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EUROPEAN UNION AND TURKEY: MOBILITY AND IN/SECURITY

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EUROPEAN UNION AND TURKEY: MOBILITY AND IN/SECURITY

A Ph.D. Dissertation

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To Erkam and Fox



EUROPEAN UNION AND TURKEY: MOBILITY AND IN/SECURITY

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ABSTRACT

EUROPEAN UNION AND TURKEY: MOBILITY AND IN/SECURITY

Lüleci-Sula, Çağla

Ph.D., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Hatice Pınar Bilgin

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International Political Sociology (IPS) literature mainly focuses on the actions of the European Union (EU) in their analyses of externalization in the Mediterranean, examining how border security policies and practices of the EU actors constitute insecurities for multiple referents. The thesis shows that most IPS studies either overlook or underemphasize how non-EU actors also play a significant role in creating these insecurities. It argues that non-EU actors have agency in the constitution of the EU's external border in/security policies and practices. The thesis also argues that, with its meta-theoretical and theoretical commitments, IPS is a suitable approach to locating multiple actors' agency in the making of in/security. Through focusing on the case of Turkey, the dissertation concludes that border in/security cooperation between EU and non-EU states of the Mediterranean may be

unbalanced in nature, but non-EU actors still have agency in the constitution of in/security.

Keywords: Agency, Border In/security, EU Externalization, International Political Sociology, Migration.



ÖZET

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ VE TÜRKİYE: HAREKETLİLİK VE GÜVENLİK(SİZ)LİK

Lüleci-Sula, Çağla

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Hatice Pınar Bilgin

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Uluslararası siyaset sosyolojisi (USS) çalışmalarının çoğu, Akdeniz'de dışsallaştırma analizlerinde esas olarak Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) eylemlerine odaklanmakta, AB aktörlerinin sınır güvenliği politika ve pratiklerinin çeşitli referans nesneleri için nasıl güvenliksizlikler oluşturduğunu incelemektedir. Bu tez, birçok USS çalışmasının AB-dışı aktörlerin de bu güvensizliklerin oluşturulmasında nasıl önemli bir rol oynadığını ya gözden kaçırdığını ya da eksik vurguladığını ortaya koymaktadır. AB-dışı aktörlerin, AB'nin dış sınır güven(likesiz)liği politikaları ve pratiklerinin oluşturulmasında bir fail olduğunu ve USS'nin bu failiği analiz etmek için uygun bir savunmaktadır. Tez aynı zamanda, kuramsal ve meta-kuramsal taahhütleri ile USS'nin çeşitli aktörlerin güvenliksizliklerin oluşumundaki failiğini incelemek için uygun bir yaklaşım olduğunu savunmaktadır. Bu tez, Türkiye örneğine odaklanarak,

AB ve AB-dışı Akdeniz ülkeleri arasındaki sınır güven(likesiz)liğı işbirliğinde AB-dışı aktörlerin güven(likesiz)lik inşasında faillığı olduğu sonucunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AB Dışsallaştırması, Faillik, Göç, Sınır Güven(likesiz)liğı, Uluslararası Siyaset Sosyolojisi.



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CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

The externalization of border in/security, which the EU (European Union) utilizes as a strategy to control mobility and immigration, is a subject that draws considerable interest in the study of International Political Sociology (IPS) (Bigo, 2005; 2009; 2014; Guild and Bigo, 2010; Leonard, 2010; Johnson, 2013; Topak, 2014; Frowd, 2014; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015; Jeandesboz, 2016; Andersson, 2016; Isleyen, 2018). ‘Externalization’ refers to a type of external governance through which the EU seeks to ensure neighboring states’ participation in the realization of its internal security policies. It is a process in which the EU attempts to transfer its norms, rules, policy instruments and programs, legislation, and practices to non-EU states, corporations, and international organizations (See Lavenex and Ucarer, 2002; 2004; Lavenex, 2002; Boswell, 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeirer, 2005; Geddes, 2009; Balzacq, 2009; Paoletti, 2011; Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi, 2013; Casas-Cortes et al., 2014; Frelick et al., 2016; Palm, 2020). Also referred to as remote control, externalization is designed to manage borders from a distance with the political aim of keeping

migrants away from the EU territory. As a result of the externalization process, border control, which states have traditionally approached as a matter of internal security, becomes a matter of external security.

IPS analyzes the process of externalization as the interpenetration of internal and external security on 'global threats' such as terrorism, organized crime, surveillance of people, and finally irregular international mobility (Bigo 2001; 2008). As internal and external security merges, states increasingly respond to these 'threats' through complex transborder cooperation channels. While focusing on the externalization of border in/security, IPS studies both identify the interpenetration of internal and external security and analyze the mechanisms of complex transborder cooperation.

IPS focuses on the sociological dimension of world politics. It is an attempt of 'trans-disciplinarity' that avoids sharp and constructed fragmentations between disciplines. IPS is neither the first nor the only attempt to make a sociological analysis of politics and security. However, as initiated first by Bigo and Walker, a group of scholars has developed a specific understanding of an IPS approach that is widely utilized in the study of security (See Guillaume & Bilgin, 2017). It directs researchers to examine bureaucratic and operational practices and relations of everyday politics via a critical and reflexive notion of security.

IPS's commitment to a social and relational ontological position almost always comes with the analysis of the processual relations of interdependence between actors from different parts of the world (See Bigo, 2011; 2017; Guzzini, 2017). Tracing the transformation of a process denotes that mutual activity has the power to modify social and political phenomena, as well as the actors that conduct these activities (See

Renault, 2016: 21). Relations shape ‘social reality,’ and practices of multiple actors are located in these processes. This is how, relying on Bourdieu’s theory of practice and the logic of practicality, IPS analyzes day-to-day practices as the main basis of social and political phenomena (See Pouliot, 2010). This requires looking not only at everyday practices of multiple actors but also how relations in different layers play a role in the constitution of social and political phenomena.

If social and political phenomena are constituted in relational terms, IPS should approach externalization as ‘a set of social and political relations’ or encounters between multiple actors. However, as will be shown in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, the majority of IPS studies on EU externalization focus mainly on what EU actors do. This contrasts with the eventuality that there are multiple non-EU actors that are involved in and influence the process and outcome. Analysis of the ‘agency’ of non-EU actors in the existing externalization analyses is either absent or underemphasized in different ways. Puzzled by such weakness in the empirical applications of externalization, this dissertation seeks to contribute to IPS literature by posing an attempt to ‘decenter the study of EU externalization’ (See Bilgin, 2017: 26). The main research question of the dissertation is: “How to locate the agency of the non-EU actors in the EU’s external border in/security policies and practices?”

1.1 Why Locating non-EU Agency?

‘Agency’ refers to an actor’s capacity to act and influence processes and outcomes. It is “the capacity of doing things that could be done differently” (Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 15) in other words, the ability and freedom “to choose among diverse possibilities” (Bigo, 2011: 243; See also Jabri, 2014). From a relational perspective,

agency is “inseparable from the unfolding dynamics of situations,” which means that it is situated in relational contexts and always refers to a dialogic process that requires the presence of multiple interacting actors (Emirbayer, 1997: 293-294). Agency is embedded in “the layered interactions between individuals/communities/societies and structures of domination” (Hobson and Sajed, 2017: 549). Agency does not mean that agents are able to act in whatever way they want in their relations regardless of the power relations within a structure. Accordingly, this dissertation does not attribute an unlimited free will to any actors; but it emphasizes that even when they are constrained by hierarchical power relations, actors of the non-EU are not merely passive recipients of externalization policies. Non-EU actors also choose among diverse possibilities and are able to act and influence the outcomes of their cooperation with the EU.

The IPS approach offers ways to transcend the dichotomy between agency and structure by introducing practices into the analysis of politics and security. Practices have a primary role in IPS analysis, which enables agency through translating structural background knowledge and experiences into intentional acts (Adler and Pouliot, 2011: 15). Yet, this does not mean that they create linear connections between agency and structure. Rather, practices initiate dynamic processes by enabling structures to evolve or to remain stable and agents to transform or reproduce these structures. This dynamism is a result of the fact that practices and agents are social and constantly in the making. They are reconstituted in a socially, historically, and politically organized web of relations. Emphasizing these relations, the theoretical and meta-theoretical commitments of IPS provide a suitable approach to locate the ‘agency’ of multiple actors in the making of in/security.

IPS analyzes day-to-day practices as routine, patterned, and unintentional acts. Yet, these practices are done by multiple agents for certain reasons in certain contexts. Practices are backed by underlying intentions and motives which are embedded in political processes in which these practices are formed and routinized. Encounters between agents constitute certain patterns that define the characteristics of a field. In other words, social and political phenomena can be read as 'fields' that have their code of actions (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 23-25). Put differently, fields are social and political contexts that are historically constituted by interactions and relations between multiple agents (See Bourdieu, 1985). They determine the maneuvering capacity of security practitioners. Fields are not constant; they are dynamic; they transform in the process (See Depelteau, 2015: 14-15). Therefore, mundane practices within these fields also change through the process. Understanding how practices result in insecurities requires an approach that can identify dynamic interactions within the field and how the field is transformed in the process as well.

Accordingly, to locate the agency or the constitutive role of non-EU actors in the field of EU's border in/security, one first needs to identify how social and political encounters between multiple actors from both sides of the border have evolved and constituted insecurities. Analyzing the field with reference to these characteristics enables the researcher to understand how the field is constituted by a complex matrix of interaction between the context and agents and between several agents involved in the governance of borders through their policies and everyday practices. Agency is embedded in both practices and policies of co-bordering. It can be traced in multiple scales, from everyday practices to the relations in the formation of policies. Relations that constitute externalization may be hierarchical or unequal in nature, but non-EU

actors still play a role in the constitution and implementation of it (See Bilgin, 2017). By adopting a social and relational ontology, academic research can comprehend non-EU actors' capacity and input to create the 'new' or to transform political phenomena (Jabri, 2014).

Externalization is a process through which the EU attempts to transfer its rules and policies to non-EU partners. However, after the EU actors attempt to transfer its norms, rules, and policies, non-EU actors either adopt, or reject, or interpret and modify these norms, rules, and policies. In this sense, externalization "requires the collaboration of often less privileged non-EU states" (El Qadim, 2018: 282; see also Guiraudon, 2003). Only by adding 'how non-EU reacts' as part of the definition and analysis externalization can be understood as a social and political phenomenon that is "both constituted by and constitutive of" the EU and non-EU (Bilgin, 2017: 55). Not only the EU but also non-EU agency is constitutive of insecurities that are outcomes of externalization. An EU-centered analysis of externalization hinders the efforts to make sense of both the insecurities constituted by the externalization policy and insecurities of multiple actors that constitute externalization. The analysis of encounters between the EU and non-EU "requires that we not only bring in the rest of the world but also bring in a more accurate account of how Europe itself developed" (Halperin, 2006: 43). Studies that put the EU in the center of their narration of border in/security draw a picture of world politics in which the non-EU actors are either non-existent or passive objects that are only influenced by what the EU does. They miss "the multiple and integral relations between the weak and the strong" (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006: 332), and present a deficient picture of border in/security cooperation as an 'empirical reality.'

IPS pays particular attention to broaden the ontology of politics and security by putting social and political relations at the center of the analysis. Engagement with other disciplines, sociology being in the first place, is to contribute to IR discipline's understanding of the 'social,' hence its idea of 'agency' in the constitution and transformation of world politics. A sociological conception of externalization that pays attention to mutual encounters between EU and non-EU has the potential to locate the joint role played by both in making and remaking of in/security. Failure in doing so may reproduce the fallacy that the EU is the only significant agent of politics and security.

1.2 Aims

The aim of this dissertation is to locate the agency of non-EU actors in EU externalization as a border in/security policy. It analyzes the process in which non-EU Mediterranean partners become part of the EU's internal in/security project of keeping immigrants away from its borders. It aims to analyze the responses to externalization from non-EU actors, how struggles over border control work, and how border in/security has been constituted by policies and practices of and relations between actors from different parts of the Mediterranean. The dissertation aims to highlight how non-EU actors exercise agency by cooperating, contesting, and changing externalization policies, legal frameworks, and practices. The motivation behind the attempt to locate the non-EU actors is to emphasize that although the EU is the initiator and the dominant actor of externalization, non-EU agency is also constitutive of border in/security.

The dissertation illustrates its arguments by focusing on the case of Turkey as a non-EU partner of externalization. Tracing the evolution of Turkey's border in/security policies and practices through its relations with the EU actors, it conducts an analysis that includes the responsibility and agency of multiple parties. Turkey is the only candidate state in the Mediterranean that cooperates with the EU on border in/security. This situation locates Turkey at the very margins between being an insider and an outsider and makes it a significant case for the analysis of the non-EU agency in the EU externalization. Moreover, Turkey's role in EU's border in/security policies has increased due to increasing mobility in the Mediterranean following the Arab Uprisings. The Turkish case also allows for re-evaluating the frequently presented argument in the literature that non-EU states become part of border cooperation 'in return for political and economic favors' such as EU funding and membership.

This research sets three specific goals that correspond to the task of locating the agency of non-EU states. The first is to explore the commitments of IPS to understand whether and how it pushes the boundaries of the existing ways of studying security, mainly by promoting a social and relational ontology. The second is to critically analyze the existing ways of studying externalization with IPS to explore whether the literature is centered mainly on EU actions. For this aim, the dissertation presents a novel reading through a classification of the literature to understand the ways these studies portray non-EU actors' role and agency in their respective analyses. The third is to situate itself in the literature by locating the experiences, perspectives, policies, and practices of Turkey in the EU externalization as a non-member but candidate state.

The dissertation highlights IPS's commitment to a social and relational ontology and emphasizes the 'interconnectedness' of global processes of insecurity (See Barkawi, 2004; Bilgin, 2016). It aims to locate the agency of the non-EU by tracing the evolution of encounters on border in/security via a relational and processual analysis of border in/security policies, legal framework, and bureaucratic practices. In doing so, it aims to understand how multiple actors' policies and practices are integral and related parts of the non-EU agency, and how such agency plays a significant role in the constitution of border in/security in the Mediterranean.

1.3 Sources

This is a library-based dissertation that relies on primary and secondary sources. Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 use secondary sources to offer a critical analysis of the literature. I have looked at thirty-eight studies of IPS and border in/security selected based on the following criteria: 1) empirical focus on external border security of the EU and its cooperation with the Southern Mediterranean states, and 2) studies that explicitly state they have an IPS/sociological/Paris School approach or analyze practices, or 3) studies that use the terminology of IPS, practice approach to security, have an ethnographic or sociological approach to security, and 4) studies that are peer-reviewed articles, books, and book chapters (See Appendix 1).

Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 look at externalization practices of the EU and non-EU actors as found in official documents as primary sources -texts of national, international and EU legislation; bilateral, multilateral, and regional agreements, EU-Turkey progress reports (1998-2020), Turkey's Ministry of Interior and Directorate General of Migration Management reports, press releases and statements of Turkey's

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, and Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, Frontex annual activity reports (2005-2020), Europol and EMSC reports; related EU documentation; multiple IO and NGO reports, among others. Second, it utilizes the information presented in secondary sources –research articles, academic books and book chapters, academic project reports, working papers. These secondary sources are not limited to the International Relations discipline. In line with the commitment of IPS for questioning the pre-set boundaries around disciplines, the dissertation utilizes multiple secondary sources from the disciplines of political science, sociology, history, anthropology, among others.

1.4 Structure

This dissertation is composed of three main parts. In the first part, Chapter 2 sets the theoretical framework of the dissertation, International Political Sociology, and its approach to security. The following chapters are designed in a way that Chapters 3 and 4, and Chapters 5 and 6 feed each other. While Chapter 3 critically examines the studies that adopt an IPS approach in their analyses of externalization of border in/security in the Mediterranean, Chapter 5 empirically analyzes externalization in the Mediterranean. Similarly, Chapter 4 presents an analysis of how the existing IPS studies locate Turkey in their analyses of EU externalization, while Chapter 6 empirically analyzes Turkey's agency in the constitution of border in/security through encounters with multiple EU actors. Chapters 3 and 5 that analyze the literature, and Chapters 4 and 6 that analyze externalization also feed each other in revealing a broader picture of the phenomenon of externalization of border in/security and how it is studied. This design is argued to be useful in highlighting the shortcomings in the

literature and showing the aspects of externalization and non-EU agency that existing studies overlook.

The dissertation is composed of seven chapters. Chapter 2 explains IPS's roots and key commitments that are most relevant to the puzzle of this dissertation. It then analyzes IPS's approach to security and how it contributes to security studies. The chapter presents IPS as influenced by the practice turn that emphasizes empirical analyses of security practices, as a reflexive approach, and is committed to adopting a social and relational ontology.

Chapter 3 analyzes the extent IPS studies of EU border in/security include the non-EU agency in their respective analyses. It examines this literature to understand whether non-EU states that cooperate with the EU are located as passive objects, only influenced by what the EU does.

Chapter 4 presents an analysis of EU's practices and policies of externalization in the Mediterranean in relation with non-EU partners. To understand how externalization is constituted through multiple layers, the chapter analyzes the policies, legal framework, and bureaucratic and operational practices of border in/security cooperation. The chapter analyzes the actions of various EU actors through encounters with non-EU partners in each layer.

Chapter 5 analyzes IPS literature on EU-Turkey border in/security cooperation. It specifically aims to clarify whether and how Turkey's role and agency is included in the IPS literature on the EU's external border in/security policies and practices or EU externalization.

Chapter 6 aims to locate the agency of one non-EU actor, Turkey, in the EU externalization process by utilizing IPS's relational approach. Following the framework built in Chapter 4, this chapter traces the main points of change in Turkey's border policies and analyzes each process by situating its practices into a political and legal context. It analyzes the Turkey-EU border in/security cooperation field under three main periods based on political events that transform the field significantly. These points of change are chosen by considering 1) it is a change that is important for both parties and the relations between them (Turkey and the EU or EU states), 2) it is a change that influences all areas (political, legal operational) of the border security field.

Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation by revisiting the main question and aims and clarifying the main findings of the overall research.

CHAPTER 2:

IPS AND IN/SECURITY

This chapter introduces the IPS approach to security that will be utilized throughout the dissertation. Rather than presenting an exhaustive overview of IPS, the chapter aims to clarify IPS's key commitments that are most relevant to the subject of this dissertation. In this context, it first delves into roots and main commitments of IPS. Second, it clarifies IPS approach to security by going into its main contributions to security studies: practice approach, reflexive research, and relationality. Lastly, the chapter clarifies how these commitments of IPS are highlighted and utilized in this analysis to comprehend better the agency of multiple actors operating in the field of border in/security.

2.1 The Roots and Commitments of IPS

IPS is neither a completely new approach nor aims to serve as a new and established school of thought that is based on relations of disciplinary inclusion and exclusion

(Bilgin & Guillaume, 2016). It is inspired by works of scholars who present a critique of the IR discipline and have certain commitments in terms of how to study ‘the international.’ IPS builds on the seminal works of Ashley (1988), Der Derian (1988), Der Derian and Shapiro (1989), Ashley and Walker (1990), Walker (1993) published in the 1980s and 1990s (Basaran, Bigo, Guitted, & Walker, 2017: 2). These scholars question two related aspects of how ‘the international’ is studied with existed concepts and approaches. First, they make a deconstructive critique of the discipline of IR. They base the criticism on the tendency to treat boundaries and categories of the disciplines as given. Second, these scholars question the concepts and assumptions that have underpinned ‘the international’ such as sovereignty, state, borders and emphasize their social character. In Der Derian’s (1989: 6) words, they challenge “the given boundaries of the battlefield, both the geographical lines between the states and within systems and the theory/practice divisions inscribed by the discipline.” These two points are also closely related to each other and present in the majority of seminal IPS studies.

First, Der Derian and Shapiro (1989) analyzed the history of the discipline starting from the post-World War I period and brought together essays that aimed to disturb and deconstruct the habitual ways of thinking and acting in world politics. These authors emphasize the ‘constructedness’ of the disciplinary boundaries. They focus on the placement and displacement of theories, and how these boundaries have served to silence certain approaches throughout the history of the discipline. This way, theories have served as knowledge practices. Ashley and Walker (1990) further the argument by stating that no boundaries around disciplines ever existed by themselves.

According to the authors, no exclusionary boundaries ever separated the discipline of IR from other disciplines such as political science, sociology, philosophy, and history. These boundaries have been drawn by some who claim authority over the disciplinary knowledge and these explicit criteria alienated the dissident voices such as ‘critical scholarship’ by pushing it into the margins of the discipline (Ashley and Walker, 1990: 368-375). However, Der Derian (1988: 192) suggests, “complexity, ambivalence, and indeterminacy of human relations” makes it impossible for a single theory to explain and understand international relations.

Second, Ashley (1988) focuses on the discursive dichotomy between sovereignty and anarchy. He analyzes how these discourses create powerful representations that have political consequences. The assumption that anarchy makes world politics more chaotic and needs to be overcome creates the conclusion that one must surrender power to the nation-state. Via this critique, Ashley demonstrates the link between conceptual categories of the discipline and real-world consequences of them.

Similarly, Walker (1993: 18) argues that the discipline of IR is highly concerned with “the politics of boundaries” and how to make borders more secure. He argues that these boundaries and categories have a constitutive role by creating inside-outside dichotomies. When scholars of IR approach state borders as political and legal entities that exist almost naturally to keep the states secure, they ignore how borders create such dichotomies spatially and temporally (Walker, 1993: 6-7). These dichotomies strengthen the assumption that ‘inside’ space is peaceful, safe, and secure; while ‘outside’ is insecure and this requires rethinking the notion of borders. This also

justifies the temporal fallacy that the future of inside is up to linear progress towards democracy and a just system, while there will be perpetual conflict outside.

These critiques and their impact on empirical analyses have constituted the basis of the IPS approach. Still, IPS is not and does not intend to be a coherent and homogenous school of thought. It is rather a signifier that creates conversation links between approaches and scholars that share a common interest in questioning the institutionalized ways of knowing and doing IR.

Philosophical stance and empirical scope of IPS have been shaped by the above-mentioned seminal works. Yet, as initiated by Bigo and Walker¹, IPS section of International Studies Association (ISA) and *International Political Sociology Journal* have developed a specific understanding of an IPS approach which is also reflected throughout this dissertation (Guillaume & Bilgin, 2017: 1). Walker (2017: 16-17) sets out the commitments of this approach as,

to stress relations rather than distinctions; to resist the interests and forces that not only prefer to compartmentalize but also to privilege one field over another; to study phenomena that seem to be simultaneously social, political, and international, but not quite in ways that make sense to analysts committed to the academic disciplines specializing in the social, the political, or the international; to examine practices and specificities rather than the usual repertoire of containments and exclusions; even to

¹ Guillaume and Bilgin make a list of other scholars who have been associated with an IPS approach to the study of international and security. (See Guillaume and Bilgin 2017: 12, Notes 3)

try to push all these scholarly enterprises beyond their largely European and North American tradition

Understood from this definition, IPS is a reflexive, deconstructive, post-positivist, and interpretivist approach that is committed to a sociological analysis of the international, by focusing on the role of practices of and relations between multiple actors. This section specifically focuses on its commitment to deconstructive and sociological analyses.

IPS's commitment to sociological analysis comes with a critical and deconstructive stance towards concepts and knowledge claims. According to conventional theories of IR, "international refers to a realm of reality with clear boundaries," which claims a substantial knowledge (Bigo & Walker 2007, 728). Questioning and deconstructing pre-set boundaries around disciplines, scholars of IPS argue that there is need to bring political sociology "to bear on the problem of the international" (Bigo & Walker, 2007: 730). This attempt constitutes the primary concern that all IPS scholars share. These scholars aim to play an encouraging role in bringing IR and sociology disciplines together, to contribute to analyses of both (Bigo & Walker, 2007a: 1). This would foster innovative epistemological, methodological, analytic, and theoretical perspectives on the study of the international (IPSS Charter). Integrating anthropological and sociological definitions to the study of the international will contribute to IR theories' understanding of agent, structure, and idea of social. Bigo and Walker (2007a, 5) define sociology as "the analysis of what social actors do." These social actors are constituted by social relations (Rajaram, 2016: 92). Actors and agents of the international do not stand independent of their social relations.

Reflecting on this idea of a ‘social whole’ can develop communication lines between disciplines (Buzan & Albert, 2010: 2; Albert & Buzan, 2013: 117). These transversal lines are required by growing diversity in IR, which cannot be provided by seeking common grounds or core themes and theories.

While making these commitments on deconstruction and sociological analysis, IPS avoids performing as the foundation of a new discipline or school of thought (Huysmans & Nogueira, 2012: 2). Fixing and crystallizing an emergent field of international studies is at odds with IPS’s commitment to thinking in a plural manner (Guillame & Bilgin, 2017: 1). What makes IPS a deconstructivist approach is this refusal to become a theory that has fixed boundaries and can be verified and falsified through case studies (Bigo, 2017: 32). Pre-set disciplinary boundaries constantly recreate relations of inclusion and exclusion by leaving certain approaches, methods, and works outside of the definition of an ‘appropriate’ international research.

IPS scholars pay attention to not draw the boundaries of a new discipline while getting involved in writing practices due to their awareness of the fact that “speaking in the name of a group is also speaking instead of the group” (Bigo, 2013: 128). Thus, although works from an IPS lens have certain common grounds on how an international study looks like, there is a significant amount of diversity within IPS due to its emphasis on plurality in theorizing and in practices of the international. What Albert and Lapid (2016: 75-78) suggest for a more diversified IPS is the integration of more classical work from sociology, as well as more history, and paying more attention to process-oriented empirical questions. This keeps IPS analyses away from constructing an established school of thought.

2.2 Security Studies and IPS

Scholars of IPS widely engage in security studies and their approach to security is commonly named the Paris School.² This section aims to examine the evolution of security studies and IPS's contribution to this field. It presents an overview of the traditional approaches to security that marked the literature during the Cold War period and how it has been challenged by constructivist approaches since then. It then locates IPS in and its main contribution to security studies.

International security has become a distinct field of study after the World War II. Key concepts of this field were war and defense (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 1) and security had been studied under the name of war studies, military studies, and strategy.

Traditional understanding of security predominated the field for decades (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 2; Baldwin, 1995; Walker, 1997; Booth, 1997). Although international security has become a distinct field, the study of security continued to be “the study of threat use and control of military force and power” (Walt, 1991: 221-222). Based on a realist understanding of world politics that has an objectivist ontology, this approach conceptualizes security as a situation that is external to how humans make sense of it. Accordingly, threats exist independent of its referents and the aim of international security studies of the Cold War was to provide ways of protecting referents from these external and internal threats through scientific inquiry.

² Political Anthropological Research of International Security (Bigo 2016: 72)

However, the idea that the end of the Cold War suddenly changed security studies is a cliché (Booth, 1997: 85). By the 1970s and 1980s, analyses of security started to challenge ‘the Cold War understanding of security’ especially in Europe. Unease with the Cold War security tradition became visible in a call for a broadened approach to security (Booth, 1991: 317). New thinkers started to make analyses on “non-offensive defense, common security, democracy, human rights, disarmament, confidence building, and civil society” (Booth, 1997: 85). These new approaches have broadened the security agenda through the inclusion of new types of threats other than military, and referent objects beyond the state (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 187-188; Booth, 1991: 318). A variety of threats to the lives and well-being of humans, not only at state but also at sub-state levels are relevant to the security studies (Booth, 1994: 4). When security studies incorporate referent objects other than the state, a wider variety of threats other than military also become significant.

Peace Researchers’ understanding of security as positive peace rather than negative peace has been significant for the broadening of security (Bilgin, 2005: 53). For this understanding, not only lack of direct threats but also the presence of positive content such as the establishment of good relations, constructive mediation, and solution of conflicts are necessary for a peaceful and secure situation (Galtung, 1969). While security is understood as not only to be safe from direct threats but also to be free of any obstacles, the agenda gets broadened, in Booth’s (1991: 319) words, to include all physical and non-physical constraints.

Wolfers (1952: 485) argued in the Cold War years that security is “in an objective sense, the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of

fear that such values will be attacked.” Yet scholarship on security had not completely overlooked the subjective understanding of security in that period. Constructivist understanding of security, which has been influential since the late 1980s, refers to approaching security as derived from one’s view of the world (Bilgin, 2017a: 51). It emphasizes non-objective nature of security. In terms of ontology, constructivist approaches argue that threats and security issues are constructed, rather than “being independent of us knowing about or representing them” (Bilgin, 2017a: 60). All three approaches that this chapter examines –Copenhagen, Aberystwyth, IPS- adopt a constructivist approach while focusing on different aspects of security.

The Aberystwyth School³ has been influenced by the positive understanding of Peace Researchers in its approach to and definition of security. According to Booth (1991: 319) emancipation produces security rather than power or order. Emancipation refers to “freeing of people from all of their physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do” (Booth, 1991: 319). The School problematizes three features of Cold War security: statism, military focus, and its problem-solving approach to security (Bilgin, 2017a: 51).

In the early 1990s, the group of scholars who worked at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), ‘the Copenhagen School’, presented another constructivist challenge to the objectivist understanding of security (McSweeney, 1996). These scholars started their analyses by questioning the pre-given meaning of security and asked, “What makes something a security issue?” (Wæver, 1995: 54).

³ This approach is also known as the Welsh School, or Critical Security Studies.

The Copenhagen School argues that security is “a specific way of framing an issue” (Buzan et al., 1998: 4) which they name ‘an act of securitization.’ Securitization refers to the presentation of an issue as an existential threat by political elites, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure. Thus, Copenhagen School scholars aim to understand ‘who can securitize, what, and under what conditions.’

Although the Copenhagen School defines securitization as an intersubjective act, the approach is criticized for relying heavily on political elites and security discourse, while the role of other actors such as the audience remains under-theorized (Balzacq, 2005; Stritzel, 2007; Cote, 2016; Williams, 2011; Salter, 2008; Leonard & Kaunert, 2011). Hansen (2006) more specifically suggests that securitization is a long process in which not only language, but also broader discourse plays a significant role. IPS scholars pose similar criticisms to the Copenhagen School and the Aberystwyth School approaches to security.

According to IPS, security as a terminology has different forms and meanings in different times and spaces. The concept of security does not have autonomy itself or refer to specific actions, objects, or facts. It is always dependent on the type and shape of relations between actors inside a specific historical and social episteme (Bigo, 2016: 67). Thus, security refers to certain practices that might otherwise be called as violence, insecurity, threat, fear, coercion, mobility, or freedom (Bigo, 2013: 124-125). It more often than not has a political origin and is about the legitimacy struggles and power relations between multiple actors that together constitute ‘security’ and ‘insecurity’.

All these three constructivist approaches -IPS, the Copenhagen School, and the Aberystwyth School- share the assumption that there is a close link between security and politics. Yet the first significant point of divergence between IPS and the other approaches (traditional or critical) is that IPS does not attribute a certain consciousness to the discourses and practices of security. Processes of securitization may occur in the ordinary course of the things Yet, as Pouliot (2008: 261) also suggests, in either case, actions can be oriented toward a particular goal or an end. This emphasis on spontaneity does not mean lack of involvement of politics or political agency in the process of in/security. IPS's argument is that in/securitization processes involve not only exceptional and conscious speech acts of political elites but also everyday practices and routines of multiple transnational networks of bureaucracies and private agents managing in/security (Bigo, 2008: 116; Bigo, 2010; Huysmans, 2005; Basaran, 2010). Security claim has both discursive and non-discursive elements. Discourse is also considered a form of practice. Yet, what is central to the study of security in IPS is institutional, bureaucratic, and technological practices, put differently non-discursive practices, that create in/security continuum via certain categorizations and boundary formations and interpretive meanings (See Mohr 2013: 106).

The second distinctive feature of IPS of security is that it focuses on not only "what security is," but also "what it does" (Bigo, 2008: 116; C.A.S.E. Collective 2006). It analyzes both conditions and consequences of in/security. It develops what Bilgin (2004: 33) names "a reflexive notion of security" by focusing on the processes within which security measures may end up with further insecurity for some others. Security

always has winners and losers (Bigo, 2008: 123). Security and insecurity grow together which makes them two sides of the same coin (Bigo, 2013: 126). This is why IPS uses notions of in/security and in/securitization instead of security and securitization, by drawing more attention to the consequences of acts of security.

Third, IPS scholars advocate an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of security. The emphasis on the significance of more engagement especially with sociology and anthropology in the analysis of security is a central commitment of IPS. It engages with sociology because of the understanding that security is more deeply embedded and rooted in society, social activity, and social relations (Bigo, 2008: 127). Speech is significant in in/securitization processes, but security is also embedded in political decisions and everyday practices of multiple actors including bureaucrats, security practitioners and individuals within society (Bigo, 2008: 126). As such and different from the Copenhagen School, IPS of security focuses primarily on the practices and policies that take place at different channels and levels of politics. Adopting an IPS approach requires a “multi-faceted study of the practices of the professionals of in/security” (Bigo, 2016: 73). It approaches discourse in a more comprehensive manner, including both what is said and done in world politics, and not only by elites but also a broader group of actors such as professionals of security. The next section analyzes IPS and security practices in a more detailed manner.

2.3 In/security Practices

Following social and political theory, different paradigms on methodology are named as ‘turns’ in critical security literature. These turns or discussions between different

approaches do not constitute concrete debates or research paradigms in Kuhnian terms by building on each other, but they coexist as different ways of doing critical research in security. Various definitions of security –as speech act, discourse, field, dispositif, governmentality, emancipation, practice- exist in relation to these coexistent methodological approaches. These approaches include discourse, materiality, mapping, visuality, and genealogy among others (Aradau and Huysmans, 2013; see also Campbell, 1998; Hansen, 2006; Shephers, 2013; Salter and Mutlu, 2013).

Majority of the scholars of IPS follow the practice theory or the practice turn in their analyses, which accounts for social life as organized in links of practices of social activity. Although practice theory refers to a heterogeneous group of works and approaches, their common commitments can be summarized as: emphasis on process; situating knowledge in practice; taking practices as routine, collective, and repetitive actions; including materiality as a form of practice; consideration of social order as multiplicity consisting of overlapping orders; referring to constant construction of social phenomenon (Bueger and Gadinger, 2015: 453).

Practice turn in critical security, which also informs this dissertation, is influenced by the works of Bigo and Walker, having its roots in Bourdieusian analysis.⁴ Drawing on “Bourdieu’s drive to rethink security in terms of practices rather than norms, values, or interest,” IPS analyzes the relations between politics and security professionals

⁴Bueger (2016: 328) classifies four major accounts of international practice theory: Foucauldian governmentality, Wengerian communities of practice, and Latour or Deleuze inspired arrangement theory and Bourdieusian praxeology.

(Bigo, 2016: 72). Rethinking notions of security through a Bourdieu-inspired lens, Bigo (2008) argues that in/security is the result of in/securitization processes which are embedded in everyday practices and policies. Thus, IPS aims to analyze “mundane bureaucratic decisions of everyday politics” (Bigo, 2008: 127).

Practices are defined and studied in different ways in the literature. For instance, Balzacq et al. (2010: 2) define practices as “forms of social interactions which are derived from objective relations that are neither visible nor conscious” (Balzacq et al. 2010: 2). Bueger and Gadinger (2015: 451) suggest that they are actual activities rather than intentions or motivations of actors. Reckwitz (2002, 249) makes a broader definition by stating that practices refer to routinized type of behaviors that include multiple and interconnected elements such as bodily and mental activities, things (materials) and use of them, emotions, motivations, and forms of knowledge. He defines them as configuration of bodily and mental activities, things and their use, and background knowledge or logic that shapes the practices and organizes them.

Accordingly, as Balzacq et al. (2010: 4) argues, IPS’s sociological approach to security is more comprehensive than a linguistic approach, with its inclusion of several non-linguistic practices such as know-how, gestures, and technology.

However, this does not mean that IPS completely excludes linguistic elements from the analysis. Security practices, as well as claims of security, involve both discursive and non-discursive elements (Bigo, 2013: 129).

Bigo’s account on how security practices take place provides a more concrete guide. He identifies two types of tools that are utilized to enact international practices of in/security: regulative, and capacity tools (Bigo, 2010: 8). Regulative tools serve to

‘normalize’ the behavior of target individuals and groups. In the shape of policy regulations, constitutions, etc., regulatory tools permit or prohibit certain practices. They are materialized within normal practices, every so often through legal regulations. For instance, as Balzacq (2011: 17) argues, “since 2002 almost all of the documents on illegal migration and asylum (in Western countries) have a strong connection to terrorism.” Frontex, in the case of the EU and border control, serves as an agency that applies regulatory tools. Regulatory tools can also create a basis for capacity tools, which aim to impose ‘external discipline’ upon individuals and groups (Balzacq, Basaran, Bigo, Guittet, & Olsson, 2010: 9). Capacity tools aim to develop capacity-building in the target institutions, states, etc. Once tools and regulations are transferred to the target through capacity-building, the practices are reconstituted constantly even without the control of the builder. Technology⁵ and know-how transfer by the EU to the candidate states on various issues is an example of how capacity tools work. The candidates become members only when they convince the EU bodies that they have the capacity to reconstitute the practices of the Union.

Speaking specifically for the field of security, tools are significant because they embody practices of in/security. They both influence practices and get influenced by them in turn. Tools have their own “operating procedures, skill requirements, delivering mechanisms, and its own political economy” (Salaman, 2002: 2-3). Thus,

⁵ Balzacq et al. (2010: 11) argue that there are three elements of technology in critical security studies: “tools (mainly capacity tools such as databases, biometrics, sensors, or algorithms); methods (networking, fusions, or military transformation); and techniques (instantaneity/simultaneity, automaticity).”

they configure actions and shape social relations, and tend to have a political aspect when it comes to the issue of security (Balzacq et al., 2010: 8). Furthermore, without the identification of the tools, it is not easy to trace and analyze the process within which practices transform in/security issues.

Kratochwil (2011) states that the aim to come up with a shared meaning and understanding of practice is a useless exercise. Practice theorizing implies that “a concept of practice is contingent on actual practices” (Bueger 2017: 330) and the attempt constitutes a practice itself. Therefore, researchers may to define practice in line with their specific empirical case, their subject matter, and whom they analyze as actors of security. Some studies of border security focus on everyday micro practices of border crossing, some analyze materialities at the borders and airports, while others analyze bureaucratic practices of in/security performed by multiple institutions and actors. According to IPS, empirical studies of the ‘social’ cannot be limited to the analysis of the practices of one actor. Different from the Copenhagen School’s focus on elites in the process of securitization, IPS’s sociological approach includes more actors and their practices into security analysis.

Bigo (2016: 75) states that IPS of security investigates three questions: who are the actors that participate in the practices of in/securitization? where do they come from? what do they do regarding congregating around specific stakes and using new technologies? If insecurity is about everyday policies and practices, then not only the state elites are security actors. In the everyday routine, there are multiple actors that consciously or unconsciously reproduce (in)securities for other individuals, and even for themselves. In this sense, IPS analyzes different types of practices by “all the

agents that act and change the world” (Bigo, 2016: 68). Therefore, some scholars draw attention to “the risk of becoming an overcrowded circus” (Bueger and Gadinger, 2015: 450); however, taking this multiplicity into account does not pose a problem of consistency, for IPS but it rather functions as an organizing principle (Van der Ree, 2014: 232). IPS seeks to refer to “the plurality of spaces and actors” (Kessler 2009: 88) and the web of practices that these actors generate. It aims to analyze these webs of practices in a relational manner, rather than focusing on actions of individual actors. By this way, it aims to capture interrelations between actors that are involved in the same social and political event. Put differently, IPS does not seek a common definition and encourages case-oriented research which defines its understanding of practice.

2.4 Reflexivity and the Centrality of Methods

As Bigo & Walker (2007a: 5) state, “the analysis of social practices involves the participation of analysts in the situation they are analyzing.” Theorists and researchers have a role in shaping practices, while also being shaped by them (Bilgin, 2017a: 51). Reflexivity enables scholars to account for this “role of social sciences in shaping social reality” (Alejandro, 2020: 2). Thus, scholars must be reflexive to both the ‘empirical reality’ and the knowledge of it. A researcher has a responsibility while interacting with research objects and subjects and contributing to the formation of authoritative knowledge as a result of this interaction (Huysmans & Nogueira, 2012: 1). They must make their practices, beliefs, choices, and dispositions conscious and explicit. A proper reflexive analysis, as Bigo (2016: 71) suggests,

is driven neither by (a) an idealist view of the world where ideas, norms, discourses, subjectivity, human freedom, and individuals are at the core of the examination of social sciences, nor (b) an objectivist, structuralist paradigm, one that simplifies history, trying to discover the law of history and reducing agents to the status of receptacles.

Reflexive analysis is embedded in sociological and historical inquiry. To see and reflect on the agency of social actors, IR scholars that conduct sociological analyses aim to deconstruct social relations. Reflexivity, as referred to in this study, is about being aware of both the agency of the researcher in constituting the knowledge of the world, and the agency of other social actors in constituting what the researcher analyzes empirically. As such, it is related to all ontological, epistemological and methodological choices of researchers.

According to constructivist ontology, the empirical realm is constantly being (re)constructed. This refers not only to how politicians and practitioners constitute social realities, but also how researchers produce the knowledge of the world. “Methods help to produce realities” which makes methods and research design significant (Law, 2004: 152). Rather than simply being techniques of extracting information from reality and aligning it with -or against- bodies of knowledge, as performative, “methods are practices through which ‘truthful’ worlds are enacted, both in the sense of being acted upon and coming into being” (Aradau & Huysmans, 2013: 3). They are also reflexive acts about doing research (Bueger, 2017: 332). Thus, the choice of methods and methodologies are significant not only in terms of conducting valid analyses, but also regarding which questions are asked while others

are left unanswered, and which conclusions do research techniques bring the researcher to. The ‘how’ of writing is never separated from what is being said (Huysmans & Nogueira, 2012: 2).

IPS’s approach to research is self-defined as reflexive and constructivist on the one hand, and materialist and empirical on the other (Bigo, 2016: 66). One of its significant contributions to the study of (critical) security is this strong emphasis on the importance of empirical analysis. This is also embedded in the Bourdieusian understanding which aims to map the international or to provide “an empirical visualization of the international” (Bigo & Madsen, 2011: 221; see also Madsen, 2017; Pouliot, 2013; Bigo, 2011). Bourdieu’s approach intends to bridge interpretive and objectivist methodology. This interpretive logic requires going back and forward between theory, methodology, and empirical material (Kratochwil & Friedrichs, 2009 in Bueger, 2017: 332). Bourdieu (1988: 775) highlights Kant’s view that “theory without empirical research is empty, empirical research without theory is blind” to express how theory and empirical research are bound to each other. As such, IPS refuses to accept dividing lines between a theoretical constructivism and empirical positivism while emphasizing the significance of reflexive research (Bigo, 2013: 121; Bigo, 2016: 65; Bigo & Walker 2007). IPS’s constructivist stance comes from its commitment to reflexivity and deconstruction of pre-given claims of knowledge. Its empiricism comes from its denial of applying cases to abstract theories, and its encouragement for the sociological and processual analysis of practices of multiple actors as well as their relations with the non-human objects (Bigo, 2013: 121).

What it draws attention to is that researchers should be aware of the relations between the observed and the observer while conducting empirical analyses (Bigo, 2016: 66). When it comes to security studies, a researcher is also part of and contributes to the game of in/security (Bigo, 2013: 128). Due to this relation, it is significant to think about what one does and does not consider a phenomenon as a process or an act of in/security. Political and ethical judgments and values are embedded in practices of in/security, as Frost (1986; 2012: 7) argues, and these practices also include studying security in a specific way or studying empirical phenomena from a security perspective. Thus, IPS of security starts its analysis by deconstructing the meaning of security to trace its roots and origins (Bigo, 2013: 127). While traditional security studies in the discipline of IR see security in positive terms (Bigo, 2013: 122) and IPS scholarship starts the analyses by challenging this idea. A reflexive approach to security allows the researcher to see the practices of in/security from a different angle rather than adopting pre-given definitions of what constitutes security. This includes questioning of the sources and processes of in/security and whose security is being threatened, by what forms of reasoning (Bigo, 2013: 127). Once the conceptualization of security is made, an IPS researcher observes practices and builds research strategies specific to each empirical field of observation (Bigo, 2016: 66).

It is important to note that only when the 'international' is seen as a specific object of analysis, it requires a distinctive methodology (Bigo & Walker, 2007: 728). In this sense, IPS encourages the researchers for a reflexive approach to research yet does not direct them to a single method, but rather promotes plurality in techniques. As each case or research has its own understanding and definition of what constitutes

practices, ways of analyzing these practices also vary. Both qualitative methods such as discourse analysis, qualitative content analysis, ethnography, archival research, document analysis, participant observation, interviews; and quantitative methods such as social network analysis, multiple correspondence analysis, and statistics are applied in IPS analyses of world politics. Considering its deconstructive approach towards foundational knowledge, and pluralistic stance in terms of methodology, multi-method mixes are also suitable with and widely used in IPS research. Thus, IPS adopts a pluralist approach also to research methods, but it encourages scholars to always think and reflect about the conditions of reflexivity regardless of what method they apply (Guild, 2009; Huysmans, 2005).

2.5 Sociological and Relational Research

Relational analysis is one of the most relevant commitments and significant contributions of IPS to security research. Security and insecurity grow together and the boundary between these two notions is a result of competitions between different actors and their altering personal and institutional priorities. A relevant security analysis needs to address these political relations (Bigo, 2013: 130). To analyze relations, the Bourdieusian approach in IPS focus on “practices *qua* temporally unfolding patterns of activity” rather than agents or individual actions (Schatzki, 1987: 119). IPS’s interest in actors and practices is not limited but mainly related to these actors’ social and political relations with other actors, practices, discourses, and things. Notions such as states, boundaries, security, etc. are meaningful in relation to other notions, and they also make sense only when seen in relation to “the practices that the notions encompass and ignore” (Bigo, 2013: 122). In this sense, notions have

meaning only when they are analyzed in a relational manner, by focusing on its links with other notions, practices, and images.

The differentiation between actors (human beings) and actants (human beings in relation to objects) is significant here (Bigo, 2013: 124; 2017: 36). For such account of security, actors and agents are not the central focus of the analyses, but they are located within a social web of relations. More directly, agents are constituted by relations, and they do not stand outside of these relations (Rajaram, 2017: 92). IPS develops a relational analysis of a society of individuals that is tied to transversal and processual relations of interdependence between societies (Bigo, 2017: 32; Bigo, 2011). Conceptualized this way, notions such as state, institution, bureaucracy etc. go beyond being homogenized and fixed actors, and become social, heterogeneous, and constantly changing fields that constitute the international.

Commitment to relational research stems from IPS's social constructivist ontological stance. However, not every approach with a social ontological stance assumes relationality. In relationality, ontologically, nothing exists in an isolated position, or before its relations with others. It highlights social relations, "processes and mechanisms that, among other things, give rise to *both* actors and the environments in which they find themselves" (Jackson and Nexon, 2019: 4). Put differently, relations become the things that constitute both structures and agents that operate within them (Bigo, 2012: 236). IPS is interested neither with the agents nor the structures themselves, but the relationality between actors and the field that these relations constitute. According to this approach, actors are not autonomous or independent. This is why and how an IPS approach follows a process-relation approach that is

transcending the agency-structure debate (Bigo, 2016: 69). It is not the agents that create relations with others as in the constructivist IR, but rather relationality comes first, and they constitute actors. While drawing a map of the field of security, for instance, the researcher should consider agents only when they act in relation to each other (Bigo, 2016: 70).

Discussion between relational and substantive approaches to social reality is central to see how IPS makes sense of sociology (Rajaram, 2017: 92) and how this understanding of sociology is reflected in relational IPS analyses. A relational approach of sociology is interested in the analysis of social processes, while substantive sociology analyzes ontologically distinct points, actors, and things. What this creates is fixed accounts of the analysis of social phenomena such as politics. IPS sees and analyzes social processes in a relational way and approaches them as unfixed, dynamic, and processual phenomena.

Relational analysis puts particular emphasis “on *position* and on *process*” (Jackson and Nexon, 2019: 12). Neither the relations nor the positions of actors can be taken as pre-existing. An IPS analysis of in/security is interested in constantly transforming practices, positions and struggles between actors within a field (Pouliot, 2013).

Analyzing this field in order to understand the positions of the actors requires putting the relations in the center of the analyses, rather than analyzing those actors and their identities in a separated manner. If sociology is the study of what social actors do, social analysis is an attempt to make a visualization of the relative distances between different positions of these agents that act in different ways. Positions are significant in an IPS analysis because, for instance, a dominant actor within a field with

hierarchical relations is only possible when there are less powerful actors (See, Shimizu, 2021: 6).

IPS analyzes security via a sociological perspective to empirically visualize or map the international, conceptualized in terms of specific ‘fields’ (Madsen, 2017: 107). The ‘field’ in Bourdieusian analysis refers to “the total nexus of interconnected human practices” (Schatzki, 2001: 11) and “a bundle of structured relations within which agents are variously positioned” (Pouliot, 2010: 36). Fields as social configurations are structured along three main dimensions: relations of power, objects of struggle, and taken-for-granted rules (Pouliot, 2010: 33). They are composed of unequal and sometimes hierarchical positions and power relations. Fields of power are composed of relational practices between multiple agents. IPS does not deny or ignore the role of political elites in claiming and inescapably creating in/securities, but it aims to analyze power competitions and struggles between different actors such as elites, practitioners, or other groups or individuals (Bourdieu, 1989). Practices are always “embedded in power politics” (Bueger & Gadinger, 2015: 455). Internalized subjective best-practices, rules, and logic of that particular field create “a kind of feel of the game which does not need to calculate in order to find its direction and place in a reasonable manner in space” (Bourdieu, 1985: 11). Practices are the outcome of this kind of ‘practical sense’ resulting out of the merge of diverse fields’ logics (Bigo, 2016; Bourdieu, 1998).

This conceptualization of field and its impact on the actors is different from a structural approach to international studies. Field relies on a relational mode of human thinking, rather than a structuralist understanding that focuses on the role of structures

on agents (Bourdieu, 1985: 17). Thus, social action is not necessarily directed by a premeditated design or a sovereign force that dominates the field. Practices of agents are almost always oriented toward a goal with or without being consciously informed by it (Pouliot, 2008: 261). However, these goals or motives are never fixed not they can be attributed to different actors with a pre-given and taken for granted approach. All dimensions of a field, relations, power struggles, rules and motives are always in the making. Field analysis aims to understand these specific systems and webs of relations that function the game. The change in the relationality, positions and dynamics of forces within fields is central to an IPS analysis. To analyze field, its history, relative autonomy, and its original logic should be understood “by reference to which the relationship between each agent, and its own work, past or present, is objectively defined” (Bourdieu, 1985: 22).

2.6 An IPS Approach to Border In/security

IPS analyzes international politics as transversal fields that the most powerful actors dominate and impose their rules of the game to the others. ‘The political’ of IPS refers mostly to the analysis of these power struggles in a given social sphere (conceptualized as field) that generally, but not always, evolve around battles over domination (Madsen, 2017: 108).⁶ Once constituted, fields also have determinative impacts on the positions, relations and practices of the agents that are playing the same game whether they consist of hierarchical, competitive or cooperative relations.

⁶ Bourdieu (1985: 22) states that objective relationships of a field may be competitive, cooperative, hegemonic (domination), and transversal (in relation to other fields) (See also Salter, 2013; Bigo, 2017).

This dissertation analyzes the EU's externalization of border policies and practices to Turkey as a field of in/security. This field is composed of the circulation of in/security policies, practices, and techniques which is made possible through the cooperation between multiple agents of EU and Turkey, as well as practices of international and non-governmental organizations. To grasp the interconnectedness and multilayered/multi-dimensional nature of this field, it aims to conduct an analysis that highlights the agency, input, and responsibility of both sides in the making of politics. These relations might be hierarchical in their nature, but there is still agency of the peripheral actors in developing ideas, practices, political and legal frameworks (See Mbembe, 2002). This hierarchy cannot be taken for granted or "a natural order among states" but it needs to be engaged through a framework that reveals the role of actors that are located at "the bottom rung" (Bilgin, 2017: 2). The control of EU borders is made possible with the contribution and contestation of non-EU actors⁷ though the existing IPS studies do not always reveal the process in which multiple actors together act, learn, change and mutually constitute. It is, however, not possible to comprehend border in/security as made up of relations without rendering visible the agency of Southern partners.

To locate the agency of non-EU actors in externalization as a border in/security field, this dissertation highlights a few respective yet related points throughout

⁷ In order not to fall into the trap of what Hobson and Sajed (2017: 561) state as "reducing agency to resistance/ heroic defiance within an oppositional posture vis-a-vis the West" this dissertation does not only highlight moments of resistance, but also analyze cooperation, compliance, negotiations, political dialogues and frameworks, and changes in policy under the title 'Border In/security Policies.'

the analysis that stem from the commitments of IPS. The first is the sociality and relationality of border in/security processes. IPS is committed to highlight and study relations rather than distinctions or practices of separated agents (Walker, 2017: 16-17). The second is that relational analysis is almost always processual, and it is constantly in the making (Guzzini, 2017: 371). Agents' routines, motives, choices, actions, as well as considerations of politics and security are to be treated as emerging in the process. Since these properties are emerging, the process needs to be included in the analysis rather than simply taken for granted. In a relational and processual ontology, borders and in/security practices are not to be taken given, but their constitution and evolution processes also become part of the analysis. Rather than analyzing merely the current practices at borderlands, the dissertation analyzes the processes in which practices have become possible and evolved. The third is IPS's commitment to integrate experiences of multiple actors beyond Europe and North America. Actors of the international are plural and are engaged in multiple games at different scales at the same moment, whether they are aware of this or not (Bigo, 2017: 38). A reflexive analysis requires being aware of not only the agency of other social actors in constituting what the researcher analyzes empirically, but also the agency of the researcher in constituting the knowledge of the world. Therefore, it is significant to locate the role of multiple EU and non-EU actors and their relations in constituting border in/security processes.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter introduced the IPS approach, which the dissertation utilizes to analyze the in/security field that EU and non-EU actors constitute via practices and policies of border control. It highlighted IPS's commitment to reflexivity, sociality of in/security processes, relationality, and the primacy of practices in the constitution of insecurity. IPS's contribution to critical security studies are embedded in these commitments. The emphasis on sociology as 'the study of what social actors do' directs IPS scholars to analyze practices of multiple social and political agents by emphasizing the significance of bureaucratic and operational practices in the constitution of in/security. Everyday practices are significant because constitute complex web of power relations. Therefore, with its meta-theoretical and theoretical commitments, IPS is a suitable approach to locate the 'agency' of multiple actors in the constitution of border in/security.

CHAPTER 3:

IPS STUDIES OF EU EXTERNALIZATION

The starting point of this dissertation is the observation that most of the existing IPS literature focus on the actions of EU actors in their analyses of externalization although there are multiple non-EU actors that take part in the process. To verify this observation, this chapter conducts a critical analysis of IPS and EU externalization literature to identify what they overlook given IPS's own theoretical and meta-theoretical commitments. The chapter analyzes the existing literature on external border in/security in the Mediterranean by grouping into three. The first group of studies do not integrate non-EU's actors and actions in their analyses of EU externalization, while centering their studies on EU's policies and practices. The second group of studies integrate non-EU states into their analyses yet portray them as recruited or forced by the EU to take part in border in/security cooperation. The third group of studies integrate non-EU agency by analyzing these actors' everyday in/security practices. However, non-EU actors generally enter the story only after

externalization frameworks have already been constituted by actors of the EU.

Therefore, their portrayal still renders invisible the role of certain non-EU actors in the making of border in/security.

3.1 The EU as the Only Significant Actor of Border In/security

Majority of the studies that analyze EU external border in/security focus completely on EU actors' actions, decisions, structure, in/securitization processes, and the evolution of border control tools and systems in Europe. They put the EU actors in the center of their analyses and examine what the EU, its agencies, institutions, and member states do (See Basaran, 2008; Leonard, 2009; Leonard, 2010; Driessen, 2007; Huysmans, 2000; Johnson, 2013; Jeandesboz, 2016; Bigo, 2005; Bigo, 2016; Huysmans, 2006; Boswell, 2003; Bigo, 2009; Balzacq, 2009). These studies either do not mention EU's border cooperation with non-EU states and actors, or although at some level they mention that other actors take part in externalization, they do not present an account on what the non-EU partners do. Doing so, albeit unintentionally, they still separate out non-EU from EU, and highlight the latter as the only significant agent of the border in/security regime in the Mediterranean. They study externalization with a focus on EU without considering its "constitutive relations with 'non-Europe'" (Bilgin and Futak-Campbell, 2021: 14). As a result, externalization is understood as decided and implemented by EU as the only actor that 'in/secures' its external borders.

In "Security, Law, Borders: Spaces of Exclusion" Basaran (2008: 339) analyzes the legal constitution of border zones by defining 'security' as embedded in ordinary

practices. The article critically analyzes the bordering technologies that are utilized by the EU actors because they constitute in/securities for immigrants. She challenges the existing literature's wide portrayal of liberal states' illiberal acts as exceptions.

Basaran (2008: 343) states that border agreements with the Mediterranean neighbors are also tools of border in/security since they are part of the legal constitution of borders. Yet the EU is in the center of the narrative since the article presents in/security practices including border cooperation from the perspective of the EU. The article focuses on the activities and motivations of multiple EU actors, without touching upon the role of non-EU partners in the constitution of in/securities. A similar comment can be made about a few of Bigo's studies. As analyzed in the previous chapter, Bigo is one of the pioneers of the establishment of the specific understanding of IPS that this dissertation relies on. Although Bigo has made significant contributions to not only IPS but also critical security studies in general, his empirical work focuses mostly on the evolution of externalization in Europe by policies and practices of multiple EU actors. Like Basaran, Bigo also points out the tension between the EU's liberal legal systems and security-driven discourse and practices both in "Immigration controls and free movement in Europe" (2009) and in "The in/securitization practices of the three universes of EU border control" (2014). The studies empirically analyze how externalization as an in/security regime has been mutually constituted by actors of the EU. These studies particularly analyze how EU actors have made legal and political changes in border policies following the Schengen Agreement to 'secure the external borders.' They narrate externalization by anchoring the focus on EU, which overlooks the international nature of this phenomenon. Doing so, they present an uncomplete picture of not only non-EU but

also EU because it underemphasizes the mutual will and shared responsibility (of EU and non-EU) in the constitution of co-bordering policies and practices.

Following Bourdieu in adopting a dynamic and relational approach, Bigo recommends conducting the analysis of how each agent influences the field by its actions, practices, policies, know-how, technologies. His “Frontier controls in the European Union” (2005) examines in/security practices of several EU actors such as member states, European Council, Commission, police, gendarmerie, and politicians all of which share the motivation of increasing border security measures. The chapter analyzes the link between the state and the frontier, and multiple actors that play role in the EU border control policies. The study argues that Europe and its frontiers are not territorial, and the distinction between internal and external has been blurred in EU border security. To make his point, Bigo focuses on in/security practices of various EU actors, such as the member states, European Council, European Commission, police, gendarmerie, and politicians arguing that all these actors share the desire to increase border control (Bigo, 2005: 55).

Guild and Bigo (2010) advance a similar analysis in “The transformation of European border controls” analyzes the choices of European and US authorities about what kind of border controls will be implemented and where spatially. The chapter narrates how certain actors of EU and US (with a stronger focus on EU) have shaped the relationship between borders and control. It emphasizes the fact that through implementing remote-control policies, these actors changed “the way territorial frontiers and controls have been conceptualized under a sovereign state” (Guild and Bigo, 2010: 260). The authors present a historical analysis of EU’s evolving

externalization policy frameworks, as well as practices of ‘Western’ actors such as Frontex, NATO, UNHCR, security forces of EU and member states, among others. The authors do not integrate the impact of ‘outsider’ actors in this transformation while also presenting their argument clearly by stating that “externalization is the result of policy choices made in Europe both by the member states and the EU” (Guild and Bigo, 2010: 257).

Bigo (2016) analyzes EU border in/security further in “International Political Sociology: Internal Security as Transnational Power Fields” where he explicitly states that in/security practices of professionals are extended outside the European neighborhood to police at a distance. The study encourages a relational approach which requires researchers to analyze networks and relations between various agents. Yet again it applied a relational approach by analyzing the EU actors (institution’s agents or private agents such as security companies) and how border security is managed by these actors’ practices and policies, without integrating non-EU actors. In other words, Bigo’s work does embrace a relational ontology; however, such relationality is mostly internal to the EU. Although *Möbius Ribbon* metaphor refers to the blurring of internal and external securities, most of his empirical works are not extended beyond the EU borders while analyzing ‘the transnational field’ of border in/security. However, as in other fields of translational policing, migration control requires the cooperation of several states” (El Qadim, 2018: 283) and has been constituted not only by the EU’s security agents but also others that are located outside of the EU territories. Bigo’s analyses, notwithstanding their success in

capturing the dynamic character of borders and border in/security, under-analyze multiple ‘international’ cooperation channels that make this dynamism possible.

Huysmans (2000) in “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration” also analyzes the process in which the issue of migration has become a security matter in the EU by examining securitizing discourse and practices. Huysmans, like Bigo (2009), elaborates on how multiple actors from different levels of policing, such as states, politicians, people, and police forces of the EU contribute to the construction of migration as a threat. Both studies argue that securitization started after the Schengen Agreement, due to the EU states’ ‘anxiety’ of securing the external borders. In 2006 Huysmans published a book titled *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration, and Asylum in the EU* which further focuses on securitization of migration in the EU. The book analyzes ‘techniques of government’ and presents externalization as one of these techniques that the EU utilizes to keep third-country nationals away from its borders. It traces the process in which the EU actors establish this security project to keep migrants inside the countries of origin or transit countries, through readmission agreements, and locking them up in detention centers, among others (Huysmans, 2006: 55, 96). However, in both of Huysmans’s analyses (2000; 2006), border cooperation with neighboring countries is taken as an act of the EU and its agents. Despite the book’s contribution to the conceptualization of insecurity from a sociological perspective, its implementation to the empirical case of migration focuses only on the political sociology of what the EU actors do. These analyses present the issue as if the EU actors are the only agents that decide on and implement external border in/security policies.

Boswell (2003)'s article "The External Dimension of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy" also critically analyzes the emergence and development of the 'external dimension' of EU migration policies by focusing on the factors that shaped the process. Boswell states that the EU develops two types of migration policies: externalizing control tools (control-oriented approach) and taking prevention measures to diminish the root causes of migration. To understand "which pattern of cooperation is likely to predominate in the future" the study examines how EU states and institutions negotiate, decide, and implement cooperation with non-EU states (Boswell, 2003: 619). Boswell focuses on three determinants all of which revolve around the EU: the potential of externalization to meet EU's goals; institutional context of decision making in EU; and domestic pressures in EU. What is overlooked in his analysis is the policies of non-EU contracting parties as agents that have a potential to influence the type and shape of externalization. Both preventive measures such as establishing aid policies in the countries of origin, and control measures such as signing readmission agreements require the consent and cooperation of non-EU countries. An IPS analysis that adopt a social and relational ontological stance should integrate the relations between EU and non-EU and how the encounters between multiple parties shape the future of border cooperation. The examples of how non-EU parties act and influence the outcome of externalization is provided in the following chapter.

So far, this chapter analyzed the studies that examine EU externalization in general, without focusing on a specific actor. There are also a few studies that frame the analysis around specific EU agents. It is more likely that any study which focuses

solely on one actor would miss the interconnected dynamics that produce border in/security. Frontex, being a highly dominant agent in the field, is one that is widely analyzed. Leonard (2009), in “The Creation of Frontex and the Politics of Institutionalisation in the EU External Borders Policy,” critically examines the reasons why EU member states chose to establish an agency like Frontex rather than forming a cooperation themselves to regulate border control. She defines Frontex as an agency that is responsible for coordinating cooperation between the member states, training national border guards, conducting risk analyses, etc. In “EU border security and migration into the European Union: Frontex and securitization through practices,” Leonard (2010) further examines practices of Frontex such as developing data collection plans with third countries, conducting risk analyses, coordination between member states, training border guards, etc. In her analysis of joint operations, Leonard (2010, 246) suggests that rather than Frontex “the overall responsibility for the implementation of any given operation remains with the organizing and leading country” as if third countries have no role in these transborder operations. However, majority of Frontex’s practices, like other EU agents, such as risk analysis and joint operations require the cooperation of non-EU actors, especially security forces. In fact, as also stated by Frontex, non-EU countries are “a main part of the operational team in joint operations” (See Frontex Handbook, 2014: 33). By not integrating the role of non-EU in the analysis of Frontex misses multiple cooperation channels that make Frontex’s in/security practices possible. This empirical deficiency is a result of putting the EU actors in the center of analyses contra to IPS’s commitment to analyze ‘multiple social and political relations’ that may end up with in/security practices.

Jeandesboz (2016) in “Smartening border security in the European Union: An associational inquiry” examines EU’s governance of its borders via technology and dataveillance. The article focuses on the agency of entities that associate social (human) and technical (machine) elements such as Schengen Information System (SIS), Visa Information system (VIS), Entry/Exit System (EES) etc. Despite the Jeandesboz’s aim to include multiple human and non-human agents into the analysis, all the actors that are analyzed in the research are entities of the EU. In this sense, albeit unintentionally, the article contradicts not only with IPS’s but also its own promise. A similar framework is visible in Balzacq’s (2009: 6) *The Frontiers of Governance: Understanding the External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs* where he analyzes “EU’s anxiety with space” as the reason for developing technical cooperation with neighboring countries to enhance security and to form “smoother systems of managing borders.” He argues that this technical cooperation is an asymmetric one since it provides “less security” for at least one of the partners. While defining and analyzing the main tools of and developments in ENP as a mechanism to cooperate with non-EU neighbors, Balzacq does not present any account on how non-EU actors take part in the constitution of border security frameworks. The cooperation with non-EU countries is portrayed as if it is unilaterally taken by the EU. As a result, although these articles provide detailed accounts on technical and material aspects of bordering, non-EU agents that cooperate with the EU in data gathering, risk analysis, etc. remain invisible.

There are also studies that analyze a specific border that EU shares with a specific non-EU state, but still put EU in the center of the analysis. In “Coping with Fortress

Europe: views from four seaports on the Spanish-Moroccan border” Driessen (2007) presents an anthropological analysis of how Spain-Morocco border has been transformed from an international border to an external border of the EU. This transformation ended up with an inside-outside division in the Mediterranean between EU and non-EU states. New external borders brought new control techniques such as surveillance, identity cards, residence-permit controls, high investment in border guards and equipment to tighten border control. The study continues with the analysis of four seaports on the Spanish borders that are physically located within the EU, and how border control practices and policies of EU lead to a transformation in these seaports without integrating non-EU practices and policies into the analysis.

Johnson’s article (2013) “The Other Side of the Fence: Reconceptualizing the “Camp” and Migration Zones at the Borders of Spain” analyzes the dynamics of migration in the Spanish enclave of Melilla, and neighboring Moroccan city of Oujda based on fieldwork in the camps. Like Driessen, Johnson also emphasizes that after the borders of the EU’s coastal states were transformed to “external borders” they became the most “staunchest proponents of tougher border controls” through the use of technologies such as visa regimes, interdiction at seas, radars, sensors, cameras, and immigration centres (Johnson, 2013: 79). While Driessen analyzes the transformation of the border in time, Johnson focuses more on the current in/security practices in the borderlands. Both studies refer to the existence of border cooperation as a strategy of the EU to keep migrants away, yet neither refers to non-EU neighbors as taking part or having any responsibility in the in/securitization of the Spain-Morocco borders. These authors define practices such as readmission agreements and deportation regime as tools of border in/security, which can only be possible with

close cooperation with actors of a non-EU state. Not integrating non-EU states into the analyses result in the under-analysis of the role and responsibility of Moroccan actors both the history and current of this shared border that has become a zone of in/security.

To summarize the analysis so far, the literature on EU externalization that focuses only on EU actors analyze: how the EU actors establish policies, frameworks, and institutions to manage border in/security; and how the practices of and relations between the EU actors constitute the field of border in/security in the Mediterranean. Put differently, these studies present a detailed and fulfilling analysis of several aspects of what the EU has been doing to manage its borders. However, they overlook the ‘international’ character of externalization by still approaching externalization as if it is a regional problem happening in the EU. They disconnect EU from its relations with other actors that are located physically outside of its borders. This portrayal of externalization takes EU out of the broader picture, treat it as a separate unit, and does fulfill the commitment to relationality. Empirically, this does not only present the issue of EU border security as only a problem of the EU, but also attributes all responsibility to the EU by overlooking the international character of the issue.

IPS does not approach internal and external securities separately. This traditional distinction, if ever existed in the empirical world, disappeared following the Cold War with the blurring of internal and external security threats, as Bigo first analyzed in 2001 in “the Mobius Ribbon of Internal and External Securities.” He states that this merge is not result of a shift in preferences in the analysis of border security, but rather a fact that is emerging in the field following multiple actors’ application of new

security practices. What Bigo observes in this new field of the EU's border security is that responsibilities and practices of EU's police force (traditionally an agent of internal security) and army (traditionally an agent of external security) interpenetrated. This happened due to a couple of developments. First, threats to individuals and states became transnational. Now "outsider" enemy may be "inside," and vice versa (Bigo, 2001: 93). Second, understanding of borders and sovereignty has changed. Physical state border is swiftly becoming a symbolic appearance. Borders are now more dependent of identities, limits, relations of domination and exploitation. Third, police did not know how to react to new threats and transnational networks of criminals, and army did not know what its duty was after disappearance of the Soviet threat. Thus, both understanding and practices of borders started to change with the impact of new developments in the field. Bigo utilizes the *Mobius Ribbon* to visualize how relations and agents of inside and outside (or internal and external) can be very ambiguous and unfixed. So, he suggests, there is a need to search for a new approach to understand this new security field. Scholars of IPS "need to replace a discipline still living in the past" by questioning the naturalness of the boundaries of both the discipline, and political entities such as states (Bigo and Walker, 2007). Through a dynamic and relational approach, one needs to understand how each agent has its practices, policies, know-how and technologies while taking part in this new field of EU border security (Bigo, 2001: 97-98). As this relational approach is applied only to the EU agents, externalization is understood as a regional matter as if it has been constituted in Europe only by the actors of the EU; therefore, the division between inside and outside remains highlighted.

EU externalization is organized around policing at a distance through political and institutional networks. Although *Mobius Ribbon* refers to the observation that abolition of the internal borders resulted in a merge of internal and external securities, these studies do not extend the research beyond EU's territorial frontiers. Doing so, they miss out the potential power of *Mobius Ribbon* to understand how physical borders are becoming vague. Their overlooking of non-EU agency does not only pose limits in empirical analyses, but also contradicts with the IPS commitment to question boundaries between internal and external securities. EU ('internal') and non-EU ('external') actors constitute border in/security together, which these IPS studies under-analyze.

Narrating EU externalization as such contradicts with IPS's commitment to analyze the sociology of international politics, by first overlooking 'the international nature' of externalization. This is not to suggest that what is happening in the EU cannot have implications for 'the international' or that international only refers to relations between states or nations. Neither the IPS approach nor this dissertation takes 'domestic' and 'international' as "two distinct endeavors" (See Niang, 2020: 98). However, externalization as a technique of remote control, and insecurities that it produces cannot be made possible without the cooperation (and contestation) of non-EU parties. The making of externalization and its impacts go beyond the territorial boundaries of the EU. In this sense, narrating externalization as if it is made in the EU but have consequences elsewhere misses the fact that it is also constituted internationally with the participation of non-EU actors.

This EU-based portrayal of externalization is the starting point and scope of interest of this dissertation. Studies may have an EU-centered approach regardless of whether they are critical of EU policies, or not. It is possible to criticize the EU and still present it as a separate unit in the center of in/security processes. Having a critical stance towards claims and politics of security is not the distinguishing feature of IPS though since it is embedded in all critical security studies. What is particularly distinctive about IPS in critical security studies is its emphasis on reflexivity, which requires researchers to be aware of the outcomes of all social and political phenomena, including their own research and writing. Keeping this commitment in mind has a potential to better understand why underemphasizing non-EU agency may end up with multiple challenges for a comprehensive analysis of externalization.

3.2 The EU as Recruiting non-EU Actors

There are studies that analyze both EU and non-EU actors in their analysis of externalization and present findings as to how and why non-EU parties become part of externalization policies and practices (See Ferreira, 2010; Rees, 2008; Chou, 2009; Walters, 2004; Casas-Cortes, 2012; Fakhoury, 2016; Cetti, 2014; Petrillo, 2013). However, they portray the partnership in a way that EU either “recruits”, “forces” or “compels” the non-EU neighbors to cooperate in return for certain economic and political promises.

Ferreira (2010), in “Risk Politicization Strategies in EU Migration and Asylum Policies” analyzes governance and risk profiling as bordering strategies with a constructivist approach that integrates discursive and non-discursive securitizing

strategies. In 2008, when many migrants arrived at Lampedusa, multiple EU actors agreed that migration flows are unpreventable and “relations with third countries of origin or transit should be enhanced to persuade them to cooperate on migration and border management” (Ferreira, 2010: 176). To locate its borders elsewhere, the EU signs agreements with neighbors like Libya who are “compelled to” implement certain security practices in the cooperation with EU (Ferreira 2010: 176). Moreover, for the Mediterranean countries, mobility partnership is “an opportunity to be empowered” which also makes the EU countries “concerned with the increased expectations of some third countries” (Ferreira 2010, 176). This portrayal implies that non-EU states of the cooperation are demanding partners that carry a risk of becoming a troublemaker if they are not controlled by the EU (See Korany, 1986: 549). Petrillo (2013, 120) in “Migratory pressures on the EU’s external borders and policy implications: Developments from the South of Italy” also argues that EU manages ‘migration crisis’ “in a securitized way” by turning third countries into “gatekeepers of Fortress Europe.” Cetti (2014: 4), in “Border Controls in Europe: Policies and Practices Outside the Law” more explicitly states that within the scope of EU’s remote-control policies, non-EU Mediterranean states such as Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, and Libya “have been recruited through agreements containing returns and readmission clauses into playing the role of the buffer zone, filtering out unwanted migrants.”

While in Ferreira’s analysis portrays non-EU states as ‘demanding junior partners’ Petrillo presents them as ‘gatekeepers’ recruited by the EU, and Cetti portrays them as ‘employers’ of the EU. What these analyses share is the dominant role attributed to

EU. Non-EU states on the other hand are portrayed as actors that work for the EU to benefit from certain opportunities. They appear in these narratives as what Grovogui (2006: 8) refers to as “appendages of Western makers of history, on terms defined by the latter.” The impact of the non-EU actors on the implementation process is shown when Petrillo suggests that after “co-signed bilateral agreement” the traffic from Libya to EU stopped almost completely (Petrillo, 2013: 121). Moreover, Cetti (2014: 16) define all non-EU states that accept deported immigrants as “unlawful environments.” In most of these analyses non-EU states are located as underdeveloped and needy actors that do the EU’s job by implementing its practices in order to benefit from certain opportunities that are provided.

Casas-Cortes et al. (2012, 50) in “Re-bordering the neighborhood: Europe's emerging geographies of non-accession integration” argue that with the help of the frameworks such as ENP and GAMM, the EU created new geographies of collaboration with non-EU states “to be able to control migration flows well before arrival at actual EU borders”. Morocco is “the leading actor in EU border management policies” because it is the most integrated Southern partner (Casas-Cortes 2012, 51). In return, it received “the greatest level of funding” from the ENP Initiative. Similarly, Fakhoury (2016, 74) in “Securitising Migration: The European Union in the Context of the Post-2011 Arab Upheavals” presents Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan as states that “shoulder the main burden of the Syrian refugee crisis by cooperating for tighter border surveillance” “in return for “incentives such as speeding up accession process and visa-free travel.” These analyses approach the issue by putting the EU actors in the center and locate non-EU states from the perspective of the EU. They reduce the

Mediterranean states' incentive to obtain basic gains which overlooks multiple kinds of social and political relations between actors such as bureaucracies that might influence the decision to cooperate. As such, they risk reinscribing "a static, homogeneous and Eurocentric view of that 'external' world" having monolithic interests (Dimitrovova and Kramsch 2017, 798).

Rees (2008: 97) in his article "Inside Out: The External Face of EU Internal Security Policy" also argues that "imposing its model of internal security upon its neighbors" is one way how EU copes with transnational threats. Rees (2008: 104) suggests that "the EU has pressured EU-Mediterranean countries to tighten their emigration controls through better document security and the improvement of border management" and "has imposed readmission agreements" for the return of migrants. Despite EU's "awareness of the poor economic conditions of the non-EU countries, it has placed significant additional burdens on them" to conform its internal security provisions (Rees, 2008: 105). So, the article suggests, although there is not an international law obligation imposing such cooperation, "economic power and influence of the EU" have secured these agreements (Rees, 2008: 104). Chou (2009: 542) in "The European Security Agenda and the External Dimension of EU Asylum and Migration Cooperation" argues that European heads of state and government portray mobility partnership as beneficial for both the EU and non-EU states. However, the article suggests, the EU's approach is repressive because the action plans for mobility partnership were drafted "without any dialogue with non-EU countries" (Chou, 2009: 553). According to Chou, EU's policy is "to enforce cooperation unilaterally" for its own benefit. Chou analyzes only the practices of the

EU actors which unintentionally reifies the narrative of “unilateral cooperation” and contradicts with the main argument of the research. Similarly, Walters (2004) in “The Frontiers of the European Union: A Geostrategic Perspective,” argues that non-EU states act as buffer zones between the unwanted migrants and EU. Measures such as safe third country agreements and readmission agreements “encourage non-member countries to close down known routes of clandestine entry, and to improve their detection and surveillance procedures” (Walters, 2004: 684). Accordingly, although they see dangers of being a buffer zone, they also see membership as a countermeasure. They foresee that this is temporary and when they become members, the buffer zone responsibility will shift to new neighbors (Walters, 2004: 685) which will free them from such burden.

The studies that portray non-EU actors as recruited by the EU transcend the first group in the sense that they include non-EU actors into the analyses. These studies also have an account on the border in/security policies of border cooperation rather than focusing merely on daily practices. However, they analyze in detail how and by whom political decisions are taken in the EU while treating non-EU actors as if they share one common purpose or reason to be in the partnership, which is their need to benefit from EU politically or economically.

IPS defines border security as a transnational field that is composed of social and political relational practices between multiple agents (See Bigo, 2016). These competitive, cooperative, transnational, etc. relations are often constituted of power struggles between these agents with various motives. This kind of empirical analyses, however, overlooks a variety of different motivations, roles, routines, and struggles of

non-EU actors, in other words, internal drivers of border control policies in non-EU contexts. According to all these articles, EU uses its power to ‘impose’ border in/security partnership because non-EU states are either suffering from poor economic or political conditions in need of favors, or their bid for membership make them ready to implement EU’s policies.

This account overlooks how non-EU partners are contributing to or contesting the EU’s externalization policies based on their internal dynamics. Majority of these studies argue that through externalizing, the EU aims to transfer its security policies and practices to external actors without giving up on its normative commitments on paper. Put differently, their studies imply, the EU ‘minimizes costs while increasing profits’ (See, Stock et al. 2019: 2). This portrayal of non-EU actors as silent and trapped has the risk of naturalizing, albeit unwittingly, the EU domination over non-EU parties by missing multiple channels they engage in and together constitute the border in/security regime in the Mediterranean.

3.3 Border In/security as Everyday Practices

There are IPS studies in the literature that analyze practices of both EU and non-EU actors that constitute externalization (See Andersson, 2016; Casas-Cortes et al., 2014; Frowd, 2014). They come closest in integrating the agency of non-EU with their analyses of everyday in/security practices of multiple actors. However, due to their urge to capture daily and routine practices of border in/security, majority of these studies present a snapshot of the current activities in the field without locating them into broader political processes.

Frowd (2014) in “The field of border control in Mauritania” emphasizes that the literature on borders tend to ignore border control actors from the Global South, their “practices and rationalities.” Frowd’s article draws attention to a significant ‘shortcoming’ in the literature, also relevant to this dissertation’s puzzle, which is ‘the ignorance of the actions of the Global South.’ Starting from this point, Frowd describes the Mauritanian border as a transnational and sociotechnical space that is governed from Brussels and Nouakchott. The article aims to focus on the sociology of human and non-human security actants, conducting a Bourdieusian analysis and answer two questions: Who are the actors that make up the field of border security in Mauritania border, and what are their practices? What rationalities of border control are adapted in border governance in Mauritania? Frowd analyzes border posts, landscape, biometric entry-exit system, and training practices as security actants (Frowd, 2014: 227).

Frowd locates the agential power of ‘materials/things’ in border control in Mauritania, such as Senegal River, Sahara, border posts, digital technologies etc. The article draws attention to non-humans as actants, and their ability to make a difference. However, when it comes to ‘social agents of border security’ the article focuses mostly on the policies and practices of IOM and EU institutions or states. Technologies, as a significant agent in border control according to the article, are portrayed as tools of EU and/or IOM, while local border guards, police, and gendarmerie are mentioned only to the extent that they apply these tools in border control (Frowd, 2014: 235-236). This presentation of border in/security cooperation attributes a limited agency to the non-EU actors especially in the construction of

remote-control policies, while still portraying the field of border control as established and governed heavily by the policies of Western actors. Although Frowd's analysis has come a long way in pointing to the agential power of the Southern actors, it is still built on the assumption that "EU, its member states, and international partners like IOM have dramatically intensified their border management activities in West Africa" while actors of the non-EU entered the process later by implementing EU-initiated in/security practices (Frowd, 2014: 226). The analysis of non-EU actors can be strengthened by a processual analysis of how the current border in/security field has been constructed through encounters between multiple actors operating at different layers of externalization. The analysis of how decisions, moments of compliance and confrontation influence the process and outcomes has a potential to comprehend the agency of non-EU in the constitution of in/security policies.

Andersson (2016) in "Hardwiring the frontier? The politics of security technology in Europe's fight against illegal migration," also highlights non-human agency in technological border control but reframes the significance of it by focusing on how technologies, security workers and migrants are mutually constructed. In 2006, the Spanish government started a development cooperation initiative, Plan Africa, and "opened embassies across West Africa, and poured resources into the region in exchange for collaboration in patrols and deportations" (Andersson, 2016: 5).

Technology created a social effect, a network between security professionals of EU and non-EU. Andersson argues that "technology created winners," Spanish Civil Guard in this case, as it dominates the border security field and keeps other agents in a secondary position. Although the African communities did not want to cooperate in

the beginning, the author suggests, soon they were integrated as part of Joint Operation Hera, and local forces started to police beaches and borders. Later, Europol “encouraged” African officers to promote a model law on smuggling, and as a result of “backroom talk” between African officers and Civil Guard of Spain in a meeting, they decided to collaborate (Andersson, 2016: 6). On the one hand, Andersson’s analysis is successful in the sense that it makes the author realize the existence of non-members in the process. On the other hand, although it presents an account on how border in/security policies are decided by EU actors such as Frontex and Spain and implemented through the systems they produce such as Eurosur, the article does not analyze how non-EU actors play an agential role in the constitution of these political processes of border security. This narration presents a snapshot of the current bordering practices while leaving the question of how it has been constituted through encounters between EU and non-EU unanswered. However, as Depelteau (2008: 62) puts it, “Social phenomena are fluid and moving like movies instead of being fixed like pictures.” Like Frowd’s analysis, Andersson builds the analysis on an already constituted political framework of border in/security, which renders invisible non-EU actors’ contributions in this process.

Casas-Cortes et al. (2014, 4) in “Good neighbours make good fences: Seahorse operations, border externalization and extra-territoriality” make a ‘thick description’ of the Seahorse operations, one of the externalization programs coordinated by the EU with the participation of the states in African and Europe, and the EU institutions. The article presents multiple countries taking part in these operations into the analysis, either by providing funding or through border security practices. Through ‘cooperation

centers' which monitors the borderlines to detect irregular departures, several transnational actors collaborated in their extra-territorial practices. Both Andersson and Casas-Cortes et al. focus on joint operations and locate the actions of EU and non-EU actors that contribute to the implementation of externalization policies. These actors include border guards, police patrols, bureaucracies, EU agencies, among others. Casas-Cortes et al., like Frowd and Andersson focus heavily on the technical aspects of border control. The article also presents an account on how the EU has constituted externalization policies, by going through policies such as ENP and GAMM. Externalization is defined as "an explicit effort to stretch EU's borders" by "outsourcing of border control responsibilities to another country's security forces" (Casas-Cortes et al., 2014: 2-3).

Both Andersson and Casas-Cortes et al. analyze joint operations and focus on security forces' practices. However, most of these articles do not analyze how non-EU actors play an agential role in the constitution of these policies through their decisions, cooperation, reluctance, and contestation. Although they provide an account on the practices of non-EU actors, they do not analyze broader political encounters between multiple parties. As a result, they provide an account of the agency of the non-EU actors as implementors of the EU's policies.

Mc Cluskey (2020) in "Freedom, technology and surveillance: everyday paradoxes on the EU-Morocco border" conducts an ethnographic analysis at the Moroccan borderlands to understand "everyday paradoxes in which migrants are embedded, stemming from their entanglements with bordering technologies." Mc Cluskey particularly emphasizes the paradox between freedom, technology, and surveillance.

The focus of the article is on the everyday in/securities in the migrant experiences. Thus, the research is centered on the migrant experience, rather than the actors and relations that constitute in/security. It presents the migrant narrative with direct notes from the dialogues made during the ethnographic research. Other than that, the article presents a clear vision of why the EU externalizes border in/security (to keep migrants away) and how EU actors such as Eurosur, Frontex, Spain, Spanish security forces work together to make externalization practices possible. When it comes to actors of Morocco, the article briefly mentions that the Moroccan government wanted to transform the state from a 'transit' to 'destination' country and got funding from EU for 'the regularization programs.' (Mc Cluskey, 2020: 119). Moroccan authorities' motivations were reduced to 'being paid' once again in a representation of one migrant's narrative (Mc Cluskey, 2020: 129). The author defines this 'trade' as "re-inscribed colonial mentalities of oppressor and oppressed" (Mc Cluskey, 2020: 129).

When it comes to the analysis of in/security practices of a few actors in the field, the article briefly mentions Moroccan police's discriminative practices, and support of a few Moroccan NGOs to migrants. Due to its emphasis on the experiences "at a human level" majority of the article expectedly analyzes what migrants declared throughout the field work. It does not aim to present a deeper analysis of political decisions, motivations, or even bureaucratic practices in/security. Still, it has a clear vision on the political motivations of the EU and its actors, while its account on the non-EU motivations is limited to the role of EU funding.

El Qadim, in "Postcolonial challenges to migration control: French-Moroccan cooperation practices on forced returns" (2014), argues that only by focusing on mid-

level practices one can comprehensively analyze the processes of border security. The article combines the practice approach with the postcolonial perspective. This combination of different approaches to security contributes to the article's understanding and portrayal of non-EU agents as having agential power in the constitution of policies and implementation of practices.

El Qadim has a critical approach towards border controls and argues that EU and non-EU cooperation is an asymmetric one, and EU tries to pressure Morocco throughout the negotiations. She analyzes this asymmetry by locating it into colonial relations in the past and Morocco's continuing reliance on the EU's economic support (El Qadim, 2014: 244). Despite the article's emphasis on hierarchical relations between EU and Morocco, El Qadim analyzes not only EU's but also Moroccan actors' approaches in the cooperation when making arguments such as "Moroccan actors have not only been resisting the signing of a readmission agreement," but also defended "their own version of what forced readmission should be through their administrative practices of forced returns" (El Qadim, 2014: 249). Moroccan officials' objections, she states, are not to negotiate for more gains from EU, but they have a 'political nature.' Moroccan officials see some practices of France as "undermining Morocco's sovereignty, credibility, and dignity in the international level" (Al Qadim, 2014: 256).

Al Qadim's article portrays the cooperation as a political process that two parties take part with their own political considerations; analyzes multiple channels of relations between French and Moroccan agents; does not focus only on everyday practices of border in/security, role of material things, role of technology, role of only one agent, but managed to locate multiple actors' actions on different levels. In this sense, the

article takes a step further in integrating non-EU agency by not overlooking non-EU parties' role in constituting border in/security cooperation based on internal dynamics. It does so by combining the practice approach with the postcolonial approach. This dissertation, different from Al Qadim, aims to utilize from an IPS approach in its analysis of border in/security and the agency of the non-EU actors.

To summarize, this third group of studies come closest in terms of locating the agency of non-EU actors in their analysis of how the Mediterranean borders are in/secured. They integrate the existence and practices of non-EU actors (state and non-state) into their analyses. These studies do not treat non-EU actors as if they are monolithic entities with one common motive and aim to act. In this sense, they bring together the 'international' and the 'sociology' of the EU's external border security with their analyses of everyday practices of multiple actors at the borderlands, and how non-human actants such as technology, landscape etc. influence border in/security. However, they bring non-EU actors into the analysis only after the EU actors established the political framework and it is time to implement the necessary practices. Although majority of these studies are built on certain assumptions about what kind of political urge EU actors act upon (to keep migrants away) they do not have an account on the possible motivations of non-EU. Doing so, they overlook how border in/security policies are also interconnected and this is another layer of bordering where non-EU agency lies.

This argument is neither to downplay the role of everyday practices nor to advocate an orthodox understanding of what is political (i.e. diplomacy, decision making, elite discourse, etc.). Practices of security professionals are both political and constitutive

of insecurities. However, security practitioners operating in the field tend to consider what they do as “professional responsibility” and “sense of duty to enforce law” which makes it impossible to disregard the agency lies in the making of political and legal framework (See Isleyen, 2018a). Reliance on routine in/security practices may result in the underemphasis of political agency and power relations that give the fields their current shapes. Bordering is not only made at the borderlands or identity checks in transit cities, but it is also made where the decisions to apply security measures are made relationally. There is no externalization before relations. It is made possible through interconnected policies and practices of actors from different parts of the Mediterranean.

This is not to suggest that political decisions or context are the only things to look at to understand where political agency lies. Practices are also political. However, even if border in/security practices are unconscious and come out of routines, they are based on consciously taken political decisions. The rationale behind these decisions cannot be reduced to ‘economic gain out of EU funding’ or taken for granted. On the contrary, the analysis of how everyday practices are located within political relations can provide a comprehensive understanding of non-EU agency in externalization.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter is built on the main puzzle of the dissertation, that is, most of the IPS research on externalization in the Mediterranean put the EU in the center of their analyses. What is puzzling here is that this is in contrast to relational commitments of IPS. This eventuality results in an incomplete picture of border in/security in the

Mediterranean by overlooking the existence, agency, and responsibility of non-EU actors that also take part in the construction of in/security. Based on these insights driven from this chapter's analysis, the next chapter narrates the process of the EU externalization to non-EU states by focusing on the political and legal frameworks and bureaucratic practices of externalization.



CHAPTER 4:

EU EXTERNALIZATION OF BORDER IN/SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

This chapter presents an analysis of how the EU⁸ externalizes its border in/security policies and practices to the non-EU states of the Mediterranean. It builds on the analysis presented in Chapter 3, which showed the shortcomings of existing IPS studies in locating the agency of non-EU actors in their investigations of externalization in the Mediterranean. To illustrate its points on what the literature is overlooking, the chapter analyzes how the actors of the EU have constituted externalization frameworks and practices through encounters with non-EU partners.

⁸ The dissertation does not specifically focus on the positions of various EU actors operating in the field; but it is aware of the differences within the EU. It does not consider the EU as a monolithic entity or an undifferentiated whole and points out the differences between actors where relevant for the main puzzle of the research.

The chapter first traces the roots of the border cooperation in the Mediterranean starting from the 1960s until the 2000s to understand how the current border in/security regime has been constituted by the EU through encounters with the neighboring partners. Second, it analyzes the evolution of externalization after the abolition of the EU internal borders by going through three layers of bordering as political context, legal framework, and bureaucratic and operational practices of in/security. Third, the chapter examines how externalization evolved through multiple layers after the Arab uprisings as a critical juncture that influenced the current shape of the field.

4.1 Background of the EU's Border In/security Policies in the Mediterranean

The United States became the pioneer of the strategy of border externalization in the 1920s when it shifted the processing of migrants to its consular posts abroad (Zolberg, 1997). In Europe, this strategy was first used in 1969 by the United Kingdom, when it started to practice the “entry clearance system” to extra-territorialize the management of family reunification and reduce postcolonial immigration from India (Joppke, 1999: 117). Although this method was originally developed as an administrative tool that was neutral on applicant rights, it quickly became “an unofficial quota system that allowed a drastic reduction of the rate of entry” which makes it a tool of border control (Joppke, 1999: 117). Since then, states of Europe have used externalization as a strategy of border in/security to keep migrants away and to create ‘buffer zones’ through political, legal, and operational channels of cooperation with non-EU states (Guiraudon and Joppke, 2001: 13).

Externalization has been institutionalized since the 1990s, but association agreements of the 1960s already started collaboration on different areas and constitute the basis of border in/security cooperation in the Mediterranean (Guasconi, 2013: 163; Tsoukalis, 1977; Osswald and Wessels, 1982; Isaac and Kares, 2017). These agreements increased European states' authority over border politics in the Mediterranean. They also aimed to increase their involvement in the domestic politics of non-EU states since they require specific commitments on political, economic, or human rights developments while offering easier access to the EU markets or technical and financial assistance.⁹ Although association agreements regulated or limited the mobility of goods and humans, especially by addressing the root causes, their focus was economy and development.

The idea of creating a global approach in the Mediterranean was advocated first by the European Parliament, followed by the Commission and the Council, after which the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) was introduced at the Paris Summit (European Parliament, 1973: 35). According to the Commission, the policy was based on "mutual interest with the Mediterranean neighbors" particularly in the field of external security along with trade, energy, and labor (Commission of the EC, 1972: 2). The focus of the GMP was on the Mediterranean states, specifically a couple of Maghreb countries, Turkey and Yugoslavia (Isaac and Kares, 2017: 15). The EC started border in/security policies specific to the Mediterranean region later in the

⁹ Association agreements are currently regulated under the Article 217 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU).

1970s in the form of either EC level or bilateral schemes (Commission of the EC, 1982: 15-16).

Practices and policies of migration and border control are not independent of the security considerations of their agents in their particular contexts. Rather than being a problem, accepting immigrants and refugees was a solution for the EC and member states at that time (Bilgin, 2016b: 2). However, the way mobility policies were designed still made mobility of certain groups easier while putting limitations on the others based on the EC's conception of security. While immigration for family reunification or postcolonial immigration was limited, labor immigration was encouraged. In 1976's EC-Turkey Council, for instance, Turkish worker migrants were given "a second priority" to move to Europe if the Community nationals could not fill vacancies (Bourguignon, 1990: 57). In this sense, the policies of the EC states were still serving the project of 'securing Europe' while securitizing multiple referents.

The open framing of human mobility in security terms started after the signatory of the Schengen Agreement in 1985 because most European governments began to become concerned with protecting the external borders (D'appollonia, 2008: 204; Bilgin, 2016b). The governments of the coastal states of Europe, which shared sea borders with non-EU states of the Mediterranean, were more eager to implement border security measures than the others. When traditional responses to mobility have been insufficient for the European states, new types of migration policies were introduced (Boswell, 2003: 619-20; Appleyard, 2001). Therefore, by 1987, the

Parliament and the Commission started to underline “the need for extraterritorial control of asylum and migration” (Triandafyllidou, 2014).

Securitization of mobility and externalization of border in/security in the Mediterranean became more institutionalized in the post-Cold War. This tendency was related to the membership of Greece, Spain, and Portugal as the coastal states of Europe, as well as increasing tensions in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) due to the Arab-Israel conflict. The measures mainly targeted push factors in the region. The Council adopted Redirected Mediterranean Policy (RMP) in 1990 mainly introducing finance and trade-related protocols and several decentralized cooperation programs between several EU and non-EU professionals.¹⁰ The 5+5 Initiative was launched in 1990 for a “forward-looking agenda on information exchange, joint management of international borders, agreed forms of labor migration, migration for development, and protection of the rights of migrants” (IOM, n.d.).¹¹ The Commission also proposed the Middle East Peace Process to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict and accordingly eliminate push factors to prevent further immigration to Europe (Commission of the EC, 1993). The EU institutions and states agreed on increasing the level of involvement in the Southern and Eastern neighborhoods to create an ‘area of security’ in the Mediterranean in the first half of the 1990s. Border in/security policies and practices were increased with each conflict

¹⁰ The protocols signed with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Turkey were updated in 1992 and all are still in effect (European Commission Press Release, 2019).

¹¹ Ten member states are: Algeria, France, Italy, Libya, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia.

in the region. As is seen, EU states started to pay attention to the Mediterranean mainly to ‘secure their borders’ by preventing immigration flows that might be triggered after periods of political instability. This is how the EC/EU actors have linked their security with that of the non-EU states and started externalizing border policies and practices through the Mediterranean, which was originally a matter of internal security.

4.2 Border In/security after the Abolition of the EU’s Internal Borders

The literature of IPS agrees that after the implementation of the Schengen Agreement, securitization of migration and externalization of border in/security policies intensified (See Chapter 3). Building on this argument, this part analyzes the EU externalization starting from the abolition of the internal borders until the Arab uprisings. It analyzes the process by pointing to the links between border in/security policies, legal framework, and operational practices to comprehend how the EU actors have constituted a remote-control regime of in/security through relations with non-EU actors.

4.2.1 The Policies of Border In/security

The majority of the political and legal frameworks of externalization are initiated by actors of the EU; however, they are established through encounters between non-EU parties that also have agency in the constitution of resulting insecurities. The EU initiated several regional and bilateral dialogues, mobility and migration partnerships, program and frameworks, joint action plans that make possible the implementation of in/security practices to keep immigrants away from the EU territory. This part

analyzes political tools of externalization to better comprehend how the agency of the non-EU is also exercised at this layer despite the unbalanced nature of cooperation.

Aspects of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP/Barcelona Process) already constituted a form of externalization before the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) (Tömmel, 2013; Noutcheva, 2015; Dimulescu, 2011; Collyer, 2016). EMP was introduced after the implementation of the Schengen Agreement in 1995 as a significant attempt to fully adopt a systematic and comprehensive approach to address South-to-North mobility in the Mediterranean (European Council, 1995). By signing the Barcelona Declaration (1995: 2), participants agreed to establish “a comprehensive partnership through strengthening political dialogue on a regular basis and the development of economic and financial cooperation.” The partnership covered economic and social affairs, along with the issues of politics and security, which demonstrates the EU’s aim to “prevent southern problems from becoming northern problems” (Bilgin, 2016b: 3). This approach forms one of the main tools of the Union’s externalization policy, which is ‘to strengthen’ the Southern Mediterranean in a way that does not ‘harm’ EU’s security.

Another tool of externalization, which is to control mobility, was also realized in EMP through “closer cooperation in the area of illegal migration” between police, judicial and other authorities “to reduce migratory pressures,” along with training programs and programs of assistance for employment (Barcelona Declaration, 1995: 6-13). However, EMP’s call did not guarantee a stronger border security partnership, which shows the impact of non-EU partners on the outcomes. For instance, the association agreement that integrated Algeria to EMP could not provide an active

partnership, and negotiations between the two parties were unsuccessful because the Algerian government considered regional cooperation ‘as a threat to state sovereignty.’ Algeria reconsidered border security partnership only after 9/11 when the government started to change its definition of state security to include counterterrorism as a significant element of its defined foreign policy strategy (Zardo and Loschi, 2020: 5). Thus, even when non-EU states comply with policies and practices of externalization, this may be a result of their security considerations rather than the EU’s demands. These considerations may range from concerns related to sovereignty, preserving or changing the state’s position in the region or regional and bilateral conflicts, securing natural and economic sources within its borders, along with other issues of domestic or international politics (See Reslow, 2012; Natter, 2013).

Before 9/11 intensified externalization of border in/security, the Council already recalled in the Tampere Council the need for “close cooperation with the countries of origin and transit” on migration control (Tampere European Council, 1999). EU defined “strengthening border control capacities particularly in directly bordering countries” as central to its objective of ‘securing EU external borders’ (Wunderlich, 2013: 29). The initiative repeated “the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration” (Leonard, 2010: 234). Therefore, the external dimension of border in/security policies got formalized and became a priority in EU politics (Triandafyllidou, 2014). Since then, the EU has built externalization policy frameworks on “a discourse of partnership” emphasizing “the regional Euro-Mediterranean character of this relationship” (Collyer, 2016: 606). This vision was

furthered at the Seville European Council of 2002, at which member states decided to “encourage the third countries to accept new disciplines” to be sure that they recognize and respect the coherence of EU external policies and their obligations in the border in/security cooperation (Xhaferaj, 2011: 49).

The securitizing impact of 9/11 on borders and migration was more explicit in the Hague Program of 2004, in which migration and security have further been aligned. The program had a considerably more restrictive and security-based focus and reflected the member states’ securitized view of migrants associated with terrorism (Hulme and Kostakopoulou, 2018: 212). This securitized view of mobility and migrants was shared by some of the non-EU coastal states of the Mediterranean. In the case of Algeria, for instance, 9/11 and increasing securitization of migration corresponded with the state’s giving up on the policy of isolationism since its independence. The security environment that was constructed after 9/11 corresponded with the change in Algerian foreign policy to more active diplomacy in the 2000s, which relatively increased the state’s responsiveness to EU’s border externalization policies and strengthened the cooperation with actors of the EU (Darbouche, 2008).

European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was initiated in this environment when it became clear that EMP did not produce the expected results in terms of convincing non-EU neighbors to partner with the EU actors on external border in/security policies. Prevalent narratives on EMP suggest that the project ended because the South was not committed to or not ready for engaging in the kind of openness and interdependence that EMP required (Bilgin, 2017a). The unbalanced character of the partnership drove many neighboring countries away from the idea of cooperation under EMP. ENP was

prepared based on this view that a more balanced relationship would have helped in building stronger cooperation.¹² Thus, it promised a partnership that also considered ‘the needs of the Southern parties.’ It covered bilateral, regional, and neighborhood-wide programs not only on border cooperation but also “on democracy and economy, rule of law and good governance, state building” (European Commission website). The Commission claimed that the EU and non-EU partners set priorities together” however, ENP was still centered on integrating Southern Mediterranean¹³ and Eastern Europe in the policy of “securing the EU’s external borders” (Cassarino and Lavenex, 2012: 284).

ENP updated the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) model with a stronger security aspect in issues related to migration and a more institutionalized externalization vision (Jeandesboz, 2007). It targeted bilateral and multilateral collaboration between enforcement bodies and neighboring countries “in the effective control of borders by specialized and trained personnel, judicial and police cooperation” (Commission of the European Communities, 2004: 23). The idea behind ENP was first stated in a speech by then-president of the European Commission in 2003 as “engagement with a circle of friends that would not become members”; however, ENP did not build that type of an equal partnership (Collyer, 2016: 609). The discourse of a balanced partnership was nothing more than “a clear presentational effort to develop a narrative of equality of cooperation, partnership, and harmonious collaboration”

¹² Bilgin (2017a) also suggests that “approaching the South in a non-Eurocentric perspective” and “considering Southern actors’ understandings of the process, their insecurities and interests” would have helped with developing a better model.

¹³ Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine.

(Collyer, 2016: 611). It was an aim to build a hierarchically designed mode of governance on non-EU states and externalize a fully securitized agenda on migration and border control (Lavenex and Wichmann, 2009; Zardo and Cavatorta, 2018). On the contrary, the security collaboration in the Mediterranean has deteriorated the security of individuals and regimes in the South, rather than being beneficial and establishing a balanced cooperation, while ‘securing’ the external border of the EU (Bilgin et al., 2011: 7).

The EU’s initiation of this unbalanced in/security cooperation is not a sufficient indicator that the actors in the South adopted the hierarchically developed political frameworks within the scope of ENP. Not only domestic politics of different states but also how they position themselves in regional dynamics played a role in their reluctance to adopt externalization policies. For instance, Algeria was one of these partners that rejected to be an active partner of ENP due to concerns regarding its conflict with Morocco. The Moroccan government’s active involvement in EU externalization increased the Algerian government’s ongoing distrust towards border security partnership in the Mediterranean, which the government associated with the security of the state (Collyer, 2016). As such, Algeria’s resultant position in the border in/security cooperation was renewed, while further centralizing Morocco’s role in bordering policies.

In 2005, following “an issue of unwanted land migration” from Sub-Saharan to the Spanish territories of Ceuta and Melilla (the so-called ‘Cayucos Crisis’), the EU initiated the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) to address all migration and asylum issues “in a comprehensive and balanced manner” and

Morocco's involvement in border in/security cooperation became even more crucial for the EU states, Spain being in the first place (European Commission, 2006; see also Collyer et al., 2010; Vives, 2017). GAMM framework was established to manage external aspects of the EU's migration policy (Collyer, 2016) which once again emphasized "dialogue and partnerships with third countries based on mutual interests" (The Council, 2009: 2). The EU aimed to "reduce migratory pressures" by creating a clear institutional framework (Wunderlich, 2012: 1414). GAMM specifically aimed to guarantee temporary mobility of documented migrants; to fight against undocumented migration; and to initiate development in the countries of origin (IOM, 2005; Migration and Home Affairs, 2019). Spain was the most significant advocate of GAMM since the state aimed to accommodate Morocco's policy considerations and "ensure its continued cooperation on irregular migration" after 2005 (Kaiser, 2013: 21). The Spanish government's support for "Moroccan interests" lasted with its continuous "pressure on the EU institutions to approve additional funding for Morocco" (Kaiser, 2013: 21). In practice, with the direct or indirect participation of multiple EU and non-EU actors, GAMM became the most comprehensive attempt to integrate non-EU states into EU's border security policies and became the spearhead of many related regional initiatives (See, Wunderlich, 2013: 26).

The Rabat Process was jointly established in 2006 by Spain, Morocco, France, and Senegal and was presented as "a flexible strategic framework," according to which the partner states adopt new ministerial declarations and action plans every three years in line with "evolving realities of migration and development" (Rabat Process

Website). Yet again, all action plans focused on preventing mobility to the EU by reducing root causes of migration, promoting ‘legal’ migration, fighting irregular migration, building capacity for identification and travel documents, and encouraging return and readmission (Marrakesh Political Declaration, 2018). One of the main motives behind Morocco’s positioning itself in the center of the process also through intensified bilateral cooperation with Spain was shared concerns to control undocumented migration (Lavenex, 2008; Wunderlich, 2010). People who tried to cross the Mediterranean were pushed back to their countries of origin without any safety of life, facing several insecurities on the route to the Canary Islands (Senge, 2018: 68-69). What Spanish border guards’ and Moroccan authorities’ initial security response caused was the death of an estimated 6,000 deported people on the way back or in the deserts of Morocco (BBC, 2005; Cassarino and Lavenex, 2012: 284). As such, while serving the joint ‘security concern’ of Morocco and Spain, the cooperation between two sides resulted in severe migrant insecurities.

Not every ENP state in the Maghreb adopted action plans, though. It was not possible to design and implement action plans with Libya and Algeria. In the case of Libya, this was mainly due to the state’s lack of required conditions such as being a signatory of an association agreement. Furthermore, when the Gaddafi regime was overthrown, there was a period of uncertainty due to the lack of institutions to take over. Algeria, however, refused to accept action plans of ENP by labeling it as “a hegemonic approach” that could harm the state’s political and economic ambitions (Martinez, 2010: 178). Morocco’s central role in the process was another motive of the Algerian government for refusing to be part of the partnership once again with a last-minute

decision (Collyer, 2016). Similarly, Tripoli Process included Algeria but not Morocco because of the bilateral disputes between two states, indicating that the processes of externalization are “not always under the control of the EU” but non-EU states of the Mediterranean are able to determine their level of engagement (Collyer, 2016: 615).

When the partnership between Morocco and Spain became successful in reducing migration, the EU introduced the framework of ‘bilateral dialogues’ that would help in building political partnerships. Political partnerships are deepened forms of transborder cooperation that, according to the Commission, “promote mutually-beneficial migration and mobility partnerships” (European Commission, 2015a: 16). Once built, discussions and actions based on bilateral dialogues are transferred into partnerships. Partnerships are negotiated mainly by the Commission, Presidency of the Council, representatives from concerned EU and non-EU states, along with a couple of agencies such as Frontex, EASO, Europol, and the European Training Foundation (Garcia, 2015: 32). On paper, the main priority of the EU in partnerships is to “encourage legal migration” by offering non-EU states “legal migration opportunities” in return for their cooperation on preventing “illegal’ migration, strengthening border control, and accepting readmission commitments (European Commission, 2007a). In practice, partnerships work as projects to prevent mobility by way of readmission and return, rather than proposing new ways for documented migration (Lavenex and Stucky, 2011; Carrera and Hernandez, 2011). In this regard, they serve the purpose of ‘securing the EU’ from unwanted immigrants while resulting in multiple insecurities for immigrating individuals through the implementation of border control practices.

Regional programs also continued to be developed by building on the achievements of the Tampere and Hague on controlling external borders (The Council, 2009: 2). The Stockholm Program was adopted in 2009, following the Lisbon Treaty that included a degree of supranational governance in the internal security policy domain (Meissner, 2017: 3). The Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) was introduced as a policy domain that includes “asylum, immigration, and border policies, counter-terrorism, justice, and police cooperation, as well as the external dimension of these activities” (Kaunert et al., 2014: 39). Within that scope, the Commission issued a communication calling for “a dynamic and comprehensive migration policy which consolidates a global approach to migration” (European Commission, 2009: 23-24). The Council identifies two significant goals of the Program as “to control illegal immigration by ensuring that illegal immigrants return to their countries of origin or a country of transit” and “to create partnership with third countries to encourage the synergy between migration and development” (The Council, 2009: 60).

The Stockholm Program was promoted as being more “citizen-oriented” and “liberal” than its predecessors (Hulme and Kostakopoulou, 2018: 212). The most significant political priority of the Program was “to focus on the interests, needs rights and freedoms of citizens” referring to the citizens of the EU (The Council, 2009: 3). It highlighted the need for strengthening internal security strategy and cooperation with non-EU states to make EU citizens “more secure” inside and beyond borders (The Council, 2009: 4). Therefore, it created a dichotomy between the EU citizens to be secured and others that threaten their security. The Program document encouraged the

use of security technology, particularly computerized systems of information exchange and data processing to prevent the mobility of outsiders to Europe (See, Bigo and Jeandesboz, 2009: 1). In the level of state-to-state cooperation, the Stockholm Program stated that partnership with non-EU states “should be flexible and responsive to the needs of both the EU and the partner countries” to not repeat the mistakes of the previous ones (The Council, 2009: 61).

Despite ‘the goal of mutual benefit’ emphasized in these political cooperation tools, these platforms and dialogues were built mainly based on multiple EU actors’ security considerations which result in unbalanced cooperation. However, this does not imply that non-EU has no influence in shaping externalization policies. Like EU states and agencies, Southern partners are agents of the in/security cooperation and have a clear vision of what they want out of it. They are “active borrowers of externalization” due to their ability to reshape and redirect the reception of EU norms and practices (Cassarino and Del Sarto, 2018: 3; see also Acharya 2004). They accept the terms of cooperation based on internal dynamics and motives. For instance, to reduce transit migration through Morocco, Spain suggested a restriction of Morocco’s visa allowances from northern and Sub-Saharan Africa countries. The Moroccan government welcomed this suggestion because it was also in line with Morocco’s policy of strengthening its borders to ‘secure’ itself from conflicts in the region (Carling, 2007a).

Non-EU Mediterranean states’ responsiveness to the securitization of migration in discourse and practice, including the adoption of criminalizing or controlling political, legal, and organizational arrangements, has not been independent of their internal

policy considerations. Non-EU actors selectively adopt or discard externalization policies and practices initiated by multiple EU actors based on their respective and transforming motives which may be related to financial, political, or security-related considerations (Koenig, 2017: 7-8). The process of externalization increased the EU's dependency on non-EU partners, which has led the latter to exercise more agency in shaping the political and legal frameworks, as well as the implementation of practices, which Cassarino (2018) names as 'reversed conditionality.' It is significant to take into consideration how non-EU actors play an agential role in creating insecurities resulted from externalization as a socially, politically, and relationally constituted security project.

4.2.2 Legal Framework

Readmission agreements, visa facilitation agreements, safe third country rule, and migration clauses of international agreements and EU legislation are primary tools of externalization that oblige the parties to implement certain practices. The EU as an entity is built on a series of legislative practices, some of which also regulate border in/security. The Schengen area is one of these legislative frameworks after which externalization practices were enhanced.

The boundary of citizenship was already drawn by the Treaty of Maastricht.

According to the treaty, "every person holding the nationality of a member state shall be a citizen of the Union" (Treaty of Maastricht, 1992: 15). Therefore, checks at the common borders of the signatory states would be eliminated. As the Commission highlights, "the abolition of internal border controls cannot come at the expenses of

security” which pointed out the need for the tightening of external border controls (European Commission, 2018). While the citizens of member states and of former EFTA and most OECD countries could cross state borders freely, non-citizens would be subject to border checks (Convey and Kupiszewski, 1995: 944). Member states had to “ensure effective controls at their external borders in cooperation with third countries where appropriate” (Treaty of Maastricht, 1992: 108). Consequently, the distinction between inside and outside, as well as the idea of externalization became prevalent with the changes in the definition of citizenship, external borders, and what/whom counts as ‘threatening security’ (See also Huysmans, 2000; Bigo, 2009).

Member states were motivated to conclude readmission agreements especially with non-EU neighbors after the abolishment of the internal borders to establish a border in/security regime that legally bound the parties. The first agreement was signed between the Schengen states and (then non-EU) Poland based on the ‘security concern’ that Poland’s borders were “vulnerable to exploitation by criminal gangs seeking to bring illegal migrants to the West” (Agenda 2000: 1997; see also Lavenex, 2006: 334). The number of readmission agreements has multiplied since then (El Qadim, 2018: 286). Conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council defined readmission agreements as a crucial element of the EU external border security policy. The Council recommended member states “to work for bilateral and multilateral agreements with countries of origin or transit to ensure that illegal immigrants can be returned to their home countries” (European Council, 1992).

Readmission agreements build joint frameworks for the return of migrants whose asylum seeker claims are rejected or manifestly unfounded to the country of origin or

transit. Once concluded, signatory states become bounded to take their nationals –or depending on the content of the agreement third country nationals (TCNs)- back if they entered EU irregularly (Lavenex, 2006: 341). Other than the possibility of the use of force in the operational phase, readmission agreements are also criticized for bending the law. The principle of non-refoulement, which is utilized in readmission agreements, obliges the host country to keep immigrants that would be subject to inhuman treatment or torture (Panizzon, 2012: 8-9). The non-refoulement principle implies that a state should be listed as a ‘safe third country’ for readmission to be possible. The principle of safe third country was introduced in the 1990 Dublin Convention and has become a frequently referenced tool of border externalization to reduce asylum applications to the EU states and to make returns and readmissions possible (European Parliament, 2000; von Heldorff, 2015). Soon after its introduction, London Resolution adopted the safe third country principle establishing ‘a territorial exclusion regime’ to share responsibility with third states on ‘securing the EU’ from unwanted immigrants (London Resolution, 1992).

As is seen, backed by the safe third country principle, readmission agreements are designed to make it easier “to deport undocumented migrants by regulating the collaboration of origin countries” (El Qadim, 2018: 286). They are generally based on reciprocity on paper. In practice, they create an unbalanced responsibility between the EU and non-EU signatories. Therefore, the EU actors aim to convince potential partners by trying to balance the cooperation from different channels. Member states managed to conclude agreements with states from different parts of the world, but

governments and bureaucrats of the non-EU states in the Southern Mediterranean have been reluctant (Coleman, 2009; Cassarino, 2007).

Analyzing readmission agreement negotiations are useful to reveal where in the process of externalization non-EU agency lies because of their ‘heavy and binding conditions’ for non-EU parties. According to the broad literature on readmission negotiations, non-EU states may reject concluding readmission agreements with the fear of becoming a buffer zone between the states of origin and the EU especially due to articles that imply the acceptance of TCNs along with the citizens of the signatory state (See, El Qadim, 2010; El Qadim, 2017; İçduygu and Aksel, 2014; Cassarino 2007; Wolff, 2014; Zardo and Loschi, 2020 among others).

For instance, the EU approached Tunisia for a readmission agreement and offered “development aid and support for reintegration of returned migrants” (Cassarino and Lavenex, 2012: 287). Although the Tunisian government agreed on implying joint border in/security practices under other frameworks, it rejected to sign a readmission agreement. Similarly, despite having a long-standing history of cooperation with the EU on border security, negotiations with Morocco have not produced a positive outcome for the EU for 20 years (Kaiser, 2019: 5). Most Mediterranean states, including Morocco, reject signing TCN clauses resulting from multiple motives expressed as “not becoming the EU’s policemen” or “dumping ground” (Coleman, 2009: 151). Morocco exercised agency by not accepting but transforming the EU’s demand of readmission agreement by signing a comprehensive mobility partnership in 2013 instead (Zardo and Cavatorta, 2018). Contrary to the common portrayal of externalization in the literature, incentives such as funding, visa or market privileges

did not guarantee the southern Mediterranean transit states to sign agreements (Kaiser, 2019). As a result, only a limited number of readmission agreements could have been concluded by the 2000s.

Realizing that the conclusion of readmission agreements was difficult, coastal member states opted for the diversification and intensification of externalization measures, including all possible legal mechanisms to secure the borders by keeping unwanted immigrants away. This was also related to the 9/11 events that added another layer on top of the post-Schengen idea that external borders of the EU must have been ‘secured against intruders.’ The Seville Council concluded that every future EU cooperation agreement should have included an article on “compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration” (Lavenex, 2006: 342). Following that, the Return Directive was published in 2008 to establish “common rules concerning return, removal, use of coercive measures, detention and entry bans” (The Return Directive, 2008). It foresaw a “fair and transparent procedure for return decisions” but also put measures of control and limitation of mobility such as “a valid entry ban throughout the EU for migrants returned by an EU country” and use of coercive measures based on “the principle of proportionality” (The Return Directive, 2008). The principle of non-refoulement was already reaffirmed and strengthened in 2003 by the Dublin II Regulation to take ‘extra precautions’ “to prevent the abuse of the system” by asylum seekers (Dublin II Regulation, 2003). The act made a broad definition of safe third countries as all those “respecting the principle of non-refoulement” to make return decisions easier (Dublin II Regulation, 2003). Building

on each other, these regulations ensured that once labelled ‘illegal’ immigrants could be captured and deported at the cost of their safety.

The EU also introduced the concept of framework agreements for the instances when it could not conclude a comprehensive agreement, but the parties agreed on enough points. An example was the one signed between Tunisia and France in 2008. The agreement was structured around three externalization strategies: organization of documented migration, fight against undocumented migration, building a development model in Tunisia (Cassarino and Lavenex, 2012). Other than the promise of development incentives, one of the motives of the Tunisian government to party to this bilateral agreement was its search for international legitimacy at that time. Thus, it was a jointly negotiated and agreed initiative to serve the aim of controlling emigration from Tunisia to France. To discourage human mobility to the EU, the agreement put “highly selective criteria” on Tunisian emigrants based on “their skills and labor, employment conditions, and housing in France” (Cassarino and Lavenex, 2012: 286). For instance, the agreement allows family reunification for non-national residents in France, but according to the 2006 Immigration and Integration Law, families of TCNs can only be considered for joining them after they stay in France for at least eighteen months which was considered crucial by the French government (Chou and Baygert, 2007: 3). The immigrants also needed to prove that they were competent in French. Looking at the result it produced, which is to prevent family reunification, the regulation resulted in insecurities for immigrants.

Externalization measures may also target the domestic legislation of a non-EU state. However, the governments tend not to make alterations in domestic law as

externalization measures only because the EU demands it. For instance, the Tunisian Law 2004-06, which the government adopted as a regulation on border control with the support of EU following the adoption of ENP, punished “those who have provided information for, planned, facilitated, assisted, acted as intermediary in an organized the smuggling of a person in and out of Tunisian territory by land, sea or air, even if no payment was received” (Cassarino and Del Sarto, 2018: 5). The scope of the law encompassed not only undocumented migrants but also whomever in the country that has been aware of clandestine exists and not report it to the authorities (Perrin, 2012). It also targeted the populations that live on “the margins of illegality” (Meddeb, 2012: 389, in Cassarino and Del Sarto, 2018). The legitimacy given by the adoption of this law helped the Tunisian government for its aim of balancing internal social discontent which led to the justification of control and domination over the society. Furthermore, the media portrayal of Tunisian immigrants as individuals attracted by “the dream of European El Dorado” drove public attention from poverty, social discontent, and political violence in Tunisia, while attracting attention to pull factors in the EU (Cassarino and Del Sarto, 2018: 5). Thus, it complied with the government’s policies on multiple levels. Similarly, the law that criminalized irregular entry and increased penalties against smuggling was introduced in Algeria in 2008. The law was welcomed by the EU because it complied with its border security policies; however, it was a result of the Algerian state’s decision to adopt its legislation with its security policy ‘to protect national borders’ in the region (Benantar, 2013: 68, in Zardo and Loschi, 2020). Considering the result they produce, which is to increase the authority of the governments to create migrant illegality by broadening the definition of the term, these regulations are practices of insecurity.

What all legal tools of externalization shares is that they are prepared in a way to control and prevent immigration to the EU, while also serving several other domestic or international policies of non-EU governments that requires case-by-case analyses. These frameworks potentially empower certain actors through increasing their authority and consolidate their place in the field which are also reflected in bureaucratic and operational practices of border in/security cooperation. Although included parties point out humanitarian concerns on paper, in/security practices in the field are linked to these political and legal tools of externalization.

4.2.3 Bureaucratic and Operational Practices

IPS of security is interested in the analysis of “mundane bureaucratic decisions of everyday politics” (Bigo, 2008: 127). Accordingly, this part analyzes bureaucratic and operational practices of in/security through which political and legal frameworks are operationalized mainly by the EU actors through relations with non-EU parties. It draws particular attention to capacity building initiatives, development programs, activities of Frontex and EASO as EU agencies, policing activities of multiple security forces, surveillance, and detention and removal centers, among others.

The establishment of a border enforcement body had been on the EU agenda for years and member states established Frontex after the 2004 enlargement as a supranational agency. The agency’s primary responsibility is the operational cooperation of border in/security between countries of origin, destination, transit since then (Council of the EU, 2004; European Council, 2004). Frontex’s activities at the external borders is expected to “help guarantee free movement without internal border checks” (Frontex,

n.d.). Since Frontex acts within the broader area of JHA, it also deals with the EU's internal security issues occasionally (Kaunert et al., 2014). Due to its primary role in arranging operational practices, Frontex's establishment had significantly influenced the practices and relations in the field of border in/security.

Member states transferred their authority and responsibility of the coordination and implementation of several in/security practices such as surveillance, border checks, risk analysis, joint return operations, border security training to Frontex. The agency is considered a security actor since most of its activities are composed of 'extraordinary' security operations and activities, and its cooperation partners are mostly security professionals. Practices of Frontex has already been highly criticized by civil society and scholars for their insecurity impacts on immigrant lives (See Carrera, 2007; Neal, 2009; Leonard, 2009; Leonard, 2010; Papastavridis, 2010; Cetti, 2014; Bigo, 2014; Perkowski, 2018; Leonard and Kaunert, 2020). It is also highly debated that legal principles such as non-refoulement and third safe country rules are respected in Frontex's operations or whether there is regular ill-treatment to migrants (Papastavridis, 2010; Klug and Howe, 2010). What makes Frontex even more significant as a security agent is that although its tasks are limited to operational activities, it also has responsibility in the formation of in/security policies at least through two channels. First, especially 'extraordinary' border security operations are decided based on Frontex's risk analyses. Second, Frontex has the authority to initiate joint operations at the air, land, and sea external borders.

The agency is highly involved in capacity building activities which have been the oldest and most significant externalization practices developed either 'to increase

non-EU states' security capacity', or to address push factors. Capacity building in countries of origin, transit, and destination; and ensuring improvement in infrastructures and administrative capacity of non-EU states are noted as significant aspects of GAMM adopted for long-term and sustainable border security cooperation. Training targets the development and use of surveillance equipment, conducting risk analyses, intelligence sharing, as well as physical tools of border security such as border checks and return operations. In the short term, these externalization practices aim to prevent migrants before they arrive at the EU territory, return undocumented migrants, and assist resettlement and stay in the related non-EU state. In the longer term, they may also intervene with domestic structure of the partner state through institution building, policy formulation, and legal reform processes. Practices of Frontex signal increasing EU authority in migration and border management in the non-EU states. For this reason, some non-EU states such as Algeria refused to develop close cooperation with agencies such as Frontex due to their unwillingness to share authority with them on significant issues such as information sharing and capacity building (Zardo and Loschi, 2020; Abderrahim, 2019).

EU also includes capacity building practices in political frameworks such as regional protection programs (RPPs) which were designed in the 2000s to increase non-EU states' capacity to create "safe buffer zones" in the neighborhood through developing mobility control systems (Commission of the European Communities, 2005; European Commission, 2005). These activities are also 'useful' in helping the EU in its claim to build a balanced give-and-take partnership with non-EU states. Based on this claim, the Stockholm Program of 2009 particularly invited the Commission and

the Council “to support enhanced capacity building in third countries so that they can control efficiently their external borders” (The Council, 2009: 56). The program document repeatedly stated, “the need for a more efficient system of immigration” for “the security of member states and citizens,” due to the large flow of “illegal immigration especially through the Southern borders” (The Council, 2009: 5). Doing so, it portrayed immigrants that were labelled as ‘illegal’ as a threat to the security of the EU citizens which needed to be protected through cooperation with non-EU partners on border control policies and practices.

Following this call, the EU initiated the North Africa RPP in 2011 targeting Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia which aimed for refugee law training and legal aid on registration and documentation, along with procedures for return (Papadopoulou, 2015: 13). The North African program also had a resettlement component based on which eight member states agreed to resettle people from Shousha Camp in Tunisia and Salloum camp on the Egyptian-Libyan border (European Resettlement Network Website). It also included funding to be used in refugee camps outside of the EU. Yet, in practice, not all refugees who were included in the resettlement process were actually settled since some of them were departed at the late stages (European Resettlement Network Website). RPP provisions related to keeping immigrants away from the EU territory are more likely to be implemented, while the ones that address the rights and protection of immigrants tend to remain on paper, which makes them tools of border in/security.

Although Frontex is the leading agency for influencing and coordinating external border in/security, EASO has also been increasingly involved in the field of border

in/security, focusing intensively on capacity building activities and assistance of RPPs. It has been authorized for the harmonization of EU states' asylum systems such as reception, return, and resettlement; and of transborder border in/security cooperation with the countries of ENP, RPP, mobility partnership, and Rabat Process in the Mediterranean (European Commission, 2016; See Garcia et al., 2015). As highlighted in the Stockholm Program, the Council made it clear the need to be sure that "the activities of Frontex and EASO are coordinated" when it comes to the reception, return and resettlement of migrants (Comte, 2010). Although political frameworks such as the Stockholm Program promote "the encouragement of voluntary returns" and voluntary resettlement, they also recommend "being aware of the need for enforcement where necessary" (The Council, 2009: 66).

Therefore, the majority of the activities of EU agencies such as Frontex and EASO are practices of security which raises the question of whether their increasing authority in the field means increasing insecurity for immigrants. In fact, EU agencies have come at the forefront in the field of border in/security since the 2000s with the claim that there was an implementation gap to be fulfilled and the need for actors to enhance cooperation among the member states and with non-EU states. The increase in the quantity and power of EU agencies in influencing and delivering EU policies is also referred to as 'agencification' of EU politics (Tsourdi, 2020: 506-7). The increasing authority of EU agencies constructs migration and border management as 'a technical matter that needs to be dealt with' rather than a humanitarian issue. Member states transfer not only authority to these supranational agencies, but also the

responsibility of insecurities resulting from border security cooperation between actors from inside and outside of the EU.

To summarize, as also stated in the 2008 European Security Strategy report, since the abolition of internal borders, the EU's external border practices have increasingly been built on the political view that "internal and external security are now inseparable" (The Council, 2009: 73; see also Bigo, 2001; 2006; 2013). Accordingly, the document posits, "addressing threats, even far away from the European Continent, is essential to protecting Europe and its citizens" (The Council, 2009: 73). To fulfill this aim, EU externalization policies and practices have been intensified and institutionalized in the 2000s with the active involvement of non-EU partners. The policy of remote control is constantly constituted by multiple actors in the shape of political and legal frameworks and realized through practices of capacity building, information exchange, surveillance, readmission, return, as well as increased security personnel and co-policing activities (The Council, 2009: 76). Externalization policies and practices have become even more embedded following the uprisings and migration flows from the MENA.

4.3 Border In/security after the Arab Uprisings

In 2011 the EU announced a new and ambitious ENP for "determined and reinforced engagement with its neighbors" (European Commission, 2011). The Union decided to strengthen bilateral and regional relationships with neighboring countries through a "more funds for more reform approach" (European Commission, 2011). Member states' bid for a deepened border in/security cooperation with neighbors further

empowered MENA states in this relationship (Cassarino, 2014; Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2016). Based on this background, this part analyzes the evolution of the EU externalization policies, legislation, and practices of in/security in the post-2010 period through encounters with non-EU partners.

4.3.1 The Policies of Border In/security

The EU initiated new political dialogues, programs, and partnerships after the Arab uprisings, all of which aimed to increase the security aspect of border and migration policies. The majority of these programs and partnerships were intensified with backup articles that make ‘return and readmission’ easier in the cases where prevention of immigration was not successful (Hulme and Kostakopoulou, 2018: 218). Once it became clear that immigration from the MENA would continue longer than expected, bilateral dialogues and partnerships were turned into long-term in/security responses to migration flows in contrast to the previous short-term and emergency measures taken in the Mediterranean. They now have a more technical framework than before and constitute one of the most significant drivers of the global approach to migration and mobility in the last decade (Council Conclusions on the GAMM, 2012). The aim was to make them bases for return and readmission agreements. With all the coastal Mediterranean neighbors that member states initiated bilateral dialogues with,¹⁴ they also approached for negotiations on readmission agreements (European Commission, 2015b; see also Garcia et al., 2015: 28-29). Within the scope of bilateral dialogues, priority was given to “the partners’ efforts on

¹⁴ Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Algeria, and Egypt.

security aspects on migration management, border controls and return, and protection in the region for those in need” (Garcia et al., 2015: 28). Therefore, non-EU partners were expected to increase in/security policies and practices to keep immigrants away from the EU territory.

The EU also increased funding to reintegrate ‘legally or voluntarily’ returned migrants as well as development aid for the countries of origin to address push factors, mostly in the form of short-term projects assigned to NGOs, state institutions and local associations. However, it is still challenging for the EU and member states to conclude mobility partnerships with the Mediterranean countries due to several political and security-related factors. For instance, the Commission (2011: 9) offered mobility partnerships with readmission clauses in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco after the Arab uprisings (See also Wunderlich, 2013; European Commission, 2016a: 13-16). While a few joint declarations establishing mobility partnerships were concluded with Morocco and Tunisia in 2013 and Jordan in 2014, Egypt has twice refused to even engage in negotiations (Garcia, 2015: 31). Similarly, Algeria did not show any interest in concluding mobility partnerships with the EU in line with its policy of limited engagement with the EU actors on migration and border in/security cooperation (Abderrahim, 2019).

According to Carrera et al. (2012: 14) the EU presented the dialogue on mobility partnership has “as a fait accompli to the authorities of Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco” which was not welcomed by the governments. The states that have signed mobility partnerships, however, tend to share certain common incentives with the member states, such as reducing transit migration, and fighting with ‘radicalization and

terrorism' (Seeberg, 2014: 5). Tunisia and Morocco have already been closer partners of the EU in the Mediterranean, especially before the uprisings. After the uprisings, most of the non-EU states continued the cooperation on multiple levels because they increasingly securitized borders and migration has become a priority also for the governments or security elites of non-EU Mediterranean states which increased their claimed need for stricter border security measures (Zardo and Cavatorta, 2018).

Controversially though, one motive for non-EU states to reject partnerships, as cited in the literature, was their unwillingness to share authority over their borders, especially in times of political turmoil. Algeria, for instance, did not respond positively to mobility partnerships or migration compacts since the government refused to take part in any bilateral project funded by the EU due to self-claimed concerns that they would 'harm the state's sovereignty' and not comply with the non-interference principle (Zardo and Loschi, 2020: 5). Another problem of mobility partnerships is that most of them are related to security practices such as information exchange based on EU's claimed needs rather than proposing concretely defined opportunities to the citizens of third countries. This situation again increases non-EU governments' concerns for sharing their authority with the EU actors on security-related issues (See Council of the European Union, 2013). These concerns of becoming the disadvantageous partner of an unbalanced relationship were shared by the authorities of many non-EU states of the Mediterranean, especially those having a colonial past (Collyer, 2016: 611). Partnerships may also target push factors in sending countries, such as democratization and economic development (Cassarino

and Lavenex, 2012: 285), which may break the power balance between multiple national and international actors competing in the field.

Even when a partnership is concluded, it cannot always get fully applied. For instance, the EU-Morocco partnership on asylum is not fully institutionalized mainly due to clashes of policy choices between different actors in the field, or dominance of one in the process of decision making (Wunderlich, 2012; Freyburg et al., 2015).

When it comes to Libya, rivaling governments and armed militias competing for power and control; terrorist groups, smugglers, traffickers have been benefiting from the power gap after the Gaddafi rule, which makes the partnership with and control of the EU actors undesired (Koenig, 2017). With the states that do not respond to the EU's formal attempts positively, negotiations for mobility partnerships continue mainly via informal dialogues rather than structured political frameworks (Zardo and Loschi, 2020). Informal negotiations and political dialogues can also be demanded or preferred by the Southern partners in instances where the governments want to keep cooperation less visible to the public due to the unpopularity of border in/security cooperation with the EU among the population (Cassarino, 2018). Libya, for instance, accepts partnership deals with several motives other than the EU development and technical assistance such as political backing by the EU for the Presidency Council, as well as support and equipment to increase national authorities' power on border control (Keunig, 2017: 15-16).

Regional frameworks are also not preferred by non-EU partners because they may "carry the risk of opening new fronts in regional or bilateral conflicts" as in the case of the conflict between Algeria and Morocco (Zardo and Cavatorta, 2018; Collyer,

2016). Despite the increase in bilateral frameworks especially in the post-2011 period as a result of non-EU partners' demands, the EU also continued to develop regional frameworks. Building on the Rabat Process, it initiated the Khartoum Process of 2014 covering the Horn Africa, Tunisia and Libya to reinforce a common understanding on issues of migration through "a spirit of shared responsibility" (Khartoum Process Website, 2019). The parties recalled previously initiated partnerships and dialogues with the aim "to build on the positive outcomes of these meetings" (Rome Declaration, 2014: 1). The program text had a humanitarian focus on its general aims such as "preventing human rights abuses and protecting human dignity especially in the Mediterranean" (Rome Declaration, 2014: 2). However, it was designed to implement joint in/security practices to prevent migration at the source like the previous programs. Its focus was on initiating capacity building to keep migrants in the origin and transit states; as well as practices with a more direct security aspect such as assisting national authorities in stepping up prevention measures; establishing shared criminal law frameworks; and establishing new detention centers and managing them (Rome Declaration, 2014: 3-4).

The dramatic increase in migration flows in 2015 once again propelled the issue of border control "to center stage on the European agenda" and triggered the preparation of new regional responses (Spindler, 2015). The heads of states or governments from Europe and Africa came together at the Valletta Summit in 2015, followed up by High-Level Dialogues on migration and border security. Its Action Plan stated that the existing mechanisms of the Rabat and the Khartoum Processes would be used to monitor the implementation of the Joint Valetta Action Plan (Valletta Summit Action

Plan, 2015; see European Commission Website, 2019). The Plan sets main priority domains, the majority of which foresee the implementation of in/security practices such as “fight against irregular migration” and “strengthening cooperation to facilitate the return and sustainable reintegration of irregular migrants” (Valletta Summit Action Plan, 2015). Participants of Valletta Summit¹⁵ declare “the sharp increase in flows of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants” as their main concern and first priority, while “saving lives” was put as a side aim (See, Valletta Summit Political Declaration, 2015). The document reveals the main focus of the Summit which was ‘to secure the EU territory from immigrants’ like other bilateral and regional frameworks of border externalization.

The EU also declared a joint communication “Towards a new European Neighborhood Policy” that set the basis for the revision of ENP by proposing higher solidarity on migration and mobility, by securing a responsibility-sharing approach with non-EU states (See European Commission, 2015a: 3, 13). The document denounced the security approach towards migration, yet still addressed ‘undocumented mobility problem’ linked with terrorism, smuggling, human trafficking, and drug trafficking. The language of the document had a clear differentiation between “legal and illegal” forms of migration, and “skilled and unskilled” types of migrants, which was criticized by the Mediterranean partners such as Turkey (See Chapter 6). The EU also issued the Agenda on Migration in May 2015 that contained measures ‘to control and prevent possible migration flows’ from the

¹⁵ Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal in Southern Europe, and Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Turkey, Algeria, Tunisia in the Eastern and Northern Mediterranean.

MENA (European Commission, 2015c). The goals were to prevent migration at its source to 'secure EU borders' and to enhance the ability to cope with it when prevention was not successful (Ceccorulli, 2019). Most of the in/security practices included in regional frameworks stay in the background due to the humanitarian rhetoric that accompanies capacity building activities. As is seen, continuity prevailed in the EU's response to border security cooperation in the Mediterranean.

Although the partnership continued to be designed in an unbalanced way, non-EU states of the Mediterranean exercised agency in the creation of insecurities in multiple ways and instances. Their agential power in the relationship with the EU actors tends to increase in the time of 'crises' when the EU needs their cooperation more and the give-and-take balance works in favor of non-EU states. What is also noteworthy is that even in times of regional crises, such as the Arab uprisings, experiences of the Mediterranean states vary significantly which is reflected in their responses to externalization policies (Zardo and Cavatorta, 2018). Although there is a tendency in the literature to homogenize non-EU actors' position in and response to externalization, they have independent motivations, decisions, policies, and security considerations that intervene in the process and change the outcome of border in/security.

Put differently, the non-EU agency cannot be reduced to 'gatekeeping with the expectancy of economic gain' since the factors that motivate non-EU states into partnership vary, including the renewal of strategic alliances with EU, gaining efficiency and authority in management and control of EU policies, national and international legitimacy, consolidating the regime, and meeting economic needs

through funding. Moreover, the fight against undocumented migration, which has been institutionalized through these political processes, may allow MENA states to conceal the main political and economic push reasons of emigration to the EU states. Along with other possible factors that may motivate non-EU states for partnerships, one significant and widely overlooked motive is securitization of undocumented migration by non-EU states (and sub-state actors) themselves. Analysis of these political initiatives and frameworks are significant in the sense that they reveal the agency of non-EU states in being an actor of the EU's security project, and that they take part in the constitution of policies that in/security practices are situated in. These political tools also prepare the basis of border in/security laws and regulations.

4.3.2 Legal Framework

Legislative tools of border security have increasingly continued to be the primary component of externalization after the Arab uprisings. The Commission specifically emphasized the role of readmission agreements as “a necessary tool and a major element for efficient management of migration” in line with the EU's policy of return (European Commission, 2011: 2). The Union changed its approach to readmission negotiations by transforming them into bilateral contracts and transferred the authorization of signing the agreements with non-EU states to individual member states (European Commission, 2015b).

Especially the coastal non-EU states of the Mediterranean have been approached for readmission agreements in the post-2010; however, they continued to resist concluding an agreement. Each agreement foresees the establishment of a joint

readmission committee, composed of the Commission representing the EU, and representatives from the EU and non-EU states. This committee “supervises the implementation of the agreement, adopts decisions necessary for its uniform application, and proposes and decides on amendments” (Garcia et al., 2015: 38). The possibility that the EU actors will be dominant in the committee and in the implementation process of readmission practices increases the non-EU governments’ reluctance. Moreover, most of the states that conclude readmission agreements are either candidate or potential candidate states. Therefore, candidanship is cited as a significant incentive for a closer partnership defined by laws and agreements. The possibility that the lack of candidanship vision becomes a challenge for the conclusion of the readmission agreements is considerable, but this situation still cannot be generalized. For instance, although the membership option was ruled out by the 2000s, Morocco continued to be the EU’s closest partner in the Mediterranean on border in/security. Morocco and the EU parties negotiated and decided on a ‘privileged partnership’ which the Moroccan government welcomed because of its ‘quest for international legitimacy’ and because a privileged partnership seems to bring not only political prestige but also more international investors (Kaiser, 2019; Fernandez-Molina, 2016).

Another motive for many non-EU states in rejecting readmission agreements is that all the EU’s agreements have a standardized approach with only slight variations, obliging the signatory non-EU state to accept both their nationals and TCNs who transited through their territory (Garcia et al., 2015). Mixed migration flows from MENA in the 2010s increased the significance of TCN clauses for the EU, while

bearing more responsibilities to the non-EU signatories. Most non-EU parties avoid TCNs; however, even when they sign readmission agreements with TCN clauses they abstain from the implementation of readmission in practice by contesting the proof of transit. Often the bureaucracy and professionals of security in the field can come up with a 'valid reason' since most of the immigrants either lose their id-related documents or destroy them before landing in hopes that they will not be returned directly (Carling 2007: 323; Carrera, 2007: 20; Wunderlich, 2013). As a result, the processes of readmission get longer and immigrants are left with unambiguous legal status for long periods.

Despite the EU's efforts to present externalization as balanced cooperation that is 'built on give-and-take calculations,' the process is not as straightforward and rarely produces positive results for the EU actors. Following the Arab uprisings, member states attempted to sign readmission agreements with Morocco, Algeria, and Libya, none of which became successful. Since the 2000s, Morocco has refused to accept the TCNs clauses with the fear of becoming "the rubbish bin of Europe" despite the 2008 Advanced Status Agreement offered by EU (Wunderlich, 2012: 1423). Instead, the Moroccan ministry of interior demanded the EU to strengthen border in/security cooperation through increased funds and enhanced training of security personnel. Furthermore, a certain amount of this funding would not to be monitored by the Commission, which strengthened the position of the ministry of interior in Moroccan politics (Wunderlich, 2012: 1425).

Algeria also refused to start negotiations for a readmission agreement for similar concerns. Then the EU activated different externalization practices through capacity

building such as technology and know-how transfer, and training of border security professionals which also strengthened Algerian state's ability to 'secure' its borders (Cassarino and Lavenex, 2012: 285). Similarly, when Libya rejected to sign a readmission agreement, the Commission signed a 'cooperation agenda' with the Libyan authorities which included cooperation in managing and controlling migration flows, and funding to assist the Libyan government in increasing its border control capacity (Triandafyllidou, 2014: 15).

As is seen, despite the changing political environment in the region and increasing demand from the EU, transit states' approach towards binding legal cooperation has not changed significantly in the post-2011 period. Due to the difficulty of getting non-EU accept TCN clauses, the Commission proposed signing readmission agreements directly with countries of origin, rather than transit (Garcia et al., 2015). In 2016, EU started by proposing bilateral migration contracts to Jordan and Lebanon. Following that, the European Council suggested institutionalizing this approach by establishing incentive packages to non-EU countries of origin and transit which aims to "ensure effective return and readmission" (European Council, 2016).

However, readmission agreements cause significant insecurities for immigrants since their aim is to keep them away from the EU territory sometimes at the cost of their well-being. The EU has been criticized for its attempts to return immigrants to countries where their safety and rights cannot be guaranteed. For instance, after the failure of concluding a readmission agreement, Libya and Italy started negotiating a framework agreement for the readmission of TCNs. This initiative was highly criticized on the basis that Libya did not have an asylum system, was not a party of

1951 Convention, so could not be a safe third country¹⁶ (Amnesty International, 2010; OHCHR & UNSMIL, 2016; Global Detention Project, 2018).

The principle of safe third country was also renewed with Dublin III Regulation of 2013 to make returning undocumented immigrants easier. The EU simultaneously introduced the complementary Eurodac Regulation and the Asylum Procedures Directive to establish common procedures for the approval or withdrawal of international protection applications based on the renewed principle. Accordingly, safe third country is defined as a state where,

(a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; (b) there is no risk of serious harm as defined in Directive 2011/95/EU; (c) the principle of *non-refoulement* in accordance with the Geneva Convention is respected; (d) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is respected; and (e) the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention (European Parliament and European Council, 2013: Article 38).

¹⁶ All EU neighboring countries except for Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, and Syria are signatories of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol.

According to these regulations, the EU can reject an international protection application if the origin or transit country that the asylum seeker comes from is a third safe country by this definition (European Parliament and European Council, 2013). Experiencing political instability after uprisings and government changes, most of the Southern Mediterranean states now fall outside of this definition, even if they met these criteria before. However, this ‘advantage’ of restricting asylum applications increases the EU’s motivation of granting safe third country status, in some cases regardless of the current situation in the neighboring states. When UNHCR also gets involved in the declaration of safe third country status by becoming a supervisor, the EU has a stronger hand, even if the legal conditions are not met.

The EU’s increasing willingness for the externalization of border in/security not only increased unlawful in/security practices, but also strengthened non-EU actors’ position in the relationship. As the Commission (2011: 12) posits, “agreements with transit countries have very little value for EU without TCN clauses.” Therefore, the EU actors started to search for other ways to convince them to accept ‘unwanted immigrants.’ Since 2004, the EU has increasingly resorted visa facilitation agreements in persuading non-EU states to accept TCN clauses (El Qadim, 2018). Visa facilitation agreements regulate the issuance of short-stay visas, in particular, “makes it easier, quicker, and cheaper to obtain visas” by simplifying the process of paperwork (Commission of the European Communities, 2009: 3). According to El Qadim (2018: 287), this was “a response to the demands of origin countries” as well as transit countries that are part of the border in/security cooperation. However, the incentive of visa facilitation does not always ‘convince’ transit states for readmission

without visa liberalization or exemption (Boratynski et al., 2006). EU also makes visa exemption or visa waiver agreements with certain non-EU states to provide visa-free travel for a maximum of three months during a six-month period of stay (Garcia, 2015: 41). The EU has concluded visa exemption agreements with certain countries in South America and Asia, but not with any Mediterranean countries which were considered as injustice by these countries (El Qadim, 2018: 293), and caused fluctuations in both Morocco-EU and Turkey-EU cooperation on border in/security (See Chapter 6).

In conclusion, the EU has been utilizing legal frameworks to externalize border in/security practices to neighboring states. Readmission agreements -especially with TCN clauses, visa facilitation agreements, safe third country rule, along with privileged partnerships helped the EU achieve this aim. These agreements, however, imply practices of in/security through which lives and well-being of immigrants might be severely threatened especially in the processes of detention and return. Through accepting, rejecting, or transforming these regulations, and becoming parties of externalization, non-EU actors also have agency and responsibility in the implementation of legislation and practices of in/security.

4.3.3 Bureaucratic and Operational Practices

Policies and legal frameworks of externalization are relevant for an IPS analysis because they are related to practices and relations in the field. The EU did not only intensify existing practices of border in/security, but also presented new types of actors and practices based on renewed political and legal frameworks following the

Arab uprisings. When member states were faced increased migration flows, the EU decided to provide more operational and financial resources for mobility control measures and return operations. This situation increased the role of in/security agents in the management of migration and borders, which has increased the extent to which migration is handled within the field of security.

Increasing authority of the security actors in the field was the outcome of especially the coastal member states' demands on controlling migration flows in the Mediterranean (Meissner, 2017: 7). In 2011, an amending regulation entered into force to extend Frontex's authority by introducing new obligations and increasing its operational capacity to "secure the external borders" (European Parliament and Council, 2011). There has been an enhancement in the agency's technical equipment capacity, the number of border security personnel, and research and data gathering capacity (European Parliament and Council, 2011). Soon after the 'migration crisis' of 2015, Frontex was transformed into 'the European Border and Coast Guard Agency.' This transformation increased the agency's tasks and responsibilities, as well as its financial and human resources and equipment (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, 2016). Frontex was also given the authority to propose organizing (voluntary or forced) returns on its own initiative, along with its traditional duty of organizing and co-financing joint operations (Slominski and Traunder, 2018: 107). Although no agency has autonomous decision-making powers in AFSJ and Frontex is subject to several EU institutions the Commission being in the first place, its power and influence in policy making has been increased significantly after the uprisings in

MENA. Therefore, Frontex has become unarguably the leading institution operating in the field of external border in/security.

Before this transformation, Frontex still relied on the contributions of the EU and member states because it did not have an operational staff of its own and was not able to purchase its own technical equipment. The agency's staff was composed of temporary and contract agents, seconded national experts, but not permanent personnel. Since 2016, it has been able to deploy border and coast guard officers from its own rapid reaction pool, to manage a budget of more than €320 million and to purchase its equipment (Meissner, 2017: 7). Frontex is able to influence the EU institutions also because it provides information through reports, risk analyses, and other official documents in cooperation with EU and non-EU states. Furthermore, while previously border management was the responsibility of member states, "the new regulation now foresees a responsibility shared between the member states and Frontex" (Council of the European Union, 2018: 12). The cooperative use of technology for surveillance contributes to the spatial extension of borders, by making extraterritorial control possible (Jones & Johnson, 2016). As Frontex got stronger and more dominant in the field, EU's external borders were transformed from merely physical lines of sovereignty to technological spaces which are governed by surveillance practices of in/security. Thus, joint physical and surveillance operations between Frontex, EU and non-EU states have made a considerable impact on the externalization, securitization, and militarization of EU borders (Benam, 2011).

Along with EU states and institutions, cooperation with non-EU states on border security has been an integral part of Frontex since its establishment which is

operationalized in multiple ways. The most significant is through risk analysis, information exchange, training, and joint operations. Information sharing networks that have a significant role in cooperation are set up for gathering relevant information, developing best practices, offering expert knowledge to the Commission and the Council (Boehm, 2012). Currently, Frontex concluded eighteen working arrangements with several countries on the joint implementation of these in/security practices (Garcia, 2015: 44). Furthermore, based on the regulation of 2014, which gave Frontex the mandate to assist not only member states but also non-EU states, the agency provides self-funded technical assistance projects and security training programs in the EU neighborhood (European Parliament and Council, 2014).

While the agency managed to build closer cooperation with several non-EU partners such as Morocco and Turkey, some others rejected cooperation with Frontex in the form of information sharing or establishing disembarkation platforms (Abderrahim, 2019). Frontex got assistance from member states for joint operations in the Mediterranean such as Operation Poseidon (2006), Operation Hermes (2011), and Operation Triton (2014), yet non-EU states neither took part in these operations, nor gave any formal support other than limited contact with Frontex for returns. By 2018, the EU Council stated in a press release that “the EU is improving its return policy and its cooperation with non-EU states as part of its comprehensive approach to migration” (Sputnik, 2018). Following this, the EU interior ministers agreed on giving the agency authorization for deeper cooperation with non-EU states on migrant return operations. This new rule foresees the deployment of Frontex border management and return teams for operations in non-EU state territories. As such, established as an

assisting agency in 2004, Frontex's power, autonomy and authority have increased regularly as the EU's security approach has also been consolidated.

The amendment did not only strengthen Frontex's position in its relations with the EU and non-EU states, but also intensified its cooperation with Europol and EASO (European Parliament and the Council, 2016). Frontex and EASO closely cooperate on two main issues that have been at the top of the EU's agenda, which are information gathering and risk analyses, and return operations. EASO collects up-to-date information on countries of origin to be utilized in asylum determination processes and the decision-making process of external border policies (Tsourdi, 2020: 511). Therefore, it is also able to develop independent projects and influence the EU policy making. EASO also cooperates with non-EU states under mobility partnerships, association agreements, and common agendas. The cooperation may involve the areas of preventing undocumented migration, enhancing cooperation on return and readmission, addressing root causes, among others (EASO Annual Report, 2018). EASO and local actors in non-EU states establish joint investigation teams for tracking and fighting trafficking and smuggling and return migrants to their homes (EASO Annual Report, 2018).

In the aftermath of the so-called 'migration crisis' of 2015, the role of Europol, which has been the police organization operating within Europe for decades, also increased with the establishment of the European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC) under its authority. The center was established due to "a highly dynamic irregular migration... across the Mediterranean Sea, external land borders and further on, into Europe towards their desired destination countries" (European Migrant Smuggling Centre,

2017: 13). EMSC 's main aim is to support "police and border authorities to coordinate highly complex cross-border anti-smuggling operations" in coordination with Eurojust and Frontex (Europol, n.d.). Since its establishment one of the areas of focus of EMSC has been "reaching out to partners beyond European borders" including state and non-state agents and private sector in source and transit countries, to prevent irregular migration through operational interaction (European Migrant Smuggling Centre, 2017: 14).

In its second year of operation, EMSC established an 'Information Clearing House' to improve Europol's intelligence picture on irregular migration and smuggling, "with a focus beyond EU borders on source and transit countries" (European Migrant Smuggling Centre, 2017: 20). In a joint report by Europol and Interpol, it is stated that "while systematic link between migrant smuggling and terrorism is not proven, there is an increased risk that foreign terrorist fighters may use migratory flows to (re)enter the EU" (Joint Europol Interpol Report, 2016: 4). To prevent these flows, EASO, Europol and Frontex do not only mobilize their own border security personnel, but also work in coordination with police forces of member states (European Migration Smuggling Centre, 2020). Although in theory EMSC fights with smuggling, in practice it organizes and coordinates joint in/security operations to prevent undocumented immigration to the EU, which it considers a translational threat along with terrorism.

Frontex was further empowered with an amending regulation in 2019 based on the idea that "the Union framework in the areas of external border control, return, combating cross-border crime, and asylum still needs to be further improved"

(Regulation (EU) 2019/1896, 2019). This regulation made Frontex stronger especially through increasing its role in joint transborder return and rescue operations by getting more assistance from other agencies, member states, and non-EU states. The increasing role of joint return operations in externalization policy also influenced policies and practices of detention. Whether ‘voluntary’ or through enforcement, the policies and operations of return, refoulement and resettlement comes with the issue of reception and detention centers as unliberating practices of border in/security. Individuals are kept waiting in these centers either until their asylum applications are resulted, or after the decision for return or resettlement is given. In the mid-2000s Britain, Italy and Germany also pushed forward the idea of creating off-shore asylum reception centers where the EU could detain asylum seekers during the process of assessing their claims (Papagianni, 2006; Nakache and Losier, 2017). With the help of sophisticated systems of electronic surveillance, member states’ coastguards apprehend migrants at sea before they reach the mainland. The coastal member states further proposed the establishment of asylum-processing centers outside of EU territories, particularly in North Africa. According to this idea, entry to the EU could take place only when an asylum-seeking claim is concluded positively, and refugees would be resettled in different member states through a quota system (Leonard and Kaunert, 2016). The individuals that are deported based on readmission agreements are also brought into the detention centers either at the external borders, or in transit countries or off-shore centers, and are being kept until they are resettled to countries of origin (Demmelhuber, 2011: 818).

The management of these in-between spaces is generally left to the local authorities, mostly to the ministry of interior and local security forces, for them not to resist the opening of more detention centers as well as the strengthening of the existing ones with more security technology and staff. This is one of the channels how non-EU security actors exercise agency in insecuritying immigrants. By 2019, there are five detention centers in Algeria, governed by Interior or Home Affairs through a centralized system; around fifty in Egypt governed under the responsibility of Interior Ministry; over fifty in Libya under the authority of Ministry of Interior; nineteen in Morocco governed by Ministry of Interior and managed by multiple governmental actors such as Directorate General of National Security, Prison Administration, Border Police, Gendarmerie Royale; and two in Tunisia governed by Interior Ministry (Global Detention Project Website). Although on paper these facilities are properly governed by government institutions and monitored by IOs and EU institutions, there are criticisms that non-governmental actors defined as ‘non-state actor-militia/armed groups’ are also involved in the practices to ‘secure’ these centers. The conditions as well as detention periods in these centers are also highly criticized.

In Libya for instance, lives and well-beings of migrants are highly threatened in and out of detention centers and camps. Nevertheless, EU continues to return migrants to Libya to be put in detention centers. Migration through Libya increased even more following the 2016 EU-Turkey agreement, which made it more difficult to use the Eastern Mediterranean route for transit immigrants. This led to the signing of a new Memorandum of Understanding in 2017 between Libya and Italy which did not only regulate reception conditions in Libya but also included the establishment of a

satellite system that would help the Libyan authorities to increase control over national borders especially in the South (See, Palm, 2020). The foreword of the document still included a reaffirmation of respect to “the principles of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity for Libya, besides the principle of non-interference in internal affairs” (ASGI, 2017). This demand for assurance on paper is a result of the idea that technologies of border in/security are “meant not only to improve the control of borders, but also project the authority of the EU both within and beyond the European territory (Zaiotto, 2011: 538, in El Qadim, 2018: 284).

According to the legislation adopted in the Gaddafi period, all individuals who arrive in Libya without valid documents are “illegal migrants” to be put in detention centers. The EU also provided training on human rights standards to the personnel overseeing the detention system and accommodation of immigrants (Palm, 2020; 13). However, according to the UN, conditions in detention centers are “inhuman, severely overcrowded, without adequate access to toilets or washing facilities, food or clean water” (UNSMIL & UNHCR, 2016). Individuals in detention centers are subjected to “torture, harassment, physical violence, sexual exploitation, and forced labor, with no formal registration, no legal process, no access to lawyers or any judicial authorities” (Nakache and Losier, 2017: 3-4; see also Human Rights Watch, 2014). This does not prevent the EU from renewing the partnership with Libya on different levels which was criticized heavily (Palm, 2017). The Malta Declaration of 2017 stated that the cooperation under memorandum of understanding would become effective only if the government would respect human rights and international law in conjunction with the

UN and IOM. According to Palm (2020: 13) this was not the case in 2017 and is still not currently.

As is seen, human mobility has increasingly been controlled and prevented by in/security policies and practices for decades. Insecurities that are resulted in border security regimes have been jointly constituted by and are the responsibility of all agents that are involved in the process. Although EMSC reported a decrease in immigration during the COVID-19 lockdown, the agency also highlights the risk of “increasing movement of irregular migrants” in the case of “a loosening of travel and movement restrictions” and calls for an increase in the capacity of EU’s border security agents to be ready to overcome this ‘possible risk’ (European Migrant Smuggling Centre, 2020: 19). Therefore, it is noteworthy that, once established, ‘extraordinary measures’ that constitute border in/security regimes tend to become ‘the norm.’

4.3.4 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the EU initiated policies and practices of externalization in the Mediterranean by keeping an eye on the agency of non-EU partners in resulting insecurities. It traced how the political context, legal framework, and operational practices of border in/security in the Mediterranean have evolved through encounters with non-EU actors. The chapter presented critical junctures that intensified the EU’s policies and practices of externalization, such as the introduction of the Schengen area, the 9/11 events, the Arab uprisings, and the so-called ‘migraton crisis’ of 2015.

By analyzing how non-EU actors responded the EU's transforming motives and policies on border in/security cooperation, the chapter showed that non-EU actors played a role in all the relational dynamics that they have been part of. Therefore, it integrated what the first group of studies analyzed in Chapter 3 as 'portraying the EU as the only significant actor of externalization' are missing. Second, to further transcend the limits that are posed the studies that 'portray non-EU actors as recruited by the EU', the chapter provided examples from Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria, and showed that non-EU partners responded differently to increasing securitization of migration and externalization of border in/security policies. Put differently, even when they have gone through similar political processes like the uprisings in the region, motives and policies of non-EU actors in border in/security cooperation are never monolithic and cannot be homogenized. Third, by integrating the role of non-EU partners not only in the implementation of practices but also in the constitution of political and legal frameworks, the chapter showed that these actors exercised agency in multiple aspects of border in/security. Studies that analyze only everyday in/security practices of non-EU actors overlook how they also contribute to the making of policies that result in insecurities for immigrants.

Through this analysis, the chapter further showed that the EU actors occasionally highlight the 'balanced nature of border cooperation' and 'shared responsibility' as two principles of externalization. However, bilateral, and regional political frameworks as well as agreements and joint practices that the EU designs and proposes remain unbalanced since they are based on the EU and member states' political agenda. This is one of the several ways how non-EU states reject taking part

of many of these policies and practices. Put differently, despite the unbalanced nature of relations non-EU parties still have agency, influence and responsibility in political decisions and programs, agreements and legislation, and the implementation of operational and bureaucratic practices in the field. These heterogeneous reactions resulted from internal dynamics also shape the policies and practices of externalization and are indicators of the significance of locating non-EU agency in the process by analyzing each case individually in a scrutinous way.

Following this chapter, the dissertation narrows its focus to Turkey as a case of how non-EU states exercise agency in the process of externalization. For this aim, the next chapter analyzes the existing ways that IPS literature studies Turkey-EU cooperation on mobility and border security.

CHAPTER 5:

IPS STUDIES OF EU EXTERNALIZATION AND TURKEY

This chapter presents an analysis of IPS literature on EU externalization at and through Turkey's borders. Similar to Chapter 3 that presents an analysis of the literature on EU externalization in the Mediterranean, this chapter groups the literature into three based on how they portray Turkey as an agent of border in/security: 1) EU as the only significant actor of border control, 2) EU as pressuring Turkey, 3) Border in/security as everyday practices.

5.1 The EU as the Only Significant Actor of Border In/security

Chapter 3 analyzed the studies that focus on Spain-Morocco borders without reference to non-EU parties. When it comes to EU's borders with Turkey, the dissertation identifies one IPS study that analyze the cooperation by relying on EU actions.

Pallister-Wilkins's (2015) article titled "The humanitarian politics of European border policing: Frontex and border police in Evros" explores "the double-sided nature of humanitarian governance concerned with care and control" at Greece-Turkey and Bulgaria-Turkey borderlands. The article discusses the concept of humanitarianism and its usage in governance of people through a Foucauldian framework. Findings of the article rely on interviews with Frontex personnel employed in public relations, research and development, risk analysis, land borders section of the operations division, and observations and interviews with Frontex and Greek police located in Evros. Pallister-Wilkins (2015: 61) finds out that in Evros the practices of Greek border police alternate between taking care of people and guarding state territory by preventing "illegal" entry and "catching bad guys". "Bad guys" refer to "organized criminal networks." The dilemma between care and control is argued to create a tension in everyday operational practices of border policing. The author provides examples from interviews with border guards and how she observes this tension in their speeches.

The article also analyzes practices of Frontex by which many border guards at the EU-Turkey borders are employed. Pallister-Wilkins (2015: 63) finds that "there is a very direct relationship between the work of on the ground border policing and Frontex" or in other words, between the field and the office. In this sense, her study takes a step further in analyzing not only everyday practices in the field but also the role of bureaucracy/institutions. The link between institutional policies and practices of in/security professionals is a significant one that is not analyzed widely by IPS studies. As a result, everyday practices in the borders, border cities, or transit cities

are getting extracted from their broader political, social and historical context.

According to Pallister-Wilkins (2015: 63), the link between institutions and practices does not necessarily work in a hierarchical manner, but rather “as spheres of overlapping regimes of governance” due to rather disjoint nature of border control in Europe between the EU institutions and member states. Pallister-Wilkin’s study reveals the paradox also in Frontex professionals’ statements which locate migrants as “a risk” and “at risk” almost simultaneously.

By the end of the article, the author states that Frontex increased its engagement with non-EU countries, in this case, Turkey. Such engagement activities can be seen “as an attempt to reconcile the tensions between humanitarian border policing where the individual is the subject, and the need to defend territory where the territory is the object” (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015: 65). The author locates herself in the research as “a liberal European subject” to question the role her identity may have on respondents of the interviews (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015: 56). This is a significant step in emphasizing the subjective nature of social and political research in general, put differently, reflexive scholarship. The article also presents a well-structured research on the agency of “multiple actors in European migration control” (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015: 54). However, the role of non-EU actors in the constitution of border in/security is not highlighted in the research, although actors of EU and non-EU initiate numerous common in/security policies, practices, as well as joint sea and land operations. In Stock et al.’s (2019: 5) words, the article “predominantly represents the view from the border spaces of traditional immigration countries in the ‘developed North’”, which unintentionally features the role of the EU actors while laying limited place to the

actions of ‘others’. Because the article relies on fieldwork in the EU, it is expected that the analysis has a focus on the actors of the EU. Still, locating EU actors in their broader relations with actors from the other side of the border has the potential to integrate multiple parties’ agency in border in/security processes.

5.2 The EU as Pressuring Turkey

There are studies in IPS and externalization literature that portray non-EU countries “as recruited or forced by EU” to ‘secure’ its borders. These studies argue that non-EU states take part in externalization because they either need economic and political favors from the EU or forced by it to cooperate. As such, they limit non-EU agency to taken-for-granted motives and overlook the dynamic nature of social and political relations by presenting a uniform and fixed understanding of how and with what kind of incentives non-EU actors do what they do.

When the non-EU partner is a candidate as in the case of Turkey, conditionality is presented as a mechanism through which EU forces non-EU parties. “Securitization of migration in Europe: critical reflections on Turkish migration practices” is an example (Togral Koca, 2012). The article focuses on how securitization of migration in EU restructures migration regimes of non-EU states. Adopting ‘a sociological approach to securitization,’ the article operationalizes international practices of migration management as “policies, policy tools, instruments, etc.” It specifically traces Turkey’s migration practices in light of its candidacy status by conducting document analysis and expert interviews (Togral Koca, 2012: 65).

Togral Koca examines how the EU actors' securitizing practices influence Turkey's migration regime to understand the extent the EU is 'successful' in exporting its border in/security regime to non-EU states. The article analyzes "exclusionary visa practices, technological tools and databases, advanced systems of border control supported by police and paramilitary forces, safe third country notions, readmission agreements and joint patrolling" (Togral Koca, 2012: 67). In the Accession Partnership Document, the EU recommends Turkey to align with EU on its "visa policies, border control mechanisms, lifting the limitation to 1951 Convention, concluding readmission agreements with the EU and other third countries" (Togral Koca, 2012: 68). Then the article examines what Turkey did to harmonize its policies with EU on each subject.

The article argues that Turkey was likely to change its liberal visa policy to a more restrictive policy "due to the EU's concern" that it would harm effective border control. Although the article states that Turkey's motivation for having a liberal visa policy was its aim to increase its influence in its neighborhood, it puts forward the EU's conditionality as the most significant motivation for change. According to Togral Koca (2012, 68-69) "Turkey was urged to align its visa policies with positive and negative lists of the EU" and "as a response to increasing pressures from the EU, Turkey has taken considerable steps in fortifying its borders in line with the membership conditionality." Similarly, when it comes to maritime and land border controls, the article argues that "in such a context and as a response to increasing pressures from the EU, Turkey has taken considerable steps in fortifying its borders in line with the membership conditionality" (Togral Koca, 2012: 69).

Regarding asylum law and readmission agreements, Togral Koca emphasizes Turkey's geographical limitation to 1951 Convention, its conflict with the non-refoulement principle, problems with Turkey's protection and deportation regime, and how it intends to change these in accordance with the EU criticism. The article emphasizes Turkey's reluctance to sign a readmission agreement due to three possible reasons, which are the fear of becoming a buffer zone, technical and financial cost, and disagreement over visa liberalization (Togral Koca, 2012: 72-3). Here, although the article sets EU conditionality as the main motive of the Turkish state, it also presents Turkey's influence in the process of partnership by revealing the points it contested EU demands.

In "Bordering processes through the use of technology: the Turkish case" Togral Koca (2020) further examines Turkey's border regime by drawing on critical border studies and adopting a Foucauldian lens. The article analyzes intensive technology use and humanitarian discourse in bordering processes, and relations of inclusion and exclusion at Turkey-Greece and Turkey-Syria borders. It relies on data gathered from official statements, policy and legal documents, NGO and media reports, and academic works. The article presents Turkey's domestic and foreign policies as the broader context of border in/security practices. Within that scope, the article examines Turkey's 'fight with terrorism' and the government's 'selective approach' to migrants from different ethnic, religious, and economic backgrounds (Togral Koca, 2020: 10).

However, Togral Koca (2020: 6) portrays Turkey-EU border cooperation of the 2000s as a relation of domination in which "the EU pressured Turkey to strengthen controls -especially on its Greek border- and has backed those demands with various financial

and technical incentives.” According to this narration, Turkey “has had to apply the IBM system” that imposes the construction of physical barriers and the use of technologies for the governance of mobilities (Togral Koca, 2020: 6). Furthermore, for visa liberalization, Turkey was “required to implement the Memorandum of Understanding of 2012” through developing cooperation practices and data exchange (Togral Koca, 2020: 13).

Togral Koca (2012: 65) argues that existing studies “put the focus exclusively on the EU and pay little attention to how the securitization in the EU restructures third countries’ migration regimes.” The article problematizes this approach because it does not integrate the role of non-EU actors in the constitution of insecurity. Both of Togral Koca’s articles overcome the point that they criticize by integrating Turkey in the analysis of border in/security. Still, the analyses can be strengthened by integration of a more comprehensive inquiry of internal dynamics of Turkey. In both studies, Togral Koca emphasizes EU’s motives for bordering partnership, and portrays Turkey as ‘compelled’ because of its bid to become a member or the funding that EU would provide. Multiple actors from different parts of the world enter into in/security processes with certain motives and expectations that change over time and space. The relationship between EU and non-EU actors may or may not be hierarchical in nature; however, even when they are, there is still agency of non-EU parties in the constitution of in/security policies. Their agency can be located in a more comprehensive manner by emphasizing how relations evolve and how non-EU parties become part of the process with respective and dynamic motives and policies.

5.3 Border In/security as Everyday Practices

IPS defines security as constituted by practices of professionals. Majority of IPS and border security studies analyze practices of security professionals and how attempts for security end up with further insecurity. These studies present a snapshot of the current sociology of practices in the field by analyzing everyday practices of EU and non-EU agents of in/security.

Isleyen (2018, 23) in “Transit mobility governance in Turkey” asks “how Turkey governs irregular transit mobility heading towards the EU” and builds her answer by utilizing a “practice approach which focuses on the actual activities and concrete situations through which transit mobility is governed in Turkey.” Isleyen’s paper is self-defined as shifting from policy and discourse level to the level of actual practices by security professionals. Such approach focuses on the moment that professionals intervene into the transit movement. The article defines “empirical work” as the analysis of daily practices of security (Isleyen, 2018: 24). It aims to focus specifically on everyday strategies and techniques that Turkish security officials use to govern mobility. The study benefits from “Bourdieu-inspired methodological questions” (Isleyen, 2018: 23). Its methodology is defined as a triangulation which includes data from discourse analysis, interviews and participant observation in Ankara, Edirne, and Izmir.

Isleyen (2018: 27) argues that there are two practices that Turkey conducts in everyday governance of transit mobility: checkpoints and travel document. Both practices are tools of bordering beyond the EU territories. To analyze controls on migrants, Isleyen observes checkpoints in Izmir and Edirne, both borders to the EU territory. The article defines checkpoint as “a key practice of Turkish policing of

human mobility towards the EU” (Isleyen, 2018: 27). They serve to control the entry into and exit from the city, and movement within the city. Traditionally, checkpoints have been tools of policing in Turkey to catch criminals.

Another tool, travel document, is a paper issued by either DGMM of Ministry of Interior, or the governorate of the city of the applicant’s residence. Regulated by Article 77 of the Law 6458, travel permission documents may be given to asylum seekers who want to leave their city of residence. According to Isleyen (2018: 29) borders are practiced at the moment when “state officials make a decision on the eligibility and credibility of the mobility request of the applicant.” Since it has a travel history of the applicant, travel document serves not only as a tool of control, but also as a tool of surveillance. In this sense, it is presented as a significant element that “confirms Turkish state’s monopoly over legitimate and illegitimate journey” (Isleyen, 2018: 30). With DGMM’s official order in 2015 to prevent unauthorized travel of Syrians via more controls they also became subject to stricter practices of travel document obligation.

Although it argues that in the context of membership negotiations Turkey has made certain reforms to harmonize its laws and policies in line with the *acquis communautaire*, the article does not provide further details on how Turkey’s border policies have transformed through encounters with the EU and how this transformation contributed to the constitution of externalization policies. It focuses on everyday practices of mobility control and provides a snapshot of the current field of border in/security in Turkey, by relying mainly on discourses and practices of Turkish policemen. Main finding of the article is that “Turkish practices reproduce the EU

border” (Isleyen, 2018: 31). In this sense, Isleyen’s work takes a significant step in emphasizing Turkey’s agency in constantly constituting the EU’s borders through everyday practices of security professionals. Isleyen puts forward the EU’s motivation which is to keep migrants away from its physical borders and locates Turkey’s agency in the implementation of the EU’s political decisions. By the end of the article, she states that the findings of her article do not “intend to argue that Turkish practices merely reflect EU preferences and expectations” (Isleyen, 2018: 31). So, the article neither presents EU’s expectations as a motive of Turkey’s implementation of in/security practices, nor integrates Turkey’s motives and contribution to the construction of policies as representative of its agency in the process.

In another article titled “Turkey’s governance of irregular migration at European Union borders: Emerging geographies of care and control” Isleyen (2018a: 1) focuses on “the intertwinement of care and control” in two border cities in Turkey: Edirne and Izmir. The article adopts a Foucauldian-inspired approach to analyze discourses and practices of care and control as inherent into humanitarianism in Turkey’s daily governance of mobility. Main argument of the article is that Turkey’s borders are increasingly shaped by humanitarian logics and operational exercises, which is a significant place to look for the interplay between care and control. It builds on the assumption that “humanitarianism in border security performs dual roles of care (life and safety of individuals) and control (order)” (Isleyen, 2018a: 4). Put differently, it argues that humanitarian logic is utilized to justify mobility control practices, like Pallister-Wilkins’s (2015) article which analyzed the dilemma between humanitarian discourse and security practices. Unlike Pallister-Wilkins, Isleyen analyzes the field

of EU-Turkey border in/security with reference to certain practices of both EU and non-EU actors.

Isleyen (2018a), emphasizes the centrality of geography in the governance of migration. According to the article, practice approach allows for analyzing “the plurality and diversity of discursive articulations and actions by security actors, their power relations, struggles, and resistances,” as well as state officials’ “discursive practices of identification, categorization, and nomination” (Isleyen, 2018a: 3-4). Findings of the article rely on interviews with police officers in Edirne and Izmir, participant observation, and document analysis. The study first addresses care and control dilemma in discourses of interviewees, and to an extent, in their daily practices of border control. While border police define their duty as securing borders from “illegal” acts, they state their feeling of empathy towards migrants. Policemen relate their duty with state sovereignty and protection of borders from “illegal” acts. Next, the study focuses on the centrality of geography in the governance of mobility in Turkey. It presents differences in the governance of mobility in different parts of Turkey, such as Western border cities, Eastern and Southern border cities, and ‘temporary protection centers.’ It then analyzes humanitarianism and smuggling networks, focusing on how humanitarian discourse tends to represent migrants as victims, and smugglers as the responsible actors for migrants’ suffering. As a result, Isleyen (2018a: 12-3) states, not only migrants’ agency is disguised, but also smugglers are portrayed as the only source of suffering.

Isleyen’s study looks mostly at discourse and practices of border police towards migrants and smugglers and significance of geography in perceptions of migrants and

border practices. It is already stated that the article “looks excessively at Turkish state officials” by specifically focusing on the dilemma in their discourses between their “professional duty” and “humanitarian responsibility” (Isleyen, 2018a: 7). Therefore, it grants agency to actors from Turkey in the implementation of in/security practices. When it comes to the constitution of the border in/security regime, the article states that “in the context of its membership negotiations with the EU, Turkey has introduced a number of reforms ... in order to harmonize its laws and administrative exercises in line with the EU’s *acquis communautaire*” because “the EU has demanded Turkey to effectively manage irregular migration through ... increased technology to control its borders” (Isleyen, 2018a: 6). An analysis of Turkey’s transforming role in the constitution of externalization policies and legal frameworks that enable in/security practices has a potential to highlight its agency also in the making of border in/security policies.

Topak also conducts a Foucauldian analysis of control practices at the Greece-Turkey borders in his 2014 article titled “The biopolitical border in practice: surveillance and death at the Greece-Turkey borderzones.” His main argument is that contra Foucault’s argument that biopolitics is the product of the transition from sovereign to governmental powers, “biopolitics operates through sovereign territorial controls and surveillance, practices of death and exclusion, and suspension of rights” at the Greece-Turkey borders (Topak, 2014: 815). As such, despite their diffusion beyond and inside state territories, techniques and effects of borders are still concentrated.

Topak’s findings are based on in-depth interviews with Greek, Turkish, and Frontex authorities at the Evros border zones and NGOs conducted in 2012. Information from

the field is supported by documents and reports. He focuses on two routes from Turkey to Greece –Aegean Sea and Evros- separately, by analyzing surveillance and death at these border zones. The Greek and Frontex authorities’ response to migration flows was to increase surveillance capacities at the borders, which was supported by the EU External Borders Fund. There is a gradual increase in Frontex’s involvement in border activities with its own personnel, equipment, budget, and technological support. Frontex is also indirectly involved in border activities such as developing new surveillance mechanisms with private security corporations such as Eurosur, risk analysis, and cooperation agreements with non-EU countries, without being directly accountable for human rights issues linked with these activities (Topak, 2014: 822). These surveillance activities direct migrants towards riskier routes, rather than being completely preventive.

In his analysis of the Aegean Sea, Topak (2014) focuses on surveillance technologies initiated and applied by the Greek coastal guards, Frontex, with the assistance of National Coordination Center (NCS) and Eurosur. The article informs that the Greek and Frontex authorities use “patrol vessels, boats, helicopters, planes, thermal cameras, binoculars, night vision goggles, movable vehicles, land vehicles, and land-based radar systems” to detect and control the entry of migrants to the EU territories (Topak, 2014: 823). What makes Topak’s article specifically significant for this dissertation is his occasional emphasis on the role of Turkish authorities at least at the operational level, such as the paragraph he argues,

Not only is the Greek section of the border surveyed; the Turkish side is subjected to even more intensive surveillance to preempt the entry of

migrants while they are still on Turkish territory. The Greek head of border operations stated that once they detect migrants approaching from the Turkish side, they first call the Turkish authorities to arrest them, and then they send patrol units to the nearby sections to prevent their entry.

Topak's main finding is that border control is being transformed from being "patrolling driven" to "intelligence driven" which represents a logic of biopolitical control by the EU actors. The analysis closes with the argument that "Border surveillance activities of the Greek and Frontex authorities, directly or indirectly, cause migrant deaths and injuries" (Topak, 2014: 829). Topak integrates Turkey's actors' daily operational practices of border in/security into the analysis. The research attributes agency to security professionals from Turkey in the constitution of the EU borders via daily practices; however, it still locates Turkey as the partner that implement these practices "as a result of ongoing pressure from the EU" and upon "request from the Greek side" (Topak, 2014: 828).

Ikizoglu Erensu and Kasli's 2016 article "A Tale of Two Cities: Multiple Practices of Bordering and Degrees of Transit in and through Turkey" takes a step further in integrating non-EU agency into Turkey-EU border in/security cooperation. The article focuses on transit migration via ethnographic analysis comparatively in two cities of Turkey. The article challenges to the existing notions of 'transit space' arguing that it is commonly referred to as a fixed space that people come and go, without looking at multiple experiences in different transit spaces. It argues that transit cities have different roles in EU externalization, mainly based on their geographical proximity to

the external borders of the EU. To analyze this difference, the authors pick Edirne that shares land borders with the EU, and Kayseri which is located in the center of Turkey's geographical space. They analyze local experiences of migrants and citizens along with mundane practices of professionals in Edirne and Kayseri. For instance, role of Edirne has changed as the migratory routes shifted because of the changing policies of the EU and Turkey. Following stricter measures especially by Frontex, the route started to shift from Edirne-Greece border to Aegean Sea in the south and Bulgarian border in the North. According to the authors, authorities in Edirne started to perceive the EU and Greece as partners, despite Turkey's fluctuated relations with these actors before. In Kayseri, which does not share any geographical borders with the EU, anti-Europeanism has not changed with refugees' settlement in the city, but rather increased now with the impact of the international migration regime. Illegitimacy of the border regime and refugees mirror each other for the local people. Thus, geographical positions of cities have implications for the encounters between the 'locals' and the 'border-crossers' by influencing public perceptions about their legitimacy (Ikizoglu Erensu and Kasli, 2016: 17).

The article analyzes bureaucratic interactions between different institutions operating in the field. For instance, state institution officials in Kayseri, who are "on the receiving end of occasional visits by UNHCR and EU representatives without being able to control their timing or content" accuse these institutions for "demanding and investing in the welfare of refugees without mirroring the same for the welfare of locals" (Ikizoglu Erensu and Kasli, 2016: 8). The article further includes the role and

agency of local authorities in Edirne and Kayseri and analyze how border cooperation with the EU has changed Edirne and Kayseri's role as extraterritorial bordering cities.

According to the authors, Turkey "became part of the European migration regime under the notion of transit" in the 1990s. They argue that as the notion of transit state "came into favour with European policy-makers, it enabled member states to convince neighbors to roll out migration and border control policies in line with the EU interest" (Ikizoglu Erensu and Kasli, 2016: 528-29). The article defines externalization as a project that EU actors initiate and develop in line with their claimed interests, which non-EU states like Turkey gets involved in the process later through mainly implementing in/security practices.

Sari and Dincer (2017) in "Toward a New Asylum Regime in Turkey?" define new asylum regime in Turkey as "a semi-autonomous social field" which has been "produced, interpreted, and negotiated by various actors involved in asylum process" (Sari and Dincer, 2017: 61). This suggests that migrants' everyday lives are largely shaped by these "multiple migration authorities and their shifting, and contradictory policies and practices," which encourages the authors to make a "thick understanding" of relevant actors, institutions, and policies (Sari and Dincer, 2017: 61). The findings rely on policy and legal documents, and interviews with a few civil society, international organization, and state institution representatives, and asylum lawyers.

The article puts forward that in the 2000s Turkey started to transform its asylum regime in accordance with the EU regulations. The article continues with Turkey's

more recent attempts to reconfigure its asylum regime with 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), and establishment of the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) operating under Turkey's Ministry of Interior. This brought a new and rather dominant actor into the "semi-autonomous field" of asylum regime in Turkey. The article examines relations between DGMM, ASAM and UNHCR, pointing out conflictual encounters between them, and their impact on asylum and refugee application processes. There is a problem of ambiguity regarding these actors' roles, duties, and responsibilities in the field, which eventually constitutes further insecurity for migrants. The authors argue that especially after 2016 coup attempt, securitization started to increase with regulations that gave certain state actors the authority to deport anyone who are leader, member, or supporter of a terrorist organization (Sari and Dincer, 2017: 76). The authors locate actors of Turkey in the asylum regime of the state and emphasized how relations and certain code of actions play a role in the implementation of insecurity practices. In this sense, the article differs itself from the previously analyzed studies, by analyzing both sides' legal and operational practices.

The authors start their analysis from EU's decision to take "harsh measures to prevent migration from the Middle East, Africa, and Asia" which made Turkey a transition country and a transnational hub (Sari and Dincer, 2017: 59). Accordingly, "in line with Turkey's EU accession, the Turkish government has attempted to restructure the country's migration/asylum regime" (Sari and Dincer, 2017: 60). Turkey's new asylum regime, although it strengthened Turkey's borders as well, "serves to fulfill EU member states' desire to externalize control tools and restrictive asylum policies

to neighboring countries in order to raise the borders of the EU against irregular migration” (Sari and Dincer, 2017: 73). The article states that this partnership made Turkey “a buffer zone” which is “responsible for protecting EU’s external borders by keeping refugees within its borders” (Sari and Dincer, 2017: 73).

This third group of IPS studies that analyze everyday practices of in/security at and through Turkey’s borders integrate the existence and role of Turkey’s actors into their analyses in one way or another. They go beyond not only the first two group of studies in this chapter, but also the studies that focus on EU externalization in the Mediterranean that are analyzed in Chapter 3 in locating the agency of non-EU actors into their analyses. More specifically, Isleyen (2018; 2018a) and Topak (2014) look at how everyday practices of the EU and Turkish actors constitute an in/security field. They grant agency to Turkey’s actors in implementing border in/security practices by analyzing the information gathered from their fieldwork in Turkey. In this sense, non-EU security professionals enter the story only after the policies have been decided and put into operation. Ikizoglu Erensu and Kasli (2016) and Sari and Dincer (2017) take a step further by going back and forward between the current practices in the field, and the processes in which the current borders has been constituted via political, legal, and operational techniques. This dissertation builds on the analyses of this third group of IPS studies and how they locate Turkey’s actors and contributes to this literature by putting more emphasis on Turkey’s agency as a non-EU actor that make externalization policies and practices possible via cooperation and contestation throughout a constitution process.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed existing studies on EU and Turkey's cooperation on border in/security. Similar to the grouping that was made in Chapter 3, it found out three main ways in which the literature portrays non-EU actors. Majority of the IPS studies that focus on Turkey-EU borders that are analyzed in this chapter integrate the existence and role of Turkey's actors into their analyses in one way or another. So, the literature on Turkey-EU borders is different from the IPS literature on EU externalization in the Mediterranean in the sense that they do not leave aside the role of non-EU actors in the constitution of insecurity. Based on their field research, majority of the studies analyzed in this chapter present an analysis of in/security practices at and through Turkey's borders and how they contribute to the everyday constitution of borders through practices. In this sense, they take a step further in granting agency to the actors of Turkey as a non-EU partner. They integrate Turkey's actors into the analysis and do not take their motives for granted.

However, like the studies analyzed in Chapter 3, when it comes to the constitution of political frameworks and dialogues, these studies tend to consider the contribution of non-EU states only indirectly. They do not locate how actors of Turkey exercise agency throughout the process by transforming the policies that are designed and initiated by the EU. Although they consider how the relationships can be asymmetric or hierarchical, they leave limited room for the perspective of Turkey's actors (See also, El Qadim, 2017). As such, they locate non-EU agency by integrating non-EU actors' everyday security practices but render invisible the possible influence of these states on externalization policies. This dissertation builds on the analyses and findings these studies by examining how multiple actors from Turkey contributed to the

constitution of externalization policies, legal frameworks, and practices of in/security.

The next chapter presents an analysis of the process in which Turkey has contributed to the constitution of externalization policies, legal framework, and bureaucratic/operational practices as a case.



CHAPTER 6:

EU EXTERNALIZATION OF BORDER IN/SECURITY AND TURKEY

This chapter builds on Chapter 5's analysis of IPS literature on Turkey-EU cooperation on border in/security. It aims to locate the elements of non-EU agency that are missing or underemphasized in the existing studies in multiple ways that Chapter 5 identified. To fulfill this aim, it analyzes non-EU partners' agency in EU externalization policies and practices by focusing on the case of Turkey. It examines the process in which Turkey's policies, legislation and practices of border in/security have evolved since its very foundation through its relations with EC/EU actors. The chapter first traces the evolution of Turkey's border in/security policies and practices starting from its foundation that constituted a basis of certain current policies. Second, it analyzes the process following Turkey's official candidanship to see how relations of border in/security were transformed by the membership vision. Third, it analyzes the post-Arab uprisings period to examine how Turkey's agency has been exercised in

the process through relations with the EU. The chapter analyzes these processes by going through political, legal, and operational layers of border in/security cooperation while pinpointing critical junctures that actors of Turkey acted and influenced border in/security processes based on its internal dynamics and motives.

6.1 The Background of Turkey's Border In/security Policies

Turkey's longstanding relations with actors of EC/EU can be traced to understand the roots of its agency in constituting current border in/security cooperation with the EU. Early decades of Turkey's border control practices were marked by state and nation building policies that were designed to establish and maintain a 'homogenized society' (Icduygu and Aksel, 2013: 170). As part of the policy of population exchange, non-Turkish and non-Muslim populations were sent to Greece and Bulgaria based on the rule of reciprocity with the claim that they threatened "the internal and external security of the country" (Icduygu et al., 2008: 372). Security forces started to implement surveillance practices based on the Law on Settlement of 1934 and the Passport Law of 1950 to sort out and deport 'suspicious individuals' that were likely to be "anarchists, murderers, spies, or those who worked for Greece during Turkey's War of Independence" (Guner, 2007: 1456; see also, Law No. 2510; Passport Law No. 5682). Thus, the Turkish government's definitions of what constitutes security and insecurity influenced the state's migration and border management practices and policies for decades.

Once the consolidation process slowed down, the Turkish elites concentrated on the idea of aligning the state with 'the Western world' in the beginning of the Cold War

(Icduygu, 2004). This shift in Turkey's international politics led the government to change its migration policy from accepting 'only Muslim-Turks' to 'only Muslim-Turks and Westerners.' This policy shaped one of the most delimiting legal regulations of Turkey's current border in/security policies, its geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, which ensured that only immigrants of 'European origin' could settle as refugees. The limitation indicated that Turkey "retains resettlement to a third country as the most preferred durable solution for refugees arrived due to the events occurred outside of Europe" (UNHCR Turkey, n.d.). In practice, the limitation means those who come from outside of Europe cannot apply for refugee status in Turkey, which is a significant source of insecurity for the immigrants who cannot apply for refugee status.

Turkey put the limitation based on the governments' enduring 'security concerns' that they linked to the safety of the state and society. First, respective Turkish governments have associated social and political instability in the East and the South of Turkey with the MENA countries because they had strong historical and societal ties (Kirisci 1996). Second, they have had a fear of becoming a buffer zone or 'dumping ground of Europe' since the foundation of the Republic, which started to rise again recently as the number of immigrants increased due to border in/security cooperation with the EU (Kirisci 2002; 2004). Turkey was not concerned with opening its borders to immigrants of European origin for holding to the aim of aligning the state with the Western world (Biehl, 2009), while strengthening in/security practices that targeted the immigrants coming from the East and South based on the security considerations of the time.

The labor force deficit in Europe after the establishment of EEC also helped transborder mobility between Europe and Turkey to be taken out of the realm of security. The EEC states wanted to receive immigrant workers as part of mass-production-based Fordist guest-worker programs (Castles et. al, 1984) while Turkey's policy makers also considered emigration as a "pressure-release valve and even as a development tool" (Oguz, 2012: 47). Turkey signed several bilateral labor recruitment agreements with states of Europe (Icduygu and Ustubici, 1984: 48, 57). The Ankara Agreement of 1963 further aimed at "securing freedom of movement for workers" between the parties (Official Gazette, 1964). Being an association agreement, it established a more comprehensive economic partnership between Turkey and EEC states encouraging all joint measures to "align the economic policies of Turkey and the Community more closely" (Official Gazette, 1964; Treaty of Rome, 1957, Article 227/2). Thus, all involved parties considered migration as a matter of economy rather than security during this period. Accordingly, until 1975, the role and authority of security bureaucracy declined in Turkey's migration and border policies while civilian bureaucracy's role increased (See Icduygu and Aksel, 2013).

Turkey concentrated on border security policies once again following mixed immigration of foreigners from its neighborhood who were neither Turk and Muslim nor European (Icduygu and Aksel, 2008). It has become a transition point for migrants escaping from increased political instability in the East and trying to make their way to Europe. These immigrants often stayed in Turkey longer than expected as 'irregular migrants' or had to stay permanently due to growing border in/security policies and practices of Europe. As a result, Turkey has become one of the first

countries to be identified as a transit space (Oelgemoller, 2011: 414), increasing its significance as an externalization partner. The EEC had already initiated the Global Mediterranean Policy in the Paris Summit of 1972 that advocated a common approach to migration and border policies in the Mediterranean neighborhood, including Turkey and was in line with its security policies. Turkey kept the geographical limitation while allowing Iranian immigrants to stay temporarily as tourists because there were no special regulations for their legal status. Following the flow of Kurdish refugees from Northern Iraq after the Gulf War, Turkey started to grant ‘temporary guest statuses’ to non-European immigrants as ‘a short-term solution’ to cover up the legal hole resulted from the limitation. This ‘solution’ has become a routine in/security practice of Turkey’s migration management field following the Arab uprisings.

Turkey also introduced new national laws with increased security elements. The Coastal Security Law of 1982 (No. 2692) and the Law of Protection and Security of Land Borders of 1988 (No. 3497) increased security professionals’ authority and involvement in border management policies and practices (Turkish Armed Forces, 2020; Sert, 2013). The 1994 Regulation¹⁷, Turkey’s first systematic national regulation on asylum, was also drafted with “security concerns in reply to an increased influx of immigrants after the end of the Cold War” (Burgin and Asikoglu, 2015: 121). It was “a securitized response to regional conflicts” and post-conflict

¹⁷ ‘The Regulation on the Procedures and the Principles Related to Mass Influx and Foreigners Arriving in Turkey either as Individuals or in Groups Wishing to Seek Asylum either from Turkey or Requesting Residence Permits with the Intention of Seeking Asylum from a Third Country’.

migratory flows (Ustubici, 2019: 6). Thus, immigration became more prominently associated with security and the Regulation led the Turkish authorities to pursue a more targeted security policy on irregular and transit migration (Icduygu, 2005; Biehl, 2009). It was designed mainly by the Ministry of Interior to increase national security actors' involvement in migration policies (Eroglu, 2015; Kirisci, 1996). Police forces were given the authority to make "important decisions about the destiny and rights of refugees" and act as the primary decision maker in individual cases and decision-making processes about border security (Eroglu, 2015: 31; Baklacioglu, 2009: 19). The law empowered national authorities and city governors in the refugee status determination process vis a vis UNHCR (Law No. 94/6169). It required all non-European refugees who applied to UNHCR to be resettled in Turkey to also apply to the Turkish authorities with a 'temporary asylum' claim (Biehl, 2009). This situation created what is called 'the dual procedure' that lasted for decades and made application processes longer, more complicated, and unpredictable. The Regulation also made national authorities the ultimate decision maker for temporary stays in Turkey. Article 7 of the Regulation stated that only "if needed Ministry of Interior may cooperate with other ministries, institutions, and international organizations and institutions such as UNHCR and IOM" (Official Gazette, 1994).

The Regulation did not provide a clear and equal procedure for international protection applications. The post-1994 period was still characterized by "rights violations by Turkey especially the right to non-refoulement and increasing number of cases against Turkey at the level of the European Court of Human Rights" (Ustubici, 2019: 6; see also Kirisci, 2012). The regulation cited the geographical limitation for

the deportation of asylum seekers and this unequal procedure. Despite the European Commission's continuing criticism and suggestion for lifting the limitation in progress reports since the 1990s, Turkey has maintained it before and after the start of membership negotiations (See Council of the European Union, 2001; Kirisci, 2007). Although an amendment to the 1994 Regulation was made in 1999 and the ministry of interior prepared a circular in 2006, these reforms could achieve only limited improvement, if any (Aydin and Kirisci, 2013). Turkey continued to keep its migration practices as 'national' as possible until the EU candidanship and the 1994 Regulation had been the primary source of legislation on asylum until LFIP was prepared in 2013 (Eroglu, 2015).

To sum up, Turkey's border and migration policies did not start with externalization. They have been shaped by Turkey's internal motives and through its dynamics with the states in its neighborhood since the establishment. These motives were not stable, they have been socially and politically constituted, and changed throughout the process based on the influential actors' defined policy needs and considerations of security. Turkey's border control practices changed based on whom and what the governments did or did not define as 'threat' based on broader relations with other actors. Turkey's insistence on keeping the geographical limitation while softening its security approach to immigration from Europe constitutes an example of how it exercised agency relationally and established the roots of its current migration and border in/security regime.

6.2 Border In/security after the Candidanship

Turkey applied for full EU membership in 1987 and became a candidate state in 1999 (Helsinki European Council, 1999) only a couple of years after implementing the Schengen Agreement. This part analyzes the period between Turkey's candidanship and the Arab uprisings to understand how both sides' expectations of Turkey's membership played a role in determining externalization policies, legal framework, and operational practices. It focuses precisely on Turkey's actors' agency in the making of border in/security policies and practices through encounters with the EU.

6.2.1 The Policies of Border In/security

Since the 1990s many EU actors have increasingly framed migration as a security matter and intensified attempts to integrate non-EU states into its border in/security project. The EU presented the harmonization of border and migration management as a crucial component of candidate Turkey's 'EU-ization process.' 9/11 had already provided the environment for further aligning migration with security in Europe and elsewhere. Thus, the EU's calls for harmonization referred not only to conform with the international norms, but also to handle migration as a matter of security within and abroad Turkey's borders. The EU explicitly stated member states' expectations of border in/security cooperation in accession partnership documents and progress reports. When Turkey's Justice and Development Party (JDP) rose to power in 2002, the government was also keen to harmonize legal and political systems with that of the EU to serve the membership goal. However, the assumption that 'Turkey adopted all the EU criteria about border security to become a member' or for the EU funding is still misleading. In contrast with what several IPS studies argue, the goal of membership has not always resulted in the Turkish state's compliance with the EU

actors' demands. The process has collaborative and confrontational moments, influenced by both sides' motives and actions.

Especially until the accession negotiations began, Turkey had been reluctant to align its legislation with the EU due to uncertainty about its future membership, with the continuous fear of becoming a 'buffer zone' for irregular migrants (Kirisici, 2007; Icduygu, 2014). The EU actors' securitizing discourse also contributed to the Turkish government's reluctance. Various EU politicians publicly voiced their concerns about Turkey's accession because of a possible migration flow from Turkey, presenting scenarios of an 'invasion' and questioning Turkey's ability to integrate its migration regime (Lagro, 2008). The Commission verbalized member states' concern as a 'recommendation declaration' by stating that "the management of the EU's long new external borders would constitute an important policy challenge and require significant investment" and "closer cooperation both before and after accession" (European Commission, 2004). The potential flow of people from and beyond Turkey after the accession was referred to as "a complex issue" that could require considering "permanent safeguards" (European Commission, 2004).

Starting of the membership negotiations in 2005 motivated Turkey to reaccelerate border cooperation. It adopted the National Action Plan on Asylum and Migration determining all tasks and timetables to adopt a fully integrated migration management system through reforming policies, practices, and institutions until 2012 mainly to fight irregular migration (*Turkish National Action Plan*, 2005). It also continued to take part in the regional initiatives of the EU on border cooperation. Turkey had already been part of international border management (IBM) following the accession

negotiations when the EU accelerated it with the belief that “there is a need for better management of the external border controls” through understanding the “arrangements for cooperation between services responsible for external border control and [inspecting] the conditions in which a common mechanism to control external borders could be created” (Sert, 2013: 174). Turkey further adopted ‘the National Action Plan towards the Implementation of Turkey’s Integrated Border Management Strategy’ in 2006. The Commission considered this “a step forward towards alignment with EU standards, as the development of an integrated approach to border management is a key element for accession negotiations” (Progress Report, 2006: 61).¹⁸ Turkey immediately became a member of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) which was initiated in 2008 with the aim “to build a permanent and institutional framework for cooperation” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.a.). UfM adopted the motto “there is no development without security and no security without development” (UfM Secretariat, 2019; UfM Secretariat, n.d.). The project started to lose its focus on migration later in the process mainly due to incoherent and contradictory initiatives (Collyer, 2016).

Turkey also occupied an important place in the Stockholm Program of 2009 in which the EU advocated for a comprehensive approach in border security with the involvement of Frontex and EASO, international organizations and non-EU states. With the Stockholm Program,

¹⁸ Turkey adopted the Second Action Plan for Integrated Border Controls in 2011 after the outburst of the Arab uprisings (Ministry of Interior, n.d.).

The EU and Turkey have agreed to intensify the cooperation to meet the common challenge of managing migration flows and to tackle illegal migration in particular. This cooperation should focus on joint responsibility, solidarity, cooperation with all Member States and common understanding, taking into account that Turkey neighbors the EU's external borders, its negotiation process and the EU's existing financial assistance in relevant areas, including border control (Stockholm Program of the Council, 2009: 78).

As shown, actors of the EU and Turkey tried to establish several bilateral, regional, and international channels for closer border in/security cooperation throughout the first decade of 2000s when 'hope for membership' peaked. However, it is not possible to jump to the conclusion that border in/security cooperation was smooth, without moments of contestation. Contrary to the widely accepted argument in the literature that Turkey cooperated in this process due to the membership expectancy, the partnership had its ups and downs. Furthermore, it is also not possible to assume without more profound research that when Turkey transformed its policies in line with the EU criteria, it complied because of the membership bid.

The studies that are built on such arguments overlook broader internal political and social dynamics within Turkey such as the impact of Turkey's new foreign policy vision of 'zero problems with neighbors' that had a significant influence on its migration policies (See Davutoglu, 2010). As Icduygu and Aksel (2013: 185) state "by calling upon the emigrants, co-ethnics and ex-Ottoman citizens to reconnect with the Turkish state, the Presidency reinvigorate Turkey as a hegemonic power."

Turkey's JDP government redefined the state and society's relations with the Eastern and Southern neighborhood and started to soften its approach towards immigrants from the MENA while introducing new policies and legislation to make their stay in Turkey easier (See, Kale et al., 2018). Immigrants' easier settlement in Turkey coincided with the EU states' expectations but these policies were not necessarily introduced upon their demands. They were also part of the government's new foreign policy vision of 'humanitarian diplomacy' and more involvement with the governments and peoples of the MENA.

Turkey responded to certain demands of the EU negatively with similar foreign policy motives. For instance, the government rejected to lift the geographical limitation while still opening negotiations with the EU concerning a readmission agreement with TCN clauses (Progress Report, 2005: 111). Yet, only after a year, the Turkish government decided to pause readmission agreement negotiations until 2009 (Progress Report, 2009). As also stated later in the Stockholm program document "concluding the negotiations on the readmission agreement with Turkey is a priority" for the EU (Stockholm Program of the Council, 2009: 78). However, the government put the negotiations on hold and Turkey's confrontation was related to its policy of zero problems with its neighbors and "its move to build a visa-free area with Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Yemen, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia" most of which were negative-listed by the EU (Ihlamur-Oner, 2014: 137; see also Icduygu and Aksel, 2014). The policy of active involvement did not only aim for good relations between the states and governments, but also within societies. This approach included the aim to "extend a helping hand and provide safe haven to people who fled oppression" (Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, 2009). Turkey further decided to lift visa requirements mutually with Syria in 2009. The EU did not welcome Turkey's reluctance for a readmission agreement while suggesting a strict implementation of the already existing bilateral agreements with Bulgaria and Greece as a mechanism for border in/security cooperation.

The readmission agreement negotiations are useful to reveal how and where Turkey's agency is located in the process. In 2003, the Commission officially invited Turkey to readmission agreement negotiations by sending a draft text. Turkey waited until March 2004 to reply when it finally started negotiations. After the EU decided to freeze negotiations on specific chapters of the *acquis communautaire*, Turkey put readmission negotiations on hold between 2006 and 2010 (Icduygu and Aksel, 2014: 353). By the early 2010s representatives from several member states and EU institutions started to explicitly voice that the EU lost the vision of Turkey's full membership. The Turkish government and bureaucracy responded with a similar approach. Partially freed from how Turkey performed according to the progress reports, Turkey and the EU's policies of and expectations on migration started to diverge based on their changing political and security-related considerations (Icduygu and Ustubici, 2014: 53). Still, border cooperation continued because uprisings in the MENA started, and first group of Syrian citizens entered Turkey in 2011. At that time, despite starting to lose its membership vision, it was again Turkey that decided to change its open-door policy and got funding from EU for border closure and the implementation of in/security technologies at the Syrian border. This change was

related to Turkey's changing approach towards the governments of MENA in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings.

Furthermore, the EU approached the Turkish government for the reopening of readmission negotiations, to which it responded with the demand that visa facilitation dialogues would take place simultaneously (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). Since membership was far from being guaranteed, visa-free travel was considered a suitable alternative by the public and the government. This demand was also related to the upcoming elections in June 2011, and the government wanted to serve the news to the public to show that JDP was keeping up with its promise in 2002 to have closer relations with the EU. While the ministry of interior was reluctant to sign the readmission agreement based on the institution's traditional security concerns that was detailed in the previous part, MFA was supportive of the agreement that was supposed to come with the visa liberalization dialogue. Disagreements over the readmission agreement between Turkey's actors and between member states increased the Turkish government reluctance. It rejected to finalize the agreement between February 2011 and June 2012 to focus on its demand of visa liberalization (Icduygu and Aksel, 2014: 353-355). Since the power politics favored MFA over the ministry of interior at that period, and the government also wanted to sign the agreement with multiple incentives, the agreement was signed in June 2012, which also included a joint declaration on the cooperation in visa policy (The Council of the EU, 2012).

In sum, this part showed that the border in/security policies in the Mediterranean had been relationally constituted throughout the process. Both the EU and non-EU actors

have had their internal motives while acting in this constitution process, rooted in their domestic politics, international politics, or changing security considerations, which the existing literature tends to underemphasize.

6.2.2 Legal Framework

Turkey's legislation on migration and border control has transformed significantly following the candidateship. Turkey selectively adopted the EU's legal criteria and aligned its framework with international norms. It started to harmonize its national legislation in line with what was identified by the accession partnership document of 2001 (Icduygu, 2015). Accordingly, Turkey was to align its visa policies with the EU; adopt EU border practices such as admission, readmission, and expulsion to prevent irregular migration; strengthen border controls; and lift the geographical limitation to 1951 Convention (Council of the European Union, 2001). Turkey did not make most of these alterations during the 2000s, while still taking certain steps to strengthen border controls.

It adopted the first National Program of Action for the Adoption of the EU Acquis (NPAA). It agreed to take further measures on issues of border control, visa and asylum systems (NPAA, 2001). The document influenced the preparation of the draft law for the amendment of the Passport Law 5682 of 1950; ratification of the 2000 Convention against Transit Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) and its Protocol to Prevent Suppress and Punish Trafficking (Progress Report, 2003); amendment of the Penal Code in 2002 to align with this protocol and the Palermo Convention; increasing penalties for human trafficking and smuggling (Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, 2009b; Progress Report, 2010). Change in the Penal Code was significant because it defined and criminalized migrant smuggling as an independent crime for the first time in line with the EU legislation. Before, migration smuggling had been punished through the Law No. 765 of the Turkish Penal Code under the framework of “forming an illegal organization for the aim of committing crime” (Ozmenek Carmikli and Kader, 2016: 54). In 2005, after the accession negotiations started and intensified Turkey-EU cooperation, Turkey redefined human smuggling under Law No. 5237 of the Penal Code, putting it under the framework of “crimes against humanity.” This further increased punishment of human trafficking. Turkey’s legal framework on human smuggling got its current form in 2010 with the Law No. 6008 and its punishment was made heavier (Gendarmerie General Command, n.d.).

On the one hand, Turkey was making regulations with increased security measures in line with the EU criteria or the government’s security policies. On the other, it started to introduce liberal migration and border management policies in line with its foreign policy approach. The discrepancy between the EU’s suggestions for increasing border security yet liberating the border regime also influenced Turkey’s mixed practices. In 2003, a law regulating Work Permits for Foreigners (Law No. 4817) was adopted which made it easier for foreigners to get work permits via a change in the administration process also aligning Turkey’s legal system with international standards. Turkey also adopted a new Settlement Law in November 2006, cancelling the 1934 Settlement Law that was designed based on the defined security considerations of the time (Ozgur Baklacioglu, 2017: 15). The new law comparatively liberalized Turkey’s migration policies for those who immigrate to Turkey, despite

keeping the ‘Turkish descent and culture’ requirement for immigrants (Icduygu and Aksel, 2008: 181). As the previous section clarifies, this criterion was put in the early times of the Republic to create a homogeneous society that was easier to control. In practice, this meant having the willingness and ability to adopt the Turkish language, Turkey’s culture and mainly a Muslim Sunni ethnic background. This policy, taking ethnic origins as criteria was not in accord with the EU common immigration policy. Despite the criticism in the progress reports, Turkish authorities did not abandon this rule on the excuse of ‘providing security.’

Turkey rejected the EU’s continuous suggestions for lifting its geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention stating that “EU should display sensitivity in burden-sharing” for Turkey to lift it (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2006: 2). In its formal reply to the Commission’s question of when and how the limitation would completely be lifted, Turkey’s Directorate for EU Affairs (then the Ministry of EU) stated that in the case of lifting the limitation, Turkey would need more reception and return centers, more sources to manage these facilities, training for the personnel, and a more developed information collecting and sharing system, all of which are practices of in/security (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2006: 3). Turkey asked for more cooperation, assistance, and funding from the EU and UNHCR to meet its claimed needs to prevent “illegal immigration in the eastern Mediterranean” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007).

Otherwise, it is stated, Turkey would be overburdened with possible mass population movements. However, Turkey amended the 1994 regulation in 2006 allowing the acceptance of immigrants of non-European origin within the scope of other legal frameworks for protection such as UNHCR refugee status, secondary protection or

residence permits before resettling into a safe third country (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2006: 4-6).

Other than introducing new regulations or amending its existing national legislation, Turkey also concluded bilateral agreements and protocols with the EU and non-EU states as part of the policy of externalization. After the candidateship, Turkey and Greece started bilateral talks at a high official level to discuss increasing cooperation on “fight against illegal migration, drug trafficking and terrorism” (Progress Report, 1999). These talks turned into a bilateral protocol on readmission implementation in 2001 which is still in effect by 2020 along with the one signed with Bulgaria in 2004 (Progress Report, 2001).¹⁹ Turkey also signed readmission agreements with non-EU countries in the neighborhood within the scope of accession vision to include more countries in Turkey’s pool of safe third countries to resettle non-EU asylum seekers to “voluntarily align further with the EU’s positive and negative visa lists”²⁰ (Progress Report, 2009). These agreements served the EU’s externalization policy. Still, they were done because they also assisted Turkey in achieving the aim of ‘securing the state’s Southern and Eastern borders’ by discouraging irregular migration.

The EU had also made efforts to conclude a readmission agreement with Turkey since its official candidateship (Progress Report, 2006). After JDP acceded to power, the EU officially asked Turkey to open negotiations on a readmission agreement. Yet, the

¹⁹ The bilateral protocol also constituted the legal base for the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016.

²⁰ Started with Syria in 2001, Turkey has concluded 15 readmission agreements with countries from neighboring regions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020).

Turkish government remained silent by not providing a formal reply (Progress Report, 2003). It took Turkey twelve years to even agree on starting an official dialogue. As illustrated in the previous section, Turkey unilaterally put the dialogue on hold by 2006. Negotiations between Turkey and the EU continued only after 2010 when Turkey started changes in its policy towards the MENA regimes. In 2011, following the uprisings in the region, negotiations on a readmission agreement were finalized and got ready to be initialed and signed (Progress Report, 2011: 90). Until the agreement got activated, existing bilateral protocols with Greece and Bulgaria would be utilized as parties agreed to designate daily contact points among law enforcement staff.

Although developing national asylum legislation that complies with international standards was needed as part of the harmonization process, EU membership was not the only motivation of Turkey for transforming and introducing these legal regulations. Based on the interviews with bureaucrats in Turkey, Eroglu (2015) identifies that “a legal loophole in the Turkish asylum system” was a significant motive of Turkey to transform its legislation. This part illustrated that Turkey’s security and foreign policy strategies played a role in its choices for rejecting or adopting the EU criteria. As a civil society representative also stated “not every development is done just because the EU wants this” but Turkey has had its own needs regarding migration and border management (Eroglu, 2015: 34). Even when Turkey’s membership process slowed down especially after the 2010s, Turkey’s legal and operational systems’ improvement continued through relations with the

neighboring EU and non-EU states, mainly based on the state's political and security-related considerations.

6.2.3 Bureaucratic and Operational Practices

Turkey and the EU started border cooperation talks and projects before candidateship mostly based on the Ankara Agreement, and bilateral protocols with Greece and Bulgaria (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998; 1999). Cooperation between these parties' security forces increased significantly after the official candidateship. Turkey has not always agreed to the EU's recommendations related to border policies and legislation. However, it imported most in/security practices to 'strengthen state borders.' Joint in/security practices targeted irregular crossings either to Turkey or the EU by way of establishing new checkpoints and watchtowers especially along Turkey's Eastern and Southern borders, assigning additional border security personnel, training of security forces, development of shared database and surveillance systems, constructing new detention and return centers and enhancing the capacity of existing ones (See Progress Report, 2001). These practices serve the security of actors either from the EU or Turkey while they constitute insecurities for the same referents and/or others. They are designed to detect and tackle criminals but have increasingly been implemented to prevent unwanted mobility of individuals.

Security actors of both the EU and Turkey considered the establishment of shared databases and surveillance systems as significant elements of border in/security cooperation. New fingerprint systems were established in gendarmerie and police offices in 2001 to comply with the Schengen Information System (Progress Report,

2001). Security forces also started participating in the EU's center for information exchange (CIREFI),²¹ an 'early warning system' established in 1999 (Progress Report, 2002). This system aimed at "effectively managing legal immigration, preventing illegal immigration and facilitator networks, better detecting forged documents and improving expulsion practice" (CIREFI, 1999). Ministry of Interior also introduced a new passport complying with the international standards with an optical scanning feature "as a helpful measure in controlling immigration" (Progress Report, 1998). Biometric passports that create DNA and fingerprint databases were required to harmonize with the Schengen visa system. Turkish passports and visa stickers have further been renewed in 2010 with a biometric security feature (Progress Report, 2009: 76). Turkey also introduced the e-visa system establishing an information sharing database with the EU on border security and irregular migration (Progress Report, 2015: 70). Turkey was willing to immediately implement these surveillance practices because they were required for visa-free travel for Turkish citizens before or after the membership (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020).

From an IPS perspective, in/security practices are constituted by relations between multiple security actors. After the candidatureship, Turkey's security agents developed closer ties with multiple EU agencies to conduct joint surveillance activities. Turkey signed a cooperation agreement with Europol in 2004 to intensify joint surveillance and information sharing (Progress Report, 2004). It also opened a national office to work with Europol and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to meet the

²¹ Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration.

Schengen requirements. A few years later a memorandum of understanding between Turkey's MFA, EU and Frontex was signed enabling a framework to set up enhanced operational cooperation that involves training activities, joint operations, deployment of Frontex officials in Turkey, and providing systematic exchange of information and risk analyses (Progress Report, 2012: 76; Frontex General Report, 2014).

Accordingly, Turkey's borders have increasingly become surveillance-driven with the help of the EU's externalization (See Topak, 2014).

For the first time since systematic data collection began in 2008, the number of irregular crossings to the EU decreased sharply in 2012 due to these "enhanced joint surveillance and patrolling activities at the Greek-Turkey land border" (Frontex General Report, 2012: 9, 18). However, this does not mean 'more security' for immigrants because, in practice, increased surveillance at Turkey's borders led individuals to new and sometimes more dangerous routes, rather than safely keeping them in their country of origin or Turkey. Surveillance activities are in/security practices also in the sense that they aim to secure state borders but constitute insecurity for individuals by establishing relations of exclusion and inclusion. As widely studied by IPS scholars, they label 'legal and illegal subjects' through the use of algorithms and databases. Originally, these measures were "associated with police surveillance activities to catch criminals" (Isleyen, 2018: 28; See also, De Genova, 2004). Their usage has been expanded to include migrants with the securitization of migration in the Mediterranean. This is also why 'undocumented' migration is considered a threat because it makes governance through surveillance more difficult.

Once security forces determine ‘illegal’ individuals through surveillance, they are held and returned through the implementation of physical practices of in/security.

These new border in/security tools required security personnel that were trained to use them. Training activities aimed to establish common practices between security forces in Turkey while aligning their practices with the EU’s security actors. They were designed to facilitate faster and more cooperative joint action, when necessary, by establishing closer relations and more robust communication between security actors. Therefore, training practices focused intensively on the use of technology and surveillance systems which constitute a crucial element of externalization. Starting from the early 1990s staff of Turkey’s staff “appointed to border checkpoints and on forgery of visas and travel documents” have got annual training from EU and UNHCR (Progress Report, 2002: 116). After the candidanship, Turkey’s coast guards, gendarmerie, and land forces started to get regular and more intense training on preventing irregular immigration (Progress Report, 1999; 2000). In 2008 a specialized department on border security studies was established in the Turkish Police Academy. It took over some of the training responsibilities from the EU and international agencies, while its own trainers continued to get intense EU training (Progress Report, 2008).

As discussed by Bigo (See Chapter 5), border security forces increased joint activities after the merge of internal and external securities. The Commission regularly suggested Turkey merge border security forces under a unified border guard for “increasing coordination and efficiency” (Progress Report, 1999; Council of the European Union, 2001, 2003, 2006, 2008). Turkey has taken significant steps to at

least increase collaboration between security actors and harmonize their practices. In 2005 ministry of interior issued a circular to enhance cooperation between coastguards, police, and gendarmerie (Official Gazette, 2005; Progress Report, 2005). The policy of unifying security forces as part of IBM framework was enlarged in 2006 to cover operational cooperation on information gathering and risk analysis through joint border surveillance and checks (European Commission, 2017). Accordingly, ministries of foreign affairs, interior, and customs started to share databases “for the screening of persons crossing the borders” (Progress Report, 2007: 63). The Commission recommended Turkey to establish a risk analysis unit under police administration which resulted in the establishment of a board with members from chief of general staff, land forces, MFA, gendarmerie, and coast guards to provide improved coordination in combating irregular migration and monitoring operational practices (Progress Report, 2010). In 2008 a standard manual of checks at the EU external borders was published and distributed to all related security forces to harmonize the practices at border checkpoints (NPAA, 2008; Progress Report, 2008). These joint activities made sure that Turkey used all its available sources of security to cope with irregular migration to and beyond its borders.

Transborder cooperation of security forces was also enhanced after the candidateship which the government and security bureaucracy welcomed. Turkey signed an agreement with Greece to supplement the bilateral protocol which increased police cooperation to fight irregular migration. Regulations on the return of irregular migrants were activated in 2002 and continued under this framework until the conclusion of the readmission agreement. With the bilateral protocol of 2004, border

police and coastguards of Bulgaria and Turkey also started to work together to prevent irregular crossings through their shared land and water borders (Progress Report, 2004). Turkey also applied for the observer status to the European Gendarmerie Force and was granted a position in 2009 which the government welcomed as an opportunity to continue “its important contributions to international security” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a). It opened ‘the Directorate for Project Implementation on IBM’ under Ministry of Interior to prepare and administer EU projects to “on the legislative and administrative structure for IBM in line with the national action plan on asylum and migration, and the national plan on adoption of the *acquis*” (Progress Report, 2009: 73). A specialized bureau²² was also established under the Ministry of Interior to carry out the tasks determined in the 2005 national action plan following the start of accession negotiations (Turkey Migration Report, 2013: 29; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). However, the uncertainty related to Turkey’s membership prevented the bureaucracy from advising the government to make any more radical changes if they were not in line with Turkey’s defined ‘security needs’ (Icduygu and Aksel, 2014: 358).

Externalization measures also ‘strengthened’ Turkey’s borders physically by increasing the security component of crossing points through a ‘build-operate-transfer model.’ Turkey welcomed the renewal of checkpoints that would help to monitor “movements from the East and to the West” and it also contacted neighboring countries to establish a joint early warning system (Progress Report, 2002; Directorate

²² The Bureau for Developing and Implementing Asylum and Migration Legislation and Administration.

for EU Affairs, 2006). Cooperation under IBM also required “rebuilding of infrastructure such as equipping border forces with thermal cameras, radar, night vision systems and devices, and communication devices, as well as clearing of the landmines along borders” (Sert, 2013: 179). Turkey’s coast guard had spent more than half of its resources on these measures throughout the decade.

The national action plan regulated several in/security practices such as deportation, increasing the capacity of border security forces, and establishing return centers. After the plan set the goal to “harmonize Turkey’s existing asylum practices with the EU taking account of the EU minimum standards,” ministry of interior introduced the ‘Implementation Directive’ in 2006 to present detailed instructions to security forces on how to properly apply the 1994 Regulation (Circular No. 57; Turkish National Action Plan, 2005). The Directive included regulations to determine common security practices to prevent irregular crossings, making it more difficult to get a residence or asylum seeker status for persons caught smuggling.

To sum up, although Turkey rejected or transformed some of the policies and legal regulations that the EU initiated, the government and security bureaucracy were more willing to implement externalization practices that also served increasing the state’s capacity to control national borders. Externalization of in/security practices was designed to serve the claimed security needs of Turkey and the EU actors, while most of them resulted in more insecurity for immigrants. By analyzing policies, legal frameworks, and practices of externalization, this section showed how actors of Turkey exercised agency in multiple ways through different channels. It did so by

either cooperating with the EU actors or objecting their demands throughout the first decade of its candidanship in which its membership expectancy was at highest.

6.3 Border In/security after the Arab Uprisings

Post-uprising migration flows boosted the EU's willingness to externalize border in/security practices, which increased the role of non-EU partners in the type and shape of cooperation. This particularly applies to Turkey as an EU candidate Mediterranean state that accommodates the highest number of 'non-European immigrants.' This section analyzes the EU's border in/security externalization to Turkey following the Arab uprisings, with a focus on Turkey's role and agency in the process.

6.3.1 The Policies of Border In/security

Increasingly after the conflicts in and migration flows from the MENA, Turkey and the EU's approaches and policies towards the region started to diversify. The Turkish government continued to align the state and society more with the 'suffering peoples of the region' and criticized the EU for not sharing 'the burden.' The tone of criticism has increased as Turkey was convinced that the EU did not 'fulfill the promises' resulting from their political and legal cooperation. Turkey started to further prioritize its political and security-related motivations in the border in/security cooperation, which reveals the moments that actors of Turkey influenced the outcomes of externalization.

Since the very beginning of the Arab uprisings, Turkey's official discourse about the conflicts has been framed around "a humanitarian and moral responsibility" (Erdogan,

2015). Political elites assume a role as '*ensar*' which is an Islamic term given to people of Medina who helped immigrated Muslims including Prophet Muhammad. Turkey had located itself as a humanitarian actor that took side with "the suffering people" of the MENA (Erdogan, 2015a). The government criticized the EU for not keeping its promises, while Turkey "fulfilled its responsibility" by reducing irregular migration towards the EU and hosting millions of refugees (Erdogan, 2016; 2016c; 2017; 2019). Turkey "as home for those who have been oppressed" opened its territory to the people of the MENA, but the EU was "being picky by selecting people whom they need such as the educated ones" to open its borders (Erdogan, 2015c). Erdogan accused "the West" for being a beholder to the issue of migration and to the burden Turkey carried (Erdogan, 2014).

While the government and bureaucrats of Turkey emphasized the EU's lack of cooperation in managing migration flows, representatives of the EU accused Turkey of not conducting strict enough policies to prevent irregular crossings and to not lift the geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention (Icduygu, 2011). As a result of these disagreements, Turkey stopped implementing the bilateral border agreements with Bulgaria and Greece in 2012 for a short period (Progress Report, 2014). Border in/security cooperation fluctuated but did not come to an end, due to what the joint action plan of 2015 addressed as "common challenges that need a coordinated response" (European Commission, 2015a). The plan specifically aimed at "supporting Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey" and "strengthening cooperation to prevent irregular migration flows to the EU" (European Commission, 2015a).

The Commission also announced a revised and ‘more ambitious ENP’ and the EU stated its support for cooperation beyond the original ENP states including “Turkey as a candidate country” by using “a new thematic framework to facilitate trans-regional work and investment” on several issues including visa and mobility control (European Commission, 2015a). In the EU-Turkey summit of 2015, both sides further agreed to cooperate “to prevent migrants’ travel to Turkey and the EU” and “swiftly returning migrants who are not in need of international protection to their countries of origin” (EU-Turkey Summit, 2015). The EU-Turkey Statement was also announced in 2016, in which the EU made its aim straightforward: “to remove the incentive for migrants and asylum seekers to seek irregular routes to the EU” (First Report on the EU-Turkey Statement, 2016). The Statement specifically targeted to decrease the number of arrivals to Greece through increased surveillance and physical control practices. According to the report on the implementation of the plan, these measures successfully served the EU’s ‘indented results.’ The number of migrants crossing to Greece decreased sharply and a high number of smugglers were caught by Turkey’s security forces (First Report on the EU-Turkey Statement, 2016).

Addressing the Turkish government’s criticisms, the documents of these deals emphasized ‘the spirit of burden sharing’ rather than ‘burden-shifting’ to Turkey. The action plan was reevaluated in November 2015 with repeated promises for ‘re-energizing Turkey’s accession process’ and progress in ‘visa liberalization process for Turkish citizens.’ The Commission also emphasized Turkey’s candidateship in the revised ENP, while proposing higher solidarity on border in/security. The parties also agreed in the summit that the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement of 2013 would

become fully applicable in June 2016 “in order for the Commission to be able to present its third report with a view to completing the visa liberalisation process” which would mean the lifting of visa requirements for Turkish citizens in the Schengen zone by October 2016 (EU-Turkey Summit, 2015). The EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 included further promises such as the opening of new chapters in the accession negotiations and visa liberalization.

However, the intended goals of the Turkey-EU joint action plan, the summit, and the EU-Turkey Statement other than ‘securing the EU borders’ have not been achieved, which increased the Turkish governments’ existing hesitations about the cooperation. The ‘unkept promises of EU’ that the government referred to be the opening of new chapters in Turkey’s accession negotiations; visa-free travel for Turkish citizens; increasing financial assistance to support Turkey in meeting visa liberalization needs; and EU funding for the accommodation of immigrants and refugees that are kept in or returned to Turkey. This situation reduced the government’s motivation to hold to the obligations arising from the border in/security cooperation.

The Turkish government and bureaucracy and the EU’s approaches to border in/security further diverged when Turkey started to align its territorial security with the MENA as a continuation of its foreign policy of active engagement in the region. Turkey has broadened its claimed territorial zone of security by linking it to its neighborhood. Its involvement in the region is also presented as its “increasing power, ability and influence” regionally and globally (Erdogan, 2015c; 2015d). Turkey’s “fight with terrorism” in the region has also been presented as a sign of its power (Erdogan, 2016a; 2016b; 2016d). Erdogan invited the international community,

especially the EU and the USA to help Turkey to fight terrorism, to secure Turkey's borders and Syria from terrorists, to establish a secure zone and eventually return Syrian refugees back (Erdogan, 2019b; 2019c). In this sense, overthrowing the existing government and creating a safe zone in Syria are presented to be 'security needs' of Turkey, which the government says is not supported by 'the Westerners' (Erdogan, 2015).

Turkey's government became more concerned about the threat of terrorism within and abroad its borders after the attempted coup of July 2016, which further influenced its attitude towards Turkey-EU cooperation on the management of migration and borders. Following continuous criticisms of the government, another high-level political dialogue was initiated in 2018 in which both sides stated their willingness to cooperate on the fight against terrorism, Turkey's accession process, financial support for migration management in Turkey, and visa liberalization process (Joint Statement, 2018). The EU demonstrated occasional support at least in the discursive level because Turkey's presence in Syria and its ability to reach out to various actors increase its significance as a partner for the EU (Nas, 2019). The Commission stated that security of both Turkey's borders and the South Mediterranean region is significant due to the member states' belief that "EU's security starts beyond its borders" (European Commission, 2017a).

The Turkish government continued to claim that the EU's support and commitments to Turkey about border security cooperation and the fight with terrorism on paper has never been realized in practice. Tensions between both parties peaked by early 2020 when the Turkish Presidency decided to open the Western borders by stepping out of

the deals and let refugees cross to the EU. This happened after an attack on the Turkish army from the Syrian regime near Idlib. Erdogan made Turkey's approach clear by saying that the government called the EU for cooperation to establish a safe zone in Syria and accommodated individuals who escaped from the regime in Turkey. He added, however, "Turkey reached its capacity. Now everyone will have their share of this burden" (Deutsche Welle, 2020).

Thousands of migrants reached the borders of Greece after this statement, yet the security forces of Greece and Frontex pushed them back to Turkey by implementing harsh in/security practices. Spokespersons of the EU responded that Turkey's practices are against international law and the EU would not open its borders for these refugees. The Commission criticized Turkey, stating that the EU was aware of "the increased migratory burden and risks Turkey had been facing on its territory" yet it "strongly rejected Turkey's use of migratory pressure for political purposes" (Progress Report, 2020: 7). This move was not new for the EU because it was made by the Moroccan government repeatedly since the 2000s, which, according to Kaiser (2013: 22) "used the threat of relaxing border controls as a bargaining tool." The Turkish authorities have also 'threatened' the EU occasionally since 2017 with opening the borders and letting the refugees to Europe following political disagreements (Euractiv, 2017). The crisis with Turkey eased a couple of weeks later when Turkey decided to re-close its borders due to the threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the security and well-being of migrants who already crossed the borders remain unclear. These interactions disregarded the legal cooperation between Greece

and Turkey and international law that both are a party of, and increased in/security practices at and around the borders putting immigrant lives and security into danger.

As is seen, Turkey has exercised agency in its border in/security cooperation with the EU before and after the Arab uprisings by agreeing or challenging externalization policies. The uprisings increased Turkey's role in border in/security in the Mediterranean as a candidate transit country. Although Turkey and the EU started to diversify in their policies towards the MENA governments, societies, and immigration flows, their cooperation endured due to either common concerns or when it was considered in line with Turkey's internal motives, which was reflected in changes in legislation and bureaucratic practices.

6.3.2 Legal Framework

Regardless of the disagreements that Turkey and the EU had, Turkey took significant steps to align its legal framework with the international and EU's standards in the 2010s. Turkey also finalized legal agreements to strengthen border in/security cooperation with the EU. It did so by accepting or rejecting the EU's externalization measures based on the Turkish government's considerations of politics and security.

The adoption of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP / Law No. 6458) was the most significant development transforming national legislation. The drafting of LFIP was started in 2009 by the bureaucrats of the Asylum and Migration Bureau while Turkey's harmonization process was intense. Other civilian national and international institutions such as UNHCR, IOM, bureaucratic elite from several other ministries, as well as civil society representatives and academics were consulted in

this process (Eroglu, 2015: 34-35). The Law was accepted by the Turkish Parliament in 2011 and adopted in April 2013. It combined the previous Law on Aliens and Law on Asylum, harmonizing Turkey's legal system further with the international and EU standards on paper (Icduygu and Aksel, 2008: 181). Certain provisions of Foreigners' Residence and Travel in Turkey (1950/5683) and Passport Law (1950/5682) were abolished by LFIP which became the main legal regulation on foreigners (Arap and Çerçi, 2014).

LFIP is Turkey's first-ever asylum law setting out the main pillars of the national framework. Therefore, it changed border in/security field significantly by introducing new safeguards about the non-refoulement principle and access to RSD procedures (Progress Report, 2013: 65). Improvements in Turkey's legislation were welcomed by the Commission. However, LFIP's provisions are different on refugees of European and non-European origin due to Turkey's limitation to the 1951 Convention, which constitutes insecurities for a group of immigrants. Despite the EU's continuous insistence, Turkey held on to the decision of not accepting non-Europeans as refugees. Instead, the temporary protection regime that allows non-European migrants stay in Turkey acquired a legal basis and a permanent status with LFIP (Turkey Migration Report, 2015; Isleyen, 2018: 26). First introduced to accommodate the immigrants running from Iran's Islamic Revolution, temporary protection was only a short-term solution to find a way around the geographical limitation. The decision for temporary protection status was given by the cabinet when it was impossible to activate the mechanism of international protection in instances of mass entrance (Turkey Migration Report, 2014: 72-73). When it became the norm and changed

routine practices of acceptance, insecurities stemming from the limitation also became permanent. Put differently, the temporary protection regime normalized immigrants' stay in Turkey for long periods without granting them legal status and rights.

The EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement was also a crucial step for closer border cooperation. As discussed previously, the readmission agreement had been on the EU's agenda even before Turkey's candidanship and the drafting process started following the accession negotiations in 2005 (Dardagan Kibar, 2013). The agreement was concluded in 2013 right before the local elections during which the government promised the public visa-free travel to Europe and entered into force in October 2014. It stipulates that irregular migrants transited through Turkey can be deported back if their asylum application is rejected (EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement, 2013). Turkey also agreed to take TCNs and stateless persons back if they reach a member state with a visa issued by the Turkish authorities; have a residence permit to live in Turkey; and enter a member state transiting from Turkey or after staying in Turkey for a certain time (EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement, 2013).

As is seen, the terms of the agreement shifted significant responsibilities to Turkey in terms of whom could be returned. Therefore, Turkey wanted the Articles 4 and 6 of the agreement, regulating the readmission of TCNs and stateless persons, would enter into force after three years. Until September 30, 2017, the provisions of the agreement would apply only to the nationals of Turkey and the EU and "irregular migrants originating from countries with which Turkey has signed readmission agreements" (Progress Report, 2015: 69). The EU and Turkey also negotiated a special deal about the Syrian migrants. According to the deal, Syrians who targeted the EU would be

kept in Turkey, and the EU would provide an amount of 3 billion Euros financial assistance to the Turkish government to be used for the accommodation and care of these individuals. As analyzed above, visa-waiver status for Turkish citizens travelling to Schengen area countries was also negotiated within the scope of this deal, which became the basis of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016.

Simultaneously with the EU-Turkey Statement, two parties also launched the visa liberalization dialogue based on a particular roadmap towards a visa free regime with Turkey. Because the readmission agreement did not regulate visa liberalization, a separate document was signed to set out the requirements Turkey needed to meet. Accordingly, Turkey expected the Commission to propose an amendment to the Regulation (EC) No 539/2001²³ which would “allow Turkish citizens to travel without a visa for short stays of 90 days within any 180-day period for business, touristic or family purposes, in the Schengen area” (European Commission, 2016a). Visa liberalization was expected to be concluded by November 2016 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.a.). However, the Commission explicitly put the effectiveness of LFIP as a condition to move forward on the visa liberalization clarified in the following statement from the Progress Report of 2014,

²³ See “Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement.”

The Commission is looking forward to the effective implementation of Turkey's obligations under the readmission agreement towards all Member States. The Commission conducted a series of peer assessments in order to evaluate the status of Turkey's implementation of the visa roadmap and its benchmarks. The Commission will issue its first report on the implementation of the roadmap on 20 October 2014 (Progress Report, 2014: 63).

Visa liberalization became a condition for both sides. Turkey stated that "it will not implement the TCN provisions of the agreement until the EU confirms that the remaining visa liberalization benchmarks have been fulfilled" (Progress Report, 2016: 79). For the EU agents and member states, visa-free travel of Turkey is a risk since it is "often abused by irregular migrants" (European Migrant Smuggling Centre, 2018: 11). As discussed in the previous section, the Turkish Government frequently referred to the pending visa liberalization as 'an unkept promise' which has contributed significantly to the deterioration of the border in/security cooperation. By 2016 Turkey had kept unanswered the majority of readmission demands from Greece, Bulgaria, France, and Germany. It also stopped responding to readmission applications by Greece under the framework of the bilateral protocol for irregular migrants who reached the Greek mainland (Progress Report, 2016). By 2018 the implementation of the bilateral protocol has deteriorated significantly (Progress Report, 2018) and, to date, Turkey maintains its position on not implementing the TCNs.

Turkey's rejection to lift the geographical limitation also continued to be a point of disagreement. Turkey sought other ways to accommodate non-European migrants. The Temporary Protection Regulation of 2014 introduced 'conditional refugee' status which allowed non-European individuals to stay in Turkey until they were resettled into a third safe country (*Temporary Protection Regulation*, 2014; Turkey Migration Report, 2014: 68-69). The Regulation also introduced 'subsidiary protection' and 'conditional protection' status to increase the level of protection for non-European refugees, who are not protected under the terms of the Geneva Convention.

Subsidiary protection is given to migrants who are not eligible for temporary or conditional refugee status within the scope of 1951 Convention but the principle of non-refoulement applies to (Turkey Migration Report, 2015: 76-77). In other words, if there is a risk that they may be subject to inhumane treatment in where they will be sent or resettled to, they are accommodated under conditional or subsidiary refugee status. Like temporary protection, subsidiary and conditional protection status are designed to take immigrants without granting them legal status. Since they do not have a legal status such as refugee, resident or citizen, their basic rights like accommodation, work, health, and financial assistance are not guaranteed by law. This left them in an in-between position in the sense that their stay in Turkey is not 'illegal' but they are also not integrated into social, political and economic life.

To claim asylum, an applicant must be physically in the territory of the targeted state. Despite the attempts to keep migrants away from the EU, "the largest number of detections of illegal border-crossing" was reported on the Eastern Mediterranean route, "mostly between Turkey and the Greek islands in the Eastern Aegean Sea"

(Frontex General Report, 2015). Accordingly, the Turkey-EU Statement of 2016 was published as a ‘unique model of cooperation’ as a result of continuing negotiations between the Turkish Government, European Commission, Presidency of the Council of the EU, Germany and Greece as a party of the deal. It introduced new regulations about the status of Syrian migrants. First is the return of all individuals who entered the Greek Islands irregularly from Turkey after March 20, 2016 (Council of the European Union, 2016). Under the existing bilateral readmission agreement with Greece, migrants who have not applied for asylum or got rejected would be returned to Turkey. With the deal, Turkey and Greece agreed to make every necessary cooperation including the exchange of information and personnel with the financial and practical assistance of the EU. Second, it introduced a new one-for-one system for Syrian nationals which was the most debated regulation in Turkey and abroad. According to this deal, all irregular migrants would be returned to Turkey starting from March 20 and for every Syrian migrant who was returned, another Syrian refugee would be taken to the EU. This deal, which is based on the EU-Turkey readmission agreement which dated back to 2002, existed before 2016 but was not implemented effectively before the Statement. The EU could return Syrian migrants “who entered from Turkey irregularly in exchange for the resettlement of Syrian nationals who qualify for international protection” (Hulme and Kostakopoulou, 2018: 217; European Commission, 2016: 2). Syrians to be resettled to the EU are determined by UNHCR (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.) and those “who have not previously entered or tried to enter the EU irregularly” are given priority (Second Report on the EU-Turkey Statement, 2016: 8). Third, Turkey will cooperate with neighboring member states and non-EU neighbors to prevent every attempt of

irregular mobility by sea, air, and land. The agreement also includes an article about the acceleration of visa liberalization process for Turkey as well as an article about an additional EU funding of 3 million Euros (Turkey-EU Summit, 2016).

The statement is criticized by civil society on a few bases. First, due to Turkey's geographical limitation, readmission to Turkey is against the non-refoulement principle according to international and the EU law. As cited in Chapter 4, a safe third country is one in which "the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention" (European Parliament and European Council, 2013: Article 38). Turkey does not fulfill this criterion which leaves the immigrants in a vague position before international law. Second, it is debated whether Turkey can be classified as a safe third country due to concerns regarding human rights issues in Turkey (Human Rights Watch, 2017; Amnesty International, 2016; Nielsen, 2016). To reduce the criticism, a regulation to implement LFIP was made in March 2016 (Progress Report, 2016). It introduced further safeguards for non-refoulement principle. If there is a risk that migrants may be subject to torture or other types of inhuman treatment in the country they are sent to, they cannot be sent to these countries of origin or third safe countries (Official Gazette, 2016). According to DGMM and the Commission this agreement saved lives because it resulted in a significant decrease in the number of deaths in the Aegean Sea (Turkey Migration Report, 2016: 62; Council of the European Union, 2016; Joint Action Plan, 2016). Although irregular crossings and death rates have decreased, Turkey-EU cooperation still constitutes in/securities for migrants looking

at the operational practices of the field due to the EU and Turkey's decisions in the political and legal levels.

In July 2019, Turkey's MFA Cavusoglu announced that the Turkish government put the readmission agreement on hold and it "will no longer be functional until the EU fulfills its promise of visa free travel for Turkish nationals" (Cetin, 2020: 5172). Thus, political disagreements between Turkey and the EU have reached a new peak by also affecting the legal channels of border in/security cooperation. The tension was also reflected in the operational practices, which is analyzed in the following section.

6.3.3 Bureaucratic and Operational Practices

The Arab uprisings did not only trigger new points of cooperation and contestation between Turkey and the EU actors as analyzed above, but also transformed practices and relations of power in the field. The EU-inspired LFIP of 2013 opened a new chapter in the field of border in/security, first and foremost by declaring the establishment of Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) under the Ministry of Interior as "the main entity in charge of policy-making and proceedings for all foreigners in Turkey" (UNHCR Turkey, n.d.). DGMM immediately dominated the field by taking over authority from the directorate of security affairs and police, and from civilian institutions like UNHCR and ASAM (SGDD) (Law No. 6458, 2013; Turkey Migration Report, 2013: 29). It became responsible for the implementation of legal frameworks such as LFIP -the law that established DGMM itself-, EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement, and EU-Turkey Statement. A Prime Ministry circular set up some of DGMM's border in/security related tasks as

conclusion of readmission requests by EU states; conclusion of new and implementation of existing bilateral readmission agreements working with MFA; management of all the process related to TCNs starting from their acceptance until deportation (including the decision to deport); establishment and capacity increase of removal centers; taking all other necessary administrative, legal, financial, technical measures (Official Gazette, 2014).

Since the early 2000s, the national programs for the adoption of the *acquis* foresaw “the creation of a new body within the ministry of interior for all border protection issues, including coast guards, composed of non-military, professional law enforcement officials” which would be “responsible for receiving and deciding on requests for residence permits of foreigners and asylum applications in the first instance” (Progress Report, 2003; NPAA, 2003; NPAA, 2008). When DGMM was finally established in 2013, the EU framed this as a shift in “security-driven approach” to a more civilian approach to migration management, which was also promoted by Turkey (Progress Report, 2013: 63). However, as is seen in its tasks, DGMM has taken over many responsibilities from security agents, all of which are analyzed as in/security practices in studies of IPS and in this dissertation. DGMM coordinates and closely cooperates with land forces, security general directorate, gendarmerie, and coastguard (Turkey Migration Report, 2013: 55). Its officers have also been trained and consulted by the foreigners’ police, which depended entirely on the knowledge and stance of the individual police officers who gave training (Sari and

Dincer, 2017: 71). Therefore, security professionals and bureaucracy, more than civilian agents, started to transfer knowledge and practices to DGMM.

LFIP also formalized the temporary protection status for Syrian refugees, which was in line with Turkey's 'humanitarian approach' towards 'the oppressed people of Syria' while not clarifying its terms. This uncertainty also created a 'legal differentiation' which diversified the international protection process of Syrians from other migrants that looked like a 'privilege.' They had easier access to registration, services, and aid than conditional refugees and most asylum seekers from non-European countries (Ustubici, 2019: 11). However, Syrian immigrants were mostly excluded from resettlement procedures. The Temporary Protection Regulation of October 2014 (No. 2014/6883) was introduced as an attempt to regulate the rights of people under temporary protection, and to clarify bureaucratic procedures that they must go through (Official Gazette, 2014a). The regulation aimed to close the loophole in LFIP about the dual procedure of temporary protection by increasing DGMM's authority on the granting of international protection status. Accordingly, UNHCR and its implementation partner ASAM phased out of registration of immigrants and the application for temporary protection would be made only to DGMM through the Provincial Directorates of Migration Management (UNHCR, 2018). As a result, the regulation did more to change power relations among the agents in the field in favor of DGMM than preventing migrant insecurities resulting from the uncertainties they had to face.

The formalization of the temporary protection is an in/security practice in the sense that it normalized the deprivation of non-European immigrants of certain rights and

recognition (Ustubici, 2019; Togral Koca, 2016). They are not protected under the 1951 Convention because of their ineligibility to apply for asylum in Turkey. While they can apply for UNHCR status, UNHCR's implementation partner in Turkey is overburdened and during the long periods of uncertainty, they had to move to a satellite city chosen by the Ministry of Interior (Biehl, 2009). Satellite city policy was to make the surveillance of migrant groups easier. They are obliged to sign in to local police regularly and need to apply to 'temporary leave permit' if they want to travel to another city. They cannot be accommodated in UNHCR camps due to lack of asylum seeker status, which implies that their access to livelihoods is not guaranteed, apart from the right to free healthcare via AFAD of Ministry of Interior (Togral Koca, 2016). Turkey's rejection of lifting the limitation, analyzed in its broader encounters with the EU, results in insecurities for immigrants, which cannot be grasped by analyzing only everyday practices.

As is seen, the 2014 Regulation has not been fully successful in serving its original purpose, which was to fix the ambiguities in LFIP and decreasing insecurities caused by the loopholes in law. The conditions of different categories of asylum seekers in Turkey are still not harmonized. When compared to other non-European conditional refugees, Syrians have easier access to registration, services, and aid. They were given unrestricted access to seasonal work and in rural areas confirmed in the Law on International Labor Force of 2016 (Progress Report, 2016). This was another attempt to convince these people to stay in Turkey and to not seek ways to the EU. However, due to the scarcity of job opportunities in rural areas and wide non-covered employment of Syrians by local employers, their rights in the labor market are also far

from being secured. The majority of them entered Turkey through an open borders policy and were not obliged to stay in a satellite city different from other non-Europeans who are waiting for resettlement or status determination. On the other hand, Syrians are largely excluded from refugee status determination procedures to be resettled in a third safe country (Ustubici, 2019: 11).

The Regulation also gave DGMM the right to request the establishment of removal centers, establish accommodation centers, and manage and monitor all these centers (Official Gazette, 2014a). Removal, detention, and deportation are immediate effects of border security externalization and are criticized highly by NGOs and IOs widely for their life-threatening consequences (Ustubici, 2019: 3). Once DGMM gives the decision for deportation, the individual needs to leave Turkey. If this does not happen and a decision for ‘administrative control’ is taken, that person is taken to the nearest removal center by the police force in 48 hours. The process of administrative control can be extended to one year (Turkey Migration Report, 2013: 62). Since directives for the establishment of new removal centers are also given by the Ministry of Interior, the number of these centers increased in line with deportation decisions (Turkey Migration Report, 2016: 64). DGMM continually regulates renew the existing centers by adding up electronic monitoring systems to increase their capacities to ‘safely’ accommodate more people (Progress Report, 2016: 78).

Before DGMM, these centers were co-managed by institutions under Ministry of Interior and MFA²⁴ (Turkey Migration Report, 2016). Responsibility shifts only ended MFA's authority, while empowering the Ministry of Interior. Although MFA had been more active in migration related issues in the 1990s and 2000s, this leverage has changed in the ministry of interior's favor in the 2010s, which contributed to the shift in power relations in the field (See Tolay, 2012). PM's 2014 circular requested all government institutions to provide any necessary support to DGMM on migration and border management, putting it in a leading position. Since then, these ministries have taken several steps to harmonize their practices with the Ministry of Interior (Progress Report, 2013). While ministry of interior gained strength vis a vis other ministers, IOs, NGOs and EU institutions, DGMM did the same within Ministry of Interior. Before, several smaller departments of Ministry of Interior were responsible for border security, but neither of these bodies had "direct authority over the border security forces of the army or the coast guard" as DGMM has (Sert, 2013: 176). DGMM is now authorized to coordinate security actors and practices, which makes it a security actor itself.

DGMM has been cooperating with the EU agencies especially in data sharing and joint surveillance (DGMM, n.d.). Turkey signed various protocols with Frontex, Europol and EASO to exchange data and to develop threat assessment databases on irregular migration (Progress Report, 2014: 65; Progress Report, 2019: 42). Turkey

²⁴ The directorate general of security (MoI) and the deputy directorate general for migration asylum and visa (MFA).

and Frontex started data exchange as part of the memorandum of understanding of 2012 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012; Progress Report, 2013). Currently Turkey and Frontex operate the Turkey Frontex Risk Analysis Network (TU-RAN) which is an intelligence sharing platform to share information and knowledge and to conduct joint analyses on borders and migration control (Frontex, n.d.; Frontex Annual Activity Report, 2016). Frontex Risk Analysis Unit also engages with DGMM along with several Turkish national police, coast guard, gendarmerie, and customs to prepare risk analyses (Frontex Annual Activity Report, 2016). Various projects are funded by the EU to establish centers “to collect, exchange, process data on border security” and “to carry out joint risk analysis between policemen, border guards and coastguards on border checks and surveillance systems” (Progress Report, 2016: 81). Based on these shared databases and exchange of liaison officers, Turkish and Greek coast guards, and Frontex security personnel actively cooperate in patrolling the Aegean Sea (Frontex Annual Activity Report, 2018).

Furthermore, LFIP increased the activities of security forces in the field, which meant further control and insecurity in everyday mobility. It allowed national and local officers to check documentation not only on the entrance and exit of Turkey’s borders, but also within the country such as on bus journeys, airports, passengers who utilize from transit zones of airports. It introduced a new institutional framework that enhanced police and judicial cooperation parallel with the EU standards (Icduygu and Ustubici, 2013). If the officers considered it necessary, they were also allowed to hold ‘suspicious persons’ for hours (Turkey Migration Report, 2013: 34). Both LFIP and the 2014 Regulation increased the Turkish police’s power for stricter security

measures including surveillance practices for registration and accommodation like “taking fingerprints, pictures and other biometric data” and registering under a database for the issuing of a temporary protection identification document (Icduygu and Millet, 2016; Sixth Report on the EU-Turkey Statement, 2017).

Despite the increase in in/security practices, irregular arrivals by sea from Turkey to Greece went up significantly in 2015 (Progress Report, 2016: 78). The Turkish government and the Commission jointly made and implemented the action plan of 2015. Not only the EU but also Turkey was motivated to increase externalization measures that would help Turkey increase its border in/security capacity to strengthen national borders. The EU intended to support Turkey by increasing Turkish security forces’ patrolling and surveillance capacity, supporting joint return operations, increasing information exchange with Frontex, and increasing funding for Turkey’s visa liberalization dialogue needs (European Commission, 2015a). Turkey was motivated to strengthen national borders with increased security capacity. This meant to upgrade the surveillance equipment of the coast guard; increase cooperation to fight smuggling; increase information exchange with Frontex, Europol, and EU states’ immigration liaison officers located in Turkey (European Commission, 2015a). The government also started building a ‘modular wall’ on Turkey-Syria border under ‘Border Physical Security System Project’ to be protected by “barbed-wire barriers, surveillance balloons, thermal cameras and motion sensors” and later started to be surveilled by a domestically produced “smart border security system” (Togral Koca, 2020: 8; Guler, 2019; Atac et al., 2017; Aldroubi, 2018).

Turkey also became part of the joint Operation Poseidon of 2015 in which security forces of Turkey and Frontex provided Greece “with technical assistance with the goal of strengthening its border surveillance” and returns and readmissions (European Commission, 2015; Frontex, n.d.a.). These joint activities mostly relied on the bilateral protocol Turkey and Greece signed in 2001 (Progress Report, 2015: 71). In May 2015 Turkey signed a more targeted police cooperation agreement with Bulgaria and Greece to improve joint border security activities establishing a major cooperation center at the Bulgaria-Turkey border (Progress Report, 2015). Later in 2016, Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria also signed a trilateral police cooperation agreement. The use of patrol vessels and boats, helicopters, thermal cameras, movable vehicles for coastal surveillance in the Aegean Sea intensified significantly to increase joint surveillance capacity. As such, Turkey’s borderzones, especially in the West, have increasingly become spaces “where surveillance intensifies, and migrant lives are held hostage” (Topak, 2014: 816). These borders have increasingly moved from being patrolling-driven to intelligence-driven. The border zones have become gates filtering “those who are allowed to enter and then who need to be protected and those to be detained and returned” (Ustubici, 2019; ProAsyl, 2013; see also Isleyen, 2018a; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015; Qadim, 2014). Put differently, not only the EU states but also Turkey exercised agency in the constitution of “logic of control” which refers to “a logic of policing, of filtering, of risk management” of unwanted migrants (Bigo, 2014: 213-214).

The EU-Turkey Statement, aiming at the return of migrants who reached Greece, was also result of the increase in immigration in 2015, which became successful in

‘securing the EU borders’ by decreasing mobility on this route. The Commission prepared seven reports in two years on the implementation of the deal covering day-to-day practices of readmission, return, and resettlement noting the decrease of arrivals (Second Report on the EU-Turkey Statement, 2016: 2; Seventh Report on the EU-Turkey Statement, 2017: 2). In/security practices were decided and physically implemented jointly by several actors, like the Commission, representatives of several EU states and Turkey, EASO, Frontex, Europol, along with DGMM, IOM, and UNHCR. The EU also allocated €14 million funding to be used in the enhancement of security equipment of the Turkish coast guard such as fast response boats and radar systems “to prevent departures of migrants from the Turkish mainland” (First Report on the EU-Turkey Statement, 2016: 3). The statement significantly increased joint in/security practices such as patrolling and surveillance. The deal has been criticized widely for paving the way for the forced return of migrants from the Greek Islands via intensifying and normalizing security practices that constitute insecurity. Formally, temporary protection status of migrants who cross the border becomes invalid but the Statement made an exception for Syrians who were readmitted from the Greek Islands. In practice, however, not all of them were re-registered (Ustubici, 2019). Rejected migrants, as well as other non-Europeans who were apprehended at the Turkey-Greece borders were detained and deported which violated non-refoulement principle (see Ulusoy and Battjes, 2017).

The attempted coup of July 2016 in Turkey became another critical juncture that interrupted the field and led to a redistribution of power and resources. Amending LFIP and Turkey-EU Statement, an emergency decree of 2016 regulated that “people

who are considered to be affiliated with terrorist organizations can be removed from Turkey without the possibility of suspending a removal decision by filing an appeal” (Progress Report, 2018: 45). It also increased DGMM’s power and authority further in collecting passenger and crew data from carriers operating in Turkey. Another decree of 2018 abolished the Migration Policy Board, previously established by LFIP; and the Migration Advisory Board, which was co-organized by civil society and academia, and the Coordination Board on Combatting Irregular Migration. The Decree established a new department under DGMM, the Department for Combatting Irregular Migration, to take over responsibilities of the closed boards (Progress Report, 2019: 45). Its responsibilities were performing operations related to irregular migration; providing coordination between security forces to fight with irregular migration; implementing the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement; and performing other duties given by DGMM (DGMM, n.d.). Despite suggestions from the EU for the establishment of a single civil agency in charge of border security, Turkey has not responded to this positively. The government put this idea on complete hold in 2019 due to ‘security concerns’ (Progress Report, 2019).

DGMM has continued to be the primary institution in the implementation of border in/security practices adopting the more security-inclined approach of the Turkish Presidency built with the regime change in July 2018. The Presidential Decree of 2018 established the Security and Foreign Policies Council which was given the authority to design Turkey’s migration and border security policies. The Migration Policy Board was reestablished under Ministry of Interior and was given operational level responsibilities. It meets irregularly by the call of Ministry of Interior with

representatives from other ministries to work on documents such as migration strategy documents and Turkey's national action plans (DGMM, n.d.a). The Cyber Security Council was also abolished and a board under Presidency was established to take over its authority (Progress Report, 2019). The Ministry of EU was also abolished after the regime change and downgraded to a directorate under MFA. Therefore, taking over authority from different bureaucratic institutions, the Turkish Presidency consolidated power on the policy-making level. DGMM did the same at the operational level, consolidating authority under Ministry of Interior, eliminating other national institutions, NGOs and IOs (See Sari and Dincer, 2017: 75-76). In other words, the establishment of DGMM, supported later by the regime change, served to consolidate power in national institutions, rather than civilizing migration management practices.

The number of Syrians resettled from Turkey to the EU under the one-for-one framework decreased with the impact of these security measures (Seventh Report on the EU-Turkey Statement, 2017: 9). Most frequently used methods are

intercepting migrants at the borderlines and discouraging their passage, sometimes even by circling their boats and causing waves; intercepting migrants in Greek territorial waters, forcing them to return to the Turkish side, and/or towing them back and abandoning them in Turkish territorial waters; arresting migrants in Greek islands, forcing them back onto their boats or towing them back to Turkish territories.

(Topak, 2014: 824)

These practices of Greek, Turkish and Frontex coastal guards are a source of in/security themselves, along with continuous risks of smuggling, death, and several serious cases of abuse (UNHCR Turkey, 2017). Besides, the decline in one route does not necessarily mean that migrants give up on their aim to reach the EU territory. Deaths in the Mediterranean Sea also continued because in/security measures force people not only to riskier routes but also to riskier techniques (UNHCR Turkey, 2018b). According to the High Commissioner for Refugees, “Taking measures to reduce the number of refugees and migrants arriving in Europe, without at the same time stepping up peace-making, development, and safe pathways is morally unacceptable” (UNHCR Turkey, 2017). Turkey did not only help to make it harder for migrants to leave for the EU, but also changed its open borders policy to Syrian migrants following the attempted coup of 2016 and several terrorist attacks in different cities, claimed by ISIS or PKK. The Turkish Government announced that migrants coming by land must do so through official border posts to enable border guards to surveil who enters, and who might bring ‘security risks’ and ended visa free policy to Syrians who come by air and sea. Along with the newly developed ‘Serhat’ radar system and ‘Korkut’ air defense gun system that were developed by Aselsan,²⁵ new domestically established air systems were launched at the crossing points on the Southeastern borders (Togral Koca, 2020: 8). The company also introduced day and night cameras for real-time monitoring of Syrian borders.

²⁵ Aselsan is a defense company of Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TSKGV), which was founded in 1975 and gradually became a significant actor of border in/security in the 2000s.

In 2019 Turkey's ministry of interior announced that they would deal with migrant settlements in metropolises, especially Istanbul. To prevent them from "walking around freely" and "disturbing public peace and order" the Ministry put a deadline for immigrants to go back to the satellite cities they are registered to (Sozcu, 2019; T24, 2019; Sputniknews, 2019). Following his order, the office of the governor of Istanbul published a press release stating that they started to send thousands of undocumented migrants back to removal centers (Governorship of Istanbul, 2019). The police also started to search for and detect unregistered employment of immigrants to notify the lawful authorities for punishment.

As stated above, Turkey also suspended the cooperation and opened its borders to let immigrants cross to Bulgaria and Greece by the end of 2019. The EU considered this move as "politically motivated and highly risky" and controversially decided to increase security measures at the Greek-Turkish borders (European Migrant Smuggling Centre, 2010: 15-16). The Greek forces implemented harsh security measures towards refugees at the borders such as blast bombs and teargas and told them to turn back to Turkey because they would not open the borders (Berberakis, 2020). Some refugees claimed that the Greek Security Forces "forced them back to Turkey, smashed their phones, ripped up their IDs, and beat them" (Damon and Baykara, 2020).

However, neither Turkish nor Greek nor Frontex security officers assumed responsibility for insecurities at the borders. They accused political and legal decisions of policy-makers, other states' security forces, or human smugglers and harsh geographical conditions (for deaths). Like Turkish security forces who say they

are only practicing their duty with the command of the state, Frontex officers underlined that they were “working only with Greek officers, and with their approval and their schedules” and that they “support not substitute” (Topak, 2014: 829). While local police officers and border guards showed empathy towards migrants in Turkey, their discourse and practices were strict towards irregular crossings to the EU, which they saw where “illegality” begins (Ikizoglu-Erensu and Kasli, 2017). Quoting from another police officer from Izmir, the Aegean border city in Turkey, security officers “do not fight against migrants, but fight against criminals and crime. And that is the irregular and illegal nature of departures from the country” (Isleyen, 2018a: 10). In this sense, although practitioners have agency in everyday practices of border security, they consider it doing ‘what is ordered to them by the state’, or as a “professional responsibility” and “a sense of duty to enforce law” (Isleyen, 2018a: 9).

As is seen, these practices of border in/security are performative in the sense that they create “migrant illegality” by constructing certain migrants as “illegal subjects” (Ustubici, 2019: 4). They create relations of inclusion and exclusion through filtering unwanted migrants. Externalization practices aim to disseminate the tools and methods that are designed to keep these “illegal” migrants away. With the initiation of the EU and the contribution of several actors such as member and non-member states’ governments, bureaucracy, Frontex, EASO, UNHCR, and IOM, these practices are increasingly harmonized and become regional policies through a series of capacity building activities in non-EU states and cooperation agreements. Framed under a technocratic language, most of these regulations and practices are designed to ensure non-EU states’ capacity to prevent migrants from reaching the EU borders by

regulating return and readmission (UNHCR, 2019). Through these practices, spaces of transit have not only become gates to filter who may enter the EU but also “sites of humanitarian intervention where unwanted migrants can be returned” (Ustubici, 2019: 4). Yet, as border security professionals state, insecurities are not constituted only in the level of operational/bureaucratic/everyday practices. The field of border security and resulting insecurities are constituted by the relations of agents from various levels of policing activities, and from different parts of the world.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed Turkey’s policies and practices as a case to locate the role and agency of non-EU partners in the EU externalization. Different from the existing IPS studies as analyzed in Chapter 5, it examined the process in which actors of the EU and Turkey have constituted the field of border in/security through encounters at multiple layers. These layers be the in/security policies of Turkey and the EU, legal framework of migration and border in/security, and operational and bureaucratic practices in the field. The chapter traced significant points of change in the broader dynamics between Turkey and the EU because they have implications for the establishment of legal framework and operational practices of in/security in the field. It went back and forth between these three layers to demonstrate connections, points of consent and conflict, as well as change and continuity. Adopting this framework, it analyzed bureaucratic and operational practices of Turkey’s actors and changing power relations in the field by locating them into broader political and social dynamics between Turkey and the EU and how these dynamics constitute insecurities for others, that are, immigrants.

Through this analysis, the chapter transcended the limitations of the existing studies on Turkey that were clarified in Chapter 5. It showed that actors of Turkey exercised agency through multiple channels of border in/security cooperation by singling out the policies and practices that were initiated by the EU actors. In contrast to what is argued by some of the studies in the literature that were identified in Chapter 5, Turkey's incentives to take part in border in/security cooperation cannot be explained by the governments' expectancy of membership. Actors of Turkey acted based on the internal political and social dynamics in constituting migration and border in/security policies and practices since the establishment of the state. However, this does not imply that Turkey's policies and practices can be separated from its relations with EU actors. The border in/security regime between Turkey and the EU has been constituted relationally, as the actors of the EU initiated certain policies, frameworks, and joint practices, and actors of Turkey influenced the outcome by accepting, rejecting, or transforming these frameworks; hence, contributing to the constitution of insecurities.

CHAPTER 7:

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This dissertation sought to answer the question, “How to locate the agency of the non-EU actors in the EU’s external border in/security policies and practices?” Chapter 2 explored the origins and commitments of IPS to trace the concepts and theoretical tools it offers for the study of non-EU agency. Chapters 3 and 5 analyzed the existing ways IPS scholars analyze EU’s border in/security policies and practices to understand whether or how they locate the agency of non-EU actors. Chapters 4 and 6 analyzed Turkey-EU border in/security cooperation in the Mediterranean as an empirical example to elaborate on the dissertation’s points related to the social and relational character of in/security processes and the significance of non-EU agency. These aims were furthered through a structure based on dividing the dissertation into three parts.

In the first part, Chapter 2 presented the theoretical framework by exploring key commitments of IPS that are most relevant to the puzzle of this dissertation and

situated it in security studies by looking at its main contributions. In the second part, the dissertation analyzed the EU externalization in the Mediterranean. For this aim, Chapter 3 presented a critical analysis of the literature on EU externalization based on IPS's theoretical and meta-theoretical commitments. To illustrate its points on what was missing in the existing literature as analyzed in Chapter 3, Chapter 5 conducted an empirical analysis of how the actors of the EU constituted externalization policies, legal framework, and bureaucratic and operational practices through encounters with the Mediterranean neighbors. In the third part, the dissertation followed a similar design with the second part but narrowed its focus on Turkey-EU border in/security cooperation as a case. Within this scope, Chapter 4 conducted a similar analysis with Chapter 3 and examined whether or how the existing IPS literature located Turkey's agency. Based on this analysis, Chapter 6 aimed to locate actors of Turkey in the border in/security cooperation between actors of the EU and Turkey. Chapter 6 constituted the part that the dissertation empirically illustrated all its points related to the non-EEU agency in the constitution of border in/security in the Mediterranean. The below paragraphs will summarize the findings of these three parts and how each of them came together and contributed to solving the main puzzle and answering the main question of the dissertation.

Chapter 2 showed that IPS was a convenient approach to locate the 'agency' of multiple actors in the constitution of insecurity when its commitments to reflexive scholarship and social and relational analysis of practices were considered and utilized together. Such an approach analyzes externalization as a dynamic social and political process that is made up of complex and multi-layered relations between

multiple agents. The chapter clarified how the dissertation defined externalization, that was, a project of security that has been constituted by the dynamics between the EU and non-EU actors that creates insecurities for other referents.

Chapters 3 and 5 utilized the commitments of IPS as clarified in Chapter 2 to critically analyze IPS literature on EU externalization in the Mediterranean. While Chapter 3 analyzed IPS studies of EU externalization in the Mediterranean, Chapter 5 narrowed its focus to the case of Turkey and examined how IPS analyses locate Turkey's agency as a non-EU partner of EU externalization. The analyses produced a new classification of IPS literature on the border in/security policies and practices in the Mediterranean: studies that 1) portray the EU as the only actor, 2) portray non-EU actors as recruited or forced by the EU, 3) analyze only everyday practices of non-EU actors.

The first group of studies, by putting the EU actors in the center of their analyses, contribute to the understanding that "externalization is the result of policy choices made in Europe both by the member states and the EU" (Guild and Bigo, 2010: 257).

The chapters argued that such narrative of externalization, apart from its inconsistency with 'empirical reality,' contradicts IPS's commitment for "trying to push all these scholarly enterprises beyond their largely European and North American tradition" and to analyze experiences of "all the agents that act and change the world" ((Walker, 2017: 17; Bigo, 2016: 68). The second group of studies incorporate the actions of non-EU partners into their analyses; however, portray non-EU partners in the Mediterranean as either recruited or pressured by the EU 'to secure' its external borders. This narrative does not only reify a certain type of

‘division of labor’ in world politics but also (re)presents non-EU actors “on the receiving end” of externalization and as “the junior partners in the power game” (Hobson and Sajed, 2017: 558; Korany, 1986: 549; Alejandro, 2019: 3-4). The third group of studies takes a step further in incorporating non-EU experiences in their analyses; however, most of these analyses are built on the assumption that ‘externalization is a political project of the EU to keep migrants away from its borders’ while non-EU actors appear in already existing structures and frameworks of externalization (See Depeteau, 2015: 12). While these studies locate non-EU agency in some way, non-EU actors are still largely absent as “purposeful and conscious agents” that act and influence the constitution of externalization policies (Grovoqui, 2006: 36). Overall, Chapters 3 and 5 showed that IPS studies of border in/security in the Mediterranean have gone a significant way in integrating non-EU actors, but most of these studies have weaknesses, albeit in different ways, in comprehending non-EU agency in their respective analyses.

From two related questions of a research process that Bilgin (2017: 33) formulates as: (1) “What limit”? and (2) “What do you propose as an alternative?” I so far summarized how the dissertation answers the former. As to the latter, based on the findings on the limits of existing IPS studies in including non-EU agency, this dissertation proposed a way of locating non-EU agency in the study of EU externalization: by defining externalization as an interconnected process made up of social and political relations and analyzing the processes in which border in/security has been constantly transformed. It defended that doing so requires adopting a social, relational, and processual analysis design.

To this end, Chapters 4 and 6 presented an IPS perspective on EU externalization in the Mediterranean and Turkey's agency as a non-EU but candidate partner. In the attempt to decenter the EU and locate the experience and agency of non-EU, they analyzed externalization as a field that has been constituted and constantly in the (re)making by social and political interactions between multiple actors. It was argued that relations between EU and non-EU may appear hierarchical in nature within a particular field, but non-EU actors still have agential power that influence the process. Having highlighted the input by non-EU actors, the chapters traced how border in/security cooperation had been shaped by decisions, negotiations, participation, contestation, and practices of not only EU but also non-EU actors. Finally, the chapters emphasized how non-EU agency is exercised in different layers of bordering -the constitution of in/security policies, legal frameworks, and bureaucratic and operational practices- by pluralizing various potential actors that have role in the process.

Chapter 4 traced how the EU actors have established externalization as a security project through encounters with the Southern Mediterranean states. It did not specifically focus on the role of specific non-EU partners but still did not overlook the roles played by them. It did so by providing examples from significant transit states' responses to externalization, particularly of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. Chapter 4 identified that similarities can be found in non-EU partners' responses to border in/security cooperation, but the policies and practices of the Mediterranean partners vary and cannot be generalized. It concluded that without an in-depth analysis of sociological and relational dynamics between concerned parties, it is not

possible to reveal how non-EU actors exercise agency through rejecting, agreeing, or transforming policies and practices of externalization.

Chapter 6, therefore, analyzed broader political and sociological dynamics between Turkey and the EU actors while considering the interconnectedness of border in/security processes by bringing together all the insights driven from the previous chapters. Like Chapter 4, it made a periodization of the relations by highlighting Turkey's border in/security policies, legislation, and practices based on significant points of change that transformed the field. Doing so, Chapter 6 located Turkey's agency in border in/security in the Mediterranean by pinpointing the moments of insecurity that multiple actors of Turkey played a role in. The points of transformation, as well as moments of cooperation and contestation throughout these processes, were utilized to highlight the moments of agency in the constitution of insecurities. It was concluded that it is the agency of multiple actors in a complex web of relations that constitute these transformations (See Bhambra, 2010). By tracing the process while keeping an eye on the moments of change, compliance, and contestation, the chapter revealed that Turkey's changing security, economy, and political motives, which have been constituted through interaction with the EU, have influenced the process and outcome of externalization significantly. Put differently, the chapter has shown that non-EU actors are "potential agents for change" (Bilgin, 2000: 49).

The dissertation identified three types of weaknesses/limits in the literature, as summarized above. I will illustrate how the proposed way of analyzing EU externalization and Turkey as a non-EU partner contributed to overcoming each of

these limitations. First, Chapter 4 analyzed EU externalization without focusing on a specific non-EU case but by emphasizing that the EU has not constituted these policies and practices by itself as a separate unit, but through encounters with non-EU partners in the Mediterranean and responding to certain politically significant developments. These developments include events that happened either in Europe or elsewhere, such as the abolition of internal borders, enlargement waves, 9/11 attacks, the Arab uprisings, 2015 ‘refugee crisis,’ and changes in the policies of partnering states, among others. The analysis of Turkey further illustrated that Turkey’s policies and practices, developed either based on its encounters with actors from Europe/EC/EU or on its internal dynamics or relations elsewhere, influenced the evolution of border in/security in the Mediterranean. Put differently, regardless of the shape of relations such as hierarchical, cooperative, or competitive, the EU is not the only significant agent of externalization, but there are other actors that act and influence the constitution and transformation of border in/security. To externalize means to be interconnected with an ‘outsider.’

Second, by tracing the policy formation and change, as well as reluctance, cooperation, and confrontation moments with the EU, the dissertation has shown that motives of non-EU partners in developing and implementing border in/security policies vary. Possible incentives were listed as financial assistance, EU accession, visa-facilitation, strengthen and protect national borders, reputational gains of being partners with the EU, regime security, prevention of brain drain, reduction of remittances that many countries of origin depend on, and the reduction of smuggling industry based on examples from non-EU partners. Based on their respective motives,

non-EU partners selectively adopt or discard the EU's border control policies and practices. The dissertation identified changing motives of Turkey since the establishment of the state as population exchange in the early Republican period, economic gains of labor force emigration to Europe, not becoming a buffer zone as a transit state, membership, and increasing the influence and involvement in the MENA following the Arab uprisings. It has shown that its presence in border in/security cooperation can be reduced neither to EU membership nor EU funding. Put differently, the narrative that is built on the assumption that 'non-EU states are recruited or forced by the EU' is misleading. First, because non-EU states have agential power in their relations with the EU, rather than being passive importers of EU's norms, policies, and practices. Second, because 'non-EU' is not homogeneous, static, and actors of non-EU do not act upon monolithic incentives but rather have heterogeneous experiences.

Third, this dissertation analyzed externalization as a form of interconnection between the EU and non-EU actors that is "multi-dimensional" and "consisting of social and political as well as economic flows" and processual relations out of which insecurity is (re)produced and transformed (Barkawi, 2004: 156-7). If IPS defines notions such as externalization as relations of constitution, such interconnectedness cannot be reduced to current everyday practices of security professionals in the field. Analyzing externalization as primarily produced by everyday practices renders invisible the role of broader politics in creating insecurity. This is not to promote an orthodox understanding of what constitutes 'political' by reducing it to considerations of state security, decision making, diplomacy, political strategy, elite discourse, etc. It is to

emphasize the processes through which non-EU agents influence the course of externalization policies rather than only internalizing and implementing EU policies. Analyzing multiple actors from different layers as agents of in/security, rather than focusing only on practices, the dissertation looked at how Turkey and EU's relations at the political level are connected to multiple actors' practices in the field. Put differently, this dissertation has contributed to the analysis of practices by proposing a multi-dimensional analysis based on the historical evolution of policies, legal framework, and practices of border in/security in the Mediterranean in two ways. First, even though the third group of IPS studies examines mostly the practices as constitutive of border in/security, their analyses rely on the -implicit or explicit- assumption that the EU actors have a political motive in establishing externalization policy. However, they include non-EU actors as agents of externalization in the analysis only after externalization is established in the EU by the actors of the EU. This narrative still locates non-EU actors at the receiving end of externalization policies and renders invisible their agency in the constitution of policies and legal frameworks. Second, and relatedly, border in/security is constituted not only by everyday encounters at the borderlands but also at where political decisions are taken. Everyday practices may come from a routine and are applied almost unconsciously as IPS suggests; however, they are made possible by consciously developed political and legal frameworks.

Overall, this dissertation, by situating itself critically in relation to the literature, presented an attempt to decenter the study of border in/security through an analysis of the EU externalization and the agency of non-EU actors. It defended that, as Hobson

and Sajed (2017: 563) state, “if we define agency solely in terms of holding an exercising predominant power, then non-Western agency becomes squeezed out (and even impossible to see or conceptualize).” The way out of this dilemma may be to point out simply the presence of the non-EU actors in border in/security as an interconnected process. Therefore IPS’s ‘everyday/routine politics approach’ has the potential in showing the presence, hence, the agency of non-EU. Therefore, this dissertation did not argue that IPS as a theoretical framework is Eurocentric; however, there are certain weaknesses in its empirical applications of externalization in terms of their accounting of how insecurities are also re/constituted in the non-EU contexts by the agents outside of the EU.

Avoiding Eurocentrism is not about avoiding studying EU, but about how we study it (Bilgin, 2016). It is possible to study EU, critically analyze its policies and practices, emphasize the hierarchical nature of its relations with actors from other parts of the world, and still avoid contributing to the narratives that put EU (or ‘the West’) at the center of the past, present, and future of world politics. As Bilgin (2016: 167) has argued, “Global IR is about research design, not about the choice of topic.” Tracing the broader dynamics between the agents of EU and non-EU and pointing out the critical moments of compliance, contestation, and change in multiple dimensions of these relations is only one way of doing this. This attempt may and should also be done by proposing other designs that enable engagement with the agency and responsibility of multiple parties in constituting international phenomena instead of taking for granted their roles, policies, practices, motives, and decisions.

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- Zolberg, A. (1997). The Great Wall against China: Responses to the First Immigration Crisis, 1885-1925. In J. Lucassen & L. Lucassen (Eds.), *Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives*. New York: Peter Lang.

APPENDIX 1. BIBLIOGRAPHY OF IPS AND EU EXTERNALIZATION STUDIES CONSULTED

Publication	Question / Argument	Empirical Focus	Theoretical commitments	Methods / Source	Non-EU Agency
Huysmans, J. (2000). The European Union and the Securitization of Migration. <i>Journal of Common Market Studies</i> , 28(5), 751-777.	How is migration connected to representations of societal dangers and how is the development of a common migration policy implicated in making this connection?	how states, people, police, and other agencies within the EU contribute to the construction of migration as a threat by their discourses and practices	sociological approach to securitization	NA	EU as the only actor
Bigo, D. (2001). The Möbius Ribbon of Internal and External Securit(ies). In M. Albert, (Ed.), <i>Identities Borders Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory</i> , (pp. 91-116), Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.	Internal and external securit(ies) are merging in the EU	EU actors' actions practices, policies, know-how, and technologies in the new field of the EU border security	Bourdieusian approach	Interviews	EU as the only actor
Boswell, C. (2003). The 'External Dimension' of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy. <i>International Affairs</i> , 79(3), 619-638.	Which pattern of cooperation (control or prevention oriented) is likely to predominate	political and institutional factors which have influenced the emergence of the external dimension	NA	NA	EU as the only actor

	EU border policies in the future	of EU immigration and asylum			
Walters, W. (2004) The Frontiers of the European Union: A Geostrategic Perspective, <i>Geopolitics</i> , 9(3), 674-698.	How might we make sense of the territoriality of the EU's borders? How might we theorize their implications for territory and identity?	EU's border externalization practices and policies to Central and Eastern Europe and Mediterranean neighbors	Critical geopolitics + governmentality (Foucauldian)	NA	non-EU as recruited
Bigo, D. (2005). Frontier controls in the European Union: Who is in Control? In D. Bigo, & E. Guild (Eds.), <i>Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and within Europe</i> , (pp. 49-99). Farnham: Ashgate.	Deconstruct one of the strongest myths of political discourses: the statement that controls are linked with the place where the borders of the European Union run	reveal the connection between the state and the frontier and analyze different actors playing a role in controlling the movements of people inside the EU	Foucauldian approach	Genealogy	EU as the only actor
Huysmans, J. (2005). <i>The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration, and Asylum in the EU</i> . London: Routledge.	What is contested in the politics of insecurity that plays off human security against security of citizens, liberty against national security, and economic value of free movement against the	policies, discourses, practices, and technologies of insecurity in Europe and how they are linked with the issue of migration	Sociological approach to securitization	NA	EU as the only actor

	criminalization of the economic market? What is this security quality that security policy invests in a policy area?					
Bigo, D. (2006). Internal and External Aspects of Security. <i>European Security</i> , 15(4), 385-404.	The merging of internal and external aspects of security in Europe	institutional games between various EU actors in the security field	Bourdiesian approach	NA	EU as the only actor	
Driessen, H. (2007). Coping with ‘Fortress Europe: views from four seaports on the Spanish-Moroccan border. In W. Armstrong, & J. Anderson (eds.), <i>Geopolitics of European Union Enlargement: the fortress Europe</i> , (pp. 78-89). London: Routledge.	The impact of clandestine cross-Mediterranean migration on port societies	the analysis of four seaports on Spanish borders to understand the impact of clandestine migration on the daily life of society	NA	Ethnographic research	EU as the only actor	
Basaran, T. (2010). <i>Security, Law, and Borders</i> . London: Routledge.	Illiberal acts of the EU as a liberal entity	legal constitution of border zones	Practice approach	Legal analysis	EU as the only actor	
Rees, W. (2008). Inside Out: The External Face of EU Internal Security Policy. <i>European Integration</i> , 30(1), 97-111.	EU’s response to transnational threats, has two facets: impose its model of internal security upon its neighbors; and foster	EU’s cooperation with the Central and East European countries in the pre-accession period, and North African countries	Securitization	NA	non-EU as recruited	

	related norms within the international community				
Bigo, D. (2009). Immigration controls and free movement in Europe. <i>International Review of the Red Cross</i> , 91(875), 579-591.	Tension between security-driven discourse and legal systems of the EU	legal and political changes within Europe especially following the Schengen Agreement	NA	NA	EU as the only actor
Leonard, S. (2009). The Creation of Frontex and the Politics of Institutionalisation in the EU External Borders Policy. <i>Journal of Contemporary European Research</i> , 5(3), 371-388.	Reasons for which EU member states chose to establish an agency like FRONTEX rather than forming a cooperation to regulate border control	FRONTEX's role in external border control in terms of how it cooperates with or train the member states	NA	NA	EU as the only actor
Balzacq, T. (2009). The Frontiers of Governance: Understanding the External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs. In T. Balzacq (Ed.), <i>The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs: Governance, Neighbors, Security</i> , (pp. 1-34). London: Palgrave Macmillan.	EU and non-EU cooperation might produce less security for at least one of the partners	content and rationales of the external dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs	institutionalism, constructivism and policy instrument analysis	NA	EU as the only actor
Chou, M. (2009). The European Security Agenda and the 'External Dimension' of EU Asylum and Migration Cooperation.	Formation of the external dimension of European asylum and migration cooperation	practices of Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ), and Common Foreign and	Securitization	NA	non-EU as recruited

<i>Perspectives on European Politics and Society</i> , 10(4), 541-559.	has been in the making since the early 1970s and did not originate as the security problematique as it is now conventionally perceived and articulated	Security Policy (CFSP), and the process in which migration has been transformed from a humanitarian and market issue to a security challenge			
Guild, E. & Bigo, D. (2010). The transformation of European border controls. In B. Ryan & V. Mitsilegas (Eds.), <i>Extraterritorial Immigration Control</i> , (pp. 257-280). Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.	How are EU and member states' policy choices of externalization made and how the consequences lead inexorably to the people on the tuna nets?	the contention that European (but also US) authorities have made choices about where their border controls will be carried out and developed forms of remote controls to check the identity of people who want to enter or transit through their territory before they travel	IPS	NA	EU as the only actor
Leonard, S. (2010) EU border security and migration into the European Union: Frontex and securitization through practices. <i>European Security</i> , 19(2), 231-254.	How FRONTEX's activities contribute to the securitization of asylum and migration in the EU	(in)security practices of FRONTEX	Sociological approach to securitization	NA	EU as the only actor

Ferreira, M. (2010). Risk Politicization Strategies in EU Migration and Asylum Policies. <i>Journal of Global Analysis</i> , 1(2), 153-184.	The policy dynamics of EU migration policies is carving a hierarchical risk culture whose risk politicization strategies reify migrants as a risk group	the institutional, political and strategic dimensions of securitizing migration in the EU (discursive and non-discursive practices)	Constructivist security / securitization	NA	non-EU as recruited
Togral Koca, B. (2012). Securitization of Migration in Europe: Critical Reflections on Turkish Migration Practices, <i>Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations</i> , 11(2), 65-77.	To what extent the EU exports its border security regime to third countries	Turkey's migration practices in the light of its candidacy status	Sociological approach to securitization	Document analysis, expert interviews	non-EU as recruited
Casas-Cortes, M., Cobarrubias, S. & Pickles, J. (2012). Re-bordering the neighborhood: Europe's emerging geographies of non-accession integration. <i>European Urban and Regional Studies</i> , 20(1), 37-58.	How in the past decade the EU, member states and partner states have been engaged in a quiet process of institutionalizing more complex and differential geographies of the Southern European borders, including the economic integration of non-candidate countries and the management of	EU policies toward non-candidate neighboring countries and 'neighbors of neighbors', focusing on the policy frameworks of European Neighborhood Policy and the Migration Routes Initiative under the Global Approach to Migration; and the actual practices of border management and the role of North African states,	NA	Interviews	non-EU as recruited

	migration or 'border externalization'	migrants and popular movements			
Johnson, H. L. (2013). The Other Side of the Fence: Reconceptualizing the "Camp" and Migration Zones at the Borders of Spain. <i>International Political Sociology</i> , 7(1), 75-91.	Analysis of the agency of the migrants, or "the migrant narrative"	the dynamics of the political space of migration in the Spanish enclave of Melilla, and neighboring Moroccan city of Oujda	(in)securitization	Fieldwork	EU as the only actor
Petrillo, E. R. (2013). Migratory pressures on the EU's external borders and policy implications: Developments from the South of Italy. <i>Annali del dipartimento di metodi e modelli per l'economia il territorio e la finanza</i> , 1, 107-137.	Has border enforcement effectively stopped irregular migrants from entering the EU? If so, under what conditions?	EU's growing securitization of the immigration control, the policy implications and geopolitical impacts of the FRONTEX policing along the Italian Southern external borders	Securitization	Available information and statistical data from FRONTEX and the Italian Interior Ministry	non-EU as recruited
Topak, O. E. (2014). The Biopolitical Border in Practice: Surveillance and Death at the Greece-Turkey Borderzones. <i>Environment and Planning D: Society and Space</i> , 32, 815-833.	While Foucault posits that biopolitics is the product of the historical transition away from sovereign powers towards governmental powers, Greece-Turkey border zones	biopolitical control practices at the Greece-Turkey borders	Foucauldian concept of biopolitics	In-depth interviews, policy documents	Everyday practices of non-EU


	demonstrates that biopolitics operates through sovereign territorial controls and surveillance, practices of death and exclusion, and suspension of rights				
Bigo, D. (2014). The in/securitization practices of the three universes of EU border control: Military/Navy – border guards/police – database analysts. <i>Security Dialogue</i> , 45(3), 209-225.	How EU border control is routinely embedded in practices rather than discourses	(in)security practices of military, police, and database analysts	(in)securitization	Interviews	EU as the only actor
Cetti, F. (2014). Border Controls in Europe: Policies and Practices Outside the Law. <i>State Crime Journal</i> , 3(1), 4-28.	European states can be considered as committing “state crime,” although they appear to be only indirectly related to security control measures	how the EU is outsourcing its border control activities to non-EU actors and how these agencies act outside of legal structures on behalf of the EU	Securitization	NA	non-EU as recruited
Frowd, P. M. (2014). The field of border control in Mauritania. <i>Security Dialogue</i> , 45(3), 226-241.	Who are the actors that make up the field of border security in Mauritania border, and what are their practices? What rationalities of	Actions of Mauritanian border posts, landscape, biometric entry-exit system, and training practices	Bourdieusian analysis + actor-network theory	Ethnographic research	Everyday practices of non-EU

	border control are adapted in border governance in Mauritania?				
Casas-Cortes, M., Cobarrubias, S. & Pickles, J. (2014). Good neighbours make good fences: Seahorse operations, border externalization and extra-territoriality. <i>European Urban and Regional Studies</i> , 23(3), 1-21.	How does the current extra-territorial bordering processes work?	Operation Seahorse and the transnationally coordinated border control projects and infrastructures implemented by the Guardia Civil of Spain	NA	Policy documents analysis and interviews	Everyday practices of non-EU
El Qadim, N. (2014). Postcolonial challenges to migration control: French–Moroccan cooperation practices on forced returns. <i>Security Dialogue</i> , 45(3), 242–261.	Decolonizing the study of migration policies by looking for the agency of state actors in the countries of origin	Practices of French and Moroccan officials, ministries of interior, ministries of foreign affairs, French Embassy in Rabat, Delegate Ministry of Morocco	Postcolonial perspective and practice approach	Interviews	Everyday practices of non-EU
Pallister-Wilkins, P. (2015). The Humanitarian Political of European Border Policing: Frontex and Border Police in Evros, <i>International Political Sociology</i> , 9, 53-69.	Double-sided nature of humanitarian governance concerned with care and control.	duality of humanitarianism in the practice of Greek border police in Evros, Greek–Turkish border, and of Frontex headquarters	Practice approach	Fieldwork	EU as the only actor
Ikizoglu Erensu, A. & Kasli, Z. (2016). A Tale of Two Cities: Multiple Practices of Bordering and Degrees of ‘Transit’ in and	Do geographical positions cause variations in how cities	compares Edirne and Kayseri as transit cities in terms of what role they	NA	Ethnographic analysis	Everyday practice

through Turkey. <i>Journal of Refugee Studies</i> , 29(4), 528-548.	experience EU-ization and how they receive border-crossers and refugees	play within the European migration regime		+ interviews	s of non-EU
Bigo, D. (2016). International Political Sociology: Internal security as transnational power fields. In R. Bossong, & M. Rhinard (Eds.), <i>Theorizing Internal Security in the European Union</i> , (pp. 61-85). Oxford: Oxford University Press.	(in)security practices of professionals are extended outside towards the European neighborhood	competitive relations between actors in the field of EU internal security	Paris School / IPS / Bourdieusian approach	Sociological and historical analysis	EU as the only actor
Jeandesboz, J. (2016). Smartening border security in the European Union: An associational inquiry. <i>Security Dialogue</i> , 47(4), 1-18.	How the reliance on mass dataveillance of travelers is sustained as a central policy option in the governance of EU border security	initiative of the European Commission proposing the establishment of EU 'smart borders	Sociological approach to securization / actor-network theory	Interviews, archival work	EU as the only actor
Fakhoury, T. (2016). Securitising Migration: The European Union in the Context of the Post-2011 Arab Upheavals. <i>The International Spectator</i> , 51(4), 67-79.	How and why the EU has constructed its response to migration wave after the Arab uprisings into a high security threat	EU's strategies for externalizing border control to third countries	Securitization + sociopolitical context	NA	non-EU as recruited
Andersson, R. (2016). Hardwiring the frontier? The politics of security technology	How technologies, rather than 'halting migration', have acted	Bordering practices and technologies at the Spanish borders	Ethnographies of borders + practice	Fieldwork / ethnographic research	Everyday practice

in Europe's 'fight against illegal migration.' <i>Security Dialogue</i> , 47(1), 1-18.	as catalysts for new social relations among disparate sectors, creating areas for collaboration and competition, compliance and conflict		approach to securitization		s of non-EU
Sari, E. & Dincer, C. G. (2017). Toward a New Asylum Regime in Turkey?, <i>Movements Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies</i> , 3(2), 59-80.	Turkey's recent attempts to reconfigure and consolidate its migration/asylum regime.	the old and newly emerging migration/asylum agencies, changing asylum laws, and ongoing reconfigurations of legal and administrative practices.	Securitization	Interviews, policy and legal documents	Everyday practices of non-EU
Isleyen, B. (2018). Transit mobility governance in Turkey. <i>Political Geography</i> , 62, 23-32.	How Turkey governs transit mobility heading towards the EU?	checkpoints and travel document as tools of border governance	Practice approach + critical border studies	Discourse analysis, participant observation , Interviews with police officers in Turkey	Everyday practices of non-EU
Isleyen, B. (2018a). Turkey's governance of irregular migration at European Union borders: Emerging geographies of care and	How does mobility or lack thereof shape the discursive articulations	dilemma between care and control in everyday	Foucauldian-inspired	Fieldwork	Everyday practice

control, <i>Environment and Planning D: Society and Space</i> , 36(5), 849-866.	on and practical application of humanitarianism in Turkey and what spaces of care and control do related border practices constitute in the two cities under study?	practices and discourses of police	Practice approach		s of non-EU
Togral Koca, B. (2020). Bordering processes through the use of technology: the Turkish case. <i>Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies</i> . doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1796272	How does the use of technology functions across different border zones, where control of borders and their effects are concentrated	charting bordering processes and practices with a specific focus on the use of technology that seeks to detect, filter and prevent (certain) mobilities at Turkey's border zones with Syria and Greece	critical border studies + Foucauldian approach	Document analysis of official statements, policy, and legal documents, NGOs and media reports, academic works	non-EU as recruited
Mc Cluskey, E. (2020). Freedom, technology and surveillance: everyday paradoxes on the EU-Morocco border. <i>Int. J. Migration and Border Studies</i> , 6(1/2), 115–137.	How does the paradox between freedom, technology, and surveillance multiply, travel and come to the fore at a human level in the everyday lives of	migrant experiences on the everyday in/securities they encounter with	IPS / Paris Approach	Fieldwork / ethnography	Everyday practices of non-EU



migrants attempting to
enter Europe?