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GAZİANTEP ÜNİVERSİTESİ

SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ

ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANA BİLİM DALI

**İBN HALDUN'UN ASABİYET VE UMRAN
KAVRAMLARININ TEMELİNDE KÜRT
SORUNU'NUN TANIMININ VE ÇÖZÜMÜNÜN
ANALİZİ**

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

MEHMET KILIÇ

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MAYIS 2017

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GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

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**ANALYSIS OF THE DEFINITION AND SOLUTION
OF THE KURDISH PROBLEM ON THE BASIS OF
IBN KHALDUN'S ASABIYAH AND UMRAN
CONCEPTS**

MASTER'S OF ART THESIS

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MEHMET KILIÇ

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Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Onayı


Doç. Dr. Ayşe ANTARYAIOĞLU
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Müdürü

(Unvanı, Adı ve SOYADI)
SBE Müdürü

Bu tezin Yüksek Lisans/~~Doktora~~ tezi olarak gerekli şartları sağladığımı onaylarım.


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(Unvanı, Adı ve SOYADI)
Tez Danışmanı

(Unvanı, Adı ve SOYADI)
İkinci Tez Danışmanı (varsa)

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Jüri Üyeleri:
(Unvanı, Adı ve SOYADI)

Doç. Dr. B. İzzet Yandaş
Yrd. Doç. Dr. Mesut SÖHRET
Yrd. Doç. Dr. Bülent Gökçek

İmzası


T.C.
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Date of Viva: 12/05/2017 MEHMET KILIÇ

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences


Doç. Dr. Zetire Nettekuluoğlu
(Title, Name and SURNAME)
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of
Master's of Art/~~Doctor of Philosophy~~.


Asst. Prof. Dr. Mesut SÖHRET
(Title, Name and SURNAME)
Head of Department

This is to certify that I(we) has(have) read this thesis and that in my(our) opinion it is
fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master's of
Art/~~Doctor of Philosophy~~.

(Title, Name and SURNAME)
Co-Supervisor (if present)


Asst. Prof. Dr. Mesut SÖHRET
(Title, Name and SURNAME)
Supervisor

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully
adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master's of Art/~~Doctor of
Philosophy~~.

Examining Committee Members:
(Title, Name and SURNAME)

Signature

Doç. Dr. Züsten Yılmaz
Asst. Prof. Dr. Mesut SÖHRET
Asst. Prof. Dr. Bülent Çiğdem





ABSTRACT

ANALYSIS OF THE DEFINITION AND SOLUTION OF THE KURDISH PROBLEM ON THE BASIS OF IBN KHALDUN'S ASABIYAH AND UMRAN CONCEPTS

KILIÇ, Mehmet

M. A. Thesis, Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Mesut Şöhret

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Kurdish problem has been one of the most challenging issues of Turkey for many years. Although the problem has been among the major problems for many years, let alone solving the problem, even naming it has been really difficult. Therefore, this study aims to analyze both the description and the solutions of the Kurdish problem within the lights of Ibn Khaldun's major concepts which are asabiyah and umran. However, the study doesn't aim to describe the problem with all dimensions but it aims to investigate it within the scope of Ibn Khaldun. Because the religion factor plays an important role on the basis of Ibn Khaldun's theories and also inasmuch as Turks and Kurds are Muslim communities in majority, it would be suitable to investigate the Kurdish problem on the basis of Islam in general and in Ibn Khaldun's viewpoint. Therefore, according to Ibn Khaldun, the deterioration of asabiyah ties and umran, in historical context, forms the basis of the Kurdish problem. In order to solve the Kurdish problem, the asabiyah ties should be empowered again and the umran conditions of both Turks and Kurds should be improved.

Key words: Kurdish Problem, Ibn Khaldun, Asabiyah, Umrans

ÖZET

İBN HALDUN'UN ASABİYET VE UMRAN KAVRAMLARININ TEMELİNDE KÜRT SORUNU'NUN TANIMININ VE ÇÖZÜMÜNÜN ANALİZİ

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Kürt sorunu, uzun yıllardan beri Türkiye Cumhuriyeti için en zor konulardan birisi olmuştur. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti için yıllarca en zor konulardan biri olmasına rağmen, sorunu çözmek bir yana, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti soruna isim koymakta bile zorlanmıştır. Bu çalışma, İbn Haldun'un temel teorileri olan asabiyet ve ümran kavramları ışığında Kürt Sorunu'nun hem olası tanımlarını hem de sorunun çözümü noktasındaki önerileri analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Ancak, çalışmanın temel amacı Kürt sorununu bütün boyutlarıyla incelemek değil, sorunu İbn Haldun'un bakış açısıyla değerlendirmektir. İbn Haldun'un teorilerinin temelinde din faktörü önemli bir rol oynadığı için ve ayrıca Kürtler ve Türkler genelde Müslüman topluluklar oldukları için, Kürt sorununun İslam ve İbn Haldun'un bakış açısı temelinde incelenmesi uygun olacaktır. Bu sebeple, İbn Haldun'a göre Kürt sorununun temelinde, tarihi gelişim içerisinde, Türklerin ve Kürtlerin din ve birlikte yaşama temelli asabiyet bağlarının ve ümranlarının bozulması yatmaktadır. Kürt sorununu çözmek amacıyla, hem Türklerin hem de Kürtlerin asabiyet bağlarının tekrardan kuvvetlendirilmesi ve ümran koşullarının iyileştirilmesi gerekmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Kürt Sorunu, İbn Haldun, Asabiyet, Ümran

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Kurdish Issue, which extends from the last years of the Ottoman Empire to PKK, has occupied the agenda of Turkey and has become the subject matter which affects all the areas such as society, security, economy, religious belief and politics of the country directly since the collapse of Ottoman Empire. The regions on which the Kurdish people mostly live today were the areas of knowledge, culture, brotherhood and tolerance during the Ottoman time. However; when we look at the picture that has been drawn today in the eastern and south-eastern part of Turkey, those areas have been the places from where most of the migrations take place and most of the conflicts, underdevelopment have been taking place again in these areas mostly since the collapse of Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the problem that takes place in the east and south-east of Turkey not only affects these areas but also these conflicts are playing an important role in the emergence of unrest and disorder in terms of security, economy, politics, society etc. in the other regions of Turkey.

In fact, when the time period after the collapse of Ottoman period is investigated, although the actors and the ideologies show changes, the events that have been experienced do not look unfamiliar because the same scenarios have recurred until today. That is to say, the attitudes of the Kurdish people against the government rather than the Turkish people, which arose mostly with the emergence

of Sheikh Said rebellion, have remained same but in different versions and by different actors within Kurdish people. However, the present situation moves through a way different from that of Sheikh Said rebellion and in a way which do not match up with the identity of both Turks and Kurds that they inherited from Ottoman Empire, which means that it moves through a separatist and radical Kurdish nationalism.

The most significant difference of today's Kurdish problem from the Kurdish problems in the past is that Kurdish nationalism shows escalation among the Kurdish people especially among the Kurdish left wing. Moreover, the inclination of the remaining non-leftist Kurdish people to leftist-nationalist groups escalated with the emergence of PKK in 1970s and Kurdish left nationalism started to take active part in terrorism because they put aside their political struggles in 1960s and assumed a more radical and terrorist identity with the emergence of PKK. Thus, the development of the problem since the time of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire implies that Kurdish issue will be a more challenging problem for both now and the future.

When Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the terrorist organization called PKK, was captured in 1999, he was being called as the killer of 30.000 people. However; it is really plaguesome to see that the number of martyr and dead people from the foundation of republic until today the total number is two or three times bigger than 30.000 people. Moreover; "while there were 10.885 martyr public officials during the War of Independence in 1900s, 11,735 people became martyrs during the fight against PKK" (Yayman 2014:56).

Although it is a problem which should have been solved immediately until now, the problem has been keeping growing and getting worse since the founding years of the republic. The efforts that made by the government officials in order to solve the problem become either in vain or insufficient because "Kurdish issue, throughout the Republican History, instead of being governed by the political authorities, has been directed by the security officials, and worst of all was left to the perception of security mechanisms" (Yayman 2014:16). Let alone solving the problem, "even naming the problem is an area on which we cannot make an agreement because according to different viewpoints, the problem is named as the East problem, South-east problem, Kurdish problem, PKK problem, underdevelopment problem, human rights problem" (Yayman 2014:13)

Beside the problem of solving and naming the issue, there is a literature problem, which can be described as the lack of the studies that deal with the problem from all the perspectives such as economy, education, politics, etc. Because, despite the fact that many books, reports and articles have been written related to PKK and Kurdish issue, “some of these works target to understand and describe the PKK and Kurdish problem in all honesty, however, some others just try to produce papers in accordance with their own policies and targets”(Bahar, 2013:84). The reason underlying the emergence of such a big literature is that everybody has approached the Kurdish problem from different perspectives because it is a problem including all the layers of the society and because the conditions, which form the basis of the Kurdish problem, have witnessed many changes over years.

Thus, the Kurdish problem lacks the studies which will deal with the deficiencies within the area such as religion and sociology and which will inject the views of Ibn Khaldun into the literature of Kurdish Issue, who has a deep understanding in religion, sociology, politics, and economy etc. Within this perspective, the main object of this study is both to analyze the definition and solution regarding the Kurdish problem in a historical context and within the light of the theories of asabiyah and umran which were put forth by Ibn Khaldun. However, it cannot be expressed that this study aims offer the whole picture of the problem in order to describe and solve the problem, on the contrary, the main aim while composing this study is to provide the Khaldunin perspective while analyzing the Kurdish problem. The whole picture can only be provided when all the studies related to the Kurdish problem are investigated totally together with Ibn Khaldun’s ideas.

The reason why Ibn Khaldun is preferred is that Ibn Khaldun, who had an upper-level education, is an intellectual thinker known for his striking determinations related to the foundation and collapse of the states, and also related to the science of history and sociology. Moreover, Ibn Khaldun is known as the founder of the modern sociology of today with his umran theory in which he tried to explain the structures of the society. Thus, it would be a total injustice not to give ear on the solution of a problem having sociological, political, ethnical and historical background to a scholar and also to an intellectual statesman, who put forth outstanding theories related to the structure of the society.

An another reason for consulting Ibn Khaldun in the solution and the definition of the Kurdish issue is that Ibn Khaldun gives more place to politics rather than the other issues in his work named *Mukaddimah*. “About 79 of the book’s 229 sections mention politics, the sultan, kingship or the state directly, and the content of many of the rest contains references to things we would consider to be state-related: Ibn Khaldun tells us that his book is about ‘umran’, which he defined as human gathering” (Kalpakian, 2008:363).

There are mainly two concepts which is thought to be helpful in this study in order to analyze the definition and solution of the problem. The concepts which are thought to be helpful in defining and solving the Kurdish problem according to Ibn Khaldun are *asabiyah* and *umran*. Ibn Khaldun describes *asabiyyah* within the light of the origin word ‘*asabe*’ which implies that *asabe* is a term used to describe the people who share the same kinship. According to Ibn Khaldun, there are two types of *asabiyah*, which are genealogical *asabiyah* and upper-*asabiyah*. “While coming from the same genealogy and being cognate is indispensable for the first type of the *asabiyyah*, for upper-*asabiyyah*, there are no such criteria” (Albayrak, 2000:7). However; the criteria which lead the genealogical *asabiyyah* to form an upper-*asabiyyah* are the factors such as religion, sharing the same culture or habituation which undertakes the role of a glue. The first one is ‘‘limited nationality’’, which comes from the same origin and has a blood tie among each other however, the other is the nationality consciousness, which can be called as ‘‘general nationality’’ (Elmalı, 2003:136).

The two types of *asabiyah* are used in order to describe the ties between Turkish and Kurdish people and thus, these are the terms forming the main arguments of this study. It is clear that although they have different genealogical *asabiyahs*, both Turks and Kurds also possess a common upper-*asabiyah* which is based on both the religion and habituation having been existing for more than 1000 years. Thus, the main argument of this study is to claim that the *asabiyah* ties between the Turkish and Kurdish people, which are based on both religion and habituation, have deteriorated in a historical context since the collapse of Ottoman Empire.

The concepts of asabiyah will also be useful in analyzing the solution of the Kurdish problem claiming that the solution of the Kurdish problem is based on uniting Kurds and Turks under the same religion of Islam. According to Ibn Khaldun, this type of unification is provided through upper-asabiyah which is to emerge when the different asabiyahs gather around the same religion. Because, call for the religion ends the envying and the rivalries among the people possessing different asabiyahs (Haldun, 2014:300). The other way of providing upper-asabiyah is through uniting the Kurds and Turks under habituation asabiyah which occur as a result of sharing the same territories due to the fact that two asabiyahs live together for a long time, implying that both Turks and Kurds have shared the same territories for approximately 1000 years.

The other concept, which is thought to be helpful in describing and solving Kurdish problem is umran because every type of asabiyah occurs within umran. Ibn Khaldun describes umran as a term or a new type of science which is used to describe all the social, societal, cultural, or political activities of human being within the process that is ranging from the tribal life to sedentary life. Thus, solving the Kurdish problem starts with forming an umran in which all those social, societal, cultural, economical and political activities are to take place in order to create an environment for unifying their asabiyah ties based on religion and habituation.

The difference of this work lies in its being the first work to analyze both the definition and the solution of the problem according to the theories and the concepts proposed in Mukaddimah which is an introduction book to a history book called Kitabu'l Iber by Ibn Khaldun and which is accepted as a masterpiece by many scholars within many disciplines both in the West and the East.

The methodology which will be followed in this study is qualitative method which uses the secondary data analysis. "Qualitative research is concerned with developing explanations of social phenomena. That is to say, it aims to help us to understand the social world in which we live and why things are the way they are" (Hancock 2009:7). It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible (K. Denzin and S. Lincoln 2000:3)

The secondary data analysis is the way of extracting knowledge necessary for understanding the nature of a problem and in defining and proposing solution to the problem. Such analysis can be done with the information that is available in the

statistical information in the published articles, or with the data available in the text, tables, graphs, and appendices of the published articles, or upon the original data (Church 2001:33). Thus, while reviewing the necessary literature, the books, articles, journals, reports and newspaper reports which are related to both the concepts and works of Ibn Khaldun and which are about the Kurdish problem were made use of.

There are four chapters in this study. The first chapter which is also the introductory chapter of this study describes the situation of the Kurdish problem, the importance of the study with its propositions and the concepts that will be used in the study. Then, the first chapter ends with the introduction of the methodology and type of the data analysis.

The second chapter introduces both the concepts of Ibn Khaldun such as *asabiyah*, *bedawat-hadari* and *umran*, which form the basis of the study, and the short life story of Ibn Khaldun. After the concepts are introduced, the second chapter continues with discussing the importance of Ibn Khaldun in international relations studies, which is important in understanding the validity of Ibn Khaldun in discussing the Kurdish problem. Then, the last part of the chapter submits the historical origins of the Kurdish people in order to understand whether they have genealogical *asabiyyah* or not. The last part of the second chapter finishes with the discussion of the types of the *asabiyah* which bring Turks and Kurds together and of how and when the habituation and upper-*asabiyah* ties which connect both Turks and Kurds together formed.

In the third section of this study, the definition of the Kurdish problem according to Ibn Khaldun will be tried to analyze within the framework of *asabiyah* and *umran* concepts which were explained in the previous chapter. Within the scope of analysis of the definition of the Kurdish problem, this study aims to discuss whether the upper-*asabiyah* ties between Turks and Kurds deteriorated by taking the historical development from Ottoman time up to now into the consideration. The aim of taking the Ottoman time as base is to explain whether the rebellions such as Sheikh Ubeydullah and Bedirhan Beg rebellions are the background events of the Kurdish problem.

The last part of the study analyzes the solutions regarding the Kurdish problem using both habituation and religion *asabiyah* as a base in a parallel way to

the description of the Kurdish problem in the third chapter. However, before going through such kind of solution, the steps taken by the government officials in order to solve the Kurdish problem until 2000s since the foundation of the Republic will be investigated. Because, the analysis of these steps will be beneficial in order to understand the differences among the solutions that were put forth by Ibn Khaldun and the statesmen and the others.



CHAPTER TWO

IBN KHALDUN'S LIFE AND HIS MAIN CONCEPTS

There becomes a necessity of recognizing Ibn Khaldun in terms of his education that he acquired during his life and his professions that he performed after taking his education in order to analyze the definition and solution of the Kurdish problem within the perspectives of Ibn Khaldun. Because, both classical education that he received from the renowned scholars of his time and the duties that he fulfilled during the time of his statesmanship constitute the prime source of the concepts that were put forward by Ibn Khaldun.

Beside his education that he acquired, Ibn Khaldun, as being the one taking part in the political life, “had the opportunity to examine the political structures within the light of his experiences and observations, which can be assumed as being ahead of his time” (Çiftçi and Yılmaz, 2013:83). These duties that Ibn Khaldun assumed have provided the theoretical framework in terms of forming the scholarly background for his later life. After introducing the life story and the main concepts of Ibn Khaldun, it might be useful to have a deep look inside the importance of Ibn Khaldun within the area of political science and international relations in order to understand his validity while offering definitions and solutions of problem which belongs to the past and now.

2.1 IBN KHALDUN'S LIFE

“Ibn Khaldun was born in Tunis in the year 1332 to an aristocratic family who had recently emigrated from Andalusia to the Maghreb” (Baeck, 1996:3). “His real name was Abdurrahman. He is also known as ‘Ebu Zeyd’ (Zeyd’s Father) besides being named as ‘Veliyyuddin’ or ‘E’t-Tunusi’ (Tunusian). However; he is known mostly as ‘Ibn Khaldun’ (Khaldun’s son). But; his father’s name is not Khaldun but Muhammad” (Dursun, 2008:49). Because Khaldun is the name of his great-grandfather. Ibn Khaldun’s family was a family who undertook important duties in both the state and governance in Isbiliyye (which is called as Sevilla in today’s Spain) (Dursun, 2008:50). “Ibn Khaldun was thus the descendant of an old, prominent and learnt family. He was brought up in the cradle of this legacy which he inherited from his family, guided by its fortunes and traditions” (Enan, 1997:8)

Growing up in an intellectual family provided him a great opportunity to have a qualified education. Therefore, Ibn Khaldun had a strong like to the knowledge since his early childhood: “Since my very early infancy, the time of my weaning, I have never ceased to seek knowledge and the best virtues, dividing my time between attending the courses and the circles of scholars until the time of the devastating plague that killed dignitaries, notables and most of my teachers in Tunis” (Dhaouadi, 2005:586). Generally, Ibn Khaldun’s life is investigated by dividing it into three distinctive periods: the first twenty years constitute his childhood and education years. In the second twenty-three years, Ibn Khaldun both experienced political adventures and continued his education. In the last period of his life, he worked as a judge, scholar, and mudarris. Ibn Khaldun maintained the first two periods of his life in mainly Magrib and Egypt while the last period was in Egypt (Say, 2011:85).

The first period of Ibn Khaldun’s life starts with his step to the deep educational life. “Ibn Khadun started his education near his father by taking lessons from him” (Dursun, 2008:50). Moreover, he had also many opportunities to receive decent education from the famous scholars of his time. Therefore both the education that he acquired from the precious scholars of his time and the education he received from his father also play an important role in our philosopher’s thoughts since his father had also intellectual background. For example, because his father was a

knowledgeable man and make expeditions around the desserts, Ibn Khaldun, who liked to travel, was able to witness the lifestyles and conditions of the bedewi people, which would be the basis for his concepts such as bedawet-hadaret, asabiyah, and umran. The Islamic Scholars from which Ibn Khaldun took courses can be classified into three groups (Say, 2011:86):

1. His father Muhammad, sheiks and school teachers in Tunisia
2. The scholars who are in the knowledge council of Sultan Ebu'l-Hasan Merini
3. The scholars from Magrib and Andulusia (Spain)

“The education that Ibn Khaldun took included the most important domains namely religious canons (the Quran and the Prophetic tradition), the legal focus of different schools and the practices of law, the methods of speculative theology (kalam), the Greek tradition of Arab philosophy (falsafa) and last but not least the Persian political wisdom literature” (Baeck, 1996:6). Moreover; Ibn Khaldun was trying to learn Arabic language and the various specific areas in this language both from his father and his scholars in Tunisia (Dursun, 2008:50). Dursun also claims that Ibn Khaldun was making a great effort to memorize the books that he was studying by making a reference to Ibn Khaldun biography book called ‘E’t-Ta’rif’ (Dursun, 2008:50)

The second period did not start well for Ibn Khaldun because at the beginning of this period “he lost his entire family except his brother in a devastating plague that ravaged both Eastern and Western Islamic World in 1348” (Yıldız, 2010:28). Although he felt sorrows after losing his family, Ibn Khaldun then spent most of time on studying and state affairs. The other important feature of this period was Ibn Khaldun’s first appearance in politics. “Ibn Khaldun’s enter into the politics started with the time when he was appointed as the clerk of Sultan Ebu Ishak, who was obtaining the Tunisia governance, at the age of eighteen. Likewise, Ibn Khaldun obtained similar duties in the places such as Biskra, Fas, Gırnata, Bicaye, Tlemsen (Tilimsan)” (Say, 2011:87). The bi-polar life which is based mostly on knowledge and active participation in politics caused Ibn Khaldun to live more fluctuant life. For example, “frequently changing sides, he first served the emir of Tunis followed by a past at the rival court of Fes, then by a stay at Themcen, and finally then the sultan of Granada”(Baeck, 1996:4).

One of the reasons for Ibn Khaldun's life being mostly turbulent and his frequently changing jobs was that the geography in which our thinker spent his life was always in turmoil and power struggle. And the second reason was the favorable traits that Ibn Khaldun had. Because; "he was slandered and complained about by some of the people of his time due to his fondness to the justice, objectivity and his sustaining power. Thus, he was discharged and remitted for five times" (Haldun, 2014:25). After a series of reversals and failures in his role of teacher and counselor to various local emirs, he quit the political scene with a pang of disappointment. For about three years he retreated into the desert castle, Qalat Ibn Salama (Baeck, 1996:1).

In the castle of Qalat Ibn Salama, he had the opportunity to finish his famous book 'Mukaddimah' because Ibn Khaldun was able to find the peaceful environment that he had been seeking for a long time. Although the incidents mentioned above even always impelled Ibn Khaldun to change his occupation and the region where he lived, Ibn Khaldun became one of the important figures of his time with the advantage ensured by both his intelligence and knowledge. This advantageous situation provided the occasion for Ibn Khaldun to be preferred by different state administrators. Therefore, after staying in the castle for about three years Ibn Khaldun turned back to Tunisia where "he set out to raise students and make researches" (Dursun, 2008:58).

During the last period of his life, our scholar who disgusted with the court life and its intrigues, 'emigrated' to Egypt where the Mamluk Sultan offered him protection and where he became the supreme judge for litigation in the Maliki tradition. "He assumed high offices and positions as a judge in Cairo, a city he found fascinating ('he who doesn't know Cairo, does not know the power of Islam') as well as irritating ('people live as if the final judgment was postponed indefinitely.')" (Gierer, 2001:3). In this period, Ibn Khaldun, on one hand, also started to write the history of the east, on the other, he studied on Mukaddimah and continued to make extractions and additions until a couple of weeks before his death (Say, 2011:90) He lost his life in 1406 at the age of 74" (Dursun, 2008:59).

2.2 IBN KHALDUN'S MAIN CONCEPTS

2.2.1 Understanding Ibn Khaldun's Concepts in Their Essences

The scholars who have studied Ibn Khaldun have fallen into a common mistake by directly translating the terms into their own languages without taking the whole meaning of the terms into the consideration. Thus, to be able to convey the content and the meaning of the concepts of *asabiyya* and *umran* into different languages and to understand them correctly have been the major problem which most of the scholars have had to cope with. Hassan describes this problem as a kind of methodology problem which leads to the wrong definition and misunderstandings of the concepts of *asabiyya* and *umran*.

“In fact; there emerges an approach or method problem related to Ibn Khaldun which arises from dealing with him from just one perspective. ...In other words; if there is a need to analyze Ibn Khaldun and his works, it should be fulfilled with not just one point, but by dealing with all the dimensions.” (Hassan, 2011:25)

Beside the approach or methodology problem that Umit Hassan describes, the deficiencies in describing the concepts also originate from directly translating the concepts from their Arabic origins to the target language in which the problem of finding the correct correspondence of terms appears or even if the correspondences which are found in the target language are correct, they are deficient in terms of compensating the exact meaning of the terms. In other words; one of the major problems of this difficulty rises from the analysis and interpretation of essential terms from the *Mukaddimah* and their equivalence in Western thought. (Chabane, 2008:331). For example, within the lights of the problems mentioned above, the different translations of the ‘concept’ *asabiyyah* are following, which can be inferred that the following translations just reflect one dimension of the concept *asabiyyah*:

“*Asabiyyah* was interpreted as “*esprit de corps*” in De Slane’s *Mukaddimah* translation, both Gastoun Bouthoul and afterwards Howard Becker and Harry Elmer Barnes shared the same definition with that of De Slane. The interpretation of A.F. von Kramer has been “community feeling” (“*Gemeninsinn*”), and even “nationalist idea” (“*Nationalitätsidee*”). Hellmut Ritter, used the correspondent of *asabiyyah* as “feeling of solidarity”. The equivalent that both Salahuddin Khuda Buksh and Haroon Khan Sherwani used nearly at the same time period is “communal spirit”. Ernest Geller sees the meaning, which *asabiyyah* performs, as “social cohesion” or “martial spirit”. Topçuoğlu develops an analysis in which he used “solidarity tie”, “social contact link”, “sociability” as the equivalents of *asabiyyah*” (Hassan, 2011:172-173)

Say claims that “there are as many interpretations as interpreters of the *Mukaddimah*” (Say, 2011:39). The reason underlying such a problem is the reality in which “most of the writers handling Ibn Khaldun’s work are far away from

deepening through and some of the writers define asabiyyah by looking at its political results and even some make the concept similar to a group of sociology concepts in a random way” (Say, 2011:105) However, such problem is not valid just for asabiya. Although Say refers to the asabiyya dimension of the problem, it is also probable to come across the same problem while describing the concept ‘umran’. According to Chabane, because the translation of the concept of ‘umran’ remains always in debate and likely subject to change (Chabane, 2008:332). However; although there are also the ones who translated this concept into different languages, their translations are far away from reflecting the overall meaning but they can just show the readers just one partial meaning of the concept as it was the situation in translating ‘asabiyah’.

For example; M. Mahdi translated ‘umran badawi’ as ‘primitive culture’, ‘umran hadari’ as ‘civilised culture. Moreover; N. Nassar translates concept of umran as ‘sociology’, ‘umran badawi’ as ‘nomadic society’ and ‘umran hadari’ as ‘sedentary society’. Djamel Chabane, contrary to the available translations, proposes or suggests translating the concept of “umran” into “urbanization” (Chabane, 2008:331).

Turkish resources or the ones who translate Mukaddimah into Turkish preferred to use the term ‘asabiyyah’ directly as it is in Arabic origin, however; foreign resources preferred to translate the term from its Arabic origin into their languages. Thus, while explaining asabiyyah or umran within today’s terminology and utilizing in this study’s context, instead of directly translating it to the languages of today, it is more proper to use the terms’ themselves directly like the Turkish ones have done. Because, “it is really hard not only to find a proper equivalent in the other languages to the Arabic origin of asabiyah but also to describe the term by oversimplifying its meaning” (Hocaoğlu, 2007:44).

Besides using the Arabic origins of the concepts, they also need to be investigated with their broad meanings that Ibn Khaldun tries to convey because the concept of asabiyyah and umran have Arabic origins, which is the language of being composed of the words of derivations with various meanings, and because these words gain new meanings in Mukaddimah context beside their Arabic-origin meanings. For this reason, in this study instead of preferring one or many types of definitions in English or Turkish origins, it is preferred to use the concepts’ themselves and the detailed description of them which in turn helps us to understand

the concepts better and more closely and also to use the concepts more effectively within Kurdish problem.

2.2.2 Asabiyyah

Asabiyyah is characterized as “the most important and mostly-known technical term” (Say, 2011:312). “Asabiyyah which is both a basic concept and one or, even in many ways, first of the key concepts” (Hocaoğlu, 2007:44), is essential for the foundation of many states or even empires whether they are large or small. Therefore, “the content of concept word ‘asabiyya’ constitutes the vital-point of Ibn Khaldun’s political theory” (Hassan, 2011:172). “The theory of asabiyah presents the dimensions and the reasons of the solidarity feelings of the societies who are connected to each other via family, clan, tribe or blood tie” (Semiz, 2013:22).

“Ibn Khaldun converted the terms such as asabiyah and umran into the concepts which have distinct meanings rather than their ordinary dictionary meanings” (Say, 2011:313), which may bear the need to learn the root, synonyms and the environment in which those words are given new meanings. In this context; there is a strong connection between the word ‘asabe’ and ‘asabiya’ because ‘asabe’ is the smallest element in forming the co-operation which leads to the wider form of ‘asabiyah’.

“The word ‘asabe’ is both the plural form of ‘‘asib’’ and also carries the meaning of ‘helping and protecting’ beside the meanings such as ‘binding, surrounding, durable and tied’’” (Say, 2011:313) However; “men do not cooperate with simply anyone but among themselves” (Goodman, 1972:258) “People, who strive to gather around a relative and protect him during a fight or a defence, are named as asabes” (Karaman, 2006:452) Thus, there should be one more thing in order to make the meaning of asabe more accurate, which is being the kinship, relatives or relationship.

“On the nature of human society, Ibn Khaldun explains the structure and form of relationship in what he terms as ‘ta’awun’ (co-operation). This term is used to explain the social relations between the members of the society. Every individual is in need of supports of each other in their lives” (Ahmad, 2012:24). Ibn Khaldun

explains the concept of asabe or asabiyyah in the context of ‘ta’awun’ (co-operation). “Within this frame, it can be seen that asabiyyah is explained as a key concept in forming unity/society” (Yavuz, 2013:333)

According to the definition by Durmuş Hocaoglu who is successful in terms of including the kinship factor, “asabe is the name given to the community which is formed by relatives having paternal blood tie among the Arabs of Pre-Islamic Age of Ignorance” (Hocaoglu, 2007:44). In the same way, in the Turkish-Islamic Encyclopedia, Hayreddin Karaman describes “the ‘asabe’ as an ‘Islamic Law term’ used for the inheritors connected directly or via the man to the legato” (Karaman, 2006:452), which implies that the inheritors are those people who are connected to each other via kinship. Thus, while defining ‘asabe’, both ‘kinship which occurs as a result of sharing the same blood’ and ‘helping-protecting’ are key elements.

While describing asabiyyah in Mukaddimah, Ibn Khaldun starts to explain the term by referring to genealogy and bases Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H. – Peace be upon him)’s hadith related to lineage as an example: “You understand the meaning of the hadith; ‘Learn your lineages to be able to provide you the kinship.’ That benefit of lineage is the one which stands at protecting the tie of brotherhood and right and law of kinship. The one that exceeds this is useless” (Haldun, 2014:289). Thus, by stressing the importance of the lineage, Ibn Khaldun who says that asabiyyah is a kind of power which emerges out as a result of unity, also implies that the essence or core of the asabiyyah is the lineage or kinship (Köktürk, 2011:87) as it is in the concept ‘asabe’.

In an another section in which Ibn Khaldun takes the definition of asabiyyah one step further, he explains asabiyyah as “the feature of resistance against the enemies and showing courage by gathering together” (Haldun, 2014:250). Thus, while proposing the general definition of the term ‘asabiyyah’; “Ibn Khaldun emphasizes the society’s protecting itself and acting against the common enemy; desiring to gain a victory by conquering countries, beating the enemy by using force and violence beside their maintaining the general necessities of lifestyle by gathering around” (Hassan, 2011:195).

According to the definition by Durmuş Hocaoglu; “asabiyyah is the esprit of solidarity and unity, which mobilizes the defense reflex against a common threat and

unifies all the individuals of the society consisting of the same asabes” (Hocaoğlu, 2007:45). According to another definition; “asabiyyah is the feeling of solidarity which provides the people, who come from the same kinship, to act out against the opponents” (Çağrı, 2006:453). In a similar way, asabiyyah can be defined as the feeling of the joint solidarity which emerges out among the people sharing the same asabe, during the time of a common goal, aim or danger.

In his book *Mukaddimah*, Ibn Khaldun refers to two kinds of asabiyyah which has the same functions in terms of both forming and unifying the society. “The first one is being lineage asabiyyah which can be called as the real asabiyyah in terms of its forming a more strict and organic tie, and the second one is being the upper-asabiyyah which can also be named as general-asabiyyah and being less strict and not organic but institutional” (Hocaoğlu, 2007:45). “While coming from the same genealogy and being cognate is indispensable for the first type of the asabiyyah, for upper-asabiyyah, there are no such criteria” (Albayrak, 2000:7). “The first one is ‘limited nationality’ which comes from the same origin and has a blood tie among each other, however; the other is nationality consciousness, which can be called as ‘general nationality’” (Elmalı, 2003:136). According to Ibn Khaldun, the source of the cooperation and helping are at first biological, but for the second it is social. The families and the tribes form the basis of collectivism. Religion step into the stage in the second form of asabiyyah although it is not possible to draw strict lines and provides positive social manners (Yavuz, 2013:336)

In other words; upper-asabiyyah can be formed with the help of unifying elements such as culture, religion, belief and ideology in the societies which have different asabiyyahs. Because, there are non-organic factors in forming the second type of asabiyyah such as religion, culture, belief and ideology, they are like blends and according to Ibn Khaldun, “blends are comprised of the pieces and general nationalities are like blends” (Elmalı, 2003:136). However; if different components living in the same territory are unable to become a single nation with the help of those elements mentioned above, it is not possible for them to gather around the same ideal due to the fact that they possess different aspirations.

Ibn Khaldun emphasizes the role of the religion in forming the upper-asabiyyah claiming that two different asabiyyahs can form an upper-asabiyyah which

is the result of gathering around the same religion. Because, “religion is the adolescent of ‘asabiyyah, at once transforming and in a way forming asabiyyah as a basis of society” (Goodman, 1972:259). Thus; a direct relationship can be founded between genealogy and religion which has the power of keeping the different lineages together. Likewise; “the dynasties whose land and hegemony is broad are based on the unifying role of religion” (Haldun, 2014:500). The reason underlying this fact is that “the individuals love and respect each other under the politics of religion, which thus in turn ensure social order” (Azarkan, 2003). In such situations, the power of the societies is increased due to the fact that they hold the power, which the religion provides, together with having asabiyya. Because “religious calling enhances the power in the essence of the state in addition to the power of the asabiyya which reach to the sufficient number” (Haldun, 2014:300).

The asabiyyahs which merge each other under religion come together and reach their goals with ease because their targets, aims and desires are the same. In Ibn Khaldun’s view, “such a bond is achieved through subjective identification of the individual with the group in the sense that he effectively subordinates his atomic honor, interests, rights, advantage, privileges, power, wealth etc. to those of the group” (Goodman, 1972:257). Thus, the lifespan of the states or empires which gather around the same religion has been long-lasting compared to others. The asabiyyahs constituting the empire or state strive to make their country long-lasting due to the fact that their hearts are connected to each other for the sake of the religion without falling separated from each other:

“Call for the religion ends the envying and the rivalries among the people with asabiyyah. All of them gather around the right and the truth; religion guides them to think prudently about their affairs and benefits; nobody can prevent them from reaching their goals because their targets are the same and even for each other; because these people risk the death in order to reach their purpose. Even though the troops or the supporters of a state are more in number than them, the ones who fight for the sake of the supremacy of the right vanquish those who don’t. Because they are on the wrong path, their desires are diverse; and since they dread of dying, they flee from the battlefield; even when they outnumber their rivals, as it is mentioned above, because they sink into zest and felicity, they vanish off the face of the earth swiftly” (Haldun, 2014:300).

The other way which leads to upper-asabiyyah is habituation, meaning that it is melting of different genealogical asabiyyahs in a pot by uniting to each other as a result of two different asabiyyahs’ living together for a long time. Because they have lived together for a long time, depending on this togetherness, for the societies to

become as if they are one nation and they are acknowledged as though they are coming from the same generation. As it appears; Ibn Khaldun is of the opinion that “the factors such as education, living together for a long time, even if they don’t belong to same asabiyyah, can render them into one nation” (Elmalı, 2003:137).

2.2.3 Umran

The other concept which holds as much importance as asabiyya and which makes Mukaddimah really original in the world of modern sciences like sociology, politics, or history, etc. is ‘umran’. Ibn Khaldun starts to explain the concept ‘umran’ by referring to the philosophy of history. Ibn Khaldun’s reference to the philosophy of history while explaining umran is important because “philosophy of history is the only basis to be able to analyze the foundation and development of the states truly, and to be able to determine the meaning world and the structure behind the events” (Çetin and Çağ, 2015:113). The following statements of Ibn Khaldun related to the function of history philosophy confirm his attitude towards the science of history:

“It should be known that history, in matter of fact, is information about human social organization, which itself is identical with world civilization. It deals with such conditions affecting the nature of civilization as, for instance, savagery and sociability, group feelings, and the different ways by which one group of human beings achieves superiority over another. It deals with royal authority and the dynasties that result (in this manner) and with the various ranks that exist within them. (It further deals) with the different kinds of gainful occupations and ways of making a living, with the sciences and crafts that human beings pursue as part of their activities and efforts, and with all the other institutions that originate in civilization through its very nature” (Haldun, 2014:35).

However; although he (Ibn Khaldun) appreciates the value and advantages of the philosophy of history, he also makes criticisms related to the falsehoods and inconsistencies that are made while handling or transmitting the historical data because Ibn Khaldun is accepted different from the other historians since he thinks that the history is not an area which is consisted only of the recorded tales but an area which is worth of being searched (Yavuz, 2013:320). Therefore, he thinks that some major false methodologies are being followed within the science of history. One of the most important falsehoods is the affliction of untruth into the historical information. Ibn Khaldun puts forth many reasons for which so many falsities afflict into the historical knowledge (Haldun, 2014:36):

- 1) Partisanship for opinions and schools
- 2) Unawareness of the purpose of an event
- 3) Ignorance of how conditions conform to reality
- 4) People as a rule approach great and high-ranking persons with praise and encomiums
- 5) Making untruth unavoidable

The problems mentioned above related to the method of the philosophy of history lead Ibn Khaldun to the redefinition of a field of study, which can be fulfilled with the help of a new science called 'ilm-il umran'. In other words, "Ibn Khaldun concluded in 'ilm-il umran' with reference to history" (Albayrak 2000:4). Ibn Khaldun describes this new science as a kind of new discipline or a science in the first chapters of his book (Haldun, 2014:40). Ibn Khaldun thinks that the new science will be able to handle the historical data with all dimensions because it deals with the conditions of the societies with all perspectives such as politics, culture, economy etc.

"When the translations of Mukaddimah by Rosenthal and Uludağ are compared, the issues that Ilm-il Umran deals with are listed as such; occurrence of social union, the reasons of collective living in the structures such as villages or cities, political authority and the structuring that the political authority bring together, the need for the economical activities and social relations that are brought together" by the intellectual activities" (Yavuz, 2013:325). The concept of 'umran' covers the same elements with the ilm'il ümran because ilm'il umran is the theoretical form of umran, which is used as a new science in order to understand and define the always changing structures of a human gathering. In other words it can be said that Ilm-il umran is about umran (Yavuz, 2013:324).

Ibn Khaldun, instead of directly explaining the concept in his book, he just refers to it in Mukaddimah. From this context, it can be understood that on the basis of umran the society or the people who come together in order to cooperate (ta'awun) lies. Therefore, it can be inferred that the 'umran' is described as "a concept that covers all the political, economical, cultural, historical, military, social, religious, scientific, educational, juridical and even criminal actions or activities of 'human gathering' or of a society, or of the people residing somewhere or of the

population, who come together for cooperation” (Say, 2011:284). Umran has many but similar meanings in Arabic language:

The word ‘umran’ is originating from the root ‘imar’ and has connection with the word ‘mamur’. The concept, which is connected to the words such as ‘imaret’, ‘mimar’, ‘itimar’, istimar in terms of its root, carries meanings such as ‘residing or living in somewhere’, ‘being populated of somewhere’, ‘keeping somewhere in a good state’, ‘prosperity, welfare, happiness’ and ‘population and civilizing’. (Say, 2011:285)

Ibn Khaldun, while talking about umran which himself named it as human society, claims that social organization and society is mandatory: ‘When Allah (c.c.) created human, it gave him some capabilities/powers in order to lead his life and livings. Allah (c.c.) informed that he should do everything in order to lead his life. However; because it is not possible for the human beings to succeed this, they should live together inevitably” (Yavuz, 2013:323). Ibn Khaldun, while explaining the concept of umran, places the human being at the center and later describes three features of the umran phenomenon (Bursalioglu, 2007:50):

- 1) ‘Umran’s being natural because human society is natural and human is natural by nature.
- 2) Since human society’s development in a particular way is mandatory, umran is also organic.”
- 3) Because the individuals tend towards specializing in certain professions that they perform well and in which they acquire skills, umran is functional.

Ibn Khaldun explains this broad content together with describing the foundation of a city or a town. If a city or town is founded somewhere and if this place hosts lively, social, economical, administrative, political and scientific activities, this situation is described as the foundation, progress and expansion of the umran; on the contrary, if these activities regress and disappear in time, it is interpreted as constriction, regression and collapse of the umran at this time (Bursalioglu, 2007:51). The political, economical, cultural, historical, military etc. aspects of umran show progress in time because “it becomes clear that Ibn Khaldun saw umran not as something static, a product, but rather as a dynamic process” (Amri, 2008:351)

Ibn Khaldun generates typologies while analyzing the societies (Yavuz, 2013:324). Hence; Ibn Khaldun divides the societies into two in terms of both their needs and their existences.

- 1) Tribal society which is the most basic stage of the society and in which just the basic needs are fulfilled.
- 2) The sedentary life, which is named as city life, in which, secondary needs such as culture, education and entertainment, rather than basic needs, such as eating, sleeping, or sheltering are fulfilled.

The first stage of the umran is acknowledged as the tribal phase. In this stage, tribal people are distant from luxury and excess that the city life brings because they usually live in the deserts, mountains, or on the slopes. In other words, their lives are very simple. Because their food is modest, they do not become sick very often and their sleep is less than the “hadari people’s”. Thus; as mentioned above, “the clans who wander in the deserts as nomads are more capable of slaving the people, outcompeting in terms of power, violence and oppression. This is because of their being capable of fighting with other peoples” (Haldun, 2014:255).

The life of the “hadari” people, who lead a total opposite life style that of the Bedouins is as comfortable as possible because they live in abundance in terms of everything due to the fortune that both the wars and conquests bring. Sedentary life diversifies the abundance and welfare. It causes to empower and generate the arts and talents which are the means of producing the necessary things to be able to live in abundance. Dining halls, clothes, buildings, beds, and other needs related to home are of this kind. Performing each and every one of these things requires necessary skills. With the desire of the self, these needs and their varieties increase” (Haldun, 2014:520).

The concepts of ‘asabiyah’ and ‘umran’ are the complementary factors in the every stage of the society. Both the concepts necessitate each other for their existence of the society and themselves. Furthermore, both Ibn Khaldun and his main concepts are arousing great interest among especially the Western scholars of various disciplines, which in turn necessitates to have a closer look at the investigation of Ibn Khaldun and his concepts within the western literature.

2.2.4 Understanding Ibn Khaldun and His Concepts in Today's International Relations

Ibn Khaldun's views, which were extremely new and modern for his time, was known late in the West because European scholars were late in translating Ibn Khaldun's works, especially the introduction book *Mukaddimah* into the Western languages. It was not until 1800s that the first translation of *Mukaddimah* appeared in Europe. "In 1863 Marquis de Slane translated the *Prolegomena* into French" (Baeck, 1996:4). "The English speaking world had to wait for almost a century later. Frank Rosenthal leads the ones who translated *Mukaddimah* into English. In 1958, Frank Rosenthal published an English translation; this was reprinted in 1967 and prefaced with text-critic comments" (Baeck, 1996:4). Rosenthal who was fascinated from Ibn Khaldun's scholarly aspects and thus influenced from his thoughts presents Ibn Khaldun in the first translation of *Mukaddimah* as "having conceived and formulated a philosophy of history which is undoubtedly the greatest work of its kind that has ever been created by any mind in any time and any place" (Leaman, 2013:354).

The translations of Ibn Khaldun's works into Western languages especially into English made Ibn Khaldun known worldwide especially in the West. However; these translations especially provided Ibn Khaldun to be studied within certain disciplines by many scholars which lead him to be accepted as the pioneer of the many disciplines in our time. "He came to be celebrated as the founder of sociology and the discoverer of a great number of analytical insights and theories in political science, in economics, in public finance, in the philosophy of history, in demography and in social geography" (Baeck, 1996:4). Moreover, "Ibn Khaldun finds place among the disciplines such as history, philosophy of history, Islamic philosophy, sociology, social psychology, political sociology, political philosophy, law, sociology of law, economy, geography, religious sociology, education history and science history; separate works related to him are published; sometimes widely and sometimes in a short way, his opinions are included particularly in theoretical works beside eastern and western scholars" (Yıldırım, 2012:140). Durmuş Hacıoğlu describes Ibn Khaldun's various aspects mentioned above as such:

“Ibn Khaldun, the greatest history philosopher of the Islamic World, luxuriant ideology fountain that gushes from the middle of dessert; in Cemil Meriç’s own statement, ‘shooting star in the sky of the East’; founder of modern sociology; empiricist; according to some, Islamic Marxist; forerunner of Sociology, History, Geography and Economy school; the one whose ideas left a deep impression both in the East and the West, however; in the West rather than in the East; the last major thinker of the Islamic world, who left an impression globally; our great honour; African scholar, philosopher and sufi” (Hocaoğlu, 2007:44)

The translations of Mukaddimah into the Western languages not only made Ibn Khaldun but also the concepts of ‘umran’ and ‘asabiyya’ popular throughout the word. Therefore, the terms of asabiyyah and umran need to be clarified in terms of today’s political science terminology so that they should be understood more clearly because they are the terms that emerged approximately seven hundred years ago, thus belonging to very distant past. Such a comparison may also empower Ibn Khaldun’s and his concepts’ relevance within the political science and international relations area.

According to Mazrui, “the most universalized modern version of asabiyah is nationalism. Because, in his paper he addresses nationalism as a modern form of social cohesion and globalization as the post-modern asabiyah” (Mazrui, 2013:6). It is true that asabiyah is a form of social cohesion in which the people cohere in order to found a state or to fight against the enemies and also it is true that the term asabiyah may compensate the meaning of the nationalism when it is thought in a broader sense. Because, just in the similar way in which nationalism does in a common sense, “asabiyya’ binds groups together through a common language, culture, and code of behavior and when there is conscious approximation of behavior to an idea of the ideal, at different levels, family, clan, tribe, and kingdom or nation, society is whole” (Ahmed, 2002:30). In a parallel way to the Ahmed’s definition related to the function of asabiyya, according to Smith, “nation is ‘a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith, 1991:180)

However, if the meaning of the term is narrowed down to the types of the asabiyah, it will be seen that the term nationalism will be too wide to provide the meaning of the types of the asabiyah. In this respect, “the first type of them is the asabiyah which is based on the genealogy; the other one is being the upper-asabiyah which is more comprehensive than the previous one in terms of including the different genealogies under the same ideology, religion or culture” (Haldun,

2014:300). In the process of the first asabiyya, because the people just gather around according to their asabes or their kinship, thus it can be stated that the term nationalism becomes too broad to cover this type of the meaning of asabiyah.

This doesn't mean that nationalism does not possess the kinship or social cohesion of the people who have the same ancestors or the same blood tie, in fact, the meaning that the asabiyah based on genealogy has formed in Ibn Khaldun's terminology can be provided with that of nationalism. Nation is a "community whose members share feelings of fraternity, substantial distinctiveness, and exclusivity, as well as beliefs in a common ancestry and continuous genealogy" (Barrington, 1997:714).

However, this nation is really within the basic level and it is rare to see such a genealogical state both because in a broader definition, nation is described as

"an extensive aggregate of persons, so closely associated with each other by a common descent, language, or history, as to form a distinct race or people, usually organized as a separate political state and occupying a definite territory and the biological structure of an ethnic group is not sufficient to suggest the existence of a nation" (Fernández, 2004:13).

Thus, it would be better to name the genealogical asabiyah, as Elmalı termed it, as "the 'limited nationality' because it is the limited nationality that is based just on the genealogy or kinship" (Elmalı, 2003:136). Or even genealogical asabiyah can be described as an ethnic group. Because it is pertinent to point out that:

"an ethnic group differs from the nation since it tends to be smaller, and physical characteristics are more homogenous among the members and may not always develop the political need to self-differentiate and determine themselves to become a nation-state" (Fernández, 2004:18)

As it has been mentioned above, Ibn Khaldun refers to two kinds of asabiyahs. "The first one is 'limited nationality' which comes from the same origin and has a blood tie among each other, however; the other is nationality consciousness, which can be called as 'general nationality'" (Elmalı, 2003:135). Thus, it can be understood that the second type of asabiyah can provide the meaning of broader nationality in terms of the broad meaning that it has, which is called the upper-asabiyah. Because, it is both founded later after the foundation of the limited asabiyah and holds two or more asabiyahs together in itself. According to Ibn Khaldun, holding two or more asabiyahs occur via power, which means that "the asabiyahs obey the ones who are more powerful, or via the other connecting features

such as religion, or culture, sharing the same territory which is called the habitation” (Haldun, 2014:310). “Ibn Khaldun sees each limited asabiyah as the pieces leading to the mixture of upper asabiyah which implies that general nationalities are also like the mixtures formed with the joining of limited nationalities to each other” (Elmalı, 2003:135).

The other concept which needs to be clarified in terms of today’s political terminology is the concept of umran. In a Phd dissertation in India, “the concept ‘umran’ is translated into and very often used as ‘civilization” (Sulaiman, 2015:25)’. Although “umran seems to be synonymous with the term ‘civilization’, there are differences which prevent them from being synonymous with each other” (Say, 2011:308). The main uniqueness of the term ‘umran’ emerges when the distinction between the types of umran is made. While defining umran, “Ibn Khaldun makes classification according to the needs of the people and the ways of meeting the needs, which are the bedewi and hadari umran” (Haldun, 2014:105).

Civilization corresponds to the developed version of city life while umran covers all the phases of the development of the society from bedewi phase to hadari one. Moreover, “the concept of civilization is used to describe the cultural, historical, and material accumulations of the societies” (Say, 2011:308). According to Wei, “civilization is the product of city life and even at its initial stage; a civilization has a large population and considerable geographical scope” (Wei, 2011:1). However, “umran is not the product of city life because both bedewi life and hadari life have their own umrans changing from society to society” (Haldun 2014:110). That is to say, according to Ibn Khaldun, “umran is not a concept which is belonging to just city life but nomadic cultures also may possess umran” (Say, 2011:309). It is also noted that even at the initial stage of umran, which is called the bedewi umran, there doesn’t have to be a large population and considerable geographical scope. Thus, what Say claims is that because “umran is a concept which deals with both the initial and the last stages of the development of the societies, it is a concept which encompasses the concept of civilization” (Say, 2011:310).

While making the comparisons, it is also important to keep the study of comparing away from juxtaposition. Because, although they are the concepts which are similar to each other in many ways, they also have significant differences. During

the process of the comparison, it is important to highlight such a distinction in order to emphasize the originality of Ibn Khaldun's theories and concepts.

2.3 THE KURDS AND CONCEPT OF ASABIYAH

During the Ottoman Empire, Kurdish people were being accepted as the Muslim citizens living mostly in the east side of the Anatolian region. The Kurdish people had rights to self-governance by choosing their own governance on condition that they obeyed the central government. Moreover, until the end of the Ottoman Empire, Kurdish people protected their status-quo although there emerged some centralization policies applied due to a few rebellions in the area. During this time, let alone taking back their citizenship rights, even the claims related to the origins of the Kurdish people (For example, they didn't have ethnic identity or they aren't different ethnic identity than the Turks or they came from the Persian ethnic identity.) were not on the agenda of the Ottoman Empire.

However, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and with the foundation of the new Turkish state, the discussions related to the origins of Kurdish people started to emerge. Therefore from past to now, there have been a few claims related to the origins of the Kurdish people.

1. Connecting Kurdish people's origins to the Turkish people
2. Finding origins of Kurdish people within the legends
3. Connecting Kurdish people's origins to the Persian people

Investigating the origins of the Kurdish people is crucial because this investigation may help us to understand the genealogical asabiyah ties of the Kurdish people.

2.3.1 Connecting Kurdish People's Origins to the Turkish People

According to Buran, there is connection on the origins of Turks and Kurds claiming that "because of the many Turkish words which also exist in Kurdish and also because of historical, cultural and geographical communities" (Buran, 2011:46) Moreover, Buran also makes geographical connections between Turks and Kurds. Because he thinks that "Bulgarian Turks became Slavs in the territory to which they

had migrated from Central Asia which is the main land of Turks. In this way, Kurdish people might have migrated to the east of Turkey from Europe and became the Kurds in the course of time” (Buran, 2011:46).

There are also the ones who assert that Kurdish people’s origin may date back to the Sumerians. G.R. Driver leads the ones who made researches in this area. In his article ‘The Name Kurd and Its philological Connexions’. “Driver examines various ancient words and attempts to establish philological connections between those vocabularies and the term “Kurd” as an ethnic label. Driver suggests that the earliest account of the Kurds comes from a Sumerian clay tablet in the third millennium B.C. on which the name of a land called Kar-da or Qar-da is inscribed. This land, south of Lake Van, was inhabited by the people of “Su” who were connected with the Qur-ti-e, a group of mountain dwellers. It is with the name Qur-ti-e that Driver makes his first etymological connection. According to Driver’s second derivation, an early version of the word “Kurd” is perhaps encountered in Xenophon’s epic “*Anabasis*” in its reference to the Karduchi or Kardukhi, the hostile inhabitants of the region corresponding to present-day Kurdistan. These people were mountain dwellers living in the territory between Armenia and Mesopotamia. Xenophon narrates the attacks of the Karduchi (also spelled as Carduchi) on the Greek armies during their retreat from the Kardaka land (401–400 B.C.E.)” (Özoglu, 2004:23). John Limbert also reaches the same finding, to which Driver came before, by showing the clay which was used by the Sumerians as a sample (Limbert, 1968:45) and this study’s reaching the same finding with that of Driver is really interesting.

2.3.2 Finding the Origins of Kurdish People within the Legends

In their attempt to introduce legends of the Kurdish origin, scholars often refer to the *Serefname*, a sixteenth-century book that narrates a dynastic history of the Kurds. (Özoglu, 2004:22) In one of them, especially according to a myth taking place in Sehname, it is claimed that the Kurds are descended from the children hidden in the mountains to escape Zahhak (a child-eating giant) (McDowall, 2004:4). Moreover, in a legend, Kurdish people are alleged to ascend from the Prophet Abraham’s wife, Sarah who is claimed to be Kurdish and a native of Harran, where a Kurdish population also lives today (McDowall, 2004:4). In an another myth, by taking the physical appearances of Kurdish people into account, due to their

resemblance to the Assyrian King, Ashurbanipal, it is claimed that the Kurds are Assyrian. Some scholars have even claimed that they have found a Kurdish nose that looks like the nose in the relief of the Assyrian king Ashurbanipal. (Limbert, 1968:47)

2.3.3 Connecting Kurdish People's Origins to the Persian People

“Although the legend which is related to the Zahhak story, cited in the *Serefname*, alleges that the Kurds are the amalgamation of diverse groups who invented their own language and civilization as a result of their isolated residence in the mountains, nationalists assume the existence of a Kurdish essence and endeavor to discover the original core of the Kurds that, they believe, existed at some point in ancient history”(Özoglu, 2004:23). According to these nationalists; some of the Kurds themselves claim to be descendants of the Med Empire (Persian Mad), who, as Herodotus describes, eventually overthrew the Assyrians in 612 B.C. and who later was absorbed by Cyrus the Achaemenian into his empire of the Medes and the Persians. (Limbert, 1968:48)

Another person who alleges that Kurdish people are descended from the Medes is Vladimir Minorsky who is a Russian Kurdologist. According to Minorsky, the origins of Kurds derive from the Medes. As a matter of fact,

“there are no evidences and bases, which will enable to discuss linguistic and geographical distinction between the Medes and the Kurds; for instance, although the number of the Med language samples is few, the researches that have been conducted with the findings reveal that the relationship of the Med language with the ancient Persian language is the same with that of the modern Kurdish language to the modern Persian language.” (Aslan, 2011:10)

However; what Bruinessen opposes here is that “though some Kurdish intellectuals claim that their people is descended from the Medes, there is not enough evidence to permit such a connection across the considerable gap in time between the political dominance of the Medes, and the first attestation of the Kurds (as Cyrtii)” (Bruinessen, 2000:16).

“Although there are many disputes about the origin of the Kurds, there is one thing all these theories have in common. All tend to be autochthonistic (territorially based) in nature. In other words, these theories look at the ancient inhabitants of a specific region, known as “Kurdistan” sometime after the 12th century, and hope to find etymological connections between these people and the modern Kurds” (Özoglu, 2004:25). In addition to this similarity, notwithstanding the fact that there

are contradictory explanations related to the origin of the Kurds and they lived together with Armenians, Persians, Arabs and Turks in the territory that they live, Kurdish people is a gathering who possesses their own genealogical *asabiyyah*. Because “the ethnic identity of the Kurds in Turkey, the existence of two culturally distinct social strata in several regions, seem to indicate that the present Kurds have incorporated quite heterogeneous ethnic elements. It is not clear when precisely a distinct Kurdish identity emerged” (Bruinessen, 2000:16). This together-living has made their cultures, languages and geographies common.

Moreover, since both Kurds and Turks were in the face of danger and thus they were obliged to defend themselves; it can be said that they both have collective spirit. Hence, it is clear that both groups have the genealogical *asabiyyah*, which is the next step of *asabe*, within the framework of definition of *asabiyyah* mentioned above. However; there is one thing that makes Kurds different from the Turks. Although, the Kurdish people have striven to found a state, they have been unsuccessful in founding it, which is the ultimate aim of *asabiyyah*. Because there was not a totalitarian power which has structurality to be such as to become a state (Semiz, 2013:40).

According to Ibn Khaldun, the people should develop a common attitude or take action by coming together in this direction so that the people can achieve founding a state which is the ultimate goal of the *asabiyyah* (Haldun, 2014:103). Furthermore, the thing that is aimed with *asabiyyah* is the society’s protection itself by coming together, resisting the enemy, feeling of desire to expand the land, the feeling to defeat the enemy with power and severity (Çiftçi and Yılmaz, 2013:87). Since the Kurdish people’s living in the mountainous areas which have always been exposed to invasions and being mostly nomadic people within their areas have prevented them from coming together in order to found a state by gathering around a common *asabiyyah* considerably. That means Kurdish people having been known as nomads during the period of the Islamic conquests reveals that they have nomadic characteristics (McDowall, 2004:9). Moreover, another determinant that hinders the Kurds from unifying with each other around a common *asabiyyah* is that “Kurdish tribes’ were unable to gang together and they were in the state of civil war” (Biçer, 2014:165) Although Mehmet Özdemir did not address the Kurds in his detection, he identifies the condition of the Kurds’ being unable to found a state by giving the Arabs of the Pre-Islamic Age of Ignorance as example as follows:

“The Arabs of the Pre-Islamic age of Ignorance mostly became famous with their “Eyyams” meaning tribal conflicts taking place among themselves and were unable to become a remarkable political power over the Arabian peninsula and within the world and regional history; whereas their human potentials were largely sufficient for succeeding this. Since they couldn’t achieve this, the northern and southern regions of Arabia excluding Hedjaz were unable to escape from getting under the influence of Byzantium and Sasanids who were the super power of the time.” (Özdemir, 1992:237)

Another reason why Kurds haven’t been able to unite together might be the lack of common, more powerful *asabiyyah* which will gather other Kurdish *asabiyyahs* under its umbrella. Because according to Ibn Khaldun, a political authority is indispensable (Yavuz, 2013:331), which will provide hierarchy over others by using its power. Thus, the Kurdish people were unable to found states with the name of Kurd.

2.4 KURDS, TURKS AND UPPER-ASABIYAH

In historical context, It is true that Kurdish people were really unsuccessful in founding their own states when compared to Turkish people. However, although they were unsuccessful in founding states, they helped two big empires either in founding period or during the time of growing. The Ottomans and the Seljuk Empires are the ones in which Kurdish people carried out important missions such as waging wars against the common enemies, providing the peace over the territories on which they live in order to help those empires.

Ibn Khaldun connects the loyalty of the Kurds to the theory of *asabiyyah*. Because, “the concept of *asabiyyah* in Ibn Khaldun has a broader meaning than the feeling of unity within cognate societies. *Asabiyyah* is a form of behaving, which collective living and organization produce, aside from the feeling of unity” (Çiftçi and Yılmaz, 2013:87). Ibn Khaldun mentions about a powerful unifying factor which brings Turks and Kurds together. Therefore, it is possible and necessary to introduce two factors that lead them to collective living and organizing during the time of both the Ottomans and also the Seljuks for hundreds of years. The first of them is religion and the next one is habituation, meaning the feeling of living together.

According to Ibn Khaldun, the political authority is necessary in order to found and maintain a state. However, “although political authority is inevitable, the most important factor is the legitimacy of the authority. There are two sources which

can provide the legitimacy of the authority according to Ibn Khaldun” (Yavuz, 2013:331):

1. The authority which is based on the reasons of intellectual people
2. The authority which is based on religious sources

If the political authority is based upon the religious sources which are sent by Allah c.c. (The Creator – The God) and if the authority is acquired in this way, this authority is named as the religious authority. However; if the political authority is obtained via the rationalist bases, and this authority is called as rationalist authority (Yavuz, 2013:332). In this way Ibn Khaldun thinks that because the authority which is based on the religious teachings would provide the people of the state welfare in both this world and the other world. That’s why the Kurdish people chose the Kurds as their religious partners in the historical context. By means of religion, different asabiyyahs gain character in the form of single belief because:

“Call for religion ends the envying and the rivalries among the people with asabiyyah. All of them gather around right and truth; religion guides them to think prudently about their affairs and benefits; nobody can prevent them from reaching their goals because their targets are same and even for each other; because these people risk death in order to reach their purpose. Even though the troops or the supporters of a state are more of a number than them, the ones who fight for the sake of the supremacy of the right vanquish those who don’t. Because they are on the wrong path, their desires are diverse; and since they dread of dying, they flee from the battlefield; even when they outnumber their rivals, as it is mentioned above, because they sink into zest and felicity, they vanish off the face of the earth swiftly” (Haldun, 2014:300).

Although the Kurds, among the four schools of Islamic law, follow the Shafi’i rite and their non-Kurdish neighbors; the Turks follow the Hannifin legal school (Bruinessen, 1992:23), most Kurds have shared the same religion which is orthodox Sunni Islam together with Turks for more than 1000 years. The Kurds and the Turks’ meeting with Islam took place as a result of two different events happening on different dates and locations. Primarily;

“With the era of Caliph Omer, the Kurdish people started to meet with the Muslims and waged war against the Muslims in company with the Persians, however; the Kurds together with the Persian armies were defeated by the Islamic armies. The Kurds entered into the domination of the Islam during the Era of the Four Caliphs and a great majority of them converted to Islam” (Biçer, 2012:51).

“The beginning of a junction point for the Turks with Islam is the commencement of Turks’ entering into Islam tribe by tribe in consequence of the Talas War in which the Turks and the Arabs battled against each other. The Turk-Arab struggle, which began during the time of the Islamic conquests after the

collapse of the Sassanid Empire and which lasted for a century, left its place to friendship and cooperation after the Talas War; the Turks accepting Islam started to hold places among the political and military ranks of the Abbasid Caliphate” (Taşağıl, 2013:501). As a result of these two events, the foundations of the upper asabiyyah belonging to Kurds and Turks, which have lasted for nearly more than one thousand years, have been laid down.

There is one more element which has brought Turks and Kurds together for more than one thousand years. According to Ibn Khaldun this element is called habituation tie in Ibn Khaldun’s terminology. In fact, habituation tie is one of the most effective elements, which unifies the different asabiyahs. Habituation occurs when two asabiyahs come and live together for a long time. Ibn Khaldun describes the determinants of habituation ties, which occurs as a result of joining together afterwards, as living together, defending one another, long-lasting contact, growing-up together, sucking the same milk (Haldun, 2014:130). However; Turks had to come to Anatolia in other words; to the regions of Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia, which are the places the Kurds mostly live in, so that both asabiyyah types mentioned above put the theory into practice.

It was clear that the “Kurdish reality played a critical role in the Turks’ victory within the Malazgirt War which the Turks acknowledged as the opening of the Anatolian gates to them” (Sofuoğlu, 2015:6), which started the fellowship of both the Turks and the Kurds. In this war, according to the account related from M. Ali Sallabi by Eker, Sultan Alparslan of Seljuks gathered ten thousand soldiers from the Kurds (Eser, 2014:191). Together with this war that occurred in Malazgirt which is one of the counties of Muş, Muslim Turks and Kurds made the city become a Muslim county (Eser, 2014:191). Therefore, it can be concluded that as a result of this war, although Anatolia became a new homeland for Turks, they also gained a new companion for both their religion ‘Islam’ and also for the territories in which they would live.

One of the biggest indicators of this asabiyyah was to be called by their names of Kurdish territories in which the Kurds live. Because, “the term Kurdistan was first used in the twelfth century as a geographical term by the Saljuks” (McDowall, 2004:6). The second indicator is that the Kurds were famous for the provision of troops to the Islamic armies, fighting with distinction on the frontiers of

Islam against Byzantium, Armenia, Persia's eastern marches and in the Crusades. For example, "before the foundation of the Seljuk State, the Kurds who especially lived in South-eastern Anatolia and who even have a principality called Mervanids participated in conquest and holy war by band- wagoning the Turkmen, and thus they also spread out up to the Fırat neighborhood" (Eser, 2014:187-188). But, with the collapse of the Seljuk State, habituation *asabiyyah* which is one of two legs in these *asabiyyahs* has been interrupted by the time the Ottoman Empire was founded.

The famous scholar, who provided Ottoman Turks and Kurds gather around the same upper-*asabiyyah* after the time of Seljuks for the second time, is Idris-i Bitlisi. "The new shah of Persia, who imposed Schism as the state religion, tried to spread it across the neighboring countries. The Ottomans, from their side, wanted to put a stop to the shah's expansionist aims and assure their Iranian border in order to be able to embark on the conquest of the Arab countries" (Nezan: 2016). Thus; "both empires were in competition over Kurdish-populated areas, but the Ottomans were more successful negotiators and an influential group of Kurdish notables opted to join the expanding empire" (Klein, 2015:8). "Idris-i Bitlisi, who was a potent sheikh in Bitlis and around, by negotiating with the Kurdish begs, who felt discomfort of the Safevid presence, and by persuading them to declare their loyalties to Yavuz Sultan Selim; was quite influential in the process of conquests to a large extent and was rather appreciated by Yavuz Sultan Selim" (Gencer, 2010:1).

With the Chaldiran War and the efforts of Idris-i Bitlisi, the Kurds, who join the Ottoman Empire, reached some of the administrative rights together with an autonomous government, which was not provided to other *eyalets* (state) within the administration of the Ottoman Empire. The Kurdish people acquired the same rights which were provided at the time of Sultan Selim, also during the reign of Sultan Magnificent Suleyman who was the successor of Yavuz Sultan Selim. In a *beraat* (a kind of official document for achieving some political immunities) that he sent at that time, Sultan Suleyman who appreciates the Kurds due to their helpfulness to the Ottoman Empire explains the rights given. In that *beraat*, "first Kanuni Sultan Suleyman appreciate the efforts of the Kurds due to their opposing the Kızılbaş and attending in Iran expedition and then he gives the provinces and fortresses that have been controlled by each of them as their *yurtluk* and *ocaklık* since past times along

with the places that were given to them with separate imperial licenses (berat); and their provinces, fortresses, cities, villages, and arable fields (mezraa) with all their harvest, under the condition of inheritance from father to son, are also given to them as their estate (temlik)” (Özoglu, 2004:53).



CHAPTER THREE

ANALYSIS OF THE DEFINITION OF THE KURDISH PROBLEM BASED ON IBN KHALDUN'S CONCEPTS

Throughout the history of the Kurdish problem, various scholars, politicians, journalists have tried to offer a proper definition to the Kurdish problem. However, it can be stated that from the foundation of Turkish Republic until 2000s, the theories related to the definition of the problem were mostly based on the nationalistic approaches being parallel with the state ideology, which was ignoring especially the Kurds and other aspects of the problem such as the religion, economy, etc. Because the perception of the problem as a security issue for a long time and transferring it to TSK (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri – Turkish Armed Forces) by ignoring its other psycho-socio components made the Kurdish problem really complicated (Dikmen, 2015:67). Moreover, although there have been some sincere and significant efforts and studies in order to define and solve the Kurdish problem in all aspects after 2000s, these studies were insufficient in reflecting the whole picture of the problem. Therefore, let alone solving the problem, it shouldn't be forgotten that Turkey is really far away from even putting a name to the problem (Yayman, 2014:21).

One of the most important mistakes, which have been followed in order to define the Kurdish problem, is the evaluating the problem superficially by just degrading it to the PKK factor. Therefore, “for many years, the terror and Kurdish problem, PKK and terror problem, Kurdish and PKK problem are intermingled. Because PKK was seen as the major source of the grim experiences, it was supposed that the problem will be solved with the termination of PKK” (Yayman, 2014:20).

However, according to Ibn Khaldun, investigating the events by the look of things may prevent the people from understanding major factors within the events. Ibn Khaldun explains this phenomenon by mentioning about the methodology of history again as it was in umran:

“When looking from outside, the history cannot pass over being the kind of science which only informs about the old days and states, and the events taking place in the ancient history. The words which get around are narrated. The audiences are entertained via these words when they gather around ” (Haldun, 2014:64)

“Ibn Khaldun calls this historiography as the superficial historiography as it deals with only the superficial materials” (Dursun, 2008:27). However, the best way to understand the events better is to investigate them with their all dimensions such as the economical, political, educational etc. factors of the society. Because, according to Dursun, Ibn Khaldun claims that the history also has an inner side or deepness rather than its superficiality (Dursun, 2008:27):

“The history is a consistent viewpoint when it is investigated deeply. It is a kind of analysis. It is the investigation of the events with their reasons, or ascribing them to their reasons. However, its principles are really sensitive. It is to know the ways and reasons of the phenomenons thoroughly. Therefore, history is a fundamental science.”

Following a thorough method in describing the Kurdish problem, which includes all the dimensions of both the Turkish and Kurdish societies instead of just evaluating it by the look of things such PKK or terrorism may lead to solve the problem more easily and in a shorter time. Hence, contrary to the attitudes approaching the Kurdish issue within the borders of nationalism and PKK, Ibn Khaldun approaches the problem within the framework of first, asabiyah and then the umran between Turks and Kurds which centers both habituation and religion. It can be proposed that there is a before and after relationship between asabiyah and umran in the emergence of Kurdish problem because the spoilage of the asabiyah ties between Kurdish and Turkish people bring out many destructions within their umrans.

It is possible to state that according to Ibn Khaldun, the basis of the Kurdish problem consists of the Kurdish people’s return to their own genealogical asabiyah due to the fact that “while, on one hand, the evolution of the Republic of Turkey, being founded after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, to an “ethno-secular” ideological formation was weakening the moral values, which carried the potential

for providing the unity and togetherness, and on the other hand, was triggering anti-nationalism” (Yayman, 2014:19). Hence, under the basis of the Kurdish problem lies “the unrecognition of Kurdish identity” (Kizilkaya, 2014:14). Such a preference by two sides led to the spoilage of upper-asabiyah ties which were founded under the roof of religious values and habituation and consisting of the blends of two asabiyahs.

The deterioration of the asabiyah ties of both Turks and Kurds brought together an environment in which severe clashes have taken place among both the Kurdish rebels and the Turkish Government, which caused damage in political, economical, educational aspects of the lives or in other words within the umrans of both Turks and Kurds. As a result of the clash environment, The Kurds were deprived of most of the facilities that the umran includes such as the economy, politics, and religion.

3.1 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE KURDISH PROBLEM

It might be stated that the history of the Kurds and the Turks have three periods in which the underlying reasons of the background of the Kurdish issue can be tracked down. It can be inferred from these three periods that the asabiyah of both habituation and religion began to deteriorate gradually during these three periods because of the conditions that were formed by both government officials and the Turkish and the Kurdish people of that time.

- 1) The first period includes the 19th and 20th centuries, implying the end of the lifespan of the Ottoman Empire. The rebellions that took place in this period do not possess the features of the genealogical asabiyyah, partly excluding the Sheikh Ubeydullah Rebellion.
- 2) The second time period ranges from the end of the First World War to the 1970s, covering also the early Republican Period. The distinctive feature of this period is that the Kurds and the Turks chose to turn back to their asabiyah identities. These periods are the times in which the Kurdish issue started to experience a drastic change in terms of both content and their actors who play important roles. In this sense, it can be said that “the years of the 1960s, were

a milestone in terms of the Kurdish issue. On the one hand, the extremely harsh and derogatory attitude of 27th May military coup against the Kurds, and on the other, the change and conversion which was experienced in the region caused the Kurdish Issue to gain a more ‘nationalistic quality’” (Yayman, 2014:20).

- 3) The last period of time can be described as some of the Kurds’ gathering around the PKK, in which they started to ignore their conservative Islamic identities and together-living for hundreds of years; and also in which they also experienced separations among each other.

Although the emergence of a terrorist organization, PKK and its terrorist actions, which harms both the West and the East part of Turkey, have been shown as the major source of the problem for many years, it can be inferred from those three periods that the events which took place in the historical context from Ottoman Empire to today’s Turkey were more effective in shaping the situation of today’s Kurdish problem. For this reason, it is also possible to realize from those three periods that PKK is not only one of the branches in Kurdish problem but also it is the result which emerged at the end of the mutual wrong steps that were taken both by the Turkish Government and Kurdish rebels on the basis of genealogical asabiyah from 1920s until 1980s. However; this doesn’t mean that these policies do not legitimize the terrorist attacks which it was applying for many years to both Kurdish and Turkish people because it is a known fact that PKK is already a terrorist organization.

3.1.1 Kurds and Turks during the Ottoman Empire

The events that took place mostly during the 19th and 20th centuries and the conditions which emerged as a result of these events can be acknowledged as the first time period describing the emergence of the Kurdish problem. The Kurdish rebellions which emerged during the Ottoman Empire do not reflect any kind of genealogical asabiyah features in Ibn Khaldun’s terminology because of the other determinant factors leading to the rebellions, such as “Ottoman Empire’s losing its centralistic features by losing its power due to poor management, long-lasting wars and everlasting rebellions since the 17th century” (Akdag, 1975:51) and thus; local

Kurdish Emirates' gradually achieving influence and a considerable level of autonomy. Consequently, Kurdish beys captured most of the lands ranging from Sivas to Iran and the Arabian frontiers. "All of these begs, like Mir Seyfettin, who was the emir of the Cizre and Bohtan regions, were acting as if they were independent from the Ottoman Empire" (Gencer, 2010:11).

The Ottoman Sultans, having had realized that the situation was getting worse, chose to follow the centralization policies throughout the region in order to break the influence of these begs in the region. Hence; "during the administration of Mahmut II, the Kurdish regions were placed under the control of the center, and the previously autonomous chieftains were removed from their regions" (Aydm, 2005:18). Together with employing the civil servants that were appointed from the central government instead of begs in the region, "the income levied throughout the region would be more easily and directly sent to the state treasury, and it was thought that following such a method would lead to the empowering of the state" (Gencer, 2010:11). However, "the imposition of centralization policies led to many rebellious movements in many parts of the Empire as well as among the Kurdish emirates. Kurdish emirs did not welcome increased state control and loss of authority (Kaya, 2012:110)

"The first line of opposition was against the reforms threatening the traditional lives of the Kurds who would enjoy a de facto autonomy in the Ottoman Empire" (Aydm, 2005:16). Therefore, "the first tribe of all that revolted against the Ottoman Empire was the Bedirhan family because of the new re-centralization policies by the Ottoman Empire" (Akyol, 2006:10). "Prior to 1847, Bedirhan was loyal to the Ottomans and helped the local governors to govern the Kurdish land" (Özoglu, 2004:72). However, "the battle at Nizip, close to Bedirhan beg's seat at Jazira bin Umar, ended in the defeat of Ottoman forces and, tempted by the power vacuum in the region, Bedirhan began to widen his sphere of influence" (McDowall, 2004:45). "Two American missionaries spent four weeks with him in the summer of 1846, and noted that 'nearly every chief in northern Kurdistan came to make their respects to him, bringing him presents, such as money, horses, mules, and other valuable properties" (Bruinessen, 1992:180).

Bedirhan Beg's desire to gain control throughout the region by sending troops over Nestorians was the origin of the events, which made both the Ottoman Empire and Bedirhan beg being subjected to each other. In addition to these reasons, such as the relationships of the Nestorians with foreign powers, especially USA and UK, and the mission house and the school which were built by the missionaries coming to the region, "when the Nestorians living in the region rejected to pay their taxes, which was fulfilled for many years, the war between the Nestorians and the Kurdish begs became inevitable" (Gencer, 2010:94). Hence, Bedirhan Bey, who launched an operation in order to gain control over the region, slaughtered the people in the villages of the Nestorians who resisted. However, "as a result of the pressure exercised by the British and French governments because of the massacres of the Nestorians, the Ottoman government sent a strong army against Bedirhan Beg to punish the chief and to prevent any further Christian massacres" (Bruinessen, 1992:25).

However, the real problem that made the Ottoman Empire and Bedirhan Beg being subjected to each other was, instead of the Nestorian case, the effort to put into use the Tanzimat Reforms in the region. Due to the fact that Bedirhan Beg's zone of influence covered both Diyarbakir and Erzurum provinces, the inclusion of both provinces to Tanzimat Reforms displeased many begs including Bedirhan beg. Because, these begs were aware of the fact that the central government preferred to govern these regions via not the power partners but the civil servants who would obey the orders under no circumstances. "Tanzimat Reforms favored justice, equality, security of the properties and life as a principle. Whereas, it was not possible to mention any kind of non-discriminatory taxation system in this region" (Gencer, 2010:110). As a result, Bedirhan Beg, contrary to the previous Nestorian incident, revolted this time against the Ottoman Empire. "The revolt was an effective one and the Ottoman government had to send a heavily armed army to crush it" (Akyol, 2006:10). Bedirhan Beg, who took refuge in Orak Castle, became helpless because he was not able to resist the severe pressure. Therefore, he had to surrender to the Anatolian Army on the condition that the Army gave him quarter and forgave him. Bedirhan Beg who was sent to Istanbul by being forgiven, was banished to Crete.

The Ottoman archives indicate that Bedirhan's revolt did not stem from nationalism in any real sense of the term, but from a new administrative system enforced by the Ottoman central government that aimed at dividing Bedirhan's land and weakening his authority because, "Bedirhan established a state-like (de facto) administration in his emirate, making all the appointments for the local posts from among his own men, which autonomy was in fact provided by both Sultan Selim and Suleyman during the 15th and 16th centuries" (Özoglu, 2004:59-60). Moreover, "according to the Diyarbakir Marshall, Zekeriya Pasha, Bedirhan Beg who expanded his zone of influence considerably, was holding thirty or forty thousand soldiers" (Gencer, 2010:71), which implies that he was endeavoring to form a new army and special forces, as he had been inspired by Kavalali's army.

Ubeydullah, the sheikh of the Semdinans, was another leader following Bedirhan Beg, who had a huge authority over his region and thus, revolted in the last periods of the Ottoman Empire "because the Semdinans emerged as political and military leaders of the Kurds in the second half of the 19th century and controlled a vast region in South-Eastern Anatolia and North-West Iran" (Özoglu, 2004:73). Exactly like Bedirhan Beg's gaining power by making use of the power vacuum caused by the Nizip War, Sheikh Ubeydullah gathered his strength by filling in the authority gap emerging right after the Ottoman-Russian war that resulted in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire.

Iranian territories were the regions in which the major conflicts took place, although the starting point for the revolt was the Ottoman Empire. There are three reasons why the revolt took place within the territories of Iran (Sarikcioglu, 2013:31):

- 1) The Sheikh was cognizant of the fact that Iran was less powerful than the Ottoman Empire, which might have led to the establishment of dominance over Iranian territories more easily and then could have made them turn back to Ottoman lands after obtaining more power.
- 2) Ubeydullah was a Sunni Sheikh and faithful to the Ottoman Caliphate.
- 3) He was also aware of the fact that the revolt that emerged over Iranian territories would not be supported; however, it would be ignored and not interfered by the Ottoman Empire.

“When the sovereigns in Tehran claimed taxes from the Kurds in Urmiye in 1872 December, Kurds denied the demand of the taxation due to the fact that they usually paid their taxes to Sheikh Ubeydullah who inherited from his father the privileged right of levying taxes” (Karlsson, 2008:40). “Thereupon, Sheikh Ubeydullah claimed that the Kurds in Iran were slaughtered; some of the tribes were exacted and crushed under extremely high taxes; some of the Kurdish women were kidnapped and anomaly of illegality against Kurds became widespread. Thus, the Sheikh revolted by alleging that hostility between the Iranian Sekak (one of the branches of Semdinian family who were living in Iran) and the Ottoman Hareki (one of the branches of Semdinian family who were living in Iran) tribes were not ended by both of the states” (Sarikcioglu, 2013:16). The revolts of Sheikh Ubeydullah and his sons, which had been against Iran and lasted until Tabriz was suppressed as a result of Iran’s repel. As a result of the suppression by Iran, Sheikh Ubeydullah’s revolt returned to the territories of the Ottoman Empire in which the rebellion emerged from. “Upon his return to the Ottoman territories, Ubeydullah had to surrender to the Ottoman authorities in early 1881 and they exiled him to Istanbul and then to Hijaz, where he died in 1883” (Özoglu, 2010:75).

Although the reasons referred to above are shown as the determinants of the revolt, Sheikh Ubeydullah’s revolt contains many factors in itself, which differ in many ways from the other revolts. According to Jwaideh; it seems that the main reason for the revolt was “the fear of the Armenian ascendancy in Kurdistan” (Özoglu, 2004:74) because of the promise made to the Armenians after signing the Treaty of Berlin on July 13, 1878 and to show his dissatisfaction with the treaty, in July 1880 Ubeydullah warned Tosun Pasha, the ‘*mutasarrıf*’ (the governor of a subdivision) of Baskale:

“What is this I hear, that Armenians are going to have an independent state in Van, and that the Nestorians are going to hoist the British flag and declare themselves British subjects? I will never permit it, even if I have to arm the women” (Özoglu, 2010:74).

The other reason which led Sheikh Ubeydullah, who was really affected by the idea of nationalism, to revolt, is his desire to establish an independent Kurdish state over the territories. In this respect, “the Ubeydullah revolt is important not only because it demonstrates the emergence of a new political leadership in Kurdistan but, more importantly, because some of the students of Kurdish nationalism identify this revolt as the origin of the Kurdish nationalist struggle. (Özoglu, 2004:75). The major

source of which the proponents of this idea are based on is the following letter Sheikh Ubeydullah sent to Mr. Cochran, an American missionary in the Hakkari region:

“The Kurdish nation, consisting of more than 500000 families, is a people apart. Their religion is different (from that of others), and their laws and customs distinct... We are also a nation apart. We want our affairs to be in our hands, so that in the punishment of our offenders we may be strong and independent, and have privileges like other nations. This is our object (for the revolt)... Otherwise the whole of Kurdistan will take matter into their own hands, as they are unable to put up with these continual evil deeds, and the oppression, which they suffer at the hands of the (Persian and Ottoman) governments” (Özoglu, 2004:75).

The most basic judgment that can be derived from these revolts is that although the Kurdish people revolted, these revolts did not harm the *asabiyyah* ties having been existed for many years because “most of the Kurds saw themselves as Muslims on the first hand, Ottomans, on the second hand, and lastly, as Kurds” (Karlsson, 2008:43). Furthermore, “these revolts failed one after another because these failings were related partly to the Kurds’ being behind the Ottomans in terms of weapon technology and strategy, and partly related to the acts of rebellious Kurdish beys with narrow personal interests, rather than acting together with extensive Kurdish national feeling or including the efforts of struggle for ‘Kurdayet’ (‘Kurdism’)” (Karlsson, 2008:41).

So, although “it is reasonable to think that the nationalist aspirations of non-Muslim communities, particularly those in the Balkans, contributed to the process of this collapse, it would be a mistake to think that the same applies to most Muslim communities of the Empire. Kurdish nationalism, which emerges totally in its real meaning after the World War I, constitutes a prime example of how wrong this generalization would be” (Özoglu, 2004:69). Moreover; “the circumstances surrounding the formation of the Hamidiye Light Cavalry demonstrate how difficult it is to separate Kurdish history from that of the Kurds’ neighbors, Armenians in particular” (Klein, 2015:13). However, it is necessary to exclude Sheikh Ubeydullah because “his rebellion provided the Kurdish nationalist movements in the 20th century with the symbol for a struggle against a dominant state (Özoglu, 2004:76).

3.1.2 Kurds after World War I

Nationalistic movements which started to spread with the emergence of the 1789 French Revolution affected many peoples closely. Therefore, Ottoman Empire was also among the empires which were affected adversely by the nationalistic ideas. However, “the Kurdish people, who are located within mainly the eastern part of the Empire, were late in falling under the influence of the nationalistic movements” (H. Dursun, 2013:8). Together with the end of World War I, the idea of nationalism also started to influence the Kurdish elites of the era. Because, “the Kurdish notables played a pivotal role in promoting the idea of nationalism in their community” (Özoglu, 2004:87). Thus, the post-World War I period is the second of three periods mentioned above, in which both the Kurds and the Turks started giving emphasis to their own asabiya and the upper-asabiya ties started to weaken.

It is also necessary to divide this second period into two parts. The first period includes the time ranging from the World War I period until the foundation of the Turkish Republic (1914-1923) in which there seems to happen an inclination of some Kurds to their own asabiya in the first period of post-World War I. However, such a tendency does not reflect the overall Kurdish population because the ones, who were influenced by the nationalistic feelings both because of the collapse of Ottoman Empire and Armenian threats, were the grandchildren of the elite families such as Bedirhans and Semdinans, together with the Kurdish intellectuals like Fevzi Pasha and Seyyid Abdulkadir. But, on the contrary, both the Kurds and the Turks were able to come together during the War of Independence to be able to protect their upper asabiya and also their motherland. For example many Kurds had been martyrs during the War of Canakkale just because of the same reasons with the Turks.

The second time period includes the events in which, as a result of both the policies of the newly-founded Turkish state against the Kurds and the reactions that the Kurds show to these policies, both the Turks and the Kurds began to give importance to their own asabiyyah identities ignoring their upper-asabiyyah ties. The most important feature of this period was that “the abandonment of the Ottoman legacy and the religious authority of the Caliphate led the traditional and conservative Kurdish elites to realize that the dominant doctrine of the Turkish Republic was Turkish nationalism, not Muslim fraternity, and this led to the Kurdish resistance” (Kaya, 2012:134).

3.1.3 The Period from World War I until the War of Turkey's Independence

“The Ottoman Empire was a multiethnic state with different nations living under its jurisdiction” (Arakon, 2014:143). Moreover, “Ottoman Empire never followed an administrative mentality of ‘divide and rule’ in his state policy of the East, on the contrary, the Ottomans followed the policy of ‘empower, unify and let them govern themselves as much as possible” (Doğan 2010:8) However, the World War I was the dramatic end for both the Ottoman Empire and its multinational nature. With the collapse of the Empire, many independent, nation-based states emerged.

The post-world war period and the collapse of Ottoman Empire offered some opportunities for founding an independent state to the Kurds, too as well as other ethnic communities such as Armenians. However, although some of the Kurdish intellectuals look for the liberation of the Kurds in their own *asabiyyahs*, in other words, in founding a new state, most of the Kurds do not trust on these Kurdish intellectuals and show their faith to both the Ottoman Empire and thus, to the caliphate. Hence, they did support the War of Independence that was started by Mustafa Kemal, which implies that they still preferred to live under the umbrella of habituation and religion with the Turks

Descendants of Bedirhans and Semdinans lead the Kurdish intellectuals who try to look for the liberation of the Kurds within supporting their own *asabiyyah* identities. For example, “the Bedirhani family produced several Kurdish nationalists after the break-up from the Ottoman Empire and enjoys a special place in the great narrative of Kurdish history” (Özoglu, 2004:70) In addition to the descendants of Bedirhan Pasha and Sheikh Ubeydullah, “the ones who defend the idea of separatism are the members of the Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti and also the members of the Ottoman Parliament, such as Serif Pasha and Seyyid Abdulkadir” (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:16).

The first reason of the Kurdish intellectuals’ having the idea of following their own *asabiyyahs* when compared to the past was that “it was a direct consequence of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and it was not the product of an independence war against the occupation, nor the issue of resistance to colonialism, but an immediate and direct challenge to the newly founded or constructed nation-

states” (Arıkanlı, 2016:92). The other reason that leads the Kurds to find a solution after the World War I was the efforts of the Armenians to form an independent Armenian state within the territories of Eastern Anatolia, which was also supported by the allied powers of entente states. These intentions of the Armenian people caused uneasiness on Kurdish people, which impelled them to take urgent precautions to prevent the Armenians succeed. However, “the project of forming an Armenian State which was prescribed by the treaty of Sevres fell apart both because of the successes of Anatolian opposition movement and the expansion of the Soviet Union throughout the Caucasus, and also as a result of the political and military support treaty signed by Moscow and Ankara in 1921” (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:14).

However, the reactions of the Kurds who seek the solution under the idea of uniting under the umbrella of the upper-asabiyyah, did not delay. “the Kurdish people, who support the movement of the opposition by Mustafa Kemal, protested the actions of Serif Pasha, which favours the idea of separatism and 22 Kurdish tribal leaders published a notice stressing the Islamic ties between the Turks and the Kurds in March, 1920” (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:16). The most basic reason behind this protest was that contrary to other ethnic minorities which split from the Empire, the Kurdish people was still believing that fact that they belonged to the Muslim fraternity under the roof of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, “the case of Kurdistan during the WWI period indicates that when the idea to found a Kurdistan did not correspond with political, economic and geostrategic circumstances and aims, it was disregarded” (Kaya, 2012:130)

The situation of Kurdish people choosing the side of Turkish people and their rejection of nationalistic ideas can also be understood from the insurgencies which emerged out in the region that they mostly lived. For example, “actually, only 4 of 23 insurgencies, which was being directed against the opposition movement and occurred during the years of 1919 and 1921, emerged within the territories of the Kurdish population and 3 of them included Kurdish tribals” (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:14). Moreover, “there wasn’t any union or ethnic identity which emerged among the Kurds” (Özcan and Aküzüm 2012:16), in other words, because the Kurds did not support such kind of separatism, Kurdish intellectuals could not find the

necessary background to be able to overcome the other asabiyyahs. Ibn Khaldun explains this situation in terms of power relations:

“If there are dispersed tribes and many asabiyyahs within a territory, there should be a most powerful asabiyyah which will overcome the other asabiyyahs and unite them around him by making them subject to him. Therefore; there is going to emerge a bigger and more powerful asabiyyah. If this is not provided, there will be disorder which will cause conflicts and disputes” (Haldun, 2014:420).

Although, there were separatist ones who supported the vice versa among the Kurds, the most significant development that prevents them from establishing a state or struggling for the sake of an independent state is the War of Independence which was initiated within the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and “Kurds’ being generally in support of the sultan and the caliphate” (Aydın, 2005:22). Therefore, “many local Kurdish tribal leaders, seeing the Kemalists as soldiers of Islam, supported the Anatolian resistance movement” (Özoglu, 2004:3). Because “Mustafa Kemal and the government of Ankara were able to attract Kurdish tribal chieftains to the movement of resistance on the condition of loyalty to the sultan, caliph and the homeland” (Aydın, 2005:23). In other words, the opposition movement’s often declaration implying that “their aim was to save the Ottoman Empire together with its caliphate and sultanate was the major reason lying in the background of feeling of solidarity among the Kurds and the Turks within this movement” (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:16).

In order to get the support of the Kurds, “Mustafa Kemal used the rhetoric of the need to struggle to save the caliphate which unites Turks and Kurds together, and ensuring that the Turkish identity would not threaten the Kurdish identity” (Karlsson, 2008:47). For this aim, Mustafa Kemal started to negotiate with the Kurdish chieftains in order to get their support. “Mustafa Kemal’s contacts with Kurdish chieftains appeared to be better than those of the Kurdish nationalist organizations that were seeking opportunities for founding a Kurdistan in the borders of Mısak-ı Milli (the name of the National Pact which was formed during the years of the War of Independence in order to show the national borders of the state)” (Akyol, 2006:31). As a result “between 1919-1920, the mainstream Kurdish leaders welcomed Mustafa Kemal’s promises concerning the preservation and protection of the caliphate, the liberation of the former vilayet Mosul from British occupation and

the Kurdish-Turkish fraternity in the future state to be founded after the war's end. They also opposed any kind of separatist programme" (Bozarslan, 2008:340).

Beside the negotiations with the Kurdish Chieftains in the region, Mustafa Kemal used the same rhetoric while making speeches in the National Assembly related to the upper-asabiyyah ties between the Turks and the Kurds although he doesn't directly address them. In his speeches, Mustafa Kemal was trying to emphasize the unifying role of Islam:

"There is only one kind of nation within these borders. There are Turks, Circassians and various Muslim elements within these borders. It is the national border of brother nations whose interests and aims are entirely united... The article that determines this border is our one great principle: around each Islamic element living within this homeland's borders there's recognition and mutual acceptance in all honesty to their race, tradition and environment. Naturally, there are no details and explanations belonging to this tradition because it is not the time to answer details and explanations" (McDowall, 2007:188)

These two crucial policies which were followed by the Ankara Government during the years of national struggle provided the Kurds to attend the War of Independence. Therefore, it can be realized that this state of unity, which was achieved after World War I, might prove that although there had been nationalistic revivals, both Turks and Kurds cared about the upper asabiyyah by waging war against the enemies together.

3.1.4 Kurds and Asabiyyah Ties after the War of Turkey's Independence

The victory in the Independence War brought a new environment of clash rather than peace to the territories where the Kurdish mostly live, because "the most significant result of the end of the Kurdish alliance with the Kemalist state was a succession of revolts between 1924 and 1936. Three of them, the Sheikh Said revolt in 1925, the Ararat revolt of 1930, and the Dersim revolt between 1936-8, left a deep imprint on both the history of Kurdish nationalism and that of the Turkish Republic" (Bozarslan, 2008:341). The most important reason for the emergence of a new clash environment was the disappointment the Kurdish felt related to the expectations of the life and governance styles which they experienced during the time of the Ottoman Empire "as the new government represented the opposite of the Ottoman tradition" (Bozarslan, 2008:350).

Besides the reasons mentioned above, Bozarslan also relates this change to mostly two reasons (Bozarslan, 2008:350):

- 1) It was obvious by the end of 1923 that Turkish nationalism would become the country's official and hegemonic ideology,
- 2) The second reason was linked to the abolition of the caliphate, one of the main pillars of the Kurdish-Kemalist alliance,

In addition to Bozarslan, Arıkanlı explains the reasons for the deterioration of the upper-asabiyyah ties by going deeper as such: "Turkey's centralized administration that aimed to eliminate the local tribal and religious authorities of the aghas and the sheikhs, and its national education and Westernization policies" (Arıkanlı, 2016:100). Contrary to Kurds' expectation in terms of equality in the management of the new state, "Kurdish people were encountering Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's project to found a new state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, which was based on a modern Turkish nation-state" (Karlsson, 2008:49). This project was encountered with resistance among the Kurdish people who rejected the ethnic and secular identity (Karlsson, 2008:49-50), which caused the Kurdish people to feel alienated.

The emergence of such alienation was due to the abolition of the Caliphate which had the symbolic power of obeying two asabiyyahs and which led to the transition from theocratic politics to normal politics according to the political classification formed by Ibn Khaldun. Thus, the Kurds opposed the natural politics because natural political power is a system which is being far away from religious acts and benefits due to the fact that this administrative understanding is aiming to improve in just world affairs although it can be said that there is a certain system of law and administrative understanding within it. Therefore, the upper-asabiyyah consisting of religion, habituation and caliphate had lost one third of its power due to the abolition of the caliphate. Because "with the abolition of the caliphate in March 1924, the most important symbol of Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood disappeared" (Bruinessen, 1992:281).

Not only did the abolition of the caliphate but also the other policies followed within this period have a big role in the emergence of this loss. "The abolition of the

reference to Islam in the 1924 Constitution, the law on unity of education providing a national education system and the abolishment of Islamic theological schools (March 1924), the Hat Law (October 1925 started in Kastamonu), the law on abolition of cults, lodges and angles (December 1925) and the civil law (October 1926) and finally the acceptance of the gregorian calendar instead of the Islamic moon calendar and the Latin alphabet instead of the Arabic alphabet” (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:19-20) might be acknowledged as taking part among these policies.

The first uprising which emerged within the first years of the Republic was the Sheikh Said rebellion. The Sheikh Said uprising was the first one, brought out by the Kurds after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, claiming that religion and habituation ties were removed as a result of the abolition of the caliphate by the new government and by favoring the idea of nationalism. Compounding of the problem was the decision of the new regime to abandon religion, which had assumed a major role in bringing Turks and Kurds together. Because “the conservative Kurdish elite realised that the dominant doctrine of the Turkish Republic was Turkish nationalism, not Muslim fraternity, and this led to the Kurdish resistance” (Kaya, 2012:134).

Sheikh Said’s revolt is the most debated Kurdish rebellion in the literature and there are different arguments about its character (Kaya, 2012:134). For example, Bruinessen describes the uprising as “neither a purely religious nor a purely nationalist one...” (Bruinessen, 1992:294). Olson also emphasizes both facets of the uprising by claiming that “obviously, both elements were involved”. However, according to Jwaideh, “there was a strong nationalist sentiment underlying the revolt and religion was simply manipulated for a nationalist cause” (Jwaideh, 2006:210). According to the common view which is accepted by most people such as Olson and Bruinessen, this uprising embodies both religious and nationalist aspirations. When the religious identity of Sheikh Said was taken into consideration, it is possible to say that the rebellion has religious concerns because Sheikh Said, who was a well-known Sunni sheikh, was selected as the leader of the revolt and most of the participants of the revolt were Zaza-speaking Sunni Kurds (Kaya, 2012:134). However, it would be totally injustice to name this rebellion as purely nationalistic one.

“The organization behind the revolt was the Azadi (meaning “freedom”), which was founded as a secret organization in Erzurum in 1923” (Bozarslan,

2008:338). “The revolt which was led by a Kurdish religious dignitary – the Naqshbandi Sheikh Said of Piran – seriously threatened the Republic before it was crushed at the gates of Diyarbakir” (Bozarslan, 2008:339). “The uprising, which started as a result of fire shot by Sheikh Said to the soldiers, who came there to arrest the deserters (describe the people who flee from the compulsory military mission) taking refugees within the home in the village of Piran, was squashed because of both the absence of the support that the rebels expected from the people and the attack of the government with twenty thousand soldiers against the rebels” (Hür 2008).

As a result of this upheaval, many people who joint in this revolt were executed. “Şeyh Said and many other Kurdish leaders, even together with the leaders who actually did not join in the rebellion, were taken to the Court of Independence in Diyarbakir and were sentenced to death in June 1925. The executions took place on 4th of September, 1925, and Sheikh Said, together with 47 Kurdish leaders, was hanged” (Karlsson, 2008:136). The other non-participants in the rebellion were exiled to the West with their families. It is really interesting to notice that the families who were exiled to the West were the most influential families within the region. The other point that catches attention is that in the places of the Kurds who were obliged to migrate, the people, who came from the western parts of Turkey or as a result of population exchange, were replaced and it is also interesting that the closure of the settlement was made within the regions in which the rebellions took place.

However, “the Kurdish oppositon did not cease as a result of these events and a group of exiled nationalists founded a new organization called Xoybun (meaning “independence”) in Beirut in 1927” (Karlsson, 2008:136). The organization founded would support the uprising which would be recorded as the second upheaval after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. “This organization stood behind the revolt targeting to form a liberated area around the mountain of Ararat, which would be the center of the Kurdish government in 1930” (Karlsson, 2008:136). “In the second article of the Xoybun’s statute, the purpose of the society was described as, ‘establishment of an independent Kurdistan state within the national borders of Kurdistan and Kurds, which are under the oppression of Turkey” (Aydın, 2005:28).

However, as a result of government's sending the military troops on the revolting Kurds, the revolt was suppressed in 1930.

“The revolt which would be the last one in the near future was triggered within Dersim region which is now named Tunceli” (Karlsson, 2008:137). “This rebellion may be interpreted as a rebellion against the efforts to rehabilitate the region that was perceived as a ‘boil’” (Aydın, 2005:30). “The revolt started after the ‘Dersim Law’ of 1935, which in fact aimed at the extraction of this ‘sore’ by dispersing the Kurdish Alevi population and replacing it with a Turkish population” (Bozarslan, 2008:348). This law divided Turkey into three zones (McDowall, 2004:207):

- 1) Localities to be reserved for the habitation in compact form of persons possessing Turkish culture;
- 2) Regions to which populations of non-Turkish culture for assimilation into the Turkish language and culture were to be moved;
- 3) Regions to be completely evacuated.

“When the Dersim Kurds who were led by Seyyid Riza laid claim to regional autonomy, Ankara responded to this claim by sending a troop of 50.000 soldiers and by proclaiming a state of siege” (Karlsson, 2008:137). The Kurds in the Dersim region who couldn't endure such a power had to yield, which caused the tranquility period to start, which would continue until the 1970s.

The basic feature of the revolts of this period is that “although almost all the Kurdish areas were militarily contested at one time or another during Mustafa Kemal's presidency, the Kurdish resistance was not able to mobilise the entire rural population, and the urban population remained essentially quiescent” (Bozarslan, 2008:346), because, for example, (Kaya, 2012:135). The basic reason which caused such a situation to emerge originates from the fact that most of the Kurds were not supporting these upheavals because these rebellions were embodying nationalist aspirations beside religious features. Thus, Kurds' not supporting these upheavals proves that Kurds were still giving importance to the upper-asabiyyah and they did not return to their own asabiyyahs.

When all the lines mentioned above are taken into the consideration, the period, in which Kurdish people's preferences of their own asabiyyah started in terms of ideology, took place during the time of 20th century or post-World War I period. However, the period in which Kurdish asabiyyah aspirations took shape actively or in the form of a rebellion occurred after the foundation of the Republic. Thus, it can be said that the Sheikh Said Rebellion is the first nationalist rebellion after the Sheikh Ubeydullah Rebellion. However, as it was mentioned before, it would not be proper to put emphasis on just nationalistic aspects of these rebellions.

"After 1925, the state developed a double discourse towards the Kurds: on the one hand, their existence was ignored, while on the other, the state insisted that they certainly existed, but only as an oppressed and feudal ethno-class, whose main aim was to destroy the Turks as an ethnic group" (Bozarslan, 2008:348). Together with these implementations, "Kurdish schools, organizations and publications were prohibited and Kurdish town or village names were made in Turkish. For instance, the name of Dersim was changed into Tunceli. According to the Surname Law introduced in 1934, their surnames would be taken from the Turkish language and the names of the foreign people or races would not be used. Thus, all the words which include the letters of w, x and q were prohibited to give to the Kurdish children because the Turkish language did not possess those letters." (Karlsson, 2008:136-137). As a result, "following the severe suppression of the Dersim Rebellion, the Kurds of Turkey remained relatively inactive" (Kaya, 2012:316)

The limiting laws that were introduced following the squash of the revolts would keep the Kurds away from the political activities and pushed them into a period in which no political activities took place. Although restrictive policies encouraged the Kurds to run after their own asabiyyahs, the conditions of that period did not permit it because in Turkey, the WWII period also witnessed increased pressure on minority groups and the strong one-party rule continued.

By taking the explanations, which Ibn Khaldun put forwards related to the asabiyyah power, into consideration, when the Kurdish people's asabiyyah power is compared to that of the Turkish people, because Kurds' asabiyyah power was less powerful than the Turkish people's, the failure of the revolt was inevitable. According to Ibn Khaldun, "if an asabiyyah wants to overpower another asabiyyah,

the first one should be more powerful than the latter” (Haldun, 2014). Aliza Marcus summarizes this fact as such: “Kurds’ struggle aimed at their targets was failing. The states were quite powerful; however, the Kurds were divided as much as they were not able to perform a durable tough courage” (Marcus, 2009:15).

The autism that was experienced after the suppression of the insurgencies ended as a result of the transition of Turkey to a multi-party period in the 1950s. As a result of the transition to the multi-party era in 1946, “CHP gradually started to be remembered as the party of suppression and unjust administration” (Karlsson, 2008:138). However, “Democrat Party, which was a newly founded party in 1950s, was able to pull the local Kurdish leaders towards the party’s side, who foresaw that the Kurdish people had the chance of becoming active in the country’s policies and of empowering their leadership throughout the region” (Karlsson 2008:138). The Democrat Party, by taking great support from the Kurds, won the elections of 1950 and started to change the policies and the regulations of one-party period. “At the same time, with the Democrat Party rule, the conditions of the Kurds started to get better gradually. The military control decreased and even some of the prominent families who were banished to the West were permitted to turn back to the regions they were living beforehand” (Karlsson 2008:139)

The relief period coming with the Democratic Party era was not long-lasting. “The Turkish army staged a coup in order to end the empowering autocratic government of Adnan Menderes in 1960” (Marcus, 2009:19). The justification that was claimed for the military coup was the fact that the Democratic Party was getting too closed to the Kurds. As a result of the military coup, the leader of the Democrat Party was executed and after exiling many Kurdish begs or aghas, the policies that had been limiting and ignoring were brought back. “An emblematic example is General Gursel, who removed the civilian government in 1960 and declared himself president, publicly declaring in Diyarbakir that “[t]here are no Kurds in this country. Whoever says he is a Kurd, I will spit in his face”(Klein, 2015:55).

3.1.5 The Inclination of the Kurds to the Leftist Groups: The Last Period within the Kurdish Problem

“Although the Kurds in Turkey had not been very active in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, debates revolving around Kurdish rights began to emerge in the late 1960s with the initiative of the Labor Party of Turkey (TIP)” (Kaya, 2012:142) After these silent periods which had not been very active, the Kurds started to turn back to the political life more actively. The significant difference from the other periods is the beginning of the transition of the Kurds to the ideology of the secular-left. “The leading people of the struggle of Kurdish identity started to comprise of mostly leftist-socialist intellectuals. The leftist winds which affected the whole globe had influences on also the Kurdish youth, who were in the struggle of finding food, job, identity, justice” (Tan, 2015:118) Because, “the development of Marxist ideas in the 20th century and its reflection on the practicality caused this stream of thoughts to be a determinant phenomenon globally. However, Turkey started to come across this stream of thought merely during the last quarter of the 20th century” (Semiz, 2013:86).

Kurdish people’s showing interests in leftist groups or parties that started in the 1960s and increased gradually in the 1970s, formed the last period of the three periods in which the asabiyyah ties had been affected negatively. Therefore, this period caused divisions within the upper-asabiyyah. It can be said that the emerging leftist view caused the Kurds to become alienated from both their identities and in the meantime, from the Turks by forming an alternative to Islam and polarizing both sides. Thus, the remaining asabiyyah ties were exposed to danger because PKK tried to de-activate the role of the religion factor in terms of the Kurdish people.

The third time period throughout the history of the Kurdish problem, which is the longest, the most conflict-abundant and which is on-going, starts with the foundation of the PKK although there were many leftist and Kurdish-centered attempts such as the TKP (Turkey Communist Party – Türkiye Komünist Partisi) , the TIP (Turkey Workers’ Party – Türkiye İşçi Partisi), the DDKO (Revolutionary Eastern Culture Centers – Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları) from the end of the 1960s to the 1970s. Because, The Marxist-Leninist view besides the nationalist separationist paradigm that PKK possesses makes it different from the rebellions that have been taking place since the times of the Ottoman Empire. When the three

periods, from the Ottoman Empire until the foundation of PKK, are analyzed, although the insurgencies include nationalist and religious features, the first revolt possessing the leftist paradigms started with PKK. Because “PKK followed the policies opposing the religious motives within the line of Marxist-Leninist ideology” (Semiz, 2013:18).

“Despite the generally high degree of religiosity in Kurdistan, the PKK encompasses non- or anti-religious movements. The PKK has Marxist-Leninist, therefore atheist, roots and although it adopted a softer stance on religion following the initial years after its founding by Abdullah Ocalan in 1978, it still embodies the antithesis to the religious groups and parties in the area, such as the Islamist movements in both Sunni and Shi’a Islam” (Klein, 2015:23).

The foundation of PKK starts with Abdullah Ocalan and encounters military coup years during 1980s. “It was born out of the vision essentially of one man, Abd Allah Ocalan, widely known by his nickname ‘Apo’. Ocalan had been a student in Ankara at the time of the 1970 coup, involved with Devrimci Genc another leftist group, the Ankara Higher Education Association (AYOD). He drew inspiration from his friend Mahir Cayan, a leader of the Turkish revolutionary Left in the early 1970s (McDowall, 2007:420). However, before starting the university years, he did not have any relationships with leftist groups. Rather, he describes himself as a religious, rightist, a poor villager young man. He also describes his meeting with the leftist ideas as a turning point in his life” (Polat, 2013:31).

His meeting with the leftist ideas started with his getting into Istanbul University Law Faculty in 1970. In Istanbul, Abdullah Ocalan became the member of DDKO (Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları), which was a leftist organization. However, Ocalan’s real meeting with the leftist organizations occurred in Ankara, where he became one of the sympathizers of THKP/C. During the years of his staying in Ankara, he was brainstorming ideas related to the foundation of the organization which will lead them to establish a independent Kurdish state in the southeastern part of Turkey. Therefore, “Abdullah Ocalan and his friends made their first meeting in order to form a ‘Kurdish separatist’ organization” (Polat, 2013:32). They were filled with anger at the exploitation of both the rural and urban proletariat at the hands of aghas, merchants and the ruling establishment (McDowall, 2007:420).

“During the first meeting in Ankara, those Kurdish-leftist terrorist were declaring that the towns in the region of both southeast and east Anatolia were the

colony of Turkey. They also manifested that their aims were to establish an independent Kurdish state and in order to succeed this aim, there was a need to found a secret organization” (Polat, 2013:32). However, the official establishment of PKK occurred in 1978. The terrorist organization was founded with twenty people who attended a meeting in the village of Fis, Diyarbakır in 1978 (Dikmen, 2015:67). After its founding, PKK carried out its first terrorist activity in Sanlıurfa in order to declare its existence. “PKK left a notice in the crime scene that was carried out in an armed assault to Mehmet Celal Bucak who was the Sanlıurfa parliament member of AP (Adalet Partisi – Justice Party) and with this terrorist attack PKK declared its founding in July 1979” (Polat, 2013:33).

During the 1970s and 1980s, Turkey was also experiencing rough times because of the leftist and rightist events which took place in most of the cities of the country. These events were affecting the country deeply and many people were being killed in a night without knowing who killed them. While in 1976, there were 104 political crimes, in 1977 this number reached 230 people and however, when it came to 1979, in average 20 people were being killed every day (Marcus, 2009:74) In this atmosphere, “the armed forces had taken over political power; they declared a state of emergency throughout the country. Leaders of the political parties were arrested. The parliament was dissolved. Even mayors and municipal councils were dismissed. Over a hundred thousand people were arrested” (Lundgren, 2007:47).

There were also PKK militants among the ones who were arrested and oppressed in the prisons such as Diyarbakir military prison, which lead to support PKK’s Marxist-Lenninist teory related to oppression of the people both ideologically and politically. PKK used this theory which was based on Marxist-Leninist theory in order to increase its militant numbers. Especially, the bad events in Diyarbakir prison have affected the Kurdish people closely, which caused most of them to attend PKK. Because during the years of the military coup in Turkey, different values and ideologies such as left-wing radicalism, ethnic Turkish nationalism, separatism and Islamism have been treated as threats to national security. (Lundgren, 2007:39)

The most important rhetoric which PKK used in order to gain more members around PKK was based on the theory in which Kurds had been under the oppression both ideologically and practically. Abdullah Öcalan made use of the theories of Marksist-Leninist ideology while laying the foundations of his terrorist organization.

PKK claims that the ideological enslaving of the Kurds occurs via the religion of Islam. “According to leftist Kurdish intellectuals, Kurdish people were enforced to accept Islam because of the fear based on sword. These intellectuals also claim that the main religion of the Kurds was Zoroastrianism (Tan, 2015:176). The claims of Abdullah Ocalan confirm the theories of those intellectuals. According to Abdullah Ocalan, the Kurdish people have been ideologically enslaved since the Kurdish people first started to become Muslims during the time of the caliph Omar:

“With the abolition of Zoroastrianism which acts as an ideology of the national opposition and stays as ideologically nationalist during the period of enslavement, Kurdish people also got into the invasion of the foreigners in the field of the spiritual values. The religion of Islam is like a Trojan horse which plays the role of conquering the castle inside and causing the national denial in the hearts and minds of Kurdish people. Islam Religion which shows its influence played the same role in conquering the Kurdistan. Islam, which became the tool of making forget the national values, of improving the Panislamism, of hiding the exploitation within the hands of local and foreign feudals, is the biggest ideological means which kills the national opposition soul of Kurds until today from medieval ages” (Semiz, 2013:117)

PKK’s theory of the political enslavement took some of its power from the criticisms against the policies which were applied during first years of the Republican Government of Turkey. Moreover, the military coup in 1980 and the events that took place following the coup years also empowered leftist theories of political enslavement by PKK. “In addition to the conditions of political prisoners, military pressure, the military regime’s ban on civil organizations, newspapers and political parties, the dismissals of the workers who were suspected to have connections with leftist organizations, military investigations, torture and death reports under surveillance, illegal executions, tortures directed against the Kurdish prisoners, or making the prisoners repeat Turkish nationalistic slogans, memorizing Ataturk’s speeches, were supporting the leftist claims in which Turkey was a fascist state that wouldn’t be able to change without making a revolution” (Marcus, 2009:66-67).

Moreover, “PKK, in order to gain adherences while persuading people, was trying to make the people believe that they were primarily Kurds, and that in fact they did have the right to establish their own state, and that only the revolutionists of Kurdistan could accomplish this act” (Marcus, 2009:119). However, at the time period of the Ottomans, Kurds did not tolerate the secessionist movements, because they had seen themselves as being primarily Muslims, then the Ottoman citizens, and

last but not least, Kurdish. Some of the Kurds, who had considered the conditions within and outside the prisons, unfortunately adopted the rhetoric claimed by PKK.

The last but most intriguing step which pulled Kurdish people to PKK was about the Kurdish people's religious identities. It was really interesting to see that although PKK and most of the Kurdish people had negative identities towards each other, because most of the Kurdish people were following the Shafii legal school of Islam while theoretical ideology of PKK was denying the teachings of Islam, PKK was still finding its supporters and militants among the Kurdish people. In other words, "contrary to high rate of religiousness among the Kurdish people, the issue which arouses curiosity within the society is the problematique of how PKK gained support from the Kurdish people" (Dikmen, 2015:80-81). The reason why the Kurdish people supported such a secular and terrorist organization was implicit in a policy which PKK applied in order not to tame the Kurdish people's religious feelings:

"PKK followed two important strategy changes both in the years of 1990s and in the years after Ocalan was captured in order to widen its social base in terms of religious and traditional values. Although PKK did not change its viewpoint against religion and tradition on the basis, while it was releasing itself to the public, it tried to behave attentive not to conflict with the social values. It was adopted to do studies in the small groups in order to devastate these values which are seen as 'reactionist values' of the public and it was also adopted not to criticize them in front of the public, which need to be devastated. For this reason, without getting into close contact, it was made difficult for the public to understand the political-ideological program of PKK. While most of the Kurdish people support Kurdish nationalists in terms of political-cultural bases, the ideological structures of those nationalists are not being criticized" (Dikmen, 2015:80-81).

The policies which were followed from the founding years were fruitful in terms of gaining supporters for PKK because in short time PKK gained many members in order to make its first comprehensive attack against Turkey. PKK started its first attack in Şemdinli and Eruh in 1984, which would also become the starting point for a long time conflict within Turkey. And "the course of time which lasted from first attack against the military facilities in Eruh and Semdinli to today comprises the most bloody period of the Kurdish problem" (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:30).

The attacks of PKK was not only against Turkish government or military officials. The Kurdish and Turkish civil people and the economical targets were also getting their share from the cruel attacks of PKK (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:32). Massacres of PKK were including Pınarcık, Çiftekavak, Çobandere, Milan,

Behmenin, Haraberk, Peçenek, Yağızoymak, Kovancılar, Çevrimli, Çetinkaya, Pazarcık, Midyat, Cevizdalı, Seki Village, Yolaç Village, Tatvan Village, Başbağlar Village, Bingöl, Sündüz, Derince, Savur, Maden, Hamzalı etc. From 1984 to 2017, there were nearly 35 massacres which PKK participated actively and as a result of these massacres approximately 500 people were killed (<http://www.ahaber.com.tr/analiz/2016/09/09/pkknin-il-il-yil-yil-katliamlari:2016>).

The aim of the economical and civilian attacks was to hit the important income resources such as tourism, to weaken state's existence in the region by preventing the public service and to form an insecure environment. However, the basic aim PKK tried to reach was to present itself as the alternative authority (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:32).

The reaction which was showed to PKK was based on the military level and Kurdish problem have been understood as on terror issue for many years. During this period, government officials defended the idea that Turkey did not have a Kurdish problem, rather it was just a terror problem; they preferred the way which undermined the Kurdish reality by ignoring the historical and sociological background of the Kurdish problem (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:32). For example, the extraordinary justice experience which started with the stage of siege continued with the state of emergency (OHAL) and until it was abolished in 2002 a political process in which the state of emergency became ordinary existed (Özhan and Ete, 2008:5). The reactions of the Kurdish people have been to develop an opposite behaviour which include: (Dikmen, 2015:70)

1. The evacuations of the villages, mandatory settlement policies, and the tangible and the moral problems that these policies have caused
2. The people who died during the conflicts had sorrows all over the region beginning with their family, relatives, and tribes.
3. The negative results of firm policies of armed forces which degrades the problem into a security problem
4. The state's policy of sending the civil servants who do mistakes during their duties because of disciplinary regulations of the state
5. The emergence of marginalizing and exclusive attitude within the society because of the disruptive effect of terror on the public.

When the events from the Ottoman Empire until now, including the foundation of Turkey and also the emergence of PKK, and the those five outcomes mentioned above are investigated, it can be concluded that the umran of the Kurds and the Turks deteriorated together with the spoilage of asabiyah ties among Turks and Kurds. However, the most effective and distructive period in spoiling the umran of the Kurdish people occurred during the conflicts which took place between PKK terrorists and Turkish armed forces. For example, according to the explanation of Faruk Çelik who was the minister of labour and social security, the expenditure which was spent on the struggle against PKK reached 400 billion dollars (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:49). Moreover, during the fifteen years of period until the capture of Ocalan in 1999, the struggle with PKK caused to the loss of 35.000 people and billions of dollars (Özhan and Ete, 2008:8). Therefore, the solution according to Ibn Khaldun lies in providing a more secure umran which has more welfare and is really far away from the terrorist killings.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS OF THE SOLUTION OF THE KURDISH PROBLEM ACCORDING TO IBN KHALDUN'S PERSPECTIVES

Although in recent years there have been some sincere and important steps in order to solve the Kurdish problem, it has been the major issue of Turkey which awaits to be solved immediately by the state actors. However, the conflicts which started long time ago still continue to exist and harm the daily lives of both Turkish and Kurdish people. It is possible to express that the mistakes which have been made while offering definition to the Kurdish problem were repeated while trying to solve the problem. In fact, because definition and solving has cause and effect relationship and without having proper definition to the problem, it would be really hard to take steps in order to solve it, Kurdish problem lacks an absolute definition of the Kurdish problem which will provide a map to show the way in order to solve the problem.

This study does not claim that it is providing the whole picture of problem while analyzing the solutions but just drawing a picture which implies the definition and solution of the Kurdish problem according to Ibn Khaldun. However, the thorough and absolute definition and solution offers are possible to emerge when different ideas or different theories are put together. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to offer the Khaldunian perspective in analyzing the solution suggestions related to the Kurdish problem. While implementing such a problem-solving, the major thing that should be cared is the need to know the conditions of each period in which different approaches were followed in order to solve the problem because the

Kurdish problem has a background which is affected from the conditions of the each time period. For instance; the problem was finding a way out within the perspectives of one party period while, after 2000s, the definitions related to the problem could differentiate under the umbrella of more different ideologies together with development related to democracy in Turkish Republic.

Before making the analysis of the offers, it would not only be better to express the wrong solutions that were offered beforehand, but also to support the ones which will be useful to approach the problem and the most importantly; to unearth the ones which have not been emphasized up to now by analyzing the solutions in a historical context. Because, any kind of solutions regarding the Kurdish problem can be reached by investigating the solution offers that were put forward by both the governments of the time and the civil bureaucracy and also within the lights of the concepts of *umran* and *asabiyyah* offered by Ibn Khaldun.

4.1 THE HISTORICAL ATTEMPTS IN SOLVING THE KURDISH PROBLEM

4.1.1 The First Period on the Solution of Kurdish Problem: 1923-1970

At the beginning of this period, the revolts of the time and the adaption of the policies, which were applied during the first times of the newly founded Turkish Republican government, were determining for the later times. During this period which can also be called as the first time period of Kurdish problem, “instead of traditional, political, economical and cultural structures of Ottoman Empire, the efforts of forming a modern nation state; centralization, Westernization, secularism, and Turkish nationalism, which are the fundamental principals of the project of forming a nation-state based on,” (Özcan and Aküzüm 2012:19) have been the determining factors. In other words; “the ideology of the Kemalists, built on the concept of unity and territorial integrity: *'One state - one nation - one language'* became the backbone of official Turkish nationalism”(Lundgren, 2007:43). Every effort that is directed against these policies were acknowledged as illegitimate and were needed to prevent by the founding government.

The other factor that was determining the perceptions related to the solutions of Kurdish problem was the conditions into which Turkish Republic was founded. Together with the leaving countries from Ottoman Empire because of the nationalistic movements that began in 19th century and due to the bitter experiences which emerged as a result of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of 1st World War, “one of the most sacred values for Turkish state-builders was the absolute integrity of the territory and the existing borders and national security thing in Turkey was imbued with a strong fear of territorial loss and disintegration” (Lundgren, 2007:20). Thus; “the ruling Kemalist Republican People’s Party was adamant in its stance that political ideas and movements from the periphery would jeopardize the ideological core of the Turkish state” (Fend, 2015:53). In other words; the ongoing fear of separation due to reborn from the ashes of Ottoman Empire together with Turkish Republic’s War of Independence and the perception of the Kurds as being the most dangerous threat to the structure of the government were decisive in such politics. Even three major rebellions which were caused by the Kurds confirm such a concern.

When the reasons mentioned above were analyzed, because the founding government saw the Kurds as threats to its existence, the new government perceives this threat as a base while describing the Kurdish problem. Thus, contrary to the multi-national structure of Ottoman Empire, without taking the other people apart from Turkish people into consideration, the government ignores them while offering a solution. Therefore, “from the mid-1920s until the end of the 1980s, the Turkish state acted as if there was no Kurdish element on Turkish territory” (Limbert, 1968:45). An article in *Son Posta* dated April 1946 echoed this establishment view, ‘In Turkey, no Kurdish minority never existed either nomadic or settled, with national consciousness or without it.’ (McDowall, 2004:397)

It was really probable to come across such policies within the discourses of government officials in a way in which they highlight the Turkish identity and ignore the Kurdish identity. For example; “the settlement law, (*İskan Kanunu*) which was introduced in 1934 and aimed at settling both the Turkish and Kurdish people into sedentary life, divided the people living in Turkey into three major groups: (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:21)

- 1) The ones speaking Turkish and coming from Turkish origin,
- 2) The ones who can’t speak Turkish however coming from Turkish culture and

3) The ones neither speaking Turkish nor belonging to Turkish culture

The other parameter determining the way of the government's approach to solve the Kurdish problem was the socio-political structure of the region beside the fear of separation that was caused in the government. Following the foundation of Republic, the Turkish Republican Government officials were approaching the problem within the borders of underdeveloped lands and people in the east and southeast and they obliged the people living in the region to be both educated and modern by melting them down within the frame of Turkish identity. Moreover; the roles of the aghas were really distinctive within the society because "the agha was still intermediary between illiterate villagers and the outside world." (McDowall, 2004:399) For this purpose; Turkish Republic strove to break this structure as much as it could do.

When it came to 1960s; the Democrat Party, which was the first product of the trials of transition to multi party life, tried to reflect the democracy atmosphere of multi-party life. For example; "between the years of 1965-1968, Turkish-Kurdish newspapers such as Dicle, Fırat and Deng, Kurdish Grammar book, Kurdish-Turkish dictionary and the theater play named 'Birina Reş "Kara Yara"' and a long epic named Mem-u Zin was unearthed" (Kizilkaya, 2014:2). Moreover; "Democrat Party's launching party organizations in the east, abolishing the public inspectorships and the permitting the Kurdish begs, who were exiled in different times, to return back to their regions are among the important actions" (Yayman, 2014:78). However; such an atmosphere was ended with the abolition of Adnan Menderes Government and execution of Adnan Menderes as a result of military coup in 1960

Before the coup period, although there was a positive atmosphere regarding the Kurds, everything related to the Kurds and the recognition of their existence reverted back following the coup d'état. However, although the period after the military coup was the continuation of the 1930s, "Kurdish national feeling, successfully repressed in the 1920s and 1930s, was gradually reawakened during the 1960s" (Bruinessen, 1992:32). According to Tan, there are two mainstreams of Kurdish politics; one is Islamic – religious, the other is secular nationalist" (Tan, 2015). Therefore, the years of 1970s were the time in which two mainstreams of Kurdish politics started to emerge and become visible.

Moreover, because those periods were also the periods in which rightist and leftist conflicts took place, the Turkish government was not able to follow a distinct

policy regarding preventing the escalation of Kurdish Left Wing. The most basic reason was the fact that during these times, Kurdish politics, which found a place for himself in leftist-political area, stayed in the shadow of rightist-leftist clashes (Yayman, 2014:42). That's why, Kurdish leftist wing were invisible among the other leftist groups until the time when PKK made Kurdish leftist organization most visible and active.

4.1.2 From 1980s to 2000s in Solving Kurdish Problem

“External threats legitimized and conserved the Kemalist state ideology of secularism and Turkish nationalism with the help of the military playing a key role in politics - shown by several coup d'états by the Turkish army up to the early eighties” (Fend, 2015:54). The perception of the threat which was employed by Turkish nationalism showed itself also within the policies which were imposed on the Kurds. Therefore, it was possible to keep the tracks of founding ideologies of the early Republican period within the government's approach in 1980s regarding the Kurdish problem. Because, “in the early 1980s, the existence of the Kurds, let alone of a Kurdish problem, was vehemently ignored in Turkey” (Bruinessen, 1992:45).

The thing that makes different the periods following 1980s from the periods preceding is the beginning in which the name of the 'Kurd' was started to refer, especially with Turgut Özal period. However; with Turgut Özal's coming into the power, although significant changes were made regarding the policies which were followed in Kurdish politics, such a significant change was able to separate its line from that of Republican completely after 1990s. Because, “Prime Minister Ozal followed a more security-based and statist perspective regarding the Kurdish issue, however; the President Ozal had more liberal ideas. Turgut Ozal, after going up to the Presidential Palace, followed a braver manner in this issue and put forward the need the issue to be discussed utterly including founding a federation with the Northern Iraqi Kurds” (Yayman, 2014:309).

However; the first explanations accepted as the first in terms of acknowledging the Kurdish identity were expressed by Suleyman Demirel who was the prime minister in the period in which Turgut Ozal was fulfilling the duty of presidentship. “Suleyman Demirel who became the prime minister again after a long

period with general elections on 20th of October 1991 spoke as follows in a speech in Diyarbakır as part of a tour organized to the south-eastern Anatolia on the 20th of December with Erdal Inonu who was the coalition government partner at that time” (Yayman, 2014:204). However; this speech did not find any reflection in the practicality:

“Turkey recognized the Kurdish reality. Istanbul, together with Hakkari, is yours. This homeland belongs to all of us. The Kurdish people in Northern Iraq are fellows of ours. If Saddam attempts a cruelty, he finds us against him.” (Yayman, 2014:205)

The another difference of Turgut Ozal period from the other period in terms of solving the Kurdish problems was the fact that “during the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq in March 1991, Turkey's president Turgut Ozal took the unprecedented step of inviting Iraqi Kurdish leaders for semi-official talks.” (Bruinessen, 1992:45) Thanks to these negotiations that were lead with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders, the conflicts with PKK ended as a result of the single-sided ceasefire put forth by PKK. The take of such a step proved reflections in the solutions of the problem. “Turgut Ozal suggested that a federal state would be the best solution in Iraq, implying that such a solution might also be feasible in Turkey. Not long before, he had lifted the ban on the use of the Kurdish language and alleviated censorship of the Kurds' publications. Politicians of all shades began to mention the Kurds explicitly, and later to criticize the oppression of their culture.” (Bruinessen, 1992:45)

When he declared a unilateral cease-fire in March 1993, for example, Abdullah Ocalan (the founder of PKK) stated, “Turkish-Kurd brotherhood is about 1,000 years old, and we do not accept separation from Turkey” (Gunter, 2008:72). However; the ceasefire put forward was not long-lasting; and with the immediate death of Turgut Ozal, the Turgut Ozal period left its place to Tansu Ciller period in which more severe conflicts would take place. During the period of Tansu Ciller, the policies of recognizing Kurdish identity, which started with Ozal-Demirel-Inonu terzetto, left its place to securitization policies (revealed by mainly Copenhagen School) which were the ideologies of the founding state.

1990s ended with the capture of Abdullah Ocalan in Kenya and thus, with the emergence of the leadership problematique in PKK. The start of the adventure of Ocalan's capture was the Turkey's pressure on Syria in terms of dismissing PKK from there as a result of the escalation relating the relationships of Turkey and Syria because it was permitting PKK to take shelter in this country. The militant named

Batufa who worked in Ocalan's home in Aleppo expresses this fact as such: "When Syria told Ocalan that the pressure is done to Syria by Turkey, we had to change our place. And then the camps were closed down" (Marcus, 2009:267). Afterwards, Abdullah Ocalan, who was in trouble due to the flux and reflux within the triangle of Greece, Italy and Russia, got Kenya in no time flat, in which he would be captured, because he couldn't receive acceptance from the countries due to the pressure.

With the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, Kurdish issue acquired a new dimension and Abdullah Ocalan slip into the expressions directed to the solution of Kurdish problem on the base of Turkey's unity perspective by denying the discourse of Kurdistan with four pieces. "The historical conclusion I have arrived at is that the solution for this [Kurdish] problem which has grown so big, is democratic union with the democratic, secular Republic" (Gunter, 2008:137). It is a fact that, in the process following the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, PKK first experienced a deep shock, came across the problematique of leadership, started to look for an environment, in which it would feel itself secure and would perform terrorist actions, as a result of the pressures because Syria avoided taking the risk of war against Turkey. Furthermore, PKK entered into turmoil as a result of "Ocalan's commands that PKK should give up the armed struggle by withdrawing from Turkey in August, 1999, two months later when he was sentenced to death" (Marcus, 2009:286).

Ocalan was mentioning about a concept which he called as 'democratic republic' for Turks and Kurds: "Instead of struggling for independence, federation and autonomy, Kurds, from now on, would struggle for a completely democratic Turkey in which Turks and Kurds unify as the founder of Turkey" (Gunter, 2008:70). This situation also dragged PKK into conflicts and separations in itself about the decisions to be taken. Because, the ideal of founding a Kurdistan, which was carried for many years and cost the lives of many terrorists, came nothing with the capture of Abdullah Ocalan.

"Turkey's dramatic capture in February 1999 of Abdullah Ocalan—the long-time leader of the PKK—ironically opened new possibilities for solving its continuing Kurdish problem" (Gunter 2008:59). The one who came to the power in order to turn these opportunities into practicality was not Bulent Ecevit- Devlet Bahceli- Tansu Ciller government founded as a result of the coalition, but the AKP government with the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which formed a surprising emergence in the commencement of the 2000s. "The pro-Islamic Justice and

Development Party (JDP, AKP) – which came to power in November 2002 pursuing a pro-European policy, was pushing back the authoritarian structures of the secular Kemalists. Part of the AKP policy for more democracy, as required for the EU rapprochement, was to deal with the Kurdish issue” (Fend, 2015:54). However; the guns which were silent for five years were shot again with the command of Abdullah Ocalan in June 2004.

The attacks of PKK continued until 2008 in which the Turkish Government started new process in solving the Kurdish problem called expansion process (açılım süreci or milli birlik ve kardeşlik süreci/national unity and brotherhood process according to AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and Development Party). In this process, AKP provided many rights to the Kurdish people, which can be accepted as the first after the foundation of the Turkish Republic. The most influential step was taken in order to remove the burdens behind Kurdish languages (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:39):

1. The prohibition to put Kurdish names to the newly-born kids was abolished.
2. The Kurdish names of cities were given back
3. It was permitted to open classes in order to teach different languages
4. The prohibition of radio and TV broadcasting for the languages except Kurdish language was abolished
5. The important works of the Kurdish literature were published by Culture and Tourism Ministry and Kurdish plays were permitted to put on the stage
6. The departments of Kurdish Language and Literature and Kurdish Institutes were permitted to open
7. Prisoners were able to speak in their mother tongues with their relatives
8. The prohibition of making political propaganda in the different languages except Turkish was abolished
9. The names of important people who has important place within the history of Kurds were given to the schools

The democratic initiative process at the same time was aiming to bind up the wounds which emerged in the lives of the Kurdish people in 30 years which passed with the struggle with PKK. In this context (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:40):

1. The compensation money was decided to be given to the citizens who were damaged in the struggle against PKK,

2. Daily life and travelling were made easier by decreasing the number of road control and search points
3. Within the 'project of returning to village and rehabilitation', 187,861 people were provided to turn back to their villages or cities and for these projects 111.860.00 TL were spented.

These policies of AKP continued until 2012. However, the year 2012 is turning point for questioning the attacks of PKK both within the country and abroad. Although there have been important steps in order to solve the Kurdish problem, in 2012, PKK, by ignoring all the advances in solving the Kurdish problem, started to increase its attacks. These situations show that PKK was in serious contradiction (Bahar, 2013:91). Moreover, the Turkish Government started to both meet the terrorist leader of PKK and let some of the Kurdish intellectuals to make regular visits to the Imralı Island with their advocates. After the agreement text in 2015 in Dolmabahçe in Istanbul, the two sides ended their coalition in terms of solving Kurdish problem. Turkish Government started to take active struggle against PKK, which today still continues in Turkey in addition to both Syria and Iraq.

It is possible to claim that the policies that were followed in order to solve the Kurdish problem during the governance period of Turgut Ozal, Suleyman Demirel, and Erdal Inonu and also Adnan Menderes show parallelism with those of Ibn Khaldun such as the recognition of the Kurdish identity and the expansion of the freedom areas in Turkey. In addition; the policies that were followed by AKP since the beginning of 2000s can show similarities with the solution proposals that were put forth in this study by Ibn Khaldun. However; one thing that makes AKP different from Turgut Ozal, Suleymen Demirel and Erdal Inonu and also from Adnan Menderes is that AKP's Islamic conservative identity is more close to Ibn Khaldun's identity.

The things that make the policies of Ibn Khaldun similar to those of AKP's policies since 2002 have been the policies which were implemented in order to support the asabiyyah based on the religion. The effect of religious-conservative identity which AKP has is huge in following such a policy. For instance,

“Ex-Mazlum-Der members and current AKP parliamentarians İhsan Arslan and Abdurrahman Kurt, both of whom represent the province of Diyarbakir, have been influential in the making of the AKP’s Kurdish policy. According to Kurt, Erdoğan refers to Islamic bonds between the Turks and the Kurds when he says ‘there is a single nation in Turkey’. Obviously, his configuration of Kurdish identity is very different from the DTP’s (Democratic Society Party – Demokratik Toplum Partisi) and has strong Islamic connotations. The Kurdish Islamists have taken advantage of the opportunities presented by the AKP government, which saw the former as an effective antidote against the secular Kurdish nationalist movement. The Kurdish Islamists hoped that the AKP would reduce the TSK’s political autonomy and expand the scope of public expressions of religious rituals, symbols, and discourse. They were instrumental in mobilizing grassroots support to the AKP in the 2007 parliamentary elections, and are the only group that has matched the mass-mobilization capacity of the secular Kurdish nationalists. For instance, the Kurdish Islamists organized a huge rally in Diyarbakir to protest Israel’s attack against the Gaza Strip on January 4, 2009” (Tezcür, 2009:11).

4.2 IBN KHALDUN AND HIS SOLUTION PERSPECTIVE ON KURDISH ISSUE

The policies which have been adopted for many years were mostly based on secularity and identity politics which were aiming just to save the state rather than its people. However, “a local and sincere social unification ground, which provides a psychological transformation in the minds of Turkish and Kurdish people who sank to the speculative magic of ethnic language, should be formed by giving up the secularity and identity politics” (Özhan and Ete, 2008:12). In this respect; Kurdish people want three things at the same time: their religion, ethnicity and living in welfare with modern conditions (Tan, 2015).

The detailed investigation of umran of both the Kurds and Turks may enable to analyze the solution of the Kurdish problem in terms of providing both the social unification ground and the requests of the Kurdish people. In other words, it can be claimed that social unification ground can be achieved through providing a more developed umran for Kurdish people, which might enable to offer more similar life conditions for both the Turks and Kurds. Therefore, departing from the definition of umran, two concepts, which form the social structures of Turks and Kurds in other words; their umrans, can be mentioned. The first one is the habituation and the second is religion.

4.2.1 Umran and Habituation Asabiyah

The concept of habituation asabiyah, which is the second form of upper-asabiyah, provides the unity and togetherness within the society and includes determining factors of a society for surviving such as economy, health, language,

identity, and politics etc. which are in fact the sum of the conditions providing the people to live together. Thus, if the factors providing the people live together do not ensure equal rights, in other words, do not involve two peoples in Turkey in terms of forming equal environments for living, the deterioration of the umran is inevitable. Therefore, analysis of the solution of the Kurdish problem goes through the investigation of the living conditions of the Kurdish people living both in the West and the East.

In a study which investigates the origin of the Kurdish problem (Table 2), although the answers vary in different areas, Kurdish people see social-economical reasons and discrimination as the most important source of the Kurdish problem with 55 per cent. In a similar way, Turkish people also see the social-economical reasons as the most important source behind the Kurdish problem. However, contrary to the Kurds, Turkish people see PKK/Terror as the second determinant in the emergence of Kurdish problem. Therefore, it is possible to state that according to Kurdish people, Kurdish nationalism, state policies, discrimination, and the most importantly social-economical reasons were the major cause of deterioration of the habituation for the emergence of the Kurdish problem. It is possible to see the picture more clearly and closely when the items of the habituation such as economy, identity, politics and education etc. are investigated one by one.


Table 1: The Analysis of the Reasons behind the Kurdish Problem (Aras and Aydın, 2009:41)

What is the most important source of Kurdish problem according to you?		
	Turks(%)	Kurds(%)
Social-Economical Reasons	22,0	27,6
There's no Kurdish Problem.	19,6	3,8
External Power	16,2	5,6
Discrimination	9,2	28,0
PKK/Terror	14,5	3,3
State Policies	10,0	18,2
Kurdish Nationalism	7,4	10,9
Others	1,1	2,5
Total	100,0	100,0


4.2.2 Habituation and Economy

One of the most important determinants which lead to make the umran better by providing ideal habituation environment is economy. In fact; it is clear that economy in Turkey poses problem not only for the Kurds but also for the Turks. Because, the answers that were given to the question ‘What is the most important problem in Turkey according to you?’ in table 3 clearly shows that the most important problem in Turkey is the economy rather than the Kurdish problem. Thus, the economical problems are not related to the Kurds but also are problems which also concern the Turkish people, too. However, on the other hand, when the other table (Table 3) is taken into the consideration, although the economical factors affect both the Kurdish and Turkish people, the Kurdish people are affected more than Turkish people. According to a study conducted in 2006, in the table 4 below, in which the unemployment rates are shown, “the region, in which the unemployment rate is the highest, is south-eastern region with the percentage of %14 (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:47), in which the population of the Kurdish people is dense.

Graph 1: Classification of the Problems According to Their Importance (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:47)



Graph 2: The Unemployment Rate According to the Regions (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:47)



According to the datas of Turkish Statistical Institute in 2014 which gives more updated information when compared to the datas of 2006, South-Eastern Anatolia held its place on the last row in terms of employment again. “While the region which had the highest rates in terms of unemployment was South-Eastern Anatolia region with the percentage of %15,6, the region, which had the lowest scores, was North-Eastern Anatolia region with the percentage of %5,3. Furthermore, while the region, in which the rate of unemployment within the men was the highest, was South-Eastern Anatolia region with the percentage of %16,4, it was the Istanbul region which had the lowest unemployment rate in terms of women with %15,6” (TUIK:2015). These official reports also suggest that the rate of unemployment in the region is above the average in Turkey (Alp and Tastan, 2010:23).

In addition to the employment rates throughout the region, when the gross domestic product rates are investigated, once more the North-eastern and Southeastern Anatolia are the poorest regions in Turkey (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:47). According to an another report of Turkish Statistical Institute in 2014, the rate of the Kurdish people whose monthly income is less than 2000 Turkish lira is more than 75 per cent (Yeğen, 2015:23). However, it is really interesting to see that “the public spending for the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolian regions were more when compared to the other regions” (Özcan and Aküzüm, 2012:48). Especially after

2000s, a great effort started to be spent in order to develop the region both economically and in terms of education. For example; in ten years, Turkish Government invested 37 billion Turkish Liras in the region. According to the development plans of Grand Assambly of Turkey, the Turkish Government is working on forming attraction centers which include the cities of Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, Van and Erzurum.

Despite huge amount of investments, the region still keeps its rank in the last rows of the table. Because, when the direct cost of terror in Turkey is assumed as 400 billion dollars, and while the indirect cost is thought to have been four or five times more, it will be seen that the biggest obstacle which prevents Turkey from developing more is PKK (Bahar I. , 2013:6). Therefore, the sabotage and the destroying of the investments make the efforts of both the government and the private sectors meaningless. The relief of the umran in terms of economy will occur when the threats of PKK against Kurds and Turks are eliminated.

4.2.3 Habituation and Education

It is possible to state that although the educational level in the regions of Kurdish people seems to be behind that of the western regions in Turkey, the educational level of the Kurdish people is similar to that of the Turkish people. According to the statistical numbers in table 4, the rate of the Kurdish people who are graduated from a secondary school is not much less than the average rate in Turkey. It is also possible to see the same scenario for both the rate of college and high school or vocational school although there are few differences. However, it should be expressed that the rate of illiterate Kurdish people is much more above the average in Turkey.

Table 2: Education Status: Comparison of Educational Status of Kurdish People and Turkey in General (Çağlar and Çitlioğlu, 2009:51)

Education	The Kurdish People	Average in Turkey
Illiterate	20.4	8.5
Uncertificated	9.7	5.1
Primary School	33.5	38.9
Secondary School	14.1	15.0
High School or Vocational High School	17.1	23.7
College	5.3	8.9
Total	100.0	100.0

When the table below, which shows the educational status of Kurds in 2013, is investigated, it is possible to notice that there has been a noticeable increase in the educational level of Kurdish people. For example, while the rate of the illiterate Kurdish people was 20.4 in 2009, the number of the illiterate people in 2013 dropped down with 0,9 score. However, the most significant increase took place in the numbers of the university students among the Kurdish people with the increase of 9,3 score. It can be inferred from these two tables that the umran which includes the educational factors of both Turks and Kurds have started to resemble to each other.

Table 3: Educational Status of Kurdish People in 2013 (Yeğen, 2015:23)

Education	The Kurdish People
Illiterate	19,5
Primary School	38,6
High School	27,4
Above High School	14,6
Total	100.0

4.2.4 Habituation and Identity

Although both Turks and Kurds see the socio-economical factors as the main reasons underlying the Kurdish problem, the point in which Kurds differentiate from the Turks is that the Kurds also complain about both discrimination and the state policies. Because, the Kurds relate Kurdish problem to the state policies and the discrimination with the highest scores. This inclination reaches to the rate of %46,2 in total (Aras and Aydın, 2009:41). The demands of the Kurdish people related to their identities were righteous before 1980s because there was a denial of the Kurdish identities until 1980s. It may also be valid to express that the policies of military government after the military coup of 1980 were similar to those of before 1980s, which implies that the acknowledgment of Kurdish existence in real sense started to occur after 1990s with the efforts of Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel etc. However, those policies were insufficient in terms of satisfying the Kurdish people.

The constitution, it is worth mentioning that it reflects the ideology of Republican period, states that every citizen living in Turkey is Turk, another article

describes the state language as Turkish and also another article states the fact that this article cannot be changed (Marcus, 2009:85). However, “compounding the problem of Turkey’s definition of a minority is that even the Kurds decline to pursue official minority status within Turkey. Rather, they seek to be a recognized as a “constituent people” of that state (Gunter, 2008:105) Thus, primarily, the Kurdish identity should be recognized in the constitutional form so that the Kurds and the Turks, who are the pieces forming the upper-asabiyyah, have equal judicial rights. In other words, the environment which will lead both sides to live on the equal citizenship ground should be provided to be able to offer the together living which is the basic condition of habituation asabiyyah.

In spite of the more liberal policies related to identities, which were followed after 1980s, the securitization policies which were applied since 1930s prove in a considerable extent that they are far away from the state policies which Ibn Khaldun draw frame for. Because, according to Ibn Khaldun “if the state becomes evil and tyrant, this state is harmful to its people. If the ruler, who becomes firm, punishes his people severely and looks for the unseen faults of the people, the people live in anxiety and abasement and try to escape from the punishments by deceiving and lying. Thus, they gain bad habits, their common senses and moral values deteriorate, there happen times in which they take leave of the ruler in the field of the war. Tyranny devastates the umran, and ruins the developed areas. The ruin which took place within the shape of deterioration in the umran harms the state.” (Haldun, 2014:110) However, on the contrary, the sense of solution in Ibn Khaldun is “a new understanding which will restructure all the institutions and the foundations including education, health, law and economy; in which all the fractions of the society will be able to live together and without clashing; and also which will separate the regime from state ideology and will convert it into a servant state understanding from tyrant and dominating state perception” (Tan, 2015:119)

AKP government, who performs a more eager attitude compared to the previous ones in solving the Kurdish problem, did not step back although PKK started the conflicts again in those periods. The leader of AKP government Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which started off in order to fulfill this aim, went to Diyarbakir in 2004 and made a speech emphasizing that the Kurdish people are different ethnicities and that they acknowledge the identity of the Kurdish people. However; he argues

that this distinctiveness does not necessarily undermine the unity between the Turks and Kurds since they have a long history of cooperation and share similar cultural values, which tend to be based on their common belief in Islam (Tezcür, 2009:5). The emphasis that was done in Diyarbakır has been the closest explanation related to solutions of the problem by Ibn Khaldun because it emphasized the *asabiyyah* ties based on habituation and religion. However; since the speech remained unfulfilled and did not reflect any kind of effort related to the constitution, it stayed back in terms of empowering the upper-*asabiyyah*.

As Mustafa Kemal promised while founding the Republic, the solution is possible with the steps which do not show that this state is monopolized by the Turkish people but show that Kurdish people are also the owners of the state on the base of equal citizenship. For instance “when the Lousanne Treaty was signed the Kurds were not recognized as a minority group. This base can be the idea of ‘Turkey citizenship’” (Canatan:2009). Hence, “Suleyman Demirel, before 2000s, uttered crucial things related to the problem and mentioned about constitutional citizenship: We still acknowledge the Kurdish identity. Ethnic differences are our wealth. The thing that we want to provide is the constitutional citizenship. In summary, we want to found two things: constitutional citizenship and constitution patriotism.” (Yayman, 2014:193) “This presumably would imply that, along with the ethnic Turks, the Kurds are equal stakeholders in the Republic of Turkey. Minority status, although guaranteeing full democratic rights, would imply less than full equality as co-founders and co-owners of the Republic of Turkey” (Gunter, 2008:97).

The other method of providing the habituation between the Turks and the Kurds is to provide the Kurdish people to use their own language freely, which was given to the Turks. Because, both during the foundation years of the Republic and during the period of 1980 military coup, the prohibitions were brought to the Kurdish language in addition to the ones brought to the identity. According to Ibn Khaldun, pressure policies applied by the government are influential in the deterioration of the *umran*. “If the ruler treats the people affectionately and tolerantly; ignores and forgives the faults of the people, the people shelters in him, the people drink the water of fondness as much as they want, they lay down their lives during the war against the enemies. Thus, the dominance gets better in every aspect.” (Haldun, 2014:485)

“In this respect, AKP has taken important steps related to the Kurdish rights since 2002 and ended the processes of pressure, denial and assimilation. Foremost among these steps include the opening of private Kurdish language courses, the abolition of the obstacles around Kurdish, the broadcasting of the Kurdish channels, the foundation of TRT Sesh (TRT KURDI) channel, the teaching of Kurdish as an elective course in secondary school, the teaching of Kurdish as an elective course in the universities and the foundation of Kurdology institutes and also able to Kurdish defence in the courts” (Bahar, 2013:42). The abolition of the prohibitions did not take place just during the period of AKP but also both during the time of Turgut Ozal and Adnan Menderes.

4.2.5 The Kurdish People in the West

The insufficient and insecure conditions of the environment because of the terror which was caused by PKK have led to big number of migrations for many years among the Kurds. The table below shows that most of the migrations from Kurdish areas to the other areas took place during the most turbulent years of Kurdish problem. However, it is also interesting to notice that after 2000s there is a sharp decrease in the amount of migration. The reason underlying such a decrease might be the more relaxing atmosphere which was provided after 2000s within the region.

Graph 3: The Rate of the Migrations (Yeğen, 2015,:45)




Table 4: Population from the Eastern Part of Turkey in 10 Cities (Sönmez, 2013:49)

	Cities	Population from the East (2012)
1	Istanbul	3.613.110
2	Izmir	808.487
3	Ankara	512.180
4	Adana	510.298
5	Bursa	422.618
6	Gaziantep	340.451
7	Kocaeli	328.456
8	Antalya	225.014
9	Manisa	138.892
10	Mersin	406.366
Total		7.305.872
Migrants from East		9.329.109

Table 7 shows that a huge number of the Kurdish people choose to migrate to the big cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir etc. The most basic reason why most of the Kurdish people choose those cities is that first they are economically more developed and second they are also more secular when compared to the east. However, there is intriguing reality that although those big cities offer many opportunities both economically and educationally and these cities are more developed in terms of education, economy, living conditions, the Kurdish people do not give up their nationalistic ideas. The most significant indicator of this situation is the increase of vote rates of HDP (Halkların Demokratik Partisi – The Democratic Party of the Peoples) in 10 years. Because the most significant determinant of vote division is the ethnical identity variable in the region (Yeğen, 2015:58), HDP is the only party which represents the Kurdish identity in Turkey.

Graph 4: The Vote Rates of HDP in Different Regions (Konda Araştırma ve Danışmanlık, 2015:37)




Table 8 shows that although Istanbul offers many opportunities for Kurds, the HDP choice of the Kurdish people in both elections exceeds 15 per cent score. It is possible to see the same scenario in the Aegean region with the score of approximately 8 per cent score. It can be inferred from these scores that the development rate of the countries is not the only determinant for Kurds, but they are also interested in their ethnic identities. It is also possible to state that the role of the nationalism determinant among the Kurdish people is increasing. According to table 9, the rate of Kurdish people who choose HDP in general and local elections throughout ten years has increased in a considerable level. Therefore, it can be said that nationalism is the most determinant candidate for directing the Kurdish problem rather than the economical or educational etc. problems. The developments in both Syria and Iraq are also significant factors which determine the nationalistic flows among Kurds.


Table 5: Party Choices of Kurdish and Zaza Voters (Yeğen, 2015:58)

	AK Party	HDP
2007 General Elections	% 36	% 41
2009 Local Elections	% 37	% 45
2011 General Elections	% 39	% 47
2014 Local Elections	% 42	% 52

4.2.6 Umran and Religion

It is possible to express that the increase in the nationalism among the Kurdish people undertake a dangerous mission in separating Kurdish and Turkish people. Therefore, the main aim in solving the Kurdish problem should be to empower Islamic religious ties among the Kurdish people while trying to pull nationalist and secular Kurdish people to the sides of the Muslims. Because, one of the most crucial concepts that Ibn Khaldun thought to have had in the development of the society is the religion. Because, within umran, “a new power is needed which will increase social unification by eliminating the deficiencies.” (Yıldız, 2010:42) Moreover, religion is a determinant in forming of the asabiyyah because “after the conflicts end among the asabiyyahs who have different kinships by means of religion, unification around a common goal occurs. Because their aims are same and equal for everybody, the reaching to their goals becomes inevitable.” (Haldun, 2014:250)

Graph 5: Rate of the Religiosity According to the Ethnicities (Yeğen, 2015:44)




The rate of the Kurdish and Turkish Muslim people in table 10 are promising for the solution of the problem. According to the table 10, the number of religious people in both Turks and Kurds are really high. However, they differentiate in terms of being fanatical or intermediate. In other words, although both ethnicities see themselves as Muslims in one hand, on the other hand their level religiosity differs from each other in a certain level. For example, according to the findings of the same study, there are more fanatical Kurdish people than the Turkish people, which


implies that increase in the belief of religion among the Turkish people may result in more strong asabiyah ties between Turks and Kurds.

There are two more tables (table 11 and 12) which are significant in terms of showing the rate of the religiosity of the Kurdish and Turkish people. In these two studies, because their rate of performing daily prayer is high, it can be inferred that the rate of their belief in Islam is also high. The similar rate can also be seen in the analysis of the rate of fastening of both Turks and Kurds in table 12. However, the rest of the Kurdish people who do not pray or fasten have the possibility of being seized by the nationalist view or the ideas of the terrorist organization, PKK. Because, there is an inverse proportion between the rate of religiosity and nationalism. According to Dikmen, while the perception of separation for the ever non-prayers is %75,4 and the perception of belonging is %51, the perception of separation in regularly prayers is %47 and the perception of belonging is %82 (Dikmen, 2015:80). Therefore, the religion and its practices play a crucial role in bringing ethnically different societies together.

Graph 6: The Situation of Daily Praying According to Ethnicities and Sects (Yeğen, 2015:38)



Graph 7: The Frequency of Fastening during Ramadan (Yeğen, 2015:39)



According to Semiz, the functional role of the religious authorities in the region and loyalty of the local people is an argument which empowers the thought that they will have an important mission in solving of the social, political, ethnical, terror and violence problems (Semiz, 2013:217). In this respect, since 2012, the beginning to employ ‘mele’ (local religious men) as the religious officials throughout the east and southern-east has contributed to the provision of the asabiyyah based on religion. Beside this, Qur’an courses, non-governmental organizations, foundations can also render service for empowering the religion asabiyyah among Kurds and Turks. However; so that these institutions and the religious authorities can succeed in such a unifying job, besides knowing the religion of Islam, they should also learn the social structure of Kurdish people and also the ideological structure of PKK.

“With the emergence of PKK following 1980, present leftist-ethnical-secular language changed into a separatist form with the addition of the idea of independence” (Özhan and Ete, 2008:11). Thus, “it is clear that a limited strategy that aiming at just eliminating the terrorists on the mountains would not contribute to the solution without putting a solution package into use, in which all the dynamics feeding and nurturing are taken into the consideration”(Özhan and Ete, 2008:13). Because, it is a known fact that in cause and effect relationship and all the more so as a result of the events, Kurdish and terror issue, terror and PKK issue, Kurdish and PKK issue are intermingled (Yayman, 2014:38). Thus, the aim in following the

policy of empowering the religion asabiyyah is to unify the Turks and Kurds under the roof of single asabiyyah by nullifying the effect of PKK over Kurdish people. For this reason, the biggest purpose of religion-centered policies that are followed should be preventive in attending the PKK and should give those people the identity of Muslim. Moreover; the terrorists who are turning back can be given the religious education in order to rehabilitate or replace them into the society.



CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

After the turn of the new century, Turkey has started to deal with many problems such as economy, politics, Syrian refugees, ISIS etc. However, the Kurdish problem has been the most long-lasting and most difficult problem which has a very complicated nature for Turkey. Complexity of the problem makes it urgent to solve because both civilian people and government officials are losing their lives. Moreover, the new developments both in Syria and Iraq make the solution of the Kurdish problem more urgent because the emergence of the new possible Kurdish communities in both Iraq and Syria may encourage the Kurdish people in Turkey in negative and nationalistic way. For example, the declaration of Northern Iraq Regional Kurdish Governance Iraq related to the referendum which will be held in September 2017 may lead to the increase of the nationalistic feelings of Kurdish people with their co-ethnicities.

It is also possible to express that the nature of the Kurdish problem enters into a new phase after the turn of the new century and especially after the events in Syria. In this new period, the basic reason behind the Kurdish problem has been nationalism or in Ibn Khaldun's terminology, the increase in the feelings of Kurdish people's own asabiyah rather than the problems related to umran. Because, after this period, especially in 10 years time, although there have been many investments especially economically and educationally, in the regions where the Kurdish population lives, the problem still continues to exist with many participants into PKK

or other Kurdish terrorist organizations from the Kurds. Moreover, statistical datas related to the increase of the HDP's vote rate in the long run may show that Kurdish people still gives more importance to their own asabiyahs rather than the development of their umran conditions.

Therefore, this study tried to analyze the Kurdish problem in terms of its description of the Kurdish problem within three long periods which include:

1. The first period which consists of the 19th and 20th centuries, implying the end of the lifespan of the Ottoman Empire,
2. The second period which ranges from the end of the First World War to the 1970s, covering also the early Republican Period,
3. The last period which starts with the emergence of PKK in 1970s and still continues today.

When these three periods were investigated, it could be understood that the deterioration of upper-asabiyah ties was the main factor in the emergence of the Kurdish problem in the historical context. Moreover, the origin of the Kurdish problem was not only PKK but it was hidden in the history of both the Kurds and Turks. Because, the emergence of PKK after 1970s was one of the important factors which caused the increase of the nationalistic feelings among the Kurds. However, the periods before the emergence of PKK was also influential in weakening of upper asabiyah. According to Ibn Khaldun, an another determinant in Kurdish problem is the deterioration of the umran, which includes the economical, educational, political, etc. conditions of the Kurdish people. However, it should be noted that the developments in the umran of Kurds in ten years time did not make many changes may not lead to the solution of the problem. Because, the increase of the genealogical asabiyah among the Kurdish people may hinder them from seeing development of umran conditions.

According to Ibn Khaldun, the religion of Islam played a unifying thus an important role in bringing Turks and Kurds together for more than a thousand years. Until 2000s the security based policies were preferred while solving the problem. Therefore, it was concluded in this study that according to Ibn Khaldun, the solution of Kurdish problem goes through providing the upper-asabiyah ties which is based on both religion and habituation. Therefore, religion is the key factor in dealing with

Kurdish problem. However, the policies which exclude the PKK factor can be unsuccessful because the Marxist-Leninist ideology is the main burden in providing religion-based asabiyah.

While dealing with empowering the religion asabiyah, it is also necessary to struggle with PKK. However, the struggle with PKK should be really different from that of security-based approaches. Because, dealing with PKK with military conditions may solve the military side of the Kurdish problem. However, such a struggle will not decrease but increase the nationalistic feelings of the Kurdish people. Therefore, the struggle against PKK should be both ideologically which targets to eliminate the Marxist/Leninist ideologies of PKK and if necessary militarily since if the ideology of a terrorist or his family is not changed, the struggle may turn into a useless effort. Thus, both ideologically and, if needed, military struggle arise while dealing with the Kurdish problem.

In summary, following a thorough and detailed viewpoint in describing and solving the Kurdish problem will be effective. Khaldunian approach is just one dimension which analyzes the definition and solution of the problem. Therefore, the other approaches which deal with the analysis of the problem from different perspectives will provide the rest of the picture. However, because the religion is the key component of the region, excluding the religion factor in analyzing the events may lead the studies to become deficient.

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ÖZGEÇMİŞ

Mehmet Kılıç 1989 yılında Gaziantep’te doğdu. Mustafa Kemal Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi İngilizce Öğretmenliği Bölümünden 2012 yılında mezun oldu halen Hasan Kalyoncu Üniversitesi Yabancı Diller Yüksekokulu’nda okutman olarak görevine devam etmektedir. İyi derecede İngilizce bilmektedir.

VITAE

Mehmet Kılıç was born in Gaziantep in 1989. He graduated from the Department of English Language Teaching, Faculty of Education at Mustafa Kemal University in 2003. He still works as English language instructor at Hasan Kalyoncu University. He knows English at an advanced level.