

Assessing the Role of Bias in Mediation:
An Analysis of Mediation Efforts to the Cyprus Conflict

by

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

in

Political Science and International Relations



KOÇ ÜNİVERSİTESİ

September 12, 2024

**Assessing the Role of Bias in Mediation: An Analysis of Mediation Efforts
to the Cyprus Conflict**

Koc University

Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities

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ABSTRACT

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Mediators can be biased towards one disputant during mediation. One potential factor is the existence of an alliance membership, whereby a mediator may favor one disputant due to a shared alliance. This phenomenon, known as alliance bias in mediation, has been the subject of extensive academic study. The consensus in the literature that allies are more likely to get involved in a conflict between other members of the alliance demonstrates the significance of the subject. Consequently, this thesis seeks to address the research question of how does an intervention of a biased ally in an intra-alliance conflict impact the outcome of the mediation? The mediation efforts of the US and the UK to the Cyprus conflict between Turkey and Greece exemplifies such case, since all actors are allied through The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Informed by the theoretical framework of alliances and the bias in mediation, the interventions of the US and the UK to the Cyprus conflict are analyzed. The mediation efforts of the UN as an unbiased actor are also discussed. This thesis therefore elaborates on the impact of a biased mediator from a different angle based on an intra-alliance dispute and within the context of a contemporary conflict that remains unresolved.

Keywords: Bias in Mediation, Intra-Alliance Conflict, Alliance Memberships, Cyprus Conflict, Turkey, Greece, US and UK Mediation, UN, NATO

ÖZETÇE

Arabuluculukta Tarafılığın Rolünün Değerlendirilmesi: Kıbrıs Sorunundaki

Arabuluculuk Çabalarının Bir Analizi

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Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler, Yüksek Lisans

12 Eylül 2024

Arabulucular, arabuluculuk sırasında bir uyuşmazlık tarafına karşı taraflı olabilirler. Potansiyel faktörlerden biri, bir arabulucunun paylaşılan bir ittifak nedeniyle bir uyuşmazlık tarafını kayırabileceği bir ittifak üyeliğinin varlığıdır. Arabuluculukta ittifaktan doğan tarafsızlık olarak bilinen bu olgu, kapsamlı akademik çalışmalara konu olmuştur. Literatürde müttefiklerin, ittifakın diğer üyeleri arasındaki bir uyuşmazlığa müdahil olma ihtimalinin daha yüksek olduğu yönündeki görüş birliği, konunun önemini ortaya koymaktadır. Sonuç olarak bu tez, “ittifak içi bir çatışmaya taraflı bir müttefikin müdahalesi arabuluculuğun sonucunu nasıl etkiler?” araştırma sorusunu ele almayı amaçlamaktadır. ABD ve Birleşik Krallık'ın Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasındaki Kıbrıs ihtilafına yönelik arabuluculuk çabaları, tüm aktörlerin Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü (NATO) aracılığıyla müttefik olması nedeniyle bu duruma örnek teşkil etmektedir. İttifaklar ve arabuluculuktaki önyargılara ilişkin teorik çerçeveden hareketle, ABD ve Birleşik Krallık'ın Kıbrıs ihtilafına müdahaleleri analiz edilmektedir. Tarafsız bir aktör olarak BM'nin arabuluculuk çabaları da tartışılmaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu tez, taraflı bir arabulucunun etkisini, ittifak içi bir anlaşmazlık temelinde ve henüz çözülmemiş bir çatışma bağlamında farklı bir açıdan ele almaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Arabuluculukta Tarafılık, İttifak İçi Çatışma, İttifak Üyelikleri, Kıbrıs Sorunu, Türkiye, Yunanistan, ABD ve İngiltere'nin Arabuluculuğu, BM, NATO

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to my advisor Assoc. Prof. Resat Bayer for his invaluable academic support, kindness and understanding throughout this MA program. I am also incredibly thankful to all my professors for their precious contributions to my education throughout my years at Koc University. I am very thankful for my friends at Koc University as well, who have made this journey an unforgettable one. Lastly, I would like to thank my mother, my father and my sister, who have always been the greatest sources of motivation and support in my life.

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INTRODUCTION

Alliances have been an important unit of analysis in International Relations and historically studied by various scholars from different aspects. The past research on the questions of why states form alliances along with how states manage intra-alliance dynamics have revealed significant findings and contributed to the better understanding of alliances. Along with intra-alliance management and allies' interactions in various areas in the form of military support or trade relations, scholars often theorize that allies are also more likely to get involved in a conflict between other members of the alliance (Owziak & Frazier, 2014; Greig & Regan, 2008; Crescenzi et al., 2011). Therefore, alliance memberships emerge as one reason for bias during the mediation process. It is well established that mediators are prone to supporting their allies in the mediation process, but what unfolds when the mediator is allied with both sides of the conflict? How effective can the mediator be in the case of an intra-alliance conflict where both the mediator and the disputants are allied with one another? In previous research, alliance bias in mediation was frequently studied as one-sided. How the mediation process transpires when there is a shared alliance between the mediator and the disputants involved has not been the focus. There are also conflicting arguments on the effectiveness of a biased mediator, especially in the context of intra-alliance conflicts. While the findings of various studies suggest that the bias increases the mediator's persuasiveness, other studies claim that the bias decreases the mediator's credibility and has a negative impact on the mediation success. Leeds et al. (2002) defines alliances as written agreements between two or more states that comprise of various promises to offer the allies support in the form of military aid, neutrality agreements and promises to cooperate in an event of a conflict (Leeds et al., 2002). Although most scholars agree on the importance of alliances for international

relations, literature offers different explanations to the question of why states form alliances and how alliances are managed by the partners involved. While the traditional theories explain the basis of alliance formation by emphasizing on the role of external threats and concepts such as balance of power, more recent arguments focus on institutionalism and the increasing importance of the role of small states. In the context of the Cyprus conflict between Turkey and Greece, this thesis will address the following research questions: How does an intervention of a biased ally in an intra-alliance conflict impact the outcome of the mediation? How does the bias unfold in mediation when mediator shares alliance ties with both disputants involved? The findings along with initial expectations are analyzed in the conclusion section.

As allies to both Turkey and Greece, the impact of the US and the UK's alliance bias on the mediation success to the Cyprus conflict will be discussed while providing an overview on the theories of alliances in IR. The analysis of the various actors' involvement to the Cyprus conflict presents an interesting case to examine the effectiveness of biased and unbiased mediation efforts. The first chapter provides the justification for examining the Cyprus conflict and provides an outlook on the case selection process. The second chapter moves on to the background of the Cyprus conflict between Turkey and Greece to provide an understanding of historical evolution and the impact of the conflict on the alliance dynamics within NATO. The chapter dedicated to the theoretical framework addresses the traditional and more recent theories of alliance formation and theories on the third-party involvement to conflicts. These two concepts are discussed together to better address the research question. At the end of this chapter, research question and the expectations are further explained. After the theoretical framework, the mediation attempts of the UN as an unbiased actor are

examined. Britain's and the US intervention as allies to both Turkey and Greece are also discussed. Focusing on the mediation attempts of the main actors in the Cyprus conflict, this part elaborates on the difference between biased and unbiased mediation and how they unfold in an intra-alliance conflict. The strengths and weaknesses of pre-existing theories of bias in mediation are highlighted based on the involvement of Britain, the US and the UN in the Cyprus conflict. The US impact as a major power is also analyzed to discuss the impact of a major power on relations between the two allies. By focusing on one of the alliance memberships of Turkey and the mediation efforts of key political actors in the Cyprus conflict, this study makes an analysis on the impact of a shared alliance between both disputants and the mediator and how it plays out in an intra-alliance conflict. In the conclusion part, findings from the Cyprus conflict are presented along with the initial expectations based on the literature and the theoretical framework.

RESEARCH METHOD AND CASE SELECTION

As discussed in the introduction, this thesis examines the intervention of biased and unbiased actors to Cyprus conflict which provides an in-depth analysis on the research question. As one of the founder countries of the NATO, Turkey has been an important ally with its strategic geopolitical location. With economic and social ties to countries in different continents, Turkey has historically been involved in various alliances which further increased its regional importance as a political actor. An analysis of Turkey's partnerships and alliances can therefore provide useful findings for alliance studies, through the evaluation of previous theories and security dynamics particularly in the Middle East. In order to select one of the

alliance memberships of Turkey to evaluate the theories and hypotheses, the formal alliances that Turkey was involved in since 1923, Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset was used. There are a few reasons why this dataset suits to the research aspirations. Firstly, the dataset makes a concise classification of alliance types, which is useful for this thesis since findings of the previous studies suggest that the impact of bias depends on the type of alliance as well. Due to the deeper commitments compared to other types of alliance, Owsiak and Frazier (2014)'s study suggests that that sharing a defense pact has a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of an alliance member to intervene as a third party to an intra-alliance conflict. (Owsiak & Frazier, 2014). Therefore, it is important to consider the effect of different pacts separately. Secondly, the ATOP dataset does not only include the alliance types or members, but it also codes the existing provisions in an alliance treaty. The amount of alliance obligations between states important aspect that can provide implications on the level of hostility or peace. More importantly, this dataset codes if a treaty includes a provision for mediation. This adds another dimension to this thesis, which allows to also observe if a mediation process took place based on a provision of a treaty, or independently managed by an alliance member itself.

Based on the definition of Leeds et al. (2002) alliances are various written agreements between at least two or more states who promise to fulfil different types of promises. Alliance types differ based on the obligations that signatory states have. States can agree to stay neutral/non-aggressive or provide military assistance in case their ally enters into a conflict. Agreeing to consult each other or to cooperate in the event of an international conflict are other types of formal alliance agreements (Leeds et. al, 2002). The literature broadly agrees that along with pre-existing historical connection with the conflict or diplomatic interest,

alliance ties of a mediator to disputants increase the possibility of mediator's involvement and the willingness to intervene in a conflict increase through a shared alliance commitment. (Savun, 2009; Owsiak & Frazier, 2014). Not only the shared alliances increase the likelihood of intervention, but they also influence the mediator's relationships with the allies during the mediation process. Despite the consensus in the literature that a shared alliance with disputants increase the likelihood of an ally's involvement to other allies' disputes, not all alliance types entail the same level of commitment among allies. As discussed, scholars seem to agree that allies who share a defense pact has the highest level of commitment to the alliance thanks to the promise to militarily intervene, which would require a dedication of military resources in the event of a conflict (Gelpi, 1999; Owsiak & Frazier, 2014). Other types of alliances such as the neutrality or the non-aggression pacts require less involvement and consequently lower dedication of resources compared to defense pacts (Owsiak & Frazier, 2014).

The choice of the formal agreement from the ATOP dataset is therefore based on Owsiak and Frazier (2014)'s findings that 'the defensive alliance commitments remain the only alliance relationship that significantly increases the likelihood of mediation in a given dispute.' (Owsiak & Frazier, 2014, p.256). This finding suggests that compared to other types of pacts, allies who share a defense pact are more likely to engage in mediation to other allies' conflicts. The likelihood of mediation is not statistically significant in other types of pacts such as neutrality or non-aggression (Owsiak & Frazier, 2014). The choice to focus on a defense pact in this study therefore aligns well with the findings in the literature. The table in the appendix is extracted from ATOP dataset and presents a list of formal alliance memberships of Turkey since 1923. The case selection was conducted based on certain

criteria that would allow for conducting an analysis of an intra-alliance conflict that is mediated at least by one or more allies of both disputants. Out of forty-three alliances listed, nine of them are defense pacts. Therefore, initial analysis to choose a dyad was narrowed down to these nine defense pacts. Additionally, in order to exclude the impact of war-time differences in mediation and the change in the alliance members' behavior during war, the formal alliances signed during a war or terminated during a war were also eliminated, which corresponds to the two defense pacts in the list. Whether the agreement is terminated was also considered to conduct research on an intra-alliance conflict that does not lack current relevance. Therefore, the remaining six pacts were eliminated due to certain limitations. 1) Turkey, USSR, UK, France, China: Although this is a defense pact, it lacks the relevance with the present day as it was ended with World War II. The impacts of being in a war would also prevent observing the intra-alliance dynamics. 2) Turkey, France, UK was also signed during war. 3) Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece and 4) Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and UK were terminated and not relevant for studying an intra alliance conflict 5) Turkey and the US as well as 6) Turkey, Germany have two members in the alliance and therefore not suitable for analyzing an intra-alliance conflict mediated by another ally, as this would necessitate at least 3 members.

The alliance between Turkey, Greece, Cyprus and the UK, which is the Treaty of Alliance signed in 1960 provides an interesting case for analysis of mediation process to an intra-alliance conflict. The interventions of the UK and the US as a NATO allies to Turkey, Greece allows for examining how bias played out during the mediation process. As Turkey, Greece and the UK were guarantor powers of Cyprus ruled by Treaty of Guarantee adds another shared alliance that further bind the UK to both conflicting sides. As this thesis elaborates on

the role of bias in mediation, the UK's mediator role can therefore provide useful findings. The period of focus is predominantly between the start and termination dates of Treaty of Guarantee. However, to provide a historical context and more contemporary mediation attempts, particularly that of the UN, the developments that are before and after these dates are also mentioned.

Consequently, in the context of the alliance between Turkey, Greece and the UK established by London-Zurich agreements, this thesis focuses on the firstly effectiveness of the UK's mediation of the Cyprus problem as an ally of both Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, as the three guarantor powers of Cyprus are also allies within NATO, how the US mediated the conflict and how did bias play out in the presence of a shared alliance with both conflicting parties will also be the main focus. The region of this alliance also makes it a more interesting case along with the Europe, as the Middle East is a region with the most mediation attempts in the world relative to their total share of system conflict (Greig & Diehl, 2012). With the discussion on the Cyprus conflict and alliance bias in mediation, this thesis presents an analysis of the hypotheses on bias in the literature by examining the Turkish-Greek relationship and elaborating on how the conflict was mediated by the alliance partners.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

Alliances

Alliances have historically constituted an important part of peace studies and study of state behavior (Bailes et. al, 2016). Theories of alliances, in conjunction with traditional ideologies have attempted to provide answers to the research questions such as why states form an alliance, or the dynamics that come into play after the alliance formation (Sprecher & Krause, 2006). Concepts such as balance of power or band-wagoning have been frequently included into the discussions. Reflections of the power relations between states to their alliance behaviors and the impact of changing international environment to alliance formation are among important issues. While previous theories were considered as significant contributions that created the basis for the more recent ones, they also have been criticized and considered to have been insufficient in providing explanations to various newer cases. This section will discuss the traditional theories of alliances, power dynamics and potentially underdeveloped aspects of alliance frameworks.

Definition of Alliances and Traditional Theories

Alliances are written documents signed between at least two states and classified according to their purpose of formation (Sprecher & Krause, 2006). Different promises are made for an alliance such as providing military assistance or refraining from military conflict with one another. To remain neutral as response to a dispute or consultation in the case of a global conflict consists another type of alliance. Based on these purposes of formation, Leeds et al.

(2002) identifies 5 types of alliances, which are offensive, defensive, neutrality, consultation or non-aggression pacts. An alliance can also classify as more than one type. The classification of Leeds et al. (2002) has been widely accepted among scholars (Leeds et al., 2002).

Alliance theorists have put emphasis on different factors as important contributors to the alliance formation (Ismayil & Yilmaz, 2022). Various scholars attempted to explain the purpose of alliance formation and the intention of states. Understanding why alliances form is crucial, as states' political agenda might strategically shape based on their opponents' alliance dynamics (Walt, 1987). Liska (1962) argues that states form alliances to maximize their capabilities. An alliance is a way to lessen the impact of a dominant power that threatens a state's security, and an alliance succeeds if the disagreements between the members are kept in minimum (Liska, 1962). According to Walt (1987) "...states ally to balance against threats, rather than power alone" which explains the success of the United States to sustain NATO against the Soviet Union (Walt, 1987, p5). Ideological similarities do not motivate states as much as the purpose to balance against a threat. Since the threat may pose more danger if it is at a close distance, countries often seek to form alliances against threats posed by countries that are close to them or their neighbors. (Walt, 1987). Snyder (1991) suggests that weaker countries may seek to counterbalance the power of stronger nations by joining alliance with other countries. After the formation of an alliance, states could encounter challenge to comply with each other's interests and foreign policies. The conflicting interests among members might lead to a fear of abandonment, and on the other hand, common interests might result in a concern that an alliance partner's problem will entrap the others. The coexistence of fear of abandonment and entrapment might cause an alliance security dilemma, since reducing one results in an increase in the other. This dilemma can be avoided

by increasing the coherence within the alliance (Snyder, 1991). Schroeder (2004)'s work reviewed the alliances formed between 1815-1945. Based on the findings, theories regarding the purpose of alliance formation have greatly differed. States can opt for aligning with other states to constrain each other's actions to enhance their security agendas. As a protection measure to possible threats, states can choose to form an alliance with the source of the perceived threat, or with other states against the threat (Schroeder, 2004). Morrow (1991)'s autonomy-security trade-off model suggests that alliances are formed based on autonomy and security and since they "...dichotomize a nation's interests, the political effects of an alliance are separable into autonomy and security effects" (Morrow, 1991, p. 910) While alliance partners should have coherent purposes in forming an alliance, importance of differing national interests and foreign policy purposes in gathering nations together, as opposed to the common view that considers alliances as countries that came together for the same purpose. For instance, since Israel and the US would come to each other's help unconditionally due to their very similar policy aims, it would not be imperative for them to make an additional pledge for military support. However, in an alliance, if states' purposes are complementary to each other, they don't limit other's aspiration of pursuing different interests of their own (Morrow, 1991). As a counterargument to Morrow (1991), Altfred (1984) asserts that alliances inevitably limit the autonomy of its members, as they are formed based on the promise that partners will have to take an action in certain contexts in response to possible threats against other alliance members. In this sense, being in an alliance comes with a cost. The decision to join or not to join in an alliance is made based on a cost-benefit calculation along with the attractiveness of alliance promises. The probability of whether promises will be fulfilled may depend on the type of an alliance. In defense pacts, promises are more frequently fulfilled compared to other types of pacts (Altfred, 1984). As discussed

by various scholars, states can give up certain amount of their authority to be in an alliance. Alliance partner might have to adjust their policies to please the other members of the alliance. There might also be a reputational cost in situations where a state cannot fulfill its alliance obligations (Gelpi, 1999). These costs, however, can be compensated by the gains in return, such as the decreased need to purchase arms and therefore an increase in wealth. (Altfeld, 1984)

While alliances have historically constituted an important part of the international relations, as the international system and position of the countries evolve, theorizing alliances and their dynamics evolve accordingly (Sprecher & Krause, 2006). Liska (1962) argued that that “To be efficacious, alliance policy must fit the prevailing environment and the trends perceptible in it” (Liska, 1962, p. 161). In a multipolar system, where a few states have similar amount of military power, there is not an apparent rivalry as these powers have no intention of or capacity for domination. However, these powers do not have a complete information on each other’s intention, which might create a room for insecurity, and therefore a need to align. In multipolar systems alliances might also form to prevent a power from dominating the system and preserving the balance. On the other hand, in bipolar systems alliance formation tend to be more predictable since there is a clear distinction in power established by the system between superpowers and rest of the states. Superpowers in this context will not be interested in aligning with another superpower as there will be no state that threatens to dominate. When in alliance with a smaller state, superpowers promise to provide security benefits to smaller powers regardless of their need. Therefore, security claim is a predominant reason why a small state would form an alliance with a superpower (Snyder, 1991).

Alliance Asymmetry and Bandwagoning

Variables such as dependency, burden-sharing within an alliance and continuity is affected by the power inequality among its members. Thus, considering the power asymmetry in an alliance can reveal significant dynamics. Alliances with both major and minor powers as members are classified as asymmetric alliances (Oma & Peterson, 2019). In asymmetric alliances, small states make concessions such as allowing another state to use its military base or adjust their domestic policy in a way that strengthens the position of their more powerful alliance partners (Morrow, 1991). The security protection in return for small states' alliance commitment in such alliances can result in fear of abandonment experienced by less powerful actors. In order not to left out alone against security threats, smaller states can make sacrifices in their own foreign policy by prioritizing the concerns of superpowers. Smaller allies of the US making Afghanistan a priority in their military agenda despite not facing a threat to their own territory can be an example of such fear (Oma & Peterson, 2019). The Dutch support to the US policies and NATO during 1950's and 1960's is another example. Netherlands almost unconditionally supported the US policies by often providing troops to the US military operations, and NATO by making large contributions to its military budget. The Dutch efforts to strengthen the hegemonic position of the US in NATO constituted a strategic part of Dutch foreign policy which was aimed at consolidating its own position in the Western Europe by the US support in return. (Van Staden, 1995). On the other hand, since the major powers have the most capacity within an asymmetric alliance, they in return bear more of the burden and contribute more to the alliance than its partners. For instance, particularly in military alliances, the security that is considered to have been provided by a

major power will cover all alliance partners regardless of the extent of their contributions to the alliance. Therefore, making the greatest contributions will make a major power the most important member to the alliance (Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966). Asymmetric alliances can also be formed to balance major powers or thanks to small states' act of band wagoning, which is to partner with a powerful actor to eliminate a potential threat or perceived as joining to the stronger side for more protection (Chun, 2000). Band wagoning is different than being a partner of an ally, as it is aimed at acquiring benefits through an alliance rather than solely balancing against a threat (Sprecher & Krause, 2006). Snyder (1991) challenges Walt (1987) s view of defensive band-wagoning as sacrificing, which is referred to as giving in to an aggressive country's demands to prevent an attack. Instead, he argues that band-wagoning doesn't always imply complying with the dominant country's requests, but rather aligning oneself with a certain actor (Snyder, 1991). Balancing is another way to deter a threat through joining an alliance, which is more commonly practiced compared to band wagoning in alliance formation. This refers to forming an alliance with states to balance a more powerful external actor (Sprecher & Krause, 2006). Since interests and aims of alliance members change over time, the continuation of an alliance might also depend on the difference of power among the actors. Morrow (1991)'s study finds that asymmetric alliances that includes both major and minor powers is more likely to survive as the difference of power between actors provides them with more issues for bargaining over the time compared to symmetric alliances with similar capabilities. Warsaw pact provided the Soviet Union an ability to control policies of Eastern Europe. For Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union was the guarantor of their internal and external security (Morrow, 1991).

While the traditional theories have played an important role in alliance studies and have been effective in explaining the formation of various alliances to date, the fact that the alliance behavior of countries change over time and various alliances are being terminated, the evolving international security atmosphere suggests that new explanations may be needed. NATO is important in the sense that it is considered to have survived a change in the international system since its first establishment (Rafferty, 2003). Neo-realism and balance of power fell short in explaining NATO's continuing significance and expansion even after the Soviet Union dissolved (Esitashvili & Martin, 2020). The traditional theories of alliances emphasize the importance of classical frameworks based on which some of the latest frameworks are founded. On the other hand, the evolving international system and the lack of explanations provided by the past theories created a need for the recent ones discussed. More recent literature rather put emphasis on different aspects of alliances such as the institutional structure, or relations between allies along with the importance of small states' participation. Other than the military protection as a way of deterrence, alliances have implications on the trade relations between states. Once in a military alliance, states become more likely to trade with each other due to the assumption that increased wealth within alliance members also would contribute to the alliance's overall military strength with increased arms purchase. (Krause & Specher, 2006). However, since there's a common military pledge, Long (2003)'s study finds that better trade relations between allies are only observed in defense pacts (Long, 2003). States who sign joint regional trade agreements are also less likely to engage in a military conflict not to damage their economic ties (Krause & Specher, 2006). Neoliberalism, on the other hand, tend to explain the formation of alliances from the view of institutionalism. Alliances are a response of security community against external threats. Rather than accelerating the power competition, alliances establish

institutions that can reinforce cooperation among states. If the cooperation turns out to be beneficial for all members involved, an alliance can be long-lasting (Ismayil & Yilmaz, 2022).

Most theoretical explanations provided by the theorists frequently regarded major powers as units of analysis in alliance studies as major powers are considered to be most impactful actors for the alliance dynamic. Neorealism, for instance, does not take in to account the capabilities of small states within an alliance by focusing on the gross capabilities of states, instead of usable options depending on the context. Therefore, theories and concepts that explain small states' alliance behavior is historically underdeveloped (Van Staden, 1995). The way small states view alliances and how they make the choice to align with other states differ than that of great powers such as the Britain or the US. Bailes et. al (2016) developed a concept of alliance shelter to explain how Western small states make allies. Alliance shelter is based on the argument that small states need political and economic shelter, and thus they unproportionally benefit from the alliances compared to larger states (Bailes et.al, 2016). "...lack of capabilities of small states allows them to benefit disproportionately from international cooperation in a manner denied to larger states." (Bailes et.al, 2016, p.13).

Besides their deterring effect, alliances can be utilized by the allies to restrict the actions of each other and prevent allies from engaging in conflicts that might damage intra-alliance relations or prevent alliance promises from being fulfilled. In this sense, Gelpi (1999) notes that allies can use alliances to limit each other by intervening their conflicts and can be a tool for managing their members' relations with other states. A way of understanding the alliance dynamics is to examine the interaction between the alliance members, particularly when their interests do not align. A third party interference to a dispute between the alliance partners

might have a remarkable impact on the bilateral relations. The success of the interference by an alliance member to another ally's conflict can demonstrate the extent to which alliances can be used to convince or limit an ally (Gelpi, 1999). Similar to Gelpi (1999)'s, other scholars also point out to relationship between alliance ties and third-party involvement to a conflict. Greig and Regan (2008) discusses the factors that affect the willingness to intervene to a conflict. Since alliances are formed due to a shared threat, an alliance partner will have an incentive to intervene to the conflict to ensure that the interests over alliance and the overall security are not preserved. (Greig & Regan, 2008). Owsiak and Frazier (2014) also focus on the willingness of states to mediate a conflict through diplomatic intervention within an alliance. Due to the deeper commitments compared to other types of alliance, Owsiak and Frazier (2014) finds that being in a defense pact has a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of an alliance member to intervene as a third party to an intra-alliance conflict. While the partners in a non-aggression pact less frequently act as a mediator compared to defense pacts, partners in neutrality pacts almost never get involved to the conflict (Owsiak & Frazier, 2014). These studies suggest that dwelling upon the intervention of alliance members to the conflicts of the other member states can reveal beneficial insights for alliance studies (Gelpi, 1999; Owsiak & Frazier, 2014; Greig & Regan, 2008). To analyze the relationship between third party involvement and alliance dynamics, it is useful to examine both variables' theoretical aspect.

Mediation as the Third-Party Involvement

Third party involvements in alliances can strengthen or weaken the dynamics between partners. To better analyze the alliance dynamics and states interests, it is therefore helpful

to inquire the why alliance partners might have an incentive to intervene in intra-alliance conflicts. In that sense, since the most frequently used method of official third-party intervention is mediation. Therefore, studies that inquire the relationship between third-party intervention and alliances also discuss mediation as such method (Bercovitch, 1996). This part of the thesis will first highlight the trends in international mediation, followed by the effect of power dynamics between actors and mediator bias.

Zartman and Touval (2007) defines mediation as intervention of a third party to a conflict in order to assist conflicting parties to reach a compromise that they couldn't have reached themselves (Zartman & Touval, 2007). There are different kinds of mediation classified based on the intervention style of a mediator. Fisher (2001) classifies mediation as power-based mediation and pure mediation. Power-based mediation is practiced through rewards and punishments and is based on manipulating the conflicting parties. Pure mediation is series of attempts to resolve a conflict and reach a compromise between parties mostly conducted by a rather unbiased and an objective mediator. While power-based mediation is more likely to be carried out by the great powers such as the UK or the US; small countries, and supranational organizations such as the UN frequently engage in pure mediation (Fisher, 2001). The number of mediation processes to resolve active conflicts differs based on the region. The Middle East is the region that receives the most mediation, whereas Asia is the least. Furthermore, statistics show that the amount of regional mediation has doubled post 1980 period compared to pre-1980's. Trends in mediation can provide some clues on the changing dynamics. An important finding is the emerging patterns regarding the actors that take on the mediator role. After the 1956, there was an increase in major powers as mediators, accompanied by the decrease in UN-led mediations. At the end of the cold-war period, the

increase in mediation attempts considered to avoid confronting the superpowers. Greig and Diehl (2012) notes that the unexpected spike observed in mediations based in Europe might have been related to avoid provoking the US or the Soviet Union through NATO or Warsaw pacts. In the Middle East alliances such as League of Arab States is considered to have been inefficient in mediating the conflicts in the region. Instead, conflicting parties have sought mediation support from the EU states, and from the US. The risk of superpower confrontation again made the mediation practices more appealing within the Middle East region (Greig & Diehl, 2012).

Alliance Membership and Mediator Bias

Effectiveness of a mediator can depend on variety of factors. The understanding of what causes the conflict and in which ways can a mediator be beneficial in conflict resolution can be useful (Kydd, 2006). In the literature, there is not a consensus if the mediators should practice mediation forcing the disputants to compromise or make an effort to find a common ground where the interests of both parties are recognized. Some scholars claim that the power-based mediation done by superpowers that threaten to deprive conflicting parties of significant resources is an effective way to reach a settlement. (Stedman, 1996). Findings of Quinn et. al (2007) suggest that manipulative mediation has the strongest impact on the likelihood of reaching a formal agreement (Quinn et al., 2007). Mediators can also help solving issue of mistrust between the conflicting parties if they think they don't have enough information on each other's intention. For instance, if there's a discussed peace agreement, the mediator can assure each party that the interest in a peace agreement is mutual (Kydd,

2006). Differing intensities of the conflict can have an impact on the mediator's success and effectiveness. Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) suggest that if the intensity of the conflict is high, coercive strategies in mediation can be more effective compared to that in low-intensity conflicts (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006). On the other hand, there is a disagreement whether the intensity of a conflict makes it more likely for parties to seek for mediation. While some arguments claim that with the increase in the conflict, parties will be more focused on their position and will be less willing to accept mediation, the others argue that if the intensity of the conflict is measured by the number of fatalities, increase in the fatalities will make the actors more likely to resort to mediation (Kleiboer, 1996).

Resolution of a conflict can often benefit to the mediator in different ways. Besides the moral will to stop a conflict from becoming a war, a mediator will spend more effort to mend the relationship between conflicting parties if she has an economic or strategic interest from the relationship. A threat to two alliance partner's relationship can spill over and become another threat for the overall security of the alliance if certain issues are not resolved. The alliance partner other than the main conflicting partners will have an existing incentive to mediate the conflict so that her interests over alliance and the overall security are not risked. Therefore, being in a type of alliance or having an economic relationship with the parties can reinforce a state's willingness to act as a mediator. (Greig & Regan, 2008). Owsiak and Frazier (2014) focus on the willingness of states to mediate a conflict through diplomatic intervention within an alliance. Their study concludes that being an alliance partner in a defense pact has a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of an actor to intervene as a third party to an intra-alliance conflict. While the partners in a non-aggression pact less frequently act as a mediator compared to defense pacts, partners in neutrality pacts never get involved. Within

defense pacts, however, the extent of willingness to be involved in the conflict depends on the deepness of the alliance commitments. The study finds that deeper the alliance commitments, more likely for partners to mediate a conflict between alliance members. (Owsiak & Frazier, 2014). The study of Crescenzi et al. (2011) supports Owsiak and Frazier (2014)'s argument by noting that "...trading relationships and alliance portfolio biases significantly enhance the likelihood of third-party mediation." (Crescenzi et al., 2011, p.1086). On another note, the mediator is known well and has had a historical involvement in the conflict, the disputants will be more likely to trust and willing to accept the mediation. The factors such as geographic proximity, historical interest in the conflict such as previous colonial ties with the conflicted parties increases an actor's likelihood to mediate a conflict and prevent it from turning into a war. In this regard, being in a defense pact again emerges as an important factor as it reflects an alliance that came together over a security concern (Greig & Regan, 2008). Such ties also enhance the importance of the mediator from the perspective of the disputants. Crescenzi et al. (2011) also finds that if mediator shares an alliance tie with one of the disputants, it has significant and positive effect on the mediation success. (Crescenzi et al., 2011). Gelpi (1999)'s study on the relationship between the mediator bias stemming from an alliance tie, and the success of the mediation presents important findings. If the disputants share an alliance, they will be more prone to appeal for mediation due to their shared commitments. Particularly great powers, who share a defense pact with one of the disputants, are found to be 81% times successful when they mediate a conflict (Gelpi, 1999).

Effectiveness of an unbiased mediator has also been widely discussed in the literature. Assuming that the mediator is impartial, and her best preference is a negotiated agreement

between the disputants, Kydd (2003)'s study finds that the likelihood of a conflict increases if information coming from the mediator influences parties to offer less concessions. An unbiased mediator will only make an effort to conclude an agreement or a ceasefire, which could result in disregarding the interests of conflicting sides. If an unbiased mediator encounters that one of the parties will have high costs without any agreement, she will have to misinform the other party to prevent it from not giving any concessions. In such case, mediator should be biased towards the weaker party to decrease the chance of a conflict by lying to the stronger one and extract concessions. Therefore, even an unbiased mediator who only seeks for an agreement between conflicting parties will have an incentive to take a side. The credibility of the mediator comes into question if all parties acknowledge that the only intention is to resolve the conflict. Nonetheless, if she has a common interest with one of the parties, mediator will be trusted, which decreases the likelihood of the conflict (Kydd, 2003). Nevertheless, scholars who defend the effectiveness of an unbiased mediator argue that the mediator can only gain trust if she does not take a side, as this can contribute to finding a fair common ground. Stemming from this argument, it is claimed that small states who have less power to threaten the parties will be more prone to go follow legal procedures and therefore easier to trust. (Gelpi, 1999)

Power Asymmetry and Mediation Success

The way the mediation is conducted might depend on the extent of power mediator has over the disputants. The stance of the mediator prior to the mediation process can determine the mediator's initial outlook on the conflict. Mediator's perspective of fair management of the process can vary. This perspective can range from conducting secret deals with disputants

without each other's knowledge to ultimately resolve the conflict which would be beneficial for all parties or to facilitating a more transparent process by strictly following legal procedures and lead. In this sense, initial positioning along with passive or a more active approach of mediators can influence how the negotiation processes conducted and the ways conflicts are resolved (Princen, 1992).

Power asymmetry has an explanatory power on states' alliance behavior and therefore is significant factor for the resolution of an alliance-related conflict. The difference of power can influence the effectiveness of third-party intervention (Quinn et. al, 2007). In symmetric power relation between disputants, states hold enough power to counteract threats from each other. In asymmetric power relations, less powerful states do not have such capacity against their more powerful opponents. Therefore, Frazier and Dixon (2006) argue that the disputes where there is a difference of power between two conflicting parties, the mediation is less likely to be efficient compared to a symmetric power relationship (Frazier & Dixon, 2006). Crescenzi et al. (2011) also finds that difference of power between disputants decreases the likelihood of mediation success (Crescenzi et al., 2011). This is because the more powerful disputant will be prone to secure a full victory out of a conflict due to its greater capacity, rather than settling for a compromise proposed by the third party acting as the mediator. As a counter-argument to this, it is claimed by some scholars that since in symmetric power relations parties have similar capacities, the competition to gain advantage over one another would avert the success in the mediation. In the asymmetric power relations, at some point weaker one must settle for mostly what the greater power wants, therefore mediation process to convince the weaker party will be likely to give results. In asymmetric relations, mediator must convince the greater power to make only small number of concessions, and the weaker

party to settle for the outcome mostly based on the interests of the more powerful disputant. (Quinn et al., 2007) In such cases, the mediation will be perceived as a zero-sum game by the parties since there will be a clear winner and loser emerging from the process (Richmond, 1999).

Given the complexities discussed such as mediator's interest, position, type of the conflict and potential issues of mistrust, it might be challenging to suggest which combination of these factors lead to a successful mediation process, and what the definition of the success entails in the context of mediation. In this sense, definition of a successful mediation might depend on how it is being measured. Convincing the conflicting parties to accept the mediation is one measurement. More commonly, the end of the violence or hostility are accepted as outcomes of a successful mediation process (Wallenstein & Svensson, 2014). Some scholars also emphasize importance of the post-mediation phase in measuring the successful mediation. Svensson (2009) argues that merely considering formal peace agreements or a ceasefire between disputants as the indicators of success in mediation might not be accurate. Instead, quality of the provisions on a peace agreement related to territorial issues, or regarding justice can be dwelled upon as indicators of a successful mediation process. These indicators can be significant as they can impact the longevity of peaceful relations (Svensson, 2009). Consequently, there could be various definition of successful mediation process, many of which are based on outcomes such as peace agreements, or ceasefire. One of the key issues that effects the success of the mediation is the right timing, or the ripe moment where the intervention to a conflict is most likely to provide desired outcomes (Kleiboer, 1996). While the ripe moment is interpreted differently, one of the most accepted ones is the definition of Zartman (2008), who asserts that the ripe moment is when

the parties are in Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS). This definition refers to the deadlock situation that prevents actors from reaching their desired outcomes should the conflict persists. Since the costs of an ongoing conflict are higher than a compromise, MHS is considered as the period in which parties are most willing to accept mediation and settle for a mutual agreement (Zartman, 2008). The concept of Turning Point (TP) conveys a similar meaning to MHS. There's a point at the negotiation process where conflicting parties determine that there's no benefit in continuing to oppose. At this point, they decide to yield more authority to the negotiator. This point is called a turning point, that is often unveiled during crisis times and caused by desperation (Druckman, 2001). Although mediators might perceive that a conflict has reached its MHS, the perception of the conflicting parties can differ. In this sense, sometimes the disputants' perspective of the conflict might be more impactful than the mediator's opinion. (Richmond, 1999). On the other hand, Edmead (1971) argues that early intervention to a conflict could be also more efficient since the escalation of the conflict can be avoided (Edmead, 1971). The perception of the mediator from disputant's view can be a determinant of an effective mediation. Richmond (1999)'s framework on mediation emphasizes the importance of disputant's view as opposed to mediators' view. Is the mediator being viewed as an oppressor, or a facilitator? How well did the mediator facilitate a previous conflict? The answer of the disputants to these questions can play a crucial role for the mediation process and for their anticipations based on which the success of the mediation will be decided on. The conflicting parties will initially evaluate the information coming from the mediator in conjunction with the mediator's existing image prior to her involvement and decide on her resourcefulness accordingly. Therefore, image of the mediator is of a great importance for disputants' early judgements and the mediators'

awareness of this perception can improve the quality of their mediation styles (Richmond, 1999).

Conclusion and the Research Question

The findings from various studies point out to the complexity of international mediation while emphasizing the importance of numerous factors and some questions to be asked. Mediators interest in resolving the conflict and her position in the eyes of the conflicting parties appears to have been an ongoing discussion (Princen, 1992) Changes in the international system, rising powers and regional alliances all together have historically impacted the number of mediation attempts in certain regions. States are considered to have avoided direct confrontations with mainly the US and the Soviet Union and opt for a mediation instead. A regional alliance besides states can facilitate a mediation process between geographically closer actors. On the other hand, it might not have a significant effect on the conflict resolution. Rise or fall of regional alliances therefore has had an impact on the mediation trend (Diehl & Greig, 2012). The type of conflict and power relations of the conflicting parties are also remarkable factors. While there's no clear consensus whether mediation delivers successful outcomes in a conflict in symmetrical or asymmetrical power relations, theories point out to the potential drawbacks of both (Quinn et al., 2007) Similarly, there is no consensus whether it is more efficient to utilize coercion or engage in a facilitative approach as a mediation strategy (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006; Kleiboer, 1996). The discussion on the right moment to intervene and the concept of MHS highlights the potentially differing perspectives of the mediator and the disputants regarding the course of the conflict (Zartman, 2008). In some contexts, a state can be more willing to act as a

mediator. A dispute between alliance partners provides an important incentive for other alliance members to intervene due to the fear that the conflict can damage the alliance dynamics unless mitigated (Owsiak & Frazier, 2014).

The studies that have focused on the bias in mediation have demonstrated the importance of mediator's role in resolving intra-alliance conflicts. Theories of alliance formation can further contribute to the understanding of what contributes to bias in the resolution of an intra-alliance conflict. Alliance ties, particularly defense pacts, has an importance in states' decision to intervene in a conflict, or side more closely with one disputant. Alliance partners are more inclined to intervene in each other's conflicts when there's a shared defense pact (Owsiak & Frazier, 2014). Furthermore, the biased mediator had the most significant effect on the success of the conflict resolution if there is a shared defense pact with one of the disputants (Gelpi, 1999). The most frequently utilized official third-party intervention appears to be mediation and works of various scholars such as Gelpi (1999) has frequently focused on mediation as the third-party intervention (Gelpi, 1999) However, past research on a biased mediator's impact is focused on the cases where the mediator is in favor of the one side. Within the alliance dynamics, the success of an alliance partner as a mediator that is biased towards both sides due to a shared alliance with conflicting parties has not been the main focus in the literature. In the light of the theories regarding alliance formation and mediation as the third-party involvement discussed within the literature, this thesis will seek to provide explanations for the research questions of "How does the intervention of an alliance partner to an intra-alliance conflict effect the relations between the conflicting alliance members in a defense pact?" and, "What is the impact of a biased mediator who shares a defense pact with both disputants on the conflict resolution process? The research

questions pose an importance because it can contribute to a better understanding of power relations within alliance dynamic as well as how bias plays out within an intra-alliance conflict.

In the light of the literature review, it is expected from that the biased involvement of an alliance partner to other members' conflict is ineffective, as the mediator's intervention creates distrust and the intention to involve is constantly questioned by the conflicting parties. The involvement of the UK and the US to the Cyprus conflict between Greece and Turkey will be elaborated in the next chapters based on the theoretical framework and arguments concerning the impact of bias in mediation. How the alliance management behaviors of the main actors of the conflict impacted the conflict will also be a topic of discussion. Based on the literature review and the findings of previous studies regarding bias in mediation, this thesis will argue that mediation efforts to the Cyprus conflict by the UK and the US fell short in achieving a compromise between Turkey and Greece and did not result in long-lasting peaceful relations between the two countries. The next chapter will elaborate on the historical cornerstones of the conflict, mainly the Zurich-London agreements, which were considered as the greatest attempt of involved parties to resolve the conflict in the island between the two communities.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Zurich-London Agreements and the Cyprus Conflict

Cyprus has always been geographically important due to its strategic location with the routes connecting the West and the East. Therefore, it has been of great interest to both major powers and neighboring countries (Güney, 2004). The conflict historically divided the two communities within Cyprus, while intensifying ethnic hostility. At the time when Turkey and Greece, two neighboring countries and NATO allies, have quite a lot of cooperation options and areas, the Cyprus problem set them against each other and caused an increase in their military expenditures for defense purposes every year. 1960 agreements led to differences of opinion particularly between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, as both sides claimed to have the most say on the future of Cyprus (Sözen, 2004).

On February 11, 1959, the Turkish and Greek delegations came to a consensus in Zurich, and on February 19, 1959, the prime ministers of Turkey, Greece, and the UK validated these documents in London. The Zurich and London agreements came into force on the 16th of August in 1960, and they established the Republic of Cyprus (Gokturk, 2013). The Treaties did not only symbolize an importance for the future of the peace process in Cyprus, but they were seen as one crucial element in guarantor countries' separate security strategies (Kyriakides, 2009). The London Protocol had 25 Articles and called for the creation of two treaties with the new republic of Cyprus. The first treaty, which involved the UK, Greece, and Turkey, provided assurances of Cyprus' independence, while the second treaty

established a defensive alliance allowing for the deployment of a limited number of Greek and Turkish troops to the island. These troops would also train a Cypriot army (Göktürk, 2013). It was apparent that the treaties conveyed extensive powers to guarantor states of Greece, Turkey and the UK. In this sense, they neither posed an ultimate solution on the independence of the island, nor were based on referendums (Kyriakides, 2009). The treaties gave the impression that even though they were accepted as parts of the founding agreement of Cyprus, the island was far from being an independent state. Through the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee along with the constitution of Cyprus, the guarantor powers avoided to convey full authority to Cyprus. They were granted the sufficient authority to interfere and preserve the status quo established by the 1960 treaties, which demonstrated their distrust towards the future motives of Cypriot politicians. Particularly Greek Cypriots, however, viewed the treaties as lacking legitimacy and biased towards interests of foreign western powers (Markides, 2022).

The Cyprus conflict and the period that began with the Zurich-London agreements also had an impact on the bilateral relationships of the signatory states. As a result of the Soviet Union's aggressive post-war policies, Turkey had already been pushed to collaborate with the West, sealed by its membership to NATO in 1952. The Anglo-Turkish relationship reinforced by Turkey's NATO membership encountered a challenge with the Cyprus problem, as the interests of both countries in the region were different. Turkey wanted to keep the British presence on the island as a safeguard and deterrence towards Soviet policies to expand. However, it was a struggle to maintain the British presence due to Greek opposition to it. For the sake of the Greek-Turkish conflict from escalating, it was in the Western powers' interest to retain their influence over the island (Richmond, 1998).

Regarding the Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance, along with the 1960 constitution of Cyprus, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cyprus at the time argued that “...the constitutional and political development of the Republic has been arrested in its infancy and the Republic as a sovereign state has been placed in a strait jacket.” (Kyriakides, 2009, p.431). The Zurich-London agreements were therefore drafted in a way that reflected the interest of the Western powers, and dissatisfaction with the 1960 agreements caused even more frustration and the escalation of conflict in the island (Markides, 2022). Even though the Treaty of Alliance, Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Establishment had been drafted in a way that reflected the interests of the guarantor states, there were violations in the clauses of the agreements. Turkey was only allowed to place 650 officers in Cyprus, the number allegedly went up as far as around 42.000, reported by the Republic of Cyprus and between 20.000-35.000 reported by the UK. Regardless of the contradicting reports, it is considered to be certain that Turkey ultimately infringed military provision put forward by the Treaty of Alliance (Kyriakides, 2009).

The Zurich-London agreements that officially established the Republic of Cyprus is considered as an official intervention by guarantor powers to the Cyprus conflict (Fisher, 2001). Even though the agreements of 1960 which consisted of 27 articles provided Turkish Cypriots with a certain amount of power over the territory, they did not live up to Turkey's initial demands. The disproportionate power conveyed by the Zurich-London treaties to the Turkish community led to resentments on the Greek side (Crenshaw, 1964). By proposing 13 amendments to the 1960 constitution, The Greek Cypriots also violated particularly the 1st Article of the Treaty of Guarantee along with the constitution itself; as 6 of the proposed amendments were proposed to be made to the unchangeable basic articles of the constitution

(Aksar, 2001). In response to this proposed alteration of the constitution in a way that restricts the rights of the Turkish minority, violent conflicts started to take place between Turkey and Greece. The UK, in the light of these events, called for the parties to resolve the issue diplomatically. The UK's efforts resulted in a ceasefire that prevented the possibility of a war, while political issues remained unresolved (Mendoza, 1981). In the beginning of 1964, Cyprus collapsed as a result of the intensification of ethnic clashes that had been going on since the 1950's. The collapse of Cyprus also represented the termination of the Zurich-London agreements. The 1974 coup led by the military regime of Greece tried to overthrow the government of Cyprus led by Greek Cypriots at the time. While the two communities afterwards continued to live separately after the dissolution of agreements, there has been on and off negotiation processes regarding the future of the island. (Sözen, 2004).

Background of the Mediation Efforts

The decision to decide on a mediator for a given conflict may be based on the combination of the potential influence or the extent of objectivity that the possible mediator could have. Accordingly, there have been efforts to mediate the conflict between Cyprus and guarantor powers, particularly by the US and the UK. The US and UK held separate talks with Greece and Turkey, which resulted in joint decisions coming from both groups that again favored the validity and the suitability of the 1960 treaties. Shortly before the 1960 agreements were signed, Britain had offered the Macmillan plan as a means of mediation, which proposed a bicomunal government organization in a way that would have conveyed more rights to the Turkish Cypriots. Macmillan plan was rejected; however, it created a base for the Zurich-London Accords. According to the mediation framework of Keashly and Fisher (1990) by

the time Britain came up with the Macmillan Plan, the mediation process had already reached to the stage “with deeds gaining significance over words and with relationship issues moving to the fore.” (Keashly & Fisher, 1990, p.444). Along with the Macmillan Plan, previously rejected plans beforehand demonstrate that the UK’s consistent efforts are not aimed to provide consultation as a third party, but rather to exert its influence in a way that directs both parties (Keashly & Fisher, 1990). The circumstances and background of a specific conflict may create an impression that a particular third party is a reasonable intermediary. The UK's initial diplomatic attempts were based on this notion. Greece, however, was reluctant to allow the UK to mediate the conflict thanks to the perception that the UK’s intention in the mediation efforts was to retain the power over Cyprus. Therefore, Greece was quick to dismiss the diplomatic efforts of Britain. The refusal of a potential mediation resulted in a Greek coup in 1974, followed by the Turkish invasion 5 days after (Mendoza, 1981).

The involvement of the UN in the mediation process in the Cyprus conflict took place when the Zurich and London agreements collapsed in the beginning of 1964. The arrival of the UN temporarily eased tensions among Greek Cypriots, who claimed that the UK's role differed significantly from that of the previous British Force. While the British had been responsible for maintaining separation between Greeks and Turks, the UN's mandate was to assist the legal authorities in restoring order. (Crenshaw, 1964) After the military intervention of Turkey in 1965, the UN mediator assigned to Cyprus released a report to settle the conflict. Eventhough this report was approved by Cyprus and Greece, the refusal of Turkey resulted with the resignation of the appointed mediator (Greig & Diehl, 2012). Therefore it is claimed that the UN, whose mediation efforts historically succeeded in reducing tensions in many

conflicts, did not play an impactful role in mediating the conflicts in the Middle East in general, including the conflicts surrounding Cyprus. The UN was neither able to prevent the 1974 Greek coup, nor were sufficient in convincing the two sides of the island to come to a diplomatic solution. The perceived inefficiency of the UN resulted from the unsuitable military and political characteristics of the conflicting parties as well as their unwillingness to resort to mediation (Mendoza, 1981). On the other hand, during some period of the conflict the UN was able to convince the parties to cease-fire. For instance, During the initial stage of UN peacekeeping efforts to bring peace to Cyprus, which involved direct mediation from 1964-65 and good offices from 1966-1974, the UN's primary goal was to achieve a unified solution based on the 1960 Treaties that established the Republic of Cyprus, albeit with some adjustments. The UN aimed to address the main concern of the Greek Cypriots, who believed that the country was not entirely independent due to the limitations imposed by the 1960 Treaties, and to reduce the frustration created between the two communities by the 1960 Treaties (Richmond, 1998).

The involvement of powerful actors such as the US or the UK to the Cyprus conflict has also had an impact. Historically, especially the superpowers like the US are known to be impactful in mediating conflicts in different parts of the world. According to the realist theory, superpowers are interested in engaging in a mediating role to increase their influence in global politics. Such mediation is called a “power mediation”, rather than a purely conducted one. This type of mediation provides superpower with a greater amount of control over the information flow between the interested parties and their actions. When the US’ mediator role is assessed during crisis times, the study of Güney (2004) suggests that the intervention of the US to the Cyprus conflict should be evaluated within the framework of realism, as the

country utilized this role as a foreign policy instrument (Güney, 2004). As the conflict in Cyprus has been greatly influenced by the power politics, the mediation actions that took place was also included within this dynamic. Richmond (1998), on the other hand, argues that the Cyprus problem has never provided a necessary incentive for third parties to mediate the conflict, as it was seen the conflict didn't have an obvious impact on the international system (Richmond, 1998).

ALLIANCE BIAS AND THE MEDIATION EFFORTS IN THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

The Middle East was influenced by competition of domination between the US and the Soviet Union. The political influence in the Middle East has been significantly re-shaped by the alliance dynamics between states. Cyprus Conflict, along with the Suez Canal, has been an issue that has shaped the relations of Turkey, the UK and Greece through their stances in the Middle East. Each state had great incentives to be involved as impactful players in the Middle East, which posed an importance for the foreign and domestic policies. Cooperation and alliance dynamics became significant in the 1950's, thanks to the acknowledgement of the US and the UK that they can no longer hold an influence in the Middle East without the cooperation of the Middle Eastern states (Yeşilbursa, 1999). In the context of Turkey-Greece relations, which had shown a progress due to their membership to NATO and closeness to Western countries in 1950's, Cyprus conflict damaged the ongoing cooperation between the two countries (Kalaitzaki, 2005).

Alliances form against threat, and a dispute involving partners poses another threat to the security of the other alliance members (Walt, 1987). As it was discussed in the literature review, a state's bias towards another can emerge from a shared alliance tie (Crescenzi et al., 2011; Greig & Regan, 2008) Previously formed alliances between Britain and Turkey in the Middle East, and the dynamics came into play by Turkey and Greece's memberships to NATO in 1950's created a bias that the UK and the US had towards both sides due to their shared alliances with disputants. This section will discuss how the alliance dynamics between Turkey, Greece, and the UK as the guarantor powers of Cyprus, as well as the impact of NATO's intra-alliance dynamics have played significant roles during the Cyprus conflict. The historical causes of bias that the UK and the US had towards Turkey and Greece and its impact on the course of Cyprus will be discussed. In the literature, theories of the impact of the alliance bias on the mediation success suggest various outcomes. Moreover, these studies mostly put emphasis on the impact of alliance bias when the mediator is sided with one of the disputants due to her shared alliance. The alliance bias that emerges from mediator's common alliance with both disputants presents a different area of research. The UK's involvement in Turkish-Greek dispute over Cyprus issue when all three countries were in alliance as guarantor powers of Cyprus presents such case, as well as the approach of the US managing the two NATO allies. Accordingly, within the context of Cyprus conflict, the following questions emerge: How does an intervention of an alliance member to a conflict between other members impact the relations between allies? How did the alliance bias of the US and Britain have an impact on the bilateral relations of Turkey and Greece?

The UK's Intervention to the Cyprus Conflict

The UK was one of the main actors in the Cyprus conflict due to its inclusion as guarantor power in the 1960 treaties, also thanks to the colonial ties to Cyprus. Britain's approach and interventions to the Cyprus conflict between Turkey and Greece was influenced by the efforts to keep the Middle East under control through alliances, as well as not to convey full authority of the island to either Turkey or Greece.

The Middle East had been a significant part of the UK's security agenda, dating back to the Suez Canal. The geopolitical importance of the Suez Canal made Britain dependent on Egypt, as the canal had a critical location that connected the British Empires' territories (Yeşilbursa, 1999). Thanks to historical ties, the UK frequently engaged in mediation to the Middle East not to lose control over the region and its political actors. Cyprus, a former British colony, was also a region that was frequently intervened by the UK (Greg & Diehl, 2012). Anglo-Turkish cooperation in the Middle East in the 1950's and their inclination to form an alliance can be explained through both countries' foreign policy aspirations and concerns. The relationship and alliances of Britain and Turkey also exemplifies a major power and small state interaction, where both countries benefitted from forming an alliance with each other (Athanassopoulou, 2020).

Turkey's alliance formation in the 1950's demonstrates an act of bandwagoning, as the cost of not cooperating with Britain against the Soviet threat in the Middle East could be higher as Turkey was concerned by the regional political alterations (Waltz, 1979). Thanks to Stalin's aggressive and expansionist policies, Turkey had to protect itself from the Soviet

threat by forming alliances with more powerful Western countries. In the Middle East, Turkey was encountering tensions from Syria and Iraq for its increasing closeness to Britain. With the collapse of Saadabad Pact with Balkan countries, Turkey was also partially isolated from the Eastern Europe and eager to form alliances with stronger western states, particularly Britain, to reduce its potential vulnerabilities in different regions. Under the regional political uncertainties, Turkey therefore attempted to reduce security risks by siding with more powerful countries (Athanassopoulou, 2020). In this sense, it can be inferred that as Stephen Walt argues, Turkey formed its alliances in 1950's to balance against geographically close threats, rather than solely balancing against dominant powers (Walt, 1987).

The extent of defense cooperation between Turkey and the UK over the Middle East has had an impact on the positioning of the UK towards Cyprus conflict. In the 1950's Turkey was a strategic actor in the defense of the Middle East and an important partner for the UK's efforts to encounter the Soviet threat and to manage Egypt. To include Turkey officially as a defense partner along with the US, France; the UK set up a regional defense pact named The Middle Eastern Command (MEC), later Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) (Yorgancıoğlu & Kıralp, 2019). The alliance was to be led by the UK, for the purpose of including Egypt as a member to be able to keep troops in Egypt in the name of the Middle East Command, which was to be established in Cyprus. Turkey's inclusion to this pact was important for the UK's aim of creating a unified defense of the Middle East to take control of the Suez Canal (Yeşilbursa, 1999). Therefore, the UK initially opposed to the idea of Turkish membership to NATO, as it was important for the UK to prevent newly formed security alliances to reduce vulnerable countries' dependence on her in the Mediterranean (Holland, 2019). However, in the later discussions regarding Turkey's admission to NATO, it became clear that NATO

membership was much more attractive for Turkey in terms of increasing her own security, compared to joining the Middle East Command. In exchange for the UK's support to Turkey's NATO admission, the US decided to support the UK's Middle East Command and Turkey's inclusion to the defense pact, which would further increase Turkish cooperation in the Middle East both for the US and the UK (Yeşilbursa, 1999). The two countries' inclusion as members to other alliances demonstrate that besides Cyprus issue, Turkey was a more important ally for the UK to preserve its interest in the Middle East, which could point out to the bias that the UK had towards Turkey during the mediation process to Cyprus. The UK's efforts to cooperate with Turkey first through Middle East Command and then by providing support to Turkey's admission to NATO demonstrate that when the Cyprus conflict intensified in 1960's, the UK had already been in cooperation with Turkey through cooperation in the Middle East prior, which can also be explanatory on the causes of Britain's bias towards Turkey in the context of Cyprus conflict. The Anglo-Turkish interactions before the Cyprus conflict also prove that being able to manage Turkey to create a unified Middle East against Egypt had been one of the priorities of the UK's foreign policy.

It can be inferred that the way the UK tried to control Turkey's political choices in the Middle East through alliances also had an impact that shaped the course of events in the Cyprus conflict. However, when the Cyprus conflict escalated between Turkish and Greek communities, the UK became aware that to retain her influence over the island she must be able to control both sides (Holland, 2019).

Macmillan Plan, which was put forward by the Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan, was the most evident attempt of the UK's efforts to reconcile Turkish-Greek relations. According to the plan, Greece and Turkey would gain limited authority, which would allow Britain to keep

control over Cyprus. Consequently, with the implementation of the plan, the partition of the island by either Turkey or Greece would be prevented (Holland, 1998). The Macmillan Plan, however, perceived by the Greece to have favored the Turkish. “With its bias in favour of the Turkish position, the government wanted to pressure the Greek government; but the Greek government was in turn trying to use whatever leverage it had to pressure back” (Demetriou, 2019, p.410). As the UK was aware of this perception, they counted on the Turkish government’s support to the plan’s implementation and was already expecting the Greek opposition. The plan was indeed heavily boycotted by the Greek Cypriots, which resulted in escalation of the ethnic violence between the two communities. However, the increased instability in Cyprus was not perceived as a drawback for the UK, as it would legitimize the UK’s interest to keep its authority over the island. The plan was accepted by Turkey but refused by Greece and Greek Cypriots (Demetriou, 2019).

The arrangements of Macmillan over Cyprus in 1958 made sure that “Turkish-Cypriots were guaranteed ‘a specially favored and specially protected state’ in the governance of the island.”, without referring to any partition. Regardless of the privileges promised to Turkey, Macmillan seemed to be fond of Greece as well, referring to them in press as Britain’s ultimate allies and Turkey as hard to understand (Holland, 2019). While the UK seemed to have sided with Turkey in 1950’s thanks to their prior cooperation in the Middle East, the UK eventually became aware that the only way to keep control of Cyprus was to ensure that Turks and Greeks lived in Cyprus peacefully without political clashes. This idea of pleasing both sides to have power over Cyprus also required not fully supporting or opposing national claims of Turks or Greeks. Therefore, the UK had to find a balance to manage both Turkey and Greece, which could not have been achieved by only supporting the Turkish claims over

Cyprus. This policy of supporting both sides were made obvious in various instances, which is also the cause of the alliance bias that Britain had. In 1959, a year before the establishment of Republic of Cyprus, Macmillan referred to Greece "...as ultimately the friends of Britain ('they think like us,' he said) and the Turks as bafflingly inscrutable." to the British journalist (Holland, 2020, p.767) Especially after 1964, the UK was neither willing to nor able to resolve the longstanding enmity between Turkey and Greece on its own. It therefore pursued policies that favored an international settlement or greater American involvement in the dispute. The internalization of the solution process for the Cyprus could either mean the involvement of the NATO or the UN. Although there were hesitations from the US side whether to get more involved in the issue, the total abstainment would not be feasible to keep NATO under control (Yellice, 2018). The events that led to the Zurich-London agreements provide evidence and the impact of the UK's dual bias towards Turkey and Greece. Initially, it can be inferred that the UK's mediation attempts and to bring Turkey and Greece to the negotiating table were not intended to mend the relationship between the guarantor powers, but rather to make them reach a compromise where neither of them would have the authority. Therefore, Britain directed its mediation efforts in a way that would ultimately prevent both sides from emerging as the dominant power in Cyprus. While Macmillan plan and the effort for its implementation demonstrates Britain was more prone to cooperation with Turkey, Britain's bias towards one side of the conflict ultimately led to the failure of the plan as well as the further escalation of violence between the two communities in Cyprus. The approach of Britain towards the end of 1950's was towards the inclusion of Greece as well, however, without any success in negotiations or any improvements in relationship between Turkey and Greece.

The US Involvement and NATO

Superpowers have frequently taken the mediator role to serve their own foreign policy interests. In this sense, mediation is used as a tool by superpowers in order to expand their influence in a region. The role of the US as a mediator in the Cyprus conflict can also be explained based on this argument. The US involvement to Cyprus conflict is an example of power mediation, where a superpower utilized the mediation process to establish its own influence (Güney, 2004). The Soviets, on the other hand, was afraid of the partition, which would turn Cyprus into a NATO base and weaken the influence of EOKA, a communist group operating in Cyprus. Although their reasons differed, the Soviet Union and the US essentially wanted a similar outcome on the fate of Cyprus, which does not convey authority of the island to the either Greece or Turkey (Hart, 1990).

Although Turkey and Greece were not among the founding members of NATO, the two states have greatly aligned their policies with the West. The fact that the two conflicted states are important members of NATO has had an impact on the conflict management over Cyprus (Çolakoğlu, 2022). In fact, the idea of an independent Cyprus had first emerged within the context of NATO (Holland, 2019). Since its formation in 1949, admission to NATO was a significant pillar for both Turkish and Greek foreign policy. NATO's approach to the Cyprus conflict after the two countries became full members also posed an importance (Chourchoulis & Kourkouvelas, 2012). The US, in this regard, was managing a conflict not only between the two neighbors, but also NATO allies. "Each ally always expected the support of the US against the other. However, most of the time, both allies were dissatisfied with the attitude of the US at the same time." (Çolakoğlu, 2022, p.912).

In the 1950's, the US perceived securing the Middle East as the responsibility of the UK. This perception led the US to abstain from the regional defense alliance proposed by the UK to keep control over Egypt. However, after the Korean War, the US became more cautious of the increasing Soviet threat over the Middle East, which increased its awareness of the importance of keeping military bases in Egypt under control (Yeşilbursa, 1999). While the influence of the US gradually rose in the Middle East and on the relationship between Turkey and Greece, US was not willingly managing the conflict between NATO allies. Turkey actively pushed for its accession to NATO, while Greece was pursuing a more passive policy towards the alliance, based on the assumption that if Turkey was to be admitted, Greece would obtain its membership as well due to geopolitical reasons. Therefore, Greece initially supported Turkey's membership to NATO, instead of the Middle Eastern Commence alliance proposed by Britain (Chourchoulis & Kourkouvelas, 2012). In alignment with the theory of Waltz (1987) that states join alliances to balance threats (Waltz, 1987), it can be argued that both Greece and Turkey wanted to side with the US for the security protection from NATO (Çolakoğlu, 2022).

The apparent US involvement to Cyprus and mediation between Turkey and Greece can be divided into different periods. Firstly, by Truman Doctrine and announcing financial support to Greece and Turkey, the US lift Britain's burden to support those countries, as well as establishing its influence further in the Middle East by taking the place of the UK (Athanassopoulou, 2020). In the 1950's, the policy "...of keeping the United States at an equal distance from each country." was to avoid damaging the intra-alliance dynamics of NATO, which would then weaken against the Soviet Union. The Zurich-London Agreements

signed in 1959, followed by the independence of Cyprus in 1960 were seen as positive developments by the US, since the agreements would improve the relations between the NATO allies (Kalaitzaki, 2005, p.112).

Although the US followed a policy of non-intervention in the beginning of 1960's, it had to conduct diplomatic interventions later during the mid 1960's thanks to the escalation of conflict in the island. After the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the US interventions to the island became more visible and frequent. Gradually increasing intervention of the US meant that the previous responsibility of the UK to retain the stability of Cyprus was being undertaken by the US, which increased the importance of the US intervention as the third party (Çolakoğlu, 2022). Witnessing the weakness of the UK over Egypt, Turkey was in a significant position for US efforts to renew the alliance scheme that included the Middle Eastern nations (Holland, 2019). However, the most significant involvement of the US in the Cyprus conflict started when an intense outbreak between the Turkish and Greek community took place in 1963. For the US to keep its influence on the island through guarantor powers of Cyprus established by the 1960 agreements and to deter the Soviet influence on the island, it was important to retain the stability between Greece, Turkey and UK. Apparently, the state of bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece was also significant for the US to preserve NATO's intra-alliance dynamic (Güney, 2004).

Therefore, the US had to first protect the alliance between guarantor powers over Cyprus to stabilize the island, which then would protect the intra-alliance dynamics within NATO and prevent any Soviet exploitation of the situation. In this regard, the bias of the US towards Greece and Turkey as the mediator in the Cyprus conflict emerged from the fact that both

countries were sharing a defense alliance with the US. The priority of the US while mediating the Cyprus conflict was to protect the unity of NATO, instead of providing a solution that would ultimately resolve the rooted hostility between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus. In fact, despite having different motives, both the US and UK made an effort to stabilize the political climate in Cyprus. To manage Turkish and Greek communities in Cyprus was important for the UK to retrieve its decreasing influence over the Middle East. For the US, it was prioritized to keep the Middle East prevent communism from spreading further in the Middle East and unite against the Soviet threat.

Exchange of telegrams as of 1964 between the US, Greece and Cyprus governments reflect the cautious approach of the US towards Turkey and Greece, in efforts to diplomatically convince them to negotiate and to refrain from taking a military action, along with the growing US concerns regarding Cyprus and a potential military action could be taken by Turkey. From the exchanges, it is evident that Makarios was not convinced on the efficiency of the US mediation efforts and was concerned about protecting the Greek interests in Cyprus. Similarly, Greek Prime Minister Papandreou argued that instead of pressuring Greece to negotiate, the US should have followed a firmer approach against Turkey. In this sense, Greek Prime Minister implied to their belief that the US was biased in favor of Turkey. Nevertheless, both Greece and Turkey have made efforts to reach a compromise by continued discussion with Acheson, taking into account the national interests and concessions to be made. For instance, one telegram exchange suggests that Greece was willing to allow the establishment Turkish military bases in some areas such as the island of Kastellorizon, or to allow Turkish presence in some of Britain's existing military bases. However, it was still concerning for Acheson that the potential concessions from the Greek side still would still

fall short in fulfilling Turkey's security demands. As a response to potential military action of Turkey, Greece was expecting not only a reaction from the US, but also support from the NATO allies to oppose Turkey. These expectations in the mediation process demonstrate the conflict's impact on the relations between Greece, Turkey and other NATO members along with NATO's role in balancing both allies. The telegrams also reveal the US belief that Turkey was militarily superior over Greece. Even though it was believed that Turkey would be successful in the event of an armed intervention, the US assumed such intervention would provoke even greater regional instability and would not lead to a long-lasting peace (U.S. Department of State, 1964).

The telegrams and letters exchanged convey a sense of the American approach to mediation in Cyprus which is focused on preventing the escalation of conflict and promoting the negotiation of interests between Turkey and Greece. However, it is evident from the reactions of both Turkish and Greek diplomats reveal the disappointment in US mediation as both sides were forced to negotiate while their requests were consistently not being met. Particularly during the Washington talks, one telegram notes that Greek Foreign Minister Costopoulos suggested that the President Johnson and Washington officials "concentrated only on procedure without touching on substance" (U.S. Department of State, 1964).

The alliance bias of the US played out in a way that in order to protect the interests of NATO, the US did not fully support either Turkey or Greece, which caused disappointment in both parties and Cypriots, without any progress in their relations. For instance, the disbelief of Makarios reflected in one telegram document dated June 29, 1964, where he referred to mediation efforts of President Johnson as 'an expected failure' (U.S. Department of State,

1964). Instead, the US seemed to have supported Greece and Turkey's actions depending on the period. For instance, as also reflected in various telegrams, when Turkey intended to take a military action to Cyprus in 1964, the US declared that it would not support such an intervention (Kalaitzaki, 2005). The US mediation in Cyprus failed due to the superficial approach of the US towards the Cyprus problem between Turkey and Greece that considered the conflict as the problem of NATO. Therefore, solutions that are offered by the US was solely aimed to resolve a conflict between allies, rather than viewing it as a rooted and ethnic problem in Cyprus between the two neighbors.

Alliances such as NATO, Britain's defense pact in the Middle East or the 1960 agreements combined with the evolving international order have had an impact on the course of Cyprus and the third-party bias in interventions. Various actors like Britain and the US or international organizations like the UN have been involved to the Cyprus conflict as third parties and mediators. Even though efforts of the third parties have relieved the tension or limited the violence in the Cyprus during crises periods, no actor or mediator was successful in fully resolving the conflict as a third party. The mostly inefficient and diplomatic interventions of the UN, combined with the bias caused by the US concern of NATO and Britain's wish to retain its influence over Cyprus by controlling Greece and Turkey led to a set of attempts to mend the relationship between Turkey and Greece, which was achieved in the long term. The bias that the US had towards Turkey and Greece mostly played out through their formal alliance tie in NATO. Therefore, while trying to find a resolution for the Cyprus conflict, the US had to manage both Greece and Turkey strategically so that the intra-alliance dynamic within NATO would not be damaged by a conflict between the two alliance members.

Turkey and Greece had the common purpose of minimizing the potential Soviet threats by closely aligning with stronger Western countries, primarily the US and Britain. Cyprus conflict, however, significant for both countries' alliance behavior, as it was clear that the national interest of Greece and Turkey outweighed the alliance interests of NATO after the 1974. On the other hand, as an alliance partner, Turkey and Greece both had relied on the US to act as a mediator to the Cyprus conflict in a way that their national interests are preserved. Having realized the strategic US interests in Cyprus after the 1974 crisis, the perception of the US as a mediator who once seem to have protected the interest of the disputants, changed for Turkey and Greece (Kalaitzaki, 2005).

Although the US did not have an improving impact on the Greek-Turkish relationship in the period from 1950's to 1970's, both Greece and Turkey could not stop their security dependence to the US and NATO. Despite the US embargo to Turkey after its intervention to Cyprus or closing of the US bases in Turkey did not fully damage bilateral relations. When Greece left the military command of NATO, it continued to hold the membership (Rizas, 2009). The fact that Turkey and Greece sustained their NATO membership over the years can be considered as balancing against threats as Walt (1987) argues, especially from the Soviet Union, which is also an explanation for NATO's survival (Walt, 1987). In the 1970's, the US had to balance Greece and Turkey to smooth the effect of Turkey's invasion to Cyprus, as both countries were important for the US foreign policy.

The UK and the US pursued different interests over the Cyprus and the status of the Turkish-Greek relations. However, the interventions and the mediation efforts conducted by both the

Britain and the US was influenced by the two countries' shared alliances with disputants, Turkey and Greece as well as the importance of disputants for foreign policy purposes. Both UK and the US have had an impact on the bilateral relations of Greece and Turkey that can be explained by the alliance bias. Starting from 1950's, Britain had to keep Turkey as an alliance partner in the Middle East to unite against primarily to Egypt and the Soviet threat. At the same time, to be able to manage Turkey and Greece as the guarantor powers of Cyprus, the UK also had to ensure that Turkey and Greece had a compromise over the island. Contrary to the argument of Kydd (2006) who asserts that the mediators can contribute to building trust among disputants (Kydd, 2006), the closeness of Britain to both disputants created a mistrust and did not have an improving impact on the Greek-Turkish relations between the 1950-1970 period, which resulted by Turkey's military operation to Cyprus in 1965, followed by the junta of 1974 (Holland, 2020). Therefore, the shared alliance ties and the interest of Britain from both Turkey and Greece further strained Greek-Turkish relations. Moreover, by conducting frequent interventions to preserve the interest of the shared alliances, it can be argued that the US and Britain used alliance ties as tools for managing their partners' affairs, also asserted by Gelpi (1999) who argues that alliances provide member states an opportunity to regulate bilateral relations between other alliance members. The fact that the US and Britain were most frequently intervened to the Cyprus conflict also validates Gelpi (1999)'s claim that alliance partners are more prone to be assigned as mediators to a conflict between other members (Gelpi, 1999).

The fact that both Turkey and Greece were geopolitically important members of NATO had an influence on the Zurich-London agreements. However, the alliance between Turkey, Greece and UK as guarantor powers established by the Zurich-London agreements have not

created a sustainable political context, as dissatisfaction of Turkish and Greek communities in the Cyprus over the agreement have caused various clashes. Rather than focusing on the rooted problems and a more efficient power sharing between the two communities in Cyprus, preserving the intra-alliance dynamics of NATO was prioritized in the Zurich-London Agreements. “Protecting the interests and stability of Turkey, Greece, and the NATO Alliance in the final solution, rather than Cypriot communities, was the primary purpose.” (Çolaklıoğlu, 2022, p.914). The idea of the independent Cyprus led by the US and the UK, which is an important step towards the resolution of the conflict between Greece and Turkey, has therefore failed with Turkey’s military intervention to Cyprus in 1964 (Greig & Diehl, 2012).

UN’S MEDIATION EFFORTS IN CYPRUS

Scholars offer various theories regarding the effectiveness of an unbiased mediator. It is often argued that although unbiased mediators might be considered as effective as they are not supporting one particular side, it can still be challenging to convince disputants that their interests will be protected upon reaching an agreement (Kydd, 2003). Therefore, even though the international organizations such as the UN are considered as impartial negotiators, there may still be struggles in gaining the trust of the conflicting parties and provide the reassurance that there is no underlying intension (Honeyman, 1985).

The UN’s peacekeeping and mediation efforts have been in effect in Cyprus since 1964. By initiating plans and mediation attempts such as Ghali Set of Ideas or the Annan Plan, the UN have frequently tried to resolve the conflict and to manage the involvement of diverse actors,

including the EU, NATO, Turkey, and Greece. However, the clash of interests between Turkish and Greek Cypriots as well as the governments involved further complicated the UN's attempts (Moulakis, 2007). This part focuses on the role of the UN as an unbiased mediator in the Cyprus conflict, exploring the reasons behind the successes and failures. The impact of NATO on the UN mediations the complexities encountered during the mediation process will be discussed. The specifics of UNFICYP and the Annan Plan will be addressed to evaluate the efficiency of such interventions.

UNFICYP

Before the launch of UNFICYP, the mediation efforts of particularly Britain and the UN had already failed. In 1964, the UNFICYP was established by the Security Council, in hopes to restore the order in the island. The intervention of the UN was first demanded by the Government of Cyprus in 1963, by citing concerns of territorial integrity of the island (Aksu, 2010). Since the intervention of UN Security Council in 1964, the UN had put an emphasis on the territorial integrity of Cyprus, which encouraged the two sides in Cyprus to alter their territorial claims on the island (Vural & Duba, 2023). In the negotiation process regarding the extent of involvement of NATO and the UN in Cyprus, Makarios made it clear that the most authority should be conveyed to the Security Council instead of NATO. "...in the event of a NATO operation NATO interests would take priority over Greek Cypriot interests. A NATO-based solution would tend to favour Turkish Cypriots as Makarios believed had been the case with the Zurich and London agreements." (Aksu, 2010, p.32). A mediation process led by the UN instead of NATO would also be an advantage for Greece, as Turkey had fewer

allies in UN than in NATO. The Soviet Union was also in favour of creation of a UN peace-keeping mission to Cyprus, as it could get involved in the decision-making through the Security Council (Aksu, 2010). The US, on the other hand, was concerned with balancing the Turkish side and the Greek side during the UN-led mediation process to prevent any intra-alliance dispute within NATO. Thanks to the shared history and culture between Greece and the Soviet Union, the US leaned more towards supporting Turkey in this period. Supporting Turkey was also important for the US since the countries within the UN was more prone to support enosis, which would provoke Turkey and potentially create problems for NATO (Aksu, 2010). However, the US also held a significant position in the General Assembly, repeatedly opposing with the internalization of Cyprus conflict (Coulfoudakis, 1976).

Profoundly run by the Greek Cypriots, the Government of Cyprus feared a potential Turkish invasion. Despite the UN's increased visibility in the mediation process, it is important to note that the UK and US made efforts to resolve the conflict through NATO and mostly excluded the UN from the process (Aksu, 2010). In particular, Greece delayed the aim to involve UN in the mediation process not to upset the US and the UK, as both countries were strongly opposed to the idea of enosis or the UN involvement (Bolukbasi, 1998). However, increased domestic pressure on Greek government, as well as unwillingness of the UK and the US to negotiate on enosis further encouraged Greek government to bring the Cyprus problem to the General Assembly of the UN. The extent of UN involvement to the Cyprus Conflict and the response of the organization was informed from the complex history of the island and presence of the external political powers, particularly the US and Britain (Coulfoudakis, 1976). Within UN, the Cyprus conflict was seen as a threat to global peace and particularly to the stability of the Mediterranean. However, the complexity of the conflict

made it challenging to determine if the rooted causes of the conflict were intra-state or inter-state (Aksu, 2010)

The UNFICYP was sent to Cyprus as the result of the breakdown in the constitutional arrangements that was brought about with 1960 London-Zurich Accords (James, 1989) The purpose of the UN involvement was to protect international stability and efforts to return to normal conditions in Cyprus. However, the mandate of UNFICYP was unclear since the limitation of its mission or the extent of use of force were left vague. More detailed objectives of the operation were later defined after obtaining unsatisfactory results from the initial process (Sambanis, 1999). UNFICYP was composed of national units belonging to various UN members. The largest human resource belonged to the UK and these national units consisted of military and police forces. Extraordinarily, the peacekeeping force was also supported by civilian staff of diplomats and technicians (Stegenga, 1970)

The Zurich-London agreements of 1959 held significance for the UN, as they not only recognized Cyprus as an independent state but also as a member of the UN. Consequently, this advancement added credibility to the potential engagement of the UN in addressing the Cyprus conflict. (Bolukbasi, 1998). The US and Britain initially had been against the involvement of the UN in the Cyprus conflict between Greece and Turkey, as a UN resolution might potentially cause disunity among NATO members. Although Greece was also not willing to damage the unity within NATO, Greek rebellions that consecutively occurred in 1958 and 1959 forced Athens to appeal to the UN. However, both attempts failed (Bolukbasi, 1998)

For the US and the UK, taking Cyprus issue to the UN undermined the Anglo-American security interests in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, while giving the Soviet Union an opportunity for exploitation. For Greece, the involvement of the UN meant increased diplomatic options, as well as a way to restrain the repressive approach of the NATO along with the Britain and the US (Coufoudakis, 1976). The US initially believed that limiting the internationalization of the issue by keeping it within NATO, the escalation of the further conflict can be prevented and the cohesion within the NATO would not be damaged. The involvement of the UN as the mediator to the Cyprus conflict made it easier for the Soviet Union to dismiss the legitimacy of the Zurich-London agreements, as the agreements served for the NATO interests from the perspective of the Soviets (Bolukbasi, 1998). Furthermore, the appointment of a UN mediator to the conflict implied that the Zurich-London Accords of 1959 were inefficient, and that there should be a renewed compromise regarding the fate of Cyprus (Coufoudakis, 1976).

Success and Failure of the UNFICYP

Various scholars assert that the suppression of violence by the UN paved the way for negotiation and diplomatic progress, and that's why UN peacekeeping force can be considered as successful (James, 1989). On the other hand, other arguments point out to the UN's inefficiency in dealing with the politically complex nature of the Cyprus conflict that has not been truly resolved between Turkey and Greece till present day. The arguments that are in favor of UNFICYP claim that the peace-keeping operation was able to decrease the violence in Cyprus to some extent (Stegenga, 1970). By 1974, the UNFICYP was only able

to retain the status quo of the island, preventing the violence to escalate. However, up until this date, there were no political improvements between the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus (Coufoudakis, 1976). Although the UN was able to avert the armed violence in Cyprus, it could not prevent the occupation of Turkey in 1974 (James, 1989). Moreover, the incidents after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus have increased 100 times compared to the past 5 years prior to invasion (Sambanis, 1999). The two Geneva Conferences in 1974 that were held after the UN's call for ceasefire were not effective in calming the political tensions between Turkey and Greece. However, failure of these conferences provided an advantage to Greece in the General Assembly, as all states voted in favor of clearing all foreign armed forces from Cyprus (Bolukbasi, 1998).

To elaborate on the success of the UN as a mediator to the Cyprus conflict, it is important to delve into the measurements of peacekeeping success or failure. There have been various arguments regarding the accurate measurement of a peacekeeping mission's extent of success. According to Sambanis (1999), "...peacekeeping is not designed to resolve conflicts and most peacekeeping operations would be judged as failures according to this standard." (Sambanis, 1999, p.80). Whereas Diehl (1993) argue that a peacekeeping operation can be considered successful if it limits the level of violence and armed conflict (Diehl, 1993). Diehl's perspective on the success of a peacekeeping operation is analogous with the success criteria of Bratt (1996), which is the limiting the number of casualties (Bratt, 1996). On the other hand, Sambanis (1999) claims that the success of the peacekeeping can be a product of exogenous and endogenous variables that makes it challenging to accurately measure the efficiency of a peacekeeping operation. One important external determinant that contributes to peacekeeping capability is the involvement of superpower and regional power interests

(Sambanis, 1999). These endogenous and exogenous variables can also be observed in the peacekeeping operation in Cyprus. The impact of the US as a superpower, as well as the Britain's and NATO's strategic interests in the island contributed to the extent of success of UNFICYP as an exogenous variable, which made it challenging to measure the impact of the UN itself. In terms of limiting the violence, the observed decline of incidents in Cyprus between the period of 1968-1974 can be attributed to UN's mediation efforts and the presence of UNFICYP. In this period, the peacekeeping operation was successful in limiting the violence which fulfils the criteria of Diehl (Diehl, 1993).

Considering the involvement of numerous actors in the initial launch of UNFICYP and about its operational framework, Sambanis (1999)'s argument is remarkable. When applied to the Cyprus case, the involvement of the US and the Soviet Union in the peacekeeping process exemplifies an exogenous variable of superpower involvement. The Soviet Union greatly supported the operation to distribute the influence of US among Security Council, as well as to avoid a potential NATO peacekeeping mission (Aksu, 2018). Although the US might have preferred a NATO intervention, it later contributed to the settlement process initiated by the UN especially after 1974 (Sambanis, 1999). Consequently, superpower involvement did not have a negative impact on the mediator role of the UN, as both the US and the Soviet Union was supportive of the process during certain periods. On the other hand, according to Birgisson (1993), despite the UN was able to calm the violence and armed conflict in Cyprus, the duration of the political conflict between Turkey and Greece was prolonged since the presence of the UN in Cyprus prevented a direct dialogue between two sides (Birgisson, 1993).

Compared to the positions of actors such as Britain, the US or the NATO, the UN can be considered an unbiased third-party that intervened in the conflict. As inferred from the literature, intra-alliance dynamics of NATO and particularly the approach of UK and the US have had a considerable impact on the course of the peacekeeping operation of the UN. Particularly, the US wish to not internationalize the conflict to maintain the stability within NATO has influenced the course of UN's mediation. According to various scholars, the evaluation criteria for the success of a peacekeeping operation differs. While the peacekeeping force had little to do to prevent the Turkish invasion of 1974, from conflict management aspect, UNFICYP's presence certainly limited the number of casualties throughout the years (Sambanis, 1999) As for conflict resolution, the UNFICYP's work, and mission did not result in a settlement between the two parties. The alliance dynamics within NATO, as well as the regional interests of the US and the UK had an impact on the initial launch and the course of the peacekeeping operation.

While there is a consensus that the UNFICYP's presence of a peacekeeping operation was most successful in minimizing the violence in Cyprus between the two communities until 1974, the operation did not lead to a diplomatic improvement on the ongoing political conflict between Turkey and Greece for the long term. In this sense, despite being an unbiased mediator, the UN did not succeed in creating a cohesive international approach to reconcile the distinct political demands of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Overall, considering the unbiased position of the UN, it can be said that its mediation did not resolve the conflict, however, it has certainly minimized the level of violence between the two communities except for the 1974 invasion of Turkey.

After the 1974 period, there were various attempts by the UN until the proposal of the Annan Plan. Some of the attempts were in the form of diplomatic talks. The first attempt was the UN initiated set of meetings held between 1974 and 1977, followed by another period between 1977 and 1979. The topics of discussion included a proposed compromise over a federal structure for Cyprus, where both Turkish side and the Greek side would have certain amount of power over the governance of the island. These talks, however, considered to have failed due to disagreement over territorial issues and proposed power-sharing arrangements (Yılmaz, 2010). The attempts of the UN continued with a reconciliation plan called Set of Ideas, put forward by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. The plan suggested arrangements over constitutional structure with bicameral legislature, arrangements over areas controlled by Turkey. Specifically, the plan proposed that in exchange of Turkish Cypriot's decreased control over some areas, they would get the economic control over other key regions such as Morphou. However, as Turkish Cypriots opposed the proposed territorial concessions and rejected the plan. The Greek Cypriots were also not pleased with the proposals, which was thought to be favoring the Turkish side, as well as the continuation of Turkey's military presence in Cyprus. Therefore, the Set of Ideas were also rejected by both sides (Bolukbasi, 1995).

Consequently, in this time period, the disagreements over key issues and distrust between the two communities thwarted the UN's diplomatic efforts. Compared to the Annan Plan, such diplomatic talks and the meetings initiated by the UN after the 1974 incident are considered to be less comprehensive and impactful and were rejected by both communities in Cyprus.

[Annan Plan](#)

In efforts to reunify the island, the Annan Plan was put forward by the UN. According to the Annan Plan of 2002, the updated version of Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Alliance were to be applied to the new state. Annan Plan was considered a comprehensive plan that was drafted based on the outcomes of previous negotiations and unofficial interventions of the UN to Cyprus that lasted for decades (Sozen & Ozersay, 2007). The distrust in the London-Zurich agreements and the efforts of the UN and the guarantor powers of Cyprus for finding another viable solution to the conflict was impactful in the creation of the plan (Kyriakou & Skoutaris, 2016). The most vital component of the Annan Plan was the establishment of United Cyprus Republic composed of a Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State, similar to Switzerland's cantons, the two constituent states would have the right to exercise their own power in judiciary with having separate constitutions (Sozen & Ozersay, 2007). This power sharing arrangement offered a similar plan to the 1959 London and Zurich Agreements (Sozen, 2007) There would also be a presidential council, 9 members of which to be chosen every 5 years from the Greek and Turkish Cypriot to provide a fair representation at the national level. This council would also appoint the members of the Supreme Court consisting of equal number of members from Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Moulakis, 2007) The plan involved the repatriation of territory capable of accommodating approximately half of the 220,000 Greek Cypriot refugees and conveyed partial control of the island to the Turkish side. The timeline was drafted based on the return of refugees and the withdrawal of the Turkish army. This was planned to take place in approximately 18 years or until Turkey's accession to the EU (Christophorou, 2009). The Annan Plan was a second attempt that offer compromise based on a power sharing arrangement similar to London-Zurich Agreements. According to the plan, both Turkish and Greek side would have

the right to station maximum of 6000 military personnel. The territory of Cyprus would be divided into two with a clear boundary separating the Turkish side and the Greek side (Sozen & Ozersay, 2007).

Failure of the Annan Plan

The referendum in 2004 posed a significant challenge for both communities in Cyprus. Three decades following the Greek military coup and Turkish invasion, substantial transformations occurred in the political landscapes compared to 1974. Any proposed resolution would face limitations in altering the situation at the time (Christophorou, 2009). The Annan Plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriots in the voting with the claim that the plan was only meeting the Turkish demands (Michael, 2009). This rejection demonstrated the inability of the UN to have control over EU, which decided to admit the Greek controlled side of the Cyprus to the EU before a compromise was found between the two communities in Cyprus. With the admission of the Greek Cypriots to the EU, the Annan Plan became less attractive and therefore even easier to refuse (McGarry & Neophytos, 2021). The rejection of the plan by the Greek Cypriots was also interpreted as the UN's closer stance towards Turkey and Turkish Cypriots by some (Moulakis, 2007). Afterwards of the plan's rejection, the Greek Cypriots were admitted to the European Union and the island remained as divided into two sides (Michael, 2009). The Annan Plan's failure was a disappointment for the UN and the EU but also to NATO, as the alliance would have wanted to end the rooted dispute between its two strategic members that would strengthen the cohesion within NATO (Moulakis, 2007). The rejection of the Annan plan and the inability of UNFICYP to achieve a long-lasting peace demonstrate the complexity of the international mediation to Cyprus. As

detailed as the Annan plan was, the power sharing arrangement and the federal system proposed were not sufficient in convincing the two sides with strong territorial claims and eventually led to a lack of consensus. The Annan Plan's failure impacted the UN's strategy within the mediation process in following years in a way that the UN would have less imposition on Greece and Turkey but rather offer consultancy based on the advice of various international organizations (McGarry & Neophytos, 2021).

Overall, as unbiased mediator, the UN has faced various challenges in its mediation attempts to Cyprus. The struggle was to manage the conflicting interests of disputants and the mediators. The initial unwillingness of the US to internationalize the problem outside of NATO also contributed to these challenges. Therefore, even though the UN's involvement in the mediation process of Cyprus can be considered as impartial were challenges other than being biased which have challenged the efficiency of the UN's mediation efforts and international intervention.

MAJOR POWERS AS MEDIATORS: THE ROLE OF THE US

The major powers have the capacity and interest to mediate conflict between minor powers. A major power can therefore restrict the actions of minor states in order to contribute to international stability and foster peaceful relations between the conflicting parties (Bayer, 2024). Major powers especially in defense pacts are more likely to mediate intra alliance conflicts compared to allies considered as minor powers (Owziak & Frazier, 2014). Powerful

states often engage in mediation in order to influence the conflict based on their own interests (Bercovitch & Rubin, 1992).

The involvement and the mediator role of the US to the Cyprus conflict as a superpower can be examined through various alliance management and mediation theories. This part of the thesis will elaborate on the ways in which the United States balanced threats through NATO while steering the course of Cyprus conflict between Turkey and Greece. The concepts of alliance management that will be discussed in conjunction with the Cyprus conflict include Patron-Client states, fear of abandonment, alliance asymmetry and the security dilemma. This chapter will seek to answer one particular research question that this thesis focuses on, which is whether the US as a major power was able to contribute to peaceful relations between Turkey and Greece in the context of Cyprus conflict. This section will therefore delve into the mediator role of the US and how it managed the dynamic between the two allies.

Although the UN and the US had the same purpose of resolving the conflict in Cyprus and reaching a compromise between Turkey and Greece, they were not able to coordinate in their mediation efforts, which paved the way for a failed mediation process. While the UN and the appointed mediators like Galo Plaza repeatedly stressed the importance of the unity of the two communities in Cyprus, the US stance was mostly in favour of partition of the island by one particular side. Furthermore, to avoid the internalization of the issue, which would put NATO in a vulnerable position, the US frequently tried to prevent the involvement of the UN. In this sense, despite its crucial position in the bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece, the US perceived the Cyprus conflict as a regional problem and a potential disruption

to NATO, therefore; the origins of the conflict also at the local level were perpetually dismissed in the US attempts to mediate. Had the UN and the US work together, the political pressure by the US along with the unbiased mediator role of the UN could complement each other which then could create a more efficient political atmosphere to conduct a mediation with tangible and long-lasting outcomes between both disputants (Amaral, 2013). Similarly, Gelpi (1999) claims that within alliances, more powerful allies utilize mediation as a tool for oppressing their allies (Gelpi, 1999). In line with Gelpi (1999)'s argument, Amaral (2013) argues that for powerful states, mediation to other conflicts is a part of the foreign policy. (Amaral, 2013). This strategic approach is evident in the US actions with Greece and Turkey, where mediation attempts aimed to maintain proximity between the two nations to counter potential Soviet influence in the Mediterranean.

Even though there is a consensus that the powerful states hold a certain amount of bargaining power over their less powerful allies, the extent of that bargaining power might depend on a few variables. For instance, the conflicting parties' willingness to find a compromise has an impact on the effectiveness of a major power as a mediator. Side benefits that might be offered by the major power to her allies might be appealing to the conflicting parties. On the other hand, the level of credibility of the mediator also can be an important determinant on the success of the mediation led by a major power (Guney, 2004).

According to Wong (2018), patron state's strategy over its client states is determined by the amount of bargaining power that the client states have. Based on client states' bargaining power, the patron state might decide to improve their relationship with client states. Client states' bargaining power over the patron state also might have an impact on the relations between the patron state and an adversary state to a client state (Wong, 2018). This theory

can be applied to the US approach to Turkey and Greece. In the case of Cyprus conflict, the importance of the shared alliance with Turkey and Greece for the US conveyed a certain amount of bargaining power to the client states. Therefore, the US had to seek both disputants' interest when making foreign policy decisions. The fact that the US tried to balance its bilateral relations with both Turkey and Greece during the conflict as well as the crisis episodes also complies with Wong (2018)'s theory that the patron states shape their relations with an adversary to the client states based on their bargaining power. Wong (2018) also theorizes that the amount of bargaining power a client state has depends on the availability of another patron state to ally with. In order to keep the client states on her side, the patron state has to provide assurance and political support. Indeed, the US avoided completely ignoring the interests of both Turkey and Greece thanks to the existence of the Soviet Union as another superpower as an adversary to the US during Cyprus conflict. The mediation process of the Cyprus conflict therefore exemplifies how can client states influence the alliance behavior of a patron state.

The patron-client dynamic that can be observed in the triangle between the US, Turkey and Greece also leads to an alliance security dilemma. Particularly from the mediation processes that took place during the crisis episodes in Cyprus, it can be inferred that Greece and Turkey have tried to side with the US while pursuing their own agendas in Cyprus. The exception to this argument might be when Greece withdrew the military sources from NATO in 1974, as a reaction to the passive stance of the US towards Turkey's action. Besides this incident, the fact that Turkey and Greece mostly align with the interests of the US demonstrate a fear of abandonment, which is experienced by smaller states against the major powers. On the other hand, from the mediation efforts of the US, it is evident that there was a struggle in finding a

balance between satisfying both allies without damaging the intra-alliance dynamics of NATO. The formal alliance that the US has with Turkey and Greece also exemplifies an asymmetric one, as the US is significantly more powerful than Greece and Turkey. In this sense, since there is an alliance asymmetry, these states are more prone to experience alliance security dilemma.

An aspect of mediation that was covered in the theoretical framework section is the effectiveness of a biased or an unbiased mediator. As covered in the literature review, there is not a clear consensus on whether an effective mediator should be biased towards one disputant. Some scholars argue that in order to build trust, the mediator should be impartial and only aim towards the resolution of the issue. (Kydd, 2006; Stam & Smith, 2003) On the other hand, other scholars agree that if a mediator is biased towards one side, it will be easier for the mediator to convince the disputant to compromise or make concessions as the disputant would know that the mediator would sincerely be seeking their common interest (Savun, 2008). When mediators are very committed to finding a compromise between the two disputants, the cost of such achievement as well as the interests of the disputants might be overshadowed. Owsiak and Frazier (2014) classify this type of mediator as unbiased. However, impartiality might not be the most convincing image for a mediator, as the disputant can then perceive the mediator as dismissive of their interests out of a negotiation or a peace agreement. This perception can negatively impact the trust that mediator builds with the disputants (Owsiak & Frazier, 2014). In the literature, however, bias is often perceived as siding closer to one disputant and having common interests. Therefore, if a mediator is indifferent to the interests of both disputants, then the mediation is defined as unbiased (Kydd, 2006). In the case of Cyprus conflict, however, the US cannot exactly be

classified as a biased mediator based on these definitions, as the throughout the conflict, the US did not consistently support either Turkish or Greek side. Instead, the US tried to stabilize the conflict particularly in the crises episodes by trying to stay close to both sides. An example of the US efforts to avert a potential war is the presence of a US fleet in the Mediterranean, between Greece and Turkey, purpose of which is to prevent a possible attack from the sea either by Turkish or Greek side (Hitchens, 1997). The most applicable theory of mediator bias to the US is put forward by Stam and Smith (2003). Contrary to Kydd (2006), Stam and Smith (2003) define a third type of mediator bias in their study. Mediators' purpose might solely be to end or prevent a conflict between the disputants rather than supporting one side. Therefore, some mediators can also be considered as being 'biased towards peace'. In other words, when mediators do not deal with the issue at stake and but instead try to avert war, their bias is not towards one side of the conflict, but towards peace (Stam & Smith, 2003). Avoiding the war between the two allies is chosen by the mediator ally also because diplomatic intervention in the form of the mediation would be less costly compared to military intervention to a war (Owsiak & Frazier, 2014). However, given that a mediator is only concerned about the possibility of the war but dismissive of the interest of the disputants, the disputants do not perceive the mediator as a credible, which makes the mediator ineffective during the mediation process (Stam & Smith, 2003). In the case of Cyprus conflict, the US stance can be interpreted as being a dual-biased mediator thanks to the alliance tie shared by both disputants, Greece and Turkey.

The disputants' trust in the impartiality of the mediator is another factor that impacts the success of the mediation. As the Cyprus conflict is a long-term and an unresolved conflict, the two disputants have a rooted mistrust in each other (Amaral, 2013). Kydd (2006) argues

that there are certain characteristics for a mediator to be trustworthy in disputants' perception. If the focus of the mediator is not to resolve the issue between the disputants but solely to prevent the conflict from escalating, disputants won't fully trust the intentions of the mediator, which will decrease the effectiveness of the mediation (Kydd, 2006; Stan & Smith, 2003). This argument is valid for the US mediation to Cyprus. As the US was solely concerned with preventing a possible war between Turkey and Greece, the disputants were not able to fully trust that the US sought the interests of them. However, despite the extent and the nature of bias, various scholars seem to agree that the mediator bias negatively impact the mediator's credibility from the perception of disputants. According to Kydd (2006), an effective mediator should care about the issue at stake and the outcome of the mediation, rather than being too concerned with the possibility of a war (Kydd, 2006). This mistrust, in the end, makes it more challenging for the mediator to convince the disputants to compromise.

Throughout the US intervention to the Cyprus conflict, the US intention was to maintain good diplomatic relations with both conflicting sides to protect the internal strength of NATO. Therefore, the mediation actions taken by the US can be considered to aimed towards preserving the image of NATO against the Soviet Union through seemingly good diplomatic relations between NATO members but not for the purpose of searching for a compromise that would in the long term create a secure community within Cyprus and diminish the rooted hostility between Greece and Turkey. The Cyprus crisis that broke out with 1964 Turkish intervention to Cyprus was seen as a challenge for the US mediation to the conflict. There are two ways to measure if the mediation was successful at the time. The fact that the intervention did not turn out to be a war thanks to Johnson Letter pressuring Turkey to stop

the actions and forbidding the use of any US-backed military support might mean that the mediation was successful (Guney, 2004). Another component of the US mediation of 1964 is the successfully applied pressure to Turkey, forcing it to stop the intervention. Turkey, in the end, complied with the directions coming from the US and terminated the actions in Cyprus. This act of mediation by the US to Cyprus is in line with Gelpi (1999)'s argument claiming that the powerful allies can utilize mediation as a way of influencing actions of the less powerful allies in their favor (Gelpi, 1999). On the other hand, this mediation attempt by the US certainly did not stop the ongoing conflict but only prevented the actions of Turkey from turning into a war involving the two NATO allies.

When another crisis broke out in 1967, the US was more hesitant to apply harsh pressure on Turkey due to the fear that Turkey then would get closer to the Soviet Union. Instead, the US opted for a diplomatic collaboration with Turkey that would not completely dismiss the aspirations of the Turkish government (Adams & Cotrell, 1968). The efforts to have a diplomatic compromise rather than dictating a request proves that no matter how powerful an ally is, the cooperation of the smaller allies is still valued. The main concern of the US regarding a possible Turkish-Soviet closeness is also a reflection of a superpower fear that prevents a powerful political actor from completely ignoring the political stance of its allies. Therefore, during the crisis of 1974, the US influence on was rather limited Turkey after its limitations imposed in Turkey's 1964 intervention to Cyprus (Guney, 2004).

Conclusion

As a superpower and a NATO ally, role of the US was quite influential on the bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece due to her mediator role and political interest in the conflict. The three mediation attempts by the US to Cyprus particularly in 1964, 1967 and 1974 demonstrate that the US mostly got involved in Turkey and Greece's bilateral relationship to preserve the stability in the region and NATO's internal cohesion, especially during crises episodes in the region. These three crises between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus also reveal that the mediation was utilized as a foreign policy instrument by the US (Guney, 2004). This argument is consisted with the theories of various scholars such as Although the US was not able to resolve the ongoing conflict, the mediation was successful in deescalating the conflict particularly when the violent crises broke out (Amaral, 2013). This argument is only valid if the mediation success is defined as preventing the war between disputants.

The US involvement also validates the hypothesis of Owziak and Frazier (2014), who argue that for a state to intervene in allies' conflict, there must be a foreign policy interest of the mediator (Owziak & Frazier, 2014). From the evaluation of the mediation efforts of the US particularly in 1964, 1967 and 1974, it can be inferred that the US had two main motives. The first one was to prevent an outbreak of a war between Turkey and Greece, which would ultimately damage the entirety of NATO and would weaken the alliance against the Soviet Union. It is also evident that the US purposefully kept its mediation efforts rather diplomatic with Turkey and Greece to prevent both sides from developing close relations with the Soviet Union. Overall, it can be inferred from the mediation attempts of the US that the efforts to keep NATO together and stabilizing the region against the Soviet Union's threat was the

main purpose and a compromise between the two disputants that would put an end to the rooted ethnic conflict in Cyprus was overshadowed. Therefore, it can be argued that the regional and global interests of the US was driving force that ultimately shaped its role as a mediator and consequently the impact on the bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece. While the US is often classified as being unbiased in the literature in the mediation process of Cyprus conflict, the apparent intention of the US to avert the war between Turkey and Greece by all means makes the US as a biased mediator towards peace.

The mediation efforts of the US and the outcome aligns with some hypotheses and does not align with others. For instance, Kydd (2003) claims that mediation is more likely to become successful if mediator is biased towards one side. Owziak and Frazier (2014) finds that a mediator who is biased towards one disputant is less likely to become successful. In these studies, bias is defined as sharing an alliance with one or both of the conflicting states. Therefore, the cases where the mediator shares an alliance with both sides but leans closer to the preferences of one particular side was ignored. Based on the classifications of Owziak and Frazier (2014) and Kydd (2003), the US would be considered as being biased towards both sides. However, from the mediation attempts and the main motives evaluated in this section reveals that in the case of Cyprus conflict, the US was not biased towards one disputant but tried to stay close to both for the sake of avoiding the war by all means. This style of mediation most closely corresponds with the arguments of Stam and Smith (2003), who introduces a new category of bias, which is being biased towards peace. Even though the US as a superpower had the leverage to influence the actions of its allies, the interests of Turkey and Greece was impactful in how the US chose to conduct the mediation. However, given that the mediation success is defined as resolving a conflict between the two disputants

which ends the hostile relations, the findings suggest that despite being the most influential political actor during the Cyprus conflict, the US was not successful in mediating the dispute between Turkey and Greece throughout the years.

CONCLUSION AND FINDINGS

Although the studies on bias in mediation reveal significant findings in different contexts in terms of alliance dynamics, bias was frequently considered as one sided. In this sense, the theories were based on the cases where mediator was allied to only one disputant in the conflict. The success of the mediation when mediator is tied to both disputants through a shared alliance has not been the focus in the context of bias. This thesis attempts to address the complexity of mediation and mediator bias in situations of an intra-alliance conflict mediated by another alliance member. In this thesis, the case of Cyprus conflict between Turkey and Greece was analysed as an intra-alliance conflict within NATO. The various hypotheses and arguments addressed in the theoretical framework section are applicable to the mediation attempts to the Cyprus conflict. One important study that very closely align with this thesis is Owziak and Frazier (2014) argue that only when a state has alliance ties to both disputants, there is a statistically significant effect on likelihood of an ally mediating an inter-alliance conflict. This finding is valid for both the US, who is a NATO ally to both disputants, and valid for the UK who was a guarantor power alongside Greece and Turkey besides being a NATO ally. In this sense, both the US and the UK validates Owziak and Frazier (2014)'s finding that a state with alliance ties to both disputants are indeed more likely to mediate.

The involvement of the US and the UK suggest that both countries were in favour of a stable relationship between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus for different reasons. The analysis of the US involvement to Cyprus conflict demonstrates that the US concern over NATO's internal dynamic has been the priority. The primary reason for this concern was to counter the influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. The US has frequently made an effort to stabilize the conflict primarily in the crisis episodes and discouraged both parties to take action against each other, which would further contribute to the intensification of the conflict and destabilize NATO. In the literature, the UN's attempts to mediate the conflict as an objective actor is considered both efficient and inefficient from different point of views. While the mediation attempts of the UN prevented violation to escalate, the efforts to find a compromise that would satisfy both conflicting sides considered to have failed. The mediation attempts of the UN in this regard was inefficient due to its inability offer direct incentives to Turkey and Greece which would create a long-lasting compromise (McGarry & Loizides, 2021).

While this thesis examined the overview of of the Cyprus conflict and the mediation attempts between 1960-1974 period, for better understanding of the current state of the conflict, it is also important to acknowledge that there have been various mediation attempts that followed to resolve the ongoing conflict after 1974, all of which were impacted by the international landscape and domestic dynamics of the countries involved.

Turkey's evolving domestic politics in the post 1974 period was one of the aspects that shaped the Turkish view on Cyprus conflict and the solutions proposed. The shift in the foreign policy can be observed through the Turkish government's increased willingness to

resolve the ongoing conflict and a visible more moderate approach to the proposals for compromise, such as the Annan Plan. However, Turkey's moderate stance in the foreign policy was encountered with obstacles from the Greek side, mainly due to EU membership of Greece as of 1981, which enabled Greece to influence the EU policies on Cyprus and the ongoing conflict. The EU membership of Greece was also influential in country's decision to reject the Annan Plan of 2002, as the country had now more leverage not to make as many concessions. Later, the admission of Cyprus to the EU further complicated the conflict, leading to resentments in Turkey whose membership status had been pending (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009).

By its peacekeeping presence, the UN has been able to calm the violence and keep the island relatively stable since 1974. However, this achievement has neither addressed the root causes of the conflict nor has encouraged a dialogue and understanding between the two communities in Cyprus. Some of the UN-proposed solutions included carrying out diplomatic talks from 1974 to 1977 between Turkey and Greece concerning a federal arrangement over Cyprus, which was not implemented thanks to the disagreements on the proposed shared governance (Yılmaz, 2010). The failed talks were followed by various other attempts at reconciliation, such as the 1992 Set of Ideas put forward by UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali which focused on tackling the disagreements over sovereignty and constitutional issues. However, the proposals in different areas were rejected by both sides due to the persisting disagreements over the key issues (Bolukbasi, 1995). Similarly, the Annan Plan of 2002 put forward by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was also rejected by the Greek Cypriots over the dissatisfaction of existing military presence of Turkey in the

island, because of which the plan was perceived as biased towards Turkey by Greeks (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

Overall, the Cyprus conflict was relatively stable in terms of the level of violence compared to 1974 and beforehand. The efforts of the UN in its more recent attempts were aimed at reaching a compromise on a federal structure and shared governance of the island, however, these proposals to find a common solution did not yield to desired outcomes. This can be attributed to the significant international developments such as the EU membership of Greece and Cyprus, all of which had an impact on the foreign policy approach of Turkey and provoked nationalist tendencies within country that ultimately had a negative impact on the country's once modest approach to resolve the Cyprus conflict.

Through the analysis of mediation attempts to Cyprus conflict, which has been considered as unresolved up to date, this thesis focused on the impact of mediator's bias when there is a shared alliance with both conflicting sides. Despite the mediation attempts influenced by the alliance dynamics with mediators, the bilateral relationship of Turkey and Greece did not experience the desired improvement. The analyses demonstrate that alliance bias can complicate the mediation process and prioritizing the interest of the alliance can overshadow the issue at stake, which makes it challenging to address the roots of the conflict that would ultimately lead to its resolution. This thesis therefore concludes that the mediation to Cyprus conflict was profoundly impacted by the alliance ties between the disputants (Turkey and Greece) and the mediators (the UK and the US) through NATO. And London-Zurich treaties (The UK, Turkey and Greece). This thesis therefore conducts an analysis of a case where a mediation process was influenced by overlapping alliances, which resulted in a distrust

among disputants to the mediation process and the mediators, and ultimately did not yield to desired outcomes.

LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

This thesis focuses on alliance management and mediation through focusing on one conflict, which is the Cyprus conflict between Turkey and Greece. Cyprus conflict historically involved various biased and unbiased political actors that had an impact on the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey. The choice to focus on the bilateral relations of Turkey and Greece as guarantor powers set by the London-Zurich agreements and the involvement of the US in the Cyprus conflict as a NATO ally to both guarantor powers allow this thesis to elaborate on various concepts in international relations such as the theories of alliance management, mediation as well as effectiveness of a superpower as a mediator. Perception of the US as a biased mediator towards both sides or based on Stam and Smith (2003)'s classification, towards peace, also makes this thesis unique, as previous works did not focus on the dual-bias that the US had towards Turkey and Greece but rather focused on why the mediation failed. The alliance that has been the focus of this thesis was selected from the ATOP dataset, which only includes the classification of formal alliances that are in the form of written agreements. Therefore, informal alliances were ignored while selecting the case.


The fact that this study is concerned with an ongoing contemporary conflict makes it relevant and timely research for present day that can spark other important questions for political scientists and pave the way for useful findings. The historical focus on one conflict and

evaluation of it based on the existing theories provide an in-depth analysis and the political behaviours of the actors involved. The examination of the Cyprus conflict by applying the theories of alliance management and the third-party involvements provide a solid understanding of the alliance dynamics in the region as well as the impact on the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey. While conducting an analysis through focusing on the role of bias in mediation and alliances, thesis also offers a detailed theoretical framework section that elaborates on alliance management and mediation as a third-party involvement, which are two concepts usually discussed separately.

On the other hand, this thesis comes with certain limitations. As the focus is on a single conflict for elaborating on alliance management and mediation, it might be challenging to generalize the findings and apply to other cases of conflict. Cyprus conflict is a historically complex and unresolved conflict that has involved various political actors. Evaluation of this conflict based on two theoretical frameworks and the focus on the role of superpowers can undermine the complexity of the conflict and lead to oversimplification. Another limitation is regarding the single region focus of this study, which is Middle East and the relevant political actors. Historical complexity of a conflict and the involvement of different actors in a region are other challenges to the applicability of this study's findings. This thesis also elaborates on the superpower involvement and its impact on the Cyprus conflict through mediation and alliance management. Although the Cyprus conflict historically involved two superpowers which are the US and the Soviet Union, the discussion puts more emphasis on the role of the US considering the membership to NATO and alliance ties to Greece and Turkey.

This thesis derives from the theory that defense pacts have the most statistically significantly effect on the way the mediation is conducted and the success of the mediation. However, as argued by Owziak and Frazier (2014) not all defense pacts come with the same level of commitment among their members, and the effect of an alliance tie in the form of a defense pact is most significantly observed in alliances with deep level of commitment (Owziak & Frazier, 2014). As NATO is considered as one of the most important military alliances, the level of commitment of its members would expected to be more substantial compared to some other defense pacts. The further research can dwell upon the differing levels of commitment measured by the amendments in the pact, and effectiveness of the mediator in each intra-alliance conflict. Therefore, the alliance management of the Soviet Union and the involvement in the mediation process is not covered. While a detailed analysis on the involvement of the US as a superpower to the Cyprus conflict from the perspective of alliance management is provided, this research could be further extended comparatively by delving into the alliance management strategies utilized by the Soviet Union and the impact on the allied states. Comparison of the political behaviours of the US and the Soviet Union can provide a better understanding of superpowers' alliance management patterns and therefore be more generalizable. The comparison of the US's alliance management strategies in various alliances can also provide a better understanding of a superpower's role as a patron state and how other allies are being managed comparatively. Another comparative study can be regarding the mediation patterns of allies in different types of alliances. Although defense pacts are accepted as having the most significant effect on likelihood of mediation and third-party involvement, research that conducts a comparison between alliances that have different obligations can also lead to useful findings as to why this is the case.

This thesis presents an in-depth analysis on the Cyprus conflict, bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece and the impact of the US as a superpower, this research can be further developed by doing a case comparison with other formal alliances classified by the ATOP dataset, which would lead to more generalizable findings for alliance studies. Overall, this thesis delves into a complex puzzle, shedding light on the role of bias in mediation particularly in a defense pact along with how alliance management behaviours of the mediators unfold during the mediation process between the allies.



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Table: Turkey's Alliances from 1923 based on the classification of Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset, Retrieved from <http://atop.rice.edu/data>.

Members	Defense Pact	Signed during war	Termination Date	Cause of Termination
Turkey,USSR	No	No	1945	USSR denounces and asks for territorial concessions
Turkey,Persia	No	No	1928	Replaced by phase 2 of this alliance
Turkey,Persia v.2	No	No	1937	Replaced by new alliance – Saadabad Pact
Turkey, Afghanistan	No	No	1948	Expiration
Turkey, Italy	No	No	1935	Turkey participates in sanctions against Italy
Turkey, Hungary	No	No	1945	Hungary surrenders to United Nations
Turkey, Bulgaria	No	No	1939	Expiration
Turkey, France	No	No	1940	France surrenders to Germany
Turkey, Greece	No	No	1941	Greece loses independence in WW2
Turkey, Romania	No	No	1944	Russian occupation of Romania
Turkey, Yugoslavia	No	No	1941	Yugoslavia loses independence in WWII.
Turkey, Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia	Defense/Consultation Pact	No	1940	Italy invades Greece through Albania – signatories do not aid Greece
Turkey, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran	No	No	1955	Replaced by the Baghdad Pact

Turkey, United Kingdom, USSR, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Greece, Romania	Yes	No	1939	End of Spanish Civil War
Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece	No	No	1940	Bulgaria demands territorial cessions from Romania
Turkey, France	Defense/Consultation/Offense Pact	No	1939	Replaced by new alliance – British – France – Turkish Alliance
Turkey, France, United Kingdom	Defense/Consultation/Neutrality/Offense Pact	Yes	1940 – France, 1945 – Britain and Turkey	France signs armistice with Germany, effectively surrendering. The alliance continues for UK and Turkey until the end of WWII.
Turkey, Germany	No	Yes	1945	Germany was divided at the end of the WWII.
Turkey, US, UK, Russia, China, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti...	Defense/Offense Pact	Yes	1945	End of WWII.
Turkey, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, West Germany, Spain, Czech Republic, Hungary...	Defense Pact	No (Korean War for GR and TR)	Still in effect	
Turkey, Philippines	No	No	Still in effect	
Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece	No	Yes (Korean War)	1954	Replaced by new treaty for this alliance – phase 2

Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece v.2	Yes	No	1964	The alliance was nullified by Greek-Turkish rivalry over Cyprus
Turkey, Pakistan	No	No	1955	Superseded by Baghdad Pact (CENTO)
Turkey, UK, Egypt	No	No	1956	Egypt announced abrogation. UK was involved in military conflict with Egypt following Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal.
Turkey, Iraq, UK, Pakistan, Iran	No	No	1959-Iraq, 1979-Pakistan and Iran, 1979-UK and Turkey	Iraq and Iran withdraws following changes in governments, Pakistan claims CENTO has "lost relevance".
Turkey, US	Defense/Consultation Pact	No	Still in effect	
Turkey, Greece, Cyprus	Defense/Consultation Pact	No	1964	Unilaterally denounced by President of Cyprus as a result of inter-communal violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

				Military Coup and Invasion by Turkey. Alliance broken by national guard military coup in Cyprus that wanted to unify with Greece (in direct opposition to the treaty's provisions). Turkey then invades and eventually takes control over 1/3 of island.
Turkey, Cyprus	UK, Greece, Defense/Consultation Pact	No	1974	
Turkey & Signatories of Helsinki Final Act	No	No (Except for Azerbaijan)	Still in effect (East Germany, West Germany and Czechoslovakia are replaced by successor states. Yugoslavia's membership was suspended in May 1992)	
Turkey (not a permanent member) & Signatories of ASEAN	No	No	Still in effect	
Turkey, Romania	No	No	Still in effect	
Turkey, Ukraine	No	No	Still in effect	
Turkey, Bulgaria	No	No	Still in effect	
Turkey, Russia	No	No	Still in effect	
Turkey, Albania	No	No	Still in effect	
Turkey, Poland	No	No	Still in effect	

		Yes (First Nagorno- Karabakh War for Azerbaijan)	
Turkey, Azerbaijan	Yes		Still in effect
Turkey, Moldova	No	No	Still in effect
Turkey, Croatia	No	No	Still in effect
Turkey, Hungary	No	No	Still in effect
Turkey, Albania	No	No	Still in effect
Turkey, Azerbaijan	Defense/Consultation/Non-aggression	No	Still in effect