



**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**AN ANALYSIS OF INCREASING EUROSCEPTICISM AND RISING NATIONALIST
DISCOURSE IN HUNGARIAN POLITICS**

Master's Thesis

Özgün Elif Çaldemir

International Relations

January 2023



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Asst. Prof. Dr. Resul Yalçın

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PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.



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MACAR SİYASETİNDE ARTAN AVRUPA ŞÜPHECİLİĞİ VE YÜKSELEN MİLLİYETÇİ SÖYLEMİN İNCELEMESİ

ÖZ

Avrupa şüpheciliği son yıllarda Avrupa Birliği üye ülkeleri arasında yükselişe geçmiş olan bir olgudur. Macaristan, üye ülkeler arasında tutumun iç ve dış politikada en belirgin hale geldiği ülkelerden biridir. Sovyet sonrası dönemde batı ile ilişkilerini geliştirme ve Birliğe katılım konusunda en istekli ülkelerden biri olan Macaristan'ın bu politik duruşu benimsemesi çalışmanın çıkış noktasını oluşturmaktadır. Çalışmada, Macar siyasetinde artan Avrupa şüpheciliğinin ve yükselen milliyetçi söylemin incelenmesi amaçlanmaktadır. 2010 sonrası dönem çalışmanın odak noktasını oluşturmakla birlikte süreçte etkili olan olaylar tarihsel bir bakış açısıyla sunulmuştur. Dönem içerisinde Avrupa şüphecisi tutuma sebep olan AB politikaları ve olaylar incelenmiş ve Macar politikasındaki aktörlerin bahsedilen olay ve politikalara karşı davranışları analiz edilmiştir. Yapılan çalışma Avrupa şüpheciliğini parti ve kamu düzeyinde incelemeyi amaçlamıştır. Bu bağlamda, Macar Avrupa şüpheciliğinin aşırı sağ partilerin kullanmış olduğu milliyetçi söylem ile birlikte gelişmekte olduğunu ve iç ve dış politikada önemli bir araç haline geldiğini ortaya koymuştur. Bu aşamada parti liderlerinin ve hükümet yetkililerinin konuya ilişkin ifadelerinden alıntılar yapılmıştır. Kamu düzeyinde artan Avrupa şüpheciliğini ölçmek amacıyla Avrupa Komisyonuna bağlı bir kurum olan Avrobarometre verilerinden faydalanılmıştır. Kamu düzeyinde Avrupa şüpheciliğinin Avrupa kimliğine karşı değil, AB politikalarına ve bütünleşme kapsamının genişlemesi ve derinleşmesine karşı geliştiği sonucuna varılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa şüpheciliği, Macaristan, Avrupa Birliği, milliyetçilik, Viktor Orbán

AN ANALYSIS OF INCREASING EUROSCEPTICISM AND RISING NATIONALIST DISCOURSE IN HUNGARIAN POLITICS

ABSTRACT

Euroscepticism is a phenomenon that has been on the rise among the member states of the European Union in recent years. Hungary is one of the countries where the attitude among the member states has become the most prominent in domestic and foreign policy. The starting point of the study is the adoption of this political stance by Hungary, which was one of the countries most eager to develop its relations with the West and join the Union in the post-Soviet period. In the study, it is aimed to examine the increasing Euroscepticism and the rising nationalist discourse in Hungarian politics. Although the post-2010 period is the focus of the study, the events that were effective in the process are presented from a historical perspective. The EU policies and events that caused the Eurosceptic attitude during the period were examined and the behavior of the actors in the Hungarian policy towards the mentioned events and policies were analyzed. The study aimed to examine Euroscepticism at the political party and public level. In this context, it has been revealed that Hungarian Euroscepticism develops together with the nationalist discourse used by far-right parties and has become an important tool in domestic and foreign policy. At this stage, quotations were taken from the statements of party leaders and government officials on the subject. In order to measure the increasing Euroscepticism at the public level, data from the Eurobarometer, an institution affiliated to the European Commission, were used. It was concluded that Euroscepticism at the public level developed not against European identity, but against EU policies and the expansion and deepening of the scope of integration.

Keywords: Euroscepticism, Hungary, European Union, nationalism, Viktor Orbán

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CENCOOP	Central European Nations' Cooperation in Peace Support
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EC	European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EMU	Monetary Union of the European Union
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIDESZ	Hungarian Civic Alliance
FN	Front National
GAL	Green-Alternative-Libertarian
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPA	Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance
ISPA	Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession
JOBBIK	Movement for a Better Hungary
KDNP	Christian Democratic People's Party
MDP	Magyar Dolgozók Pártja
MSZMP	Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PHARE	Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring their Economies

SAPARD	Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development
SEA	Single European Act
TAN	Traditionalism-Authority-Nationalism
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
USA	The United States of America
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
V4	Visegrad 4



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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Soviet Union which controlled vast territories in European continent and Asia caused enormous changes in world politics. Central and Eastern European countries have become the most important actors and subjects of these changes. Hungary has experienced both communist and European transition periods as a Central European country. Because of its significant geopolitical position, it became a strategic area of influence after World War II for two great powers of the Cold War, so it couldn't stay neutral and was affected by changes in world politics greatly.

The Communist regime was consolidated with one-party politics in Hungary and the Hungarian people suffered from political, economic and social implementations of this regime-change as can be observed in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Hungary lost a lot of qualified population as a result of harsh Soviet intervention in 1956 and pro-Soviet governments continued to be influential in domestic politics until the end of the 1980s. The communist journey of Hungary ended with a peaceful and quiet transition thanks to lessons from the past and the apparent desire of the Hungarian people for a democratic change via intensifying communication with the western world.

Studies for transition were started before 1989 with the effect of the détente policy of Mikhail Gorbachev which offered more open and soft foreign policy understanding and accelerated afterward with the idea of integration into the western and especially European community. This tendency can be observed with the initiation of applications for the membership process of the North Atlantic Organization (NATO), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union (EU). Hungary started a transition process and made a lot of changes in different areas with the contribution of political elites and the significant support of the Hungarian people for return to Europe. The transition process of Hungary is evaluated as one of the smoothest and most well-organized among other CEE countries because of the long process of pre-feasibility studies which started in the mid-1980, before the collapse of the Soviet regime, and people's claims for independent and democratic governance. Efforts and assistance programs of the United

States and the EU countries with the aim of filling the existing loophole after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) is also non-negligible factor that affects this process. As a result of all these constituents, Hungary became a member of NATO in 1999 and joined to EU in 2004 with the fifth and largest enlargement of the EU (Güngörmüş, 2010).

Hungarian people and political figures have had a lot of expectations from the approach with western institutions and community in the manner of improvement of living standards like democratic representation of the ideas and economic welfare. However, European integration process didn't meet the expectations. Global political and economic issues, for instance 2008 global economic crisis, became influential in this process and contribute to this dissatisfaction in almost all EU member states. As a result of this political atmosphere, Euroscepticism and populist-nationalist discourses started to gain support and became visible with the rise of far-right parties in European politics. Hungary is one of the most appropriate cases for examining this situation which occupy an important place in the international relations. This thesis aims to analyze and explain the signified transformation of dynamics in Hungarian politics. For this purpose, the transformation of Hungarian politics will be examined from the First World War to present with the special attention to the election of Victor Orbán as prime minister of Hungary.

1.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Rising nationalist discourse is an important topic of the current international politics. This situation started to be visible even inside of the EU which is the only successful and well-functioning example of a supranational organization. It manifests itself in the increasing Euroscepticism among member states. Hungary can be pointed out as one of the countries that comes forefront with Eurosceptic and nationalist statements within the Union. This research will discuss Hungary as a unique case and evaluate its Eurosceptic position by considering the dynamics of its domestic politics and nationalist-populist discourse that is mostly used by far-right politicians. Therefore, this study examines how Hungary turned into one of the most Eurosceptic states among the EU members while it was one of the most pro-European after the collapse of the Soviet regime.

1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The main research question of the thesis is *“How did Hungary turn into one of the most Eurosceptic states among the EU members while it was one of the most pro-European after the collapse of the Soviet regime?”* This thesis also attempts to look for answers for the following questions in order to better understand the Euroscepticism in Hungary.

- What were the initial determining factors of a more pro-EU Hungarian Politics after the Soviet regime?
- What has gone wrong with the pro-EU politics of Hungary?
- What are the internal dynamics of Hungarian Euroscepticism?
- Is the rising Euroscepticism an anti-European agenda or a wish for more national sovereignty?
- Have the specific EU policies or the overall domestic politics in Hungary transformed the country from a pro-EU to one of the most Eurosceptic countries in Europe?

1.3. RESEARCH AIMS

This study aims to analyse increasing Euroscepticism and rising nationalist discourse in Hungarian politics and assess how Hungary turned into one of the most Eurosceptic states among the EU members while it was one of the most pro-European after the collapse of the Soviet regime. It examines the internal and external dynamics of Hungarian Euroscepticism and pinpoints whether the rising Euroscepticism in Hungary is an anti-European agenda or a wish for more national sovereignty.

1.4. SIGNIFICANCE AND PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH

CEE countries became an important part of the EU after their accession in 2004 to the Union. Their objectives were to achieve well-functioning democracy, free market economy, being part of European society in the social area and most importantly leaving the Soviet influence behind in all spheres of their lives. Since CEE countries have similar political patterns with the influence of communist regimes and one-party politics, they are evaluated together in some research. However, they assert a lot of different political, economic, cultural and geopolitical reasons for their Eurosceptic discourses. This research aims to focus on

rising populist-nationalism and Euroscepticism in Hungary. Their causes will be examined by considering historical background of Hungary and current political stance of the country. This thesis also tries to understand the difference between party and public Euroscepticism in Hungary. National and EP election results, Eurobarometer data and discourses of party officials were examined to understand this difference.

1.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study describes the Euroscepticism and analyses the Hungarian Eurosceptic discourse and raising nationalist sentiments in the country. The study used secondary source materials and data. Therefore, data collected from the secondary source resources such as books, articles, reports, reviews, policy briefs, national and international newspapers, news outlets, government officials' speeches and announcements, websites of the EU institutions were analysed and applied throughout the thesis. In addition, discourse analysis generates a part of the research by analyzing expressions of government officials and party members. Numeric data using for measuring level of Euroscepticism in Hungarian politics and public life were taken from Eurobarometer surveys. While qualitative method is preferred for explaining concepts and historical background of the Hungarian Euroscepticism, numeric data provided opportunity for creating more concrete framework to research. While evaluating the Hungarian Parties' Eurosceptic position, hard and soft Euroscepticism categorizations of Taggart and Szczerbiak were considered. The measurement and comparison of public Euroscepticism was made based on pre-membership rates and measurements made in 2022 of Eurobarometer survey.

1.6. RESEARCH SCOPE

Hungarian history is examined from end of the World War I to the contemporary era, but the main area of interest is post-Soviet period. The kinds of changes made in order to be a part of European Union, consequences and reaction of the people to these changes generate an important part for the research to understand the emergence of Euroscepticism and rise of populist nationalism in Hungary. Thesis focuses on current political position of Hungary and Orbán government while examining Eurosceptic and nationalist discourse the country.

1.7. LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS

Since thesis includes some discourse analysis of Hungarian government officials, not knowing the Hungarian language brought some limitations. In addition, there were scarce resources in the pre-communist period of Hungary, so the historical part related to this time frame adhered to a few resources.

1.8. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

This thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter aims to provide introductory explanations about the content, research aim and framework of the thesis. Research methodology and literature review which includes most important sources using for forming the thesis will be presented also in this section.

The second chapter provides a brief historical background of Hungary to provide a better understanding of political, economic and social changes in Hungarian politics. Even, the thesis will focus on the post-Soviet era and contemporary development in Hungarian politics, some important events in Hungarian history starting from the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 will be covered in this chapter. The goal of this chapter is to offer a historical background to the thesis by emphasizing the turning points of the selected time period. This chapter is planned under six sub-titles. The first three subtitles include the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, the post-World War One period by focusing on the trauma of the Treaty of Trianon, and Hungary's stance in World War II. The other three chapters mention the communist regime in Hungary by emphasizing the effect of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and its outcomes, the transition process and the EU membership which indicate the 1989-2010 period that contains the establishment of a democratic government and adoption of the values of the EU, and the period between the years of 2010-2022 which is the process starts with the election of Victor Orbán as prime minister and states more Eurosceptic and nationalist policies respectively.

The third chapter will generate the conceptual framework of the dissertation. In this context, the concept of Euroscepticism occurs as the main focus of the thesis. The concept will be examined under three subtitles as party Euroscepticism, left-right Euroscepticism and

Public Euroscepticism. In the following section, Euroscepticism in the European Parliament will be presented by starting from 2009 Parliament elections to current time. The concept of Euroscepticism will be evaluated under the dynamics of Hungarian politics in fourth chapter. In the second part of this chapter, the concept of nationalism will be discussed for providing a basis for the claim of the rising of nationalist discourse in Hungarian politics. For this purpose, concepts of neoliberal nationalism, populist nationalism, and irredentism will be specifically handled related to the economic, political, and socio-cultural sides of contemporary Hungarian policy.

The fourth chapter focuses on the EU-Hungary relations which have an important place in Hungarian politics as a political and economic partner of Hungary. The impact of specific EU policies on the rising Euroscepticism and nationalist discourse in Hungarian politics will be examined. In the second part of the chapter, the dynamics of Hungarian Euroscepticism will be evaluated both at the level of political parties and public opinion by benefiting from Eurobarometer and Eurostat data. To provide a concrete basis for the claim of the dissertation that the Hungarian populist discourse has a nationalist sentiment, speeches of party leaders, and members of FIDESZ, Jobbik and Mi Hazánk will be analyzed. The usage and effect of nationalist discourse for generating a Eurosceptic stance will construct the last part of this chapter.

In final section of the dissertation, a summary of the findings will be presented about the Hungarian political, economic and social life by emphasizing the concept of Euroscepticism and rise of nationalist discourse in party politics and public life.

1.9. LITERATURE REVIEW

Some scholars claim that the roots of Hungarians and Turks come from common ancestors, so a specific department named as Hungarology (Hungarian Studies) has been established to search this connection in Turkish Universities. Nevertheless, the number of written sources in Turkish that contain the overall historical development of Hungary is scarce. “*Macaristan’da Değişim ve Demokrasiye Geçiş (1989-2009)*” which is written by Naciye Güngörmüş who is professor of Hungarian Studies in Ankara University which is one of the most reputable universities in Turkey is an important study in this topic. The book

examines the Hungarian history by considering political, economic and social changes on a large time scale between the beginning of the migration from Central Asia to late 2009. When looking at the Hungarian history, it can be seen that 1956 Hungarian Revolution has a significant place in Hungarian history. There are several studies that evaluate the event from different angles. Cox (1997) tries to analyze nature of Hungarian Revolution by considering different definition of revolution in literature. Gyani (2006) examines the different interpretation of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and its reflection to the discourse of current politics. Movements caused a significant impact in world politics. Bekes (1997) examines the responses of other actors and involvement of great powers to the issue. Studies of Bozóki & Simon (2010) and Nemeth (2018) provide information about the post-Soviet period and initiation of cooperation with west after the independence. Nemeth's article focuses on military cooperation. Transition period after the communist regime is one of the areas that is studied a lot by the scholars. Sancaktar (2019) provides information about the economic, political and social changes that were made in 1980s. While articles of Batory (2002) and Janse (2019) focus on political changes that are made for yielding with Copenhagen Criteria, Ferge & Juhasz (2004) focus on social political changes during the transition period.

There are abundant sources written about Euroscepticism as a currently debated topic in the literature of international relations. *The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism* which is prepared by the editorship of Leruth, Startin and Usherwood (2017) provides a versatile perspective on the concept. It includes chapters on theoretical information, Eurosceptic political parties' position in domestic and European Parliament, evaluation of public Euroscepticism, effects of non-state actors and future of the European integration written by forefront names of the field. Studies of Vasilopoulou offers a significant contribution to the literature by providing a compilation of principle studies of the area of Euroscepticism. "*Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism*" which was published in 2013 presents chronological information about the development of Euroscepticism studies. In addition, it includes the main sources in the field of party and public Euroscepticism. Second article of Vasilopoulou's (2017) "*Theory, concepts and research design in the study of Euroscepticism*", provided a starting point and help for improving the structure of this thesis. She compiles information about the top-cited articles in the study of Euroscepticism, provides numerical information about the unit of analysis that was used and countries which

were mentioned mostly. In addition, Euroscepticism studies were categorized according to the research design that was preferred in her article. Barack and Startin (2015) accepts the signing of Maastricht Treaty as a turning point for the rise of Euroscepticism in their article "*Introduction: Euroscepticism, from the Margins to the Mainstream*". They emphasize on the being Euroscepticism is a political attitude of mainstream parties in following years and exhibit tendency of European community's voting for radical right parties by comparing the 2009 and 2014 European Parliament elections. "*Source of Euroscepticism*" which is published by Hooghe and Marks (2007), aims to search for the causes of the rise of Euroscepticism.

Definition of Euroscepticism is a controversial and multi-level phenomenon, so identifying it for specific cases is a troublesome issue. There are a lot of studies for classifying Euroscepticism. Taggart's (1998) article "*A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems*" provide one of the very first contribution for defining Euroscepticism. His studies that are conducted with Szczerbiak are very important and prominent in the area of Euroscepticism especially understanding its reflection to party politics (2001; 2002; 2004; 2018; 2020). They made a simpler categorization as *hard* and *soft Euroscepticism* by analyzing party behaviors. Their article which was published in 2004 specifically focus on Euroscepticism in CEE countries. Their study indicate that Euroscepticism started to become one of the issues in Hungarian politics right after the resulting of membership process. Kopecky and Mudde (2002) classify Euroscepticism into four categories -*euroenthusiasts*, *europragmatists*, *eurosceptics*, *eurorejects*- and criticize the classification of Taggart and Szczerbiak hard and soft Euroscepticism because of the lack of criteria about categorization. Flood (2002) looks at the discourse of party and government officials and votes in the European Parliament and Council to measure Euroscepticism. He provides six value-neutral positions by relating each category with the idea of further integration and specific policy areas. Flood's (2002) categorization -*rejectionist*, *revisionist*, *minimalist*, *gradualist*, *reformist*, *maximalist*- offers a more dynamic approach. Alongside the studies that focus on party Euroscepticism, Krouwel and Abts (2007) and Sorenson (2008) focus on public Euroscepticism. While former study aims to investigate the target and degree of Euroscepticism simultaneously, latter aims to search for the reasons of the public Euroscepticism. She mentions from four main -*economic issues*, *sovereignty concerns*, *democracy deficit* and *sociopolitical*- reasons

in her study. EP is the most suitable institution for measuring public Euroscepticism, due to the directly election of the representatives by European Community. Article of Guimaraes and Aquino (2020) provide a sufficient information about the last three election EP elections (2009, 2014, 2019) and make a comparison among them by considering the rise the number of Eurosceptic politicians in the Parliament. Tereszkieicz (2018) focuses on the reasons for the rise of Euroscepticism in V4 countries by considering the Eurosceptic parties' approach to the five nodal points. According to his analysis, all Eurosceptic parties of V4 adopt a similar position towards the external actions of the EU. These are EU-Russia relations and defense policy which generate two of the five points.

Nationalism is a very wide and ambiguous concept. Umut Özkırımlı (2000) examines nationalism under three main groups -primordialism, modernism and ethno-symbolism- in his book "*Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*". The book contains basic information about the nationalism literature. Breuilly (1993) and Hobsbawm (1990) criticize primordialist approach and evaluate nationalism as a continuation is modernization process. Gellner (1983) and Anderson (2009) are also affiliate nationalism with modernism, but they adopt a constructivist approach. Ethno-symbolism was emerged as a critical response to modernism. Armstrong (1982) evaluates nationalism in a historical perspective starting from ancient times. He claims that nations are invented phenomenon and ethnic and cultural backgrounds affect the nation formation process. Smith (1991) who is the prominent figure of the ethno-symbolism asserts that ethnic identity is essential for nation formation. According to his aspect, coming from the similar ethnic origin is the first prerequisite of constitution of nation.

Hungarian people adhere to their national values, and they remained this attitude after their membership to the EU as can be observed in the Eurobarometer surveys. However, characteristics of Hungarian nationalism have changed over time to catch up with the global dynamics. Fabry (2019) argues that despite the economic crisis which is caused by neoliberal policies, Orbán government has not abandoned neoliberalism. Instead, it was compounded with the authoritarian-ethnicist values to consolidate his government. Geva (2021) named Orbán's governing style as "*ordonationalism*" which is combination of authoritarianism and hyper-nationalist neoliberalism. Populism is one of the ideologies that can be easily combined with the nationalist rhetoric. Although it is a debated concept, Mudde's (2007)

definition of populism is accepted by most of the scholars in the field. Mudde (2007; 2017) has a lot of studies that focus on populism and far-right political parties. Hungarian irredentism is related to Hungarians living abroad within the pre-Trianon borders. Waterbury (2009) discusses about this issue by emphasizing on diaspora politics. She claims that irredentist policies turned to a diaspora politics, and it can be called transborder nationalism.



CHAPTER II

A BRIEF HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF HUNGARY

There are several turning points in Hungarian history that influenced the current political stance. While some of these historical events left negative marks on the Hungarian social consciousness, some contributed to the development of Hungarian politics in a more democratic way. Hungary has taken lessons from past events and formed its policies according to them afterward. In this section, these turning points which affect Hungary's current Eurosceptic stance will be underlined and explained under six categories.

2.1. HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1848

Hungarian people have fought for their sovereignty and independence throughout history. This wish for independence and national sovereignty became more apparent with the worldwide expansion of values like nationalism, freedom, equality and democracy after the French Revolution. The period between 1790-1848 is called national awakening in Hungarian history (Güngörmüş, 2010, 52). In this process, liberal values both in the economic and political arena and national policies gained importance. The distinctive feature of Hungary from other CEE countries is the involvement of Hungarian reformers and radicals like István Széchenyi and Lajos Kossuth who had a strong political consciousness toward Hungarian national development and support for liberal changes in Hungarian politics before the upsurge of revolutionary radicalism in the 1840s. Wish for change supported by Hungarian elites resulted in the emergence of social movements which raised up against Habsburg rule, turned into independence demonstrations that involved the nationalist notion. This situation manifests itself in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 which is depicted as one of the biggest and catastrophic events in Hungarian history. A lot of Hungarian people lost their lives during the revolutionary movements. Russia's support for Habsburg Empire made difficult to resist against Habsburg Empire's military presence. In addition, any of the European states except Poland support Hungarian revolutionary groups against joint attacks of Habsburg monarchy and Russia. This situation caused distrust among the Hungarian population. It provided a ground for Eurosceptic ideas and caused the formation of a distant political stance in Hungary against Europe for the future. Hungarian

people couldn't reach national sovereignty which was expected outcome of the revolution. A dual regime was established in May 29, 1867 under the name of Austria-Hungarian Monarchy. Even though Hungarians abide by the Austria-Hungarian Monarchy in their foreign affairs, their presence gained an autonomous feature in domestic politics (Güngörmüş, 2010, 58).

Like the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, some uprisings took place between October 1918 and August 1919 with the desire for national sovereignty. They carried three distinctly different ideological features. The first, led by Michael Karolyi, the leader of the short-lived First Hungarian Republic, has a bourgeois-democratic character. It was supported by the proletariat with the aim of overthrowing the monarchy. It can be evaluated as a trial for transition to democracy. The second one has a socialist background and the establishment of the Hungarian Soviet Republic was the major aim of this movement. Lastly, the third one was a counter-revolutionary action against the communist regime which gained support from peasants and caused impairment of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. Hungary's old rulers consolidated their regime with the support of this counter-revolutionary action (Deak, 1968). Hungary entered into World War I as a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire under these circumstances.

2.2. POST-WORLD WAR I PERIOD AND TREATY OF TRIANON

Austro-Hungarian Empire entered into the war as one of the initiators. It was the Hungary as a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire fell into the loser side of the war. The long-lasting war has brought many long-term damages to the losers, with the impact of the difficult conditions offered by the peace treaties. Treaty of Trianon which is signed by the Kingdom of Hungary after as loser of the war has a crucial impact on Hungarian history. Due to the non-existence of a functioning government and substantial internal disturbance Hungarian domestic politics were in a chaotic situation. Signing of the Treaty of Trianon was seen as a solution for providing livable standards in Hungary and named as trianoni békediktátum (peace order) in the Hungarian language (Öz, 2017, 91).

Hungary lost 2/3 of its lands and almost half of its population by signing this Treaty on June 4, 1920 (Dilbaş, 2019, 88). As a result of this situation, Hungary suffered from a

huge amount of economic and political loss alongside the psychological burden of losing half of its ethnic population. Mining lands, forest assets, substantial agricultural land were shared among its neighbors, regardless of the Hungarian population living within the borders. This division can be seen explicitly in the map below:




Figure 1: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 2020

After the signing of the Treaty of Trianon, the idea of irredentism began to emerge and to be represented in Hungarian literature by emphasizing the problems of the Hungarian minority living abroad. *Nem! Nem! Soha!* (No! No! Never!) which is written by Attila József is the most significant example of this trend and it has become the slogan of Hungarian irredentism afterward. Hungarian poet Gyula Illyés expresses this thought with his famous words “*The Hungarian is the one who suffers from the Trianon*” (Öz, 2017, 89). This situation caused worsening of relations with neighbors because of the perception of the issue of the Hungarian minority as a threat by neighboring countries.

2.3. HUNGARY IN WORLD WAR II

Peace treaties which were signed after World War I haven't been successful in providing peace and security in Europe. Versailles Agreement that was signed with Germany included a substantial amount of reparation and military restrictions. Bulgaria signed Neuilly Agreement which caused territorial loss and military restrictions after the war. Austro-Hungarian Empire split up after the war. The saint-Germain agreement was signed with Austria in 1919 and the Treaty of Trianon was signed with Hungary two years later from the war. Ottoman Empire signed Sevr Agreement which caused a territorial loss to a considerable extent. Articles about the control of Bosphorus, reparation, minority rights and military restrictions caused great damage. Compelling terms of agreements that were imposed on losers caused economic problems. This situation triggered the rise of fascist and nationalist movements in Europe, like Germany and Italy. In addition to this atmosphere, the 1929 Great Depression which is one of the biggest worldwide economic crises and its outcomes supported the rise of fascist leaders in Europe like Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany. The economic crisis hit the Kingdom of Hungary also very badly and economic unrest reverberated to political areas. As a result, a government reshuffle occurred. Gyula Gömbös government was established with the new revisionist notion and the hope of ejecting the country from economic depression. He was admiring Benito Mussolini and adopted the Italian model which required a more consolidated central authority in domestic politics differently from the previous government (Çolak, 2009, 36). Deactivation of opposition parties, prevention of unionization and establishment of total fascism with nationalist and historical sentiment were the main goals of Gömbös government. In this direction, he signed Rome Protocols with Austria and Italy against the anti-revisionist Balkan Pact, which was approved by Türkiye and Little Entente. Despite the fact that Hungary's efforts to remain neutral in the Second World War, these political moves caused the Kingdom of Hungary to be positioned with the Axis powers. With the effect of its irredentist policies, Hungary declared war against the USSR on 26 June 1941 to protect the Hungarian minority living in the former Hungarian lands in Yugoslavia (Güngörmüş, 2010, 71). The main goal of Hungary was to take back the loss of lands and population after the First World War, but things didn't go as planned for Hungary. Along with the great loss of, lives Germany invaded Hungarian territory in 1944 to prevent Hungary from forming secret alliances with other sides of the war. However, the USSR gained strength in the region as a result of the change

in relations between Romania and Nazi Germany. With the efforts of the pro-Soviet provisional government established in Debrecen, the Red Army entered the territory of Hungary. In conclusion of the war, Hungary was weakened in economic and social terms. A lot of Hungarian people died, were taken as prisoners of war or immigrated from Hungary because of ethnic, economic or ideological oppression, causing a substantial decrease in the Hungarian population. As a political result of the war, Hungary became one of the Eastern Bloc countries and lost its national sovereignty one more time in history after the 1848 Revolution.

2.4. COMMUNIST REGIME IN HUNGARY

The roots of the idea of establishing a communist regime in Hungary dates back to the Russian Revolution of 1917. There was a large number of Hungarians who were imprisoned by Russia as prisoners of war. These people adopted the idea of communism and saw the idea of bringing the communist order to their home as a mission. Bela Kun is a significant example of these people. He joined the Russian Communist Party after World War I and initiated for establishment of a Hungarian Communist Party in Russia (Pastor, 2001). However, the party couldn't be effective in Hungarian politics until the Soviet intervention in Hungary after World War II.

As stated in the introductory sentence of the first paragraph, Hungarian elites who were educated in the USSR such as Matyas Rakosi and Erno Gero became influential actors in deciding the direction of Hungarian politics in the post-World War II era. Although conservative liberals and social democrats played an important role for a short time in the post-1945 period, in 1947 the Hungarian Communist Party, which adopted the Stalinist perspective, won the elections and a long-term communist regime began in Hungary (Güngörmüş, 2010, 78). Implementations of the communist regime were more obvious in economic and political arenas. The existence of the private sector in the Hungarian economy disappeared gradually because of the expropriation accordingly with the command economy which was supported by the communist regime. As a result of this policy, factories, banks and private properties were taken from their owners and turned into public properties. In addition to internal changes in the economy, foreign assistance which was offered as a part of the Marshall Plan was not accepted because of the Soviet influence in Hungarian politics.

This situation was generating a clue for Hungary's position in Cold War. Likewise, in the economic area, Soviet influence was visible in the political atmosphere. In 1948, Magyar Dolgozók Pártja (MDP) (The Hungarian Working People's Party) was established under the leadership of Mátyás Rákosi and Rakosi Period started in Hungarian politics (Güngörmüş, 2010, 79). In this period, the existence of other political parties was denied and a dictatorial kind of government with Stalinist understanding was founded by the Rákosi government between 1948-1953.

Policies that followed during the Rákosi period caused unrest among the Hungarian population. As a result, he handed over his chair to his successor Imre Nagy who became one of the most important public figures in Hungary. He wanted to follow more independent and neutral foreign and domestic policies. Land reform, the abolishment of working camps and compulsory settlement, and amnesty for political prisoners were generating the main agenda of his policies. In addition to policies that were close to the western political perspective, he declared that Hungary would leave Warsaw Pact which was a military union established by Eastern Bloc states against NATO. The most distinctive feature of the Warsaw Pact from NATO was that it could militarily intervene in member countries as it did in Hungary in 1956, allegedly, for maintaining law and order. Support and public propaganda about liberation by Western countries, especially Britain and France, and the United States caused bold steps that come from the Hungarian government against the Soviet regime. Social movements started in Hungary with the participation of lots of intellectuals and public elites on October 23, 1956.

However, support of the western countries remained in words and was not put into practice. They remained silent against the Soviet intervention which, allegedly aimed to restore law and order in Hungary. The coincidence of the timing of the Suez Crisis with the Hungarian Revolution at the end of October 1956 was one of the most important reasons why the Hungarian people couldn't get international assistance (Bekes, 2007, 61-62). It can be said that the economic interests of the United States prevailed in the protection of human rights and providing democracy to the world. Britain and France asserted the principle of non-intervention and not being involved in it. Consequently, the Soviet army was summoned by Hungarian Communist Party officials to restore order in Hungary. The Soviet army intervened in Hungary on November 4, 1956.

2.4.1. 1956 Hungarian Revolution

There are several points of view in the literature about the events in Hungary that happened in October 1956. These views can be classified as those seeing the events as a revolution and those that do not see the events as such. In the first group, there are three different opinions. According to the first opinion which is supported by Cardinal Mindszenty who was the leader of the Roman Catholic church, the 1956 Hungarian revolution can be considered a counter-revolution against the revolutionary communist regime of the 1940s (Cox, 1997, 3). The second opinion which is proposed by David Irving (1981) considers this event as an insurrection because of its leaderless, disordered structure and lack of unifying aim of the crowd. Neumann (1949) indicates that revolution should cause fundamental changes in the internal and external dynamics of a state after it happened. The third opinion that considers these events as not a revolution, refers to Neumann's definition and indicates that there is no visible success in changing the political, economic or social structure of the country, so this event cannot be accepted as a revolution. On the other hand, there are some that accept the 1956 events in Hungary as a revolution. Lomax (1976) suggests that the 1956 event in Hungary has a revolutionary characteristic, because its aim was a system change led by the working class to constitute a state of workers. Kecskemeti (1961) opposes the idea relates social classes to revolution. He claims that the involvement of elites in the revolutionary process, which is a distinctive feature of the Hungarian revolution of 1956, and the spread of movement among broad public masses bring to the 1956 events a revolutionary characteristic. Molnar (1971) emphasizes the national characteristic of the Hungarian revolution rather group-interest-based approach. According to this point of view, the wish for national independence and moving as a national community against a system that restricts national sovereignty causes the naming of this event as a revolution.

Despite different approaches to the definition of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, it remains to be a very significant topic in the history of Hungary. Its effects on the Hungarian population and politics are still visible. Because of this reason, it will be examined under a special title in this thesis. The day of 23 October, the date of the beginning of the social movement in 1956 for liberation is celebrated as a solemn national holiday today. This date was chosen for the establishment of contemporary Hungary in 1989 as a reminder of the past as well.

The social movements started as a small student uprising against oppressive Soviet rule but gained support from very different domains of the public especially from Hungarian elites and some government officials like prime minister Imre Nagy. So, it turned into a mass public protest for national independence. This situation can be inferred from a speech of Nagy on October 23, 1956. He starts his speech as “Comrades!...”, but the crowd reacts to this addressing in a negative way. Therewith he continues his speech with “My fellow citizens...” (Nadas, 2006). It can be seen that from this reaction Hungarians were willing to conduct an independent and national domestic and foreign policy separately from the Soviet Union.

As a result of these public protests and government support tend to change for national liberation and westernization, the Soviet Union started a military intervention which was named as Operation Whirlwind to restore the order (Bekes, 2007). There were three main aims of this intervention: (i) constituting a strong and unified communist party administration, (ii) strengthening the security forces of the state by providing loyalty and discipline among armed forces for combating such an issue, and (iii) ensuring party control over the public zone and media apparatus (Bekes, 2007, 54). This situation was repeated in other Soviet military interventions in CEE countries, such as the Prague Spring of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

November 4 was a dark day in Hungarian history. The Soviet regime was restored with the help of Soviet military forces. A lot of people died, were imprisoned or fled from the country. This situation became the starting point of the country’s future problems. Firstly, Hungary lost skilled labor from its population which supports the events of 1956 because of the reason indicated in the previous sentence. This situation caused a socio-cultural change in the Hungarian population. As a political consequence of the revolution, Hungary has lost prestige in the international area. Its membership application for the UN was suspended until the 1963 declaration of a general amnesty for 1956 defendants (Güngörmüş, 2010).

2.4.2. Moderate Socialism in Hungary

After the repression of the revolutionary events of 1956 with the help of Soviet military assistance, János Kádár became president of Hungary. He was general secretary of

the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt) (MSZMP) and the person who invited the Soviet armed forces to Hungary for ensuring order. Although he gained Soviet support, he considered the national expectations and reactions of the people. As a result, he constituted more moderate socialism differently from other CEE countries, so his period which is last for thirty-three years between 1956-1989 named as Kádár Period or moderate socialism period in Hungary (Güngörmüş, 2010, 119). He used soft power apparatus instead of hard power, to generate support in domestic politics for his government. School curricula, historical textbooks and media were structured by the government to influence public opinion. (Gyáni, 2006. 1201).

This political attitude was also reflected in the economic field. Policies about land reform were significant in this process. Kádár government's policies regarding agricultural economics were more moderate in comparison with the government of Rákosi (1948-1953) and Nagy (first government 1953-55, second and third governments in 1956). In addition, an industrialization process started with the joint initiative of government and Soviet foreign assistance. In the framework of "new economic understanding", the Kádár government allowed private economic initiatives. Alongside a suitable ground was provided for new economic initiatives, some of them were supported by the government (Altinoğlu, 1990, 93). As a result of these economic policies, economic welfare and employment rates increased (Sancaktar, 2019, 40) and the People's Republic of Hungary became a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in 1982, despite the objection of other Eastern Bloc countries (Güngörmüş, 2010, 122). This decision separates Hungary from other Eastern Bloc countries and shows that Hungary was inclined to cooperate with western countries even before the dissolution of the USSR.

The economic recession of the 1980s alongside foreign debt triggered the social protests. The first social movement against the economic situation started in 1985 (Güngörmüş, 2010, 130), but the movement gained support from anti-socialist domains of the public and movement triggered the starting point of the decline of the Soviet regime in Hungary.

2.5. TRANSITION PERIOD AND EU MEMBERSHIP PROCESS OF HUNGARY

Hungary has experienced a smoother transition process in comparison with other CEE countries. Moderate socialist understanding which is followed during the Kádár government is an influential factor for smooth transition. Strict rules of the Rakosi government were stretched and a place was provided for private initiatives. The more moderate and populist policies applied in the agricultural field, the privatization in the economic field and the fact that the integration with the west started in this period were the factors that facilitated the transition period. Existence of elites who supported cooperation with Europe against the communist regime and a strong civil society played an important role in this smooth transition. The liberalization process started under these circumstances in Hungary.

It can be said that preparation for transition began in the mid-1980s. Moderation of Soviet policies abroad with the effect of glasnost and perestroika policies of Gorbachev facilitated the implementation of new reforms without any foreign intervention. Preparations for change can be classified under two categories as economic and political. The first steps of the transition from a command economy to a market economy were taken with a new economic understanding of the Kádár regime. Bilateral agreements with IMF in 1982 and with European Economic Community (EEC) in 1988 accelerated the process. As a result of this process, privatization studies were expanded in the country to different economic fields. The scope of privatization which started with the agricultural economy spilled over to other economic areas. New private banks and private companies were established, and their number increased after 1987. In addition, government enterprises were incorporated, and their stock certificates were launched into the market in 1988 under the scope of the privatization program (Sancaktar, 2019, 41).

The liberalization movement started to show itself in the political arena. New movements flourished in the country and became stronger both in MSZMP and among political intellectuals. Independent candidates were elected into parliament, so this situation paved the way for the representation of different ideas in the parliament. There were three major representatives of this liberal opposition movement: the Hungarian Democratic Youth League (DEMISZ), the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Hungarian Democratic Forum

(Sancaktar, 2019, 41). As a result of the opposition voices, MSZMP made some amendments and regulations in its party statute and removed the inscription of “worker” from its title. In addition to this change, a revision was made to the Hungarian constitution and Hungary shifted from a one-party regime to a multi-party parliamentary regime.

The abolishment of the Berlin Wall in April 1989 triggered political change in other CEE countries. The dissolution of communist regimes and the Solidarity movement which was a well-disciplined public movement that started in Poland had an important effect on the beginning of a liberal transition in Hungary. Besides, the re-organization and active contribution of civil society to political life accelerated the democratization process. The main features of this period were non-violent public movements organized by civil society and elite-led negotiations. Another key factor of democratic transition in Hungary was the organised round table talks. The first one was the Opposition Round Table held in March 1989 by opposition groups to strengthen their relations and draw a more unified picture against the communist side to initiate better negotiations. The second one was National Round Table, as a result of which some amendments were made to the constitution, and a new democratic Republic was declared on October 23, 1989 (Bozoki & Simon, 2010, 210). Since it is the symbol of Hungary's independence, it was chosen on the day of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution for the declaration of the new republic. The first democratic election was held in 1990 with the participation of political parties which had different backgrounds and Hungary proceeded in a successful way with the transition to democracy.

One of the most significant ideas of the transition period was “return to Europe”. According to this approach, Hungary began to conduct more pro-European politics and made some initiatives to strengthen its relations with the Western world. Starting from this point, Hungary followed a policy that decreased its dependency on the Soviet Union and its institution and increased the radius of action in foreign policy for cooperation with the west. In this process, Hungary prioritized joining NATO, because of anti-socialist movements that gained strength in neighboring countries, the civil war in Yugoslavia, and the rise of nationalism in domestic and foreign policy. After the dissolution of the Warsaw pact, processes for joining NATO were augmented.

There were some criteria that candidate countries must comply with in order to create a security force working compatible with the existing structure and to become a member of NATO. These criteria were indicated in the Studies of Enlargement in the framework of the Partnership for Peace program was introduced by NATO for increasing the engagement with other states, especially post-Soviet countries in Europe (Borawski, 1995). According to these criteria, countries must have a functioning democracy, a free-market economy, a consolidated legitimate authority that is respectful of human rights and an armed force that reaches a certain standard. As a result of a successfully conducted transition process, Hungary took an invitation for joining NATO with other Visegrad 4 (V4) countries at the 1997 Madrid Summit.

Undoubtedly, NATO membership is a beneficial development for Hungary as well as for NATO. When geopolitical position and its influence among other CEE countries are considered, Hungary would have been a significant partner of NATO in the region. A referendum was held after the invitation of NATO and people voted in favor of joining NATO with %70. Hungary became a full member of NATO on March 12, 1999. It became an influential actor, especially in the Balkan operations of NATO. It contributed to disarmament operations in Macedonia, SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina and KFOR in Kosovo.

Besides, Hungary joined regional military forces. The Central European Nations' Cooperation in Peace Support (CENCOOP) would be an appropriate example for this argument. The idea of constituting a peacekeeping force that specifically includes CEE countries was suggested by Austria in 1996. The aim of the project was to enhance the cooperation of CEE countries in peace operations and increase their capacity to provide a standard among the military forces of these countries for working collaboratively. Hungary joined the project in 1998 as one of the first ones among CEE countries with Romania and Slovakia (Nemeth, 2018, 18). Also, Switzerland and Croatia contributed to the project. These forces joined the UN peacekeeping operations especially in the Balkans. However, due to the difference of opinions among the initiators, the project couldn't become durable. The most important deviation manifested itself in the attitudes of initiators against the 9/11 attacks. While Austria and Switzerland prefer a neutral stance, other initiators were eager to join the war on terror which is declared by the US. They sent military support to US

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, the existence of CENCOOP was ended in the mid-2000s because of differing opinions among participatory states on military issues.

Accession to the EU generated other important topics of Hungarian agenda in transition period. After a short period of non-socialist Democratic Forum in government, socialist party won the elections again, but this didn't interrupt integrationist agenda with the West. Hungary didn't keep the integrationist agenda only within the limits of economic and trade relations but started adopting western institutions and policies to Hungarian political system. In addition, it was the first country that made changes in the legal process to conduct compatible policies with the judicial requirements of the EU. It turned into one of the importers of western policies among CEE countries (Agh, 1999, 841). As a result of policies followed by government, Hungary became the first country among other CEE countries which presented participation petition to Council of Europe in Strasbourg (Güngörmüş, 2010, 220). From this point of view, it can be said that Hungary was one of the countries which are willing to follow pro-European policy changes for the accession to EU and European Community (EC) in post-Soviet period.

Hungary made official membership application to the EU in 1994, but firstly it had to regulate its policies according to Copenhagen Criteria. "The Copenhagen Criteria" indicates the conditions candidate countries must meet before they can become members of the European Union". These criteria which will have been applied in enlargement process were discussed at Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and strengthen in 1995 at the Madrid European Council (Rezler, 2011, 392).

The Copenhagen Criteria for Enlargement (Gerguri & Hoti, 2017, 1010) can be classified into three sections:

1. Political Criteria: Candidate states must ensure sustainable and functioning democracy, human rights, the rule of law, respect for and protection of minorities.

2. Economic Criteria: A functioning market economy must be established, and it has to have a capacity to challenge with competitive pressure and market forces.

3. Administrative Criteria: Candidate state must have a capacity to take obligations of membership (acquis communautaire).

Hungary fulfilled these criteria and became a member of the EU in 2004 with the fifth and the largest enlargement of the EU (Karadeniz, 2020). Economic, political and social policy changes which were made to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria will be explained with details in Chapter 4. After ratification of its membership on May 1, 2004, Hungary became a significant player and partner of the EU, especially policies about the Balkans and Eastern Europe because of its geopolitical position and historical and cultural bond with the region. For this purpose, a special center was established for the development of relations with the Balkans in Budapest in 2005. The main purpose of this center is to promote economic, political and sociological development in the Balkan countries in order to create a functioning system in line with EU policies under the leadership of Hungary.

Hungary became a member of the EU as a result of the fifth enlargement with great expectations, but Hungarians have always carried a sense of apprehension about losing their national independence and sovereignty one more time for the sake of European integration. While EU membership has brought some economic and political benefits, instability in sectors of agriculture and construction maintained. Even, EU membership and economic aid have caused some amelioration in Hungarian economy which damaged by 2003 financial difficulties, it couldn't ensure the expected effect in the Hungarian economy. This situation reverberated to domestic politics and a campaign that led by FIDESZ was started calling for referendum against government reform. As a result of initiatives of FIDESZ-KNDP, a referendum was held on March 9, 2008 (Güngörmüş, 2010, 294).

FIDESZ and its leader Viktor Orbán came into prominence as influential actors of the referendum process and increased their popularity in Hungarian politics. Referendum was concluded in favor of opposition parties and government's economic reform package was rejected by community. This campaign helped Orbán to regain his popularity and paved the way for his current position.

The 2008 global economic crisis is one of the important events that caused a change in world politics. Due to the increasing interdependency of economic structure, and political outcome of this situation with the effect of neoliberal policies, almost all countries had been affected by this crisis. The crisis started in the US real estate market and triggered a worldwide economic crisis. The economic crisis was started to be felt among EU members

in mid-2008 and hit Hungary like other countries in the Union. However, Hungary was in a distressed economic condition apart from global economic crisis (Egedy, 2012, 163). Unemployment and inflation rates increased day by day and living standards decreased especially in rural areas. This situation caused an unrest among people and dissatisfaction about the government. Also, it created a doubt about the EU policies, because Hungarian people couldn't reach the expected welfare after EU membership. In addition, Hungary as a leading figure for other CEE countries on the road of EU membership started to lose its position and importance due to economic difficulties. These mentioned reasons contributed to rise of Eurosceptic voices in Hungary. As a result, right-wing and nationalist parties rallied. FIDESZ led by Viktor Orbán who is important political figure of Hungary since 1990s and Jobbik (Movement for Better Hungary) led by Gábor Vona came into prominent in Hungarian politics by using a populist-nationalist political language. The main argument of them were "regaining national pride to Hungary" (Foundation Robert Schuman, n.d).

2009 European parliament elections showed that these arguments gained support from public and Hungarian politics witnessed rise of conservative and far-right parties. FIDESZ won 14 of 22 total seats belong to Hungary (Puddington, et al, 2010). Also, Jobbik involved to Hungarian politics as a significant player. It captured three seats and became representative of people of Hungary in the European Parliament.

2010 parliamentary elections were held under these circumstances and resulted in a great success of FIDESZ. The first round of the election was held on 11 April and FIDESZ ensured absolute majority to constitute a government. In the second round which is made on 24 April, it achieved capturing two-third of parliamentary majority (CNN, 2010). It made an alliance with KDNP (Christian Democratic People's Party) which is described as a satellite party of FIDESZ (Batory, 2010, 3). A new political structure was started to construct under this government. Slogan of new government was different from previous ones that include liberal approach to politics and discourse of "return to Europe". It adopted more nationalist and illiberal political agenda under the leadership of Viktor Orbán. These new regulations caused repositioning of Hungary's stance in world politics and change of the balance in international relations.

2.6. POST-2010 PERIOD IN HUNGARY

2010 elections foreshadowed future changes in Hungary. A new page was opened in Hungarian politics with FIDESZ-KDNP coalition. This new alliance gained 68% of the seats in the parliament which means 263 of the 386 MPs (Batory, 2010, 7). The coalition's 2/3 majority in parliament gave it an absolute decisive position in domestic and foreign political changes. As a result, there was a noticeable shift in Hungarian politics from 'liberal and western-oriented policies' to more 'illiberal' one. Due to this period being the main focus of the thesis, mentioned changes will be examined in detail in the fourth chapter. However, the important events after the 2010 elections will be addressed to provide a better understanding of Hungarian history in this part of the chapter.

Constitutional changes that made after the election is one of the signs of the shift to Eurosceptic policies in Hungary. Cardinal change was made in the end of 2011 and new constitution entered into force on January 1, 2012. Opposition parties and western states express their concern about democratic backsliding in the country. Focus of their concerns about this new constitution and legal changes include interference to independence of the judiciary and administration of justice (Paczolay, 2012, 372), criminalization of homelessness and interference to media freedom (Ekholm and Svärd-Ylilehto, 2018). These legal and constitutional changes were criticized by Venice Commission which is a responsible branch of Council of Europe about monitoring compliancy of member states with EU standards. In addition, high ranking officials of the Council of Europe and the European Commission uttered the concerns about the evolution of recent Hungarian politics moving away from rule of law and warned Hungarian politicians. This issue will be covered with details in Chapter 4.

Support to FIDESZ and Jobbik continued in 2014 and 2018 parliamentary elections. As a result of this support, discourse of the party officials and prime minister Orbán became tougher than before, and they started to use more populist-nationalist discourse. Shift from EU values to Euroscepticism finds place itself the most concretely in Viktor Orbán's speech at the XXV. Bálványos Free Summer University and Youth Camp on July 26, 2014. In this speech, he says that *"Hungarian nation is not a simple sum of individuals, but a community that needs to be organized, strengthened and developed, and in this sense, the new state that*

we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state.” (Tóth, 2014) and emphasized that a separate politics will be conducted from the EU values from now on.

By turning mass protests into a civil war in Syria in 2011 caused a worldwide political crisis. Syrian refugee issue became one of the crucial problems in world politics. The European continent has been affected from migration flow, which is the outcome of the Syrian civil war, as a result of its geopolitical position. As one of the frontier countries of the EU, Hungary became one of the members that faced the negative consequences of refugee issue and became a destination or a transition point towards western Europe for Syrian refugees. Number of asylum seekers were increased as a result of rising intensity of the conflict in 2015. Some of the EU member states like Germany had more welcoming approach to refugee issue in comparison with Hungary. Difference of opinion among the EU member states against the issue caused tension between these actors (Goździak, 2019). Therefore, this situation is considered as an important agenda for the rise of Eurosceptic policies in Hungary.

2022 general elections which was held on 3rd of April give a hint about the continuation of Eurosceptic political inclination in Hungarian policy. Coalition of FIDESZ-KDNP won the election against opposition bloc “United for Hungary” which consists of six political parties that have very different ideological backgrounds from the far-right to left as liberals, social democrats, social liberals, greens and the ultra-nationalist Jobbik (Nichols, 2022). The Fidesz-KDNP alliance gained 53% of the votes and guaranteed 135 deputies in the 199-seat parliament, while the United for Hungary received 35% of the votes, below the percentage indicated in the election polls. One of the biggest surprises of the election result was that the far-right *Our Home Movement* (Mi Hazánk), contrary to expectations, passed the 5% electoral threshold and gained right to representation with 6 seats in the parliament (Europe Elects, 2022). Looking at these figures, it can be said that the Fidesz-KDNP coalition achieved a 2/3 majority in the parliament, enabling it to make constitutional amendments again. It seems that the Fidesz-KDNP coalition and prime minister Viktor Orbán will continue to become influential actors in Hungarian politics in the upcoming years.

When looking at the current political stance of Hungary, a shift from pro-EU politics to Euroscepticism and rise of nationalist discourse in politics can be observed. This situation became more visible after the election of FIDESZ and rise of right-wing parties Jobbik and Mi Hazánk in Hungarian politics recently. There are some domestic and international dimensions of this political outcome. Reasons and consequences of the rise of Euroscepticism and nationalist discourse in Hungarian politics will be examined in forthcoming chapters by considering the effect of party politics, public opinion and other international actors.



CHAPTER III

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter will consist of two main sections, and they will constitute the conceptual framework of the thesis. In the first part of the chapter, concept of Euroscepticism will be presented. Historical evolution of the term, sources, types and effects of it on public and party politics will be examined by facilitating from relevant literature. In the second part, concept of nationalism will be covered because of the claim of the thesis about Hungarian Euroscepticism has a nationalist sentiment. At this point, neoliberal nationalism, populist nationalism and irredentism are three important sub-titles of the concept of nationalism that are the most compatible with the Hungarian nationalist discourse will be explained. Implementation of these concepts on Hungary case will be examined in the fourth chapter as a case study by benefitting from Eurobarometer statistics and discourses of Hungarian government officials and political figures.

3.1. CONCEPT OF EUROSCEPTICISM

Euroscepticism is a concept that comes to the forefront in the study of Europe and the European Union, especially in the last three decades. However, the emergence of Euroscepticism can be dated back to the idea of the establishment of the EU. There were different views on the EU project, European unification and further integration of the Union during the establishment process. Rejection of the membership application of Britain by French president Charles de Gaulle and “empty chair crisis” resulting from the French opposition to Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) can be considered as runners of future scepticism in the early period (Vasilopoulou, 2013).

The emergence of the term in its current form can be traced back to the 1970s in Britain (Turmakov, 2017). The idea of Euroscepticism manifests itself in Britain politics as a continuation of British conservatism and exceptionalism. It states concern about turning the EU into a possible federal structure and a threat to national sovereignty. Policies that were followed by Margret Thatcher in the 1980s, unwillingness for constructing a fiscal, monetary, policy and defense union and the averseness of signing of the Single European

Act can be seen as indicators of opposition to further European integration (Wassenberg, 2020). Under these circumstances, it wouldn't be a surprise that the first usage of the term by British press in 1985 in acknowledgement of "anti-marketeers" who reject the EEC membership in 1975 referendum (Vasilopoulou, 2017, quoted in Spiering, 2004).

Signing of Maastricht Treaty which is accepted as the founding treaty of the EU in 1992 can be interpreted as the turning point for the rise of Euroscepticism and Eurosceptic discourse (Dobrescu, 2008; Vasilopoulou, 2013; Usherwood & Startin, 2013). Eurosceptic ideas and thoughts were against market integration before the Maastricht Treaty as stated in the British case above. However, nature and the scope of the Euroscepticism has started to change after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. While the main focus of the sceptic discourse and ideas were directed to the market integration before the Maastricht Treaty, afterward national sovereignty and identity concerns began to dominate the sceptic stance (Hooghe & Marks, 2007, 120). Another reason for the increase of Euroscepticism in the EU is explained with transition to "permissive consensus" to "constraining dissensus". The concept of permissive dissensus was firstly used in Europe's Would-be Polity by Lindberg and Schiengold (1970) to indicate the absence of public opinion in decision-making process of the EU (Down & Wilson, 2008). Elites and technocrats were influential actors in decision-making process until Maastricht Treaty, and quick European integration especially in economic area is seen as the result of this understanding. The concept of permissive consensus replaced with the constraining dissensus which is offered by Hooghe and Marks (2005) after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (Down & Wilson, 2008). It states difference of opinion in various fields in European politics such as economy policies, security and defense policies, migration policies etc. The changes that come along the Maastricht paved the way for public attendance to decision-making process. In this way, EU referendums became an important tool in EU politics. Rejection of the EU Constitution which foresee further European integration by the Dutch and French community and rejection of Lisbon Treaty by the Irish people can be indicated examples as the influence of EU referendums and domestic approach of member states on EU politics (Usherwood & Startin, 2013; Vasilopoulou, 2013). From this point of view, it can be said that Eurosceptic sentiments started to become visible in post-Maastricht period in consequence of the involvement of the European community to decision-making process.

Constituting a single market and an interdependent economic mechanism was a reason of d'être of the establishment of the EU. The Single European Act (SEA) was one of the most important steps of this unity. It goes further with Maastricht Treaty. It offered some conditions which named as convergence criteria to be a part of the Eurozone to ensure the sustainability of the single currency and monetary system. These criteria can be listed as price stability, sustainable public finances, exchange-rate stability and long-term interest rates (European Commission, n.d). This interdependency and structural issues paved the way for an unexpected economic crisis in European continent. It started to emerge in 2008 on a global scale with the mortgage crisis in the USA and started to Europe. Two main reasons can be asserted the emergence of this economic crisis: independence of international capital movements and structural problems of economic and Monetary Union of the EU (EMU). The economic problems affected Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy the most, but after that, it reverberated to all EU member states. These countries had some difficulties paying back the debt they received. At this point, other economically more stable EU members like Germany helped to payment. However, some austerity measures for instance cutting of some portion of the pensions or increasing of retirement age started to be implemented in these five countries. As a result, people started to protest austerity measures. Even, separation of Greece from the EU, Grexit, come to the agenda. On the other hand, citizens of the member states that helping payment of the debt were not willing to pay money that they haven't spent. Under these circumstances, neither guarantor states like Germany or France nor debtor countries like Greece or Ireland were not satisfied with the implemented policies to cope with economic crisis. Thus, 2008 economic crisis or European debt crisis which impact the can be seen as an important indicator of the rise of Euroscepticism among the EU members (Taggart & Szczesniak, 2018).

Migration started to become a significant issue in European politics with the enlargement processes. Cultural, economic and political differences between the old and new members have created some concerns on both sides. These concerns increased especially after eastern enlargement. 13 new members joined to the EU in consequence of eastern enlargement. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined to the EU in 2004 with the fifth and the broadest enlargement. After three years in 2007 two new

members –Romania and Bulgaria- joined to the EU. The enlargement process continued with the joining of the last member which is Croatia to the Union in 2013 (European Parliament, n.d). These new members had very different historical backgrounds, and because of these discrepancies, they have different political and economic systems. Most of the new members were post-communist states, so the market economy and democracy were relatively new concepts for them. In addition, the social and cultural habits of citizens of new members were different than Western European population. Since the principle of free movement of people, goods and capital was ratified with the Treaty of the EU, citizens of the new members tend to migrate to old member states which have more economic opportunities and living standards. This situation caused national identity concerns among western members. Syrian refugee issue caused a migration flow to Turkey and Europe. A lot of people left their home for finding a safe place and Europe was one of the destinations. After the Syrian refugee issue, the topic of migration started to be more securitized. Xenophobia and Islamophobia became one of the main subjects of European politics. It created national and identity security concerns, economic problems and distrust against the EU, especially its migration policy. Thus, it can be said that Syrian refugee issue became one of the latest promoters of the Eurosceptic discourse.

Right to withdrawal from the Union was entitled to all member of the EU with the Article 50 of the Maastricht Treaty. Idea of withdrawal of Britain has a long history in British politics. The last referendum was held in 2016 in Britain in related topic and majority of the people vote in favor of withdrawal. As a result, one of the oldest, economically, and politically stable members left the Union in 2020. Since it is a relatively new topic in comparison with Eurozone crisis and migration issue, outcomes of the Brexit and its effect to Euroscepticism cannot be clearly indicated. It could even be said that Brexit helped spread some pro-EU ideas. An example of this situation can be seen in Irish politics. The impact of Brexit on Euroscepticism should be examined over several years. If British politics and economy go well after Brexit, it could pave the way for the rise of Euroscepticism and European politics could witness more separatist national policies in member states. On the other hand, if the opposite happens, Brexit may prepare a ground for pro-EU ideas.

Economy and immigration policies, national sovereignty and democracy concerns are among the top issues on which the EU and its members have the most disagreements

(Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2018). Three of the issues that most affect the idea of Euroscepticism are the Eurozone crisis, especially the post-2015 migration problem and Brexit as explained in the previous paragraphs. As indicated above Euroscepticism has its roots basically from economic concerns, perceived threat against identity and national sovereignty and institutional distrust (Hooghe & Marks, 2007, 122). The motivation of the Eurosceptic discourse can stem from very different reasons like countries' historical background, financial conditions or geographical position. Severity of Euroscepticism also differ from country to country. For example, the reasons behind British Euroscepticism are different from Hungarian Euroscepticism. While the former is mostly related to economic problems and influenced by financial reasons, identity concerns and nationalist discourse promote Hungarian Euroscepticism. Thus, it cannot be mentioned from one and well-defined Euroscepticism.

Euroscepticism is an ambiguous concept that hard to make a certain definition. There is not a definition that has been reached a consensus among the scholars of the discipline due to the multidimensional nature of the concept. While the target of the Eurosceptic discourse mostly on the EU, its focus can change time to time and according to the domestic political dynamics and historical backgrounds of different countries (Leruth, Startin & Usherwood, 2017). Taggart's (1998) definition of *'the idea of contingent or qualified opposition as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to process of European integration'* is one of the very first. However, Taggart states that not all opposite ideas are indicator of Euroscepticism. This idea can be seen in Ermağan's (2012) differentiation between Euroscepticism and opposition to Europe. According to this aspect, Eurosceptics are not against the European integration, but they are not willing to deepening of the integration. On the other side, EU opponents completely object the institutions and policies of integration.

Since it is a broad and ambiguous concept, there are a lot of different layers of the Euroscepticism. It was categorized by the scholars of the study field according to its intensity, its position in party politics or public sphere. The upcoming section will give information about these categorizations and its visibility in European politics by utilizing from data shows that existence of Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament.

3.1.1. Categorization of Euroscepticism

Concept of Euroscepticism is evaluated in different levels and with different perspectives in literature. There are several ideas and studies that cover the term from different aspects. In these studies, Euroscepticism is examined in party (Taggart & Szcerbiak, 2001; Kopecky & Mudde, 2002; Flood, 2002) and public level (Krouwel & Abts, 2007; Sorenson, 2008). In addition, motivations of left and right Euroscepticism differ from each other (Mudde, 2002; Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002; Vasilopoulou, 2009). In this section, these concepts will be explained.

3.1.1.1. Party Euroscepticism

First categorization in the field was made by Taggart & Szcerbiak (2001) as hard and soft Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism is defined as opposition to the any kind of political or economic European integration and refusal of EU membership. Soft Euroscepticism indicates unwillingness against one or some policies of the EU, but soft Eurosceptic ideas don't represent an opposition to European integration and opposition to the EU membership (Taggart & Szcerbiak, 2001; 2002). Eurosceptic parties criticize the EU policies that are seen as a threat to national interest and identity, but don't support the separatist discourse.

Even if the study of Taggart and Szcerbiak is an important step for making classification about the type and features of the Euroscepticism, the definitions were found too broad by the other scholars of the field. Kopecky and Mudde (2002) criticize the categorization of hard and soft Euroscepticism as being defined in a very broad framework and lack of criteria. According to them, any opposition to the EU and its policies can be included to soft Euroscepticism and this situation causes wrong evaluations. Instead, they offered a two-dimensional conceptualization by improving Easton's (1965) specific and diffuse support for political systems. While diffuse support is related to attitude towards overall political system and institutions, like democracy, specific support represents support for current government or political elite. Kopecky and Mudde use diffuse support to indicate support for the idea of European integration and specific support for denoting support for the EU and its development. From this point of view, they developed four new typologies.

These are Euro-enthusiasts, Euro-pragmatists, Eurosceptics and Euro-rejects and can be seen in the table below.

Table 1: Typology of Kopecky and Mudde

		Support for European Integration	
		Europhile	Europhobe
Support for the EU	EU-optimist	Euro-enthusiasts	Euro-pragmatists
	EU-pessimist	Euro-sceptics	Euro-rejects

Source: Kopecky & Mudde, 2002

Support for European integration which is the first dimension is divided into two sections as Europhiles and Europhobes. Europhiles see European integration which includes pooled sovereignty and a unified liberal economy as a necessary thing and their ideas are parallel to federalist understanding. On contrary, Europhobes oppose European integration, mostly with the influence of nationalist, socialist or isolationist ideas. Support for the EU which constitutes the second dimension also distinguishes into two groups. The first one is EU-optimists and indicates the parties that are satisfied with the EU's current existence and policies and willing to further integration. EU-pessimists are not happy with the current functioning of the EU and advocate that European integration has gone beyond its purpose and EU should turn back to its founding principles.

The first one of the typologies of Kopecky and Mudde is Euro-enthusiasts. This group is placed in the junction point of Europhile and EU-optimists and represents the idea of supporting European integration, the EU and its current existence and policies. Eurosceptics indicated the combination of Europhiles and EU-pessimists. Despite that they

support for European integration, they are pessimistic about the current or future development of the EU. Europragmatists are located in the upper-right corner of the table which consists of Europhobes and EU-optimist positions. They support some EU policies with utilitarian purposes if they provide benefits to their country. Otherwise, they don't support further European integration. The last typology is Eurorejects which is the combination of Europhobes and EU-pessimist positions. Parties belonging to this group oppose both European integration and the EU.

Flood (2002) offers six new typologies (rejectionist, revisionist, minimalist, gradualist, reformist, maximalist) for the EU alignment. Rejectionists constitute the first group and are against the EU membership, institutions and policies. Parties within this group have similar features and backgrounds with Eurorejects and hard Eurosceptics in former cases. Revisionists are inclined to support European integration, if necessary, but some amendments should be made to the EU treaties and institutions. Minimalists accept the status quo, but they support further European integration neither for the current structure of the EU nor in some specific areas. Further European integration is a beneficial action according to gradualists, but it should be carefully planned and implemented. Reformists have a participatory attitude towards the EU policies and are inclined to support European integration, but the EU institutions need to be revised and improved. Maximalists can be described as the most enthusiastic group about European integration among these six typologies and they advocate the idea that European integration should go further as possible in the manner of structure and policy areas (Lázár, 2015, 217). The maximalist approach has some similarities with federalist understanding and is close to Euroenthusiasts in Kopecky and Mudde's categorization.

3.1.1.2. Left and Right Euroscepticism

Attitudes of mainstream and peripheral parties toward European integration differ from each other. While mainstream parties incline to have a pro-EU stance, marginal radical left and radical right parties mostly use Eurosceptic discourse. Groups or people who support these parties tend to describe themselves as "losers of globalization" (Wagner, 2021, 28). This label provides them a community conscience and help to increase of support and vote in elections. However, features of this group differ from each other. Motivations of right and

left-wing Euroscepticism are not the same. While left Euroscepticism is mostly related to economy and capitalist discourse in the EU, right Euroscepticism originates from loss of sovereignty and identity concerns. Left-wing Eurosceptic parties evaluate European integration as a part of the neoliberal world order and the prevention of reaching social infrastructure. On the other hand, right-wing Euroscepticism correlates with nationalism and asserts that the EU jeopardizes national sovereignty and causes a loss of national identities (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, 13). Although the situation is started to change recently, Euroscepticism is still more visible in radical left-wing and right-wing parties in comparison to mainstream political parties.

Left Euroscepticism is mainly represented by radical left parties in the national political system. According to March's (2011) definition, radical left parties oppose the "socio-economic structure of contemporary capitalism ... [and] advocate alternative economic and power structures involving a major redistribution of resources" (Wagner, 2021, 1070). They claim that the EU is the continuation of the global capitalist system and this situation brings an extra economic burden and causes inequality of fair distribution of financial sources. SYRIZA is one of the most popular and current examples of the success of left-Eurosceptic parties. The 2008 Eurozone crisis and refugee issue affected Greek policy as one of the main actors and topics of these events. As a result, an early general election was held in Greece. SYRIZA became the first party in the 2015 general elections. Party officials and supporters asserted that they won't allow the austerity measures which is offered by the Troika (consisting of the International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank and European Commission). It adopted a Eurosceptic and anti-austerity discourse during the election campaign contrary to pro-EU mainstream parties the New Democracy and PASOK (Vasilopoulou, 2018). This political stance provides a chance to establish a coalition government with a right-wing Eurosceptic party, ANEL. It can be said that the coalition of SYRIZA and ANEL took the advantage of rising of Eurosceptic ideas in the Greek population coming with EU austerity measurement and refugee policies.

The rise of far-right parties is a popular phenomenon in European politics as well as world politics recently. The term far-right is used by Mudde (2017) to indicate both the extreme right and radical right. Usually, the former is used to indicate the parties which reject the main elements of democracy like majority rule and popular sovereignty and the latter

which oppose the basic elements of liberal democracy like pluralism and minority rights. Mudde's aspect will be adopted in this study to explain right Euroscepticism.

The common features of successful far-right parties are inducing people who are sidelined by mainstream parties by prospering usage of populist language, ideological nativism and authoritarianism (Mudde, 2017). Right Eurosceptic parties are members of this group. National sovereignty concerns and the immigration policy of the EU are two core topics that are put forward by right Eurosceptic parties. They use populist and nationalist sentiments against EU policies and increase their vote in national and European Parliament elections. UKIP from the United Kingdom, FN from France, FIDESZ and Jobbik from Hungary can be some of the recent examples of the right Eurosceptic parties that increase their supporters in the national and international areas.

In addition to left and right Euroscepticism, Hooghe, Marks & Wilson (2002) mention another ideological classification of approach to European integration. They offer to distinguish political parties as GAL (Green-Alternative-Libertarian) / TAN (Traditionalism-Authoritarian-Nationalist). While GAL comprises liberal and libertarian parties, TAN involves conservative and nationalist parties. By considering these features of the parties that involve these groups, it can be said that GAL-type parties more inclined to follow pro-EU policies than TAN-type parties. Instead, TAN parties tend to adopt Eurosceptic discourse. However, there are some exceptions at this point. For example, while most of the Green Parties of the western Europe have a pro-EU stance, Scandinavian Green Parties are placed in Eurosceptic group. This classification also differs in east and west Europe. While Euroscepticism can be observed in both GAL and TAN parties in western Europe, it is only visible among TAN-type parties in eastern Europe. Also, motivation of Eurosceptic discourse varies across these two regions. Environmental issues, immigration and multiculturalism are determinant factors of opposing to European integration in western Europe. Religion and minority issues come forefront in eastern Europe (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002). As a result, it can be said that this classification offers a different perspective, but it doesn't provide a sufficient answer to explain Euroscepticism. It helps to understand a party's position to the EU. Ideological position of a party should be evaluated with its political strategy to provide a better understanding.

3.1.1.3. Public Euroscepticism

Euroscepticism is an important tool that political parties use in election process. They can adopt a Eurosceptic discourse to attract more voters and increase their vote, so party Euroscepticism doesn't always reflect the rate of public Euroscepticism. Therefore, some scholars have made some research to define and categorize relatively less studied concept of public Euroscepticism. Two forefront study of Krouwel & Abts (2007) and Sorenson (2008) about public Euroscepticism will be covered in this section.

Krouwel and Abts (2007) developed a two-dimensional model to understand and analyze public Euroscepticism. Different origins and variant intensity of the Euroscepticism among the actors constitute the starting point of the study. It focuses on investigating the target and degree of Euroscepticism simultaneously. First axis represents the behaviors of the actors towards the European authorities, the European regime and the European community. The second axis indicates the attitudes according to their degree of reflexivity and negativism.

The main targets of the support for the EU and European integration and criteria of evaluation for this support were specified by Krouwel and Abts (2007) in the Table 2 below:

Table 2: Targets of European Evaluation

	<i>Targets</i>	<i>Sub-targets</i>	<i>Criteria of evaluation</i>
European Union (specific support)	Authorities (actors)	Morals	Integrity of actors
		Actions	Competence of actors
	Regime (institutions)	Institutions	Responsiveness – Equity
		Performance	Output – Outcomes
		Practice of European integration	Widening – Deepening
European integration (diffuse support)	Community	Liberal-democratic society	European democracy
		European integration	National sovereignty
		European project	EU membership legitimacy

As a second phase of this study, they categorize citizens' attitude towards the EU and European integration into five groups. These attitudes are sorted from the most supportive attitude to most rejective attitude as trust, scepticism, distrust, cynicism and alienation. Trust

represents the citizens who are confident about the EU and its institutions. Their position is similar to Europhiles in Kopecky and Mudde's typology. Political scepticism represents alert and critical citizens. They don't deny the existence of the EU but evaluate the integration process critically. If worries of the sceptic citizen are verified by the political actor, in this case the EU and its institutions, sceptic attitude can turn to political distrust. It indicates citizens who have a critical eye on the EU in a pessimistic view. Even though political distrust includes an accepted pessimist worldview, these citizens are open to monitoring and evaluating the system. This feature of this group enables a possibility for change. On the other hand, cynicism symbolizes prejudiced negativism. Cynic citizens are not able to evaluate political actors and institutions separately. They believe that politicians are corrupt, selfish and don't have sufficient qualifications. They tend to generalize this negative perspective to whole process. Alienation is the extreme point of the rejective attitude. Alienated citizens are unwilling to participate in political movements and don't pay attention to democratic institutions. Political alienation denotes the loss of both procedural trust and systemic trust in democracy (Krouwel and Abts, 2007, 42).

Public Euroscepticism can derive from a lot of different reasons. Sorenson categorizes public Euroscepticism by emphasizing its motivation into four sections. According to her classification motivations for public Euroscepticism can be economic issues, sovereignty concerns, democracy deficit and sociopolitical reasons (Sorensen, 2008). Firstly, Euroscepticism which originates from economic reasons is named utilitarian Euroscepticism. The utilitarian approach reflects the basis of the neo-functionalist perspective. People evaluate the consequences of the relations with the EU or the EU membership according to its economic return. If a country gets harmed by the economic partnership or being a member of the EU, this situation provides a ground for utilitarian Euroscepticism. Secondly, the loss of national sovereignty is one of the concerns related to public Euroscepticism. Pooled sovereignty which is a result of assigning some sovereignty rights of nation-states to a supranational body like the EU causes sovereignty-based Euroscepticism. The liberal intergovernmental approach which is asserted by Moravscik reflects this kind of concern toward European integration. Thirdly, the democracy deficit in the EU causes public Euroscepticism. The voting system of the EU has been changed a couple of times since its establishment. An important change was made with Lisbon Treaty

and double-qualified majority voting was proposed instead of the old weighted-vote system (European Parliament, 2014). There are three kinds of voting systems simple majority, qualified majority and unanimous voting in the European Council and voting type changes according to the importance of the topic (European Council, 2020). While the simple majority is used for procedural matters, vital issues like common security and defense policies, EU membership and financial issues require unanimous voting. The qualified majority is the mostly preferred voting system in the decision-making process of the EU. Most of the decisions are made by qualified majority. According to the principle of double-qualified majority voting, at least %55 of member countries should approve the decision and these countries have to comprise %65 of the European population. This new system of voting presented a more efficient decision-making process to European Union in comparison with the old weighted-vote system. It aimed to decrease the democracy deficit in the EU. However, it can be said that great powers of the EU, like Germany and France, still dominate the decision-making process. Lastly, public Euroscepticism can derive from sociopolitical reasons. Citizens of a member or a candidate state can develop a Eurosceptic stance because of the discrepancy of political opinion for EU policies.

3.2. EUROSCEPTICISM IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

European Parliament is legislative body of the EU and it is the only directly elected institution. It consists Members of the European Parliament (MEP) who are elected by the people of the European Community (European Parliament, n.d). Due to this feature, it can be said that it represents the ideas of the European community. When looking at the current party division in the Parliament, an increase in Eurosceptic voices attracts attention. In this section, the structure of the European Parliament will be briefly explained. Then, the increase of the Eurosceptic parties and MEPs will be explained by comparing the 2009, 2014 and 2019 election results.

The European Parliament is a body that represents the democratic interests and political views of the citizens of the member states. The European Parliament is a part of the legislative process and shares legislative power with the Council. Adoption of legal regulations binding the member states is possible with the approval of both the European Parliament and the Council. EP has a word on passing or rejecting the law or it can offer an

amendment. However, EP has an advisory role on some issues, so its views are not legally binding. The most important ones of these areas are foreign policy issues and the budget. The EP makes the European Union budget together with the Council, but it has an advisor role in this process. In addition, it has political control over other European Union institutions.

Citizens of every member state elect its MEPs to represent its ideas in the EP. EP elections are made every five years and last one has been made in 2019. Number of the MEPs are directly proportional with the population of every member country. Members of the European Parliament form groups according to their political aspects, not their countries. Parliamentarians do not represent their country, but the political views of the European citizens who voted for them.

The European Parliament consists of seven party groups and non-attached members. According to the data of Politico (2019) these groups are European People's Party (EPP) – center-right, Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D)- social democracy, European Conservative Group (ECR) – Eurosceptic conservative, Renew Europe Group (RE) – liberal democracy, Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic green left (GUE/NGL), Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) – green identity and Identity and Democracy (ID) – Eurosceptic radical right-wing and non-attached members (Guimaraes & Aquino, 2020, 23).


Existence of the idea of Euroscepticism is not a new phenomenon in the EU Parliament. The voices against the EU institutions, policies and further European integration always found itself a place in the Parliament. Its feature of being articulated in large scale of ideologies from the far-right to left increased its representation in the Parliament. In addition, some parties that can be evaluated as center right like FIDESZ joined the Eurosceptic camp recently. The data of the 2009, 2014 and 2019 EP elections will be presented below by evaluating the distribution of party groups and rise of Eurosceptic atmosphere in the EP.

3.2.1. 2009 European Parliament Elections

Citizens of 27 member states (Croatia was not a member) voted for EP elections in 2009. Lack of voter turnout is one of the salient features of this election. However, since there is an observable gradual decline in voter turnout, it was not a surprising result. Voter turnout which was %61 in 1979 elections is diminishing gradually since then. In 2009 elections this ratio regresses to %43 and it means that more than half of the European community didn't join the election. This result is a reflection of being seen of EP election as second order (Trechsel, 2010) by the European community. They don't show and interest and join the EP elections like national elections. This situation explains the low voter turnout in the EP elections.

The results of the EP elections and distribution of party groups are indicated in the table below:

Figure 2: 2009 European Parliament Election Results



Source: European Parliament, 2014.

When looking at the results of the 2009 European Parliament elections from the left-right spectrum, it can be clearly said that there is visible domination of center-right and far-right (Deloy & Reynie, 2010). EPP increased its vote share in comparison with the 2004 EP elections. In addition, a new actor included in the Parliament as a voice of the Eurosceptic, conservatist, right-wing and gained important support from the European community in a short span of time. ECR was formed by the MEPs who think that EPP's approach to EU issues as too federalist and there is a need for forming a new group in the EP. It was formed with the leadership of David Cameron who was the former prime minister of Britain in 2006 and it gained significant feedback from the public. Furthermore, 3 of the NI members were members of the far-right Hungarian party, Jobbik. The impacts of the 2008 economic crisis can be evaluated as an influential factor for these results and the creation of ECR (Guimares & Aquino, 2020, 24). On the other hand, the left's vote share is at its lowest level since 1979 (Deloy & Reynie, 2010). Contrary to the right, the 2008 economic crisis affected the voting rate of the left-wing in a bad way. Left-wing candidates couldn't take a significant amount of the votes except for nine of the member states. However, support for Green parties and their candidates increased in comparison with previous elections. It shows that the representation of environmental issues and politics increased and will be debated in European politics in the upcoming years.

3.2.2. 2014 European Parliament Elections

2014 EP elections were held on May. There was a slight decrease in voter turnout and more than half of the European community didn't go to polls. The table that shows the result is:

Figure 3: 2014 European Parliament Election



Source: European Parliament, 2014.

The main agendas of this election were the economy, East-West divide among the member states and rebranding issue (Mudde, 2014). The winners of the economic crisis were far-right parties. Most of them use populist, nativist and democratic practices. Some of the center right parties, like Fidesz, adopt a more far-right, populist and Eurosceptic ideological stance during the election process to increase their vote rate. While this attitude of mainstream parties helps them to increase their vote, it legitimizes the rise of far-right parties. The most prominent example of this statement is the win of Front National (FN) in France. A far-right party became the first party in an EU member's national elections since the World War II and this situation was the most important reason of the increase of the weight of far-right in the EP (Mudde, 2014). EPP maintained its position as the largest group, although a visible decrease in its voting rate. S&D which represent the social democrats remained as the second largest group in the EP with a slight decrease. Voting rate of Eurosceptic ECR group increased by gaining 70 seats and it became the third largest group of the EP. Although not as much as far-right parties, far-left parties also increased the support they received from

the EU citizens. They adopted a nationalist anti-immigration and Eurosceptic discourse to persuade the voters (Halikiopoulou, 2014). The most important examples are PODEMOS from Spain, SYRIZA from Greece and Sinn Fein from Ireland. Economic crisis, austerity measures, migration policy of the EU and the pro-EU attitude of the mainstream parties provide a suitable ground for rise of far-left in these countries and it reverberated to the EP. Under these circumstances, GUE/NLG group increased its voting share from 4.57% to 6.92% and gained 17 more MEPs in the EP. It improved its performance and became fourth largest group in 2014 elections instead of its fifth position in the 2009 elections. Members of the non-attached members played a decisive role in the post-2014 period. NI increased from 33 to 52 in 2014 EP elections and almost all of the members of the group had a far-right ideological background. The success of the FN which is a French far-right party is inconvertible. It became the first party in national rally and had right to send 23 representatives to the EP. This number means almost one third of the France MEPs. All of the MEPs joined the NI group in the EP. In addition, 3 members of the Hungary's far-right party Jobbik, 4 members of Austria's far-right the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), 2 members of far-right Golden Dawn and 3 members of far-left Movement for a United Communist Party of Greece (KKE), 4 members of far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) of the Netherlands, 4 members of Eurosceptic and conservatist the Congress of the New Right (KNP) from Poland formed the NI group in the Parliament. It means that with the little existence of the far-left Eurosceptic members, far-right Eurosceptic understanding was dominant in the NI group. Due to the far-right and far-left parties are representatives of Eurosceptic ideas, there is a visible and rising Eurosceptic agenda in the EP.

3.2.3. 2019 European Parliament Elections

Low participation to the EP elections can be seen as a reason for democracy deficit in the EU and decisions of the EP is criticized because of this low turnout. Participation to 2019 EP elections was %50.62 and this result was surprisingly high in comparison with the previous election (European Parliament, 2019). Although it is still quite low when compared to national elections, it was the highest since 1994 elections. Individual, institutional, contextual factors and implications became influential for increase of voter turnout. The willingness of European young population to go-to-vote and people's believe in that their voice is heard in European politics via voting are two important reasons of the increase of


participation. In addition, increase of the sense of duty to vote among the European community with the effect of increment of educational level and rise of interest on politics affected voter turnout positively. Media-effect is an influential factor on higher turnout. Visibility of the issues about the European politics and the EU, electoral campaigns and political actors on media have a positive effect on participation and promote abstainers to vote. Lastly, voters can see European elections an opportunity to warn the current national government. The rise of far-right and far-left parties in the EP also can be evaluated as the reflection of this warning.

2019-2024 EP consists of 7 party groups and non-attached members. EPP became the largest group as in the previous two elections. S&D followed it as the second largest group. The number of MEPs of Renew Europe which is former ALDE increased considerably and settled to third place. Greens/EFA and ID which is former EFDD increased their vote sharing and seats substantially and became the fourth and fifth largest groups in the EP respectively. ECR lost 8 seats and regressed from 3rd place to 6th place. While NI has had 57 seats, GUE/NGL group became the last group with 41 seats. The results of the 2019 EP elections and the distribution of party groups can be seen in Figure 4:

Figure 4: 2019 European Parliament Election Results

European Parliament 2019 - 2024

Constitutive session



Resource: European Parliament, 2019

To sum up, an overall examination of the existence of Euroscepticism can be made by considering the 2009, 2014 and 2019 EP election results with the inclusion of political,

economic and social developments. The rise of Euroscepticism in the last three EP elections can be seen in the table below:

Table 3: Rate of Eurosceptic MEPs in the EP

Year	Number of Seats in the EP	Percentage of MEPs
2009	88	11.71%
2014	118	15.71%
2019	135	17.97%

Source: Guimares & Aquino, 2020

The success of the Eurosceptic candidates in the elections was reflected in the behavior of the party groups. Eurosceptic MEPs (members of GUE/NGL, ECR, ID–former EFDD- and NI groups) started to become more active in speeches and parliamentary questions in comparison with non-Eurosceptic members of the EP (Brack, 2017). The 2008 economic crisis and its effects on the European continent because of the economic and social interdependence that increased with the Maastricht Treaty can be interpreted as one of the reasons for the result that is indicated above. This ratio increased with the contribution of media effect in 2014 elections. Eurosceptic parties and candidates started to use Eurosceptic discourse more often as a propaganda tool by adopting a more populist language to increase their voting share in national elections. According to Treib (2014), people attribute a second-order character to the EP elections and see them as a warning for national government. They incline to vote for Eurosceptic parties as a sign of protest against dissatisfaction in reflection of the concerns about the EU policies to domestic politics and supranational structure of the EU. Also, increase of visibility of Eurosceptic discourse in mass media contribute to attraction of public attention to this topic. The 2015 refugee crisis and Brexit were two major topics that are discussed in media channels and turned to important arguments for Eurosceptic parties. 2019 EP elections was realized under this atmosphere. Participation to the elections was higher, but it doesn't show a rising support for the EU and its institutions.

Anti-establishment discourse found itself a ground alongside the Eurosceptic party groups (Guimares & Aquino, 2020, 30). With the contribution of this inclination, Euroscepticism gained support in European continent and its representation increased in the EP.

3.3. CONCEPT OF NATIONALISM

Nationalism, like Euroscepticism, is a concept that has not been fully agreed upon. Nationalism has a long history in world politics, but it entered into the research area of academia as an important concept in 1920 with the studies of Hayes and Kohn. Even though important studies have been made in 1960s and 1970s, 1980s are accepted as the bright era because of Hobsbawm and Smith's studies. These studies include a conceptual and theoretical framework to nationalism studies. According to Jordan and Weedon, nationalism is a discourse that shapes our consciousness and enables us to make sense of the world; in other words, it is a way of seeing and interpreting that determines our collective identities and directs our daily conversations, behaviors and attitudes (Özkırmı, 2000, 14).

Several categorizations have been made to understand and analyze nationalism. Synder and Smith use a historical categorization. According to this categorization, nationalism can be examined under 3 periods as pre-World War I period, years between two world wars 1918-1945 and post-1945. Post-1990 period was added as a new category to this classification by Özkırmı.

Another categorization is formed around the question of "to what extent are nations and nationalism modern?" Although different suggestions, three main categories are accepted commonly. These are primordialist, modernist and ethno-symbolist approaches.

Concept of primordialism is firstly used in 1957 by British historian Edward Shils in one of his articles. Effect of primordialist approach was quite visible in academic studies until 1960s. According to the primordialist understanding, nations are seen as a natural and given structure. It can be mentioned four categories within the primordialist understanding of nationalism. First one is naturalist approach. Ethnic identity is seen as a natural part of human being like five senses. People are belong to different ethnic communities and they are tend to exclude each other. Supporters of this idea advocate that nations have an historical

origin, natural boundaries and specific features. At this point, Smith (1984) criticizes naturalist aspect by offering a new approach, perennialism. He believes that the roots of the existence of nations stem from ancient times, but it doesn't mean nations are an indispensable part of natural order. Even if some changes occurred in the understanding of nationalism, its core was preserved. Biological approach associates nationalism with genetic links and instincts. Concerns about the reproduction and survival of the nation consist the hinges of the approach. Pierre van der Berghe is one of the most important figures of this approach. He describes ethnic communities as super families. Cultural primordialism is the last category. It prioritizes the effect of beliefs in the formation of an ethnic community. Common history, language, religion or beliefs constitute a bond among people and strengthen group consciousness.

The modernist approach to nationalism occupies a more prominent place in literature in comparison with primordialism. It became the dominant approach in nationalism studies until the emergence of ethno-nationalist understanding in the 1980s. According to the modernist approach, nations and nationalism are two phenomena that belong to the modern era. Industrialization and capitalist world order caused the emergence of nations and nationalism. It developed through modernization processes with the increase of central state authority, urbanization, secularization and mass media (Smith, 2002, 34). Studies can be categorized under three sections according to their main focus for explaining the reasons for the rise of nationalism. These main points are economic, political and social-cultural reasons. Any of the reasons cannot be the only reason for nationalism by itself, but according to some researchers, one of them has a stronger influence.

The effect of economic transformation on the emergence of nationalism is mostly asserted by neo-Marxist understanding. According to this approach, struggle against neo-imperialism or economic imperialism brings a national qualification to this struggle. Tom Nairn is an important figure of this approach in nationalism literature with the concept of uneven development. He criticizes the idea that see the nationalism as a natural continuation of history and advocates that the roots of nationalism should not be sought in the internal dynamics of societies, but in the general historical development process of the world (Selçuk, 2011, 3858). He is influenced by dependency theories, like world system theory of Immanuel Wallerstein, while developing this approach. Industrialized (core) states achieved a global

superiority on undeveloped (periphery) states by with the help of capitalist world order. Nationalism emerged in undeveloped countries as a reaction to this uneven structure. It diffused and influenced developed countries in time.

Some modernist researchers evaluate nationalism as an output of the political processes. Breuilly, Brass and Hobsbawm can be demonstrated among this group. Breuilly (1993) defines nationalism as *“political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments”* in his book *Nationalism and State*. Economic and cultural structures can explain some kind of nationalism, but it is related to politics and gaining power. Breuilly separate nationalism firstly according to their purpose and then, whether they are against a nation-state or a non-nation state. Three purposes of nationalism are ranged as separation, reform and unification (Breuilly, 1993, 9). Hungarian nationalism is placed as separatist and opposed to the non-nation state section. It has a separatist characteristic because its purpose was separation from the Austria-Hungarian Empire in the 1848 Hungarian Revolution and separation from the Soviet regime during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Brass who is another modernist researcher tries to explain the roots of nationalism with the concept of instrumentalism. According to this understanding, nationalism is seen as an instrument that is used by elites for taking authority and preserving it. Nationalism is used by elites to crystalize the distinction between different ethnic groups by selecting some specific part of a group culture for gaining their support. Elites use nationalism for creating competition between different ethnic groups for preserving their interest. Lastly, Eric Hobsbawm explains nations and nationalism by considering their relations with political interests. He criticizes the idea of primordialism which is nations are given and unchangeable categories. He evaluates the nationalism as a result of social engineering and explain it with the concept of invention of tradition. It means symbolic implementation and habits that are followed by a group of people ceremonially. It bridges over the past and present. National consciousness is the most concrete example for this concept (Özkırımlı, 2000, 134). Nations are quite new phenomena and emergence of them can be traced back to emergence of territorial state (Hobsbawm, 1990). For this reason, considering the state and nations independently would be a mistake. According to Hobsbawm nationalism is a dual phenomenon. It starts and is constructed by the upper-class, but it can be understood by analyzing the hope, necessities and interest of the crowd.

There is an approach that see the roots of nationalism in socio-cultural reasons. Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson are the representatives of this approach. Gellner defines nationalism as the principle that argues that the political and national unit should be compatible with each other and belongs to modern era (Gellner, 1983, 1). According to him, nationalism reveal nations. It is a high culture and it occurs by imposing of this culture on other sub-cultures. As a result, a community which share the same cultural code consists of (Gellner, 1983, 57). Anderson defines nations as a social artefact and explain it with his concept of imagined communities. According to his idea nations are imagined communities (Anderson, 2009, 6). Once it emerged, it can be reproduced in other communities. It can comply with different ideologies from far-right to far-left in different countries. He emphasizes the relation between emergence of nationalism and decline of religion and monarchism. Decline of monarchy and power loss of religious institutions in politics create the necessary space for rise of nations and nationalism. Although the inequality and exploitation within the society, nations developed with the understanding of fraternity. Sense of fraternity enables people to make all kinds of sacrifices and even give their lives for the sake of their nation (Anderson, 2009, 20).

The last category is ethno-symbolism. It emerged as a critical response to the modernist approach. It is used to indicate nationalism theories that emphasize the importance of ethnic background and culture. It can be seen as a midway between primordialism and modernism (Özkırımlı, 2000, 190). According to enthno-symbolism current nations are the ethnic communities of the pre-modern era. These two are different in level of development, but the core remains the same. Current nations are formed under the influence of past ethnic cultures. Symbols, myths, discourses and language decide the content of nationalism. Ethno-symbolists accept that nationalism is an output of the modern era, but the emergence of nationalism cannot be explained by only the modernization process and its elements. Ethnic background and commitments are influential in the emergence and development of nationalism. John Armstrong and Anthony Smith are the two important figures of this approach. Armstrong is seen as the founder of ethno-symbolism. He presents a historical perspective on nationalism and starts to trace its roots in ancient times. He suggests that nations exist before nationalism in his book *Nations before Nationalism* (Armstrong, 1982). They are not given, but an invented phenomenon. Contrary to the modernist approach, he

claims that ethnic identities develop independently from territorial boundaries. Ethnic and cultural distinctions are determinants of national categorizations. Myths and symbols are significant determinants of this distinction. Despite Armstrong being seen as the founder of ethno-symbolism, Smith can be indicated as the prominent theorist of this area. He defines the nation as “a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith, 1991, 14). Smith claims that the origin of the nation comes from ethnic identity. Communities that have similar ethnic origins constitute nations. At this point, Smith mentions two types of ethnic communities as lateral and vertical that provide a basis for nation formation. Lateral ethnic communities generally include the elite class as a subject of nationalist movements. Due to the capability of communicating between the elite groups being easier at this level, the nationalist movements spread easily in the region. Thus, this type of ethnic community is called as lateral. They have flexible boundaries, but they can't reach the bottom of the community. It is mostly seen in western European countries (Özkırmı, 2000, 202). Latter type of ethnic community is seen in eastern cultures. Common values and culture play a unitary role among the different classes of the community. It creates an intense and exclusive ethnic structure. The emergence of the nation starts with the ethnic core which constitutes people who are connected to each other and conscious of their differences. (Özkırmı, 2000, 201). These ethnic cores form the basis of modern nation-states. He defines nationalism as an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation' (Smith, 1991, 72). He mentions two types of nationalism territorial nationalism and ethnic nationalism and separates them into two phases pre-independence and post-independence. Pre-independence territorial nationalist movements emerge against a foreign regime and have a separatist characteristic. These kinds of movements are named anti-colonial nationalism. Post-independence territorial nationalism aims to gather dispersed ethnic communities within the previous colonial lands and form a territorial nation. They are defined as integration nationalism. On the other hand, ethnic nationalism in the pre-independence phase expresses establishing an ethnic-based state by separating from a larger political institution. Thus, these movements are called secession or diaspora nationalism. Ethnic nationalist movements adopt an expansionist agenda in the post-independence period. They aim to expand their territories to

the lands where their kinsmen live and to form a united ethnonational state. They called irredentist or pan nationalism. (Smith, 1991, 82-83)

3.4. HUNGARIAN NATIONALISM

The movement of Hungarian nationalism is rooted back to Habsburg Empire. Hungarians have been accepted as a privileged part of the population in the Habsburg Empire, so their nationalist movement can't be associated with economic reasons or a periphery position within the society. Hungarian nationalism developed against the political oppression of the Habsburg Empire (Özkırımlı, 2000, 106). Hungarian nationalism started among elites and spread to the community. Smith's ethnic nationalism is a more compatible nationalism type to explain for features of Hungarian nationalism when its history is considered. When the effect of the elite factor is considered, it can be evaluated as a lateral ethnic community.

There are more specific categorizations of nationalism. Three subtitles that explain the current Hungarian nationalist discourse will be explained in the following section.

3.4.1 Neoliberal Nationalism

Neoliberalism and nationalism offer a quite distinct world perspectives and these two theories generally cannot be portrayed together. Neoliberalism started to be influential in world politics in the 1970s and prepared a basis for the consolidation of the capitalist world order. A free-market economy and a functioning democracy are two important elements of neoliberalism. Diminishing state intervention over the market is seen as a factor that increases interdependence in the economic area and as a result an initiator for peace. On the other hand, the state has a significant place in nationalist policies. Despite its place and scope being a discussed topic recently, the connection between state and nationalism can be seen in the emergence of the nation-state concept. The understanding of citizenship is another significant difference between neoliberalism and nationalism. Neoliberalism prioritizes the individual existence of a person. While self-reliance, productivity and independence are encouraged qualifications under the concept of individual responsibility, dependence is portrayed as a negative attitude. Contrary to neoliberalism, dependence to a culture or an ethnic identity is an asset for nationalism. An individual is responsible to his/her group

Neoliberalism emerged in western countries and developed quickly with the policies followed by great powers. Eastern countries and states which are under Soviet influence experienced this transition later than western countries. Neoliberalism spread to the eastern part of the world with the initiatives of external actors like the EU, IMF, the World Bank and western states. However, some CEE countries can be seen as an exception at this point. Hungary is one of the states that is included in this group. Neoliberal policies started to develop in the 1970s which is an early date in comparison with the eastern sphere of the world and internal actors, like politicians and elites, played an important role in this transition period distinctly with other eastern states.

There are some examples of politicians who combine neoliberal economic programs with conservative policies. This method is mostly preferred by right-wing politicians. Thatcher and Reagan are two influential political figures who implement neoliberal policies with authoritarian populist discourse (Harmes, 2012, 70). Nationalism can be a tool of foreign policy for a populist leader. David Harvey argues that “the neoliberal state needs nationalism for a certain sort to survive” (Harmes, 2012, 71). For example, while Thatcher adopts a nationalist discourse against economic integration with Europe, she followed neoliberal policies to promote free-market economy in internal politics.

Contemporary Hungarian government under the leadership of Viktor Orbán carries neoliberal nationalist features. Dorit Geva (2021) named Orbán’s governing style as “ordonationalism” which combine authoritarianism and hyper-nationalist neoliberalism. Nationalist discourse is seen as a necessary element for economic and political survival of Hungary.

Economic growth and national rejuvenation constitute the major pillars of the Orbán regime. On the economy side of the policy, Orbán government claims that encouraging the competitiveness will strengthen the economy and promote a work-based society (Fabry, 2017, 136-137). Economic policy is constituted by the government by sticking to the central elements of neoliberalism like maintenance of balanced budget, a flat tax system and pursuit of regressive social policies. Criminalization of homelessness and regulations in retirement procedures that come by the 2011 constitutional changes are compatible policies with neoliberalism. On the political side, increase of nationalist discourse attracts the attention.

Creating a common threat against homeland is the most common method by nationalist politicians and Orbán uses this rhetoric quite a lot in his speeches. Syrian refugee crisis and the EU policies in this area ease to usage of this xenophobic and nationalist language. Creating the image of “outsiders” and “enemies of people” can be encountered quite a lot in Orbán’s speeches. For instance, he calls Syrian refugees as “Muslim invaders” (Independent, 2018) and point George Soros who is Hungarian-American investor for being guilty of poor state of events in Hungarian politics. “Stop Soros” law which prevent aiding to undocumented migrants passed from the parliament. Mudde evaluates this law as a perfect example of radical right party behavior by combination of these three features: an authoritarian approach to law and order, a populist critique of elites as out of touch and corrupt, and a nativist ideology that casts immigrants as a threat to the nation (Beauchamp, 2018).

3.3.2. Populist Nationalism

Nationalism can easily combine with other ideologies. Populism is one of the easiest ideologies that can combine with nationalism. It is a debated term and there is no consensus about its definition. However, Mudde’s (2007) definition is accepted by most scholars in the field. He defines populism as “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus the 'corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté gindrale* (general will) of the people” (Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove, 2014, 1326-1327). Image of “the people” has a significant place in populism. They are seen as a main subject of democracy. The general will of the people is an indispensable feature of liberal democracies, but the understanding of the people is very different in these two perspectives. People are described as homogeneous, pure and virtuous. Mudde (2007) evaluates populism as a monist ideology that opposes pluralism. This approach brings a skeptical attitude toward institutional bodies. Elite groups are seen as corrupt and evil parts of society. This feature of populism provides the concept of the “other” needed in the nationalist understanding.

Using of populist discourse is one of the common methods used by politicians. The intensity of populist discourse is increased by politicians in election time for taking support, especially in domestic politics. Right-party politicians mostly combine this populist

discourse with nationalist sentiment. Meaning of the people is used to refer an ethnic group by radical right party politicians (Lugosi, 2018, 3-4). Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán, Turkey's president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Donald Trump who is the former president of the USA can be pointed out as suitable examples of this situation. Election slogan of Donald Trump which is "Make America Great Again" has populist-nationalist features. Orbán government which was an important ally of Trump administration follows a similar policy. He uses populist-nationalist discourse that contribute to the successful results of 2022 general elections. Hungarian nation, Christian roots and importance of family are seen as basics of Hungarian values and these concepts can be encountered in his speeches a lot. He clearly indicates these points in his speech of Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in August 2022. Orbán says that *"I'm here to tell you, our values. The nation, Christian roots and family can be successful in the political battlefield. We made these values successful and mainstream in Hungary"*. He constructs concept of "the people" over these values and groups that oppose to these values are seen as the enemy of the people. The European Union, George Soros, Roma people and migrants constitute the main actors of the other. This political attitude brings a Eurosceptic political stance alongside.

3.3.3. Irredentism

Irredentism is defined as a policy of returning land to a country that it belonged to in the past according to Cambridge dictionary. The main focus of Hungarian irredentism is taking back the lost territory and population with the Treaty of Trianon (This partition can be seen at the Figure 1 in Chapter 2). It is the same idea that caused Hungary's involvement to World War II alongside Axis powers. Although Hungary regained some of the lost lands at the beginning of the war, borders remained pretty much the same as the decided territories in the Treaty of Trianon at the end of the war. This situation caused the issue of Hungarians living abroad. Hungarians living in Romania constitute the majority of the Hungarians living abroad. More than 1.2 million ethnic Hungarians live in Romania, especially in Transylvania (Harris, 2018). Hungarians living in Slovakia and Serbia follow it. As Waterbury (2009) claims that, irredentist ideas transformed to a diaspora politics because of the current conjuncture. It can be named as "transborder nationalism" which is defined as promotion of some specific definition of national community by homeland government for its own purpose (Waterbury, 2009, 7). "Status Law" which aims to promote for Hungarians living

in the neighboring countries their belonging to a unitary Hungarian nation, prosperity in their mother country, and the consciousness of their national identity has been passed in 2001 (Kis, 2004, p. 157; Waterbury, 2009, 6). Status Law provides some benefits to ethnic Hungarians living abroad in the area of work permit, taking medical care, getting pension and scholarship opportunities in education. Orbán was the head of government in this process and Fidesz government used this nationalist discourse as a tool for maintaining economic and political relations with the Hungarians living abroad same as today. This discourse is still used by Orbán and right-wing politicians such as officials of Jobbik. Officials of neighbor countries like Romania and Slovakia utter their disturbance about this irredentist approach and condemned such statements of Hungarian politicians. However, irredentist rhetoric still find itself a place in statements of Hungarian politicians. Facebook post of Hungarian prime minister about the map of “Greater Hungary” which shows the old Hungarian Kingdom can be seen as an example for existence of this discourse in Hungarian politics (Barberá & Vladisavljevic, 2020). In addition, an amendment was made to allow dual citizenship for ethnic Hungarians abroad. This regulation ease to vote for them. Hungarian diaspora responds this political stance by supporting Fidesz in general elections. %96.2 of total vote of them goes to Fidesz (Hutt, 2022). Even if Hungarian government uses irredentist discourse and it gets response from Hungarian diaspora, Orban’s irredentism is largely symbolic and is getting intense during the poll to increase voting rate. Looking at the current political structure, there is no reason to believe that Hungary put in a claim for lost territories by force.

CHAPTER IV

THE EUROPEAN UNION-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS AND THE RISE OF EUROSCEPTICISM IN HUNGARY

This chapter aims to evaluate Euroscepticism in Hungary by considering EU-Hungarian relations from a historical perspective. The EU membership process of Hungary will be explained in the first section of the chapter. Economic, political and social policy changes to fit with the Copenhagen Criteria that were made with the understanding of “return to Europe” will be presented. In the second part, EU policies and events that caused the rise of Euroscepticism will be mentioned by considering from post-accession to current political stance. Hungarian Euroscepticism will be analyzed in party and public level by using Eurobarometer and the European Commission data in the last section.

4.1. CHANGES IN THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS OF HUNGARY

Hungary was one of the post-Soviet countries which are more eager to improve its relations with the west. Contacts with the west has started quite earlier from the collapse of the Soviet Union. A protocol which is signed in agricultural area in 1968 with EEC can be demonstrated as first contact with west. In the following years, EEC-Hungarian relations made progress especially in economic area with the contribution of trade agreements. Economic liberalization process started with bilateral agreements that were signed in 1980s with the EEC and other international institutions, like IMF. Economic rapprochement paved the way for improvement of political relations. Weakening of the Soviet influence over the CEE countries and marks of the collapse of the Soviet Union provide a suitable ground for amelioration of the EU-Hungarian Relations. The EU prepared economic aid programs to accelerate accession process of the CEE countries to the Union. PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring their Economies), SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development) and ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession) were launched to support CEE countries for accession process (Yılmaz&Tolunay, 2007). All EU financial aid programs were gathered under IPA (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance) in 2007.

Hungary started the negotiation process in 1998. There were some economic and political criteria that Hungary should fulfil to be the member of the Union. The economic, political and social changes that are realized by Hungarian governments to complete the accession process will be presented under three subtitles below.

4.1.1. Economic Changes

Hungary was a centrally planned economy which was bound to the Soviet financial assistance in communist period. A statist socialist economy model was adopted until 1980s and economic growth occurred in industry, agriculture and husbandry sectors with the help of this economy model (Sancaktar, 2019, 40). Hungarian economy started to deteriorate in 1980s and economic recession and foreign indebtment became significant issues of the decade. Economic recession strengthened the liberal opposition parties which prioritize neoliberal reforms and received foreign support from capitalist western countries. This economic atmosphere triggered political movements and played a role in falling of communist regime in Hungary.

Hungary tried to ensure multiple options for economic relations with other world economies quite before the EU membership process. It became a member of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) in 1973. Economic liberalization continued in 1980s when is an earlier date in comparison with other CEE countries. A law that allows establishment of private business was enacted and scope of private business that restricted with area of agriculture was expanded (Knight, 1983; as cited in Sancaktar, 2019, 41). This development opened a road for improvement of a functioning market economy. Hungary became a member of IMF in 1982 and influence of capitalist market economy became more visible in the country. Accession negotiations started in 1988 with the EU and Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed by the parties. Government monopoly over the foreign trade was lifted and %90 of export was deregulated within two years (Sezer and Çeşmecioğlu, 1998, 19-25). Establishment of private banks contributed to the economic liberalization process and foundation of private business was promoted by providing a legal ground.

Economic integration of member states to the economic area generates an important part of the accession process. Economic integration aims to constitute a functioning system

with effective distribution and dispersion of economic resources among the member countries. According to the integration theories, economic integration paves the way for deepening of the European integration. FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) played a significant role for economic integration of Hungary to European economic area (Kaminsky, 1999, 2). Export rate of the Hungary increased with the influence of FDI, mostly with the initiation of multinational corporations, and it turned to a pivotal export country for the EU. European association agreement was signed before the membership agreement and trade relations developed with the signing of several partnership agreements by joining of Hungary to the European free trade area. Agriculture has a different place in economic integration process. While integration of other sectors like industry proceeded faster, integration of agriculture and food sector required more detailed process because of health issues and lack of competitiveness of Hungarian firms in related area (Duponcel, 1998, 92). This branch continued to become a problematic issue for the EU-Hungarian relations in the scope of CAP afterwards.

4.1.2. Political Changes

There were some political changes that should be made by candidate countries to comply with the *acquis communautaire*. European Commission's annual reports became a guideline for the candidate countries in accession process. These reports aim to monitor the current situation in the country and were indicating necessary further changes that should be made by CEE countries to fulfil the political step of the Copenhagen criteria. Janse (2019) constitutes a table shows the European Commission's conceptualization of the Copenhagen political criteria between 1997–2004 is indicated in Table 4. Table includes the data from Opinions (1997), the Regular Reports (1998–2002, and in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania 1998–2004); the 2003 Comprehensive Monitoring Reports about the political pillar of the Copenhagen Criteria. These political criteria were classified under three main titles in the table as democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, including minority rights. As indicated in the table, Hungary started the reform plans for the necessary political changes quite earlier and it had already ensured some of the political requirements such as free and fair elections, rule by law etc. when it comes in 1997. It can be said that fulfilling the political criteria was less challenging for Hungary in comparison with other CEE countries.

Table 4: The European Commission's Conceptualization of the Copenhagen Political Criteria, 1997–2004

POLITICAL COPENHAGEN CRITERIA (1997–2004)	BULGARIA	ROMANIA	POLAND	HUNGARY	ESTONIA	LATVIA	LITHUANIA	CZECH REPUBLIC	SLOVAKIA	SLOVENIA
DEMOCRACY										
Free and fair elections (national and local), including universal adult suffrage, right to be elected and competitive multiparty system	1997; 2000; 2001; 2002.	1997; 2001; 2002; 2004	1997; 1998; 2000; 2001	1997–2002	1997	1997; 1999	1997	1997; 2002	1997–2002	1997; 1999
Democratic control and oversight (involving the opposition) over government and public companies	1997–1999	1997, 1999, 2002, 2003	1997, 1999	1997	1997	1997	1997	1997, 1998	1997, 2001, 2002	1997
Independent media	1997–1998, 2000, 2004	1997; 2001; 2003; 2004	1997; 1998; 1999	1997, 2000–2002	1997	1997	1997	1997; 2001; 2002	1997–2002	1997
RULE OF LAW										
Powers government and officials circumscribed by law and exercised in accordance with law (especially law enforcement and secret service)	1997, 1998–2004	1997–1998; 2002–2004	1997–1999	1997	1997	1997	1997	1997	1997–2000	1997
Rule by law, not emergency decrees		1998–2004		1997					1998	1997
Independent and impartial judiciary	1997–2004	1997–2004	1997–1998; 1999–2002	1997–2002	1997, 2001, 2002	1997, 2001	1997, 2001	1997, 1999–2002	1997–2002	1997; 2001, 2002
Justice delivered timely	1997–2004	1997, 1999, 2001; 2002–	1997–2002	1997–2002	1998–2002	1997, 1999,	1997–2002	1997–2002	2000; 2001; 2002	1997–2002
Judicial decisions enforced and obeyed		2001; 2003	2002			1997			1998; 1999; 2000	
Right to a fair trial (especially access to justice) guaranteed	1997, 1998–2002; 2004	1997, 2001–2003	1997, 2000; 2001; 2002	1997, 2002	1997	1997	1997–2002	1997, 2002	1997, 2000	1997, 2001, 2002
Criminal justice in accordance with fundamental rights standards (esp. articles 2, 3, 5 and 6 ECHR)	1997–2004	1997–2004	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997–2002	1999; 2000; 2001; 2002	1997–2002	1997
Citizens have access to information from the state and local government bodies on matters of public interest		2002; 2003; 2004	2000; 2001; 2002					1999; 2000; 2001; 2002	2002	
Independent non- governmental checks on exercise of power (NGOs, universities, Ombudsman)	1997–1998; 2000–2004	1997–1998; 2000–2004	1997–2002	1997–1998; 2000–2002	1997, 1999	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997–2002
Absence of corruption: Government officials (judges, legislature, executive branch, police, military) do not use public office for private gain	1997–2004	1997–2004	1997–2002	1997	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997–2002
Laws are enforced	2000	1998	1998							
Crime is controlled	2002–2004	2001–4						1999, 2000	2000	
Independent public administration	1998–2004	2001	2000–2002	2001			2000–2002	2000–2002	1998–1999, 2001–2002	2002

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING MINORITY RIGHTS										
Freedom of expression guaranteed	1997, 2000–2004	1997–1998; 2000–2004	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997	1997	1997, 2001	1997–1998; 2001–2002	1997–2002	1997
Right to private property guaranteed	1997	1997; 2000–2004	1997–2002	1997	1997	1997	1997	1997, 2002	1997	1997–2002
Freedom of association guaranteed	1997, 2000	1997	1997	1997	1997	1997, 1998	1997	1997	1997	1997
Ratification of Framework Convention on Protection Minorities and Recommendation 1201 Council of Europe. Minority rights recognized in national constitution and legislation (re employment, use of minority languages; access to housing, education and health care)	1997, 1999–2004	1997–2004	1997	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997	1997	1997–2002
Programs to give effect to minority protection legislation (access to housing, education, employment, health care; protection against discrimination)	1997–2004	1997–2004	1997, 2000–2002	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997–2002	1997–2002

Source: Janse, 2019, 62-63.

There were still some changes that Hungary should make to fulfil political requirement of Copenhagen Criteria, although its successful transition process so far. Completing the political deficit and finishing the accession process successfully was one of the main agenda of 1994-1998-2002 governments. Hungary was the leading applicant of the membership process during FIDESZ-MPP coalition of 1998 under the leadership of current prime minister Orbán (Batory, 2002, 3). A significant progress has been made in political context in his tenure. Agriculture policy, corruption and the minority rights issue continued to be the major issues that need to be handled. Some steps have been taken to fulfil the requirements by Hungarian governments. Making progress was more difficult in agriculture due to complexity of reconstruction of the sector. A fragmented and uncompetitive land structure has emerged because of the policies that were followed during the regime transition process (Batory, 2002, 3). This situation beclouded integration of agriculture sector to political and economic structure of the EU. Anti-corruption units have been established and Criminal Law Convention was signed coping with corruption. In addition, judges and judicial staff who have information about the EU legislation have been raised. Although the studies that have been made in this area, Hungary's progress remained its lower rank position in coping with corruption (European Commission, 2000b, 16). Last of the major issues is minority rights. Rights of Roma people which constitute approximately %7.05 of Hungarian population according to data of the Council of Europe is the main focus of the issue. Hungary started studies to improve minority rights shortly after the regime change. Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities and Act LXXIX of 1993 on Public

Education were passed by the Hungarian Parliament (Réti, 1995, 273). These legal regulations which were made in line with the EU's political criteria have aimed to protect minority rights and eliminate the structural deficit of disadvantaged groups. Despite the regulations that are made to minimize the human rights violations, minority right issue - especially about the Roma population- remained one of the major issues in Hungarian politics.

4.1.3. Social Policy Changes

Social policy was one of the fields that is needed to make changes. Implementations of communist governments were quite different from democratic and liberal perspective. Previous governments in communist era prioritized security issues instead of social policies. The main aims of the social policy change were promoting the idea of individual responsibility instead of public responsibility in social issues, encouraging private investments and marketization, diminishing social insurance by strengthening private insurance for decreasing public spending (Ferge and Juhasz, 2004, 234). World Bank and IMF were two important funders of the initiations for social policy changes. European Social Model started to become influential among CEE countries in social policy area in mid-1990s. It foresees integration of social policies by civil and social dialogue (Ferge and Juhasz, 2004, 234). Pension, health, education, gender right policies and policies for anti-discrimination can be indicated as forefront issues of social changes.

Institutionalization of administrative bodies and consultation agencies, developing a law-making process comply with the European model were to first issues that should be handled by Hungarian government (Ferge and Juhasz, 2004, 236). The Council of Europe played an important role in this process. Development of social and civil dialogue were two significant ways for improvement of social policy. As a result of social dialogue, unionization was encouraged and a platform that helps to establish a cooperation in sectoral level was established with the guidance of the Commission. The EU provided funds to Hungary and Poland in this process by developing PHARE program. Development of civil dialogue means inclusion of civil organizations to policy-making process in social area. Existence of civil society and financial support to civil organizations were not sufficient and concrete in policy-making process in Hungary. State started to financial support to civil

organizations in accession process and took some steps to ensure the persistency of inclusion of civil society to politics. Act 50 of 2003 can be shown as an example. Distribution of resources among of civil organizations became fairer and funding of them became less complex (Ferge and Juhasz, 2004, 239). Another initiative was held by the Commission. It launched the Interactive Policy-making Initiative and the Open Method of Coordination which provide a discussion area to civil organizations and gave an area of influence to them in policy-making process. Civil organizations had a word in policy area with the implementation of these programs in Hungarian politics. This situation brought polyphony to political area and contribute the development of democratization process.

Development of the labor market was a major issue that need some changes for integration into the acquis. Proper safety and health conditions should have been ensured in working areas. National Authority for Labor and Safety at Work has been passed by Hungarian Parliament in 1993 for harmonization of national labor law with the EU law (Ferge and Juhasz, 2004, 240). In addition, a separate unit was constituted under the authority area of the Ministry of Welfare to promote gender equality in 1998-2002 Orbán government. Act 125 of 2003 was accepted by the Hungarian government for promoting gender equality in working area. Even though pension system continued to become in the interest area of national politics, private pension programs were encouraged for the harmonization of the EU policies.

Social assistance was one of the most incomplete areas in Hungary after the regime change and new laws and regulations should have been made to cope with the deficit in this area. Hungarian government started studying in this area for integrating the social policies to the EU norms. Protection of old people and orphan and disadvantageous children were the focus of the policies. Social Act (1993) and Child Protection Act (1997) were approved by the parliament for this aim (Ferge and Juhasz, 2004, 245). World Bank provided financial assistance to improvement of social policies. It also gave the structural support for institutionalization of the social assistance system. The EU started to become influential for policy-making process in social policy area after 2002. It requested for preparation of a Joint Inclusion Memorandum from each candidate state to fulfil the accession criteria. Joint Inclusion Memorandum should have been included main problems in social policy areas.

Hungary made the necessary political, economic and social policy changes to fulfil the membership criteria and became a member of the EU on May 1, 2004 with other nine CEE countries. Hungary was one of the most willing countries for the EU membership, because accession to the EU was meaning the confirmation of the Europeanness. Becoming a part of the Europe and constituting strong relations with the west were important goal in Hungarian politics after the communist regime. Hungary's joining to the EU was supported by 83% of the voters. This was the fourth highest rate that is seen in membership referendums (Monte, 2022, 18). However, their willingness about the EU membership hasn't continued so long. Dissatisfaction about the EU policies and feeling of being a secondary position in the Union caused increase of Euroscepticism and rise of nationalist discourse in Hungarian politics.

4.2. CASES AND EU POLICIES THAT CAUSE A EUROSCEPTIC STANCE IN HUNGARIAN POLITICS

European integration continued to increase and deepened in different areas after the membership. For example, Hungary joined the Schengen Area in 2007 and accepted to open its national borders to other European Community members without a visa requirement. However, Eurosceptic attitudes started to increase in Hungarian politics and public opinion with the influence of deeper integration. There are some prominent events and EU policies that plays a significant role for emergence of Eurosceptic political stance. These were listed and analyzed under four subtitles in the following part of this section.

4.2.1. European Sovereign Debt (ESD) Crisis


2008 economic crisis triggered a world scale economic crisis. It had a significant impact on the economies of the European countries. However, crisis had a more negative effect on fragile CEE economies due to the adoption of relatively new economic system. A lot of CEE countries had to apply to IMF for taking public loans for coping with the crisis atmosphere. Hungary was one of the CEE countries that highly affected by the crisis. Hungarian economy was caught the crisis under disadvantageous economic conditions. Economic reform studies had lost its primary position after the accession and public debt and budget deficit was quite high (Flamm, 2012, 315). Structure of the market economy had

different dynamics from the command economy of the communist era. Competitiveness and egocentric structure of market economy was not compatible with the state-centric approach of command economy. While working areas were under the control of the state in communist regimes, proliferation of the private companies and competitive market understanding became dominant in economy after the accession. In addition, unemployment rate gradually increased with the adoption of the implementations of market economy (Flamm, 2012, 305-306). These unfamiliar situations caused a distrust and dissatisfaction among the Hungarian population. It became a reason for Euroscepticism and triggered the rise of populist-nationalist governments by starting with 2010 elections.

EU institutions and IMF were important actors of the crisis management process during the ESD crisis. They provided funds to the states that are in poor economic condition and launched some economy programs that are compatible with the required implementations for each state which ask for supervision (Bourne and Chatzopoulou, 2017, 306). These programs were including austerity measures that means cutting government spending, and repayment schedules. These implementations were seen as an intervention to national sovereignty and caused public protests against the European integration. According to Vasilopoulou (2013), Euroscepticism entered into a new phase because of the crisis. Mass protests, elite Euroscepticism and anti-referendum agenda among the EU leaders constitute the new features of current Eurosceptic stance (Bourne and Chatzopoulou, 2017, 306).

According to the answers that are given to one of the questions of the Eurobarometer survey provide information about the effect of the EDS crisis on the rise of Euroscepticism among EU member states. The question is “*Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership of the European Community (Common Market) is ... ?*”. The graphic below shows the rate of the positive response of the European Community between 1973-2019 to this question. It can be clearly seen that there is a sharp decrease in 2009 about the positive image of the EU among the EC due to the effect of EDS crisis.

Figure 5: Public Support for the EU Membership and Economic Growth



Source: Hix and Hoyland, 2022, 126

Similar picture can be seen in Hungary when Eurobarometer data is examined. The highest negative response with 23% was taken to the same question that indicated above (Molnar, 2013, 92). This economic crisis caused the rise of Eurosceptic and nationalist right-wing parties in Hungarian politics. FIDESZ won the 2010 election under the leadership of Orbán. He re-elected for three successive general elections (2014-2018-2022) as prime minister since then. Although a declining support for other right-wing political party Jobbik in recent years, it became third party in 2010 and 2014 general elections and main opposition party in 2018 general elections.

4.2.2. Migration Policy

International migration is one of the pivotal issues in world politics in the twenty first century. Even there are several reasons of condensation of migration flow -like natural disasters, employment opportunities, seeking for better life conditions etc-, one issue became prominent more than a decade. Syrian refugee issue which is consequence of Syrian Civil War caused displacement of a great number of people. Syrian civil war began as mass protests against the authoritarian administration of Assad regime in 2011. Protests started with demands for more political rights, freedom and human rights. They turned into violent movements with the harsh response of the government. The conflict which begins between newly established Free Syrian Army and government forces turned into a civil war in a short

time. Involvement of other actors to the conflict as a party worsened the situation. Political and military support of Russia, Iran, Hezbollah groups to the Assad regime and support of the U.S and Arab governments to non-integrated opposition created more complex dynamics in the region (Davis, 2015).

Migration issues started to become more important agenda in world politics after the Syrian Civil War which started as a continuation of Arab Spring. Refugee flow which is consequence of civil war required generating a global political step with the initiation of international organizations like the UN, especially UNHCR, and the EU. Because of its regional proximity to the conflict area, EU countries became a destination point for asylum-seekers. The conflict has getting intense within years and reached a peak in 2015. It caused an explosion in the number of asylum application and more than a million people applied for the asylum to the EU countries (Canveren and Duruçay, 2017, 863). Southern countries like Greece and Italy were the most affected members from this issue. The reason is that Dublin Regulations which is a regulation that includes implementations regarding the migration issues accepted after 1990 summit. According to Dublin Regulations, asylum-seekers should settle in the member state that they entered into the EU borders (Şimşek, 2019, 496). If they pass to another EU member country, they can be returned to the country that they are documented. This situation caused an unrest in southern and borders members of the EU.

Every member country developed a different approach for the issue. While Germany and Sweden had a more humanitarian and welcoming approach, other countries, especially border countries, adopted more sceptic and unwelcoming approach. Hungary was one of the countries that give the harshest response. It indicated that Hungary cannot accept more asylum application because of the lack of structural facilities and it withdrawn from the Dublin Regulation in practice. It fenced its Serbia borders to prevent illegal migration. It brought more strict border control and rise of “*stop migrants*” discourse. Migration issue started to be perceived as a threat and a security issue. This situation reflected to the political discourse. Securitization of migration issue finds itself a place in the speeches of prime minister Orbán. He emphasizes that security of the Hungarian borders equal to security of Schengen area. He stated this approach in one of his speeches as “*Hungary is party to the Schengen Agreement, and we are securing a section of Europe’s common external borders.*”

Illegally crossing a state border is a crime, which must be punished. The rules must be observed, or else the security of the citizens will be lost.” (Speech and Remarks, 13 November 2016; quoted in Canveren and Duruçay, 2017, 864). Orbán asserted that migration flow had a negative effect on citizen’s daily life and caused an unrest among the European community (Orbán, 6 September, 2016 quoted in Canveren and Duruçay, 2017, 865). He expressed this in words as *“Uncontrolled immigration has brought an unmanageable terror and public security situation into Europe.”* (Orbán, 16 September 2016; quoted Canveren and Duruçay, 2017, 865).

Clashing of the EU migration policy and the Hungarian security-based approach to the issue caused taking a Eurosceptic stance by Hungarian government. Prime minister Orbán and other government officials indicated their concern in the context of national, economic and cultural security. This situation left a question mark about common security and defense policy right along with constitution of a common migration policy.

4.2.3. Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)

Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is a part of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which was one of the three pillars of the EU. Establishing a common security and defense policy became an important agenda after the Cold War and it was officialized with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. While it is related to Russian threat in the first place because of the post-Cold War atmosphere, its scope was expanded and contained all European foreign policy issues, especially related to security and diplomacy. Expansion and deepening of the security policies caused rise of Eurosceptic discourse related this issue. Main concern was losing national sovereignty, because this policy was supporting EU’s transformation into a supranational structure. According to this view, CSDP and PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) were seen as two steps that provide a ground for deeper integration. Eurosceptic politicians criticize this policy as becoming a step towards a European federal state (Tereszkiewicz, 2018, 150). Second criticism directs to the establishment of PESCO and intended a European army. They indicate their concern for possible usage of European army as an oppression tool against Eurosceptic voices. In addition, Eurosceptic politicians like Korwin and Kovacs oppose the establishment of PESCO, because of the economic corruption. According to them, European

Commission sees the establishment of military-industrial complexes as a new source of money (Tereszkiewicz, 2018, 151). Politicians from Jobbik support this argument as a Eurosceptic discourse in Hungarian politics. They state that EU had a huge failure in coping with migration crisis and it doesn't draw a successful picture for using its power. Therefore, giving more power and deepening of integration is the last thing that can be done in favor of member states. This discourse manifests itself in 97th Eurobarometer report Hungary locates under the EU average looking at the satisfaction rate for the CSDP (Summer 2022, 14).

4.2.4. Relations with Russia

Relations of the European countries with Russia follow always a process with ups and downs by the nature of balance of world politics. Deteriorated relations at the end of the Cold War improved in following years. Russia became a member of the Council of Europe in 1996. It can be seen as a step for developing relations with the west. Partnership in trade- especially in energy sector- was the most important reason of the improving relations. Interdependence which is established between the EU and Russia based on energy relations until mid-2000s is a prominent example of post-Cold War cooperation (Siddi, 2021, 2). Balances started to change in 2006 because of gas transit crisis. Although the crisis started between Ukraine and Russia, it reverberated to the EU-Russia relations. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 worsened the relations. A lot of disagreements emerged between the parties after the annexation, but energy sector was excluded in this dispute (Siddi, 2021, 2). Even, gas trade increased when coming to the 2016. This situation showed that energy sector is a substantial part of the EU-Russian relations and it is evaluated separately within other political dynamics. Ukrainian-Russian War which started on February 24, 2022 became a turning point for this understanding. Council of Europe declared that Russia's membership was ceased by the unanimous decision of the Parliamentary Assembly and Russia can no longer be a member of the Council of Europe. Further sanctions that include energy relations were declared by the EU. Economic sanctions, restrictions on Russian media institutions, visa and diplomatic measures were declared by the EU against Russia (European Council, 2022). Energy relations took an important place while this restriction plan is preparing. Dependence of the EU members to Russia about the energy raised a question mark about the possible solutions. However, EU stated that it won't renounce implementing sanctions against Russia until the unlawful detainer is ended.

Hungarian-Russian relations followed a different political transformation after the Cold War. Pro-EU stance of the Hungary turned into a Russian-friendly political attitude. It started to be depicted as one of the best allies of Russia in the EU. Four main points can be indicated examples of political disagreements between the EU and Hungary's policy towards Russia. These disagreements are mostly uttered by the far-right political parties' officials as a continuation of their Eurosceptic discourse. First disagreement comes from implemented EU sanctions against Russia. Hungary and other V4 countries emphasize the ineffectiveness of sanctions that are used against Russia. They claim that EU's dependency to Russia in energy sector beclouded implementation of economic sanctions against Russia. Russia is in good economic condition and its economy is not dependent to the European economies. Implemented sanctions backfired and affect EU member states' economies negatively. Some Eurosceptic parties state this negative influence over specific sectors. For example, statements of the politicians of Jobbik which is Hungarian Eurosceptic party focus on farming sector (Tereszkiewicz, 2018, 149). In addition, there is a special relation between Hungary and Russia in energy sector. Natural gas and nuclear energy projects constitute the main agenda of this relation. Rosatom which is a Russian state company specialized on nuclear energy made investments in Hungary and Finland for electricity production (Siddi, 2021, 18). Relations in the energy area remained stable during the political tension of 2013-2014 and this situation can be seen as a success for Russian diplomacy. Different perspectives about Russia's Crimea and Syria policies generate the second pillar of disagreement. According to this perspective Russia defend its interests in these places, so the EU should stay out of these conflicts and take a neutral position. Hungarian politician Zlatan Balczó evaluates Russia's intervention to Crimea because of American and NATO involvement to Maidan protests. According to his assessment, Russia took a step for protecting its interest in Crimea. Also, referendum which was made in 2014 about the status of Crimea showed the people's willingness to joining to Russia (Tereszkiewicz, 2018, 149). Based on this statement, it can be said that opposite opinions to perspective of the EU found itself a place in Hungarian politics and contributed to Eurosceptic discourse. Third point can be seen as continuation of politics towards Ukraine. Divergency of act and discourses showed itself immediately after the starting of the Russian-Ukrainian war. EU foreign ministers compromised for starting a training mission to support Ukrainian army. Hungary was the only member state that didn't support this initiative. Hungarian Minister of Foreign

Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó explains the reason of this act as *'Hungary opted for "constructive abstention" which did not prevent the proposal from being approved, but made it clear that the country does not want to contribute to the costs of the operation'* (Hungary Today, 18 October 2022). In addition, he stated that keeping Hungary out of this war is the first aim of the Hungarian government. This statement of him as *"Anything leading to escalation and western or central Europe being dragged into the war is not something we consider a good idea"* (Hungary Today, 18 October 2022) indicates that Hungarian government is not willing to follow the similar policy for Russian-Ukrainian War with the EU and prioritizes its national interest. Last point that causes a disagreement between Hungary and the EU towards Russian politics is related to economic relations. Hungary supports further improvement of economic relations with Russia. It claimed that strengthening of economic relations contribute to implementation of EU's energy and Middle East policies. EU sanctions implemented against Russia because of Crimean issue and Ukrainian-Russian war cause an opposite view for relations with Russia.

4.3. EUROSCEPTICISM IN HUNGARY

Euroscepticism is a rising agenda in Hungarian politics like most of the other European countries. Eurosceptic voices started to increase shortly after the Hungary's membership to the EU. Firstly, economic conditions during the ESD crisis caused the rise of Eurosceptic sentiment among the people and this situation reverberated to the political area. It concluded with the victory of a Eurosceptic party, Fidesz, in 2010 general elections and term of Viktor Orbán started in Hungarian politics. After this election, Hungarian politics met with the concept of "illiberalism". The term firstly was used by Fareed Zakaria (1997) in his famous article "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy". It indicates a lack of implementation of core values of liberal democracy. This situation causes a conflicting approach with EU's membership criteria and is a sign of rise of Eurosceptic discourse in Hungarian politics.

Fidesz took some steps under the leadership of Orbán for further changes and consolidation of illiberal political stance. It formed an alliance with KDNP in 2010 elections. Thus, government took the two-third of majority in the parliament and gained the right of making constitutional amendments. Constitution change and media act can be shown as two


important initiatives of this government. They were criticized by opposition parties and the EU institutions on account of the fact that a deviation from the democratic values of the EU. After this point, a visible shift from pro-EU politics to Euroscepticism started to be observed in Hungarian politics. Hungarian Basic Law was passed from the parliament and entered into force in 2012. The most significant change was related to the realm of authority of constitutional court. Scope of its audit over the budget, social security and tax law was decreased. Authority of the Constitutional Court was restricted for the first time after the independence (Paczolay, 2012, 370). In addition, nomination process of the judges changed. While all parties have an equal representation right in the Court, this rule changed as parties will be represented proportionally with their member of parliament in Nomination Committee. These constitutional changes were evaluated as a backward in checks and balances principle which is one of the basic pillars of liberal democracies by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe (Paczolay, 2012, 372). New press and media act was the other much-debated change of the Orbán government. According to this act, the Hungarian government had passed the law establishing a supervisor body, the National Media and Communications Board, composed of five members of the ruling Fidesz, in order to monitor all media outlets in the country (Ekholm and Svärd-Ylilehto, 2018). This new regulation created discussions in the EU and officials indicated their concern about the course of events in Hungarian democracy.

EU has taken some concrete steps to implement sanctions against Hungary alongside the official statements and warning. Fidesz was suspended from the EPP which is the largest group in the Parliament in 2019 due to democracy and rule of law concerns within the government (Euronews, 2020). Orbán declared his party's leaving from the group after the possibility of further suspension or exclusion process in 2021. In addition, EU was prepared to impose some economic sanctions against Hungary. It recommended suspending 7.5 billion euros in funding for Hungary over corruption, the first such case under a new sanction meant to better protect the rule of law (Reuters, 2022).

The Eurobarometer surveys that are made by the European Commission for measuring public opinion about the EU and its policies indicate a decrease among Hungarian people who support EU integration since the membership. This situation can be inferred

from the 2019 EP election results. Figure 6. which is presented below shows the high rate of public Euroscepticism in Hungary in 2019 EP elections.

Figure 6: 2019 EP Election Results in Member Countries



Source: POLITICO, 2022


This section aims to present an overall analysis of the rise of Euroscepticism in Hungarian politics in party and public levels by considering the turning points that are indicated above.

4.3.1. Eurosceptic Political Parties in Hungary

Hungarian Euroscepticism will be evaluated in party level in this section. Tendency of Hungarian people to vote for right Eurosceptic parties increased significantly after the 2009 ESD crisis. This situation can be seen in Mudde's (2014) study on the increase in support for far-right parties in the pre-crisis (2004-7) and crisis (2009-13) periods. Figure 7. shows that change in percentage of the vote between the last national parliamentary election

in the pre-crisis period and the last national election in the crisis period. This comparison expresses the results of the 2006 and 2010 national elections for Hungary.

Figure 7. Change in Far-Right Electoral Results Between Pre-Crisis (2004-7) and Crisis (2009-13)



Source: Mudde, 2014, 101.

Three Hungarian Eurosceptic parties will be explained in the following section. Political attitudes of government party Fidesz and far-right parties Jobbik and Mi Hazánk will be evaluated by considering their political stance against EU policies and discourses of party officials.

4.3.1.1. Fidesz

Fidesz was established in 1988 as an anti-communist student movement and turned into a political party in a short notice. It supported liberal values with the “return to Europe” principle and adopted a pro-European stance until mid-2000s. It came to power as a coalition government with MDF and FKGP in 1998. Party became the main actor of membership negotiation process under the leadership of Orbán (Arató, 2020, 108). It lost the parliamentary elections in 2002 against MSZP by a canvas and Medgyessy’s socialist government completed the EU membership process in 2004. Fidesz formed an alliance with KDNP for 2006 elections but couldn’t achieve a significant success in parliamentary elections. On contrary, Hungarian people tend to vote for Fidesz in EP and municipal

elections. Even it lost the national elections, it won 14 of the 22 chairs in the EP elections in 2009 elections.

A new era started in Hungarian politics after 2010 parliament elections. Fidesz's success in the 2009 EP elections was also reflected in the 2010 national elections. A shift from pro-EU discourse to Eurosceptic and nationalist policy understanding started to be visible after this date. This change can be felt in Orbán's speech during the anniversary of 1848 Hungarian Revolution in March 15, 2011. Main focus of his speech was Hungary won't allow more EU intervention and it will defend its national sovereignty against Brussels (Arató, 2020, 109). The date of this speech due to anniversary of 1848 Hungarian Revolution has a precedence. He stated that in a speech at the same year "*We did not let Vienna dictate us in 1848, we did not let Moscow dictate us in 1956, and we won't let Brussels or others dictate us now.*" (Csehi and Zgut, 2020, 58). One of his speeches in March 2012 can be indicated as an example of nationalist and Eurosceptic discourse. He said that "*We write our own constitution, and we do not need a template and the unwanted help of foreigners trying to move our hands.*" (Csehi and Zgut, 2020, 58). We and them distinction and creating a foreign enemy as a nationalist politics started to be main arguments of Orbán in following years.

Fidesz won 12 of the 21 chairs in EP elections. Eurosceptic discourse started to dominate Hungarian politics especially in 2014/2015 (Danaj et al., 2018, 244). There are three main topics that Fidesz built its Eurosceptic political strategy on. These are migration issue, concerns about the loss of national sovereignty and changing the structure of the EU. However, migration was constituting the main agenda. Migration flow which is result of the Syrian civil war caused rise of xenophobia and Islamophobia in western countries. This situation was observed more concretely in Hungary due to its border country location. Soft Eurosceptic position of Fidesz turned towards hard Euroscepticism under this political atmosphere (Arató, 2020, 113). Eurosceptic discourse against EU's migration policy and statements that target George Soros for funding the migration organizations generated the main points of the election campaigns of Orbán and Fidesz. They claim that migration flow creates a significant threat against Hungarian people and Christian values. This concern can be inferred from the national consultation's letter that is sent to Hungarian citizens behalf of the government in April 2017. The letter says that:

“Let’s stop Brussels! Let’s stop the appropriation of national powers by Brussels! Let’s stop Brussels’ policy of continually seeking to exceed the powers given to it in the Treaties! And let’s stop efforts which – through the promotion of migration – seek to change the ethnic composition and cultural foundations of the European Union, and Hungary within it!” (Government of Hungary, 2017 cited as Hargitai, 2020, 192).

In addition, Stop Soros law was passed from the parliament in June 2018. This law criminalized helping an illegal migrant who seek for asylum and restrict the area of movement of non-governmental organizations.

Election campaign of Fidesz remained constructed only migration issue and security of external borders of the EU in 2019 EP elections. Migration issue securitized by the government party. Orbán’s speech at Balna venue in April 7, 2019 was only focused on migration. His speech has seven basic arguments against migration. According to his speech migration policy shouldn’t be a part of common EU policy, it should be under control of the nation-states; none of the countries should have to accept migrants; people who don’t have a valid ID shouldn’t be accepted into the European borders; migrant cards should be disposed; EU shouldn’t continue funding George Soros’s organization; discrimination against Christians should be ended and lastly anti-immigration officials and leaders should be authorized in the EU institutions (Arató, 2020, 120). Election campaign became successful with the help of its visibility in media channels. Fidesz won 12 of 21 seats in 2019 EP elections and became the most crowded group of Hungarian MEPs in the Parliament. However, their group was suspended from EPP due to democratic backsliding in the country.

The national elections held in Hungary in April 3, 2022 resulted with the re-election of Viktor Orban, who has been in power for 12 years, against the opposition bloc candidate, Peter Marki-Zay. While the Fidesz-KNDP alliance won 53% of the votes, guaranteeing 135 deputies in the 199-seat parliament, the “United for Hungary” coalition, consisting of 6 opposition parties with different political views from the far right to the left, received 34% of the votes and remained below the percentage indicated in the election polls (Euronews, 4 April 2022). Looking at these figures, it can be said that the Fidesz-KNDP coalition achieved two-third of majority in the parliament, enabling it to make constitutional amendments, and

that it will be one of the most influential actors of Hungarian politics in the future under the leadership of Prime Minister Orbán.

4.3.1.2. Jobbik

Jobbik started its political life in 2003 as a far-right political party built on the previous right-wing party, MIEP. It has had a Eurosceptic and conservative political stance since its establishment. Opposite voices against the membership came from the Jobbik politicians and supporters during the accession process. It can be categorized as a hard-Eurosceptic party when its secessionist discourse is considered. It was suggesting Hungary's exit from the Union. It increased its support at public level in the 2009 EP elections and send three representatives to the Parliament for the first time since its establishment. The slogan of their election campaign was "*Hungary is for the Hungarians*" and supported leaving Hungary from the EU which is an anti-democratic, corrupt and neoliberal institution (Arató, 2020, 114). It criticized the EU policies and further European integration. Hard Eurosceptic stance can be inferred from an interview of Gabor Vona and Bela Kovacs who are two important political figures of Jobbik:

"For us, the EU is not just a dead end. [...] The only country where unemployment is higher than Hungary is Greece. Soon it will be ten years since we joined the EU and we can boldly say that we have been deceived. We did not need to join the EU, the EU needed us to join. Our markets have been taken away. [...] Hungary had great opportunities in farming but is now eating Dutch cheese, Danish pork, Spanish fruit and German salami". (Vona and Kovacs, n.d., cited as Turmakov, 2017, 47).

2014 EP elections brought more success to Jobbik. Even though no change in the MEP number that was sent to the Parliament, it became the second party of the election after Fidesz. It had a similar approach to Fidesz towards foreign policy issues like migration and security policies by pointing out national sovereignty and identity concerns. Both parties support the cooperation with Turkic states with the turanism approach, and the improvement of relations with the eastern world under the policy of eastern opening. This situation manifests itself in Hungary's joining to Organization of Turkic States as an observer state. However, the concerns of the voters about the EU policies and the constitution of the

Eurosceptic sentiment differ from each other. While Fidesz voters put the migration issue to the top places, Jobbik voters prioritize financial issues (Hargitai, 2020, 202).

A shift from a far-right and hard Eurosceptic position to a mainstream and soft-Eurosceptic position started to be observed in after 2014 in Jobbik. While Jobbik approach to center by toning down its far-right Eurosceptic and nationalist rhetoric, Fidesz adopted a more Eurosceptic and radical right position (Arató, 2020, 124). Jobbik shifted to a europragmatic political position during this term. This new political transition affected Jobbik's voting rate negatively. It received %13.07 of the total votes in 2018 national elections. This rate was %6 point less than the previous election which was held in 2014. This situation reflected to the 2019 EP elections. Jobbik received %6.34 of total votes and it can send only one MEP to the Parliament.

Jobbik joined to the "United for Hungary" bloc which is an alliance consists of six political parties in 2022 national elections. Common candidate of the alliance was liberal-conservatist politician Peter Marki-Zay. He lost the election against prime minister Orbán by a wide margin. Effect of Jobbik declined in Hungarian politics after the party's shift from far-right to center recently. This situation can be seen in the last national and EP elections.

4.3.1.3. Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland Movement)

Mi Hazánk was established by the former far-right politicians of Jobbik to fill out the gap emerged after the ideological transformation of the party (Arató, 2020, 123). It was founded by Laszlo Toroczkai who is former Jobbik member in 2018. It adopted Jobbik's previous nationalist and revisionist discourse quickly (Hyttinen, 2022, 423). Mi Hazánk started to use symbolic objects and places of Jobbik along with its national rhetoric. It arranged public meetings and far-right festivals like Jobbik was used to. It was a beneficial strategy to engage attention of young participants. Hungarian flag, accessories that related to Hungarian culture and Trianon-related objects were main symbols in the area. Nemzeti rock (national rock) bands which is the central actor of Jobbik's gathering became the important actor of Mi Hazánk's gatherings. Another significant point is existence of paramilitary groups. Like Jobbik's Magyar Garda (Hungarian Guard Movement), Mi Hazánk has a paramilitary group named as Betyársereg (The Army of Outlaws). These paramilitary groups became the symbol of existence of far-right parties on the field in

Hungarian politics (Hyttinen, 2022, 439). Aim of them is intimidating opposition groups by creating a threat of violence and providing confidence to party's supporters (Hyttinen, 2022, 439). It can be inferred that, Mi Hazank is a relatively new political party in Hungarian politics which has a far-right, ultranationalist, irredentist and Eurosceptic position in Hungarian politics. It emphasizes on the unity of all Hungarians who are living in pre-Trianon territories and prioritizes national sovereignty of Hungary.

Mi Hazank participated to 2022 parliamentary elections apart from the United for Hungary coalition. It became one of the biggest surprises of the 2022 national election result by receiving %6.17 of the total votes, contrary to expectations, passed the 5% electoral threshold and gained the right of representation with 7 seats in the Hungarian parliament (Euractiv, 4 April 2022). This voting rate shows that some of the Jobbik voters were uncomfortable from party's political transformation and tend to vote for Mi Hazank.

4.3.2. Public Euroscepticism in Hungary

Hungary was one of the first countries which make the political and economic regulations for making strong connections with Europe in the post-communist era. Support for the EU membership was %81 when looking at the 1990 Eurobarometer data (Eurobarometer, 2004). It launched programs for complying with the Copenhagen Criteria and completed the membership requirements quickly. Membership referendum concluded with %83 positive voting for Hungary's accession to the EU. However, this rate showed a sharp decline in following year. Citizens who evaluate EU membership as a good thing decline to %63 in 2003 and this number regressed to %45 in spring of 2004 (Eurobarometer, 2004). Current attitude of Hungarian people towards the EU can be inferred from the rate of positive answers that were given to the question of "*In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?*" in 97th Eurobarometer. Although a small raise in comparison with previous years, positive image of the EU in the eyes of Hungarian people remained at the level of %51 (Eurobarometer Factsheets, Summer 2022, 3).

The public attitudes towards the EU and their views on feeling part of the EC may differ from each other. This kind of differentiation can be mentioned in Hungarian politics. Hungarian people are one of the groups in EC that define themselves by emphasizing their

national origin and tend to vote for Eurosceptic parties for more than a decade. However, their Eurosceptic attitude is generally against the EU which is seen as a corrupt institution and its policies. They also define themselves as European. According to the first Eurobarometer survey that is made after the membership, %92 of the Hungarian people indicated that they feel European (Eurobarometer, 2005). Although this ratio decreased some, it is still more than average ratio of the EU member states. According to the question of Eurobarometer 96 (Winter 2022), “*Please tell me to what extent do you feel you are a citizen of the EU?*”, %81 of the Hungarian people who attend to the survey responded to the question as they feel themselves as a European citizen. This ratio is more than %10 percent from the average of EU member states which is %71. From this point of view, it can be inferred that Hungarian Euroscepticism is shaped against EU policies that are thought of as a restriction for national sovereignty, not against the European identity.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Rise of Euroscepticism and the question of whether the de-Europeanization process has begun, occupies the center of international relations discussions regarding the European Union. Opposition for further European integration has always been there, but they were minor and muted for most of the time. However, in recent years this has increasingly turned into secessionist voices which may undermine the very bases of the European Union project. Brexit is the most concrete example of this situation. Separation of Britain which was one of the backbones of the EU created concern for the future of the Union. Hungary is one of the countries the Eurosceptic political attitude is rising and looking at the national and EP election results it started to become a chronic case in the country. Eurosceptic parties have been gaining support from a significant part of society since the 2010 national elections. However, the emergence of such a dominant position of Eurosceptic political parties is a surprising situation for the EU. When the post-Soviet period is considered, Hungary was the most pro-European and well-prepared country for the candidacy for EU membership. Liberalization process in both economic and political areas started much earlier from the independence. After the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, a different socialism understanding was constituted in Hungary during the Kádár government. Economic liberalization process started with the “new economic understanding” and Hungary joined IMF and World Bank seven years before the independence. Improvement of economic relations contributed to political affinity to the western economic, political and daily-life dynamics. In addition, existence of a strong civil society structure and contribution of elites to the process paved the way for a smooth and peaceful transition after the Soviet period.

Hungary prioritized being a part of the west after the declaring independence in October 23, 1989. Transition from command economy to market economy and constitution of a functioning democratic system were two main targets of post-independence period. Alongside these two targets, studies for social policy changes for integration of Hungarian population to EC took important place within the process. Membership of NATO and EU were the main agendas of 1990s with the idea of return to Europe. Hungary became a member of NATO in 1999 after integrating its security system to existing structure of

NATO. However, since the EU membership has required more nuanced regulations in many different arenas which is indicated in Copenhagen Criteria, it realized in following years. Hungary prepared economic, political and social integration programs to fill out these criteria by receiving assistance from the EU. Concurrently, the Union announced PHARE, SAPARD and ISPA programs to guide candidate countries for helping to render their economic and political atmosphere comply with the *acquis communautaire*. As a result, Hungary became a member of the EU in 2004 with the fifth enlargement. Current prime minister Orbán was the significant actor of the membership negotiation process during his government between 1998-2002. However, EU membership did not bring the expected economic impact and dissatisfaction about the membership started to increase among people.

2008 economic crisis created a worldwide effect and reverberated to the European continent as ESD crisis. Hungary encountered economic crisis in a disadvantageous economic condition. Increase of unemployment rate and unreliable economic picture generated a doubt about the EU policies and directed Hungarian people to support Eurosceptic parties. This tendency started to become visible in 2009 EP elections. Fidesz, a former pro-EU party, adopted populist-nationalist rhetoric under the leadership of Orbán and won more than half of Hungary's seats in the EP. Another far-right party Jobbik sent representatives to the EP for the first time in party history. Fidesz won the 2010 national elections after its success in EP elections and gained 2/3 of the majority in parliament which enable it to make constitutional changes. New press and media act and regulations about the authority of the constitutional court caused discussion and created concerns about democratic backsliding.

Support for Eurosceptic parties reached top position in 2014–2015. Migration crisis and policies that are conducted by the EU in this field played an important role for the emergence of this situation. Border countries like Greece, Hungary and Poland gave a negative response to the EU's implementations which was determined with Dublin Regulations. They made harsh provisions against migration issue. Hungary built high-tech border fence to its southern border for preventing the unwanted migration flow to the country and criminalize the aiding to migrants. Harsher precautions reflected to the political discourse. Xenophobic and anti-migration rhetoric became the main points of the statements of far-right politicians in Europe. Hungarian prime minister Orbán became one of the

primary figures of this political attitude both in domestic politics and EP. His populist-nationalist and Eurosceptic rhetoric gained support from the Hungarians. Marginal appearance of nationalist and Eurosceptic rhetoric started to become center by its representation by a mainstream political party. Fidesz moved away from Soft Eurosceptic position. Hard Eurosceptic sentiment and emphasis on national sovereignty started to generate main points of statements of Orbán. In addition, Jobbik increased its political influence during the 2014 EP election by becoming second party. Domination of far-right parties and Eurosceptic discourse affected foreign policy language and preferences of Hungary. Critical approach to EU institutions and policies came to the forefront in party officials' statements. Migration policy, CSDP and Russian policy of the Union constitutes three main titles of the Hungarian Eurosceptic politicians' statements recently. Dispute about the difference in approach to Russia relations became visible during the Russian invasion of Crimea. Even if Hungary condemned the annexation, it tried to ensure its neutral position. This tendency became more visible after the Russia-Ukraine War which started on February 24, 2022. Hungary exhibited a cautious behavior towards the issue. It followed a balance policy to protect its neutral position. Even though it signed off the sanctions against Russia, bilateral dialogue with Russia continued for developing economic relations, especially in the energy sector.

The number of the Eurosceptic MEPs increased in EP after the 2019 elections. Although the voting rate of Jobbik decreased in comparison with the previous election, Eurosceptic-nationalist rhetoric continued to dominate Hungarian politics. Fidesz emerged as the representative of this language as a result of the mitigation of Jobbik's hard Eurosceptic position. Its nationalist rhetoric carries neoliberal, populist and irredentist features. As an indication of this situation, Hungary continued neoliberal economy policies which encourage market competitiveness alongside the nationalist discourse. Populist-nationalist and irredentist language accompanied the neoliberal policies. Constitution of the image of a common enemy and statements focus on Greater Hungary which indicated Hungary's pre-Trianon Treaty borders became popular in the Hungarian political agenda. In addition to Fidesz's Eurosceptic-nationalist stance, Mi Hazánk was founded as a far-right political party and substituted Jobbik's place in Hungarian politics. It adopted Jobbik's

political agenda and nationalist discourse. It gained unexpected success in the 2022 national elections.

Perception of Euroscepticism differ according to the source of the scepticism. Hungarian Euroscepticism is not against European identity, it is rather against the EU policies and the idea of further European integration. It cannot be evaluated as hard Euroscepticism, but it does not fit comfortably into the description of Soft Euroscepticism either. Increasing Eurosceptic and nationalist discourse in Hungarian politics, especially by the government recently, is hardening to make a description of Hungarian Euroscepticism. Therefore, the Hungarian Euroscepticism can be placed somewhere between the hard and the Soft Euroscepticism, but probably more close to the hard Euroscepticism. The only difference is, the Hungarian Eurosceptics are almost against everything within European Union, except breaking away from it. Thus it is probably won't be wrong classifying the Hungarian Euroscepticism as semi-hard Euroscepticism. Hungarian Euroscepticism expresses concerns about the loss of national sovereignty, and democratic deficit in the Union. In addition, Eurosceptic and nationalist rhetoric is increased by far-right political parties during the election terms. When looking at the fifteen years of Hungarian politics, it can be said that Eurosceptic-nationalist rhetoric has become a successful tool for far-right parties' election campaigns.

Further Suggestion

Euroscepticism affects the foreign policy behavior of Hungary by causing to embark on a quest in non-European world with the influence of eastern opening of Orbán government. Effect of Euroscepticism on Hungary's relations with China, Russia and Türkiye which are depicted as members of the non-western and non-European world can be examined in this context. China-Hungarian relations developed in Orbán government. Their relations can be evaluated by focusing on China's image as a rising power and its worldwide foreign investment because of its opening policy. Russian-Hungarian relations are important because of their historical bond which comes from Soviet past of both countries. While other post-Soviet countries are not willing to contact Russia except important diplomatic relations, Hungary is stated as one of the best allies of Russia in Europe which is interesting because of the wish of Hungarian people for the establishment of a more democratic state completely

separate from Soviet government. Lastly, Türkiye has emerged as an ally of Hungary outside the EU. Claims about common Central Asian roots of both countries, similar political transformation in recent time and some supportive statements made by both sides in the international area support this argument. Their presence in Organization of Turkic States can be evaluated as a sign for future foreign policy preferences of both countries.



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