



**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**THE AK PARTY'S IDEOLOGICAL SHIFT: FROM "POST-ISLAMISM" TO
"MUSLIM NATIONALISM"**

**THESIS SUPERVISOR
ASSOC. PROF. DR. MURAT BAYAR**

YUSUF EVIRGEN

**MASTER'S THESIS
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PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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ÖZET

Mevcut Türk siyaseti literatürü, AK Parti'nin ikinci döneminde (2013-) Türkiye'nin otoriter bir döneme girdiğini vurgulamaktadır. Ancak mevcut literatür, AK Parti liderlerinin otoriter dönem öncesi ve sonrasındaki söylemlerine değinmemiştir. Bu tez, AK Parti'nin otoriterleşmesini göstermek için genel seçimlerde AK Parti seçkinlerinin söylemlerine odaklanmakta ve “AK Parti liderlerinin genel seçimlerdeki söylemlerini göz önünde bulundurarak AK Parti'nin otoriterleşmesini görebilir miyiz?”, Bu iki dönemde (2002-2013, 2013-2018) ideolojik bir fark var mı?” sorularını sormaktadır. Bu soruları yanıtlamak için altı genel seçimde AK Parti liderlerinin söylemleri incelenmiştir. Tez, AK Parti'nin genel seçimlerdeki parti liderlerinin söylemlerine bakıldığında AK Parti'nin otoriterleşmesinin görülebileceğini iddia etmektedir. Bu tez, AK Parti'nin ilk döneminde (2002-2013) Türkiye'nin demokratikleşmesinin post-İslamcı ideolojinin bir sonucu olduğunu, ikinci dönemin (2013-2018) ise otoriter dönüşe neden olan Müslüman milliyetçi ideolojinin bir sonucu olduğunu göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Müslüman Milliyetçiliği, Post-İslamcılık, İslamcılık, Demokratikleşme, Otoriterleşme, AK Parti

ABSTRACT

Existing literature on Turkish politics emphasizes that Turkey had an authoritarian turn in the second AK Party term (2013 -). However, existing literature has been silent on discourses of the AK Party's leaders before and after the authoritarian turn. This thesis focuses on discourses of the AK Party's leaders in general elections to examine the AK Party's authoritarian turn and asks "Is there any ideological shift in these two periods and can we follow this shift by considering the discourse of AK Party leaders in general elections (2002-2013, 2013-2018)?" To answer these questions, discourses of the AK Party's leaders are examined in six general elections. Thesis claims the AK Party's authoritarian turn can be seen by considering discourses of party leaders of the AK Party in general elections. This thesis shows that the first period of the AK Party (2002-2013) was a result of post-Islamist ideology that is relevant to Turkey's democratization, the second period (2013-2018) was a result of Muslim nationalist ideology that cause authoritarian turn.

Key Words: Muslim Nationalism, Post-Islamism, Islamism, Democratization, Authoritarianism, the AK Party

ABBREVIATIONS

Critical Discourse Analysis: CDA

European Union: EU

Felicity Party: SP

Justice and Development Party: AK Party

Kurdish Hezbollah: KH

Kurdish Workers' Party: PKK

Nationalist Movement Party: MHP

People's Democratic Party: HDP

Political Discourse Analysis: PDA

Republican People's Party: CHP

Shanghai Cooperation Organization: SCO

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CHAPTER I

1. INTRODUCTION

The global rise of populism and the decline of democracy in the past couple of decades have affected countries from various parts of the world. From Venezuela to Hungary, many countries are affected by populist policies, which can damage democracy in many ways (Jordan Kyle, 2018). At the same time, from Germany to France, European countries are affected by far-right parties, which may damage democracy (Mudde, 2016). Not only far-right parties or populist policies have caused the decline of democracy but also some events as Brexit vote and the Five-star Movement and civil wars in many countries have expedited the number of countries that face the decline of democracy (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). The “Democracy in Crisis” report of Freedom House shows that the world has experienced the most severe crisis of democracy in 2017 (*Democracy in Crisis. Retrieved from Freedom House*, 2018). At the same time, Democracy in Crisis report (2017) shows that Turkey has witnessed the sharpest decline of democracy in the world.

During the first period of the AK Party (2002-2013), the AK Party was seen as an Islamic democratization model for several Middle Eastern countries (Yesiltas & Balci, 2013). After the post-modern coup in 1997, Islamists who aimed to establish an Islamic state divided into two different groups. One of them defended Islamism and its traditional sense, and the other supported peace with modernity and democratic values (Yilmaz, 2008). Notably, the AK Party won decisively in the critical 2002 general election, which also signified the failure of political Islam in Turkey because Islamist Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) got only two percent of total votes. This election has brought a significant turning point to Islamism. After the election, Islamist intellectuals, Islamic movements, and political parties have thought about Islamism again. Then, the AK Party and its supporters no longer expressed their ideology or politics in the name of Islam, but in the name of key concepts of democracy as pluralism, minority rights, human rights, and the rule of law (Dağı 2004). Yalcin Akdogan—one of the significant actor of the AK Party’s first period—conceptualizes the AK Party’s

ideology as “conservative democracy” (Akdoğan, 2003) that shows political leaders of the AK Party did not want to be seen as former Islamist. In the context of the AK Party’s strategy with liberal democratic values, the “Democratic Opening” (Demokratik Açılım) served as a significant case because Democratic Opening is a solution to Turkey’s minority rights related issues. At the same time, Western institutions’ regulations have become practically viable for the AK Party, such as the European Union (EU) and the European Court of Human Rights. In 2004, Turkey and the EU relations reached a peak level at the Copenhagen Summit, employing the AK Party’s enthusiasm for EU membership. In the Copenhagen Summit, the EU decided to begin negotiations for EU membership.

Military tutelage was a significant obstacle to the democratization process of Turkey for the most part of the Republican period since 1923 (Gürsoy, 2013). After the memorandum in 2007, the AK Party wanted to reorganize civil-military relations by using the framework of liberal democracy and EU membership process (Toktas & Kurt, 2010). With the support of the EU, the AK Party pioneered to establish a more civilian state than ever. The Ergenekon trials were represented as an important step for objection to the deep and military based state (Esayan, 2013). These trials also were supported by the EU. The institutional design of judiciary was also a significant obstacle to the democratization of Turkey (Patton, 2007). In 2008, the AK Party faced a closure trial because of the AK Party’s allegedly turning into a focal stage for anti-secular actions. The Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi) did not allow the closure of the AK Party. In 2010, the AK Party wanted to change the 1982 Constitution, which was drafted after the coup by the military. This constitutional amendment package included the regulation of the supreme council of judges and prosecutors. The EU also supported this constitutional amendment package (Alessandri, 2010). To sum up, it can be said that the first period of the AK Party is an example of democratization for many countries in the Middle East region as Tunisia (Cavatorta & Merone, 2015).

Especially after 2013, the AK Party’s policies have been different from the first term (2002-2013). This second, post-Gezi period (2013-) has been mostly associated with Muslim nationalism, motivated by a quest for Muslim domination; protecting Muslim interests

(Yenigun, 2014) that are associated with the decline of democracy in Turkey. This decline in democracy has been examined by some scholars in the context of the AK Party's shift towards authoritarianism (Öniş, 2013; Sarfati, 2017). Several reasons caused the decline of democracy in Turkey. Some scholars support that the decline of democracy has occurred after the constitutional amendment package in 2010 (Özpek & Tanriverdi Yaşar, 2018). Others argued that, in the 2011 election, the AK Party has gained hegemonic power to transform the country through untouchable power (Çınar, 2018). At the same time, the Gezi Park protests are often cited as the source of the AK Party's authoritarian turn (Benhabib, 2013). In fact, the Gezi Park protest is one of the key points in understanding the decline of democracy in Turkey because policies of the AK Party have truly shifted towards authoritarian directions after the Gezi Park protest. Three different dynamics can show policies of the AK Party have shifted after the Gezi Park protest. First, these protests have provoked the long-standing secular-religious cultural divide in society. Second, the Gulen Movement and the AK Party have had significant differences of opinion about the Gezi protest (Taş, 2018). This situation has caused a clash of a strong alliance between two significant Islamist groups, the AK Party and the Gulen movement. Finally, a significant number of Kurdish elites and the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) supported the Gezi Park protest (T24, 2013). After the Gezi Park protest, some divisions (secular-religious, the AK Party-Gulen movements and the AK Party-Kurdish Elites and PKK) have become more apparent in July 2013. It can be said that there is no certain time scale to show decline of democracy, but this study take into consideration Gezi Park protest as a beginning of democratic backsliding in Turkey because the protest shows that the AK Party has lost its public support and they do not see the Gezi Park protest as a democratic demand but as a threat. This thesis defends post-Gezi Park protest (2013-) is the beginning of the authoritarian turn of the AK Party.

On the other hand, Turkish politics literature tries to identify hows and whys of Turkey's slide to authoritarianism. There are too many arguments to explain this sliding. Some analysts argue that the AK Party successfully associated Islamic civil society

organizations¹ and the prospering middle class to the state, “therefore undermining their autonomy and stripping them of their democratic functions” (Sarfati, 2017, p. 404). While some scholars claim the quality of leaders which is the issue of both side governing party and opposition to understand the decline of democracy, others indicate that by winning elections, growing hegemony of the “center” in the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the media cannot bring gap for the periphery (Öniş, 2013).

Domestic factors cannot explain the decline in democracy only. According to the democratization literature, international factors cannot bring democracy alone either (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006). In other words, a mixture of domestic and international factors can provide the democratization process (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006). After the European Council’s acceptance to establish negotiations for Turkey’s EU membership, the AK Party has lost its enthusiasm for membership. Not only domestic context but also international context has brought increasing authoritarianism. Therefore, the rapid decline of the AK Party’s EU membership enthusiasm can be another key explanatory variable in Turkey’s slide to authoritarianism. At the same time, global economic issues also have affected the AK Party and EU relations. Greece has been affected worse in the 2008 global mortgage crisis, and also the EU’s common currency policy brings significant economic issues to the EU. On the other hand, non-Western countries have developed their economies without a democratization process such as China. President Erdoğan mentioned his ambition to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which shows Erdoğan’s disappointment with the EU process and his search for alternative canals to adopt global world order economically. Therefore, this kind of economic disappointment against the EU and the economic success of authoritarian countries can be one significant factor behind the AK Party’s authoritarian turn.

All of these arguments show that there are two different periods in the AK Party era. This study aims to answer, “Is there any ideological shift in these two periods and can we follow this shift by considering the discourse of AK Party leaders in general elections (2002-

¹ Islamic civil society organizations aim “to preserve, sustain, and transfer Islamic identity and beliefs to successive generations” (RICHARD YOUNGS, 2018).

2013, 2013-2018)?” This thesis claims that these two different periods of the AK Party have two different ideological frameworks. The first period (2002-2013) was an example of “post-Islamism” that helps Turkey’s democratization process, and the second period (2013-2018) has been an example of “Muslim nationalism” that can cause the authoritarianism period of the AK Party. This thesis mentions two different Muslim based ideologies because the AK Party is a split party from an Islamist political party, and it includes continuities with Islamist parties. However, Islamism and Islamic thoughts have their own cleavages, such as extremist and moderate Islamists. Therefore, this study also aims to show differences among Islamism related ideologies. This thesis uses the political discourse analysis (PDA) method to show the ideological shift of the AK Party. Especially, discourses of general elections campaigns (2002, 2007, 2011, June 2015, November 2015, and 2018) are examined to help understand this shift.

The thesis proceeds with four chapters. In the first chapter, post-Islamism and Muslim nationalism are defined extensively in theory. These two ideologies, their historical discussion, and their evolution are discussed, and several political parties that have adopted these political ideologies from all over the world are included in the discussion. In the end, this chapter lays forth the main conceptualization and definition of post-Islamism and Muslim nationalism. The second chapter covers theory and methodology and examines the concept of ideology. Defining ideology is significant because Muslim nationalism is accepted as an ideology in this study. This chapter covers the relationship between party ideology and election campaigns, and aims to find an answer to the question: how can election campaigns of parties show the ideological framework of parties? The chapter frames the methodology of the study in detail. In the third chapter, all of the collected sets of data are analyzed in every single general election from 2002 to 2018. This chapter shows the results of the analysis, and it concludes that there is an ideological shift of the AK Party from post-Islamism to Muslim nationalism. The last chapter is a discussion and conclusion. The results and policy implications of this thesis are covered in this chapter.

CHAPTER II

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1.1 Understanding Post-Islamism

Islamism is crucial to understand post-Islamism because post-Islamism can be defined (contextualized) as a sub-set of the Islamism. Although there are significant differences between Islamism and post-Islamism, there are also connections between the two. There is evidence to suggest that post-Islamism is a significant concept for explaining the cleavages of Islamism. Olivier Roy defines Islamism as “the contemporary movement that conceives of Islam as a political ideology” (Roy, 1994). Roy emphasizes that Islamism is an upheaval against modernity, and also it establishes laws and rules based on the Sharia law (Roy, 1994). On the other hand, some scholars claim that there are significant relations between Islamism and the state. Sami Zemni defines Islamism as an ideology “that strives to appropriate the political space through the mobilization of religious (Islamic) resources and modes of social action ranging from the da’wa (predication) to the jihad (violence, terrorism) through which certain social groups manifest their desire to control the state or to overthrow or oppose the state and to install an order that is called Islamic” (Zemni, 2013, p. 136). In Zemni’s definition, it is understood that state is significant to comprehend Islamism.

Meysam Badamchi’s Islamism definition also brings useful information to understand relations between state and Islamism, and he argues that Islamism is an ideology that struggles to establish an Islamic order by appeal to the power of the state (Badamchi, 2017). He emphasizes that Islamists take the state into consideration because the state is the most powerful institution for enforcing good and eradicating evil. Good and evil are determined by Islamist elites to provide an Islamic principle of “*alamru bil maruf vannahyu anil munkar*” that means command right, forbid wrong. These definitions have different arguments about Islamism. However, Islamism can be explained with several significant concepts. It can be said that Islamism aims to establish an Islamic state and/or control that state, and/or design the society by enforcing the Sharia law.

On the other hand, post-Islamism is different from Islamism. The post-Islamist thesis has been advanced by scholars such as Asef Bayat and Olivier Roy since the beginning of

the 1990s. Olivier Roy's book *The Failure of Political Islam* (1994) brings several questions about the problems of political Islam. Roy associated political Islam with Muslim Brotherhood and the broader Ikhwani tradition that failed in two different domains. First, these movements did not get significant vote shares in the elections. Second, Islamist movements did not find a solution for the economy and governance (Roy, 1994). For instance, after the Iranian Islamic Revolution, every single Islamist expects that the Iranian Islamic Republic gives an "Islamic" direction to Islamist movements all over the world. However, Iranian Islamic Republic does not bring an Islamic solution to the problems about governance and economy in its own society and country either.

According to Asef Bayat, after the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Iran faced some issues that originated from Islamism. Because of these issues, Iran has shifted from strict political Islamist ideas to more moderate ideas that helped to maintain the Islamic State (Bayat, 1996b). Bayat names this political shift as Post Islamism in his essay, published in the journal of *Middle East Critique* in 1996 (Bayat, 1996b). At the beginning of his article, Bayat defines Islamism as "a systematic attempt from above to Islamicize society and the economy" (Bayat, 1996b, p. 43). According to Islamists, Islam can provide a solution to social, political, economic, and moral problems. They see Islam as a solution to all human problems in the world. This understanding of Islamists causes a monopolization of truth. It also means there is no space for alternative ideas, thoughts, and activities. Therefore, Bayat sees Islamism as exclusivist and intolerant of pluralism.

In contrast to Islamism, post-Islamism calls for limiting the political role of Islam, and does not assert Islam is a solution to all human problems. Bayat establishes a definition looking at Iran's political shift, and he emphasizes that Iran's situation is no longer seen as Islamism. By looking through Iran, Bayat defines post-Islamism associated with the values of democracy and aspects of modernity. He ends up the definition of post-Islamism with a quotation, "we don't mind destroying mosques in order to build freeways."² This quotation shows that the discourse of the state elites was not seen as an argument of Islamism. However, Bayat does not define post-Islamism with phrases of state elites. He draws a picture

² Stated by an Iranian diplomat abroad, 1995 (Bayat, 1996b).

to understand the shift from Islamism to post-Islamism with three different social phenomena as Teheran Municipality, the Alternative Thought Movement, and Islamic Feminism.

After the Islamic revolution of Iran, the capital city of Tehran has been changed by a new Islamic republic. According to Bayat, Teheran has been changed in the 1990s. Freeways, huge commercial billboards, shopping malls, and city design resemble people European or North American cities, not Iranian cities. At the same time, municipality constructed around 500 new parks that enabled them to bring together in the public sphere, not several social classes but also men and women. It challenged the Islamic Republic of Iran's forced veiling and gender segregation.

This movement is neither anti-Islamic nor secular, but it seeks to reconstruct the means of the religion in the modern age to solve complex problems of humans (Bayat, 1996a). They call to re-interpret reading of the Qur'an, ignoring "true reading" and ulama's reading. Members of the Alternative Thought Movement believe that Islam and democracy are compatible, and they call for the secular democratic state that accepted Islam as a faith. This movement brings alternative ideas against the state elites of Iran. It can be said that the Alternative Thought Movement is the core of the post-Islamist ideas in Iran.

Under the Alternative Thought Movement, Islamic feminist movements have emerged. These alternative Islamic Feminist movements have provided visibility of women in the public sphere. In contrast to the strict ideas of Ulama, Islamic Feminist movements have created alternative ways to understand women's role in Islamic society. Therefore, post-Islamism is at peace with women and women's issues (Bayat, 1996b).

Bayat's arguments are only a beginning for understanding post-Islamism analytically, and a significant number of articles have been published on the subject matter. Scholars show interest in analytically conceptualizing post-Islamism.

2.1.2 Overview of Post-Islamist Literature

Post-Islamism literature is extensive, with a significant amount of articles that help to establish a good framework to understand the phenomenon. This chapter tries to lay out a

framework to emphasize historical landmarks and bring key features of post-Islamism. In this section, the main features of post-Islamism are reviewed.³ Post-Islamism's understanding of pluralism, democracy, Westernization and modernization are elaborated on, in particular.

First of all, one of the key features of post-Islamism is its approach to pluralism and democracy. There is a strong relationship between pluralism and democracy and post-Islamism (Bayat, 2005), which also shows the main difference between Islamism and post-Islamism. While Islamism cares monopoly of religious truth, post-Islamism focuses on pluralism on religious topics. Moreover, their differences are not only on religious topics but also on ethnic minorities. For instance, some Islamist political parties and movements are called Islamo-nationalist (Lauzière, 2005). This is mostly because they have supported hegemonic ethnicity in their own countries. Doing that, they have also moved away from their idea of ummah. Therefore, it can be said that Islamist political parties have some problems with pluralism in the modern society.

Not only pluralism is problematic for Islamist political parties but also democracy as well (Hilmy, 2010). Many post-Islamist political parties and movements have chosen unique pluralist strategies, such as the Lebanese Hizbullah or Al-Wasat Party in Egypt. This strategy shows post-Islamist movements' desire for a compromise between Islam and democracy (Bayat, 2005). Moreover, it shows that these movements' desires to talk about liberty and democracy within an Islamic framework (Cavatorta & Merone, 2015). This compromising also helps countries' democratization process (Yenigün & Duran, 2016). For instance, the AK Party's first period shows post-Islamism's pluralism and democracy understanding. Alewi and Kurdish opening and relation with the democracy of the AK Party could be understood as the proper examples of post-Islamism indicate the main features of post-Islamism.

³ This chapter draws significant points of post-Islamist movements. Examples of post-Islamism chapter give these significant points' details with examples.

Second of all, Westernization and modernism are the other two hot topics of post-Islamism because Islamism has significant problems with them.⁴ Especially, Western ideas constitute a series of problems for Islamism. These ideas are not only relevant to political concepts but also the lifestyle of people. For instance, some Islamists are against new apartment types -one bedroom and one living room, skyscraper- which they think damage Islam's family understanding and lifestyle (Arslan, 2016). Islamism sees modern and Western ideas as negative and problematic on so many accounts. Post-Islamism is different because it has had a positive relationship with modernity and the outcomes of Westernization (Bayat, 2005). In Bayat's words, post-Islamism "wants to marry Islam with individual choice and freedom (albeit at varying degrees), with democracy and modernity, to achieve what some have termed an "alternative modernity" (Bayat, 2013c, p. 8). Post-Islamism also does not accept modernity completely, but it does not have an existential problem with modernity either. It is the only project to establish alternative modernity. Many post-Islamist political parties have not a problem with modernity's outcomes. For instance, the AK Party's urban planning can be another example of post-Islamists' relationship with modernity.

The idea of the West is another hot topic of post-Islamist thesis because Islamists have many arguments against the West and their attitudes from the 18th to 20th centuries. Turkey's Islamist parties have not a good relationship with the west, and they see the west as a Christian association (Gazete, 2019). However, post-Islamist are having a positive relationship with the West. For instance, the AK Party had a good relationship with the EU, and it supported Turkey's EU membership. First period of the AK Party can be seen as pro-West but several scholar argues that AK Party's positive attitude toward the EU membership was a strategic decision to shape public opinion and to appease secular elites in Turkey (Saatçioğlu, 2010).

In conclusion, it can be argued that the distinguished feature of post-Islamism is its good relationship with democracy, modernity, and pluralist ideas. These key features also

⁴ There are different discussions about Islamism and modernity. First ideologues of Islamism supported modernity (Lauzière, 2005) and they have good relationship with modernity. However, this arguments are only relevant first some ideologues of Islamism in the early phase of Islamist ideology.

show differences between post-Islamism and Islamism. The next chapter covers several details of these concepts with case and examples.

2.1.3 Examples of the Post-Islamist Movements

Post-Islamism has brought different arguments to the academic world. Many scholars contribute to the post-Islamism concept. The editor of the *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*, Asef Bayat, some political scientists, and sociologists bring valuable comments on post-Islamism (Bayat, 2013c). This book provides in-depth information about the post-Islamism all over the Muslim majority countries.⁵ Although this book has a comprehensive discussion about the post-Islamism, there are some shortcomings. This book does not include some significant post-Islamist movements in the Middle East, such as the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia. After focusing on the leading examples of post-Islamism, some other cases of post-Islamist movements are examined. This chapter covers the most active and vocal post-Islamist movements, including those in Iran, Morocco, Indonesia, and Tunisia. Turkey is not a subject of this chapter because it is discussed separately in later chapters.

First of all, Asef Bayat's chapter "*The Making of Post-Islamist Iran*" is about the evolution of Islamism to post-Islamism in Iran (Bayat, 2013b). It is known that post-Islamism is conceptualized to look at social movements in Iran. In the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, Iran's main policy was Islamization of society and state. However, the West's modernization process and different social movements have brought some problematic situation to Iran. In other words, Iran's Islamization policies and modernization process have created some dilemmas that led to the construction of new social movements as the Green Movement. According to Bayat, the Green Movement was the main pillar of the post-Islamist movement in Iran because it shook the main moral dynamics of the Islamist state (Bayat, 2013b). Green Movement includes different kinds of people as students, women, youths, and

⁵ This book includes different Muslim majority countries: Iran and Egypt (Bayat), Turkey (Ihsan Dagi and Cihan Tugal), Morocco (Sami Zemni), Indonesia (Noorhaidi Hasan), Lebanon (Joseph Alagha), Pakistan (Humeria Iqtidar), Saudi Arabia (Stephane Lacroix), Sudan (Abdelwahab El-Affendi) and Syria (Thomas Pierret).

religious intellectuals and also state employees and the professional class that bring new ideas to the society and state as gender relations, youths' rights, public rights, and student politics. At the same time, Bayat states: "At the heart of the post-Islamist project lay a blend of republican ideals and religious ethics, with "democracy" as its political missions" (Bayat, 2013b, p. 56). This post-Islamist opening with Green Movement brings a reform (*eslahaat*) idea to Iran. Eslahaat emphasizes the separation of religious affairs from the state and democratization of Iran.

Bayat sees that post-Islamism has had two significant primary sources: post-Islamist women and post-Islamist intellectuals. Firstly, after the Iran Islamic Revolution, women lost some of basic their rights as divorce, child custody, or travel abroad. They have some problems with polygamy and the dress code in the public space. They must wear the hijab, irrespective of faith in the public space. Moreover, the beginning of the war between Iraq and Iran (1980–1988) strangle the debate on women's status in Iran. The role of women in the public sphere was the one of the key debates. In the 1990s, women raised their voice against Islamist state elites. Mainly, an increasing number of women in universities help to establish women's social movements. Some Islamic feminist magazines were published, such as *Farzaneh*, *Zan*, and *Zanan*. These magazines discussed how-to establish a "proper" or "feminist" ideology under the Islamist rule. These magazines provide in-depth information to public and they were strong tool to prevent the state's women's right violations. However, the state authorities did not comply with the women's demands and *Zanan* was banned because of their critics to "religious authorities on hijab and Shari'a." (Bayat, 2013b) Despite all pressures against women, women have taken significant rights from the state.

Secondly, some clerics and religious intellectuals launched a campaign against not only the orthodox interpretations of Islam, but also the state. Mohammad Khatami, the reformist president of Iran and a part of the Green Movement and he argues that "the religious intellectual respects reason and appreciates freedom but perceives the body as more than mere matter and man as greater than mere nature" (Bayat, 2013b, p. 49). On the other hand, some significant intellectuals criticized ideologicalization of religion. Uniquely, Ali Shariati and Morteza Mutahhari's ideas shaped post-Islamist movements in Iran. Ali Shariati gives a

respectable amount of conferences to the students. His books have brought significant public discussion that reshaped Iran's Islamization state politics. In conclusion, activists' women's rights and Islamic intellectuals affect Iran's state politics.

Thirdly, post-Cold war period was a victory of the West that is associated with liberal democracy and individual rights. This victory has affected the Islamist ideological framework in the Iran (Bayat, 2013a). Eastern Europe countries had democratic transition, and this transitions were supported by the United States. This increasing liberal values in the several countries sparked the importance of liberal values for public in Iran. Demands from public and also intellectuals pushed the government of Iran and clerics to re-interpretation of Islam. The role of liberal pressure and political agenda of the post-cold war affected the political situation in Iran and it enabled to more moderate Islamic interpretation and it sparked off the new ideological framework as post-Islamism.

All in all, Bayat draws a frame to explain the shift of Iran towards post-Islamism from Islamism. Bayat's structure includes three different general factors: first, the failure of Islamist project that causes people to rethink Islamism; second, social changes (increasing literacy, urbanization and economic development) that bring different approaches on Islamism; and third, global post-Cold war period that brings liberal pressure to Iran (Bayat, 2013a). At the same time, Khatami's presidential power helped to establish a post-Islamist society because of Khatami's and ministers' post-Islamist ideological framework with a more pluralistic, democratic state.

Morocco constitutes another case of post-Islamism in the Middle East region. Moroccan monarchy has always wanted to control and organize the role of religion in society. Until the beginning of the 1990s, the Moroccan state controlled all the religious fields. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Islamist movement reacted to the King's institutional environment (Zemni, 2013). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moroccan King II Hassan wanted to establish "Democratic Bloc" to solve significant problems in Morocco, and Hassan's son Mohammed IV carried out the Democratic Bloc reform that consists of different political groups, such as Islamists.

All of these changes were seen as an opportunity by Abdellilah Benkirane, who created Jamiyya al-Islamiyya Movement. This Islamist movement wanted to adapt to the Moroccan monarchy's Democratic Bloc. However, King did not allow Abdellilah Benkirane to establish an Islamist political party in 1989 and 1992. After the government refusal of Jamiyya al-Islamiyya as a political party, Benkirane tried to form the party by changing the name, but the government refused the formation of this party again. After that, he realized to enter the political sphere with a new party is impossible. Therefore, he decided to take part in the election in Dr. Khatib's Popular Constitutional and Democratic Movement. After several years, the party name was changed to Partiments de la Justice et du Developpement (PJD). In the 1997 election, the PJD had had a great success, and it got nine seats in the parliament. In the 2002 election, PJD got 42 seats in the parliament. However, PJD did not aim to get power from the King, and so, it can be said that PJD helped to establish "democratic bloc" because PJD represented an alternative ideological framework in the Morocco parliament.

After the Arab Spring, Morocco monarchy has been changed by the King. The demands from protesters were new constitution. King accepted these demands such as election and a new constitution. These reforms aimed to prevent revolution in Morocco. In this term, this revolutionary movement is called as February 20 Movement. This movement includes some different political groups as left-Marxist movements, the movement of the *diplomes chomeurs*, and a group of progressive journalists (Zemni, 2013). However, PJD was against the 20 February Movement because Benkirane's ideas are different from other groups. Benkirane emphasized that monarchy is a key component of Morocco, and if Morocco lost monarchy, he did not know what Morocco would become (Benkirane, 2011). All of these PJD's policies in the Arab Spring era and Benkirane's explanations about the monarchy did not bring a post-Islamist sound in Morocco. However, Zemni mentions that "The PJD is post-Islamist in the sense that it is not so much striving to reestablish the 'original Islamic city' as it is trying to create a social order where justice is guaranteed through a respect for Islamic values that have their genealogy in the sacred texts" (Zemni, 2013, p. 151). However, Zemni's definition is not enough to say that the PJD is a post-Islamist

political party because the PJD is a sidekick to the monarchy, and it brings some issues to establish democratization process in Morocco. Therefore, Zemni's article can be criticized as the PJD's ideological framework cannot be accepted as post-Islamist because reestablishing the original Islamic city is not an adequate argument.

Thirdly, Indonesia is another example of post-Islamism in the Muslim world. Notably, Indonesia's population and its geographical location bring importance to the discussion. At the same time, radical Islam has been a significant issue for Indonesia. However, Indonesia has succeeded in establishing a democracy with a transition from conflict (Yenigün & Duran, 2016). Declining of radical Islam and rising of post-Islamist framework has helped to establish democracy in Indonesia. According to Noorhaidi Hasan, a post-Islamist ideological framework is growing with the rise of the new Muslim middle-class (Hasan, 2013). Their lifestyle and worldview have shaped Islamism in Indonesia. Hence, post-Islamism has been a new trend. This new Muslim (upper) middle class has eased to establish a democratic public sphere in Indonesia (Hasan, 2013).

Changing the conjuncture of Indonesia has affected the ideology of militant Islamist leaders' ideas about the Sharia and Jihad. Some of these militant Islamist leaders have come to emphasize that Sharia must be applied at a personal level (Hasan, 2013). This particular level defends that implementation of Sharia should begin from below. This changing ideology of militant Islamist leaders' ideological framework have helped the democratic consolidation process in Indonesia. Democratic consolidation in post-Suharto's Indonesia has also decreased Islamist movements and leaders' effects on society. At the same time, Hasan mentions that liberal democratic sphere brings some significant NGOs to dilute of radical Islam in Indonesia (Hasan, 2013). For instance, Liberal Islamic Network, founded in 2002, aims to show liberal ideas of Islam and progressive views on Islam.

On the other hand, some political parties represent Islamism in Indonesia, such as the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan). Nowadays, this political party has represented post-Islamism in Indonesia, and it does not see any contradiction between Islam and democracy. Mainly, they defend pluralist democracy with Medina Charter, and this policy brings a 7.4% vote in

the 2004 election. After that, this post-Islamist ideological framework brings an opportunity to be a catch-all party in Indonesia politics.

Tunisia has significant post-Islamist movements, such as the Ennahda Movement, that has made the post-Islamist project possible. Especially after the Arab Spring, Ennahda played a vital role in establishing democracy in Tunisia. In the first election of Tunisia, Ennahda got 37% votes, and it came to power. Moreover, some scholars argue that Ennahda has helped to establish a new pluralist democratic system that respects human rights and civil liberties (Stepan, 2012). However, there are some criticisms to Ennahda by some NGOs of women's rights, secular organizations, and some extreme left parties. These criticisms are mostly about Ennahda's power that can help religious state (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013) because Ennahda's history was relevant to the Salafism.

Ennahda showed its moderation with the 2014 constitution of Tunisia because, with this constitution, Ennahda accepted the liberal democratic state and its rules (Cavatorta & Merone, 2015). At the same time, some other scholars argue that Ennahda's moderation is about the Islamist intellectual Rachid Ghannouchi's leadership because he had already moderated before the Arab springs, and his writings showed this moderation (Allani, 2009; Tamimi, 2001). However, the main problem is that these moderations may not be enough to call Ennahda as post-Islamist. Cavatorta and Merone provide arguments about the Ennahda's post-Islamist situation: "Ghannouchi claimed that giving up on a reference to the Sharia in the constitution does not determine the degree of 'Islamism' of the party because the mission of an Islamist party today is to realize the broader objectives of the Sharia, which are, fundamentally, justice and liberty." (Cavatorta & Merone, 2015, p. 33). Ghannouchi's ideas can bring about Ennahda's post-Islamist tendencies because he gathers up moderation and Islam, democracy and Islam, justice, liberty, and Islam. It can be said that all of these ideas show that Ennahda's claim to be an Islamic party. However, to entitle Ennahda as Islamist party does not prevent ambiguity between Islamism and post-Islamism because many other Salafi organizations have reorganized as political parties and these parties are called as Islamist. Ennahda and these Salafi political parties have a different ideological framework so, a post-Islamist ideological framework can be a correct definition for the Ennahda party

(Cavatorta & Merone, 2015). At the same time, Ennahda's party leaders and members mention their parties that compromise liberal democracy, and it can be an example of the Islamist democratic party in the Middle East as the AK Party in Turkey (Marks, 2017). Hence, it can be said that all of these frameworks show to entitle Ennahda as a post-Islamist party.

Post-Islamism in Turkey

Islamism is discussed for almost a hundred years in Turkey. Especially after the establishment of the first Islamist political party, the National Order Party (MNP) under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan in 1970, Islamism has been the main pillar of Turkish politics. After 1970, Islamist political parties and their political activities have affected Turkish politics in a variety of ways. After these days, a conflict between secular elites and Islamist elites has become evident, and it gave some insights about the future of Turkish politics.

After 1970, secular elites' pressures and Kemalist state's reaction against Islamist political parties has brought party closure cases to the Turkish political arena. The MNP was shutdown by the decision of constitutional court in 1971. This party closure triggered to found The National Salvation Party (Millî Selâmet Partisi, MSP). The MSP achieved a surprising electoral result in the 1973 election, got 11.8 percent of the total vote. After this success, Islamist became a major actor in the Turkish politics because the other political parties needed to MSP to form a coalition government. In this coalition government, the MSP achieved to passing a bill that enable to establish theological high schools (imam-hatip) and many graduates have had strong political power as Islamists in 1990s (the president Recep Tayyip Erdogan). In 1977 election, MSP's vote share was 8.6 percent of total votes and this results was seen as a setback. After the coup in 1980, the MSP was closed by the decision of Kenan Evren. After that closure, Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) was established by Necmettin Erbakan and they got 7.2 percent votes of total votes in 1987 election. In 1991 election, the RP formed a coalition with the ultra-nationalist party of Turkes and they got

16.7 percent votes of total votes. After this election, Islamist had significant power with the help of Imam Hatip schools that graduated many Islamists (Narli, 1999).

The role of Islamist parties in Turkish politics have increased day by day but the secular elites saw Islamist political parties as a threat to secular establishment. In 1997, the one of the most important decision was carried out and after the meeting of the National Security Council on February 28, 1997 Welfare Party was closed by Constitutional Court in 1998. Then, the Virtue Party (FP) was founded by Islamist politicians and FP included several groups as ‘reformists’ (Yenilikçiler) and “traditionalists” (Gelenekçiler) (Yilmaz, 2011). A group of people who called themselves ‘reformists’ (Yenilikçiler) has established a new political party, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi in 2001. After the establishment of the AK Party, the post-Islamism concept is top of Turkish politics and agenda of scholars, and these scholars argue that the ideology of the AK Party is post-Islamism⁶ (Dagi, 2013; García, 2012; Hossain, 2016; Saktanber, 2006; Yilmaz, 2009a). However, at the beginning of the AK Party era, the AK Party’s elites reject the AK Party’s Islamist roots, and they called their ideology as “conservative democracy” (Akdoğan, 2003). This concept of conservative democracy opens a new road in Turkish politics for ‘reformist Islamists’ because this ‘new’ concept can give a change to a catch-all party as Motherland Party (ANAP). On the other hand, after the AK Party’s emphasis on conservative democracy, national and international media channels discussed the AK Party’s ideological framework as such. These discussions focus on the AK Party’s Islamist roots because national and international media did not theorize the AK Party as representative of conservative democracy (Turunc, 2007). Moreover, these media discussions mostly focus on the AK Party’s members because many party leaders had strong ties with Islamist movements. Therefore, at the beginning, there are many different views about the AK Party’s ideological framework. In academia, a considerable number of scholars wrote significant articles that include discussions about the ideological framework of the AK Party. It can be said that these discussions and articles divided into two different parts. One of them defends that the AK Party’s ideology is conservative democracy (Akdoğan, 2003)

⁶ Ihsan Dagi argue that post-Islamist movements and political parties is established with Virtue Party. However, this post-Islamist intraparty opposition movement did not succeed because Islamist elites had significant power in Virtue Party. (Dagi, 2013)

and others emphasize the AK Party's post-Islamist tendencies (Dagi, 2013). In this chapter, scholars' arguments about the relationship between the AK Party and post-Islamism are reviewed.

Post-Islamism is one of the much-debated concepts of Turkish politics at the beginning of the AK Party era. The AK Party's policies about the EU, minority issues, and laicism bring about a discussion about the relationship between the AK Party and post-Islamism. Understanding post-Islamism in Turkey, this question must be answered: Why has Turkish Islamism needed to evolve towards post-Islamism?

Scholars have provided different answers to this question. Bayat's ideas about the birth of post-Islamism are directly relevant to secularism. He emphasizes that although there were significant pressures against Islamism, the AK Party aimed to establish a faithful society in a secular state (Bayat, 2007). Dagi mentions that the secularist pressure on the Islamists encouraged Islamists towards solution-seeking, and this is why Islamists saw post-Islamism as a solution to compromise with secular leaders in Turkey (Dagi, 2013). The 1997 post-modern coup is also essential for understanding the AK Party's post-Islamist transition. Post-modern coup made the Islamist actors think closer to the secular establishment, and also, this coup brought to rethink notions of democracy, the European Union accession process, human rights, and the globalization process (García, 2012). This kind of ideological evolution of Turkish Islamists ended up with a compromise with the secular establishment. In addition to post-modern coup's effects on Islamism, al-Queda's 2001 attack is another triggering factor for the birth of post-Islamism (Cavdar, 2006). This bloody assault bought some criticism to the Islamist movement so, some Islamist movements chose to compromise the secular establishment, such as the AK Party. It can be said that the post-modern coup is one of the significant factors of the birth of post-Islamism, but al-Queda's 9/11 attacks and the growing influence of "Jihadist terrorism" in the world constitutes another significant factor. New 'reformist' Islamists compromising secular elites brings a question that if post-Islamists do not want to establish an Islamic state and society, why do they get involved in politics? This question is answered by Ihsan Dagi, who puts an emphasis on the notion of service to people. He points to the AK Party's slogan, "service to people is equal to service to God" (Dagi,

2013). This discourse of service can be useful to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people (Vicini, 2016). Hence, Islamist roots of party leaders and their political background have lost their significance. Thus, policymaking became possible for post-Islamists in general and the AK Party in particular.

On the other hand, it is not accurate to say that secularists' pressure against Islamists is the only factor to make post-Islamism possible in Turkey. Some other factors affected the birth of post-Islamism. According to Yilmaz et al., many Turkish Muslims religious tendencies are shaped by "the pluralistic urban Ottoman experience and small-town Anatolian traditionalism, and by the contesting currents of cosmopolitan pluralism and rural social conservatism" (Yilmaz, Barton, & Barry, 2017, p. 48). Hence, these people voted for "Muslim Democrats."⁷ Yilmaz's perspective is sociological because his arguments include that Turkish people are relatively closer post-Islamism than Islamism. Especially, Yilmaz's pluralism emphasis is significant because we already mentioned that pluralism is one of the critical concepts of post-Islamism. At the same time, Yilmaz also attaches importance to Islamists' compromising with the secular establishment. Islamists want to accommodate themselves in the secular state (Yilmaz, 2009b). Thus, several factors may affect the Islamism's evolution to post-Islamism as pressure of secularists and sociological structure of Turkey.

The historical background of post-Islamism and why the AK party chooses post-Islamism are mentioned above. However, there is a different question to understand why scholars identify the AK Party's ideology as a post-Islamist? This question is significant to comprehend post-Islamism in Turkey and differences and similarities between conservative democracy and post-Islamism. In literature, there are some different approaches describing the AK Party's post-Islamist tendencies. Firstly, Lijphart claims that party ideology, party program, and leaders' speeches must be examined to understand ideology (Lijphart, 1984). However, to understand the AK Party's ideology, its historical background must also be analyzed in accordance with the historical institutionalism to party politics (Beyme, 1996)

⁷ Yilmaz called the AK Party's elites as Muslim Democrats. However, he also emphasizes that there are no differences between concepts of "Muslim Democrats" and post-Islamists.

because past political party formation affect future political party formations. AK Party's ties with Milli Gorus (National Outlook) tradition is significant (Turunc, 2007) because the AK Party's party program mentions that its ideology is conservative democracy. They reject their former ties with Islamism. Turunc (2007) emphasizes that modernists (the AK Party) were no less religious than traditionalists, but they cooperated with the periphery, particularly women, youth, and unemployed people. Therefore, they were more effective than other Islamist political parties. Moreover, the AK Party accepted traditional values like family, Islamic symbols, and culture. All of these kinds of sounds bring a 'conservative' ideological framework. However, in contrast to supporting family values, Islamic symbols, and culture, they focus on globalization, evolutionary change, and pluralistic world view. Turunc (2007) called this situation as modern conservatism but, at the end of the paper, Turunc emphasizes that: "the democracy in the AKP's conservative democracy perhaps has more real substance than its conservatism" (Turunc, 2007, p. 89) because of the globalization perspective of the AK Party. On the other hand, some arguments are brought forward as a democratic opening and the AK Party's peace talks with Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in 2009 (Turk, 2014). This is not an evolutionary change in Turkish politics. Peace talks were revolutionary situation. Thus, the first era of the AK Party (2002 – 2013) may not be called as conservative. There are some conservative attitudes of the AK Party, but these attitudes did not overlap with modern conservatism.

Post-Islamist political parties do not establish strong ties with the radical interpretation of Islam. In contrast, they emphasize Islam's contributions to civilizations (Hashemi, 2009) as the AK Party. Also, post-Islamist parties emphasize human rights, modernization, gender equality, pluralism, and notions of democracy (Esposito, 1998; Esposito, 2008; Kamali, 2009; Piscatori, 2000). All of these developments of post-Islamist parties bring this idea "point to an emerging trend of democratic politics within the ethical-moral legal codes of Islam" (Hossain, 2016, p. 223), including the AK Party. Moreover, there are some similar arguments about the AK Party's post-Islamist ideology. The AK Party's leaders and its program promoted the EU standards as universal human rights values, freedom, democracy, and free-market principles. While developing these kinds of universal

values, they did not give references to Islam directly or indirectly (Yilmaz et al., 2017). Dagi mentions the AK Party's post-Islamist ideological framework with his justifications as well (Dagi, 2013; Dağı 2004). For Dagi, the ideological framework of former intellectuals of Islamism also has an evolution from Islamism to post-Islamism (Dağı 2004). Their demands are about human rights, democracy, and pluralism. This kind of evolution of former Islamists helped to establish the AK Party's post-Islamist project in Turkey. Therefore, it can be said that Islamists' evolution to post-Islamism is not only about political parties but also about intellectuals, non-governmental organizations, and some Islamic communities as well. For instance, the AK Party does not explain headscarf issue by focusing on Islam and they emphasize the individual rights.

In conclusion, post-Islamism has not a strong historical background in Turkey but, more than the last two decades, Turkey has significant post-Islamist political parties as Virtue Party and AK Party. Beginning with Virtue Party's (VP) reformist Islamists, some of the scholars called VP as post-Islamist (Yilmaz, 2011), and lastly, the AK Party's post-Islamist aspects demonstrate the historical background of post-Islamism. After the 1997 post-modern coup, the Islamists' ideological evolution becomes clear and their role in the Turkish politics have more powerful than Islamist political parties. Thus, the post-Islamist political parties and their impacts on Turkish politics are crucial to analyze recent political developments and main discussion in Turkish politics.

2.1.4 Understanding Muslim Nationalism

In the post-Islamism chapter of the thesis, it emphasized that distinctions between Islamism and post-Islamism were significant and analyzing their strict differences that can help to prevent conceptual ambiguity. This chapter covers the concept of Muslim nationalism, its relation with nationalism, and its differences from Islamism. Muslim nationalism's relations with nationalism and differences between Islamism and Muslim nationalism are substantial because Muslim nationalism includes some features of nationalism and it has some similarities and differences when we compare with Islamism.

A significant amount of articles explain relations between nationalism and religion in nationalism literature. Especially, Brubaker's (2012) framework eases to understand religion

and nationalism relations. Brubaker explains the links between religion and nationalism with four different approaches:

- Religion and nationalism as analogous phenomena
- Religion as a cause or explanation of nationalism
- Religion as imbricated of intertwined with nationalism
- Religious nationalism as a distinctive kind of nationalism

Notably, “religion as imbricated of intertwined with nationalism” and “religious nationalism as a distinctive kind of nationalism” are essential to understand Muslim nationalism. First, religion, as imbricated of intertwined with nationalism, argues that religion supplies myths and symbols that are vital to nations’ discursive representation (Brubaker, 2012). At the same time, Smith gives significant insights about the roles of symbols and myths in nationalism (Smith, 1986). For instance, Turkish political history also shows similarities between conservatism, Islamism, and nationalism (Bora, 2016). Islamism includes some features of nationalism, and also nationalism contains some elements of Islam and Islamism. However, the theoretical level of political ideologies and daily politics’ arguments are entirely different. In other words, Islamism’s theoretical level does not include features of nationalism. If it includes features of nationalism, it is no more Islamism; it is Muslim nationalism (Bilici, 2001). Therefore, differences between Islamism and Muslim nationalism are crucial to the conceptual framework.

Religious nationalism as a distinctive kind of nationalism reveals significant aspects of Muslim nationalism. Religious nationalism is an alternative to secular nationalism (Brubaker, 2012). Notably, the USA, India, Iran, Israel, Palestine, Turkey, Algeria, Egypt, and Pakistan have cases of major political actors with religious nationalism (Brubaker, 2012). At the same time, the role of Islamist movements and ummah understanding of Islam help to construct a religious nationalism. In other words, “Muslim believers—is a kind of nation” (Brubaker, 2012, p. 14). Finally, Muslim nationalism can be seen as religious nationalism.

Looking at the 18th and 19th centuries is significant to understand the differences between Islamism and Muslim nationalism. These differences can provide in-depth

information about why this thesis emphasizes the AK Party (2013-2019) as a part of Muslim nationalism. As an ideology, Islamism has aimed to construct a state with Islamic principles that are compatible with *terakki* (progress), and it can be said that Islam can help the modernization process.⁸ At the same time, ethnicity is not as crucial as an identity in Islamism. In contrast, Muslim nationalism is a kind of mobilization tool for many liberation movements (Aktürk, 2015). These liberation movements use Muslim nationalism for the fight for independence. Therefore, it gives particular importance to Muslim's power and quest for power (Yenigün, 2017) .

Muslim nationalism's main point is strengthening of Muslims' interest in worldwide. For instance, according to Aktürk, Muslim nationalism was an essential tool for mobilizing against British, Greek, or Hindus (Aktürk, 2015). Islamism's main interests do not overlap Muslims' interest because Islamism is an ideology that wants to organize and bring an effective Islamic state into the modern world. In other words, while Islamism provides an opportunity to all people -no matter their language or ethnicity-. Islamism allows to other religious groups, but it does not assess these groups as equally. In contrast, Muslim nationalism focuses on Muslims' interests all over the world and Muslim nationalism is exclusionist than Islamism. Interests of other groups are ignored by Muslim nationalism. Therefore, Muslim nationalism and Islamism become dissimilar based on Muslims' interests.

This fundamental difference between Islamism and Muslim nationalism brings an issue to "the other." These two different ideologies interpret the "other" issue differently in social life. Islamism does not completely accept the other, and it increases cost of being other in the Islamic state. In other words, the other has rights to live in Islamic state but the other does not have equal rights with Muslims. Islamism's approach to the other identity groups is neither inclusive nor exclusionary. Islamism's approach to the other groups is assessed under the Islamic state and Islamists accept the Islam as a solution of all identity groups in the Islamic state (Paşa, 1970). Yenigün argues that the 6th and 7th centuries are crucial because differences between Muslim nationalism and Islamism are apparent in these times (Yenigün,

⁸ There are some discussions about moral principles of Islam and modernization process. These discussions, Islamists argue that Islam's moral principles are compatible with modernization process.

2017). Islamic schools as Damascus and Medina have affected Islamism and Muslim nationalism. According to Yenigün's conceptualizing, while Muslim nationalism can be an example of Damascus schools -pragmatic school-, Islamism can be an example of Medina school (Yenigün, 2017).⁹ Yenigün observes the Damascus school as a rational actor that focuses on the increasing Muslim's benefit while decreasing Muslim's cost. In contrast, Medina school enables to include various identities, and it provides cohabitation with all groups. In Yenigün's conceptualization, Muslims' interest is crucial in Muslim nationalism, and he also asserts the importance of power in Muslim nationalism. All the arguments show that the "other" is one of the key differences between Islamism and Muslim nationalism.

Islamism and Muslim nationalism's assessing ethnicity and sect is another difference. Cohabitation with other groups is possible under the Islamism, but Muslim nationalism's regulation and exclusivist perspective does not allow cohabitation. Exclusiveness of the Muslims in a society is key difference when we consider the other approach of Muslim nationalism and Islamism and Muslim nationalism is more exclusivist than Islamism. For instance, some leaders use Muslims' interest arguments against hegemonic powers, such as Sultan II. Abdul Hamid. According to Yenigün (2017), Abdul Hamid's pan-Islamist policies can be seen as Muslim nationalism because Abdul Hamid's pan-Islamist policies are pragmatic, and they seek a Muslim interest in worldwide. For instance, Abdul Hamid's policies about Indian Muslims are significant because it shows that Abdul Hamid's pan-Islamist policies have similarities with Muslim nationalism. In other words, pan-Islamism was a tool to unify all Muslims in the world. It can be said that this policy was strategic to prevent the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. However, this definition is not enough to understand Abdul Hamid's Muslim nationalist policies because his domestic policies were different from foreign policies. While Abdul Hamid wanted to unify all Muslims in the world, he wanted to create a modern identity based on Hanafiyyah School and Turkish origin (Yılmaz, 2018). This identity dream pressures some religious minority groups, such as Bektashis (Yılmaz, 2018).

⁹ Yenigün mentions that Islamism can be example of Medina school but his Medina model thesis more closer post-Islamism than Islamism.

Moreover, at the end of Sultan's rule, Abdul Hamid identified himself as a Turkish and a Muslim (Karpas, 2001). Several Muslim groups are affected by the Sultan's this kind of policies and also they were affected by the liberation movements in different countries as Pakistan, Algeria and Egypt. Thus, these political developments triggered the ideological evolution from pan-Islamism to Muslim nationalism (Ahmad, 2005). Thus, the "other" is the problem of Muslims and different ethnic groups in Muslim nationalism, while Islamism does not consider ethnicity and sects as a problem in the Ottoman Empire. If we can look at Yenigün's (2017) Muslim nationalism conceptualizing on Damascus school, the problem of the "other" is the same with Abdülhamit's era.¹⁰

There are also some differences between Islamism and Muslim nationalism about moral principles and strategies. According to Yenigün, Muslim nationalism aims to protect Muslim's interests that bring some violations of the moral tenets of Islamic governance. In sequence, Islamists' intellectual traditions protect the ethical principles of Islamic governance. In other words, Muslim nationalism ignores some ethical principles of Islamic governance to protect the state and provide independence for many countries. Therefore, Yenigün emphasizes that Sultan II. Abdülhamit's strategies are one of the examples of Muslim nationalism. At the same time, Yenigün clearly states that Muslim nationalism is a pragmatic ideology that can ignore some ethical principles (Yenigün, 2017). On the other hand, identifying nationalism with religion among Turkish people is also a pragmatic step for the independence movement of Turkey (Zürcher, 1999). Not only independence movements in Turkey, but also some Bosnian independence movements use this tactical instruments. For instance, Bosnian independence movements have sloganized "independence for the Bosnian Muslims," so they have established identity-based ethnicity and identity (Zürcher, 1999). Hence, it can be said that pragmatic tactics of Muslim nationalism bring some problems to Islamic governance, and it raises the importance of ethnicity.

¹⁰ This subject is discussed under the "Overview of Muslim Nationalism Literature" chapter in detail.

Lastly, there are some similar ideas between Islamism and Muslim nationalism about Westernization.¹¹ In the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, intellectuals discussed different ideologies to prevent the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and Islamism was the one of the ideologies. Islamism mainly focuses on Islam as a solution for preventing the Ottoman Empire's collapse. Notably, the effort of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, Said Halim Paşa, and Mehmet Akif Ersoy was significant for Islamism. Their articles and poems showed that Islam is the only solution to prevent the collapse of Ottoman Empire. They do not accept the Westernization as a solution, instead they want to show that Islam is compatible with Western ideas and concepts. For instance, although Abul A'la Maududi does not accept the Western democracy concept completely, he labels himself as a pro-democratic person (Yıldırım, 2018). Therefore, it can be said that they have some problems with the westernization process of the Ottoman Empire because many Islamist intellectuals mentioned that “we should not copy the morality of West, we should import only the technology of West.”¹²

Muslim nationalism is similar to Islamism about Westernization ideas because Muslim nationalist people are from “Ulema,” and they do not have strong ties with the West. Although the worldview and educational background of Islamist people are very different from ulema (Yardım, 2016), they have same ideas with Muslim nationalists about the West and Westernization. Muslim nationalist movements had warred against the West in the 19th and 20th centuries, such as Indian Muslims. These situations triggered the anti-West ideas in the Muslim nationalists as Islamists. We can categorize the Muslim nationalist movements' views as anti-West. In conclusion, there are distinct differences between Muslim nationalism and Islamism, but when we consider West and Westernization, we can observe distinct similarities between Islamism and Muslim nationalism.

2.1.5 Overview of Muslim Nationalism Literature

¹¹ Westernization refers to Western concepts or ideas such as democracy or freedom. Westernization is a concept that focuses on the Western concepts and ideas such as secularism, modernization and democracy.

¹² This sentence has been attributed by Mehmet Akif Ersoy (Cömert, 2017). Moreover, it is significant to understand beginning of Islamism in 19th century.

Muslim nationalism literature is not extensive. Nevertheless, it still includes a significant amount of articles, and these articles help to establish an excellent framework to understand the concept. This chapter develops a framework to emphasize historical landmarks, and it provides essential features of Muslim nationalism. In the previous section, three main elements of Muslim nationalism were discussed. In this section, pragmatism, the “other” and the idea of the west in Muslim nationalism are examined.

First of all, many scholars emphasize Muslim nationalism’s origins differently. Some of these scholars argue that one of the critical features of Muslim nationalism is pragmatism and *realpolitik*. In the beginning, Yenigün’s article has different arguments than other Muslim nationalism related articles. Therefore, this section analyzes Yenigün’s (2017) main points. First of all, Yenigün draws a framework with the help of Abdelwahab el-Affendi’s book (el-Efendi, 2009), which establishes some significant aspects that are relevant for the early years of Islam and the first political conflict in the history of Islam. According to Yenigün, Abdelwahab el-Affendi’s argument can give a clear explanation to Muslim nationalism (Yenigün, 2017). El-Affendi mentions two different schools in Islam. One of them is Medina school, and the other one is Damascus school (el-Efendi, 2009). Yenigün states that: “Muslim nationalism, an extension of Damascus model, is a quest for power and seeks Muslim interests worldwide. Islamism, an heir to Medina model, may be characterized by an ethical pursuit of justice that occasionally clashes with Muslim political interests”¹³ (Yenigün, 2017, p. 229). In other words, Yenigün’s ideas about Muslim nationalism are about the first division of Muslims. Specially, Muslim nationalism is born after the conflict between Ali and Muawiyah. According to Yenigün, Muawiyah’s Damascus model promoted *realpolitik*, and did not consider the ethical situations seriously (Yenigün, 2017). On the other hand, Yenigün mentions that Sultan II. Abdül Hamid and Maudidi’s politics show political pragmatism. After these kinds of examples, Yenigün called the AK Party as a Muslim nationalist political party. Moreover, he emphasizes that the Uludere massacre, the pro-Islamization process after Arab spring, and the attitude of the AK party on Gezi protests

¹³ Yenigün uses Muslimism as Muslim nationalism. Therefore, there is no difference between Muslimism and Muslim nationalism.

are some of the Muslim nationalist policies of the AK Party (Yenigün, 2017). Especially after the Arab spring, Erdoğan abandoned left-liberal ideas, and emphasized raising religious generations. Therefore, it can be said that all the politics of the AK Party are an example of Muslim nationalism for Yenigün.

There are some scholars mention that Muslim nationalism is a pragmatic ideology that can provide independence for many countries at different times (Zürcher, 1999). At the same time, some other scholars mention that religion is a tactical instrument; namely, religion was useful for political purposes of the liberation movement in Turkey (Karpas, 1959; B. Toprak, 1981). In conclusion, the literature shows that Muslim nationalism is one of the key movements of Islam. After the politicization of Islam (war between Ali and Muawiyah), Muslim nationalist ideas have affected Muslim world in different ways. Especially, independence movements are mostly related with Muslim nationalism in 20th century. However, some examples of Muslim nationalist political parties or groups are affecting today's politics as well.

Second of all, the situation of the “other” is another key feature of Muslim nationalism because it supports the unity of Muslims, and it does not consider any other non-Muslim groups as comrades or brothers. Because of the effect of national liberation movements in the Middle East, ethnicity can be an important factor that enable to understand Muslim nationalism. Muslim nationalism is nationalism intertwined with religion or a kind of “religio-nationalist ideology that drove the European powers out of the Middle East” (Friedman, 2012, p. 17). Therefore, the “other” is a significant problem for Muslim nationalism and this other not only opposes religious minority groups but also ethnic minority groups. Hegemonic identity determines the other, and this can cause democratic backsliding and authoritarianism in Muslim majority countries.

Some scholars argue that Islam's *Ummah* concept can provide opportunities for countries solving ethnic minority issues (Ataman, 2003). Ataman emphasizes that understanding ethnic diversity was liberal in the history of Islam, and he adds “Islam never forces Muslims or non-Muslims to leave their cultural, ethnic, or religious characteristic.” (Ataman, 2003, p. 101) Ataman's ideas about Islamism and Islamic thought are compatible

with the liberal democratic system, at least in principle. However, at the end of the article, Ataman argues that many Islamic groups demand to force Muslims or non-Muslims to leave their identity. It can be said that these liberal ideas of Islamist groups refer to the post-Islamist thesis of Asef Bayat and Yenigün's Medina school conceptualization. Not only Ataman argues that Islam's Ummah concept can offer a solution minority issues in Muslim majority nation-states, but also other scholars argue (Vatikiotis, 2016).

However, Ummah's understanding of Islamist movements does not solve ethnicity problems in Turkey. There are many Islamist political parties in Turkish politics since the 1970s. Although Necmettin Erbakan's movements also see Islam as a major identity of the society in Turkey (Yavuz, 1997), this kind of political parties does not offer any solution to the Kurdish issue. Therefore, Islamist political parties and groups have some liberal arguments about ethnicity, culture, or religion, but they do not retire from hegemonic identity understanding. For instance, Kurdish Hezbollah (KH) can explain this kind of situation in Turkey. In the beginning of KH, they were against the PKK, because of the PKK's Marxist, secular and atheist attitudes (Sarigil & Fazlioglu, 2013), and the two had armed conflicts. After the armed conflict, KH chose to take away weapons, and they have created Mustazaf-Der in 2004. Mustazaf-Der supported the right to education in mother tongue. However, their demands have not been adapted by any government in Turkey. They are also used Ummah concept to justify their mother tongue-based education in Turkey.

Some Islamic leaders also are not memorialized with their ethnicity, such as Said Nursi. Some websites of Islamic groups warp the ethnicity of Said Nursi (Risale, 2010). In other words, Said Nursi's Kurdisness is a problem for these kinds of groups. At the same time, well-known scholar Şerif Mardin also mention Said Nursi as a "Turkish Muslim fundamentalist thinker" (Mardin, 1989, p. 23). Finally, it can be seen that Islamism and Islamic groups' Ummah concept are useful at the theoretical level. All of these kinds of explanations show that Islamism and Islamic groups' theoretical level is different from practices. In other words, these kinds of minority issues arise from Muslim nationalism attitudes in the 20th century. It can be said that Muslim nationalism movements' identity formulas have affected Islamist groups. Mucahit Bilici's article asks, "*What Remains of*

Islamism Beyond Muslim Nationalism?" (Bilici, 2001). This article shows transitivity between Islamism and Muslim nationalism. At the same time, some Islamist scholars also turn their ideological framework from Islamism to Muslim nationalism. Sometimes, Afghani mentions that Islamism is significant to be independent, but he also mentions local nationalism's importance (Keddie, 1969). Especially, 20th centuries Muslim nationalist movements' reactions against imperialist powers bring some minority problems to Muslim nation-states because ethnonationalism and Muslim nationalism are mixed by many countries as a strategic step (Zürcher, 1999). Therefore, Islamism has turned Muslim nationalism into different ways. However, there are some arguments about Muslim nationalism that can solve some minority issues. For instance, Aktürk tries to understand Turkey's democratic openings with Muslim nationalism and Muslim multiculturalism, and he emphasizes that Muslim nationalism can offer a solution to the Kurdish issue in Turkey (Aktürk, 2018). He thinks Muslim nationalism as under the Ummah's understanding of Islam, but this definition is not enough to explain completely Muslim nationalism. However, Ummah understanding of Muslim nationalism also has some minority issue problems. Alewi-Kurds, secular-Kurds, or some other groups are not part of the solution under Muslim nationalism. At the same time, some other claims also exist in the political agenda that a significant amount of Muslim Kurds support KH in Turkey (Çakır, 2015). It is clearly observed in the events of 6-7 October. In conclusion, not only Muslim nationalism does not offer any solution to minorities but also it creates some problems for countries. In other words, it gives importance to hegemonic identity roles in countries. Consequently, it is clear that Muslim nationalism has a significant problem with the "other" issues.

Lastly, Muslim nationalism and Islamism share similarities in their perception of the West. Imperialist powers' colonial policies have caused significant problems in Middle East countries and anti-west understanding is common in Muslim independence movements. At the beginning of the section, it was emphasized that Islamist enlightened people and Ulema have had some differences in "Western ideas". Enlightened Islamist people have had an education in the western education system, or they had spent years in western countries. Therefore, their mentality was different from Ulema's mindset, which is an important

Muslim nationalism. Islamists accept the West and Westernization as conditional, but the Muslim nationalists do not accept the West and Westernization completely. Consequently, it can be said that Ulema's thoughts on the west were more skeptical.

Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), emphasizes Sharia Law's importance in Egypt. Moreover, he also emphasizes that the parliamentary system is compatible with Islam. Still, he does not give clear arguments on how Islamism constructs an Islamic state and parliamentary system together (el-Benna, 2014). On the other hand, some scholars and Islamists argue that Hassan al-Banna's ideas were not problematic for democracy or parliamentary ideas. Al-Banna also rejects political parties, modern nation-state understanding, and all its institutions (Haqqani & Fradkin, 2008). Of course, there are other Islamist thinkers and enlightened people in the Middle East countries. However, el-Benna's ideas are important in modern western ideas because it can be said that the Muslim Brotherhood is the first institutional organization for Islamists. It can be said that MB is one of the well-known Islamist organization which is against many western ideas and organizations. Many Islamist groups are affected by MB's structure and ideas, such as Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) (Haqqani & Fradkin, 2008). This is important because several scholars argue that JI represents Muslim nationalism (Yenigün, 2017). JI's ideas are also against west ideas and their intuitions. Generally, they want to show Islam and west ideas compatibility (Yıldırım, 2018).

On the other hand, first representatives of Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, Said Halim Paşa or Mehmet Akif Ersoy, have positive ideas on western ideas. Therefore, Islamism's ideological framework was different from today's Islamism understanding, and it can be said that this ideological framework was the close post-Islamism thesis when we consider Westernization as a concept, which is a significant criticism against post-Islamism. For instance, Mehmet Akif Ersoy, the deputy of assembly in 1920, mentions the importance of the westernization process (Özgürel, 2014). He criticizes the Sultan's attitude against this westernization process. At the same time, there is a significant criticism against Muslim nationalist Sultan II. Abdül Hamid's closure of assembly. Sultan's attitude against assembly was anti-democratic, anti-western, and also pragmatic for his power. This case shows that

there are some anti-west ideas in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire within Muslim nationalists. At the same time, Ulema also was against western ideas, and they have clear criticism against the west, such as Said Nursi. Nursi was against materialism, which is coming from the west for him. At the same time, he was against western-style ideas, institutions, and practices (Mardin, 1989). In conclusion, Muslim nationalist or Islamist people or movements have significant anti-west ideas that can help to mobilize people against the British Empire (Friedman, 2012). In other words, anti-west ideas are significant features of Muslim nationalism.

2.1.6 Example of the Muslim Nationalist Movements

There are several studies about Muslim nationalist movements in the literature. These studies examine several Muslim nationalist movements in different ways. This section lays out a significant set of examples of Muslim nationalist movements. Especially, Pakistan's Muslim nationalism is significant in drawing a perspective on Muslim nationalism. At the same time, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, as a founder of Muslim nationalism (Mujahid, 1999), which is a debated topic, is explained.

First of all, several articles focus on Muslim nationalism in Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan's experience can help us to understand Muslim nationalism in broader terms. First, Ahmad Khan has had an importance on Muslim nationalism thesis. Notably, his ideas affected Pakistan's future because he put something new for Ulema. He tried to establish Western ethos with his Islamic heritage (Malik, 1964). This ideological framework was new for Muslim people in India. Malik explains Ahmad Khan's qawm¹⁴ concept: "qawm (in the sense of nationality) can be located internationally or locally, and it can be created by ethnic ties or shared spiritual or religious values. Muslims all over the world were a nationality" (Malik, 1970, pp. 130-131). This kind of understanding of nationalism is a kind of pragmatic step for Muslims in India. Therefore, they can have distinct nationalities in India, and so, they can have more power against India and the British Empire. On the other hand, Ahmad Khan's arguments about nationality were very premature to construct a distinct nationality

¹⁴ Qawm refers people who have same ethnicity.

because literature argues that there are complex relationship between religion and nationalism (Gilmartin, 1998). Primarily, literature examines religious nationalism deeply and gives significant insight into Muslim nationalism (Van der Veer, 1994). In this book, the author focuses on Hindus and Muslim nationalism and emphasizes Muslim nationalism's improvements in India. It is seen that Muslim nationalism is pragmatically used as a mobilization tool for Muslims in India.

Furthermore, Muhammad Ali Jinnah era, Muslim nationalism, was apparent because Jinnah has some strategic tools to construct a national identity in India to establish a new nation-state. For instance, the election campaign in 1946, discourses were important to show how Jinnah construct Muslim identity (Gilmartin, 1998). In this election, discourses focused on Muslim identity and Muslim nationalism. However, according to Gilmartin, "Even as it rhetorically attacked family connections and biradari voting, the League organized a candidate list that was as sensitive as that of their Unionist opponents to the nuances of family, biradari and tribal influence in rural constituencies" (Gilmartin, 1998, p. 434). Therefore, it is already mentioned that ethnicity is not separate from Muslim nationalism. Not only the discourse of election support this thesis but also there are some newspapers that were organized by Ahmad Khan in the Urdu language that help communication between Muslims. In other words, while Hindi as a symbol of the identity of Hindus, the Muslims saw Urdu in same perspective (Rahman, 1997). Therefore, the Urdu language can be another distinction between Muslims and Hindus.

Finally, it can be said that Muslims wanted to establish a Muslim identity under the conceptualization of Ummah in Pakistan, and also they were successful in establishing Muslim identity. However, their Ummah concept was strategy, and it includes borders between states, and it can be said that there are some problems in practice. At the same time, they do not only care about Muslim identity; they also care about some family ties, kinship, and languages. This kind of care brings some ambiguity on their Ummah concept. However, it also clarifies their Muslim nationalist attitudes. In other words, their movements and ideological framework include pragmatism, anti-west thesis, and the "othering."

CHAPTER III

3.1 THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

3.1.1 Ideology and Elections

The relationship between parties' ideology and elections, the impact of ideology on voting behavior and the effect of voting on party ideology and policy shifts have all been complicated discussions in political science literature. Political parties' ideology is an important factor that affects the results of the elections. For instance, a liberal or conservative political view can change voting behavior and candidate evaluation. It can be said that ideology is influential on the behaviors of parties, voters, and candidates. This brings a clear argument that ideology is crucial for general elections in modern democracies. A most recent study shows that party ideology is significant for voters (Grewal, Jamal, Masoud, & Nugent, 2019). They aim to reach poor people's voting behavior, and they want to find the answer: Can poverty bring electoral advantage to Islamist Political Parties? After the survey results, poor people were more willing than their luxurious counterparts to vote for Islamist political parties. Thus, party ideology is one of the key determinants of voting behavior and party ideology and elections have correlations that affects party's ideological situation.

On the other hand, there are different arguments about how the ideology of the parties triggers ideological shift or policy changes. Firstly, parties can change their ideological framework in response to changes in public opinion (Adams, Clark, Ezrow, & Glasgow, 2004). Public opinion has significance in modern democracies. Thoughts and activities of civil society organizations, mass media, and leaders can shift public opinion that can struggle to change the ideology of political parties. The beginning of the AK Party era can be a good example. The AK Party's political leaders have had strong ties with the past Islamist political parties. To gain more votes and soothe public opinion, the AK Party emphasized that there is no connection between Islamism and the AK Party. Therefore, it tried to compromise with the secular elites, mass media, and civil society organizations. This story shows that public opinion can affect the ideology and discourse of political parties.

Not only public opinion but also election results can affect party ideology. However, some of the scholars argue that parties adjust their ideological framework in response to past election results (Adams et al., 2004). On the other hand, according to the Hotelling-Downs principle, both different sides want to locate at the center to get more voters. Hossain argues that countries that have secularist and Islamist party divisions wish to close the center. His graph shows that:






Figure 1. Evolution of a composite political system for the Muslim world. (a) Degrees of state-imposed secularism in Muslim-majority societies. (b) Degrees of state-imposed Islamism in Muslim-majority societies. (c) Emergent secular-Islamist political structure in Muslim-majority societies.

(Hossain, 2016, p. 222).

These graphs show how Islamist political parties can build their ideological framework to get more votes than before. This Hotelling-Downs principle can explain the Turkish Islamists' ideological shift. Especially, graph c can be an example of Turkey. Before the Virtue Party (FP), there are no post-Islamist political parties but, after the reformist movement emerged out of the FP, post-Islamism started to find a place in Turkey. To get more votes, the AK Party chose a novel way in comparison to the old Islamists. It chose neither assertive secularism nor assertive Islamism. The AK Party therefore came to power with this middle-of-the-road, post-Islamist ideological framework.

It was not only the AK Party to adjust its ideological path but also the People's Democratic Party (HDP). The democratic opening brought a significant opportunity between Turkey and the PKK. The HDP broke its former Kurdish-prioritized ideological framework to become a party of Turkey in order to be able to go beyond its Kurdish votes from East and Southeast and appeal to larger masses (Celep, 2018). In the general elections held on June 7, 2015, the HDP decided to change its former strategy of running with independent candidates and decided to contest elections as a party. It passed the ten percent national election threshold and became the first ever Kurdish party to do so in Turkey. This case is an example of the ideological shift because of the effects of past election results and the change of Turkish politics. Moreover, it can be speculated that the median voter theory can explain the ideological shift of the HDP.

Some scholars do not mention about the correlation between ideology and elections. They suggest that past election results can affect political parties' policy shifts in the current election (Somer-Topcu, 2009). Of course, this policy shift does not mean a radical change in the ideological identity completely. However, this policy shift can affect party ideology in the long term. In Turkish politics, the AK Party can be an excellent example of a correlation between past election results and political parties' policy shift. Again, the democratic opening

process and June 7, 2015 election are relevant to this correlation. The AK Party lost to come to power alone on June 7, 2015 election. Then, they announced that the democratic opening and peace process with the PKK were over, and political parties tried to form a coalition. However, the AK Party's nationalist attitude and the help of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to the AK Party prevent to form a coalition government. Before the repeat election on 1 November 2015, serious conflicts occurred between the PKK and Turkish soldiers and police officers and these conflicts escalated day by day. On 1 November 2015, with the help of MHP, the AK Party's success came to power alone again. This case does not show an ideological shift directly, but it can show a policy shift of the party. In the long term, if this the AK Party's attitude continues in the long run, it can be suggested that this is an ideological shift. On the other hand, it must be emphasized that this thesis does not take into consideration of why the AK Party's ideology is shifted. It just focuses on showing the ideological shift of the AK Party.

3.1.2 Understanding Ideology

The definition of ideology is debated. The scholars use numerous explanations, but there is no absolute definition in the literature. First, the ideology concept was used by DeStutt De Tracy, who wanted to form ideas scientifically. According to De Tracy, the meaning of the ideology is "science of ideas" (de Tracy, 1817). Thirty years later, Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote a book on German Ideology. In this book, Marx and Engels contradicted De Tracy's ideology definition. They do not use the "science of ideas" to define the ideology, and they define ideology as a fabrication used by a specific group of people to justify their ideas in society. In other words, dominant political ideologies always are used by the ruling class, and also ideologies are incorrect interpretations of politics. After the Marx and Engels definition, Karl Manheim established different kinds of ideology definition that correspond with Marx and Engel's definition, but Manheim contributed the definition of ideology from a historical perspective. To understand ideology, to examine history is a key component of the definition of ideology.

In the contemporary world, there is no precise definition of ideology. According to Frederick Watkins, ideology comes almost entirely from the political extremes (Watkins, 1964). In other words, ideology does not overlap with the status quo, and it includes an abrupt change in the existing order. However, it brings a question about the situation of conservatism because it defends the status-quo, and there are no revolutionary ideas in the conservative ideological framework. On the other hand, some scholars support that ideologies will not be existing anymore (Bell, 1960). The 68-generation challenged Bell's argument on the end of ideologies. After the late 1960s, various ideologies have affected global order, such as environmentalism, feminism, Islamism, or social democracy. In 1992, Fukuyama also claimed that after the Cold War, Western liberal democracy has ended up the ultimate form of human government (Fukuyama, 1989). However, after the Cold War, different political situations in different countries show that western liberal democracy is not a final form of human government because some other kind of political forms exist in many countries. Therefore, it can be said that ideology is alive and there is no single or final ideological form in the world.

Consequently, after the birth of the ideology concept, social scientists cannot accept whether ideology is a negative, positive or neutral meaning in modern society but, it can be said that ideologies will not be dead soon. Therefore, to understand ideas, ideology, and the ideological shift is significant to describe, explain, and analyze the current political situation. Defining ideology is crucial for this thesis to go ahead with the question: "Can we define post-Islamism and Muslim nationalism as ideology?" Instead of accepting a definition of ideology in the literature, the next chapter draws a different definition of ideology to bring clear conceptualization for this thesis.

3.1.3 A Working Definition of Ideology

Considering literature, my definition of ideology is a framework of ideas, a comprehensive worldview, and it draws a perspective for political parties, social groups, and individuals. Therefore, it can be said that post-Islamism and Muslim nationalism have a framework shaped by ideas (see chapter 2).

3.1.4 Research Design

This study aims to show the AK Party's ideological shift from post-Islamism to Muslim nationalism through looking at Turkish general elections. General election campaigns serve as a key variable to see an ideological shift because political parties emphasize their ideological framework in the election campaign. Political parties show their ideas, political aims, and ideologies in their election campaigns.

The time scale of this research includes around seventeen years. To understand the ideological shift and the two different ideologies of the AK Party, we need to divide the time scale into two different periods, namely, the 2002-2013 and the 2013-2019 periods. 2013 is chosen as a turning point of the AK Party's ideology because, after 2013, the AK Party's main policies at the beginning such as the Kurdish opening, defense of minority rights, maintaining the democratization and the EU accession processes, and not playing with the controversy of the secular-religious division have started to change year by year. After this critical year, the AK Party's political agenda has started to show signs of changes in the political sphere. After 2013, The AK Party's policies and discourse have affected minority rights, Kurdish issue, gender issue and EU accession process negatively.

The analysis of two different time scales that enables us to understand post-Islamism, Muslim nationalism, and the ideological shift. At the same time, conceptualizing post-Islamism and Muslim nationalism is significant for operationalization. In this thesis, I considered all the literature and examples of post-Islamist movements; I can give a clear definition of post-Islamism. My definition is that post-Islamism is an ideology that combines the values of democracy, pluralism, and modernity together with a care of Islam and its principles, yet with no intentions of establishing an Islamic state or order. Muslim nationalism, as different from post-Islamism, is an ideology that cares about Muslim domination, ethno-religious nationalism, and anti-west arguments. It may cause a decline in democracy because its key concepts damage the plurality, minority rights and democracy.

Party leaders give a speech to the public during the general elections campaign period. However, all of these speeches are not taken into consideration by examining newspapers

because they make news in a specific ideological framework. A newspaper can well choose some subject which is vital for the newspapers' ideological framework. Therefore, to analyze all of these speeches properly, this thesis focuses on a number of different newspapers' contents, which are relevant to expressions of the AK Party's leaders. There are different newspapers, news channels, and media organizations that represent different ideological orientation as left, right and Islamist. Choosing several media organizations that represent different ideologies may be one of the best option for this study. However, there are some newspapers that are closed, and some other media organizations are sold, such as Hurriyet and their editorial policy may be different from before. Therefore, this study does not focus on certain media organizations. Instead of this, all election campaign speeches are founded through google search that enable to do in-depth research. In Google research, I use specific words that can enable to find election discourses. I apply not only word restriction to Google research but also time restriction.¹⁵ Other researchers can find the same results by considering same keywords and time restriction. The only problem can be found in Google's algorithm that enable to see most click rate in the first pages. Thus, if the researches want to find the same results, it may not be possible because of the Google's algorithm. This can be a big problem for this study. In order to prevent this situation, I focus on the first five pages of results of the Google search because it is really hard to be in first five pages of Google search and it may not be possible "old" news articles. The first five pages are significant to prevent selection bias and also to write valid and reliable study.

I analyze all the data that I find in the Google search but I restrict the Google search by focusing on several keywords that are relevant to the key variables of this thesis as pluralism and democracy, West and Westernization and religion. If the discourses of the party leaders are relevant to these key concepts, I consider all of them in this study without considering these discourses fit or not fit to this study. In 2011 general election, I consider this year as a post-Islamism but I find several different results and these results contradict with my hypothesis. 2011 election includes mixed discourses that can be assessed as post-

¹⁵ Election campaigns begin ninety days before the general election. The time restriction is restricted by considering ninety days.

Islamism and Muslim nationalism. Furthermore, there can be found many different discourses of the AK Party's leaders but the AK Party does not enable to find these discourses on the AK Party's website. There are some general election manifestos on the AK Party's website, but there is no document about the discourses of leaders.

Some restrictions can be found in this inquiry. First, parties and political figures can discuss a variety of political issues and agendas in their election campaigns. These political agendas can change in every single country and over time. In Turkey, it is tough to examine the ideological shift of the AK Party because Turkish politics has many subjects that cause a big data issue. Therefore, to solve big data issues, some particular topics that can show the AK Party's ideological shift selected. In this regard, to see an ideological change of the AK Party, pluralism and democracy, West, and religion are vital variables and I focus on certain political items that could help us differentiate post-Islamism and Muslim nationalism and the evolution from one to the other. First, the discourse of pluralism and democracy is crucial because it can be said that minority issues are one of the main issues of Turkey's democracy. Moreover, the Kurdish issue, Alevi issue, and Syrian people can help to understand minority rights that are critical to mention post-Islamism and Muslim nationalism. The discourse on minority issues and democracy can be a key variable in understanding the AK Party's ideology and its ideological shift. Secondly, the discourse of the West is another significant variable of Turkey because Turkish politicians discuss Westernization, West-Turkey relations, and the European Union (EU) process from many years to now. Notably, in the beginning, the Erdogan claims that "*What good did Islamism do for us? (İslamcılık yaptık da ne oldu?)*"¹⁶ (Emre, 2001). In the Islamist political parties' era before the AK Party, Islamist political parties and West relations are also problematic so, this discourse of the West can show the AK Party's ideology that can be post-Islamist or Islamist and also it can give some insights about the Muslim nationalism that focuses on quest Muslim domination. Lastly, the discourse of religion is another critical variable to understand the ideological shift of the AK

¹⁶ This sentence is mentioned by Islamist columnist Akif Emre. In this column, Akif Emre criticizes Erdogan. He emphasizes that Islamism is still possible for everyone, but many Islamists and Islamist ideology is attempted to disappear by international conjuncture and internal dynamics of Turkey. However, Islamist should not give up because of these situations. They must come with alternative project to struggle against main pillar of the politics.

Party. First period of the AK Party, they chose to compromise the secular elites. Some political process supports this as “Alevi Opening” (Alevi Açılımı). However, in recent years, this compromise has entirely gone down the drain in the political sphere. In other words, the Sunni discourse of the AK Party leaders has brought some problems to freedom of faith understanding. The ‘sensitivity’ about the Alevi issue proved to be more strategic than sincere, when the AK Party collected more and more political power and no longer needed to persuade the secular and the Alewis in later years. It can be said that religious discourse can be an appropriate variable to show the ideological shift of the AK Party. All of these three variables can illustrate the changing on the AK Party’s ideology from post-Islamism to Muslim nationalism.

On the other hand, there are some additional restrictions on this thesis. One of them is conceptualization. In this thesis, elections, ideological shift, and two different ideologies (post-Islamism and Muslim nationalism) are the main concepts, and so, to understand these concepts is significant. First of all, ideology is defined by many scholars in different ways. These different definitions of ideology bring ambiguity about both post-Islamism and Muslim nationalism: Is Muslim nationalism an ideology, and is post-Islamism as an ideology? In other words, if we do not define post-Islamism and Muslim nationalism as an ideology, we cannot be talk about the ideological shift either. It must be emphasized that to formulate ideology is crucial. Secondly, to draw a frame for ideologies (post-Islamism and Muslim nationalism) is significant. It can be said that post-Islamism and Muslim nationalism need efficient sources for conceptualizing. However, there are some definitional problems with these ideologies. First, post-Islamism has been discussed by many scholars in the literature, but it has no an analytical framework. Early studies of post-Islamism were not adequate to define the post-Islamist movement. Preliminary studies on post-Islamism draw an unanalytical investigation that makes it challenging to conceptualize post-Islamism. Today’s studies have some analytical arguments about post-Islamism, but there is no clear definition in the literature. This study provides an explicit description of post-Islamism to prevent ambiguity. Second, the conceptualization of Muslim nationalism is not easy either because this literature is newly emerging, and there is a remarkable lack of research. Some

scholarly works that mention about Muslim nationalism are not adequate to bring a clear definition of Muslim nationalism. Therefore, this thesis brings some definitions to help to comprehend the ideological framework of Muslim nationalism.

3.1.5 Methodology and Data Sources

This study focus on the ideological shift of the AK Party. There are several methods to analyze this ideological shift. However, in-depth and critical analysis is possible with qualitative methods, especially discourse analysis that enables one to understand someone's ideological framework with a discursive background. In other words, people's discourses can give some insights about their ideological framework that can be constructed by family, friends, or some political groups. Teun A. Van Dijk claims that "ideologies are not simply related to undifferentiated forms of text or talk, but mapped on to different levels and dimensions discourse, each with its own structures or strategies" (Dijk, 1998, p. 200). It can be said that there are significant connections between discourse and ideology. Everyday conversation, dialogue, and speeches can show some clues about her/his ideological framework. On the other hand, in the political sphere, the leader's discourses or activities can show an ideological framework for her/his party. Their speeches to the press, public meetings and party documents can show a party's ideology. Political leaders can construct an ideological framework with expressions, symbols, or activities. In other words, discourses are vital tools to understand the ideological framework of the political parties. Therefore, to understand the ideological context of the AK Party and its shift from post-Islamism to Muslim nationalism, this thesis uses discourse analysis, in particular political discourse analysis (PDA).

It is known that there are several sub-categories of discourse analysis. Still, all these methods have the same starting point that discursive practices construct all social situations, including political, cultural, class, ethnic, racial, and gender inequality as well as and self and the other. The role of discourse may be a reproduction of unequal power relations and the challenge of dominance (Dijk, 1993). This reproduction process may be found in everyday

power relations as a relationship between parents and children, or police and citizens, and so on. Also, these discursive practices can be used in the reproduction of power for state interest by elites and institutions as ideological state apparatuses. It can be said that discursive practices can serve to legitimize relations of organized social force. At the same time, constructive and deconstructive discourse strategies can help to establish a particular national identity (De Cillia, Reisigl, & Wodak, 1999). Political parties' ideological framework can shape this national identity. In other words, governments can form a national identity to establish an ideological society. Not only Wodak et al. (1999) but also Hansen mentions that "Language is social and political, an inherently unstable system of signs that generate meaning through a simultaneous construction of identity and difference" (Hansen, 2013, p. 15).

There are several sub-categories of discourse analysis. In this research, Political Discourse Analysis (PDA) provides the opportunity for a more in-depth analysis of the subject matter. However, PDA is ambiguous because it focuses on "political discourse" but to define which discourses are political and which are not is not easy. Moreover, PDA is relevant to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Teun A. Van Dijk explains this situation with these sentences: "without collapsing political discourse analysis into critical discourse analysis, we would like to retain both aspects of the ambiguous designation: PDA is both political discourse, and it is also a critical enterprise" (Dijk, 1997, p. 11). Furthermore, Dijk and Fairclough define political discourse analysis as a "critical-political discourse analysis" because political discourse analysis includes significant critical lenses for understanding the political process by looking at discourses. Dijk and Fairclough define critical-political discourse analysis that deals with the reproduction of power, power abuse, and domination through political discourse. This political discourse analysis deals with discursive conditions and consequences of political inequality that result due to such domination (Fairclough, 1995; Dijk, 1993).

Primarily, CDA provides the opportunity to look at the texts through critical lenses, considering the impact of power, ideology, or politics. Moreover, it takes a particular interest in the relationship between language and power (Wodak, 2001). Many critical discourse

analysts support Habermas's argument that "language is also a medium of domination and social force" (Habermas, 2015, p. 130). To discover notions of ideology, power, gender inequality, and hierarchy is significant to examine all texts through a critical lens. All of these definitions bring a solution to PDA's ambiguity issue. As a result, it can be said that PDA enables discourse analysis with critical lenses.

It is tough to define what political discourse is. According to Dijk, the most straightforward definition of PDA is about politicians. Moreover, studies of political discourse are also about political institutions, politicians, such as party members, prime ministers or president, political members, and members of the opposition party (Dijk, 1997). However, some other actors are in the political process, such as; interest groups, voters, and bureaucrats. The broad definition of politics enables us to accept all of these actors and activities are subject to PDA (Dijk, 1997). In other words, many topics are relevant to politics. However, some social issues may not be understood as political subjects initially, such as migration that is a sociological subject in a broad sense. Still, some social issues cause some political problems, and so, its dynamics affect political institutions, non-governmental organizations, and politicians. It can be said that there are several subjects that affect the political process in a country. Therefore, many topics can be subject to PDA.

All the political processes have some politicians' or institutions' ideas and attitudes. These ideas and beliefs have some insights into the politicians' ideological framework. According to Dijk, politicians have some semantic polarizations that help to understand the political process and politicians' ideology (Dijk, 1997). Evaluations of the political process are characteristically polarized: while we are democratic, they are undemocratic, while we are patriots, they are stateless, and our soldiers are freedom fighters, they are terrorist (Herman & Chomsky, 2010). All of these discourses give some insights into the ideology and political aim of politicians. Their discourses construct an ideological framework and national identity in a broad sense. Therefore, PDA enables an examination of the AK Party's ideology because discourses of politicians can give some insights into the ideology of their political parties. Moreover, the AK Party's discursive shifts can show the ideological shift

between two different time periods. Therefore, PDA can be the best method for understanding the ideological shift of the AK Party over time for this thesis.

CHAPTER IV

4.1 Discourses and Analyses

4.1.1 Discourses

The empirical data is collected from both primary and secondary resources. Firstly, discourses of leaders of the AK Party are examined by speeches in public meetings, leaders' reflection of speech to mass media, and leaders' interviews with the media. These kinds of discourses have provided inside knowledge of thinking of party leaders with regard to the AK Party's religion, pluralism and democracy, and West discourses that are the main research agenda of the thesis. However, religion, pluralism, and democracy, and the West are very grand topics. Therefore, this thesis brings some keywords to find discourses related to religion, pluralism and democracy, and the West.¹⁷ These keywords are researched on Google by determining the time scale. In other words, the last 90 days before the election are examined by focusing keywords on google. This systemic data collection enables us to find similar discourses, and it prevents the selection bias problems of the thesis. Therefore, every scholar can use these keywords to find the same data-discourses- and it can be said that if other researchers had the same research question and methodology, s/he could end up with similar data and conclusions.

4.1.2 Election Campaigns

In this chapter, six different elections are examined. At the beginning of every single chapter, speeches of party leaders are reviewed. In every single chapter of elections, the importance of election and dynamics of election are discussed as they provide insights to understanding Turkey's political discussion in the broader picture that could have shaped party leaders'

¹⁷ Key words: west, the EU, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Erdoğan, Islam, religion, Kurdish issue, Alevi issue, Kurdish, democracy, freedom of speech, freedom, pluralism, headscarf, laicism, secularism, public meeting, Davutoğlu, Binali Yıldırım, the AK Party, Bülent Arınç, Abdullah Gül, Individual rights.

speeches of election campaigns. This is also significant because PDA is not only choosing several discourses and analyze them, but also the context of the discourses and political agenda of that time should be considered. All of these discourses analyzed by assessing the political agenda of the elections and discourses are assessed without ignoring the context of all speeches. In this study, post-Islamism tendencies of the AK Party are seen in 2002 and 2007. The 2011 general election includes several speeches that are relevant to post-Islamism and Muslim nationalism. Muslim nationalism trends of 2015, 2018, and 2019 speeches of election campaigns are shown.

4.1.3 Discourses of 2002 Election Campaign

The general election of 2002 was crucial for Turkey because there was a major crisis in both politics and the economy. Therefore, the economic and political context within which the 2002 elections took place must be well discussed and understood extensively in this chapter. Only then the speeches of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the party leader, could be accurately analyzed within the broader frameworks of post-Islamism.

First of all, the collective memory of people in Turkey would fall short of remembering any successful coalition government in its history. The experienced coalition governments did not help to heal Turkish politics' main issues, such as the Kurdish issue. Before the 2002 election, there were significant existential problems between the secular elites and Islamists. Notably, the post-modern coup has shown the sharp divisions between secular elites and Islamist elites once again. At the same time, this post-modern coup has affected Turkish Islamist movements, and in the midst of political turmoils, some Islamists chose novel, different ways of dealing with politics than those of the same old traditional Islamists. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and other reformist Islamists have established a new political party, the AK Party. With the establishment of the AK Party, 2002, general election speeches were affected by the AK Party's Islamist ties. Secular leaders of the other political parties reacted to the AK Party's elites' Islamist background. However, the AK Party claimed that they are no longer representative of an Islamist political party, and they called their ideology as a conservative democracy. Therefore, it can be said that one of the main discussions focused on the division between secularism and Islamism.

Second of all, there were some significant economic problems in Turkey. Many intellectuals perceived these economic problems collectively as the economic crisis of Turkey. After this economic crisis, many scholars argue that its possible causes and its possible results (Dufour & Orhangazi, 2009; Macovei, 2009; Öniş, 2009). At the same time, some scholars claim that the 2002 economic crisis was more severe than other economic crises in Turkey (Özatay & Sak, 2002). However, political parties and coalition governments did not find a solution to these economic problems. Therefore, another main discussion of the 2002 elections was the economy and economic problems. Many leaders and party leaders gave speeches about the solution to financial issues.

Third, there are many speeches in the election. Some statements about pluralism and democracy, modernism and westernization, and religion are chosen because all of these concepts bring some insights into the AK Party's post-Islamist ideological framework.

Religion

Islam can be one of the critical references to a political party's ideology in Turkey. Notably, the AK Party's discourse about Islam is significant because there was a sharp political division between the secular political parties and the AK Party. This discussion mostly focused on leaders of the AK Party's ties with Islamism. However, the leader of the AK Party rejected this Islamist ideological background. Erdoğan and other political figures of the AK Party used the opportunity of the times to express their understanding of religion and its role in society. These discourses still provide some significant insights into the AK Party's understanding of religion at the time.

In the Eskişehir public meeting, Erdoğan said “the AK Party is not religious. It is a party, which is against all the abusers of religion” (Hürriyet, 2002b). These sentences are of critical significance. The first sentence shows that the AK Party does not want to be labelled with Islamism. Moreover, it does not see Islam as a solution to all political, social, and economic problems either. Notably, in the second sentence, “abusers of religion” show that the AK Party's view on the religion related topics. Erdoğan first says that AK Party is not a religious party, and then, he draws a framework about the religious parties that can take advantage of religion and religiosity in politics. It is valuable because not only Erdoğan

provide an ideological framework which ignores the religion related political party but also, he directly criticizes other Islamist political parties such as Felicity Party (SP). Hence, these sentences can be one of the determinants that show the AK Party's distance from Islamism.

A critical issue that helps us contextualize the AK Party's ideology and Islamism is the headscarf issue. Actually, the headscarf issue is one of the key points to get a vote from a voter. Notably, the SP and the AK Party run against each other. Erdoğan's discourses help to understand the AK Party's view about the headscarf issue. In Kahramanmaraş public meeting, Erdoğan mentioned that "we will remove obstacles to the freedom of education" (Yılmaz, 2002). After some citizens question about the headscarf issue, he replied as "We will become a country of liberties, be patient" (Yılmaz, 2002). These two speeches show the AK Party's view on religion related topics and problems of religious people. These two different sentences show that the AK Party's solution is not about relevance to Islam. The AK Party emphasized that *freedom of education* brings a human rights perspective. On the other hand, emphasizing the *country of liberties* is another significant determinant of the AK Party's idea about religious people's issues. Erdoğan did not mention the headscarf's role in Islam or its importance in Islam; he placed the headscarf issue within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On the other hand, in Şanlıurfa meeting, Erdoğan once again said that "we will solve the headscarf issue" (Hürriyet, 2002c). He mentioned the headscarf issue more than one public meeting. Hence, it can be said that the headscarf issue is significant for the AK Party. Moreover, it can also be noted that they want to get Islamist or religious people's votes. At the same time, Erdoğan says, "We will solve the obstacles which are related to freedom of religion with social reconciliation" (Çankırı, 2002). Once more again, Erdoğan gives importance directly to freedom of religion. Furthermore, *social reconciliation* is another significant clause in this speech because reconciliation shows a positive meaning about democracy, liberty, and human rights. This word shows Erdoğan and the AK Party's compromising to all the Turkish citizens. This compromising understanding can show its ideological framework that is no longer Islamism. However, there are some speeches that have some Islamist tendencies about the headscarf issue. These speeches do not focus on freedom of education. For instance, one of the well-known party leaders, Bülent

Arınç said that “Turban is our dept of honor” (Hürriyet, 2002c). In Arınç’s speech, the *dept of honor* is a significant clause because it brings more importance to the headscarf issue. Erdoğan’s speeches focused on freedom of education and liberty, but it can be said that Arınç’s words have an emotional meaning. Arınç’s terms can be interpreted in two different ways. One of them is that Arınç wanted to get votes of the SP, the other one is that Arınç showed his Islamist background.

In conclusion, there are significant speeches of the AK Party’s leaders about the relations between the AK Party and Islam. These speeches mostly focus on some issues of religious people in Turkey. However, these speeches are not relevant to Islamism or conservative democracy. First of all, most of the expressions focus on liberties, notions of democracy, and human rights. These kinds of concepts are not ideological tools of Islamism. At the same time, these concepts are not ideological tools of conservative democracy because these kinds of speeches focus on a revolutionary change in Turkey’s conditions. It can be said that there is no significant causal relationship between conservative democracy and the speeches of the AK Party leaders. Finally, all of these speeches overlap with post-Islamism because post-Islamism has a positive attitude towards not only liberties, notions of democracy, and human rights, but also Islam. The AK Party does not express the name of Allah or Islam. The party’s leading figures want to solve religious people’s problems with notions of democracy, freedom, and liberty understanding. All of these kinds of attitudes show that the AK Party’s speeches of leaders are compatible with the post-Islamist ideological framework.

Pluralism and Democracy

Pluralism is one of the primary key components of democracy. In other words, there is a bilateral relationship between pluralism and democracy. Especially in Turkey, pluralism has more importance than many other countries because Turkey has significant minority groups such as Alevis, Kurds, Armenians, or Rums. Moreover, their freedom of speech, rights, and living conditions can show a party’s relations with democracy. In other words, a party’s leaders’ declarations about the minority groups can give some insights about their democracy

understanding and also their perspective about the pluralism. Some speeches of the AK Party's leaders are examined about pluralism and democracy in the context.

Erdoğan had many speeches before the 2002 general election, and freedom of speech and democracy was the main topic of public meetings. In Eskişehir, Kütahya, and Bilecik, Erdoğan states that “freedom of expression is only in theory, not in practice” (V. Toprak, 2002a). This sentence shows Erdoğan's idea about the freedom of expression in Turkey. Moreover, he wants more freedom of expression than ever. In other words, there is no meaning of freedom of expression; in theory, former governments do not take note of freedom of expression in practice. After the emphasis on freedom of expression, Erdoğan says that “despite all efforts on democracy in Turkey, there is no significant progress on it” (V. Toprak, 2002a). It can be understood that Erdoğan defends the democratization process in Turkey, and he emphasizes that this democracy level is not adequate for Turkey. On the other hand, at the beginning of the sentence, Erdoğan mentions freedom of expression, and then he emphasizes the importance of democracy. He shows that the AK Party's relationship with democracy is significant and this democracy cares about freedom of expression. Thus, The AK Party's democracy understanding is not restricted to electoral democracy only.

There are also some speeches about pluralism in public meetings. For instance, Erdoğan said “those who try to destroy us will come to life with us. We are Mevlana, Yunus, Pir Sultan Abdal, Ferhat, and Şirin” (Hürriyet, 2002b). In the first sentence, it shows that the AK Party does not want to war with the others. They accept that there is a pressure on the AK Party, but this situation does not bring assertive Islamism to the AK Party. Despite all the assertive secularists' opposition, Erdoğan delivers positive speeches to the people. At the same time, the second sentence shows the AK Party's compromising understanding of all the ethnic groups of people in Turkey. For instance, emphasizing *Pir Sultan Abdal*, who is the well-known Alevi minstrel, shows that the AK Party has no problem with Alevi people. On the other hand, this compromising language is not only for Alevis but also for Sufis. Yunus is another minstrel, and he is loved by Sufis. Therefore, Yunus and Pir Sultan Abdal, in a sentence, bring the AK Party's pluralism understanding directly. Moreover, there are many issues between Alewis and Islamists, and these kinds of problems brought some significant

cases in Turkish political history, as Maraş Massacre (1978) ¹⁸. However, the AK Party's compromising understanding with all the groups points to its idea of pluralism.

On the other hand, there are some other speeches about the AK Party's pluralism understanding. The AK Party's public meeting in the Black Sea region, Erdoğan, said: "We will overcome the obstacles in front of freedom of education with consensus. The rulers of this country should not discriminate against people like Alevi and Sunni. Looking at people's skull should not cause discrimination" (V. Toprak, 2002b). Again, at the beginning of the speech, Erdoğan emphasizing the *consensus* idea of the AK Party. There is no pressure to solve the freedom of education in Turkey. On the other hand, he gives positive messages about the Alevis' discrimination problem in the Black Sea region. First of all, the words in the Black Sea are significant because most of the people are Sunni in the area. Therefore, it can show the AK Party's pluralistic perspectives are not regional. Furthermore, using the *discrimination* word is significant because it indicates that the AK Party accepts that there is a discrimination against the Alevis in Turkey. In other words, the discourses of the AK Party do not ignore Alevis. In the next sentence of Erdoğan, he chooses a word *skull* to show former governments and leaders' racists¹⁹ attitudes. With the emphasizing skull, Erdoğan shows that there is no meaning of people's skull, which determines the identity of people, so Erdoğan provides an opportunity to compromise all the groups of people in Turkey without considering their ethnicity or sects. These sentences bring an accurate understanding of the pluralism idea of the AK Party.

In conclusion, all of these sentences give some insights about the AK Party's democracy and pluralism understanding. With the interpretation of these sentences, it is directly seen that the AK Party takes note of notions of democracy, such as freedom of education and freedom of expression and pluralism. Emphasis on notions of democracy and pluralistic perspective of the AK Party overlap with the post-Islamist ideological framework.

¹⁸ Maraş Massacre was the massacre of over 100 Alevis in the south of Turkey, Kahramanmaraş in 1978 by Turkish ultra-nationalist organization.

¹⁹ In Turkish, *kafatasçılık* refers to racism. It includes a perspective which is relevant with people's skull. People's genetic factors determine shape of skull, so people can determine your race with the help of shape of skull.

While Islamism focuses on the main religion sect or ethnicity in the country and its attitude is majoritarian, post-Islamism comprises with minority religious or ethnic groups and its attitude is pluralistic. Thus, the AK Party's leaders' discourse is compatible with post-Islamism.

Modernism and Westernization

Modernism and Westernization are significant topics of Turkish politics. At the same time, these concepts are significant for Islamism. Islamist ideological framework has some problems with “westernization” and “modernization.” In contrast, post-Islamism has a good relationship with these kinds of concepts. Therefore, discourses of the AK Party leaders’ are significant to understand the AK Party’s ideological framework. Notably, some topics can give some insights about the AK Party’s ideology, such as; the EU, which was an important topic of Turkish politics in the 2002 election. In other words, the AK Party’s discourses give significant insights into how the AK Party differs from the Islamist ideological framework. Consequently, the AK Party leaders’ discourses are crucial.

In the 2002 election, leaders of the AK Party give positive speeches on the EU membership process. Erdoğan mentions that: “AK Party, which accelerates the EU membership process and is determined to accelerate the integration of our country with the world, is ready to take part” (Hürriyet, 2002a).

This extract shows that the AK Party’s enthusiasm to be a member of the EU. At the same time, the AK Party did not focus on only the EU membership but also on integration with the world. In other words, it can be said that the AK Party understands the globalizing world. Consequently, the AK Party understands the modern world and its reaction to the modern world and the west. It can be said that the AK Party has positive ideas for westernization and modernism.

On the other hand, the AK Party emphasized the importance of integration with the world. However, their main aim is to be a member of the EU. For instance, Erdoğan says:

“Turkey must resolve the issue of the European Union firstly. Because with the EU integration, important steps will be taken in fundamental rights and freedoms” (Haber7, 2002).

Erdoğan's these discourses are important because of two different aspects. First, Erdoğan argue that the EU is the first issue to be resolved. This sentence shows that the AK Party's perspective on the EU membership process because Erdoğan seems the EU membership process is the most important topic of Turkish politics. In other words, this discourse shows the willingness of the AK Party to be a member of the EU. Second, Erdoğan states the importance of fundamental rights and freedoms. At the same time, associating the EU and fundamental rights and freedoms is important because the AK Party sees those as parts of the EU's provisions for improving fundamental rights and freedoms in Turkey. Finally, the leaders of the AK Party see the EU membership as an advantage for Turkey.

Consequently, the AK Party's ideas on Westernization and modernism show that the AK Party does not act as an Islamist political party. In contrast, the AK Party acts as a post-Islamist political party. Especially, emphasizing the EU membership process and integration into the world is one of the main indicators of the AK Party's post-Islamist ideological framework in the 2002 election.

4.1.4 Discourses of 2007 Election Campaign

2002 election was one of the important elections in Turkish politics. It caused significant changes in Turkish politics. This election enable to discuss main issues of Turkish politics by focusing on human rights and liberal aspects of democracy. 2007 election maintained these changes that offered "more" democratic governance possible in Turkey. The AK Party was enthusiastic about continuing the democratization process. In the election campaigns in 2007, discourses included main features of liberal-democracy, such as; pluralist understanding, freedom of faiths, the importance of minority rights, and the importance of elections. Hence, the post-Islamist understanding of the AK Party is the dominant ideology in discourses of party leaders. This section covers several discourses on the AK Party's religion, pluralism and democracy, and modernism and westernization.

Religion

Religion was the main topic of the 2007 election campaign because several related issues were still hotly debated, such as the headscarf and freedom of faith issues. Therefore, discourses on the religion of the AK Party leaders mostly focused on these kinds of topics.

Erdoğan gave an interview with Ali Kirca's TV program. In this interview, he emphasized several important topics on religion. Erdoğan mentioned: "The concept of laicism of the Republic of Turkey was written in 1982 Constitution. We put this definition into our party's program. A secular person must respect and secure the people's faiths. We have a civil constitution workshop." (Haber7, 2007).

Two points are important in these sentences. First, addressing the importance of the civil constitution, it was a strategy to mention that the 1982 constitution was written by soldiers. The importance of the civil constitution was important for the AK Party's program because the 1982 Constitution was already problematic for the AK Party, as its secularism clause could still be used for party closures. Moreover, the National Security Council (MGK) had significant power to affect the governments' political agenda, including the domestic issues such as the secularism debates. Therefore, a new civil constitution is important not only on topics for freedom of religion but also for democratization in Turkey. Second, addressing secular people as who can improve freedom of faith to secure all people's faith is crucial because freedom of faith is not only depends on religious people but also secular people. Therefore, Erdoğan constructed an identity that can help freedom of faiths. He did not exclude secular people in freedom of faiths issue, and so he clarified that protecting people's faith is not the only topic for faithful people but also for everyone.

On the other hand, Erdoğan talked about several important topics in the same TV program. Especially, the headscarf was an important topic, and mainstream media was curious about this topic. Ali Kirca asked a question on the headscarf issue because Erdoğan did not mention headscarf issues in election campaigns. Erdoğan answered this headscarf related question:

"The headscarf issue is freedom issue in Turkey. It is not about the people; it is related to education. Therefore, it is an issue of freedom in education. This is a matter of freedom of religion and conscience. No one can perceive this as the symbol of a political party. I'm cutting it down. The citizen covers her head because she is a believer and because of it is one of the matters of religion. Not with an imposition. A lot of public opinion research has been

done on this subject. In a study, around 70 percent of the society agreed that this is a matter of freedom, and they agreed to that they have a right to education. Taking away their freedom of education is not injustice, suppression? For this, there must be such an institutional consensus. Otherwise, things are getting tenser. So, we cannot be part of this tension. But for such a matter of freedom, ‘we do our part’ we said. We are of the same opinion now” (Haber7, 2007).

This compact answer is significant in understanding Erdoğan’s approach to religion. Moreover, this answer gives some insights into Erdoğan’s extent of Islamist reactions. In this answer, Erdogan emphasizes the headscarf issue as a freedom issue. Focusing on the freedom issue shows Erdoğan’s democratic attitude, and he does not show an Islamist attitude. This emphasis on freedom of education is supported by some statistical data that screens public opinion on the headscarf issues. In other words, Erdoğan’s view on headscarf is not Islamic; they clearly focus on freedom of faith and freedom of education. Finally, it can be said that ideas about religion are pluralist and libertarian, and they do not focus on Islam’s arguments.

Pluralism and Democracy

Minority issues were one of the main issues of Turkish politics in the 2007 election. Many different topics were discussed by politicians. Especially, the Kurdish issue was a dominant minority issue on the political agenda. Moreover, the problems of Turkey’s democratic system, freedom, justice, and human rights were also significant topics in the 2007 election. The AK Party emphasized these kinds of topics, and it explained what they understand from democracy and democracy related concepts. For instance, Erdoğan mentioned:

“The difference of the AK Party is that it has an understanding and a stance which is devoted to democracy, justice, human rights and freedoms, secularism, the requirements of the social state and rule of law and the future ideals of this country and shows its love by loving all the colors of this country. The AK Party is a center party that stands with the same affinity to every person, every belief, every idea that is legitimate in this country and it

expresses itself in the entire society, not with parts of it. An understanding that likes to be intertwined with all kinds of understanding away from extremes but close to the center... The AK Party is a party whose political base is Turkey and 780 thousand square kilometers. Therefore, we are a party that rejects regional nationalism. We are a party that rejects ethnic nationalism. We are a party that rejects religious nationalism. We respond to the demands of the change of both the right and the left, without imprisoning politics into narrow fractional patterns. Our difference is here. Because we are not a one-way party whose ear is full of its own voice, we are not, we will not be. The AK Party is a party that has a principle to defend the rights of citizens in the same way” (Haber7, 2007).

This extract considers that the AK Party did not have a problem with the main features of democracy, such as freedom, human rights, justice, and the rule of law. At the same time, Erdoğan’s word choice is significant because he addressed every single minority group in Turkey, and he said all of these minority groups as *colors* of Turkey. This discursive attitude is a step toward solving minority issues in Turkey. Moreover, he mentioned that the AK Party rejects ethnic and religious nationalism. This emphasis crucial because ethnic and religious nationalism can be an example of the Islamist background of the AK Party. Rejecting this kind of nationalism, the AK Party shows that the AK Party and Islamism do not have any connections because it was an important topic in the 2007 election. For instance, Erdoğan mentioned: “I said how many times ‘I did get off the National Outlook identity’. Let the people decide” (Haber7, 2007).

National Outlook identity refers to Islamism in Turkey. Therefore, the National Outlook identity can be a problem for the AK Party’s democracy understanding because the Islamist political parties did not have a good relationship with freedom and human rights concepts.

When we consider pluralism and democracy in Turkish politics, the Kurdish issue is one of the main political discussion. Therefore, discourses of the AK Party’s leaders about Kurdish issue should be analyzed. Erdogan answered discussions about the Kurdish issue in

public and media when he gave interview before the election and in the public meetings. Erdogan assesses the Kurdish issue as: “Each ethnic group has its own problems. There are two parties in the Southeast: The Independents and the AK Party. The AK Party there gives a tough struggle. Why? So that our people will not be deceived. We have a single roof. It is said that there are so many ethnic groups in Turkey. What is a single roof? The issue is the citizenship of the Republic of Turkey, constitutional citizenship. As long as we protect our national unity and integrity as the Turkish nation, no one can divide us” (Haber7, 2007).

This extract shows the AK Party’s view on minority issues and especially the Kurdish issue. Constitutional citizenship is an important concept in this extract because it makes possible new kind of citizenship concept that include all minority groups, and discourse shows a pluralist understanding of the AK Party. It shows that the AK Party does not accept Islam as a unifying tool or a single roof between Kurds and Turks. The AK Party’s view on minority issues was pluralist, and they rejected ethnic and religious nationalism. These discourses show the AK Party’s post-Islamist ideological framework. While the Islamist political parties focus on the religious brotherhood between Kurdish and Turkish people, the AK Party’s first period (2002–2013) focuses on pluralism and democracy aspects of post-Islamism.

Modernism and Westernization

EU membership process is one of the key topics in the 2007 election. Especially, the AK Party’s view on the EU was important, and there were some problems with the membership process on the Cyprus issue. However, the AK Party did not show an unwillingness to be part of the EU. For instance, Erdoğan said:

“Approximately %55 percent of the population want EU membership. There is a problem in the question of ‘Will they take us to the EU’. We do not have any problems with the EU membership right now. Three chapters were opened under the German presidency. The Portuguese Prime Minister gave positive messages with the speech he took over. In this process, we will catch the performance during the German period” (Haber7, 2007).

In this extract, Erdoğan clearly argues that the AK Party does not have any problems to be part of the EU. At the same time, he does not have any speeches against the EU and their reluctant attitudes toward Turkey's membership process. This kind of tough process does not affect the AK Party's west understanding. They continued all process, and they did not give any negative speeches against the EU or the west.

4.1.5 Discourses of 2011 Election Campaign

This study argues that 2013 is the year that authoritarian turn was seen in the AK Party's policies. 2011 general election was the last election before the Gezi Park protests and this situation increase the importance of 2011 election. It is possible to observe AK Party's authoritarian turn and also it is possible to observe pro-democratic and pro-western attitudes. In 2011, some issues were more distinct than other issues, such as; Kurdish issue, freedom of speech, and freedom of faith. Relations with the EU is also problematic for the AK Party because of jailed journalist and other problems of Turkish democracy. Thus, the role of 2011 election is key in understanding and analyzing ideological shift of the AK Party. Erdoğan's interviews with journalists enable to understand the AK Party's ideological orientation. In the interviews, discourse is more authoritarian than the public meetings.

Religion

In 2002 and 2007 election campaigns, the AK Party emphasized freedom of faith in Turkey. However, some discourses were different from the 2002 and 2007 elections in the 2011 election. Leaders of the AK Party gave more Islamic references, and their ideas on the other religious groups and religions were different from 2002 and 2007. At the same time, the AK Party's "othering" discourse is a problem for minority groups. For instance, Mehmet Ali Birand asked Erdoğan about the Kurdish issue and Erdoğan's answer includes keywords about the BDP, such as; *terrorist, civil fascist, bandit, Zoroastrian, an enemy of religion*. Erdoğan answered this question:

"I'm not saying that. Am I the one who says, 'Zoroastrian is the religion of the Kurds'? Let everyone know. The one who is in Imralı says it. He said that Islam was forcibly imposed on Kurds, I'm saying that. Friday prayers, what they say is 'Friday prayers are not performed behind the imam of the state.'

On the other side, behind the retired Imam from the Diyanet until yesterday, there are women and men in mixed way, and it is not acceptable in the forms of Friday, they also stand there for Friday Pray. What is this? This is to bring Islam into sedition, mischief, and to enter among Muslims in a completely division movement. Aren't we going to tell you that? Aren't we going to tell it to our Kurdish brothers?" (Hürriyet, 2011)

This extract shows some changing discursive dynamics of the AK Party. In 2002 and 2007 election, religion was not assessed with Islamic discourse and the AK Party was seen as a defender of freedom of faith and human rights. In the 2011 election, discourses about religion are different from a previous discourse of elections. The role of religion was seen as more important, and it enabled to marginalize the political parties such as BDP. In this extract, Erdogan appeals to religious-Kurdish citizen and emphasizes the differences between BDP and the AK Party. These differences contain mostly religious arguments that may help AK Party to get more votes from religious-Kurdish voters. Emphasizing the Diyanet shows the AK Party's will to control religious space in the public and the AK Party tries to restrict alternative religious activities in the public space. This attitude contradicts the former views of the AK Party about the freedom of faith in the public space. Thus, understanding the religious plurality and freedom of faith is different than the previous elections. This observation enable to see a beginning of the ideological "shift" of the AK Party.

Pluralism and Democracy

In the 2011 election, we can observe some different political attitudes of AK Party toward pluralism and democracy. In the main stream TV channel, Erdoğan's speeches help to understand views of the AK Party about the political agenda in Turkey. Jailed journalists and Kurdish issue were the main topics of the 2011 election campaign when we consider pluralism and democracy. In the 2011 election campaign period, journalists asked many questions about these topics. In the program, Mehmet Ali Birand, a well-respected journalist, asked a question about Erdoğan's reaction to journalists' criticisms against the AK Party because Erdoğan's speeches were threatening against journalists. Erdoğan said that "*She pays the price*" against Nuray Mert's letter. Erdoğan answered:

“These are the words I say with confidence and accountability. I think first, and then talk. Ms. Mert compares the roads we have made in Dersim. She says that the roads built in Dersim were the roads made in the security plan of the security forces at that time. If she says that today’s divided roads are also made for the security forces’ operations plans, I am here ... This is not freedom of thought. In this country, if you evaluate this power in order to prepare the ground for an approach within a rationale of a coup, for a security personnel, for a security operation, you will get the answer for it. There is also a limit to freedom of thought. If you try to intervene in the freedom of this power in this country, you will get the answer. If hers is freedom, I’m sorry mine is also freedom. Could it be a heavier insult to this government? These roads we made for our people, and she said that these are for special operations, police and armed forces. She also uses these roads; all people are using. Currently, 13 thousand 600 kilometers divided way, we have done it for who? These ways we have made for our people, you get up and bring them side by side with Dersim. ‘They are made for the operation. You get the answer. Freedoms are not unlimited. The moment you walk in from someone else’s border, it’s border breaking at the point of freedom. You cannot use such an unfair expression here. Moreover, I do not have an expression ‘pays the price’” (Hürriyet, 2011).

This extract shows the shift of ideology of the AK Party if we consider under the roof of pluralism and democracy. Emphasizing the limit of the freedom of thought shows a positive attitude toward the pluralism or individual rights view of the AK party is different from the previous discourses of general election in 2002 and 2007. As an intellectual, Nuray Mert was pointed as a target and it is a violation of human rights and this may decrease the reputation of Nuray Mert in public.

The AK Party ideological shift is not restricted to this TV program. Some other journalists asked several questions about human rights and journalists mostly focused on jailed journalist as Ahmet Şık and Nedim Şener. Their accusation was not accepted as a fair decision by intellectuals and they claimed that political authorities affected this court

decision. Ruşen Çakır, a well-respected journalist, asked a question about the situation of Ahmet Şık and Nedim Şener. Erdoğan answered this question: “There are such books that are more effective than the bomb” (T24, 2011b).

This sentence damaged the rights of freedom of thought, freedom of speech and human rights. Analogy of book and bomb is valuable to understand the setback of democracy and pluralism in Turkey. Addressing book and bomb in the same picture may restrict intellectuals’ views in the future. They may not express themselves in a free way. They may shape their ideas by considering pressure from political power. The AK Party’s pressure increases the cost of speech and the AK Party does not allow the criticism against their government. Question about Ahmet Şık and Nedim Şener was not asked by only Ruşen Çakır, but also Mehmet Ali Birand asked a question about jailed journalists' situation and the freedom of thought:

“There are authors in prison who have written such books about me, my president and my friends, that cannot be considered in the frame of neither freedom of thought nor freedom of speech. There are lies, insults” (Hürriyet, 2011).

In this extract, Erdoğan’s ideas on freedom of thought and freedom of speech were different from before. Erdoğan sees journalists’ ideas are insulting and alternative ideas and views are not accepted by the AK Party. Freedom of thought was not seem as one of the important political agenda of the AK Party and the AK Party’s position was to limit freedom of expression and they wanted to construct which is freedom of speech. Discourses were not restricted to these two discourses, Erdoğan says:

“Is this done in the name of freedom? The limit of freedom is as much as the freedom of another person. Unlimited freedom is nowhere in the world. I respect everyone’s freedom, but he/she won’t interfere with my realm of freedom” (T24, 2011).

This sentence shows that Erdoğan believes freedom of expression and speech, but he also believes that freedom has limits. Therefore, it can be said that Erdoğan’s freedom

understanding was not the same in 2002 and 2007 election, but he still mentions the importance of freedom of thought and expressions.

Finally, it can be said that the AK Party's freedom understanding, and attitudes were different from before elections, and also some speeches could damage freedom of speech and expression, such as; book and bomb analogy.

On the other hand, democracy's main concepts of freedom of expression and freedom of thought began to be restricted by the AK Party government. At the same time, there are some other topics to understand the pluralist ideas of the AK Party. The Kurdish issue is one of the main cases to understand the minority groups' situation in Turkey. The AK Party had many arguments about the Kurdish issue. In a public meeting, Hakkari, Erdoğan said:

“Oh, my brother from Hakkari. They said, ‘the country is divided’, ‘peace is disappeared’. Our party, our friends have been insulted the most severe. What happened? The brotherhood did not break, the brotherhood was exalted, and our communication increased. Eight and a half years ago, talking about Ahmed Hani was a cause of fear. Today, the Republic of the Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism is publishing Mem-u Zin. While the Kurdish tape was hiding in the tandoors yesterday, today's state television broadcasts in Kurdish for 24 hours. Who brought this, which party brought this? Who? We brought it, we did it, and we will go further. Today, there is a Hakkari University which organizes the International Kurdology Congress, the Kurdish Women's Congress and Kurdish Language and Literature Congress in the 21st century. Who founded this university? The AK Party is bringing these services here. As a struggle for democracy, as rights and freedoms, we said, ‘There will be universities in 81 provinces of this country’ and we have realized all these universities.” (T24, 2011a)

Two different strategies are in this extract. One of them is showing the AK Party's improvements in the Kurdish issue, and the other one is that showing the AK Party's willingness to improve democracy, rights, and freedom. First, explaining significant improvements in Kurdish people's rights shows the AK Party's pluralist ideological framework. Moreover, it shows that they do not have a problem with the Kurdish identity. In

other words, it can be said that the AK Party recognizes Kurdish identity. In the second strategy, addressing democracy, rights, and freedom is important because Erdoğan emphasizes that this is a struggle for democracy. In other words, solving the Kurdish issue is one of the main steps in Turkey's struggle for democracy. Moreover, Erdoğan said:

“A mother says, ‘I cannot speak Kurdish in prison with my child.’ I did not know the Kurdish ban in prison until that time. I asked is it possible to adjustment with circular? I published a circular, we solved this problem; in this way, a mother was able to talk to her daughter” (T24, 2011b).

This sentence shows that solving the Kurdish issue is not only for the struggle for democracy but also for human rights. All of these steps help to establish a pluralist society in Turkey. Many restrictions against Kurdish people were removed by the AK Party government. Especially, the Kurdish opening policy of the AK Party may contribute to removing restrictions, and it eases Turkey's democratization process. However, while positive steps were taken, there is also an othering issue in place. For instance, Erdoğan had some problems with the opposition side because he thinks that opposition parties do not want to see this positive picture in Turkey. Erdoğan said that:

“Democracy, fundamental rights, and freedoms do not come in this way. Together, we will prevent this abuse policy. We have started a new process with all our sincerity, but the CHP, MHP, BDP, in an alliance, have worked day and night to sabotage this process” (T24, 2011a). Erdoğan's populist attitude is seen in this extract that includes the “other” and “us” dynamic of populist discourse. Accusing opposition political parties that want to sabotage peace process is a polarisation discourse. These discourses are problematic for the legitimacy of other political parties when we focus on effects of public opinion.

Modernism and Westernization

In the 2011 election campaign, there are no significant discourses on Western institutions, countries, and other processes.

4.1.6 Discourses of 2015 Election Campaign

2015 elections may be the key point to understand the AK Party's ideological shift. In 2002 and 2007 elections, we observed the positive view of the AK Party, while 2011 election

contained mixed discourses about democracy, pluralism, West, and modernization. In 2015 general elections, discourses are neither pro-democratic nor mixed discourses about the democracy. 2015 elections are examples of the AK Party's authoritarian turn and ideological shift.

In 2015 elections, Muslim nationalist discourses are the main agenda of the AK Party's leaders. In this period, there are some changes in Turkish politics. Firstly, a foremost figure of the AK Party, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has been selected as the president of Turkey. Ahmet Davutoğlu, former foreign minister of the AK Party government, has been assigned as a prime minister of Turkey. However, Erdoğan was very active in the 2015 election campaigns. At the same time, Davutoğlu carried out public meetings of the AK Party as a leader of the AK Party under Erdoğan's shadow. Secondly, HDP has decided to enter the election as a party²⁰, although Turkey has a significantly high election threshold of 10%. Hence, HDP has wanted to expand its power in Turkish politics. These two significant points have affected the Turkish political agenda. The election quickly evolved into an AKP-HDP major axis. In this section of the thesis, two different elections are analyzed separately.

4.1.7 Discourses of June 7, 2015 Election Campaign

June 7, 2015 election may help to see authoritarian turn and ideological shift of the AK Party. Political tension was high and Turkey's most sensitive political discussions were alive on June 7, 2015 election. These sensitive discussions on the peace process, the impartiality of president, rising authoritarianism claims of opposition parties. Under these political discussions, the AK Party chose to carry out religion-based election campaign. The role of minority rights was also one of the main discussion of the Turkish politics. Syrian refugees and their interaction to the society were not discussed so much in the election campaigns. However, the AK Party's agreements with the European Union (EU) were one of the key factors that affect Turkey's authoritarian turn. The EU's intentions about the Syrian refugees is that the EU wanted to protect their borders to prevent huge refugee migration to the Europe.

²⁰ Before the 2015 election, HDP entered elections with independent deputies because of high national election threshold of 10%. Therefore, entering 2015 elections as a party was significant decision for Kurdish political movement. It meant the party was confident to bypass this threshold electorally this time, and it did.

This view of the EU affected Turkish politics and the AK Party had a leverage against the EU that check the Turkey's human rights violations and other liberal democracy related situations. In addition to Syrian refugee issue, the AK Party signaled that the peace process had disagreement and distrust between both sides. Despite all of minority, democracy, pluralism and West related issues, the AK Party government choosed to discuss religion-based topics that were crucial to get more votes for their calculation. However, the election results were different from their expectation. This factor affected the next election on November 1, 2015 results and election discourses.

Religion

It is already mentioned that June 7, 2015, election campaign discourses of the AK Party leaders focused on religion-related topics. Especially, leaders of the AK Party's discourses aimed to unite Kurdish people and Turkish people under a roof, Islam. For instance, Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) was one of the main discussions in election campaigns, and HDP consistently declared publicly that the Directorate's (Diyanet) policies were as unequal, especially for the non-Sunni segments of society in Turkey. For instance, the Directorate always refrained from legally acknowledging the legal status of Cemevis, the holy place for the Alevi community in Turkey. Against the HDP's discourse on the Directorate, Erdoğan answered:

“They have nothing to do with religion. The Diyanet, which they say we will close, printed the Quran in Kurdish” (Gazete2023, 2015).

This sentence shows two different important policies of the AK Party. First, Erdoğan's discourse clearly shows the AK Party as the protector of religion, because others have nothing to do with religion. He defended Diyanet and its policies and activities. However, Erdoğan did not reply to the main criticisms of HDP on Alewi people's demands from Diyanet or equal representation in Diyanet. Erdoğan's Kurdish Quran argument addresses the Sunni Kurdish population. It can be said that Erdoğan wanted to unify Kurds and Turks under the Sunni Islam roof. This discourse may be a tool to get more votes from religious Kurdish population. Erdoğan's criticisms were not restricted not only with HDP's policies on religion-related topics but also CHP. For instance, Erdoğan said:

“HDP and CHP are not different in terms of religion and belief, and that CHP chose Çankaya and HDP chose Taksim as Kaaba. ... “We will continue to take care of our Kaaba and the Koran. Of course, the Koran annoys those who are looking for new Kaabas. You know who these are. My Kurdish brothers are loyal to their religion and have a religion. So, I think that they will give the necessary answer to the rulers who adopt Zoroastrianism as their religion” (AljazeeraTurk, 2015).

This extract shows the AK Party’s new discourse when they mention religion and the “other.” The emphasizing the Kaaba, the holy place for Muslims, was addressing the Muslims in Turkey and it was a step for the AK Party to show their ideological framework that represents interests of Muslims. Kaaba mostly refers to a way that Muslims kowtow and Meaning Erdoğan’s discourses about CHP and HDP’s Kaaba are Çankaya and Taksim, respectively, shows that while the AK Party’s way is Islam’s way, CHP and HDP’s way is different from Islam’s way. Mentioning secular places like Taksim and Çankaya shows that when CHP was founder of state, they governed the country from Çankaya and HDP is the left political party and Taksim is the left’s center. Thus, Erdoğan’s specific place selection illustrates how discourses were crucial in the elections. These discourses exclude HDP and CHP as labelled anti-religious. Erdoğan’s HDP and CHP discourses show the problem of the “other” and the AK Party’s closeness to the “othering.” Erdoğan explained that Kurds are loyal to their religion, and so, he wanted to establish a roof under the Sunni Islam sect between Kurds and Turks again. Mentioning Zoroastrianism, Kurds’ religion before Islam, is also strategic because he wanted to take the votes of religious Kurds. Erdoğan’s these strategic speeches strengthen Muslim nationalist arguments because his discourses overlap with pragmatic approach and protect and improve Muslim’s power in political field are one of the feature of Muslim nationalism. These strategic discourses strengthen the weight of Muslim nationalism in Erdoğan’s discourse.

First period (2002–2013) of the AK Party, leaders of the party emphasized that freedom of religion is significant for democracy in Turkey. However, general election discourses before the June 7 election were exclusivist that can observe in other discourses of

the leaders of the party. As a religious minority group, Alevis was the main political agenda of the political campaign of the AK Party. For instance, Erdogan says:

“The Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge is the largest bridge project in the world.”...

“If Alevism loving Hz. Ali, no one can’t be more Alevi than I am. But if Alevism is a religion, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is not there” (CNNTürk, 2015).

This extract shows two different dynamics of the AK Party’s discourse. One of them is that Yavuz Sultan Selim’s actions against Alevis were not accepted by Alevi communities. In other words, Alevis’ view about Yavuz Sultan Selim is not good. Therefore, many Alewi communities were against Istanbul’s name of the new bridge, Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge. After the new bridge’s name announcement, Erdoğan emphasized Alevis and Alevism. Erdoğan’s discourses show that freedom of faith is not subject to the AK Party because Erdoğan explain their religious belief by excluding religious minorities. He reduces the meaning of Alevism as loving Hz. Ali and also; he does not accept that Alevism as a religion. The AK Party’s Alevi understanding includes the “othering” issues in many ways. These discourses do not overlap with freedom of faith and pluralism. They may damage democracy and they can cause a decrease in the freedom of faith and minority rights. Moreover, using these sentence structure show the hegemonic Sunni discourse of the AK Party. These discourses clarify the differences between the AK Party’s the first period and the second period.

Pluralism and Democracy

Pluralism and democracy were the main topics of the AK Party government in the first period. In 2015 election, pluralist ideas and minority rights were not the main political agenda of the AK Party. Especially, discrimination against Alevis has been an obstacle to the democratization process. Alevi's understanding of the AK Party began to change in day by day. Especially, discourses, policies of Diyanet, and some symbolic names showed the AK Party’s changing nature. At the same time, the AK Party leaders’ views on homosexuality damages pluralism and minority rights. Erdoğan’s neutrality²¹ to all political parties is also one of the problem for democracy. On the other hand, the peace process was still on the table

²¹ Neutrality principle that help to establish check balance system, was given by Turkish constitution. In other words, President of Turkey cannot be member of any political parties.

on June 7, 2015. Moreover, leaders of the AK Party gave positive speeches on the peace process. For instance,

“This city also knows the value of serenity, love of peace, and brotherhood. Because Batman so suffered from terrorism, unsolved cases. When we started the process of the democratic initiative, we received the greatest support from Batman, and Batman was again the leading representative of the solution process. When we addressed to all Turkey as ‘mothers don’t cry’, mothers from Batman respond in happy tears” (İnternetHaber, 2015).

This extract enable to understand the AK Party’s attitudes on the peace process. Especially, “mothers don’t cry” refers to all mothers. In other words, these words include the mother of Kurdish and mother of Turkish people who lost their children at war between Turkish soldiers and PKK. This extract shows the possibility of peace. However, there are some contradictory arguments on the HDP²². In other words, it can be said that although “us” and “other” discourse of the AK Party’s leaders are very distinct, the peace process is ongoing.

There are some other minority rights and pluralism problems in election campaign discourses. HDP nominates a homosexual person in Istanbul to be deputy. However, the AK Party’s leaders did not like this situation. Moreover, they did not consider this case as a human rights or minority rights. For instance, Erdoğan mentioned that:

“We do not nominate a homosexual person. We do not have such a problem” (Bianet, 2015b).

HDP’s candidate became a matter of debate. First period of the AK Party era, the AK Party leaders considered “Homosexuals must also be legally guaranteed within the framework of their rights and freedoms” in 2002 (OdaTv, 2020). However, situations were different in 2015. Erdoğan’s sentences show the ideological changing of the AK Party because they do not consider the rights of homosexuals within the framework of human rights and freedom. At the same time, Erdoğan’s discourse brought about the “other” and the “othering” issue.

²² Religion section of June 7,2015 shows that the AK Party’s attitude to the “other”.

The neutrality of Erdoğan was another important topic in the election campaign because opposition parties defended that Erdoğan spends the state's money on the election campaigns of the AK Party. This situation creates inequality between political parties. Erdoğan answered opposition parties' arguments:

“The gentleman is offended. He said, ‘With whose money does the president go to the squares?’ I spend the money of the state; this is my most natural right. I got a 52 percent vote.”

(Sözcü, 2015).

This extract shows one main problem of democracy understanding of the AK Party. Erdoğan's speech brings a question on democracy because Erdoğan's democracy understanding focuses on getting the majority of votes that give significant power. However, the existence of the constitution and its role are not the main agenda of the AK Party. In other words, it can be said that this situation and speeches damage equal competition between political parties, and it also hurts the rule of law principle.

Finally, all of these extracts show that the AK Party leaders have significant problems with features of democracy and especially pluralism. The “other” issues were ongoing in 2015. Except for the Kurdish issue, other minority issues and democracy issues were problematic. The Kurdish issue was on the political agenda, but there was some hope between Kurdish and Turkish people under the roof of Islam. This extract is one of the main features of Muslim nationalism in 2015.

Modernism and Westernization

On June 7, 2015 election campaign, there are no significant discourses on Western institutions, countries, and other processes. There can be some reasons for that. One of them is that the AK Party government tried to reach an agreement on Syrian refugees with the EU. This case can be one explanation of no discourse. The other one is that Turkey's political agenda focused on domestic politics because of significant problems with democracy, minority rights, freedom of religion, and the peace process. In conclusion, this section does not cover any discourses of the AK Party leaders on the westernization process.

4.1.8 Discourses of November 1, 2015 Election Campaign

June 7, 2015 election is a turning point for Turkish politics because, after the election, political parties had to come up again with a coalition government concept. The result of the election was not good for the former ruling party, the AK Party. Political parties did not establish a coalition government. Supreme Committee of Elections (YSK) decided to hold an election on November 1, June 2015. However, some political situations as conflict between PKK and Turkish military forces in several Southeaster cities in Turkey were not the same as June 7, 2015 election. Union of Kurdistan Communities (KCK) announced to end the peace process because of the policies of AK Party. Thus, Turkish politics' main political agenda was Kurdish issues and conflict between PKK and Turkey. Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)'s blasted a bomb in Sıhhiye, Ankara. ISIS killed one hundred nine people at "Labor, Peace, and Democracy" public meeting. Therefore, it can be said that Turkish politics were utterly different from the June 7 election. Under these circumstances, political parties established a new election campaign era.

Religion

Election campaign discourses of the AK Party leaders before June 7, 2015, focused on the unity of Muslims. Especially, the AK Party believes that Kurdish and Turkish people can be united under the roof of Islam. November 1, 2015 election, the AK Party did not change its policies about Islam's unifying power. For instance, Erdoğan said:

"O my Kurdish brother, don't forget. My Lord-Rabbim- created us in tribes. But remember, tribes are not a religion. Racism is not a religion; don't forget that" (Nerinaazad, 2015).

In this extract, Erdoğan gives references from Islam to address Kurdish people. Especially, racism refers to ethnic nationalism. In other words, he wants to emphasize that PKK or HDP's ideological framework is so close to racism or ethnic nationalism. Therefore, saying racism is not a religion refers to Islam's unifying power on Kurdish and Turkish people. Emphasizing the unifying power of Islam or the unity of Muslim is one of the essential features of Muslim nationalism.

On the other hand, the AK Party gave some election promise to voters. Especially, situations of djemevi were an important topic for Alevis. Davutoğlu emphasized:

“We will take every step to solve the problems of our Alevi community groups and our brothers. At this point, we will give legal status to djemevi with Traditional İrfan Centers” (Sputnik, 2015a).

As an election promise, Davutoğlu accepts Alevis’ problems, and he offers a solution to Alevi people. While mentioning unify Sunni Muslims is one of the main agenda of the AK Party government, considering Alevi’s problems is another important variable to consider the AK Party’s ideology. Before June 7, 2015 election, there are some contradictory speeches of the AK Party leaders. However, June 7 election results may affect AK Party’s discourses.²³ In conclusion, the AK Party’s discourses focused on the unity of Muslims. Moreover, freedom of faith discourse was only in election promise speech. Therefore, it can be said that the AK Party’s 2015 elections discourses focused on the unity of Muslims that refers to Muslim nationalism.

Pluralism and Democracy

Several problems have affected Turkish politics, such as bomb explosions, conflict between PKK and Turkish forces, and end of the peace process. The AK Party’s attitudes toward these situations can enable to understand the ideology of the AK Party. The conflict between Turkey and PKK was one of the main political agendas of the November 1 election. Davutoğlu considered Turkish soldiers’ operation as a “peace and democracy” operation. Davutoğlu said that:

“Don’t worry; we won’t go back to the eighties and the nineties. When the peace and democracy operation had to start, the instruction I gave when the PKK was attacked was clear” (BBC, 2015).

Davutoğlu describes the operation of Turkish soldiers against PKK as democracy operation. Davutoğlu’s expression about the conflict as democracy operation shows the

²³ This November 1, 2015 election promise on Alevi issues was same with 2018 election promise. The AK Party gave election promise on Alewi issues and djemevis’ status in 2018 election.

ideological shift of the AK Party because before this conflict the peace process was seen as an important step for democratization period but after the conflict leaders' expression show the democracy understanding of the AK Party is changed. The last two elections' discourses of the AK Party were different from than November 1 election campaign discourse. Especially, the June 7 election campaign's discourses focused on the "unity of Muslims" and "mothers don't cry." However, only five months changed the AK Party's discourses on the Kurdish issue. This case shows the AK Party's "pragmatic" ideological framework to be the ruling party. Davutoğlu said:

"If the AKP is removed from power, either terrorist gangs or 'White Toros'²⁴ will circulate here" (Bianet, 2015a).

This extract shows that the AK Party's discourse claimed that the AK Party is the only protector of people. If the AK Party is not a ruling party, people will suffer from terrorism and unidentified murders. This speech directly shows that democracy is not the AK Party's main commitment. In the early election of the AK Party, leaders mentioned freedom, democratization, freedom of faith, and Westernization. However, the November 1 election shows that the AK Party's democracy discourses are not on the political agenda. The "othering" and "other" were problems in the 2011 and June 7, 2015 election. However, on November 1, 2015, election discourses include not only the "othering" and "other" problem, but also a threat. At the same time, the AK Party's agenda focused on winning the election. For instance, Davutoğlu said:

"Now we have surveyed after the terrorist attack in Ankara, and we are keeping the pulse of the public. There is an upward trend in our votes" (Birgün, 2015).

This extract illustrates the AK Party's pragmatic thoughts about winning elections. After the explosion, focusing on getting votes from people can only explain with the pragmatism of the AK Party leaders and their focus.

²⁴ White Toros is a car, refers unidentified murders in 1990s.

Modernism and Westernization

June 7, 2015, the election did not focus on modernism and Westernization, but there is a discussion about modernism and westernization. The EU was not in political agenda in election campaign discourses because the Syrian refugees' situation was a matter of negotiation between the AK Party and the EU. Therefore, discourses were not relevant to the EU and westernization ideas of the AK Party leaders. However, some discourses of the AK Party leaders focused on modernism and former political parties' attitude on some special days. For instance, Erdoğan answered criticism on "Cumhurbaşkanlığı Külliyesi"²⁵. Erdoğan said:

"On the one hand, while celebrating the Republic Day with frock, waltz, and champagne, a nation who can not find shoes to wear on his feet, jacket on his back, and tries to live a half-hungry half-full life is watching this view with surprise" (Sputnik, 2015b).

This extract provides some insight about the west and modernism understanding of the AK Party. Erdoğan's answer includes two different important points. One of them is that Erdoğan emphasizes the AK Party's ties with the Ottoman Empire and Seljuq Dynasty on Cumhurbaşkanlığı Külliyesi. In other words, he argues that this building has a connection with the past. As an answer, he mentions frock, waltz, and champagne. He chooses these kinds of words to show that other political parties' world view. In other words, it can be said that Erdoğan criticizes other leaders' policies. Furthermore, this extract can be a criticism of the modernism understanding of other political party leaders.

4.1.9 Discourses of 2018 Election Campaign

2015 elections illustrated some insights into the AK Party's Muslim nationalist ideological framework. Especially, pragmatism, the "other" and "othering, and unity of Muslim arguments are some features of the AK Party's ties with Muslim nationalism. At the same time, the AK Party gave discourses that are relevant to Muslim nationalism in the 2018 election campaign. The importance of the 2018 election is that Turkey's first election after

²⁵ It refers to president's office to govern country. Külliye refers Islamic-Ottoman social complex.

the accepted presidency system. Moreover, there was a coup attempt on July 15, 2016. After the coup attempt, the AK Party and MHP have been on the same side on policymaking. All of these significant events can affect the AK Party's political agenda. Therefore, this election's discourses can provide some discourses that can help to understand the AK Party's ideological framework.

Religion

2015 elections provided several discourses that can show the Muslim nationalist ideological framework of the AK Party. Unifying Muslims under the roof of Islam was one of the key topics of the AK Party in domestic politics. In the 2018 election campaign, the AK Party's aim was very close to ideas that expressed in 2015 elections. In the 2018 election, they did not want to unify Muslims not only in Turkey, but also in the world. At the same time, the AK Party leaders quested power for Muslims in the international arena. For instance, Erdoğan said:

“The only language understood by the immoral cruel is power. If the whole world, all Muslims are one and stand against this persecution, the support of the lobbies that believe me is not enough for Israel to continue its recklessness” (Sputnik, 2018).

Firstly, emphasizing power's role in fighting the enemy of Islam is important in this extract. It is a kind of a power quest for the Muslim community. Secondly, emphasizing the unity of Muslims' role against the enemy of Islam is the second important point in this extract. These two significant points give significant insights into the AK Party's Muslim nationalist ideas. It must be emphasized that Erdoğan gave this speech in a meeting²⁶ that aims to support Palestinian people. It also can show the AK Party's roles and aims as quest power for Muslims and the unity of Muslims. On the other hand, Erdoğan said:

“You know, Jerusalem is not just a city. Jerusalem is a symbol, a test, Jerusalem is the Qibla. If we cannot protect our first Qibla, we cannot confidently look into the future of our last Qibla. To be honest, the Islamic

²⁶ Zulme Lanet Kudüs'e Destek Meeting.

world has failed in class in the test of Jerusalem. Not only the Islamic world but all humanity has failed the class” (Hürriyet, 2018).

This extract also shows that the AK Party aims to establish unity of Muslims and quest power for Muslims. Notably, emphasizing the importance of Jerusalem in the Muslim world and emphasizing Jerusalem is the first Qibla of Muslims that illustrates Muslim nationalist understanding of the AK Party. In conclusion, it can be said that the AK Party’s 2015 and 2018 elections include significant features of Muslim nationalism.

Pluralism and Democracy

After the coup attempt, terrorism, unity of nation and enemies of Turkey were discussions in Turkish politics. Under this difficult period, pluralism and democracy were not essential topics of Turkish politics. The “other,” “othering,” and friend-enemy discourses were common in the political agenda of the AK Party. Therefore, it can be said that the Muslim nationalist ideological framework’s significant features on the table. For instance, Erdoğan said:

“Have you heard about the fight against terrorism from the CHP? Did you hear it from the others? They have not a problem with fight terrorism; that’s just our problem. As the occasion arises, they used the PKK, FETÖ, and DAESH. We overcame them all together with our nation” (CNNTürk, 2018).

This extract shows “us” and “other” discourse. Discourses locate the CHP with terrorist organizations. With these kinds of discourses, the AK Party leaders establish the “other.” These discourses damage pluralism. To call the major opposition party of Turkey, CHP with terrorist organizations directly undermines pluralism. This deepens the “other” and “othering” issue in Turkish politics.

On the other hand, it is already said that Turkey has significant minority problems, such as the Kurdish issue. The peace process was the main political agenda of the AK Party government. After 2015, this peace process was collapsed. In the 2018 election, Erdoğan’s discourse was different from previous elections. For instance, Erdoğan said:

“We don’t say there are no Kurdish people; we say there is no Kurdish problem” (Euronews, 2018).

This extract shows that the AK Party's view on the Kurdish issue is different from previous elections. The AK Party's perspective on the Kurdish issue is different. AK Party's compromising attitude is not on the political agenda. At the same time, there is a high tension between the AK Party and HDP. Erdoğan said against HDP deputies:

"They are atheists, religious abusers" (Euronews, 2018).

This extract shows two different points. One of them is that Islam is again a function as an umbrella between Kurdish and Turkish people. Another one is the "othering" issue. These two kinds of discourses damage pluralism and human rights. People are not supposed to be discriminated based on their faiths in liberal democracies, and their individual faiths are not supposed to be abused for political advantage. In conclusion, these kinds of discourses establish the "other," and also they undermine the progression of human rights, pluralism, and democratic processes.

Modernism and Westernization

In the 2018 election, discourses against the west were very distinct. The enemies of Turkey are not only domestic but also international. The AK Party leaders' discourses show this kind of tendency. Moreover, the AK Party saw the June 24 election as an answer to enemies. For instance, Erdoğan mentioned:

"Hopefully, after June 24, we will make an operation to that Moody's" (BBC, 2018).

Erdoğan mentioned this sentence after Moody's rating explanation on the Turkish economy. Moody's decision on the economy seems as an operation for the AK Party, and the next election is the opportunity to answer Moody. This answer is a kind of operation for Erdoğan. On the other hand, the AK Party sees the June 24 election to show the power of the AK Party. Erdoğan said:

"Great Turkey wants a powerful president and a powerful parliament. Time is time for Turkey; time is time for Istanbul. We must put this together. The West is paying attention to June 24th. They are waiting for how Erdoğan will collapse. Are we ready to chasten? You have always chastened" (NTV, 2018).

This extract is important to show two different points. One of them is emphasizing the West as an opposition side. The other is the idea that the West wants to see the collapse of Erdoğan. This extract is another example of the division between "other" and "us". This

discourse enable to show the differences of the AK Party's first period and the second period. The West view of the AK Party elites is changed and this changing shows that the AK party sees West as enemy and the "other". this extract illustrates the West as against the AK Party, and voters' role is to "chasten" to the West. Moreover, labelling West as an opposition is a strategy to unify voters of the AK Party. This emphasis is one of the significant features of Muslim nationalism. Secondly, emphasizing the collapse of Erdoğan is significant because, as a charismatic leader, Erdoğan has a significant impact on the voters of the AK Party. Therefore, anti-west arguments and "us" and "other" discourses are very distinct. It can be said that the discourses of the AK Party leaders on the west show that the AK Party's ideas came quite close to Muslim nationalism.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Last twenty years, Islamism is one of the main ideologies in Turkish politics. As a significant actor, the AK Party has offered a significant transformation of Islamism, not only for Islamism but also for the country and the Middle East region. This study shows this transformation with the help of political/critical discourse methodology. Considering the AK Party's political history in two distinct periods, the relative liberal-democratic 2002-2013, and the illiberal-authoritarian 2013-present, the thesis attempted to inquire whether the party's ideology can be observed with an extensive look at party speeches and discourses. It is obvious that the AK Party government started with aiming democratization at first but then evolved into a different direction. This thesis claims that the AK Party has had authoritarian turn and finds an answer to the question of the AK Party's ideological shift within the broader frameworks of post-Islamism and Muslim nationalism as different from classical, old-school Islamism.

This thesis answers: "“Is there any ideological shift in these two periods and can we follow this shift by considering the discourse of AK Party leaders in general elections (2002-2013, 2013-2018)?” The thesis uses the PDA (Political Discourse Analysis) method because

daily discourses construct ideologies of people, social movements, or political parties. PDA is both political discourse, and it is also a critical enterprise that is a tool of CDA (Critical Discourse Analysis). PDA helps to understand discourses through critical lenses.

This thesis focuses on discourses of the AK party leaders during the election campaign era. This era is significant because leaders show their attitudes in daily politics. Discourses of election campaigns can provide information into political parties' ideologies. This thesis observes that there is, indeed, an ideological shift of the AK Party, and this shift is primarily from Post-Islamism and Muslim Nationalism. The conclusion chapter overviews the contributions of this study to the literature of comparative politics and Turkish politics, restrictions of this thesis, and it covers the results of this thesis.

There are several contributions of this study to literature. First, conceptualization is one of the problems in the literature on Islamism, post-Islamism, and Muslim nationalism. This thesis offers a detailed conceptualization of various types of Islamism by giving examples from several social movements and political parties. This analytical conceptualization enable to study Islamist political parties, movements, and groups that aim to establish a society or/and state based on Islam's principles. For instance, MB, ISIS, the AK Party, and the Ennahda have different political agendas based on Islam. The conceptualization of Islam-related ideologies is significant also because many political situations have affected Islamism, such as; independence movements, the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the democratization process in the Middle East. These cases are often relatable to the context of a larger discussion on the major concepts of this study. A comprehensive theoretical framework of post-Islamism and Muslim nationalism provides an in-depth insight into Islam related topics and Islamism. Hence, it can be said that this thesis' main contribution is that it clarifies differences between Islamism, post-Islamism, and Muslim nationalism.

It is already mentioned that there are significant relations between ideology and discourses in the theory and methodology chapter of this thesis. This thesis also shows this relation between ideology and discourses. Moreover, considering two different eras of the AK Party, this thesis provides an opportunity to show the ideological shift with discourses. Mainly, PDA provides an opportunity to show how political parties' ideological framework

is relevant to the discourses of political parties' leaders. At the same time, leaders of political parties give speeches in election campaigns. These speeches are important because they are not only promises or commitments of political parties. These discourses also provide to understand a political party's ideological framework. Consequently, it can be said that this study shows the theory that discourses are the primary tool to understand the ideology of person, political parties, or social movements.

This thesis provides several contributions to studies of Turkish politics. Notably, the AK Party, the ruling political party, was the main topic of this thesis. Focusing on the AK Party provides contributions to Turkish politics, Islamism in Turkey, and ideological shift in the Turkish politics. Moreover, examining election campaign discourses provides a way for new studies in Turkish politics. Other political parties' election campaigns can give information on ideologies, policies, and leaders' attitudes in Turkey. Moreover, it can help new comparative research on discourse in the election campaigns of other political parties in Turkey. On the other hand, it can bring contributions to Middle East politics, such as Islamist political parties or movements. Therefore, it can help to establish comparative studies on ideologies of Islam-related political parties in the Middle East.

There are also some restrictions on this thesis. These restrictions are conceptualization and big data. First, conceptualization is an issue for this study because post-Islamism and Muslim nationalism concepts are newly emerging. Therefore, it can be said that conceptualizing and defining these concepts is crucial and challenging. Providing adequate definitions for these concepts is relatively hard task. This thesis examines the existing literature and draws a framework for this thesis to overcome conceptualizing issues.

There are many discourses in election campaigns. Political leaders give speeches about daily politics. However, examine all of these discourses is not possible for this thesis because of a big data issue that is a problem for qualitative studies because there are various discourses that include ideological orientation of political parties but it is not possible to analyze all the discourses. Therefore, this thesis chooses some topics to understand the AK Party's ideological framework, such as pluralism and democracy, modernism and westernization, and religion. These concepts help to overcome big data issues, and they

provide an opportunity to understand the ideology and ideological shift of the AK Party. However, this situation does not completely resolve the big data restriction.

Results of this thesis show the last two decades' political agenda in Turkey. This thesis illustrates that the AK Party's ideological framework does not overlap with Islamism because there are various differences in between the AK Party's discourses and Islamist ideology. In the first period of the AK Party, discourses show that the AK Party's ideology is post-Islamism. In other words, the AK Party's leaders' discourses overlap with main features of post-Islamism. The AK Party's leaders care about democracy, modernism and pluralism. Especially the 2002 and 2007 discourses of election campaign show these concepts, and the AK Party cares democratization, modernism, west, and pluralism. However, in the 2011 election campaign, the AK Party leaders' discourses were different from 2002 and 2007 discourses of the election campaign. Especially, problems of freedom of speech and jailed journalists were the main issues and discourses of the party leaders were more aggressive than the 2002 and 2007 elections. Some topics are problematic for the post-Islamist ideological framework in the 2011 election. This election includes mixed discourses about post-Islamism and Muslim nationalism. This result is surprising because the literature and my observations show that the AK Party's authoritarian turn has begun after the Gezi Park Protest, 2013. However, the results show that the AK Party's authoritarian turn may be earlier than 2013. This result may spark off other studies that focus on the exact authoritarian turning point of the AK Party.

After the 2011 election, some issues and related discourses have become more distinct. Gezi Park Protests, Gülen movement, and the AK Party cleavages and also the Syrian war have affected the AK Party's ideological framework in regressive ways in terms of democracy. In the 2015 elections, ideological shifts are more distinct. Notably, the collapse of the democratic opening and Muslim nationalist ideological framework were seen in discourses of the AK Party's leaders. These changes in Turkish politics have affected the AK Party's policy-making and politics. Moreover, after a coup attempt in 2016, the AK Party's ideological understanding begins to more close the Muslim nationalist ideological

framework. In the 2018 election campaign, the AK Party leaders' discourses showed significant indications of an embrace for Muslim nationalism.

Consequently, the AK Party has affected Turkish politics. Especially, the AK Party's policies have affected several key concepts and dynamics of Turkish politics as Islamism, religion and politics, democratization, state-military relations, and minority issues. These political experiences may shape the future of Turkish politics and also behaviour of the other political parties and political actors should be affected by this authoritarian turn of Turkish politics. In this study, I conceptualize post-Islamism and Muslim nationalism, showing the AK Party's ideological shift with these essential concepts.

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