



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of International Relations

**SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
EFFECTS ON TURKISH MIGRATION PRACTICES**

Kübra HASTUNÇ

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2018

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PRACTICES

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
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
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KABUL VE ONAY


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- ☐ **Serbest Seçenek/Yazarın Seçimi**

17 / 01 / 2018



Kübra HASTUNÇ

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Bu çalışmadaki bütün bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar çerçevesinde elde ettiğimi, görsel, işitsel ve yazılı tüm bilgi ve sonuçları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduğumu, kullandığım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadığımı, yararlandığım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduğumu, tezimin kaynak gösterilen durumlar dışında özgün olduğunu, Prof. Dr. Müge KINACIOĞLU danışmanlığında tarafımdan üretildiğini ve Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Yazım Yönergesine göre yazıldığını beyan ederim.



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To my dear brother M. Yusuf Çoban

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ABSTRACT

HASTUNÇ, Kübra. *Securitization of Migration in the EU: Effects on Turkish Migration Practices*, Master's Thesis, Ankara, 2018.

The phenomenon of migration is a highly debated topic in international politics in recent years, rising in importance on the global agenda. This can be seen in the securitization of migration policies of the EU, who has sought to restrict migration and sharpen border controls since mid-70s. In this process Turkey is of vital importance, considered one of the main bridges for transit migration into the EU. Thus, the securitization of migration in the EU has been influencing the Turkish migration management. The developing research on securitization of migration draws the attention to how migration is administered/framed as a security issue. However, these works put the focus exclusively on the EU and pay little attention to how the securitization in the EU restructures third countries' migration policies. This thesis intends to fill this gap in literature and question whether migration is securitized or not in Turkey through exploring the Turkey's compliance with the EU migration policies in the context of securitization, and programs and discourses of political parties on migration. Because of its strategic geopolitical position (e.g. being one of the most important transit countries for irregular migrants and asylum seekers into Europe) and in relation to its candidacy status, Turkey provides a very suitable framework in order to depict how the EU expands the securitization process into third countries and how candidate countries (are obliged to) follow the EU's requirements and thereby replicating the same securitization process in their migration policies. In the thesis, 'securitization theory' of the Copenhagen School given that it has become a reference point in the literature on migration issue and the analytical framework of 'Europeanization' used to assess whether and how EU's securitized policies led to change in Turkey's migration policy.

Keywords

Migration, securitization, Copenhagen School, European Union, Turkey

ÖZET

HASTUNÇ, Kübra. *Avrupa Birliği'nde Göçün Güvenlikleştirilmesi: Türkiye'nin Göç Uygulamaları Üzerindeki Etkileri*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2018.

Göç olgusu, son yıllarda uluslararası politikada oldukça tartışılan ve küresel gündemde giderek önemi artan bir konudur. Bu durum, özellikle 70'li yılların ortalarından itibaren göçü sınırlamaya ve sınır kontrollerini güçlendirmeye çalışan Avrupa Birliği'nin göç politikalarının güvenlikleştirilmesinde görülebilir. Bu süreçte Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği için transit göçün temel geçiş noktalarından biri olarak hayati önem taşımaktadır. Bu sebeple, göç konusunun Avrupa Birliği'nde güvenlikleştirilmesinin, Türkiye'nin göç yönetimi üzerinde de etkileri olmuştur. Göçün güvenlikleştirilmesi konusunda gelişmekte olan araştırmalar, göçün bir güvenlik meselesi olarak nasıl düzenlendiğine/yönetildiğine dikkat çekmektedir. Ancak bu çalışmalar, yalnızca Avrupa Birliği'ne odaklanıp AB'deki güvenlikleştirmenin üçüncü ülkelerin göç politikalarını nasıl yeniden yapılandırıldığını göz ardı etmektedir. Bu tez, Türkiye'nin güvenlikleştirme bağlamında AB göç politikalarına uyumunu ve siyasi partilerin programlarını ve göç konusundaki söylemlerini inceleyerek Türkiye'de göçün güvenlikleştirilip güvenlikleştirilmediğini sorgulamayı ve literatürdeki bu boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlamaktadır. Stratejik jeopolitik konumu nedeniyle (örneğin, düzensiz göçmenler ve sığınmacıların Avrupa'ya girişi için en önemli transit ülkelere biri olmak) ve adaylık statüsüyle ilişkili olarak Türkiye, AB'nin güvenlikleştirme sürecini üçüncü ülkelere doğru nasıl genişlettiğini ve aday ülkelerin AB'nin taleplerini yerine getirip kendi göç politikalarında aynı güvenlikleştirme sürecini nasıl uyguladıklarını (ya da uygulamak zorunda kaldıklarını) göstermesi açısından çok uygun bir çerçeve sunmaktadır. Bu tezde, AB'nin güvenlikleştirilmiş politikalarının Türkiye'nin göç politikası üzerinde bir değişime sebep olup olmadığı ve nasıl olduğu, literatürde göç konusunda bir referans noktası haline gelen Kopenhag Okulu'nun 'güvenlikleştirme teorisi' ile birlikte analitik çerçeve olarak 'Avrupalaşma' kullanılarak değerlendirilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Göç, güvenlikleştirme, Kopenhag Okulu, Avrupa Birliği, Türkiye

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD	Disaster and Emergency Management Authority
AFSJ	Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
AHIG	Ad Hoc Group on Immigration
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJEU	Court of Justice of the European Union
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
JDP	Justice and Development Party
NMP	Nationalist Movement Party
PDP	Peoples' Democratic Party
RPP	Republican People's Party
SEA	Single European Act
SIS II	Schengen Information System II
UN	United Nations
VIS	Visa Information System

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of international migration has become increasingly important especially in the international arena since the 1990s and as a policy area within the European Union itself, and it takes place at the top of the EU agenda. As the process of enlargement and deepening of the EU progresses, importance of migration phenomenon increases in economic and political integration efforts. In addition, migration policy has a decisive role in the EU's efforts to create a "field of freedom, security and justice", one of the main objectives of the EU as stated in the Lisbon Treaty (Smith & Timmins, 2001). In this context, the EU is taking a firm action towards establishing a common migration policy since the Amsterdam Treaty signed in 1997. While steps are being taken to create a common migration policy, the dynamics of 2004 enlargement process reveal that these common policies should be reflected in foreign policy. Hence, intertwined reflections of the common migration policy both in domestic policy and foreign policy has emerged.

A security-oriented approach seems to be dominant in establishing a common migration policy in the EU. As a matter of fact, while common policies are being developed on issues related to border controls and fighting against irregular migration, legal migration issue has not been transferred to the supranational area. For this reason, the EU migration policy will be examined in this thesis in light of the securitization theory. International migration, after the end of the Cold War, has become one of the issues included in the security agenda of states and their threat perceptions, besides the issues of energy, organized crime and environmental problems (Chebel D'Appollonia & Reich, 2008). To analyze this threat structuring, the securitization theory has been developed by the Copenhagen School, and this theory is applied to various areas of migration (Faist, 2005). In this context, this thesis study aims to evaluate whether EU's security-oriented migration policies create or not a security-oriented approach in the candidate countries and third countries, especially in Turkey, through the EU's externalization policy. The securitization of EU migration policy was not only applicable in domestic politics, but it also influential in the externalization of common migration policy. Externalization, also referred to (Baldaccini, 2007) as the external dimension of EU common migration policy, has become one of the EU's priorities in recent years. Within this context, it is seen that the EU's internal policy goals and the integration in the field of migration are supported through foreign policy. Therefore, it is intended that the EU's restrictive and security-oriented migration policies are reflected in third countries,

primarily in the candidate and neighboring countries, and better control of migration movements towards the EU is established.

The EU candidate countries are in a decisive position in the externalization of migration policies. Because these countries will create and protect the EU's external borders in the future. As a candidate country, Turkey, is located at the core of externalization strategy. Turkey is an emigrant country in the 1960s, but it has become a migration-receiving and transit country after 1980s. In this process, Turkey stands out among the main transit countries through which migration movements towards the EU pass. This situation is also reflected in Turkey-EU relations, and process of securitization and externalization of the EU migration policy is closely affecting Turkey in the membership process. In the literature, while the EU migration policy and the Turkey migration policy are examined separately or in relation to each other, there is no holistic study that covers the EU common migration policy and its reflections in Turkey in the context of the securitization and externalization dynamics. Within this scope, reflections of the securitization and externalization of EU migration policies in Turkey will be examined in order to fill this gap.

This thesis entitled "Securitization of Migration in the EU: Effects on Turkish Migration Practices" is based on the following arguments: EU migration policy is developed in a security-oriented way both in domestic policy and foreign policy. These security-oriented policies are spreading through the conditionality policy¹ and spillover effects towards neighboring countries, third countries the EU has close relations, and candidate countries including Turkey. Despite the European Commission's statement on the establishment of a comprehensive migration policy considering immigrant rights, the policies and practices in this area continue and develop with security understanding. These policies are failing to prevent irregular migration. They also place a financial and humanitarian burden, and even lead to strengthening of criminal networks and human trafficking.

¹ By constituting a key part of the EU's enlargement strategy, conditionality is a successful element of the Union's foreign policy. The conditionality policy refers to the fulfilment of the conditions determined by the priorities of the promise of technical and financial assistance, association agreements, and ultimately membership to influence the conduct of both non-member and non-candidate countries. As in other policy fields, the conditionality for membership has proved to be a powerful instrument in the promotion of strict immigration control standards beyond the territory of the member states. For more information on this subject, see: Karen Smith, "The Evolution and Application of the EU Membership Conditionality", in M. Cremona (ed), *The Enlargement of the European Union*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp.105-109.

The EU is externalizing its security-oriented migration policy to third countries through the conditionality policy and encouraging them to develop their policies in line with the EU migration policy. However, conditionality policy does not adequately work since the incentives offered to the third countries apart from candidate countries are considered insufficient by these countries. From these countries' point of view, the conditionality policy on migration is EU-centered and does not sufficiently consider the drawbacks of source and transit countries. Migration is a multilateral phenomenon that directly affects the source countries, transit countries, destination countries and immigrants. Because of this feature, migration movements can only be managed by a policy takes into account the needs of all parties. Therefore, development of a common policy considering immigrant rights for the management of migration movements in the source, transit and destination countries will provide a win-win situation for all involved parties.

The thesis developed around these arguments consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, the thesis explains the theoretical framework and examines briefly various aspects of securitization as a theoretical tool of analysis as well as the evolution of migration as a security threat. Since the securitization theory constitutes theoretical basis of the thesis, the first chapter essentially surveys the securitization theory as developed by Copenhagen School of security studies. It also discusses the process in which the securitization takes place. In this context, the chapter also takes into account the process of desecuritization. The second chapter of the thesis deals with the establishment of EU common migration policy and its relation to securitization. The chapter examines elements of migration policy that are transferred to the supranational level in the EU. It also deals with the question of how the security-oriented approaches are effective, and how this reflects on the member and candidate countries. The chapter explores the ways in which migration policies have been transferred to the supranational level by analyzing the treaties, summits, five-year programs on the development of the area of freedom, security and justice, since the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992. In this context, it will examine the migration-security nexus and, how and to what extent securitization in the EU has taken place in this process. The chapter also assesses the perceptions and concerns about migration and securitization discourses on this issue in the EU countries. With the transfer of migration to the supranational arena, the EU institutions have emerged as securitization actors in this process. Therefore, this part addresses the different approaches and discourses of the Council of Europe, the European Commission and the European Parliament on the securitization and migration as well. These viewpoints are

discerned by examining the documents adopted by the Council of Europe and the Commission, and the discourses of political groups in the European Parliament. Then, the chapter analyzes the securitization areas consisting of combating irregular migration and border controls. Finally, after considering how the securitization of migration is affected by global dynamics, the chapter examines the extent to which desecuritization process, aimed at bringing a balanced approach to migration, takes place in the EU.

The third chapter seeks to assess Turkey's alignment with the EU migration policy in the light of securitization. In this context, firstly, Turkey's transition from an emigrant country to a migration-receiving and transit country is assessed. Membership negotiations between the EU and Turkey started on 3 October 2005, and the EU acquis chapter of "Justice, Freedom and Security", which deals with migration policies, has not been negotiated yet. Nonetheless, combating irregular migration policies have been on the top of Turkey-EU agenda especially in 2009 and 2010. The progress of negotiation process and attribution of special importance to Turkey in the EU externalization policy reveals the problem of Europeanization² of Turkey's migration policy. In this regard, Europeanization of Turkey's visa policy, integrated border management and combating irregular migration policies will be assessed in this section. In addition, the changing strategies of the EU and Turkey on the visa facilitation/exemption treaties, which are presented as an incentive for Europeanization, and readmission agreement will also be examined. Finally, impacts of the EU's securitization tendencies on Turkey's migration policy in the harmonization process will be evaluated. Within this framework, the politicization tendency of migration policies, which is the first step of securitization, will be scrutinized by examining the programs of four political parties to determine whether or not international migration in Turkey has become a "security" issue or not.

² The issue of migration management and regulating irregular migration is viewed as a part of the 'Europeanization' process. Although there is not a mutual agreement on how to define Europeanization, the term is commonly used to depict the 'influence of the EU' and/or the 'domestic impact of the EU'. According to Radaelli (2003: 30), more precisely, it refers to "processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies".

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. Introduction

Studies on irregular migration in the European Union can be analyzed thoroughly under the securitization theory of Copenhagen School. Therefore, first chapter of the thesis establish a theoretical foundation of main subject. The EU countries consider that immigrants coming through illegal ways will have a negative impact on their economies, political policies, and sociocultural balances, and develop new policies in order to ensure their security. Jef Huysmans' conceptualization of securitization on three related themes (internal security, cultural identity and welfare state) is used as the supplementary reference to show how the EU securitizes migration issue. Accordingly, securitization of migration issue in Europe can be addressed within the four aspects. These aspects are; internal security, cultural identity, welfare state and social security. Within the scope of internal securitization, the text of EU agreements and discourses of political elites are examined and the securitization concept is discussed in the context of internal security. In terms of cultural security, creation of the "other" discourse and establishment of a homogeneous society is the subject of discussion. At this point, demographic characteristics of the EU countries, and effects of migration issue on their population structure and employment level are examined in the context of sociocultural security. Immigrants are also securitized economically in terms of sharing the facilities of welfare state and creating unemployment problem. This chapter reveals that cultural and internal security concerns play an important role in securitization of migration at the EU level. However, in the integration process, Europe which seeks to become an important economic, political and security power, seems to securitized migration mainly on an economic basis.

1.2. Copenhagen School and Securitization Theory

The Copenhagen School, based on a constructivist approach, is a group working on security that emerged at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) and is consisted of important scholars like Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, Pierre Lemaitre, Morten Kelstrup and Elzbieta Tromer (Waever, *Securitization and Desecuritization*, 1995). The Copenhagen School has introduced new concepts such as "securitization" and "desecuritization" for rethinking security. The School has broadened and reconceptualized the notion of security beyond the state by defining new categories of security: military, political,

environmental, societal, and economic security. And it has also played a significant role in providing a useful framework to analyse how a specific issue becomes securitized or desecuritized.

According to Copenhagen School's approach, security is seen as speech-acts. It means articulation of a specific issue as an existential threat to security. Moreover, the issues can be presented as a security problem through the use of speech-acts and it is called 'securitization'. The Copenhagen School regards the speech-act as the starting point of the securitization process. Any issue can become a security problem through the speech-act alone, irrespective of whether the issue creates an existential threat in material terms (Emmers, 2016: 134). Securitization theory has been used extensively in international relations and political science studies in our country recently (Baysal & Lüleci, 2011: 63). The concept of securitization was originally proposed by Ole Waever in his well-known article "Securitization and Desecuritization" published in 1995, and then it used as a theory that became the basis for other works of the Copenhagen School writers.³ Securitization theory was later discussed in detail in a book titled by 'Security: A New Framework for Analysis' published in 1998 and then it was further elaborated in the security studies literature.⁴ According to this theory, in the simplest term, calling a subject as 'security' makes it a security problem. With the securitization act, an issue is already shown as a threat, so that it takes an absolute primacy over other issues. Thus, the securitizing actors (e.g. states, policy-makers, governments, bureaucracies, lobbyists, political leaders, and pressure groups) gain legitimacy to resolve the issue by using extraordinary means or taking measures (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998: 21). Securitizing actor, consciously, labels the issues that he would like to use extraordinary measures as a security problem. The actor states that it is an emergency situation by using the term "security", and in this way demands using all measures necessary to resolve this security threat (O'Reilly, 2008). When an actor uses rhetoric to present an argument and declares to an audience that an object of security is existentially threatened, depending upon circumstances and acceptance, the issue can be located or end up on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized, through politicized, to securitized (see Figure 1) (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998: 23). In brief, a state representative puts a particular development into a private space by uttering the concept of security and demands the right to use all the means necessary to

³ Ole Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization", *On Security*, Ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 46-87.

⁴ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, "Security: A New Framework for Analysis", Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

prevent this development. The usage of "security" word for a subject ranks it in priority of policy agenda and creates a sense of immediate situation that requires using every means available by state.




Figure 1 - Securitization moves

Source: Piedade (2016)

Another important point is that, according to Copenhagen School writers securitization is an intersubjective process (Williams, 2003). Namely, securitization is an intersubjective process built upon the idea that the construction of security meaning requires both the securitizing actor and the securitization audience. Even if a securitization decision is taken by a single actor, the securitization process is not a subjective process. On the other hand, the securitization theory does not accept only objective understanding of security. Success of a securitization process is determined not only by securitization actor, but also the relevant audience of securitization act. In other words, the securitization of a specific issue can be described as successful or unsuccessful depending on the acceptability of an existential threat by the target audience. Discourses of a securitization actor must convince the audience for successful act of securitization. Individuals cannot decide on their own whether a matter is a security issue or not. Therefore, securitization should be regarded as an intersubjective and socially constructed process: whether a reference object is an object deserving to survive, the threat is a security threat, the threat legitimizes the usage of extraordinary measures or not; all these issues are socially constructed (Buzan et al., 1998: 31).

Unlike many other security studies, the Copenhagen School does not treat the security clearly as a positive value. According to this view, security is often a situation that should be avoided. The writers of the School define securitization as the failure of normal politics and they use the 'less security, more politics' slogan (Wæver, 1995). Therefore, the normative stance of the School is to support "desecuritization". Wæver (2005) advocates the removal of certain issues from the security agenda as a contrary process to securitization, and he conceptualizes it as desecuritization. Desecuritization (issues are not considered under the concept of security, normalization of the subjects) is identified as moving of issues from extraordinary area to ordinary area rather than characterized as threats to be taken extraordinary measures. The Copenhagen School is questioning whether it is a good idea to frame as many problems as possible on the basis of security (Wæver, 1995: 64). Securitization strengthens the logic of "us and others" (Buzan et al., 1998: 208). Accordingly, the Copenhagen School advocates return of securitized issues to the normal policy area (issues should be desecuritized) instead of extension the scope of security in an extreme and unreasonable way. Desecuritization is the ideal goal for the Copenhagen School scholars (Wæver, 2003). Ole Wæver (1995), who first introduced this concept, explains why an issue should be excluded from security area as follows: If approaching an issue in security context is not effective for solving the problem, desecuritization policies may be effective. The School writers generally think that addressing the issues in a security context may have dangerous consequences so keeping them in the political area is a better choice, it will be easier to solve problems in this way. Matt McDonald, who has made significant contributions to the Copenhagen School, clearly stated this stance of the School as 'Proponents of the School defend desecuritization, namely the necessity of removing issues from the security area.' (McDonald, 2008).

Wæver has offered harsh critiques of the security studies for leading to only security-oriented thinking. In other words, security studies strengthen securitization because they only impose a security-oriented point of view to political and social problems. Therefore, Wæver criticizes this approach of the security studies through the concept of desecuritization. As I pointed out before, desecuritization is about removing the problems addressed in the security context from the definition of existential threat (Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, 2006). Wæver and Huysmans theorized three strategies of desecuritization: preventive-objective strategy, constructivist strategy and deconstructivist strategy. Firstly, in preventive-objective strategy, relevant actors do not speak about a certain issue as a threat at all. They try to convince the target audience that there is no connection

between the subject matter and security, and it cannot be a security problem ever. Within this framework, there should be no link between the issue and security and no security-related discourses on the subject. In the case of migration issue, this strategy can be implemented by for example emphasizing the benefits that the immigrants bring to society and economy instead of characterizing as a security threat.

Secondly, in constructivist strategy, already securitized issues should not be approached as a security problem anymore. It is aimed at reducing the success of securitization activities here. For instance, in the case of migration issue, the securitization of migration is restricted by using the concept of social security only. Thirdly, deconstructivist strategy brings the issue back to normal policy area. In this strategy, it is aimed to remove actively the link between the related issue and security (Wæver, 2000). Thus, while an issue may not been previously securitized, it can be restructured as a security threat at a later time. Similarly, the securitization of an issue does not mean that it will remain so forever. For example, communism was successfully structured and accepted as a threat previously, but then it was completely out of the threat within four to five years at the end of the Cold War. In this process, the discourse has completely changed. This is one of the best examples of something previously structured and accepted as a threat is no longer a threat, namely desecuritization.

1.3. Securitization of Migration

In order to explain relationship between migration and security and the "securitization of migration" concept, it is first necessary to briefly look at the historical development of security. It appears that there is no sustainable security understanding in the aftermath of two world wars in the 20th century. When the wars came to an end, new matters of debate emerged. One significant question was how security issues must be resolved. In this respect, realism dominated security studies during the Cold War. The realist approach treats security as an extension of power (Comak, 2006: 99). The neo-realist version makes a distinction between high politics and low politics. According to Kenneth Waltz, security and military issues are included in the high policy area, while issues of prosperity and wealth enhancement constitute low policy area. Accordingly, priority of the state is to maximize security (Ari, 2013: 101-105). As the classical security concept began to be questioned from the 1960s, functionalism, pluralism and transnationalism formed by liberal thoughts, and neo-Marxist approaches influenced by Marxist theory have begun to develop critical viewpoints. This

critical point of view lies at the heart of the new security understanding that has begun to scrutinised after the Cold War.

During the Cold War period, state evaluated threats within the framework of classical security approach. This was a demonstration of a system based on military power and defense. With the end of the Cold War, other threats of secondary importance come to the forefront and a new non-military sense of security has emerged (Marchesin, 2005). With the influence of globalization in the post-Cold War era, national security understanding that consider the state as a focal point, give place to the international security understanding whose focus is individual and society. Thus, the state-based and military power-focused security understanding of the 20th century changed and it began to has political and sociological meanings in the 21st century through broadening its scope. This situaiton has led to expansion of the scope of international security threats. Concepts such as energy security, climate change, illegal migration and regional conflicts are now considered as threats to international security (Akçadağ, 2012). The scope of threats extended and deepened as globalization has gained momentum as a driving force. Thus, security has become an issue for not only to preserve existence of the states but also to maintain social structure and enhance and protect living standards. Beginning in the mid 1990s, the concept of “human security” has begun to visibly influence and challenge global politics, institutions, and governance (Oberleitner, 2005). The UNDP Human Development Report of 1994 introduces the concept of human security, which focuses on the people. In the Report, threats to human security presented under seven headings (UN Development Programme, 1994):

- Threats to economic security
- Threats to food security
- Threats to health security
- Threats to environmental security
- Threats to personal security
- Threats to community security
- Threats to political security.

In addition to these threats, the report also touched on global and cross-border threats, and stressed that most important of these is migration issue. Accordingly, uncontrolled increase in population, economic inequality, drug trafficking and international terrorism through international migration are among the major threats to security (Aksu & Turhan, 2012: 76).

Extension of the security concept includes a wide range of economic, political, human rights and migration issues. But deepening this concept is to evaluate security not only by regional and national dimensions but also by international dimension. It should not be forgotten that individual security is also taken into consideration by deepening concept. It is possible to say that extension is about the source of security and deepening is related to providing security for whom and for what purpose. It should also be mentioned horizontal and vertical extension. Horizontally extension refers to the spread from military security to human security. Human security includes the threats such as international migration, economic instability, political deterioration and international terrorism. Vertical extension means expanding political responsibility for ensuring security (Rothschild, 1995: 55). Extension and deepening of security is a process that goes in direct proportion to the increasing security threats. This situation has disadvantages as well as advantages. For instance, analysis of security threats by including politics, economy and diplomacy elements can be considered as an advantage. However, security agencies, that give orders to use force for protecting the state have excessive power, and this is seen as a disadvantage (Aksu & Turhan, 2012: 70-71).

In the framework of new security concept, migration is also considered as a threat to security. This new approach, also called as soft security, has given a different dimension to the interpretation of migration issue by international community (Akçadağ, 2012: 3). According to Huysmans, the first issue to be discussed is whether it is possible to address security studies on the concept of migration outside securitization. In line with new security concept, the migration issue is embodied as a security threat and it is emphasized that the relationship between security and migration should be examined sociologically and politically (Huysmans & Squire, 2009: 12).

With the changing of security concept from a state-centered approach to a society-centered approach, migration concept also became a matter of security without historical, social and socioeconomic basis. As a result of securitization of migration, migration began to be viewed as a threat to the existence of state, in the sense that economic integrity and internal stability of the countries are ruined (Özcan, 2009: 329-330). With the securitization of migration, migration is being perceived as a threat and it is stated that action should be taken in order to protect the society. Some immigrants prefer western countries to migrate from their countries due to the problems in its sociological structures, income distribution, political regime or structural policies and western countries worry about it. Those who are not satisfied with the situation in their own countries can be perceived as a threat to societal security by the

countries receiving migration. This is one of the reasons for securitization of migration (Kaya & Kentel, 2005: 9). The fact that migration is considered no longer as a human rights issue in rhetoric and practice, but accepted as a security threat that obstructs social integrity. So this approach allows to legitimate securitization of migration.

It is possible to say that many actors are included in the securitization process of migration. National governments, Europol and media are also considered among these actors. The way in which the structural framework is defined for securitization of migration depends on the relationship between political and social power. Political debates about migration in the 1980s was tried to be explained by considering three subjects. It is possible to list these subjects as protection of public order and stability of internal affairs, challenges confronted by the welfare state and cultural integrity of the country. Besides these, social securitization is also considered as a subject to be examined. The migration phenomenon has begun to be integrated into the field of insecurity in politics and discourses. Migration is no longer just a problem, but it is taking place in state policies as a threat to society (Huysmans, 2006: 68-69).

It is possible to consider securitization of migration in four dimensions. The first is economic framework, where migration is treated as a threat to wages, local labour force and welfare state. The second is national security framework, accordingly migration threatens structure of the nation state, and borders and internal security of the country. The third is sociocultural framework, migration is perceived as a threat to national identity and population dynamics. Finally, migration examined in the political framework has been made an element of threat by the anti-immigrant rhetoric of political parties (Lewis & Ewers, 2008: 471). In this respect, it is necessary to examine the concepts of internal security, cultural identity, welfare state, and social security in order to understand the process of securitization in general terms.

1.3.1. Internal Security

In European countries as well as in many other countries, writers have begun to focus on security studies. Since the 1990s, security issue has increasingly comprised internal affairs and social structures of the countries as well. European countries began to associate international security agenda to their internal security. In the EU, securitization of migration in terms of internal security means securitization of its borders (Bigo, 2000: 35). The First and Second World Wars, civil wars, ethnic conflicts, natural disasters and political pressures have led to mass movements of the population in the 20th century. Therefore, according to Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, 20th century should be called as "age of migrations" (Castles &

Miller, 2008: 56). Accordingly, it is not surprising that migration and asylum issues are also included in the internal security field.

Mass media has also played an effective role in considering migration as a problem. Media is one of the tools that causes public to perceive certain matters with fear and leads to the perception of migration as an internal security threat. While the media sometimes express that the migration phenomenon is a threat to internal security, the audience is also trying to embrace concept of community and to protect community from the outsiders (Buonfino, 2004: 32).

With the globalization process, distinction between domestic policy and foreign policy began to decrease and this issue occupied the agenda quite a while (Kalesnykas, 2012: 3). Internal security aims to remove security threats such as terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration. Protecting important infrastructure elements such as energy roads, nuclear power plants, bridges, transportation networks, and to control border security, carry out crisis management successfully and ensure the security of sectoral strategies, all of them fall into internal security's area of responsibility (Remuss, 2010: 10-11). Accordingly, five critical factors are considered to be important for ensuring internal security. These factors can be listed as; to prevent organized crime and terrorist incidents, to increase the degree of security in virtual world, to strengthen external borders, to increase resistance to natural disasters (Guild & Carrera, 2011: 1).

According to EC Treaty, ensuring free movement within the internal borders requires better protection of the external borders. The Treaty states that "the Council shall takes measures aimed at ensuring the free movement of persons within the internal borders, in conjunction with the additional measures on external border controls, asylum and immigration".⁵ For this purpose, common methods should be determined and applied for external border controls. When we look at modern societies, it seems that the most important obstacle to free movement of persons is not border controls. In the matter of free movement of persons, some other issues can be more restrictive such as work permit, residence permit, whether social assistance is provided or not, and possibility of raising welfare level is given or not. Besides, there is another important restrictive obstacle that the idea of systematic and regular control of everyone and everything crosses the borders will be difficult if many people are allowed to cross the borders as they want (Huysmans, 2006: 70).

⁵ Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty), Article 61, 1999.

As mentioned above, border security is also important in ensuring internal security. The rules, techniques and procedures applied to the protection of border security differ from country to country. But it is a judgment accepted by all societies that border security is important to maintain territorial integrity and social order of the country. Reducing the control of internal borders leads to an increase in importance given to external border security. In the European Union, this is expressed as the "Europeanization of internal security policies" and the "externalization of security threats" (Lavenex & Wichmann, 2009: 83). Thus, while providing free movement of persons in the EU member states is aimed, attention should be paid to those who come from outside the Union (Karyotis, 2007: 4).

Today, migration is a vital point in the field of internal security. When the migration subject is opened, the concepts of "foreigners", "asylum seekers", and "refugees" are brought to the agenda. Migration issue, by questioning cultural identity, challenging the legitimacy of post-war political order and the welfare state, creates internal security problems and influences political decisions (Huysmans, 2000: 761-762). Efforts for ensuring internal security must be legitimate. In other words, it must be politically acceptable, necessary in practice, and supported by society. Increased awareness about there is security vulnerability in the countries leads to the development of internal security fact. Creating an orderly security environment will make it easier to fight against organize crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism. In order to operating this system properly, nature of the relationship between internal and external security gains importance (Ioannides & Collantes Celador, 2011: 420).

In the securitization of migration, economic integration and the securitization of the internal market are at the forefront. The aim of securitization of migration in terms of internal security is to provide free movement of international services, capital, goods and persons after the internal borders removed. However, this situation is not always an advantage, because it may also has disruptive effects on public order and legal order. In brief, securitization of migration in terms of internal security means mainly that securitization of borders. In this respect, when we analyze the European integration process, it can be said that migration is considered as an issue of internal security (Huysmans, 2000: 758).

Today, internal security issues are increasingly on the political agenda of countries. The reasons of this situation is expressed as rise of terrorist incidents, natural disasters and crises that undermine the country's economies. Especially in the European Union countries where internal borders are removed as much as possible, new threats cause some problems cannot be

solved easily, and make the crisis management impossible. Politicians no longer look at issues of internal and external security in terms of source of problems, but at the same time they regard it as a means of protecting societies (Duke & Ojanen, 2006: 478).

1.3.2. Cultural Identity

As a result of the globalization, there has been an increase in the number of immigrants and countries which are subject to international migration. People who have different national identities, traditions, religions and behavior patterns, and speak different languages all around the world interact with each other. As a result, it has become increasingly difficult to speak of a homogeneous society. Cultural homogeneity is related to the cultural diversity of the society's population (Gilligan & Ball, 2011: 157). This cultural diversity includes language, religion, traditions, customs and other cultural elements that create ethnic diversity. Discourse of "cultural diversity" has become an argument used to keep immigrants out and perceived them as threats (Ibrahim, 2005: 187).

According to Copenhagen School, the main referent object for the securitization of migration is related to situations when states and societies perceive a threat in identity terms (Waeber, Buzan, Kelstrup, & Lemaitre, 1993). It is a common characteristic of migration discourses in Europe to emphasize the threat that migration pose to the culture and identity of the host country. Migrants and asylum seekers are often discursively presented as a threat to the communal harmony and the cultural homogeneity of the receiving country and are therefore considered a social threat. A particular society may perceive threats to its identity from foreigners because of the fear of losing what makes it unique and distinct from other societies. However, not all societies interpret such threats in the same way. Generally, more homogeneous societies feel more threatened by the influx of immigrant and refugees. This insecurity derives from a fear that the presence of immigrants could eventually change the ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic composition of the host country, a fear that is often fed by the high birth rates of immigrant groups (Karyotis, 2007: 8-9).

At present, many countries have cultural differences in themselves. Countries with different cultural structures are thought to be more dynamic and more creative in social terms, but they are also more successful economically. This situation can be exemplified by "global cities" like New York, London, Paris, Los Angeles, and Tokyo. Culture is a key ingredient of global cities' success. As the world becomes increasing more connected through different cultures, it is inevitable that new global cultural centers will emerge. These global cities have a

cosmopolitan structure and they are also home to many immigrants. Thus, they contribute to the economic structure of the city by creating opportunities for new investments and creating business opportunities. Especially rising generations seem to find these cities more attractive to live. In this case, international migration emerges not only for economic reasons, but also for the exploration of different cultures (Global Commission on International Migration, 2005: 42).

Consequently, migration, social inclusion and multiculturalism issues have begun to affect social and public policies worldwide. Perhaps nowhere are these issues more difficult and fascinating than in countries with limited immigration experience. On the one hand, in order to facilitate harmonization of immigrants in the experienced destination countries, such as the United States, new policies related to immigrants are developed in social and political spheres. On the other hand, migration to the countries with limited immigration experience causes some troubles. Harmonization of immigrants with the society in these countries is very difficult. Especially in these countries, like Greece, ethnic and cultural homogeneity is tried to be provided. The emergence of mass migration to Greece in the 1990s resulted in markedly increased levels of hostility and fear vis-a`-vis migrants. Immigrants to Greece quickly came to be seen as a threat both to traditional culture as well as to one's own personal safety and security. Moreover, Greece society addressed migration issue as a threat to the perception of nation state (Swarts & Karaktsanis, 2012: 33).

There is also a conservative discourse in academia that regards multiculturalism as a cause of social disintegration (the best known version is Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations*, 1996). This discourse emphasizes the differentiation between "us" and "them" by arguing that other cultures are obstacles to the existence of home culture. Accordingly, this discourse considered migration as one of the primary factors weakening national tradition and social homogeneity. Huysmans (2000: 758) stated that migration may be counted as internal and external danger to the existence of national community or western civilization. The discourse reproduces the political myth that a homogenous national community or western civilization existed in the past and can be re-established today through the exclusion of those migrants who are identified as cultural aliens (Huysmans, 2000: 757-758).

Myron Weiner identifies five broad categories in which migrants may be seen as a threat: 'as opponents of the home regime', 'as a political risk to the host country', 'as a threat to cultural identity', 'as a social or economic burden' and 'as hostages, risks for the sending country'

(1993: 10-18). His elaboration of these categories concentrates on examples in which migrants do pose a threat to the life of states, though how these threats are measured, particularly in the case of 'cultural identity' raises questions about who identifies the threat. According to Copenhagen School, the most important factor in securitization of migration is that society perceives a danger to its identity. Because immigrants and asylum-seekers often contradict general harmony and cultural homogeneity of migration-receiving countries, and they experience a compliance problem. For this reason, they are perceived as social and cultural threats (Karyotis, 2007: 8-9).

Issues such as multiculturalism, nationalism, xenophobia and racism should be examined in order to understand cultural identity issue in the securitization of migration. But fundamental point here is to manage the cultural diversity that emerges as a result of migration. In this case, securitization of cultural identity through extreme discourses is not necessary (Huysmans, 2000: 762-763). The situation of migration whether as a threat or not also constitute a significant subject of research in security studies. It may be argued that migration should be securitized if it puts the social and political unity of society in jeopardy. The discourse on the securitization of migration, which aims at containing and controlling the phenomenon, answers public fears of economic competition and of threat to the cohesion of the community. (Buonfino, 2004: 39-40). As a result of securitization of migration, the distinction between "us" and "them" has become very acute in the cultural field, and immigrants are usually referred to as the "other culture". As a result of this understanding, the relationship of the immigrant with the society are destined to be conflictual. Immigrants are presented as worthless and dangerous (Karyotis, 2007: 9). The distinction between us and them resulted from cultural identity differentiation leads to deepening of the distance between cultures (Doty, 1998: 82).

When one examines the integration of immigrants issues in international relations, it appears that there are some measures foreseen in order to protect cultural identity and to remove migration issue from danger category. The first and most important of these measures are increasing border controls and restriction of free movement. The second is the assimilation or integration of immigrants into society of the country they migrate to. The last measure is about the integration policies and multicultural nature of the country will coincide or not (Huysmans, 2000: 763). In the framework of integration discussions, integration of immigrants has always been a subject of the debate. Integration usually means adaptation of

immigrants to the socio-cultural structure of the country they migrate to. It is also possible to mention certain aspects of integration. They are listed as follows (Kaya, 2007: 3-4):

- Cultural or behavioural integration (acculturation)
- Structural integration that enables immigrants to be involved in the institutions and organizations of the host society (political integration)
- Civic integration (a shared identity of citizenship)
- Marital integration
- Identificational integration (creation of a sense of peoplehood at the societal level)
- Attitude integration (absence of prejudice)
- Behavioral integration (absence of discrimination)

The issues of belonging to a community or being an immigrant have key importance in the protection and structural change of cultural identity. European countries are also experiencing this situation. Regardless of the nature of their migration policies, it appears that all European countries are immigrant-receiving countries, and immigrants are considered as a threat to the national cultural homogeneity (Huysmans, 2000: 762).

1.3.3. Welfare State

After the 1929 economic crisis, welfare state understanding emerged in the economy. The concept of the welfare state was also used to ensure planned development after the World War II. The welfare state can be briefly defined as social improvement through income transfer and social services. In a broad sense, it is treated as an increase in the efficiency of the state in managing the economy (Koray, 2005: 171-175).

One of the most important aim of people migrating is to achieve better living conditions. With the rise of capitalism and acceleration of globalization, there has been an increase in the international labor force migration. The rise of inequalities with globalization has led to international labor force migration from underdeveloped and developing countries to developed countries (Gökbayrak, 2009: 56).

According to Myron Weiner, it is possible to benefit from the concepts of security and stability to explain international migration. From an economic standpoint, migration generally has a meaning as a brain drain and labor migration for the sending country, while it means unemployment and inequality in the distribution of social opportunities for the migration-

receiving country. Demand for labor is increasing in some countries through developments in the global economy, changes in oil prices, transformations in trade or capital flows, but in some countries it is decreasing (Weiner, 1992-1993: 95). The demand for immigrant labour force is shaped by migration policies of the migration-receiving countries. On the one hand, it appears that the migration-receiving countries prefer the highly skilled labour and encourage the brain drain. On the other hand, they also aim that unqualified or low-skilled workers come to the country to fulfill some jobs in the service sector with no insurance and low wages (Gökbayrak, 2009: 56). Some discourses put forward the idea that the influx of economic immigrants might drive down wages and create unemployment, while at the same time it will drive up the cost of housing and other goods. Therefore, nationals of the host country usually fear that they will have to compete with low-paid immigrants for the scarce jobs and services available and perhaps lose jobs to them (Karyotis, 2007: 10). Factors such as high income levels, employment opportunities, and welfare level in migration-receiving countries have an influence that attracts immigrant population (Akçadağ, 2012: 6). People who come to the countries with high income per capita for working purposes cause emergence of additional housing, education and transportation services. These needs are met by the facilities of welfare state that they come in. However, nationals of the host countries are often not satisfied with sharing of these opportunities with the immigrants (Weiner, 1992-1993: 114-115). For example, in the case of Turkish migration, Europeans tend to see that Turkish migrants have not integrated into host societies especially because of their different culture. Therefore, they do not want to share benefits of the welfare state with those culturally different people. Because of having huge and young population and high rates of population growth, Europeans believe that Turkey's membership would cause a huge population movement towards EU countries, which in turn would harm the welfare state (Yüksel, 2014: 180).

Thus, migration is seen as a phenomenon that creates a security problem, threatening national identity, social cohesion and income distribution, as well as being a factor that worsens the conditions of the welfare state for the societies (Ratzmann, 2012: 263). From an economic standpoint, immigrants are considered as an additional burden on the labor market and seen as a threat to the welfare state in the social security system of the host country. According to this argument, since immigrants are not citizens, facilities of welfare state must not benefited by them. Huysmans describes this relationship between citizenship and the welfare state as "welfare chauvinism" (Huysmans, 2006: 161). Within the framework of security discourses, the issue of whether migration affects host country's economy negatively or positively is

contested. Many economists assume that migration has positive effects on the country's economy over the long run. The host countries' economies can be improved by meeting their needs to skilled immigrant workers. The number of local labor getting a job such as childcare and cleaning is decreasing as the demand of unskilled immigrants to these jobs increases. This situation leads to higher profits, as employers pay lower taxes. The contribution of immigrants to the economic growth of the country is observed positively in this respect. Thus, the argument that immigrants put an additional burden on the welfare state has been challenged by several economists (Caviedes, 2004: 299).

As a result of the increase in financial and demographic pressures due to 1970s economic crisis, some economic and social developments such as the rise in elderly population in Western European countries, the differentiation of citizens' expectations due to changing family structures, the increase in unemployment rates, the loss of power of trade unions, and the view that welfare state as an obstacle to global competition, the concept of welfare state has been increasingly questioned. As a solution to the crisis that the welfare state encountered, neoliberal ideology, which can be summarized as "less state, more market" has become prevalent, which required restructuring of the welfare state, rather than its removal (Gökbayrak, 2009: 57). As a result of successive economic recessions and the rise in unemployment since the early 1970s, problems arose regarding the fair distribution of social goods such as housing, health care, unemployment insurance benefits, and jobs especially in developed and developing countries. Scarcity makes immigrants and asylum-seekers rivals to national citizens in the labour market and competitors in the distribution of social goods. This has resulted in an increasingly explicit assertion of welfare chauvinism, or the privileging of national citizens in the distribution of social goods. Securitization of migration can clearly be seen in the form of welfare chauvinism (Huysmans, 2000: 767). National citizens see immigrants as free-riders of benefits of the welfare state and consider them as the welfare state damagers. In brief, welfare chauvinism is radically expressed as socioeconomic exclusion of immigrants from a society where they are not members but benefit from welfare facilities of it. On the other hand, moderate welfare chauvinism aims to limit utilization of the distribution of labor force opportunities by immigrants. Thus, welfare state facilities are first tried to be utilized by the citizens of the state (Huysmans, 2006: 78-79).

Having welfare state facilities has an important place in the politics of a country. Welfare chauvinism predicts that cultural identity traits will be associated with social policy areas such as health, age and employment. Trying to prevent immigrants' social rights also reinforces the

assumption that migration threatens cultural homogeneity. Thomas Faist argues that immigrant-receiving countries' citizens consider immigrants as a threat not only due to their sharing of the economic competitiveness and social rights in the labor market but also stems from the idea that they have negative effects on the cultural homogeneity of the national state (Faist, 1995: 189). From securitization perspective, it appears that the socioeconomic problems of the welfare state arguably as a result of the immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees have been extensively employed as a securitizing discourse by some countries (Huysmans, 2000: 768-769).

1.3.4. Social Securitization

Today, the idea that security is only about military issues has lost its influence. Security is now being addressed in wider aspects. When it comes to security, people do not think about only military issues, but also economic, environmental, or social issues. Defining of political and social identities of the community in security studies is often resulted from existence of an external threat. Some studies on social security consider security discourse as an inevitable consequence of migration.

The concept of social security, which is related to individuals, should be considered differently from the concept of societal security related to collective structures and their identities. While the concept of social security is important in terms of economy, the concept of societal security is related not to individual level and economic issues, but to measures taken to defend collective identities (Waeber, 2008: 155). The concept of social security firstly used by United States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the US Social Security Act of 1935, which constitutes one part of the "New Order" policy initiated to establish welfare state. Through the Atlantic Charter of 1941, it was adopted at the international level, and gained its real meaning with the Beveridge Report prepared by Sir William Beveridge in 1942. After the 1944 Philadelphia Declaration, usage of the concept became widespread at the international level. The main goal in social security is to ensure that citizens benefit more from household security, social insurance security, and livelihood security (Brauch, 2008: 3-4). The 1941 Atlantic Charter emphasizes the importance of social security in Article 5 by stating that "improved working standards, ensured economic progress and guaranteed social security for all" (NATO, 1941). In addition, Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that social security is one of the fundamental human rights (BM İnsan Hakları Komisyonu, 1948: 206).

In brief, international migration is one of the issues that countries considered it as a national threat because of its economic and social consequences on ensuring internal and external security (Özdal, 2008: 97-98). International migration movements are seen to have an impact on social security systems as well as social stability, demographic security, cultural identities and philosophy of welfare state (Akçadağ, 2012: 9). The phenomenon of migration is also seen as one of the biggest obstacles to the efficient functioning of social security systems (Huysmans, 2006: 81). Since the Oil Crisis in 1970s, immigrants are no longer considered people who need humanitarian aid and protection, or serve to economic purposes like worker immigrants, but who threaten the borders and social order of the state, through their use of the social services of the state in concern (Canpolat & Arıner, 2012: 12).



CHAPTER 2

EU MIGRATION POLICY AND SECURITIZATION

2.2. Introduction

In the second chapter of the thesis, migration policies of the EU were separated certain periods and evaluated within the framework of securitization and desecuritization. Therefore, the EU's significant developments, treaties, summits, five-year programmes about migration issue were firstly analyzed in detail. Then, the perceptions and concerns of EU member states and EU institutions (as securitizing actors; EU Council and different political groups in the European Parliament) about immigrants and migration were examined. In the light of these developments, this chapter of the thesis reveals that the EU securitized migration in the issue areas of fighting against illegal migration and strengthening border controls. Finally, the questions of how the theoretical framework given in the first chapter was integrated into the European Union in general and what are the means and purposes of securitization of migration in the EU were sought to be answered.

2.2. Establishment of the EU Common Migration Policy

With respect to the evolution of migration policies in the EU, it seems that common policies in this area focus on the fight against illegal migration and border control, instead of legal migration or integration issues. Therefore, a security-oriented development can be seen in the Europeanization of these policies. In this section, the development of EU common migration policy is examined in the axis of Europeanization and securitization. In this context, the development of migration policies is assessed through textual analysis of the five-year programs on the development of the treaties, summits and the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ). Analyzing the development of migration policies, this part evaluates the change in the discourses on migration within the framework of various global and internal factors over time, and demonstrates that from a securitization perspective, migration issue is mostly framed as an element of security and threat. However, the Stockholm Programme adopted by the European Council in December 2009 (provides a framework for EU action on the issues of citizenship, justice, security, asylum, immigration and visa policy for the period 2010–2014) aimed at improving other dimensions of migration by removing from the security-oriented discourse, emphasized the need to develop a multidimensional and comprehensive migration policy.

Migration policies are developed in the area of freedom, security and justice policies. The foundations of the need to create an area of freedom, security and justice were laid by the free movement of persons, one of the four fundamental freedoms within the EU. 'Free movement of persons' concept has undergone many changes in the EU integration process over the years. The 1951 Treaty of Paris, which established the European Coal and Steel Community (the first step that will constitute the foundations of the EU) allowed citizens of six member states to work in all member states. Later, the 1957 Treaty of Rome aimed to establish a common market between the six member states. According to Article 48 of the Treaty, the workers of a member states have the right of free movement in another member state if there is a job opportunity in that state. Article 48 entered into force in 1968 as a result of efforts for putting into effect the Article in order to alleviate the problem of unemployment. Although Italian citizens are at the forefront of these beneficiaries, the labor force mobility among member states has remained limited over the years (Castles & Miller, 2008). Initially, free movement was restricted to workers. Over time, this right has gradually expanded and in 1993 the freedom of movement became a general right with the Maastricht Treaty. Today; every European citizen including tourists, workers, students, freelancers and retirees can exercise this right (Lavenex & Uçarar, 2004).

However, free movement of people may cause some problems in terms of internal security. Removal of borders between member states deprives of an important national tool for controlling the entrances and identities of persons. Criminals, drug traffickers, smugglers or irregular migration networks are not allowed to exploit freedom of movement. Therefore, the EU decided that measures such as adoption of the same standards regarding migration, asylum, visa policies and strengthening of external border controls, should accompany the free movement of persons. Consequently, a need for cooperation in justice, police and customs issues has arisen in the EU where controls are removed at the internal borders. Police cooperation aims to ensure that EU citizens enjoy the freedom of movement in safe. Judicial cooperation ensures that citizens do not lose their freedom of movement right due to legal obstacles arising from differences in the systems of member countries. In addition, the EU aims to bring those who threaten the safety of individuals and society to justice. Customs cooperation is necessary to prevent fraud and national law violations. Strengthening external border controls and fighting against illegal migration are among the most important of these measures.

2.2.1. From the Maastricht Treaty to the Amsterdam Treaty: Transferring Migration Policy-Making to the Supranational Level

Immigration movements, especially from Eastern Europe to Western Europe, increased considerably in the 1990s as a result of the end of the Cold War, the increased impact of globalization and the unification of Germany. Migration movements, coupled with increased unemployment in Western Europe, have created discomfort in Western European countries, increased prejudice against immigrants, and consequently contributed to the election of anti-immigrant parties. Parallel to this process, along with globalization, cross-border crime and increased terrorism have led to the handling of immigration policies and security issues in connection with each other (Maas, 2008).

Under these circumstances, the EU's most important and comprehensive integration initiative after the economic and monetary integration of the 1990s, has been the integration initiative under the heading of "justice and home affairs" including migration policies. Since 1990s, the migration issue has been moved by the EU to high politics area that directly affects the sovereignty of member states and draw attention as the most active policy area on the agenda of the EU. The provision of four fundamental freedoms (free movement of goods, people, services and capital) with the aim of removing internal borders in the EU has had implications for the movement of immigrants in the EU territory, which in turn affected member states, in particular, with regards to social policies, and socio-economic, political and educational rights. In the process of providing four freedoms, it was not possible to treat immigrants uniformly. From the second half of the 1980s onwards, Southern Europe became a new immigration zone, which in turn increased xenophobia and led to securitization of migration issues in the EU. The impact of this situation on European integration has created pressure on the development of a policy in an area outside the EEC's organizational purposes and jurisdiction (Lodge & Bayburtlu, 2002).

Spread of integration into a previously unplanned policy area can be explained by the "spill-over effect" in the neo-functionalism⁶ of EU integration theories. Neo-functionalists view

⁶ Neo-functionalism is a theory of regional integration in a process by which countries remove barriers to free trade, originated in the United States after Second World War, and realized its essential development in the second half of the 1950s and the 1960s. Neo-functionalism was developed by Ernst Haas who first brought the theory in 1958 in his work 'The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957'. Key thinkers of the theory are Philippe Schmitter, Leon Lindberg, Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane, Lawrence Scheinman, and Amitai Etzioni. The theory was aimed to explain the regional integration and development in the areas of economics cooperation in

spill-over as a driving force of the integration process. Haas explain this concept as those benefiting from the advantages of supra-national institutions created in an area would support similar entities in other areas. Thus, he acknowledged that the integration in one sector would encourage integration in other sectors, and national interests of the states would be evaluated in a higher and integrated structure (Schmitter, 2005). A principal theme of neo-functionalism is the logic of spill-over, which assumes that international programs established to fulfill functional tasks are likely to generate pressures for integration in adjacent issue areas (Lu, 1999: 7). For instance, when the sector such as coal and steel governed by the central institutions creates pressure so that the neighboring areas of policy such as taxation and wages are influenced by integration. Therefore, in terms of spill-over process, the most important element of pressure in the EU has been the removal of internal border controls. After signing of the Schengen Agreement which gradually abolished internal border controls by the five member states in 1985, the 1987 Single European Act and the 1990 Schengen Convention strengthened this goal (den Boer, 1997). In this way, an immigrant entering any of the EU states will be free to travel in other member states as well. The second element of pressure is the continuation of the expansion process. As the borders of the EU expand with the consecutive enlargement processes, it has become even more difficult to prevent irregular migration. As a result of the EU's removal of borders within itself on the one hand and continuing to expand on the other hand, it has become a necessity to create common policies on immigrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees (Niemann, 2006: 16-17). In other words, freedom of movement within the EU and together with expansion of the EU to include new members raised concerns about the growing irregular migration, and these concerns prompted the EU to create a common migration policy. Thus, while ensuring freedom of movement within the EU among their members, policies to prevent irregular migration to EU has started to be developed.

A number of ad hoc and para-Communitarian bodies and agencies, such as the TREVI Group(1976), the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration (1986), the Schengen Group (1985) assumed competence over immigration and asylum issues. The TREVI Group was established in 1976 firstly in order to coordinate action against international terrorism. Than, its scope was extended to the areas of undocumented immigration, asylum inflows, police and security cooperation. In 1980s, through the ad hoc working groups, TREVI Group dealt with general

Latin America but it was Europe where political and economic integration was best developed therefore theory become closely associated with EU.

migration problems in member countries, visa policy, and internal and external border controls (Kostakopoulou, 2001: 51). As I mentioned above, the second important step was the Schengen Agreement signed in 1985. Schengen acquis, which envisaged common measures for removing internal border controls regarding the free movement of production factors within the EU, and for strengthening external border controls against possible migration flows from third countries to this region, put into practice in 1995. Afterwards, the Single European Act (SEA) was signed in 1986 and came into effect in 1987. With the main aim of establishing the single market foreseen until the end of 1992, it can be called as milestone for the member states to cooperate on the migration policy regime. Removal of internal borders in order to ensure four fundamental freedoms has created the necessity of effectively protecting the external borders of the member states as the community's external borders. This situation has implicitly necessitated closer cooperation between member states on the issues related to migration (Yılmaz Elmas, 2016: 32-33). The first initiative that facilitate the cooperation between states on migration was the creation of an Ad Hoc Group on Immigration in 1986 (Ad Hoc Immigration Group of Senior Officials-AHIG). It was established by the national ministers responsible for immigration. Its works has resulted in two major international treaties on the harmonization of European asylum law: the 1990 Dublin Convention and 1992 London Resolution. Dublin Convention determines which state is responsible for examining the applications of asylum. London Resolution aims to bring external legal barriers to prevent asylum claims to EU countries (Bozkurt, Özcan, & Köktaş, 2008: 332-335). In 1987, the migration issue was discussed at an ad hoc meeting of Trevi Group ministers. The meeting is important because it framed the work to be carried out in the future on migration. The matters in hand in this context were: The problem of migration in member countries, visa policy (development of the common visa policy idea by working towards a possible uniformized system, including grant visa criteria), external border controls, internal border controls, seekers of political asylum (especially abuse of the political asylum system, transfer of asylum seekers, procedure for the examination of asylum claims and forged documents) (Lodge & Bayburtlu, 2002: 23). Then, the 1988 Coordinators' Group on the Free Movement of Persons (also called as the Rhodes Group) worked on the causes that delay the removal of internal borders and produced the Palma Document. The European Council adopted it in June 1989 in Madrid. Palma Document refers directly to physical controls by listing the obstacles to free movement of persons. In the Palma Document and in the subsequent reports, the Coordinators' Group has emphasized its opinion that the creation of an area without internal borders (Cruz, 1993).

In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty established an intergovernmental justice and home affairs pillar, including migration issues. Before the treaty, intergovernmental cooperation in this area was on bilateral and multilateral basis with informal consultative meetings since 1970s (Wallace, Pollack, & Young, 2010). This informal cooperation was mainly formalized with the Treaty. In Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty, nine policy areas identified as "matter of common interest" relating to internal security: Asylum policy, external border controls, migration policy for third country nationals, drug trafficking, fraud, criminal and judicial cooperation, customs cooperation, police cooperation (especially in the fight against terrorism, drugs trafficking and other serious forms of international crimes), and common information exchange system within the EU through Europol. Scholars, such as Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans have argued that the incorporation of migration policy issues into Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty together with the fight against international crimes and law enforcement issues has led to securitization of migration (Bigo, 2000). Therefore, addressing migration together with criminal activities became it equivalent to these issues. Put it differently, illegal immigration was seen as the same kind of threat as international crimes. As a result, Europeanization of illegal immigration with the Maastricht Treaty intensified the securitization discourse on migration. In this process, migration was presented as a security threat that can deeply affected the political identity of a particular community (Cholewinski, 2000).

The main purpose of the Maastricht Treaty was defined as follows; to protect and develop the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice in which the free movement of people was ensured, through appropriate measures, in relation to external border controls, migration, asylum and fighting against crime and prevention. With the establishment of the EU, the liberal logic of economic integration was combined with this security logic after the Cold War. This tendency has increased with the aim of strengthening the field of freedom, security and justice in the Amsterdam Treaty. According to the Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed in 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999 in order to address the deficiencies of the Maastricht Treaty, firstly EU should be protected and developed as a field of freedom, security and justice (Moravcsik & Nicolaïdis, 1999). It should be also an area where free movement of persons is provided, and an area where appropriate measures are taken regarding external border controls, asylum, migration and fighting against crime and prevention. Maastricht Treaty formally established the European Union as a single body of three pillars. EU's policy areas are divided into three main headings through these pillars.

First pillar, the European Communities included social, economic, environmental and regional policies. Second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) handled foreign policy and military matters. Lastly, third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs addressed the need for cooperation and interaction between the police, customs, immigration services, and justice ministries of member states. Some issues in the third pillar of the Maastricht Treaty have been transferred to the first pillar by the Amsterdam Treaty (Randazzo, 2009: 507-508). Accordingly, a new title "Free Movement of Persons, Asylum and Migration" (Title IV) was made subject to the decision-making rules of Pillar I. Therefore, this issue was brought within the scope of the EU's supranational authority. Moreover, a renewed Pillar III created with Amsterdam Treaty which provided for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Title VI) and Schengen treaties were also included in EU legislation (Lodge & Bayburtlu, 2002: 15).

The EU's authority and responsibility in the field of migration was first clearly stated in Amsterdam Treaty. Migration policies were taken from the intergovernmental third pillar of the EU (Justice and Home Affairs) to supranational first pillar (European Communities) with the Amsterdam Treaty. Moving of migration policies into the supranational area in this way has had a significant impact on the policies of member states in this field (Faist & Ette, *The Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration*, 2007). Furthermore, a historical step has been taken to establish normative and political development of freedom and security within the EU and the gradual creation of freedom, security and justice by the Amsterdam Treaty. Within this framework, transferring of the authorities on migration, asylum and borders to the European Community means to be given a stronger role to EU institutions (Balzacq, Guild, & Carrera, 2008).

Through Amsterdam Treaty, Title IV which includes migration issues (visa, asylum, migration and other policies concerning the free movement of persons) were added to the Treaty Establishing the European Community. Article 62 of the treaty includes provisions relating to borders (removal of controls at the internal borders, transition from external borders and visas), and freedom of movement of third-country nationals in period of less than three months. According to Amsterdam Treaty, European Community has the authority to take measures relating to the following policies; asylum, temporary protection and load sharing, entry to the country and its conditions, migration policies including "illegal migration" and third-country nationals residing in other member states (Baldaccini & Toner, *From Amsterdam and Tampere to the Hague: An Overview of Five Years of EC Immigration*

and Asylum Law, 2007). Using the illegal migration terminology in the context of a security-focused approach in the treaty, has an important effect in perceiving immigrants as people who should not to be trusted and suspected. In sum, the new Title IV, which migration policies are addressed, is considered one of the most important improvements of the Amsterdam Treaty. This title opened the legal ways for developing a common migration and asylum policy in the EU. Clayton states that Title IV clearly revealed the dual purpose of EC law on migration. Accordingly, member states are obliged to open their borders to each other, while protecting their borders against the outside. In this context, strengthened external border controls can be seen as a consequence of the partially loose internal borders. The European migration policies that tightened with this process, as Clayton pointed out, brought the title of "Fortress Europe" to the EU (Clayton, 2008: 144-145).

2.2.2. 1999-2004: First Multi-Annual Programme

Amsterdam Treaty paved the way for the progressive construction of the area of freedom, security and justice, and the EU migration policy has become a rapidly developing area. In this process, five-year programs have been prepared which include the political agenda, general trends, targets and timetables that structure the EU activities on these issues. The 1999 Tampere European Council and the 2004 Hague Program are two important milestones in the development of this field. These two milestones set the agenda for the creation of the area of freedom, security and justice. During the five critical years of this process, a number of legal instruments have been implemented alongside action plans and policy documents. They have significantly affected the entry of third country nationals into the European Union, their freedom of movement and residence (Baldaccini & Toner, 2007: 1).

Tampere Programme, the first of the multi-annual programs, covers the years 1999-2004. The European Council convened in Tampere on 15-16 October 1999 for the implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty and for the transformation of the Union into an area of freedom, security and justice. The conditions affecting the creation of the Tampere Program are expressed in the final declaration as follows:

"The European Union has already put in place for its citizens the major ingredients of a shared area of prosperity and peace: a single market, economic and monetary union, and the capacity to take on global political and economic challenges. The challenge of the Amsterdam Treaty is now to ensure that freedom,

which includes the right to move freely throughout the Union, can be enjoyed in conditions of security and justice accessible to all." ⁷

As such, in Tampere Programme, freedom is starting point and foundation of the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ). Security and justice are seen as indispensable elements of freedom. Therefore, according to the founding logic of the AFSJ, freedom should be a priority over security when a choice should be made in any case. The main issues addressed by the Tampere Summit are as follows: Management of migration flows, development of an active common policy on visas and counterfeit documents, closer cooperation between the EU consulates in the third countries and establishment of EU common visa issuing offices, serious sanctions against persons involved in human trafficking and economic exploitation of migrants regarding "illegal" migration, increasing member states' efforts to identify criminal networks in such activities and seize them with Europol, effective control of future boundaries of the Union, encouragement of voluntary return with the help of source countries and transit countries, and signing of readmission agreements with the relevant third countries (Baldaccini & Toner, 2007: 3-4). Although European Union indicated that EU policy will be freed from the security axis through Tampere Programme, the EU migration policy was once again securitized because of the terrorist attack on September 2001 in the United States (Özgöker & Batı, 2016: 6).

Paragraph 3 of the Tampere Programme clarified how the area of freedom, security and justice should be understood:

“This freedom should not, however, be regarded as the exclusive preserve of the Union’s own citizens. Its very existence acts as a draw to many others world-wide who cannot enjoy the freedom Union citizens take for granted. It would be in contradiction with Europe’s traditions to deny such freedom to those whose circumstances lead them justifiably to seek access to our territory. This in turn requires the Union to develop common policies on asylum and immigration, while taking into account the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration and to combat those who organise it and commit related international crimes. These common policies must be based on principles which

⁷ European Council, "Towards A Union of Freedom, Security and Justice: The Tampere Milestones", Paragraph 2, Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 October 1999.

are both clear to our own citizens and also offer guarantees to those who seek protection in or access to the European Union.”⁸

As it is seen from these statements, Tampere Programme were quite ambiguous in the matter of migration. On the one hand, EU asserted that third country nationals were welcome ‘and that they will not be denied the freedom to access the territory’. This was legitimised by referring to the humanitarian tradition of the EU. On the other hand, it was argued that in order to ensure this freedom, consistent border controls were an absolute necessity. This can be explained by the fact that with the Tampere Programme member states wanted to turn over a new leaf and counter the criticisms that the EU’s migration policy was too restrictive. However, the underlying primary thought was still the prevention of third-country nationals to enter the EU despite the good intentions (Van Dijck, 2006: 15-16). In other words, security-oriented approach to migration became more dominant at the Tampere Summit.

At the Tampere Summit, the key elements of EU migration policies have emerged as follows: partnership with source countries, a common asylum system, fair attitudes towards third-country nationals and the management of migration flows. The importance of the Amsterdam Treaty and Tampere Summit is to frame migration as a security concern, as well as create a legal basis for migration issue and draw a political orientation. Amsterdam Treaty strengthen the link between asylum, migration and security matters through the establishment of the AFSJ, ‘in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime’.⁹ Security continuum was legitimized by reference to the creation of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. According to the AFSJ logic, illegal migration was considered as a threat, because it undermined all three basic values: freedom, security and justice. Firstly, illegal migration was an obstacle to the aim of creating free movement of persons (freedom). Secondly, illegal immigrants was seen as a threat to public order (security). And lastly, regarding the third basic value (justice), it was a problem that is in close connection with organized crime and human trafficking. Because the fight against illegal migration required intensive police cooperation between member states (Van Dijck, 2006: 15). Since then, EU policies have focused on unwanted migration and strengthening of border controls in EU countries and neighboring countries (Geddes, 2007).

⁸ European Council, "Towards A Union of Freedom, Security and Justice: The Tampere Milestones", Paragraph 3, Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 October 1999.

⁹ European Communities, "Treaty of Amsterdam, Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts", 2 October 1997.

In brief, discourse of the AFSJ created by the Amsterdam Treaty has been reiterated in Tampere. At the Tampere Summit in 1999, it was once again emphasized that Europe was an area of freedom. It was also emphasized that area of freedom should be protected and protection could be achieved by keeping the immigrants away who constitute a potential of increased crime in the Union. In order to achieve this, it was agreed that external boundaries of the EU should be protected in the best way. It was stated that this aim was absolutely necessary for "secure European Union".¹⁰ Tampere was seen as a manifestation of Europe's increasingly sharpening and hardening discourse on migration issue.

2.2.3. 2004-2009: Comprehensive Approach to Migration

The second and more decisive legal framework for the development of the area of freedom, security and justice is marked by the Hague Programme adopted by the Council of Europe on 4-5 November 2004. With the five-year Hague Programme, development of the area of freedom, security and justice that aimed at Tampere and the aim of these elements to be achieved by all people was again emphasized (Council of European Union, 2005). Hague Programme, replacing Tampere Programme, offered a new schedule and course of action for reaching the targets between 2005 and 2009. Unlike the Tampere Programme, Hague Programme begins with an ideological preface:

"The security of the European Union and its Member States has acquired a new urgency, especially in the light of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and in Madrid on 11 March 2004. The citizens of Europe rightly expect the European Union, while guaranteeing respect for fundamental freedoms and rights, to take a more effective, joint approach to cross-border problems such as illegal migration, trafficking in and smuggling of human beings, terrorism and organised crime, as well as the prevention thereof. Notably in the field of security, the coordination and coherence between the internal and the external dimension has been growing in importance and needs to continue to be vigorously pursued."

These expressions in the preface of the Hague Programme show that the effects of terrorist attacks in 2001 and 2004 highly influenced the Programme. As a matter of fact, in the words of a prominent scholar, "macro-securitization" in the document was similar to that of Cold War in the name of "war against terrorism" which was launched after the September 11

¹⁰ European Council, "Towards A Union of Freedom, Security and Justice: The Tampere Milestones", Paragraph 3 and 4, Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 October 1999.

events (Buzan, 2006: 1101-1118). Macro-securitization is defined as a priority on security issue for a long period of time. Thus, this macro-securitization was widely accepted by the EU states and over time it has led to restrictive implications on migration policies (Buzan & Waever, 2009).

Migration issue, with the enlargement process in 2004, remained high on the agenda in the EU and extension of the EU borders with new members increased concerns about border security and increasing irregular migration. At a time when the effects of events in 2001 and 2004 was continuing in the EU as well as at the global level, and security was also among the chief issues, migration-terrorism and therefore migration-security link has become stronger. Moreover, because of externally linked 11 September 2001 attack and 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings led the EU to attach greater importance to migration issue in its foreign policy (Luedtke, 2009).

The Hague Programme is continuation of the Tampere Programme and envisages the monitoring of the implementation and the assessment of the measures taken. Moreover, the European Parliament's call for a balance between the goals of freedom, security and justice in the construction of the AFSJ has also been taken into account in the formulation of the Programme. Hague Programme set forth a "comprehensive approach" to migration policies, including the root causes of migration, entry and acceptance policies, integration and return policies, and all phases of migration. The introduction of a comprehensive approach is indeed an indication of desecuritization of migration by taking it in a broader framework. The Programme includes the following measures for migration and border control:

- Establishment of a European common asylum system that provides a common procedure and a single status for persons granted asylum or protection status as of 2010,
- Legal arrangements for foreigners who will work legally in the EU in line with labor market requirements,
- A European framework that will ensure the successful integration of migrants into society,
- Partnerships with third countries to improve asylum systems, better deal with "illegal" migration and implement resettlement programs,
- Policies on the return of illegal immigrants to the source countries,
- Funds for the management of external borders,

- Accelerate establishment of the Schengen Information System (SIS)¹¹ and the Visa Information System (VIS)¹²,
- Increase the usage of common visa rules, biometrics and information systems (to maximize effectiveness and functionality of these systems between the countries) and cross-border sharing of ideas on practices.¹³

When a general assessment is made, the conceptual bases that summarize the Hague Programme can be listed as follows:

- There are three elements of the AFSJ: freedom, security and justice. However, no clear distinction between these very different elements was made. Moreover, it has not been determined what these elements cover. For this reason, it is often uncertain in what context the AFSJ measures has taken.
- Compared with the dimension of freedom and justice, it advocates the expansion, superiority and strengthening of the security dimension. Hence, it appears that the security dimension is unilaterally strengthened at the expense of freedom and justice elements.
- There is a security understanding that security of the EU and member states has priority over the freedom and security of individuals. This understanding attracts the attention as a guiding value of the Programme (Balzacq, Guild, & Carrera, 2008: 7).

The Hague Programme has made an important transformation in the conceptual structure of the AFSJ. The meanings and functions of the terms ‘freedom’ and ‘justice’ are structured as a lower priority values when compared to ‘security’. Moreover, the balance metaphor is used for freedom and security. In practice, however, security has outweighed in terms of balance. Understanding of the Hague Programme is allowing to surveillance applications (biometrics

¹¹ The Schengen Information System (SIS) was put into practice in 1995, aiming to provide information on specific persons and property categories together with the Schengen acquis. The system is used by the national border control authorities, other customs and police control authorities and the judicial authorities of the Schengen States. SIS is seen as the most important common database in terms of protection of internal security in the EU and management of the external border controls. In addition, the system is one of the most important measures taken in the EU about control of external borders, grant visas and residence permits and the fight against crime after the removal of internal borders.

¹² The Visa Information System (VIS) aims to improve implementation of the common visa policy. In this context, it is aimed to share visa information between member countries, increase cooperation between consulates and exchange of information between visa authorities.

¹³ The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, (2005/C 53/01), 3 March 2005.

and information systems) towards strengthen security, and migration management and control (visa policy, refoulement, readmission, border controls, fight against irregular migration) regardless of the effects on freedom, fundamental rights and the rule of law (Balzacq, Guild, & Carrera, 2008: 8). After the Hague Programme, European Commission published a document entitled "Towards a Common Migration Policy" in December 2007. It has been emphasized that the commitment to establish a common policy should be renewed and implementation of these policies requires more effective cooperation between the Union and its member states. In August 2008, it was stated that the European Migration Network established in 2003 should be formalized and the flow of information about migration to Eurostat should be improved (OECD, 2008).

On the other hand, European Pact on Immigration and Asylum was accepted on 24 September 2008. It constitutes the framework for EU immigration policy for the following years and accordingly forms a basis for the Stockholm Programme, which was adopted in 2009. The Pact expresses its commitment to execute a "fair, effective and consistent policy" to tackle with challenges and opportunities of migration issue. Legal migration, illegal migration, border controls, asylum policy and Union's relations with third countries are regulated in the Pact. It aims at a common migration policy based on solidarity among the member states and cooperating with third countries. As stated in the final declaration of the Council of Europe; this common policy should be built on good management of migration flows and should be in the interest of not only target countries but also resource countries and immigrants themselves. In other words, there should be a triple gain. Therefore, the European Union focuses on closer cooperation with third countries in the returning process of irregular migrants and the intensification of border controls. While the pact is not legally binding, the European Commission will supervise the operation of this mechanism (Council of the European Union, 2008).

The European Commission held its first annual assessment on implementation of the Pact in June 2009. The pact begins with the statement that the European Union does not have the resources to accept everybody who wants to migrate for a better life. It has been stated that the poorly managed migration policy will ruin social cohesion of destination country. When dealing with migration issues, it is emphasized that the Europe's capacity for sheltering, health, education, social services and labor market should be taken into account and abuse of migrants by criminal networks should be prevented. Therefore, the Pact call for an increased cooperation at the EU level, as required by a Europe where internal borders are removed and

migration is better governed. One of the issues that the Pact emphasizes about irregular migration is returning of irregular migrants. This issue has been addressed by the "Directive on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals". The Pact called on member states to increase cooperation with regard to arrangement of common flights for returning immigrants and improvement of readmission agreements. It has been also called for the establishment of two separate command centers for the EU countries in the south and east and focused on the role of Frontex, which is responsible for the security of EU's external borders. As regards relations with third countries, it has been emphasized that legal migration opportunities should be proposed for third country nationals and attention has been paid to the importance and benefits of circular migration (Council of the European Union, 2008).

Regular assessments are made on the implementation of the Pact. Indeed, at the June 2010 Summit, Council of the European Union evaluated the Commission's first annual report on 6 May 2010. In the report, struggle against irregular migration, developments in cooperation with the source and transit countries and especially labor migration issues are indicated. In the Council; the need to focus especially on following issues emphasized in the second year: Continue to work on the policy plan for legal migration and included it in the integration priorities in this area, combating illegal migration and human trafficking, enlargement of the external border controls, and continue to work towards the establishment of a common asylum system. As one can see, studies on the Pact have a more comprehensive approach including legal migration, as well as a security-focused approach to the migration. The Pact has prepared substructure of the Stockholm Programme with this feature (Council of the European Union, 2010).

2.2.4. 2010-2015: Desecuritization Tendency with the Stockholm Programme

2009 has been a transition year in the area of freedom, security and justice; the Hague Programme was concluded, the Lisbon Treaty and the Stockholm Programme entered into force and have new initiatives in the immigration issue. The preparation process of the Lisbon Treaty and the Stockholm Programme have slowed down the developments in this area. In the Council, number of the accepted legal texts on AFSJ also decreased from 144 to 121 compared to the previous year (Monar, 2010).

The third five-year plan (2010-2015), third phase of the AFSJ, was announced by the Swedish presidency in December 2009. Stockholm Programme provides a framework for activities of

the EU in the fields of citizenship, justice, security, asylum and migration for the five-year period 2010-2014. The launch of the Stockholm Programme coincided with the approval process of the Lisbon Treaty. During this period, the EU was keen on deepening the Union and desired to become a more active and stronger actor in foreign policy. The Stockholm Programme emphasized the security of European citizens as a reflection of the deepening and willingness to establish a European identity. A new European External Action Service was established with the Lisbon Treaty as an indication of the EU's desire to become a global actor with its legal entity. In this regard, the focus has been on Europe's place in migration movements in the global world and increasing cooperation with third countries in the field of migration. The Lisbon Treaty also reflects the desire to deal with challenges in global soft security areas such as climate change, demographic changes, energy security and combating terrorism. Therefore, the EU has entered a period that its focus on soft security issues and address the migration phenomenon as a security matter. The emphasis on effective combating with irregular migration, signing of readmission agreements, implementation of the returning directive issues are indications that a security-oriented approach to migration has been adopted (Council of the European Union, 2009).

Some statements of the Sweden's Minister for Justice Beatrice Ask and Minister for Migration and Asylum Policy Tobias Billström during Swedish presidency reflect the background of Stockholm Programme. "At this point, there are people who are wondering whether it is possible to reach consensus on these issues or not. In our opinion, it is especially important to maintain openness to the rest of the world during the economic crisis and recession, and avoid sinking in protectionist measures. Europe has gained prosperity through openness and free trade, as well as free movement of persons."¹⁴ As seen in their statements, the Stockholm Programme, in contrast to previous programmes, tries to eliminate imbalance between freedom and security in favor of security, by emphasizing freedom. However, when the Programme is closely analyzed, the security-oriented approach is still maintained despite the rhetoric of freedom seems to be strengthened. Although irregular migration compensates for labor demand in many sectors of the EU by illegal employment, openness regarding to this issue was not adopted for this issue. On the contrary, special emphasis is given to combating irregular migration. The issue of increasing sanctions for irregular migrant employment has been included in the Programme. This situation has led to the reaction of

¹⁴ Beatrice Ask and Tobias Billström, "Stockholm Programme in Focus", Dagens Nyheter Newspaper, 15.07.2009.

employer lobbies in the countries where irregular migrant employment is high, such as Spain and Italy (Council of the European Union, 2003).

In June 2009, the European Commission issued a document entitled "An Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Serving the Citizen: Wider Freedom in a Safer Environment" as preparation for the Stockholm process. In the document, the EU Council has set the main priority for the coming years as "to focus on the interests and needs of its citizens" and the main challenge is stated as "respecting fundamental rights and ensuring integrity while guaranteeing European security". Moreover, the document set four political priorities for the Stockholm Programme. In Stockholm, two more priorities have been added and the Programme has been shaped around these priorities (European Commission, 2009):

Promoting citizenship and fundamental rights-Europe of rights: According to this understanding, European citizenship should become a concrete reality. The AFSJ should be an area where fundamental rights in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights are preserved. In addition, the expansion of the Schengen area must continue.

Europe of law and justice (Facilitation of human life): The aim here was set as speeding up the creation of a justice area in the EU to prevent current legal division. Priority will be given to the mechanisms for facilitating access to the justice so that people will be able to seek their rights anywhere in the Union. It also included an intention to remove obstacles on recognition of the laws of a member state in other member states.

A Europe that protects citizens: According to this approach, an internal security strategy should be developed to improve security within the Union, thus protecting the lives and safety of European citizens and combating organized crime, terrorism and other threats. This strategy intended to strengthen cooperation to make the EU more secure in areas such as law enforcement, border management, civil protection, disaster management, criminal law. It is stated that this cooperation should be based on solidarity among the member states. The internal solidarity principle was not emphasized in previous five-year programs but was underscored in the Stockholm Programme so that. Internal security would be ensured and countries receiving more irregular migration should have more support to combat migration in this area (Council of the European Union, 2009: 4).

Access to Europe in a globalised world: According to the EU Council, entry to the EU by businessmen, tourists, students, scientists, workers, and people who have legitimate reasons to travel to the EU territory should be more efficient. At the same time, the Union and member states must guarantee the security of their citizens. In line with this goal, integrated border management and visa policies were evaluated to serve these purposes. Within the framework of integrated border management, the EU intends to continue facilitating legal entry into the territory of member states while taking measures to prevent irregular migration and cross-border crime and to ensure a high level of security. Accordingly, coordination of the activities of Frontex and European Asylum Support Office is necessary for the acceptance of immigrants at the EU's external borders. The Council of Europe called for strengthening of integrated border management and Frontex's role to reach capacity to respond changing migration flows more effectively. It also emphasized that operational cooperation between Frontex and source or transit countries should be increased and capacity building should be supported in these countries in order to ensure effective protection of external borders (Council of the European Union, 2009: 55).

Council of Europe emphasized the need to develop a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), where modern technologies are used on the southern and eastern borders, a uniform border surveillance system among member states was to be established, and surveillance data would be effectively shared. Furthermore, the ways of better coordinating and integrating external border controls should be sought to achieve the dual objective of facilitating entry and enhancing security (Council of the European Union, 2009: 56). According to this system, technology will play a key role in strengthening the external border control system. The implementation of Schengen Information System II (SIS II)¹⁵ and development of Visa Information System (VIS)¹⁶ are main objectives in this regard. According to the Council, an electronic system for registering entries into and departures from the member states would complement existing systems, and allow effective data sharing,

¹⁵ The second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) is a large-scale information technology (IT) system that supports internal security and the exchange of information on people and objects between national police, border control, customs, visa and judicial authorities. As people and goods can move in the Schengen Area without being checked at internal borders, SIS II is used by security officials to help keep people safe and counter cross-border crime.

¹⁶ The EU developed large-scale IT systems for collecting, processing and sharing information relevant to external border management. The Visa Information System (VIS), which supports the implementation of the common EU visa policy, is one of these tools. VIS is a system for the exchange of visa data between Schengen States. Establishment of the VIS is a key element of the European Union's visa policy, aimed at creating an area of freedom, security and justice without internal borders.

provided that member states comply with data protection rules (Council of the European Union, 2009: 57).

Within the framework of the visa policy, it is emphasized that efforts to establish a common visa policy need to be accelerated. Accordingly, the visa policy should be part of a broad vision to take into account domestic and foreign policy objectives. Therefore, the external dimension is also emphasized. In this context, EU should sign visa facilitation agreements with third countries. Visa applications to third countries are required to be regularly reviewed by the Commission in conformity with certain criteria such as combating irregular migration, public policy and security (Council of the European Union, 2009: 58).

Europe of responsibility, solidarity and partnership on migration and asylum issues:

Under this goal, five main commitments defined in the European Pact for Migration and Asylum were reiterated:

- Organize legal migration by taking into account the priorities, needs and acceptance capacities determined by each member state and encourage integration,
- Control of "illegal" migration by ensuring that "illegal" immigrants are returned to the source or transit countries,
- Making border controls more efficient,
- Create "Europe of Asylum",
- Establish a comprehensive partnership between source and transit countries to promote synergy between migration and development (Council of the European Union, 2009: 60).

Accordingly, development of a prospective and comprehensive migration policy based on solidarity and accountability remains a key policy objective for the EU. The Council of Europe has emphasized that well-governed migration can benefit all parties, while accepting the opportunities and challenges of increasing human mobility. A flexible policy that will respond to the priorities and needs of member states and where immigrants can fully use their potential is needed. In the face of significant demographic challenges that the Union will face in the future and bring labor demand, flexible migration policies will have a long-term impact on economic performance of the EU. The Programme indicated that long-term consequences of migration, such as labor market and social situation of immigrants must be taken into account and emphasized importance of the link between migration and integration in terms of

core values of the Union. . Under this heading, it is stated that illegal migration should be "prevented", "controlled" and "combated against", in order to provide "convincing and sustainable" migration and asylum procedures in the EU. Since member states especially those at the borders of the EU, including southern borders, feel increasing pressure about irregular migration issue. From the persapective of this study, it should be noted that the language used in relation to irregular migration included "prevention", "control", and "combat". Furthermore, it can be observed from the expressions used in the Programme that Mediterranean member states requested to embark upon measures regarding the issue (Council of the European Union, 2009: 59).

The Council of Europe once again reiterated that EU migration policies should be an integral part of EU foreign policies under the heading "development and implementation of the global EU approach to migration". Accordingly, it was underlined that this approach needed to be developed and strengthened based on the principles of "solidarity", "balance" and "genuine partnership" with source and transit countries (Council of the European Union, 2009: 60). The aim was to balance three areas, namely -promoting mobility and legal migration, making the best use of migration and development linkage, combating irregular migration-. The main focus regarding the matter is to increase cooperation with peripheral countries in Africa, East and Southeast Europe. The introduction of a more balanced approach can be seen as a step towards desecuritization of migration. Furthermore, migration and development, policies considering national labor market requirements, proactive policies for immigrants and their rights, and integration issues are discussed under the heading "Creating a Dynamic and Comprehensive Migration Policy". The inclusion of these elements in the migration policies can be seen as important steps for desecuritization of migration in the EU. However, the security-oriented approach is still overwhelming in practice (Martin, 2012: 1-7).

The role of Europe in the global world-External dimension: According to this priority, importance of the external dimension of the policies on AFSJ requires more integration of these policies into the general policies of the EU. It was emphasized that the external dimension is decisive for the success of the EU's dealing with challenges in the global world and for the achievement of the Stockholm Programme's objectives successfully. It has also drawn attention to the need for this dimension to be fully aligned with the EU's foreign policy (Council of the European Union, 2009: 5).

As a result, the most striking issue highlighted by the Stockholm Programme was the providing solidarity and sharing responsibilities among the member states in the matters of migration.

2.2.5. Innovations of the Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, underscored that one of the main objectives of the EU is to provide EU citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal borders. AFSJ is the area where most changes are made with the Treaty and it has been moved to "main goal of the Treaty" section. Thus, in the Treaty, this issue was preceded by policy areas such as economic and monetary union, internal market and CFSP. Lisbon Treaty provided the legal framework required for realization of the Stockholm Programme objectives (Monar, 2010: 158-159).

Lisbon introduces a number of new provisions in the field of justice and home affairs, and therefore in the field of migration policies (Title V: Area of Freedom, Security and Justice - Art. 67-89). While this title in the Amsterdam Treaty was "Visa, asylum, migration and other policies on free movement of persons" and establishment of the AFSJ was the target; changing the title in Lisbon Treaty as the AFSJ is an indicator of desire for institutionalization in this area. Therefore, the progress made in the creation of such an area can be considered a success for EU integration. Under the Treaty, decision-making regarding some issues is moved from unanimity procedure to qualified majority / joint decision procedure: A part of short-term visa rules, residence permits, and single format for visas, legal migration, Eurojust, Europol. Passports and ID cards are among the areas subject to unanimity rule (European Parliament consultation procedure). After approval of the European Parliament, the Council of Europe can decide unanimously (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, 2009). The move of some visa policies and legal migration issues from unanimity to the qualified majority procedure indicates the EU's desire to establish a common policy in these areas. Placing these intergovernmental issues under the supranational authority can be seen as Europeanization of these issues. Thus, common migration policy of the EU would not focus on border controls to combat irregular migration, but would develop common policies in the field of legal migration. It can be regarded as a process that contributes to the desecuritization of migration.

In this context, after the Treaty, institutional structures also changed. The Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security of the Commission was divided into Directorate-General Home

Affairs and Directorate-General Justice as of 1 July 2010. It is a positive development that the justice issues will be handled separately from the security issues. Separate consideration of migration issues from the security issues in the future will contribute to desecuritization of migration. As a matter of fact, the signals are given in the section where the mission of the Directorate-General is stated. Accordingly, the Directorate-General has two main priorities: to ensure European security and bring solidarity to the center of European migration policies. This statement indicates that migration policies have increasingly been seen as a separate issue from security policies (Balzacq, Guild, & Carrera, 2008: 13).

2.3. Migration-Security Nexus in the EU

With the 21st century, migration and security issues have gained new and challenging dimensions. In this process, many concepts including internal security, human security and social security have become main items on the agenda. At the same time, migration has also been placed at the top of national and international agenda. Between policy goals and public interests in these two important issues, there are various consequences for states and individuals, namely immigrants and citizens (Guild, *Security and Migration in the 21st Century*, 2009).

Today, there are no major security threats to the EU member states, but more differentiated, less visible and less predictable threats exist. In the Security Strategy Document issued by the EU Council in 2003, irregular migration is considered among these threats whose external dimension is very important. In the Document, irregular migration has also been counted among issues that may be linked to terrorism and areas where criminal organizations operate. The fact that migration issue takes place in the European Security Strategy (ESS) demonstrates the importance of migration-security context in the EU (Council of the European Union, 2003). Within the context of ESS, it should be noted that migration issues are politicized and securitized in the EU at the national and supranational levels. With the increasing number of international migration movements, this securitization discourse emerging from the interaction of public opinion, visual and written media, government policies and aimed at preserving existing power structures and socio-political boundaries has become a dominant discourse in EU countries. The national rhetoric of migration as a security concern in EU countries has been reflected on the EU's policies and attitudes and these discourses have been adjusted again by the Union (Buonfino, 2004).

Especially after the September 11 attacks, the boundaries between security, terrorism, migration and social fears have intertwined. Migration has become one of the most important security concerns of the 21st century. Among the various discourses that emerged in this process (migration as economic benefit, migration as security concern, liberalization of migration, etc.), security rhetoric was dominated by the accelerating influence of 9/11 attacks. In the EU, "economization" (emphasizing the need for skilled labour) and "securitization" are prominent discourses in recent years. Although securitization discourse starts to outweigh with September 11 attacks, increasing need for young labor force in the EU countries due to aging population has also brought economicization discourse into the forefront. Dominance of securitization is closely related to national governments' approaches to prevent increasing migration flows, appease media pressures, relieve the public about their fears on migration. As the British Home Secretary David Blunkett has stated, in socio-economically troubled periods, society directs its need to find a scapegoat generally to immigrants (Blunkett, 2003).

Security is a configuration based on distinctions such as me and others, insiders and outsiders, therefore concepts such as solidarity, ethics and human rights remain the second plan against security. This situation threatens the living space of newly arrived immigrants or irregular migrants and leads to stigmatization of settled migrants. In this way, concepts such as human rights, peaceful life, freedom and justice are threatened (Buonfino, 2004: 2). If one of the EU's key objectives is thought to be creation of the AFSJ, it can be argued that securitization tendency conflicted with the EU's own projects.

As Didier Bigo puts it, security concept involves ensuring and protecting security of the society, not disturbing and worrying it. But sometimes, in order to protect society and provide confidence, discomfort and anxiety are aroused in the society (Bigo, To Reassure and Protect After September 11, 2002). This dilemma of security and insecurity is at the heart of migration debates in Europe. In the globalizing world, through removing the borders in the world, migration has become a phenomenon that needs to be controlled and filtered even if it cannot be reduced. As a result of fears about increasing migration and perceived risks, securitization has taken its place among other discourses as the most appropriate national discourse. Within this framework, there is a tendency for securitization to be used as the most appropriate discourse for the protection of the Union in a pluralistic world, since it will preserve existing boundaries and identity strongly. Therefore, it is important to consider perceptions and concerns about migration in the EU.

2.3.1. Perceptions and Concerns about Migration

The presence of immigrants from different backgrounds can create challenges, especially for traditionally homogeneous societies. There are three key interrelated concerns here: security and crime, socio-economic factors, cultural factors. The main issue in the aftermath of September 11 attacks is existence of real or imaginary dangerous strangers and the threat of terrorism. In fact, these fears are not new fears, because anti-migration sense has always existed. Although anti-migration thoughts decrease over time, it has come to light again with new forms in times of political instability and transformation (UN Development Programme, 2009).

There were different tendencies about irregular migration in Europe before the September 11. First was the concerns about uncontrolled entry. Indeed, concerns about irregular migration have begun to emerge in countries such as Belgium, France, Italy and Spain since the 1980s. Through removing the restrictions on migration coming from Eastern Block in 1989, the fear of irregular migration coming from Eastern Europe arose. Later on, these concerns have been alleviated, but this time politics and media focused on irregular immigrant entries into Italy and Spain by sea. This is a clear example of securitization in political discourse, and states have generally responded with symbolic and highly visible security measures. For instance, Italian government declared a state of emergency after a ship with 928 Iraqis entered Sicily on March 2002. In order to prevent migration by sea, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and England have been operating common sea patrols in the Mediterranean under Ulysses operation since September 2003 (Boswell, 2007).

Security concerns also stem from perceived links between migration and crime. Seventy percent of the participants in European Social Survey believe that immigrants increase crime problems in a country. This rate has exceeded eighty five percent in Germany, Czech Republic and Norway. As emphasized in "The Godfather" movie, prejudiced images that link immigrants to crime are spreading through popular media. In these publications, it is often emphasized that violence has been committed by immigrant groups such as the Italian mafia and Chinese triad (UN Development Programme, 2009: 89).

Another factor in this regard is the irregular stay and social and economic impact of employment. These concerns shaped around the exploitation of welfare state and social security, cost of asylum systems and fear that irregular workers will hinder local workforce. Exploitation concerns about asylum have become important in western European countries

such as France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These countries have received a high number of asylum applications since the late 1980s. In the 1990s, these countries took a series of measures to restrict and deter entry into asylum systems and made difficult the criteria for recognizing asylum claims. Sanctions against the people carrying immigrants, returning asylum-seekers to safe third countries, accelerated asylum procedures and reduction of welfare benefits for asylum-seekers constitute these measures. From the mid-1990s, these measures were taken at the EU level. The global economic stagnation that began in 2008 revived the anti-immigrant rhetoric. As local workers feared losing their jobs even more in this period. As a result, governments were under serious pressure. Even in countries where migration is commonly accepted by the public, thoughts on immigrants have been changing. In the UK, for example, opinions towards the Eastern European immigrants have changed negatively (UN Development Programme, 2009: 90).

Economic worries and security concerns sometimes trigger each other, and a vicious circle emerges. Immigrants who are marginalized because of their temporary or irregular immigrant status and difficulty to find jobs may resort antisocial behavior and crime, justifying the security concerns of local people. In cases where this leads to more discrimination in the labor market and politics, there is a risk of returning to the old community structure where gangster groups or other anti-social organizations are getting stronger and threatening the local people. Such a situation has been observed among some young Maghribs in France and among some central American groups in the United States. Therefore, when the disadvantage of the labor market leads to social exclusion, adverse effects on social cohesion immediately arise. In addition, the securitization of migration also reflects concerns of cultural conflict and identity, which politicians often exclude (Faist, 2007).

2.3.2. Securitization Discourse of the EU Countries on Migration

Migration is presented as a growing threat to European societies or as a new focus for insecurity and responsible for many socioeconomic and social problems. This discourse provides legitimacy for the state to protect its citizens from external threats. Migration control policies are tried to be legitimate in practice (Boswell, 2007: 591). In this way, securitization of migration has become a dominant political discourse at the EU level. This approach has created a tendency to restrict migration in the creation of migration policies. The most important of these measures is strengthening border controls.

Securitization literature presents two approaches for organizational interests in the political system and both of them are based on the logic of power maximization. According to the first approach, security institutions in the system are willing to exercise influence over other areas. To this end, security institutions try to export their technologies and practices to other policy areas. Security professionals involved in the area of migration during policy making process and thus securitization is emerging. This approach is encouraged through the legitimization of security approaches. The second approach is that these institutions attempt to expand their power by avoiding supervision. They apply the "venue shopping" to liberate themselves from internal limitations arising from democratic institutions. The concept of venue shopping refers to the fact that security professionals expand their capabilities by avoiding being an object of public discourse. In other words, they are liberating themselves from the public comment for obtaining legitimacy (Guiraudon, 2000). In this case, the security professionals provide securitization at the European level in order to avoid parliamentary supervision or judicial control that would prevent their activities at the national level. Consequently, national actors involved in migration management keep migration away from public debate and policy making is transferred to intergovernmental cooperation bodies at European level. At this level, security agendas of the interior ministers are dominant. Securitization in discourse can legitimize the use of certain security practices. Administrative agencies have an important activity area without being subject to public or judicial review (Boswell, 2007: 593).

In order to prevent migration, border controls are increased around in line with the above mentioned discourses. The argument went, in the absence of migration controls, human traffickers would not be needed, and informal economies concentrated in specific cities and agricultural regions would gradually decline. For this reason, the concept of virtuality should be considered. According to the economic anthropologist Daniel Miller, virtualism refers to the "new economic politics" that builds the real economy and adapts it to real or abstract economic models. Economists are not shaping the real world, instead, "new economy" begins to reflect models of economists. Because economic models are nourishing economic policies. From my standpoint, Miller's virtuality theory can also be applied to irregular migration. If irregular migration is the result of strict measures, it cannot be said that state actually controls irregular migration. Also, both the state and media reveal this fact themselves. In other words, irregular migration is emerged by public and governmental arguments. As explained elsewhere, anti-immigrant discourses are developed in relation to various perspectives. For instance, negative terms used for immigrants (illegal, alien, the "other", etc.), great numbers

of immigrants, the burden that immigrants bring to the society, different cultures of immigrants are among the themes of anti-immigrant discourses. Anti-immigration discourses in Europe can be distinguished as follows (Samers, 2004: 29):

- *Europe's population is high:* Current EU population is quite high for long-term sustainability. Europe is among the most densely populated regions compared to other regions of the world.
- *Labor market needs do not show migration as reasonable:* The lack of labor in some sectors results from low wages. Low employment rate, especially among immigrants, indicating that there is no need for more immigrants.
- *Free movement of labor is not always a solution:* Advocates of free trade think that free movement of goods and services must be conducted with free movement of labor jointly. However, human resources cannot be considered equal to goods, services, and capital. The goods are consumed in a simple way, but the immigrant labor force, with their families, needs various social services such as education, vocational training, and health care.
- *Migration will increase the burden of member states' welfare systems:* In most European countries, social services and health care services are partially free and the people who pay taxes bear this cost. Although low-paid immigrants benefit entrepreneurs, they create burden for welfare systems.
- *Migration cannot compensate for population aging:* Migration alone cannot compensate for population aging and cannot solve the EU labor market problems (Heeger & Lorant, 2009).

Migration is presented as a source of problems related to social, economic and social security, such as unemployment, housing problems, and rise of organized crime. Concrete evidence cannot be shown in this process because it is very difficult to put forward concrete effects of migration. In fact, the low-level threats are presented as major threats. One of the negative effects of these discourses is that in some European countries, the people who have right of asylum enter and live in the European countries illegally (Faist, 2007: 30-31).

When these discourses on migration issue in the EU are examined, two main tendencies can be observed: economization and securitization. Some politicians, journalists and writers prefer to address migration as economic gain and loss (unemployment, qualified and unqualified labor requirement, contributions or damages on the economy and social security system, etc.).

This discourse is called as economization. The dominant approach in the EU is security-oriented approach which relates migration to terrorism, cultural conflict, crime and similar issues.

The use of illegal migration terminology in the context of a security-focused approach has an important effect in perceiving immigrants from outside the EU as persons who should not be trusted and as suspicious persons. Thus, a culture of suspicion and distrust towards third-country nationals and irregular migrants has emerged. This attitude towards the immigrants is strengthened by the development of EU migration policies, which are essentially securitizing “migration” and do not take into account the human rights dimension. Failing to make clear distinction between refugees and economic immigrants is at the center of negative public and media perceptions towards these groups. While most organizations on migration use a more neutral language such as “irregular”, EU institutions continue to use the phrase “illegal”. Moreover, “illegals” are used instead of illegal immigrants for them. These expressions in official documents of the EU reflect the perspective on immigrants and describe migration as a concept to be struggled (Cholewinski, *The Criminalisation of Migration in EU Law and Policy*, 2007).

This negatively charged language has created an image of enemy and has continuously emphasized the criminal image that violates the law. However, this image ignores the fact that a significant part of irregular migrants enter the country legally. At the same time, this image overlooks that every person has basic human rights and must be protected according to international law. The majority of these rights in the European Convention on Human Rights are also found in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which became legally binding with the Lisbon Treaty. Values such as the human dignity found in the Charter are transboundary values. It also does not categorize people as citizens, non-citizens, legal residents or irregular migrants. While the Charter of Fundamental Rights will bring a culture of human rights to EU law, the lack of a rights-based approach of migration policies makes this insufficient. If such an approach is taken, the rights of third-country nationals in member states must be protected, regardless of their employment or legal status. In addition, concrete procedural guarantees must be provided on the non-refoulement¹⁷ process. The creation of a

¹⁷ Non-refoulement is a fundamental principle of international law which forbids a state receiving asylum seekers from returning them to a country in which they would be in likely danger of persecution based on “race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”.

rights-based approach in this way could reverse the tendency of migration to be considered as a crime in both member states and neighboring countries (Cholewinski, 2007: 334-335).

The first problem with defending strict migration controls is that the need for it is exaggerated. In other words, the perception of threats from migration and trans-border crime is largely based on cultural prejudice rather than on a serious data analysis. Strict border controls based on unfounded threat perceptions are not sustainable in the long run. For instance, after the fall of Berlin Wall, rigid border control argument is fed by the concern that there would be mass migration from Eastern Europe. These fears have not been realized because there are factors that will discourage migration as well as factors that will encourage it. The fact that Western Europe offers better opportunities in economic terms is an attractive factor for migration. However, especially hard employment conditions for unqualified labor and socio-cultural and linguistic differences are among the factors deterring migration. For these reasons, most people do not prefer migration even if their life quality will rise (Zielonka, 2001: 519-520). Indeed, despite the worries about migration after the fall of Berlin Wall, migration from the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) to the EU in those years constituted only 15% of the total migration. There is no reliable data on irregular migration, even when the legal migration figures are reached. According to estimates, labor migration from the CEECs is twofold the official statistics. Nonetheless, these figures show that concerns about mass migration, as evidenced by the circles advocating strict border controls between the EU and its neighbors, are exaggerated (Zielonka, 2001: 520-521).

2.3.3. Migration Perspectives of EU Institutions as Securitizing Actors: Different Approaches

At the EU level, EU institutions' securitization discourses on migration are more ambiguous and complicated compared to the national level. Official views of the EU on migration issue can differ from the views of member states' governments and the views of general EU citizens. Attitudes towards migration movements in the EU countries are becoming increasingly radical. For instance, while French President Nicholas Sarkozy emphasized joint action at EU level to prevent irregular migration, the Italian Parliament has adopted many anti-immigration measures. Despite these trends of member state governments, former Commissioner Jonathan Faul, responsible for freedom, security and justice in the European Commission, has made statements that migration may be useful for both source and destination countries. This attitude stems from the Commission's tendency to attach

importance to non-security aspects of migration. In the meantime, it is becoming increasingly difficult to make arrangements at EU level that will please both the citizens of member states and immigrants. In addition, target audience in the discourse of securitization at the EU level can be bureaucrats, experts and political professionals different from the national level. This makes the securitization process more complicated than national level (Neal, 2009).

The main actor in securitization of migration in the EU is the EU Council, which is composed of the member states and heads of government. Since the EU Council is composed of representatives of the member states, governments of the member states are also seen to have maintained their securitization discourse here. Regarding the European Council's final declarations, prevention of irregular migration has been a part of various policies in recent years. This is a reflection of sensitivities and concerns of member states about migration, particularly the Mediterranean EU members. Italy, Spain, and Greece, which receive a large amount of irregular migrations from the Mediterranean and have taken various measures in this regard, are paying attention to burden-sharing on this issue because they are at the forefront of struggle with irregular migration in the EU due to their geographical location. Therefore, irregular migration is one of the primary issues on the EU Council agenda (Huysmans, 2000).

In the European Parliament, perspectives on migration are differentiated because different political groups are involved. Some groups of Parliament also reflect the concerns on migration and support securitization. The perspectives of the political groups in the European Parliament differ:

- **European People's Party:** In the party program of Christian Democrats, challenges brought by migration are at top priority for the European People's Party group. In particular, attention is drawn to the migration pressure from south and southeastern Europe and emphasizes need for a common migration policy that focuses on the fight against irregular migration. As part of these policies, consolidation of external border controls, signing of readmission agreements, cooperation with the source and transit countries in combating irregular migration, and a strict return policy towards irregular migrants are emphasized. The notable point here is that only implementation of a common policy on illegal migration is advocated rather than legal migration.
- **Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats(S&D):** There is no title about migration in the group program that represents the center left, but in Party's opinion on

the Stockholm Programme, EU migration policies that include the integration of immigrants is prioritized. Here, the title "to build a welfare Europe with immigrants" was used. Respect for the basic rights and dignity of immigrants in migration policies, equal attitude towards immigrants, and more effective policies on family unification are underlined as part of this title.

Claudia Fava, who represented this group in the Justice and Home Affairs Committee before 2009 elections, stated in an European Parliament session on this issue that a global approach should be implemented, not an absolute restriction approach. He indicated that the best way to combat irregular migration is increasing regular migration opportunities. Fava, as a Parliamentarian representing Italy receiving more immigration than other countries, has underlined enhancing cooperation between countries in this regard. He also stressed that human rights and dignity of immigrants should be protected while these policies are being implemented.

- **ALDE-Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe:** The speech of Graham Watson in 2008, former president of this liberal group, reflects views of the group:

"Migration management is one of the biggest challenges the EU faces today. For a long time, reaction of Europe has not been coordinated in its best expression, and it is thoughtless in its worst form. We must give up migration management model which ends at the national borders. Some initial steps towards EU cooperation have been taken in the fight against illegal migration, but we should not stop here. Making Europe a fortress is not a solution. A comprehensive strategy that responds to the needs of Europe and takes into account the factors that cause people to leave their homes can only manage migration effectively." (Watson, 2008).

Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, coordinator on migration in the group, stressed that regional conflicts, resource shortage and income distribution gap would increase migration more. In this case, he emphasized the need to create a "radical and at the same time a responsible migration policy". (European Parliament, 2007).

- **The Greens-European Free Alliance:** They are among the groups advocating immigrant rights in the European Parliament. According to the group program, Europe needs migration and migration should be viewed as an opportunity. In addition, free mechanisms should be established for legal entry and working of immigrants. As a first step, the EU should recognize that it needs immigrants and give them the same rights as EU citizens. The point that group emphasizes in this process is the human perspective.

French Parliamentarian Helene Flautre's views can also be given as representative of this group's attitude toward migration. Flautre opposes the securitization of migration, and drawing attention to human tragedies, especially realized when immigrants try to cross the EU with boats from the Mediterranean. He also states that readmission agreements signed with third countries impair immigrant rights (The Greens/European Free Alliance, 2009).

- **European Conservatives and Reformists(ECR):** ECR is a new group compared to other groups and was formed in June 2009 by eight political parties against federalism in Europe. According to the Prague Declaration, which reflects the views of the group, exploitation of asylum procedures should be abolished through an effectively controlled migration policy (European Conservatives and Reformists Group, 2013).
- **European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL):** The Group, representing the left wing in EP, opposes the creation of a fortress Europe. In addition, this group emphasizes the positive aspects of migration and advocates migration policies based on the free movement of people and protecting human rights. It also advocates equal attitude to immigrants in terms of economic, cultural and social rights. Group is opposed to selective migration policies, creation of migration quotas and mandatory repatriation policies for immigrants. It has also launched a campaign to pressure European governments to close down immigrant detention centers (GUE/NGL, 2010).
- **Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD):** The group on the right wing is generally skeptical about EU integration and has a negative view on the further integration of the EU, signing of more treaties and creation of policies by the EU. Therefore, it is also against the creation of a common migration policy, because it defends that each country has right to make its own migration policy. Group program also states that each country has the right to "protect its own borders and to strengthen its historical, traditional, religious and cultural values." It is also emphasized that group rejected "the bureaucratization of Europe and the creation of a single central European super-state" (Heeger & Lorant, 2009).

On the other hand, the European Commission, which is driving force of the EU's execution, has adopted a non-security approach (desecuritization tendency) for the enlargement process, free movement, and migration from third countries to the EU. The Commission emphasizes aging population of the EU and EU's immigrant needs in its documents. In this context, it advocates increasing the ways of legal migration. However, the importance attached to

fighting illegal migration is also seen in the Commission documents. The Commission and the Council's attitudes intersect at this point. Usage of the term "illegal migration" by the Commission, Council and Parliament has been criticized at the international arena. People themselves are not illegal, they may not have permission to be on a land, or there is no proper documentation of their immigrant status. But this situation does not make them personally illegal.

Against the securitization tendency of national policies, the EU policies are trying to present itself as a new structuring that attaches importance to human rights and cooperation, even though it reflects this securitization tendency. As a result, despite the dominant importance given for fighting "illegal" migration and strengthening border controls in the EU migration policies, it is seen that there are also discourses on human rights and economization issues through an emphasis on the economic benefits of humanitarian aid and migration. (Buonfino, 2004: 49).

2.3.4. Issue Areas of Securitization

From the above analysis, it will not be wrong to state that the EU countries by and large securitized areas of irregular migration and border controls and framed them as threats or insecurities for the EU and member states. Irregular migration is included within the scope of legal regulations at European level and is considered as a crime and risk. It is emphasized that administrative practices such as surveillance, detention, control and criminal sanctions against this issue are necessary and they should be legalized. In this context, EU law and policy have developed a security link on irregular migration and border security. This situation is valid in relation to the implementation of integrated border management strategy and common EU policy on irregular migration. The basic principle here is that integration of border management and threats to border that the EU is facing must be taken under the security area. Integrated border management was meant to tackle irregular migration. In other words, one of the key objectives of the EU border management is to create a common migration policy in which illegal activities are managed in a comprehensive manner. It is striking that the EU continues to use expressions like "illegal immigration", "fight against", and "combat" in expressing this issue area. The negative implications of these expressions categorized related person as suspicious or criminal (Balzacq, Guild, & Carrera, 2008: s. 2-3).

Integrated and holistic approaches create an innovative discourse and political strategy at EU level. Behind the holistic approaches lies the understanding that more security measures

would bring more solutions to the challenges and dilemmas that the EU faces at common external borders. This strategy is presented at the official level as "comprehensive policy on illegal migration". (Balzacq, Guild, & Carrera, 2008: 3). Migration-related securitization areas in the EU have emerged as fighting against illegal migration and border controls. In this context, fighting against illegal migration in the EU will be discussed first, and then the border control that has been strengthened institutionally in the last years will be evaluated.

2.3.4.1. Fight against Illegal Migration

At the EU level, it seems that importance is given mostly to tackle with illegal migration. The term "illegal migration" is often used in the EU for people who cross the borders of member states without permission and necessary documents. Although those who remain in the country although their visa or residence permit has expired and illegal workers in the country are included in the scope of illegal migration. The term "illegal migration" in EU policies is used for illegal entry into an EU country. Interestingly, there is no common definition of "illegal migration" in the EU. With no common definition in the EU, Europol (European Police Office) refers to illegal migration as follows: "Migration is not illegal at heart, in fact, it is necessary for the development of both the source and destination countries. But migration becomes illegal when individuals try to enter a country as a fugitive or in fraudulent ways through help of others." (EUROPOL, 2009).

There are shortcomings and contradictions in the EU's approach to migration. Irregular migration is desired to be prevented on the one hand, and irregular migrants reaching member countries are working as cheap labor in various sectors of the economy on the other hand. Problems related to migration are part of increasing dependence of the EU on migration phenomenon. It is also officially recognized in the EU that immigrants are indispensable elements of the EU economy and irreplaceable substitute for decreasing demography of the EU. Immigrants are also presented as the basis for many social and political problems that EU politics have difficulty to handle. In a large part of the EU economy, there is a decisive function of cheap and flexible labor, which is provided by irregular migrants and lacks working-related rights. However, governments and politicians within the EU are treating the irregular immigrant group necessary for economy in the criminal category. In sum, the EU has not developed a common and coherent policy on combating irregular migration yet. The reason is largely based on the fact that some country's economies benefit from these

immigrants as cheap labor, and thus they do not want to completely prevent irregular migration (Schierup, Hansen, & Castles, 2006).

2.3.4.2. Border Controls

Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Internal Affairs of the EU, stressed the importance of border controls for the EU with a security-oriented perspective in a May 2010 speech, as follows: "Border management integrated with 1600 entry points to the EU is a key position to reduce and prevent the entry of people and goods that threaten EU security." (Malmström, 2010). A decisive role has been given to the European Border Agency (Frontex) in this process. This institution was established in 2004 and became effective since May 2005. Frontex, located in Warsaw, is a specialized and independent EU agency, tasked with coordinating operational cooperation between member states on border security. This institution is at the key position to ensuring border security at the supranational level. According to its founding Regulation, Frontex's main responsibilities include the following (Lahav, 2004):

- **Conducting risk analyses:** To establish an information collection system for the regular analysis of the situation at the external borders of the EU and to ensure efficient allocation of resources within this context.
- **Coordinating operational cooperation between member states regarding the management of external borders:** Proposing an operation on land, air and sea borders of the EU through inviting member states and based on risk analysis.
- **Assisting member states in the training of national border guards:** To support the development of common standards for training of border control authorities in member states and implementation of integrated border management.
- **Following up on developments in research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders:** The Directive establishing FRONTEX gave the Agency the competence to follow up on developments in research that are relevant for external border surveillance and controls and to disseminate such information to the member states and the European Commission.
- **Providing member states with a rapid response capability:** Among the duties of Frontex, there is combining expert technical and human resources across the EU and to serve these to member states. These teams will be kept ready if there is an unexpected crisis at the external borders.

- **Assisting member states in organizing joint return operations:** When member states decide to refoulement of irregular migrants who do not voluntarily return to their countries, Frontex supports these states. Frontex assumes the role of coordinating this process, increasing its efficiency and ensuring cost effectiveness. In addition, to ensure the fundamental rights and human dignity of returnees are guaranteed at every stage of the operation is also among the responsibilities of Frontex.

The joint operations coordinated by FRONTEX, which represent its most significant activity can be seen as securitizing practices. Because these operations are a type of practices that have traditionally been deployed to deal with security threats and aim to stem migration flows. On the other hand, FRONTEX's activities that aim to assist member states in the training of their border control authorities have also contributed to the securitization of migration in the EU. The content of the training activities organized by FRONTEX, especially the training sessions relating to the detection of false documents and airnaval cooperation in surveillance operations reinforces the idea that the external borders of the EU member states are under threat by irregular migration and need to be protected (Léonard, 2010). FRONTEX generally describes itself as an 'intelligence-driven' organization. The use of the term of 'intelligence', widely in FRONTEX documents, although it was not included in the founding Regulation, is an interesting situation. Because 'intelligence' has traditionally referred to information concerning threats to (national) security and intelligence structures have only traditionally been established to control and prevent security threats (Gill & Phythian, 2012). The use of this term, rather than more neutral concepts such as 'data' or 'information', also contributes to securitizing asylum and migration in the EU. Consequently, FRONTEX can be considered a successful practice as a securitization tool (Neal, 2009: 333).

CHAPTER 3

TURKEY'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE EU MIGRATION POLICIES IN THE CONTEXT OF SECURITIZATION

3.1. Introduction

Turkey, situated at intersection of the three continents and exposed to different forms of migration throughout its history, is high on the agenda regarding regular and irregular migration in Europe. It is possible to say that migration issue in Turkey-EU relations always has an important place because Turkey is a source country and a transit country due to its geographical position. The EU is concerned that the security problems of candidate countries like Turkey will have repercussions in the area of freedom, security and justice. Therefore, in order to integrate in the internal security area of the EU, candidate countries is expected to provide full harmonization on these issues, including the migration, in the accession process (Wolff, Wichmann, & Mounier, 2009).

This chapter seeks to examine Turkey's compliance with the EU migration policies in the context of securitization and externalization¹⁸ of these policies, and to present the challenges and opportunities for Turkey and the EU in this process. In this context, the process of transforming Turkey from an emigrant country to a transit and migration-receiving country will be discussed first. Later, the Europeanization level of Turkey's migration policies will be evaluated in the light of Radaelli's classification. Focus will be on the visa policies, integrated border management and combating irregular migration. Then, signing of the readmission agreement, one of the most controversial issues in Turkey-EU relations in 2010, and to submit of visa facilitation/exemption for this agreement, and changing strategies of the EU and Turkey in this process will be examined. Finally, under the title of "Securitization of Migration Policies in Turkey", the programs of four political parties will be examined and politicization and securitization of migration in Turkey will be evaluated. Within this framework, the extent to which migration is securitized in Turkey will be discussed.

¹⁸ According to Lavenex, externalization is "a form of external governance in which internal and foreign policy goals come together" (Lavenex, 2004: 681). Different domestic policies of the EU member states and in a way converging EU foreign policy agree on one point in order to address the migration issues in cooperation with third countries. The assumption is that the EU tries to expand its effectiveness of governance particularly in areas such as asylum and migration policies, which have become securitized inside (Lavenex, 2004: 686).

3.2. Changing From An Emigrant Country to A Transit and Migration-Receiving Country

Countries like Spain and Italy, and Central and Eastern European countries such as Poland were emigrant countries before the EU membership (especially in the 1960s), but later became transit and migration-receiving countries under the influence of their geopolitical position. Turkey has begun to undergo a similar transformation more intensely after the membership negotiations started in 2005. The transformation of Turkey into a transit country is also important in terms of becoming irregular migration a key issue in Turkey-EU relations. This section will examine the transformation in question supported by current data.

3.2.1. Turkey as An Emigrant Country

From the foundation of the Republic to the 1960s, migration from Turkey to abroad has been limited. In the 1960s, there was a need for foreign labor due to the economic restructuring of European countries after the Second World War, so a great number of workers were recruited from the Mediterranean countries, including Turkey. This worker recruitment was made systematically based on bilateral agreements that regulate labor migration among states. Rapid population growth, low per capita income, unfair distribution of income, imbalances in the distribution of agricultural land, and employment problems are among the reasons for the large-scale labor migration movements from Turkey to Europe during this period (Mutluer, 2003). Therefore, in this period, Turkey's migration policies were determined by pull factors such as the labor force needs in the EU and push factors such as unemployment in Turkey (İçduygu & Kirişci, 2009: 805).

In the First Five-Year Development Plan covering 1962-1967 in Turkey, "exporting excess labor force" was considered as a development strategy. In this context, Turkey signed the first bilateral labor agreement¹⁹ with West Germany in 1961. Afterwards, similar bilateral agreements have been signed with Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium (1964); France (1965), Sweden and Australia (1967). Less comprehensive agreements were signed with England (1961), Switzerland (1971), Denmark (1973) and Norway (1981) (İçduygu, Sert, & Karaçay, 2009) The successive and systematic implementation of these agreements shows that the European countries receiving migration as well as the emigrant countries find it useful and desirable. These agreements were signed on the presumption that Turkish citizens would

¹⁹ These agreements include general arrangements for the selection, recruitment and wages of the immigrant workers.

temporarily migrate to those countries. As a matter of fact, the immigrants were called as guest workers (gastarbeiter) in those countries. However, Turkish citizens later became permanent immigrants in these countries.

As a result of bilateral labor agreements, inflow of the workers' remittances in the Turkish economy has increased over the years. In fact, the workers' remittances provided much more income than foreign direct investments for Turkey as well as many developing countries in the 1990s (Neyaptı, 2004). Even though the inflow of workers' remittances was adversely affected by the 1974 oil crisis, 1980 military coup, and 1994 economic crisis, it increased significantly in the second half of the 1990s. An interesting development is the decrease of this flow after the 1999 earthquake. This shows that desire for investment is the main driving force in these flows (Aydaş, Metin-Özcan, & Neyaptı, 2005). By 2008, workers' remittances increased by 10% and rise to 1.32 million dollars (SOPEMI, 2010: 246). Another significance of the remittances is the use of them in closing trade deficit. In the 1980s, these transfers were used to cover 60% of the trade deficit. On the other hand, in the 1990s, when the Turkish economy became more liberal, this rate has fallen to around 35%. However, the importance of workers' remittances for Turkey has continued (Abadan-Unat, 2017: 87).

The 1973-1974 oil crisis, which took place after the flow of migration in the 1960s, led European countries to stop labor recruitment from non-EU countries, including Turkey, while causing economic stagnation in Europe. However, even if new labor migration is stopped, limited number of migration to Europe continues through family unification and asylum (Kirişçi, 2003). From this period onwards, Turkish citizens who have migrated previously involved in the policies of family unification, integration of immigrants and citizenship in these countries (İçduygu, 2000). Since 1974, the fact that European countries have closed their gates to labor migration from Turkey, causing the Turkish labor migration to turn towards oil-exporting Arab countries. From 1990s onwards, migration flows from Turkey have turned to the countries of Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). For this reason, it can be said that the Turkey's migration movements in recent years have diversified towards different countries from Europe. This diversity also includes the Middle East countries today. There are a considerable number of Turkish immigrants in the Middle East countries and CIS, and this shows that the direction of migration flows from Turkey turns to the countries outside Europe due to economic and social reasons. Between 1996 and 2005, half of the labor force migration from Turkey went to the countries of CIS. In 2008, labor migration decreased from 75-80,000 to 57,000 compared to the previous two years. In

this period, the two main destinations were the countries of CIS (19,500) and Middle East (25,000). The ratio of labor migration to the countries of CIS and Middle East to total labor migration is about 90% in this period (SOPEMI, 2010: 246).

From the 1960s to 1980s, Turkey regarded labor migration as a means of economic development and gave importance to the policies on this issue. However, it is difficult to say that "effective and comprehensive policies" concerning migration policies has been developed since 1980s. In this process, Turkey has two perspectives: to protect connections of immigrants with Turkey and to support harmonisation of these immigrants with the society of countries they live. Turkish leadership, especially in recent years, has asked the Turkish immigrants to harmonise with society of the country they live, to learn language of it, to participate in the education system, politics and civil society activities there (İçduygu, Sert, & Karaçay, 2009: 2-3).

The fact that Turkey is a country that emigrates to Europe has changed in the last decade. However, because of the high number of Turkish immigrants, Turkey continues to be perceived as an emigrant country in Europe. This situation is also a negative factor in discourses about the Turkey's membership to EU. Since Turkey is a country that emigrates to all parts of the world and Turkish immigrant population is high in Europe, it has to update and review its policies on this issue. In this context, from my standpoint, Turkey should take into account the internationally accepted migration policies and adopt a more comprehensive, contemporary and detailed migration policy. In addition, more substantial policies on immigrants returning from European countries need to be developed. These include harmonisation of immigrants and their families with Turkey in the fields of job, health and education (İçduygu, Sert, & Karaçay, 2009: 3-4). The number of Turkish immigrants returning to Turkey is expected to increase because European countries are increasingly attaching greater importance to the policy of encouraging voluntary repatriation. This brings the need for institutionalization of policies in this area.

3.2.2. Turkey as A Migration-Receiving Country

Turkey has been perceived as an emigrant country in Europe since 1960s. In fact, Turkey has a geography that receive migration from different regions historically, and turned into a transit and migration-receiving country for the last ten years (Kirişçi, 2003). Today, immigrants come to Turkey from different countries for different purposes and some of them stay in Turkey while others try to transit European countries through Turkey. As a matter of fact,

Turkey became one of the main transit countries which irregular migration to Europe has transited. Therefore, in recent years, the migration policies of the EU relating to Turkey have focused on the prevention of transit migration (Faist & Ette, 2007: 12-14).

Historically, migration movements to Turkey can be examined in five periods. These periods can be categorized as 1923-1978, 1979-1987, 1988-1993, 1994 and after, with regard to the changes in the nature of migration and the policy responses Turkey has made to these changes (İçduygu, 2004: 90).

- *1923-1978 period:* More than 1.9 million people migrated to Turkey, most of them from Balkan countries.
- *1979-1987 period:* It is a time when immigrants came from Iran after the regime change in 1979 and temporarily stayed in Turkey and then migrated to European countries or North America. Throughout this Cold War period, thousands of asylum seekers from Eastern European countries and the USSR came to Turkey, many of whom have been placed in countries such as Canada and the United States by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Kirişçi, 2003).
- *1988-1993 period:* Asylum seekers from Iraq, Bulgaria and Bosnia, and economic migrants from the former Soviet Republics leave marks in this times. Between 1988 and 1991, half a million refugees from Iraq has led to increasing importance of migration issues for Turkey in that period (Kirişçi, 2003). On the other hand, nearly half of Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria settled in Turkey. In those years and in the following years, unrelieved instability in the neighboring regions of Turkey became an important push factor for the people who flee to Turkey from their countries in the hope of a better life and security (İçduygu, 2004: 89-90). The fact that Turkey's economic conditions are better than neighboring regions is an important attraction factor for economic migrants who want to improve their living conditions. Thus, after the 1990s, Turkey has become a country receives migration through a new irregular migration flow originating mainly from neighboring countries, especially from the former Soviet Republics. One of the main reasons for this is the liberal visa policies applied to citizens of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia and Central Asian Republics (Kirişçi, 2003). Some of these immigrants made shuttle trade while others worked irregularly in housework, textile, construction, tourism, agriculture and entertainment sectors. The shuttle trade continues and offers a \$ 6.2 billion foreign exchange source for Turkey. Moreover, the

majority of irregular labor migration in Turkey is still coming from CIS countries (SOPEMI, 2010: 284). The arrival of irregular migrants to Turkey is explained by the concept of "economization". In other words, the irregular migrants having the aim of work are welcomed because of economic interests of the country.

- *1994 and after period:* In Turkey, policy amendments were made with the 1994 Asylum Regulation. Moreover, irregular migration and asylum flows increased during this period. In this process, which took place since 1988, 934,354 foreign nationals were granted residence and work permits. For instance, after the instability in Kosovo in 1999, 17,746 people came to Turkey. Foreign nationals with the highest number in Turkey in 1995-2005 period are citizens of Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, Germany and England, respectively. The reasons for the migration of Bulgarian and Azerbaijani citizens to Turkey are socio-cultural ties with Turkey. Germany and UK citizens consist of mostly retired immigrants (İçduygu, 2004).

In recent years, migration from the EU to Turkey has also increased. EU citizens living in Turkey consist of the following groups: Turkish representatives and employees of EU companies and institutions, EU citizens married to a Turkish citizen, children from the marriage of EU citizens and Turkish citizens, the EU citizens seeking an alternative lifestyle, immigrants who had to leave Turkish citizenship in order to get citizenship of one of the EU countries and then returned to Turkey, and retirement migration from European countries (Kaiser, 2007: 477-478). Among these immigrants, retirement migration as a new type of migration has become widespread in recent years and attracts attention. Retirement migration mostly occur in Cesme, Kusadasi, Didim, Bodrum, Marmaris, Fethiye, Kemer, Antalya, Manavgat and Alanya. The number of immigrants who have settled in these provinces in recent years and whose majority is EU citizens has exceeded 20,000. Retirement migration has become widespread in the Mediterranean EU countries first, and then Turkey has become one of the favorite countries in recent years. With the impact of aging population of Europe and Turkey's membership perspective to the EU, these migration movements have spread to Turkey as well. The "pull factors" that encourage European retirees to settle in Turkey include climate, low cost of living, natural beauties, good social relations, respect for old people, security and peaceful living (Balkır & Kırkulak, 2009: 132).

3.2.3. Turkey as A Transit Country

Turkey is also a transit country as well as a migration-receiving country, and this is the prominent issue in relations with the EU. Immigrants from countries like Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ghana, Nigeria and Somalia use Turkey as a transit country to go to European countries. These immigrants come illegally to Turkey with the help of human traffickers and try to pass other countries in this way. It is difficult to collect sufficient and reliable data on irregular migration movements. When an assessment is made by the number of irregular migrants identified by security forces, it can be said that the number of irregular migrants caught in Turkey is gradually increasing by years. Especially in recent times, migrants who use rental boats and inflatable boats to reach European countries via the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea are caught / rescued by the Coast Guard Command on the migration route. The number of irregular migrants caught in our country during 2005-2014 is 496,912 and about half of them were thought to be transit migrants. At the Migration Policies Committee Meeting in 15 February 2017, Suleyman Soylu, current Interior Minister of Turkey, stated that “We made the first meeting of the committee created for organizing Turkey’s migration policy. Turkey has never turned anyone back from the door. Turkey has not returned immigrants to bullets and bombs at their countries. When preparing the institutional infrastructure, Turkey has not allowed conflicts and weaknesses in terms of social and security. This was not an easy task. The current number of irregular migrants in Turkey is 3.551.078 and considerable majority of them comprises transit migrants. According to AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Authority) data, total expenditures of Turkey made by public institutions, non-governmental organizations and the public for Syrian refugees was 25 billion dollars.” (DHA, 2017).

The primary reason why the transit migration over Turkey has increased in recent years is that the EU countries take strict measures to transitions from the Mediterranean and transit migration routes turn towards Turkey. This change has been a turning point in recent years both in terms of Turkey's migration policies and Turkey-EU relations. Human traffickers have a crucial role in the irregular migration and in the determination of their routes. Irregular migration and increasing human trafficking are processes that affect each other in vicious circle. It seems from Frontex data that, Turkey is a transit country for irregular migration, but it continues to be a source country as well. According to the report; Turkish citizens are in the 8th place among the citizens of 10 countries who are turned back from the EU external borders (land, air and sea). The other nine countries are Ukraine, Russia, Brazil, Serbia, Belarus, Croatia, Macedonia, Georgia and the US, respectively (FRONTEX, 2010: 27). What

is noteworthy here is that Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia, the candidate or potential candidate countries, are among these ten countries with Turkey. This can be attributed to the rise in unemployment rates in these countries due to the global crisis. The changing and transforming migration structures between Turkey and the EU can be explained by "migration systems theory". Accordingly, migration movements occur as a result of interaction between push and pull factors²⁰ emerging from the economic, political, social and demographic aspects between the EU and Turkey. Moreover, while bilateral labor agreements were effective in the 1960s in regulating these migration movements, Turkey's membership process to the EU today is an important factor on tackling irregular migration. In this context, what follows examines the Europeanization of Turkey's migration policies during the membership process.

3.3. Europeanization of Turkey's Migration Policy in Membership Process

Turkey has obtained a candidate status to the EU at the Helsinki Summit held in December 1999 and the accession negotiations started on 3 October 2005. Consequently, Turkey needs to align its migration policy with EU policy, as it does in other areas. The migration policy is addressed under Chapter 24, "Justice, Freedom and Security" in Turkey-EU relations. The comprehensive and challenging nature of the EU acquis in this area complicates the harmonization process. In the membership process, migration has become a part of the current debate as a phenomenon in which political, economic and social dimensions are in interaction. In addition, migration is the most concrete dimension of de facto integration (Philippe, 2004: 97) For these reasons, migration issue is one of the most challenging areas where the most intensive debates has taken place in the negotiation process. As a matter of fact, harmonization programmes continue intensively although the title "Justice, Freedom and Security" has not yet been opened to negotiation. For instance, works on Turkey-EU readmission agreement are made without opening negotiations of this title. Signing of this agreement is a part of the externalization policy of the EU, and involved in an area where the externalization policy coincides with the membership process.

²⁰ Push and pull factors are used to understand why people choose to migrate. Immigrants' decisions to emigrate from their home countries to a new country is the result of the interaction between both push and pull factors. Push factors are those that encourage immigrants to leave their home countries. Push factors may include conflict, personal safety, natural catastrophes, drought, famine, weather and climate, extreme religious activity, poor economic activity, or lack of job opportunities. Pull factors are those physical, economic, social and political conditions in the destination country that attract the immigrants to leave their home. Better economic and social conditions, more job opportunities, and the expectance of better living conditions often pull people into new countries.

During the membership process and the transition process to a migration-receiving country, Turkey is expected to review its migration policy and adapt it to new conditions. Indeed, Turkey is already attracting the attention of NGOs advocating immigrant rights. In the past years, Turkey has preferred to make non-systematic and temporary arrangements on matters related to migration. As the EU membership process accelerates, new policies are developed in the field of migration. These new policies mainly focus on the irregular migration. The adoption of the National Action Plan for Asylum and Migration in 2005 is a result of this process (İçduygu, Sert, & Karaçay, 2009: 3). The Plan aims to ensure that Turkey's migration regulations and the institutional structure in this area are subject to a comprehensive reform process, within the context of the EU *acquis* (SOPEMI, 2008). However, these developments remained limited and Turkey appears to need to develop a more comprehensive and detailed migration policy. This policy should be prepared taking into account that the country may encounter new types of migration such as temporary migration and family reunification. There is also a need to develop policies for the integration of immigrants. These policies will be subject to the Europeanization process before and after the membership.

Radaelli (2003) has identified four major types of change in the degree of Europeanization; inertia, absorption, transformation and retrenchment. Europeanization of migration policies is a new and slow process in Turkey. Compliance on migration issue in Turkey is seen as a process of technical harmonization rather than a comprehensive transformation (Keser, 2006). Therefore, this change in Turkey is taking place in the politics dimension. The Europeanization in the politics dimension is explained by the compatibility between the national and EU policy making structures and this situation has not developed in Turkey yet (Faist & Ette, 2007: 20). Some authors, such as Thomas Diez, refer to this kind of Europeanization as EU-ization. EU-ization is referred to as a situation experienced by candidate countries mostly in the membership process in which institutional and policy changes take place radically. This kind of Europeanization experienced by Turkey, takes place in a fast and superficial manner in the membership process. However, the Europeanization takes place slowly but more deeply after membership (Diez, Agnantopoulos, & Kaliber, 2005: 3).

When examined irregular migration policies of Turkey in the framework of progress reports, "inertia" was observed in Europeanization, in other words, there was a resistance to change and delays emerged. This is also due to the fact that it is costly to combat irregular migration and compliance with border control policies. With the opening of Turkey-EU negotiations in

2005, "absorption" process started concerning the issues of irregular migration and border controls as it is in other policy areas. Within this context, it can be stated that national policies' compliance with EU policies has begun. As a matter of fact, the National Action Plan on Asylum and Migration was prepared in 2005 and the Action Plan on Border Controls was adopted in 2006. Action plans are tools helping to draw a road map for the transformation of Turkey's migration policies.

However, since 2006, after Turkey's EU membership perspective has not been met, Turkey's adaptation to the EU in this area has slowed down as in other reforms. Negotiations on the readmission agreement were also suspended during this period. In terms of administrative capacity, Turkey established the Bureau for Development and Implementation of Asylum and Migration Legislation and Administrative Capacity (Asylum and Migration Bureau) in October 2008. Under the Ministry of Interior to conduct research, project and analyse studies on integrated border management legislation and administrative structure in line with the National Action Plan on Asylum and Migration and the National Program. This Bureau can be seen as a significant development despite its limited resources. However, it needs to be further strengthened and transformed into a separate institution (İçduygu, Sert, & Karaçay, 2009: 3-4). In 2009, with the presentation of visa facilitation agreement as an incentive, readmission agreement negotiations have been restarted and a consensus has been reached (Aka & Özkural, 2015). This situation has lent a new impetus to this area. However, unless the membership timetable has been fully defined, it is clear that this impetus can not be sustained. The key issue here is the finalization of the membership timetable for Turkey. A radical "transformation" in migration policies can only be achieved if a definite membership timetable is determined. Indeed, the transformation observed in the Central and Eastern European countries is interrelated with the clearness of the membership timetable. Europeanization process for Turkey's visa policy, border controls and fighting against irregular migration is assessed below in the light of the classification of Radaelli.

3.3.1. Visa Policy: Retrenchment Process

Adoption of EU visa policies for candidate countries is one of the prerequisite for membership and it is expected that these countries will fully harmonise with Schengen legislation before accession. These countries are not automatically included in Schengen Area after membership, but they are included after approval of their competence relating to capacity and applications on border controls and surveillances by the Council (European

Commission, 2004: 41). In this context, Turkey has to adopt the EU's positive and negative visa lists²¹. Turkey does not have a problem in harmonising with the positive visa list, namely in providing visa exemption for some countries. But it hesitates to harmonise with the negative visa list. As a matter of fact, in the 2010 Progress Report, it was emphasized that some of the country's citizens on the negative list of the EU could enter Turkey without a visa, and therefore there was no harmonisation in this regard (Avrupa Komisyonu, 2010: 83). Turkey does not apply the same policy to all EU citizens regarding visa obligations. In the 2011 Progress Report, Turkey's "non-uniform policy on all EU citizens regarding visa obligations" is criticized (European Commission, 2011: 92). Similarly, in the 2012 Progress Report, it was stated that "Turkey continues to distinguish among members regarding visa policy; citizens of the 11 member states of the EU still have to obtain a visa before entering Turkey, while citizens of the 16 member states are exempt from this obligation " (European Commission, 2012: 76). This visa can be obtained from the Turkish borders and can be valid for a period of one month up to three months and for one or more entries, depending on citizenship of the applicant. Citizens of the other 16 member states are exempted from visa for short stays up to 90 days. In addition, Turkey continues to apply no visas to citizens of some Southeast European countries, such as Kosovo (European Commission, 2009: 75).

Turkey has traditionally implemented a liberal visa system, and membership process will lead to the consolidation of this system. In this process, visa application to neighboring countries and the Turkic republics will have to be initiated and the challenges will occur in Turkey. This will affect Turkey's relations with neighboring countries negatively from socio-cultural and economic aspects. Applying a visa to these countries will also increase irregular migration movements (İçduygu & Kirişci, 2009: 809). Besides, it is thought that tourism and business relations by neighboring countries will be damaged (Apap, Carrera, & Kirişci, 2004: 41).

When the previous enlargement processes were examined, it was clear that the candidate countries had problems with the alignment of their visa policies. The best example is Poland, which has close cultural and commercial ties with its eastern neighbors Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Especially consolidation of border controls with Ukraine and applying visa for its citizens have created problems between the two countries. Due to this tension, a system has been created that provides flexibility in border crossings between Poland and

²¹ The European Commission has prepared two types of visa lists: Positive and negative visa lists. Positive visa list includes the third countries whose citizens are not required to have a visa when entering the EU countries. Negative visa list of the EU includes the third countries whose citizens are required to have a visa when entering the EU countries.

Ukraine. Nevertheless, Poland's participation in the Schengen area required Ukrainian citizens to take the Schengen visa to enter Poland, which costs 35 euros. This has led to a significant decrease in transitions from Ukraine, Belarus and Russia to this country. For the Ukrainians, 35 euros seem to be quite expensive when it is thought that it will correspond to about one half of the living expenses of one month. In this process, migration structures has changed in Poland and Ukraine. Some of those made a continuous transition between the two countries have settled in Poland, others have stayed in Poland without a valid residence permit, or returned to Ukraine. Poland wants to maintain good relations with its Eastern neighbors, so it has tried to facilitate border crossings through bilateral border agreements (Iglicka & Ziolk-Skrzypczak, 2010).

Turkey has recently stretched its visa policy towards neighboring countries in a regional approach and removed visas with some countries, not in line with EU visa policies. For instance, in 2009, the visa requirements for Syria, Albania, Libya, Jordan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and then, Lebanon, Russia, Tanzania and Sudan in 2010 were abolished. These initiatives are made as a part of new developments in Turkey's foreign policy and aim of improving relations with its neighbors, and desire to diversify foreign trade after the global crisis. Indeed, Turkey's role as a "frontier state" during the Cold War has been transformed into a potential role of a "regional keystone" in its neighbourhood. (Eralp, 2009: 212). In the past years, Turkey has tried to harmonise negative visa applications besides the EU's positive list (e.g. visa issuance to Azerbaijan in 2003), but there have also been intensive attempts to liberalize the visas with neighboring countries on the EU's negative visa list especially since 2009 (Avrupa Komisyonu, 2004: 120). This can be described as "retrenchment" process according to Radaelli's classification of the Europeanization level. Retrenchment implies that national policies become less 'European' than they were (Ette & Faist, 2007: 18). In other words, this is an opposite effect when European norms turned a state into a less 'European' one. In countries where the preferences of the national government are in contradiction to the development of European migration policy, retrenchment is a possible outcome. In this way, Turkey's policies are developed contrary to the EU visa policy. In fact, if Turkey's accession date is close, such a policy would not be possible because of obligation to adopt the Schengen acquis before membership. As the date of membership is not close, it is possible to prefer such a policy in terms of developing commercial, economic and socio-cultural relations with neighboring countries in this process though contrary to the EU visa policy.

While the results of visa liberalization may be positive in the short term, there may be some negative consequences in relations with these countries before membership. If and when Turkey becomes an EU member, the citizens of these countries would have to get a visa again. Given the experience of the countries involved in the 2004 enlargement process, it can be predicted that this will cause troubles in terms of relations with neighboring countries. As a result of the abolished visas, humanitarian and cultural interaction will increase but then it will be interrupted after putting visas into effect again. However, given the 2004 enlargement experience, it seems that flexible border transitions can be provided specifically for these countries.

3.3.2. Integrated Border Management: Key Europeanization Area

Turkey has a border of 11,282 km and 117 border gates, and because of this feature, border management gains more importance (Özler, 2010: 5). Turkey will be the country protects southeastern borders of the EU after membership and even before membership under the externalization policy. This demonstrates the importance of border controls in Turkey-EU relations. In this context, the national action plan for the implementation of integrated border management strategy by Turkey was adopted in March 2006. According to the European Commission, the Plan is a positive step towards alignment with EU standards, and the development of integrated border management will be a key element in negotiations on the title of justice, freedom and security (Avrupa Komisyonu, 2006: 61). Marc Pierini, former Head of EU Delegation to Turkey, explains the importance of integrated border management in Turkey-EU relations as follows:

“Integrated border management faces two major challenges: Firstly, this concept means "open boundaries" where trade, tourism and all human and goods flows are facilitated, while at the same time it also means "safe boundaries" where cross-border crimes are reduced at the highest possible degree. All of these require professional and specialized border personnel with high equipment and education, and they should reach modern standards of border protection forces, and open to cooperation at the national and cross-border level. At the same time, these personnel will have to struggle against illegal migration to and via Turkey in the light of international principles and rule of law. In this regard, Turkey and the EU face a common problem.” (Pierini, 2011)

There is no single model in the area of integrated border management. Each country has its own distinctive border structure. Since Turkey has long land and sea borders at a point where

Asia, the Middle East and Europe intersect, border management gains particular importance. Through the twinning projects for this structuring, technical expert support is received from EU countries, particular from Finland, which is among the specialist countries on this issue. It is also stated that the EU will provide financial support for this issue. In the border management models of EU countries, it seems that they depend on the civil authority although they have different structuring, and their land, sea and air border units are gathered under a single roof, and appointments are made by the civil authority (Özler, 2010: 3). In addition, common standards, regulations and practices between member states have been adopted and are applied at all external borders. In case of Turkey, there is no a single unit that controls the boundaries, it has a fragmented structure. In this context, the European Commission emphasizes frequently in progress reports the need to establish a new non-military border law enforcement agency under Ministry of the Interior to ensure border controls (Avrupa Komisyonu, 2009: 75).

Establishing a new civilian border law enforcement agency is one of the most important issues in border management. Since the financial burden of establishing this force is so great, candidate countries have difficulty to fulfill the condition in the previous enlargement process (Mitsilegas, 2002: 675). The External Borders Task Force, which has been restructured in order to harmonize border controls in the membership process, meets every two months since January 2009. In this context, modernization of border crossing points is being done. However, progress on the implementation of national action plan on border management has remained limited. There is no official mechanism to monitor implementation of the Action Plan. Another problem in this regard is the lack of cooperation between the police and customs enforcement units operating in border management. Improving border cooperation with neighboring countries is also considered as an important element in tackling irregular migration. Moreover, the need for Turkey to cooperate with Frontex is constantly emphasized by the EU authorities (Avrupa Komisyonu, 2009: 75).

It seems that Turkey has not made much progress in the Europeanization of the border management. The fact that the establishment of integrated border management is very costly and military vulnerabilities are dominant due to terrorism on the borders of Turkey can be considered as reasons for lack of progress in this area. It is obvious that the policies in this area are not in the "absorption" level, although there is no completely "inertia" in Europeanization in this respect. Hence, it can be said that Europeanization is in the first stages of absorption process. With the progress of membership process, it can be predicted that the

"transformation" will occur by the impact of EU's financial and technical support. The emphasis on tightening border controls as a precondition for the membership sparks a debate that the enlargement is a process of enlarging the Fortress Europe. In this manner, Turkey will be a key factor of the structure called as "Fortress Europe ". However, it should be noted that strengthening border controls in this way can not completely prevent irregular migration.

3.3.3. Tackling Irregular Migration: Absorption Process

The struggle against irregular migration has become a decisive issue in Turkey-EU relations because Turkey has been exposed to increasingly more transit immigrants in recent years. For this reason, Turkey is expected to take effective measures to prevent irregular migration in the accession process. For instance, on the Eastern Mediterranean migration route in which Turkey is located, the sea crossings between Greece and Turkey decreased considerably and there was increase in land transitions in 2009 and 2010. But nowadays, sea crossings between Turkey and Greece have increased again. On the other hand, citizenship profiles of immigrants caught in illegal transitions are also changing. People coming from Asia and the Maghreb have mostly Palestinian, Somali and Afghan citizenship. Illegal immigrants coming from North Africa increasingly use the airline to reach Turkey, and then they turn towards EU territories from Turkey. This choice is based on the operations of Frontex in the seas, as well as cheaper transportation costs, less vital risk and lower capture ratios (FRONTEX, 2010).

Turkey is increasing its activities in tackling irregular migration. Critical areas are identified in order to prevent irregular migration especially in the Aegean Sea. In these regions, the Coast Guard Command maintains intelligence activities and helicopter flights in cooperation with the related agencies such as General Command of Gendarmerie and General Directorate of Security (Sahil Güvenlik Komutanlığı, 2007). In this way, the coastal areas where irregular migrants can use as a gathering place before sailing, and the coves where small boats can be secretly moved are identified through making risk assessments. Coast Guard boats, patrol flights by helicopters, and mobile radars are used for identifying irregular migrants in these areas. Many irregular migrants are caught in inflatable boats that are about to move into Greek islands such as Mytilene, Chios and Samos, located at very close distances in the Aegean Sea. Furthermore, the capture of migrant smugglers related to irregular migration are also important in the migration policies. Irregular migration through the sea is mainly concentrated in Canakkale Behramkale, Balıkesir Ayvalık, Aydın Kusadasi and Didim.

However, as stated previously, migration routes are constantly changing as a result of tightening controls (İçduygu, Erder, & Gençkaya, 2014).

As stated by Tibor Varadi, former Vice-President of the EU Delegation to Turkey, the struggle against irregular migration is a policy correlated with good relations with neighbors. As a matter of fact, refoulement of irregular migrants go to Greece through Turkey was addressed under the heading "resolution of border disputes peacefully" in the 2010 Turkey Progress Report. Therefore, border problems with neighboring countries are closely affecting the fight against irregular migration. This can be seen, for example, in engaging issues of the Turkish-Greek territorial waters problem and irregular migration. Both sides are accusing each other on the fight against irregular migration due to the border problems with Greece. The Greek authorities indicate that Turkey has deliberately left irregular migrants in Greek territorial waters, and the Turkish authorities claim this is done contrary to Greece's Readmission Protocol under inhuman conditions. This situation has become one of the main subject of disputes between the two sides in recent years. As a matter of fact, the border between Turkey and Greece is regarded as one of the "murderous borders" by Migreurop network advocating immigrant rights (Migreurop Network, 2010).

In brief, when Turkey's policies on the fight against irregular migration are examined in general, it seems that there is "inertia" in Europeanization process in this area, that is, no harmonization has taken place until 2001. Since the negotiations had not yet begun at that time, harmonization in this area could not be made. After 2001, Turkey began to give importance to the policy on fight against the irregular migration as mentioned in the progress reports. Therefore, "National Action Plan on Migration and Asylum" was adopted in 2005 within the scope of harmonization with EU legislation. Through the Action Plan, which is considered to be a road map of this area, it can be argued that "absorption", namely harmonization process has begun in Europeanization.

3.3.4. Readmission Agreements and Visa Facilitation/Exemption as Europeanization Incentive

One of the most important agendas in Turkey-EU relations in 2010 is the signing of the readmission agreement between the EU and Turkey. The readmission agreement is a reflection of the EU's control-oriented externalization policy on Turkish migration policies, rather than being a factor of the membership process. This agreement is a matter of tough negotiations between the EU and Turkey. Turkey has been hesitant to sign this agreement for

many years. Because Turkey did not want to undertake costs of readmission agreement without the EU membership. Today, however, the strategies of both the EU and the Turkish side have changed in this regard and efforts are being made to reach a consensus on the agreement. Negotiations based on cost-benefit analysis and changing strategies of the two sides in the process of signing the readmission agreement would be examined in the following two sections.

3.3.4.1. Inertia Period in Europeanization: Credibility Problem of Conditionality²²

The European Union has expressed its demand for signing the readmission agreement between Turkey and the EU in all progress reports since 1998. On the other hand, Turkish officials expressed their concerns that Turkey would become a country where unwanted immigrants are gathered by the EU as a result of signing the agreement (Apap, Carrera, & Kirişci, 2004: 22). Therefore, the Turkish side has been hesitant for a long time due to the 'costs of agreement'²³ would bring to Turkey. A consensus was reached on signing the agreement in 2004 and negotiations were initiated in May 2005. Turkey's strategy in this process is to sign the readmission agreements first with the source countries, then with the transit countries and with the EU finally. With this strategy, Turkey has aimed to establish a system which is expressed as "chain refoulement". Turkey has proposed to sign a readmission agreement with many source countries²⁴, but received no answer. Thus, Turkey has had significant difficulties in signing these agreements with the source countries. In addition, negotiations with many countries²⁵ also continue. Negotiations between the EU and Turkey were frozen in December 2006 due to these difficulties and various drawbacks (Turhan, 2016: 469). In the process of signing agreements with the source countries, the EU has described the signing of readmission agreement as a priority in Turkey-EU relations (Phuong, 2003: 654).

²² The term 'credibility of conditionality' means to the EU's 'threat of withholding rewards' if the candidate countries do not comply with the EU conditions and to the EU's 'promise to deliver the reward' if the candidate countries are successful in terms of rule adoption.

²³ Readmission agreement requires important institutional, structural, social and legal changes for immigrants that might have disruptive effects on the relationship between state and civil society or national economy.

²⁴ These source countries which do not respond to Turkey's proposal are Algeria, China, Ethiopia, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tunisia, Afghanistan.

²⁵ Countries where negotiations with Turkey continue are Russia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Georgia, Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Moldova, Iran, Pakistan. Negotiations have been completed with these countries, but the agreement has not been signed.

Several drawbacks have influenced the desire of Turkish authorities to freeze the negotiations on signing this agreement. Postponement of the signing readmission agreement with the EU until 2012, which is close to the membership perspective at that time, can be regarded as a sign of this situation. Therefore, Turkey has delayed the signing of readmission agreement to until its full membership. Since it is known that full membership will take many years, it is in fact intended to delay great financial and institutional burden the agreement will bring to Turkey. Turkey did not want to take on this burden without full membership. On the other hand, signing of the agreement is seen as one of the trump cards in Turkey's hand to strengthen the full membership perspective. As stated by Kirişci, a high-level Turkish diplomat expressed the following opinion on the credibility of conditionality and open-ended negotiation process: "If the EU will make negotiations open-ended, we will make the reforms open-ended." It is seen here that conditionality policy of the EU reaches an impasse (Kirişci, *The Limits of Conditionality and Europeanization: Turkey's Dilemmas in Adopting the EU Acquis on Asylum*, 2007).

Due to these drawbacks, the signing of readmission agreements with the source countries has mentioned in the 2003 National Program, but it has not been included at all in the 2008 National Program. Therefore, demand of "completing readmission agreement with the EU as soon as possible", among the short term priorities in the 2008 Accession Partnership Document, was dropped in the National Program. However, in 2009, both the EU and the Turkish side changed their strategies in a more compromising manner and entered into a new negotiation process (European Commission, 2008: 14).

3.3.4.2. Visa Facilitation/Exemption: Reconciliation Period

Turkish foreign policy has begun to pursue the win-win strategy instead of zero-sum game since 2000s (Kirişci, 2006: 51). This strategy is tried to be applied in the signing of readmission agreements as well as in other issues. Therefore, in 2009, the Turkish government changed its hesitant approach towards readmission agreements and agreed to pursue negotiations. In return, Turkey secured the EU's financial support for sharing the financial burden on Turkey and implementation of visa facilitation/exemption in 2007-2013. The basic principles stressed by both sides in the negotiations are "international burden sharing, solidarity, joint responsibility and common understanding" (IHA, 2009). Since the EU membership is not possible in the short term, the European Union instead presented the

visa facilitation²⁶ as a conditionality incentive to Turkey, similar to its practices towards the Balkan countries (European Commission, 2009: 74). However, after the decision of CJEU (Court of Justice of the European Union) on 19 February 2009²⁷, Turkey expresses that visas should be abolished in accordance with the provisions of the Ankara Agreement, and it does not welcome visa facilitation warmly. However, it should be noted that this decision does not provide a basis for visa exemption for all Turkish citizens. Article 41/1 of the Additional Protocol on which the decision is based, opens the way for visa exemption to businessmen, lawyers, sportsmen, academicians, doctors and the Turkish citizens go to EU countries for tourism, education and treatment (Balkır, 2010: 209-210).

Turkey and the European Commission reached a settlement on the readmission agreement text in May 2010. The European Commission's report on the reconciliation text has been put on the agenda of Justice and Home Affairs Council in June 2010 (Council of the European Union, 2010). This agreement would ensure that European countries send many irregular migrants especially Afghan, Iraqi and Pakistani, back to Turkey. These immigrants would be placed in repatriation centers in Turkey to be returned to their countries. Efforts are continuing to increase these centers in line with international standards. However, it is criticized by international NGOs and some European Parliamentarians that these repatriation centers are crowded and substructures are not enough. Furthermore, considering that the number of irregular migrants has increased too much in 2017, it is stated that these centers would not be sufficient and this situation would bring a heavy burden to Turkey. In addition, basic needs such as food, health and clothing must be met while these immigrants stay here. To compromise on this issue by Turkish government, a link between the agreement and visa exemption should be established, and Turkey should also give up its reluctant attitude towards signing of these agreements (Flautre, 2010).

Turkey's other requests in negotiations for readmission agreement besides the visa facilitation/exemption were strengthening of border controls, sharing the costs arise from a

²⁶ Visa facilitation agreements have been signed with the Balkan countries and some neighboring countries as an incentive in exchange for the signing readmission agreements.

²⁷ CJEU ruled in its judgment of 19 February 2009 (C-228/06) that, under the provisions of Additional Protocol, Turkish citizens could enter the EU without a visa on certain conditions within the framework of freedom to found enterprises and provide services. This decision had a broad repercussion in the public opinion and visa-free entry of Turkish citizens into the EU begun to be discussed. For more information on this subject, see: Narin Tezcan, *Vize Şikâyet Hattı: AB'de Türk Vatandaşlarının Hakları*, Economic Development Foundation, No:229, 2010; Elspeth Guild and Kees Groenendijk, *Visa Policy of Member States and the EU Towards Turkish Nationals After Soysal*, Economic Development Foundation, No:249, Istanbul, 2011.

variety of needs, such as housing and health care of irregular migrants to be sent back to Turkey, with the EU in the process of being sent back to the source country. In this context, the EU agreed to provide financial assistance to Turkey in the context of pre-accession partnership in order to meet these costs. This financial assistance would be used in the improvement of Turkey's fight against irregular migration and implementation of integrated border management systems (Council of the European Union, 2010). One of the demands of Turkey for reducing the burden of readmission agreement to Turkey is ensuring Turkey sign the agreement with the source countries simultaneously with readmission agreements that the EU signed. Turkey had pointed out the necessity of signing readmission agreements with the source countries before signing an agreement with the EU in the previous years' strategy. However, Turkey changed this strategy and requested simultaneous signing of the agreement with the source countries. Therefore, the Turkish government is adopting a more conciliatory attitude. Within this framework, the EU agreed to encourage the signing of readmission agreements with Pakistan and other Asian countries (Barrot, 2009).

The signing of the readmission agreement is subject to the approval of member states. The key issue here is to provide Turkey visa facilitation and set a date for visa exemption. Turkey wished to be included in the process of bringing EU visa exemption to Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia in 2009. Therefore, Turkey did not only demand visa facilitation, but also the complete abolishment of visa ultimately. Turkey's stance on this issue led to the launch of a dialogue with the European Commission to draw up a roadmap on visa exemption because of its long standing relationship with the EU, which is "based on different legal obligations and rights" stemming from the Ankara Agreement, the Additional Protocol and the Customs Union. With these negotiations, it can be seen that Turkey-EU relations are evaluated by international relations scholars not only as "bilateral negotiation" but also within the general enlargement process of the EU (Müftüler-Baç, 2009).

The EU's three requests from Turkey to provide visa facilitation/exemption were tightening border controls, implementing biometric passports and signing readmission agreement. Turkey has been implementing biometric passports²⁸ and has taken steps to strengthen border controls as of 2010 June. In this context, particular emphasis was placed on the use of technological tools in migration controls in line with EU policies. Turkey has also reached a

²⁸ A biometric passport is a passport that has an embedded chip which includes biometric information about passport holder. Countries included in the Schengen area, such as France, Germany and Italy use biometric passports.

settlement on the signing of readmission agreement. However, the main disagreement between the two sides was determination of visa facilitation/exemption date. The EU side stated that visa facilitation/exemption studies could be started after signing the readmission agreement, while the Turkish side insisted that it would not sign the agreement unless the day was determined on this issue (Sönmez & Kırık, 2013). Consequently, the visa exemption dialogue between Turkey and the EU was initiated in Ankara on 16 December 2013 and the Readmission Agreement was signed on the same date. Readmission Agreement officially entered into force on 1 October 2014, and it was envisaged that the agreement would be implemented for the third country citizens on 1 October 2017. However, with the rise of irregular migrations towards the Europe since mid-2015, the two sides agreed to change this date to 1 June 2016 (Ekinçi, 2016: 18-19).

In terms of Turkey-EU relations, the process of signing the readmission agreement is actually outside the scope of membership negotiations. As a matter of fact, Chapter 24 on which the readmission of irregular migrants is handled has not yet been negotiated. Signing the readmission agreement is also considered as a factor facilitating the opening of this chapter into negotiations. However, in the current situation, it would be more appropriate to consider the issue of signing readmission agreement as part of the EU's externalization policy of migration.

3.4. Securitization of Migration in Turkey

Irregular migration in Turkey is perceived as a security issue in two different ways. On the one hand, border controls are regarded as a national security issue because of terrorism problem at the Turkey's borders, and illicit border crossings are accepted to violate Turkish laws. On the other hand, Turkey has responsibility to the EU to the extent that transit migration targets EU countries. Turkey is expected to increase its measures in this regard as EU countries regard migration as a security threat and increasingly attach importance to preventing transit migration. This process led to bring about the first politicization of migration and then securitization of migration in Turkey. Because the adoption of the EU migration policies which strongly urge and oblige Turkey to prevent the inflow of immigrants is going hand in hand with the securitization discourse on migration.

Politicization is the first step of securitization. Policies on international migration in Turkey are not politicized compared to EU countries and, unlike EU countries, have hardly taken place on the political agenda until 2010. However, as reflected in the 2010 Turkey Progress

Report, 2010 migration policies have been moving into the political area in Turkey and taking place on the agenda. In other words, migration issues in Turkey have been politicized through externalization of the EU migration policy since 2010, while the EU tries to externalize its migration policies through readmission agreements (Tolay, 2012). Politicization of migration issues both at domestic policy level and foreign policy level could be considered as an emerging trend in current Turkey's migration policy. This trend reveals that Turkey's migration policy has become a common ground where the domestic policy and foreign policy converge. For instance, recent public discourses of the Turkish political parties adapted for their general election campaigns in 2015 could be substantial evidence of such an argument. Politicization shows clearly itself in the different opinions of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) and Republican People's Party (RPP) about the Readmission Agreement between the EU and Turkey. While the JDP drew attention to visa liberalisation dialogue with the EU in its public discourses, the RPP put emphasis on the responsibilities, costs and burden of signing the Readmission Agreement. As the issue of tackling irregular migration has gained importance in Turkey-EU relations, in the Progress Report, the migration issue seems to be much more intense than in previous years. While the issue of international migration has been addressed only under Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security), in the previous progress reports, it has been evaluated under the titles of "protection of human rights and minorities" in political criteria and "resolution of border disputes peacefully" in regional issues and international obligations in the 2010 Progress Report. The EU's commitment to providing visa facilitation/exemption for Turkey in response to the signing of readmission agreement, ensured that this issue takes place at the top of the Turkey's political agenda (İçduygu, Sert, & Karaçay, 2009).

Another area where politicization can be assessed is the extent to which international migration is on the agenda of political parties in Turkey. Unlike EU countries, international migration issues are not mentioned much in election campaigns. The program of the three major parties raise different aspects into the forefront. The JDP's Program does not include the other issues of international migration except the brain drain. Under the headings of Industrial Property, Science, Technology and Health, the Party Program emphasized the necessity of preventing brain drain and reversing this process (AKP, 2001). On the other hand, the RPP is the political party refers to international migration most in its program. The importance given to the migration issue is also understood from the fact that "immigrant problems" are taken into account besides the issues of regional development, information

society, and relations with EU (CHP, 2008). Under the External Relations heading of the program, there is the following statement:

“Increasing xenophobia, racism and Islamophobia in European societies also affect political decision-making bodies; and leads to bringing more rigid and restrictive provisions on the law of foreigners and citizenship law. It is essential that migration movements take place in accordance with the laws and international agreements. Necessary measures will be taken to prevent illegal migration movements.” (CHP, 2008: 135).

Here, concept of "illegal migration" is used and emphasis is placed on prevention of illegal migration. This issue is again emphasized in the section of effective combating human trafficking. In the Program, it is stated that “we will effectively combat illegal migration and human trafficking, which create security threats for our country and have a high human cost” (CHP, 2008: 139). In other words, illegal migration is defined as one of the areas that creates security threats. Therefore, the Program seems to have a security-oriented approach to the migration issue. With the above statement in RPP Program, the racism and anti-Islamism closely affecting Turkish citizens in Europe and restrictive approaches in citizenship law are criticized. The problems of Turkish immigrants living abroad are addressed in the Party Program as follows: “The Republican People's Party is tasked with solving the problems of citizens and compatriots living abroad caused by our country.” (CHP, 2008: 136). In addition to these issues, the issues related to the international migration, such as reversal of the brain drain, integration of migrant workers and their families into the countries they live in, and protection of their rights are also mentioned.

In the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) Program, migration was included among the problems associated with globalization:

“The globalization process, which is expected to provide adoption on a global scale and actualization of universal values such as human rights, democracy and respect for the law, has been associated with issues such as international terrorism, migration, ethnic conflicts, financial bankruptcies and internal disturbances, double standards against the international law, rising inequality of income between rich countries and poor countries, environmental disasters and hunger.” (MHP, 2009: 11-12).

Developing projects that will stop unconscious and uncontrolled migration phenomenon, and encourage settled life, are among the main objectives of the Party Program (MHP, 2009: 34). However, it is understood from the following phrases that these expressions in the Program are meant to be internal migration, not international migration:

“In order to prevent unconscious migration, the midsize provinces that has potential in the field of industry and services will be determined and infrastructure needs of these centers will be met rapidly, and a suitable investment environment will be created for the private sector. Migration towards the big cities from rural areas will be kept in these centers and on-site employment will be provided.” (MHP, 2009: 90).

Another example from recent period in Turkey is the Syrian refugees. This issue is one of the most important and hot topics of the political agenda, and the different approaches about Syrian refugees reflected in the election declarations of the parties are important to show the outlines of the migration debates in Turkey. The government has followed the “open door policy” towards Syrian refugees and declared at every opportunity that people in difficult situations are accepted without any ethnic, religious or cultural discrimination (Justice and Development Party, 2015: 334). In the Social Policies for International Migration and Integration Report of JDP, it is stated that “We have known the solidarity with our Syrian brothers in our country as a human duty. In the spirit of ‘ensar-muhacir’, we have opened our doors, homes, and hearts to Syrian brothers escaped from a brutal war and took refugee in our country, and used every means available for them.” (JDP Directorate of Social Policies, 2017: 7). It is understood that the expressions of JDP like "brotherhood" and "ensar-muhacir" which are frequently emphasized in its public meetings are used to facilitate acceptance of the Syrians by the society. As can be seen from these examples, the JDP has a desecuritization tendency towards immigrants and refugees. While the JDP has preferred to emphasize the importance of this approach, the RPP has assessed the situation with economic data. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, leader of the RPP, expressed that the assistance made to the Syrians is not made for Turkish citizens (Öndül, 2015). That kind of statements led to provoke xenophobia in the society. According to Kılıçdaroğlu, Syrian refugees will be returned to their homeland whether peace is provided or not. The reason of returning is economic. RPP viewed Syrian refugees as a source of problems in many ways such as employment, investment, tourism, house rent, and they are shown to cause especially the unemployment of Turkish workers (Republican People's Party, 2015: 77). Therefore, as it is understood from the discourses of party leader, the RPP has the securitization tendency towards immigrants and refugees.

On the other hand, NMP has addressed this issue as an "internal security problem" in accordance with its nationalist politics, and complained about the lack of aid to the Syrian Turkmen. In the NMP election declarations, the issue of Syrian refugees is included under the title of "Internal Security". The basic approach of NMP is that refugees and immigrants are not only a problem for Turkey, but an issue that needs to be discussed on international

platforms. The NMP has stated that this issue, which is an international problem, should be evaluated and solved on international platforms and financial burden of the problem should be shared with the UN and allies. It has mentioned hospitality as a cultural value, and stated that distribution of immigrants within the country will be regulated and basic needs will be met in accordance with Turkish hospitality. Nevertheless, there are statements that will come to xenophobia in some parts of the NMP declaration. For instance, NMP mentions mostly the troubles which immigrants are causing and will cause in Turkey, and this situation gives rise to thought that they are seen as people prone to commit crimes. Use of expressions specific to immigrants such as “city teams will be formed to prevent disruptions caused by people who are prone to commit crime and it will be ensured that events are prevented before they happen.” shows that the issue is addressed in the security axis. One of the NMP targets in its 2015 election declaration was taking measures that take into account the interests and security of the country against external migration and uncontrolled refugee flows arising from international and regional crises (Nationalist Movement Party, 2015: 58). This was another example of the NMP’s security-oriented understanding on migration issue.

NMP and Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) did not find convincing enough the JDP’s help to Syrian refugees without any ethnic discrimination. According to NMP, JDP has done Turkmen an injustice, and PDP claims that JDP has done Kurds an injustice. Although PDP adopts a discourse on migration issue close to the JDP’s discourse at the point of human sensitivities, it highlights the nationalist approach as the NMP does. In its election declaration, PDP used the title of “Humanitarian Treatment of Immigrants” on this issue. General structure of its declaration includes the concepts of equality, justice and freedom. There is a promise that the PDP will solve the problems of social acceptance and harmony in the article “the necessary policies will be made in order to prevent hate speech, discriminative language and racism towards immigrants and asylum seekers”. According to “PDP Research Unit Round Table Meeting Report”, urgent efforts are needed to change the understanding of refugees as a burden or low-cost labour, and the perception that support for refugees is a human responsibility should be strengthened and social responsibility sharing should be enhanced (Peoples' Democratic Party, 2016: 13). PDP does not consider immigrants and refugees as a security problem for the country.

When the Turkish media examined, transit migration movements appear more in the visual and written media in recent years. The news are generally about the irregular migrants caught dead or alive while trying to cross the Aegean Sea with boats, or trying to cross the land

borders behind trucks on non-human conditions. However, this is an migrant-oriented approach in the Turkish media involving the tragedy of migrants, rather than the security-oriented approach of the EU countries' media which treats migrants as a security threat. As another dimension of politicization, NGOs seem to be increasingly active in the issue of human rights violations of irregular migrants. Therefore, reflection of irregular migration on the media and NGOs is about the human rights violations. The current irregular migration movements are mostly transit migration. However, in the process of signing readmission agreement with the EU, it will not be possible to send irregular migrants in Turkey back to the source countries unless the readmission agreement is signed with the source countries, and this will make Turkey the destination country for these migrants. In other words, there will be an unpredictable number of irregular migrant entry into Turkey, and economic and social disturbances may emerge depending on the magnitude of this number. This situation can result in the politicization of migration at the first stage, and the securitization in the next stage, as seen in the EU countries.

Securitization of migration, as Hollifield states, is one of the two types of migration policies countries can choose. First of these policies hold relatively more open borders to migrants and transform migration movements into an advantage for the country. The second is a restrictive migration policy tightens the border controls (Hollifield, 2004). In short, there is a choice here between the securitization of migration and desecuritization of migration. As stated previously, migration in Turkey is not yet a very politicized and thus securitized area compared to European countries. However, with the transformation of Turkey into a transit country and the acceleration of harmonization with EU policies, fight against irregular migration is increased and border controls are strengthened. At this point, it is important for Turkey how to shape its migration policies in the coming years. Turkey on the one hand increases the struggle with irregular migration and on the other hand abolishes the visas with many neighboring countries for socio-economic and cultural reasons. Thus, restriction policy is imposed for harmonization with EU as well as liberalization policy in order to increase socio-economic relations with neighboring countries. As the EU accession process becomes more concrete, Turkey will have to fully adapt to Schengen rules including visa applications. At this stage, however, the Turkish government reflects much easier its socioeconomic and foreign policy objectives on visa policies. Therefore, migration policies are mostly directed by a non-security approach (İçduygu & Kirişçi, 2009).

Considering the Turkey-EU negotiation process, it appears that migration policies have been dealt under Chapter 24 "Justice, Freedom and Security" among the 35 chapters. Collaterally to the structure of the EU acquis, migration issues are discussed under this chapter with the following issues: judicial cooperation in criminal and legal matters, police cooperation, combating organized crime, combating terrorism, fighting against drugs, customs cooperation (Avrupa Komisyonu, 2009: 73-78). Dealing migration issues under the same chapter with such security issues also brings a security-oriented approach to migration policies. Indeed, the main migration issues discussed under this chapter are the fight against irregular migration and strengthening border controls. Another issue addressed in this context is the harmonization of visa policies and, as mentioned earlier, for candidate countries like Turkey, these policies result in the visa application for the citizens of neighboring countries. On the other hand, when examining the negotiation chapters, it is seen that issues such as legal migration, family unification and integration of immigrants into society are not included in the negotiations. As the EU acquis is developed in these issues, Turkey will have to harmonize them. As it is seen, the EU's security-oriented migration policies bring about a security-oriented approach in the candidate countries and third countries, through the EU's externalization policy and its spillover effects. This leads to a "win-lose" approach in terms of immigrants' rights as a result of the implementation of restrictive and security-oriented migration policies by these countries.

CONCLUSION

The 21st century has added new and controversial dimensions to international migration and security issues. Hard security understanding based on the war and peace, international relations and foreign policy in the Cold War, has expanded to new soft security areas such as energy, environment, human security and migration after this period. Migration in this process has become a controversial issue where differences of opinion are widespread, and started to take place at the top of the agenda. The reason why international migration is among the few issues high on the agenda is its multidimensional nature regarding different areas such as politics, economics, social policy, security, demography, and socio-cultural structure. In addition, migration is a complex process affecting the source country, the transit country and the destination country in many ways, in particular the immigrant itself. Therefore, migration management is becoming quite difficult. Because the phenomenon of migration is a multidimensional process that affects many countries, it is necessary to develop common policies in which all parties are involved.

In this master's thesis, the intersection areas and effects of migration and security issues which are at the top of the agenda in international arena, the supranational level in the EU, and domestic policies of member states are examined. In the thesis, it has been evaluated to what extent security-oriented approaches are effective in the process of establishing a common migration policy in the EU. Moreover, the impact of securitization of migration in the EU on migration policies and migration controls of member states, candidate countries and neighboring countries are addressed. It is analyzed how the process of securitization-externalization in the EU affected/will affect the policy-making process in Turkey.

The migration policy, which has an important place in the economic and social development of the European Union and in its external relations, has been transformed into one of the supranational policies of the Union after the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and the Tampere Summit (1999). When examined the process of establishing a common migration policy in the EU, it appears that the migration policy has been developed with a security-oriented approach. As a matter of fact, not all factors of migration policy have moved to the supranational area, a common EU policy has been developed only on irregular migration and border controls, which are addressed as security issues. In addition, these policies are being developed within the scope of EU's efforts to create a field of freedom, security and justice since 1999, and therefore handled in the same framework with security issues such as drug trafficking,

organized crime and combating terrorism. With the enlargement process and the impact of the international conjuncture, security and freedom areas in the EU are carried out together, but the security area and security-oriented practices are seen to be dominant. After the enlargement process, free movement of the people is extended to the new member states, and border controls are tightened further in order to prevent irregular migration at the same time. When the EU Council decisions, the EU Treaties and the five-year programs prepared on this matter are examined, it is understood that balance between freedom and security stands in the direction of security. This situation brings the criticism that "Fortress Europe" has been established. Nonetheless, the five-year Stockholm Programme announced in 2009 tries to provide a balance between freedom and security. This programme directly influences the securitization of migration policy, can be considered as an important step in moving migration away from security-oriented discourses to a certain extent, and pursuing comprehensive strategy considering the non-security aspects of migration. In other words, it is a remarkable development for desecuritization of migration.

The securitization tendency of migration in EU-level politics emerges differently in member states due to their political, geographical and socio-economic conditions and different migration experiences. With regards to the influence, a classification can be made between the old member, the new member and the candidate countries; but the countries in the same group, for instance Germany and Italy, are experienced different influences due to their different migration structures. Although the degree is different, securitization tendency is observed in every country. In fact, the securitization of migration can be seen as a process both bottom-up and top-down in the EU. EU countries are moving their country policies to the EU level in the EU Council and EU migration policy is developing in a security-oriented manner. However, these policies at the EU level are also binding for member states which do not approve such a policy, and encourage the securitization of migration policies of candidate countries and neighboring countries to a certain extent.

The EU Council, which consists of the member states and heads of government, is the main actor in the development of a security-oriented EU migration policy, because the policies of member states are also in this direction. This situation is a reflection of the sensitivities and concerns of member states on migration, particularly the Mediterranean EU members, which are faced often with irregular migration movements due to their geographical location. However, the approaches and discourses of EU institutions on the securitization of migration are different. On the other hand, the European Commission, which is the driving force of

executive in the EU, shows a non-security approach to issues of free movement in the enlargement process and migration from third countries to the EU. The Commission emphasizes the need for immigrants due to aging population of the EU, and therefore advocates increasing the ways of legal migration. In the European Parliament, there are different viewpoints about migration policy depending on the existence of different political groups. When an assessment is made according to the party programs of political groups in the parliament and the opinions of parliamentarians involved in that group, it seems that 92% of the EP supports developing an EU common migration policy, but support for securitization of migration is less than 50%. Although there is a difference of opinion between the institutions regarding securitization of migration, the views of the EU Council are dominant in policy making in accordance with the EU's institutional structure. However, it shows that the EU is still unable to develop a comprehensive and consistent policy on fighting against irregular migration. The reason is largely based on the fact that some country's economies use immigrants as cheap labor, and therefore they do not want to completely prevent irregular migration.

Fighting against irregular migration, one part of the securitization of migration policy in the EU, and further tightening of border controls using high technology are often handled with an exaggerated approach in the EU. Taking migration as a threat and a security issue, these policies can not effectively achieve the goal of preventing irregular migration. The tightening of controls at an entry point only causes these migration movements to shift to other entry points. Such policies, along with failing to prevent irregular migration, bring financial and humanitarian burden, and lead to further strengthening of human trafficking and criminal networks. As a matter of fact, the EU has been aware of this in recent years and try to improve external dimension of migration policy and to increase cooperation between the source countries and transit countries on preventing irregular migration. Thus, effects of the common migration policy are intertwined in domestic policy and foreign policy.

The externalization of migration policy is an important factor in the development of the EU common migration policy and in increasing the effectiveness of fighting against irregular migration. In order to make a holistic assessment of the EU common migration policy, the external dimension of this policy has also been examined in the thesis and internal and external policies have been seen to complement each other. Transit countries as well as source countries are involved in the formation and development of migration movements. Therefore, management of the migration came to the EU will not be sustainable without developing a

policy towards these countries. In this context, what really matters in the externalization of EU migration policies is the reflection of restrictive migration policies to outside and ensuring better control of migration came to the EU.

It seems that the EU has developed various approaches periodically to ensure effectiveness of the externalization of migration policy. The approach to eliminating the root causes of migration has been adopted in the 1990s, but this approach was not effective enough because it was costly and its results would be obtained in the long term. After this, therefore, the remote control approach, which is a more security-oriented and restrictive approach on migration, has been adopted. With this approach, it is intended to shift the control responsibility of irregular migration movements to the source countries and especially transit countries. The most important means of this strategy is the signing of readmission agreements that return irregular immigrants to the source countries and transit countries. However, the implementation of this strategy has been difficult in terms of persuading the source and transit countries to cooperate. The EU has tried to implement a conditionality policy in order to enable third countries to cooperate on fighting against irregular migration and offered some incentives. In practice, these incentives are in the form of development assistance in African countries, while visa facilitation/exemption agreements in the eastern neighbors and candidate countries. However, these incentives are not applicable to all third countries. Third countries are not very interested in incentives other than membership or visa facilitation, and finding appropriate incentives is not always easy. In cases where the positive incentives are not efficient, the Council also tries to use negative incentives, namely impose sanctions. However, the EU rarely prefers to impose sanctions in terms of its normative actor identity in international arena, its relations with third countries and regional dynamics. Therefore, the EU follows different strategies for different groups of countries in the matter of externalization of migration policy. The EU, as a normative power, constitutes a structure in various policy areas in its own right. The EU is trying to be effective on the global arena using tools such as enlargement, European Neighborhood Policy and bilateral agreements. The externalization of migration policies is also included in this structure.

With this structuring, the EU shows its desire to become a global actor and normative power in migration policies. However, this strategy is considered to be EU-centered and ineffective in achieving the aims, especially from the perspective of third countries. As stated in the five-year programs in this area, the focus is mostly on controlling migration in the source and transit countries, rather than aiming to develop third countries and strengthening democracy

there. The conditionality policy, aiming to transfer control of migration movements to the source and transit countries by offering incentives to third countries, does not sufficiently consider the emerging costs for these countries in this process. Therefore, third countries apart from the candidate countries do not consider the incentives offered by the EU to be sufficient and do not want to act jointly with the EU in this respect. This situation reduces the efficiency of externalization strategy. Even if the cooperation with these countries is provided at a sufficient level, these policies will transform the EU's policy of fighting against irregular migration into a policy of combating secondary migration and circular repatriation, and create a vicious cycle.

Bring an effective solution to the problem through a security-oriented approach is very difficult. Therefore, comprehensive migration management approach preferred by the European Commission and majority of the European Parliament, and the consideration of non-security aspects of this area are important in terms of policy efficiency. In this respect, as it is seen in the 2009 Stockholm Programme, the EU recognizes that migration movements must be "managed" rather than controlled. Therefore, it is necessary to adopt a management approach that focuses on enhancing dialogue and awareness on preventing irregular migration between the source, transit and destination countries. Although it is not possible to find an exact solution to the irregular migration, it seems more appropriate to manage irregular migration controls in a more effective way that considers immigrant rights. In this context, the needs of all parties to this issue, including the EU destination countries, source countries, transit countries and the immigrants themselves should be considered in the development of migration policies. This approach, which advocates taking non-security aspects of migration into account, can be called "quadruple benefit approach".

Turkey is a key transit country in terms of migration movements towards the EU in the securitization-externalization axis on migration. As a candidate country started negotiations with the EU on 3 October 2005, Turkey has to align its migration policy with the EU common migration policy. However, as in the other policy areas in membership process, some difficulties and opportunities arise and the harmonization in this area is significantly influenced by the general situation of Turkey-EU relations. Although the chapter "Justice, Freedom and Security", which includes the migration policy, has not yet been opened in negotiations and there are some disruptions in the relations, harmonization continues intensively. These new harmonizations comparing with other policy areas seem to have been done technically at the first stage rather than a comprehensive transformation, as in the

countries involved in the 2004 enlargement process. In this process, the change in Turkey takes place in the policy dimension, not in the areas of politics or polity.

Given the progress reports published since 1998, the Accession Partnership Documents, the National Programs and the Action Plans adopted by Turkey in this process, there are harmonization differences between the various elements of Turkey's migration policy. When an assessment is made according to Radaelli's classification of Europeanization, "retrenchment" is seen in the Europeanization of Turkey's visa policy. While Turkey attaches great importance to harmonization of this area in the previous periods, it recently tends to stretch its visa policy towards the neighboring countries within the framework of a regional approach, and abolishes visas with some countries, not in line with EU visa policies. Because the membership schedule is not definite, Turkey prefers a policy to develop commercial, economic and socio-cultural relations with neighboring countries. Regarding the fight against irregular migration, a part of the migration policy, "inertia" was observed in Europeanization until 2001, that is, there was resistance to change and delays. Another element of migration policy, integrated border management, is an area in which the progress has not been achieved much because of terrorism and military vulnerabilities in Turkey, and harmonization in this area is very costly. After the opening of the Turkey-EU negotiations in 2005, "absorption" process began in the fighting against irregular migration and border controls, as it is in other policy areas. However, after 2006, credibility problem of the conditionality policy emerged because of uncertainty in the EU membership perspective and freezing of negotiations in some chapters. Therefore, there has been a slowdown in the harmonization process. In this period, negotiations on the readmission agreement, which is important for the externalization of the EU migration policy, have also been frozen by Turkey.

In 2009, with providing visa facilitation/exemption agreement as an incentive, the readmission agreement negotiations have been restarted and a consensus has been reached. This situation has given new impetus to harmonization in all aspects of the migration policy. However, as stated by the Turkish authorities, a radical "transformation" in migration policies can only be achieved when a definite membership schedule has been set. Indeed, the transformation observed in the Central and Eastern European countries is related with the clearness of membership schedule. However, relations between the two sides in this process are also taking place within the framework of externalization of the EU migration policy. For instance, Turkey-EU negotiations on the readmission agreement are part of the EU's externalization policy.

While this harmonization process is continuing, it can be predicted that the securitization tendency of migration in the EU will also be reflected in Turkey. However, since this area has not undergone a radical transformation, it is observed that even politicization, which is the first step of securitization, has not taken place in Turkey yet. The extent to which the politicization of international migration has taken place can be understood by examining the extent to which this issue takes place in the agendas of political parties in Turkey. Unlike the EU countries, international migration issues are not addressed in the election campaigns in Turkey. When the programs of four major parties are examined, it is seen that different points concerning the migration issue such as brain drain, integration problems of migrant workers in Europe are at the forefront. Therefore, the issues of fighting against irregular migration and strengthening of border controls are not included much in the agenda of political parties and international migration is not perceived as a threat yet. When examined the media, it can be seen that transit migration movements have been discussed more in visual and written media in recent years. However, this approach in the Turkish media is largely an immigrant-focused approach includes the tragedy of these people, rather than the media in the EU countries treat immigrants as a security threat. The reason why the international migration in Turkey has not yet been politicized and securitized is that the current irregular migration movements are mostly transit migrations and Turkey has not yet influenced a lot economically and socially. Therefore, the migration policies of Turkey are now managed by a non-security understanding.

Considering the future of Turkey-EU relations, it is clear that international migration will continue to exist on the agenda of this relationship. Turkey and the EU should accept this reality and develop policies in this direction. During the membership process and the transition process to a migration-receiving country, Turkey needs to review its migration policy and adapt it to new conditions. In this context, it will be beneficial for both sides to consider migration as an issue that needs to be studied and "managed", rather than as a problem to be controlled in Turkey-EU relations. In this process, policies that will benefit the EU and Turkey as well as immigrants and thus provide "triple benefits" should be adopted. The EU and Turkey have recently shown a compromising attitude that preserves the interests of both sides in terms of transit migration movements, and this strategy will ensure that the process is managed better in the long run and migration is no longer a problem.

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APPENDIX 1. ORJİNALLİK RAPORU



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YÜKSEK LİSANS/DOKTORA TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ORJİNALLİK RAPORU

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 28.01.2018

Tez Başlığı / Konusu: Avrupa Birliği'nde Göçün Güvenlikleştirilmesi ve Türkiye'nin
Göç Uygulamaları Üzerindeki Etkileri

Yukarıda başlığı/konusu gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 121.... sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 19.../12.../17... tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda belirtilen filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı %16...'tür.

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Programı: Uluslararası İlişkiler
Statüsü: ☒ Y.Lisans ☐ Doktora ☐ Bütünleşik Dr.

28.01.2018

DANIŞMAN ONAYI

UYGUNDUR.

Prof. Dr. Müge Kinacıoğlu
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ADVISOR APPROVAL

APPROVED.

Prof. Dr. Müge Kinacıoğlu
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APPENDIX 2. ETİK KURUL İZİN MUAFİYETİ FORMU



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28.01.2018

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28.01.2018

ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL

Approved

Prof. Dr. Müge Kınacıoğlu
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