

GERMANY'S AND TURKEY'S
COMMUNICATED SOFT POWER PRESENCE IN KOSOVO:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO FOREIGN POLICIES

A Master's Thesis

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June, 2017

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Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
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
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
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ABSTRACT

GERMANY’S AND TURKEY’S COMMUNICATED SOFT POWER PRESENCE IN KOSOVO: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO FOREIGN POLICIES

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Despite its vast literature, scholars and policymakers concerned with soft power are still plagued with numerous uncertainties, such as how soft power can be derived effectively; what attraction specifically entails; or soft power’s domestic dimensions and its expression in foreign policy. This dissertation attempts to analyze the question of how states differ in the communication of their soft power. In order to realize this goal, a comparative study scrutinizing the communicated soft power presence in Kosovo of Turkey and Germany – two key states that have actively been engaged in the Balkan region – has been undertaken. The methods of the research were a combined effort of literature review, field interviews with state officials, analysts, and academics, and web-based content analysis of German and Turkish newspaper and governmental websites. It has found that while there is an overlap of attribute focus between the two states, specifically in terms of “culture and ideational influence”, the literature and field interviews of each country suggest that the communicated soft power ends up vastly

different. It appears that Turkey's soft power communication has been heavily influenced by certain key policy figures. Germany's soft power, on the other hand, has been much more institutionalized. Given that successful soft power communication requires intangibility/invisibility, Germany's soft power in Kosovo may also be more stable in the long-term.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, Germany, Soft Power, Turkey

ÖZET

ALMANYA VE TÜRKİYE'NİN KOSOVA'DAKİ YUMUŞAK GÜCÜ: İKİ DİŞ POLİTİKANIN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALIZI

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Geniş bir literatüre sahip olmasına rağmen yumuşak güç, bu konuda çalışan akademisyenler ve siyaset yapıcılar için bu gücün nasıl üretileceği, hangi cazibe özelliklerini taşıdığı veya yumuşak gücün ülke içi boyutları ve dış politikadaki ifadesi gibi pek çok belirsizliklerle uğraşmak zorunda olduğu bir alandır. Bu tez, ülkelerin yumuşak güç konusundaki iletişim farklılıklarını analiz etmeye çalışmaktadır. Bu amaçla Balkanlarda aktif rol oynayan iki ülke olan Türkiye ve Almanya'nın Kosova'ya yönelik yumuşak güç politikaları karşılaştırmalı olarak incelenmiştir. Araştırma yöntemi olarak hem literatür incelemesi hem de resmi yetkililer, araştırmacılar ve akademisyenlerle mülakatlar, saha araştırması ve ayrıca Türk ve Alman basın ve resmi internet sitelerinin internet bazlı içerik analizinden oluşan karma bir yöntem uygulanmıştır. Bu analizde, Türkiye ve Almanya'nın özellikle "kültürel ve fikirsel etki" alanında benzer politikalar izlediği, buna karşılık literatür incelemesi ve mülakatlarda iki ülkenin yumuşak güç iletişiminin oldukça farklı olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Türkiye'nin yumuşak gücü büyük ölçüde önemli siyaset yapıcılardan etkilenmektedir. Öte yandan

Almanya'nın yumuşak gücü daha kurumsallaşmış bir özellik göstermektedir. Başarılı bir yumuşak gücün elle dokunulmayan/görünmez bir güç olması gerektiğinden Almanya'nın Kosova'ya yönelik yumuşak gücü uzun vadede daha istikrarlı görünmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Almanya, Dış politika, Türkiye, Yumuşak Güç

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Auswärtiges Amt (English: Federal Foreign Office)
AKBP	Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik (English: German Cultural– Educational Policies)
DAAD	Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (English: German Academic Exchange Service)
DIMAK	Deutscher Informationspunkt für Migration, Ausbildung und Karriere (English: German Information Point for Migration, Labor and Careers)
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EU	European Union
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GiZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (English: German Society for International Cooperation)
IFA	Institute für Auslandsbeziehungen (English: Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations)
INTERPOL	International Police Organization
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
MFA	Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance

OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
RPP	Republican People's Party
SAP	Stabilization and Association Process
SEECF	South-East European Cooperation Process
SWP	Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (English: The German Institute for International and Security Affairs)
TIKA	Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı (English: Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency Directorate)
TPP	True Path Party
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Research Problem:

In its simplest dictionary definition, power (in the political sense) is the capacity or ability to direct or influence the behaviour of others or the course of events (Oxford dictionary). The beginning of the 21st century carries the burden of the post-Cold War era: the return to multiple poles of power in an increasingly globalizing world. With regards to these complex dynamics, Joseph Nye conceptualized the notion of soft power in the early 1990s. The premise was not entirely new, but the context and emphasis on it had changed. Ever since, it has been altered or interpreted in different ways but theoretical and operational gaps still plague policymakers' and academics' minds. For instance, there are still questions as to what exactly soft power is, how soft power can be derived, practised and strategized effectively; what the interplay between hard power and soft power appears to be in different country cases; or what kind of dynamic sources it derives from. The purpose of this study is to clarify some aspects of soft power theory and generate empirically grounded knowledge with regards to domestic dynamics and sources of attraction that might coincide with soft power. I have chosen Turkey and Germany to investigate their differing soft power interpretations in practical terms. A juxtaposition of Turkey and Germany in the context of Kosovo's post-war

reconstruction and state-building might yield some defining new insight in foreign policy-making and how domestic dynamics affect and shape soft power application.

The relevance of such viewpoints in soft power literature boils down to two reasons. Firstly, soft power academics still do not have a clear grasp on the components of soft power such as attraction or public diplomacy and how they interact with each other. Secondly they usually do not consider the internal factors that might be involved in the shaping of soft power. Most of the soft power literature focuses on the foreign policy dynamics and practices of soft power without an attempt at investigating the links to domestic dynamics. Nye repeatedly mentions that domestic values and policies set limits for actors and need to be synchronized with foreign policies since hypocrisy is harmful to soft power (Nye, 2004:55,89). Turkish and German soft power have been studied before, but literature on the comparison between the two countries' soft power policies with a specific detailed consideration of internal dynamics has yet to flourish. In this sense, this research endeavors to provide additional empirically-grounded knowledge into those avenues of soft power.

Today, the term is associated with the diplomacy of various actors i.e. the USA, China, India and even Russia. Yet, other states have also started to devise their foreign policy according to soft power doctrines; both explicitly and implicitly. As relatively understudied actors of soft power, Germany and Turkey offer new perspectives for the concept. With this in mind, I investigate how Germany's and Turkey's differing interpretations of the international sphere and the ways in which they define, formulate and plan soft power, yields distinct applications of its foreign policy strategy. For my research, I compare both countries' soft power policies towards Kosovo, where they

have provided institutional and economic development assistance since the 1999 NATO intervention. Prior to any theoretical explorations, Kosovo's historical and political context should be explicated further.

Similar to other Balkan countries, Kosovo's history intersects with the history of the Ottoman Empire of which it was part of from the 15th to the early 20th century. Kosovo and parts of Macedonia were a significant large-scale administrative unit called a 'vilayet' of the Ottoman Empire by the late 19th century (Malcolm, 1998). It is important to realize that throughout history the territory of Kosovo has always been a matter of dispute between Albanians and Serbs, who have both linked the area to their nationalist rhetoric and ideals (*The Kosovo Report*, 2000). The Serbs regard Kosovo as sacred to the Serb nation, "(...) the place where the Serbian army was defeated by the Turks in the famous Battle of Fushe Kosova of June 1389 and the site of many of Serbia's historic churches" (*The Kosovo Report*, 2000). At the same time, the region was also the birthplace of Albanian nationalism pioneered by the 'League of Prizren' formed in 1878 (Jelavich, 1983). However, unlike its other nationalist counterparts (i.e. Bulgarian or Greek), Albanian nationalism was mainly directed at preventing foreign powers to claim "Albanian lands" (Jelavich, 1983). With the suppression of the League of Prizren, Albanian nationalism continued on culturally rather than politically (Jelavich, 1983). This background is crucial when evaluating Turkey's presence in Kosovo.

As much as this historical background seemed to be an advantage to Turkey, for it produced strong cultural and kinship bonds as soft power assets, it has also been a disadvantage in exercising her soft power in the long run (Author's interview with high-level Turkish diplomat, December 20, 2016, Ankara). Given these circumstances

Turkey's activities have been repeatedly denounced to have a hidden agenda: a comeback to the region in the form 'Neo-Ottomanism'. Some Albanians, especially nationalist historians, define Ottoman rule in Kosovo as an era of 'five-century occupation' (Author's interview with high-level Turkish diplomat, December 20, 2016, Ankara). Not only are these events of great importance to Turkey's current attempts at reconciliation and historical-cultural connection, but have also determined Kosovo's perceptions towards Turkey. The people of the Balkans recollect Ottoman history as if it happened in the near past (Author's interview with Turkish high level official, December 20, 2016, Ankara). More importantly, many disregard Albanian nationalism in the context of a 'Greater Albania', first conceived with the League of Prizren (Telephone conversation with SWP¹ analyst, March 3, 2017, Berlin). Considering these conditions, the dynamics of Turkish soft power are heavily reliant and prescribed by historical and cultural sentiments.

During the First Balkan War of 1912, the start of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Serbia gained control over Kosovo. Following World War II, Kosovo became a constituent of Serbia under the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The ethnic tensions that led to the Kosovo War in the 90s are manifold. Certainly, Kosovo's incorporation into Serbia "(...) was one of the bitter memories conjured up in subsequent years (...)" (*The Kosovo Report*, 2000). Yet the conflict in Kosovo must also be regarded within the greater scheme of disintegration that occurred in Yugoslavia (*The Kosovo Report*, 2000). Prior to the Milosevic era, the Yugoslav administration attempted to improve Kosovar Albanians' situation who were harshly repressed in the early years of the republic as

¹ Stiftung Wissenschaft Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

being loyal Stalinists and Enver Hoxha sympathizers (*The Kosovo Report*, 2000). Ultimately, Kosovar Albanians were reconciled to a certain extent with the 1974 constitution that designated Kosovo as an autonomous province of Serbia, bestowing Kosovo its own administration and judiciary (*The Kosovo Report*, 2000). Albeit, throughout the Milosevic era, Serbian nationalists increased pressure on the province. Most compelling evidence for this was Milosevic's speech in 1988 in Belgrade: "Every nation has a love, which eternally warms its heart. For Serbia, its Kosovo" (*The Kosovo Report*, 2000). The culmination of tensions between Serb and Albanian nationalists led the Milosevic administration to revoke Kosovo's autonomous status in 1989, followed by human rights abuses and discriminatory government policies (*The Kosovo Report*, 2000). Reignited tensions between Albanians and Serbs resulted in both Kosovar pacifist movements led by Ibrahim Rugova and then military resistance by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (*The Kosovo Report*, 2000).

Armed conflict between the KLA and Milosevic's forces eventually led to NATO's three month bombing campaign starting March 1999. In effect, a civilian administration, via UN Resolution 1244, named United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established along with NATO's deployment of Kosovo Force (KFOR)² (*The Kosovo Report*, 2000). As a result of NATO operations, of which both Turkey and Germany were part of, the Serbs agreed to withdraw their military and police from Kosovo. Between 1999 up until Kosovo's independence in 2008, Kosovo was under the transitional administration of UNMIK, which transferred its rule of law operations to the

² Kosovo Force (abbreviated as KFOR) is a NATO-led international peacekeeping operation in Kosovo that has supported the peaceful and secure environment in Kosovo since June 12 1999 (<http://jfcnaples.nato.int/kfor/about-us/welcome-to-kfor/mission>).

European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX)

(<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmik/background.shtml>). During those transitional years under UNMIK, Finland's former president Ahtisaari prepared a plan and a comprehensive report that would aid the cohabitation of Serbs and Albanians and determine the country's final status (Gallucci, 2011). Although the plan was approved by five Western countries, the 'Quint' (the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy) it was rejected by Russia (Gallucci, 2011). The Quint support warranted Kosovo's independence in 2008 but the Ahtisaari plan was only implemented in the Albanian communities of South Kosovo, with a majority of the North still under Serbian control (Gallucci, 2011). Germany and Turkey were among the first to recognize Kosovo's independence. Interestingly, Russia's rejection was vehement enough that it even threatened the international community with a recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Author's interview with Turkish academic, June 2, 2017, Ankara).

Although 114 UN countries have recognized Kosovo's independence, Serbia (with the backing of Russia) still considers Kosovo as its own province. Kosovo strives for EU and NATO membership, yet it has not acquired even UN membership due to Russian and Chinese vetoes at the UN Security Council. Given these conditions, Kosovo still struggles with its sovereignty. Arguably, Western involvement has also put a strain on this sovereignty. The EU's deployment of establishments such as EULEX has aimed to remedy Kosovo's predicament. EULEX has been previously labelled as the EU's most ambitious civilian mission, as it had the largest mission and was the first to hold executive power (able to directly interfere in Kosovo's affairs') (Chivvis, 2010). Despite EULEX's prominent presence in Kosovo and executive power, it has been plagued by

legal deadlocks, for it has to follow both UNMIK, Yugoslav and Kosovo code (Esch, 2011) while also struggling with local organized crime (Esch, 2011). In this framework, the Kosovo issue has continued to question the integrity and capabilities of both the global order, the European Union and especially that of Germany, which had to fulfil multilateral expectations of its Western and East-European peers after reunification (Peters, 1997). The situation in Kosovo has also provided an opportunity for Turkey to reassert its new identity (Demirtaş, 2008). Consequently, just as Turkey, Germany's soft power activities in Kosovo have pronounced analytical potential.

In short, Kosovo is still seen as a controversial political entity. It struggles an existential issue. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) website showcases that Kosovo's economy is mostly dependent on foreign aid, whilst its people mainly live off of remittances provided by the diaspora abroad (<http://www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/countryinfo.html>). This economic and political instability has provided fertile ground for a multitude of actors to intervene (i.e. the United States, the EU, Russia, Turkey, China, Serbia). Nonetheless, this study concerns itself with only two: Turkey and Germany.

A comparative analysis of Germany and Turkey illustrates a most-different cases design. They are both states that are ambiguously defined when placed on a 'great power-small power' scale. Although Germany has the capabilities of being a great power, it is usually not recognized as such (Grix & Houlihan, 2014). Hence, Germany can be designated as a regional power along with some great power tendencies. Turkey is mostly referred to as a middle power (Oran et al., 2001), which is usually denoted to states that are below a great power but that have some influence in the international

hierarchy (Neumann, 1992). Unfortunately, these power distinctions have posed a challenge to academics since, empirically, the variations are much more complicated. Not only is the distinction between regional and middle powers confusing, but so are the designations for a middle power, which are either seen in an intermediary position in the global power hierarchy or literally as a buffer zone between regional or great powers (Neumann, 1992). Middle powers have traditionally exhibited a reliance on international organizations or regional institutions (Nolte, 2010). In the same manner, Turkey has also displayed reliance on its NATO membership, her possible EU accession and other regional memberships such as the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Not only do these hegemonic differences matter for a comparative analysis but also economic units. Simply put, Germany's GDP is 3,3 trillion US dollars, while Turkey's is 717 million US dollars³. Such significant differences allow this study to apply a most-different research design, which in turn provide the basis of the hypothesis. In this framework, the research question is: *How and to what extent do Germany's and Turkey's soft power presence in Kosovo differ based on both foreign and domestic dynamics?*

Correspondingly, my hypothesis is that Germany's soft power policies are determined by post-WWII trauma, focus on European institutions and multilateral approaches to diplomacy (Hellmann, 2009) & (Auswartiges Amt website: (www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Schwerpunkte/Uebersicht_node.html)); meanwhile Turkey's soft power is influenced by a humanitarian foreign policy based on shared history, culture and a desire of reconciliation with its history and region (Kalin,

³ World Bank GDP ranking, last updated April 17, 2017

2011) & (Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>). I have chosen these specific variables because they constitute the general composition of each state's foreign policy. The differences in the domestic politics of each state determine the outcome of the soft power policies; hence yielding different soft power models. To confirm my characterizations, I use qualitative data from interviews along with a quantitative web-based content analysis of Turkish and German newspapers and ministerial websites. Bearing this in mind, this study endeavors to explore new avenues, while also complementing previous literature. The following section will briefly touch upon the core soft power literature and conclude with evident theoretical and practical gaps in that literature.

1.2 Literature Review

Every research on soft power needs to commence with the work that started it all: Joseph Nye's influential book *Soft Power: The Means to Success*. Despite being mainly geared towards U.S. foreign policy; this writing has been a point of departure for many other studies within the literature of soft power. On its simplest terms, Nye defines soft power as "(...) getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them" (Nye, 2004:5). However, shaping preferences so that others will want what you want is heavily based on the context at hand. Nye stresses the importance of context by giving the historical account of how, initially, Prussia's seizure of Alsace and Lorraine after the Napoleonic Wars was perceived as a national asset (Nye, 2004). With the dawn of nationalism, Alsace and Lorraine became a thorn in the side rather than an asset; thus Nye claims that it is important to know what game is being played and how the value of the cards might change (Nye, 2004). Power is thus inherently

context-driven and it is the book's aim to understand power within the context of the contemporary information age. Hence, the context within which political development occur determine the scope, content and parameters of power.

A crucial component of soft power, just as in any other form of power, is information. Through effective use of information, power relations can be elevated or enhanced. To Nye, information plays an integral part in three types of power:

Table 1: Nye's three types of power

	Behaviors	Primary Currencies	Government Policies
Military Power	coercion deterrence protection	threats force	coercive diplomacy war alliance
Economic Power	inducement coercion	payments sanctions	aid bribes sanctions
Soft Power	attraction agenda setting	values culture policies institutions	public diplomacy bilateral and multilateral diplomacy

Three Types of Power

(Nye, 2004)

However, according to Nye, with the rise of the global information age, soft power will become even more relevant. Nye suggests that a trend into this direction is manifesting itself (2004:31):

This political game in a global information age [the ability to share information and be believed] suggests that the relative importance of soft power will increase. The countries that are likely to be more attractive and gain soft power in the information age are those with multiple channels of communication that help to

frame issues; whose dominant culture and ideas are closer to prevailing global norms (which now emphasize liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy); and whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international values and policies.

In fact, Nye has emphasised the role of information long before writing *The Means to Success*. Approximately a decade before, Nye co-authored a *Foreign Affairs* article with William A. Owens (1996), where they state that the international realm's new currency is information and that the use of information can multiply hard and soft power resources. Similarly, the idea of context and information is applicable to my research. As a matter of fact, it is crucial to understand the contextual relation between Kosovo and the two soft power proponents Turkey and Germany. The historical context between Kosovo and Turkey has tremendous impact on the way information is crafted, transferred and perceived between Turkey-Kosovo and Germany-Kosovo. In a sense, Turkey's and Germany's information endowment shapes their political strategies, which influence Kosovo. For instance, Turkey's focus on establishing strong ties with its neighbours translates into the emphasized shared history, culture (with a concentration on religion), kinship relations as well as Ottoman heritage that is directed towards Kosovo. Meanwhile, Germany's priority of EU survival and expansion transcribes itself into soft power policies towards Kosovo that are driven by the context of integrating the Balkans to the EU and empowering economic relations. I have selected Kosovo as a recipient country of soft power, since Kosovo's young and disputed state structure provides a fertile ground for such 'informational confrontations' and the contestation of soft power from external actors such as Turkey and Germany.

All in all, Nye advocates that soft power politics are based upon the ability to share information and that countries who effectively use multiple channels of communication

to help frame issues, will become the most attractive and powerful actors in the information age (2004). Despite the growing amount of literature in this field, there are still questions as to how soft power can be derived effectively and what attraction specifically entails (J. B. Mattern, 2005); what the interplay between hard power and soft power appears to be in different country cases (Yasushi & McConnell, 2008) or how domestic sources of attraction can affect soft power tendencies. Domestic sources of attraction are tremendously understudied despite being one of the main elements of soft power. Attraction itself depends on these domestic practices, understandings and developments since a country can only be attractive when its rule of law, institutions, economy are exemplary to other states. Indeed, these aspects are simply representative of Nye's overarching neoliberal perspective. In the seminal neoliberal work co-written between Nye and Robert Keohane titled *Power and Interdependence*, it is argued that all information shapers are democracies, which consequently leads to the assumption that democracies can shape information and harness soft power the most effectively (Keohane & Nye, 1997). Before looking at the dynamics between domestic affairs and soft power, it is crucial to isolate and analyse one essential component of soft power: attraction.

Attraction can be an opaque and misleading concept. As the source of soft power, it needs extensive scrutiny, which in turn will provide a valuable basis for the evaluation of attraction of Kosovo's institutions and society towards Turkey and Germany. Additionally, a better understanding of attraction will also augment the practicalities of soft power. Nye's dissection of soft power places attraction at the very heart of what soft power constitutes, to the point where he equates soft power as attractive power in

behavioural terms (2004). Correspondingly, Nye argues that, similar to Adam Smith's 'invisible hand', soft power is at work when there is an observable but intangible attraction (2004).

One challenge to soft power's notion of attraction comes from Janice Mattern. She attributes the problematic application of soft power to Nye's confusing dual-ontology of attraction: that it is an essential condition and that it materialises as a result of social interaction (Mattern, 2005). The issue is that, assuming it is inherent basically renders the cultivation of attraction useless, since it posits natural conditions; while the second ontology of social interaction is potentially too vast to be practical (Mattern, 2005). Mattern tries to resolve the ontological confusion with her constructivist approach on the *sociolinguistic* dimension of reality, which constitutes the use of what she calls *verbal fighting* - using coercive linguistic means to get actors to comply (i.e. the U.S.'s post-9/11 rhetoric towards terrorism) (2005). In this sense, soft power becomes the ability to construct, represent and communicate a specific reality for others to accept. According to Mattern these sociolinguistic techniques are the most effective way to attract other countries and the reason why soft power is actually not soft but basically 'bullying' (2005). While, I do not use *sociolinguistic* aspects of attraction extensively in my research, I consider the framework in order to spot how Turkey and Germany differ in their linguistic interactions with regards to Kosovo. Such an approach will be a helpful tool in uncovering the underlying policy framing and political strategies of both Germany and Turkey in Kosovo. Since this study uses field interviews and government websites, it is crucial to consider how attraction can be inferred through sociolinguistics.

Another notable critique by Mattern towards Nye is in the aggregation of soft power. Mattern contends that Nye aims to amass soft power through the attractiveness of political and cultural values or ideals/visions (2005). Yet, Nye's work lacks an explanation as to why some universal values are the 'right' ones or how to acquire them (Mattern, 2005). Clearly, universal values can be misleading concepts when measuring the soft power capacity of a country. Even illiberal democracies that do not have the 'right' values according to the West, can exhibit great soft power tendencies. For example, a soft power ranking of 2016 by political consulting agency Portland-Communications places Russia on the 28th spot of the Soft Power 30 index (McClory, 2016). Of course, Russia placing below the U.S. can also display the success in communicating universal values, which the U.S. does through a multitude of public channels from diplomacy to media. That is why Mattern's emphasis on communicative verbal strategy should be taken as a key factor when assessing soft power capability.

Inversely, there is also literature on the weakness of attraction from scholars of other fields. Ying Fan, a scholar from Business and Management, criticises soft power of being too intangible and ultimately always tied to hard power (2008). Fan accurately questions as to why culture is an asset of soft power, when other countries such as India or China are culturally abundant (2008). Thus, culture only has the potential of being a soft power and other factors such as hard power harvest that potential (Fan, 2008). Even though Fan's work is not part of international relations literature, it can be said that there are valid accounts of the limitations of soft power. In fact, most of these issues resonate with subsequent iterations of Nye's theory such as 'smart power' - an aggregate of soft power and hard power or Nye's later claims that a culture's content is crucial to

attraction (2008) rather than, as Fan puts it, the richness of it (2008). Fan's criticism of intangibility also ties into Mattern's criticism of Nye's confusing ontology. Broadly, they both judge soft power on the basis of effectiveness.

Consequently, effectiveness has been another prime facet in the soft power literature. Since my research compares the soft power methods of two countries, it is vital to consider the practices that have been theorised for soft power. For instance, akin to Nye's advocacy of smart power, Gallarotti posits that hard power can inhabit a central aspect of smart power especially when it is used in the case of peacekeeping⁴ or protecting countries against aggression and tyranny (2011). He mentions the U.S.'s use of military primacy as a means to sustain global economic dominance (Pax Americana) during the post-war period (Gallarotti, 2011). However, Gallarotti mentions that effective soft power requires policymakers to consider that soft power is a complex phenomenon with many of the benefits being indirect and long term; and that abundant tangible resources, such as hard power, do not necessarily determine power - outcomes determine power (2011). However, such an assessment also raises a 'chicken or egg' type of causality dilemma, since power can also be understood as the capacity to achieve desired outcomes. These considerations will be taken into account when assessing Turkey's and Germany's soft power in relation to their military presence within NATO's KFOR. Even if Gallarotti's study is not very distinct from other smart power literature, it might give a basic overview of how military presence can interact with or

⁴ Peacekeeping in the UN's definition of deploying troops into a conflict area following the principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force except for self-defense and defense of the mandate. Peacekeeping interventions are meant to maintain ceasefire and control conflict. (<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml>).

complement the effectiveness of soft power.

Besides military capabilities, soft power can also be enhanced with effective leadership. Nye does not expand the role of leadership beyond its attractive capabilities. He asserts: “(...) smart executives know that leadership is not just a matter of issuing commands, but also involves leading by example and attracting others to do what you want” (Nye, 2004:5). An alternative view stresses that leadership has varied effects on soft power. Alan Chong (2007) postulates that within the the current global information space two sets of leadership models are to be observed: *leadership inside-out (LIO)* and *leadership outside-in (LOI)*. He defines *leadership inside-out* as a nation-state’s method of achieving its foreign policy through projecting a communitarian base, being a credible source of information and by targeting an omnidirectional audience (Chong, 2007). In essence, Chong derives *LIO* from a cultural and cohesive society structure that are nurtured domestically and conveyed externally through foreign policy (2007).

Furthermore, *leadership outside-in* exercises political entrepreneurship through international regimes⁵ and forms epistemic communities⁶ in order to achieve the nation state’s foreign policy goals (Chong, 2007). Correspondingly, *leadership outside-in* might cause soft power to assume structural forms in the respective regimes and

⁵ There are two relevant definitions for this analysis: Nye and Keohane simply define international regimes as “(...) sets of governing arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence (...)” (Keohane & Nye, 1997:16). Meanwhile Stephen Krasner expounds international regimes with “(...) sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner, 1982:186).

⁶ According to Peter Haas, epistemic communities constitute (Haas, 1992:3): “(...) a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and and authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area. (...) they have (1) a shared set of normative principled beliefs; (...) (2) shared causal beliefs; (...) (3) shared notions of validity; (4) a common policy enterprise (...)”

epistemic communities (Chong, 2007:123). Interestingly, through a case study of Singaporean foreign policy, Chong claims that *LIO* is more efficacious than *LOI* because national ideas once operationalized through *LOI* are “(...) subject to much distortion from the multiple power applications of additional actors and their preferences” (Chong, 2007:140). Chong’s study is useful in the way it presupposes soft power effectiveness though foreign policy actors and structures. Hence, it adds a structural dimension to my study with which I will be able to classify how international regimes are managed for the soft power policies of Turkey and Germany. Regimes that are not self-enforcing usually necessitate international organizations (Keohane & Nye, 1997). As such, it would be beneficial to consider how Germany mobilises the EU or NATO and how Turkey utilises NATO or EULEX for the enforcement of their norms and rules.

Since this study aims to understand the interplay of domestic dynamics with soft power, domestic sources of attraction will also be analysed. The literature of domestic sources of attraction is highly understudied as the literature review illustrates. An investigation into how attraction can be established through domestic stability, such as setting a good example through good governance, rule of law, human rights, domestic law enforcement or social cohesion - or as Nye would say: “leading by example” (Nye, 2004:5) , should provide a useful perspective for both Germany’s and Turkey’s attraction in Kosovo. Consequently, this study will aspire to be a contribution to that understudied literature. Moreover, this research might also yield a new outlook into attraction and soft power since it pursues a comparative framework unlike most of soft power literature, which usually concentrates on only one country.

A critical offshoot literature of soft power is that of public diplomacy. Although

the term is nothing new and can be examined independently from soft power, the post-Cold War period and concepts such as soft power have dramatically altered it. As a critical element for government policies of soft power (See Table 1), Nye characterizes public diplomacy as communicative effort of conveying information and a positive image through long-term relationships (2004). Different from public relations, Nye emphasizes the relationship aspect of public diplomacy since it provides a tool to “(...) create an enabling environment for government policies” (Nye, 2004:107). In turn, such an environment nurtures soft power because it enables communication. Nye succinctly points out that public diplomacy is an essential element of grasping and harnessing soft power: “By definition, soft power means getting others to want the same outcomes you want, and that requires understanding how they are hearing your messages, and fine-tuning it accordingly” (Nye, 2004:111) . It is imperative not to confuse public diplomacy with propaganda or to assign it an adversarial notion. As Nye states, German diplomacy during the Cold War portrayed itself as a reliable ally of the U.S., which in turn led to joint coordination of public diplomacy (2008) - identical to joint programs such as EULEX, where Turkish-German diplomacy coincide. Additionally, one has to dismiss the notion that public diplomacy is mere propaganda, for the latter indicates a lack of credibility while the other, as Nye puts it, goes beyond propaganda by establishing long term relations (2008).

Another important point is to associate public diplomacy with public affairs. Although, public diplomacy is aimed at foreign publics, Jan Melissen argues that this should not be the case in the “(...) ’interconnected’ realities of global relationships” (Melissen, 2005:9). Indeed, Melissen points out that states have been engaging their

domestic publics to foreign policy development and external identity building (i.e. Canada, Chile and Indonesia) (2005b). One can already see the parallels with Germany and Turkey who have both engaged their publics on foreign policy. Public diplomacy has been an instrument of foreign policy ever since the inception of the nation-state, in forms such as image cultivation history (e.g. Ancient Greece, Rome, Byzantium, Fascism, Communism, Turkey after the fall of the Ottoman Empire) (Melissen, 2005). However, public diplomacy back then is considerably distinctive from what it is now. It is necessary to realize that a significant bulk of contemporary public diplomacy of states derives its techniques from the U.S. experience (Melissen, 2005) – especially her public diplomacy post 9/11 via the emergence of social media. Thus, the study of contemporary public diplomacy in countries such as Germany or Turkey will necessarily be linked to the new public diplomacy rather than the more archaic versions.

It should be clear by now that public diplomacy, just like soft power is a multifaceted concept in itself. It has been distinctly reworked and re-categorized multiple times. Two blueprints of public diplomacy are mentioned in this study – one by Nye and the other by Melissen. Nye assigns three dimensions to public diplomacy: daily communications, which disclose the context of domestic and foreign policy decisions; strategic communication, in which, akin to political or advertising campaigns, simple themes are developed and conveyed; and long-lasting relationships with key individuals (2004).

Giving examples for each dimension can greatly illuminate their respective goals and strategies. Daily communications are comprised of government officials' domestic press releases and are crafted with great attention (Nye, 2004). While the domestic

dimension of such press releases is surely beneficial for this study's emphasis on domestic dynamics, it is also vital to consider that the communication with the domestic press has significant effects on external perceptions conveyed through foreign press (Nye, 2004). For instance, Nye mentions that the British press, after a series of train accidents, described Britain as a 'third-world country', thus giving foreign press room to label Britain as a declining nation (2004). Strategic communication places priority on symbols or themes to further government policies and communicates them over the course of years such as the British Council's attempt to cultivate its image as a modern, multi-ethnic and creative country (Nye, 2004). However, such branding can be thwarted. For instance, Britain's image as a loyal European partner was fractured when it entered the Iraq War alongside the USA (Nye, 2004). It is important to note that Nye's strategic communication dimension is similar to the later described 'nation branding' in Melissen's work. Long-lasting relationships can be exemplified by the connections between key individuals through exchanges, scholarships, seminars, conferences or media channels (Nye, 2004). Nye remarks that in the post-war decades, exchanges have helped educate world leaders such as Anwar Saddat, Margaret Thatcher or Helmut Schmidt (2004). In a sense, these long-lasting relationships facilitate the common ground under which communication happens.

Notably, Melissen also argues that three notions are linked to contemporary public diplomacy. These are: propaganda, nation branding/*re-branding* and cultural relations (Melissen, 2005b). Before explicating each of Melissen's dimensions, it should be noted that there are clear parallels to Nye's three dimensions of public diplomacy. Daily communications through the press might be perceived as simple propaganda of

government elites. Strategic communication through ideals and themes is simply creating a country's self-image. Long-lasting relations through exchange programs are similar to the diffusion of cultures' ideas, research that is described in cultural relations. As such, the reader should bear these parallels in mind when assessing Melissen's three dimension of public diplomacy.

It is quite obvious that the link to propaganda assigns public diplomacy a negative connotation. Welch's definition of propaganda (as cited in Melissen, 2005b) discerns it as "(...) the deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of an audience through the transmission of ideas and values (...)". By this definition, Melissen argues, there is not much difference between the two (2005b). However, what distinguishes public diplomacy from propaganda is its purpose of opening minds rather than narrowing them down for a specific purpose and its 'two-way street' pattern of communication (Melissen, 2005b). A diplomat that promotes environmental sustainability should surely not be put into the same boat as an ISIS propagandist.

The second concept of national branding/re-branding is akin to public relations in big businesses and aims to mould a particular kind of self image, something that Ibrahim Kalin, the current Presidential Spokesperson, mentions repeatedly (2011). Melissen states that, "nation-branding accentuates a country's identity and reflects its aspirations, but it cannot move much beyond existing social realities" (Melissen, 2005b:20) As such, while it is looked upon favorably by many transitional countries and 'invisible' nations, it also cannot elevate the perceptions of a country all by itself since realities can bypass it (Melissen, 2005b). For instance, the Justice and Development Party government might have toned down its image of 'zero-problems with neighbours' by changing the prime

minister from Davutoğlu to Yıldırım. This could be seen as a case of re-branding. Nation branding itself branches out into many conceptual areas. Anholt, asserts that many have distorted the notion of ‘nation brand’ into ‘nation-branding’; “(...) which seems to contain a promise that the images of countries can be directly manipulated using the techniques of commercial marketing communications” (Anholt, 2013:6).

Lastly, cultural relations provide a necessary bedrock for public diplomacy. Lending points out (as quoted by Melissen, 2005b), that cultural exchange not only exchanges culture but also a country’s thinking, research, journalism and nation’s debate. In addition to his warning on nation branding, Anholt also advises that cultural relations should not turn into cultural promotion, where cultural habits or achievements are thrust into another culture’s attention (2013). Instead nations need to “(...) *do culture together* (...)” (Anholt, 2013:12). Both German and Turkish foreign policy officials participate in such exchange, albeit with different focuses. One might argue that Germany communicates more through debates on specific norms and Turkey more on culture. All in all, these ideas contribute to a new diplomacy in the form of public diplomacy. In spite of its vast attention to detail, this new public diplomacy has also faced criticism.

Further work by Brian Hocking questions ‘New’ Public Diplomacy; new mechanisms of diplomacy based on the post-9/11 world. Relating back to Nye’s and Gallarotti’s proposal of smart power, Hocking accentuates that public diplomacy is not unique to soft power and that a failure to see the difference of public diplomacy in hard power vs. soft power will only obstruct its application (2005). In actuality, public diplomacy is not a new paradigm but inherently related to other modes of power such as

military or economic, and rather a strategy that configures information (Hocking, 2005). In other words, public diplomacy has its own set of mechanisms that need to be considered outside of the framework of soft power. Again, this reinforces the idea that other types of power inextricably establish links with soft power.

Necessarily, I also derive knowledge from preceding soft power studies on Germany and Turkey. Previously, Turkey's soft power policies have been based on its foreign policy of multilateralism, peace promotion, economic and humanitarian assistance (Alpaydin, 2010). However, the academic and policy literature is usually a few years old so recent events are not included. In fact, Turkey's soft power has been questioned back in 2007, because of its domestic security problem (separatist ethnic movements & radical Islam) (Oğuzlu, 2007). Others criticise the soft power concept as too absolute - it does not explain how Turkey can just swiftly shift to hard power as in the case with Syria (Demiryol, 2014). This literature is more recent and challenges the claimed soft power status of Turkey. Meanwhile, prior German literature focuses on how soft power can be used by environmental foreign policy (Wyligala, 2012) or climate diplomacy with 'Energiewende' ('Energy transition') (Li, 2016) or even with the help of sports such as the 2006 Football World Cup in Germany (Grix & Houlihan, 2014). A comparative research provides new insight as to how scholars can characterise Turkey's and Germany's soft power. Policy decisions in Kosovo will highlight whether, for example, Germany's environmental soft power is a model also used in Kosovo and whether Turkey's shift to hard power in the Syrian civil war has affected its attraction in Kosovo.

Last but not least, the application of the above mentioned elements of soft power

depends on some sort of legitimacy. Retracing steps back to the basic understandings of power, Berenskoetter indicates that Weber's approach to power requires a "(...) belief in the legitimacy of the command (...)" (Berenskoetter, 2007:5) by the obedient side.

Weber's requirement for *Herrschaft*⁷ to be legitimate rests upon the ability to institutionalize the relation of power either through legal contracts, agreed terms (i.e. bureaucracy), a belief or tradition (i.e. patriarchs and servants); or the charismatic quality of a leader issuing commands (leader and disciple) (Berenskoetter, 2007).

Certainly, these ideas correspond to some of the aspects of soft power. A soft power can become more legitimate if it acts according to the rules of international organizations (bureaucracy) or if it has attractive values (charisma). In addition, legitimacy itself may also prove to be a direct source of power as: "(...) the belief of actor (B) that (A) is legitimate provides (A) with a source of influence to get (B) to do what it otherwise would not (Whalan, 2013:7)." In this respect, legitimacy can simply be an attribute that enables direct outcomes for a specific actor – hence warranting power.

However, it is impossible to simplify power through a list of ingredients. It is important to notice that as Lukes claims: power is consensual (1980) and such consensus does not only stem from specific characteristics of a leader or the nature of an institution. To clarify the link between power and legitimacy, Arendt states (as cited in Lukes 1980:32): "Power springs up whenever people get together and act in concert, but it derives its legitimacy from the initial getting together rather than from any action that then may follow". Legitimacy under the soft power framework can have multiple

⁷ "Usually translated into English as authority, domination, rule, or governance, *Herrschaft* is defined by Weber as 'the opportunity to find obedience amongst specified persons for a given order' " (Berenskoetter & Williams, 2007:4)

sources. Nye points out that how soft power acts domestically; that is its political values and the strength of its institutions and economy can generate a model for others to follow (Nye, 2004). Furthermore, Nye contends that unilateral foreign policy is an inhibitor of legitimacy and that multilateral institutions such as the UN are sources of legitimacy in world politics (Nye, 2004). All in all, Nye claims that, “(...) both the substance and style of our (US) foreign policy can make a difference to our image of legitimacy, and thus to our soft power” (Nye, 2004:68). Notably, Nye’s attention on domestic and foreign political aspects of legitimacy, echoes with the domestic and external focuses of soft power in this research. It is through repeated actions in both dimensions that power becomes embedded into a specific relation, thus normalizing and legitimizing the power of the one who issues commands. This interactive aspect is of great importance for power in general and more specifically for soft power. After all, without interaction, there can be no base for power relations. Hannah Arendt (as cited in (Habermas & McCarthy, 1977:4) accentuates this train of thought as follows:

Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is ‘in power’ we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name.

Thus, power becomes reliant on unified relations; keeping all actors together. Indeed, without the communicative nature of power, it becomes nothing more than simple dominative power; the focus on the self rather than a unified relation (Penta, 1996). In this sense, one can easily spot the parallels between Mattern’s power conception through ‘linguistic capabilities’ (Mattern, 2007) ,which is a sociolinguistic focus on communicative power. In the end, the communicative and interactive view of power is best represented in Nye’s theory of soft power. To illustrate, Nye’s table on sources,

referees and receivers of soft power can facilitate how and where such interactions take place:

Table 2: Nye's Classification of soft power sources, referees and receivers

SOFT POWER SOURCES, REFEREES, AND RECEIVERS		
Sources of Soft Power	Referees for Credibility or Legitimacy	Receivers of Soft Power
Foreign policies	Governments, media, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)	Foreign governments and publics
Domestic values and policies	Media, NGOs, IGOs	Foreign governments and publics
High culture	Governments, NGOs, IGOs	Foreign governments and publics
Pop culture	Media, markets	Foreign publics

(Source:Nye, 2008)

The interaction stems from Nye's classification of sources such as foreign policy or pop culture. Each source has its corresponding referees for credibility or legitimacy; that is the actors involved in the transmission of the source. For instance, pop culture is legitimized through media and markets. A country's pop culture would be successful in disseminating itself to foreign publics when it is legitimate or credible in the media and market spheres. Actors can generate credibility or legitimacy through a variety of actions that are relevant to the receivers. For example, Nye asserts that it is "(...) domestically difficult for the government to support presentation of views that are critical of its own policies. Yet such criticism is often the most effective way of establishing credibility" (Nye, 2008:105-106). Nye claims that the openness of US society and polity is one reason for its soft power attractiveness towards foreign elites

(2008). In this case, the source of soft power would be either foreign or domestic policies that are refereed by other governments, media, NGOs, IGOs and received by foreign governments and publics.

Nonetheless, domestic dynamics are much more convoluted. Being open to criticism is not enough for a proper application of soft power. Domestic developments in the form of increased security threats and domestic instability are important factors that can inhibit soft power from nurturing. Ten years ago, Tarik Oğuzlu predicted that two reasons would challenge Turkey's emerging soft power identity. Firstly, he (correctly) warned that threats to national security might increase in the years to come which would induce more reliance on hard power (Oğuzlu, 2007). Secondly, he claimed that legitimacy of Turkey's soft power identity depended on "(...) the resolution of Turkey's perennial domestic security problems, namely radical Islam and separatist ethnic movements" (Oğuzlu, 2007:95). Oğuzlu is correct in having assumed that solutions to chronic domestic issues of Turkey are essential for the operation of its planned foreign policy. But reliance on hard power does not necessarily offset soft power, as domestic security is a basic groundwork for soft power development. Vice versa, hard power foreign policy actions can also act domestically by satisfying the security concerns of the public. If basic security needs are not met then the government, citizens, local NGOs, media and markets have no room to exhibit and interact with each other safely. A secure environment is required for these interactions to take place.

This section aimed to clarify the literature background of this dissertation. To sum up, soft power literature can focus on a variety of specific factors ranging from socio-linguistic communication, to leadership roles, to public diplomacy. In this sense,

the dissertation benefits from prior literature by scrutinizing how Turkey and Germany communicate their soft power socio-linguistically or how leaders affect the soft power presence in Kosovo. Having discussed the literature's various debates, the next section will go through this study's position in the literature.

1.3 Significance to Literature

This study is geared towards two areas of IR literature. Soft power scholars because of its focus on neglected aspects of soft power and foreign policy scholars because of its eclectic reach to instruments of foreign policy such as public diplomacy. For the soft power literature, my research aims to fill the gap of how states might differ in soft power applications. Although countries might apply the same tools (i.e. nation branding, cultural relations), each iteration is catered towards the state's structure and its domestic politics. As such, each state communicates its soft power differently. It is the aim of this research to highlight how these differences might be observed empirically.

In terms of foreign policy, this paper aspires to elaborate the link between internal dynamics and foreign policy and how certain foreign policy strategies might differ in practical terms because of such differences. Additionally, my study also highlights to what extent Turkey and Germany utilise soft power with purpose and planning. This is important as to assess the validity of the soft power application. This study's research objective is to clarify and outline Turkey's and Germany's soft power based on empirically founded knowledge. It aims to answer the basic question of how Germany's and Turkey's soft power is strategized, applied and reorganized. The comparison through the soft power presence in Kosovo has been chosen because it can clarify how

the actors might differ in their applications. Kosovo is a relevant pick for the study because of Turkey's historical tie (to the region in general as well) and Germany's overarching plans that include Kosovo in what they coin as the 'Western Balkans'. Additionally, Kosovo is a relevant case because its relative infancy as a state leaves it open to a lot more power relations from the external than other established countries.

On the whole, the relevance of my research paper rests in its study of foreign policy relations with regard to internal dynamics and varieties of structures – whether it be historical, cultural or systemic. It underlines these relations with the foreign policy instrument of soft power, which, while studied extensively, is still a loose concept due to some of its aspects being understudied.

1.4 Methodology

My primary data consists of two categories: elite and expert interviews (i.e. foreign policy actors such as diplomats, public officials but also academics and journalists who are linked to the soft power policies) and web-based content from newspapers and ministerial websites. The list of interviewees for the pool was constructed based on participants' understanding of Turkish/German foreign policy or their connections to the region. This qualifies individuals who are knowledgeable about Turkish/German foreign policy in general and also those who have worked in the Balkans or specifically in Kosovo. These interviews and web-content help illuminate how foreign policy actors formulate their soft power policy/strategies and how they are influenced by variables such as domestic or structural developments. In short, I gathered my primary data through two channels: the internet for newspaper articles, ministerial and institutional websites; and interviews for the opinions of elites.

Considering that my data is only text-based, I have opted to use content analysis as part of my analytical method. Content analysis makes inferences from data and gives me quantitative results of the content (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2005), which I expect to test my thesis' claims appropriately. From a conceptual viewpoint, content analysis highlights the cause-effect relationship I have theorized. That is, the relationship between Turkey's and Germany's interpretations of foreign policy, the independent variable, to their soft power application, which is the dependent variable. Hence, I test a hypothesis that assesses a relationship via different variables, which are situated within the content. In this case, the purpose of content analysis is to draw inferences from the content's meaning and the context of its production and consumption (Riffe et al., 2005). Accordingly, the content's meaning, production and consumption extrapolates how policy documents communicate Turkish and German soft power notions and how Kosovo's officials or public consumes/reproduces these communicative efforts.

It is also important to note that my comparative analysis follows a most different research design. Consequently, I fix the independent variable across the two cases, which means that the content variables in the content analysis will be similar for both Germany and Turkey. Some codes that I use as my independent variables are: 'Culture', 'History', 'Institutions', 'Rule of Law', 'Democracy' etc. The software that I apply for the content analysis are Google Scraper, which searches for content on the web and QSR's NVivo 11. NVivo 11 has useful algorithms that can map out the relationships in-between codes and documents. Ultimately, Turkish and German soft power images are shaped by both the input that each government gives and the subsequent outputs observed by Kosovar officials. As such, the content analysis of word codes (i.e. Culture,

Democracy) assesses my thesis' claims because it quantifies and evaluates the symbols used. The concentration of these symbols in turn map out the communication that are representative of the soft power of Turkey and Germany.



CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A proper evaluation and application of a highly ambiguous term such as that of soft power, requires a multifaceted understanding of various aspects of international relations. For instance, soft power can be principally assessed through the lens of public diplomacy (see Melissen, 2005b), through the strength of domestic institutions and values (see Nye, 2004), through verbal communication (see Mattern, 2005) or even in coordination with hard power (see Gallarotti, 2011). The vast amount of possibilities involved with soft power analysis can confuse readers and scholars alike on how and through which channels, actors conduct their soft power strategies. Accordingly, to present a clear view of how the soft power of Turkey and Germany operate in Kosovo with regards to their own domestic dynamics, this study focuses on specific attributes of soft power that may best highlight those interactions. Since there is no list of definitive soft power attributes that scholars have collectively agreed upon, the attributes discussed in this study may be categorized and grouped according to Nye's soft power 'currencies': values, culture, policies and institutions (see Nye, 2004). Additionally, each attribute is assigned a domestic or foreign dimension as to underscore the domestic dynamics involved in this soft power arrangement.

The choice of these attributes is inspired by both the fundamental soft power literature (i.e. Nye) and subsequent research, such as Alan Chong's identification of three dimensions of small state soft power; these being: enlargement of political economy potential, models of good governance and diplomatic mediation (2007b). Although neither Germany nor Turkey can be designated as a small power, the classifications suggested by Chong can illuminate aspects of soft power that are usually neglected. For instance, Nye distinguishes between soft and economic power (2004), whilst Chong accentuates the importance of economic potential, which he applies to the case study of Singapore (Chong, 2007b). As an effort to acknowledge previous knowledge and contribute to the cumulative field of soft power the study adds, with respect to the thesis' focus on domestic dynamics of soft power, ideational or cultural projections into consideration. Similarly, these attributes are also utilized under the roof of soft power literature. This section will discuss the theoretical underpinnings and the corresponding methodology of the research.

The first attribute that is significant to this study is external and is positioned within the foreign aspect of soft power. Nye signifies this as a source of soft power called 'foreign policies' (refer Table 2) while Chong denotes it as an information strategy dimension termed 'diplomatic mediation' (2007b). Foreign policies as a source of soft power inextricably relates to the 'policies' currency of soft power and the corresponding government policies of public, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy that Nye lays out in *The Means to Success* (2004). The success of these diplomatic methods depends on a variety of factors and other actors. Nye postulates that so called referees evaluate the legitimacy and credibility of a soft power (Nye, 2008). Chong's closely

related dimension of ‘diplomatic mediation’ that small states demonstrate, also supports this observation as it relies on a “(...) capital derived from the domestic reputation and international record of small states” (Chong, 2007b:10). Although Chong is indicating the almost ideational powers that are tied to the diplomacy of small states such as that of the Vatican; characteristics of building trust and the pacific settlement of interstate disputes, which constitute the heart of successful diplomatic mediators (2007b), are also imperative for the soft power of Germany and Turkey in the case of Kosovo.

Considering the antagonistic nature between Serbia and Kosovo, such diplomatic mediation has the possibility of harnessing a lot of legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of other states, IGOs or NGOs – thus extending soft power reach beyond Kosovo. For the purpose of this study, Nye’s and Chong’s two definitions are consolidated under the attribute of ‘Foreign Policy and Diplomacy’.

The diplomatic dimension added to this attribute is essential for two reasons. For example, Turkey’s foreign policy towards Kosovo is dictated by its broader Balkan foreign policy, which according to a high-level Turkish diplomat associated to the Balkan region, defines it with the aspects of stability, peace, welfare and even the joint prospects of joining the EU (Author’s interview, January 20, 2017, Ankara). However, this general foreign policy does not focus on public diplomacy or multilateral diplomacy (only in the EU example maybe, but still insufficient), which requires deepened connections and networks with civil groups and international organizations such as NATO or the UN. Via this combined classification the research includes not only the wide-ranging foreign policy goals and strategies of Germany and Turkey, but also its

diplomatic manner, which in turn provides this research the capability of fully assessing the two states' soft power skills.

Opposite to the foreign dimension of the first attribute, the second attribute represents another amalgamation of Nye's sources of soft power; domestic values and policies (2008). Chong's model on small states designates these domestic features as 'models of good governance' (2007b). Nye defines domestic values and policies as elements that make, in his case, the United States attractive; i.e. democracy, human rights, individualism, liberty (2004). But, these values cannot be merely imposed through rhetoric. As Nye points out, not being able to uphold these values both abroad and domestically results in double standards and hypocrisy, which is detrimental to the soft power of a nation (2004). Some examples Nye provides relate to capital punishment, distrust in the government, crime and divorce rates or post-9/11 policies that led to scandals such as that of Abu Ghraib (2004). To add, Nye also proves that even among the values of Western nations, there can be friction; i.e. the divide between Germany and the US on the Iraq War (2004). To mitigate this facet, Chong's dimension of good governance can be of help. Based on international indices Chong designates good governance through the normative standards of "(...) probity in application of the law, financial propriety, absence of cronyism, policing corruption, peaceful transfers of leadership, and bureaucracy efficiency" (Chong, 2007b:9). Evidently, these standards range from a variety of domestic components, some of which spill over to some of the other attributes. An efficient bureaucracy or the absence of cronyism are necessary prerequisite for a meritocratic and legitimate diplomatic ministry and with it successful diplomatic conduct with regards to soft power. All in all, Nye's domestic values and

Chong's attention to good governance comprise the second attribute weighed in this research: 'Domestic Values and Governance'.

The third attribute considered in this paper might be debatable under soft power requirements, since it includes the hard power component of economy. Even if Nye has entitled economic power as its own power type (2004) there is no reason to believe that it means total exclusion or detachment from soft power. Just like military power can interact and bolster soft power assets (Gallarotti, 2011), so do economic factors benefit other soft power strategies or attributes. After all, to conduct cultural or educational diplomacy through cultural agencies or scholarship programs, economic power is pivotal. Bigger economies can give greater financial freedom to the ministries that are occupied with scholarly or cultural exchange scholarships. The attractiveness of economic potential of a country can further this by cultivating even more exchange. Therefore, the economic approach taken here should not be confused with economic sanctions, inducement or coercion, which suggest hard power means of getting what one wants. Rather, economic potential, akin to Chong's paper on small state soft power, is key to the attractiveness of a nation (2007b). The perspective taken in Chong's paper is classified as 'enlargement of political economy potential' (2007b). The political dimension of this term grants it a more social and corporatist aspect, which is why Chong defines it as "(...) a demonstrable competence in the management of communities affecting the wealth of a government and its population" (Chong, 2007b:8). Surely, his characterization of this dimension was meant to describe the attractiveness of infrastructural development, capital and trade flows of small states such as that of Panama or Singapore (Chong, 2007b). Nonetheless, this thinking should not be

exclusive to small states and can also matter for the attractiveness of bigger states such as Germany or Turkey. Indeed, economic potential and the metropolitan life of cities such as Berlin or Istanbul is the reason why many Kosovars might be attracted to those places.

When compared, Germany's and Turkey's economic potential are heaps apart giving Kosovo's population and its companies vastly different impressions of the country's soft power. According to the UNDP website, Kosovo is a lower-middle income country with a poverty rate of 29.7% and youth unemployment reaching 57.7% (<http://www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/countryinfo.html>). Thus, Kosovo's economic struggles provide an opportunity for Germany and Turkey to intervene and strengthen their soft power presence there. To illustrate, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) has provided 9,86 million USD of bilateral official development assistance (ODA) as of 2015 (TIKA, 2017). In contrast, according to the website of Germany's own developmental agency: Deutsche Gesellschaft für International Zusammenarbeit (GiZ); Germany has committed itself to 23 projects in Kosovo with 65 million USD in commissions (www.giz.de/projektdaten/index.action?request_locale=en_EN#?region=4&countries=XK). Albeit the data does not state what year this is from or whether this is only the committed volume of finance. Furthermore, interestingly, the GiZ does not provide any ODA annual report data similar to that of TIKA. Instead the GiZ shifts its focus as it states the following (GiZ, 2015:30):

GIZ is pursuing a different goal. 'Should I stay or should I go?' is the question many Kosovars are asking themselves. The new German Information Point for Migration, Education and Career (...) DIMAK, aims to provide answers. (...) Technical and vocational education and training, youth employment and private

sector promotion activities underline the advantages of staying in Kosovo and building a promising future at home, rather than suffering disappointment in a strange country.

Germany's GiZ seems to transcend a simple representation of figures and instead provides possible economic opportunities through its 23 projects and its commitment to provide technical and educational training for the youth through DIMAK. Both the TIKa and the GiZ are soft power apparatuses that need to be discussed under a theoretical soft power framework.

In this sense, retaining most of the fundamental arguments made by Chong and other peers, the study terms the third attribute as 'Political-Economic Potential'. Many Turkish high-level diplomats, such as one that was stationed in Germany, admired Germany's huge economic potential fueled by the EU (and also fueling it) aspiring Turkey to achieve similar heights (Author's interview, February 2, 2017, Ankara). In fact, the same official stated that he discussed the importance of economic development with then foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, which he questioned with: "But what about our principles?" Notably, Kemal Kirişçi has argued that Davutoğlu's zero-problem policy and trading state blueprint make only "(...) scant reference to economics (...)" (Kirişçi, 2009:44). The emphasis on principles guides us to the final and fourth attribute of soft power.

In *The Means to Success*, the first source of soft power that Nye identifies is culture. This is unsurprising because culture seems to be the most understood and, at the same time, the opaquest out of all soft power sources. Firstly, it is essential to make the distinction between the two varieties: high culture (i.e. literature, art, education etc.) and pop culture (i.e. mass entertainment) (Nye, 2004). Contrary to Niall Ferguson's claim

that US soft power is demonstrated through American cultural and commercial goods such as Tom Cruise or McDonald's (Ferguson, 2003), Nye insists that popular cultural power does not equate to soft power (2004). As Nye points out popular cultural assets such as McDonald's do not deter most Serbs to support Milosevic, nor does Pokémon ease Japan's foreign policy outcomes (2004). Quite the opposite can transpire through popular culture. Other countries might feel their own culture being undermined by the gargantuan of American goods and entertainment (2004). Simply, Starbucks can be perceived as an invading force into Parisian café culture. On the other hand, despite Turkey's domestic issues, most Balkan, Middle Eastern and even Latin American countries, will feel attracted to Turkish daily life through TV soap operas (Rousselin, 2013). Much like values, culture is not an all-purpose tool, but rather a wild card that can either be indirectly beneficial or detrimental to a nation's soft power.

Similarly, high culture is also not a tangible resource that yields firm results. As Fan spotlights, Chinese and Indian rich high cultures do not provide them immediate soft power (2008). At first glance, Turkey's focus on shared history and culture seems to point out that high culture is a dominant soft power factor. However, a balanced study needs to consider how pop culture acts in the sidelines of high culture and how the state interferes with some aspects of Turkish entertainment. Equally, Germany's cultural interactions with Kosovo are also in need of this balance. Moreover, both need to be considered within cultural diplomatic and educational frameworks. This fourth attribute of soft power does spill over to other attributes such as diplomatic mediation or economic potential as well. For instance, Chong postulates that diplomatic mediation of the papal diplomacy was an ideational threat to varying degrees for Nazi Germany,

Fascist Italy, Communist Poland or China (2007b). Therefore, Turkish and German diplomacy demands a close inspection with regards to culture. Culture is not only an important factor for cultural diplomacy but diplomacy in general.

Values have been discussed under the second attribute, ‘Domestic Values and Governance’, which again shows the interconnectedness among each attribute. Values are closely related to culture while still remaining an exclusive element of soft power. As mentioned before, akin to culture, values are not universally compatible and can hinder soft power rather than re-enforcing it. Nevertheless, the link between culture and values is a necessary thread that needs to be considered for the fourth attribute utilized in this study: ‘Culture and Ideational Influence’.

To summarize, these four attributes have been grouped under a domestic, foreign matrix and with consideration to Nye’s sources of soft power table (refer Table 2). Identical to Nye’s Table 2 typology, receivers of soft power have been added to my model. Differently from Nye, means have been designated with respect to each attribute’s methods. Naturally, economic potential can be showcased through domestic economic development or amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) to other countries. Similarly, foreign policies and diplomacy is conducted through either bilateral or multilateral diplomacy, while cultural ideas can be conveyed through cultural diplomacy or civil society activities. Furthermore, channels of each attribute are inspired by Nye’s referees of soft power (refer Table 2). The channels are the segments of the global order through which each attribute must inevitably pass through in order to be legitimate. Via these basic additions and revisions, the following representation is generated:

Table 3: Modification of Nye’s soft power typology based on attributes and dimensions

Dimension	Attribute	Means	Channels	Receivers of Soft Power
Foreign	Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy	Governments, IGOs, NGOs, Media	Foreign Governments and publics
Domestic	Domestic Values and Governance	Rule of Law, Institutional integrity,	Domestic Government, Municipalities	Foreign governments and publics, Municipalities
Both	Political Economic Potential	Foreign Direct Investment, Domestic economic growth, Global capitalist network	Companies, NGOs, IGOs, Governments	Foreign governments, companies and publics
Both	Culture and Ideational Influence	Cultural Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, Civil society	Government agencies, NGOs, IGOs	Foreign governments and publics

(Source: Nye, 2008)

Not only do these attributes stay true to previous academic literature by pioneers such as Nye, they also overlap with existing quantitative frameworks such as that of Portland Communications’ Global Soft Power Index (McClory, 2015). The index combines objective data through indices such as ‘Government’; which represents public institutions, political values, major policy outcomes, ‘Engagement’, ‘Enterprise’ or ‘Culture’, with subjective data such as ‘Culture’, ‘Foreign Policy’ or even ‘Cuisine’ (McClory, 2015). Suffice to say, there are a myriad of aspects to consider when

attempting to empirically assess soft power. As such, my typology in Table 3 is similar to the Portland Communications' index, which was designed with the "(...) inherently subjective nature" (McClory, 2015:22) of soft power in mind. The next section will detail the method of collection and analysis of data.

Each of these attributes' importance and application for Turkey and Germany will be evaluated quantitatively through web-based content analysis of newspaper articles from each country and governmental websites. Prior to any enquiry on the data collected, a certain addendum is in order. Web-based content analysis is a particularly demanding and problematic undertaking. With the advent of Web 2.0's more interactive media design, websites have become much more complex and dynamic, challenging methods of traditional content analysis, which had easily identifiable sources and corresponding fixed content (Skalski, Neuendorf, & Cajigas, 2017). Other scholars such as McMillan have predicted almost two decades ago the difficulty of microscopically analyzing a 'moving target' that is the Web (2000). Stempel and Stewart have also argued in the same year that the Internet is similar to a 'mixed blessing' for researchers (2000). For instance, news articles' content might vary from the full story put on paper or some websites modify the length of texts (Stempel & Stewart, 2000).

Nevertheless, McMillan has also asserted that the Web does not challenge the final phases of analyzing and interpreting data, but rather requires thoroughness on the part of researchers (2000). In McMillan's words, "In conclusion, the microscope of content analysis can be applied to the moving target of the Web. But researchers must use rigor and creativity to make sure that they don't lose focus before they take aim" (McMillan, 2000:93). Bearing this in mind, each newspaper article has been scrutinized

and handpicked meticulously and coded through NVivo 11 for the purpose of the research topic. Via this method, the significance of the soft power attributes that is demonstrated in the content will be weighed against the intentions of each actor. In chapters three and four, I evaluate to what extent Turkey and Germany practice and preach each attribute.



CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDY TURKEY

3.1 Foreign Policy Fundamentals and Aims

Any deep analysis of foreign policy should entail and begin from the respective entity that decides on its direction. In Charles and Margaret Hermann's vocabulary, the respective decision unit(s) of foreign policy, is or are imperative to such investigation (2001). However, this research does not concern itself with the dynamics of decision units, but solely explores the content of foreign policies. Under these circumstances, an appropriate beginning of Turkish foreign policy should consider the official narrative of it. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) offers a valuable starting point.

The government website's claimed normative stance portrays the core of Turkish foreign policy as value-driven and dynamic. The first paragraphs convey the notion that Turkey is concerned principally with human activities, best exposed by the following statement, "Turkey takes initiative to pursue, in the words of Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, 'an enterprising and humanitarian foreign policy' " (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>). This humanitarian focus is further coupled by the MFA website with political, economic and social aspects, with a bold proclamation that, "Principles do matter"

(<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's famous quote "Peace at home, Peace in the World" is exemplified as one such principle along with an overarching peace oriented approach. Furthermore, the statement uses this foundation to amplify Turkey's approach of a 'principled' vision, which only appears vaguely. Notably, Ahmet Davutoğlu's foreign policy approach is still influential, since his 'zero problems with neighbors' strategy was a peace-oriented approach with an attention to, what he designates, as the 'human element' of power politics (Davutoğlu, 2001). This underpinning framework is reinforced by accounts of Turkey's active involvement in multilateral institutions such as the EU or NATO and is amalgamated by the MFA website in the 2023 vision of achieving "concrete objectives covering various aspects of governance" (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>). Although, a high-level official from the MFA has confirmed that the 2023 vision is a principal goal of Turkish foreign policy (Author's interview, January 30, 2017, Ankara), it is only abstractedly mentioned by both the MFA website and other sources. In contrast, the website's description of Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans is much clearer.

The MFA website's declaration on Balkan relations is fairly straightforward and effectively reflects Turkey's overall foreign policy. Apart from the political, economic and geographical importance, the Balkans are also predominantly associated with historical, cultural and human ties (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-with-the-balkan-region.en.mfa>). Accordingly, the humanitarian aspect of Turkish foreign policy that has been of focus in the previous declaration, can be seen seeping into many of the regional policies. The website's statement continues to point out that the Balkans' peace, stability

and territorial integrity is vital to Turkey, not only because of ties to Turkish minority communities, kin and also the vast amounts of Balkan-originated Turkish citizens, but also because Turkey itself is a Balkan country (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-with-the-balkan-region.en.mfa>). Correspondingly, Turkey's Balkan policy is affected by factors such as kinship ties and geographical considerations. Indeed, this characterization of Turkey is an essential reason as to why it pursues an active role in the Balkans.

Amongst examples of such active participation are Turkey's Chairmanship in the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP); a joint initiative of 12 countries in the Balkans that aims to nurture regional cooperation. Yet, the most notable involvement of Turkey was her initiation of the Trilateral Summit with Bosnia Herzegovina and Serbia launched in 2010. The MFA website states that the summit was conducted amongst the presidencies of each country, leading to constructive talks and prospects of further cooperation between Bosnia Herzegovina and Serbia (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ankara-summit-declaration-adopted-at-the-conclusion-of-turkey-_bosnia-herzegovina-_serbia-trilateral-summit_-15-may-2013_-ankara.en.mfa). Lastly, Turkey's bilateral and trilateral active diplomacy in the Balkans does not mean that it acts against the grain of EU integration politics. Quite the contrary, a high-level Turkish diplomat asserts that apart from shared historical ties, the Balkans and Turkey also share the future of regional integration and EU accession (Author's interview, 20 January 2017, Ankara). Though this ambition is also reiterated in the Ankara Declaration following the trilateral talks, contemporary situations such as diplomatic predicaments between EU countries and Turkey, have forced a reconsideration of these assertions.

Most of the above discussed assumptions also carry over to Turkey's bilateral relations with Kosovo. The political, economic, cultural and historical ties all stimulate Turkey's active involvement in Kosovo. Notwithstanding, a nuanced analysis of Turkey's soft power role requires a look into Turkey's foreign policy character with regards to academic literature.

3.2 Turkey's Foreign Policy Character

Any consideration of Turkish foreign policy and diplomacy obligates a breakdown of its fundamental principles. Perhaps the best way to start is by assessing Turkey's role within an international context. It is unsurprising to see divergence between academic and state-level awareness of international relations. Yet, nowhere might this divide be more apparent than in the Turkish case. Aydın, for instance, begins his paper on the determinants of Turkish foreign policy with the striking opening remark: "Turkey is not one of the great powers of the twentieth century" (Aydın, 2004:1). Barely a decade later, foreign minister Davutoğlu declares that Turkey's strategic objective until 2023 is to become, in his exact words: "A democratic country with a strong economic structure. A regional, European and global power" (Davutoğlu, 2011, London).⁸ Surely the wording is different, but the 2023 vision is the aspiration to become a great power. So what drives a former academic like Davutoğlu to announce these goals with so much confidence? What perceptive shift can we see within Turkish

⁸ Speech entitled "Vision 2023: Turkey's Foreign Policy Objectives" delivered by Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey at the Turkey Investor Conference: The road to 2023 organized by Goldman Sachs (London, 22.11.2011)

foreign policy before the turn of the millennium? The next part aims to clarify under what historical context Turkish foreign policy has developed under the JDP.

Turkey's unique geographic position and its multifaceted, even ambiguous, cultural composition of West and East, gives it a truly unique position in international relations. The duality of a western and eastern ideals has drastic effects on Turkish foreign policy, spawning confusion among policy-makers, researchers and academics as to how for instance the rising conservative tendencies since the 70s and peak with the JDP, would translate to Turkish foreign policy (Aydin, 2004). This murky perspective is best described in Aydin's following quote (Aydin, 2004:6):

(...) it appears that almost everyone seems to agree that something is happening in Turkish foreign policy - something that has not been satisfactorily explained by Turkey specialists. But there seems to be no agreement as to what is happening and where it leads the country.

It is therefore essential to acknowledge the variety of cultural, ideational and religious dynamics of Turkey, which can and do increase uncertainty in her foreign policy behaviors.

Nonetheless, even the ambiguity of Turkish foreign policy behavior is dictated by some inflexible principles, which stem from experience, tradition, basic values and norms (Aydin, 2004). Aydin provides two indicators, or determinants of Turkish foreign policy: structural and conjectural (2004). Structural determinants can be independent from the international political medium and daily happenings, “ (...) exerting a long term influence over the determination of foreign policy goals” (Aydin, 1999:155). Some examples of structural determinants are geographical position, historical experiences, cultural background along with national stereotypes and images of other nations (Aydin,

1999). Meanwhile, conjectural determinants “(...) exert temporary influence on a country’s foreign policy and especially on its daily implementations” (Aydin, 1999:155). These can be domestic or international developments, such as the end of the Cold War, changes in balance of power, domestic political changes, scarcity of economic factors or the personalities of specific decision-makers (Aydin, 1999). Bearing these factors in mind, Turkey’s soft power towards the Balkans is indivisibly linked to either structural or conjectural determinants; or in some measure tied to both.

Turkey’s structural determinants can be condensed into three main traditional inputs: the Ottoman experience and its legacy; geopolitical realities; and the ideological foundations defined under Atatürk (Aydin, 2004). With this framework we can infer that Turkey’s foreign policy behavior is determined by the interplay of historical roots, geopolitics and Republicanism. These three determinants are not mutually exclusive but manifest themselves simultaneously and interact with each other. For instance, the interchange between historical roots and Republicanism affects the geopolitics of Turkey and what role it assigns to itself. One could argue that the back-and-forth between historical roots and Republicanism has become more distinguishable in the JDP era, due to increased positive sentiments of a romantic Ottoman period. Yet, as a matter of fact, Philip Robins posits “ (...) that the experience of competing value systems goes back at least to the 1830s and the idea of the Tanzimat (...)” (Robins, 2007:290). Robins’ Huntington inspired analysis concludes that the conflictual nature of Kemalism and post-Islamism is that of ‘cohabitation’; a cooperation rather than dissonance (Robins, 2007).

While cohabitation is debatable in today's circumstances, there is no denying that the two value systems are at odds with each other. Still, historical roots in Robins' so called post-Islamist sense, rather than Republican ideals found in Kemalism, seem to set the geopolitical agenda nowadays. In his opening speech as foreign minister for the 4th Ambassador's Conference, Ahmet Davutoğlu proclaimed the following (2011): "There is nothing to shy away from our history. On the contrary, we see our history and geography as a center of great power. We will extract our power from there."⁹ Clearly, history-centric foreign policy was a key indicator of JDP's foreign policy in the beginning of the decade. However, this does not mean that historical roots had no affect on geopolitical strategies during previous periods.

Prior to the JDP era, the Turkish foreign ministry would regard its Ottoman legacy as a reason for insecurity (Aydin, 2004). Kenan Evren's (leader of the 1980 coup and Turkey's seventh president) stance on history reflects this properly (as quoted in Aydin, 1999): "Turkey's historical position indicates that she is obliged to pursue a policy based on being strong and stable within her region... (since) she is surrounded by unfriendly neighbors." The rift between Davutoğlu and Evren's statements is quite noticeable. Arguably, the metamorphosis of Turkey's foreign policy perspective is an outcome of its conjectural factors, one of these being of course the political, economic and constitutional transformation it underwent during the JDP years. Assuredly, domestic transformations started during the neoliberal policies of the Özal period, which attempted to shift the state-centric economic status quo (Buğra, 1994). But Özal's period

⁹ Author's translation from Turkish: "Bizim tarihten çekineceğimiz bir şey yok. Aksine tarihimizi ve coğrafyamızı büyük bir güç merkezi olarak görüyoruz. Gücümüzü de oradan alacağız."

of transformation was rather imperfect, only shifting the state apparatus to the executive branch of Prime Minister (Buğra, 1994). The JDP period had been more successful in the late 00s because EU institutions propelled Turkey away from prior ‘illiberalism’ and encouraged the transformation of civil society (Grigoriadis, 2009). The conjectural factors engendered by the EU led to drastic domestic and subsequent foreign policy change. At the time, Aydın lists the following conjectural factors having a heavy impact on Turkish foreign policy:

Table 4: Conjectural factors that have heavily impacted Turkish foreign policy

- The transition to détente and the subsequent end of the Cold War
- the Cyprus issue
- constitutional and political developments of the country along with economic ambitions and problems
- the 1960 military intervention and the various political-ideological outcomes of it
- the 1961’ Constitution and its socio-political structuring

(Aydın, 1999)

Of course, these events are to a lesser extent not heated topics as they used to be and many others, such as Kurdish separatism, can be listed at the time of this writing. For example, the failed coup attempt in 2016, Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian civil war, the refugee crisis and the ISIS threat connected to those events, are far more impactful on the current state of affairs. Surely, these event will be considered as well. However, due to research lag that is inherent in social sciences, it is not as easy to sketch Turkey’s immediate foreign policy behavior as accurately. Besides, the utilization of a path dependent framework is vital to a full comprehension of current Turkish foreign policy. The actions and viewpoints of today’s policy-makers and politicians are surely affected and molded by recent events, but the ideological make-up and basis of the

current government very much relies on past events and structural changes, namely some of the ones Aydın lists.

To illustrate, the economic ambition of the Özal period and the subsequent economic crises in the 90s has fueled the JDP government's rhetoric of not repeating the mistakes of the 90s, whilst also further advancing the neoliberal reforms of Özal in order to become a global economic power by 2023. Consecutively, the 2023 aspiration had extended itself into Davutoğlu's foreign policy of becoming a regional economic powerhouse connecting East and West, along with friendly relations with all of Turkey's neighbors. This is only one conjectural factor that echoes into current politics. The failed coup attempt has impacted the political climate very heavily, resonating the coup of the 60s and of the 80s. Moreover, the end of the Cold War has shifted Turkey's geostrategic situation rather dramatically since the West's Communist competitor is no more present. Still, Turkey's geopolitical setting means that the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war have affected it immensely. However, instead of heavy reliance on the West, Turkey has observed much more self-confident behavior, which has worried some of its Western allies. This shift has stimulated fierce discussion over Turkey's foreign policy. In fact, such behaviors have also been amplified by the Balkan conflicts which relate to the focus of this study. Aydın notes (Aydın, 2004:97):

Especially in connection with the Bosnian conflict (...) questions were raised about whether the West would have allowed the Serbs to conduct their so-called "ethnic cleansing" if the victims were Slovenians or Croatians, that is Christians instead of Moslems. These events in the Balkans, when viewed together with the Karabakh issue (...) resulted in the questioning of both Turkey's western orientation and the desirability of her further integration into Europe. In the meantime, pan-Turkist and neo-Ottomanist ideas gained ground, at least among right-leaning intellectuals.

As shown, connecting past events with current activities is crucial to clarify Turkish foreign policy and to illuminate its connections with domestic structural or conjectural dynamics. Bearing this in mind, Turkey's structural and conjectural determinants have steered its foreign policy towards the prospect of soft power. The contents and character of Turkish soft power will be discussed in the next section.

3.3 Turkish Soft Power

Akin to most other states, soft power is a relatively recent phenomenon in Turkish foreign policy. Although Turkey exhibited soft power even before the JDP period during the 90s, the exact approach to Turkish soft power was only initially formulated by government officials in 2011 with Ibrahim Kalın's *Perceptions* (published by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Center for Strategic Research) article: "Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey." The same year, Selcen Öner dissected Turkish soft power into internal and external factors (2011). Öner looks at the determining internal and external factors of the two terms: 2002-2007 and 2007-2011, that contributed the most to Turkish soft power. Internally, Turkish soft power gained vitality when the JDP, a party with an Islamist origin and a seemingly democratic agenda, came to power in 2002 (Öner, 2011). Meanwhile, the prospect of an EU accession, constituted the external factor that helped Turkey gain soft power momentum (Öner, 2011). A solid relation between internal and external factors is crucial for the endurance and continuity of soft power, since they inevitably affect each other. The first JDP term between 2002-2007 is a good illustration of such synergy.

From an institutional perspective, Turkey accumulates significant soft power through government-tied organizations/institutions such Yunus Emre Institute. An illustration of such institutions are displayed in the table below:

Table 5: Institutes tied to Turkey’s foreign cultural and educational relations; their main objectives and presence

Yunus Emre Institute	- Promoting Turkish language and culture - Worldwide presence: 40 centers in 34 countries¹⁰
Türkiye Scholarships by YTB ¹¹	- Supports foreign students and researchers - Worldwide presence: since 2011 over 1000 projects in 70 countries and has provided approximately 100 million TL in financial assistance¹² - 16000 scholarships in 105 universities in 55 Turkish cities¹³
Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Cultural Exchange Programs	- Held around 215 cultural and art events abroad in 2016 - Ex. ‘Turkish Festival’, ‘Turkish Cinema Weeks’, ‘Turkish Culture Days/Weeks’¹⁴

As displayed, a variety of Turkish governmental institutions conduct cultural or educational policies in order to convey a certain image of Turkey. While, the Yunus Emre emphasizes the promotion of Turkish culture and language, the YTB mainly focuses on educational support. With scholarships to international students of around 100 million TL and in 55 Turkish cities, the YTB has contributed to Turkey’s educational attraction to international students. Meanwhile, cultural conducts such as

¹⁰ Accessed from Yunus Emre Institute’s official website: <http://www.yee.org.tr/en/>.

¹¹ English: The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities

¹² Accessed from YTB’s official website: https://www.ytb.gov.tr/proje_destek.php.

¹³ Accessed from Türkiye Bursları/Scholarship official website: <https://www.turkiyeburslari.gov.tr/en/english-home/>.

¹⁴ Accessed from the MFA’s official website: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/cultural-activities-organized-abroad.en.mfa>.

that of the MFA (i.e. Turkish festivals) or Yunus Emre's language centers, has provided Turkey a cultural presence in the international community.

Furthermore, this first term was also characterized by a lot of soft power accumulation through domestic human rights reforms and civil rights dialogue combined with the EU's financial commitment that would support these changes (Öner, 2011). This was especially important because the post 9/11 climate had introduced a West-Islam debate to the forefront. The fact that a predominantly Muslim country with a traditionalist religious government would push for Europeanization in those formative years was reason enough for Western countries to hope that Turkey would act as a role model for other Middle Eastern countries (Oğuzlu, 2007). This optimism by the West is key to soft power accumulation since for Turkey “ (...) to be considered as a soft power, the credibility of the Turkish model needs to be recognised by the Western and Middle Eastern countries” (Oğuzlu, 2007:89). Of course, this is not exclusively true for Turkey, since Nye's soft power explication defines credibility as a necessary requirement of soft power (Nye, 2008). Internally, such credibility was mostly achieved with the government's attempt at de-securitizing internal and external issues. Indeed, proponents such as Oğuzlu argue that this de-securitization has been the prime method of Turkish attraction in the early to late 2000s (Oğuzlu, 2007:88):

The attractiveness of the Turkish model and the concomitant rise in Turkey's soft power has become possible following the government-led de-securitization process in which previously securitised issues are now being gradually redefined as political issues. It is only in a de-securitized environment that analysts can examine whether Turkey's soft power exists or not.

An internal example of this was the JDP government's politicization of the Kurdish issue and distinguishing it from PKK-led terrorism, while an external example was the

less securitized positive relations with Syria back then (Oğuzlu, 2007). In fact, relations had improved since 1999, even before JDP rule, bringing economic and cultural dimensions into the forefront rather than political and military ones. As will be discussed later, the unsolved Kurdish issue and foreign relations with Syria have taken more securitised turns, akin to the previous governments. Thus, Turkey has effectively lost most of the soft power it has accumulated in those early periods.

Oğuzlu had reported as far back as 2007 that Turkey's soft power precondition was that it needed to find long-lasting solutions to these de-securitized problems (2007). Then again, some of the literature has also argued that Turkey could not gain enough legitimacy without intervening into the affairs of the Middle-East and Central Asia (Beng, 2008). Still, Phar Kim Beng also acknowledges that Turkish soft power requires a domestic growth before expanding onto the foreign realm (2008). Other literature has also suggested that a EU-centric approach of the Turkish political and foreign policy elite would be more beneficial to Turkey's, and in fact also the EU's, soft power (Altınay, 2008). The inability to find an appropriate approach by the political and foreign policy elite is reason enough to understand why Turkey's soft power has taken deep impacts.

3.4 Turkish Foreign Policy in Kosovo

It is unavoidable and certainly necessary to scrutinize Turkey's foreign policy in Kosovo under the context of her relationship and policies towards the Balkans. Under this framework, there are two distinguishable features that Turkey's foreign policy in the Balkans exhibits: support of integration into multilateral institutions along with respective multilateral diplomacy and reinforcement of historical-cultural ties (Author's

interview with high-level Turkish diplomat, December 20, 2016, Ankara). Under this framework Turkey has been a staunch supporter of aiding Kosovo in gaining recognition from countries and international organization memberships (Author's interview with high-level Turkish diplomat, December 20, 2016 and high-level Kosovar diplomat, February 2, 2017, both in Ankara). Similar to the determinants of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey's multilateralism and its historical-cultural sentiments in the Balkans are not independent from each other and in fact are at some instances at odds.

In a sense, one might even prescribe the dynamics between the two as paradoxical. On the one hand, Turkey's prior look to the West enforced its desire to join the EU and henceforth placed it in almost the same camp as the Western Balkans. On the other, the historical and cultural sentiments that it pursues with its neighbors is labeled as Neo-Ottomanism and thus a hindrance to EU integration of the Western Balkans. Ultimately, this duality is certainly an echo of Turkey's structural determinants of the Ottoman experience and legacy and the ideas/values of Atatürk's leadership. The JDP government's romantic sentiments of the Ottoman legacy overshadow West-oriented beliefs of foreign policy and thus generated almost an identity crisis of how Turkish diplomacy should be conducted in the Balkans. This is why other actors in the region such as Germany grow suspicious of Turkey's activities there. A senior and high-level official Turkish diplomat states that German diplomats would rather frequently ask their Turkish counterparts in regular friendly conversations whether they had any big plans in the Balkans (Author's interview, December 20, 2016, Ankara). Such friction and concern from the both the West and certain communities in the Balkans has certainly

raised matters of contention. To illuminate some of these aspects, one must look at both the history and methods of Turkey's involvement in the Balkans.

Suffice to say, Turkey has been related to the Balkans both during most of the Ottoman Empire and in the early days of the Republic. Due to these historical bonds, any involvement of Turkey in the Balkans is perceived with skepticism. Davutoğlu's famous 2009 speech in Sarajevo titled *Ottoman Legacy and Balkan Muslim Communities Today* has only amplified skeptics' sentiments. Davutoğlu contended in his speech that the Balkans endured a 'Golden Age' under Ottoman Rule and that almost all Balkan people were part of this legacy; in his exact words (Davutoğlu, 2009, Sarajevo)¹⁵:

Who ran world politics in the 16th century? Your ancestors. They were not all Turks, some were of Slav origin, some were of Albanian origin, some were even converted Greeks, but they ran world politics. So, Mehmet Pasha Sokolovic is a good example. If there was no Ottoman state, Mehmet Pasha would be a poor Serb who lived just to have a small farm. At that time there was no developed farm in that part of the world. But because of the Ottoman legacy he became a leader of world politics.

Based on these premises, Davutoğlu argued that the Balkans needs to recapture that era of coexistence – what he terms as the 'Balkan Spirit' – and once again make the Balkans the centre of world politics alongside Turkey (Davutoğlu, 2009, Sarajevo). Similarly, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's bold statement that "Turkey is Kosovo, Kosovo is Turkey"¹⁶ and Turkey's initiative to change Kosovar history textbooks to accommodate for a better image of Ottoman rule¹⁷ are all factual pretexts in service of sceptics.

¹⁵ Speech transcript from European Stability Initiative website: <http://www.esiweb.org/rumeliobserver/2010/12/04/multikulti-and-the-future-of-turkish-balkan-policy/>.

¹⁶ News from Hürriyet: <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/sirbistandan-erdogana-kosova-tepkisi-24977520>.

¹⁷ News from Vatan: <http://www.gazetevatan.com/osmanli-iscalci-degldi-515322-gundem/>.

Additionally, high-level diplomats also testify that Kosovar historians consider Turkey's policies under the Erdoğan rule to be based on creating a sphere of influence for its Islamic and 'Neo-Ottoman' ideologies (Author's interview, December 20, 2016, Ankara). Coupled with Turkey's engagement in Bosnia, rapprochement with Serbia, Turkish investment and popularity of TV soap operas in the region, and these statements have led many to dismiss Turkish foreign policy in the region as 'Neo-Ottoman ambitions'. In spite of this, dismissing Turkish foreign policy on the basis of such rhetoric will not be enough for a proper scholarly analysis. Regardless of setbacks, some Turkish diplomats regard impediments as beneficial to Turkey's long-term institutional adaptability and resilience (Author's interview, January 30, 2017, Ankara).

Despite 'Neo-Ottoman' accusations towards Turkey's conduct in the Balkans, there also exists a wide array of literature critiquing those allegations. For instance, Dimitar Bechev disputes that Turkey's increased enthusiasm and participation in former Yugoslavia is "(...) driven mainly by structural shifts of democracy, Europeanization and globalization (...)" (Bechev, 2012:131). This compels Turkey to engage in multidimensional policy through trade, investment and soft power projections (Bechev, 2012). Besides, stalled EU integration, Brussels' diminishing influence have stimulated not only Turkey's partaking, but also Russia's and China's (Bechev, 2012). Moreover, Turkey was already pre-occupied with the region because of the security issues that Yugoslavia posed in the 1990s and Turkey's own identity-seeking position in international relations during the post-Cold War period (Demirtaş, 2013). As such, the failure of the EU-US Butmir Process to nurture peace and dialogue in the region was an opportunity for Turkey to begin an initiative by herself (Demirtaş, 2013). This active

foreign policy was best embodied in the historical trilateral talks that former Turkish president Abdullah Gül spearheaded along with Serbian President Boris Tadic and Bosnia Herzegovina President Haris Silajdzic (Demirtaş, 2013). On surface, these lone enterprises by Turkey can reinforce the argument that she disturbs EU or US engagement in the region. As Erhan Türbedar states (Türbedar, 2011:153):

But in general, Turkish presence in the Western Balkans has caused some suspicion in Brussels. From the start, Europeans were arguing that Turkey favors the Bosniaks, and for this reason Ankara cannot be a moderator in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (...) But the fact is that Europeans are reluctant to see Turkey as an important player in the Western Balkans, since they regard this region as their territory and they hope to remain the major influential force.

Despite the EU's calls for more dialogue in the Balkans with initiatives such as the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP)¹⁸, it is interesting to see that the EU rejects any process of mediation that is outside of its viewing field. Contrary to these concerns, a part of the literature agrees that Turkey's single-handed ventures do not bolster a 'Neo-Ottoman' ambition (Bechev, 2012) (Türbedar, 2012).

On the opposite, Turkey actually fortifies the EU's ambitions in the region. According to some think-tanks such as Stratfor, these actions on Turkey's part are based on the desire to exhibit her geopolitical relevance in the region and to convey the idea that peace in the Balkans is not possible without Turkey's involvement (Türbedar, 2011). Despite such reports, Turkey's policies did not diverge from the EU in any major way (Türbedar, 2011). The MFA statements are a testament to its commitment to integrate the Balkans into the EU. One could argue that the EU's concerns stem from its own insecurities. A 2011 conference report between the European Council on Foreign

¹⁸ European Parliament website:
www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.5.2.html

Relations and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo mentions signs of a ‘shrinking Europe’ (European Council on Foreign Relations conference proceedings, 2011).

Indeed, scholars such as Birgül Demirtaş argue that Turkey has adapted a Europeanised Turkish foreign policy, albeit a limited one (2015). Demirtaş asserts that the adaptation is incomplete because Turkey lacks elite socialization of European values and instead depicts herself mainly, “(...) based on its geography and history rather than on democratic credentials or human development levels (...)” (Demirtaş, 2015:135). As such, Demirtaş stresses that too much emphasis on religion and history can only reinforce the de-Europeanization that Turkey also endures currently in domestic politics (2015). To some extent, the domestic dynamics of Turkey feed into the de-Europeanization of its foreign policy, which according to Demirtaş was left relatively untouched by the time of her report in 2015 (2015). Two years later, the feedback between the two might have developed even further, leading to a Turkish foreign policy in the region that might look even more different from the EU approach in the near future. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that in the near-past, Turkey’s active involvement in the Balkans was driven by both her own identity-seeking nature and her sentimental attachment to the region.

For instance, Turkey was one of the few countries to display active involvement in the Bosnian War of 1992-1995. One might argue that Turkey’s active role was primarily identity-driven; to display its geopolitical significance even after the end of the Cold War (Demirtaş, 2011). On the other hand, it can be explained through Bosnia’s cultural-religious attachment to Turkey. Nevertheless, the involvement of the US and the NATO spearheaded via the Dayton Peace Agreement overshadowed Turkey’s power in

Bosnia (Author's interview, January 25, 2017, Ankara). This example proves that the JDP government is not the only administration that has defined its foreign policy with the determinant of the Ottoman legacy, since the administration during the Bosnian conflict was a TPP-RPP¹⁹ coalition. More accurately, one should notice that the trend towards cultural and historical ties has risen with Davutoğlu's foreign policy beliefs and to some extent also Ibrahim Kalın's. Surely, Davutoğlu is not acting foreign minister or prime minister anymore and one might assume that his influence has diminished. Despite the absence of some key policy-makers, Turkey's current foreign policy is still primarily driven by the 2023 vision (Author's interview with high-level Turkish diplomat, January 30, 2017, Ankara), which has remnants of Davutoğlu's ideas. Only under these assumptions does it seem feasible to discuss Turkish foreign policy in Kosovo.

Correspondingly, the dichotomy of Ottoman roots and multilateral diplomacy is even more apparent in Kosovo, which directly affects its soft power opportunities there. Kosovo's main foreign policy goal, which many of the interviewees stated as well, is the integration into international institutions such as the UN, NATO and the EU. In simple terms: to legitimize its sovereignty. Of course, the UN is the primary aim in this matter, since it also eases the accession into other international organizations. Turkey is a very big supporter and proponent of Kosovo's integration into the global sphere. Ever since the Ahtisaari plan and Kosovo's independence in 2008, Turkey has exhibited strong support towards Kosovo in the foreign policy framework of the JDP era (Demirtaş, 2010). According to a think-tank analyst from Kosovo, Turkey has in some instances

¹⁹ True Path Party & Republican People's Party

assisted Kosovo's acceptance into institutions even more than Western countries (Email correspondence, February 15, 2017). The same analyst affirms the following (Email correspondence, February 15, 2017):

Turkey does help a lot on this direction. There are unofficial statements telling the stories when Kosovo applied for EBRD²⁰ and Turkey managed to secure in the last minutes two votes from countries of Caucasus, none recognising Kosovo. The advantage of Turkey in this regard is that it is not 'diplomatic' or 'cautious' in giving this support comparing to perhaps sometimes Germany which calculates more due to the position of Serbia or other sensitivities. The example here is UNESCO which both supported but Turkey is the strongest supporter along US. The same appears to be with INTERPOL.

The advantage of Turkey's less restrained diplomacy with regards to Serbia and Russia and the cultural-historical ties fuel its energetic push of Kosovo towards international institutions. However, the same cultural-historical ties are also the reason as to why some of the support is less exacerbated for other integrative processes. Kosovo's integration into the EU comes to mind the most.

Two interviewees, a SWP analyst and a high-level Turkish diplomat both affirm that, like every other Balkan country, Kosovo is adamant at joining the EU (Telephone conversation with SWP analyst, March 3, 2017 & Author's interview with high-level diplomat, January 20, 2017). Turkey is in a unique position because it is both a supporter and fellow candidate to the EU accession process. The statements of a high-level official in the Balkan bureau of the Turkish foreign ministry highlights the fact that Turkey's aim in the Balkans, apart from striving stability and peace, is to create interdependence by joining the EU together (Author's interview, January 20, 2017, Ankara). The same high-level official stated: "There is no country in the Balkans that does not aspire to be

²⁰ Abbreviation for European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

part of the EU” (Author’s interview, January 20, 2017, Ankara). However, the recent trend of animosity between the EU and Turkey, especially since 2010 (Tocci, 2014), might suggest that Turkey is not too keen in supporting Kosovo’s accession into the EU. Turkey certainly supports Kosovo in the matter and does not interfere as Russia does, but it is not too enthusiastic about Kosovo’s EU accession either (Author’s interview with high-level diplomat, January 20, 2017, Ankara). Analysts share the sentiment that Turkey is neither a hindrance nor a massive supporter of EU integration (Telephone conversation with SWP analyst, March 3, 2017, Berlin) & (E-mail correspondence with Kosovar Center for Security Studies Analyst, February 15, 2017).

This places Turkey in a very peculiar position and inhibits its soft power capabilities to a certain extent, since Balkan countries are exceedingly attracted to the EU. Certainly, interview accounts and academic journal research is not enough to assess Turkey’s soft power position. Therefore, the next section will analyze the content of Turkish newspapers and Turkish governmental websites with regards to the soft power attributes laid out in the theoretical framework chapter.

3.5 Turkish Soft Power in Kosovo: Data Presentation and Analysis

In addition to her hard power involvement in Kosovo through NATO operations and KFOR²¹, Turkey has enacted a variety of soft power instruments. For instance, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and the Yunus Emre Institute have been actively involved in culture, education, health to even agricultural aspects. As

²¹ Turkey’s presence under KFOR has been operative since 1999 and has since exhibited an active role such as undertaking temporary leadership of the Multinational Task Force South (MNTF(S)) (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/iv_-european-security-and-defence-identity_policy-_esdi_p_.en.mfa). As of 2015 Turkey has 372 troops deployed under KFOR (*Kosovo Force (KFOR) Key Facts and Figures*, 2015).

the TİKA website promotes, the two organizations sometimes act collaboratively, such as their initiative to teach Bosniaks in Kosovo Turkish

(www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/tika_kosovalı_bosnak_genclere_turkce_ogretiyor-20711).

Moreover, Kosovo is one of the countries, where students have been provided the most scholarships²². Needless to say, the Turkish private sector has been strikingly visible in Kosovo and has employed thousands of Kosovars through its activities. Indeed, TİKA's involvement in Kosovo and the overall Balkan area should be taken into special consideration.

Merely acknowledging that TİKA is a Turkish soft power apparatus is not sufficient for the comprehension of Turkish soft power. It is vital to notice the pretext under which TİKA has been utilized as a soft power tool. The case of TİKA showcases how Turkish soft power is a product of foreign policy change via domestic ideational shifts (İpek, 2015). In other words, TİKA's presence needs to be considered through the domestic policy elite's framing of material interests, which are subject to the combined lens of the elite's principled and causal beliefs²³ (İpek, 2015). Coupled with the aforementioned remarks on how principles prioritize economics in Davutoğlu's foreign policy understanding,²⁴ it would be a mistake to dismiss the ideational impact on Turkish soft power. While Turkey had pursued similar material interests in the 90s and 2000s, the JDP period signified a much more drastic increase in TİKA activities

²² Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy website:

<http://kdk.gov.tr/sayilarla/binlerce-uluslararasi-ogrenci-turkiye-burslari-projesiyle-turkiyede/7>.

²³ Principled beliefs are "(...) normative ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust" (Keohane and Goldstein, 1993:9). Meanwhile causal beliefs "(...) are beliefs about cause-effect relationships which derive authority from the shared consensus of recognized elites (...)" (Keohane and Goldstein, 1993:10).

²⁴ See Author's interview with high-level diplomat on p.35: "But what about our principles?"

precisely because of the impact of ideas alongside material interests (Ipek, 2015). As Pinar Ipek posits,

The turning point for policy change was the convergence of strategies to advance material interests and normative ideas in determining the criteria for constituting soft power as an instrument of foreign policy, a factor that was missing in the previous period. Incorporating business organizations, think tanks, and civil society's ideas and expectations into the foreign policy-making process is a function of using ideas to identify strategies to serve principled beliefs and material interests, as well as legitimize political practices.

In this sense, Turkey can be witnessed using multidimensional instruments to exert her soft power in Kosovo. The transformative process of Turkish foreign policy in the late 2000s culminated in the soft power presence in countries such as Kosovo. In order to grasp her soft power presence's extent in Kosovo, a quantitative analysis was also conducted.

To evaluate Turkey's soft power presence in Kosovo, web-based sources from newspapers and governmental websites have been analyzed. Firstly, newspaper sources will be discussed. The sources used for data collection from newspapers are three popular Turkish newspaper websites. Each newspaper has been selected to accommodate certain views. As such, Hürriyet has been chosen to represent mainstream liberal views, Cumhuriyet for left-winged and Kemalist views and Sabah for right-winged pro-government views. The decision to use newspaper sources in addition to governmental sources lies in the fact that governments' conduct of soft power is heavily reliant on mass media. James Pamment designates various 'spaces' of German soft power, one of which he labels as 'shared mediascapes'; flows of news and how the framing of these are distributed (2017). A significant amount of soft power research also concerns itself with how governments conduct public diplomacy through news and

media outlets. Terry Flew points out that China's CCTV has been an essential instrument of expressing China's cultural diplomacy and enhancing China's image in the world (2016). Regulating information flows through media outlets is a vital part of public diplomacy and subsequently soft power. Assessing Germany's and Turkey's soft power policies through the lens of media outlets proves vital. Akiba Cohen and Michael Curtin aptly summarize this the following way (as cited in Servaes, 2012:650):

“International relations and foreign policy are influenced by public opinion, and public opinion may be influenced by information in the media.”

For the three newspaper sources, a web-based content analysis software from tools.digitalmethods.net called Google News Scraper was run. All three newspaper sources were searched through keyword inputs based on the attributes of Table 3. Four keywords were chosen for each attribute, which are represented below in Turkish (each keyword had a ‘Kosovo’ prefix in order to avoid articles that had no direct link to Turkey-Kosovo relations):

Table 6: Soft power attributes and their respective keywords used for Google Scraper (Turkish newspapers)

Soft Power Attribute	Keywords
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	Diplomasi, Dış Politika, İlişkiler, Soydaş
Domestic Values and Governance	Hukuk üstünlüğü, Hukuk egemenliği, Kurumlar, Demokrasi
Political Economic Potential	Yatırım, Ekonomi, İş adamlar, Ekonomik yardım
Culture and Ideational Influence	Kardeşlik, Din, Kültür, Ortak Tarih

²⁵

²⁵ Author's translation in order of appearance: Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, Relations, Kin, Rule of Law (twice as Hukuk üstünlüğü and Hukuk egemenliği), Institutions, Democracy, Investment, Economy, Entrepreneur, Economic Aid, Fraternity, Religion, Culture, Common History.

The codes ‘diplomacy’, ‘foreign policy’, ‘relations’ are fairly obvious given that they are used to measure the weight of the attribute ‘Foreign Policy and Diplomacy’. ‘soydaş’, which means ‘kin’ in Turkish is a less obvious inclusion. ‘Kin’ was used as a code for ‘Foreign Policy and Diplomacy’, because the MFA also conducts diplomacy majorly through the Turkish populations in Prizren and other parts of Kosovo (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-kosova-siyasi-iliskileri-.tr.mfa>). For the attribute of ‘Domestic Values and Governance’, technically only three codes have been used: ‘rule of law’, ‘institutions’ and ‘democracy’. However, since rule of law can be translated as both ‘hukuk üstünlüğü’ or ‘hukuk egemenliği’, those two have been used to collect articles. ‘Investment’, ‘economy’, ‘businessmen’ and ‘economic aid’ are also discernable codes that represent the attribute of ‘Political Economic Potential’. While ‘businessmen’ might be too inclusive for male entrepreneurs, the code was not solely exclusive to male ones. In fact, since the code is ‘iş adamları’, the Google scraper also looked for ‘iş kadınları’; that is businesswomen. Finally, ‘fraternity’, ‘religion’, ‘culture’ and ‘shared history’ are codes that have been chosen, bearing rhetoric of government policy makers, such as Ibrahim Kalın (Kalin, 2011) or Ahmet Davutoğlu (Davutoğlu, 2001 or 4th Ambassador's Conference speech, 2011), in mind. Such words are also significantly reiterated in the MFA’s official website (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-kosova-siyasi-iliskileri-.tr.mfa>). Having explained the reasoning behind the chosen codes to collect newspaper articles from the three sources, the next part will present the quantity of generated articles.

Using the Google News Scraper for the codes of ‘Foreign Policy and Diplomacy’ yields the following results (results displayed through Google News Scraper’s tag cloud

view; each keyword's prevalence is indicated by its size along with the number of references in parentheses).

Figure 1: Cloud representation of keyword references of three Turkish newspapers²⁶

Issue cloud - issues for source *hürriyet* (retrieved by Google scraper)

"Kosova diplomasi" (24) "Kosova ilişkiler" (100) "Kosova dış politika" (62) "Kosova soydaş" (4)

Issue cloud - issues for source *cumhuriyet* (retrieved by Google scraper)

"Kosova diplomasi" (1) "Kosova ilişkiler" (5) "Kosova dış politika" (5)

Issue cloud - issues for source *sabah* (retrieved by Google scraper)

"Kosova ilişkiler" (41) "Kosova dış politika" (100) "Kosova soydaş" (4)

Issue cloud - issues for all sources (URLs, cumulative, retrieved by Google scraper)

"Kosova diplomasi" (27) "Kosova ilişkiler" (149) "Kosova dış politika" (170) "Kosova soydaş" (9)

The tag clouds suggest that, apart from Cumhuriyet, the other two newspaper outlets do have a sizeable amount of articles on Turkey's foreign policy with regards to Kosovo. Conversely, quantity does not always equate to relevance when it comes to Google News Scraper. Sometimes, articles have irrelevant information that happens to coincide with the key words. For instance, one article mentions a robbery in a street named Kosovo, which has naught to do with the research. Hence, for each attribute's results, I have handpicked the articles that pertained to Kosovo and the relations between Turkey and Kosovo. Each article's contents were then added to a master document, which was later on analyzed with NVivo 11. Thus, a deeper and more relevant analysis

²⁶ Author's translation of the keywords from Turkish: Kosova diplomasi (diplomacy), Kosova ilişkiler (relations), Kosova dış politika (foreign policy), Kosova soydaş (kin)

of the content was possible. In order to provide context to the NVivo analysis, the below table demonstrates the Google News scraper results for the all attribute key words:

Table 7: Amount of keyword references for each newspaper (Turkish newspapers)

Attribute	Keywords	Number of articles for each source (by URL)		
		Hürriyet	Cumhuriyet	Sabah
Culture and Ideational Influence	Kosovo Fraternity	64	3	33
	Kosovo Religion	19	0	12
	Kosovo Culture	100	49	100
	Kosovo Shared History	46	7	54
Political Economic Potential	Kosovo Investment	85	1	36
	Kosovo Economy	100	45	100
	Kosovo Entrepreneur	45	3	52
	Kosovo Economic Aid	0	0	38
Domestic Values and Governance ²⁷	Kosovo Turkey Institutions	52	1	30
	Kosovo Turkey Democracy	74	28	41
	Kosovo Turkey Rule of Law	19	2	6
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	Kosovo Foreign Policy	62	5	100
	Kosovo Diplomacy	24	1	0
	Kosovo Relations	100	5	41
	Kosovo Kin	4	0	4
Total:		794	150	647

²⁷ Besides the prefix of ‘Kosova’ there is also ‘Türkiye’ (Turkish for Turkey) included. The use of this was meant to avoid irrelevant articles and only scrape for results that included domestic attribute keywords such as ‘democracy’ ‘institution’ with relation to Turkey.

The Google News Scraper collects data from potential sources that might contain these keywords. However, in most cases they are irrelevant to the actual URLs from the website. For example, the Google news scraper also collected URLs from sources that it dedicated as parody, press statements, blogs etc. To illustrate:

Figure 2: Cloud representation of keyword references for the ‘Domestic Values and Governance’ attribute for Cumhuriyet²⁸

Issue cloud - issues for source *cumhuriyet (mizah) (basın bildirisi) (kayıt) (blog)* (retrieved by Google scraper)

"Kosova Türkiye hukuk egemenliği" (1) "Kosova Türkiye kurumlar" (2) "Kosova Türkiye demokrasi" (19)

To avoid unnecessary collision with other sources, the articles chosen were only from the newspapers’ website. As noted before, many scholars on web-based content analysis advocate for precision of data collection.

In total, 85 news articles have been compiled for the purpose of this research. These range from stories on grand investment projects such as the Limak airport in Prishtina to providing training and jobs to Kosovar youth (Salih, Sabah, 2015) to small-scale social, educational or cultural exchanges. One such story is about young Kosovars visiting Yalova as trainees of a joint project between Yalova University’s educational program, Kosovo’s Entrepreneur and Tradesman Union (which has a significant amount of Turkish kin) and Yalova’s hairdresser’s association (IHA, 2015). While these projects might seem trivial from a larger perspective, they provide substantial information on Turkey’s public diplomacy conducts. Naturally, public diplomacy requires communication also with relatively small groups of population. Thus, investigating these

²⁸ Author’s translation of the keywords from Turkish: Kosova Türkiye hukuk egemenliği (rule of law), Kosova Türkiye kurumlar (institutions), Kosova Türkiye demokrasi (democracy)

stories in larger amounts can provide a better overall picture of Turkey's soft power in Kosovo.


Apart from the number of articles, the amount of the content itself is also crucial. By and large, the 85 articles contain around 51,000 words that can be inspected for specific key words relating back to the topic of soft power and the attribute laid out in this research. Similar to the Google News Scraper's keywords input pertaining to the attributes of Table 3, similar keywords have been selected as codes for NVivo's text query function. It should be noted that they are slightly different from the ones inputted into the Goggle News Scraper. 'Kosova' and 'Türkiye' have been omitted in this case since the articles are about Turkey-Kosovo relations in the first place. The following keywords have been coded for each attribute:

Table 8: Soft power attributes and their respective keywords used for NVivo 11 (Turkish newspapers)

Attributes	Keywords (engl. translation)
Culture and Ideational Influence	Kültür (Culture)
	Ortak Tarih (Shared History)
	Kardeşlik (Fraternity)
	Din (Religion)
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	Dış ilişkiler (Foreign relations)
	Dış politika (Foreign policy)
	Diplomasi (Diplomacy)
	Soydaş (Kin)
Domestic Values and Governance	Demokrasi (Democracy)
	Hukuk üstünlüğü/egemenliği (Rule of law)
	Basın özgürlüğü (Press freedom)
	Kurumlar (Institutions)
Political Economic Potential	Ekonomi (Economy)
	Yatırım (Investment)
	Ekonomik yardım (Economic Aid)
	İş kadınları/adamları (Entrepreneurs)

Again, it should be noted that the keywords do not exclusively look for the specific wording but also include related material. For instance, ‘dış ilişkiler’ or ‘dış politika’ also includes any segment that contains ‘dış’, which has given rather relevant results such as ‘dış siyaset’ or ‘dış ticaret’²⁹. This feature is beneficial to the analysis since it also incorporates derivatives of the keywords. Under this format, NVivo’s text query function yields the following results for each attribute:

Figure 3 & Table 9: Pie chart and table for keyword frequency for each attribute (Turkish newspapers)



Attributes (Ranked)	Number of Coding References
Culture and Ideational Influence	140
Political Economic Potential	135
Domestic Values and Governance	42
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	34

According to the analysis results, the attributes ‘Political Economic Potential’ and ‘Culture and Ideational Influence’ comprise the vast majority of the articles’ content. Both have almost identical amounts of references, 140 and 135 references respectively. Meanwhile, ‘Domestic Values and Governance’ and ‘Foreign Policy and Diplomacy’ rank at 3rd and 4th place, with 42 and 34 references respectively. These outcomes indicate that, despite the government’s heavy rhetoric on kinship, shared

²⁹ Author’s translation from Turkish: Foreign politics and foreign commerce

history and Ottoman sentiments, they are less prevalent in media than economic traits. To clarify, however, the disparity is not significantly large and the two attributes only differ in 5 references. Suffice to say, the more relevant distinction lies between economic-cultural factors and domestic-diplomatic ones. In a sense, this should not come as a surprise for diplomatic factors, since traditional diplomacy between states is only superficially covered in mainstream media. Similarly, an explanation for domestic factors of soft power having low amounts of references could be that newspapers mainly cover stories based on cultural, economic and diplomatic activities (and those only minor) since they aim to highlight the story and not how domestic dynamics of Turkey affect or might affect Kosovo. However, to further investigate the soft power presence of Turkey in Kosovo, state-level sources need to be included as well.

To balance the outcomes of the three newspaper sources, four state-level websites have been chosen for web-based content analysis. The chosen state level websites are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey (for all factors), the Ministry of Economy (for economic factors), Yunus Emre Institute (for cultural factors) and the Interior Ministry (for domestic factors). Except the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, each other ministry website has been assigned a respective attribute. The reason for allotting all attributes to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is because they participate in almost all of the activities between Turkey's other ministries and institutes and Kosovo. Unlike the newspaper sources, no specific URL is given by the Google Scraper, which conversely to Google News Scraper is more broad in its function. Hence, it only generates the number of mentions by one or more sources found through Google's engine. For the 'Domestic Values and Governance' attribute, the prefix 'Kosova' was added. Although,

the attribute assesses Turkey's own domestic attraction, one way of building such attraction is also through involvement with Kosovo's own rule of law or institutions. Just as the other codes, the prefix 'Kosova' does not exclude sources that do not contain it. As such, sources relating to rule of law, institutions and press freedom within Turkey will still be generated. That being said, the following results have been produced by Google Scraper:

Table 10: Amount of sources that reference keywords based on attributes for Turkish ministerial and institutional websites

Ministerial and Institutional websites	
Attributes (Ranked)	Number of Sources that reference the keywords
Political Economic Potential	1,135
Culture and Ideational Influence	690
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	463
Domestic Values and Governance	6

The most striking aspect of the results is the 'Domestic Values and Governance' attribute, which is covered very insubstantially by the Interior Ministry. Only 6 sources seem to refer to the assigned keywords, which stands inadequate in comparison to other attributes such as 'Political Economic Potential' with an impressive amount of 1,135 sources. That being said, it is rather intriguing that the Economic Ministry has more sources on 'Political Economic Potential' than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on

‘Foreign Policy and Diplomacy’. Considering the government’s heavy rhetoric on shared culture, religion and kinship, ‘Culture and Ideational Influence’ ranking at second place is not unexpected. A possible explanation for the high number of sources of ‘Political Economic Potential’ might be that the Ministry of Economy has abundant reports that refer to the keywords of the attribute. Indeed, a quick search in the website reveals that there are numerous reports and data on Turkey’s trade and investment with Kosovo (<http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/>). There are specifically around 200 hits in the Ministry of Economy websites when searching for ‘Kosova’, whilst the MFA only has one page.

With this being said, the Interior Ministry, dealing with domestic issues, will not contain much on Kosovo’s institutions or rule of law. Still, as mentioned before, the coded keywords do not solely seek the compound word ‘Kosova hukuk egemenliđi’ (rule of law) but also ‘hukuk egemenliđi’ itself. As such, it is rather extraordinary that only a scanty amount of sources is found. To offset this matter, the same keywords used for the Interior Ministry have also been used for the Ministry of Justice, which also deals with issues such as rule of law or press freedom. Using the Google Scraper with the ‘Domestic Values and Governance’ keywords for the Ministry of Justice website results in a much more adequate number of sources:

Table 11: Amount of sources that reference ‘Domestic Values and Governance’ keywords in the Ministry of Justice website

Domestic Values and Governance	232
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When added to the number of sources of the Interior Ministry, the new results do not change the ranking, but are much more evenhanded. Consequently, a comparison with the newspapers' content is now justified. It should be recorded that the units between the two data sets are different, since newspapers' content was analyzed for the keywords as well, while the ministry and institutional website was only scraped for sources. As such, what matters is not the unit and quantities of data but rather the similarities or dissimilarities in ranking. The comparison is displayed in the following table:

Table 12: Comparison of keyword references between Turkish newspaper websites and Turkish ministerial and institutional websites

Newspaper websites		Ministerial and Institutional websites	
Attributes (Ranked)	Number of keyword references within articles	Attributes (Ranked)	Number of sources that reference the keywords
Culture and Ideational Influence	140	Political Economic Potential	1,135
Political Economic Potential	135	Culture and Ideational Influence	690
Domestic Values and Governance	42	Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	463
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	34	Domestic Values and Governance	238

The most noticeable characteristic of this comparison is that each of the four attributes have dissimilar rankings. In fact, the differences are only by one ranking. In comparison with the newspaper data, ministerial and institutional websites' 'Culture and

Ideational Influence’ move down one ranking and ‘Foreign Policy and Diplomacy’ move one up. Accordingly, ‘Political Economic Potential’ moves up one rank and ‘Domestic Values and Governance’ moves down one rank. In a sense, one can say that the top two ranks and lower two ranks swap the attributes when compared. As was argued, diplomatic factors are the least principal attribute in newspaper sources, which is not unreasonable. Yet, it is interesting that ‘Foreign Policy and Diplomacy’ does not rank higher than economic factors. Two possible inferences emerge: either the Turkish government wants to highlight the investments and economic aid in Kosovo more than culture and diplomacy or the concentration on economic factors is simply a product of overabundant information on economic activities in Kosovo. The second justification could be of concern since the economic factors could rank highest purely because of material quantity (that is amount of reports or other text URLs) without actually identifying the bearing of economic factors towards Turkey’s Kosovo relations. In order to mediate this concern, I will also inspect the data from solely the MFA. As mentioned, all attribute keywords have also been applied for the MFA. Consequently, the following outcome is observed (next page):

Figure 4: Cloud representation of the number of sources referring to the keyword³⁰



Naturally, aside from ‘Kosova’ being the most cited word in the MFA’s website, keywords pertaining to the ‘Foreign Policy and Diplomacy’ attribute seem to be much more prevalent in this data pool: ‘Kosova diplomasi’ (diplomacy) and ‘Kosova dış politika’ (foreign policy) have more than 200 sources that refer to them. However, ‘soydaş’ (kin) seems to be meager in comparison with only 24 sources. This might point out the fact that the MFA contains text that concerns bilateral state relations more than smaller-scale ones. Press statements and official speeches seem to dominantly reflect general relations between Turkey and Kosovo.

However, as expected in the context of Turkey’s emphasis on heritage sentiments, ‘Kosova kültür’ (culture) ‘Kosova ortak tarih’ (shared history) are chief

³⁰ Author’s translation from Turkish: Kosova Kardeşlik (fraternity), Kosova Din (religion), Kosova Kültür (culture), Kosova Ortak Tarih (shared history), Kosova Yatırım (investment), Kosova Ekonomi (economy), Kosova iş adamlar (businessmen), Kosova ilişkiler (relations), Kosova diplomasi (diplomacy), Kosova dış politika (foreign policy), Kosova soydaş (kin), Kosova hukuk üstünlüğü/egemenliği (rule of law) Kosova kurumlar (institutions), Kosova demokrasi (democracy), Kosova ekonomik yardım (economic assistance)

keywords within the website's content. 'Kosova kardeşlik' (fraternity) and 'Kosova din' (religion) are less impactful on the overall picture, but still do highlight the fact that kinship and religion play a big part in the MFA's rhetoric on Kosovar relations. Moreover, the rather noteworthy amount for domestic factors such as 'Kosova kurumlar' (institutions) and 'Kosova demokrasi' (democracy), which both are fixed at 128, means that the MFA has plenty of sources discussing or presenting Turkish-Kosovar relations in domestic dynamics. The somewhat surprising and ample number of sources for 'Kosova hukuk üstünlüğü'/'Kosova hukuk egemenliği' (rule of law) are also testament to this fact. In conclusion, comparing the two data sets yields:

Table 13: Comparison of keyword references between newspaper websites and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Newspaper websites		Ministry of Foreign Affairs website	
Attributes (Ranked)	Number of keyword references within articles	Attributes (Ranked)	Number of Sources that reference the keywords
Culture and Ideational Influence	140	Culture and Ideational Influence	597
Political Economic Potential	135	Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	463
Domestic Values and Governance	42	Political Economic Potential	449
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	34	Domestic Values and Governance	382

Unlike the aggregate government data, the MFA sources prioritize 'Culture and Ideational Influence' and 'Foreign Policy and Diplomacy'. Diplomatic factors being prioritized in the MFA should not be astonishing, but the fact that they rank below 'Culture and Ideational Influence' reflects a lot about current Turkish foreign policy.

Just as remarked in the analytical part of this chapter, Turkish foreign policy, with policy-makers such as Kalın and Davutoğlu at the helm, has seen discernable changes towards a more historical-cultural emphasized perspective accompanying a re-imagination of its geography (Aras, 2009). Kalın remarks (Kalin, 2011:19) that Turkey “(...) adopts a point of view based on its own geographical and historical background” instead of the “(...) structural preferences or tensions of a polarized world system (...)”. This statement, along with Davutoğlu’s repeated reference to Ottoman history and culture in the Balkans (Davutoğlu, 2009, Sarajevo)³¹, effectively demonstrates the historical-cultural focus of Turkey’s contemporary foreign policy.

This new outlook of Turkish foreign policy is also amplified by the data. Similar to the previous government data set, the MFA data set also rank domestic factors the lowest. In comparison to newspapers’ content, the MFA ranking is much more synchronized than the aggregate government data. ‘Cultural and Ideational Influence’ rank first for both data sets and ‘Political Economic Potential’ only differ in one rank; 2 for newspaper data and 3 for MFA data. Likewise, ‘Domestic Values and Governance’ rank at 3 for newspapers’ data and 4 for MFA data. The most notable and predicted difference lies in ‘Foreign Policy and Diplomacy’, with rank 2 for MFA data and rank 4 for newspaper data. Thus, diplomatic factors are indeed more prevalent in government data than in mainstream media.

Ultimately, the data presented suggest an obvious parallel with literature on Turkish foreign policy. Regardless of government or public media data, ‘Cultural and

³¹ Speech transcript from: <http://www.esiweb.org/rumeliobserver/2010/12/04/multikulti-and-the-future-of-turkish-balkan-policy/>.

Ideational Influence’ undeniably performs a vast part of Turkish foreign policy in general and Turkey’s soft power presence in Kosovo. While mainstream media accentuates these cultural factors alongside economic factors (being ranked 2nd), government data, in reference to the MFA data, solidifies the cultural rhetoric with diplomatic instruments (being ranked 2nd). To what extent, this defines Turkish soft power in general and in Kosovo will be discussed further in comparison with German soft power in the final chapter of this research.

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY GERMANY

Similar to the Turkish case, Germany's soft power presence in Kosovo can only be evaluated by dissecting its overall foreign policy and its goals in the Balkans. Therefore, the first section of this part will introduce essential characteristics of German foreign policy and then analyze how they extend into the Balkans.

4.1 Foreign Policy Fundamentals and Aims

A quick look at the German foreign ministry's website will reveal that German foreign policy and European politics are inextricably coupled. The German foreign ministry groups the two terms as Foreign- and European politics (German: Aussen- und Europapolitik) (http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Startseite_node.html). This initial observation is also supported by most academics on German foreign policy. An academic from the Free University of Berlin describes that he starts his lectures with indicating to his students that any exploration of German foreign policy necessitates a consideration of its European politics (Author's interview, February 23, 2017, Berlin). This link with European politics, shapes German foreign policy goals and strategies. Consequently, Germany's Foreign Office website defines "(...) upholding peace in a united Europe", "European integration", " (...) strengthening human rights in a

globalizing world” and the recent refugee crisis as focal points of its foreign policy (<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Schwerpunkte/Uebersicht.html>; accessed November 2016). A good summary of these elements is given in the following statement: “German foreign policy is politics of peace. Concretely, this means the use of binding rules and strong multilateral institutions, as well as commitment to disarmament, crisis prevention and peaceful resolution of disputes”³² (http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Friedenspolitik/Uebersicht_node.html). Germany aims to solidify the elements of peace in its foreign policy by concentrating on human rights since it regards the respect of such rights as the best way to conduct politics of peace. Essentially, German foreign policy aims peaceful solutions to global problems mainly through the EU, its transatlantic ties and other multilateral means.

The main focus of these statements was on the political and economic arrangements of German foreign policy. Another interesting cornerstone of German foreign policy, which directly relates to soft power policies, are cultural and educational policies. While its foreign policy is embedded with the EU, it also uses instruments of cultural diplomacy and educational policies that encourage intercultural dialogue as well as promoting German as a language³³. This cultural and educational aspect constitutes the third pillar of German foreign policy (with the other two being political and economic relations) and is represented by the AKBP (Cultural and Educational Foreign Policies³⁴). While these cultural and educational policies aim to promote German culture

³² Author’s translation from German: “Deutsche Außenpolitik ist Friedenspolitik. Konkret bedeutet das den Einsatz für verbindliche Regeln und starke multilaterale Institutionen, sowie Engagement für Abrüstung, Krisenprävention und friedliche Streitbeilegung.”

³³ Taken from the Federal Foreign Office website: www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Schwerpunkte/Uebersicht_node.html.

³⁴ Author’s translation from German: Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik

and language, they also emphasize support for EU integration, multiculturalism, intercultural and scientific dialogue and even conflict prevention³⁵. Most notable for the study of soft power is the Federal Foreign Office's official website statement that the AKBP aims to portray Germany as "(...) a modern and attractive location for education, science and professional development"³⁶ (http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/KulturDialog/01_Ziele_und_Aufgaben/ZielePartner.html?nn=382590). Noticeably, attraction plays a key role in Germany's cultural and educational policies, echoing a key aspect of soft power.

Interestingly, German culture or its educational policies are not utilized solely through the government. Rather, the federal government sets the general framework and themes for intermediary organisations who apply the frameworks on field³⁷. When asked how much freedom these organisations were given, a high-level official from the Western Balkan Division of the German foreign ministry said that even the general framework was rather flexible and that these organisations are absolutely autonomous in the projects they pursue (Author's interview, March 10, 2017, Berlin). Some of the most important intermediary organisations include the Goethe Institute, the German Academic Exchange Service³⁸ as well as private civil society organizations. Overall, the overarching purpose of these organizations is to enable a collaborative environment

³⁵ Taken from the Federal Foreign Office website:
www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/KulturDialog/01_Ziele_und_Aufgaben/ZielePartner.html?nn=382590.

³⁶ Author's translation from German: Deutschland als modernen, attraktiven Standort für Bildung, Wissenschaft, Forschung und berufliche Entwicklung vorzustellen.

³⁷ Taken from the Federal Foreign Office website:
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/KulturDialog/01_Ziele_und_Aufgaben/ZielePartner.html?nn=382590.

³⁸ German: DAAD

between cultures and peoples, whilst also portraying Germany in a good light. As such, it can be argued that this third pillar has some of the most essential soft power tools for Germany's soft power policies. However, a deeper analysis into what exactly constitutes and characterizes German foreign policy is vital.

4.2 Germany's Foreign Policy Character

Streamlining German foreign policy can be a challenging task since Germany's foreign policy is defined by the experiences of the Third Reich, the post-WWII era and the following post-Cold War era with reunification. To this date, Germany's foreign policy struggles to balance perceptions of normalisation and so called hegemonic goals with European integration and multilateral cooperation. Intriguingly, some of the basic literature on German foreign policy starts with a power-related viewpoint, distinguishing between military, economic, political and cultural power, each grouped under either hard or soft power (Jäger, Höse, & Oppermann, 2007). Academic literature on German foreign policy, much more than Turkish foreign policy, puts emphasis on the anarchical nature of international relations, tackling subjects of globalization and transnationalization with soft power (Jäger et al., 2007). Indeed, under the transnational framework, Jäger, Höse and Oppermann state that there is, “ (...) enormous importance of legitimate foreign-policy action not only in one's own society. In other societies, too, certain actions must be accepted (...)”³⁹ (Jäger, Höse, & Oppermann, 2007:34). Due to this global and transnational affinity of German foreign policy, it is inclined to embrace soft power approaches naturally. This tendency should not come as a surprise when

³⁹ Author's translation from German: “(...) enorme Bedeutung, die der Legitimation außenpolitischen Handelns nicht nur in der eigenen Gesellschaft zukommt. Auch in anderen Gesellschaften müssen Handlungen Akzeptanz finden (...)”

observing debates in German foreign policy; mainly the debate between normalisation and multilateral continuity⁴⁰.

For many states, the fall of the Soviet Union and disintegration of the bipolar world order necessitated a shift in foreign policy attitudes. German foreign policy faced a similar but distinct crossroad due to the nature of German reunification: the question whether to continue the Western integrated multilateral diplomacy of West Germany or to revert to a German 'power state' (Baumann, 2007). At that time, prominent realist IR scholars such as Mearsheimer and Waltz asserted that Germany would not constrain herself by multilateralism, but rather become a great power by acquiring a nuclear weapon (Mearsheimer, 1990) & (Waltz, 1993). In fact, Rainer Baumann argues that multiple case study research has generated the idea that while "(...) the material factors, such as Germany's power, may have changed with the unification, constant ideational factors prevent Germany's departure from multilateralism and the return of the power-state of Germany"⁴¹ (Baumann, 2007:449). This overall outcome constitutes the core of the theory of continuity within German foreign policy literature. While multilateral continuity is widely acknowledged and accepted by scholars of German foreign policy, it is also re-evaluated in subtle ways. Baumann, for instance, claims that multilateralism in itself has seen understated changes since the early days of unification (2007). For him, continuity should not be evaluated under the premise of solely multilateral perpetuation, but rather in what form and how it is continued (Baumann, 2007).

⁴⁰ German: 'Kontinuitätstheorie'

⁴¹ Author's translation from German: Die materiellen Faktoren wie etwa Deutschlands Macht mögen sich mit der Vereinigung verändert haben, konstante ideelle Faktoren verhindern aber nach- haltig Deutschlands Abkehr vom Multilateralismus und die Wiederkehr des Machtstaates Deutschland.

The most notable change in this manner happened during the 90s with global events such as the Iraq War, Bosnian War etc. (Baumann, 2007) testing Germany's commitments to international organizations and its own political goals. In the case of Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, the German *Grundgesetz* (English: Basic law) (Grundgesetz: Article 26, Paragraph 1) prohibited any military action, which was substituted with a financial support of 17 billion dollars (Hyde-Price, 2001). As a matter of principle, the deployment of German troops, determined by the Federal Constitutional Court, requires the consent of the Bundestag (parliament) (Brose, 2013). Under those circumstances, Germany deployed troops to Bosnia with the the landmark decision of 12 July 1994 (Federal Constitutional Court, 1994)⁴². Germany's decision to act military signified a remarkable shift in her foreign policy, as she pursued humanitarian and developmental assistance since the end of WWII (Hamilton, 2014). The multilateral shift happened in the framework of four main aspects. Baumann designates the following aspects as 'templates of rationalization' for multilateral cooperation (2007):

- international or historical responsibility (ex. WWII and Holocaust)
- Factual necessity (ex. the fact of growing global interdependence)
- Usefulness of multilateral cooperation
- Status- and influence goals (only through multilateral cooperation can Germany reach the desired status and influence in international relations).

The heavy reliance on rationalizing multilateralism with international or historical responsibility that had dominated German foreign policy up until the early 90s

⁴² *Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court]*, July 12, 1994, vol. 90, p. 286, accessed on May 28, 2017: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3720.

had lost considerable significance (Baumann, 2007). Instead, German officials rationalized multilateralism through usefulness and influence capabilities by focusing on terms such as ‘national’, ‘strategic’, ‘influence’, ‘military capabilities’ or ‘geostrategic potential’ (Baumann, 2007). This internal debate on German multilateralism through newer forms of rationalization, paved the way for some obvious shifts in foreign policy practice during the 90s. Germany withheld from any form of military intervention in the Gulf War of 1991, but was notably involved in 1999’s Kosovo War (Baumann, 2007). Consequently, even the acceptance of a multilateral continuity in German foreign policy needs to consider that subtle adjustments in the debate can lead to discernible foreign policy outcomes. Therefore, when examining soft power policies of Germany in Kosovo, the debate on multilateralism needs to be reconsidered under the circumstances and realities of the current era.

4.3 German Soft Power

Unlike literature on Turkish soft power (see Kalın, Oğuzlu & Davutoğlu), there is no primer book or article on German soft power, nor is it blatantly dedicated as a focal point of foreign policy such as in Turkish foreign policy (i.e. ‘Zero-Problem Strategy’). Nevertheless, German soft power does manifest itself quite frequently under different disguises. These are mostly practice-oriented forms under specific foreign policy tools and influenced by Germany’s international relations beliefs. Indeed, soft power is rejected as a sole determinant of German foreign policy and is rather attributed as an essential element. This is best reflected in the question on whether Germany should strive to be ‘Mars’, ‘Venus’ or ‘Pluto’, with ‘Mars’ and ‘Venus’ portraying the duality of hard and soft power; while ‘Pluto’ represents the foreign policy of a small power (von

Bredow, 2007). The fact that this question is in the title of the last chapter of the handbook on German foreign policy, reveals a certain doubtful and wavering side to German foreign policy doctrine.

Egon Bahr, a German politician most known for his influence on West Germany's 'Ostpolitik' ('East-politics') during Willy Brandt's term, mentions splitting global concerns under a transatlantic alliance: the Americans waging war and the Europeans building peace (von Bredow, 2007). Von Bredow rejects Bahr's proposition and contends that there needs to be, "(...) a certain complementarity of peacefulness and exertion of power, of hard power and soft power, is necessary. But there must be this mixture on both sides of the Atlantic" (von Bredow, 2007:631)⁴³. Evidently, the idea of playing solely the peacemaker and conveyer of soft power, is not a role that Germany can sustain or assume indefinitely. Events such as the intervention in Kosovo depict this mixture of hard and soft power. Military means are used to some extent in Germany's new multilateral foreign policy, yet it seems that their main purpose lies in enabling an environment for peace-building and soft power application. After all, Germany's decision to engage in air strikes during the Kosovo war was a synthesis of supporting her NATO allies (a multilateral endeavour), a moral responsibility majorly stemming from her Third Reich past and a rather realist concern of impending migration (Hyde-Price, 2001). Due to this mix, German soft power is much more challenging to highlight than Turkish soft power. In this sense, public diplomacy can act as a key marker of German soft power.

⁴³ Author's translation from German: "(...) eine gewisse Komplementarität von Friedfertigkeit und Machteinsatz, von hard power und soft power ist nötig. Aber es muss auf beiden Seiten des Atlantiks diese Mixtur geben."

Similar to Turkish soft power, public diplomacy envelops an extensive chunk of German soft power. West Germany's cultural department aspired during the early years of the Federation to re-integrate the German people into the international sphere (Enquete-Kommission 1975: Paragraph 30). On paper this goal of German public diplomacy is also imitated by Turkey's ambitions to reconstruct and improve its image in the region during the early 2010s (Kalin, 2011). Germany desperately needed to rehabilitate her image after WWII and the Holocaust. Meanwhile, Turkey's shaky human rights track, frequent coups and unstable state structure gave it reasons to pursue the same ambition. Although there is a similarity in the objective, and also means (public diplomacy), differing understandings of what constitutes public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and soft power, yields widely different results. These disparities will be discussed in further detail in the last chapter.

As noted earlier, Germany's AKBP dictates that intermediary organisations, who are notably autonomous in their decisions, conduct the necessary public and cultural diplomacy of promoting the German language and culture (Grolig and Schlageter, 2007). Some examples for these organizations, their main objectives and financial support are presented in the following table (next page):

Table 14: Institutes tied to Germany's AKBP; their main objectives and financial support

Goethe-Institute	- Conveying German language and culture - Worldwide presence: 159 institutes in 98 countries - Funding of around 215 million Euros from the Federal Foreign Office (AA) as of 2015⁴⁴
German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)	- Supports foreign students and researchers - Worldwide presence: 15 regional offices, 56 information centres 500 'Lektors' and language assistants - Funding: approximately 471 million euros in total; 39% from the AA as of 2015⁴⁵
Alexander von Humboldt-Foundation	- Supporting post-doctoral researchers, scholars (54 of which won a Nobel prize) - Funding: around 114 million euros in total; 34% from the AA as of 2015⁴⁶
Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations (Ifa)	- Since 1917; organizes art exchange, informational sessions and dialogue, service provider of the AKBP - Funding of around 8 million euros from the AA as of 2006

Modified and stripped down table from (Grolig and Schlageter, 2007).

The table reveals that each institution or foundation funded by the Federal Foreign Office (AA) has a different focus within AKBP. In spite of that, they are broadly connected. For instance, while the DAAD is mainly used for funding researchers it also provides German language courses, an area of expertise for the Goethe institute. This is also the case for the Turkish examples. The Yunus Emre Institute, which focuses on cultural factors more than the YTB, also provides scholarships. However, in the Turkish example, neither the YTB or Yunus Emre


⁴⁴ Foreign Office website, Culture and intercultural dialogue, Funding for Goethe-Institut increased http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/KulturDialog/Aktuell/141126_StM-Boehmer-GI-Muenchen.html

⁴⁵ DAAD website, Facts & Figures, Budget and funding bodies: <https://www.daad.de/der-daad/zahlen-und-fakten/en/30736-budget-and-funding-bodies/>.

⁴⁶ Research in Germany, Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, <https://www.research-in-germany.org/en/research-funding/funding-organisations/alexander-von-humboldt-foundation.html>.

institute websites reveal which ministries are tied to funding; nor are there any figures on the volume. In the German case these figures are featured prominently on the websites. While the amount of financial aid from the AA might differ for each institution, the AA does attempt to retain equal opportunity. To illustrate, AA funding for the DAAD constitutes about 39% of the total budget, while for the Humboldt Foundation this figure estimates around 34% (See Table 14). A report of the Federal Government on AKBP showcases this relatively equal budget distribution between the main intermediary organisations:

Figure 5: Distribution of AKBP budgeted among affiliated institutions in percent as of 2015



Source: 19th Report of the Federal Government on Foreign Cultural and Educational Policies, German Bundestag (18th Election period), 11.03.2016.

Outsourcing cultural and educational foreign policies to these intermediaries is not only beneficial in lessening the bureaucratic burden of the federal government. More importantly, as Grolig and Schlageter point out (Grolig and Schlageter, 2007:552):

“(...) the Foreign Office avoids that the foreign cultural and educational policy⁴⁷ becomes an instrument of exploiting art, culture and education for political purposes. Instead, it mirrors a pluralistic image of Germany; its culture and society. Only by maintaining their autonomy and undisputed intrinsic values, can the offers of the AKBP unfold its added value in favour of the value-oriented German foreign policy.⁴⁸

This lack of political goals within public diplomacy is highly intriguing for it denies the political foundation of soft power diplomacy. But it does resonate with Nye’s expectation of public diplomacy becoming a two-way street of dialogue between participants (Nye, 2008).

Germany’s AKBP asserts itself as an isolated sphere outside of the political sphere. This is further amplified by statements on the significance of credibility in German public diplomacy literature (Grolig and Schlageter, 2007:554):

A good reputation gives Germany political as well as economic structuring and attraction power. Hereby the following applies: To advertise for Germany means to emphasize strengths without exaggerating or misrepresenting false facts. Public diplomacy is only successful in the long term if it has credibility.⁴⁹

Along with the independence of cultural and social foreign policies, this attention to credibility generates a soft power potential that is exceptionally free from government control. Precisely the combination of an abstinence of politicization and focus on credibility both obscures and strengthens the conduct of soft power, because it does not

⁴⁷ German abbreviation: AKBP

⁴⁸ Author’s translation from German: “(...) das Auswärtige Amt, dass die Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik keine Instrumentalisierung von Kunst, Kultur und Bildung für politische Zwecke ist, sondern dass ein pluralistisches Bild Deutschlands, seiner Kultur und Gesellschaft. widerspiegelt wird. Nur durch die Wahrung ihrer Autonomie und ihres unbestrittenen Eigenwerts können die Angebote der Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik ihren Mehrwert zugunsten der wert- orientierten deutschen Außenpolitik entfalten.”

⁴⁹ Author’s translation from German: “Gutes Ansehen gibt Deutschland politisch wie ökonomisch Anziehungskraft und Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten. Hierbei gilt: Für Deutschland werben bedeutet Stärken unterstreichen, ohne zu übertreiben oder falsche Tatsachen vorzuspiegeln. Denn Public Diplomacy ist langfristig nur erfolgreich, wenn sie Glaubwürdigkeit besitzt.”

declare itself as a blatant attempt at extending influence or increasing dependence on another state. While an un-politicized public diplomacy opens up dialogue options with a multitude of actors, credible transmission of public diplomacy deepens the legitimacy of soft power. As Craig Hayden puts it: “Understanding soft power as ultimately shaping perceptions of credibility and legitimacy suggests that soft power hews closer to a ‘power to’ capacity, as opposed to ‘power over’ (Hayden, 2012:119). Consequently, Germany’s soft power becomes both transparent in its content yet remains subtle in its practice. Germany has the “power to” act or influence rather than “power over” actors. This subtlety is so prominent that there is no major research on German soft power. In fact, it seems that some German IR scholars distance themselves from some often mentioned characterizations of Germany such as ‘normative’ or ‘civilian’ power. When asked what he understood under these terms, an academic from the Free University of Berlin claimed that he identified these terms as too ‘politicized’ (Author’s interview, February 23, 2017, Berlin). It is interesting to observe this dissociation of politicization when it comes to most foreign policy matters, from both German officials and scholars. Most likely this attitude might be a reflection of the multilateral core of German foreign policy, which highlights open-dialogue between states as an integral part of peace-keeping and development. Assuredly, German national interests are of course of importance. Yet, the multilateral factor seems to create a propensity to a less politicized foreign policy. In this light, it is fitting to continue with some of the other so-called politicized terms associated with German power.

Normative power is one such interpretation of Germany’s power. Unsurprisingly, it considers multilateralism, along with antimilitarism, integration and diplomacy as

integral elements of normative formation (Crawford, 2010). Certainly, these principles do not conform to the realist world view and are shockingly pacifist and, in harsher words, naïve at first glance. During the Cold War, such foreign policy and power abstinence would be regarded as highly irrational and impotent. Yet, in today's globalized standards these norms do resonate more with the international order. Be that as it may, Germany's acceptance of these principles was not shaped by a clairvoyant vision that the new world order would accommodate such doctrines. In fact, Germany's 'Weltanschauung' (world view) was, in a sense, forcefully shaped by its weak state condition resulting with Allied and Soviet occupation (Crawford, 2010). Germany's lack of real sovereignty or a proper military, meant that other means had to be nurtured for Germany to influence world events (i.e. multilateralism, diplomacy, pacifism). Subsequently, these alternatives were integrated so deeply into the Federal Republic's foreign policy making, that they endure to date. A paradox arises with the fact that Germany retained these 'weak state' principles even with the increase in German power during the post-Cold War period (Crawford, 2010). According to Crawford, retaining these norms was not just because of institutional integration, but because "(...) at the moment when a growing German military power became acceptable, international problems increasingly defied military solutions" (Crawford, 2010:166). Therefore, structural changes in world politics, steered and supported Germany's continuation of multilateralism and antimilitarism. Subsequently, the idea of normative power emerged as a possible explanation of this new power arrangement.

Analogous to soft power, normative power, is an ambiguous concept. It proves especially useful when discussing Germany's much debated power status. Realists and

Constructivists have argued on Germany's post-unification power status. In a realist perspective, any deviation from multilateralism, such as Schröder's refusal to participate in the Iraq War, Germany's recognition of an independent Croatia and military action during the Yugoslavia succession era, justified the return of a German great power vision (Crawford, 2010). Despite certain deviations and increased military and economic power, Constructivists acknowledge that the normative vision of the Bonn Republic is still continued in post-unification Germany (Crawford, 2010). Regardless, such a theoretical juxtaposition can limit a proper foreign policy analysis, since it imbeds events and policies into the theory. Theoretical guidelines can be useful to facilitate Germany's foreign policy course for policy-makers and politicians. But their rigid nature can also mean that Germany's foreign policies are misinterpreted. That is why normative power becomes an appropriate characterization of German foreign policy and power. Still, justifying a normative label for Germany might not be as easy as expounding what it actually constitutes.

One of the most prominent scholars on normative power, Ian Manners, describes it with regards to the European Union and not solely Germany. Despite the anarchical nature of the world, the EU operates on the level of civilian power, instead of military power, and as Crawford mentions attempts to, "(...) attract others to join the effort" (Crawford, 2010:170). The composition of a normative basis with the aspiration to attract/entice other actors to employ the same principles, exhibits an underlying soft power model. Bearing this in mind, Manners designs a comprehensive layout of the EU's normative basis based on the connection between principles, objectives, institutions and fundamental rights (2002):

Table 15: Manners' typology of the EU normative basis

<i>Founding Principles</i>	<i>Tasks and Objectives</i>	<i>Stable Institutions</i>	<i>Fundamental Rights</i>
Liberty	Social solidarity	Guarantee of democracy	Dignity
Democracy	Anti-discrimination	Rule of law	Freedoms
Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms	Sustainable development	Human rights	Equality
			Solidarity
Rule of law		Protection of minorities	Citizenship
			Justice
Treaty base – set out in art. 6 of the TEU	Treaty base – set out in arts. 2 of TEC and TEU, arts. 6 and 13 of TEC	Copenhagen criteria – set out in the conclusions of the June 1993 European Council	Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

In the table, Manners associates principles such as liberty, democracy or rule of law with certain objectives, their respective institutions and the fundamental rights attached to them. Democracy, for instance, should aim for anti-discrimination through rule of law, since a fundamental right of democracy is freedom to vote, express opinion etc. Additionally, Manners also provides the treaties that the principles, objectives, institutions and rights are based upon (2002). It should be noted that these normative notions are not mere guidelines for the EU, but for its neighbouring regions as well (2002). Those who wish to join the EU and benefit both economically or politically are drawn to these ideas. Moreover, Manners dismisses arguments that this normative basis as simply a trait of the EU, but rather characterizes it as a source of its power (Manners, 2002:253):

The idea of the 'pooling of sovereignty', the importance of a transnational European Parliament, the requirements of democratic conditionality, and the pursuit of human rights such as the abolition of the death penalty, are not just 'interesting' features – they are constitutive norms of a polity which is different to existing states and international relations. Thus, the different existence, the different norms, and the different policies which the EU pursues are really part of redefining what can be 'normal' in international relations. Rather than being a contradiction in terms, the ability to define what passes for 'normal' in world politics is, ultimately, the greatest power of all.

As evidenced in the quote, Manners treats the normative basis as the core from which the EU derives its power to shape international relations. Through shaping norms, the EU fundamentally shapes the policies of other countries and therefore re-moulds aspects of the international order. Manners exemplifies these with cases such as Turkey's human rights improvements during her endeavour to join the EU (2002). Effectively, such power to influence others, resonates clearly with soft power.

Identically, Crawford utilizes Manners' normative approach in order to explain German foreign policy. Similar to the EU's normative basis, Germany's multilateral, anti-militarist and norm-driven foreign policy is suited for contemporary power relations, "(...) where traditional conceptions of the 'national' interest are increasingly irrelevant" (Crawford, 2010:170). The recent wave of nationalist world leaders is thought-provoking to say the least and challenges most of the assumptions that Crawford mentions. Nevertheless, in essence, Crawford's argument holds on Germany's end. Although Germany had the means to pursue a 'normal' power role and take its own foreign policy path akin to Britain during its time at the EU (Brexit solidifies this), Germany still chose to integrate even more deeply into Europe (Crawford, 2010). Of course, this does not equate to German passivity. Quite the contrary, German leaders do attempt to guide their cooperative partners into certain directions they think is the correct course (Crawford, 2010). Precisely this collective commitment, despite the option to revert to traditional power politics, contributes to Germany being recognized as a credible and legitimate actor in international relations – hence a normative power. Of course, Crawford points out that the normative basis might not be enough for Germany to influence others normatively (2010). Germany's material capabilities are an important

factor in this regard. The next section will discuss the material potential that strengthens the normative basis of German foreign policy.

Unsurprisingly, Germany's foreign policy with regards to her economic power is not too distant from the methods discussed before. West Germany, even before unification, was a noticeably major economic power. Naturally the East-West conflict did not allow this economic quality to translate into political power (Schmidt, Hellmann, & Wolfe, 2007). Even if Germany was capable to do so, the same principles of multilateralism and cooperation would have been pursued (Schmidt, Hellmann, & Wolfe, 2007:91):

However, such a policy (transforming economic power into political power) was not even endeavoured. As a result of a collective learning process, the political, economic and intellectual-cultural elites had recognized that a higher net profit could be achieved by virtue of their willingness to bind to commitments and supranational pooling of interests than by any other strategy⁵⁰

This accepted commitment of economic relations on a transnational level was nothing new for the Bonn Republic and was indeed pursued by foreign minister Gustav Stresemann (1923-1929) back in the Weimar period (Schmidt et al., 2007). Economic power was the primary means of conducting assertive foreign policy. Stresemann pointed out in one of his speeches that Germany's foreign policy had to utilise global economic relations in accordance with the only aspect of what defined Germany as a great power, that is her economic power (Turner, 1967). Germany's normative foreign policy takes inspiration and strength from this economic basis. Without it, the normative

⁵⁰ Translated from German: "Allerdings wurde eine solche Politik auch gar nicht angestrebt. Als Ergebnis eines kollektiven Lernprozesses hatten die politischen, wirtschaftlichen und geistig-kulturellen Eliten inzwischen erkannt, dass sich durch Bindungsbereitschaft und supranationale Interessenbündelung ein höherer Nettomachtgewinn erzielen ließ als durch jede andere Strategie."

basis collapses into the purely ideological sphere and promises become less salient.

In the end, arguments are more convincing when they offer a benefit to others.

Appropriately, a German scholar from the Free University states the following:

“Economic power, which is hard power, can open up possibilities for soft power, (...) which relies on negotiations and winning arguments (...) In most cases, more money in the treasure helps achieving compromises in the EU” (Author’s interview, February 23, 2017, Berlin). The concentration on economy might have started as necessity, but evolved into a virtue of German politics; a substitution of warfare with welfare (Schmidt et al., 2007). As such, Germany already had the

(...) instruments of soft power, which have been increasingly available to her since the 1960s: economic and technological competence, social stability, readiness for compromise, capability to adapt and innovate, and ability to regulate interests in order to contribute to international problem solving”⁵¹ (Schmidt, Hellmann, & Wolfe, 2007:91).

Germany’s procurement of soft power mainly through material means is completely dissimilar to the aforementioned statement by a high level diplomat on Davutoğlu’s fixation on principles⁵².

On the surface, Germany seems to focus on a combined material and ideational foreign policy just as Turkey showcased in the recent years (Ipek, 2015). But Germany had already presented such ability when she transformed instrumental assets such as the necessity of pursuing multilateralism post-WWII into a set of values that have continued


⁵¹ Author’s translation from German: “Stattdessen setzte es auf die Instrumente der ‘soft power’, die ihm seit den 1960er Jahren in wachsendem Maße zur Verfügung standen: wirtschaftliche und technologische Kompetenz, soziale Stabilität, Kompromissbereitschaft, Anpassungs- und Innovationsfähigkeit und die Fähigkeit, auch angesichts unterschiedlicher Interessen zur Regelung internationaler Problemlösungen beizutragen.”

⁵² See Author’s interview with high-level diplomat on p.35: “But what about our principles?”

to nurture multilateral pacifism after reunification (Author's interview with Free University academic, February 23, 2017, Berlin). For this reason, it is unsurprising to observe the transfer of Germany's material capability to value-driven systems. Ultimately, Germany's pursuit of economic prosperity, along with multilateral pacifist foreign policy, has shaped her into an important soft power actor. Besides, the focus on economic power as a means of conducting foreign policy also suggests the importance of domestic politics within foreign policy.

The analysis of domestic dynamics and their effect on soft power policies is an integral part of this research. Just as with the Turkish case, before examining specific foreign policies towards Kosovo, the internal politics and their effects on German foreign policy will be discussed. German policy- and decision-makers are no strangers to the relationship between internal and external politics. Most investigation on German foreign policy regard domestic dynamics as an essential component of the interactive process that leads to foreign policy outcomes (Haftendorn, 1989). The image below illustrates how internal politics affect each other and are affected by external factors. The amalgamation of these dynamics construct German foreign policy.

Figure 6: Haftendorn's representation of the interaction between Germany's internal- and external politics (modified slightly with proper labels)



(Source: Haftendorn, 1989)

Since each Federal Government considered Germany to have a limited foreign policy scope, conflicts of priority with other nations have been possibly avoided (Haftendorn, 1989). As discussed earlier, Germany's lack of autonomy and sense of historical/international responsibility prior to unification, might have also affected this attitude. Correspondingly, German foreign policy was mainly reactive and attempted to avoid or minimize the intensity of internal political issues over foreign policy priorities (Haftendorn, 1989). It is interesting to see that this trend still seems to continue. A Turkish high-level diplomat who served in Germany, notes that German politicians, regardless of ideological background or party-affiliation, are not highly critical of the government's foreign policies (Author's interview, February 2, 2017, Ankara). This display of integrity and consistency in foreign policy making, showcases that internal politics, although affecting decisions, do not overly dictate it. It can be said that Germany's internal politics do have less impact on foreign policy. For example, despite criticism of Merkel's reticence towards president Erdoğan's strict stance on Germany with Nazi accusations (Fischer, Spiegel, 2017), Germany seemingly maintains her foreign policy composure.

Lastly, 'Weltinnenpolitik'⁵³ constitutes another interesting facet of domestic dynamics and foreign policy in the German political sphere. Since the term has been relatively understudied, I will mention it only briefly. Essentially, 'Weltinnenpolitik' is an alternative outlook on the relationship between internal and external politics,

⁵³ Literally meaning 'World-domestic politics' in English. In this context an interplay between the global and domestic spheres of politics.

blending the two under multilateral cooperative policies. Erwin Müller describes it as follows (Müller, 1995:7):

It is an approach that seeks to shape global politics on the basis of the principles of domestic state politics; in order to address the problems of this world in a kind of Copernican transition, to a form of expression which is characterized by freedom from violence and cooperation; contrary to the confrontational nature of day-to-day global reality and its inability of solving common survival problems due to this fragmentation of states.⁵⁴

This focus on cooperation and pacifism is not all too unnatural for German foreign policy. However, 'Weltinnenpolitik' is far more ambitious in its endeavour, since it suggests that the common problems of humanity could be solved under combined leadership. While, the intentions of 'Weltinnenpolitik' might be too idealistic for most scholars or policy-makers, they do resound with certain elements of German foreign policy. Multilateralism, anti-militarism and the idea that global problems can be solved under these principles, are all facets of German foreign policy. In fact, some prominent intellectuals such as Jürgen Habermas, see the EU as an initial step towards this 'emancipatory' vision. In Habermas' words: "Only a European Union, which would be able to act on an external basis, could influence the course of world economic policy. It could push forward the global environmental policy and take the first steps towards a

⁵⁴ Author's translation from German: "(...), dann handelt es sich um einen Ansatz, der Politik im globalen Maßstab nach den Prinzipien staatlicher Innenpolitik gestaltet sehen will, um die Probleme dieser Welt in einer Art Kopernikanischer Wende einer Form der Bearbeitung zuzuführen, die sich durch Gewaltfreiheit und Kooperation auszeichnet, ganz im Gegensatz zu der taglich erlebten globalen Realität der Konfrontationen wie der im Rahmen einer fragmentierten Staatenwelt unbewältigt bleibenden gemeinsamen Überlebensprobleme."

‘Weltinnenpolitik’⁵⁵ (Habermas, 2006).⁵⁶ Not only are these cooperative elements reiterated, but so are the economic focus of foreign policy mentioned earlier.

While, ‘Weltinnenpolitik’ is not a necessary concept for the understanding of German soft power, it does illuminate certain aspects of it. Besides, German politicians such as Willy Brandt (1983) or Joschka Fischer (Fried, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2010) have been keenly aware of the concept of ‘Weltinnenpolitik’, which justifies the consideration of its characteristics. Indeed, Angela Merkel’s current refugee policies are alleged to also have hints of such ‘Weltinnenpolitik’ (Augstein, *Spiegel*, 2016). The next section will attempt to clarify how Germany’s foreign policy characteristics translate into her foreign policies in Kosovo.

4.4 Germany’s Foreign Policy in Kosovo

The relative proximity of the Balkans to Germany and EU member states makes Kosovo and other ex-Yugoslav countries important geopolitical points for German foreign affairs. Amidst the fall of Yugoslavia, Germany’s high activity in the region marked a decisive change of her foreign policy identity after German reunification (Calic, 2007). Similar to Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans, there were certain determinants that played an integral role to Germany’s Yugoslavia policies. It is no secret that Turkish officials like to emphasize the Ottoman heritage and cultural relations in the Balkan region. But in fact, West Germany’s early foreign policy towards

⁵⁵ Author’s translation from German: “Erst eine Europäische Union, die außenpolitisch handlungsfähig würde, könnte auf den Kurs der Weltwirtschaftspolitik Einfluß nehmen. Sie könnte die globale Umweltpolitik vorantreiben und erste Schritte auf dem Wege zu einer Weltinnenpolitik machen.”

⁵⁶ From a ‘Neue Rundschau’ article called “Die Erweiterung des Horizontes”: <https://rundschauehd.de/2006/11/jurgen-habermas-die-erweiterung-des-horizonts/>.

Yugoslavia was also dominated by historical and cultural emphasis (Calic, 2007).

Besides their political and economic association, they also had a sense of ‘fraternity’ in form of the 700.000 Yugoslav guest workers in Germany (Calic, 2007). Eventually, by the time Yugoslavia and the East Bloc started to collapse, such historical relations were not sufficient to explain Germany’s policies in the region.

It has been scrutinized that Germany’s foreign policy has displayed rigidity through a continued emphasis on a normative basis. This aspiration also extends to Germany’s intervention to the Yugoslav conflict:

The commitment of the Federal Government during the advent of the Yugoslavia crisis was guided by political, economic, humanitarian and security-driven interests and motives. It followed the tried and tested principles of German foreign policy: a strongly normative and value-oriented alignment (safeguarding human rights and the development of international law), the goal of multilateral embedding (if possible within the framework of international institutions) and a culture of military restraint for conflict resolution⁵⁷ (Rudolf as cited in Calic, 2007:469).

Accordingly, German foreign policy maintains its identity despite certain sentimental relations with Yugoslavia (i.e. guest workers, previous partnership). Furthermore, German-Yugoslav relations in the Cold-War period had been relatively untouched by historic events such as the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941 and the war crimes that accompanied it (Calic, 2007). To this date, German tourists congregate in former

⁵⁷ Author’s translation from German: “Das Engagement der Bundesregierung bei Aufkommen der Krise in Jugoslawien war von politischen, wirtschaftlichen, humanitären und sicherheitspolitischen Interessen und Motiven geleitet. Es folgte den bewährten Prinzipien deutscher Außenpolitik: einer stark normativen und werteorientierten Ausrichtung (Wahrung von Menschenrechten und Entwicklung des Völkerrechts), dem Ziel multilateraler Einbettung (wenn möglich in den Rahmen internationaler Institutionen) sowie einer Kultur der Zurückhaltung gegenüber dem Einsatz militärischer Gewaltmittel zur Konfliktlösung.”

Yugoslav states such as Croatia (over two million German tourists visit Croatia every year).⁵⁸

All these instances have led to Germany's testament in her reconciliation with Eastern Europe under her 'Ostpolitik', rejecting the previously dominant Hallstein doctrine, which prohibited West Germany to pursue relations with countries that recognized East Germany (Krell, 1991). This recurrent commitment of Germany's normative basis simplifies an analysis of its bilateral relations. In this regard, Germany's relations with Kosovo do not deviate exceedingly from the overall politics towards the Balkans. Kosovo was certainly a challenging turning point for German decision makers. On the one hand, Germany needed to consider Kosovo as an internal problem of Yugoslavia, but on the other hand, severe human rights abuses meant that Germany had to take action in order to protect the normative basis it promotes (Calic, 2007) whilst also mitigating the regional threats and instability caused by the war. Of course, first and foremost, the crises in the Balkans were a security threat for Europe and Germany, considering the influx of refugees into Germany and other EU countries (Author's interview with high-level German diplomat, March 10, 2017, Berlin).

The subsequent military intervention not only defied expectations of Germany's much emphasized pacifist nature, but also raised eyebrows towards the prospect of German normalisation discussed in the beginning of this chapter. In the end, these military interventions only solidified Germany's multilateral path, and showed that it could conduct military operations among a cooperative environment, unlike the 'German

⁵⁸ Data obtained from Federal Foreign Office website: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Nodes/Kroatien_node.html.

special way' (Calic, 2007). Moreover, Germany's support of internal opposition towards Milosevic, signified the continuation of democratic and pacifist means of structural/regime change (Calic, 2007). As a consequence of the Kosovo War, the EU announced (about the same time the Kosovo War ended: June 1999) the Stability Pact of South-Eastern Europe (Calic, 2007). The Stability Pact was an initiative by the European Commission, alongside the support of international organizations such as the OSCE, the G8, NATO and a large number of other states (Hombach, 1999), that sought to bring peace and security to the region. Germany's contribution to the Stability Pact also meant that conflict prevention and structural adjustment policies in South-Eastern Europe became a 'leitmotif' of German Balkan policies (Calic, 2007). To some extent the Stability Pact also provided an opportunity for Germany to expand the zone of economic stability into her eastern front (Staack, 2007).

However, the EU's, and in a sense, Germany's blueprint-type approach towards the Balkans is also criticized by some. A well-known Turkish academic, criticizes the approach as a mere re-utilization of the EU's politics towards Eastern Europe without acknowledging the nuances of each Balkan state (Author's interview, 21 March, 2017, Ankara). The same academic also pointed out that most of his research led him to conclude that the EU's structural adjustment programs and financial aid only prolonged the frozen conflict in the Balkans, which were still based on ethnic, religious and political antagonism (Author's interview, 21 March, 2017, Ankara). Although academic consensus might be mixed about Germany's foreign policy in Kosovo, a quantitative analysis might highlight various new perspectives.

4.5 German Soft Power in Kosovo: Data Presentation and Analysis

Equal to Turkey's multidimensional approaches towards Kosovo through institutions such as TİKA or Yunus Emre, Germany has its own set of institutes and organizations. One such is the 'Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit' (GIZ), which, according to their website, engage Kosovo on the basis of achieving "(...) political stability and democracy based on the rule of law" (<https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/298.html>). In this framework, GIZ's website sets sustainable economic development; public administration, democracy, civil society and energy as key areas of cooperation between Kosovo and Germany (<https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/298.html>). Moreover, parallel to the Yunus Emre institute, Germany has its own education-cultural establishment called the Goethe institute. Unlike, Yunus Emre, the Goethe Institute has a center solely dedicated to learning the German language.⁵⁹ Germany's soft power presence can be witnessed even further with cases such as Kosovo's open petitions for Germany to invest more into Kosovo⁶⁰. A quantitative analysis of Germany's activities can evaluate the extent of these soft power dynamics in detail.

Analogous to the Turkish case, German soft power has also been evaluated through three newspaper sources and four government websites. The three newspaper sources used for the data collection were Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Central politics, conservative-liberal), die Welt (Conservative) and die Tageszeitung (New left, Green left). The respective political alignments of each should give a balanced

⁵⁹ Taken from Goethe Institute's Prishtina website: <https://www.slzprishtina.org/haus/menu/prufungen/>.

⁶⁰ Taken from Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: <http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,4,2368>.

impression of German media in context of soft power attributes. As for data from government ministries and institutions, the Federal Foreign Office, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy; and the Goethe Institute have been selected. The first section will demonstrate newspaper sources' content analysis.

In order to generate the relevant news articles, the following keywords were entered into the Google News Scraper:

Table 16: Soft power attributes and their respective keywords used for Google Scraper (German Newspapers)

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	Kosovo Aussenpolitik, Kosovo Außenpolitik, Kosovo Beziehungen, Kosovo Diaspora, Kosovo Diplomatie
Domestic Values and Governance	Kosovo Deutschland Rechtstaatlichkeit, Kosovo Deutschland Rechtsstaat, Kosovo deutsche Institutionen, Kosovo deutsche Demokratie
Political Economic Potential	Kosovo Ökonomie, Kosovo Wirtschaft, Kosovo Investition, Kosovo Unternehmer
Culture and Ideational Influence	Kosovo Kultur, Kosovo Religion, Kosovo Kulturpolitik, Kosovo Ausbildung

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The keyword choices were kept relatively simple in this data collection. Again, just as with the Turkish case, general words such as 'Wirtschaft' (economy) were used. The German case is distinct in only a few keywords such as 'Kulturpolitik' (cultural

⁶¹ Author's translation in order of appearance: Kosovo foreign policy, Kosovo foreign politics, Kosovo relations, Kosovo diaspora, Kosovo diplomacy, Kosovo Germany rule of law, Germany legal state, Kosovo German institutions, Kosovo German democracy, Kosovo economy (both 'Ökonomie' and 'Wirtschaft' are the same) Kosovo investments, Kosovo entrepreneurs, Kosovo culture, Kosovo religion, Kosovo cultural policy and Kosovo education.

policies), ‘Ausbildung’ (education) and ‘Diaspora’. ‘Kulturpolitik’ was designated because it reflects a component of the ‘Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik’⁶² of the Federal Foreign Office discussed in the analytical part of this chapter. Since the AKBK constitutes a key area of German soft power, the use of keywords relating to it is beneficial to this study. Moreover, ‘Diaspora’ was used as an alternative equivalent to Turkey’s ‘Soydaş’ (kin) keyword. The Kosovar diaspora in Germany is remarkably big and surprisingly impactful not just on foreign policy but on domestic politics. A German high-level state official has stated that some German MPs rely on Kosovar votes from their district (Author’s interview, March 10, 2017, Berlin). Based on these premises the following amount of articles have been compiled for each newspaper source (next page):

⁶² English: Foreign Cultural and Educational Policies

Table 17: Amount of keyword references for each newspaper (German newspapers)

Attribute	Keywords	Number of articles for each source (by URL)		
		Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	Die Welt	Die Tageszeitung
Culture and Ideational Influence	Kosovo Culture	100	99	0
	Kosovo Religion	100	62	15
	Kosovo Cultural Policy	3	1	1
	Kosovo Education	0	0	0
Political Economic Potential	Kosovo Economy	57	39	83
	Kosovo Economy ⁶³	0	100	0
	Kosovo Investments	4	9	0
	Kosovo Entrepreneurs	88	0	5
Domestic Values and Governance ⁶⁴	Kosovo Germany Rule of Law	0	33	6
	Kosovo German Institutions	21	27	4
	Kosovo German Democracy	100	78	15
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	Kosovo Foreign Policy	200	151	18
	Kosovo Diplomacy	0	0	8
	Kosovo Relations	100	72	14
	Kosovo Diaspora	1	4	1
Total		774	675	170

⁶³ ‘Kosovo Economy’ has been coded twice to account for both ‘Ökonomie’ and ‘Wirtschaft’. Both translate to economy.

⁶⁴ Besides the prefix of ‘Kosova’ there is also ‘Türkiye’ (Turkish for Turkey) included. The use of this was meant to avoid irrelevant articles and only scrape for results that included domestic attribute keywords such as ‘democracy’ ‘institution’ with relation to Turkey.

Equivalent to the Turkish case, all these articles were filtered manually based on relevancy. Distinct from the Turkish newspaper articles, these filtered articles were mostly on the link between Kosovars and the refugee crisis. Interestingly, German newspapers such as die Welt regard Kosovar immigrants as refugees (Mülherr, Welt, 2015). Indeed, in my interview with a high-level state official from the Federal Foreign Office's Western Balkan division, the interviewee affirmed that Germany's, and for that matter Europe's, first great refugee crisis came from former Yugoslavia (Author's interview, March 10, 2017, Berlin). Therefore, both journalists and the government signify Kosovars as refugees.

In this context, it is not all too astonishing that Germany treats Kosovar migration as part of the overarching refugee crisis and Germany's struggle to integrate these migrants through 'Willkommenskultur'⁶⁵. Under these circumstances, 70 relevant articles on Kosovo were gathered. The number of articles is less than their Turkish counterparts, but the content is significantly larger with around 62,000 words; contrary to Turkish news articles' 51,000 words. Subsequently, NVivo's text query function was used to generate the attribute concentration of the content. The following keywords were coded for NVivo (next page):


⁶⁵ Author's translation from German: Welcome culture.

Table 18: Soft power attributes and their respective keywords used for NVivo 11 (German newspapers)

Attributes	Keywords (engl. translation)
Culture and Ideational Influence	Kultur (Culture)
	Religion (Religion)
	Kulturpolitik (Cultural Policy)
	Ausbildung (Education)
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	Beziehungen (Relations)
	Aussenpolitik/Außenpolitik (Foreign Policy)
	Diplomatie (Diplomacy)
	Diaspora (Diaspora)
Domestic Values and Governance	Demokratie (Democracy)
	Rechtsstaatlichkeit/Rechtsstaat (Rule of law/legal state)
	Pressefreiheit (Press freedom)
	Institutionen (Institutions)
Political Economic Potential	Wirtschaft/Ökonomie (Economy)
	Investitionen (Investments)
	Unternehmer (Entrepreneurs)
	Finanzhilfe (Financial assistance)

Based on these keywords, NVivo created the figures on the next page:

Figure 7 & Table 19: Pie chart and table for keyword frequency for each attribute (German ministerial & institutional websites)



Attributes (Ranked)	Number of Coding References
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	55
Domestic Values and Governance	40
Political Economic Potential	39
Culture and Ideational Influence	15

Unlike the Turkish case, the content of the German newspaper articles is much more evenly distributed. Except, 'Culture and Ideational Influence', all the other attributes are not too far apart from each other. In fact, 'Domestic Values and Governance' and 'Political Economic Potential' only differ by one keyword reference, which can surely be designated as rather insignificant. Strikingly dissimilar from the Turkish case, 'Cultural and Ideational Influence' places last in the ranking of attributes. The same attribute ranked first in the Turkish newspapers' content. At first assessment this feature demonstrates the concentration on diplomatic, domestic and economic factors rather than cultural and ideational ones. Since, the cultural focus is much more akin to Turkey's foreign policy, the results have transpired as expected. Germany's focus on multilateral diplomacy, EU integration and pacifism is modestly reflected by these newspapers' content. To further strengthen this argument, four government websites have been scraped for the attribute keywords.

Just as with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, the Federal Foreign Office has been scraped for all attributes. The other three government websites have been coded specifically for one attribute. These are: The Federal Ministry of the Interior (for domestic factors), the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (for economic factors); and the Goethe institute (for cultural aspects). Although the Goethe Institute is an autonomous body that establishes its own direction for cultural and educational policies, they are still funded by most of the Federal offices. So while it does contrast with Yunus Emre institute's much more government directed approach, the Goethe institute is still a dependent establishment of the German government. With this

in mind, the attribute keywords used for the Google Scraper are identical to the ones used for NVivo's text analysis. Applying those keywords yields the below results:

Table 20: Keyword frequency for German ministerial and institutional websites

Ministerial and Institutional websites	
Attributes (Ranked)	Number of sources that reference the keywords
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	282
Culture and Ideational Influence	216
Domestic Values and Governance	113
Political Economic Potential	41

Clearly, 'Foreign Policy and Diplomacy' is the most dominant attribute in this ranking with 282 sources. Interestingly, 'Cultural and Ideational Influence' also has a vast amount of sources, namely 216, thus ranking second spot. The focus on cultural factors is usually a trait associated with the Turkish case. Yet, Germany seems to also concentrate on a value-oriented approach towards foreign policy. These aspects will be discussed in juxtaposition with the Turkish case in the last chapter. Additionally, the low amount of sources for 'Political Economic Potential' is also startling. Despite Germany's heavy investments in the Western Balkans, there do not seem to be many sources tied to their conducts in Kosovo. This might be because reports are either classified or Germany does not inform of these economic activities on ministerial websites. Either way, the data at hand show that Germany's primary focuses on Kosovo are through diplomatic and cultural factors. 'Domestic Values and Governance' is a

substantially more significant attribute with comparison to Turkey, but not by itself. It is also imperative to compare the newspaper data set with the government type data set.

Table 21: Comparison of keyword references between German newspaper websites and German ministerial and institutional websites

Newspaper websites		Ministry and Institutional websites	
Attributes (Ranked)	Number of keyword references within articles	Attributes (Ranked)	Number of Sources that reference the keywords
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	55	Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	282
Domestic Values and Governance	40	Culture and Ideational Influence	216
Political Economic Potential	39	Domestic Values and Governance	113
Culture and Ideational Influence	15	Political Economic Potential	41

The most noteworthy observation in this comparison is the synchronicity of the ‘Foreign Policy and Diplomacy’ attribute. Both newspaper sources’ content and government websites rank these diplomatic factors at first spot. Assuredly, this should be nothing all too remarkable for government websites, but it is curious for newspaper articles. Regardless of political alignment all of the newspaper sources reported more on diplomatic matters than other attributes. On the other hand, government websites have designated cultural factors as a focal point of German soft power, while newspapers barely report on those factors (only 15 references).

Also intriguing is the fact that the ‘Domestic Values and Governance’ attribute only differs in one rank between the two data: rank 2 for newspaper websites and rank 3 for government websites. This could be due to the focus on internal politics that these newspapers also have. Most of the stories link back to domestic concerns in Germany such as the refugee issue (Lohse, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2015 & Martens Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2015). A foreign political story can thus be used to expand domestic political discussion. Overall, the close parallel of diplomatic factors suggests that there might be a coordinated effort among newspapers and the government. Not in the sense of a collaboration between media and government but rather in a coordinated effort to emphasize the foreign political dimension between Kosovo and Germany. The ongoing debate of normalization and multilateralism in Germany’s foreign policy might be a product of this outcome. That being said, a more detailed analysis of these attributes with regards to the Federal Foreign Office should clarify some of these points. Similar to the Turkish case all the keywords were applied to the Federal Foreign Office website, producing the subsequent results in Google Scraper’s tag cloud view (next page):

Figure 8: Tag cloud number of sources referring to the issue (keyword)⁶⁶



At first sight, the tag cloud representation highlights that cultural factors were abundantly referred to in the Federal Foreign Office Website. Both ‘Kosovo Kultur’ (culture) and ‘Kosovo Ausbildung’ (education) are one of the largest clouds in the representation, with 136 and 135 sources respectively. Meanwhile, diplomatic and foreign policy characteristics are also prominent, albeit expectedly. The attention to culture and education is both very surprising but at the same time anticipated. Since Germany’s federal foreign office states that the AKBP constitutes the third pillar of German foreign policy, the results should not come as a shock. But the magnitude of these outcomes does make the case astounding. It further cements the fact that Germany has pursued even more value driven policies than proponents against normalization have argued. This is even more evident when compared to newspaper websites:

⁶⁶ Author’s translation of keywords from German: Kosovo Kultur (culture), Kosovo Kulturpolitik (cultural policy), Kosovo Religion (religion), Kosovo Ausbildung (education), Kosovo Ökonomie/Wirtschaft (economy), Kosovo Finanzhilfe (financial assistance), Kosovo Unternehmer (entrepreneurs), Kosovo Investitionen (investments), Kosovo Aussenpolitik (foreign policy), Kosovo Diplomatie (diplomacy), Kosovo Diaspora (diaspora), Kosovo Beziehungen (relations), Kosovo Demokratie (democracy), Kosovo Pressefreiheit (press freedom), Kosovo Institutionen (institutions) Kosovo Rechtsstaat (legal state)

Table 22: Comparison of keyword references between newspaper websites and the Federal Foreign Office

Newspaper websites		Federal Foreign Office website	
Attributes (Ranked)	Number of keyword references within articles	Attributes (Ranked)	Number of Sources that reference the keywords
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	55	Culture and Ideational Influence	297
Domestic Values and Governance	40	Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	238
Political Economic Potential	39	Domestic Values and Governance	124
Culture and Ideational Influence	15	Political Economic Potential	94

Antithetical to the aggregate data from ministries and institutions, the Federal Foreign Office data place ‘Culture and Ideational Influence’ at the top of the ranking list; thus shifting the observed parallel between media and government in context of the ‘Foreign Policy and Diplomacy’ attribute. Of course, ‘Foreign Policy and Diplomacy’ is an integral part of the Federal Foreign Office and thus retains an important position in the list; being ranked 2nd. Nevertheless, it is especially intriguing that cultural factors take precedence over traditional diplomatic means. Lastly, the other two attributes preserved their rankings in comparison to aggregate government data. Both ‘Domestic Values and Governance’ and ‘Political Economic Potential’ retain their position at 3 and 4 respectively. Economic factors ranking last further cement the fact that Germany’s government websites do not assert their economic activities with Kosovo openly.

On the whole, the data presented suggest three outstanding trends in German foreign policy and soft power. Firstly, the overall government rhetoric of diplomatic and foreign policy focus is also reflected in the media. As such, Germany might still be embroiled in a debate over what sort of foreign policy Germany should conduct. This is further amplified by the second trend, which is the fact that the Federal Foreign Office focuses on cultural factors more than diplomatic ones. Such cultural and educational focus in the Federal Foreign Office might eventually underpin Germany's soft power activities in Kosovo. Last but not least, the third trend of German foreign policy hints that economic activities are publically situated in the background. All data, except those from newspapers, place 'Political Economic Potential' in the last spot. Consequently, this leads to the deduction that economic factors are only indirectly coordinated by Germany. For instance, through international and multilateral institutions such as the EU, IMF or the EBRD. These prospects are further discussed in the following concluding chapter with comparison to Turkey's soft power.

CHAPTER 5

TURKISH AND GERMAN SOFT POWER IN COMPARISON

This research had two primary goals: First, to compare Turkey's and Germany's foreign policy activities in Kosovo through the lens of soft power. Second, to explore the rather neglected area of domestic dynamics, which can affect and direct soft power perceptions. Soft power is usually discussed through foreign policy means, such as public or cultural diplomacy. Nye only designates domestic values such as democracy or rule of law as inherently attractive without explicating on the dynamics at work (Nye, 2004). As a result, four attributes have been introduced in the beginning of this chapter, each assigned to either foreign or domestic dimensions (Shown in Table 3 in the next page). Accordingly, each attribute was allotted specific keywords in order to obtain a holistic picture of both Turkey's and Germany's soft power conduct.

Table 3: Modification of Nye’s soft power typology based on attributes and dimensions

Dimension	Attribute	Means	Channels	Receivers of Soft Power
Foreign	Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy	Governments, IGOs, NGOs, Media	Foreign Governments and publics
Domestic	Domestic Values and Governance	Rule of Law, Institutional integrity,	Domestic Government	Foreign governments and publics
Both	Political Economic Potential	Foreign Direct Investment, Domestic economic growth, Global capitalist network	Companies, NGOs, IGOs, Governments	Foreign governments, companies and publics
Both	Culture and Ideational Influence	Cultural Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, Civil society	Government agencies, NGOs, IGOs	Foreign governments and publics

(Source: Nye, 2008)

This chapter deliberates on Turkey’s and Germany’s soft power capabilities comparatively. The first part investigates the statistical similarities and differences accumulated through the web-based content analysis from chapter 3 and 4, while the second part assesses the preceding deductions through soft power and Turkey’s and Germany’s foreign policy. The second part also heavily relies on empirical field research that was made through interviews with high-level state officials, academics and researchers in both Ankara and Berlin. The third part finalizes the research with concluding remarks on the assessment of the empirical and analytical research, along

with some future recommendations on which directions this study, and the overall literature, could take.

5.1 Statistical Comparison

Both Turkey's and Germany's data set have yielded distinct, yet theoretically fitting results. In Turkey's case the emphasis on cultural ties, shared history and religion was reflected in the prominence of those facets in newspapers and government websites. For Germany, the continuation of multilateralism and pacifism was underlined through attention to diplomatic and cultural political means. Deeper analysis into the meaning of these deductions can be inferred from a comparative analysis, which is considered to be a reliant tool on illuminating conceptual formations (Collier, 1993) and widening the scope and depth of political information (della Porta, 2008). Differences between the two countries can accentuate or even change perception of each government's soft power strategies. Bearing this in mind, the first comparison will be made between Turkish and German media. Table 23 juxtaposes the data gathered from both sides (next page).

Table 23: Comparison of keyword references between Turkish and German media based on the results from Google News Scraper and NVivo 11

Turkish Media		German Media	
Attributes (Ranked)	Number of keyword references within articles	Attributes (Ranked)	Number of keyword references within articles
Culture and Ideational Influence	140	Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	55
Political Economic Potential	135	Domestic Values and Governance	40
Domestic Values and Governance	42	Political Economic Potential	39
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	34	Culture and Ideational Influence	15

On the surface, German media has considerably less references than Turkish media, as Germany's highest number is 55. Nonetheless, the ranking matters more than quantity since it provides an impression of which direction the media concentrates on. The most marked difference in this comparison is the pronounced discrepancy between the attributes 'Culture and Ideational Influence' and 'Foreign Policy and Diplomacy'. For Turkish media the cultural factors are of utmost importance, proven by its leading rank, whereas Germany mostly neglects those elements as it is placed last. Conversely, German media prioritizes 'Foreign Policy and Diplomacy', whilst Turkey is less concerned about those aspects. As discussed in their respective chapters, this difference most probably mirrors the respective societal debates that matters to Turkey and Germany. For Turkey's media, Kosovo is primarily a cultural, historical and religious tie that Turks have to that region and Kosovo specifically. To German media, Kosovo poses

a fundamental foreign political question in the context of EU politics and Germany's 'Willkommenskultur'. Taking everything into account, Turkey's media does mimic the sentimental tone of Turkey's government towards Kosovo, whereas Germany's media confers on Kosovar relations in a more practical matter under the framework of the EU and the refugee crisis.

Another, albeit less weighty, contrast between the two data sets lies in its prioritization of economic and domestic factors. In juxtaposition, the 'Domestic Values and Governance' and 'Political Economic Potential' attributes switch spots. German articles' domestic concerns of Kosovo (Rathfelder, Tageszeitung, 2016) are reflected in the second spot ranking of 'Domestic Values and Governance'. Turkish articles' boasting of economic and infrastructural investments in Kosovo (Sabah, 2010)⁶⁷ explains the second spot for 'Political Economic Potential'. But evaluating the media data is not enough in order to comprehend Turkish and German soft power differences. These disparities rest on a public level and can only reflect on the environment that the two governments conduct their soft power. The next section will therefore investigate the governmental level of these disparities.

Comparable to how Turkey's and Germany's societal outlook determines which soft power attributes the media prioritizes, the same applies for governmental conduct. To clarify how and to what extent these attributes are treated by each state, the subsequent juxtaposition is utilized.

⁶⁷ Author of the article is not listed:

http://www.sabah.com.tr/ekonomi/2010/11/05/balkanlarin_en_buyuk_un_fabrikasi_aksoydan

Table 24: Comparison of keyword references between Turkish and German ministerial and institutional websites based on Google Scraper results

Turkey's Ministerial and Institutional websites		Germany's Ministerial and Institutional websites	
Attributes (Ranked)	Number of keyword references within articles	Attributes (Ranked)	Number of keyword references within articles
Political Economic Potential	1,135	Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	282
Culture and Ideational Influence	690	Culture and Ideational Influence	216
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	463	Domestic Values and Governance	113
Domestic Values and Governance	238	Political Economic Potential	41

Unlike the media comparison, government data are less divergent from each other. First of all, the 'Culture and Ideational Influence' attribute is ranked second for both Turkish and German governmental websites. The lack of difference of this attribute for both parties could mean that they equally prioritize the cultural factors with relation to Kosovo. The comparison is between the Yunus Emre institute's website and the Goethe institute's website. As such, they will surely be rife with content when it comes to soft power activities in Kosovo. In detail, the Yunus Emre Institute does have substantially more sources on the attribute than the Goethe Institute. This shouldn't be too startling since Turkey has the much mentioned historical-cultural connections in Kosovo. Yet it is commendable that with respect to its own prioritization, Germany focuses on these cultural factors just as much as Turkey.

Furthermore, the ‘Foreign Policy and Diplomacy’ attribute ranks first for Germany and third for Turkey. Meanwhile ‘Domestic Values and Governance’ ranks last for Turkey and third for Germany. This arrangement insinuates that Germany’s approach is heavily reliant on diplomatic and foreign political methods with a slight trace on domestic guidelines. Foreign policies strengthen Germany’s multilateral approach, while domestic focuses indicate some sense of Germany’s commitment towards establishing institutions, rule of law and democracy in Kosovo; thus verifying Germany’s EU-integrated approach towards Kosovo and the Balkans in general. In Turkey’s data set these two attributes are ranked last, meaning that Turkey’s approach is not reliant on heavy diplomacy and effort to shape domestic features of Kosovo. Of course, Turkey does give importance to these attributes, albeit not as much as it does to cultural or economic factors.

The most striking difference is that ‘Political Economic Potential’ ranks first on Turkey’s list while it ranks last on Germany’s set. The reason for this might rely on a theoretical level. Scholars such as Ipek have noted the foreign policy shift in the JDP era on both material and ideational levels with the case of TIKA (Ipek, 2015). Correspondingly, it should not be too surprising to see economic aspects in the forefront of Turkish foreign policy. Even so, Germany’s economic activities in Kosovo are not necessarily small but rather overshadowed by its commitment to multilateral approaches. Before assessing the analytical perspective of each state’s soft power policies based on the data and literature at hand, one more statistical comparison is necessary: that between each foreign ministry. The following table presents this comparison.

Table 25: Comparison of keyword references between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Office based on Google Scraper results

Ministry of Foreign Affairs website		Federal Foreign Office website	
Attributes (Ranked)	Number of keyword references within articles	Attributes (Ranked)	Number of keyword references within articles
Culture and Ideational Influence	597	Culture and Ideational Influence	297
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	463	Foreign Policy and Diplomacy	238
Political Economic Potential	449	Domestic Values and Governance	124
Domestic Values and Governance	382	Political Economic Potential	94

The resemblance between the two foreign ministries is rather striking. Although the amount of references is larger on the Turkish counterpart, the rankings are almost identical. ‘Culture and Ideational Influence’ and ‘Foreign Policy and Diplomacy’ are both ranked first and second respectively for each ministry. Meanwhile, ‘Political Economic Potential’ is ranked third for the Turkish foreign ministry and fourth for the German foreign ministry; vice versa for ‘Domestic Values and Governance’. Ultimately, these resemblances lead to the conclusion that Turkey’s and Germany’s soft power presence do not differ on the surface. Both parties focus on customary aspects of soft power. The actual disparity might lie in the content of these methods.

5.2 Analytical Comparison

Overall, while statistics both suggest that soft power focuses vary from area to area, they are almost identical when it comes to the respective foreign ministries of each country. The divergence that exists between government ministries, such as the different concentration on economic factors might be affected by Germany's connection to the EU and its economic activities in Kosovo or Turkey's materially integrated foreign policy (Ipek, 2015). The genuine difference lies in the outlook of Turkey and Germany on each attribute. This can be verified through the empirical interviews conducted and an extensive array of literature. Some of these mentalities in turn affect the ranking of some attributes. This section will discuss how Turkey's and Germany's general foreign policies and their soft power approaches, which are affected by those policies, influence the statistical rankings presented above.

As has been laid out, Turkey's foreign policy is decisively dictated by the three determinants of geostrategic positioning, historical context and Republican ideologies (Aydin, 2004). Although Davutoğlu's foreign policy approach goes at odds with most of Atatürk's principles, it does strive to capture the peace-oriented approach of 'Peace at home, peace in the world'. Yet, the approach neglects that domestic dynamics heavily influence foreign policy outcomes. Even if Turkey acts friendly towards Kosovo, her Islamic rhetoric at home affects her rhetoric in the Balkans; which has been signified as 'Neo-Ottoman' multiple times. The interesting segment of this analysis arises from the fact that whilst this rhetoric is poles apart from Germany's EU-centric rhetoric, scholars such as Demirtaş argues that Turkey conveys its ideas through Europeanized instruments (2015). Undeniably, Germany and the EU's concerns are not of 'Neo-Ottoman' nature

but rather the fact that the same language can be used to interfere with the EU's activities in the Balkans (Terzi, 2012). These concerns have also been expressed in the interviews with German officials from the Federal Foreign Office. One such official stated that Germany in fact appreciates Turkey's involvement in Kosovo, since she has religious ties to the region, which can be used as leverage (Author's interview, 10 March, 2017, Berlin). When asked, Turkish high-level diplomats articulate the same motivation to cooperate with Germany. A high-level Turkish diplomat occupied with the Balkans has also voiced the idea that Turkey and Germany have in fact a lot in common; namely the parallel between TIKA-GiZ and Yunus Emre-Goethe institutes (Author's interview, 16 April, 2017, Ankara).

So whilst, intentions and instruments align between Turkish and German diplomats, the content do drastically differ. The GiZ website plainly states that democracy, political stability and the rule of law are important elements that need to be dealt with before any economic or energy aid may be provided to Kosovo (<https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/298.html>). Meanwhile, TIKA's website focuses on the economic and agricultural aspects that it provides to countries such as Kosovo. This divergence of content is the reason why domestic factors are favored in the German data and why economic factors are favored in the Turkish data (See Table 24). In the end, Turkey does not concentrate on the ramifications of its domestic dynamics on its soft power presence. Surely, high-level Kosovar diplomats have articulated that they regard Turkey as a prime friend and partner of Kosovo (Author's interview with high-level Kosovar diplomat, February 2, 2017, Ankara). But the same high-level diplomat has also voiced that Germany is "one of the most important allies of Kosovo" (Author's

interview, February 2, 2017, Ankara), which indirectly shows that Turkey is not necessarily favored over Germany.

In addition, Turkey's approach seems to be more blatant than Germany's because of the rhetoric started with Kalın and Davutoğlu. Germany's soft power is subtle in this regard. The literature and field interviews do not mention soft power all too much. Instead they are only briefly referring to soft power instruments. The comprehensive manual on German foreign policy, *Handbuch zur deutschen Aussenpolitik*, only has 8 references on soft power (search function was used for Schmidt et al., 2007). That being said Germany's soft power attraction might be more elusive but in turn also more attractive, because it is less assertive. However, a researcher from the SWP has also argued that Germany would not have the leverage it has over the Balkans were it not for its economic power and EU position (Telephone conversation, March 3, 2017, Berlin). Another Turkish scholar on the Balkans stated that the EU's reluctant and slow integration of the Balkans only makes matters worse and inhibits any democratic or economic progress (Author's interview, 21 March, 2017, Ankara). As a consequence, Germany's soft power is also only ephemeral. Thus it raises the question as to whether Kosovo is authentically attracted to Germany or because of the 'carrot' that is provided – that is the EU.

The subsequent absence of EU activities has led Turkey to be more assertive over the region, but Turkey's own domestic struggles and emphasis on culture and religion, has only led to backlash and a taint over Turkish soft power. In fact, some scholars state that Turkish soft power has simply ceased with regards to countries such as Syria (Dayıoğlu et al., 2013). Many Turkish soft power academics have in fact called

for solving domestic issues such as the Kurdish question or radical Islam a decade ago (Oguzlu, 2007). Neglecting domestic dynamics even further can only be damaging for Turkey's soft power. The next section will lay out some possible recommendations and alternatives that can remedy Turkey's and Germany's soft power.

The two countries both have their issues regarding soft power in Kosovo. Turkey neglects its domestic issues and over-emphasizes religious and cultural rhetoric, whilst Germany is not as engaged in Kosovo and is mostly stalled by a 'shrinking Europe' (European Council on Foreign Relations conference proceedings, 2011). A continuation of this research can also add other domestic elements. One of these is city-planning. The attraction of Berlin as a metropolitan, multicultural city is a form of soft power that Germany harnesses. Thus, future research could delve into the domestic dimension of urban attraction. The same is true for İstanbul, which many Kosovars, aspire to immigrate to. However, much can be done on the Turkish counterpart to plan these cities with a global agenda in mind; similar to Germany. Cities play a big role in migration and attraction. Turkey seems to do this less but does have potential since it has relations in the Balkans in the form of sister cities and municipality officials who visit Kosovo frequently (Author's interview with Turkish academic, March 19, 2017, Ankara).


5.3 Conclusion

The aim of this study was to highlight the similarities and differences of Turkey's and Germany's soft power presence in Kosovo through empirically grounded analysis. In order to achieve this, interviews with government officials, analysts and academics from Turkey, Germany and Kosovo have been conducted. To amplify the

empirical analysis, a web-based content analysis on Turkish and German governmental websites and newspapers has been additionally performed. Both the interviews and web-based content analysis have been related back to the literature on Turkish and German soft power. A comprehensive mind map has been generated in order to clarify the relations of literature and empirical analysis in the context of Turkey's and Germany's soft power presence in Kosovo (image on the next page):



Figure 9: Determinants of Turkey's and Germany's soft power presence in Kosovo



Kosovo's position in the web of relations in Image 6 is rather clear: it seeks to strengthen the legitimacy of its sovereignty by gaining more recognition, joining international organizations and thus strengthening its institutions and economy (<http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,224>). As such, Kosovo regards both Turkey and Germany as important benefactors to its cause and goals (Author's interview with high-level Kosovar diplomat, February 2, 2017, Ankara). Naturally, due to Turkey's and Germany's larger commitment to the region and to Kosovo specifically, they are also committed to aid Kosovo in those areas. With this in mind, Turkey and Germany have shaped their foreign policies towards Kosovo under the umbrella of soft power.

The empirical analysis on the web-based content analysis has displayed no vast differences in methodology. Based on the soft power attributes laid out in the theoretical framework of this chapter, both foreign ministries have somewhat similar prioritization of soft power attributes (See Table 25). 'Culture and Ideational Influence' and 'Foreign Policy and Diplomacy' attributes are prominent in both foreign ministries and have the same ranking in the web-based content analysis (See Table 25). The ministerial websites differ moderately with Turkey emphasizing 'Political Economy Potential' the most and Germany focusing on 'Domestic Values and Governance' and 'Foreign Policy and Diplomacy' more than Turkey (See Table 24). Equally important are the interviews in this manner, which have highlighted that Turkey and Germany do not drastically vary in soft power methodology. Some Turkish diplomats have noted that Turkey and Germany intersect in political, economical and cultural aspirations in Kosovo, while a German diplomat has also voiced that Turkey's position in Kosovo is beneficial to Germany (Author's interview with high-level Turkish diplomat April 16, 2017, Ankara & high-

level German diplomat, March 10, 2017, Berlin). Rather, the most compelling difference between the two actors are the foreign policy makers that have shaped Turkish and German soft power in general and thus naturally towards Kosovo.

Image 6 illustrates that Turkey's notable soft power policy makers are Ahmet Davutoğlu and Ibrahim Kalin, who have both left substantial marks in Turkish soft power literature (See Kalin, 2011) & (Davutoğlu, 2001). Meanwhile, Germany's literature has no similarly notable soft power policy makers. The soft power process is de-personalized and instead institutionalized. Yet, Germany's soft power is still observable empirically and traceable under other theoretical frameworks such as normative power or civilian power (Hyde-Price, 2001) & (Hellmann, 2016). Moreover, Turkey's soft power policies have found more voice through Davutoğlu's speeches over the years (See Davutoğlu, 2009, Sarajevo speech), which has also irritated many Kosovars of Turkey's intentions in the region. Furthermore, Turkey's own domestic difficulties (i.e. regional instability due to the Syrian civil war, attempted coup d'état) have also affected its soft power capabilities and legitimacy, with some scholars arguing that it is de facto non-existent anymore (Dayioğlu et al., 2013). Despite these factors, Turkey has not changed its foreign policy towards Kosovo. Nevertheless, Germany's soft power in Kosovo, in the framework of the EU and integrating the Western Balkans to Western organizations and liberal economic structure, seems to be more stable. As a result, it has generated attraction in a much more 'silent' and subtle way than Turkey, which might be the reason why it has endured to date. Yet, unless Germany does not fasten the integration of Kosovo into the West, other actors such as Russia or China might extend their influence as well.

In the final analysis, soft power should be assessed under its ephemeral nature. This study's results have highlighted that even if Turkey and Germany overlap in some attributes of soft power communication, such as 'Culture and Ideational Influence', key political figures have heavy impact on the final results. The assertiveness of political figures such as Davutoğlu can inhibit soft power communication, as it has been observed in the case of the Sarajevo speech and the preceding 'Neo-Ottoman' accusations. Successful soft power presence requires more institutionalization rather than personalized politics. Indeed, Nye argues that soft power needs to retain an intangibility akin to Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' (2004). In this framework, Germany's institutionalized form of soft power in Kosovo appears to be more stable in the long run. From another point of view, states can yield and steer their respective domestic politics. A focus on improving domestic politics through solving issues can exceedingly improve the image that soft power recipients such as Kosovo might have. Additionally, the juxtaposition between Germany and Turkey has shown that many instruments and methods of soft power remain the same between the two actors. It should be noted that soft power is not a form of power that needs to be nurtured alone. Overcoming prejudices and distrust can revitalize the soft power that both Turkey and Germany have to different extents in Kosovo and can aid these actors to win the hearts and minds of the Kosovar people together.

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Interview with high-level Turkish diplomat (No. 4), January 30, 2017, Ankara.

Interview with high-level Turkish diplomat (No. 5), February 2, 2017, Ankara.

Interview with high-level Kosovar diplomat, February 2, 2017, Ankara.

Email correspondence with Kosovar Centre for Security Studies analyst, February 15, 2017, Berlin.

Interview with German scholar/academic, February 23, 2017, Berlin.

Telephone conversation with SWP analyst (1), March 3, 2017, Berlin.

Interview with SWP analyst (2), March 8, 2017, Berlin.

Interview with high-level German diplomat, March 10, 2017, Berlin.

Interview with Turkish scholar/academic (1), March 21, 2017, Ankara.

Interview with Turkish scholar/academic (2), March 21, 2017, Ankara.

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