

SECURITIZATION OF EUROPEAN UNION'S

IMMIGRATION POLICY IN

2021 GERMAN FEDERAL ELECTIONS

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PLAGIARISM

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ABSTRACT

The phenomenon of international immigration has been one of the important issues both at the international and local level for many years. In Europe, especially after the Second World War, immigration has become a controversial issue in international politics. After the Second World War, while immigration was considered necessary to improve the deteriorating economy of Europe, after the 1970s, immigration began to be limited and border controls were strengthened. This can be clearly seen in the immigration policies developed by the European Union. In 2015, Europe faced a serious immigration crisis. This situation occurred as a result of the 2011 Syrian civil war and affected both the European continent and the EU. As a result, asylum applications to the EU have increased. In particular, as an EU member state, Germany has been the first country in Europe to receive the highest number of asylum applications. In this process, Germany is of vital importance as the EU's country that receives the most Syrian immigration. Therefore, the securitization of immigration policy in the EU has had implications for Germany's immigration policy. In the changing world agenda with the climate and the COVID-19 crisis, what will be unique for this study is the ability to understand the role of securitization on immigration in the 2021 German Federal elections. To do this, the immigration policies of the EU and Germany will be examined and the election manifestos of the political parties on immigration in the 2021 German federal elections will be analyzed. Therefore, the aim has been to reveal whether and/or to what extent the political parties securitized immigration in their election campaigns. While making this analysis, securitization theory and speech act methodology developed by the Copenhagen School were used.

Keywords: Immigration, Securitization, Copenhagen School, Germany, European Union

ÖZET

Uluslararası göç olgusu uzun yıllar boyunca hem uluslararası düzeyde hem de yerel düzeyde önemli konulardan biri olmuştur. Avrupa'da özellikle İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra göç uluslararası politikada tartışılan bir konu haline gelmiştir. İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra göç Avrupa'nın bozulan ekonomisini düzeltmek için gerekli görülürken, 1970'li yıllardan sonra göç sınırlandırmaya ve sınır kontrolleri güçlendirilmeye başlanmıştır. Bu Avrupa Birliği'nin geliştirdiği göç politikalarında açıkça görülebilir. 2015 yılında Avrupa ciddi bir göç kriziyle karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Bu durum 2011 Suriye iç savaşının bir sonucu olarak meydana gelerek hem Avrupa kıtasını hem de AB'yi etkilemiştir. Bunun bir sonucu olarak AB'ye olan sığınma başvuruları artmıştır. Özellikle bir AB üye ülkesi olarak Almanya Avrupa'nın en fazla sığınma başvurusu alan birinci ülkesi olmuştur. Bu süreçte Almanya, AB'nin en fazla Suriye göçünü alan ülke olarak hayati önem taşımaktadır. Bu nedenle, AB'de göç politikasının güvenlikleştirilmesinin, Almanya'nın göç politikası üzerinde etkileri olmuştur. İklim ve COVID-19 krizi ile değişen dünya gündeminde, bu çalışma için benzersiz olacak şey, 2021 Almanya Federal seçimlerinde güvenlikleştirmenin göç üzerindeki rolünü anlama becerisidir. Bunu yapmak için AB ve Almanya'nın göç politikaları incelenecek ve 2021 Almanya federal seçimlerinde siyasi partilerin göç konusundaki seçim beyannameleri incelenecektir. Böylece, bu tez Almanya'da göçün güvenlikleştirilip güvenlikleştirilmediğini sorgulamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu analiz yapılırken, Kopenhag Okulu'nun geliştirdiği güvenlikleştirme teorisi ve söz edimi metodolojisi kullanılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Göç, Güvenlikleştirme, Kopenhag Okulu, Almanya, Avrupa Birliği



To my love..

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	i
ABSTRACT.....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	v
LIST OF FIGURES	vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	viii
INTRODUCTION	1
1. CHAPTER: THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY	7
1.1 Traditional Approaches to Security.....	9
1.2 New Approaches to Security.....	17
1.3 Securitization of Immigration	27
2. CHAPTER: SECURITIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GERMANY	32
2.1 Securitization of EU's Immigration Policy	32
2.2 Securitization of Immigration in European Union.....	38
2.3 Securitization of Immigration in EU Member States.....	47
2.4 Securitization of Immigration in Germany	52
3. CHAPTER: GERMANY'S TOWARDS IMMIGRATION (2014-2021) AND POLITICAL SYSTEM	56
3.1 Germany's Approach to Immigration Crisis (2014-2021).....	56
3.2 Germany's Political System	60
4. CHAPTER: ANALYSIS OF THE 2021 GERMAN FEDERAL ELECTIONS ..	68
CONCLUSION.....	76
REFERENCES	81

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Assessment of the consequences of refugee immigration.....	59
Figure 2. Bundestag election 2017.....	60
Figure 3. Percentage of second votes.....	69



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CDU: Christian Democratic Union

CSU: Christian Social Union

EEC: European Economic Community

EU: European Union

EURODAC: European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database

FDP: the liberal Free Democratic Party

FRONTEX: European Border and Coast Guard Agency

IOM: the International Organization for Migration

Linke: The Left

OSCE: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

RRP: Radical Right Party

SEA: Single European Act

SPD: Social Democratic Party

Trevi Group: Stands for Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and Violence
Internationally

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

INTRODUCTION

It is difficult to specify a single and clear definition on the concept of immigration, which has been one of the most fundamental phenomena throughout history. Immigration is not just about moving of people from one place to another. On the contrary, immigration is a process that largely affects people's living conditions, cultures and political and social structures of countries. Immigration is generally regarded as a collective action requiring the internal or international collective movement of people rather than an individual action (De Haas et al., 2020). According to IOM, international immigration is the movement of persons from their place of residence to a country of which they are not a national, by crossing an international border. With the definition of immigration-related concepts and the development of immigration policies, the issue of immigration has become one of the priorities of the states. Although the concept of refugee was legally defined with the 1951 Geneva Convention after the Second World War, the admission policies of countries for refugees and asylum seekers have changed. According to the 1951 Geneva Convention “refugee as a person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail him— or herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution” (UNHCR, 2011, p.3).

After the Second World War, concepts related to immigration have become an important concept discussed both in the political and social arena. Immigrants were regarded as necessary especially for the recovery of the European economy. The concept of immigrant does not have a clear definition in the international arena. However, most countries have used the UN definition to define the concept of immigrant. Accordingly, the UN defines the concept of immigrant as a person who temporarily or permanently crosses domestic or international borders and leaves his/her place of residence for different reasons. On the other hand, IOM defines the concept of immigrant as people who move to another region or country to improve their economic situation. The difference between a refugee and an immigrant is that the immigrant can leave their country for a reason unrelated to the persecution, such

as study or employment. Also, the reason for immigrants to immigrate is to reach better living conditions. Asylum seeker, on the other hand, differs from the concept of refugee in that it is at the investigation stage from a legal point of view. Therefore, an asylum seeker is a person who flees from their own country from persecution or serious harm and seeks protection from another country and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status in this context. As a result, with the definition of the concepts, immigration took place in the political arena in a definitional sense until the 1970s. However, with the economic recession after the oil crisis, the Yugoslav civil war and the Syrian civil war in 2011, Europe faced an intense wave of immigration.

After the Syrian civil war that broke out in 2011, millions of people left Syria and immigrated to neighboring countries. Not only neighboring countries, but also European countries became one of the important destinations. According to Eurostat data, Germany constitutes 27.7% of the EU's asylum applications with 148,200 asylum applications in 2021 (Eurostat, 2022). For this reason, Germany has become one of the main destination countries in the EU. Germany, which was exposed to this immigration flow, changed its immigration policy from time to time. When immigration reached its peak in 2015, Chancellor Angela Merkel, who followed an open-door policy and a welcoming policy towards immigrants, also called for solidarity with EU member states. Thus, Merkel has become a leading actor in both international and domestic dynamics. However, in 2017, Merkel's immigration policies and the EU's stance against immigration began to be questioned. In this direction, it was necessary to examine the securitization theory pioneered by the Copenhagen School in order to analyze how immigration is constructed and perceived as a security concern. The effects of EU immigration policy on German domestic politics were also examined to illuminate the research question of the study. Therefore, this study aims to understand the interplay between the international and domestic dynamics of the EU immigration policy by focusing on the variety of discourses generated by the political parties in Germany in the context of the immigration crisis. Hence, the securitization theory forms the theoretical framework of this study and becomes a result of the political discourses that will be positioned in the analysis of German practices related to immigration.

Securitization theory has played a key role in the analysis of both EU and German practices regarding immigration because it is an important way of

understanding the changing policy conjuncture regarding immigration. After the Second World War, while security studies focused more on military issues defended by traditional theories, the scope of security was widened under the leadership of the Copenhagen School. Widening the meaning of security to the economic and environmental realm has brought new lenses to the international relations literature such as “societal security, human security, food security and others” (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p.2). The Copenhagen School, established in 1985, challenged mainstream theories of international relations based on the traditional security approach. The main argument in these criticisms was that focusing only on the military dimension led to a narrow understanding of security. In addition, the Copenhagen School, which is a part of the critical approach, opposes the state-centric of security in the traditional approach and draws attention to the fact that individuals or people should be the referent object. Moreover, the new security approaches challenge the traditional assumption that world politics is unchanging and constant, but instead they emphasize the room for change when they define world politics as consisting of social structures. The three main components that bring the securitization process together are very important in understanding the general atmosphere of the thesis. To clarify, security issues through speech acts constructed by actors and related security policies become a security issue by being categorized under the name of “security”. Then, the audience should accept the security problem or threat posed by the securitizing actor. Thus, the securitizing actor legitimizes the extraordinary measures taken to eliminate the labelled security problem or threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p.26). In other words, the state and political parties (securitizing actor) should construct existential threat as a security threat to the existence of national security (referent object). Second, this security threat posed by migrants must be urgent and must be removed from the routine patterns of normal politics in order to be adopted in the context of the emergency. Finally, the public (audience) needs to accept these created emergency measures. In the light of this information, in this study, the securitization of immigration in the 2021 elections was investigated and the findings showed that the climate and pandemic crisis replaced immigration in the 2021 elections compared to the 2017 elections. Accordingly, although the issue of immigration is included in national election manifestos, it has been observed that it is reflected in political campaigns as a humanitarian issue rather than a security issue.

Therefore, the audience did not perceive the immigration issue as a security concern, which made the securitization process unsuccessful.

Studies on securitization of immigration in Germany have been carried out in different ways. To explain, Banai & Kreide has categorized immigrants and asylum seekers as long-term and short-term threats in the securitization process. Accordingly, in the short-term category, refugees and asylum seekers are associated with an "immediate threat of violence, crime and terrorism", while naturalized persons or persons with an immigrant background are classified as a long-term threat to socio-cultural values (Banai & Kreide, 2017, p.915). Another study showed far-right parties presenting immigrants and asylum seekers as existential threats (Mushtaq et al., 2021, p.16). Accordingly, it is argued that the discourses of right-wing parties exert pressure on the government and that the issue of immigration is thus securitized. Another study examined the posters and advertisements of far-right parties and the presentation of immigrants and asylum seekers as a cultural and economic threat (Schmuck & Matthes, 2015, p.1578). Accordingly, it has been argued that the parties use the effect of posters and advertisements to present immigrants as a threat. Therefore, negative political campaigns against immigrants can increase anti-immigrant attitudes. Finally, in line with political campaigns, the use of the language of risk regarding immigration in media discourse also contributes to securitization (Galantino, 2022, p.339). Especially between 2015/2016, it was explained that the subject of immigration was used with risky words such as "EU border management and Balkan migration route" in the German press. However, the main finding of the study is that the use of risk language within the framework of migration does not directly establish immigrants as a risk factor, but rather affects and triggers the securitization process. In the changing world agenda with the climate and the COVID-19 crisis, what will be unique for this study is the ability to understand the role of securitization on immigration in the 2021 German Federal elections. Frankly, this study is important in terms of emphasizing that the issue of immigration is still important, even though the climate crisis and the sudden pandemic have covered the whole world agenda.

This study consists of four main parts. The first chapter is "Theoretical approaches to international security", which is related to the conceptual and theoretical framework of the thesis. In this context, the securitization of immigration is discussed by examining the conceptual view on security and traditional and new

security understandings. The first part of chapter 1 provides a conceptual analysis of traditional approaches to security. This section generally describes the way security is handled by traditional theories and the new security understanding. The second section presents a comparison of where new approaches to security (feminism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism, English School and social constructivism) challenge traditional theories. The final section presents the securitization of immigration and explains the securitization process based on the Copenhagen School. In doing so, it exemplifies how immigration is perceived as a security issue.

In the second chapter, the arguments on how the securitization of immigration is constructed as a security problem in the European political agenda through securitization theory and speech act were discussed. Chapter 2 has four subsections. In the first part, presented data on the securitization of EU immigration policy. In the second part, in order to better analyze the securitization of immigration in the EU, the important steps and agreements taken by the EU on immigration were presented as a case study. In the third section, perceptions, concerns and attitudes of EU member states on immigration in the absence of a common immigration policy were examined. In the last part, Germany's attitude towards immigration, which plays a leading role in EU immigration policy, was examined.

In the third chapter, Germany's approach to the immigration crisis between 2014-2021 and the tendency of political parties are examined. In the first part, with the immigration crisis reaching its peak in 2015, Germany's approach to the immigration crisis in the period between 2014-2021 was examined in order to better analyze the 2021 elections. The second part focused on the general approaches of the parties in order to better analyze the approaches of the political parties competing in the 2021 elections.

The last chapter, the official political statements and election manifestos of the political parties during the 2021 German federal elections were examined. Therefore, Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU), Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Greens (Grüne), the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), The Left (Linke)'s election manifestos were examined. Accordingly, the priorities of the political parties in the election manifestos were analyzed and the differences were revealed. As a result, this study aimed to address the findings of the

2021 German federal elections and to reveal the impact of immigration on the political process. Therefore, the aim has been to reveal whether and/or to what extent the political parties securitized immigration in their election campaigns. As a result, the analysis has found out that the issue of immigration does not have the priority of securitization against the climate and pandemic crisis. Moreover, the priority of security has shifted to the energy and immigration crisis that emerged after the Ukraine crisis.



1. CHAPTER: THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

The issue of security is one of the fundamental elements in the discipline of international relations. It is impossible to mention a single definition of security that has been agreed upon in the literature. Security is a phenomenon that requires “extraordinary measures” for nation-state, supranational and non-state actors, adapted to individuals, issues, changing historical circumstances (Brauch, 2008, p. 2-4). The phenomenon of security, which was discussed by Arnold Wolfers for the first time in the discipline of International Relations “measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked” (Wolfers, 1952, p. 484-485). Security is defined by Ullman not only as a purpose but also as a result. According to him, security “we may not realize what it is or how important it is until we are threatened with losing it” (Ullman, 1983, p.133). This adds events such as earthquakes to the identification and evaluation process (Baldwin, 1997, p.13). Baldwin, on the other hand, emphasizes the advantage of this situation as “the development of deterrence policies by states against the threat of military attack” (Baldwin, 1997, p.13). It will be possible to interpret the differentiation of the definition of security as minimizing the occurrence of attacks and thus ensuring security. From this point of view, it should be noted that the definition of security focuses on the protection measures taken regarding acquired values. According to Baldwin, defining security can be easier by answering two main questions: “security for whom?” and “security for which values?”. In general terms, security is “the absence of threat to core values” (Baylis et al., 2001, p.254).

According to Buzan the meaning of security is controversial and ambiguous, hence discussions on the concept of security are ongoing (Buzan, 1991). The reason why the definition of the concept of security is ambiguous is that many variables are taken into account when defining it and the concept is re-determined according to changing conditions. However, they differ from each other on issues such as what threats and concerns are, how they occur, and how security policies are determined. Academic studies reveal that the concept of

security is definitively ambiguous. According to Buzan, security is a “controversial and rather ambiguous concept, just like the concepts of love, freedom and power,” and for this reason discussions on the concept of security are continue (Buzan, 1991, p.7). Wolfers characterized security as an “ambiguous symbol” and he supposed it may not have any accurate meaning at all, that’s why Buzan suggests that the attention to develop security studies may increase. Unfortunately, the fact that security is very important in national politics can cause potential mischief due to the ambiguity of its meaning. Security is of great importance because policymakers and strategists view it primarily in a national context (Buzan, 1991, p.5). For this reason, Buzan argues academic studies on security are limited to a narrow view of it.

Buzan divides security studies perspectives into two groups: wideners and traditionalists (Buzan et al., 1998, p.1). Such classifications help us to understand “what is security and what is the security problem” and allow us to clarify how issues are securitized. International security studies have their roots in the West and their foundations were laid predominantly in North America, Europe and Australia. Prior to the World War II, international security studies were examined under the subject headings of “war studies”, “military studies” and “strategy”. Security studies, on the other hand, established a distinct field of study in the post-war period by aiming to protect states from the negative effects of war. With the evolution of the conjuncture of security, the post-war literature has started to use security as a central concept instead of "defense" or "war" (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p.1). After these developments, security studies have shifted from the military ground to a civilian ground (Baysal & Lüleci, 2015, p.66).

After World War II, the approach to security studies was generally dominated by “traditional theories” that focused on military issues and the survival of the state. The changing world politics since the 1970s has resulted in new perceptions and approaches. The reason for these new perceptions and approaches is the dissatisfaction with the fact that security is being studied in a narrow field as a result of military and nuclear obsessions suffered from the Cold War period (Buzan et al., 1998, p.2). Widening the international security agenda from military and political focus to economic and environmental area brought new lenses to the international relations literature such as “societal security, human security, food security and others” (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p.2). Moreover,

among the issues of "high politics" concerns other than military issues were included (Baysal & Lüleci, 2015, p.67). With the change in the perception of security that began in the 1980s and gradually increased in the 1990s, caused differentiation between traditionalists who focus on the superiority of a narrow military security concept and wideners who include an economic and environmental dimension.

The literature suggests that the discussions on security can be categorized under two camps: The first camp includes the traditional approaches, which build their notion of international security on the assumption that the international system is anarchical and this leads to power struggles among states. The second camp includes the new security approach which argues that the field of security has widened with globalization. This thesis adopts the new security approach and elaborates on how a non-military issue like immigration has become securitized in German political discourses. In order to establish the theoretical framework of the thesis, firstly, the following section will provide a conceptual analysis of the traditional approaches to security. This will enable to differentiate the new security approach. Accordingly, the second section will put forward the fundamental tenets of the new security approaches.

1.1 Traditional Approaches to Security

The foundations of the traditional perspectives of security are based on the Realist School which defines security from a military and political point of view and highlights power politics among the states. The Realist paradigm is a collection of approaches that build upon three main features: "statism", "survival", "self-help" under anarchy (Baylis et al., 2001, p.100). Statism is a state-centered approach of Realism that emphasizes the sovereign state as the main actor in the international system (Baylis et al., 2001, p.143). They operate under an international system in which there is no central authority i.e., anarchy. The absence of central authority leads to a self-help system in which all states seek survival by relying on their power. Security is defined via protection of the state's territory, sovereignty and political independence. At this point, power becomes an essential tenet of Realist view of international relations.

The Realist paradigm focuses on power and actions, using a materialist perspective to analyze International Politics. Thucydides¹, Machiavelli² and Hobbes³ are important representatives of the understanding that holds the basic concepts of Realism together. Accordingly, they draw attention to the importance of power in politics and define this power through material capabilities. According to Realism, power defined in terms of material capabilities, is the main unit of International Politics. In the Melians' Dialogue, Thucydides expresses the importance of power with the following statement: "the strong do as they will and the weak do as they must" (Dunne et al., 2013, p.100). Thus, material capabilities provide concrete data for assessing the impact of power on the likelihood of conflict (Dunne et al., 2013, p.100). For example, when power is unstable, the weaker side does not choose to fight because they know they will lose, so the outcome of the conflict is predictable (Dunne et al., 2013, p.100).

In this respect, Realism defines interest in terms of power. Power is the capacity to influence others "through orders, threats, persuasion, or a combination of these" (Morgenthau, 1948, p.14). According to Morgenthau, international and domestic politics are "a power struggle inseparable from social life itself" (Morgenthau, 1948, p.17). In Classical Realism, power is always the main goal for state and statesmen in such a situation. Realism underlines two important features of power: it is relational and relative. To explain, relational power means "the use of power in relation to the other entity" (Baylis et al., 2001, p.150). Relative power, on the other hand, takes into account the total capabilities of state actors, not just one's power capabilities (Baylis et al., 2001, p.150).

Despite the centrality of concept in Realism, Classical Realism and Neo-Realism (Structural Realism) has points of divergence regarding the conceptualization of power. In Classical Realism, the state's will to power is explained through human nature. For example, according to Morgenthau, people

¹ The Melian Dialogue in Thucydides' book "History of the Peloponnesian War" is an important example of power politics (Thucydides, 416 BC). In the "Melian Dialog" it is emphasized that the superior position of Athens in power may give them the right to conquer the lands of Melia.

² Machiavelli's book "The Prince" draws attention to the power and security of political actors (Machiavelli, 1513). Machiavelli focuses on power in his works, emphasizing that it is very important to a united and secure principality.

³ Thomas Hobbes, in his famous book *Leviathan*, introduced the term anarchy by defining international nature as *bellum omnium contra omnes*, "the war of all against all" (Frederik & Arends, 2009, p.22). It states that in order to achieve victory in this environment, it is necessary to be strong.

are born with a desire for power, which may cause interstate conflicts. Accordingly, the concept of power in Classical Realism is defined as the goal it seeks in the anarchic nature of international relations. On the contrary, in Structural Realism, power is not the goal in itself but the tool for survival (Dunne et al., 2013, p.78). And the condition for survival is the “state's material capabilities and alliances with other states” (Dunne et al., 2013, p.61). This can be explained with the levels of analysis in international relations. While Classical Realism seeks to explain international politics at the state level, for Structural Realism the level of analysis is the system. That is, while Classical Realists claim states seek power, Structural Realists emphasize that states seek power because it is the structure of the international system that pushes them to do so. For this, power is the sum of the abilities possessed to protect interests in the international system.

In this context, Kenneth Waltz, emphasizes abilities and states that these abilities are ranked according to power: "population and territory size, resource equipment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence" (Baylis et al., 2001, p.151). As mentioned above, according to Structural Realists, power is a means of survival. However, Structural Realists refer to different approaches when explaining the purpose and extent of power. Thus, these emerging differences allow the Structural Realists to be divided into Defensive and Offensive Realists. Questions of "Power for what?" and "How much power is enough?" are the elements that reveal this distinction. Kenneth Waltz, one of the pioneers of Defensive Realists, argues that it does not make sense for states to continuously maximize their power because this will eventually result in anarchy punishing this aggression (Dunne et al., 2013, p.78) . They seek to maximize power in order to reach survival, and the amount of power that can keep them secure in the system will be sufficient. On the contrary, John J. Mearsheimer, one of the pioneers of Offensive Realism, asserts that anarchy and uncertainty create anxiety among states, which results in states maximizing power as much as possible (Dunne et al., 2013, p.78). That is, states will never be sure of their survival until they have significantly more power than the others. In fact, Mearsheimer argues that even when great power is militarily advantageous over its rivals, it continues to seek opportunities to achieve greater power

(Mearsheimer, 2001, p.34). This process only comes to an end “when hegemony is achieved” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.34). Mearsheimer claims that this "eliminates any possibility of challenge by another Great Power" (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.35). As a result, the main argument of Offensive Realism is that the best way to survive is to have overwhelming power. In line with this information, power in Realism is defined through material factors. It does not refer to the rule of law, ideologies, institutions, economics, or democracy when describing power.

In the discipline of International Relations, the anarchic nature of the system has been one of the main points for defining security. Anarchy means that "there is no centralized authority or ultimate arbiter that stands above states" (Dunne et al., 2013, p.79). One of the pioneers of Classical Realism E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, claims that there is a constant anarchic structure in international relations and that it cannot be changed. Realists find a solution to the problem of order in International Politics by providing an "effective central authority" (Dunne et al., 2013, p.61) . For this, governments try to make domestic politics peaceful and different from international politics by protecting borders, enforcing laws and protecting citizens (Dunne et al., 2013, p.61) .In this situation, where international politics is based on a self-help system, Waltz attributed survival to "the state's material capabilities and alliances with other states," as explained in detail above (Waltz, 1979, p.103-104). Thucydides and Morgenthau accept anarchy and its consequences and argue that it is a reflection of human impulses (Dunne et al., 2013, p.61). Because Thucydides and Morgenthau do not distinguish between international politics and domestic politics (Dunne et al., 2013, p.61). However, Morgenthau's famous book on “Politics Among Nations” initially sharply separates international and domestic politics, and later undermines it (Dunne et al., 2013, p.62). By defining politics as a power struggle, he emphasizes that it cannot be separated from social life. Morgenthau and Thucydides emphasize the crucial importance of communities, identities and norms in establishing and maintaining order. Accordingly, this study requires an analysis of the crisis in the EU regarding migration in Germany. To explain, it should be stated that it is inevitable that the immigration crisis in the international arena will affect the domestic policy in Germany as an EU member state.

In an anarchic international system, states compete with each other on issues such as security and the market. This rivalry is often observed with zero-sum play and accordingly "more for one actor means less for another" (Baylis et al., 2001, p.150). However, the reflection of the competitive nature of power politics has made it difficult to agree on universal principles. Although interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states is excluded, it is a fact that the principle of non-intervention of great powers in their relations with countries close to them is suspended by realists. Accordingly, while anarchy, one of the main concepts of realism, reflects the macro level, the concept of interest (power) reflects the micro level (Guzzini, 2004, p.5). In this context, the question of why states want power is important. Classical Realists try to achieve power by focusing on human nature, while Neo- Realists try to increase their security by focusing on the structure of the international system. In the absence of a higher authority above the great powers and in the absence of certainty that a country will not attack another, a state is expected to be strong against the possibility of attack (Dunne et al., 2013, p.78). That is the great powers have no choice but to compete with each other for survival.

Kenneth Waltz emphasizes the importance of capabilities rather than power in this situation. Waltz argues that these capabilities can be positioned according to their strength in areas such as " size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence" (Baylis et al., 2001, p.151). According to Waltz the fundamental aim of the state is to provide her own security. On the other hand, states actually reduce their freedoms while ensuring their security (Waltz, 1979, p. 112). In other words, if states want to be secure themselves, they should limit their freedoms. The relationship of authority and control is the determining factor in ensuring the security of the state (Waltz, 1979, p. 112). In return, states in the anarchic order of the international system act in their own interests. According to Structural Realism, the way states are governed and their behavior towards other states are relatively less important. To them, the state is a black box and what happens inside is irrelevant to international politics.

Survival is one of the core principles of Realism. A state may have economic, humanitarian and environmental goals, but the ultimate goal of states is

to preserve its territorial integrity. Accordingly, if the state fails to survive, it cannot pursue other goals. Depending on their material capabilities each state has a position in the international system which is defined by hierarchical power relations and this position is subject to change. The reason why states want power is based on the five assumptions of the international system according to the Structural Realist explanation. First, the great powers are involved in an anarchic system as the main actors in international politics. Second, states use their military capabilities to survive. For this reason, every state has the potential to harm its neighbor. Third, states can never be sure of each other's intentions because they do not trust each other. In other words, policy makers cannot be sure of the intentions of revisionist states that are determined to change the balance of power or status quo states that do not feel the need to change it. Fourth, the ultimate goal of states is survival. Finally, "states are rational actors" (Dunne et al., 2013, p.79). Actors develop sound strategies by analyzing cost and benefit. However, all these factors do not indicate that states have to compete with each other for power. However, the third assumption makes possible the existence of a revisionist state in the system. To put it simply, "the great powers fear each other" (Dunne et al., 2013, p.79). The greatest concern of the great powers is that another state capable of attacking will attack them. Due to the anarchic nature of the system, the absence of a "nightwatchman" to protect states in case of any threat raises concerns (Dunne et al., 2013, p.79). As a result, states that want to survive have no choice but to compete for power with other states (Dunne et al., 2013, p.80). These structural necessities cause the increase in the security of one state to decrease the security of another state. As a result, this causes a security dilemma. While emphasizing the importance of power in the international system, neo-Realists reframed Classical Realism's concept of power by focusing on the distribution of power in the system and how it affects international politics (Waltz, 1979, p.126). Power is not distributed equally in international system, hence while powerful states are prioritizing their self-interest have been the determining factor in the system. According to Waltz there are 3 main levels of analysis for Neo-Realist approach; the individual, the state and the system level. In other words, Classical Realism explains the international system according to the state level, while the Neo-Realist approach puts emphasize on the anarchic structure of the system. In this context, the main goal of the states in the competitive and anarchic nature of

the international system is to provide their security. Waltz attributes survival both to a state's material capabilities and to its alliances with other states.

In the system of international relations, states try to provide their security. Due to absence central authority in the system, the issue of security has been a priority concern of the states. In addition to this, the features of the system are self-help. Therefore, states cannot trust any state about their national interest. The system of "self-help" stemming from anarchy required "great powers to take care of themselves" (Glaser, 1994, p.55,56). Especially after the Cold War, this traditional understanding has been questioned by critical security approaches. Great powers have to rely on themselves to survive, as they have no supreme authority to turn to when attacked (Dunne et al., 2013, p.80). While stating the regularity between war and conflict, Waltz emphasized that this is similar in domestic politics. On the contrary, he argued that international politics is not unique either (Baylis et al., 2001, p.153). The key difference is the structure in international system. While there is no need for citizens to defend themselves in domestic politics, security can be achieved through self-help due to the anarchic structure of the international system and the absence of a supreme authority (Baylis et al., 2001, p.153).

According to Structural Realism, the state should focus on relative power to increase its capacity. According to Waltz, "relative gain is more important than absolute gain" due to the anarchic nature of the international system (Powell, 1991, p.84). In Waltz's "Theory of International Policy", security in the international system depends on the bipolar system. Accordingly, he argues that with a small number of hegemonic states, deterrence will be effective on other countries. In this case, the security of one state means the insecurity of the other state, and this means the zero-sum game in international relations terminology. Since power has been defined as military power in realism, the condition of ensuring security has been to increase military security. However, although increasing military security provides deterrence, it also causes a security dilemma. To explain, it is a fact that deterrence can be achieved more easily in a multipolar system. Accordingly, "there are more states that can come together to oppose an aggressor state" (Dunne et al., 2013, p.85). Waltz in his Theory of International Politics provides important data on what the balancing of forces is. He emphasizes

that balancing of power has a distinctive feature in international politics (Waltz, 1979, p.117). In addition, he argues that the self-help system paves the way for power balancing (Waltz, 1979, p.118). It also highlights the difference between balancing and bandwagoning. He defines bandwagoning as "states joining forces with a rising state that win's wars and gains power" (Dunne et al., 2013. P.82). On the other hand, he argues that the behavior of states in response to a rising power in the system is to balance it rather than bandwagoning in it. While Schweller emphasizes the purpose of power balancing as "self-preservation and the preservation of already held values", he states that the purpose of joining the majority is "self-expansion: achieving coveted values". According to Kenneth Waltz and Walt's power criteria, states that do not have weak government institutions, leaders who have not been appointed legally and/or do not have the ability to use economic resources effectively and efficiently are weak states and these states are likely to join the majority (Schweller, 1994, p.78).

Another important point that Waltz emphasizes is the difficulty of cooperation between states as a result of the theory emphasizing relative gains. The reason why making a deal is difficult is that one state is worried that the other state will get the biggest share of the pie, and that it may change the balance of power in its own interests (Dunne et al., 2013, p.82). In other words, according to Structural Realism, increasing the military capacity of a state to ensure its security creates a perception of threat for the other state and mutually states feel under threat and increase their military forces. As a result of this vicious circle, the security dilemma is inevitable (Snyder, 1984, p.461). In conclusion, it is possible to emphasize that the notion of security as a relative concept is at the core of the security dilemma.

Structural realists have different answers as to how much power is sufficient for great powers to ensure security. The answer of Structural Realists to this question divided them into two camps: defensive realism pioneered by Waltz and offensive realism associated with Mearsheimer. According to Waltz, one of the pioneers of the defensive realists, if a state is too strong, the appropriate amount of power is sufficient because balancing will occur. To explain, the fundamental aim of the states instead of being power maximizers, states are security maximizers (Waltz, 1979). Rather than increasing power, preserving

power is the main aim of states. Accordingly, defensive realists argue that the pursuit of hegemony is strategically wrong. Waltz recognizes that security is the highest position in anarchy, but the state must first ensure survival, because if survival is achieved, "such other goals as tranquility, profit and power" are also provided (Snyder, 2002, p.152)

Mearsheimer, on the other hand, argues that power struggle is limitless, but this does not come from human nature it comes from anarchic structure of the international system (Snyder, 2002, p.151). Since states have the capacity to harm each other, they try to gather as much power as possible to increase their security against any kind of attack. Therefore, the only way for the state to guarantee survival is to increase power and become hegemony (Dunne et al., 2013, p.80). With this regard although Mearsheimer and Waltz have some common points in Structural Realism, Mearsheimer differs from Waltz about explaining the behaviour of states.

As a result, traditional approaches define security from a military and political perspective, highlighting power politics between states. They define power through material capacities. However, in the conceptualization of power, Classical Realism and Structural Realism put forward different arguments. In Classical Realism, the concept of power is defined as the goal sought in the anarchic nature of international relations, in Structural Realism it is just the way to survive. However, the structure and scope of power differ according to Structural Realists. Accordingly, as explained in detail above, they are divided into Defensive and Offensive Realists. In conclusion, it is possible to state that traditional approaches do not refer to the rule of law, ideologies, institutions, economy or democracy when describing power.

1.2 New Approaches to Security

It is possible to state that before the 1990s, the concept of security predominantly prioritized military issues, and after the 1990s, this scope expanded socially, environmentally, economically and politically with the effect of globalization. In Cold War conditions, the narrow definition of security as the tension between the two superpowers not turning into an armed conflict was

insufficient to reflect the security concerns of the world population. In other words, security expanded to issues such as economic, environmental issues, human rights and migration, and deepened as these issues rose to the global or international level (Krause & Williams, 1996, p.230). In this direction, new security approaches such as feminism, post-structuralism, postcolonialism, English School and social constructivism have emerged. One of the common features of new security approaches is to discuss international security by putting human security at the center. As such, they deal with security from a holistic perspective.

The new and critical approaches emphasize the state-centric of security in the traditional approach and draws attention to the fact that individuals or people should be the referent object. In this respect, threats are no longer treated as exogenous, given and fixed but instead, the critical scholarship focuses on their construction processes. To explain, Structural Realism argues that threats to a self-help system result from “material capabilities of possible opponent”, while threats to a critical approach are structured by complex factors such as “history, culture, communication, ideologies” (Krause, 1998, p.306). Hence, the new security approaches challenge the traditional assumption that world politics is unchanging and constant, but instead they emphasize the room for change when they define world politics as consisting of social structures.

The feminist approach emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a critique of traditional international relations theories. Feminism's criticism points were on the state, which traditional security understanding emphasized as the main actor, and international security and political economy. Realist Theory divides the subjects of international politics into low politics and high politics. While high policy issues such as security, balance of power, military capacity and state administration are seen as a masculine area, low policy issues such as the environment, human rights, minority rights and migration represent a feminine area. Therefore, Realism has prioritized high policy issues, which it defines as masculine, above those that it describes as feminine (Blanchard, 2003, p.1289-1312). Feminism, on the other hand, argues that this is a patriarchal structure and that a gender-based restructuring should be made. Tickner, argues that not only international politics but also international relations theories contribute into power

hierarchies and criticizes the masculinity reproduced by Realism. According to her, traditional approaches employ concepts in a way to qualify and construct masculinity as ideal (Tickner, 2004, p.44). As a result, Feminism criticizes the fact that the security structure created by realism is based on male dominance and argues that wars not only affect states and soldiers, but also affect civilians. Moreover, by emphasizing the poverty and death caused by wars, which are an important concept of security, he argues that security is very important not only for states but also for people and societies. In this direction, "Security for whom?" stressed the question.

Another criticism of the traditional security approach has been put forward by the Constructivist approach. The constructivist approach is a method about "the way human society works" (Booth, 2007, p.152). Constructivism offers a different perspective on a number of key themes of international relations theory, including anarchy, state interest and identity, the conceptualization of power, the structure of power, and the possibility of change. According to Ted Hopf, Constructivism should be analyzed in "traditional and critical variants" (Hopf, 1998, p.172). The agenda of Constructivism is the place of identity in world politics and the theorizing of domestic politics and culture, which is the theme of international relations theory. According to Constructivism, the basic structure of international politics is socially constructed. Constructivists try to understand and explain the change in this social structure at the international level (Dunne et al., 2013, p.189). According to Hopf, Constructivism has four main claims. First, "actors and structures are mutually constructed" (Hopf, 1998, p.198). This process takes place in an "intersubjective social context" (Hopf, 1998, p.173). Moreover, it is very difficult to express the constancy of anarchy in such an environment. As a result of the mutual interaction of the actor and the structure, there cannot be a single meaning of anarchy. Second, the existence of identities in international politics and in local society is essential to provide both order and predictability (Hopf, 1998, p.174). To explain, actors have multiple identities and these identities are the sum of their preferences and actions. Thus, according to Hopf, "a state understands others according to the identity it attributes to them, while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practice" (Hopf, 1998, p.175). The main point here is that the producer of the identity cannot

control how it is understood by others. Consequently, the determinant of meaning is the intersubjective structure itself. Thirdly, power is a key element for both the traditional and the Constructivist approach. But the conceptualization of power differs. Constructivists do not reject the materialist conceptualization of power in international politics. According to the Constructivist approach, power is both material and discursive. To explain, discursive power deals with the definition and transformation of norms and ideas for the system. This discursive power, based on the power of social practice, is defined through its capacity to reproduce the intersubjective meanings on which both social structures and actors are constructed (Hopf, 1998, p.178). Finally, this change in world politics is considered difficult but possible due to the volatile and permanent nature of social structures. According to Alexander Wendt, the practices of states shape the character of anarchy (Wendt, 1992, p.395-396). "Self-help and power politics" are the institutions of anarchy, not its essential feature (Wendt, 1992, p.395). Although Wendt argues that Constructivism is a theory of international politics in his article "Anarchy Is What States Make of It" in 1992, he makes a sharp distinction in his later studies. And he states that Constructivism is an approach (Wendt, 1999, p.5). Wendt emphasizes two key tenets of Constructivism: " (1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature" (Wendt, 1999, p.1). Hopf, on the other hand, considers this understanding as "observation of existing reality" (Hopf, 1998, p.180). What Constructivism offers is an explanation for "how and where change may occur" (Hopf, 1998, p.180). Actors with multiple identities theoretically affect change because they have both alternative practices and sufficient material resources. According to Constructivism, identity politics is a constant competition for control of the power a social group needs to produce meaning. For this reason, diversity facilitates change.

Hopf makes a distinction between "conventional" and "critical" while making the claims of Constructivism. Conventional constructivism argues that there should be intersubjective communities in which actors interact both with themselves and with each other. To explain, conventional constructivism explores

identities and social practices reproduced by identities and explains the impact of these identities on actions. Critical constructivism, on the other hand, "wish to surface identities, not to articulate their effects, but to elaborate on how people come to believe in a single version of a naturalized truth" (Hopf, 1998, p.183-184). In other words, while critical constructivism pursues the myths of identity formation, conventional constructivist approach examines "identities as possible causes of action" (Hopf, 1998, p.184). In addition, they show different views on the origins of identity. Critical constructivism argues that participation in the reproduction process of observed social entities is conscious. At the same time, it claims that the actor and the observer are inseparable. For this reason, they are more likely to see some power relations that cause alienation in the identity formation process. On the other hand, in conventional constructivism, "the observer never becomes a subject of the same self-reflective critical inquiry" (Hopf, 1998, p.184). Moreover, it "offers little or no cognitive explanation for identity" (Hopf, 1998, p.184). The assumptions about power differ between the critical constructivist approach and the conventional constructivist approach. Critical constructivism claims that power is exercised in every social dynamic and is always a dominant actor in this dynamic. On the other hand, conventional constructivism argues that social practices reproduce power relations and that "power is everywhere" (Hopf, 1998, p.185). However, questioning these power relations is not in their area of interest. Additionally, conventional constructivism "does not accept critical theory's ideas about its own role in producing change" (Hopf, 1998, p.185). The point of analysis of critical constructivism is "social constraints and cultural understandings from a supreme human interest in enlightenment and emancipation" (Hopf, 1998, p.185).

Like Realism, the Constructivist approach affirms that there is anarchy in the international system. Therefore, in the self-help system where all states try to survive by relying on their own power in the absence of a central authority, for Realists the state is potential enemies of each other. But for the Constructivist approach, threats are not given automatically, but instead are generated through inter-subjective interaction. Thus, the fact that security is a context-specific social construct detracts it from being centralized around material factors such as military capability. In this respect, it challenges the traditional understanding of

security. In the security dilemma environment created by the Cold War, traditional theories could not predict the outcome of the period. Thereupon, traditional security studies began to be questioned. The challenge to the hegemony of Realism in security studies accelerated with the end of the Cold War and supported the emergence of critical approaches. Thus, with the “widening” and “deepening” of the security agenda, security studies have gained a critical dimension. In this context, the Copenhagen School presented a Constructivist approach to the classical understanding of security. As stated earlier, the Constructivist approach focuses on how security is perceived and how an idea is socially constructed. Accordingly, the Copenhagen School argues that states behave differently towards the construction of any threat, and thus security is not a "given" but a "constructed" matter.

The foundations of the Copenhagen School were laid in 1985 by Jaap de Wilde, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre and Elzbieta Tromer, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever who worked at the Peace and Conflict Research Center in Copenhagen. In his book titled *People State and Fear* (1983), Buzan criticized traditional security approaches and stated that focusing only on the military aspect results in a narrow understanding of security. In line with these growing criticisms, the issue of security has been discussed in detail and the Copenhagen School has questioned the traditional security approach in its first studies. There are two motivations that support expanding the security research agenda. First, security agendas that developed after 1980 motivated security questions to move beyond narrowly military issues (Huysmans, 1998, p.482). Secondly, the School was very interested in making an original contribution to the theoretical debates generated by security studies (Huysmans, 1998, p.482). In this context, the Copenhagen School has made three main contributions to the international security literature: the theory of securitization, the theory of the regional security complex and the sectoral security approach. Since the framework of this study is the securitization approach, more attention will be focused on the securitization theory rather than the other two approaches.

Securitization theory was first introduced to the international security studies literature by Ole Weaver in 1995 with the article "Securitization and Desecuritization" and studies were carried out by members of the Copenhagen

School. Then, Securitization theory was introduced to the security studies literature with the book "Security: A New Framework for Analysis" written by Waever and other members of the institute located at the Copenhagen Center for Peace and Conflict Research. After analyzing the question of "whose security" in security studies, another question that should be analyzed has been the question of "security against what values". To explain, according to the traditional security understanding, state security comes before interstate relations. In the Cold War period, the provision of security was based on the realization of military power. However, Buzan's characterization of security as an "underdeveloped concept" caused his concerns beyond military issues to enter the agenda of security studies (Buzan, 1991, p.3). The main reason for this was that the tension between the West and the East turned into a non-military dimension as a result of the Cold War. At this point, which includes constructivist and critical approaches, the Copenhagen School has an important place. According to the Copenhagen School, security problems and related security policies are constructed by actors. According to this theory, briefly categorizing a topic under the name "security" makes it a security problem. In addition, the School is not interested in whether the subject is a "real" threat, because from a constructivist point of view it defines security as a subjective structure. Security is a concept that is constructed socially between the subjects, rather than a definition between subjects and object (Buzan et al., 1998, p.31).

Another important point put forward by the Copenhagen School is the theory of the regional security complex. Despite the rapid progress of technological developments, threats mostly continue to reach short distances easily (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p.461). The theory studied since the 1990s has emphasized the regional importance of security. For this reason, it is of great importance in terms of analyzability that the threats have a strong relationship with the region where they occur. (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p.466-467). According to Buzan, on a global scale, all states are dependent on each other about security issue. However, this level of dependency is proportional to their distance from each other. According to Buzan, the source of the regional security complex comes from two separate roots, one of which is the relationship between the anarchic structure of the international system and the balance of power, and the

other is the pressure caused by local geographical proximity (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 46). There is strong relationship between geographical proximity and security because many threats may travel easily in short distances than in long ones. In the bipolar system of the Cold War era, states tried to provide their security by positioning themselves according to two superpowers or pursuing a balance of power. However, these states, which were suppressed in the order that was formed later, gained more movement capacity in a regional sense. However, there is a tendency for great powers to override the regional requirement, and small powers have reinforced this. Small powers would find themselves locked in the regional security complex, while large powers would expand their power over the entire planet by penetrating several adjacent regions (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 46). In this regard, it is necessary to take into account the regional dynamics of security, which will be carried out with reference to the state.

A third concept that the School has introduced into the studies is the "Sectoral Security" approach. The Copenhagen School originated with the idea of focusing on the non-military aspect of European security. Copenhagen School has not only addressed military security in terms of defining and perceiving security, but also expanded the concept by adding different security perceptions. According to Buzan, the "sector" is the lens that a person uses when studying a holistic "reality" situation in the international system (Buzan et al., 1998, p.27). But this lens illuminates only a specific part of reality. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde extend the concept of security by adding concepts; military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. To illustrate, the military sector is concerned with "forced coercion relations"; the political sector related to "relationship of authority, governing status, and recognition"; the economic sector is concerned with "relationships of trade, production, and finance"; the societal sector is associated with "relationships of collective identity"; and the environmental sector related to "relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.7). The military sector deals with the mutual interaction of states' perceptions of their "offensive and defensive capacities" and the intentions of states. For this reason, it will not be objectionable to emphasize that the main actor in this sector is the state. State and state sovereignty is also an important issue in the political sector, but political organizations other than the state are also

important in this sector, for example, the European Union, which is a supranational organization. However, the military and political sectors do not focus on the identities of nations.

Copenhagen School conceptualizes security as “speech act” by taking a constructivist approach to its center. In addition to the approaches of social constructivism and political theory in the theory of securitization, the theory of speech act in the philosophy of language has also been used. The link between politicization and securitization through the speech act theory may cause the actor to handle the subject in extraordinary ways. In this context, security can be called a “self-referential application”, because although a subject is not existentially threatening, presenting the subject as a threat makes it a security issue (Buzan et al., 1998, p.24). These problems are constructed by securitizing actors through conversations that take place within the framework of a security threat. In other words, “securitization” is the legitimization of extraordinary measures outside of standard political procedures as a result of the perception of an issue as an existential threat. In order for an issue to be categorized as a serious security issue, it is not necessary that this issue contains really important threats that’s why, presenting the problem as a threat has a very big impact on the securitization of the issue. Securitization does not occur only with the destruction of the usual rules or the presence of threats that make it legitimate to take such extraordinary measures. In order for the securitization process to be completed three basic components must exist; “existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules” (Buzan et al., 1998, p.26). If these three steps do not come together, the referent object remains the securitizing move through the statement and the process cannot be completed (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25-26). Hence, securitization occurs when the target audience accepts the issue as a security issue (Buzan et al., 1998, p.25-26).

According to scholars of the Copenhagen School, securitization is defined as an extreme version of politicization (Buzan et al., 198, p.23). By securitizing an issue, this issue is taken from the political sphere to the security sphere by the actor securitizing the issue. The purpose of the academic analysis of securitization is to reveal how an issue becomes a security issue and the process of constructing it in this way. The securitization process varies depending on the position of the

actor. The actors are positioned according to their positions of power in the constructed space. Therefore, studying on securitization theory also means studying on power politics (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 31-32). Accordingly, securitization studies provide a clear path for analysts by asking clear questions: “who securitizes (securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions” (Buzan et al., 1998, p.32). Accordingly, the process of securitization is explained as follows: first, a subject that emphasizes that the referent object is under an existential threat must be selected. In the second stage, the securitizing actor has to bring this issue to the security field as a security problem or threat through speech act. In other words, this actor " is someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act "(Buzan et al., 1998, p.40). Finally, the audience should accept the security problem or threat posed by the securitizing actor. Thus, the securitizing actor legitimizes the extraordinary measures taken to eliminate the labelled security problem or threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p.26). In addition, if the decision presented by the securitizing actor is not accepted by the audience, there may be a securitization move, nothing more is possible. Since the securitization process evolves around the problem or threat presented by the securitizing actor, the process is not objective. It also cannot be attributed as a subjective process, as the audience must accept it in order for the process to be successful. Therefore, the securitization process is neither objective nor subjective. The communication between the securitizing actor and the audience emphasizes the intersubjective dimension of the process.

As Buzan states, there are three different securitization units: referent objects, securitizing actors, and functional actors. Accordingly, the referent object is that which is considered to be under an existential threat, and therefore must be protected. Hence, the identified threat to the referent object "justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.21). Secondly, securitizing actor is the person or community that claims that the referent object is under an existential threat and presents it to the audience, bringing the subject to the security arena (Buzan et al., 1998, p.36). In other words, it is the actor who implements the securitization move. The last one is the functional actor that "affects the dynamics of a sector" without being a securitizing actor and a referent

object (Buzan et al., 1998, p.36). However, it is not always easy to distinguish between actors and referent objects. This is because an actor can be both a referent object under threat and a securitizing actor expressing this threat.

1.3 Securitization of Immigration

After World War II, traditional theories centered on the survival of the state, which focused more on military issues, became dominant in security studies. Then, after the Cold War, traditional theories were insufficient to solve the emerging problems and were criticized by critical theories. The traditional understanding analyzes the political agenda by following a state-centered path, focusing on the concrete aspect of security (McDonald, 2002, p.283-284). The critical understanding of security, on the other hand, problematizes the stereotypical definitions of security and argues that the security threat is socially constructed. As a result of these developments, the meaning of security has been expanded and the referent object and its actors have been deepened (Krause & Williams, 1996, p.230).

Buzan et al. argue that "security is a self-referential practice" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.24). In other words, it does not matter whether the threat actually exists or not, the threat is socially constructed by the political elites. In traditional theories, the referent object threatened by the issue of migration is the state. In other words, migration, which is considered a problem, is categorized as an extension of state security. However, with the emergence of the concept of societal security, a new referent object has entered the literature. With an emphasis on identity, this new referent object showed how issues such as migration can be an existential threat. The definition of societal security was first mentioned in the book "Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe" (Wæver et al., 1993) was developed step by step in response to national conflicts state like the former Yugoslavia (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 212). In the 1980s, it further expanded the concept of security, which was expanding economically and environmentally. Especially in Western Europe, in the face of increasing EU integration, national voters were concerned about the loss of cultural autonomy as well as political sovereignty (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p.213). However, immigration also came to

be seen as a threat to national identity. Thus, referent object has shifted from state sovereignty to the concept of societal security. The meaning of the societal security is not referred to social security. To explain, societal security is associated with “nations and their survival” and a nation is referenced by “some group, movement, party, or elite” and supposes that the speeches and movements made in the name of it (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 41). According to Buzan et al. the societal sector is about identity. On the other hand, societal insecurity arises when communities identify any development or potential for their survival as a threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p.119). According to societal security, the referent object is society itself. This situation formed the basis of the "identity security" research. In this context, there is a conceptual difference between state security and societal security and this does not always fit to each other for instance, national minorities may be threatened by their own state and also the state or the political actor might mobilize across to any confrontation from internal or external threats (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p.213). As the concept of societal security, ethnic conflicts and civil wars came to the fore as a result of the Cold War, internal stability and harmony problems emerged (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p.29). Developments such as ethnic separatism and cleansing in Yugoslavia and the emergence of internal resistance to the expansion of the European Union have shown that state and societal security concerns, as well as improving societal security, have not always coincided (Bilgin, 2003, p.211).

According to the Copenhagen School, which considers the issue of immigration and the issue of “securitization of migration” within the societal sector, security occurs as a result of a community perceiving a problem as a threat to its own collective identity. In this context, societal security is a collective phenomenon that includes “actions taken to protect the identity of “we”” rather than an individual phenomenon (Buzan et al., 1998, p.120). The concept of nation has been defined from different perspectives in the literature: one view defines a nation in terms of people living in the same state and being loyal to that state, while another view defines theirs in terms of “ethnic, organic community of language, blood, and culture” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 120). Therefore, the concept of nation has its own ambiguity. On the other hand, the concept of society implies a broader framework which is not always carrying an identity. For this reason,

threats to identity actually play an important role in the construction of the threat of the phenomenon of "we" and often contribute to the formation of the phenomenon of "we". In such an environment, the phenomenon of immigration becomes one of the common issues that can be a threat to societal security. According to Huysmans, there is a sense of insecurity in society that accelerates xenophobia and racist attitudes towards immigrants and refugees because they are seen as a source of insecurity (Huysmans, 2006, p.75-76). Immigrants and refugees are the collective security apparatus. Therefore, it is not only posing a threat to individual security, but also poses a threat to collective security (Huysmans, 2006, p.58). In this respect, classifying the phenomenon of immigration as a threat to collective security can easily construct immigration as a security problem. According to Huysmans, security prioritizes the autonomy of the political unit and he emphasizes the question of "how security framing renders that what needs securing" (Huysmans, 2006, p. 52). Huysmans argues that when there is no objectified fear, it turns an abstract feeling like death. In accordance with issue of immigrants resemble to threat which is death. According to Buzan et al. the concept of fear is a facilitating condition in the process of securitization (Buzan et al., 1998, p.32).

The securitization theory, examined under the security studies of the Copenhagen School, reveals a multidimensional structure that includes the military, social, economic, political and environmental sectors. In addition, immigration has a very important place in areas such as human security, state security, social and economic security. Increasing international immigration in the face of the diversification of security concerns is an important issue that needs to be addressed. According to the securitization theory, for a problem to be perceived as a security problem, it does not need to exist in real terms, security issues turn into security problems with the securitization actions socially constructed by the actors and as a result this securitized issue is accepted by a "sufficient audience to sanction extraordinary defensive moves" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.204). Based on this information, if the issue of immigration is to be securitized, a perception of existential threat caused by immigrants should be created by the political or security elites. In addition, this perception is created through speech act. To clarify, first of all, immigrants must be shown as a target for immigration to be a

security problem or threat. Then, elites need to label them as threats/problems through speech act. Finally, the justification process needs to be initiated in order for the immigration policy towards immigrants to become more rigid and for extraordinary measures to be taken.

For example, immigrants are considered as an economic danger to the citizens of the host country. It is thought that immigrants may cause economic instability in the host country and unemployment may occur by lowering wages (Karyotis, 2007, p.10). However, the contribution of immigrants to the economy is an undeniable fact. Immigrants benefit the host country in the long run as they "provide needed skills and helps boost economic growth" (Karyotis, 2007, p.10). Cultural differences are emphasized in the securitization of migration. In this vein, Maggie Ibrahim describes securitization of immigration as "the most modern form of racism" (Ibrahim, 2005, p.163). Accordingly, it is argued that this discourse, based on the idea of cultural superiority, is that cultural difference destabilizes the order and causes social fragmentation. However, it is also possible that this new racist idea may cause ethnic conflicts. Thus, he claims that he has updated the racist discourse with "discourses that immigrants threaten human security" (Ibrahim, 2005, p.183). Another discourse used in securitization of immigration is related to the crime rate of immigrants. Accordingly, there are claims that immigrants are more involved in criminal activities than natives. According to Martinez and Lee, immigrants may be more likely to commit crime because of "acculturation problems, poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, and a preponderance of young males" (Martinez & Lee, 2000, p.514). Tsoukala and Ceyhan, on the other hand, examine the association of immigrants with crime. According to the study, immigrants tend to be more likely to engage in criminal activity "because they are generally young, male, unmarried, and poor" (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002, p.25). Moreover, their unequal treatment before the justice system also increases the crime rate in statistics (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002, p.26).

In this chapter, basic concepts such as "security", "securitization" and "securitization of immigration" are defined according to the structural framework of the thesis. As a result of the analysis of security discussions, the studies were categorized around two camps. The first camp includes traditional approaches that build notions of international security on the assumption that the international

system is anarchic and that this leads to power struggles between states. The second camp includes the new security approach, which argues that the field of security has expanded with globalization. This thesis details how a non-military issue such as immigration is securitized in German political discourses by adopting the new security approach. The securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School has been discussed in detail as it constitutes the theoretical framework of this study. Thus, securitization theory becomes a result of the political discourses that will be located in the analysis of German practices on immigration. In this direction, the study aims to analyze how the immigration problem is securitized by the political parties in Germany. Before moving on to the analysis part, this study examined the relationship between immigration and security based on literature review at the level of the European Union and Germany.

2. CHAPTER: SECURITIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GERMANY

In this chapter, the arguments on how the securitization of immigration is constructed as a security problem in the European political agenda through securitization theory and speech act were discussed. In order to better analyze the securitization of immigration in the EU, the important steps and agreements taken by the EU on immigration were presented as a case study. Afterwards, perceptions, concerns and attitudes of EU member states on immigration in the absence of a common immigration policy were examined. Finally, Germany's attitude towards immigration, which plays a leading role in EU immigration policy, was examined.

2.1 Securitization of EU's Immigration Policy

European countries experienced a number of political and economic consequences as a result of their deteriorating economy after the World War II and they were trying to restructure their economy started recruitment programs in the late 1950s. For example, Germany implemented the guest worker (*gastarbeiter*) program and recruited workers from Turkey. In the period between 1950 and 1960, immigrants were seen as extra labor force and migration policies were encouraged under the name of "guest worker" definition and were considered necessary for economic development. According to Kastoryano, the increasing wave of immigration with the efforts to improve the economy has also caused problems related to immigration and integration in European countries (Kastoryano, 2010, p.81) . For example, the migration movement in France was seen as a need to improve the labor market, but it later became the answer to demographic problems (Kastoryano, 2010, p.81). The wave of immigration, which was initially seen as an opportunity for economic development, tended to be welcomed by European countries in the two decades following the World War II.

The increasing economic turmoil in the 1970s negatively affected the European approach towards immigrants. The increasing immigrant population began to be perceived as a threat to the European identity, both with guest workers becoming permanent and family reunifications. Thus, immigration has become an issue of public interest (Huysmans, 2000, p.754). Huysmans defines this process as a shift

from a permissive immigration policy to a control-oriented and restrictive one (Huysmans, 2000, p.754). The increase in the unemployment rates with the 1974 Oil Crisis led to strengthening of negative discourses in the European Economic Community (EEC) countries. This situation caused the member states to stop the recruitment of migrant workers and to put the quota application into action, and in this way paved the way for the implementation of incentive programs for the existing immigrants to return to their country. As a result of all these measures, the problem of irregular immigration has emerged ⁴.

In order to carry out a common strategy on security issues, the Trevi Group (stands for Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and Violence Internationally), based on intergovernmental cooperation, was established with the initiative of the Dutch at the European Council in Rome in 1975. In addition, intergovernmental cooperation with the Ad hoc Group on Immigration was further strengthened. The main purpose of the Trevi Group is to strengthen the collectivity in the fight against terrorism and to strengthen internal security among its member states. This Group expanded its field of activity after the 1980s, emphasizing the issues of illegal immigration and organized crime. According to Faist, there is an important institutional link between immigration policies and crime (Faist, 2002, p.10). In that sense, the legal basis of the EEC's approach to the phenomenon of immigration as a security problem was established by the Single European Act (SEA). The Treaty entered into force in 1987 as a revision of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. SEA was the agreement providing for the completion of the

⁴ The concept of irregular immigration is not universally accepted. The concept is "generally used to identify persons moving outside regular migration channels" (IOM, 2023). According to IOM, irregular immigration "Movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination" (IOM, 2023). The concept is called the illegal dimension of the immigration movement. However, the use of the concept of illegal immigration rather than irregular immigration is also criticized by national and international actors. Furthermore, "it is not the immigrant as a human being who is illegal, but his or her mode of entry and stay or work " is illegal (Düvell, 2005, p.26). For this reason, the concept of irregular immigration is widely used in the international community. Another point is that it is not appropriate for human rights to define the immigrant's illegal. Since the concept of illegal immigration can be associated with crime, the concept of irregular immigration is preferred of a more neutral expression.

transition to the common market and free movement. According to the SEA “The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty” (SEA, Art. 13). With this agreement, the emphasis on intergovernmental cooperation increased with the removal of internal borders. In this context, the concerns about the free movement of third-country nationals within the single market after entering European countries became a striking point which led to policies strengthening the Community’s external borders. From this, it will be possible to draw the following conclusion: the fear that third-country citizens can freely move between European countries, has progressed with the effort of the member states to control the European Community border. For this reason, increasing unemployment rates have led to the perception that immigrants create a burden for the country of immigration due to socio-economic reasons.

According to Huysmans, the diminishing of internal border controls in some countries in the European Community paved the way for personal identity controls (Huysmans, 2000, p.759). Thus, border checks have been replaced by identity checks (Huysmans, 2000, p.759). In this sense, diminishing of internal border controls is in contrast to the traditional state-centered understanding. To explain, according to the traditional approach that focuses on military issues and the survival of the state, the state wants to protect its borders unilaterally for security. On the other hand, although the purpose of SEA was to increase the economic benefit, the security aspect was emphasized. In addition, another importance of the agreement was that it draws attention to a common migration policy by emphasizing the inadequacy of national policies. European integration on migration has strengthened member states. In other words, with the single market policy, there has been a global economic and political change. Thus, the central feature of state sovereignty has developed the ability to control its own borders (Geddes, 2001, p.62). In this context, the agreement enabled migration to become a "European" issue within the framework of interdependencies (Geddes, 2008, p.72-73).

Another important step taken regarding the Europeanization of migration policy and the securitization of immigration is the Schengen Agreement signed in 1985 by France, Germany and the Benelux countries. This agreement, which provides free movement for European Community citizens, was a determined attempt to strengthen

the common migration policy by removing internal border controls. The Agreement was also strengthened with the signing of the 1990 Schengen Convention in which a common visa policy was advocated. This convention linked immigration and asylum with terrorism, transnational crime and border control (Huysmans, 2000, p.756). Moreover, Schengen Agreement included the free movement of not only people but also goods. Thus, it paved the way for ill-activities that could be committed by criminals, terrorists and immigrants. Thus, the problems created by immigration and transnational activities were connected. In addition, immigration, which is frequently referenced in maintaining public order and ensuring internal stability, has also become a leading issue in the political arena. As a result, according to Huysmans, security discourses and technologies have become integrated with the Europeanization of immigration policy (Huysmans, 2000, p.756). International terrorism in the 1970s, the consequences of the end of the Cold War on immigration and criminality, and the Kosovo refugee crisis in the late 1990s brought along some transnational challenges (Ette, 2017, p.42). Although military conflicts were ended after the Cold War, the internal borders abolished with the Schengen Agreement revealed new security problems among the member states. Thus, external borders were strengthened and internal borders were tried to be protected. However, with the increase in asylum applications, the more restrictive measures taken by the member states resulted in a negative result because the restrictive measures taken in one country caused more asylum seekers in other countries (Ette, 2017, p.43). The result that the one-handed effort was not helpful enough brought the need for intense cooperation. In this case, the issue of transnational immigration and crime has turned into a security process that is more relevant to "politicians, press and public opinion" (Ette, 2017, p.43). As a result, Schengen Agreements emphasized that immigration regulations have a strong connection with the protection of internal security, while Trevi Groups played an important role in promoting the intergovernmental structure institutionalized under the name of Justice and Home Affairs, the third pillar of the the Maastricht Treaty (also known as Treaty on European Union). In this context, The Maastricht Treaty has a major role in shaping the economic and political structure of the European Union, and the European Community has been named the European Union.

Following the acceleration with the SEA and the Schengen Agreements, the Maastricht Agreement signed on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1

November 1993 brought the third pillar on Justice and Home Affairs. With this agreement, the issue of migration formed the basis of an intergovernmental approach to a common policy implementation. In addition to cooperation on security issues such as customs, police and judicial, drugs; terrorism, immigration and organized crime emerged as urgent transnational issues during this period (Ette, 2017, p.30). Although a number of developments were handled with the establishment of the third pillar with this agreement, according to Huysmans the fact that the Maastricht Agreement dealt with the issue of migration together with criminal matters paved the way for the social construction of migration as a security issue (Huysmans, 2000, p.753). In this context, the Agreement introduces a number of new policies and innovations for the Commission and the Court of Justice (Wincott, 1996, p.408). A restrictive authority has been given to the Commission on Justice and Home Affairs. In other words, the scope of voting rules, which gives member states the right to veto in the legislative process, is limited (Wincott, 1996, p.408). Thus, a pragmatic point of view was preferred over the promotion of cooperative policy for the management of the migration phenomenon. In more detail, the Commission can propose legislation by emphasizing more general criteria covering some of the issues covered in Article 6 of the Agreement (*Treaty on European Union*, 1992). Thus, the aim here is to focus on the main causes of irregular immigration rather than following strict policies towards the phenomenon of immigration. Therefore, in conclusion, the importance of the Maastricht Treaty is to give a new perspective on the new security threats posed by the free movement of people within Europe by emphasizing and facilitating the importance of cooperation.

The Amsterdam Agreement was signed in October 1997 and entered into force in May 1999. The agreement contains several controversial provisions "due to their insignificance when held against the criterion of federalist ambitions"(Moravcsik et al., 1999, p.60). Despite this, the Agreement includes important developments within the scope of refugee and migration policies. As the issue of migration was included in the Third Pillar of the Maastricht Agreement and as a result of the dissatisfaction arising from the intergovernmental structure, it became the agenda to move the issues related to migration to the First Pillar. As a result, the Amsterdam Agreement incorporated refugee and immigration-related policies into the First Pillar, depillarised the old institutional framework and creating an "Area of Freedom, Security

and Justice" (Ette, 2017, p.34). The involvement of the Commission was increased by providing a joint initiative power with the member states. The intergovernmental structure of the Union gained a more supranational dimension with immigration and asylum issues being placed in the first pillar. Moravcsik et al. argue that by introducing unanimity voting on first pillar issues, possible future policies can be avoided before the government is lock prior to the draft stage (Moravcsik et al., 1999, p.80). The Amsterdam Agreement stated that ensuring internal security is possible not only with the freedom offered to EU citizens, but also with the freedom of non-EU citizens. Thus, migration and asylum issues have gradually increased their importance in the EU agenda. However, it should be noted here that the member states continued to hold their powers in these policy areas. Therefore, it would be appropriate to state that states continue to be an effective factor in the decision-making process in migration policies. The Schengen, Maastricht and Amsterdam Agreements are of great importance in establishing the basic foundations and content for harmonization of EU migration policies.

The European Council meeting held in Tampere in October 1999 is an important development for the establishment of a common policy within the scope of the "Area of Freedom, Security and Justice" initiated with the Amsterdam Agreement. In this meeting, the reasons for migration and asylum were mentioned and "the need for a global vision" was stated (Araújo, 2011, p.28). At the meeting, the Commission was further strengthened in the migration and asylum policy areas, with the Council asking the Commission to establish a progress calendar. As a result of the commission's failure, the heads of state of Spain and the United Kingdom decided at the European Council meeting held in Seville in June 2002 to "reduce development aid for countries of origin that refuse to implement immigration control strategies" (Araújo, 2011, p.29). In this context, it was emphasized at this meeting that the EU's long-term goal should be to deal with the root causes of illegal migration. A key pillar of strengthening institutions such as the Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament, according to Geddes, was "the belief that it can help secure more progressive policy outcomes that offer protection for the rights of asylum seekers." (Geddes, 2001, p.59-60). In response to including immigration and asylum-related policies in the first pillar, member states implemented Council sovereignty and unanimity. After the Amsterdam Agreement, the powers of supranational institutions

were supported and associated with the possibility of creating common immigration and asylum policies. In such an environment, a dilemma emerged between nation states and the international system and the role of the EU became sharper. In addition, opt-out from free movement and unanimity criteria have ceased to be supportive elements for immigration policies. Negative perceptions towards immigrants, policies that focus on security and xenophobia have affected both immigrants and the countries they go to. This situation also supported the discourses of right-wing parties in Europe about security.

Another important turning point regarding the securitization of immigration was the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Attacks on US buildings in 2001, Madrid in 2004 and Paris in 2015 were perceived as cross-border security threats. Immigrants have become a physical threat to internal security due to the bridge between immigration and terrorism after 9/11. Thus, strict policies regarding border controls and migration management in the EU have been paved against the increasing security threat. As a result of the reporting of immigration and asylum policies regarding the securitization of immigration, the Parliament focused on the humanitarian dimension, while the Council focused on protecting the EU borders from immigrants.

2.2 Securitization of Immigration in European Union

It is possible to state that the discourse of EU institutions on securitization of immigration is more ambiguous compared to the national level. Opinions on immigration may differ between EU member states and the governments of member states. For example, former Prime Minister of France Manuel Valls called for joint urgent action to prevent irregular immigration and stated that this situation is a threat to the concept of Europe (TheGuardian, 2016)⁵. On the other hand, the Italian parliament adopted many measures against immigrants. Former Commissioner Franco Frattini, who is responsible for freedom, security and justice at the European Commission, stated in a statement published in November 2007 that third countries can offer them immigration or mobility opportunities in return for their cooperation in

⁵ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/22/french-pm-manuel-valls-says-refugee-crisis-is-destabilising-europe>

preventing irregular migration (Hampshire, 2016, p.579). This attitude of the Commission is related to emphasizing the non-security aspects of immigration. In addition, when the securitization discourse is handled at the EU level, the fact that the audience can be political professionals, experts and bureaucrats makes this process different from the national level (Neal, 2009, p.336). Thus, immigration is securitized through two different processes, the first at the "discursive level" and the second with the "creation of security agencies" (IOV & BOGDAN, 2017, p.14). To explain, according to Iov and Bogdan, immigration has been constructed discursively as a threat to national security and has led the EU to take integrated measures. In this context, illegal entry and the existence of criminal networks (through organized crime, arms, drugs or human trafficking) affect the security of national borders and immigration has become a matter of international security (IOV & BOGDAN, 2017, p.15). In addition, immigrants pose a threat to internal security as they affect the labor market and benefit from social assistance.

When the literature on immigration in the EU is examined, it can be observed that the discourses on the connection between immigration and security tend to be around the axes of economization and securitization (Buonfino, 2004; Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002). Also, Faist underlines those immigrants are seen as the source of problems such as unemployment and crime and defines this as meta-politics (Faist, 2006, p.9). Accordingly, fears about immigration are associated with social problems and security concerns (Faist, 2006, p.9). In addition, Buonfino argues in her study that the arrival of immigrants in the host country creates competition for education, housing and job opportunities (Buonfino, 2004, p.33). She states that the reason for this rhetoric is the fear of falling wage levels, the risk of an increase in the prices of additional goods in the market, and the possibility of an increase in housing expenses (Buonfino, 2004, p.33-34). Ceyhan and Tsoukala, on the other hand, base these fears on the assumption that low-paid immigrants will take away the jobs of the local population through informal laboring (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002, p.23-24). As a result, these perceived existential fears and concerns about the identities and security of European societies have caused immigration to be seen as a long-term threat to the social order.

Similarly, according to Huysmans, immigration is a "meta-problem". So, immigration is the source of more than one problem. The fact that immigration has

become a security issue in Western Europe has to do with the European integration process. It is also a fact that securitization focuses on the instability created by immigration within internal integration and, in relation to this, "the dangers of public order" (Huysmans, 2000, p.751). That is, immigration is both an internal and an external threat to national existence (Huysmans, 2000, p.758). Huysmans argues that the political process that builds the relationship between immigration and crime in the internal market is not sufficient on its own. Because this is possible with a broad politicization in which immigrants are portrayed as a threat to national identity and welfare provisions. Therefore, while examining the Europeanization of immigration policy, Huysmans emphasizes its connection with societal dynamics.

According to the UNHCR, although there are different types of immigration, people fleeing persecution or serious harm from their country of residence are called "asylum" when a state provides protection on its own territory (UNHCR, 2006). It states that according to the International Organization for Migration, immigrants do not have to be asylum seekers and that asylum seekers are not economic migrants (International Organization for Migration, 2015). However, according to the studies mentioned above, securitizing actors ignore these distinctions and define everyone as an economic immigrant. In other words, the securitizing actor includes asylum seekers and refugees in the word "immigrant".

Some academic studies associate immigrants with organized crime, human trafficking and terrorist activities. According to Karamanidou, the definition of immigration as "illegal" has caused it to be described as risky elements to EU borders in official discourses (Karamanidou, 2015, p.56). In the Karamanidou's article, securitization of immigration has occurred in three areas: "at the border" (especially within the scope of FRONTEX's activities), "beyond the border" (focusing on the external dimension in immigration controls) and "inside" (focusing on the areas of detention and deportation while controlling immigrants) (Karamanidou, 2015, p.44-45). Accordingly, the most well-known of Frontex's activities, especially the patrolling of the EU's southern sea borders, is the securitization activities in terms of border control. In this study, he emphasizes that the activities carried out jointly by Frontex and the security institutions of the member states (such as HERA, NAUTILUS, POSEIDON) aim to prevent immigrants from entering the EU and to obtain intelligence on border mobility. Karamanidou argues that both discourses and

practices are effective in the securitization process and that discourses also legitimize practices that characterize immigrants as "the other" (Karamanidou, 2015, p.56).

In a similar vein, on the link between immigration and terrorism Baker-Beall explores the EU's response to "returning foreign fighters" and argues that seeing immigrants as a potential terrorist threat has important political and social consequences. Moreover, the reason for the calls for the possibility of a terrorist attack in the EU was seen as the return of approximately 5000 EU citizens who went to the civil war in Syria to their homes. According to Baker-Beall, there are two reasons why these people are seen as a danger: first, there is a concern that these people may use their experiences in terrorist activities. The second concern is that they will lead radical ideas and acts of violence in the social dimension (Baker-Beall, 2019, p.437). After the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, the EU introduced a set of policies addressing returning foreign fighters as part of the fight against terrorism. Accordingly, this article draws attention to the relationship between the securitization of immigration and border control policy under the banner of counter-terrorism. In conclusion, Baker-Beall emphasizes three important points. First, the EU's addressing the narrow scope of foreign fighters against the problem of immigration and border control. Second, the EU uses the threat posed by foreign fighters not only to prevent terrorism, but actually as part of securitization of immigration. Finally, the EU is trying to legitimize the steps it has taken by taking more measures as a securitizing actor against this emerging threat (Baker-Beall, 2019, p.437).

The terrorist attacks of September 11 became a turning point in the construction of immigration as a security concern in the EU, beyond its impact on the USA. These actions carried out by non-state actors have awakened the idea that governments in Europe should also fight non-military threats to security (Lazaridis & Wadia, 2015, p.1). On this topic, Gabriella Lazaridis and Khursheed Wadia made a significant contribution to the literature by publishing a book on how immigration was securitized in Europe after the 9/11 attacks. In this book, firstly, focused on the change in immigration policy after 9/11 and how it was governed by security concerns. At this point, it was emphasized that "the relationship between terrorism and immigration policy is not unidirectional" (Lazaridis & Wadia, 2015, p.33). That is, for securitization, immigration need not be explicitly stated as a security threat. Moreover, the process by which immigration becomes associated with

security/insecurity concerns is important. Secondly, this study argues that the security measures taken by European states after September 11 led to an overwhelming insecurity of immigrants and settled ethnic minorities. Finally, the study examined the populist reactions in European states against immigration and immigration policy after 9/11. Accordingly, populist extremist parties and groups have turned immigration into a security problem with far-right discourses, which include that immigration is a threat to European security and that it affects the national cultures of states (Lazaridis & Wadia, 2015, p.). It is a fact that these reactions will increase as a result of the economic and financial crises, when the austerity policy is brought to the agenda.

In the context of security, terrorism and immigration, the 2015 Paris attacks are important in securitizing migration. Some of the political figures in Europe have contributed to the securitization of immigration by associating these terrorist attacks with the migration crisis. Thus, the public's view of immigrants was built on fear and their anxiety increased. In this sense, the work of Dionysios Stivas both examines the relationship between security, terrorism and immigration and presents a critique of the Copenhagen School's theory of securitization. Contrary to the common sense of the securitization literature, Stivas "investigated the actual or potential response of the target audience to the securitization moves"(Stivas, 2019, p.54). Moreover, Stivas found that even after the terrorist attacks in Europe, immigration has not been successfully securitized at the EU level. According to the securitization theory, three conditions must be met for successful securitization: "existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.26). Stivas argues that although the European Council and the Commission refer to the threats posed by the immigration crisis, they cannot present it as an existential threat to the EU. In addition, the European Border Coast Guard Organization (EBCG) and the EU-Turkey "Statement", which the EU has considered for the emergency, were found to be legally illegal and the securitization was unsuccessful (Stivas, 2019, p.54). Nevertheless, the negative tendency towards immigration in the EU public opinion paved the way for successful securitization. Therefore, the acceptance of the audience, which is a part of securitization, is emphasized once again.

Examining the relevance of minority and immigration issues to security, Sasse states that these issues are closely related to "security and control or rights" (Sasse,

2005, p.678). While stating the common responsibility of national minorities and immigrants in increasing the diversity of EU member states, Sasse argues that these rights are interlocked in policies created in the face of both political stability and social cohesion concerns. Sasse noting that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU provide examples of the dual dimension of security-rights, first of all, the OSCE emphasizes that the EU has developed itself sufficiently in this area with its focus on minority rights (Sasse, 2005, p.689). Secondly, she stated that while the concept of security has been of great importance for the OSCE and the EU since the 1990s, the concept of rights has gradually gained importance in policy discourses and approaches (Sasse, 2005, p.690). Sasse clearly states that these institutions are important for defining the concept of integration and that the management of immigration-rights policies is a supranational situation (Sasse, 2005, p.690). As a result, the association of minority and immigration issues with security and control has resulted in a security-emphasizing institution like the OSCE focusing on minority rights over time. From this point of view, it is possible to state that the EU and OSCE's emphasis on the supranational nature of the management of policies regarding migration-rights has increasingly securitized the issue of migration.

Hintjens contributed to the literature by presenting data on successful securitizations as well as unsuccessful securitizations. Accordingly, the first unsuccessful securitization started in 2015 when the Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi claimed that the "trans-Mediterranean slave trade" emerged. Hintjens attributed the failure of this situation to its lack of legitimacy in the face of elite audiences (Hintjens, 2019, p.186). In this context, she stated that Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy saw smugglers as a threat, legitimizing military measures for this, but this situation resulted in failure as it undermined European human rights principles (Hintjens, 2019, p.186). In this study, despite the fact that the securitization process in the EU was initiated by the member states and EU institutions, the unsuccessful securitization movements as a result of the audience's disagreement with the stated security threat are revealed.

The EU's support for the participation of third parties to protect borders in immigration management also makes a significant contribution to the securitization of immigration. Accordingly, she argues that "the securitization of migration is not a linear but a spiral process" (Panebianco, 2022, p.1400). In the securitization of

immigration, she draws attention to the impact of the political leaders and populist party leaders in Europe on state sovereignty and the anti-immigration rhetoric on public opinion. Thus, in this article, it is argued that the EU externalizes immigration management by ignoring the humanitarian and political consequences.

Valeria Bello made an important contribution to the literature, claiming that the use of securitized language such as "illegal border crossings" by FRONTEX, an EU agency, to describe immigrants is effective in securitizing migration in the EU (Bello, 2022, p.1340). In this respect, Bello states that being treated as criminals, being held in immigration centers and being deported are effective in increasing negative opinions about immigrants. In addition, she states that the detention of undocumented passengers increases the security threat by causing the securitization of immigration and the transformation of immigrants into criminals (Bello, 2022, p.1336). In addition to Frontex, Kaunert and Léonard (2012) state that courts of justice have an important role in establishing fair treatment against immigrants, while Bello argues that the EU Council, which reflects individual interests, securitizes immigration (Bello, 2022, p.1337). Bello states that the Council of Europe is influenced by countries such as Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy and Hungary, which are biased towards immigrants, and explains that FRONTEX contributes to the securitization of immigration by declaring immigrants as criminals rather than refugees (Bello, 2022, p.1339-1340). In this sense, as in Karamanidou's article focuses on the immigration-crime relationship and deals with Frontex's activities as a securitizing actor.

Léonard and Kaunert's study are significant in that it focuses on the role of external actors in securitization of immigration. The point emphasized in the article is that an external actor may make threats to target a securitized vulnerability of another actor in order to gain an advantage. In this article, the example of Turkey as an external actor is considered. Léonard and Kaunert consider the EU's investment of funds in response to Turkey's threat to send more immigrants to Europe as the decentralization of the issue of securitized immigration (Léonard & Kaunert, 2022, p.745). The focus of this article on the influence of external actors in the securitization process is important as it fills the gap in the literature on securitization of asylum and immigration in the EU.

Michela Ceccorulli's contribution to the literature is on the issue of immigration threatening the ontological security of the EU. In this study, it is analyzed that the immigration flow to Europe between the years 2015-2016 poses a threat to the ontological security of the EU and this causes an internal crisis. It is argued that this situation poses a threat to the collective self of the EU (Ceccorulli, 2019, p.316). For this, she argues that the Schengen area was securitized and then normalized (Ceccorulli, 2019, p.317). Moreover, the ethical relevance of this situation has been discussed and it is argued that the ontological threat of the EU prevents it from acting as a normative force. As a result, in this article, it is argued that the security of interior space is under the collective responsibility of the EU, with the claim that immigrants and asylum seekers pose a threat to border security.

Robert Dover provides clarifications in his study that the supply of immigrants is necessary for the economic growth of the EU. However, on the other hand, it emphasizes the reality of a social and political resistance against immigrants. He states that this tension may cause the EU's economic prosperity to be jeopardized as a result of its ideological war with Russia and China in Africa (Dover, 2008, p.127). However, it expresses the occurrence of social unrest. Thus, this tension states that the African Government has taken more stringent measures in border controls. He emphasizes that in the face of these measures, immigrants have to choose more dangerous routes to reach the EU. He also mentioned the possibility that the EU's cooperation with Africa through Europol, Eurojust, the European Police College and the Borders Agency would appear as part of its post-colonial activity. As a result, Dover argues that geographically, the immigration problem has moved from Europe to Africa and the European Commission supports this on economic grounds. In addition, in the interview with Prof. Dr. Emin Gürses, the importance of the role of third sector organizations in integrating immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees was emphasized (E. Gürses, personal communication, July 29, 2022). Gürses states that job opportunities are provided in support and education services for the integration of immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees in England (E. Gürses, personal communication, July 29, 2022).

Andrew Neal's study has made a significant contribution to the literature in line with his criticism of the securitization theory. In this article, the case of Frontex as a securitizing actor is investigated. Neal criticizes the securitization theory, arguing

that it fails to explain the multifaceted relationship of different institutions. Instead, the article argues that Frontex should address the EU's immigration and asylum policies and practices from a risk analysis framework. This framework aims to "manage and regulate the activities of security apparatuses in Member States" (Neal, 2009, p.353).

Léonard and Kaunert argue that it is important to analyze practices rather than discourses in securitization of immigration. Accordingly, Léonard and Kaunert compare Frontex's activities in the context of the Mediterranean "migration crisis" in 2005–2006 and 2015–2016, revealing that security practices intensified after 2016 (Léonard & Kaunert, 2022b, p.1427). In doing so, they apply a revised version of the Copenhagen School's securitization theory, emphasizing that security is not just one with survival and existential threats, but a continuum (Léonard & Kaunert, 2022b, p.1427). That is, the understanding of security constitutes the scope of securitization. Moreover, Frontex's increased cooperation with security institutions such as Europol and NATO also contribute to security-based information gathering, thus leading to "a spiraling in the securitization of migration in the EU" (Léonard & Kaunert, 2022b, p.1427).

By claiming that the securitization process is a dynamic process, Alessandro Buonfino has contributed to the enrichment of the literature. In her article, she explores how immigration is politicized at the national level. In addition, the article examines how the conceptualization of immigration among EU member states has transformed into a hegemonic discourse through human rights and economization discourses. In other words, it causes the security discourse at the nation-state level to directly affect the supranational level (Buonfino, 2004, p.43). It is evaluated as the victory of the securitization discourse of governments as the risk and fear that societies perceive in the face of mass immigration. One reason for this is that national governments argue that securitization is the best option to maintain the current balance of power in the socio-political framework. As a result, Buonfino argues that the securitization process is the result of a dynamic interaction between political actors, public opinion, local and global media (Buonfino, 2004, p.24). Noting that radical right parties also play an active role in the securitization process, she demonstrates that this situation jeopardizes social cohesion among multi-ethnic groups in European societies.

This section has explored the existing literature on securitization of immigration in the EU. It is possible to say that international immigration has been one of the most striking issues in Europe since the second half of the twentieth century. The explanation of most of the social and political actors through the concepts of immigrant, refugee, asylum seeker and foreigner has made it difficult for the public to sharpen the distinction between legal and irregular immigration, with the effect of securitization tools. As mentioned above, the building block of a successful securitization is the acceptance of the discourses of the securitizing actor by an audience (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). The point that distinguishes this study from the studies mentioned above is that it examines the election results and examines whether the securitization process is successful or not. The common point of the above-mentioned studies on the securitization of immigration in the EU is that the phenomenon of immigration is not only seen as a security threat to the collective identity and culture of the EU society, but also presented as a meta-problem. At the same time, there is a common view that more than one actor participates in the process regarding the meta-problem perception of immigration. Another common point of the studies mentioned above is that the 2015 Syrian Migration Movement constituted a breaking point among EU member states. For this reason, the securitization of immigration in member states will be analyzed in the next section.

2.3 Securitization of Immigration in EU Member States

The securitization of immigration is one of the important issues on the world agenda. In this context, EU member states are important in terms of both their policy actions and their discourses. However, different immigration policies have been followed due to the lack of a common immigration policy among the member states. The reason for this is the divergence of national preferences between member states and conflicts between governments. Accordingly, before examining the securitization of immigration in Germany, the literature on securitization of immigration in member states other than Germany will be examined. The content of the reviewed studies will be presented briefly.

In the securitization process, the audience has to accept discourses, Philippe Bourbeau exemplifies by arguing that the securitization process is multidimensional.

According to Bourbeau, immigration laws and various speech acts are effective factors in the securitization of immigration (Bourbeau, 2011, p.96). This study examines the security discourses of political actors, strict migration laws, deportation and detention activities within the scope of securitization. As an example of this, he reveals that both the media and political elites had a great influence on the securitization of immigration in the 9/11 attacks. Bourbeau states that the Ministers of the Interior, who are political actors, have an important role in the securitization process in France. Accordingly, former Interior Minister Philippe Marchan's statement that "Uncontrolled migration will be a threat to our fundamental national interests" indicates that it is an important step in securitization of migration. For this reason, Bourbeau states that this process is not a binary-process due to the dynamic interaction between the public, the media, the political elites and the pre-existing contexts but should instead be seen as a situation that requires continuity.

Regarding the securitization of immigration in Greece, in the study of Karyotis & Patrikios titled as Religion, securitization and anti-immigration attitudes: The case of Greece, religious elites are shown as securitizing actors. This study examines the effects of religious elites, which are non-political actors, on the securitization process. The research shows that religiosity is one of the main factors in the construction of an anti-immigration attitude in Greece, in line with the quantitative analysis findings (Karyotis & Patrikios, 2010, p.52-54). However, it is emphasized that the power of the religious messages advocated by the Orthodox Church outweighs in Greece, even if the political actors begin to shift to desecuritized discourses (Karyotis & Patrikios, 2010, p.54). In conclusion, this study highlights that religious elites rather than political actors have an influential role on immigration in the securitization process.

There are also studies showing that right-wing and nationalist parties have an impact on the securitization of immigration in Greece. The main argument in this study is that right-wing parties sometimes change their attitudes and securitize immigration in order to increase their electoral support. To explain this, Lazaridis and Skleparis states that the key point in the success or failure of far-right parties such as the Golden Dawn (GD) party is the effectiveness of governments on immigration policy. They also explain that it is the actors like GD who carry out the act of controlling immigration after it has been securitized by political elites and security

experts. In this article, it was emphasized that right-wing parties are the securitizing actors in the securitization of immigration in Greece, and revealed how a party, unlike western democracy, can lock up the securitization of immigration and institutional racism with routinized and stereotyped security practices that are more compatible with social values (Lazaridis & Skleparis, 2016, p.188).

The construction of the Evros fence as a result of security concerns regarding immigration in Greece also contributed to the securitization process. The construction of the Evros fence by Greece in 2011 in order to prevent irregular immigration is considered within the scope of securitization. Accordingly, the main argument of the article is that despite the cost of this fence and the opposition of the EU, Greece in economic crisis was built as a securitizing move to immigration at both the EU and national level (Grigoriadis & Dilek, 2019, p.181). In addition, this article reveals that practices and discourses act together by explaining the discourses of political actors at the national level on both the increase of security personnel at the border and the construction of the fence. Thus, the construction of the fence has been shown as a security issue by political actors at the national level.

A similar move to the Evros fence in Greece, in order to prevent irregular immigration, took place in Hungary. Boldizsar Nagy, who examined the effects of the fences planted on the southern border of Hungary between 2015-2016 on Hungarian immigration policy, evaluated this situation as a securitizing move and explained it with different theories; securitization, majority identity populism, and immigration. Accordingly, Nagy describes the immigration security nexus based on six different elements of the Hungarian Asylum Law. Accordingly, first of all, the "denial" method involves denying the asylum status and the need for international protection of those who arrive irregularly. To justify this, immigrants are labeled "illegal" and associated with immigrants and crime (Nagy, 2016, p.1041). Second, the deterrence of refugees with strict measures. Third, physical and legal barriers to prevent refugees from coming in. Fourth, according to the Criminal Code, if immigrants enter Hungary illegally, the penalty will be quite high. Fifth, it is the problem of lack of solidarity and free-rider, as Hungary does not want to be involved in burden-sharing policies with the EU. Finally, breaching the law. Thus, according to the result here, it is clear that the vast majority of the Hungarian Asylum Law is not in line with the EU and Hungarian Legal System. At the same time, in the article, it is stated that the media

under its control and commercial organizations under the influence of Fidesz are in interaction, by showing the government as the securitizing actor (Nagy, 2016, p.1041).

Krisztina Juhasz has made a significant contribution to the literature on the construction of immigration as a security concern in Hungary. According to this, the article analyzes the Hungarian Government's immigration policy in 2013 and the European Agenda on Migration, which the EU approved in 2015. Accordingly, it is argued that the 2013 Hungarian Migration Strategy does not coincide with the Hungarian Migration policy implemented after the 2015 Syrian Migration Movement. However, Juhasz refers to the rivalry between the Hungarian Government and the far-right populist party Jobbik, arguing that the changes made to the Asylum Law as a result of this rivalry contradict both European and International commitments (Juhász, 2017, p.52). Similar to the fence in Greece, the construction of a fence in Hungary to close the border and the launch of an anti-immigration poster campaign, these steps taken by the Hungarian government caused immigration to be built as a security problem (Juhász, 2017, p.36).

In order to combat irregular migration from the Mediterranean to the EU, apart from Greece due to its geographical proximity, Italy has shown that it attaches importance to burden sharing by taking various measures in this regard. In this context, Rosa Rossi's contribution to the literature is how the activities of International Organizations are constrained by domestic policies and how the concept of the nation-state, emphasized by the so-called 'point' approach, contributes to this. In this article, it is argued that the EU's fight against immigration has become more difficult due to the contradiction between the securitization of immigration and the liberal approach in the fight against irregular immigration from the Mediterranean (Rossi, 2019, p.380-381). Accordingly, she states that the rescue operations are the subject of criticism. It argues that there is a lack of mutual trust between both the EU and its member states, as well as international organizations (IOs) and NGOs. It applies the "interactive model" method to explain this process (Rossi, 2019, p.371). Accordingly, this model emphasizes the dynamism between internal and external variables that affect various policies. Rossi, however, applies this model to Italy's immigration admission process during the immigration flow. In conclusion, this study argues that the International Organization for Migration and UNHCR have an active

role in securitizing immigration in Italy. She states that International Organizations have increased their activities in Italy through: firstly, by their participation in hotspot crisis centers and secondly, by calling attention to public authorities through cooperation projects on the safety of immigrants and refugees (Rossi, 2019, p.378). Moreover, Valeria Bello's emphasis on the prejudicial cognitions of non-state actors and the subsequent narratives in the securitization process made an important contribution to the literature (Bello, 2022a, p.1475). Thus, she focuses on the role of reception centers in securitizing migration and argues that these centers spiralize this process "with the increase of social and intergroup conflicts". The main finding of the article is that the administrators of the reception centers are prejudiced and develop negative practices as a result of producing stereotypical narratives.

In this section, securitization of immigration in member states is briefly discussed. The resources utilized can be increased, but the general conclusion is that, as mentioned above, the issue of immigration has a wide place in the political agendas of the member states. Based on the information above, the way in which immigration is securitized differs from country to country. In France, this process takes place through both political actors and legal regulations (Bourbeau, 2011). Greece, which is the peripheral country of Europe, has been examined because it is a transit country for immigration. Unlike others, the securitization of immigration in Greece has the effect of religious elites (Karyotis & Patrikios, 2010). However, there is also analysis on the securitization of immigration by right-wing parties to increase electoral support (Lazaridis & Skleparis, 2016). On the other hand, Hungary, which resists the EU's solutions to the immigration problem, has been examined since it is on the border of the Schengen area and is seen as a transit country to go to Germany. In Hungary, it is observed that immigration is securitized by the heavy sanctions imposed on the Migration Policy and the discourses of the right-wing parties (Juhász, 2017; Nagy, 2016). Italy, on the other hand, has been examined because it is the center of cooperation in the Mediterranean region and it is a country of asylum and transit. Accordingly, according to the studies examined, there is an argument that the securitization of immigration contradicts the liberal approach (Rossi, 2019). It is also argued that the International Organization for Migration (IOM), an intergovernmental organization, contributes to securitization by establishing hotspot crisis centers. In addition, it is stated that reception centers, which are non-state actors, have an impact

on securitization (Bello, 2022a). As a country with economic attractiveness, Germany receives immigrants from different parts of the world, such as North Africa, the Middle East and the Black Sea region (Ukraine). Therefore, in the next section, Germany will be examined as a special case.

2.4 Securitization of Immigration in Germany

Since 2014, the number of asylum seekers entering European territory has been gradually increasing. Accordingly, EU member states have received a large number of asylum applications compared to previous years. According to Eurostat data, Germany constitutes 27.7% of the EU's asylum applications with 148,200 asylum applications in 2021 (Eurostat, 2022). For this reason, Germany has become one of the main destination countries in the EU. In conclusion, this section will review the literature on securitization of immigration in Germany.

Ayelet Banai and Regina Kreide have contributed significantly to the literature by discussing how the securitization discourse has shaped the version of exclusion from the concepts of human rights and civil rights. It is argued that "guest workers, citizens with a migration background, asylum seekers and refugees" pose a threat depending on time and case in the securitization process (Banai & Kreide, 2017, p.915). In addition, Banai and Kreide categorize threats as long-term and short-term threats: associate refugees and asylum-seekers with "immediate threat of violence, crime and terrorism" in the short-term category (Banai & Kreide, 2017, p.915). It classifies naturalized persons or people with an immigration background as a long-term threat to socio-cultural values. Focusing on the Roma minority in Germany, the article discusses the use of securitization rhetoric to justify evictions and other forms of oppression for those under citizenship protection. In conclusion, the article argues that immigration policies should be implemented within the scope of citizenship and human rights.

The contribution of Shireen Mustaq, Dua Hamid and Javaria Shaikh to the literature is that the securitization discourse excludes immigrants from their citizenship and human rights. In this article, AfD, Pegida movement CSU are examined as securitizing actors. Accordingly, they argue that while examining securitization, the problem of immigrants and refugees is presented as an existential

threat. In addition, it is argued that the rhetoric of right-wing parties put pressure on the government and even brought the Merkel government to the verge of being dissolved. On the other hand, the article also focused on the statements of the Christian Democratic Union, the Green Party, the Left Party and the Social Democratic Party in the process of desecuritization that "the refugee crisis is a humanitarian crisis that deserves humanitarian intervention and that refugees are not a threat to the German state and society"(Mushtaq et al., 2021, p.16). However, in conclusion, the article reveals that the securitization process is more effective than the desecuritization process in Germany.

Thomas Diez and Vicki Squire focus on citizenship traditions in Germany and the United Kingdom, noting that political opportunities in citizenship and immigration are constrained by institutions and their discourses. The article argues that in the case of Germany, the perception of terrorism-related threats to immigration is directly expressed, representing a less problematized distinction in citizenship (Diez & Squire, 2008, p.566). In addition, Diez and Squire argue that the exclusionary discourses of political actors are effective in the process of securitization of immigration, but this process has developed in a certain way based on the long tradition of citizenship in Germany and England. For this reason, Parliamentary debates are included in the article. It is stated that in the debates of the Bundestag in 2001, the link between foreigners and terrorism was emphasized on migration. For example, it was emphasized that former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder made a significant contribution to the securitization of immigration with his discourse that non-citizens pose a security risk (Diez & Squire, 2008, p.574). In conclusion, this study emphasized the concept of citizenship in the securitization of immigration in Germany, emphasizing that securitization, especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, developed over the fact that non-citizens created a security problem.

The importance of right-wing parties in presenting immigration as a security concern across Europe is an undeniable fact. Parties use the influence of posters and advertisements to portray immigrants as threats. On top of that, the work of Desirée Schmuck and Jörg Matthes has brought a different perspective to the literature by discussing the impact of far-right parties on young voters, including immigrants, who cause symbolic and economic threats while creating their advertising campaigns. This study claims that the discourses of these parties have an impact on the voter and

spread the idea that migrants pose a risk to cultural identity and economic welfare (Schmuck & Matthes, 2015, p.1578). Therefore, negative political campaigns against immigrants can increase anti-immigrant attitudes. According to the results of the research, it has been revealed that the perception of economic threat interacts in parallel with the level of education, but the perception of culture and identity threat, which is perceived as a symbolic threat, is not related to the education level of young voters.

Right-wing parties' anti-immigration rhetoric strengthens securitization by leading to more restrictive immigration and asylum policies. For example, it is stated that the power of Radical Right Populism (RRP) in Germany and Austria is reflected differently in recent immigration policies (Rossell Hayes & Dudek, 2020, p.3). In this study, it is discussed that RRP parties can affect anti-immigration policies in 3 different ways, even if they are not effective in controlling the government. First, it can directly affect migration policies by participating in governing coalitions. Second, RRP parties interact by appealing to those who think that mainstream parties do not meet the needs of the voter. Finally, the radicalization of the voter by adopting the views of the party elite by the voters. Thus, Hayes and Dudek state that it contributes to the production of anti-migrant policies. The main finding of the article is that the rise of the AfD with the opportunity to radicalize the voter was the turning point of the 2017 elections.

In line with political campaigns, the use of risk language regarding immigration in media discourse also contributes to securitization. Just as securitization theory reveals, a subject is constructed risky with discursive connections through speech acts. Maria Grazia Galantino, on the other hand, discusses how the issue of immigration was handled in the media in Germany and Italy in 2015-2016, drawing attention to the effect of securitization in framing immigrants. Galantino states that the areas where the word risk is used in the German press are "the management of EU borders and the Balkan migration route" (Galantino, 2022, p.339). One of the main findings of the article is that the use of risk language in the migration framework does not directly construct migrants as a risk factor, but affects and triggers the securitization process. Associating immigration with threats and terrorism in media discourse may raise the possibility of harmful consequences for the host country and may result in the construction of the foreigner as dangerous. In

conclusion, the article argues that the media association of migration with illegality, terrorism and crime contributes to legitimizing the policy of securitization.

According to the discussions above, it is observed that the studies on the securitization of immigration in Germany are carried out by different means. In the securitization process, categorizing immigrants and asylum seekers as long-term and short-term threats (Banai & Kreide, 2017) , far-right parties (AfD and CSU) presenting immigrants and asylum seekers as existential threats (Mushtaq et al., 2021; Rossell Hayes & Dudek, 2020a) , far-right parties' posters and advertisement and the presentation of migrants and asylum seekers as a cultural and economic threat (Schmuck & Matthes, 2015) and finally, the effect of the risk language used in the media on the securitization process (Galantino, 2022) has been the focus of the above studies.

Germany played a leading role in the EU's immigration policy. On the domestic level, the German Chancellor Merkel's policy lead in the EU's response to immigration crisis had important implications for the political parties. This study aims to understand the interplay between the international and domestic dynamics of the EU immigration policy by focusing on the variety of discourses generated by the political parties in Germany in the context of the immigration crisis. For this purpose, the next section will examine the official political statements and election manifestos of political parties during the 2021 German federal elections.

3. CHAPTER: GERMANY'S TOWARDS IMMIGRATION (2014-2021) AND POLITICAL SYSTEM

3.1 Germany's Approach to Immigration Crisis (2014-2021)

In response to the immigration crisis that followed the outbreak of the Syrian Crisis, Germany embraced the phrases of Willkommenskultur (welcome culture) and Anerkennungskultur (culture of recognition). Accordingly, these phrases meant “a culture that recognizes the value of immigrants' contributions to society and thus promotes intercultural dialogue, cultural diversity, mutual respect and social cohesion” (Heckmann, 2016, p.5). These phrases emerged in the 2010s as part of Germany's open-door and welcoming policies towards immigrants. The phrase of Willkommenskultur was included in political rhetoric in the 2010s regarding Germany's admission of new immigrants to address its current labor shortage. On the other hand, the phrases of Anerkennungskultur a year later aimed to include existing immigrants in Germany's economic, political and social processes. Historical choices based on this issue have contributed to Germany's existing immigration and asylum policies. Sequential constitutional amendments covering immigration and citizenship issues, especially in the 2000s, paved the way for a more open and welcoming attitude towards immigrants. Thus, the immigrant population in the country has gradually increased. Therefore, Germany became an "immigration country" (Ilgit & Klotz, 2018, p.620). According to the 2021 data of Statistisches Bundesamt, people with an immigration background, who made up 22.3 million, represented 27.2% of the total population in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2021).

By mid-2015, immigration to Germany since 2013 reached the peak of the last 20 years, with more than 1,226,000 people entering (Mushaben, 2017, p.527). This influx of immigration to Germany was an important turning point for the political arena. The issue of immigration, which became a focal point, accelerated the rise of the far-right AfD, a xenophobic with its anti-immigration rhetoric (Hertner, 2022, p.461). In the face of these difficulties, the coalition government of the Christian CDU/CSU and the SPD followed an open-door policy. Thus, with the 2015-2016 immigration crisis, Angela Merkel's Chancellorship was a prominent figure in influencing immigration policies at both the national and EU level. In the September

9th in Bundestag Merkel stated that “If we show courage and lead the way, a common European approach is more likely ... If Europe fails on the refugee issue, we would lose one of the key reasons for founding a united Europe, namely universal human rights.”(Helms et al., 2019, p.359). Merkel's statements reminded all EU member states that the EU has an important role in protecting human rights and minority rights. Moreover, Merkel has been referred to as a "moral leader" in the international press after this speech (Helms et al., 2019, p.359).

Merkel has been the figure guiding immigration policies at the EU level, calling on member states to be more open and welcoming. At this point, Merkel advocated a relocation system to create a common immigration policy. A distribution mechanism based on an "open and fair" quota system has been developed that includes the participation of all EU member states with the relocation system (Mushaben, 2017, p. 527). Another purpose of this system was to reduce the burden on frontline countries such as Greece and Italy. Moreover, Merkel stated that “This must be a European responsibility, and only then will all member states care about the causes of migration.” (Helms et al., 2019, p.360). Merkel, as the pioneer of this burden sharing system, emphasized the importance of humanitarian aid and wanted to make the quota system mandatory. On 22 September 2015, the temporary relocation system came into effect, despite opposition from Hungary, Poland and the United Kingdom (Mushaben, 2017a, p.96). These countries have refrained from accepting refugees during the immigration crisis. Therefore, Merkel was the first to emphasize solidarity by calling on all EU member states to share refugees in a fair and balanced quota system (Mushaben, 2017a, p.96). However, due to the lack of solidarity among the member states, the desired efficiency could not be obtained from the system.

Anti-immigrant sentiment has been fueled by Merkel's refusal to set the upper limit for asylum seekers (Helms et al., 2019, p.361). On 25 August, Merkel suspended the Dublin agreement, allowing them to seek asylum in Germany instead of " forcing them to return to their first port of entry " (Rossell Hayes & Dudek, 2020, p.133). Thus, Germany became an attractive location for asylum seekers and received a large number of applications. Germany, which accepted 298,000 Syrian immigrants in 2015, became the first country to accept 66,000 more immigrants compared to the previous year (Politiko, 2016). “Wir Schaffen das” (we can do this) Merkel said at a press conference six days later when she suspended the Dublin agreement (Mushaben,

2017b, p.527). The motivation behind this statement was “Germany’s orderly conditions, economic strength, developed civil society, demographic needs, its capacity for flexibility in tough times and constitutional imperatives affirming that asylum knows no upper limits” (Mushaben, 2017b, 527). Upon these statements, the far-right political party AfD found support with its anti-immigrant rhetoric such as " We say we don’t want to lose Germany to an invasion of foreigners from a different culture." (Independent,2017). However, the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA) movement, which started its activities in Dresden in 2014, took an anti-immigrant stance with protests in other German cities (mostly eastern cities) (Mushaben, 2017a, p.98). Horst Seehofer, the leader of the CSU, the sister party of Merkel's CDU in Bavaria, argued that Merkel's welcome policy radicalized the country (Hoffmann, 2016). However, Seehofer stated that Germany's refugee flow should be stopped and stated that: " We want a clear system of rules that clearly and credibly reduces immigration to a reasonable level. " (Feldenkirchen and Neukirch, 2016). These rhetoric by Seehofer " turned the sister parties (CDU/CSU) into distant relatives " (Mushaben, 2017b, p.529). In response, Merkel temporarily reinstated border controls on 14 September 2015, "adopting provisions that make it easier to deport immigrant offenders" to limit asylum seekers (Helms et al., 2019, p.362). Germany's decision to restart border controls has created a "domino effect" in neighboring countries, for example, temporary border controls have been targeted in Austria, France, Norway and Sweden (Gülzau, 2021, p.10).

Due to Merkel's handling of the immigration crisis, anti-immigrant sentiment has already increased since more than 500 women were sexually assaulted by "North African-looking men" in Cologne, Hamburg and other cities on New Year's Eve in 2015 and 2016 (Mushaben, 2017b, p.528). In 2015 and 2016, the Bundestag introduced Asylum packages. Accordingly, “the first package provided more funds for newly arrived immigrants, while the second restricted immigrants’ freedom of residence and movement in Germany” (Hertner, 2022b, p.465). Thus, with the effect of anti-immigrant sentiments after the attacks, Germany's "welcoming" approach was questioned. In the March 2016 survey of the Public Opinion Barometer on Refugees, respondents were asked what they think about the impact of immigration on the economy and cultural life in Germany. In the survey results, it was observed that the positive and negative evaluation results were equaled only on the economy (Figure

3.1). In other dimensions apart from the economy, the opinions of the participants are that the refugee flow can create negative results. As a result of the New Year's Eve in 2015/2016, the AfD gained momentum with 12.6 votes in the 2017 Federal elections (Figure 3.2). On the other hand, Merkel's Christian Democratic Union regressed from 34.1% of the votes in 2013 to 26.8% in 2017 (Figure 3.2). Therefore, it is difficult to say that the German public is satisfied with Merkel's "welcoming" policy.

Figure 1. Assessment of the consequences of refugee immigration

Assessment of the consequences of refugee migration

In percent

	Consequences are ...			Approval of the admission of refugees from war or civil war among those who expect <i>negative</i> consequences from refugee migration
	rather negative	ambi-valent	rather positive	
Social consequences of refugee migration				
Is good or bad for the economy	39	23	39	71
Cultural life is undermined or enriched by refugees	44	21	35	70
Germany becomes a worse or better place to live because of the refugees	47	30	23	72
The core values of our society are undermined or enriched by refugees	51	30	18	70
The influx of refugees bears more risks or opportunities in the <i>short term</i>	74	11	15	78
The influx of refugees bears more risks or opportunities in the <i>long term</i>	48	15	37	70
Personal consequences of refugee migration				
	high (60-100)	medium (50)	low (0-40)	
Likelihood of <i>negative</i> personal consequences	19	9	72	62

Source: CAPI-Bus, Module "Barometer of Public Opinion on Refugees in Germany", February 25, 2016 – March 21, 2016. Calculations made by authors.

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
Despite the rather negative expectations regarding the social consequences of the influx of refugees, only one in five Germans expect negative effects for themselves or their families.

Source: The German Institute for Economic Research 2016

Figure 2. Bundestag election 2017

Percentage of second votes

Bundestag election 2017, Germany
Final result



Source: The Federal Returning Officer 2017

The 2017 elections marked a turning point when the far-right party AfD, with almost 13% of the vote, entered the Bundestag. Merkel emphasized that "Europe must fulfill for refugees who have a claim to protection " and invited all EU member states to be in solidarity (Hertner, 2022b, p.473). For this reason, Merkel pioneered the relocation formula based on a fair and balanced quota system. In the face of the increasing number of refugees, Merkel's open-door policy faced anti-immigrant tendencies at the domestic level. In the context of the immigration crisis, as an EU member state, Germany's leading role, the immigration policy between 2014-2017 was examined. The 2021 elections, after the 2017 elections, are specifically examined in the next section, as they are the process that includes the end of Merkel's Chancellor term.

3.2 Germany's Political System

The Federal Republic of Germany is a parliamentary democracy in which power is mostly reflected in the parties in the parliament (Bundestag). For this reason, German governments need a majority in parliament. Otherwise, the government's

ability to implement its policy agenda is weakened. To illustrate, some of the decisions that were considered controversial during the Eurozone crisis achieved an absolute majority with the support of the opposition parties. Moreover, As Merkel's majority in the coalition decreased as a result of the 19th Bundestag, the majority of the ruling parties in the parliament became important once again (Mai et al., 2023, p.2). To explain, while the parties of the governing coalition was 80% in 2013-2017, this rate decreased to 56% after the 2017 elections (Mai et al., 2023). As a result, German governments' dependency to the parliamentary majority has increased. The Bundestag, elected every four years, is the only directly popularly elected chamber. The duties of the president of the Bundestag are to maintain the daily parliamentary routines. For example, it has the responsibility of "chairing plenary sessions, deciding who is allowed to speak, enforcing time limits", as well as maintaining the general atmosphere of the Bundestag (Abels et al., 2022a, p.258). Another feature of the German political system is the "Chancellor" position, which can be compared to the office of the Prime Minister, is the most important position of the government. The Chancellor is responsible for forming a cabinet. Therefore, she or he plays an important role in the formation of government. In addition, Chancellor presents a binding proposal to the Federal President to elect her/his ministers and to appoint/dismissal these ministers. Next, the Chancellor is responsible for setting the general principles of government policy. However, the Chancellor has a responsibility to the Bundestag when it comes to the activities of the government. Ultimately, the Chancellor has an important position as the chief executive of the Federal Cabinet and heads the executive branch.

A feature of federal states is "horizontal coordination" (Person et al., 2023, p.3). According to this, horizontal coordination "serves to prevent negative spillovers" by contributing to mutual information on both interests and policy positions among sub-national units (Person et al., 2023, p.3). Intergovernmental councils, on the other hand, have the main task in ensuring horizontal coordination. Germany is categorized as a " prototype of cooperative federalism " based on a system of intergovernmental relations (Person et al., 2023, p.3). In addition, intergovernmental competition and burden-sharing can adversely affect the coordination capacities of intergovernmental councils. On the other hand, this cooperative structure does not offer much incentive. The formation of coalition governments is determined by the Federal and autonomous

regions parliaments on the basis of proportionality. There are sixteen relatively autonomous regional governments that limit the scope of federal power (Herzog et al., 2020, p.6). The limits of these autonomous regions (Länder) are determined by the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (Herzog et al., 2020, p.6). Regional parliaments are empowered at the federal level by the Bundesrat, second chamber of parliament which is indirectly elected. Therefore, Bundesrat is reflection of the federal nature of the state. While the federal government manages matters such as "foreign affairs, defense and the social welfare system "regional governments mostly manage "domestic security and education " issues, "making them key actors in preventing and combating crime and violent extremism" (Herzog et al., 2020, p.6).

Besides that, Germany uses a mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system. This system is "is that some seats are allocated in single-member districts (SMDs) to personalise the composition of parliament without affecting the proportionality between parliamentary parties " (Weinmann & Grotz, 2021, p.948). The Bundestag, which is elected every four years, has been elected by voters in the Federal Republic since 1949 "by secret ballot in general, direct and free elections based on the principle of equal voting rights " (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d). In addition, Germany has two voting systems: the first vote "is for district candidates who are elected by plurality", while the second vote is the vote in which the party lists are determined at the federal level (Jankowski et al., 2020, p.4). Directly elected MPs are the official representatives of certain regions. The reason why the second vote is more important than the first is that "the partisan composition of the Parliament is (almost) determined entirely by the second ballot" (Jankowski et al., 2020, p.4). This system offers two ways of limiting geographical disproportion. First, the majoritarian stage of the system provides representation in the Bundestag for each region by at least one member (Haffert, 2021, p.5). In the proportional stage, all states are represented proportionally, with the seats in the list distributed according to the state lists (Haffert, 2021, p.5).

19th The parliamentary groups of the Bundestag are as follows; Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU), Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Greens (Grüne), the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), The Left (Linke) and Alternative for Germany (AfD). The Christian Democratic Union founded in 1946, received a large number of votes in the 19 Bundestag elections held

since 1949. The CSU is the Bavarian sister party of the CDU. With the votes it receives, the CDU/CSU (the Union parties) represents the dominant party group of the German party system, both in terms of elections and legislation (Lees, 2013). The CDU/CSU embraces "socially and culturally conservative, Catholic social welfarism, and pro-business market liberalism" (Clemens, 2018, p.56). In 2000, Angela Merkel took office as the first female leader of the CDU. Merkel, a secular Protestant who grew up in the communist east, tried to modernize the CDU. From the 2000s on, Merkel has sought to move the Union "more secular, industrial, beyond a traditional middle class" from a character that appeals to a "suburban-rural, church-going, traditional middle-class base" (Clemens, 2018, p.56-57). As a result, under the chancellorship of Angela Merkel, the Union parties gradually shifted from a moderate right-wing position to the center (Reinl & Heinrich, 2018). Thus, with this change in policy, it was aimed to attract the support of the voters, who are at the center of the political arena, to the party. Until the 1990s, the concept of the center was based on "petit bourgeois respectability, fitting in with the CDU idea of unifying the people across social class line" (Dostal, 2021, p.662). Moreover, the fact that the majority of the Green voters of the new middle class had little in common with those forming the Christian Democratic electoral coalition caused the center to dissolved (Dostal, 2021, p.662). The party shifted to the left when the voters on the right spectrum thought that their interests were not represented, and thus the ideological distance with the voters on the moderate right became longer. Support for the CDU has collapsed significantly during the last two terms of Merkel. The ideological distance between Union parties and the voters fueled this situation. The period of the Merkel governments was accompanied by a number of important events. The last period of the Merkel government was "characterized by crisis management" as a management style compared to other periods (Person et al., 2023, p.21). Although the Merkel administration has faced challenges such as the 2008-2009 economic crisis, the 2010-2012 Eurozone crisis, and most recently the 2015/2016 immigration crisis, the Corona pandemic in late 2019 "put the federal government under tremendous pressure" (Person et al., 2023). In these situations, confidence in the CDU/CSU has declined in economic performance, "foreign policy, law, asylum and migration" (Dostal, 2021, p.670). Under Merkel's leadership, the Union parties displayed a pro-immigration stance. Merkel described this decision as a national duty by saying "We can do this" as a result of the intense immigration movement through the Balkan corridor in 2015.

In the face of this situation, Merkel was the first to call for solidarity for the fair and balanced distribution of refugees from EU member states according to the quota system (Mushaben, 2017, p.96). As a result, Merkel's liberal and welcoming policy has increased the inflow of immigrants to Germany. Although the CDU/CSU appears to have taken the same stance on immigration, the CSU has often been the opposition party. For example, in 2017, CSU Leader Horst Seehofer's statement "Islam does not belong to Germany. Germany is shaped by Christianity" reflects a negative statement about the cultural aspect of immigration (Hertner, 2022a, p.474). In addition, recent asylum and integration laws have become quite restrictive as the CDU/CSU wants to prevent immigrants from coming to Germany. After Merkel's announcement that she would not run for a fifth term, the CDU/CSU lost power in the 2021 German Federal Elections.

Social Democratic Party the oldest political party in Germany, founded in 1875, is located on the center-left in a socio-economic context. The party is characterized by its focus on labor market policies. In this respect, it has "strong organizational ties with the unions" (Marx & Schumacher, 2013, p.164). The party was closed when the Nazis came to power, but after the Second World War it operated in West Germany. The SPD has been influential in German politics with the coalitions it formed with the CDU. In 1966, it became a partner of a coalition formed by the CDU. In the 1970s, when the oil crisis was also experienced, the party achieved high success with its "blend of economic pragmatism and traditional social democratic values" (Marx & Schumacher, 2013, p.164). In the 1990s, all parties shifted their policies to the right in the socio-economic context, thus recognizing the need for reform of labor market institutions. Thus, the SPD was able to successfully present its policy recommendations to the CDU. In the 2000s, while the SPD became a coalition partner in 2013, it received the lowest vote rate in its history with 21% in 2017. The reason for this is that the immigration debate is dominant in Germany. This became clearer in 2017, after migration was first addressed as a humanitarian issue in 2013 (Hertner, 2022a, p.472). Similar to Merkel's policy, the SPD treated "migration as a problem with EU-wide implications" (Hertner, 2022a, p.472). Later in 2020, Olaf Scholz was determined as the chancellor candidate. SPD candidate Scholz proved his power by getting 25.7% of the votes in the 2021 Bundestag elections.

Today's German Green Party has its roots in Alliance 90 and the Greens, which was merged in 1993. Citizen groups such as Initiative Democracy Now, Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, and Neues Forum that emerged in 1989 united to form Alliance '90. On the other hand, The Greens were founded in 1980 as a combination of West German environmental organizations. Although environmental issues were tried to be pushed into the background by mainstream parties, the Greens began to achieve success in the 1990s (Wang & Keith, 2020) . The Greens achieved their first success in 1998 by joining the Red-Green coalition government under Chancellor Schroeder. With the Fukushima disaster in March 2011, Germany announced that it would withdraw from nuclear energy. Thus, the political climate became favorable for the Greens. Ultimately, in the 2011 German state elections, the Greens won their first state government election in Baden-Württemberg as a coalition partner with the SPD. During this period, the Greens supported the tax and social policy agenda, advocating for a strong state to spend more. Greens' electorate base is generally “well-educated and demographically urban”(Walker & Gadd, 2022, p.7). It tends to gain votes from big cities where universities are located, especially in West Germany. Unfortunately, the success of the Greens did not last long and fell 8.4% in the 2013 Federal elections. In the 2017 Federal parliamentary elections, the vote rate remained almost the same. The fact that things are not going well on climate issues, where the Greens are seen as experts, still make the German people think that the Greens are the most competent party on the environment (Zohlnhöfer & Engler, 2023, p.8). Thus, for the first time, the Greens joined major parties to determine the Chancellor candidate. Annalena Baerbock is the first Green Chancellor candidate.

The Liberal Free Democratic Party, which was founded in 1948, is a liberal party on the center right of the socio-economic spectrum, it advocates values that center freedom in the socio-political spectrum (Mayer & Schultze, 2019, p.249). So, maintains that “self-determination on one’s own body should be weighted higher than welfare matters of others” (Mai et al., 2023, p.14). It mostly receives support from " small and middle-size businesses " (Franzmann, 2019, p.338). FDP, which has participated in the government many times as a member of the junior coalition, could not enter the parliament for the first time in 2013 Bundestag elections. There are many different reasons for this. One is that some members of the FDP voted against Merkel's economic rescue package for Greece and Spain (Zur, 2017, p.381).

Nevertheless, the party was able to enter the Bundestag in 2017 after the party leader was replaced by Christian Lindner. In this period, the party's attitude towards immigration is on the “strengthening of external border controls through Frontex” (Freudlsperger & Weinrich, 2023, p.20) . Thus, the party rejected the relocation system. It became a coalition partner in the 2021 Bundestag elections.

Founded in 2007 as a combination of the East German-based Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) and the West German-based Electoral Alternative for Labor and Social Justice (WASG), The Left Party forms the center-left of the political spectrum. The origin of the PDS goes back to the Socialist Unity Party (SED), which ruled East Germany until German reunification. As a Marxist-Leninist communist party, the SED was both the founding and governing party of the German Democratic Republic (GDR; East Germany) until 1989. The Left Party's electoral support generally comes from eastern Germany. In fact, in the 2021 German Federal elections, the Left party did not get any seats from the states in the west of the country (Thomeczek, 2023, p.6). In other words, the party's reliance on the East German-origin PDS made the party "more established in the East German states" (Thomeczek, 2023, p.6).

Known for its anti-immigrant stance, the AfD is a "relatively young party" founded in 2013 (Lewandowsky & Wagner, 2022, p.20). When the AfD was founded, the party took a Eurosceptical⁶ and anti-EU stance. Later on, it became a populist radical right party adopting anti-immigrant and xenophobic views (Hansen & Olsen, 2022, p.3). In 2013, the AfD reacted to the European Monetary Union and the bailouts and almost managed to get into the German parliament. By 2015, however, with the onset of the immigration movement, the party shifted its agenda to immigration, opposing the admission of refugees (Elshehawy et al., 2022p 863). Moreover, the AfD has succeeded in making the immigration crisis a campaign issue by emphasizing it as an issue that the government should address (Hansen & Olsen, 2022, p.15). According to Hansen and Olsen, this has made the AfD "as a populist issue entrepreneur" who can find new problems to gain votes in the political arena(Hansen & Olsen, 2022, p.15). The party's first electoral breakthroughs were in the state elections in 2016,


⁶ The term was first used in British public debates on European integration in the 1980s. It is used to describe skeptical opposition to European integration and its policies. However, there is no common agreement on “what Eurosceptics oppose” (Leconte, 2015, p.254). For this reason, it is possible to find different views on the definition of Euroscepticism.

entering parliaments. In the 2017 Bundestag elections, it took 12.6 % and had 94 seats in the parliament. It is important to note that the AfD's anti-immigration and xenophobic rhetoric is effective behind this success. Thus, Germany, thanks to AfD, is an outlier case in terms of the success of far-right parties in political elections (Elshehawy et al., 2022, p.863). Because while radical right parties have maintained their rule in many Western European countries since the 1980s, extreme right-wing parties in Germany have had difficulty in getting into government (Arzheimer & Berning, 2019, p.1). Immigration did not come to the fore as a problem before the 2021 election, and the pandemic crisis took over the policy agenda. In this situation, it became inevitable for the AfD to make efforts to both maintain and increase its vote share. Even though the AfD's vote rate decreased by 2.3% as a result of the election, this does not mean that the party was completely unsuccessful. For example, in Saxony it has become the largest part of the state's, with a certain population for which it can find support. As a result, the 2021 elections led to a decrease in the vote share for the AfD.

4. CHAPTER: ANALYSIS OF THE 2021 GERMAN FEDERAL ELECTIONS

The German federal elections in 2021 resulted in a new coalition government. The Christian Democrats could not compensate for the problems that occurred after the departure of Angela Merkel in the face of the new stronger government. This coalition of the Social Democratic Party, the Greens and the liberal Free Democratic Party is also called the "traffic light coalition". The Greens, who entered this coalition, joined the major parties for the first time in nominating the Chancellor candidate (Faas & Klingelhöfer, 2022, p.1506). The main parties participating in the elections are: Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union, Social Democratic Party, the Greens, the liberal Free Democratic Party, The Left and Alternative for Germany. As a result of the 2021 federal elections; The Social Democratic Party received a relative majority of the vote with 25.7%, and the Greens succeeded at the federal level with 14.8%, liberal Free Democratic Party received 11.5 %. The far-right party Alternative for Germany won 10.3%, losing 2% of the vote compared to the 2017 election result (12.6 %). Merkel's Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union received 24.1% of the vote, losing 8.9% compared to 2017. The Left party experienced a significant decline by receiving 4.3% of the vote. Although the party could not exceed the 5% threshold, it still won seats in Berlin and Leipzig and entered the Bundestag. Accordingly, about the 2021 elections, "made the party system more volatile, fragmented and polarized" and, in turn, has led to less division in terms of coalition formation options (Abels et al., 2022, p.250).

Figure 3. Percentage of second votes



Source: The Federal Returning Officer 2022

When the 2021 Federal elections are examined, the map showing the largest parties in localities and electoral districts indicates that there are "numerous and deep cleavages" (Dostal, 2021, p.670). Considering the regional distinctions (north-south and west-east), the SPD appears to be the strongest party in the northern region. In the south, the CDU/CSU maintains its position as a strong party. The AfD, on the other hand, has gained support in Saxony and other parts of East Germany, replacing the CDU/CSU's declining support in the east. The Greens, on the other hand, continued their support from the urban areas. Lastly, the Left party receives its support mostly from the urban areas. The different policies of the parties affect the dynamics of electoral competition. For this reason, firstly, the election manifestos of the parties participating in the 2021 German federal elections on immigration were examined.

The 2021 Federal elections in Germany differed from previous elections on whether conventional election campaigns will take place due to coronavirus restrictions (Dostal, 2021, p.667). For example, street rallies, which is one of the traditional election mechanisms, were provided through social media (Dostal, 2021, p.667). This situation had a negative impact on the election mechanisms of the Christian and Social Democratic parties, whose electorates were around sixty years old. One of the most important results of the German federal elections is the end of Merkel's term as chancellor. In addition, Merkel withdrew from the leadership of the

party, leaving the chancellor candidate Armin Laschet and the CDU with the worst election result in its history (Abels et al., 2022, p.261). After Merkel's withdrawal from the leadership, there was internal turmoil in the party and for the first time a referendum was held to determine the party leadership. In the CDU/CSU election campaign, the global climate, tax reductions, the preference of state-supported housing instead of the upper limit against rent increases, and foreign policy within the scope of security policies were discussed (Angenendt & Kinski, 2022, p.172). While the issue of immigration was a major issue in the German federal elections in 2017, its importance decreased in the 2021 elections. The issue of immigration was replaced by climate change, which was the main agenda in 2019, and the corona pandemic that emerged in 2020. Despite the decrease in the importance of immigration, it still took place in the agenda. In the election manifesto, immigration was handled as an issue that should be controlled and regulated (CDU/CSU, 2021, p.25). In Merkel's first term cabinet, Germany followed rather generous policies towards immigrants compared to European countries. However, as a result of the Paris attack, New Year's Eve and sexual assault incidents in 2015, restrictive policies were implemented by reviewing border controls and Dublin rules in late 2015. For example, the BAMF granted subsidiary protection status to refugees. Accordingly, the residence permit of refugees has decreased to one year and a two-year waiting period has been imposed to apply for family reunification (Secen, 2022, p.16). As it can be understood from here, the immigrants that Merkel embraced within the scope of the open-door policy at the first time have now turned into a burden that is difficult for Germany to bear. For this reason, the CDU/CSU party has also defended the relocation formula based on a fair and balanced quota system within European countries in its 2021 election manifesto (CDU/CSU, 2021, p.27). However, the Union parties have committed to the right of asylum by adhering to the legal and humanitarian obligations of Germany and Europe. However, the CDU/CSU has drawn attention to important issues at this point. First, more countries indicated that they should be declared safe countries of origin (CDU/CSU, 2021, p.26). Secondly, it was emphasized that in order to reduce the number of people fleeing to Germany and Europe, a clear distinction should be made between people in need and those who have to leave the country because they do not need protection (CDU/CSU, 2021, p.26). Finally, it was pointed out that refugees who committed criminal offenses should be deported (CDU/CSU, 2021, p.27). Accordingly, during Merkel's chancellorship, Germany's immigration policy remained

in a dilemma between strict or “liberalizing immigration controls” (Hadj Abdou et al., 2022, p.335). Merkel often emphasized that the issue of immigration is not only Germany's problem, but also a common problem of the EU. Accordingly, she stated that close cooperation with the EU is necessary for both the EU and Germany. For example, it was emphasized that collective deportations should be facilitated by establishing detention facilities at commercial airports and that deportation should be controlled in violation of the re-entry ban (CDU/CSU, 2021, p.26-27). In addition, within the scope of migration, CDU/CSU has put on its agenda to cooperate with the defense capabilities of the EU by strengthening Frontex and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in addition to NATO. As a result, in the CDU/CSU election manifesto, the issue of immigration was handled more with the EU dimension and EU-level actions were demanded on the problems related to external borders (Burst et al., 2021).

An important reason for Merkel's decrease in the vote rate in the 2017 and 2021 German federal elections is her pro-immigrant policies (Secen, 2022, p.9). In addition, the fourth term of the Merkel cabinet has passed with “crisis management” compared to other terms (Person et al., 2023, p.21). Although the Merkel cabinet has faced challenges such as the 2008-2009 economic crisis, the 2010-2012 Eurozone crisis, and most recently the 2015/2016 immigration crisis, the pandemic crisis in late 2019 “put the federal government under tremendous pressure” (Person et al., 2023). Since this crisis fell like a bomb on the agenda, the focus of the voters shifted to the pandemic and the government was under pressure with this crisis. Therefore, although the issue of immigration was included in the CDU/CSU election manifesto, it was not labeled as a security concern. This immigration to Germany and the EU has taken place as an issue that needs to be kept under control and regulated. The CDU/CSU's 2021 election manifesto highlights three main issues: climate protection, tax reductions and pension (WAZ,2021). However, the most important agenda topic remained as the pandemic crisis, climate change and environmental policies.

The party's confidence in economic issues was largely behind the SPD's victory with 25.7% of the votes in the elections. There are three important headings in the 2021 election manifesto of the SPD. First, There are three important headings in the 2021 election manifesto of the SPD (including the self-employed) to pay into the state pension plan. Second, a higher income tax rate for the highest earners. Finally,

SPD drew attention to climate protection and sustainability. With its economic efforts to raise the minimum wage and protect and strengthen labor and employment, the SPD has also gained “credibility in EU integration” (Angelucci et al., 2021, p.1). Therefore, workers/labor union members have a tendency to vote for the Left party and the SPD. These economic areas in which the SPD achieved success actually reflected the conventional concerns of the Left party. Therefore, in my opinion, the economic study of the SPD played a role in the Left party's decline from 4.9% to 4.3%. Climate change, one of the general agenda issues of the 2021 elections, was also an important matter for the Social Democrats. Accordingly, the SPD drew attention to the protection and sustainability of the climate. Moreover, Scholz emphasized that by 2045 Germany should be in a leadership in climate protection position. The party's stance on immigration, on the other hand, is towards creating more humanitarian and solidarity-based policies. In this respect, the SPD, which is based on democracy, freedom and the rule of law, drew attention to the fact that nationalist and populist hate speeches should not get in the way of European unity (SPD, 2021, p.6). Secondly, it was emphasized that within the scope of a humanitarian and solidarist asylum and refugee policy in the EU, the Dublin system should be reformed with a solidarity-based distribution mechanism (SPD, 2021, p.58). Therefore, the European asylum system that guarantees the right to asylum and can balance responsibility and solidarity has been targeted. By following these steps, we can conclude that the SPD promotes further cooperation with the EU on asylum and immigration, economic and financial policy issues.

The fight against climate change is at the center of the Greens 2021 election manifesto. To explain, it is underlined that sustainable, zero-emission and less noisy options should be chosen in freight traffic (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, 2021, p.38). The Greens state that for the EU to meet its 2030 climate target, "a clear reduction of emission certificates and removal of excess certificates from the market" and the use of renewable energy sources instead of coal (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, 2021, p.19). In order to fulfill all these promises, the Greens developed a comprehensive ecological tax reform. However, although the German voters accepted as a problem of current era, they did not come close to accepting the personal tax increase taken under the tax reform (Dostal, 2021, p.669). The issue of immigration was not among the main agenda topics of the party. The Greens generally focused on

increasing the EU's competences within the scope of asylum policies. They underlined that the new federal government to be formed should protect the rights of asylum (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, 2021, p.227). The Greens argued that the EU should implement the rule of law at the borders and for this, it should support rescue operations at sea. In addition, they have declared that they will fight for a comprehensive civil sea rescue operations financed and supported by Europe (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, 2021, p.230). Therefore, while the Greens prioritized climate and environmental policies, they approached immigration from the perspective of human rights, not from the perspective of security. This means that for the Greens, immigration is a humanitarian issue rather than a security issue.

The agenda topics in the 2021 election declaration published by the FDP were increasing investment in education, tax reductions and setting an upper limit for CO2 emissions (Angenendt & Kinski, 2022, p.172). There was also criticism of the measures taken against the pandemic crisis in the election manifesto of the liberals. In line with this, liberals stated that " the state and federal governments restricted the liberty of citizens too much " (Faas & Klingelhöfer, 2022, p.1512). Besides these, the election manifesto put forward by the FDP on immigration is generally about the integration of immigrants. The FDP argued that the asylum system should be less bureaucratic and offered a division of duties between the federal state and the federal government for this purpose. Accordingly, while the federal state deals with the integration process, the federal government should deal with issues of deportation, protection status, and termination of residence (FDP, 2021, p.57). In addition, the Common European Asylum system should be developed and the equal distribution of asylum seekers should be ensured. Finally, FDP underlined that Frontex needs to be improved. What needs to be done for this is: improving the control mechanism, ensuring transparency and increasing the number of personnel. Moreover, Germany should play a leading role in staffing (FDP, 2021, p.58). Another focus of the FDP is the illegal deportation of immigrants. Accordingly, such incidents should be clarified and further measures should be taken to prevent human rights violations. In addition, social democrats argue that one of the ways to achieve this is if Frontex takes over the sea rescue operations. Therefore, the FDP has addressed the issue of immigration on the basis of human rights, not security.

The main topics of the left party's 2021 election manifesto are: increasing the minimum wage, the upper limit of rent, the creation of the millionaire tax and the opposition to arms exports (Angenendt & Kinski, 2022). Also focusing on the ecological crisis, the Left party stated that "renewable energies should replace the fossil energy system by 2035 in order to save the climate" (Die Linke, 2021, p.58). In addition, the Left party emphasized the pandemic crisis and stated that improvements should be made in terms of working hours and wages of health sector workers (Die Linke, 2021, p.8). The party's view on immigration is based on mainly human rights and social security rights issues. In this direction, the Left party emphasized the legal and safe ways to enter the EU, and underlined that Frontex should be abolished and instead a civilian European sea rescue program should be established. In addition, the manifesto drew attention to the negative conditions in the refugee camps and the people losing their life during the crossing of the Mediterranean, and stated that the practices of refusal at the European borders and the right to asylum were violated (Die Linke, 2021, p.115).

As the other political parties examined, the AfD's 2021 election manifesto was on the pandemic crisis and climate change, which were the subject of general discussion. In this direction, the measures taken against Covid-19 were opposed, it was emphasized that Germany should leave the EU and the deportation of immigrants without legal permission was advocated (Angenendt & Kinski, 2022, p.172). Compared to the 2017 elections, the issue of immigration has lost importance in the 2021 elections in the face of the pandemic crisis. However, the AfD has put forward very strict measures within the scope of immigration. Secondly, they also offered solutions to increasing immigration pressure on Europe. Firstly, Germany must take control of the borders, as the EU cannot provide permanent and effective protection at its external borders (AfD, 2021, p.92). Even fences can be built as physical barriers to prevent "irregular immigration" (AfD, 2021 p.92). Moreover, AfD also argues that family reunification should be refused. They pointed out that in the face of increasing mass immigration, crime rates, terrorist attacks and financial burden also increased and the EU is not able to cope with this crisis. On the other hand, the AfD claimed that international agreements had lost their effectiveness. For this reason, they emphasized the need to focus on humanitarian aid in crisis areas and to recruit high skilled immigrants (AfD, 2021, p.91). Finally, they stated that the number of safe

countries of origin should be increased in order to deport the increasing number of asylum seekers and refugees over Germany. Considering all these developments, it is possible to conclude that the AfD perceives the immigration crisis as a humanitarian crisis, a political crisis or a combination of these (Hadj Abdou et al., 2022, p.330). Therefore, the issue of immigration is an important factor in the functioning of political and socio-economic systems. As a result, in the 2021 elections, the AfD's immigration discourse could not find an answer in the face of the corona crisis and climate change, and the vote rate decreased to 10.2%.

As discussed earlier in detail the securitization process has three main components; "existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules" (Buzan et al., 1998, p.26). Although radical right parties acted as a driving force in the politicization of immigration, the AfD, as a radical right party, was not able to achieve its expected result in the 2021 elections. However, since the issue of immigration was a major concern in the 2017 elections, it contributed to the securitization of immigration. Thus, it also put pressure on mainstream political parties, and in 2017, it enabled all political parties to consider immigration as a security concern. However, this was not the case in the 2021 elections because, pandemic crisis and climate and environmental issues were influential in the election campaigns of these parties. However, all the German political parties have a consensus on necessity to strengthen European defense and foreign capacity (Röth, 2022, p.). In the 2021 German federal elections, immigration was not seen as a priority threat to the national security. New developments (i.e., Ukrainian case) demonstrated that priority moved from immigration to energy issues.

CONCLUSION

With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, large numbers of people fleeing persecution and violence began to seek asylum in neighboring countries and Europe. These applications reached their peak in 2015, increasing gradually. Eventually this led to the immigration crisis in 2015. In the face of this immigration crisis, the EU immigration policy was insufficient and could not follow a common policy in the face of mass immigration. Germany, which appears to be economically strong in the absence of a common EU immigration policy, has been of interest to immigrants. Merkel's discourses about establishing a common immigration policy have led Germany to take a leading role in policy-making compared to other EU members. The effects of EU immigration policy on German domestic politics were also examined to illuminate the research question of the study. Therefore, this study aims to understand the interplay between the international and domestic dynamics of the EU immigration policy by focusing on the variety of discourses generated by the political parties in Germany in the context of the immigration crisis. For this purpose, the securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School has been applied to analyze how immigration is constructed and perceived as a security concern. Therefore, the securitization theory formed the theoretical framework of this study and became a result of the political discourses positioned in the analysis of German practices related to immigration. As a case study, Germany was chosen because it is the country with the most exposure to immigration and the most generous immigration policy among European countries.

The securitization theory, which forms the backbone of this study, is a challenge to traditional security understandings as stated in Chapter 1. Therefore, the points that make securitization theory different from traditional understandings are mentioned. These differences are important for understanding securitization theory, which results in the evolution of the concept of security over time. Therefore, in order to analyze immigration in the 2021 German federal elections, the points of securitization theory that differ from traditional security approaches are presented. At this point, this section aims to explain the definition of security within the framework

of changing understandings and in which situations migration is securitized. Accordingly, immigration has been securitized as a security concern against three elements: economic, social and internal security. These three basic security concerns, which were seen together in Germany in the 2010s, were mostly seen within the scope of social security in the 2021 elections.

In the second part of the study, there are discussions about how the securitization of migration is built as a security problem in the European political agenda through the securitization theory. The reason for this is that this study analyzes how the EU common immigration policy is reflected in the 2021 German federal elections. In order to better understand the securitization of EU immigration policy, the important steps and agreements taken by the EU on immigration are detailed. Moreover, perceptions, concerns and attitudes of EU member states on immigration are examined. According to this, securitization of immigration in member states is related to economization and securitization, as a meta problem (including more than one problem), organized crime, human trafficking, terrorist activities, illegal border crossing and ontological. As a result, immigration is not only seen as a security threat to the collective identity and culture of the EU society but also constructed as a meta problem, more than one actor involves in process. Finally, securitization of immigration in Germany is examined as the main focus of the study. Accordingly, firstly, it is concluded that the securitization discourse is related to exclusion from the concepts of human rights and civil rights. For example, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), Pegida movement presented the problem of immigrants and refugees as an existential threat to national identity. Second, immigration has been constructed as a security concern, associated with terrorism. Accordingly, it was concluded that non-citizens pose a security problem, especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Finally, attention was drawn to the influence of radical right parties in constructing immigration as a security concern in Germany. It is seen that the discourses of radical right parties such as the AfD have an impact on the establishment of a stricter immigration policy.

In the third chapter, Germany's approach to the immigration crisis between 2014-2021 and the tendency of political parties are examined. In the first part, with the immigration crisis reaching its peak in 2015, Germany's approach to the immigration crisis in the period between 2014-2021 was examined in order to better

analyze the 2021 elections. The second part focused on the general approaches of the parties in order to better analyze the approaches of the political parties competing in the 2021 elections. In 2015, influx of immigration to Germany became an important turning point for the political arena. This accelerated the rise of the xenophobic far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which prominent with its anti-immigrant rhetoric (Hertner, 2022, p.461). Increasing immigration caused political, economic and social problems in German society. In the face of all these difficulties, the coalition government consisting of the CDU/CSU and SPD followed an open-door policy. Moreover, the culture of welcome and recognition was created as part of Germany's open-door policy towards immigrants. On September 9, Merkel stated in the Bundestag: "A common European approach is more likely if we show courage and lead ... One of the most important reasons for building a united Europe if Europe fails on the refugee issue, namely universal human rights." (Helms et al., 2019, p.359). Merkel's statements reminded all EU member states that the EU has an important role in protecting human rights and minority rights. Merkel has been the figure guiding immigration policies at the EU level, calling on member states to be more open and welcoming. On the other hand, Merkel stated "Wir Schaffen das" (we can do this) at the press conference she held six days after the Dublin agreement was suspended in 2015 (Mushaben, 2017b, p.527). The motivation behind this statement was "Germany's orderly conditions, economic strength, developed civil society, demographic needs, its capacity for flexibility in tough times and constitutional imperatives affirming that asylum knows no upper limits" (Mushaben, 2017b, 527). However, the political, economic and social problems caused by the increasing number of immigrants, with the effect of anti-immigrant sentiment in Germany, the "welcoming approach" was questioned. The 2017 elections marked a turning point when the far-right party AfD, with almost 13% of the vote, entered the Bundestag. In the face of all these policies, although Merkel invited the member states to be more open and welcoming and stated that the issue of immigration is a common problem of Europe and requires solidarity, this situation caused the votes of the CDU/CSU to drop in domestic politics. The conclusions drawn from this section are important in order to understand the cause-effect relationship of the steps taken by Germany towards the 2021 elections. In this section, the place of immigration in German politics until 2021 has been tried to be analyzed. The reason for this is to understand the motivations of political parties on immigration in the 2021 elections. Accordingly,

it has been observed that Merkel's softening immigration policy after 2015 and the rise of the anti-immigration AfD, a radical right-wing party, increased the anti-immigration rhetoric. With the increase in social events (New Year's Eve in 2015), immigrants were seen as a danger to cultural life. Thus, it has been revealed that the migration policies of the Merkel administration are no longer supported both at the political and social level.

The last chapter, the official political statements and election manifestos of the political parties during the 2021 German federal elections were analyzed. Therefore, Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU), Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Greens (Grüne), the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), The Left (Linke)'s election manifestos were examined. As a result, this study aimed to address the findings of the 2021 German federal elections and to reveal the impact of immigration on the political process. Therefore, it has mainly been intended to reveal whether it is possible to securitize immigration in these elections. Thus, it was intended to highlight whether the securitization approach contributed to the study and whether it produced answers to existing questions. In other words, the issue of immigration was replaced by climate change, which was the main agenda in 2019, and the corona pandemic that emerged in 2020. Despite the decrease in the importance of immigration, it still took place in the agenda. In the election campaign of the CDU/CSU, immigration was addressed as an issue to be controlled and regulated. Also, the party advocated a relocation formula based on a fair and balanced quota system within European countries. As a result, in the CDU/CSU election manifesto, the issue of immigration was handled more with the EU dimension and EU-level actions were demanded on the problems related to external borders (Burst et al., 2021). The SPD's stance on immigration, on the other hand, is to produce more humane and solidaristic policies. Accordingly, the European asylum system, which guarantees the right to asylum and balances responsibility and solidarity, was targeted. Hence, it encouraged Germany's greater cooperation with the EU. The Greens' approach to immigration was that the EU should enforce the rule of law at the borders and support rescue operations at sea for this. Therefore, the party approached immigration not from a security perspective, but from a human rights perspective. The election manifesto put forward by the FDP on immigration is generally about the integration of immigrants. Accordingly, while the federal state deals with the

integration process, the federal government should deal with issues of deportation, protection status, and termination of residence. The Left party's view on immigration was based on mainly human rights and social security rights issues. In this direction, the Left party emphasized the legal and safe ways to enter the EU, and underlined that Frontex should be abolished and instead a civilian European sea rescue program should be established. Finally, the AfD, known for its anti-immigration stance, emphasized the deportation of immigrants and the EU's inability to protect external borders in its election manifesto. Thus, it put forward strict physical measures such as the construction of fences. Three main conclusions emerged from this chapter. The first is that political parties do not construct the issue of immigration as a threat to national security, but rather approach it from the perspective of human rights that need to be protected. Secondly, they focused more on the EU dimension of immigration to Germany, emphasizing cooperation with the EU. To explain, the CDU/CSU advocated EU-level action at the external borders, the SPD emphasized cooperation with the EU on the European Asylum System, the Greens has suggested the rule of law at EU level and support of rescue operations at the borders, the Left Party has highlighted the legal and safe way to enter the EU within the scope of human rights and social security and the AfD specified the EU's inability to protect external borders. Finally, in the 2021 elections, the public does not perceive immigration as a security concern. Although immigration was built as a security concern by the AfD with anti-immigration rhetoric, it did not succeed because the public did not accept it. The important agenda topics of 2021 were the climate and pandemic crisis. The energy and immigration crisis that emerged after the Ukraine crisis brought new definitions to the agenda. To explain, immigrants from Ukraine have different perceptions compared to immigrants from the Middle East and the Balkans. Obviously, while immigrants from Ukraine were easily accepted, the situation was not the same for immigrants from the Middle East and the Balkans. Therefore, the influence of political culture on immigration emerges. Could political culture be the reason why immigrants from the Middle East and the Balkans are perceived differently? This proves that the cultural approach is an issue that requires further research.

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