

Tracing Euroscepticism Back:
Turkish Public Opinion and the Left Between 1963-1971

Tun İbrahim Ceylan



A thesis presented to the

Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History at
Boğaziçi University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

June 2025

Approvals

“Tracing Euroscepticism Back: Turkish Public Opinion and the Left Between 1963-1971,” a thesis prepared by Tun İbrahim Ceylan in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts from the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University, has been approved on 19 June 2025 by:

THESIS ADVISOR

Professor Aydın Babuna
Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History
Boğaziçi University

COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Associate Professor Alper H. Yağcı
Department of Political Science and International Relations
Boğaziçi University

Professor Barış Doster
Faculty of Communication
Marmara University

Declaration of Originality

The intellectual content of this thesis, which has been written by me and for which I take full responsibility, is my own, original work, and it has not been previously or concurrently submitted elsewhere for any other examination or degree of higher education. The sources of all paraphrased and quoted materials, concepts, and ideas are fully cited, and the admissible contributions and assistance of others with respect to the conception of the work as well as to linguistic expression are explicitly acknowledged herein.



Copyright © 2025 Tunç İbrahim Ceylan.
Some rights reserved.



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

To view a copy of this license, visit
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/>

Abstract

Tracing Euroscepticism Back: Turkish Public Opinion and the Left Between 1963-1971

Tunç İbrahim Ceylan, Master's Candidate at the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University, 2025

Professor Aydın Babuna, Thesis Advisor

Turkey-European Economic Community (EEC) relations started with the Turkish application for association in 1959 and the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963. This thesis examines the early public discussions in Turkey on the nature and aims of European integration, the EEC, and the Turkey-EEC relations between the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol, with a specific focus on Turkish leftist thought. It is found that apart from the milestones like the signing of the Ankara Agreement or the Additional Protocol, Turkish public opinion and politicians showed less interest in the EEC and Turkey-EEC relations. Turkey's rapprochement with the organization was usually welcomed based on identity-based views and the mentality of bloc politics of the Cold War. More nuanced and critical voices in mainstream public opinion began to be heard in the final years of the 1960s as Turkey and the EEC were negotiating the Additional Protocol. The leftist intellectuals, however, were vocal and critical about the EEC and Turkey's possible integration with the organization from the outset. The thesis aims to examine views of Turkish public opinion on Turkey's foreign policy and the country's place in the world by focusing on leftist periodicals and their views on the EEC and Turkey-EEC relations. As the Turkish left labelled the EEC as a Western-capitalist institution having imperialist, neo-colonialist, and monopolist agendas, it is demonstrated that leftist opposition to the EEC set one of the early examples of Euroscepticism in Turkey.

43,000 words

Özet

Avrupa Şüphecililiğinin İzini Sürmek: 1963-1971 Arasında Türk Kamuoyu ve Sol

Tunç İbrahim Ceylan, Yüksek Lisans Adayı, 2025

Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü

Profesör Aydın Babuna, Tez Danışmanı

Türkiye-Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu (AET) ilişkileri Türkiye'nin 1959 yılında ortaklık başvurusu yapması ve 1963'te Ankara Anlaşması'nın imzalanmasıyla başlamıştır. Bu tez, Avrupa entegrasyonunun doğasını ve amaçlarını, AET ve Türkiye-AET ilişkilerine dair Ankara Anlaşması ve Katma Protokol arasında yapılmış erken tarihli kamuoyu tartışmalarını Türk sol düşüncesine odaklanarak incelemektedir. Ankara Anlaşması ya da Katma Protokol'ün imzalanması gibi önemli gelişmeler dışında, Türk kamuoyunun ve siyasetçilerin AET ve Türkiye-AET ilişkilerine ilgisinin yoğun olmadığı tespit edilmiştir. Türkiye'nin AET ile yakınlaşması kimlik temelli görüşler ve Soğuk Savaş'ın blok siyaseti temelinde genellikle olumlu karşılanmaktadır. Ana akım kamuoyunda daha nüanslı ve eleştirel sesler 1960'ların son yıllarında, Türkiye ve AET Katma Protokol'ü müzakere ederken duyulmaya başlanmıştır. Bununla birlikte sol görüşlü entelektüeller, AET'ye ve Türkiye'nin AET'yle muhtemel bütünleşmesine en başından beri eleştirel yaklaşmışlardır. Bu tez 1963-1971 yılları arasında Türk kamuoyunun dış politikaya ve ülkenin dünyadaki yerine ilişkin görüşlerini, büyük ölçüde o dönemde Türkiye'de yayımlanan sol görüşlü süreli yayınların AET ve Türkiye-AET ilişkilerine dair fikirlerine odaklanarak incelemeyi amaçlamıştır. Türk solunun AET'yi emperyalist, yeni-sömürgeci ve tekelci amaçları olan batılı-kapitalist bir kurum olarak niteleyerek, Türkiye'de Avrupa şüphecililiğinin erken örneklerinden birini sergilediği gösterilmektedir.

43.000 kelime





To my parents

Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms *xiii*

Acknowledgements *xv*

1 INTRODUCTION 1

- 1.1 Historical Background: Turkey in the 1960s 3
 - 1.1.1 Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1960s 8
 - 1.1.2 Turkish Left in the 1960s 12
 - 1.1.3 Leftist Journals in the 1960s 20

2 THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 25

- 2.1 Theoretical Framework 26
- 2.2 Case Selection 35
- 2.3 Methodology 38

3 MAJOR ISSUES IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: PERSPECTIVES OF TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION AND LEFTIST INTELLIGENTSIA 41

- 3.1 De Gaulle and Transatlantic Relations 44
- 3.2 British Applications for Membership to the EEC 53
- 3.3 Turkish Public Opinion Towards the EEC and European Affairs 63
 - 3.3.1 Political Parties and EEC 68
- 3.4 Leftist Intellectuals on Issues in European Integration 71
 - 3.4.1 The Raison d'être of the EEC 72
 - 3.4.2 Reflections on Transatlantic Ties: "Division in the West" 78
- 3.5 Conclusion 86

4 TURKEY'S PLACE IN AN INTEGRATING EUROPE 91

- 4.1 Early Years of Turkey-EEC Relations 93
 - 4.1.1 Ankara Agreement 98
 - 4.1.2 The Additional Protocol 102
- 4.2 Discussions on Turkey-EEC Relations in Turkish Politics 106
 - 4.2.1 Turkish Private Sector, Labor Unions and the EEC 111
 - 4.2.2 Government Programs and the EEC 116

4.2.3	Discussions in the Turkish National Assembly	121
4.3	Turkey's Position in the EEC According to the Leftist Intelligentsia	129
4.4	Conclusion	145
5	CONCLUSION	151
5.1	Limits of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research	155
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	157



Abbreviations and Acronyms

AP	Adalet Partisi (<i>Justice Party</i>)
Basın-İş	Türkiye Gazeteciler ve Basın Sanayi İşçileri Sendikası (<i>Turkish Journalists and Press Industry Workers Union</i>)
BP	Birlik Partisi (<i>Unity Party</i>)
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CGP	Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (<i>Republican Reliance Party</i>)
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (<i>Republican People's Party</i>)
CKMP	Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi (<i>Republican Villagers Nation Party</i>)
DİSK	Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (<i>The Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey</i>)
DP	Demokrat Parti (<i>Democrat Party</i>)
DPT	Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı (<i>The State Planning Organiza- tion</i>)
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EFTA	The European Free Trade Association
EU	European Union
EURATOM	The European Atomic Energy Community
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
İKV	İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı (<i>Economic Development Founda- tion</i>)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
Metal-İş	Metal İşçileri Sendikası (<i>The Union of Metalworkers</i>)
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (<i>Nationalist Movement Party</i>)
MNP	Milli Nizam Partisi (<i>National Order Party</i>)
MP	Member of Parliament
MSP	Milli Selamet Partisi (<i>National Salvation Party</i>)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDR	National Democratic Revolution
NSC	National Security Council

OECD	The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
SEATO	The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
TİP	Türkiye İşçi Partisi (<i>Workers' Party of Turkey</i>)
Türk-İş	Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (<i>The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions</i>)
TÜSİAD	Türk Sanayicileri ve İş İnsanları Derneği (<i>The Turkish Industry and Business Association</i>)
UK	The United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	The United States (of America)
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
YTP	Yeni Türkiye Partisi (<i>New Turkey Party</i>)

Acknowledgements

I owe a debt of gratitude, firstly, to Prof. Aydın Babuna, who has always been helpful and guiding. Without his advice, this work would never have been completed. Likewise, I am thankful to the committee members, Prof. Alper H. Yağcı and Prof. Barış Doster, whose invaluable comments improve the thesis.

Writing a thesis is a long journey on a bumpy road under unpredictable weather conditions. In such a long and challenging journey, I would like to express my gratitude in the most profound and most excellent sense to my mother and father, dear family of mine. Your existence is a reward for me, which I had a chance to grasp once again during the writing period. My cats, Badem and Karakız, you have also done a lot to reduce my stress by showing up in the room unexpectedly while I was working late at night.

My friends from my undergraduate years are the ones witnessing the whole process. They helped me to form a solid thesis structure out of thought pieces with our enjoyable and inspiring discussions. So, I am beyond thankful to my dear friends Mert Aydemir, Deniz Yüce, Hasan Fatih Öyük, Furkan Sarier, Furkan Taşpınar, Hami Utku Topkaya, and Can Onat Atış. Your contribution to my social and academic life is precious.

Lastly, I want to thank TÜBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council) for financially supporting my Master's studies for two years through the TÜBİTAK-BİDEB 2210-A Program.

NOTE: The in-house editor of the Atatürk Institute has made detailed recommendations with regard to the format, grammar, spelling, usage, syntax, and style of this thesis.



Introduction



The relations between Turkey and Europe constitute a long story which various fields of social sciences have searched for convenient ways to narrate it. Actually, the relations are too complex to be confined to superficial and shallow dichotomies of “East and West”. The situation is a multifaceted one shaped not only by enmities, conflicts, and divisive features like religion, but also by geographical proximity, historical entanglements, intensive political and economic ties, and cultural interactions.

In the foreword section to his book *Rönesans Avrupası*, Halil İncalcık mentioned the importance of the Ottoman Empire for understanding 15th and 16th century Europe and stated that the Empire had become an indispensable member of the European States System with the Ottoman-French alliance.¹

1 Halil İncalcık, *Rönesans Avrupası*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2013), XI.

This situation of “relevance to each other” did not terminate for centuries. It continues, as Turkey’s candidacy to the European Union (EU) in 1999 is one of the most visible examples of this relevance.

The EU is the advanced stage of European integration which was initiated just after the Second World War as an attempt to “...supersede the nationalism, both economic and political, that had destroyed the European continent almost beyond repair and had led to the loss of its global primacy.”² The mainstream accounts emphasize that in order to have a shared future, European leaders prioritized trade liberalization, democracy, functional integration, and supranational institutions as essential means of cooperation and peace in post-1945 Europe.³

Turkey, a member of the European Council, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), applied for association with the European Economic Community (EEC)⁴ in 1959. The Ankara Agreement establishing an association relation between Turkey and the EEC was signed in 1963. The Turkish ruling elite and public opinion thought that Turkey’s engagement with the organization was beneficial and tended to see the relations as a genuine acceptance of Turkey into Europe. Even before the 1959 application, Turkey had a Europeanist movement, which was epitomized by the foundation of the parliamentary group of European federalism established in 1948.⁵ Nonetheless, it does not mean that it led to a consensus in the country as to being a part of integrating Europe.

In Turkey, the general tendency in the public opinion and mainstream political circles was to support Turkish association with the EEC. It was partly related to the economic advantages the EEC could provide to the Turkish

-
- 2 Mark Gilbert, *European Integration*, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021), 11.
 - 3 Vicki L. Birchfield, John Krige, and Alasdair R. Young, “European integration as a peace project,” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19 no. 1, (2017), 4.
 - 4 In Turkish, the term “Ortak Pazar” has been used to refer the EEC. See: Rıdvan Karluk, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsası, 1996), 25. “Müşterek Pazar” was also another term used to refer the organization especially during the 1950s and first years of the 1960s.
 - 5 Mehmet Cevat Yıldırım, “1948-1960 Döneminde Türkiye’de Avrupacılık: Avrupa Birliği Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Bir Değerlendirme,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 11 no. 41, (Spring 2014), 115.

economy, besides supporting the relations with bloc politics mentality. Plus, identity-based arguments could have been encountered. Turkish newspapers, National Assembly minutes, government programs, election manifestos, journals, and booklets published by trade unions offered great examples of this phenomenon. Nevertheless, negative attitudes against the EEC did also exist.

Leftist intellectuals constituted one of the critical circles against the country's current way of engagement with the EEC. They criticized the very nature, essence, and aims of the organization and suggested that further steps to establish closer economic and political relations with the EEC would be detrimental to Turkey's industry, economy, and sovereignty. They rejected a seat for Turkey within the EEC as they labelled the organization as imperialist, neo-colonialist, exploitative, and a monopolist state capitalist entity. Turkish left in the 1960s wrote many articles on the topic. They paid considerable attention to the developments shaping Europe, European integration, and Turkey's place in such an organization. The ideological baggage they carried extensively impacted their perceptions regarding the EEC as well as other Western-based international organizations.

The ways in which Turkish leftist intellectuals elaborated their arguments on Turkey's place in the world and Europe can contribute to our understanding of public reflections on Turkey-EEC relations. The period and intellectual perspectives presented by leftist intellectuals can also lighten the early Euro-sceptic tendencies in Turkey, which can be considered as one of the pillars on which anti-EU attitudes are founded. Furthermore, examining the early years of relations by focusing on intellectual and public support/rejection might add to our knowledge of political and intellectual life in the 1960s, which was a decade of intellectual liveliness.

§ 1.1 Historical Background: Turkey in the 1960s

The 1960s was a decade of political and institutional change in Turkey as the very first year of the decade witnessed the first military coup d'état of the Re-

public of Turkey. On 27 May 1960, the 10-year-long Democrat Party incumbency under the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was given an end by the military.

Studies emphasized the worsening welfare of the military as the motive; for example, it is claimed that whenever the economic well-being of the military became worse, an intervention came to the stage.⁶ Economic and socio-economic demands have been touched upon by many academic works. Çağlar Keyder stated that the 27 May Coup d'état was a consequence of the policy of the Democrat party governments prioritizing the interests of the rural and commercial bourgeoisie⁷ to the detriment of urban classes. Likewise, Aslı Daldal put the term “new middle classes” made up of city-dwellers like bureaucrats, army officers, journalists, and managers while explaining the power and stimuli behind the 27 May Coup d'état.⁸ Majoritarian tendencies of Democrat Party governments were epitomized by the investigation commission, which was set up in April 1960.⁹ The commission was designed to control and limit all political activities in the country;¹⁰ however, the principal target was CHP. The commission has been considered among the reasons paving the way towards the coup d'état in the literature.

Regardless of the real motive that brought the military intervention to the stage, its effects on Turkish politics and political institutions were indisputable. Thus, the 27 May can be categorized as one of the critical junctures in Turkish political history rather than the term “continuity”.¹¹ This rupture has also been identified as the “Second Republic”.¹²

Many new political institutions were established after the coup d'état of 27 May 1960. The new constitution of 1961, a bicameral system with a Republican

-
- 6 Nasser Momayezi, “Civil-Military Relations in Turkey,” *International Journal on World Peace* 15 no. 3 (September 1998), p. 23.
 - 7 Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), 175, 177.
 - 8 Aslı Daldal, “The New Middle Class as a Progressive Urban Coalition: The 1960 Coup d'état in Turkey,” *Turkish Studies* 5, no. 3, (2004), 75-76.
 - 9 Selin Esen, “18 Nisan 1960 Tarihli Tahkikat Komisyonu,” *Mülkiye* 34 no. 267, (2010), 189.
 - 10 Sedef Bulut, “Üçüncü Dönem Demokrat Parti İktidarı (1957-1960): Siyasi Baskılar ve Tahkikat Komisyonu,” *Akademik Bakış* 2, no. 4, (2009), 137.
 - 11 Yunus Emre, *The Emergence of Social Democracy in Turkey*, (I.B. Tauris: 2014), 57.
 - 12 Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010.), 244.

Senate and the National Assembly, the Constitutional Court, proportional representation, National Security Council, which reserved a constitutional role for the military in politics, were these impactful institutions established after the 27 May Coup d'état in order "to prevent power monopoly".¹³

Bülent Tanör described the 1961 Constitution as the first Turkish constitution bringing the principles of supremacy and binding force of the constitution, in addition to mechanisms to implement these principles.¹⁴ The constitution was designed to create a balance of power in the country by way of boosting bureaucratic and economic institutions at the expense of political parties and politicians.¹⁵ Apart from checks and balances created with the 1961 Constitution, the period was shaped by expanding rights and liberties. The new constitution paved the way for political diversification, in which different ideologies from nationalist, religious, and leftist backgrounds had a chance to express themselves in the form of political parties and trade unions.¹⁶

There were three general elections in the decade. The first one took place on 15 October 1961 and resulted in the CHP-AP coalition, the first coalition government of Turkey.¹⁷ The 1965 General Election enabled Süleyman Demirel and his party AP to gain a significant electoral victory by consolidating "...old DP support".¹⁸ 1965 was also noteworthy due to the success of TİP, the left/socialist party, sending 14 MPs to the National Assembly.¹⁹ The last election of the decade was on 12 October 1969, which witnessed the lowest percentage of voter turnout in Turkish political life with 64.3%.²⁰ The election gave enough support for Demirel's AP to form the government alone; however, the

13 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (2010), 245.

14 Bülent Tanör, *İki Anayasa 1961-1982*, (İstanbul: Beta, 1994), 19.

15 İlkay Sunar and Ziya Öniş, *Sanayide Yönetim ve Toplumsal Uzlaşma*, (İstanbul: TÜSİAD Yayınları, 1992), 75-76.

16 Yeşim Arat and Şevket Pamuk, *Turkey Between Democracy and Authoritarianism*, (Cambridge University Press: 2019), p. 23.

17 Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands*, (Palgrave Macmillan: 2005), 95-96.

18 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (2010), 250.

19 Mete Kaan Kaynar and Nurettin Kalkan, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Partiler Seçimler Beyannameler (1923-1980)*, (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2022), 65-66.

20 Ibid., 68.

defining characteristics of the 1969 election were the changes in the electoral system. The national remainder system was replaced with the d'Hondt system,²¹ which led to a decrease in the representation of relatively minor parties like TİP, YTP, and MHP.²²

From the date of signing of the Ankara Agreement on 12 September 1963 to the signing day of the Additional Protocol on 13 November 1970, six different governments under three different prime ministers served in Turkey. These governments are 9th (İsmet) İnönü (25.06.1962 – 25.12.1963), 10th İnönü (25.12.1963 – 20.02.1965), (Suat Hayri) Ürgüplü (20.02.1965 – 27.10.1965), 1st (Süleyman) Demirel (27.10.1965 – 03.11.1969), 2nd Demirel (03.11.1969 – 06.03.1970) and 3rd Demirel (06.03.1970 – 26.03.1971).²³

During the period, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP – Republican People's Party), Adalet Partisi (AP – Justice Party), Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi (CKMP – Republican Villagers Nation Party), Yeni Türkiye Partisi (YTP – New Turkey Party), Millet Partisi (MP – Nation Party), Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP – Workers' Party of Turkey), Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (CGP – Republican Reliance Party), Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP – Nationalist Movement Party) and Birlik Partisi (BP – Unity Party) were the political parties represented in the National Assembly.²⁴

The final years of the decade saw Turkey struggling with economic and social unrest accompanied by rising political violence. Initiated firstly by extreme leftist groups in the late 1960s, the political violence was also continued by extreme and militant right-wing groups.²⁵ Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel claimed that the country was ungovernable with such a liberal and permissive constitution by pointing out the necessity of an amendment towards

21 Ergun Özbudun, "Seçim Sistemleri ve Türkiye," Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 4 no. 1, (1995), 528-529.

22 Suavi Aydın and Yüksel Taşkın, *1960'tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2018), 178.

23 İrfan Neziroğlu and Tuncer Yılmaz, *Hükümetler-Programları ve Genel Kurul Görüşmeleri*, vol. 3 (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2013); and İrfan Neziroğlu and Tuncer Yılmaz, *Hükümetler-Programları ve Genel Kurul Görüşmeleri*, vol. 4, (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2013).

24 See: *Yüzüncü Yılında TBMM*, ed. Yusuf Tekin, (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2020).

25 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (2010), 257-258.

a more authoritarian direction.²⁶ As Yeşim Arat and Şevket Pamuk assert, the 1961 Constitution could not be that effective even though it contained considerable "...liberal and democratic aspirations", which resulted in another military intervention in 1971.²⁷

As a by-product of rising and popularizing politics in Turkey, the 1960s witnessed a considerable rise and diversification in intellectual debate on political issues, including foreign policy. The adoption of the multi-party political system and subsequent incumbency of the Democrat Party had already paved the way for public attention, discussion, and politicization of foreign policy issues.²⁸ Nevertheless, it was not until the Coup d'état of 27 May 1960 and consequent developments, epitomized by the adoption of the relatively more liberal 1961 Constitution, that an atmosphere of freedom was felt by intellectuals, the press, and universities, which led to politicization in return.²⁹ This situation contributed significantly to the formation and development of more vocal and nuanced public opinion.

The new conjuncture of publishing and press activities was determined mainly by the amendments made by the National Security Council (NSC) on the press law, penal law, and the general simplification of the publishing and newspaper process by removing the obligation to get permission and making a down payment.³⁰ The legal amendments led to ease among the press and the intellectuals, at least in the initial phase after the Council took control.³¹

Although the liberal attitude started to reverse in 1971 military intervention, the 1961-1980 period can still be identified with dynamism in publishing activities.³² The decade saw room for freedom of the press and circulation of ideas. Intellectuals willing to express their ideas through publishing activities

26 Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 133.

27 Arat and Pamuk, *Turkey Between Democracy and Authoritarianism*, (2019), 25.

28 Gencer Özcan, "Ellili Yıllarda 'Dış Politika,'" in *Türkiye'nin 1950'li Yılları*, pr. Mete Kaan Kaynar, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2019), 97-98.

29 Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 139.

30 Beral Alacı and Resul Babaoğlu, "27 Mayıs Sürecinde Türkiye'deki Basın Politikaları," *Cumhuriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 17 no. 33, (Spring 2021), 333-334.

31 Ibid., 335.

32 Orhan Koloğlu, *Osmanlıdan Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), 78.

like newspapers and journals seemed to benefit from this period of relative autonomy. The vitalization and diversification in public opinion made themselves visible through the vivid and vocal press; however, the liberal attitude towards the press was not long-lived, as legal cases on the press dramatically increased in the 1970s.³³

The growing impact of the press on politics in these decades coincided with the increasing number of printed press materials and attention given to social and political events by the public. The agenda was not only about domestic politics but also about foreign policy issues.

1.1.1 *Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1960s*

The 1960s brought novelties in the foreign policy domain as well. The feeling of insecurity due to shift in NATO's strategy from massive retaliation to "flexible response", the general decrease in threat coming from the USSR, the emergence of the Cyprus Question,³⁴ and Turkey's search for potential supporters in its positions on Cyprus Question led Turkish governments in the 1960s to pursue a more multidimensional foreign policy.

One of the main features defining Turkish foreign policy from 1960 until 1980 was relative autonomy.³⁵ The period saw substantial changes in international politics paving the way for more autonomous foreign policies across the globe. The Cold War started to enter into the détente period, the US's power and influence both in the world and the Western alliance took a step back due to the Vietnam War and fall of the Bretton Woods system, the USSR balanced the US in terms of foreign aid, the Third World became vocal and an active powerholder via non-aligned movement.³⁶

In such an international context, bloc-based politics began to be less attractive and practical; instead, multi-dimensional foreign policy approaches

33 Koloğlu, *Osmanlıdan Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın*, (1992), 78.

34 William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 104.

35 Baskın Oran, "1960-1980: Görelî Özerklik – 3 - Dönemin Bilançosu," in *Türk Dış Politikası*, vol. 1, ed. Baskın Oran, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), 657.

36 Ibid., 657-660.

were increasingly demanded. In this context, Turkey also started to move towards a normalization/rapprochement with the USSR, non-aligned and non-Western countries even though it did not mean leaving the Western alliance or a total change of position.³⁷ This turn was fed mainly by the Cyprus Question, of course.

Cyprus was under British rule in the first half of the 20th century; however, violence targeting the Turkish Cypriots and British authorities started to terrorize the island. The situation in Cyprus became an international issue in the 1950s, and Turkey could not stay inactive because of the Turkish community living on the island and the historical ties.³⁸ Even though the independent state of Cyprus was proclaimed in 1960, the violence led by EOKA targeting the Turkish community and aiming at the unification of the island with Greece did not end. Turkish intervention in the island on the basis of its guarantor status was averted by US President Lyndon Johnson in 1964 while the letter greatly exacerbated anti-American sentiments in Turkish society and gave momentum to efforts for a multidimensional foreign policy.³⁹ Having closer ties with the USSR was also part of these efforts.

The relations between Turkey and the USSR had become more and more problematic, primarily after the Second World War, as Turkey opted to align with the Western bloc via the Truman Doctrine, its NATO membership, and the Baghdad Pact.⁴⁰ During the 1950s, the mentality running Turkish foreign policy under the Democrat Party governments was to comply with the US in almost every field in order to get more US assistance⁴¹ even though the relations eased after Stalin's death in 1953. Nevertheless, this tendency started to change because of declining US financial aid at the end of the 1950s, the Cuban

37 Oran, "1960-1980: Görelî Özerklik – 3 - Dönemin Bilançosu," in *Türk Dış Politikası*, vol. 1, (2009), 672-679.

38 Suat Bilge, "The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey," in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition*, ed. Kemal H. Karpat, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), 139.

39 Uzgel, İlhan. "TDP'nin Oluşturulması," in *Türk Dış Politikası* vol. 1, (2009), 90.

40 Kemal H. Karpat, "Turkish Soviet Relations," in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition*, (1975), 84.

41 Özcan, "Ellili Yıllarda 'Dış Politika'," in *Türkiye'nin 1950'li Yılları*, (2019), 97.

Missile Crisis, NATO's "flexible response" strategy, the US policy towards the Cyprus Question, and intensifying anti-American attitude in Turkey.⁴²

One of the big differences in the 1960s in comparison to the previous decade was a normalization with the USSR, starting especially with Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin's visit to Moscow in the last months of 1964.⁴³ The later period saw an increasing level of dialogue through high-level visits, including those of Prime Minister Ürgüplü in 1965, Soviet Prime Minister Kosigin in 1966, Prime Minister Demirel and President Cevdet Sunay in 1969.⁴⁴

Increasing Soviet influence and countering Western dominance by way of economic relations and aid was one of the mechanisms the Soviets implemented during the period.⁴⁵ Coming together with Turkey's rising need for financial sources, financial credits formed one of the lines of Turkish-Soviet relations developed. Despite earlier hesitance, Turkey started to benefit from Soviet aid from 1967 onwards while the First Five-Year Development Plan needed capital, and the Western financial aid sources were not sufficient.⁴⁶ Thanks to the 1967 Economic-Technological Cooperation Agreement between the parties, various projects, including a steel mill in İskenderun and an oil refinery in Aliğa, were financed.⁴⁷ This cooperation continued in the 1970s with the second agreement of economic cooperation in 1975, aiming to increase the capacity of existing industrial facilities and construct power plants.⁴⁸

As Turkey was creating more friendly ties with the USSR in the 1960s, its attitude towards the Third World experienced a change as well. In the 1950s, Turkish foreign policy towards the Third World and Arab countries was

42 Mustafa Aydın, "Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis," (Ankara: Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, 2004), 70.

43 Karpat, "Turkish Soviet Relations," in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition*, (1975), 90.

44 Erel Tellal, "SSCB'yle İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası*, vol. 1, ed. Baskın Oran, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), 778-779.

45 John Sakkas and Nataliya Zhukova, "The Soviet Union, Turkey and the Cyprus Problem, 1967-74," *Les Cahiers Irice* no. 10, (2013), 129-130.

46 Tellal, "SSCB'yle İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası*, (2009), 782.

47 Ibid., 782-783.

48 Tellal, "SSCB'yle İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası*, (2009), 782-783.

mostly in line with the West, which was exemplified by its pro-Western alliance attitude in the Bandung Conference in 1955 and "...harsh attacks on non-alignment, socialism and communism".⁴⁹ Turkey's image in the eyes of the Third World was also drawn by its position in UN General Assembly votings regarding Algerian independence, in which Turkey abstained or voted against the Algerian position in 1955, 1957, 1958, and 1959.⁵⁰ These events were frequently recalled by leftist journals of the period. For instance, TİP's *Sosyal Adalet* blamed Turkey for becoming a spokesman of imperialists and colonizers.⁵¹

The Cyprus Question brought the time of awakening in Turkish foreign policy by making Turkish policymakers realize that neither its Western allies, including the US, nor the Third World countries were supporting Turkey's views, and Turkey was close to diplomatic isolation.⁵² Especially, the US position was made clearly obvious by the US President Johnson's letter to Prime Minister İsmet İnönü dated 5 June 1964.⁵³ The letter said that in case of a Soviet intervention stemming from a step taken by Turkey without consultations among NATO allies, Turkey would not be defended by the alliance.⁵⁴

In such a context, Turkey tried to reverse its image in the Third World in the 1960s. It sent representatives to East African nations like Madagascar and Sudan, participated in the 1964 Afro-Asian Conference in Jakarta, created more balanced and warmer ties with India, and formed envoy teams to visit Third World countries.⁵⁵ Turkish votes in UN meetings started to be much

49 Aydın, "Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis," (2004), 60.

50 Eyüp Ersoy, Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962)," *Turkish Studies* 13 no. 4, (2012), 693.

51 Sosyal Adalet, "Olaylara Bakış", July 1965, p. 13.

52 Eray Alim, "Turkey between the Third World and the West: Consequences of Failing to Strike the Right Balance (1961-1965)," *Middle East Critique*, 31 no. 3, (2022), 294.

53 Süha Bölükbaşı, "The Johnson's Letter Revisited," *Middle Eastern Studies* 29 no. 3, (1993), 517.

54 Ibid., 517.

55 Alim, "Turkey between the Third World and the West: Consequences of Failing to Strike the Right Balance (1961-1965)," (2022), 296-297.

more in line with the non-Aligned countries' positions as in the case of votes on the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁵⁶

Turkey's changing attitudes in its foreign policy conduct did not directly result in tangible results in favor of its arguments on Cyprus because the Third World insisted on supporting Cyprus, which was also a non-aligned country.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the point here is that Turkey became well aware of its diplomatic isolation stemming from its foreign policy choices after the Second World War and tried to enhance its image in the eyes of non-Western countries. This was one of the highlight points of Turkish foreign policy in the 1960s.

The seeking of parallel lanes in foreign policy in 1960s' Turkey has been mostly demonstrated with a changing attitude towards the USSR and the non-aligned countries, with more attention given to the Middle Eastern countries. Relations with Europe and the EEC have not usually been considered within this perspective of "multi-dimensional" Turkish foreign policy as the Western European countries were important for Turkey primarily because of their close relations with the US rather than being independent international actors as they had been before 1945.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, given that the public discussions on Turkey's position in European integration and the EEC were highly problematized topics in the 1960s and 1970s, the relations between Turkey and the EEC deserve more attention in order to have a more comprehensive understanding of Turkish foreign policy during the period and public responses to it.

1.1.2 *Turkish Left in the 1960s*

Erik Jan Zürcher assumes that the 1961 Constitution allowed political parties and movements outside of the mainstream to appear in politics.⁵⁹ It was

56 Faruk Sönmezoğlu, "Soğuk Savaş Yıllarında Kıbrıs Sorunu, Bağlantısızlıklar ve BM Genel Kurulu'ndaki Oylamalar/Kararlar," in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004), 565.

57 Sönmezoğlu, "Soğuk Savaş Yıllarında Kıbrıs Sorunu, Bağlantısızlıklar ve BM Genel Kurulu'ndaki Oylamalar/Kararlar," (2004), 565.

58 Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, (2013), 127.

59 Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History*, (2010), 5.

true, especially for the Turkish left, establishing impactful political parties, entering the Parliament, and engaging in publishing activities like journals. In other words, the 1960s was a decade of emergence and vitalization for the Turkish left.

The decade saw intensifying leftist critics targeting both domestic and foreign policy moves as leftist classics became available across the country for the first time.⁶⁰ As knowledge was disseminated quickly, the decade witnessed the popularization of the leftist movement, accompanied by organizational development and rising waves of protests.⁶¹ In terms of organization, the foundation of TİP by twelve unionists in 1961 and the foundation of DİSK in 1967 by unionists from TİP⁶² constituted the most important steps taken in the decade to institutionalize the leftist view and take it into daily affairs and politics.

When one looks at the ground on which the Turkish leftists stood, anti-imperialism, anti-fascism, and in most cases a leftist interpretation of Kemalism were the main slogans 1960s Turkish left was based.⁶³ Within this, the relations between the leftist ideology and Kemalism have been a topic of interest for various studies. Gökhan Atılğan suggested that a linear history view, attributing anti-imperialist meanings to the Turkish War of Independence and leftist leaders' relations with Kemalism brought positive attitudes towards Kemalism in Turkish leftist circles.⁶⁴

It can be realized that specifically YÖN cadres gave considerable importance to anti-imperialism of the Early Republican Turkey. Articles on Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism were published in different volumes of YÖN; a picture of Mustafa Kemal with a kalpak was firstly

60 Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*, (2003), 128.

61 Ahmet Öncü and Özgür Mutlu Ulus, "Türkiye Solunun Aşıl Topuğu: 1960-1971 Yıllarında Türkiye Solundaki Devlet Tartışmalarının Karatani'nin Sermaye-Ulus-Devlet Çerçevesinden İrdelenmesi," *Çalışma ve Toplum*, 1 (2019), 42.

62 Gökhan Atılğan, "Türkiye'de Toplumsal Sınıflar: 1923-2010)," in *1920'den Günümüze Türkiye'de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim*, eds. Faruk Alpkaya and Bülent Duru, (Ankara: Phoenix, 2017), 348-349.

63 Oran, "1960-1980: Görelî Özerklik – 3 - Dönemin Bilançosu," in *Türk Dış Politikası*, vol. 1, (2009), 669.

64 Gökhan Atılğan, "Sosyalist Soldan Kemalizme Olumlu Bakışlar (1920-1971): Nedenler, İmkânlar, Dönemler ve Bazı Sonuçlar," *Praksis* 21 no. 3, (2009), 48.

given a place in the pages of *YÖN*; based on a text written by Hasan Tahsin in 1919, implying sympathy towards the poor, the journal argued that the first action of the national struggle came from a socialist.⁶⁵

Socialist nationalism was a defining feature of the Turkish leftist thought in the 1960s, and it was not limited to the *YÖN* circles. Other than the picture of Mustafa Kemal wearing a kalpak, which was rapidly accepted by other leftist circles, these different circles named the socialist struggle they were giving as “the Second National War of Independence” in reference to the Turkish War of Independence, whose aims were thwarted after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.⁶⁶ The primary media organ of the Turkish National Democratic Revolution (NDR) movement, *Türk Solu*, had also emphases of Kemalism. 102nd volume of the journal highlighted that even though the Kemalist revolution did not result in complete liquidation of the feudal structure and joint rule of all national classes, it was still important as the first successful national liberation war.⁶⁷

Anti-imperialism was accompanied by a considerable anti-western attitude among Turkish leftists which also became visible via opposition to western-based political, economic, and cooperation organizations. NATO was the primary target for leftist critics. The Turkish left interpreted that NATO was a barrier in front of democratization, an instrument for dependency on the US and US interests, an obstacle for Turkey to pursue an independent foreign policy embracing non-alignment, neutrality, and cooperation with the Third World.⁶⁸

There was also a strong anti-American attitude among the Turkish left in the 1960s. US foreign policy choices like withdrawing Jupiter missiles and its positioning in the Cyprus Question paved the way for various circles in Turkey

65 Gökhan Atılğan, “Sosyalist Milliyetçilik Söylemi (Türkiye, 1961-1968): Temeller, Ayrılıklar,” *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 64 no. 3, (2009), 16-17.

66 Ibid., 17.

67 Nail Satılğan, “Cumhuriyet bayramını doğru değerlendirelim,” *Türk Solu*, vol. 102, (28 October 1969), 5.

68 Barış Doster, “Türkiye’de NATO Karşıtlığının Tarihsel ve Siyasal Kökenleri,” *Ortadoğu Analiz*, 4, no. 40, (April 2012), 33-34.

to question the nature of Turkey-US relations.⁶⁹ As one of these circles, the Turkish left problematized the US policy choices in the Cyprus Question to raise more question marks on the Turkish-American alliance.⁷⁰

TİP, student clubs, and the unions thought that the capitalist world was ruled by the US, and Turkish political leadership after the Second World War had betrayed the anti-imperialist aspect of the Turkish national struggle and the Kemalist revolution.⁷¹ The opposition to Western-based organizations had its foundations in this conceptualization. For example, TİP Chair Mehmet Ali Aybar expressed that the Common Market obliged Turkey to stay in the capitalist system and consequently a dependent status, and it was the real problem for Turkey.⁷²

As Aybar's words on the EEC suggest, there was a strong inclination among Turkish leftist academics, authors, and intellectuals in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s to assess the European integration movement along with other Western organizations with the terms imperialism, capitalism, colonialism, exploitation, dependency, and center-periphery.⁷³ The anti-West attitude was also supported by the embrace of the Dependency Theory, which started to become popular in the 1970s.⁷⁴

While the decade was identified with the vitalization and popularization of the leftist movement, ideological differences and discussions among the Turkish left were also part of this vitalization. The main fault line shaped around the question of how and in which way socialism would come to Turkey. The division over the strategy enabling Turkey to move towards socialism, the nature and essence of socialism, and the role of the working class were the main problematics of both TİP and the Turkish left in the 1960s. These issues

69 Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç, "The Roots of Anti-Americanism in Turkey 1945-1960," in *Bilgi* 72, (Winter 2015), 252.

70 Bilge, "The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey," in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition*, (1975), 171.

71 Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*, (2003), 130.

72 Nihat Sargın, *TİP'li Yıllar (1961-1971)*, (İstanbul: Sosyal Tarih Yayınları, 2020), 144.

73 Şaban H. Çalış, *Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri*, (Ankara: Nobel, 2016), 138.

74 Ibid., 137-138.

also constituted the main cleavages for further divisions within the left in Turkey in the 1970s.⁷⁵

As the Turkish left diverged while responding to this question, three main movements can be mentioned to portrait the leftist movement in 1960s' Turkey. The first one was TİP. The party was one of the most significant components making the popularization of the left possible. Before the 1960s, socialist parties had never had a chance to live long enough to gather public support and convey their messages to wider circles; on the contrary, TİP achieved this popularity with its country-wide organization and election success, enabling it to send MPs to the Turkish National Assembly.⁷⁶

Founded in 1961, 15 MPs from TİP were elected in the 1965 general elections, and the hopes were higher for the next elections, which took place in 1969.⁷⁷ Despite the party's successes, like having enough power to form a parliamentary group, introducing socialism to the whole country, and legitimizing the socialist struggle, TİP's public support was limited to %3% whose effect in MP numbers was increased by the election system.⁷⁸ Therefore, due to the changing election system and decreasing public support, partially caused by inner-party divisions, the party barely managed to enter the Turkish National Assembly with only two MPs in 1969.⁷⁹

Mehmet Ali Aybar, the Chair of the party from 1962 to 1969, was one of the prominent figures of the Turkish left with his unique approach to social-

75 See: Vehbi Ersan, "Geçmişten Kalan (1960'ların Mirası)," in *1970'lerde Türkiye Solu*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2014).

76 Özgür Mutlu Ulus, *The Army and Radical Left in Turkey*, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 6.

77 Aybars Yanık and Tanıl Bora, "Altmışlı Yıllarda Türkiye'nin Siyasî Düşünce Hayatı," in *Türkiye'nin 1960'lı Yılları*, pr. Mete Kaan Kaynar, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2017), 281.

78 Cem Eroğul, "Çok Partili Düzenin Kuruluşu: 1945-1971," in *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye*, eds. Irvin C. Schick and E. Ahmet Tonak, (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2006), 149.

79 Mustafa Şener, "Türkiye İşçi Partisi," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce – Sol*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2008), 364.

ism. While rejecting proletariat dictatorship, Aybar highlighted “smiling socialism”.⁸⁰ He envisioned a “Turkish socialism”, which was not just an economic system, but a system of values and philosophy.⁸¹ Aybar defended that Turkish socialism would come as a bottom-up movement ensuring democratic rule of all working classes.⁸² In this manner, he explicitly rejected a top-down socialist revolution.⁸³

Even though the socialist revolution argument seems to prevail in time within TİP, the party was far from being ideologically homogenous while lacking a clear roadmap and human resource sharing a common background and experiences.⁸⁴ Discussions within the party on socialism and the ways to achieve it directly reflected the tension points of the Turkish left of the time. The responses given to Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 created a strong opposition against Mehmet Ali Aybar, who supported the Alexander Dubček regime and continued to use phrases like “smiling socialism”.⁸⁵ The party lived for 10 years, from 1961 to 1971, until it was closed by the verdict of the Constitutional Court after the second military intervention in civil politics in Turkey on 12 March 1971.⁸⁶

Another leftist group in Turkey was NDR supporters led by Mihri Belli and other ex-Turkish Communist Party members.⁸⁷ The group adopted a gradualist socialist revolution thesis in which a democratic revolution would be initiated by national forces that are composed of revolutionary intellectuals,

80 Erkan İnan, “Türkiye İşçi Partisi’nin İnşa ve Gelişimini Tetikleyen Koşullar (1960-1966),” *Uluslararası Politik Araştırmalar Dergisi* 9 no. 2, (2023), 26.

81 Barış Ünlü, *Mehmet Ali Aybar*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2022), 265.

82 Şener, “Türkiye İşçi Partisi,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce – Sol*, (2008), 370.

83 Ibid., 370.

84 Ibid., 357.

85 Aydın and Taşkın, *1960’tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi*, (2018), 200-201.

86 Ayşegül Komşuoğlu, “1969 Seçimleri ve XIV. Dönem Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi,” in *Yüzüncü Yılında TBMM*, ed. Yusuf Tekin, (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2020), 498.

87 Ulus, *The Army and Radical Left in Turkey*, (2011), 94

both from the military and civilians.⁸⁸ They were opposed to a parliamentary way towards socialism and emphasized the revolution aspect of the theory.⁸⁹

NDR was seen by its supporters as a solution to Turkey's problems, and this solution resembled different aspects of Maoism and Latin American urban guerrilla strategy.⁹⁰ The "activism" of the theory vis-à-vis socialist revolution theory's tendency to stick to the Parliament made NDR highly popular, especially among the young people in 1968 as student protests were storming through both the country and the world, and TİP was on the eve of political schism.⁹¹ The change of the electoral system in 1969 also played a significant role in the popularization of NDR arguments and political violence.⁹²

Initially, NDR theses found place in the pages of YÖN. However, the NDR movement started to publish its own publications from 1967 onwards, such as *Türk Solu*.⁹³ The strategy and tactics to initiate the national-democratic revolution, USSR-China tensions, and guerrilla warfare created impactful divisions within the movement while NDR was also a movement identified with its revolution view.⁹⁴

Last but not least, *YÖN-Devrim* was another highly influential leftist movement in the 1960s. The initiative led by Doğan Avcıoğlu can be characterized as an intellectual movement built on the idea that Turkey did not have an ideologically conscious and experienced working class to achieve a socialist

-
- 88 Ulus, *The Army and Radical Left in Turkey*, (2011), 94
- 89 Kemal Sevlı, "Milli Demokratik Devrim Tezi: 1960'larda Türkiye Solunda Bir Ayrım Noktası," MA Thesis, Ankara University, (2007), 53.
- 90 Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (2003), 145-146.
- 91 Aydın and Taşkın, *1960'tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi*, (2018), 161-162.
- 92 Selçuk Koca, "Altmışlı Yılların Siyasal Partileri," in *Türkiye'nin 1960'lı Yılları*, pr. Mete Kaan Kaynar, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2017), 859.
- 93 Mustafa Şener, *Türkiye Solunda Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset: YÖN, MDD ve TİP*. (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2015), 173 and 193.
- 94 Ibid., 207-208.

revolution.⁹⁵ Plus, the movement suggested that Turkey was a country oppressed by imperialism and feudalism, which sustained only a “ballot box democracy” for show.⁹⁶

YÖN-Devrim movement identified three main roads for economic development, which are capitalist, socialist, and non-capitalist ways.⁹⁷ Non-capitalist countries firstly achieved their independence under the leadership of military and civilian intellectuals, and secondly, by way of implementing nationalist, populist,⁹⁸ and etatist policies, they went towards socialism.⁹⁹ The problem Turkey faced was leaving the path of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, whom the *YÖN-Devrim* movement saw as the leader of the first independence war of the world.¹⁰⁰

Under these conditions, the movement tried to formulate a symbiosis of Kemalism and Marxism in which Kemalist principles are revisited with Marxist concerns in order to give the right direction to Turkey on its way towards socialism.¹⁰¹ As the country lacked a working class strong and organized enough to achieve revolution, “fresh forces”¹⁰², consisting of military and civilian intellectuals, were the address the *YÖN-Devrim* movement looked for.¹⁰³

The movement has been described as an intellectual movement with its successes and failures. *YÖN-Devrim* was very successful in the 1960s to give direction to leftist public opposition and influence wide circles in Turkish society both from military and civilians; nevertheless, it could not manage to

95 Mehmet Özgüden, “Türkiye’de Seçkinler,” in *1920’den günümüze Türkiye’de Toplumsal Yapı, 1920’den Günümüze Türkiye’de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim*, eds. Faruk Alpkaya and Bülent Duru, (Ankara: Phoenix, 2017), 387.

96 Özgüden, “Türkiye’de Seçkinler,” in *1920’den günümüze Türkiye’de Toplumsal Yapı, 1920’den Günümüze Türkiye’de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim*, (2017), 388.

97 Gökhan Atılğan, *Yön Devrim Hareketi*, (İstanbul: Yordam, 2008), 305

98 In Turkish: Halkçı

99 Atılğan, *Yön Devrim Hareketi*, (2008), 305.

100 Ibid., 305.

101 Gökhan Atılğan, “Sanayi Kapitalizminin Şafağında,” in *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat*, pr. Gökhan Atılğan, Cenk Saraçoğlu and Ateş Uslu, (İstanbul: Yordam, 2015), 574.

102 In Turkish: Zinde kuvvetler

103 Atılğan, “Sanayi Kapitalizminin Şafağında,” in *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat*, (2015), 574-575.

organize -despite some weak efforts such as “Workers Party” and “Socialist Culture Association” - political instruments to implement the policies it suggested.¹⁰⁴ The movement dissolved after 12 March 1971.

As can be seen, the 1960s was a period of change and a rise of interest in politics in Turkey. The country started the decade with the Coup d'état of 27 May 1960, which impacted Turkish political organization greatly by the new institutions introduced to Turkish politics. The new institutions, especially the 1961 Constitution, allowed for a revitalization of political activities and public opinion thanks to its relatively liberal features. The Turkish left benefited from this liberal atmosphere by publishing activities, establishing trade unions, political parties, and organizing protests. As this study tries to show, foreign policy was not immune to leftist critique and suggestions.

1.1.3 *Leftist Journals in the 1960s*

There were a number of leftist journals that started to be published within the new political and social atmosphere Turkey had after the Coup d'état of 27 May. Through these journals, the leftist intelligentsia commented on various political, social, and economic developments, criticized current policies and the system, and proposed solutions in accordance with their ideological standpoint.

Other than the journals, which are detailed below, there were other leftist periodicals such as *Türk Solu*, *Sosyal Adalet*, *Sosyalist*, and *Yeni Çağ*. These journals also served as important means for conveying messages and opinions of Turkish leftist thought. Among these, *Türk Solu*, which was a product of the NDR movement in Turkey, has been made the subject of a few scholarly works.¹⁰⁵ Despite the existence of many other journals, this section mainly focuses on leftist journals that are used as primary sources in this study.

One of the well-known and influential journals of the period was *YÖN*. It was the primary medium of information and discussion of the *YÖN* movement. The journal began to be published in December 1961. The first volume

104 Haluk Yurtsever, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş*, (İstanbul: Yordam, 2008), 59.

105 See: Özgün Dinçer, “Türk Solu Dergisi (1967-1970) ve Milli Demokratik Devrim Stratejisi,” (MA Thesis, Ankara University, 2006).

of the journal included the declaration founding YÖN and the principles the journal was based. The declaration emphasized the necessity to develop economically in the direction set by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; achieving a common understanding among middle classes such as teachers, politicians, unionists, managers, a new etatism balancing the advantages and disadvantages of the economic development process, and directing the masses to saving.¹⁰⁶

The journal talked about a wide range of social, political, and economic topics affecting Turkey and the international system. Turkey-US relations and Turkish dependency on the US, income injustice, exploitation by both domestic and foreign actors, economic and social backwardness, and the “East” question were the subjects discussed in the pages of YÖN.¹⁰⁷

Led by Doğan Avcıoğlu, other prominent intellectuals like İlhan Selçuk and Mümtaz Soysal were active in publishing processes as they wrote many articles for the journal.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, the journal served as “...a forum for Marxist-oriented intellectuals but did not necessarily limit its pages to orthodox Marxists and included a wide spectrum of left-wing writers, from social democrats to hard-core Kemalists.”¹⁰⁹ YÖN embraced class struggle theses; tried to integrate Kemalism and leftist thought into each other; and in time, the journal found itself further left on the political spectrum.¹¹⁰

Apart from YÖN’s success in the development and popularization of Turkish leftist thought, it also achieved critical success as an ideological journal. Its circulation hit 20.000 and the journal stood firm financially with its sales, subscribers, and advertisements it took.¹¹¹ Gökhan Atılğan argued that this success can be explained by four points, which are rising interest in socialist publishing in the 1960s, the effectiveness of the concept of journal in a period

106 “Bildiri,” YÖN, vol. 1, (20 December 1961), 12-13.

107 Artun Ünsal, *Umuttan Yalnızlığa Türkiye İşçi Partisi (1961-1971)*, (İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, 2019), 20.

108 Faruk Alpkaya, “Bir 20. Yüzyıl Akımı: ‘Sol Kemalizm,’” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce – Kemalizm*, eds. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), 478.

109 Daldal, “The New Middle Class as a Progressive Urban Coalition: The 1960 Coup d’état in Turkey,” (2004), 87.

110 Alpkaya, “Bir 20. Yüzyıl Akımı: ‘Sol Kemalizm,’” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce – Kemalizm*, (2009), 478.

111 Atılğan, *Yön Devrim Hareketi*, (2008), 241-242.

lacking other mass media, the feature of being the first socialist leaning journal, and the attractiveness of its editorial staff and the content.¹¹²

When it comes to foreign policy, YÖN aimed to convey the news on both Turkish foreign policy issues and other international political developments. Other than the main foreign policy subjects of Turkey at that time such as the Cyprus Question, the relations with the US and USSR, the journal shared news and commented on various international developments like the Vietnam War and developments in decolonizing Africa.

The importance given to foreign policy was grounded in their quest to explore the superstructure and base leading Turkey, Turkish society, and Turkish history, and they underlined the role of external dynamics.¹¹³ Therefore, they chose to bring foreign policy issues, which had once been ignored, to be discussed in the media, in front of the public, and discuss them in their articles published in YÖN.¹¹⁴

The journal was closed twice. The first one came after the 77th volume on 5 June 1963, and the journal stayed closed for one year; the second and final closing took place on 30 June 1967, after the 222nd volume of the journal.¹¹⁵ The successor of YÖN was *Devrim*, which was a newspaper published between 1969-1971. Nonetheless, these two were not identical as YÖN was much more inclusive and open in terms of its relations with other leftist circles,¹¹⁶ making YÖN more vivid, vocal, and influential.

The final years of the 1960s witnessed a diversification and rise in the number of leftist journals. One can give a few reasons for this phenomenon. First, the left itself saw dissidence and splits, as in the case of TİP. And secondly, the closure of YÖN created both a necessity and a vacuum within leftist circles to raise their voices through different journals and be sure that they were heard.

112 Atılğan, *Yön Devrim Hareketi*, (2008), 245.

113 Mert Dikici, "YÖN Dergisi ve Türk Dış Politikası," (MA Thesis, Yıldız Technical University, 2007), 164.

114 Ibid., 164.

115 Hüseyin Akyol, *Türkiye'de Sol Örgütler: Bölüne Bölüne Büyümek*, (Ankara, Phoenix, 2022), 352.

116 Ergun Aydınoglu, "Sol Hakkında Her Şey" mi? (İstanbul: Versus, 2008), 63-64.

Considering these, *ANT*, *Aydınlık*, and *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık* might be focused on to grasp the context in a more comprehensive manner. *ANT* was firstly published on 3 January 1967. Doğan Özgüden, who actively participated in the establishment of the journal, explicitly expressed the rationale for bringing *ANT* into reality. He argued that *ANT* was an attempt to combine anti-imperialist struggle with a socialist one, exemplified by its opposition to YÖN's military-civilian bureaucratic regime proposal, ignoring working class socialism, rejecting CHP's left-of-the-center politics.¹¹⁷

The other important aspect of *ANT* is that it stood aloof from Kemalism and efforts to craft a socialist ideology based on Kemalism. Again, Doğan Özgüden stated that the journal tried to emphasize problems Kurds and working classes had to face during the “period of Kemalist incumbency”.¹¹⁸

The journal became a firm supporter of TİP, especially until the party split between Aybar and his opponents, and called every socialist to support the party on the basis of acknowledging that TİP was the only organized socialist party.¹¹⁹ This call has also been read as an effort to unify leftist circles who were inclined to split more. With this intention, “scientific socialism” prioritizing the actor role of the working class rather than parliamentarism or other ways to revolution occupied a great place in *ANT*'s pages.¹²⁰

When it comes to foreign policy, for example, *ANT* tended to see Republic of Cyprus founded in 1960 and Makarios as a part of Third world and anti-imperialist movement; on the contrary, YÖN and TİP – especially in Aybar's term- emphasized help Makarios received from the West and rejected the status of Third World in the context of Cyprus Question.¹²¹

The diversification within the left can also be exemplified by *Aydınlık* and *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık* (PDA). *Aydınlık* was one of the influential leftist

117 Doğan Özgüden, “Sosyalist Dergi Ant,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce – Sol*, eds. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2008), 669-671.

118 Ibid., 673.

119 Muhlis Kara, “ANT ve YÖN Dergilerinde İktidar Tartışmaları,” (MA Thesis, Dokuz Eylül University, 2019), 86.

120 See: Songül Aydın, “12 Mart Öncesinde ANT Dergisi,” (MA Thesis, Yıldız Technical University 2008).

121 İhsan Ömer Atagenc, “1960-1980 Dönemi Türkiye Solunun Kıbrıs Politikası,” (PhD Thesis, Gazi University, 2015), 191-192.

publishing works in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. The first volume of the journal was published in 1968 when TİP was struggling with inner-party discussions, and the streets were full of students both in Turkey and around the world. Besides *Türk Solu*, *Aydınlık* served as a journal in which the popularizing NDR movement discussed ideological and theoretical issues.¹²²

However, as other factions emerged in the period, the NDR movement led by Mihri Belli came into conflict, and this conflict paved the way for the split in the journal. There are various accounts in the literature as the real stimulus for this divide. It was argued that the reason was Doğu Perinçek's refusal of Belli's plans to establish a "national front" by underlining the leadership of the proletariat.¹²³ Another account mentioned a final meeting in which ideological gaps on Maoism, Kurds, and the role of the military were tried to be bridged.¹²⁴

Due to this split, the clique firstly appeared in the NDR movement¹²⁵ founded *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*. It started its career as a new leftist journal with its first volume in January 1970. As time went on, the group adopted Maoist ideology in a consistent manner as the only group to do so.¹²⁶ The split was also further intensified by international developments such as the USSR-China dispute. After declaring the USSR "social-imperialist", PDA asserted that the main fight was between imperialisms and people as opposed to *Aydınlık*'s emphasis on capitalism-socialist divide.¹²⁷

The discussions and rhetoric of Turkish leftist intellectuals were shaped in this context. Developments in Europe, European integration, and the EEC were also part of these discussions.

122 Ersan, *1970'lerde Türkiye Solu*, (2004), 34.

123 Atagenç, "1960-1980 Dönemi Türkiye Solunun Kıbrıs Politikası," (2015), 16.

124 Gün Zileli, *Yarılma (1954-1972)*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2015), 393-394 quoted in Emre Turku, "Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık Dergisi ve Türkiye'de Maoculuk Düşüncesinin Gelişimi", (PhD Thesis, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, 2025), 136.

125 Aydınoglu, "Sol Hakkında Her Şey" mi?, (2008), 151.

126 Yurtsever, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş*, (2008), 292.

127 Şener, *Türkiye Solunda Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset: YÖN, MDD ve TİP*. (2015), 214.

Theoretical Overview



This study will try to show the main opinions and tendencies presented by Turkish leftists and Turkish public opinion on the EEC, and Turkey-EEC relations, with particular attention to the Turkish left between 1963 and 1971.

These years witnessed the birth of the relations between Turkey and the EEC with the signing of the Ankara Agreement. However, the years following the agreement saw increasingly heated public discussions on the topic. Turkish leftist intellectuals and politicians were some of the main participants in these discussions.

This leftist intelligentsia was heavily critical of the EEC as an organization, Turkish association/membership in the organization and further deepening of the relations. Their critiques, which directly targeted the very nature and aims of the organization, their definition of the EEC, and total objection against a possible Turkish accession, can also be regarded as one of the first

vocal signs of the anti-EU tendencies in Turkey. In those years, the objection was mostly reinforced by anti-West and anti-US attitudes among the leftist intellectuals. For example, a quote from YÖN is as follows: “It is naïve to say that an American and a Turk sit at a table and make an agreement which is in favor of Turkey.”¹

Besides this anti-West attitude, the anti-EEC tendency of the Turkish left might also be considered within the theoretical framework and concept of Euroscepticism. This thesis, by using the conceptual understanding offered by Euroscepticism discussions in academia, aims to provide a panorama of the 1960s in Turkey in relation to newly emerging and popularizing Turkish leftist thought and their conceptualization of European integration and Turkey's place in it.

§ 2.1 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical structure of the thesis is based on the concept of Euroscepticism. In contrast to populism, the term has been used in a narrower manner in the context of European politics.² Thus, there have been many attempts to define the concept and make categorizations to apply it in daily politics. The concept first emerged to describe the critical thoughts in the UK towards the European integration project, adding the country's earlier “‘awkwardness’ or ‘otherness’ in relation to a Continental European project of political and economic integration.”³

-
- 1 The original Turkish text: “Bir Amerikalı ve Türk masaya oturup da Türkiye'nin çıkarını gözetken anlaşma yapacak demek saflıktır.” İlhan Selçuk, “‘Evet’ ve ‘Hayır,’” YÖN, vol. 136, 5 November 1965, p. 3.
 - 2 Robert Harmsen, “Concluding Comment: On Understanding the Relationship between Populism and Euroscepticism,” *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, vol. 11, no. 3, (September 2010), p. 334.
 - 3 Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering, “Introduction: Euroscepticism and the Evolution of European Political Debate,” in *Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration*, eds. Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering, (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2004), 13.

Although the term “Euroscepticism” was first used in the UK, it did expand its realm in continental Europe especially during the ratification period of the Maastricht Treaty,⁴ which founded the institutional setting of the EU in the sense it is known today. While the support for European integration was at its peak in the very first years of the 1990s, it has been seen that a similar rate of support could not be maintained after the Maastricht Treaty despite the emphasis made on “European citizens” in the treaty.⁵ As it was primarily a result of criticisms targeting the EU on the basis of democratic deficit and lack of legitimacy,⁶ the negative tendencies towards the EU and European integration became one of the hot topics in political science and international relations fields.

There have been numerous articles and books examining the reasons for changes, the degree of public support for the European project, and the reasons for this change. The majority of the studies have pointed out the economic aspect of the EU membership and the perception of economic well-being. In their article, Anderson and Reichert took the economic “cost and benefit” into account and highlighted the winners and losers of European integration in relation to the changing level of support for the EU project.⁷ Likewise, another article shows the positive correlation between an affirmative attitude towards the EU and a specific individual’s security, trade, and economic interests.⁸

-
- 4 Harmsen and Spiering, “Introduction: Euroscepticism and the Evolution of European Political Debate,” in *Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration*, (2004), 17.
 - 5 Richard C. Eichenberg and Russell J. Dalton, “Post-Maastricht Blues: The Transformation of Citizen Support for European Integration, 1973-2004,” *Acta Politica* 42, (2007): 129.
 - 6 Sofia Vasilopoulou, “Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism: Plus ça change?,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 51 no. 1, (2013): 163.
 - 7 Christopher J. Anderson and M. Shawn Reichert, “Economic Benefits and Support for Membership in the E.U.: A Cross-National Analysis,” *Journal of Public Policy* 15 no. 3, (1996): 231-249.
 - 8 Matthew Gabel and Harvey D. Palmer, “Understanding variation in public support for European Integration,” *European Journal of Political Research* 27, (1995): 3-19.

Even though the economy-related causes for opposition to European integration have been appropriated as the main exploratory tool in many studies, there are also academic works highlighting the role of politics. For example, there have been some studies assessing the relations between the impact of the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty on EU governance, making the EU more majoritarian by decreasing the role of unanimity in decision-making and declining support for the EU in the core EU countries.⁹ Similarly, it is also claimed in the literature that alongside favorable economic circumstances, public opinion might have a more positive tendency towards European integration as they get more acquainted with the processes and the consequences of this integration.¹⁰

Identity and national sovereignty have always been subjects for studies questioning the roots of support or opposition to European integration. The literature examining the relationship between identity and European integration basically remarks on two sides of the same coin.¹¹ There are works in European studies literature that have intended to show that national and European identity cannot necessarily be exclusive to one another. “Multiple identities” perspective is the base for this approach. For example, Thomas Risse asserts that “European and national identities are not zero-sum propositions” and one can identify himself/herself as Rhinelandish, German and European at the same time.¹² The studies produced at the beginning of the 2000s have also suggested that dual or multiple identities are likely to increase in the

-
- 9 Jenna Bednar, John Ferejohn, and Geoffrey Garrett, “The Politics of European Federalism,” *International Review of Law and Economics* 16 (1996): 279-294.
 - 10 Christopher J. Anderson and Karl C. Kaltenthaler, “The Dynamics of Public Opinion toward European Integration, 1973-93,” *European Journal of International Relations*, 2 no. 2, (1996): 175-199.
 - 11 Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration,” *European Union Politics* 6 no. 4, (2005): 419-443.
 - 12 Thomas Risse, *A Community of Europeans?* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2010), 23-24.

EU while people are keeping their national identity and also appeal more to the European one.¹³

Despite some suggestions that the emergence of the European identity would result in a boost in public support for European integration,¹⁴ Euroscepticism has not stopped equipping itself with identity-related problems, especially over the past three decades. By placing strong emphasis on nation and nationalism, many right-wing political parties fueled Eurosceptic attitudes among the European public opinion in many countries, from Austria to Denmark.¹⁵

While Eurosceptic tendencies were becoming easier to meet in European politics, the academic works aiming to define what Euroscepticism is and what the term does not imply by categorizing the attitudes began to increase. One of the most well-known attempts at this cause came from Paul Taggart in his article “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems,” which was published in 1998. According to Taggart, three different tendencies can be considered within the scope of Euroscepticism, which are the anti-integration position, opposing the current form of European integration based on its over-inclusivity, and opposing the current state of the EU by claiming its over-exclusivity.¹⁶ After saying that his use of the term “Euroscepticism” is encompassing in his article, Taggart defined the term as:

Euroscepticism expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.¹⁷

-
- 13 Jack Citrin and John Sides, “More than Nationals: How Identity Choice Matters in the New Europe,” in *Transnational Identities*, eds. Richard K. Hermann, Thomas Risse and Marilynn B. Brewer, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 170.
 - 14 Sean Carey, “Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?,” *European Union Politics*, 3 no. 4, (2002): 390.
 - 15 Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, and Carole J. Wilson, “Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?” *Comparative Political Studies* 35 no. 8, (October 2002): 965-989.
 - 16 Paul Taggart, “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems,” *European Journal of Political Research*, 33(3), 363-388. pp. 365-366.
 - 17 *Ibid.*, 366.

In 2000, Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart started to build their notable Euroscepticism typology. They shared the distinction between the “Soft” Euroscepticism and “Hard” Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism is described as an “...outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining members of the EU.”¹⁸ It is stated that while implementing this approach in reality is unattainable, Hard Euroscepticism implies “...the principled objection to the current form of European integration in the EU.”¹⁹

Szczerbiak and Taggart proposed that a political party can be Hard Eurosceptic if it is a single-issue anti-EU party or if the party blames the EU for being “...too capitalist/socialist/neo-liberal/bureaucratic, depending on ideological position (communist/conservative/socialist/populist).”²⁰ Given these, for categorizing one entity within the circle of Hard Euroscepticism, the entity should oppose the principles and very nature and foundations of European integration. Whereas, Soft Euroscepticism is defined as:

Soft Euroscepticism is where there is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU or where there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU trajectory.²¹

As the quotation from the working paper of Taggart and Szczerbiak suggests, Soft Euroscepticism is mostly linked to resentment for policies and interests instead of totally rejecting the European integration project. In other

-
- 18 Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, “Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union, the Euro and Europeanisation,” Proceedings of a Workshop held at the Sussex European Institute, sponsored by its Centre on European Political Economy, (23 June 2000).
 - 19 Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, “Europeanisation, Euroscepticism and Party Systems: Party-based Euroscepticism in the Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe,” *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 3 no. 1, (2002), 27.
 - 20 Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, “Crossing Europe: Patterns of Contemporary Party-Based Euroscepticism in EU Member States and the Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe,” SEI Working Paper no. 51, Opposing Europe Research Network Working Paper no. 6, (2002), 4.
 - 21 Ibid., 4.

words, it means a state of split on the perceived interests and solutions towards an issue between the Member or candidate states and the EU.²² For Hard Euroscepticism, however, the real fault line is not the policies, interests, or solutions to the issues but rather the direct existence of the integration, its aims, and the nature as the integration is being identified as an “enemy.”²³

While the term Euroscepticism is divided into two, which are Soft Euroscepticism and Hard Euroscepticism, Taggart and Szcerbiak have tried to reveal the differences among political parties from Central and Eastern European countries opposing the EU membership and the European integration in their quest to measure the role of the party systems in the emergence of party-based Euroscepticism in these countries.²⁴

Their typology faced some criticisms, and consequently, other definitions and typologies started to emerge in academic literature. One of those objections came from Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde in 2002. In their article, Kopecký and Mudde brought four main criticisms of the Euroscepticism definition of Szcerbiak and Taggart. They argued that Szcerbiak and Taggart’s concept of Euroscepticism is too broad, the distinction between Soft and Hard Euroscepticism blurs at some points, has uncertainties on criteria to differentiate two forms of Euroscepticism and is unable to test the details, paving the way for inconsistencies in estimation of the level of Euroscepticism in a specific country.²⁵

In connection with these comments, first, they designated two distinct categories, which are “diffuse support” and “specific support”. Diffuse support stands for the general idea of the EU (Europhile vs. Europhobe) while specific support is about the current implementation of European integration (EU-

22 Taggart and Szcerbiak, “Crossing Europe: Patterns of Contemporary Party-Based Euroscepticism in EU Member States and the Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe,” (2002), 4-5.

23 Ibid., 5.

24 Taggart and Szcerbiak, “Europeanisation, Euroscepticism and Party Systems: Party-based Euroscepticism in the Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe,” (2002), 23.

25 Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde, “The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe,” *European Union Politics* 3 no. 3, (September 2002), 300.

optimist vs. EU-pessimist).²⁶ Secondly, by taking this main distinction into consideration, they offered four categories, which are Euroenthusiasts, Europragmatists, Eurosceptics, and Eurorejects.

In this categorization, Euroscepticism is given as one of the pessimistic tendencies towards European integration, in addition to Eurorejects. More elaborate and rigorous categorizations to present details have become common in further typologies as Euroscepticism studies have grown. Taggart and Szczerbiak criticized this tendency by claiming that the more a theory is complicated and refined, the harder it is to categorize actors within these refined categorizes.²⁷ Nevertheless, this tendency has continued as in the case of those of Chris Flood and Simon Usherwood. Similar to the typology provided by Kopecký and Mudde, Flood and Usherwood built their categorization based on the criticisms and the severity level of opposition to European integration.²⁸

According to Flood and Usherwood, current typologies cannot emphasize the nuances and wrongly put some groups, whose motives are a mixture of support and opposition in reality, into the basket of Eurosceptics.²⁹ In order to overcome these shortcomings, a category made up of six different articles was offered. These articles are maximalist (further development of integration as much and fast as possible), reformist (in favor of integration with an emphasis on reform on the troubled parts), gradualist (slow and assured advance of the integration), minimalist (while accepting the current state, willing to stop further moves), revisionist (seeking to turn into a previous stage) and

-
- 26 Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde, "The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe," *European Union Politics* 3 no. 3, (September 2002), 300.
 - 27 Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, "Theorising party-based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement and Causality," 8th Biannual International Conference of the European Union Studies Association conference (March 2003), 16.
 - 28 Hande Gürdağ Uzuner, "Şüphenin Gölgesinde Birlik: Avrupa Şüpheliği'nin Göç Dalgaları ve Artan Sağ Popülizm Çerçevesinde İncelenmesi, İtalya Örneği" (PhD thesis, Ankara University, 2024), 84.
 - 29 Christopher Flood and Simon Usherwood, "Positions, Dispositions, Transitions: A Model of Group Alignment on EU Integration," 55th Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association, University of Leeds, (April 2005).

rejectionist (complete rejection of the integration project and initial “no” to accession).³⁰ In another article, they applied this categorization to three political parties: the British Conservative Party, French UMP (*Union pour une Majorité Populaire*), and Polish PiS (Law and Justice).³¹

Catharina Sørensen is another important academic providing a different Euroscepticism typology. This typology primarily focuses on showing different motives that led to Euroscepticism and differentiating levels of Eurosceptic attitudes among the EU Member States. According to Sørensen's typology, there can be Eurosceptic motives shaped around economic, sovereignty-based, democratic deficit, and political reasons.³² The main aim of the typology is to put an emphasis on different causes for Euroscepticism witnessed in different EU countries and different levels of intensity, rather than just labeling a country or a group Eurosceptic.

In 2010, Cécile Leconte made a significant contribution to the academic literature on Euroscepticism with his book *Understanding Euroscepticism*. Leconte identified four variations of Euroscepticism, which indicate that the term is not a monolithic concept; rather, there are more than one Euroscepticisms interacting with each other.³³

The first variation is “utilitarian Euroscepticism,” which refers to the questions raised by an individual or a group as to the benefits of integration or the distributional impacts of the integration project.³⁴ The second one is “political Euroscepticism,” problematizing issues of subsidiarity and supranationalism while “value-based Euroscepticism” deals with the EU’s interference in social issues in which societal values are specifically important, such as abortion and

30 Flood and Usherwood, “Positions, Dispositions, Transitions: A Model of Group Alignment on EU Integration,” 55th Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association, University of Leeds, (April 2005), 6.

31 Christopher Flood, and Simon Usherwood, “Ideological Factors in Party Alignments on the EU: A Comparison of Three Cases,” EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal, (May 2007).

32 Catharina Sørensen, “Love me, Love me not... A Typology of public euroscepticism,” SEI Working Paper no. 101; EPERN Working Paper no. 19, (2008).

33 İlhan Aras, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye’de Euroseptisizm*, (İstanbul: Sentez, 2015), 110.

34 Cécile Leconte, *Understanding Euroscepticism*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 46.

divorce.³⁵ The last category is “Cultural anti-Europeanism,” featuring opposition to the integration on the basis of rejection of an idea of Europe vis-à-vis national values.³⁶

Bernhard Weßels is another theoretician developing a system of differentiation of Euroscepticism. According to his formulation, there are adamant Eurosceptics and critical Europeans.³⁷ In this typology, the author tried to spotlight the links between European identity and Euroscepticism with an emphasis on the negative correlation between these two.³⁸ Weßels argues that adamant Eurosceptics tend to support the demise of the European integration project; critical Europeans are likely to ask for solutions to issues in integration while Eurosceptics are in between.³⁹

Last but not least, Sofia Vasilopoulou dealt with typologies of Euroscepticism with her doctoral thesis and later works. In her works primarily focusing on extreme right-wing political parties, she supposes that party positions should be looked at with their views on European integration in “principle,” in “practice,” and as to “future.”⁴⁰ Established on this differentiation, Vasilopoulou also adds “cultural definition” into these parameters and gives three types of Euroscepticism appropriated by extreme right-wing political parties. The first one is “Rejectionist Euroscepticism,” acknowledging common European features but opposing the EU in principle and its institutional structure by underlining the primacy of the nation state and sovereignty.⁴¹ The second type is “Conditional Euroscepticism,” which does not reject the integration in principle but rejects the legitimacy of the supranational institutions and their decisions in favor of European cooperation based on nation state interests and

35 Cécile Leconte, *Understanding Euroscepticism*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 50, 57.

36 Ibid., 60.

37 Bernhard Weßels, “Discontent and European Identity: Three Types of Euroscepticism,” *Acta Politica* 42, (2007), 288.

38 Ibid., 289.

39 Weßels, “Discontent and European Identity: Three Types of Euroscepticism,” (2007), 304.

40 Sofia Vasilopoulou, “Varieties of Euroscepticism: The Case of the European Extreme Right,” *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 5 issue 1, (2009), 6.

41 Sofia Vasilopoulou, *Euroscepticism and the Radical Right: Domestic strategies and party system dynamics*, (PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2010), 71.

intergovernmentalism.⁴² “Compromising Euroscepticism” is the third type offered. This type is inclined to approve of cultural, principal, and practical aspects of European integration while the opposition is mostly directed at the future of integration, which is an ever-closer union.⁴³

§ 2.2 Case Selection

This thesis is a humble attempt to examine the leftist intellectual reflections on European integration during the 1960s by employing the conceptual framework of Euroscepticism. The subject, Turkey-EEC relations and public opinion towards it, is still on the agenda of Turkish politics. Turkey-EU relations can be traced back to 31 July 1959, when Turkey first applied for associate membership to the EEC.⁴⁴ Despite more than half a century, the journey, which has been named “long and narrow road,”⁴⁵ is yet to be over.

The relations between the EU and Turkey, a candidate to the EU for 20 years, are a topic on which many scholarly and non-scholarly texts have been produced, numerous discussions have been held, and various divergent opinions have been expressed. Especially the 1990s and the 2000s were peak decades in terms of the frequency of these works and discussions. However, most of these have given relatively little attention to the formative years of the relations. Attention has been given to account for the “big” and recent events like the establishment of the Customs Union, Turkey’s candidacy in the Helsinki Summit, and the opening of the accession negotiations.

Similarly, different tendencies circulated among Turkish intellectuals and broader public opinion have not been given enough voice to be heard in proportion to the importance and impact of the period. Mentioning the lack of

42 Sofia Vasilopoulou, *Euroscepticism and the Radical Right: Domestic strategies and party system dynamics*, (PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2010), 71-72.

43 Ibid., 72.

44 İlhan Tekeli, and Selim İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu* vol. 1, (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993), 127.

45 “Uzun İnce Bir Yol” Belgeseli, YouTube / T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Avrupa Birliği Başkanlığı, accessed 2 April 2025, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aEQxU86PfS4>.

academic interest in the broader public opinion towards the EU, for example, Ali Çarkoğlu said: “Despite the fact that relations between Turkey and the EU date back to 1959, there has been very little academic discussion concerning the mass support for this relations.”⁴⁶

Both the 1960s and the specific topic of the idea of EEC in Turkey deserve a close examination because of the significant domestic and foreign policy transformations witnessed in Turkey during the period. Changing societal and intellectual attitudes towards foreign policy and emerging public opinion, including the left-wing public opinion, which was also vocal on foreign policy issues, made the period abundant in sources to reflect on.

In parallel with the global trend in the 1960s when people took an eager interest in social and political developments all around the world with the Vietnam War, the anti-war movement, the civil rights movement, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and student protests⁴⁷ Turkish public opinion emerged as a vivid forum in which various political topics were discussed. Turkey-EEC relations, as an important foreign policy subject with strong economic implications, were one of the topics of the public debates conducted in journals, daily newspapers, and among the political elite in political parties and at the Turkish National Assembly.

Turkish left, which started to be effective and visible during the 1960s for the first time in Turkey, was not an exception to this phenomenon. In connection with the general vitalization of public opinion and politics, the Turkish left started to grow in the legal and political realm, which was epitomized by

46 Ali Çarkoğlu, “Societal Perceptions of Turkey’s EU Membership: Causes and Consequences of Support for EU Membership,” in *Turkey and European Integration*, eds. Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 22.

47 For major international developments in the 1960s and their impacts on the public opinion see: Christopher B. Strain, *The Long Sixties*, (Wiley Blackwell: 2017); G. Ray Funkhouser, “The Issues of the Sixties: An Exploratory Study in the Dynamics of Public Opinion,” *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 37 no. 1, (Spring 1973), 62-75; Ralph B. Levering, “Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and American Politics since the 1960s,” *Diplomatic History* 13 no: 3, (Summer 1989), 383-393.

TİP's entry into the Turkish Parliament in the 1965 elections.⁴⁸ EEC and Turkey's place within this organization was taken as a topic by the Turkish left to be discussed and used to disseminate their ideologically loaded approaches to wider Turkish public opinion. Examining the discussions on the EEC, the nature and aims of the organization, advantages and disadvantages of the institution to Turkey, therefore, can be an informative study to explore different opinions circulating among people. This study can enrich our understanding of both the political and intellectual history of modern Turkey.

In order to explore the discussions, journals published by Turkish leftist intellectuals alongside other primary and secondary sources can be used to trace back and navigate how and in which contexts these discussions began and evolved in time. These journals have already served as sources for many studies, including master's and PhD theses dealing with the period and history of the Turkish left.⁴⁹ However, most of the studies covering the Turkish left's

48 Mustafa Şener, *Türkiye Solunda Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset: YÖN, MDD ve TİP*, (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2015), 258.

49 There are considerable number of academic theses written in Turkish universities making leftist journals and Turkish left's approach to foreign policy their main problematic. Among many, the following studies can be provided to show the range of appropriation of these journals and leftist politics in recent academic works: Songül Aydın, "12 Mart Öncesinde ANT Dergisi," MA Thesis, Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi, 2008; Mert Dikici, "YÖN Dergisi ve Türk Dış Politikası," MA Thesis, Yıldız Technical University, 2007; Hikmet Güner, "Aydınlık Hareketi ve Dış Politika (1974-1980)," MA Thesis, Ankara Üniversitesi, 2018; İhsan Ömer Atagenç, "1960-1980 Dönemi Türkiye Solunun Kıbrıs Politikası," PhD Thesis, Gazi Üniversitesi, 2015; Tülay Arpa, "1960-1975 Yılları Arasında Sol Basında Türk-ABD İlişkileri," MA Thesis, Pamukkale University, 2005; Serpil Güvenç, "Socialist perspectives on foreign policy issues: The case of TİP in the 1960s," MA Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2005; Emre Turku, "Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik Dergisi ve Türkiye'de Maoculuk Düşüncesinin Gelişimi," PhD Thesis, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, 2025; Özgün Dinçer, "Türk Solu Dergisi (1967-1970) ve Milli Demokratik Devrim Stratejisi," MA Thesis, Ankara University, 2006; Emre Sürer, "Türk Solu İnşasında Yön Hareketi," MA Thesis, Kütahya Dumlupınar University, 2018; Nuran Aytemur, "The Turkish Left and Nationalism: The Case of YÖN," MA Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2000; Muhlis Kara, "ANT ve YÖN Dergilerinde İktidar Tartışmaları," MA Thesis, Dokuz Eylül University, 2019; Ergül Ceyhan, "YÖN Dergisi ve Eğitime Bakış Açısı (Köy Enstitüleri)," MA Thesis, Siirt University, 2024; Atıl Cem Çiçek, "Türk Siyasal Yaşamında YÖN Dergisi (1961-1967)," PhD Thesis, İnönü University, 2013; Onur İşçi, "Les Relations entre

attitude towards foreign policy seem to give relatively less importance to Turkey-EEC relations in comparison to the emphasis made on the relations with the US and the USSR. Nonetheless, the topic deserves more attention because of its importance for Turkish foreign policy during the 1960s and 1970s. It can also reveal the nuances offered by different circles of society on a controversial subject, which continues to be a significant topic for Turkish politics.

Considering this, this thesis aims to select the EEC as the main discussion subject to be searched in Turkish leftist publications. By way of this, this study provides insights concerning Turkish leftist visions in the first years of the EEC and Turkey-EEC relations, as the leftist thought was constructing itself. Moreover, a more framed and limited study in terms of its focus, the EEC, and Turkey's position in it, can also be beneficial for intense examination of the research subject.

§ 2.3 Methodology

In order to fulfill its aim, which is seeking the hows and whys of the mainstream Turkish public opinion and specifically Turkish leftist intellectuals' positioning towards the EEC, this thesis employs various sources. In addition to secondary sources and various primary sources such as daily newspapers, booklets, Turkish National Assembly minutes, election manifestos, political party programs, and journals, this study primarily focuses on the articles published in four leftist journals from the period, which are *YÖN*, *ANT*, *Aydınlık*, and *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*. These journals were examined in detail, the articles on international developments, Turkish foreign policy, and specifically Turkish-EEC were focused on and critically evaluated, and their rhetoric, discourse, and ideological approach to the topics were analyzed.

The selection of these journals is a result of a few research-related concerns. Firstly, these journals complement each other in terms of the period. As

le Parti Ouvrier de Turquie et la Revue YÖN (1961-1965)," MA Thesis, Galatasaray University, 2019; Ersan Barkın, "YÖN Dergisi Yazılarında Demokrasi Anlayışı," MA Thesis, Gazi University, 2011.

the thesis aims to work on the period between the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol, following the events by selecting just one journal is not feasible for this study. It is because, for example, *YÖN*, which started to be published in 1961 until 1967 with some interruptions, does not cover the whole period examined in this thesis. Therefore, the thesis needs to employ some other journals that were published from 1967 onwards.

Secondly, the selection of these journals aims to provide perspectives of different factions within the emerging Turkish left. Although the 1960s was the decade of emergence for the Turkish left and real ideological ramifications came to the stage from the 1970s onwards, it does not mean that every leftist journal and intellectual share an entirely identical ideological perspective in the period. Considering this reality, *YÖN*, *ANT*, *Aydınlık*, and *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık* have been selected for detailed examination as these journals are representative works to present nuances and differences among the Turkish left during the 1960s and early 1970s. Plus, their similarities and differences regarding the subject of this thesis, the Turkey-EEC relations, can provide us with a more comprehensive image of the Turkish left and their way of dealing with the subject.

Lastly, working with more than one journal can widen the scope of the study and enable the study to make more informed comments by increasing the number of samples examined. There is no doubt that carrying out research by focusing on a single journal or newspaper might also provide comprehensive knowledge. Nevertheless, multiplying the number of studies can be beneficial for a study to grasp the similarities, differences, and nuances towards a specific subject. As this thesis aims to follow Turkish leftist intellectuals' opinions as to the EEC and the Turkey-EEC relations in a particular period, using more than one primary source can serve as a base for having a wider understanding of the period, the subject, and the sources.

Major Issues in European Integration: Perspectives of Turkish Public Opinion and Leftist Intelligentsia

In the 1960s, wider circles of Turkish society were giving more and more attention to foreign policy issues. The Cyprus Question was one of the main topics on which foreign policy issues were to be discussed by the public, with its central position both in domestic politics and foreign policy. Even though the Cyprus Question kept its crucial position in the foreign policy agenda, it was not the only problem in Turkish foreign policy. Apart from other topics such as the relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Turkey, the issues in the Middle East, like the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and Turkey's situation with its allies like the US and neighbors like Greece, there were also several other issues which were followed and commented on by Turkish intellectuals.

European integration was another topic in Turkish foreign policy, receiving more attention over time. Despite the fact that Turkey made an application

for association with the EEC in 1959 and signed an association agreement (Ankara Agreement) in 1963, the inner problems of Europe and the *raison d'être* of the EEC might not have been seen as of high importance compared to the Cyprus Question.

In international politics, the central issue was the Cold War, which divided Europe into two via an Iron Curtain “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic.”¹ A nuclear war possibility decreased considerably after the Cuban Missile Crisis, and small steps towards détente were taken;² nonetheless, the leading international order continued to be set by the Cold War and the bloc politics throughout the 1960s. Nevertheless, it does not mean that European issues were not on the agenda.

It can be seen that the leftist intellectuals were interested in developments in Europe and published articles in periodicals that featured the issues, bottlenecks, and future projections on developments occurring in the European continent and problems within the Western Bloc. The publications followed and narrated the events, crises, and novelties by not only considering these events in the scope of “possible effects on Turkey” angle, but also by transmitting the developments within their own and immediate meaning for the Western Bloc and Euro-Atlantic relations.

What was the point of transmitting news on a newly emerging common market initiative composed of only six Western European countries for Turkish leftist intellectuals? How did they depict European integration, the EEC, and other Western institutions? How did they contextualize/see the problems that arose between the members of the Western Bloc, such as the one between France and the UK, in the context of British membership in the EEC and France's attitude toward NATO? Can their attitudes be seen as “Eurosceptic”; if yes, which specific categories of Euroscepticism can the Turkish left be put in?

-
- 1 “The Sinews of Peace (‘Iron Curtain Speech’),” *International Churchill Society*, (Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri: 5 March 1946). <https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/>
 - 2 Brian White, “The Concept of Détente,” *Review of International Studies* 7 no. 3, (1981), 165.

Firstly, Turkish leftist intellectuals made a distinguishable effort to identify and interpret the institutions of the Western Bloc and their role in pursuing the current order in which Turkey is only a semi-peripheral and underdeveloped member. By emphasizing the history, aims, and actions of the institutions of Western alliance and European integration, Turkish leftist intellectuals tried to dissociate Turkey from these institutions and discourage Turkish public opinion from being a part of them, including the EEC. With this perspective, it can be argued that Turkish leftist intellectuals in the 1960s were almost entirely Eurosceptics in view of their conceptualization of European integration, its aim and nature, as well as rejection of Turkish membership.

Secondly, the European integration and problems that arose between the members, such as France, the UK, and the US, considerably impacted the Western Bloc and the international order Turkey was a part. As Turkish leftist intellectuals were seeking an alternative foreign policy positioning for Turkey -out of CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), IMF (International Monetary Fund), NATO, OECD (Organization for Economic Development and Co-operation), and other Western bloc institutions-, the inner tensions and problems might have been focused on closely to convince the Turkish public opinion that these institutions do not have a promising future; thus, alternative foreign policy options should be looked for.

Finally, they were willing to grasp the real meaning of European developments, including the French-American dispute and the French-British controversy on British membership in the EEC. It was essential to transmit it to the Turkish public according to their own ideological baggage, as nearly no one in Turkey was aware of what the EEC stood for during the 1960s.

For the sake of clarity and making the context clear, the chapter presents the major problems that were focused on by the Turkish leftist intelligentsia. Then, the chapter shows how the Turkish left read the European developments and gave meaning to them while analyzing the discourse and similarities and differences in their arguments.

§ 3.1 De Gaulle and Transatlantic Relations

There was a totally new international political context after the Second World War ended in 1945. As Germany, Japan, and Italy were defeated in the war, they were primarily out of power politics, at least for a while, and there were essentially two victors: The United States and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. As a consequence, the post-1945 world witnessed that an international order, which was political ideology and doctrine-oriented, had a tendency towards decolonization; Africa and Latin America had a substantial impact on international relations; and economy turned into a center topic in which economic development and welfare were seen as important as peace, balance of power and security.³ This new world was led by two great powers that emerged from the war. These superpowers aimed to achieve an international setting that benefited their interests, including political ideology and security.

With this vision, Soviet Russia saw the current political and military situation as a chance to shape Europe according to its political will, concerns, and interests. There were primarily two objectives of Moscow. One of them was securing the Russian western frontier, which lay ahead between Germany and its territory; and secondly, to achieve the first objective, establishing political regimes in Eastern Europe, which Moscow would trust and felt no security threats.⁴ Therefore, communist regimes in Eastern Europe started to be founded, such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, even if there was too little mass base for communist governments.⁵

In this context, Europe was a two-piece entity (if it is an entity) divided by an Iron Curtain, as Winston Churchill put forth. The other side of the continent tried to relieve itself from the catastrophe and destruction caused by the war. US aid, namely the Marshall Plan, was funneling money to Europe to give

3 Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914-1995)*, (İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2018), 319-321.

4 Tony Judt, *Postwar*, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), 129-130.

5 Ibid., 130.

sap to the European economy to create a vast, open, and integrated market for US exports and help Western Europe to support the US economy.⁶

As a continent sitting in the middle of world politics, Europe was a devastated land whose economic wealth had evaporated (once again, after the First World War), and the center of gravity of international politics went away from the continent. It shifted towards the US and the USSR. In short, Europe lost its position as a hegemon. Losing hegemony is about not retaining enough power to sustain the existing order. In a more Gramscian way, not having the power to maintain the existing order in the modern capitalist era means not having enough power in politics, economy, and even culture.⁷ But, while Europe was recovering from the economic, social, and political fatigue of the Second World War, some political figures in Europe started to take the political stage, aiming for a European comeback. One of the most prominent examples of this attitude was Charles de Gaulle.

De Gaulle aimed for a Europe in a Euro-Atlantic alliance but a more autonomous one, especially politically and militarily. He objected twice to British accession to the EEC, withdrew France from NATO's military column, and tried to develop a foreign policy not bound by bloc politics. Turkish leftist intellectuals focused to a considerable extent on France and de Gaulle's way of foreign policy, and sometimes, they even implicitly sympathized with his policies.

Charles de Gaulle became the first President of the Fifth French Republic in 1959, and his intentions were not limited to increasing the French state's capacity and reforming the state institutions. While carrying out reforms in France, he was also willing to re-give France a seat among the top tiers in international politics by way of keeping the distance towards the US and Western bloc and having nuclear capacity.⁸ In short, and therefore, de Gaulle aimed to create a France which is less dependent on bloc and alliance politics in its

6 Michelle Cinni, "From the Marshall Plan to EEC: Direct and Indirect Influences," in *The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After*, eds. Martin A. Schain, (Palgrave: 2001), 14.

7 T. J. Jackson Lears, "The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities," *The American Historical Review* 90 no. 3, (June 1985), 572.

8 Julian Jackson, *A Certain Idea of France: The Life of Charles de Gaulle*, (Penguin Random House UK: 2018), 587.

foreign policy steps. These steps, which extended from visiting Moscow in 1966 to “the empty chair crisis”⁹ in 1965, French withdrawal from NATO’s military wing to blocking the UK’s accession to the EEC, created problems between France and its Euro-Atlantic allies.¹⁰ In a period where bloc politics was the driving force in world affairs, France under de Gaulle recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the first major Western country to do so after 1950.¹¹ So, as can be seen through these examples, France during de Gaulle’s Presidency created an anomaly for bloc politics with its relations both within and outside of the Euro-Atlantic alliance system.

It does not mean for France to leave the Atlantic alliance and to stay unaligned or join the Soviet bloc. France remained a part of the Western Bloc throughout the Cold War, but numerous controversial policies were pursued by Gaullist France, causing the widening of the fault lines within the Western alliance. His actions were not compatible with those days’ “normal” in terms of foreign policy making and conduct, as Graham O’Dwyer puts it in a concise style:

-
- 9 Empty Chair Crisis refers to an important political development in which French absence in EEC meeting for 7 months upon inconclusive Council of the Ministers meetings in 1 July 1965. The meeting was about financing the Common Agricultural Policy. After the meeting, the French cabinet held an emergency meeting on the same day; and, French Permanent Representative to the EEC, Jean-Marc Boegner was withdrawn a few days later. As France declared that no French appearance would be in the Council and the Committee of Permanent Representatives meetings, French chair in these meetings remained empty for 7 seven month and it led to a deadlock situation. In January 1966, the problem was resolved with the Luxembourg Compromise which reflected de Gaulle’s view on the functioning of the EEC. Intergovernmental structure of the EEC was reiterated with the Luxembourg Compromise vis-a-vis supranational ambitions. On the Empty Chair Crisis, see: N. Piers Ludlow, “Challenging French Leadership in Europe: Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the Outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965-1966,” *Contemporary European History*, 8 no. 2, (1999): 231-348. On the Luxembourg Compromise, see: Geoffrey Garrett, “From the Luxembourg Compromise to Decisive Decision Making in the European Union,” *Electoral Studies*, 14 no. 3, (1995): 289-308.
- 10 James Ellison, “Separated by the Atlantic: The British and de Gaulle, 1958-1967,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 17 no. 4, (2006), 867.
- 11 Garret Martin, “Playing the China Card Revisiting France’s Recognition of Communist China 1963-1964,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 10 no. 1, (2008), 52.

De Gaulle was perhaps unfortunate to find himself in the Élysée during a period where the bi-polarity of the international system, the development of the European Economic Community, French membership of NATO, and reliance on the US for security “chipped away” at French independence.¹²

During de Gaulle’s Presidency, France proposed to guarantee European self-defense by proposing to use French nuclear weapons; however, it was also seen that de Gaulle was insisting on national autonomy when it comes to the use of these weapons,¹³ which led to discussions among France and its European allies. Or, Gaullist France seemed to act as the primary actor driving European integration forward, at least in an economic manner, but the 1960s witnessed French rejection of the UK as a member of the EEC.¹⁴

The European integration project was central to France’s foreign policy in the 1960s. It was mostly because France was one of the founders of the institution, and it yielded beneficial economic results for its members in the 1950s and 1960s. Nevertheless, actors and their motivations and expectations were also crucial for giving importance to the integration project. De Gaulle was a French President whose life had been shaped by Franco-German enmity and relations to a great extent. In spite of his later disappointment epitomized by his words “cordial potentiality,” the international political context characterized by bloc politics after 1945 compelled most of the European politicians, including de Gaulle, to work with their old foes.¹⁵

He saw Franco-German cooperation as an inseparable part of his intention to make Europe re-established and independent -of transatlantic ties-.¹⁶ So, it can be said that de Gaulle saw European integration as an instrument to

12 Graham O’Dwyer, *Charles de Gaulle, the International System and the Existential Difference*, (London and New York: Routledge: 2017), 12-13.

13 Edward A. Kolodziej, *French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press: 1974), 21.

14 Ibid., 21.

15 Carine Germond, “A ‘Cordial Potentiality?’: De Gaulle and the Franco-German Partnership, 1963-1969,” in *Globalizing de Gaulle*, eds. Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher and Garret Martin, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 43-44.

16 Ibid., 43.

achieve his foreign policy goals. These foreign policy goals seemed to demand the rejection of the UK from becoming an EEC member.

In his memoirs, *Memoirs of Hope*, Charles de Gaulle briefly defined his intentions while trying to keep France's distance from the US and NATO. He said that he followed a policy with "ultimate precaution" as to the Atlantic alliance, which he did not aim to leave the alliance; instead, he intended to disengage "...from the integration realized by NATO under American command..."¹⁷ Having connections with the countries of the Soviet Bloc, including and primarily with the USSR, he argued that he facilitated the way towards a détente by equipping the French state with nuclear arms, deterring any thought or consideration held by another country to attack.¹⁸

De Gaulle perceived the two-state system in which other countries are treated as just cards in a poker game, the US leadership in the Western bloc, with almost all rulings based on its visions and assessments, totally irrelevant and unacceptable in the 1960s world and for a nation-state.¹⁹ In the current setting, de Gaulle saw NATO membership as a type of subordination and dependence on the US, which could not comply with being an independent nation-state.²⁰ Therefore, he made efforts to create a foreign policy that was in dialogue with all state actors in international politics.

He also thought that a possible nuclear war would have probably taken stage in a limited geography, which de Gaulle estimated to be Western Europe, making being a part of NATO less meaningful for France in his political mentality and realization.²¹ Thus, he sought ways to distance French foreign policy from NATO and the US while strengthening ties with non-Western countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. As a direct consequence of this vision, France, between 1959 and 1966, disengaged itself from NATO while it

17 Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor*, trans. Terence Kilmartin. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 202.

18 Ibid., 202.

19 Serge Berstein, *The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958-1969*, trans. Peter Morris, (Paris: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 161.

20 O'Dweyer, *Charles de Gaulle, the International System and the Existential Difference*, 2017, 13.

21 Berstein, *The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958-1969*, 1989, 161.

was still in the Western bloc in case of a powerful and unified Germany and a potential enmity with the USSR targeting Europe.²²

As de Gaulle dismissed such a Soviet action to a great extent,²³ France withdrew from NATO's integrated military structure through the Ailleret-Lemnitzer agreement in August 1967, which caused significant problems for NATO, especially in the evacuation of military bases located in France.²⁴

As France was getting estranged from the US and NATO, one of the main instruments used within French foreign policy was the EEC, for sure. France was one of the fathers of the idea of an economically integrated and cooperating Europe. In the literature examining the meaning of European integration in the eyes of French governments under de Gaulle's Presidency, traditionalist accounts have emphasized the ideological and geopolitical utilization of the EEC. The main idea here is that France considered European integration as a tool to overcome American hegemony over Europe, have an autonomous continent outside of American will and design, assert France's and Europe's role as global powers, and use the EEC not just as an economic cooperation but as a base for more integrated political organization to ensure Europe's freedom.²⁵

Although these purely ideological and geopolitical narratives have been challenged by relatively novel revisionist accounts prioritizing the importance of political and economic features shaping de Gaulle's policies towards the EEC,²⁶ there is no doubt about the place the EEC occupied in French foreign policy under the given circumstances. That was the context and reasoning behind de Gaulle's opposition to British membership in the EEC.

Firstly, de Gaulle opposed the UK in the EEC because he perceived that the EEC was a base for autonomous Europe in terms of security and defense.

22 Kolodziej, *French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou*, 1974, 51.

23 Bernstein, *The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958-1969*, 1989, 161.

24 Maurice Vaïsse, "France and NATO : An History," *Politique Etrangère* 4 (2009), 142.

25 Andrew Moravcsik, "Charles de Gaulle and Europe," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 14 no. 1, (Winter 2012), 54-56.

26 See Andrew Moravcsik, "Charles de Gaulle and Europe," (Winter 2012) for a brief and concise examination of traditional and revisionist accounts shaping French policy towards the EEC during de Gaulle's term in Presidency.

The Atlantic alliance should not have subordinated Europe and its independent nature; there must not have been a place for the UK in the EEC as “Britain was too tied, and too contended to be tied, to the United States.”²⁷ According to de Gaulle, as the Nassau Agreement demonstrated, the British nuclear abilities were not independent, and the US had an essential part in the British nuclear program, which made the UK too tied and “special” to the US.²⁸

In this sense, de Gaulle evaluated the UK’s accession as a pragmatic choice made by the UK and the US, which would be identified as “an American trojan horse” within the EEC²⁹ disrupting French efforts to use European integration as an *equipoise vis-à-vis* the US. While British leftists objected to British accession to the EEC by claiming that it would have harmed the relations between the UK and the Commonwealth, which was the tie having the potential for the UK to arm itself to cut the “special relationship” with the US and achieve its independence,³⁰ de Gaulle seemed to think the exact opposite. He probably thought that the special relationship between the UK and the US would not have disappeared. Still, it would have been used to undermine the European integration project and European autonomy over the US. Some arguments highlighting the US insistence on British application to the EEC can support de Gaulle’s attitude; however, the impact of these requests was probably limited or not at the level of being decisive as economic and domestic political factors seem to draw the real picture.³¹

Secondly, de Gaulle’s rejection of the British application was also based on a claim of difference. He said that “...in all her doings very marked and very

27 Douglas Johnson, “De Gaulle and France’s Role in the World,” in *De Gaulle and Twentieth Century France*, eds. Hugh Gough and John Horne, (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), 93-94.

28 Matthew Jones, *The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent* vol. 1, (Routledge: 2017), 450.

29 James Chace, “Great Britain looked to France like America’s Trojan Horse,” *The New York Times*, (3 May 1970). <https://www.nytimes.com/1970/05/03/archives/great-britain-looked-to-france-like-americas-trojan-horse-de-gaulle.html>

30 Andrew Mullen, “The British left: For and Against Europe? A historical survey,” *Capital & Class* 321 issue 3 (Autumn 2007), 222.

31 Kristian Steinnes, “The European Challenge: Britain’s EEC Application in 1961,” *Contemporary European History* 7 no. 1 (March 1998), 62-63.

original habits and traditions. In short, the nature, the structure, the very situation that are England's differ profoundly from those of the continentals".³² However, these cultural and identity-based assumptions tended to cover other political aims even though these were not entirely useless to understanding the actors' positioning. De Gaulle was also getting cold feet on British accession because it would have changed the whole setting and power balance within the EEC, where the driving force was the Franco-German compromise, and the French were the more dominant part if a comparison was needed.³³ Thus, de Gaulle probably did not want to lose this beneficial status.

Thirdly, some arguments claim de Gaulle's utilization of rejections towards the UK as a tool to boost his domestic political situation. The rejection speech broadcasted live gave the impression that de Gaulle was at the driver's seat of the EEC, which helped the French President to gain more popularity at home.³⁴ The vetoes might have been seen as valuable instruments to assert France's leading role in international politics, which was an aim of de Gaulle in his policies.

Even though Turkish leftist intellectuals were not loyal admirers of de Gaulle and France, they had more or less a tendency to be sympathetic towards de Gaulle. Apart from Gaullist France's policies' significance because of their substantial impact on European and transatlantic relations, Turkish leftist journals in the 1960s covered de Gaulle and French foreign policy during his Presidency in a considerable manner to show their audience that an autonomous -if not independent- foreign policy is possible even within the Western bloc -if quitting it is not rational and practical-. They wanted a foreign policy similar to that of France in the 1960s, which is multidimensional in terms of policy orientation, allows engaging proactively with Third World countries,

32 Richard Davis, "Euroscepticism and Opposition to British Entry into the EEC, 1955-75," *Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique* XXII no. 2, (2017), 3-4.

33 Douglas Johnson, "De Gaulle and France's Role in the World," in *De Gaulle and Twentieth Century France*, (1994), 93-94.

34 Ibid., 84.

ensures a space for a country to create and pursue initiatives outside of the Western Bloc, and prioritizes national sovereignty and independence.³⁵

After being informed about the inner tensions within the Western Bloc and their instrumentalization by different parties in the bloc, examining the British case also offers valuable insight when the main aim of this thesis, analyzing the Turkish leftist intellectuals' attitudes towards European integration, is taken into account. It is because, first, the UK was a country seeking accession to the EEC like Turkey in the 1960s and early 1970s. Seeing discussions made on similar topics in a country that was a leading player in the discussions (France's veto for the UK's EEC membership, de Gaulle's interpretation of the UK's primary goals to become an EEC member, and so on) can contribute to our understanding of the period and the significant problematics of the European integration project. Second, an examination may reveal the extent of similarity of discourses appropriated by leftist intellectuals in different parts of the world and help researchers look deeply into the circulation of ideas, ideology, and related discourse. Last but not least, British accession was one of the hot topics of the European political agenda in the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, giving some details can benefit this thesis as the effort provides valuable information on the context in which Turkish leftist intellectuals reflected.

35 A few examples which this study also examines are: İdris Küçükömer, "Amerikan Hegemonya paradoksu – De Gaulle ve dünyanın kaderi," *YÖN*, vol. 100, (26 February 1965): 16; "De Gaulle'den örnek alalım," *YÖN*, vol. 110, (7 May 1965): 10; "General de Gaulle ne istiyor?" *YÖN*, vol. 60, (6 February 1963): 13; Hüseyin Baş, "NATO kovulmalıdır," *ANT*, vol. 50, (12 December 1967), 7; Aydınlik Dergisi Kurucuları, "Aydınlik Görüşlerini Açıklıyor: Dünya, Türkiye ve Devrimci Mücadele," *Aydınlik*, vol. 1, (November 1968), p. 14.

§ 3.2 British Applications for Membership to the EEC

The relations between the UK and the EEC were complex from the outset. The UK was not part of the Six³⁶ (Belgium, Federal Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) when the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Paris Treaty, was signed in 1951. It wanted to be part of it in time as a result of a variety of reasons. Only the third application yielded a positive outcome though, and the accession treaty, which entered into force on 1 January 1973, was signed by Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, who saw membership as his primary goal in 1972.³⁷

With different views in British public opinion, in 1961, the UK applied for the first time to be a full member of the EEC during Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's incumbency. Despite the unsuccessful result because of de Gaulle's veto, the first application was significant for British foreign policy. The application demonstrated a disengagement from post-1945 British foreign policy,³⁸ foreign policy imagination in which the UK was a hegemon/or one of the hegemons, at least, and rearrangement of the British foreign policy priorities in the face of new realities in an international political context. Mixed public opinion and the British government's hesitation while announcing its decision to apply for full membership can be followed in Macmillan's address to the House of Commons on 31 July 1961.³⁹

36 Henry L. Mason, "Ratification," in *The European Coal and Steel Community*, (Springer Dordrecht: 1955), 9.

37 Jonathan Davis, "Labour's Political Thought: The Soviet influence in the interwar years," in *The British Labour Party and the Wider World*, eds. Paul Corthorn and Jonathan Davis, (London and New York: Tauris, 2008), 70.

38 Kristian Steinnes, "The European Challenge: Britain's EEC Application in 1961," (March 1998), 61.

39 "Address given by Harold Macmillan on the United Kingdom's application for membership to the EC," (31 July 1961), [https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/address_given_by_harold_macmillan_on_the_united_kingdom_s_application_for_membership_to_the_ec_31_july_1961-en-a5c95873-acao-4e9f-be93-53a36918041d.html#:~:text=On%2031%20July%201961%2C%20Harold,European%20Economic%20Community%20\(EEC\).](https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/address_given_by_harold_macmillan_on_the_united_kingdom_s_application_for_membership_to_the_ec_31_july_1961-en-a5c95873-acao-4e9f-be93-53a36918041d.html#:~:text=On%2031%20July%201961%2C%20Harold,European%20Economic%20Community%20(EEC).)

The address was highly cautious as it emphasized that any British, Commonwealth, and European Free Trade Association interests would not be harmed by any future British move to join the EEC. It was underlined that making a formal application was necessary to comprehensively explore the advantages and disadvantages of becoming a full member. Macmillan concludes the speech by saying that without consultation with the Commonwealth and approval by the House, the government did not sign any agreement and did not burden the UK with any legal responsibility.⁴⁰

The 1967 application was the second attempt of the British governments to achieve the aim of joining the EEC. The application was made by Harold Wilson, the UK's Prime Minister from the Labour Party. In similarity with the address made by Harold Macmillan in 1961, Wilson also gave a speech addressing the House of Commons on 2 May 1967 and informing of the government's decision to present an application to the EEC. When the content of this address is examined in comparison with the earlier example, it appears that Wilson was more optimistic and willing about the membership. Despite accepting that there were "major issues" to discuss during the membership negotiations; however, he said that "...the Government believe that there is nothing either in the Treaty of Rome or in the practical working of the Community which need make them insoluble."⁴¹

Wilson seemed to be more aware of -and willing to make it known to the public that- ongoing European integration was not only an economic initiative but also a political one from which the UK should not stay away. Wilson said that his government's appeal to the EEC was directly related to its recognition of the importance of the recent developments that occurred in Europe towards

40 "Address given by Harold Macmillan on the United Kingdom's application for membership to the EC," (31 July 1961), [https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/address_given_by_harold_macmillan_on_the_united_kingdom_s_application_for_membership_to_the_ec_31_july_1961-en-a5c95873-acao-4e9f-be93-53a36918041d.html#:~:text=On%2031%20July%201961%2C%20Harold,European%20Economic%20Community%20\(EEC\).](https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/address_given_by_harold_macmillan_on_the_united_kingdom_s_application_for_membership_to_the_ec_31_july_1961-en-a5c95873-acao-4e9f-be93-53a36918041d.html#:~:text=On%2031%20July%201961%2C%20Harold,European%20Economic%20Community%20(EEC).)

41 "Statement by Harold Macmillan on the United Kingdom's application for membership to the EC," (London: 2 May 1967)," https://www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-do66-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/35d99c8a-od73-4797-boeb-e2ed9c8bae6c/Resources#680afb40-143e-484b-b430-881db671d1ec_en&overlay

political unity and the necessity for the UK to have a role in it, especially bearing in mind that this European unity is essential for the continent to achieve its full economic and international political potential, which is significant aspects for power projection and having global political influence.⁴²

All the earlier attempts remained in vain. The UK applied for the third time with more hope as de Gaulle, the main person responsible for the failure of the earlier two processes, was no longer the French President after he resigned from office in 1969. As part of the first enlargement of the EEC, the UK was among the accession countries in 1973, as were Denmark and Ireland.⁴³

On 22 January 1972, the very day the accession treaty was signed by Edward Heath, the Conservative Prime Minister, made a speech. This one was more “European” in the sense that it evaluated the role of Europe in world affairs. Nonetheless, the speech seems to aim at easing the discussions at home. He said that every member of the EEC stayed tied to its own national identity, history, and tradition, but it did not mean that this tendency would prevent them from embracing the common European destiny, interests, and heritage.⁴⁴

The complex story of the British position in European integration is not limited to this. In 1975, UK citizens were asked if they preferred to stay in the EEC or not through the first referendum in British history to seek a resolution to unending discussions.⁴⁵

But the question here is why the UK initially stayed out of European integration. Why did later alignment attempts in the 1960s and 1970s always give rise to highly contentious debates in the country? And what was the position

42 “Statement by Harold Macmillan on the United Kingdom's application for membership to the EC,” (London: 2 May 1967),” https://www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-do66-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/35d99c8a-od73-4797-boeb-e2ed9c8bae6c/Resources#680afb40-143e-484b-b430-881db671d1ec_en&overlay

43 Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert, “Introduction,” in *European Union Enlargement*, eds. Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 2.

44 “Speech by Edward Heath,” (Brussels: 22 January 1972), https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/speech_by_edward_heath_brussels_22_january_1972-en-45bb74bd-554c-49d4-8212-9144ce2e8c1d.html

45 David Buttler and Uwe Kitzinger, *The 1975 Referendum*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 54.

of the British left on European integration and Britain's role in it? How did British concerns differ from Turkish mainstream and leftist ones? All these questions are related to the identification of the essence and aims of European integration by British public opinion and intellectuals, and how they perceived the integration. The answers found in this section might enable one to see the similarities and differences in the discourse in two simultaneous accession countries and give meaning to common and dissonant features.

Four main factors may explain the British attitude. These factors can be categorized as international politics, concerns over national sovereignty, economic circumstances, and cultural identification. These four factors shaped British policy and public opinion towards Europe, European integration, and the UK's place in it.

Regarding international politics, there is no doubt that the world was not the same vis-à-vis the world before the Second World War. Great powers of the pre-Second World War world, such as France and Italy, shrank; Germany was defeated, and its industrial capabilities and manpower were damaged immensely; and there were only two great powers that brought "bipolarism" into international politics, which were the United States and the Soviet Union.⁴⁶ When it comes to the UK, despite being one of the victors of the War, it was suffering a huge trade gap and waning industrial capacity, which necessitated the country to get American aid and give up some old habits and promises such as colonies like India, mandates like Palestina, guarantees given to Turkey and Greece.⁴⁷ As various British governments' main priorities focused more on the "homeland" to fix the economic and social problems, the reality that the British Empire was not at the center of international power politics became more evident.

In such circumstances, the UK tried adapting to the new reality. In this reality, it became a member of the Western Bloc organizations, including NATO, and accepted to be under the US nuclear defensive umbrella. Nevertheless, many politicians facing this new reality still tried to believe and make the British public believe that the UK still had enough power to retain its

46 Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, (New York: Random House, 1987), 357.

47 Ibid., 367-368.

global and unique position. Before Harold Wilson spoke to “...Britain’s frontiers as being ‘on the Himalayas’...”⁴⁸ after his election victory in 1964, Winston Churchill’s “Three Majestic Circles” concept epitomized the view of the unique and still important position of the UK in world politics. In his address to the Conservative Party Annual Conference in 1948, Churchill said the following:

As I look out upon the future of our country in the changing scene of human destiny I feel the existence of three great circles among the free nations and democracies. The first for us is naturally the British Commonwealth and Empire with all that comprises. Then there is also the English speaking world, centring upon the United States, in which we, Canada, and the other British Dominions play so important a part. And finally there is a United Europe. I wish I had a blackboard. I would make a picture for you. I don't suppose it would get hung in the Royal Academy, but it would illustrate the point I am anxious for you to hold in your minds. These three majestic circles are co-existent, and if they are linked together there is no force or combination which could overthrow them, or even challenge them effectively. Now if you think of the three interlinked circles you will see that we are the only country which has a great part in every one of them. We stand in fact at the very centre of the seaways and perhaps of the airways also, we have the opportunity of joining them all together.⁴⁹

As seen in this passage, Churchill proposed that the UK was present in the three crucial cooperation units shaping British foreign policy. These are the Commonwealth, the special relations between the US and the UK, and Europe. The idea basically signifies that the UK sustains its global power role as it was at the heart of every cooperation area. Nonetheless, it became a difficult task for post-Second World War Britain as the rest of the century was

48 Jonathan Davis, “Labour’s Political Thought: The Soviet influence in the interwar years,” in *The British Labour Party and the Wider World*, (2008), 65.

49 Anne Deighton, “Britain and the Three Interlocking Circles,” in *Europe 1945-1990s*, ed. Antonio Varsori, (Macmillan Press: 1995), 155.

defined as a period of relative decline for the UK.⁵⁰ Despite its inability to correspond to those days' international political reality, the idea persisted until the late 1960s and constituted a political base for British ignorance and low interest in the integration project in continental Europe.⁵¹

This tendency was not specific to the Labour Party or the Conservatives, as both largely overlooked European integration in their foreign policy visions. They carried the same baggage, which ignored Europe in exchange for British relations with the Commonwealth, excluding initial positive thoughts of Labour in the late 1940s on integration's possible advantages for a socialist Britain to pursue a leading role in global politics.⁵² This overlook and post-1945 British foreign policy vision implying the uniqueness of the UK triggered a backlash for British application to the EEC in the 1960s, which was observed in Charles de Gaulle's tendency towards the UK and his vetoes of British accession.

Increasing divergences from the idea of central and supreme Britain became more visible via British applications to the EEC in the 1960s. The British governments' wish to be a part of the European integration project meant changes in the political motives and perceptions. Rather than sticking to the idea of "three circles", British governments seemed to have a preference in line with their capacities and political priorities in EEC applications. Balancing a French or Federal German leadership in Europe and being a part of decision-making processes might have been among those priorities.⁵³

The UK also kept itself away from the initial stages of European integration because of concerns about national sovereignty. Mostly overlapping with Britain's unique position in global politics, breach of national sovereignty was

50 Michael J. Turner, *Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century*, (Continuum: 2010): VII.

51 Davis, "Euro scepticism and Opposition to British Entry into the EEC, 1955-75," (2017), 4.

52 Nicholas Crowson and James McKay, "Britain in Europe? Conservative and Labour Attitudes to European Integration since the Second World War," in *The Primacy of Foreign Policy in British History, 1660-2000*, eds. William Mulligan and Brendan Simms, (Palgrave Macmillan: 2010).

53 Kristian Steinnes, "The European Challenge: Britain's EEC Application in 1961," (March 1998), 72-73.

always a core point for both the Conservatives and Labour in discussions regarding European integration and British presence in it. The loss of sovereignty argument in the context of British accession was one of the fault lines between the British left and the European integration project. The left in Britain claimed that a possible British membership in the EEC would prevent them from carrying out an alternative economic strategy, including a socialist program, state interventionism, planning, and protectionism in trade.⁵⁴

The supranationalism was constantly criticized by the Labour governments. While the Labour supported and was a part of the European Recovery Program, Council of Europe, European Coal and Steel Community, and European Defence Community, it kept its distance during the process of establishment of the ECSC on a supranational basis and preferred not to be a part of it.⁵⁵

Discussions on the UK's position in Europe led to tense debates among intellectuals and politicians. However, the fundamental disagreement was between the members of the same ideological chambers rather than across the classical right-left divide.⁵⁶ Hesitations to make the UK a part of the EEC due to concerns about sovereignty were also part of Conservative Party members' thought balloons, which even impacted inner-party divisions. During the first application in 1961, the British Prime Minister compared the discussions on British membership to the EEC with the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, another big fault line breaking the Conservative Party into pieces for a generation.⁵⁷ In the same way, during the third application leading to British membership, a Member of the Parliament from the Conservative Party, Enoch Powell, challenged Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath by asserting that this membership would cost sovereignty to the UK.⁵⁸

54 Davis, "Euroscepticism and Opposition to British Entry into the EEC, 1955-75," (2017), 9.

55 Andrew Mullen, "The British left: For and Against Europe? A historical survey," (Autumn 2007), 220.

56 Stephen George, "The Intellectual Debate in Britain on the European Union," Research and Policy Paper No. 5, (October 1998), 6.

57 Davis, "Euroscepticism and Opposition to British Entry into the EEC, 1955-75," (2017), 9.

58 Ibid., 9.

The Suez Crisis in 1956, which showed the necessity for the UK to pursue a more bloc and alliance-based approach to preserve its interests, and the election of John F. Kennedy, who was in favor of British membership to the EEC, to the US Presidency in 1960 paved a way to rethink and approach more positively to the EEC, at least in the Foreign Office of the UK.⁵⁹ The political will was only one side of the coin. The application for EEC membership had, of course, an economic aspect. It shaped the EEC discussions in the UK to a considerable extent in the 1950s and 1960s as the Treaty of Rome was designed primarily as an economic integration project.

Because of "...an overvalued pound, inefficient British manufacturers protected from foreign competition, and unnecessarily powerful trade unions...",⁶⁰ the British economy was underperforming in the 1950s when it is compared with the Six. Apart from these, economic cooperation seemed to yield positive results across the Channel, enabling the members of this supranational cooperation to be better off.⁶¹ According to Mancur Olson, the UK was in the sixth position with 2.3% of the average annual rates of growth per capita gross domestic product at constant prices among the group with six countries of the ECSC between 1950 and 1960.⁶²

Realizing this economic gap, British governments in the 1960s tried to engage with the EEC and become a part of it. However, when it comes to parliamentary discussions and intellectuals' approach, it can be seen that the economic aspect of the membership was discussed not only based on the benefits but also on whether a possible EEC membership would restrain economic growth and development in the country or not.⁶³

At the same time, British politicians were concerned about isolation from a successful economic cooperation which the UK was not part of. In 1965,

59 Andrew Mullen, "The British left: For and Against Europe? A historical survey," (Autumn 2007), 220.

60 David Sanders, *Losing an Empire, Finding a Role*, (Macmillan Education: 1989), 143.

61 Ibid., 143.

62 Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), 6.

63 Baris Tufekci, *The Socialist Ideas of the British Left's Alternative Economic Strategy*, (Palgrave Macmillan: 2020), 108.

Prime Minister Harold Wilson and his Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, talked about how Europe would turn into a “closed shop,” and this would be under the leadership of de Gaulle.⁶⁴ They concluded that Europe should have been “outward looking and not autarkic”; otherwise, it would have created problems with the Atlantic and Commonwealth.⁶⁵

As this conversation presents, the economic aspect takes the Commonwealth into account. Churchill’s three majestic circles envisaged that the Commonwealth would occupy an important position in the British worldview. Thus, it became a topic that was impactful enough to think about in London in its relations with continental Europe. Maintaining trade relations with Commonwealth countries as usual was one of the forces leading the UK to join the EFTA rather than the EEC. Nevertheless, the efforts to create stronger ties within the Commonwealth did not achieve successful results, while the British economy was not able to overcome its problems and devalued the pound, which negatively affected Commonwealth countries whose reserves were in the pound.⁶⁶ Despite the realization that the Commonwealth and British Empire were not useful in the new global political and economic setting anymore, the Labour Party continued to put a huge emphasis on relations with the Commonwealth and its future in the case of British EEC accession.

In these discussions, British trade with the Commonwealth, especially British reliance on food, was highlighted as a factor for being cautious. In 1962, Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell called on all Commonwealth countries to reject an agreement between the Conservatives and the Six.⁶⁷ Getting closer to Europe was even seen as abandoning and a betrayal. Labour Party used the narrative of “Conservatives who turned Britain and the Commonwealth adrift” until 1975 when the EEC referendum sealed the case.⁶⁸ The future Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson put his views on 3 August 1961 during a debate in the House of Commons as:

64 Davis, “Euroscepticism and Opposition to British Entry into the EEC, 1955-75,” (2017), 8.

65 Ibid., 8.

66 Davis, “Labour’s Political Thought: The Soviet influence in the interwar years,” in *The British Labour Party and the Wider World*, (2008), 66.

67 Davis, “Euroscepticism and Opposition to British Entry into the EEC, 1955-75,” (2017), 6.

68 Ibid., 7-8.

If there has to be a choice, we are not entitled to sell our friends and kinsmen down the river for a problematical and marginal advantage in selling washing machines in Dusseldorf.⁶⁹

These words suggest that the UK was getting closer to continental Europe because of a vital necessity of the circumstances. It may have been just a rhetorical speech because even if the Commonwealth partners of the UK were important, being a part of growing Europe might probably have been seen as crucial as old imperial partners in London. Thus, despite objections from these partners (for example, New Zealand, which did not want to lose its position in the butter market in the UK),⁷⁰ the UK opted for EEC membership.

Finally, cultural identification can be given some space to explain the motives and anti-motives for Britain to engage with the European integration project. Culture has been a part of the efforts to interpret the fault lines in the relations between the UK and European integration, and it was not a tendency that firstly appeared in the 1950s. For example, there are phrases like “going to Europe” and “favoring European food” in the UK, as if Europe is distinct, opposing, and different from Britain, and the UK is not part of that place called Europe.⁷¹ This has been a point in discussions about whether the country should have been in the EEC. And this attitude was held and used by political actors, as well.

In the famous speech he made at the Labour Party Conference in 1962 on European integration and the UK's position in it, Labour Party leader Hugh Gaitskell identified British accession as “the end of a thousand years of history,” which tried to indicate that Britain would not be the same Britain after EEC membership. This cultural aspect was sometimes more personal. For instance, according to his personal advisor's account, Harold Wilson was a classic Englishman from the north, finding continental Europeans, especially

69 UK Parliament, “European Economic Community volume 645: debated on Thursday 3 August 1961,” <https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1961-08-03/debates/d15b0024-f27c-4dc7-a429-e79a86b2f389/EuropeanEconomicCommunity>

70 For more information regarding Commonwealth partners' attitude towards the EEC and their concerns, see: John Singleton and Paul L. Robertson, “Britain, Butter and European Integration, 1957-1964,” *The Economic History Review* 50 no. 2, (May 1997).

71 Menno Spiering, *A Cultural History of British Euroscepticism*, (Palgrave Macmillan: 2015), 2.

French and Southern Europeans, alien, and he did not like their food.⁷² The British public has been shaped by these ideas based on cultural identification of the British, European, self, and others. All these factors might have increased the hesitance for integrating Britain into Europe.

§ 3.3 Turkish Public Opinion Towards the EEC and European Affairs

The developments, which were shaping Europe and its position within the Western bloc, were followed on the continent and in circles located in various parts of the globe. Turkish intellectuals, especially the leftist intellectuals, were no exception to this as the changes shaping Europe also triggered changes in the dynamics of global politics, which might have directly affected the system of international politics.

There are a few reasons for this attention. First, the 1960s was the decade of widespread interest in foreign policy in Turkey. It became a reality due to the 27 May 1960 Coup d'état and the 1961 Constitution. Before the 1960s, discussing foreign policy issues publicly in a way that incumbent leaders and/or parties holding political power did not support was not common.⁷³ In addition, criticizing the governments because of foreign policy was seen as inappropriate until the 1960s, when foreign policy affairs tended to be considered via "bi-partisanship" and as a national cause.⁷⁴

The 1961 Constitution changed this tradition with its liberal tendencies. The relatively free environment for public opinion and the press facilitated the easy and rapid transmission of information and criticisms of all kinds, including those of foreign policy affairs. The Cyprus Question and tense relations with the US also contributed to popular interest. Relations with the US became

72 Davis, "Euroscepticism and Opposition to British Entry into the EEC, 1955-75," (2017), 9.

73 Duygu Sezer, *Kamu Oyu ve Dış Politika*, (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1972), 104-105.

74 İlhan Uzel, "TDP'nin Oluşturulması," in *Türk Dış Politikası* vol. 1, ed. Baskın Oran, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), 78, 79.

a target of harsh criticism, especially for the leftist intelligentsia in this relatively more diverse political atmosphere, which emerged after the 27 May 1960 Coup d'état as the 1960s was a decade full of vitalization and diversification in terms of theory, practical attitudes, and intellectual debate movement for Turkish left.⁷⁵

In such an atmosphere, every foreign policy step could quickly become a subject for public discussion covered by the press. Because Turkey formed a close relation with the EEC in 1963 with the Ankara Agreement, the relation itself, its nature, and its prospects for Turkey and the EEC were a topic of interest in the Turkish press, including the Turkish leftist periodicals.

Secondly, the EEC was a complex system of institutions, and the level of knowledge about the organization, working scheme, and technical details regarding the EEC was relatively low. It was the case when the first membership application was made in 1959 by Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu during Adnan Menderes's term in prime ministry, and the Ankara Agreement was ratified. During the ratification process, President İsmet İnönü was concerned about the obligations brought by the agreement and the extent to which these obligations resembled capitulations, which he personally struggled to abolish at the Lausanne Conference in 1923.

The developments that took place in Europe were relevant for Turkish politics not only because of Turkey's relations with the EEC, but also because of their importance for the future of both global politics and the Western alliance of which Turkey was a member. Thus, Turkish public opinion, political actors, and businesses followed European affairs and made comments on them during the 1960s.

De Gaulle's opposition to American economic hegemony and efforts to create a "European front", British military withdrawals from the Middle East and East Asia, and shaken alliances were topics covered by the Turkish press. For example, de Gaulle's visit to Romania and his speech in the Romanian Parliament which he called on every European nation to act against foreign

75 Gökhan Atılğan, "Türkiye Sosyalist Hareketinde Anti-Emperyalizm ve Bağımsızlıkçılık, (1920-1971)," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce - Sol*, eds. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinçil, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2008), 680.

political, economic, and military presence in their countries, was covered by *Milliyet*.⁷⁶

Abdi İpekçi commented on the French-American rivalry with these words:

As the gold reserves of the United States were melting quickly, a war had been fought for two years, especially by General de Gaulle, against American economic hegemony. De Gaulle was accused of America for trying to maintain dominance, which it no longer had, by financing itself from other countries. France also demanded to turn into a gold-based system in order to prevent America from obtaining wealth, which it did not deserve, by way of dollar hegemony.⁷⁷

Likewise, Metin Toker reflected on de Gaulle's policy on NATO by saying that de Gaulle, not being contended with withdrawing French personnel from NATO's military cadre, threw out the military and civilian headquarters of the alliance out of France.⁷⁸ So, it can be argued that the inner disputes within the Western alliance were seen and followed by the Turkish public.

Britain and its relations with the integration movements throughout Western Europe was another topic followed by the Turkish press. The UK's decision to withdraw from the Persian Gulf and East Asia was shared under the title of "Britain No Longer Great"⁷⁹. The article questioned whether Britain left an empire and found a new role for itself as an advanced European country like France, Germany, and Italy; however, it was not known yet that de Gaulle, rejecting Britain from becoming a member of the Common Market, allowed the UK to implement this role.⁸⁰

The UK's diminishing dominant role in world politics was a theme many news articles commented on. For example, an article from *Cumhuriyet* shared news about the devaluation of the British pound in 1967 as "The darkest day

76 "De Gaulle Meydan Okuyor," *Milliyet*, 16.05.1968.

77 Abdi İpekçi, "Kriz...", *Milliyet*, 15.03.1968.

78 Metin Toker, "Gözün içine baka baka...", *Milliyet*, 09.09.1968.

79 Original Turkish text: "Büyük'lüğü kalmayan Britanya.

80 "Büyük'lüğü kalmayan Britanya," *Milliyet*, 18.01.1968.

of recent English history”⁸¹. The article located next to a column was named sarcastically “Steady as the English currency”.⁸²

The second veto of de Gaulle on the British application to the EEC membership was also covered by the Turkish press. It was argued in *Cumhuriyet* that the primary motive behind de Gaulle’s second veto on British accession was his concerns regarding a potential unbalancing and decreasing dominance of France within the EEC as a result of British EEC membership despite the majority of the European public opinion supporting this accession.⁸³ Nevertheless, France tended to conceal the real motive and emphasize instabilities in the British economy.⁸⁴

The leading institution in Turkey on Turkey-EEC relations, İKV,⁸⁵ identified the aims of the EEC as founding a “United State of Europe”.⁸⁶ The main stimuli for this movement was in fact a political goal, which is “...creating an independent Europe while the world remained in between two giants.”⁸⁷ It was stated that in order to achieve this aim, European countries united in economic manner as the US capital and technologic supremacy did not let the European states to act alone.⁸⁸

The opinions on the aims and nature of the EEC seen in İKV publications disagreed with the views presented by leftist intellectuals. Leftist critique of the EEC was trivialized because of their anti-Western attitude, which could also be visible in their opposition to NATO, the Council of Europe, and their

81 “Sterlin’in Değeri Düşürüldü”, *Cumhuriyet*, 20.11.1967, 3.

82 “İngiliz parası gibi sağlam”, *Cumhuriyet*, 20.11.1967, 3.

83 Kayhan Sağlamer, “İkinci Veto”, *Cumhuriyet*, 26.10.1967, 3.

84 Sağlamer, “İkinci Veto”, *Cumhuriyet*, 26.10.1967, 3.

85 İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı -İKV- (Economic Development Foundation) was established jointly by Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Istanbul Chamber of Industry on 26 November 1965. The primary goal of the institution is to follow the developments in EU affairs and Turkey-EU relations. See: “İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı,” https://www.ikv.org.tr/ikv.asp?lng=tr&ust_id=9349&id=10

86 *Avrupa Toplulukları (Ortak Pazar) ve Türkiye Ortaklığı*, (İKV Yayınları: 1969), 23.

87 Metin Toker, *Ortak Pazar mı? Ortak Tuzak mı?* (İKV Yayınları: 1970), 11.

88 *Ibid.*, 11.

alliance with the US.⁸⁹ One of the core arguments of the Turkish left, the exploitation of Turkey by EEC members, was also opposed on the basis of the insignificance of the Turkish market for these countries in terms of its size and value.⁹⁰

The hot topics of European politics were also given a place in İKV publications. The initial British hesitance to partake in the EEC because of its prioritization of the Commonwealth was mentioned. The reasons for French vetoes on British applications were evaluated both “objective” and “subjective”.⁹¹

One of the articles published in the January-April 1964 volume of the *Journal of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce* gave a comprehensive account of the relations between the EEC and Turkey. In this article, the EEC was seen as one of the integrationist movements observed from 1948 onwards in Europe, plus the most successful one.⁹² The concluding remarks in the article identified Europe as an actor who tried to claim its position between the US and the USSR as a “third power”.⁹³

The journal conveyed international political and economic developments as well, including the EEC affairs. For example, the March 1970 volume of the journal gave the details of the British accession to the EEC. The article listed the pull factors for the UK to join the EEC such as competitiveness rise for British industry, innovation, new markets, the developing electronics sector in the country, and economic dynamism.⁹⁴ The article suggested that other countries like Denmark and Norway would follow the UK and the dream of “united Europe” would be one step closer.⁹⁵

The journal of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce also mentioned the US concerns over the European integration project on the occasion of British membership. It was stated that the US, initially supporting British accession,

89 Toker, *Ortak Pazar mı? Ortak Tuzak mı?* (1970), 15.

90 *Ortak Pazar'da Türkiye*, (İKV Yayınları: 1971), 71.

91 *Avrupa Toplulukları (Ortak Pazar) ve Türkiye Ortaklığı*, (1969), 22.

92 Halil Nadaroğlu, “Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu ve Türkiye,” *İstanbul Ticaret Odası Mecmuası*, (January-April 1964), 65.

93 *Ibid.*, 72.

94 Halûk Cillov, “Dünya ve Memleket Konjonktürü,” *İstanbul Ticaret Odası Mecmuası*, (March 1970), 8-9.

95 *Ibid.*, 9.

now worried due to a united Europe could object to the US and discriminate against the US.⁹⁶

3.3.1 *Political Parties and the EEC*

After the Democrat Party's application to the EEC in 1959, CHP conducted research⁹⁷ on the EEC and the possible impact of Turkish association/membership to the organization.⁹⁸ There are two interesting features regarding this research. The first one was that the work questioned on which article of the Treaty of Rome Turkish application was made; and the second is that none but economic aspects, reasons, or consequences of the application were taken into account in CHP's research.⁹⁹

Although one of the earliest steps fell short of realizing and emphasizing the political aspect of the EEC, the later discussions held among political elites seemed to give the political aspects considerable place. The left-wing TİP MPs and Islamist politicians such as Necmettin Erbakan were frontrunners in this context. Their reflections can be followed via the Turkish National Assembly minutes and election manifestos.

Developments in Europe and transatlantic relations became a scope of interest for TİP because they built their arguments opposing NATO and, of course, the EEC by emphasizing the contradictory nature of transatlantic relations and inner struggle among capitalist countries.

By responding to the question, whether Turkey should have joined the EEC, TİP manual from 1969 said that the Common Market was an attempt by capitalist countries joining forces with each other to achieve more power.¹⁰⁰

96 Halûk Cillov, İstanbul Ticaret Odası Mecmuası, "Dünya ve Memleket Konjonktürü", June 1970, 11-12.

97 CHP Araştırma ve Yayın Bürosu, *Avrupa İktisadi Camiası ve Türkiye'nin Camiayla İşbirliği Hakkında Çalışma*, Ankara, 21 September 1959 quoted in İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu* vol 1. (1993).

98 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu*, vol 1. (1993), 128.

99 Tekeli and İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu*, vol 1. (1993), 128-129.

100 TİP Bilim ve Araştırma Kurulu, *Türkiye İşçi Partisi El Kitabı*, (Ankara: 1969), 10.

An underdeveloped country like Turkey should have accepted to be exploited if it wanted to join them, the manual put forward.¹⁰¹

It is also noteworthy that the TİP manual preferred to examine the Common Market under the title of “economic and social state of Turkey”, not under the foreign policy chapter. The same attitude can also be visible in other political parties’ documents.

It is evident that TİP, in tune with other leftist circles in the country, opposed the EEC membership of Turkey because it was seen as an imperialist organization. As the aim of the organization was given as “...the integration of the European capitalism...”, the reason for the hegemon classes in Turkey to align Turkey with the EEC was to keep their privileged status in the country, the party’s working report from the 3rd Congress suggested.¹⁰²

The main politicians in TİP were also interested in the fault lines within the Western alliance in order to introduce the nature and the aims of the EEC. In her book *Türkiye ve Sosyalizmin Sorunları*, Behice Boran identified the problematic relationship between the European capitalists and the US, which was shrinking the borders of the capitalist economy.¹⁰³ American aid flowing towards Europe triggered an awakening among the European bourgeoisie who had been afraid of American dominance in the European economy, she argued.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, they launched integration movements to develop further European capitalism and defend their interests internationally.¹⁰⁵

The Turkish National Assembly was also a venue where European affairs became a topic of discussion even before the signing of the Ankara Agreement. Plus, these discussions tended to rise in times of significant developments. For example, on 7 February 1963, a few weeks after de Gaulle declared

101 TİP Bilim ve Araştırma Kurulu, *Türkiye İşçi Partisi El Kitabı*, (1969), 10.

102 Türkiye İşçi Partisi, *Çalışma Raporu*, (Ankara: 6-12 November 1968), 20.

103 Behice Boran, *Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları*, (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1970) quoted in Günay Dumrul Uygur, “Türkiye İşçi Partisi 1961-1971,” (MA Thesis, İstanbul University, 2020), 151-153.

104 Ibid., 151-153.

105 Ibid., 151-153.

his objection to the first British application, MPs from different political parties discussed foreign policy issues by giving considerable attention to developments that occurred in Europe.

In one of those speeches, CKMP MP Cevad Odyakmaz argued that US President John F. Kennedy supported European integration which would cooperate with the US in the face of the Communist bloc.¹⁰⁶ The speech also emphasized that the Common Market constituted the foundation of future political union in Europe, in which the UK should have taken its place.¹⁰⁷

On the same day, YTP MP İhsan Şeref Dura also shared his views on the recent political developments in Europe. He described the French rejection of British EEC accession as a crisis “Europe willingly went into”; and he tried to highlight the relation between the French veto and the Bahama negotiations.¹⁰⁸

CHP MP Cihad Baban was another speaker on the same day. By mentioning de Gaulle’s presidency and the French drift apart from the NATO alliance, he argued that France wanted to end American interference in European affairs, which triggered a struggle for influence and prestige among great powers.¹⁰⁹ It was also stated in the speech that CHP did not assess the Common Market only as an economic concept; but rather, its role in the direction towards the political integration “European Union” was already realized.¹¹⁰

Election manifestos were other documents to follow political parties’ attitudes towards European affairs. The 1965 election manifesto of AP identified the aims of international cooperation organizations, including OECD, IMF, GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), and EEC as enabling its parties to engage as much as possible economically¹¹¹ without any negative connotation. EEC was characterized by its dynamism in terms of development rate and welfare.¹¹² It is also notable that similar to TİP manual of 1969, this

106 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period:1, vol. 13 meeting 2, (17.02.1963), 207.

107 *Ibid.*, 207.

108 *Ibid.*, 210.

109 *Ibid.*, 219.

110 *Ibid.*, 219.

111 *Adalet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi*, (Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Neşriyatı 21: 1965), 30.

112 *Ibid.*, 31

document did not examine Turkey-EEC relations under the title of foreign policy. The issues were evaluated under the “Foreign capital and international organizations” rather than the foreign policy chapter.

Necmettin Erbakan was an ardent critic of the Common Market, who especially became vocal in discussions held in the Turkish National Assembly from 1970 onwards. Erbakan identified the EEC as a “Catholic Union” willing to create a single state ruled by a council according to its ideological aims.¹¹³ In this perspective, he saw Turkish membership in the EEC as being annexed to become one state, which was unacceptable.¹¹⁴ The founding principle of the Common Market was tied to “Zionism” and its “world domination goal” by Erbakan.¹¹⁵

These ideas were the foundation for later political parties and movements led by Erbakan, including National Order Party (MNP), National Salvation Party (MSP), and Welfare Party (RP).¹¹⁶ The election manifestos of these parties; therefore, can give important details. For example, MSP’s manifesto for the 1973 elections, when the Additional Protocol entered into force and the transitional period, described the EEC as an organization mimicking Bismarck’s method to unite German states back in the 19th century. It was stated in the MSP manifesto that Bismarck created a customs union among these small German principalities firstly; and then, this customs union turned into a political union, which was the method followed by the EEC right now.¹¹⁷

§ 3.4 Leftist Intellectuals on Issues in European Integration

In such a context, Turkish leftist intellectuals reflected on the developments shaping Europe, transatlantic, and Turkey because of its relations with the EEC, European countries, the US, and NATO. They may have tried to inform the public and direct public opinion according to their own perspective. The

113 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 3, vol. 9, meeting 2, (11.12.1970), 233.

114 *Ibid.*, 246.

115 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period: 3 vol. 9, meeting 2, (11.12.1970), 238-240.

116 Şaban H. Çalış, *Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri*, (Ankara: Nobel, 2016), 133.

117 *Milli Selamet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi*, (İstanbul: 1973), 34.

meaning attributed by Turkish leftist intellectuals to European integration and the EEC should be taken a look before other problematics of the era, namely de Gaulle and the changing nature of transatlantic relations and the British accession process to the EEC.

3.4.1 *The Raison d'être of the EEC*

The search for how a group of people evaluates developments in a specific part of the world necessitates some acquaintance with their identification of the main characters of the developments in question. Therefore, it is essential for this research to examine Turkish leftist intellectuals' identification of the European integration project and its main institution, the EEC, to see their perspective and interpret more precisely their views concerning this institution and the international developments they followed.

When the articles published in Turkish leftist periodicals in the 1960s and the initial years of the 1970s are examined, one can encounter some pieces trying to define what the EEC was and what the main purposes of the EEC and the European integration project were. *YÖN*, as one of the most prominent journals with its high number of volumes, contained articles and sections interpreting the meaning and the purpose of European integration. Even though most of these sections were not separate articles, sections dealing with the question of the meaning and purpose of the EEC can be appropriated through examining articles written on Turkish foreign policy, European politics, transatlantic relations, and as one of the most interesting cases, in articles evaluating movie sector in Europe and Turkey.

Interestingly, the article authored by Nijat Özön and originally published in *Türk Dili* in March 1963, "Ortak Pazar ve Sinema," was given in the 65th volume of *YÖN*. As the article details the possible impact of an integrated European economy with the EEC on the European cinema sector and current developments in the Member States, the article shares an encyclopedia definition of the EEC. The article narrates that the Common Market is an economic union in which the Six stipulated the phased removal of customs duties and had the aim of turning into a European political union, namely the United States

of Europe, like the US.¹¹⁸ Without any positive or negative comments, the article examines the recent and possible future developments in the European cinema sector while Europe is integrating economically. The article was published in March 1963, before the Turkish-EEC Association Agreement, the Ankara Agreement, was signed in September 1963. Therefore, it can be considered as an important example of the initial momentum for following EEC-related news in Turkey in these left-oriented journals.

However, not all articles dealing with the EEC and giving a definition were neutral towards the EEC. For the part of the Turkish left, Eurosceptic tendencies can easily be realized. *YÖN* presents an abundant source for definitions regarding Western organizations, including the EEC. Most of these definitions can be found in the articles covering European political developments such as de Gaulle, French foreign policy, transatlantic relations, and French rejection of British EEC accession. Thus, one has to extract the parts regarding the definition and purpose of the EEC from these articles.

For example, in his article on American hegemony and de Gaulle's foreign policy moves, İdris Küçükömer defines the EEC as "a new emerging power arisen in the capitalist arena."¹¹⁹ He continued by detailing this definition as "an attempt of unification by recovering six Western European countries to get a bigger share from the world economy" and predicts that as the EEC's economic power increases, the diplomatic capabilities to affect world affairs would improve, which contributed more to the economic strength of the EEC in a cyclical manner.¹²⁰

The section penned by Küçükömer shows the leftist intellectual apprehension of the EEC as a capitalist league in search of increasing its share in the current economic system. Likewise, İlhan Selçuk defined the Common Market as "one of the capitalist imperialism organizations" while asserting that Western bloc institutions were in decline and prone to collapse.¹²¹

118 Nijat Özön, "Ortak Pazar ve Sinema," *YÖN*, vol. 65, (3 March 1963), 14.

119 İdris Küçükömer, "Amerikan Hegemonya paradoksu – De Gaulle ve dünyanın kaderi," *YÖN*, vol. 100, (26 February 1965), 16.

120 *Ibid.*, 16.

121 İlhan Selçuk, "Yıkamak... Ve Yapmak," *YÖN*, vol. 130, (24 September 1965), 3.

The dichotomy between the nation-state and supranational or international organizations was another aspect found in leftist publications. It can be encountered within Turkish leftist circles arguing that international organizations like the EEC, NATO, and CENTO serve to obliterate nations from the world.¹²² EEC's plans to use a single currency were identified as removing national borders.¹²³ *Türk Solu* defined NATO as a hostile military organization of world monopolies to keep and increase areas to exploit.¹²⁴ In this context, the article declared NATO an enemy of the people, a castle of exploiter gangs to be destroyed sooner or later.¹²⁵

The notions of capitalism and imperialism can be found in great numbers in leftist journals. As İlhan Selçuk did, these two terms were used to describe the European integration movement. Nonetheless, one more word was found in the pages of YÖN and other Turkish leftist journals examined in the scope of this research. The concept of "neocolonialism"¹²⁶ seemed to shape their worldview as a useful term for the current international political and economic setting and its working conditions.

Neocolonialism was a widely used term in former colonies that gained their independence in the 1950s and 1960s. Nevertheless, it does not mean full economic and political independence according to neocolonialism discourse. Kwame Nkrumah, the first Ghanaian Prime Minister after the country's independence, claimed that imperialism was maintained in these countries via neocolonialism, which he defined as that a country is seemingly independent but its economy, politics, monetary policy, trade, developmental policies, investment are controlled by former colonists who do not have any responsibility or justification for this hegemonic relation.¹²⁷ In short, it means a continuation of colonialism and exploitation in its more modern form.

122 "İsrail neden savaşa mecburdu?" *Sosyalist*, vol. 6, (20 June 1967), 1.

123 "Ortak Pazar – Ortak Para," *Sosyalist*, vol. 18, (2 March 1971), 4.

124 "NATO halkımızın düşmanıdır!" *Türk Solu*, vol. 94, (2 September 1969), 10-11.

125 Ibid., 10-11

126 Journals use the term "yeni sömürgecilik" as Turkish translation of the term "neo-colonialism".

127 Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, (New York: International Publishers, 1966), IX-XI.

While the term has been used in the academic literature on Africa and third-world countries, Turkish leftist intellectuals also adopted the concept to explain Turkey's situation within the Western bloc. In *YÖN*, Doğan Avcıoğlu described neocolonialism as foreign economic and political control imposed on a country, independent on paper but not in essence.¹²⁸ In the same article, he also underlined that the socialists of Turkey were yearning for the national private industry, which would say no to the Common Market devastating the hope for national industrialization and development.¹²⁹ So, it cannot be wrong to think that his conceptualization of the EEC was located within the framework of neocolonialism.

Besides original articles, *YÖN* also featured speeches given at important events, forums, and conferences. One of these speeches was given by Nermin Abadan, who researched the conditions of Turkish guest workers in Germany on behalf of the State Planning Organization. While sharing this research's findings, she said that countries of the Common Market and other similar organizations took workers from underdeveloped countries, gave these workers jobs that Europeans did not want, and these workers -despite their legal equality with German workers- were treated unjustly because of their lack of language skills, not having enough familiarity with the customs of the host country, and staying away from social life.¹³⁰ She added, "When it comes to giving a name to this situation, which workers from underdeveloped countries have to face in developed countries, we can call it 'neocolonialism.'"¹³¹

It can be seen that neocolonialism was not only thought of in relation to international relations but also used to describe the EEC countries' guest worker programs and the treatment of those workers. According to this conceptualization, like in international politics where countries are seemingly independent but, in reality, bound with economic and political ties to developed capitalist countries, workers also had to deal with a system of hierarchy while

128 Doğan Avcıoğlu, "Milliyetçilere Sesleniş," *YÖN*, vol. 78. (25 September 1964), 3

129 Ibid., 3

130 "Almanya'daki İşçilerimiz," *YÖN*, vol. 94. (15 Ocak 1965), 3.

131 Ibid., 3.

they were free and equal to the host countries' nationals. The term neocolonialism seems to be used to define embedded inequality in the capitalist order in which the EEC is a part and in seeking to widen the share it takes.

Aydınlık was another journal that attributed more or less a similar meaning to the EEC. In the first volume, the journal has a long chapter, which can be considered as a manifestation of the political stance the journal is positioned. In this chapter, other than various Western bloc institutions such as NATO, the EEC was given a place and criticized in an intense manner. The purpose of the Common Market was given as the concentration of production and capital in the Six, increasing the competitiveness of monopolies of these countries to fight against countries struggling for their national independence.¹³²

The chapter identified the EEC as an instrument for imperialist strategy and politics, and it was argued that this unification helped European monopolies not only to maintain their higher positions in the colonies but also to organize the joint plundering of colonized countries, which was identified as a novel form of collective colonialism.¹³³

The views on imperialism, neo-colonialism, collective colonialism, and monopolistic tendencies of the EEC economies were widely shared opinions among both the Turkish and the world left in the period. An article in *Türkiye Solu*, which was published under the leadership of Mihri Belli just after 12 March 1971, asserted that the Common Market was a method for imperialist monopolies to export consumer products without any tariffs and need to move means of production to less developed countries.¹³⁴ The next volume of the newspaper continued the tendency. The Erim government was criticized because of its support for the continuation of Turkey's exploited status in the imperialist world system by being positive towards the Common Market and foreign capital.¹³⁵

132 Aydınlik Dergisi Kurucuları, "Aydınlik Görüşlerini Açıklıyor: Dünya, Türkiye ve Devrimci Mücadele," *Aydınlik*, vol. 1, (November 1968), 15.

133 Ibid., 15.

134 Şevki Akşit, "Açmazın Kökeni," *Türkiye Solu*, vol. 1, (5 April 1971), 6-7.

135 "Karaosmanoğlu, Emperyalizmin Sözünü Etmeden, Ekonomide Çözüm Öneriyor," *Türkiye Solu*, vol. 2, (19 April 1971), 3.

In order to explore the views of the world left, which was also available in Turkey, one can examine *Yeni Çağ*. It was an international leftist journal published in various languages. The journal included an article on conflicts between the working classes and capitalist monopolies. An article published in the journal suggested that more concentrated, centralized, and specialized international capital became the way towards exploitation, and the burden on the working classes increased.¹³⁶ This was the case in the EEC, the article argued, as the EEC was an attempt by financial oligarchy to keep their market share and privileges via capitalist integration while the world was witnessing a fight over markets and privileges.¹³⁷

Likewise, neo-colonialism was another aspect attributed to the EEC both by the Turkish left and the world left. An article from *Yeni Çağ* gave an example of it by describing NATO, SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), CENTO as military means, and the Common Market as the economic means of neo-colonialism.¹³⁸ The article suggested that states which gained their independence recently were taken under control through these organizations, serving the same aim with aid coming the Western countries.¹³⁹ These common themes and approaches might be read as a clue for intellectual ties between Turkish leftists and the world left. The Turkish left was probably well aware of the other leftist publications and ideas circulated around in the period.

While *Aydınlık* highlighted the “imperialist league” idea, *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık* emphasized the divisions within the Western bloc to explain the emergence of European integration. In the opening article of the 5th volume, it was stated that Western European imperialists were annoyed by US policy to solve all problems with the USSR by itself, and the US tolerated the Common Market, which was, in fact, a threat to its own monopolies, to preserve NATO.¹⁴⁰ So, when the name of the subchapter, “The Imperialist Front

136 Louis Saillant, “İşçi ve sendika hareketinde savaşın ve birliğin gelişmesi,” *Yeni Çağ*, vol. 5-6, (May-June 1964), 226.

137 Ibid., 226.

138 Fuad Nassar, “Yeni-Sömürgecilik Nedir,” *Yeni Çağ*, vol. 2, (February 1965), 106.

139 Ibid., 106.

140 “Aydınlık’ta dünya ve Türkiye,” *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, vol. 5/19, (May 1970), 13.

Shattered,” is taken into account too, it shows that the journal was willing to present ruptures and fault lines within the Western bloc and tried to indicate that the EEC’s purpose is to leverage the European economic and political situation and autonomy vis-à-vis the US.

ANT made the EEC and European integration a topic in various articles published in different volumes. Its take, nevertheless, was not that different from the other leftist journals. *ANT* described the Common Market as a colonizer and “club of the wealthy” to which Turkey did not belong.¹⁴¹ This “club” would, of course, work for its own benefit. Another volume of *ANT* signified the fault lines within the Western bloc. A column written by Doğan Özgüden emphasized that the primary purpose of the Common Market is to counter American capital although the aim seemed to fail as most of the European businesses were bought by American firms.¹⁴² These lines underline two things, which are the clash between the two sides of the Atlantic and American awareness and intervention to keep its hegemon status.

3.4.2 *Reflections on Transatlantic Ties: “Division in the West”*

Articles on foreign policy and international politics often took place in leftist journals in the 1960s and 1970s. Because Turkey was a part of Europe, the Western bloc, its institutions, and European affairs were followed closely by Turkish intellectuals. Sometimes, these lines transmit these developments without significant comments. However, most of the journals included analyses touching upon various aspects of foreign policy to society. These texts say a lot about the Turkish left’s envision of international developments as well as conveying their policy recommendations for Turkey.

Charles de Gaulle and his way of conducting foreign policy, the fault lines in transatlantic relations and the Western Bloc, British application to the EEC and its refusal by France, and the US’s position in the Western Bloc and the globe were among the topics leftist journals focused on. Although there are variations in how different journals handle foreign policy developments, commonalities outweigh differences. Despite differences and shared ideas, three

141 “Türkiye tarihi bir dönüm noktasındadır,” *ANT*, vol. (September 1970), 4.

142 Doğan Özgüden, “Yeni Amerikan İşgali,” *ANT*, vol. 46, (14 November 1967), 3.

main arguments can be suggested by examining Turkish leftist journals covering European affairs in the 1960s and the first years of the 1970s.

Firstly, French foreign policy and de Gaulle's position towards the US were popular in these journals. In some cases, it seemed to reach some degree of admiration, which was not needed to conceal. Secondly, disagreements between the parties of the Western Bloc, such as French withdrawal from NATO's military wing, French veto on the UK to be a full member of the EEC, and French rapprochement with the USSR and China, were presented as manifestations of "unavertable" fall of the Western alliance. And thirdly, even though the EEC and "the Six" were treated as actors in the international system, the articles in leftist journals tend to see the EEC mainly as an economic actor whose political agency was considered equal to neither those of states nor other important military alliances such as NATO.

With more than 200 volumes, *YÖN* had a chance to witness almost the entire decade of the 1960s and numerous foreign policy developments shaping both Turkey and international politics. This witnessing resulted in a great collection of reflection articles evaluating the developments, their reasons, and potential consequences. Issues in European integration and related problems were also selected as topics. One of the subjects given high attention was de Gaulle and his foreign policy options towards his fellow Europeans and the US.

The 60th volume of *YÖN* examined the first veto of France towards the UK's membership in the EEC in two pages. The first part was published without an author's name and conveyed the developments in Europe in the context of European integration. The article evaluated the French vote against the UK as an example of an obvious conflict between the US's view of "the Atlantic Community" and de Gaulle's struggle for an independent Europe.¹⁴³

The article said that "As the UK had not been joining to the Common Market, the free Western world seems to split into two," and also argued that the French veto was also related to possible negative impacts of the UK's membership on France, the only agricultural country among the Six.¹⁴⁴

143 "Ortak Pazar", *YÖN*, vol. 60, (6 February 1963), 12.

144 *Ibid.*, 12.

The same volume also shared a translation article from *L'Express* arguing that despite disagreements, the West stands as one against the Communist world because of economic and military ties and interests, and, for a Europe free and autonomous, there are no choices other than two, which are "...an enlarged Common Market with unified nuclear capabilities including the UK or a French-German-Soviet pact establishing a continent community from Brest to Vladivostok."¹⁴⁵ This part also shows the somehow inferior position of the EEC in those days in the eyes of *YÖN* and presents how the EEC advances into the circle of the hegemons. It is interesting to see that even though the authors of *YÖN* say that it is the division of the West, sharing an article translation implying that the UK can still be part of the integration project is interesting. However, both assessments seem to accept and favor Europe, which keeps some distance from the US.

Although the translation articles published in *YÖN* tended to make a more nuanced foreign policy analysis of de Gaulle's intentions, policy options, and the general situation in Europe in the 1960s, the articles written by Turkish intellectuals seem to defend the "division of the West" argument. For example, İbrahim Çamlı noted that the breakdown of the negotiations between the EEC and the UK was one of the early results of de Gaulle's plans to create a European Union without the UK and a Western defense system whose leader is not the US.¹⁴⁶

This division was articulated not only through de Gaulle's veto on the UK in 1963 and 1967 but also through other steps taken by de Gaulle, such as proposing a gold-based international monetary system. Doğan Avcıoğlu identified the UK as a "trojan horse" that the US was willing to put in the EEC, saw de Gaulle's gold-based monetary system plans as "a desire to demolish one of the columns of American hegemony," and took the division argument into the EEC itself by pointing at differences between Bonn and Paris and economic rivalry between them.¹⁴⁷

Likewise, *YÖN* published the foreword section of the book by Fethi Naci, "What is Imperialism," which also analyzed that inner tensions and conflicts

145 "General de Gaulle ne istiyor?" *YÖN*, vol. 60, (6 February 1963), 13

146 İbrahim Çamlı, "Batı ittifakı içinde bağımsız Türkiye," *YÖN*, vol. 62. (20 February 1963), 16.

147 Doğan Avcıoğlu, "Emperyalizmin Çırpınışları," *YÖN*, vol. 98, (12 February 1965), 3.

of interest between imperialist forces rose, as it can be seen in de Gaulle's war on the US dollar; the US was not maintaining its hegemon position in the imperialist camp, and imperialists of Western Europe started to challenge the US.¹⁴⁸

A similar attitude can also be found in TİP's *Sosyal Adalet*. By quoting Mehmet Ali Aybar's speech he made in Gaziantep, tensions between French capitalism and US capitalism were associated with the French veto of British EEC accession and the joint nuclear force proposed by the US.¹⁴⁹ It was argued that polarization took place within the Atlantic alliance, which would probably lead to a new division of labor in the alliance in the future.¹⁵⁰

YÖN published a variety of translation articles examining European affairs authored by well-known intellectuals such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Duverger, and Gilles Martinet. With these articles, the journal tried to show how European intellectuals present the developments to their audience. These translation articles did not create a counterargument to the editorial policy and ideology of YÖN. These articles and opinions were offered to support articles exclusively written for YÖN by Turkish leftist intellectuals.

Sometimes, this aim was more visible by putting an explanatory introductory part before the translation articles. For instance, before giving a translation of a column by Gilles Martinet saying that NATO was a façade for sustaining the American hegemony, an introduction part was added before the column with YÖN name claiming that European independence from the American hegemony was not a dream, but a necessity led by de Gaulle based on economic reality.¹⁵¹ Another example is an article from Duverger, who defended that European socialists should hold a more aggressive attitude towards NATO; this article was also given with an introductory part added by the editorial board claiming that international organizations are serving the US hegemony.¹⁵²

148 Fethi Naci, "Emperyalizm Nedir?" YÖN, vol. 123, (6 August 1965), 8-9.

149 Mehmet Ali Aybar, "Dünya ve Türkiye'de Durum," *Sosyal Adalet*, vol. 9, (14 May 1963), 8-9.

150 Ibid., 8-9.

151 Gilles Martinet, "Solun ayağındaki diken: NATO," YÖN, vol. 162, (6 May 1966), 6.

152 Maurice Duverger, "Kurt ve Köpek," YÖN, vol. 159, (15 April 1966), 16.

De Gaulle's policy moves were found interesting. In some instances, this interest seems to go as far as admiration and has turned into a policy recommendation for Turkish foreign policy. In the 110th volume, YÖN gave a part of de Gaulle's speech by saying that "Children of Atatürk have to read the General's words as a lesson," and the title of the section is "Let's look up to de Gaulle".¹⁵³ In the same way, it was indicated in the journal that "The US hegemony was established based on the psychosis of a Soviet attack" and, "Although several countries including France realized that, this "deception and trick" was still valid in Turkey."¹⁵⁴ So, it can be asserted that de Gaulle's policies were evaluated as an awakening by YÖN.

The other important journal of the Turkish left in the late 1960s and early 1970s, *ANT*, also reserved a considerable place for those days' political and economic developments. Similar to YÖN, de Gaulle's policies and transatlantic relations were among the most covered topics in *ANT*. The very first volume of the journal included a foreign policy section praising Gaullist foreign policy because of its character, being noble, both national and international at the same time, and being realist.¹⁵⁵ The article asserted that Turkish foreign policy was far from being similar to that of France.¹⁵⁶ French withdrawal from the military wing of NATO was also approved in the pages of *ANT*. The development was given as the initial step taken by the nations that NATO could not instrumentalize in the service of Anglo-American imperialism, and Turkey was called to give some thought to the foreign policy of de Gaulle.¹⁵⁷

In addition, France's rapprochement with the USSR, China, and the third world was admired while presenting fighting against imperialism's wars for exploitation and the US political and economic hegemony as the necessary conditions for Gaullist foreign policy to flourish.¹⁵⁸ However, in several in-

153 "De Gaulle'den örnek alalım," YÖN, vol. 110, (7 May 1965), 10.

154 "Sovyet saldırısı efsanesi," YÖN, vol. 167, (10 June 1966), 7.

155 Hüseyin Baş, "Dış Yorum," *ANT*, vol. 1, (3 January 1967), 13.

156 Ibid., 13.

157 Hüseyin Baş, "NATO kovulmalıdır," *ANT*, vol. 50, (12 December 1967), 7.

158 Hüseyin Baş, "Neden doğuya açılış," *ANT*, vol. 39, (26 September 1967), 12-13.

stances, the journal criticized de Gaulle for his domestic policy. His progressive and realist foreign policy was seen as a contradiction with anti-social and conservative domestic policy, and his resignation was announced via the cover page of the 123rd volume of *ANT*.¹⁵⁹

Another topic *ANT* covered was the second British application to the EEC in 1967. In the 4th volume, the column gave the recent developments and specified that the UK had close ties with the US and there were divergences in views on the European political union between the UK and France, which could form a barrier -again- for British accession.¹⁶⁰ A column written on a negative speech made by de Gaulle on British membership to the EEC evaluated the situation after suggesting that the UK fell short of being a superpower after the Second World War but did not -want to notice this reality, de Gaulle made the UK paid the price for American “friendship.”¹⁶¹ An article from *Sosyalist* also referred to the UK’s deteriorating relations with the Commonwealth because of an American-led initiative for making the UK an EEC member, “a cheating of a friend”.¹⁶²

Even though de Gaulle was not expected to say “yes” to the UK’s membership because of the UK’s position of being a “satellite state to the US”¹⁶³, another column in the same volume argued that the UK needed cooperation with Europe and becoming a member to the EEC to get rid of the US pressure and its political independence.¹⁶⁴

Aydınlık’s first volume gave a specific focus to European integration and its aims as giving a clear and comprehensive manifesto of the journal’s views. In this article, the division argument was emphasized to a great extent. It is stated that the situation in the Western Alliance led by the US, without any problem until the late 1950s, started to be shattered due to the quarrel

159 The headline on the cover page is “Sosyalizm’siz Denge Politikasının İflası”.

160 Hüseyin Baş, “Bonn Doğu’ya Açılıyor,” *ANT*, vol. 4, (24 January 1967), p. 12-13.

161 Ibid., 12-13.

162 “Emperyalistler Arası Boğuşma,” *Sosyalist*, vol. 13, (12 January 1971), 4.

163 Hüseyin Baş, “İstenmeyen Ada!”, vol. 21, (23 May 1967), 13.

164 Halûk Tansuğ, “Hint Denizi’nde Yeni Kıbrıs’lar,” *ANT*, vol. 21, (23 May 1967), 12-13.

among imperialist capitalist Western countries, which was triggered by unequal distribution of markets and raw materials.¹⁶⁵ The article argued that despite this quarrel, these imperialist countries maintained their unified position against the Socialist bloc and national independence revolutions.¹⁶⁶ This statement can infer that the EEC was not considered a power divisive enough at that point, and its impact was limited.

The French refusal of the UK's EEC accession was attributed to "French monopolies" that were in a clash with the US capital. France's struggle among the imperialist powers, the article continued, was evidence of struggles that would never end.¹⁶⁷ *Aydınlık* also tried to theorize the relations between "Western imperialists" by splitting up 25 years after the Second World War into three phases. The first phase was identified with the socialist revolution waves until 1949 when Western Europeans had to be allied with the US; the second phase was characterized by "the tales of red danger and Soviet occupation" when the US hegemony grew; and finally, the third phase appeared after the late 1950s and 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which the Western alliance witnessed divergences as a result of distrust among the allies and led de Gaulle to defend "United Europe from Urals to the Atlantic."¹⁶⁸

In light of these quotes, similar to the other leftist journals' approach, *Aydınlık* also emphasized the inner quarrel among the imperialist powers. In fact, this deduction was directly put into words by *Aydınlık* in the 8th volume. The article commenting on de Gaulle's resignation asserted as follows:

During his presidency, De Gaulle did not follow an anti-imperialist policy against American imperialism. France had aimed to shuffle the deck to ensure that it got more powerful cards for itself.¹⁶⁹

165 *Aydınlık Dergisi Kurucuları*, "Aydınlık Görüşlerini Açıklıyor: Dünya, Türkiye ve Devrimci Mücadele," *Aydınlık*, vol. 1, (November 1968), p. 14.

166 *Ibid.*, 14.

167 *Ibid.*, 15.

168 *Ibid.*, 16.

169 "Aydınlık'ta Dünya ve Türkiye: 'Devrimciler el ele milli cephede,'" *Aydınlık*, vol. 8, (June 1969), 96.

The rhetoric adopted by *Aydınlık* seems to be pursued by *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık* after the split up of the journal into two. In his article, Hikmet Kıvılcımlı commented on de Gaulle's resignation by describing the French President as "the first one to raise the red flag" against the US by depending upon French gold and foreign currency reserves, but he was overthrown in a week.¹⁷⁰ The "perpetrator" was, of course, the US, according to the article. In the same way, the opening article of volume 5 of the *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık* discussed the US policy towards the EEC. The main idea was that the US was tolerating what was going on in Europe to keep NATO unified despite its grievances because it is claimed that the EEC was directly contrary to the US monopolies without any doubt.¹⁷¹ Both quotes can be read as a demonstration of the "division of the West" argument conveyed through the pages of the journal as the other journals did.

In *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, de Gaulle was seen as a victim; however, it cannot be accurate to say that there was sympathy towards him. It was stated that De Gaulle was sacrificed for the benefit of the US and German imperialism, and German imperialism took the helm of leadership in Europe, which acted more in line with the US interests than de Gaulle, who had not allowed the UK to "get the inside track".¹⁷² Nevertheless, there seems to be no room to think that France was favored among other Western alliance countries. The sacrifice of de Gaulle was evaluated by saying that "Imperialism cannot resolve its contradiction by getting rid of a few bigwigs in charge."¹⁷³

Plus, it is observed in this journal that West Germany and German finance capital were attributed an agency in shaping the political and economic developments. While *YÖN*, *ANT*, and *Aydınlık* emphasized the primary role of the US and NATO, *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık* did also highlight the role of inner struggles among European powers.

170 Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, "Sayın İ. İ. Paşa'ya Açık Mektup," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, vol. 2/16, (February 1970), 274-275.

171 "Aydınlık'ta dünya ve Türkiye," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, vol. 5/19, (May 1970), 13.

172 Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, "Deccal Kapımızı Nasıl Çalıyor? (II)," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, vol. 7, (July 1970), 211.

173 Ibid., 212.

§ 3.5 Conclusion

When the general approach to the EEC is examined in the scope of Euroscepticism typologies, it can be claimed that Turkish leftist thought had Eurosceptic tendencies to a great extent. These tendencies can be revealed by examining their attitudes towards the nature and aims of the EEC and how they saw the developments in the Western alliance during the period.

By identifying EEC as an imperialist, neo-colonialist, exploitative, and monopolist structure, they put a principled rejection to the very existence of the organization as well as Turkish membership in the organization. Therefore, rather than being evaluated within the framework of “Soft Euroscepticism”, the total rejection of the EEC constituted an example of “Hard Euroscepticism” in Euroscepticism conceptualization of Szczerbiak and Taggart.

In terms of Kopecký and Mudde’s terms, there are two questions to be answered while deciding the category Turkish leftist intellectuals belong. On the distinction of “Europhile” and “Europhobe”, their attitude is highly Europhobe as they define the EEC as an imperialist organization willing to sustain the old colonial ties and oppression through economic and financial means. The second distinction is about the current implementation of the European integration project. De Gaulle’s policies of rejecting the British applications and aiming to create an autonomous Europe as a third power were approved by the leftist intellectuals. Sometimes, this approval extended to the instance of Gaullist foreign policy as a method to be implemented in Turkish foreign policy. However, considering these approvals as evidence for the Turkish left’s total embrace of the EEC policies can be an overstatement.

It might be said that their position was mostly about anti-US tendencies rather than originally admiring the way the EEC follows and would follow. A third power emerged by way of the splitting of the Western alliance would have meant the failure of the American system of alliance, which was a development Turkish left anticipated. As they were also estimating the decline of the West, including capitalist Europe sooner or later, they were probably not optimistic about the future of European integration. Thus, defining Turkish leftist intellectuals as Eurorejects rather than Europragmatists seems more suitable.

Aside from the Turkish left, the public opinion and political parties presented more nuanced attitudes. It can be argued that the main Eurosceptic tendencies came from both the right and left of the political spectrum. Erbakan's arguments on the aims of the EEC and TİP's position rejecting the very nature of the EEC, along with Turkish alignment with the organization, can be put into "Hard Euroscepticism" category according to the typology presented by Szczerbiak and Taggart.

Other political parties and businesses might not be considered as "Hard Eurosceptics", "Rejectionists" or "Eurorejects" for the first year after the Ankara Agreement was signed. On the contrary, optimism could be seen among Turkish MPs commenting on the integration project. However, this mostly affirmative tendency started to change as transitional stage negotiations were on the agenda. Still, public opinion and political parties, excluding extreme left and extreme right, did not pursue purely principled rejectionist tendencies aiming to cut all the ties between Turkey and the EEC. But rather, the economic advantages and disadvantages of the transitional stage were discussed with an intention to draw attention to the relatively lower competitiveness of Turkish industries vis-à-vis those of the EEC countries, Chapter 3 demonstrates.

This chapter tries to give a brief account of the main subjects of the 1960s and the very first years of the 1970s in Europe. British efforts to become a full member of the EEC, de Gaulle's two vetoes on the UK, and rising tension in the transatlantic ties, as France withdrew from the military wing of NATO and tried to reach out to the USSR and China, were among the topics shaping the international political stage. Turkish leftist journals covered these topics by publishing original articles, translating articles from Western media, and analyses on behalf of the journal in some instances. In these articles, the aim was to inform the Turkish public about the developments in Europe as Turkey itself was allied with the countries in question in NATO. Plus, informing the public according to the ideological background of the journals was, in fact, another aim.

While conveying the developments to the Turkish audience, they exert considerable effort to give meaning to world affairs rather than just mentioning the developments of the week or month. And sometimes, this search for

meaning was in the shape of a theory. It was not a surprise for leftist intellectuals to read developments through Marxist lenses, of course. Nevertheless, researchers should consider these efforts as they are one of the earlier examples of commenting on foreign policy in public, which was almost nonexistent before the 1960s.

These journals dealt with international developments, and in most cases, these analyses directly examined events in the context of Turkey. However, as this chapter shows, there are several examples showing how these leftist journals evaluate developments in the international political arena without considering Turkey. This global perspective was also apparent for the EEC – the Common Market. This chapter tries to demonstrate that despite the central role attributed to the US, the USSR, and NATO did not change; the EEC found a place in the lines of Turkish leftist journals. This is partly because Turkey became an associate country with the EEC through the Ankara Agreement of 1963. However, the importance of the EEC's role and the fault lines it created in transatlantic relations were also found interesting by these journals.

The main goal of this chapter is to show how Turkish leftist journals describe the EEC in the 1960s and the first years of the 1970s and how they assessed the developments shaping and being shaped around the EEC in the context of the greater Western alliance lying on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. The findings are that de Gaulle was a primary figure whose way of foreign policy was followed by and, in some cases, was recommended to Turkey. Despite describing de Gaulle as a common theme, it cannot be said that all journals analyzed it similarly. For example, while *YÖN* and *ANT* were presenting his independent foreign policy, *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik* recalled France's place among the Western imperialist powers.

"The division of the West" argument was commonly held by all these journals. It was stated that Europe was revolting against the American hegemony, which was created after the Second World War, and the EEC was one of the offspring of this division, and Europe's path to walk more autonomously. Nonetheless, in various articles, NATO's primacy and the Western allies' unity against the Socialist bloc were underlined. This can be considered as the idea held by leftist intellectuals that despite an apparent division, the EEC was not

seen as powerful as the US, the USSR, and NATO. Its agency and aims were mostly defined as economic ones.

While Chapter 3 was an effort to present the European affairs affecting and being affected by the EEC, Chapter 4 will focus on Turkey's place in such an organization in the eyes of Turkish leftist intellectuals.



Turkey's Place in an Integrating Europe



The European Economic Community (EEC) was established with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, intending to create a common market in 12 years among the signatories “...by removing all restrictions on the internal movement of people, money and services; the setting of a common external tariff for goods coming into the EEC; and the development of common agricultural, trade and transport policies.”¹ While Western European countries were getting together and closer in order to create a common market in 1957, the 1960s was the decade of initial concrete steps taken to achieve the aims of the Treaty of Rome. For example, one of the most impactful policies in terms of scale and budgetary reasons, the Common Agricultural Policy, was introduced in 1962, and the Customs Union was achieved in 1968 by removing the last internal

1 John McCormick, *Understanding the European Union*, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022), 50.

customs duties and initiating common external tariffs.² In the same way, as one of the significant milestones towards today's EU, the Merger Treaty, creating one Commission as an executive body and one Council of Ministers, was signed in 1965 with the purpose of superseding the Commissions and Councils of Ministers of EEC, EURATOM, and European Coal and Steel Community.³

The 1960s were also the years during which the Western European countries (re)started to take to the stage in international politics and economy with the help of the EEC. Two British applications vetoed by de Gaulle, efforts to leverage the European integration process against the US and make Europe an autonomous pole in international politics, the negotiations between the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the EEC⁴ were boosting Europe's place in global affairs as well as its confidence. The economic success the EEC achieved throughout the 1960s also fed this confidence, and the decade became a period when Western European countries gained self-esteem and an international personality beyond the Western alliance and the US.⁵

-
- 2 Berkeley Hill, *Understanding the Common Agricultural Policy*, (London and New York: Earthscan, 2012), 295-296.
 - 3 Gordon L. Weil, "The Merger of the Institutions of the European Communities," *The American Journal of International Law* 61 no. 1 (January 1967), 57.
 - 4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was one of the post-Second World War initiatives to increase cooperation between world nations with the aim of decreasing the risk of conflict caused by international trade. It entered into force in 1948; and, the plan was that it would be replaced by the International Trade Organization. Failure of this plan made the GATT the leading institution in world trade until the 1990s when the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established. The EEC's position in world trade and related problems was discussed during the Dillon and Kennedy rounds in 1960-1961 and 1964-1967 respectively. For brief information about the GATT, see: Douglas A. Irwin, "The GATT in Historical Perspective," *American Economic Review* 85 no. 2, (1995), 323-328. On GATT-EEC negotiations, see: Francie McKenzie, "The GATT-EEC Collision: The Challenge of Regional Trade Blocs to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1950-67," *The International History Review*, 32 no. 2, (2010), 229-252.
 - 5 Oral Sander, "Yirminci Yüzyıl Tarihinin Temel Özellikleri," in *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, pr. Melek Fırat, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2013), 36.

Turkey was not indifferent to European affairs even though the main channel for Turkey and Western European countries was the Western alliance⁶ and its already established institutions such as NATO. This chapter will be devoted to examining the question of the place/position of Turkey within the emerging EEC by focusing primarily on the leftist journals of the time, which are *YÖN*, *ANT*, *Aydınlık*, and *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*.

The chapter will argue that the general tendency in Turkey was often to emphasize the economic aspect of the EEC rather than focusing on the political one. It will be shown that this was valid for the leftist intellectuals who underlined the adverse effects of an association or membership in the EEC by stating reasons such as Turkey's inferior level of industrialization, competitiveness, and economic development compared to the Six. The EEC was seen as an obstacle to Turkey's way to becoming a developed country as the aims of the organization were detrimental to Turkey.

The chapter will appropriate the term "hard Euroscepticism" to explain the attitudes held by Turkish leftists towards European integration, the EEC, and Turkey's role within it. The objections published in Turkish leftist journals targeted the very nature and the existence of the EEC by labeling the organization as "monopolist," "imperialist," and neo colonialist," rather than just a few criticisms on the policies of the EEC.

This Euroscepticism can be considered as a part of the Turkish left's anti-Western attitudes with regard to actors like the US, USAID (United States Agency for International Development), NATO, CENTO, IMF, and OECD. The chapter will show it by presenting the call for a new foreign policy in the pages of these leftist journals, which highlighted de Gaulle's distant positioning towards the US and France's withdrawal of its military forces from NATO.

§ 4.1 Early Years of Turkey-EEC Relations

The basis of the relations between Turkey and the EEC was the Ankara Agreement, which was initialed on 25 June 1963 and signed on 12 September 1963

6 William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 127.

after four years of negotiations.⁷ Despite some concerns about the consequences of a potential EEC membership and an insufficient level of knowledge about the organization, it did not hesitate to be a part of it. Turkey's application for associate membership to the EEC came on 31 July 1959, not later than 19 months after the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC entered into force.⁸ Applying at an earlier stage, even when the basic policies of the EEC were recently being set and the future of the organization was not that clear, can be tied to two reasons other than purely economic considerations: Greece's position in the EEC and general Western-oriented foreign policy tendency in Turkey.⁹

Greece applied for EEC associate membership two months earlier than Turkey, on 15 May 1959, and signed an association agreement known as the Athens Agreement, which founded the legal basis of Greece-EEC relations, opened the way to establishing a customs union between the parties, and full membership.¹⁰ The bulletin news, which gave information about the Athens Agreement and further steps to be taken, finished with a final section named "Turkey's Turn Next".¹¹ As can be seen through the way in which the European Community Bulletin conveyed the news to its audience, the processes of the two countries coincided with each other in terms of time and procedures. And this is prominently as a result of Turkey's efforts to follow Greece in its way towards the EEC membership. This close watch was epitomized by Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu's sentences: "Even if Greece throws itself into an empty pool, it should not be left alone; you shall throw yourself too without any hesitation".¹²

7 Kamuran Reçber, *Türkiye - Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri*, (Alfa Aktüel: 2009), 9.

8 Rıdvan Karluk, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsası, 1996), 390.

9 Çağrı Erhan and Tuğrul Erat, "AET'yle İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası*, vol. 1, ed. Baskın Oran, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), 813.

10 "Greece Signs Agreement with EEC," in *Bulletin from the European Community*, no. 45, (April 1961), 1.

11 Ibid., 2.

12 Karluk, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, (1996), 392.

It was basically because of the tense relations between Turkey and Greece, mainly due to the Cyprus Question and related issues such as the attitude towards EOKA.¹³ While the relations were feeling a relative phase of calmness after the Zurich and London Agreements in 1959, Turkish foreign policymakers were still unwilling to take the risk of Greece joining a community or formation of which Turkey is not a part and benefiting from them economically and politically.¹⁴ Other push factors for Turkey were intensifying trade relations between Turkey and Europe while Turkish -then- guest workers massively migrating to Europe and strengthening the ties.¹⁵

Of course, other than political and foreign policy aims, there were other stimuli for Turkey to engage with the EEC more closely. Turkey was mostly an agricultural country at that time; therefore, the search for better options for exporting agricultural products did have an important place in the Turkish will for alignment with the EEC in its efforts to have a sustainable balance of trade.¹⁶ Additionally, the EEC could have filled the shoes of the US in terms of foreign aid,¹⁷ as the US tended to tie the credits to conditions such as quitting inflationist policies, devaluing the Turkish Lira, tax reform, and less support for the agricultural sector.¹⁸

Economic and foreign policy priorities and goals, such as providing less conditional financial aid to the country and not falling behind Greece, can be considered daily concerns for Turkey to stay closer to the EEC. However, questions on Turkey's place in Europe and identity-based issues have always been an inseparable part of the context, if not the most important, in which the

13 Erol Manisalı, *Avrupa Çıkmazı*, (İstanbul: Otopsi, 2003), 87.

14 Erhan and Erat, "AET'yle İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası*, vol. 1, (2009), 814.

15 Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 167.

16 Haluk Günuğur, *Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri*, (Ankara: Avrupa Ekonomik Danışma Merkezi, 2008), 6.

17 Erhan and Erat, "AET'yle İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası*, vol. 1, (2009), 813.

18 Çağrı Erhan, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası*, vol. 1, ed. Baskın Oran, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), 560.

relations are thought.¹⁹ For example, the 1990s and 2000s witnessed vocal resistance to Turkish membership in the EU, particularly in France and Germany through arguments founded on identity.²⁰ The first days of the relations were similar as identity-based arguments were a part of the discussions.

Nora Fisher Onar and Ahmet Evin argue that there were three “ineliminable” aspects shaping the rhetoric of discourse regarding Europe in Turkey. These aspects are “certain traumatic episodes in the Turkish collective imagination”, seeing Europe as a given and monolithic actor, and “treating Europe as a menu” to prefer some of the given and rejecting others.²¹ These three dimensions can be directly associated with identity-related arguments in discussions on Turkey’s Europeanness or Turkey’s place in Europe.

In this context, mentioning more structural and long-term reasons like identity and westernization for the instinct in Turkey to partake in European integration should also be looked. Becoming modern had been tied to being “Westernized”; modern Turkish republic transformed itself by taking the West as a model; thus, aligning with the West turned into a solid custom in Turkish foreign policy, too -even if domestic politics sometimes deviated from the Western model-.²²

This identity dimension was immensely visible, especially between the first application for associate membership in 1959 and the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963, in Turkish public opinion while becoming a part of

-
- 19 Senem Aydın-Düzgit and Bahar Rumelili, “Contested Identities: Historicising and Deconstructing Representations in EU-Turkey Relations,” in *Turkey and the European Union*, eds. Bekeken Saatçioğlu and Funda Tekin, (Nomos: 2021), 57.
 - 20 Hakan Yılmaz, “Turkish identity on the Road to the EU: Basic Elements of French and German Oppositional Discourses,” *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 9 no. 3, (December 2007), 293.
 - 21 Nora Fisher Onar and Ahmet Evin, “Convergence and Resistance: The European Dilemma of Turkish Intellectuals,” in *European Stories: Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts*, eds. Justine Lacroix and Kalypto Nicolaidis, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 297-299.
 - 22 Şevket Ovalı and İlkin Özdişmenli, “Ideologies and the Western Question in Turkish Foreign Policy: A Neo-classical Realist Perspective,” *All Azimuth* 9 no. 1, (2020), 105.

the EEC was associated with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's aims to transform Turkey into a modern country situated in contemporary civilization.²³ This argument can be supported by newspaper comments made after the Ankara Agreement in 1963, which featured the development as a step in Turkey's centuries-long efforts in Westernization and being accepted into the Western world.²⁴

"Becoming Western" has not been only about becoming European. For example, the idiom of "little America" used for Turkey has also been at the center of discussions of Turkish modernization.²⁵ Nevertheless, the centrality of the EEC membership has maintained its relevance not only throughout the period but also from the very first days of the relations to these days.²⁶ For example, in the foreword of his memoirs, a former Turkish diplomat Yıldırım Keskin put forward that:

The Foreign Ministry gave me a chance to see various countries and meet the people of those countries. European affairs allow me to work for raising our country to the level of contemporary civilization in a way that Atatürk pointed out. I have closely witnessed Turkey's adventure on the roads of Europe for almost half a century. I felt sadness, cheer, anger, and despair with Turkey, but I have never quit working hard and meticulously. Because at the end of the road, I believe there is happiness in this country and its people.²⁷

23 Mehmet Döşemeci, "Cutting Through the Cold War: The EEC and Turkey's Great Westernization Debate," in *The Balkans in the Cold War*, eds. Rajak et al, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 340.

24 Ibid., 342.

25 Lucia Najšlová, *Turkey and the European Union*, (I.B. Tauris: 2022), 70.

26 Mehmet Döşemeci, *Debating Turkish Modernity*, (Cambridge University Press: 2013), 1.

27 Original Turkish text: "Dışışleri bana, çeşitli ülkeler görmek, o ülkelerin insanlarını tanımak; Avrupa işleri de Atatürk'ün işaret ettiği doğrultuda, ülkemizi çağdaş uygarlıklar düzeyine çıkarmak için çalışmak olanağını vermiştir. Türkiye'nin Avrupa yollarındaki yaklaşık son yarım yüzyıllık serüvenini yakından yaşadım. Türkiye ile beraber üzüldüm, sevindim, kızdım, umutsuzluğa düştüm ama iğneyle kuyu kazmaktan vazgeçmedim. Çünkü o kuyunun dibinde, bu ülkenin ve insanının mutluluğunun bulunduğuna inandım." Yıldırım Keskin, *Avrupa Yollarında Türkiye*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2001), 8.

Therefore, while contextualizing the relations, one should always bear in mind the inner meanings and connotations of the EEC membership in wider public opinion and elites in Turkey.

For the EEC side, the motive to engage with Turkey via an association agreement has been attributed to geopolitical necessities of the period as “the Europeanness of Turkey and Turks has always been contested”.²⁸ In such a context, while the Cold War was the main phenomenon shaping world politics, the capitalist states of the EEC aimed to create ties with Turkey’s democratic and capitalist forces to strengthen them.²⁹ Hence, by taking Turkey’s economically less-developed state into account, academic literature has tended to emphasize security and geopolitical stimuli in addition to pleasure “to be preferred” over EFTA for the EEC to engage with Turkey.³⁰

4.1.1 Ankara Agreement

Turkish application for association with the EEC came on 31 July 1959 without any consultations or discussions in the Turkish National Assembly as the political leadership in Turkey did not see public support or creating legitimacy for the application necessary.³¹ This tendency has generally been associated with the precedents of Turkish foreign policy in those days, which involved being a part of Western organizations and decision-making mechanisms and -as it has mentioned above- not letting Greece be “alone” in Western European institutions.³²

28 Kemal Kirişçi, “Religion as an Argument in the Debate on Turkish EU Membership,” in *Religion, Politics, and Turkey’s EU Accession*, eds. Dietrich Jung and Catharina Raudvere, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 30.

29 Ian Bache, Stephen George and Simon Bulmer, “Enlargement,” in *Politics in the European Union*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 545.

30 Çiğdem Nas and Yonca Özer, *Turkey and the EU Integration*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 15.

31 Deniz Vardar, “Türkiye Avrupa Topluluğu/Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri,” in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004), 442-443.

32 Ibid., 443.

With these considerations, Turkey started to negotiate its association with the EEC. There were 10 meetings between the parties, of which the first three aimed at consultations; the fourth one enabled the parties to present their negotiation positions, and the others created the Ankara Agreement text via discussions.³³ These meetings spanned 4 years, from 1959 to 1963 until giving the final outcome on 25 June 1963 as the agreement was initialed by the parties in Brussels.³⁴

The agreement was signed on 12 September 1963; and, it was approved with 267 affirmatives, 1 abstention, and 1 opposing votes at the National Assembly; 100 affirmatives, 3 abstentions, and 1 opposing votes at the Republican Senate.³⁵ As the number of abstentions and negative votes in voting sessions in the legislative organs demonstrates, there was no strong opposition to the agreement and its main idea in politics, which is forming a customs union between Turkey and the EEC in the future. Customs Union with the EEC basically means that Turkey to remove tariffs and other duties for goods coming from the EEC countries; and in addition, Turkey needs to implement the Common External Tariff, which was set and pursued by the EEC.³⁶

The Ankara Agreement was an association agreement; in other words, it does not intend to bring -directly and automatically- full membership to Turkey in the EEC. The envisioned status was "...less than admission to the Community but more than a mere trade agreement."³⁷ This situation was also valid for Greece as both countries were not seen as economically developed enough to join the EEC as full members.³⁸ It was therefore planned in the Ankara Agreement that a customs union with Turkey would come through a three-

33 Günuğur, *Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri*, (2008), 8.

34 Ibid., 17.

35 Rıdvan Karluk, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye İlişkileri: Bir Çıkılmaz Sokak*, (İstanbul: Beta, 2013), 33.

36 Glenn W. Harrison, Thomas F. Rutherford and David G. Tarr, "Economic implications for Turkey of a Customs Union with the European Union," *European Economic Review* 41, (1997), 862.

37 Dominik Lasok, "The Ankara Agreement: Principles and Interpretation," *Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi* 1 no. 1&2, (December 1991), 27.

38 Hakan Yılmaz, "Euroscepticism in Turkey: Parties, Elites, and Public Opinion," *South European Society and Politics*, 16 no. 1, (2011), 190.

staged process.³⁹ Due to this staged process and not envisioning Turkish participation in decision-making mechanisms of the EEC, the agreement has also been assessed as a document creating a “gradual pre-association” relations between the parties.⁴⁰

The first stage envisioned in the agreement is “the preparatory stage” in which reciprocity in compromises between parties is not sought; and, the main goal is to enhance Turkey’s economic capacities via financial support and facilitated trade in agricultural products.⁴¹ The second stage is the “transitional stage” which necessitates Turkey to take some steps towards achieving the customs union such as abolishing customs duties and quota restrictions implemented against the EEC members.⁴² The last stage is envisaged as the “final stage” that starts with the establishment of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EEC and opens the way for Turkey to advance towards full membership in the organization.⁴³

On the other side, what did the Ankara Agreement mean for Turkish nationals in 1963? Basically, since the day the agreement was signed, there was an inclination among Turkish society, especially among middle classes and political elites, to evaluate the Ankara Agreement as a demonstration of acceptance of Turkey into the European family and recognition of its European-ness.⁴⁴ The speech made by President of the Commission of the EEC Walter Hallstein on the signing ceremony of the Ankara Agreement seems to approve those views:

...We are witnessing an event of great political significance. Turkey is part of Europe. That is really the ultimate meaning of what we are doing today. It confirms in incomparably topical form a truth which is

39 Ali Sait Yüksel, *Türkiye İlişkileri Açısından Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu*, (Eskişehir: Eskişehir İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi Basımevi, 1976), 66.

40 Karluk, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye İlişkileri: Bir Çıkmaz Sokak*, (2013), 35.

41 Yüksel, *Türkiye İlişkileri Açısından Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu*, (1976), 67.

42 Erhan and Erat, “AET’yle İlişkiler,” in *Türk Dış Politikası*, vol. 1, (2009), 830.

43 Armağan Emre Çakır, “Introduction,” in *Fifty Years of EU-Turkey Relations*, ed. Armağan Emre Çakır, (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 1.

44 Berdal Aral, “Making Sense of the Anomalies in Turkish-European Union Relations,” *Journal of Economic and Social Research* 7 no. 1, (2006), 101.

more than the summary expression of a geographical concept or of a historical fact that holds good for several countries. Turkey is part of Europe: and here we think first and foremost of the stupendous personality of Atatürk, whose work meets us at every turn in this country, and of the radical way in which he recast every aspect of life in Turkey on European lines... Turkey is part of Europe: today this means that Turkey is establishing a constitutional relationship with the European Community. Like the Community itself, that relationship is imbued with the concept of evolution...⁴⁵

When it comes to mainstream newspapers, the attitude regarding the meaning of the agreement was mostly the same. *Cumhuriyet* was published with a title emphasizing Turkish membership in the EEC by saying that “We entered into the Common Market – The agreement was signed yesterday”⁴⁶ and explained the event as a turning point in Turkish economic and political history while the agreement remarks Europeanness of Turkey.⁴⁷ Likewise, *Milliyet* underlined in its headline that “It has been registered that Turkey is a part of Europe – The Common Market Agreement has been signed”^{48, 49}

Despite a lot of expectations and excitement about the EEC and its role within Turkey’s relations with the West, there was considerable ambiguity involved in the process both prior to and subsequent to the signing of the Ankara Agreement. The EEC was not known in wider circles in Turkish society in those days⁵⁰ as negotiations with the EEC and planning were only carried out by a limited number of officers from mainly the Foreign Ministry and a

45 “Address by Professor Dr. Walter Hallstein President of the Commission of the European Economic Community on the occasion of the signature of the Association Agreement with Turkey,” 12 September 1963, <https://aei.pitt.edu/14311/1/S77.pdf>

46 Original Turkish text: Ortak Pazara Girdik – Dün Anlaşma İmzalandı.

47 “Ortak Pazara Girdik – Dün Anlaşma İmzalandı,” *Cumhuriyet*, (13.09.1963), 1.

48 Original Turkish text: Türkiye’nin, Avrupa’nın bir cüz’ü olduğu tescil edildi – “Ortak Pazar” anlaşması imzalandı.

49 “Ortak Pazar’ Anlaşması İmzalandı,” *Milliyet*, (13.09.1963), 1.

50 Gülten Kazgan, *100 Soruda Ortak Pazar ve Türkiye*, (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1970), 77, 78.

few technicians from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Trade.⁵¹ This situation turned the negotiations into a largely unknown process with a newly established organization among the wider circles of society.

This lack of practical and technical knowledge was highlighted by different groups. For example, *Barış Dünyası*, published by a former MP from Menderes's Democrat Party, made an emphasis on the general lack of interest and information as to the agreement and the process compelling the country to achieve an economic and mental transformation.⁵² Other than the public, this attitude could even be observed within political leadership.

The agreement was initialed by İsmet İnönü during a meeting only after he was assured that Turkey could stop implementing the agreement should it could not manage to abide by the obligations it would shoulder in the future.⁵³ And the Ankara Agreement was presented by pro-EEC factions in this meeting as "throwing a hook towards Europe".⁵⁴ This conceptualization might be considered a manifestation of the perceived meaning of signing an association agreement with the EEC, which one way or another, makes a reference to the identity aspect in the reception of the whole EEC story in 1960s' Turkey.

4.1.2 *The Additional Protocol*

From the day the Ankara Agreement entered into force on 1 December 1964 to the day when the Additional Protocol took effect on 1 January 1973, Turkey experienced the preparatory stage envisioned in the association agreement.⁵⁵ This stage had been planned for Turkey to strengthen its industry and economy without giving any concessions to the EEC while the EEC started to cut tariffs for Turkish agricultural products and extend the scope for tariff cuts.⁵⁶

51 Mehmet Ali Birand, *Bir Pazar Hikâyesi: Türkiye-AET İlişkileri*, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1978), 152.

52 "Ortak Pazar," *Barış Dünyası*, vol. 17, (October 1963), 441.

53 Birand, *Bir Pazar Hikâyesi: Türkiye-AET İlişkileri*, (1978), 157-158.

54 Ibid., 157.

55 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu* vol. 2, (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993), 11.

56 Esra Çayhan, *Dünden Bugüne Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri ve Siyasal Partilerin Konuya Bakışı*, (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1997), 521.

The genuine aim seems to be preparing the Turkish economy for competition in a customs union. Since the import-substitution industrialization, which prioritized the growth of the national industry by way of utilizing the means of trade policy like limiting imports and introducing quotas, was the leading policy,⁵⁷ this stage was specifically significant for an economy like Turkey to gain competitiveness. This competitiveness was necessary for the country in further stages that -unlike the preparatory stage- necessitated Turkey to take some steps towards forming the customs union in a gradual manner via harmonization of Turkish economic and trade policies with those of the EEC.⁵⁸

Nevertheless, similar to the negotiation period for the Ankara Agreement, this preparatory stage seemed mostly to be dominated by the negligence of the economic consequences of Turkey-EEC relations. As a result, the advantages of the preparatory stage could not be appropriated enough to prepare the Turkish economy and industry firstly for the transitional period and then for the customs union. Furthermore, despite tariff concessions and relieved quotas, Turkish exports to the EEC increased more slowly than Turkish imports from the EEC.⁵⁹ Between 1963-1969, Turkish exports were up by 7,6% on average while imports from the EEC increased by 9% on average; and, the EEC's share within the Turkish imports soared from 29% in 1963 to 42% in 1972.⁶⁰

Lack of anticipated progress was also added with insufficient efforts in public to learn and get acquainted with the EEC, except for considerable efforts made by İKV.⁶¹ Still, Turkey informed the EEC that it was ready to negotiate the terms for the next stage in 1967.⁶²

57 Feridun Cemil Özcan, "Altmışlı Yıllarda Türkiye Ekonomisi," in *Türkiye'nin 1960'lı Yılları*, pr. Mete Kaan Kaynar, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2017), 183.

58 Vardar, "Türkiye Avrupa Topluluğu/Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri," in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, (2004), 444.

59 Karluk, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, (1996), 411.

60 Ibid., 411.

61 Tekeli and İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu* vol. 2, (1993), 25-26.

62 Reçber, *Türkiye - Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri*, (2009), 14.

Turkey's move to start the negotiations for the transitional period triggered the public debates, which reached their peak during the final meetings and the signing of the Additional Protocol in 1970. Daily newspapers circulating around the country reserved considerable space for the topic. The attitude in 1970 seemed to be different in comparison to 1963 when nearly an entirely optimistic atmosphere had been dominant.

Milliyet, for example, conveyed both supporting and opposing views on the EEC. Between 10-13 October 1967, four articles from various standpoints were published by the newspaper under the title of Turkey and the Common Market. The first opinion of this article series was authored by Osman Okyar, an academic from Middle East Technical University. He basically paid attention to the necessity for Turkey to terminate its total protectionist policies even if the Common Market was not on the agenda.⁶³

On 11 October 1967, Aydın Yalçın's article, who was an MP from AP, was published. The article asserted that the EEC accession of Turkey was tying the fate of the country to Western Europe's fate; thus, it was more than a guarantee for economic development.⁶⁴ The Turkish economy would be better off within the EEC, which is also designed to recognize differences between different members and regions, instead of maintaining autarkic protective policies.⁶⁵

This article was followed by TİP MP Sadun Aren's piece claiming that the necessities for Turkish economic development, which are industrialization and increasing exports, could not be achieved within the structure of the EEC was published in *Milliyet*.⁶⁶ The next day, Besim Üstünel's article was published. It also presented negative remarks on Turkish association with the EEC by underlining the incompatibility of the competition-based design of the EEC, appealing to already industrialized countries.⁶⁷

Actually, the Ankara Agreement had put forward that the negotiations for the next stage could begin in 1969; and, in the absence of any protocol, the

63 Osman Okyar, "Himaye ve Ortak Pazar," *Milliyet*, (10 October, 1967).

64 Aydın Yalçın, "Ortak Pazar'ın Faydaları," *Milliyet*, (11 October 1967).

65 Ibid.

66 Sadun Aren, "İktisadi İlişkiler Değişmeli," *Milliyet*, (12 October 1967).

67 Besim Üstünel, "Ortak Pazar Karşısında Türkiye'nin Hevesleri," *Milliyet*, (13 October 1967).

situation could be extended to 1974.⁶⁸ However, having thought that the continuous trend in which the EEC signed numerous association agreements with other countries might have undermined the position of Turkey, and taking advantage of the negative atmosphere in relations between Greece and the EEC due to the Regime of the Colonels, the Turkish government tried to make a quick move.⁶⁹

In addition, the economy was in trouble in Turkey in 1970. The government introduced various new taxes, especially targeting the urban population such as business and property taxes, and devalued the Turkish Lira by 66%.⁷⁰ In this situation of economic hardship, the government intended to leverage its relations with the EEC to find a source for financial relieve and show its foreign policy options, enabling it to drift apart from the US.⁷¹

Finally, the Additional Protocol initiating the opening of the transitional period for Turkey, was signed on 23 November 1970 in Brussels and voted in the National Assembly on 5 July 1971.⁷² The Additional Protocol was primarily about the free movement of goods; and to achieve this aim, it envisioned the gradual lifting of tariffs within 12 years for some group of goods and within 22 years for some other group of goods.⁷³

It is important to highlight here that the divisions within the Assembly in this voting were much more evident as AP and MGP members voted in favor; CHP and DP members voted against the Additional Protocol.⁷⁴ When this voting is compared with its predecessor, namely the vote for the Ankara

68 Ali Sait Yüksel, *Ortak Pazar'a Geçiş Dönemi ve Türk Sanayii*, (İstanbul: Ahmet Sarı Matbaası, 1970), 168.

69 Vardar, "Türkiye Avrupa Topluluğu/Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri," in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, (2004), 445.

70 Suavi Aydın, and Yüksel Taşkın, *1960'tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2018), 183.

71 Ibid., 183-184.

72 Çayhan, *Dünden Bugüne Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri ve Siyasal Partilerin Konuya Bakışı*, (1997), 62.

73 İlke Göçmen, *Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri: Hukuki Boyut*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2022), 30.

74 Çayhan, *Dünden Bugüne Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri ve Siyasal Partilerin Konuya Bakışı*, (1997), 62.

Agreement, it can be said that political positioning and polarization were much more apparent in the 1970s in comparison to 1963. This divergence might have stemmed from the realization in Turkey that Turkey would need to take some concrete steps with the Additional Protocol -such as gradually lifting customs duties- and felt the tangible effects of the association for the first time.⁷⁵

§ 4.2 Discussions on Turkey-EEC Relations in Turkish Politics

Before the negotiations for the Ankara Agreement started, there were no considerable differences in the Turkish public opinion.⁷⁶ İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin argued that political actors and businesses defended Turkish association with the EEC because they thought that Turkey could only decrease its losses by cooperation.⁷⁷ They named this attitude “Defensive accession” on which other motives like westernization and following Greece were built.⁷⁸

As it is mentioned earlier in this chapter, it was not until the Additional Protocol in 1970 that the discussions in Turkish public questioned the real meaning of the EEC for the Turkish economy. Business associations gave a clear momentum to their activities on the EEC and the potential effects of the Additional Protocol on Turkey in the 1970s. Their positions differentiated mostly according to their views on development strategies and the open market.⁷⁹ For instance, TÜSİAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association) after

75 Tekeli and İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu* vol. 2, (1993), 11.

76 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu* vol. 1, (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993), 133.

77 Ibid., 133.

78 Ibid., 133.

79 Serap Atan, “Europeanisation of Turkish peak business organisations and Turkey–EU relations,” in *Turkey and European Integration*, eds. Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 103.

its foundation in 1971, paid serious attention to the EEC with its research publications named “Research on the EEC”.⁸⁰

Nevertheless, as the businesses had diverse views on national industrial development, their views towards the EEC were also diverging and blocking collective action on the issue.⁸¹ As a consequence, despite a relative rise in interest from other institutions for the EEC and Turkey’s association, İKV remained the main institution following the EEC affairs, making publications, holding conferences to inform the Turkish public.

This limited information and awareness in the Turkish public were also visible in the political arena. The preparatory stage, covering approximately 10 years after the Ankara Agreement, was a period of negligence and nearly a silence in terms of the EEC and Turkey’s preparations for the next stage. This voluntary forgetting was epitomized by the absence of the notion of the EEC and its potential impacts on the Turkish economy both in the First Five-Year Plan of 1963-1967 and the Second Five-Year Plan of 1968-1972.⁸² It shows the degree of overlook on the issues about the EEC, obligations, and impacts of the obligations which Turkey would start to take in the transitional period.

The real politicization of the EEC and the related issues in Turkish politics came with the negotiations for the Additional Protocol and its signing in November 1970. When one looks at the Turkish National Assembly minutes, s/he may realize the fall in number of discussions on the EEC after the Ankara Agreement and notable increases in 1967, the year that Turkey conveyed its intentions to the EEC to negotiate the terms of the transitional stage, and 1970, the year the Additional Protocol was signed. It is a clear demonstration of the tendency in Turkey during the 1960s. The crucial milestones attracted atten-

80 Some of these publications are *Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu Üzerine Görüşler-Yaklaşımlar* (İstanbul: TÜSİAD Yayınları: 1977); *Katma Protokol’ Çerçevesinde Neler Yapılabilir?* (TÜSİAD Yayınları: 1977); and *AET ile İlişkileri Özel Kesim Nasıl Değerlendiriyor?* (TÜSİAD Yayınları: 1978).

81 Robert Bianchi, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 261.

82 Mine Eder, “Populism as a barrier to integration with the EU,” in *Turkey and European Integration*, (Turkey and European Integration, ed. Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 56.

tion and created discussions while the interim periods that necessitated political and economic action were quieter. This leaning went into a significant reverse in the 1970s, owing to political polarization on the issue and the rise of populism in Turkish politics.⁸³

1970 was a turning point for the reception of the idea of European integration and Turkey's position within it among public and political circles in Turkey. This phenomenon became a reality not only because changes in the Turkish political atmosphere where different views became obvious and vocal due to "...post-1970 left-right polarization" creating factions on opinions as to Europe.⁸⁴ It is also because of the declining harmony and positive dialogue between Turkish and EEC elites, which had been the case during the previous decade.⁸⁵ The period prior to Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974 is more or less defined with the term "reciprocal goodwill".⁸⁶ But, this manner changed as a result of complex international developments such as the oil crisis, problems in the international monetary system, the Cyprus Question, transformation of the EEC through further deepening moves, and the first enlargement wave in 1973.⁸⁷

Given the fact that there were increasingly diversifying motives and attitudes towards Turkey's way of alignment with the EEC during the 1960s and the 1970s, different approaches towards the issue within the Turkish bureaucracy should also be mentioned before giving some details about the discussions in the Parliament and between political parties. It is important because bureaucrats and state officials were the ones who worked on technical details,

-
- 83 Mine Eder, "Populism as a barrier to integration with the EU," in *Turkey and European Integration*, (Turkey and European Integration, ed. Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 56.
- 84 Aydın-Düzgüt and Rumelili, "Contested Identities: Historicising and Deconstructing Representations in EU-Turkey Relations," in *Turkey and the European Union*, (2021), 67.
- 85 Atila Eralp, "The Role of Temporality and Interaction in the Turkey-EU Relationship," in *Special Issue on Turkish Foreign Policy (New Perspectives on Turkey no. 40)*, eds. Mustafa Aydın and Kemal Kirişçi, (İstanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2009), 153.
- 86 İrfan Kaya Ülger, *Türk Liderlerin AB Vizyonu*, (Ankara: Sinemis Yayınları, 2003), 145.
- 87 Eralp, "The Role of Temporality and Interaction in the Turkey-EU Relationship," in *Special Issue on Turkish Foreign Policy (New Perspectives on Turkey no. 40)*, (2009), 153.

conducted negotiations, and put the resolved issues into practice. Turkish bureaucracy, especially after 1967 when the Additional Protocol came onto the agenda, showed this kind of divergence.

The main fault line lied between the Foreign Ministry and the State Planning Organization (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı* - DPT) as the former was leading Turkey's relations with the EEC from the very beginning and the latter intended to slow down the process by noting that Turkey's economic underdeveloped status vis-à-vis the EEC members would lead to problems both for Turkey and the EEC.⁸⁸

The dispute between the two institutions became totally evident just before and during the negotiations for the Additional Protocol were carried out. An attempt by the DPT to seize the authority to pursue foreign economic relations from the Foreign Ministry failed,⁸⁹ but tensions continued. DPT saw the Foreign Ministry as a group of people trying to make Turkey's benefits available to Europeans while the Foreign Ministry blamed the other as saboteurs of the negotiations with inappropriate demands.⁹⁰

DPT kept its cautious position during the 1970s as well. This position can also be seen in DPT's "Special Expertise Commission Report on the European Economic Community" reports. For instance, the report dated August 1976 clearly put forward that as Turkey would not fulfil its obligations during the fourth and fifth planning terms, keeping the obligations as they were could be inconvenient for investment decisions and the state of affairs in the Turkish economy.⁹¹ So, it can be claimed that this stance was a response to those who were willing to accelerate the process despite problems. The report also implied some reversals of the current situation by stating that:

The opinion that the political aspect of the Turkey-EEC relations is as important as the economic aspect of the relations is a widely circulated

88 Erhan and Erat, "AET'yle İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası*, vol. 1, (2009), 840.

89 Mehmet Ali Birand, *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası 1959-2004*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2005), 158.

90 Ibid., 159.

91 T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, *Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu*, (August 1976), 3.

argument. According to this view, the Ankara Agreement of 1963 envisions economic integration with the Western European countries; and, this integration would play a great role while establishing closer ties with them politically. The duty of the Commission is limited to the economic aspect of the subject. At the same time, the Commission has found evaluating the political aspect with economic lenses is beneficial: Political choices have economic consequences. Revising the political choices is within the duties and responsibilities of the government, in case the economic cost is heavy to jeopardize today and tomorrows of the country's economy. Taking into consideration this perspective, Turkey has shown the necessary attention up until today to keep the Ankara Agreement with its main principles and goals^{92, 93}.

This block quote, extracted from the report, demonstrates the attitude of the DPT during the mid-1970s towards the EEC. It is clearly pointed out that the tendency in Turkish bureaucracy is that if economic obligations do not fit into the country's agenda, the obligations can be revisited.

92 The original Turkish text: Türkiye-AET ilişkilerinin ekonomik olduğu kadar politik yönden de büyük önem taşıdığı görüşü yaygındır. Bu görüşe göre 1963 yılında imzalanan Ankara Anlaşması; Türkiye'nin Batı Avrupa ülkeleri ile ekonomik bütünleşmesini öngörmekte olup bu ekonomik bütünleşme Batı Avrupa ülkeleri ile daha sıkı siyasal bağlar kurmakta önemli bir rol oynayacaktır. Komisyonumuzun temel görev ve yetkisi; konunun ekonomik yönü ile sınırlıdır. Bununla beraber, konunun politik yönünü, ekonomik açıdan genel bir değerlendirmeye tâbi tutmanın yararlı olacağını düşünmüştür: Politik kararların, bir ekonomik maliyeti vardır. Bu ekonomik maliyet, ülke ekonomisinin bugününü ve yarınını tehlikeye atacak kadar büyük olursa, politik kararların gözden geçirilmesi, devlet yönetiminin görev ve sorumluluğu içindedir. Bu genel perspektif içinde değerlendirildiğinde, Ankara Anlaşması'nın bütün temel ilke ve amaçlarıyla korunmasında Türkiye, bugüne kadar elinden gelen bütün dikkati göstermiştir.

93 *Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu*, (August 1976), 3.

4.2.1 Turkish Private Sector, Labor Unions and the EEC

Business associations in Turkey carried different perspectives and a mixture of ideas regarding Turkey's EEC association. In an interview, then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit underlined that the Turkish private sector had contradictions on the issue. Ecevit criticized their high willingness to lift customs duties and take steps for EEC association, and their later grumbles because of the negative effects.⁹⁴

It was true that there were distinct ideas about the topic within the Turkish private sector. Especially those who were based in İstanbul and Ankara were generally in support of the EEC. While businesses located in Anatolia had concerns about their competitiveness in the face of European manufacturing, larger holdings and business associations were inclined to emphasize the benefits they could facilitate through decreasing customs duties and rising trade with the EEC countries.⁹⁵ Plus, the real increase in business associations' interests in Turkey-EEC relations with a more critical perspective came to the stage only with the Additional Protocol.

As mentioned earlier, the Turkish private sector founded İKV in 1965 in order to follow the recent developments in the Six and Turkey-EEC relations. İKV published more than 150 booklets until 1980, which dealt with a wide range of topics extending from European horticulture market (*Avrupa Çiçek Pazarı*, 1972) to corporate law in the EEC (*Ortak Pazar İçinde Şirketler Hukukunun Gelişimi*, 1967) and Turkish agriculture vis-à-vis the EEC (*Türk Tarım Tavizlerinin Diğer Ülkelere Verilen Tavizlerle Karşılaştırılması*, 1976).⁹⁶

The foundation's activities continued during the Additional Protocol debates shaping the agenda in Turkey. The booklet, *Turkey in the Common Market*,⁹⁷ was an intensive work for illuminating what Turkey would encounter during the transitional period. The booklet concluded -against the criticisms- that the transitional period would not bring unbearable conditions to the

94 Bülent Ecevit, "Demokratik Solda Temel Kavramlar ve Sorunlar," in *Demokratik Sol*, (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008).

95 Bianchi, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey*, (1984), 261.

96 For full list of the publications, please refer to: https://www.ikv.org.tr/ikv.asp?lng=tr&ust_id=70&id=208

97 Original Turkish name: Ortak Pazar'da Türkiye.

Turkish economy; but rather, it would be an opportunity for the Turkish economy and industries to develop by breaking inward-oriented, uncompetitive protection policies.⁹⁸

Before establishing IKV jointly with the İstanbul Chamber of Industry, the İstanbul Chamber of Commerce seemed to follow the developments in the Turkey-EEC axis. The January-April 1964 volume of the organization's journal included an article authored by Halil Nadaroğlu. This article examined the reasons for the Turkish association and the mutual impact of the Ankara Agreement on the parties.

The article claimed that as a member of the Western alliance, Turkey opted for the EEC in order to develop economically, socially, and politically, in addition to economic factors like export increases.⁹⁹ Even though the article recognized the concerns among the Turkish public as to possible negative effects of the association on the Turkish industry and economy, it defended the association by saying that Turkey could not have grown and developed autarkically; thus, it was logical to partake in the integration.¹⁰⁰

During the negotiations of the Additional Protocol, similar to most other actors in Turkey, the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce seemed more cautious to support any deal. Despite declaring no categorical rejection, the article on the issue gave a list of "conditions" in which the Turkish economy and industry would not be damaged. In order to achieve advantageous results for Turkey, the goods for which Turkey decreased customs duties should be selected meticulously, the implementation of the agreement should be monitored, industrial investments should go in the right direction, and Turkish competitiveness should be enhanced in 22 years.¹⁰¹

İstanbul Chamber of Industry supported the Turkish association and the further advances in the process such as moving to the Additional Protocol. In their statement regarding the Additional Protocol, the organization stated that

98 *Ortak Pazar'da Türkiye*, (İstanbul: İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı Yayınları, 1971), 84-86.

99 Halil Nadaroğlu, "Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu ve Türkiye," *İstanbul Ticaret Odası Mecmuası*, (January-April 1964), 64-69.

100 *Ibid.*, 72.

101 See: Halûk Cillov, "Türkiye-Ortak Pazar Anlaşmasının Geçiş Dönemi," *İstanbul Ticaret Odası Mecmuası*, (June 1970).

accession to the Common Market was the most important political and economic development of the past 150 years.¹⁰² By emphasizing the identity aspect of the relations, the statement said that “The Common Market opened the way for Westernization with its institutions, reason, logic, appearance, and democratic understanding.”¹⁰³

Istanbul Chamber of Industry rejected criticisms coming from extreme left, extreme right, and “centre-of-the-left” by emphasizing these political circles’ silence on the future of the Turkish economy.¹⁰⁴ Plus, the Additional Protocol’s deficient parts concerning Turkish industrial goods were highlighted, the government was called to create units to follow and implement the EEC affairs as the chambers and İKV were invited to increase their efforts.¹⁰⁵

Turkey’s one of the biggest business associations, TÜSİAD, was established in 1971. When TÜSİAD publications are examined, one can encounter some works on the EEC as well. Even though the date of TÜSİAD’s studies is a few years late for this research’s time focus, they are still relevant in order to observe the changing attitudes in the 1970s vis-à-vis the 1960s.

For example, TÜSİAD conducted a survey, with the participation of 1300 firms responding to 306 questions, in 1977, aiming to present broader business perceptions regarding the EEC and Turkey-EEC relations. The survey found that approximately 65% of the businesses support full membership of Turkey in the EEC while more than half of the participants claimed that Turkish industries could meet the conditions only at an advanced level in the future.¹⁰⁶ It was also presented in the survey results that the vast majority of opponents to Turkish membership supported strengthened trade relations with Islamic countries.¹⁰⁷

102 “İstanbul Sanayi Odasının Katma Protokol Hakkındaki Görüşü,” in *Ortak Pazar’da Türkiye*, (İstanbul: İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı Yayınları, 1971), 89.

103 “İstanbul Sanayi Odasının Katma Protokol Hakkındaki Görüşü,” in *Ortak Pazar’da Türkiye*, (1971), 90.

104 Ibid., 91.

105 Ibid., 93-94.

106 *AET ile İlişkileri Özel Kesim Nasıl Değerlendiriyor?* (1978).

107 Ibid.

On the state of relations between Turkey and the EEC and what policy Turkey should have followed, 47% of the Turkish firms asserted that the relations had been much better in the earlier phase -probably in the 1960s- as only 14% of the participants claimed that it was a mistake to create an association relation between Turkey and the EEC.¹⁰⁸ Turkish businesses implied that trade walls and trade protection were needed until a certain maturity level in Turkish industry was achieved.¹⁰⁹ It should also be noted that the majority of the participants thought that the EEC could achieve the aim of “political union”.¹¹⁰

In a publication on the state of the Turkish economy in 1975, a sub-chapter was reserved for Turkey-EEC relations. After giving a chronology of developments in the relations, the sub-chapter focused on the issues in the relations, Turkish accession to the ECSC, and Greece-EEC relations.¹¹¹

The “issues and evaluations” section of the report, authored by Erol Manisalı, argued that the relations were stuck mainly because of the articles of the Additional Protocol, which contained lesser and fading trade, social, and financial benefits given to Turkey.¹¹² The main problem in this article was provided as the “unbalance” between the parties to the Protocol; additionally, it was stated that frictions in this process would lead to drift the parties away from each other.¹¹³

In its search to present the circulating views on the topic, in 1977, TÜSİAD published a report in which the opinions of different business associations, political parties, and trade unions were focused, and the changes to the initial positioning of these organizations can be followed. By quoting from Türk-İş’s general assembly reports, the organization’s support for Turkish EEC mem-

108 *AET ile İlişkileri Özel Kesim Nasıl Değerlendiriyor?* (1978).

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid.

111 *1975 Yılıının Sonunda Türk Ekonomisi*, (İstanbul: TÜSİAD Yayınları, 1975). The sections were authored by different authors; and every section within the aforementioned sub-chapter gives the reference that the opinions presented belong to the authors and it does not need to reflect TÜSİAD’s view. Nevertheless, it can still be argued that a totally contravening text might not have been published in a TÜSİAD report.

112 *1975 Yılıının Sonunda Türk Ekonomisi*, (1975).

113 Ibid.

bership due to positive effects on industrialization and welfare was highlighted; nevertheless, the deteriorating effect of the Additional Protocol and the EEC's trade relations were also emphasized later in the 1970s.¹¹⁴

Türk-İş, one of the influential labor unions, put a map of Europe, coloring blue the EEC countries, including Turkey and Greece, on its journal's cover in September 1963. The journal's 7th volume gave detailed information about the EEC with an article titled "We Have Become a Member of the Common Market".¹¹⁵ After introducing the EEC, its organizational structure, the Ankara Agreement, and presenting a few concerns as to the possibility of Turkey's loss of qualified workers and capital to the EEC countries, the article concluded by summarizing Türk-İş's position towards the issue. It was stated that:

Both early cheers and categorical pessimisms are ill-timed. Our entry into the Common Market has not yielded any good or bad results yet. This constitutes one of the newest and maybe the most significant of the chances we have seized since Tanzimat to become Westernized and wasted recklessly.¹¹⁶

The negligence of the EEC affairs during the preparatory stage was also mentioned by Türk-İş General Secretary Halil Tunç in December 1969. In his speech made in Genel-İş Congress, he asserted that no significant advances had been achieved in the process, and the opinions were built upon political and emotional aims without any effort to realize the real advantages and disadvantages for the Turkish economy.¹¹⁷

In parallel with the trend in Turkey, Türk-İş also examined the EEC and Turkey-EEC relations during the Additional Protocol debates heated in late

114 *Türk-İş Working Report of 8th General Assembly*, (Ankara: 1970); *Türk-İş Working Report presented to the 10th General Assembly*, (Ankara: 1976) quoted in *Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu Üzerine Görüşler-Yaklaşımlar*, (1977) 10-17.

115 "Ortak Pazar Üyesi Olduk," *Türk-İş Dergisi* 7, (September 1963), 3-7.

116 The original Turkish text: Erken sevinçler de, kesin karamsarlıklar da zamansızdır. Ortak Pazar'a girmemiz, bugün ne bir kâr, ne zarar sağlamıştır. Bu Tanzimat'tan bu yana elde edip cömertçe harcadığımız batılılaşma fırsatlarının, en yenisi ve belki de en önemlisini teşkil etmektedir.

117 "Genel-İş Sendikası 4. Genel Kurulu Yapıldı," *Türk-İş Dergisi* 82, (December 1969), 19.

1969 and early 1970. The cover of the 83rd volume of the *Türk-İş* journal included a map of Turkey and the EEC countries with a question mark between them. Plus, there is a lengthy article in this volume which examined the EEC, its current problems, and the Turkish position in it without making edged comments.¹¹⁸

Chair of Metal-İş Federation Kaya Özdemir also criticized the current benefits in December 1969 during Basın-İş General Assembly. He said that only the industrial sector that can compete with its European peers is textile; however, no concession was given by the EEC for this sector.¹¹⁹ He also added that Turkey should not have been an agrarian country within the Common Market, and there needed to be vigilant against the EEC blocking the country's industrialization.¹²⁰

The Chamber of Mechanical Engineers published a book¹²¹ on their attitude towards Turkey's moving forward in the transitional period. They immensely criticized Turkish accession by emphasizing the risk of underdevelopment of Turkish industries, uncontrolled access for the Common Market members' people to live, work, trade, and establish.¹²² The chamber offered an extension for the preparatory stage, reevaluation of the risks for the transitional stage, and interestingly, holding a referendum on Turkish accession to the Common Market.¹²³

Another significant labor union was DİSK. DİSK was more hardliner in terms of opposition to the EEC and Turkey's EEC membership in comparison to other well-known unions. This opposition appeared clearly in the decisions of the 3rd General Assembly, which took place on 13-15 February 1970. The 31st article of the decisions put forward that DİSK would fight against the Turkish

118 "Ortak Pazar Sorunu," *Türk-İş Dergisi* 83, (January 1970), 16-31.

119 "Basın-İş Sendikası Genel Kurulu," *Türk-İş Dergisi* 82, (December 1969), 20.

120 Ibid., p. 20.

121 *Ortak Pazar ve Türkiye*, Makine Mühendisleri Odası, (Ankara: 1970).

122 Tekeli and İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu* vol. 2, (1993), 105-106.

123 Ibid., 106.

membership in the EEC, the entry of American imperialism, and foreign capital into Turkey.¹²⁴

While DİSK was opposing the EEC, it tried to inform the public on the issue. In 1974, DİSK published a booklet on Turkey-EEC relations. The booklet directly challenged the idea that the Turkish economy could develop within the EEC by way of liberal policies based on very limited state intervention, a market economy, and promoting competition.¹²⁵ The final paragraph of the booklet is as follows:

There is no possibility for the Turkish nation, national forces, and national industrialists to say “yes” to the responsibilities stemming from the Additional Protocol. Because the Common Market, a monopoly of capitalist countries, is a “common grave” at best for less developed countries opting to establish a customs union with it.¹²⁶

TÜSİAD’s report, published in 1977, shared DİSK’s views as well. The report indicated that DİSK was an opponent to Turkey’s EEC association and membership from the very beginning. By quoting from DİSK’s 3rd General Assembly Working Report from the late 1960s, it was stated that the organization identified the EEC as “an economic exploiter net of imperialism” and proposed to quit this net.¹²⁷ DİSK maintained its negative attitude towards the EEC. TÜSİAD’s report shared DİSK’s position, which was rejecting the continuation of the Turkey-EEC association even if the agreements are revised.¹²⁸

TİSK, the Confederation of Employer Unions, initially defended that the Turkey-EEC tie was a consequence of the two-bloc world order; therefore, it

124 *DİSK Tarihi*, vol 2, ed. Aziz Çelik, (İstanbul: Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu Araştırma Merkezi, 2022), 279.

125 Hasan Ceyhan, *Ortak Pazar ve Türkiye*, (İstanbul: DİSK Yayınları, 1974), 116.

126 The original text: “Türk ulusunun, ulusal güçlerin ve ulusal sanayicilerin Katma protokolün yükümlülüklerine evet demelerine olanak yoktur. Çünkü kapitalist ülkelerin monopolü olan ORTAK PAZAR, onunla gümrük birliğine gitmeyi yeğliyen az gelişmiş ülkelerin sanayileri için olsa olsa bir ORTAK MEZARDIR.”

127 *DİSK Working Report, 3rd General Assembly, 1968-1970* quoted in *Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu Üzerine Görüşler-Yaklaşımlar*, (1977), 17.

128 *Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu*, Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, (Ankara: 1976) quoted in *Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu Üzerine Görüşler-Yaklaşımlar*, (1977), 22.

should have been improved as the same international political order continued.¹²⁹ However, the complicated relations in the 1970s were criticized by blaming the EEC for undermining the advantages that Turkey had been benefiting from as a result of the new trade ties the EEC established with third countries.¹³⁰

While the relations of Turkey-EEC started the first signs of disquiet and unease in the last quarter of the 1960s, and the views among the bureaucratic elites and public were highly differentiated, this situation was also reflected in the National Assembly minutes. The approaches started to vary, and the number of references to the EEC and its impacts on the Turkish economy increased from the last years of the 1960s onwards in comparison to the earlier years of the decade. Plus, the way in which different political parties' approach to the subject started to show great divergences.

4.2.2 *Government Programs and the EEC*

The 9th İnönü government, which signed the Ankara Agreement, was a coalition government formed by CHP, CKMP, YTP, and independents. When one investigates the coalition protocol of the government, s/he can see the direct emphasis made on the Common Market. The EEC was introduced as an organization with which Turkey had important ties in terms of foreign economic relations, and the necessity to sign an association agreement recognizing Turkey's economic realities and the common fate that Turkey and the Western world share was emphasized.¹³¹

Foreign policy reserved a significant place in the government program as well. On 2 July 1962, the program was read by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü in

129 *İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı'nın 'Katma Protokol'de Yapılması Gereken Değişiklikler' ile İlgili Önerileri Hakkında Konfederasyonumuz Görüşleri*, TİSK; *Working Report for 9th Ordinary General Assembly*, TİSK, (Ankara: 1976) quoted in *Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu Üzerine Görüşler-Yaklaşımlar*, (1977) 10-17.

130 *11th Ordinary General Assembly Working Report*, TİSK, (Ankara: 1976) quoted in *Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu Üzerine Görüşler-Yaklaşımlar*, (1977), 17.

131 Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, *Hükümetler-Programları ve Genel Kurul Görüşmeleri*, vol. 3, (2013), 1483.

the National Assembly. The EEC was briefly mentioned at the end of the program with only three brief paragraphs. These paragraphs mentioned the likelihood of an increase in the number of members to the EEC and a consequent rise in initiatives for political integration, the negotiations between the EEC and Turkey for an agreement that would be for the benefit of both parties.¹³²

The government program of the 10th İnönü Government also took note of the Turkey-EEC relations. The program was read in the National Assembly by Prime Minister İnönü on 30 December 1963, three months after the signing of the Ankara Agreement.¹³³ The program mentioned the necessity of closing the economic development gap between Turkey and EEC Member States as one of the grand issues the nation was facing.¹³⁴ Similar to the prior one, this program also underlined the common fate of Turkey and the Western world, in which the Ankara Agreement was defined as a historical milestone.¹³⁵

The Ürgüplü Government between February-October 1965 was also in favor of the association with the EEC and Turkey's position in European integration. The government program said that the unification of the all-world nations to cooperate instantly was unrealistic; therefore, regional cooperation organizations should be seen as the steps on that road.¹³⁶ In this way, complying with the obligations of the Ankara Agreement, facilitating implementation of the agreement with economic and social policies, making efforts to improve the Turkish economy, ensuring its well-being among other EEC member economies, were given as the policies to follow.¹³⁷

First Demirel Government of 1965-1969 assessed the EEC along with the GATT, IMF OECD as the organizations which envisioned the highest level of economic cooperation; in this context, opposing foreign capital was neither in line with short term economic development efforts nor founding purposes of

132 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 1, vol. 6, meeting 1, (02.07.1962), 161.

133 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 1, vol. 24, meeting 3, (30.12.1963), 33.

134 *Ibid.*, 37.

135 *Ibid.*, 45.

136 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 1, vol. 36, meeting 4, (26.02.1965), 503.

137 *Ibid.*, 503.

the organizations like the EEC that Turkey was eager to become a full member.¹³⁸ The program also underlined the government's plans to make Turkish industry ready and competitive vis-à-vis the EEC¹³⁹ and commence the efforts enabling Turkey to move to the transitional stage.¹⁴⁰

The government program of the Second Demirel Government, which was in office for four months from November 1969 to March 1970, was not that different in terms of its attitude towards the EEC. This program evaluated the association relations between Turkey and the EEC as consistent with the national interests and goals; emphasized the high ability of these relations to comply with the traditional patterns in Turkish foreign policy, and announced the government's willingness to conclude negotiations for the transitional stage.¹⁴¹

The third Demirel Government lasted 1 year between 1970-1971, and it was the government that successfully concluded the negotiations with the EEC and signed the Additional Protocol. The government program mentioned the intentions of the government to reach an agreement with the EEC and the move towards the transitional period. An advanced stage of the relations, the program expressed, would be to the advantage of Turkish efforts for economic development through bringing a new dynamism as the economic, social, and political significance of the association grows day to day.¹⁴²

The government programs of the period do not show great differences. The governments were willing to accelerate the dialogue and the level of association with the EEC, as the organization was seen as an important economic actor and a union of political allies of Turkey. The necessity to take steps in order to prepare the Turkish economy for more advanced and integrated stages of the association was an underlined phenomenon of almost every program. Nonetheless, successive Turkish governments did not manage to take concrete steps to prepare the Turkish economy for further stages of association.

138 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 2, vol. 1, meeting 1, (03.11.1965), 84.

139 *Ibid.*, 84.

140 *Ibid.*, 96.

141 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 3, vol. 1, meeting 1, (07.11.1969), 68.

142 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 3, vol. 3, meeting 1, (09.03.1970), 385-386.

Nevertheless, the similar tone of the government programs, which shortly touched upon the relations with the EEC ought not to be considered as evidence for unanimity for full support for EEC membership of Turkey among Turkish politicians and the wider public. There were noteworthy divergences both in political and societal circles, which became clearer with the discussions surrounding the Additional Protocol.¹⁴³ Parliamentary minutes are the documents one can hear the conflicting voices over the issue.

4.2.3 *Discussions in the Turkish National Assembly*

The government programs provided above do not yield diversified opinions on the EEC and Turkey's relations and role within it. It was primarily a result of the incumbent parties of the period, CHP and AP differed little -at least considering official party policy- in their approach towards the issue during 1963-1971. Of course, there were nuances between these parties' attitudes. For example, İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin put CHP and AP into different categories as AP stood with the idea of swift moving towards the transitional period without any delay, CHP remained more cautious about the timing and possible effects of instantaneously moving to the transitional period.¹⁴⁴

Likewise, it should not be thought that all members of CHP or AP were thinking in the same way; or, other political parties in the National Assembly shared a common perspective. One of the contributors to this end was no doubt TİP, which came into existence and grew its influence during the 1960s through the popularization of the left in Turkey for the first time.¹⁴⁵ While the canon of leftist thought was translated into Turkish and read by the masses in Turkey also for the first time,¹⁴⁶ the entry of TİP into the National Assembly brought their diverse approaches regarding the EEC to the Assembly as well. TİP, from the beginning of the association relations with the signing of the

143 Tekeli and İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu* vol. 2, (1993), 55.

144 Ibid., 57.

145 Ahmet Öncü, and Özgür Mutlu Ulus, "Türkiye Solunun Aşıl Topuğu: 1960-1971 Yıllarında Türkiye Solundaki Devlet Tartışmalarının Karatani'nin Sermaye-Ulus-Devlet Çerçevesinden İrdelenmesi," *Çalışma ve Toplum*, 1, (2019), 42.

146 Hüseyin Aykol, *Türkiye'de Sol Örgütler: Bölüne Bölüne Büyümek*, (Ankara, Phoenix, 2022), 71.

Ankara Agreement, rejected the EEC by seeing the organization as a colonialist entity which worked in the benefit of the Six, "...by supplying them with export markets, cheap raw materials and fields of investment".¹⁴⁷ Thus, membership of Turkey in the EEC was seen as detrimental for the country's economy and development strategy as the accession would cost the national independence in the long run.¹⁴⁸

It was claimed in the May 1963 volume of *Sosyal Adalet*, which was published by TİP, that Turkish membership in the EEC would be an unequal relation in terms of economic power; and in the capitalist system, this kind of relation would inevitably create disadvantages result for the weak side by referring to Turkey-EEC relations.¹⁴⁹ Negative effects on Turkey's European identity and excessive damage to the Turkish economy in the case of staying outside the EEC were also rejected.¹⁵⁰

When it comes to CKMP and YTP, which took a role in the coalition governments, the main idea of them can be summarized as that Turkey's association with the EEC was beneficial and the Turkish economy would develop with the help of the community's financial support.¹⁵¹ So, it can be claimed that their opinions were not significantly different from that of AP. However, nuances, differences, support, and opposition to the EEC and Turkey's accession to the organization should be examined via National Assembly minutes in order to grasp how the issue was treated in Turkish politics in those years.

When one focuses on the discussions making the EEC and Turkey-EEC relations its subject, s/he may realize a major surge in 1969 and 1970, when the Additional Protocol negotiations were on the agenda and near to be concluded. Despite some references and discussions, the period prior to these

147 Erkan Doğan, "Articulating Socialism with Nationalism: A Critical Analysis of Nationalism in the Turkish Leftist Tradition in the 1960s," (Ph.D Thesis, Bilkent University, 2010), 203-204.

148 Ibid., 203-204.

149 "Ortak Pazar Kalkınma Yolu Değildir," *Sosyal Adalet*, (7 May 1963), 3.

150 Ibid., 3.

151 R. Bahar Üste, "Türkiye'de Siyasal İktidara Gelen Partilerin AET/AT/AB İlişkileri Hakkındaki Görüşleri ve Yönetim Yapısına Etkileri," *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 8 no. 3, (2006), 334-335.

years demonstrated a relative lack of interest in the National Assembly although the transitional period would directly affect Turkish industry and economy.

The first months of 1963 witnessed discussions in the National Assembly in which the EEC was taken into the agenda. In these discussions, it can be seen that Turkish MPs tried to learn more about the EEC and what the organization means for Turkey in the case of association. For example, Sadrettin Tosbi, a parliamentarian from CKMP, complained about the general lack of information among the MPs on the subject, and the government's incompetence both to inform the National Assembly about potential benefits and risks of an association.¹⁵² He also called for more discussions on the subject in the National Assembly and more active participation of the Parliament in the process through committees.¹⁵³

On the same day, the Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin gave a place to the EEC in his speech, the differences between Greek and Turkish association agreements (preparation stage for Turkey) and the reasons for it,¹⁵⁴ in response to Nihat Erim's motion for a general debate on Turkey's position in face of the recent developments including the EEC, Greece's association agreement and need for Turkey to seek for the same conditions in its own association agreement.¹⁵⁵

The MPs' complaints about the government's inability to inform the National Assembly seem to continue. On 27 August 1963, Faruk Sükan from AP said that despite various significant developments, the Parliament and public remained uninformed, including on the conclusion of the negotiations with the EEC for the association agreement.¹⁵⁶

In January 1964, the National Assembly was discussing the ratification of the Ankara Agreement. Turhan Feyzioğlu and Şefik İnan from CHP, Fahrettin Kerim Gökay from YTP, Erol Yılmaz Akçal from AP, Yusuf Ziya Yücebilgin from CKMP, and independent MP Coşkun Kırca took the floor. Almost all

152 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 1, vol. 11, meeting 2, (14.01.1963), 88.

153 *Ibid.*, 88.

154 *Ibid.*, 107-108.

155 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 1, vol. 10, meeting 2, (09.01.1963), 650-651.

156 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 1, vol. 20, meeting 2, (27.08.1963), 396-397.

these speakers emphasized the importance and advantages of Turkey's association with the EEC which is both an economic and political movement while accepting the development gap between Turkey and the Six, which should have been closed during the preparation stage.¹⁵⁷

On 18 June 1964, Kasım Gülek from CHP made a reference to the EEC while discussing a proposal regarding the status of international schools in Turkey. After stating that the period of capitulations ended in Turkey, Gülek said that Turkey was on the road to full membership in the Common Market, which would give decisions on the economy, which Turkey also implemented. So, there is a need to see things beyond narrow and chauvinistic nationalism as Turkey is a nation which is progressive, civilized, and Europeanist.¹⁵⁸

As this example presents, the relations with the EEC were instrumentalized in order to support and justify opinions on daily politics in the National Assembly. In this example, it can be seen that this justification was made by giving references to Turkey's identity and civilizational status as the Turkey-EEC relations tended to be analyzed with identity politics lenses in 1960s' Turkey, especially within broad circles.

TİP showed a great divergence from the other political parties in the National Assembly. Despite some reservations regarding the need for immediate and great efforts to prepare the Turkish economy and industry for the next stages of the association agreement, the political parties in the parliament did not express direct confrontation to Turkish association with the EEC during the 1960s. TİP was an exception to this stance.

The party directly opposed Turkish association or membership to the EEC by claiming that in case of full membership, the customs walls would disappear, there would be freedom for capital and people, which "...opened the gates of foreign exploitation and oppression that had not been witnessed even in the Ottoman Empire era."¹⁵⁹ This stance was also supported by TİP MPs' speeches in the Turkish National Assembly, as well.

On 14 February 1967, Sadun Aren from TİP concisely mentioned the party's attitude towards Turkish membership in the EEC. In a passage in his

157 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 1, vol. 25, meeting 3, (14.01.1964), 80-90.

158 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 1 vol. 31, meeting 3 (18.06.1964), 23.

159 *Üçüncü Büyük Kongre Çalışma Raporu*, Türkiye İşçi Partisi, (9-12 November 1968), 20.

long speech, he expressed that the Common Market is not fit for Turkey as the organization was a system which was founded by the Western countries with the aim of strengthening their industries.¹⁶⁰

Aren also rejected the idea of giving away full membership in the future if disadvantages outweigh the advantages by underlining the importance of consistency in state administration; and called for an immediate decision on organizing the relations with the Six outside the EEC.¹⁶¹ These sentences received a response given by the Minister of Industry on 24 February 1967. Minister Mehmet Turgut shaped his words by focusing on Turkey's position in the Western alliance and this position's importance for parliamentary democracy, individual freedoms, and private enterprises in Turkey.¹⁶²

1969 and 1970 were the years when the subject really caught attention both in public and in the National Assembly as the Additional Protocol was being negotiated. Hence, there are heated debates in the parliament. This period also showed tougher attitudes held by political parties and some opinion shifts. On 9 December 1968, the 9th Association Council¹⁶³ was gathered and decided to commence the negotiations for the transitional stage by ignoring the Commission recommendations.¹⁶⁴ The negotiations officially started on 9 February 1969;¹⁶⁵ and, this move accelerated debates in the parliament.

Once relatively more unified, CHP witnessed some divisions on the subject during the period. For example, in a speech made in the National Assembly, İrfan Baran from CHP criticized the economic policies of the government

160 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 2, vol. 12, meeting 2, (14.02.1967), 636.

161 *Ibid.*, 636.

162 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 2, vol. 14, meeting 2, (24.02.1967), 470-471.

163 Association Council (*Ortaklık Konseyi*) is the leading institution in Turkey-EU relations. It was formed by the Ankara Agreement. The main task of the institution is overseeing the implementation of the Ankara Agreement and monitoring and facilitating the relations towards the Customs Union. It was designed as an executive organ made up of Turkish government, EEC Member States' governments and EEC organs like the Council and the Commission. The Association Council was set to meet in every six months and serve as a forum where bottlenecks of the relations are resolved. For further information, see: Şaban H. Çalış, *Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri*, (Ankara: Nobel, 2016), 93.

164 Birand, *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası 1959-2004*, (2005), 16.

165 *Ibid.*, 16.

by referencing the policy towards the EEC. Baran mentioned the government's inability to act independently in the economy as it tied its fate with that of the EEC and the potential detrimental effects of the customs union against Turkish exports to European countries.¹⁶⁶

It is also evident that a more leftist rhetoric appeared within CHP during the period. There were some discussions in which an MP from CHP labelled the EEC as a form of "neo-capitulation".¹⁶⁷ Nevertheless, it can be said that the general tendency in the party was not to stop the whole process; but instead, to raise the question of the preparedness level of the Turkish economy and industry to meet the obligations of the transitional stage and the timing of the move. The speech made by Nihat Erim on 23 May 1970 on behalf of the CHP group in the National Assembly put the attitude very clearly:¹⁶⁸

... The criticisms targeting the government today are about not taking the necessary measures during the preparation stage and the incomplete state of preparations... The source of the concerns right here is the danger of collapse of our industry with incoming goods originating from industrialized Western countries... We, as CHP group, are in support of Turkish participation in the Western European integration movement. In 1963, the agreement with the Common Market was signed by the government led by CHP. If we are criticizing the govern-

166 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 3, vol. 9, meeting 2, (21.12.1970), 334-336.

167 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 3, vol. 5, meeting 1, (28.05.1970), 945.

168 The original Turkish text: "...Hükümete bugün yöneltilen eleştiriler, hazırlık döneminde gerekli tedbirlerin alınmadığı, hazırlığın tamam olmadığı şeklindedir... Endişelerin kaynağı, gümrük indirimleri sonunda yerli sanayimizin, ileri Batı sanayi ülkelerinden gelecek mallar karşısında, çökmesi tehlikesidir... Biz C. H. P. Grubu olarak, Türkiye'nin Batı Avrupa entegrasyon eylemi içinde olmasından yanayız. 1963 te Ortak Pazarla anlaşmayı, başında C. H. P. nin bulunduğu Koalisyon Hükümeti imzalamıştır. Eğer şimdi Ortak Pazar meselesinde Hükümeti eleştiriyorsak, bu, işin esasına itirazımız olduğundan değildir. Uyanlarımız, millî menfaatlerin en üstün seviyede korunmasını sağlamaya yardımcı olmak endişesine dayanmaktadır. Modern Devlet bünyesi içinde kalkınabilmenin vazgeçilmez şartı, Türkiye'nin sanayileşmesidir. Ortak Pazar anlaşması sanayiimizi çökertmesin, tersine milletlerarası rekabete süratle girişebilecek seviyeye getirsin. İstedığımız ve aradığımız bunun formülüdür. Acele ederek telâfisi imkânsız bir hata işlenmesin, diyoruz."

ment, it is not to do with the essence. Our warnings are about the concerns to help preserving the national interests par excellence. In a modern state structure, industrialization is an indispensable condition for Turkey. The Common Market agreement should not destroy our industry; but rather, it should bring it to a level available for international competition quickly. The formula we desire and seek is this. We say that no unrepairable mistake should be committed by rushing.¹⁶⁹

The election manifesto of the party in 1969 made this tendency very clear. It was defended that in order to achieve a quick move to the transitional period, Turkish national industry would be left vulnerable, which would result in collapse and becoming a satellite.¹⁷⁰ Therefore, and in order to avoid being overpowered within the Common Market, the country needed larger and modernized businesses.¹⁷¹ As it is seen, CHP did not principally reject the EEC association or membership; yet, it was cautious about the rush for the transitional period and its possible negative impacts on Turkish industry.

A very similar attitude was held by GP. Turhan Feyzioğlu, on behalf of GP group in the parliament. Turhan Feyzioğlu was a CHP MP who founded GP on 12 May 1967 after Bülent Ecevit and his “left-of-the-center” group became dominant within CHP with the support of İsmet İnönü.¹⁷² He defended that closing ties with the EEC is important for Turkey; however, the conditions for the next stage should be thought carefully, and Turkey should use its right to extend the preparatory stage.¹⁷³

The Additional Protocol discussions were also important to present different oppositions to the EEC. Necmettin Erbakan, who was an independent MP elected from Konya, challenged the EEC by utilizing both economic and

169 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 3, vol. 5, meeting 1, (23.05.1970), 351.

170 *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi*, (1969) quoted in Mete Kaan Kaynar and Nurettin Kalkan, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Partiler Seçimler Beyannameler (1923-1980)*, (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2022), 474.

171 *Ibid.*, 474.

172 *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* vol. 7 (İstanbul: İletişim, 1983-1985), 1967-1990 quoted in Mete Tunçay, “Siyasal Gelişmenin Evreleri,” *Bilineceği Bilmek*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2019), 177-178.

173 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 3, vol. 1, meeting 1, (10.11.1969), 101.

identity-based arguments. On 31 July 1970, Erbakan's motion was read in parliament. In this motion, he described the EEC as a "Catholic union" which aims to gather all the power in a council, taking sovereignty rights of the Member States away.¹⁷⁴ He added that taking Turkey into the EEC meant destroying its great history and identity, which is significant for humanity; and in this way, Erbakan proposed establishing a common market between Turkey and Islamic countries.¹⁷⁵

Likewise, on 11 December 1970, Erbakan gave a long speech at the National Assembly regarding the lack of preparation in Turkey to move to the next stage, the failure of the government to provide enough information to the parliament, and the nature of the EEC. His speech was again shaped with identity-based claims. In this speech, he listed three aims for the EEC to accept Turkey into membership. These reasons are melting the Muslim population of Turkey in a Christian union, to use Turkish people as "servants and workers" in the triplex house of EEC, where "Zionist capitalists and their European officials" settle and invade Turkey not by war but by buying land.¹⁷⁶

In the coming years, Erbakan's opposition grew as he organized his views within political parties such as MNP and MSP in the 1970s. In the election manifesto of MSP for the 1973 elections, it was argued that Turkish nationalism, national sovereignty, and national industry would be destroyed by the EEC.¹⁷⁷

As it can be seen from the National Assembly minutes, there is a considerable increase in the number of debates during times of active negotiations with the EEC were carried out, when an agreement was signed or about to be signed. However, both in 1963, when the Ankara Agreement was the subject, and in 1969-1970, when the Additional Protocol was the core element of the discussions, the MPs complained about a lack of consultations in the Assembly and their lack of information on the state of affairs with the EEC.

Plus, it should be noted that the parliamentary debates did not present direct opposition to the EEC at the party level, in general. The discussions did

174 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 3, vol. 8, meeting 1, (31.07.1970), 870.

175 *Ibid.*, 870.

176 *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, period 3, vol. 9, meeting 2, (11.12.1970), 241-242.

177 *Milli Selamet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi*, (İstanbul: 1973), 34-39.

not usually focus on identity-based arguments, except Erbakan's speeches featuring differences between Turkey and the EEC countries in terms of identity. Apart from that, the real dynamic in parliamentary discussions was the economy, the effect of the EEC association, the timing, and the conditions for moving to the next stages of the association agreement.

§ 4.3 Turkey's Position in the EEC According to the Leftist Intelligentsia

Even though there were some newspaper and journal articles penned, it cannot be true to suggest that the Turkish application for association with the EEC in 1959 brought a tense public discussion in Turkey.¹⁷⁸ The same was true for the association agreement. Despite common indifference towards the real meaning and future prospects the Ankara Agreement would bring, the only vocal circles were the leftist intellectuals who were talking and writing about the agreement, Turkey-EEC relations, and its potential results.¹⁷⁹

Among the leftist circles, the highest share of the energy was consumed for the discussions regarding the US and NATO. Anti-imperialism, independence in foreign trade relations, and foreign policy were mostly discussed with references to NATO and the US, which resulted in EEC discussions being sidelined even by the leftist intellectuals.¹⁸⁰ Nevertheless, the Turkish left's response to the question of the EEC deserves attention and contextualization as the 1960s were the years of vitalization for leftist thought in the country, which can be traced through leftist journals.

As the relations with the EEC tended to be seen as an identity issue in Turkish public opinion, it can be claimed that the leftist journals did not take the identity as a reason for their negative position towards the EEC. But rather, these journals primarily aimed to show economic and political reasons and

178 Vardar, "Türkiye Avrupa Topluluğu/Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri," in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, (2004), 442-443.

179 Birand, *Bir Pazar Hikâyesi: Türkiye-AET İlişkileri*, (1978), 153-154.

180 Tekeli and İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu* vol. 2, (1993), 55.

consequences of Turkish association with the EEC. Plus, it can be argued that the stance of the leftist intellectuals towards the EEC was “Hard Eurosceptic” while taking the euroscepticism conceptualization set out by Taggart and Szczerbiak.

The first journal examined here is *YÖN*. The Greece factor in Turkey’s application and lack of information about the EEC among political circles, which was mentioned earlier in this chapter, were also mentioned in *YÖN*. The 57th volume of the journal had an article questioning the awareness in Turkey of the consequences of Turkish association with the EEC. The text argued that there had been no studies examining Turkish interests in the EEC, the general tendency towards the organization, and what kind of relations could have been appropriate for the short and long-term goals of Turkey.¹⁸¹

The movement known as *YÖN-Devrim* asserted that western imperialism had captured Turkey again; and the only way to get rid of imperialism is by winning a political and economic struggle against it.¹⁸² This was also presented as a prerequisite for the country to achieve the level of contemporary civilization.¹⁸³ With this perspective, articles appeared in *YÖN* were mostly leaning to reject Western international organizations, and this rejection did not only target NATO, the main organization of the Western alliance. These organizations were assessed as instruments of Western imperialism and interests. OECD, for example, was also put into the same category. It was identified as “...a cooperation and development agency founded by the capitalist countries” emphasizing foreign debt payments and price stability for specific reasons instead of rapid development.¹⁸⁴

International organizations were seen as obstacles to Turkish political and economic independence. By quoting the Minister of Finance Ferit Melen, *YÖN* underlined the role of international organizations like OECD, IMF, and Turkish Consortium and the hardship for Turkey to decide price raises made

181 Mümtaz Soysal, “Dış Politika ve Parlamento,” *YÖN*, vol. 57,(16 January 1963), 6.

182 Gökhan Atılğan, *Yön-Devrim Hareketi*, (İstanbul: Yordam, 2008), 136.

183 Atılğan, *Yön-Devrim Hareketi*, (2008), 136.

184 “O.E.C.D. Türkiye Raporu,” *YÖN*, vol. 160, (22 April 1966), 16.

for sugar beet by itself.¹⁸⁵ So, in the eyes of the Turkish leftists, these organizations blocked Turkish economic independence and development and served in the interests of the Western countries lending money to Turkey and willing to guarantee its repayments.

The EEC was conceptualized with the same perspective. It can be argued that during the 1960s, the Turkish left opposed the EEC membership of Turkey basically on two bases. The first one was about their foreign policy perspective, and the second one is on the Turkish economy. *YÖN* was a quite example to see the reflection of this argument.

In the 98th volume of *YÖN*, Doğan Avcıoğlu assessed the aims of the Common Market in the face of American foreign policy and economic aims. The final section of this article was reserved for policy recommendations for Turkey, which clearly gave the perspective of the author and *YÖN* about Turkey's position in the international political setting. After expressing the split within the Western alliance, Avcıoğlu said that pretending to be a Westerner and a part of the West had been easier before this split; so, which imperialism would Turkey prefer, the US or Western Europeans now?¹⁸⁶ Avcıoğlu responded his own question by stating that each side would mean being a satellite (*peyk*), remaining as an underdeveloped agrarian country turning to imperialism; in this respect, Turkey, the first country to raise its flag and fight against imperialism under Atatürk's leadership, should have sided with the "Third world".¹⁸⁷ With this argument, Doğan Avcıoğlu surely rejected Turkish accession to the EEC by identifying it as a form of imperialism.

YÖN gave considerable importance to articles envisioning a Turkish foreign policy independent from Western organizations and brought up the example of de Gaulle due to his approach to NATO and the US later on. Turkey's foreign policy in line with bloc politics was labelled as "dependent, one-sided and characterless"¹⁸⁸ by *YÖN* articles, and a more nuanced foreign policy was advised/hoped.

185 "İktisadi Politikamızı Kim Çizer?" *YÖN*, vol. 94, (15 January 1965), 7.

186 Doğan Avcıoğlu, "Emperyalizmin Çırpınışları", *YÖN*, vol. 98, (12 February 1965), 3.

187 Ibid., 3.

188 Erdoğan Başar, "İkinci Milli Kurtuluş Savaşı", *YÖN*, VOL. 106, (9 April 1965), 8.

Some articles published in *YÖN* advised having a more balanced, multi-dimensional foreign policy. For example, İbrahim Çamlı listed “mild” Turkish leftist intellectuals’ opinions in which they desired a more reciprocity between Turkey and its western allies, including the US, a foreign policy being aware of Turkey’s special position both in the West and Asia and Africa, and a more proactive foreign policy.¹⁸⁹ Nonetheless, in this article, there was no direct reference for Turkey to leave the Western bloc. Likewise, the 148th volume of *YÖN* published an article by Doğan Avcıoğlu, which started with these sentences:

The necessity to be disentangled from being a satellite in foreign policy and head towards independence is now understood. An independent foreign policy necessitates developing economic, political, and cultural relations with the USSR even if Turkey remains in the Western Alliance. Being able to say that “neither Washington nor Moscow” is possible by moving a little bit away from Washington and becoming closer to Moscow to some extent. In the context we are living in, rapprochement with the Soviets is a sine qua non for a foreign policy aiming for independence. In this respect, we need to recognize the big neighbor by getting away from Cold War bragging like “America is angel, Russia is bogey” without falling into the dichotomy of “Russia is angel, America is bogey”.¹⁹⁰

In line with the view demonstrated in the passage above, there were articles published in *YÖN* proposing a more balanced foreign policy, declining “serving either to Uncle Sam or Uncle Ivan”.¹⁹¹ NATO-sceptic sentiments are embedded in *YÖN*’s foreign policy stance. Encountering the texts proposing more limited/changing relations with NATO and even leaving NATO could not be seen as a coincidence throughout *YÖN*. For example, 155th volume ended with an article arguing that the basis for Turkey’s NATO membership - the Soviet threat- was not existent anymore; therefore, Turkey should have

189 İbrahim Çamlı, “Batı ittifakı içinde bağımsız Türkiye,” vol. 62, (20 February 1963), 16.

190 Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Sovyetler ve Biz,” *YÖN*, vol. 148, (28 January 1966), 3.

191 “Çöp tenekesini karıştıranlar,” *YÖN*, vol. 108, (23 April 1965), 6.

prepared for 1969,¹⁹² taken its interests into consideration, discussed the issue openly and taken the opportunity to get away from the mistakes on the issue.¹⁹³ The implied move might have been changing the status of NATO bases in Turkey, revising bilateral agreements, or leaving NATO.¹⁹⁴

The 150th volume of *YÖN* reserved its two pages for a speech given at the Socialist Culture Association by Numan Esin, who was a former National Unity Committee Member and Deputy Chair of CKMP. While talking about Turkey's defense strategy, Esin suggested that Turkey should have moved forward with independence in economy, politics, and defense policy by mobilizing its own sources; and, there should not have been any room for tying its own fate to an alliance system by giving up its ability to control.¹⁹⁵ Consequently, Esin offered Turkey to leave NATO in 1969.¹⁹⁶

Before coming up with the idea of leaving NATO, Esin also stated that there was no incentive for Turkey to integrate with the developed capitalist countries or the developed socialist countries as these integration movements are not beneficial for underdeveloped countries.¹⁹⁷ This sentence can also be read as a reference to the EEC. The sceptic tendency towards NATO and other western-based organizations could also stretch towards the EEC by putting the EEC into the same basket with other western bloc organizations.

Despite some implicit appreciation of mobilization of the European powers via the EEC against the US, especially its instrumentalization by de Gaulle to counter the US,¹⁹⁸ *YÖN* tended to portrait the EEC as a league which gathered neo-colonialists to implement their monopolist state capitalism

192 According to the North Atlantic Treaty, "...after the Treaty has been in force for twenty years any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation". 1969/1970 was the year the parties might leave the alliance. See: Francis A. Beer, "Introduction: NATO and International Integration," in *Integration and Disintegration in NATO*, (Ohio State University Press: 1969), 1.

193 İffet Aslan, "Nato Meselesi," *YÖN*, vol. 155, (18 March 1966), 16.

194 *Ibid.*, 16.

195 Numan Esin, "Ulusal Stratejiye Dönüş Zorunluluğu," *YÖN*, vol. 150, (11 February 1966), 10-11.

196 *Ibid.*, 10-11.

197 *Ibid.*, 10-11.

198 "De Gaulle'den Örnek Alalım," *YÖN*, vol. 110, (7 May 1965), 10; and "Ortak Pazar," *YÖN*, vol. 60, (6 February 1963), 12 are the articles mentioning third power envisioning of de Gaulle.

agenda,¹⁹⁹ as the Chapter 3 expressed while examining Turkish leftist conceptualization of the aims and the nature of the EEC. In addition, the EEC was identified as a capitalist imperialism organization that Turkey could not have benefited from for its economic development;²⁰⁰ thus, no future was available for Turkey in the EEC.

The economic underdevelopment and lack of heavy industry in Turkey were emphasized by numerous articles published in *YÖN*. While Turkey was characterized as a country trying to balance its current account deficit by borrowing in foreign exchange, having an industrial base relied on assembly industry²⁰¹ and raw material, technical knowledge, machinery imports,²⁰² Western countries were defined as giant capitalists who controlled Turkey economically through creating consortia and institutions with the name under aid agencies.²⁰³

Plus, Turkey was presented as a semi-colonized country whose economic policies were set by foreigners in their interests.²⁰⁴ According to *YÖN*, the general tendency in foreign trade policy implemented in Turkey aimed to turn Turkey into an open market under the name of trade liberalization.²⁰⁵

The technological development gap between Turkey and the EEC was also highlighted by *YÖN*. In an article, after giving a speech made by the Vice President of the EEC Commission regarding Europe's struggle against the US in terms of R&D and human capital, it was stated that Turkey could not produce machinery, it lacked technical knowledge and know-how, and royalty contributions to the national industry were very limited.²⁰⁶

Because of these differences, the suggestions to European and Turkish socialisms also diverged. Doğan Avcıoğlu thought that since the European coun-

199 Fethi Naci, "Yeni Sömürgecilik Nedir?" *YÖN*, vol. 103, (19 March 1965), 16.

200 İlhan Selçuk, "Yıkamak... Ve Yapmak," *YÖN*, vol. 130, (24 September 1965), 3.

201 In Turkish: Montaj sanayii

202 Doğan Avcıoğlu, "Kökü Dışarıda Sanayi," *YÖN*, vol. 218, (2 June 1967), 3.

203 İlhan Selçuk, "'Evet' ve 'Hayır,'" *YÖN*, vol. 136, (5 November 1965), 3.

204 "Türk Milliyetçilerine Sesleniş," *YÖN*, vol. 110, (7 May 1965), 8.

205 Fethi Naci, "Emperyalizm Nedir?" *YÖN*, vol. 123, (6 August 1965), 9-10.

206 Doğan Avcıoğlu, "Teknoloji Emperyalizmi," *YÖN*, vol. 210, (7 April 1967), 3.

tries had already achieved the industrialism stage, the goal for European socialists should have been nationalization and establishing social justice while Turkish socialists aimed for rapid development, industrialization, and achieving economic independence.²⁰⁷

As it can be seen, the structural differences between Turkey and Western capitalism were tried to be shown in these articles. The aim was to show that the necessities of the Turkish economy were different from the members of the EEC. Thus, the EEC was not the true base for Turkey to trust and construct its economy according to leftist journals of the period.

In light of the discussions on the EEC, the solution to the economic underdevelopment of Turkey was presented in *YÖN* as mobilizing its own national powers, taking care of and processing its own national resources rather than joining an organization of capitalist imperialism.²⁰⁸ Instead of becoming a part of it, according to *YÖN* articles, Turkey should have fought against this imperialism, which was necessary for Turkey to achieve its real independence by breaking the influence of this imperialism over itself.²⁰⁹

Fethi Naci's foreword for his book *Emperyalizm Nedir?* (What is Imperialism) was published in the 123rd volume of *YÖN*. In this text, it is stated that the US, West Germany, the UK, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands invested in Turkey, "a market of sweet profits"; however, these investments aimed to get profits easily and blunted the development of the industry in Turkey.²¹⁰ Besides, it was mentioned that Turkey knowingly tried to join the EEC, which would have destroyed the country's industry; hence, Turkey had to give up immediately its efforts like joining the EEC.²¹¹

When the leftist publications are examined, it is evident that Turkish leftist intellectuals saw the problem of imperialism, underdevelopment, and inequalities as also a consequence of Turkey's inner dynamics. Niyazi Berkes claimed that foreign economies created a class of private entrepreneurs who

207 "Moskova'nın Gözüyle Türkiyede Bugünkü Sosyalizm Hareketi," *YÖN*, vol. 198, (11 January 1967), 12.

208 Selçuk, "Yıkamak... Ve Yapmak," *YÖN*, vol. 130, (24 September 1965), 3.

209 Naci, "Emperyalizm Nedir?" *YÖN*, vol. 123, (6 August 1965), 10.

210 Ibid., 9.

211 Ibid., 9-10.

instrumentalize the means of exploitation against the national resources of a country.²¹² Criticisms against Turkish industrialists, for example, were a direct consequence of this phenomenon. Therefore, as Behice Boran suggested, the idea that overcoming the outer problems like imperialism was directly tied to the struggle against capitalism inside the country.²¹³

YÖN and other leftist journals touched upon this aspect as well. It is asserted that capitalism in Turkey was in alliance with the *ağalık* system inside and imperialism outside against the nation.²¹⁴ The export and import capital was defined as the strongest branches within the Turkish capitalist classes, and the article defined their intention as preventing Turkish factories from working.²¹⁵ In this manner, there was always a reference to “comprador bourgeoisie”²¹⁶ and national industry throughout the pages of YÖN. Doğan Avcıoğlu put forward that Turkish socialists were in need of a national industry “...which said ‘no’ to the EEC, which eliminates hopes for development and industrialization in the country, opposed to ‘snatcher’ (*kapkaççı*) assembly and package industries founded with the name of foreign capital, led the process of disposal of *toprak ağas*...”²¹⁷

While considering the attitude held by Turkish leftist intellectuals who wrote for YÖN, the EEC was evaluated as an organization of capitalist exploitation, which Turkey should never have been a part of. Because of Turkey’s economic and industrial underdeveloped situation, it was believed in the journal that Turkey could not have benefited from the EEC; but rather, it could

212 Atılğan, *Yön-Devrim Hareketi*, (2008), 137.

213 Gökhan Atılğan, *Behice Boran: Öğretim Üyesi, Siyasetçi, Kuramcı*, (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2009), 197.

214 “Türk Milliyetçilerine Sesleniş,” YÖN, vol. 110, p. 8. (7 May 1965), 8.

215 Ibid., 8.

216 An article by Mümtaz Soysal published in 149th volume of YÖN started with a historical and current definition of the term “comprador”. According to the article, comprador means “buyer” in Portuguese. Compradors were the group of people who worked for Western colonial Powers in China. Today, it also means “representatives of the western capitalism”, some of them occupied some governmental positions and some others pretended to be industrialists even though they only assembled foreign-made products. See: Mümtaz Soysal, “Komprador Dinciliği,” YÖN, vol. 149, (4 February 1966), 3.

217 Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Milliyetçilere Sesleniş,” YÖN, vol. 78, (25 September 1964), 3.

have become a market for western European goods. With this conceptualization, the attitude of the journal can be categorized as “Hard Eurosceptic” as Turkish engagement as a member to the organization was rejected the EEC in principle on the basis of differences between the Member States and Turkey, the aims and the nature of EEC, which was defined as “neo-colonial” and “imperialist”.

Similar tendencies one may see in *YÖN*’s pages can also be encountered in *ANT*. This journal also criticized the one-dimensional, bloc-based foreign policy followed by Turkey; however, it highlighted the necessity for Turkey to develop and establish its strong industry sector with national resources and the economic adverse effects of the EEC more than *YÖN*. Since the life span of the journal almost totally overlapped with the discussions regarding Turkey’s move towards the transitional stage of the Ankara Agreement, Turkey-EEC relations had a significant place throughout *ANT*. Moreover, it can be seen that economic concerns were emphasized more often and more directly in *ANT* probably because of the centrality of the subject for wider circles during those days in comparison to the early and mid-1960s.

On Turkish foreign policy, *ANT* principally underlined the necessity for Turkey to follow Atatürk’s foreign policy, founded on the principles of realism, anti-imperialism, peace, and international friendship.²¹⁸ Hüseyin Baş said in his article that Turkish foreign policy came to a wake-up point with international developments like the US’s attitude towards the Cyprus Question, the rise of the Third World; however, it did not mean a total change of course, as relations with the Eastern bloc countries were still limited.²¹⁹ The article defined this situation as a “contradiction”; and the reason for this contradictory situation was presented as Western allies, which demanded Turkey only for their aggressive goals while declining to establish mutually beneficial economic, trade, and cultural relations with Turkey.²²⁰

The west-sceptic attitude in *ANT* is visible in various articles. For instance, in the 50th volume of *ANT*, it was estimated that NATO would not continue to be the façade of Anglo-American imperialism from 1969 onwards as

218 Hüseyin Baş, “Dış Yorum”, *ANT*, vol. 1, (3 January 1967), 13.

219 Ibid., 13.

220 Ibid., 13.

nations would reject as in the case of France, which would be a precedent for other European nations.²²¹ In such a context, Turkey should have reconsidered NATO and bilateral agreements, examined de Gaulle's foreign policy, and followed European affairs more closely in order to develop a new Turkish foreign policy as it needed to get rid of all agreements and pacts tying itself to imperialists.²²²

The same article also mentioned the high possibility of the European economic integration movement's success and its move towards political integration as opposed to Anglo-American interests;²²³ nonetheless, the article did not advise Turkey to become a part of this integration movement. Actually, this is an obvious example of Turkish leftist intellectuals vis-à-vis European integration. Europe's split with the US was implicitly cherished with the articles on de Gaulle and its "independent foreign policy". Yet, Turkey was not given a place in this European integration, at least in its current form and under those circumstances. It is because they saw the EEC -like other international organizations- as an entirely detrimental entity for the Turkish economy and development.

With the impact of the domestic political context in the period discussing Turkey's advance to the second stage of the Turkey-EEC Association Agreement and its potential effects on the Turkish economy and industry, the economic aspect of the association was given considerable place in *ANT*. According to *ANT*, Turkey should have sided with the less-developed countries sharing common problems with Turkey rather than seeking membership to the EEC because it would be harmful as its industry would not compete with that of Western Europe.²²⁴

The difference in economic development between Turkey and the Six was also a point highlighted by *YÖN*. The EEC was identified as a "club of the rich", made up of members looking like each other in terms of socio-economic structure, political tradition, and history, in which Turkey could not establish

221 Hüseyin Baş, "NATO Kovulmalıdır," *ANT*, vol. 50, (12 December 1967), 7.

222 Baş, "NATO Kovulmalıdır," *ANT*, vol. 50, (12 December 1967), 7.

223 Ibid., 7.

224 "AET Tuzağı," *ANT*, vol. 42, (17 October 1967), 6.

equal and reciprocal relations.²²⁵ An article in *ANT*, by quoting Besim Üstünel, suggested that Turkey's membership in the Common Market means cheap and huge amounts of imports from Europe, a fell in Turkish industry, and the absence of new industrial initiatives.²²⁶ The quote concluded that such a situation, blocking or delaying industrialization of the country, was not compatible with Turkish national interests and even longer-term relations between Turkey and the EEC.²²⁷

The same article conveyed the words of Sadun Aren, who is an MP from TİP. Aren claimed that with the beginning of the transitional stage, Turkey would be deprived of the means to ensure the balance of international payments, which resulted in the collapse of the national industry.²²⁸ Turkey should not have integrated with those who were richer than itself until it becomes industrialized and ready to export industrial goods; otherwise, it would be a poorer-than-ever member of the EEC Customs Union.²²⁹

The journal also covered an anti-EEC protest organized by university students. The final week of 1968, 23-30 December, was declared as "The Week of No to Assembly Industry and the Common Market"²³⁰ with the slogans of "They are partners, we are the market".²³¹ Plus, a marching protest, which lasted 3 days on the İstanbul-İzmit road, was announced by reserving a place for one of the students taking part in the protest. In this article, the student answered questions about why he attended the protest and the attitude of the workers. The student said that the press did not cover the protest since they were afraid of the assembly industry and the Common Market, "the paper giants of imperialism".²³²

225 "Türkiye Tarihi Bir Dönüm Noktasındadır," *ANT*, vol. 5, (September 1970), 3.

226 "Ortak Pazar'a Girmek ya da Girmemek," *ANT*, vol. 93, (8 October 1968), 16.

227 *Ibid.*, 16.

228 *Ibid.*, 16.

229 *Ibid.*, 16.

230 In Turkish: Montaj Sanayii ve Ortak Pazara Hayır Haftası Tekeli and İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu* vol. 2, (1993), 59.

231 In Turkish: Onlar Ortak, Biz Pazar. Tekeli and İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu* vol. 2, (1993), 59.

232 "İlan Kölesi Basının Yer Vermediği Yürüyüş," *ANT*, vol. 106, (7 January 1969), 12.

ANT defended that a strong national industry, which led to economic development of the country, could not be established with foreign capital and integration. And, similar to *YÖN*, *ANT* also highlighted the relations between Turkish assembly industrialists, foreign capital, and the Common Market. The journal shared a text written by two university students on the topic in its 116th volume. The text claimed that foreign capital did not allow Turkish industry to emerge and grow.²³³

The article argued that in the case of EEC membership, Turkey would completely become a market and colony as a result of lifted customs tariffs, the national industry would become a dream, foreign capital would rule the country, and foreigners would be in charge of planning the important investments.²³⁴ The EEC membership was defined as a “suicide”; plus, the article said that assembly industrialists would fit into the situation by becoming importers.²³⁵

The opposition to the EEC intensified as the negotiations for the Additional Protocol were to be concluded at the end of 1969. The cover page of the 153rd volume is about the EEC with the headline “Colonial Period Is to Start Officially: Turkish People Are at the Gallows”.²³⁶ The following volumes mentioned the topic by underlining the decline of the customs tariffs and state income with the transitional stage,²³⁷ by detailing some Turkish right-wing figures’ negative opinions concerning the EEC,²³⁸ and by criticizing CHP due to its passive position regarding the US, NATO, CENTO, 6th Fleet, and the EEC.²³⁹

In an article commenting on the Turkish economy, the Common Market was thought of as an insurmountable blow to Turkish industry with rising im-

233 “Montaj Sanayii Soygunu ve Ortak Pazar: Emperyalizm ve Ekonomik Tuzakları,” *ANT*, vol. 116, (18 March 1969), 8-9.

234 *Ibid.*, 8-9.

235 *Ibid.*, 8-9.

236 “Sömürge Dönemi Resmen Başlıyor: Türkiye Halkı İdam Sehpasında,” *ANT*, vol. 153, (2 December 1969).

237 “Sömürge Politikasında Halka İlk Kazık: Zam!” *ANT*, vol. 154, (9 December 1969), 4.

238 “Bazı Sağcı Yazarlar da Ortak Pazar’a Karşı,” *ANT*, vol. 154, (9 December 1969), 16.

239 “24 Saat Harekatı,” *ANT*, vol. 156, (23 December 1969), 5.

ports and decreasing tariffs, exacerbating the problem of balance of international payments as exports would not increase as it had been planned, and the mounting of foreign dependency.²⁴⁰

ANT, as an influential Turkish leftist journal, seems to cover the Turkey-EEC relations in a similar attitude to *YÖN*, it can be argued. Arguments built on imperialism, capitalist exploitation, and the disadvantageous position in which Turkey would find itself due to the structural differences between Turkey and the EEC Member States in terms of economic and industrial development levels were pointed out by the articles published in *ANT*. The main idea of *ANT* articles on the issue can be summarized as that Turkey, as a country lacking a strong heavy industry sector, could not benefit from such an organization composed of Western industrial countries; on the contrary, it would become an open market for goods coming from those countries. Therefore, any further integration moves should have been avoided. The same attitude can also be observed in *Aydınlık* and *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*.

Aydınlık, which was published between 1968 and 1971, was also one of the Turkish leftist journals that advocated similar views to *YÖN* and *ANT* on the EEC, international organizations, and Turkey's position within these organizations. The journal totally rejected the idea of Turkish membership in the EEC by labelling these organizations as means of imperialism, finance capital, and exploitation.

The rhetoric on the alliance of unprogressive classes against progressive, national, and democratic powers in Turkey was a common theme for 1960s' Turkish left. The first volume of the *Aydınlık* also mentioned the conflict as well. The article suggested that Turkey had quickly been invaded economically by imperialism and the bourgeois as a result of profiteering and state protection during the Second World War.²⁴¹ In the text, international monopolist capital and this bourgeois class were seen as in an alliance with landowner *ağas* and unprogressive circles against national and democratic movements.²⁴²

240 Burhan T. Ener, "Türkiye'nin Ekonomik Çıkmazı," *ANT*, vol. 168, (17 March 1970), 9.

241 *Aydınlık Dergisi Kurucuları*, "Aydınlık Görüşlerini Açıklıyor: Dünya, Türkiye ve Devrimci Mücadele," *Aydınlık*, vol. 1, (November 1968), 22.

242 *Aydınlık Dergisi Kurucuları*, "Aydınlık Görüşlerini Açıklıyor: Dünya, Türkiye ve Devrimci Mücadele," *Aydınlık*, vol. 1, (November 1968), 22-23.

As the Western-based international organizations, including the EEC, were seen as a league of economically developed, industrialized, capitalist Western countries, the leftist journals seemed to demonstrate economic and social characteristics of Turkey, making it different from the countries forming these international organizations. Like YÖN, *Aydınlık* emphasized that Turkey was a country clipped at least 100 years off the Western countries; thus, it was among the Third World nations that were underdeveloped and exploited.²⁴³ Private capital was also blamed for making the country a reserve force for advanced capitalist countries, which turned Turkey into a semi-colony.²⁴⁴

By taking these assertions into consideration, Hikmet Kıvılcımlı suggested that despite its economically underdeveloped and backward position, the country joined imperialism's widest cooperation mechanisms such as NATO, CENTO, SEATO, European Council, Common Market, and served international finance-capital.²⁴⁵ In another article in *Sosyalist*, he emphasized the meaning of Turkey's accession to the EEC as "recolonization" and serving the country in the EEC.²⁴⁶ So, it can be said that Kıvılcımlı regarded Turkish membership and participation in this kind of organization as a contradictory behavior in view of its economic, social, and international political realities.

The similar attitude held in earlier volumes of *Aydınlık* continued in later volumes as well. It was argued in the journal that taking measures appropriate for a capitalist setting in a semi-colony and semi-feudal country would do nothing but give in to imperialists.²⁴⁷ Limiting credits and money supply, setting high interest rates, devaluation, trade liberalization, a decrease in public expenditure, tax hikes, and freezing raises in salaries were probably the criticized measures, which were offered by the aid consortia to Turkey.²⁴⁸

As these measures created resentment, the article also tried to prove that the implementation of these measures was not up to national decisions but foreign pressure, aiming to take concessions from the country. An article in

243 Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, "Türkiyede Sınıflar ve Politika," *Aydınlık*, vol. 5, (March 1969), 369.

244 Ibid., 369.

245 Ibid., 370.

246 Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, "Bunalım Patlıyor," *Sosyalist*, (29 December 1970), 7.

247 "Batak Göl ya da Türkiye Ekonomisi," *Aydınlık*, vol. 22, (August 1970), 338-339.

248 Ibid., 340.

the journal highlighted that the EEC tied the \$225 million credit to the agreement -the Additional Protocol- which would pave the way for the Common Market to exploit Turkey as an open market.²⁴⁹

In the light of these arguments found throughout the pages of *Aydınlık*, the tendency of the journal can be summarized as that the EEC, alongside other international economic and political organizations, should have been avoided. The idea was that Turkey, in its current economic, social, and political realities, was subdued by the very same Western capitalist countries that Turkey still illogically tried to tie itself to. In such a context, the EEC association of Turkey was opposed by *Aydınlık*, and the leftist authors penned articles in the journal.

Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık was published for approximately one year, between 1970 and 1971 when the Additional Protocol negotiations were one of the primary foreign policy topics on the agenda. Therefore, the discussions in the journal are often shaped around this topic and criticisms targeting trade unions, political parties and political figures upon their attitudes on the issue as well as comments on the nature of the western-based integration movements and their incompatibility with Turkey.

It was put forward in one of the articles in *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık* that the Common Market was making Turkey an open market for international foreign capital by sacrificing customs duties and the national borders to Western imperialists.²⁵⁰ Another article presents the engagement with the EEC as "...entering into a closer and in some respects a new relationship arrangement (via the Common Market) with the imperialism..."²⁵¹ So, it is obvious that the widespread tendency of the Turkish leftists to correlate the EEC and imperialism is also apparent in this journal as well.

The same volume providing the definition of the EEC had some passages in which CHP and Ecevit were criticized due to their not-tough-enough policies against the EEC. The article suggested that Ecevit and his supporters did

249 "Batak Göl ya da Türkiye Ekonomisi," *Aydınlık*, vol. 22, (August 1970), 340.

250 Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, "Deccal Nasıl Kapımızı Çalıyor (III)," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, vol. 8/22, (August 1970), 282.

251 "Paranın Değerinin Düşürülmesi Halk Yığınlarının Yoksullaşmasını Hızlandıracaktır," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*, vol. 9/23, (September 1970), 350.

not stand against the Common Market as they purported to want a genuine people's government and be willing to save the people from feudal and capitalist powers.²⁵² This tendency, besides not thinking of nationalization of the banking system in the country, was labelled as a contradiction and the Ecevit movement's fail to grasp the political and economic mechanisms which keep Turkey dependent on imperialism.²⁵³

The perceived attitude of Ecevit and his circle towards foreign capital, international organizations, and domestic issues did cause many criticisms to be voiced in the journal against Ecevit and his "Left-of-the-Center" movement. The movement was degraded because of its vision on society and entrepreneurship, foreign trade, defending the common interests of the bourgeoisie, and its opposition to the EEC, "just for now".²⁵⁴

Likewise, in the 6th volume of the journal, Türk-İş was criticized because of being supportive of Turkish association with the EEC. It was stated in the article that "The attitude of Türk-İş as to foreign capital, the Common Market and foreign trade was compatible with the interest of imperialism and its collaborators."²⁵⁵ Plus, by reminding of an earlier working report of the union in support of nationalization of the foreign trade and industrialization, the article suggested that the trade union was totally on a different trajectory now.²⁵⁶

The subject of the national bourgeoisie can also be encountered in *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*. By pointing out the divisions within Turkish bourgeois classes and those who opposed the Common Market and the ones whose interests clashed with those of foreign monopolies were identified as "national bourgeoisie".²⁵⁷

252 Erdoğan Güçbilmez, "CHP'deki Gelişmeler Üzerine," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, vol. 8/22, (August 1970), 317.

253 Ibid., 317.

254 "Faşizm Tehdidine Karşı Demokratik Güçbirliği," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, vol. 13/27, (January 1971), 182.

255 "Türk-İş Emperyalizmin İşçi Sınıfı Saflarındaki Koludur," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, vol. 6/20, (June 1970), 109.

256 Ibid., 109.

257 "Devrim Ateşi Söndürülemez," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, vol. 21/35, (23 March 1971), 1.

The Erim government was criticized in the journal extensively for its way of conduct and approach to the EEC. The article sharing the government program and underlining the government's actions for the Additional Protocol had the title, namely "Program of the New Government: Comfort Plan of the Ruling Classes".²⁵⁸ The same article emphasized that even though the program claimed a foreign policy on Atatürk's way in principles, the articles on the US, NATO, CENTO, and the EEC constituted a discrepancy with the prior claim.²⁵⁹

The next volume of the journal made another critique of the government program on the basis of its premises on foreign capital and industrialization policy, which that article argued a total harmony between the program and the forces of the EEC and monopolist capitalists.²⁶⁰ Thus, it can be surely said that no place was envisioned for Turkey in the EEC and European integration according to the articles of *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*.

§ 4.4 Conclusion

Turkish public opinion and political party positions as to Turkish association/membership in the EEC became an arena for harsh discussions, especially since the government declared its willingness to negotiate terms for moving towards the transitional stage in 1967. From that point onwards, mixed views took the stage instead of purely optimistic opinions. It was because different circles of society were getting aware that Turkish industries would be affected by a gradual drop in customs duties applied against the EEC countries. In this context, "Soft Eurosceptic" tendencies started to be found in a denser manner among the Turkish public.

Widespread criticisms like those of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Mechanical Engineers, and TÜSİAD did not directly aim at the nature and very existence of the EEC as they were critical mostly about the

258 "Yeni İktidarın Programı: Hakim Sınıfların Huzur Planı," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, vol. 24/38, (13 April 1971), 1.

259 Ibid., 2.

260 "Emperyalist Hakimiyeti Perçinleme Programı," *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, vol. 25/39, (20 April 1971), 2.

timing of the Additional Protocol and preparedness level of the Turkish economy for further integration. Because these criticisms only reached the policy level, they cannot be considered a principled rejection of the European project, which is “Hard Euroscepticism”.

On political parties, it can be suggested that Eurosceptic tendencies increased during the last quarter of the 1960s. Before then, both mainstream parties CHP and AP supported Turkish association with the EEC as the relations tended to be seen as final evidence for the Europeanness of Turkey. Demirel governments starting in 1965 aimed to increase the level of cooperation and prepare Turkey for the next stages of the Ankara Agreement. As the Turkish association was seen as an advantage for Turkish politics and economy, AP is evaluated as a “Euroenthusiast” entity, at least on its façade.

CHP MPs showed more nuances during the late 1960s. More cautious approach advising extension of the preparatory stage and increasing the preparedness and competitiveness level of Turkish industries was central to CHP’s stance during negotiations for the Additional Protocol. Therefore, CHP can be fit into the category of “Soft Euroscepticism” in Szczerbiak and Taggart’s typology. It does not mean that CHP was totally anti-European; but rather, they tended to underscore the disadvantageous position Turkey would fall into in terms of economy and industry. In terms of Flood and Usherwood typology, CHP might be categorized as gradualist, willing to pursue integration but in a slow and assured manner. Turhan Feyzioğlu and GP can be thought of under the same category.

However, it should also be noted that more strict tendencies were becoming present in later periods. For example, CHP MP defining the EEC as a form of “neo-capitulation” seems closer to “Hard Euroscepticism” than the soft one since the argument directly targeted the essence of the EEC.

Principled and rejectionist opposition towards the EEC can be found among the left and right ends of the political spectrum. Necmettin Erbakan identifying the EEC as a “Catholic Union” aiming to melt the Turkish-Muslim population and make them “servants” was no doubt a direct attack on the foundation of the EEC. Although he also shared economic concerns over Turkish-EEC relations, the very existence and Turkish presence in the organization were denied by him. His stance was no doubt a “Hard Eurosceptic” in

Szczerbiak and Taggart's terms; "Euroreject" in Kopecký and Mudde's terms; "Rejectionist" in Flood and Usherwood's typology. His stance also carried "Cultural anti-Europeanist" aspects according to Cécile Leconte's Euroscepticism understanding.

When it comes to the Turkish left, it can be argued that the left constituted the main "Hard Eurosceptic" circle in Turkey. Turkish leftists opposed Turkey's integration with the EEC as they thought trade liberalization envisioned in the Ankara Agreement would turn Turkey into an open market for Western European goods. Actually, extensive trade liberalization, which leftist circles signified, became a reality only with the implementation of the Turkey-EU Customs Union entering into force as of 1996. Neither the Ankara Agreement of 1963 nor the Additional Protocol of 1970 brought a fully functioning, comprehensive trade liberalization between the parties. Nevertheless, leftist circles degraded the foundations of Turkey-EEC relations and almost all cooperation attempts by using the rhetoric of trade liberalization and an eventual exploitation of Turkish markets by capitalist Western European goods and capital.

TİP did not accept Turkish accession to the EEC by identifying the organization as "foreign exploitation" and "oppression". Its incompatible nature with the Turkish economy and industries was always emphasized. TİP MP Sadun Aren proposed creating relations with the Six outside of the framework of the EEC by opposing giving away full membership if disadvantages were seen. DİSK shared the same road with TİP as the union explicitly stated that it fights against Turkish membership in the EEC.

Turkish leftist journals of the period criticized Turkey-EEC relations in many ways. Hence, one can think of the opposition presented by Turkish leftist journals as a "Soft Eurosceptic" one. However, as this study tries to reveal, their critique was more systemic rather than being policy-based. They principally opposed Turkey's membership and active participation in Western international organizations like NATO, OECD, and IMF. According to them, these institutions were a means for former colonizers to continue their dominant position in international relations. The EEC was also among these organizations.

YÖN contains various articles evaluating the imperialist, neo-colonialist, and monopolist state capitalist tendencies of Western organizations. It was

stated in the context of Turkish membership in the EEC that Turkey and EEC countries were not similar in terms of economic development and industrialization; therefore, they declined the membership as a way for Turkey to develop economically. The EEC was presented as a threat to Turkish industry.

Similarly, *ANT* underlined the shortcomings of a possible Turkish membership in the EEC. With its weak industrial base, Turkey was advised to cooperate with countries with similar economic development. EEC was rejected by labeling it “the club of the rich”, demonstrating negative impacts of a future convergence and Turkey’s subordinate position within the organization, which makes membership a “suicide” for Turkey.

Aydınlık did also underline the imperialist and exploitative aspects of the EEC. Turkey’s position as a Third-World country was emphasized, and it was argued that Turkey had nothing to gain from imperialist organizations. *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık* mentioned that Turkey was being sacrificed for the Western capitalist by way of the EEC. Foreign capital, foreign trade, and the EEC were seen as imperialist instruments.

Under the light of the given examples, Eurosceptic tendency among the Turkish left is obvious. This tendency should also be considered within the scope of their general attitude, anti-Western, anti-US attitudes. By taking into account that their criticism on specific policies was not the aim; but an instrument to degrade the role and image of the EEC in the eyes of Turkish society, their opposition can be categorized as a principled one targeting the very existence of the EEC and Turkish engagement with it. Consequently, it can be said that articles published in Turkish leftist journals constituted examples of “Hard Euroscepticism” in most cases.

In terms of Flood and Usherwood typology, articles published in the leftist journals are “rejectionist” as they blocked the road for Turkish further integration and membership in the EEC. For Cécile Leconte’s typology, it should be noted that “Utilitarian Euroscepticism” and “Political Euroscepticism” can be found in Turkish left while value and culture-based oppositions did not appear in contrast to right-wing opposition to the EEC.

For Kopecký and Mudde’s typology, Turkish leftists can be categorized as “Eurorejects” because of their “Europhobe” and “Pessimist” approach to the organization in its relations with Turkey. Actually, the study tries to show that

de Gaulle's policies and the possibility of a Europe emerging as a third power independent from the US were seen as a positive development by the Turkish leftists. In this sense, putting Turkish leftist journals to a more Europhile and "Optimist" side might be offered. Nevertheless, the main determinant of their stance was the position they took on Turkey-EEC relations.

This chapter tries to present a brief glimpse of how the discussions on the EEC and Turkey's position in such an integration project were echoed among Turkish political elites and leftist intellectuals in the 1960s and the very first years of the 1970s. As the discussions tended to rise in number considerably whenever a milestone step was about to be taken, the general public interest, even in political circles, remained quite low in other periods. In this sense, 1963, when the Ankara Agreement was signed, and the 1969-1970 period, which witnessed the Additional Protocol negotiations and the signing of the document, can be counted as the peak periods of public discussions on the EEC.

When it comes to the Turkish left, -at least for the scope of this study, limited to pre-selected journals from the period, the general tendency towards the EEC can be defined as a direct and total rejection. EEC, mostly called the Common Market in the texts during the 1960s, was defined as a capitalist integration movement of the Western European countries trying to "bounce back" vis-à-vis the US and US-led political and economic order, which was reigning over Europe. Plus, the organization was also evaluated in the Turkish leftist journals as a collective exploitation mechanism against former colonies of European countries who had just gained their independence. Thus, the word neo-colonialism was also used by Turkish leftists to define European integration and the EEC.

The articles published in the journals see the EEC, alongside other Western-based international political and economic organizations like NATO, CENTO, IMF, OECD, as Western capitalist, industrialized, and economically developed countries' means to sustain their supremacy over the world. As Turkish leftist intellectuals chose to categorize Turkey as an economically underdeveloped, non-industrialized semi-colonial state under the influence of Western imperialism, especially from the Second World War onwards, they did not see any benefits for Turkey to partake in these organizations.

Turkish leftist intellectuals, as shown in the chapter, opposed Turkish accession to the EEC by claiming its “imperialist, neo-colonialist” aims and nature, locating Turkey among a different group of states, the Third World, because of its political and economic conditions and realities, denying a development path for Turkey within the EEC, arguing the impossibility for Turkish industry to be developed and competitive in benefit of Turkish economy and people, can be put into the category of principled rejection of the European integration and the EEC. Considering these premises and the theoretical framework presented, it can be said that Hard-Euroscepticism was the tendency of the Turkish leftist intellectuals during the 1960s and early years of the 1970s as political parties and wider public opinion relatively much more nuanced in their attitudes towards the issue.

Conclusion



This thesis intends to reveal the reflections in Turkey regarding European integration and its leading organization the EEC with a specific focus on Turkish left by utilizing theoretical framework of Euroscepticism literature. The study focuses primarily on the period succeeding the signing of the Ankara Agreement, which established the association relations between Turkey and the EEC. As the agreement set the foundations of the relations, it paved the way for diversified views and discussions in the country.

Indeed, relations between Turkey and integrating Europe did not begin with the Ankara Agreement. Relations after the Second World War were shaping within the international political context of the Cold War in which Turkey was a member of the Western alliance. Along with the countries founding the EEC, Turkey was a member of European Council, OECD and NATO. EEC tended to be seen as one of these organizations making Turkey closer to its Western allies.

Greek application for association in 1959 triggered the Turkish government to engage with the EEC in a more institutionalized manner while the tension was at a considerable level between the two NATO allies mainly because of the Cyprus Question. Nevertheless, there were other reasons for Turkey to get closer to the EEC. Economic concerns in a period when American aid and credits became harder to reach constituted a base for the Turkish application. Moreover, there was an identity dimension to the relations. Partaking in the European integration was seen as “becoming a part of Europe” and “to be accepted into the European family”. It might have meant a final and decisive answer to the “in betweenness” of Turkey and the Turkish society, struggling to navigate across “the East” and “the West”, modernity and tradition for one and a half centuries.

As these considerations were establishing the framework of Turkey-EEC relations among the Turkish ruling elite, the negotiations to conclude an association agreement between Turkey and the EEC yielded positive results, and the Ankara Agreement was signed on 12 September 1963. The general atmosphere in Turkey is inclined to see the developments from the perspective of identity (Turkey’s Europeanness) and the economic advantages Turkey could gain from the association. The details, realistic estimations for economic prospects and risks the association would bring, stayed in the background.

This tendency continued in Turkish public opinion -and even in Turkish politics- which set a trend of negligence. The Turkish government’s decision to start the negotiations for the Additional Protocol in 1967, which moves the association to its transitional stage, drew public attention to the subject. However, it was not until 1970 that Turkish public opinion demonstrated more nuanced views, real attention, and more sceptic tendencies towards the association, its advantages and disadvantages.

Turkish leftist intellectuals paid relatively more attention to the issue from the point the Ankara Agreement was signed and the period onwards. Even though the main attention was given to Turkey-US relations and NATO-related topics, Turkish leftists problematized the aims, nature, and very essence of the European integration movement. They argued that together with other Western-based international organizations, EEC was also pursuing im-

perialist, capitalist, neo-colonialist, and monopolist aims that tried to maintain unequal relations between the West and “the rest” through economic means. These ideas can be followed via the articles published in journals of the period, such as *YÖN*, *ANT*, *Aydınlık*, and *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık*.

They were likely to see the EEC as clear evidence of inner struggles within the Western alliance. Europe, which was once a mighty continent, was making efforts to regain its political and economic power vis-à-vis the US, which emerged as the leader of the Western bloc, they claimed. French President De Gaulle’s foreign policy, aiming to instrumentalize the EEC for an “autonomous Europe”, the French veto on two British applications for membership to the EEC, and French withdrawal from NATO’s military forces were evaluated within the scope of the “Division in the West” point of view. By indicating these divisions, Turkish leftist intelligentsia could aim to degrade both the Western bloc and the EEC in the eyes of the Turkish public.

When it comes to Turkey’s position and role within such an organization, the Turkish left seems to take its side at a very early stage. They rejected an association or membership for Turkey in the EEC by claiming that the country had nothing to gain from a neo-colonialist league. They tried to show the differences between the development levels of the Turkish economy and industries in comparison to those of the Six, the founding members of the EEC. The idea here is that Turkey could not benefit from the EEC with its weak industrial base and competitiveness level as all the other members were developed, industrial capitalists.

The negative attitude held by Turkish leftist intellectuals was a result of a mixture of approaches. Apart from their practical evaluations signifying “uselessness” of the EEC in the development of the Turkish economy and industries, dependency theory and general anti-West tendency must have shaped the mindset of the Turkish leftist authors on the topic. They envisioned a different path of economic development, foreign policy, and industrial policy for Turkey according to their ideological stance. Thus, it can be easily realized that the articles penned by Turkish leftist intellectuals underlined the importance of an autonomous foreign policy independent from the ties of bloc politics, a development plan prioritizing heavy industry based on national/domestic resources and financial options.

In some instances, it is observable that they implicitly supported the European integration movement. Especially French President de Gaulle's moves in foreign policy in terms of NATO, the USSR, and the Third World evoked admiration among Turkish leftists. This admiration was even turned into a policy recommendation for Turkish foreign policy conduct. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this admiration was not about embracing the current form of European integration and the EEC, which they criticized in countless articles. This admiration was produced because of the rupture and anomaly General de Gaulle was able to create within the Western alliance to the detriment of the US. The lack of advice within Turkish leftist intellectuals for Turkey to join the EEC in its current form demonstrates their position in principle when it comes to Turkish association/membership.

In the eyes of Turkish leftists of the period, Turkey, as the first country to lead an anti-imperialist national independence struggle, was an *ex officio* member of the Third World. Turkish foreign policy should be carried out by taking this reality into consideration, Turkish leftists argued. Although there were no views advising cutting all relations with Western Europe, no arguments supported Turkey's further economic and political integration with Western European countries.

In terms of the theoretical framework offered by Euroscepticism typologies, it can be concluded that among the Turkish leftist intellectuals, there were Eurosceptic tendencies. This Euroscepticism did not imply an enmity between Turkey and the EEC countries; however, it was directly opposed to Turkey's integration with the organization. Most of the leftist intellectuals principally rejected European integration and Turkish accession from the very beginning. The nature, aims, strategy, and foundations of the EEC were associated with imperialism, hegemony, monopolist state capitalism, neo-colonialism, and exploitation. It was also stated that in the case of Turkish membership, Turkey served as a market for developed European countries, which brought no benefit to Turkey. In this context, Turkish leftists rejected Turkish membership in the EEC.

By taking these into consideration, the tendency can be categorized as "Hard-Eurosceptic" in Szczerbiak and Taggart's typology because of their principled rejection rather than a few policy disagreements. According to the

typology of Kopecký and Mudde, the attitude can be categorized as “Euroreject” as they were “Europhobe” and “Pessimist” about European integration. Their view, not seeing any reason for further Turkish engagement with the EEC, might be considered within the category of “rejectionist” in Flood and Usherwood’s terms. When it comes to the typology set by Cécile Leconte, “Utilitarian Euroscepticism” and “Political Euroscepticism” seem to appear among Turkish leftist circles.

Turkish society and political parties that started to be more nuanced on the issue also presented examples of different types of Euroscepticism. For instance, trade unions, political parties, and chambers underlining possible negative effects of the transitional period on Turkish industries and their competitiveness might be considered within “Soft Euroscepticism” as they did not attack the nature and existence of the EEC. The fact that “Hard Euroscepticism” came from two ends of the political spectrum, the far-left and far-right as in the cases of TİP and Necmettin Erbakan, is noteworthy, both for the period and the current discussions shaping around Turkey-EU relations these days.

§ 5.1 Limits of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research

This study is an attempt to examine deeply the very first years of the Turkey-EEC relations, which are still one of the main agenda items in Turkish politics. It also tries to bring Euroscepticism discussions in Turkey, which have been made around the recent developments, to earlier times of relations. As the number of academic works on the very first years of the relations was lower compared with the later period of Turkey-EU relations, this study aims to explore the period and Turkish public opinion regarding the relations with a specific focus on the Turkish left. By doing so, the foundations and historical construction of the Euroscepticism phenomenon can be grasped in a more comprehensive manner.

This study has, of course, limitations. Firstly, the study has been limited to a time period of 8 years, from 1963 to 1971. The period covers the signing of the Ankara Agreement and the ratification of the Additional Protocol in the

Turkish National Assembly. The 1970s was another decade that was full of domestic and foreign policy developments, both affecting and being affected by Turkey's relations with Western Europe and the EEC. Plus, the decade had a divided but vocal left, which might be very interesting and academically fruitful to examine.

Secondly, leftist journals examined need to be limited for the sake of the consistency of the study. As this study mainly focuses on *YÖN*, *ANT*, *Aydınlık*, and *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık* in order to represent different factions within the Turkish left, there were other large and small periodicals. Working on these periodicals can give a chance for a more detailed understanding of the period and the issue.

Thirdly, while this study endeavors to grasp the Eurosceptic tendencies in Turkey during the very first years of the relations, the left constituted the area of research. However, there were significant right-wing intellectuals who thought and wrote about European integration and Turkey-EEC relations. This thesis aims to mention the right-wing reflections by looking at Necmettin Erbakan and political parties in the National Assembly, which is inadequate to portrait the whole landscape, without doubt. Examining right-wing periodicals, maybe in a comparative manner with the left, would probably be a very intense and informative study.

Bibliography

PRIMARY SOURCES

Journals and Newspapers

ANT (1967-1971)

Baş Hüseyin. "Bonn Doğu'ya Açılıyor." *ANT*, vol. 4, (24 January 1967): 12-13.

———. "Dış Yorum." *ANT*, vol. 1. (3 January 1967): 13.

———. "İstenmeyen Ada!" *ANT*, vol. 21. (23 May 1967): 13.

———. "NATO kovulmalıdır," *ANT*, vol. 50. (12 December 1967), 7.

———. "Neden doğuya açılış," *ANT*, vol. 39. (26 September 1967), 12-13.

Ener, Burhan T. "Türkiye'nin Ekonomik Çıkmazı," *ANT*, vol. 168, (17 March 1970): 9.

Özgüden, Doğan. "Yeni Amerikan İşgali," *ANT*, vol. 46. (14 November 1967): 3.

Tansuğ, Halûk. "Hint Denizi'nde Yeni Kıbrıs'lar." *ANT*, vol. 21. (23 May 1967): 12-13.

"24 Saat Harekatı." *ANT*, vol. 156, (23 December 1969): 5.

"AET Tuzağı." *ANT*, vol. 42, (17 October 1967): 6.

"Bazı Sağcı Yazarlar da Ortak Pazar'a Karşı." *ANT*, vol. 154, (9 December 1969): 16.

"İlan Kölesi Basının Yer Vermediği Yürüyüş." *ANT*, vol. 106, (7 January 1969): 12-13.

"Montaj Sanayii Soygunu ve Ortak Pazar: Emperyalizm ve Ekonomik Tuzakları." *ANT*, vol. 116, (18 March 1969): 8-9.

"Ortak Pazar'a Girmek ya da Girmemek." *ANT*, vol. 93, (8 October 1968): 16.

“Sömürge Dönemi Resmen Başlıyor: Türkiye Halkı İdam Sehpasında.” *ANT*, vol. 153, (2 December 1969).

“Sömürge Politikasında Halka İlk Kazık: Zam!” *ANT*, vol. 154, (9 December 1969): 4.

“Türkiye tarihi bir dönüm noktasındadır.” *ANT*, vol. 5, (September 1970): 2-45.

Aydınlık (1968-1971)

Aydınlık Dergisi Kurucuları, “Aydınlık Görüşlerini Açıklıyor: Dünya, Türkiye ve Devrimci Mücadele.” *Aydınlık*, vol. 1. (November 1968): 1-31

Kıvılcımlı, Hikmet. “Türkiye’de Sınıflar ve Politika.” *Aydınlık*, vol. 5, (March 1969): 369-385.

“Aydınlık’ta Dünya ve Türkiye: ‘Devrimciler el ele millî cephede.’” *Aydınlık*, vol. 8. (June 1969): 81-104.

“Batak Göl ya da Türkiye Ekonomisi.” *Aydınlık*, vol. 22, (August 1970).

Barış Dünyası (1962-1971)

“Ortak Pazar.” *Barış Dünyası*, vol. 17, (October 1963): 440-441.

Cumhuriyet

Sağlam, Kayhan. “İkinci Veto”, *Cumhuriyet*, 26.10.1967.

“Ortak Pazara Girdik – Dün Anlaşma İmzalandı.” *Cumhuriyet*, 13.09.1963.

“İngiliz parası gibi sağlam.” *Cumhuriyet*, 20.11.1967.

“Sterlin’in Değeri Düşürüldü.” *Cumhuriyet*, 20.11.1967.

Milliyet

Aren, Sadun. "İktisadi İlişkiler Değişmeli." *Milliyet*, 12.10.1967.

Aydın Yalçın, "Ortak Pazar'ın Faydaları." *Milliyet*, 11.10.1967.

Besim Üstünel, "Ortak Pazar Karşısında Türkiye'nin Hevesleri." *Milliyet*, 13.10.1967.

İpekçi, Abdi. "Kriz..." *Milliyet*, 15.03.1968.

Okyar, Osman. "Himaye ve Ortak Pazar." *Milliyet*, 10.10.1967.

Toker, Metin. "Gözün içine baka baka..." *Milliyet*, 09.09.1968.

"Büyük'lüğü kalmayan Britanya." *Milliyet*, 18.01.1968.

"Ortak Pazar' Anlaşması İmzalandı." *Milliyet*, 13.09.1963.

"De Gaulle Meydan Okuyor." *Milliyet*, 16.05.1968.

Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik (1970-1971)

Güçbilmez, Erdoğan. "CHP'deki Gelişmeler Üzerine." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, vol. 8/22, (August 1970): 316-238.

Kıvılcımlı, Hikmet. "Deccal Kapımızı Nasıl Çalıyor? (II)." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, vol. 7/21, (July 1970): 193-221.

———. "Deccal Nasıl Kapımızı Çalıyor (III)." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, vol. 8/22, (August 1970): 273-299.

———. "Sayın İ. İ. Paşa'ya Açık Mektup." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, vol. 2/16. (February 1970): 257-295.

"Aydınlık'ta Dünya ve Türkiye." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, vol. 5/19. (May 1970): 1-16.

"Aydınlık'ta dünya ve Türkiye." *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, vol. 5/19. (May 1970): 1-15.

“Devrim Ateşi Söndürülemez.” *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, vol. 21/35, (23 March 1971): 1-2.

“Emperyalist Hakimiyeti Perçinleme Programı.” *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, vol. 25/39, (20 April 1971): 2-3.

“Faşizm Tehdidine Karşı Demokratik Güçbirliği,” *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, vol. 13/27, (January 1971): 177-189.

“Paranın Değerinin Düşürülmesi Halk Yığınlarının Yoksullaşmasını Hızlandıracaktır.” *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, vol. 9/23, (September 1970): 347-350.

“Türk-İş Emperyalizmin İşçi Sınıfı Saflarındaki Koludur.” *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, vol. 6/20, (June 1970): 107-111.

“Yeni İktidarın Programı: Hakim Sınıfların Huzur Planı.” *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik*, vol. 24-38, (13 April 1971): 1-2.

Sosyalist (1967-1971)

Kıvılcımlı, Hikmet. “Bunalım Patlıyor.” *Sosyalist*, (29 December 1970): 7.

“İsrail neden savaşa mecburdu?” *Sosyalist*, vol. 6. (20 June 1967): 1.

“Ortak Pazar – Ortak Para,” *Sosyalist*, vol. 18. (2 March 1971): 4.

“Emperyalistler Arası Boğuşma.” *Sosyalist*, vol. 13. (12 January 1971): 4.

Sosyal Adalet (1963-1965)

Aybar, Mehmet Ali. “Dünya ve Türkiye’de Durum.” *Sosyal Adalet*, vol. 9, (14 May 1963): 8-9.

“Ortak Pazar Kalkınma Yolu Değildir,” *Sosyal Adalet*, (7 May 1963): 3.

Türk Solu (1967-1970)

Satılğan, Nail. "Cumhuriyet bayramını doğru değerlendirelim." *Türk Solu*, vol. 102. (28 October 1969): 5.

"NATO halkımızın düşmanıdır!" *Türk Solu*, vol. 94. (2 September 1969): 10-11.

Türkiye Solu (1971)

Akşit, Şevki. "Açmazın Kökeni." *Türkiye Solu*, vol. 1. (5 April 1971): 6-7.

"Karaosmanoğlu, Emperyalizmin Sözüünü Etmeden, Ekonomide Çözüm Öneriyor." *Türkiye Solu*, vol. 2. (19 April 1971): 3.

Yeni Çağ (1964-1987)

Nassar, Fuad. "Yeni-Sömürgecilik Nedir." *Yeni Çağ*, vol. 2. (February 1965): 101-110.

Saillant, Louis. "İşçi ve sendika hareketinde savaşın ve birliğin gelişmesi." *Yeni Çağ*, vol. 5-6. (May-June 1964): 225-239.

YÖN (1961-1967)

Aslan, İffet. "Nato Meselesi." *YÖN*, vol. 155. (18 March 1966): 16.

Avcıoğlu, Doğan. "Emperyalizmin Çırpınışları." *YÖN*, vol. 98. (12 February 1965): 3.

———. "Kökü Dışarıda Sanayi," *YÖN*, vol. 218, (2 June 1967): 3.

———. "Milliyetçilere Sesleniş." *YÖN*, vol. 78. (25 September 1964): 3.

———. "Sovyetler ve Biz," *YÖN*, vol. 148, (28 January 1966): 3.

———. "Teknoloji Emperyalizmi." *YÖN*, vol. 210, (7 April 1967): 3.

Başar, Erdoğan. "İkinci Milli Kurtuluş Savaşı." *YÖN*, vol. 106, (9 April 1965): 8.

- Çamlı, İbrahim. "Batı ittifakı içinde bağımsız Türkiye." *YÖN*, vol. 62. (20 February 1963): 16.
- Duverger, Maurice. "Kurt ve Köpek." *YÖN*, vol. 159. (15 April 1966): 16.
- Esin, Numan. "Ulusal Stratejiye Dönüş Zorunluluğu." *YÖN*, vol. 150, (11 February 1966): 10-11.
- Küçükömer, İdris. "Amerikan Hegemonya paradoksu – De Gaulle ve dünyanın kaderi." *YÖN*, vol. 100. (26 February 1965): 16.
- Martines, Gilles. "Solun ayağındaki diken: NATO." *YÖN*, vol. 162. (6 May 1966): 6.
- Naci, Fethi. "Emperyalizm Nedir?" *YÖN*, vol. 123. (6 August 1965): 8-9.
- . "Yeni Sömürgecilik Nedir?" *YÖN*, vol. 103, (19 March 1965): 16.
- Özön, Nijat. "Ortak Pazar ve Sinema." *YÖN*, vol. 65. (3 March 1963): 14.
- Selçuk, İlhan. "'Evet' ve 'Hayır'..." *YÖN*, vol. 136, (5 November 1965): 3.
- . "Yıkma... Ve Yapma." *YÖN*, vol. 130. (24 September 1965): 3.
- Soysal, Mümtaz. "Dış Politika ve Parlamento." *YÖN*, vol. 57, (16 January 1963): 6.
- . "Komprador Dinciliği." *YÖN*, vol. 149, (4 February 1966): 3.
- "Almanya'daki İşçilerimiz", *YÖN*, vol. 94. (15 Ocak 1965): 3.
- "Bildiri." *YÖN*, vol. 1. (20 December 1961): 12-13.
- "Çöp tenekesini karıştıranlar", *YÖN*, vol. 108, (23 April 1965): 6.
- "De Gaulle'den örnek alalım." *YÖN*, vol. 110. (7 May 1965): 10.
- "General de Gaulle ne istiyor?" *YÖN*, vol. 60. (6 February 1963): 13.
- "İktisadi Politikamızı Kim Çizer?" *YÖN*, vol. 94, (15 January 1965): 7.
- "Moskova'nın Gözüyle Türkiye'de Bugünkü Sosyalizm Hareketi." *YÖN*, vol. 198, (11 January 1967): 12.

“O.E.C.D. Türkiye Raporu.” YÖN, vol. 160, (22 April 1966): 16.

“Ortak Pazar.” YÖN, vol. 60. (6 February 1963): 12.

“Sovyet saldırısı efsanesi,” YÖN, vol. 167. (10 June 1966): 7.

“Türk Milliyetçilerine Sesleniş.” YÖN, vol. 110, (7 May 1965): 8. *1975 Yılıının Sonunda Türk Ekonomisi*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD Yayınları, 1975.

Other Primary Sources

Adalet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi. Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Neşriyatı 21: 1965.

AET ile İlişkileri Özel Kesim Nasıl Değerlendiriyor? TÜSİAD Yayınları: 1978.

Avrupa Çiçek Pazarı. İKV Yayınları: 1972.

Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu Üzerine Görüşler-Yaklaşımlar. İstanbul: TÜSİAD Yayınları: 1977.

Avrupa Toplulukları (Ortak Pazar) ve Türkiye Ortaklığı. İKV Yayınları: 1969.

Boran, Behice. *Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları*. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1970.

Ceyhan, Hasan. *Ortak Pazar ve Türkiye*. İstanbul: DİSK Yayınları, 1974.

Chace, James. “Great Britain looked to France like America's Trojan Horse,” *The New York Times*, 3 May 1970.

CHP Araştırma ve Yayın Bürosu, *Avrupa İktisadi Camiası ve Türkiye'nin Camiayla İşbirliği Hakkında Çalışma*. Ankara: 21 September 1959.

Cillov, Halûk. “Dünya ve Memleket Konjonktürü.” *İstanbul Ticaret Odası Mecmuası*. March 1970.

Cillov, Halûk. “Türkiye-Ortak Pazar Anlaşmasının Geçiş Dönemi.” *İstanbul Ticaret Odası Mecmuası*. June 1970.

Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi. 1969.

De Gaulle, Charles. *Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor*, translated by Terence Kilmartin. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971.

DİSK Working Report, 3rd General Assembly, 1968-1970.

İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı'nın 'Katma Protokol'de Yapılması Gereken Değişiklikler' ile İlgili Önerileri Hakkında Konfederasyonumuz Görüşleri. TİSK.

Katma Protokol' Çerçevesinde Neler Yapılabilir? TÜSİAD Yayınları: 1977.

Milli Selamet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi. İstanbul: 1973.

Nadaroğlu, Halil. "Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu ve Türkiye." *İstanbul Ticaret Odası Mecmuası.* January-April 1964.

Ortak Pazar İçinde Şirketler Hukukunun Gelişimi. İKV Yayınları, 1967.

Ortak Pazar ve Türkiye. Makine Mühendisleri Odası. Ankara: 1970.

Ortak Pazar'da Türkiye. İstanbul: İKV Yayınları, 1971.

T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, *Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu.* August 1976.

TİP Bilim ve Araştırma Kurulu, *Türkiye İşçi Partisi El Kitabı.* Ankara: 1969.

TİSK 11th Ordinary General Assembly Working Report. Ankara: 1976.

TİSK Working Report for 9th Ordinary General Assembly. Ankara: 1976.

Toker, Metin. *Ortak Pazar mı? Ortak Tuzak mı?* İKV Yayınları: 1970.

Türk Tarım Tavizlerinin Diğer Ülkelere Verilen Tavizlerle Karşılaştırılması. İKV Yayınları, 1976.

Türk-İş Working Report of 8th General Assembly. Ankara: 1970.

Türk-İş Working Report presented to the 10th General Assembly. Ankara: 1976.

Türkiye İşçi Partisi, Çalışma Raporu. Ankara: 6-12 November 1968.

UK Parliament, “European Economic Community volume 645: debated on Thursday 3 August 1961,” <https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1961-08-03/debates/d15b0024-f27c-4dc7-a429-e79a86b2f389/EuropeanEconomicCommunity>

Üçüncü Büyük Kongre Çalışma Rapor. Türkiye İşçi Partisi, 9-12 November 1968.

“Address by Professor Dr. Walter Hallstein President of the Commission of the European Economic Community on the occasion of the signature of the Association Agreement with Turkey.” 12 September 1963. <https://aei.pitt.edu/14311/1/S77.pdf>

“Address given by Harold Macmillan on the United Kingdom's application for membership to the EC.” 31 July 1961. [https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/address_given_by_harold_macmillan_on_the_united_kingdom_s_application_for_membership_to_the_ec_31_july_1961-en-a5c95873-acao-4e9f-be93-53a36918041d.html#:~:text=On%2031%20July%201961%2C%20Harold,European%20Economic%20Community%20\(EEC\)](https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/address_given_by_harold_macmillan_on_the_united_kingdom_s_application_for_membership_to_the_ec_31_july_1961-en-a5c95873-acao-4e9f-be93-53a36918041d.html#:~:text=On%2031%20July%201961%2C%20Harold,European%20Economic%20Community%20(EEC))

“Address given by Harold Macmillan on the United Kingdom's application for membership to the EC.” London: 2 May 1967. https://www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-do66-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/35d99c8a-od73-4797-boeb-e2ed9c8bae6c/Re-sources#680afb40-143e-484b-b430-881db671d1ec_en&overlay

“Basın-İş Sendikası Genel Kurulu.” *Türk-İş Dergisi* 82. December 1969.

“Genel-İş Sendikası 4. Genel Kurulu Yapıldı.” *Türk-İş Dergisi* 82, December 1969.

“Greece Signs Agreement with EEC.” In *Bulletin from the European Community*, no. 45. April 1961.

“İstanbul Sanayi Odasının Katma Protokol Hakkındaki Görüşü.” In *Ortak Pazar'da Türkiye*. İstanbul: İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı Yayınları, 1971.

“Ortak Pazar Sorunu.” *Türk-İş Dergisi* 83. January 1970.

“Ortak Pazar Üyesi Olduk.” *Türk-İş Dergisi* 7, September 1963.

“Speech by Edward Heath.” Brussels: 22 January 1972.

https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/speech_by_edward_heath_brussels_22_january_1972-en-45bb74bd-554c-49d4-8212-9144ce2e8c1d.html

“The Sinews of Peace (‘Iron Curtain Speech’).” *International Churchill Society*, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri: 5 March 1946. <https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/>

Turkish National Assembly Minutes

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 1, vol. 6, meeting 1. (02.07.1962).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 1, vol. 10, meeting 2, (09.01.1963).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 1, vol. 11, meeting 2, (14.01.1963).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 1, vol. 13, meeting 2. (17.02.1963).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 1, vol. 20, meeting 2, (27.08.1963).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 1, vol. 24, meeting 3. (30.12.1963).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 1, vol. 25, meeting 3, (14.01.1964).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 1 vol. 31, meeting 3 (18.06.1964).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 1, vol. 36, meeting 4. (26.02.1965).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 2, vol. 1, meeting 1. (03.11.1965).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 2, vol. 12, meeting 2, (14.02.1967).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 2, vol. 14, meeting 2, (24.02.1967).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 3, vol. 1, meeting 1. (07.11.1969).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 3, vol. 1, meeting 1, (10.11.1969).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 3 vol. 9, meeting 2. (14.12.1970).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 3, vol. 3, meeting 1, (09.03.1970).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 3, vol. 5, meeting 1, (23.05.1970).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 3, vol. 5, meeting 1, (28.05.1970).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 3, vol. 8, meeting 1, (31.07.1970).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 3, vol. 9, meeting 2. (11.12.1970).

Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Period 3, vol. 9, meeting 2, (21.12.1970).

SECONDARY SOURCES

- Ahmad, Feroz. *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London and New York: Routledge, 2003.
- . *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*. Oxford: Oneworld, 2003.
- Alacı, Beral and Resul Babaoğlu. “27 Mayıs Sürecinde Türkiye’deki Basın Politikaları.” *Cumhuriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 17 no. 33, (Spring 2021): 317-346.
- Alim, Eray. “Turkey between the Third World and the West: Consequences of Failing to Strike the Right Balance (1961–1965).” *Middle East Critique*, 31 no. 3, (2022): 285-302.
- Alpkaya, Faruk. “Bir 20. Yüzyıl Akımı: ‘Sol Kemalizm.’” In *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce – Kemalizm*, edited by Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil. İstanbul: İletişim, 2009: 477-500.
- Anderson, Christopher J., and Karl C. Kaltenthaler. “The Dynamics of Public Opinion toward European Integration, 1973-93.” *European Journal of International Relations* 2 no. 2 (1996): 175-199.
- Anderson, Christopher J., and M. Shawn Reichert. “Economic Benefits and Support for Membership in the E.U.: A Cross-National Analysis.” *Journal of Public Policy* 15, no. 3 (1996): 231-249.

- Aral, Berdal. "Making Sense of the Anomalies in Turkish-European Union Relations." *Journal of Economic and Social Research* 7 no. 1, (2006): 99-120.
- Aras, İlhan. *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye'de Euroseptisizm*. İstanbul: Sentez, 2015.
- Arat, Yeşim, and Şevket Pamuk. *Turkey Between Democracy and Authoritarianism*. Cambridge University Press, 2019.
- Armaoğlu, Fahir. *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914-1995)*. İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2018.
- Arpa, Tülay. "1960-1975 Yılları Arasında Sol Basında Türk-ABD İlişkileri." MA Thesis, Pamukkale University, 2005.
- Atagenç, İhsan Ömer. "1960-1980 Dönemi Türkiye Solunun Kıbrıs Politikası." PhD Thesis, Gazi University, 2015.
- Atan, Serap. "Europeanisation of Turkish peak business organisations and Turkey-EU relations." In *Turkey and European Integration*, edited by Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe. London and New York: Routledge, 2004: 100-121.
- Atılğan, Gökhan. "Sanayi Kapitalizminin Şafağında." In *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Siyasal Hayat*, prepared by Gökhan Atılğan, Cenk Saraçoğlu and Ateş Uslu. İstanbul: Yordam, 2015: 501-656.
- . "Sosyalist Milliyetçilik Söylemi (Türkiye, 1961-1968): Temeller, Ayrılıklar," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 64 no. 3, (2009): 1-25.
- . "Sosyalist Soldan Kemalizme Olumlu Bakışlar (1920-1971): Nedenler, İmkânlar, Dönemler ve Bazı Sonuçlar," *Praksis* 21 no. 3, (2009): 47-76.
- . "Türkiye Sosyalist Hareketinde Anti-Emperyalizm ve Bağımsızlıkçılık (1920-1971)." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce – Sol*, edited by Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil. İstanbul: İletişim, 2008: 661-704.
- . "Türkiye'de Toplumsal Sınıflar: 1923-2010)." In *1920'den Günümüze Türkiye'de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim*, edited by Faruk Alpkaya and Bülent Duru. Ankara: Phoenix, 2017: 323-366.

- . *Behice Boran: Öğretim Üyesi, Siyasetçi, Kuramcı*. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2009.
- . *Yön-Devrim Hareketi*. İstanbul: Yordam, 2008.
- Aydın, Mustafa. “Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis.” Ankara: Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, 2004.
- Aydın, Songül. “12 Mart Öncesinde ANT Dergisi.” MA Thesis, Yıldız Technical University 2008.
- Aydın, Suavi, and Yüksel Taşkın. *1960’tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2018.
- Aydın-Düzgit, Senem, and Bahar Rumelili. “Contested Identities: Historicising and Deconstructing Representations in EU-Turkey Relations.” In *Turkey and the European Union*, edited by Beken Saatçioğlu, and Funda Tekin. Nomos: 2021: 57-76.
- Aydinoğlu, Ergun. *“Sol Hakkında Her Şey” mi?* İstanbul: Versus, 2008.
- Aykol, Hüseyin. *Türkiye’de Sol Örgütler: Bölüne Bölüne Büyümek*. Ankara, Phoenix, 2022.
- Aytemur, Nuran. “The Turkish Left and Nationalism: The Case of YÖN.” MA Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2000.
- Bache, Ian, Stephen George, and Simon Bulmer. “Enlargement.” In *Politics in the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Barkın, Ersan. “YÖN Dergisi Yazılarında Demokrasi Anlayışı.” MA Thesis, Gazi University, 2011.
- Bednar, Jenna, John Ferejohn, and Geoffrey Garrett. “The Politics of European Federalism.” *International Review of Law and Economics* 16, (1996): 279-294.
- Beer, Francis A. “Introduction: NATO and International Integration.” In *Integration and Disintegration in NATO*. Ohio State University Press: 1969: 1-11.

- Berstein, Serge. *The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958-1969*, translated by Peter Morris. Paris: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Bianchi, Robert. *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Bilge, Suat. "The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey." In *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition*, edited by Kemal H. Karpat. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975: 135-185.
- Birand, Mehmet Ali. *Bir Pazar Hikâyesi: Türkiye-AET İlişkileri*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1978.
- . *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası 1959-2004*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2005.
- Birchfield, Vicki L., John Krige, and Alasdair R. Young. "European integration as a peace project." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19 no. 1, (2017): 3-12.
- Bölükbaşı, Süha. "The Johnson's Letter Revisited." *Middle Eastern Studies* 29 no. 3, (1993): 505-525.
- Bulut, Sedef. "Üçüncü Dönem Demokrat Parti İktidarı (1957-1960): Siyasi Baskılar ve Tahkikat Komisyonu." *Akademik Bakış* 2, no. 4, (2009): 125-145.
- Buttler, David, and Uwe Kitzinger. *The 1975 Referendum*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996.
- Carey, Sean. "Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?" *European Union Politics*, 3 no. 4, (2002): 387-413.
- Ceyhan, Ergül. "YÖN Dergisi ve Eğitime Bakış Açısı (Köy Enstitüleri)." MA Thesis, Siirt University, 2024.
- Cinni, Michelle. "From the Marshall Plan to EEC: Direct and Indirect Influences." In *The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After*, edited by Martin A. Schain. Palgrave: 2001: 13-37.

- Citrin, Jack, and John Sides, "More than Nationals: How Identity Choice Matters in the New Europe." In *Transnational Identities*, edited by Richard K. Hermann, Thomas Risse and Marilynn B. Brewer. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004, 161-185.
- Crowson, Nicholas, and James McKay. "Britain in Europe? Conservative and Labour Attitudes to European Integration since the Second World War." In *The Primacy of Foreign Policy in British History, 1660-2000*, edited by William Mulligan and Brendan Simms. Palgrave Macmillan: 2010: 305-318.
- Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* vol. 7, İstanbul: İletişim, 1983-1985.
- Çakır, Armağan Emre. "Introduction." In *Fifty Years of EU-Turkey Relations*, edited by Armağan Emre Çakır. London and New York: Routledge, 2011: 1-9.
- Çalış, Şaban H. *Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri*. Ankara: Nobel, 2016.
- Çarkoğlu, Ali. "Societal Perceptions of Turkey's EU Membership: Causes and Consequences of Support for EU Membership." In *Turkey and European Integration*, edited by Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe. London and New York: Routledge, 2004: 19-45.
- Çayhan, Esra. *Dünden Bugüne Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri ve Siyasal Partilerin Konuya Bakışı*. İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1997.
- Çiçek, Atıl Cem. "Türk Siyasal Yaşamında YÖN Dergisi (1961-1967)." PhD Thesis, İnönü University, 2013.
- Daldal, Aslı. "The New Middle Class as a Progressive Urban Coalition: The 1960 Coup d'état in Turkey." *Turkish Studies* 5, no. 3, (2004): 75-102.
- Davis, Jonathan "Labour's Political Thought: The Soviet influence in the inter-war years." In *The British Labour Party and the Wider World*, edited by Paul Corthorn and Jonathan Davis. London and New York: Tauris, 2008: 64-85.

- Davis, Richard. "Euroscpticism and Opposition to British Entry into the EEC, 1955-75," *Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique* XXII no. 2, (2017): 1-15.
- Deighton, Anne. "Britain and the Three Interlocking Circles." In *Europe 1945-1990s*, edited by Antonio Varsori. Macmillan Press: 1995: 155-181.
- Dikici, Mert. "YÖN Dergisi ve Türk Dış Politikası." MA Thesis, Yıldız Technical University, 2007.
- Dinçer, Özgün. "Türk Solu Dergisi (1967-1970) ve Milli Demokratik Devrim Stratejisi." MA Thesis, Ankara University, 2006.
- DİSK Tarihi*, vol 2, edited by Aziz Çelik. İstanbul: Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu Araştırma Merkezi, 2022.
- Doğan, Erkan. "Articulating Socialism with Nationalism: A Critical Analysis of Nationalism in the Turkish Leftist Tradition in the 1960s." Ph.D Thesis, Bilkent University, 2010.
- Doster, Barış. "Türkiye'de NATO Karşıtlığının Tarihsel ve Siyasal Kökenleri." *Ortadoğu Analiz*, 4, no. 40, (April 2012): 31-41.
- Döşemeci, Mehmet. "Cutting Through the Cold War: The EEC and Turkey's Great Westernization Debate." In *The Balkans in the Cold War*, edited by Rajak et al. Palgrave Macmillan, 2017: 331-351.
- . *Debating Turkish Modernity*. Cambridge University Press: 2013.
- Dumrul Uygur, Günay. "Türkiye İşçi Partisi 1961-1971." MA Thesis, İstanbul University, 2020.
- Ecevit, Bülent. "Demokratik Solda Temel Kavramlar ve Sorunlar." In *Demokratik Sol*. İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008.
- Eder, Mine. "Populism as a barrier to integration with the EU." In *Turkey and European Integration*, edited by Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe. London and New York: Routledge, 2004: 49-74.

- Eichenberg, Richard C. and Russell J. Dalton, "Post-Maastricht Blues: The Transformation of Citizen Support for European Integration, 1973-2004." *Acta Politica* 42, (2007): 128-152.
- Ellison, James. "Separated by the Atlantic: The British and de Gaulle, 1958-1967." *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 17 no. 4, (2006): 853-870.
- Emre, Yunus. *The Emergence of Social Democracy in Turkey*. I.B. Tauris: 2014.
- Eralp, Atila. "The Role of Temporality and Interaction in the Turkey-EU Relationship." In *Special Issue on Turkish Foreign Policy (New Perspectives on Turkey no. 40)*, edited by Mustafa Aydın and Kemal Kirişçi. İstanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2009: 149-170.
- Erhan, Çağrı, and Tuğrul Erat. "AET'yle İlişkiler." in *Türk Dış Politikası*, vol. 1, edited by Baskın Oran. İstanbul: İletişim, 2009: 808-853.
- . "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler." In *Türk Dış Politikası*, vol. 1, edited by Baskın Oran. İstanbul: İletişim, 2009: 522-575.
- Eroğul, Cem. "Çok Partili Düzenin Kuruluşu: 1945-1971." In *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye*, edited by Irvin C. Schick and E. Ahmet Tonak. İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2006: 112-158.
- Ersan, Vehbi. *1970'lerde Türkiye Solu*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2014.
- Ersoy, Eyüp. "Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962)," *Turkish Studies* 13 no. 4, (2012): 683-695.
- Esen, Selin. "18 Nisan 1960 Tarihli Tahkikat Komisyonu." *Mülkiye* 34 no. 267, (2010): 167-192.
- Flood, Christopher, and Simon Usherwood. "Ideological Factors in Party Alignments on the EU: A Comparison of Three Cases." EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal, (May 2007).
- Flood, Christopher, and Simon Usherwood. "Positions, Dispositions, Transitions: A Model of Group Alignment on EU Integration." 55th Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association, University of Leeds, (April 2005).

- Funkhouser, G. Ray. "The Issues of the Sixties: An Exploratory Study in the Dynamics of Public Opinion." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 37 no. 1, (Spring 1973): 62-75.
- Gabel, Matthew, and Harvey D. Palmer. "Understanding variation in public support for European Integration." *European Journal of Political Research* 27, (1995): 3-19.
- Garrett, Geoffrey. "From the Luxembourg Compromise to Codecision: Decision Making in the European Union." *Electoral Studies*, 14 no. 3, (1995): 289-308.
- George, Stephen. "The Intellectual Debate in Britain on the European Union." Research and Policy Paper No. 5, October 1998.
- Germond, Carine. "A 'Cordial Potentiality?': De Gaulle and the Franco-German Partnership, 1963-1969." In *Globalizing de Gaulle*, edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher and Garret Martin. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010.
- Gilbert, Mark. *European Integration*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021.
- Göçmen, İlke. *Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri: Hukuki Boyut*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2022.
- Güner, Hikmet. "Aydınlık Hareketi ve Dış Politika (1974-1980)." MA Thesis, Ankara Üniversitesi, 2018.
- Günuğur, Haluk. *Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri*. Ankara: Avrupa Ekonomik Danışma Merkezi, 2008.
- Gürdağ Uzuner, Hande. "Şüphenin Gölgesinde Birlik: Avrupa Şüpheciliği'nin Göç Dalgaları ve Artan Sağ Popülizm Çerçevesinde İncelenmesi, İtalya Örneği." PhD thesis, Ankara University, 2024.
- Güvenç, Serpil. "Socialist perspectives on foreign policy issues: The case of TİP in the 1960s." MA Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2005.
- Hale, William. *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*. London and New York: Routledge, 2013.

- Harmen, Robert, and Menno Spiering. "Introduction: Euroscepticism and the Evolution of European Political Debate." In *Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration*, edited by Robert Harmen and Menno Spiering. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi: 2004, 13-35.
- Harmen, Robert. "Concluding Comment: On Understanding the Relationship between Populism and Euroscepticism." *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 11, no. 3, (September 2010): 333-341.
- Harrison, Glenn W., Thomas F. Rutherford and David G. Tarr. "Economic implications for Turkey of a Customs Union with the European Union." *European Economic Review* 41, (1997): 861-870.
- Hill, Berkeley. *Understanding the Common Agricultural Policy*. London and New York: Earthscan, 2012.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. "Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration." *European Union Politics* 6 no. 4: (2005): 419-443.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Carole J. Wilson. "Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?" *Comparative Political Studies*, 35 no. 8, (October 2002): 965-989.
- Irwin, Douglas A. "The GATT in Historical Perspective." *American Economic Review* 85 no. 2, (1995): 323-328.
- İnalçık, Halil. *Rönesans Avrupası*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2013.
- İnan, Erkan. "Türkiye İşçi Partisi'nin İnşa ve Gelişimini Tetikleyen Koşullar (1960-1966)." *Uluslararası Politik Araştırmalar Dergisi* 9 no. 2, (2023): 19-33.
- İşçi, Onur. "Les Relations entre le Parti Ouvrier de Turquie et la Revue YÖN (1961-1965)." MA Thesis, Galatasaray University, 2019.
- Jackson, Julian. *A Certain Idea of France: The Life of Charles de Gaulle*. Penguin Random House UK: 2018.

- Johnson, Douglas. "De Gaulle and France's Role in the World." In *De Gaulle and Twentieth Century France*, edited by Hugh Gough and John Horne. London: Edward Arnold, 1994: 83-94.
- Judt, Tony. *Postwar*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2005.
- Kaiser, Wolfram, and Jürgen Elvert. "Introduction." In *European Union Enlargement*, edited by Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert. London and New York: Routledge, 2004: 1-9.
- Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands*. Palgrave Macmillan: 2005.
- Kara, Muhlis. "ANT ve YÖN Dergilerinde İktidar Tartışmaları." MA Thesis, Dokuz Eylül University, 2019.
- Karluk, Rıdvan. *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye İlişkileri: Bir Çıkılmaz Sokak*. İstanbul: Beta, 2013.
- . *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*. İstanbul: İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsası, 1996.
- Karpat, Kemal H. "Turkish Soviet Relations." In *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition*, edited by Kemal H. Karpat. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975: 73-107.
- Kaynar, Mete Kaan, and Nurettin Kalkan. *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Partiler Seçimler Beyannameler (1923-1980)*. Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2022.
- Kazgan, Gülten. *100 Soruda Ortak Pazar ve Türkiye*. İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1970.
- Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. New York: Random House, 1987.
- Keskin, Yıldırım. *Avrupa Yollarında Türkiye*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2001.
- Keyder, Çağlar. *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007.
- Kirişçi, Kemal. "Religion as an Argument in the Debate on Turkish EU Membership." In *Religion, Politics, and Turkey's EU Accession*, edited by Dietrich Jung and Catharina Raudvere. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008: 19-39.

- Koca, Selçuk. "Altmışlı Yılların Siyasal Partileri." In *Türkiye'nin 1960'lı Yılları*, prepared by Mete Kaan Kaynar. İstanbul: İletişim, 2017: 845-863.
- Kolodziej, Edward A. *French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press: 1974.
- Koloğlu, Orhan. *Osmanlıdan Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992.
- Komşuoğlu, Ayşegül. "1969 Seçimleri ve XIV. Dönem Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi." In *Yüzüncü Yılında TBMM*, edited by Yusuf Tekin. Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2020: 477-511.
- Kopecký, Petr, and Cas Mudde, "The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe." *European Union Politics* 3 no. 3, (September 2002): 297-326,
- Lasok, Dominik. "The Ankara Agreement: Principles and Interpretation." *Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi* 1 no. 1&2. (December 1991): 27-47.
- Lears, T. J. Jackson. "The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities." *The American Historical Review* 90 no. 3, (June 1985): 567-593.
- Leconte, Cécile. *Understanding Euroscepticism*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Levering, Ralph B. "Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and American Politics since the 1960s." *Diplomatic History* 13 no: 3, (Summer 1989): 383-393.
- Ludlow, N. Piers. "Challenging French Leadership in Europe: Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the Outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965-1966." *Contemporary European History*, 8 no. 2, (1999): 231-248.
- Manisalı, Erol. *Avrupa Çıkmazı*. İstanbul: Otopsi, 2003.
- Martin, Garret, "Playing the China Card Revisiting France's Recognition of Communist China 1963-1964." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 10 no. 1, (2008): 52-80.

- Mason, Henry L. "Ratification." In *The European Coal and Steel Community*. Springer Dordrecht: 1955: 1-33.
- McCormick, John. *Understanding the European Union*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022.
- McKenzie, Francie. "The GATT-EEC Collision: The Challenge of Regional Trade Blocs to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1950-67." *The International History Review*, 32 no. 2, (2010): 229-252.
- Momayezi, Nasser. "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey." *International Journal on World Peace* 15 no. 3, (September 1998): 3-28.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. "Charles de Gaulle and Europe," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 14 no. 1, (Winter 2012): 53-77.
- Mullen, Andrew. "The British left: For and Against Europe? A historical survey," *Capital & Class* 321 issue 3, (Autumn 2007): 217-231.
- Nas, Çiğdem, and Yonca Özer. *Turkey and the EU Integration*. London and New York: Routledge, 2017.
- Neziroğlu, İrfan, and Tuncer Yılmaz. *Hükümetler-Programları ve Genel Kurul Görüşmeleri*, vol. 3. Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2013.
- Neziroğlu, İrfan, and Tuncer Yılmaz. *Hükümetler-Programları ve Genel Kurul Görüşmeleri*, vol. 4. Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2013.
- Nkrumah, Kwame. *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. New York: International Publishers, 1966.
- O'Dwyer, Graham. *Charles de Gaulle, the International System and the Existential Difference*. London and New York: Routledge: 2017.
- Olson, Mancur. *The Rise and Decline of Nations*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982.

- Onar, Nora Fisher, and Ahmet Evin. "Convergence and Resistance: The European Dilemma of Turkish Intellectuals." In *European Stories: Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts*, edited by Justine Lacroix, and Kalypto Nicolaïdis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010: 294-312.
- Oran, Baskın. "1960-1980: Görelî Özerklik – 3 - Dönemin Bilançosu." In *Türk Dış Politikası*, vol. 1, edited by Baskın Oran. İstanbul: İletişim, 2009: 665-680.
- Ovalı Şevket, and İlkin Özdikmenli. "Ideologies and the Western Question in Turkish Foreign Policy: A Neo-classical Realist Perspective." *All Azimuth* 9 no. 1, 2020: 105-126.
- Öncü, Ahmet, and Özgür Mutlu Ulus. "Türkiye Solunun Aşıl Topuğu: 1960-1971 Yıllarında Türkiye Solundaki Devlet Tartışmalarının Karatani'nin Sermaye-Ulus-Devlet Çerçevesinden İrdelenmesi." *Çalışma ve Toplum* 1, (2019): 39-78.
- Özbudun, Ergun. "Seçim Sistemleri ve Türkiye." *Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi* 4 no. 1, (1995): 521-539.
- Özcan, Feridun Cemil. "Altmışlı Yıllarda Türkiye Ekonomisi." In *Türkiye'nin 1960'lı Yılları*, prepared by Mete Kaan Kaynar. İstanbul: İletişim, 2017: 179-204.
- Özcan, Gencer. "Ellili Yıllarda 'Dış Politika'." In *Türkiye'nin 1950'li Yılları*, prepared by Mete Kaan Kaynar. İstanbul: İletişim, 2019: 97-133.
- Özgüden, Doğan. "Sosyalist Dergi Ant." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce – Sol*, edited by Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil. İstanbul: İletişim, 2008.
- Özgüden, Mehmet. "Türkiye'de Seçkinler." In *1920'den günümüze Türkiye'de Toplumsal Yapı, 1920'den Günümüze Türkiye'de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim*, edited by Faruk Alpkaya and Bülent Duru. Ankara: Phoenix, 2017: 367-406.
- Reçber, Kamuran. *Türkiye - Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri*. Alfa Aktüel: 2009.

- Risse, Thomas. *A Community of Europeans?* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2010.
- Sakkas, John. and Nataliya Zhukova. "The Soviet Union, Turkey and the Cyprus Problem, 1967-74." *Les Cahiers Irice* no. 10, (2013): 123-135.
- Sander, Oral. "Yirminci Yüzyıl Tarihinin Temel Özellikleri." In *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, prepared by Melek Fırat. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2013: 27-69.
- Sanders, David. *Losing an Empire, Finding a Role*. Macmillan Education: 1989.
- Sargın, Nihat. *TİP'li Yıllar (1961-1971)*. İstanbul: Sosyal Tarih Yayınları, 2020.
- Sevli, Kemal. "Milli Demokratik Devrim Tezi: 1960'larda Türkiye Solunda Bir Ayrım Noktası." MA Thesis, Ankara University, (2007).
- Sezer, Duygu. *Kamu Oyu ve Dış Politika*. Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1972.
- Singleton, John, and Paul L. Robertson. "Britain, Butter and European Integration, 1957-1964." *The Economic History Review* 50 no. 2, (May 1997).
- Sørensen, Catharina. "Love me, Love me not... A Typology of public euro-scepticism." SEI Working Paper no. 101; EPERN Working Paper no. 19, (2008).
- Sönmezoğlu, Faruk. "Soğuk Savaş Yıllarında Kıbrıs Sorunu, Bağlantısızlıklar ve BM Genel Kurulu'ndaki Oylamalar/Kararlar." In *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, edited by Faruk Sönmezoğlu. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004: 541-571.
- Spiering, Menno. *A Cultural History of British Euroscepticism*. Palgrave Macmillan: 2015.
- Steinnes Kristian. "The European Challenge: Britain's EEC Application in 1961," *Contemporary European History* 7 no. 1, (March 1998): 61-79.
- Strain, Christopher B. *The Long Sixties*, Wiley Blackwell: 2017.
- Sunar, İlkey, and Ziya Öniş. *Sanayide Yönetim ve Toplumsal Uzlaşma*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD Yayınları, 1992.

- Sürer, Emre. “Türk Solu İnşasında Yön Hareketi.” MA Thesis, Kütahya Dumlupınar University, 2018.
- Szczerbiak, Aleks, and Paul Taggart. “Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union, the Euro and Europeanisation.” Proceedings of a Workshop held at the Sussex European Institute, sponsored by its Centre on European Political Economy, (23 June 2000).
- Szczerbiak, Aleks, and Paul Taggart. “Theorising party-based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement and Causality.” 8th Biannual International Conference of the European Union Studies Association Conference, (March 2003).
- Şener, Mustafa. “Türkiye İşçi Partisi.” In *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce – Sol*, edited by Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil. İstanbul: İletişim, 2008: 356-417.
- Şener, Mustafa. *Türkiye Solunda Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset: YÖN, MDD ve TİP*. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2015.
- Taggart, Paul, and Aleks Szczerbiak, “Crossing Europe: Patterns of Contemporary Party-Based Euroscepticism in EU Member States and the Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe”, SEI Working Paper no. 51, Opposing Europe Research Network Working Paper No 6. (2002).
- Taggart, Paul, and Aleks Szczerbiak. “Europeanisation, Euroscepticism and Party Systems: Party-based Euroscepticism in the Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe”, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 3 no. 1, (2002): 23-41.
- Taggart, Paul. “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems.” *European Journal of Political Research* 33 no. 3, (1998): 363–388.
- Tanör, Bülent. *İki Anayasa 1961-1982*. İstanbul: Beta, 1994.
- Tekeli, İlhan, and Selim İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu* vol. 1. Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993.

- Tekeli, İlhan, and Selim İlkin. *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu* vol. 2. Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993.
- Tellal, Erel. "SSCB'yle İlişkiler." In *Türk Dış Politikası*, vol. 1, edited by Baskın Oran. İstanbul: İletişim, 2009: 769-783.
- Tufekci, Baris. *The Socialist Ideas of the British Left's Alternative Economic Strategy*, Palgrave Macmillan: 2020.
- Tunçay, Mete. "Siyasal Gelişmenin Evreleri." *Bilineceği Bilmek*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2019: 153-189.
- Turku, Emre. "Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik Dergisi ve Türkiye'de Maoculuk Düşüncesinin Gelişimi." PhD Thesis, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, 2025.
- Ulus, Özgür Mutlu. *The Army and Radical Left in Turkey*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011.
- Uzgel, İlhan. "TDP'nin Oluşturulması." In *Türk Dış Politikası* vol. 1, edited by Baskın Oran. İstanbul: İletişim, 2009: 73-93.
- Ülger, İrfan Kaya. *Türk Liderlerin AB Vizyonu*. Ankara: Sinemis Yayınları, 2003.
- Ünlü Bilgiç, Tuba. "The Roots of Anti-Americanism in Turkey 1945-1960." In *Bilig* 72, (Winter 2015): 251-280.
- Ünlü, Barış. *Mehmet Ali Aybar*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2022.
- Ünsal, Artun. *Umuttan Yalnızlığa Türkiye İşçi Partisi (1961-1971)*. İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, 2019.
- Üste, R. Bahar. "Türkiye'de Siyasal İktidara Gelen Partilerin AET/AT/AB İlişkileri Hakkındaki Görüşleri ve Yönetim Yapısına Etkileri." *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 8 no. 3, (2006): 332-349.
- Vaïsse, Maurice. "France and NATO : An History," *Politique Etrangère* 4 (2009): 139-150.

- Vardar, Deniz. "Türkiye Avrupa Topluluğu/Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri." In *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, edited by Faruk Sönmezoğlu. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004: 439-452.
- Vasilopoulou, Sofia. "Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism: Plus ça change?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 51, no. 1. (2013): 153-168.
- . "Varieties of Euroscepticism: The Case of the European Extreme Right", *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 5 issue 1, (2009): 3-23.
- . "Euroscepticism and the Radical Right: Domestic strategies and party system dynamics." PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2010.
- Weil, Gordon L. "The Merger of the Institutions of the European Communities," *The American Journal of International Law* 61 no. 1, (January 1967): 57-65.
- Weßels, Bernhard. "Discontent and European Identity: Three Types of Euroscepticism", *Acta Politica* 42, (2007): 287-306.
- White, Brian. "The Concept of Détente." *Review of International Studies* 7 no. 3, (1981): 165-171.
- Yanık, Aybars, and Tanıl Bora. "Altmışlı Yıllarda Türkiye'nin Siyasî Düşünce Hayatı." In *Türkiye'nin 1960'lı Yılları*, prepared by Mete Kaan Kaynar. İstanbul: İletişim, 2017: 275-300.
- Yıldırım, Mehmet Cevat. "1948-1960 Döneminde Türkiye'de Avrupacılık: Avrupa Birliği Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Bir Değerlendirme." *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 11 no. 41, (Spring 2014): 109-131.
- Yılmaz Hakan. "Euroscepticism in Turkey: Parties, Elites, and Public Opinion." *South European Society and Politics* 16 no. 1, (2011): 185-208.
- . "Turkish identity on the Road to the EU: Basic Elements of French and German Oppositional Discourses." *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 9 no. 3, December 2007: 293-305.

Yurtsever, Haluk. *Yükseliş ve Düşüş*. İstanbul: Yordam, 2008.

Yüksel, Ali Sait. *Ortak Pazar'a Geçiş Dönemi ve Türk Sanayii*. İstanbul: Ahmet Sarı Matbaası, 1970.

———. *Türkiye İlişkileri Açısından Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu*. Eskişehir: Eskişehir İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi Basımevi, 1976.

Zileli, Gün. *Yarılma (1954-1972)*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2015.

Zürcher, Erik J. *Turkey: A Modern History*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010.

“İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı.” Accessed: 2 March 2025.
https://www.ikv.org.tr/ikv.asp?lng=tr&ust_id=9349&id=10.

“Tüm Yayınlar.” Accessed: 7 March 2025.
https://www.ikv.org.tr/ikv.asp?lng=tr&ust_id=70&id=208.

“Uzun İnce Bir Yol” Belgeseli. YouTube / T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Avrupa Birliği Başkanlığı. Accessed 2 April 2025. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aEQxU86PfS4>.