

ÇAĞKAN FELEK

SMALL STATES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Bilkent University 2018

SMALL STATES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by
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Department of
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Ankara
August 2018

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UNION

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by


ÇAĞKAN FELEK

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA
August 2018

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
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
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ABSTRACT

SMALL STATES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Felek, Çağkan

Ph.D., Department of Political Science and Public Administration

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The 2004 Enlargement of the European Union marked an important development within the institutional history of the European Union with the participation of eight Central and Eastern European and two island states. The active representation of small member states became more important than ever in the European Union policy-making. Although the literature on the representation of small states in the European Union provides an enriching contribution, existing studies are limited by their focus on providing theoretical overviews which lack empirical case study analyses. This study tackles the issue of political representation of small member states in the European Union and empirically examines the role of four small member states in European Union policy-making. By developing a set of arguments on the domestic and supranational factors impacting the role of small state representatives, this research qualitatively examines the representation of Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, and Malta in the European Union institutions. In this

research, it is argued that domestic and supranational structural factors impact representation of small states in the European Parliament and Council of the European Union. Compared to large member states, representing high percentage of country's population, limited administrative resources and structures of party politics influence legislative behaviour of small state representatives. This leads representatives to establish a closer relationship with their constituencies in the European Parliament. Considering the Qualified Majority Voting method, representatives employ strategies which are particular to small states in order to influence voting processes in the Council of the European Union.

Keywords: Cyprus, European Union, Malta, Political Representation, Small States

ÖZET

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NDE KÜÇÜK DEVLETLER: AVRUPA PARLAMENTOSU VE AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ KONSEYİ'NDE SİYASİ TEMSİLİYET

Felek, Çağkan
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis
Ağustos 2018

2004 yılında sekiz Orta ve Doğu Avrupa devletleri ve iki ada ülkesinin katılımıyla gerçekleşen genişleme süreci, Avrupa Birliği'nin yerleşmiş kurumsal yapısının değişimi açısından önemli bir gelişmedir. Bu bağlamda, küçük Avrupa Birliği üyesi devletlerin politika yapım süreçlerine etkin katılım sağlayabilmesi her zamankinden daha önemlidir. Küçük devletlerin Avrupa Birliği içindeki rolüne ilişkin zengin literatür olmasına rağmen, önceki çalışmalar teorik katkı sağlamış ancak ampirik vaka çalışmaları bağlamında yetersiz kalmıştır. Bu çalışma, küçük devletlerin Avrupa Birliği'ndeki temsiliyetini konu alarak, dört küçük Avrupa Birliği üye ülkesinin politika yapım süreçlerindeki rolünü ampirik olarak analiz etmektedir. Bu araştırmada, yerel ve uluslararası yapısal faktörlerin küçük devlet temsilcilerinin davranışı üzerinde etkisi olduğu varsayılarak, Estonya, Kıbrıs, Lüksemburg ve Malta devletlerinin Avrupa Birliği kurumlarındaki temsiliyeti nitel araştırma yöntemleri kullanılarak analiz edilmiştir. Bu çalışma kapsamında yerel ve uluslararası yapısal faktörlerin, küçük devletlerin Avrupa

Parlamentosu ve Avrupa Birliđi Konseyi'ndeki siyasi temsiliyeti üzerinde etkisi olduđu öne sürölmektedir. Büyük devletlere kıyasla, ölkö nüfusunun yüzdolik olarak fazla kesiminin temsil edilmesi, kısıtlı idari kaynaklar ve siyasi parti yapılarının küçük devlet temsilcilerinin yasama davranışları üzerinde etkisi bulunmaktadır. Bu faktörler, Avrupa Parlamentosu'ndaki temsilcilerin seçmenleriyle daha yakın ilişki kurmasına yol açarken, Avrupa Birliđi Konseyi'nde kullanılan nitelikli çoğunluk uygulaması göz önüne alındığında, temsilciler küçük devletlere özgü olan stratejileri kullanarak oy verme süreçlerini etkilemeye çalışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliđi, Kıbrıs, Küçük Devletler, Malta, Siyasi Temsiliyet

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CHAPTER 1



INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

This study investigates the political representation of small member states in the European Union (EU). The purpose of this research is to examine the causal mechanisms as domestic and supranational structural factors which impact the voting behaviour of directly and indirectly elected small state representatives in EU institutions, specifically in the Council of the EU and the European Parliament (EP) through processes of political representation. The EU institutional design has undergone important developments since its establishment through different treaty reforms. The negotiation settings during these treaty reforms always acted as a venue for small states to maintain and empower their representation in EU institutions during policy-making processes. The Lisbon Treaty is

the latest treaty that claimed to bring strong institutional incentives which would empower the representation of small states and strengthen their role in EU policy-making. This is further explained in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (European Union, 2012a, 2012b).

In view of those incentives, the literature on the EU studies has provided important insights on whether those institutional reforms have been successful in empowering the representation of small states in EU policy-making. When the institutions of the EU are considered, the Council of the EU and the EP have been subject to institutional changes which also impacted their position in EU policy-making. In its long-lasting institutional developments, the EP evolved from a consultative chamber to a legislative assembly with increased role given to the representatives, the Members of the EP who are directly elected by EU citizens in the elections. The reapportionment of seats in the EP and the revisions delivered to respond to the need of strengthening the link between the Members of the EP and the European *demos* have always been on the agenda of treaty reforms in the history of the EU. The European Commission has been acknowledged as the supranational authority which acts as the “guardian of the European Union treaties and the equality between member states” (Nugent & Rhinard, 2016, p. 2). Therefore, the revisions made within the context of the European Commission were always shaped by its institutional composition which ensures that the equality between states will be protected. On the other hand, the Council of the EU has always been an institution in which the intergovernmental bargaining occurs, and national interests are pursued by the

member states through indirectly elected representatives, the member states' ministers (Wessels, 2008, p. 18). The Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) method leads member states to realign their national positions during policy-making mechanisms and to search a consensus in order to qualify the representation of 65 percent of the EU population, added to the positive votes of the 55 percent given by the member state representatives, which is called the "double majority" (Council of the European Union, 2016d) principle.

Within the framework of those institutional changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty, the position of small states in EU policy-making have always been part of the debate among scholars and by the public. In the literature, there is not a concrete definition on what constitutes a small state, and consequently, studies on the role and influence of the small member states in EU policy-making are diversified in terms of their focus and methodological considerations. Some scholars used objective factors such as population, land size, or economic size measured in Gross Domestic Product per capita to serve as a dividing line between large and small states. Other scholars preferred to look at the relative capabilities of states which are difficult to quantitatively measure but may be distinguished by considering the spatiotemporal context. In light of the different conceptualisations of the term "small state," scholars assessed and attempted to define the role of the small states in the EU institutions.

Within the literature on small states, the academic interest on small states also showed important progress in the post-World War II period. Different approaches on the

representation of small states in international politics were examined under a rich theoretical framework in the field of international relations. The research progressed in parallel to the regional and international political, economic, and socio-cultural developments which have led to a rise in the visibility of small states. The neorealist approach considers small states as weak actors in terms of their foreign policy behaviour due to limited military capabilities of small states. In the neorealist approach, the role and influence of states are measured according to the possession of military power.

According to the neoliberal institutionalist approach, despite the asymmetries of power which large and small states possess as their material resources, the existence of the institutions increases the interdependence between states and provides a ground for the economic cooperation among states. It also minimises the risk of security concerns for states. The social constructivist approach, in contrast, provides an insight in which the position of the states is analysed not solely based on foreign policy behaviour and introduces the importance of the structures, both domestic and international, added to the examination of the role of the states in world politics under spatiotemporal contexts. Nevertheless, today international politics are not dominated by power relations based solely on the military capacities of the states. In that regard, the EU is a good laboratory in which the position of the EU member states can be examined in the institutional, spatiotemporal contexts and under the impact of the domestic and supranational structures.

The basic foundational principle of European communities is to provide an institutional opportunity for states to engage in the economic cooperation based on the coal and steel

production (Hix & Høyland, 2011, p. 32) between six large and small states.

Nevertheless, the European project has developed both based on the economic matters, and on the socio-cultural and political foundations. The EU is an institution which is considered as a compound system of representation. The policies applied in the EU institutions have a direct impact on daily lives of the citizens. In order to assess the representation of the states in the EU institutions, the policy-making processes are in need of an examination at a multi levelled setting, specifically where society, state, and supranational actors are involved in light of the economic, social and political foundations.

The negotiation processes during EU treaty reforms were mainly based on the intergovernmental bargaining between large and small members with the goal of empowering their representation in EU institutions and ensuring their active role in EU policy-making, considering their material resources. Although the equality of the EU states and the citizens are emphasized in the EU treaties, it would be naïve to think that the representative balance between large and small states has been fully achieved in EU policy-making processes and mechanisms. Despite the foundational ideals which European integration has been built upon, each member state has its own national priorities which should be maintained and protected. The divide between small and large states is also reflected in the EU policy-making processes and when the relationship between EU citizens and the policy-makers are considered.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the causal mechanisms in which domestic and structural factors impact the representation of small states in the EU institutions, namely in the Council of the EU and the EP, after ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Hence, by developing a set of hypotheses, this study qualitatively examines the representation of small states with the case studies on Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, and Malta in EU policy-making through the relationship established between representatives and the citizens. While there has been a graduate thesis exploring small state theory and small member states of the EU¹, this study goes far deeper. It introduces new criteria for the definition of a small state, provides strong empirical evidence and focuses on the representation of small states in the EP and Council of the EU, in light of the Lisbon Treaty.

1.2. Conceptualisation of the Research

The aim of this research is derived from the main question of how the political representation of small member states has shaped in EU policy-making since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. In order to answer the main research question, the representation of small states is explored in the EU institutions during the policy-making processes. This research focuses on the Council of the EU which is formed by ministers from member states and the EP comprised of directly elected representatives. When the main research question is harmonised with the representation of the small states in these

¹ See Çetin (2008).

institutions, specific research questions are derived in order to empirically examine separately the representation in both of the EU institutions.

There is no clear definition to categorise EU member states either as large or small in the literature. For the purpose of this research, the cases are selected in parallel to various determinants. When the population size is considered, the existing literature provides different thresholds to classify states as large or small. However, as proposed in the World Bank Report (World Bank, 2016) and in other studies, states which have population size below 1.5 million form the cases of this research. These member states are Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg and Malta. Four states have six seats each in the EP which are digressively proportional to the population (European Union, 2012a). Added to the population criteria, in the Council of the EU, Malta has a voting weight which is three, and the voting weights of Cyprus, Estonia, and Luxembourg are four for each state within the context of the QMV rule. Upon further examination, four-EU states can be identified by different domestic, political, economic and socio-cultural backgrounds in which these structural factors impact their representation in the EU policy-making. In that regard, the research questions to be examined in this study in light of the case selection are the following:

a. How does the representation of Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg and Malta differ from large member states when the relationship developed between the citizens and the Members of the EP is considered?

- b. Can voting behaviour of Cypriot, Estonian, Luxembourg and Maltese representatives be conceptualised in a framework comprising different domestic and supranational structural factors which lead them to vote along national or supranational lines?
- c. Considering the QMV method, how is the behaviour of Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, and Malta shaped which empowers their national position during the voting processes in the Council of the EU?
- d. Is there any difference among the behaviour of Cypriot, Estonian, Luxembourg and Maltese representatives in influencing the voting processes of the Council of the EU compared to the large states?

The research questions are important in empirical and theoretical aspects and findings elaborated at the end of this study will contribute to the literature. In theoretical terms, answers to these research questions will be related to the theoretical framework drawn about the position of small states in global politics. Examining representation of small states in light of the domestic and supranational structures will add to the debates on the role of small states when their impact within the EU institutional settings is considered. Another importance of this research questions is its contribution to the ongoing debate over the concept of representation. The multi-level assessment of the representation of small states in the EU will empirically contribute to the studies concerning the relationship between the representatives and the citizens which is the essence of the representation processes. In that regard, the processes and mechanisms of the

representation are utilised to the institutional setting of the EU and incorporated in to the discussions on the role of small EU states. Another empirical contribution of this study will be to the “democratic deficit” problem which is still debated in the EU institutions. The notions of equality, accountability, and responsiveness are criticised within the institutional framework of the EU in the last decade. These notions which are emphasized in EU treaties, are linked to the position of small EU states and representatives and examined to provide an insight to the academic and public discussions in the European polity. Lastly, this study adds to the literature about the country cases which are analysed. In that regard, the case study method which is applied in this research will provide in-depth information about those four-EU states. In that regard, the domestic and supranational structural factors which influence the representation of these member states are tested in this study in a case study approach.

Relevant to the research questions, the argument in this research is stated as the following:

Domestic and supranational structural factors impact representation of small states in the EP and Council of the EU. Compared to large member states, representing high percentage of country’s population, limited administrative resources and structures of party politics influence legislative behaviour of the small state representatives. This leads Cypriot, Estonian, Luxembourger and Maltese representatives to establish a closer relationship with their constituencies in the EP. Considering the QMV method,

representatives from these four states employ strategies which are particular to small states in order to influence voting processes in the Council of the EU.

The primary data at the individual level was collected by interviews with the Cypriot, Estonian, Luxembourgish and Maltese Members of the EP. To understand the behaviour of small state EP representatives, it is necessary to receive their individual opinions about their legislative activities. By conducting interviews, not only how they vote for a specific policy is observed, but also why they vote in a particular pattern for a specific policy is learnt. This is added to the assessment of the relationship between the small state Members of the EP and the small state citizens. The interviews included open-ended questions and were semi-structured. After having the first correspondence with Members of the EP, a protocol explaining the purpose of this research was prepared, and it provided detailed information about how the interviews would be conducted. Requests for conducting interviews were made in three rounds. In total, 12 Members of the EP accepted to provide interviews, and the interviews were conducted between December 2015 and March 2016. The interviews reflect the diversity between the countries which are examined in this research as well as exposing differences in terms of the national and supranational political party affiliation and ideology.

Secondary data was collected from the PARLEmeter and EUROBARometer Survey Data Sets. The EUROBARometer Survey Data Set is composed of public opinion surveys conducted by EU institutions on a regular basis and published twice a

year (European Commission, 2016f). There are three versions of the EUROBAROMETER Survey: standard, flash, and qualitative (European Commission, 2016f). The aim of the EUROBAROMETER Surveys is to measure the perceptions of EU citizens towards the EU institutions in addition to important political, economic, and social developments happening in the European polity (European Commission, 2016f). The PARLEMETER Survey is conducted annually, except for the important developments (i.e. the EP elections) in which the results are published twice a year (European Parliament, 2010-2016). The PARLEMETER Surveys include data about the perceptions of EU citizens towards the EP, the voting behaviour of the citizens in the EP elections, and citizens' attitudes towards their representatives (European Parliament, 2010-2016). Another secondary dataset in this study is based on the Council of the EU and is comprised of the voting results on policies which were discussed and voted on by the Ministers of the member states in the Council of the EU (Council of the European Union, 2014-2016). As not all decisions are given during the meetings in the Council of the EU, only the vote results which are publicly available are analysed.

The latest EP elections were held in May 2014. Therefore, the interviews of this study were conducted with Members of the EP who serve in the current 8th EP (2014-2019). However, as Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg and Malta accessed the EU in 2004, the EUROBAROMETER Survey Data between 2004 and 2016 is analysed in this research. Although, data about Luxembourg exists since 1973, in order to make a comparison across country cases, the time frame taken for the EUROBAROMETER analysis is limited from 2004 to 2016. The PARLEMETER Survey analysis includes all available

and published data. In that regard, the time frame of the PARLEMETER analysis is limited to the years between 2010 and 2016. The decisions in the Council of the EU are taken by the representatives formed upon national politicians who are elected through national elections. As the representatives in the Council of the EU change in parallel to the national elections held in member states, the timeframe which is included in the analysis is limited to the votes between 2014 and 2016 so that the post-national elections periods are captured.

1.3. Outline of the Chapters

This study begins with an assessment in the second chapter that provides answers to the questions of how small states are conceptualised and are represented in international politics. The theoretical framework on the position of small states is explained in light of the neorealist, neoliberal institutionalist, and social constructivist approaches which are helpful in analysing political representation of small states in the EU in further stages of this research. After providing the development in the literature about representation of small states in world politics, various conceptualisations of the term “small state” are also evaluated in regard to the analyses made by scholars in their existing studies. The concept of representation is also explained in the second chapter which will form a guide to analysing the position of small member states in the multi-levelled structure of the EU. The third chapter concerns the question of how to define and categorise small EU states. This chapter begins with an assessment of the EU enlargement with the emphasis on the accession of small states through different rounds. Then, small states are evaluated in

light of their objective and subjective capabilities. The third chapter continues with an examination of the historical developments where processes of representation of small states were shaped in EU institutions through different revisions made in EU treaties. The examination of the country cases is also provided in the third chapter and the domestic and supranational structures impacting their representation are explored before moving on to the empirical analysis. The attitudes of the Cypriot (Turkish and Greek), Estonian, Maltese and Luxembourger citizens towards the EU are also examined in this chapter by benefiting from the EUROBAROMETER Survey Data Sets.

The empirical analysis is provided in the fourth and fifth chapters. The fourth chapter is dedicated to the examination of the representation of small states in the EP. Analysing the PARLEMETER Survey Data Set, the divide between large and small states is examined considering perceptions of the EU citizens towards their representatives in the EP. The differences in perceptions are also examined among small states. The chapter continues with analysis of the primary data collected during the interviews conducted with small state EP representatives and representation of small states are investigated by considering the behaviour of the Members of the EP in light of the domestic and structural factors. In Chapter 5, the representation of small states in the Council of the EU is explored in terms of the strategies they apply to empower their position during the EU policy-making. Secondly, these strategies are examined with five policy proposals on different policy areas which were negotiated and voted on between 2014 and 2016. These proposals are “the regulation on the monitoring, reporting and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport, the directive on package travel and linked travel arrangements,

the directive as regards seafarers, the regulation on trade in seal products and the directive on payment services in the internal market” (EUR-Lex, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2015). In doing so, the strategies applied by small state representatives are investigated. In the last chapter, the findings and conclusions are provided, and unresolved points in the research are explained which would open a venue for the future research.



CHAPTER 2

THEORIES OF SMALL STATES, CONCEPTUALISING THE SMALL STATE AND REPRESENTATION OF SMALL STATES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

2.1. Introduction

This chapter provides answers to the questions of how small states are conceptualised and represented in international politics. The objective is to review the theoretical framework of the role and influence of small states which is helpful in analysing political representation of small states in the EU policy-making. Small states have attracted scholarly attention depending on the regional and international developments in the post-World War II. These developments led to an increase in visibility of small states, parallel to the increase in their role and influence. Small states were traditionally regarded as

“weak” actors in world politics and were not considered to constitute a security threat to other states in the mid-1950s. Despite this perception, over the years, small states have strengthened their representation and influence with decision-making mechanisms in regard to political, economic, and social developments by either acting as individual actors or in alliance with other countries. One of the pathways that increased the visibility of small states was the emergence of international organisations (i.e. United Nations, EU, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and small states have acquired representation in those organisations. Therefore, they have had the opportunity to engage in decision-making mechanisms and to raise their voice in the international community since World War II.

When the academic progress of examining the position of small states in the post-World War II era is considered, there remains a question in the literature in which scholars could not come up with a concrete definition: what constitutes a small state? Nevertheless, scholars, working groups, and committees belonging to different regional and international organisations have derived various definitions of the term “small state” for the purpose of developing their research in analysing the causal relationship between foreign policy behaviour of small states and their influence in world politics. The World Bank defines small states “as countries with a population size² equal to or less than 1.5 million” (World Bank, 2016, p. ix). The United Nations General Assembly considers a population size of 10 million as the threshold to categorise its member states as either

² See World Bank (2017a) for the list of countries ranked according to their population size.

small or large. The number of countries with a population size as less than 10 million exceeds the number of countries having more than 10 million in the General Assembly.³ Hence, the decision-making mechanism in the United Nations General Assembly urges large states to ally with smaller ones to reach to the two-thirds majority (United Nations, 2016b).⁴ Based on the QMV system of the Council of the EU, it is sufficient to block the decision-making process or reject a proposal when the 13 smallest EU member states comprising only 8.35 percent of the EU population vote in agreement collectively.⁵ In contrast, the combination of the largest four densely populated EU member states is also sufficient for a motion to be rejected, which is called “blocking minority” (Council of the European Union, 2016d).⁶ When the economic capacity is applied as an indicator to distinguish large states from small countries, the annual Gross Domestic Product rates of

³ There are 193 states in the United Nations General Assembly. 110 member states have a population size less than 10 million each. The population data was retrieved from United Nations (2017).

⁴ For the list of member states of the United Nations, see United Nations (2016c). Each member state in the United Nations General Assembly has one vote. The decisions are established by either a two-thirds majority or simple majority vote. For further information about voting procedures in the United Nations General Assembly, see United Nations (2016b) and United Nations (2016a). For a historical account on the development of the role of small states in the United Nations, see Vandenbosch (1964, pp. 299-308).

⁵ In the Council of the EU, for a decision to be taken or a proposal to be adopted, it is required that both 16 member states out of 28 and the representation of the 65 percent of the EU population, which is called the rule of “double majority” are met (Council of the European Union, 2016d). The member states in which each one comprises less than 1.5 percent of the EU population are Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, and Slovakia (Council of the European Union, 2017). If these states get into alliance and vote against, the proposal is rejected because the condition of having 16 positive votes of member states is not met.

⁶ Those EU member states are Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy. They comprise 54 percent of the EU population (Council of the European Union, 2017). If these member states collectively vote against a proposal, it is rejected because of the “blocking minority” condition (Council of the European Union, 2016d).

the top 16 members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development are more than the average annual Gross Domestic Product rates of all member states (i.e. the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development average).⁷

The literature on small states does not provide a concrete definition of the term “small state”. Nevertheless, academic interest seeks answers to whether small states influence international politics, how they affect international politics if the former question is affirmative, and why they do not if the initial query is answered in the negative.⁸ Consequently, scholars have evaluated the role and influence of small states under different spatiotemporal contexts without reaching an agreement on what delineates a small state. This chapter provides a typology of how scholars define small states under the context of acquired representation of small states in international and regional institutions. Different conceptualisations of the term “small state” and approaches towards the position of small states in world politics are explored. In this research, the political representation of small EU states is analysed by considering the spatiotemporal institutional context and under the influence of political, economic, and sociocultural

⁷ The total Gross Domestic Product data is used to show economic capacities of states and to make annual comparison across countries which are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016c). For the list of member states, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2016b). For the ranking of the member states according to the 2016 Gross Domestic Product indicator, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2016a).

⁸ See Baehr (1975), Milsten (1969), and East (1973) for a historical overview about the disaccord on different conceptualisations of the term “small state”.

structures. Thus, this chapter provides a review of small state literature which will shed a light regarding how to define the small EU state.

This chapter begins with an exploration of various historical approaches to the role of states in regional and international politics which were mainly dominated by the debate on power relations between small and large states. The concept of “power” is contextualised through its relevance in relation to the role and influence of small states considering neorealist, neoliberal institutionalist, and social constructivist approaches. The progression in small states literature is then evaluated by considering global and regional institutional developments in the post-World War II atmosphere. The literature review continues by providing an examination of the objective and subjective criteria that are utilized to conceptualise the term “small state” as it is applied to the neorealist, neoliberal institutionalist, and social constructivist approaches. Classifying states as small and large solely based on the objective criteria remains a simplistic method of consideration within the EU context. The founding principle of the EU is to achieve absolute equality among member states in policy-making mechanisms. Furthermore, the role and influence of member states are not solely based on foreign policy behaviour dominated by military and economic matters, in contrast to the arguments proposed by the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches. The EU is designed as a multi-levelled institutional structure in which the society, the state, and the EU interact with each other. The outcome of EU policy-making in many issues has an influence even in the daily lives of the EU citizens. Therefore, in this research, the impact of small states in the EU policy-making processes are analysed across different policy areas, considering

the interplay between the citizens (whom are directly and indirectly represented) and the representatives. Hence, the position of the small states in the EU policy-making also needs to be examined with the concept of “political representation”. Hence, deriving deductively from the social constructivist approach, the relations between the represented (citizens) and the representatives (political elites) are assessed at the individual, national, and supranational levels impacted by the national and supranational structures. In that regard, one section of this chapter is dedicated to the review of the concept “political representation” incorporated to the theoretical overview of social constructivism. As a result, this chapter reviews the theoretical framework of the position of small states in international politics. Deriving from these approaches, it will be helpful in analysing political representation of small states in the EU policy-making which is the topic of the next chapters.

2.2. Approaches on Power: The Small States in World Politics

In the 1950s, scholars who worked in the field of small states claimed that small states were weak actors, hence they could only exert a limited role and influence in international politics (Çetin, 2008, p. 7). To examine the relationship between states when their foreign policy behaviour is considered, scholars made a distinction between the “weak countries” and “great powers” (Vandenbosch, 1964, p. 293). The term “small state” was initially used interchangeably with the concept of “weak state.” This is due to the post-World War II political atmosphere, in which the relations between states were mainly based on the security concerns and military capacities of states. According to Amstrup (1976, p. 168), although there were attempts to separate “smallness” from

“weakness,” those attempts remained insufficient as they were based on the causal mechanism on the administrative capacity and the state size impacting the behaviour of the state. If a state possesses limited administrative resources, it is acknowledged as a weak state. Amstrup (1976, p. 169) further argues that it is difficult to differentiate between the two notions solely based on the objective criteria or by considering the administrative resources and proposes that the research on small states can be extended by examining the position of small states in a broader framework of foreign policy analysis.

With the end of the World War II, the international system was surrounded by security concerns of states that would not harm their survival and would protect their military capabilities against the threats emerging from other states. Those security concerns led to the formation of a hierarchical system in the world ranked according to abilities of states to defend themselves against external threats by using their military resources. As the sole measure of state power was based on military resources, the legacy of World War II led small states to be defined as “entities which are unable to contend war with the ‘great powers’” because of their insufficient military capacities (Vandenbosch, 1964, pp. 293-294). The main difference between “weak states” and “great powers” was defined according to their military strength, and scholars argue that small states always shape their actions in order to secure their survival (Fox, 1959; Handel, 1990; Keohane, 1969; Rothstein, 1968; Vandenbosch, 1964; Vital, 1967, 1971). Fox (1959, pp. 2-3) argues that strong military resources make a country politically powerful, but this does not mean that small states lack a voice in international politics. In his book, derived from case studies

on “Turkey, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Spain” (Fox, 1959), the author argues that small states always tend to diplomatically engage into coalitions with “great powers” (Fox, 1959, p. 187). However, when small states lack influence in the “large decisions” (Fox, 1959, p. 187), they remain neutral (Fox, 1959, pp. 187-188). Similarly, Rothstein (1968, p. 29) accepts that military weaknesses of the small states posit national security threats and create dependence on other states for their survival; however, the author disagrees with the limited assessment on small states’ foreign policy behaviour based on military capabilities. The author defines that:

a small power is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the small power’s belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognized by the other states involved in international politics (Rothstein, 1968, p. 29).

Rothstein (1968, p. 29) proposes that the position of a small state is defined by state’s own perception and by others’ perceptions of a state in an institutional setting. These perceptions about the weaknesses urge small states to align with great powers for their survival (Rothstein, 1968, p. 244). On the same note with Rothstein (1968), Vital (1967, p. 33) argues that self-perception of a small state is always shaped by the notion of weakness which leads to an alliance with the great power, but alignment in a bipolar world according to the self-perception of the state does not provide a guarantee of survival (Vital, 1967, p. 143). Keohane (1969, p. 295) suggests that instead of the perceptions in which the security of a state is maintained by its own resources, the role that the leaders view their countries playing should be considered. In that regard, the dictated structure of the institutions is minimised in shaping the behaviour patterns of

states. In light of the literature which was enriched by the prominent scholars, small states can be defined under theoretical framework of neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and social constructivism.

According to the neorealist approach, the power of a state is the main determinant to understand its role in the international anarchical environment, and this power is measured by military resources and capabilities of states. Possession of military power enables the state to survive and to protect its security against external threats coming from other states (Fox, 1959, p. 2). By instrumentally measuring the power of states in terms of their military resources, small states are considered politically and economically weak. The neorealist view suggests that the international arena is shaped in conjunction with economic and political relations between states and that states always seek to defend their interests in the international arena while surrounded by anarchy. Thus, small states protect their self-interests by engaging into alliances with other states and position themselves in a bipolar or multipolar world in which the “power is balanced”.⁹ The proposed reason for this is that small states lack material military and economic resources required to ensure their interests, and this incapacity always creates a security concern for

⁹ The terms “bipolarity” and “multipolarity” are included here on purpose because there exists a discussion about different small state behaviour in a bipolar or multipolar world. The position of small states changes when it comes to form alliance with great powers. Vital (1967, p. 143) explains that alignment in a bipolar world does not fully ensure the security of small states because the security threat can still come from the ally. On the other hand, Rothstein (1968, p. 244) maintains that compared to multipolarity, in a bipolar international system small states have better idea on choosing the constellation to be the part of which would ensure their survival. That choice is shaped by the experience of states’ leadership and the perceptions about the developments in the international system.

them (Vital, 1971, pp. 8-9). The lack of material resources also leads small states to be incapable of exerting any political and economic influence, and it makes small states more vulnerable against external threats (Elman, 1995, p. 175; Vandenbosch, 1964, pp. 294-295). Therefore, in the post-World War II atmosphere, it was argued that there was a need for small states to adapt themselves according to newly emerging international power structures as they do not have the sufficient capabilities to influence the outcome. This adaptation process would take place for small states either by forming alliance with the powerful states which would require to comply to the demands of the large states so that small states continue their survival through international power relations and avoid external threats against their self-interests (Fox, 1959, pp. 187-188; Reiter & Gärtner, 2001, p. 12). Fox (1959) describes two models of alliance in the bipolar power structure. Her empirical study suggests that small states tend to form alliance with the great power to overweight the “balance of power” (Fox, 1959). She calls this model of alliance the “anti-balance of power” (Fox, 1959, p. 188). In this model, small states can influence the outcome. The second model is called the “pro-balance of power” (Fox, 1959, p. 188) in which small states tend to align with the less powerful great power (Fox, 1959, p. 188). Added to the discussion on the adaptation process of small states to the emerging power structures, Bjøl (1971) explains the behaviour of small states through international power relations as:

By itself the concept of the small state means nothing. A state is only small in relation to a greater one. Belgium may be a small state in relation to France, but Luxembourg is a small state in relation to Belgium, and France a small state in relation to the United States of America. To be of any analytical use “small state” should therefore be considered shorthand for “a state in its relationships with “greater states” (Bjøl, 1971, p. 29).

Small states are often ignored in the neorealist approach when the power relations between states are considered. As the power relations between states are mainly determined by their military capabilities in the international system surrounded by warfare and anarchy, small states remain to be overlooked because of their insufficient military capabilities. Hence, the shifts in the balance of power urge small states to shape their behaviour by engaging in alliance with the large states and by adapting themselves to the evolving power structures.

The neorealist approach possesses a simplified account of the role of small states in the world. As vulnerable position of small states is already presupposed because of their limited military resources, the neorealist approach leaves small states with an option to align with great powers as balancing actors which restricts actions of small states to obey and respond to the demands of the large states. In that regard, the neorealist approach diminishes small states to a single model which is based on weaknesses in actions vis-à-vis other states and continuous vulnerability against external security threats due to their insufficient material resources. This approach disregards the importance of historical, political, economic, and socio-cultural structures and dismisses the spatiotemporal context in which the role and influence of a state are subject to change under an institutional setting. In sum, it is very difficult to explain the position of small states in the EU under neorealist approach. Even the founding principles of the European Communities were based on ending the conflict between France and Germany through economic cooperation and regional integration, acquired representation of small states (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) meant that small states would also be the

part of the integration process despite their weaknesses. In that regard, the neorealist account remains a primitive explanation of the European integration in which large and small states were represented in an institutional context. The later phases of the process of European integration proved that the relations between EU states were not solely based on the security concerns and showed the possibility of economic integration under a supranational context.

Contrary to the neorealist approach which is based on maximising self-interests of states in military terms under an atmosphere surrounded by warfare, the founding principle of neoliberalism proposes the inevitable interdependence between states, despite the asymmetrical power possession between states. Thus, the concept of “soft power” (Nye, 1990, 2004) is proposed, and it is argued that by the use of that power, states can maintain influence in international politics. On the concept of “soft power”, Nye (1990, p. 157) argues that the use of military resources in order to ensure the interests of states can be costly. The author explains that:

While military force remains the ultimate form of power in a self-help system, the use of force has become more costly for modern great powers than it was in earlier centuries. Other instruments such as communications, organizational and institutional skills, and manipulation of interdependence have become important (Nye, 1990, pp. 157-158).

In accordance with the “soft power” argument proposed by Nye (1990, 2004), the neoliberal institutionalist approach introduces the role of institutions which would empower utilisation of instruments proposed by the author. According to the neoliberal

institutionalist approach, institutions are the settings which influence state behaviour, and they form a venue in which interests of states are reflected. Contrary to the neorealist approach, the neoliberal institutionalists view a common ground for cooperation among states in purpose of achieving a collective good. Although relations between states are dominated by the asymmetry of capabilities in terms of possession of power, neoliberal institutionalism proposes that states engage into cooperation in various international organisations, as being parts of the institutional context. According to this approach, states need stability to have a role in politics and international organisations to create a ground for themselves to gather and pursue collective goals in accordance with their self-interests. Hence, it is explained that the institutions minimise the risk of security threats coming from other states. Institutions facilitate the cooperation between states and contribute to a more stable order which serves more for economic and political interests of states than the continuous risk of conflict.

The neoliberal institutionalist approach suggests that regardless of being large or small, each state can exert influence and play a role in world politics. This happens mostly by being a member of an international organisation and by embracing institutional norms and principles of the organisation (Browning, 2006, p. 672; Keohane, 1969, p. 296; Steinberg, 2002, pp. 340-341). Neumann and Gstöhl (2004, pp. 16-17) in explaining the position of states in the United Nations decision-making claim that small states tend to institutionalise international norms and values by emphasizing and showing loyalty to these norms and values. The United Nations as an international organisation is regarded as the guarantor of peace and stability in the world hence emphasising international

norms and values is seen as a safeguard for small states. According to Neumann and Gstöhl (2004, pp. 15-16), the reason small states advocate international norms and values is explained within the context of the dichotomous relationship of being powerful and weak. The authors state that being powerful internally means that the concerns and interests of the great power are considered without being questioned (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2004, pp. 17-19). Occasionally, those concerns, and interests do not meet with the demands coming from small states. To minimize the inequality of power, small states tend to advocate international norms and principles. In that regard, the neoliberal institutionalist approach calls for considering the position of small states in a broader framework. Rather than relying on the approach of measuring state capabilities based on power relations dominated by the military resources, neoliberal institutionalist view suggests that it is possible to establish institutional cooperation and relatively benefit from each other based on the common political and economic good. This brings the opportunity for states to cooperate in other areas than the security such as the economy.

Similar to the neorealist approach, neoliberal institutionalism also argues that behaviour patterns of small states are generalised, in which the spatiotemporal particularity is not considered. As smallness is a negative attribute, being small *a priori* means possessing limited state resources. Although neoliberal institutionalism introduces the existence of institutions as a setting in which states engage in cooperation with each other, it remains insufficient in explaining how small countries influence decision-making mechanisms and the modalities of this influence because of the limitation the approach possesses in considering small states according to the material resources. Nevertheless, considering

the neorealist approach which is mainly based on power relations between large and small states based on their military capabilities, neoliberal institutionalism introduces the institutions which enables states to engage into cooperation.

As the neoliberal institutionalism also explains relations between states based on their material capacities, the relations between member states in the EU institutional setting are far from being examined today. The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community provides the institutional setting in which the member states engaged in economic cooperation, as proposed by the neoliberal institutionalist approach. However, this approach is far from explaining the current situation of the EU institutional setting. The institutional transformation of the EU and how states position themselves and exert influence in that institutional setting urge consideration of structures independent of the material resources. In the contemporary EU, member states engage into cooperation not only in economic means. In that regard, the role of the small states is not shaped solely in terms of material possession of their resources but also the structural factors based on political and social embodied in the EU institutional set up. The harmonisation of cultural identities of member states to the European values and principles in an institutional setting requires examination of the structural factors added to their material resources. The social constructivist approach explains the contemporary institutional framework of the EU. Harmonising the concept of 'representation' with the theoretical framework of social constructivism gives the opportunity to assess the representation of EU states in the policy-making processes. In

that regard, the influence of domestic and supranational structural factors will be examined impacting the representation processes and mechanisms in the EU.

As neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism consider the material capacities of states in assessing their role in international politics, the social constructivist approach focuses on state behaviour as shaped by “structures” and perceptions. First, the role of a state is determined by the perceptions attributed to them which create the “identity” of a state (A. Hey, K., Jeanne, 2003, p. 3). Position of a state is formed either by how other actors acknowledge it or how a state perceives itself vis-à-vis other actors, through constructed identities by domestic and supranational structures. The social constructivist approach suggests that the state identity is not shaped by constraining dichotomies such as positive or negative, small or large, weak or powerful, because states are not defined or categorised based on their material resources (Browning, 2006, p. 674). This view provides the opportunity to evaluate the role and behaviour of small states in *sui generis* behaviour patterns contextualised through identities and to examine their role in spatiotemporal contexts by the structural resources they possess. Small states are not attributed as weak against great, and their behaviour is dependent on their perceived capabilities to act shaped by structures (Browning, 2006, p. 682).

Scholars who analyse the position of small states in light of the social constructivist approach put forward the argument that domestic structural factors impact the role of small states in world politics. In that regard, Elman (1995, p. 180) argues that both

neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches explain the inter-state relations, and it is not sufficient to understand behaviour of small states under the framework of institutional context as both of those approaches are “state-centred” (Elman, 1995, p. 180). Instead, the author proposes the harmonisation of the “state-centred” view with domestic structures. According to the author, small state behaviour in international politics is not independent of the domestic developments in a country (Elman, 1995, p. 211). Elman (1995, pp. 174-175) accepts that external pressures shape the state behaviour but argues that it is not independent from domestic constraints. The institutional design (i.e. the domestic regime type, the calculations and predictions of the national leaders, the societal preferences, and the periods of crisis) influences the behaviour of small states (Elman, 1995, p. 189). Hence, the “state-centred” approach is complemented by the domestic structural factors which impact the behaviour of small states in international politics.

All in all, neorealist, neoliberal institutionalist, and social constructivist approaches offer different insights on behaviour patterns of small states in international politics. In the neorealist analysis, the emphasis is given to the inter-state relations which are dominated by power relations based on the military resources. The role of small states is shaped under domination by large states and small states engage in alliance with large states to balance the power. Because neorealist scholars conceptualise the term “small state” attached to the weakness and vulnerability, they argue that there is a typical pattern of small state behaviour in the anarchic international environment and argue that despite aligning to great power, this does not guarantee the elimination of risks of external threats

coming from other actors. The neoliberal institutionalism introduces the role of the institutions to the analysis. Although the world is surrounded by asymmetries of power in which states seek to maximise their self-interests, the institutions provide a ground for states to seek for cooperation and to enjoy common benefits. Therefore, the institutional setting minimises the risk of being subject to external security threats for small states and enhances cooperation between large and small states not only in military terms but also in other areas. Both of these approaches presuppose that foreign policies of small states are shaped in the same pattern. In contrast, the social constructivist approach brings an objection to this argument by introducing the role of identity construction and the importance of structures which impact the behaviour of small states in world politics. In that regard, social constructivism explains that each state has its own identity which is built through self-perceptions or through perceptions attributed to itself. The social construction of identity is linked with the structural factors, and this enables scholars to analyse the behaviour of small states in spatiotemporal context. Therefore, a state may be influential in one case and uninfluential in other.

Linking those approaches to the EU narrows the scope of the relations between large and small states to a regional context. The primary purpose of the establishment of the European Communities was to provide security for the European continent and to help the small founder countries to overcome their vulnerability against their large counterparts. However, the institutional development of the EU as an organisation was not regarded solely based on this principle. The expansion of the European norms and principles and the development of economic integration leading to regionally minimised

security concerns and regional stability which was enhanced by cooperation and coordination among member states based on the common European values. Over the years, the EU has been considered an institutional organisation in which the European principles, values, and norms prevail, and economic cooperation between member states has progressed. Social and cultural cooperation between member states has also been achieved, and small member states do not feel threatened by their larger counterparts. The security concerns based solely on military capabilities were transferred to the economic integration through cooperation between states, and the institutional setting of the EU has provided the venue for small states to acquire representation. The European integration project has not been developed independent of the domestic and supranational structures. The EU includes 28-member states also with different socio-cultural backgrounds. Each member state has its own domestic structures and these domestic structures have been embodied in the supranational construction through the European integration project. In a multi-levelled setting of the EU in which the developments at the supranational level have impacts at the national and societal levels, similarly, the influence domestic structures in each member state is also reflected at the EU level. In that regard, the EU, added to the economic and political emphasis, needs to be considered as the institutional setting in which the domestic and supranational structures are into interplay with each other. This continuous interaction enables to examine the representation of small states in the EU. On the contrary, any examination about the role of the member states solely based on the material capabilities and ignoring the influence of domestic and supranational structures may not provide a complete insight on the position of EU states in the policy-making processes.

2.3. Small States Literature

Until the 1970s, small states were regarded as uninfluential actors in international politics because of their insufficient material resources. The main argument proposed by neorealist scholars was shaped by the military weaknesses of small states which leads them to be vulnerable against external security threats from other actors and small states being inactive in relation to foreign policy behaviour because of their size and military incapability. The inadequate importance given to the international position of small states also caused a lack of consensus on how to define and categorise small states vis-a-vis larger counterparts. Baehr (1975, p. 461) and Amstrup (1976, p. 165) explain that the small state research was in the very beginning phase and scholars ignored to analyse the small states' position in world politics in the 1960s. This led to the lack of a uniform definition on what a small state constitutes. Fox (1959) and Vital (1971) avoid giving a concrete definition for small states and employ different variables to measure the state size. They focus on large states in the international politics and neglect the behaviour of small states, as world politics are shaped in parallel to the decisions and the actions of the large countries. Similarly, Keohane (1969, p. 296) names small states as “system-ineffectual” (Keohane, 1969, p. 296) states because they do not have any influence in world politics.

The emergence of new small states occurred after World War II, and this led scholarly analysis to develop by focusing on survival of the small states under the influence of

security concerns emanating from the Cold War conditions. This also brought the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community based on the idea of ending the war across the European continent and providing the possibility of economic integration which would foster prosperity and stability throughout the continent. The development of studies on small states shows the initial footsteps in that period which are concerned with small states in Europe. In that regard, studies on the political, social, and economic developments in small European states formed the focus of the literature in the 1960s and the 1970s. However, the research failed to produce a theoretical overview which “would contribute to define and assess the role of small states in other parts of the world” (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2004, p. 10).

The development of small state literature moved to another dimension in the mid-1980s (Çetin, 2008, p. 8). Added to the analyses on foreign policy behaviour of states based on military capacity, small state studies began to be equipped with research on economic relations between large and small states under the institutional context, as proposed by the neoliberal institutionalist approach. Small states literature further gained momentum through comparative analysis of state influence in international and regional institutions based on their economic capabilities. The rising importance of international economic institutions and the realisation of economic interests by states would contribute to deepen relations between states based on economic issues. In that regard, the effects of globalisation were a tendency towards more flexible and integrated economic relations between states and a deepening regional integration in Europe (Çetin, 2008, p. 8).

Additionally, the establishment of Central and Eastern European, Balkan, and Baltic

states contributed to the development of literature (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2004, p. 12).

Katzenstein (1985)'s work provides a major contribution. The author focuses on economic capacities of small states, their strengthening position in the European continent, and economic relations between large and small states. The author examines the methods used in which small states cope with and adapt to the emerging trends in the global economy in a case study about small Western European states (Katzenstein, 1985, p. 21). Katzenstein (1985, p. 9) states that small states were successful in being part of the world economy. Despite their vulnerabilities, they were successful in integrating into the world economy by ensuring "democratic corporatism" (Katzenstein, 1985, pp. 87-103) regulated by the "domestic compensation policies" (Katzenstein, 1985, pp. 47-57).

Between 1950 and the 1970s, scholars were concerned with the international position of small states under the Cold War atmosphere, and central themes which were subject to the analysis were the importance of the state size influencing foreign policy behaviour of states. The attempts to conceptualise the term "small state" remained limited to the security policies regarding military capacities and capabilities. Later on, the emphasis on the role of small states was also acknowledged by the emergence of international organisations, and the initial area of cooperation for small countries which was related to the security concerns was accompanied by cooperation in economic issues. This would help small states to minimise their vulnerability against external security threats. In the 1980s, the realisation of the benefits that economic interdependence between states would bring opened another path in small states literature. Hence, scholars began to analyse the role of states in rising economic relationship and the benefits they could have as a result

of that process. In that period, expansion of the institutional analysis on economic policies and development issues is observed.

The 1990s indicate another turning point in small states literature. As an international organisation, the EU shifted the focus of small states literature towards the interaction of a constructed understanding of the identities of its states and the importance of European values and principles grounded on the domestic and supranational structures in understanding the position of member states in the EU. This enabled the introduction of various conceptualisations of the term “small state” with a social constructivist interpretation added to the past debates on initial phases of the European integration process. The literature has shown an advancement in analysing the role and influence of small states within the institutional setting based on socially constructed identities and in parallel to the domestic and supranational structural factors impacting the representation of small EU states. However, in the current stage of the research, the question of “what constitutes a small state?” persists, and this is reviewed in the next section of this chapter. Hence, objective and subjective criteria which were employed in conceptualising the term “small state” are reviewed, linked to the development of the small state literature.

2.4. Conceptualising the Small State

Ranking based on material capacities has been a major method to categorise states as large or small. According to the neorealist approach, states are categorised as “weak” and

“powerful” by looking at their military resources. As in the neorealist approach in which the world politics is dominated by large states, small states are considered as weak actors and are mostly ignored because of their insufficient military capacities. The reason for this is explained by Veenendaal and Corbett (2015) that small states are not considered “real” (Veenendaal & Corbett, 2015, p. 527) states because of their tiny populations, vulnerable economies, and weak military resources. Small states are not acknowledged as independent states because they always act in alliance with the large states (Veenendaal & Corbett, 2015, pp. 528, 530). Veenendaal and Corbett (2015, p. 527) argue that by overlooking small states scholars miss the opportunity to explore the political, economic, and social developments in which small states may have a voice in institutional setting and call for more in-depth research on small states. This will create an opportunity for a comprehensive analysis on their role and behaviour under the institutional context in which small states show their influence through international organisations.

Consequently, proposing the importance of institutions would foster cooperation between states and enhance stability in the international system. Neumann and Gstöhl (2004) examine the United Nations Security Council decision-making process to analyse influence of states in the international institutional system (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2004, p. 16). According to Neumann and Gstöhl (2004, p. 16), added to the “permanent members of the United Nations Security Council”, participation of other member states in decision-making processes shows their influence through multilateral diplomacy depending on specific institutional circumstances and based on different policy areas. Since the economic and political resources of each state differ, this kind of international institutional setting causes member states to mostly take a position on exerting their

influence despite the differences in their material resources when the decision-making rule is focused on unanimity.

Baehr (1975), however, argues that “small states do not form an analytical tool to assess their role and influence in international politics because scholars cannot come up with a clear explanation on what constitutes a small state” (Baehr, 1975, p. 466). Despite this criticism, scholars employ different methodological tools to categorise states as small and large, and they assess their role and influence in international politics. In contrast to the argument proposed by Baehr (1975), Maass (2009, p. 65) claims that non-agreement on a concrete definition on what constitutes small states is in fact useful, and it provides the “conceptual flexibility” (Maass, 2009, p. 81) for scholars to employ different research designs in examining the role of small states.

There have existed valuable studies which contribute to the literature by shedding light on how the term “small state” may be conceptualised. The population, military resources, territorial size, and economic resources have been useful criteria to categorise states as small and large. Crowards (2002) explains that harmonising various objective criteria (e.g. population size, total income vs. population size, land area vs. total income, and the geographical location vs. possession of military resources) leads to various opportunities to classify states as large or small and enables scholars to assess distinctive features of small states, compared to their larger counterparts. Crowards (2002, pp. 172-173) used regression analysis in categorizing states as large and small states to reduce subjectivity

and to employ a combination of parameters to measure the state size instead of classification based solely on a single determinant. In that regard, the author utilizes three parameters (i.e. population size, land size, and economic resources). Comparatively, Vital (1967) categorises countries according to their population size and economic resources. Vital (1967, p. 8) considers “economically advanced countries with less than a population of 10-15 million and underdeveloped countries with less than a population of 20-30 million” as small states. He states that the least densely populated states may be economically advanced, and those states shall not be considered weak. If a state has a population between 1 and 5 million but it is economically advanced, then it possesses more power than a state with a population between 10 and 15 million that is not industrially developed. East (1973, p. 558) distinguishes states according to their territorial size and economic resources, and he analysed foreign policies of 32 countries which he had considered small from 1959-68. By using the data from the “Comparative Research on the Events of Nations Dataset” (East, 1973, p. 557), East (1973, pp. 565-566) found that small states show a more active foreign policy behaviour when they engage in alliances with large states or when they become a member of an international organisation. Armstrong, De Kervenoael, Li, and Read (1998, p. 641) apply a cut-off point below 3 million as the population size and consider states which are below that threshold as small states while analysing economic performance of small states in international politics. Atkins, Mazzi, and Easter (2000, p. 55) propose that states populated less than 1.5 million are considered as small, parallel to the Commonwealth report on small states (Charles, 1997, pp. 8-9). Similar to Atkins et al. (2000), Payne and Clarke (1987, p. 17) also take the population as a criteria and classify that “countries with

a population size below 1 million are small” (Payne & Clarke, 1987, p. 17). Goetschel (1998, p. 30) focuses on the territorial size in his study on small European states. Finally, other studies use the distribution of votes in various negotiation settings and categorise states according to their voting weights (Tallberg, 2008; Thomson, Stokman, Achen, & König, 2006).

Neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches maintain that “small states are always treated as ‘objects’, not as ‘subjects’ of International Relations” (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2004, p. 15) due to the definitions based on material resources of states. Neumann and Gstöhl (2004, p. 15) refer to that branch of research by arguing that the position of states is measured through the notion of power they possess which is materially measurable and restricted to the military power. Thus, the authors contend that this type of measurement does not fit into the realities of the contemporary world, because it is proposed in neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches that “no ties exist of any kind binding parties together” (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2004, p. 15) under the institutional context and that no feeling of responsibility exist between actors such as institutions urging them to cooperate and maintain stability based on the common values and principles (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2004, p. 15). On the same note, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan (1998) expresses the following:

It is easy for small nations to feel daunted by the global forces at work in our lives today. The cumulative effect of the globalisation of trade, finance, labour and communications may seem to be as powerful as a force of nature, as inevitable as the ocean tides, or as unpredictable as the path of a tornado. Large countries with enormous labour forces, abundant natural resources, arsenals of high-tech weaponry and fleets of expert technicians and negotiators may seem to have all

the advantages. Small nations may feel so diminished alongside bigger Powers that they fear being out-gunned and out-raced in the global economic sweepstakes, which is often portrayed -- incorrectly -- as a zero-sum game. Small nations may conclude that they have little or no role to play internationally, and that they should somehow stay away from the fray, see to their own needs and leave the playing field to those countries who are going to get their way anyway. I would like to sound the strongest possible note to the contrary. My long experience at the United Nations has shown me that the small States of the world -- Uruguay among them -- are more than capable of holding their own. I would even go so far as to say that their contributions are the very glue of progressive international cooperation for the common good (Annan, 1998).

The literature on small states is comprised under three main headings. The first branch of these studies considers that it is irrelevant and unnecessary to categorise states as large or small because there is not a widely accepted yardstick to explain what a small state is. It is impossible to determine where smallness begins and ends despite different objective and subjective criteria considered in studies. The second group categorises small states according to their material resources in line to the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches. This group uses determinants such as economic capacity, military possession of states, population, and territorial size. The institutional context is also considered. The last group emphasizes that membership to an international institution based on the cooperation through the use of the material resources is not complete to explain the role of small states in the institutions. Thus, the scholars propose to consider the influence of domestic and supranational structures which is helpful to understand the position of small states vis-a-vis large states.

A state cannot be independent of other states by denying the politically, economically, and socio-culturally interdependent developments in the world. The economic interdependence between states is closely related to their economic capacities. East (1973, p. 558) explains that as long as the economic capacities of states become smaller, the strategies that the political elite can use to pursue national interests become limited. Due to limited economic resources of small states, their domestic markets are also limited, and the production stays less varied. This brings higher dependence on exports and imports from other states (Vital, 1971, p. 54). Consequently, small states engage in various economic activities with other states. However, this type of economic engagement brings the additional issue of small states being embargoed due to their in compliance with requests by large states having high volume of economic activity (Çetin, 2008, pp. 23-24). Compared to their larger counterparts, it is claimed that small states will be negatively affected by this type of economic activity. (Vital, 1971, p. 55).

Due to their limited economic, military, administrative, and bureaucratic resources, small states tend to limit their interests to specific foreign policy areas. These policy areas are strategically and geographically important or they are particular prioritised issues which may have direct influence on their domestic political, economic, and social developments (East, 1973, p. 564). The number of outside diplomatic missions of a state or why these diplomatic missions are located in particular states indicates the foreign policy areas which are regarded as important by a small state. Whereas limited foreign policy interests of small states are regarded as a weakness, Handel (1990, p. 42) considers this approach of limited interest as an advantage for small states and explains that “because weak states

can focus their attention on a limited range of foreign policy problems, they have a relative advantage over decision-makers in the super and great powers. Policy makers in the weak states have a closer knowledge of issues involved and fewer distractions” (Handel, 1990, p. 42).

Considering those reasons, small states always prefer to be a part of an institutional setting to minimise their vulnerabilities. It would not be wrong to claim that small states have two options to have a voice in world politics. The first option is to be the part of an international organisation or institution. However, this option bears the risk of being under the influence of large states which are members of the same international organisation. Small states may take the side of their alliance partner even if a decision is against their interests, and this may lead them to lose their autonomous position (Çetin, 2008, pp. 143-144). The second option for small states is not to be the part of an international organisation or an institution with the goal of protecting their autonomy and continuing to pursue their activities with their own capacities and capabilities. This creates another disadvantage for small states as they may be at risk of being left alone and detached from international politics. However, small countries prefer the first option in most cases in order to minimise their structural vulnerabilities. They emphasise the rules, principles, and norms in which an organisation or an institution was founded upon. Being a front defender of international treaties, human rights principles, and international laws are choices of small states in an organisation or an institution. The EU forms a venue for small states who opted for the first.

On the other hand, parallel to the arguments to the social constructivist approach, the development in social and political structures of a state are shaped by history and rooted in the culture of a society. Hence, it would not be wrong to claim that the development of social and political dynamics is also related to the state size, as structural factors. One of the important domestic structural factors is the possible existence of a causal mechanism between state size and the development of democracy. It is argued that “there is not a direct relationship between the size of a state and the development of democracy” (Dahl & Tufte, 1973, p. 138). The authors state that there is no optimal size of a country. Hence, they conclude that “no single type or size of unit is optimal for achieving the twin goals of citizens’ effectiveness and system capacity” (Dahl & Tufte, 1973, p. 138). On the other hand, a branch of scholars found that the smaller the society is, the more democratic it becomes compared to larger societies. Scholars who argue that there is a relationship between the size of society and the democratic development explain that small states tend less to shift to authoritarian regimes because small island states are more democratic (Ott, 2000, p. 118). Baehr (1975, p. 457) counters that argument and claims that to respond to the citizens’ demands which is an essential part of the democracy, the government should not be too small. Accordingly, the administrative and bureaucratic capacities of states are important when they get into interaction with other states in an institutional setting. Small states may be weak in participating in decision-making processes because of the limited resources they receive regarding information about activities of other states. Similarly, bureaucratic capabilities of small states may remain limited because of their insufficient human resources. When this occurs, small states

prefer to transfer most of their bureaucratic and diplomatic information channels to large states which may cause them to be limitedly informed by activities of other states and to accept biased information about others' activities (Baehr, 1975, p. 462).

Within the EU framework, it is not sufficient to evaluate the role of the member states in policy-making processes and mechanisms by solely focusing on the approaches based on the material capacities of member states. As the social constructivist approach proposes, the influence of the structural factors also shape the behaviour of states in international politics. In that regard, the EU provides the opportunity to examine the representation of member states in the EU policy-making through the interaction of domestic and supranational structures that foster multi-level dynamics of political representation.

Hence, drawing from the social constructivism, it is important to assess the concept of representation linked to the structural domestic factors impacting the role of small states at the supranational level. Harmonising the social constructivist approach with a debate on the concept of representation will be useful in examining the position of small member states in the EU policy-making. In the multi-levelled setting of the EU, the structural factors influence the representation patterns of EU states at the supranational level. In that regard, the interaction of the domestic and supranational structural factors is in need of a synthesis with the representation processes and mechanisms, narrowed down from these theories to the representation of EU states and citizens. The binary notion of the concept of political representation is applied in this study by involving the processes of representation of citizens in the multi-levelled EU institutional framework, added to the debate on the representation of states as polities.

Representation can be a difficult concept to define. The literature provides various explanations from different viewpoints. Although it is expedient to suggest a simple definition, political representation is mainly involved in a relationship between represented and the representative. Pitkin (1967) who is accepted as one of the established scholars on representation defines the concept as “a dynamic process involving someone taking place of someone else, both by including the authorization of the representative by the represented and the accountability of the representative to the represented” (Bellamy & Castiglione, 2013, p. 208). Similarly, “representation” is defined as a “process in which meaningful collectivities in the society are reflected within the composition of a parliament or any other institutions by their representatives” (R. Andeweg, B, 2003, p. 150).

It is widely accepted that representation takes place mostly in democracies. Likewise, when scholars discuss democracy and political representation, they consider representative democracy in which the represented function as collective units and authorize representatives to represent themselves. In representative democracies, political outcomes are decided by a group of representatives. Representatives are individual actors, mostly enrolled in the process of political representation through political parties and pursuing interests of the represented in a setting. Hence, political representation requires a mediating assembly of some kind between the represented and the representative, in which in most of the cases it is the parliament (Brennan & Hamlin,

1999, p. 109). The dynamic relationship between the represented and the representative is pursued by political parties or other collective institutions. Interests and expectations of the represented are reflected under collective units of political parties mainly through the parliament or other kinds of representative democratic institutions. In that regard, the process of representation presupposes two main actors: the represented and the representative. Differing ideologies, views, and expectations of the represented are pursued by their representatives. This dynamic relationship between these two actors establishes a link for the represented to authorize its representatives and to be accountable to whomever the representative represents in a setting where the activity of political representation takes place.

An important branch of literature exists on the role of representatives in terms of their responsiveness to their supporters which includes explanation of a causal mechanism that helps to measure the strength of relationship between the represented and the representatives, as well as the effectiveness of mediating actors and structural factors (e.g. institutions such as political parties, governments, parliaments, electoral systems, ideologies, and issues) (R. B. Andeweg & Thomassen, 2005; Binzer Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; Dalton, 1985). The delegate-trustee dichotomy is an important model used to explore the causal mechanism between the represented and the representative. The trustee model indicates a hierarchical relationship between the represented and the representative (Mansbridge, 2011, p. 623). Hence, the representative may act for the represented by pursuing a common well-being. A trustee is someone who is a free agent, and she gives decisions according to what she considers as right and just.

A trustee follows her own judgment based on the facts in each case and decides independently what she considers to be in the best interests of her representatives. Contrary to a trustee, a delegate does not use the independent judgment as a criterion for her own decision-making. A delegate always seeks opinions of her constituents or supporters and always follows the instructions given to her by her constituency or supporters during decision-making processes. Pitkin (1967) points out that “the representative cannot be completely identified with the demands or interests of the represented and neither the representative can be completely divorced from those demands or interests” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 508). Likewise, Eulau, Wahlke, Buchanan, and Ferguson (1959) in an empirical analysis argue that this type of classical dichotomization does not reveal the style of political representation. Hence, Eulau et al. (1959, p. 749) introduce the concept of “politico.” The “politico” is a representative role in which “the representative may hold a trustee orientation at one time and a delegate orientation at other time” (Eulau et al., 1959, p. 749). The “politico” gives a chance to the representative to assess her role depending on the particularity of the issue and within the political environment in which she acts (Eulau et al., 1959, p. 750).

All in all, the role of small EU states needs to be analysed by the concept of ‘representation’ harmonised in a theoretical framework provided by social constructivism. In a multi-levelled representation of the EU, the domestic structural factors as proposed by the social constructivist approach impact the representation of member states in the EU. In the policy-making, the representation process occurs by participation of the individuals (i.e. citizens and policy-makers) in the EU. Therefore, it is

important to narrow down the analysis from the wider theoretical framework on the small state behaviour to the representation of citizens by their representatives in which the domestic and supranational structural factors impact the representation process. The model of trustee, delegate and politico improves our understanding of the representation of EU states, as the structural factors influence the behaviour of the representatives and determine their actions according to this model. In that regard, the representation of small EU states is examined in light of the structural factors influencing the process of representation, involving the role of citizens and the representatives.

2.5. Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has provided a review of how small states are conceptualised and how their role is assessed in the discipline. Various historical views to the role and the influence of states in regional and international politics were mainly dominated by the power relations between states. In that regard, the concept of “power” is contextualised through its relevance to the international position of small states in light of neorealist, neoliberal institutionalist, and social constructivist approaches. In the neorealist perspective, emphasis is placed on material determinants while categorising states as large and small. Behaviour patterns of small states, however, are argued as typical because smallness connotes with weakness and vulnerability. The neoliberal institutionalist approach gives importance to institutions as they enhance economic cooperation between states, minimise security risks, and provide small states to be more active in spatiotemporal contexts. Social constructivism relates the importance of

spatiotemporal context with socially construction of identities and the structures impacting behaviour of small states.

The review of objective and subjective criteria which are useful to categorise states indicate a variety of definitions for the state size. The first branch of study categorises small states according to their material capacities such as population, economic, territorial size, and military resources. Neorealist scholars built their research based on the military resources of a state combined with its population and land size. Linking military resources to the population size is also a determinant for states to show their military capacities including their human resources as well as their economic capacities regarding their labour resources. Secondly, neoliberal institutionalist scholars mainly consider the level of economic performance of states linked to the cooperation established among states in the institutional set-up. Lastly, in social constructivist research, small states are defined by looking at the structural factors rather than material resources. The domestic structures influence the position of countries, and this leads to the argument that the state which possesses fewer material resources may exert influence in international politics based on its possession of structural resources. This approach was synthesized with the concept of “representation”.

In this chapter, different conceptualisations of the term “small state” and approaches towards the position of small states in international politics were identified. The review of those approaches has provided guidance on how to explain the “small European Union

state” which is the main topic of the next chapter. In this research, the role and influence of small EU states are analysed by taking the spatiotemporal institutional context in which the domestic and supranational structures influence representation of small states and citizens and the representatives are involved in the processes of representation. Categorising states as small and large solely based on their material resources remains simplistic within the context of the EU. The founding EU principle is to achieve full equality among member states in decision-making and policy-making mechanisms. Although the seats in the EP and the voting weights in the Council of the EU are apportioned according to population size, the European Commission provides the opportunity for all of its member states to be equally represented. In that regard, small states exert their influence in the EU policy-making under the spatiotemporal contexts. The EU is designed as a multi-levelled institutional structure in which the society, the state, and the EU interplay with each other. The outcome of the EU policy-making has a multi-level influence even in the daily lives of its citizens. Hence, in this research, the influence of small states in the EU policy-making are analysed in different policy areas, considering the interplay between the EU citizens and the European and national political elites within the framework of the EU and in light of the structural factors impacting the processes of representation. The next chapter examines the conceptualisation of the term “small European Union state” according to the objective and subjective criteria. It also evaluates the institutional developments on the representation of small EU states. The domestic structural factors influencing the representation of small states are also explored with a focus on the country-cases of this research.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF SMALL STATES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION¹⁰

3.1. Introduction

The European Coal and Steel Community was established in 1951 as a result of the Treaty of Paris which was signed by Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Amongst these countries, Germany, France, and Italy were considered to be large states, whereas Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg were deemed small.

¹⁰ Part of the data and arguments proposed in this chapter was accepted for publication in Grigoriadis, I. & Felek, C., (forthcoming). “Hype, disillusionment and capacity problems: Turkish Cypriot media and the European Union”, *Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. When this research was finalised, the article was in the proof-reading process.

The European integration process with more than 60 years' experience has provided a new institutional structure for EU states. The initial years of European integration led the member states to change their policies and attitudes towards other EU states in relation to the security concerns they possess. Deepening integration also provided new opportunities for member states to improve their relations based on economic cooperation. The contemporary institutional framework of the EU enables the relationship between member states on diverse political, social, and economic areas under the EU because it is a supranational organisation.

The EU gradually evolved in its institutional setting. Added to the evolution in the EU institutional set up, shared political, economic, and social values and principles have contributed to the deepening of the EU integration, beyond economic issues. The project included the internalisation of international norms such as the rule of law, supremacy of the individual rights and freedoms, and democratic values. In such a secure institutional environment, small member states gained the opportunity to raise their voices in the EU policy-making processes and mechanisms. Considering the latest developments through the integration process, there are 2004 (membership of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), 2007 (membership of Bulgaria and Romania) and 2013 (membership of Croatia) enlargement rounds. Since then, there have been a greater number of small EU states. Despite the differences in material resources each member state possesses, the EU Treaty reforms over time provided small member states a more active involvement in the policy-making institutions.

The EU encompasses different institutions in which important decisions are given shaping the direction of the EU integration. Those decisions which are implemented by member states influence the daily lives of European citizens. Therefore, member states need to adopt themselves to those ongoing political, economic, and social developments by actively engaging in these processes and ensure that they are actively represented. Member states would not want to disappear from these processes and remain completely isolated without pursuing their national interests. Accordingly, they want to maintain their autonomy, have their voice heard, and be influential in these processes. This is easier in the EU institutional setting. However, despite each member states' desire to actively participate in the EU policy-making, the mechanisms incorporated in the EU institutional framework urge member states to act in balance between maintaining their autonomy, seeking a more active role, and avoiding actions based on their self-interests alone and contributing to the project of the EU integration.

This chapter addresses the position of small states in the EU, seeking to discover how small EU states are defined. The assessment begins by defining the institutional structure of the EU and examining its differences from other international organisations in relation to representation of small states. The chapter continues by providing a historical account of the EU enlargement rounds though exploring the developments in the EU institutional set up by different EU Treaty reforms when small states acquired membership. Moving on, objective and subjective criteria which were discussed in the second chapter are

employed in the context of the EU. Also, a “small European Union state” is conceptualised considering the literature. The chapter concludes by providing a chronological overview of Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, and Malta as small states and the country cases examined in this research. It explores the historical dynamics of how these states functioning as small member states have gained EU membership in terms of their domestic structures. As the EU institutional structure involves different decision-making and policy-making mechanisms which directly influence its member states, it becomes necessary to consider the design of domestic political contexts of these member states while evaluating their role and influence in the EU policy-making mechanisms. When small member states are assessed, the structural factors embodied in domestic politics largely affect the position of small states in international politics, as proposed by Elman (1995, p. 176). In liberal democratic states, domestic societal actors and institutions are involved in the policy-making mechanisms and processes. Those actors also shape and demonstrate influence in policy-making mechanisms of the state, both at the national and supranational levels. In contemporary politics, it would not be wrong to argue that successful policies whether at the national or supranational levels are achieved by strong collaboration between the state, political elites and societal actors. Hence, the behaviour and role of states, whether they are small or large, cannot be solely dependent on the decisions given by the state and political elites but rather in relation to domestic structural factors. This involvement provides a ground for an interplay between society and the state in policy-making processes and is reflected at the EU policy-making mechanisms. Therefore, any analysis on the representation of member states in the EU

policy-making requires examination of the domestic structural factors. This is made in the last section of this chapter.

3.2. Small States Through the History of European Integration

In the 1980s, small states became more influential under the emergence of globalisation and different regionalisation movements around the world. Rather than having the security concerns as a priority for their survival, those developments created different venues for small states to empower their representation in other economic and socio-cultural issue areas by participating in various institutional settings (Bailes & Thorhallsson, 2013, pp. 104-105). One of the important landmarks for the regionalisation attempts is the EU. Since its foundation, the EU has provided an institutional set up which aims to create a balance between small and large states in policy-making mechanisms (Çetin, 2008, p. 53). At the same time, it is stated that the EU also forms a ground for small states to be under its protection when their political and economic interests are maintained and pursued in its institutional context (Bailes & Thorhallsson, 2013, p. 105). Hence, establishment of the EU formed an institutional platform for small member states in which they maintain their interests and influence.

Looking at the contemporary framework, the EU includes many small states when population and economic size are considered to classify member states as large and small.

Table 1 indicates the participation of member states in the EU through seven rounds of enlargement.

Table 1. EU Enlargement Rounds

Source: European Commission (2016a)

Enlargement	Name of the States Joined the EU
Rounds	
1957: Founding States	Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, West Germany
1973: First Enlargement	Denmark, Ireland, The United Kingdom
1981: Second Enlargement	Greece
1986: Third Enlargement	Portugal, Spain
1995: Fourth Enlargement	Sweden, Finland, Austria
2004: Fifth Enlargement	Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Czech Republic
2007: Sixth Enlargement	Bulgaria, Romania
2013: Seventh Enlargement	Croatia

The enlargement rounds led many small states to be the EU members. The threshold put in order to categorise member states as large or small leads different assessment on the quantity of member states which are deemed small. However, without any concern, it can be clearly argued that 2004 enlargement marked an important juncture in the EU history. The 2004 enlargement included 10 states in which most of them are acknowledged as small states and the 2004 enlargement is considered as the biggest enlargement process. In the EU institutional setting, small member states are directed to play an influential role and are represented equally with large states. This is explicitly stated and guaranteed by the TEU, Article 4 (European Union, 2012a). The institutional developments always aimed for equal representation between small and large states and to maintain the small states' influence in EU policy-making. Nevertheless, would be overly simplistic to think that absolute equality between small and large EU states has been achieved. In various policy areas, such as economic and security policies, the inequality between large and small states persists because large member states try to influence and dominate small states or to shape the direction of the European integration in parallel to their political and economic interests (Çetin, 2008, pp. 59, 103). Nevertheless, it is claimed that small EU states are successful in shaping the policy-making agenda (Steinmetz & Wivel, 2010, p. 8). Before moving on to the analysis on the representation of small states in shaping the EU policy-making agenda, it is important to explain how small member states are defined and categorised in the EU institutional framework.

3.3. Conceptualising the Small European Union State

The EU is composed of 28-member states. Among them, most of the states can be classified as small. The European Communities included six states, with the divide of three large states (i.e. Italy, West Germany, France) and three small states (the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium). Since its foundation, the principle has been established that the interests of small states would be protected, and small states would have an equal participation role in the policy-making processes of the organisation. Therefore, the institutional rules and norms have provided an opportunity for small EU states to impact the policy making processes and to have strong positions in the EU in terms of their representation. Before moving on to examine the influence of small EU states, it is important to define a small EU state in light of the objective and subjective criteria. This will then provide the foundation required to examine and assess position of small EU states.

Generally, states are defined by their material resources, such as the population size, economic power, or military power possession (Steinmetz & Wivel, 2010, p. 5).

Thorhallsson (2006) provides six features which are useful to categorise states as large or small or weak and powerful in international politics. The features are the following:

fixed size (population and territory); sovereignty size (whether the state can maintain effective sovereignty on its territory; its ability to maintain a minimum state structure and presence at an international level); political size (military and administrative capabilities); economic size (GDP, market size and development success); perceptual size (how domestic and external actors regard the state); preference size (ambitions and prioritizations of the governing elite and its ideas about the international system) (Thorhallsson, 2006, p. 8).

Therefore, small EU states are defined and conceptualised according to several criteria in light of Thorhallsson (2006)'s proposition. Tiilikainen (2006, p. 74) in his study about the EU membership and the development of small state identity categorises member states as large and small by examining their population and economic size. Maes and Verdun (2005, p. 330) explain that, added to the quantitative measures applied to distinguish small states from large states in the EU, it is important to assess their economic and political weight in the EU decision-making and policy-making processes. The authors analysed the role and influence of Belgium and Netherlands during the creation of Economic and Monetary Union. Bengtsson, Elgström, and Tallberg (2004, p. 312) consider the geographical importance, preference size, and perceptual size. The authors' analysis is based on the performance of Nordic countries during the EU Council Presidency. Ayres (1996, pp. 28-29) also looks at the economic size and the geographical importance of states and focuses on the existence of the correlation between the level of economic development through the deepening European integration in Cyprus and Malta. In that regard, the scholars may analyse the causal relationship between a criterion or combination of the objective criteria and the role of the small EU states. The combination of the population size and the economic size provides to evaluate the economic performance of states by studying the causal mechanism between the population size and the economic performance of the states. Similarly, when the population size is combined with the economic indicators, the analysis can be done in terms of furthering the existing research on whether smallness influences economic capabilities of states. Employing all

of the criteria given above may lead to make an assessment on the studies about whether the economic capabilities of states are dependent on the land size and the population.

The EU was established upon the principles of deepening political and cultural integration in parallel to strengthening economic relations. Hence, to examine the relationship between states through deepening economic and political integration and the role and contribution of states to this process, additional criteria are needed. As mentioned above, how a member state is regarded in the EU by other states and how a member state positions its own influence in EU policy-making are important questions to be answered which reveal subjective capabilities of member states in the EU policy-making. Although the institutional arrangements and mechanisms are aimed to empower the representation of small states but made according to the objective criteria, perceptual evaluation about small EU states must be done in light of the domestic and supranational structural factors and based on the issue areas and within the institutional set up of the policy-making mechanisms.

While defining small EU states, it is possible to arrive at a two-fold conclusion in the literature. Small states are distinguished by looking at their material capabilities, which are mainly the population size. In addition, economic power and land size are other indicators which help categorise small and large states. However, contrary to Thorhallsson (2006)'s proposition, Danlken (1998) argues that there are no strict

indicators which help categorise states as small and large. Rather than solely measuring the material capacities of states, it is important to evaluate positions of states by:

their economic strength and competitiveness, strategic position and military potential, cultural reputation, leading and respected personalities, excellence in science and technology, and the ability to join international institutions where the challenges and risks of the modern world are met and dealt with (Danlken, 1998, p. 44)

Any categorisation which conceptualises small states based on their material capacities may not provide a steady ground for assessing role and influence of small EU states during policy-making processes. For example, a member state with a very high level of gross domestic product may have less population or a lower military capacity than other member states, but it does not mean that the state cannot exercise its influence in the Council of the EU. Similarly, in an institutional setting such as the EU, the “Security and Defence Policy” is always based on shared and common ground, and it is pursued according to commonly agreed principles (Çetin, 2008, p. 59). That is why, within the EU institutional design, categorising states according to their military capacities do not explain how small states may exert influence compared to their larger counterparts because decisions related to this policy area have always been taken in consensus.

States are distinguished by the subjective criteria, in addition to material capabilities. Every state would be keen to have its influence when it joins an institution or becomes part of an institutional setting like the EU. Self-perceptions of member states, perceptions about capabilities of member states between each other, and the role they play in the EU

policy-making also reveal their influence. Thus, it is important to consider in tandem, the power of which states possess and the power of the states that they exercise in the EU. This is not independent of the domestic and supranational structural factors shaping the exercise of influence in the EU policy-making. By combining the objective criteria with subjective criteria, it is possible to examine the position of small states in the EU. In other words, population size and economic capacity are important indicators in categorising states as large and small. However, it is not sufficient to distinguish between small and large EU states and to understand what a small EU state means. For example, although Luxembourg is one of the small states in terms of the population size, its economic capacity and influence in the EU is higher than most of the Central and Eastern European member states.

Recent developments in the Lisbon Treaty based on the EU institutional setting remain to be examined as well. However, previous studies explain the exercise of the power by member states by considering only the power they possess and subsequently ignore institutional developments and impact of small states on the EU policy-making mechanisms. This study is based on the role and influence of the small EU states considering the institutional changes in which the Lisbon Treaty brought. Consideration is given in regard to the institutional setting which are based on the shared rules and principles stated in the EU Treaties. In that regard, the next section is dedicated to the assessment on the historical developments in the EU institutional set up which influenced the representation of small states.

3.4. The European Union Policy-Making and Small States

The developments which led to substantive changes in the EU institutional setting provide an avenue to explore the changes in representation and role of small EU states. The reforms which were provided in the EU treaties additionally shed a light on how member states exert their influence during the negotiation processes on the treaties. In that regard, it is important to provide a brief overview on the main EU institutions, namely the European Commission, the EP, and the Council of the EU and examine how EU policy-making is pursued in the continuous dialogue between these mechanisms. Hence, this chapter continues with an analysis of developments in the representation of small states in EU institutions and evolving role of small EU states in policy-making processes. This is done by considering the gains of small member states through reforms brought by EU treaties in EU policy-making processes and mechanisms.

3.4.1. Institutions of the European Union and Small States

EU policy-making is formed by complex processes in which the European Commission, the EP, and the Council of the EU are the main institutions involved (Nugent & Rhinard, 2016, p. 5). Explaining the role of these institutions provides an overview of the complexity of EU policy-making, and it also demonstrates how the developing EU institutional structure form an avenue for small states to exert their influence. The EU has institutionally been developed with its *sui generis* features since its founding. The EU

institutional structure does not resemble a particular type of government. It possesses institutions in which a democratic state has with its legislative, executive, and judiciary functions. Although the founding principle of the EU is marked with a deepening economic integration between member states, throughout history the EU it has improved its supranational position, being above the states, having competences above the state level, and having an impact on the daily lives of EU citizens. As the European integration project develops in several enlargement rounds, the extension of the policy areas in political, social, and cultural matters was inevitable thus leading to the increased supranational competences. Simultaneously, various policy areas remained solely at the initiative of governments or member states. The founding principles and the role and competences of the EU institutions are stated in EU treaties. Whereas some of the EU institutions take binding decisions on member states that are directly implemented and harmonised through the national legislation, some of the institutions were established to monitor and technically help states during the implementation processes of the EU legislation. It was inevitable that the representation of small EU states was affected from the reforms brought by the EU treaties. This influence was on the institutional representation and on the policy-making processes. First, the institutional representation is evaluated.

The EP as a legislative body is the only institution in which EU citizens are directly represented through regular elections. It is where the democratic legitimacy of the EU is ensured, and accountability and responsiveness are expected by its citizens to be shown from their representatives. The EP was founded as a chamber of advisory representatives

when the European Coal and Steel Community was established. The initial two-terms of its activities were pursued by appointed representatives. In 1979, the first EP elections were held by member states, and Members of the EP were elected directly “by universal suffrage for five-year periods” (European Parliament, 2016a). When elected, the representatives are enrolled in supranational political parties according to their ideological orientations, although they run in the national political party lists in EP elections. The number of Members of the EP has gradually increased in different EU enlargement rounds. There are 751 Members of the EP which are enrolled in eight different supranational political parties. 23 committees work by participation of Members of the EP and prepare the work for the plenary sessions.¹¹ Most of the legislative activities and voting takes place during the plenary sessions of the EP, in Brussels or Strasbourg. Table 2 shows the composition of the Members of the EP enrolled in different supranational political parties. National political parties in each member state are primarily affiliated with one of the supranational political parties in the EP according to their ideological and political orientations. Therefore, when a Member of the EP is elected, it enrolls in a supranational political party in which her national political party is affiliated.

¹¹ The data about the composition of the EP, supranational political parties, and the committees were updated in 2016 from the EP Website (European Parliament, 2016a). The composition of the institution is subject to change in the future.

Table 2. Composition of the European Parliament (8th Term, 2014-2019)
Source: European Parliament (2016c)

Political Group	Number of Members of the EP
European People's Party	215
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats	190
European Conservatives and Reformists	74
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	68
European United Left–Nordic Green Left	52
The Greens–European Free Alliance	51
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	45
Europe of Nations and Freedom	37
No Affiliation / Independent	18

As can be observed from the table above, two main supranational political parties, European People's Party and Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, possess the majority in the EP. This means that these two political parties have Members of the EP from most of the member states. In that regard, considering the small state Members of the EP, it may be claimed that it is difficult to take an active role for the small state representatives in these European political parties. As there are many representatives from large states, the role of the large state Members of the EP is actively pursued at the committee level. The small state Members of the EP however may encounter difficulties in pursuing his legislative activities at the committee levels as the supranational political parties are represented in ratios in the committees and the seats in these committees are

mostly filled with the large state representatives. Small state members of the EP may have an easier role in explaining her position to other members if she is enrolled in a smaller European political party. However, the role of the small state Members of the EP and the differences between their enrolment in a larger and smaller European political party is subject to further examination. Nevertheless, when the representation of small states is considered, the composition of supranational political parties accommodates representatives elected from diverse national political parties. Although representatives elected from small EU citizens are mostly enrolled in the big supranational political parties, there are many Members of the EP from small member states represented in other supranational political parties.

The powers of the EP increased as a result of the negotiations among member states through the EU treaties vis-a-vis the European Commission and the Council of the EU (Hix & Høyland, 2013, p. 172). The duties of the EP are stated in the TEU and the TFEU (European Union, 2012a, 2012b). Through the rounds of institutional arrangements, the EP increased its powers and was transformed from the advisory chamber to the “co-legislator with the European Commission and the Council of the EU” (Hix & Høyland, 2013, p. 173; Kohler, 2014, p. 601). The EP has also full competence regarding the appointment of the President of the European Commission and the dissolution of the European Commission if needed. Table 3. indicates the development of the competences of the EP in light of EU treaties (European Parliament, 2016b).

Table 3. The Development of Competences of the EP

Name of the Treaty	The Development of Competences
Treaty of Paris (1951)	It was established as a consultative body named as the “General Assembly” in which its members were appointed by national parliaments (Hix & Høyland, 2013, pp. 172-173). As it was only a consultative body in that time, the concerns on the representation of small states were not raised.
Treaty of Rome (1957)	The treaty stated the duties of the institution as the consultative body, formed by the delegates appointed by the national parliaments. It also called for the direct elections, however, it was in 1979 when the direct EP elections were held (Dinan, 2014, p. 211). When the representation of states was concerned, larger member states had more seats than their smaller counterparts (Roy, 2012, p. 64).
Single European Act (1987)	The institution was transformed to the EP and its powers were stated as a cooperation partnership with the Council of the EU on all policy areas excluding budgetary control. Hence, the decisions given by the EP needed to be considered by other EU institutions (Dinan, 2012, p. 138).

Table 3 (cont'd)

Maastricht Treaty (1993)	The issue of democratic legitimacy was addressed in the Maastricht Treaty and the competences of the EP were increased by introducing the co-decision procedure (Mazzucelli, 2012, p. 155). The co-decision procedure brought veto power to the EP which means no legislation could pass if the EP voted against, despite the strong position of the Council of the EU. The empowerment of the institution also led the discussions on the apportionment of the seats between large and small states during the treaty negotiations.
Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) and Treaty of Nice (2003)	After 20 years of direct elections, the EP became a co-legislator with the Council of the EU. The co-decision procedure was extended to most of the policy areas (Vanhoonacker, 2012, p. 189). Raising concerns by small states about the allocation of seats were addressed in the Treaty of Nice. The apportionment of seats was re-arranged in parallel to the need for the seats with the 2004 enlargement (Laursen, 2012, p. 198).

Table 3 (cont'd)

Treaty of Lisbon (2009)	The number of seats increased with the Lisbon Treaty after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements and re-apportioned with a protocol in 2010 (Ziller, 2012, p. 265). The powers of the EP were expanded. Added to the budgetary authority in which the EP has the last word, the Council of the EU requires the approval of the EP on most policy issues of EU legislation (Ziller, 2012, p. 258). As the ratification of this treaty was in the post-2004 enlargement, the main negotiations were shaped by the representation of small states in the EP vis-à-vis large member states.
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When the gradual evolvement of the EP is considered as an institution, the most important development in which the reforms brought by the treaties is the increase in its competences. It transforms the institution from a consultative body to an important institution vis-à-vis the Council of the EU and the European Commission. The ordinary legislative procedure provides that the legislative process is subject to the approval of the EP with the Council of the EU in many decisions across different policy areas. The empowerment of the EP has also meant that the Members of the EP have had an important role in EU policy-making. Thus, with the increase in the powers of the EP, the small state Members of the EP have more representative responsibility in representing their citizens in EU policy-making. The negotiations during the treaty reforms also show that one of the concerns raised by small member states were about the allocation of seats in the EP and its committees. Therefore, the bargaining over the number of seats

dominated the treaty negotiations. In contrary to the main argument that small state Members of the EP have a minimal role during the policy-making processes, the legislative activities pursued in the committees by small state representatives provide small member states with the opportunity to promote the interests of their citizens and to forward their proposals to the Plenary. In that regard, the main negotiations through the treaty reforms between small and large states were held on the basis of arrangements about the number of Members of the EP, related to their representation in the committees and during Plenary Sessions.

The European Commission is the institution which is aimed to ensure the supranational position over the member states as an executive body (European Commission, 2016d). Members of the European Commission, known as Commissioners, are proposed by the national governments and are appointed with the approval of the EP. The EP appoints the President of the European Commission and may dissolve the entire Commission with a motion of non-confidence (European Commission, 2016e). The European Commission mainly pursues executive activities and is composed of 28 Commissioners (European Commission, 2016c). The importance of the European Commission for small states lies at the division of competences based on specific issue area for each Commissioner. Appointment of the Commissioners specialising on particular policy areas surpass the concerns based on the national interests ensure the supranational stance of the European Commission. When the limited administrative capacities of the small EU states are considered, specialisation on specific issues by one Commissioner also means the transfer of full capacities on a particular policy area according to the issues prioritised at the

national level. The European Commission has the role of protecting the main principles stated in the founding EU treaties with its supranational position as the “guardian of the treaties” (Nugent & Rhinard, 2016, p. 2). In that regard, small states feel themselves closer to the European Commission, compared to the Council of the EU in which the balance between states are more difficult to achieve due to the voting weights during the policy-making mechanisms in the Council of the EU.

In most of cases, the policy-making processes begin with a proposal submitted by the European Commission to the Council of the EU and the EP (European Commission, 2016b). This adds a legislative initiative to powers of the European Commission. After the initial submission of a proposal, the European Commission takes an active role during the subsequent phases of the policy-making processes by stating its opinion whenever required by the Council of the EU. The European Commission is responsible for monitoring the implementation of policies when they are approved by the Council of the EU and the EP and then later become EU legislation. After the approval of the annual EU budget by the EP, the European Commission is the institution which ensures and monitors the implementation of the annual budget. Table 4 shows the development of the competences of the European Commission considering EU treaties.

Table 4. The Development of the Competences of the European Commission

Name of the Treaty	The Development of the Competences
Treaty of Paris (1951)	It was first established with the name of the “High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community”. Its workings were “to regulate the market for coal and steel by issuing decisions that would be binding for the member states” (Glockner & Rittberger, 2012, p. 18). The institution was regarded as the main body in which the equality between states were ensured during the initial phases of the European integration.
Treaty of Rome (1957)	The institutional framework of the High Authority was defined as the technocratic, executive and administrative authority of the European Communities (Cini, 2014, p. 236). In the Article 157 of the treaty, it is stated that the large member states would have “two Commissioners and small member states would have one” (Roy, 2012, p. 66). Although, this was raised as a concern which would influence the supranational position of the institution, the treaty negotiations were held by the guarantee that the equality between member states would be protected.
Brussels Treaty (1967)	The institution changed its name to the European Commission with the Brussels Treaty, and its competences mostly remained untouched. The negotiations were also shaped by the equal representation of member states.

Table 4 (cont'd)

Single	Allocation of the number of Commissioners due to the EU
European Act (1987)	enlargement was discussed, the administrative and executive functions of the European Commission have remained same. On the issue of excluding Commissioners from the institution, small states objected to the proposal and maintained their position on the equal representation.
Maastricht Treaty (1993)	The composition of the European Commission was discussed due to the concern raised by the small states that their larger counterparts might dominate policy-making processes and this would undermine the supranational position of the European Commission (Mazzucelli, 2012, p. 155).
Treaty of Amsterdam (1999)	The concerns raised by the small states during the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty were again addressed. Therefore, the Treaty of Amsterdam also proposed a change in the composition of the institution, in which the larger states gave up from having two Commissioners and began to be represented by one Commissioner (Vanhoonacker, 2012, p. 190).

Table 4 (cont'd)

Treaty of Nice (2003)	2004 Enlargement was the main issue on the negotiations about the Treaty of Nice which also had reflections on the composition of the institution. According to the Treaty, it was decided that each state would be represented with one Commissioner. There would be 24 Commissioners in the European Commission as a result of the 2004 enlargement. However, this brought objections raised by the large member states (Laursen, 2012, p. 202). The powers of the President increased. The President could decide on the internal workings and agenda of the meetings, allocate responsibilities of Commissioners, and call for the resignation of a Commissioner.
Treaty of Lisbon (2009)	Due to objections by large states about reducing the composition of the European Commission, number of Commissioners as one per each member state was stated in the Lisbon Treaty (Ziller, 2012, p. 264). Today, the institution is composed of 28 members. The workings of the European Commission are defined as managing the EU programs, initiating the EU legislation, and acting as the mediator between member states and other EU institutions (European Union, 2012a).

Discussion on the revisions concerning the powers of the European Commission have always been shaped on protecting the supranational position of the institution. In that regard, the European Commission has always been the guarantor of the EU treaties in which the implementation of the EU legislation is ensured, the European values and

principles are always protected, and none of the member states has domination over member states. As these concerns were mainly raised by the small EU states due to the fear of losing influence in the policy-making mechanisms, small states have always been in favour of equal representation in the European Commission and of protecting the supranational position of the institution in which the national interests are disregarded. The attempts by small member states to ensure that they have an equal voice with large states were mainly done with emphasis given to the institutional values and norms and the supranational position of the EU. Therefore, reforms brought by the treaties in shaping the powers of the European Commission were mainly dominated by the discussion of the issue of equal representation of states. Before the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, large states were represented by two Commissioners and small states were represented by one Commissioner. However, with the enlargement processes in 2004, 2007 and 2008, it was decided in the Lisbon Treaty that each state is represented with one Commissioner in the institution. This led the loss of the advantageous position of the large states and provided the equal representation of states in the European Commission. Although, during the negotiations about the Lisbon Treaty, it was proposed to decrease the number of Commissioners which would replace the permanent position of each member state with the rotation, the concerns of the small states led to keep the representation ratio of member states with one Commissioner per member state.

Moving on, the Council of the EU is the institution where the national interests of member states come into play during policy-making processes by bargaining, position-taking and forming coalitions in order to safe guard their interests (Tallberg & Johansson,

2008, pp. 1222-1223). It is composed of ministers belonging to the national governments, and it is the main decision-making EU institution in conjunction with the EP (Council of the European Union, 2016c). The Presidency of the Council of the EU is under a six-month rotation for each member state (Council of the European Union, 2016a). After a proposal is submitted by the European Commission, it is discussed in the meetings of the Council of the EU ministers, and the EP's opinion helps in giving the latest decision of the legislation before it becomes law and is implemented. Legislation at the EU level directly becomes effective at the national level, in which the national governments of the EU states must implement the legislation, and European citizens should comply accordingly (Cross, 2013, p. 71). Although the minutes of the meetings are kept confidential, the voting records have been made publicly available in the last years. Table 5 indicates how competences of the Council of the EU have developed in light of EU treaties.

Table 5. The Development of Competences of the Council of the EU

Name of the	The Development of the Competences
Treaty	
Treaty of Rome (1957)	The Council of the EU was not established within the initial architecture of European Communities. The need for the establishment of an institution in which national interests would be ensured was first stated in the Treaty of Rome (Glockner & Rittberger, 2012, p. 22).

Table 5 (cont'd)

The Brussels Treaty (1967)	The decision by the leaders of France and Germany was given with the aim of shaping the direction of integration process and the need for the establishment of the Council of the EU in which inter-governmental bargaining would taking place was mentioned. With the United Kingdom being a member of the EU, the Council of the EU held its first meeting in 1975. Followed by different enlargement rounds after the treaty led the concerns to be raised by small member states about the composition and institutional workings of the institution.
Single European Act (1987)	The “democratic deficit” problem was explicitly recognised, and the institution was regarded as the facilitator to achieve consensus and cohesion between the policy-makers and the European demos. The institutional voting procedure of the Council of EU was changed from unanimity to QMV (Dinan, 2012, p. 137). The change of the voting method brought concerns, as the QMV Method leads large member states to seek for a consensus during the policy-making. Although small member states asked for the expansion of the policy areas which would be voted by the QMV, the number of policy areas remained same.
Maastricht Treaty (1993)	The institution gained a formal status as an EU institution which would provide the general guidelines about the development of European integration process (Mazzucelli, 2012, p. 155).

Table 5 (cont'd)

Treaty of Amsterdam (1999)	The post named as the “High Representative” was created with the responsibility to assist the Council and to implement foreign policy decisions (Vanhoonacker, 2012, p. 187). Unlike the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative position was a supportive position and did not have the right to take any initiative. The institution played a prominent role in deepening the economic and political integration of the EU, including the Economic Monetary Union, Single European Act, and the 2004 and 2007 enlargement initiatives.
Treaty of Nice (2003)	The weighting of the votes in the Council of the EU was re-arranged in accordance with the membership of new states with the 2004 enlargement. The QMV system began to be used in most policy areas (Laursen, 2012, p. 198). The distribution of the voting weights according to the QMV Method formed the main issue of negotiations between member states.
Treaty of Lisbon (2009)	The Council of the EU was explicitly described as an institution shaping the direction and priorities of the EU. A full-time President was appointed who is responsible for chairing the summits. The position of the High Representative was created to pursue the foreign relations of the EU. Although the use of the QMV system was extended in most policy areas, it entered into force in 2014 (Ziller, 2012, p. 258).

The Council of the EU has always been an institution in which national interests are pursued and inter-governmental bargaining is done in EU policy-making. Over the years, the role of the institution has increased, but the voting weights which are determined in accordance with the population size have always been a concern for small states. The voting weights of small states is not sufficient enough to change the substance of a proposal or to block a decision when the QMV method is applied. On the other hand, in contrast to the unanimity in which large member states could block decisions with one vote, the QMV was preferred by small member states as in principle, large member states are in need of engage into coalition with small member states. The Lisbon Treaty introduced important changes in the competences of the Council of the EU which have partially overcome the concerns of the small states. Today, in the Council of the EU, a decision is taken, or a proposal is adopted with the requirement that both 55 percent of states support the action and the representation of 65 percent of the EU population is maintained (Council of the European Union, 2016d). In that regard, the QMV method during the policy-making requires the alliance of states with each other and the representation of 65 percent of EU citizens. This method provides the small states with an ability to form an alliance with other member states and block a decision. A small state can engage into cooperation with other states, and when 8.35 percent of the EU population is reached, the decision is blocked. Another institutional development which strengthens the role of small states is the Presidency of the Council of the EU which is held by six-month periods in rotation. During the Presidency, small states can determine their priorities which are nationally important for them and pursue their activities in EU

policy-making related to their prioritised issues. Hence, small states can be influential in shaping the policy-making process in accordance with their national interests.

In addition to the legislative and executive institutions, there exist other institutions which contribute to the workings of the EU (Çetin, 2008, pp. 72-73). The European Court of Justice is the judiciary institution which helps properly implement EU legislation. The European Court of Justice monitors the implementation of EU legislation by member states, solves the conflicts between EU institutions and states, and delivers opinions about the cases (Wallace, 2014, p. 67). The Court does not accept individual applications. It is composed of the judges appointed and approved by the Ministers in the Council of the EU. The European Court of Auditors is the institution which monitors implementation of the financing of the EU in light of the legal structure of the annual budget issued by the European Commission (The European Court of Auditors, 2016). The Economic and Social Committee is the consultative institution which cooperates with other EU institutions under the framework stated in the TFEU, Article 130 (European Economic and Social Committee, 2016). It is composed of sub-committees formed on specific issue areas. On the issue areas which are listed in the Treaty, the Committee provides decisions when needed. The Ombudsman is appointed by the EP and unlike the European Court of Justice, its responsibility lies in solving conflicts on the implementation of EU legislation by accepting applications from individuals and other corporate entities (European Ombudsman, 2016). Lastly, the European Central Bank is the institution gathering the central banks of EU states and was established by the Maastricht Treaty (Mazzucelli, 2012, p. 149). It is an independent, supranational institution regulating and supervising

economic policies in cooperation with national central banks (European Central Bank, 2016). Nevertheless, as the focus of this thesis is based on the representation small member states in EU policy-making, the institutions except for the European Commission, the EP, and the Council of the EU are left out of the scope and the institutional developments through the treaty reforms are not examined.

3.4.2. European Union Policy-Making Processes and Small States

After briefly explaining EU institutions and their changing competences in light of EU treaties which have impact on the representation of small EU states, this section of the chapter explains how EU policy-making processes happen, how the institutions contribute to these processes and in which ways small states impact these processes. First, the European Commission initiates the policy making process by submitting a proposal to the EP and the Council of the EU. This is the initial stage in which small states determine and bring a proposal into the agenda of the European Commission according to national priorities. In the first reading, the EP discusses the proposal in relevant committees and sends it to the plenary session to be voted on by the Members of the EP. During the committee stage, small state representatives can influence the policy-making process by proposing an amendment when a proposal is at the committee discussion and before it is forwarded to the plenary session. After voting in the plenary session of the EP, the position is sent to the Council of the EU. The Council discusses the proposal with EP's position in relevant working groups, and the proposal is voted on in the Council of Ministers either by QMV or unanimity, depending on the type of

legislation. During the voting process in the Council, small states may create an alliance with other states and either cause to approve or reject the proposal. If the Council approves EP's position, then the proposal is adopted. It becomes legislation, and the process is over. When the Council does not approve the EP's position in the first reading, the Council returns with a position, and the second reading of the proposal begins. The Council sends the proposal back to the EP to be discussed and voted on. If the EP approves the Council's position and votes in favour of the adopted proposal, then the proposal is adopted. When the EP does not approve position of the Council, then the EP comes up with amendments and sends the proposal back to the European Commission. Small states can gain another opportunity in that stage. Small state representatives can again propose changes in the proposal in the committees, and these changes can be approved during the voting in the EP plenary session. After the European Commission's re-examination of the proposal with amendments proposed by the Parliament, the proposal is re-directed to the Council. At this stage again, small member state representatives can initiate a coalition with other representatives, and this leads the proposal to be rejected by not satisfying the conditions of the QMV method. If the Council approves amendments of the Parliament and changes are made by the European Commission, then it is adopted. When the Council does not approve the amendments made by the EP and the Commission, then the proposal goes to the Conciliation Committee. Conciliation Committee submits the proposal after necessary changes (requested by the Council and the EP) to the Council and the EP at the same time. If both institutions approve the proposal by the Conciliation Committee, then the proposal is adopted. The proposal can again be blocked by small EU states in the Council by not

satisfying the rules of the QMV method. If either the Council or the EP or both institutions reject the proposal submitted by the Conciliation Committee, then the proposal is rejected, and the process is over without becoming a legislation. Table 6 shows how policy-making processes take place in the EU.

Table 6. Processes of EU Policy-Making

Source: Author's Own Collection, Tobler and Beglinger (2010, p. 95)

Cycle	Process
FIRST READING	Proposal initially submitted by the European Commission to the EP and the Council. The EP votes on the proposal and if voted for, then sends it to the Council of the EU. In light of the EP's decision, the Council of the EU either votes for or against the proposal. If it votes for, then it becomes legislation and the process is over on the first reading.
SECOND READING	If not voted for the proposal, the Council comes with its position. The second cycle begins. The proposal sent to the EP. If the Parliament votes for on the second cycle, it becomes legislation and the process is over on the second reading. If not voted for the EP in the second reading, the EP sends the proposal to the European Commission and the third cycle begins.
THIRD READING	The European Commission revises the proposal in light of the EP's decision and sends it to the Council. If the Council of the EU votes for the proposal, then it becomes legislation and the process is over on the third reading.

Table 6 (cont'd)

FINAL READING	If the Council votes against the proposal on the third reading, then the proposal goes to the Conciliation Committee. After revisions are made by the Conciliation Committee, the proposal is submitted both to the EP and the Council of the EU. If both institutions vote for the proposal, then it becomes legislation and the process is over. If one of the institutions votes against the proposal, then it becomes null and the process is over without becoming a legislation.
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All in all, the role and influence of small EU states are shaped in various stages of the policy-making processes. The European Commission, within its institutional set up by having one representative for each member state, provides an avenue for small states to initialise the policy-making process by making proposals to be discussed and voted in other institutions. Secondly, the EP is an institution in which its small state representatives influence the process both at committee meetings when discussions are held on a proposal and during the Plenary Session. On the other hand, in the Council of the EU in which the national interests of member states are exerted, representatives from small member states can also engage in coalitions with other member state representatives and can shape the future of a policy-making proposal in accordance with the conditions of the QMV method either at the committee stage or during the Ministers' meetings.

3.4.3. European Union Treaties: What did Small States Gain Through Reforms in the Policy-Making Processes?

The role and representation of small states are shaped considering the EU treaties which led to a continuous development in the EU institutional set up. In the Council of the EU where national interests are on the table, in the European Commission, its supranational position is attempted to secure. Related to the European Commission, main developments occurred on the allocation of Commissioners. Therefore, through treaty reforms, one of the significant issues debated between small and large EU states for the European Commission was mainly based on the proportion of seats. Small states were always insisting on enhancing and protecting equal representation in the European Commission. In the Council of the EU, fundamental issues raised during the discussions in treaty reforms were mainly shaped by the duration and structure of the Council Presidency and the allocation of voting weights in its policy-making mechanisms. In the EP, the allocation of seats and institutional powers have been the main issues of negotiation by member states. In this section, the negotiations between small and large EU states are assessed in light of the Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties.

The Maastricht Treaty (1993) marked an important transformation for EU states in which the international organisation from the European Communities to the EU was created with a three-pillar structure with the ideal to protect the dialogue between supranational and intergovernmental practices (Duff, 1994, pp. 19-20). The main accomplishment of the Maastricht Treaty was to establish the Economic and Monetary Union and to achieve

balanced and developed economic activities and more economic integration among states. In terms of the institutional reforms, small EU states proposed the extension of policy areas voted on by majority rule instead of unanimity in Council of the EU and urged the adoption of the co-decision procedure between the Council and the EP (Mazzucelli, 2012, p. 155). In the EP, supranational political groups were defined for the first time, and the institution began to be regarded as the law-making body. It was no longer the consultative chamber. The institutional design of the European Commission formed the debates in terms of apportionment of seats in the institution. It was claimed by small EU states that because large states were represented with two Commissioners, it would undermine the supranational position of the European Commission. However, no change could be made in terms of re-allocation of the number of Commissioners in the Maastricht Treaty (Mazzucelli, 2012, p. 162). However, this concern continued to be discussed until the preparations of the Amsterdam Treaty and can be regarded as a success of small EU states to keep this issue on the agenda until the Amsterdam Treaty.

The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) took almost three years beginning during the 1996 negotiations with an intergovernmental conference and continuing until the treaty to entry into force in 1999 (Stubb, 2002, pp. 61-71). After the Maastricht Treaty which was mainly about deepening economic integration in terms of the monetary union in the EU, the Amsterdam Treaty had three issues in its focus: “bringing the EU closer to the citizens, having the institutional reform for to achieve the efficiency in the workings of the institutions due to the upcoming EU enlargement and strengthening the collective external action policies of the EU” (Vanhoonacker, 2012, p. 184). Related to the

institutional reforms, the main question debated was related to the efficiency of the workings of the EU with 24 states. In this respect, inclusion of more small states with the 2004 enlargement formed the main debate in protecting equality among states in policy-making mechanisms (Mazzucelli, 2012, pp. 189-190; Stubb, 2002, pp. 65-66). The representation of small states in EU institutions gained importance considering the innovations to be made in the EU institutional structure. However, the Amsterdam Treaty was acknowledged as the treaty which could not satisfy the three-fold focused areas aimed to improve. Neither large nor small member states could be satisfied with the newly-introduced Amsterdam Treaty. In this respect, the institutional reforms which could be achieved by the Amsterdam Treaty were left to the following conferences to be addressed.

Nevertheless, it can be argued that the discussions on the institutional reforms with the Amsterdam Treaty created a sharp tension between large and small EU states (Mazzucelli, 2012, p. 193). The vote weights in the Council of the EU and the number of Commissioners in the European Commission again formed the key issues. Small states were supporting the strong European Commission which would prevent the domination by large member states and ensure the equality among member states and its supranational institutional position in the EU institutions. The concerns over equality and supranationalism were however always objected by the large member states. In the end, no comprehensive agreement could be found on these issues, and it had to be transferred to be tackled in another intergovernmental conference. The composition of the European Commission remained same (i.e. one Commissioner for each small state, two

Commissioners for each large state), and this issue was left to be tackled again with the possibility that the design of the institution could be shaped as one Commissioner per member state.

On the other hand, the extension of the QMV in more policy areas in the Council of the EU was agreed and stated in Article J.13 of the Amsterdam Treaty (Amsterdam Treaty, 1997). The substantial extension on other areas was left to be discussed later. Hence, the Amsterdam Treaty had many leftovers for the discussions on the Nice Treaty. After one year, the next intergovernmental conference was held in 2000 to discuss those left-overs of the Amsterdam Treaty. Although the equality of states was guaranteed with the founding principles of the EU, the need to take further steps to ensure equality among states was also addressed in the Nice Treaty (2003).

The reform of the EU institutional structure again formed the main agenda with the need of undertaking necessary arrangements to be implemented after the 2004 enlargement. The negotiations for creating the draft of the Nice treaty were challenging, and the treaty took two referendums in Ireland to be ratified due to national constitutional concerns (Stubb, 2002, p. 119). The difficulty in obtaining the approval of the Nice Treaty by Ireland again raised the issue of the deepening divide between large and small states. The reflection of this issue on the EU institutional design was felt during the negotiations. The focus of the Nice Treaty was also about the institutional reform of the EU. The split between large and small states over the institutional design of the European Commission

was still apparent which led several cessations during the negotiations. Small states were again in favour of the representation of all states in the European Commission with one Commissioner whereas the big powers like France and Germany were insisting on keeping their position with two Commissioners (Laursen, 2012, p. 196). During the negotiations, small states also proposed that the European Commission Presidency would be shaped in rotation and the President of the Commission would have more than two vice-Presidents from different member states by ensuring the representation of small states in these posts. At the same time, the proposition by small states was on the extension of QMV in the Council of the EU to more policy areas than the Amsterdam Treaty (Stubb, 2002, p. 132). Hence, it succeeded, and the QMV spread to more policy areas.

In this respect, the Nice Treaty can be acknowledged to be more successfully implemented than the Amsterdam Treaty (Laursen, 2012, p. 215). In the end, after so many discussions, the composition of the European Commission was set to 27 Commissioners, in which each state is represented by one Commissioner until the enlargement reaches to 27 EU states. This means that large states gave up their second Commissioner, and this can be regarded as a success of small states in protecting the supranational nature of the European Commission. However, the appointment of the President of the European Commission and the vice-Presidency remained to be discussed later. The voting procedure in the Council as QMV was also expanded to new policy areas which corresponds to the 90 percent of the voting processes.

Altogether, with the developments towards the contemporary structure of the EU was accomplished with a series of treaties. The latest of these treaties is the Lisbon Treaty. It was the result of a long-term discussion on the “democratic deficit” problem. Hence, the Lisbon Treaty brought significant changes in the EU institutional set-up. The treaty was proposed in 2007 and could be effective after two years of tense negotiations under the influence of the failed Irish referendum. The Polish opted out of some social issues such as abortion, and the Czech Republic had reservations on the suitability of the Lisbon Treaty with the domestic law. Hence, the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on December 1, 2009 (Ziller, 2012, p. 264).

The role of the EP increased, and it became a co-legislator with the Council. The Ordinary Legislative Procedure is required for the adoption of almost all EU legislation by both of the institutions. This also placed the EU into a bi-cameral legislative institution. The composition of the European Commission also stayed the same in contrast to the provisional articles of the Nice Treaty which proposed a diminished number of Commissioners after Bulgaria and Romania joins the EU. Small states kept their insistence on the arrangement of one Commissioner per member state, opposing to the proposal by large states on reducing the number of Commissioners. The institution divided into two chambers as those with full rights of voting and associate Commissioners without the voting right.

During the negotiations for the Lisbon Treaty, large member states proposed the Council Presidency as a long-term, permanent post in which the President would serve for two and a half years. However, small states opposed to this proposal with a claim that it would destroy equal representation and would threaten the supranational nature of the institution. Small member states proposed for the service of the President to be in six-month rotations. In the end, it was scheduled in line with the proposal of large member states, however with a diminished role compared to the previous treaties, and the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was created to represent the EU in external affairs. Furthermore, policy areas which should be voted with QMV were extended.

In addition to the QMV procedure, one more requirement was also added to the Lisbon Treaty (Dosenrode, 2016, pp. 117-119). In most of the policy areas, added to the QMV, the decision-making mechanism should fulfil a representational ratio of EU states and the citizens. For a decision to be approved, it is required that 55 percent of the states and 65 percent of the total EU population be represented in the voting process (Council of the European Union, 2016d). Issue areas such as defence and security remained to be voted on with unanimity as it was before. This arrangement on the voting procedure was acknowledged as weakening the negotiation influence of small states as it created the opportunity for large states to engage in the coalition. A few numbers of large states can easily form those ratios with their voting weights and population sizes. However, this arrangement has also increased the influence of small members as it provided the opportunity for small states to engage into cooperation among themselves and block a

decision, against their larger counterparts. Overall, the Lisbon Treaty brought the latest significant changes on the EU institutional design. On the one hand, small member states were regarded as successful in shaping the structure of the European Commission and on the Council of the EU Presidency. On the other hand, having a permanent European Council President brought criticisms by small member states as the permanent Presidency would increase the power of large states.

Having explained the developments in the supranational institutional representation of small states occurred by the treaty reforms, focusing on the domestic structural factors is needed in order to examine the representation of small states. Those institutional reforms brought by the treaties have influenced the representation of small states, however, the structures at the domestic level also influence the institutional representation of small states. In that regard, in the next section of this chapter, these structural factors are reviewed with a scope on the country cases examined in this research.

3.5. Domestic Structural Factors Influencing Multilevel Representation of Small States in the European Union

There have always been continuous developments on how to define and measure the impact of small EU states. However, as explained in the previous chapters, small states have always been examined in terms of the security aspects in which large states dominate the world politics and they are in need of shaping their role accordingly. In

earlier scholarly work, small states have been defined under two main branches, objective criteria which seek for measurable capacities of states, and subjective criteria, mainly examining the perceptual influence of states and domestic structures independent from measurable capacities.

When small EU states are examined, it can be clearly accepted that with the last rounds of enlargement, the number of small states increased. This creates the question of whether the dominance of large states in EU policy-making is over or not and urges scholarly attention to focus more on the role of small EU states in policy-making processes. It should be emphasized that recent literature on the role of EU states in policy-making processes was examined in relation to large states. The individual or collective role of small states was largely ignored. Although the focus in the literature has been on the behaviour of large states, the main argument has been shaped that the small states have been over-represented in the EU institutional mechanisms hence they have the ability to exert more influence, almost equal to the large states.

When objective and subjective criteria are applied in order to conceptualise a small EU state, the case selection in this research posits important remarks to be mentioned which show the diversities among states themselves in terms of their political culture and the influence of selected country cases on the EU policy-making. The main rationale for the case selection in this research is the population size which is below 1.5 million which makes Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg and Malta as country cases to be examined. When

political, economic and socio-cultural factors are considered, Luxembourg protects the virtue of being a founding member and an autonomous economic power in the EU. In security terms, Cyprus plays a crucial role for the EU due to its geographical position in the eastern Mediterranean region with its strong political position, despite its relative economic capacity. Estonia, since its EU membership has showed a very positive economic performance, has been as one of the fastest growing economies since 2006 (Berglund, Ekman, Deegan-Krause, & Knutsen, 2013, p. 53). Malta which became the EU member in 2004 has so far treasured its neutrality in political, economic, and security terms. Hence, it is important to briefly identify the domestic, political, economic and socio-cultural factors in those four small states. In that regard, considering the *a priori* and post-EU accession of those states to see the domestic developments on those states bears importance.

First, Cyprus and Malta, being former British colonies, share the same historical roots in terms of both being island states and having similar political, economic, and social trajectories. After gaining independence in 1960 and 1964, respectively, Cyprus and Malta entered into economic and social transformation. However, similar economic and social transformation was experienced by Cyprus and Malta on separate paths.

Throughout history, the economy of Cyprus was mainly based on agricultural production, whereas Malta was not rich enough to have an economy based on natural, agricultural resources (Ayres, 1996, p. 17). Cyprus was more involved in accounting, manufacturing, and maintaining a labour force. Malta could sustain her economy by the British dependency in terms of imports and grants from the British government (Ayres, 1996, p.

17). In terms of the size of the land, Malta and Cyprus also show differences. Malta is 320 square kilometres whereas Cyprus is much bigger at 9240 square kilometres (World Bank, 2017b). The population size differs in Malta and Cyprus in which they are 420,521 and 1,187,575 citizens respectively (Eurostat, 2016).

The Association Agreement between Malta and the European Economic Community occurred in 1970. Malta first applied for EU membership in 1990. The application was suspended in 1996. After a two-year break, it resumed in 1998 (Cini, 2003, p. 133).

Although the political culture in Maltese society has been deeply polarized because of the two-party political system, Malta was among the first states who ratified the accession treaty and accepted the decision of the referendum among the applicant states in that period after having a strong public political discussion. The process of submission to the referendum for EU membership was also dominated with a strong polarization between the Labour Party and Nationalist Party. The Labour Party was against EU membership and offered the suggestion of establishing a special economic agreement with the EU instead of a full membership. The referendum for EU membership was held in March 2003, and 90 percent of Maltese citizens participated. As a result, 53 percent of the citizens voted for EU membership, and 46 percent voted against (Pace, 2011, p. 134).

The signing of the Athens Agreement marked a significant milestone in Maltese history, and Malta became an EU member in May 2004.

On the other hand, the “Republic of Cyprus” was established in 1960 as a bicommunal unitary state. Greek Cypriots comprised approximately 81.5 percent and Turkish Cypriots approximately 18.5 percent of the population. Bicommunal cooperation lasted, however, for only three years. In December 1963, following Greek Cypriot proposals to amend the constitution and the outbreak of intercommunal conflict, Turkish Cypriots withdrew from their participation in state positions. Considering mounting intercommunal violence, most of the Turkish Cypriots were eventually forced to live in enclaves. The de facto partition of the two communities introduced by intercommunal conflict became consolidated in July-August 1974 when a Greek Cypriot coup instigated by the Greek Junta aiming to annex Cyprus to Greece and was followed by Turkey’s military operation. This resulted in the de facto division of the island into the Turkish Cypriot north and the Greek Cypriot south. Conflict resolution efforts failed to deliver a positive result, and nine years later, on November 15, 1983, the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared but received no recognition by the international community except from Turkey. Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, state institutions in the North Cyprus have been deprived of any international status or formal relations. United Nations efforts have focused on lifting the division and achieving a resolution of the conflict since the late 1970s.

Parallel to the developments to find a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem, Cyprus’ first steps to sign an association agreement with the European Economic Community date back to the 1970s (Nugent, 1997, p. 55). Yet its membership in the Unaligned Movement, its wish to remain neutral in the East-West conflict, and its desire

to avoid antagonizing the Soviet Union meant that an application for full membership would only materialize after the Cold War ended in 1990. Accession talks started in 1998, despite the persistence of the Cyprus problem. While EU member states did not want to inherit the Cyprus problem within the EU, it was believed that the membership process could have a catalytic impact on the conflict resolution process. In the December 2002 Copenhagen European Union Summit, the “Republic of Cyprus” was admitted as a new EU member state. Hence, the conflict resolution and membership processes were decoupled. Nevertheless, on April 24, 2004, Greek Cypriots rejected the United Nations-sponsored Annan Plan which proposed a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem whereas Turkish Cypriots accepted. A week later, on May 1, 2004, Cyprus became an EU member without a peace deal. The whole island was recognized as a territory of the EU, and all Cypriots were recognized as EU citizens. On the other hand, the implementation of EU legislation was suspended in the North Cyprus. Apart from the motivations that EU membership would bring for Malta and Cyprus, the EU also had political and economic interests in having Cyprus and Malta as members, in addition to the other 8 states with the 2004 enlargement. The EU membership of Malta and Cyprus would bring peace and stability in the Mediterranean region. Added to the establishment of stability and security, economic activities and agreements in the Mediterranean region would also be enhanced.

Moving on, Luxembourg as one of the founding members has always been among the economic powers in the EU. The country was always involved in the dynamics of regional and international politics and is geographically located at the core of the politics

of Europe. Historically, the country maintained its role in ensuring peace between France and Germany, although today the peaceful atmosphere between these countries is taken for granted (J. A. Hey, 2002, p. 211). The geographical size of Luxembourg is 2586 square meters with 580,000 inhabitants which places the country at a very strategic position in the heart of the Europe to raise its voice in the EU (Eurostat, 2016; World Bank, 2017b). As a founding EU member, the country has always maintained a diplomatic role in the EU. The role of Luxembourg throughout the history of European integration is expressed that “the last Presidency has proven it again that we are not about being around and present only on defending our little territory and what we do for our wealth but we have believed in this European project from the very early, otherwise we had not co-founded it” (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #8, Conducted on 19 January 2016). Main EU institutions and offices include the European Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors, the European Investment Bank, the EP Secretariat, the Official Publications Office, Eurostat, and the European Translation Centre which are located in Luxembourg.

Lastly, the Baltic state of Estonia gained its independence in 1991 (Auers, 2015, p. 1). The popular movements comprising the “quasi-parties” and civil society organisations began to raise their discontent with the national political situation in the late 1980s (Grofman, Mikkel, & Taagepera, 2000, p. 338). Those organisations were organised around demands for achieving political independence from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and economic autonomy in the country. The independence of Estonia marked the introduction of democratic experience in the country as well. The adoption of the

constitution, establishment of the new political parties, and the Estonian Parliament led the country to undergo rapid social change in terms of making progress in the democratically institutionalised political culture. Hence, Estonian political culture started to be shaped by its EU membership with expectations that EU membership would ensure the independence of the country and would make the country part of Europe. On the other hand, the motives by the EU behind the membership of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are shaped by ensuring the stability and peace on the European continent. The application for membership began in 1995, and Estonia entered into the EU in 2004.

Having the accession processes of four countries in mind, the representation of those states also showed differences in the EU. The differences in representation of these member states are explained by the domestic structural factors embodied in the political culture of these member states. One of the domestic structural factors which shows the diversity within their political culture when their representation is considered within the development of party politics in those states. Proportional representation is used in all of the four states. Whereas Malta is based on a two-party system, Cyprus, Estonia, and Luxembourg have multi-party systems. However, when examining the voting method, the four states use different voting methods in electing their representatives in national and the EP elections. In the “Republic of Cyprus”, elections are held based on an open-list, party-based ballot in which the voters elect the political party and the candidates running under a political party. In the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, open-list and mixed-voting methods are used. The citizens elect either a political party, a political party and candidates running under that political party, or independent candidates. The seats in

Malta are allocated according to the single transferable voting Droop method in which elections are held under an open and party-based system. In Estonia, open-list and candidate-centred voting methods are used, and seats are allocated according to the single transferable voting system. Lastly, Luxembourg uses open-list and candidate-centred voting methods.

Four states have deep-rooted political cultures embodied by their party politics. When the EP elections are held, citizens elect their representatives directly according to the domestic electoral rules, subject to a few minor changes. Moreover, elections held at the national level directly influence the representation of those states in the Council of the EU as they are represented by the Ministers. In terms of the Presidency of the Council, Cyprus held the Presidency in July-December 2012 (Cyprus Presidency, 2012), Estonia in July-December 2017 (Estonia Presidency, 2017), and Malta in January-June 2017 (Malta Presidency, 2017). Luxembourg held the Presidency eleven times since 1960 with the last Presidency in July-December 2015 (Luxembourg Presidency, 2015). In the EP, diversity of the representatives belonging to different national political parties can be observed. These member states are represented by six Members of the EP each. In all states, the representatives are enrolled in different European political parties which are in parallel to the ideological orientations of their national political parties.

The “Republic of Cyprus” has a rich number of political parties, and the national political scene is shaped by representation from diverse ideologies (Charalambous, Papageorgiou,

& Pegasiou, 2015, pp. 411-413; Katsourides, 2014, pp. 646-653). The Progressive Party of the Working People and the Democratic Rally have two representatives in the EP, and they are enrolled in European United Left/Nordic Green Left, European Parliamentary Group and European People's Party respectively (European Parliament, 2014-2019a). The rest of the seats are distributed between the candidates from the Democratic Party and United Democratic Centre Union as represented in the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats and European Conservatives and Reformists (European Parliament, 2014-2019a). In Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, there is a rich number of political parties as well. The government has always been formed by coalitions dominated by the National Unity Party or Republican Turkish Party and has engaged in coalition with smaller political parties.¹² There is not a Turkish Cypriot representative in the EP.

Moving on, in its political scene, Malta has a “two-party system” with representation of smaller parties in the Maltese Parliament (Pace, 2004, p. 114). The Labour Party and the Nationalist Party have dominated the political scene both at the national and supranational levels (Carammia & Pace, 2015, p. 425). Without engaging in coalitions at the national level, the Maltese Parliament has always joined with one of these political parties without any coalition (Baldacchino, 2014, p. 6). Both political parties have their own position towards European issues, and these approaches have always shaped

¹² For more information about the party politics in Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, see Çarkoğlu and Sözen (2004); Kaymak and Vural (2013); Lacher and Kaymak (2006); Sözen (2005).

behaviour of Maltese citizens towards the EU. Dependent on the two-party system, representatives in the EP were elected from these two political parties in the 2009 and 2014 elections. As these parties have different ideological viewpoints on many political, economic, and social issues, the representatives are enrolled either in Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats if they are elected from the Labour Party or European People's Party if they are elected from the Nationalist Party (European Parliament, 2014-2019d). Luxembourg's party politics are pursued mainly with the dominance of three large political parties (i.e. Christian Social People's Party, Democratic Party, Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party). Smaller parties also play a role in the political scene of Luxembourg as the Greens and the Alternative Democratic Reform Party. Seats in the EP are diversely distributed. Two Members of the EP from Christian Social People's Party are enrolled in European People's Party, one from Democratic Party is in Alliance of Liberal and Democrats for Europe, another is in Greens/European Free Alliance and one from Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party participates in Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (European Parliament, 2014-2019c). Deep rooted party politics in Luxembourg is explained that "we use to believe that what happens in Europe is in fact the prolongation of the things we also believe at home" (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #8, Conducted on 19 January 2016). Lastly, Estonian politics are also pursued with the involvement of numerous political parties in which the government has always built upon coalitions. In the EP, each representative has a different national political party affiliation with an independent candidate as well. The representatives from the one of the largest national political parties, the Estonian Reform Party, are enrolled in the Group of Alliance of

Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and other Member of the EP are enrolled in Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats and European People's Party. Independent candidates pursue their legislative activities in the Group of Greens/European Free Alliance (European Parliament, 2014-2019b).

Added to the historical developments on those states, the EU accession, and the structures of their party politics, it is important to investigate how the political culture of those countries developed in terms of perceptions of citizens towards the EU. Hence, the impact of domestic political structures on attitudes of citizens towards the EU is evaluated. In doing so, the EUROBAROMETER Survey Data is used.¹³ The question about the image of the EU is answered as either “very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative, very negative or don’t know” (European Commission, 2004-2016). The answers “very positive” and “fairly positive” are combined and indicated as “positive.” Although Turkish Cypriot Community does not have any representative in the EU institutions, their perceptions towards the EU are included. Figure 1 shows the level of positive answers given by Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Estonian, Maltese, and Luxembourger citizens between 2004 and 2016.

¹³ See APPENDIX B for the EUROBAROMETER Data.




Figure 1. Image of the EU
Source: European Commission (2004-2016)

When examining Figure 1, it is worth noting that each state has its own peculiarities.

Firstly, the data on Cyprus indicates the developments regarding the solution of the Cyprus problem influenced the perceptions of citizens towards the EU. Whereas Turkish Cypriots perceived the EU membership positively as it would end the *status quo* in the North Cyprus, Greek Cypriot aspirations for EU membership can be understood by tracing back to 1990, the application of the EU membership. When the former President of the “Republic of Cyprus” George Vassiliou was elected in 1988, he prioritised EU membership of Cyprus in his agenda. The change of attitude of the Communist Party, in 1990, in favour of EU membership created a positive atmosphere in the Republic of Cyprus. After accession talks began in 1998, Greek Cypriot perceptions were also positive towards EU membership. Membership was expected to secure a fair solution to

the Cyprus problem, which would be a “European solution in accordance with the European Union values and the *Acquis Communautaire*” (Diez & Tocci, 2010, p. 182). In that regard, Greek Cypriot Community showed a positive attitude towards the EU in the post-EU membership which continued until 2009. The level of positive image formed in the views of the Greek Cypriots was between 50 and 60 percent. On the other hand, worsening economic conditions in the South Cyprus also impacted perceptions towards the EU beginning with the year 2010 and marked the lowest level in 2013 as 18 percent when the economic crisis hit Cyprus. Domestic political institutions became non-responsive towards the demands of the Greek Cypriot Community, and the recovery from the economic crisis were decoupled with the economic demands put forward by the Troika which included many economic measures. Since the recovery period beginning in 2015, the image of the EU has begun to be shaped positively again. The data shows that the positive perceptions towards the EU as an institution began to rise again. Although, the level of the perceptions reached to 26 percent, doubling the 2013 ratio, when compared to other small states, it is very far to claim that Greek Cypriots gained a positive attitude following the years of the economic crisis. When considering the North Cyprus, the perceptions of the Turkish Cypriots were shaped in parallel to the attempts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. Although the Annan Plan failed to be implemented in 2004, perceptions of the Turkish Cypriot Community were positively shaped towards the EU. The EUROBAROMETER Survey Data shows that the positive image of the EU within the Turkish Cypriot Community was 57 and 68 percent in 2004 and 2005 respectively. In 2005, 48 percent of Turkish Cypriots viewed EU membership as an opportunity for the solution of the Cyprus problem and to increase the economic

prosperity in the North Cyprus. However, the positive image of the EU for the Turkish Cypriot Community sharply decreased from 68 to 40 percent between 2005 and 2007. The main reasons for this decrease are the worsening economic conditions in the Turkish Cypriot Community and difficulties in establishing a direct relationship between the EU and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The first and most important interaction between the EU institutions and Turkish Cypriots occurred following the April 2003 opening of the “Green Line” checkpoints. The EU’s full support for conflict resolution raised optimism about its contribution to peace and economic prosperity on the island. However, the failure to achieve conflict resolution in Cyprus before its membership due to the negative vote of Greek Cypriots led to increased interest by EU officials in mitigating the isolation which Turkish Cypriots had endured in the aftermath of the Annan Plan referendums. In that view, the constructive stance of the Turkish Cypriot Community in the Annan Plan referendum should be recognized and rewarded. However, the attempts by the EU to engage into a dialogue with the Turkish Cypriot Community through indirect channels, not through the state institutions, were not enough and could not contribute to the daily lives of the Turkish Cypriots. Consequently, the positive attitude towards the EU began to decrease. Nevertheless, compared to other states, Turkish Cypriots by not having direct engagement with the EU continued to keep their positive perceptions towards the EU. The level of positive image answered by the participants mainly fluctuated between 50 and 60 percent.

Since the EU membership, perceptions of Estonian citizens towards the EU moved between 30 and 40 percent. Since the application, the Estonian politics towards the

necessity of the EU membership were shaped along the necessity which would positively increase the economic wellbeing in the country and as a step to ensure the democratic consolidation. In that regard, it was perceived that being part of the EU would be pragmatically beneficial for Estonian citizens. This was also reflected in the referendum results in which 67 percent of the Estonian citizens voted in favour of EU membership (Berglund et al., 2013, p. 55). The same pattern with other small state citizens also can be observed for Estonian citizens with the impact of the economic crisis surrounding European between 2010 and 2013. The positive perceptions of the Estonian citizens towards the EU started to decrease, however, continued to increase in 2014 after the crisis. Between 2014 and 2016, this level fluctuated between 34 and 50 percent. Malta, as another island with Cyprus also showed positive perceptions towards the EU between the levels of 40 and 50 percent. However, domestic politics have mainly been concerned with shaping the perceptions of Maltese citizens towards the EU. Two parties dominate national party politics and attitudes of the Labour Party and Nationalist Party towards the EU membership impact the perceptions of the Maltese citizens. Economic policies applied by the Labour Party and the Nationalist Party indirectly influenced the citizens' perceptions towards the EU. The negative consequences of the economic crisis which directly affected daily lives of the Maltese citizens led to diminish the positive perceptions towards the EU to 35 percent. However, the recovery period lasted shorter and the EU began to regain a positive image for the Maltese citizens in 2014. In 2014, the level of positive perceptions towards the EU reached to 46 percent. Lastly, Luxembourg citizens rank as the first in having a positive attitude towards the EU which was between 50 and 60 percent. The geographical proximity and the deep

integration of the Luxembourg's political culture with the EU led Luxembourg citizens to be more positive towards the EU. However, the consequences of the economic crisis led for a sharp decrease in positive perceptions of the Luxembourg citizens. The decrease occurred from 65 percent to 38 percent, which is the sharpest decrease among those four small member states. However, in 2014 and 2015, this level moved up to 45-50 percent which shows that almost one out of two citizens positively perceived the EU. Nevertheless, except for the Turkish Cypriot Community, effects of the financial crisis in Europe showed its impact on the perceptions towards the EU between 2010 and 2013 in all member states. The position of the Turkish Cypriot Community is interesting which is subject to further analysis. Despite being the only community, which does not have any direct relationship at the state level, Turkish Cypriots maintained their positive attitudes towards the EU, despite the unresolved Cyprus problem. As seen from the figure above, Greek Cypriots, Maltese, Estonian, and Luxembourg citizens reacted to the economic downturn in Europe by losing their positive attitudes towards the EU. In all states, beginning from the second half of 2010, the positive perceptions towards the EU showed a sharp decrease which lasted until 2013.-2014 Although, these positive perceptions were regained in the post-economic crisis period, it could not reach to the levels of positive perceptions which were observed in the pre-crisis. The expectations of the citizens with the EU membership show similarities, except for the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Communities. The EUROBAROMETER Survey Data shows that between 2005 and 2016, 72-75 percent of the Estonian citizens perceived first that the EU would bring "freedom to travel, study and work in the EU" (European Commission, 2004-2016). Within the same time frame, Maltese and Luxembourg citizens also possessed the same

perception between 43 and 60, and, 53 and 68 respectively (European Commission, 2004-2016). When it is looked at the Greek Cypriot Community, similar perceptions were kept until 2011 between 79 and 51 percent. However, these perceptions were replaced by the attitudes towards the unemployment problem by Greek Cypriots, between 62 and 48 percent, within the time frame of 2011 and 2016 (European Commission, 2004-2016). Different than other small state citizens, the attitudes of the Turkish Cypriot Community were formed by the possibility of increasing economic prosperity. In that regard, Turkish Cypriots perceived that the EU membership would increase the economic wellbeing in North Cyprus. This range was fluctuated in 30 and 51 percent between 2004 and 2016 (European Commission, 2004-2016). All in all, the domestic structural factors lead to argue that the representation of small states show differences in the EU institutions. Different processes occurred in four small states in terms of their EU accession. Similarly, the differences in structures of their party systems and the developments embodied in the political culture of these member states are proposed to show reflections on the representation processes in the EU policy-making.

3.6. Conclusion


The role and influence of small EU states are examined considering their behaviour in negotiation settings and the instruments they use to achieve their goals during policy-making and decision-making processes. If the material capacities of states are considered, the role and influence of small states are regarded as weak in international politics. However, small EU states are distinguished from other small states in the world, in terms

of their economic, social, and administrative, and perceptual capabilities (Çetin, 2008, p. 77). Except for the deficiency in their military resources, Knudsen (1996, p. 16) explains that “small EU states show an ideal example of a small state with their developed economies, strong administrative structures, and the execution of legal power within their borders” (Knudsen, 1996, p. 16). Thus, small states play more active role in EU policy-making compared to the established historical approaches on small states which had regarded small states as weak actors. The EU treaties aim to maintain the equality of member states, acknowledge the weakness of small members, and have provided major steps to empower the influence of small EU states in policy-making mechanisms. Even during the most important revisions in EU treaties, the rule of unanimity was applied, and it was aimed that member states would be represented equally. The political equality of member states was a goal in the allocation of representatives in EU institutions. For example, the “seats in the EP and the allocation of votes in the Council of the EU were determined considering population size of member states”, although the QMV is now applied in many policy areas (Archer & Nugent, 2006, p. 4; Grøn & Wivel, 2011, p. 527). One representative for each state in the Commission also indicates the supranational position of the institution which enables equal representation of member states in all policy areas, not providing any privileges for any member state and putting Malta and France at equal positions (Grøn & Wivel, 2011, p. 525).

In this chapter, the position of small EU states was evaluated, trying to answer how small member states are defined and conceptualised. The EU institutional structure which is different from other international organisations was explained in relation to the

representation of small states in these institutions, the historical overview on the EU enlargement rounds and participation of small states were given. Then, objective and subjective criteria which are useful to distinguish small states from their larger counterparts were incorporated in the EU context. Small EU states were defined according to their material capacities and capabilities based on the subjective factors. This chapter provided a brief overview of the EU institutions, namely the European Commission, the EP, and the Council of the EU within the representation of small member states. Policy-making mechanisms and processes in which these institutions are involved in were also explained and the venues for exerting an influence for small member states are assessed. An analysis on the developments in representation of small member states in these EU institutions and their evolving role in policy-making mechanisms was given by trying to explain what small member states gained through reforms in the policy-making processes and mechanisms. Complementing the historical developments on the representation of small EU states, overview on the structural domestic factors having the impact of representation of small states were also explored in terms of their political system designs and the developments in their political culture with a focus on the country-cases which are examined in this research. The empirical analysis takes place in Chapters 4 and 5. Moving on, the representation of small states is examined in the EP and the Council of the EU.

CHAPTER 4



POLITICAL REPRESENTATION: THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND SMALL STATES

4.1. Introduction

The EU is one of the world's greatest economic and political organisation when its supranational institutionalized structure is taken into account. According to Moravcsik (2010, p. 91), “the European Union delivers most of the day-to-day legislation to more than 500 million European Union citizens”. Within the principle of the equality of states and equality of citizens, the EU provides the opportunity for states and the citizens to participate in the policy-making processes which has a direct influence on their daily lives. Added to the existing literature on the theoretical approaches on small states’

position in international politics, the EU forms the institutional structure in which the multi-level representation processes occurs and the role of small EU states are not shaped along their capabilities in terms of their military or economic resources. This leads to examine the representation of EU states by taking a multi-levelled approach comprising the representation of citizens in the EU institutions. In that regard, the EP is the institution composed of representatives who are directly elected by citizens, whereas the Council of the EU is formed upon indirectly elected representatives which pursue their activities in the EU institutions under the influence of domestic and supranational structural factors.

The EU includes small member states in which their number gradually increased over the years through different enlargement rounds. However, since its establishment and despite the equal split between countries in those years, the fear of being dominated by large states has formed an important concern for small member states. Taking the multi-levelled approach, this brings the main question related to the scope of this research of how small state citizens are represented in multiple mechanisms of EU policy-making processes. This chapter empirically examines the representation of citizens in the EU focusing on both small state citizens and representatives within the EP institutional context.

Since the prominent works on political representation (Dahl & Tufte, 1973; Eulau et al., 1959; Pitkin, 1967; Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999; Rehfeld, 2006), scholars have

examined the changing conceptualizations of the term “representation” with a specific focus on the representation of citizens by their representatives both at national and international levels. Issues such as how representatives understand and pursue their role in policy-making mechanisms, the strength of relationship between representative and the represented, conditions of accountability, responsiveness and transparency between elected political elites and their constituencies remain on the agenda and continues to be the subject of empirical analysis by scholars (Bowler, 2017; Brennan & Hamlin, 1999; Dalton, 1985; Mansbridge, 2003, 2011; McCrone & Kuklinski, 1979; Önnudóttir, 2016a, 2016b). Compared to large EU states, representation of small states, their role in policy-making processes, and behaviour of the large states towards small states are also studied (Archer & Nugent, 2006; Bailes & Thorhallsson, 2013; Björkdahl, 2008; Grøn & Wivel, 2011; Panke, 2010, 2012b). It is argued that a small EU state needs to be constructed by looking at its economic, social, and military capabilities in addition to the population and geographical sizes (Archer & Nugent, 2006, p. 5; Panke, 2012b, p. 112). The implication is that categorizations on defining small and large states change the analyses on the position of small EU states in policy-making processes, because it is difficult to come up with a concrete explanation of a small state. Testing the role of small EU state representatives during policy-making processes, it is explained that the strategies utilised by small states are “agenda-setting in meetings according to the prioritised policies, advocating, and referring to supranational and international conventions, ideals, and norms by lobbying and forming coalitions with large EU states in order to protect their political, social, and economic interests are important mechanisms” (Bailes & Thorhallsson, 2013, p. 103; Björkdahl, 2008, p. 136; Grøn & Wivel, 2011, pp. 530-534;

Panke, 2010, p. 802; 2012a, pp. 317-322). Hence, the success of small states in EU policy-making depends on the extent in which these strategies are applied successfully by representatives. Separated from studies in the literature in which quantitative methods are mainly applied over large-N analyses, this chapter examines how small EU states are represented in the EP through legislative activities of representatives based on qualitative methods. In this study, it is argued that domestic and supranational structural factors influence the mechanisms of representation in the EP when small state Members of the EP become candidates in the elections, hold their election campaigning, and pursue their legislative activities after being elected as compared to large states. These factors are limited administrative capacities, representing high proportion of countries' population and, domestic and supranational structures of party politics. A candidate competes under her state's electoral system. There is not a uniform electoral system among EU states. The only directive is the system of proportional representation and having maximum 5% threshold in the EP elections. It is identified that candidate centred, decentralized, open list voting systems create a more dependency to the constituencies during their legislative activities of Members of the EP (Farrell & Scully, 2010, pp. 50-51). In this research, it is proposed that representing high proportion of country's population urges small state Members of the EP to pursue closer contact with their constituencies and leads to a stronger relationship with the represented compared to large EU states. This chapter is based on a case study methodology with individual-level data and the member states which are subject to analysis are Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, and Luxembourg. Four-states have six representatives in the EP each.

Compared to the past, the Lisbon Treaty provided strong institutional incentives for small EU states with more participatory role in the EU policy-making processes by introducing different representative elements in favour of the small states explained in the TEU (European Union, 2012a) and the TFEU (European Union, 2012b), and small EU states are aimed to be active and influential. In light of those developments, this chapter will examine the representation of small EU states by the representatives in the EP. The EP is the institution in which citizens are directly represented by their representatives (Casado-Asensio & Lefkofridi, 2011, p. 3; Scully & Farrell, 2003, p. 269). After the EP elections, Members of the EP represent their constituencies during their service. When elected, they are enrolled in supranational EP political parties, parallel to their ideological views and according to their national political party lines. Existing studies analyse Members of the EP legislative activities by looking at the relationship developed between representatives' voting attitudes and positions of their supranational parties as well as the congruence between representatives' voting behaviour and perceptions of their constituencies across various political, economic, and social issues (Bressanelli, Koop, & Reh, 2016; Costello, Thomassen, & Rosema, 2012; Farrell & Scully, 2010; Hix & Noury, 2009; Høyland, 2010; Mühlböck, 2012; Piattoni, 2013; Trumm, 2015). Therefore, the EP serves as a good laboratory to investigate the relationship between the represented and the representative. The main framework of the legislative activities in the EP is expressed by a Member of the EP as:

The majority of the people in the European Parliament are of very high academics, professionals, high calibre people that you can work with, you can learn and share knowledge. People are more open to collaborate. They do not see you as competitive. The party politics that we have at the national level are not so strong here. Here is stronger for a reasonable, not extreme, not the Eurosceptic though. Mainstream teams, there is more willingness for cooperation than

competition. This is obvious and that is why, I think that you can only see this reaching of compromises, either between political groups but also between different national interests. Something that you do not see at the local level because, usually the national interest is very common for parties usually. Here, we have those differences, we have ideological differences, at the same time we have our own local concerns (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #1, Conducted on 9 March 2016).

When representing high proportion of population structural factor is considered, comparison between small and large EU states is made and the relationship between the representative (small state Members of the EP) and the represented (small EU state citizens) gains importance in terms of accountability, responsiveness, and transparency. The party systems are related to both levels (national and supranational) mechanisms of representation, and it has an influence on the dialogue between the representative and the represented. This chapter begins with an elaboration on why the process of political representation differs in the EU from large states both at national and supranational levels. At the same time, assessment on the perceptions of the Estonian, Maltese, Cypriot, and Luxembourger citizens towards the EP and their representatives is provided. Finally, the analysis on representation of country cases are shared including an investigation on the role of Cypriot, Estonian, Luxembourger and Maltese Members of the EP.

4.2. Representation of Small European Union States: Why Is It Different Than Large States?

As this research is on the representation of small EU states and citizens, it is important to explore why this process differs from large states. In order to measure the difference on

the relationship between the small state representatives and citizens vis-à-vis large states, the PARLEMETER Survey Data Set is analysed (European Parliament, 2010-2016).¹⁴ The PARLEMETER Survey specifically focuses on perceptions of the citizens towards the EP. The dataset includes questions on how the citizens view the EP as an institution and provides the data about how the EU citizens perceive the role of their representatives (European Parliament, 2010-2016). The dataset also includes specific questions on European identity and the EU citizenship, however within the scope of this research, the data on the European identity and the EU citizenship is not examined. Since 2010, the fieldwork has been conducted as face-to-face interviews in all 28 member states with sample size; n=500 for small states and n=1000 for large states (European Parliament, 2010-2016). The surveys are conducted annually, although there are PARLEMETER Surveys published twice a year due to important developments in Europe (e.g. the issue of migration, 2014 EP elections, adoption of an important legislation) in which citizens experience significant policy changes both at national and supranational levels.

In this study, the PARLEMETER Survey Data is analysed with a timeframe between 2010 and 2016. The analysis covers six-year period of perceptions of small and large EU state citizens towards the EP, as an institution and their representatives, Members of the EP. Comparison between large and small states is important to determine if there exist any differences on the representation of small state citizens by their representatives. The comparison also helps to see if there is any difference in representatives' contact with

¹⁴ See APPENDIX A for the PARLEMETER Survey Data.

their constituencies and creating awareness about their activities. Moving on, another analysis is also conducted on Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, and Luxembourg. This also enables to identify differences among small states and to elaborate on the conjunctural and contextual economic, political, and social factors influencing perceptions of citizens in those states. Hence, the analysis includes first the divide between large and small EU states, and secondly the divide among cases of this research. There are 14-member states, six large states and eight small states included in this analysis in order to show the variance among large and small states. Germany is selected as the largest EU state when the population size is considered to classify states as large or small. Compared to Germany, the United Kingdom and France rank as the second and third largest state of the EU with approximately 65 million populations. Italy, Spain, and Poland maintain the population size between 38 million and 60 million in which the results of the analysis comprising these countries indicates the general trend on the EU average. Lastly, small states are Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, Luxembourg, Latvia, Slovenia, Lithuania and Ireland. These countries have the population size below 5 million.¹⁵ The table below indicates the distribution of the states according to their population size which was used as an indicator in case selection.

¹⁵ Croatia is not included in the analysis. The country became EU member in 2013 so there is not data available between 2010-2013.

Table 7. Ranking of the EU States According to Their Population Size
Source: Eurostat (2016)

	Member State	Population Size		Member State	Population Size
1	Germany	80,636,124	15	Austria	8,592,400
2	United Kingdom	65,511,098	16	Bulgaria	7,045,259
3	France	64,938,716	17	Denmark	5,711,837
4	Italy	59,797,978	18	Finland	5,541,274
5	Spain	46,070,146	19	Slovakia	5,432,157
6	Poland	38,563,573	20	Ireland	4,749,153
7	Romania	19,237,513	21	Croatia	4,209,815
8	Netherlands	17,032,845	22	Lithuania	2,830,582
9	Belgium	11,443,830	23	Slovenia	2,071,252
10	Greece	10,892,931	24	Latvia	1,944,565
11	Czech Republic	10,555,130	25	Estonia	1,305,755
12	Portugal	10,264,797	26	Cyprus	1,187,575
13	Sweden	9,920,624	27	Luxembourg	584,103
14	Hungary	9,787,905	28	Malta	420,521

The questions from the PARLEMETER Survey Data Set provide the opportunity to examine the differences in the relationship developed between the citizens and the Members of the EP. These questions are the following:

P1. “I have recently read in the press, seen on the Internet or on television or heard on the radio something about the European Parliament. (Yes/No/Don’t Know)” (European Parliament, 2010-2016).

P2. “I am well informed about the European Parliament’s activities. (Yes/No/Don’t Know)” (European Parliament, 2010-2016).

P3. “The European Parliament conjures up a positive image for me. (Yes/No/Don’t Know)” (European Parliament, 2010-2016).

P4. “In my opinion, Members of the European Parliament sit in the European Parliament according to their nationalities. (Nationality/Political Affinities/Don’t Know)” (European Parliament, 2010-2016).

P5. “I would say, European Parliament’s decisions are adopted above all according to the interests of the member states from which the Members of the European Parliament come from. (Member States/Political Groups in the European Parliament/Don’t Know)” (European Parliament, 2010-2016).

The answer “Don’t Know” in each question is ignored in this analysis, as such the choice of the answer “Don’t Know” has no significant impact on the result. Therefore, positive and negative answers were measured. The data from the large and small states were calculated by taking the average of the answers given by large member state citizens and small member state citizens. These results were grouped, and their averages were calculated. The results are presented in percentages. Hence, “Large States Group” includes Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, and Poland. “Small States

Group” includes Lithuania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta.

The calculation for each year was made as (where $xy\% = 0.xy$ and where xy is two – decimal number):

The Average (Large States, Small States)

$$= \frac{\text{Country 1} + \text{Country 2} + \text{Country 3} + \dots + \text{Country (n)}}{n}$$

The first and second figures below show the awareness of the EU citizens about the EP.

The response “Yes” given by the participants which means “I have recently read in the press, seen on the Internet or on television or heard on the radio something about the EP” (European Parliament, 2010-2016) is calculated. Below is the divide between large and small states.




Figure 2. The Awareness of the EU Citizens About the EP (The Divide Between Large and Small States)

The awareness about the EP is very high among citizens ranging between 50 to 80 percent. Between the years 2010 and 2012, the awareness of large and small state citizens is at the level of 70 percent. The trend is declining for small states with a sharp fall in 2013 to 50 percent which means that one citizen out of two claims that he or she is not informed about the EP. 2014 was the year for EP elections. In that regard, the increase in the trend as the EP elections approached means that the visibility of the EP because of the election campaigning started to increase. Election campaigning of the political parties and the candidates started to appear more in the media and it brought an increase in the trend to 70 percent again. The awareness between large and small state citizens about the EP has been in parallel and does not give a significant difference in terms of the information received by the large state and small state citizens, except for the year 2013. In 2013,

small state citizens claim that “they are not sufficiently informed about the EP” (European Parliament, 2010-2016). This critical juncture marks the period before the 2014 EP elections. Hence, as the member states entered into the election campaigning process for the elections, the level of information in which the citizens claim that they receive shows an increase and reach back to the 70 percent between the years 2014 and 2016. When it is looked at the distribution between the small states, the level of awareness of the Cypriot, Maltese, Estonian, and Luxembourg citizens is between 60 and 85 percent. Figure 3 shows the distribution between small states.




Figure 3. The Awareness of the EU Citizens About the EP (The Divide Between Small States)

When it is looked at the differences between small states, it is observed that Cypriot, Maltese, Estonian, and Luxembourg citizens are aware of the activities of the EP

between 60 and 80 percent between 2010 and 2012. Omitting the year 2013 that marks a sharp decline for small states, Luxembourg ranks between (66 to 83 percent - the highest). Cyprus remains as the fourth. In 2013, 47 percent of Cypriot citizens answered that they have not received any news related to the EP in recent years. The trend for four small states shows a decrease in 2012 and 2013. This means that citizens receive less information about the EP. Although, the visibility of the institution increased in the post-2014 EP elections, this is again part of the election campaigning and it is due to the appearance of the candidates in the media. After 2015, the level of Cypriot, Maltese, Estonian, and Luxembourger citizens who positively responded to this question shows a decline. Between the years 2015 and 2016, Luxembourg ranks the first and Cyprus as the last.

Whereas, Figure 2 and 3 are about the visibility of the EP as an institution, Figures 4 and 5 indicate the level of information in which citizens claim they receive about activities of the EP. The participants who positively responded to the question on their awareness about the EP's activities (European Parliament, 2010-2016) are calculated. Figure 4 shows the divide between large and small state citizens.




Figure 4. The Awareness of the EU Citizens About Activities of the EP (The Divide Between Large and Small States)

Figure 4 shows the level of information that citizens receive about activities of the EP between large and small EU states. Compared to large states, small state citizens are more informed, but this remains as a very slight difference which is approximately 3-4 percent. However, the average percentage of citizens claiming that they are informed about the activities of the EP is significantly low compared to the answers given about the awareness of the EP as an institution. When this ratio is compared to the level of being heard about the EP as an institution, citizens answer that they hear or read about the EP through various information sources, but they are less informed about its activities both in large and small EU states. Although there is not a big difference about the level of information in which citizens claim they receive about the EP's activities, a difference exists when it is compared to the awareness of citizens about the EP as an institution. Whereas 50 to 80 percent of the large and small state citizens claimed that they are aware

of the EP as an institution, 30 to 40 percent of the citizens responded that “they are informed about the EP’s activities” (European Parliament, 2010-2016). When it is considered the level of information received about activities of the institution among small member states, the trend decreases to 20 percent. Below is the figure which shows the level of information small state citizens claim they receive about the EP’s activities.




Figure 5. The Awareness of the EU Citizens About Activities of the EP (The Divide Between Small States)

When examining the divide among small states, around 47 percent of Luxembourgers answer that “they are informed about the activities of the institution” (European Parliament, 2010-2016). However, ratio of Estonian citizens remains only at the level of 20 percent. Cyprus follows Estonia as the second lowest with 25 percent. Beginning in 2014, it is indicated that Cypriots were less informed in contrast to Maltese citizens

whereas the ratio of citizens has increased from 34 to 43 percent. The reason of the high level of information received by the Luxembourgger citizens is assumed to be its proximity to the EU institutions. In that regard, Luxembourg by being located within continental Europe and having some EU institutions on its land influences the awareness of Luxembourgger citizens. Added to the geographical position, Luxembourg has a deeply rooted historical and cultural exchange with other EU founding states, and this influences the perceptions of the Luxembourgger citizens towards the EU. However, other three states lack the geographical proximity with EU institutions. Therefore, the perceptions of citizens of these states are mainly subject to the developments occurring the EU with regards to the domestic political, economic and social developments. The next figure is about the perceptions of the citizens towards the EP. The respondents expressed their perceptions to the statement about the image of the EP. “Very Positive and Fairly Positive” (European Parliament, 2010-2016) answers are combined. The figure below shows the divide between large state and small state citizens who have a positive perception towards the EP (European Parliament, 2010-2016).




Figure 6. Image of the EP (The Divide Between Large and Small States)

Figure 6 shows the divide between large and small state citizens in terms of their positive perceptions towards the image of the EP. The institution is reflected with a positive image for large state citizens with a slight difference from the small state citizens until 2014. 2014 marked a turning point in which small state citizens began to have more positive perceptions than large state citizens but with a decrease from 36 to 29 percent. In 2014, this ratio is even below for large state citizens. Even in 2015, the positive image of the EU for large state citizens decreased to 23 percent. Overall, perceptions of both small and large state citizens towards the EP ranges between 30 and 35 percent except for the first half of 2012 in which almost 50 percent of the large state citizens perceived the image of the EP positively. The reason for the decrease of the positive image of the EP for both small and large state citizens can be explained by looking at the domestic developments in the post-2014 EP elections. In that regard, the issues which were

discussed during the election campaigning were under the influence of domestic economic, political and social developments. This could be reflected in the perceptions of citizens. The level of positive perceptions towards the image of the EP for small state citizens indicates differences when Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, and Luxembourg are taken into consideration. Figure 7 below shows the divide between small states.




Figure 7. Image of the EP (The Divide Between Small States)

When examining the divide among small states, Malta is ranking the first in which the EP conjures up a positive image for Maltese citizens. This ratio is around 47 percent between the years 2012 and 2014. On the other hand, the ratio of Estonian citizens remains only at the level between 15 and 20 percent. Cyprus follows Estonia as the second lowest ratio. Between 25 and 35 percent of the Cypriots see the EP in a positive way until the year

2014. The EP has a positive image in the eyes of Maltese and Luxembourg citizen around the level of 40 percent. On the other hand, post-2014 EP elections indicate a common decline of the positive image of the EP for citizens. This is also observed in the analysis between large and small states. Except for Luxembourg, there is approximately 10 percent decline of the positive perceptions towards the EP by the Cypriot, Maltese, and Estonian citizens. The positive image of the EP remains between 25 and 40 percent when the average is calculated for the groupings of small and large states. The same trend is observed for the country cases of this study with variances among these four cases. Malta as reaching the highest ratio between 2012 and 2014 forms a contrast with the level of positive perceptions of the EP for Cypriot citizens.

Apart from the perceptions of the large and small EU citizens towards the EP as an institution, the PARLEMETER Survey Data also provides the opportunity to measure how citizens perceive the role of the Members of the EP. In the Article 10.4 of the TEU, it is stated that “the will of citizens and European political awareness are formed by the European political parties in the European Parliament and by Members of the European Parliament’s participation” (European Union, 2012a). In that regard, the important part of legislative activities of representatives is formed upon casting votes for EU policies which would reflect the will of EU citizens. How they vote is the main question in which the PARLEMETER Survey Data provides the answers by showing the divide between small and large states and among small member states. Previous research shows that Members of the EP’s ideological orientations as left or right influence voting behaviour in the EP which is associated with Members of the EP’s national and European

affiliations (Hix & Noury, 2009; Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2005; Scully, Hix, & Farrell, 2012). Being elected from national political parties sharing the same ideology, the representatives enrol in supranational political parties parallel to their ideological orientations. Added to the ideological orientation impacting role of Members of the EP, prioritization of specific policy issues at the national level under the influence of domestic structures and which would protect or ensure national interests (by Members of the EP national political party or by state/government apparatuses, institutions) also influences Members of the EP's voting behaviour (Vasilopoulou & Gattermann, 2013; Walczak & Van der Brug, 2013). Vasilopoulou and Gattermann (2013, p. 607) identified that on socio-economic issues that had been discussed in the sixth EP (2004-2009), Members of the EP voted along their states' policy priorities. However, on socio-cultural issues, they voted along European political party lines. Especially, on policy issues such as "immigration and EU integration", Walczak and Van der Brug (2013, pp. 17-18) found out that votes of the Members of the EP were more fragmented than other issue areas. Hence, in 2004-2009, Members of the EP voted along national political party lines or along European political party lines depending on their sensitivity about specific policy issues (Walczak & Van der Brug, 2013, pp. 17-18).

Considering the previous research on the voting behaviour of representatives in the EP, it is important to examine how the EU citizens perceive role of the Members of the EP in EU policy-making. Therefore, added to the citizens' attitudes towards the EP as an institution, the perceptions of the citizens towards the legislative behaviour of their representatives, dichotomised as voting along national lines or European lines are also

measured. The PARLEMETER Survey respondents expressed that Members of the EP pursue their legislative activities either according to their nationalities or their European political affiliations. Figure 8 indicates the divide between large and small state citizens.




Figure 8. Perceptions Towards the Enrolment of the Members of the EP in Pursuing Their Legislative Activities (The Divide Between Large and Small States)

Examination of the PARLEMETER Survey Data reveals that there is a clear difference at two ratios between small and large state citizens' opinion about Members' of the EP affiliation. Although there are slight fluctuations, approximately 30 percent of small state citizens claim that Members of the EP pursue their legislative activities according to their nationalities compared to large state citizens which is around 39 percent. This also means that almost 65-70 percent of small state citizens and 55-60 percent of large state citizens perceive their representatives to be affiliated with the European party lines. This finding

forms a contrast with the interviews conducted with the Cypriot, Maltese, Estonian and Luxembourgish Members of the EP as representatives claimed that they are more accountable and responsive to their constituencies and domestic structural factors impact their activities in the EP. However, the small state citizens perceive that their representatives are more affiliated with their European political parties than their nationalities. The analysis also shows that the perception on the affiliation of the representatives shows differences among small states. Below is the figure indicating the divide between those four states.




Figure 9. Perceptions Towards the Enrolment of the Members of the EP in Pursuing Their Legislative Activities (The Divide Between Small States)

When it is considered the data covering the years between 2010 and 2016, 37 percent of the Luxembourgish citizens claim that the Members of the EP sit according to nationality.

However, this ratio remains between 20 and 25 in Cyprus. Estonia shows a significant decline between the years 2010 and 2012. Despite a relatively high percentage of Luxembourg citizens, only around 25-30 percent of Cypriots, approximately 25-30 percent of the Maltese and Estonian citizens think that Members of the EP sit according to nationality in the EP. In that regard, the contrast explained above also shows itself when the divide between these four-member states are examined. Almost in all of the interviews, the Cypriot, Estonian, Maltese and Luxembourg representatives claimed that they pursue their legislative activities by considering their nationalities as a priority. However, the perceptions of the citizens are the opposite. 60 to 80 percent of citizens in these member states perceive that the representatives are affiliated with their European parties.

Another question being asked about in the PARLEmeter Survey is about the perceptions of the citizens towards the adoption of the EU legislation in the EP. Citizens' attitudes towards the voting behaviour of the Members of the EP are measured by asking a question on adoption of the EU legislation. The answers provided on the adoption of the decisions according to the member states' national interests are calculated (European Parliament, 2010-2016). Below is a figure showing the divide between large and small state citizens who believe that adoption of the EU legislation is according to national interests of member states in which Members of the EP represent.




Figure 10. Perceptions Towards the Voting Behaviour of the Members of the EP in Adoption of the EU Legislation (The Divide Between Large and Small States)

Figure 10 shows the divide between small and large states. Around 43 percent of large state citizens believe that the representatives take decisions in the EP according to interests of their states whereas this ratio is around 35 percent for small state citizens. However, when it is looked at the level of perceptions among small state citizens, each state shows differences. Around 25 percent of Estonian citizens think that their representatives vote along national lines. Between 35 and 45 percent of Cypriots think that “Members of the EP pursue their activities according to the states they come from” (European Parliament, 2010-2016). Approximately 30 to 40 percent Maltese and Luxembourger citizens also think that voting behaviour of their representatives is shaped along national lines. Towards the 2014 EP elections, the belief that the representatives act according to the national interests gained strength. In 2013, only 35 percent of Cypriots think that the representatives act in parallel to national lines. The ratio increased during

the 2014 EP elections to 48 percent. In the post-2014 EP elections, the perceptions for voting behaviour of the Members of the EP shaped in parallel to national interests decreased for all four small member states. Figure 11 indicates the divide between Estonia, Malta, Luxembourg and Cyprus.




Figure 11. Perceptions Towards the Voting Behaviour of the Members of the EP in Adoption of the EU Legislation (The Divide Between Small States)

Considering the last two important answers provided in the PARLEMETER Survey, both the large and small state citizens perceive that the role of the representatives is shaped along national lines. Confirming the previous research, around 40 percent of the large and small state citizens believe that the representatives act according to national interests of the countries which they represent. This also means that almost 55-60 percent of the citizens perceive that representatives' voting behaviour is shaped along the European

political party lines. Although, this analysis is further subject to the issue-based examination, the general findings from the PARLEMETER Survey Data provides insight on perceptions of EU citizens towards their representatives and about representatives' voting behaviour.

The analysis on Cyprus, Malta, Luxembourg, and Estonia also shows similar results with the analysis on the divide between large and small states. Around 35-40 percent of the citizens think that their representatives vote along national lines and protect their national interests. However, this also means that around 60-65 percent of the citizens think that the representatives act in parallel to their affiliation with European political parties. These findings also form a contrast with the interviews conducted with Cypriot, Maltese, Estonian and Luxembourgish representatives. All of the representatives which responded to this question emphasized the national priorities and expressed that their voting behaviour is always in parallel to their constituencies' expectations and requests. In that regard, within the scope of this research, the relationship between the small state citizens and representatives are still subject to the analysis. Added to the perceptions of the represented (i.e. small EU citizens), in the next section, the representation of small states, is explored by considering the perceptions of the representatives in terms of their responsibility towards their constituencies during the EU policy-making. The structural factors as the variances in national and supranational party politics and representing high proportion of population which are argued to influence the representatives' legislative behaviour are examined.

4.3. Representation of Small European Union States: A Qualitative Analysis on the Legislative Behaviour of Members of the European Parliament

The membership of small states through different enlargement rounds of the EU led to different arrangements in its institutional setup. The aim was to ensure that the active role and representation of small member states continue and do not become dominated by their larger counterparts in policy-making. Therefore, in parallel to the “democratic deficit” debate, the equitable representation of small EU states and their contribution in policy-making has been also discussed. The Lisbon Treaty has provided strong institutional incentives for small EU states to strengthen their participation in the policy-making processes by introducing differentiated representation elements in favour of them. In view of that, scholars have directed their focus on the analysis of whether those institutional incentives have been successful in securing the influence of small EU states in policy-making processes. Existing studies are based on explaining the role played by an EU state on a particular policy area to overcome her vulnerable position as foreign policy behaviour. They are limited to the analyses on structural disadvantages which small states encounter about voting procedure in the Council of the EU, the emphasis given to the protection of representative equality of states in the European Commission and on the promotion of small states’ national interests and their agenda according to their national priorities during the Council Presidency (Grøn, 2014; Panke, 2012a, 2012b; Svetličič & Cerjak, 2015; Thorhallsson, 2017, pp. 35-46; Wivel, Thorhallsson, & Steinmetz, 2010, pp. 117-214). In this part of the research the representation of four small member states in the EP are explored. This is done within the framework of political

representation in which the processes of representation are under the influence of domestic and supranational structural factors. The modalities of how representatives elected by small member state citizens acknowledge their role, responsibility and accountability towards their constituencies and towards the common good of the Union are assessed. The analysis draws on semi-structured interviews with twelve Cypriot, Estonian, Maltese, and Luxembourgish Members of the EP,¹⁶ conducted in 2016 as well as official EU documents, treaties, and regulations.

The objective is to make a contribution to the issue of political representation of small EU states from the point of the legislative role undertaken by the small state representatives in the EP. While influence of small states in the European Commission and the Council of the EU are examined in the framework of foreign policy, the representation of small states in legislative activities in the EP bears importance and requires an analysis within the framework of political representation. This is because the “EP is the only institution whose members are directly elected by citizens” (European Parliament, 2016a). This establishes a direct relationship between citizens and the political elite, different from other channels of representation in the EU (Rose, 2013, p. 17). By being directly elected, the representatives are expected to reflect the perceptions, expectations and interests of their constituencies through their legislative activities in supranational political parties and at the same time serve the EU common good. Despite the enriching literature on citizen representation in the EP, most of these studies employ

¹⁶ See APPENDIX C for the interview questions.

quantitative methods in measuring the relationship between citizens' perceptions and legislative behaviour of the Members of the EP through roll-call votes on policy issues (Arregui & Thomson, 2009; Dalton, 2015; Hix & Noury, 2009; Hug, 2016; Scully et al., 2012; Walczak & Van der Brug, 2013). These studies do not, however, provide a complementary analysis on small state representatives' voting behaviour which may shed a light on the representation of small EU states considering domestic and supranational structural disadvantages which small states face due to their limited economic and political capacity. This analysis elaborates on the processes of representation which would influence the voting behaviour of small state representatives through the established link with their constituencies. Hence, it aims to contribute to the literature on the role of small EU states during policy-making processes by focusing on the EP. Contributing to the debates on whether democratic credentials of the EU provide effective representation of small EU states, this section of the research examines on how small member state citizens' perceptions are reflected through the legislative behaviour of their representatives, considering the institutional empowerment brought by the Lisbon Treaty. It concludes with an examination of representation of small states in light of interviews conducted with Cypriot, Estonian, Luxembourgish, and Maltese Members of the EP.

The EU is a "system of compound representation" (Benz, 2004, p. 875; Kröger & Friedrich, 2013, p. 172) and "the multi-tiered polity" (Schmitt & Thomassen, 2000, p. 7). In the European Commission, the Council of the EU and the EP, political representation occurs through three channels in which these channels are dependent and institutionally

linked to each other (Bellamy & Castiglione, 2013, pp. 214-215; Mårtensson, 2007, p. 288). Among these representational channels, the EP is the sole institution where citizens are directly represented. Accountability and responsiveness of the representatives refers directly to their respective constituencies unlike the Council of the EU and the European Commission. Although the EP had been acknowledged as the weakest institution in terms of policy-making capacity, different EU Treaties brought significant changes in its institutional setup. The Lisbon Treaty introduced competence changes for the EP and increased powers of the institution vis-à-vis the Council of the EU and the European Commission (Hix & Høyland, 2013, p. 173). The treaty extended EP's legislative powers across 85 policy areas and made it an equal law maker with the Council through the ordinary legislative procedure (Council of the European Union, 2015e). Many policy areas and issues related to the budget are co-decided with the EP and the Council of the EU (European Parliament, 2016b). According to Article 14 of the TEU, empowered competences, composition and representation of citizens in the institution are the following (European Union, 2012a):

The European Parliament shall, jointly with the Council, exercise legislative and budgetary functions. It shall exercise functions of political control and consultation as laid down in the Treaties. It shall elect the President of the Commission. The European Parliament shall be composed of representatives of the Union's citizens. They shall not exceed seven hundred and fifty in number, plus the President. Representation of citizens shall be degressively proportional, with a minimum threshold of six members per Member State. No Member State shall be allocated more than ninety-six seats. The members of the European Parliament shall be elected for a term of five years by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot. The European Parliament shall elect its President and its officers from among its members (European Union, 2012a).

Added to the key developments on the institutional empowerment of the EP, the Lisbon Treaty has also aimed to strengthen the dialogue between the representatives and the European *demos*. The mechanisms which establish the link between the representatives and the citizens are explained in Article 10 in the TEU as:

The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy. Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament. Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their governments, themselves democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens. Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen. Political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union (European Union, 2012a).

In parallel to institutional empowerment of the EP and the emphasis on a stronger dialogue between representatives and the represented, the Lisbon Treaty has also provided strong institutional incentives for small EU states to strengthen their involvement in policy-making by introducing differentiated representation elements in favour of the small states. The degressive proportionality principle (Cegiełka, 2010; European Parliament, 2013) in allocation of seats in the EP secured an overrepresentation of small states as the treaty does not allow a member state to be represented below six and above 96 seats (European Union, 2012a). For proposals to be adopted by the Council of the EU, the approval of 55 percent of member states is required which must represent at least 65 percent of the EU population (Council of the European Union, 2016d). In order to reduce the chances of larger states joining forces to stop proposals, a “blocking coalition” must include at least four-member states representing 35 percent of the EU total population (Council of the European Union, 2016d). Small states can also exert their

influence on other policy areas when unanimity remains the decision-making rule (Council of the European Union, 2015e). The process usually starts with a proposal prepared by the European Commission in which the institution is regarded as the guarantor of equality among member states.

The May 2004 EU enlargement resulted in a significant increase in the number of small states. Hence, the notion of smallness became more debated in the literature as many of the new members could be regarded as small. Added to increased efforts to conceptualise and define what constitutes a small EU state is decoupled with the examination on the representation of small EU states in policy-making processes. Different conceptualisations of the term “small state” influence the scope and purpose of those studies. Archer and Nugent (2006, p. 6) as well as Panke (2012b, p. 117) explain that a small EU member state needs to be defined by looking at its economic, social, military, and diplomatic capacities and capabilities in addition to its demographic and geographic size. Subjective conceptualizations affect the debate on influence of small states in EU policy-making processes and mechanisms. Nevertheless, population size, Gross Domestic Product rate, territory, economic, and military resources is one way to distinguish a small state from large one (Pace, 2002, pp. 25-26). Scholars who attempted to conceptualise small member states according to their economic, military, and administrative capacities mostly argued that small states’ role is acknowledged to be limited and weak in institutional settings. Hence, it is argued that small states exert influence by devising pragmatic solutions to increase their negotiation capabilities in EU policy-making

mechanisms (Bailes & Thorhallsson, 2013; Björkdahl, 2008; Grøn & Wivel, 2011; Panke, 2012b).

In this research, small states are defined based on population size and their representation weight at the EP. The threshold for the population size is drawn at 1.5 million which includes Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, and Malta. Those states share the same number of seats in the EP, six each which is guaranteed by the Article 14.2 of the TEU (European Union, 2012a) stating that the allocation of seats in the EP should be digressively proportional and in consistent with population size (Cegiełka, 2010). To explore the representation of small member state citizens in the EP, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 12 representatives; three Cypriot, three Estonian, two Luxembourg, and four Maltese in 2016, serving in the 8th term of the EP. Except from one interview conducted over the phone, the rest of the interviews were conducted as face-to-face meetings. Participant interviewees form a representative sample when internal validity is considered, as they were independent candidates in the EP elections or from differing national political parties and currently pursue their legislative activities in different supranational political parties. Below is the distribution of representatives from Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, and Luxembourg according to their enrolment in European political parties.




Figure 12. Members of the EP Across Supranational Political Parties

Source: European Parliament (2014-2019a, 2014-2019b, 2014-2019c, 2014-2019d, 2014-2019e)

As the existing studies propose, small EU states encounter different structural weaknesses because of their limited capacities which influence their role in EU policy-making. Interviews reveal that one of these structural weaknesses, limited administrative and bureaucratic capacity, is also felt in the EP. As the sufficiency of administrative and bureaucratic resources is important to develop more effective and coherent policy positions, it is required to have qualified diplomatic personnel and policy experts in the EP who are actively involved in activities and negotiations in national delegations, committees, and working groups (Thorhallsson, 2006, pp. 18-19). The representatives' collaborative relationship with their national delegations and experts is considered important and influencing their legislative activities in the EP (Thorhallsson & Wivel,

2006, pp. 659-660). However, small EU member states have a lower number of administrative personnel and policy experts in Brussels compared to large states. In the view of one small state Member of the EP:

Compared to someone coming from a large member state having a much bigger membership and a delegation for example, Spain, Portugal, Germany, United Kingdom. For example, most of the Members of the European Parliament coming from a large member state specialize and participate in one committee ... In my case, I participate in four, five other different committees. It is a lot of work that has to do with participation in each committee. And coming from a small member state, you cannot just say I want to concentrate and focus on one committee and that is all I could do (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #1, Conducted on 9 March 2016).

It is argued that small state Members of the EP have more representation responsibilities compared to other states' representatives. For Germany, Italy, or the United Kingdom, almost one percent of German, Italian, or British citizens are represented by their representatives. For Croatia, nine percent of Croatian citizens are represented by their representatives. For Sweden, this ratio is five percent. However, for Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, and Luxembourg each representative represents 17 percent of citizens from these states. Table 8 shows the representative responsibility ratio of Members of the EP in 28 states.

Table 8. Representative Responsibility Ratio of Members of the EP

Source: European Parliament (2016c); Eurostat (2016); Author's Own Calculation

Member state	Population in millions (in 2016)	Number of Members of the EP (in 2016)	Number of Citizens per Member of the EP (in thousands- Population/Number of Members of the EP)	Ratio of citizens represented by a Member of the EP (in percentage- 100/Number of Members of the EP)
Austria	8.69	18	482.777	5.6
Belgium	11.31	21	538.571	4.8
Bulgaria	7.15	17	420.588	5.9
Croatia	4.19	11	380.909	9.1
Cyprus	0.85	6	141.666	16.7
Czech Republic	10.55	21	502.380	4.8
Denmark	5.71	13	439.230	7.7
Estonia	1.32	6	220.000	16.7
Finland	5.49	13	422.307	7.7
France	66.76	74	902.162	1.4
Germany	82.18	96	856.041	1.04
Greece	10.78	21	513.333	4.8
Hungary	9.83	21	468.095	4.8
Ireland	4.72	11	429.090	9.1
Italy	60.67	73	831.095	1.4
Latvia	1.97	8	246.250	12.5

Table 8 (cont'd)

Lithuania	2.89	11	262.727	9.1
Luxembourg	0.58	6	96.667	16.7
Malta	0.43	6	71.666	16.7
Netherlands	16.98	26	653.076	3.8
Poland	37.97	51	744.509	1.96
Portugal	10.57	21	503.333	4.8
Romania	19.76	31	637.419	3.2
Slovakia	5.43	13	417.692	7.7
Slovenia	2.06	8	257.500	12.5
Spain	46.45	54	860.185	1.9
Sweden	9.85	20	492.500	5
United Kingdom	65.38	72	908.055	1.4

Small state Members of the EP have more representation responsibility compared to medium and large EU states. For Germany, Italy, or the United Kingdom, almost one percent of German, Italian, or British citizens is represented by a Member of the EP (Germany - 856,041 inhabitants per representative, Italy - 831,095 inhabitants per representative, and the United Kingdom – 908,055 inhabitants per representative). For Poland, the ratio is two percent (100/51 - 744,509 inhabitants per representative). However, for Cyprus, each Member of the EP represents 17 percent (100/6) of Cypriot citizens - 141,666 inhabitants per representative. The same ratio applies for Malta that it

has 71,666 inhabitants per Member of the EP, and Luxembourg has 96,667 inhabitants per Member of the EP with 16.67 percent. Representing a high proportion of country's population puts more representation responsibility on small state Members' of the EP shoulders. It requires increased and continuous dialogue with their constituencies, not only during their service in the EP, but also during the election campaigning to be more visible to their constituencies and to increase the opportunities of being elected in the elections. A small state representative explained the difference as:

This is something that has to do with difference on size and population. I am sure that those whom I represent all expect me, at some point on that time, either in the campaign or throughout the five-year term. So, the expectations of the constituency are much bigger. You are expected to be with the constituent, you are expected to meet the constituent, and you are basically expected to be there for the constituent. This is reflected; it is a reflection of the smaller insularity of the society (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #7, Conducted on 8 March 2016).

Another representative stated that:

Well, there is always campaign. Not just two months before the elections. So that, I did not have a special campaign, because, I find that a normal politician should be vocal and visible all the time, explaining views on some issues, participating actively in the public sphere. This interpersonal relationship is stronger than in bigger countries. So, I guess, I am not exaggerating that in [name of the country], every politician is from every city and they are a phone call away. So that, in this sense, this is very direct and close (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #12, Conducted on 20 January 2016).

Similarly, it is explained that “in a small country it is easier to keep this connection because, in every region, in every city, every village, you may know someone. Basically, the persons recognize each other easily” (Interview with Member of the European

Parliament #10, Conducted on 2 February 2016). These quotations confirm that establishing a closer contact with the constituency is a feature of small state societies, as the Members of the EP represent high proportion of their countries' population. One Member of the EP explains that:

We are elected for five years. So, for me I don't believe in like spending two years and you know you have to work because election is coming. So, I feel it is my responsibility to work for whole five years, I look at people's vote as an investment on me and when you invest on something, you want a return. Because if you don't get a return from your investment, you don't do it anymore" (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #4, Conducted on 3 February 2016).

To detail the closer relationship between the Members of the EP and citizens, the methods of the dialogue in which they establish with the citizens were asked. One Member of the EP shared her views as:

In my mind, I represent the entire population we have at home. And, this is probably because we are so small that people expect you more than in the larger countries to be accessible, to be available and to meet them. So, it is not enough for people to be in Brussels and not go and meet them in [home country]. So, what I used to do before and I still do, unfortunately at a much smaller rate, because I cannot go every day and do regularly these things, but when I am in [name of the country], I meet with the people in my office, I try to go and meet people in their homes. So, for me this is extremely important to keep that contact. Because I believe that since they elected me, my interest should be their interest, or their interest should be my interest, that is why I keep in touch with them, understand their realities and try to represent them in the best way (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #4, Conducted on 3 February 2016).

It is also expressed as:

Your aim is to protect your contract with the electorates and with the voters and with the [name of the country] public. And, now as you spend at least three

quarters of your time abroad, you must find out new ways. Mainly, on Facebook and so on. It is more complicated. But, I am in [name of the country] one day in a week, then I try to meet people (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #9, Conducted on 9 March 2016).

As the EP is the sole EU institution which establishes a direct link with the citizens, representing high proportion of country's population as a structural factor influences legislative responsibilities of small state representatives and requires a closer personal contact with their constituencies. Other structural factor influencing legislative activities of small state representatives are the structures of party politics. It impacts in terms of how small state representatives become candidates in the EP elections, hold their election campaigning, and pursue their legislative activities following their election because their performance signifies accountability and responsibility towards their constituencies.

The delegate theory of representation proposes that representatives are solely engaged in responding to their constituencies' demands during legislative activities. Pitkin (1967, p. 146) on the concept of representation explains that the representative is a "mere" agent for those who sent him to the legislature. Adopting Pitkin's definition of representation, McCrone and Kuklinski (1979, p. 297) empirically discovered that legislators are responsive to their constituencies when there is a salient issue to them because they perceive themselves as obliged to represent the preferences of their constituencies. Similarly, in the EP, Vasilopoulou and Gattermann (2013, pp. 620-621) found that when an issue becomes salient to constituencies, it affects voting behaviour of representatives during their legislative activities and leads Members of the EP to vote along national

lines. In other words, Members of the EP respond to their constituency's preferences. Higher congruence was observed on socio-economic policies, and lower degree of congruence on cultural and gender-based issues (Dalton, 2015, p. 10). Consequently, when a controversial, nationally-sensitive issue is debated in the EP, representatives' behaviour corresponds to national policy positions (Arregui & Thomson, 2009, p. 671). Therefore, when a policy issue is salient to the constituencies and comes to the agenda of the EP to be discussed and debated, it may make small state representatives face disagreements with their supranational parties. This situation is expressed as "we don't agree on every decision, we disagree, we try to promote our ideas, to express ourselves in order to convince the rest of the Members of the EP, what they are saying and why we are saying something" (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #2, Conducted on 9 March 2016). Another Member of the EP details this type of behaviour as:

"[In case of an issue voted which is salient to my constituency], I will inform the group that I will be voting against. And there are cases where I diverge because my accountability is towards my citizens ... When it comes to deciding, I as a Member of the European Parliament, I decide by myself, keeping in mind that I was elected by the citizens to represent them (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #3, Conducted on 8 March 2016).

Moreover, one can observe that small state Members of the EP also feel themselves more accountable to their constituencies rather than their supranational political parties. Many of them tend not to follow the voting recommendations of their political parties when a policy issue is salient to their constituencies. Hence, they may vote against the proposal which is along national lines. This is significant in terms of accountability towards their

constituencies and showing the role of small state Members of the EP, being responsive to their constituencies. As an answer to the question how one dealt with a salient issue which was debated and voted but remained nationally sensitive and the supranational party line was against this sensitivity, one Member of the EP stated that:

I and some other colleagues of mine feel very isolated from the rest of the group. Because for us, it was a red line, it was a national interest, it was something extremely important. For them of course, it was a political goal, and that's why we think we have many times in our group those differences of opinion. Sometimes, it is not just a difference of opinion; it is even a major political conflict. So, there is no way for me to follow the party line when it comes to this (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #1, Conducted on 9 March 2016).

Another representative expressed that “my accountability is towards my citizens. When it comes to deciding, I as a member of the European Parliament, I decide by myself, keeping in mind that I was elected by the citizens to represent them” (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #3, Conducted on 8 March 2016).

Moving on, Blais and Bodet (2006, pp. 1243-1244) explain that proportional representation increases the strength of the relationship established between the representatives and the represented, as it induces the government to be more responsive to the citizens and leads more parties in the political scene with more choices for the citizens. Since the 1999 EP elections, proportional representation system has been harmonized with the national electoral rules of all EU member states (Dalton, 2015, p. 6). Under the proportional representation, Farrell and Scully (2010, pp. 50-51) discovered that electoral system designs in member states shape how Members of the EP understand

their role and pursue their legislative activities. Empirical analysis indicates that the representatives who are elected on an open-list, candidate-centred ballot tend to vote more along supranational lines, whereas closed-list, party-centred electoral designs lead Members of the EP to vote more along national lines (Hix, 2002, pp. 24-25). Considering the four small states examined in this study, it is claimed that electoral system designs urge Cypriot, Estonian, Maltese and Luxembourgish representatives to seek for a personal vote in addition to their national political party affiliation. A Member of the EP states that:

We [the name of the country] have a significant difference. In many countries, the system is as a list. They don't need to run, they run to get the votes for the party. In our case, we need to be in the whole country to have the votes for the party and also for us. This is different. In Germany and in other countries as well, they act on the regional basis. We have to act for the whole country. (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #5, Conducted on 8 March 2016).

Maltese politics are built on a two-party political system and this feature of party politics in Malta accompanied with single transferable voting method leads to low party discipline and to competition for personal votes in the EP elections. It is explained by a Member of the EP that:

You do not vote only for your party, but you support your personal candidate. It means that we need to run after every vote and never give up, even when you think that you are going to get higher votes, because you usually get elected precisely with those personal votes." (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #6, Conducted on 3 March 2016).

Another representative stated that:

The main difference is, I get a feeling that we are more in touch with our constituency. We do not have the closed list system, but instead, people vote directly for you. So, it depends on how much vote you get, whether you are elected or not. It is vital and important that you keep in constant touch with your constituents, you understand what they are, what they need and how you address those needs. And, that puts everything in the perspective. The things that I work on here, every time I try to make sure that my constituents' needs, and necessities are also being taken care of ... But, I think what is different from the smaller and the larger member states is this direct contact with your constituents all the time (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #4, Conducted on 3 February 2016).

Luxembourg with its rich political scene in terms of the existence of different political parties is always governed with the coalitions. The voters may put a stamp on a single political party or make different selections among candidates belonging to the different political parties based on a single district. In the case of Luxembourg, it is emphasized that “the Luxembourgish parties have been the founder members of all the European parties that exist. The European People’s Party not only has been co-founded by the Luxembourgish party but also in Luxembourg forty years ago” (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #8, Conducted on 19 January 2016). Considering these elements of the electoral system in Luxembourg, a Member of the EP shares that:

You must do a lot of things to be in the press, people speak about you. You are in the news; you must be present in the public ... As [name of the country] is very small, you go to any city, on the streets and people know you. So, they talk to you. You don’t need to have big events because it is the direct contact you can have with your voters (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #9, Conducted on 9 March 2016).

Lastly, Estonia with a multi-party system has also been governed by coalitions, and the ballot is open-list and candidate-centred. Estonia adopted, however, a closed-list and

party-based electoral system in the 2009 EP elections and shifted back to the open-list and candidate-centred in the 2014 elections. Therefore, interviews with the Estonian representatives made it possible to compare their observations in the two elections. As an answer to the question of whether open-list, candidate-centred system encourages to establish a closer relationship with the small state representatives and the constituency, the Member of the EP argued the following:

Yes, absolutely. Because, then all candidates, at least theoretically have the chance. If you have closed list, then one or two persons may be from the top of the list can get in and that's it. But then, with the open list, on the one hand, the demands are much more from the candidates because they also have different motivations to get in. They all can get in. On the other hand, of course, the motivation of voters is higher. Because, it is clear and especially after the 2009 experience, people want to vote for concrete persons, not just for party as such. In [name of the country], for the national elections we always had the open list. I don't know why then it was sort of experiment to do it for European elections in a closed way and it was a disaster (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #12, Conducted on 20 January 2016).

Another representative answered the same question as:

Exactly. They vote for the person and then it is more the people feel that they are very much control of whom they vote for and they actually get for what they vote for. People are well aware that the list is there, but they can choose whomever and if he or she gets the most votes (Interview with Member of the European Parliament #11, Conducted on 20 January 2016).

Hence, the interviews reveal that compared to the closed list and party-based systems, running in the open-list candidate-centred systems in the EP elections results with a closer relationship between small state representatives and the citizens to act and pursue the election campaigning on a more individual basis. This leads representatives to

establish mostly face-to-face contact with their constituencies and during their service, Members of the EP perceive themselves more responsive and accountable to their constituencies.

4.4. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the representation of small member state citizens in the EP. Although there are many studies examining the representation of small states in the EU as part of their foreign policy, the representation of small state citizens in the EP, an institution whose representatives are directly elected, has remained under-researched. Within the framework of political representation, how representatives elected by small state citizens acknowledge their role, responsibility and accountability towards their constituencies were explored. The divide between large and small state citizens' perceptions towards the EP and their representatives was shown. Differences in perceptions of the Cypriot, Maltese, Luxembourgish and Estonian citizens were also provided.


Within the context of the EP, it has been proposed that small state Members of the EP represent a high proportion of their countries' population. Moreover, as is the case for other institutions, small states encounter shortages in the EP in terms of their diplomatic and expertise capacities. This chapter focused on small EU states, namely Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, and Malta, and aimed to explore small EU state citizens' representation by their deputies in the EP. Revisiting the literature on small states in this

research, small states were defined by examining their population size and representative weights in the EP because the allocation of seats occurs according to the population. In that regard, it is demonstrated that smallness is not dependent solely on the objective criteria related to state capacity but is also related to the perceptions of representatives concerning their accountability and responsiveness to their constituencies. The interviews revealed that when a policy issue was salient to the constituencies and came to the agenda to be discussed and debated, it led twelve Cypriot, Estonian, Luxembourger, and Maltese representatives to confront their supranational political parties. The representatives felt themselves more accountable to their constituencies rather than their political parties and tended not to follow their voting recommendations. This argument was confirmed with the previous findings of the existing empirical studies which suggested that representatives are more responsive to their constituencies when there is a salient issue because they perceive themselves as obliged to represent the preferences of their constituencies. It was also supposed that party politics influence the mechanisms of representation in the EP when small state Members of the EP become candidates in the elections, hold their election campaigning, and pursue their legislative activities after being elected. The interviews also revealed that twelve representatives perceived themselves to seek a personal vote during the campaigning process for the EP elections and felt responsible for establishing closer contact with their constituencies. This also led them to feel more accountable and responsive towards their constituencies during their legislative activities at the EP.

It is evident that small EU states face structural disadvantages in participating and influencing the EU policy-making. Nevertheless, it has become clear that their representation and their role in that process are not negligible. This chapter showed that small EU state representatives' legislative activities are pursued in terms of reflecting their constituencies' preferences and by engaging in negotiations at various levels of the policy-making processes despite structural shortcomings related to their belonging states' capacities and capabilities. In this context, the use of interviews helped gain a deeper insight both on the small state representatives' legislative activities and the representation of small EU state citizens in the EP.

It is difficult to generalize these findings and to make arguments regarding how other member state representatives vote. The purpose of this chapter, however, has been to investigate the representation of small state representatives with the help of individual-level data which were juxtaposed with conclusions drawn from existing studies. These conclusions could be further examined in other member states. Thus, the literature will be enriched with more ground-level data based on different methods and will make an addition on the representation of the European *demos* in the EP. It could also contribute to efforts to relieve the “democratic deficit” problem and to strengthen the EU democratic credentials.

CHAPTER 5



POLITICAL REPRESENTATION: THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND SMALL STATES

5.1. Introduction

Two EU institutions, the EP and the Council of the EU, form the main legislative bodies of policy-making processes in which the policy-makers are the elected representatives from member states. In the EP, the representatives are directly elected in the EP elections, whereas the representatives in the Council of the EU are national politicians who are ministers from member states elected through national elections. Representatives in the EP may shape their voting behaviour by taking position along national or supranational political party lines. The Council of the EU is the institution in which the inter-

governmental bargaining occurs, and national interests are pursued at the supranational level by the ministers of the EU states. In that regard, active engagement in the policy-making processes in the Council of the EU is a requirement for states to achieve success in convincing other member states parallel to their policy preferences and in defending their national positions during the EU policy-making. Member states adapt their national positions during policy making processes and ministers representing member states try to reach a consensus with other member states without losing their national priorities. However, being active for small states bears difficulties due to their limited material resources and structural deficiencies. One of the main scarcities for small states is their insufficient administrative and bureaucratic capacities compared to large member states. In order to overcome this deficiency, small member states employ different strategies in order to empower their position in the Council of the EU. Based on the QMV rule, it is sufficient to block the decision-making process or reject a proposal by the 13 smallest EU member states comprising only 8.35 percent of the EU population. Votes of the largest four densely populated EU member states are also sufficient for a motion to be rejected. Therefore, the QMV rule urges member states to reach a consensus for a success in the EU policy-making. For small states, this is done either by engaging into coalitions with other small states or with large states to create a “blocking majority” (Council of the European Union, 2016d). By doing this, small states convince other member states according to the identical national priorities and try to reach a consensus in forming a position during the decision-making processes.

This chapter explores the representation of small states in the Council of the EU in terms of the strategies they apply to position themselves during policy-making processes. First, the strategies employed by small member states are assessed which lead them to exert a more influential role despite their deficiency in having a limited administrative and bureaucratic capacities. Then, these strategies are examined with a focus on five policy proposals based on the day-to-day policy-making processes in the EU institutions. These strategies are based on engaging into coalition with other EU states and advocating European and international principles. In that regard, several proposals on different policy areas which were proposed by the Commission, negotiated, and voted on in the Council between July 1, 2014 and December 31, 2016 are examined in light of the strategies applied by small states.

5.2. Institutional Representation of Small States in Council of the European Union

One of the main structural factors claimed to be important is member states' administrative and bureaucratic capacities in examining their role in the policy-making processes. When it is looked as an objective criterion in categorising EU states, administrative and bureaucratic resources of small states remain less than large states in terms of the number of policy experts based in national delegations in the EU institutions and in outside missions. Compared to large states, small states' administrative and bureaucratic personnel and policy experts who are employed in the EU institutions and in outside missions are less than large states. Scholars explain that in determining the role and influence of states in the international politics, the sufficiency of their diplomatic and

bureaucratic capacities are important and should be considered (Kaniok & Majer, 2016, pp. 2-3; Thorhallsson, 2006, pp. 27-28). Panke (2010) notes that small EU states have “undersized staff and fewer financial means” (Panke, 2010, p. 801). Having small diplomatic and bureaucratic capacities is a structural disadvantage for small states in the EU institutions. In that regard, small EU states develop different strategies in order to overcome this vulnerability and to maintain their successful national position in the Council of the EU. The first strategy which is applied for small member states is the prioritisation of issue areas which are nationally important for them (Panke, 2009, p. 5). Although large member states have the ability to influence and to be actively involved in negotiations in and out of their political, economic, and social interests, small member states need to prioritise the issue areas which are politically, economically, and socially more important for them and to direct their expertise capacity in those prioritised areas. Due to the limited administrative and bureaucratic capacities, small states always need to concentrate on the policy issues in which they will have political and economic gains in return. However, large EU states can be active in diverse policy areas and be influential in policy-wise due to their large administrative resources.

Small states use the deficiency of having limited administrative and bureaucratic capacities for their benefit as well. Small states concentrate on the core issues which are nationally more important for them and direct their expertise in those policy issues. Concentration of the expertise to specific policies also provides the opportunity for small states to be active in their prioritised issues instead of focusing on the wide policy areas. Therefore, other policy areas which are less important for small member states’ interests

were deployed to the supranational policy-making mechanisms with the trust that the supranational policy-making mechanisms will ensure the equality of EU states and small states' national sensitivities will not be harmed.

When administrative and bureaucratic capacities remain insufficient, small EU states remain to be selective in policy areas which they focus on. Despite this selective attitude, small states still may remain ineffective in exerting an influence on particular policy areas. When this occurs, another strategy which they apply is on advocating European values, norms, and principles (Björkdahl, 2008, p. 138). These issues are always refereed on behalf of European common good which will ensure the benefit of the all EU member states rather than specific national interests in which large member states may seek for and try to influence other member states to achieve the goal which will be in accordance with the large states' national interest. This approach which is mostly utilised by small member states creates the opportunity to be mostly accepted by large member states as this approach limits large states to diverge from the European principles and values in order to pursue their national interests. As a result of the negotiations with the "Europeanised" approach applied by the small member states return to them as a reward which will ensure small states' national interests.

The importance of engaging into coalitions by forming consensus because of the QMV system also comes into the agenda for small states when they approach to the negotiations by referring to the European principles and values. The QMV method urges

states to be in coalition with other states during the voting processes in most of the policy areas in the Council of the EU. However, these coalitions are not permanent and varies across policy areas between states. In that regard, small EU states are always regarded as the coalition partners by other member states on a particular policy issue and not in another issue. When large member states get into disagreement with other large states on a particular policy issue, small EU states play an important role in maintaining or moderating the conflict among states by being a coalition partner and in ensuring the smoothness of the policy-making processes by emphasizing the EU and international principles, values, and norms instead of being part of the disagreement.

Both large and small EU states were aimed to be represented equally as it has been stated as an EU founding principle. The Presidency of the Council of the EU was designed in rotation with six-month duration for each member state. This rotation has a lot of importance for small EU states. Presidency of the Council of the EU increases visibility of small states both within the EU institutional workings and also in international politics in representing the EU in other international organisations. Within the institutional workings of the EU, small states forward policies to the agenda during the Presidency and to negotiate them by prioritising in the EU policy-making (Bunse, 2009, pp. 40-43).

Cyprus held the Presidency only once, which was between July and December 2012. The Presidency was coincided with the economic crisis and rising unemployment rates in the EU states. In that regard, by prioritising the economic and social policies with the motto

of “Towards a Better Europe” (Cyprus Presidency, 2012) Cyprus influenced the agenda of the Council of the EU decision-making processes. Luxembourg has held the Council Presidency twelve times since 1960. The last Presidency was between July and December 2015. During the last Presidency in 2015, Luxembourg prioritised the migration issue and brought the migration policies to the agenda with the aim of improving the immigration policy which would be in accordance with the EU values and principles (Luxembourg Presidency, 2015). Another priority in which Luxembourg placed during the Presidency was the need for the revitalisation of the single market which would be appropriate for the digital technological developments and for the creation of job opportunities for the youth (Luxembourg Presidency, 2015). Malta’s and Estonia’s Presidencies were in 2017 in which the Maltese Presidency was between January and June 2017 and Estonian Presidency was between July and December 2017. Malta also set the migration as the main priority to be kept on the agenda and hosted the Valetta Summit on migration to improve policies on this policy area (Malta Presidency, 2017). As being an island member state, Malta also showed a big interest on the maritime sector and emphasized the need for a coherent maritime policy during its Presidency (Malta Presidency, 2017). Lastly, priorities of the Estonian Presidency were shaped by the importance given to the “United Europe through Balance” (Estonia Presidency, 2017). The main objective set by the Estonian Presidency was to find a ground in which all of the different views can be united for a better EU. The main policy area which was set during the Estonian Presidency was on the digitalisation of the European polity in light of the technological developments and on the “free movement of the data” across Europe (Estonia Presidency,

2017). Hence, in accordance with this prioritisation, Tallinn Digital Summit was held in Estonia.

In the contemporary design of the Council of the EU, QMV is one of the decision-making mechanisms which is mainly used in addition to the simple majority voting or unanimous voting systems. Simple majority and unanimous voting systems first place all of the member states in an equal place and prepare an opportunity for all member states to block any decision which is against their interests. However, currently, QMV method is applied almost in all policy areas. Below are the voting weights of the EU states according to the QMV method.

Table 9. Voting Weights of the States According to the QMV Method

Source: Council of the European Union (2016d)

Member State	Voting Weight	Member State	Voting Weight
United Kingdom	29	Bulgaria	10
Germany	29	Austria	10
France	29	Lithuania	7
Italy	29	Denmark	7
Spain	27	Ireland	7
Poland	27	Slovakia	7
Romania	14	Croatia	7
Netherlands	13	Finland	7

Table 9 (cont'd)

Portugal	12	Luxembourg	4
Hungary	12	Estonia	4
Greece	12	Cyprus	4
Belgium	12	Latvia	4
Czech Republic	12	Slovenia	4
Sweden	10	Malta	3

As can be observed from the table above, small states have a very low vote weight. In light of these voting weights, small states are in need of engaging into coalitions with other small states. When small states engage into coalitions with other small states, 13-member states having the minimum population size need to vote against the proposal, so that the proposal is rejected. In other words, if all of the small states possessing the voting weights between three and seven together with Bulgaria vote against the proposal, the proposal is rejected. Within the context of the QMV rule, this ratio is equal to 8.35 percent of the EU population. The second option for small states is to engage into coalition with large member states and allow for the proposal to be approved. In that regard, if a small state is allied with large states, the small state contributes to the voting weight and the population ratio for a proposal to be approved. In that regard, if Germany gets into alliance with the small states with the voting weights with seven, four, and three, and if these states vote against the proposal, the proposal is rejected.

Within the time frame of this research, between July 1, 2014 and December 31, 2016, most of the proposals in the Council of the EU were voted by the QMV system. In 2016 there were 89, in 2015 there were 85, and between July 1st and December 31st of 2014, there were 38 decisions which were voted. Out of 212 decisions, 145 of the decisions of the Ordinary Legislative Procedure were used, and they were all voted by the QMV method.¹⁷ The distribution of the decisions is shown below across policy areas:

Table 10. Distribution of the Decisions Voted Across Policy Areas
Source: Council of the European Union (2014-2016, 2016b)

Policy Area	Number of Votes
Economic and Monetary Affairs	24
Budget	3
International Trade	13
Transport and Tourism	16
Industry, Research, and Energy	4
Environment and Public Health	13
Constitutional and Intra-institutional Affairs	1
Legal Affairs	29
Agriculture	5
Regional Development	2
Internal Market and Consumer Protection	10
Culture and Education	0

¹⁷ See APPENDIX D for the Council of the EU Voting Data.

Table 10 (cont'd)

Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs	14
Fisheries	8
Employment and Social Affairs	3
Foreign and Security Policy	0

As seen in Table 10, decisions taken were mostly in the areas of “economic and monetary affairs, legal affairs, international trade, transport and tourism, environment and public health, internal market and consumer protection, civil liberties, justice, and home affairs” (Council of the European Union, 2016b). However, in policy areas of “foreign and security policy, employment and social affairs, fisheries, culture and education, regional development, agriculture, constitutional and intra-institutional affairs, industry, research and energy, and budgetary issues” (Council of the European Union, 2016b), only 26 decisions were voted in total. In the “foreign and security policy and in agricultural policy issues” (Council of the European Union, 2016b), unanimity was used as voting method. Similarly, the “intra-institutional affairs” (Council of the European Union, 2016b) are voted on simple majority. In that regard, the decisions in which the QMV rule is not applied, there are 67 decisions which were taken by other voting methods in those areas.

Within the determined time frame of the analysis, 25-member states voted against or abstained during the voting processes on 145 proposals. The Czech Republic, Italy, and

Lithuania did not vote against a proposal. On the other hand, in the policy areas “regional development and international trade” (Council of the European Union, 2016b), all proposals submitted for voting were accepted without any rejections. In “foreign and security policy” (Council of the European Union, 2016b) as well as “culture and education” (Council of the European Union, 2016b), there was not any decision given within the time frame of the analysis. “Civil liberties, justice and home affairs, environment and public health, internal market, and consumer protection” (Council of the European Union, 2016b) were the areas in which member states voted mostly against the proposal or abstained. In contrast, decisions given in “budgetary issues, employment and social affairs as well as constitutional and intra-institutional affairs” (Council of the European Union, 2016b) got few objections from states. Below is the table which indicates the voting behaviour by the member state representatives across different policy areas, in terms of when the member states reject the proposal or abstain from voting. The vote “Abstain” under the Qualified Majority Voting method means the “Vote Against” (Council of the European Union, 2016d).

Table 11. Number of Votes Across Policy Areas (Abstained/Voted Against by States)
Source: Council of the European Union (2014-2016)

MS/PA	EC	BU	TR	IN	EN	CO	LE	AG	IM	CL	FI	EM
AT	2			1	2		1	1	2	3		
BE					2	1	1	1	1			
BG					2							
CY					2							
DE	1				1		1	1	1			

Table 11 (cont'd)

DK	1				2		3	1	2	11		
EE							1		2			
ES							1		1		1	
FI	1								1			
FR									1			
UK	2		4	1		1	4	3	2	10	2	
EL				1	1							
HR				1	1							
HU					3			2				
IE							1		2	7		
LU	1				1							
LV					1						1	
MT					1				1		1	
NL	1	1		1		1	3	2	1			
PL	1		3		3					1		
PT	1				1							1
RO					4							
SE								1	1			
SI	1		1	1				1				
SK								1	1			
TO	12	1	8	6	27	3	16	14	19	32	4	2

When the position of the EU states is concerned within time frame of the analysis, it is possible to see that member states showed small numbers of objections to the proposals, except for the United Kingdom. Similarly, small states rejected or abstained from a very small number of proposals. In that regard, Cyprus rejected only two proposals. Whereas Estonia voted against two proposals, there was one abstention. The same voting behaviour with Estonia applies to Malta as well. Lastly, Luxembourg voted against one proposal and abstained once. In this research, the proposals in which Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, and Luxembourg voted against or abstained are qualitatively examined and the behaviour of the representatives are analysed in light of the strategies in which small states use to influence the decision-making processes in the Council of the EU.

5.3. Small States Embracing European Values and Norms and Entering into Alliances with Other Member States

Small states employ strategies in order to maintain their influence during the policy processes in the Council. Two main strategies are given in the literature as small states engaging into coalitions with other states to pursue their national interests and advocating European values, principles, and norms by creating an approach for other states that the particular policy issue is against the common good of the EU. In this section of this chapter, five policy proposals are investigated in light of these strategies applied by Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, and Luxembourg. Those proposals are chosen among the decisions taken between the June 1, 2014 and the December 31, 2016. They are the

proposals in which Cypriot, Maltese, Estonian, and Luxembourgish representatives voted against or were absent at the moment when voting procedure took place. In that regard, those five proposals are the following:

“The Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the monitoring, reporting and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013” (EUR-Lex, 2013a).

“Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on package travel and linked travel arrangements, amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC” (EUR-Lex, 2013b).

“Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 2009/38/EC and 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, and Council Directives 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC as regards seafarers” (EUR-Lex, 2013d).

“Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 on trade in seal products and repealing Commission Regulation (EU) No 737/2010” (EUR-Lex, 2015).

“Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on payment services in the internal market and amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and

Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC” (EUR-Lex, 2013c).

5.3.1. The Regulation on Maritime Transport: Cyprus Emphasizes European Union Principles, Malta Gets into Alliance with Greece

The “Regulation on the Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification of the Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Maritime Transportation and amending Regulation (EU) No. 525/2013” (EUR-Lex, 2013a) was discussed and adopted with the aim of reducing the carbon dioxide emissions in the shipping sector and reducing the negative impact on climate change. The policy area is on environment and public health. In that regard, the Ministers of Transportation, Telecommunications, and Energy all participated in the voting. The ordinary legislative procedure was used, and the proposal was voted by the QMV system. Although policy-making process started in 2013, final voting took place in 2015. The regulation was proposed by the European Commission and sent to the Council and the EP. The EP voted for the regulation with amendments. The amendments were discussed in the Commission and sent back to the Council and the EP to be voted. Among member states representatives, Poland chose to abstain, and Cypriot, Maltese, and Greek ministers voted against the regulation. On the other hand, 24 ministers voted for the regulation. One-member state abstained during the voting process. The regulation was approved and began to be implemented.

When it is looked at position of small states during the discussions in the Council on this policy issue, strategies applied by small member states were both referring to the EU principles and getting into alliance with other member states. Cyprus voted against the proposal by claiming that the regulation would negatively influence the market competition, and Malta got into alliance with Greece by claiming that the regulation will increase the administrative costs and the collection and publication of the data would be against the principle of the privacy. The Cypriot representative explained his concerns that:

Cyprus had clearly expressed preference for a broadly agreed international monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system under the aegis of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) ... In particular Cyprus believes that the provisions included in Article 21 of the Regulation that are related to the publication of information relevant to the energy efficiency of ships will result in distortionary competitive effects. Also, the information to be published regarding the energy efficiency of ships are not uniformly comparable and thus will lead to inappropriate conclusions and affect the market and the decision making for new rules. Cyprus, therefore, is not in a position to consent to the adoption of the Regulation (Council of the European Union, 2015d).

Whereas Cyprus rejected the proposal with a position that the reference given to the European principles, as the market competition, the convention of the International Maritime Organisation was claimed as a protective instrument which would ensure the proper implementation of this regulation. On the other hand, when it is looked at the position of Malta during the voting process on the regulation, getting into alliance with a large state was the strategy applied. In that regard, Malta and Greece voted against the regulation by stating that:

We (The Hellenic Republic and Malta) consider that not all data required for each ship to be monitored and reported are relevant for the purpose of monitoring,

reporting and verifying CO2 emissions from ships, thus increasing the administrative burden and costs for both the flag States and the shipowners with no evident benefit to the marine environment ... In addition, the Hellenic Republic and Malta are not convinced about the proportionality and added value of publishing commercially sensitive data, especially those related to “transport work” and “cargo carried”, taking especially into account that ships operate in an environment subject to many variables which are not under the control of any party and influence their performance. Bearing in mind the above, the Hellenic Republic and Malta are not in a position to consent to the final agreement on the proposed Regulation (Council of the European Union, 2015d).

Malta and Greece made a joint statement expressed their concerns about the negative results of the implementation of this regulation. The first concern raised by those states was about the increase of the administrative burden and costs which would not be beneficial for the marine industry, and the second concern was that the regulation would harm the EU principle in terms of the privacy. The regulation was approved and was signed in 2015 by the Presidents of the EP and the Council, and it became binding on all of the member states.

5.3.2. The Directive on Travel Arrangements: Small States Allied and Maltese Sensitivity Emphasized

The “Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on package travel and linked travel arrangements, amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC” (EUR-Lex, 2013b) was initially proposed by European Commission in 2013. It was adopted in 2015 at the end of the second reading. The policy area of the directive was “internal market and consumer protection” (Council of the

European Union, 2016b). Ordinary legislative procedure was used, and it was voted on by QMV. Main objective of the directive is to strengthen the protection of consumers through the services they buy during their touristic travels. It is explained that the directive on the protection of consumers who benefit from touristic packages for their holidays needs revision because of the technological developments, and the previous directive was unsuccessful in creating harmonization among states. Hence, this directive was proposed to modernise previous arrangements which would ensure the protection of the consumers and would adopt the technological developments in the tourism sector. The proposal was initiated by the European Commission and sent to the Council and the EP. Whereas Council approved the proposal in the first reading, it was sent back from the EP with amendments. In the second reading, Commission adopted the changes in which the EP proposed and sent them back to the Council and the EP. In the second reading, it was approved by both institutions, and the proposal became directive in which member states were in need of adopting the directive at the national level. When the voting procedure took place in the Council on second reading of the proposal, 21-member states voted for and seven-member states voted against it. There was no abstention. Seven-member states which voted against the proposal were Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands, and Slovakia. These states can be considered as small states and during the discussions on the proposal they developed different strategies in order to convince their counterparts. Against large member states, small member states engaged into alliance and emphasized deficiencies of the proposal. Apart from Austria, the ministers from Belgium, Estonia, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands, and Slovakia in their joint statement expressed that:

... We support the improvement of consumer protection, where needed, e.g. in the field of dynamic packages ... However, we do have questions regarding the way this revision has worked out. Regulation needs to be smart and self-explanatory and must be enforceable. We have strong doubts whether this is the case with this proposal. A first point we want to raise regards the level of harmonization. The directive states that the target is maximum harmonization. In reality however, there are numerous enabling clauses inserted allowing all kinds of derogations or choices. This is not the way forward to create an internal market for package travels ... Regarding this point, a level playing field with third country operators is also important. Yet the mandatory insolvency protection requirement for third country operators is unenforceable and consequently may distort competition ... Furthermore, the proposal's potential for negative impact on airline services is also a concern, in particular for Member States whose tourism sector is more dependent on-air transport ... The proposal risks stifling innovation and hindering the competitiveness of our tourism sector, ultimately creating higher prices and less choice for consumers ... Therefore, we cannot support this proposal (Council of the European Union, 2015a).

The objections raised against this proposal clearly indicate the attempts to give references to the principles which are stated in the EU legislation. The harmonisation of the EU legislation in member states was one of those principles. In that regard, those member states stated their concerns about this proposal as it would negatively influence the harmonisation of the EU legislation. Market competition is another important reference given when those member states refused to the proposal. One of the requirements in which this directive brings to be implemented by all member states are claimed to be risky for the market competition. A significant objection was also introduced to this statement particularly by Malta. Malta is the only island member state in which the airline transportation is very important for the tourism sector. Hence, it was claimed that the implementation of this directive would create problems for the tourism sector in Malta. Malta was successful in negotiating its own priorities and incorporating it into the statement by forming a consensus with other member states. Despite all of these concerns

raised by small states, being into alliance could not rescue them to propose for any amendments in the proposal. The proposal was signed in November 2015 by the Presidents of the EP and the Council. It became the directive in which all of the member states would be in need of harmonising their domestic legislation with this directive.

5.3.3. Directive on Payment Services: Luxembourg Remains Alone

“The directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on payment services in the internal market and amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC” (EUR-Lex, 2013c) was proposed by the Commission in 2013. The proposal was in economic and monetary affairs. The ordinary legislative procedure was applied, and it was voted by QMV. Main emphasis given in the directive was on “modernising the payment services in the EU internal market in parallel to the technological developments” (EUR-Lex, 2013c). The objective of the proposal was to ensure that the consumers would fully benefit from technological means in the EU market and to improve the system of e-payment in line with the “Europe 2020 and the Digital Agenda” (EUR-Lex, 2013c). It is explained that by revising the previous legislation, the market integration would be deepened in the EU. The proposal was adopted in the first reading. The EP and the Council approved the proposal without any demand for amendments. During the voting process in the Council, 27-states voted for the proposal. None of the states abstained from voting. The sole member state which voted against the proposal was the Luxembourg. Nevertheless, Luxembourg has been the financial centre hosting financial institutions and contributing

the EU budget despite its tiny population size. In his statement, Luxembourg Minister for Agriculture, Viticulture, and Consumer Protection stressed that:

The first payment services directive (2007/64/EC) provided the legal basis for the creation of an EU-wide single market for payments and put in place a single passport for payment services providers. The new payment services directive which repeals directive 2007/64/EC, undermines the passporting regime established by directive 2007/64/EC and the principle of home Member State supervision, and thereby reintroduces potential for market fragmentation. Such development in the area of cross-border supervision of payment institutions is in contradiction with the aim of the initial proposal which is to help developing an EU-wide market for electronic payments and runs counter to the existing achievements in other financial services legislation ... In light of the above, Luxembourg votes against the new payment services directive (Council of the European Union, 2015c).

The objections raised by Luxembourg was about the technical substance of the directive. It was mainly argued that the revision of the directive would undermine the single passport regime for payment services providers. In raising the objections, Luxembourg also used the strategy of giving reference to the supranational principles which are guaranteed by EU treaties and the concerns on violating these principles were shared. Hence, the main emphasis was given to the integrity of the European common market and it was argued that the revisions in the directive would be in contrast with the legislation enacted in this policy area. However, because it was only the Luxembourg which voted against the proposal, it was accepted with the votes in favour given by other 27-member states. In December 2015, the procedure was completed, and the proposal was signed by the Presidents of the Council and the EP.

5.3.4. Regulation on Seal Products: Estonia Allies with Finland

“Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 on trade in seal products and repealing Commission Regulation (EU) No 737/2010” (EUR-Lex, 2015) was proposed in 2015. The policy area of the regulation is “internal market and consumer protection” (Council of the European Union, 2016b). The ordinary legislative procedure was applied, and the QMV system was used. The basic regulation on trade in seal production prohibited the selling of the seal products. The only exception to this ban was when the seal products were derived by hunting by indigenous communities in which seal hunting help for the survival of those communities (EUR-Lex, 2015). The previous version of the regulation was found out to be arbitrary and unjustifiable by the World Trade Organisation. Therefore, the objective of the revised regulation was to implement the recommendations given by the World Trade Organisation and to make the regulation in compatible with its rulings. The proposal was adopted in the first reading. The Commission sent the proposal to the Council and the EP. The Parliament approved the proposal with amendments and the Council approved the proposal with amendments sent by the EP. During the voting process in the Council, 23-member states voted for the proposal. Whereas Sweden voted against, Denmark, Estonia, France, and Finland abstained. During the negotiation process about this proposal, Estonia showed a small state behaviour by engaging into coalition with Finland in raising the concerns about the deficiencies of the proposal. In that regard, the joint statement by Finland and Estonia was the following:

... Finland and Estonia consider the dispute settlement system of the WTO as a central element in providing security, credibility and predictability to the multilateral trading system, and fully agree that the WTO ruling in Seal Products

case (DS 400/401) shall be respected ... While welcoming the continuation of the trade possibilities in seal products for Inuit and other indigenous communities, Finland and Estonia emphasize the need of such possibilities for the interest of fisheries and small-scale artisanal production in accordance with long standing traditions and cultural heritage ... Finland and Estonia are of the view that the outcome of the negotiations could have been more balanced. Such a balanced solution would have improved the international animal welfare standards, taken into account the needs of small communities and small-scale coastal fisheries and the sustainable use of exhaustible marine resources in preserving the ecosystem balance. For these reasons, Finland and Estonia abstain from voting on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation No 1007/2009 on trade in seal products (Council of the European Union, 2015b).

The main concerns raised by Estonia and Finland were based on protecting the national fisheries industry which added to “the protection of the rights of the indigenous communities on seal trade” (Council of the European Union, 2015b). In that regard, the emphasis on the national heritage and traditional values are placed in the text which would imply the need for the protection of the domestic fisheries sector in those member states. Providing reference to the international standards on the animal welfare and the environmental issues, Finland and Estonia claimed the need for protecting the domestic fishing sector in both states. Nevertheless, despite one abstention and three against votes, the regulation was approved October 2015.

5.3.5. Directive on Seafarers: Malta Abstains from Voting by Emphasizing the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

“The Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2008/94/EC, 2009/38/EC and 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the

Council, and Council Directives 98/59/EC and 2001/23/EC as regards seafarers” (EUR-Lex, 2013d) was proposed in 2013. The ordinary legislative procedure was applied, and the voting took place by the QMV system. It was discussed under the policy area of “employment and social affairs” (Council of the European Union, 2016b). The objective of the proposal was inclusion of the working rights of the seafarers to the pre-legislated directives harmonised with the EU labour law. Previous directives regulating the working conditions of the labour provided safe guarding measures for all sectors, but the seafarers were excluded from the scope of these directives. In that regard, the proposal was submitted to include the conditions which would protect the rights of the seafarers because of the concerns on the lack of the interest on the maritime sector in the EU states. It was explained by the Commission that with the proposal the protection of the worker rights would be improved, the scope of EU law on labour rights would be extended to the maritime sector with a specific focus of the seafarers (EUR-Lex, 2013d). The directive was approved in the first reading. After the European Commission initiated the process, the proposal was forwarded to the EP, and it was approved without any amendments. In the Council, 27-member states voted for the proposal and only Malta showed abstention. By showing abstention, Malta showed a small island state behaviour emphasizing its national interests and used the strategy of referring to the EU Treaty. In his statement, the Minister of the Sustainable Development, Environment, and Climate Change stated that:

Malta fully supports the amending Directive’s objective of improving the living and working conditions of seafarers and increasing the attractiveness of maritime employment. However, it considers that extending the same EU legislative framework applicable to land-based workers to seafarers is not the right means to attain such objectives ... Malta also contests that the adoption of the Directive can be based on Article 153(2) TFEU in conjunction with Article 153(1) paragraphs (b) and (e) TFEU. Malta is of the view that the correct legal basis for amendments to the Collective Redundancies Directive and to the Transfer of Undertakings

Directive is Article 153(2) in conjunction with Article 153(1) paragraph (d) TFEU since they both relate to the protection of workers where their employment is terminated ... Therefore, for the abovementioned reasons, while firmly supporting the objectives of improving the living and working conditions of seafarers, Malta abstains from voting (Council of the European Union, 2015a).

As an island member state, Maltese concerns were based on applicability of the directive which would contrast with the TFEU. Hence, Malta by referring to EU treaties showed its position during the voting process in the Council. Nevertheless, the proposal was approved in 2015. Consequently, the directive began to be implemented by the EU states.

5.4. Conclusion

In the contemporary design of the Council of the EU, QMV is one of the decision-making mechanisms which is mainly used, in addition to the simple majority voting or unanimous voting systems. The voting weights in which member states have according to the QMV method urge member states to seek for a consensus in which most of the member states show similar perceptions towards policy proposals. Therefore, small EU states apply various strategies of engaging into coalitions and advocating European and international principles, to show their influence during decision-making mechanisms in the Council. The regulation on the maritime transportation shows Malta being in an alliance with Greece. Similarly, during the negotiations on the regulation about the seal products, Estonia tried to raise her voice by entering into a coalition with Finland. On the other hand, the directive on the travelling arrangements formed a case showing the alliance of small states to maintain their position and to stress their concerns about the

proposal. Directives on payment services, seafarers, and maritime transportation are cases in which Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta applied the strategy of emphasizing European and international principles in defending their positions on the proposals. Those states used the arguments by claiming that the implementation of these regulations and directives would be in contrast with the EU treaties and international conventions. The Council Presidency is another opportunity for small states to have an influence in the EU. By prioritising policies and issues which are nationally important and bringing them to the Presidency agenda enable small states to increase their visibility, explain their national priorities and to direct the policy-making processes within the EU institutions. Cypriot, Estonian, Luxembourg, and Maltese Presidencies are examples in which those member states impacted the policy-making processes according to the goals set in various policy areas and on different issues.

The representation of small states is nevertheless open to debate in terms of the influence they exert during the decision-making processes in the Council. Although, the concerns expressed during the voting processes and the votes given against a proposal or showing abstention provides the small states to express their concerns on a particular policy proposal, the examination of the directives and regulations within the time-frame of this research showed that despite the objections showed by the small member states, all of the policy proposals were accepted. Compared to the unanimous and simple majority voting methods, the QMV system has not been for the benefit of the small states which would ensure and protect their national priorities in an EU institution in which the intergovernmental bargaining occurs and national interests are defended.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

6.1. Summary of the Findings

In this study the representation of four small member states in the EU policy-making were examined. By developing a set of hypotheses on the structural factors which shape the role of small state representatives, the representation of Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, and Malta in the EP and the Council of the EU was investigated with a focus on the relationship established between citizens and the representatives. The scope of this research was limited to the legislative activities pursued in the Council of the EU and the EP, narrowed to voting behaviour of representatives in EU policy-making and perceptions of citizens towards the representatives. Therefore, empirical analysis was made by testing the structural factors of representing high percentage of the population,

domestic and supranational party systems and limited administrative resources influencing the position of small states in the EU institutions. In the EP, these structural factors lead representatives to establish a closer relationship with their constituencies. Furthermore, these factors also lead small state representatives to develop strategies in order to influence the decision-making in Council. This study explored the influence of small states in EU policy-making in light of the existing theoretical approaches synthesized with the EU policy-making mechanisms in understanding position of small states within the EU institutional context and vis-à-vis large states.

Drawing on the initial research question concerning how the political representation of small member states has been shaped in EU policy-making since the Lisbon Treaty, the case study method was applied by selecting four small member states (i.e. Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, and Luxembourg). The aim of this research was to empirically test whether the domestic and supranational structural factors have influence on the role of these small EU states in policy-making processes. It was proposed that domestic and supranational structures impact representation of those states in the EP and Council of the EU. Compared to large state representatives, in the Council, representatives from those states employ various strategies in order to overcome their weaknesses and to have an impact on policy-making processes. In the EP, the structural factors impact representatives' legislative behaviour and lead Cypriot, Maltese, Estonian and Luxembourgish representatives to establish closer relationship with their constituencies.

This research began by providing a theoretical overview which provides answers to the questions of how small states are conceptualised and are represented in international politics. The theoretical framework on the role of small states was reviewed in light of the neorealist, neoliberal institutionalist, and social constructivist approaches. After providing an examination of the progress in the literature regarding representation of small states in international politics, various conceptualisations of the term “small state” were evaluated in light of the analyses made by scholar in their existing studies. The concept of “representation” was explained and formed the foundation of explaining the representation of small states in the multi-levelled structure of the EU. The study proceeded by trying to answer the question of how to define and categorise small EU states. Small states were evaluated by looking at their objective and subjective capabilities. An elaboration on country cases was also provided by providing an insight about the political culture and party politics as domestic structural factors impact representation processes in EU policy-making. This exploration was developed through examination of the perceptions of citizens from countries which are focus of the research. The perceptions towards the EU were investigated with the data collected from EUROBAROMETER Surveys between 2004 and 2016.

An empirical analysis of the representation of Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, and Luxembourg in the Council of the EU and the EP was made in subsequent parts of the study.

Analysing the PARLEMETER Survey Data Set, the divide between large and small states were examined with a focus on the perceptions of the EU citizens towards their representatives in the EP. Furthermore, the variances among small states were assessed

within the context of citizens' perceptions towards their representatives. It continued with the analysis of the primary data on the interviews conducted with small state Members of the EP. Representation of Cyprus, Malta, Estonia and Luxembourg were examined in EU policy-making. It was made by considering the behaviour of the representatives during their legislative activities in the EP in light of the structural factors influencing their voting behaviour. Furthermore, the representation of small states in the Council of the EU were explored by considering the strategies they apply to position themselves during EU policy-making were explored. The strategies employed by small member states were assessed which lead them to exert an influential role in the institution. These strategies were tested by examining five policy proposals. In that regard, several proposals on different policy areas voted in the Council of the EU between July 1, 2014 and December 31, 2016, were examined in respect to the strategies applied by Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, and Luxembourg. These proposals were "the regulation on the monitoring, reporting and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport, the directive on package travel and linked travel arrangements, the directive as regards seafarers, the regulation on trade in seal products, and the directive on payment services in the internal market" which were abstained or voted against by small member states (EUR-Lex, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2015).

In this study, the country cases were selected according to various determinants which reflect the economic, political, demographic, and social differences among those states. When population size is considered, states which have population size below 1.5 million form the cases of this research. These member states are Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, and

Luxembourg. In terms of the institutional representation, they have six seats each in the EP. In the Council of the EU, Malta has a voting weight as three when the QMV method is considered. The voting weights of Cyprus, Estonia, and Luxembourg are four for each state. Four of these member states have different aspirations in joining the EU, and the political culture in these countries was shaped along different attitudes towards EU membership. The examination of the EUROBAROMETER Survey Data also confirms this claim. In that regard, the EU membership of Cyprus was perceived positively by Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities and the main perceptions were within the context of the solution prospects to the Cyprus problem. In the two-party Maltese politics, its membership to the EU was subject to domestic discussion in the public, and these discussions were mainly concerned with whether EU accession would contribute to economic prosperity for the island. Estonia acquired EU membership with the aims of strengthening the democratic transformation and economic wellbeing of the country after its independence. Lastly, Luxembourg has always maintained its importance through political and economic processes of European integration with an emphasis given to the ideals of the European project rather than the domestic, political, and economic concerns.

The EUROBAROMETER Survey Data indicates that during the initial EU accession period, positive attitude towards the EU by the Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, Maltese, and Estonian citizens was between the range of 37 and 58 percent. Luxembourgish citizens also positively perceived the image of the EU until 2010 between 50 to 60 percent. In the Turkish Cypriot Community, the trend showed sharp fluctuations. In 2004 and 2006, 70 percent of Turkish Cypriots positively perceived the EU whereas in 2010

only 40 percent of the Turkish Cypriots' attitudes were positive. The year 2012 marked an important divide in which positive perceptions towards the EU showed a significant decrease. The negative consequences of the economic crisis in Europe began to impact daily lives of citizens, and in that regard, a decline is evident between 2012 and 2013 in those four-member states. Nevertheless, the recovery of the negative impacts of the economic crisis also led to an increase in the perceptions of the citizens towards the EU in a positive way.

In the EP, in order to explore the representation of small states, it is important to determine whether there is a difference in the perceptions of small state citizens towards the EP compared to the large EU states. In that regard, the PARLEMETER Survey Data reveals that the awareness about the EP was between 70 and 80 percent between 2010 and 2012. Added to the high level of awareness of the EP as an institution, its visibility in terms of the legislative activities pursued by the Members of the EP remains considerably low between 2010 and 2016. Notably, 30 to 40 percent of small and large member state citizens claimed that they are aware of the legislative activities pursued in the EP.

Positive image of the EP also remains between 30 to 40 percent until 2014. Beginning in 2014, the positive image of the EP started to decline to 23 percent for large state citizens and 29 for small state citizens. Moving on, 30 percent of small state citizens think that the Members of the EP sit according to their nationalities. This perception is 37-40 percent for large state citizens. The importance given to national priorities by representatives also remains below 45 percent as it is perceived by the large and small state citizens. 40 to 45

percent of large state citizens think that the decisions are adopted in parallel to national interests in the EP, and this ratio is between 35 and 38 percent for small state citizens.

Upon investigation of the differences among small member states, similar patterns are observed between 2010 and 2013. Approximately 63 to 85 percent of Cypriot, Maltese, Luxembourg, and Estonian citizens claimed that they are aware of the EP as an institution. After a decline in 2012 and 2013, 51-57 percent of the Cypriot, 62-69 percent of Maltese and Estonian, and 73-83 percent of Luxembourg citizens claimed that they were informed about the EP between 2014 and 2016. However, the level of information received by small state citizens about the EP's activities fluctuated between 2010 and 2016. Luxembourg ranks at the top, as 40 to 50 percent of Luxembourg citizens expressed that "they are informed about the EP's activities" (European Parliament, 2010-2016). Malta is the second highest between 34 and 43 percent. Estonia is ranked as the fourth, between 19 to 25 percent. The same pattern is observed within the context of the image of the EP for Estonia. Only 15 to 30 percent of Estonian citizens claimed that they have "a positive attitude towards the EP" (European Parliament, 2010-2016). Malta ranked as the first between 2012 and 2014. In 2015 and 2016, 35 to 37 percent of Luxembourg citizens expressed that "the EP conjures up a positive image for them" (European Parliament, 2010-2016), and 34 to 41 percent of Luxembourg citizens think that the "Members of the EP sit according to their national affiliations" (European Parliament, 2010-2016). When the Cypriot, Maltese, and Luxembourg citizens are assessed this ratio remains 21 to 31 of citizens who think that the "Members of the EP pursue their legislative activities according to the national interests" (European

Parliament, 2010-2016). When the decisions taken in the EP are considered, 22 to 27 percent of Estonian citizens think that “decisions are taken according to the national interests” (European Parliament, 2010-2016). Whereas Malta ranked as the third with the ratio 32 to 36, the perceptions of the Cypriots showed a significant change in 2013. After 2013, 44 to 48 percent of Cypriot citizens think that the “decisions are taken in parallel to the national priorities of the Member states in the EP” (European Parliament, 2010-2016). The divide between large and small EU states and the variations among small states which are examined in this research indicates that political, economic, supranational, and domestic developments influence perceptions of the citizens towards the EP. In that regard, the economic crisis in Europe can be marked as an important juncture which also impacted the perceptions of the citizens. After the 2013 economic crisis, the positive perceptions of the small state citizens could not reach the levels observed during the pre-economic crisis period. This is due to the medium and long-term consequences of the crisis. Due to the short-term impact of the economic crisis in daily lives of the citizens, the influence is directly reflected on their perceptions.

When legislative behaviour of small state representatives is concerned, there are three structural factors which were argued to be influential in their voting behaviour (representing high percentage of the population of the country, the party systems and limited administrative capacities). The interviews reveal that in the EP these structural factors influence representative responsibilities of small state Members of the EP and requires a closer relationship with their constituencies. Similarly, twelve Cypriot, Estonian, Luxembourgish, and Maltese Members of the EP felt themselves to be

responsible for establishing closer contact with their constituencies. This also led them to feel more accountable and responsive towards their constituencies during their legislative activities in the EP.

Furthermore, in this research, it was proposed that in the Council of the EU, representatives from those states employ common strategies to influence policy-making processes despite their structural deficiencies. It was expected that small state representatives tend to engage in coalitions with other small states to vote against or block a decision or employ the strategy of referencing international European principles and values in order to show their objection during the voting processes in the Council when the QMV method is applied. The analysis of the regulation on the maritime transportation showed Malta's alliance with Greece. Regarding the regulation about seal products, Estonia raised its objection by entering into a coalition with Finland. The directive on travel arrangements showed the alliance of small states instead of small states' alliance with large states. Directives on payment services, seafarers, and maritime transportation are the cases in which Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta applied the strategy of emphasizing European and international principles in defending their position during the voting processes.

Another important mechanism in which small states demonstrate their influence is during the Council Presidency. In that regard, the Presidencies of the Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, and Luxembourg held between 2012 and 2017 also led those states to bring the salient

policy issues to the legislative agenda of the EU. Luxembourg prioritised migration, revitalisation of the single market, and creation of job opportunities for the youth. Malta also set migration as the main priority and emphasised developing coherent policies in the maritime sector. The priorities of the Estonian Presidency were shaped along technological developments in Europe. Cyprus influenced the agenda by emphasizing the need for a comprehensive framework on the EU budget and a stronger economic governance system which would be helpful for member states to recover from the economic crisis and to empower growth of the economy in member states.

6.2. Theoretical and Empirical Contributions-Avenues for Future Research

The main theoretical framework on social constructivism harmonised with the concept of “representation” provided the theoretical and empirical background in examining the representation of small EU states in policy-making processes and to make within and across case comparisons between small states based on domestic and supranational structural factors within the EU institutional context. In applying the case study approach, four small member states were selected, and the representation of these states were examined in the Council of the EU and the EP, through the relationship established between the representatives and citizens.

The main objective of this research was to explore the political representation of small states in the EU policy-making after ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Multi-level assessment of the representation of the small EU states theoretically and empirically

contributed to the literature in several aspects. One of the theoretical contributions of this study was to link the concept of the “representation” with the social constructivism. Synthesizing the social constructivist approach with the concept of representation has provided a background for improving our knowledge on the representation of member states in the EU. Structural factors influencing international position of states were incorporated to the concept of representation and were contextualised within the EU. Therefore, the relationship between the represented and the representative was examined within the EU framework. The analysis on the voting behaviour of the representatives in the EP and the Council of the EU embodied in the processes of representation was also refined empirically and methodologically in investigating the relationship between representatives and the citizens. Another contribution of this study lies within the ongoing debate of the democratic credentials of the EU. The “democratic deficit” problem was expected to be resolved by the reforms brought by the Lisbon Treaty. One of the concerns raised about this issue was the possibility of whether equal and active representation of member states would be ensured in an enlarged EU. Although, the notions of equality, accountability, responsiveness were clearly pointed out throughout treaty reforms, including the Lisbon Treaty, the empirical analysis on the representation of small EU states would provide an insight on the application of these principles, mainly, the equality of states and citizens. This study contributes to earlier scholarship on country cases which were examined. Hence, this research aimed to increase our knowledge within country cases which are small EU states, namely, Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, and Luxembourg.

Nevertheless, due to the focus on four EU states, it is difficult to assume generalizations about the processes and mechanisms of the political representation of small EU states in this research. Despite the theoretical and empirical contributions of this study, there is need for further research on this topic. Any of the theoretical and empirical assessments in this research could be enriched by taking this examination one step further. Broadening the scope of this research, applying it in wider contexts would be valuable in terms of its contribution to the field. The number of country cases could be increased by revising the objective and subjective criteria in categorising small and large states. The inclusion of more small states could contribute to the examination of the arguments of this research concerning the representation of small EU states. Expanding the time frame could also be beneficial in examining the pre- and post-ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and could create a more comparative approach. At the same time, this could increase the availability of the data. There could be more interviews conducted, and more data could be examined when the Council voting results, EUROBAROMETER Survey Data, and PARLEMETER Survey Data are considered. Interviewing EP representatives of large states could enable a more confident assessment of the difference between large and small states in terms of representation in the EP. All of these opportunities would render an extended cross-country comparison possible and would help decrease selection bias. Another route could be the limitation of the country cases and an examination of the representation of a specific small EU state in the policy-making processes as a single case study. Hence, this would result with the improvement of in-depth knowledge about the representation of a specific EU state limited to a specific time period and policy issues. This would also provide a deeper analysis of domestic structural factors influencing the

representation of small member states. The third opportunity which could take this research further is examining the multi-levelled policy-making settings of EU institutions. The voting processes both in the Council meetings and the EP Plenaries are the final stages of policy-making processes. Until a proposal comes to the voting stage, it is discussed in various committees and in national delegations in both institutions. The role and influence of small member states also matter at these institutional levels when a particular proposal is negotiated, revised, and sent to be voted on. When the limitations in administrative and bureaucratic capabilities of small states are concerned, the role of the appointed officials and experts in those committees is important as they may have an active role in maintaining small states' national priorities and in convincing other delegations when it is needed to amend a proposal. Therefore, negotiations taking place at this level could also be the subject of an examination which would contribute to the literature on the representation of small EU states in the policy-making processes. All of the suggested future contributions could help improve our understanding of the EU democratic credentials based on the legitimacy of EU institutions, and of the responsiveness and accountability of the representatives towards the European *demos*.

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Face-to-Face Interview.

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Face-to-Face Interview.

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Face-to-Face Interview.

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Face-to-Face Interview.

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Face-to-Face Interview.

Interview with Member of the European Parliament #8. (Conducted on 19 January 2016)
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APPENDICES

ABBREVIATIONS

(same as the terminology used in the Council of the EU)

Source

Council of the European Union (2016). Council Configurations. Retrieved from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/configurations/>

UK	United Kingdom	ECMA	Economic and Monetary Affairs
DE	Germany	BUDG	Budget
FR	France	INTR	International Trade
IT	Italy	TRTO	Transport and Tourism
ES	Spain	INRE	Industry, Research and Energy
PL	Poland	ENPH	Environment and Public Health
RO	Romania	COIA	Constitutional and Intra-institutional Affairs
NL	Netherlands	LEAF	Legal Affairs
PT	Portugal	AGRI	Agriculture
HU	Hungary	REDE	Regional Development
EL	Greece	IMCP	Internal Market and Consumer Protection
BE	Belgium	CUED	Culture and Education

CZ	Czech Republic	CLHJ	Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
SE	Sweden	FISH	Fisheries
BG	Bulgaria	EMSA	Employment and Social Affairs
AT	Austria	FOSP	Foreign and Security Policy
LT	Lithuania	AVES	Small States Average
DK	Denmark	AVEL	Large States Average
IE	Ireland	PA	Policy Area
SK	Slovakia	DN	Document Number
HR	Croatia		
FI	Finland		
LU	Luxembourg		
EE	Estonia		
CY	Cyprus		
TCC	Turkish Cypriot Community		
GCC	Greek Cypriot Community		
LV	Latvia		
SI	Slovenia		
MT	Malta		

APPENDIX A. SUMMARY OF THE PARLEMETER SURVEY DATA

Source

European Parliament. (2010-2016). EUROBAROMETER: PARLEMETER. Retrieved from <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/EUROBAROMETER>

Questions and Answers

P1. “Have you recently read in the press, seen on the Internet or on television or heard on the radio something about the European Parliament? YES, NO, DON’T KNOW”

(European Commission, 2004-2016)

P2. “In general, do you consider that you are very well, fairly well, fairly badly or very badly informed about the European Parliament’s activities? VERY WELL INFORMED, FAIRLY WELL INFORMED, FAIRLY BADLY INFORMED, VERY BADLY INFORMED, DON’T KNOW” (European Parliament, 2010-2016)

P3. “In general, does the European Parliament conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image? VERY POSITIVE, FAIRLY POSITIVE, NEUTRAL, FAIRLY NEGATIVE, VERY NEGATIVE, DON’T KNOW”

(European Parliament, 2010-2016)

P4. “And, in your opinion, do Members of the European Parliament sit in the European Parliament according to...? THEIR NATIONALITY, THEIR POLITICAL AFFINITIES, DON’T KNOW” (European Parliament, 2010-2016)

P5. “Would you say that the European Parliament’s decisions are adopted above all...? ACCORDING TO THE INTERESTS OF THE MEMBER STATES FROM WHICH THE MEPS COME, ACCORDING TO THE POLITICAL AFFINITIES OF THE MEPS, BOTH, DON’T KNOW” (European Parliament, 2010-2016)

Data

P1	2016									AVES
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	
YES	0.6	0.68	0.73	0.51	0.62	0.72	0.72	0.81	0.5	0.66125
NO	0.39	0.32	0.27	0.49	0.38	0.27	0.28	0.19	0.5	

P1	2016						AVEL
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL	
YES	0.7	0.69	0.35	0.52	0.62	0.62	0.583333
NO	0.27	0.3	0.64	0.47	0.38	0.37	

P1	2015									AVES
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	
YES	0.66	0.67	0.83	0.58	0.81	0.78	0.74	0.83	0.53	0.72125

NO	0.33	0.32	0.17	0.42	0.18	0.22	0.26	0.17	0.47
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P1	2015						AVEL		
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL			
YES	0.78	0.62	0.42	0.65	0.69	0.65	0.635		
NO	0.2	0.37	0.57	0.35	0.31	0.34			

P1	2014									AVES	
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE		
YES	0.58	0.6	0.78	0.57	0.62	0.76	0.86	0.75	0.47	0.67625	
NO	0.4	0.38	0.22	0.43	0.36	0.23	0.13	0.24	0.5		

P1	2014						AVEL			
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL				
YES	0.67	0.53	0.44	0.5	0.62	0.56	0.553333			
NO	0.31	0.45	0.55	0.48	0.36	0.41				

P1	2013									AVES	
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE		
YES	0.47	0.62	0.57	0.65	0.56	0.6	0.63	0.61	0.44	0.585	
NO	0.5	0.36	0.41	0.31	0.43	0.37	0.36	0.36	0.51		

P1	2013					AVEL				
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	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL	
YES	0.57	0.43	0.26	0.36	0.66	0.35	0.438333
NO	0.38	0.56	0.72	0.58	0.33	0.63	

P1	2012	AVES								
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	
YES	0.64	0.85	0.73	0.79	0.75	0.75	0.82	0.78	0.55	0.7525
NO	0.34	0.14	0.27	0.21	0.25	0.24	0.17	0.21	0.44	

P1	2012	AVEL					
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL	
YES	0.73	0.6	0.4	0.56	0.74	0.59	0.603333
NO	0.23	0.4	0.59	0.42	0.25	0.41	

P1	2010	AVES								
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	
YES	0.59	0.75	0.66	0.63	0.73	0.72	0.78	0.78	0.76	0.72625
NO	0.39	0.23	0.33	0.36	0.27	0.27	0.22	0.2	0.21	

P1	2010	AVEL					
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL	
YES	0.63	0.49	0.42	0.51	0.67	0.65	0.561667
NO	0.34	0.5	0.57	0.47	0.32	0.33	

P2	2016									AVES
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	
INFORMED	0.32	0.43	0.43	0.24	0.26	0.37	0.36	0.47	0.41	0.37125

P2	2016						AVEL			
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL				
INFORMED	0.35	0.45	0.18	0.31	0.2	0.41	0.316667			

P2	2014									AVES
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	
INFORMED	0.3	0.34	0.47	0.34	0.34	0.35	0.42	0.52	0.42	0.4

P2	2014						AVEL			
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL				
INFORMED	0.34	0.32	0.19	0.27	0.21	0.41	0.29			

P2	2010									AVES
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	
INFORMED	0.28	0.43	0.42	0.25	0.31	0.24	0.4	0.41	0.43	0.36125

P2	2010						AVEL			
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL				

INFORMED	0.29	0.28	0.21	0.33	0.19	0.34	0.273333
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P3	2016									AVES
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	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE
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POSITIVE	0.25	0.35	0.35	0.27	0.18	0.14	0.21	0.26	0.38	0.2675
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P3	2016						AVEL
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	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL
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POSITIVE	0.27	0.23	0.12	0.3	0.18	0.31	0.235
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P3	2015									AVES
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	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE
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POSITIVE	0.24	0.34	0.37	0.26	0.18	0.2	0.21	0.31	0.34	0.27625
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P3	2015						AVEL
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	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL
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POSITIVE	0.24	0.2	0.15	0.31	0.2	0.32	0.236667
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P3	2014									AVES
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	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE
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POSITIVE	0.3	0.44	0.41	0.34	0.27	0.25	0.31	0.33	0.4	0.34375
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P3	2014						AVEL
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	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL	
POSITIVE	0.3	0.22	0.17	0.39	0.29	0.41	0.296667

P3	2013									AVES
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	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	
POSITIVE	0.3	0.48	0.43	0.26	0.23	0.19	0.31	0.32	0.5	0.34

P3	2013									AVEL
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	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL	
POSITIVE	0.3	0.18	0.23	0.43	0.19	0.42	0.291667

P3	2012									AVES
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	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	
POSITIVE	0.27	0.47	0.39	0.33	0.24	0.21	0.33	0.27	0.33	0.32125

P3	2012									AVEL
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	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL	
POSITIVE	0.29	0.17	0.21	0.39	0.15	0.34	0.258333

P3	2011									AVES
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	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	
POSITIVE	0.26	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.24	0.18	0.35	0.28	0.31	0.31375

P3	2011						AVEL
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL	
POSITIVE	0.22	0.12	0.19	0.4	0.21	0.35	0.248333

P4	2016										AVES
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE		
NATIONALITY	0.35	0.3	0.41	0.23	0.24	0.36	0.27	0.36	0.45	0.3275	

P4	2016						AVEL
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL	
NATIONALITY	0.29	0.35	0.29	0.46	0.23	0.35	0.328333

P4	2014										AVES
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE		
NATIONALITY	0.35	0.27	0.34	0.25	0.25	0.4	0.27	0.28	0.31	0.29625	

P4	2014						AVEL
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL	
NATIONALITY	0.24	0.37	0.34	0.5	0.25	0.41	0.351667

P4	2013										AVES
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE		
NATIONALITY	0.39	0.31	0.41	0.21	0.28	0.45	0.35	0.36	0.43	0.35	

P4	2013						AVEL
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL	
NATIONALITY	0.3	0.36	0.41	0.47	0.29	0.48	0.385

P4	2012									AVES
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	
NATIONALITY	0.36	0.24	0.36	0.24	0.31	0.38	0.29	0.3	0.35	0.30875

P4	2012						AVEL
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL	
NATIONALITY	0.3	0.36	0.34	0.46	0.25	0.45	0.36

P4	2011									AVES
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	
NATIONALITY	0.36	0.29	0.34	0.29	0.29	0.46	0.25	0.26	0.36	0.3175

P4	2011						AVEL
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL	
NATIONALITY	0.32	0.35	0.31	0.45	0.3	0.4	0.355

P4	2010									AVES
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	

NATIONALITY	0.38	0.28	0.37	0.22	0.3	0.41	0.27	0.27	0.35	0.30875
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P4	2010						AVEL			
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL				
NATIONALITY	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.53	0.33	0.4	0.378333			

P5	2016									AVES
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	
MEMBER	0.3	0.3								
STATES	5	6	0.44	0.44	0.28	0.31	0.34	0.47	0.4	0.38

P5	2016						AVEL			
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL				
MEMBER STATES	0.31	0.32	0.31	0.36	0.23	0.38	0.318333			

P5	2015									AVES
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	
MEMBER										
STATES	0.32	0.33	0.32	0.44	0.16	0.36	0.27	0.36	0.28	0.315

P5	2015						AVEL			
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL				
MEMBER STATES	0.3	0.32	0.37	0.27	0.22	0.37	0.308333			

P5	2014									AVES
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	
MEMBER										
STATES	0.38	0.36	0.42	0.48	0.36	0.38	0.32	0.48	0.31	0.38875

P5	2014						AVEL
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL	
MEMBER STATES	0.28	0.29	0.45	0.44	0.27	0.46	0.365

P5	2013									AVES
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	
MEMBER										
STATES	0.39	0.33	0.42	0.35	0.31	0.36	0.34	0.44	0.38	0.36625

P5	2013						AVEL
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL	
MEMBER STATES	0.32	0.37	0.45	0.37	0.27	0.54	0.386667

P5	2012									AVES
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	
MEMBER STATES	0.37	0.36	0.38	0.4	0.3	0.34	0.36	0.39	0.33	0.3575

P5	2012						AVEL
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL	
MEMBER STATES	0.3	0.36	0.38	0.41	0.25	0.48	0.363333

P5	2011									AVES
	EU	MT	LU	CY	EE	LV	SI	LT	IE	
MEMBER STATES	0.36	0.33	0.39	0.38	0.35	0.39	0.3	0.36	0.27	0.34625

P5	2011						AVEL
	DE	UK	FR	IT	ES	PL	
MEMBER STATES	0.32	0.3	0.4	0.37	0.25	0.44	0.346667

APPENDIX B. EUROBAROMETER SURVEY DATA

Source

European Commission. (2004-2016). European Commission Standard EUROBAROMETER Survey No. 62-85. Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&instruments=STANDARD>

Question and Answer

“In general, does the European Parliament conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image? VERY POSITIVE, FAIRLY POSITIVE, NEUTRAL, FAIRLY NEGATIVE, VERY NEGATIVE, DON’T KNOW”
(European Commission, 2016f)

Data

	TCC	GCC	EE	LU	MT	
POSITIVE	2004	56.80%	51.20%	38.30%	60.56%	45.18%

2005-1	67.80%	56.15%	37.80%	57.85%	47.80%
2005-2	64.60%	52.10%	36.96%	57.34%	45.00%
2006-1	61.00%	55.31%	39.62%	54.47%	45.60%
2006-2	55.88%	55.95%	47.60%	52.50%	45.91%
2007-1	53.80%	52.88%	55.92%	55.97%	55.49%
2007-2	40.20%	52.80%	51.58%	52.89%	53.00%
2008-1	52.00%	57.74%	46.97%	52.59%	57.40%
2008-2	51.20%	50.40%	45.50%	46.20%	48.90%
2009-1	41.40%	51.59%	46.12%	56.23%	50.40%
2009-2	49.00%	50.79%	45.51%	65.54%	46.00%
2010-1	52.31%	37.48%	42.44%	52.67%	47.90%
2010-2	43.71%	33.33%	37.30%	46.39%	42.60%
2011-1	47.60%	41.72%	37.90%	48.10%	36.27%
2011-2	42.20%	39.29%	29.38%	42.97%	35.66%
2012-1	48.91%	28.85%	35.50%	41.22%	35.67%
2012-2	47.10%	24.45%	29.41%	35.66%	37.80%
2013-1	42.40%	16.44%	31.87%	38.10%	44.40%
2013-2	49.00%	16.73%	34.16%	39.84%	40.92%
2014-1	50.70%	25.65%	44.47%	41.50%	42.86%
2014-2	55.80%	24.00%	45.01%	50.69%	46.64%
2015-1	57.12%	23.40%	49.35%	51.89%	51.39%
2015-2	52.70%	21.84%	36.02%	45.54%	42.35%
2016-1	49.31%	26.29%	33.40%	44.97%	41.57%

2016-2	60.20%	26.55%	34.83%	46.72%	42.02%
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APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Depending on your political views and ideological positioning of your national party, would you think that sometimes your decisions form a contrast with the instructions provided by the European political party in which you pursue your activities? If yes, would you vote along national or supranational lines? Why?
2. I suppose that there are some issues that have been prioritized and highly sensitive for your country at the national level. How would this sensitivity influence your activities in the EP? On some occasions, would this sensitivity lead to any divergence from your European political party decision when it comes to vote on a nationally-sensitive issue? Why do you think this happens? Is there any example of when you diverted from your European political party?
3. Would you get recommendations from your national political party when you vote on a specific policy issue? If there is a contrast between the recommendation from your national political party and the decision of your political group, what would you consider as more important and how would you act?
4. How did you pursue your campaign activities for the 2014 European Parliament elections? Considering your relationship with your constituency, would you think that this relationship is based on the point that you represent a high percentage of your

country's population and it impacts your legislative activities in the European Parliament? In which ways?

5. Would you think that the electoral system design in your state influences your election and legislative activities in the European Parliament? Would you think that the electoral system in your state allows for a close relationship with your national political party and your constituency? In which ways?
6. Please imagine that you are voting for a specific proposal. The changes that will take place upon your voting will touch upon a sensitive economic regulation in your country and will lead a big debate and change at the domestic level. Your political group decision is in favour of this amendment, but the decision of your national political party is against. At the same, this economic policy is debated publicly in your state. A roll call vote will take place in which your vote will be publicly visible. What would be the factors you would consider while voting on that proposal?

APPENDIX D. COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION VOTING RESULTS DATA (JULY 1, 2014-DECEMBER 31, 2016)

Source

Council of the European Union. (2014-2016). Document Register: Public Votes.

Retrieved from

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/register/en/content/out?PUB_DOC=%3E0&DOC_SUBJ ECT=VOTE&i=VT&ROWSPP=25&ORDERBY=DOC_DATE+DESC&DOC_LANCD =EN&typ=SET&NRROWS=500&RESULTSET=1&DOC_YEAR=2014

Coding

0: NO, 1: YES, 2: ABSTAIN

Data

P	D	A	B	B	C	C	D	D	E	E	F	F	U	G	H	H	I	I	L	L	L	M	N	P	P	R	S	S	S
A	N	T	E	G	Y	Z	E	K	E	S	I	R	K	R	R	U	E	T	T	U	V	T	L	L	T	O	E	I	K
E	20																												
C	13																												
M	/	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
A	02																												
A	53																												
E	20																												
C	12	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
M	/																												
A																													

B U D G	20 12 / 03 36	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
L E A F	20 13 / 01 10	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
E N P H	20 13 / 03 07	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
T R T O	20 13 / 00 12	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
A G R I	20 13 / 03 98	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
T R T O	20 13 / 01 05	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
E C M A	20 13 / 01 85	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1
E C M A	20 12 / 01 69	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
E N P H	20 12 / 02 88	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
E N /	20 14 /	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

E C M A	20 12 /0 08 4	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1
L E A F	20 12 /0 36 0	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
E C M A	20 13 /0 02 5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
E C M A	20 13 /0 02 4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
L E A F	20 14 /0 27 6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
L E A F	20 14 /0 27 2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
L E A F	20 14 /0 19 0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
L E A F	20 14 /0 27 5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
I N T R	20 14 /0 16 8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
E C	20 13 /0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

R E	30 9																												
I M C P	20 15 /0 02 8	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
R E D E	20 15 /0 16 0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
B U D G	20 14 /0 18 0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
L E A F	20 13 /0 08 8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
L E A F	20 13 /0 08 9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
E N P H	20 14 /0 09 6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
E N P H	20 13 /0 44 2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
A G R I	20 15 /0 09 0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
E N P H	20 13 /0 43 5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

E C M A	20 13 /0 26 4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
E C M A	20 14 /0 01 7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
C L J H	20 14 /0 21 7	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
I N R E	20 14 /0 18 5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
L E A F	20 13 /0 40 3	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
T R T O	20 13 /0 01 4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
T R T O	20 13 /0 01 5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
T R T O	20 13 /0 01 6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
C L J H	20 14 /0 33 7	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
C L	20 14 /0	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

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