

TIME AS THE GROUND OF TRANSCENDENCE:
A DIALOGUE BETWEEN KANT AND HEIDEGGER



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ABSTRACT

TIME AS THE GROUND OF TRANSCENDENCE: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN KANT AND HEIDEGGER

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In this dissertation, I attempt to present a critical dialogue between Immanuel Kant and Martin Heidegger in terms of *time*. Heidegger sees his own project of the interpretation of *Critique of Pure Reason* as a retrieval (*Wiederholung*) of the problem of the ground laying of metaphysics. I do aim at furthering the dialogue first by basing my reading on the way that Heidegger interprets Kant and second by tracing what Heidegger should have thought within the relevant context. In this regard, my project is to pursue the way that Heidegger derives his understanding of temporality and transcendence from his reading of *Critique of Pure Reason* which at the same time offers a novel evaluation concerning the main yet subtle themes of the latter, such as time as pure image. Although it is commonly acknowledged that Heidegger is indebted to Kant for his own understanding of temporality, the resultant view he came up with has given rise to strong approvals or rejections. Although those reactions definitely have significance in the literature, Heidegger's methodology seems to remain unquestioned to a great extent. The dissertation in its culmination aims to fill this lacuna in the relevant literature — and it does so, on the one hand, by putting Heidegger's methodology into question and, on the other, by

indicating an alternative reading regarding the relationship between temporality and transcendence. I suggest that Heidegger's derivation of temporality from Kant's threefold synthesis is untenable, yet — as he says for Kant — he indeed does have insight into the inconspicuous, i.e., the pure image of time, which I take to be the only possible background against which Heidegger should and could have characterized temporality as transcendence.

Keywords: Transcendence, Temporality, Imagination, Pure Image, Time



ÖZ

AŞKINLIĞIN ZEMİNİ OLARAK ZAMAN: KANT VE HEIDEGGER ARASINDA BİR DİYALOG

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Bu çalışmada, Immanuel Kant ve Martin Heidegger arasında “zaman” bağlamında bir diyalog sunulmuştur. Heidegger, *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*’ne dair yorumunda kendi projesini metafiziğin zemininin oluşturulmasına dair bir “yineleme” (*Wiederholung*) olarak görür. Ben de bu tezde, öncelikle Heidegger’in Kant yorumuna yer vererek, ikincisi ise alakalı bağlam içinde Heidegger nereye varabilirdi sorusu üzerinden ilerleyerek bu diyalogu geliştirmeyi hedefliyorum. Bu açıdan, Heidegger’in kendi “aşkınlık” ve “zamansallık” düşüncelerini *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*’nden nasıl türettiğinin yolunu izlerken, temel ve incelikli bazı konularda da alternatif bir okuma sunabilmeyi hedefliyorum ve burada da bu proje adına “saf zaman resmi” mefhumunu öne çıkarmayı planlıyorum. Heidegger’in zamansallık düşüncesini Kant okumasından türettiği çoğunlukla bilinse de vardığı sonuç itibarıyla güçlü kabul ve redlerle karşılaşmıştır. Şüphesiz bu değerlendirmelerin literatürde önemli bir yeri vardır ancak belirtmeliyim ki Heidegger’in yöntemi büyük oranda ele alınmadan bırakılmıştır. Bu proje literatürdeki işte bu boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlar: bunu yaparken hem Heidegger’in yöntemini ana eksene oturtur hem de aşkınlık ve zamansallık ilişkisi bağlamında alternatif bir yorum

sunmayı hedefler. Önerim ise en temelinde şudur: Heidegger'in üçlü sentezden zamansallık türetmesi makul bir yorum olmamakla beraber, daha orijinal olana dair sezgisi — onun Kant için söylemiş olduğu gibi — çok güçlüdür. Burada Heidegger adına “söylenmemiş” olan ise “saf zaman resmi”dir. İddiam odur ki Heidegger’ci anlamda aşkınlık olarak zamansallık ancak ve ancak saf zaman resminden türetilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Aşkınlık, Zamansallık, Imgelem, Saf Resim, Zaman





For Nazik

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

*What then is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not.*¹

How would one philosophically encounter time when it is ordinarily the most familiar? The question concerning time has long occupied the minds of certain distinguished philosophers. The present dissertation is an attempt at staging a dialogue between two of them, Immanuel Kant and Martin Heidegger, with regard to *time* with a specific philosophical focus as will be explained below. In this regard, part of my project is to pursue the way that Heidegger derives his understanding of temporality and transcendence from his reading of *Critique of Pure Reason*. The dissertation, then, critically assesses Heidegger's methodology for such a derivation by asking the guiding question whether his method of doing so is tenable. The significance of this question lies not so much on a directly-provided answer to the question, as it does in examining Heidegger's *methodology*. This examination is indispensable with regard to two aspects: first, it opens to question what has so far remained out of focus in the relevant literature; and second, it carries within itself the opportunity for an alternative, i.e., a novel evaluation that attempts to further the dialogue from a point where Heidegger himself left untouched. This point is nothing other than Kant's understanding of time as pure image. In this regard, I will critically scrutinize Heidegger's original way of deriving temporality — and transcendence — from his reading of Kant's threefold synthesis as I also point to time as pure image as an alternative interpretation for the ground of transcendence.² The problem

¹ Saint Augustine, *The Confessions of Augustine* (New York: Wiley, 1860). 315.

² I should at the outset remark that Heidegger uses the word 'transcendence' for Kant's understanding of "transcendental."

of transcendence is crucial from two viewpoints which for the main thesis of the dissertation are seen to be intertwined. From a Kantian perspective, it signifies the conditions of the possibility of cognition. Second, from a Heideggerian perspective, it delineates the *openedness* of Dasein to the “world” — strictly speaking, it represents that and how Dasein *is* the world. The frame of the study, then, is determined by the problem of transcendence in the aforementioned twofold sense. In this regard, the usage of “transcendence” throughout the dissertation refers to these two senses at once, i.e., both condition and openedness.

The methodology I undertake in this dissertation is systematic textual reading and discussion. By this means, I attempt to provide a hermeneutical account of Heidegger’s interpretation of *Critique of Pure Reason* centered around the theme of “time.” In order to achieve this I offer a close reading of some of Heidegger’s most basic readings which are *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason,”* *Being and Time*, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* and *Logic: The Question of Truth*. For Kant’s own understanding of the relevant themes, I utilize *Critique of Pure Reason*.³

Now I want to make certain remarks regarding the relevant background to familiarize the reader with the structure. During the years 1927-29, Heidegger had a growing interest and engagement with Kantian critical philosophy. The year of the publication of *Being and Time* (1927), has been the same with the lecture course *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*,⁴ which was followed by another one delivered in the winter semester of 1927-28 titled *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason.”* Just after these, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* which interpreted the *Critique* as laying the ground for metaphysics, appeared in the year 1929.

³ I present an interpretation of *Critique of Pure Reason* up to the “Transcendental Dialectic” part.

⁴ Heidegger permitted the text of the course to be published almost half a century later. See Translator’s Preface in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*.

The planned first division of the second part of *Being and Time* was devoted to Kant's doctrine of the schematism and of time, which was not published as so.⁵ However, the finished version (of *Being and Time*), taken together with *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* and *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, may have been, in three volumes, closest to the outline Heidegger had planned.⁶ Therefore, these three and *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"* can be taken as consisting a coherent totality, each approaching the similar theme from another subtle aspect. Accordingly, my reading and interpretation are mostly based on these primary sources in what follows.

In Chapter 2 of the dissertation, I begin with a general remark concerning Heidegger's specific interest in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, during the late 1920s. Heidegger's interpretation of the *Critique*, I point out, has a twofold significance. Firstly, regardless of how much Heidegger's reading is criticized for doing "violence" to the *Critique*, it sheds a new light onto the much-debated issues within the latter. In this regard, I believe it opens up a path that will in turn be a fertile ground for the generation of novel philosophical discussions. Secondly, Heidegger's interpretation of the *Critique* provides the reader with an occasion to probe into his own thinking around that period *within the context* — which otherwise runs the risk of being unduly marginalized.

In the supposed dialogue with Kant, Heidegger's approach comprises laying bare what remains in darkness — in his words, what is "unsaid." Broadly construed, Heidegger's interpretation consists in positioning the *Critique* into an ontological framework. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger refers to this project as "laying of the ground for metaphysics." Whether this framework is in accord with Kant's original understanding or it is Heidegger postulating it that way will be a matter of concern throughout that chapter.

⁵ The published version of *Being and Time* consists of only two divisions of the first part compared to the planned version.

⁶ Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1988). Translator's introduction. Xvii.

According to Heidegger, Kant did have insight into time in its originality. However, Heidegger contends, Kant, in the second edition of the first *Critique*, shrank back from what he had discovered, namely, the transcendental power of imagination as the root of the two stems of our knowledge which are sensibility and understanding. This mostly has to do with the way that Kant, and the traditional philosophy before him, apprehended “Logic.” In this regard, I take up Heidegger’s treatment of Kant’s logic in comparison to what the former refers to “logic as *αποφαίνεσθαι*.” After a broad outline in order to render the reader familiar with how Kant handles logic in relation to the categories, I will claim that Heidegger’s ontological assessment of the *Critique* rests in reading the *a priori* conditions of experience that find their seat in the faculties of sensibility and pure understanding as primordially rooted in the transcendental power of imagination. Here, Heidegger’s ontological assessment of what Kant calls as the transcendental conditions constituting the possibility of experience will lead us to the question of transcendence. In order to clarify the Heideggerian assessment of the Kantian transcendental conditions as a matter of transcendence, I will first critically examine whether Heidegger himself is a transcendental philosopher in the Kantian sense. In order to do justice to the ontological and the transcendental problematic, I attempt at a clarification of Heidegger’s usage of the notions of “ontology,” and “transcendental philosophy.” There, I point out that although one may set as their goal a disentanglement of the obscurity that surrounds these notions, it will soon be seen that the problematic is more than a linguistic one. Eventually, the chapter arrives at the point of realization that an examination concerning methodology becomes indispensable. This is still related with the subject matter at its core since Heidegger asserts that the unique method of ontology is nothing else than phenomenology. Hence, the discussion turns out to be one that has to do with the question whether Heidegger’s interpretation of the *Critique* by means of a phenomenological method is tenable. This, I assume, can be handled only as long as one gets a grasp on what each philosopher understands from the *a priori*. In broad terms, whereas for Kant the *a priori* signifies the universal and necessary, Heidegger interprets it as “always already.” The latter lays bare the indispensable relation (for Heidegger) between *a priori* and time which at the same time points to the problem of finitude to be handled in Chapter 3. In a nutshell, for Heidegger, the *a priori* structure of Dasein

expresses its finite being — what is *a priori* in Dasein's structure is what makes it finite.

Having its departure from the project of ground-laying, Heidegger explores the main theme of the *Critique* as “finitude.” In order to render this element within the *Critique* visible, in Chapter 3, I first juxtapose this theme with Kant's famous “Copernican Revolution.” One may get a grasp of Kant's account of finitude with regard to both his limitation of knowledge with the scope of possible experience, and the sensible nature of human intuition. However, as far as Heidegger's challenge is concerned, Kant's understanding of finitude remains within the bounds of the traditional philosophy.

Heidegger conceives the indispensable component of finitude as transcendence, for a finite being must transcend itself in order for experience to be possible. Here, Heidegger interprets the Kantian notion of the “transcendental” indicating the *a priori* conditions of the possibility of experience in line with the issue of “transcendence” which preliminarily means “stepping beyond”. I accordingly bring transcendence to the fore in order to explicate its presumed relation to the Kantian notion of the “transcendental” by displaying and discussing the pertinent perspectives of Kant, Heidegger, and also “Heidegger's Kant”. Again, Heidegger will not be content with Kant's understanding of transcendence which brings him to search for what he calls a more originary ground that enables the transcendence of a finite being, namely, Dasein. This ground, as will be seen, can only be laid bare within the structure of “being-in-the-world” — as Heidegger understands it. Thus Heidegger characterizes Dasein as the mode of the being of the human which designates never an inner worldly extant or entity, but rather an issue of existing “always already” in-the-world. Before giving place to the human being's fundamental structure from Heidegger's viewpoint as being-in-the-world, I touch upon Heidegger's notion of “existence” (of Dasein) in contrast to the notion of “extantness”. Thereby, I refer to Heidegger's challenge against traditional philosophy that assesses as *extant* what indeed *exists* (from his own point of view). Thus, for Heidegger, existence is only specific to Dasein's mode of being, and further it is always an issue for Dasein. The issue of existence as “being-in-the-

world” indicates the intimate connection of finitude and transcendence in Heidegger’s thinking. Finally, in chapter 3, I explicate Heidegger’s understanding of “being-in-the-world” as laying bare the ground of transcendence and point how “transcendence”, as indicating the issue of being-in-the-world, is the manner of our finite existence. Given this assessment that the ground of transcendence can only be laid bare through the notion of the world, I shall conclude this chapter by raising Heidegger’s remark that the phenomenon of the world is what is left “unthought” in Kant.

Above all, the third chapter concludes by hitting upon what Heidegger conceives as “unthought” in Kant, namely, being-in-the-world as an “always already” (a priori) structure of our finite existence. This, as we shall see in the fourth chapter, paves way to Heidegger’s encounter with Kant with regard to the notion of time. Heidegger, in order to retrieve what is glimpsed but left “unthought” in Kant’s transcendental philosophy, traces the transcendental conditions of possible experience back to an originary and a unitary source that becomes the horizon of being, namely, the original time.

Chapter 4 begins with the remark that Heidegger’s understanding of original time (temporality) and his interpretation of Kant’s transcendental power of imagination are mutually implicative. That chapter’s task, then, turns out to disclose what Heidegger precisely realized in Kant’s account of imagination. To explore the seeds of Heidegger’s notion of temporality, I first explicate the function of transcendental imagination within Transcendental Deduction (in A edition) and Schematism, respectively. There, I attempt to explore its significance in Kant’s system, in order to be then followed by Heidegger’s.

There are two distinguished, though not entirely clear cut, sides within Transcendental Deduction — namely, objective and subjective. I will offer a treatment of both in order to provide the reader with a broad picture concerning transcendental imagination in its functionality. The chief aim of the objective side (or the “objective deduction”) is to account for the categories’ necessary applicability to the objects of experience — and this Kant designates as “objective

validity” of the categories. Kant views the account thus provided as pertaining to “*quid juris*.” Subjective deduction, on the other hand, deals with those sources — sense, imagination, apperception — that make cognition possible. Kant attributes distinct functions to each and I treat these in the fourth chapter. The kernel of the subjective deduction, concerning the subject matter, is the “threefold synthesis”: the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, of the reproduction in imagination, and of recognition in the concept — hence I cover them in detail.

If Transcendental Deduction undertakes to bring forth the necessary application of categories to the appearances that are given under forms of sensibility — arguing that they *must* be so applied — then the task of the Schematism involves highlighting the *sensible condition* under which their necessary application is determined. In other words, it is only the schemata that make the “subsumption” of appearances under pure concepts possible. Transcendental power of imagination, by means of the schemata, determines time in a transcendental fashion. This in turn is possible, as far as I see, only by means of providing a “pure image” in accordance with the rule grounded in the pure concepts of understanding. In this regard, I contend that different layers of time must be distinguished.

According to Heidegger, Kant’s notion of the “possibility of experience” signifies that (and brings to bear *how*) a finite being is able to know, namely, to “transcend” itself. Now Heidegger touches upon two basic requirements in order for cognition —and hence for *truth* — to be possible: firstly, the object must be *given* which entails Dasein’s preliminary “turning-toward” to it which in turn presupposes that there be some prior “horizon” that makes this very encounter (between the subject and the object) possible. This horizon, he will then contend, is “ecstatical temporality.” Thus, I introduce there Heidegger’s understanding of ecstasis and temporality within broad lines.

To turn back to the principal matter, I address Heidegger’s reading of both Transcendental Deduction and Schematism. Since Heidegger’s fundamental outlook concerning imagination is to evaluate it as the common root of sensibility

and understanding, I explicate his interpretation by heavily relying on his stance concerning the deduction and schematism.

I critically examine Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's threefold synthesis since it is the basic source for Heidegger to arrive at his understanding of temporality. After an explication of Heidegger's standpoint concerning the synthesis, I move on to the next chapter.

The fifth chapter, again, handles the threefold synthesis and schematism with a focus on the pure image of time. This latter is the kernel of my evaluation of the supposed dialogue between Kant and Heidegger. In this regard, I first indicate my discontent concerning Heidegger's methodology for his derivation of temporality. In a nutshell, I argue that the threefold synthesis cannot be the decisive source for deriving something like temporality — in relation to various reasons that I articulate in detail. In that chapter, I also point to the problem regarding Heidegger's way of putting forward *imagination* by means of what I see to be a reduction of understanding to imagination.

I then draw attention to Heidegger's appropriation of Kant's understanding of "significance." The parallelism laid bare there allows me to discuss what can be posited as the original source behind transcendence, as well as behind something like a horizon. There, one can clearly see how for both Kant and Heidegger the problems of significance and transcendence are intertwined.

In the same chapter, I also provide my reading of Kant's "Principles" that is to be assessed as the completion of the task inaugurated by Transcendental Deduction. As fundamental synthetic judgments *a priori*, the principles ground all other judgments whether synthetic or analytic. Although Kant gives prominence to the principles, Heidegger seems to remain in silence concerning these until the mid-1930s — the period when the famous so-called *Kehre* in his thought begins to take place. Although Heidegger then analyzes the principles in detail, I hold my reserve concerning its place within the dialogue; that is, I believe it no longer can be taken

as an indispensable component for the question whether Heidegger is still a Kantian philosopher can no longer be replied with confidence.

Examining the principles enables me to spell out an encounter with the unique structure of time that I explicate in that chapter. I owe this derivation to the observation of the four principles in relation to the pure image of time. Once this relation is established, I believe, one has a more acute sense of what remains “unsaid” — this time in Heidegger’s thought.



CHAPTER 2

AN ONTO-PHENOMENOLOGICAL READING OF *CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON*

2.1. Interpretative Violence?

Beginning with the late 1920s, Heidegger had a profound interest in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. This preoccupation of Heidegger's in Kant's critical philosophy, I believe, has a dual significance. On the one hand, it sheds new light on the usual assessment of the *Critique*, and on the other it helps one better comprehend Heidegger's central project during these years. This project, broadly construed, is to demonstrate the centrality of *time* in human experience. One may see Heidegger as a disciple of Kant in this respect yet this manner of reducing the issue to a mere legacy would be missing the entire edifice Heidegger builds up anew from within the *Critique*. Instead, Heidegger, to put it more accurately, regards his own project as entering into dialogue (*Auseinandersetzung*) with Kant.⁷ This dialogue has not so much to do with what Kant did say as with what Kant "had wanted to say."⁸ This strategy has been the target of many criticisms initiated most notably by Ernst Cassirer, who accused Heidegger of "doing violence" to the text: "[In the *Kantbook*] Heidegger speaks no longer as a commentator, but as a usurper, who as it were enters

⁷ Martin Weatherston, *Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant: Categories, Imagination and Temporality* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 3f.

⁸ Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 5th ed. (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1997). 141. Aka. *Kantbook*.

with force of arms into the Kantian system in order to subjugate it and to make it serve his own problematic.”⁹

On the other hand, others who are more sympathetic to Heidegger’s reading assert that he derives this interpretation from within the “context of the *Critique*.”¹⁰ Strikingly enough, Heidegger admits doing some violence to the text. However, his manner is already shaped by venturing beyond getting a clearer picture of what Kant simply says. Indeed, doing violence is a part of his strategy reading the *Critique*:

in order to wring from what the words say, what it is they want to say, every interpretation (*Interpretation*) must necessarily use violence. Such violence, however, cannot be roving arbitrariness. The power of an idea which shines forth must drive and guide the laying-out (*Auslegung*).¹¹

For Heidegger, the “violence” that every interpretation must use in order to grasp the phenomena cannot be due to the commentator’s will. On the contrary, one must be driven by the idea that forms the text. To this aim, at the very beginning of the *Kantbook*, Heidegger articulates the theme of his investigation as having to do with interpreting the *Critique* as “laying of the ground for metaphysics and thus of placing the problem of metaphysics before us as fundamental ontology.”¹² As is seen, the theme of the *Kantbook* is comprised of a twofold task connected to each other. In this regard, one needs both to understand the sense of ground-laying for metaphysics and what this ground-laying has to do with what Heidegger calls “fundamental ontology.”

⁹ Ernst Cassirer, “Kant Und Das Problem Der Metaphysik,” *Kant-Studien* 36, no. 1–2 (1931): 1–26. (Tr. by Martin Weatherston)

¹⁰ Charles M. Sherover, *Heidegger, Kant and Time* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971). 133.

¹¹ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 141.

¹² *Ibid.* 1.

2.2. Laying the Ground for Fundamental Ontology

To begin with, the meaning of the Heideggerian usage of ‘laying the ground’ must be clarified. At this point, Heidegger gives the example of a building. Alluding to what Kant says of metaphysics, namely his seeing metaphysics as a “natural predisposition,”¹³ he contends that one must still avoid the representation of this ground-laying as a foundation of an “already-constructed building,” or substitution of one for the other. Rather, for Heidegger, the significance of the ground-laying lies in “projecting of the building plan itself” in order to grant its agreement concerning how the building will be grounded.¹⁴ In this sense, the *Kantbook*’s main objective is to follow Kant in his ground-laying. Strictly speaking, Heidegger sees his own project as a retrieval (*Wiederholung*).¹⁵ He clarifies this as follows:

By the retrieval of a basic problem, we understand the opening-up of its original, long-concealed possibilities, through the working-out of which it is transformed. In this way it first comes to be preserved in its capacity as a problem. To preserve a problem, however, means to free and keep watch over those inner forces which make it possible, on the basis of its essence, as a problem.¹⁶

Thus, Heidegger’s interpretation of the *Critique* attempts to retrieve the core problematic of the latter by setting its possibilities free. What comes to the fore when this is done so will be treated in due course; yet I should initially point out that Heidegger’s attempt to lay bare the fundamental ontology of Dasein (specifically in *Being and Time*) and his interpretation of the *Critique* goes hand in hand. *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* thus arises out of a merging-together of Kant’s critical philosophy with what Heidegger maintains in *Being and Time*. The latter, so to

¹³ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). B21.

¹⁴ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 1f.

¹⁵ Sherover, *Heidegger, Kant and Time*. 12n. Sherover suggests that the literal meaning of the original ‘Wiederholung’, derived from the verb ‘wiederholen’ means “to hold again.” In this sense, translating this term as ‘repetition’ incorrectly connotes to a mechanical kind of sense. Thus, following Richardson and Sherover, I keep the French derivative ‘retrieve.’

¹⁶ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 143.

speak, can be read as an attempt to go beyond Kant while at the same time grounding on the very insight gained from him. This central insight that Heidegger takes notice of and undertakes the task to transform so as to uncover a phenomenological account of the constitution of Dasein is nothing but the all-pervasiveness of *time* throughout the *Critique*.

Nevertheless, Heidegger time and again maintains that Kant shrank back from what he indeed saw since he was still oriented within the remnants of traditional western philosophy in a double sense. Firstly, Heidegger contends that Kant followed the Cartesian tradition in the sense of the latter's neglecting of the subjectivity of the subject. While Descartes asserted that he put philosophy on a novel and firm ground with his "*cogito ergo sum*," what he left untouched in his *radical* beginning was to account for the Being of the *res cogitans*, i.e., "the meaning of the Being of the 'sum.'" ¹⁷ Likewise, for Heidegger, Kant fails to give an ontology of Dasein, although he had gone beyond the former concerning the essential respects. And secondly, for Heidegger, even if Kant positions *time* within the subject, his analysis of it remains bound again within the traditional understanding of time as now-sequence, which eventually prevented him from elucidating his schematism (as-*transcendental determination of time*). ¹⁸

Keeping these in view, Weatherston underlines that the first *Critique* is undoubtedly crucial for Heidegger. According to him, Heidegger's interest is shaped not only by Kant's insight into the relation between time and the problem of Being, but also by Kant's hesitation — or equivocality in manner — for deepening what he discovered. ¹⁹ The reason why this is so mostly has to do with how Kant and the traditional philosophy before him apprehended "logic."

¹⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008). 24. References for this edition to German pagination.

¹⁸ Ibid. 45.

¹⁹ Weatherston, *Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant: Categories, Imagination and Temporality*. 14.

2.3. Logic and Ontology

If, understood traditionally, the basic signification of the term ‘logos’ is *discourse*, this will not still mean much until the significance of discourse itself is to be determined. The real sense of discourse gets more and more covered up by what comes as subsequent interpretation of the word ‘logos.’ It gets translated, (and so always gets interpreted) as “reason, judgment, concept, definition, ground, or relationship” among others.²⁰

For Heidegger, this variety of difference exposes the susceptible nature of discourse to modification. He contends that even if logos is understood as “assertion,” and “assertion” in the sense of “judgement,” that will still be missing something essential about the term, especially if judgement is to be taken in a sense of contemporary theory of judgement. Logos, Heidegger argues, does not primarily mean judgement, if one understands by it a way of “‘binding’ something with something else” or the “‘taking of a stand.’”²¹ What logos as discourse rather signifies is to make manifest what one is “talking about” in one’s discourse.

Alluding to Aristotle, Heidegger gives place to this function of *λογος* as *αποφαίνεσθαι*, that is, to bring into appearance. In this sense, logos lets something be seen: “it lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about.”²² Only within carrying over this function (that *λογος* is seen as *ἀπόφαντις*) can the logos have the structural constitution of *σύνθεσις*. One should understand *synthesis* here not in a sense of mere binding together of the so-called psychical with the *external* physical. Rather, Heidegger contends, “the *συν* has a purely apophantical

²⁰ Heidegger, *Being and Time*. H32.

²¹ Ibid. H32.

²² Ibid. H32.

signification and means letting something be seen in its togetherness (*Beisammen*) with something — letting it be seen *as* something.”²³

Heidegger’s above-mentioned analyses hold a central place within the broader context of his attempt at drawing fundamental ontology. He explicates this as follows:

the analysis of assertion has a special position in the problematic of fundamental ontology, because in the decisive period when ancient ontology was beginning, the *λόγος* functioned as the only clue for obtaining access to that which authentically *is* [zum eigentlich Seienden], and for defining the Being of such entities. Finally assertion has been accepted from ancient times as the primary and authentic ‘locus’ of *truth*.²⁴

What we initially grasp from the quotation above is a dual relation to Being whose inextricably linked parts are assertion and truth. Heidegger’s scrutiny into the intricate nature of this relationship is meant to serve as a basis for his task of the destruction of traditional ontology. By means of this analysis, he attempts to pinpoint, as it were, the way that Kant comes to derive his fundamental assertions against the tradition.²⁵

According to Heidegger, Kant does question into the foundations of logic although it is not initially visible from the outside.²⁶ As is well known, Kant’s main goal in the first *Critique* is to inquire into the possibility of articulating true assertions about nature and this task specifically belongs to the *deduction* of the categories. As Heidegger elucidates, assertion is traditionally supposed to be articulated by the categories. Going back to the ontology of the ancients, Heidegger states that the entities one discovers within the world are to be taken as the basic instances of the

²³ Ibid. H33.

²⁴ Ibid. 196.

²⁵ I use ‘against’ here in a double sense in order to make it connote with being contrary to something and having something against the background of (something else).

²⁶ Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. 222.

interpretation of Being. Entities are said to be accessed within *λογος*. Heidegger elucidates his point as follows:

the Being of these entities must be something which can be grasped in a distinctive kind of *λέγειν* (letting something be seen), so that this Being becomes intelligible in advance as that which it is — and as that which it is already in every entity. In any discussion (*λογος*) of entities, we have previously addressed ourselves to Being; this addressing is *κατηγορεῖσθαι* When used ontologically, this term means taking an entity to task, as it were, for whatever it is an entity — that is to say, letting everyone see it in its Being. The *κατηγορίαι* are what is sighted and what is visible in such a seeing. They include the various ways in which the nature of those entities which can be addressed and discussed in *λογος* may be determined *a priori*.²⁷

Assertion had been formed in terms of categories which entails that any examination on philosophical logic must be an inquiry into the nature of the categories. Kant's fundamental quest, in this regard, is to account for how the “subjective” categories of assertion can make “objective” judgements about nature. Broadly, his solution to this problem lies in his Copernican Revolution, and in specific, his Transcendental Deduction and Analytic of Principles. Thus, he advances that the categories as the basis of assertion are indispensable for constituting the very experience itself. And so, the argument goes, that the categories must be counted among the basic conditions of experience, which make them to be assessed more than mere functions of thought. How the categories are to have this function of constituting experience is to be justified by their relation to intuition. Weatherston holds that this point is the one where Kant makes the critical break with the tradition. Hence, what is distinctive concerning the categories in Kant is their necessary relation to intuition unless they are to remain as mere forms of thought.²⁸

It is this emphasis on intuition that Heidegger admires in Kant. Indeed, Heidegger's reading of Kant argues for the priority of sensibility over understanding, which

²⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*. 70.

²⁸ Weatherston, *Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant: Categories, Imagination and Temporality*. 12.

renders the latter's function as being in the service of the former.²⁹ What Heidegger also derives from Kant is the priority of time over space since it is time that is the form of sensibility of all objects whatsoever.³⁰ The problem of the relation of pure concepts to intuition then specifically turns out to be a problem concerning the categories to time. This relatedness carries within it the potentiality of casting light into the relationship between logos and Being in Kant. Alluding to Kant's design of the *Critique*, Heidegger points out that understanding's possible relation with time fundamentally remains within the boundaries of the "Transcendental Logic," notwithstanding this relation becomes a problem from the "Analytic of Principles" onward. He further emphasizes the fact that this second book's ("Analytic of Principles") appearing within the "Transcendental Logic" itself indicates the beginning of a new problematic which is no longer reserved merely for the "Analytic of Concepts." This problematic is the possible *a priori* unity of intuition and thinking. And out of this theme, there emerges *ontological knowledge* as a "new central issue." What is undoubtedly crucial for Heidegger here is that Kant deals with the problem of the possibility of ontological knowledge in the "Transcendental Logic" which for Heidegger implies that Kant's understanding of ontology is grounded in *logic*.

What is noteworthy is that the question of being or the inquiry into the ontological constitution of beings, ontology, is primarily guided by *Logos*, i.e., by the true statement about beings. This traditional grounding of ontology in logic reaches so far that even the traditional designations for the ontological structures of beings is taken from the field of Logos: categories, κατηγορίαι. But Kant, under strong pressure from traditional motives, centers ontology in logic in a new way.³¹

To turn back to the initial subject-matter, i.e., the problem of ground-laying in relation to fundamental ontology, certain questions need to be raised. To begin with, in the *Kantbook*, Heidegger asks "Why for Kant does laying the ground for

²⁹ Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1997). 57. See A19/B33.

³⁰ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A34/B50.

³¹ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. 114f.

metaphysics become the *Critique of Pure Reason*?”³² Although the basic Kantian answer to this question lies in pure reason’s interrogating itself, asking this question takes Heidegger to fundamental ontology, that is the ontological analytic of Dasein. This can be elucidated by having recourse to the notion of metaphysics. If metaphysics (τα μετά τα φυσικά) signifies a *passing beyond*, and in Heidegger’s sense, if it means specifically to pass beyond (transcend) beings to Being, then one is able to account for how Heidegger sees that project as belonging to fundamental ontology. This kind of an account, for Heidegger, needs to be grounded phenomenologically since it requires to render Dasein — as the inquirer — “transparent” in its own Being,³³ i.e., to let Dasein show itself from itself.

This move for Heidegger is tantamount to uncovering the horizon from out of which Dasein shows itself from itself. At this point, Richardson notes that “the sense (*Sinn*) of anything for Heidegger is the non-concealment by which it appears as itself.”³⁴ Accordingly, the sense (or as sometimes translated as “meaning”) of the Being of Dasein is that which makes possible the non-concealment by which Dasein appears as itself. This point is crucial since it hints at *temporality* as the meaning of the Being of Dasein, or in other words, the “horizon” within which Dasein can show itself from itself. I will treat the issues such as “meaning” and “horizon” in Chapter 5 of the dissertation. I now analyze Heidegger’s broad reading of the *Critique* in terms of phenomenological ontology.

It should be noted that Heidegger’s manner of developing his own ideas by means of the interpretation of other texts is prevalent — and his ontological reading of the first *Critique* is not exempt from it. Such a reading can be assessed either on the grounds of how Heidegger comes up with an ontology of human Dasein taking its cue from Kant’s transcendental philosophy — more precisely, how Heidegger

³² Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 3.

³³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*. H7.

³⁴ William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 4th ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003). 7.

himself is a transcendental philosopher — or it can allude to the way in which the first *Critique* itself can be seen as an inquiry into ontology, in terms of the possibility of it. I will critically examine each approach respectively in what follows.

2.4. Onto-Phenomenological *Critique* or Transcendental Heidegger: The *a Priori*

Concerning the first aspect, William Blattner maintains that Heidegger's ontology is transcendental in a strictly Kantian sense,³⁵ for it is occupied not with the objects themselves but our mode of knowledge towards them. Rachel Zuckert argues that Heidegger's interpretation of the *Critique* is not only a "translation" of the problematic of the latter to his own philosophical concerns, but is "an exercise in transcendental philosophy."³⁶ She further contends that Heidegger's way of doing so is a challenge to Kant with regard to the former's claim that Kant failed properly to analyze the conditions for the possibility of knowledge — and this for Heidegger entails a transformation concerning the *a priori*:

Heidegger transforms Kant's conception of the *a priori*, an epistemological, evidentiary term, into a characterization of our manner and activity of apprehending objects, namely, as that which we understand 'in advance' or 'beforehand,' that which we 'anticipate' in empirical judgments, or our 'pre-ontological understanding' (everyday practical engagement with the world).³⁷

Steven Crowell, in his "Facticity and Transcendental Philosophy," challenges the view that Heidegger's understanding of *facticity*, i.e., his claim as to the situatedness of Dasein itself as being already surrounded in a world, cannot accord with a transcendental demand for *a priori* cognition. According to him, this kind of assumptions betray the idiosyncrasies of a common tendency which sticks to the idea that "philosophy as a form of inquiry that is both autonomous and cognitive is

³⁵ William Blattner, "Ontology, the A Priori, and the Primacy of Practice," in *Transcendental Heidegger*, ed. Steven Corewell & Jeff Malpas (California: Stanford University Press, 2007). 21.

³⁶ Rachel Zuckert, "Projection and Purposiveness: Heidegger's Kant and the Temporalization of Judgment," in *Transcendental Heidegger*, ed. Steven Corewell & Jeff Malpas (California: Stanford University Press, 2007), 215–31. 215.

³⁷ Ibid. 216-18.

impossible.”³⁸ Mark Okrent’s point has close affinities with that of Crowell. Okrent defends the view that Heidegger is a transcendental philosopher in the Kantian sense as well as he is a pragmatist.³⁹ And similar to Zuckert, Okrent maintains that Heidegger’s transcendentalism is related mainly to his understanding of the *a priori* — and arises out of a challenge to Kant’s who (for Heidegger) misses a more primordial *a priori*. This *a priori*, in turn, has two sides. The first concerns the *a priority* of Being over beings which Heidegger expresses as follows:

In early antiquity it was already seen that being and its attributes in a certain way underlie beings and precede them and so are a proteron, an earlier. The term denoting this character by which being precedes beings is the expression *a priori*, *apriority*, being earlier. As *a priori*, being is earlier than beings. The meaning of this *a priori*, the sense of the earlier and its possibility has never been cleared up.⁴⁰

In relation to the previous one, the second priority that Okrent indicates is the priority of “*intentions* directed toward being in relation to intentions directed towards beings.”⁴¹ This point basically discloses Heidegger’s stance concerning that unless one is familiar (albeit nonthematically) with *what it means* to have intentions, it would not be possible to carry out that act towards any beings themselves. The two senses of *a priori* relate to a final one — and that is the science of Being for Heidegger, “a science which itself makes use of an *a priori* mode of cognition, that is, a kind of intending that is independent of all intentions directed towards things that are.”⁴² As is widely acknowledged, Heidegger’s name for this science is “phenomenology” which is “*the analytic description of intentionality in its*

³⁸ Steven Crowell, “Facticity and Transcendental Philosophy,” in *From Kant to Davidson: Philosophy and the Idea of the Transcendental*, ed. Jeff Malpas (London: Routledge, 2003), 100–121. 100.

³⁹ Mark Okrent, “Heidegger in America or How Transcendental Philosophy Becomes Pragmatic,” in *From Kant to Davidson: Philosophy and the Idea of the Transcendental*, ed. Jeff Malpas (London: Routledge, 2003), 122–38. 122–24.

⁴⁰ Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. 20.

⁴¹ Okrent, “Heidegger in America or How Transcendental Philosophy Becomes Pragmatic.” 124.

⁴² *Ibid.* 125.

apriori.”⁴³ This point will be of significance in what follows yet now I critically delineate the way in which the claim concerning the *Critique* as an ontological work is reflected in the literature.

Heidegger himself articulates both his debt to and appropriation of the standpoint of the *Critique* by stating that the fundamental problematic of *Being and Time* comprises a radicalizing of the Kantian problematic of the foundation of ontological knowledge taken differently from the issue of judgment and without the constraint to that of the positive sciences. In this regard, Camilla Serck-Hanssen’s article is a representative one with regard to her defense of Heidegger’s assertion that the main question of the *Critique* is the question of Being — emphasizing that, this also holds for Kant himself.⁴⁴

Nevertheless, Heidegger’s claim needs clarification. What does Heidegger mean by “ontology?” The *Kantbook* implies that he uses the term to conform to at least two distinct meanings. Hence, the need for clarification has not so much to do with a linguistic one as with gaining a sense of the term within the context in which it is used. Due to the scholastic conception (which has been dominant throughout), metaphysics is divided into two realms which are called “general metaphysics” (*Metaphysica Generalis*) and “special metaphysics” (*Metaphysica Specialis*). The former which concerns being in general is also termed “ontology.” Special metaphysics, on the other hand, is divided into three realms as God (Theology), nature (Cosmology) and human being (Psychology) as its proper domain.⁴⁵ In the

⁴³ Martin Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, ed. Theodore Kisiel (tr) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985). 79.

⁴⁴ Camilla Serck-Hanssen, “Towards Fundamental Ontology: Heidegger’s Phenomenological Reading of Kant,” *Continental Philosophy Review* 48, no. 2 (June 4, 2015): 217–35, <https://doi.org/10.1007.220>.

⁴⁵ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 5f.

“Architectonic of Pure Reason,” Kant remains faithful to this division saying that it is prescribed by the pure reason itself and in this regard, is by no means accidental.⁴⁶

For Heidegger, special metaphysics necessarily leads back to ontology, since, to begin with, the former is *ontic* and needs to be grounded by the *ontological*.⁴⁷ At this point, he still seems to refer to the traditional understanding of ontology which concerns being in general, in the sense of general metaphysics. The issue, however, begins to get complicated when Heidegger points out that “Kant uses the designation ‘Transcendental Philosophy’ for *Metaphysica Generalis (Ontologia)*.”⁴⁸ The complication arises because there seems to remain no room for taking Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy as something revolutionary (for Heidegger), if it can simply be equated with traditional ontology. Nevertheless, understood within the context, Kant does by no means equate his understanding of Transcendental Philosophy — used in the sense of our mode of knowledge of the objects — with that of ontology as traditional metaphysics, although he seems to suggest so: “[transcendental philosophy] considers only the understanding and reason itself in a system of all concepts and principles that are related to objects in general, without assuming objects that would be given (*Ontologia*).”⁴⁹

Heidegger yet alludes to one other sense when he uses the term ‘ontology,’ and it seems to be the sense in which he identifies Kant’s genuine understanding of transcendental philosophy to be similar to his own understanding of ontology:

the laying of the ground for ontological knowledge certainly strives — over and above a mere characterization of transcendence — to elucidate it in such

⁴⁶ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A846-7/B874-5.

⁴⁷ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 7.

⁴⁸ Ibid. 11. See A845-6/B873-4.

⁴⁹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A845/B873.

a way that it can come to be developed as the systematic totality of a presentation of transcendence (transcendental philosophy = ontology).⁵⁰

Still, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger uses the term ontology both in the sense of general metaphysics, e.g., when he refers to “The Task of a Destructuring of the History of Ontology” in §6 — and in the sense of another, as it were, genuine ontology, when he alludes to his own way-making through the question of Being. The twofold usage can be seen below:

Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task.⁵¹

By means of the passage above — and for the sake of clarification — I suggest to take Heidegger’s usage of “ontology” in a broad and a narrow sense — respectively to correspond to the “general metaphysics” and to “genuine ontology” as I name within the framework of our discussion. After this parenthesis, it seems clear that for Heidegger, Kant’s transcendental philosophy is indeed ontology in the narrow, genuine sense. At least this is what one can gather from the *Kantbook*. However, *Being and Time* holds fast to the claim that the *Critique* falls short of providing an ontology (in the narrow sense): “[Kant] altogether neglected the problem of Being; and, in connection with this, he failed to provide an ontology with Dasein as its theme or (to put this in Kantian language) to give a preliminary ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject.”⁵² In the *Phenomenological Interpretation*, on the other hand, Heidegger alludes to the structure of ontology while he provides an almost word-for-word definition of Kant’s transcendental philosophy:

⁵⁰ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 62.

⁵¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*. H11. Emphasis removed.

⁵² Ibid. H24.

What in advance determines a being as a being, the constitution of being which first makes possible a being as the being that it is, is what in a certain sense is 'earlier' than a being and is *a priori*.⁵³

And eventually, Heidegger once again equates transcendental philosophy with ontology (in the narrow sense) when he contends that "[t]ranscendental knowledge is ontological knowledge, i.e., a priori knowledge of the ontological constitution of beings. Because transcendental knowledge is ontological knowledge, Kant can equate transcendental philosophy with ontology."⁵⁴

Although the characterization of broad and narrow senses of ontology provides a clarification to a certain point, we are still left with an ongoing obscurity here. In this regard, Blattner points out to "a philosophical aporia that besets [Heidegger's] early conception of ontology."⁵⁵ This aporia stems not only from fact that Heidegger uses the term 'ontology' in various senses, but also that his allusions to Kant's understanding of the "transcendental" (which Heidegger uses as "transcendence") is equivocal. Béatrice Han-Pile points to a similar problem in her article, questioning whether and to what degree Heidegger can be thought as a transcendental philosopher. Referring to Heidegger's contention that Being is that which determines entities *as* entities and through which the latter are already understood,⁵⁶ Han-Pile argues that what is left undetermined is "the extent to which Heidegger modifies the Kantian definition of the *a priori*."⁵⁷ This observation seems to be one of the cruxes of the subject matter. That is, to my mind, the debate on whether Kant's transcendental philosophy is ontology (in the narrow sense) or whether Heidegger's ontology may be read as an instance of the Kantian transcendental philosophy can,

⁵³ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. 26.

⁵⁴ Ibid. 127.

⁵⁵ Blattner, "Ontology, the A Priori, and the Primacy of Practice." 27.

⁵⁶ Heidegger, *Being and Time*. H6.

⁵⁷ Béatrice Han-Pile, "Early Heidegger's Appropriation of Kant," in *A Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus & Mark Wrathall (Blackwell, 2007), 80–101. 80.

to a great extent, be assessed on the grounds of each philosopher's understanding of the *a priori*. This, however, points to a much more overarching vision than a mere juxtaposition of Kant's and Heidegger's usage of the *a priori* could provide. This vision, to begin with, has to do not with the "what" but the "how" of the *a priori*. In this regard, the latter signifies nothing but methodology.

In the preface to second edition, Kant refers to the *Critique* as a "treatise on the method, not a system of the science itself."⁵⁸ Heidegger, likewise, underlines the significance of the methodology of the investigation into the question of the meaning of Being — and he enunciates this method to be *phenomenology* which finds its basic motto as "to the things themselves!"⁵⁹ In light of this very brief but fundamental emphasis on the method, the question guiding the fundamental problem can be raised anew concerning the tenability of Heidegger's evaluation of the *Critique* in terms of ontology.⁶⁰ This again, can be tackled only as long as one keeps sight of the methodology of the Heideggerian ontology: "Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. *Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible.*"⁶¹

This statement above signifies Heidegger's devoted stance in favor of phenomenology not only in his magnum opus but also in the lecture courses around that period. His attitude is at times so acute that he says "any appeal to Kant against phenomenology basically collapses already in the first sentence of the *Critique*."⁶²

⁵⁸ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. Bxxii.

⁵⁹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*. H27-8.

⁶⁰ However, my strategy here is not to take part in either of the initially mentioned intellectual polarization concerning whether the *Critique* is an ontological inquiry or not. This kind of an attitude, I suspect, will run the risk of unduly reducing the *Critique* — and the transcendental methodology therein — to one of the parties, be it ontology or epistemology. What is rather needed is to preserve transcendental philosophy in its originality — an approach which does not at all imply that other ways of access to it must be closed.

⁶¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*. H35.

⁶² Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. 57.

The alluded first sentence, in turn, is as reads: “In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is intuition.”⁶³

In this regard, Chad Engelland sees Heidegger’s “turn” to Kant’s transcendental philosophy to be related with the former’s interest in phenomenology: “[t]he promise of phenomenological Kant, then, is what interests Heidegger in transcendental philosophy.”⁶⁴ In the *Phenomenological Interpretation*, this approach is apparent from the outset:

In its basic posture the *method* of the *Critique* is what we, since Husserl, understand, carry out, and learn to ground more radically as *phenomenological method*. That is why a phenomenological interpretation of the *Critique* is the only interpretation that fits Kant’s own intentions, even if these intentions are not clearly spelled out by him.⁶⁵

There is something radical here: While Heidegger’s viewpoint evidently provides a phenomenological interpretation of the *Critique* — which is quite plausible — he also does regard phenomenology as the method of the *Critique* itself — which is quite open to question. The latter is all the more so given that Heidegger’s argument in favor of it is almost every time entangled with his treatment of the *Critique* with a phenomenological method. Thus, the question of whether, at a certain point, Heidegger is exposing the way Kant *does* phenomenology or Heidegger is reading Kant in his own way *by means of* phenomenology for the most part remains undecided

⁶³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A19/B33. For Heidegger, this sentence not only promises to phenomenology but it also points to what he calls the primacy of intuition. The so-called primacy will in turn be the source of what Heidegger calls “finitude” throughout his reading of the *Critique*. I will be zeroing in on finitude and its relation to transcendence in the chapter follows.

⁶⁴ Chad Engelland, “The Phenomenological Kant: Heidegger’s Interest in Transcendental Philosophy,” *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 41, no. 2 (2010): 150–69. 151.

⁶⁵ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*. 49.

Recall the bifurcation initially made concerning the relevant literature, i.e., the difference between the commentators who see Heidegger as a transcendental philosopher and those who take the *Critique* to be an ontological work. Although their departure points are distinct, what is common to both perspectives seems to be an indispensable reference to the *a priori*. I attempted to handle the problem of the *a priori* with reference to what it signifies, i.e., methodology — and that brought the present chapter to the debate concerning phenomenology. In what follows, I examine the characteristics of the *a priori* for Kant and Heidegger with regard to the problem of the transcendental and the ontological.

Kant opens B edition of the *Critique* saying that all our cognition, without doubt, begins *with* experience. However, it does not follow that all it all arises *from* experience. The question then turns to whether there is any cognition “independent of all experience and even of all impressions of the senses,” — where this kind of cognition is called *a priori*.⁶⁶ Although there are two kinds of *a priori* judgments — analytic and synthetic — Kant’s main focus is on the latter since only synthetic judgments *a priori* are ampliative in the sense of extending cognition. Now, the whole *Critique* can be read around the question of the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments as Kant’s chief aim comprises this question proper, yet this kind of an attitude would be beyond the confines of the present dissertation. For the time being, I believe it suffices to say that Kant’s transcendental philosophy heavily lies on the possibility of those judgments where the question becomes that and how experience is constituted with regard to them. Hence, the “how” of the *a priori* in Kant’s understanding may be better grasped when it is acknowledged that this *a priori* is responsible, by means of transcendence, in the constitution of cognition.

Although Heidegger refers to *a priori* in his texts and lecture courses, one doubts whether it is the same *a priori* as Kant’s or it gets totally transformed. As I have referred above, for Heidegger, Being has priority over beings as it is that what makes intelligible the entities *qua* entities. Although this is a very broad and fundamental claim, one can make sense of it by having recourse what Heidegger designates as

⁶⁶ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. B1-2.

“average understanding of Being.”⁶⁷ Briefly, this understanding characterizes a “pre-ontological” basis upon which we human beings make sense of things, e.g., when we use hammer as a hammer, or when we form a sentence such as “the table *is* brown.”

However, Heidegger’s reflection concerning the *a priori* is much broader than confining a priority to Being itself. In other contexts, he refers to the priority of e.g., the existential structure of Dasein as “care” or the “world” as such. However, again, the problem is to manifest the “how” of the *a priori* — and in this regard I propose that Heidegger has an ambivalent position. To explicate, on the one hand, Being in general, and the *world* in particular, are *prior* in the sense that Dasein has no chance but to be *thrown* into an already-constituted world; however, on the other hand, Dasein is that which does the transcendence, and in this sense, is *the a priori* as such. Admittedly, in contradistinction to Kant’s account, Dasein is always an *attached* being (in the world of appearances and other Dasein) and does not constitute experience *from the beginning*. Nevertheless, Dasein is at the same time that on which temporality is founded and, on this account, it is the *a priori* par excellence.

All in all, I suggest that the question as to the plausibility of Heidegger’s reading of the *Critique* as an onto-phenomenological work remains — and necessarily remains — undecided to a great extent for the reasons I attempted to explicate above which chiefly has to do with the ambivalence of the notions of ‘ontology’ for Heidegger on the one hand, and ‘transcendental’ on the other. Secondly, the question whether Heidegger’s philosophy can be taken as transcendental, at least in the period that I analyze, is one that seems to promise a clearer answer. To my reading, Heidegger remains as a transcendental philosopher in the Kantian sense although he transforms the significance of the *what* and the *how* of the *a priori*.

⁶⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*. H5.

CHAPTER 3

FINITE TRANSCENDENCE AND BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

In this Chapter of the dissertation, my strategy concerning the subject-matter consists in presenting a dialogue [*Auseinandersetzung*] between Kant and Heidegger with regard to two central themes, that are, finitude and transcendence. Due to his hermeneutical approach, Heidegger says that it is not so much an attempt to understand what has been said as it is an attempt to disclose what has not been said.⁶⁸ Hence, it is clear that Heidegger does not have an “antiquarian interest” in Kant but rather the interest is on what Kant has to convey to him as a spur for the still current metaphysical problems.⁶⁹ Accordingly, Heidegger’s preoccupation with Kant gains a novel significance for what he takes over from Kant is very much based on what Kant did not spell out but tacitly presupposed, or better, has to presuppose. In this regard, Richardson characterizes Heidegger’s project as a *re-trieval* that has not to do with merely explicating what has been said by Kant but rather to disclose “what he did not say, *could not* say, yet nevertheless laid before our eyes as unsaid.”⁷⁰

In this chapter, by virtue of my narrative plot, I step back from Kant’s conditions of the possibility of knowledge to shed light on Heidegger’s condition of these conditions. In order for this attempt to be intelligible, I begin by reminding the reader of the basic traits of Kant’s finitude and transcendence in sequence. Following this, I refer to Heidegger’s understanding of these two, in order then to draw out the basic characteristic of Dasein as Existence. This latter will also be paving the way for the

⁶⁸ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 175.

⁶⁹ Sherover, *Heidegger, Kant and Time*. 10f.

⁷⁰ Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*. 158.

very ground that make both finitude and transcendence possible for Heidegger. Hence, from that point on, it will be of essential importance to merge them together as finite transcendence, which is only a possibility whose condition lies in Dasein's Being-in-the-world.

3.1. Finitude

I begin with explicating Kant's Copernican Revolution with regard to human finitude.⁷¹ At this point, it will be apt to briefly remind the reader of the Copernican Revolution in order to show its relation with finitude. In trying to secure metaphysics' position as science that relies on synthetic judgements *a priori*, Kant offers a model in allusion to Copernicus. That is, basing on Copernicus' primary hypothesis, which substituted geocentric model in favor of the heliocentric one that enabled explaining the motions of the heavenly bodies, Kant's model reverses the traditional subject-object relation, as it were. That is, due to the fact that the philosophers' attempt before him to secure the certainty of knowledge ends in failure (for Kant), he bases his model not on the conformity of the subject's knowledge to the object; but rather on the conformity of the object to the subject's faculty of intuition. This way, Kant asserts, it would be possible to have knowledge *a priori* of objects.⁷²

As I mentioned above, what I will attempt to do is to interpret the Copernican Revolution with regard to human finitude. I offer to take finitude — and then transcendence — as the two sides of the same Revolution. I begin by finitude. It should be seen as a characteristic of the Revolution that features the limitations brought to cognition. That is, from that point on, a certain demarcation is drawn that limits cognition to appearances where it is evaluated on the base of the human standpoint, as mentioned above.

⁷¹ Hereafter I will be using "Copernican Revolution" to mean Kant's Copernican Revolution.

⁷² Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. Bxvi-xvii.

Appearances, in addition, are necessarily taken under the forms of sensibility, i.e., space and time. This limitation of the possible experience to that of appearances secures for Kant the *a priori* status of knowledge, for reason can know *a priori* of objects merely what it has put into them.⁷³ That is, when reason's interest to venture beyond these appearances — in order to gain knowledge — to things in themselves is strictly to be limited, the way, Kant asserts, is paved for synthetic knowledge *a priori*, which in turn promises metaphysics as a science.⁷⁴

These two factors above — the limitation to appearances and space-time — determine human intuition as finite in Kant. That and how intuition is finite can be seen within the following lines:

In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is intuition. This, however, takes place only insofar as the object is given to us; but this in turn, is possible, only if it affects the mind in a certain way.⁷⁵

From above, one can get an initial grasp on what human finitude consists of in Kant. That is, as he clarifies, in order for there to be knowledge, the object must be *given* – the mind must be *affected*. In other words, unlike divine intuition (*intuitus originarius*), human (finite) intuition (*intuitus derivativus*) does not create its object; it solely takes in what has already been given.⁷⁶

Now, a question can be raised as to why Kantian finitude matters. I should remark that the significance of the Kantian finitude primarily lies in its relation with the Copernican Revolution's norm-giving characterization. As Allison puts forward,

⁷³ Ibid. Bxviii.

⁷⁴ Ibid. Bxviii.

⁷⁵ Ibid. A19/B33.

⁷⁶ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 18. Here, as will be explicated, another characteristic of the Kantian finite intuition takes place as being 'noncreative'.

pre-critical philosophy assessed knowledge as if it should conform to a theocentric norm.⁷⁷ This, in turn, means that human knowledge was degraded to a secondary position in comparison to God's-eye-point-of-view. In contrast to theocentric view, Kantian critical philosophy marks a shift concerning the norm for human beings: from that point on, human knowledge is to be the unique norm that one can rely on. Kant's contribution regarding the human-standpoint is that it is of no deficiency, but it is the sole source that one can judge, concerning knowledge. Since human mind is the very source for the rules or formations under which an intuition of an object is to be possible, it is elevated to the first-degree that constitutes the norm. From that point on, human finite knowing is the authority, so to speak, to assess what counts as human knowledge.

The project of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is concerned with the possibility of metaphysics as a science, which is in Heidegger's words, "laying the ground for metaphysics."⁷⁸ In his *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger asks the question, which will be decisive for his entire interpretation of the *Critique*, as follows: "Why is laying the foundation for science a critique of pure reason?"⁷⁹ Understanding this question, as far as I can see, amounts to focusing on the very *grounding* or foundation itself. This grounding, in turn, is human pure reason so that, strictly speaking, it is the "humanness of reason, i.e., its finitude" that is fundamental for the entire groundlaying.⁸⁰ Thus, Heidegger is quite clear that the project of the *Critique*, from the outset, is determined with the certain theme of the finite essence of the human being.⁸¹ This in turn signifies that the

⁷⁷ Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 38.

⁷⁸ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 1.

⁷⁹ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. 8.

⁸⁰ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 15.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* 18.

problem of the possibility of metaphysics as a science turns out to be the problem that is concerned with fundamental ontology — the ontological analytic of Dasein in its finite essence since the ground-laying problem brings one to a more primordial question of what the human being is.⁸² Accordingly, in what follows, I take into account this analytic of Dasein as a prerequisite when I am concerned with the Kantian problematic as ground-laying. And to begin with, I explicate the related assumption of Heidegger's with reference to *Critique of Pure Reason*. That is, I discuss the Kantian finitude which in turn brings one back to fundamental ontology that is a preparatory study for the ground-laying — the project of the *Critique* from Heidegger's stance.

As I noted above, finite intuition is noncreative intuition, and Heidegger bases his interpretation of the Kantian understanding of finitude mainly on this aspect of the latter. When disclosed, this aspect is tantamount to saying that the object must be given, “at hand,” or in other words, the mind must be affected. This affection, again, is what factually determines human intuition as finite.⁸³ In other words, what takes place here is a “referential dependence on the givenness.”⁸⁴ From another aspect, that at the same time explicates why finite intuition is “*intuitus derivativus*,” i.e., having the character of deriving the intuition from the given.⁸⁵

Concerning the aforementioned limitation of the possible experience to that of appearances, Heidegger's remark is to be kept in mind that the problem with finite intuition has not much to do with the problem of unknowability of things in themselves, as having to do with the unintelligibility of any statement concerning what is beyond *possible experience*.⁸⁶ My emphasis on the possibility of experience

⁸² Ibid. 1.

⁸³ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. 60.

⁸⁴ Ibid. 265.

⁸⁵ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 18.

⁸⁶ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. 108.

alludes to the fact that the limitation drawn is at the same time what makes the non-limited; that is, objects of appearance possible.

Moreover, Heidegger points out that human finitude should not be understood merely or primarily with regard to the fact that human reason shows various deficiencies; but rather that finitude should be understood as lying within the “essential structure of knowledge itself” so that the limitedness is fundamentally an implication of this essence.⁸⁷ This essence, in turn, will be discussed under the consideration of “existence.”

So far, I have focused on the Kantian finitude, which I denoted as the characterization of the Copernican Revolution as a shift concerning possible experience. Doing this more or less amounts to concentrating on the “objective side” of the experience; that is, the prerequisite as to the givenness of the object which affects human mind. However, this is only one side of the picture which does not yet by itself give a clue on the Kantian contribution concerning the subject-matter. This latter, I assert, is comprehensively to be understood when human finitude, the first characterization, is taken with the second one, which is human transcendence.

3.2. Transcendence

In what follows, I base my interpretation of “transcendence” in Kantian critical philosophy as the second aspect of the Copernican Revolution. The answer to the question as to why it is so lies in human transcendence’s being constitutive concerning possible experience. That is, human transcendence determines the way, i.e., the mode under which an object is to be experienced. In this regard, I shall remind the reader of Kant’s transcendental philosophy and its basic features:

I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a

⁸⁷ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 15.

priori. A system of these concepts would be called transcendental philosophy.⁸⁸

Transcendental philosophy indicates a stepping-back from the experience and going back to these conditions of experience. In this regard, it has been clarified that for Kant the condition of all knowledge is the ego; as “I think.”⁸⁹ Considered with “finitude,” the problem turns out to be as follows: How is it possible that a finite being transcend itself so that it becomes open to a being that it has not produced?⁹⁰ This question ought to be borne in mind as we proceed in this chapter because understanding it is tantamount to getting a grasp on the very ground that at the same time makes asking this question possible.

As I have posed the question why Kantian finitude matters, now I pose the similar question from the aspect of the Kantian transcendence: Why does the Kantian transcendence matter? More specifically, why does the Kantian transcendence matter for Heidegger? I assert that the core answer to this question lies within the lines of what is known as the *conditions of the possibility of experience*, in Kant’s transcendental viewpoint. To begin with, experience in Kant does not take place in a haphazard way but it needs to conform to certain rules — rules that are constitutive and regulative due to forms of sensibility and understanding. In this regard, Kant focuses on, as the quote above indicates, the *mode of knowledge* itself insofar as it determines the conditions for the possibility of experience. For Heidegger, this withdrawal from experience to the very conditions of experience is of significance, first because, this withdrawal has to do with the ontological rather than the ontical, and second because Heidegger will be following Kant in his scrutiny into the necessary conditions of experience — but this time, as to be seen, Heidegger will

⁸⁸ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A11-12/B25. Sherover notes that “in Heidegger’s discussion this reference to the transcendental elements of experience is usually expressed by the substitution of the noun ‘transcendence’ for the adjectival ‘transcendental.’” See Sherover, 16.

⁸⁹ Ibid. B131-132.

⁹⁰ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 30.

be taking the investigation further — if only by going even one step back, to the condition of the conditions of the possibility of experience.

Now what I focus on is Heidegger's stance on Kant's transcendental philosophy. At this point, it is apt to remind the reader of the previous parts' question as follows: "Why is laying the foundation for science a critique of pure reason?" I noted that this question is decisive in Heidegger's reading of the *Critique* in such a way that taking this question into account means to disclose the finite essence of the human being. Still, I pointed out that human finitude is only one side of the picture, and that at the other side there lies transcendence. At this point, Heidegger is quite clear in claiming that "finitude is placed at the point of departure for transcendence" for Kant,⁹¹ and indeed Heidegger goes even further claiming that transcendence is the finitude itself.⁹²

To begin with, Heidegger puts forward that in traditional philosophy, the transcendent is what lies beyond; i.e., the otherworldly. In epistemology, transcendent is what remains beyond the subjective realm, e.g., thing in itself. Taken this way, what transcends — what does the "stepping beyond" is the object, the non-ego.⁹³ However, Heidegger contends, what is transcendent in the strict sense of the word is Dasein itself: "*Transcendence is a fundamental determination of the ontological structure of the Dasein.*"⁹⁴ At this point, he challenges both the subjectivist and objectivist accounts of intentionality. Heidegger maintains that intentionality is neither some type of extant relation between two isolated entities nor something that belongs to a so-called immanent sphere within the subject.⁹⁵

⁹¹ Ibid. 51. And the claim continues as saying that for this very reason the attempts both at a subjective idealism and an objective realism are misguided.

⁹² Ibid. 64. To understand this claim will amount to getting a grasp on the phenomenon of the world that will be explicated.

⁹³ Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. 298f.

⁹⁴ Ibid. 162.

⁹⁵ Ibid. 65.

Rather, intentionality is grounded in the specific transcendence of Dasein. This position of Heidegger's opens to question the traditional approaches to the "subject" as an isolated *ego* and the inner sphere of this so-called subject to whom belongs something like intentionality. In this regard, Heidegger contends that it is an entire misunderstanding to posit an inner and an outer sphere as distinct from each other. Rather, as I will be explicating soon, what is needed is to undermine these approaches while at the same time to pave the way for an explication of Dasein's constitution (Dasein-analytic).

To proceed, Heidegger indicates that Kant uses the term 'transcendental' to mean "ontological."⁹⁶ That is, since the problem of metaphysics — ontology in Heidegger's understanding — is the problem of the possibility of synthetic judgements *a priori*, and since the latter is what is ampliative — or in other words, what discloses the *Being itself* — for Heidegger, transcendental philosophy is ontology.⁹⁷ This identification is expressed by Sherover as follows:

Viewed from the side of the perceiving subject, the conditions are transcendental; from the side of the object they are ontological. But, however regarded, their source is in us. Because the possibility of knowing the objects—that-are in our experience constitutes the be-ing of these objects for us, the knowledge of these necessary characterizations of objects as known, in advance of any particular encounter, is a knowledge of their ontological characteristics, namely, ontological knowledge.⁹⁸

The identification and the above quote make more sense when what is denoted as transcendence is understood as a stepping-beyond: beyond beings that *are*, to the constitution or the possibility of these beings.⁹⁹ In this regard, Heidegger suggests that "the expression 'transcendental' refers not only to *a priori knowledge* of the

⁹⁶ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. 40. See A845 / B783.

⁹⁷ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 9.

⁹⁸ Sherover, *Heidegger, Kant and Time*. 31.

⁹⁹ This will be a matter of debate in Chapter 5.

possibility of synthetic knowledge *a priori*, but also to this *possibility itself*,”¹⁰⁰ where the latter refers to ontology. To explicate, transcendence is not primarily the stepping beyond of the knower to the known; but the very constitution of the knower that renders such an encounter possible.¹⁰¹

In addition, Heidegger contends, the problem of transcendence does not refer to a theory of knowledge in place of the old metaphysics; rather what is questioned is ontology and the inner possibility of it.¹⁰² This point once again emphasizes the constitutive role of transcendence, put in different words. Taken this way, Heidegger states, what the Copernican Revolution expresses basically is that “ontic knowledge of beings must be guided in advance by ontological knowledge.”¹⁰³ Heidegger admits that Kant recognizes this correlation between the ontic and the ontological, yet could not express it in a sufficiently radical way, for reasons we will be discussing. If, once again, the problem is on the possibility of that “in advance”ness — the transcendence of the finitude, a much more basic and primordial approach is needed, and for this Heidegger is quite precise: “Beings are in no way accessible without an antecedent understanding of being.”¹⁰⁴ In other words, in order for one to experience the object *as* an object, one must have a pre-ontological understanding of *what it means to be* an object. Admittedly, this referred-accessibility lies within the transcendence of Dasein, yet one step back, it very much depends on a more genuine phenomenon, that is Being-in-the-world. To explicate the latter, I shall touch upon the way Dasein *exists*.

¹⁰⁰ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. 127.

¹⁰¹ Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*. 113.

¹⁰² Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 11.

¹⁰³ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. 38.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* 38.

3.3. Existence and Being-in-the-World: The Unsaid?

I now move on to the matter of the constitution of Dasein. This is indispensable since for Heidegger it has been misconceived so far in Western Philosophy yet there is the need to raise it anew in a novel way. To understand Dasein's constitution is first and foremost tantamount to undermine the hitherto-made assumptions on the subject as an isolated ego.¹⁰⁵ For Heidegger, the problem lies in missing the original constitution of Dasein as existence: "Humans exist, whereas things in nature are extant."¹⁰⁶ However, he contends, the problem in the Kantian ontology is that it still remains within the lines of the ancients and the medievals in the sense that Kant still comprehends both persons and things within the same ontological category, namely *res*, things [*Dinge*].¹⁰⁷ Accordingly, Heidegger says, Kant uses the expressions for existence ("Dasein and *Existieren*") in the sense of "extantness" [*Vorhandenheit*].¹⁰⁸ However — despite the very contribution Kant makes to the subject-matter — from a Heideggerian perspective the problems of both finitude and transcendence remain superficial in Kant, for concerning the former, finitude still refers to being-created; i.e., producedness, which in turn implies extantness, and concerning the latter, transcendence (of a finite creature), taken by itself, gives rise to the problem of the difficulty of explaining the "stepping out" from an *ego-sphere*.

Then what does it mean to say that Dasein *exists*? First and foremost, it means that Dasein has a *world*. That is, Dasein is not an entity that merely and/or primarily occupies space within the world as an object does. Literally speaking, Dasein is a

¹⁰⁵ For Heidegger, various problems, such as skepticism about the 'external world', arise within the bounds of the separation of the subject and the object, and taking the former within the same category as the latter — that is, as extant.

¹⁰⁶ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. 13.

¹⁰⁷ Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. 139 and 152. Heidegger remarks that this assertion does not miss the Kantian disjunction of seeing persons and things as "two different kinds of beings," that are peculiar to metaphysics of morals and metaphysics of nature.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.* 139.

being that *is* in-the-world, a structure which is distinct from being an intraworldly entity.

To begin with, when Heidegger differentiates between Dasein and things in nature, he denominates the characteristic of the former as Being-in-the-world whereas for the latter he uses the term Being within the world, that is, being intraworldly, as a *possible* determinant.¹⁰⁹ I emphasize the term ‘possible’ on purpose because Heidegger points out that the way the intraworldly occurs within the world is not due to a necessity. However, when Dasein *is*, it is necessarily in-a-world. In this regard, it is a misunderstanding to posit a Dasein first which then “steps beyond” to the world. Rather, Heidegger contends, existence means having been already “stepped beyond.”¹¹⁰ Accordingly, Dasein is always already in the world as a necessary determinant of its existence: “Dasein is its Da, its here-there.”¹¹¹ Thus the answer to the question whence rises the necessity on the one hand and possibility on the other has to do with Being-in-the-world’s being an “essential ontological structure.”¹¹² Unlike Dasein, the intraworldly is not bound by such a determinant; being within the world is not an ontological structure and does not belong to the former’s being.¹¹³

Having briefly pointed out the basic difference between “Being-in” and “being-within” the world, now I will approach the phenomenon of the world. To begin with the negative, Heidegger says that world is not nature; and certainly not the extant. It is not the totality of those items surrounding us. However, the fact we understand

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. 168.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. 300.

¹¹¹ Ibid. 300.

¹¹² Ibid. 169.

¹¹³ Ibid. 169.

something like nature in our encounters entails that we do indeed understand the world.¹¹⁴ In this sense, world has the character of *a priority*.¹¹⁵

Being-in-the-world, as Heidegger hyphenates it, stands for a unitary phenomenon. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger remarks that though this compound expression is a unitary one, which does not come together in a piecemeal fashion, the constitutive items can be analyzed one by one in order to see the significance of the structure. The way Heidegger analyzes the components is respectively as follows: first, “in-the-world,” which entails understanding worldhood as such; second, that entity which is determined by Being-in-the-world; third, “Being-in” as such, which alludes to understanding inhood itself.¹¹⁶

To pursue the order Heidegger puts forward, I begin by explicating worldhood as such. From the beginning, Heidegger clarifies that worldhood must be seen as an ontological phenomenon; as an *existentiale*, which once again implies that Dasein’s character is determined existentially by Being-in-the-world.¹¹⁷ Thus, questioning worldhood itself is by no means abandoning Dasein analytic; rather, understanding worldhood is an indispensable component for unveiling the latter which Heidegger characterizes as fundamental ontology.

In order to make a grasp on worldhood as such possible, Heidegger begins with what it is not, and in that context, he exemplifies four usages of the “world.” First, he mentions the ontical sense when one uses “world” as a totality of those entities

¹¹⁴ Ibid. 165.

¹¹⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*. H65.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. H53.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. H64.

possibly occurring within the world. Here he refers to the extant,¹¹⁸ i.e., the intraworldly that makes up the totality. Second, “world,” this time in an ontological sense, signifies the Being of those entities in the first usage. This Heidegger exemplifies as any realm that refers to the unity or multiplicity of those entities, such as in the “world” of a mathematician; “world” signifies any realm of possible objects that possibly occur within the lines of mathematics. Third, “world” is used in still another ontical sense. Here the usage implies not the intraworldly entities but the very space in which the factual Dasein may live. World here, says Heidegger, has a “pre-ontological existentiell signification.”¹¹⁹ Fourth, and last, “world designates the ontologico-existential concept of *worldhood*.”¹²⁰ In this last sense of the word, worldhood comprises any understanding of the first three usage for it comprises the grounding; i.e., the a priori character of worldhood in general.¹²¹ It is this ontological-existential signification that I will be clinging to in due course when I refer to something like a world, for it is both the ground of the first three and the basic characteristic that Heidegger refers to whenever he makes any assertion on Dasein’s Being-in-the-world.

Now that I briefly brought worldhood to the fore, I move on to an examination of that *entity*, i.e., Dasein.¹²² To begin with, one of the central themes in Heidegger throughout his entire study is Being. Hubert Dreyfus explicates this central theme as a study of what it means for something *to be*; and specifically, what it means to

¹¹⁸ The present edition of *Being and Time* translates *Vorhandensein* as present-at-hand. I prefer to stay within the lines of the “extant” for the sake of consistency throughout the text; and at times I will be using present-at-hand where it is compared with ready-to-hand [*Zuhandensein*].

¹¹⁹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*. 65.

¹²⁰ Ibid. 65.

¹²¹ Ibid. 65.

¹²² I emphasized entity in the way Heidegger does since Dasein is not an entity in the usual sense at all. I guess he uses this term to allude to a kind of natural attitude.

be human.¹²³ Being, in turn, is “always the Being of an entity.”¹²⁴ And this one entity, for whom Being is an issue, is Dasein itself.¹²⁵ In this regard, Dasein has a pre-ontological understanding of Being and every access towards the intraworldly and the other Dasein is based on this understanding.¹²⁶ That means, once again, Dasein is always already in-the-world before any knowing-comportment takes place, where the latter arises from out of the world.¹²⁷

To proceed, in its *average everydayness*, Dasein is “absorbed in the world.”¹²⁸ That is, Dasein is engaged in other Dasein and the intraworldly so much so that the world becomes self-evident to some degree. However, and exactly because of this self-evidence, this state of being absorbed is by no means obvious; that is, Heidegger says, even if it is ontically apparent that Dasein is that which is in each case I myself, the ontological significance of what Dasein is remains hidden.¹²⁹ Ontologically speaking, Heidegger points out that Dasein is not an ego-self; not an isolated I. Rather, he points out that the self and the world are merged together in one single entity, i.e., Dasein.¹³⁰ In this regard, what is called *self* in turn is determined by its

¹²³ Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991). 1. Recall here Heidegger's reading of the *Critique* as laying the ground for metaphysics which in turn brings forth the question of what is human being.

¹²⁴ Heidegger, *Being and Time*. 9.

¹²⁵ Ibid. 12.

¹²⁶ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. 20.

¹²⁷ This point is significant for it amounts to a shift from the Kantian understanding of experience. And I will be elaborating on it in what follows.

¹²⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*. 113.

¹²⁹ Ibid. 115f.

¹³⁰ Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. 297.

very comportment to the world.¹³¹ Hence Dasein is always already in a world that comprises *Being-with* and *Dasein-with* [*Mitsein* und *Mitdasein*].¹³² That is, Dasein is in a world with the extant and other Dasein: “a bare subject without a world never ‘is’ proximally, nor is it ever given.”¹³³ In this regard, for Heidegger, Kant’s failure lies in this very point that he misses the phenomenon of the world in his taking what (for Heidegger) is Being-in-the-world as an isolated subject.¹³⁴

For Being-in as such, as the third component of Being-in-the-world, I shall merely remark that *Being-in* is what makes the essential structure of Dasein and in this sense, it is distinct from the extant’s being “inside” something.¹³⁵

By means of a basic comparison between Dasein and the intraworldly, i.e., the fundamental structure of Being-in-the-world on the one hand and Being within the world as a possible state on the other, I have attempted to provide a transition and to pave the way for more elaborated understanding of Being-in-the-world with regard to both finitude and transcendence. And accordingly, I move to the ground of these: Being-in-the-world.

I will first give an account of Heidegger’s understanding of finitude and transcendence in order to show their belonging togetherness as *finite transcendence* which in turn bases its ground in Being-in-the-world.

I now try to explicate what I have so far attempted to hint at. Initially, Kant’s understanding of finitude has been discussed with regard to the necessary limitation

¹³¹ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*. 14.

¹³² Heidegger, *Being and Time*. 114.

¹³³ Ibid. 116.

¹³⁴ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*. 14.

¹³⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*. 132.

of experience to that of appearances in terms with finite intuition. There, I have pointed out that, for Kant, human intuition is *intuitus derivativus*, i.e., it derives its knowledge from what has already been given by means of affection. So far so good. However, as Heidegger asserts, Kant's primary motivation concerning human finitude lies within the very fact that it has been created. It is this very grounding of Kant's that Heidegger's phenomenon of the world challenges. For Heidegger, it is again a misdirected attempt to make sense of finitude with regard to createdness. Rather, it can basically and genuinely be explicated with reference to Dasein itself — its characteristic as Being-in-the-world.¹³⁶ In this sense, the world is the necessary determinant of Dasein whence the latter is identified with finitude. Specifically, and literally speaking, Dasein is *thrown* into the world and by means of this thrownness the former gains its characteristic as being finite.¹³⁷ Hence, Dasein's identification with finitude is concerned with the fact that Dasein is *always-already* in-the-world so much so that a self without a world is unintelligible.

Moving on to Heidegger's understanding of transcendence, I remark that, for Heidegger, transcendence does not signify a subject's being related to an object, as in Kantian philosophy, as much as it means "*to understand oneself from a world.*"¹³⁸ That is, Dasein already is beyond itself; it is its "*Da*," as has been indicated. Accordingly, Heidegger adds that transcendence in this regard is also the prerequisite for Dasein's being a self: "The 'toward-itself' and the 'out-from-itself' of transcendence are implicit in the concept of selfhood."¹³⁹ This point is the very onto-epistemological break from the Cartesian dualism of the subject and object which is also implicit in the Kantian stance, as Heidegger time and again reminds the reader of. In this regard, one is no more in a position to discuss how it even becomes possible that the subject reaches beyond, as in Cartesian philosophy, since

¹³⁶ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. 107 Also see. 278.

¹³⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*. 383.

¹³⁸ Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. 300.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.* 300.

Dasein is already beyond. Furthermore, as I noted, Heidegger's break also marks a shift from Kant's understanding of transcendence, for there is no more an isolated ego-sphere as the departure point.

Recall that to assess the project I attempt to undertake, transcendence is to be seen as the other side of finitude, carrying equiprimordial significance. I pointed out that Heidegger is quite precise at this point. Understanding finitude without transcendence carries with it the risk of taking one back to the pre-critical approaches, e.g., Locke's *tabula rasa* where the human being is still finite in the sense of being have to be affected, yet the subject has nothing to do except taking what hits, as it were, the blank slate. On the other hand, trying to understand transcendence without finitude would be unintelligible since it will be ignoring the basic constitution of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, in Heideggerian terms, and will be positing an isolated ego-self which is distinct from the affection that the extant and other Dasein determines.

As I brought forth the mutually dependent structure of finitude and transcendence, hereinafter I take these two together as *finite transcendence*; an attitude that is to be the guiding thread throughout what follows, which in turn necessitates the ground that has been implied so far.

As indicated above, transcendental philosophy is another formulation of ontology for Heidegger. It is to say that, one can take transcendental philosophy's constitutive role, that is, its feature as determining the conditions of possibility of experience on the same footing with having pre-ontological understanding (that is, "knowing" beforehand e.g., what it means for an extant to be an extant) of the necessary provision for an experience to be an experience. This pre-ontological understanding signifies that Dasein pre-scientifically comports towards the extant before the latter even becomes a problem for scientific investigation.¹⁴⁰ This kind of formulation is another expression of the fact that ontic knowledge must be guided by ontological knowledge, as mentioned above. Likewise, Heidegger clarifies that ontology means

¹⁴⁰ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. 17f.

to philosophize transcendently, that is, to problematize ontology is to inquire into something like transcendence that characterize the very understanding of Being.¹⁴¹ In this regard, Heidegger remarks that the subject-matter of ontology turns out to be the essential ground of transcendence, out of which there arises the possibility of something like *a priori* synthesis.¹⁴² This, I assert, is tantamount to Kant's problematization that all knowledge begins with experience though it does not follow from the former that it is all derived from experience,¹⁴³ for this experience in turn is constituted by means of the rules of synthesis that are essentially transcendental.

Recall, once again, the main problem: how can a finite being transcend itself so that it becomes open for a kind of "stepping beyond" from out of itself? Thought traditionally, one may give this question its due as a fair one, yet I still assert that the formulation of the problem this way deviates one from a genuine path to be taken. What I mean is this: once the problem is brought forth as above, one has already missed the grounding that entails understanding Dasein as an entity that has already stepped beyond, as I have tried to explicate with regard to the phenomenon of the world. Otherwise, one has no chance but to remain stuck within the lines of traditional approaches whence arises the inextricable problems of solipsism and dualism, to name but two. It is from this perspective that Heidegger's Being-in-the-world marks a shift concerning the point of departure: it undermines the misformulation in the very question. The primary reason for the misformulation is that the question presupposes an isolated self to begin with. Thus, the fundamental subject-matter is henceforth no more limited to how it is possible that a finite being transcends itself but it is rather concerned with the ground which makes both finitude and transcendence possible, that is, Being-in-the-world. This very possibility, as Heidegger contends, is what remains hidden from Kant. I initially remarked that Heidegger's attitude towards Kant is primarily shaped by delving into

¹⁴¹ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 10f.

¹⁴² Ibid. 30.

¹⁴³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. B1.

what Kant did not explicitly say but rather presupposed, or actually, had to presuppose. Specifically, Heidegger undertakes the task to disclose the unthought in Kant for him to arrive at the conditions of the possibility of knowledge. And this phenomenon, call it either the presupposition or the *unthought*, is nothing else than the *world*. That is, the world constitutes the intelligible background thanks to which something like conditions of possibility of knowledge become possible. This basically amounts to saying that the Heideggerian world is the condition of the Kantian conditions of the possibility of experience.

All in all, I began with underlining the task I undertake in the present chapter, which is staging a critical dialogue between Kant and Heidegger with regard to human finitude and transcendence. To this aim, I mentioned the basic traits of the Copernican Revolution whose aspects I took as finitude and transcendence, respectively. While doing this, I also explicated Heidegger's position regarding the subject-matter that turns out to be decisive for the project of the dissertation. Then, "Existence" came to the fore as the essential structure of Dasein, by means of which I drew out the fundamental differences between Being-in and within the world. I discussed Heidegger's understanding of finitude and transcendence in order then to show their belonging-togetherness as finite transcendence. There, I also explicated the phenomenon of the world so that it became possible to show what I merely hinted at initially: Being-in-the-world is the ground that makes finite transcendence possible. In this regard, once again, the phenomenon of the world is the *unthought* in Kant's critical philosophy whose primary concern is to interrogate into the basic conditions that make experience possible.

CHAPTER 4

TRANSCENDENTAL FACULTY OF IMAGINATION AND TEMPORALITY

Heidegger's claim that the meaning of the Being of Dasein (as in-the-world) is temporality and his interpretation of Kant's transcendental faculty of imagination as the common root of sensibility and understanding are mutually-implicative; that is, only against the background of his Kant interpretation does temporality as meaning of the Being of Dasein gain its significance which in turn is structured as the core of his treating of Kant's transcendental synthesis. Hence, what seems as distinct interpretations should be seen as belonging to one complete project. Following Heidegger's ontological reading of Kant in the second chapter, in the third chapter I have analyzed the problem of finitude which brought me to the phenomenon of the world. Thus, I am now at a position to dig deeper into the nature of Kant's transcendental power of imagination. I will basically do this first from Kant's and then Heidegger's point of view. Hence, this chapter's task amounts to displaying how specifically Heidegger interpreted the significance of Kant's account of imagination — that will also turn out to be the ground of temporality as the meaning of the Being of Dasein. As Richardson claims, "[Heidegger's] argument for such an interpretation has two moments: the analysis of the 'transcendental deduction of the categories,' where the role of the pure imagination is first discovered; the analysis of 'schematism,' where it is examined in operation."¹⁴⁴ Hence, I will first analyze Kant's understanding of imagination in both places only then to be followed by Heidegger's.

¹⁴⁴ Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*.124.

4.1. Transcendental Deduction

Before probing into the Transcendental Deduction, it may be helpful to introduce the basic classifications Kant draws with regard to the Deductions. The first bifurcation concerns Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions and the second one relates to Subjective and Objective Deductions (indeed, sides of deductions) within the Transcendental Deduction. The “Metaphysical Deduction” — a term coined only in the second edition — is titled “The Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding” which constitutes the first chapter of Book I of the Transcendental Analytic, and that Book is titled the “Analytic of Concepts.”¹⁴⁵ The second main chapter of the “Analytic of Concepts” is ‘The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding’ and it may be called the “Transcendental Deduction” proper.¹⁴⁶ Briefly, Kant says that the Metaphysical Deduction proves the a priori origin of the categories in total agreement with the “universal logical functions of thinking,” and the Transcendental Deduction shows these categories’ “possibility as *a priori* cognitions of objects of an intuition in general.”¹⁴⁷ More specifically, the Metaphysical Deduction seeks to explain the categories’ origin in the nature of understanding by determining the list of categories; the Transcendental Deduction shows that it is not only possible but also necessary that the categories “of such an origin” apply to objects of experience: in short, the latter has to do with their objective validity, which also concerns the legitimate use in their extent and limits.¹⁴⁸ For Kant, the Transcendental Deduction — which in his own words has costed him the greatest labor and likewise deserves special concern — has two sides: the objective and the subjective. Kant at times refers to these subjective and

¹⁴⁵ This usage as ‘Metaphysical Deduction’ can be found in B159.

¹⁴⁶ H.J. Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience Vol I.* (London: Routledge, 2002).239. For Paton, designating the first book of the Analytic of Concepts as Metaphysical Deduction should be seen as an afterthought that corresponds to the Metaphysical and Transcendental Expositions in the Aesthetic – which is itself an afterthought.

¹⁴⁷ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason.* B159.

¹⁴⁸ Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience Vol I.* 240.

objective aspects as if there were two deductions: the Objective Deduction and the Subjective Deduction.¹⁴⁹ The former “refers to the objects of the pure understanding, and is supposed to demonstrate and make comprehensible the objective validity of its concepts *a priori*” and the latter examines “the pure understanding itself, concerning its possibility and the powers of cognition on which it itself rests.”¹⁵⁰ Paton contends that one should keep separate both Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions and Subjective and Objective Deductions (or sides of deductions) within the latter as well, since Kant does not clearly make this separation, especially in the first edition. He continues by saying that it is not even clear where one needs to “draw the line between the two.”¹⁵¹ All one can do, he suggests, is to take the references to *imagination* as an exact sign that one is dealing with the Subjective Deduction.¹⁵²

Kant goes on to say that the subjective side, though “is of great importance”, does not constitute an indispensable part for his fundamental purpose. “For,” he says, “the chief question always remains: ‘what and how much can understanding and reason cognize free of all experience?’ and not: — ‘how is the faculty of thinking itself possible?’”¹⁵³ At this point, Paton says that he prefers the substitution of asking “how the power of thinking can be a power of *a priori* knowledge,” and showing how the latter is yielded by the collaboration of imagination and sense for being concerned with the possibility of the power of thinking itself.¹⁵⁴ A.C. Ewing, on the other hand, accuses Kant of doing injustice to his own Subjective Deduction, saying

¹⁴⁹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. Axvi.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. Axvi-xvii.

¹⁵¹ Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience Vol I*. 241.

¹⁵² Ibid. 241.

¹⁵³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. Axvii.

¹⁵⁴ Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience Vol I*. 241.

that “it is not by empirical introspection but by analysis of what must be involved in any possible experience that he arrives at the threefold synthesis.”¹⁵⁵

Now, Metaphysical Deduction is comprised of three sections; the first deals with the understanding in its logical employment, the second with the forms of judgement and the third one with the pure concepts of understanding, namely, the categories. This suggests that the first two are preparatory, and belong, so to speak, to General Logic whereas the categories’ section carries out the specific problem of Transcendental Logic which makes it apt to be referred as the Metaphysical Deduction proper.¹⁵⁶ The second stage which draws out the table of judgements should be seen as providing the clue for the categories.¹⁵⁷ Remarkably enough, the Metaphysical Deduction proper opens up — just after a brief reminder about General Logic — with the implication that the categories must be schematized – an early sign of what will later constitute the kernel for understanding the Transcendental Deduction:

Transcendental logic, on the contrary, has a manifold of sensibility that lies before it *a priori*, which the transcendental aesthetic has offered to it, in order to provide the pure concepts of the understanding with a matter, without which they would be without any content, thus completely empty.¹⁵⁸

Paton notes that if “the categories have objective validity only when they are schematized,” Kant, “by anticipation, gives to them names which belong properly to schematized categories.”¹⁵⁹ So, the schematized categories are not yet empty forms of thought. For this, they must receive their content from their relation to the

¹⁵⁵ A C Ewing, “Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories,” *Mind* 32, no. 125 (1923): 50–66, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2249498>. 53.

¹⁵⁶ Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience Vol I*. 245.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. 256.

¹⁵⁸ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A76-7/B102.

¹⁵⁹ Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience Vol I*. 298.

forms of sensibility; space and time. This content, in turn, should be “gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain way” — required by the spontaneity of our thought.¹⁶⁰ This very act, Kant calls “synthesis.”¹⁶¹ Kant continues by saying that the synthesis is what first engenders knowledge and that it should be treated accordingly.¹⁶² And what yields this synthesis is the transcendental power of imagination: “a blind though indispensable function of the soul without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are scarcely even conscious.”¹⁶³ Pure concepts, in turn, are given by “the pure synthesis, generally represented.”¹⁶⁴ Paton explains this as being tantamount to the assertion that “the category is a concept of ‘the pure synthesis.’”¹⁶⁵ He further elaborates this point by saying that the categories for Kant are the rules of pure synthesis which constitutes their content.¹⁶⁶ Thus for Kant, the three-factored-narrative for knowledge goes this way: firstly, the manifold should be given in intuition; the second factor, namely imagination, synthesizes this manifold, which does not still generate knowledge. The concepts’ giving unity to this synthesized manifold which “consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity” is the third factor involved; and that is grounded on the understanding.¹⁶⁷

The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in

¹⁶⁰ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A77/B102.

¹⁶¹ Ibid. A77/B102.

¹⁶² Ibid. A77-8/B103.

¹⁶³ Ibid. A78/B103.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid. A78/B104.

¹⁶⁵ Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience Vol I*. 274.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid. 279.

¹⁶⁷ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A78-9/B104.

an intuition; which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of understanding.¹⁶⁸

Kant's assertion above is of cardinal importance since it reveals the function of the categories *within* the same act. It is one and the same understanding which supplies two results by strictly the same act. Paton explains this by referring to the transcendental logic's fundamental difference than formal logic. On this account, the understanding, on the one hand, brings forth the logical structure of a judgement by means of the analytic unity; and on the other, this same understanding provides the manifold of intuition with a transcendental content by means of the synthetic unity.¹⁶⁹

At this point, I would like to note that though Kant's *architectonic* somehow entails the Schematism Chapter under Book II of the "Transcendental Analytic"; namely, the "Analytic of Principles," it is implicit in the Transcendental Deduction. In this regard, Paton suggests that it is crucial to keep in mind that "the reference to time is not a late interpolation, but is essential to Kant's argument."¹⁷⁰

Before beginning with the Transcendental Deduction, Kant touches upon the "Principles of any Transcendental Deduction" by emphasizing the distinction between the question of right (*quid juris*) and the question of fact (*quid facti*), saying that the proof of the former is entitled the deduction. Transcendental Deduction, then, aims to show *by what right* the categories are to be applied to objects of experience. It might in this sense "be called a 'justification' rather than a 'deduction', of the categories."¹⁷¹ A basic outline of Kant's presentation of the problem can be summarized under three main characteristics: (1) that the deduction

¹⁶⁸ Ibid. A79/B104-5

¹⁶⁹ Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience Vol I*. 287.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid. 261.

¹⁷¹ Ibid. 313.

must be transcendental and not empirical;¹⁷² (2) that the deduction is indispensable;¹⁷³ and (3) that the deduction of the categories is subject to difficulties which space and time are relatively exempt from.¹⁷⁴

To begin with, Kant says that there are empirical concepts, which necessitate no deduction since experience is always there for the proof of their objective validity.¹⁷⁵ However, there are some concepts — such as cause and effect — which are “destined for pure use *a priori*.”¹⁷⁶ Experience, in this sense, does not supply the necessary and universal characteristics that these concepts supposed to possess, but only the fact whence this possession arises. Hence, Kant says that one is faced with the problem of from where to derive these concepts’ objective validity: that is, how they can relate to objects which are not acquired from experience. The account to be provided for how they can relate so Kant entitles the Transcendental Deduction.¹⁷⁷

The Transcendental Deduction of the categories is both indispensable and difficult (compared to that of space and time) for similar reasons which give us occasion to handle the indispensability and the difficulty together. That is, unlike space and time, they are not concepts under which an object must be given; so, they are not

¹⁷² Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A85-7/B117-19.

¹⁷³ Ibid. A86/B118.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. A88-91/B121-3.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. A84/B116-7.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. A85/B117.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. A85/B117.

immediately and obviously related to objects.¹⁷⁸ The question for Kant is, then, by what right “subjective conditions of thought should have objective validity.”¹⁷⁹

Now, in addition to the intuition of the senses, by means of which something is given, all experience comprises a “concept of an object.”¹⁸⁰ In this regard, Kant contends that the concept of an object in general differentiates itself into different concepts. To be an object in this sense is, for instance, to have a certain quality, quantity, to be a substance with accidents, to have causal interaction with the other ones, etc. These concepts of objects (or of an object) in general, are the categories.¹⁸¹ At this point, the contention of the objective deduction becomes visible: if it can be shown that “concepts of objects in general lie at the ground of all experiential cognition as a priori conditions,”¹⁸² the objective validity of the categories will be established insofar as it is shown that without them no object can be thought. That for Kant is the objective side of the deduction: objects *must* be thought under the forms of thought, namely, the categories.¹⁸³ But, says Kant, more than the faculty of thought, i.e., the understanding, is required if we are to know a priori the objects of experience. What also needed is to explain how *understanding*, as a faculty of knowledge, is meant to have this very possibility of relation.¹⁸⁴ And this constitutes

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. A87-8/B120.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. A89/B122.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. A93/B126.

¹⁸¹ Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience Vol I*. 342f.

¹⁸² Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A93/B126.

¹⁸³ Up to this point, I have been concerned with Kant's assertion *that* the categories apply to objects of experience; the manner of explanation how they can do so is to be found in the subjective deduction, taken with the Schematism.

¹⁸⁴ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A97.

the subjective side of the deduction.¹⁸⁵ I now handle these subjective sources of knowledge that are needed for a possible experience.

Kant points to three basic sources — sense, imagination, apperception — on which all our knowledge depends; and then notes that each of these have empirical employment as they have transcendental ground.¹⁸⁶ As there are three sources of the mind, there are basically three main tasks as follows: “(1) the synopsis of the manifold *a priori* through sense; (2) the synthesis of this manifold through imagination; finally (3) the unity of this synthesis through original apperception.”¹⁸⁷ The word synopsis, rather than synthesis, is applied to sense, since the “synthesis involves an active uniting of the manifold, while sense is passive and does not unite its manifold.”¹⁸⁸ This synopsis is taken through imagination and brought into unity by the original (transcendental) apperception. Receptivity for Kant can yield knowledge possible “only if combined with spontaneity.”¹⁸⁹ This spontaneity, Kant argues, is the basic ground of a threefold synthesis: “the apprehension of the representations as modifications of the mind in intuition; of the reproduction of them in the imagination; and of their recognition in the concept.”¹⁹⁰ Kant refers to the unitary structure of knowledge, saying that if each representation were isolated from each other, nothing as knowledge could have arisen.¹⁹¹ For this reason, one should

¹⁸⁵ Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience Vol I*. 352.

¹⁸⁶ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A115. The division of the basic sources into three only takes place in the first edition.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. A94.

¹⁸⁸ Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience Vol I*. 347.

¹⁸⁹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A97.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid. A97.

¹⁹¹ Ibid. A97.

direct their attention to this structure and to synthesis in particular. Now synthesis in general “is the mere effect of the imagination.”¹⁹²

Kant says: “one must assume a pure transcendental synthesis of [imagination] which grounds even the possibility of all experience.”¹⁹³ Paton notes that this core of the doctrine is preserved throughout the *Critique* but with one crucial modification: the transcendental synthesis of imagination is referred as productive (instead of reproductive) elsewhere.¹⁹⁴ However, as Paton goes on, the two doctrines, as it were, of imagination are not so different *prima facie*, since in both cases it is a prerequisite that a transcendental synthesis of the pure manifold of time is regarded as the necessary condition of all knowledge.¹⁹⁵

To begin with, every representation, as it belongs to inner sense, is subject to time. In time, the manifold is distinguished and represented in a sequence. This act Kant calls the synthesis of apprehension “since it is aimed directly at the intuition, which to be sure provides a manifold but can never effect this as such, and indeed as contained in one representation, without the occurrence of such a synthesis.”¹⁹⁶ Ewing explains this dense phrase by saying that we are conscious of something as necessarily a process in time. Thus, we must be conscious of the stages of the procedure while *discerning the times* at which each take place.¹⁹⁷ The synthesis of

¹⁹² A78/B103. Heidegger follows Kant in this treatment yet gives prominent place to A-Deduction considering that in the B-Deduction, imagination is reduced merely to a function of the understanding. See also note b in the same pagination.

¹⁹³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A101.

¹⁹⁴ Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience Vol I*. 364. See A118; A123; B152.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. 365.

¹⁹⁶ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A99.

¹⁹⁷ Ewing, “Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.” 51. My emphasis.

apprehension is “inseparably combined with” the synthesis of reproduction.¹⁹⁸ One is familiar with that reproduction from empirical association. However, this mere empirical connection presupposes that the appearances in fact are subject to an *a priori* rule, i.e., lawful reproducibility. Kant exemplifies this rule by saying that whenever I try to draw a line in thought, it is obvious that the manifold must be apprehended by me as following each other; yet if I were to lose the preceding representations in thought — cannot reproduce them during the process — I would never get a thorough representation.¹⁹⁹ The synthesis of recognition in a concept, then, basically amounts to the consciousness that the manifold — successively apprehended and reproduced — is combined into one representation.²⁰⁰ No matter how clear or faint the awareness of *this* consciousness may be, it is *sine qua non* for knowledge-generation. Hence, it should be noted that one not only apprehends and reproduces the parts of the line, so to speak, but also represents (in apprehending *and* reproducing) the time itself since every representation is given in time — that is what one already gains from the Transcendental Aesthetic. Thus, the pure synthesis of the reproduction of time (as bound with the apprehension of it) is a necessary condition of knowledge. The *recognition* of the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction of time, in connection to the former, is tantamount to the fact that the time successively apprehended and reproduced alike belongs to one identical consciousness.

At this point, there arises the need to understand the matter of “an object of representations.” Reminding the reader of that what we sensibly represent are mere appearances and not things in themselves, Kant envisages the object in question as, on the one hand, *corresponding to* and, on the other, *distinct from* cognition. He thereby contends that this object must be thought of as nothing else than “something in general = X,” for outside our cognition, there is nothing that could stand over

¹⁹⁸ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A102.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid. A101-2.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. A103.

against us as corresponding to it.²⁰¹ Since the relation of our cognition to that of its object bears an element of necessity, so the object is viewed as that which guarantees the regularity in this very cognition. On the other hand, the unity that the object renders necessary can be nothing else than the “formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the representations.”²⁰² Now, since for Kant every necessity has a transcendental ground as its condition, this unity of consciousness concerning the synthesis of the manifold of intuitions, too, entails a transcendental condition which is nothing other than the *transcendental apperception*. This condition is not only the ground of the unity of the synthesis of the manifold in one consciousness, but also it is the ground of concepts of experience in general and therefore of the objects of possible experience. That and how this is possible is elucidated as follows:

Thus the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances in accordance with concepts, i.e., in accordance with rules that not only make them necessarily reproducible, but also thereby determine an object for their intuition, i.e., for the mind could not possibly think of the identity of itself in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this *a priori*, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its action, which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, and first makes possible their connection in accordance with *a priori* rules.²⁰³

What corresponds to this condition above Kant now designates as the “transcendental object = X” whose pure concept renders objective reality possible. It fulfills this task by means of the providing the ground for empirical concepts’ necessarily relation to an object. Moreover, this pure concept of the transcendental object cannot contain any determinate intuition except the unity that a cognition must possess if it were to relate to an object. This relation, again, is nothing other than the unity of consciousness with regard to synthesis of this manifold undertaken in order to render the representation as representation where it belongs to one

²⁰¹ Ibid. A104.

²⁰² Ibid. A105.

²⁰³ Ibid. A108.

consciousness. This combination in one representation is necessary since without this condition, our cognition would be devoid of an object. The condition of this relation, again, is based on a priori rules concerning the synthetic unity of appearances. This, however, is grounded on nothing other than transcendental apperception.

4.2. Schematism

Up to schematism, Kant's main strategy is to show that the categories must apply to all objects of experience, that is, the manifold given must be combined due to the principles of synthesis comprised in judgement.²⁰⁴ What Kant ventures to do at this point is to expose the "schematism of the pure understanding" that deals with the "sensible condition under which alone pure concepts of understanding can be employed."²⁰⁵

Kant calls this analysis of schematism as one that has to do with *subsumption*. Woods explicates this as follows: "To identify a particular as something or other is, according to Kant, to 'subsume' it, to bring it under a rule of organization" — since Kant defines a concept as "something that serves as a rule,"²⁰⁶ — that enables one to acknowledge a particular image as the image of something in general.²⁰⁷ In the case of empirical concepts — such as a house — there is no difficulty concerning subsumption, for the fact that the particular house which is the object of sensible experience shall easily be subsumable under the empirical concept of 'house' and shall be quite homogeneous with it. However, the need for a doctrine of subsumption appears for the fact that the categories and the intuition of the manifold are totally

²⁰⁴ H.J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience Vol II* (London: Routledge, 2002).17.

²⁰⁵ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A136/B175.

²⁰⁶ Ibid. A106.

²⁰⁷ Michael Woods, "Kant's Transcendental Schematism," *Dialectica* 37, no. 3 (1983): 201–19, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42968953>. 203.

heterogeneous compared to each other. Strictly speaking, no object of experience will support the case concerning the same procedure with pure categories, since they are never to be revealed as pure concepts; e.g. as “a reality,” “a plurality.” The question for Kant is then how pure concepts are to be rendered homogeneous with intuition.²⁰⁸ Keeping with the terminology of the *Transcendental Deduction*, Kant is now to show *the way* that the categories possess “objective validity” or “function as concepts which are applicable to intuition”.²⁰⁹ and that will be possible for Kant by showing how objects of experience subsume under the pure concepts of understanding.

For the fact that one can never *intuit* the categories, e.g., causality itself by the senses and in the appearance, Kant introduces his doctrine of transcendental schematism by saying that “there must be a third thing” which is intellectual (so, homogeneous with the category) on the one hand and sensible (so, homogeneous with the intuition) on the other.²¹⁰ The schemata is both intellectual and sensible since it is both spontaneous (for it determines and not determinable); and receptive (for it is related to *time* which is the form of the givenness of the representation).

Just after this opening, Kant entitles the schema as the transcendental time-determination.²¹¹ To explicate, he reminds us what the concept of understanding comprises, namely, “pure synthetic unity of the manifold in general.”²¹² And it is time, as the form of sensibility of the given manifold in inner sense, that contains an *a priori* manifold in pure intuition. Now, again, a transcendental time-determination, insofar as it is universal and bases upon an *a priori* rule, is homogeneous with the

²⁰⁸ Ibid. 205.

²⁰⁹ Ibid. 205.

²¹⁰ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A138/B177.

²¹¹ Ibid. A138/B177.

²¹² Ibid. A138/B177.

category; it is homogeneous with the appearance insofar as it is time that is contained in every representation of the manifold.²¹³

Referring to the Transcendental Deduction, Kant summarizes what has so far been done. In this regard, he reminds us that the categories are (in addition to the empirical) also of transcendental use; and their empirical use is restricted to the appearances, it cannot be extended to things-in-themselves. Again, the only manner that an object can be given to us is by modification of our sensibility. This is followed by the contention that the pure concepts *a priori* — unless they be devoid of content — must comprise the *a priori* conditions of the inner sense which in turn carry the condition under which alone the categories can be applied to any objects of experience. This *a priori* and formal condition of sensibility whence the use of the pure concepts is restricted, Kant entitles the *schema* of this concept of understanding; and concerning the “procedure of the understanding with these schemata”, he entitles the *schematism of the pure understanding*.²¹⁴

Now, for Kant, the schema is always a product of [the transcendental power of] imagination.²¹⁵ To explicate, Woods reminds that, for Kant, the imagination functions both empirically and transcendently. In its empirical employment, it is reproductive in enabling an image to be created out of manifold of impression one has at a particular moment. For this certain content to be an object of knowledge, in turn, it must be ordered due to certain *a priori* forms — and this function belongs to the transcendental imagination.²¹⁶

Here, the procedure of imagination is schematic: by means of it the (pure) categories become schematized, i.e. the transcendental imagination in its schematic procedure, produces a schema for each category such that is

²¹³ Ibid. A138-9/B177-8.

²¹⁴ Ibid. A139-40/B178-9.

²¹⁵ Ibid. A140/B179.

²¹⁶ Woods, “Kant’s Transcendental Schematism.” 205.

becomes materially operative. But generally speaking the schemata, as transcendental time determinations, are the conditions under which the categories are brought to bear on inner sense. Time is ‘determined’ in a number of ways so that sensible intuition is received under various *temporal modes* in accordance with categories. Schemata therefore, in guaranteeing the employment of the categories, restrict their application to inner sense.²¹⁷

The temporal modes — as Woods call them above — amount to the schemata which are “*a priori* time determinations in accordance with rules.”²¹⁸ These are, following the categories’ order, time-series, the content of time, the order of time and finally the sum total of time in regard to all possible objects.²¹⁹ Broadly, time-series as time-determination demands that “an object has extensive quantity which is apprehended as a unity.”²²⁰ Time-content, as the second mode, determines time by filling it concerning it to be representable “as a quantum.”²²¹ Time-order demands necessary succession which entails that objects relate to each other causally; and finally, the sum total of time determines objects either as possible, actual or necessary.²²²

Time, as we have already seen, is the form of sensibility immediately for inner sense and therefore mediately for outer sense. Thus, it is the form of sensibility for all senses whatsoever. In addition to being a form of sensibility, time is itself a pure intuition. Following from this latter point put forward in the *Aesthetic*, Kant continues by saying that time is the pure image “for all objects of the senses in general.”²²³ Now I assert that this contention of Kant’s is quite the crux of the *schematism* in the sense that Heidegger should have had in mind this

²¹⁷ Ibid. 212f. Emphasis mine.

²¹⁸ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A145/B184.

²¹⁹ Ibid. A145/B184-5.

²²⁰ Woods, “Kant’s Transcendental Schematism.” 218.

²²¹ Ibid. 218.

²²² Ibid. 218.

²²³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A142/B182.

characterization of time when he derives temporality from transcendental imagination. To explicate, what follows when time is seen not only as pure intuition but also as the pure image for all objects of sensibility in general is that it constitutes a temporal horizon within which the categories are rendered objectively valid. Thus, when Kant says transcendental schemata determine time, it must be taken as *pure image*. I suggest that time in this sense must come to mind whenever Kant refers to the transcendental schemata as time-determinations. Otherwise, one cannot but run the risk of confusing time as pure intuition and time as pure image, as I believe Heidegger does. Admittedly, it is one and the same time in each case — however, different layers are at work in these two different characterizations of time. Then, it follows that whereas time as pure intuition assumes its being also the form through which an appearance is *given*, time as pure image characterizes the way in which time as pure intuition — hence, the pure manifold of time — is determined in accordance with a *rule* that the pure understanding prescribes.²²⁴ In other words, time as pure intuition indicates the pure manifold of time, whereas time as pure image indicates the way in which this pure manifold of time is always already in a synthetic unity thanks to the indispensable role of schematism. Hence, once again, the schematism of the power of imagination makes possible the mediation between pure categories and time — the former is rendered sensible and the latter is rendered intelligible by being determined.

Still, how is one to understand *pure image* here? Certainly, it is not an image of something in particular. Rather, as Woods contends, “[a] pure image is best regarded as a temporal aspect, produced by the transcendental imagination, under which a sensible manifold is apprehended.”²²⁵ Hence, the pure concepts in their necessary relation to time are rendered “temporally operative” in accordance with the transcendental schematism.²²⁶ Being temporally operative amounts to the fact that

²²⁴ Ibid. A145/B184.

²²⁵ Woods, “Kant’s Transcendental Schematism.” 216.

²²⁶ Ibid. 216.

what we have as pure “now-sequence” is objectified in such a way that we are aware of something external, as it were, as present and enduring. This is made possible in accordance with the execution of the transcendental schemata demanded by transcendental apperception.²²⁷ Therefore, a pure subjective succession is made objective by the cooperation of transcendental imagination and transcendental apperception. By this means, “a sequence of impressions in a subjective time-order becomes an object of appearance when it submits to ‘I think substance, cause, etc.’, i.e., the *consciousness*, in such a way that the object is *present*.”²²⁸ What makes this possible, as Woods elaborates, is “by submitting to a commonly experienced temporal matrix in which, for example, duration is measurable.”²²⁹

4.3. Transcendence for the Possibility of Cognition

In Heidegger’s terminology, Kant’s “possibility of experience” denotes what a finite creature is able to know, as it were, of a being that it did not created, i.e., how this creature is able to stand-out-of itself. This I have already indicated in detail in Chapter 3. Now Heidegger remarks that there are two fundamental conditions for this possibility of experience. The first begins with the already-known fact that the object must be given. Heidegger asks what one needs to understand from this fact. Referring to Kant, our first clue is that it means to “relate [the object’s] representation to experience.”²³⁰ What this further means for Heidegger is that there must be an in advance “turning-toward” to this object that is already able to be “summoned.”²³¹ This initial “turning-one’s-attention-toward” takes place, as the

²²⁷ Ibid. 217.

²²⁸ Ibid. 217.

²²⁹ Ibid. 217.

²³⁰ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A156/B195.

²³¹ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 83.

Transcendental Deduction opens up and the Schematism expounds, in the ontological synthesis.²³² So, this brings about the first condition.

The second condition is concerned with the truth value of knowledge. For Kant, truth means “agreement with the object.”²³³ Heidegger claims there must be something in advance like a “with-what” of the possible encounter — something which renders this encounter possible by giving a principle, as it were. This something, again, “must open up in advance the horizon of the standing-against, and as such it must be distinct.”²³⁴ It is this horizon, Heidegger concludes, that is the condition of the possibility of the object [*Gegenstand*] in its “being-able-to-stand-against.”²³⁵ What is more, it is this same horizon that brings the transcendental power of imagination — in its enabling of the “pure look of objectivity in general,”²³⁶ — together with the anticipation of an understanding of temporality that forms this very horizon on the other.

Heidegger argues that these two conditions above determine transcendence in its essence and for him it is expressed sufficiently in Kant’s formulation of the “highest fundamental principles of all synthetic judgments,” which reads as follows: “the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience.”²³⁷ At this point, Heidegger makes a radical move and emphasizes the phrase “at the same time”. The way Heidegger elucidates “at the same time” is to evaluate it as giving clue to the “essential unity

²³² Ibid. 83.

²³³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A157/B196-7. Heidegger here notes that the word ‘object’ is used here in the sense of the German ‘Objekt.’

²³⁴ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 83.

²³⁵ Ibid. 83.

²³⁶ Ibid. 93.

²³⁷ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A158/B197.

of the full structure of transcendence,” namely, temporality, that forms something like a “horizon of objectivity in general” in its letting the object to stand-against.²³⁸ What is new here is that this “constant standing-out-from” is what Heidegger calls *Ecstasis*. Additionally, this ecstasis forms a horizon where this outlook lets Heidegger denote transcendence as “ecstatic-horizonal.” The highest principle of Kant’s account then marks this structure of transcendence for Heidegger which is a unity in itself.²³⁹ This unity, which Heidegger calls “care” is explicated in *Being and Time* as follows:

The future, the character of having been and the Present, show the phenomenal of the ‘toward-oneself,’ the ‘back-to,’ and the ‘letting-oneself-be-encountered-by.’ The phenomena of the ‘towards...,’ the ‘to...,’ and the ‘alongside...,’ make temporality manifest as the εἰς-αὐτὸν pure and simple. *Temporality is the primordial ‘outside-of-itself’ in and for itself.* We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, the ‘ecstases’ of Temporality.²⁴⁰

4.4. Transcendental Deduction and Schematism from Heidegger’s Aspect

After these general remarks, I now analyze Heidegger’s treatment of the Transcendental Deduction. The mainstream interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction relies on the above-mentioned perspective of *quid juris*.²⁴¹ However, Heidegger’s stance on the issue is quite different. He both questions the juristic form that the problem is supposed to take and of the dimension of objective validity it acquires. At this point, Heidegger notes that his interpretation will not be following “the twisted paths” of the Transcendental Deduction. What he rather ventures to do “is to lay bare the original impetus for the problematic” of the Deduction.²⁴² If, the

²³⁸ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 84.

²³⁹ Ibid. 84.

²⁴⁰ Heidegger, *Being and Time*. H328-9.

²⁴¹ Guyer and Paton are among those, to name but two.

²⁴² Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 49.

problem of the “origin and truth” of the categories be determined,²⁴³ as he says is demanded by Kant, “then the *quaestio juris* cannot as such be taken as a question of validity.”²⁴⁴ Rather, Heidegger continues, “the *quaestio juris* is only the formula for the task of an analytic of transcendence, i.e., of a pure phenomenology of the subjectivity of the subject, namely, as a finite subject.”²⁴⁵

However, when Heidegger questions the tendency that Kant has for the juridical form of the inquiry, what he first sees is Kant’s polemical orientation against theoretical dogmatic metaphysics which takes the pure concepts’ employment for granted. In contrast to this, Kant’s position concerns grounding the legitimacy of the supposed authority of the usage of these concepts. No matter how natural it may seem, for Heidegger, Kant sustains his most genuine insights such as “time”, “the power of imagination” and even the “transcendental analytic” itself at this position. Seen in this juridical form, Heidegger contends, Transcendental Deduction is nothing but the most untenable part of Kantian philosophy.²⁴⁶ Why this inevitably turns out to be so, according to Heidegger, lies in the isolation of the pure concepts of understanding from its original unity with pure intuition, namely, time. Indeed, Heidegger sees that Kant’s apprehension of the pure concept of understanding vacillates between meaning sometimes only notions and sometimes categories, so to speak.²⁴⁷ And where Kant understands them as mere notions, he attempts to rebuild the already-distorted unity between them and the objects of intuition. Cut off

²⁴³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A128.

²⁴⁴ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 61f.

²⁴⁵ Ibid. 62.

²⁴⁶ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*. 208f.

²⁴⁷ Kant contends that a pure concept, “insofar as it has its origin solely in the understanding (not in a pure image of sensibility)” is called a notion. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A320/B377.

from its relation to time, Kant needs to re-pose the problem of the contents of pure thought's relatedness to objects of experience.²⁴⁸

Put in other words, the main difficulty of the transcendental deduction — which at the same time directs the inquiry to a juridical one — has to do with Kant's understanding of the *a priori*. That is, when what is *a priori* is understood in the sense of lying ready in the mind, within the sphere of the pure subject, and so “accessible therein prior to any move to ob-jects,” the manner of the determination of the of what is objective by the subjective requires an explanation of objective validity, namely legitimacy in a juridical fashion. Thus in Heidegger's perspective, what misdirects the attempt of the Transcendental Deduction has mostly to do with Kant's understanding of *a priori* as what lies in the isolated subject as well as his cutting of the categories from their intrinsic relation to pure intuition, time.²⁴⁹

Nevertheless, Heidegger admits that Kant's “actual procedure” is far superior than his own awareness of it. That is to say, on the one hand, Kant's ambivalence with the Transcendental Deduction is grounded in his deeper “insecurity” concerning method — he “vacillates between psychology and logic.”²⁵⁰ However, on the other hand, he has the distinct insight for the need of a phenomenological methodology which also grounds the former two. That and how these two stances intertwine is clear when one concerns the two sides of the deduction. Exactly at the point where he first speaks of a *juridical* deduction of the objective *validity* of the categories, what he chiefly has in mind is the phenomenological disclosure of the essence of the categories,²⁵¹ — and that alludes to what is known as the subjective side of the deduction. One can see this as follows:

²⁴⁸ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. 212.

²⁴⁹ Ibid. 213.

²⁵⁰ Ibid. 219.

²⁵¹ Ibid. 223.

[I]t is already a sufficient deduction of [the categories] and justification of their objective validity if we can prove that by means of them alone an object can be thought. But in such a thought there is more at work than the single faculty of thinking, namely the understanding, and the understanding itself, as a faculty of cognition that is to be related to objects, also requires an elucidation of the possibility of this relation, we must first assess not the empirical but the transcendental constitution of the subjective sources that comprise the a priori foundation for the possibility of experience.²⁵²

Taking this quotation into account and keeping in line with the Kantian terminology, Heidegger argues that what lies at the heart of the problem of the Transcendental Deduction is not a *quaestio juris* but a *quaestio facti*. To be sure, one should not take it as facts in the sense of empirically verifiable data but in an ontological sense, what is at stake here is the phenomenological disclosure of the ontological constitution of Dasein, that is, the rendering of the transcendental structure of Dasein transparent in itself. And this, Heidegger contends, is far from a juridical mode of inquiry into validity.²⁵³

Now we are at a position to see anew two sides of the Transcendental Deduction. Reminding the reader of these two sides, Heidegger confidently says that Kant misrepresents the fundamental task of the both sides of the deduction. That is to say, in giving priority to the objective side of the deduction, Kant relatively downplays the subjective side; yet Heidegger maintains that Kant overlooks the fact that “*by radically carrying out the subjective side of the task of the deduction, the objective task is taken care of.*”²⁵⁴ In other words, if Kant had followed this radical path that Heidegger takes notice of, the objective side would not have appeared in this form. So once again, what is at stake here is to give a phenomenological account of the transcendental constitution of Dasein. This phenomenology, in turn, should make intelligible the intrinsic connection of the subjective sources of cognition and

²⁵² Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A96f.

²⁵³ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. 224.

²⁵⁴ Ibid. 225.

centered in the pure power of imagination, how these render possible the transcendence of the finite Dasein.

4.5. Understanding Transcendental Faculty of Imagination and Synthesis

If the subject-matter of the Transcendental Deduction for Heidegger is transcendence, then it is crucial to ask on what ground this transcendence is to be established. This ground, it will be examined, is none other than the transcendental schemata rendered possible by transcendental imagination. Heidegger's originality concerning his interpretation of Kant begins to show itself at the very moment one asks this question of the ground of transcendence. For Richardson, "the acceptance or rejection of his reading depends on this, and this alone."²⁵⁵ Likewise, Sherover says that "[t]ranscendental imagination is itself transcendence; it is the possibility of experience as the complete integrated unity of the elements that constitute the possibility of human knowledge."²⁵⁶ And Heidegger himself says that the Schematism chapter must be the kernel of the whole *Critique*. However, for Heidegger, Kant's treatment of this chapter as one that has to do with subsumption of the appearances under pure concepts directs the analysis to a more superficial form.²⁵⁷ And this again is intrinsically connected with his treatment of the Transcendental Deduction as having to do with a *quaestio juris*. Although Heidegger admits that the first approach to the problem as one of subsumption may be an acceptable one, it covers up the fundamental vision of the Schematism to a certain degree. On the explication of Kant's schematism, I have indicated that the problem of subsumption concerns the heterogeneity between the pure concepts of understanding and the objects of experience. As a result of this, in Kant, some mediating representation were called in, to bridge, as it were, the gap between two poles, which will in turn secure the application of the former to the latter. This was the general idea behind "subsumption." However, the moment that the subject-

²⁵⁵ Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*. 122.

²⁵⁶ Sherover, *Heidegger, Kant and Time*. 136.

²⁵⁷ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 63.

matter becomes to be dominated by subsumption, the same problem that I addressed above (concerning objective validity) occurs. Thus, rather than going forward by subsumption, Heidegger's strategy in interpreting Schematism is to feature the temporalizing character included there.

Now Heidegger elaborates on how this comes to be possible. He begins with a dense statement as follows: "[the transcendental schematism] forms [*bildet*] that which stands against in the pure letting-stand-against in such a way that what is represented in pure thinking is necessarily given intuitably in the pure image [*Bilde*] of time."²⁵⁸ As we know that it is the schema that forms schema-images for the categories, now Heidegger contends that what is represented by means of the categories which is at the same time given in pure intuition is made possible by transcendental schematism. And since these transcendental schemata are nothing but time-transcendentally-determined, he says that the possibility of overlapping of intuition and thinking lies in this very determination. In technical words, Heidegger continues, it is *time* that "gives a preliminary enclosedness to the horizon of transcendence."²⁵⁹ That is, it is time and the temporal-ontological horizon granted by it that makes possible the ontical encounter within the object as an object.

I have pointed to time as "pure image" above and claimed that Heidegger should have in mind this form of time while deriving temporality from transcendental imagination. Now Heidegger says that "as 'pure image,' time is the *schema-image*" — a phenomenon which differentiates itself either from a mere look or a "likeness."²⁶⁰ This is the sole possibility for him that the pure concepts possess "a certain look" and this possibility in turn is "nothing other than always just time and the temporal."²⁶¹

²⁵⁸ Ibid. 76.

²⁵⁹ Ibid. 76.

²⁶⁰ Ibid. 68. Emphasis mine.

²⁶¹ Ibid. 74.

Recall that the project that Heidegger undertakes is to interpret the *Critique* as laying the ground for ontology. This ground-laying — in Heideggerian terminology — shows itself as fundamental ontology; i.e., the analysis of the structure of Dasein, which amounts to laying bare transcendence in its finitude. Understood technically, this task is nothing other than accounting for the possibility of *a priori* synthesis. Whence this synthesis arises, as I have indicated, is the transcendental power of imagination. A parenthesis may be opened here.

For Heidegger a faculty in the transcendental sense should not be understood as a “‘basic power’ [‘*Grundkraft*’] which is *at hand* in the soul.”²⁶² In this sense, both Richardson and Sherover point out to the meaning of the term transcendental imagination by means of going back to the stem of it. *Transzendente Einbildungskraft*: first, it is an indispensable power (*Kraft*) within the knower; (and not simply an act) and it indicates what the knower is capable of / can achieve.²⁶³ Moreover, though it is conventionally referred to as a faculty, it is not faculty [*Vermögen*] in the ordinary sense. In order for a better understanding, the literal sense should be kept in mind: “ein/bilden = ‘to form in(to),’ ‘to form in,’ ‘to in-form,’ ‘to picture in,’ ‘to structure in.’ The word ‘Einbildungskraft’ must then be understood in its full literal sense as joining to ‘imaginative structuring’ the *kraft*, the power to do so, i.e., ‘the power of imaginative structuring,’ or ‘the power of the imagination.’”²⁶⁴ Thus in order to avoid misrepresentation, one should keep in mind that ‘imagination’ is merely the abbreviated form of what is originally referred as the “transcendental power of imagination.” In this regard, it means what something is “able to do” in the sense of enabling the structure of ontological transcendence.²⁶⁵

²⁶² Ibid. 94. Emphasis mine.

²⁶³ Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*. 122.

²⁶⁴ Sherover, *Heidegger, Kant and Time*. 64n.

²⁶⁵ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 94.

Heidegger further contends that the notion ‘faculty’ means “possibility” in the sense he has referred to when considering Kant’s “possibility of experience.” Understood this way, transcendental power of imagination is not primarily a middle faculty between pure intuition and pure thinking, it is rather a fundamental *ability* of the human soul “that grounds all cognition a priori”.²⁶⁶ With this contention, one can see that Heidegger begins to render conspicuous what he has been building up until this point. That is to say, from this point on in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, he lays bare one of his central arguments concerning imagination. Heidegger suggests it in a question-form as follows: “what if [imagination] was that ‘unknown common root’ of both stems?”²⁶⁷ This question indeed is partly given rise by the seemingly equivocality of the fundamental sources in Kant. On the one hand, there is the bifurcation of the sources as sensibility and understanding which is all in accord with receptivity and spontaneity again differentiated within “Transcendental Aesthetic” on the one hand and that of “Logic” on the other. Within this picture, the transcendental power of imagination has no place at face value at all, leaving aside the interpretations of it as a middle faculty. However, the path that Heidegger’s interpretation takes us is beyond the dilemma of the number of the sources, juxtaposed respectively. Because his reading of the *Critique* from the beginning depends on what it hints at, rather than what it says actually, Heidegger focuses on the “unknown common root” alluded by Kant. That is, what is hinted at is the transcendental power of imagination for Heidegger. And what supports this claim in his reading is again his interpretation of the *Critique* as having to do with the transcendence of a finite being, which then finds its true source in ontological synthesis; i.e., the “original unity” whence the two elements, so to speak, spring from.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁶ Ibid. 94f. See *Critique of Pure Reason* A124.

²⁶⁷ Ibid. 96.

²⁶⁸ Ibid. 96. Nevertheless, Heidegger declines the possible objections in advance, saying that his argument in no way suggests that pure intuition and pure thinking is a “product of the imagination” and in this sense they are merely imaginary. Rather – this time building up the same argument from reverse – Heidegger says that the transcendental power of imagination can only “imagine” something from out of the union of those two. See 97.

In what follows, Heidegger maintains that pure intuition and pure thinking depend on the transcendental power of imagination, respectively. For the former, what Heidegger does is to basically go back to Kant's understanding of space and time as "original representations,"²⁶⁹ where "original" needs to be apprehended not ontically or psychologically as if something innate in the soul. Instead, he suggests, one should remind themselves of the term '*originarius*' in the "*intuitus originarius*" where it means "to let spring forth."²⁷⁰ Doubtless, as having to do with human finitude, this letting-spring-forth is not creative in the ontical sense yet the forms of sensibility are "formative" in the sense that they determine "the *look* of space and time in advance as totalities which are in themselves manifold."²⁷¹ They intuit what is given as it presents itself. Due to their essence, pure intuitions are "original" in the sense of re-presenting. There lies the essence of the transcendental power of imagination in this presenting since pure intuition "can only be 'original' because according to its essence it is the pure power of imagination itself which formatively gives looks (images) from out of itself."²⁷² On the other hand, Heidegger's treatment of the dependence of pure understanding on transcendental imagination is much more intricate than that of sensibility. To begin with, Heidegger stresses the so-called dependency of understanding upon intuition. Then, he refers to the schemata which is produced by the power of imagination. Alluding to Kant's usage of "the schematism of our understanding,"²⁷³ where understanding works with them, Heidegger now claims as reads:

this working-with of the understanding, however, is *not* a way of putting-into-practice, which it *also* carries out on occasion. Rather, this pure schematism, which is grounded in the transcendental power of imagination, constitutes

²⁶⁹ Ibid. 99.

²⁷⁰ Ibid. 99.

²⁷¹ Ibid. 99. Emphasis mine.

²⁷² Ibid. 99.

²⁷³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A141/B180.

precisely the original Being of the understanding, the 'I think substance,' etc Now if Kant calls this pure, self-orienting, self-relating to..., 'our thought,' then 'thinking' this thought is no longer called judging, but is thinking in the sense of the free, forming, and projecting (although not arbitrary) 'conceiving' of something. This 'original' thinking is pure imagining."²⁷⁴

Apparently, Heidegger attempts at a phenomenological disclosure of the "origin" of understanding which finds its authentic possibility in the "turning-toward." This, to my reading, has its point of departure in the spontaneous nature of understanding. However, Heidegger also asserts that understanding is not only spontaneity but it is spontaneous receptivity, yet I find the lines below in no way plausible:

On the other hand, in the domain of pure knowledge, i.e., within the problem of the possibility of transcendence, the pure taking-in-stride of that which gives itself, i.e., the taking-in-stride which gives to itself (spontaneously), cannot remain concealed. But must not precisely a pure receptivity now emerge, just as compelling and with all its spontaneity, in the transcendental interpretation of pure thinking? Apparently.²⁷⁵

However, what Heidegger argues so far is still introductory concerning his central claim that the transcendental power of imagination is the root of both stems. That this is so becomes clear when he says that what instead serves as the decisive proof is to show the essentially temporal character of what Kant's threefold synthesis. Accordingly, Heidegger first treats the fashion Kant expresses his syntheses of apprehension, of reproduction and of recognition. What is the meaning of these "synthesis of?" At this point, Heidegger is precise in repudiating that apprehension, reproduction, etc are subject to a synthesis as well as declining that either one of these bring about a synthesis. What the threefold synthesis rather signifies is that "synthesis as such has the character of either apprehension or reproduction or recognition. Hence the expressions mean Synthesis in the mode of Apprehension, Reproduction, and Recognition, or synthesis as apprehending, as reproducing, as recognizing."²⁷⁶ Then, Heidegger remarks that the main objective of the three modes

²⁷⁴ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 106.

²⁷⁵ Ibid. 108.

²⁷⁶ Ibid. 124f.

of synthesis — though not usually expressed precisely enough — lies in showing their essential belonging-togetherness in the original pure synthesis as such.²⁷⁷ And as a final note, he reminds the reader of Kant’s contention that all our representations are finally subject to time.²⁷⁸ Keeping these in mind, for Heidegger the decisive question becomes that if all representings are carried out by the threefold synthesis, “then is it not the time-character of this synthesis which makes everything uniformly submissive in advance?”²⁷⁹

In the section where the threefold synthesis took place, I already noted that the synthesis in the mode of apprehension occurs due to the mind’s distinguishing every sequence in the sense of “now and now and now.” Heidegger contends that, while empirical intuition is directed to the being that is present in the now, the pure (apprehending) synthesis is directed to the now, i.e., the present itself. From out of this, what Heidegger derives is that the pure synthesis as apprehension is present-forming and by this means it has a “temporal character.”²⁸⁰ Likewise, synthesis as reproduction which represents “no-longer-now” is what first creates “having-been-ness” in the first place.²⁸¹ The last analysis — of synthesis in the mode of recognition — Heidegger admits is the most compelling given Kant’s decline of all the temporal references to the ‘I’ of pure apperception.²⁸² He then argues that what seems the latest in the empirical generation of conceptual development of synthesis is indeed the first which directs the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction. Alluding to the way Kant depicts understanding as being “always busy poring through the

²⁷⁷ Ibid. 125.

²⁷⁸ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A98-99.

²⁷⁹ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 125.

²⁸⁰ Ibid. 126.

²⁸¹ Ibid. 127.

²⁸² Ibid. 128.

appearances with the aim of finding some sort of rule in them,”²⁸³ Heidegger arrives at the following result:

if this pure synthesis reconnoiters, then at the same time that says: it does not explore a being which it can hold before itself as selfsame. Rather, it explores the horizon of being-able-to-hold-something-before-us in general. As pure, its exploring is the original forming of this preliminary attaching, i.e., the future. Thus the third mode of synthesis also proves to be one which essentially is time-forming.²⁸⁴

For Heidegger, the reason that the pure modes of synthesis are three in number are not that they refer to three sources of knowledge but rather that “originally unified in themselves, as time-forming, they constitute the ripening of time itself.”²⁸⁵ He further contends that it is because of this very fact that “[instances of] ontological knowledge are ‘transcendental determinations of time.’”²⁸⁶ That is, only because the pure modes of pure synthesis are unified in the “threefold -unifying of time,” is there also to be ground in them the unification of the three elements of pure knowledge as a condition of possibility. For that reason, Heidegger’s argument goes, the apparently-mediating-faculty of the transcendental power of imagination is indeed nothing other than original time. And again, it is only in this being-rooted in time that the transcendental power of imagination is the “root of transcendence.”²⁸⁷ Heidegger thus brings together what he has so far maintained as follows:

The interpretation of the transcendental power of imagination as root, i.e., the elucidation of how the pure synthesis allows both stems to grow forth from out of it and how it maintains them, leads back from itself to that in which this root is rooted: to original time. As the original, threefold-unifying forming of future, past, and present in general, this is what first makes possible the “faculty” of pure synthesis, i.e., that which it is able to produce, namely, the

²⁸³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A126.

²⁸⁴ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 130.

²⁸⁵ Ibid. 137.

²⁸⁶ Ibid. 138.

²⁸⁷ Ibid. 137.

unification of the three elements of ontological knowledge, in the unity of which transcendence is formed.²⁸⁸

In a nutshell, I analyzed Transcendental Deduction and Schematism with regard to the transcendental power of imagination from both Kant's and Heidegger's stances. The next chapter will continue with covering this fundamental problem with a much more critical stance.



²⁸⁸ Ibid. 137.

CHAPTER 5

PURE IMAGE OF TIME

Heidegger's interpretation of the transcendental power of imagination culminates in two fundamental results, the first of which is that the transcendental power of imagination is the root of both sensibility and understanding. This first contention, as will be seen, is generated from a more fundamental insight that the transcendental power of imagination itself is rooted in original time,²⁸⁹ which at times turns out to the more radical thesis that it *is* original time,²⁹⁰ namely, temporality.²⁹¹ Admitting Heidegger is a keen interpreter of the history of philosophy, it should still be noted — as Stephen Käufer also cautiously does — that the moment he begins to interpret Kant, he concurrently advances his own views.²⁹² Given that Heidegger's philosophy within the late 1920s is confined to his profound involvement in the *Critique*,²⁹³ it becomes all the more difficult to discern what belongs to the interpretation and at what point Heidegger's original ideas intervene. Placed at this very juncture, the present chapter should be seen not as an attempt at an endeavor of mere disentanglement but as at furthering the dialogue from a critical vantage point.

²⁸⁹ Ibid. 141.

²⁹⁰ Ibid. 123.

²⁹¹ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. 232.

²⁹² Stephan Käufer, "Schemata, Hammers, and Time: Heidegger's Two Derivations of Judgment," *Topoi* 22, no. 1 (2003): 79–91, <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022160015430>. 80.

²⁹³ Ibid. 80.

5.1. Introduction to the Main Problematic: Heidegger's Contention Concerning Imagination and Temporality

The argument — that imagination is original time — will be of central significance throughout what follows not only for it is the fundamental upshot of Heidegger's interpretation of the *Critique* in that period but also for it is the very background against which the present chapter grounds its own thesis concerning the aforementioned interpretation. My thesis is not so much shaped by a major disapproval of Heidegger's main result as much as it is shaped by a discontent concerning his methodology. In other words, what I would challenge is not whether transcendental power of imagination is itself original time — instead, I recognize such an outcome in its full force, notwithstanding the fact that I do question the way that he arrives at such a conclusion. Stated more precisely, Heidegger — in both the *Kantbook* and *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* — regards and highlights Kant's "threefold synthesis" as the main point of departure for deriving "original time" and identifying it with the transcendental power of imagination. However, such an approach, I suggest, is untenable from at least two regards. Firstly, as is seen in the previous chapter, Heidegger takes Kant's threefold synthesis to coincide with the dimensions of past, present and future. Recall that in this regard each mode of synthesis corresponds to one dimension of time: synthesis as apprehension to past, synthesis as reproduction to present and synthesis as recognition to the future. Although I refrain from a repetition of each mode's structure since I have already handled them, it should be noted that this for Heidegger is the basic means for coming up with the distinctive result in his Kant interpretation. By means of bringing forth the "inner temporal character" of each mode, Heidegger believes to have derived "the ultimate, decisive proof" concerning the transcendental power of imagination.²⁹⁴ Nevertheless, I argue that it can by no means be the decisive proof, reserving my concern regarding the strangeness of such a *proof* by Heidegger, considering his otherwise phenomenological approach. The reason I argue so has not so much to do with the insufficiency of such a proof as it has with the supposed motivation behind it. Indeed, Heidegger seems to make a hasty postulation from the threefold synthesis to original time, where each mode

²⁹⁴ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 124.

corresponds to one dimension, as mentioned above and elucidated in the previous chapter. I however contend that it is by no means genuine albeit it can serve well for heuristic purposes. Basically stated, this postulation is nothing but concocted in its methodology. In what follows, I articulate the reasons behind my challenge.

5.2. Threefold Synthesis and Temporality

To begin with, I suggest that in his derivation, Heidegger confuses the different layers of “time” — that are time as pure intuition and time as pure image. As explicated in the previous chapter, he refers to the temporal function of each aspect of the threefold synthesis. For Heidegger, then, the modes of the synthesis are temporal, i.e., time-forming, in the sense that each constitutes a *horizon* thanks to which something like past, present or future is formed. However, the problem is, he uses time as *pure intuition* to mean time as *pure image*. The way I read it, the time whose *a priori* synthesis is the condition of possibility of a threefold synthesis *of the representations* is nothing other than time as pure intuition.²⁹⁵ Nevertheless, Heidegger takes *pure intuition of time* which is nothing but the “pure succession of nows” to unjustifiably substitute for something like pure image which I suggest is the unique source of something like a horizon.

I already noted that for Heidegger understanding is rooted in transcendental imagination. Moreover, in the previous chapter, I indicated to Heidegger’s claim that Kant unduly sets apart the faculties of sensibility and understanding from each other. For him, then, what Kant should have maintained is to show the “inner dependency” of understanding upon time:

*But if the synthesis of understanding, as synthesis of recognition in the concept, is related to time and if categories emerge from just this synthesis as activity of understanding, that is, if the three syntheses are interrelated on the basis of time, then the origin of the categories is time itself.*²⁹⁶

²⁹⁵ One point that in my opinion supports my claim concerns the structure of the Critique: the threefold synthesis takes place at a point where Kant had not yet introduced “pure image.”

²⁹⁶ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*. 247.

Admittedly, the threefold synthesis *of representations* take place only against the background of the synthesis of time itself — this is what Kant already maintains. However, the synthesis of time itself is not confined merely to the function of imagination by itself. I assume that Heidegger has in mind the following passage when he allocates synthesis exclusively to imagination.

Synthesis in general is, as we shall subsequently see, the mere effect of the imagination, of a blind though indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious. Yet to bring this synthesis to concepts is a function that pertains to the understanding, and by means of which it first provides cognition in the proper sense.²⁹⁷

However, he seems to take the passage at its *face value* and downplay the role of the understanding that is stressed in the second part of the passage. Due to my reading, on the other hand, Kant is sufficiently clear here concerning the independence of the faculties, notwithstanding their cooperation.

In the previous quotation from the *Phenomenological Interpretation*, Heidegger, I observe, again confounds two distinct levels — he seems to attribute the function of the schematism to the threefold synthesis. For Kant, it is the task of schematism to render pure concepts of the understanding meaningful, i.e., related to intuition (time). However, the schemata are able to do so only by following the *rule* that the pure concepts of understanding prescribe: thus arises the categories as categories within the same procedure that time is transcendently determined. Hence it is one thing to say that (I suggest as Kant does) time is determined within the same act, namely schematism, that at the same time renders pure concepts' relation to the sensible content possible. Nevertheless, it is something entirely different to suggest that (as Heidegger does) the origin of categories is time itself. This is the schematism level in the *Critique*. I propose that even if Heidegger is alluding to this level, his manner of doing this is, at best, reductive.

It should further be noted that what for Heidegger serves as decisive is “preliminary” for Kant — which by no means is supposed to constitute the core in the latter's

²⁹⁷ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A78/B103.

understanding of the transcendental power of imagination. From my point of view, Heidegger's analysis here should be taken as nothing more than positing an original time behind the objective temporal order. This approach, however, is still indebted to the Kantian approach given that it inherits and appropriates time as a transcendental condition that renders the objectivity of objects possible.

What I also criticize is the fact that many commentators have no problem with an attempt at a repetition of Heidegger's conclusion, leaving his strategy unquestioned. Duane Armitage, in his "Imagination as Groundless Ground: Reconsidering Heidegger's *Kantbuch*" articulates his point of departure as an endeavor to substantiate Heidegger's claim concerning the "un-thought identity" of transcendental imagination and time.²⁹⁸ In his article, Armitage has no problem at all with following the way that Heidegger derives his *proof*. Another article with a similar attitude is from Stephen Käufer. In "Schemata, Hammers, and Time: Heidegger's Two Derivations of Judgment," Käufer also relies on the analogy of temporality built on the threefold synthesis.²⁹⁹ As I indicated, this analogy may hold to a certain degree, however, a focus confined to it would be missing a much more authentic alternative, which I will be discussing. Michael Woods, on the other hand, has a strategy that is much more in line with what I will attempt to point out. According to Woods, if "time" that is determined by means of the transcendental schemata is to be interpreted as "pure form of intuition," it would make little, if any, sense. Thus, he contends, it should be taken as "pure image of all the objects of experience." However, I dissent from his perspective the moment he equates "time as pure image" with "pure succession."³⁰⁰ The motivation behind my challenge of his reading is that, to begin with, we have no textual evidence that Kant identifies pure image with pure succession, and secondly, even assuming that Woods alludes

²⁹⁸ Duane Armitage, "Imagination as Groundless Ground: Reconsidering Heidegger's *Kantbuch*," *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy* 20.2 (2016): 477-496., accessed December 27, 2019, https://www.pdcnet.org/epoche/content/epoche_2016_0999_2_3_61.

²⁹⁹ Käufer, "Schemata, Hammers, and Time: Heidegger's Two Derivations of Judgment."

³⁰⁰ Woods, "Kant's Transcendental Schematism." 217.

to the *modes* of time, Kant clearly expresses that there are three of such modes, which are “persistence, succession, and simultaneity.”³⁰¹ And this brings the present chapter to the second point that I tackle concerning the problem with Heidegger’s postulation. The latter, I argue, covers above a more genuine approach which in my opinion sheds light to the supposed dialogue between Kant and Heidegger with regard to the subject matter. My strategy, in this sense, departs from that and how Heidegger inherits his understanding of “significance” from Kant and appropriates into his own onto-phenomenological project. One out of the various passages whence one can have a sense of Kant’s “significance” runs as follows:

Without schemata, therefore, the categories are only functions of the understanding for concepts, but do not represent any object. This *significance* comes to them from sensibility, which realizes the understanding at the same time as it restricts it.³⁰²

A careful reading of the above passage within the context of the *Schematism* will show that, in Kant, the significance of the categories is established by means of schematism. Thus, in Kantian terminology, the objective validity of the categories is secured only within this sensible condition of possibility. With a Heideggerian terminology, this “significance” is to be taken as referring to that which makes transcendence possible. Stated precisely, significance and transcendence are intertwined together.

For Heidegger, the nature of the subject matter turns out to be more intricate, although the fundamental stance is preserved: “We shall point to *temporality* as the meaning of the Being of that entity that we call ‘Dasein.’”³⁰³ Keeping this in mind, one should direct their attention now to a second passage from the *Kantbook* which reads as follows:

³⁰¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A177/B219.

³⁰² Ibid. A147/B187. My emphasis. For the other passages covering “significance,” see B149, A139/B178, A146/B185, A147/B186.

³⁰³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*. H17.

The going-out to ..., which was previously and at all times necessary in finite knowing, is hence a constant standing-out from ... (*Ecstasis*). But this essential standing-out-from ..., precisely in the standing, forms and therein holds before itself a horizon. In itself, *transcendence is ecstatic-horizonal*.³⁰⁴

And already in *Being and Time*, what is pointed out as ecstatic-horizonal is temporality:

The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical-unity, has something like a horizon....
The unity of the horizonal schemata of future, Present and having been is grounded in the ecstatical unity of temporality.³⁰⁵

Considered together, the three passages above lays bare the relationship between ecstatic-horizonal temporality as meaning (of the Being of Dasein) and in turn, “meaning” as transcendence. Heidegger’s claim that the “transcendence ripens in original time” is a further contribution to what I attempt to establish at this point.³⁰⁶ Stated precisely, for Heidegger, as well as for Kant, what is marked as the meaning (of something) is that which uncovers the structure of transcendence of this very being. In this sense, to say either that something has meaning or that its meaning is such and such, is to render the enabling condition of the possibility of this meaning transparent in itself. In this sense, the project that Heidegger undertakes both in the *Kantbook* and in the *Phenomenological Interpretation* can be viewed as rendering this structure, namely, transcendence visible from out of itself.

As has been indicated, transcendence is made possible by the transcendental power of imagination that constitutes schemata which in turn furnish the categories with meaning. These schemata, again, are transcendental time-determinations. In Heidegger’s words, this is explicated as follows:

³⁰⁴ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 84. My emphasis.

³⁰⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*. H365.

³⁰⁶ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 138.

What is to be determined is time as a pure manifold. Or to put it more precisely: What is to be determined is the manifold that has the character of time thanks to a *pre-view* of this manifoldness, 'time.'³⁰⁷

At this point, there emerges a need to delve specifically into *that* time which is transcendently determined by means of the transcendental power of imagination. In other words, if, from the beginning, the schemata are what transcendently determined time is, then the sense in which "time" should be understood here must be delineated. Kant provides us with the clue to pinpoint, as it were, the aforementioned sense that time needs to be taken at this point, albeit subtly: "the pure image of all magnitudes (*quantorum*) for outer sense is space; for all objects of the senses in general, it is time."³⁰⁸ Now from the beginning of the *Critique*, and specifically in "Transcendental Aesthetics", one is familiar with the theme surrounding "time" characterized as form of sensibility and/or as pure intuition. The emphasis on time as pure image, however, is novel. Time in this sense, as Heidegger also contends, is not only the form of sensibility that stands over against the categories, but as pure image, it is the "schema-image."³⁰⁹ However, if Kant already notes that the schema cannot be brought to an image at all,³¹⁰ then it is all the more urgent that one acquire a keen understanding of what characterizes that time (as transcendently determined) which can never be depicted as an image yet serves *as* pure image. From my reading of Heidegger, the sense in which the former is the case can be discerned not through what the pure image is, but through what it does, i.e., what it enables:

The imagination forms the look of the horizon of objectivity as such in advance, before the experience of being. This look-forming [*Anblickbilden*] in the pure image [*Bilde*] of time, however, is not just prior to this or that

³⁰⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Logic: The Question of Truth*, 2010. 254.

³⁰⁸ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A142/B182.

³⁰⁹ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 73.

³¹⁰ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A142/B181.

experience of the being, but rather always is in advance, prior to any possible [experience].³¹¹

This passage above is well in accord with Heidegger's most general appropriation of Kant's transcendental standpoint, that is, with the former's claim that ontic knowledge must be guided beforehand by ontological knowledge. This point is what one already gets from the previous chapters. However, what is peculiar to the one above is the contention that the so-called "ontic experience" entails a prior *horizon*. In other words, it is this horizon that permits something like experience to come forth *in* the pure image of time. Already in *Being and Time*, Heidegger explicates Dasein as that which understands Being — and whenever this tacitly happens — with *time* as its standpoint. Thus, he argues, time — which in this case must be distinguished from the way that it is ordinarily understood — must be originally brought to light as the horizon for all understanding of Being, "*and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being.*"³¹²

A parenthesis will be useful at this point. Though Heidegger's usage of the terms 'time,' 'temporality,' and 'original time' are for the most part intertwined, I am inclined to think that he uses the notion 'temporal' generally as belonging to that which is *time-forming*. In the *Kantbook*, e.g., he refers to the *temporal* characterization of pure imagination *for* the very reason that it is time-forming: the former is that which generates time in the mode of either past, present or future.³¹³

The basic reason I bring "time as pure image" to the fore has to do with the aforementioned problematic of significance, or meaning. By this means, I suggest that what constitutes the inkling for Heidegger in his radical identification of imagination and the original time, must be nothing else than Kant's insight into time

³¹¹ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 92.

³¹² Heidegger, *Being and Time*. H17.

³¹³ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 126.

as pure image.³¹⁴ Heidegger indeed realizes the importance of this sense of time within the *Critique*, yet he is much more occupied in deriving his understanding of original time from the threefold synthesis which is indeed “preliminary” for Kant for his further inquiry into the nature of the synthesis that is needed for the meaning of the pure categories.³¹⁵ Indeed, it is still a broad beginning to present the transcendental power of imagination as the fundamental root of transcendence. What one should further advance, I emphatically suggest, is the idea that the former possesses this authority only against the background assumption that the schemata generated — more precisely, the time that is to be determined thereby — is not the time *as such*, but time *qua* pure image. As far as I see, Heidegger did not venture to ground his otherwise meticulous approach on this subtle sense of time, although it was apparent to him to some degree.

Why did Heidegger rely so much on the aforementioned postulation while another possibility was already visible to him? Was it Heidegger who shrank back this time, and if so, why? Is not Kant’s time *as pure image* — if wringing what is hidden from what is conspicuous is the task, as Heidegger already remarks — the original source behind Heidegger’s “temporality?” In any case, one thing is certain: a lacuna is left behind. In other words, although Heidegger does not explicitly say so, I suggest that the only source behind his understanding of temporality can be the pure image of time. This, however, by no means implies that the dialogue between Kant and Heidegger is exhausted.

Now, according to Heidegger, the Chapter on *Schematism* is the kernel of the *Critique*.³¹⁶ However, the task that the schematism undertakes is not and cannot be exhausted in that specific chapter. The chapter that follows — Chapter 2 of the *Analytic of Principles* — is also of crucial importance for completing the function

³¹⁴ It should be remarked that I do not identify time as pure image with the original time itself.

³¹⁵ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A98.

³¹⁶ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 63.

of the former, and that is the “System of All Principles of Pure Understanding.” As *Schematism* provides the pure understanding with the sensible condition under which alone the latter can be applied, the *Principles* “deals with those synthetic judgments which flow *a priori* from pure concepts of the understanding under these conditions and ground all other conditions *a priori*.”³¹⁷ In other words, having established the conditions upon which the transcendental power of judgment is permitted to employ the pure concepts of understanding for synthetic judgments *a priori*, Kant now ventures to present (systematically) the judgments that the pure understanding actually generates, confined by the former (sensible) conditions,³¹⁸ and these are called the “principles of pure understanding.”

Before getting into an elucidation of these principles at the juncture wherein it becomes indispensable for the present chapter, some introductory remarks are needed. To begin with, Kant analyzes these principles under four headings which respectively are as follows: Axioms of Intuition, Anticipations of Perception, Analogies of Experience and Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General. These in turn correspond as well in sequence to quantity, quality, relation and modality. Kant gives prominent place to the principles within transcendental philosophy by arguing that the latter has as its *main* task to “correct and secure the power of judgment in the use of the pure understanding through determinate rules.”³¹⁹ He further contends that the first group of principles (Axioms and Anticipations) are *mathematical* whereas the latter group (Analogies and Postulates) are *dynamical*. What this signifies is not the fact that they are either principles of mathematics or of dynamics but that they are the very principles which make either mathematics or physical sciences possible.³²⁰

³¹⁷ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A136/B175.

³¹⁸ Ibid. A148/B187.

³¹⁹ Ibid. A135/B174.

³²⁰ Ibid. A162/B201-2.

Despite the distinguished place that the principles occupy within the *Critique*, there have been relatively few commentaries on these matters. Drawing attention to this very fact, Frank O'Farrell remarks that the principles, however, deserve a special scrutiny in order to uncover the "genuine meaning" that they do carry within Kant's critical system. O'Farrell further contends that the *Critique* must be interpreted anew in light of the principles section for that is the center of the former.³²¹

Indeed, it is not until the mid-1930s that Heidegger undertakes the task to feature a systematic interpretation of these principles, although Kant's Transcendental Philosophy has been his main area of interest in the 1920s — as has been indicated from the beginning. His treatment of the principles, then, takes place during 1935-36, chiefly by means of the lecture course that Heidegger delivers, which is translated into English as "The Question Concerning the Thing: on Kant's Doctrine of the Transcendental Principles."³²² Admittedly, Heidegger of *the Thing* is no longer the Heidegger of *Being and Time* and the *Kantbook*, among others. More precisely, *the Thing* stands in the middle of the transition — namely, "the turn" (*die Kehre*) — from a period of the centrality of temporality in finite human transcendence to the rise of Heidegger's distinct treatment of the notion "event": the unfolding of Being itself by means of various epochs within its history. Leaving the debates whether there really is a *turn* aside, I take *the Thing* into account, not in the sense of how it represents and reflects Heidegger's appropriation of Kant which would serve as one main thread within the dialogue, but only when and in the sense of which it becomes helpful as an attentive commentary.³²³

If, as noted above, the task that the schematism undertakes is completed by means of the principles, then the sense in which the latter does so must be clarified. Recall

³²¹ Frank O'Farrell, "Kant's System of Pure Understanding's Principles," *Gregorianum*, Vol. 64, No. 1, accessed January 3, 2020, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23576677>. 55.

³²² Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning the Thing: On Kant's Doctrine of the Transcendental Principles*, ed. James D. Reid (London: RLI, 2018).

³²³ That is to say because, to begin with, Heidegger no longer develops his ideas as he simultaneously interprets Kant — which is a sign that one cannot read the former in the light of how he reads Kant any more.

that the schematism is the name given to the function of the transcendental power of imagination, thanks to which time is transcendently determined in accordance with the rules that the categories prescribe. This latter marks the way in which the determination at issue originates systematically, due to the spontaneous nature of the understanding. That is, the time determined in the schematism is always necessarily determined in some certain fashion: either as *time-series*, *the content of time*, *the order of time* or the *sum total of time*. What then comes to forefront as the *principles* — that lie at the basis of all synthetic judgments *a priori* — are nothing but certain articulations of the way in which time is determined, in this instance as itself a synthetic judgment *a priori*. Take, e.g., the principle of the *Axioms*: “all appearances are, as regards their intuition, extensive magnitudes.”³²⁴ To begin with, this synthetic *a priori* principle reckons all appearances in terms of their quantity, i.e., extensive magnitude. The schema, however, for all magnitudes, is number, which represents the successive addition of homogenous units to one another.³²⁵ This also points to the synthesis of time itself within this process. Thus, what an appearance — in terms of being an extensive magnitude — represents is nothing but *time* that is generated in accordance with rules, and in this case, with rules that render it possible to be synthesized as time-series. The other three principles also follow the same pattern in terms of the remaining distinct articulations of time. What must be noticed, however, in all these cases is the fact that time is *necessarily* represented in a certain form. The necessity stressed here signifies a twofold sense: first, for an appearance to be an appearance (for finite human intuition) means that it necessarily is received in a definite *timely* form — and that one already knows from *Transcendental Aesthetic* — and second, time itself must be represented in such form — and it necessarily needs to be so — since “time cannot be perceived in itself.”³²⁶ Hence there is a correlation here — and indeed a circle, which is by no means vicious — between the appearance and time: none can be reckoned without

³²⁴ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. A162/B202.

³²⁵ Ibid. A142/B182.

³²⁶ Ibid. A183/B226.

the other. This circularity concerning the principles points to nothing but the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments: “The conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience, and on this account have objective validity in a synthetic judgment *a priori*.”³²⁷ For Heidegger, this circularity concerning the proof of the principles is indeed a necessary one that alludes to the “in-between” character of the experience that culminates as the supreme principle (of all synthetic judgments).³²⁸

The First Analogy also underlines the structure of time as that which cannot be perceived yet makes possible the appearance to be perceived in a certain mode. Its principle is concerned with the substance which is the permanent throughout all alterations and the relevant proof thereby begins as follows:

All appearances are in time; and in it alone, as substratum (as permanent form of inner intuition), can either coexistence or succession be *represented*. Thus the time in which all change of appearances has to be thought, remains and does not change. For it is that in which, and as determinations of which, succession or coexistence can alone be *represented*.³²⁹

In a nutshell, I suggest that the threefold synthesis cannot by itself be the ground for temporality. Heidegger’s attempt to do so is misguided for the reasons I provided above. Rather, one should focus on Kant’s understanding of the pure image of time, if they were to derive something like a horizontal original time.

³²⁷ Ibid. A158/B197.

³²⁸ Heidegger, *The Question Concerning the Thing: On Kant’s Doctrine of the Transcendental Principles*. 166.

³²⁹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. B224-5. My emphasis.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The main axis of discussion for this dissertation has been to present a supposed dialogue between Kant and Heidegger with a focus on time. Accordingly, in Chapter 2 of the dissertation, I begin with revealing the nature of the dialogue which is broadly determined by Heidegger's ontological interpretation of the *Critique*. Since an explication to be provided in this regard necessitates going back to the ground, I evaluate Heidegger's interpretation with a focus of the way that he features "logic" in its originality and the way it gets covered up by signifying terms like 'assertion,' 'judgment,' and so forth. However, he contends, logic originally signifies nothing else than "to make manifest." Thus, from the beginning, Heidegger's phenomenological method has been implicit. However, in most of his books and lecture notes, his phenomenological outlook was much more conspicuous, most notably in his contention that the *Critique* could only be assessed phenomenologically. Thus, again in the second chapter, I critically examine Heidegger's contention (that the *Critique* is an onto-phenomenological work) well in accord with taking into account the other side of the picture; that is, I question whether Heidegger himself carries transcendental elements dominantly in his thought.

The result of the debate on the former side remains undecided to a great extent which has to do with Heidegger's ambivalence concerning the notions such as "ontology," "transcendental philosophy," and "a priori" — one that also prevails regarding the possible relations between them. However, I do maintain that the formal structure remaining the same with Kant's transcendental philosophy — which Heidegger appropriates as the ontological priority over the "ontic" — the "what" and the "how" of the *a priori* undergoes an essential transformation in Heidegger's thinking. That

is, Kant goes back to the conditions of the possibility of experience and what determines these conditions is *a priori* for him. As he clarifies, what we apprehend as nature cannot be the main source behind the regularity but only its illustration. Empirical examples, strictly speaking, are denied from providing any justification concerning for our *a priori* forms and concepts. Heidegger, on the other hand, has a broader approach in his usage of the *a priori*. Although his general contention is that Being has priority over beings, he at times gives relative priority to various other sources such as the “world,” “Dasein,” “temporality” or “care.” Consequently, I suggest that the question regarding Heidegger’s transcendentalism can be assessed more clearly relative to the question whether the *Critique* is an onto-phenomenological work.

Chapter 3 undertakes to feature another characteristic of Heidegger’s reading of the *Critique*, namely “finitude.” For Heidegger this theme determines the *Critique* from the outset. As is seen within the chapter, the problem of finitude cannot be handled in distinction from “transcendence.” Accordingly, the problem indicated there turns out to give an account of the way that a finite being transcends itself so that in order for experience to be possible.

The third chapter serves as a mediator for it links Heidegger’s onto-phenomenological interpretation to the present dissertation’s more specific interest, namely, time. It has this task with regard to its problematization of transcendence of a finite being. It also has a peculiarity concerning the manner I adopt: there, I mostly interpret the problematic from Heidegger’s stance, and speak, as it were, as a Heideggerian in this respect. This has to do with an attempt to see the subject matter *through* Heidegger’s viewpoint, in trying to apprehend the background against which he lies in developing one of his most insightful notions — and that is the “world.” However, for Heidegger, Kant’s understanding of finite transcendence remains within the bounds of the traditional philosophy no matter how much he intended otherwise — *world* remains as the “unsaid” in Kant’s thinking.

By the fourth chapter, I believe I have already established the general framework. Hence, I focus on the fundamental issue — the relation concerning the

transcendental power of imagination and temporality. Explicating the former through Transcendental Deduction (in A edition) and Schematism has brought the present dissertation to a point where it has the foresight concerning the initial question: what did Heidegger specifically see in transcendental imagination so that he could derive from it something like original time? The answer to this question, I conclude, mostly lies in the synthesis that the transcendental imagination enables. What Heidegger saw in synthesis, then, can be apprehended against the background of what it enables — and this is nothing else than transcendence. This is what I derive from my reading of Heidegger's interpretation of the *Critique*. However, Heidegger seems to be much more critical concerning the deduction and schematism, and in this regard, he concentrates on what Kant *could not* take notice of. What for him Kant could not see, again, is the “subjectivity of the subject,” namely, existence. Put more precisely, what Kant could not maintain, he contends, is to provide a purely phenomenological account of the deduction and the schematism.

Nevertheless, this time carrying a more critical approach against Heidegger, I suggest that it is not a matter of what Kant could not see but a matter of a lack of clarity on the side of the former. More explicitly, as I contend from the fourth chapter onwards, Heidegger fails to distinguish different layers of time — mainly, time as pure intuition and time as pure image. Accordingly, in the fifth chapter, I zero in on how Heidegger confuses and misrepresents these two. To explicate, I contend that Heidegger uses time as pure intuition in Kant's threefold synthesis to characterize time as pure image. However, this reading is untenable for, firstly, it confuses pure intuition with pure image, and secondly, it relies heavily on a reduction of pure understanding to the transcendental imagination.

Another problem with what I take as Heidegger's hasty postulation has to do with its covering above what I suggest to be a more genuine alternative. This alternative, I suggest, can be derived from Kant's understanding of the significance of the categories. Kant posits schemata as the only way that the pure concepts gain significance which otherwise are nothing but mere forms of thought. Then, to call it in a Heideggerian way, “transcendence” is impossible without schemata as

transcendental time-determinations. Likewise, for Heidegger, the structure of transcendence and the notion of “significance” have close affinities. To put it precisely, significance of the being of Dasein is possible only by means of the ground that it transcends itself — whose possibility in turn lies in temporality. The parallelism in these philosophers’ apprehension of the relation between transcendence and significance is for me the component by means of which alone the derivation of temporality from the transcendental imagination could be possible. Heidegger does not follow this path.

I then examine Kant’s principles with regard to the way that they accomplish the problem concerning transcendence to a great extent. That they are able to do so is grounded in their very structure — as fundamental synthetic *a priori* judgments which are certain articulations of the way that time is determined (as schemata), they ground all other synthetic judgments.

To conclude, despite Heidegger’s all efforts to derive temporality hastily from the threefold synthesis, I attempted to show that the latter by itself cannot be taken as a source that corresponds to the intended outcome. In this regard, I believe that the pure image of time is the original ground that Heidegger must have paid attention in order to arrive at the supposed outcome concerning temporality. In other words, time as pure image is the unique source that can be assessed as the “horizon” of transcendence.

This horizon was visible to Heidegger — albeit subtly — yet it remains as the “unsaid.” Why did Heidegger not follow this more genuine path? Was it a matter of carelessness? Not at all. Or was it his approach of searching for what Kant must have said, more than focusing on what he indeed said. It may be so. However, it is not still entirely clear where the “violence” stops and genuine interpretation begins. Besides, it is far from being obvious from Heidegger’s texts whether at a certain point it is Kant that is speaking, or Heidegger’s Kant, or still, Heidegger himself. Notwithstanding all these obscurities that may hinder one’s access to the subject matter, the dialogue between Kant and Heidegger is an invaluable source for the opening up of a philosophical path, which can by no means be exhausted.

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APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

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Ph.D.	METU Philosophy	2020
MA	METU Philosophy	2013
BA	METU Philosophy	2010
High School	Süleyman Demirel Science High School, Isparta	2004

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2014-2015	Ankara University Philosophy	Research Assistant
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FOREIGN LANGUAGES

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PUBLICATIONS

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

Dasein'ın Zamansallık Analizinin Tarihselci bir Eleştirisi. 1. ODTÜ Lisansüstü Felsefe Öğrencileri Kongresi: 11-12 Haziran 2016. [A Historicist Criticism of the Temporal Analysis of Dasein - June 11-12 2016]

“Towards Metaphysics” within a Twofold Way: Ontological Difference and the “Nothing” of Anxiety. The University of Bonn. Philosophy of Events Symposium. Participants’ Conference. 2018.



B. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

AŞKINLIĞIN ZEMİNİ OLARAK ZAMAN: KANT VE HEIDEGGER ARASINDA BİR DİYALOG

Gündelik olarak bize en yakın ve tanıdık olgu olan “zaman” ile felsefî bir karşılaşma nasıl mümkündür? Saint Augustine “Öyleyse zaman nedir? Bana hiç kimse sormazsa, onun ne olduğunu biliyorum, ancak sorulacak olursa, bilmiyorum”³³⁰ derken tam da “zaman”ın burada ifade edilen doğasına işaret etmiş görünmektedir: en tanıdık ve en bilinemez olana.

Bu çalışmada Immanuel Kant ve Martin Heidegger arasında “zaman” konusunda bir diyalog geliştirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, projemin ana eksenlerinden biri, Heidegger’in zamansallık (temporality) anlayışını Kant’ın *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi* kitabından (özelinde de “üçlü sentez”den) nasıl türettiği — daha açık olarak, buradaki yöntemi — olmuştur. Tez boyunca sorguladığım ana konu Heidegger’in buradaki yönteminin ne kadar savunulabilir olduğudur. Bu sorgulamanın ana eksenine yerleştirmek istediğim tez, Heidegger’in vardığı *sonucu* tüm gücü içinde kabul ediyor olduğumdur.

Yönteme dair bu inceleme, bana göre iki açıdan değerlidir. Birincisi, literatürde Heidegger’in Kant yorumuna — özelinde de zaman konusunda — geniş yer verilmesine rağmen, yöntemine dair bir sorgulamaya neredeyse rastlanmamıştır. İkincisi ise, bu sorgulamanın bizi, baştan beri kurmaya çabaladığım diyalogu belirli açılardan geliştirecek olmasına dair inancımdır — ki bu gelişim noktasının dinamiği bana kalırsa Kant’ın “saf zaman resmi” düşüncesinden başka bir şey değildir. Öyleyse, tezin izleyeceği yolu bu noktada daha açık ortaya koymak yerinde olacaktır. Heidegger’in zamansallık (ya da orijinal zaman) türetiminde ve bunu esasen aşkınliğin zemini olarak ortaya koyuşunda onun Kant yorumunun, özel

³³⁰ Saint Augustine, *The Confessions of Augustine* (New York: Wiley, 1860). 315.

olarak da üçlü senteze dair okumasının, ağırlığı var mıdır ve varsa ne ölçüde belirleyici olmuştur? Kuşkusuz bu soruya verilecek yanıt pozitifdir ve bu etkinin neredeyse tartışma götürmez bir ölçüde baskın olduğu yönündedir. O zaman, bir sonraki soru şu olmalıdır: Heidegger'in zamansallık türetiminde bir önceki kadar göze çarpmayan, ancak bir o kadar güçlü olan söz konusu başka etkenler var mıdır? Bu soruya yanıtlım, aynı zamanda tezin temel iddiasını belirleyecek önem ve niteliktedir. Bana göre, ilk okuyuşta belirgin olmayan ancak Heidegger'in zamansallık anlayışında Kant'ın üçlü sentezinden daha etkili olduğunu düşündüğüm faktör, yine Kant'ta gördüğümüz “saf zaman resmi” ya da başka bir deyişle, “saf resim olarak zaman” anlayışı olacaktır. Daha açık söyleyecek olursam, tezin temel iddiası, zamansallığın arkasındaki esas kurucu zeminin ilk başta öne çıkan üçlü sentez değil sadece saf zaman resmi olabileceği — daha net bir ifade ile, olması gerektiği — yönündedir. Peki Heidegger neden ve nasıl üçlü sentezi bu denli öne çıkarmış ve geçmiş-şimdi-gelecek zaman formlarının esas kaynağını burada görmüştür? Buradaki yaklaşımım sezgisel olarak geçerli görünse de bahsi geçen yorumun savunulamaz olduğu şeklinde olacaktır. Diyebilirim ki, Heidegger'in buradaki yöntemi, belki bir noktada kendi fenomenolojik yaklaşımına da ters düşecek biçimde aceleci ve varsayımsaldır. Heidegger'in kendi deyimi ile, üçlü sentezin belirli zaman formlarına denk düştüğünü göstermek, orijinal zaman çıkarımı adına “nihai kanıt”tır. Ancak tezimde savunduğum gibi, bu çıkarım nihai olmaktan uzaktır; zira burada Kant'taki farklı zaman katmanlarının Heidegger tarafından birbirine karıştırılması ve bir anlamda iç içe geçirilmesi söz konusudur. Bahsettiğim farklı katmanlar, aynı “zaman”ın bize vereceği farklı anlam ya da açılar olarak anlaşılmalıdır. “Saf görü olarak zaman” ve “saf resim olarak zaman” bu noktada ayırt edilmek durumundadır. Temel olarak, ilki üçlü sentezde karşımıza çıkan saf-şimdi-dizisi iken, ikincisi daha sonra şematizm bölümünde karşılaştığımız, aşkınsal olarak belirlenmiş zamandır. Bunların her biri aşkınsal imgelem yetisinin işlevidir ve bana kalırsa Heidegger bunun esasen orijinal zamanı doğrduğunu söylerken genel çerçevede oldukça haklıdır. Ancak, belirttiğim gibi, doğrudan üçlü sentezden yapılan bir zamansallık tüetimi, Kant'taki zaman anlayışının farklı açılarının ayırt edilmemiş olduğu anlamına geleceği ölçüde, savunulamaz hale gelmektedir. Bunu gerekçelendirmek için, Heidegger'in zamansallık anlayışının “ekstatik” doğasına bakmak yerinde olacaktır. Zaman,

kendi dışına uzanan bir niteliktedir Heidegger için ve de bu bağlamda Dasein'ın varlığının anlamına işaret eder. Zaman kendi dışına uzanan bir nitelikte olduğu kadar, Dasein'ın da kendi dışına uzanmasının, yani onun aşkınlığının, koşuludur. Daha net bir ifade ile, zaman, bu varlığın anlamının ufkudur. Heidegger'de böylece anlam, aşkınlık ve zaman anlayışları, ayrılamaz biçimde birbirine bağlıdır. Burada yine Kant'a dönecek olursak, kategorilerin geçerliliğinin, yani onların “anamlı” olabilmesinin koşulunun, zaman bağlamında olduğunu görürüz. Yani, zaman ile dolayımınmamış kategoriler, sadece düşünmenin koşulu olarak işlev görürler ancak objektif referansları ya da geçerlilikleri yoktur. Kısaca, kategorilerin aynı zamanda “duyusallığa gelebilir” olması demek onların zaman cinsinde olması demektir. Böylece her ne kadar farklı kanallardan ilerleseler de Kant ve Heidegger'in anlam ve zaman düşünceleri arasında bir paralellik görmek mümkündür. Bu paralellik sayesinde baştan beri kurmakta olduğum diyalogu bir adım ileri taşıyabileceğimizi ve şunu söyleyebileceğimizi düşünüyorum: Kant ve Heidegger'de anlamı kuran şey zaman olsa ve anlamın kurulması bir şekilde aşkınlığa işaret etse de Heidegger'de zamanın ekstatik bir ufuk olarak açılmasını sağlayan şey de Kant'ın saf zaman resmi anlayışı olmalıdır. Benim yorumuma göre, ancak ve ancak bu saf zaman resmi, kendi içinde ufuk tanımlamasına uygun bir şeyi barındırabilecek niteliktedir. İşte Heidegger'de “söylenmemiş” olan, belki de üstü örtük kalan budur. Zira saf görü olarak zaman, saf-zaman-dizisi olarak kendini göstermektedir ve bahsi geçen ufku kurabilmekten uzaktır. Bunu kurabilecek olan ise, kendisi kendinde algılanmayan ancak deneyimin vuku bulmasını sağlayan — bir nevi arka plan işlevi gören — saf zaman resmi olmalıdır.

Bu noktada “zamansallık” ile ne kastedildiği açık kılınmalıdır. En basit ifade ile, Heidegger için “zamansal” demek, zamanı meydana getiren / doğuran anlamına gelmektedir. Örneğin Heidegger Kant'ın akşinsal imgelem gücünün zamansal olduğunu söylerken, buradan anlamamız gereken şey, bu yetinin zaman-doğurucu olduğudur.

Bu çalışmada kullandığım esas metodoloji, sistematik metin okuması ve metne dayalı tartışma biçimindedir. Temel olarak, Heidegger'in *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'ne dair yorumu, hermeneutik bir yaklaşımla “zaman”ı merkeze alarak değerlendirilmiştir.

Bunun için başvurduğum temel kaynaklar Heidegger'den *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (*Kant ve Metafizik Sorunu*), *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"* (*Kant'ın "Saf Aklın Eleştirisi" Kitabının Görüngübilimel Yorumu*), *Being and Time* (*Varlık ve Zaman*), *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (*Görüngübilimin Temel Sorunları*) ve *Logic: The Question of Truth* olmuştur (*Mantık: Hakikat Sorusu*). Kant'ın konu hakkındaki anlayışı için ise *Critique of Pure Reason* (*Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*) kitabına başvurulmuş ve "Aşkınsal Diyalektik"e kadar olan bölümler dikkatlice incelenmiştir.

Tezin ikinci bölümünde başlangıç olarak Heidegger'in 1920'lerin sonlarına doğru yoğunlaşan Kant yorumunun önemi vurgulanmıştır. Bu yorum iki açıdan değerlidir. Birincisi, Kant'ın anlayışında temel yer tutan imgelem gücü, şematizm, aşkınsal dedüksiyon gibi kavramlara yeni bir yaklaşım geliştirmekle beraber, Heidegger literatürde çokça tartışılacak yeni bir yol açmıştır. Bununla beraber, ikinci olarak, Heidegger'in Kant yorumu, Heidegger'in o yıllardaki temel düşüncelerini — "zamansallık" başta olmak üzere — yeni bir ışıktaki görebilmemizin ve anlayabilmemizin yolunu da açmış olacaktır. Böylece Heidegger düşüncesini alakalı bir bağlam içinde görmek ve değerlendirmek olanaklı hale gelecektir.

Esas bir soruya dönersek, tezin temel eksenini oluşturan aşkınlık problemi neden ve ne şekilde önemlidir? Buna Kant'ın ve Heidegger'in perspektiflerinden iki ayrı yanıt verilmiş ve bu yanıtlar esasen çalışma boyunca bilinçli olarak iç içe geçirilmiştir. Öncelikle belirtmeliyim ki, Kant bu kavramı kullanmamıştır; onun için deneyimi kuran şey, aşkınsal koşullardır ve yine bu bağlamda "deneyimi aşan"dan bahsedilir ki buna da "aşkın" adı verilir. Yine de Heideggerci "aşkınlık" kavramının kullanımı, benim görüşüme göre yerinde ve Kant'ın problematiğinin ruhuna uygun haldedir. Öyleyse diyebiliriz ki, Kant için aşkınlık problemi, deneyimin kurucu koşullarına bir geri çekiliş iken, Heidegger içinse Dasein'in "dünya"ya açılmışlığını — daha net bir ifade ile, Dasein'in esasen dünya-içinde-olmaklık durumunda oluşunu — imler haldedir. Tez boyunca bu iki anlam beraber kullanılmıştır: böylece bu kavramın kullanımı bir yandan koşullara bir geri çekiliş, diğer yandan da "dünya"ya açılış demektir. Daha derinlemesine baktığımızda ise, zaten bu çekilme ve açılma

hallerinin birbirini çağrıştırdığını görürüz. Kısaca, dünyaya açılmak, koşullara da çekilmek anlamına gelecektir.

Bu noktada, konuyla ilintili tarihsel-felsefi bağlam hakkında okuyucuyu bilgilendirmek yerinde olacaktır. 1927-29 yılları boyunca, Heidegger'in Kant'ın eleştirel felsefesine dair ilgi ve alakası göze çarpar niteliktedir. *Being and Time*'ın yayınlandığı yıl, Heidegger'in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* adı altında verdiği ders ile aynı yıldır. Bunu da *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"* isimli güz döneminde verdiği ders izler. Hemen bunlardan sonra ise, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* yayınlanır (1929). Esasen *Being and Time*'ın ikinci bölümünün ilk alt başlığı Kant'ın şematizm ve zaman anlayışlarına ayrılacak şekilde planlanmış olmakla beraber bu şekilde yayınlanmadı. Yine de diyebiliriz ki, bu kitabın bitmiş versiyonu, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* ve *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* ile beraber düşünüldüğünde, Heidegger'in planına uygun bir taslak sunar. Böylece bahsi geçen bu üç kitap, *Phenomenological Interpretation* ile de birlikte el alındığında tutarlı bir bütünlük sunar.

En geniş anlamda söyleyecek olursak, Heidegger'in Kant okuması, *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'ni onto-fenomenolojik bir bağlamda yorumlama şeklinde karakterize edilebilir. Bu okumanın Kant'ın kendi anlayışı ile uyum içinde olup olmadığı ikinci bölümde tartışılmıştır. Esasen Heidegger'in Kant okuması "hermeneutik şiddet" barındırdığı gerekçesi ile sıkça eleştirilmiştir. Yani, bazı eleştirmenlere göre Heidegger, *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'ni yorumlamaktan oldukça uzakta, bu metin üzerinden kendi düşüncesini geliştirmektedir. Öte yandan Heidegger'in yorumuna daha ılımlı bakanlar açısından, Heidegger'in okuması savunulabilir bir okumadır ve radikalliği "şiddet" anlamına gelmek durumunda değildir; zira onun çıkarımları *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'nin bağlamı içerisinden geliştirilmiştir. İlginçtir, Heidegger kendisi de metne bir nevi şiddet uyguladığını kabul etmiş, hatta belirli durumlarda bunu savunmuştur. Ona göre felsefi bir yorum, metnin ne söylediğini aktarmakla kalmaz, bunun ötesinde ve daha ağırlıklı bir biçimde metnin "ne söylemek istediğine" bakar. Bu noktada önemli olan ise metni yöneten temel düşünceyi çekip çıkarmak olmalıdır. *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'nde ise bu temel, Heidegger'e göre metafiziğin

temelinin kurulmasıdır. Bu temelin kurulması da onto-fenomenolojik bir şekilde yapılmalıdır ve Heidegger'e kalırsa Kant'ın yaptığı da bundan başka bir şey değildir. Öte yandan, Heidegger'in *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'nden hareketle kendi düşüncesini geliştirdiği eleştirisi çok da haksız sayılmamalı diye düşünmekteyim — her ne kadar buna negatif bir anlam yüklemesem de. Zira Heidegger'in 1920'lerin sonlarındaki düşüncesini ve perspektifini belirleyen şey çoğunlukla onun Kant yorumu ile iç içe geçmiş ve beraberinde geliştirilmiştir.

Tezin sorunsalı içerisinde kısaca hatırlatacak olursam, Heidegger'e göre Kant esasen “orijinal zaman”a dair sezgi sahibidir — yani bunun aşkınsal imgelem yetisinden türetildiğini görmüştür — ancak sezdiği şeyden bir nedenle geri çekilmiş ya da bunu tam olarak geliştirmemiştir. Heidegger'e göre bunun en önemli nedeni, Kant'ın geleneksel mantık anlayışını takip etmiş olmasıdır. Heidegger'e göre geleneksel mantık (skolastik dönem ve sonrası) Antik Yunan felsefesi döneminden beri çokça farklı şekillerde yorumlanmış ve böylece temel anlayışta değişime tabi tutulmuştur. Heidegger'e göre mantığı “iddia” ve “iddia”yı da “yargı” olarak anlamak demek, onun özüne dair temel bir özelliği kaçırıyor olmak demektir — özellikle çağdaş anlamda bir yargı teorisinden bahsediliyorsa. Mantık, Heidegger için “bağlayıcı” bir işlevi olan ya da “belirli bir konum almak” demek olan bir çeşit “yargı” anlamına gelmez. Özünde, söylemin “neye dair olduğu” anlamına geldiğini vurgular Heidegger; Aristoteles'e göndermede bulunarak, mantığın, “meydana getirmek” / “görünür kılmak” gibi işlevlerine işaret eder. Yine bu bağlamda Heidegger, Antik Yunan'daki anlayışı daha açık kılarak, Varlık, hakikat ve mantık kavramlarının iç içeliğine vurgu yapar. O zaman Kant'ın mantık ile ilişkisi Heidegger'in gözünden nasıl kendini gösterir? Bilindiği gibi, Kant'ın *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'ndeki temel meselelerinden biri doğa hakkında nasıl geçerli / hakiki yargılarda bulunabileceğimizin zemininin açığa çıkarılmasıdır. Bu açığa çıkarma biçimi, en temelinde Aşkınsal Dedüksiyon'a aittir. Daha açık ifade edecek olursak, sağlanması amaçlanan açıklama, kategorilerin objektif geçerliliğinin kanıtlanmasıdır. Heidegger'in buradaki yorumu, kategoriler ve mantık arasında, “iddia” ve “yargı” üzerinden yola çıkarak bağlantı kurmaktır ve vardığı nihai sonuç ise Kant'ın mantığının geleneksel ontolojik zeminden kopmadığı şeklinde olacaktır. Ancak yine de belirtmeliyim ki, kategorilerin tek başına bize hakikati

vermiyor oluşu da Kant'ın geleneksel rasyonel bakış açısından kopuşunun net bir örneğidir; zira kategoriler ancak ve ancak duyulanım ile ilişkili biçimde ve bu ilişki dolayısı ile bize doğru yargıyı verebilirler. Heidegger esasen bu noktada daha ileri gidip — üçüncü bölümde de işleyeceğimiz “sonluluk” kavramını da öne çıkaracak şekilde — Kant'ta duyulanımın anlama karşısında daha öncel olduğunu savunacaktır. Aslında, Kant'ın Heidegger'de ilgisini çeken de bir yandan bu ikiliktir, yani, ona göre Kant bir yandan geleneksel mantığı takip etmiş bir yandan da ona yeni bir yön kazandırmıştır.

Böylece bu bölümde Heidegger'in Kant okumasındaki mantık ve ontoloji ilişkisini incelemek, bu tartışmanın esasen bir “koşullar” tartışması olduğuna bizi ikna edecektir — kısaca bu iki filozofun anlayışlarındaki “*a priori*”ye götürecektir. Kant için *a priori*, bilmenin bağımsız ve zorunlu koşullarına bir çekiliş — yani aşkınsal bir inceleme — iken, Heidegger için bunun da koşulu sayılabilecek bir *a priori* vardır ki bu da “Varlık”tır, bunun incelenmesine dair çalışma da Heidegger'e göre fenomenolojik olmak durumundadır.

Saf Aklın Eleştirisi Heidegger'in iddia ettiği gibi onto-fenomenolojik bir çalışma mıdır? Bu soru, bir diğer açıdan sorulduğunda, Heidegger'in 1920'lerin sonlarına doğru olan temel düşüncesinin aşkınsal bağlamda değerlendirilebilir olup olmadığı ile de beraber ele alınmıştır. *A priori* tartışması bize tam da bu soruların yürütülmesi gereken zemini çizmekle beraber, ikinci soruya dair yanıtın büyük oranda pozitif olmasına işaret eder. Yine bu tartışma, ilk sorunun ise doğası gereği — ki bu da çoğunlukla Heidegger'in bahsi geçen dönemde ontoloji'ye ve özelinde Kant ontolojisine dair yaklaşımının çok-anlamlı olmasından kaynaklanır — diğeri kadar kararlı bir şekilde yanıtlanamayacağını söyler. Ancak bu kararsızlık, benim görüşüme göre, bir “eksiklik” olarak göstermez kendini. Zira bu konuda yürütülen ve yürütülebilecek olan tartışmalar, nihai bir sonuca ulaşmayı amaç edinmekten ziyade, tartışmanın doğası ve yöntemi bakımından bir değerle kendilerini gösterebilirler.

Bahsi geçen çok anlamlılığı anlaşılır kılmak için tezimde “geniş” ve “dar” anlamda “ontoloji” terimlerinden faydalandım. Kısaca açacak olursam, geleneksel batı

felsefesinde Kant'ın da sadık kaldığı bir ayrımı gözettim. Bu ayrım, özel metafizik ve genel metafizik olarak kendini gösterir. Özel metafizik çalışma alanı bakımından üçe ayrılır: Tanrı (Teoloji), Doğa (Kozmoloji) ve İnsan (Psikoloji). Genel metafizik ise “ontoloji” adını alır. Heidegger Kant'ın ontolojik bir çalışma yaptığını söylerken yer yer genel anlamda ontolojiye gönderme yapıyor gibi görünmektedir — Heidegger'in Kant “genel ontoloji” için “aşkınsal felsefe” adını kullanıyor söyleminde görebileceğimiz gibi. Öte yandan, *Phenomenological Interpretations*'da aynı Heidegger, varolanı varolan olarak belirleyen şey önceldir derken, neredeyse aşkınsal felsefenin tanımını yapmaktadır. Heidegger, Kant ontoloji yapıyor derken, “geniş” anlamda genel metafizikten mi bahsetmektedir, yoksa “dar” anlamda ve kendisinin de öne çıkardığı “hakiki” denebilecek bir ontolojiden mi? “Hakiki” ontoloji, tahmin edileceği üzere, Heidegger'e göre “Varlık” sorusunu gündeme getiren ve özelinde de bu Varlığı dert edinebilen Dasein'ı merkeze alan bir ontolojik soruşturma olmalıdır.

Tezimde, her ne kadar faydalı olsa da bu kullanımın da soruna bir parça ışık tutmaktan öteye geçemeyeceğini, zira temel problemin dilsel bir noktada yatmadığını belirtmeye çalıştım. Ancak bana kalırsa bu tartışmanın önemi, daha çok, bizi yönleme götürmesinde yatıyor olmalıdır. Yönleme ilişkin bu soru da bizi *a priori* 'ye; ancak bu iki filozofun anlayışlarında neyin *a priori* olduğundan çok, *a priori* olanın “nasıl”lığına götürür, yani kısaca, Kant ve Heidegger'in hareket noktalarının anlamlarının ve farklarının sorgulanmasına. Bu da en temelinde yine fenomenoloji ve eleştirel felsefe arasındaki farkı açık eder. Birinin bir diğerine indirgenebilir olup olmaması ise farklı bir çalışma konusudur ve bu tezin kapsamı dışında kalır.

Saf Aklın Eleştirisi'nin Heidegger tarafından ontolojik bir çalışma olarak, daha net söyleyecek olursak, temel ontolojinin zeminini kurmak olarak yorumlanması ne anlama gelecektir? Öncelikle bu, Heidegger'in okuduğu şekli ile Kant'ın ve Heidegger'in kendi projesinin paralelliğine işaret eder, zira temel ontoloji “Dasein-analitiği”nden başka bir şey değildir. O zaman şöyle diyebiliriz, Heidegger her ne kadar Kant'ın “öznenin özneliği”ni dikkate almayı ihmal ettiğini, ya da daha

doğrusu, bunu fenomenolojik olarak açımlayamadığını söylese de bir yandan da Kant'ın temel ontolojinin yolunu açtığını söylemektedir.

Bu bağlamda, Heidegger'in Kant okumasında kendine biçtiği işlev ise Kant'ın açtığı olanağı yeniden gündeme getirmek, adeta onda saklı olanı bulup çıkarmak ve bunu sürdürmektir. Saklı olanın ve sürdürülmesi gerekenin ne olduğu, aynı zamanda bu çalışmanın da hareket noktasını belirlemiştir. Başlangıç olarak söyleyecek olursak, bu hareket noktası, Heidegger'in Kant'ta gözlemlediği kurucu bir roldür; daha özelinde ise zaman'ın insan deneyimindeki belirleyiciliği ve kuruculuğudur.

Bahsetmiş olduğumuz Varlığın öncelliği Heidegger'de “hali-hazırdalık” vurgusu ile öne çıkar. Yani, koşullar her ne ise, hali-hazırda-olagelmiş'in içinden doğmak durumundadır: geri çekilebileceğimiz başka bir “bağımsız” alan yoktur. *A priori* olarak Varlığın bu niteliği, esasen “zaman” fenomenine işaret eder, zira hali-hazırdalığın kendisi burada zaman bağlamı ve ufkuna bir göndermedir.

Öyleyse üçüncü bölümde ele alınan “sonluluk” ve “aşkınlık” problemlerinin zaman ve *a priori* ile olan bağlantısı en baştan açık kılınmış olur. Kısaca değinmem gerekirse, zamanı imleyen hali-hazırdalık düşüncesi, aynı zamanda insan varlığının sonluluğunun açımılamasından başka bir şey değildir. Burada “sonluluk” insan yaşamının sonlu olması anlamında değil, daha çok bilginin sınırlı olması anlamında kullanılmıştır. Sonluluk ve aşkınlık Heidegger'in Kant yorumunda öne çıkardığı ve ayrılamaz biçimde bir arada ele aldığı sorunsallardır: Dasein sonludur ve hali-hazırda aşkın olandır. Bu iki fenomen, o zaman, Heidegger'de yansımasını “dünya” mefhumunda bulacaktır. Heidegger'e göre Kant'ta “söylenmemiş” olan da zaten budur. Bir başka ifade ile, Heidegger için Kant, sonluluk ve aşkınlık problemlerini görmüş ancak bu soruşturma felsefi anlamda geleneksel çerçevede kalmıştır. Yani kısaca Kant, sonluluk problemini “yaratılmış olmak” bağlamında ele alırken aşkınlık konusunda yine geleneksel bağlamdan çıkamamış ve bunu öznenin hali-hazırda bulunduğu durum olarak ortaya koymamıştır. Yine de söylemeliyiz ki, Heidegger için Kant'ın bu probleme işaret etmesinde dikkate alınması zorunlu olan bir şeyler vardır ki bu da esasen Kant'ın bilmenin zorunlu ve evrensel koşullarına

yaptığı vurgudur. Bu koşullar ise Kant için ancak ve ancak öznde bulunur. Kant'ın meşhur “Kopernikçi Devrim”inin anlamı da en sade ifade ile budur.

Hatırlayacak olursak, Kant dünya merkezli modelin yerine güneş merkezli modeli öneren Kopernik'e dair bir benzetmede bulunur ve insan bilgisinin nesnenin bilgisine denk düşmesi gerektiği geleneksel savından ayrılarak, nesnenin insan bilgisinin koşullarına denk düşmesi gerektiğini öne sürer. Doğa adı verilen düzenlilik ise, insanın bilme modunun bir karşılığı olmasından öte bir şey değildir. Üçüncü bölümde işte bu devrim, Heidegger'in sonluluk ve aşkınlık yorumunun kaynağı olarak ele alınmıştır. Temel olarak iki açı vardır Kant'ın Kopernikçi Devrim'inde: mümkün deneyimin görüngülere sınırlandırılması sonluluğu imlerken, bu deneyimin koşullarının öznde bulunuyor olması aşkınlığa işaret eder. Burada dikkatimizi çekmesi gereken bir diğer nokta da Kant'ın kendi devrimi ile, insan bilgisine dair süregelen “norm”u yerinden etmiş olmasıdır. Kısaca, Kant öncesi geleneksel rasyonel ya da deneyimci felsefelerde, insan bilgisi bir nevi Tanrısal bilgi ile kıyaslanır ve ikincil ya da türetilmiş bir bilgi konumuna düşerdi. Kant'ın Devrimi ile başarmış olduğu bir diğer şey de insan bilgisinin yargılanması için tek normun yine insan bilgisinin kendisi olduğu söylemiydi. Heidegger'in sıkça sorduğu, “Bilmenin zemininin kurulması neden saf aklın eleştirisidir?” sorusu da bana kalırsa bu noktada anlam kazanıyor, zira bunu kurabilecek olan sadece insan aklının kendisi, daha farklı bir ifade ile, aklın *insancılığı* olarak karşımıza çıkıyor.

Heidegger de sonlu aşkınlık incelemesinde tam bu noktadan yola çıkmış ve bu incelemeyi *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*'nin temel teması olarak ortaya koymuştur. Diyebiliriz ki “dünya” mefhumu da bu bağlamda gelişmiş; Kant'ta Heidegger'e göre “söylenmemiş” olarak kalan şey Heidegger'in ilgili dönemdeki en önemli atılımlarından biri olmuştur. Bu bölümde Dasein'in dünya-içinde-olması ile doğadaki şeylerin “yer kaplaması” arasındaki fark gündeme getirilmiş, ilkinin Dasein'in zorunlu bir yapısı olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Dasein hiçbir suretle “yer kaplama”ya indirgenemeyecek olandır; o hep ve hali-hazırda dünya-içindedir. Kant'ta sezilen ancak söylenmeyi çekip çıkararak Heidegger, böylece, mümkün deneyimin koşullarının sorgulandığı aşkınsal araştırmaya yeni bir yön kazandırır: bu koşullar dünya-içinde-olmaklık üzerinden okunmak durumundadır ve daha da

önemlisi, “dünya” mefhumunun da açılabilmesine olanak sağlayan *ufka* işaret eder — bu da kendisine göre orijinal zaman’dan başka bir şey değildir.

Dördüncü bölüm işte bu orijinal zamanı Kant ve Heidegger’in düşünceleri üzerinden derinlemesine kavrama amacıyla ile açılır. Burada yine iç içe geçen okuma ve yorumlar söz konusudur: Heidegger’in ele aldığımız dönemdeki Kant yorumu — en temelde de aşkınsal imgelem gücünün orijinal zaman olduğu görüşü — ile Heidegger’in bir o kadar özgün olan zamansallık düşüncesini Dasein’in varlığının ufkuna yerleştirmesi birbirine işaret eder ve birbirini besler niteliktedir. Öyleyse izlemememiz gereken eksen kendini göstermiştir: dünya-içinde-varolan Dasein’in ufku olarak açılan “zaman” ile aşkınsal imgelem gücünün doğurduğu — hatta ve hatta Heidegger’e göre kendisi olduğu — “zaman” bir ve aynı şekilde anlaşılmalıdır. İşte bu eksen daha iyi kavramak için bu bölümde sırasıyla Kant’ın “Aşkınsal Dedüksiyon” ve “Şematizm” anlayışlarına yer verilmiştir. Bunu izleyecek olan ise, Heidegger’in bu bölümlere dair görüşünün açılanması olacaktır.

Öncelikle “Aşkınsal Dedüksiyon” içindeki, birbirinden keskin bir şekilde ayrılmamış olsa da iki ayrı “açı” sunan, nesnel ve öznel olarak adlandırılan yönlere yer verilmiştir. İlkinin ağırlığı kategorilerin deneyim nesnelere zorunlu uygulanmasının, yani bir diğer ifade ile, onların “objektif olarak geçerli” olduğunun gösterilmesindedir. Saf kavramlar, temel olarak, deneyimin arkasında yatan “nesne kavramları”dır. Ancak bunu gözlemliyor olmak bir gerekçelendirme, yani dedüksiyon, değildir; bu gözlem sadece bir örnekleme olabilir. Aşkınsal bir dedüksiyondan beklenen ise, bu kavramların evrensel ve zorunlu olarak nesneye dair deneyimin arkasında yattığı ve özünde bu deneyimi mümkün kıldığının kanıtlanmasından başka bir şey olamaz.

Bunu kısaca netleştirdikten sonra “temsillerin nesnesi” ne demektir anlamaya çalışalım. Yukarıda nesnel ve öznel dedüksiyonların birbirinden keskin bir şekilde ayrılmadığından bahsetmiştim. Bu noktadan itibaren, yine keskin olmayan bir şekilde, öznel dedüksiyona geçiş yapılmaktadır. Bunun işareti de aşağıda

bahsedeceğimiz aşkınsal nesne, aşkınsal farkındalık ve üçlü sentez olarak anlaşılabilir.

Yukarıda bahsedilen “nesne” anlatımına geri dönecek olursak, burada kastedilenin belirli bir nesne olmadığının altı çizilmelidir. Bu nesne, bir yandan bilmemize denk düşerken öte yandan bilişselliğimizden ayrı olandır. Kant bunun “genel olarak bir şey = X” olarak düşünülmesi gerektiğini söyler — bu vurgu gerekli ve önemlidir zira bilmemiz dışında ona denk düşebilecek başka bir şey yoktur. Bu “şey” aynı zamanda, bilme halimizin nesnesine olan ilişkisi her zaman bir zorunluluk taşıyacağından, bu bilmedeki düzenliliği sağlayan “şey” olarak görülmelidir. Bunun yanında, biliyoruz ki nesnenin zorunlu kıldığı birlik, bilincin temsildeki sentezinin birliğinden başka bir şey değildir. Kant için her türden zorunluluk, aşkınsal bir koşul gerektirdiğinden, buradaki koşul da “aşkınsal farkındalık”tır. Bu farkındalık hem sentezin hem de sentezin koşulunun (yani “ben”in özdeşliğinin) farkındalığıdır. O zaman Kant’ın kurduğu bir sonraki bağlantı şu olacaktır: bu farkındalığa denk düşen ve yukarıda “genel bir şey” olarak ifade edilen koşul, “aşkınsal nesne =X”dir.

Öte yandan, öznel dedüksiyon, bilmeyi ve esasen saf anlamayı de mümkün kılan öznel koşulların fonksiyonları ile beraber ortaya çıkarılmasının da çalışmasıdır. Bu öznel koşullar, “duyulanım,” “imgelem gücü” ve “farkındalık”dır. Bu bölümde bahsettiğimiz koşullara yer verilirken, öznel dedüksiyonun Heidegger düşüncesinde bir nevi kalbi olan üçlü senteze de ayrıntılı bir şekilde yer verilmiştir.

“Sentez” fikri Kant düşüncesinde temel bir rol oynar. Ona göre bilmeyi doğuran ilk faktör sentezdir ve bu şekilde dikkate alınmalıdır. Üçlü sentez olarak bahsi geçen işlev de kısaca şu fonksiyonlardan oluşur: öncelikle çeşitlilik görüde verilmeli, daha sonra imgelemde sentezlenmeli ve sonrasında ise kavramlar aracılığı ile birlik verilmelidir. Kuşkusuz “öncesi” ya da “sonrası” ifadeleri burada zamansal bir öncelik-sonralık ilişkisi önermez; zamansal olarak bu bir ve bütün bir eylemdir. Üçlü sentezi daha açacak olursak, görüde söz konusu olan, temsillerin edinilmesidir (apprehension); yine bu temsiller imgelemde yeniden üretilir ve kavramlar aracılığı ile de tanınır. Tüm bu süreç kapsamında esas olan zamanın sentezleniyor olmasıdır. Kısaca, görüdeki toparlama, zamanın “şimdi ve şimdi” şeklinde, belirli bir halde

ayırt ediliyor olmasına bağlıdır — edinmede söz konusu olan basitçe budur. Yeniden üretmede ise, deneyimsel çağrışım alışkanlığımızın esasen arkasında yatan aşkınsal koşulu anlamaya çalışabiliriz. Belirli bir durum ya da olayın hep bir diğerini takip ediyor olması ve bunun kesin bir şekilde bu şekilde gerçekleşeceğini bildiğimiz ve “doğa yasası” olarak kabul ettiğimiz ilke, esasen aşkınsal düzlemdeki ardışıklığa tekabül eder. Bunun deneyimsel düzlemdeki karşılığını ise, eğer bir önceki düşüncemi bir sonraki anda kaybediyor olsaydım, esasen “temsil” diye bir şeyin olanağından bahsedemeyecek olduğum gerçeğinden yola çıkarak açıklayabiliriz. Son olarak, tüm bu temsilin “benim temsili” olduğunun tanınması gerekir: temsilin kavramda tanınması bu anlama gelir. Yine bu tanınmada söz konusu olan, bilmenin mümkün olması için çeşitliliğin bir ve bütün olarak sentezlenmiş olması gerektiği gerçeğidir. Heidegger için, “üçlü sentez” adı altında anılan, esasen tek bir sentezin üç yönüdür — ki Kant açısından da düşündüğümüzde bu yorum oldukça geçerli görünüyor. Bununla beraber, “edinmenin sentezi,” “yeniden üretmenin sentezi” ve “tanınmanın sentezi” olarak kullanılan yapı, yine Heidegger’e göre şu anlama gelir: “edinme modunda sentez,” “yeniden üretme modunda sentez” ve “tanınma modunda sentez.” Kısacası, dilsel olarak ilk başta anlaşıldığı gibi, edinme ya da tanınma bir senteze tabi tutuluyor gibi düşünmemek daha yerinde olacaktır. Tüm bu temsil sentezinin arkasında yatan esas koşul ise, zamanın sentezidir. Zamanı edinir, yeniden üretir ve tanırız. Burada söz konusu olan, temsillerin ya da zamanın sentezinin farkında olup olunmadığı değildir; ancak bunun bilme için zorunlu aşkınsal koşul oluşudur.

Aşkınsal Dedüksiyon’un temel işlevi kategorilerin, duyulanım formu altında verili olan deneyim nesnelere zorunlu uygulanışı ise, Şematizm’in temel fonksiyonu da bu uygulanışın hangi koşullar — daha net söyleyecek olursak, hangi “duyarlılık koşulu” — altında olduğunu açığa çıkarmak olacaktır. Kant düşüncesinde Şematizme duyulan zorunlu gereklilik, en temel olarak, saf anlamayı ve duyarlılık arasındaki “heterojenlik” probleminden yola çıkar. Kant’ın da belirttiği gibi, deneyimsel alanda belirli nesnelerin belirli kavramlar altına koyulması problemli olmayacaktır. Ancak saf kategoriler söz konusu olduğunda bu durum problemli hale gelir; zira deneyimimiz bize tek başına “neden-sonuç” ya da “çoğulluk” gibi saf kategorilere dair duyumsama sağlamaz. Kısaca, bunları “duyulayamayız.” Ancak

Aşkınsal Dedüksiyon'un bize gösterdiği gibi, doğada bu kategoriler zorunludur. Daha doğrusu, doğadaki düzenlilik olarak duyumsadığımız şey, bu kategorilerin doğaya zorunlu uygulanmasından başka bir şey değildir. Öyleyse problem, tekrarlamak gerekirse, bu zorunluluğun duyusal koşuluna gitmek ile çözülecektir. Bu ise, şemaların işlevini kavramaktan geçer.

Kant, aşkınsal şematizmi “üçüncü bir şey”in gerekliliği bağlamında tanıttacaktır. Bu üçüncü şey, bir yandan duyulanımsal öte yandan düşünsel olmalıdır. Bu bağlamda aşkınsal şema hem “spontane” (çünkü belirleyicidir) hem de “alıcı” olacaktır (çünkü alıcılığın formu olan zaman ile ilişkilidir). Böylece şema, duyulanım ve anlama arasında adeta bir köprü görevi görecektir.

Kant’a göre, şemalar “aşkınsal zaman belirlenimleri”dir. Daha basit söyleyecek olursak, şemalar aracılığı ile “zaman” aşkınsal olarak şu ya da bu formda belirlenmiş olur (ki bu işlev de yine aşkınsal imgelem gücüne ait olacaktır). Bunun mümkün kılınması demek — yani zamanın aşkınsal olarak belirlenmesi — ise saf kavramların belirli bir saf zaman resminde ifade edilmesi demektir. Öyleyse saf zaman resmi denen şey, kendisi aracılığı ile, deneyimin şu ya da bu şekilde belirli bir formda vuku bulmasıdır diyebiliriz. Yine, Kant’a göre, örneğin, nedenselliğe dair duyumsamamız yoktur. Ancak belirli olaylar dizisi arasında nedensellik kurabilmek demek, neden-sonuç kategorisinin duyumsanabilir hale getirilmesi demektir. Bu aynı zamanda zorunlu biçimde kurulan bu nedenselliğin saf zaman resmi aracılığı ile, ya da arka planında gerçekleşmesi anlamına gelir. Bu noktada, “saf zaman resmi”nin “saf görü olarak zaman”dan ayırt edilmesinin öneminin altı tekrar çizilmelidir.

“Aşkınsal Dedüksiyon,” Heidegger için ciddi bir eleştiri odağı olmuştur. O, bu noktada Kant’ın nesnel ve öznel tarafları hatalı oluşturduğunu söyler ve “eğer öznel dedüksiyon Kant tarafından gerçek bir fenomenolojik yaklaşım ile yürütülebilse idi, nesnel dedüksiyona gerek kalmazdı” diye de ekler. Burada Heidegger için söz konusu olan yargısal bir karar — yani kategorilerin deneyim nesnesine uygulanabilir olmasının haklı çıkarılması — değildir. Kant’ın ileri sürdüğünün aksine, Heidegger için buradaki mesele bir “olgu” meselesidir ve bunun haklıca

yürütülmesi ancak saf anlamının kaynağına dair fenomenolojik bir yaklaşımla mümkün olur.

Aynı şekilde, Şematizm bölümü Heidegger için her ne kadar *Saf Aklın Eleştiri*'nin “kalbi” olsa da buradaki problematiğin, “kategorilerin altında toplanma” olarak dile getirilmesi de şematizme dair Kant'ın esas iç görüşünü perdeleyecek niteliktedir ve bu anlamda talihsizdir. Zaten Heidegger için de Kant'ın esas olarak kendi sezgisinden geri çekildiği nokta burası olmuştur, yani Kant en temelinde “zaman”ın neliğine dair açıklamayı yapmış ancak bunu yeterince ileri götürmemiştir.

Beşinci bölüm, yine üçlü sentez ve şematizmi ele alırken bu kez saf zaman resmi üzerinde daha çok yoğunlaşır. Bu nokta önemlidir çünkü başta da belirttiğim üzere, tezin temel iddiası tam da bu ağ üzerinden kurulur. Bu bölümde Aşkınsal Dedüksiyon ile açılan işlevi tamamlayıcı nitelikte olan “Prensipler”e de değinilir. İlginç olan şudur ki, Heidegger şematizm ve dedüksiyon üzerine bu kadar gitmişken, Prensipler konusunda neredeyse 1930'ların ortasına kadar adeta sessiz kalır — ki bu dönem de az ya da çok Heidegger'in dönüşündeki “dönüşüm” olarak adlandırılan evreye denk gelir. Bu nedenle Heidegger'in bahsi geçen dönemde Prensipler üzerine yazdıklarına doğrudan yer vermemeyi tercih ettim, zira — yine her ne kadar tartışmalı bulunsa da — Heidegger'i o dönem civarı ve sonrasında aşkınsal bir filozof, daha da özelinde Kantçı bir filozof olarak adlandırmak pek yerinde olmayabilir.

Bu parantezi kapattıktan sonra şunu söylemeliyim: Prensipler'in önemi, temel olarak Dedüksiyon ile başlatılan ve Şematizm ile koşullanan görevin tamamlanmasında yatar. Yukarıda bahsettiğim gibi, Kant'ın eleştirel felsefesinde şematizme duyulan ihtiyaç, saf anlama ve duyarlılık arasında bir nevi köprüye gerek duyulmasından çıkarılıyordu. Aşkınsal zaman belirlenimleri olan şemaların işlevi, esasen duyulanabilir olan ve düşünülür olanı zaman dolayımında birleştirmekten geçiyordu. İşte prensipler de şematizm aracılığı ile sağlanan duyuşal koşulların temel sentetik *a priori* ifadeleri anlamına gelir. Bunlar yine kategorilere denk düşecek şekilde nitelik, nicelik, ilişkisellik ve modaliteyi ilgilendirirler. Kant, ilk iki prensibin matematiksel, üç ve dördüncü prensiplerin ise dinamik prensipler

olduğunu söyler. Burada söz konusu olan, prensiplerin yapısının matematiksel ya da dinamik olması değil ancak onların matematiği ve dinamik doğa bilimlerini mümkün kılıyor olmasıdır. Aynı şekilde, şemalar tarafından koşullanan zaman da burada temel bir sentetik *a priori* yargı aracılığı ile ifade edilmiş olur. Bu temel yargılar ise tüm diğer (analitik ya da sentetik) *a priori* yargıların temelini oluşturur. İfade edilen zaman ise, dört ayrı grup altında incelenir: zaman-dizisi, zaman-içeriği, zaman-sırası ve zaman-toplamı.

Toparlayacak olursam, bu çalışmanın amacı, Kant ve Heidegger arasında “zaman” bağlamında eleştirel bir diyalog kurmaktır. Bu iki filozofun ilk bakışta oldukça farklı görünen yaklaşımları göz önüne alındığında, “Heidegger’in ekstatik zamansallık düşüncesi nasıl oluyor da Kant’ın aşkınsal imgelem gücünden çıkabiliyor?” sorusu daha yakıcı bir biçimde kendini gösteriyordu. Belirtmiş olduğum gibi, burada zamansallıktan “zaman-meydana getirme”yi anlamamız gerekiyorsa, soru, imgelem gücünün zamanı nasıl meydana getirdiği sorusuna dönmüş oluyordu. Heidegger’in bu noktaya dair yanıtı, üçlü sentezin her bir yönünün, ayrı ayrı geçmiş-gelecek-şimdi formlarını kuruyor olmasında yatıyordu. Ancak, belirttiğim gibi, mesele benim yorumuma göre burada son bulmamaktadır. Üçlü sentezin her bir fonksiyonunun farklı zaman formlarına karşılık düştüğünü söylemek sezgisel anlamda kolaylaştırıcı bir okuma yolu olsa da “bir ufuk olarak zaman” düşüncesini açıklayabildiğini savunmuyorum. Bana göre, burada üzerine gidilmesi gereken, üçlü sentezle beraber — hatta belki de daha yoğun bir şekilde — “saf resim olarak zaman” olmalıydı. Heidegger farklı bağlamlarda bahsi geçen saf zaman resmine değinmiş olsa da üçlü sentezin zamansallığın esas kaynağı olduğu düşüncesini ısrarla savunmuştur ve dahası literatürde de çoğunlukla bu savunma sonucu açısından gerekçelendirilmiş ya da reddedilmiştir. Benim dikkat çekmeye çalıştığım ise Heidegger’in vardığı sonuçtan çok, bu sonuca varmakta kullandığı yöntemidir. En geniş hali ile tekrarlayacak olursam, Heidegger’in üçlü sentez ve ekstatik-zamansallık arasında kurduğu bağ bana göre yetersizdir ve dahası, savunulabilir değildir. Daha geçerli olduğunu düşündüğüm yol ise, saf zaman resmi ve zamansallık arasında kurulabilecek bağ olması gereğidir. Bu noktaya varmak için, tezimde Kant ve Heidegger’in “anlam” anlayışları arasındaki genel paralelliğe vurgu yaptım. Kant için kategorilerin anlamlı olmasını sağlayan şey, onların zaman

ile bağlantılarının kurulmasıdır. Böylece kategoriler sadece düşünülebilir değil aynı zamanda duyulanabilir de olacaklardır. Bu esasen, baştan beri gündeme getirdiğim aşkınlık problemine işaret eder. Heidegger için de benzer şekilde, aşkınlığın ufku zamansallıktır. Bu düşünceler ışığında, şu fikri ifade edebiliriz: eğer kategorilerin anlamlı olması demek onların aynı zamanda duyulanabilir olması demek ise ve bu da en temelinde aşkınlık problemi ile bağlantılıysa; bu anlamı en temel olarak sağlayan şey *saf zaman resminden* başka bir şey değildir, zira ancak ve ancak bu resim bize düşünülebilir olanın duyulanımsal karşılığını verecektir. Üçlü sentezde bahsi geçen zaman ise, saf görü olarak zamandır. Bu tez boyunca en temel olarak vurgulamaya çalıştığım nokta, Heidegger'in Kant'taki bu iki farklı zaman anlayışını yeterince ayırt etmediği yönünde gelişmektedir. Bu aynı zamanda, Heidegger'in şematizm ve üçlü sentez boyutlarını da net bir şekilde ayırt edemediğine işaret etmektedir.

Tüm bunlarla beraber, söylemeliyim ki, Heidegger'in Kant yorumunun gerçek anlamda orijinal bir yorum olarak kalacağına şüphe yoktur. Dahası, bu yorum, Kant ve Heidegger arasında geliştirilebilecek olan birçok farklı diyaloga gebe olması bakımından da oldukça değerlidir, zira aşkınlık problemi, bana kalırsa, tüketilemeyecek bir problemdir. Hem Kant'ın hem de Heidegger'in bunun üstüne bu denli güçlü bir şekilde gitmesi bunun göstergesinden başka bir şey değildir. Yine aynı şekilde, aşkınlığının zemininin, ya da ufkunun — her ne şekilde ifade ediyor olursak olalım — “zaman” olması bir yandan kadim felsefe tarihi sorunsalları bir yandan da incelediğimiz iki filozof açısından sunulduğu şekliyle bir o kadar özgün ve orijinaldir.

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