

ANARCHISM AND JUSTICE

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ABSTRACT

ANARCHISM AND JUSTICE

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The aim of this thesis is to clarify the differences between two conceptions of justice: Eternal Justice (*Themis*) and Social Justice (*Dike*). In our modern world, justice has always been perceived as a distributive and legislative issue. Unlike social justice, eternal justice is not anthropomorphic but a cosmological phenomenon. In order to develop an understanding of eternal justice, I mainly referred to the works of Arendt and Nietzsche. With the help of their conceptualizations and theories, this thesis offers a way to reintroduce eternal justice into politics.

Keywords: Anarchism, Justice, Nietzsche, Arendt

ÖZ

ANARŞİZM VE ADALET

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Bu tezin amacı iki adalet anlayışı arasındaki farkları ortaya koyabilmektir: Sosyal Adalet (*Dike*) ile Ebedi Adalet (*Themis*). Günümüzde adalet dağıtımsal ve yasamayla ilişkili bir mesele olarak algılanmaktadır. Sosyal adalet ile karşılaştırıldığında ebedi adalet insanbiçimci bir fenomen değildir; tam aksine kozmolojik bir fenomendir. Ebedi adaleti anlayabilmek için genel olarak Nietzsche ve Arendt'in eserlerinden yararlandım. Bu tez, Nietzsche ve Arendt'in kavramsallaştırmaları yardımıyla ebedi adalet kavramını siyaset alanına yeniden geri getirmenin bir yolunu sunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Anarşizm, Adalet, Nietzsche, Arendt



To my companions

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations of Arendt's Works in English

HC The Human Condition
LM The Life of the Mind
OT The Origins of Totalitarianism
OR On Revolution

Abbreviation of Nietzsche's Works in English

BGE Beyond Good and Evil
BT The Birth of Tragedy
EH Ecce Hommo
GM On the Genealogy of Morals
PTAG Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks
Z Thus Spoke Zarathustra

Abbreviation of Kant's Work in English

CJ Critique of Judgment

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

*Das Alte stürzt, es ändert sich die Zeit,
Und neues Leben blüht aus den Ruinen.*

Friedrich von Schiller

There are two dominant political attitudes in modern political theories: liberalism and socialism (Marxism). The former was a dedicated defender of 'freedom,' and the latter was a tireless promoter of 'equality.' Liberals are not only interested in freedom but also justice and equality, but neither equality nor justice is the core characteristic of classical liberalism. Nevertheless, equality and justice can be found in an extended version of liberalism, such as political liberalism. If one looks at Marxism, the situation is more complicated. Although Marx was not interested in equality, because he was interested in emancipation, generally speaking, Marxist thinkers have, at least thematically, been wandering around the notion of equality.

My main argument is that neither Marxism nor liberalism can offer a comprehensive and holistic justice theory. Instead of an anthropomorphic conceptualization of justice, which generally manifests in distributive and legislative forms, I would like to offer a conception of cosmological or eternal justice that has been inspired by Nietzsche and, to some extent, Arendt.

I think there are two main problems in our contemporary world that do not allow us to grasp the true nature of eternal justice: resentment and the

politicization of needs. My main aim is to offer a cosmological justice that is free from resentment and needs.

A conception of cosmological justice as a political issue should not be polluted by needs which are pre-political matters and resentful motivations. I believe that the Nietzschean concept of *amor fati* and the Arendtian concept of *amor mundi* are two pillars of eternal justice. This eternal justice was known in Ancient Greek religion and culture, but it has almost been forgotten by modern and pre-modern political thinkers. In other words, in this thesis, I would like to recall this almost forgotten goddess.

I have been influenced by many philosophers. Therefore, it is very difficult to say this or that philosopher is very central to my philosophical approach, but I know that I am deeply interested in the anarchist school of thought. In terms of its membership, this school differs from Marxism, Conservatism, and Liberalism. There are traditional members of the school such as Godwin, Tolstoy, Goldman, Kropotkin, Landauer. In addition to them, there are some members whom I call "reluctant" anarchists, out of the anarchist tradition, such as Simone Weil, Albert Camus, George Orwell. Lastly, there are secret members of the school, such as Arendt and Nietzsche. Yet, they are not aware of their membership.

I don't like to specialize in this or that philosopher because I am not a religious person, and I am also a fanatic of free-thinking. I like thematic studies. In this thesis, I will wander around the concepts of Justice and Anarchism. Of course, there will be some friends, companions, lovers, enemies (?) in the garden of Justice and Anarchism.

Theoretically speaking, there are three central concepts that dominate almost all contemporary political theories in both political science and political

philosophy: *Liberty, Equality, and Justice*. In Western philosophy, since Plato and Aristotle, these concepts have been constructive notions of almost all powerful political theories. Plato's *Republic* is nothing more than the glorification of justice. On the other hand, Aristotle's *Politics* might be seen as a premature defense of a liberal understanding of liberty. Although there are many communitarians and conservative elements in his *Politics*, some liberal thinkers such as William Galston and Martha C. Nussbaum have praised him for his premature liberal elements. Equality is a relatively modern concept, and it is difficult to find its origins or premature forms in antiquity.

Throughout the history of Western politics, liberty and equality always have been perceived as two sides of the same coin by "progressive" and "optimistic" thinkers; it is known that the famous French Revolution slogan "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*" is the highest manifestation of this assumption, but sometimes they were two brothers like Cain and Abel; even though we do not know which one killed the other at the beginning of Time, it is obvious that, from time to time, they have changed their roles periodically. As we know, incest and *same-sex* marriage have been forbidden in almost all "civilized" societies in history; therefore, it should not be expected from them to be united in a "peaceful" marriage. Unfortunately, in many cases, they have been natural enemies even though the majority of progressive and optimist political thinkers have always been unwilling to confess it. Fortunately, we have another concept from the ancient world which helps us go beyond the never-ending war between liberty and equality: Justice. The Hate-Love relationship (*Die Hassliebe*) of these two brothers could be tamed by the Goddess of Justice. This thesis will try to defend the central position of justice for political philosophy.

In order to understand the sociological status of these concepts, we should briefly study how these concepts or notions have emerged and changed

throughout human history. For that purpose, we should study not only Ancient Greece but also Ancient Egypt and Ancient India. This work is mainly based on the Western tradition, which was rooted in Ancient Greece and, to some extent, Ancient Egypt; therefore, I will not try to discuss the genealogy of these central political concepts in other cultures and traditions although they are extremely valuable for political philosophy. Without studying Chinese, Japanese, African, Indian, and Tibetan philosophy, our minds will be *gently* colonized. Nevertheless, in this thesis, I will not specifically mention them.

Libertas, a Roman goddess of liberty, might be seen as a dominant goddess of our contemporary time, especially for liberals and libertarians, although no one is capable of telling who or what she really is. We know that for the ancient world, the notion of liberty was totally different from that of the modern world. In Ancient Greece, people were not free in their private life, but they were definitely free in public life. Constant said:

Thus, among the ancients, the individual, almost always sovereign in public affairs, was a slave in all his private relations. As a citizen, he decided on Peace and War; as a private individual, he was constrained, watched, and repressed in all his movements; as a member of the collective body, he interrogated, dismissed, condemned, beggared, exiled, or sentenced to death his magistrates and superiors; as a subject of the collective body he could himself be deprived of his status, stripped of his privileges, banished, put to death, by the discretionary will of the whole to which he belonged. Among the moderns, on the contrary, the individual, independent in his private life, is, even in the freest of states, sovereign only in appearance. His sovereignty is restricted and almost always suspended. If at fixed and rare intervals, in which he is again surrounded by precautions and obstacles, he exercises this sovereignty, it is always only to renounce it (1819).

This paradigm-shifting is very important because modern people tend to think that freedom is freedom of the private realm. Today, we talk about some form

of freedoms that have been secured by laws such as freedom of movement, freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work, freedom to conduct a business.

These forms of freedom assume that each individual is an autonomous being. Freedom is the freedom of an autonomous individual. Modern citizens (individuals), unlike Greek or Roman citizens, don't have a huge impact on politics. Of course, they have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections, but if they are compared with the diversified and rich political actions of a Greek or Roman citizen, these rights are extremely passive and limited.

Although these huge paradigm differences of liberty between the ancient and modern worlds are still very significant for political theory, I think that both ancient and modern versions of liberty are not useful for our contemporary political problems such as politics of victimization and politicization of needs.

Since the French Revolution and the American Revolution, liberty has been one of the central archetypes of almost all socio-political movements. All revolutions or political reforms all around the world, which have been inspired by the promises of the French Revolution, have promoted the idea of liberty. Arendt sadly admitted that not the American Revolution, but the French Revolution was a prominent revolution model for almost all revolutions.

Arendt said:

It was the French and not the American Revolution that set the world on fire, and it was consequently from the course of the French Revolution, and not from the course of events in America or from the acts of the Founding Fathers, that our present use of the word

'revolution' received its connotations and overtones everywhere, the United States not excluded (OR, 55).

In this sense, the American Revolution, as another potential inspirational source for political changes, has not been studied in detail in the history of revolutions.

Libertas might be a powerful and ancient goddess, but there is another goddess who is older than her: *Justitia*. Throughout the history of human civilizations, the concept of justice has always been associated with *authority* and coercive institutions (Budge, 1967). According to many different cultures, religions, and traditions such as Ancient Greek and Ancient Egyptian, if there are chaos and disorder in society, only justice eliminates them and brings harmony for humanity. The attribution of a divine characteristic to justice might be seen even in our so-called most secularized and modernized judicial systems. In other words, the understanding of justice as divine authority, is backed up by mythical and archetypal elements which might be found historically in different societies and regions.

The Platonic understanding of justice might be seen as an echo of the Ancient Egyptian goddess of justice, *Maat* because both of them were based on the notion of order. Egyptians had many complex and diversified cosmologies about chaos, justice, and order. I am not planning to discuss all of them in this work, but it is obvious that in Ancient Egypt, the dominant narrative of justice was based on hierarchy and order. In other words, the statist and conservative version of Justice has survived in Ancient Egypt. Because of this dominant characteristic, Ancient Egypt was accused by Nietzsche of being extremely Apollonic.¹

¹ “But lest this Apolline tendency should cause form to freeze into Egyptian stiffness and coldness...” (BT,9)

Its authoritative narrative may also explain to us why current conservative parties or politicians prefer to use the word of 'justice' in their party programs or speeches. Most of the time, the classical understanding of justice is cold and dry, and it always resists changes. In a Nietzschean sense, it is very Apollonic. This characteristic makes it a suitable discourse tool for conservatives all around the world.

In this research, I would like to discuss the possibility of a non-authoritarian understanding of Justice. Is it possible to talk about anti-hierarchical and decentralized justice? Is it possible to imagine a form of justice without coercive institutions and authoritarian structures? This form of justice I have called 'Anarchist Justice.' Even though it may share some similar characteristics with the Marxist and liberal forms of justice; anarchist justice offers us a third way to go beyond its two siblings. In other words, these two elements, for us, mortals, which appear as natural antagonists to each other, *Justice* and *Chaos*, will be united for the sake of eternity. In the next chapters of this work, I would like to discuss why the theory of justice is a more central concept than equality and liberty for political philosophy, and then I will criticize the two siblings of anarchism: liberalism and Marxism. I am also planning to say something about Arendt and Nietzsche. In the final chapters, I would like to define justice.

Like Arendt and Nietzsche, I am also looking for something in ancient worlds, but unlike them, I am trying to go deeper. I am looking for a forgotten and forbidden form of Justice. It is difficult to grasp this eternal justice, and it is also difficult to investigate her chaotic nature. It has been excluded from society in ancient India and ancient Egypt. eternal justice has never been an active principle of life in these ancient worlds, but they have worked within their sons, Shiva and Seth.

Alain Daniélou (1992) said:

Shivaism is essentially a nature religion. Shiva, like Dionysus, represents but one of the aspects of the divine hierarchy, that which concerns terrestrial life generally. By establishing a realistic coordination between subtle beings and living creatures, Shivaism has always opposed the anthropocentricity of urban society. Its western form, Dionysism, similarly represents the stage where man is in communion with savage life, with the beasts of the mountain and forest. Dionysus, like Shiva, is a god of vegetation, of trees and of the vine. He is also an animal god, a bull-god. The god teaches man to disregard human laws in order to rediscover divine laws. His cult, which unleashes the powers of soul and body, has encountered a lively resistance from city religions, which have always considered it antisocial. Shiva, like Dionysus, is represented by city religions as the protector of those who do not belong to conventional society and thus symbolizes everything which is chaotic, dangerous and unexpected, everything which escapes human reason and which can only be attributed to the unforeseeable action of the gods (p.15).

This god is our son: son of justice, Prometheus. Daniélou was right about his analysis of Shiva but not Dionysus; Prometheus is a Greek equivalent of Shiva. It might be argued that Seth from Egypt, Shiva from India are premature forms of Prometheus.²

² Unlike Shiva, Dionysus is a childish and playful figure. Shiva, like Prometheus, is a father figure in Indian religion. Shiva is a mature and stable god. His destructive character is not childish but fatherly.

CHAPTER 2

ANARCHISM

2.1. Handbook

*The bird of Hermes is my name
eating my wings to make me tame.*

George Ripley

Those who know do not speak. Those who speak do not know.

Lao Tzu

This thesis is not a Ladder of Jacob or a Roman Way,
It cannot guide you into the *heavenly* or *earthly* kingdom
It is not Light or Dark
It is not Good or Evil
It is as it is

It is a Cretan Labyrinth
full of snakes, beasts, dragons,
but also, nymphs, satyrs, muses

2.2. What is Anarchism?

Although there are many different interpretations of anarchism in the history of political thought, there is a consensus among anarchists about the enemy: the State. Peter Marshall (2010) said, "Anarchy is usually defined as a society without government and anarchism as the social philosophy which aims at its realization "(p.3). Anarchism is against the State, but What is the State?³ Early anarchists such as Bakunin and Proudhon have preferred the institutional definition of the State.⁴

The institutional and legislative definition of State does not lead us far away from the liberal distinction of civil society and State. I prefer Landauer's definition of State. Landauer (2010) said, "The state is a social relationship; a certain way of people relating to one another. It can be destroyed by creating new social relationships, i.e., by people relating to one another differently" (p.214). During his time, the concept of *authority* was not well defined and it was not distinguished concept from state around the anarchist's circle. It might be argued that in their political terminology, State and Authority were almost identical. Landauer was the first anarchist thinker who shifted anarchist methodology from macro level to micro level.

³ Weber said, "Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Gerth & Mills, 2007, p.78).

⁴ Bakunin said (2002), "We revolutionary anarchists are proponents of universal popular education, liberation, and the broad development of social life, and hence are enemies of the State and of any form of statehood... Since every state power, every government, by its Nature and by its position stands outside the people and above them and must invariably try to subject them to rules and objectives which are alien to them, we declare ourselves the enemies of every government and every state power, the enemies of the state organization of any kind "(pp.135-136).

If we accept Landauer's definition of the State, many forms of authority in our daily life could be seen as a form of State. Universities are State. Schools are State. Families are State. Marriages are State. Monogamic relationships are State, etc. Landauer has revolutionized classical anarchism by focusing on relationships. His definition of State allows us to detect even the smallest form of State, which may occur in human relations. By following Landauer's approach, we could easily assume that *authority is a form of relationship*.

Anarchists want to remove this heavy stone from the river of the relationship. Therefore, we hope that life may flow and rises generously. In a manner of speaking, authority is living inside us, and the institutional form of the State is a reflection of our inner authoritarian tendencies. Unfortunately, for a long time, authoritarian tendencies have been part of the daily life of homo sapiens biologically and psychologically; therefore, the majority of people fatuously cling to authoritarian relations. They exchange their freedom for the sake of security and stability. So-called biological and psychological needs, the nature of which I will discuss further later, have also played an important role in rise of authoritarian relations. Anarchism is a revolutionary theory which aims to destroy all form of authority/ state in relations here and now!

2.3. Ontological Anarchism

The Ancient Greek word arche, ἀρχή, has several meanings and connotations, but generally speaking, it means *origin* and *first essence*.⁵ Although it has

⁵ "ARCHE". Origin, beginning, source, rule. Heraclitus says (f. 70), "In a circle, the beginning (arche) and end are common." Alcmaeon says (f. 2), "People are unable to connect the end with the beginning." From an Aristotelian point of view, the early Greek philosophers were seeking the "origin" of all things, for the most part, the material origin. When Aristotle distinguishes the senses of the word, he begins from immanent starting points (the heart of a living being, for example) and external origins (the parents of the child, for example). In another sense, it means the ruling authority. Importantly, the basis on which something is known is the arche, so not only the material and moving causes are archai, but

mythological roots like many logical concepts of ancient Greek philosophy, presocratic philosophers such as Thales (water) and Anaximander (Apeiron) have used it for their metaphysical investigation, but it had political connotations.

Literally speaking, *an- Archos* means without origin. Therefore, this might be used as a metaphysical starting point for an anarchist investigation. I don't believe that philosophical investigation needs to begin with an ontological account, but even if we assume that ontology is the first philosophy, it might still be argued that there is ontological anarchism.

What is ontological anarchism? There is a very simple answer: *There is no beginning or origin*. Primordial Water comes from somewhere, where? Here or there. Ontological assumptions are nothing more than wishes, which are based on our biological, psychological, and sociological conditions. Therefore, we should be careful about the cleverness of philosophers. Philosophers are corporeal beings, not angelical guardians of the truth. Contrary to this, sometimes they are "Tyrant of truth" (Nietzsche), or at least they crave to be. Secretly (Marx) or Openly (Nietzsche).

Can we also talk about epistemological, ethical, aesthetic, logical and political theories of anarchism? If we could, epistemological anarchism would simply say "Anything goes". Ethical anarchism would preach as follows: "Do whatever you want. Do what you will. The will of cosmos works with your will." Aesthetic anarchism might be based on this maxim: "What is beautiful? It is up to Nature and Nature does not make mistakes."

in a way all the causes, including formal and final (Aristotle, *Metaph. III.1*)" (Preus, 2007, p.51).

If we could talk about anarchist logic, it would say that everything is logical. Therefore, my thesis is nothing more than aesthetic propaganda of my political belief which is what this thesis is about: Political anarchism. *Beyond* rules and rulers.

2.4. Auctoritas and Arche

When I use the word ‘authority’, I do not refer to the Roman version of it.⁶ However, the Roman version of *auctoritas* is also related to the legitimization of power and institutions (Connolly, 2014). For my anarchist approach, authority is a specific *disequilibrium*⁷ between organic or inorganic things. Therefore, my definition of authority is a larger conceptualization that also includes the Roman understanding of authority, or at least it might be applicable to investigate the Roman version of authority as well.

The political implications of *arche* and *auctoritas* are totally the same although their instruments are different. Mostly, Roman people legitimized their political system by referring to ancestors and speeches. A Greek philosopher, by the help of reason, legitimized his philosophy. As can be seen, both *arche* and *auctoritas* are nothing more than legitimization tools but legitimization of what? Disequilibrium. Roman people have legitimized the hierarchical order and slavery by referring to the traditional authority of ancestry. A Greek philosopher wanted to legitimize his cosmology by the authority of reason.

⁶ For Arendt, Authority and Politics do not exclude each other. Hammer said (2015),” For the Romans, according to Arendt, authority was not in conflict with politics but was vested in the senate and linked back to the foundations of the community. 'The word auctoritas,' as Arendt writes, 'derives from the verb augere, "augment", and what authority or those in authority constantly augment is the foundation'” (p.129).

⁷ From my point of view, Chaos is equilibrium (Eternal Justice). Contrary to this, any form of Order is a disequilibrium.

Both hier-archy and slavery, which are based on the legitimization of authority, create disequilibrium. Whenever there is an authority, there should be a disequilibrium. I am critical about hierarchy and slavery, not because of morality, but because of aesthetics. Unlike Nietzsche, I do not see any aesthetic value in the hierarchy and slavery of Rome.⁸ Of course, there are some admirable works of Romans such as architecture and civic virtue, but they might have been achieved without the ugliness of hierarchy and slavery. I am not saying that it is easier than hierarchy but more beautiful. Whenever there is a legitimization crisis, noncreative minds prefer authority to create legitimization for *arche* or *auctoritas*.

Mythology, reason, history, tradition, custom, logic, community, positive science, technology, needs, economy, sociology are nothing more than instrumental tools to legitimize a form of *arche/auctoritas* which creates disequilibrium. Remember, Adorno and Horkheimer introduced us to the concept of instrumental reason. I think reason is always instrumental; we cannot define the reason without the instrumentality of it. From the same perspective, I am arguing that *authority* and *arche* are always instrumental. They are instruments to legitimize all forms of disequilibrium. For that reason, eternal justice is my starting point which allows me to overcome the legitimization problem. Eternal Justice in her equilibrium is always beautiful.

⁸ According to Nietzsche, hierarchy is a necessary precondition of high culture and beauty. He said, "A higher culture can come into existence only where there are two different castes in society: that of the workers and that of the idle, of those capable of true leisure; or, expressed more vigorously: the caste compelled to work and the caste that works if it wants to. (HH,439). I think the existence of two castes that creates hierarchy might be useful for the creation of high culture, but it is not an essential requirement. It is obvious that without hierarchy, creating a high culture might be difficult, but it is not impossible.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICS

3.1. Politics and Ethics

Although ethics and politics have been considered as two areas that are strongly interconnected, I would like to eliminate open or hidden ethical agendas from politics. Josiah Ober (2017) said,

Ethical and political theories can be tightly intertwined (as they were in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*), but they are not necessarily or causally related: Some ethical theories reject politics; some theories of politics avoid taking an ethical stance. My claim is that a secure and prosperous constitutional framework can be stably established without recourse to the ethical assumptions of contemporary liberal theory, and indeed without- out the central assumptions of early-modern liberalism or republicanism (p.7).

Aristotle is the most notable example from the history of philosophy to understand the connection between ethics and politics. Not all but many Greek and Roman philosophers give us advice on how we should live. Ethics is a very powerful tool because it works at the micro-level.

There are three positions in these two fields:

1. Ethics is the first; politics may be derived from it.
2. Politics is first; ethics may be derived from it.
3. They are independent fields.

I am a member of the third school. Ethics and politics must be separated for the sake of politics, not for the sake of ethics. In other words, politics is the first and last philosophy. Like ontology, ethics is totalitarian but in a very

cynical way. It must show what is good and what is bad. Arendt wanted to save politics from social interests, but I would like to go further. Politics should be saved from morality/ethics as well. However, it does not mean that ethics cannot imitate politics. Although ethics and/or morality are not eternal, they can imitate the eternal beauty of justice, too. Politics is the first and only legitimate ground of eternal justice.

Enlightenment thinkers, especially liberals such as Stuart Mill and Bentham, have improved the bridge between ethics and politics. This is another disastrous consequence of the distortion of the classical public and private realms. They have gone beyond Aristotle because Aristotle at least gave his moral advice to *citizens*, not to *individuals*, but utilitarians have assumed a given individual starting point, which is a totally abstract pre-assumption.

I would like to follow the footsteps of Arendt and Nietzsche to solve this problem because they don't have a hidden or open moral agenda even though there are some serious errors in Arendt's political theories about morality. There are two important philosophers whose theories influenced Arendt's politics: Aristotle and Kant.

Both of them, unlike Arendt, have developed comprehensive moral theories. Arendt has taken the notion of citizenship from Aristotle, but she has deliberately omitted Aristotelian morality. When Aristotle defined the classical distinction of public and private, which has been admired by Arendt, he wanted to design and organize private life as well.⁹

Without moral theory, the Aristotelian distinction between public and private may easily collapse. Arendt's second trick is the third critique of Kant, the

⁹ “Aristotle saw the household – in his vocabulary the *oikos*, or sometimes the *oikia* – as the basic social unit of the polis... Modern scholars have generally accepted that the polis, and in particular Classical Athens, was indeed made up of a number of such households”(Roy,1999,p.1)

critique of judgment. She has taken Kant's judgment but carefully omitted practical reason. "What must I do" has been discussed and answered in the second critique of Kant, the critique of practical reason. Obviously, three critiques of Kant are connected. Arendt did not answer this question. As you see, she has perverted both the Kantian and Aristotelian approaches. We will discuss them in the Arendt chapter.

Marx has never written about morality in a systematic way, but I think that his sociological approach had a hidden moral agenda (equality). Instead of liberal terms such as equality and freedom, Marx has preferred an eschatological perspective, emancipation, as all Christians do. Emancipatory theories are based on the very subtle way of slave morality. I don't believe in either emancipation or its necessity. The world is perfect and always be. The world is justice, and *Justia* always wins.

Marx cried, "Workers of the world, unite!"

No thanks. My dear unappointed commander. Oppressed, weak, and exploited working classes will not unite for your hunger for political power. If you are powerful enough, go and fight Bismarck one by one; don't abuse the working class for your glorification. Unlike you, Prometheus has never tried to command humanity or a specific class. He has used his own power, but you, my dear Marx, you wanted to achieve your own glorification by commanding workers. Your name has dominated the history of socialism too much. You are the last guardian of Judea and enemy of Rome.

Politics is the big sister of ethics but there is no necessity or obligation to connect them. if ethics does not imitate the beauty of politics, we may perceive this situation as hypocrisy. If ethic does not reflect the beauty of politic to some degree, eternal justice may be withdrawn from the world.

Marx is the most famous example of this hypocrisy. His political philosophy is ugly, and this ugliness cannot be an inspirational source for ethics.

3.2. Political Philosophy or Parable of the Poisoned Arrow

I am interested in political philosophy specifically. From my point of view, political philosophy is not a subfield of philosophy, but it is the foundation of philosophy. Levinas said, "ethics is the first philosophy." By using the same methodology, I am arguing that "*Politics is the first philosophy.*"

The Levinasian understanding of ethics is totally different from the classical understanding of ethics; therefore, it may hardly be called an ethical theory. As Peperzak(1993) argues:

Levinas insists forcefully on the irreducible moments of heteronomy. Instead of seeing all realities as unfolding or surrounding elements of one basic and central instance called "the Same," which realizes itself by appropriating them, the irreducibility of Otherness must be recognized. This recognition supplants the overt or hidden monism of ontology by a pluralism whose basic ground model is the relation of the Same (le Même) and the Other (l'Autre)(pp.18-19).

He has questioned the priority of Being (Ontology) to respond to Husserl's and Heidegger's philosophy (Levinas,1969). Although I agree with his critical position about the primordial position of ontology in the Western tradition, I prefer to start with political philosophy rather than ethics. We should also remember that Levinas was not alone in this journey. There were other disappointed pupils of Heidegger. Other prominent followers of Heidegger, such as Arendt and Marcuse, have also tried to respond to Heidegger's ontology-centered philosophy (Arendt, 2004; Marcuse, 2005). Arendt has completely abandoned philosophy for the sake of politics because all philosophical contemplation, whether it is ontological, ethical, or political,

will directly go into the solitude of Being. From Arendt's perspective, Heidegger could definitely be considered as a political philosopher along with his ontology, but he cannot be seen as a political thinker. Like Levinas, Arendt leads us to shake the foundational and hierarchical position of ontology in Western philosophy, but for this meaningful project, we should sacrifice even political philosophy according to Arendt. Personally, I deeply appreciate the Arendtian project, but I am not interested in politics, which diversifies opinions. As we learn from the trial of Socrates, democracy may kill the possibility of political "truth" as I said before; I am explicitly and strictly interested in political philosophy; therefore, I don't want to abandon truth in politics.

My concern about political truth inevitably leads me to two giants of antiquity: Aristotle and Plato, but the former one might be considered a proto political scientist who was rarely interested in a "timeless" truth in politics; the latter one dedicated one of the most important works to teaching the truth in political philosophy. After studying the works of Leo Strauss, I have been convinced that if anyone would like to understand the meaning of political philosophy, he or she should study Plato intensively.

From the Straussian perspective, we can argue that political philosophy is the study of the ageless wisdom of philosophers. The distinction between an esoteric and exoteric understanding of philosophical texts is a major characteristic of Straussian philosophy that opens space for ageless and uncorrectable wisdom (Strauss, 1952). In a manner of speaking, philosophers have discussed many disposable and changeable laws and theories to find solutions for their contemporary problems, but at the same time, they gave us ageless wisdom or keys which could be used in a different time and space. The former is the exotic meaning of the philosophical texts, and the latter one is the esoteric meaning of the philosophical texts.

This radical attitude of Leo Strauss helped me to read ancient philosophers along with modern philosophers from a totally different perspective because it brings us timeless and immortal truth for politics (Strauss, 2008). Although I agree with the Straussian justification of political philosophy, my purpose is not quite Straussian. Strauss was interested in political philosophy for philosophy. I am interested in political philosophy for politics. Geometrically speaking, I prefer to stand between Arendt and Strauss about politics and political philosophy. The Arendtian glorification of politics is too hot, but Straussian political philosophy is too cold for me. Therefore, I would like to make an endless journey between political philosophy and politics.

In order to explain why political philosophy is my starting point, I would like to share my position about three subfields of philosophy: ontology, epistemology, and logic. ontological, epistemological, and logical questions are questions of "a man[who] was wounded with an arrow thickly smeared with poison." Let me quote a long citation from Buddha:

It's just as if a man were wounded with an arrow thickly smeared with poison. His friends & companions, kinsmen & relatives would provide him with a surgeon, and the man would say, 'I won't have this arrow removed until I know whether the man who wounded me was a noble warrior, a brahman, a merchant, or a worker.' He would say, 'I won't have this arrow removed until I know the given name & clan name of the man who wounded me... until I know whether he was tall, medium, or short... until I know whether he was dark, ruddy-brown, or golden-colored... until I know his home village, town, or city... until I know whether the bow with which I was wounded was a longbow or a crossbow... until I know whether the bowstring with which I was wounded was fiber, bamboo threads, sinew, hemp, or bark... until I know whether the shaft with which I was wounded was wild or cultivated... until I know whether the feathers of the shaft with which I was wounded were those of a vulture, a stork, a hawk, a peacock, or another bird...until I know whether the shaft with which I was wounded was bound with the sinew of an ox, a water buffalo, a langur, or a monkey.' He would say, 'I won't have this arrow removed until I know whether the shaft with which I was wounded was that of

a common arrow, a curved arrow, a barbed, a calf-toothed, or an oleander arrow.' The man would die, and those things would still remain unknown to him (Bodhi, 2015).

The man would die, and ontological, epistemological, and logical questions would still remain unknown to him; therefore, I would like to make philosophy more applicable, yet without losing its depth. In other words, I am trying to say that I am suspicious of self-help philosophies such as "daily" stoicism or "daily" Buddhism. From my point of view, philosophy is medicine, and the philosopher is a healer but not a priest! ethics and politics, twin sisters, are a powerful tool for him or her. In this thesis, I preferred to focus on the second one, the big old sister.

3.3. Prometheus and Justice

*Hier sitz' ich, forme Menschen
Nach meinem Bilde,
Ein Geschlecht, das mir gleich sei,
Zu leiden, zu weinen,
Zu genießen und zu freuen sich,
Und dein nicht zu achten,
Wie ich*

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Prometheus

According to Aeschylus, *Themis*, the Goddess of natural law, divine order, orderliness, is the mother of Prometheus (Griffith, 2013). Even though *Themis* is not a direct synonym of *Justitia*, generally speaking, *Justitia* might be seen as the Roman equivalent of *Themis*. This myth gives us many clues about the true nature of Justice, but at the same time, it alludes to us the complexities of justice because Prometheus is a rebellious titan who has

stolen fire from the gods to elevate humans. He was the first non-human creature who rebelled against Zeus and his tyranny. Aeschylus alludes to us that *Justice is the mother of Rebellion*. Throughout the tragedy, Prometheus tries to legitimize his crime for the sake of justice, but the problem is that there is only one legitimate *Order*, and its legitimacy allows it to seem to be Justice: Zeus and his world.

In Ancient Egypt, there are some premature and mixed forms of *Promethean consciousness* such as Seth, but the clear and distinct manifestation of it is observable only in Ancient Greek. When I use the term 'Promethean Consciousness', I am not referring to one specific Greek titan. Rather, I am referring to a specific form of consciousness, having diversified names and forms in different cultures and societies. Of course, there is no universally finished version of this consciousness. Promethean consciousness is not an external object; therefore, in the Weberian sense, I am using it as an ideal type for observing and more importantly for interpreting nature and history.

The myth of Prometheus is unique because even though Prometheus was a destructive god in terms of Zeus's order, he was also extremely creative. Furthermore, He does not need his polar opposite. With the help of Athena, He has created the human race and given them fire. From the point of Zeus and other Olympian gods and goddesses, his action was nothing more than chaos threatening the Order.

In order to continue its Being, the established order should define the new order as chaos or a threat. It should delegitimize its successor. Otherwise, it may easily lose its legitimacy. For Olympians, acts of Prometheus were unlawful, but unlawful according to whose law? The unchangeable cosmic law of *Themis*? I don't think so. The Olympians have legitimized their order by power, not by *Themis*. As it is known, they have fought against titans, then

they have taken their sovereignty. Stories of olympians may easily lead us to the famous conclusion of Thrasymachus that "justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger" (Plato, Republic, 338c). Although I am not a great fan of the Platonic understanding of justice, personally, I do not agree with the purely relativistic and almost nihilistic notion of justice either. There must be a kind of justice, even if it is an open-ended and fragmented project of political philosophy. We cannot see its body completely, but we can hear her whispering, or if we are capable enough, we can smell her odors. Although justice is an extremely geometrical and mathematical Goddess, she manifests herself in many different dimensions. That's why we should be careful to listen to each and every whispering, crying, and singing of her.

I have chosen the testimony of Prometheus as a clear starting point to understand the nature of justice. Again, I am not arguing that it is a socio-archeological reference. But rather, it is a suitable *sign* for our modernized and secularized minds to understand a mythical phenomenon. Furthermore, I would like to make something clear: All languages, whether they are used by scientists, philosophers, artists are based on a fragile intersubjectivity between subjectivity and objectivity. In other words, we are seeking a bridge between the universal and particular, being and becoming, paradox and consistency. Mathematics and geometry are also necessary tools to understand the nature of justice, equilibrium. Alas! Sorry for dis-order!

Let me turn back to our *hot* topic. Prometheus is the image of creative destruction. If we follow his torch, we probably lose our well-founded grounds, he promises us only the ruins of the old world, but these ruins are very valuable to create a new brave world. *Christos Anesti!* we know this story from the Bible even, "The very stone which the builders rejected has become the cornerstone" If we would like to create a world according to the

law of eternal justice, we should go into the foundation of the old world and take the stone.

Many well-accepted notions of justice are generally based on a moderate solution which tries to reform the order or at least notion of order. "Very well, Prometheus, if you do not try to steal the torch, you might have an easy chair in Mount Olympus." Or "Okey, we will reform the order, we can give ashes of the fire to your lovely human race but nothing more than this, if you give fire to them, they will become potential gods or goddesses! Such a madness!" These kinds of *moderate* solutions are many for our contemporary Olympians. Social democracy, left liberalism, democratic socialism, Marxism, etc. All these political agendas are based on reformist perspectives. I am not saying that they are *ethically* right or wrong, but theoretically, they are not based on the radical transformation of the world for the sake of justice.

Justice has always been depicted as cold, conservative, and, most importantly, distributive. I have some objections to these classical attributions of justice. Can we think of vivid, anarchist, and warmish justice? Although distribution is an essential part of her characteristic, we may try to see other faces of this complex Goddess. (O Hecate, three faces Goddess hear my prayer!).¹⁰ Thanks to Aeschylus, she was not an anti-natalist, and she loved her son as the son loved humanity! Where is the father? Sometimes, in nature, the father is not

¹⁰ Although Nietzsche was hostile against social Justice, which is a form of slave morality, he certainly was aware of the difference between eternal justice and social justice. Nietzsche said, "Everything that happens in accordance with this strife, and it is just in the strife that eternal justice is revealed. It is a wonderful idea, welling up from the purest strings of Hellenism, the idea that strife embodies the everlasting sovereignty of strict justice, bound to everlasting laws. Only a Greek was capable of finding such an idea to be the fundament of cosmology; it is Hesiod's good. Eris transformed into the cosmic principle; it is the contest-idea of the Greek individual and the Greek State, taken from the gymnasium and the palaestra, from the artist's agon, from the contest between political parties and between cities-all transformed into the universal application so that now the wheels of the cosmos turn on it." (PTAG,5)

a precondition of procreation. Its opposite is also true! Sometimes a mother is not a precondition for procreation. Cosmos is full of miracles. Why? Simply because cosmos is full of chaos! Chaos is full of cosmos! *Opus Contra Naturam!*

3.4. Prometheus versus Dionysus (Nietzsche) and Atlas (Marx)

Prometheus has always been perceived as a revolutionary figure by Marx and Marxists. In newspapers, sometimes Marx has been depicted as Prometheus whose liver has been eaten by the eagle (The Prussian Empire)¹¹. I think Prometheus was a more suitable symbol for anarchism than Marxism. In this point, if we would like to understand the political dimension of Promethean consciousness, we should make a study on how Prometheus differs from his brother Atlas (Marx) and his nephew Dionysus (Nietzsche).

The working class might have been seen as Atlas because, like this giant titan, they have held the world on their shoulders, but on the other hand, there are very few similarities between the working class and Prometheus. Marx has always perceived the working class as the new Prometheus. Sometimes he projected his fantasy upon the working class. Who is Prometheus? Marx or the working class?

First of all, in his precondition, unlike the working class or Marx, Prometheus has never subject to exploitation or needs. At the beginning of his rebellion, he was absolutely free. What about Marx? Could we describe Marx himself as a Promethean philosopher?¹² I don't think so. Marx was not a god; he had

¹¹ *Rheinische Zeitung, Der gefesselte Prometheus (1843)*

¹²The huge difference between young Marx and mature Marx is also important. Unlike mature Marx, young Marx, dealing with alienation, was more romantic and humanitarian; therefore, his early years might be seen as relatively Promethean.

some needs to survive his life, he was mortal and he was never interested in the self-overcoming of humanity.

Secondly, he was a crypto Zeus, who wanted to create his own state. Prometheus would never have wanted to take the power of Zeus; in other words, he would never have wanted to be a new Zeus. The position of Marx could be compared with that of the early Zeus, who has overthrown the regime of Saturn. Marx was craving to overthrow the masters of capital (Saturn) in order to bring in his new proletarian dictatorship (a new Saturn/Zeus).

Like the political history of ancient Greece, Greek mythology gives us many clues about how power could *corrupt* easily. The power of Uranus was taken by his son (Saturn), then Saturn has faced the same tragedy: Zeus has taken his power. We, humans, are still living in the regime of Zeus, but Zeus, unlike his grandfather and father, was so clever; therefore, he has *distributed* his power to other gods and goddesses. He has trained his sons and daughters very well; therefore, they have never rebelled against him. Athena was a complex exception, but I will not discuss her unique condition in this thesis, but her special connection with Prometheus should be studied.

Atlas, the brother of Prometheus, the great laborer, might have been the most suitable mythological reference point for both Marx and Marxists. As Ayn Rand clearly understood, Atlas was the greatest laborer of Greek mythology. Both Marx and Ayn Rand have attributed great value to labor. I advise Marxists to just let Prometheus go. Therefore, they may share Atlas's story with Ayn Rand.

There are some aesthetic and romantic reasons behind Marx's obsession with Prometheus. Prometheus is a typical expression of heroic masculinity and

eroticism of Ancient Greek. As I said before, authority is ugly. There is neither eroticism nor beauty on its surface. Prometheus is generous, powerful, brave, attractive, and, most importantly, heroic. These are delicious characteristics that make Prometheus aesthetically and romantically a role model for male homo sapiens. Even today, male homo sapiens strive to obtain these titles. As far as I remember, Marx and Nietzsche were also male homo sapiens, so they could not go far away from the limits of an ordinary male primate.

Prometheus was not a laborer. He was an *absolutely* free, unbonded titan. He was not trying to help specific groups or classes such as women or slaves but humanity. Although he did not need to do that, because of his generosity and greatness, he helped humanity. Neither Marx nor the working class seem to fit in these criteria. For Marx, the working class was a savior of humanity. Marx was a scientist who emulates a poet. We, anarchists, are the poet, and we do not emulate scientists. Marx knew that poetry (anarchy) was the only way to arrive at a free society, but he was obsessed with the historical and material conditions. All legendary sages (not philosophers) were anarchists. Prometheus, Shiva, Buddha, Jesus, Zarathustra were anarchists. Young Marx was so close to anarchism, but his unchecked desire to dominate the International made him a feudal lord of The First International. Like all state-obsessed Germans, Fichte, Hegel, and Bismarck, he was poisoned by the delicious wine of state power.

Not Marx, but Nietzsche was so close to anarchism. Unfortunately, he has lost himself because of extreme revelation. He was John the Baptist waiting for a personal Jesus who has never come. What is a John the Baptist without a Jesus? Nothing. Then, he has chosen Dionysus instead of Prometheus, although he has studied the tragedy of Prometheus well.

In his early years, Nietzsche has praised Wagner and his works. He has seen that Wagner's operas have triggered Dionysian experiences for the masses. This was the dilemma of Nietzsche; the Dionysian experience was expressly based on collective madness. He never would like to abandon Dionysian madness, but at the same time, he praised the solitude. O our lovely Nietzsche, our sweetheart, you know that madness is always a social phenomenon. If you praise Dionysian madness, at the end of the day, you are a collectivist, not an individualist. True individualism is neither *Dionysian* nor *Apollonian* but *Promethean*. By choosing Dionysus, you preferred to play in the kinder garden of Zeus. Why? We should ask why Nietzsche was Dionysian rather than Promethean.¹³

You might have seen that Zarathustra is nothing more than another name of Prometheus. Fire, dear Nietzsche, not wine was the tool of Zarathustra! I know, Apollonic understanding of fire was problematic, and you were too afraid of its tyrannical regime because it leads us to focus on only one dimension of the fire. According to the Platonic and Apollonic tradition, the sun illuminates something, but the Promethean fire burns everything to create new things. The Intoxication of Dionysus does not help us to overcome Zeus's order because it is inherently reactionary. Sadly, Nietzsche has never seen the great potential of Prometheus, and he has stayed an eternal rebellious child. His affirmation has always been safe and anti-political. He has found the true medicine, but he has chosen the wrong doctor.

¹³ Nietzsche said, "Anyone who understands the innermost kernel of the legend of Prometheus-namely that wrongdoing is of necessity imposed on the titanically striving individual- is also bound to sense the un-Apolloine quality of this pessimistic view of things, for it is the will of Apollo to bring rest and calm individual beings precisely by drawing boundaries between them, and by reminding them constantly, with his demands for self-knowledge and measure, that these are the most sacred laws in the World" (BT, 9). He also argued, "The double essence of Aeschylus's Prometheus, his simultaneously Apolline and Dionysiac nature, could therefore be expressed like this: 'All that exists is just and unjust and is equally justified in both respect.'" (BT,9). All of them are significant indicators of how and why Nietzsche admired Prometheus.

There are two important characteristics of Prometheus to understand his joy. First of all, unlike Dionysus and Apollo, he was not the son of Zeus. Secondly, although he was rebellious, he was a mature man, not a child. Being mature and rebellious at the same time is a very difficult position. If you follow the works of Marx chronologically, you will find how a romantic revolutionary becomes an authoritative mature. I am accusing mature Marx because of being too much mature and noncreative. I am also accusing Nietzsche because of being too much of a child and a dreamer.

3.5. Justice and War

War is the father of all and king of all.
He renders some gods, other men;
he makes some slaves, others free.

Heraclitus

Let me start with a fancy statement: Democritus and Heraclitus are *one*. Heraclitus was crying because he was looking at the sunset and thinking in the night. Democritus was smiling because he was looking at the sun rising and thinking in the light. It is the spectrum of illusion.

Deep and natural smiling and crying are the two sides of same coin. If we would like to learn the subtleties of the ocean, we should understand that contradictions are nothing more than the illusionary surface of the endless ocean; they are totally superficial and mentally constructed. I am not saying that there is no contradiction! Indeed, there are very powerful and ancient contradictions in the world. But not in the Hegelian sense! There is no history, no past but the future! What about the present? It is the first step for the future. When I use the word of 'future', I am not using it in a progressive or futuristic sense. The future is the pregnancy, and mortals wait for the birth of the divine

child (Now). What is the meaning of the future without the past? Aren't they meaningful in their togetherness? Yes, they are, but for immortals, not for mortals. Saturn feeds on the death of presents when he consumes the present or, mythologically speaking, when he clips the wings of Eros, and creates the past. In that sense, the past is the graveyard of the presents, and Saturn (Cronos) is the ruler of the dead. On the other hand, Rhea as her mother Gaia, is the matrix of new potentialities, expectations, dreams. She always generates new children, even unto the end of the *world*. Therefore, without the assistance of the past, the future will be free from the Saturnian understanding of time. It is also possible to destroy the future and create an absolute monarchy of the past in the present. But do not try this at *home*.

War is the parent of all, but I am not sure whether it is a mother (Athena) or a father (Mars). *Sometimes*, War is the father of all. Therefore, Peace is the mother of all. *Sometimes*, Peace is the father of all. Therefore, War is the mother of all, but there must *always* be an eternal mother and father. It is extremely difficult for our mortal minds to understand the eternal polarization of the TWO. There must always be a perceivable child of the marriage: order, balance, equilibrium, etc. Names and forms might be changeable from culture to culture or from person to person, but when we have seen a polarization or contrast of two things, we immediately have the THIRD one. Sometimes manifests itself as a bridge, sometimes as a child, a (social) contract, a negation, or JUSTICE!

According to Russell (1976), Heraclitus was "the first of the Fascists" (p.27) because of fragment 53. Although there are dangerous possibilities that may lead unobservant readers to fascism in Heraclitus' philosophy, I do not agree with Russell. Nevertheless, I am not trying to rescue Heraclitus' fame and glory. Fascists are *absolutely* free to perceive Heraclitus as a father of their philosophy! No, they have never interpreted him in the wrong way. We prefer

to interpret him in a different way. Again, I am not legitimizing fascism in pure relativism. NO! not at all; I clearly know that "This Town Ain't Big Enough for Both of Us." Some contradictions are too extreme by their nature; therefore, they cannot live in harmonic diversity. It is the handicap of liberal democracy. As it is known, liberalism tries to open a space for diversities and differences, which might be easily consumed by radicals from the right or left.

We may ask if War is the father of all, where is the mother of the children? As I said before, fatherless and motherless procreation is a rare but real phenomenon in the universe and nature. If we would like to truly understand the nature of justice, we should embrace inevitable tensions between things and creatures. The tension, which is blooming from the marriage of repulsion and attraction, is a suitable fresh name for War. I would like to say this "tension is the father of all." Passion might also be an accurate term to understand if it is properly used. Each and every living creature, whether they are organic or inorganic, are burning in eternity. If there is a craving, which is an expression of passion, inevitably, there must be war between things.

3.6. Justice and Love

By following the footsteps of St. Augustine, Arendt asked „Warum ist es so schwer, die Welt zu lieben? “(Denktagebuch I: 522)¹⁴. She indirectly answered this tragic question:

For instance, Love, in distinction from friendship, is killed, or rather extinguished, the moment it is displayed in public. (Never seek to tell thy love / Love that never told can be.) Because of its inherent wordlessness, Love can only become false and perverted when it is

¹⁴ "Why is it so difficult to love the world?"

used for political purposes such as the change or salvation of the world (HM, 51–52).

According to Arendt, only the public realm could have a "world." If we deal with political issues by Love, it inevitably will turn into unworldly isolation and competition of personal interests. Why? Because we cannot love everything and everybody without discrimination. When I use the word 'discrimination', it might reverberate as a very harsh word, but unfortunately, it is true. We always have some criteria to love someone or something. We cannot love everything as Christians' God does. If we love everybody and everything without criteria, it means that we love nobody and nothing. In this sense, human love, whatever form it takes, is inherently based on our interests. Only the Christian God as a supreme being could love every living creature without criteria.

From this perspective, it might be argued that Justice does not work with Love. She cannot. If she works with Love, she could be a kind of semi goddess, not a divine being. I will not discuss forms of human love or different names of it, such as *Eros*, *Agape*, *Philia* etc. in this thesis because even if it has diversified forms psychologically and sociologically, the central driving force of human love could easily be observed in every form of it.

Another important point is that human love is not free from domination and power relations. It was not a rare phenomenon that in the ancient world, many slaves loved their masters if their masters were relatively "good" men. Many children love their caregivers, even if their caregivers damage their psychology. The most common example in our contemporary time might be romantic love. Even though there may be wealth inequality and age differences etc., partners may continue to love each other. Why? Because human love is not based on rational contemplation but is just a reaction, it cannot see the world without separation and segregation. Its world will

always be limited by someone, family, class, nation, etc. From my point of view, Love is not only the most antipolitical thing, but at the same time, it is the most dangerous enemy of Justice even if the Divine/eternal Love is the only true and dedicated lover of Justice.¹⁵

Justice should not and cannot marry anyone. S/he should always be a virgin, and if s/he really wants to bring balance to the world, s/he should fertilize herself/himself like a snake. Her child will be Prometheus, Anarchy. Even Jesus tells us the same story in a veiled fragment:

Do not think that I have come to bring peace to the earth. I have not come to bring peace but a sword. I have come to set a man against his father, and a daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law. And a person's enemies will be those of his own household (Matthew 10:34-36).

That's why Heraclitus is crying enigmatically for eternity. He *confessed* that "War is the father of all, and king of all. He renders some gods, other men; he makes some slaves, others free."

¹⁵ After I studied the Works of Simon Weil, I was surprised that we have quite a common attitude about many issues, including Love. I deeply appreciate Simon Weil's anarchism and conceptualization of Love, but at the end of the day, she is very naïve. I am not saying that she is dangerless. She is obviously one of the most powerful dedicated anarchists of the 20th century, but If we would like to smash all idols such as Marxism and Capitalism, we should embrace romantic evil again. It implies that for the sake of eternal Justice, Love must be sacrificed. Love of God must be replaced by Justice of God.

CHAPTER 4

LIBERALISM AND MARXISM

4.1. Critique of Liberalism

*Die Gedanken sind frei, wer kann sie erraten,
sie fliegen vorbei wie nächtliche Schatten.
Kein Mensch kann sie wissen, kein Jäger sie schießen
mit Pulver und Blei: Die Gedanken sind frei!*

Liberalism might be seen as the first legitimate and powerful son of modernity. According to Strauss, there are three main waves of modernity: Liberalism, Socialism, and Fascism (Strauss,1996). In the contemporary world, the last child of modernity is obviously illegitimate without doubt, but the first and second children of modernity still deserve more reasonable objections. In this chapter, I will discuss why classical liberalism is not applicable to the theory of justice, but before this valuable discussion, I would like to summarize the fundamental criticism of Marx against liberalism because I agree with him. In many works, Marx has always tried to indicate that the liberal conceptualization of free and independent individuals is ideological and historically superficial. At the beginning of *Introduction to a critique of political economy*, he said:

The subject of our discussion is first of all material production by individuals as determined by society, naturally constitutes the starting point. The individual and isolated hunter or fisher who forms the starting point with Smith and Ricardo belongs to insipid illusions of the eighteenth century (Marx,1963, p.1).

He has used this historical methodology in different works. He has used it to criticize German idealism and their understanding of liberation as well. Marx said:

The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus, the first to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature (1963, p.37).

Liberalism might be divided into two central categories: political and economic liberalism. The economic side of liberalism clearly determines the political side. Most of the time, British economists have taken private property as a given condition, and they have imagined the independent individual as a fantasy (Marx, 1997). According to Marx, individuals within their material conditions are historical. The main objection of Marx against liberalism is that the liberal definition of freedom is pure abstraction. The liberal ahistorical conceptualization of the individual legitimates many forms of exploitation and power relations. Basically, Marx argued that liberals have never studied material conditions in a scientific way. He said,

"The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness" (Marx, 1997, pp.20-21).

A systematic and consistent theory of justice should necessarily comprehend the concepts of freedom and equality. If a theory fails to offer systematic and consistent account of freedom or equality theory, consequently, it fails to offer a justice theory as well. I agree with Marx: classical liberalism has failed about freedom, but it also failed about justice theory even though contemporary liberals have done their best to conceptualize liberal justice theory. Rawls, Dworkin, and Amartya Sen have tried to update liberal theory to offer a new form of social contract and justice (Sen, 2011; Nussbaum,

2006). Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen have understood that the Rawlsian version of the social contract, like all forms of social contract theories, is not enough to achieve a meaningful form of justice. Sen preferred to emphasize a qualitative understanding of justice rather than distributive understanding. On the other hand, Nussbaum has tried to combine Aristotelian philosophy with modern Liberalism. I appreciate contemporary liberals who have communitarian or collectivists tendencies because they also have critical standpoints about the purely abstract conceptualization of individuality.

After I have summarized fundamental critics of Marx against liberalism, which are still valid in our contemporary world, I would like to briefly discuss why liberal justice theory is not as holistic as anarchist justice theory. First of all, all distributive forms of justice theories is inherently based on the liberal understanding of individuality, which is totally ahistorical, abstracted and superficial. Without assuming independent and rational human beings, distributive justice is theoretically impossible. Since Marx and Hegel, we know that individuals are always historically, socially, and economically circumscribed. The first concern of liberalism is liberty, not justice or equality. Therefore, it is naturally infertile to create a holistic understanding of justice. For example, could classical liberal theory help us to create a health system for the elderly or disabled people? No, because they have never studied individuals on a relational level but in an atomistic position. Justice cannot be understood by the self-owning individual; it is inherently relational. On the other hand, Nussbaum and Sen are contemporary exceptions who prefer a more relational understanding of justice. They are also exceptional liberals who clearly understood the Marxist critique of liberalism. Even their struggle indicates that without communitarian, conservative, or Marxist empowerments, classical liberalism does not answer social justice issues.

4.2. Young Marx and needs

Differences between young and mature Marx have always been a controversial topic between humanist Marxists and structuralist Marxists, who are fighting against each other in every realm of academic Marxism like the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox. As a Jew (anarchist), I am planning to convert to neither Catholicism (humanist Marxism) nor Eastern Orthodoxy (structural Marxism), but before the Marxist conceptualization of man, I would like to clarify this distinction.

Althusser argued (1970) that there is an epistemological break between young Marx and mature Marx. According to him, this peculiar break does not allow us to read Marx from a humanist perspective. Althusser, who was a quite smart Marxist, has found a way to restore the church of Marxism. He said Marxism is not a humanism, meaning that assuming a human is a creative being is nothing more than an ideology, and the concept of alienation is purely superficial.¹⁶

The conceptualization of human needs is another important topic to see the differences between humanist Marxists and structuralist Marxists. In following section, I will discuss Young Marx's conceptualization of human

¹⁶ “A L I E N A T I O N (*aliénation, Entdusserung*). An ideological concept used by Marx in his Early Works (q.v.) and regarded by the partisans of these works as the key concept of Marxism. Marx derived the term from Feuerbach's anthropology where it denoted the State of man and society where the essence of man is only present to him in the distorted form of a god, which, although man created it in the image of his essence (the species- Being), appears to him as an external, pre-existing creator. Marx used the concept to criticize the State and the economy as confiscating the real self-determining labor of men in the same way. In his later works, however, the term appears very rarely, and where it does, it is either used ironically or with different conceptual content (in *Capital*, for instance)” (Althusser, 1970, p.309).

needs. I will read *Economic and Philosophical manuscripts of 1844* in the light of my anarchist methodology.

Marx(1964) said:

Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living being he is, on the one hand, endowed with natural powers and faculties, which exist in him as tendencies and abilities, as drives. On the other hand, as a natural, embodied, sentient, objective Being, he is a suffering, conditioned, and limited beings, like animals and plants. The objects of his drives exist outside himself as objects independent of him, yet they are objects of his needs, essential objects which are indispensable to the exercise and confirmation of his faculties... Hunger is a natural need. It requires, therefore, a nature outside itself, an object outside itself, in order to be satisfied and stilled. Hunger is the objective need of a body for an object which exists outside itself and which is essential for its integration and the expression of its Nature. Sun is an object, a necessary and life assuring object, for the plant, just as the plant is an object for the sun, an expression of the sun power and objective essential powers... Suppose a being which neither is an object itself nor has an object... it would be solitary and alone... But nonobjective Being is an unreal, non-sensuous, merely conceived being; i.e., a merely imagined being, an abstraction. To be sensuous, i.e., a merely to be an object of sense or sensuous object, and thus to have sensuous objects outside oneself, objects of one's sensations. To be sentient is to suffer(to experience)... Man as an objective sentient being is a suffering being, and since he feels his suffering, he is passionate. Passion is man's faculties striving to attain their object... But man is not merely a natural being; he is a natural human being. He is a being for himself. Everything natural must have its origin (pp.207-208).

Let's begin the hunt!

1. *"Man is directly a natural being."*

All beings are natural beings.

2. *"On the other hand, as a natural, embodied, sentient, objective Being, he is a suffering, conditioned and limited beings, like animals and plants."*

All beings are limited and conditioned, although minerals are not suffering; they are limited and conditioned, too.

3. *"The objects of his drives exist outside himself as objects independent of him,"*

There is no outside or inside of himself.

4. *"Hunger is a natural I need,"*

Hunger is not a natural need. There is no distinction between natural and artificial needs. Hunger is an illusionary sense to escape from the heaviness of solitude. Some so-called needs are biologically constructed, some of them are socially constructed. There are no differences between social and biological construction. Hunger is a sexual perversion that has been practiced in the in-animal kingdom.

5. *"Hunger is the objective need of a body."*

Hunger is a subjective need of Karl Marx, who wanted to generalize his need as a universal need of a body. what does Marx know of my body and its capacity? my investigation shows that the Human body is a very mysterious body. Unfortunately, Marx has never studied the human body.

6. *"Suppose a being which neither is an object itself nor has an object... it would be solitary and alone..."*

Exactly! He should have spent more and more time alone.

7. *"But nonobjective being is an unreal, non-sensuous, merely conceived being, i.e., a, merely imagined being, an abstraction."*

No! solitary being which Marx has clearly defined neither is an object itself nor has an object, is not an abstraction or imagined being. It is a seed that waits to be imagined by itself. Sometimes objective beings turn into imagined beings; sometimes, its opposite is true. Remember, there is no beginning!

8. *"Man as an objective sentient being is a suffering being, and since he feels his suffering, a passionate. Passion is man's faculties are striving to attain their object."*

Man is a suffering being. Nowadays, it is correct for most people, but it may change! Passion is another topic. Passion is not man's faculty. The human is a vessel of passion for expressing the self. We are striving to attain illusionary objects because we assume we need them. Yes, even breathing and eating cannot emerge without our assumption.

9. *"everything natural must have its origin."*

Ah! We have arrived at the center of the human mind! Firstly, I should state that Marx conceptualization of time and space is very primitive in a negative sense. Origin? Does he mean arche? It does not matter. Who told Marx that Everything natural must have its origin? He means everything, natural or

"unnatural," must have its origin. Let me tell what he is looking for: a creation myth.¹⁷ But I told you, there is no origin. Look at anarchist ontology.

All religious minds tend to find the origin of something. It is the foundation of all religions, and Marx is not an exception. He was looking for the stone in the wrong place.

There is no outside or inside of Man. There is no outside or inside of Nature either. There are no fixed objects that man needs. Needs are the expression of powers and passions of nature. Needs are changeable, even the most *basic* needs such as hunger. Marx wanted to make a distinction between man and nature to create a dialectical relation. The one of the most fundamental assumptions of Marx is the priority of needs. I need to eat something; otherwise, I cannot maintain my corporal being. It is a very old belief (*doxa*). One day, a crazy free spirit may abandon this so-called need. If you believe, few exceptional people have done this before in history.

Marx basically argues that we are creative beings who have some power and abilities, but that first of all we should satisfy our basic corporeal needs. Historically speaking, he says that first we are animals (natural beings), but that we can go beyond it.

I think the opposite. Life creates to manifest itself. needs, which are known as limitations, are aesthetic obstacles created by nature to test itself. Therefore, we should not spend our worthy time discussing what is human. All (natural) things are transitional things.

¹⁷ Marx liked to depict yourself as a Prometheus. Today, it is called narcissistic personality disorder (God complex), but I would like to say more about it. Zeus was a god, and Prometheus was a titan. It means they were both divine beings. Prussian Empire is a state, and he is a human being. He should have found a philosopher as an enemy, or he should be a state! Could he? He couldn't because you were not a Junker as Bismarck!

Let's examine the hidden causality principle of young Marx. Assume that someone steals bread from a bakery, and then he or she eats it. Here is the question: "Why did he steal it?" Marx answers "Because he is hungry, Material condition determines consciousness". According to Marx, "Life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy this need" (Marx,1963, p.48).

I could say this: All things in nature are living. The distinction between stone and plant is an assumption of homo sapiens. Life before everything else growing and manifesting. A monk may freely stop eating and burn his body to manifest life. These so-called needs are nothing more than the most common strategies of life among homo sapiens.

The second point is that the satisfaction of the first need (the action of satisfying, and the instrument of satisfaction which has been acquired) leads to new needs; and this production of new needs is the first historical act (history fundamental condition) (Marx,1963, p.48)

There is no first need. Therefore, there is no history. All things in nature are eternally flowing. Sometimes, a living creature may try to sustain itself. Nowadays, eating and drinking are quite common strategies to sustain the corporal body among animals, including homo sapiens. These two activities have been practiced for a long time. Therefore, the accumulation of these practices biologically, psychologically, emotionally achieved a kind of truth status. As I said before, there is no history. History is the legitimization of the the accumulation.

When Marx speculates on the concept of life, he prefers to start with preconditions which led him to historic conditions. If I am hungry, I cannot use human tools. First of all, I should eat something, and I should also satisfy

some basic needs, and then I can create. He did not observe all realms of nature. Life is a very complex and cryptic phenomenon. From my understanding of life, it desires to manifest itself, and it creates diverse human needs such as hunger. Life and Force are interchangeable terms. In a manner of speaking, we are not eating foods to satisfy our basic needs. Force/ Life forces us to believe that we should eat something. Life desires to manifest itself, and this desire created a hunger for food. We crave limits because *absolute* freedom is a joy killer. Absolute freedom means that nature and its features are the same.

Nature creates limits to recognize itself in three kingdoms of the world; minerals, plants, and animals are subject to limits. They should be otherwise; they cannot recognize themselves. There must always be limits for a creature. Marx offers us the view that we may overcome at least some basic needs to start the real history of humanity, which allows us to create freely. But we are already free!

If humanity, not the working class, want to eliminate capitalism, it can. If humanity wants to create a new body that feeds upon solar energy, it can. Marx has never studied his desire. It is carefully omitted in his works, but I want to be a doctor, who before giving medicine to my patients carefully tests them himself. I am not advocating possible heaven in the future. I am living in heaven, and I am trying to show this heaven to my patients NOW!

My readers might be shocked if I could show them how simple environmental and biological changes affect writers' works. When I shine a spotlight on Marx's daily life, I am not doing it for a personal reason. I don't care about his moral or psychological condition, but a good doctor should heal himself first! The reader may ask why I criticized Marx so much. Simply because his overrated legacy, like a heavy stone, is sitting in the river of

anarchism! Look at history. You may find many anarchists who were Marxist in their early years of a political career. The opposite is rarely true.

I am criticizing Marx because his followers could have been anarchists. Jesus was preaching to Jews because geographically and traditionally, they were a good target group for his teaching. Although he said, "Don't think that I came to destroy the law or the prophets. I didn't come to destroy, but to fulfill", he definitely brought a new law. I am trying to spread my views and beliefs, and I am trying to persuade Marxists. For example, liberals and Nietzscheans are also possible "clients" for me, but Marxists are my first target group. I cannot say that they are the easiest but most fruitful.

Anarchism has been mostly rejected and forgotten in the school of socialism because of the domination of Marx. Being an anarchist is more difficult than being Marxist because anarchism is dealing with the now, not the future dream communist land. For an intellectual middle-class male, being a liberal is even more boring than being a Marxist. If he is a member of the upper-middle-class, he generally prefers Liberalism, but anarchists may come from all classes! Marxism allows many intellectuals to feel a bit heroic without losing their safety zone. Heil Pope of socialism! You are the head of a socialist church because you couldn't be the head of a state.

Unlike Nietzsche, I don't believe that socialism is inherently decadent. It is true for some pre-Marxist and Marxist versions of it, but Nietzsche's argument against socialism is exaggerated. There are few but reliable anarchist thinkers who are free from resentment and slave morality. From my point of view, Marx is not the highest manifestation of socialism; contrary to this, he is the symptom of decadence. According to Nietzsche, Socrates was the peak point of decadent which destroyed the noble Greek spirit and its

values. In a manner of speaking, Marx and Socrates share the same values of decadence. Marxists assume that Marx is the highest point of socialist theory, but for me, he is the lowest, which kills all noble and romantic anarchist elements of socialism.

4.3. Critique of Marxism

In this chapter, the main assumptions of Marx will be criticized. I will not criticize some ideas of Marx; I will criticize the *fundamental ideas* of Marx. There are two main branches of Marx's theory: methodology and practice. Although I do not agree with Marx's political solutions either, I will mainly discuss his methodology.

The socialist tradition, especially the Marxist form of socialism, has made many contributions to our contemporary concept of equality, but Marx was quite critical of liberal rights and freedom as we briefly summarized; therefore, it is very difficult to find discussions of individual freedom and the voice of minorities in Marx's theory. Although I have agreed with him in terms of his critique of capitalism and its consequences, Marx, as a Hegelian thinker, has never given his authoritarian tendency up. In this sense, liberals and anarchists have a common critique of Marxism. Contrary to this, Marxists and anarchists have another common critique, the critique of capitalism and private property.

Early liberal thinkers have emphasized the central role of liberty for humanity and had a kind of anti-authoritarian tendency though they were not anarchists. Marx, especially later Marx, was not interested in authority as an independent subject, either. However, Marx and other socialists were the first modern thinkers who have witnessed a degenerative version of liberty; and our contemporary liberal thinkers are still compelled to introduce and address the

concepts of justice and equality to overcome an unfair form of 'liberty.' Liberals have refreshed and updated their theory throughout the history of western political philosophy. Especially contemporary political liberals such as Rawls, Sen, and Dworkin have started to emphasize the unreplaceable position of justice for liberal theory. According to Althusser (2014), Marx was not well aware of the danger of authority/State, but Althusser may lead us to a very prejudiced perspective because, obviously, he was a member of the Marxist church, even though he has tried to reform it. Marx, as a genius political thinker and politician, must have been aware of the possible consequences of authority, but according to Marx, for the sake of equality, liberty must be suspended at least for a while. Rudolf Rucker (1980) said:

On 20 July 1870, Karl Marx wrote to Frederick Engels: "The French need a thrashing. If the Prussians are victorious, the centralization of state power will be helpful for the centralization of the German working class; furthermore, German predominance will shift the center of gravity of West European labor movements from France to Germany. And one has but to compare the movement from 1866 to Today to see that the German working class is in theory and organization superior to the French. Its domination over the French on the world stage would mean the dominance of our theory over that of Proudhon, etc. likewise." Marx was right: Germany's victory over France meant a new course for the history of the European labor movement. The revolutionary and liberal socialism of the Latin countries was cast aside, leaving the stage to the statist, anti-anarchist theories of Marxism. The development of that lively, creative socialism was disrupted by a new iron dogmatism that claimed full knowledge of social reality when it was scarcely more than a hotchpotch of theological phraseology and fatalistic sophisms and turned out to be the tomb of all genuinely socialist thought (pp. 85-86).

After the death of Marx, the anarchist tendency had risen again in socialist organizations, and Engels has written his well-known work, *On Authority*, to respond to anarchists. He said, "A revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing" (Engels, 1978, pp 730-733), and then Lenin will have

repeated the same theory when he has said that in extraordinary political conditions of revolution, freedom is a luxury (Goldman,1932).

Today, contemporary Marxism has gone beyond many fundamental characteristics of orthodox Marxism. For example, some Marxists have preferred to focus on the libertarian version of Marxism such as council communism, situationism, and left communism; then they have updated many fundamental theories of Marxism, but the problem is that whatever they have updated in Marxist theory are just naïve imitations of anarchist theory. They have taken many anarchists' premises and theoretical grounds, and then they have tried to mix them with Marxism. Personally, I do not believe in the possibility of an anti-authoritarian or libertarian form of Marxism. Marxism, as a tradition, has a history of gathering around a leader and is an inherently authoritarian. Today, Marx and Marxism do not help us to find solutions for some contemporary problems.

For Marx, *the material condition* is the ground of everything for social, political, and economic structures. He summarized this idea at the beginning of the *Communist Manifesto*, "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. („Die Geschichte aller bisherigen Gesellschaft ist die Geschichte von *Klassenkämpfen*“). ‘Struggle’ may not be the accurate translation of *kämpfen* because it is a very light and *democratic* translation which omits other brutal connotation of *kämpfen* such as fight and war.

When Marx used the term ‘material condition’, he specifically referred to a particular form of the material condition, productive forces. Material conditions are at the foundation of class struggle. Other power relations could be understood from the conceptualization of productive forces, which leads us to the famous orthodox Marxist sociological assumption: the relation between base (infrastructure) and superstructure. Even though I do not agree

with the superstructure and base dichotomy of Marx, the consequences of productive forces are unignorable. Therefore, even if it has no foundational characteristic for society and humanity, Marx's economic theory must be studied in detail. The central concept through which I see the world is *authority/arche*. For many orthodox Marxists, we cannot start with a concept to understand the material world. According to them, Marx, as a father of scientific socialism, has observed and studied society and history, and he has seen a kind of foundational thing, and then he called it the material conditions. But what is material condition? Productive forces. Good, but for example, could Marxist theory explain the power relation between disabled and able people? The problems of disabled people are indeed extremely based on *material conditions*, whether it is an organization of the external world for them or their physical body; their problem is based on a material issue.

However, even though material conditions are at the foundation of their theory, not only Marx and orthodox Marxists, but even contemporary Marxists have said little about disabled people. Ableism is one of the examples to see the complex and cryptic nature of "material" conditions. This kind of question could be duplicated: could Marxism explain power relations between humans and other animals? Could Marxism explain power relations between transgenders and cisgenders? No, it cannot because it is not materialist *enough*. I am a member of the materialist school, and as a humble pupil of Democritus, I am mainly studying material conditions but not the Marxist way. I have two main objections to the central assumptions of Marx. Firstly, the material conditions cannot be reduced to reproductive forces, and reproductive forces cannot be seen as the central moving power of history. Reproductive forces might be the foundational ground of many things, but there are other forms of material conditions which cannot be explained by reproductive forces. In other words, as a materialist, I don't have a problem

with Marx's materialism, but I have a problem with his reproductive force-centered materialism.

My second objection about Marx and Marxism is about historical materialism. I don't believe in the Hegelian understanding of history. There is no past, no history, no inherent teleology of history; there is only you, I, and we. I am gladly taking the critique of capitalism from Marx, but I am not making class struggle my central topic. I am not saying that Marx is an economic reductionist. Marx has been accused of being an economic reductionist. Marx was well aware that everything could not be explained by the reproductive force, but he thought that the reproductive was the main driving force of history. In a manner of speaking, although Marx was not a rigid economic reductionist, he might be seen as a soft economic reductionist. At the end of the day, for Marx, class struggle is the central driving force of history, and I have a problem with that.

I would like to give another example to discuss why one form of material condition should not take center place in political theories. Other critical schools, such as radical feminism, have improved their own understanding of materialism by using Marx's methodology. In her *Dialectic of Sex*, Shulamith Firestone(1970) argued that Marx and Engels were not materialistic enough because they haven't understood the material difference between men and women, which creates exploitation and domination. Firestone was not talking about gender roles etc., which could be understood by sociological and historical methodologies. She radically argues that the biological difference between females and males creates exploitation. Especially reproductive difference, which is obviously material, was a foundation of female exploitation. Firestone was right when she talked how material difference systematically creates power relations between women and men, but she has made the same methodological mistake as Marx did: *overgeneralization of*

one form of material condition to explain everything. By arguing that the material condition of females is central, she ignored other material conditions.

Marx believed that productive forces are the central driving force of history. Firestone believed material differences between male and female is the central driving forces of history; that would be Both of them are *partially* right if Marx says that reproductive forces are one of the central driving forces of history and if Firestone says material differences between male and female is one of the central driving of force history, they might be more realistic and humbler, but ideologies are not based on humble observations. Totalistic ideologies such as feminism and Marxism promise not less than the golden key of history or the world.

The most fundamental anarchist principle is that authority/*arche* creates disequilibrium independently and inherently. It cannot be used for the sake of revolution or reforms because it may easily corrupt and degenerate even the purest-minded revolutionaries. Why? Because our political means are not neutral tools to achieve ends. Our means are shaping us just as we are shaping them. When an artist is carving marble, the marble carves the artist. Furthermore, the artist does not choose wood, ceramic, plastic, etc., as a means because he knows that he cannot achieve his own end by them. In the same way, the political philosopher should choose his or her means very wisely. Unfortunately, Marx and his followers have never understood the importance of the harmony of means and ends. *We cannot achieve a stateless society with the help of a state.* A doctor cannot wipe out poison by using a poison; he should use a medicine. Marx was a really good doctor to detect some illness of our capitalist society, but there are many illnesses which do not originate from capitalism, but Marx was not a holistic doctor to see all forms of illnesses and to cure them. Therefore, historically speaking, when

the so-called followers of Marx used his method to make the world a better place, the consequences of their treatment were catastrophic.

4.4. Eternal Symbolic Value and Marx

In the future, I would like to read *das Capital* from an anarchist perspective. Early anarchists such as Bakunin and Cafiero have accepted the general framework of *Das Capital*. When I was a young anarchist, I thought like them I thought that Marx was totally right about the analysis of Capitalism. Today, I have arrived at a “radical epistemological break”. Capitalism is nothing more than a surface of domination. I would like to make a list of my groundbreaking propositions. According to Marx, we could define two main values of the commodity: Use value and exchange value.

He said:

The usefulness of a thing makes it a use-value. But this usefulness does not dangle in mid-air. It is conditioned by the physical properties of the commodity and has no existence apart from the latter. It is, therefore, the physical body of the commodity itself, for instance, iron, corn, a diamond, which is the use-value or useful thing. This property of a commodity is independent of the amount of labor required to appropriate its useful qualities. When examining use-values, we always assume we are dealing with definite qualities, such as dozens of commodities that provide the material for a special branch of knowledge, namely the commercial knowledge of commodities. Use-values are only realized [verwirklicht] in use or in considered here they are also the material bearers [Träger] of... exchange-value.

...

Commodities come into the world in the form of use-values or material goods, such as iron, linen, corn, etc. This is their plain, homely, natural form. However, they are only commodities because they have a dual nature because they are at the same time objects of utility and bearers of value. Therefore, they only appear as

commodities, or have the form of commodities, in so far as they possess a double form, i.e., natural form and value form (Marx, n.d).

There has never been the distinction between use-value and exchange value.

There is no value. Value is a human belief. Let's analyse an apple. According to Marx, if I eat it, it refers to use value. If I exchange it with a grape, it refers to exchange value. Use value leads us to human needs or wants, but as I said before, all needs, including biological needs, are constructed beliefs. We *believe* that we have to eat something; therefore, we eat an apple; therefore, it gains a so-called use-value. I am offering a kind of "symbolic value", but I don't think that symbolic value has started with consumer society. Symbolic value is an imaginary thing that is rooted in the spirit of the world. The first value of history is symbolic value. Hunger is a latent symbol of it before manifesting itself in the animal body. When Marx assumed that there are some essential needs for life, he has already created the premature distinction between use and exchange value.

For observant economists who study the real history of the world and universe, such as mineralogy, ecology, and geology, the human-centric economy creates many errors, such as the superficial distinction between use value and exchange value. What is the source of all marvelous things in nature? Solar energy. This is the answer of ecological economists.¹⁸ But for us, followers of Mother Nature, Solar energy is the only manifestation of light.

¹⁸ I strongly recommend my reader to read the works of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen. His understanding of nature and energy may allow us to overcome both the liberal and Marxist understanding of the economy.

All of the economic assumptions of Marx are based on classical economists' humancentric approach. Homo sapiens is not the only agency of the economy. All creatures of Mother Nature, whether they are organic or inorganic, are economic agencies. From my naturalist economic approach, capitalism is not a special or revolutionary economic system. It is a continuation of primate domination.

4.5. Commodity Fetishism

In the section titled “Fetishism of commodity and its secret, Marx (n.d.) said:

A commodity appears, at first sight, an extremely obvious, trivial thing. But its analysis brings out that it is a very strange thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties. So far as it is a use-value, there is nothing mysterious about it, whether we consider it from the point of view that by its properties it satisfies human needs

I argue that there is no distinction between use value and exchange value. Marx alludes to us that exchange value makes commodities mysterious, but use value is a relatively simple situation of the commodity. I don't think so. Use value is a very mysterious thing too. Why should I eat something? If I assume that I should eat something to maintain my corporal being, then use-value may not be a mysterious thing. According to Marx, exchange value, which creates the mystery of the commodity, is the foundation of capitalism. If I follow Marxist terminology, I may argue that use-value is the foundation of domination, including capitalism. Capitalism is a relatively a new baby of illusionary human hunger. You cannot make a value distinction between use value and exchange value because both of them are illusionary value (symbolic value).

From an evolutionary perspective, the first fetishism is sexual fetishism. Sexuality is a form of fetishism. If we follow the evolutionary line of life on Earth, we will find that sex is not the common evolutionary strategy of minerals or plants. (Remember, minerals are living things too). Some plants are sexualized, but few of them. Whenever there is a sexualization of a creature, bodily needs are introduced by nature. Therefore, commodity fetishism can only be a secondary fetishism that is derived from sexual fetishism.

Commodity fetishism is an extended version of sexual fetishism, but all sexual activities are in themselves are fetishism. Whatever is sexual is perverted too. Eating is also sexual perversion.

As long as generation continues on the surface of the earth, fetishism will rule our destiny. Therefore, we shouldn't spend our valuable time discussing the nature of commodity fetishism. First of all, we should know the nature of fetishism which is older than human civilization. Marx does not know what fetishism really is. If he did, he would study other kingdoms of the world.

CHAPTER 5

ARENDT AND NIETZSCHE

5.1. On Arendt

Arendt is a very peculiar thinker for my intellectual journey because through Arendt's works, and I have started to understand the political significance of resentment and massification. Not Nietzsche, but Arendt enabled me to see the political significance of envy, resentment, and revenge. In this chapter, I will summarize the most important concepts of Arendt, and I will try to explain why they are relevant for the anarchist form of justice.

One of the most important criticism of Arendt against modernity is that the classical distinction between public and private has been destroyed by the "rise of the social." Arendt said

the emergence of the social realm, which is neither private nor public, strictly speaking, is a relatively new phenomenon whose origin coincided with the emergence of the modern age, and which found its political form in the nation-state (HC, p.28).

Arendt alluded that the modernist conceptualization of politics, which has emerged with modernity, is totally different from an ancient notion of it. This huge paradigm-shift is based on the rise of social which has distorted the distinction between the public and private realms. The most distinctive characteristic of the household (private) was that humans satisfied their needs under the shelter of the private realm. Arendt said:

The distinctive trait of the household sphere was that in it, men lived together because they were driven by their wants and needs. The driving force was life itself—the penates, the household gods, were,

according to Plutarch, "the gods who make us live and nourish our body"—which, for its individual maintenance and its survival as the life of the species needs the company of others...The realm of the polis, on the contrary, was the sphere of freedom (HC, p.30).

The basic political assumption which Arendt derived from Ancient Greece is that citizens should be free from necessities simply because "freedom is exclusively located in the political realm" (HC, p.31). However, the modernist understanding of freedom and equality has reversed this classical distinction, and politicized needs, which were supposed to have belonged to the private realm, came into the public realm. According to Arendt, this paradigm shift is the foundation of all totalitarian regimes or totalitarian ideologies.

Basically speaking, in our modern societies, people are gathering not for public interest but their social interests. For example, a woman enters politics to rally against gender discrimination or the patriarchal system, or a Jew enters politics to fight against antisemitism. According to Arendt, these are inherently unworldly anti-political attitudes. Nonetheless, Arendt accepted that under extraordinary conditions, identity politics might be acceptable. In Nazi Germany, Jews should defend themselves as Jews because the regime threatens their life because of their Jewishness, but this kind of politics is not desirable, and it must be used wisely.

Arendt emphasized that freedom belongs to the public. Although I agree with the importance of the public for politics, I do not think that the public is the realm of freedom. Both the Arendtian and the modernist versions of freedom are irrelevant for anarchist justice. I think that not freedom, but justice belongs to the public realm, but is it possible to think of a form of justice without the politicization of needs? I think it is possible. Should justice always be social justice? No.

The second important concept of Arendt's, which I have borrowed from her, is the concept *mass society* where people are politicized for only their personal interests. Arendt has never used Nietzschean terms such as resentment, envy, etc., to explain mass society. According to Arendt, rather than slavish emotions, political apathy is the foundation of mass society. She said:

The public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak. What makes mass society so difficult to bear is not the number of people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that the world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate and to separate them (HC 52-53).

I agree that mass society destroys the public realm and politics, but political apathy is not only the reason for massification, but resentment is also a significant factor. Nevertheless, Arendt is right when she argues that mass society is the death of politics. I totally agree that the classical distinction of public and private should be achieved to overcome totalitarian tendencies and massification of citizens. However, while Arendt's public is the realm of freedom, For me, the public is the realm of justice. The Arendtian distinction between the public and the private might be useful for an anarchist justice theory, but it does not mean that Arendt totally embraced the whole Aristotelian framework.

Although Arendt has borrowed Aristotle's definitions of the public and private to discuss her peculiar concepts such as mass society, totalitarianism, freedom, etc., she also preferred to refer to the third critique of Kant for the construction of the public realm.

Kant said, "We may say that, of all these three kinds of liking, only the liking involved in taste for the beautiful is *disinterested* and *free* since we are not compelled to give our approval by any interest, whether of sense or of reason

"(CJ: 52). Disinterestedness for the beautiful with its free play is a very thought-provoking position for Arendt because being free and disinterestedness is a central theme for her political theory. Kant said, "*Taste* is the ability to judge an object, or a way of presenting it, by means of a liking or disliking *devoid of all interest*. The object of such a liking is called *beautiful*" (CJ:53).

Arendt has borrowed the notion of disinterestedness from the third critique of Kant, and then she tried applying it to the political realm.¹⁹ As I said before, mainly Arendt has tried to combine two thinkers for politics: Aristotle and Kant. The classical distinction between the public and the private has been taken from Aristotle, but the regulative character of the public realm has been taken from Kant. This is a very problematic combination because Kant has never mentioned the distinction between the public and the private and their political implication. Further, as I said before, Aristotle had a clear vision of how the private realm should be regulated, but Arendt did not offer any ethical framework which inherently regulates the private realm.

Arendt says something about the nature of the public realm by abusing Kant's third *Critique*, but she carefully omitted the private realm. If she was a true follower of Aristotle, she should say something about ethics and regulation of the private realm.

Another important point is that Arendt is so naïve about human nature. Political apathy is a very optimistic term to explain mass society and totalitarian regimes. She said:

Totalitarian movements are possible wherever there are masses which, for one reason or another, have acquired the appetite for political

¹⁹ Unfortunately, Arendt had never finished the third volume of *The Life of the Mind*. We have only her lectures on it. ("Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy", edited Ronald Beiner, Chicago University Press)

organization. Masses are not held together by a consciousness of common interest, and they lack that specific class articulateness, which is expressed in determined, limited, and obtainable goals. The term masses apply only where we deal with people who either because of sheer numbers, or indifference, or a combination of both, cannot be integrated into any organization based on common interest, into political parties or municipal governments or professional organizations or trade unions (HC p.311).

Resentment, along with anger, hate and fear, are more powerful motivations behind totalitarian movements. In other words, not political apathy but resentment has destroyed politics. Arendt is still important for our project because she is the only thinker who reminds us of the ancient notion of the public.

5.2. On Nietzsche

Ich liebe den, der freien Geistes und freien Herzens ist:
so ist sein Kopf nur die Eingeweide seines Herzens,
sein Herz aber treibt ihn zum Untergang

Nietzsche, *Also Sprach Zarathustra*

In this chapter, I will summarize the essential concepts of Nietzsche, and then I will indicate how and why they are very useful for an anarchist form of Justice. Ressentiment is one of the most important concepts for understanding the *Genealogy* of Nietzsche. Ressentiment is the peculiar feature of slave morality. According to Nietzsche, there are two distinctive moralities that could be observed in the history of morality: master morality and slave morality.

He said:

In the end, two basic types became apparent to me, and a fundamental distinction leaped out. There is a master morality and a slave morality; - I will immediately add that in all higher and more mixed cultures, attempts to negotiate between these moralities also appear, although more frequently the two are confused and there are mutual misunderstandings (BGE 260).

Even the first part of this passage reveals the complexity of master and slave morality. Before giving an exact definition of master and slave morality, Nietzsche warns us about how they could be mixed in higher cultures. Furthermore, he alludes that we may misunderstand what slave morality and master morality really are. What is master morality, and what is slave morality?

Nietzsche said:

The beginning of the slaves' revolt in morality occurs when resentment itself turns creative and gives birth to values: the resentment of those begins who, being denied the proper response of action, compensate for it only with imaginary revenge. Whereas all noble morality grows out of a triumphant saying 'yes' to itself, slave morality says 'no' on principle to everything that is 'outside,' 'other,' 'non-self': and this 'no' is its creative deed. This reversal of the evaluating glance – this inevitable orientation to the outside instead of back onto itself – is a feature of resentment: in order to come about, slave morality first has to have an opposing, external world, it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all, - its action is basically a reaction (GNO 10).

Beyond Good and Evil (Jenseits von Gut und Böse) was written after *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None (Also sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen)*. Therefore, it made some obscure concepts of Zarathustra clear for the readers. After BGE, Nietzsche wrote *On the Genealogy of Morality (Zur Genealogie der Moral)*, which gave us more clues about what he means by master and slave morality. Although works of Nietzsche may not be categorized as “early” and “mature” easily, as it is often done for Marx, and we can argue that *Beyond Good and Evil* and *On the*

Genealogy of Morality are the most fruitful books which allow us to see Nietzsche's central concerns and interests in moral psychology.

Basically speaking, Nietzsche argued that slave morality is based on the *negation* of the external world. Contrary to this, master morality is based on self-affirmation. In other words, slave morality always needs an external stimulator to create values, but master morality does not need an external stimulator to create values. We should be careful about the concept of master morality because Nietzsche did not mean that tyrannical or oppressive people are the only examples of master morality. However, Nietzsche was not naïve about master morality either.

He definitely accepted that tyrannical people might improve master morality (For example, Caesar and Napoleon), but it is not the only version of master morality. Artists and philosophers are also capable of improving master morality. Nietzsche warns tyrannical leaders that they could be masters, but tyranny makes them friendless. "Are you a slave? Then you cannot be a friend. Are you a tyrant? Then you cannot have friends." (Z, "On the Friend").

The slave morality starts with saying no (*Nein-sagen*) to something from the external world, but the master morality starts with saying yes (*Ja-sagen*) to its own values. For master morality, confrontation with the external world is also possible but not for negation but for affirmation. In a manner of speaking, master morality is growing, increasing, and flowing in the confrontation.

The highest medicine against resentment could be found in Nietzsche's *Ecce Homo*. He said:

"My formula for human greatness is amor fati: that you do not want anything to be different, not forwards, not backward, nor for all eternity. Not just to tolerate necessity, still less to conceal it- all

idealism is hypocrisy toward necessity-, but to love it..." (EH, Why I am so clever, 10)

Amor fati is absolutely the most mature concept of Nietzsche's philosophical journey. Even the most subtle and veiled forms of resentment might be cured under the rainbow of *amor fati*. *Amor fati* does not lead us to *endure* pain and suffering. Contrary to this, it calls us to *embrace* them without murmuring and crying. Stoics, Christians, and Spinoza may advise us to endure tragedies because they try to minimize pain and suffering, at least on a psychological level, but Nietzsche does not advise us to endure suffering, but he advises us to go beyond them in order to overcome them.

I would like to clarify the difference between the stoic or Spinozist version of *amor fati* and Nietzsche's *amor fati*. For example, Nietzsche's *amor fati* is not contradictory with rage. Nietzsche embraces all spectrum of life, but Rage is not acceptable for Spinozist or stoics because They would like to freeze the life by using so-called *amor fati*. Their *amor fati* turns into another version of resentment. They gently and exquisitely condemn rage. Anarchist justice should be free from resentment; therefore, it cannot be based on critics of external worlds. Affirmative anarchism should not criticize the state, family, capitalism, etc. It should embrace fate. This is the only way of anarchist justice.

I don't like *rhizomes*; I am still a follower of the *oak*. I don't like never-ending, meaningless becoming or water. *All life has one unquestionable origin, chaos*. I am for civilization, not cynical resentment against it. But I am very careful to offer a solution to the problem of politics.

5.3. Critique of Nietzsche and Arendt

I have learned philosophical thinking from Arendt and Nietzsche, although the former has never defined herself as a philosopher and the latter was

extremely hostile against philosophers. According to Arendt, politics should be free from interests and necessities. In other words, she is totally against the politicization of personal problems. On the other hand, Nietzsche was also critical of modern politics which he saw as a manifestation of slave morality. Their common characteristic is that both are disgusted with all forms of victimized attitudes, whether in the political realm or moral psychology. Nietzsche has never been a key figure of Arendt, but she was an excellent Nietzsche reader and interpreter. She has tried to save politics from slavish envy, which is motivated by resentment. Arendt sensed that mass society is based on envy and resentment. Without these powerful collective emotions, the massification of societies is not possible.

Ladies first. Arendt has never studied justice as an independent subject. From the Arendtian perspective, justice has always been social justice. When we talk about justice or fairness, it inevitably brings us social questions, which is Arendt's nightmare. From the Arendtian understanding, politics has nothing to do with justice and equality; it is about freedom but not in the modernist sense. There is only one form of freedom, and it belongs to the public realm. I am not sure that the Greek version of freedom is useful for our modern crisis, but I totally agree that the politicization of needs and problems always brings totalitarian regimes. My main objection against Arendt is that justice is not necessarily social justice. In other words, we may think of justice without politicization of needs and problems. This form of Justice will belong to the public realm.

Arendt was afraid that (social) justice might be tool to destroy the classic distinction between the public and private realm. For the sake of justice, the public realm may be easily conquered by the private realm. Many scholars thought that Arendt had ignored power relations in the private realm, which shapes the public realm, but for Arendt, power relation is inevitable in the

private realm because of its very nature. Violence or domination is the intrinsic character of the private realm. As you see, Arendt has never ignored power relations in the private realm, and she did not care about them. On the other hand, Arendt has an optimistic view about *sensus communis*; if we have disinterestedness in the public realm, each and every citizen naturally acts according to *sensus communis*.

I think that without eternal justice, it is almost impossible to experience a public realm that is free from necessities and personal interests. I am trying to say that the anarchist form of justice belongs to the public realm, not the private realm.

Another problem of the Arendtian dichotomy of the private and the public is that they are connected. For Arendt, totalitarian regimes arise when the distinction between the public and private is blurred, but if you define this kind of dichotomy, you create its inherent distortion within the identification model. Arendt has defined what private is; therefore, she recognized it. This recognition is the death of the public in itself. Arendt should totally have an affirmative attitude to the public without recognizing the private realm. Basically, she should totally abandon understanding the private realm, and she should not conceptualize and recognize the private realm. She should theorize public without the notion of private, but it is extremely difficult.

She has tried to protect the public realm from the invasion of the private realm. She recognized her enemy, and her theory turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. In a Nietzschean sense, she said no to the private realm; therefore, her “yes” to the public realm became a very weak voice, not a joyful song. But this problem is not specifically the problem of Arendt. It is a main problem of political sciences in general. Politics in itself cannot be affirmative; therefore, all justice theories coming from politics will inevitably

be a form of negation. You should always say “no” to something in politics, but the situation is different in political philosophy. You can say yes without the notion of no in political philosophy.

This problem is also very crucial in Nietzsche's works. Nietzsche has never made the distinction between political science and political philosophy, but we can predict his answers. Perhaps, Nietzsche would argue that this distinction is totally superficial and political philosophers haven't courage enough for philosophical solitude. According to Nietzsche, you should be a Caesar or a Heraclitus (BGE,200). Otherwise, you cannot be a free spirit. Sadly, Nietzsche was none of them. It is very ironic that although Nietzsche has never tried to be a systematic thinker, he was one of the most systematic thinkers. It is difficult to criticize Nietzsche. However, I am very clear about my objections against Marx and Arendt. Nietzsche is almost unconquerable. I can only criticize his personal weakness. Although he has praised self-sufficiency and absolute independence, after his mental breakdown, he had been cared for by his sister until his death. This is, of course, not a critic of his philosophy. Nevertheless, I wanted to emphasize that living a Nietzschean life was extremely difficult even for Nietzsche.

In terms of justice, there is only one objection against Nietzsche, but this objection is not logical or philosophical but purely intuitive. I *believe* that, although almost all versions of justice are based on slave morality, there is still hope for an affirmative version of justice, anarchist justice. The starting point of justice does not necessarily start with negation or saying “No”.

To imagine a kind of justice in an affirmative way, we should really push the limit of the current horizon of imagination as it is known that Nietzsche has praised the mother of Napoleon (BGE,239). From the same perspective, it might be expected from him to praise the mother of Prometheus, *Justia*. He has made the same mistake that has been done before him. He thought that

Justice is an inherently cold and lifeless concept. Nietzsche knew the importance of Prometheus and his tragedy, but he has ignored his mother.²⁰



²⁰ Nietzsche is very annoying thinker because you may find many contradictions, radical changes in his Works. For example, *Birth of Tragedy* allow us to think about nature of eternal justice, but he does not give us any clue about the difference between social justice and eternal justice in his other works. When he criticizes justice in some works, he does not introduce this important distinction. He is a sophist.

CHAPTER 6

MEDITATIONS ON JUSTICE AND ANARCHY

6.1. The problem of Evil and Anarchism

Simone Weil said:

Monotony of evil: never anything new, everything about it is *equivalent*. Never anything real, everything about it is imaginary...Imaginary evil is romantic and varied; real evil is gloomy, monotonous, barren, boring. Imaginary good is boring; real good is always new, marvelous, intoxicating. Therefore, imaginative literature is either boring or immoral (or a mixture of both). It only escapes from this alternative if, in some way, it passes over to the side of reality through the power of art—and the only genius can do that (Grace and Gravity, 69-70).

My dear anarchist comrade, why did you try to save theology in the name of mysticism? You are the opposite of Nietzsche about dualism. Please, I cannot tolerate the white lies of both of you.

Many imaginary evils are romantic, and many real evils are boring. Furthermore, many imaginary goods are boring, and many real goods are marvelous BUT not always!

There are marvelous real evils. You are adoring Jesus and accusing Caesar! Caesar has massacred innocent children and women of the Germanic tribe, but he was marvelous. Accept it! From your perspective, he was evil. I agree with you, but he was marvelous, new, and intoxicating too.

Dear Nietzsche, you are not more honest than Weil about the problem of evil. Whenever you made the list of great men, you carefully omitted the name of Jesus. Although you said that he was a free spirit, you did not write his name at the same line where the name of Napoleon, Caesar, has been written. Say it! Jesus was a great man. You enjoy talking about the greatness of military leaders again and again. You are punishing resentful Christians by this method, but someone could be altruistic, humble, good, and powerful. Good is not always a mask of weakness. Stop this narrow punisher style! Jesus was good, powerful, and altruistic. Accept it! Greatness is not always seen as evil by slaves. Sometimes real greatness might be seen as good by slaves too! Be honest.

Dear Simon Weil, there is a romantic and powerful evil. Accept it. Embrace the greatness of Caesar. Please, I beg you, abandon all your hidden theological agenda. You too, Nietzsche.

6.2. Justice, Death, and Mortality

"Mortals are immortals, and immortals are mortals,
the one living the others' death and dying the others' life."

Heraclitus

We are mortals. It is difficult to admit it, but we are, at least for a while. In Ancient Greece, immortals were rarely interested in injustice, etc. Some gods have raped mortal women, or some goddesses have punished mortal women, etc.; *virtueless* actions were quite common among immortals in Greek mythology; therefore, justice could not be their main concern. In Ancient Egypt, the situation was more complex; although the characters of gods and

Goddesses was less anthropomorphic, all of them respected justice and order, which were undistinguishable concepts for Egyptians.

From a Nietzschean sense, justice is definitely a concern of slaves. Immortals, semi-gods, and powerful leaders have always been interested in their big projects. Is it possible to think of justice without resentment and envy? Perhaps, but it is very difficult, and it is equally difficult to overcome Nietzsche's objections about social justice. Without joyful and vivid mediators such as Prometheus, justice might be easily abused by slaves in order to take revenge from masters. Unfortunately, revenge, which is blooming in the desert of resentment, has always been masked by justice in political history. If we should overcome Nietzsche's objection, we should create an affirmative form of justice. The main problem of classical justice theory is that almost all of them start with saying "No" against something. justice for working classes, justice for women, justice for gay people, justice for the oppressed, etc. All forms of these slogans and theories are inherently based on saying "No" against becoming of Life.

As you see, our quest is extremely difficult. From the Nietzschean perspective, it could be argued that although some thinkers seem affirmative on the surface, inside, they are full of envy and resentments. They are priests who have invented philosophical ways of revenge. Even Spinoza and Epicurus, who were considered affirmative thinkers, were full of envy, and they were hostile against life itself. I think that an anarchist understanding of justice may allow us to overcome the revengeful form of justice.

6.3. Why am I writing?

Why am I writing about political issues? Because I am weak. Plato said, "philosophers [must] become kings...or those now called kings [must]...genuinely and adequately philosophize"²¹ because he was not a (philosopher) king. If he was a philosopher-king, he could directly create a perfect society. Why did Pericles not write anything about his political ideas? Or why did Solon not write a book like the *Republic*? Simply because they were too busy applying their political theories.

Why did not Alexander the Great write about his political theory? Caesar, Bismarck, Napoleon, Jefferson²², Atatürk, Robespierre, Blanqui have never written political theory because they have already tasted political power. We, political scientists and political philosophers, are writing because we are too weak to take power. What we are doing here is nothing more than dreaming of la-la land where it is reigned by our political ideas. We know we cannot be rulers or monarchs; therefore, we have chosen the pathway of theory. Could you show me any great leader who has written any valuable books about political science or political philosophy? When we cannot conquer the world or shape the world according to our world view, we prefer to intellectualize our desires or emotions. I think because I cannot. If I can do, I will have everything I need. In other words, *I cannot; therefore, I think*.

Why am I writing? Obviously, it is worse than thinking. The majority of great ancient Greek philosophers did not write anything, or they have written one book or few fragments. They have known that one wise sentence could be more powerful and useful than a noisy book. Even *now*, hundreds and

²¹ The Republic, 5.473d

²² Declaration of Independence was an exception but even this shows his style; few words, more action.

thousands of theses and books have been written, but most of them are not comparable with one fragment of Heraclitus. Writing is a mercurial art. I can play with words; then words may GROW. Or I can poison them, then they may decay and finally die. *"Isis Moriendo Renascor"*²³

If someone preaches, it is an indicator of resentment. Nietzsche warned us about new and old idols, but a text might also be an idol. All written texts of history are nothing more than propaganda. A political text cannot be written without the hypocrisy of the author. In world history, there are very few exceptional writers or thinkers who have totally altruistic motivations. Jesus, Buddha, Zarathustra have never written books because they were books themselves. Nietzsche was still exceptional because he uncovered the real narcissistic motivations of philosophers and writers. He wrote books because he wanted to show the real motivations and psychologies of philosophers. Nietzsche was alone, and he was crying and screaming from his time to our time. He has never found his students. If he could find a dedicated student, he might be his Socrates. Simply he wrote "smash all idols," but anthropologically speaking, writing a book or essay is also a form of idolatry. *The book which calls us to smash all idols is an idol.* This is the dilemma of Nietzsche. He was a prophet without apostles. He was a master without students. If he had an apostle, a student, or a lover, he might have thought his teachings to them.

He used writing to communicate to the future and readers of the next centuries. This is an inexcusable crime! By way of written texts, his tears, cries, screams arrived at us. Christians may postpone the "good" life to heaven, but he has postponed his teachings. He did not find a student, a friend,

²³ Èze is a small village locating in Southeastern France. The motto of the village is *Isis Moriendo Renascor* "In death I am Reborn". In this emblem, a phoenix is perched on a very special bone.

or a lover; therefore, he has frozen his voice. he has frozen life, he has canalized his hunger for power into books, another form of frozen life.

Look at Caesar, he has created a legendary empire, and he gave it to Augustus, his adoptive child. Then, Augustus became the first Roman emperor. Hundred or thousand books are nothing more than dust against his willpower. Look at Socrates; his death is more valuable than a hundred or thousand books about freedom of speech.

If a philosopher does not have a good companion, he is a tyrant. It is also true for British philosophers. When the loneliness of a philosopher increases, his tyrannical mind expands. Hobbes was tyrannical because he was extremely lonely. Hume, Mill, Locke, Bentham, Smith were relatively fortunate in terms of their companions. At the sunset of loneliness, the shadow of the philosopher is the longest. Heraclitus, Schopenhauer, Hobbes, Nietzsche are generally pessimistic about human nature because they were alone.

Why am I writing? Is the pen mightier than the sword? No. we don't have swords. Therefore, we prefer to glorify our pens. Is knowledge power?²⁴ No. Power is power.

Why am I writing?

"You are asking me questions, and I hear you;

I answer that I cannot answer- you must find out for yourself."²⁵

²⁴ "scientia potentia est", "Wissen ist Macht"

²⁵ Song of Myself' by Walt Whitman

6.4. What is power?

All organic life is interconnected. There is no purely autonomous organic being. Chemically speaking, all life is a one chained chemical reaction. The human body mainly consists of six elements: oxygen, carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, calcium, and phosphorus. They are extremely reactive elements. It may give us many clues about the biological and psychological nature of homo sapiens. If we imagine a creature who consists of Iridium, Platinum, or Gold, it will be an almost anti-reactionary creature.

Chemistry, along with biology, is a very important science for understanding anthropological problems. All life forms are mainly based on solar energy. All life is becoming not because of metaphysical reasons but because of the nature of the elements. When I am writing this text (or when you are reading this text), hundreds, maybe thousands of chemical reactions occur in your brain, stomach, eye, hands, etc. Such a madness! Water flows, even in this thesis; you may ask, "what is the main idea of the author? "Where is the structure?"

I don't want to construct a structural political theory because systematic political theories are inherently resentful. When someone is not powerful enough to bend the river, he or she writes a guideline to construct a dam. Nevertheless, I would like to *do* systematic politics, but as I said before, I cannot because I am weak.

What is power?

Power is the capacity to transform an object by using the will.

I will not write about it because people are writing about what they don't have. Then I will not to be one of them.

What is power?

Power is power.

6.5. Why am I doing philosophy?

The amalgam of the Arendtian and the Straussian definition of political thinker and philosopher might be useful to understand the main difference between philosophy and social sciences, but we have another distinction which was also rooted in Ancient Greece: Sage and Philosopher. As it is well known, philosopher (*philo-sophos*) means lover of wisdom, but sage has a very different meaning. Sages are not seeking wisdom because they have already obtained it. A sage could be a philosopher if he or she wants, but a philosopher cannot be a sage easily. Generally speaking, we all know what 'philosopher' means, but what does 'sage' mean? Robert C. Neville said:

Sage understands memories and expectations, guilt and frustrations, joys and sorrows, suffering, pain, triumph, ecstasy, nobility, depravity, honor, degradation, sincerity, mendacity, stress, and release. They understand the combinations and ambiguities of these in the lives of persons and in the affairs of peoples, and their understanding allows them so to follow the trail of what is important through the underbrush of triviality that they cleave to what is essential. Sages are those who understand people. What people? Anyone (1978.p.54).

I am doing philosophy simply because I am not a sage. All philosopher consciously or unconsciously desires to arrive at the Elysian Field of sages. Unfortunately, most of them have never found it.

6.6. Philosophy in The Jungle and Cave

I took as my starting point a saying of the poet-philosopher, Schiller, that 'hunger and love are what moves the world.' Hunger could be taken to represent the instincts which aim at preserving the individual; while love strives after objects, and its chief function, favoured in every way by Nature, is the preservation of the species. Thus, to begin with, ego-instincts and object-instincts confronted each other.

Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents

We are still living in the jungle or savannah. In order to protect ourselves from dangerous species, including homo sapiens, and the environment, we have created the Cave. Today this cave is known as home and family.

The current emotional and psychological condition of humanity is not that different from the condition of homo sapiens living in the jungle or savannah. We pretend to be civilized and rational, but the limbic system is more ancient and more powerful than the frontal lobe or other advanced parts of the brain. In other words, all so-called philosophical justification or logical argumentation are nothing more than relics of competition rooted in the ancient jungle and savannah.

Most of us are still animals. Our cognitive abilities have never evolved to know so-called philosophical or scientific truths. They have evolved for us to thrive and to grow. It means that throughout human history, philosophical and scientific truths have been nothing more than a tool to thrive. If your political and ethical positions, which helped you to thrive, are close to my views, you will think that they are philosophically acceptable. If my political ideas are disturbing your current living conditions, you will think that they are philosophically wrong.

For example, if you are married, you will probably not fight against monogamy, and you will be careful about anti-monogamist political ideas. If your father is a Marxist, you will be critical against anti-Marxist political ideas and so on. As you see, we prefer to assume that we are choosing our political positions freely, but the truth is that we are the echo of our pasts. (This morning, I am very fatalistic, I hope it will eventually change). Intellectuals use more subtle ways of defense mechanisms to legitimize their political preferences. Before Nietzsche, Diotima explained the peculiar Nature of mankind. In Plato's *Symposium*, her views are presented as follows:

Let me make it clearer, she said. All humans are pregnant, both in body and in mind, and when we come to a certain age, our nature longs to give birth. But to give birth is impossible with someone ugly; it can only occur with someone beautiful. The coming together of a man and a woman is a begetting for both. It is a divine matter, this urgent desire for pregnancy and giving birth, an element of immortality in a living mortal being, and it cannot happen with what is discordant. What is ugly is what is out of joint with divinity, whereas the beautiful is what fits with divinity. As Moira and Eileithyia, Kalloni or Beauty is this bringing forth (206c–d2).

"All humans are pregnant" is a very powerful claim, and it is very difficult to grasp its real meaning. In this sense, Diotima is a kind of vitalist because her vision of life is not based on distinction what is organic and what is inorganic. At the same time, materialism or idealism are not applicable terms to understand Diotima's vitalism.

From Diotima's perspective, Schiller was wrong when he said, "hunger and love move the world" because only love moves the world, and hunger is nothing more than a "perverted" version of love. Marx omitted the love, and he simply said, "hunger moves the world," but where does hunger come from? Because we were evolved in that way. I don't think so. All history, including the history of biology, is a construction, a fantasy of a biologist.

Vital energy (love) moves everything. If a saint dies during the hunger strike, it does not mean that he or she resisted his or her material needs. Material conditions do not determine us; we are material conditions with their vitality. All materials are living, organic, or inorganic. Both Marx and Hegel were looking for a starting point, but there are none. Without a starting point, we cannot talk about history, but as I said before or after, Mother Nature does not recognize history and time. She likes to make surprises and miracles. The

unexpected and incalculable side of nature will always wait in the shadow. She makes us free *absolutely*.

6.7. Monism, Dualism and Pluralism

Religions are mainly based on monism and superficial dualism. According to religious minds, there are two sides of existence, but at the end of the day, one side of it will be destroyed, and we shall have peace.

In Christianity, Archangel Michael will defeat Satan; then the earth will enter the heavenly golden age. For Marxists, proletarians will defeat the capitalists; then, all humanity will live in peace and prosperity.

Marxists have learned this classical religious dualism from Hegel, but Hegel was the only systematic thinker collecting ancient relics of collective religious consciousness. In other words, he has done nothing more than systematizing disorganized religious beliefs. Typical religious minds create dualisms in order to unite them. They define unachieved monism and preach to their followers to eliminate dualism to arrive at the monism.

Very few thinkers prefer to start with dualism to arrive at pluralism. Generally, great thinkers abuse dualism to hide their totalitarian monism. I am a pluralist.

What is human?

In this section, I will discuss Marx's and Nietzsche's understanding of humans. Although there was some important difference between the young and old Marx, needs are very important factors to understand Marx's conceptualization of the human. Basically, Marx hopes that with the help of

communism, humanity will be freed from the satisfaction of basic needs, and then each member of the species will be free to produce creatively.

Marx was not a good observer of nature. Needs, which have been mentioned in different texts of Marx, are very anthropomorphic. In nature, material needs and dreams are interwoven, and no one is capable of telling us which is the first. Material conditions determine consciousness, but Consciousness determines material conditions. Hegelians forces us to accept that Consciousness is the beginning of everything. On the other hand, Marxists forced us to accept material condition is the beginning of everything.

I may say consciousness and material condition are two sides of the same coin, but it may not satisfy the historical materialist. They may ask, "what is the beginning of this dialectical relation of consciousness and material condition?" There is no beginning. Marxists assume there is a historical chain. They want to find the key to everything, the origin of something. There is no origin. Consciousness and Matter are orphans. Idealists and materialists have been fighting each other for their parenthood. If Consciousness is the parent of matter, the idealist will win; if matter is the parent of Consciousness, the materialist win.

I said I am a materialist; I decided to change my mind *now*; I am an idealist. Change is also annoying; the human mind cannot adapt itself quickly. Nietzsche said, "Man is something that shall be overcome. Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman — a rope over an abyss. What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end"(Z, First part, 4). He was right. Human is a transitional stage to another thing, but in the future, overman will be a transitional stage of another over man.

Marx has tried to freeze nature. Because he wanted to grasp the key of nature, his baconism was very authoritarian, and Mother Nature is not as obedient a bride as his wife, Jenny von Westphalen. Mother nature is monstrous and contradictory. We cannot see all faces of her. There must always be a veiled face of Mother Nature. Marx wanted to conquer Mother Nature. "All" is not the favorite word of Mother Nature. She surprises us to create an amazing exception, and then she makes this exception the norm. You may say, "All humans need to eat something"; then Mother Nature may create the ability for one human to perform photosynthesis. Do you think it is impossible? You spoke like Marx when he saw the Paris commune; he thought that the Paris commune could not survive because of current conditions. Nothing is impossible for Mother Nature!

According to Marx, man is a social being; therefore, he is an animal. Without divine intervention, an ordinary human cannot be consistent. Marx was a liar, Nietzsche was a liar, Arendt was a liar. I am a liar. You, the reader you are a liar. There is no way out. Both Greeks and Abrahamic religions have one common central characteristic: Divine intervention. Many Greek heroes were protected by Athena like Moses was protected by the God of Israel. Nietzsche was right, God is dead, but it must rise!

Nietzsche wanted to be a prophet, but no one cared about him. Writing a book is a sin for a prophet. He was screaming. Nietzsche was not a prophet; God did not choose him. Sorry. Next, please. Marx wanted to be Prometheus. Where is his Athena? A God did not choose him either. They are social beings, subject to needs and fragilities. Prophets were unharmed. Even if they were harmed, they were informed by messengers of God before it happened.

6.8. Dike and Themis

The differences and connections between *Dike* and *Themis* are also important to comprehend the Greek understanding of justice. Hesiod said, "Second he married sleek Themis, who bore the Watchers, Lawfulness, Justice, and flourishing Peace..." (Theogony 901). Although there is no consensus about the clear meaning of *Dike* in Ancient Greek (Dickie, 1978), it is obvious that *Dike* is a daughter of *Themis*.

I am especially interested in the nature of *Themis*, which has always been associated with divine justice. On the other hand, *Dike* mostly has been associated with human affairs.²⁶ All forms of Justice which are inspired by modernity are based on the notion of *Dike*. In other words, social justice is the expertise of *Dike*. Contrary to this, Eternal Justice is linked with *Themis*. Anarchist Justice should work with *Themis*, not *Dike*.

6.9. Justice the Eternal Healer or Eternal poet

From an evolutionary perspective, we have evolved as social creatures. This is the foundation of all so-called evil. We are both psychologically and sociologically connected. In nature, all creatures are connected directly or indirectly, but some animals are more self-sufficient than primates; therefore, they are relatively free from possible social hierarchy and dominations. Social justice is for codependent creatures like humans, not for self-sufficient animals like snakes and dragons.

²⁶ As I said before, although Nietzsche was aware of the differences between social (*Dike*) and eternal justice (*Themis*), he seldom emphasized their differences. "But the most wonderful thing in that poem about Prometheus (which, in terms of its basic thought, is the true hymn of impiety) is its profound, Aeschylean tendency to *justice*: the limitless suffering of the bold 'individual' on the one hand, and the extreme plight of the gods, indeed a premonition of the twilight of the gods, on the other; the power of both these worlds of suffering to enforce reconciliation, metaphysical oneness- all this recalls in the strongest possible way the center and principal tenet of the Aeschylean view of the world. Which sees moria, as eternal justice, throned above gods and men" (BOT 48-49).

This is also the answer to why gods and goddesses are not interested in justice because they are also *self-sufficient* and immortal. Mortality and codependency are two essential characteristics of justice seekers. In a manner of speaking, they might be considered as a weakness of our race. It is obvious that we are not immortals or self-sufficient creatures. In this current condition, what can we do to achieve Justice? There is only one way to achieve affirmative justice: *amor fati*! Although Nietzsche was very critical against the stoic understanding of nature, both Nietzsche and the stoics have attributed a central role to *amor fati* in their philosophy. How can we achieve affirmative anarchist justice? There is a very simple way of it. We should embrace all spectrums of Life. We should accept life as it is. I am not saying that we should endure (stoic) but embrace! It is very important because when we endure something, it creates resentment and superficial peace in our psyches.

6.10. Against Salvation

Generally speaking, the majority of political philosophers of continental philosophy have an open or hidden salvationist agenda. They want to be heroes, saviors, conquerors, but they cannot. Therefore, they suffer from Cassandra syndrome. They think that they see what is good and what is bad for humanity, but people do not listen to them. Obviously, it is a Judeo-Christian prophet desire. Greek heroes differ from prophets. Nietzsche is not an exception. He cannot be Perseus or Heracles; therefore, he has created Zarathustra. He also wanted to lead humanity, the mass. His inverted Platonism is not less ecclesiastical than socialism.

Let's be honest. There must be a hierarchy between great men. Nietzsche argues that both Goethe and Napoleon are great men, but as I said before,

Napoleon was not impressed by Goethe, but Goethe was deeply impressed by him. It is a particular indicator that Napoleon was greater than Goethe. "I imagine, and I create" is the motto of all great political leaders. On the other hand, great artists' motto is like this: "I imagine, and I write." Can you see the huge difference between them?

Nietzsche cannot be a Napoleonic hero; therefore, he had to be a Goethean-style writer. Nietzsche's Zarathustra is not a hero. It is a prophet who has been rejected by people. Political leaders, not political philosophers, have offered a salvation for humanity. It is true but their offers are nothing more than veils for their real agendas: self-glorification.

6.11. Anarchism versus absolutism

The majority of people are inherently tribal because of evolution. There were clever chiefs or witch doctors who have invented universalism and absolutism. They have found a way to universalize their tribal God or goddess. It is very simple. Find one form of *suffering* or *problem* and make it the most important subject of humanity. Therefore, one personal and local god or goddess will be the beginning of monotheism. Before Christianity, these gods and goddesses were extremely territorial, but after Christianity, gods and goddesses have started to become universal. Paul said, "There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus." (Galatians 3:28)

Institutionalized Christianity, which was invented by Paul, was the peak point of slave morality and absolutism for its time. We are all one in Christ Jesus; therefore, there will be no one. Although Jesus has never tried to universalize his teaching, Paul and other followers of Jesus have created the idea of the church. Modern western political ideologies did not go far from the Christian

framework. Liberals, Marxists, and feminists, either this or that way, are still using Paul's formula. Because of their Judeo-Christian roots, they are inclined to absolutist thinking.

What is the foundation of everything? This is the question of absolutism. They are searching for the foundation because they want to create their own church (inverted empire). Theoretical, philosophical, mathematical, or military. It does not matter.

All systematic thinking is tyrannical. It should be, but I am not sure of their consistency. Be careful! I am not a postmodern thinker; I am not trying to deconstruct legitimized systems, nor am I criticizing them! I am offering my own solution! The solution is the *three*, pluralism. The two is the legitimization of all tyranny because eventually, two will become one. Saint Michael will destroy the army of Satan; the working class will overthrow capitalists, women will smash the patriarchy, Nazis will exterminate the Jewish spirit, etc. Two is the number of eschatology.

Totalitarian minds would like to define two irreconcilable powers or subjects. When they create a foundation of two, all other conflicts might be reduced or at least explained by this dichotomy.

Therefore, anarchism starts with *three*. Three is the number of pluralisms. Three independent subjects create a pluralism/triangle. Whenever we have three independent and authentic subjects, decentralization of power may begin. Be careful! When three women or three workers come together, it does not create pluralism/ triangle. They are the points of the straight line. They are not capable of creating triangles. Three subjects should come together not because of their biological needs. They should come together for the sake of aristocracy and spirit.

The Modern Family is tyrannical because it creates a world or a state for two people. Then two become one. Couples act like one person— the state and family work by the same principle. When two people become one, we have a new agency and so on. All individuals, as much as possible, must be independent and self-sufficient.

In order to overcome authoritarian tendencies, there should be at least three independent arches. This eternal principle is applicable everywhere. "The Three" should govern Love, Business, international relations. Only through polyarchy might anarchy be achievable. Duality is a hidden monism and totalitarianism.

6.12. The philosopher as a philosophical subject

Marx had two hands. If he did not have two hands or arms, his works might have been different. His writing style, his concerns, his emotional expressions might have been different. An author is the sum of his conditions. He or she is nothing more than an expression of these conditions.

If, a philosopher, preaches a kind of political salvation; we should look at his or her life. For example, I am not interested in the biography of Wittgenstein, Frege, Heidegger, etc., simply because political philosophy was not a central issue of them. Of course, modern minds prefer to make differences between the life of philosophers and their ideas. This distinction was unknown to ancient philosophers.

Aristotle's ethics and politics were connected, and he was practicing his philosophy. Marx also advised us praxis but only a socio-political one! He carefully eliminated the most important part of praxis: ethics! If a doctor cannot heal himself, how can we trust him?

Marx was blaming liberals for being not revolutionary enough. He was right. But as an anarchist, I am blaming (J'accuse) him because of not being revolutionary enough. Marx has never been interested in ethics.

Consequently, I am trying to say that if a philosopher gives us a formula of (political) salvation, we should ask him whether he or she used it before. It is my pharmacological motto.

I am not saying that Marx was a false prophet. Torah taught us there were many minor prophets who have done little but important things for the people of Israel, but the problem is that Marx did not feel satisfied with the role of Daniel, Jeremiah, or David. Nothing less than the role of Jesus or Moses satisfied him. He wanted to be tragic, but he became pitiful.

The life of a philosopher is a philosophical subject. Philosophy is a kind of dance. You cannot produce philosophical works out of producers. Dance only manifests itself within the body of the philosopher. The philosopher is the philosophical work. Books are nothing more than the repercussions of the *magnus opus* of the philosopher, his or her life. When I use the word "life", I am not referring to the biographies of philosophers.

6.13. Antagonist and Protagonist

The Savior syndrome, which is quite common among political thinkers, deserves more attention. A mind which suffers from a savior complex works in a universal structure. First, define a *moral or political* problem, then offer a (totalistic) solution against it.

"The Sky is falling" is the best song of apocalyptic minds. Marx and Nietzsche are the typical examples of the apocalyptic mind and the savior

syndrome. Marx has associated himself with Prometheus. Nietzsche has associated with himself Dionysus and later Zarathustra. The sky is not falling, Everything is alright. Catastrophic events and destructions are natural parts of the life circle. No one is capable of writing the end of the story.



CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION: AMOR MUNDI AND AMOR FATI

At the beginning of my research, I was trying to find inspirational resources such as liberalism and Marxism, which may enrich my anarchist theory of justice. I was planning to write a thesis that is mainly based on sociological and economic theories and researches, but I have understood that socio-economic theories are not useful for my philosophical position. I have perceived that it is not possible to offer a social and economic theory of justice without the politicization of needs (Arendt) and resentment (Nietzsche). Arendt leads me to abandon all social and economic questions, which are based on biological needs, for the sake of politics, and Nietzsche gave me an affirmative cosmology about Justice. He pushed me to abandon politics too. I should also add that Arendt's *amor mundi* and Nietzsche's *amor fati* cannot be easily melted in one vessel. It will be my future project to discuss how we can think about them together.

I was planning to use both Marxists and liberal socio-political theory to extend and improve classical anarchist theory in order to offer an anarchist theory of justice, but I have arrived at a very radical conclusion. Almost all social justice theory, whether it is anarchist, Marxist or liberal, has an inherently social and economic dimension. In contrast, I have decided to offer a very radical form of anarchist justice inspired by Arendt and Nietzsche. My anarchism is not based on the negation of the state. In other words, I don't want to start by saying no *against* the state, family, and capitalism. I don't want to be anti-authoritarian, but I want to be *beyond* the state, family, and

capitalism. I want to be an anarchist, not against authority but beyond it. Anarchy means beyond the law, not against the law.

In this sense, anarchist justice is not based on calculation or measurement. Generally, we prefer to think of ourselves as *under* or *against* the law. We assume only two positions about justice and law: we should be ruled by it, or we should fight against it. I think there is another way we can go beyond it. Going beyond something does not mean escaping from it. I am not offering a cynical resistance way as Deleuze, Foucault, or others do. There is a glorious victory shining like a morning star *beyond* the mountain of the law. Affirmative, vivid, and most importantly, joyful justice reveals itself in the public realm. It is anarchist because it is beyond all forms of rules and regulations.

Once upon a time, I was a sociologist who studied material conditions, but today, I have seen that under these circumstances, sociology is a way of revenge. Neither Arendt nor Nietzsche cared for sociology. Although both of them were almost historians, they have never arrived at the harbor of sociology as Marx did.

This is one of the most important common characteristics of these three thinkers. They have studied history very well then, they have developed their perspectives. History (Saturn) made Marx a sociologist and economist; it made Arendt a political theorist and Nietzsche a philosopher.

I don't know the real meaning of freedom and equality in our contemporary world. I am very skeptical whether they are useful concepts to *solve* our problem, but I know that Justice is *whispering*.

What is Justice? Who is she? Justice is the love of the world (*amor mundi*). If we embrace all spectrums of the world without discrimination, then we have Justice. What is Justice? Justice is *amor fati*. If we embrace all paths of Life without resentment and envy, then we will have Justice. I have understood that we should keep *silent* beyond good and evil, right and left, up and down, female and male, love and hate, dark and light, suffering and joy, Life and death. Justice is waiting *there* beyond all superficial dichotomy and illusion.

*"Do I contradict myself?
Very well then, I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes.)"*

Walt Whitman

And they lived happily ever after.

THE END

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APPENDICES

C. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

aędaş siyaset kuramlarında ve siyaset felsefesinde baskın olan iki temel kavram vardır: eşitlik ve özgrlk. 1789 Fransız Devrimi'nin o meşhur "*Özgrlk, Eşitlik, Kardeşlik*" sloganında en olgun biçimini bulan özgrlk ve eşitlik idealleri içinde yaşadığımız modern veya modern sonrası olarak tabir edilen dönemin en belirleyici unsurları olmuştur.

Özgrlk kavramının kökenleri Antik Yunan ve Roma'da bulunabiliyor olsa da, yani başka bir ifadeyle modern özgrlk anlayışının ötesinde bir özgrlk kavramsallaştırılmasından bahsedilebilse bile, bugün özgrlk daha çok liberal ve modern anlamıyla anlaşılmaktadır.

Eşitlik kavramı günümüzde daha çok sosyalizm ile özdeşleştirilmektedir. Her ne kadar Marks Hegelci bir düşünr olarak eşitlik ile değil de kurtuluş (*Emancipation*) ile, yani toplumsal çelişkilerin sonlandırılması ile ilgilenmiş olsa da, bugün Marksizm en azından tematik açıdan eşitlik kavramına oldukça yakın durmaktadır.

Özgrlk veya eşitlik kavramları yerine çağdaş siyasetin açmazlarını çözmek için Adalet kavramını yeniden değerlendirmemiz gerekir. Modern öncesi toplumların, özellikle Antik Yunan ve Roma toplumunun adalet kavramını nasıl algıladığını incelemek bugnn siyasi açmazlarını çözmemize yardımcı olabilir.

Bu tezi yazmaya başladığımda niyetim hem Liberalizm hem de Marksizm içindeki adalet tartışmalarından ilham alan ancak onları aşan anarşist bir

sosyal adalet kuramı önermekti. Ancak araştırmalarım bana gösterdi ki adaleti anlamak için modernitenin ufku aşmamız gerekir. Hem liberalizm hem de Marksizm modernitenin çocukları olduğuna göre böylesi bir adalet kuramını önermeye uygun değillerdi. Bu yüzden modernitenin ufku aşan düşünürlere odaklanmaya başladım ve kozmik bir adaletin sosyal bir adaletten tartışmaya ve konuşmaya daha değer olduğuna ikna oldum.

Günümüz siyaset kuramlarına baktığımızda adalet kavramının genel olarak sosyal adalet veya hukuksal Adalet olarak kullanıldığını ve anlaşıldığını görürüz. Antik Yunan toplumunda adalet kavramı iki farklı şekilde anlaşılmaktadır. Yunan mitolojisinde *Themis* Ebedi Adalet'i temsil ederken onun kızı *Dike* insana dair olan adaleti temsil eder. Birincisi kozmosun yasalarına göre bir adalet tasavvuruna dayanırken ikincisi insanların ihtiyaçlarına ve sorunlarına yönelik yasaların yansımasıdır.

Modern dünyanın çocukları olarak ne liberalizm ne de Marksizm/sosyalizm böylesine bir adalet ve kozmoloji algısını sunamayacağı için Ebedi Adalet'in yalnızca anarşizm ile anlaşılabilirliğini veya vücut bulabileceğini düşünüyorum.

Antik Yunan, Ebedi Adalet olgusunu anlayabilmemiz için eşsiz bir öneme sahiptir; çünkü diğer birçok uygarlıkta adalet düzen, yasa, kural ve devlet gibi Apolloncu kavramlarla algılanmaktadır. Sadece Antik Yunan'da yıkım ve yok oluş Ebedi Adalet'in bir unsuru olarak açıkça ortaya konmuştur.

Aiskhylos, *Zincire Vurulmuş Prometheus* isimli meşhur trajedisinde Prometheus'u *Themis*'in oğlu olarak tanıtır. Bu oldukça sembolik ve üzerine düşünmeye değer bir bilgidir çünkü Prometheus Zeus ve diğer tanrılar açısından bakıldığında onların düzenini tehdit eden bir tanrıdır.

Ebedi adalet tanrıçası *Themis* kendi yasalarını oğlu aracılığıyla uygulamaktadır. Başka bir ifadeyle Ebedi Adalet (*Eternal Justice*) kendini Prometheus(*Chaos*) aracılığıyla ortaya koymaktadır. Burada dikkat edilmesi gereken nokta Prometheus'un bağlı olduğu yasanın insanlar ve hatta tanrılar tarafından dahi belirlenmediğidir. Prometheus bizzat Ebedi Adalet Tanrıçası'nın oğlu olarak Ebedi Adalet'e hizmet etmektedir.

Tüm bunlara ek olarak dikkat etmemiz gereken en önemli şeylerden birisi de Prometheus'un bir isyancı veya başkaldıran olmadığıdır. Nietzscheci anlamıyla Prometheus Zeus düzenine 'hayır' demez aksine kendisi yeni bir düzen önerir. Ancak bu yeni düzen kurulu düzen tarafından bir Kaos olarak anlaşılmak zorundadır.

Prometheus kendi kurallarını koymakta ve kendi değerlerini üretmektedir ve tüm yaptıkları Ebedi Adalet Tanrıçası'nın kurallarıyla uyum içindedir. Prometheus Zeus düzeninin analizini, eleştirisini yapmaz; hatta insanlara bu düzeni nasıl yıkacaklarını da öğretmez. Kendisi tek başına insanların da ateşe sahip olduğu bir düzene 'evet' der ve bu düzeni yaratır. Tüm bunları düşündüğümüzde Prometheus yaşama ve kendi değerlerine 'evet' diyen ilk anarşisttir.

Böylesi kozmik bir adaletin siyaset alanına taşınmasını engelleyen, çağdaş toplumda siyasetin imkanlarını yok eden ve siyaseti susturan iki temel sorun olduğunu düşünüyorum: hınç (*ressentiment*) ve ihtiyacın siyasallaştırılması (*politicization of needs*). Birincisinin analizi için Nietzsche'ye ikincisinin analizi için de Arendt'e başvurmamız gerekir.

Nietzsche'ye göre (sosyal) adalet ve eşitlik talebi kölelerin yani zayıf olanların talebidir. Güçsüz olanlar güçlü gördüklerini yaşam alanında deviremedikleri için onlardan en azından ahlak alanında üstün olmaya

çalışırlar. Bu açıdan Nietzsche'nin en temel eserlerinde adalet her zaman kölelerin talebi olarak karşımıza çıkar. Ancak *Tragedyanın Doğuşu* veya *Yunanlıların Trajik Çağında Felsefe* gibi eserlere baktığımızda Nietzsche'nin adaletin kozmolojik veya ebedi olanına alan açtığını görürüz.

Nietzsche en bilinen eserlerinde sosyal adalet (*dike*) ile ebedi adalet (*Themis*) arasında net bir ayrım koymamış olsa da yukarıda bahsedilen eserlerde ebedi adalet (Eternal Justice) kavramını kullanmaktadır. Basitçe ifade etmemiz gerekirse Nietzsche en bilindik eserlerinde adalet kavramını her kullandığında aslında sosyal veya hukuksal adaletle vurgu yaparken bazı eserlerinde bu adaletten farklı kozmolojik veya ebedi bir adaletin varlığını da kabul etmektedir. Ancak yine de bu iki adalet kavramsallaştırmasının net bir karşılaştırmasını ve farklılıklarını herhangi bir Nietzsche eserinde görmemekteyiz.

Arendt'in adalet ile ilişkisine baktığımızda ilk bakışta güçlü bir bağ görmeyeceğimizi söyleyebiliriz. Arendt'in esas mesele ettiği konu modernite öncesi siyasetin özel ve kamusal alan ayrımına dayandığıdır. Modernite ile birlikte ne özel alan ne de kamusal alana benzeyen üçüncü bir alan; sosyal alan ortaya çıkmıştır. Arendt'e göre Antik Yunan'da ve Roma'da ihtiyaçlar siyaset öncesi bir alan olan eve yani *oikos*'a aittir. Modernite ile birlikte *oikos*'a ait olan sorunlar kamusal alana taşmış ve ihtiyaçlar politik bir mesele halini almıştır.

Arendt için kamusal alan yani ihtiyaçlardan arınmış insanlığın bir arada yaşamayı deneyimlediği alan özgürlüğün alanıdır. Ben Arendt'in kamusal alan tanımının siyaset için oldukça yararlı olduğunu düşünüyorum. Ancak kamusal alan özgürlüğün değil ebedi adaletin açığa çıktığı alandır.

Örnek vermek gerekirse, Sezar Roma cumhuriyetini yıkıp kendisini yaşam boyu diktatör ilan ettiğinde ve aynı şekilde Brutus cumhuriyeti kurtarmak için Sezar'ın suikastine karıştığı anda kamusal alanda deneyimlenen ebedi bir adaleti açığa çıkarıyordu. Bu gibi örneklerde görülebileceği gibi ebedi adalet kendisini hepimizi ilgilendiren kamusal meselelerde açığa çıkarmaktadır. Bu yönüyle Arendt'in ihtiyaçların siyaset öncesi bir alana ait olduğu ve kamusal alanın bu ihtiyaçlardan bağımsız bir siyaset alanı olduğu fikri oldukça önemlidir. Arendt'e göre kamusal alanın çöküşü insanların politika konusuna duyarsızlaşması ve ihtiyaçları siyasallaştırmalarından kaynaklanmaktadır. Ben politik duyarsızlaşma veya ihtiyacın siyasallaştırılmasından daha çok hınç duygusunun kitleleri motive ettiğini düşünüyorum. Arendt burada insan doğasına dair Nietzsche ile karşılaştırıldığında daha iyimserdir.

Nietzscheci anlamıyla daha güçlü ve daha sağlıklı olana duyulan hınç daha soylu ve daha sağlıklı politikanın da önüne geçmektedir. Hınç duygusunun olduğu yerde veya hınç duygusunun son derece örgütlü olduğu toplumlarda Sezar, Napolyon veya Büyük İskender gibi siyasi figürlerin çıkması mümkün değildir.

Nietzsche, Arendt kadar berrak bir şekilde kamusal alanın önemini ve onun özel alandan farkını görememiş olsa da Büyük Siyaset (*Great Politics*) ancak ihtiyaçlardan arındırılmış siyasal bir alanda mümkündür. İhtiyaçtan ve hınç duygusundan arındırılmış bir siyasal alan ebedi adaletin alanıdır çünkü ebedi adalet iyinin veya kötünün yanında değildir. Tam tersine iyinin ve kötünün ötesinde olduğu için kamusal alanda Sezar gibi sayısız insanı öldüren bir kişi de, İsa gibi radikal bir şiddet karşıtını da kendi tezahürünün bir parçası olarak kuşatır.

Tezim boyunca dikkatli bir şekilde yaptığım Nietzsche okumaları bana siyaset hakkında bambaşka bir bakış açısı daha sundu. Siyaset hakkında

yazanların motivasyonunun en inceltiřmiř řekliyle hınç duygusu olduėunu anladım. Platon bize filozofların kral veya kralların filozof yapılması gerektiėini söylüyordu söylemesine ama çabası hep kralı filozof yapmak yönünde olmuřtu. Platon bir Kartaca tiranını filozof yapmaya çalışıyordu ama filozofu yani kendisini kral yapmak için niye çabalamıyordu? Cevap yine Nietzsche'nin güç istenci kavramsallařtırmasında yatıyor. Platon bir tiran veya bir kral kadar güce sahip olsaydı zaten *Devlet* eserinde hayal ettiėi dünyayı kurardı. Bařka bir ifadeyle Platon hayal ettiėi dünyayı kuramadıėı için, siyasi olarak güçsüz olduėu için hayal ettiėi dünyayı yazıya döküyordu.

Siyaset felsefesiyle ve siyaset kuramıyla ilgilenen düşünürlerin temel motivasyonunun hınç duygusu olduėunu anladım ve siyaset hakkında kuramsal yazın alanına yönelmenin güç istencinin inceltiřmiř hınç dolu bir biçimi olduėuna ikna oldum.

Bu içgörü tezimin orta yerinde adeta bir pulsar gibi atmaya ve tezimi parçalamaya bařladı. Sezar, Napolyon, Jefferson, Büyük İřkender, Bismarck... gibi büyük siyasetçilerin hiçbirisi siyaset kuramı üretmemiřlerdi çünkü doğrudan siyaset yapabildikleri için kuramları kurdukları dünyada gömülü bir řekilde zaten mevcuttu. Bismarck'ın hayal ettiėi siyasi bir düzen vardı ve bunu yaratabildi. Marx'ın hayal ettiėi bir siyasi düzen vardı ancak bunu yaratamadıėı için bu düzenin nasıl olması veya nasıl olmaması gerektiėine dair kitaplar yazdı. Bařka bir ifadeyle Marx Bismarck'ın sahip olduėu güce sahip olmadıėı için siyaset hakkında yazıyordu.

Ontoloji ve epistemoloji gibi alanlarda yazan filozofların durumu siyaset üzerine yazan filozoflardan bu açıdan önemli ölçüde ayrılır. En nihayetinde ontolojik ve epistemolojik iddiaların da arkasında güç istenci vardır ama hınç duygusu bu alanlarda ya yoktur ya da çok daha zayıftır ancak siyaset hakkında yazan filozofların hınç duygusu tiranlara karřıdır. Marx Antik Roma'da

Sezar'ı değil Spartaküs'ü över çünkü Sezar bir tirandır. Bütün siyaset kuramları üzerine yazan düşünürler içerisinde sadece Nietzsche Sezar'ın bir kişi olarak büyük bir ruh olduğunu söyleyebilecek kadar iyinin ve kötünün ötesindedir.

Ahlak alanında nasıl ki güçsüz olduğumuz için 'iyi' olmanın kendisi kölece bir tavrırsa siyaset alanında siyaset yapamadığımız için siyasi kurtuluş teorileri yazmak da aynı ölçüde kölece bir tutumdur. Bu noktadan sonra benim tezimin de kölece bir zayıflıktan kaynaklandığını söylemem gerekiyor. Siyaset hakkında yazıyoruz çünkü siyasi güce o veya bu şekilde sahip değiliz.

Arendt'in dünyayı Nietzsche'nin de kaderi sevmeye olan çağrısı bu açıdan oldukça değerli bir sağaltım aracıdır. Dünya'nın kurtarılmaya veya dönüştürülmeye ihtiyacı yoktur çünkü dünya üzerinde ne yaşanırsa yaşansın ebedi adaletin kuşatıcı ve kozmik dengesinde işlemektedir. Aynı şekilde içinde bulunduğumuz koşullara ve duygulara hayır demek yerine onları kucaklamak yine ebedi adaletin bireysel düzeyde tezahür etmesidir. Başımıza gelenler için birilerini veya siyasi bir yapıyı suçlamak yerine onları kucaklamamız gerektiğini idrak etmek ancak ebedi bir adaletin zamansız mekânız ve öznesiz bir şekilde çalıştığını kabul etmekten geçmektedir.

Özgürlük ve eşitlik en nihayetinde dünyanın o veya bu şekilde olması gerektiğinin ön kabulüne dayanır. Liberal anlamıyla özgürlük talep eden, sosyalist anlamıyla eşitlik talep eden bir siyasi kuram günün sonunda dünyayı ve kaderi olduğu gibi sevmiyordur, kucaklamıyordur. Bu açıdan modernitenin en olgun özgürlük anlayışı olarak liberalizm ve modernitenin en olgun eşitlik anlayışı olarak sosyalizm *amor mundi*'ye ve *amor fati*'ye olanak vermemektedir.

Ben Arendt'in ve Nietzsche'nin siyasal kuramlarının kamusalık konusunda bazı açılardan benzediğini düşünüyorum. Her ne kadar Nietzsche'nin *agora*'nın kendisine gerek metaforik olarak gerekse de tarihsel olarak çok büyük sempatisi olmasa da, Nietzsche'nin büyük insanların önemli bir kısmı kendini kamusal alanda göstermiştir. Sezar, Napolyon, Büyük İskender, Alkibiadis, İsa, Bismark...

Arendt'in kamusal alanı anlayışı büyük insanların deneyimi üzerine kurulu değildir; ancak Arendt de herkesin hatırlanmak istediğini ve bu yüzden kamusal alana dahil olduğunu, olmak zorunda olduğunu söylemektedir. İsa ve Sokrates gibi figürler Arendt'in kamusalık vurgusunun zirve noktaları olarak görülebilir. Ancak Arendt için kamusalık deneyimi şiddet taşımadığı için (çünkü şiddet politika öncesi bir mesele olarak özel alana ait bir olgudur) Sezar, Brutus gibi figürleri politikanın içine kolay kolay almaz.

Leo Strauss'a göre modernitenin üç dalgası vardır: Liberalizm, Sosyalizm ve Faşizm. Fikrimce anarşizm, liberalizmin ve sosyalizmin kardeşi olarak dördüncü ve üzerine en az düşünülmüş akım olarak bu listeye eklenmelidir. Ben anarşizmin politik bir düşünce okulu olarak esas meselesinin özgürlük veya eşitlik olmadığını tam aksine, Ebedi Adalet olduğunu düşünüyorum. Bu açıdan eşitlik ve özgürlük konusuna ağırlık vermiş klasik anarşist kuramcılardan farklı düşünüyorum.

Anarşizm metafizik açıdan herhangi bir kurucu unsur önermez; aynı şekilde politika konusunda da herhangi bir kurucu değer veya ilke etrafında kendini şekillendirmez. Bu açıdan anarşizm iyinin ve kötünün ötesindedir. Benim anarşizmden anladığım şey herhangi bir otoriteye “hayır” demek yerine yaşama “evet” diyebilmektir. Tahakküm üreten kurumlar yaşam nehrinin ortasına bırakılmış çöp yığınları gibidir. Tek yapmamız gereken bu yığınları coşkun bir şekilde akan yaşam nehrinin üzerinden kenara koymaktır.

Başka bir ifadeyle devlet, okul, aile gibi kurumlar yaşama “hayır” diyen onu durdurmaya ve denetim altına almaya çalışan kurumlardır. Anarşizmin köle ahlakına alan açan biçimine değil yaşamı olumlayan ve yücelten bir biçimine sempati duyduğumu söylemek isterim.

Nietzsche için anarşizm en nihayetinde sosyalizm ve Hristiyanlık ile birlikte kölece bir isyana dayanır. Tarihsel açıdan düşünürsek Nietzsche’nin gördüğü anarşistler içinde bulundukları sisteme karşı kızgınlık ve hınç dolu figürlerdi. Bu açıdan sosyalistlerden farkı değillerdi. Oysa Nietzsche’den sonra Gustav Landauer, Rudolf Rucker, Emma Goldman gibi anarşistler yaşamı olumlayan neşeyi kucaklayan bir anarşizmin imkanını aramıştır. Nietzsche’yi okuyup onun devlet, ahlak ve benzeri otoritelere olan mesafesini anarşist kuram ile harmanlamaya çalışmışlardır.

Ben Nietzsche’nin anarşizme çok şey öğrettiğini ve öğretebileceğini düşünüyorum ancak yine de Nietzsche ile anarşizm arasındaki ilişkinin onun özgürlük anlayışında ve bütün değerleri yeniden değerlendirmesinde değil de adalet kavrayışında bulunacağını düşünüyorum. Başka bir ifadeyle Nietzsche’nin bilinen en temel kavramlarına değil de eserlerinde belli belirsiz kendini gösteren adalet kavramına bakmamız gerektiğini düşünüyorum.

Aynı şekilde Arendt’in de anarşizme neyin siyasal olup neyin siyasal olmadığını öğretmesi açısından katabileceği çok şey olduğunu düşünüyorum. Anarşizmi sosyo- politik bir teori olmaktan çıkarıp onu kamusalıya yaslanan bir kurama dönüştürmek için Arendt’in özel ve kamusal alan ayırımına ihtiyacımız var.

Arendt’i ve Nietzsche’yi anarşist bir adalet kuramı için yan yana getirdiğimizde ortaya bazı zorluklar çıkmaktadır. Özellikle bu adaletin sosyal veya hukuksal bir adalet değil de ebedi bir adalet olduğu düşünülürse bunun

anarşizm ile ilgisi bizi yine bir siyaset felsefesine götürecektir. Her şeyden önce böylesi bir anarşist adalet kuramı sosyal veya ekonomik eksenli yeni bir toplum modeli önermez. Yeni bir toplum dahi önerme iddiasından uzaktır. Ebedi adaletin siyaset alanında işlediğini iddia eden anarşist bir kuram ancak yeni bir insan önerebilir. Bu açıdan Nietzsche'nin Arendt'e göre ebedi adalet fikrine daha fazla olanak tanıyan bir düşünür olduğunu düşünüyorum. Elbette Nietzsche anarşist değildi. Döneminin sosyal adalet ve eşitlik isteyen anarşistlerine karşı da oldukça eleştireldi. Ancak anarşizmi bir toplum kuramından çıkarıp siyaset felsefesi alanın konusu haline getirdiğimizde, yani herhangi bir kurucu arkhe'nin var olmadığını iddia ettiğimizde Nietzsche ve anarşizm arasındaki benzerlikler şaşırtıcı bir şekilde artar.

Ebedi adalet penceresinden baktığımızda kamusal alanda gerçekleşen her şey; bu ister şiddet içersin ister içermesin, her zaman adildir ve kozmik bir yasanın dışı vurumudur. Ancak bu biz ölümlü canlıların kavrayabileceği ve pratik edebileceği bir şey değildir. Zeus'un babasını devirmesi de Prometheus'un onu devirecek bir insanlık yaratma girişimi de ebedi adeleti gözetimi altındadır.

Bilindiği gibi Yunan tanrıları kendi keyiflerince insanlara zarar verebilir veya onlara yardım edebilir güçteydiler. Herhangi bir erkek tanrı beğendiği bir ölümlü bir kadını kaçırabilir ve tecavüz edebilirdi. Athena kendisine saygısızlık eden bir kadını lanetleyebilir veya bir kahramanı savaş alanında destekleyebilirdi.

Antik Yunan'ın düşünce dünyasında tanrılar güçlü oldukları için insan dünyasına ait ahlaki bir kurala veya yasaya göre hareket etmezlerdi yani iyinin ve kötünün ötesindeydiler. Tanrılar seçimlerini güçlü oldukları için kendi arzularına ve düşüncelerine göre yaparlardı. Bu açıdan tanrıların davranışları ancak kozmik adaletin kuşatıcılığı ile anlaşılabilir.

Ben bu tip bir kozmik/ebedi bir adaleti ısrarla anarşist bir adalet olarak görmeyi tercih ediyorum; çünkü böylesi bir adalet insan aklının kurduğu düzene ve kurallara ait değildir. Bir özü, başlangıcı, sonu yoktur. İnsanlığı, işçi sınıfını veya herhangi bir özneyi kurtarma iddiası da olmadığı için böylesi bir adalet her şeyin adil olduğunu ve hiçbir şeyin adil olmadığını söylemektedir. Elbette böylesi bir ebedi adaletin yeni bir anarşist toplum vaadiyle fazla bir ilgisi yoktur. Bu tarz anarşist bir adalet kozmolojik tahayyülünden ötürü bize ekonomik, sosyal ve ahlaki bir kurallar bütünü yani yasalar veya cezalar sunmaz; ancak yeni bir insan tahayyülüne sahip olduğu için yeni bir insan ilişkileri biçimini de kaçınılmaz olarak beraberinde getirecektir. Yine de *Dike*'nin *Themis*'i anlayıp ona benzeyebileceğini, ondan pay alabileceğini veya ona öykünebileceğini aklımızdan çıkarmamamız gerekiyor.

Şüphesiz kozmik adalet iynin ve kötünün ötesinde kurulmuş olan kamusal alanda en üst formunu açığa çıkarıyor olsa da onun özel alanda ve doğanın diğer alanlarında da çalıştığını söyleyebiliriz. *Themis* mineraller, bitkiler ve hayvanlar dünyasını, yani doğanın diğer bütün katmanlarını da kapsamaktadır ancak sadece kamusal olanda en yetkin halini dışa vurmaktadır.

Tıpkı Arendt gibi ben de ihtiyacın siyaset alanından çekilmesini istiyorum; ancak bunu özgürlük için değil, ilahi adaletin kendini açığa vurabilmesi için istiyorum ancak daha kozmolojik bir yerden bakarsak kamusal alanın çöküşü bile ebedi adaletin yasalarını ihlal eden bir şey olarak görülmemelidir. Ben Arendt gibi kamusal alanın yeniden kurulmasının siyasal için en önemli şey olduğunu düşünmüyorum ama 'mümkünse' kamusal alanı yeniden kuralım.

Arendt bize kamusal alanı çökerten ihtiyaç politikalarının dünyası sevmemekten kaynaklandığını ima etmektedir. Ancak kamusal alan

çöktüğünde bile dünya aslında bir çöküntü halinde olsa bile sevmeye değerdir. Dünya kamusalık deneyimi olmadan da sevebilir ancak kamusalık deneyimiyle birlikte onu daha berrak bir şekilde sevebiliriz.

Nietzsche'ye dönersek aslında Nietzsche'nin kader sevgisi Arendt'in dünya sevgisini kapsayan ve onu aşan bir kavramdır; çünkü Nietzsche bizi kimseyi suçlamamaya, hatta suçlayanı bile suçlamamaya çağırmaktadır. Arendt ise son derece teorik bir hamle ile kamusal alanı çökertenleri suçlamaktadır. Ebedi adaleti duyabilmemiz için her şeyden önce kaderi sevmemiz ondan sonra da dünyayı sevmemiz gerekir.

Sonuç olarak, ebedi adalet sosyal ve hukuksal adalet kuramlarından farklı olarak insan- merkezci bir evren algısına sahip değildir. Böyle bir algıya sahip olmadığı için ahlaki, sosyal ve ekonomik herhangi bir yasaya bağlı şekilde işlemez. Doğası gereği anarşizandır; çünkü herhangi bir metafizik ilkeye göre kendini konumlandırmaz. Liberalizm ve Marksizm böylesi bir adalet kuramı için yeterli değildir; çünkü iki fikir de o veya bu şekilde dünyanın nasıl olması gerektiğine dair bir fikre sahiptir. İki kuram da modernitenin özgürlük, eşitlik ve adalet anlayışının dışına çıkamamaktadır ve en önemlisi her iki kuram da insanı merkeze almaktadır. Şüphesiz ki bu insan modern bir insandır.

Değerli okur, ebedi adaletin nasıl işlediği hakkında yazmaya ve onu tasvir etmeye aslında o kadar da gerek yoktur. O bir kuşun ötüşünde, bir nehrin akışında kendini gösterdiği kadar Napolyon kendini imparator ilan ettiğinde veya İsa çarmıha gerildiğinde de kendini göstermektedir. Dünyanın adalet getirilmeye değil zaten gerçekleşmekte olan adaleti anlamaya ve dinlemeye ihtiyacı vardır. Bu yüzden ebedi adalet nasıl inşa edileceğine dair siyasi, sosyal veya etik bir kuram önermek onun doğasını daha baştan yadsımak anlamına gelir.

O yařamın özel alanından kamusal alanına kadar her yerde kendini göstermektedir. Kaderi ve Dünya'yı olduđu gibi sevdiđimizde onu daha iyi duyacak ve anlayacađız. Tm yapmamız gereken ebedi adaletin sosyal ve hukuksal adalet algısından ayrı kozmolojik bir anlamı olduđunu hatırlamak ve onu anlamaya çalışmaktır. Dünya'nın nasıl olması gerektiđine sadece sen karar vereceksin, kendi deđerlerini btn deđerleri yeniden deđerlendirerek bulan 'yeni' bir insan, iřte ancak odur ebedi adaletin parlaklıđını artıran.

Dnya'da ve Kader'de olan btn kamusal olaylara "evet" diyebildiđimiz gn Ebedi Adalet'in btn kozmosu nasıl dndrdđn de anlamıř olacađız. Bu adalet iynin ve ktnn, gzel ve çirkinin, aydınlık ve karanlıđın, yařam ve lmn, ezen ve ezilenin tesinde anlařılmayı ve dinlenmeyi bekliyor. Ebedi Adalet'in yeni bir dnya yaratan çocuđu (Prometheus) kurulu herhangi bir dzen iin her zaman bir kaos olarak algılanacaktır. Yeni bir insan ve dnya hayali olan her řey kurulu dzene karřı yıkıcı ve tahrip edici grnr. Oysa gerek yeni bir yaratımın ezici ađırlıđının nceki dzene kaos hissi vermesidir. Sadece kendini referans alan yeni bir insan ve dzen arayıřı kurulu yapılar tarafından bir tehdit olarak algılanacaktır. Dünya'nın kurtarılmaya veya deđiřtirilmeye ihtiyaı yoktur. Ebedi Adalet'in her yerde ve her řekilde iřlediđini grebildiđimiz vakit dnyayı kurtarma hevesi olan btn siyasi kuramları bir kenara bırakıp yařamaya bařlayacađız ve en nemlisi siyaset yapmaya bařlayacađız. Siyaset yapamadıkları iin siyasi gleri kudretleri buna yetmediđi iin dřmanlarından yazarak intikam almaya alışan btn siyaset kuramcılarını ve filozoflarını bir kenara bırakıp Ebedi Adalet'in çocuđu olmaya alışıyorum.

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