


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BILKENT UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

AN ANALYSIS OF TURCO-GREEK DISPUTE WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO

BY
H. TARIK OGUZLU



A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
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
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
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ABSTRACT

This study aims to analyze the current problems between Turkey and Greece by making special references to the European Union (EU) and NATO. The interesting point in Turo-Greek relations took place after these countries began to seek ways to integrate themselves with the western world by seeking membership in the major institutions of this block, mainly EU and NATO.

Although many circles both from these countries and from the international community had expected that possible membership of Turkey and Greece in these international organizations would suffice for the emergence of a peaceful and cooperative relationship between these countries, the developments following their membership in these organizations disproved them. While, on one hand, the old problems between these two intensified, on the other hand, there took place some new points of contentions over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. The major aim of this study is to have a brief look at the characteristics of bilateral relations within the framework of EU and NATO. The writer aims at analyzing the possible roles of these above-mentioned organizations in the deterioration of bilateral relations by making special reference to the problems which have been arisen due to the involvement of these international bodies in bilateral relations. A special emphasis has been made to the role of the EU in developments that took place in the course of the Cyprus dispute. Especially, the membership prospects of the Greek Cyprus Government in the EU, that gain importance after the EU included

Cyprus in the membership list in December, 1997, have been analyzed keeping in mind the possible repercussions of this development in solution of the Cyprus dispute.

One of the major aims of this study is to show that Turkey and Greece might create a suitable environment to make progress in the solution of their disputes, as soon as they cooperate seriously under the roof of NATO. Trying to solve problems within NATO framework, rather than using EU mechanisms, would yield more positive results in the near future.



ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasındaki mevcut sorunları Avrupa Birliği ve NATO çerçevesinde incelemektir. İkili ilişkilerde ilginç olan gelişme bu iki ülkenin kendilerini Batı dünyasının temel organizasyonları olan Avrupa Birliği ve NATO'ya dahil etmek istemeye başlamalarından sonra ortaya çıkmıştır.

Hernekadar, hem bu ülkelerde hem de uluslararası camiada birçok çevre Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın muhtemel bir AB yada NATO üyeliği sonucunda aralarında barışa ve yardımlaşmaya dayalı ilişkilerin ortaya çıkacağını umduysa da, sonraki gelişmeler bunları haksız çıkardı. Bir taraftan eski problemler çözülmezken, diğer taraftan Kıbrıs' da ve Ege Denizi'nde yeni ihtilaflar ortaya çıktı. Yazarın buradaki temel amacı iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin bozulmasında bu uluslararası organizasyonların muhtemel etkilerini incelemektir. Özellikle Kıbrıs sorununun gelişiminde AB'nin Güney Kıbrıs Rum Yönetimi'ni üyelik sürecine dahil etme kararı, bu kararın Kıbrıs sorununun çözümüne muhtemel etkileri çerçevesinde, incelencektir.

Eserde ki temel argümanlardan birisi de, iki ülkenin NATO çerçevesinde işbirliği yaptıkları takdirde, muhtemel bir çözüm için gerekli olan ortamın yaratılacağını göstermek olacaktır.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Among the disputes in the world, the long-running Turco-Greek Dispute seems really different from all the others owing to its peculiarities and the large content ranging from the contentions in the Aegean Sea to the thorny Cyprus problem. Although the Greek and Turkish nations, under different authorities, have been living side by side for centuries, they could not establish a peaceful relationship; instead they have always competed with each other in many areas.

The reason why I chose to write a dissertation on this issue relates to my curiosity how it could be possible that these nations, despite their all closeness and togetherness in history, could not manage to solve their problems. The interesting point stems from the irony that the togetherness of these nations within the same international structures and within the same camps does not seem to suffice for peaceful coexistence. True, many might jump to the conclusion that their cooperation within the same international structures would help them settle the points of contentions; but the conflict between these two NATO allies has intensified since they became members of Western institutions, over the last few decades, bringing them to the brink of a full-scale war several times either over the contentious continental self issue or a couple of pieces of small rocks in Eastern Mediterranean as the latest incident indicated.

A cursory look at the Turco-Greek dispute and the intervention of the third parties at various stages does indicate that the third parties somehow contribute to the formation of perceptions and mistrust in each country about the other. For instance, the EU is always regarded in Turkey with justice as a pro-Greek institution. And NATO is taken with a pinch of salt by the Greek public in general. It seems that the third party involvement is an important part of the conflict, and, therefore, an attempt will be made to examine various third party initiatives and their results.

As shown in the second chapter, the Greek nation could get its independence mainly through the help of outside powers and this fact later enabled these countries to shape this newly borne Greek nation according to their ideals. In this respect, the imposition of “Hellenism” on the Greek nation necessitated the portrayal of the Turks as their enemy par excellence. This in turn determined in the next decades, especially after the W.W.II, the main patterns of Greek behaviour towards Turkey. After presenting the main characteristics of Ottoman-Greek relations both during the era of Ottoman domination over the Greek origin subjects and of the state-to-state relations between the independent Greece and the Ottoman Empire, dynamics of relations between Greece and the newly born Turkish Republic until the end of WWII will be taken up in the same chapter. Here, the major aim of the present study would be to show that these countries did not experience a relatively peaceful co-existence since they could not eradicate the underlying causes of problems, mainly the psychological barriers.

In the third chapter, the main point of consideration will be an analysis of the current problems with special reference to their togetherness in the same international block following the W.W.II. The reasons why Greece and Turkey could not formulate a peaceful relationship throughout this period will be explored in the context of their Europeanness. In this respect, the deterioration of bilateral relations was mainly a product of the Cyprus dispute. The outbreak of the Cyprus crisis initially as a headache in the relations prevented them from constructing a cooperative and peaceful relationship during the cold war era. After mentioning reasons for the lack of cooperation in bilateral relations, in the next sections, the Cyprus Dispute and the Aegean Sea Problems will be handled respectively. The role of the third parties in the emergence of the dispute as well as in the deterioration of bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece will always be a major point of consideration.

In the fourth chapter, possible causes of disputes that took place in the cold war era will be tackled. Although both decided to anchor themselves to the western world,

and in this way searched for the same means, they could not achieve a peaceful atmosphere between one another. Possible reasons for the emergence of Aegean disputes, ranging from the delimitation of the territorial waters to the sharing of the command and control responsibilities within NATO, and of the Cyprus dispute will be analyzed in their association within NATO. Throughout this chapter, first bilateral relations within the European Union Context, and then within the NATO framework will be analyzed. In the European Union section, first the attitudes of the Union towards the Turco-Greek disputes in the absence of Greek membership will be studied. In other words, the hands-off policy of the then EC, European Community, will be looked at. Afterwards, an attempt will be made to demonstrate how the Union started to side with Greece, and that Greece began to use the mechanisms of the Union in order to force Turkey to yield to Greece's demands.

One of the major arguments this study comes up with is that the bilateral disputes became more complicated with the involvement of the European Union in the relations. The deadlock in the solution process of the Cyprus dispute has largely resulted from the interference of the Union with the Cyprus question, and from the use of the EU mechanisms by Greece against Turkey. The old-established objective of becoming a member of the European Union weakened Turkey's hand against Greece, given that Greece is a full member of the Union and has the right to veto Turkey's membership. In the second section of this chapter, NATO will become the international organization whose role will be examined. Despite the togetherness of Greece and Turkey within this organization, the reasons for their failure to achieve a constructive relationship will be looked at, and all the misperceptions both in Greece and Turkey with respect to NATO will be scrutinized.

In the fifth chapter, a framework will be drawn up for a possible solution to the Turco-Greek disputes by concentrating on the feasibility of NATO as a conflict solving mechanism.

The concluding chapter will be an assessment of the ideas studied in the preceding chapters. Some reflections on prospects regarding the course of Turco-Greek relations will also be put in.



CHAPTER 2: SURVEY, A HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

Without understanding the realities of the past between the two peoples of the Aegean Sea, it might become difficult to comprehend the present Turco-Greek dispute. Causes of the currently disputed issues cannot always be founded in the past, but at least the emergence of major dynamics that continue to affect the present relationship might be discerned. There is no doubt that the Turco-Greek dispute is one between two modern nations, and that there is very little historical explanation for it, not least because modern Greece and the Ottoman Empire, and then modern Turkey acted in the past as strategic allies several times, sometimes for several decades when they saw fit. This is not to say, however, that a distorted version of history is not used for mobilizing these societies against each other. Each side's version of history becomes a good tool for generating arguments for the continuation of the conflict. It is, therefore, a good idea to have a glimpse at the way in which history is used.

From the arrival of Turkish communities in Anatolia to the fall of Istanbul to the Ottomans, these people, or more truly their natural antecedents, had been living under different authorities. Although the political entities of these communities, the Ottoman State and the Byzantine Empire, were cooperating in many fields, they were political rivals during this period. There was a kind of equal relationship between these political entities. In other words none of them realized full control over the other. While the Byzantine Empire had been trying to keep its control over the Balkans and Anatolia, the Ottomans had been seeking ways to enlarge their territories and to anchor themselves to the Balkans. The Byzantine dynasties were asking the Ottoman help both for their throne-struggles and for their attempts to maintain their control over the peoples of the Balkans who were challenging the Byzantine rule there. In return for their help, the Ottomans could find the chance of first landing in the Balkans and then controlling the Byzantine domestic political life through their close connections with the dynasty. During this period the Ottomans managed to conquer

much of the area and suppressed the Byzantine rule. This kind of Ottoman -Byzantine relationship lasted until the fall of Istanbul to the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Mehmet the Conqueror.

Since then, the kind of equal relationship between these communities gave way to Ottoman domination over the Byzantine. In spite of the fact that the Ottoman Empire subjugated the Orthodox Greeks completely, the Greeks did not suffer. The "Millet" system of the Ottoman Empire enabled them to improve their status in contrast to Byzantine times. The Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul was not only assigned the role to regulate the religious life of the orthodox peoples in the Balkans and all over the Empire, as used to be in the Byzantine times, it was also made competent to involve in secular issues as well. This fact shows that the Greek Patriarchate improved its status under the Ottomans. The importance of this millet system affected the Greek community of the Empire in two important ways. On the one hand, they were promoted to the leadership of Christian populations of the Empire through the leading position of the Patriarchate in Istanbul, on the other hand they became somehow associated with the administration of the Empire.¹ That is not to say, however, that the influential position of the Greeks during the Ottoman Empire dates back to the fall of Istanbul to the Ottomans in 1453. Instead the Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire had to wait till the 18th century to take up a leading position among the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

Beginning with this century the Phanariot Greeks were being appointed to the governance of the Romanian Principalities by the Ottoman Sultans as hospodars - local governors -.² Together with these Phanariot-origin governors, the Patriarchate in Istanbul became one of the sources of Greek influence. But this is not to say that all the Greeks under the Ottoman rule were equally prosperous: for instance, the Greek peasants of Pelloponesean peninsula had been suffering from the heavy burden of taxes and miserable living conditions. In broader terms, Ottoman Greeks were

discriminated among themselves regarding their respective positions in the Empire. This fact was to play an important role in the process of Greek War of Independence with respect to contributions and loyalties of the Greeks to this struggle. As one famous historian -Stavrianos – notes, the positions of the Greeks in the Empire during the 17th and 18th centuries were reminiscent of the Serbians' during the 16th and 17th centuries.³ The privileged status of Greeks also emanated from the appointment of phanariot Greeks to important positions in the state apparatus. This was generally the case in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. As the Ottoman Empire began to establish foreign affairs department and embassies abroad, the influence of phanariot Greeks increased even more. Because these people spoke more than one foreign languages and their ties with the western world were closer than those of the Turks, the Foreign Ministry bureaucracy were filled by these people. They were appointed either to ambassadorship or to the chief translator - dragoman- positions.⁴ Greek merchants also contributed to the enlightenment of Greeks either by opening western style secular schools where the pupils were being taught the history of ancient Greeks, or by providing the clever students with scholarships to study in Europe.⁵

Throughout the nineteenth century the prestigious position of these people started to deteriorate. Especially the roles of various fractions of the Greek community, such as merchants, Phanariot Greeks or the clergy declined, as the emergence of modern Greek state affected their status negatively.

The 19th century started for the Ottoman Empire with the revolts of the politically tiny and weak sub-nations scattered in the Balkans. Of these, Greek communities were first to kick off. Being inspired by the ideas of French Revolution, they thought that it was time for their independence following the Serbs's revolt in 1814. General weakness of the Ottoman Empire during the early nineteenth century provided encouragement for these independence movements. Reasons of the Ottoman decline are outside the scope of this study. The present dissertation will focus instead on the

reasons and motives leading the Greek people to follow the Serbs' example. Differing roles played by various classes of the Greek community scattered all over the Empire will also be looked at.

Regarding the process leading to Greek independence, the first point to be born in mind is that it started in non-Greek territories by the efforts of those Greeks who were not familiar with the conditions of Morea where the movement gained momentum and in the end led to independence. Founded in 1814 in Odessa by the Greek merchants and the members of the Phanariot families, the "Philikia Heteria" organization played the key role in the struggle and somehow became the catalyzer of the Greek people. Contrary to the expectation of this organization, the movement did not succeed in the Romanian Principalities. The fact that these principalities had been ruled by Greek hospodars was not enough for the people living there to support the movement.⁶ After the failure in Romania, they turned to Morea to mobilize the people there. The determined Greek masses in the peninsula were more enthusiastic and their conditions were more favorable for an uprising which culminated in the Greek independence in 1830 following the defeat of the Sublime Port in the Ottoman-Russian war of 1828. In fact it was the Russians who dictated an independent Greek state to the Porte following the latter's defeat.

As for the role played by the various Greek communities within the Empire and the foreign powers of the time, most of the historians could not reach a consensus. The fact that this Philikia Heteria organization was established by Greek merchants might lead to the idea that the first classes to desire independence were the merchants and tradesmen.⁷ As a famous historian put it: "the contrast between the dazzling world of Europe and the wretched conditions at home naturally pointed to the conclusion that Turkish rule was incubus that must be cut off as soon as possible. This explains why it was the merchants who organized Philikia Heteria revolutionary society who compromised the greater part of its members and who took the initiative in the

conspiratorial work predatory to the revolutionary outbreak”⁸ While the situation of the merchants were suitable for the outbreak of independence struggle, those of the Greek Phanariot families and Orthodox Clergy in Istanbul were not so much conducive to their active contribution to the movement. Members of Phanariot families were so close to the Ottoman State bureaucracy that they might have lost much more than their gains if they had sided with the rebellions in Morea. But they generally helped the resurgent. Therefore, their role in the Ottoman state administration decreased to lower levels than it was before.⁹

Regarding the role of the Greek clergy, historical evidence is interesting because it contradicts with the general convictions prevailing in Turkey about the role of the Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul during the Greek war of independence. “The leaders of the Orthodox Church was perhaps the most skeptical about revolutionary organizations. The top clergy believed that a revolution led by disciple of enlightenment would mean not only the destruction of an imperial structure in which the Church had a definitive place, but also the destruction of the intellectual foundations of Balkan Orthodoxy.”¹⁰ over which they had had a preponderant position for centuries thanks to the Ottoman administration. This is not to say, however, that the rank and file of the orthodox clergy was hostile to the rebellion in Morea. Evidence suggests that almost many of the rural priest supported the local people and provided them with ammunition. The situations of the local Greek administrators (primates) were somehow similar to that of Phanariot families. Because they were enjoying power under the privileges given by the Ottoman rule, they were somehow ambivalent to an appraisal. The expression, “uncircumcised Turks” reflects the common disposition toward these people in Greek territories.¹¹

One thing that needs a bit of attention here is the active and enormous support of the Great Powers of the time, Russia, Britain and France, to the Greek independence movement. Without their support and encouragement the Greeks could not have

obtained their 'liberation'.¹² The rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers of Europe led these European states to support the Greek war. Regarding the attitudes of the big powers, Russia was the most enthusiastic one among them to see the Greeks independent from the Ottomans. Because the Russians were orthodox and they perceived themselves as the protector of the rights of the orthodox peoples of the Ottoman Empire, they were closer than the other big powers to the Greeks' aim of independence. Besides, the Russians thought that if the Greeks were to become independent due to their support, they might have gained a strategic ally in the Balkans. As a result, the attitudes of the Russians changed considerably in the favor of Greeks after throning of Alexander.

The ambitious new Tzar wanted to partition the Ottoman Empire, and he even managed to sign an agreement with Britain as to how to share the territories of the Empire. The British government was reluctant to commit itself immediately. But, like in Russia, the change of foreign ministry from Castleragh to Caning, Britain began to side with the Russians against the Ottomans. This was at a time when all the Great Powers were involved in the dispute not to give the others the opportunity to act freely and benefit from the developments. In other words, each Power's concern was not to lose its privileged status to the others.¹³ This foreign involvement which played a determining role in the Greek war of independence would have great impact on Greece's foreign and domestic policies in the decades to come. The observations of an expert support this argument.

“ From a political or economic point of view, directly or indirectly, Greece was controlled by foreign powers. Thus President Capodistrias had to submit to the allied representatives at the Paros Conference statistics concerning frontiers, tribute, and indemnity for lands, including large estates that belong to the Turks (chiftlicks). British, Russian and German rivalry for regional influence played an important role for the formation and the development of the new Greek state and its financing.”¹⁴

The role of foreign involvement in Greece's domestic policy continued with Britain in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and with the Americans after the W.W.II. After the veteran politician Constantin Karamanlis became the prime minister following the 1974 Cyprus crisis, Greece did start a kind of multidimensional foreign policy to reduce her dependence on one foreign power and to implement a policy of balance among major powers. Importance of foreign interference with Greece's affairs especially came into existence in Greece's relations with Turkey. Since the independence of the Greek state, the Greeks could not face the Turks on their own. This was obvious in the territorial gains of Greece in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Being encouraged by the great powers in their strategic interests concerning the Ottoman Empire, Greece did enlarge her territories threefold at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, firstly taking the Ionian Islands in 1864, secondly the Theselya Valley in 1881, and then a large chunk of the Ottoman Macedonia and Crete, as well as most of the Eastern Aegean Islands after the Balkan Wars in 1913. The irredentist aspirations of Greece reached its zenith after Venizelos came to power, and when he landed the Greek troops into Anatolia just after the WW1 in order to impose the terms of the Sevres Treaty.

The interesting development in Turco-Greek relations took place in the aftermath of the great catastrophe of the Greeks during the early 1920s. Bilateral relations between these two countries improved so much that Greece and Turkey finalized very important agreements, such as the treaty of 1930 regulating the minority rights in each country and thus eradicating the thorny problem of "etabli", and the treaty of nonaggression and goodneighbourliness signed in 1930. From mid-1930s to mid-1950s

Turkey and Greece acted as strategic allies. That is why historians treat this period in Turco-Greek relations as one that demonstrate how it could be possible that the countries which are at odds with each other on many things can solve their long-standing problems and live in peace. Although the international conditions were conducive to such a *détente* between Turkey and Greece, it has to be pointed out that all this was certainly a success on the part of the politicians on both shores of the Aegean Sea.

The reasons for rapprochement may be summarized as follows: First of all, after having been defeated in Asia Minor, Greece could no longer pursue a totally irredentist policy towards Turkey. Her capabilities and resources did not enable her to match her long-awaited national aspirations; on the contrary they dictated on Greece to seek ways for living in peace with Turkey. Instability in domestic political life emanating from the deep-rooted rivalry between the royalist and the republicans to seize power and the international relations of the post war world were among factors which encouraged Greece to improve her relations with Turkey.

Secondly, the charismatic leader of the Greek political life, Eleftheros Venizelos, displayed all kinds of determination and resolution to increase the level of relations with Turkey. His personal feature enabled him to dictate his terms upon his people. Venizelos was quick to understand that he could not extract the support of the big powers in order to implement his expansionist policies vis-à-vis Turkey. His perception that the Greek people had been tired of fighting for long years forced him to look for ways to relieve his people of troubles of the Great War.

Thirdly, both Greece and Turkey became known as the status quo states which preferred to see the international situation of the post war years unchanged. Both countries were pleased with their current boundaries and against any claim requiring changes in the territorial frontiers. The behavior of the Bulgarian governments

brought them closer because Sofia was not happy with the status quo, and it was busy trying to alter it to her advantage. The revisionist policies of this country that was caused by her substantial territorial losses on the eve, and in the aftermath of the W.W.I, was threatening especially Greece because the former was looking for an outlet to the Aegean Sea, and the most suitable country to open this way seemed to be Greece. Greece was more eager than Turkey to improve bilateral relations. In case of a war with Bulgaria, Turkey seemed the only country to help Greece to ward off the aggression. Besides Bulgaria, both countries were perceiving a significant threat coming from Italy. Being an unsatisfied country following the Great War, Italy was also searching for ways to change the postwar status quo to her favor. The Mediterranean was a suitable place for Italy to enlarge her influence and even her territories. Explanations and speeches of Italy's charismatic leader, Benito Mussolini, especially his reference to Mediterranean Sea as "more nostrum" (our sea) gave rise to fears both in Turkey and Greece about Italy's real intentions. Although the Italian government concluded bilateral treaties with Greece and Turkey, Mussolini's intentions were menacing.¹⁵

Fourth, in the absence of complex and grinding problems of 1950s and onwards, such as Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, there was all the reason for both countries to cooperate with each other more easily.

Fifth, in the improvement of bilateral relations the role of the outside powers should not be overlooked. Great Britain encouraged these two to cooperate and to form a kind of alliance against the revisionist countries of the region. This was not a one-sided interest on the part of Britain. Both Greece and Turkey were perceiving Britain as the only country with her enormous naval capabilities in the Mediterranean Sea which could protect them against these revisionist countries. In this regard, one general conclusion might be that these countries cooperated more easily when they were encouraged by an influential power in the Mediterranean Sea.¹⁶

Most importantly, the leaders of the time, Atatürk and Venizelos, showed both determinism and goodwill in the process of improvements of the bilateral relations. They did not resort to bilateral problems to gain in domestic policy as it has been the case since 1950s. The strong leadership both displayed made them capable of constructing their policies easily, without the pressure of strong opposition, and to dictate them on their own people. As one expert put it bluntly, the type of regime is not really the most important factor before solution. "Democracy does not help to resolve the questions. If there were dictators in Greece and Turkey who did not have to worry about public opinion, we could have reached an agreement by now".¹⁷

As far as the crowning events of this period are concerned, the signing of 1930 treaties regulating the status quo of the minorities once and for all, and the ones about goodneighborliness and nonaggression should be remembered. Formation of a Balkan Entente among Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia was the climax of bilateral relations. Although the alliance established by this entente in 1934 had many defects, it showed the resolution of the countries to solve their problems and even to conclude an alliance. During the years of World War II Turkey and Greece continued to have good relations, and in the aftermath of the war they joined NATO.

The Psychological Characteristics of the Disputes:

In the analysis of problems in Turco-Greek relations, the way to look at the causes of them is really important. If somebody endeavors to discern the causes of disputes only by focusing on historical events and using a purely historical and political approach, he/she might neglect the unseen factors which normally sabotage bilateral relations. The analysis of current problems between Turkey and Greece should not only be made through a historical or political approach, but a psychological approach should also be made use of in order to understand the psychological barriers behind the

nonsolution of the disputes. A psychological approach assumes that people on both shores of the Aegean Sea are biased against each other. Both nations created some “chosen traumas” and “chosen glorious” with respect to the other side and they can not escape from the effects of them in any solution process.¹⁸ In the formation of these psychological barriers to peace, the creation of chosen traumas and chosen glories had important places. Both nations idealized their victories over the other side as their chosen glorious and their defeats by the other side as their chosen traumas. On one hand, while the Greeks could not finish the process of mourning over their losses of Istanbul to the Turks in 1453 and their defeats in Cyprus in 1974, the Turks, on the other, could not adopt to the new situation after they lost their Ottoman Empire. Their inability to adapt to new changes in territorial boundaries led them to construct chosen traumas and to make them alive in the minds of the new generations through psychological processes.

In the creation of Greek state and nation two factors are very significant; the idealization of Hellenism, and the concept of Megali Idea. Both had direct concerns with the Turks. While Hellenism necessitated the denial of the Greek’s existing identity as oriental, barbaric, and uncivilized and its whole projection onto the Turks, the Megali Idea aimed at liberation of the unredeemed brethren in the old Hellenic territories. “Today the Megali Idea and the Hellenism on the one hand, the psychology of the Greek people of remaining victims on the other hand are the unseen powers which are imbued in modern Greek group identity and they complicate political negotiations, create psychological resistance to solutions and made negotiations with the Turks difficult.”¹⁹

The fact that there was not a Greek nation when the Greek state was established means that the formation of the Greek nation should be called “national building” rather than “national awakening”. The trend that was common during the process of nation state’s emergence in the western Europe was not seen in Greece.²⁰ The Greek

intellectuals emboldened by liberal and Grekophile western intellectuals had tried to link the Greece of 19th century to the ancient Greece. According to them there was a continuation in this process. Thus, the “Rums” of the Ottoman Empire, the “Romeics” of the Byzantine Empire and the ancient Greeks were the people of the same origin.²¹ As it was the case in the creation of independent Greek state, the help of the western intellectuals was decisive in the process of building a nation. Their involvement in this process determined the kind of society which this newly born states should possess. In short “Hellenism was imposed by the west upon the people who had been cut off from its influence for two millennia.”²²

The existence of these chosen glorious and traumas led them to be preoccupied with themselves, and not to trust the other side. The Greeks are much more preoccupied with the Turks than the Turks with the Greeks. This can easily be discerned in the amount and frequency of information and news that come out in the national press directly related to the other side.²³ The way the other nation is displayed and characterized in the press is also another barrier to negotiations.

“Embodied in the Greek news media is the image of Turkey as the enemy par excellence. Turkey is described as a large, undemocratic, and aggressive power disrespectful of human rights. Turkey is inclined to torture and genocide and, is now, as in the past, barbaric and uncivilized. In short Turkey is the source of all the evil in the world. Greece, on the other hand, is described as totally untithetical to Turkey. The Greeks are characterized as being small, innocent, and victims who are brave and civilized Christians”²⁴

While the Turks are described in the father figure, the Greeks are displayed in a mother figure just to give the impression the Turks are rapists.

In the creation of these psychological barriers, the chauvinistic version of nationalistic ideology and abuse of this by politicians constitute the other important reason. Because it is easy for politicians to get vote in elections through the depiction of the other side as the enemy par excellence, the politicians who resort to such measures are

the main culprits of the unbreakable impasse.²⁵ Until the extermination of these sort of politicians and the emergence of a realist and rational approach to problems, it is difficult to expect a solution in the near future.

In the formation of misperceptions on both shores of the Aegean Sea, one factor is highly important, that is, the “Western Factor”. Both nations formulated their views about each other through the eyes of Western Europe. This was because of the huge role Western Europe played in the emergence of these nation states. In the imposition of “hellenism” on the Greek state the west played the most decisive role by putting it as a precondition that this new state must accept in return for western help to get independence. In other words, the Greeks were somehow obliged to accept the anti-Turkish character of hellenism and so to label the Turks as “barbar and uncivilized”. Because hellenim was formulated in western European capitals and it took all its anti-Turkish features through the efforts of European Intellectuals in their attempts to idealize the Greek civilization as the cradle of the overall western civilization, the Greeks did not have so many options to chose but to accept hellenism and embraced the anti-Turkish views of the western civilization.

Likewise, the new Turkish Republic took its reference from Western Europe and constructed its anti-Greek stand through the lenses of the West. The Turks had never evaluated the Greeks independently of Western Europe; on the contrary they saw them as the “naughty-boy” of the West and the collaborator of the western capitalist in their vicinity. The fact that both nations have been continuing to evaluate each other through the lenses of the “West” has been putting the western world to a very important place in the development of bilateral relations. In fact, the west is a living dilemma in Turco-Greek relations. While, on one hand, it feels closer to the Greeks culturally and idealize them as their idol of civilization, on the other hand, the strategic and economic considerations of today’s world force them not to leave Turkey completely outside of their civilization. This might lead to the point that as

long as the west keeps its dilemma towards these countries, these nations will continue to perceive themselves through the views of the “West”. This will feed the misperceptions and misunderstandings in both countries, making the solution of problems more difficult. Since the western world treated these countries differently and could not formulate somehow a common approach in the evaluation of them, the very existence of strategic cooperation within the same international security structure could not suffice for the solution of their problems.



CHAPTER 3: TURCO-GREEK DISPUTES IN THE MAKING

After W.W.II, Greece and Turkey, entered into a new period in their bilateral relations. This era would become completely different from their relations prior to the general war. However, the multiplication of the problems that led them to a degree to a collusion course throughout the whole post war period, constituted the main characteristic of this new relationship. In addition to the diversification of the points of friction, their togetherness in the same international platforms became a second significant feature of their post war relations. While many people from the both countries were expecting that Greece and Turkey would cooperate within these international platforms and so increase the level of confidence between themselves, the developments of this era disproved them. Before analyzing the major points of friction that came about in this period, it might be helpful to seek the reasons that paved the way for the emergence of tensions in bilateral relations.

One factor that seems to have caused the general deterioration of bilateral relations during this period might be the togetherness of these countries, Turkey and Greece, within the same international platforms of the western world, such as NATO and the European Council. Emergence of very complex problems, such as the command and control responsibilities within NATO poisoned the relations. In this regard, one might wonder why it was the case. In other words, why did these countries chose to follow a collision course in their relations?

A possible answer to this question might be found in the role of the western world. The fact that both Greece and Turkey became members of the same international camp, gave third countries, the major western European countries and the United States, an important role to play in shaping the character of bilateral Turco-Greek relations. Thus the simplicity of

relations, witnessed in the previous period (1923-1950), evaporated and gave way to complexity and misunderstandings. The involvement of the third parties in bilateral relations did also complicate the solution of the main problems, Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. In contrast to the solution process of the minority problem of 1920s, in which Greece and Turkey were the only parties and they found the ways of solution on their own, the interference of the third parties in the solution process of the problems, that emerged in the next decades made a possible settlement more difficult rather than easier.

One other reason for the deterioration of relations in this period might be the emergence of a suitable environment enabling these countries to voice their old arguments more freely. Paradoxically having addressed their security considerations under the international protection of NATO, both Greece and Turkey did not hesitate to follow a more nationalistic foreign policy towards each other. So to speak, both of them were sure that the western alliance would not allow them to fight and endanger their security environment in the region. This perception led these countries to feel more courageous in voicing their national claims with respect to the other side and to act more freely in adding new points of contentions to the old ones.¹ The best examples of this policy were noticed during the crisis in the Aegean Sea following 1970s onwards. The so-called “brinkmanship” policy has been resorted to several times. 1976 Hora Crisis, 1987 Sismik Crisis and lastly the latest Kardak/Imia Crisis of 1996 are the showcases of perfect implementation of this policy.

One possible explanation with respect to multiplication of bilateral problems during this period might be related to the political regimes of these countries. Although both of them embraced the values of the western style democracy and initiated their programs of democratization in association with the goal of integrating with the western world, the

abundance of disputes in bilateral relations became the characteristic of this period. That is not to say that it was democracy which caused all the problems, and which forestalled any solution process, but, oddly enough, it was during this period that these countries added new ones and exacerbated the old ones. Lack of strong leadership and talented cabinets, caused by the failure of politicians to establish strong governments, prevented them from formulating rational, realistic and peaceful policy alternatives. In contrast to pre-W.W.II period, in which the strong leadership of Atatürk and İsmet İnönü, and Venizelos enabled these countries to construct solid and realistic policies with respect to each other, the post-war situation created an environment in which it was quite difficult for politicians to reach a consensus on their policies about the other side. Instead they began to use the existing bilateral problems in order to weaken their political rivals and to gain popularity in domestic policy. To formulate nationalistic, and somehow chauvinistic policies seemed attractive to them to win election.

Related to the general climate of post-war world, bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey turned out to be multidimensional. In contrast to the simplicity of relations in the pre-war years, this period was characterized by the variety of bilateral issues. The addition of new dimensions to the existing relations made the solution of existing disputes more difficult by making settlement of each contingent on the others. In other words, they could not succeed in solving any of the disputes completely independent of the others.

One point that attracts attention is that the US and other western countries did not come up with solution proposals to settle down all the thorny problems between Greece and Turkey. Even though some people, especially the leftist circles in Turkey and Greece, claim that the reason for the West for not seriously trying to solve the Turco-Greek dispute was to keep them under control by making them dependent on the West, it seems that the underlying

reasons of the Western behaviors were deriving its sources from the conditions of the cold war, during which these western countries had to become more cautious in their approach to Greece and Turkey because, if they formulated extensive peace proposals, they might have offended one of them by appearing to support the arguments of the other.²

The Cyprus dispute holds a very special place. As both countries started to live under the same international structure of the western world, NATO, the coming of Cyprus as a very significant point of contention in their first years of togetherness, in 1955, kept both busy with this dispute and affected their respective attitudes towards the other problems of 1970s as well. Although historians or analysts of international relations do not need to deal with problems that did not occur, it is intriguing to ask the question: but for the Cyprus dispute, would Greece and Turkey have still experienced a problematic and uneasy relationship? The answer to this question should be looked for in the connection of the Aegean Sea problems with the Cyprus dispute. If somebody tries to analyze this, he/she will most probably notice that there is a connection between the problems of 1970s in the Aegean Sea with the Cyprus problem. It is a fact that the tough stance of these countries in the Cyprus problem led them to create some new friction in the Aegean Sea, and to be more intransigent and unyielding in the solution process of existing problems.³ For example, the dispute concerning the command and control responsibilities within NATO took place after Greece's withdrawal from the military wing of NATO following Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Likewise, Greece rushed to militarize her Eastern Aegean islands after 1974 Cyprus crisis in blatant contravention of the Lausanne Treaty by which Turkey ceded those islands to Greece. Although the problems concerning the delimitation of territorial waters and the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea had nothing to do with Cyprus, and they were highly related to the parties' strategic and economic interests in that sea, the emergence and persistence of the

Cyprus dispute had negatively affected the disposition of Greece and Turkey to possible solution of aforementioned problems. It is, therefore, plausible to infer from all these cases that the emergence of Cyprus dispute had prevented both Greece and Turkey from consolidating a period of cooperation and good-neighborliness which they had initiated earlier despite their togetherness within the same international platforms, such as NATO.

Now a cursory look at these problems might help us diagnose the underlying causes of them, and maybe derive some principles to be used in the solution process.

1. The Cyprus Dispute:

The outbreak of the Cyprus crisis as a headache in Turco-Greek relations was a product of post W.W.II developments. Although history might help us understand the motivations with regard to the two communities on the island, it seems that the underlying reasons of the current dispute did largely come about due to the cold war atmosphere.

During the Ottoman rule from 1571 to 1878, the communities on the island lived in a peaceful atmosphere, and this continued under the British reign till 1950s. When the Ottomans took the island from the Venetians, a new period started for the local communities. The plight of the Greek Orthodox Cypriot community, which suffered during the Venetian rule, improved a lot after the Ottomans granted them extensive rights ranging from religious to public area. The most important privilege they gained was the ethnarch position of their religious leaders. This title enabled these religious leaders to regulate both social and religious aspects of their live. Indeed, this community became one of the associates in the island. Regarding this period, one thing is clear that there occurred no rebellion among this community against the Ottoman rule

due to their dissatisfaction. There is no evidence that their life standard was in any way lower than the Turks. On the contrary, the granting of trade and business sector to this community made these people richer than their associates on the island. Although these two communities lived in peace even in mix-villages all over the island, there was not much intermingling: Very few mix-marriages took place; both communities had different educational systems and background; and the British administration which established itself in 1878 and remained until 1960 did very little to radically change it. Under these circumstances it was too much to expect that the state set up in accordance with the 1959 and 1960 treaties would overcome all these difficulties and bring about a Cypriot identity.⁴

After the British took the island's rule from the Ottomans following the 1877-1878 Ottoman - Russian war in return for British support to the Ottoman Empire against the Russians, the Greeks in Cyprus continued to flourish. And the orthodox Greeks started to perceive themselves as the majority and the boss over the Turkish community. Emboldened by the success of their compatriots in mainland Greece in 1830s, they began to seek ways to unite the island with Greece. The policy of Union of Cyprus with Greece, 'enosis', affected the attitudes of this Greek orthodox people both towards the Turks and the ruling British negatively. Nevertheless, international conditions of that time did not offer much chance to the Greeks to achieve their aims, enosis, envisaged in the Megali Idea. The weakness of the newly-born Greek state and the global interests of the big powers, Britain, France, and the Russians, were not conducive to the realization of enosis throughout the nineteenth century. Despite this, the gap between the communities started to widen in this period. Under the privileges granted to them by the British rule, the Greeks on the island prospered and outweighed the Turks in many respects.⁵

The transfer of legal possession of the island from the Ottomans to Britain in 1914 following the Ottoman Empire's decision to join the W.W.I on the side of the Central Powers ended the 400 years of Ottoman rule on the island. In 1925, Cyprus became a crown colony. One development that took place around this time would later become a point of dispute between Turkey and Greece was that Turkey relinquished its sovereignty rights in favor of Britain. The Turkish government of that time could foresee the developments of 1950s. When the British government invited Turkey to the London Conference together with Greece to discuss the present situation in 1955, Greece objected to this by claiming that Turkey was not a party to the conflict, because she relinquished her sovereignty rights in the Lausanne Peace Treaty. However, this was not true altogether because Turkey did relinquish her sovereign rights on condition that they would be transferred to Britain.

Under the British rule from 1925 to 1960, the only aim of the Greeks in Cyprus was to realize enosis as soon as possible. The Turkish community did try to preserve its unity and self-control that was granted by the British. Following the Second World War, a new trend did become visible in international relations, de-colonization. When the Greek Cypriots noticed that the colonial powers were freeing their dominions and granting them independence, they thought that the time for their own independence had arrived. However, the Greeks' definition of independence for Cyprus was not in harmony with those of the other colonized nations because their aim was enosis rather than independence in the usual way. If they had really desired to establish an independent state in association with the Turkish community, the century-old owners of the island, all these bloody clashes might have been avoided.

From the end of the Second World War until 1960, the main goal of the Greek Cypriots was first to get rid of the British rule and then to realize enosis. In contrast, both Turkey and the

Turkish community on the island were pleased with the British rule and they did not have any objection to the continuation of it. However, when they realized that it was impossible to preserve the status quo, the best course of action seemed to them to be to divide the island in two sections and to secure the lives of the Turkish community from the bloody assaults of the Greeks.⁶

Following the failed attempts to preserve the status quo, Turkey, Greece and England decided to get together and to grant independence to the island under certain constraints in 1960. The 1960 Agreements established an independent Cyprus state consisting of two sovereign entities, the Cypriot Turks and the Greek Cypriots. According to the provisions of the treaties that established the independent Cyprus Republic, a 70 to 30 ratio was to be applied in state institutions. While the Greek Cypriots would hold 70% of the bureaucratic posts, the Cypriot Turks would 30%. The president would be a Greek and the vice-president a Turk. Both communities took part in the establishment of the Republic as equal founders.

In the establishment of the Cyprus Republic, strategic considerations of the western alliance, NATO, were of paramount importance. If these two countries which are located very strategically, fought each other over Cyprus, this would damage the interests of NATO in the region, weakening the firmness of the Alliance against Russia and making the area a suitable target for the Soviet Union to extend its influence. It seemed that the interests of Turkey, Greece and the United States coincided. However, the sincerity of mother countries regarding the preservation of Cyprus's independence did not follow the same track. This was evidenced by different courses of actions that Greece and Turkey took in the aftermath of the Greek's attempts to alter the newly established status quo to the detriment of the Turkish community by relegating them to a minority status in the state. When they, under the leadership of

Makarios, tried to revise the constitution by demanding amendments to some articles in December, 1963, Turkey and the Turkish community of the island objected to this. Although the Greek governments of the time were not openly supporting Makarios, they were infiltrating Greek troops to the island in order to strengthen the Greeks' hands against any Turkish military action.

After the withdrawal of the Turks upon the pressure of the Greek Cypriots from the government, the Greeks began to control all the state apparatus. From 1964 to 1974, the main aim of the Greeks was to force the Turks, through a very strict economic embargo and isolation, to yield to their demands, to accept an enriched minority status and acquiescence to a togetherness in a state dominated by the Greeks. When the colonels regime in Athens initiated a coup against Makarios, who was seen by the colonels as the man preventing the unification of the island with mainland Greece, and replaced him with Nicos Sampson in order to achieve enosis, Turkey intervened militarily and divided the island into a de facto two sections.⁷

From 1963 until now, these two people have been living separately under the rule of their own authorities. First, the establishment of "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" in 1975, and then of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" in 1983 are the indications of the Turkish community's will to live under an authority controlled by themselves.⁸

Since 1974, the leaders of both communities met many times to discuss possible ways for solution. In this respect, two meetings of the communal leaders are really important. "The Four Guidelines Agreement" between Denktaş and Makarios in February, 1977, and the "Ten Points Agreement" between Denktaş and Kyprianou in May, 1979, fixed the basic principles

of a solution process. Since then, the main target of the parties has been the realization of a federal republic which would consist of two bi-zonal communities which would rule their own people in their sections but unite under the title of a federal Cyprus Republic.⁹ Although both communities agreed to the idea of federalism as the structure of the state, they could not come to a compromise, because their definitions of federalism differed too much from each other.

While the Turkish side has always desired the establishment of a federal state which would consist of two bi-communal and bi-zonal entities, the continuation of Turkey's security guarantee envisaged by the 1960 treaties, and the full recognition of TRNC as a precondition to establish the federal state, the Greek side has sought the establishment of a federal state which would have only one sovereignty, the abolition of Turkey's guarantees, and the assignment of improved minority rights to the Turkish community in the new state. In terms of their federation definitions, one thing is very significant. While the Turks rejected the assignment of "traveling, settlement and owning property" rights to the Greek community, the Greeks appear to see them as a major part of the negotiation process. The net result of these protracted negotiations is a deadlock. If the Turkish community on the island did not object to the realization of these rights from the beginning, the whole island would become a Greek state where the Greek community would dominate the Turkish community not only economically but also politically and socially. The relatively better-off positions of the Greeks over the Turks would lead the Greeks to buy Turkish lands and to return to the Turkish territories in the north that they had to leave following Turkey's 1974 military intervention. The Greeks' efforts to get back to the North display their will of making the whole island a Greek Cypriot state, under the disguise of a federation.

Regarding the position of the third parties in the solution process, it seems that their involvement did not help the parties settle the problems. Instead it is safe to say that they provoked the parties to adhere to their established arguments more rigidly, and to ignore the ideas of the other side. The reasons why the involvement of the third parties could not create a suitable atmosphere conducive to solution lie in the motives behind their actions.

The first misconception by third parties which makes things complicated has been their insistence that there is only one legal entity on the island, the Greek State. In other words, their objection to the recognition of TRNC as a legal state representing the Turkish community has hindered the solution process because it was illogical on the part of third parties to exhort the communities on the island to establish a federation, while denying recognition to the TRNC. In addition, while the third parties insisted on calling the Greek leaders as "the President", they prefer to address the leader of the TRNC as "Mr. Denktaş". This sort of an attitude has obviously emboldened the Greek Cypriots to chose intransigence in the solution process by not yielding to any Turkish proposal. As the alleged legal owners of the island, the Greeks appear to think that if the international community continue to recognize them as the only legal authority on the island, they do not need to share this authority with the Turks in a federation because it is better to be in sole possession of it. Since the Greek Cypriots were recognized as the only authority from the beginning, all the attempts to find a solution to the problem centered around the idea of how to get the Turkish side to come close to Greek views.

In the solution process, the Greek Cypriot' application for the EU membership and the acceptance of it by the Union in 1995 became a turning point in terms of the changes in Greek side's approach towards a federal solution. From 1974 to 1990, the Greeks appeared to

support a federation as a possible way to settle the dispute. However, from the 1990s onwards they changed their views and initiated attempts to become a member of the EU. The EU membership seemed to them to be as the shortest way of achieving full control over the island and getting a de facto enosis with Greece. When they understood that it was futile to force the Turkish community to yield to a state structure under the Greek Cypriot control, they began to seek ways of becoming an EU member. However, they did not stop the process of intercommunal talks between the leaders of both communities, keeping in mind that if they locked this process, the world community might have concluded that it was the Greeks which hindered the solution.¹⁰

The recognition of the Greek State as the sole authority on the island gained significance once again following the decision of the EU to start the membership process with the Greek State in May, 1998. Although this decision of the Union would not mean that the Greek Cypriots will surely be taken in the Club, the very existence of such an hope at the back of the minds of the Greeks would be enough for them not to accept any federal solution in which they would have to share the sovereignty with the Turks.

As is obvious that the involvement of the EU is not helping the parties solve their problems, the use of other international platforms, like NATO, might be made more use of in this process. Because the main reason of the current situation is the lack of confidence between the communities, the attempts at filling this gap should be the major priority. In this regard, the parties should be encouraged to work in common international institutions. Thus, NATO appears to be the most capable platform that might bring these communities together and help them eradicate the walls of misunderstanding. In addition to such sort of benefits that the communities on the island would get from NATO involvement, the existing strategic balance

between Turkey and Greece would also be preserved. The details of a NATO involvement in the Solution of Cyprus dispute is being discussed in the fifth chapter.

The involvement of the EU in the solution has not only locked the intercommunal talks on the island, but also estranged Turkey's relations with the Union. A possible membership of the Greek Cypriot Republic in the EU which recognises the Greek Cypriot government as the sole authority having full sovereignty over the island would automatically mean that the TRNC would seemingly be included in the EU as well. In case of Cyprus's membership into the EU Turkey will integrate TRNC to Turkey as it was made obvious in the treaties between Turkey and TRNC lately.

2. Aegean Sea Related Problems:

In this section, causes of problems that bring Turkey and Greece to a collision course in the Aegean Sea will be analyzed. Although this region has been host to both these countries for centuries and witnessed many historical events that these nations experienced, it has not been an area of peace and cooperation for a long time. In this respect, the existence of one trend seems very interesting as to why Turkey and Greece could not create a peaceful atmosphere in the twentieth century. It is interesting to note that the emergence of Aegean Sea problems coincides more or less with the nation state building process in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries particularly in Greece. When Greece became independent, it attained the consciousness of ownership regarding the Aegean Sea. Stemming from the existence of nationalistic ideologies in Greece, the Greek people attributed very significant value to this Sea, and somehow they thought that this region does exclusively belong to them, and that the

other state, namely Turkey, constitutes an obstacle before the expansion of their interests in the Aegean.

For example, the significant role of the “Megali Idea” concept in the formation of the modern Greek nation played a determining role in the emergence of Greek claims with respect to the Aegean Sea. One of the components of the Megali Idea relates to that Sea by putting it as an inevitable living space for the Greek people. According to them, the Ottomans captured these areas and hampered the territorial integrity of the people of Greek origin by forcing them to live separated from each other. Therefore, the fulfillment of complete Greek domination over the Aegean Sea is very logical and right. On the other hand, Turkey does not claim that the Aegean Sea only belongs to Turkey and Greece does not have any right to question Turkey’s sovereignty there. Instead, Ankara seems to share certain deposits under the seabed and wants to have unhindered navigational access to its military and maritime ships. The emergence of the Sea as an economically valuable area in the post W.W.II era increased the importance of the Aegean Sea in bilateral relations. The discovery of oil resources under the seabed led these nations to a collision course as to how they can possess as much of the area as possible. The question of sovereignty became the underlying reason of many current problems.

With the advent of the Cyprus dispute, the Turco-Greek differences over the Aegean Sea became more and more complicated. Indeed, it was perhaps the Cyprus issue which made the Aegean dispute break the surface in the first place. That is not to say, however, that the Aegean disputes are now a secondary matter in the overall Turco-Greek conflict. If anything, it has become so intense and complicated that it brought the two countries to the brink of a full-scale war several times, and that it might at any time cause tension and even armed clash. In other words, the Cyprus issue and the Aegean disputes have their own dynamics, and each

case needs to be examined and possibly resolved on its own merit. Nonetheless, close relationship between them is obvious.

2.1. The Continental Shelf Dispute:

Among the Aegean Problems, the continental shelf dispute holds the most important place owing to its close connection with other problems. The technological developments of the 1970s increased the value of the Aegean Sea in the eyes of Greece and Turkey by giving rise to hopes that they could extract oil from the seabed. When they realized that the Aegean Sea bed contains oil resources, they made the delimitation of the frontiers between themselves an important priority. The problems associated with the continental shelf areas in the Aegean Sea are twofold. While, on the one hand, the littoral countries cannot agree on how to delimit the continental shelf, they are also in conflict with respect to possible ways of solution of the problem.

The Turkish government maintains that the Aegean Sea has some sui generis special features. The fact that it is a semi-closed sea with many islands and islets scattered all around, the regulations of the 1958 and 1982 Conventions on the Law of the Sea cannot be applied here. The Greek governments on the other hand base their arguments on these treaties because according to the regulations of these conventions, all the islands together with the Greek mainland have their own continental shelves. Being aware that there are more than 2000 Greek islands, islets, rocks and other geographical formations in the Aegean Sea, one can easily comprehend Greece's possible gains if the regulations of these conventions were strictly applied here.

Therefore, Turkey proposes a median line in the middle of the Aegean Sea that would divide the continental shelf in nearly two equal parts. Greece, on her part, suggests drawing a line between the mainland Turkey and her Easternmost Aegean Islands, giving Turkey a very small share. The Greek government bases her argument on the 6th article of the 1958 Convention on the Law of the Sea, according to which if the littoral countries can not delimit her continental shelves through negotiations, the “equi-distance principle” is applied in delimitation. The Greek government also claims that her eastern Aegean islands are the natural and legal extension of her sovereignty, and, therefore, no one can make a distinction between mainland Greece and her Eastern Aegean Islands. These islands are within the territorial integrity of Greece. In contrast, Turkey says that the “natural prolongation principle” should be applied with respect to these islands; these islands lie within the natural prolongation of mainland Turkey, and the resources under the seabed of these islands should belong to Turkey. Turkey also says that the “equity principle” is also applicable here in delimitation of the continental shelf, envisaged by the Article 300 of the 1982 Conventions on the Law of the Sea. Overall the Turkish view is based on the basic principle of the Lausanne Peace Treaty which created some balance between these two countries.¹¹

Besides these substance-related problems, these countries have also been at odds with each other with respect to the ways of a solution. While Turkey supports the idea of direct negotiations between the parties as a major means of solution, Greece favors a solution reached through international law and courts. In this regard, the application of the Greek government of Karamanlis to the International Court of Justice in the Hague in 1976, and the decision of that court in 1978 is illuminating regarding the feasibility of any judicial solution, because the Court decided that it was not a competent institution to handle the issues in the absence of Turkey unless both countries came to the Court together. Like the international

Court of Justice, the United Nations Security Council issued a resolution, upon the application of Greece in 1976, stating that the parties should first try to negotiate, and then, if they could not reach a compromise, should use the judicial and arbitration mechanism, including the International Court of Justice.

Although the stance of the international community was somehow neutral towards this problem, the membership of Greece to the EU tipped the balance in favour of Greece as the Union somehow became a defender of Greece's claims against Turkey because of the consensus upon which the Union functions.

2.2 Territorial Waters:

The emergence of the territorial waters as a dispute between Greece and Turkey coincides with the signing of 1982 International Convention on the Law of the Sea by Greece but not by Turkey. According to the Article 3 of this conventions, littoral states have the right to extend their territorial waters up to 12 miles. Being a signatory to this Convention, Greece claims that she has the right to implement this article in the Aegean whenever she sees fit. Turkey vehemently objects to that on the grounds, that If Greece extends her territorial waters to 12 miles, Turkey's share of territorial waters would decrease automatically and that much of the Aegean Sea would go to Greece, making the Aegean a Greek lake. Being a littoral country on the Aegean Sea, and aware of the importance of that Sea for her navigation, both military and commercial, Turkey strongly opposes Greece's extension of territorial waters beyond the current 6 miles.

In the Lausanne Peace Treaty both countries agreed on a 3 miles limit of territorial waters.

Later in 1936, Greece extended her territorial waters to 6 miles, and Turkey reciprocated to this by extending her territorial waters to 6 miles in 1964. Under the 6 miles limits, Turkey possesses 7.47% and Greece possesses 43.68% of the Aegean Sea, while the international waters consist of 48.85% of that Sea. In case Greece and Turkey extend their territorial waters to 12 miles, Greece's share will increase to 73%, and Turkey's share will go from the present 7.47% to 8.76%, while the international waters will drop to 15% of all the waters.¹²

As these figures indicate, an extension of territorial waters to 12 miles would only benefit Greece at the expense of Turkey and the international community. Likewise in the continental shelf dispute, while Turkey suggests the use of bilateral negotiations as the proper way of solution, Greece favors resorting to judicial and arbitrary mechanisms. Turkey puts forth the article 300 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea to prevent Greece from extending her territorial waters beyond 6 miles to the detriment of their neighbors in abuse of this right.¹³ On the contrary, Greece, by citing the principle of "national integrity", claims that her eastern Aegean Islands should also benefit this 12 mile extension. In such a case, the Turkish vessels would need to take the Greek government permission to pass through these waters. For instance, a Turkish ferryboat that will depart from Mersin to go to Istanbul would need to ask Greece's permission to pass through the Greek waters to reach its destination.

2.3. Air Space Problem:

This problem is related to the limit of territorial waters; a country cannot possess an air space that extends her territorial waters. This principle was regulated by the Chicago Convention in 1944.¹⁴ Although this rule has been respected by many countries in the world, Greece denies the existence of such a rule and claims that her air zones is 10 miles. Greece bases her claims

on a presidential (royal at that time) decree issued in 1931. Although this decree was issued in 1931, the Greek governments did not bring this to the attention of the international community in general, and Turkey, in particular. When the then Greek government announced in 1975 that Greece had an air zone of 10 miles, Turkey objected to this harshly by referring to articles of 1944 Chicago Convention regulating this issue.

The significance of the air zone problem takes place when the Greek governments accuse Turkey and other countries of violating her air zones. During the Turkish military exercises over the Aegean Sea, the Turkish aircraft do not take the alleged 10 miles of Greece's air zones into consideration and fly over the 4 miles of air zone outside Greece's 6 miles of air space. Turkey recognizes that Greece has only a 6 miles air zone that corresponds to Greece's 6 miles territorial waters. Besides Turkey, the US and other countries do not also accept a 10 miles Greek air zone, and behave like Turkey during the NATO's military exercises over the Aegean Sea.¹⁵

2.4. FIR (Flight Information Region) Problem:

The region in which the responsible country regulates the civil aviation activities and provides the countries with flight information and performs search-rescue activities is called flight information region. The boundaries of these regions are approved by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Although these regions do not give the responsible countries any right of sovereignty over these boundaries, the Greek governments deem the frontiers of these flight information regions as their national air space. The present frontiers of flight information regions over the Aegean Sea were determined by the International Civil Aviation Organization in 1950 and 1958 meetings. Today's frontiers of FIR over the Aegean Sea

correspond to Greece's and Turkey's outer limits of territorial waters. Turkey and Greece are responsible for the regulation of civil aviation activities over their territorial waters.

In the essence of the conflict lies the Greek demand that all Turkish aircraft have to inform the Greek authorities when they are entering the Athens Flight Information Region. However, Turkey rejects such demands on the grounds, that these regions were organized just to regulate civil aviation. Turkey informs the Greek authorities of the flights of Turkish civil planes, but deny giving flight information with respect to military flights. According to Turkey, military flights should be organized through bilateral negotiations between Turkey and Greece.¹⁶

2.5. Militarization of the Eastern Aegean Islands:

The islands which Greece possesses off a few miles away from the Turkish coast constitute one of the thorny problems between Greece and Turkey owing to the attempts of Greece to abolish the demilitarized status of them.

The demilitarized status of these islands were first decided by the 1913 London Treaty, and then the declarations of the six European countries to the Greek government in February, 1914.¹⁷ The Lausanne Treaty that ended the war between Turkey and Greece reiterated the demilitarized status of these eastern Aegean islands.¹⁸ In addition to the Lausanne Treaty, the status of the Straits and the islands at the entrance of the straits were fixed in an additional protocol to the Lausanne Treaty in which the demilitarized status of those islands were stated openly.¹⁹ The 1936 Montreux Convention on the status of the Straits and the islands lying before the Straits were regulated according to the security needs of Turkey and there did not

occur any changes about the demilitarised status of the islands that Greece owns before the Straits.²⁰ Besides this, the 1947 Paris Peace Agreement that was signed between Greece and Italy confirmed the demilitarised status of the Dodacanese islands.²¹

Despite the existence of legal grounds, the Greek governments started to militarize these islands in the 1960s. The interesting point in the timing of the Greek government to initiate its militarization process of these islands is the fact that Greece did state to change the established status of these islands concomitantly with the developments of the Cyprus dispute. Until the 1960s, the Greek governments abided by demilitarised status of the islands. When the Turkish Government presented its first warning to Greece in 1964, due to the allegations that Greece was fortifying Rhodes and Istandkoy islands, Greece responded by saying that she was continuing to abide by the regulations of the aforementioned treaties concerning the status of these islands. Interestingly, starting with the 1970s, the Greek governments changed their attitudes towards Turkey's allegations that Greece was trying to militarize these islands. The showcase that displays the changes in Greece's approach to this issue took place in the militarization of the Lemnos Island by Greece. To the warnings of Turkey, Greece responded that, for the first time, the 1936 Montrieux Convention gave her the right to militarize this island. In her efforts to change the status quo of the aforementioned treaties concerning these islands, Greece has been using the NATO mechanisms to get Turkey to accept invalidity of these treaties.

For example, the Greek governments have tried to have NATO include the Lemnos Island in the military exercises in the Aegean Sea, realising their aims through the back door. However, the NATO countries hesitated to side with one of the parties to the conflict and avoided themselves being involved in the bilateral problems between Turkey and Greece. NATO did

not include the Lemnos Island in its maneuvers in the Aegean Sea. This attitude of NATO brought about two different evaluations in Turkey and Greece. While Turkey applauding the position of NATO in preserving its impartiality, the Greek government deemed the NATO action as being in favour of Turkey. Greece's perception of NATO's status regarding the Lemnos Island later played a role in the emergence of a hostile attitude towards NATO in Greece. Whenever the US, the leading country of NATO, has proposed that the parties should negotiate the existing problems in order to find solutions to them, Greece has suspected of these propositions, thinking that the US is acting in favor of Turkey.

To the objections of Turkey concerning the status of the Eastern Aegean Islands, the Greek governments put forth some arguments in order to justify their actions on these islands. As far as the Lemnos and Semotharace islands are concerned, the Greek governments claim that the nonmilitarized status of those islands was changed by the 1936 Montreux Convention. In this respect, there is not any consistent evaluation about the status of these islands. Many Turkish international lawyers state that the Montreux Convention only redefined the status of the Straits and the islands that Turkey possesses before the straits, by conferring Turkey the right to arm these regions. On the other hand the majority of the Greek specialists state the opposite that the Montreux Convention replaced the Lausanne Peace Treaty with respect to the clauses of the latter about the straits and the islands in its vicinity. They claim that the Montreux Convention gave Greece the right to arm these islands as well.

As of the Eastern Aegean Islands, the Greek governments adheres to the UN Charter, especially the article 51, by stating that this article gives Greece to defend itself. Greece refers to the formation of the Aegean Army by Turkey, and says that she is arming those islands just for self-defense. Oddly enough, the Aegean Army was established by Turkey long after the

Greek governments had begun to militarize these islands. With respect to the status of the Dodecanese Islands, Greece reminds Turkey that the Paris Treaty of 1947 was signed between Greece and Italy, and since Turkey was not a party to this treaty, she has no right to criticise the status of these islands.

2.6. The Early Warnings and Command and Control Responsibilities Problems:

These two problems related to the responsibilities of Greece and Turkey within NATO are very much interrelated. The essence of the conflict lies in the attempts of the parties, especially of Greece, to control much of the region. The situation prior to the 1974 Cyprus crisis was very much to the advantage of Greece, enabling her to extend her air and naval control up to the outer limits of Turkey's territorial waters. The dangers of these regulations for Turkey came about during the 1974 Cyprus Crisis. The Turkish governments thought that if Greece continued to hold the command and control responsibilities in the region according to the regulations of NATO, Turkey might not have enough time to take counter measures in case of an air attack by Greece.

After the withdrawal of Greece from the military wing of NATO in the aftermath of the 1974 Cyprus Crisis, Turkey made it clear that the regulation prior to 1974 was no longer valid, and if Greece wanted to rejoin NATO, she would have to re-negotiate the aforementioned responsibilities with Turkey. Bearing the hopes of advantageous regulations in mind, the military regime in Turkey gave its consent to Greece's entrance to NATO in 1980. Although, the parties agreed to negotiate these problems after Greece joined NATO through the Rogers Agreement, there has been no negotiation between the two since then.²²

The problems related with the command and control responsibilities in the Aegean Sea will be discussed in the fourth chapter in detail.



CHAPTER 4: GREECE AND TURKEY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO FRAMEWORK

Main thesis of the present work regarding the international organizations to which both Greece and Turkey are attached either through full membership or a special status is that these countries have tried to mobilize these bodies against each other. Here an attempt will be made to analyze this process by focusing on the two most important organizations, i.e. NATO and the European Union. The reason why these organizations are chosen as a main area of focus lies in the fact that these are the main channels that link these countries to the western world, and that they provided Turkey and Greece with the tools to cope with security, economic, and political challenges of the Cold War and after.

In the analysis of the subject regarding NATO, the year 1952, when Greece and Turkey became members, should be taken as the starting point. As far as the EU is concerned, the year 1974 will be the main date to emphasize. Although neither Greece nor Turkey had by then attained the membership status in 1974, that year signifies a departure point in Greece's history as she left the military wing of NATO and gravitated towards the European Community. The same year, 1974, confirmed Turkey's superiority to Greece not only in a single-handed war but also within the NATO platforms. Until Greece's return to NATO in 1981, Turkey enjoyed a privileged status in the region.

While highlighting the major tactics of these two countries in the process of utilization of these international organizations, the main task of the present study is to prove the futility of their endeavors and to display the prospected benefits and gains that the countries might have made if they had used the mechanisms of the institutions for solution of their bilateral problems.

4.1 The European Union Context

After the end of the World War II, the US government initiated an aid program for the western European countries to help them recover from the ruins of the devastating war. Since the US was the only country capable of providing such magnanimous help, it was logical to derive that the new international order of post war was shaped under the American influence. The Americans were helping their European partners come together and unite for common grounds in order to get over the war's trauma. Signed in 1957 the Rome Treaty leading to the establishment of the European Union -then the European Community- was an important landmark in the process of European integration.¹ Although this organization was not a body providing its members with security guarantees, it served the function of bringing them together through economic incentives. The western European countries could find time and opportunity to cooperate through this organization under the climate of security provided by the other major institution of the western world, NATO.

Although Greece and Turkey secured their membership in NATO in 1952, they had further concerns. They continued to seek other grounds to anchor themselves to the western world. Establishment of the EC offered these countries an opportunity. Two years after the foundation of the community both Greece and Turkey applied for the associate membership. In fact the Turkish foreign policy-makers of that time were perceiving the possible membership in the EC as an important milestone in their century-old Europeanization policy. According to them, membership in the community was a logical and reasonable derivation of being a member in the western alliance.²

This was also the case in Greece. Greek foreign policy-makers were searching possible ways to attach themselves to the western community more firmly. As to the time of Turkey's application for associate membership, some circles in Turkey are voicing that Turkey did this just because the Greek government applied two months before, and according to them, if Turkey had missed this chance she would have lagged behind Greece in the context of Europeans, and Turkey would have lost the chance of maintaining the balance with Greece. In other words, Greece might have mobilized the EU, as she does now, against Turkey in the absence of Turkey's membership.³ Although the latest developments of 1980s and 1990s have proven these arguments right, it was an easy way to try to explain the foreign policy motives of Turkey in the context of her relations with Greece because nobody might have expected the developments of today. Moreover both countries had not been experiencing troubling problems during that time. If anything, they were cooperating inside NATO and the Balkan Pact.

Regarding the attitudes of the EC towards their applications for associate membership, one might say that the main points of considerations that the community took into account were security and military-related ones. While the world was living through the horrors of the cold war in extreme in 1950s, the community was evaluating the application of Greece and Turkey on their capabilities to contribute to the overall European security and alliance. The significance of this security considerations was reflected into the texts of the association agreements that the community signed with Greece and Turkey in which the community was offering full membership to both of them after a fixed period of time. This kind of a clause was not put inside the association agreements that the community signed with the other countries.⁴

Since the inception of the association agreements with both Greece and Turkey in 1961 and 1963 respectively until the beginning of 1970s, the relations between the community and these NATO allies were largely shaped by the realities of the cold war. In a broader sense, the main points of considerations were security and military related. However, with the beginning of the “détente” in the superpower relations, the other considerations began to gain significance in these relations. Economic motives started to characterize the relations between the community and these two countries. This was due to the emergence of the first discrepancies between the US and its European partners. As the European countries were recovering economically, their dependence upon the US was automatically decreasing, and this led to the emergence of chasms in the western Alliance.⁵ These developments caused the emergence of a belief in the European circles that as long as both Greece and Turkey could not achieve structural changes in their

economies and thus develop, their strategic contributions to the western security would not suffice for their full membership. In light of these new arguments, the years of 1970s were really full of interesting events. While the Greek government of veteran politician Konstantin Karamanlis applied for the full membership and speeded up the process of structural changes in Greece's economy, the circles in Turkey ranging from politicians to business circles were quite busy with debates on the customs union. In other words, while the Turkish governments of the time were freezing their relations with the community due to the difficulties of economic adjustment programs that were necessary for the realization of the Customs Union, the Greek government did not see the customs union sufficient and applied for full membership instead.⁶

As to the reasons of Greece's application for full membership to the community, one should note that the Cyprus developments of 1974 and the overall American attitude towards these developments affected the circles of foreign policy decision-making process. When the newly established Karamanlis government came to the conclusion that NATO did nothing to prevent Turkey from landing on Cyprus, partitioning the island de facto in two separate entities, the most preferable foreign policy course seemed to quit NATO, not only to protest the US but also to calm down the anger and frustration of the Greek people. In fact, the process of deterioration of NATO's, namely the US' credibility in the eyes of the Greek people dates back to 1967 when the American government of that time pressured Greece to withdraw her troops, 15 thousand, from Cyprus in order to calm down the Gecitkale Crisis and an eventual military confrontation between Greece and Turkey. In addition, the Greeks believe that the success of the military to grasp

power and abolish democracy in 1967 emanates from the covert support of the American government of the time. They further claim that the Americans emboldened General Ionnanides of Greece to oust the intransigent president of Greek Cyprus Government, Makarios, from office, accelerating the process of enosis. Upon the emergence of such sort of beliefs and perceptions in Greek public opinion with respect to NATO and the US, the Karamanlis government started to look for other possible foreign policy alternatives to decrease Greece's dependence on the US. Within the general framework of "multidimensional foreign policy" Greece applied for membership in the Community. Besides, the Greek government tried to improve her relations with the Soviet Union and the other communist block countries, as well as the Middle Eastern Arabic countries.⁷

As far as the attitude of the EC towards the bilateral disputes between Greece and Turkey is concerned, one might say that until the Greek membership in 1981, the Community pursued a "hands-off" policy.⁸ This was because of the lack of common foreign policy mechanisms within the Community. Although "the Common Security Policy Program" started in 1973 with the aim of harmonizing the respective foreign policy courses of the member states, the community could not succeed in formulating and implementing a common course in foreign policy; instead each member followed her way.⁹ Each member state pursued her policy independently of the other members. In this, the difficulty of converging the interests of the community members rank first. The important point in the hands-off policy was not the lack of member states to follow a common course regarding Turco-Greek disputes but rather their failure in implementing a constructive approach to these problems. Like NATO and the US, their first priority became the confinement of a

possible flame-up between Greece and Turkey to low levels and the prevention of a military confrontation that might have disrupted the western security structure.

But after Greece's membership in the community, this hands-off policy began to change to the detriment of Turkey. The Greek governments tried to use the mechanisms of the Community to force Turkey to yield to Greek demands in the solution process of bilateral disputes. Having realized that Turkey aspired to join this Club at whatever cost, the Greek governments initiated a policy of "conditionality" according to which Turkey would have given Greece all the latter wanted.¹⁰ Although this is the stance of Greece with respect to Turkey, the EC did not follow a completely pro-Greek course. Yet, this has started to change especially after the dissolution of the communist block and the evaporation of the Cold War. All this has reduced the strategic value of Turkey in Europe and thus encouraged the Union to take a more Grekophile attitude towards Turkey.

The clear evidence of changes of EC/EU's attitudes towards Turkey might be seen in the decisions of the community's organs about Turkey's membership prospects. Although the Community was reiterating the economic, democratic, cultural, politic, and human rights problems of Turkey among the reasons for not letting her in, it added her problems with Greece to the list. This was evidenced in the report of the EC evaluating Turkey's application in 1987. The Dublin Summit of the Community leaders in June 1990 clarified the fact that if Turkey wanted to be a member, she had to make concessions to Greece.¹¹ This was putting the Community's relations with Turkey under the Greek mortgage. The use of the Union by Greece against Turkey took place also during the negotiations

regarding the realizations of the fourth financial program envisaged within the framework of the Customs Union. Due to the Greek veto, Turkey has not been receiving 600 million-dollar aid since 1981.¹²

There are several instances on which Greece successfully mobilized the Union against Turkey. For example, in 1995 Turkey could sign a customs union agreement with the EU only after the Greek government recast her veto on it. And, on the face of the Greek veto it was not so easy for Turkey to realize this agreement because Ankara had to give up its objections to the start of the negotiation process of the Greek Cyprus Republic with the Union for her membership. Because the Turkish government gives utmost importance to relations with the EU, they evaluated the Customs Union agreement as an important step in the process of being accepted as a member. The Greek assumption was that Greece did not have to do so much to earn concessions from Turkey since Turkey was so eager and blind to do everything to integrate with the Union that she might easily give up her established stand with respect to problems with Greece.

One other example of the use of the Union by Greece against Turkey might be discerned in the decisions of the European Union Commission concerning Turkey's membership possibilities. In one of them it was openly stated that so long as the Turkish troops remained in Cyprus, and there occurred no settlement on the island, Turkey could not join the Union. It is a clear projection of Greece's argument in the documents of the Union that if Turkey does not withdraw her troops from the island, Greece will not negotiate any existing problems with Turkey.¹³ The latest and well-known showcase of the European

Union's involvement in Turco-Greek disputes, on the side of Greece, came out in the decision of the Union that it would start the membership negotiation with the Greek Cyprus Republic in the first half of 1998. In this regard, one might ask why the EU supports Greece's stance or approach in its relations with Turkey. In other words, why does the European Union support Greece's policies or arguments against Turkey?

The answer to this question lies in the mechanism of "trade-off of files" inside the Union. This enables Greece to have the Union endorse her arguments. Despite the fact that Greece does not have the capability and potential of determining the decisions of the Union, other countries have to somehow take the Greek interests into consideration, since they need Greece's vote for the realization of their own policies.¹⁴ For example, the fact that Greece is blackmailing the enlargement of the EU should the EU refuse to start the membership process with the Greek Cyprus Republic is a very cheap and somehow "cost free" course of action for her. Therefore, the Greek governments do not negotiate the points at issue with Turkey, knowing clearly that, if they do, they would have to make concessions to Ankara. In broader terms, a Turkey which stands in front of the Union's door and displays all signs of willingness to make concessions in return for membership has encouraged Greece to follow the aforementioned cost free policy against Turkey.

Existence of this sort of a policy was proved by the explanations of the Greek politicians in the aftermath of the meeting of the conservative party leaders of the EU in Brussels in March of 1997. It was stated in that meeting that because Turkey had a religion and cultural traditions different from the EU countries, it is difficult and somehow impossible

for her to join the Club. Greece was quick to utter that it was not Greece, in contrast to the general belief, but the other countries of the Union that blocked Turkey's membership. Following these events many important figures in the Greek government made speeches about whether Turkey belonged to Europe or had a right to join this club or not. They even went further by stating that Turkey was linked to the continent both through her Ottoman past and her contemporary relations, and that Greece had supported the membership of Turkey and would continue to do so in the future as well.¹⁵

The motives behind these explanations might be various, but the most important among them is the fear on the part of the Greek side, that if Turkey turned her back to the EU and ceased its enthusiastic search for membership in this Club, Greece would automatically lose her leverage with, or trump card, against Turkey. Second, a Turkey who is estranged from Europe and turned to other directions, especially east, might be more harmful for Greece's interests, because such a Turkey might be more intransigent in the solution process of the problems.¹⁶ Third, Greece might encounter with the same problems of Turkey, should these arguments over different religion and culture become prevalent in the EU circles, since Greece is the only orthodox country in the Club and seen different by many in the EU. Because Greece's historical, religious and cultural traditions are much different from the other EU members, it might be likely that the latter might not want to see Greece in their family environment, particularly at a time when these views are gaining ground all over the world. Especially, after the famous social scientist Samuel Huntington noted in his article that NATO should not enlarge to other European countries whose past and present were totally divergent from the western

Europe, there has been intensive debate on the clash of civilizations and possible disintegration of the contemporary international system or redelimitation of territorial borders on the basis of cultural differences.

Being cognizant of the dangers of cultural discriminations of the EU against Turkey, Greece fears that the EU or other western institutions, like NATO, might consider pushing her out of these clubs, because she is orthodox and therefore, not from the same historical and cultural roots as the western Europe.¹⁷ Last, the Greek government might have thought that if Turkey perceived that Greece was working for her membership in the EU, she might probably yield to Greek demands in the solution process.¹⁸ These possible reasons that explain the sudden changes in Greece's foreign policy towards Turkey, might be wrong. However, as the latest trends in Greece, especially among the intellectuals, display the Greek government is being exhorted to use the EU mechanisms as far as Turkey is concerned. This might be noticed in the reports of some of think-thanks to the Greek government, that Greece should continue to support Turkey's membership in the Union, because this is the only way to get concessions from Turkey in the near future, given Turkey is willingness to join the EU.¹⁹

After the declarations of the summit held in Luxembourg on December 12, 1997, the pro-Greek disposition of the EU became quite apparent. In that meeting the Union made it clear that Turkey could not become a full member, as long as she did not display a "constructive attitude" towards the solution of Cyprus and the Aegean problems. By constructive, they meant that Turkey should accept the compatibility of the International

Court of Justice in the Hague, and make concessions to Greece by withdrawing her troops from Cyprus and giving up her objections to the membership talks of the island planned to start in May, 1998.²⁰ In the Luxemburg meeting, "the non-inclusion of Turkey, which in 1995 agreed to a customs union with the EU, came about as the European leaders prepared to invite six countries to begin negotiations for EU membership, a process that will take years. These countries are Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus. In addition, five other countries -- Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria -- are considered second-tier countries with whom negotiations will begin later."²¹ Besides the other reasons of the Union to reject Turkey's membership application, the fact that her problems with Greece has been stated openly as the most important causes of the impossibility of her membership at least in the next 15 years, marks the partial and biased attitude of the Union towards Turkey. The decisions of this Luxembourg Summit are not the only ones that are pro-Greek. For example, the decision of the EU Commission that the Imia/Kardak Dispute should be submitted to International Court of Justice in the Hague is another example.²²

The fact that Greece has been trying to keep Turkey at the door of the Union, and to this end, seemingly supporting Turkey's right to enter the EU contradicts with the behaviors of the Greek government prior to the Luxembourg summit of the EU leaders on the enlargement of the Union. Because the Greek government relies on the EU for the solution of her problems with Turkey, the emergence of a Turkey that has distanced itself from the EU and does not pursue policies to join Club any more is bound to make the solution of the disputes with Greece in the way Athens wants very difficult in the near

future. The end of Turkey's aspirations to join the EU at whatever cost would definitely damage Greece's hope to get concessions from Turkey.²³

In this regard, the question to be asked is why the EU makes the entry of Turkey contingent on her attitude towards Greece, forcing Ankara to give in to the Greek demands by accepting compatibility of the International Court of Justice in Hague, and giving priority to judicial and arbitral mechanisms in the solution process of the bilateral problems. It seems that the EU advocates Turkey's membership prospect just on economic, political, and social grounds, excluding strategic aspects. This makes the major difference between the EU and the US vis-à-vis their approaches towards Turkey. The motives behind the American policy of exerting pressure on the EU to take Turkey in might be explained in the expectations of the American Government that the bilateral problems between Greece and Turkey would be solved once and for all if Turkey and Cyprus became full members of the Union.

The US government was expecting from the Luxembourg summit that the EU would at least offer Turkey a membership perspective and lead Turkey to take up a more reconcilable position regarding the accession of Cyprus to the Union.²⁴ But now, the EU made the solution of the Cyprus problem within the Union impossible by excluding Turkey from the EU enlargement and provoking her to take steps with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, parallel to what the EU does with Greek Cypriot Republic.²⁵ The primary difference between the American and European attitudes towards Turkey became more obvious during the debates on Turkey's entry into the EU.

While the Americans have been evaluating Turkey in strategic terms and trying to keep her in the Western Security structure, and pressing the Europeans to admit Turkey to their Club, the Europeans lack a strategic point of view. Instead they emphasize economic, cultural and political aspects of relations as the foremost considerations that must be taken into account before Turkey's admission to the Union.²⁶

4.2 NATO Context

With the end of W.W.II, the European Continent came under the control of the American government due to the emergence of the communist threat in the East and the Europeans' dire need for economic improvement. Alongside with the economic aid, the Americans used also their superior military capabilities to control the developments in the continent. Although the NATO organization was established to provide security for the western European countries, it became clear that the countries located in the Balkans and the southeastern Europe also needed military protection. Successive American governments initiated a military and economic aid program under the policy of "containment of communism". The Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the Marshall Program of 1948 were designated with these goals in mind. The reason why the US developed a lively interest to keep the small countries of the Balkans, especially Greece and Turkey, in the western camp, lies in the importance of the strategic locations of these countries. Holding the gateways to the Aegean and the Mediterranean Sea, and making the passage of the Soviet fleet to these hot waters extremely difficult, both Greece and Turkey might play an important role in the strategic planning of NATO to contain the Soviet Union.²⁷ In

addition, the Civil war in Greece during the period of 1946 and 1949, and the territorial claims of the Soviets on Turkey, demanding that the latter ceded Kars and Ardahan to the Soviet Union were major factors that forced both Greece and Turkey to seek security in the western world. Open and active support of the communist Yugoslav government to the communist fractions in Greece frightened the liberal countries of the West that if Greece fell under communism, this might adversely affect other Balkan countries by exposing them to threats of Soviet domination. Taking such considerations into account the west supported the royalist and the liberal wing of the civil struggle and in the end enabled them to win the war.²⁸

The entry of Greece and Turkey to NATO did not turn out to be as easy as it was expected. Founding on the grounds of providing security for the western European countries, NATO appeared a kind of western European organization in the beginning. Some of its members, especially the northern European ones, were against the inclusion of Turkey and Greece into the organization, on the grounds that these two were not sharing the same cultural and historical traditions like them, and that, if they were included, their share of military aid would decrease.²⁹ As a result, Turkey and Greece had to wait membership until both had sent their troops to Korea to fight on the side of the western world against communism. By then, communist expansionism had gathered momentum which in turn led the West to reassess Turkey and Greece for their security. From 1952 onwards the inclusion of these two in NATO seemed more profitable for the western block than for the parties themselves.

In the containment of the Soviet Union, Greece and Turkey did not only come together inside NATO, but they also began to cooperate under the roof of the Balkan Pact of 1954 founded by Turkey and Greece together with Yugoslavia. The foundation of such a regional organization was also backed by the US as part of the policy of containment.³⁰

In the first years of their membership in NATO, both Greece and Turkey identified their national interests with those of the western world, especially of the US. Until the eruption of the Cyprus dispute in the mid-1950s, the trilateral relationship among Greece, Turkey, and NATO was in complete harmony. But with the emergence of the Cyprus problem, the relations between Greece and Turkey began to deteriorate, affecting the operability and effectiveness of NATO's strategies in the Eastern Mediterranean. Until the refusal by the Greek government headed by Karamanlis not to participate in NATO's military exercises in the Aegean Sea in 1955 following the September 6 and 7 events in Istanbul, the relations were not interrupted by any conflict.³¹ But the refusal of Greece to join military exercises would become a model for the years to come. Whenever she felt that NATO was tilting towards Turkey and becoming silent to what she called Turkey's irredentist policies in the region, she chose to boycott the exercises.

By the first half of 1960s, the NATO-Turkey bilateral relations were near to perfect. However, the emergence of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 which later resulted in the eventual redeployment of the Herkul Missiles from Turkey, in the process of reciprocal give-and-take negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union, and finally the rudely written letter that President Johnson of US sent to Turkey's Prime Minister İsmet İnönü

following the crisis in Cyprus in the middle of 1964, cast a shadow over the relations and eventually resulted in a new policy of searching for alternatives for Turkey. Until the eruption of this crisis, the Turkish authorities were sure of full NATO's guarantee in case of a Soviet attack on herself. But this crisis had displayed to Turkey that it was by no means certain that the US and NATO would come to Turkey's rescue immediately. This was even implied in the letter of the President Johnson to İnönü.

Following the crisis, the Turkish government of that time had initiated a search for other security alternatives to NATO. The upshot was a kind of multidimensional foreign policy implemented with the aim of improving the relations with the Soviet Union and the Arabic countries. The importance of this latter crisis lies in the fact that Turkey realized for the first time that the US' (NATO) global interests might not always be in complete harmony with hers.³² But one should state that the emergence of grievances in Turkey about NATO did not necessarily hamper the military activities of NATO in the Aegean Sea because Turkey did not wish to act against NATO. Instead, she tried to insert some clauses into the bilateral treaties with the US that limited the actions of the US military establishment on her territory.

The second turning point was the arms embargo imposed on Turkey by the US Congress on the ground, that the use of American-provided weapons in the Cyprus Operation in 1974 was against the foreign military aid act of the US government. In fact, the Ford government of the US was not so eager to punish Turkey just because she had used American weapons. But the Congress under the influence of the Greek lobby enacted

such an embargo. These differing attitudes by the US government and the Congress towards Turkey was revealing the discrepancies in the perception of Turkey's value in the US. While the administrations were taking into consideration the strategic location of Turkey and her contributions to the western security, the Congress was not able to evaluate Turkey objectively due to ethnic politics.³³ Of these ethnic groups working against Turkey, the Greeks and the Armenians have been the most influential. After the imposition of the embargo, the Demirel government reciprocated by closing some US military bases in Turkey. Until the abolition of the embargo by the Carter government in 1978, these military installations remained closed, and, therefore, the operation and information gathering capabilities of NATO became disabled.

As to the relations of Greece with the US and NATO during the Cold War era, it is interesting to note that the influence of the US governments on Greece's both domestic and foreign policies was much more than on Turkey. Having been much more dependent on the US' economic and military aid, the Greek governments were very sensitive to the changes in the foreign policy attitudes of the US. In other words, the Greeks were more lenient than the Turks to show their grievances and anxieties with respect to the US' actions. Having not got rid of the psychology of being a small country, it was more likely to expect and observe tensions in the US-Greek bilateral relations.³⁴

Before 1974, the grievances of Greece about US foreign policy should be looked at within the approach of US governments to the solution of the Cyprus dispute. Because the Greek governments perceived that the US was tilting to Turkey and overvaluing her

strategic position in terms of superpower relations, they were against the settlement of the dispute within the NATO framework. Their fear of any NATO involvement in the dispute stemmed also from the influence of Turkey in that organization. Therefore the Greeks objected to the deployment of NATO forces on the island during the well-known 1964 crisis. The US proposal of sending a NATO force to the island to calm down the crisis and to prevent the military clashes from getting out of hand was rejected by Greece. In the end a UN force (UNFICYP) was sent. A second event that provoked the Greek authorities not to trust the Americans in their relations with Turkey came about during the 1967 Gecitkale Crisis.

When the Greeks began to infiltrate their combat troops to the island clandestinely after 1964, and their number reached approximately 12 thousands by 1967, the Turkish authorities feared that the Greek Cypriots might again start a massacre of the Turks. Ankara threatened to intervene militarily. The ensuing crisis that erupted during the summer of 1967 is very significant, since the Turkish government might have intervened militarily following the military assaults of the Greeks on the Turks. The crisis was prevented from leading to a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey through the US brokering at the last instance, according to which the Greeks had to pull their mainland troops from the island in return for Turkey's non-intervention.³⁵ Although the Greeks pulled back their troops from the island, this was not only because of the Greeks' fear of Turkey's military superiority but also because of the legitimacy problem of the new military regime in Athens. Thus the new regime needed the support of the US government to stay in power, and therefore, it was not difficult for the US to convince the

colonels to pull back their soldiers. This event did once again lead the Greeks to conclude that the Americans were pro-Turkish regarding bilateral realtions.³⁶

The attitude of the US and NATO to the solution of the Cyprus problem during the cold war era was also a source of mistrust in Greece. The former were asking the parties to continue the strategic balance in Cyprus, founded by the 1960 treaties, and to avoid any action of hampering the status quo. Whereas the Turkish governments were sharing the considerations of the US and NATO, Greece could not digest the solution of 1960. In other words, while the security interests of the western alliance and the national interests of Turkey were overlapping in Cyprus, the Greek government was not satisfied with a NATO solution on the island because it rejected the union of the island with the mainland Greece.

The culminating event of Greece's mistrust of the NATO and the US took place with the withdrawal of Greece from the military wing of the organization in the aftermath of the 1974 Peace Operation of Turkey. Although the Greek government of that time asked NATO to prevent Turkey from landing her troops on the island, the US kept her silence and somehow acquiesced to the operation of Turkey. The Greeks went further in believing that it was the US that supported and emboldened the military to grasp the power in 1967, and then to incite the military to instigate a coup in Cyprus in the summer of 1974.³⁷ The disruption of the NATO activities in the region became more noticeable after the withdrawal of Greece from NATO.

As to the problems caused by the divergent approaches by Greece and Turkey within NATO, the command and control responsibilities in the Aegean Sea are the most important ones since these problems always affected the operability and effectiveness of NATO in the region. From 1952 to the withdrawal of Greece from the NATO, the parties always felt the effect of the NATO arrangements.

“Prior to 1974 two Izmir based subcommands (LANDSOUTHEAST) and (SIXATAF) controlled Greek and Turkish land and air operations. Senior US officials coordinated Greek and Turkish commanders, each of whom had operational responsibility within sovereign national territory. There were no difficulties regarding land operations but the Turks objected to the assignment to Greece of an air operational area corresponding to the Athens Flight Information Region-the entire region except for the narrow band of Turkish national airspace about a minute’s flying time to Anatolian coast. The Greek chiefs of naval staff, based in Athens was responsible for the waters of the Aegean, Cretan, and Ionian Seas (COMEDEAST) and a Turkish admiral, based in Ankara, for the territorial waters in the Mediterranean, Aegean, the Dardenneles and the Black Sea (COMEDNORTHEAST). Both reported to the Commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH) in Naples.”³⁸

Although this was the situation before 1974, it changed a lot after Greece left NATO. Turkey took many command and control responsibilities. As the years passed, Greece understood that she had made a mistake by leaving the alliance, because Turkey was representing the alliance in the region and going to receive much of the military aid. As it was the case, the Karamanlis Government wanted to return to the alliance, because the pre-1974 arrangements were in favor of Greece but now to the advantages of Turkey.³⁹

“The Greek terms for returning to NATO’s military wing were the establishment of a landquarter (COMLANDSOUTCENT) and a tactical air headquarters (COMSEVEVATAF) at Larissa under Greek command, and restoration of status quo ante as regards the Aegean operational responsibilities.”⁴⁰

In addition to the allocation of command and control responsibilities in the region, there took place some other problems resulting from the attempts of the parties to mobilize the organization against each other. For example, the Greek governments have not been participating in the military exercises in the region for the last 14 years just because NATO did not include the Lemnos Island in the military plans.⁴¹ The underlying reason behind Greece's attempt to have NATO include this island in the planning of maneuvers is her desire to prove that the arrangements that have been regulating the demilitarized status of her islands in front of the Dardanelles are not valid any more. The latest example of the Gavdhos issue is again reminiscent of the same problem. This time the Turkish government objected to the inclusion of the Gavdhos Island in the NATO Exercise of "DYNAMIC MIX 1996" to take place in the area of Crete due to its disputed status of property.

Utilization of the organization by Greece gained a new momentum after the election of Papandrou in October, 1981. As soon as the new government came to power, it asked the organization to give a security guarantee to herself against Turkey during the annual Defense Planning Committee in November 1981. But the organization rejected such a demand, on the grounds that NATO could not give a security guarantee to one of its members against the other.⁴² In terms of the tough stand of the respective Papandreu governments towards the US and NATO, one thing is clear that is the domestic political considerations behind the governments' actions. He firmly believed, like many Greeks, that NATO was not impartial and tilted to Turkey, but that his hostile attitude towards

Turkey and NATO emanated from domestic considerations. In other words, Papandreu used his policy of hostility towards Turkey and NATO in order to get support of the military staff and conservative circles in Greece. To justify the legitimacy of his socialist rule, he needed the approval of the military. Therefore, the implementation of an hostile policy towards Turkey seemed a very suitable ground for him to rally various circles in Greece around himself.⁴³ This policy was also in harmony with his aim of securing the civilian control over military. As an expert put it:

“His tough stand on Turkey and his general emphasis on nationalism strongly appeal to many officers; especially those from middle class and peasant background for whom nationalism and populism had always been attractive.”⁴⁴

A possible derivation from the attempts of the parties to utilize the organization against each other might be that neither of them could manage to identify their security considerations with those of the organization. Instead of harmonizing their security policies with those of NATO, they chose to verify their respective objectives through NATO. This might have been resulted from their perception that NATO's hands-off policy, while intended to project the Alliance's impartiality and encourage both nations to settle down their disputes, paradoxically produced the opposite effect. “Ankara and Athens logically surmise that the southeastern flank is accorded low priority and this gives them little reason to place NATO priorities before their own”⁴⁵

Now, in the post cold war atmosphere the role of the NATO in the solution of Turco-Greek disputes increased. The reasons of why a possible NATO involvement might create an atmosphere conducive to an overall settlement between Greece and Turkey are taken up in the fifth chapter. Nevertheless, here it might be a good idea to present the

latest agreement between Turkey and Greece concerning the allocation of command and control responsibilities in the Aegean Sea in order to prove that the NATO platforms constitute suitable grounds for these countries to work. During the NATO meetings in the first days of December 1997, these countries signed a tentative accord concerning this problem. Although this accord needs to be approved by their parliaments in order to take effect, the NATO Military Council and Defense Planning Committee have already approved this tentative agreement. According to this accord, NATO will set up two regional sub-commands, one in Izmir, and the other at Larissa, which will mainly be responsible for land operations. In both headquarters, Greek and Turkish officers will work together and a rotation system will be applied to high command positions.

As far as naval and air operations are concerned, these headquarters will have limited functions. Their main function will be to report to NATO's main southern command headquarters in Naples. The Izmir and Larissa centers will not have predetermined areas of responsibilities concerning air and naval operations. Under these regulations, the headquarters in Naples is having the command and control responsibilities in the Aegean Sea directly on itself.⁴⁶

CHAPTER 5: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION WITHIN NATO FRAMEWORK

New ideas and solution proposals are hard to come by in the long-standing Turco-Greek dispute. The existence of all the problems pose very great dangers to the security and the stability of the region. Without their settlement, no one can expect an environment that is very secure, stable and conducive to peace in the area. Before trying to formulate a solution proposal one should clearly define the existing problems between the parties. By now the major points of friction include the Aegean problems, ranging from the extension of the territorial waters to the militarization of the eastern Aegean Islands, and the protracted Cyprus problem. In the following pages, an attempt will be made to put forth the major points of view in approaching the problems and then the basic points of consideration in the solution process will be examined. The aim will be to prove the futility and danger of utilizing the EU and the needs and benefits of utilizing NATO framework instead.

Though the reasons of the existing disputes have been considered the most important obstacles before any solution, the prevailing approaches that are used to analyze the current situation in bilateral relations on the both shores of the Sea outweigh the former. Existing approaches to resolving the disputes both in Greece and Turkey are the major reasons of the current deadlock, thus the special causes of the contemporary problems hold secondary places compared to these well-established approaches, or ways of thinking. One of today's approaches traces the causes of the current problems to the pages of history books.¹ Logically, this approach takes the eleventh century as the

departure point of the developments in bilateral relations, first between the Ottoman Selcuks Turks and the Byzantines, then between the Ottoman Turks and the Byzantines, and finally between the Greeks of the modern Greek State and the Turks of modern Turkey. This approach assumes that there has been a continuation between the past and the present in the process of the emergence of the contemporary problems. To apply this approach to today's problems will definitely lead us to formulate wrong calculations vis-à-vis the causes of the problems. Instead, the causes of the current problems between Greece and Turkey should be looked at within the context of the developments of nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.

Without focusing on the developments of the early nineteenth century that took place in the aftermath of the French Revolution, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to truly analyze the dynamics of the bilateral Turco-Greek relations. In the emergence of the fundamental attitudes and prejudices both in Greece and Turkey with respect to evaluating the other side, the nineteenth century developments played a major role. The so-called "Megali Idea" of the Greek nation is a production of the developments that brought about the Modern Greek State. Moreover, the current Aegean Sea problems and the Cyprus problem have very little to do with the past. The causes of these contemporary problems relate to the developments of the Cold war atmosphere. While the Cyprus dispute began to emerge in the mid-1950s, the Aegean problems became complicated in the aftermath of Turkey's 1974 Cyprus military operation.

According to this historical approach, the reasons of all the current problems lie in the Greeks' Megali Idea dream.² To put all the people of Greek-origin under the same Greek rule is the main reason why the Greeks have pursued an irredentist policy towards first the Ottoman Empire and then the modern Turkey. All the attempts by Greek governments at militarizing the Aegean islands and achieving the union of Cyprus with the Greek mainland have strengthened this conviction in Turkey. While this has been the perception of the Greek behavior in Turkey, the policies of the latter are being considered in the same manner in Greece. So the Greeks evaluate Turkey's actions in the same way of irredentism.

The second approach, that is generally called "humanistic approach", assumes that these two nations have every reason to become friends and no reason to become enemies. The common cultural traditions ranging from musical styles to food preferences constitute the necessary grounds for friendship and good-neighbourliness. Five centuries have created the conditions of friendship. This approach puts the blame for the contemporary problems on the politicians.³ They are the ones who have been utilizing the problems in both countries in order to get votes in elections. The way the politicians behave in election times increases the misunderstandings and deepens the existing problems. According to this explanation, when the election times come, politicians make assertive claims about bilateral problems, making it impossible to resolve them, and then when the time comes to negotiate these problems seriously, it becomes very difficult for them to deny what they said prior to the elections and to prepare the public for a possible negotiation process. In other words, the politicians on both shores of the Sea are being kept hostages

to what they generally say during the election times just to gain popularity in domestic political life.

The fear that their people might perceive them as betraying their countries by negotiating with the other side is the major reason why the politicians particularly in Greece avoid negotiations. The proponents of this view which holds politicians responsible are generally called “humanistic”. This humanistic approach assumes that there is no need to become foes, instead there is everything available for both nations to live in peace and harmony. I think the latest crisis in the Balkans, the Bosnian War, has refuted this humanistic argument by showing to the world that it was not enough to have so many things, even marriages, in common for achieving peace in a region. Although the belligerent parties in the war have been sharing a common political, cultural, and economical history for centuries, they could not prevent this war. A cursory look at warring nations all over the world would reveal that in nine cases out of ten it was the neighbors who have had very much in common fought ferociously.⁴

It seems that a new way of thinking is necessary to overcome difficulties in the way of a solution between Turkey and Greece. First of all, the parties should give utmost importance to the preservation of the balance between themselves which was created by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. The provisions of this treaty regulated bilateral relations until the parties attempted to alter the existing balance in their favor. In this regard the Greek attempts to militarize the Eastern Aegean Islands off the Turkish coast, Greece’s attempt extending its territorial waters beyond the existing six miles, turning the Aegean

Sea into a Greek lake, and the unification of Cyprus with mainland Greece were perceived by Turkey as a calculated attempt by Athens at changing the Lausanne balance. On the other hand, the Greek governments have been accusing Turkey of altering the status quo both in the Aegean Sea and in Cyprus. The de facto partition of Cyprus in the aftermath of the 1974 military operation has been referred to by Greece as evidence to prove their arguments. The Greek governments also accuse Turkey of trying to alter the status quo in the Aegean Sea.

Secondly, the 1960 Constitution that established the independent Cyprus State should be considered as the starting point of any solution process of the Cyprus dispute. As it was the case with the Lausanne treaty, the 1960 Constitution did also establish a balance both between the communities on the island and between the motherland countries. This arrangement projected the existing balance between Greece and Turkey on the island.⁵

The third, related with the first two, requires the parties' respect to the international treaties and conventions that have regulated the current relations. This, of course, should not mean that only the legalistic approach should take precedence in the solution process; instead the political, economic, and security considerations of the parties should be backed by legality. The method to be applied to reach a solution has been a sort of problem between the parties since the emergence of the disputes. While the Greek side has been emphasizing the priority of the legalistic approach, Turkey supports the use of political approaches, by stating that the parties should first try to negotiate and then apply

the other methods, including arbitration, if they themselves could not come to a compromise.

Fourth, parties to the conflict should handle all the problems together. The past has shown that it was needless just to concentrate on one of the problems and make the solution of that problem as a precondition to move on to the others. The typical example of the failure of this approach is the solution process of the Cyprus dispute. The Greek governments' disposition to the Cyprus problem has been backed by the international world in their attempts to bring forth some solution proposals only tailored for Cyprus. Since the first mediation efforts of the international community, we could not see any solution attempt that aims at solving all the existing problems on a give-and-take basis. Therefore, all the problems have remained unsolved. It is now clear that the parties approach the problems differently. While Turkey has been insisting that the Aegean problems are more likely to endanger stability and security, and they should first be solved, the Greek governments have been continuing to reiterate that it is impossible and unlikely to handle the Aegean problems before the parties solve the Cyprus dispute.⁶ A kind of give-and-take approach should be used; otherwise it would be inconceivable to reach a compromise.

Fifth, the international organizations to which both parties are member should be more active in the solution process. In this regard the important point should be the preservation of the balance between the parties. In other words, the possible involvement of some organizations such as the EU should be taken with a pinch of salt as one party is

a member of it while the other is not. The organizations to which only one of the parties is attached cannot help taking sides in the solution process. It would be logical to surmise that these organizations should support the arguments of their members. Given this possible danger, the use of international organizations, for instance, the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be given priority, since these bodies possess the potentials of providing the parties to the conflicts with possible grounds to cooperate and perhaps reach a consensus. In fact the importance of these bodies stems from their capabilities of providing the parties with open communication channels and with the means for corridor diplomacy. The most important thing the parties should keep in mind is the preservation of the balance between them. Therefore, the efforts of these aforementioned international organizations should be backed. Involvement of the organizations in which both nations are not on an equal footing might impair the existing balance between the parties. The UN has already been involved in the Cyprus dispute, since the emergence of the crisis in the early 1960s, first by sending in international peace-keeping troops to monitor the military activities of the communities, and then by appointing special mediators.⁷ The role of the UN should be assisted in terms of possible frameworks for any solution.⁸

Sixth, the parties to the conflict should give their consent to any US involvement in the solution process. Being the only capable country, the US might help create a suitable atmosphere for a negotiation process. The influence of the US on both countries cannot be outweighed in the near future by any other third party. Given that the US pays utmost

attention to the security and stability of the area for her global interests, and both Greece and Turkey are dependent on it through various means, the possibility of US brokering a peace between the parties is high. Since the initiation of the special trilateral relationship among the US, Turkey, and Greece after the last two chose to accept the security umbrella of the former, we have been witnessing important changes in the format of the relations.⁹ In this regard one might wonder that why the US could not succeed in bringing these two to a consensus. The reasons lie in the realities of the cold war. Given that the most important priority of the US was to contain the Soviet Union all over the world, the US had to act cautiously not to offend one of the parties to the conflict. To propose a detailed solution proposal including all the thorny issues between Greece and Turkey might have been perceived by either party as favoring the other side.¹⁰ Therefore, it was enough for the US just to calm down the crisis and prevent the sides from fighting.

After the end of Cold war the characteristics of the international relations and regimes have changed considerably. The walls of the cold war world that were keeping the parties in check not to disrupt the harmony and stability have fallen, and the probability of military confrontations has increased. In the absence of a framework that was helping the parties to combine their interests, both Greece and Turkey are now more likely to fight even for the small and uninhabited islets of the Aegean Sea, as the latest Kardak/Imia crisis has shown. As the probability of military confrontation is increasing, the incentives for the solution of the problems through US involvement should also increase.

Nowadays, there are many reasons why the parties may want to see a more active US involvement. Although there is a general conviction in Greece that the US tilts to Turkey, the involvement of the US is important for the Greek military interests by keeping the prevailing 7 to 10 ratio in American military aids to parties. The Greeks believe that it was the US that emboldened the military circles in Greece to grasp the power in 1967 which then acquiesced to Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974 by acting passively not to have the NATO forces used to prevent Turkey. However, the respective Greek governments did understand the value of the alliance with the US vis-à-vis their relations with Turkey. Given that it is only the US that can alter the military balance in the Aegean Sea, the Greeks have enough reasons not to offend the Americans. Even though the Greek governments have been pursuing a multidimensional foreign policy since the foundation of Karamanlis Government in 1974 in order to decrease their dependency on the US, they never quit this policy as far as Turkey is concerned. For example The Papandreu government was in favor of reductions in military aids to Greece provided that the existing 7 to 10 ratio would remain.¹¹

Secondly, Greece has the advantage of using her lobby in the US to affect the organs of the decision-making process. It is true that the Greeks are more successful than the Turks in mobilizing the US public opinion against Turkey. The role of the Greek lobby in the formulation of the US Congress' pro-Greek resolutions is well known, and this seems to remain in the absence of a powerful Turkish lobby.¹² Although the American administrations appear to take Turkey more seriously than Greece in the post cold war era, there is no doubt that Greece through its powerful lobby in Washington D.C. is still

able to influence US policy-making process. In this way Athens should have no reason for suspicion that more American involvement in the resolution of the Turco-Greek disputes would favor Turkey. After all, the US and the US-led NATO are probably the only source of arbitration, given that Turkey would never acquiesce to EU brokering simply because Greece has been, and will be, able to mobilize the Union against Turkey thanks to her full membership.

Turkey might also benefit from the involvement of the US. There are some points that Turkey can not ignore as far as the US is concerned. First of all, the characteristics of the bilateral relations between Turkey and the US have not changed considerably since the end of the Cold War. Although some new dimensions were added to the old ones and some lost their significance, Turkey is still one of the most important regional strategic allies of the US. In other words, Turkey's value in US policy planning has not decreased, but it has increased first during the 1990 Gulf War, then during the formulation of American policies with respect to the post-Gulf War Middle East, and lastly during the debates concerning the politics of the Caspian oil. All these events point to the fact that the interests of Turkey and the US coincide as far as the Middle East and Central Asia are concerned.¹³ In addition, latest developments in Turkish-Israeli relations and the emergence of a de facto strategic alliance between these countries has been supported by the US. Therefore, Turkey and the US, together with Israel, have initiated a new era of cooperation based largely on strategic interests. Given that these two Middle Eastern countries have been the natural allies of the US since the end of WWII, and their regional interests coincide with each other, it would be unthinkable for the US to pursue a pro-

Greek stand in Turco-Greek problems. In other words, the use of linkage policy by Turkey might lead the US to understand Turkey's concerns in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus in return for Turkey's support for US policies in the Middle Eastern and Central Asia. Moreover the success of US' "dual containment" policy toward Iraq and Iran depends on the support and collaboration of Turkey and Israel as well.¹⁴ Clearly, respective American governments would not take initiatives in the Aegean that would hamper Turkey's interests. It is more likely than the Greek case that any future American involvement in Turco-Greek disputes will yield positive repercussions for Turkey.

Secondly the involvement of the US is important, like in the Greek case, for the maintenance of the military balance in the Aegean. As the 1975 US' embargo on the military aid to Turkey displayed, Turkey is in need of the American military hardware and technology not only to preserve the balance with Greece but also to be able to modernize its army.

Thirdly, and most importantly, Turkey should give support to the idea of US initiative as opposed to the EU in the solution process. If it were absolute and compulsory that an external mechanism will involve in the bilateral disputes, it would be better for Turkey to see the US at work. At this point, it is necessary to open a new section to demonstrate why the involvement of the EU is to the detriment of the parties and against the major principles characterizing the bilateral relations.

As the latest Bosnia War demonstrated, the EU has been unable to formulate a common foreign and security policy regarding the developments even in its neighborhood.¹⁵ The inability of the EU to speak with one voice prevents its attempts from yielding constructive results. It is also conceivable that the EU might not be as impartial as the US as far as the Turco-Greek relations are concerned. Given that Greece has been a full member of the Union since 1981, it is illogical to expect a fully neutral policy from the Union itself. The impartiality of the EU becomes a problem as long as the Cyprus dispute is being tried to be solved under the EU framework. Following the Greek Cypriots' application for EU membership in 1990 and the acceptance of it by the Union, the Cyprus dispute came to the agenda of the EU once again in 1995, when the Greek Cyprus Republic was talked about during the customs union negotiations with Turkey. During these negotiations, the Greek government pressurized other EU members to have the Greek Cyprus Republic included in membership process. Because the decisions in the EU are taken in unanimity, the Greek government could easily blackmail the policies of other member countries.

There took place many discussions about the validity of the application and the feasibility of any solution of the Cyprus problem under the EU framework.¹⁶ As stated before, the strategic balance between Greece and Turkey on the island should be maintained as a precondition for stability and peace. Under the circumstances, Greece is a full member of the Union while Turkey not, the eventual membership of the Greek Cypriot Government either alone or representing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as well, would alter the strategic balance between the parties at the expense of Turkey and the Turks in

Cyprus. Regarding the validity of the Greek Cypriot's application or the possible acceptance of it to the membership, the 1960 Constitution that founded the independent Cyprus State should be the starting point for discussions. First of all, it is against the provisions of the aforementioned constitution for the Cyprus Government to join any international institution of which both Turkey and Greece are not members. Secondly, for the realization of the membership, the consent of each community on the island has to be secured. The Turkish community made it clear that it opposes EU membership before a comprehensive solution. Thirdly, the "most favored nation" status of mother countries over Cyprus would change to the detriment of Turkey in case of Cyprus's EU membership because Greece and Cyprus will come under the same EU roof while Turkey remaining outside.¹⁷

The people who advocate Cyprus's membership in the European Union claim that the 1960 constitution is not valid anymore because the status quo that was established by this treaty was first disrupted in 1963 when the Turkish community quit their governmental post because of their fear for their lives, and then by the de facto partition of the island after the 1974 Turkish military intervention. Therefore, the articles of that constitution cannot be applied to the circumstances of today. They also try to show that the Turkish community on the island would gain the most if the island became a EU member.¹⁸ According to their reasoning, the Turkish Cypriots would get rid of the strict conditions of the economic embargo put on them by the Greek Cypriots and then would find easy access to European markets, and they would prosper. In addition, Turkey would also use the presence of this Turkish community in the Union for lobbying efforts. To support

their arguments, these circles go on to say that the Turkish language would be recognized as one of the official languages spoken in the EU.

There are enough reasons to reject these arguments. First of all, if Cyprus joins the Union, Turkey would lose her security guarantee over the Turkish community in the island because it would be illogical and nonsensical for Turkey to continue to provide a kind of security umbrella for one of the members of the Union. Secondly, the Greek Cypriots would manage to achieve their goal of enosis through the back door. In fact a kind of federative structure is against the major principles of the Union. The fundamental preconditions of the Turkish community, before any federative kind of solution, are the denial of traveling, settlement, and owning property rights to the Greek Cypriots in the Turkish North. These demands would be surpassed automatically after Cyprus' EU membership due to EU statutes.¹⁹ Third, it is hard to expect that the Turkish community would prosper economically since the conditions of the Western Thrace Turks point to the opposite. Fourth, it is highly likely that the Greek Cypriots would swallow the Turkish community after the membership because it is four times more powerful economically than the Turkish community in the island.

The solution of Cyprus problem within the EU framework has become the first priority of the Greek Cypriots since 1995 when the EU agreed to Cyprus' inclusion the EU enlargement in return for the realization of customs union with Turkey. The Greeks in Cyprus try to show that there is peace in the island, therefore, there is no danger for the EU countries to think that, if the Greek Cypriots were included into this club, they would

import a country that is full of problems. Although this was the main target of Greeks, their decision to bring in S-300 missiles from the Russian Federation seems to contradict with this policy aims. In the beginning, they were thinking that if they deployed these missiles into their territories, the Turks would probably make some concession to them in return for their non-deployment. In other words, their move of deploying these missiles would force the Turkish side to come to terms with them in the bargaining process. As someone notices the condition that the Greeks Cypriots put before the Turkish side, demilitarization of the whole island, in return for their non-deployment, it would not become difficult to guess the underlying reasons of the Greek Cypriots'. But this policy seemed to backfire when Turkey and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus decided to escalate the crisis.

This time Turkey threatened to take measures, including military ones, to deal with these missiles if they were deployed. All these Turkish moves appeared to have been designed to show to the EU countries that the Cyprus dispute is not solved and will not be solved if the Greeks in Cyprus became a member of the Union. The decision of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus that if Greek Cypriots were taken in the Club, they will start the process of integration of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus with Turkey was also taken under the considerations mentioned above. However, the latest decision of the leaders of the EU countries, held in Luxembourg on December 12, 1997, to add the Greek Cypriot Republic to the list of countries with whom the membership negotiations will start in May, 1998, shows that the Turkish side failed in Cyprus. And, the solution

prospects of the Cyprus dispute on the basis of bi-zonnal and bi-communal federation did become even harder..

As long as the international community continues to recognize the Greek Government as the only official state of the island, it would be really difficult to expect the Greek Cypriots to negotiate with the Turks. For the Greek Cypriots, the present situation on the island is better than any kind of federal structure in which the Turks would have equal share in the government.²⁰ While all these are obvious, the involvement of the Union in bilateral disputes would be very unlikely to yield any result conducive to peace because the EU has lost its impartiality, siding with Greece as the latest Imia/Kardak crisis showed. Like the Greek Government, the Union has also suggested to the parties that they should submit the issue to the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Despite this, the EU should not be disregarded in the solution proposals. What we suggest is that the mechanisms of the Union, especially the membership perspectives, might help the parties solve their problems. In other words, if the EU takes up a prudent attitude by offering membership both to Turkey and to Greek Cypriots contingent on their full success of the solution of their problems, the solution process would most probably accelerate. The EU could play a complementary role in the process.

As the history of relations between NATO and the respective countries has already been looked at in Chapter 4, possible influence of this organization over these countries cannot be comparable to other international bodies of which both Greece and Turkey are members. During the climate of the cold war atmosphere, NATO was not so active and

eager to find an overall solution to bilateral problems. Instead it was enough for it just to calm down tensions and maintain the operability of the organization in the region. For the US, NATO was a platform to confine the tensions and possible confrontations between Turkey and Greece. However, in the aftermath of the cold war many people expected that this atmosphere would change radically due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the most important source of threat to the western alliance, and that tranquillity would prevail in the region. In contrast, the level of tension in bilateral relations did not decrease. If anything, it increased, bringing the two countries to the brink of military confrontations. Being left free of the cold war's high discipline, both Greece and Turkey felt freer to voice their arguments openly. Tension in the Aegean Sea did not come to the point of military confrontations thanks to the involvement of the US at the last moment.

In other words, the situation during the cold war and now is a bit different. During the cold war era, while the US did not want to see Turkey and Greece fight each other and endanger the stability and security in the region, the respective countries were also as eager not to push matters to an extreme. Neither the US nor the respective countries could dare to destabilize the region by creating a military confrontation, exposing the region to Soviet influence. The threat of the Soviet Union did restrict their alternatives to nothing but to cooperation. Because the US governments were cognizant of the fact that neither Greece nor Turkey would dare to fight, it was easier for the US to intervene at the last point and prevent the parties from military confrontations.

But now the situation has changed. While the US is maintaining its vigilance and willingness to keep the region free of military confrontations and is ready to do everything in its power, neither Greece nor Turkey is so much adamant not to fight now. In other words, under the changed international climate, both of them may risk certain things and experience a hot confrontation. The likelihood of a military confrontation is now higher than before. The reasons why the US governments might do everything just to see the region stable and secure lies in its overall global and regional interests. As the latest war in Bosnia proved, the possibility of military confrontations and the emergence of threats to European security and stability is more in this region.

In a broader sense, after the elimination of the Soviet threat, the address of threats to European security has changed to other directions. Given the fragility of the current borders and the old established claims of almost every state over the others makes this region a real powderkeg. Moreover, it is certain that if Greece and Turkey, the most powerful countries of the region go to war, other countries might also be dragged in. This kind of eventuality would mean a very serious blow to the American prestige and interests in the region. In addition, the place of Turkey in overall American strategic planning, ranging from the Central Asia through the Middle East to the Eastern Mediterranean increase the value of keeping Turkey secure, stable, and European-oriented. To see a Turkey which is embroiled in a full-blown fight against Greece would endanger the US interests in the region. Their latest discussions over the route of oil pipelines that will transport the Caspian oil to the western markets has increased the value of Turkey in Washington D.C. Beside this, NATO should be involved in the bilateral

disputes in order to prove that it was capable of solving problems between conflicting parties, and, more importantly, between its members. The logic of this argument lies in the possibility that if the countries in the Balkans and the Eastern Europe which desire to join in this organization perceive that NATO was really effective in problem-solving, they would be more encouraged to continue their NATO membership policies. Even if they are not let in immediately, NATO membership perspectives would help these countries accomplish this transitional period in security and stability. The success of NATO will increase the credibility of this organization in their eyes.²¹ In addition, NATO has proven that it was the only organization to provide security and stability to the region, as the latest Bosnian war has demonstrated.



CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

By far major points of friction between Turkey and Greece have been established\ and a suggestion is made to the effect that NATO rather than the EU should be used as a conflict resolution mechanism in finding a solution to the Turco-Greek dispute. Here some projections will be made with respect to the future relations between these two countries.

As observed by the parties themselves and the world community, Turkey and Greece could not continue peaceful and constructive relations of the pre-World War II years after the eruption of the Cyprus conflict into violence, although, strangely enough, they joined NATO and became strategic allies of the Western world in the early years of the 1950s. Instead, they became erstwhile adversaries because of the Cyprus question. And gradually while the Cyprus question was becoming complicated due primarily to the Greeks' attacks on the Turkish community on the Island, Ankara and Athens added new problems arising out of the Aegean Sea to their already shaky relations. Sabre-rattling between the two countries continued unabated and gathered momentum in the second half the 1960s in Cyprus, and from mid-1970s onwards in the Aegean. It is not surprising, therefore, that Turkey and Greece nearly came to blows several times.

As a result of the continual conflict, there does not appear much hope on either side of the Aegean Sea for a fast rapprochement. If anything, because of the Greeks' decision to deploy sophisticated Russian-made S-300 missiles on Cyprus to curtail Turkey's air superiority, there is large room for extremely pessimistic scenarios, ranging from

escalation to a probable armed clash on the Island, in near future. It seems that under the circumstances the deadlock will more likely than not continue.

As explained earlier, one of the reasons for the current deadlock lies in the parties' diametrically opposed approaches to a solution process. And the parties do not seem to see eye to eye on what points need to be recognised as “**questions**” to be dealt with between the two countries. For instance, while Greece admits that the delimitation of the continental shelf needs to be drawn between the easternmost Greek Island in the Aegean and the Turkish mainland, Turkey asserts that those Greek islands just a few miles off the Turkish coast should be treated as a natural continuation of the Turkish mainland, and that the delimitation line should be drawn somewhere beyond these islands. As for the solution process, while Turkey suggests that the two countries negotiate their differences directly, Greece prefers to defer what it recognises as problems to the International Court of Justice.

As for the format of a solution and confidence building measures between the two countries, there does not appear to be any consensus either. So far, successive Greek governments asserted strongly that unless and until Turkey withdrew all its forces from Cyprus unconditionally, no steps would be taken in the way of a solution in the Aegean. According to Greece, by keeping her troops on the Island, Turkey has been preventing a solution to the Cyprus question. Turkey finds this argument flimsy, saying that it is prepared to withdraw a large part of its forces from the Island as a result of lasting solution to the conflict. Ankara makes a distinction between the Cyprus conflict and the

problems in the Aegean Sea, pointing out that each set of problem should be dealt with on its own merits, and that none should be made dependent on the other.

From these arguments, one might infer that we are faced with an unbreakable deadlock. Or alternatively, the whole thing might look to some outsiders as well insiders extremely meaningless. Indeed, many suggestions could easily be made, which might bring about a solution. For instance, what we have put forth here is a bit different from the both sides' approach: a package-deal method, if backed by both sides, would break the deadlock and facilitate a solution. Because the problems are very much interwoven, a give-and-take approach would be necessary in the solution process to incite the parties to make concessions and counter concessions over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. By doing so, it would be highly probable that the parties would satisfy their security concerns in these regions. One could even speculate that some limited withdrawal of Turkey's military presence from Cyprus as a gesture in return for Greece's goodwill in the solution process would relieve the Greeks of their security traumas and help confidence-building on the Greek side about Turkey's good faith. Similarly, a Greek promise not to extend her territorial waters beyond the current 6 miles or to pull back the military installations from her eastern Aegean islands would no doubt inspire confidence in policy-making circles in Turkey. And as explained earlier, NATO would play an important role in the whole process.

However, these things are easier to say than done. As long as the prevailing mistrust and misconceptions in both countries continue to exist, any part of these might appear too

radical suggestions for politicians to present to their respective public, as well as for the public to digest them. Therefore, the first priority of the parties should be to focus on confidence building-measures, which, if properly implemented, might offer both sides to learn to live with their differences. To this end, the parties should explore ways to work together and learn to make use of NATO for this purpose.

For instance, both sides may stop their military activities in the Aegean Sea for a short time or at least take a long a break during summer seasons. Gradually, they should even try to extend it to some years. This would create a cooling-off period, the main function of which would be to accelerate military confidence building between the parties. The civilian sectors would make use of this by increasing economic, social and cultural transactions. That is to say that both Turkey and Greece should use such a cooling-off period to improve their bilateral relations in many aspects with a view to showing each other that if one of them tries to damage these relations, its short-term interests would be less than its long-term benefits in case their improved relations goes uninterrupted.

In this respect, businessmen on both sides may play a significant role. They should explore new areas of cooperation from which they would earn together. If they do so, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for politicians to easily disturb good relations in order to gain in domestic politics.

In the name of solution, use of international organizations of which only one of the parties is a member has not been a good method. As the involvement of the EU in the Cyprus problem demonstrated, the parties could not reach a compromise on the island, and the EU has done nothing but to complicate the question. It has widened the gap between the parties. If the EU insists on its policy regarding the membership of Greek Cypriot government into the EU, and the Greek Cypriot government gave all its attention and priority to EU membership, this process is unlikely to produce a solution on the island in near future, since no Greek government would acquiesce to share sovereignty with the Turks as long as there has been the possibility of using it on its own. If the EU changes its stand and makes it clear that it will accept the island to membership, on condition that the communities on the island reach a compromise first; and points out that only the federal government on the island may sign the membership treaty, it would be highly possible that the local communities would reach a mutually acceptable solution in a relatively short time.

In addition, a possible NATO membership of the island might help the efforts in the solution process because all the parties to the conflict –Turkey, Greece, and the local communities- are somehow under the NATO roof, and the channels for communication within NATO would definitely increase. Otherwise, if the EU maintains its current strategy, with the Greek Cypriot government trying to achieve enosis through the back door, no-one should expect a mutually satisfied solution; instead these policies will certainly accelerate the process of recognition of TRNC by the international community or the integration of it with Turkey that would also be a kind of solution second to best.

The first and foremost concern of the parties should be the fact that there is no need to hurry up in the solution process, given that the existing problems have established for many years.



ENDNOTES

Notes For Chapter 2

¹ Dimitri Kitsikis, Türk-Yunan İmparatorluğu: Arabölge Gerçeği Işığında Osmanlı Tarihi'ne Bakış. İstanbul: İletişim, 1996, 93-106 and 22-40.

² L. S. Stavrianos, History of the Balkans since 1453. New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Wilson, 1965, 271.

³ L. S. Stavrianos, Ibid., 272.

⁴ For the place of these Phanariot Greeks living in Istanbul, see Sinan Kuneralp, İstanbul'da Rumlar: Rum Aıllı Osmalı Diplomatları," in Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlığı. ed. Semih Vaner, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1988, 43-48.

⁵ Richard Clogg, Modern Yunanistan Tarihi. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997, 35-40.

⁶ L. S. Stavrianos, Ibid., 283. The author points that the Romenian peasants were really in a plight under the rule of Greek Hospodars. He notes that: "Liberation for them at this time meant liberation from the Greek as rather than from the Turks, with whom they had virtually no contact. Far from rising in behalf of Ypsilanti, the Romanian peasants took up arms against the reigning princes and the Greek and Romanian Boyars.....who have robbed and pillaged them until there is left to them only their souls"

⁷ The founding of the Greek state on capitalist values of western Europe, the roles of tradesman and merchants were enormous compared to other classes of the Greek people of the Ottoman Empire. Stefanos Yerasimos states that it was not possible for the Orthodox Church in Istanbul to act as a catalyzor of the independence

⁸ L. S. Stavrianos, (1965), op.cit., 278.

⁹ L. S. Stavrianos, Ibid., 281.

¹⁰ L. S. Stavrianos, Ibid., 281.

¹¹ L. S. Stavrianos, Ibid., 280.

¹² Richard Clogg, (1997), op.cit., 57-59.

¹³ Richard Clogg, (1997), op.cit., 57-59.

¹⁴ Nicholas V. Gianaris, Greece and Turkey Economic and Geopolitical perspectives. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988, 26.

¹⁵ Murat Hatipoğlu, Yakın Tarihte Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1923-1954. Ankara, Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996, 87-91., and see Mehmet Gönlübol, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995). Ankara, Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996.

¹⁶ Sükrü S. Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1992). Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993, 13.

¹⁷ Stephen Kinzer, "Top Turkish General Visits Greeks, Bearing Good Will," The New York Times, March, 29, 1997.

¹⁸ Vamık D. Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, Turks and Greeks, Neighbors in Conflict. Cambridge: The Eothen Press, 1994, 7-12.

¹⁹ Ibid., 184. For the import of 'hellenism' from western Europe and the imposition of it on the newly born state by the west in return for the Western support in the Greek war of Independence, see, Stefanos Yerasimos, "Türk-Yunan İlişkileri: Mitler ve Gerçekler," in Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlığı. ed. Semih Vaner, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1988, 40. For a definition of Megali Idea, the words of Michael Smith are really descriptive of the Greek visions, "The Great Idea...in midnineteenth century came to contain at least three different starands. Strictly incorporated it was the romantic dreams of revival of the Byzantine Empire centered on Constantinople. Less strictly, it was the aspirations for Greek culture and economic dominance within the Ottoman Empire, leading to its gradual subversion from within by a process which need to entail a violent clash between the rival Greek and Turkish nations. Thirdly, the idea could be interpreted in terms of the modern nation-state, in the Greek Kingdom, which entailed a head-on clash with the Ottoman Empire. Though all these conceptions survived into the twentieth century, it was the third which prevailed." Tözün Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955. Boulder, San Fransisco, London: Westview Press, 1990, 6.

²⁰ Vamık D. Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, Ibid., 82.

²¹ Ibid., 87 and

²² Ibid., 193

²³ Ibid., 167-169.

²⁴ Ibid., 168

²⁵ "Düşmanlığın Asıl Sebebi Önyargılar," Zaman, January, 2, 1997. An interview with Herkül Milas

Notes For Chapter 3

¹ See, Theodoros A. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey, The Troubled Triangle. New York: Preager Publishers, 1983, 124-128. Here the writer

summarizes the main perceptions and misperceptions both in Greece and Turkey around the political circles.

² See, Semih Vaner, “**Türkiye, Yunanistan ve Süper Güçler: Biri Diğetine, Üçü Birine mi Karsı, Yoksa Herkes Kendisi İçin mi?**” in Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlığı. ed. Semih Vaner, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1988, 171-190

³ Aurel Braun, Small-State Security in the Balkans. Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books, 1983, 328.

⁴ See, Tözün Bahçeli, **Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955**. Boulder, Swan Francisco, London: Westview Press, 1990, 17-25. The author points to the differences between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island by referring to the past. He emphasizes on the separated educational and social systems of the communities.

⁵ For a detailed account for the British rule in Cyprus, see, Ahmet Gazioğlu, İngiliz İdaresinde Kıbrıs (cilt 1). İstanbul. 1961. And see, Sükrü S. Gürel, Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960) Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika (Cilt 2). İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1985.

⁶For a detailed account for the arguments of the parties to the Cyprus Conflict between 1945 and 1960, see Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Tarafların Tutumu ve Tezleri Açısından Kıbrıs Sorunu (1945-1986). İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1991, 17-35.

⁷ For the developments from 1960 to 1974, see Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Ibid., 57-70.

⁸ For detailed information on the process of the establishment of “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” and of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, see, M. Necati Ertegin, The Cyprus Republic and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Oxford: K. Rüstem & Brother, 1984.

⁹ The decisions that were agreed on by Denktaş and Makarios during their meeting in February, 1977 are as follows:

1. We are seeking an independent, non aligned, bicommunal federal republic;
2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land-ownership;
3. Questions of principles such as freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters are open for discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot Community;
4. The powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bicommunal character of the state.

You can reach the articles of 1977 “Set of Guideliness” and of 1979 “Ten-Points Agreement” on the internet, “<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/groupf/f614.htm>”

¹⁰ See, -----, **"1996 Yılı Başında Kıbrıs Sorunu"** Siyasi ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı, İstanbul: 1996. The article points that the Greek Cypriot Government speeded up its policy of becoming an EU member especially after the election of Glafkos Klerides to the presidency in 1992.

¹¹ For Turkish views on this issue, see, Hüseyin Pazarcı, **"Ege Denizindeki Türk-Yunan Sorunlarının Hukuki Yanı"**, and for the Greek views see, Theodoros Kotsoufros, **"Ege Denizi İle İlgili Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlıkları"** in **Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlığı**. ed. Semih Vaner, Metis Yayınları, İstanbul: 1988, 76-123.

¹² Sükrü Elekdag, **Class Notes of the Course of "Turkish Foreign Policy"** Semester: Spring, 1997. 410. And see also, Sükrü S. Gürel, **Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1983)**. Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993, 75.

¹³ Article 300 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea reads as follows: "State parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under this convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdictions and freedoms recognized in this convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of rights." Sukru Elekdag, **Class Notes**, 411. And also see, Sükrü S. Gürel, **Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1983)**. Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993, 73-75.

¹⁴ Article 1 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation in 1945 states that "The Contracting states recognize that every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory", and article 2 of the same convention states "For the purpose of this convention the territory of a state shall be defined to be land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection of mandate of such state". And the decision of ICAO Assembly held in Montreal in 1980 during the 23rd session reads as follows "The approval by the Council of regional air navigation agreement relating to the provisions by a state of air traffic services within airspace over the high seas does not imply the recognition of sovereignty of that state over the air space concerned."

¹⁵ See, Michael N. Schmitt, **"Ege'de Endişe, Türk-Yunan Anlaşmazlığı"**, **Deniz Kuvvetleri Dergisi**. (Mart 1997), 21-22

¹⁶ Greek demands for flight plans from military aircraft flying over the Aegean International airspace are also contrary to the Chicago Convention which explicitly states that the provisions of the convention do not apply to military aircraft and that the responsibility for the safety of air navigation in this respect rests with the state of the military aircraft. Article 3 of the above mentioned convention reads as follows: "This convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft and shall not be applicable to state aircraft....." Şükrü Elekdag, **Class Notes**

¹⁷ The Ottoman Empire accepted the power of the six major European Countries to determine the status of Crete and the Eastern Aegean Islands in the London Conference of 1913 in the aftermath of the First Balkan War. Ottoman Empire and Greece accepted the decision of these six states concerning the status of these islands in the Athens Treaty which they signed on November, 14, 1913. Then, the six European states convened in London and decided that Greece would possess the eastern Aegean islands, except Imbros (İmros) and Tenedos (Bozcaada), and the

Ottoman Empire would own İmros and Bozcaada and Meis, and the other Dodacanese Islands would pass to Italy. The Great powers also put the condition of nonmilitarization concerning the islands given to Greece. This decision of the six powers were conveyed to Greece on February, 13, 1914, and to the Ottoman Empire on February, 14, 1914. See, Şükrü S. Gürel, Ibid., 66-67

¹⁸ Article 12 of the Lausanne Treaty reads as follows: "The decision taken on the 13 February, 1914, by the Conference of London, in virtue Article 5 of the Treaty of London of 17-30 May 1913, and article 14 of the Treaty of Athens of the 1-14 November, 1913, which decision was communicated to the Greek government on the 13th February, 1914, is confirmed....."

Article 13 of the same treaty reads as follows: "With a view to ensuring maintenance of peace, the Greek government undertakes to observe the following restrictions in the islands of Mitylene, Chios, Samos, and Nikaria:

1. No naval base and no fortification will be established in the said islands,
2. Greek military aircraft will be forbidden to fly over the territory of the Anatolian coast. Reciprocally, the Turkish government will forbid their military aircraft to fly over the islands,
3. The Greek military forces in the said islands will be limited to the normal contingent called for military service, which can be trained on the spot, as well as to a force of gendarmerie and police in proportion to the force of gendarmerie and police existing in the whole of the Greek territory."

¹⁹ See, Şükrü S. Gürel, Ibid., 67,68. The Articles 4 and 6 of the additional protocol of the Lasusanne Peace Treaty concerning the status of the straits and islands lying before the straits determined that the islands of Lemons (Limni), Semotharece(Semadirek), Imbros(İmros), Tenedos(Bozcaada), and Rabbit islands(Tavşan Adalari) would be demilitarized.

²⁰ Şükrü S. Gürel, Ibid., 68. The Introductory protocol of the Montreux Convention redefined the status of the straits and of the islands that Turkey posses before the straits. According to these regulations, Turkey was given the right to militarize these islands. However, this convention did not bring any changes to the status of the Islands that Greece owns before the straits.

²¹ Şükrü S. Gürel, Ibid., 69. The Paris Treaty that was signed between Greece and Italy on February 10, 1947, preserved the nonmilitarized status of the Dodacanese islands.

²² See, Şükrü S. Gürel, Ibid., 78-82.

Notes For Chapter 4

¹ See, John Pinder, European Union: The Building of A Union. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Also see, Richard, M.A. McAllister, From EC to EU: A Historical and Political Survey. New York: Routledge, 1997.

² Atilla Eralp, "Soğuk Savaşın Günümüze Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri," in Türkiye ve Avrupa. ed. Atilla Eralp, Ankara, : İmge Yayınevi, 1997, 86-119, p. 90

³ Atilla Eralp, Ibid., 91. See, also Mehmet Ali Birand, Türkiye'nin Gümrük Birliği Macerası (1959-1996). İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1996. The author mention important milestones in the process of Turkey's customs union with the EU and he analysis the major reasons of Turkey's customs union adventure beginning from 1959.

⁴ Atilla Eralp, Ibid., 92.

⁵ Atilla Eralp, Ibid., 96

⁶ Atilla Eralp, Ibid., 96.

⁷ Thanos Veremis, "Greece and Nato: Continuity and Change" in jooooooooooooj. 236-286, p. 253

⁸ Matthias Esche, "A History of Greek-Turkish Relations" in Turkey and European Community. eds. Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton, Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 1990, 101-116. p.112 and John Redmond, The Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Community, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1993, 40.

⁹ Matthias Esche, (1990), op.cit., 112.

¹⁰ Prodromos Yannas, "The Greek Factor in EC-Turkey Relations," in Greece and EC, Membership Evaluated. eds. Panos Kazakos and P.C. Iokimidis, London: Pinter Publishers, 1994, 215-221, p. 216.

¹¹ Şükrü Sina Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1993). Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993, 103.

¹² Atilla Eralp, (1997), op.cit., 102.

¹³ Şükrü S. Gürel, "Türkiye ve Yunanistan: Ege'de Zahmetli Bir İlişki," in Türkiye ve Avrupa İlişkileri. eds. Canan Balkır and Allan M. Williams, İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1996, 213-250, 239.

¹⁴ See Ergün Olgun, the foreign policy advisor of President Denktaş of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, "Rumlarla Mücadeleyi Pahalıya Ödetmeliyiz," Zaman, September 20, 1997.

¹⁵ See, for example the statements of Theodoros Pangolos "Pangolos: Türkiye'yi Dışlamak İrkcılıktır," Sabah, March, 17, 1997. and Mehmet A. Birand, "Atina'nın İlginç Türk Politikası." Sabah, March, 20, 1997.

¹⁶ F. Stephen Larrabee, "Greece and the Balkans. Implications for US Policy," in The Greek Paradox, Promise vs. Performance. eds. Graham T. Allison and Kalypso Nicolaidis, Massachusetts: The Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1997, 107-112, 110.

¹⁷ Fikret Ertan, "Son Defa Huntington," Zaman, March, 11, 1997.

¹⁸ Sami Kohen, “Güvenelim mi?,” Milliyet, March, 12, 1997.

¹⁹ Hasan Ünal, “Türkiye’nin Kıbrıs ve AB Politikalarındaki Cıkmazlar,” Zaman, November, 8, 1997.

²⁰ Şükrü Elekdağ, “Türkiye’nin Avrupa Düşü,” Milliyet, December, 15, 1997.

²¹ Anne Swardson, “European Union Excludes Turkey from Expansion Plans,” The Washington Post, December, 13, 1997.

²² Caroline Southey, Bruce Clark, Kerin Hope, “Brussels Bbacks Aegean Court Case,” Financial Times, February, 22, 1996.

²³ Statements of the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mesut Yılmaz, that Turkey will cut the political dialogue with the Union and will not talk the Cyprus or Aegean problems with the Union are clear evidences of the new stand in Turkey’s approach towards the problems with Greece. See, Stephen Kinzer, “Turkey, Rejected, Will Freeze Ties to European Union,” New York Times, December, 15, 1997.

²⁴ Lee Hockstader and Kelly Coutrier quoted from Bülent Alırza, Director of Turkish Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington as saying “Washington’s whole strategy on Cyprus is based on the EU factor. The EU was expected to give enough to Turkey to make them give a little on Cyprus and the Aegean Disputes with Greece.” See, Lee Hockstader and Kelly Couturies, “Ankara Ready to Sever European Ties Angered by EU Rejection , Turkish Leader Threatens Cyprus Peace Effort,” The Washington Post, December, 15, 1997. See, also Kelly Coutrier, US-Turkish Relations in the Post Cold War Era. İstanbul: Fredrich Eber Stiffung, 1997, 29. The author says that “Washington’s current strategy, according to Washington Post, is to try to improve Turkey’s prospects for eventual EU membership and at the same time persuade Clerides and Denktaş tp consider a joint delegation for Cyprus’s negotiations with the European Community.”

²⁵ See, the official statements of Turkish Government on <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/gruph/Release/12.htm> and the Joint Declarations of Turkey’s President and the President of the Turkish Republic of the Northern Cyprus on <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupf/grupf10.htm?>

²⁶ Yasemin Çongar, “ABD’nin AB’ den Farkı,” Milliyet, December, 01, 1997.

²⁷ The writer cites Walter Lippman as quotation to support his argument that the US helped these countries “not because they are in need of relief, not because they are shining examples of democracy, but because they are the strategic gateway to the Black Sea, and the heart of the Soviet Union” Nicholas V. Gianaris, Greece and Turkey Economic and Geopolitical Perspectives. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988, 28.

²⁸ See the books of Mehmet Gönlübol, Olaylarla Turk Dış Politikası (1919-1945). Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996, and Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Modern Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979,

²⁹ James Brown, Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey, Problems, Policy choices and Mediterranean Security. London: Brassey's (UK), 1991, 4.

³⁰ Mehmet Gönlübol, (1996), op.cit., 237-249.

³¹ See Alexis Alexandris, The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Turkish-Greek Relations 1918-1974. Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies and Alexis Alexandris, 1992, 256-266. The author examines the September 6 and 7 events in İstanbul, accusing of the media for circulating wrong reports and inciting masses to attack the Greek minority in İstanbul. To him, the reports of the media that the EOKA would initiate a massacre towards the Turks in Cyprus, and that Atatürk's house in Thessaloniki was bombed by the Greeks were the real reasons setting the masses on. To him, the occurrence of these events was really an important blow to the peace negotiations, which was already being held in London.

³² For developments in Turkey's foreign Policy following the Johnson Letter see Mehmet Gönlübol, (1996), op.cit., 493-500.

³³ Ellen Laipson, "Turkey and the U.S. Congress," in The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations. ed. George Harris, The Heritage Foundation, 1984, 27-35.

³⁴ See, Theodore A. Coulumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey. The Troubled Triangle. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983.

³⁵ See Errcument Yavuzalp, Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik 1967-1979. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993, 62-112. The author was Turkish ambassador to Cyprus during the crisis. He was directly involved in the decision-making process throughout the crisis and witnessed to all negotiations between the communities on the island and to Cyrus Vance mission, a US initiative to broker for peace between the parties. He gives a clear account of the whole crisis.

³⁶ See, Tözün Bahçeli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955. Boulder, San Fransisco, London: Westview Press, 1990. 73-75.

³⁷ Theodore A. Coulumbis, (1983), op.cit., 42-56.

³⁸ Robert McDonald, "Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean - Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. Part II" in Adelphi Papers 229 Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean, 75.

³⁹ Bruce George and Mark Steinhouse, "Political and Security Issues in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean" in Conference Papers, The Aegean Issues: Problems and Prospects. December, 1989, 85-86.

⁴⁰ Robert McDonald, 76.

⁴¹ For the views of the respective parties to the Lemnos dispute see, Petros N. Stagos, "Limni'nin NATO Düzeni İçindeki Yerine İlişkin Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlığı, Yunanistan'ın Tutumundaki Amaçlar ve Etkiler" in Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlığı. ed. Semih Vaner, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1989, 191-208. and see, Gündüz Aslan,

Limni Adası'nın Hukuki Statüsü Üzerinde Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlığı. İstanbul: Otag, 1985.

⁴² Robert McDonald, 77.

⁴³ James Brown, Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey, Problems, Policy Choices and Mediterranean Security. London: Brassey's (UK), 1991, 23.

⁴⁴ the military in Balkan politics, Stephen Larabee.

⁴⁵ James Brown, (1991), op.cit., 7.

⁴⁶ See, Sami Kohen, "Ege'de Bir Kavga Yatışıyor," Milliyet, December 5, 1997. And see, -----, "International Arena Wellcome Greek-Turkish NATO Dispute Compromise," Türksih Dailiy News, December, 4, 1997.

Notes For Chapter 5

¹ This is the approach shared by many academics in both countries as well as in third countries. Generally, this point of view is applied due to its easiness in the way of analysis of current problems. It is enough just to read the history to be able to say something about the problems. The people who adhere to this point of view generally consist of the rightist and nationalistic ones in their political life. Besides it is very easy to bring up children imbued with this approach since the national education systems in both countries are designated in such a manner after that the new generations can hardly stop themselves from thinking chauvinistically. Hasan Ünal, A Paper "How To Tackle The Turco-Greek Dispute In the Post-Dayton Era? An Analysis of the Dispute and A Solution Proposal", Presented on the Conference on "Post-Dayton Balkans in Europe: Political Security and Economic Aspects of an Emerging Relationship.

² For a definition of Megali Idea, see, Michael L. Smith, Ionoan Vision: Greece in Asia Minor. 1919-1922. Allen Lane, London, 1973, 4. Also, see, Murat Hatipoğlu, Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinin 101 Yılı. 1821-1922. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1989, 29.

³ This approach is generally shared by the leftist and socialist circles in Turkey and Greece. See, Herkül Millas, Türk-Yunan İlişkilerine Bir Önsöz. İstanbul: Kavram Yayınları, 1995.

⁴ For a comparison between Cyprus and Bosnia including many aspects of them see, Hasan Ünal, "Bosnia-Cyprus: A Comparison," in Proceedings of the First International Congress on Cypriot Studies. eds. Emel Doğramacı, William Haney and Guray Konig, Gazimagusa: Eastern Mediterranean University Press, 1996, 349-355.

⁵ See Necati Minür Ertegun, The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. London: K. Rüstem & Brother, 1981, 7-8. Also see,

⁶ See, T. A. Coulumbis, “Greek Security Challenges in the Balkans,” in **Balkans A Mirror of the New International Order**, eds. Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemal Saybaşılı, İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1996, 197-214. 209.

⁷ For the role of the United Nations in the development of the Cyprus problem see, Faruk Sönmezoglu, “The Cyprus Question and the United Nations 1950-1987,” in **Turkish Foreign Policy Recent Developments**, ed. Kemal H. Karpat, Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1996, 171-185. See also, Mustafa Akşin, “Turkey, the UN, and the Cyprus Problem,” in **Proceedings of the First International Congress on Cypriot Studies**, eds. Emel Doğramacı, William Haney and Güray Konig. Gazimagusa: Eastern Mediterranean University Press, 1996, 357-367. See also Ergün Olgun, “An Evaluation of the UN Secretary General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus,” in the same source

⁸ Many people praise the works of the UN and ask the parties on the Island to continue to find a solution in the frameworks and guidelines drowned by the United Nations. See, Margarita Mathiopoulos, “Toward An Aegean Treaty 2+4 for Turkey and Greece,” **Mediterranean Quarterly**, (Summer 1997), 127-130.

⁹ See, Theodoros Coulumbis, **The United States, Greece and Turkey, The Troubled Triangle**. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983.

¹⁰ See, Kostas Ifantis, “Greece and the USA After the Cold War,” in **Greece in A Changing Europe, Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration**, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996, 147-159, 155.

¹¹ James Brown, **Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey, Problems, Policy Choices and Mediterranean Security**. London: Braeey’s (UK), 1991, 32.

¹² For the relations of Turkey with the United States Congress and the impact of the Greek lobby there on the resolutions of the Congress concerning Turkey, see, Ellen Laipson, “Turkey and the United States Congress,” in **The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations**, ed. George Harris, The Heritage Foundation, 1984, 22-33. For the influence of foreign lobbies on the decision-making process in the US, especially on the Greek lobby, see, Tayyar Arı, **Amerika’da Siyasal Yapı, Lobiler ve Dış Politika, Türk, Yunan, Ermeni, İsrail ve Arap Lobilerinin ABD’nin Dış Politikasına Etkileri**. İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 1997, 260-273.

¹³ See, Ian Lesser, **New Dimensions in the Mediterranean Security From A US Perspective Including the Eastern Mediterranean**, on the internet address, <http://www.americanembassy.org.cy/debate.htm#lesser>. See also, Şükrü Elekdağ, “ABD ve Hazar Petrolleri,” **Milliyet**, November, 24, 1997. For the post Cold War Turkish- American Bilateral Relations see, Kelly Coutrier, **US-Turkish Relations in the Post Cold War Era**. İstanbul: Fredrich Ebert Stiftung, 1997. The author points to new dimensions in threat perceptions of the EU and Turkey. To him, the end of the common security perceptions between Turkey and the EU during the

Cold War era affected the way the EU evaluates Turkey in the Post Cold War era. According to the author Turkey is now included in the list of possible places which might damage Europe's security. The author says that "For Europe, the risks to its security lie in religious fundamentalism, migration, drug-smuggling and demographic pressures", and she cites Seyfi Taşhan as quotation "These put Turkey into Europe's risk category. Therefore, we do not expect a significant contribution by Europe to our security needs in the future." On the other hand the author mentions some possible places where the interests of the US and Turkey converge, giving birth to the continuation of the security cooperation that was established in the Cold War years. She claims that the US needs Turkey for its "dual containment policy" towards Iraq and Iran and that US' policies vis-a-vis the Caspian oil converge Turkey's.

¹⁴ See, Hasan Köni, "İsrail ile Yakınlaşmanın Anatomisi," Zaman, June, 6, 1997. In this article, Mr. Hasan Ünal makes an interview with Hasan Köni, the chairman of the Turkish-American Institute in Ankara, and discusses the latest developments in Turkish-American relations with reference to Israel's role in this process. They also analyze the reasons and dynamics of the new developments in Turkish-Israeli relations with special reference on the Israeli Lobby's work for Turkey's cause in the US.

¹⁵ See, Seyfi Taşhan, "AB Dışında Avrupalı Kalabilmemiz Lazım," Zaman, November, 1, 1997. In this interview of Mr. Hasan Unal with Seyfi Taşhan, the Director of the Foreign Policy Institute in Turkey, the latter state the weakness of the European Union in formulating and implementing foreign policy courses in all around the world.

¹⁶ For the Turkish view, see, "Cyprus and the European Union: The Turkish Cypriot View and Some Selected Articles," United States Association of Northern Cyprus, Lefkoşa, 1997. And see, also the official views of the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Foreign Ministry of the Cyprus Republic.

¹⁷ See, Necati Minür Ertekün, "Ertekün: Rumların AB Başvurusu Gayrimeşru," Zaman, September, 9, 1997. In this article Mr. Hasan Ünal interviews Mr. Ertekün, the legal adviser of the President of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. See, also, Haluk Kabaahoğlu, "Cyprus and the European Union," in Proceedings of the First International Conference on Cypriot Studies, eds. Emel Doğramacı, William Haney and Güray Konig, Gazimagusa, 1996, 219-233. See, also, Necati Minür Ertekün, "The Legal Perspective of the Membership of Cyprus in the European Union," in the same source, 233-244.

¹⁸ "EU and Cyprus," Financial Times, August, 18, 1997. This article tries to display possible advantages that Cypriot Turks would gain if the island becomes an EU member. Mostly stressed on economic reasons, the arguments put in the article are mostly useless attempts at showing Turks' possible advantages because it overlooks the security and strategic dimensions of the conflict.

¹⁹ See, Ergün Olgun, "Rumlara Mücadeleyi Pahalı Ödetmeliyiz," Zaman, September, 20, 1997. Mr. Olgun, one of the political advisors of the President Denktaş of the TRNC, state the impossibility of togetherness of the three fundamental principles of the European Union structure with the emergence of a federal Cyprus

Republic basing on two bi-communal and bi-zonal entities.

²⁰ See, Nancy Crashaw, “Cyprus: A Crisis of Confidence,” The World Today, (April, 1994), 70-73.

²¹ See Hasan Ünal, “NATO’ nun Genişleme Planları, Balkanlar ve Türkiye,” Zaman, November, 1, 1996.



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