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ISTANBUL UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

MASTER THESIS

**THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN POLISH
FOREIGN POLICY MAKING DURING 2003 IRAQ
WAR**

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İSTANBUL – 2019



T.C.
İSTANBUL ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ



YÜKSEK LİSANS
TEZ ONAYI

ÖĞRENCİNİN;

Adı ve Soyadı : WERONIKA GWOZDZ Numarası : 2501170352
Anabilim Dalı / Anasanat Dalı / Programı : SİYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER Danışmanı : DOÇ. DR. ÖZGÜN ERLER BAYIR
Tez Savunma Tarihi : 20.06.2019 Saati : 13:00
Tez Başlığı : " THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN POLISH FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING DURING 2003 IRAG WAR "

TEZ SAVUNMA SINAVI, İÜ Lisansüstü Eğitim-Öğretim Yönetmeliği'nin 36. Maddesi uyarınca yapılmış, sorulan sorulara alınan cevaplar sonunda adayın tezinin KABULÜNE OYBİRLİĞİ / YOKLUĞUNA karar verilmiştir.

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ÖZET

2003 IRAK SAVAŞI SIRASINDA POLONYA KAMUOYUNUN ÜLKENİN DIŞ POLİTİKASININ BELİRLENMESİNDEKİ ROLÜ

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Tez, 2003 - 2008 yıllarındaki Irak savaşı sırasında Polonya'nın dış politika yapımında kamuoyunun rolünü incelemektedir. Mart 2003'te Polonya Hükümeti, ABD'nin Irak'ı işgalini askeri kuvvetler ile destekleme kararı aldı ve bu kararın geçerli ve doğru olup olmadığıyla alakalı olarak Polonya kamuoyunu ikna etmeye çalışmadı. Polonyalı seçmenlerin büyük çoğunluğu işgale katılıma karşı çıktı, ancak mevcut durum resmi hükümet kararını etkilemedi. Dolayısıyla, bu tezin amacı, dış politika karar alma sürecinde demokratik hükümetin kamuoyunu görmezden geldiği koşulları daha iyi anlamaktır. Tez, beş önemli koşulun, hükümetin kamuyu görmezden gelme isteğini arttırma gücünün olduğunu ve Irak müdahalesine katılma kararını etkilediğini ileri sürüyor. Söz konusu değişkenler şunlardır: uluslararası kazanım algısı, elitlerin oy birliği, durumun önemliliği, bir sonraki seçimlerin zamanı ve müdahalenin kriz durumu olarak ortaya konulması. Bu değişkenlerin hiçbiri Polonya hükümetinin kararını açıklamak için yeterli değildir, çünkü bu faktörler birbiriyle yakından ilgilidir. Ülkenin uluslararası arena üzerindeki etkisiyle ilgili Uluslararası kazanımlar artıyorsa, elitlerin fikir birliği oluşması daha olasıdır. Öte yandan, elitlerin fikir birliği, konu ile alakalı tartışmaların eksikliğine, bu durum da konunun olduğundan daha önemsiz gözükmesine neden olabilir. Seçimler yakın gelecekte olmadığı zamanda, kamuoyunu çok dikkate almadan karar vermek de daha olasıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Irak savaşı, kamuoyu, Polonya, dış politika

ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN POLISH FOREIGN POLICY MAKING DURING 2003 IRAQ WAR

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Thesis examines the role of public opinion in Polish foreign policy making during war in Iraq in years 2003 - 2008. In March 2003 Government of Poland made a decision to contribute military forces to the United States led invasion of Iraq and did not try to convince the public opinion about rightfulness of its decision. Majority of the Polish voters opposed national involvement in the invasion, however failed to influence official government decision in the present case. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to further understand the circumstances under which democratic government ignored the public opinion in its foreign policy decision making. Thesis argues that five conditions had power to increase willingness of ignoring the public by government and influenced decision of taking part in Iraqi intervention. Namely, these variables are: perceptions of international gains, elite consensus, issue salience, timing of the next elections and perceiving decision about intervention as a crisis situation. None of these variables alone is enough to explain decision of Polish government, because these factors are closely related with each other. If International gains relevant to influence of country on international arena are increasing, then elite consensus is more likely to occur. On the other hand, elite consensus and lack of debates and discussion may result with low issue salience. In situation, when elections are not in close future, then pursuing a divergent from public opinion policy is more likely to happen.

Key words: Iraq war, public opinion, Poland, foreign policy

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude and thanks to my supervisor Doç.Dr. Özgün ERLER BAYIR for her guidance, advice and insight throughout the research. I am very much grateful for the support and patience of my fiancé in this process. I am also thankful to my family, which have always believed in me and supported me.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANP: Annual National Programme

CBOS: Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej

LPR: Liga Polskich Rodzin

NACC: North Atlantic Cooperation Council

OBOP: Ośrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej

OIF: Operation Iraqi Freedom

PFP: Partnership for Peace

PiS: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość

PO: Liga Polskich Rodzin

PSL: Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe

PZPR: Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza

SLD: Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej

SRP: Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction

INTRODUCTION

Historical experiences and geopolitical location of Poland resulted with living in a fear of great power intervention and being abandoned by allies. As a result, issue of territorial defense and security guarantees are crucial for Poles. In 1989 after fall of communism next step of polish government was to apply for NATO. Becoming member of NATO on 12 March 1999 was undoubtedly big political success. Ultimately, together with European Union and bilateral cooperation with allies aims to build pillars of Poland's security. Poland believes, that if serious threat for its sovereignty would occur Alliance would react appropriately. After 9/11 attacks United States of America and European Union had divergent opinions concerning security policy. For the first time Poland found itself in situation when had to choose to side with European Union or US. As a result of perceiving America as main and most important ally and ultimate security guarantor political elite decided to take part in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), which lacked United Nations Security Council authorization. Poland got under much criticism, though was on its way to gain membership in European Union and should seek for support of France and Germany instead of being conflicted with them. Supporting United States was risky and called as most controversial foreign policy and security decision since the end of communism in 1989. Moreover, decision which was not proceeded with sufficient analyze of losses and gains to Polish domestic and foreign policy, neither convincing citizens about its righteousness. Sending Polish Contingent to Iraq never met with support from Polish public opinion. Oppositely, most of citizens was against of sending soldiers to war and stabilization of Iraq. During years 2003 – 2008 Poland's

participation in war and stabilization process was object of public disputes and plenty of public opinion polls. All polls results show, that public opinion was in vast majority against sending soldiers and their presence in Iraq. Public opinion is an inseparable element of democratic countries. Conditions and guarantees preserved by democracy are enabling public opinion to gain more power and influence decisions taken by politicians. Therefore, this case is ideal example to debate about role of public opinion in decision making process of democratic government of Poland. Under specific conditions role of public opinion significantly decreases, which is the hypothesis of my study. Main research question of thesis is: What was the place and role of Polish public opinion in decision making process to contribute military forces to Iraq? Secondary questions are: What are the main reasons behind the decision? Under which conditions democratic government tend to ignore public opinion in foreign policy making? Aim of thesis is to further understand conditions, which overweight while making foreign policy decision to stand with United States. Thesis includes assessments of the decision in the context of political elite and public opinion of Poland views.

Thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter: *'Foreign Policy Decision Making Mechanism and Security in Poland'* focuses on historical, geographical and geopolitical conditions as well as social and political order of Poland which is crucial for the way of perceiving the environment and understanding national interests of Poland. First chapter analyzes polish foreign policy and security strategy as well as decision making process after political breakthrough in 1989. In this chapter are presented important privileges and competences of President, Council of Ministers,

Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defence, Sejm and Senate and their role in creating and controlling foreign policy of Poland. Last subsections of first chapter focus on the Polish way to NATO and importance of NATO and United States for Poland. Second chapter: '*Poland's participation in the Iraqi mission*' analyzes Iraqi mission and includes detailed decision-making process of sending polish troops to Iraq as well as proceedings of the military intervention and stabilization mission in years 2003-2007. This chapter contains Polish public stance towards the mission and shows divergence between mass public opinion polls and stance of Polish government. Third chapter: '*Role of Public Opinion in Iraq Intervention*' starts with analyzing how public opinion can influence politicians' decisions in democratic countries. Last subsections focus on conditions under which governments tend to ignore public opinion in foreign policy making and which presence overweight while making decision to send polish contingent to Iraq.

Research was concluded on primary and secondary sources. Primary sources were documents: Constitution of Poland, NATO treaty, Official Journal and Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs National Security Strategy of Republic of Poland as well as data that come from surveys taken by Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS) and Public Opinion Research Institute (TNS OBOP) through years 2003-2007. Even though literature about Iraqi mission and its evaluation is comprehensive, lacks detail explanation of conditions under which public opinion had no influence on Government's decision. Thesis aims to enrich existing literature about importance of Iraqi mission importance and attempts to fill that gap.

CHAPTER 1

FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING MECHANISM AND SECURITY IN POLAND

1.1. Historical, Geographical and Geopolitical Conditions

Crucial for the way of perceiving the environment and understanding national interests is country's historical experience. Events from the past are shaping current social attitudes towards neighbors and other countries. *"Geopolitical location must be reflected in security policy. Hence, it is of key importance that there are no more wars between East and West, since such a war would be fought out on Polish soil."*¹

The most painful historical experience for Poland was losing an independence and disappearing from XVIII century Europe political map. Three partition of Poland by neighbors Austria, Prussia and Russia (1772, 1793 and 1795) happened due to internal weakness of I Republic of Poland. As a result, Poland collapsed. First real possibility of re-gaining independence came after the I World War in 1918 when Józef Piłsudski and his legion through armed action brought back Poland's independency. The biggest historical success of II Republic of Poland (1918- 1939) was to reunite country after partitions and creating new polish statehood. Foreign policy of Poland in interwar period was based on presence in League of Nations and close alliances with France and Great Britain, however security of state was under threat of hostile policy of Poland's neighbors: Germany on West and USSR on the East. Admittedly, Poland signed non-aggression pacts with USSR (1932) and III

¹Onyszkiewicz J.: "Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe nr 29, 15 Lat w NATO", Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2014, p.21

German Reich (1934) but they came out to be illusionary in August 1939, when Ministers of foreign affairs of Germany Joachim von Ribbentrop and USSR Vyacheslav Molotov signed a non-aggression pact which included partition of Poland. On 1st September 1939 Nazi Germany attacked and started to occupy Poland. However, allies of Poland: France and Great Britain were not able to give help. At the end of II World War, state structure and Poland's borders were decided by 3 leading powers of anti-Nazi coalition: USSR, USA and Great Britain. In 1944- 1945 the Red Army of USSR was marching to Berlin through Poland and released Poland from Nazi occupation, thereby presented western powers with a fait accompli. Crucial resolutions about future of Poland were decided at conference in Jalta in February 1945 which completely subordinated Poland to USSR for more than 40 years. Power was in hands of Pro-Soviet leftist party PZPR (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza) which till 1989 was playing a role of hegemonic party allied with USSR. This ideological and political alliance during the Cold War was additionally strengthen by Warsaw Pact in 1955. Historical experiences consequently produced a very resistant national identity and that is why the issue of territorial defense is playing a crucial role for Poland, country historically marked by insecurity and vulnerable to external threats. After 1989 geopolitical situation of Poland has changed. Fall of communism in 1989, wining back full sovereignty and first democratically elected president, resulted with profound structural change and opened a way to build a democratic country. *“For the first time since the Golden Age of the Jagiellonian dynasty in the early sixteenth century, there has since 1989 been a strong and united elite consensus on essentials”*². Numerous key declarations and

² Sanford G.: “Overcoming the burden of history in Polish foreign policy”, Journal of Communist

documents from the early and mid -1990s expressed new elite's shift in polish post-communist foreign policy. In years 1989-1993 Krzysztof Skubiszewski became a Foreign Minister and set main aims for future of polish foreign policy which were: re-establishing national sovereignty and independence, 'returning to Europe' through close bilateral relationships with France, Germany, Britain and rapidly becoming member of all European organizations.

1.2.1. Social and Political Order of Poland

Character and structure of social and political order of a country impacts the way in which its foreign policy is pursued. Since end of the World War II social order of Poland changed completely two times: first was post-war transformation into communist regime which lasted till 1989. Second transformation began with overthrowing communism and creating a democratic capitalism. Since '90 population of Poland is fluctuating between 38,1 and 38,5mln, from which around 95% is homogeneous Polish national identity.³ Constitution of Republic of Poland is basic law, which constitutes a foundation of country. Art.1. of Constitution states, that Poland is a "common good" of all citizens. Poland is a civil society, in which citizens have possibility to active participation in public life, thereby in creating direction of country's politics. Art.2. states, that Poland is a democratic country, in which authorities are chosen through general elections. Political parties are main element of ruling process in country. Even though political system in Poland is

Studies and Transition Politics Vol.19, No.3,2003 pp.178-203Studies and Transition Politics 2003, p.178

³ The 2011 Census of the Republic of Poland

multi-party system, since decade four parties dominated political scene. Namely, liberal- conservative Platforma Obywatelska (PO), conservative – national Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS), social - democratic Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD) and christian- democratic Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL). However, newly established parties: Eurosceptic Kukiz'15 and social democratic, pro- European Wiosna are becoming more popular among citizens, especially before planned for November 2019 parliamentary elections. At times of making a decision about taking part in Iraq war SLD was leading party, which was unquestioned winner in 2001 elections and gain 41% of votes. Generally, since 1989 political parties of Poland are following pro-western foreign policy with US as strategic ally and European Union membership. Poland's government system is called as parliamentary – cabinet, in which parliament is bicameral, created from Sejm (460 ministers) and Senat (100 senators). Political system of Poland is characterized by tripartite separation of powers: legislative, in responsibility of Sejm and Senat, executive in the hands of President of Republic of Poland and Cabinet and judiciary power realized by courts and tribunals.

Religion is playing important role in life of polish citizens. Around 96% of them is catholic.⁴ Therefore, belief is an essential element of national identity. It is an institution with the biggest authority among citizens which guarded them at times of communism. That is why, when Pope John Paul II supported democratic changes in Poland after 1989 undoubtedly influenced citizens thoughts about future direction of

⁴ CBOS :” Znaczenie religii w życiu Polaków”, 05/2006

polish foreign policy. Most of Poles believe, that Catholic Church influence country's events. It is widely believed, that religious norms and values have fundamental meaning for moral choices, participation in politics and for social life.⁵ Results of researches done over the course of 40 years show, that high level of religiousness is maintained without fluctuations.⁶ Years of structural transformation did not weaken strong identification of Poles with their parish, which is showing power of church at the local level. More than 80% of Polish citizens put deep trust in their parish and feel connected with it. Even though Catholicism dominates in Poland, it was never officially recognized as established religion. Majority of citizens – 86% is against Church taking side in political issues and support separation of Church and state. Even if institutionally Church is divided from state, constitutes “reservoir of values” from which state can legitimize its actions.

1.3. Polish Foreign Policy Decision Making Process

After political breakthrough in 1989 rules of the system and competences of individual state authorities responsible for making foreign and security policy of III Republic of Poland were based on three constitutional documents. First was Constitutional Law from April 23, 1992 concerning future Constitution and Poland's adaptation of it. Second, Constitutional Act, known as The Little Constitution from October 17, 1992 was a short – term constitution at time of transition to a new political and economic system, concerned acceptance of parliamentary system and

⁵ CBOS:” Opinie o Działalności Kościoła”, 03/2007

⁶Mazurkiewicz P.:” Kościół Katolicki w Przededniu Wejścia Polski Do Unii Europejskiej”, Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Warszawa,2003, p.102

relationships between legislative and executive powers. Currently bidding Constitution of Republic of Poland is in force since April 6, 1997. Constitution states, that sources of law in Republic of Poland are: Constitution, legal acts, ratified international agreements and regulations.⁷ Due to this document, most important privileges and competences concerning making foreign policy are in the hands of the elected for 5-year term (with option for second term) by popular voting, President.⁸

Constitution states that the President of Poland should “*watch over the observance of the constitution safeguard the sovereignty and security of the State as well as the inviolability and integrity of its territory*”⁹. President is not only acting as the representative of Poland, he is the supreme commander of the army, responsible for ratifying international treaties, appointing Chief of General Staff, heads of judiciary, heads of armed forces, head of National Bank, members of Monetary council and ambassadors. However, decisions concerning foreign policy of country must be consulted with the President of the Council of Ministers and relevant to the subject Minister.¹⁰ Therefore, in practice, competences of President considering making foreign policy decisions are limited. Due to the article 4th of Constitution, The Council of Ministers (the cabinet) is the superior administrative and executive authority responsible for foreign, security, and defense policy and has oversight of international relations and international documents. The Council of Ministers has all instruments and specialized staff to realize foreign and security policy of Republic of

⁷ Constitution of Poland 1997, Chapter III, Article 87,1

⁸ Constitution of Poland 1997, Chapter V, Article 127,1

⁹ Constitution of Poland 1997, Chapter V, Article 126, 2

¹⁰ Constitution of Poland 1997, Chapter V, Articles 133,134,135

Poland.¹¹ Prime Minister is managing the Government, choosing and controlling Ministers as well as settling the Budget. Sejm and Senate have more limited role in creating and controlling foreign policy of Poland – their influence is indirect, through taking part in ratification international contracts. Parliamentary Commissions of Foreign Affairs is taking part in foreign and security policy decision making. Every year Minister of Foreign Affairs is addressing *exposé* in Sejm concerning foreign policy plans. Military of country is in the hands of Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Poland. Republic of Poland may hand over some competencies of country authorities to the international organization or international organ on the basis of international agreement.¹²

Due to the article 116 of Constitution, Sejm is deciding in the name of Republic of Poland about state of war and peace settlements and adopting a resolution, only at times, when territory of Poland is attacked or if is obliged by international agreement to fight against aggression. If session of Sejm is not possible to take place, President of Poland is deciding about state of war. Rules of usage of armed forces outside of country and stay of foreign army in Poland are determined by ratified international agreement or legal act.¹³

According to article 2 of The Instances of Use and Stay of Polish Forces Abroad Act from December 1998 Polish armed forces outside the country can engage in two forms: use or stay.¹⁴ Using of Polish forces means presence of army abroad country

¹¹Terlikowski M.:” Poland in Strategic Cultures in Europe,Wiesbaden: Springer,2013, p. 277

¹² Constitution of Poland 1997, Chapter III, Article 90

¹³ Constitution of Poland 1997, Chapter IV, Article 117

¹⁴ Pietrzak P.:”Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland in International Operations—Legal Grounds, Strategic Considerations, and Practical Implementation”, Polish-Ukrainian Bulletin, 1/2012, pp.69–71

in order to take part in: armed conflict or to strengthen country or its allies (1.a.), peacekeeping mission (1.b.), action preventing acts of terrorism or its results. (1.c.) Stay means the presence of army abroad of country in order to take part in: military trainings and exercises (2.a.), lifesaving or humanitarian actions (2.b.) representative events. (2.c.)

Decision about usage of troops abroad is made by President of Republic of Poland at the instance of Council of Ministers (in situations specified in art 2.1a and b), President of the Council of Ministers (in situations specified in art.2.1c) notifying immediately Marshals of the Sejm and Senate. Decision about staying of troops abroad is made by: Council of Ministers (in situations specified in art 2.2a, if financial means were not included in budgets of relevant ministries), Minister of National Defense or Minister of the Interior (in situations specified in art 2.2). President of the Council of Ministers is notifying President about decision.

According to the art. 9, Council of Ministers is responsible for planning financial means for the deployment of armed forces internationally. Minister of Foreign Affairs announces areas and dates of beginning and ending of war activities.

1.4. Polish Foreign policy and security strategy

At the end of XX century Communist bloc collapsed. As a result of this profound geopolitical change Poland became a safe country - regained guarantee of inviolability of borders and territorial integrity. Poles received a chance to full participation in European and global society in a stable international order. However,

international order is dynamic and may bring new challenges for the future. Challenges, which Poland should be able to effectively face. Fundamental aim of each country and its citizens is guarantee of security. Today Poland operates in a complex and well-developed international environment. As a member of politically, military and economically strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union becomes more important player of international cooperation. Membership in NATO, EU together with alliance with United States provide high level of security and became main guarantee of Poland's development. As a close ally of USA, Poland aims to strengthen engagement of America in Europe, as a superpower, which plays key role in global dimension and stabilizing political-military relations in Europe. Character of bilateral relation with USA is strategic that is why Poland will try to develop intensive cooperation. Additionally, Poland cares about developing partnership and good relations with all its neighbors.

Basing on domestic and international conditions of the country, democratic government of Poland is formulating and realizing one chosen, deliberated conception of foreign policy making. Strategy of foreign policy express values and interests of the country, which should be realized through relations with international environment. These values are becoming strategic aims for next year. Traditionally, at the beginning of calendar year Minister of Foreign Affairs, in formal speech called 'exposé' is presenting aims of polish foreign policy to the Sejm. Tradition of presenting exposé comes from 1919 – when Poland regained sovereignty. Speech is presented to President of Poland, ministers and members of diplomatic corps. In January 2003 Minister of Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz stressed how

important political and diplomatic success for Poland was finishing accession negotiations with European Union. Becoming a member of EU compared to new chapter of Polish history and new dimension of Polish foreign policy. Cimoszewicz emphasized changing international security after 9/11 terrorist attack and international environment in which countries will need to make choices to guarantee sovereignty, security and best conditions for country to develop. Minister of Foreign Affairs stated, that strategic aim of Poland is having an image of reliable member in European Union, however, he stressed that 'special character' of relations with United States should be maintained. NATO Alliance was shown as precious and irreplaceable instrument which Poland will support and take care that doors of Alliance for new countries will be opened, so old geopolitical divisions will disappear. Aim of Poland for 2003 was to continue active engagement in anti-terrorist campaign and to keep a close watch on situation in Iraq. Cimoszewicz stated, that violation of 1441 resolution about possessing mass destruction weapons by Iraq will require decisive reaction, maybe even military action and then Poland is ready to support it, so such possibility should be taken into consideration. Terrorism became a serious external threat for Europe. Therefore, Poland should be ready to take part in stabilization and peacekeeping missions.

1.5. NATO as A Security Organization in Post- Cold War Era

North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a military alliance which in the history of IR last the longest. NATO at times of establishing in 1949 took traditions from military alliances from the past, nevertheless at its foundation had also features which made it

different from all alliances which gone before.¹⁵ NATO was formally created by a North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949. Mutual support and limited geographically area of functioning were key provisions of the Treaty. This resulted with military obligations to all its member states. If any of them would be under attack, then each member state was obliged to give help. Threat coming from Soviet Union, which aspired to gain control over Central and Eastern Europe was the driving force behind creation of NATO. North Atlantic states perceived threat coming from Soviet Union as endangering their security and emphasized need of creating defense arrangement. North Atlantic Treaty determined geographical area of functioning of the alliance. At times of creation NATO in 1949, international political system was bipolar – dominated by two great powers: Soviet Union and USA. Both countries possessed nuclear weapons. This feature enabled to destruction of societies, therefore political aim and necessity was avoiding a conflict between themselves instead of defeating opponent in war. Threat of using nuclear weapons by Soviets on NATO territory became a reason of creation strategy called ‘*massive retaliation*’ in which a state committed themselves to answer for attack with greater force. By years threat of conflict resulting with usage of nuclear weapons decreased. Strategy evolved and in 1960s became a ‘*flexible response*’ - allowed to respond to attack with a various of strategies (diplomatic, political, and military strategies). Therefore, answer to conflict was decided on case-by-case basis and did not mean only usage of nuclear arms. During the Cold War, Western Europe was in difficult political and economic situation. Countries still much damaged after the Second World War needed aid. USA aimed for ‘free’ Europe, that is why proposed assistance. However, USA had

¹⁵White B., Little R., Smith M.:”Issues in world politic”, Palgrave,2001, p.2-14

one condition – that Europe will make every effort to improve itself economically and militarily to not let a situation happen when USA would be the only source of help. NATO celebrated 40th anniversary in 1989, at times, when communist bloc was decomposing, and expansion of communism successfully stopped. International system dominated by two great powers collapsed with the break-up of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Treaty Organization. This was followed by formal declaration from Warsaw Pact in 1990 that it is not a source of threat to NATO and dissolution of its military structures in 1991. End of the Cold War and USSR ruling the Eastern Europe gave ability to political and economic change to all of states which were under Soviet rule. It also opened a way for NATO in Eastern Europe – not having USSR as opponent did not result with dissolution of NATO. On the contrary, Alliance planned to exist in the future and expand to new countries. For Eastern European countries gaining a membership meant not only military security but more significantly, at those times, political acceptability. Alliance helped ex-communist countries such as Poland or Hungary on their road to democracy. Major role in these countries played NATO's procedures, joint missions and requirements which as a result brought military power in the hands of civilian government¹⁶. During the Cold War role and aims of NATO were clearly defined by existence of threat from USSR. However, at the beginning of 90s' in some peoples' views disappearing of traditional enemies meant no need for NATO to exist anymore. End of the Cold War forced NATO to reconsider aims and rules of the Alliance in new regional and global security environment. Some countries decreased expenditures and investments for

¹⁶ Brockmann K, Bosold D.: "Democratization and Security in Central and Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet States", Institute of International Relations, Prague, 2009,p.29-33

military and limit spending for security even up to 25%.¹⁷ Unfortunately, hopes for peace came out to be too optimistic, when in some parts of Europe destabilization occurred. In the former Yugoslavia and some regions of former USSR regional conflicts arose, very often fueled by ethnic frictions. Countries of NATO came to realization, that their engagement in building common security system and cooperation will continue to be the best guarantee of peace and stability in Europe. The result of changing perception of security was need of rewriting mission of Alliance and redefining what exactly security means for the member states. In 1992 NATO started to think actively about giving support to regions outside its perimeter, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, Somalia, Afghanistan or Iraq, called 'out of area' and collaboration with the United Nations.¹⁸ Out of area operations are strong tool in order to maintain Alliance's scope and importance in the security environment. NATO creates remarkable source of power, based on democracy, rule of law, common goals, human rights approaches and interallied relations. New, post-cold war NATO focuses on stabilization of international environment through involvement in peace-keeping missions without resignation from the core task which was collective defense. NATO continues policy of "opened doors" and shows willingness to accept new member countries which meet the criteria.

¹⁷ <https://www.nato.int/>, access: 02/04/19

¹⁸ Salmon T.C.: "Issues in international Relations", Routledge 2000, p.189

1.5.1. Joining NATO: Poland's Guarantee of Security

In 1989 after fall of communism next step of polish government was to apply for NATO, which was seen as natural and desirable. Such possibility for the first time came during Foreign Ministers of the Alliance meeting on 7-8th June 1990. At this meeting Foreign Ministers released *Message from Turnberry* in which expressed their '*determination to seize the historic opportunities resulting from the profound changes in Europe to help build a new peaceful order in Europe, based on freedom, justice and democracy.*'¹⁹ Poland quickly took the chance to establish cooperation with NATO and in August 1990 official permanent talks started. First years were characterized by saying declarations and formulating positions toward European security. Direct official and unofficial talks created good atmosphere to reach concrete aims. At the end of 1991 *North Atlantic Cooperation Council* (NACC) was established which simplified cooperation with Alliance. Poland, due to cooperation with NACC was able to strength its position in multilateral consultations, which were taking place on that forum. Next step on the way to membership was establishing a program based on a commitment to democratic principles called *Partnership for Peace* (PFP) in January 1994. The purpose of PFP was to enable non-member countries to develop an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation and pace of progress. Program was created by diplomacy of United States as an answer to countries (Poland was one of them) which demanded acceleration of membership process. Poland joined to PFP in February 2nd, 1994.

¹⁹ Message from Turnberry, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23697.htm, access: 02/04/19

However, taking part in NACC and PFP was not satisfactory enough for Poland and matter of full membership in NATO was its top priority. Rules and ways of future enlargement were published in *Study of NATO enlargement* in September 1995. Document determined requirements from candidate countries and willingness to fulfill obligations resulted with future membership. Individual talks with Poland started in October 1995 when detailed requirements contained in *Study of NATO enlargement* were settled. In April 1996 Poland presented its individual document in the matter of membership. Document included Polish vision of enlargement NATO and explained how Poland may contribute to strengthening Alliance. Till 1997 official talks took part with representatives of Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs which did not occur without many disagreements, mainly concerning financial costs of enlargement process. Historical decision for Poland was made on 8th of July 1997 on NATO summit in Madrid, when Poland, Czech and Hungary were invited to begin accession talks. Aim was to sign accession protocols in December 1997 and finish ratification process till 50th anniversary of Washington Treaty in April 1999. Joining of Poland to NATO on 12 March 1999 was undoubtedly big political success and step towards democratic changes. It was seen as a proof of political elites' maturity to unite beyond political divisions, reform security system, transform military, lead to meeting the criteria of membership for superior aim which is security of country.²⁰ North Atlantic Treaty together with European Union and bilateral cooperation with allies builds pillars of Poland's security and by many politicians, including President, it is called as most important

²⁰ Protasowicki I., Nowakowski Z.: "Bezpieczeństwo polityczne i militarne Polski po 1989 roku", Politechnika Rzeszowska. Wydział Zarządzania i Marketingu, 2008, p.74-79

from them. Poland believes, that if serious threat for its sovereignty would occur Alliance would react appropriately.²¹ NATO is a political-military alliance, which essential principle is article 5 including *casus foederis* clause about collective defense. It is a base of NATO's founding treaty. Collective defense means that an attack against one ally is considered as an attack against all. NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States. Article 5 says: *"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."*²² Due to Christopher Bobinski, publisher of 'Unia and Polska' magazine: *"Poles wanted NATO membership first and foremost as a guarantee of security against a possible resurgence of Russian territorial ambitions. This explains why article 5 of the NATO treaty is sacrosanct for Poles. That they interpret article 5 as an automatic commitment by all NATO members to go to the armed defense of any member which is attacked is clear."*²³ Poland multiple times was a place in where interests of powers clashed. Invoking negative experiences

²¹ „15 lat w NATO. Rozmowa z prezydentem RP – Bronisławem Komorowskim. Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe. 15 lat w NATO”, 2014/I

²² Nato Treaty, Art 5., https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, access: 09/06/19

²³Bobinski Ch.: "Polish Illusions and Reality", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003, p. 240.

from history, solid guarantee of security became a crucial aim. Accession to NATO changed position of Poland in international arena. Being treated on the same rules with the strongest world countries and being protected resulted with being respected player. Country which is covered with political guarantees and international security system has better perspectives and chances to develop, can focus more widely on its international relations. ²⁴ Not only security guarantees are thing which Poland benefited from, but also substantial funding for modernization of its facilities and infrastructure or access to high-tech technology. Becoming NATO member resulted with obligations to modernization and restructuration of polish army. Poland entirely reformed its military. Polish army and ammunition manufacturers gained possibility to find new partners in the states of Alliance. It was also an impulse for domestic transformations. As a member of NATO, Poland is showing strong willingness to support NATO operations. Postulates NATO as security alliance but also promotes idea of extending NATO to other countries. Since the accession in 1999 Poland supported accession of other Baltic states – Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. When they joined to alliance in 2004 Poland engaged in supporting membership of Ukraine and Georgia. Eventually they did not become member states, but Alliance declared systematic cooperation within *Annual National Programme (ANP)*²⁵. Poland is looking at North Atlantic Alliance through its strongest player, United States. Permanent aim of Poland in NATO is to strengthen transatlantic relationships and make sure of USA's presence in Europe. Among polish political elite there is a strong preference for US- led NATO. Poland consistently supports American policy

²⁴Protasowicki I., Nowakowski Z.:” Bezpieczeństwo polityczne i militarne Polski po 1989 roku”, Politechnika Rzeszowska. Wydział Zarządzania i Marketingu, 2008, p.96

²⁵Zajac J.:” NATO w polityce bezpieczeństwa polski”, Regionalny Ośrodek Debaty Międzynarodowej w Katowicach,2014, p.200

towards NATO, including development of out of area missions, such as Iraq intervention. Polish politicians stand for widening scope of Alliance's tasks as it is maintained by America and hope for Poland to become a privileged partner of the US in Europe. Therefore, taking part in new NATO missions may not only improve position of Poland in the international arena but also maintain strong and stable ties with the US, which is consider as Poland's most important ally.

1.5.2. Cooperation with United States of America and its Importance for Poland

Polish citizens consider US as far ally, but much powerful and able to defend Poland when such need would occur. Table above shows results of poll hold in March 2003 which are unquestionably showing, who Poles would count on at possible times of crisis - over 48% of interviewees indicated USA. European countries function as allies is incomparably less than America.

Table I : Poles Perception of Ally of Poland

Imagine, that security of our country is threatened. From which countries Poland would get military help in such situation?	
USA	48%
Germany	16%
Great Britain	11%
NATO	8%
France	6%
Czech Republic	5%
Russia	4%
Other	9%
There is no such country	16%
Undecided	16%

Source: TNS OBOP

Pro- Americanism in Poland is a political, social and cultural phenomenon, which origins comes from the interwar period, when around two and three million Poles emigrated to the USA.²⁶ Therefore, emigrations and remigrations in next years are crucial to understand how positive image of America in Poland shaped. USA offered polish people shelter at times of war, later attractive job opportunities and higher life standards than Poland. By the years Polish and American relations developed in many fields. As an example, can be showed decision from 1923 about publishing magazine called “America”, which promoted cooperation between Poland and America. After the World War II, when Warsaw Pact and NATO was established, Poland and USA became opponents in political and military sense. Communist government of Poland had in hands monopoly to shape public feeling about the USA. As a result, news about America were strictly censored and selected in order to increase anti- Americanism in Poles. In newspapers, America was showed as a racist, dangerous and corrupted country. However, as a result of social opposition to communism in Poland, as well as from the fact, that many Poles emigrated to US and presented it as “promised land” and country of possibilities, opened to foreigners, paradoxically favorable attitudes towards America instead of decreasing, increased. *“During the Cold War, many Poles perceived Voice of America and Radio Free Europe as evidence that the United States had not forgotten the predicament. President Ronald Reagan’s harsh stance on the Soviet Union improved even further the image of the United States in Poland”* ²⁷American literature, cinematography and consumer goods (for instance Coca- Cola) were much desired among Poles.

²⁶Kolarska-Bobińska L., Kucharczyk J., Kaczyński P.M.:” Bridges Across the Atlantic? Attitude of Poles, Czechs and Slovaks Towards the United States, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw, 2005, p.

²⁷ D.H. Dunn.:” Poland: America’s new model ally”, Defence studies, 2002, 2 (2), p.65

Pro- American attitudes were strengthening in 1980s through supporting financially, politically and morally Solidarity movement in Poland. That is the reason, why since the early 1990s, with the government of Lech Walesa, Polish political parties agreed that Poland should seek a close relationship with the United States, to which Poland largely owed reemergence as an independent state. When Washington decided to enlarge NATO to the east, Poland became one of the closest allies of United States in Central and Eastern Europe. Polish people were waiting for such event since the XVIII century. For Americans, on the other hand, Poland symbolized a middle power, which despite being former USSR country succeed with building democracy and implementing market reforms.²⁸ Unlike many West European states Poland supports American hegemony, moreover, sees it in own interest to maintain powerful position of United States. In 1990 Poland got closer to US actions in the Persian Gulf. Polish and American intelligence cooperated in the Middle East. In 1994 elite polish military unit called GROM participated in operations in Haiti which were led by United States. Poland through its actions wanted to show usefulness to US and Polish government believed that loyalty would pay off in the future. When in 1999 Poland strongly supported NATO intervention in Kosovo and in same year became a member of NATO this judgement seemed to be true, that is why Poland decided to continue this way of behavior. Naturally, in December 2001 newly chosen government respond positively to US request for sending polish peacekeepers to Afghanistan. Approximately 300 soldiers including GROM, sappers and chemical decontamination group stationed in Persian Gulf and expressed their loyalty for the future actions taken by US. Among the Western alliance question of Iraq was a

²⁸ M.Lasoń.:”Polska misja w Iraku. Użycie sił zbrojnych jako środka polityki zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na przykładzie interwencji w Iraku 2003–2008”, 2010, p.44

source of clash, however Polish decision among country's elite was not controversial.²⁹ Terrorist attack on World Trade Center in New York and Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001 in which total number of people died was 2.996 (including 5 Poles) is seen as an event which changed the way of people thinking about global safety. Terrorism became the biggest threat to international security. Politician Jerzy Jaskiernia from ruling at that time SLD party said about September 11th: 'It was not only shock for global public opinion, but also for Poles. (...) at the beginning of XXI century, we realized that peace is not given for once and forever, terrorism is a real threat, needs clear and consistent answer from the world. (...) Poles see that terror threat is a global challenge and needs global answer – Poland shows solidarity with New York and Washington victims, not only with words but with actions'³⁰. Immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, Poland declared assistance to the United States.³¹ This new instantly dominated all informational radios and televisions in all Europe. Almost all world got terrified while hearing news from US and was sending condolences and promises of help to Washington. Eventually, on 29 October 2004 Osama bin Laden, leader of terrorist organization al-Qaeda appeared in Arabic television Al-Jazeera and declared a statement in which took responsibility of terrorist attacks from 9/11 and threaten that such attacks may repeat in the future. His statement resulted with starting 'War with terror'- Washington called on other states to join in the fight against terrorism involving military operations and new counterterror legislation. Many governments joined this campaign and tighten their security rules. In the period immediately after

²⁹ J. Lubecki.: "Poland in Iraq. The politics of the decision", **The Polish Review**, Vol. 50/1, 2005., p.72

³⁰ 29.11.2001, Stenographic Report from Session of Sejm

³¹ I. Protasowicki, Z. Nowakowski.: "Bezpieczeństwo polityczne i militarne Polski po 1989 roku", 2008, p.158

September 11 Poland became closer to the United States than many of its long-standing West European allies. Poland was praised in United States and called 'new European', on the contrary to the 'old Europeans' France and Germany, which disagreed with United States' policy on Iraq³². When conflict between France and Germany and the US over the question of Iraq grow in strength Polish loyalty to the United States could not be perceived as synonymous with alliance with the "West" anymore, because the unified "West" was no longer there. It is important to mention, that decision to stand with US seriously conflicted with the Polish plans of joining European Union, which became Poland's priority after 1999. There was a perception that Europeans divided into two camps: Atlanticist and Europeanists. Further continuing Poland's alignment with the US, on 30 January 2003 Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller signed so-called 'Letter of eight' together with the leaders of Italy, Portugal, Hungary, Denmark and the Czech Republic. In this view, the Atlanticist were supporters 'The letter of eight' The 'Europeanists' were represented by France and Germany³³. However, Poland instead of one camp, decided to cooperate between these two and chose "pro-European Atlanticism". Atlanticism for Poland means the special importance of the United States for European security system. Within NATO, United States is best guarantor of security for Poland. Atlanticism is a matter of country's security and defense against a large and strong eastern and western neighbor, because Poland trusts neither its Russian nor German neighbor. What Poles seek for is a counterbalance, existence of a superpower that

³² M. Zaborowski: "Occasional paper. America's Protégé in the East? The Emergence of Poland as a Regional Leader", **European Union Institute for Security Studies**, 2004, p.5

³³ C. Portela, K. Raube: "Incoherent securitisation. The European Union in the Iraq crisis", **Hamburg Review of Social Sciences**, vol. 3, issue 1, 2008, p.71

they can trust – United States³⁴. Nevertheless, Poland gives priority to the European Union and more than other European countries emphasizes need of cooperation between EU and USA. There are several reasons why Poland signed the letter of eight. The most important was willingness to strengthen relations with United States which could guarantee not only country's security but also better position within NATO and European Union. Poland hoped also to get economic benefits from USA (through increased amount of investments) as well as get new contract agreements in Iraq. Certainly, Poland wanted to contribute to process of promotion of freedom and democracy and bring them to Iraq, however benefits for Polish firms from accession to the oilfields were always one of the most important reasons, far from noble defending western civilization. Largely untapped, cheap Iraqi oil could decrease polish dependency on Russia³⁵ ³⁶ Letter was a sign of endorsement of US position on the Iraqi issue, accusing Saddam Hussein of developing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and urged United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to act against that threat. Letter not only was a sign of division within the EU regarding its Iraq policy but also attitudes toward international law. The level of support which Poland offered to give to US surprised many of its European allies. Moreover, before signing the letter, Poland did not consult its decision with either France or Germany³⁷. Showing commitment to America by Poland more than other members of Alliance was seen by them as unnecessary demonstration of loyalty and the reason of worsening

³⁴ J. Hamberger.: "Atlanticism and Security Policy in Poland and in the Czech Republic", 2008, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, p.3-8

³⁵ R. Taras:" Poland's Diplomatic Misadventure in Iraq: With us or against us?", **Problems of Post-Communism**, 51:1, 2014, p.6-9

³⁶ J. Lubecki:" Poland in Iraq.The politics of the decision", **The Polish Review**, Vol. 50, No. 1,2005, p.75-76

³⁷ M.Zaborowski:" Occasional paper. America's Protégé in the East? The Emergence of Poland as a Regional Leader". **European Union Institute for Security Studies**, 2004, p.11

relations with Germany and France. However, Polish politicians explained their decisions as 'repaying debt' from past, when Poland could count on help from USA. Some of them emphasized that America is a guarantor of Poland's security and that is why they should not refuse to USA in order to extend this alliance in the face of possible future external threats. In January 13-14, 2003 during his visit in US, Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski stated that if military intervention will be inevitable in order to disarm Iraq, Poland will unquestionably support it. Poland's prominent role as one of the few allies of United States in Iraq and its importance in America's foreign policy was also showed during the recent presidential campaign in America, when during debate President Bush gave an example of Poland and its role in Iraq as a proof of his ability to maintain the international coalitions. At the same time senator John Kerry emphasized that United States should show more appreciation to Poland for its role in Iraq. French political scientist, Jacques Rupnik in his article called '*Why Are the Eastern Europeans Pro-American?*' introduced other historical reasons why Poland's policy is orientated to the US. First and most important of them is the culture of servility. After the end of World War II countries which were in the Soviet bloc are characterized as being eager to serve to other country, because 'old habits of obedience die hard'³⁸. In this view, Poland became an American puppet. US strength appeals to Poland and commands respect. Next feature is messianism. Historical experiences of betrayal by allies, feeling cheated and fearful as well as living under communism resulted in Poland seeing itself as a chosen suffering state. They appeal to their catholic faith and believe, that suffering is for a reason which only God knows. However not bilateral alliance with United

³⁸ J. Rupnik: "Why Are the Eastern Europeans Pro-American?", **East European Constitutional Review**, 12/2003, p.69

States, but Atlanticism is a feature of Polish foreign policy since the end of the Cold War and in the context of divided NATO direction of Poland's policy was unclear. Polish government whilst being an Atlanticist wanted to become committed member of EU that is why had to maintain good relations with France and Germany as well.³⁹ One of the diplomatic actions to overcome divisions was Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz visit in Paris in March 2003 which aim was reassuring about good relationships between Poland and France even though they were disagreeing about Iraq issue. Poland's decision to support the United States in the war in Iraq was not an anti-European movement, because Polish interests are bilaterally tied with Europe and the United States. Rather, Polish government decided, that in order to ensure reliability of US security guarantees, Poland should show its solidarity to US. Over the last few years, 2003 Iraqi intervention was undoubtedly the moment, when Polish pro- Americanism was the most visible. Participation in Iraqi conflict was seen by Polish politicians as a possibility to strengthen its position on international arena, to modernize Polish Army, to benefit economically. However, the key factor which outbalanced others, was supporting USA in order to extend flourishing Polish – American relations which are seen as cornerstone of Poland's security policy.

³⁹ J. Lubecki: "Poland in Iraq Politics of The Decision", **The Polish Review**, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2005, p.72

CHAPTER 2

POLAND'S PARTICIPATION IN THE IRAQI MISSION

2.1. How the Decision Was Made?

During communism relations between Warsaw and Bagdad were evolving. It was a result of fact, that polish foreign policy character was depending on Moscow decisions. One of the first important decisions of sovereign foreign policy of Poland concerning outside of Europe was engagement in military operations against Iraq called: 'Dessert shield' and 'Dessert storm' in the years 1990 and 1991. Aim of these operations was to release Kuwait which was under attack from Iraq. Anti-Iraqi missions gained full support from western countries, even among some Arabic countries, therefore Polish participation did not arouse any controversy. Nevertheless, being a part of coalition against Saddam Hussein regime and supporting United Nations Security Council sanctions against Iraq met with distinct breach and regress in good relations between Warsaw and Bagdad from years before 1989. It was also a clear sign, that polish foreign policy was changing its direction to the west. Besides military engagement, many polish firms in 1970s and 1980s were contracted for investments in Iraq such as building roads or steelworks near to Basra. Till 1991 approximately 50,000 Poles were involved in work in Iraq.⁴⁰ In 1991 polish embassy in Bagdad established a section concerning relations with USA where polish diplomatic personnel represented Washington in Iraq till 2003.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Michta A.A :'' Military Capabilities of the Central Europeans: What Can They Contribute to the Stabilization of Iraq?', **East European Studies Publications Meeting Reports**, 2003,p.13

⁴¹ J.Knopek, R.Willa: Polska polityka zagraniczna 1989-2014. Diffin 2016, p.275-276

During the invasion of Iraq, the foreign policy leadership of Poland was composed of the President, Aleksander Kwaśniewski and the cabinet members: Prime minister Leszek Miller and Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, both from the Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD- Democratic Left Alliance). Polish government supported the USA from the beginning of the Iraqi crisis followed by signing the letter of intent in January 2003. In the same month President of Poland stated: *“Poland will take decisions when we gather more information, but undeniably the strategic partnership with the United States implies some duties upon us: our soldiers are already in the region, they are not many, but of course we are looking forward to see new developments.”*⁴² When USA could not obtain UNSC resolution supporting Iraqi invasion by 17 March 2003, President Bush issued to Saddam Hussein a 48-hour ultimatum to leave Iraq. The next day, Polish President signed a decision concerning contribution of Polish forces in Iraq, requested by Prime Minister Miller. Kwaśniewski delivered a speech appealing to striving for solidarity and determination in action stressed Poland's readiness to go to war. On 18 of March 2003 Prime Minister Miller announced official Polish participation in the war, resulting with sending 200 soldiers to the Gulf, including 54 soldiers of the GROM, a 74-strong anti-chemical warfare and the Polish supply ship, with 53 people from the crew.⁴³ Poland, along with Australia and Great Britain became US's military ally in the war. On 25 of March Polish Parliament (Sejm) had official debate on the decision of sending troops to Iraq. Government's decision met with support from major opposition parties: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS - Law and Justice) and Platforma

⁴² O. Osica.: "Poland: A new European Atlanticist at a crossroads?", **European security**, 13(4) 2004, p. 317

⁴³ M. Britz.: "European Participation in International Operations", Palgrave 2016, p.134-135

Obywatelska (PO - Citizens' Alliance). Both emphasized Polish bonds with the USA as the main reason for joining the invasion. Only the fringe parties opposition: populist Samoobrona (Self – Defence Party) and far-right Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR - League of Polish Families) opposed to government. Their objections concerned lack of UNSC endorsement consequently illegality of the invasion.⁴⁴ On May 2, government overcame its internal disputes and officially announced that Poland will take part in war in Iraq. After the decision was made, it was presented to the Sejm without consultation and was presented to the Sejm formally only after the invasion of Iraq. Decision was taken by the executive leadership President Kwasniewski and Prime Minister Miller not the Sejm, however Polish politicians accepted the risks involved within and recognized righteousness of it. The basis of decision were documents concerning security policy of Poland, namely: Security Strategy of Republic of Poland (from 4 January 2000) and Defense Strategy of Republic of Poland (from 23 May 2000). At the time of making decision both documents were prevailing. Poland's support of the war in Iraq is seen as the most important decision in foreign policy made by Poland since end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, in over regional dimension polish stance toward Iraq intervention had low importance, because it did not lead to joining Iraq war by other countries. Political and military support to US could be a result of setting security of a country as a priority of polish foreign policy and consequently necessity to protect from threats, but at same time Poland was seeing European stand as passive and without loyalty to alliance.

⁴⁴ Lubecki J.:” Poland in Iraq. The politics of the decision”. **The Polish Review**, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2005, p. 76

In order to analyze Iraq intervention it is crucial and should not be omitted, to define military intervention. Military intervention definition includes usage of armed forces and their deployment on the territory or airspace of another country. One of the legal definition of intervention sounds as follows: “The forcible or dictatorial interference of a state in the affairs of another state, calculated to impose certain conduct or consequences on that other state”⁴⁵. However, creating a comprehensive definition which would look at military intervention from all the most important perspectives (political, military, legal) is impossible, because it is a phrase ranging very wide - to different groups of scholars can mean something completely different. Nevertheless, definition would have to include coalition (unilateral, bilateral or multilateral) to conduct military operations with or without consent of state on which land, sea or air these operations would take place and with or without endorsement of eligible regional authority or the UN Security Council. Purposes of military interventions may also vary from using a military force as a response to natural disaster with aim of humanitarian assistance or military operations as an answer to aggression. However, states’ deciding about military intervention aim may not only be stabilizing or resolving the international dispute and come with help, but it is common to intend to gain influence in international affairs.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Jeggins, W.: “Oppenheim's international law”. Vol. 1, Longman 1996, p.430

⁴⁶ Salmon T.C.:” Issues in international Relations”. Routledge 2000, p.189

2.2. The Proceedings of the Intervention

Poland considered intervention consistent with the law as well as rightful. All 193 soldiers from intervention forces received special trainings about terrorist organizations and Iraqi reality. Soldiers experience from past peaceful operations of UN was emphasized as a solid base for mission in Iraq. However, engagement in war was first since the second world war in which polish soldiers were about to take part. Units were under American command, but all actions were consulted with General Staff of Polish Army which created coordination group. For Polish Army taking part in mission in Iraq from the very beginning was tremendous operation. Distance was not the only one factor which was making mission difficult. Others, such as: hard, semidesert territory and climate in which Polish soldiers did not have opportunity to fight before, other culture, religion, complicated political situation with growing anti-coalition (which culmination took part in April 2004, when Muqtada Al Sadr from extremist Islamic organization lead rebellion against coalition forces). Moreover, soldiers were just gaining experience needed to safe and effective mission in Iraqi reality.⁴⁷ After dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and joining NATO Poland restructured its armed forces. At the time of joining to intervention in Iraq in 2003 Polish military capabilities consisted of 163,000 active troops, 947 main battle tanks. Poland maintained the navy of 14,300 troops and air force of 36,450 troops.⁴⁸ Equipment and its quality by the time of mission was keep evolved and improved which influenced not only performance in Iraq but also Polish Army in Poland.

⁴⁷ Hudyma P.: "Udział wojsk polskich w misjach zagranicznych o charakterze pokojowym i stabilizacyjnym, w latach 1953 – 2008". Uniwersytet im. A.Mickiewicza w Poznaniu 2011, p.97-99

⁴⁸ Hummel H.: "A survey of involvement of 10 European states in the Iraq war", Parliamentary Control of Security Policy 2007, p.22

Polish authorities agreed for usage of polish airspace and land transit by American forces going to Iraq. Range of operation was specified as follows: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq and Persian Gulf, Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Politicians decision had one condition, that poles should not be located in first line of front. In the first phase of operation Poland sent to Iraq 193 soldiers divided into two military contingents (Kuwait and Jordan) and one vessel which stayed in Persian Gulf. Official tasks of soldiers were defined as: limited specialized missions, mainly with logistical character. In 2003 Americans covered half of the costs of polish contingent maintenance, including almost entirely cost of all division transportation.⁴⁹ Attack on Iraq under cryptonym 'Iraqi Freedom' started on 20 of March 2003 with first attack on Baghdad from air. In intervention took part armed forces from United States, Great Britain, Australia, and symbolic contingents from Spain, Portugal, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Its aim was elimination of Iraqi authorities. Soldiers used most advanced technology in order to minimize losses. Part of strategy was to start operation with forces already staying in region, not after arriving of new divisions in order to surprise enemy and not let them to be prepared for attack. Campaign finished relatively quickly with a victory of powerful, well prepared militarily and technologically coalition. Eventually Baghdad was conquered on 9 of April 2003 which was big military and political success and crucial event for course of war, because authorities lost control over the capital. Iraqi Freedom operation resulted with breakup of Iraqi military forces and abolishment of Saddam Hussein regime in just 47 days. Formal ending of campaign was announced on 1st of May 2003 by President G.W Bush. Iraqi dictator got captured on 13th

⁴⁹ Wągrowska M.: "Udział Polski w interwencji zbrojnej i misji stabilizacyjnej w Iraku". **Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych**, 2004, p.15

December 2003 and sentenced by Special Iraqi Tribunal to death.⁵⁰ After victory forces proceed with next stage of mission – stabilization. From 20 March to 1 May 2003, 140 American soldiers (542 were injured) and 30 British soldiers lost their lives in fights. Formally, war activities stopped and proceed to stabilization of Iraq. Victory in war was just a first step of slow and complex process and did not mean that there in Iraq are enough conditions to restore peace and build new political system. Government of Poland did not, planned to limit participation of polish forces only to war in Iraq. At the beginning of April 2003 policymakers showed willingness for presence in Iraq after the end of war actions, in order to stabilize situation in Iraq and restore the country. When military actions finished Poland got proposition from Washington to organize Multinational Division Central - South (MND CS) responsible for domestic stabilization of Iraq. Poland gave proposition to Denmark and Germany of shared command over stabilization zone, however both countries refused.⁵¹ Official decision about participation of Poles in stabilization forces was signed by President Kwaśniewski on 6th of June 2003, for period 9 June 2003 till 31 December 2003 with the possibility of prolongation. In total, 24 countries expressed a wish to join division.

⁵⁰ Bartnicki A., Dalewska- Greń H.: "Konflikty współczesnego świata. Wielkie tematy", 2008, p. 178-179

⁵¹ Wągrowaska M.: "Udział Polski w interwencji zbrojnej i misji stabilizacyjnej w Iraku". **Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych**, 2004, p.16-17

Figure I : Coalition troops in Iraq



Source :news.bbc.co.uk

According to plan, in September 2003 Poland took command of division and area of 65 thousand km^2 including provinces: Najaf, Babil, Wasit and Kadisija, in total 15% of Iraq's area. Tasks of polish stabilization forces consist in leading to safety, public order, creating authorities, eliminating terrorist threats, protection of cultural heritage and giving help to humanitarian organizations. Besides, Poland sent to Iraq police officers and border patrol functionaries. It is important to note, that in polish law definition of 'stabilization mission' does not exist. In history of military operations such mission was never conducted.⁵²

⁵² Lasoń M.: "Polska misja w iraku Użycie sił zbrojnych jako środka polityki zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na przykładzie interwencji w Iraku 2003–2008", Kraków 2010, p. 140

Table II : Character of Shift and Number of Soldiers Who Took Part in Shift

Shift	Date	Character of mission	Number of soldiers
I	03.09.2003 13.02.2004	stabilization	2415
II	13.02.2004 18.07.2004	stabilization	2500
III	18.07.2004 01.02.2005	stabilization	2400
IV	01.02.2005 26.07.2005	stabilization- training	1700
V	26.07.2005 06.02.2006	stabilization - training	1500
VI	06.02.2006 18.07.2006	training- consultative	900
VII	18.07.2006 24.01.2007	training - consultative	900
VIII	24.01.2007 25.07.2007	training - consultative	900
IX	25.07.2007 30.01.2008	stabilization – training - consultative	900
X	30.01.2008 1.10.2008	stabilization – training - consultative	900

Source: www.rpo.gov.pl, access: 13.11.2018

By the 5 years of presence in Iraq polish soldiers changed 10 times, each half year lasted one shift. Due to that, many of soldiers stationed in Iraq more than once. First 3 shifts which lasted till January 2005 are characterized as stabilization shifts. However, intensification of dangers resulted with efforts to improve soldier's safety, that is why range of tasks and expectations from divisions had changed. Due to instable situation of Iraq character of mission several times got modified. By time number of soldiers in polish contingent was reduced. Policy makers were responsible

for duration and sphere of activity of Polish Military Contingent. Due to primary plans of Leszek Miller government soldiers were about to serve in stabilization mission in Iraq maximally for one year. However, rise of the resistance movement and destabilization of Iraq resulted with extending this period several times. Estimated date of evacuation of polish troops from Iraq was scheduled by government of Marek Belka for the end of 2005. However, this also did not happen, mission of polish soldiers only changed character from 'stabilization' to 'stabilization-training' and reduced number of personnel (table above). Due to President Lech Kaczyński decision presence of polish military contingent in Iraq was prolonged till end of 2006 and then end of 2007.⁵³ On 23rd of November 2007 newly chosen Prime Minister Donald Tusk in his expose announced decision about withdrawal for end of 2008: *'We made this decision, with the awareness how much important it is for society and soldiers. We will conduct withdrawal operation with the belief, that our obligation towards USA was performed correct. Final terms will be consulted with our allies. Year from now in Sejm I will say to ministers and public opinion that our mission is finished.'*⁵⁴ Presidents and Prime Ministers of Poland several times payed a visit to soldiers serving on mission in Iraq, mostly on the eve of national or religious holidays. These events were publicized in mass media thereby reminded public opinion about hard mission of polish soldiers on the Persian Gulf. Ministers of National Defence and local governments representatives were coming also to polish bases. Table above shows visitations of official representatives of Poland in Iraq.

⁵³Ciechanowski G.: "Wojsko Polskie w Iraku 2003-2011". Uniwersytet Szczeciński. Katedra Badań nad Konfliktami i Pokojem, 2015, p.189-191

⁵⁴ Prime Minister expose, <https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/expose-premiera-zobacz-co-obiecuje-tusk,41257.html>, access: 30.11.2018

Table III : Visitations of Official Representatives of Poland In Iraq

Function	Name	Date of visit
Prime Minister	Leszek Miller	11.11.2003
President	Aleksander Kwaśniewski	22.12.2003
Prime Minister	Marek Belka	22.12.2004
Prime Minister	Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz	21.12.2005
President	Lech Kaczyński	06.04.2006
Prime Minister	Jarosław Kaczyński	20.12.2006 16.05. 2007
Prime Minister	Donald Tusk	19.12.2007

Source:Ciechanowski G.:” Wojsko Polskie w Iraku 2003-2011”, Uniwersytet Szczeciński. Katedra Badań nad Konfliktami i Pokojem, 2015, p.190

Main reason of the withdrawal was domestic instability in Iraq and uncertainty of stabilization – training and consultative character of the mission in the face of worsening security, human losses and material costs. Culmination of the 5 years of Polish presence in Iraq was ceremony of handing over responsibility for security of Kadisiya province to Iraqi authorities on 16 of July 2008. In the years 2003- 2008 15 thousand of soldiers went to Iraq, 22 of them died and 116 were injure.⁵⁵ October 28th, 2008 plane with last soldiers landed in Goleniów, nearby Szczecin. Polish military presence in Iraq drawed to an end. At the welcoming soldiers ceremony Minister of National Defense Bogdan Klich stated, that Poland through their mission became more safe and Iraq became stable country. He emphasized modernization of polish army and gaining experience, which made army more professional. Prime

⁵⁵ Okraska T.:” Oblicza współczesnych konfliktów zbrojnych”, Uniwersytet Śląski 2014, p.80


Minister Donald Tusk in his speech added, that death of polish soldiers in Iraq is provoking thought to the rulers about making always well - chosen and responsible decisions.⁵⁶ According to government and President decision about sending Polish soldiers was correct and finished with success. However, vast majority of public opinion disagreed with Klich's and Tusk's stance and since 2003 was disapproving engagement in military intervention in Iraq.

2.3. Polish Public Towards Iraqi Mission

Polish government's decision about joining to intervention in Iraq never met with majority support in Poland. In first decade of September 2002, before decision about joining Iraqi intervention poll concluded by Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (CBOS) shows, that 46% of Poles was against supporting USA, while 35% of Poles approved military deployment, 19% was undecided. Chart below shows results of poll conducted few months later, in February 2003.

⁵⁶ <https://www.tvp.info/346234/informacje/polska/szczecin-uroczystosc-zakonczenia-irackiej-misji/>, access: 10.01.2019


Figure II : Intervention Approval



Source: CBOS 02/2003

Chart shows, that from 51% citizens against deployment 25 % was strongly against and 26% was rather against, while 29% of them agreed with government's decision, 21% rather supported and only 8% strongly supported. Undecided was 20% of interviewees.


Figure III : Reasons of intervention



Source: CBOS 02/2003

Government of Poland stated that main reason of intervention is possessing Mass Destruction Weapons by Iraq and possible economic advantages in the future as a result of supporting USA. Therefore, in CBOS poll majority of citizens – 31% pointed demilitarization of Iraq from Mass Destruction Weapons, second was taking control over Iraqi petroleum sources – 23%. However interestingly, around 16% of interviewees answered that reason of intervention is USA aiming to dominate over the world. Only one percent less answered, that main aim is abolishment of Saddam Hussein regime - 15%. Undecided was 13% of citizens and 2% pointed other reasons intervention.


Figure IV : Possessing Mass Destruction Weapons and Intervention Support



Source: CBOS 01/2003

Possessing Mass Destruction Weapons is playing a crucial role for Polish citizens in explaining appropriateness of intervention. In polls above interviewees were asked if military intervention should happen if UNSC will not reveal such possession. Despite the fact, that between polls was only a month difference we can observe significant change of answers. In poll conducted in December 2002 around 34% of interviewees was strongly opposed to military intervention, 45% answered that can support intervention only if UN will show possessing of Mass Destruction Weapons, otherwise they are against. Only 6% supported intervention without any condition and 15 % was undecided. In poll conducted in January 2003 strongly opposed to intervention was 51%, supporting intervention under possessing mass destruction weapons condition decreased to 37%, strong support decreased to only 4%.


Figure V : Poland's Support If USA Will Start Military Action



Source: CBOS 02/2003

Generally Polish citizens are supporting Pro-Western orientation of Polish foreign policy and strengthening relations with United States. However, when they were asked about Poland's supporting USA military action in Iraq over the three months, we can observe decreased support from 35% in December 2002 to 29% in February 2003 and significant increase of not supporting USA decision from 46 % in December 2002 to 62 % in February 2003.

Figure VI : Polish Soldiers Involvement in Iraq



Source: CBOS 02/2003

It is important to stress out, that supporting USA actions and sending polish soldiers carries risks for them and their families. When human factor was taking into consideration citizens were strongly against sending polish troops to Iraq. Poll results show that 25% supported sending soldiers in January 2003 and in February number of supporters decreased to 17%. People against involvement of polish soldiers increased from 67% in January 2003 to 76% in February 2003. Two tables below

are showing results of polls conducted over the years 2003 and 2004 after decision was taken and around 2 thousand soldiers were stationing in Iraq. In September 2003 responsibility over one stabilization zone was about to be given to Poles. In polls interviewees were asked if they support soldiers presence in Iraq or not. Results are showing that decision about taking control over one stabilization zone met with support of citizens. It was seen as a reward and sign of good and flourishing work of polish soldiers. That is why it was only one moment during intervention when support increased from 36% in July 2003 to 42% in January 2004 and disapproval slightly decreased from 55% in July 2003 to 53% in January 2004.

Table IV : Stabilization Zone I

Since September 2003 Polish Soldiers are responsible for one stabilization zone in Iraq. As a result, around 2 thousand soldiers went to Iraq. Are you supporting operation in Iraq or not?	Dates of Poll						
	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII	I
	2003						2004
	%						
Definitely Yes	10	9	13	13	10	12	15
Rather Yes	26	25	27	24	18	21	27
Support	36	34	40	37	28	33	42
Definitely Not	30	33	30	31	46	37	31
Rather Not	25	27	23	26	21	25	22
Not Support	55	60	53	57	67	62	53

Source: CBOS 01/2004

However, in 2004 situation changed significantly, as a result of death of 4 Poles: 2 journalists and 2 soldiers. These tragic events influenced peoples answers in poll. In May 2004 was the lowest support of Iraqi intervention – only 22% and the highest

disapproval - 74 %. Polish citizens had hope and expected, that polish soldiers can return to country before formal ending of operation, as Spanish soldiers did. Moreover, media started to talk about American Soldiers abusing Iraqi captives. It resulted with significant decrease of support. It is important to stress out, that attitude of Poles toward presence of Polish soldiers was also slightly influenced by their fear, that Poland may become aim of terrorist attacks by Muslim fundamentalists in the future.

Table V : Stabilization Zone II

Since September 2003 Polish Soldiers are responsible for one stabilization zone in Iraq. As a result, around 2 thousand soldiers went to Iraq. Are you supporting operation in Iraq or not?	Dates of Poll				
	I	II	III	IV	V
	2004				
	%				
Definitely Yes	15	12	11	12	8
Rather Yes	27	23	25	17	15
Support	42	35	36	29	22
Definitely Not	31	36	35	40	53
Rather Not	22	24	25	26	21
Not Support	53	60	60	66	74

Source: CBOS 05/2004

Citizens, who supported Iraqi mission, were mainly educated and interested in politics sympathizers of Civic Platform (PO) and Law and Justice (PiS). The biggest opponents were sympathizers of fringe, far right party Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR).

Figure VII : Supporting Iraqi Intervention Over The Years



Source: CBOS 06/2007

Chart Above shows support of Iraqi intervention by Polish citizens in the years 2003-2007. In May 2005 support for all this time was the lowest. In December 2005 UN Security Council resolution sanctioning presence of international stabilization forces in Iraq was about to expire. As a result, Minister of National Defense, Jerzy Szmajdziński announced, that Polish soldiers will return to Poland in December 2005. When poll was taken, over 70 % of interviewees answered, that after December Poland should not help in stabilization of Iraq. Two years passed since Saddam Hussein regime was abolished. Poland since the beginning supported USA in Iraqi intervention and engaged Polish Army. However, such decision was seen in first months of 2003 as rightful only by a quarter of Polish citizens. In September 2003, when military action finished, and Poland took control over the one zone of Iraq around 30% supported such decision. With noticeable fluctuations, depending

mostly on internal situation in Iraq, such level of support was continued. At the beginning of 2005 took place elections in Iraq and progressively Iraqi security forces started to take part in protection of order and security also in Polish zone, which resulted with decreasing number of Polish soldiers. Distinctive decrease of supporting Polish presence in Iraq was result of believing, that mission brings financially, politically and for image of Poland more losses than gains. In CBOS poll from March 2005 for the first time in all these three aspects opinion that Poland is losing overbalanced benefiting from presence in Iraq. Nevertheless, Polish soldiers did not return to country in December 2005, as a result of decision taken by Government, that in February 2006 sixth contingent of soldiers will start military service in Iraq. In January 2006 CBOS conducted a poll, in which asked citizens about presence of Polish soldiers in Iraq. However, support of Poles only slightly changed since President announced extension of mission in Iraq – 22% in December 2005 and 23% in January 2006. Percent of citizens against Polish contingent in Iraq did not change since December and came to 72%. Based on data collected by CBOS⁵⁷, opinion against presence of Poles in Iraq dominated among people, regardless of their pro or anti- European attitude. Most of interviewees saw prolongation of mission for next 12 months as a decision beneficial for Polish-American relations - 67% and beneficial for Iraq – 59 %. However, only 19% of them perceived this decision as beneficial for Poland. Among opponents of mission vast majority – 83% believed, that next year of presence in Iraq would be unprofitable for Poland.

⁵⁷ CBOS: "Skutki przedłużenia obecności polskich żołnierzy w Iraku", 02/2006

As a result of decision taken by Polish government, soldiers stationed in Iraq also in 2007. Support of public towards Iraqi mission decreased from 20% in January 2007 to 16% in October 2007. Month by month disapproval was increasing from 77 % in January 2007 up to 81 % in October 2007. Donald Tusk officially stated, that his Government till end of 2008 will withdraw Polish army from Iraq. In November 2007 in survey conducted by CBOS⁵⁸ 73 % of interviewee took side of withdrawal soldiers as soon as possible, even in first half of 2008. Possibility of staying longer than till the end of 2008 was supported by only 8%.⁵⁹ Attitude against presence of soldiers in Iraq was predominating over all social and demographical groups of citizens, without regard for their political views. Table down below shows result of polls conducted in years 2003 – 2007 by CBOS.

Table VI : Supporting Iraqi Intervention Over the Years

Are you supporting operation in Iraq or not?	Date of Poll																											
	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII	I	II	III	V	XII	I	I	VI	VIII	X	
	'03					'04												'05					'06	'07				
	%																											
	Definitely Yes	9	13	13	10	12	15	12	11	12	8	9	8	10	8	8	8	9	9	10	7	6	7	7	5	3	5	3
Rather Yes	25	27	24	18	21	27	23	25	17	15	19	15	16	17	15	16	18	19	18	21	14	15	16	15	12	12	13	
Support	34	40	37	28	33	42	35	36	29	22	28	23	26	25	23	24	27	28	28	28	20	22	23	20	15	17	16	
Rather Not	27	23	26	21	25	22	24	25	26	21	20	22	24	22	22	23	23	24	22	29	24	29	29	29	32	30	28	
Definitely Not	33	30	31	46	37	31	36	35	40	53	46	51	46	49	52	49	45	44	46	40	51	43	43	48	49	50	53	
Not Support	60	53	57	67	62	53	60	60	66	74	66	73	70	71	74	72	68	68	68	69	75	72	72	77	81	80	81	

Source: CBOS 10/2007

⁵⁸CBOS: "O terminie wycofania żołnierzy polskich z Iraku", 11/2007

After 5 years of Polish presence in Iraq, in October 2008 soldiers returned to country. During all this time Poland's participation in war and stabilization process was object of public disputes and plenty of public opinion polls. Right after withdrawal, in November 2008 TNS OBOP conducted last, summarizing poll on the subject of Polish presence in Iraq. All polls held by OBOP in years 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2008 results show, that public opinion was in vast majority against sending soldiers and their presence in Iraq. These results undermine view, that opinion is often fluctuating. Persistent was also divergence between mass public opinion and stance of Polish government. Certainly, this case is ideal example to debate about role of public opinion in decision making process of democratic government of Poland. Why government ignored public opinion while deciding about sending troops to Iraq?

2.4. Polish Ways of Public Opinion Polls Implementation

Polish scholars started to use polls and questionnaires at the end of XIX century. In the beginning, they were surveys concerning social problems, which is understandable considering, the fact, that till 1919 it was hard to conduct any survey under annexationist's supervision. That is why polls had to be politically neutral. However, willingness from the public to cooperation was not significant. Surveys among the public were hold frequently during the interwar period, unfortunately many of them got destroyed at World War II. After WWII public opinion polls were taken at sociological academies till the time when sciences such as psychology or sociology were acclaimed as bourgeoisie sciences and there is no place for them at socialists Universities. As a result of this decision city of Łódź became center where

all most remarkable polish sociologists were working. Admittedly, polls were not conducted till 1956 - renaissance of empirical surveys. Nevertheless, authors of surveys had problems with censorship - in 1957 results of poll conducted by Zofia Józefowicz and Anna Pełczyńska were published on first page of New York Times, but not in any newspaper in Poland. Survey was concerning evaluation of period 1945 – 1955 and influence of this period on polish students. Publishing results of this survey which showed skepticism of the polish youth resulted with political scandal on the west. This poll was analyzed and quoted by scholars, politicians and journalists. After 1956 sociologists started to be fascinated so-called '*experimental sociology*' which emphasized, that public opinion can be analyzed not only through polls but also through conversations with people or observation behavior of masses during protests and strikes. At the same time rulers of Poland desired to get information what society is thinking about. In democratic countries getting such knowledge is not difficult, but in undemocratic states special agents such as secret police needed to work for government and make their own reports about public opinion.⁶⁰ Today for polish society it is almost impossible to imagine political and media scene without OBOP and CBOS. Multitude of taken surveys resulted with situation when part of society identifies public opinion with results of surveys.

2.4.1. Ośrodek Badań Opinii Publicznej – OBOP

Centre Of Public Opinion Research (OBOP) was established in 1958 as a result of transformation Public Opinion Research Office, which worked on governments'

⁶⁰ Młyniec E.: "Opinia Publiczna. Elementy teorii i praktyki politycznej". Adam Marszałek, 2015, p.29-32

commission. From the very beginning OBOP was struggling with financial and staff problems. During the cold war researches mostly were concerning media however publishing results of them was much restricted. Breakthrough happen in 1974, when Centre got significant financial help which enabled to hire payed interviewers and buy first computers. Having own informatic base let OBOP to establish permanent researches. Since 1975 Centre started to publish own quarterly science journal: 'Messages and Opinions'. In 1970s base of polls extended much, research area changed from media to politics, nevertheless still authorities were controlling access to this information. Till 1993 OBOP was part of Polish Radio and Television.

2.4.2. Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej - CBOS

Society's Opinion Research Centre (CBOS) was established in 1982 as a governmental unit. In the beginning Centre was conducting researches in very limited range, furthermore, part of them was secret (in 1985 it was 63%). That is main reason why CBOS was losing credibility among polish society. Even though Centers' surveys contained propaganda considering contemporary political situation in Poland any source of information is better than nothing. Since 1990 significantly increased number of researches taken by CBOS and established cooperation with Central European University in Budapest, Academy for Educational Development and Cambridge Studies. In years 1991- 1995 CBOS published 807 documents.⁶¹

⁶¹ Ibid, p.33

CHAPTER 3

ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN IRAQ INTERVENTION

3.1. Public Opinion in Foreign Policy Decision Making

Public opinion evolved through centuries on the grounds of many sciences. Scholars do not limit creation of public opinion to only one concrete historical event. Public opinion started to be developed within the confines of theory of state, law and political science. Politicians, thinkers and philosophers were interested especially in the process of creating individual's consciousness in a reference to state. By years, interest over public opinion accumulated. Every nation experienced events which were the cynosure of all eyes of people and social groups. To rule over people, it was crucial to know, how opinion of country's society can be influenced, which factors stimulate the public the most. Various of institutions, organizations and states seek to influence public opinion, which is indicative of its power. Based on currently used definitions of public opinion it is described as the totality of dominating in society opinions, expressed about issues.⁶² It is a phenomenon characterized by following features: concern groups and collectivities, emerge as a result of social interactions, touching controversial political decisions, is subjectively sovereign.⁶³ Media research in the 1990s pointed out the rise of public opinion and the media and their potential to influence key decisions of global politics.⁶⁴ That is why public opinion plays an important role in debates about international issues, especially concerning armed conflicts and peace. Moreover, public's actual role in the foreign policy making is

⁶² Lepa A.: "Opinia publiczna, media i zasady etyki". *Paedagogia Christiana* 1/27, Łódź–Warszawa 2011, p.90

⁶³ Młyniec E.: "Opinia publiczna : wstęp do teorii". Forum Naukowe Poznań 2002, p.81

⁶⁴ Leonard M.,Stead C.,Smewing C.: "Public Diplomacy". London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2002, p. 22–30.

still evolving. Contemporary, it is believed, that without public opinion modern societies cannot exist.⁶⁵ From the political communication point of view scholars are determining few main functions of public opinion⁶⁶:

Representative – public opinion should be opened to all social groups, all subjects and opinions which are the cynosure of all eyes.

Evaluative – implementation to public opinion subjects and problems which are becoming important in the eyes of people, even if their objective importance is slight.

Orientative – public opinion externalizes specified problems and subject them to verification by people. Issues can be accepted or not.

To these three main functions proposed by S.Michalczyk it is possible to show three additional functions of public opinion in political system:

Integrative – comparing peoples' who work in public space opinions with our opinions.

Monitoring –observing and analyzing all activity of politicians and issues connected with politics.

Creational – creating new situations which play important role for competition in politics, such as changing piece of legislation, demission of government, new ideas or patterns of behavior. This function is much important – related with awareness of having influence on ruler's decision - making process.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Michalczyk S.: "Demokracja medialna Teoretyczna analiza problemu". Adam Marszałek 2010, p.169

⁶⁶ Michalczyk S.: "Komunikowanie polityczne. Teoretyczne aspekty procesu". Śląsk Wydawnictwo Naukowe 2005, p.158-159

⁶⁷ Młyniec E.: "Opinia publiczna : wstęp do teorii". Forum Naukowe Poznań 2002, p.37-39

It is believed, that public opinion is a reliable guide in making politics. Polls measure the wishes and preferences of people. Reports of public opinion may affect courses of action pursued by governments. An extreme view is that public opinion which calculate benefits and risks of particular policy can control most policymakers' choices.⁶⁸ Polls are often named as legal 'ammunition' which proponents of policies can use. Governments, in order to effectively lead the people should know their opinions and attitudes. In last decades due to democratization process in Poland we could observe increased role of public opinion, because in democratic countries politics of all tiers are depend on citizens votes. Public opinion is an inseparable element of polish democracy. Usually politicians' decision - making processes is intrinsic to the controversial situations. It is a result of fact, that each decision meet with a critique from a part of unfulfilled citizens. Immediately after, other politicians are trying to take advantage of the opportunity and trying to earn dissatisfied peoples' trust. While making plans, politicians are trying to estimate the scope and intensity of the opposition (mostly with the usage of polls) and chances of unpopular decision to get support from society. Undoubtedly, democratic system is optimal environment for public opinion to function within. Conditions and guarantees preserved by democracy are enabling public opinion to get widen and deepen. In undemocratic systems or in states, where democracy is just declarative, the public aim to create a civil society through ignoring authoritarian rulers and try to build democracy even in unfavorable environment. However, creating an opinion cannot occur if person does not possess enough knowledge. Opinions should not be treated as authoritative if respondents do not understand terms or effects of foreign policy

⁶⁸ Bobrow D.B.: "International Public Opinion: Incentives and Options to Comply and Challenge". University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs 2005-16, p.3

decision. People which do not have efficient or true information can be easily manipulated by mass media. Robert Weissberg in the article ‘Why Policymakers Should Ignore Public Opinion Polls’ suggests that is why contemporary polls are not efficient guides while making politics. Rather, they are seducing respondents and do not provide worthwhile advice about policy. The mass media are a strong weapon of policymakers, not without a reason they are called the fourth estate.⁶⁹ They are playing the crucial role of collecting and distributing information. Naturally, through the media most individuals can receive information about foreign affairs. Despite a widely belief, that media’s mission is only informing the public, the truth is that people can be informationally disadvantaged due to information asymmetry. Media are the link between leaders and public but rarely act as independent, rather tend to favor leaders. It is a result of relying on leaders’ access to information therefore media present information within a frame preferable for leaders. When politicians are trying to convince the public, especially during the elections, their success often depends on how much money they intended for campaign. It is also applicable in making foreign policy. Mass media play a significant role in determining public attention to foreign affairs.⁷⁰ Citizens might not be highly informed about foreign policy issues, they often use prompts contained in questions. Therefore, wording of surveys’ questions is highly influencing results of poll. Individuals might not be able to know details of Iraq war in 2003, but survey questions could touch their morality, values and preferences. It results with having predispositions of their country to be involved in armed conflict and their sons to be sent to war. On issues of war and

⁶⁹ Weissberg R.: “Why Policymakers Should Ignore Public Opinion Polls”. **Policy Analysis** no.402, 2001, p. 5-6

⁷⁰ Soroka S.N.: “Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy”. 2003, p.28

peace people share universal judgements. Every country's citizens would avoid risky actions and possible life losses in war.⁷¹ Above mentioned feature is one of the reasons why scholars and foreign policy experts sometimes tend to characterize public opinion as an incapable of producing rational opinions on foreign policy matters.⁷² However, other features of public opinion such as stability, coherence and plausibility are making it out as a reliable, rational source of information. Fluctuations in surveys' answers are rare, public opinion turns out to be very stable. Moreover, it is believed, that individuals' opinions are coherent. It means, that citizens' views on one set of issues is correlated to their views on other, similar issues. As an example, people who would favor strong role of United Nations, tend to be critical of military power. Coherence is a big advantage of public opinion. The public's ability to gather and analyze information, later to formulate coherent opinions, is integral part of democracy. Responsiveness to the public is being considered as a core of democratic governance. Public opinion is also plausible, changes in reaction to events and government policies successes or failures. Through participation of public governments can better understand needs of citizens and consequently fulfil them, precisely determine priorities, justify their actions more reliable. Opportunity to know intentions of government at the early stage of deciding process facilitate convincing the people to support the actions.⁷³

⁷¹ Eichenberg R.C.: "Public Opinion on Foreign Policy Issues. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, London: Oxford University Press, 2016, p.16-17

⁷² Holsti Ole R.: "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus", **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1992, p. 25–98

⁷³ Długosz D., Wygnanski J.J.: "Obywatele Współdecydują, Przewodnik po partycypacji społecznej", Forum Inicjatyw Pozarządowych Warszawa 2005, p.11-12

3.2. Conditions Under Which Governments Tend to Ignore Public Opinion

3.2.1. Perceptions of International Gains

The most important aim of each state during the decision-making process is survival in the international system. There are three dimensions of the interests of country in survival: a political, economic and ideological.⁷⁴ Political dimension refer to power of states in the international system and states' governments who seek to remain in office. Wealth is the core of economic dimension, which implying that states will aim to make efficient trading agreements adjusted to their opportunities to have a comparative advantage and will focus on stable development of employment, GDP and other economic indicators. Ideological dimension indicates that each state is wishing to play a certain role in the international system and safeguard principles on which country's policy is based. Different dimensions of states interests, internal and external is provided in table below:

⁷⁴Alons G.C.:” Predicting a State’s Foreign Policy: State Preferences between Domestic and International Constraints”.**Foreign Policy Analysis**, 2007, p.211-216

Figure VIII : Different dimensions of a State's domestic and international interests

<i>External</i>		<i>Internal</i>
	Political material interest	
Defending the relative power position of the state.		Remaining in office (re-election).
	Political immaterial interest	
Defending the state's credibility.		Defending the government's credibility.
	Economic interest	
Tuning international trading agreements to the state's institutional trade opportunities.		Maximizing national economic indicators: state budget, GNP, employment etc.
	Ideological interest	
Safeguarding the 'role' the state wishes to play in the international system.		Defending the government's policy principles and paradigms.

Source: Alons G.C.: "Predicting a State's Foreign Policy: State Preferences between Domestic and International Constraints", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2003, p.215

As table shows, defending the relative power position of the state internationally, therefore the political dimension may be considered as priority over the economic and ideological dimensions. It is believed, that political and military security is a precondition for each state to be able to aim for economic and ideological goals. In economic foreign policy, states will aim to maximalize economic benefits as long as it does not conflict with their political material interest.

States' perception of struggling for power refers to realism. Due to realism, states are the key actors in the international system and each state is aiming to become more powerful in order to maximize its own interests and security.⁷⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, international relations realist, author of *Politics Among Nations*, emphasize that

⁷⁵Korab-Karpowicz, W. J.: "Political Realism in International Relations". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/realism-intl-relations/>>, access: 20.11.2018

humans are egoistic and skeptical by the nature, moreover, people have insatiable lust for power and to dominate. Therefore, self-interest overcomes morality. Anarchy is considered as the determinant of political outcomes. Since no authority above states exists states can define their interests and their power may shape relations between countries. To put it briefly, the only existing right is right of stronger state to dominate the weaker one. In anarchic world security is a core issue of each state and to increase security states seek to be powerful in order to balance other countries, which are potential threats. Hans Morgenthau and other representatives of realist school are skeptical about public's contribution to foreign policy and describe public opinion as a barrier in making coherent and effective diplomacy. Due to realist's public should not have a significant impact on foreign policy, because its preferences are more emotional than rational. Moreover, making foreign policy decisions requires secrecy and flexibility, it could be seriously jeopardized.⁷⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz attempted to cure and reformulate realism and responded to Morgenthau with more scientific approach, known as structural realism or neorealism which became very influential within the discipline of international relations. Difference between realism and neorealism lies in attitude towards human nature, whereas Morgenthau based his theory on struggle for power as a result of selfishness of human nature, Waltz avoided including human nature to his theory. Neorealism argues that states behave in similar ways and all states have same fundamental interest despite their different governments and political ideologies, which is survival. Moreover, for neorealists power is not an end in itself like for realists, therefore rational states will accumulate the power in order to ensure security. Common denominator of realism

⁷⁶ Holsti O.R.: "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1992, p.440

and neorealism is fact that according to these theories, international gains, are what states seek for while making foreign policy rather than domestic political gains. The only difference is that for realists' international gains refer to increased external influence and for neorealists' to increased security of state. How much importance to international gains is assigned by political leaders is undoubtedly affecting if politicians are taking into consideration preferences of public. International gains are various of pay-offs which can increase states' international power position.⁷⁷ In situations when essential international gains are at stake and government needs to make a foreign policy decision, if views of the public are different than views of authorities then it is much likely, that domestic political gains (such as remain in office) will be ignored.⁷⁸ Politicians perceive international gains as essential, when they are crucial for states' security and/or when states' international influence may significantly increase/decrease, because influence mean power. Americas intervention in Iraq can be an example to show, that war is an instrument which can be used to strengthen country's position in international arena. Invasion on Iraq, without UNSC approval is confirming realist statement, that when hegemon country, such as United States is deciding about war, will not take into consideration other countries or international law obligations. Poland's military engagement in Iraq after September 11 was consistent with realist assumption, that country, if only will see possibility to increase its security or extend its sphere of influence can decide to use power. Being ally of America during Iraq intervention was result of Poland's willingness to reach specific goals. Strengthening security of Poland was main

⁷⁷Alons, G.C.: Predicting a state's foreign policy: state preferences between domestic and international constraints. Foreign policy analysis, 2007, p.214

⁷⁸ Doeser F.: "When governments ignore public opinion in foreign policy: Poland and the Iraq invasion". *European Security*, 22:3, 2013, p.418

reason, why it decided to go to war in Iraq. USA, because of its superior military strength is seen by politicians and citizens as the only one country which can guarantee help in case of Russian threat. Aim of political elite of Poland was demonstration its reliability to US, which would result with stronger than ever relations with United States perceived as strategic ally. As a result, Poland supports American leadership within NATO and NATO missions. Second goal was becoming more important player on international arena. Decision to stand with America against France and Germany was risky for Poland, especially because Poland was not European Union member yet and it could influence its membership. However, government took that risk, because saw possibility of strengthening country's position within European Union. Polish politicians believed in possibility to create a 'new Europe', less dependent from Germany and France. Moreover, participation in Iraq intervention could result with economic gains, however, they were of secondary importance.

3.2.2. Elite Consensus

Elite consensus is defined as the lack of a mainstream opposition to the proposed by government policy and publicly showing support to this proposition by the most important opposition leaders.⁷⁹ Elite consensus is one of the determinants in making foreign policy decisions. If consensus among elite exists and the opposition has a similar stand, leading party does not have to be concerned about losing votes or being outflanked by competitors. When all parties take political risk of the decision,

⁷⁹ Zaller J.: "Elite Leadership of Mass Opinion: New Evidence from the Gulf War. In Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War". University of Chicago Press, 1994, p.195-196

then elite does not have to worry about losing votes in elections. Therefore, government will keep on doing policy even if it is unpopular among the public. Sarah Kreps in the article ‘Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan’ argues that elite consensus limits impact of public opinion on foreign policy decision making. As an example, she showed, that during contributing troops to Afghanistan, leaders of countries ignored hostile public opinion, moreover, did not reduced nor withdrawn their forces despite low levels of public support.

Table VII : Government and Opposition Policies on Afghanistan in Lead NATO Contributing Countries

Country	Government policy	Opposition position
United States	Troop increase	Bipartisan support
United Kingdom	Troop increase	Support for troop increase in both major parties
Germany	Troop increase	Support for troop increase in both major parties
France	Troop increase	Supports a civilian strategy but not withdrawal of military troops from Afghanistan
Italy	Troop increase	Major parties have voted with governing majority
Canada	Extend troop presence	Approved by liberals and conservatives

Source: Kreps S.:” Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan”, 2010, p.198

In all of countries presented in the table above mainstream opposition supported troop deployment policy. High degrees of elite consensus were the reason why lack

of public support for chosen government policy did not result with troops withdrawal. Moreover, countries decided to increase troops in Afghanistan. Such support among parties let the governments to resist preferences of the public. If the consequences of the decision will be negative, then all parties will fail and have to stand accountable. When elite consensus exist, voters cannot differentiate between parties' positions and cannot 'punish' them in elections. Public opinion influence decreased, it allowed governments to increase commitment to NATO operation in Afghanistan. Moreover, Sarah Kreps stated that one of the reasons, why elite consensus emerged is being a member of formal institutions, such as NATO and systemic pressures to cooperate, which it entails : *"The result of systemic factors is that elites are sensitive to the costs of international defection and converge around a commitment to international cooperation, which reduces the electoral and foreign policy effects of public opinion."* Thus, being a member of NATO may result with elite consensus this in turn may reduce the impact of public opinion on foreign policy decisions. Active public debate or discussion among political leaders concerning foreign policy issue activates public opinion and allow people to determine whether to support governments' decision or to disagree. However, if there is elite consensus then no debate takes place. Elite consensus on unpopular issues is a surprising phenomenon, because reasonable for opposition groups would be to diverge from chosen by government unpopular policy and choosing strategies which appeal to voters and maximize their electoral gain and result with wining in next elections. However, elite consensus refers only to particular government's policy and does not mean lack of elite opposition.

Political elite of Poland includes President, governing parties and opposition parties. Decision about sending Polish troops to Iraq came from President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Prime Minister Leszek Miller and Minister of Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, however all cabinet and main opposition parties supported it. Mainstream Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej), Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe), Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska) and Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) parties agreed with government's policy and emphasized need of Poland to strengthen relations with United States. Future plans of political elite were based on cooperation with America in order to modernise Polish military and establish American military bases in Poland. Therefore all parties took political risk of the decision about involvement in Iraq. Only the fringe parties, far-right League of Polish Families and populist Self Defence criticized illegality of invasion and Poland's servility to USA. Views of these parties were not anti-American, rather they preferred isolationism of Poland. Nevertheless, none of these parties was a part of political elite at time of decision making. Political consensus in Poland and lack of opposition resulted with no public debate which led up to low issue salience of the Iraq invasion among the public, which is second factor of why democratic government of Poland ignored public opinion.

3.2.3. Issue Salience

Due to definition issue salience means importance that public opinion gives to a certain political issue in relation to other issues.⁸⁰ The word ‘salience’ traditionally was used to determine the importance of issues, particularly during elections. Salience is an important concept in political science research to define importance of issues - greater salience means greater importance.⁸¹ The relationship between public opinion, issue salience, and foreign policy, over the years has been the subject of researches. Salience is playing main role in theories of governments responsiveness. Table below presents how much the impact of public opinion on policy increases, when salience is ignored and when is taken into account:

Table VIII : Public Opinion Impact When Issue Salience Is Taken into Account

Impact	Salience ignored %	Salience taken into account %
None	32	0
Ambiguous	2	0
Policy importance not discussed	37	27
Little policy importance	2	9
Substantial policy importance	27	64
Total Number	41	11

Source: Burstein P.: “The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda”. **Political Research Quarterly**, 56(1), 2003, p.34

⁸⁰ Oppermann, K., Viehrig, H.:” The public salience of foreign and security policy in Britain, Germany and France”. **West European politics**, 32 (5), 2009, p. 926

⁸¹Wlezien Ch.:” On the Salience of Political Issues: The Problem with ‘Most Important Problem’”. Nuffield College and the University of Oxford 2009, p.1-5

Based on data from the table, without taking salience into account, public opinion has no impact on policy in 34% of cases. Naturally, if citizens do not see the issue as salient, policymakers can pursue a policy which is not preferred by the public without risk of losing electorate. However, when importance of policy is substantial, then impact of public opinion increases- 64 % of cases. Therefore, issue salience has powerful impact on government responsiveness. Moreover, issue salience is also related with previous factor: elite consensus.⁸² Elite dissensus on the foreign policy decision results with intensive public discussions and appearance of opposition. In such situation issue is started to be seen by public as more salient and the more important political issue is for people, the more government has to take into account public opinion while making a decision. Elite consensus and lack of debate on the other hand may result with seeing issue as unimportant therefore decreasing issue salience. If on the election day people are voting through the prism of particular foreign policy issue, then it means this issue is salient. However, there is no published studies which would prove that increased salience of an issue results with automatically increased knowledge of the public.⁸³

In the case of Poland, citizens did not perceive Iraq issue as salient. The main reason of such behavior was fact, that more important for them were other events. Table IX shows results of poll taken in January 2004, when people were asked about most important event from 2003. Referendum on Poland's membership in the European Union was chosen by 58% of Poles. Second choice were domestic problems, such as

⁸²Doeser F.: "When governments ignore public opinion in foreign policy: Poland and the Iraq invasion". **European Security**, 22:3, 2013, p.415

⁸³Weaver D.: "Issue salience and public opinion: are there consequences of agenda-setting?", **International Journal of Public Opinion Research**, Volume 3, Issue 1, 1991, p. 53-68

politician's corruption, which had direct impact on Poles and resulted with decreasing of trust to political elite. Polish involvement in the Iraqi mission was chosen by only 8%.

Table IX : Importance of Polish participation in Iraq relative to other developments

Development in 2003	Importance
EU referendum, negotiations with EU	58%
Domestic politics, including corruptions, strikes	11%
Polish involvement in the Iraqi invasion	8%
No important developments	7%
It is hard to say	23%

Source: CBOS: "Wydarzenie roku 2003 w Polsce i na świecie", 01/2004

One of the reasons of seeing EU referendum as more salient is fact, that before referendum took place, Government launched a huge pro – EU campaign in all Poland. Moreover, television and press did not pay as much attention to intervention in Iraq as EU accession. As a result, Iraq issue salience significantly decreased. One more example of low issue salience may be the fact, that opposition to war was expressed by really low amount of people (the largest number of people taking part in demonstrations was about 2000). Showing disapproval to Government decision involved minority of the society.

3.2.4. Timing of Next Elections

In democracies politicians are held accountable in regular elections. During the voting, citizens are considering what government accomplished and what failed to achieve. It is one of the reasons, why governments are analyzing potential reactions of the public while making foreign policy decisions. It is important for leaders to maintain high levels of public approval which can be quickly weakened by unpopular foreign policies. On the other hand, by initiating popular foreign policies governments enhance public support and do not have to worry about their position. However, often public is forming its expectations from leaders only vaguely, that is why leaders must select a concrete policy course. Public's current opinion about politicians is not the most important, but at times when next elections are soon public's view become critical. Popularity of policy proposal and salience of the issue are the factors influencing voting decisions. The more salient policy issues the more weight on people's decisions. Indicators determining popularity of policies are relatively constant, that is why leaders often rely on historical experience. It is taken as granted that decisions such as participation in costly war will most likely result with alienating the public. Attentiveness of public is selective, politicians decisions on a particular policy issue will weigh the actions in next elections.⁸⁴ If public sees problem as salient, then during elections wants to punish politicians for failures in foreign policy, *'this leads elected officials to be particularly responsive [to public*

⁸⁴ Knecht T., Weatherford M.S.: "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Stages of Presidential Decision Making", *International Studies Quarterly* 2006, p. 705–710

*opinion] on highly salient issues.*⁸⁵ It is proven that when election time comes voters' decisions are not only result of personal feelings about a candidate but they can sort out differences between parties about concerning them issues even from the past.⁸⁶ However, when there is long time till next elections sometimes leaders' sensitivity to public decrease and they are willing to risk electoral support and choose criticized policy despite the fact, that the vast majority of the public prefer the opposite. Moreover, if ruling parties' political power is strong, then probability of retain a post increase and politicians lean towards ignoring opposition of public. Kurt Gaubatz in his work: 'Elections and war: the electoral incentive in the democratic politics of war and peace' analyzed impact of timing of the election on politicians' decisions concerning military action in democratic states. As he stated, if democratic government is considering participation in war/military action, then it is less likely to make a decision before election – government will postpone it till after elections. Moreover, probability of conflicts is bigger during the first half of office. Therefore, the closer time to next election, the more important public opinion becomes for politicians, especially if is opposing to foreign policy decision (Gaubatz, 1999).⁸⁷ Decision to send polish contingent to Iraq was made in 2003, in the middle of parliamentary election cycle. Previous election took place in 2001, next one was about to be held in 2005. Therefore, timing of next election was not one of the main factors which Government considered during decision making process. There were still two years till next election, therefore potential loosing electorate because of

⁸⁵Burstein P.: "The impact of public opinion on public policy: a review and an agenda". **Political research quarterly**, 56/1, 2003 p.30

⁸⁶ Repass D.E.: "Issue Saliency and Party Choice". University of Connecticut, 1971, p.394-395

⁸⁷Gaubatz K.: "Elections and war: the electoral incentive in the democratic politics of war and peace". Stanford, California: Stanford University Press 1999, p.79

pursuing a policy which is opposed by majority of population would not be immediately felt by politicians. Moreover, because of consensus among political elite existed, all parties held accountable for Iraq intervention. Furthermore, contemporary President of Poland at that time, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, already served two terms of office and was not eligible to be chosen for third time. As a result, ruling elite calculated, that pursuing a divergent from public opinion policy is not risky.

3.2.5. Crisis and Non-Crisis Decisions

To interpret crisis situation correctly it is crucial to understand what crisis is, because usually it has negative connotation, as a phenomenon which changes situation only to worse. However, due to definition crisis is a “*temporary situation, crucial for future development*”.⁸⁸ If after intermediate state development, not regress should occur, then crisis can be a chance to improve. If only right actions will be taken, then crisis will not spin out of control. Distinction between crisis and non-crisis situation is crucial in decision making process. Crisis creates a threat to country’s basic values and needs rapid response. Crises are perceived as a situation in which using military force is highly likely. On the other hand, non-crisis situations will not result with using military force and decision-making process and implementation of policy is longer. Duration and intensity of public opinion interest are the factors which enable to make a distinction between crises and non-crises. Generally, crises situations concern war and peace issues, to which public cannot remain neutral. Public and media are highly attentive, showing interest and approval/disapproval of

⁸⁸ Sztompka P.:” Socjologia. Analiza społeczeństwa”, Kraków 2002, p. 446

governments policy. Therefore, salience increases if situation is a crisis. Rarely non-crisis situations grow in popularity and attention comparable to crises rather public is ambivalent. It is the result of the fact, that they are longer in duration. International issues agreements concerning environmental protection or monetary policy can remain unsolved on political agenda and need governmental attentiveness for a very long time. Naturally, media and public are losing interest on protracted issues. Secondly, non-crises develop over a long time, touch complex subjects remote for citizens and to solve them elite debate in media and strong public participation can decrease decision making autonomy.⁸⁹ Political elite of Poland declared its solidarity with the US right after September 11. It is a result of perceiving the situation as a crisis - urgent and need of immediate action. It was obvious for Polish Government, to join the US led coalition, however, not because Poland was in direct danger, oppositely, as a result of standing with US, in terms of international terrorism, Poland's vulnerability increased.⁹⁰ Neither decision was influenced by material gains. For politicians, the main motive was related to history of Poland – decision was a demonstration of loyalty to America and repaying a debt from past. Moreover, standing along US could also guarantee security of Poland in the future. On the other side, rejection could result with losing a strategic partnership. These reasons contributed to perceiving decision about intervention in Iraq as a crisis by the President, all cabinet and mainstream political parties in Poland. However, public opinion did not perceive this decision as a crisis. Main factors which explain such position are low issue salience among society and elite consensus which resulted

⁸⁹ Knecht T., Weatherford M.S.: "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Stages of Presidential Decision-Making", *International Studies Quarterly*, 2006, p.709-711

⁹⁰ Zaborowski M.: "Occasional paper. America's Protégé in the East? The Emergence of Poland as a Regional Leader". *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, 2004, p.5-9

with lack of public debate. Media were not highly attentive and published limited information about Iraq intervention. Therefore, public was not able to see the ‘bigger picture’ and become aware of situation importance.



CONCLUSIONS

Historical experiences produced a very resistant national identity and that is why the issue of territorial defense is playing a crucial role for Poland. Since end of the I World War America is perceived as closest ally and security guarantor of Poland. Polish Government strongly support US- led NATO and consistently stand for American policy towards NATO, including development of out of area missions, such as Iraq intervention. Taking part in war and stabilization in Iraq was an example of 'bandwagoning'- Poles believed, that supporting actions which United States consider as righteous, will be also beneficial for Poland. Despite the fact, that pro-Americanism characterize polish society, decision to stand with United States and contribute military forces to Iraq in 2003 met with strong public opposition. However, public opinion failed to constrain official foreign policy decision - democratic government of Poland ignored the disapproval voice of public opinion in this case. Five interacting conditions had power to increase willingness of ignoring the public by government and influenced decision of taking part in Iraqi intervention. None of these variables alone is enough to explain decision of Polish government, because these factors are closely related with each other. First factor was perception of international gains. Strengthening security of Poland was main reason, why it decided to go to war in Iraq. Polish politicians believed, that Poland may become more important player in international arena, especially within European Union and be one of the countries creating 'new Europe', less dependent from Germany and France. Second factor was existence of elite consensus. Decision about sending polish troops to Iraq came from President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister,

however all cabinet and mainstream opposition parties supported it in order to maintain flourishing relations with US and for future cooperation. When elite consensus exists, all parties take political risk of the decision and voters cannot differentiate between parties' positions. Therefore, public opinion influence decreased. It enabled politicians to pursue unpopular among the public policy. In addition, existence of international gains significantly influence forming of elite consensus. Third factor was issue salience. The more salient political issue is for people, the more government must consider public opinion while making a decision. However, population of Poland did not perceive Iraq issue as salient. Showing disapproval to Government decision through demonstrations in polish towns involved minority of the society. In 2003 more important for citizens was upcoming referendum on Poland's membership in EU. It was caused by existence of elite consensus, huge pro – EU campaign in all Poland made by politicians, as well as not paying much attention to intervention in Iraq as EU accession by polish media. As a result, Iraq issue salience significantly decreased, and Government pursued a divergent from public opinion policy. Fourth factor was long time till next elections. Decision to send polish contingent to Iraq was made in 2003, in the middle of parliamentary election cycle. The closer time to next election, the more important public opinion becomes for politicians. Long time till next elections, resulted with decreasing sensitivity of political elite to public opinion and choosing unpopular among public policy. Fifth factor was perceiving decision to support Iraq intervention as a crisis - urgent and need of immediate action. The benefits in which Government believed that Iraq policy was likely to deliver were substantial. By helping United States, Poland could expect help from United States or by means of

NATO. It was also possibility for Polish soldiers to gain experience and develop skills necessary to guarantee Poland's security in future. On the other hand, rejection could result with losing a strategic ally. That is why Poland declared its solidarity with the US rapidly, right after September 11 attack.

Pursuing a policy to take part in Iraq intervention in 2003 contradicted with public opinion preferences. However, leadership of Poland concluded, that political costs of the decision were low. In the light of EU accession referendum, Iraq issue had much lesser importance to the public. On the other hand, benefits of supporting NATO operation and playing active role in Middle East could result with substantial improvement of image of Poland and continuance good relations with US. Therefore, political costs overweight the possible benefits. Nevertheless, decision was not preceded with enough public and parliamentary debate, neither deep pros and cons analyze, which would predict effects for Polish foreign and domestic policy. Arguments "for" and "against" came out into the open after engaging in Operation Iraqi Freedom, after first victims and political failures, such as lack of proof, that Iraq possesses Weapons of Mass Destruction. Public Opinion started to show objections more than before - it was a turning point and end of elite consensus for political parties of Poland. Politicians came to realization, that issue salience among Poles increased and engagement in Iraq may affect negatively results of elections, therefore used promise of withdrawal forces from Iraq as a campaign promise in 2005 elections. These actions only confirmed the rule that the closer time to election, less risky decisions politicians are eager to make, and more important public opinion becomes. Moreover, Poles were disappointed, that supporting Iraq is not as much

beneficial for Poland as expected – neither Poland became strong player on international arena nor became more secure, quite the opposite, Poland started to be aim of possible terrorist attack. Furthermore, promised increase of trade and removal of visas to United States did not happen.

Decision of Polish Government in 2001 to send troops to Iraq did not consider overwhelming opposition of public opinion. However, it does not decrease power of public opinion - as we can see, when variables are not interacting with each other, they are not enough to stand against influence of the public.

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