



**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY**  
**SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA**  
**INSTITUTE FOR GRADUATE STUDIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**THE EU AND ASEAN: ASYMMETRIES BOLSTERED BY  
UNIQUENESS**

**MASTER'S THESIS**

**HALİME FİŞKİN**

**MASTER OF ARTS IN PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES**

**APRIL, 2022**





**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY  
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA  
INSTITUTE FOR GRADUATE STUDIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**THE EU AND ASEAN: ASYMMETRIES BOLSTERED BY  
UNIQUENESS**

**MASTER'S THESIS**

**HALIME FIŞKIN  
175411014**

**THESIS SUPERVISOR  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Gürol BABA**

**MASTER OF ARTS IN PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES**

**APRIL, 2022**

## STATEMENT ON ACADEMIC INTEGRITY

All data in this document was gathered and presented in accordance with academic standards and ethical conduct. I further declare that I have correctly acknowledged and referenced all non-original materials and results, as required by these rules and conduct. I declare that this thesis was written in accordance with the Social Sciences University of Ankara's Institute of Social Sciences' writing guidelines.

Name and Surname: Halime FIŞKIN

Signature:

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I have been remarkably lucky since I have received various academic as well as personal assistance during my master progress. I'd like to convey my gratitude and appreciation to my thesis advisor first of all and foremost, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Gürol BABA, for his advice and generous support he has provided. He inspired and motivated me in conducting my research to the fullest I appreciate him invaluable help and support I have received along the way. I'd want to express my gratitude to my esteemed jury members Dr. Resul Yalçın and Dr. Ismail Erkam Sula for their valuable contributions and guidance. Finally, I am grateful for my family's unwavering support. They have supported me all through my thesis.

## CONTENT

|                                                                                                            |            |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| <b>STATEMENT ON ACADEMIC INTEGRITY .....</b>                                                               | <b>i</b>   |
| <b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....</b>                                                                              | <b>ii</b>  |
| <b>CONTENT.....</b>                                                                                        | <b>iii</b> |
| <b>ABSTRACT.....</b>                                                                                       | <b>v</b>   |
| <b>ÖZET .....</b>                                                                                          | <b>vi</b>  |
| <b>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....</b>                                                                         | <b>vii</b> |
| <b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>                                                                                  | <b>1</b>   |
| PROBLEM STATEMENT .....                                                                                    | 2          |
| RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....                                                                                    | 2          |
| RESEARCH AIMS .....                                                                                        | 3          |
| SIGNIFICANCE AND THE PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH .....                                                         | 3          |
| RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....                                                                                 | 3          |
| RESEARCH SCOPE .....                                                                                       | 4          |
| STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS .....                                                                              | 4          |
| <b>CHAPTER I .....</b>                                                                                     | <b>5</b>   |
| 1.1. LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN BETWEEN REALISM AND<br>LIBERALISM REGARDING COOPERATION AND ANARCHY ..... | 5          |
| 1.2. THE GENERAL CLAIMS OF LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM.....                                                   | 9          |
| 1.3. INTERREGIONALISM .....                                                                                | 10         |
| <b>CHAPTER II.....</b>                                                                                     | <b>14</b>  |
| 2.1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION .....                                                           | 14         |
| 2.2. THE ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE .....                                                                        | 20         |

|                                                               |           |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| 2.3. AIMS, PURPOSES, VALUES, AND PRINCIPLES .....             | 21        |
| 2.4. EUROPEAN UNION’S UNIQUENESS .....                        | 22        |
| 2.5. FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION.....   | 25        |
| 2.6. FAILURE IN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DEVELOPMENT ..... | 30        |
| 2.7. SPILLOVER EFFECTS.....                                   | 32        |
| <b>CHAPTER III .....</b>                                      | <b>35</b> |
| 3.1. AN OVERVIEW OF ASEAN'S HISTORY .....                     | 35        |
| 3.2. ASEAN'S THREE PILLARS .....                              | 38        |
| 3.3. ASEAN - AIMS, AND PURPOSES.....                          | 40        |
| 3.4. ASEAN’S UNIQUENESS.....                                  | 42        |
| 3.5. ASEAN FOREIGN POLICY .....                               | 45        |
| <b>CHAPTER IV .....</b>                                       | <b>46</b> |
| 4.1. THE LITERATURE ON EU-ASEAN RELATIONS .....               | 46        |
| 4.2. LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM and the EU .....                | 49        |
| 4.3. LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM and ASEAN .....                 | 50        |
| 4.4. EU-ASEAN RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF ASYMMETRY .....        | 51        |
| <b>CONCLUSION .....</b>                                       | <b>59</b> |
| <b>BIBLIOGRAPHY .....</b>                                     | <b>61</b> |
| <b>CURRICULUM VITAE.....</b>                                  | <b>80</b> |

## **ABSTRACT**

### **The EU and ASEAN: Asymmetries Bolstered by Uniqueness**

HALİME FİŞKİN

MA, Department of International Relations

Program of Peace and Conflict Studies

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Gürol BABA

April, 2022

This study examines the EU-ASEAN relations within an eclectic theoretical framework. Firstly, due to the evolution and current developments of these relations, the study used the liberal institutionalist theory as the preliminary framework. Yet the inter-regional nature of these two institutions' relations is required to merge inter-regionalism into liberal institutionalism. This eclecticism aided to explain the reasons why EU-ASEAN relations have been developing regardless of the obvious differences between these two regional schemes in various realms. The EU has been the pioneer of these relations since it has clearer institutional expectations and aims than ASEAN. The liberal economic focus of the EU grasped ASEAN members' attention to increase their inter-regional trade profits. Yet what the latter could provide to the former has been asymmetrical. The inter-regionalist liberal institutionalism steps in right here to explain that this asymmetry is not a real hindrance to the development of these relations. Accordingly, this study argues that although these two institutions are imbalanced regarding their institutionalization and economic development level, they could still continuously cooperate. Moreover, this cooperation could spill over to other realms and continue deepening.

**Keywords:** EU, ASEAN, Liberal Institutionalism, inter-regionalism, asymmetry



## ÖZET

### AB ve ASEAN: Benzersizlikle Desteklenen Asimetriler

HALİME FİŞKİN

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Barış ve Çatışma Programı

Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Gürol BABA

Nisan, 2022

Bu çalışma, AB-ASEAN ilişkilerini eklektik bir teorik çerçeve içinde incelemektedir. İlk olarak, bu ilişkilerin evrimi ve güncel gelişmeleri nedeniyle, çalışmada ön çerçeve olarak liberal kurumsalcı teori kullanılmıştır. Yine de bu iki kurumun ilişkilerinin bölgeler arası doğası, bölgeler aracılığıyla liberal kurumsalcılıkla birleştirmeyi gerektiriyordu. Bu eklektizm, AB-ASEAN ilişkilerinin çeşitli alanlarda bu iki bölgesel şema arasındaki bariz farklılıklara rağmen neden geliştiğini açıklamaya yardımcı oldu. AB, ASEAN' dan daha net kurumsal beklentilere ve hedeflere sahip olduğu için bu ilişkilerin öncüsü olmuştur. AB'nin liberal ekonomik odağı, ASEAN üyelerinin bölgeler arası ticari kârlarını artırmaya yönelik dikkatini çekti. Ancak ikincisinin birincisine sağlayabileceği şey asimetrikti. Bölgeler arası liberal kurumsalcılık, bu asimetrinin bu ilişkilerin gelişmesine gerçek bir engel olmadığını açıklamak için tam burada devreye giriyor. Buna göre, bu çalışma, bu iki kurumun kurumsallaşma ve ekonomik gelişmişlik düzeyleri açısından dengesiz olmalarına rağmen, yine de sürekli iş birliği yapabileceklerini iddia etmektedir. Üstelik bu iş birliği başka alanlara da sıçrayabilir ve derinleşmeye devam edebilir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** AB, ASEAN, Liberal Kurumsalcılık, bölgeler aracılığıyla, asimetri

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

|                   |                                                   |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| <b>IR</b>         | International Relations                           |
| <b>EU</b>         | European Union                                    |
| <b>JHA</b>        | Justice and Home Affairs                          |
| <b>EDC</b>        | European Defence Community                        |
| <b>EC</b>         | European Community                                |
| <b>ECSC</b>       | European Coal and Steel Community                 |
| <b>CFSP</b>       | Common Foreign and Security Policy                |
| <b>SEA</b>        | Single European Act                               |
| <b>AEC</b>        | ASEAN Economic Community                          |
| <b>ASEAN</b>      | Association of Southeast Asian Nations            |
| <b>TE</b>         | Treaty on European Union                          |
| <b>EURATOM</b>    | European Atomic Energy Community                  |
| <b>EMU</b>        | Economic and Monetary Union                       |
| <b>EEC</b>        | European Economic Community                       |
| <b>ASCC</b>       | ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community                    |
| <b>EP</b>         | European Parliament                               |
| <b>ECJ</b>        | European Court of Justice                         |
| <b>EPC</b>        | European Political Cooperation                    |
| <b>US</b>         | United States                                     |
| <b>ZOPFAN</b>     | Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality             |
| <b>NATO</b>       | North Atlantic Treaty Organization                |
| <b>ESDP</b>       | European Security and Defence Policy              |
| <b>UN</b>         | United Nations                                    |
| <b>PCA</b>        | Partnership and Cooperation Agreement             |
| <b>ASA</b>        | Association of Southeast Asia                     |
| <b>MALAPHINDO</b> | Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines              |
| <b>TAC</b>        | Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia |
| <b>APSC</b>       | ASEAN Political-Security Community                |
| <b>ARF</b>        | ASEAN Regional Forum                              |

|               |                                         |
|---------------|-----------------------------------------|
| <b>APEC</b>   | Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation       |
| <b>PMC</b>    | Post-Ministerial Conference             |
| <b>ASEM</b>   | Asia-Europe Meeting                     |
| <b>TREATI</b> | Transregional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative |
| <b>AEMM</b>   | ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting            |
| <b>READI</b>  | Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument   |
| <b>SLD</b>    | Shangri-La Dialogue                     |



## INTRODUCTION

The evolution and current developments of the EU-ASEAN relations as the empirical case of this research necessitated using liberal institutionalism as the theoretical framework. This framework not only provides an explanatory perspective to discuss inter-state cooperation via institutions but also illuminates the relations between institutions. It should be underlined that this theory deals with the transformation of institutional cooperation over time, and in this way, it can respond to the relationships between states and institutions that are changing. This theoretical framework is bolstered by integrating inter-regionalism into it since EU-ASEAN relations operate on a transregional and inter-regional basis. With such an eclectic framework, this research elaborates the EU-ASEAN relations under the following sections.

The first chapter provides an introduction, which includes the scope of the thesis, the purpose of the current topic, the research questions the thesis tries to answer, the related limitations, and the methodology.

The second chapter establishes the study's theoretical basis. For this, the chapter elaborates on Liberal Institutionalism, whose roots slightly touch upon Realism and bundles up Liberalism by its assumption that the co-existence of anarchy and cooperation would not completely hinder international institutions' role in cooperation between various actors. Realists regard cooperation between states as a temporary suspension from general conditions of competition, conflict, and war. Therefore, cooperation is not impossible but difficult and temporary. Liberals on the other hand see cooperation as an almost routine of state and non-state affairs. Liberal Institutionalism by merging these two, although with a much heavier emphasis on the latter, underlines the requirements and boosters of international cooperation.

The EU and ASEAN are described and interpreted empirically in the third and fourth chapter. The description covers their foundation, aims, values, principles, and uniqueness. The analysis first presents a historical context for EU and ASEAN foreign

policy and then examines the significance of EU and ASEAN's uniqueness in bilateral interactions.

The last chapter binds the theoretical framework and the empirical cases. The theoretical framework, in this sense, serves a two-fold purpose. It is firstly used to interpret the meaning of EU and ASEAN in liberal institutionalism, and to what extent they counterpoise. The theoretical framework is secondly utilized to express the reasons and impact of asymmetry in EU-ASEAN relations.

## **PROBLEM STATEMENT**

This research focuses on explaining why EU-ASEAN relations have been growing despite the clear discrepancies between these two regional organizations in numerous areas. As a result, this study contends that, despite their disparities in institutionalization, the level of regionalism they achieved and their members' cumulative economic progress, these two institutions could nevertheless continue their cooperation in the future. Furthermore, this collaboration could spread to other areas and continue to grow and deepen. This research questions the theoretical and empirical reasons of this collaboration.

## **RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

This thesis will attempt to look for answers to the following questions;

- What kind of a model has the EU created for ASEAN?
- What is the role of liberal institutionalism for the EU and ASEAN?
- To what extent inter-regionalism could provide an explanatory framework for these two organizations' interactions?
- What are the unique features of these organizations that maintain their cooperation?

## **RESEARCH AIMS**

The dissertation aims to evaluate the EU's supranational outlook toward Asia. Although the EU is structurally quite different from ASEAN, it concluded several inter-regional cooperation with it. This study aims to underline the reasons why these two organizations, regardless of their imbalance in institutionalization, intra-organizational interaction, legal-political structure, and the level of economic development levels of their members could deepen their cooperation.

## **SIGNIFICANCE AND THE PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH**

The dissertation has theoretical and empirical significance. Theoretically, it merges liberal institutionalism and interregionalism since the empirical focus is the EU and ASEAN's relations, which cannot be only interpreted with a mono-theoretical or conceptual framework.

Interregionalism is required to bring a region-based understanding of two regional organizations' fluctuating but continuously developing relations. Liberal institutionalism is used to express how these relations have been expanding in different realms of these relations. In the empirical sense, the EU – ASEAN relations are handled from two perspectives: to what extent do the peculiarities of these organizations serve for the development of relations and what's the role of asymmetry in this development.

## **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This thesis' research approach employs the qualitative research method. During the research, the thesis will use primary material of EU Parliament and Commission declarations/statements, ASEAN summit declarations together with reports and news articles. As for secondaries, it will utilize relevant books, journal articles, book chapters, news, reports, and policy papers.

## **RESEARCH SCOPE**

This study looks at the EU-ASEAN relations from an eclectic prism of liberal institutionalism and inter-regionalism. This prism not only aided to cover the imbalances between the two organizations but also explain the reasons why they can continuously deepen their cooperation. In this way, this study merges the two well know theoretical literatures on a contemporary interaction pattern between the EU and ASEAN.

## **STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS**

This thesis is composed of five chapters. The first chapter covers the scope of the thesis, the goal of the current topic, the research questions the thesis tries to answer, and the methodology. The theoretical foundation is explained in the second chapter. In the third and fourth chapters, the EU and ASEAN are explored and interpreted, through which their bases, goals, beliefs, ideals, and uniqueness are taken into consideration. The theoretical framework and empirical cases are tied together in the final chapter. This chapter also gives a succinct literature review of EU-ASEAN Relations. The conclusion section included an overall assessment of liberal institutionalism, which gave an explanatory framework in the sense that, despite differences within the EU and ASEAN, they may still work together.

## **CHAPTER I**

The study's theoretical foundation is established in this chapter. For this, the chapter delves into Liberal Institutionalism, which has origins in Realism and is characterized by the belief that the coexistence of anarchy and cooperation does not preclude international institutions from playing a role in inter-actor collaboration.

The partnership among states, according to Realists, is a short reprieve from the general conditions of rivalry, violence, and war. Cooperation is thus not impossible, just difficult and fleeting. Liberals, on the other hand, regard partnership as a result of regular both state and non-state activity. Liberal Institutionalism emphasizes the necessities and incentives of international collaboration by combining these two, however with a far stronger emphasis on the latter.

### **1.1. LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN BETWEEN REALISM AND LIBERALISM REGARDING COOPERATION AND ANARCHY**

This research looks at the EU-ASEAN relationship through a variety of theoretical lenses. To begin, the work has used the liberal institutionalist theory as a basic framework relating to the origin and ongoing advancements of these relationships.

The inter-regional nature of these two institutions' relationships, however, necessitated the fusion of inter-regionalism and liberal institutionalism. Despite the evident disparities between these two regional systems in numerous spheres, this eclecticism contributed to understanding how EU-ASEAN relations have been developing.

Since the 1970s, the rise of Liberal Institutionalism as an International Relations (IR) theory has sparked a lot of debate over its challenges to Realism (Devitt, 2011, p. 1).

Liberal Institutionalism rejects the Realistic assumption of a political conflict in international politics centered on military security concerns, instead advocating for a



world system in which state and non-state players play a direct role in global politics. This makes military power an ineffective policy tool. From an Institutional perspective, interdependence should generate cooperation and order.

According to Realists, the allocation of power and its balance among actors, primarily states, would bring about the order (Keohane & Keohane, 2005, p. 7). Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye more clearly underlined the significant points distinguishing Liberal Institutionalism from Realism. Classical Realism views high politics as the primary starting point and dismisses the importance of low politics. However, Institutionalists do not dismiss low politics' decisiveness. Both low and high politics are equally important (Keohane & Nye Jr, 1973, p. 160).

Liberal institutionalism, for instance, absorbed fundamental realist notions such as anarchy and state self-interest, while realists acknowledge that cooperation is feasible in an otherwise anarchic system under certain circumstances, such as hegemony (Moravcsik, 1999, p. 270).

Liberal Institutionalism, in contrast to Realism, is more optimistic about international collaboration. It provides an optimistic assessment of the role institutions play in the cooperation of states. As a result, liberal institutionalists attempt to dispute a realistic view of global politics (Lee, 2005, p. 109). Neorealists on the other hand argue that institutions have a negligible impact on state conduct (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 7). States construct institutions to anticipate their influence on behavioral patterns (Keohane & Martin, 1995, p. 47).

Anarchy is one of the most ambiguous concepts in political debate. It is frequently used to describe anarchy and disorder, as in a Hobbesian war of all versus all. Anarchy is defined by many scholars as the lack of government (Baldwin, 1993, p. 15).

Institutionalism, like Realism, emphasizes the international system's anarchic aspect. States must defend their interests because there is no centralized authority. Yet, unlike the Realist assumption that states could only refer to their capability, Institutionalists underline the significance of institutions generating cooperation for defense (Aceves, 1997, p. 237). The Liberal Institutionalists define anarchy as a major

obstacle to collaboration between states. They claim, however, that anarchy does not promote cooperation especially with the help of institutions (Grieco, 1988, p. 486). Besides, they argued that for cooperation some points are significant to mention.

In addition to anarchy, cheating is also an obstacle to cooperation between rational egoist states, but according to the Institutionalists, international institutions can help states to cope with this obstacle (Grieco, 1988, p. 488) via generating mutual trust (Nuruzzaman, 2008, pp. 195-196).

Liberal Institutionalism notices power as another catalyst for cooperation through international law and diplomacy operating through international organizations (Bull, 1977, p. 101). In line with Bull, Ikenberry said that institutions undertake a kind of soft legal function (Ikenberry & Ikenberry, 2019, p. 8).

Lipson supported this argument that cooperation between states is considered easier in the economic realm than insecurity (Lipson, 1984, p. 218). Liberal Institutionalism assumes that international institutions and organizations are significant in cooperation and partnership among nations. Yet these institutions and organization-oriented arguments of Liberal Institutionalism do not make it a stand-alone theory, on the contrary, it is related to various versions of Realism and Liberalism. Realists regard cooperation between states as a temporary suspension from general conditions of competition, conflict, and war.

Liberal Institutionalism can be thought of as based on Liberalism. It challenges the Realist idea that clashes are inevitable in the pursuit of power by states. Liberalism advocates and supports that sustainable cooperation is possible. States may overcome competitiveness, conflicts, and war by building familiar organizations and strengthening ties through locally and internationally institutions (Johnson & Heiss, 2018, pp. 129-130).

Neoliberalism suggests that for successful cooperation, some degree of sovereign control must be combined with national identity. Being a powerful, lawful, and sovereign state might be considered a fundamental requirement for establishing the foundations of a successful regional organization working in the expanding international arena (Norkevičius, 2014, p. 111).

Ikenberry also underlined Liberal Institutionalism's link between Realism and Liberalism. The significance of state power cannot be conceived without international institutions and liberal values. Ikenberry contends that powerful states should be rewarded for using institutions to extend and constrain their power. Thus, states avoid situations that are unethical or violate human rights. Institutions can be beneficial in both ways.

First, they can be used by the leading state to tie other states to the desired policy orientations, to consolidate and thus extend power into the future. Second, institutions can restrict the exercise of hegemonic power which is cruel and unfair. They can enable a state to establish reliable constraints and commitments to its strength, this makes collaboration easier and gives the order greater legitimacy (Ikenberry, 2019, pp. 7-10).

As an institutionalist and a supporter of liberalism, Keohane stated that, apart from Marxism and Realism, liberalism is not committed to an expansive and scant functionalist theory.

Keohane identifies liberalism with the idea of the supremacy of economic regulation based on markets rather than state control. Besides, individuals and especially their freedom is very significant (Keohane, 1990, pp. 745-747).

Doyle on the other hand argued that liberal theory has no "canonical" definition. What is called liberal resembles a family portrait with certain principles and institutions. For example, while no liberal state has all of them in perfect balance, the majority of liberal states share personal rights, political participation, property rights, and equality of opportunity (Doyle, 1986, p. 1152).

In the essay, "Eternal Peace" Kant put forward that international liberalism has three options such as republican, commercial, and regulatory. To begin, republican liberalism corresponds to constitutional governments that emphasize personal freedom and the legal system, as well as the acceptance of all individuals as equals. According to Kant the citizens' assent is essential to decide whether or not there should be a war, and "nothing could be more natural than for people who would have to choose to go through all the hardships of war to be hesitant to begin such a cruel game (Kant, 2018, p. 366). However, Doyle said that Kantian republicanism does not give the assurance of peace.

To confront war, international law is an important source as a guarantee of respect among nations (Doyle, 1986, p. 1160).

Secondly, commercial liberalism acknowledges the influence of foreign relations on state behavior. Proponents of commercial liberalism carried the benign image of business held by classical economists to the political sphere. Finally, the proponents of regulatory liberalism emphasized peace, by underlying the importance of rules. Exchanging the rules among countries is possible (Keohane, 1990, pp. 777-779).

## **1.2. THE GENERAL CLAIMS OF LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM**

The significance of global governance and international institutions is emphasized by liberal institutionalism to explain international relations. Accordingly, there are common goals in the international system and for their realization and application, international organizations play an active role (Devitt, 2011, p. 2).

Liberalism, as a baseline of Institutionalism, does not only center upon states but also on social groups and firms. Besides, Liberalism is looking for ways to put the economic and political interests of actors under one roof and reduce conflicts amongst them (Keohane, 1990, p. 174).

Liberal Institutionalists often believe that institutions encourage collaboration by distributing information to all parties, which reduces the consequences of cheating (Nuruzzaman, 2008, p. 196). Institutionalism focuses on the role of organizations in influencing state conduct in the international autocratic system. States do not hesitate to enter into conflict with a trading partner as they feel they when the stakes are high and unpredictable, they have less to lose.

Institutional tools, such as trade agreements, are provided by international organizations to confront uncertainty variables and help to establish the rule of law (Swisa, 2013, pp. 130-131). Lack of mutual interest induces the absence of institutions, uncertainty, and probable conflicts. Rather, the existence of institutions facilitates cooperation by limiting opportunistic behavior and providing interaction among states (Norkevjius, 2014, p. 110). Dugger and Shermann put forward that Institutionalism is

not reductionist but holistic. It cannot be associated with a single situation. It cannot be reduced to a specific situation, so technology, ideas, and class matter.

Institutionalism is a comprehensive study of the social procurement process in the cultural context. Therefore, it accepts that developing and changing technology, ideology, or class structure is not fixed and is compatible with change (Dugger & Sherman, 1994, pp. 116-117).

According to Keohane, Institutional theory claimed that human action causes institutions to evolve, and the resulting shifts in expectations and processes can have a significant impact on state conduct (Keohane, 1989, p. 10). The current devolution and regulation of interests are naturally constrained by institutional cooperation among nations (Reus-Smit, 1997, p. 558).

International organizations and institutions with rules, norms and practices play a crucial part in regulatory liberalism. The main reason for this is that they contribute to the cooperation between countries. To put it differently, perceived or existing insecurity between states hinders cooperation between states on regional and international issues.

Liberal Institutionalism does not only criticize the restrictions argued by the Realist theory but also brings a positivist alternative by observing the evolution of international cooperation within the post-Cold War period. It majority emphasizes that states through international institutions could congregate toward common goals (Ali, 2020, p. 3). The international community also paves the way for such congregations as Bull stated that the international community is working on the idea of common goals and interests. In short Liberal Institutionalism theory underlines the importance of cooperation for the maximizing of absolute gains (Bull & Watson, 1984).

### **1.3. INTERREGIONALISM**

The notion of interregionalism dates back to the 1960s and 1970s. Research and interest throughout the 1990s and 2000s, interregionalism reached its pinnacle, but by the present day, it has faced extinction or has begun to claim to be superseded diverse types of activity, particularly bilateralism (Grevi, 2010). The adoption of the idea of transition

from interregionalism to bipolarism relied on a belief that is motivated by the world's geopolitical shift from monopolar to multilateral (Baert et al., 2014).

Interregionalism expresses the connection of one region with another (Reiterer, 2006, p. 224). In other words, there is an interaction from region to region. In many studies related to the field; it is besides known as institutionalized interregional connections (Hänggi, 2006).

There are different approaches in the literature related to interregionalism. Interregionalism can be addressed with two theoretical explanations: realism and liberal institutionalism (Rüland, 2014, p. 17) as explained above. Realist patterns focus on the balancing games that occur between various regional actors. According to the Realists, the basic functionality required for interregional dialogues and cooperation is balancing (Hwee, 2005).

Specifically when we focus on the liberal institutionalist approach its significant to mention that institution building can be defined as a new institutional layer based on interregional dialogues and interactive relations (Doidge, 2007).

Rüland noticed that balancing is the least controversial tool for interregionalism (Hänggi et al., 2006). Instead, liberal-institutionalist patterns underline the need for collaborative efforts related to interdependence on an interregional level (Hänggi, 2000, p. 9).

International institutions, according to liberal thinking in institutionalism, seek to minimize financing costs and solve distribution issues. These two notions are related to better understanding the states' acts and cooperation. This even refers to inter-regional scenarios, where regions aim to develop cooperative regimes to facilitate information and lower transaction costs (Song, 2007, p. 69).

There are different types of interregionalisms that are also induced by different motivations. Interregionalism is a foreign policy strategy in which actors either join or oppose other actors' movements to advance their positions (Hardacre & Smith, 2009, p. 170). Institutionalists besides, claimed that the interregional dialogues play an important

function in defining the agenda and establishing institutions in a multilayered system of global governance (Hwee, 2007, p. 178).

In addition to foreign policy and institutional governance, interregional patterns have four extra formats. The first is regional groupings or group-to-group interregionalism, which are based on low-level institutionalization for which two distinct geographic entities are involved with each other (Rüland, 2014, pp. 5-6).

The relations commonly rest upon meetings focusing on specific issues in certain fields, e.g. trade, investment, human rights, or democracy. The relationship between ASEAN-EU is a significant example of group-to-group dialogues. The Second is bilateral interregionalism dates back to the 1970s.

The early samples of this type of inter-regionalism can be mentioned as in 1974, an EU-Arab dialogue was established, and in 1977, the partnership also with the Mediterranean region was established, etc. (Hardacre & Smith, 2009, p. 169). And the third is transregionalism which became popular in the 1990s (Aggarwal & Morrison, 1998, p. 41).

Trans-regionalism refers to a dialogue process that does not include partner governments in more than two areas, as is the case with regional organizations such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).

This was founded in 1996 as a transregional agreement that included ten East Asian countries as well as the EU's 15 member states (Hänggi, 2000, pp. 5-6). It focuses on development cooperation not just in terms of economics, but also in matters of politics and cultural issues. The fourth one is hybrid regionalism addressing the relationship between regional groupings and individual states. This includes inter-continental forums, such as the Africa-Europe process, and strategic relationships between the EU and China (Rüland, 2010, p. 1272). With these different formats, interregionalism acts as a political tool for increasing interdependence, mutually intensifying material, and moral resources, and resolving conflicts through cooperation between government and civil society actors (Dosch, 2013, pp. 2-3).

Interregionalism also has a regular and effective role in taking decisions and achieving goals by bringing its members together on a common understanding. This allows a more coordinated environment for the reinforcement of these goals.

For example, the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy aims to provide EU countries with the ability to act effectively to accomplish their foreign policy goals within the framework of a common foreign and security policy. These could be listed as:

- in conformity with the requirements of the United Nations Charter, to safeguard the Organisation's common goals, vital interests, independence, and trustworthiness;
- to prevent conflict and strengthen international security in conformity with the requirements of the United Nations Charter; — to secure the Union's safety in all forms;
- to encourage international cooperation;
- to promote and strengthen democratic legal values, basic human rights, and core principles (Pernice, 1999, pp. 714-715)

Interregionalism has been one of the major instruments of the EU (Söderbaum & Van Langenhove, 2005, p. 250). Interregional ties with other countries are the most well-known European means of contact. The purpose of the EU interregional acts was based on cooperation on economic and political-related issues which triggered other fields. Such as sustainable development, acculturation, acting in line with the global economy, protecting human rights, and so on (Hardacre & Smith, 2009, p. 174).

ASEM, a unique institutional example of EU interregionalism, includes a wide range of industries, including business and investing, governance, culture, technology and science, drug smuggling, environmental protection, and so on (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2000, p. 462). Gilson argues that interregional institutions founded by the EU like ASEM, are intended to safeguard the EU's interests and impose them (Gilson, 2005, p. 314).



## **CHAPTER II**

In this chapter, the EU is defined and empirically examined. Its basis, goals, beliefs, ideals, and distinctiveness are discussed. The study begins with a historical overview of the EU and then elaborates on its foreign policy regarding multilateral dealings.

### **2.1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

At the end of World War II, Europe was in shambles, divided ideologically as nationalism and infrastructure-wise (Gilbert, 2014). Europe was the core battlefield of both world wars, and in 1945 was asking for peace. More specifically, the continent has been destroyed by an intense brand of nationalism, and European unification was viewed as the solution to establishing a no-war region in Europe (Tripathi, 2015, p. 376). In line with Tripathi's view, Dinan (2014) also said that the meaning of European integration became equal to peace and prosperity (Dinan, 2014).

In the late 1940s, France's foreign minister, Robert Schuman, devised a scheme to unite the coal and iron sectors of France, Germany, Italy, and Benelux countries (Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg) under a single European administration (Dinan, 2004, p. 473). Primarily, the Schuman Plan was designed to pace economic development and improve Europe's living standards. The plan aimed to get rid of the post-War troubles in Europe, which were particularly supported by Bonnet.

Bonnet claimed that the Schuman Plan had a good potential to sort out some major problems Western Europe (Bonnet, 1951, p. 96). Fundamentally, the Plan aimed to make sure that there would be no more wars between France and Germany (El-Agraa, 2011, p. 22).

For this aim, the Plan would unite the steel and coal sources of Western Continental Europe under a high authority (Bonnet, 1951, p. 99). Guibernau argued that this high authority would possibly be an organization that is open not only to France and

Germany but to the other relevant countries of Europe. The Schuman Plan was accepted as the first international agreement that all European nations presumed to act on the same level. This is accepted as an important step for European unity (Guibernau, 2011b, p. 307).

The Schuman Plan was a significant effort that resulted in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and sowed the seeds of the Treaty of Rome, the European Economic Community's foundational treaty, in 1951 (Hitchcock, 1998, p. 603).

In 1951, a significant move was made by signing the Treaty of Paris. The ECSC was created by "the Six" states (Italy, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany). The ECSC referred to an official step that was purposed to increase cooperation in Europe (Hudson, 2016, p. 2). As the first supranational institution, the ECSC marked a watershed moment in European history (Thiemeyer, 2013, p. 87). With the Treaty of Paris, the above-mentioned six nations agreed on a high authority which would be a supranational and integrated organization aiming to direct their coal and steel resources.

This act was the first time in European history that European nations transfer a part of their sovereignty to an institution (Toepke, 1981, p. 641). Later, this high authority established a single market for the ECSC that was based on a single market. The members were apprehensive about the idea of moving from their national markets to shared markets. This concern was relying on the claim that these arrangements cannot succeed only if the parties involved relinquish some control over upcoming developments in the formation of the agreements (Vernon, 1953, p. 188).

The success of the ECSC inspired a further initiative for unification in 1952 between the six founders. This initiative was named as the European Defence Community (EDC). However, due to the deficiencies to formulate a consensual platform for the members' foreign and defense policies to function cooperatively, this plan was ended up in failure (Toepke, 1981, p. 642). This deficiency was heavily fueled by France, which refused its army to give its sovereignty to a European army. Therefore, the French rejected the EDC (Ray, 1997, p. 58).

During the 1950s, the developments in Eastern Europe like protests and separations triggered further European unification (Laurent & Hite, 1972, p. 71), which was aggregated with France's ex-colonial problems in Indochina (Ray, 2004, p. 115). These developments led the founders of the ECSC, to focus on European unification firstly in the economic realm.

As a result, the six founding members signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The ECSC, EEC, and EURATOM were the first international bodies to work toward supranational goals (Guibernau, 2011a, p. 309).

The EEC's bodies included the European Commission, the European Assembly, which later became the European Parliament, the Court of Justice, and the Economic and Social Committee (Ray, 2004, p. 116). The initial relations between the EEC and its neighbors were economic in nature, although Europe's periphery has been moving closer to a period of developing tension (Fiott, 2019, p. 124). For example, in the years following independence, Europe's southern neighbors were in upheaval, e.g., The Algeria-Morocco Sand War (1963), Israel-Arab battles over Palestine, Spain's evacuation from Western Sahara in 1975, and military coups in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria are only a few examples. These tensions pushed the EU to focus on stabilization in its periphery (Fiott, 2019, p. 125).

In 1965 the Merger Treaty aimed to unify the Treaty of Rome's institutions. The ECSC, EEC, and EURATOM were combined into the European Community (EC) under this treaty, with a central Council and Commission for all (Laursen, 2012, pp. 77-78). This treaty eased some of the issues such as enacting laws, empowering the EU Parliament, and laying the groundwork for a unified European foreign policy (Burrage, 2016).

By the first enlargement in 1973, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the European Community. In the 1980s, enlargement persisted, with Greece joining in 1981 and Portugal and Spain joining in 1986 (Schildhaus, 1989, p. 550).

The EC began to progress toward the Single European Act in the 1980s (SEA). The goal of the 1985 EC Commission White Paper was to create a zone without internal borders where products, people, services, and capital could circulate freely (Moravcsik, 1991, p. 20).

The Single European Act ratified in 1986 by Germany, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Britain, Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg, Portugal, Denmark, Italy, and Greece (Meriano, 1987, p. 89).

In the 1990s, the EC focused on the single market idea, which aimed to allow smoother trade, increased citizen participation on topics like the environment and safety, and more convenient transit between countries (Briney, 2011, p. 2). There are four significant notions mentioned in the Single Market as products, services, capital, and labor are all free to move around (Breuss, 2002, p. 254).

These economic unification policies were bolstered with the continuing enlargement steps. The enlargement of the EU has been the most crucial move for a more sustainable continent with economic recovery, peace, and stability (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003, p. 42). With the second enlargement in 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU, bringing the total number of members to 15.

Significant schisms in Europe, particularly in Germany and Eastern Europe, began to disappear with the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 served as a catalyst not just for German reunification, but also for European reunification (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 52).

The Treaty of Maastricht, also known as the Treaty on European Union (TEU), was signed on February 7, 1992, and transformed the European Community into a larger federated union of political and financial objectives known as the European Union (EU). This is a significant point and can be accepted as an initiation of an institutional reorganization of the Union (Christiansen et al., 2012, p. 696).

The TEU is supported by three primary pillars: the European Community (EC), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).

Furthermore, there was a supranational feature building on the Single European Act (SEA) and covering socio-economic areas (Dinan, 2004, p. 843).

The treaty's significant points were directly related to a unified monetary policy and currency. The Economic and Monetary Union is the name given to it (EMU). In 2002, the Euro became the European Union's single currency, and it was adopted by 12 countries (Dinan, 2012, p. 844). The Treaty of Maastricht laid out the EMU and Euro and also extended the decision making powers of the European Parliament (Pernice, 2008, p. 349).

Europe was not a politically cohesive continent in the late 1990s. The eastern part was affected by communism for years and the gap in foreign and defense policies of its members hindered such unification.

Also, the gap in the Maastricht Treaty needed to be reorganized in the legislative process and executive appointment (Hix, 2002, p. 259). These led to the Treaty of Amsterdam in June 1997, which took place in 1999. One of the goals of the Treaty was to eliminate all barriers to union (Moravcsik & Nicolaïdis, 1999, pp. 81-82). Another goal was to strengthen European integration in security and defence policy (Bindi, 2010, p. 34).

The Treaty of Amsterdam, according to Hix, strengthened the European Parliament's powers (EP). The Treaty also emphasized four CFSP tools: Principles and Guidelines, which set the tone for the entire political process; Joint Actions, that deal with specific circumstances, and Shared Positions, which declare a position on a certain problem, are all examples of common strategies (Hix, 2013, p. 6).

The Nice Treaty, signed in 2001, attempted to fill in the holes left by the Amsterdam Treaty (Smith, 2004, p. 233). The Treaty of Nice changed how members of the European institutions voted and how they were represented in the European Parliament. The new numbers of national votes at the European Council were as follows: Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom 29, Spain and Poland 27, Romania 14, the Netherlands 13, Greece, the Czech Republic, Belgium, Hungary, and Portugal 12, Bulgaria, Sweden, and Austria 10, Luxembourg, Latvia, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Estonia

7, Luxembourg, Latvia, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Estonia 4, Malta 3 (Vallecillo, 2018, p. 113). The number of votes was determined per many trends, such as economic importance and state size, while adhering to the unwritten idea of EU balance among Germany and France (Galloway, 2014, p. 672).

With enlargement, the EU continues to support the provisions of these treaties. The greatest enlargement, which took place in 2004, included the Czech Republic, Estonia, the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. As a result of this growth, the number of participant countries has increased to 28.

In December 2007, the members signed the Treaty of Lisbon, which made the EU a prominent actor in climate change, security, and concerns of sustainable development are just a few examples (Craig, 2010, p. 27).

Another important goal of the pact was to establish the EU as a major player in international markets. With the enlargement process and market, the position of the EU in international trade has been expanded (Woolcock, 2010a, pp. 23-24). By 2010, the EU would have become the world's most competitive and quickly evolving knowledge-based economy, suitable for long productivity expansion, good opportunities, and better social harmony, according to the Lisbon Agenda (Conclusions, 2000, p. 8).

Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty separated the CFSP tools into four categories. Initially, there are the EU's strategic goals and interests; secondly, there are common stances; next, there are shared activities; and finally, there are the essential positions and actions' implementation procedures (Mix, 2013, p. 3).

With all these treaties and reorganizations, Taft describes the EU as a structure that correlates to a state, with three parts of government: executive, legislative, and judicial. These parts are the EU's three political institutions: The Council of the European Union, the Parliament, and the Commission (Taft, 1915, p. 601). The European Commission is still the EU's executive branch. The European Parliament is linked with the legislative branch. Finally, the judiciary is comprised of a Supreme Court (Arnold,

1995, p. 21). The EU is based on these institutions and branches. Respectively, they stand for governments, citizens, and European interests.

## **2.2. THE ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE**

The term *acquis* is of French origin. *Acquis* stands for achieved or acquired and *communautaire* is referred to as the community. This word was coined as a result of EU negotiations including Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and the United Kingdom (Miller, 2010).

*Acquis communautaire* includes the cumulative set of European Community laws covering the EU's objectives, and policies - those are all components of the EU's legal framework. The *acquis* is dynamic, evolving with the Community. The *acquis communautaire* requires all Member States to adhere to it. (EurWORK, 2007).

As it is mentioned in the European law doctrine, the *acquis* has consisted of not only legal rules but also court decisions, commendations, and regulations (Tymoshenko, 2021, p. 220).

The *acquis communautaire* texts, commonly referred to as EU institutional-legal writings, are supranational legal documents aiming at bridging socio-cultural divides among EU member states (Bednárová-Gibová, 2016, p. 161).

There is no precise and clear information about the concept of the *acquis communautaire* in the official texts of EU institutions. It can be inferred that the notion of *acquis communautaire* is used by EU institutions as a legal category (Mychka, 2021, p. 198).

The *acquis* is a collection of rights and responsibilities whereby all EU members are required to follow. Whole EU treaties, laws, declarations and resolutions, foreign treaties, and court judgements that make up the supranational EC legal order are all included (Miller, 2010, p. 2). It is divided into 35 different chapters. Grabbe defines the *acquis* set of texts as the basis for the chapters on which the candidate countries have been negotiating with the European Union (Grabbe, 2002, p. 250). The *acquis communautaire*

is specifically used in the EU to put in line with the internal legal cooperation and political order and administer external policy goals (Petrov, 2006, p. 2).

The EU *acquis* consists of two components, internal and external. The internal dimension of the *acquis* forms the basis for the legal order of the EU. The external dimension of the *acquis* is defined as putting third countries wishing to become members of the EU on a common level with the EU Member States (Mushak, 2020, pp. 56-57). Because of its peaceful living considerations, the exterior part's main premise is also to embrace the EU's principles not just in Europe but around the world (Petrov, 2007, p. 24).

The emphasis should be placed on primary law, especially treaties when examining the compatibility of the applicant country's laws with the *acquis* (Kesner-Škreb, 2008, p. 405).

The approval of the rules by member states, as well as the presence of legislative accomplishments, illustrate the EU legal system's distinctiveness and supremacy.

The *acquis communautaire* needs to be shared and implemented by both EU members and EU applicants. The *acquis* arises as a consequence of the EU's global expansion and interactions with third countries (Mychka, 2021, pp. 199-200).

### **2.3. AIMS, PURPOSES, VALUES, AND PRINCIPLES**

The EU has been founded with the goal of putting a stop to battles and preventing future conflicts on the continent. In the EU's online webpage, the Union aims to promote peace, offer freedom and justice all over the world without borders, combat discrimination, urge scientific and technological progress, establish a unified economic and monetary system and be aware of environmental protection. Among these goals, the need and importance of peace cannot be ignored (historyextra., 2020).

For the success of the EU to carry out these major goals, Manners stated that the fact that most people are either unconscious of it, prefer to ignore it, or take peace for granted demonstrates how effective it has been in achieving its fundamental goal. Manner presented the EU's ideas in five spheres in his paper, norms and principles in European



Union Foreign Policy, e.g., economic, social, environmental, conflict, and political. Manner explains these realms:

European economic and social perspectives are usually related to ‘solidarity’, environmental perspectives are relating to ‘sustainable development’, conflict perspectives are relating to ‘sustainable peace’ and ultimately political perspectives are related to ‘cosmopolitical supranational’ (Manners, 2006, p. 177).

In addition, the EU was founded on the concept of human integrity, independence, democratization, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, particularly the rights of minorities. These are the advantages that all Member States have in a society that promotes diversity, non-discrimination, respect, fairness, collaboration, and gender equality as a goal (Masselot, 2007, p. 155). The individually listed values in the Treaty of the EU are significant for the Union’s improvement, continued subsistence, and enlargement (Börzel & Risse, 2004, p. 511).

Nine normative ideals are confirmed in EU legislation and policies: lasting peace, cultural liberty, collaborative democratization, associated human rights, supranational judicial framework, inclusive justice, community cohesion, environmental sustainability, and ultimately good governance. All of these European viewpoints, as well as EU ideals and principles, are critical to EU membership and relations with its members (Raube et al., 2016, pp. 3-5).

## **2.4. EUROPEAN UNION’S UNIQUENESS**

The EU can be defined as unique for several reasons. To begin with the distinction from other international governmental organizations, the EU has supremacy over its members, through law-making powers in particular fields that its members need to accept the supranational level (Abidin et al., 2016, p. 646).

The EU’s international economic role is also quite peculiar. It is one of the most extroverted economies in the world, with the world's biggest market area. The single market is based on a program. EC trade policy impacted access to new markets like goods,

government contracting, and other markets that were previously defined by member state policies, according to the EC (Woolcock, 2010b, p. 3).

Another uniqueness of the EU is its amalgamated structure of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Supranationalism refers to a considerable amount of power that is given to authority over the member states. The EU's supranational entities are the European Parliament and also the Council of the European Union. The EU is today the only supranational organization. Intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, is evident in areas such as taxes, the admission of new nations, and the common security and defence policy. The EU is today the only supranational organization (Thiemeyer, 1998, pp. 6-8). Supranational integration, from the other side, is a key term that refers to the removal of the public veto power. However, in intergovernmental organizations, there is no common authority shared among states. Moreover in intergovernmentalism, decisions are taken by unanimity (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004, p. 138).

European citizenship is another uniqueness. According to Moritz, European citizenship is composed of multiple layers. The first layer refers to a practical meaning. In this layer, individuals are involved in public life. A person who joins as a participant of a country's society is the second definition, which can be phrased as a person who joins as a participant of a country's society. EU citizenship is something special and distinguishes insiders from outsiders. The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, granted citizens of EU member states EU citizenship. The citizens living in the EU do not only have EU citizenship but also their national citizenship (Moritz, 2015, pp. 234-235).

Anti-discrimination rules, the concept of Union Membership, and the right to free movement, according to Wiesner, all play a part in the evolution of EU citizenship. Citizenship in the EU confers benefits, fundamental human rights, and constitutional protections on all citizens, as well as a number of opportunities (Wiesner, 2014, pp. 90-91).

The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU states that the EU citizens have the following responsibilities:

- free movement and residence in the EU Member States: European Union citizens have the right to freely migrate, settle, and work throughout the EU
- municipal elections: the ability to vote and run for office
- polls to the European Parliament: the ability to vote and to run for a seat in the European Parliament
- protection of diplomats and consuls
- submit a request to the European Parliament but also lodge a complaint with the European Ombudsman
- contact any EU entity and obtain a response in one of the EU's main languages
- under certain situations, you can view papers from the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council of Europe (EUFactSheets, 2021)

The EU's peculiarity is largely due to its Foreign and Security Policy. The EU has reached a unified phase, according to Hix, with the purpose of instituting the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The EU's foreign policy should be sustainable and accepted by both Europeans and non-European. It should fit all people (Hix, 1999, p. 263). In one of her speeches, Emma Bonino European Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs (1998) said,

I'm becoming pretty convinced that a foreign policy based exclusively on interests, whether seen at a national or regional level, seems to be no longer viable. Europe, in my opinion, requires a foreign policy that is strongly rooted in ethics and founded on widely acknowledged values and principles. Transparent political decisions that can be explained to our national legislatures, the public, and the media are what we really need (Bonino, 2003, p. 268).

The political structure of the EU is unique as well. Initially, it was formed as a procedure known as the steel and coal community. Afterwards, it transformed into a consensual union of states, not only economically, and also socially and politically. The

politics of the EU are different from other organizations and states due to their unique nature. The EU does not have a government, but it does have a political history among its member nations.

The EU's judicial system is also unique. Although it does not have a constitution, it has a special constitutional scheme. The EU has gradually become constitutionalized, according to Hix, as a consequence of the interplay among national governments' institutional choices, the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) development of constitutional theories, and regional courts' absorption of these doctrines into domestic constitutions (Hix, 1999, p. 271). Blackley further claims that the EU's judicial system is independent of its legislative, as befits a modern state, and that the European Communities' system of law, as well as its obligatory system of treaty enforcement, is what sets them apart from all prior forms of international cooperation (Blackley, 2011, p. 2).

The Euro, the one European currency, was introduced in 1999, bringing the EU's economic union to a new level. In the beginning, the main goal was to unify all members of the Eurozone, but it ended up differently. Some members could not fulfill the financial and fiscal criteria, listed in the Maastricht Treaty to be a part of this zone. As a result, not all EU members adopted the euro.

The EU aimed to reduce the possibility of future conflicts on the continent by building a shared ideology on economic cooperation, which is another uniqueness. Politicians regarded economic unity as a way of preventing future confrontations, rather than focusing on trying to find a unified philosophy, which was the cause of most of the earlier strife (Jones, 2012, p. 303).

## **2.5. FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

There are various reasons why EU countries' foreign and security affairs should be unified. Refugee movements across international boundaries, US-backed military interventions, and eventual diplomatic settlements were among the significant key catalysts for the formation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which laid the groundwork for the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) that followed several years later (Christiansen et al., 2012, pp. 686-687).

In 1970, the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was founded, and in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty transformed it into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Smith, 2012, p. 2). Its purpose is to urge EU member states to act more in lockstep on foreign policy and security matters. Its main objectives include attaining member-state unanimity and administering EU foreign policy. This initiative is part of EU efforts to gain the status of foreign policymakers, which is almost independent of its members' sovereignties.

The foreign and security policy of the European Union, as stated in an online webpage, is meant to resolve crises and increase international cooperation. Smith similarly argues that this initiative promotes sharing information, formulating mutual understandings, and setting off certain foreign policies based on those understandings. Therefore, there has been a significant level of focus on the CFSP, which caused disputes among the EU members (Smith, 2012, p. 5).

One of these disputes was about EU-US relations. EU is defined as a superpower according to some scholars. James argues that the EU as a superpower can equalize the strength between itself and the US. France accepts this as a new role in the EU. However, the other states view this as an option for the EU to improve collaboration with the USA (James, 2007, p. 1). This evident split reveals a fundamental reason for CFSP's poor progress. Regardless of these national interest divisions, the uniqueness of the EU foreign policy is academically well-discussed.

According to Hadfield, EU foreign policy can be defined as a "one-of-a-kind" cause of mutual behavior in which foreign policy implementations affect all EU nations. It deals with the issues of common interests and conscious strategy. The implicit aim here has been to create a single voice in the EU's foreign affairs, which is not an easy job at all (Hadfield, 2006, p. 656).

To achieve this one voice, there is also an institutional base. According to Smith, the three types of institutionalized EU foreign policy judgment process steps are intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and supranational decision-making procedures. Here intergovernmental presents instrumental rationality. In this rationality the heads of

government amongst themselves, which must be accepted by their domestic constituents (Smith, 2004, pp. 33-34).

EU members have opted to outsource several of their authority to EU institutions in certain policy places in terms of supranational decision-making (Sweet & Sandholtz, 1997, p. 304). Finally, these two processes of the decision-making process are linked within the transgovernmental system. It is established under the European Political Cooperation (EPC). Hadfield underlined this by stating that the European foreign and defense policy is composed of both traditional and unique forms of political practice (Hadfield, 2006, p. 676).

The CFSP has a strong diplomatic base that respects international rules. These rules emerge from international trade, humanitarian aid, and developmental cooperation. From these human security and rights have a particular role.

According to Merlingen, the EU promotes human agency outside of land by promoting key values which include civil, political, and economic aspects. This is the prominent side of European foreign policy (Merlingen, 2007, p. 436).

Yet, there are several intra-Union conflicts regarding the application of the CFSP, which restrain not only the EU governmental decision-makers but also to politicians, lawyers, and journalists. Crum put forward that, this division was mainly because of Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (Crum, 2006, p. 386). One group of proponents believe that the CFSP is just a further adoption of European Political Cooperation (EPC). Indeed, this means what causes this belief to be intergovernmental then CFSP has not the opportunity for any changes, unanimity is required.

Hooijer put forward that in theory, unanimity is required, since all CFSP delegations are equal, and no decision can be forced upon a state. The opposition party, on the other hand, claims that the CFSP will result in changes such as the inclusion of security implications, integration into a unified framework, and the European Commission's explicit power of initiative (Fink-Hooijer, 1994, p. 634).

Nuttall argued the progress of the CFSP and its regulation has a three-layered interactive pattern relying on ideas, institutions, and policies. Regarding the ideas, the

advancement of EPC could create a sharing platform of opinions and attention among European foreign policy élites. This resulted in the formation of consensus, often at the expense of any constructive external action (Nuttall, 1997, p. 5).

North defined institutions as "the rules of the game in a society" and "the humanly conceived limits that govern human interaction" in the institutional layer (North, 1990, p. 5). Both informal regulations such as punishments, norms, traditions, legacies, and ethical guidelines, as well as administrative procedures such as constitutional provisions, laws, and property ownership, make up these systems (Grillitsch, 2015, p. 2100). The policy layer, the third one, is thin and fails to satisfy but can be anticipated to evolve in subsequent years, in spite of the turbulence caused by circumstances in the Gulf and some other place (Smith, 2003, p. 563).

As either a reference to implications on foreign affairs and external relations, EU member states advanced two notions: support for the EU's capabilities as a global player as a fundamental value; and stability and cohesiveness in EU policy-making across time and problem-related domains as secondary values (Thomas, 2005, p. 344).

Smith also conceptualized that there are three certain triggers for the European foreign policy process. These are the quest for legitimacy, member state objectives, and the need for environmental stability. They are also linked to the three dimensions mentioned above: ideas, institutions, and policies. The CFSP is also related to the unanimous consensus between the member states (Smith, 2003, p. 565).

To behave as a global actor with a single voice, the EU's needs is a joint military capability. Techau (2010) identified five structural weaknesses in EU foreign policy in terms of defense capabilities. The cozy post-World War II agreement, the loss of an uniting mechanism, a strategic scope, Europe's demographic fall, and, finally, the NATO-EU impasse.

The comfortable post-World War II bargain focuses on the post-World War II period when Europe was divided and looking for ways for restructuring and get back to its previous strength (Techau, 2010, pp. 73-74). The EU had to create a fresh policy Eastern Europe after the Cold War ended.

The subject of wider and deeper contacts with the EU's new eastern counterparts arose when the EU created its "foreign policy". These relations would be a part of a social and political healing process. In this process as an external player, the US had a prominent role. Europe considered it very positively and welcomed it warmly (Fiott, 2019, p. 118). Yet, the US' contribution to Europe's economic and military re-development put Europe into a vulnerable situation, which increased its dependence on the US. Sometime after the fall of the Soviet Union could this vulnerability and dependence be noticeably lessened. The lack of any substantial European military capability in Europe is by far the most evident direct foreign policy effect of the big postwar deal (Techau, 2010, p. 75). This deficiency in the military capacity negatively affected the EU's potential to be a single voiced foreign policy player. The EU still has no standing "EU army". The union relies on the ad hoc forces of its members (Karlsrud & Reykers, 2020, p. 1532).

The lack of a cohesive mechanism refers to a decision-making system whereby member nations must accept all choices. To put it another way, there should be agreement between member states. The Lisbon Treaty changed it but only slightly. In sectors where the Union does not have exclusive jurisdiction, the Treaty emphasizes that for at least nine Sovereign States can increase coordination among themselves.

After securing the European Parliament's approval, the Council need to provide authorization for its use. Consensus is required in CFSP matters (Hofmann, 2009, p. 494). Regarding the lack of a strategic-scope, it is believed that in the non-existence of strategic scope; the trust for change becomes useless.

This further will only motivate the permanent elites and a neglectful public to assure and confess massive reforms. Europe's demographic decline refers to the demographic crisis in low-birth-rate, which causes problems in various fields. For instance, in the workforce, EU members need immigrants which are perceived as threats during times. Finally, the NATO-EU deadlock heavily influences the performance of these two.

The continuation of this deadlock will hinder the EU's progress in developing the security segment of a common foreign policy (Techau, 2010, pp. 83-84). The EU's relations are mostly economic in nature. One example is the 2004 enlargement, as well



as 10 new countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia). In 2007, the EU extended to include two more nations (Bulgaria and Romania). Entering an eastward enlargement process, the EU faced the possibility of having a long border with its new geographic neighbors, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine, and with Russia (Fiott, 2019, p. 118).

To be more explicit, relations between the EU and Russia are more advanced than those between other post-Soviet republics. A 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) went into effect in 1997 (for 10 years) and has been extended every year thereafter.

The revived economic development in Russia, as well as strong political relationships between Moscow and some EU countries, heightened relations at the start of the new millennium. The partnership is based on four pillars: economics, democracy, defense, and fairness, external security, and research, education, and society (Fiott, 2019, pp. 120-121).

## **2.6. FAILURE IN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DEVELOPMENT**

The EU, as seen by Akdemir, deals with a wide range of issues at the national, international, continental, and worldwide actor levels. Just a few instances are global climate change, the Middle East peace procedure, Africa's political and financial collapse, and refugee and asylum difficulties. He went on to say that the EU does not have the same effectiveness in establishing international ties and conducting diplomatic ties in policy making and implementation as the United States.

Akdemir has two claims for the EU to be successful in establishing foreign relations.

The first of these allegations concern the member states' preference priorities in the EU's diplomatic ties and policies.

The second claim is the speed of institutionalization and integration in the fields of foreign relations and policymaking and their EU implementations

We may assert that the EU's foreign relations, particularly the production and administration of foreign affairs, will continue to be more healthy and effective if the EU and its member countries succeed in such two areas. In this respect, the EU's foreign relations, which progress based on diplomacy, can reach the targets determined at regional and global level.

Not depending on the Union members directing the foreign policy and relations of the Union by considering their own national interests, but more protecting the principles adopted by the EU (Akdemir, 2018, p. 182).

During the Bosnia-Herzegovina War (1992-1995) the EU did not come up with an impressive solution, which proved the ineffectiveness of the CFSP (Thomas, 2012, p. 468). The Iraq War (2003) was another significant issue for the EU which divided Europe. Everts and Keohane stated that in order to achieve unity, steps were taken in early 2002 to address issues of cohesion, efficiency, and legitimacy which might arise with the addition of additional members.

The Convention came to an end in June 2003 with a 'Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe' (Everts & Keohane, 2003, p. 167). Crowe stated the fact that the EU had lately failed the Iraq test threw a pall on the Convention. It appeared absurd for the EU to announce grandiose new efforts – such as a full-fledged constitution – at a time when it was unable to unite on the most pressing strategic problem of the day (Crowe, 2003, p. 538).

The European Community's contacts with Yugoslavia in the early 1990s were centered on a 1980 Cooperation Agreement. The civil war in Yugoslavia was the issue of intense political consultations and diplomatic actions (Fiott, 2019, p. 111). Cameron also said that the Yugoslavia case which lasts during 1991-2001 was a huge reason and that induced an improvement of the CFSP (Cameron, 2007, p. 19). Hill defined this as a challenge which is triggered by the deficiency of 'actorness' (Hill, 1993). Hill, also emphasizes the specifications of an international actor.

Hill defined it as a distinct entity of others and its surroundings, one that is sovereign in the sense that it makes its own decisions in accordance, and one that

possesses specific structural requirements for international action, such as legal personality, diplomatic agencies, and the able to undertake dialogue with third parties (Hill, 1993, p. 309). With the Dayton Peace Agreement, the US involvement brought the conflict to a conclusion.

This continuing faith in the US demonstrated the EU's futility as a single foreign policy actor. According to Fitzpatrick, the Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed in 2007, attempted to bridge the gap between foreign relations and security policy. But the CFSP remained intergovernmental and CSDP needed intergovernmental backup. Furthermore, Fitzpatrick put forward three crises that CFSP and CSDP faced. First, occurred in Libya. Second, in Syria and then in Ukraine. In all three of these cases, the EU had an inactive role. The EU needs a shift from intergovernmental to a full-functioning supranational union in order to apply CFSP for real (Fitzpatrick, 2018, pp. 27-30).

One of the EU's greatest challenges, according to Cameron, is its status as an identifiable political object. Cameron continued on to remark that different member states have different viewpoints on the EU's future, and that the lack of cohesion is also something to be aware of. According to some member states, the EU should have a tight federal structure which means strength institutional form in foreign and security policy. However, others would rather have a loose form that is composed of powerful member states (Cameron, 2012, pp. 33-34).

## **2.7. SPILLOVER EFFECTS**

Neofunctionalism discusses inter-actor relations in the process of interregional integration. These relations are among both state and non-state, e.g., politics and economics or between states and markets (Pimoljinda, 2015).

According to neofunctionalists, integration is generally considered as a process, which does not happen as a result of an agreement or framework. Integration is predicated on the premise that procedures evolve over time, take on unique dynamics, and might result in unfavorable outcomes for national decision-makers. In other words, it has ups and downs. Neofunctionalists aren't just interested in international policy; they're also interested in the domestic policy characteristics of actors within national borders, and

they presume the prevalence of pluralist politics including a wide range of actors (Niemann, 1998, p. 429).

Spillover is considered as internal dynamics that compel members of a specific region to either widen the extent of their mutual responsibilities or increase the level of their mutual engagements, or both (Malamud & Dri, 2013, p. 224). According to neo-functionalism, dynamic change within the institutions is possible through internal spillover. The Commission, the Court, and the European Parliament are the EU's spillover advocates (Pimoljinda, 2015).

Mitrany's definition for spill-over effect is cooperation in one field triggers cooperation in other areas. For instance, political cooperation also affects technical and social relations (Alger, 1977, p. 277). Furthermore, cooperation in one field can lead to collaboration in other regions. This is also another definition for spill-over effect. European integration can be used as an example of how cooperation in one area interacts with partnership in other regions (Ali, 2020, p. 4).

The main argument is that spillover is linked with integration and cooperation. For instance, "functional spillover" means that integration in one domain will only work when there is interaction between other related domains (Niemann, 1998, p. 430).

On the other hand, "political spillover", includes the acts of supranational EC actors, mainly the Commission and the European Court of Justice (Hooghe & Marks, 2008, p. 119). These periods had significant effects on EU foreign policy. The foundation of the EPC to some extent was related to protecting the economic policies of the EC that can be accepted as a kind of functional spillover. Further explained economic policies are linked with functional spillover. On the other hand, in political spillover EC actors take smaller parts in the EPC/CFSP than in other EC policy fields (Smith, 2004, pp. 28-29).

Although the EU is generally accepted as a comprehensive and intense form of regionalism, it has undergone some changes since its foundation. To begin with the Marshall Plan in the 1940's cooperation was significant that caused to the foundation of ECSC in 1952. The Single European Act, aimed to a single market. However, through years not all these goals were achieved. Therefore, European integration can be regarded

as an adaptation process aimed at cohesion new institutions to the political order. European integration is the existence of a legal order that supports the rules and regimes agreed upon within the EU (Pimoljinda, 2015, pp. 28-29).



## **CHAPTER III**

In this chapter, the ASEAN is briefly examined. Its three pillars, uniqueness is empirically elaborated. And then ASEAN's foreign policy, particularly regarding its limitations are presented.

### **3.1. AN OVERVIEW OF ASEAN'S HISTORY**

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded by merger of two Asian organisations, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines (Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines) (MALAPHINDO) (Oja, 2017, p. 11). ASEAN was formed in the post-colonial and Cold War eras to help member states protect their sovereignty.

The ASEAN Declaration, commonly called as the Bangkok Declaration, was signed on August 8, 1967, in Bangkok, Thailand, formally establishing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand were the founding countries. The ASEAN Declaration, often known as the Bangkok Declaration, is proof of the establishment.

Over time, all of Southeast Asia's countries have become part of the ASEAN family, eradicating the distinction among ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries (Tripathi, 2015, p. 379). ASEAN's purpose is to make sure its members' existence by encouraging regional stability and reducing rivalry among them (Narine, 1999, pp. 12-13). One Vision, One Identity, One Community is ASEAN's slogan (Leviter, 2010, p. 29).

The Bangkok Declaration recognizes the uniqueness of ASEAN's foreign ties and expresses hope for the formation of a strong organization for mutual action and regional integration in Southeast Asia. With equalization and cooperation and the organization ought to ensure peace, improve and, welfare in the region (Indorf, 1975, p. 67). It is

clearly stated in the ASEAN Declaration that external relations are the main drivers since ASEAN's establishment.

International and regional issues played a significant role in ASEAN's foundation. Related to the foundation of ASEAN. According to Ginsberg, ASEAN was established in 1967, in the midst of the Vietnam War, to unite Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand against by the danger of communist-led riots (Ginsberg, 2009).

The fundamental targets in the foundation of ASEAN were to develop intergovernmental collaboration in political, economic, security, socio-cultural, and educational fields (Jibran, 2018, p. 28). Yet it is an inter-regional organization and initially focused on the security of its members. Yazid noted that the date before 1965 was struggling with conflict and belligerency, but the date after 1965 was harmonized by peace and collaboration (Yazid, 2013). Before the foundation of ASEAN, almost every nation confronted controversies or disputes with other nations in Southeast Asia, for instance, the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia between the years 1963-1966 (Rabel & Ireland, 1995).

ASEAN leaders agreed on a proclamation on the ASEAN threat to international peace, independence, and impartiality (ZOPFAN) in Kuala Lumpur in November 1971 (Malaysia) (van Veen, 2015, p. 7).

It is explicitly indicated in this declaration that make the initial measures necessary to gain appreciation and acceptance for Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality, free from foreign involvement in any shape or way (Saravanamuttu, 1984, p. 188). In order to defend its national life, the 1971 Peaceful, Independence, and Nondiscrimination Zone (ZOPFAN) Declaration affirmed the right of any state, great or little, to be governed autonomously without tolerating outsider involvement in internal matters. It also stated that independence and integrity is the desired goal for Southeast Asia (Ramcharan, 2000, p. 65).

In order to bolster the major aim of the Bangkok Declaration, the regional peace and stability on 24 February 1976 the ASEAN states signed the ASEAN Concord. The ASEAN Concord aims to create a conducive climate for regional peace and stability by

focusing on economic collaboration, industrial initiatives, and intraregional commerce (Askandar et al., 2002, p. 23) . The power of ASEAN is based on a common identity. Identity is a vital component in the security community, and the "ASEAN approach" is just a "continuous process of identity construction" (Acharya, 2009, p. 28).

The ASEAN Member States' interactions are defined as a set of fundamental principles. The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Collaboration in Southeast Asia (TAC) highlights the value of collaboration and promotes the concept of permanent peace.

Its overarching concepts:

1. Every nations must respect each other's sovereignty, freedom, fairness, self-determination, and national identity
2. Every state has the right to exist independently of foreign intervention, revolution, or force
3. Interference with one another's personal lives is forbidden
4. Using nonviolent methods to settle conflicts or issues
5. The use of force or threats of using violence has been re-united
6. They're able to work together effectively (see [asean.org/tac](http://asean.org/tac), chapter I, article 2)

TAC focused on security issues. Its intention was to develop a zone where ASEAN members wouldn't intervene in each other's domestic issues. It also established a High Council, which consists of a minister out of each state, to resolve disagreements (Cockerham, 2010, pp. 170-171).

ASEAN also went through enlargement. Brunei Darussalam joined ASEAN on January 7, 1984, following by Vietnam on July 28, 1995, the Lao People's Democratic Republic on July 23, 1997, Myanmar on July 23, 1997, finally Cambodia on April 30, 1999. The number of member states has increased to ten as a result of these additions.



The ASEAN Community was formally created on December 31, 2015. Jakarta is home to the ASEAN Secretariat.

ASEAN represents the localization of regionalism in Southeast Asia, and it has been successful in stabilizing and pacifying the region. Yet this is still relative (Saravanamuttu, 1997).

For instance, Asia Pacific alliances are divided between the US and China, which divided ASEAN. Several members, including Singapore, are focused on the first, while others, including Cambodia, are focused on the second. As a result, any chance of achieving an uniform foreign and security policy remains slim (Albert, 2020).

This division brings questions marks on ASEAN's durability and even its very existence. Jones and Smith stated that the absence of assurance by many diplomats and academic admirers on whether ASEAN is an organization, a discourse, or a community of different issues is a mystery, given the organization's durability, evident central importance to stability in the region in Southeast Asia, and methodologically driven transformation of foreign relations throughout East Asia in the twenty-first century (Jones & Smith, 2007, p. 149).

### **3.2. ASEAN'S THREE PILLARS**

The ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), or cornerstones of the ASEAN Community, are by far the most significant realms for ASEAN and its residents (Keng, 2009, p. 15).

ASEAN is the first organization to promote long-term peace among its members by facilitating multilateral discussions, preserving regional identity, and facilitating multilateral discussions. The APSC has worked hard to maintain inter-state relations, especially in the area of human rights protection for all Southeast Asian citizens (Putra, 2019, p. 34). In order to sustain peace and stability, the ASEAN Political-Security Community must share common values, rules, and concepts. Norms are guidelines of conduct based on rights and responsibilities (Kratochwil, 1991). Norms have a

constructive aspect that informs governmental priorities in addition to controlling behavior (Checkel, 1998, p. 333).

The APSC, which includes all ASEAN member states as well as the entire world, works for fair and independent coexistence. In other sense, the APSC strives to build a peaceful and stable zone in which ASEAN member states accept security responsibilities (Weinrich, 2020). This role should include safeguarding citizens from genocide, violations of international law, and criminal acts (Sukma, 2012, p. 136).

With the 9th ASEAN Summit in 2003, the notion of forming the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) began to take shape, and it was formally established in 2015. The ASEAN Economic Community's (AEC) purpose is to create a single market and production zone in Southeast Asia, allowing for more free movement of commodities, services, investments, labor, and capital (WINANTI). Other point raised in the AEC is that attempts are made to reduce economic and social disparities among ASEAN members (Ishikawa, 2021, p. 35).

The AEC covers various fields such as equalization and recognition of standards for member states, competition policies, infrastructure development and narrowing the gap that is necessary for development (Das, 2015). ASEAN leaders want to incorporate the national markets of its member states into an implementation phase by forming a common market. This integration process enables the region's economies to be productive by taking advantage of the differences in the region and to improve the regional economies with innovative developments (Cuyvers et al., 2005).

The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) can be expressed as the most cohesive, restructured and reinvented pillar of the ASEAN Community. ASCC is often seen as the soft side of development or cooperation. ASCC is headed by a council of ministers supported by senior officials. ASEAN Member States have delegated the coordination of the ASCC to ministries with mandate over the human development, social development and cultural sectors (Baviera & Maramis, 2017, p. 182).

The ASCC action plan includes four elements: to create a society that is not indifferent to environmental conditions and other societies; handling the social

consequences of economic integration; ensuring environmental sustainability; and enhancing regional social harmony (Amador et al., 2015).

All four elements mentioned are related to the improvement of living conditions, healthy lifestyle and well-being of individuals of ASEAN. As these elements partly were declared before in 1967 with the Bangkok Declaration, ASCC plan of action can be understood a more concrete step for noticing the aim (Guina, 2015, p. 295). While the ASCC's action plan may appear to target nationality, it operates in a complementary role and is regional. ASCC is mainly based on building a security community. National strength generates regional resilience, or, in ASEAN parlance, national resistance begets regional resilience; in other words, regional stability does not come from a powerful regional organization (Collins, 2007, p. 223).

### **3.3. ASEAN - AIMS, AND PURPOSES**

According to the ASEAN Charter, one of the organization's purposes is to ensure that ASEAN's citizens and allied nations live in that kind of a, democratic, and peaceful society with the entire world (Shimizu, 2011, p. 77). The basic concepts of ASEAN, according to Jibran, are social improvement, economic prosperity, and social evolution among member states.

Aside from this idea, another goal of ASEAN's formation was to thwart the growth of communism in Southeast Asia (Jibran, 2018). In order to overcome the Communist menace, the US gave operating and financial assistance to ASEAN member states. For example, in the 1960s, China meddled in the domestic affairs of Southeast Asian countries, prompting the United States to back the countries against China. Reilly regarded that China-backed up southeast Asia's communist parties throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Reilly, 2013). Therefore, during in the Cold War, ASEAN was established as a part of the Western Bloc with a security purpose. Yet, in time it became more than that.

Apart from security, ASEAN's main purpose was to "broaden" and "deepen" legislative, commercial, and social ties between current and future participants. The term "broadening" refers to an increase in the number of members, whereas "deepening" refers

to the development of a firmer institutional structure that takes on more obligation for improved regional cooperation (Hay, 1996, p. 254).

For ASEAN nations, the principle of cooperation is extremely important. One of the reasons the Southeast Asian countries banded together, according to Lim, was the recognition that while each country has little weight on its own, when they banded together, they would be treated more equally (Lim, 1998, p. 116). The members bolster their power via cooperation.

ASEAN does not bolster the cooperative power with a supranational tendency. ASEAN confessed as a foundation where governments discuss and solve problems, rather than building up a supranational “leviathan” (Dovgalyuk, 2017, p. 5). Instead of being a self-contained entity with power or autonomy, ASEAN is an organisation that includes joint partners with joint resolutions. In other words, instead of being identified by its own existence, ASEAN was defined by sum of its disparate parts (Stubbs, 1992, p. 63).

As it is stated on the official web site the ASEAN Declaration highlighted the aims and goals as:

- 1) Through partnership and peaceful community, for the success of Southeast Asian nations; to promote economic ties, social growth, and cultural development;
- 2) By adhering to the objectives of the United Nations Charter, to foster regional peace and security by defending the law and order and fairness among the region's governments;
- 3) In cultural, economic, technological, scientific, and official realms, to promote effective cooperation and joint decisions on problems of shared interest;
- 4) To provide assistance to one another in various domains. Such as educational, technical, professional, and official training and research centers;
- 5) To collaborate more effectively for the advancement of their agricultural goods, trade expansion, the solution of global stock trade difficulties, the

development of transport and communication facilities, and the improvement of their living standards of the people

- 6) To encourage the study of Southeast Asia;
- 7) To maintain a convenient and useful collaboration with other worldwide and regional organizations that share similar goals and objectives, and to find ways to work together more closely (asean.org).

Although the ASEAN Declaration put forward that many aims, the organization itself is not furious about achieving them all at the same time. As seen from these aims, ASEAN has quite a broad scope of inter-state cooperation.

It does not only focus on states, but individuals as well. Their people's living standards, educational, technical and professional development are also concentrated on. On the one hand, it prioritizes the importance of Asia both economically and politically, on the other it highlights Asia's relationship with the rest of the world. Thus, ASEAN is not only an inter-state and inter-regional but also an intra-state and intra-regional organization without an exclusionary regional identity.

### **3.4. ASEAN'S UNIQUENESS**

ASEAN is made up of many member states, each having its unique culture and political framework. Because of the fragmented structure of Asia-Pacific international affairs, ASEAN strives to bring its members together on an inter-regional platform that promotes economic growth, socioeconomic development, and social heritage with the goal of ensuring peace in the region. ASEAN's fundamental principle and the story of success was, in short, to create a peaceful future for its citizens and living in a mutual region. That story is based on consultation, compromise, and consensus named as the "ASEAN Way" (Anbumozhi, 2017, p. 309).

The ASEAN Way is defined as a phase of actions that ASEAN takes organizational resolutions. Consensus and general agreement are used to make decisions, which take into account a range of cultural and customs (Narine, 2002). In that way, the ASEAN Way might be considered a unique feature of ASEAN (Xuechen, 2018, p. 228).

The four essential aspects of the "ASEAN Way," which are not peculiar to Asia, are non-interference in other countries' internal affairs, quiet negotiation, non-use of force, and consensus-based decision-making. These elements have references in the UN Charter (Katsumata, 2003, p. 116). They also have regional cultural references. The foundations of the ASEAN Way, according to Acharya, are founded on Malay cultural norms that have developed throughout ASEAN (Acharya, 1997).

The ASEAN decision-making procedure is a continuation of the cultural concept of preventing hurting others' feelings and avoiding situations that lead to conflict (Tekunan, 2015, p. 145). This "soft" decision-making process is stated in the ASEAN Charter, as informal and personal (Seah, 2009, p. 199).

Jones and Kivimäki, added a few more details to the ASEAN Way. They defined it as rule in the ASEAN, which is composed of general codes of conduct within the international community, as well as procedural norms like consultation and consensual decision-making, and informality (Jones, 2010, p. 480). It is founded on the ideals of non-interference, territorial integrity, and peaceful conflict settlement (Kivimäki, 2012, p. 406).

Its flexibility and informality make the ASEAN Way quite slow in consensus building on cooperation and conflict resolution (Heng, 2014, p. 3). As a conflict management mechanism, the ASEAN Way asks member states to temporarily set aside controversial issues for some time and agree to resolve them "in due course". Therefore, it serves not as a method of conflict resolution, but as conflict management (Koga, 2010, pp. 81-82).

With this normative behavioral pattern, ASEAN directly does not take a leading role in disputes among the parties, but tries to decrease the hostilities cannot be overlooked. For instance, for the dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia, Indonesia acted as a third party and put the conflict to a calm period in conformity with this pattern (Nishikawa, 2007, p. 48).

The 'ASEAN Way' originated not just because member countries developed an understanding of the norm through time, but because a force originated between them

that attempted to modify the old norm. As a result, the 'ASEAN Way' is divisive, and countries have yet to build a single identity as a result (Yukawa, 2018, p. 312).

The ASEAN Way's core aim has been building norms for promoting cooperation among states (Kang & Sinha, 2010). In this seek for cooperation the ASEAN Way maintains the principle of non-interference (Tekunan, 2015, p. 142).

Some ASEAN observers consider that non-intervention principle to make a significant contribution to the situation of peacekeeping and maintaining tranquility in the region. Siegel said that, with support of this principle the ASEAN Way encourages a peaceful and stable region (Siegel & Arps, 2020, p. 38).

Supranational approaches and extensive intergovernmental forms of involvement are not acceptable under the ASEAN Way (Orcalli, 2017, p. 177). For example not many members appreciate the dominant position of Indonesia since they are not familiar with Indonesian foreign policy behavior (Katsumata, 2003, p. 109).

Some scholars stated that the ASEAN Way requires that the rules and patterns of behavior are informal rather than being strict or dominant (Ewing-Chow & Hsien-Li, 2013).

There are four narratives in the ASEAN Way. The first is multiculturalism which sees ASEAN citizens as insiders of different clusters. Their status is related to their societies and cultural backgrounds. Multiculturalism is linked with identity building. As for Acharya, ASEAN's power is related to a common identity also linked with the public formation process. In the security industry, identity is an important factor, and the "ASEAN Way" is a "constant process of identity creation" (Katsumata, 2003, pp. 115-116). ASEAN's efficiency is based on this common identity.

The second is ASEAN's conceptualization of globalization. This works not well for others but in developed industries and technology transfers which people don't face harmonization issues. The third, one is the libertarian centered narrative. People and nations take responsibility for their hopes, both economically and socially.

The fourth narrative is ASEAN's centrality and unity. The main argument here is to overcome the disputes and difficulties which threaten ASEAN's unity and centrality. ASEAN is not a supranational organization like the EU but a symbol of successful regionalism (Anbumozhi, 2017, p. 314).

The ASEAN's Way provides a normative basis to the understanding and practice of ASEAN Charter and Declaration. It emphasizes the importance of flexibility, informality and cultural sensitivities for decision making. It refuses supranationalism and bolsters a cultural regionalism with a vague understanding of an identity. It emphasizes equality of its members by attempting to eliminate some members' dominance (Goh, 2000, p. 113).

### **3.5. ASEAN FOREIGN POLICY**

ASEAN's foreign policy is broad and multilayered, with the goal of improving connections, dialogue, and cooperation with countries, as well as subregional, continental, and multinational organizations and individuals (Leviter, 2010, p. 194). Nischalke argued that ASEAN's external cohesion and success in critical times is based on internal agreement on the two pillars of ASEAN policy: first, all ASEAN leaders have pursued a common vision of united Southeast Asia; second, all members have shared to determine the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation's objectives (Nischalke, 2000, p. 106).

ASEAN does not have a common foreign, economic, or security policy. This is because of the diversification of member countries' histories and political structures. The absence of mandatory common policies indicates that the interests of the collective. ASEAN is not placed before its members' national interests. Single member nations, on the other hand. It is regarded as a positive condition within the company (todayonline, 2015).



## **CHAPTER IV**

This chapter briefly discusses the literature on EU-ASEAN relations and then ties together the theoretical framework and empirical cases. In this way, the theoretical framework serves a dual purpose. It's firstly used to figure out what the EU and ASEAN imply in terms of liberal institutionalism, and to what extent they are different from each other. And secondly, the theoretical framework is utilized to convey the causes and consequences of imbalance in EU-ASEAN interactions.

### **4.1. THE LITERATURE ON EU-ASEAN RELATIONS**

The literature on the topic has been examining these interregional relations from various angles. Some of these angles can be listed as financial opportunities, inequalities and asymmetries in these relations, unique features of these two organizations, and the impacts/consequences of these efforts to institutionalize these relations.

According to Mattheis and Wunderlich (2017), the connection between EU-ASEAN was mainly motivated by financial concerns. Hwee (2013) accepts the importance of finance and argues that ASEAN-EU relations that widened and expanded since 1980.

Hwee went on to remark that the connection has evolved from a narrow focus on market-based financial opportunities and expanded to the level of politics and security. In line with Hwee, De flers (2010), also puts forward that cooperation was sparked by economic and political issues, but it later shifted to the area of foreign policy.

Regarding the level and style of cooperation, Mahbubani and Sng (2017) argue that the EU established the standards and requirements of collaboration due to its more organized structure. In other words, the disparity in the inner institutionalization levels of these two organizations hindered a substantial institutional development of these relationships. One major reason for this asymmetry, as Fiott (2019) argues is that although the EU was founded before ASEAN, it did not take the former as a model.

This makes, as Moeller (2007) underlines, two organizations unequal partners. On the other hand, Tripathi (2015) argues that even though the fact that the EU and ASEAN are not identical, both organizations' cultures and histories have affected, in due course, each other's growth.

Rabel and Ireland (1995) reiterates that, despite differences in historical backdrop, economic progress, and institutionalization, both organizations have similar basic values, objectives, and goals. Fiott (2019) agrees with that by stating that despite changes in the historical background, economic expansion, and institutionalization, they share the same basic goals, objectives, and concerns.

The other important segment of the literature talks about their peculiarities, which augment their asymmetries. Abidin (2016), argues that for a variety of reasons, the EU can be described as unique. The EU, unlike ASEAN, has dominance over its members, as evidenced by its legislative powers in specific domains, which its members must acknowledge at the supranational level. Wong (2016), furthermore states that during its inter-governmental discussions, the EU speaks with one voice and adopts a common position, whereas ASEAN does not/could not. Mahbubani and Sng (2017) state that, ASEAN, on the other hand, is a non-sovereignty-sharing intergovernmental organization.

Wong (2016), believes that ASEAN, as an organization, appears to emulate or act in the same way as the EU, except that it is supranational. In the EU, integration is profound, leading to the weakening of sovereignty and the recognition of supranational institutions. ASEAN, on the other hand, has an expansive regionalist and intergovernmental structure focused on consensus-based judgment.

The literature focuses more on the EU's peculiarities than ASEAN. For example, Thiemeyer (1998) mentions that, another distinguishing feature of the EU is its mix of supranational and intergovernmental structures. The EU's uniqueness stems in great part from its Foreign and Security Policy. According to Hix (1999), the EU has reached a unified phase with the goal of establishing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Foreign policy in the EU should be long-term and acceptable to both Europeans and non-Europeans. It should be suitable for everyone. Blackley (2011) claims that the EU's political system is

also distinct. It was first developed through a process known as the steel and coal community. Following Woolcock (2010b), the EU had become a voluntary union of states, not only economically, but also socially and politically. The EU's economic significance in the world is also unusual. It has the world's largest market area and is one of the most open economies.

Jones (2012) puts forward that, another distinctive feature of the EU is that it attempted to lessen the likelihood of future conflicts on the continent by establishing a unified ideology on economic cooperation.

Rather than focusing on trying to find a unified philosophy, which was the source of most of the previous strife, politicians saw economic unity as a way of preventing future confrontations.

The literature also talks about the impacts of EU-ASEAN collaboration due to their peculiar features and expectations. Camroux (2008), states with Wong that the EU and ASEAN are also both intergovernmental organizations on one level, but ASEAN is principally an intergovernmental organization whereas the EU is a supranational institution on a different scale.

In another work Wong (2011) further claims that the asymmetries between the EU and ASEAN are decreasing as Asia-importance Pacific in global politics grows, but the latter has still a lot to learn from the former. Wong believes that this learning process is critical for ASEAN. De Flers (2010) argues that, as a result of regional conflicts in Asia, the member countries of both organizations have become closer. At the international level, they both backed each other up against invaders.

According to Koh (2017), the EU and ASEAN may be able to set their differences aside through conversations in order to build future cooperation. These meetings are seen by ASEAN as crucial in examining and deciding on ASEAN-EU relations. Furthermore, the EU-ASEAN relationship focuses on ASEAN rather than the EU. There is no contribution or exchange of opinions on EU issues from the EU side. Smith (2004) argues that another important element of EU-ASEAN relations is spillover. According to Jones

(2016), increasing the amount of cooperation in EU-Asian ties from a spillover perspective in cultural or social spillover domains will improve the level of cooperation.

Astarita (2008) states that the emergence of China is another factor shaping ASEAN-EU ties. Regarding current ASEAN-China ties, Astarita remarked that China's relations with ASEAN countries have improved.

#### **4.2. LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM and the EU**

Liberal Institutionalists consider interregional forums as an important part of international institution-building. For instance, business forums, meetings of parliamentarians take a significant part as regional organizations in interregional dialogues (Rüland, 2010, p. 1276). The EU has been a very significant platform for the liberal institutionalists to examine the effects of institutions regarding political, economic, and even culture and identity-related questions in the last decades.

The first important element of the EU which was quite valuable for liberal institutionalists' perceptions regarding the institutions was the politico-legal structure it organized.

According to Dowding, the EU is described as an international organization with federal state features (Dowding, 2000, p. 126). The formation of the EU might be seen as an example of how governments can form a regional community to address policy issues (Jupille & Caporaso, 1999, p. 430). In other words, the EU is not only an international organization or an institution but also acting as a de-facto state. The politico-legal community it operates binds its members in the sense of state.

Secondly, the EU is the main organization of the European international community, with which it created the European identity in order to bind its members. This identity consists of European values wrapped up in liberal collectivism. Belief and commitment to liberal human rights is the fundamental belief and practice of this community (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 59). Liberal institutionalists use this approach to emphasize the moral structure that the EU has provided to the lives of Europeans by sustaining peace and stability in its territory.

Thirdly, the EU is not any inter-governmental organization in which the members enjoy full-sovereignty. The EU requires the members to share their national sovereignties, at least some technical parts of it, with its decision-making organs. That makes the EU a peculiar case for the liberal institutionalists.

Swisa argued that according to some scholars the EU is not seen as an international organization just as NATO or ASEAN because of its supranational governing body. EU's supranational body abounds with laws, various governing institutions, and with member states that cannot be simply categorized as an international organization , p. 132).

These peculiarities of the EU do not only make it an interesting case for liberal institutionalists but also a very significant symbolic actor which provides a several aspects to compare various institutions with each other. One of those institutions was provably ASEAN (Swisa, 2013, p. 59).

#### **4.3. LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM and ASEAN**

ASEAN's liberal institutionalism was not initiated in the same vein with the EU. The EU initially aimed to have a unified Europe rely on economic, political and cultural cooperation. ASEAN, on the other hand, was founded in 1967 by primarily pro-European regional entities to create a balance of forces in Southeast Asia, which had been harmed by US military supremacy in the Asia-Pacific area (Acharya, 1999, p. 3).

Yet, this balance of power was not in the sense of countering the conventional power structure of the US. It was heavily political and commercial. With this aim, ASEAN targeted to limit regional conflicts, facilitate the management of fragile post-colonial political systems (Batabyal, 2004, p. 352).

ASEAN's regional cooperation facets were also different from the EU's. ASEAN's regionalism has not been as multi-faceted and deep as the EU's, but its flexibility regarding the topics and issues it covers and the members it enclosed drew attention of the liberal institutionalists. ASEAN's regionalism is built on socialization to foster collaboration among stakeholders instead of punishing non-cooperative behavior.

In other words, a voluntary enthusiasm for cooperation is one significant requirement of ASEAN members' regionalist efforts (Narine, 2002).

Asian regionalism has a pluralistic structure. There is not a single dominant organization. ARF, or APEC contributes to the continental regional integration process. APEC, does not have the idea of forming a binding international legal structure (Pimoljinda, 2015).

ASEAN did not draw strict regional boundaries for its operation, unlike the EU. The inaugural ASEAN annual conference in January 1992 with its primary economic counterparts, the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea, demonstrated that the institution's action plans it to work transregionally.

Same flexibility operated regarding the issues of discussions as well. In the following months, in July 1992, the security issues came on the agenda. The transregional element of ASEAN's performance implemented its interactions with other regional actors, one of which was inarguably the EU.

The ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) in 2000, was one of the most noticeable and recent landmarks which brought the EU and twelve ASEAN members together (Lee & Ann, 2005, pp. 104-105). Yet, their relations in the sense of liberal institutionalism have much deeper roots.

#### **4.4. EU-ASEAN RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF ASYMMETRY**

EU-ASEAN relations have almost five decades of an history. The EU started informal relations with ASEAN in 1972. The EC was the first regional dialogue partner of ASEAN in July 1977 (Mattheis & Wunderlich, 2017, p. 726). This partnership later generated the ASEAN-EEC Cooperation Agreement in 1980. The EC-ASEAN cooperation was activated by economic and political issues but later on it split over foreign policy realm as well (de Flers, 2010, p. 3).

According to Hwee since 1980, ASEAN-EU relations have broadened and deepened. Hwee went on to say that the relationship has progressed from a restricted concentrate on market opportunity and growth to a political and security conversation

(Hwee, 2013, p. 9). This has a substantial influence the EU's involvement in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The EU has been a constituent partner of the ARF as of 1994 (Fiott, 2019, p. 142). To begin with, Asia is home to the EU's four most important allies (China, India, Japan, and South Korea), all of whom have varying degrees of political and security ties. Aside from bilateral connections, the EU is a member of a number of multilateral regional cooperation, as well as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), of which it is a founder participant, and the ASEM initiative.

Furthermore, the EU has a legal commitment to help to the area's sovereignty after joining the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in 2012 (Fiott, 2019, p. 140). Yet, this obligation has not produced very concrete results. Reiter argued that, developing a strategic partnership has external and internal requirements, which necessitates several years to build up the trust and confidence between partners.

A strategic partnership also needs to be multidimensional, which looks after the interests of all sides. Bilateral connections, which include political, safety, economy, finance, marketing, and people-to-people contact, are the pioneers of these aspects (Thea, 2019, p. 84).

Supporting regional stability and counter-terrorism; preserving civil rights, liberal values, and social stability throughout domains of EU policy discussion and development cooperation are the six pillars that underpin the EU's engagement with Southeast Asia; and promoting social justice, democratic values, and good governance over all elements of EU policy dialogue and collaboration; Investing in dynamism by developing the Transregional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI); conversation encompassing topics such as migration, human trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, criminal enterprises, and drugs; assisting the growth of less developed countries; and intensifying discourse on specific policy issues (Moeller & Meoller, 2007, pp. 468-469). Due to its clearly better institutionalized structure the EU put down the rules and requirements of the cooperation.

This asymmetry regarding the level of institutionalization slowed down the development of these relations. According to Moeller, ASEAN is not a well-integrated organization. This means that both organizations are unequal partners (Moeller &

Meoller, 2007, p. 477). EU speaks with one voice and with a common position during negotiations but ASEAN does/could not. Because of the ad hoc common positions. EU members share sovereignty with a strict, law-based, and centralized institutionalization.

However, ASEAN is a consensual intergovernmental institution with no sovereignty-sharing element (Mahbubani & Sng, 2017). The EU and ASEAN have quite distinct internal organizations. The EU is composed of different countries with similar economic and political structures. In time this ended up with a common currency and a single market, which is important for EU integration.

The member states have different political systems but are supported by almost the same instruments. Including human rights, democracy, and religion. Yet, ASEAN member states have a visible political diversity. Their economic development levels, cultural perceptions, and religions/faiths also differ. In short, the EU has a much more homogeneous structure than ASEAN (Wong, 2016, pp. 7-9). This causes both organizations to have “regionally specific, systematically different patterns of politics and policies” (Katzenstein, 2007, p. 398).

The EU is generally expressed as the most successful, almost like an iconic liberal institutionalist regional organization. On the other hand, ASEAN is mostly noticed as the second most successful regional organization (Mahbubani & Sng, 2017, p. 136). According to Mahbubani, ASEAN is by far the most efficient and effective organization in Southeast Asia after the European Union (Mahbubani, 2015, p. 136).

Although both EU and ASEAN are regional organizations, the way they understand this concept are different. Although the EU was founded before ASEAN, it is not its model. As a consequence, ASEAN, which has yet to reach a degree of cooperation comparable to the EU, can utilize Europe as an example of regional integration and make effective modifications as needed to build a regional organization suitable for Southeast Asia (Fiott, 2019, p. 97). Political collaboration is also based on regional integration (Rabel & Ireland, 1995, p. 42).

The EU and ASEAN, on either hand, represent two subcontinents that have a comparable history of conflicts and warfare. As Tripathi mentioned, although the EU and



ASEAN are not the same as each other the culture and historical background of both organizations influenced each other's development (Tripathi, 2015, p. 376).

In other words, they have the same underlying ideals, interests, and interests, notwithstanding differences in historical context, economic growth, and institutionalization. After the United States and China, ASEAN member countries are the EU's third-largest key markets, and the EU is the third ASEAN country following China and Japan (Fiott, 2019, p. 140). Regional conflicts in Asia brought these countries closer.

Two of the most noteworthy of these incidents were Vietnam's assault of Cambodia and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. They both supported each other at the international level against invasions (de Flers, 2010, p. 3).

The disputes between both the EU and ASEAN, according to Koh, may be leave aside through discussions in order to foster future cooperation. ASEAN views these meetings as critical in the examination and ruling of ASEAN-EU relations. Furthermore, EU-ASEAN relations concentrates on ASEAN instead of the EU. From the EU side, there is no contribution or exchanging views on its issues (Koh, 2017).

Wong claims that as an organization ASEAN seems to imitate or behave like the EU, except being supranational. Integration is significant in the EU which results in loss of sovereignty and notices supranational institutions. However, ASEAN has an open regionalist and intergovernmental system which has a consensus-based decision making (Wong, 2016). Camroux agreed with Wong that the EU and ASEAN are both intergovernmental organizations solely on a single level, but that ASEAN maintains primarily an intergovernmental organization while the EU is a supranational institution on another (Camroux, 2008, pp. 6-7).

Another important element of EU-ASEAN relations is spillover. The EU's values are defined by Smith in terms of 'functional spillover,' which means that players may have to work for institutionalization in one realm in order to reach objectives in another (Smith, 2004, p. 33).

According to Jones, from a spillover point of view in cultural or social spillover fields will increase the level of cooperation in EU-Asia relations (Jones, 2016, p. 652).

Via spillover, Southeast Asia “ by 2050, the center of gravity of the world economy will have shifted to the Asia Pacific region, with ASEAN emerging as the worlds’ s largest exporter” (Commission, 2011).

With the increasing role of Asia-Pacific in global political economy, the asymmetries between the EU and ASEAN are eroding but the latter is still learning a lot the former. Wong believes that ASEAN's effort to learning from the EU's experiences is important (Wong et al., 2011). The framing of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 is a good example. The ASEAN Charter was developed in Jakarta with the goal of establishing ratified ASEAN rules.

The organization appears to be leaning toward becoming a legal entity similar to the EU (de Flers, 2010). At Germany's invitation, leaders of the Eminent Persons Group and the High-Level Task Force in charge of formulating the ASEAN Charter traveled to Brussels, Berlin, and Nuremberg, and the EU stated that this could make a contribution its expert knowledge in regional cooperation related to the design process of the ASEAN Charter (Koh, 2017, pp. 2-3).

Yet there is quite a long way for ASEAN to cover, and the Charter could not do it by itself. For the most part in ASEAN, worker mobility is restricted. The member states are merely required by the ASEAN Charter to allow the mobility of businesspeople, experts, skills, and services. This is a long-standing and significant distinction among ASEAN and the EU (Koh, 2017, p. 4).

Affirmative expressions related to the foundation of ASEAN and further ASEAN-EU relationship was mentioned in the 40th anniversary of the ASEAN-EU cooperation in 2017, stated as the significant contributions that ASEAN and the EU, as two of the largest and most powerful and successful regional organizations, have made to Southeast Asia's, Europe's, and the world's peace, safety, consistency, shared prosperity, and sustainable growth, including in addressing global challenges and reinforcing regionalism and multilateralism (Thea, 2019, pp. 60-61). The development of transregional relations takes time. As seen here after 40 years there is still a lot to cover in ASEAN-EU relations.

The other element of these transregional affairs is the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process. The EU launched the ASEM process in 1996, with the goal of uniting ASEAN participating countries, China, Japan, and South Korea with EU's 28 member states in a continuous interaction of people-to-people engagements (including educational as well as youth programs), cultural activities, and environmental partnership and global climate discussions (Fiott, 2019, pp. 141-142).

Human rights have been a sensitive subject in interregional partnership since the early 1990s. The ASEAN–EU human rights dialogue, on the other hand, has had a considerable effect on local dynamics by fostering the construction of regional identities, particularly in Southeast Asia. ASEM is a significant initiative in between the EU and ASEAN. The way by which the two regional groupings interact while discussing human rights policy is the key mechanism by which this development occurs (Manea, 2008, p. 373).

Another element influencing ASEAN-EU relations is the rise of China. Regarding current ASEAN and China relations from Astarita stated that China has improved relations with ASEAN countries (Astarita, 2008). Further information about ASEAN's founding purpose was to make sure to remain alive of its members by providing regional stability and wiping out oppositions among them (Narine, 2002).

The ASEAN Secretariat published an information paper in July 2018 that presents a quick summary of ASEAN-EU dialogue relations. Three key turning points are highlighted in the article.

By signing the ASEAN-EEC Cooperation Agreement on March 7, 1980, the EU became ASEAN's Dialogue Partner in 1977. The Nuremberg Declaration, signed in 2007, strengthened the EU-ASEAN alliance.

In 2012, the Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action emphasized the development of political/safety, economic/trade, and sociocultural connections. In addition to these pivotal moments, the EU's involvement in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Post Ministerial Conferences, and the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) are pivotal moments in the political-security realm.

The figures are also significant in the field of trade. According to the ASEAN Trade Database, total way trade between ASEAN and the EU reached US\$ 257.4 billion in 2017. According to this data, the EU is ASEAN's second-largest commercial partner.

There has been a significant overflow in relations recently. According to statistics from the Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI) facility, contributions were provided in a range of areas between September 2011 and September 2017, including academic achievement, research and technology, the ecology, and disaster risk management.

A quick glance at the similarities and differences.

| <b>SIMILARITIES</b>                                                                            | <b>DIFFERENCES</b>                                                                                                                               |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Regional organizations; EU has 27 member states, ASEAN has 10 member states                    | The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a non-governmental organization. The EU, on the other hand, is a supranational institution |
| The aim is to promote peace                                                                    | The euro is the European Union's main means of payment                                                                                           |
| Integration to a common market is desired                                                      | The European Union has a European Court of Justice                                                                                               |
| The topic of civil liberties is extremely important                                            | Various countries in the EU have different numbers of votes. Common foreign and security policy decisions require unanimity                      |
| The majority of the agreements are focused on financial partnerships and free trade agreements | In ASEAN, issues can be resolved by a vote of majority                                                                                           |
|                                                                                                | Economy is interwoven in the EU, but there is a non-interference agenda in ASEAN                                                                 |

Relationships among the EU and Asia over time

1994: EU was a founding partner of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

1996: the process of creating the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)

2001: acceptance of the Strategy for Europe and Asia

2003: the European Security Strategy, which includes a section on Asia, has been adopted

2012 (April): ratification of Amity and Cooperation Treaty (TAC)

2012 (June): The EU's East Asia strategy principles are being adopted.

2013: the visit of HR/VP Ashton to the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) and the ARF congress

2015: the visit of HR/VP Mogherini to SLD and the ARF meeting

2016-2025: In the sector of local transportation, partnerships and the application of best practices are encouraged. with a nod to the Kuala Lumpur Strategic Transportation Plan (ASEAN Transport Strategic Plan)

## CONCLUSION

Liberal Institutionalism recognizes that international institutions and organizations have a significant role in international cooperation and partnership. However, this theoretical approach cannot be separated from the Realist and Liberal traditions, since both of these traditions influenced liberal institutionalism although asymmetrically. Partnership and cooperation both take place in the scope of Realism, particularly in its “Neo” version and Liberalism. Realists say that throughout the event of universal rivalry, conflict, or war, state collaboration can be momentarily terminated.

Liberalism recognizes and supports that sustainable cooperation is possible in any situation. States can prevent competition, conflict and war through the formation of consensus groups or local and international institutions.

The relations among ASEAN and the EU dates back to fit into liberal institutionalist framework, which date back to 1972, even though they were officially ripened in 1977. After the first relations that started with EC, it continued with EC-ASEAN cooperation. EC-ASEAN cooperation, which was preliminary based on economic and political foundations, later split over to fields of foreign policy.

The relations among the EU and Southeast Asia, via ASEAN, has been based on EU's expectations and aims to promote regional stability and fighting against terrorism, develop dialogue incorporating issues, fight against organized crime and drugs, support the development of less prosperous countries. Due to its deepened and effective because institutionalized structure the EU put down the rules and requirements of the cooperation.

The asymmetry between the EU and ASEAN in terms of institutionalization has hampered the growth of interactions between the two institutions. ASEAN is not a well-integrated organization which made ASEAN and the EU unequal partners. As a holistic structure, the EU speaks with one voice and a common position, during negotiations but ASEAN does/could not. Due to the ad hoc common positions. EU members share

sovereignty with a centralized institutionalization. However, ASEAN is a consensual intergovernmental institution with no sovereignty-sharing element.

The EU and ASEAN have quite distinct internal structures. The EU is composed of different countries with similar economic and political outlooks. Yet, ASEAN members have a quite visible political diversity. ASEAN members' economic development levels, cultural perceptions, and religions/faiths also differ. In short, the EU has a much more homogeneous structure than ASEAN.

ASEAN is an inter-governmental organization. The EU is both an intergovernmental and supranational body. In the EU, all the countries do not have the same numbers of votes. In ASEAN, decisions are taken by unanimity voting. In the EU, the economy of the members is interconnected, the EU bodies could interfere to an extent to their member's decisions/actions. Yet, in ASEAN there is a non-interference strategy.

The liberal institutionalism provided an explanatory framework in the sense that even if there have been exposed varieties between the EU and ASEAN, they can still cooperate. And not even in one sphere, but several. Their relations started in the economic realm but their spill over is still continuing in the other realms, including normative, cultural and even political sense. The EU's institutional structure and requirements not only provide an example but also pulls ASEAN to act in a more defined institutional framework.

Even if this does not happen quite regularly, it does not break the relations. Moreover, the normative framework of the EU's institutional structure addresses the liberal elements in ASEAN's, which continue to operate in the background of these interregional institutional interactions and ease instabilities. Moreover, these interactions give the researchers a variety of research questions which could be posed in the future. Some which could be, the future of EU-ASEAN relations in the post-COVID-19 world, the impact of the US-China strain on these relations, and even a comparative discussion of the parameters among the EU's and ASEAN's extra-regional enlargements in the future.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abidin, I. S. Z., Haseeb, M., & Islam, R. (2016). Regional integration of the association of Southeast Asian nations economic community: An analysis of Malaysia-Association of Southeast Asian nations exports. *International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues*, 6(2), 646-652.
- Aceves, W. J. (1997). Institutional theory and international legal scholarship. *Am. UJ Int'l L. & Pol'y*, 12, 227.
- Acharya, A. (1997). Ideas, identity, and institution-building: From the 'ASEAN way' to the 'Asia-Pacific way'? *The Pacific Review*, 10(3), 319-346.
- Acharya, A. (1999). Realism, institutionalism, and the Asian economic crisis. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 1-29.
- Acharya, A. (2009). *Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order*. Routledge.
- Aggarwal, V. K., & Morrison, C. E. (1998). *Asia-Pacific crossroads: regime creation and the future of APEC*. St. Martin's Press New York.
- Akdemir, E. (2018). Avrupa Birliği'nin dış ilişkileri ve politikası: Avrupa Birliği'nin bütünleş (eme) mesi üzerine bir inceleme. *Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi*, 17(2), 181-218.
- Albert, L. M. E. (2020). *What Is ASEAN?* <https://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/what-asean>
- Alger, C. F. (1977). "Foreign" policies of US publics. *International Studies Quarterly*, 21(2), 277-318.
- Ali, A. (2020). CPEC: A TOOL FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM. *Margalla Papers*, 24(2), 1-15.



- Amador, J. S., Ooi, K. B., Das, S. B., & Chong, T. (2015). 57. ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community: An Assessment of its Institutional Prospects. In *The 3rd ASEAN Reader* (pp. 298-302). ISEAS Publishing.
- Anbumozhi, V. (2017). Ensuring ASEAN's sustainable and resilient future. *Building ASEAN community: Political-security and socio-cultural reflections*, 4, 309-323.
- Arnold, R. S. (1995). Money, or the Relations of the Judicial Branch with the Other Two Branches, Legislative and Executive. . *Louis ULJ*, 40, 19.
- asean.org. *What We Do*. <https://asean.org/what-we-do/>
- Askandar, K., Bercowtch, J., & Oishi, M. (2002). The ASEAN way of conflict management: Old patterns and new trends. *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 10(2), 21-42.
- Astarita, C. (2008). China's Role in the Evolution of Southeast Asian Regional Organizations. *China perspectives*, 2008(2008/3), 78-86.
- Baert, F., Scaramagli, T., & Söderbaum, F. (2014). Introduction: Intersecting Interregionalism. In *Intersecting interregionalism* (pp. 1-12). Springer.
- Baldwin, D. A. (1993). *Neoliberalism, neorealism, and world politics*.
- Batabyal, A. (2004). ASEAN's Quest for Security: A Theoretical Explanation. *International Studies*, 41(4), 349-369.
- Baviera, A., & Maramis, L. (2017). *Building ASEAN Community: Political–Security and Socio-cultural Reflections*. Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia.
- Bednárová-Gibová, K. (2016). Acquis communautaire as supranational legal texts and their interlingual reproduction across multilingual Europe. *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 236, 161-167.
- Bindi, F. (2010). *The foreign policy of the European Union: assessing Europe's role in the world*. Brookings Institution Press.

- Blackley, O. (2011). The Unique Character of the European Union. *E-International relations*.
- Bonino, E. (2003). Global and regional powers: Europe's regional interest. In *The Planetary Interest* (pp. 267-272). Routledge.
- Bonnet, H. (1951). The Schuman Plan. *World Affairs*, 114(4), 99-102.
- Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2004). One size fits all! EU policies for the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Workshop on Democracy Promotion,
- Breuss, F. (2002). Benefits and dangers of EU enlargement. *Empirica*, 29(3), 245-274.
- Briney, A. (2011). The European Union: a history and overview. In: About. com Geography, viewed.
- Bull, H. (1977). The balance of power and international order. In *The Anarchical Society* (pp. 97-121). Springer.
- Bull, H., & Watson, A. (1984). The expansion of international society.
- Burrage, M. (2016). *The Eurosceptic's Handbook*. Civitas London.
- Cameron, F. (2007). From EPC to CFSP. In *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy* (pp. 45-61). Routledge.
- Cameron, F. (2012). *An introduction to European foreign policy*. Routledge.
- Camroux, D. (2008). The European Union and ASEAN: Two to Tango. *Notre Europe*, 65.
- Checkel, J. T. (1998). The constructive turn in international relations theory. *World Politics*, 50(2), 324-348.
- Christiansen, T., Duke, S., & Kirchner, E. (2012). Understanding and assessing the Maastricht Treaty. *Journal of European Integration*, 34(7), 685-698.

- Cockerham, G. B. (2010). Regional integration in ASEAN: Institutional design and the ASEAN way. *East Asia*, 27(2), 165-185.
- Collins, A. (2007). Forming a security community: lessons from ASEAN. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 7(2), 203-225. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcl007>
- Commission, E. (2011). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Youth Opportunities Initiative.
- Conclusions, P. (2000). Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March. Retrieved March, 25, 2016.
- Craig, P. (2010). *The Lisbon Treaty: law, politics, and treaty reform*. Oxford University Press.
- Crowe, B. (2003). A Common European Foreign Policy after Iraq? *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 79(3), 533-546. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569361>
- Crum, B. (2006). Parliamentarization of the CFSP through informal institution-making? The fifth European Parliament and the EU High Representative. *Journal of European public policy*, 13(3), 383-401.
- Cuyvers, L., De Lombaerde, P., & Verherstraeten, S. (2005). From AFTA towards an ASEAN economic community... and beyond. *UNU-CRIS Occasional Paper No. O-2005/2, United Nations University-Comparative Regional Integration Studies, Belgium, downloaded from <http://www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/20050310133227>. OP, 202005(20), 2.*
- Das, S. B. (2015). *The ASEAN economic community and beyond*. ISEAS Publishing.
- de Flers, N. A. (2010). EU-ASEAN Relations: The Importance of Values, Norms and Culture. EU Centre, Singapore Working Paper No. 1, June 2010.

- Devitt, R. (2011). Liberal institutionalism: An alternative IR theory or just maintaining the status quo. *E-International Relations Students*, 1.
- Dinan, D. (2004). *Europe recast: a history of European Union* (Vol. 373). Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke.
- Dinan, D. (2012). The arc of institutional reform in post-Maastricht Treaty change. *Journal of European Integration*, 34(7), 843-858.
- Dinan, D. (2014). *Origins and evolution of the European Union*. Oxford University Press.
- Doidge, M. (2007). Joined at the hip: Regionalism and interregionalism. *European integration*, 29(2), 229-248.
- Dosch, J. (2013). Inter-Regionalism Revisited: Theory and Political Reality of Europe-Asia Relations. *MJIR| Malaysian Journal of International Relations*, 1(1), 1-16.
- Dovgalyuk, O. (2017). *The meaning of politics: supranational integration or creative fragmentation?* <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.16398.56648>
- Dowding, K. (2000). Institutional research on the European Union: A critical review. *European Union Politics*, 1(1), 125-144.
- Doyle, M. W. (1986). Liberalism and world politics. *American political science review*, 80(4), 1151-1169.
- Dugger, W. M., & Sherman, H. J. (1994). Comparison of Marxism and institutionalism. *Journal of Economic Issues*, 28(1), 101-127.
- El-Agraa, A. M. (2011). *The European Union: economics and policies*. Cambridge University Press.
- EUFactSheets. (2021). *The citizens of the Union and their rights*. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/145/the-citizens-of-the-union-and-their-rights>

- EurWORK. (2007). *Acquis communautaire*.  
<https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations-dictionary/acquis-communautaire>
- Everts, S., & Keohane, D. (2003). The European Convention and EU foreign policy: Learning from failure. *Survival*, 45(3), 167-186.
- Ewing-Chow, M., & Hsien-Li, T. (2013). The role of the rule of law in ASEAN integration.
- Fink-Hooijer, F. (1994). The common foreign and security policy of the European Union. *Eur. J. Int'l L.*, 5, 173.
- Fiott, D. (2019). *Defence industrial cooperation in the European Union: the state, the firm and Europe*. Routledge.
- Fitzpatrick, G. (2018). International and Comparative Law Quarterly.
- Galloway, D. (2014). Classifying Secrets in the EU. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(3), 668-683.
- Gilbert, M. (2014). *Cold War Europe: The politics of a contested continent*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Gilson, J. (2005). New Interregionalism? The EU and East Asia. *European integration*, 27(3), 307-326.
- Ginsberg, J. (2009). Backgrounder: ASEAN: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations. *The New York Times*, 26.
- Goh, G. (2000). The 'ASEAN Way'. *Pacific Review*, 13(3), 439.
- Grabbe, H. (2002). European Union conditionality and the *acquis communautaire*. *International political science review*, 23(3), 249-268.
- Grevi, G. (2010). Making EU strategic partnerships effective. *Documentos de Trabajo FRIDE*(105), 1.

- Grieco, J. M. (1988). Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. *International organization*, 42(3), 485-507. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787>
- Grillitsch, M. (2015). Institutional layers, connectedness and change: Implications for economic evolution in regions. *European Planning Studies*, 23(10), 2099-2124.
- Guibernau, M. (2011a). The birth of a united Europe: on why the EU has generated a 'non-emotional' identity. *Nations and Nationalism*, 17(2), 302-315.
- Guibernau, M. (2011b). Prospects for a European identity. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 24(1-2), 31-43.
- Guina, C. S. (2015). 56. The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. In *The 3rd ASEAN Reader* (pp. 294-297). ISEAS Publishing.
- Hadfield, A. (2006). Foreign Policy and Dyadic Identities: The Role of the CFSP. *Geopolitics*, 11(4), 676-700.
- Hänggi, H. (2000). Interregionalism: empirical and theoretical perspectives. *St. Gallen, University of St. Gallen*, 1-14.
- Hänggi, H. (2006). Interregionalism as a multifaceted phenomenon: In search of a typology. In *Interregionalism and international relations* (pp. 51-82). Routledge.
- Hänggi, H., Roloff, R., & Rüland, J. (2006). Interregionalism: a new phenomenon in international relations. In *Interregionalism and international relations* (pp. 23-34). Routledge.
- Hardacre, A., & Smith, M. (2009). The EU and the diplomacy of complex interregionalism. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 4(2), 167-188.
- Hay, S. J. (1996). The 1995 ASEAN summit: scaling a higher peak. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 18(3), 254.

- Heng, P. K. (2014). The 'ASEAN Way' and regional security cooperation in the South China Sea. *Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper*(2014/121).
- Hettne, B., & Söderbaum, F. (2000). Theorising the rise of regionness. *New political economy*, 5(3), 457-472.
- Hill, C. (1993). The capability-expectations gap, or conceptualizing Europe's international role. *J. Common Mkt. Stud.*, 31, 305.
- historyextra. (2020). *The big question: has the European Union been a success?* <https://www.historyextra.com/period/20th-century/big-question-has-european-union-eu-been-success-brexit/>
- Hitchcock, W. I. (1998). *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954*. Univ of North Carolina Press.
- Hix, S. (1999). *The political system of the European Union*. Macmillan International Higher Education.
- Hix, S. (2002). Constitutional agenda-setting through discretion in rule interpretation: why the European Parliament won at Amsterdam. *British Journal of Political Science*, 32(2), 259-280.
- Hix, S. (2013). *What's Wrong with the Europe Union and How to Fix it*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Hofmann, H. (2009). Legislation, delegation and implementation under the Treaty of Lisbon: typology meets reality. *European Law Journal*, 15(4), 482-505.
- Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2008). European Union? *West European Politics*, 31(1-2), 108-129. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380701834739>
- Hudson, N. (2016). *The European Coal and Steel Community: The Path Towards European Integration*.

- Hwee, Y. L. (2005). Realism and reactive regionalism: Where is East Asian regionalism heading? *Revista UNISCI*(8), 1-14.
- Hwee, Y. L. (2007). The inter-regional dimension of EU-Asia relations: EU-ASEAN and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Process. In *The European Union and Asia* (pp. 173-191). Brill Rodopi.
- Hwee, Y. L. (2013). How should ASEAN engage the EU?—Reflections on ASEAN's external relations. EU Centre Singapore Working Paper No. 13, April 2013.
- Ikenberry, G. J. (2019). Princeton University Press.  
<https://doi.org/doi:10.1515/9781400880843>
- Ikenberry, G. J., & Ikenberry, G. J. (2019). *After victory*. Princeton University Press.
- Indorf, H. H. (1975). APPENDIX ANNEX I. THE ASEAN DECLARATION. In *ASEAN* (pp. 59-69). ISEAS Publishing.
- Ishikawa, K. (2021). The ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN economic integration. *Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies*, 10(1), 24-41.
- James, S. (2007). Europeanisation as Projection: Understanding the Changing Face of EU Policy Making within the Core Executive. *Political Perspectives*, 2(3), 1-30.
- Jibran, A. (2018). THE PROSPECTS OF ASEAN IN IMPROVING MALAYSIA-INDONESIA RELATIONS: A WAY FORWARD. *JATI-JOURNAL OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES*, 21-37.
- Johnson, T., & Heiss, A. (2018). Liberal institutionalism. In (pp. 123-134).  
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315301914-11>
- Jones, A. (2012). The boundaries of an undertaking in EU Competition Law. *European Competition Journal*, 8(2), 301-331.
- Jones, D. M., & Smith, M. L. (2007). Making process, not progress: ASEAN and the evolving East Asian regional order. *International security*, 32(1), 148-184.



- Jones, L. (2010). ASEAN's unchanged melody? The theory and practice of 'non-interference' in Southeast Asia. *The Pacific Review*, 23(4), 479-502.
- Jones, L. (2016). Explaining the failure of the ASEAN economic community: The primacy of domestic political economy. *The Pacific Review*, 29(5), 647-670.
- Jupille, J., & Caporaso, J. A. (1999). Institutionalism and the European Union: Beyond international relations and comparative politics. *Annual review of political science*, 2(1), 429-444.
- Kang, H., & Sinha, T. (2010). Southeast Asia in the 2010s.
- Kant, I. (2018). 1795. *Zum ewigen Frieden*. De Gruyter.
- Karlsrud, J., & Reykers, Y. (2020). Ad hoc coalitions and institutional exploitation in international security: towards a typology. *Third World Quarterly*, 41(9), 1518-1536.
- Katsumata, H. (2003). Reconstruction of diplomatic norms in Southeast Asia: The case for strict adherence to the "ASEAN Way". *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*, 25(1), 104-121.
- Katzenstein, P. J. (2007). Regionalism reconsidered. *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 7(3), 395-412.
- Keng, C. H. (2009). The Three Pillars of the ASEAN COMMUNITY: Commitment to the Human Rights Process. *5th Roundtable Discussion on Human Rights in ASEAN—Towards an ASEAN Human Rights System: Role of Institutions and Related Activities*, 15-16.
- Keohane, R. O. (1989). *International institutions and state power : essays in international relations theory*. Westview Press.
- Keohane, R. O. (1990). Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research. *International Journal*, 45(4), 731-764. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40202705>
- Keohane, R. O., & Keohane, R. O. (2005). *After hegemony*. Princeton university press.

- Keohane, R. O., & Martin, L. L. (1995). The promise of institutionalist theory. *International security*, 20(1), 39-51.
- Keohane, R. O., & Nye Jr, J. S. (1973). Power and interdependence. *Survival*, 15(4), 158-165.
- Kesner-Škreb, M. (2008). Acquis communautaire. *Financial theory and practice*, 32(3), 405-407.
- Kivimäki, T. (2012). Southeast Asia and conflict prevention. Is ASEAN running out of steam? *The Pacific Review*, 25(4), 403-427.
- Koenig-Archibugi, M. (2004). Explaining government preferences for institutional change in EU foreign and security policy. *International organization*, 58(1), 137-174.
- Koga, K. (2010). The normative power of the “ASEAN Way”. *SJEA*, 80.
- Koh, T. (2017). ASEAN and the EU: Differences and Challenges. *Strait Times*, August.
- Kratochwil, F. V. (1991). *Rules, norms, and decisions: on the conditions of practical and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs*. Cambridge University Press.
- Laurent, E., & Hite, J. (1972). Economic-ecologic linkages and regional growth: A case study. *Land Economics*, 48(1), 70-72.
- Laursen, F. (2012). *Designing the European Union: From Paris to Lisbon*. Springer.
- Lee, H., & Ann, K. (2005). Ping Lim, and M. Azali,(2005)" Income Disparity between Japan and ASEAN– 5 Economies: Converge, Catching Up or Diverge?.". *Economics Bulletin*, 6(13), 1-20.
- Lee, S.-G. (2005). Theoretical Review: Neo-Liberal Institutionalism and the Co-Operative Security Regime in Northeast Asia. *International Area Review*, 8(1), 103-127.

- Leviter, L. (2010). The ASEAN Charter: ASEAN failure or member failure. *NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol.*, 43, 159.
- Lim, R. (1998). The ASEAN Regional Forum: building on sand. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 115-136.
- Lipson, C. (1984). International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs. *World Politics*, 37(1), 1-23. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010304>
- Mahbubani, K. (2015). ASEAN as a living, breathing modern miracle. *Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development*(2), 136-149.
- Mahbubani, K., & Sng, J. (2017). *The ASEAN miracle: A catalyst for peace*. NUS Press.
- Malamud, A., & Dri, C. (2013). Spillover effects and supranational parliaments: The case of MERCOSUR. *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research*, 19(2), 224-238.
- Manea, M.-G. (2008). Human rights and the interregional dialogue between Asia and Europe: ASEAN–EU relations and ASEM. *Pacific Review*, 21(3), 369-396.
- Manners, I. (2006). The European Union as a normative power: a response to Thomas Diez. *Millennium*, 35(1), 167-180.
- Masselot, A. (2007). The state of gender equality law in the European Union. *European Law Journal*, 13(2), 152-168.
- Mattheis, F., & Wunderlich, U. (2017). Regional actorness and interregional relations: ASEAN, the EU and Mercosur. *Journal of European Integration*, 39(6), 723-738.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994). The false promise of international institutions. *International security*, 19(3), 5-49.
- Meriano, C. E. (1987). The single European act past, present and future. *The International Spectator*, 22(2), 89-99.
- Merlingen, M. (2007). Everything Is Dangerous: A Critique of Normative Power Europe'. *Security dialogue*, 38(4), 435-453.

- Miller, V. (2010). The EU's Acquis Communautaire. *Europe*, 13, 2.
- Mix, D. E. (2013). The European Union: foreign and security policy.
- Moeller, J. O., & Meoller, J. O. (2007). ASEAN's relations with the European Union: obstacles and opportunities. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 465-482.
- Moravcsik, A. (1991). Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community. *International organization*, 45(1), 19-56.
- Moravcsik, A. (1999). A new statecraft? Supranational entrepreneurs and international cooperation. *International organization*, 53(2), 267-306.
- Moravcsik, A., & Nicolaïdis, K. (1999). Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: interests, influence, institutions. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37(1), 59-85.
- Moravcsik, A., & Vachudova, M. A. (2003). National interests, state power, and EU enlargement. *East European Politics and Societies*, 17(1), 42-57.
- Moritz, M. D. (2015). The Value of Your Ancestors: Gaining Back-Door Access to the European Union through Birthright Citizenship. *Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L.*, 26, 229.
- Mushak, N. (2020). THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE UNION'S ACQUIS. *European Political and Law Discourse*, 7, 57-65.  
<https://doi.org/10.46340/eppd.2020.7.6.6>
- Mychka, L. (2021). «ACQUIS EU» FOR A CANDIDATE COUNTRY TO JOIN THE EUROPEAN UNION. *MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF UKRAINE NATIONAL AVIATION UNIVERSITY*, 199.
- Narine, S. (1999). ASEAN into the twenty-first century: Problems and prospects. *The Pacific Review*, 12(3), 357-380.
- Narine, S. (2002). *Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

- Niemann, A. (1998). The PHARE programme and the concept of spillover: neofunctionalism in the making. *Journal of European public policy*, 5(3), 428-446.
- Nischalke, T. I. (2000). Insights from ASEAN's Foreign Policy Co-operation: The "ASEAN Way", a Real Spirit or a Phantom? *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 89-112.
- Nishikawa, Y. (2007). The "ASEAN Way" and Asian Regional Security 1. *Politics & Policy*, 35(1), 42-56.
- Norkeyj ius, M. (2014). Regional institutionalism in Southeast Asia. *Societal Studies*, 6, 98-113.
- North, D. C. (1990). *Economic performance* (Vol. 3). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nuruzzaman, M. (2008). Liberal institutionalism and international cooperation after 11 September 2001. *International Studies*, 45(3), 193-213.
- Nuttall, S. (1997). The CFSP at Maastricht: old friend or new enemy?
- Oja, T. (2017). IS THE EU'S SUPRANATIONAL POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK COMPATIBLE AND APPLICABLE ON THE ASEAN ORGANIZATION?
- Orcalli, G. (2017). Market building through regional integration agreements: The EU and the ASEAN way. *Journal of Economic Integration*, 160-192.
- Pernice, I. (1999). Multilevel constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: european Constitution-making revisited? *Common market law review*, 36(4).
- Pernice, I. (2008). The Treaty of Lisbon: multilevel constitutionalism in action. *Colum. J. Eur. L.*, 15, 349.
- Petrov, R. (2006). The Dynamic Nature of the Acquis Communautaire in European Union External Relations.
- Petrov, R. (2007). The External Dimension of the Acquis Communautaire.

- Pimoljinda, T. (2015). Theoretical discussion on regional integration: EU-Asean perspective. *International Journal of Public and Private Management*, 2(2), 15-32.
- Putra, B. A. (2019). ASEAN Political-Security Community: Challenges of establishing regional security in the Southeast Asia. *Journal of International Studies*, 12(1).
- Rabel, R., & Ireland, K. (1995). Regionalism in the Balance: Reflections on ASEAN at Fifty from a Liberal Perspective. *International security*, 20(1), 39-51.
- Ramcharan, R. (2000). ASEAN and non-interference: a principle maintained. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 60-88.
- Raube, K., Burnay, M., & Wouters, J. (2016). By way of introduction: the rule of law as a strategic priority for EU external action-conceptualization and implementation of EU law and policies. In: Springer.
- Ray, J. L. (1997). The democratic path to peace. *Journal of Democracy*, 8(2), 49-64.
- Ray, S. C. (2004). *Data envelopment analysis: theory and techniques for economics and operations research*. Cambridge university press.
- Reilly, J. (2013). China and Japan in Myanmar: Aid, natural resources and influence. *Asian Studies Review*, 37(2), 141-157.
- Reiterer, M. (2006). Interregionalism as a new diplomatic tool: The EU and East Asia. *Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev.*, 11, 223.
- Reus-Smit, C. (1997). The constitutional structure of international society and the nature of fundamental institutions. *International organization*, 51(4), 555-589.
- Rüland, J. (2010). Balancers, multilateral utilities or regional identity builders? International relations and the study of interregionalism. *Journal of European public policy*, 17(8), 1271-1283.
- Rüland, J. (2014). Constructing regionalism domestically: local actors and foreign policymaking in newly democratized Indonesia. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 10(2), 181-201.

- Saravanamuttu, J. (1984). ASEAN Security for the 1980s: The Case for a Revitalized ZOPFAN. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 6(2), 186-196.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/25797805>
- Saravanamuttu, J. (1997). ASEAN in Malaysian foreign policy discourse and practice, 1967–1997. *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 5(1), 35-51.
- Schildhaus, A. (1989). 1992 and the Single European Act. *The International Lawyer*, 549-555.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2001). The community trap: Liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the eastern enlargement of the European Union. *International organization*, 55(1), 47-80.
- Seah, D. (2009). I. The Asean Charter. *International & Comparative Law Quarterly*, 58(1), 197-212.
- Shimizu, K. (2011). the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Economic Community. *Economic Journal of Hokkaido University*, 40, 73-87.
- Siegel, C., & Arps, B. (2020). Losing Face and the ‘ASEAN Way’: Southeast Asian Culture and Regional Peace and Stability.
- Smith, M. (2003). The framing of European foreign and security policy: towards a post-modern policy framework? *Journal of European public policy*, 10(4), 556-575.
- Smith, M. (2004). 20 The European Union as a trade policy actor. *Trade politics*, 289.
- Smith, M. (2012). Still rooted in Maastricht: EU external relations as a ‘third-generation hybrid’. *Journal of European Integration*, 34(7), 699-715.
- Song, W. (2007). Regionalisation, inter-regional cooperation and global governance. *Asia Europe Journal*, 5(1), 67-82.
- Söderbaum, F., & Van Langenhove, L. (2005). Introduction: the EU as a global actor and the role of interregionalism. *European integration*, 27(3), 249-262.

- Stubbs, R. (1992). US-Japanese trade relations: The ASEAN dimension. *The Pacific Review*, 5(1), 60-67. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512749208718955>
- Sukma, R. (2012). The ASEAN political and security community (APSC): opportunities and constraints for the R2P in Southeast Asia. *The Pacific Review*, 25(1), 135-152. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2011.632975>
- Sweet, A. S., & Sandholtz, W. (1997). European integration and supranational governance. *Journal of European public policy*, 4(3), 297-317.
- Swisa, M. (2013). Future Stability in the European Union: Realism, Constructivism, and Institutionalism. Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union,
- Taft, W. H. (1915). Boundaries between the Executive the Legislative and the Judicial Branches of the Government. *Yale LJ*, 25, 599.
- Techau, J. (2010). The five structural problems of EU foreign policy. *Security Policies in Asia and Europe*.
- Tekunan, S. (2015). The Asean Way: The Way To Regional Peace? *Jurnal Hubungan Internasional*, 3(2), 142-147.
- Thea, S. (2019). The ASEAN-European Union (EU) Dialogue Relations towards a Strategic Partnership: Rationales and Benefits. *UC Occasional Paper Series*, 3(1).
- Thiemeyer, G. (1998). Supranationalität als Novum in der Geschichte der internationalen Politik der fünfziger Jahre. *Journal of European Integration History*, 4, 5-22.
- Thiemeyer, G. (2013). Economic models in France and Germany and the debates on the Maastricht Treaty. *JEIH Journal of European Integration History*, 19(1), 85-104.
- Thomas, D. C. (2005). The institutional construction of EU foreign policy: CFSP and the International Criminal Court.



- Thomas, D. C. (2012). Still punching below its weight? Coherence and effectiveness in European Union foreign policy. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 50(3), 457-474.
- todayonline. (2015). *Eight challenges ASEAN must overcome*.  
<https://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/eight-challenges-asean-must-overcome>
- Toepke, U. P. (1981). The European Economic Community--A Profile. *Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus.*, 3, 640.
- Tripathi, M. (2015). European Union and ASEAN: a comparison. *International Journal of Research*, 2(1), 376-383.
- Tymoshenko, S. (2021). THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ACQUIS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION'S LEGAL ORDER. *MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF UKRAINE NATIONAL AVIATION UNIVERSITY*, 217.
- Vallecillo, L. (2018). The Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice. *MEST Journal*, 6(1), 105-118.
- van Veen, M. (2015). ASEAN Integration: Future Powerhouse or Toothless Tiger?
- Vernon, R. (1953). The Schuman Plan Sovereign Powers of the European Coal and Steel Community. *American Journal of International Law*, 47(2), 183-202.
- Weinrich, A. R. (2020). The Emerging Regional Citizenship Regime of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 1868103420972415.
- Wiesner, C. (2014). The Europeanization of Citizenship: Conceptual Innovations, Legal Changes, and Development of New Institutional Practices. *Contributions to the History of Concepts*, 9(1), 88-104.
- WINANTI, P. S. TOWARDS AN ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD.

- Wong, E. P., Mistilis, N., & Dwyer, L. (2011). A framework for analyzing intergovernmental collaboration–The case of ASEAN tourism. *Tourism Management*, 32(2), 367-376.
- Wong, R. (2016). R. Wong (2016), “Crisis and Regional integration: Human rights and environmental governance in ASEAN”, in Sabine Saurugger and Fabien Terpan (eds), *Crisis and Institutional Change in Regional Integration* (Routledge). In (pp. 155-172).
- Woolcock, S. (2010a). EU trade and investment policymaking after the Lisbon treaty. *Intereconomics*, 45(1), 22-25.
- Woolcock, S. (2010b). *The Treaty of Lisbon and the European Union as an actor in international trade*.
- Xuechen, I. C. (2018). The role of ASEAN’s identities in reshaping the ASEAN–EU relationship. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 40(2), 222-246.
- Yazid, N. M. (2013). Malaysia-Indonesia Relations before and after 1965: Impact on Bilateral and Regional Stability (Note 1). *J. Pol. & L.*, 6, 150.
- Yukawa, T. (2018). The ASEAN Way as a symbol: an analysis of discourses on the ASEAN Norms. *The Pacific Review*, 31(3), 298-314.

## CURRICULUM VITAE

Halime FIŞKIN

### EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

- **Social Sciences University of Ankara**  
Master's Degree in Peace and Conflict Studies 2018-2022
- **Anadolu University**  
Bachelor of International Relations 2016-2020
- **Uşak University**  
Bachelor of Mathematics 2009-2015