed, but also the dissident Baathists were suppressed (Marr, 2004). According to Tripp (2008), Nasserists in Iraq were seen as a threat to the regime, as well. One might deduce that pan-Arabism was the ideology of Baath Party but who will lead this unification would originate a competition by nature. This was the case in Iraq because a group of people was affected from Egypt's leader, Nasser, and his pan-Arabist ambitions in the Middle East.

Beside the security measurements of the party, it is significant to evince the ideology of Iraqi Baath and the social policies implemented in this period. In the first congress of the party, the top cadres of Baath underlined the radical socialism and emphasized the workers' and peasants' rights. Land reform and collectivization of agriculture became the focal point of the road map. Basic commodities were subsidized. Compensations for sequestered lands were cancelled. Co-operatives were established. The peasants were distributed seed and fertilizer. The last but not least, Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) was nationalized in 1972. This step will have played a significant role in the future of Iraq. The increase in revenues from petroleum will have contributed to the flourishing of prosperity, social and infrastructural development, and national self-confidence in foreign policy.

Ideologically, Baath Party achieved a lot in a short period of time. As Marr (2004: 150-51) puts, the party system was structured on organized units such as youth

branches. Recruitment and indoctrination of new members increased substantially. In the 1980s, the party had 25 thousand members and reached 1,5 million followers.

In summary, the regime sought its own security by holding key positions in the state, which illustrates that the upper echelon of the party learnt lesson from the history.

Secondly, the Baath had sufficient time to expand its grassroots through populist policies and indoctrination. The success of the party and the top leaders has no need to mention. The regime lasted until the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. In this duration, it experienced two wars, one with Iran and the other with Kuwait. The military attempted many plots against the Baath regime and there were many Kurdish and Shiite riots within the state. Despite such great wars and extensive oppositions, the Baath, particularly Saddam, managed to stay in power until 2003.

3.2. The Saddam Era (1979-2003)

Saddam was the dormant leader of the 1968 coup. He acted alongside with Bakr, and achieved to stay as the second man after Bakr. The reason to elaborate on Saddam in a different subtitle is that the history of Baath Party in Iraq had two periods, before Saddam, and after Saddam. In the first period, while the party ideology and cadres dominated the state governance, the latter indicated that one-man rule overthrew the party influence. Secondly, he held a position in Iraq and the Middle East that the history of both would miss their buttress in his absence in any analysis.

Coughlin (2005), in his extensive study on Saddam, categorizes his life by underlying Saddam's temperament, characteristics, family, victories and failures etc. For anyone who is interested, the book provides elaborate analysis of Saddam. For this study, I focus on Saddam's childhood and political maneuvers. His early life is significant in the sense that his childhood might reflect the genesis of his ideology.

Saddam was born into a poor family near the Tigris River, a region having harsh climate. His birth date is April 28, 1937 although not certain because registration at that time in Iraq would have been difficult. However, April 28 was admitted by Saddam considering that the date became national holiday in 1980 short after he held the presidency. In his early age, he was orphaned and was raised by his relatives.

Hunt (2005) maintains that the reason Saddam left his family in 1947 is because his stepfather was cruel to him. Henceforth, he lived with his maternal uncle who was revolutionist, anti-British and conservative. Although Hunt (2005) correlates the harshness that Saddam experienced in early ages and Saddam's policies in his governance, the claim requires more medical and psychological substantiation. On the other hand, his uncle's ideological stance is more likely to indoctrinate Saddam. In 1950s, the uncle became the governor of Baghdad which paved the way for Saddam to go into the politics. Saddam joined Baath Party in 1957 and he proved his loyalty by taking role in an unsuccessful assassination of the Prime Minister, Qasim. Then, he fled to Syria by leaving a heroic fame behind. One of the great moments in his life was when he moved to Egypt and met Egypt's president, Nasser, who was the hero of Arab nations at that time. Saddam studied law at the University of Cairo and married his cousin when he was in Egypt. He came back to Iraq to help Aref stage a coup. Aref's policies against Baath Party after the coup led the party to carry out a plot against Aref in 1965. This attempt ended up with his flight to Syria. He later came to Iraq for the second coup in 1968.

As the history of Iraq proved, "[...] seizing power is much easier than keeping power [...]" (Hunt, 2005: 83). Saddam was given the role of securing the coup which later benefited Saddam for his presidency thanks to the state positions that his personnel

held. In Dawisha's (2009) book, it is clearly indicated that, the army was Saddam's main target. Hence, soldiers' salaries were raised and the army was prioritized for car and house purchasing. Secret police was established directly answerable to Saddam. Youth branches of the party were utilized to gather intelligence in society. All the key positions were occupied by the members of Saddam's tribe to reduce any risk of plot against the regime or assassination against Saddam.

In addition to these measurements, Saddam also played a significant role in social policies of Iraq and this period deserves credit for the high development especially after the nationalization of petroleum which increased the revenues. Social services, such as education and health, and the role of women in public area improved through the petroleum revenues. "Between 1973 and 1980, student enrollment in secondary schools rose from 600,000 to almost a million, and at universities it almost doubled from 49,000 to 96,000" (Dawisha, 2009: 220). Many students were sent to Western countries for higher education with comprehensive scholarships. Women also constituted more than half of the respected occupations, such as pharmacist, teacher and dentist. "[T]echnical education increased three-fold since 1977, to more than 120,090 students in 1986. Baghdad University, with its different campuses, had 34,555 students in 1988, Mustansiriyah University attracted 11,686 students, and the University of Technology served 7,584 students" (Fattah & Caso, 2009: 213). Health centers and hospitals were extended and social security salaries were paid to elderly people and retirees.

The oil revenues did not just benefit Iraqi people, they might have also been a curse Iraq's future. Saddam made tremendous investment on armament. 40% of the revenue went to the purchase of weapons from the Western states, particularly

France, and the USSR. Considering that Iraq is one of the greatest suppliers of oil in the world, this great revenue and the armament as a result of this would have boosted the self-confidence of Saddam in his foreign policy. Although it will be discussed in the next sections, Saddam's ambitions in the region ended up with two great wars, with Kuwait and Iran, and the bombardment of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) of Iraq. Yet, not until 1979 Saddam's actions culminated in the conflictual foreign policy since he seized the power as the one-man in that time. "Apart from his position as president of the republic, Saddam held all the country's top positions: he was chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, secretary-general of the Baath Party Regional Command, prime minister, and commander of the armed forces" (Coughlin, 2005: 151). Therefore, Iraq entered a new phase, which was a transition from a party rule to single-man governance. Saddam's presidency was challenged by the party, as well. However, his stratagem against Mashhadi, the secretary-general of the RCC and the only actor who can shake Saddam's position, strengthened Saddam's legitimacy.

Saddam ruled Iraq from 1979 until the US-led invasion of 2003. During this twenty-four years, it is appropriate to claim that his zeal and audacious policies engendered a leader, but also precipitated him. Prosperity, charisma, comfortable life and governing a state could not stop Saddam's unrealistic ambitions. The ethnic and religious minorities were suppressed as well as the ideological dissidents and Baathist opposition. Iraq went to war with its neighbor, Iran, which was much more advantageous against Iraq. 8-year-war melted Iraq's revenues and created loan burden for Iraq. The invasion of Kuwait followed Iran War and ended up with bombardment of the UN on Iraq. After long years of international sanctions, Iraq was now invaded by the US by virtue of Saddam's alleged support for Al-Qaida, the

perpetrator of September 11 attack. So, throughout his presidency, Iraq experienced internal and external wars except a few years of transition from one war to another. Yet, the domestic conflicts were still observable during the war years and in inter-war periods. Saddam was executed in 2006 by the Iraqi government that was established after the US invasion of Iraq.

3.3. Ethnic, Sectarian and Ideological Conflict in Iraq

Baath Party seized the power in 1968 and ruled the state until 2003. In this period, domestic conflict did not cease. The party's basic policy was to suppress all the dissidents. These included the Kurds, Shiites, liberals, communists, dissident Baathists, family members and rival clans. In this section, my focus will be on the Kurds and Shiites. One of the indicators which I apply to study the rise of terrorism after the US invasion of 2003 is political discrimination of minorities. Observing the last 30 years of Iraq in terms of the domestic clashes will pave the way for the discussion on the situation after the invasion.

3.3.1. The Kurds

Kurds are one of the biggest ethnic communities in Iraq. They speak Kurdish which shares a lot of similarity with Persian. The region where they primarily locate is surrounded by Turkey and Iran. Their existence in the region has been challenged not only by Iraq but they have also faced serious drawbacks in Turkey, Syria and Iran where they represent a minority, as well.

Problematic relations with the Kurds did not emerge in the Baathist regime.

However, it is difficult to say that Baath Party endeavored to rebuild constructive relations with the Kurds. According to the 1966 Agreement with Aref, the Kurds had

been provided cabinet seats. In the first years of the coup, Baath Party offered the seats to two frictions of Kurds, Barzani and Talabani. Talabani welcomed the offer while Barzani refused due to his suspicion about the Baath Regime (Marr, 2004). In 1970, Saddam concluded an agreement with Barzani faction. According to the agreement, Kurds were provided autonomy, proportional representation in a legislative body, appointment of Kurdish vice president, ensuring the share of oil revenues and recognition of Kurdish and Arabic in the Kurdish territory. The reason for Saddam to acquiesce such an agreement is his pragmatic vision according to Sluglett and Sluglett (2001). Firstly, Saddam was assigned to secure the continuance of the regime. It would have been risky to challenge the Kurds while the Iraqi military was not seized, yet. Secondly, Barzani's constellation was supported by Iran. The regime preferred giving concessions to reduce the influence of Iran on Kurdish territory.

The regime's movements in the following years caused the relations to crumble. The vice president nominated by Barzani was refused by Baath party due to his Persian background. In addition, two unsuccessful assassination attempt were made on Barzani's life. Lastly, 45,000 Shii Kurds were deported to Iran and they were replaced with Arabs (Marr, 2004: 155). These developments led Barzani to get aid from the US, Iran and Israel. He also requested full autonomy and made claims on Kirkuk. These demands were rejected as expected and the war started between Iraqi government and Kurdish regional government in 1974 (Marr, 2004).

Iraqi army managed to occupy most of the Kurdistan cities, such as Arbil, Sulaimaniyya and Kirkuk. The unexpected response came through the support of Iran to the Kurdish soldiers, Peshmerga. Iran supplied weapon to Peshmerga which

deteriorated Iraq's position. Iran's impact on the war ensured the stand-off situation. The parties eventually realized that the agreement would benefit both sides. On one side, Baghdad noticed that its army could not go further and the continuation of the war would have led to the confrontation of Iraq and Iran, which was not welcomed by Baath at all. On the other side, Iran did not also appreciate any war with Iraq. The Soviet's aid to Iraq was the other reason that intimidated Iran. The mutual enthusiasm for agreement brought Iran and Iraq into the table. Iran guaranteed the cessation of aid in return for the recognition of its claims on the Shatt al-Arab (Marr, 2004).

The agreement between Iran and Iraq represents a catastrophe for the Kurds, as Iran withdrew its military aid from the northern Iraq. Barzani fled to Iran leaving many peshmergas behind. Later on, Baghdad issued a new law regulating the autonomy of the Kurdish area. An assembly was formed whose members were elected by the community residing in the region. Yet, Baghdad had the right to dissolve this parliament. Baath regime also increased oil revenues for the autonomous region and implemented development plans, such as building schools and hospitals. Industrial investment projects took place. Agricultural reforms were initiated. On the other hand, Arabization of the Kurdish region continued as a Baghdad policy against any possible revolt of the Kurds. Thousands of Kurds were displaced and situated near major cities (Marr, 2004).

Despite the major infrastructural developments, anti-Kurdish policies accelerated the rebels of the Kurds against Baath regime. However, the frictions between the Kurds deteriorated the effectiveness of their riot. In 1975, Talabani established a new party, namely Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), challenging Barzani and his party,

Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK) was the other dissident party against the former Kurdish parties, which was formed in 1978 and announced in 1984. Needless to say, the lack of fusion between Kurdish groups consolidated Baghdad's position (Marr, 2004).

The start of the war between Iran and Iraq in 1980 increased the tension between Baghdad and the Kurds since Barzani's army combatted alongside with Iran. Although the regime managed to control the northern Iraq, this lasted until the coordination of KDP and PUK in 1987. Baghdad retaliated harshly by appointing Ali Hasan al-Majid as the governor of Northern provinces with full authorization. Al-Majid initiated the Anfal Campaign, which included the well-known Halabja Massacre in the recent history. "The Anfal marks one of the most brutal actions in Iraq's modern history and had a profound demographic, economic, and psychological impact on the Kurdish area" (Marr, 2004: 202). About 4000 villages and hamlets were destroyed and 1,5 million people displaced or resettled. (Marr, 2004: 202).

The miscalculated and rigid policies advanced the conflictual relations between Baghdad and the Kurds. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, a rebellion, called Intifada, broke up in all parts of Iraq by the opponents of the Baath regime. The Iraqi army hastened to wage attack on Kurdish provinces. As a result, Baghdad took all the major provinces' control. Kurds' retaliation ended up with cease-fire and withdrawal of Iraqi army to behind the front. Despite the exodus of Iraqi army and the establishment of Regional Government, the challenge between the Kurdish political parties thwarted any solution. In 1998, the parties tried to cooperate. After then, each party ruled its own territory. KDP was responsible for the region surrounded by

Turkey. PUK ruled the Iranian front and IMIK held Halabja. The region had its own schools teaching its own curriculum in Kurdish.

3.3.2. The Shiites

Shiites are the largest sectarian community in Iraq. After the 1968 coup of Baath Party, the majority of the Shiites located themselves in the opposition groups due to their affiliation with Iran and the government's brutal policies against the dissidents. In the first years following the coup, Baath Party aimed to secure its continuation. Therefore, many Shi'i Iraqis having Iranian nationality were deported. Shi'i clerics were sentenced to death due to their alleged spying activities. Religious rituals of the community were restricted in the sacred cities of Shi'a (Marr, 2004). The establishment of a university in Kufa, historic capital of Imam Ali, in 1969 paved the way for arrestments of community chiefs (Fattah & Caso, 2009).

During this period, Shiites formed various organizations to struggle with the new regime. Da'wa Party and Munazimat al-Amal al-Islamiyya (Islamic Action Organization, IAO) were two prominent groups with international bonds, particularly Iran. In 1974, the Da'wa leaders were all executed due to the political protests. Coming to 1977, 30,000 Shiites marched from Najaf to Karbala. The unrest was suppressed brutally. Although Saddam sought to assuage the Shi'i community by allocating more funds for the southern cities and offering positions in the RCC and in the party, rebelling did not cease (Marr, 2004). A year after, protests in Iran worried Baghdad and Khomeini, who later became the leader of Iranian Revolution, was expelled by the Iraqi regime. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr became the new chief of the Shiites in Iraq. The Iranian revolution and close ties between Khomeini and al-Sadr concerned the Baath regime about the Shi'i activities. The more measurements

Baghdad took against the Shiites, the more insurgency the regime faced. Al-Sadr finally was sentenced to house arrest. Many Shiites and also Sunni ulama protested against the decision and some assassination attempts were carried out against the government members. As a result of this, Al-Sadr and his activist sister, Bint al-Huda, were executed (Tripp, 2007).

Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 was also a testimony of experiment on the loyalty of Iraqi Shiites. Even though the Shiites did not present a common stance, the south was more suspicious of the war. It is worth noting that Saddam tried to forge good relations with some Shi'i clerics at that time by increasing the investment in the South and making Ali's birthday national holiday. Despite these efforts, Baghdad did not eschew to deport about 200,000 Iranian origin Iraqis throughout the war (Marr, 2004: 198).

The deportations were carried out generally towards Iran and this resulted in a big community of Iraqi Shiites in Iran. The community later formed a new organization called the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI). The group was backed by Iran and sought to establish an Islamic regime in Iraq by the leadership of Baqir al-Hakim. Da'wa and IAO also merged under SAIRI and the organization shook the Iraqi regime through its military wing Badr Brigade's bombings and sabotages.

The end of the Gulf War launched another insurgency in the south of Iraq. The soldiers who returned from Kuwait gathered in Basra and the protests broke out against the regime. The riots finally spread out across the Shi'i provinces, Najaf, Diwaniyya, Nasiriyya and Karbala. The state institutions, party headquarters, hotels and malls were attacked. However, the Republican Guard of Baghdad regained the

control and suppressed the insurgent groups brutally. By 1995, more than 200,000 people displaced. The infrastructure, roads, state institutions, communication devices were all obliterated due to the armed conflict between the regime and dissidents (Marr, 2004).

Consequently, the Iraqi regime succeeded to drain the Shi'i insurgency through harsh measurements.

3.3.3. Concluding Remarks

The Baath regime in Iraq confronted surmountable dissents not only by the Kurds and Shiites but also from communists, liberals, family members, opposing Baathists and Islamic fundamentalists. That I do not include the other factions of opponents is not to ignore the reality or to bastardize it. I seek to highlight just the related part of the Iraqi history with my thesis without crashing the details.

From a historical vantage point, it might be more appropriate to claim that the regime did not distinguish between any sect, ethnicity or ideology. The Baath leaders' threat perception was constructed on being anti-regime. Any phenomenon that had the ability to weaken the Baath dominance was dealt with brutally. Cordesman and Hashim (1997) elucidate the situation in Iraq. In their analysis, they characterize the Kurds as separatist and Shiites as supporting an Islamic regime according to the Baath understanding. Then, they maintain, however there were many Kurds who would have accepted federation and many Iraqi Shiites who were secular, nationalists and Arab. Moreover, the literature does not exhibit any inter-group clash in Iraq. Therefore, I conclude that the dissent might have been motivated by the identity of the opponents while Baath's suppression went beyond the identity since

the focal point for the regime was not who the dissident is but what threat s/he posed against the regime.

Cordesman and Hashim (1997) reveal the causes of failure of the opposition groups. Firstly, some groups were perceived as marginalized due to their extremist background. Secondly, the regime established a system of intelligence, monitor and punishment that enervated the society. Thirdly, the socialist ingredients of Baath led to the rise of a welfare state which offered free education and health. This was convincing for the society to not rebel. Fourthly, intra-group and inter-group fragmentations were at its peak. The Kurdish congregation was diffused into KDP, PUK, PKK, IMIK and etc. The protests of Shiites in various cities were unorganized. Furthermore, the Kurds and Shiites were also uncoordinated in their revolts. Fifthly, each organization sought the interest of its own community. Lastly, opposing groups had regional or international support which was utilized by Baath to label the dissidents as traitors.

I study the impact of the political exclusion and humiliation on terrorism in Iraq after 2003 US-led invasion in this thesis. Although my focus is on the post-2003 era, the social and political background of the communities in Iraq would contribute to the comprehension of the root causes of exclusion and humiliation. The Shi'i congregation had been ruled by Sunni regimes since the foundation of Iraq as a monarchy in 1921 and had been treated brutally in the last 30 years before the US invasion. The Kurdish region had not been recognized as an autonomous management until 1970. Notwithstanding the 1970 Agreement, the Baath era had been reminiscent of war and torture for the Kurdish society in Iraq. In the last

chapter, I discuss the impact of the US policy which replaced the government with Da'wa members ignoring the historical background of Iraq.

3.4. Foreign Policy of Iraq

Iraq's foreign policy after 1968 oriented towards the state's interest. As a result, the Iraqi foreign policy was very contextual since the leaders were highly maneuvering based on the domestic and international issues.

In the first years of the regime, Iraq's relations with the West were complicated. The 1968 coup coincided with Six-Day War of 1967. The new Iraqi regime maintained its hostile discourse against Israel, meaning that the diplomatic ties with the US was also interrupted (Marr, 2004).

The Eastern part of the relations were also not sparkling. Nasser-backed coup attempt was thwarted. Moreover, Camp David Accords in 1978 portrayed Egypt as a target in the Arab world (Hunt, 2005). The disagreement on Shatt-al Arab border with Iran and the support of Iran for Kurdish separatists harmed the relations between Iran and Iraq. Iran funded and equipped the Shiite and Kurdish dissidents against the new Iraqi regime. Iraq retaliated by deporting many Shiites including Khomeini (Tripp, 2007). The other Gulf countries, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were disturbed by the Iraqi regime's activities in the region. Baghdad reinforced Marxist organizations in Yemen targeting the conservative regimes of the Arab countries. Kuwaiti islands, Warba and Bubiyan, were claimed by Baath regime and Kuwait was attacked. Through the Arab League's effort, Iraq withdrew its troops from Kuwait (Marr, 2004).

In this picture, the USSR played an equilibrium role for Iraq. Iraq recognized East Germany, becoming the first Arab country. The parties signed Friendship Treaty in 1972 and cooperated further in political, economic and military fields.

After 1975, Iraq relations with Arab countries except Egypt improved. Cooperation agreements were concluded with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Saddam visited Jordan in 1979, which was the first visit after 1958. Rapprochement between Syria and Iraq ended up with National Action Charter targeting the unity of the states particularly against Israel.

In this period, the economic, political and military role of USSR diminished. Iraq initiated new collaborations with the US, France, Germany and Japan. France became the main party of the arms exporter to Iraq especially after the nationalization of Iraqi oil which increased the national revenues. The invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR halted the relations with Iraq.

The regime change in Iran was also a milestone for Iraq's history. In 1979, Khomeini, who was deported from Iraq just few years ago, established an Islamic Regime in Iran and became the Supreme Leader of Iran. The state's foreign policy, after the regime change, depended on exporting the Islamic regime to the other Muslim-populated countries. Iraq was one of the targets. Iran supported the Kurdish opponents and funded the Shiite organizations such as Da'wa and SAIRI which weakened Saddam's authority in Iraq (Karsh, 2002). Eventually, the war broke out between Iran and Iraq in 1980 which lasted eight years and consumed Iraqi economy and paved the way for loan burden. Gulf countries backed Iraq economically. Saudi Arabia was also a supporter of Iraq as a sectarian rival of Iran. Egypt aided Iraq in return for restoring its position in the Arab world. In this process, the former ally of

Iraq, Syria, placed itself alongside with Iran, which weakened Iraq's position in the war due to the revival of new front in the West. The Western states also maintained their support for Iraq. The US acted pragmatically and backed Saddam against the common enemy, Iran. France signed new agreements for new arm purchases (Marr, 2004).

The war ended with a stalemate thanks to the involvement of the superpowers. Yet, Iraq's loan reached about \$100 billion (Marr, 2004: 205). Agricultural lands and factories were destroyed. Shatt al-Arab was closed which deteriorated Iraq's economy and led to a new search for a port, which was Umm Qasr.

Not long after the Iraq-Iran War of 1980-88, Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990. The closure of Shatt al-Arab harmed Iraq's economy. Kuwaiti port of Umm Qasr that would have benefited Iraq. In addition, Iraq's revenues did not match its expenses, so the economy exacerbated due to the wars. The war debts constituted another problem for Iraq. Saddam, as portraying himself as the protector of the region, requested Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to erase the debts. Although Saudi Arabia was eager to do so, Kuwait refused the offer. This created another tension between Kuwait and Iraq. The oil prices accelerated this tension. When Iraq demanded OPEC for higher oil prices to increase its revenue, the Gulf countries declined.

The invasion of Kuwait was condemned by the Western and Arab countries. Kuwait was declared as the new province of Iraq. Although the international community demanded the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait but Iraq refused and went further by taking the foreigners in Kuwait as hostages. A year after, in 1991, "...the United States sent more than 230,000 troops to Saudi Arabia in support of Operation Desert Shield. During the fall of 1991, the United States sent an additional 200,000 troops",

thereafter “[o]n January 17, 1991, Operation Desert Shield became Operation Desert Storm, and the U.S.-led coalition began bombing raids inside Kuwait and Iraq, especially in Baghdad” (Hunt, 2005: 98). Iraq accepted the cease-fire and withdrawal from Kuwait after the US intervention. The UN passed Resolution 687, which is “the longest and most comprehensive in UN history, and its provisions were to place much of Iraq’s economy and its military under international control” (Marr, 2004: 240).

The content of the sanctions and the reaction of the international community proved the miscalculations of Saddam. The UN Peacekeeping Forces were sent to Kuwait border. The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were assigned to control the weapon of mass destruction in Iraq. Iraq was paralyzed socially and economically.

The sanctions also raised a new question about their impact on the Iraqi society. Destroyed economy and production as well as the embargo hardened the social life in Iraq. So, the UN passed Resolution 986 (Oil-for-Food) to allow Iraq to sell oil in return only for food. The sanctions were eased after 2000. Iraq was also reintegrated to Arab League in 2002 (Marr, 2004). Saddam’s dictatorship lasted until 2003 when the US accused him of supporting Al-Qaida’s September 11 Attack.

The literature I reviewed for the history of Iraq was elaborate. I also got the chance to compare and contrast the points of view of the authors. Marr (2004) and Tripp (2007) are the essential books in the literature. Despite their comprehensiveness, the authors’ framing of some issues deserves mention. Marr (2004: 268) presents the inflation as “the most serious sanctions problem” in Iraq while the reality was that the Iraqis starved to death. Tripp (2007: 230) mentions the US’s accidental attack on

an Iranian civil airline, which killed hundreds of people, with no detail and just like an ordinary war casualty whereas Saddam's any damage was elaborated throughout a paragraph. Although these points harm the credibility of these books, they are prominent in the field and inspiring for those who are interested in history of Iraq.



CHAPTER 4

IRAQ ON THE EVE OF 2003 INVASION

Saddam's aggressive policies throughout his dictatorship had caused two devastating wars, Iran and Kuwait, a decade of sanctions and an occupation of Iraq by the US-led Coalition. In this section, I shed light on the last decade of Iraq before the US invasion in 2003.

Invasion of Kuwait probably had been missing the last exit from the bridge. Kuwait was one of the biggest exporter of oil and constituted an important place for both regional and global powers. Hence, the invasion threatened the oil supply and more significantly changed the owner of the oil. Therefore, the allied coalition bombarded Iraq to compel Baghdad to retreat and they succeeded. The next mission for the UNSC was to guarantee inhibition of Iraq from any possible aggressive act. Firstly, Iraq had to recognize the sovereignty of Kuwait. Secondly, Baghdad had to pay war reparations. Lastly, the UN will send its related commissions to inspect and destroy the chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of Iraq. The UN sanctions followed this process (Tripp, 2007). Saddam had no alternative to acquiescing.

The consequences of the UN's sanctions deserve mention. The bombardment of Iraq generated more destruction of economic infrastructure than the Iran war of 1980-88. The factories, power plants, sewerage and water systems were destroyed. While Iraq was expected to pay both its debts and war reparations, it was not allowed to export

oil for any profit. Any import was hampered except food and medicine. Despite some offers by the UN on the export of oil, Saddam refused to deal since the offers contained separation of great amount for the payment of war reparations. Baghdad's reluctance to work with UN inspection teams led to a new air bombardment of the US in 1997 and 1998 (Tripp, 2007). Although the main motivation of the air attacks and sanctions was to force Saddam to regime change, the results indicated that these measurements primarily harmed Iraqi society and paved the way for ethical discussion on the sanctions.

Pellett (2003: 247-63) conducts study based on the UN reports and presents that infant mortality rate was 120/1000 in 1960, 45/1000 at the end of 1980s and greater than 100/1000 in 1998. Daily access to food diminished from 3375 cal in 1987-88 to 2277 cal in 1993-95. GDP per capita, which is used as an indicator for access to food, infant mortality rate, access to protein, decreased to less than \$500 after the sanctions, which was more than \$3000 before 1990. The government dealt with the food problem through ration card that generated a luminescent impact. In 1996, Baghdad and the UN agreed on exporting oil in return for food. However, the incomes were controlled by the UN and only approximately 55% of the incomes were allocated for food purchase. The remaining was spent for the payment of war reparations, construction of oil pipelines and humanitarian aid in the autonomous Kurdish region.

Professors, Noam Chomsky, Edward S. Herman, Edward W. Said and Howard Zinn (2003), published a joint declaration against the sanctions and accused the sanctions of being weapons of mass murder and the US leaders of hypocrisy. They clearly

reflected their intention that they do not stand with the Iraqi regime but they are supporter of Iraqi society which experienced the burden of war and sanctions.

In 2001, the US was attacked by Al-Qaeda. The relationship between these attacks and Iraq was stated by the US president in his address to Congress. He underlined the significance of combatting terrorism and brutal dictators. Katzman (2008) argues three motivations behind the invasion of Iraq based on the claims in the US government. Firstly, Iraqi intelligence provided material for Al-Qaeda in Sudan, Pakistan and Afghanistan beginning from 1990s. Secondly, Baghdad and Ansar al-Islam (affiliated with Al-Qaeda) had close ties. Finally, there was a possibility of Iraq's involvement in September 11 attacks.

Considering the last two decades of Iraq, the literature has flourished in many fields. Terrorism studies might be one of the fields that is affected a lot since the War on Terror in Iraq left a brutal organization behind, namely the ISIS. Why people radicalize and join this organization, what the recruitment tactics of the IS are and what its main motivation is occupy significant place in the literature recently. This thesis seeks to contribute to these questions.

4.1. The Invasion and the Politics in Iraq

2003 US-led invasion of Iraq aimed to topple a dictator and establish democratic government in the country. Perhaps, the easiest part of this objective was achieved through the military invasion. On the one side was an alliance of militarily most developed states in the World, the US and the UK. On the other side was a country which experienced devastating wars in the last few decades in addition to fatal embargo and sanctions. Therefore, the coalition forces managed to control the state bodies in a very short time. The second step was to establish a new order which

avored democracy and liberal economy. The success in constructing the new Iraq was also significant in the sense that the state's future would have been drawn through the game rules put in place by the US. However, the US miscalculated this invasion. The former dominant power, Saddam Husain, could not be replaced with a strong authority which then led to polar struggle among the persecuted congregations of Saddam era.

The US's first political move was to establish Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) headed by Jay Garner. ORHA aimed to maintain the basic services, deal with the refugee problem and provide humanitarian relief. Nonetheless, Iraq was far away from a toy block. For this reason, Garner followed two policies. Firstly, the retired general reconstituted the state institutions and recalled people to their jobs. Secondly, he held public meetings by involving Iraqis for the future of Iraq. Both policies did very little. Considering the intensity of the problem, ORHA was unable to set up a successful administration. Moreover, Garner's effort to bring social factions together failed due to two reasons. Firstly, his efforts did not have a response in Washington. Lastly, some groups were reluctant to take part in transgressor's aura. For instance, Ahmed Chalabi and Ayad 'Allawi sought the US affiliation to be active player in Iraq's future whereas Ibrahim al-Ja'fari (Dawa Party), 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Hakim (SCIRI), Muhsin 'Abd al-Hamid (Iraqi Islamic Party- Muslim Brotherhood of Iraq) and Hamid Majid Mousa (Communist Party) stayed away from the US's plans for Iraq (Tripp, 2007).

Despite the little progress in the initial months of the invasion, the US abolished ORHA and established a new administration body which was Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headed by Paul Bremer. Unlike Garner's governance, Bremer

appointed 25-member Iraq Governing Council (IGC) as an advisory body. This body later formed a 25-member cabinet to govern the ministries based on ethnic balance of Iraq (Katzman, 2009). The IGC was constituted by thirteen Shi'i Arab, five Kurds, five Sunni Arab, one Turkmen and one Assyrian Christian (Tripp, 2007: 284). The formation of IGC was not favored by the Sunnis who had been the dominant actor of Iraq previously. 'Allawi-led IGC created suspicion among many factions in Iraq. In Saddam's Era, 'Allawi maintained close ties with the US and the Gulf countries which damaged his credibility and legitimacy for Iraqis, particularly Sunnis. Therefore, the image for Iraqis was more likely that the US controlled Iraq through a puppet extension. Ismael and Ismael (2015) argue that embracing 'Allawi and the akin factions contributed to the legitimacy of the rejectionist constellation in Iraq. In addition, religious Shi'ites, such as Ayatollah al-Sistani who was the leader of Shia community in Iraq, opposed IGC's practices particularly about the new constitution draft (Tripp, 2007). The CPA practices and the structure of IGC proved the failure of the US in state-building process of Iraq in a very short time. "... [I]n August 2003, nearly 60% of all Iraqis expressed confidence in the ... (CPA), [whereas] by April 2004, only eight months later, less than 10% of Iraqis had confidence in the CPA" (Robinson, 2007: 270).

One of Bremer's biggest mistakes was his miscalculated policies regulating the Iraqi military. In the name of "de-Baathification", 300,000 soldiers were fired from the military and 30,000 high ranking official in Baath Party were put out of work (Tripp, 2007: 282). Yet, the soldiers were not asked to give up their weapons. Their payments were canceled and they could not find job due to their former affiliation with the Baath Party. They mostly worked for private security firms thanks to their weapons that were not surrendered (Barakat, 2005).

In 2004, the final draft of Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL) was approved by the IGC. The law included a process which would end up with the dissolution of CPA. It also formulated a federal state dependent on geography and history and whose religion is Islam. The Interim Government was established which ran Iraq until the elections. Ayad ‘Allawi was appointed as the head of the government. His policies to secure Iraq were named as de-de-Baathification since ‘Allawi reappointed the former Baath bureaucrats to the internal intelligence agency. He also created a police force containing the loyal people to him (Tripp, 2007). It is worth noting that the formulation of the interim government was not based on a dominant sect of Iraq. The head of the state was a Sunni Arab Ghazi Al-Yawar. The ministers of defense and interior were also Sunnis (Katzman, 2009).

In 2005, elections for the National Assembly of Iraq, provincial councils and the Kurdish regional assembly were held. Due to Sunni boycott of the elections, Shiite United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) won the majority by occupying 140 of the 275 seats. Kurds gained 75 of the seats which paved the way for the alliance of the Kurds and UIA for the national government (Katzman, 2009).

Fontan (2009: 140), in her book, criticizes 2005 elections and argues the following:

One might say that at least Iraqis were not told whom to vote for, as opposed to under Saddam’s rule. True, al-Safi did not tell people whom to vote for. However, Sistani did endorse a list, that of the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), also known as list 169, its official number, which won more than 3 million votes out of 8.5 million. If a man tells you that you will go to hell if you do not vote, and that, by the way, this particular list is one fine bunch of people to vote for; who will you end up voting for?

In addition to the drawbacks highlighted by Fontan, two other points deserve mention. Firstly, the turnout in the Sunni provinces were too low that Sunnis could

not win at all in Anbar, Ninewa and Diyala. Hence, they did not have a say in constitution-writing process. Secondly, Bayan Jabr, who was accused of triggering ethnic and sectarian conflict in Baghdad and the member of SCIRI, was appointed as the Minister of Interior after the election. Jalal Talabani became the president assisted by two vice presidents, one Shiite and one Sunni. The prime ministry was allocated for the representative of al-Da'wa Party, Ibrahim al-Ja'fari.

The Constitutional Committee of the new parliament functioned to create the new constitution of Iraq. The committee drafted a paper that states that Iraq is a single federal state whose religion is Islam. In the referendum, the draft was approved despite the contestation of Sunni Arab population and the ambivalence on critical issues (Tripp, 2007).

At the same year of the elections and constitutional plebiscite, another national election was held. Differently from the previous election, the UIA disassociated except al-Da'wa and SCIRI. Moreover, Sunni Islamist parties revived as a new actor in the politics. The UIA won the elections with weaker position in the parliament. Sunni Arab party placed third after the Kurdish fusion. The new prime minister became another al-Da'wa member, Nuri Al-Maliki (Tripp, 2007).

The first four-year term elected parliament was supposed to run Iraq until 2009. However, the splits became visible among Shiites-Sunnis and Arabs-Kurds in 2007. Shiite Sadrist group and the Sunni coalition withdrew their members from the cabinet. UIA lost the Shiite Fadilah Party. At the end of this process, only 142 seats out of 275 remained for the legislation (Katzman, 2009). The inter-group and intra-group divisions in the parliament were difficult to cope with. For the Shiite parties, secular/religious or federal/unitary state divergence constituted the buttress of the

diffusion. The parties also did not seek to proselytize the other groups or no party acquiesced since the constellations mostly had a paramilitary extensions out of the parliament which allowed them to grasp their aims without conciliation. In the Sunni side, the sectarian pride of being dominant in Iraqi politics for centuries was now challenged by Shiite-Kurdish alliance. So, the transition from upper echelon to the minority status accelerated the insurgent ambitions of Sunnis. Their weakness in the parliament was the other factor to dissent from the government and its policies.

The 2005-2010 era played significant role in Iraq's future. 'Allawi, Maliki, Talabani and al-Ja'fari consolidated their positions in Iraqi politics and have run the state interchangeably. The period, in addition, witnessed inter-group and intra-group violent conflicts, which will be discussed later. Although there were efforts for a permanent reconciliatory constitution, sharp ideological divergence left some groups out of the process and hampered the dominant groups due to their desire for greater role in Iraq's future. The US's withdrawal plans were opened to discussion in 2007. The biggest critique to these plans was the possibility of leaving Iraq unstable. "After an occupation lasting more than eight years, political stability is not a phrase that comes to mind when describing Iraq" (Ismael & Ismael, 2015: 27). Indeed, the last five years proved that the US did not secure Iraq nor stabilized it.

4.2. Violent Groups

The violent groups in Iraq are one of the main focuses of the thesis. The section introduces the violent organizations in Iraq which particularly have not created a great salience in the media.

Robinson (2007) studies three clusters of Islam, namely Islam as a reform, revolution and resistance. The author claims that all three types of Islamism existed in Iraq.

Islam as a reform was performed by Ibrahim Ja'fari government. The resistance was observable in Zarkawi's organization, which later became the ISIS. Lastly, Muqtada al-Sadr represented the revolutionary aspect of Islamism as well as the resistance. Robinson's versatile analysis helps understanding various interpretations of Islam in one country, Iraq. In the previous section, the political process in post-2003 is discussed. In this section, I cast light on the roots of revolutionary and resistant groups and their methodology.

Before I go through the motivations behind the resistance, it is worth identifying some of the violent organizations in Iraq. In the post-2003, the first struggle against the coalition troops came from the former officials of Baath regime. A group of Baathists formed organizations to carry out attacks on the US and the UK soldiers. Al-Awda (The Return), in this respect, is counted as the first violent organization combating the invaders. Jaish Muhammed (Muhammed's Army) contained similar insurgents. During the Falluja War of 2004, however, the group became more inclined to Islamic values and lost its Baathist notion gradually (Hashim, 2009).

The occupation triggered the Islamic resistance against a non-Muslim occupier. Ansar al-Sunna was formed by Abu Abdullah Hasan Bin Mahmud in 2003 as an Arab version of Ansar al-Islam, which was a Kurdish Islamist insurgent group. The organization performed deathly attacks against PUK and KDP (Hashim, 2009).

The 1920 Revolution Brigades was Islamist but also nationalist violent organization in Iraq established just after the invasion. Among its militias were the ex-Baathists. It also took part in Iraqi politics and was divided into two in 2007. The splitted group named itself Islamic Resistance Group-Hamas Iraq and conducted similar operations and maintained its presence in politics (Hashim, 2009).

Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) proved to be the largest Salafist organization in Iraq. Despite its sectarian basis, it managed to bring divergent blocs together under one umbrella. The previous regime supporters, patriots, domestic and foreign Islamists merged for one end with various ideologies. Its another success was its ability to cooperate with the other violent groups such as Jaish al-Rashidin (The Army of Rightly Guided), Jaish Muhammed (The Army of Muhammed) and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. However, conflicting ideologies weakened the buttress of the organization. Al-Fatihin Army in 2006 and Jaish al-Furqan (The Army of Criterion) in 2007 splitted from IAI (Hashim, 2009).

Aforementioned Badr Brigades was an armed Shiite organization founded by Iran during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88. Its affiliation with Iran harmed its reliability among Iraqi Shiites. His leader, Hadi al-Amiri, participated in UIA coalition as the member of the Badr Organization.

Jaish al-Mahdi (Mahdi Army) was a Shiite Al-Qaeda in terms of its modus operandi. Founded by Muqtada al-Sadr against the occupiers, it also targeted Sunni community. Suffering from Saddam's policies, Sadr claimed role in Iraq's future with the motivation of establishing an Islamic rule. Mujahadeen Shura Council (MSC) was established as an umbrella Salafist organization in 2006 to fight Mahdi Army. The ISIS and its founding leader Zarkawi had their genesis in MSC (Katzman, 2008).

Sahwa (Awakening) movement was an exceptional group in the sense that it was sponsored by the US against the other insurgent and violent groups. Its armed forces, The Sons of Iraq (SoI), was composed of youths coming from the US backed tribes. The US's desire to integrate this group with the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) created

tension between the US and Maliki government. Maliki's reluctance originated from the possible rise of Sunni SoI in the ISF. Bargaining on the status of SoI ended up with the recruitment of a small amount of SoI member by the ISF and monthly payment for a bigger group. This, however, did not emasculate the struggle between the ISF and SoI. The US was criticized due to its support for Sahwa whose armed group's, SoI, methodology was violent (Hashim, 2009).

Foreign occupiers, tribal leaders, violent organizations, foreign fighters, illegitimate rulers, misled policies: These are sufficient variables to cook 'chaos' and the revival of these elements matched the US occupation in the same field, Iraq. What happened after the occupation has an elaborate answer in statistics.

The number of daily insurgent attacks has risen steadily, from about 20 per day in late 2003 to about 50 per day in 2004 to about 70 per day in 2005 to about 100 per day in 2006. All types of violent attacks dramatically increased from 2004 to 2005, including car bombs, suicide car bombs and roadside bombs. The lethality of the attacks has also steadily increased, with about 2500 Iraqis dying violently every month in 2006. (Robinson, 2007: 270)

Dominant power gap after the invasion whetted the peripheral organizations' appetite for the future of Iraq. The suffering groups of Saddam era had the opportunity to seize the power and rule the state. Also, the exiled blocs returned to share the cake. In addition to the domestic showdown, the international organizations such as Al-Qaeda found a new field to maintain its so-called holy war against the western countries since it would be much more easier to conduct attacks at home than abroad.

For Hashim (2009), Sunni insurgency originated fundamentally from the foreign occupation. Based on the interviews with Sunni rebels, the author concludes that Sunni community's notion of the US and its aim in Iraq such as war against Islam and seeking for Iraqis petroleum led people to wage war against the occupiers.

Moreover, the US's closeness to Kurds and Shiites raised Sunni's concerns on their existence in the country.

Fontan (2009) argues that the invasion became an opportunity for Al-Qaeda to fight its supreme foe, the US. This was accelerated by the salience of the US's activities in prisons and detention centers on the media since the numbers of foreign fighters joining Al-Qaeda to combat the enemy increased. The author particularly highlights Abu-Ghraip prison which hosted many insurgent groups' leaders such as al-Zarkawi. The humiliating actions of the soldiers against the prisoners became significant factors for the prisoners in participating the violent organizations. Similar to Hashim's (2009) argument, Fontan (2009) also underlines the impact of the proximity between the US and the Kurds and Shiites as a factor leading the Sunnis to terror.

Byman and Pollack (2008) conclude similarly with the other studies. The US's presence in the Muslim land and Sunnis' fall in Iraqi politics with Saddam's toppling could not unite the insurgent groups but contributed to their revolt.

The reasons why people join the violent organizations occupy significant place in terms of counter-insurgency. However, the reality is that Iraq became a field which many violent organizations regardless of their ethnicity, sect and affiliation combatted each other as well as the Coalition forces. Robinson (2007: 270) cites Kofi Annan on the role of the US in its irreparable war: "The very presence of American troops feeds the insurgency, but their removal would also feed the insurgency." Propriety of this analysis is confirmed today. The presence of the US between 2003-2011 proved the revival of the violent organizations whereas their withdrawal ended up with the rise of the ISIS. The ruling party of Iraq for the last

decade, ad-Dawa Party, which had aimed to establish Islamic rule in Iraq, expected the removal of the US and the transition of the governance to Iraqi people (Shanahan, 2004). Currently, the Iraqi army could not deal with the ISIS, which acknowledges that both the presence and absence of the US create problem in the field.

4.2.1. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the ISIS

Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the ISIS get their own section separately because they require an in-depth discussion. I present the literature on Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the ISIS by harmonizing the historical process of their existence in Iraq to be able to reflect more on terrorism.

2003 US-led invasion of Iraq has raised the significance of Iraq for jihadist organizations particularly Al-Qaeda since the invasion approximated the US. Although Al-Qaeda did not involve in fighting the Coalition directly, the groups that already pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda waged war against the occupiers. Hence, the organizations such as Jama'at al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (The Society of Oneness and Jihad), Tanzim Qa'idat Al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (Organization of Jihad's Base in Mesopotamia) and Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen (Council of Mujahideen) are all referred as Al-Qaeda in Iraq(AQI) (Lister, 2014).

In some studies, the militant organizations in Iraq are not identified as the brand of Al-Qaeda due to the ideological and instrumental division (Lister, 2014; Fishman, 2010). The main ideological and instrumental difference stem from the divergent opinions of the AQI's leader, Abu Musab Al-Zarkawi, and Al-Qaeda leaders, Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Ladin (Fishman, 2010; Michael, 2007). Hoffman (2010, 555) points out Al-Qaeda's pragmatist policy in Iraq and puts that the violent organizations were significant tools for Al-Qaeda against the US, therefore Iraq was

considered as "central battlefield of jihad" by the top-leaders of the organization.

However, Zarkawi's motivation was to spark a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites to hinder the political domination of the Shiites in Iraq (Katzman, 2008).

The impact of the invasion on Al-Qaeda, the other violent organizations and Muslims around the world draw attention in the literature since the war's objective was to terminate terrorist organizations threatening the US national security. Hegghammer (2006) evaluates the success of the war on global jihadism and find that the Iraq war paved the way for reorientation of the jihadist movement which had been disorganized previously and increased the hostility of Muslim societies against the US. Gerges (2011) analyzes the contextual volatility of Al-Qaeda through the organization's successes and failures, and concludes that 2003 Iraq war was a great chance for the reorientation of the movement because the 9/11 attack was considered as a disaster by moderate Muslims around the world until the invasion took place which revitalized Al-Qaeda's jihadist ideology. Byman and Pollack (2008) argue that the jihadist insurgents have learnt how to fight effectively thanks to the experience they have had in Iraq and their survival would deteriorate the regional security since they can easily travel around the Middle Eastern states. Dodge (2013) questions the future of Iraq by analyzing the US military and political policies in Iraq. Reconstruction of the political system ended up with authoritarian regime and remilitarization of Iraq to diminish the US's cost of war led to the rise of a state which becomes a "military machine" (Dodge, 2013: 257).

Even though putting the Sunni insurgent groups in the same box and naming them as Al-Qaeda in Iraq would be problematic, the literature is shaped around this term. On the other hand, this is helpful in a way in which Al-Qaeda's main objective in Iraq

becomes explicit despite its ideological and strategic distance from the Iraqi groups. To be able to identify the impact of 2003 US invasion of Iraq on terrorism, it is required to analyze the first years of the war which AQI existed as a resistant organization before the emergence of the IS.

The process, which has ended up with the emergence of ISIS, started in 1999 after the movement's initial leader, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, had been released from prison in Jordan (Lister, 2014: 6). After that, Zarqawi contacted Al-Qaida to establish a training camp which he will later recruit and train soldiers for his own jihadi organization, Jund al-Sham ("Tracking", 2014). The organization was renamed Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTWJ) after a few months. Even in this period, Zarkawi main targets were Jordan, international community and the Shiites (Lister, 2014: 6). US's invasion of Iraq created a great chance to accelerate a sectarian conflict, which would have increased the number of Sunni tribes supporting Zarqawi. Zarkawi network helped flourishing of the organization through transnational support of jihadist militant and he finally pledged his allegiance to Al-Qaida in 2004 after becoming the central Sunni organization combating Shia and foreign powers in Iraq. The organization was renamed as Tanzim Qa'idat Al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (Lister, 2014: 8). Due to the organizations's affiliation with Al-Qaeda, it was also known as Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI). In 2006, "AQI announced its merger with five other groups (Jaysh al-Ta'ifa al-Mansura, Saraya 'Ansar al-Tawhid, Saraya al-Jihad al-Islami, Saraya al- Ghuraba, and Kataib al-Ahwal) to form Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen (MSM), a coalition whose aim was to unite and better coordinate Iraq's jihadist insurgency" (Lister, 2014: 8) and to eliminate Jaish al-Mahdi, Sadr's organization (Hashim, 2009). The Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) emerged just four months after this coalition but under a new leader, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi because

Zarkawi was killed in a US military operation in 2006 (Lister, 2014: 8). After this period, ISI experienced remarkable recession since Sahwa (Awakening) movement, which was backed by the US and local security forces, fought ISI and proved great success. Sons of Iraq, the military branch of Sahwa, recruited more than 100,000 soldiers from the tribes which were dissident of Sunni and Shiite violent organizations to counter the ISI (Katzman, 2008). Although ISI conducted effective operation against Sahwa and killed its leader, many foreign fighters left Iraq and the sectarian war was partially settled, which had been strengthening ISI's position (Kahl, 2010). However, the most important step in the emergence of ISIS was taken when US troops were withdrawn from Iraq in 2009 and eventually 2011. The only counterinsurgent group, Sahwa, lost its support from US and weakened. The turmoil that was left as the US's inheritance to the region helped ISI to restructure the organization (Lister, 2014: 10). In 2010, ISI started to recruit Sahwa's members since there were problems between the movement and the Iraqi government. The salaries were late and many Sahwa members serving as soldier were now unemployed due to the government's policies (Williams & Adnan, 2010). The last factor that caused the emergence of the ISIS was the domino effect of Arab Spring. Syrian civil war allowed ISI to spread out and expand through Syrian territory. Zarkawi's ISIS project was too close to achieve due to the political vacuum in the region. The leader, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was alleged member of Quraysh tribe, which traditionally produces the Islamic caliphs. After he died, another alleged member of the tribe, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, took the lead (Fishman, 2011). A caliphate from Quraysh tribe, to which the Prophet belonged, was a great chance to claim legitimacy. In 2012, ISI targeted the prisons to free its members in the name of operation 'Breaking the Walls' and then the organization merged the Syrian and Iraqi territory in the name of

operation 'Breaking the Borders' and 'End of Sykes-Picot' by destroying the land border between the two states (Leites, 2014: 11-14). Recently, ISIS has been endeavoring to prove its statehood status by ruling the territory that has been occupied.

The literature on the ISIS in the Middle East is yet to be developed. The sources contain the news, columns, and researches by think-tanks and the official magazines of the IS. A limited number of academic papers have been written based on these sources (Ingram, 2014; Karakoç, 2014). In addition, the organization has various names in the sources/studies such as the Islamic State (IS), the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (Karakoç, 2014; Katagiri, 2015; Turner, 2015). In the thesis, the organization is referred as it calls itself, the IS.

The literature mainly focuses on the conditions that led to the emergence of the IS and the IS's ideological differences from Al-Qaeda. Karakoç (2014) argues the failing US policies and their impact on flourishing terrorism in Iraq and Syria. The US-led invasion of Iraq and the post-war policies to establish order in the region have indirectly influenced the Sunni insurgency against the coalition (Dodge, 2006; Gee, 2006; Karakoç, 2014). As a result, the Islamic militancy, that was supposed to be weakened through the invasion, has increased. Munson (2006: 235) acquires the same conclusion and posits that "instead of draining the swamp [Islamic militancy], the US-led occupation of Iraq flooded it".

The studies in the literature also underline the divergent ideologies and strategies between Al-Qaeda and the IS. Fishman (2008) argues that the IS differs from Al-Qaeda in the way in which it attacks Muslim civilians, claims statehood and fights other insurgent groups in Iraq. Turner (2015) elaborates on the strategic divergence

between two groups and points out IS's beheadings and attacks on Shiite civilians and mosques which have contributed to sectarian conflict negatively as opposed to Al-Qaeda's strategy.

The IS differs from Al-Qaeda in the sense that it benefits from the information technologies as well. Ingram (2014) discusses the IS's ability to use the technology as main traits of the organization. It frames its activities through videos, magazines and social media which raises its popularity among the other jihadist groups and local audiences (Ingram, 2014). In addition, social media is a psychological way of fighting for the IS since the IS fighters benefit from technology as a vehicle to announce their success against the enemy (Klausen, 2014).

Katagiri (2015) studies the IS as a security problem and claims that the impact of the organization will be long-lasting, however it enjoys self-destruction actions and is threatened by joint military operations including the US and its collaborators. These two reasons are sufficient to be optimistic about the fall of the IS.

By claiming statehood, the IS demonstrates its basic nuance from other jihadist organizations. The region of the alleged state, the law applied within the state, sociological structure, the state's legitimacy in society's eyes and the organizational structure are worth studying. However, being an alleged two-year old state is the main limitation for a wide literature. That is why very few studies are highlighted in this part. The studies in this part are significant in terms of observing the transformation of Al-Qaeda's ideology and emergence of a new phenomenon, an allegedly jihadist state.

4.3. Analytical Conclusion

If I pick some common phrases from the academic studies discussed above, these might be ‘fragmented territory’, ‘fragile governments’, ‘violent organizations’, ‘sectarian conflicts’, ‘displaced people’, ‘retrogressive economy’ and nearly a million ‘deaths’ and so on. If I go back to my question on which the thesis is structures: How did the invasion contribute to the rise of terrorism in Iraq? As discussed in the second chapter, each aforementioned phrase can constitute an indicator for terrorism studies, namely structural, psychological and rational approaches. I focus on two indicators: political exclusion and humiliation. Political exclusion is clearly indicated in the second section of this chapter. Humiliation refers to the invasion’s damage on societal and personal code of honor of Iraqis. Although the chapter does not highlight elaborate literature on the practices of the US in Iraq, I aim to reveal these practices in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

THE IMPACT OF THE INVASION ON RISING TERRORISM

There has been thirteen years since the US has launched a war against international terrorism due to the Twin Tower Attack. This catastrophic event counts as the bloodiest terrorist attack against a Western state and caused approximately 3000 deaths. Post-attack decisions of the US authorities, however, proved a Turkish proverb: He who gets up in anger, sits down with a loss. The US-led coalition invaded Iraq to topple Saddam regime and so-called liberate Iraqi people. Whether this did happen is up to the audience.

The literature flourished accordingly in the last decade. So much has been written on the War on Terror and the invasion of Iraq. The crucial question in the literature is generally whether the US has achieved what it intended at the beginning, eradicating terrorism. The scholars ruminated on the consequences of the War and commonly reached the same result: The US failed to demolish terrorism.

Leaving the political ambition of the US aside, the invasion did not alleviate Iraqis troubles. Millions of refugees, asylum seekers and displaced people, thousands of civilian deaths, wrecked cities and economy and tough life conditions are the legacy of the invasion. More importantly, there is an ongoing conflict between the government and violent organizations in Iraq. This section aims to highlight the

accelerating terrorism and the role of invasion playing on terrorism depending on the US policies which led to political exclusion of the privileged groups and the society's hatred of the occupying forces.

5.1. Whither Terrorism?

While daily reshaped political borders of Iraq and Syria are circulating in reports, academic articles, columns etc., the future of these states are still opaque. Currently, many violent organizations such as the ISIS, Democratic Union Party (PYD), Al-Nusra and Badr Organization, which are designated as terrorist organizations by various states, are fighting each other as well as the central governments in Syria and Iraq. As this struggle continues to take place in the region, we got used to watch beheading videos and suicide attacks in public areas not only in Syria and Iraq but also in the neighbor states. In addition, the indirect reflection of the regional dynamics is projected onto our mind through the corpses of babies lying on a beach in the western Turkey. The tragedy of millions of refugees is just what the regional conflicts left behind.

The regional picture is getting more complicated as international actors are more involved and favor one violent organization against another as part of their counter-terrorism strategy. Which one is chosen, though, depends also on the interest calculation of the actors. So, identifying terrorists becomes more difficult. Under these circumstances, it becomes difficult to foresee the consequences of the conflicts.

What has happened in the last decade that Iraq ended up with the current dynamics?

The social incidents contain plenty of substances that each of them would have butterfly effect on the result. The September 11 attack, US-led invasion of Iraq,

terrorist attacks in European capitals, Arab Spring, and its domino effects and global financial crises would all contribute to the overall picture of the puzzle.

In this thesis, the role of US-led invasion of Iraq on rising terrorism is scrutinized. As the research question suggests, it should be departed from the very beginning: Has terrorism increased after the invasion of Iraq? START Global Terrorism Database embodies this question through the number of terrorist incidents in Iraq. Figure 1 illustrates the number of incidents between 1970-2013. As understood from the graph line, 2002 is the first break point. The total number rises particularly after 2010 until 2013.




Figure 1. The Number of Terrorist Incidents in Iraq between 1970-2013

What counts as a terrorist incident constitutes a significant place in interpreting post-2002 period. START elucidates the methodology followed to gather this data. Any incident should fulfill three criteria to be involved in the index. Firstly, the act must pursue a political, economic, social or religious aim. Secondly, the attack must aim at

delivering a greater message. Lastly, the action must infringe the international humanitarian law (START, 2013). START does not include the type of the actor in these criteria. However, the definition offered by START restricts perpetrators only to non-state actors. Thus, a question comes up: Can there be any state which murders civilians in pursuit of a political goal? This question exceeds the limit of the section and the thesis. Yet, it is worth noting that in case the number of fatalities or injuries due to a state action in Iraq is added to the incident statistics instead of considered simply as casualties, the graph line would be vertically located.

Even if I embrace the current definition and statistics gathered by START as they are, I can still argue that 2003 is a turning point for rising terrorism. Therefore, there is a positive correlation between the invasion and the number of incidents in Iraq. If I go back to the research question, then I can ask whether the invasion had impact on this trend.

The literature on terrorism indirectly explains this trend. Hafez (2006) lists five developments that trigger the Sunnis in Iraq to take action. Amongst these developments are dismissing the Iraqi army without pension, disbanding the Baathists from the state institutions and the collapse of patronage system structured on the local tribes. Atran (2011) conducted interviews with the detainees in Saudi Arabia who intended to join Iraqi insurgent groups and found that all the participants underlined the mistreatments in Abu Ghraib prison such as torture, rape and murder.

The first few years of the US invasion made considerable mistakes in re-establishing Iraq. In the next sections, I discuss the impact of two of these mistakes, excluding certain parties from the political process and committing violence against the dissidents.

5.2. Is Revenge-seeking What People Make of It?

A few illustrations from Iraq war would help us discuss the role of humiliation and revenge-seeking in terrorism studies. After the invasion, the Coalition Forces took control of some prisons to incarcerate criminals and rebels. Abu Ghraib was one of those and probably the most famous one especially after the ill-treatments against the prisoners were leaked to the press. The use of brutal torture proved to be one of the most benign treatments when compared to the humiliating scenes in the leaked photos. In one of the photos, about five or six hooded prisoners appeared to be lying naked on the floor on one another and two laughing soldiers, a man standing and a woman lying on the bodies, posed for a photograph. Another photo shows that a standing naked Iraqi was cornered by three soldiers, two of whom handing a dog. In the following photo, the same guy bled but the reason remains unknown.

The human dignity of prisoners was violated not just because of the torture but due to degrading manner in which prisoners were kept. In one of the photos, a woman soldier held a rope tying a prisoner's neck like a leash. The other picture, however, was much more humiliating. Two hooded and naked prisoners were forced to have, seemingly, oral sex while two other prisoners, one hiding his genitalia and the other holding his hands on his head, stood in the background (ANTIWAR, 2006).

More photos can be easily found on the Internet. After the photos were leaked, some of the soldiers in the photos were found guilty and were sentenced in court.

However, the penalties did not mollify the psychological damages of mistreatments and the salience of the photos in the media. Particularly two details related with the customs of Iraqi society should be considered when viewing these photos to comprehend the level of psychological harm. Firstly, the incidents happen in a

society which shaking woman's hand might be seen as a shameful act and which woman is relatively more in the background in the social life. On the other hand, the photos clearly present how the prisoners were humiliated by women soldiers.

Secondly, no matter the person watching you is man or woman, being naked in public is so disgraceful. All the photos, however, reveal the prisoners naked. These nuances influence the consequences of the incidents on the victims by violating Iraqis' customs as well as the human dignity.

The reason to begin with a narration of the photos is not to further dramatize the situation. The field suggest that such photos were a daily reality of Iraq following the invasion. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) published monthly Human Rights Reports highlighting the mistreatment of the Iraqi police and Multi-National Forces (MNF). Mass detentions, extreme use of violence against detainees, abuse and death due to torture were reported to the UNAMI centers in Iraq (Human Rights Reports, 2005/July-August). A US soldier was accused of raping 14-year girl before murdering her and her family (Human Rights Reports, 2006/November-December). In another report, four US soldiers were charged with rape and murder of a woman, her mother, father, and her 5-year-old brother (Human Rights Reports, 2006/June-August). September-October Report of 2006 cited Lancet's study on mortality rates in Iraq. The study was conducted based on 12,801 interviews and estimated that more than 600,000 people died due to violence since 2003 (Human Rights Reports, 2006/September-October). The reports also demonstrated that the MNF military operations caused death or injury of non-combatants particularly children. Therefore, even though Lancet's study included the victims of violent organizations, the number of people who lost their lives due to the US operations cannot be ignored.

A recent study, based on 2032 interviews with alleged terrorists under custody, puts that 30% of the foreign fighters in Afghanistan, Iraq and Guantanamo Bay joined Al-Qaida to seek revenge (Global Terrorism Index, 2015: 73). The study also posits that the most common motivation with 40% is identity-seeking among the interviewees. It should be noted that considerable amount of people from the EU, US or Canada join the violent organizations in order to be with their 'Muslim brothers' in their fight against the US. Hence, it would be considered as identity seeking while it contains some elements of revenge-seeking. Parallel with this study, the internationalization of terrorism deserves mention. The ideological togetherness destroys the functions of political borders. The flow of foreign fighters to Iraq is indicative for how Iraq turned out to be a front. After Israel's operations to Gaza, Sadr called upon the Iraqis to conduct revenge attacks against the US which was considered as the collaborator of Israel (CBSNEWS, 2009). Hence, Iraq became the field to fight the enemy thanks to the enemy's accessibility.

How can we relate these incidents with terrorism studies? Consider a child who was 5 or 6 in the beginning of the invasion and who witnessed his/her parents killed by a soldier. Or think about a man whose wife was raped and children were tortured and killed. How would these traumatic events affect the victim in a country with no safe and stable life? The conditions in the country also shape the preferences in that case. There are violent organizations which can help these victims hurt the transgressor who killed their relatives. The enemy is so close and weapons are found easily. So, all the conditions are now suitable to hurt the one who hurt you. Even, it goes beyond this in some cases. Any person, who can attach himself/herself to the victim emotionally due to cultural, social or religious bonds, might seek revenge against the

perpetrator which will be discussed later. Can this motivate a person to be part of a violent organization to take revenge?

The literature on terrorism studies lacks any large-N qualitative analysis of the role of revenge-seeking. However, psychologists study human nature and suggest that basic instincts often lead people to react against someone who previously harmed them. The type of message delivered constitutes a significant place for the victim. “Victims seek to deliver a message to the offender, and the message has the general form of ‘You will be punished for what you did before’” (Gollwitzer, Meder & Schmitt, 2011: 365). So, whether the offender gets a penalty does not satisfy the victim. From the victim’s perspective, the offender should know that the victim penalized the offender, which is called ‘understanding hypothesis’ in the literature. In an experiment conducted by Denzler, Förster and Liberman (2009), aggressive acts that do not meet the victim’s goal rather increase the level of aggression. Gollwitzer and Denzler (2009) describe revenge that fulfill the aim as ‘sweet’. These theoretical explanations materialize in the IS discourse. Here is a few quotations from the IS spokesman, al-Adnani (THESTAR, 2014).

...Islamic State did not initiate a war against you, as your governments and media try to make you believe. It is you who started the transgression against us, and thus you deserve blame and you will pay a great price. You will pay the price when your economies collapse. You will pay the price when your sons are sent to wage war against us, and they return to you as disabled amputees, or inside coffins, or mentally ill. You will pay the price as you are afraid of travelling to any land. Rather you will pay the price as you walk on your streets, turning right and left, fearing the Muslims. You will not feel secure even in your bedrooms. You will pay the price when this crusade of yours collapses, and thereafter we will strike you in your homeland, and you will never be able to harm anyone afterwards. You will pay the price, and we have prepared for you what will pain you...

The reason that the US deserved this price is indicated as the US’s alleged transgression against the IS. Whether it succeeds or not, al-Adnani threatens all

elements of a state with obliterating her soldiers, economy, society until the state losses her ability to 'harm anyone'. In decapitation video of journalist Steven Sotloff, the perpetrator addressed the US president Barrack Obama (NYDAILYNEWS, 2014):

I'm back, Obama, and I'm back because of your arrogant foreign policy toward us, because of your insistence in continuing your bombings in Muhassan, Albuomar and the Mosul Dam despite our serious warnings. You, Obama, have yet to gain for your actions through yet another American Citizen for just as your missiles continue to strike our people, our knife will continue to strike the necks of your people. We take this opportunity to warn those governments that have entered this evil alliance of America against us to back off and leave our people alone.

As in the al-Adnani speech, the violent actions of the IS against the American citizen are associated with the US foreign policy. The perpetrator, indeed, projects his motivation: 'An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.' It is worth noting that the IS soldiers can exterminate the western hostages without exposing the beheading scenes. However, they let the victim identify himself and why he will be killed. As indicated above, the IS intends to deliver its basic message: What we are doing is in return for what you did.

In another scene, the victim, James Wright Foley, stated, before the IS soldier murdered him, that (Allen & Sherwell, 2014):

I call on my friends, family, and loved ones to rise up against my real killers, the US government ... For what will happen to me is only a result of their complacency and criminality...I wish I could have the hope of freedom and seeing my family once again. But that ship has sailed. I guess all in all I wish I wasn't American.

Whether this was a prepared statement does not matter. If so, the IS sought to indicate that the guy was killed due to the US policies. If not, the IS managed to convey its methodology. Undoubtedly, this methodology created extensive fear particularly due to a lack of symmetry. First of all, the US air bombings kill many

civilians. Yet, the IS's presentation of murdering looks much more brutal and influence people's perspective. Secondly, the US is an internationally recognized sovereign state while the IS has been designated as a terrorist organization by many governments.

Beyond the IS's discourse against the occupation forces, the emphasis must be put on the impact of the discourse on the victim of wars or the individuals who attach themselves to the victims emotionally, ideologically or religiously. For the victims, the IS might be means to an end which is to harm the one who harmed you. For the so-called Jihadists having involved in the conflicts in the other war regions such as Afghanistan or Chechenia, the ideological or religious attachment with the sufferer of Iraq and the possibility of fighting the enemy without a great effort except travelling to Iraq play a triggering role. The interviews with these fighters put that revenge is an important motivation for the foreign fighters in return for the US's policies in Iraq (Global Terrorism Index, 2015).

Revenge-seeking discourse or attacks did not pertain to only an ethnic or sectarian group in Iraq. Muqtada Al-Sadr, who is the most influential Shiite cleric in Iraq, called his armed force, Mahdi Army, on several occasions to target Sunnis and the Coalition Forces. Badr Brigades is another Shiite government-backed violent group operating illegal attacks against Sunnis. Amnesty International (AI, 2014) puts that the violent Shiite groups kill Sunni civilians against the IS's expansion as a retaliation and the government official who was interviewed in the AI's study labeled these illegitimate actions as 'blind revenge.' Thus, the invasion not only provoked the violent groups against the Coalition Forces, but it also paved the way for ethnic and sectarian struggle as a result of the political vacuum that led the constellations to

seize the power. Dhia al-Duleimi, who was thought to be detained by the Badr Brigades, was found in a secret jail. His relatives' statements proved the tension between sectarian groups constructed on retaliatory measures. His brother expressed that (Hussein & Freeman, 2005):

We admit my brother was a member of the mujahideen, and I am proud of that [...] But to torture him in that way with hot water, just because he fights against the government - what is that?... They said Saddam Hussein is a bad man, but what is the difference between him and these people? ...All my cousins and all my relatives will fight the Badr Brigade now, I tell you - before we fight the occupation.

What does this statement tell us about the psychology of the speaker? First of all, he appreciates his brother's struggle against the government and does not approve the torture as a retribution by ignoring the fact that his brother's fight against the government might be illegal. Secondly, he criticizes the torturers by quoting their claim about Saddam. However, the way he criticizes indicates that he approves this opinion. The last but not the least, the mistreatment places the Badr Brigade to the primary target instead of the occupation. So, the statement holds the traces of revenge in the background.

This brings us to the beginning of this section: Can this motivate a person to be part of a violent organization to take revenge? Fiske, Harris and Cuddy (2004) argue that the soldiers in Abu Ghraib prison were exposed to all conditions leading aggression. They identify these conditions as being at war, targeted by Iraqis and dying comrades each day. If the authority holding the power in Iraq gets stressed enough to aggress, then how would the Iraqis register the pain? As indicated in the UNAMI Human Rights Reports, the Iraqis experienced great traumas in the last decade. Although I go through more general discussion, there are plenty of books revealing individual dramatic stories. In a state of nature of Hobbes which is Iraq in this case, individuals

might choose to take vengeance if a chance is given. Violent organizations would fulfill this gap by grabbing the individuals who are thirsty to revenge.

The invasion created a black hole that violence-prone ethnic and religious groups of Saddam era transformed to brutal organizations after 2003. The wide spectrum of these organizations increased the probability of attendance since they addressed various sects, religions and ethnicity that individuals can appeal to. The significant aspect of joining violent organizations to take revenge is the difficulty of counter-terrorism. Volkan (2002) argues that traumas can transmit to next generations and large-group violence may be consequence of this transmission. So, the war traumas might affect a few generations that grow up with hatred and might lead the descendants to violence whose buttress is the former grief.

Consequently, indeed revenge is not what people make of it but there should be a triggering incident for the revenge-seeker which is traumatic past experiences and fighters' zeal to be with their 'brothers and sisters' in this case. The US-led invasion provided a backdrop for both reasons. Causing mental or psychical impairment pushed the individuals toward the violent organizations. The political vacuum ended up with ethnic and sectarian struggle that the Iraqis were indirectly forced to take side against the enemy to survive. Moreover, the Coalition Forces removed their inaccessibility for most of the fighters in the region by coming to Iraq. The Iraq War allowed many sleeper cells in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan to fight the enemy in the homeland. The circulation of the torture, rape and murder in the international media accelerated the process of the fighters' involvement in the insurgency. Therefore, terrorism increased and revenge-seeking played a role in this increase.

5.3. Stay but Obey!

The long period of Saddam brutality ended in 2003 when the US-led forces invaded Iraq. In 20 years of Saddam ruling, the state went war with Iran and Kuwait. The ethnic and sectarian fault lines intensified due to the regime policies. Kurds and Shiites felt marginalized. Some part of the Sunni minority was kept out of the system although the Sunnis were in general favored. Despite the oil revenues, Saddam's policies ruined the economy and welfare.

Under these conditions, the invasion was welcomed by many Iraqis. The idea was that the US was present to unseat Saddam and set up democracy that all parties can engage in state affairs. This might have been the US's motivation at the beginning. Yet, the results proved the opposite. "In the years before the invasion the civilians in charge at the Pentagon had developed a long and close association with one of the key exiled opposition parties, the Iraqi National Congress (INC)" (Dodge, 2005: 711). The exile parties had left Iraq long before the invasion and their information on Iraq was outdated. Moreover, their position in the war against Iran and Kuwait curtailed Iraqis' trust in them because they were aided by the other states in return for domestic intelligence and unrest against the government.

The US formed Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to rule Iraq. Under the CPA, Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was established to run the state institutions. The members of IGC were selected by Paul Bremer, the head of CPA, and were claimed to be the most representative council of Iraqi society (Dodge, 2006). A council of 25 people mathematically proved to be representative of Iraqi ethnic and sectarian division. However, Tripp (2007: 551) argues that "[...] the IGC, ostensibly composed according to the confessional and ethnic proportions of the Iraqi

population as a whole, but in fact made up of individuals who are seen as compliant with the US project in Iraq [...]" The exiled parties, INC and Iraqi National Accord (INA) played a significant role in transformation of the state and government. In 2004, the Iraqi Interim Government was formed with the domination of these parties. The leader of INA became the head of government. The vice presidents were chosen from Al-Dawa Party and KDP, previously armed dissident groups against Saddam regime.

The US failed to establish a ground to bring all parts of the society together. By 2003, 60% of Iraqis expressed their support for CPA while this proportion decreased to 10% in 2004 (Robinson, 2007: 270). Whether the US's aim was being a mediator amongst all the groups is open to discussion. Even if so, the Iraqis lost their confidence in a very short period of time.

It would be a mistake to claim that the US favored any sect or ethnicity. The process indicates that Iraqis were divided into two from the perspective of Americans: The one who supports the US's presence in Iraq and the one who does not.

For the elections of Transitional National Assembly (TNA) in 2005, Iraq was taken as a national single constituency. In addition to the exclusion of some parties from the political process in the last two years, this decision led to great disappointment particularly amongst the minorities because their representatives would not have a voice in such a system. The minorities' objection to this decision was ignored and they boycotted the elections. For this reason, the voter turmoil was very low in the provinces that these minorities were populated (Papagianni, 2007). So, the assembly was constituted lacking the minorities and this automatically left these parties out in the process of constitution-writing.

In addition to acute faults in reformation of Iraqi politics, the US failed to surmount the military and bureaucratic problems. De-baathification of the state precipitated about 30,000 unemployed bureaucrats, soldiers and politicians (Katzman, 2009: 9). The soldiers did not surrender their weapons since they were not asked to leave them (Barakat, 2005). Such a big number of people became unpaid and dishonored in the society due to their affiliation with the Baath Party. The employers did not hire them due to their background. In the long-run, the US also was affected negatively since the bureaucracy lost the experienced civil servants and the new authority could not substitute their position due to lack of qualified human resource. The insufficient number of soldiers and corps created a security problem in the country while many violent organizations were actively fighting the MNF and Iraqi army. Considerable amount of casualties led the US to utilize paramilitary groups gathered from the obedient tribes. “Sons of Iraq” was launched to fight the violent Sunni and Shiite organizations. Composing of more than 100,000 whose 80% are Sunnis, “Sons of Iraq” were unpaid and unapproved by the Shiite government (Katzman, 2009: 24). The tension between the US authority and the government ended up with paying small portion of “Sons of Iraq”. The remaining unpaid soldiers ceased fighting with the US and joined other groups. Consequently, the US made a great number of mistakes in reforming Iraqi politics, bureaucracy and military. The question then appears to be: Did these mistakes contribute to the rise of terrorism in Iraq? If so, how?

The role of political exclusion on radicalism and terrorism is discussed in the literature from different perspectives. Willis (2006), for instance, indicates the UK as an example to inclusion of middle class, working class and woman into the system and discusses how these classes dominated the British system after 1980s. Dalacoura

(2006) emphasizes the need to include the Islamist opposition parties in the political system of the Middle Eastern countries if they admit acting in democratic framework. On the other hand, Weinberg (1991) finds no relationship between political exclusion and terrorism.

The studies, in general, shed light on the inclusion of opposition groups for democratization to occur in the given country. In this respect, Iraq is a unique case because the invasion overthrew a leader who survived many military coups and set up a system of loyalty based on fear. His methodology terrorized the society in the way in which no one would dare challenge his position. This led to sort of oxymoron stability within Iraq. However, the US chose to rebuild the state based on faulty consultation instead of reforming the institutions. The absence of a leader of 24-year dictatorship whetted all previously excluded groups' appetite as well as the former dominant parties which did not want to lose their privilege. So, the US had to maintain Saddam's era stability to be able to deal with these demands. She rather decided to surrender Iraq to Western-minded exiled parties. A country which invaded another country in the name of democracy favored a constellation, a policy which is totally against the democratic principles. This increased the dissident voices and demands on withdrawal of the US. I should note that these demands were of the Iraqis who welcomed the invasion at first. They, then, requested the US to leave Iraq and let Iraqis plot a route for Iraq. This did not happen and as discussed above, the US continued to kick disloyal ex-Baathists, soldiers, politicians, bureaucrats, and corps out.

I do not argue that the violent organizations rose to the surface since they were excluded from the political process nor do I claim that the US-led invasion is direct

cause of terrorism in Iraq. I seek to underline the impact of political exclusion on the recruitment process of the violent organizations.

In the first year of the invasion, the former Baathists, unpaid soldiers and corps who did not surrender their weaponry fell in a vacuum. Their experience and zeal to regain their privilege made them qualified candidates for the violent groups. Some of the high ranking soldiers in the IS's army are ex-Baathists. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, who was the successor of Zarqawi and the first leader of the IS, had been an Iraqi army officer. In addition to the leader, Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, who was the leader of operations in Iraq, and Haji Bakr, who had served the Baathist intelligence, were the IS's leading figures (Malm & Hall, 2015). Abu Ali an-Anbari, and Abu Ayman Iraqi, who had been Baathists officers, also were mentors and commanders of the IS ("The Reality", n.d.).

The IS proved to be a long-lasting and challenging organization. Shortly after the invasion, some small-scale organizations were formed, as well. The ex-Baathists soldiers, intelligence officers and members of Special Republican Guards and Fida'iyyin Saddam, which had been a paramilitary organization only answerable to Saddam, founded an umbrella organization, called Al-Awda (The Return) (Hashim, 2009). This group conducted attacks on the MNF and became the first insurgent organization.

"Sons of Iraq" deserves to be called another failed legacy of the US. Arming Sunni tribes against the Sunni insurgents, the US sought to provide stability and security through the capability of the clans. A small army with more than 100,000 soldiers fought with the MNF against the insurgent groups. The number of soldiers and their affiliation with the local tribes appeared a positive step in stabilizing Iraq as

Wilbanks and Karsh (2010) also asserts. However, the drawback of this policy occurred when the members of this army demanded official position in the Iraqi army. Sunni tribes' demand was refused by the Shiite Maliki government based on the fear that Sunnis would seize the Iraqi army which might threaten the government. The negotiations between the US authorities and the Iraqi government ended up with the decision of paying nearly half of the "Sons of Iraq" army monthly. The remaining groups were disappointed for this decision. Many of them ceased fighting for the US and joined other insurgent groups against the MNF.

In conclusion, the US favored some part of the society in the formation of new Iraq. So, the problem with the Saddam era was maintained by the US as well with a nuance which is that Saddam had managed to establish a stable system based on clientelism but the US screwed it up. The aggregate mistakes did not create terrorism but allowed the violent organizations to play their trump by recruiting plenty of offended individuals.

I discussed the role of revenge-seeking and political exclusion on rising terrorism through the US's policies. Revenge-seeking approach provides a bottom-up insight in the sense that the society per se was influenced and it reacted accordingly. On the other hand, the political exclusion tenders a top-down perspective in comprehending the terrorism in Iraq. The privileged groups of Saddam era were targeted by the US and this fed the violent organizations. All in all, the US contributed to the accelerating terrorism in Iraq due to her miscalculated policies.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The thesis sought to embody the impact of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 by highlighting two causes of terrorism, namely revenge-seeking and political exclusion. I tried to corroborate the role of these variables qualitatively. I found that people who were excluded from the political process or any cycle of state affairs were likely to join the violent organizations particularly if they had held the power in the Saddam era. I also found that the psychological traumas such as murder, rape and torture affected people's decision making and when a chance was given by a violent organization to take revenge against the perpetrator, people were more likely to be part of these organizations. The thesis is far away from asserting cause-effect relationship between rising terrorism and the invasion nor does it claim that revenge-seeking and political exclusion are the solitary causes of terrorism in Iraq. The thesis makes a contribution to the literature of terrorism and foreign interventions.

The literature on terrorism and radicalization offers many definitions. The contextual description of the terms plays a significant role in these variations. Despite this diversification, two common points draw attention in most of the definitions. Firstly, the actors or perpetrators are limited to non-state groups. Secondly, the action should have a political aim. These two qualifications generally find a place in the definitions of terrorism. However, there are also unorthodox perspectives underlying state

actions in the definitions. In this thesis, I formulated a bit different point of view of terrorism by defining the term as the action that intimidates innocent people by any means and creates prejudicial fear on non-target population. The definition is exclusionary in the sense that it goes beyond the political aim of the action. It is also inclusionary in the sense that the states and individuals can be included in the definition.

What causes terrorism, by nature, engenders even much more diverse answers than the variation in definition of terrorism. The causes are highlighted through a classification by placing the variables under three subtitles, namely structural, psychological and rational approaches. The structural variables refer to the conditions that the individuals would not have any impact on them. The type of political system, geographical factors, economic determinants and societal dynamics are scrutinized under the structural causes of terrorism. These indicators are studied both qualitatively and quantitatively. Yet, the results commonly differ from each other. Particularly, whether poverty causes terrorism occupies a significant place in the literature and the topic is far away from an academic consensus which pushes the literature flourish accordingly. The psychological explanations for the causes of terrorism underline individuals' cognitive processes which lead them to violence. Desire for excitement, peer pressure, group dynamics, seeking for revenge, humiliation are some psychological factors studied as the variables influencing individuals' decision-making process. The field is occupied by the medical doctors and psychiatrists. Their experimental studies contribute to the development of psychological explanation of terrorism. However, the field lacks large-N quantitative studies. The researchers generally conduct their experiments on a small group of people. The advantage of these studies is that each individual is subject to an analysis

and this gives better insight in terms of understanding the reason that why the individual acts violently. Lastly, the rational approach to the causes of terrorism investigates the individuals' preferences in their decisions. Therefore, individuals calculate their costs and benefits, and this paves the way for violence. The type of cost or benefit is up to the person and this might be money or sometimes suicide-bombing which would benefit the group more.

Beyond these three approaches, there is group of academics criticizing the orthodox studies for being biased or applying defective methods. Although the proponents of critical approach bring a new focal point to terrorism studies, they do not abstain from using the same lexicon. All in all, the literature provides a wide umbrella to explain terrorism and the factors behind it. It would be a mistake to prioritize or ignore any causality. The reason behind any violent action changes across time and space. Insisting for one definite causality would also harm the counter-terrorism strategies. In this thesis, Iraq was studied as a case through a structural and psychological explanation after 2003 US-led invasion.

Iraq is historically a unique country. Until the invasion, the government was always dominated by the Sunnis even though the majority is Shia. In the last 50 years, the state experienced many great wars but Iraq had been more developed country compared with the other Middle Eastern countries. The oil revenues provided prosperity that improved the economy, health and education. Despite the domestic progress, the society faced a brutal government and destructive wars after 1979. So, Iraqis lived in wealth that always harmed them. Just after Saddam seized the power, he attacked Iran and this war lasted eight years causing Iraq to melt the budget. The war debts pushed Saddam to invade Kuwait. As one of the biggest oil exporters,

Kuwait drew the world attention and Iraq was bombed by the international coalition in addition to heavy embargo after the war. The war sanctions deteriorated the life conditions in Iraq after 1991. The September 11 opened a new phase for Iraqis. The ruler changed but the conditions remained same and even got worse. The US, alongside with the allies, invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam to free Iraqi people. Yet, the time proved the opposite. The last decade of Iraq witnessed statistically more murder, displacement, terrorism, kidnapping and rape. The people who were supposed to be free missed the Saddam's era due to the instability in Iraq. This situation also led to the rise of terrorism. In this thesis, I focused on the nexus between the US's policies and increasing violence. Although I did not make a causal connection between the policies and rising terrorism, I argued that the policies contributed to this process by scrutinizing one structural, political exclusion, and one psychological reason, revenge-seeking.

The thesis lacks the field research. The main limitation for the field research is Iraq's current situation. So, the thesis went through the existing studies in the literature. In further research, the psychological reasons of terrorism in Iraq would be revealed through face-to-face interviews/surveys with Iraqis. In addition, profiling the violent organizations in more detail requires presence in the organization or at least contacting the detainees/prisoners. This would also contribute to the argument about the impact of political exclusion.

Despite its limitations preventing it from being a more comprehensive study, the thesis illustrates that the US-led invasion of Iraq accelerated the rise of terrorism by excluding the majority from the state cadres and committing fouls which led some Iraqis to take vengeance on these fouls. In addition to the thesis's contribution to

terrorism studies, it also aimed to indicate a path way for social and political policies that should be implemented following any invasion by identifying the US's mistakes. It is very clear that any invasion that does not win the hearts and minds of the invaded country's society is sentenced to failure. Misguided policies even stimulate the impact of this failure. Iraq is an illustrative case analysis for such a failure. Upon the Iraqi case, a few points can be raised to be a lesson for future interventions. Any intervention, first of all, should meet one basic criteria: winning the hearts for legitimacy. Even though this is a required element, it is not sufficient for the rest. The policies implemented by the interventionist country should convince the society that the policies seek people's good especially for the policies building the politics of the invaded country. The political process ought to be inclusionary for any part of the society. Any ethnic, religious or political constellation should enjoy the right to have a say in the transition process. In the societal level, the policies must not be open to any exposure of 'framing.' Any kind of mistreatment would be sentenced to insurgency through dissident groups' framing of the issue. The transparency of the practices in prisons, detention centers, police patrols and or any interference in a societal issue is a required condition to impede the negative reactions. The Iraqi case taught us this lesson through the discussion in this thesis.

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