

**LACK OF CONCERTED ACTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION'S
FOREIGN POLICY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION'S PRESENCE IN THE LIBYAN AND SYRIAN
CRISES**

by
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ABSTRACT

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The European Union has come a long way since the Maastricht Treaty, which adopted the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Throughout the years, having a coherent foreign and security policy has always been a challenge that the Union faces, which first became evident in the Union's presence during the stabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Lisbon Treaty has been adopted to address to the problems with regards to the weakness in the Union's ability to speak with one voice in foreign and security related issues. However, the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP has often trumped the efforts to have a coherent foreign policy making by reducing the Union's chance of formulating a common strategy in related fields, which is mostly linked to diverging interests among the member states of the Union. The more preferences of the member states differ, the less likely the Union presents itself as a strong and active security actor at the international level. The arc of instability that erupted in Libya and Syria in 2011 has been a litmus test for the Union to reveal its capabilities as a security actor following the Lisbon Treaty. The thesis will examine how the diverging member state preferences play a huge role in shaping the EU's response to these crises and in evaluating the Union's weight as a strong international security actor.

ÖZET

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ DIŞ POLİTİKASINDA UYUMLU EYLEM EKSİKLİĞİ: AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NİN LIBYA VE SURİYE ÇATIŞMALARINDAKİ VARLIĞININ KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ

NAZLI ECE ASLAN

AVRUPA ÇALIŞMALARI YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, AĞUSTOS 2020

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Meltem Müftüler Baç

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Libya Çatışması, Suriye Çatışması, Dış
Politika, Güvenlik Politikası

Avrupa Birliği, Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası'nı oluşturan Maastricht Antlaşması'ndan bu yana uzun bir yol katetmiştir. İlk olarak Birliğin Bosna Hersek'in istikrar kazanma sürecinde bölgedeki varlığıyla gün yüzüne çıkan 'tutarlı bir dış ve güvenlik politikasına sahip olmak' unsuru Avrupa Birliği'nin her zaman karşı karşıya kaldığı bir sorun haline gelmiştir. Lizbon Antlaşması, Birliğin dış ve güvenlik politikasıyla ilgili konularda tek ses olma becerisindeki zayıflığa ilişkin sorunları ele almak için yürürlüğe girmiştir. Ne var ki, Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası'nın Hükümetlerarası yapısı çoğunlukla üye devletler arasında birbirleriyle çakışan çıkarlara bağlı olarak Birliğin ilgili alanlarda ortak bir strateji oluşturma ihtimalini azaltarak tutarlı bir dış politikaya sahip olma çabalarının önüne geçmiştir. Üye devletlerin tercihlerindeki farklılık ne kadar artarsa, Avrupa Birliği'nin kendisini uluslararası düzeyde güçlü ve aktif bir güvenlik aktörü olarak gösterebilme ihtimali de o kadar azalmaktadır. 2011'de Libya ve Suriye'de patlak veren istikrarsızlık arkı, Lizbon Antlaşması'nın ardından Birliğin bir güvenlik aktörü olarak yapabileceklerini ortaya koyması için önemli bir sınav olmuştur. Bu tezde, çatışan üye devlet tercihlerinin AB'nin bu çatışmalara tepkisini şekillendirmek ve Birliğin güçlü bir uluslararası güvenlik aktörü olarak ağırlığını ölçmekte nasıl büyük bir rol aldığı incelenmektedir.

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To my beloved family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina	4
CAP Common Agricultural Policy	7
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy	2
CSDP Common Security and Defense Policy	2
EC European Community	2
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community	1
EDC European Defense Community	11
EEC European Economic Community	7
EPC European Political Cooperation	13
ESDP European Security and Defense Policy	15
EU European Union	1
EUFOR European Union Force	4
EUPM European Union Police Mission	4
EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community	2
EUSR European Union Special Representative	25
G20 Group of Twenty	57
GNA Government of National Accord	47
HR High Representative	5
HR/VP High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission	17

ICC International Criminal Court	38
IPTF International Police Task Force.....	23
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria	59
LAAF Libyan Arab Armed Forces.....	47
MEP Member of the European Parliament	40
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization.....	10
NFZ No Fly Zone	36
NTC National Transitional Council.....	39
OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs...	46
OHR Office of High Representative.....	31
OUP Operation Unified Protector	45
PT Planning Team	26
SEA Single European Act	13
SFOR Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina	27
SNC Syrian National Council.....	55
TEU Treaty of the European Union	15
UK United Kingdom	4
UN United Nations.....	24
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council	38
UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	24
UNSC United Nations Security Council	37
US United States	1
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	12
WEU Western European Union	12

1. INTRODUCTION

Throughout the years, the European Union's (EU) foreign and security policy has been subject to many criticisms. "Europe was an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm" Mark Eyskens, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, famously reported that in 1991 (ECFR 2018). Similarly, John Peterson notably argued that "America fights the wars, Europe does the dishes" (Peterson 2001). In terms of the economic integration and power of the Union, however, there was not much to be criticized. It is apparent that the EU has come to a point where its economic power is one of the largest in the world. Given the terrible impacts and destruction of Second World War on the European continent, Europe being an economic giant now is a success story on its own right. The war resulted in killing many people in Europe, causing a great economic damage since the industry, infrastructure and housing were destroyed. Therefore, many Europeans had to depend on humanitarian aid to survive.

In the mid 1940s, a fateful question resonated in the Europeans' minds: How can Europe avoid another war and be reconstructed in economic and political terms? In 1947, as a response to the disastrous economic situation in Europe, George Marshall, the United States (US) Secretary of State at that time, declared that the US was willing to provide the Europeans with financial assistance if the Europeans agree on cooperating in a joint program to reconstruct their economy, namely the European Recovery Program. The program was signed by Harry Truman, the US president at that time, in 1948. Meantime, the Europeans started to seek their own solutions for preventing another war. For example, Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister at that time, presented the idea of supranationalism, which required sharing of sovereignty between nations under a High Authority. He came with the proposal of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), underlining that "Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity" (Schuman 1950). According to the proposal, Franco-German production of coal and steel "as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to

the participation of the other countries of Europe” (Schuman 1950). Therefore, it would also make the war between France and Germany materially impossible. After Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy responded the call of Schuman, the group of nations, namely “the six” was created.

In 1955, the Six aimed for a deeper economic integration where they can fuse their economies into a unified place, which was expected to pave the way for an ever-closer union with ‘la finalité politique’ as the end point (Baldwin 2007). In 1957, Treaty of Rome was signed between the Six, which enabled the European Economic Community and a common market to be created in 1958. It was additionally signed in parallel with a second treaty setting up the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) (European Economic Community 1957). With the Six having laid the foundations of the European Community, other countries started to apply for the membership to be a part of the Community, which led the European enlargement process. As pointed out in the initial steps of the economic integration process, the Six managed to be embedded in an economic community under a High Authority, which resulted in success in terms of economy restructuring.

The European Community (EC) has evolved since the Treaty of Rome. It was reconstructed in economic terms and developed in such a manner that it became an “economic giant”. Given the economic challenges derived from post-World War II structure and the journey of the Community starting with the ECSC, these economic challenges were overcome through a series of agreements in which the members of the Community agreed on transferring their sovereignty into a supranational institution. If this was the case for the economic aspect of the integration that ultimately led the EU to be an economic giant, why and how were the “political dwarf” and “military worm” tags be attributed to the Union? Were the challenges imposed on the EU in political and military terms different from those of economic? To be able to answer this question, second pillar of the European Integration, namely, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the challenges that the EU faces under its CFSP and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) should be highlighted.

With the Treaty on the European Union, the Maastricht Treaty, the Common Foreign and Security Policy was adopted in 1992 as an intergovernmental pillar. Following the substantial steps towards an economic integration, the process of being a union gained a political momentum through the adoption of the CFSP, which is an inseparable part of the political integration. The Common Foreign and Security Policy aims to “strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law,

and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” (Maastricht Treaty 1992). Therefore, the second pillar of the European Union revolves around foreign and security policy issues, relying on the initiatives of the member states to a large extent as it is intergovernmental. Although the challenges with which the EU faces have been changing over time, the main obstacles within the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy have remained unchanged so far. For example, a “political dwarf” refers to a different weakness that reveals itself from time to time in the Union’s foreign policy. The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy was never intended to be a fully developed foreign policy tool. After some member states agreed that it could be useful to pursue their external objective in the late 90s, the Union attempted to achieve a more improved and coordinated foreign policy in order to represent the EU better under its CFSP/CSDP framework. However, both the ‘common’ foreign and security policy and the security and defense policy point out a different level of the unity from the other common policies of the Union. The main reason is that there is no sovereignty delegation in this area from the members states to the EU level, which does not enable the EU to have exclusive competencies. In this regard, the EU does not possess the capability to pursue any expectation in the face of the different preferences of the EU member states that were shaped at the national level. The clashing interests of the EU’s member states often make it impossible for the EU to take a concerted action as an international actor to respond any international crisis.

On the other hand, being a “military worm” refers to a lack of military capability; however, the actual problem stems from the fact that the European Union has not felt the pressure so much to develop its CFSP/ CSDP in the presence of NATO. Along with the independent foreign and defense policies of the member states and the US, there was not any incentive on the part of the EU member states to delegate their certain amount of the sovereignty unlike they had in many other fields in the European integration. This is one of the fundamental reasons as to why CFSP and CSDP remained a rather weak area of policy integration in the European Union.

The arc of instability as a part of the Arab Spring that grew around the Middle East posed a great challenge to the Union’s CFSP. In this thesis, the Union’s response to the Libyan and Syrian crises will be discussed. The Libyan case demonstrated the difficulty for the EU member states to adopt a common strategy to respond the crisis, which ultimately decreased its potential to have a strong impact on the stability and security in the region. The Syrian case also revealed the difficulty for the member states to agree on a common policy. Therefore, the EU’s role in trying to alleviate the uneasiness in Syria has been criticized for being ‘pitiful’ (Dempsey 2006). Overall, the European Union failed to project a strong presence

in the Libyan and Syrian Crises, partly related to the lack of a policy coherence among its member states. The thesis argues that the EU's relative strength in its foreign and security policy is based on the vertical and horizontal policy coherence; i.e. the EU institutions' ability to formulate a well defined policy response and the convergence of material interests among the member states shape the EU's role in foreign and security related matters.

This thesis relies on the diverging member state preferences as an endogenous factor that shackle the EU's ability to give a collective response to the Libyan and Syrian crises based on the intergovernmentalism theory. Although the decisions are taken unanimously in the EU foreign policy, the result of the bargaining process between the three largest member states (Germany, France and the United Kingdom (UK))¹ shapes the policies in this area. Considering their dominance in the EU, if these three member states agree on acting in common regarding a certain issue, smaller member states do not have enough power to resist (Keukeleire 2001). For this reason, the analysis of the EU member state tendencies on both crises is largely limited to the Big Three: Germany, France and the UK. The thesis is divided into four chapters in order to answer the key question of the thesis effectively.

The first chapter presents Intergovernmentalism as a theoretical explanation of the European Integration and the EU's foreign policy in order to make sense of the difficulty for the Union to adopt a coherent stance with regards to the any decisions related to its CFSP and CSDP. In this respect, neofunctionalism that dominated early years of the European integration process will also be discussed to understand the reasons why intergovernmentalism fills the gaps in the area of political integration that revolves around the member state preferences.

The second chapter explains the evolution of Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union. It also provides the historical background and formulation of the EU's foreign policy. In addition to this, the Union's missions of the European Union Police Mission I (EUPM) and the European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) are evaluated in order to catch a glimpse of how the EU managed to test its first crisis management capabilities under the CSDP.

The third chapter examines the EU's response to the Libyan crisis when it was first erupted in 2011. The Libyan crisis is chosen to illustrate the different preferences of the most significant EU member states and to evaluate the weight of the EU level actions in front of these different perspectives. In this respect, statements of the

¹The UK officially left the EU on 31 January 2020 and currently in a transition period. As this thesis comprises the EU's response before the year of 2020, the UK is mentioned as a member state of the Union.

High Representative and the Council will be provided to assess the EU's response to the crisis. In order to highlight the conflicting interests of the member states mainly Germany, France and the UK, statements of the leaders of these member states at that time will be analyzed.

The last chapter analyzes the EU's presence in the Syrian crisis between the years of 2011-2015. This chapter will provide the diverging interests of the big EU member states in the light of their statements regarding the way as to how they think the crisis should be handled at the EU level. In addition to that, the declarations and statements of the High Representative (HR) and the Council will also be provided in an attempt to understand the EU's response to the crisis.



2. THE INTERGOVERNMENTALIST APPROACH TO THE EUROPEAN UNION'S FOREIGN POLICY

The integration of the European Union has been subject to many theoretical approaches so far. However, there seems to be a consensus on the fact that the Union is characterized as a 'sui generis organization' that went beyond an international organization and obtained state-like elements (Müftüler-Baç 2011). Starting from the ECSC, the member states of the Union have delegated a certain, mostly bigger level of their sovereignty to a supranational authority in the areas in which the economic gains are expected such as commercial and trade policies. As discussed in above paragraphs, in every initial step taken at the economic level of the Community, there was a great incentive for adopting an ever-closer union in political aspects, as well.

2.1 Neofunctionalism: Is It too Optimistic?

Ernst B. Haas as one of the most notable neofunctionalists argues integration is a process 'whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties and activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states' (Haas 1966). The neofunctionalism also rested on the idea of 'rational causation from the economic to political sphere (Jarvis 1994). According to this assumption, the economic integration would finally pave the way for a functional spill-over in the political field. If that were the case, it would have been easier for the Union to carry out the initial economic integration process through a political one. However, in 1965, France demonstrated that it was more complicated than a functional spill-over when Charles De Gaulle, President of France at that time, manifested his opposition to the qualified majority voting procedure and the idea of strengthening of the budgetary power

of the European Commission in line with the funding of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which he believed that was arranged without a consultation of the heads of the member states (Jourdain 2015). As a response, De Gaulle boycotted the Community by withdrawing the representatives of France from the Community, which led the Council to be paralyzed for seven months, known as the empty chair crisis.

The question of “Why had we broken things off?” was raised by de Gaulle himself; then, “Because the Commission claimed an exorbitant role, (which the other member states) seemed ready to concede” explained de Gaulle (Dinan 2014). It was a reflection of the De Gaulle’s vision of the Europe in the sense that intergovernmentalist approaches were necessary to maintain the integration process. For example, in October 1965, John Tuthill, the US ambassador to the Communities at that time, described the crisis and stated that “the present crisis in the European Economic Community (EEC) can only be viewed in the context of de Gaulle’s related objectives. . . . It was a manufactured crisis created for basically political purposes . . . (de Gaulle’s) continuing efforts to reshape Europe to his concepts (Ellison 2006). Accordingly, the crisis was resolved with the Luxembourg compromise, and it was decided that if a member state finds a common proposal detrimental to its self-interest, the member state has the right to veto that proposal. This crisis not only jeopardized the neofunctionalist logic that was highly popular in the field of European integration theory, but it also indicated that ‘the loyalties’ of the member states might not always be attached to ‘a new centre’, the economic integration might not always lead to a political one and member states might as well shape the integration process.

2.2 Intergovernmentalism: Member States Matter

Since the historical case of the empty chair crisis, the notion of ‘Intergovernmentalism’ has been confidently used by the scholars to understand the European Integration. In its basic form, intergovernmentalism highlights the importance of the nation states in the integration process. Favoring the role of the nation states, Intergovernmentalism argues that European integration is driven by the interests and actions of nation states (Hix 1999). In order to apply the intergovernmentalist logic to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, it is important to comprehend the sensitivity in the area of the CFSP/CSDP and see how the member states perceive

the policy in the security and defense realm.

Hoffman famously underlines the dichotomy between ‘low politics’ such as economic and social matters and ‘high politics’ such as security and defense matters. In the areas of economic or social concerns, it is mostly probable for a member state to delegate a certain level of its sovereignty to a supranational authority as it is aware of the fact that the total gain would compensate for its occasional losses since logic of integration prevails in these concerns. However, according to Hoffman, logic of diversity prevails in the high politics, where the member states prefer to have certainty or ‘self-controlled uncertainty’ in the high policy areas, which is extremely important to the national interest and survival of the state (Hoffmann 1966). In this respect, the member states are less willing to transfer their sovereignty to a high authority than they are in the other areas of integration.

For this reason, after the Cold War had ended and the formation of the foreign policy had accelerated, CFSP was adopted as the second pillar of the integration, as an intergovernmental one mostly because the national governments of the member states were not willing to be entitled to adopt a common action in the such delicate areas as security and defense policy under any jurisdiction. The CFSP being intergovernmental also indicated that is not a supranational authority that has the legal power of enforcing a member state to comply with the CFSP (Muftuler-Bac 2008).

The intergovernmentalist approach deliberately privileges the nation states by putting them at the core of the process. In this case, it is reasonable to argue that every nation state is supposed to pursue its own benefit in every decision that is taken at the European level. Since every nation has different history, culture, strategy and their own bilateral relations with the rest of the world, it can be problematic when they try to get united under any kind of project as each of them wants its wishes to prevail at the end (Hoffmann 1966). Moreover, the differences make the interests of the member state inevitable to a large extent to diverge somewhere on the road. As it is underscored that every nation state comes from different backgrounds, one of the biggest impacts of this diversity is on the EU’s ability to develop a common position with regards to its foreign policy.

The ‘new Europe’ dreamed by the Europeans, could not be established by force. Left to the wills and calculations of its members, the new formula has not jelled because they could not agree on its role in this world (Hoffmann 1966).

The challenges with which the EU most likely confronts when it comes to taking

an action in its foreign policy are directly related to the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP. Also, the fact that the CFSP decisions is not binding generates huge limitations in the EU's capabilities in this area. Since the Council as the only institution that has the jurisdiction over CFSP is accountable to nation states, it is more likely for the Union to get paralyzed in the presence of the divergent interests of the member states (Needham 1999). Since the 'wills and calculations' of the member states are strongly associated to the domestic factors at national level, states become the players that have a constant conflict of interests among themselves. Therefore, the way that the intergovernmentalism handles the integration makes the process seem more complex and difficult as the CFSP has largely been subject to a paralysis due to "...the contradictions between the ambitions of EU member governments to play a larger international role and their reluctance to move beyond an intergovernmental framework in doing so according to Hill (Hill 1996).

Apart from the Council, the role of the High Representative is also crucial in terms of the making of the CFSP. However, as the HR does not have a legal political authority over the member states and the absence of an enforcement mechanism for the decisions taken in the realm of the CFSP is evident. Lack of political coherence deriving from the paralysis has a direct impact on the EU's ability to insert a strong position in its foreign and security policy.

3. EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY

POLICY: AN OVERVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S PRESENCE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

As highlighted in the initial steps towards the political integration, cooperation in low politics issues for the European Union has been one of the most successful aspects of the integration. Nonetheless, lack of the foreign policy coordination with external parties poses a great challenge even to an economic integration as it would be incomplete in the absence of foreign policy coordination. Therefore, the members of the European Community considered a necessary level of discussion, deliberation and consultation required, if not a common policy and action adopted in order to have similar positions in foreign policy. Concrete steps were taken by the Community with regards to the integration process during and after the Cold War to that end. This chapter will give an elaborated analysis of the formation of the CFSP/CSDP in addition to the EUPM I and EUFOR Althea that were launched by the EU to evaluate how the Union shapes its operations under its CSDP/CFSP in the presence of the diverging political wills of the member states.

3.1 The Formation of the CFSP/CSDP

The collapse of the Soviet Union serves as a turning point in terms of the Union's security and defense mechanism. While the Soviet Union was posing a threat to the West, the notions of security and defense were something that the community pushed into background after the creation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As a response to the increasing threat from the Soviet Union, US, Canada and Western European states signed the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949. Subsequently, NATO was created as a result of this treaty, sealing America's commitment to provide a security guarantee for its Western European allies (Keukeleire

and Delreux 2014). The fact that the United States was willing to promise for the security in the continent by taking a greater level of responsibility found itself in a dilemma, though. The idea was indeed welcomed to a great extent. What made the suspicions strike was the uneasiness that the French Government felt with regards to German rearmament.

As a result of the risk of unleashing German aggression, the French Government made an attempt for the Community within its defense realm (Ruane 2000). On 24 October 1950, René Pleven, the French Minister at that time, proposed that the rearmament of the West Germany should be carried through a Supranational European Army, which would soon be called as the European Defense Community (EDC). Emphasizing that although Germany was not a part to the Atlantic Pact, it would benefit from the resulting security system, “it is only right for Germany to make its contribution to the defense of Western Europe” he remarked (Pleven 1950). And he went on;

“Any system that led, whether immediately or eventually, directly or not, with or without conditions, to the creation of a German army would give rise to renewed distrust and suspicion (...) We hope that the signature of the coal and steel plan will very soon seal the agreement of the six participating countries, which will give all the peoples of Europe a guarantee that Western European coal and steel industries cannot be used for aggressive purposes (...) It proposes the creation, for the purposes of common defence, of a European army tied to the political institutions of a united Europe ’ (Pleven 1950).

This initiative of Pleven mostly resulted from the success of the European Coal and Steel Community that the French Government witnessed. The idea, nonetheless, was interpreted as France “spinning a cocoon of supranational restraints around West Germany from which it could never escape” (Ruane 2000). As it can be clearly seen in his statement, there was a common distrust on the side of France towards the reestablishment of a German army. Pleven’s proposal for “a European army tied to political institutions of a united Europe” was actually an indication of an intended supranational control mechanism over a potential threat from the Germans. To that end, it is reasonable to claim that German rearmament would be controlled and supervised by a supranational authority under Pleven Plan, which would ultimately keep the German armies from being independent.

In May 1952, the French representative signed the treaty that paved the way for EDC, which was the culmination of the Pleven Plan (Kanter 1970). Then, as a

serious consequence of France's Fourth Republic's incoherent politics, the French National Assembly voted against the French participation in the European Defense Community on 30 August 1954 after it had generated a disunity within the ranks of Atlantic unity (Ruane 2000). French Government's veto to its own proposal was also recognized as a precaution to procrastinate the German's rearmament as far as possible. Despite the fact that Rene Pleven underlined the significance of a common defense through a European Army as a bigger part of his plan, four years of debate over the common European defense did not end up with the necessary contribution to the military defenses in Europe as it had been intended so. In the light of the French veto of EDC, which initially appeared on stage with the help of Rene Pleven, French Minister at that time, an inconsistent approach of the French Government towards the professional military was in evidence. The failure of EDC also revealed the reluctance of the French Government towards putting the French national army at the risk of disappearance, which was associated with Gaullism. For this reason, the unsuccessful attempt of the EDC mostly stemmed from the fears of the French towards losing national sovereignty, rather than the actual risk of the German rearmament. Either way, it was deemed necessary to manage the anti-German sentiments for the sake of the European integration process through a softer version of the EDC. As a result of the increasing risk of the American withdrawal from Europe after the ineffective course of events that ended up with French veto and Russia's attempt to take advantage of the crisis, Britain came to the fore. Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary of Britain at that time, offered an intergovernmental alternative to the EDC (Ruane 2000).

Subsequently, the Brussels Treaty signed in 1948 was amended by the Paris Agreements signed on 23 October 1954. Expressing his pleasure for a happy chapter of Franco-German relations, "I felt we had reason to be satisfied with our work during the preceding months. Germany was now a sovereign partner in the defence of Europe, and the damage to European unity caused by the failure of EDC had been mended" Eden remarked (Eden 1954). Thereby, Western European Union (WEU) was created, soon resulting in the sovereignty of West Germany. The unsuccessful attempt of Rene Pleven to strengthen European defense was later followed by the failure of Fouchet Plan that Charles de Gaulle proposed in 1961. As a result, the Community seemed to accept that NATO remained as the sole protector of the continent in terms of its security and defense affairs, at least in the presence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) threat.

At their 1969 summit meeting that took place in Hague, the member states of the EEC (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany) re-launched the European integration process in changing international and domestic

environment. The heads of state and government of the Six also presented a report called “Luxembourg Report” to the foreign ministers in order to “pursue their study on the best way of achieving progress in the field of political unification”, which the member states agreed to adopt (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014). Also one of the goals of the Report was “to ensure through regular exchanges of information and consultations, a better mutual understanding on the great international problems; to strengthen their solidarity by promoting harmonization of their views, the co-ordination of their positions; and, where it appears possible and desirable, common action” (Allen, Rummel, and Wessels 2013). In this context, the Luxembourg Report can be considered as the first concrete step taken on the road to European Political Cooperation (EPC). To be able to satisfy the need of a harmonization, it was necessary to arrange gatherings with the foreign ministers of the Six to discuss what is going on in the world and where the Community stands. Therefore, biannual meetings were held. Three years after the Luxembourg Report, the heads of state and government adopted the Copenhagen Report in 1973. The Copenhagen Report served as a provision of the Luxembourg Report. The Copenhagen Report both increased the frequency of the meetings and underlined that “each state undertakes as a general rule not to take up final positions without prior consultation with its partners” in the foreign policy questions chosen by the foreign ministers (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014). To this respect, it created some form of a coherent environment to facilitate the prearranged stance of the Community. As the number of the meetings increased, the procedural and behavioral norms were improved incrementally (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014). Then, the London Report was adopted in 1981. Subsequently, the Single European Act (SEA) was adopted in 1986, paving the way for EPC to be anchored legally in the EU Treaty and reaffirming these foreign policy habits to a great extent and avoiding radical changes in this pattern (Dinan 2012).

The ultimate goal of the EPC was to maximize the influence of the Community at the international level by means of a coherent approach and having similar positions in foreign policy. It was based upon intergovernmental adjustments between the Foreign Ministers of the member states. Before taking a decision, a consensus was deemed necessary. Nonetheless, foreign policy coordination was still difficult because it is one of the highest layers of statehood, and it would mean a significant transfer of competency from the nation states, which was mostly avoided by them. Taking the increasing number of the member states and the activities into consideration, it started to become an obstacle as only a small secretariat was serving under the EPC.

The collapse of the USSR led a significant incentive for the Europeans to adopt a more coordinated foreign policy and capabilities. Maastricht Treaty created a new

area for European integration and identified it as Common Foreign and Security Policy, which is a reformulation of EPC. The European Council laid the basis for a political Union with the creation of CFSP as the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty, and the beginning of a common defense policy. The text is signed in February 1992 by 12 countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom), and came into force in November 1993 (Treaty on European Union 1992). Although CFSP was driven by the idea of “a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”, it was never intended to become a fully developed foreign policy tool, as there is no sovereignty delegation in this area from the member states to the EU level (Treaty of Maastricht on European Union 1992). The fact that the member states failed to provide the CFSP with the necessary institutional framework revealed its impotency and disorder at the international level especially after the Yugoslav wars. Although Maastricht Treaty made a reference to the common defense policy, it was the late 1990s when the member states thought that CFSP could be useful to pursue their external adjective. the Europeanists started to argue that US was a player in the global politics after its own interests which might converge with European Union’s normative stance and desires. It led European foreign policy to get paralyzed between ‘European integration versus Atlantic solidarity’ and ‘civilian power versus military power’ (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014).

The Europeanist logic argues that the US can not be the only organization to rely upon for European defense, and therefore Europeans should have their own defensive capabilities. The Atlanticist logic rests on the idea that there is no reason for the Europeans to take any responsibility for their own defense, and NATO is sufficient to do that. The first are of the paralyze was handled through the negotiations that France, Germany and the UK made. The latter was tackled through creating a balance between NATO states and the EU’s neutral states by complementing military with the civilian crisis management tools (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014). In this context, the British government adopted a more pro-European approach under then Prime minister Tony Blair while the French Government was more interested in the cooperation with NATO, as it found the superiority of the American military in Western Balkans as an embarrassing experience. Also, the Kosovo crisis played an important role in terms of leading Germany to have an ambition to start joining in external military operations. As a response to raising questions over Europe’s military dependence on NATO, then Jacques Chirac, the French President at that time, and Tony Blair agreed upon Franco-British St. Malo Declaration in 1998, determining that the EU must have “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up

by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises" (Franco-British St. Malo Declaration 1998). Chirac who long desired a "European defense identity" welcomed the Anglo-French agreement and noted that "to me this is a positive sign for the future, not only for the future for Britain and France, but more widely for the whole of Europe" (Chirac 2002). Blair also hailed the agreement and defined it as "a significant step forward". As a result, the creation of The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was facilitated. Accordingly, the Amsterdam Treaty came into force in 1999.

With Amsterdam Treaty, "Petersberg Tasks" were incorporated into Article 17 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), defining the spectrum of military actions that the EU can undertake in its crisis management operations (EEAS 2016). The missions are as follows: rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. In addition to that, the position of Secretary General/ High Representative for CFSP was thereby created. It was mentioned that the European Political Cooperation was deprived of the necessary common actors except for the secretariat, and it began to be problematic with the progressing agenda. The problem was solved under Amsterdam Treaty with the creation of High Representative position. The main responsibility of the High Representative was to "assist the Council and the Presidency in the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions" (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014). The creation of the High Representative position was a significant in the evolution of CFSP in the sense that it enabled the CFSP to gain a level of visibility.

At the Cologne European Council (3 and 4 June 1999), the EU leaders demonstrated their determination that "the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding common European policy on security and defence. (...) the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO" (Cologne European Council 1999). Following the Cologne European Council, the EU set a military target under the name of "Helsinki Headline Goal" in December 1999, which required the EU Member States by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year forces up to corps level (60,000 persons)" (Helsinki European Council 1999).

The ESDP played an important role in terms of the European integration because it made the CFSP operational through the Petersberg because before the ESDP, CFSP

was lack of the action driven component, which made it more of a declaratory foreign policy. Also, it enabled the EU to break the 45-year-old taboo with regards to its security and defense. The member states expressed their seriousness in terms of the ESDP by taking further steps to improve it. Among the steps, there was Berlin Plus Agreement of 2003, which enables the EU to benefit from NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations. Eventually, the scope of the Petersberg Tasks was extended by Lisbon Treaty. According to TEU Art. 43.1;

Joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union 2016).

After the Berlin Plus Agreement, The Treaty of Nice entered into force in 2003 which enabled the common defense policy to be supported ‘by cooperation between the Member States in the field of armaments’(Treaty of Nice 2003). In the same year, the EU launched its first civilian crisis management operation: The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina s a follow-on operation to the United Nation’s International Police Task Force. With the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the ESDP was renamed as “Common Security and Defense Policy”. The function of ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission’(HR/VP) was created as a combination of former positions of the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations and it was declared that;

Any Member State, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, or the High Representative with the Commission’s support, may refer any question relating to the common foreign and security policy to the Council and may submit to it, respectively, initiatives or proposals. In cases requiring a rapid decision, the High Representative, of his own motion, or at the request of a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary Council meeting within 48 hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union 2016).

The Lisbon Treaty also reformulated the role of the High Representative by renaming

the position as ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP)’, extending his or her responsibilities. Therefore, the HR was put in a position where she/he serves both for a supranational and intergovernmental position, which can be considered as a difficult job (Fabbrini 2014).

The historical overview of the European Union’s foreign policy demonstrates that the Union deemed a systematical cooperation necessary, indeed. Starting with the European Political Cooperation, a political unification was at the heart of the integration process. When it comes to security and defense, as a rather sensitive dimension of the integration, the failure of the European Defense Community revealed the difficulty of transferring the member states’ competency to the Union. Seemingly, it would only be possible for the member states to adopt a common foreign policy if the decisions taken in this area were not binding unlike the other policy areas, which ironically undermined the word “common” to a great extent. As a result, the CFSP found itself a place in the TEU without an enforcement mechanism, having no legal instruments that make member states enforce the decisions even if they are taken. The reformulated High Representative position does not have a legal power over the member states, either.

3.2 An Overview of the EU Missions

The European Union has taken on several operations as a part of its Common Security and Defense Policy both at its civilian and military dimension so far. Currently, there are 19 EU missions and operations that have been completed and currently there are 17 ongoing operations. The EUPM I and EUFOR Althea were chosen among the EU missions to focus on how the preferences of the member states, particularly Big Three, affect the CFSP/CSDP mechanism and strengthen the efficiency of the Union in this field. The importance of the EUPM stems from the fact that it was the first mission conducted by the ESDP. Therefore, the Union used the mission to as an act of ‘learn by doing’. As the Union’s first military operation under Berlin Plus Agreement, EUFOR Althea is important because it demonstrates the balance between the EU and the US as it does between the Europeanism and Atlanticism.

Table 3.1 Completed EU Missions and Operations

Completed EU Missions and Operations	Objective
EUPM/BiH	The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) started on January 2003 as the first CSDP mission of the Union with an aim of building up sustainable policing arrangements, the mission ended on June 2012 (European Union Police Mission 2003).
EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia	Operation Sophia - The European Union Naval Force Mediterranean was launched as a military operation by the EU in 2015. The main objective was to take on “systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used by migrant smugglers or traffickers”. On February 2020, the EU agreed on ending the operation (European Union Naval Force 2015).
CONCORDIA/FYROM	The EU launched the Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 31 March 2003. It was the first EU military crisis management operation. In line with the Berlin Plus arrangements, Operation Concordia aimed to contribute to a stable and secure environment in FYROM and promoting the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The operation ended on 15 December 2003 (FYROM Concordia 2003).
EUPOL Afghanistan	European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan is a civilian CSDP mission. Launched in 2007, its main objective was to assist the Afghan Government establishing a civilian police service which works within “an improved rule of law framework and in respect of human rights”. The mission ended on 31 December 2016 (EU Police Mission in Afghanistan 2007).
EUPOL PROXIMA/FYROM	The EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was launched on 15 December 2003. EU police experts were monitoring, mentoring and advising the country’s police thus helping to fight organised crime as well as promoting European policing standards. The mission ended on 14 December 2005 (EU Police Mission Proxima 2003).
EUPAT	The EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was launched on 14 December 2005 following the termination of the EUPOL Proxima. It continued the objectives of EUPOL Proxima. Additionally, the monitoring systems and consultation mechanism were improved. The mission was expected to last for 6 months and ended in 2006 (EUPAT 2005).

Table 3.2 Completed EU Missions and Operations

Completed EU Missions and Operations	Objective
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau	The EU agreed on establishing an advice and assistance EU mission in support of the Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau in February 2008. The main objective was to improve the conditions for implementation of the National Security Sector Reform Strategy. The mission completed its mandate on 30 September 2010(EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 2008).
EUFOR Tchad/RCA	Launched on 28 January 2008, EUFOR Tchad/RCA was the military bridging operation in the Eastern Chad and the North East of the Central African Republic. The main objectives were to assist the protection of the vulnerable civilians and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. On May 2009, the Council announced the fulfilment of the mandate (EUFOR Tchad/RCA 2008).
EUJUST LEX-Iraq	EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq was the first EU integrated rule of law mission operated under the CSDP. The mission was launched on 1 July 2005 with an aim of strengthening the rule of law and promoting human rights in Iraq. The mission ended on 31 December 2013 (EUJUST LEX-Iraq 2005).
EUAVSEC South Sudan	The EU Aviation Security Mission in South Sudan was a non-executive civilian mission as a part of the EU's Comprehensive Approach to Sudan and South Sudan. Launched on 18 June 2012, the mission aimed to strengthen the security at Juba International Airport. The mission ended on 17 January 2014 (EUNAVSEC South Sudan 2012).
EUMAM RCA	The Council launched the EU Military Advisory Mission in Central African Republic on March 2015. The principle objective of the EUMAM RCA was to advise the Central African Republic authorities on the management and reform of their sources, particularly their Army (EUMAM RCA 2015).
ARTEMIS/DRC	On 12 June 2003, the Council adopted the Operation Plan and the Decision to launch a Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to promote the stabilization of the security conditions and to improve the humanitarian situation in Bunia. The mission came to an end on 1 September 2003 (ARTEMIS/DRC 2003).

Table 3.3 Completed EU Missions and Operations

Completed EU Missions and Operations	Objective
EUPOL RD CONGO	EU Police Mission for the DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo) was launched on 1 July 2007. Its main objective was to assist the Security Sector Reform in the area of the police and its interaction with the justice system. The mission ended on 30 September 2014 EUPOL RD Congo (2007)
EUSEC RD CONGO	EU Mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the area of defence was launched on June 2005. The mission aimed to to assist the Congolese authorities in rebuilding an army that will guarantee security. The mission ended in June 2016 EUSEC RD CONGO (2005).
EUPOL KINSHASA(DRC)	The Union conducted the police mission in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo on April 2005. The main aim was to assist Congolese National Police in preserving order during the DRC's democratic transition. The mission ended on June 2007 (EUPOL KINSHASA (DRC) 2005).
EUFOR RD Congo	It was launched with an aim of helping the MONUC (The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in securing the region during the presidential election in 2006. The mission ended on 30 November 2006 (EUFOR RD CONGO 2006).
EUFOR RCA	The European Union Military Operation in the Central African Republic was established on 10 February 2014 to contribute to a secure environment in the Central African Republic. It was authorized by the UN Security Council Resolution 2134. The mission ended in March 2015 (EUFOR RCA 2014).
Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)	Aceh Monitoring Mission became operational on 15 September 2005. The main objective was to monitor several aspects of the implementation of the peace agreement signed by the Government of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement (GAM) The mission completed its mandate on 15 December 2006 (EU Monitoring Mission Aceh 2005).

Table 3.4 Ongoing EU Missions and Operations

Ongoing EU Missions and Operations	Objective
ALTHEA/BiH	Operation Althea was launched in 2004 as a military mission under the Berlin Plus Agreement to protect the safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation Althea 2004).
EU NAVFOR Somalia	Also known as Operation Atalanta, the EU Operation Naval Force in Somalia is the Union's counter-piracy military operation off the coast of Somalia (European Union Naval Force 2015).
EUAM Iraq	Launched in October 2017 as a civilian mission, The European Union Advisory Mission in Iraq (EUAM Iraq) aims to provide advice and expertise for the Iraqi authorities on civilian security sector reform (SSR) (EUAM Iraq 2020).
EUAM Ukraine	Launched its operations in December 2014 as a non-executive mission, the EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine aims to lend assistance to the Ukrainian authorities in the areas of civilian security sector to facilitate a sustainable reform (Euam Ukraine 2014).
EUBAM Libya	EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya was launched in 2013 as civilian crisis management mission assists the Libyan authorities towards improving the management of sea, land and air borders (EUBAM Libya 2013).
EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine	Launched in 2005, The European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine aims to contribute to the peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict by promoting the development of Transnistria-related confidence-building measures (EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine 2005).
EUBAM Rafah	Launched on November 2005, the European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah aims to contribute to strengthen Palestinian capacity and promote cross-border cooperation between different border agencies (EUBAM Rafah 2005).
EUCAP Somalia	Also known as EUCAP Nestor, the EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia was launched on July 2012 as a civilian mission in order to provide assistance for host countries in improving self-sustaining capacity for enhancement of maritime security (EUCAP Somalia 2012).
EUCAP Sahel Mali	Launched on January 2015, the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali intends to provide expertise in strategic advice and training for the Malian Police (EUCAP Sahel Mali 2015).

Table 3.5 Ongoing EU Missions and Operations

Ongoing EU Missions and Operations	Objective
EUCAP Sahel Niger	Launched on August 2012, European Union Capacity Building Mission in Niger aims to assist Niger in combatting terrorism and organized crime and provide advice and training for the Nigerien authorities (EUCAP Sahel Niger 2012).
EULEX Kosovo	Launched in 2008, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo is the largest civilian mission under the EU CFSP. The mission aims to give assistance to the Kosovo authorities in building up sustainable and independent rule of law institutions (EULEX Kosovo 2008).
EUMM Georgia	The EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia was established on September 2008 in order to promote stabilization, normalization and confidence building in Georgia following the August 2008 conflict (EUMM Georgia 2008).
EUNAVFOR MED IRINI	The European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation Irini was launched on March 2020 as a military operation under the CSDP with an aim of contributing to peace and stability in Libya (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI 2020).
EUPOL COPPS/ Palestinian Territories	Established on January 2006, the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support aims to assist the Palestinian Authority towards establishing its institutions based on security and justice sector reforms (EUPOL COPPS 2006).
EUTM RCA	Launched on July 2016, the EU Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic aims to assist the Central African Armed Forces.
EUTM Somalia	On April 2010, the EU launched the Military Training Mission in Somalia with an aim of contributing to improve the Transitional Federal Government and the institutions in Somalia (EUTM Somalia 2016).
EUTM-Mali	The EU Training Mission in Mali was launched in 2013 as a military mission in order to improve the capabilities of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali 2016).

As it can be deduced from the tables of the missions and operations that have been undertaken by the Union so far, the number of the civilian missions is higher than that of the military missions. While the number of the former suppresses the latter, the civilian missions do not rely on the crucial aspect of contestation: the collective use of military force (Palm and Crum 2019). At the same time, it is seen that the EU prefers to be risk averse when it comes to selecting the military missions to launch,

as they do not require a high level of military robustness (Palm and Crum 2019). Regardless of their nature, these missions were required to be backed up by the EU Member States. In this case, some of the missions still carry great importance in terms of analyzing the CFSP/CSDP mechanism of the EU in the light of different perspectives of the member states on this field.

3.2.1 Background of the EUPM I

The EU dedicated itself to play a supporting role in the stabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Union's dismal experiences in Balkans, starting from the Yugoslav conflicts to the war in Kosovo.(Juncos 2007). Analyzing the remarks that the EU made at the Santa Maria Da Feira European Council in 2000, it is seen that the EU started to give its first signals to act as an active actor in international policing as of 2003 instead of putting forward declaratory commitments. For example, under the Common European Security and Defense Policy, the European Council welcomed "the setting-up and first meeting of the committee for civilian aspects of crisis management, as well as the identification of priority areas for targets in civilian aspects of crisis management and of specific targets for civilian police capabilities" (Santa Maria da Feira European Council 2000). In this regard, the EU stated that the member states were voluntarily cooperating and undertook that "by 2003 they will to be able to provide up to 5,000 police officers for international missions across the range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations" (Santa Maria da Feira European Council 2000).

In a way, these unpleasant memories led the EU to increase its commitment to the region, which is geographically at the doorstep of the Union. Therefore, the member states did not have any difficulties to be on the same page when it comes to taking an action in BiH. In the light of the EU's future policing capabilities, Jacques Paul Klein, special representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina of the UN at that time, paid visits to Brussels to discuss the EU's possible takeover of the international policing task in BiH in mid 2001 (Matthiessen 2013). Accordingly, declaring that the UN would officially withdraw its a-decade-long peacekeeping mission in BiH, Paul Klein stated: "Police forces have been downsized by nearly 17,000 uniformed personnel – all trained to international policing standards" on October 2002 (Deen 2002). The mission was constituted under Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP on 11 March 2002 "in order to ensure, as from 1 January 2003, the follow-on to the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Council Joint

Action 2002). Thereby, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) had enabled the United Nations (UN) to handover the peace-keeping operations to European Union Police Mission which would be launched one year after the UN's pullout.

3.2.2 Launch of the EUPM I: Challenges Between 2003-2005

The EU launched its first crisis management operation called "The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) on 1 January 2003 (EUPM 2003).

Wolfgang Petritsch, the International Community's High Representative at that time, described the Union's perspective towards the mission and said;

"There were differences of opinion in the EU regarding Bosnia and Kosovo, but only considering the initial phase of conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The EU and the European nations were not united during the disintegration of that country, but I believe that we, Europeans, have learned a lesson in the Balkans: the need for European integration" (Rodrigues 2000).

In parallel with the statement, the mission conducted by the European Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is significant not only in terms of the circumstances and motives under which the EU handled it but also the spiritual meaning it had to the Union. BiH is considered to be a "laboratory test" by most scholars. In fact, in a document prepared jointly by the Secretariat and the Commission, it is stated that "the planning and setting up of a crisis management operation was an important learning experience for the EU and first test of its crisis management concepts, procedures, and instruments" (Council of the European Union 2003).

Nonetheless, the Union had the necessary amount of time to solve some problems regarding the way it would lead the operation before it officially launched EUPM. Similarly, the Union recognized some blanks to be filled in terms of the titles and positions that are crucial to conduct a CSDP mission. For example, Jacques Paul Klein served as "UN Special Representative of the Secretary- General" to Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the case of the EU, a similar position was deemed to be created to facilitate the coordination with Javier Solana who served as the High

Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy at that time. However, Wolfgang Petritsch who served as the International High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina at that time, was already cautious to the involvements of increasing number of people at different positions from the international community. Therefore, instead of creating the position of the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) and adding another international actor, the EU adopted the idea of “double-hatting” the next High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, who would serve both as High Representative and EU Special Representative (Matthiessen 2013). Emphasizing that his priority is to foster rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Paddy Ashdown stated that “We must cut out the cancer at the heart of Bosnian society- organized crime...” (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007).

Specifically, the EU Police Mission’s key tasks have been the following:

- To strengthen the operational capacity and joint capability of the law enforcement agencies engaged in the fight against organised crime and corruption.
- To assist and support in the planning and conduct of investigations in the fight against organised crime and corruption in a systematic approach
- To assist and promote development of criminal investigative capacities of BiH;
To enhance police-prosecution cooperation
- To strengthen police-penitentiary system cooperation
- To contribute to ensuring a suitable level of accountability (EUPM 2003).

Given that the EU took over the mission from the UN, the transition process along with the idea of double hatting the next High Representative ended up quite smoothly. One of the lessons that the EU learned during the take-over process was the fact that it had to take the opinions of the international actors into account as in the case of double hatting the next High Representative. The role of the EUSR was thereby important with his broad mandate. However, according to the interviews with the EUSR officials, it is seen that there was also several weaknesses in the position such as lack of staff in his office as the official put forward: “Ironically, you turned Lord Ashdown into a EUSR but you gave him no staff to execute that mandate” (Mustonen 2008).

The Union had to confront another major challenge that affected the capability of the Mission in terms of its budget. It was necessary to take the European Parliament’s approval to make arrangements in the CFSP budget, which means that the member states had to be willing to increase the budget to make the Union be able

to afford the operational costs. Indeed, The European Parliament decided to make arrangements in the CFSP budget in November 2003. According to this decision “an amount of EUR 17,5 million covering operational running costs of EUPM in 2004 will be financed from the general budget of the European Union” (European Commission 2003). Nevertheless, the member states did not provide the EUPM Planning Team (PT) with sufficient level of contributions. In fact, in an official document that was prepared jointly by the Secretariat and the Commission, it was stated that “few member states responded to the Call for Contributions to EUPM PT with seconded civilian personnel. The EUPM planning experience illustrates the need for closer interaction between civilian and police secondment mechanisms for civilian crisis management” (Council of the European Union 2003). The EUPM PT only comprised 28 staff, which was considerably few given the significance of the mission for the Union’s CFSP/CSDP. Additional civilian experts were necessary for the procurement and financial management. According to the interviews with the EUPM officials, the shortfalls regarding the procurement were often emphasized as one official noted that “the procurement was appalling. We did not have enough computers for almost a year and a half!” (Juncos 2007).

In addition to that, the communication and coordination inside the EUPM itself was considered poor to a large extent, which generated a mistrust among the EUPM officials. According to the interviews with the EUPM officials, problems with “the leadership of the mission” and “problems with personalities” were at the heart of the criticism (Juncos 2007). The coordination and communication between the Commission and the EUPM was also rather weak. One of the aims of The EUPM was to assist Commission’s activities in rule of law and institution building projects in Bosnia. In the light of the contributions, between 2002-2005, the European Commission allocated about 18 million aria to policing reforms in Bosnia (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2005). Nevertheless, as the Commission and the EUPM went through a serious coordination problem because of the “lack of appropriate funding procedures” for the EUPM and EUPM tried to find “funding through the member states-embassies (Juncos 2007).

Nonetheless, the actual challenge of creating a coherent environment inside the EU began to be evident when the EU deployed its first military crisis management mission in Bosnia: EUFOR Althea.

3.2.3 Background of the EUFOR Althea

The Union expressed its readiness to take over the military operation in Bosnia from NATO as the European Council indicated “the Union’s willingness to lead a military operation in Bosnia following Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR)” in 2002 (Council of the European Union 2002). As a result, the EU launched the military operation called ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 2 December 2004. “Althea” is known to be “the Greek goddess of healing” (Operation Althea 2020). The metaphor is smartly applied to the operation in BiH by the Union as a sign of healing the region. When the mission was deployed, it included 6,200 troops from 22 EU member states and 11 other countries, which enabled size of the mission to be close to SFOR (Mustonen 2008).

The main goals of the Operation ALTHEA were listed as:

- To provide capacity-building and training to the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- To support BiH efforts to maintain the safe and secure environment in BiH
- To provided support to the overall EU comprehensive strategy for BiH (Operation EUFOR ALTHEA 2004).

It should also be noted that the operation was aimed to function under Berlin Plus Agreement of 2003, assuring the EU’s access to the assets and capabilities of NATO for the EU-led crisis management operations. Paddy Ashtown, the EU Special Representative in BiH at that time described the EU’s willingness to take over this mission by stating that “BiH was out of ‘emergency surgery’ following the end of its war, with a major emphasis on NATO’s military stabilization to create the conditions for civilian re- construction. It was now in ‘rehabilitation’ with the main emphasis on civilian institution building supported by military and security reassurance. Nevertheless, a robust international military presence was still necessary to guarantee Bosnia’s stability” (Leahey 2006). In this statement, it is seen that “a robust international military presence” was deemed necessary by Ashdown. Also, considering the fact that the EU was going to take over the military operation from NATO (SFOR), a strong cooperation and a smooth transition were considered significant. However, the planning process of the EUFOR Althea was quite problematic unlike that of the EUPM for several reasons.

When it comes to a military operation that is likely to be deployed by the EU, it is important for the operation to improve certain aspects of the EU, such as a

more robust CSDP. In this case, it would be easier to claim that the operation in question serves as a European interest, thus it would be more acceptable to get reluctant member states into participating and supporting the operation for the sake of community. Nevertheless, the main support came from the Euro-Atlanticist group of the EU member states. According to Euro-Atlanticist point of view, the military instruments play a significant role in foreign policy, especially within the context of NATO (Palm 2017).

Therefore, the member states who supported the EUFOR Althea such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Hungary Lithuania and Slovakia in the light of Euro-Atlanticist logic automatically pushed for the EU-NATO complementarity by highlighting the EU takeover of the former NATO operation (Palm 2017). As the mission was operated under Berlin Plus Agreement, Atlanticist member states favored the idea of the continuation of SFOR. Britain as one of the strongest advocates of the North Atlantic Alliance publicly endorsed the take-over, as well. In fact, the statements coming from London might as well be the driving force of the follow-up operation. It is also worth remembering that the US was facing with a serious challenge in Afghanistan at that time. Therefore, a transfer of authority in Bosnia would serve as Washington's interest as well due to the fact that it would decrease the burden on the US by enabling it to pull out its forces in the region.

On the other hand, France as one of the most significant member states of the EU was on the part of "Global Power EU" (Palm 2017). Therefore, it can be said that France's support was rather different than that of Britain because France strongly emphasized the EU as an autonomous actor and "EU security identity" independent from NATO. Jacques Chirac became the first politician who publicly endorsed the EU's hand over from NATO. Among the remarks that he made during his reelection campaign speech on 6 March 2002, M. Jacques Chirac underlined the fact that the EU should immediately take an action by itself in the Balkans by taking over NATO operations in the Balkans. "Europe must be able to engage with its own resources without being systematically dependent on NATO, this is what I am proposing for Bosnia and Macedonia" he underlined (Chirac 2002).

Analyzing the statements of Chirac, it is evident that Paris was confident in the EU's ability to take a military action in Bosnia. At this point, it is significant to remember that France has always been more autonomous and skeptical relying on NATO and the US whereas Britain's position was completely contrary. Although these two countries were on the same page in terms of the need for further defense action at the European level at St Malo Summit, Britain was strongly against any

actions that undermine the transatlantic alliance during the setting up phase of the EUFOR Althea. For example, in 2003, Jacques Chirac and Gerard Schröder, the German Chancellor at that time, along with the leaders of Belgium and Luxembourg gathered in Tervuren, a suburb of Belgium. In the meeting, the leaders pushed for an autonomous military arm to Europe and proposed to set up a military center in Belgium in an effort to “planning and command” of joint European operations outside NATO. As it was discussed in Tervuren, the proposal is named after the municipality of Belgium. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder described the effort and said “It is not directed against NATO ... In NATO we don’t suffer from too much America; we suffer from not enough Europe”(Gabriella Marin Thornton 2017). It was no coincidence that they aimed to create a closer cooperation at the European level after Tony Blair had expressed its endorsement to the US in Iraq invasion, which generated a discontent among its European partners such as Germany. Nonetheless, these efforts were not welcomed by the UK. For example, “The chocolate summit (the Tervuren summit) reflected the worst fears of the US hardliners about the dangers of ESDP going off in a NATO-incompatible direction” stated Sir David Manning, Britain’s ambassador to the US at that time (Gabriella Marin Thornton 2017).

Tony Blair also expressed his disapproval and said Britain would "not accept anything that undermines NATO or conflicts with the basis of European defense we have set out" (Helm 2003). Subsequently, in a fear of losing Britain’s support regarding the launch of the operation, it was agreed that the role of NATO is “the basis of collective defense for its members” (Castle 2003).

Germany expressed its endorsement with regards to the EU hand over SFOR’s responsibilities, as well. First of all, taking over the mission would enable the Union to generate security in their own continent, as a part of its responsibility. Also, Bosnia and Herzegovina seemed like a good place to test the EU’s military capabilities because the EU would not start over from scratch in the region as SFOR had already been working to ensure a safe environment in Bosnia. As a result, it would significantly reduce the EU’s military presence in the region in line with Germany’s stance as Germany’s approach towards the use of military force was prudent and mainly relied on show of force. Consequently, Germany’s military reluctance position in this equation is parallel to what Palm defines as “bystanders” (Palm 2017). As a bystander, Germany was not willing to use military force to protect the European values or to work for European interest, but continued extending its support to take-over. It is mentioned that if any kind of action that the EU plans to take is motivated by the idea of defending European values, it is easier to get the approval of the reluctant member states. In this scenario, the action was to launch

a military operation in line with a stronger CFSP / CSDP mechanism. Therefore, “a fear of being sidelined” might also be among the factors that affected the decisions of bystanders in this case (Palm 2017). In line with its strategy towards the military mission, German military forces avoided substantial risks by choosing to go for “show of force” instead of “use of force” as using any kind of military force was subject to public criticism (Friesendorf 2012). This is an old habit of Germany which is resonated in the country’s decisions regarding using force as a foreign policy tool since the Cold War, and old habits are known to die hard. Different opinions of the member states regarding the mandate of EUFOR became visible even within the same coalition. For example, the Netherlands took a different position with regards to the fight against organized crime as a part of EUFOR’s mandate. While the UK and Italy supported ‘fight against organized crime’ to be a part of EUFOR’s mandate, Dutch Ministry of Defense was against the inclusion of it (Palm 2017).

3.2.4 Launch of the EUFOR Althea: Challenges Between 2004-2005

After EUFOR Althea was launched by the EU, a new challenge started to appear for the Union: the coordination between the EUPM and EUFOR. As the civilian and military levels of the CSDP, it was important for these two missions to be well coordinated. Also, the mandates should not clash with one another. Ana E. Juncos puts forward that they did not clash with each other in theory. Basically, while the EUPM had a non-executive mandate (monitor, mentor and inspect); the EUFOR had executive mandate that was given by the UN Security Council (Juncos 2007). Then, Juncos points out the tensions between the two mission in spite of the differences in their mandates.

In addition to the tensions, the differences in the areas of mandates were criticized as grey areas that remained in between became visible. One of them was ‘fight against organized crime’. Although it was not EUFOR Althea’s main task, General David Leakey, the former EUFOR Commander, put a strong emphasis on this issue (Mustonen 2008). Leakey’s strong approach towards fight against organized crime was criticized by the EUPM officials as EUFOR’s operations regarding this area were considered as an act of going beyond its mandate. Also, the EUPM officials defined Leakey’s approach towards the fight organized crime as “EUFOR was exceeding its mandate and its actions were interfering with the EUPM mandate” (Mustonen 2008). Afterwards, the Union took some steps to make a clarification between the mandates of the EUPM and the EUFOR and came up with adopting seven principles

under the Guidelines for Increasing Cooperation between EUPM-EUFOR and EUSR (EUR-lex 2005). In the end, fight against organized crime was not recognized as primary task of the EUFOR Althea as it is stated that member states had different point of views with regards to inclusion of it. Nevertheless, General David Leakey's assertive role in this issue clearly demonstrated that the Union confronted serious challenges to control the implementing agents, as well (Gross and Juncos 2010).

The fact that the Union adopted the Seven Principles demonstrates that the EU started to learn that establishing coordination and cooperation is subject to a never-ending circle (Mustonen 2008). However, it did not have a major impact on the coordination and communication between the EUPM and other EU actors. In fact, according to Muehlmann, "the EUPM and the Office of High Representative (OHR)/EUSR often gave different messages on police reform to local authorities and police officers, which undermined the impact of the messages" (Muehlmann 2008). The Union took further steps to improve the coordination between two missions and EUSR after 2005. Nevertheless, when it comes to the issue of "speaking with one voice", the fragmented structure of the EU along with the national strategic interests of the member states mostly trumped these efforts.

Noting that these are take-over actions of the EU, it is rather difficult to assess the success of the mission itself in terms of healing the region. However, both the EUPM and the EUFOR enabled the Union to see the weaknesses of the CFSP/CSDP so that it can improve them.

First of all, it is highlighted that the coordination problem between EUPM and EUFOR led some distress among the EUPM officials. The way that these two missions were planned and identified brought about some gaps and accordingly a great tension between them. As a result of the lack of coordination, it eventually generated several question marks regarding the EU's design of comprehensive civilian and military approach to crisis management, especially due to its fragmented structure (Juncos 2007).

Secondly, the budgetary problems regarding the improvement of the EUPM put the whole operation at the risk of being recognized as "a symbolic rather than substantial" action that was undertaken by the EU.

Finally, in spite of the endorsement that is shared by the member states with regards to the launch of EUFOR Althea, the different reasons behind the support clearly affected the coherence of the process as it affected the communication between the member states as the tension between Europeanists vs Atlanticist and the question of fight against organized crime did so. Although the security situation was indeed

improved in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the question of ‘whose success?’ is rather difficult to answer. Nevertheless, lots of the US politicians praised NATO for its success in preserving the peace and secure environment in BiH. Referring to the success, for example, “that is an extraordinary achievement that must be acknowledged today” noted Nicholas Burns, United States Under Secretary at that time, noted in 2005 (Attinà and Irrera 2016).

As it was previously highlighted, the evolution of the CFSP have rested on the political will and commitment of the member states. The political coherence is not only necessary to strengthen the 2nd pillar integration but also to enable the Union to take substantial steps within the scope of its foreign and security policy. Looking back to the evolution of CFSP/CSDP, St. Malo Declaration served as a critical point in shaping the EU perspective towards being an autonomous military power on its own. However, the fundamental political question of “autonomy” of the EU as a security actor at the international level across the civil and military aspects of the crisis management, which is the key point of the St Malo Declaration, remained to be a challenging problem perceived by the member states, particularly France and the UK (Grevi, Helly, and Keohane 2009).

In the context of this, one can deduce a basic assumption: the stronger the political cohesion between the member states of the EU, the bigger chance for the Union to have a strong presence in the realm of its foreign policy. As the Union lacks common military instruments, it relies upon the assets of the individual member states. Due to the intergovernmental aspects of the CFSP/CSDP, if any of the member states does not want the Union to be active in the area of CSDP, there is not any enforcement mechanism to get the member state to comply with any decision or military contribution in this area. Although the speed of the developments that ended up with the creation of CFSP/CSDP was remarkable, the system leaves a massive scope for member states’ initiative due to its intergovernmental nature. In the face of the different level of the political will and commitment between the member states, it has become much harder on the side of the Union to make its foreign and security policy for being ‘common’ enough. As noted in the missions in BiH, the union’s signals were supposed to be more clear from the outside world. Instead, the Union often gave different signals depending on the institution / platform and who represents the Union within it (Cameron 1998). Also, different levels of political willingness of the EU member states to represent the Union as a proper security actor further restrained the EU institutions’ ability to develop a strong policy response.

4. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S PRESENCE IN THE LIBYAN CRISIS IN 2011

4.1 Background of the Libyan Crisis in 2011

After Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, killed himself in January 2011, anti-government protests struck in Tunisia. The ultimate goal of the demonstrators was to change the regime with the help of a political transformation. As a result, the government of Tunisia fled the country to Saudi Arabia, leading the protests to spread over much of the Arab world. Although the Arab Spring mostly bypassed the eight Arab Monarchies, it led other countries in the region to protest the authoritarian governments when the intended goal was achieved in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen. However, the peaceful protests that took place in several Libyan cities against Colonel Muammar al Gaddafi, the long-standing Libyan leader, did not pave the way for a quick reform change in Libya. On February 17, 2011, Libyan security forces under Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, were accused of shooting and killing the demonstrators in order to scatter the protests (Human Rights Watch 2011). February 17 is still recognized as a significant development and called a “day of revolt” in the timeline of the Libyan crisis, which ultimately led the Libyan crisis to arise.

4.2 The EU's Initial Response to the Libyan Crisis

“The CFSP died in Libya – we just have to pick a sand dune under which we can bury it” (Atlantic Council 2011).

As one of the EU diplomats put forward the above-mentioned comment as a criticism of the CFSP mechanism, the EU's presence in the Libyan crisis will be evaluated in this chapter. The Arab Spring serves as a significant case for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy as it was the first crisis with which the EU was supposed to deal in the context of the changes introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon, aiming to make the Union a more coherent actor on the international stage. This chapter will provide an elaborated analysis on the initial response of the EU to the Libyan crisis as well as the UN and NATO involvement, showing the EU's capabilities and limitations with regards to the CFSP mechanism.

The first response of the Union to the crisis was the declaration issued by Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the EU at that time, on behalf of the Union. On February 20, 2011, Catherine Ashton expressed her concerns regarding the crisis in Libya: “We condemn the repression against peaceful demonstrators and deplore the violence and the death of civilians” she stated (European Commission 2011a). Demonstrating the consensus on the Union's disapproval of the Libyan authorities use of force, the Catherine Ashton did not make any reference to the potential restrictive measures that would be adopted. On 23 February, The European Commission agreed to allocate EUR 3 million to respond to humanitarian needs in Libya and neighbouring countries. Additionally, “Following a request from the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and the Hungarian Presidency, the European Commission activated the Civil Protection Mechanism” declared the European Commission (European Commission 2011c). With the help of the Civil Protection Mechanism, the evacuation of EU citizens and other foreigners from Libya was facilitated. Furthermore, pointing out the respect of democratic values, human rights and fundamental freedom, “The European Union should not be patronizing, but should also not shy away from using its political and moral responsibility” stated Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European Council at that time (Rompuy 2011b).

In the light of these actions, the Union has indeed responded to the crisis fast through its humanitarian assistance and civil protection mechanism as its crisis management

instruments. In this respect, it is seen that the Union did not have any difficulty to adopt a common position. As it is noted above, the EU's initial reaction to the crisis did not refer to its other foreign policy instruments, such as imposing sanctions and adopting restrictive measures. In other words, the quoted statements of Ashton and Van Rompuy did not indicate a substantial foreign policy leading to an action, as they were mostly symbolic in line with the declaratory foreign policy. On 24 February, however, Gaddafi who started to lose control of most of the Eastern region appeared on television, claiming "I am not going to leave this land. I will die here as a martyr" (Reuters 2011b). As the protests started to become apparent in the Western region and Gaddafi regime faced a serious break down, the international reaction became more visible, so did the possibility of sanctions on the EU's side.

4.3 The Initial Responses of the Member States

As it is underscored in above paragraphs, the Union only declared its concerns for the violence that took place in Libya. It is mostly because the EU found it difficult to handle the crisis through a common position among the member states with regards to the actions that were expected to be taken collectively. In the light of the initial statements of the leaders of some member states, it is seen that they were lacked a unified approach as to how they should react and in what aspects they should react.

On the side of France, the reaction against the Gaddafi regime was more vocal and visible than that of the others. Nicolas Sarkozy, the President of France at that time, responded to the crisis in Libya rapidly and rigorously. As the first country to recognize the Libyan opposition, France also differed from its European partners in terms of the personal involvement of Sarkozy and his efforts to call for a military intervention. Sarkozy took the lead in calling for the sanctions that he believed the EU needed to impose against Libya along with a no-fly zone, "The continuing brutal and bloody repression against the Libyan civilian population is revolting" he said (Watt and Wintour 2011). Going further in military aspects of his wishes, "the air strikes would be solely of a defensive nature if Colonel Gaddafi makes use of chemical weapons or air strikes against non-violent protesters" he stated (Watt 2011c).

On the side of Germany, the initial statements from the important leaders were more reserved and calculated. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, addressed

the humanitarian crisis in Libya and as a response to the Gaddafi's assertive speech "The speech by Colonel Gaddafi this afternoon was very frightening, especially because he virtually declared war on his own people." she stated (Reuters 2011*d*). In terms of a No-Fly-Zone (NFZ), it was a rather sensitive issue for Germany as it indicates a military intervention. Guido Westerwelle, the Foreign Minister of Germany at that time, emphasized on the meaning of any kind of military intervention to Germany and explained the country's position in line with its reluctance in using military means. "A no-fly zone would still constitute military intervention and Germany does not want to get dragged into a war" he said (Reuters 2011*e*). It is noteworthy to remember that The German government's traditional stance against military intervention has mostly resulted from its unpleasant history of World War II. Therefore, German public opinion towards military intervention also draws a reluctant picture, leading the country to be recognized as a "reluctant military giant" (Bowlby 2017). Furthermore, the public opinion in Germany with regards to the possible involvement of Germany in imposing a NFZ was also clear-cut as German news media often demonstrated its concerns over any type of a military involvement and stated that they did not want to get involved in the crisis as "a warring part" (Bucher et al. 2013).

Nonetheless, Germany and Britain as two of the 'big three' did not provide Sarkozy with their support for the military intervention. Although there was a consensus on the potential sanctions to be imposed on the Gaddafi regime in case of increasing violence, Germany and the UK did not endorse Sarkozy's calls for no-fly zone. For example, although David Cameron, the British Prime minister at that time, stated that "sanctions are always an option for the future if what we are seeing in Libya continues", he clearly expressed his initial concerns regarding a military action in line with his isolationist identity by saying that "I do not think we are at that stage yet" (Watt and Wintour 2011). So, he decided to follow a more reserved position. Therefore, analyzing the initial responses of the UK and France to the Libyan crisis, it was obvious that there was different point of views regarding the military intervention. While Sarkozy stood firmly on the idea of military action, Cameron made it quite clear that they are "at the stage of condemning the actions Colonel Gaddafi has taken against his own people" (Watt and Wintour 2011).

France continued to push for an intervention regardless of the cautious stances of the other member states. On 24 February, the French Foreign Ministry called for a UN mission to Libya 'to evaluate the magnitude of crimes committed and, in particular, if crimes against humanity have taken place' (as cited in Davidson 2013). On 25 February, Sarkozy told a news conference that "France would consider any initiative of this type with extreme caution and reserve" regarding a military intervention

(Reuters 2011*c*).

Along with the positions of the Big Three in the face of the Libyan Crisis, Italy's position is also worth to analyze in terms of the difficulty for the Union to adopt a substantive common policy. First of all, the reluctance of the member states with regards to using military means cannot always be explained only by its history. In this regard, bilateral relations of a member state with the Libyan government is also crucial as it is a crucial factor that hinders the EU level actions. In this regard, Italy was known to be the closest neighbor of Libya in the energy sector. The business interest played a big role in Italy's silence while its European allies strongly condemned Gaddafi. For example, Silvio Berlusconi, the Prime Minister of Italy at that time, failed to condemn the violence and noted "The situation is still in flux and so I will not allow myself to disturb anyone" (UN Watch 2011). Berlusconi's statement regarding 'not to disturb Gaddafi' were both interpreted as the product of "Berlusconi's personal ties to Gaddafi" and his 'strong interests' in Libya (Fabbrini 2014). Either way, Berlusconi was highly criticized for his statement.

4.4 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970

On 25 February, Libya's representative at the UN, Abdurrahman Shalgham condemned Gaddafi's actions against the civilians. Urging Gaddafi to leave the Libyans alone, he called the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to impose sanctions on Gaddafi through a resolution which he called "decisive, rapid and courageous" (Charbonneau 2011). As the international reaction became more visible, the measures and sanctions against Gaddafi regime started to find themselves a place on the agenda of the world. On February 25, Barack Obama, the President of the US at that time, blocked assets of Gaddafi and some of his associates. Emphasizing the condemnations of the international community against Gaddafi, Barack Obama noted that "These sanctions target the Gaddafi government" (BBC News 2011*a*).

Accordingly, Resolution 1970 was adopted unanimously by UN Security Council on 26 February, which included sanctions "to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment" (United Nations Security Council 2011*a*). The UNSC also

decided on the referral of the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC). As it was mentioned in the discussion of the EU's initial response to Libyan government, there was a consensus on the sanctions to be imposed in case of the increasing violence. In the light of the growing number of deaths in Libya, on February 28, the EU agreed on the decision of implementing the Resolution 1970 on February 28, "in line with Saturday's decision by the UNSC, the Council banned the supply to Libya of arms, ammunition and related material" declared the Council (Council of the European Union 2011*b*).

In addition to the UN measures, the Council also increased the number of people who were subject to asset freeze and visa ban. Also, Ashton addressed a speech at the 16th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) on February 28. It is important to analyze the statements of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs in order to get a glimpse of how the EU perceives the crisis in Libya. In the context of the speech, it is seen that a comprehensive and coordinated response of the international community was deemed necessary by the EU. Also, as a significant consequence of humanitarian crises, migration was recognized as a threat by the Union. Ashton expressed her concerns regarding the flow of refugees to European countries "We are trying to avoid the civil war that we fear and make contingency plans to respond to potential flow of refugees to neighboring and to European countries" she stated (Ashton 2011*b*). As a response to the question related to no-fly zone over Libya, "There is no decision yet being made on it" said Catherine Ashton (Ashton 2011*b*).

In spite of the ongoing discussions about no-fly zone which Sarkozy had called for at the very beginning of the Libyan crisis, Ashton underlined the complexity of the issue and adopted a calculated manner. At the very same day, David Cameron made a surprising move with respect to a military no-fly zone. Underlining the illegitimacy of Gaddafi regime along with Gaddafi's use of military force against his own people, "I have asked the Ministry of Defense and the Chief of the Defense Staff to work with our allies on plans for a military no-fly zone" he said in his statement made on 28 February 2011 (Cameron 2011). Considering the initial responses of the UK concerning Sarkozy's calls for intervention, the fact that Cameron decided to be proactive towards NFZ was something unexpected and it affected the course of events to a large extent.

4.5 The Undermined role of the High Representative

When France got the desirable support of the UK on no-fly zone and Germany maintained its reluctant stance towards any military intervention, the EU's CFSP faced with an inevitable challenge once again. Moreover, the proactive stance of the UK differed from that of France in many respects, which led the already existing divergence to enhance. Before moving onto the UN Resolution 1973, it is important to analyze the important events that took place in between.

On 10 March, the EU decided to extend restrictive measures to key financial entities (Council of the European Union 2011*a*). Although the Union continued to express its disapproval of Gaddafi regime through the sanctions and restrictive measures in line with UN Resolution 1970, there were still ongoing debates on such further actions as no-fly zone and a CSDP engagement. On 5 March 2011, The Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) was established. As it served as the de facto government for Libya, any member state of the EU was expected to take its time and put the idea of a formal recognition of NTC on the table at the EU level. In fact, the extraordinary meeting of the European Council conducted to discuss developments and reach an agreement regarding Libya on 11 March was an area where the member states could argue on NTC. However, France manifested itself as a rapid and relevantly detached party from the Union by officially recognizing the NTC one day before the meeting. Nicolas Sarkozy was already the first head of state to have a meeting with insurgent leaders of the Libyan National Council. Getting ahead of its allies, France became the first country to recognize NTC, as well (Cowell and Erlanger 2011).

Moreover, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron sent a letter to former EU president Herman Van Rompuy on 10 March, one day before the extraordinary meeting. In the letter, France and Britain "condemn and call for an immediate halt to, the use of force against civilians by the Gaddafi regime (The Guardian 2011*a*). This was an important move that undermined the role of the High-Representative to a large extent. Looking back to Catherine Ashton's earlier declarations regarding the Libyan crisis when it was first erupted, it is seen that they were all made after the proposals of the individual member states and the UN actions. For example, her first statement addressed to Gaddafi government came after Sarkozy had started to condemn and called for an intervention against Gaddafi regime. Similarly, France had already made a proposal to take an action in terms of imposing sanctions when she called for sanctions. Accordingly, the first sanction imposed by the EU against

Gaddafi regime had come into force after the UN Resolution 1970 was adopted.

Sarkozy's rush to condemn the regime and call for sanctions was tolerated and backed up by the Union to some extent. However, his rapid recognition of NTC generated the first real crack within the Union in the context of its response to Libyan crisis. "We cannot unilaterally rush into recognizing groups" said a spokesman for Catherine Ashton (BBC News 2011*b*). NTC's early recognition by France led some of the member states to express their concerns about the EU as a coherent actor, as well. Highlighting the importance of acting with one voice, Franco Frattini, Foreign Minister of Italy at that time, said that "Italy wants a European decision that everyone shares unanimously because that's how we act credibly" (BBC News 2011*b*). Similarly, Trinidad Jimenez, Foreign Minister of Spain at that time, said "The possibility of this recognition must be the result of agreement among all of the countries of the European Union" to express her discontent to France's rush (BBC News 2011*b*).

Nicolas Sarkozy's decision was backed up by the European Parliament, though. On 10 March, members of the European parliament (MEP) called on Catherine Ashton to recognize the Interim National Council (European Parliament 2011). In the parliament meeting, Ashton said that "one of the criticisms which can be made about us is that sometimes we take a long time to respond" and then she presented two immediate priorities of the EU: addressing the humanitarian crisis including assist with the evacuation and making sure the violence stops (Ashton 2011*d*). As for the first priority, the EU indeed acted fast and made humanitarian aid to respond the humanitarian crisis in Libya. The EU Civil Protection Mechanism to support the evacuation of EU citizens from Libya activated by the High Representative on 23 February was also a quick step the EU took. When it comes to making the violence stop, she underlined the sensitivity of the situation by saying 'this is a very fluid situation and we have to read it very carefully' (Ashton 2011*d*). A possible CSDP engagement was also deemed to be carefully analyzed. Lastly, she made herself clear with regards to the purposes of a potential CSDP engagement by saying that "a possible CSDP engagement would be to support current evacuation and humanitarian efforts" (Ashton 2011*d*). She did not make any direct reference to the possible recognition of the interim National Council.

One day after the meeting of the European Parliament and France's formal recognition, Ashton maintained her prudent attitude towards the NTC. Welcoming and encouraging the interim council, "the EU considers it a political interlocutor" said Ashton in her statement (European Commission 2011*b*). Also, the calls of France and Britain for a military action were not accompanied by the EU's support once

again. Angela Merkel was consistent with her anti-military approach and believed that there was not any legal basis for NFZ. Similarly, Thomas de Maiziere, German Federal Minister of Defense at that time, agreed with Merkel on the unnecessary of no-fly zone. “We cannot get ourselves into something which we later are not convinced about and which cannot be pushed through,” he told reporters one day before the EU extraordinary meeting (Mazkenzie and Pawlak 2011). Subsequently, an extraordinary meeting of the European Council was held on 11 March in which the consistent attitude of Germany did not change. Nonetheless, Catherine Ashton often found herself in uneasy situations where she was constantly mocked and diminished by the British leaders. For instance, in a dialogue between Bernard Jenkin, a British politician, and David Cameron regarding the reluctance of Ashton in the whole process, Jenkin raised the question:

“What exactly went on at the European Council? Who was Baroness Ashton speaking for? What mandate does she have to give her opinions? Should she not serve the member states of the European Union rather than pretending to lead them?”(Watt 2011*a*).

Furthermore, Cameron’s resistant stance on NFZ was also highly criticized by Ashton. ‘Hold your horses’ she was reported as saying to interrupt Cameron in the summit debate (Shipman 2011). At the end of the summit, France and Germany were left alone by their European partners with regards to their no-fly zone plan on Libya as the final conclusion was “in order to protect the civilian population, member states will examine all necessary options, provided there is demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and support from the region.”(Rompuy 2011*a*). What the Union indicated by a “legal basis” was the UN authorization, which was the way of the EU to demonstrate that it would not take any military action collectively under its CSDP.

4.6 The Vacuum to be Filled: Relying on the US

After the failure of the Britain and France in adopting a NFZ decision at the EU level, the two countries were further disappointed by the reluctance of the US to take the lead in a military intervention. The initial responses of the White House

indicated a cautious stance towards the Libyan crisis. A no-fly zone was a popular idea, but there were clear concerns with respect to whether the NFZ would be the first priority. During the first week of March 2011, Barack Obama said that “With respect to our willingness to engage militarily, what I’ve instructed the Department of Defense as well as our State Department and all those who are involved in international affairs to examine is a full range of options” (Obama 2011). Robert Gates, former US Defense Secretary, was also hesitant to impose the NFZ in Libya as he stated that “A no-fly zone for Libya requires more airplanes than you can find on a single aircraft carrier, so it is a big operation in a big country” (Reuters 2011*f*).

Looking back to the initial responses of Hillary Clinton, former Secretary of State of the US, it is seen that her statements regarding a no-fly zone over Libya were not as consistent as those of Gates. For example, as a response to David Cameron’s calls for the NFZ, “The no-fly zone is an option we are actively considering” she said (Lowson 2011). To that end, it is reasonable to suggest that she did not initially sound as reluctant as Gates did in terms of imposing the NFZ. Nonetheless, she started to express her doubts about the merits of a no-fly zone following the Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s skeptical attitudes afterwards. Playing down the prospects of the NFZ and warning against unilateral action, there are other ways to assist the opposition” said Clinton (Watt 2011*b*).

Therefore, when it comes to the support that France and Britain were seeking to get for their NFZ plan, things did not go as these two countries had expected. Although the White House often had stated that all of the possible actions were being examined, the US did not seem to endorse a no-fly zone over Libya, generating a disappointment for France’s and Britain’s NFZ plan. It also demonstrated America’s unwilling stance to play the leading role in Europe’s neighbourhood where the EU was clearly unable to fill the vacuum in particular to the Libyan crisis (Simón 2012).

4.7 UNSC Resolution 1973 and Afterwards

As the situation got deteriorating in Libya, Arab states became more vocal for seeking no-fly zone, as well. On 12 March, the Arab League requested the UN Council to impose a no-fly zone (Reuters 2011*a*). The attack of Gaddafi forces to the town of Misrata was as a point where significant changes started to occur for those who had been seeking for a military intervention in Libya. On 16 March

Gaddafi forces attacked to Misrata by using tanks and artillery (BBC News 2011*d*). Said al-Islam, Gadaffi's son, said with a confident tone that 'in 48 hours everything will be over. Our forces are close to Benghazi. Whatever decision is taken, it will be too late' as a response to the ongoing discussions on no fly zone" (BBC News 2011*c*).

As a response to the growing violence in Libya, UN Resolution 1973 was adopted by the Security Council on 17 March 2011 (United Nations Security Council 2011*b*). Unlike the UNSC Resolution 1970 adopted unanimously, there were five abstentions in the process of the adaptation, meaning that there were 10 votes in favor of the Resolution. The five members which abstained from voting were: Brazil, Germany, India, China and Russia (Harris 2011). Apart from the demand of immediate establishment of a ceasefire and tightening existing sanctions, there were some significant articles in the Resolution, which played a big role in leading these five countries to abstain from voting. With regards to no-fly zone, the UNSC decided to "establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians" in paragraph 6. Also, the Resolution authorized "Member States . . . to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights imposed by paragraph 6 above" (United Nations Security Council 2011*b*). The phrase of 'taking all necessary measures' was important in the context of imposing a no-fly zone, as it generated the legal basis for France's and Britain's long wanted plans for NFZ. Also; the Resolution,

"Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council" (United Nations Security Council 2011*b*).

It should be noted that German "nein" was the strongest answer that Germany could ever give to its European partners. Guido Westerwelle, later explained the reason why Germany abstained in the UN Security Council by stating "after weighing up the arguments, we decided that no German soldiers will take part in any such operation in Libya (Federal Foreign Office 2011). Although Germany's abstention was not a

huge surprise given the consistent statements of the German leaders against military intervention, it definitely enabled the country to marginalize itself. In fact, it was a way of Germany to tell its allies that “you will have to deal with this alone we are not going to help you” (Weiland and Nelles 2011). As noted, however, this decision was so strong that it brought the credibility of Germany in the eyes of the US and its other European partners at stake. In this regard, Joschka Fischer, who was a member of the opposition Greens expressed his concerns and wrote that Germany has lost its credibility in the United Nations and the Middle East” (Erlanger and Dempsey 2011).

Catherine Ashton who resisted the idea of military action decided to welcome Resolution 1973, as well. Stressing the EU’s concerns for the situation of the civilians, ‘we fully endorse the UN demand’ she declared in her joint statement with former President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy (van Rompuy and Ashton 2011). One day after the Resolution 1973 had passed, Moussa Koussa, the Foreign Minister of Libya at that time, declared a ceasefire in return on 18 March. Nonetheless, Gaddafi’s troops continued to attack even after the announcement of a ceasefire (The Guardian 2011b).

4.7.1 International Intervention in Libya following the NATO’s Involvement: Is the CSDP Really Dead?

As the attacks of Gaddafi’s government did not come to an end following the call for ceasefire of Koussa on 18 March, Sarkozy and Cameron provided their arguments regarding the necessity of taking a military action with justification. For example, Cameron played the ‘national interest’ card in order to bolster his arguments regarding the military intervention. “If Gaddafi’s attacks on his own people succeed, Libya will once again become a pariah state, festering on Europe’s border, a source of instability, exporting strife beyond her borders (...) I am clear: taking action in Libya is in our national interest he stated (Black 2011). On the side of France, Sarkozy invited several heads of state and government, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon at that time, General Secretary of the Arab League Amr Moussa and former EU High Representative Catherine Ashton to an emergency meeting to be held in Paris on 19 March. Nonetheless, Sarkozy surprised his guests by announcing that French planes were preparing to strike Libyan targets by stating “France had decided to assume its role before history” (Willsher 2011).

It was clear that Nicolas Sarkozy wanted the world to see that France was playing

a central role in Libyan crisis. Accordingly, the first offensive operation against the Gaddafi regime was performed by France under Operation Harmattan by striking armored units near Benghazi on 19 March (Gertler 2011). On 20 March, the UK and the US joined France to attack Gaddafi's forces to enforce a no-fly zone under the UN mandate (BBC News 2011e).

The French, British and US military operations were conducted under the different code names of Operation Harmattan (France), Operation Ellamy (UK) under the Operation Odyssey Dawn (US) led by the United States. The division between the UK and France became apparent over the confusion regarding the US and NATO leading the military intervention. For example, David Cameron uttered that "it's operating under U.S. command with the intention that this will transfer to NATO" (Erlanger 2011).

On the other hand, emphasizing the French initiative to intervene in Libya from day one, Alain Juppe, the foreign minister of France at that time, clearly expressed his feelings in this issue by stating "It isn't NATO which has taken the initiative up to now. France does not want NATO to have political control of the mission" (Erlanger 2011). The conflicting preferences of France and the UK once again demonstrated that even the two out of the big three agreed on a particular action (a strong response that includes military intervention to the Gaddafi regime in this case), their different positions with regards to the NATO involvement were too visible that it was inevitable for them to clash with each other in the process. As a response to the ambiguity, NATO announced that it would lead the No-Fly Zone operation over Libya as of 25 March 2011 and finally NATO declared that it took control of all military operations under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 called 'Operation Unified Protector' (OUP) on 31 March 2011 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2011). On 20 October, Gaddafi was captured and killed by rebel forces in Sirte On 31 October, OUP ended.

Disappointed first by German abstention and the NATO involvement, Alain Juppe summed up the situation in the eyes of France and said: "The common security and defence policy of Europe? It is dead." (Ash 2011). When it comes to Germany, "We back our allies and I have the deepest respect for NATO's involvement" Chancellor Angela Merkel praised NATO in an effort to make up for Germany's abstention (The Local 2011).

4.8 EUFOR Libya

“With a view to underpinning the mandates of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 (2011), the Union shall, if requested by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), conduct in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy a military operation, hereinafter called ‘EUFOR Libya’, in order to support humanitarian assistance in the region. The operation shall fully respect the Guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to support United Nations humanitarian activities in complex emergencies and the Guidance on the use of Foreign Military Assets to Support Humanitarian Operations in the Context of the Current Crisis in North Africa.” (EUR-lex 2011*b*).

Regardless of the lack of a coherent action towards the crisis, the Council agreed on EU military operation (EUFOR Libya) in support of humanitarian assistance operations in Libya under CSDP if requested by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on 1 April as it is seen above (European Commission, 2011). The EU was not able to conduct the mission without UN support as clearly stated in the declaration. The EU’s initiative to “do something” was interpreted as a desperate move, though. One of the reasons is that OCHA requests a distinction between humanitarian actions and political or military actions. It is given as an explanation as to why the UN did not support the military mission conducted by the EU as a political and military actor. In this regard, the EU seemed to make an offer that it knew the UN would refuse. EUFOR Libya would enable the EU to seem like it was doing something without taking any risks, which was mostly considered depressing in the media (Gowan 2011).

To sum up, The EU was highly criticized for being ineffective during the initial crisis. The CFSP machinery of the EU did not result in failure in terms of its rapid response to supporting evacuation of EU citizens from Libya, imposing sanctions and delivering humanitarian aid. In fact, as of 11 January 2012, the European Commission and the EU member states provided EUR 158,733,523 for humanitarian and civil protection funding (European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 2012). Nonetheless, France and Germany as two significant member states of the EU demonstrated their different positions rather harshly towards the Libyan crisis. Germany’s abstention during the vote on Resolution 1973 was a clear indication of its military reluctance stance at all cost. On the other hand, France had a completely

different point of view. Sarkozy's exceptional ambition to get involved in the crisis did not really help the EU to stand in a common position. Furthermore, the already existing disparity between the UK and France enlarged more in the face of their diverging preferences for the military intervention under the NATO command, which proved the CSDP's weakness in the presence of NATO once again. Finally, NATO came to the fore by taking the control and Gaddafi was overthrown. Since Gaddafi's defeat, Libya has been facing an incremental fragmentation and further escalations. Currently, there is a civil war between General Haftar's Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) and the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) of Prime Minister Fayeze al-Sarraj (Marcuzzi 2020).

In the face of increasing foreign involvement including Russia in the region largely due to geopolitical reasons and prolonging tribal conflicts, the deadlock in Libya still prevails and the EU's diplomatic weight has been overshadowed by hard power once again. Perhaps, the statement "The CFSP died in Libya" might be too harsh to put forward. However, it is reasonable to suggest that the EU failed to act in concert within its CFSP/CSDP, generating suspicions on the success of the changes introduced in Lisbon Treaty. Divergence between member states played a key role in shaping the Union's policy response to the Libyan crisis, jeopardizing the EU's possibility of being a reliable security actor and leading most of the political elites to pick a sand dune under which they can bury the CFSP.

5. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S PRESENCE IN THE SYRIAN CRISIS BETWEEN THE YEARS OF 2011-2015

5.1 Background of the Syrian Crisis in 2011

The Syrian crisis was first erupted with the pre-democracy protests became on 15 March 2011 in an effort to oust the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in a “Day of Rage” (Flock 2011). The EU’s initial response to the conflict was significant in the sense that there was a possibility for the EU to be affected by the crisis and its consequences to a large extent. When the uprisings had first erupted in Syria, what we know as “refugee crisis” today did not find itself such a crucial place on the agenda as it does now, neither did the concerns over regional security and terrorism. However, it was obvious by then that in case of any security threat or migration, the EU would very likely feel the damage. Nonetheless, the challenges imposed to the EU both internally and externally were too high that it could not adopt an actual policy to solve the crisis in Syria. There were other actors that involved in the process, leading the dynamics to change and making the traditional clash between US and Russia in U.N Security Council more visible than it was in Libyan crisis. In this chapter the EU’s response to the Syrian crisis in between 2011-2015, along with the intervention of global powers will be analyzed.

5.2 The EU's Initial Response to Syrian Crisis

"I don't believe it's right for five countries to agree on a united stance without the other 23 that can't be there, knowing that 24 hours later all 28 will be gathering around the same table". – Angela Merkel

As it can be indicated from Merkel's statement above, the EU's response to the Syrian crisis as the final case of the thesis will be evaluated in the light of a great deal of disagreements between the member states of the EU that make adopting a common action on the Syrian crisis more difficult (Hewitt 2013).

The EU's strategic response to the Arab Spring came on 8 March 2011 through the joint communication of the former High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) Catherine Ashton and the Commission proposing "A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean". In the communication, the EU emphasized its commitment to help its partners especially in the area of democracy as it was stated that "first, the EU is committed to build "deep democracy" (European Commission 2011*d*).

As the crisis in Syria as a part of the Arab Spring increased gradually, the EU started to make declarations regarding in particular to Syria. According to the first statement made by Ashton on behalf of the Union, it is stated that the Syrian Government's use of force was strongly disapproved as Ashton declared "I strongly condemn the brutal repression, including the totally unacceptable use of violence and live ammunition, which must cease now" (Ashton 2011*e*). In the statement, Ashton also urged the authorities to respect and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms which she defined "must be respected and protected by the authorities and security forces (Ashton 2011*e*). Subsequently, on 12 April, the EU declared its concerns for the violence taking place in Syria once again. Pointing out the emphasis on the human rights, the EU uttered that "the Syrian authorities must abide by their international commitments with regard to ensuring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" (Council of the European Union 2011*c*).

Analyzing the earliest press releases and statements made by Ashton, it can be clearly seen that the EU's responses to what was happening in Syria revolved around the emphasis on the human rights and democracy as it was the case for Libyan crisis. As for the humanitarian response, the EU started to provide humanitarian assistance

inside Syria since the beginning of the conflict. In fact, the Union allocated more than EUR 610 million from its budget to provide humanitarian assistance so far (European Commission 2011*e*).

5.3 The Initial Responses of the EU Member States

The member states of the EU could not be able to develop a common policy as to what kind of an action they should take against Syrian Government as it was evident in the EU's initial response to the Libyan Crisis. As it is underscored above paragraphs, providing humanitarian aid and condemning the violence were the initial actions which the member states had not a difficulty to be on the same page. Nevertheless, tensions mounted between EU members when it comes to taking substantial steps such as using sanctions as its foreign policy instrument against the Assad Regime.

On the side of France, there was a particular wish about the sanctions as Paris wanted the potential EU sanctions to specifically target Bashar- al-Assad. In fact, when Alain Juppé, French Foreign Minister at that time, was asked whether France wanted Assad to be named particularly in the measures, "France wished so" Juppe answered (France 24 2011). When it comes to Germany, it should be noted that Germany was highly criticized for its abstention in UN Resolution 1973 for Libya. Therefore, it followed a more pro-active approach towards the Syrian crisis at its initial stage. Condemning the violence against the Syrian civilians, Guido Westerwelle, German Foreign Minister at that time, "we feel it's necessary and unavoidable that President Assad will be directly targeted in a next round of sanctions" he said (UPI 2011).

The support for sanctioning Assad personally was shared by the UK, as well. William Hague, the Foreign Secretary of Britain at that time, indicated that a further action was expected by the UK at the EU level and "I think more will need to be done" he noted (EU Business 2011). However, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece followed a more calculated approach with regards to blacklisting Assad himself. Therefore, a split became clear between the north and south. The fact that the Southern European countries maintained a more cautious approach could also be related to their vulnerability to flow of refugees in terms of their geographical position. In the face of the split in the presence of blacklisting Assad, the Coun-

cil decided to adopt Regulation (EU) No 442/2011 concerning restrictive measures against Syria on 9 May 2011. Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP provides for an arms embargo, a ban on internal repression equipment, and restrictions on the admission to the Union, and the freezing of funds and economic resources, of certain persons and entities responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria (Official Journal of the European Union 2011).

Among those persons, Bashar al-Assad was not present in line with the Southern European countries' wishes. Nevertheless, nothing changed since the implementation of the sanctions. They did not create the intended impact on Assad regime, neither did they function as disincentives to the repression. In fact, as a response to the sanctions, Syrian Foreign Minister claimed that nobody from Europe had come and see what was going on in Syria, and nobody did not know what was really going on in Syria. Annoyed by the attitude of the EU towards the regime, "We will forget that Europe exists on the map" he said (BBC News 2011*g*). In addition to this, it was stated that 900 Syrian people were killed and thousands more were arrested in the protests (DAWN 2011).

In the face of the uncompromising statements from the Syrian Government along with the growing repression, the member states increased their pressure regarding imposing sanctions on the Syrian leader. At this point, Italy also gave up on its reluctance. Underlining their initial unwillingness to personally target al-Assad, "I have to admit a window of opportunity is narrowing day after day" stated Franco Frattini, Foreign Minister of Italy at that time."(EU Business 2011). As a result, on 23 May, the Council adopted Regulation No 442/211 and thereby imposed sanctions on the Syrian President for "authorizing and supervising the crackdown on demonstrators" (EUR-Lex 2011*a*).

Three months after the sanctions had been imposed on al-Assad, a declaration on behalf of the European Union was made by HR Catherine Ashton on 18th of August in which she noted "The President's promises of reform have lost all credibility as reforms cannot succeed under permanent repression"(Ashton 2011*a*). In this statement, it was clear that the EU was aware of the fact that the regime seemed to proceed at any cost. Pointing out the fact that Assad's promises of reform were not trustworthy anymore and emphasizing how unacceptable and intolerable the developments were once more, Ashton indicated further action on the regime as she stated "We have been reaching out to our partners in the region and calling for a Special Session of the UN Human Rights Council on Syria"(Ashton 2011*a*). The declaration was different than the previous ones in the sense that not only the High Representative of the EU but also the leaders of the US, UK, France and Germany

declared that they all were on the same page on the very same day. For example, in a written statement, Barack Obama, the President of the US at that time, accused Assad for standing in the determined Syrian people's way, torturing and killing his people. He also uttered the tightening sanctions of the US against Syria (BBC News 2011f). It was an illustration of an orchestrated attitude of both the EU and US. Nonetheless, it did not lead President of Syria to go, either. On the contrary, the crackdown in Syria got worse. Before the EU found itself in a paralyzed situation among the great powers, it had started to expand the given measures until 2013. At the end of 2011, Catherine Ashton often pointed out the communication between the EU and Arab League and the EU's support to UN in its efforts to stop the violence (Ashton 2011c).

There was a constant emphasis on the notion of systematic cooperation. However, the underlying of the systematic cooperation does not always result in a unified action, neither does it create a peaceful environment where the civilians did not get hurt, which was considered as the motivation behind the sanctions imposed by the EU. At that point, it should be noted that the EU failed to distinguish the impact of the Arab Spring on Assad regime from that on Libya. "Assad must go" strategy was supposed to work if there had not been other variables being visible in the equation like they did not in that of Libya. The incomprehension of the EU was too visible that in fact all of the sanctions on behalf of the EU were imposed in a belief that they would actually be enough for the intended regime change. In a way, the EU both underestimated the possibility of Syrian government's allies to step in and failed to read the Syrian government's signals correctly. The confidence of Syrian government was too obvious that Assad's cousin Mr. Makhoul who was subject to sanctions said that they would not go anywhere, and they would fight until the end, noting that they would not suffer alone. After a while, President Assad's statements also showed that he would not leave the office (Shadid 2011).

5.4 The Limited Role of the EU: A Deadlock in the UN Council

The EU's overall response to the Syrian crisis was parallel to that of the US on a large scale. Apart from the sanctions as its foreign policy tool, the condemnations against the regime and the statements of such member states as the UK, Germany and France were orchestrated as it is noted in the above paragraphs. The fact that they witnessed to fall of Qaddafi also paved the way for the opponents of the regime

to believe that the Syrian crisis would end up in the same way.

What played a significant role in changing the fate of the regime was the Russian support, and the tension between US and Russia felt in UN Security Council. At that point, it should be noted that abstaining of Russia and China led Resolution 1973 to authorize the use of force for the protection of civilians and establish no-fly zone in Libya was passed by the Council on 17 March 2011 (Makdisi and Prashad 2017). Although Russia did not engage in the military action, it did not use its veto right to prevent P3 countries to conduct a military intervention in Libya, either. Seemingly, it was not the case for Syrian crisis. In a belief that the UK, France and the U.S crossed the line by misusing the resolution's authority in Libyan crisis, Russia was certainly exhibiting a cautious attitude towards the crisis in Syria. In this matter, the relationship and historical links between Syria and Russia matter as well. After Hafez el-Assad died in 2000, his son, Bashar al Assad, took power and decided to adopt a policy which is open to international system. In this context, Assad maintained a good relationship with Russia, and looking back at the history, it is known that Syria mostly acted in concert with Russia. Moreover, the Syrian port of Tartus, only port of the Russian navy outside Russia, was often presented as the main reason as to why Russia had its strong support on Russia. No matter what the strategic explanations were, it was pretty obvious that the dynamics of the Syrian crisis would differ largely from those of Libyan due to the constant vetoes coming from Russia and its ally China on resolutions on Syria. To that end, Russia clearly manifested its stance by underscoring the fact that they would not back up any U.N Security Council Resolution on Syria and they did not approve Western military operation in Syria, either (Goodenough 2011). As a matter of fact, Russia took its first concrete step by vetoing a draft resolution in the Security Council aiming at "addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of Syria's population" (UN News 2011).

As a permanent member of the UNSC, Russian's veto to any resolution ends up with the resolution being unauthorized. Vitaly Churkin, the Ambassador of Russia to the United Nations at that time, explained Russia's veto on the draft and noted that "We cannot agree with this unilateral, accusatory bent against Damascus. "We deem unacceptable the threat of an ultimatum and sanctions against the Syrian authorities" Minister Sergey Lavrov, foreign minister of Russia, justified their decision by criticizing the UN resolution (Churkin 2011). Recalling Libya as a lesson learned, Russia averted any demand from the Council that might advocate a military intervention in between 2011 and 2014. The fact that the EU and the US accused Russia of hampering democratic freedoms was also disregarded by Russia due to the fear of reproduction of the "Libyan scenario" in Syria (Akbarzadeh and Saba 2018). Also,

Moscow seemed to be convinced that the US was following its own interests in the region, and its efforts to prevent Iran from establishing a strong presence in Syria, which would pose a great challenge to Israel.

On the side of the US, Washington condemned the Russian veto fiercely as Susan E. Rice, the US ambassador to the UN at that time, stated that “The United States is outraged that this council has utterly failed to address an urgent moral challenge and a growing threat to regional peace and security” (Lynch 2011). However, there was not any reference from Obama administration to a possible US intervention, either. It was noted above paragraphs that Barack Obama supported the EU sanctions on the Syrian regime and called the Syrian President to step down at the initial stages of the conflict. However, when it comes to the US-led intervention, a softer approach was maintained by Obama administration in line with the public sentiment against the US intervention. According to Pew Research Center, for example, it became evident that nearly two-thirds believed that the US “does not have a responsibility to do something about the conflict in Syria (Pew Research Center 2012). On 20 August 2012, Barack Obama revealed his position in the crisis, “we have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized” he underlined (The White House 2012).

In between the definite position of Moscow against any actions to escalate the crisis in Syria and Obama’s red line, the EU found itself in a paralyzed situation in which it mostly emphasized on the humanitarian issues and reinforce the already-existing sanctions. Throughout 2012, there was also a strong emphasis on warning against further militarization. Expressing its concerns about the protection of civilians, the EU pointed out the increasing influx of weapons into Syria and called on all States to “refrain from delivering arms to the country” (Council of the European Union 2012). Additionally, restrictive measures and sanctions described as “an expression of moral outrage of Western policymakers” were reinforced and expanded by the Union (Samaha 2019). Therefore, it can be said that the EU acted cautiously and avoided taking impulsive actions towards the crisis.

5.5 Lack of a Common Approach on the Side of the EU

Two years after the uprising had erupted in Syria, the European Union finally started to change its attitude towards the regime in 2013. Despite the fact that the statement of “Assad must go” was still recognized as Western desire and the sanctions were still present, the EU was aware of the fact that these sanctions would not shift the Syrian government’s behavior towards the intended goal of the West. On the contrary, aggravated by the restrictive measures and sanctions imposed by the West, Assad denounced the opponents “enemies of God and puppets of the West”, underlining the fact that they would welcome diplomatic moves, however, they would negotiate with the “master not the servants” and people with “terrorist” ideas. Also, Assad proposed a number of steps which he believed that would work as a solution to the crisis. Expressing his gratitude for Russia, China and Iran, he suggested that the outside powers needed to stop arming the opponents (BBC News 2013c).

The proposals were rejected by the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), which was accepted as legitimate representatives of the Syrian people and welcomed both by the EU and the US. Also, Assad’s statements were also condemned by the US and the EU. Once again urging Assad to leave the office, both the EU and the US highlighted their consensus on the regime. Meanwhile, William Hague who was working as Britain’s foreign secretary at that time called Assad’s speech “beyond hypocritical” via Twitter (Black 2013).

In 3236th Council meeting, one of the results was based upon easing certain sanctions against Syria. It included oil embargo, as well. The EU suggested that this decision was taken in order to “help civilian population and support the opposition in that country”, reminding of the fact that the EU was the biggest humanitarian donor in Syrian crisis (European Commission 2013a). Accordingly, the EU started to focus on extending its support on the opponents of the regime. It is noteworthy to remember that the foreign policy instruments used by the EU were considered weak on the regime as it was lack of military component. Moreover, there were also different point of views between the member states when it comes to taking further action on Assad regime. It is noteworthy to underline that the arms embargo was adopted by the Council on 9 May 2011 as a part of its initial response highlighted above. However, it got to a point where France and Britain urged the EU to lift the arms embargo to the Syrian rebels as they think it would lead less casualty, as William Hague, the Foreign Secretary of Britain at that time, suggested that “supplying arms to moderate opposition forces would lead to less killing in Syria” (Traynor

2013).

On 15 March 2013, France and the UK revealed their endorsement for lifting the arms embargo. In fact, they even indicated that they had the ability to meet this expectation unilaterally independent from the EU. In this matter, David Cameron stated that “If we want to take individual action, [and] we think that is in our national interest, of course we are free to do so” (BBC News 2013a). Francois Hollande, the President of France at that time, supported Cameron. “We have the certainty on the use of these weapons” he noted (BBC News 2013a). These assertive statements of the British and the French leaders mounted the tension at the EU level, leading the expected comprehensive policy towards Syria to seem more elusive. Uttering that she had not decided yet on this particular issue, “the fact that two (countries) have changed their position is not enough for 25 others to follow suit” Merkel said (BBC News 2013a).

On the other hand, such countries as Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria expressed their concerns over lifting of arms embargo by underscoring the fact that it would only lead to an increase in violence in Syria. It should also be stated that Sweden was hesitant to sign the letter drafted by Switzerland to the UN Security Council, requesting to take President Assad to the ICC. Subsequently, it became the only EU member state which had not signed the letter. Reportedly, the governments that did not add their signature to the letter justified their decision by pointing out the fact that justice and accountability would sabotage any potential settlement with the Assad regime (Human Rights Watch 2013). Following the tension among the member states The Council agreed to sustain the already existing restrictive measures except for the arms embargo at the end of the May in line with the Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP which includes “export and import restrictions with the exception of arms and related material and equipment which might be used for internal repression” (Official Journal of the European Union 2013).

In spite of the fact that the EU took this decision jointly, it was taken reluctantly. The decision was often interpreted as “forcefully driven through by Britain and France at the expense of European unity”, and “a dangerous gamble” in the media (Tisdall 2013). The European Commission and the High Representative adopted on a joint communication on 24 June 2013 (European Commission 2013b).

The overall EU response aimed to support a progress in political term to solve the crisis in Syria and its impacts on neighboring countries sustainably. The deteriorating humanitarian situation in Syria was once again emphasized and presented as a problem which had to be solved urgently through a long-term political solution. The communication included:

- To support for a political settlement (Geneva II Conference on Syria);
- To ensure access of humanitarian assistance to all war-affected areas
- To increase EU budget financial assistance by around EUR 400M in 2013
- To support the UN in dealing with claims of human rights and international humanitarian law violations
- To promote solidarity with particularly vulnerable persons who may be proposed for resettlement on EU territory
- To prevent radicalization of EU citizens and deal with EU foreign fighters that have travelled to the conflict zone
- To prepare for the post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation phase.

5.6 The Chemical Attack in Ghouta and Faith in the UN

On 21 August 2013, a chemical attack took place in Ghouta, Syria. The use of chemical weapons also drew attention to former US President's red line, as it was noted earlier that he gave a strong message to the world regarding his position in the face of the use of chemical weapons. With the 'red line' being crossed for its "big brother", the EU followed a strategy in which it waited for the statements that were expected from the White House. However, the statements coming from Paris and London outside of the EU umbrella were more aggressive and interventionist. For example, Laurent Fabius, the French foreign minister at that time, declared that "we need a reaction by the international community, a reaction of force" following the attack (Borger 2013). To show their support for a "strong response", the UK and France along with Italy and Spain signed a statement of the US calling for a "strong international response", which was not signed by Germany at the final day of the Group of Twenty (G20) Summit (Karmi 2013). The idea of military intervention was strongly disapproved by Russia once again.

The initial response came from Catherine Ashton on 7 September after the G20 meeting in which she stated "that attack constituted a blatant violation of international law, a war crime, and a crime against humanity. We were unanimous in condemning in the strongest terms this horrific attack (...) In the face of this cynical use of chemical weapons, the international community cannot remain idle"

(Ashton 2013). In the statement, there was no indication for a military intervention, neither was there clear-cut position with regards to the scope of the response that the “international community” should give. Furthermore, the Union clearly placed itself in a position where it relied upon the UN, as an international community instead of showing its own capabilities under the framework of the CFSP/CSDP.

As it was noted, France and the UK were the main advocates for a response that included military dimensions. The situation for the UK changed when the US decided to refrain from intervening although the “red line” was long crossed with the chemical attack. Recognizing himself as “war-weary”, Obama’s soft approach along with the Russian’s strong attitude towards anti-military intervention had its first impact on the UK politics when David Cameron lost in the United Kingdom House of Commons vote on Syria action (BBC News 2013b). Furthermore, when the US and Russia reached on an agreement on 14 September, calling Syria to destroy its arsenal of chemical weapons (Gordon 2013).

As Marc Pierini from the Carnegie Europe uttered, the situation paved the way for the EU to find itself between two choices: either to have a unified position and assert influence on the course of action in Syria, or let one or two member states “satisfy themselves with following the U.S. lead” (Pierini 2016). As the UK started to become more preoccupied with its new agenda, namely its vote to leave the EU, which also played a role in leading the country to lose its appetite, France lost its main ally among the member states (Dempsey 2006). Therefore, adopting a substantial policy towards Syrian crisis at the EU level under CFSP/CSDP framework became more difficult than it had already been.

5.7 Between the Years of 2014-2015: No Actorness

One thing was clear for the EU, the course of events in Syria including the chemical attack proved the effectiveness of the sanctions wrong. Considering the fact that the protection of the civilians was recognized as the main motivation of the EU sanctions, use of chemicals and the causality demonstrated that no matter who was responsible of the attack, the bad situation of civilians did not change. Moreover, non-governmental organizations working in Syria often said that the sanctions were not smart enough and they were only doing opposite of what Western countries claimed they would not: impeding aid (Lund 2019).

Most experts described the sanctions as the second punishment to civilians, underlying the fact that the EU and the US failed to define the targets of the sanctions and they neither became beneficial to the protection of civilians nor eased the regime's pressure on them since debilitating the entire economy meant that civilians would also be affected from it. However, stuck in between the US, Russia and diverging preferences of the member states regarding the Syrian crisis, the EU could not be able to commit to a comprehensive strategy.

In this regard, the Union imposed, deepened, partly lifted and extended sanctions with the intent of regime change until 2015 without finding a common position between the member states as to how to respond the crisis through concrete steps. On 3 June 2014, presidential elections took place in Syria. One day after the elections and Assad's victory, the EU made a statement concerning the eligibility of the elections and emphasized that the election could not be recognized as democratic vote and "the EU thus considers that these elections are illegitimate and undermine the political efforts to find a solution to this horrific conflict" (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey 2014).

In between 2014-2015, the threat from terrorism found itself a bigger place in the equation. The refugee problem also started to be felt densely by the EU. In 2014, the main statements included:

- Strong condemnations against the violations of human rights in Syria.
- Welcoming the commitment of the National Coalition and Free Syrian Army to practice international law.
- Supporting the neighboring countries affected by Syrian refugee inflows to a large extent.
- Calling all parties to support further action by the UNSC.
- Endorsing Geneva Communiqué, which could not reach a breakthrough in the end.

Appearance of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) on the stage led the real shift in the approaches. Accordingly, the attacks that took place in Paris, Nice and Brussels led the EU to recognize this civil war as a significant security threat. On 12 October 2015, Council conclusions on Syria were mainly based upon the fact that the EU supported the efforts to counter Da'esh in Syria and Iraq (Council of the European Union 2015). As a result of this perceived threat from ISIS, the statements concerning "security of borders and citizens", "refugee crises" came to the fore, which ultimately drew the Europeans' attention to the risk of terrorism

and migration issues.

To sum up, the EU was not able to respond to the crisis properly. The deadlock in the U.N Security Council concerning the common policy on Syria also led Europe to be paralyzed between Russia and the US as it was dealing with the different preferences of its own member states. Starting with the EU's decision to lift the arm embargo, there was a clear disunity with regards to the position that the EU should take. French ambition to support opposition forces along with its demand for military intervention especially after the chemical attack that took place in Ghouta clashed with the non-interventionist approach of Germany too. The disunity also resulted in weakening the EU's presence as a global player, decreasing the strength of its stance against the crisis. As pointed out before, when Islamic State of Iraq and Syria had come to the fore, the EU started to shift its attention to the risk of terrorism and refugee problem as its most prominent concerns, and thus seemed to give up seeking justice and accountability which had been considered necessary at the initial stage of the crisis. Thus, Russia made its Western partners, irritated as they may be, more attentive to Russia's opinion (Baev 2015). In any case, the Union failed to insert a strong presence in the crisis due to the lack of political coherence in formulating a concrete policy response to the crisis when it first erupted.

6. Conclusion

As it can be seen in the cases of the Libyan and Syrian crises, the EU could not be able to formulate a concrete strategy as to how it should react the crises. In the absence of a unified position, the Union found it difficult to take operational actions collectively. It was pointed out in Intergovernmentalist approach that the decision-making process for the member states has two levels. At the domestic level, the preferences of three big EU member states namely Germany, France and the UK have often been shaped differently. At the intergovernmental level, the Union's ability to speak with one voice have mostly been restrained by diverging member state interests especially in the realm of the Common Security and Defense Policy.

As pointed out the EU's first missions in BiH, there is a traditional gap between the Euro-Atlanticist and Global Power EU coalitions, which resonated in the EU's policies in the EUPM and EUFOR Althea. Although the Union was able to initiate a military operation in BiH, different national caveats in addition to the different perspectives of the member states regarding the EU's presence in the region often interrupted with the functioning of the operations. Germany's support for EUFOR Althea was directly related to the already secure environment of the region. As the military presence of Germany would not last long, the German government decided to be a moderate supporter without taking the risk of being excluded by the UK and France. Even so, Germany avoided using military force and followed a more cautious strategy. The position of France was shaped strongly in line with its Europeanist principles in which it did not want the EU to be systematically dependent on NATO. The strong Europeanist position of France generally clashed with the UK as the biggest supporter of Transatlantic Alliance. Although St. Malo Declaration paved the way for the EU to earn a security and defense identity, it became clear that the UK would always take an action in security and defense realm within the knowledge of the US. Due to the differences in the perspectives of the member states towards the EU as a military actor, the contributions of the member states to the operations were largely affected.

As for the Libyan Crisis, the CFSP mechanism was supposed to function better

given the extended responsibilities of the High Representative through the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. The question of “Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?” raised by Henry Kissinger would finally find itself a proper answer in the presence of the improved position of the High Representative, namely Catherine Ashton at that time. Nonetheless, this position was so undermined that it proved the inefficiency of the HR over the diverging positions of the member states individually. Although the difficulty of speaking with one voice on behalf of a group of states is understandable, it is necessary at least to adopt a common position to maintain a proper level of coherence among the Union. The EU failed to formulate a coherent strategy as a response to the Libyan crisis in the face of the different approaches of its three big member states. Germany was strictly stick to its traditional anti-interventionist principles, which ultimately led the country to abstain from the UNSC Resolution at the expense of losing its credibility in the international community. It was a very strong signal that demonstrated that the domestic preferences of the country prevailed in the cost/benefit calculations of the German government. Although Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed her respect for the NATO’s involvement as she later supported the EUFOR Libya, these actions were taken as a compensation. On the other hand, France appeared as the driving force of the Libyan intervention from day one. Sarkozy’s assertive stance was too visible that he always managed to be ‘the first leader’ to take any and every action against Gaddafi. The impulsive behaviors of Sarkozy were not endorsed by the EU. As unwilling as the French government was, Paris witnessed the NATO-led operations taking place due to the lack of unity in the CSDP realm. The UK appeared as a player which shaped its preferences in national sphere. In spite of it happened to be a strong advocate of the military intervention as France was, the two member states found themselves in the traditional gap between the Europeanism and Atlanticism once again, which ultimately enabled the US to turn a hand to the EU-level dead-end.

When it comes to the EU’s response to the Syrian crisis, the Union failed to present itself as an actor in the crisis due to its failure of adopting a coherent policy towards the crisis. However, the challenges that were imposed to the EU in the Syrian crisis differ from those of the Libya crisis in terms of the involvement of the great powers, leading a dead lock in the UN Council. In addition to that, the different preferences of the ‘Big Three’ regarding the EU’s real actorness in the crisis were too definite that the Union did not even able to react the crisis properly. At the initial stages of the crisis, Germany acted in a more accommodating manner than it did in the Libyan crisis. However, the country did not abandon its strict stance against any kind of military intervention under the CDSP. France, on the other hand, appeared as a strong supporter of military measures once more. The UK was

indeed supported France in terms of the necessity for giving a strong response to the Syrian Government. Nonetheless, the shifting policy of the US with regards to the military intervention reduced the weight of the statements against the Assad regime. As the country started to be more engaged with “Brexit” in its agenda, the idea of a military intervention slightly disappeared on the side of the UK. Under the pressure of so many actors on the ground and the paralysis of the international community itself, the High Representative could not commit to anything at all.

In the light of the cases, it is seen that although the Syrian crisis resembles that of Libyan in the conflicting member state tendencies on responding to the both crises and limited role of the HR in the process, it differs from the latter in that the exogenous factors were more apparent in the Syrian crisis. Russia, as a more assertive player in the European Eastern and Southern Neighborhood revealed itself as the main supporter of the Assad Regime. While the EU lacked a single voice as to how it should handle the crisis, Russia as a nation state with most of its resources channeled in the state administration certainly played a bigger role in shaping the crisis in line with its national interest.

It should be noted once again that both the Libyan and Syrian crises had erupted after the Lisbon Treaty had been adopted. Therefore, it can be said that the arc of instability that grew around Europe as this thesis particularly discusses the conflicts in Libya and Syria was supposed to be managed by the Union more effectively due to the improved role of the High Representative. Nonetheless, the adjustments in the role of the HR did not necessarily play a positive role in shaping the collective response of the EU to the crises. The role of the High Representative still remained limited as it had been the member states that determined how the HR, namely Catherine Ashton would negotiate and what kind of a stance she would take at the end of the day.

As illustrated in the initial response to the Libyan crisis at the EU level, the member States agreed on the fact that Gaddafi government should be condemned strictly, and restrictive measures against his regime were necessary to be adopted after a time of bargaining. The official declarations of the HR on condemning and imposing sanctions on the Gaddafi government were made after the EU member states had initiated so. However, it was not possible for the HR to speak or welcome any action on behalf of the EU in the event of conflicting member state preferences as it was the case for the question of the NFZ over Libya.

Similarly, the HR was able to represent the Union effectively when it comes to targeting Bashar al-Assad directly and lifting the arms embargo as all these actions were an outcome of lowest common denominator of the member states. However, it

was not possible for the Union and therefore the HR to adopt any military action in Syria under the CSDP when Germany was adamantly against it.

As previously mentioned, the Union's ability to act in concert particularly in the high politics area have correlated strongly with the preferences of the Big Three. What the Libyan and Syrian crises had in common was that Germany revealed itself as a reluctant leader in the security and defense field for the both cases. It went so far as to abstain from voting at the UN Security Council on Libya. On the other hand, France and the United Kingdom presented themselves as more ambitious leaders when it comes to militarily responding to both of the crises, at least in their initial stages. However, these two countries positioned themselves in an extremely different ways when it comes to the question whether the US should take the lead of the military intervention. While the UK tried to soften up the ground for the US to take the lead of a military intervention in the both crises, France acted as an autonomous actor.

As demonstrated in the Libyan and Syrian cases, diverging member state preferences shaped the EU's ability to give a collective response in its foreign policy. Lack of collective response undermined the EU's ability to have a strong impact on easing both the Libyan and Syrian crises. On account of the intergovernmental nature and set up of the CFSP, the Union seems almost handcuffed, when searching for a unified voice with regards to foreign policy (Cameron 1998). Therefore, the EU often runs into difficulty when it comes to foreign affairs policy making, and it leads the strongest member states to act on their own instead of developing a strong strategy. As the political power rests in the member states in high politics areas such as security and defense, acting in concert and having the same level of the political will to present the EU as a strong actor in the foreign policy seem to be necessary for the member states. Otherwise, it is unlikely for the Union to be seen as a strong and reliable security actor at the international stage due to the constant lack of coherence in its foreign policy.

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