

GALATASARAY UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**THE ROLE OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDPs)
IN SECURITIZATION
IN AZERBAIJAN'S NAGORNO-KARABAKH POLICY**



PHD THESIS

Arzu TURGUT

Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Ali Faik DEMİR

DECEMBER, 2022

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This dissertation is a companion who has witnessed my joys and sorrows during the long and most challenging period of my life. Most of the time, we embraced each other with this companion, in our journey in four different cities in writing process. However, from time to time, we also distanced from each other. In any case, just as a loyal friend, it kept reminding me what my purpose was.

These pages are just an outcome of the cycle of enthusiasm, disappointment, passion, acceptance, surrender, and re-embrace. I will always look at this dissertation in that way for the rest of my life.

I would like to break the tradition of thanking by putting my family at the forefront due to their sacrifices and great efforts.

My mother, Gürsoy Turgut, loves to read and values education very much. I would like to thank her for all education opportunities she has provided me so far, her unconditional love, and endless support during this process. I would like to thank my father Mehmet Turgut and my sister Ayben Aydın, whose compassion and encouragement I felt in my entire life.

I am grateful to my esteemed thesis advisor, Assoc. Prof. Ali Faik Demir, who never gave up supporting me during our long meetings from Istanbul to Izmir. In the midst of a pandemic that deeply affected every aspects of our lives, at a time when we had to lock down in our homes, he was available on weekends and even on public holidays. His knowledge, guidance, and diligence always inspired me. Most importantly, I would like to thank him for his faith in me even under very tough and uncertain conditions.

I acknowledge the contribution of esteemed members of thesis committee without whom this study could not be accomplished. I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Dr. Esra Hatipoğlu for her valuable contribution in both academic and motivational sense despite her extremely busy schedule. I would like to thank Assoc. Prof. Menent Savaş Cazala, who exerted great effort to guide me in shaping and finalizing this work. Beyond that, I am grateful to both of them for always believing in me.

I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Mitat Çelikpala and Assoc. Prof. Beyza Çağatay Tekin, who honoured my defence meeting and contributed a lot with their insightful comments and criticisms.

I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Füsun Türkmen who has inspired me with her knowledge and dedication to her work. I would like to thank and respectfully

commemorate Prof. Dr. Beril Dedeoğlu who supported me at the beginning of my PhD journey.

My dear friends and colleagues, Assoc. Prof. Ümran Şengül, Dr. Şermin Çobanoğlu, Dr. Habibe Özdal, Dr. Hasan Deniz Pekşen, and Dr. Serpil Açıkalın deserve a genuine thank for their assistance and inspiration in this journey.

I would also like to thank profoundly my friends Volkan Üzer, Alexandra Üzer, and Duygu Sakin, who opened their warm homes and hearts to me every time I came to Istanbul and encouraged me throughout this process. I would like to thank Derya Sözügüzel and Tuğba Göcel who have motivated me genuinely and enthusiastically in the last period of the thesis.

I would like to express my gratitude to all people who have left a significant mark in my life even though their names are not mentioned here.

Last but not least, I thank myself, my soul, and my body. We will continue the journey together from here with curiosity and hope.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iv
ABBREVIATIONS	x
LIST OF TABLES	xii
LIST OF FIGURES	xiii
ABSTRACT	xiv
ÖZET	xix
INTRODUCTION.....	1
 PART I: POLITICIZATION OF ETHNIC HISTORY: NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT WITH ITS HISTORICAL, SOCIETAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS	 14
I. “BEING IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH”: A GEOGRAPHICAL, DEMOGRAPHIC AND HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT	14
A. Geographical Borders of Caucasias and Nagorno-Karabakh	15
1. Natural Geography of Caucasias.....	15
a. North Caucasias	17
b. South Caucasias and Nagorno-Karabakh	17
2. Geographical Definitions of Caucasias with Political Inferences and Connotations	21
a. Ciscaucasias, Predkavkazye, Shimali Qafqaz.....	21
b. Transcaucasias, Zakavkazje, Cenubi Qafqaz	24
c. Nagorno-Karabakh or “Artsakh”?.....	25
B. Demographic Aspects of North Caucasias, South Caucasias and Nagorno-Karabakh and Ethnic Groups.....	28
1. General Overview	28
2. Azerbaijanis	33
3. Armenians	36
C. Caucasian Albanias from Ancient Times to 20th century and History of Nagorno-Karabakh	37

1. Political History of Nagorno-Karabakh from the Ancient Times to Russian Domination	37
2. Political History of Nagorno-Karabakh under the Rule of Tsarist Russia	42
II. “BEING A NAGORNO-KARABAKHIAN”: AN ACT OF REBUILDING HISTORY AND POLITICIZING ETHNICITY	53
A. Azerbaijani and Armenian Claims over Caucasian Albania: The Myths Feeding Historical Enmities	53
1. Disputes over Territorial Borders, Ethnic Groups and Governance: Imagining the Unknowable	54
a. Armenian View: “We are the First Comers, Settlers and Rulers!”	54
b. Azerbaijani View: “Arran Was Ours and We Ruled It!”	62
2. Cultural Aspects.....	67
a. Religion	67
i. Armenian View: “First Christians Were Armenians, so Were the Albanians!”	67
ii. Azerbaijani View: “We Are Just Islamized Albanians!”	72
b. Language	74
i. Armenian View: “We Created the First Alphabet!”	74
ii. Azerbaijani View: “Albanians Had Their Own Alphabet and Language!”	77
c. Monuments and Stone Crosses	79
i. Armenian View: “The Khachkars Proved We Were There!”	79
ii. Azerbaijani View: “All Are Part of Albanian History!”	81
d. Shared Views and Disagreements.....	83
B. The Dynamics of Politicization of Ethnicity in Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict	85
1. The Legacy of Soviet Policies towards Ethnic Groups	85
a. Divide and Rule Policy	85
b. Nationalities Policy	89
c. Sovietization.....	91
2. The Rise of Nationalism in Azerbaijan and Armenia and Post-Soviet Order	95
a. Azerbaijan	97
i. Azerbaijani National Awakening.....	97
ii. Newly Independent State: Azerbaijan, National Elites and Leaders	101
b. Armenia.....	105
i. Armenian National Awakening	105

ii. Newly Independent State: Armenia, National Elites and Leaders	108
III. “BEING RIGHT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH”: LEGAL STATUS OF NAGORNO KARABAKH AND CONFLICTING ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES.....	112
A. The Emergence and Escalation of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict....	112
1. First Conflicts between Azerbaijanis and Armenians.....	112
2. From Historical Hatreds to Ethnic Conflict (1988-1991).....	121
3. From Ethnic Conflict to Violence (1991-1994).....	125
4. A Frozen “No War, No Peace” Situation (1994-2020)	130
5. Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and Ceasefire (2020)	131
B. Historical, Political and Legal Documents on Nagorno-Karabakh	133
1. Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).....	133
2. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Treaty	137
3. International Law and United Nations (UN) Charters.....	140
4. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Principles	143
C. Measures, Mediation and Solutions	145
1. Mediations by Russian Federation and CIS.....	145
2. The Initiatives of International and Regional Actors.....	146
a. Proposals of United States (US).....	146
b. OSCE-MINSK Group Involvement.....	148
 PART II: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: SECURITIZATION & INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDPs)	151
I. SECURITIZATION THEORY, MAIN ASSUMPTIONS AND CRITICISMS.....	151
A. The Origins of Securitization Concept and its Fundamental Assumptions.....	151
1. Traditional vs. New Security Understanding: A Conceptual Framework	151
a. National Security Concept in International Relations.....	151
b. New Security Concepts: Military, Environmental, Economic, Societal and Political Sectors	163
2. Main Components of a Securitization Process	171
a. Referent Objects	172
b. Existential Threats	174
c. Securitizing Actors.....	174
d. Speech Act	177

e. Audience.....	179
B. The Criticisms to Securitization	181
1. Political Securitization Practices: Agenda Setting, Securitizer and Audience Problématique	182
2. “The Political” in Securitization Analysis	189
a. Schmittian Understanding in Securitization Approach.....	189
b. Society and Identity in Securitization Approach	191
3. The Politics of Securitization Theory	198
a. Securitization as a Western Theory and Post-Western Debates.....	198
b. The Role of Analysts in Securitization Process	200
c. Ethics and Normative Issues in Securitizing and Desecuritizing an Issue	202
II. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDPs) IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT	209
A. Conceptual, Historical and Institutional Framework for IDPs	209
1. Who are IDPs?	209
a. Describing IDPs: Who Escaped How Far Away?.....	209
b. Preliminary Studies: Needs-Based or Rights-Based Approach?.....	219
c. Introduction to Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPIDPs).....	225
2. Security Problems of IDPs and Implementation of Guiding Principles	230
a. IDPs and Refugees: Common Needs, Different Rights	230
b. Security Concerns of IDP & IDPs as Security Concern	235
i. Causes of Internal Displacement	235
ii. Consequences of Internal Displacement.....	240
c. Regional and Individual States’ Initiatives to Apply Guiding Principles.....	246
i. UN Initiatives.....	246
ii. Region-Based Initiatives.....	249
iii. Country-Based Initiatives	251
B. IDPs under Scrutiny: The Problématique of Sovereignty and Protection of People at Risk.....	252
1. Discussion on Changing Nature of Sovereignty at a Glance.....	252
2. Definition and Scope of Sovereign Responsibility to Protect	257
a. Sovereign Responsibility and IDPs.....	257
b. Responsibility to Protect (R2P)	262

3. Guiding Principles and Sovereign Responsibility to Protect IDPs.....	266

PART III SECURITIZING ACTS ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT AND THE ROLE OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDPs) 271

I. INSECURITY IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH: REAL AND PERCEIVED THREATS FOR AZERBAIJAN 271

A. General overview for South Caucasian security	271
B. Threats to Azerbaijan's Sovereignty/Territorial Integrity	274
1. Historical/Territorial Threats	275
2. Perceptual Threats	281
3. Regional Threats	285
C. Regime Security/Legitimacy Problem	287
1. "If Successful in the War, Your Power is Legitimate!"	287
2. "Nagorno-Karabakh is a Leverage of Power Struggles"	289
3. "Nagorno-Karabakh Hides Other Domestic Problems"	291
4. IDPs Have & IDPs Are Problems!	292

II. SECURITIZING ACTORS, SPEECH ACT AND POLICIES. 302

A. Securitizing Actors and Policies in Azerbaijan	302
1. Ayaz Mutallibov	305
2. Abulfaz Elchibey	310
3. Heydar Aliyev.....	315
4. Ilham Aliyev	323
B. Speech Act of Securitizing Actor in Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev	328
1. "Territorial Integrity", "Sovereignty", and "Occupation"	332
2. Azerbaijani View of Armenians: Universal Atrocious.....	340
3. "Commitment to Peaceful Settlement" in Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.....	346
4. IDPs: "Victimization," Liberation," and "Voluntary Return"	354
5. The Status: Only Karabakh! No Political Autonomy for Armenians!.....	364
C. Armenian Political Leaders, Policies and Statements on Nagorno-Karabakh.....	370
1. Leaders of the Republic of Armenia and Their Statements on Nagorno-Karabakh.....	373
a. Levon Ter-Petrossian (November 1991-February 1998).....	373
b. Robert Kocharian (February 1998-April 2008)	377
c. Serzh Sargsyan (April 2008-April 2018)	379
d. Armen Sarkissian (April 2018-February 2022)	387

e. Vahagn Khachaturian (March 2022-)	389
f. Nikol Pashinyan.....	390
2. Authorities of So-called Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and Their Statements on Nagorno-Karabakh	397
CONCLUSION	404
BIBLIOGRAPHY	415
ÖZGEÇMİŞ	454



ABBREVIATIONS

APF	: Azerbaijan Popular Front
AU	: African Union
CDA	: Critical Discourse Analysis
CSTO	: Collective Security Treaty Organization
CHR	: Commission on Human Rights
CIS	: Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCE	: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CHA	: Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies
ECOWAS	: Economic Community of West African States
ECDFC	: Ecumenical Commission for Displaced Families and Communities
ERC	: Emergency Relief Coordinator
EBRD	: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EU	: European Union
FMR	: Forced Migration Review
GPIDPs	: Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons
HRW	: Human Rights Watch
IASC	: Inter-Agency Standing Committee
CFE	: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Council of Europe
IDMC	: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDU	: Internal Displacement Unit
IDPs	: Internally displaced people
IDP	: Internally displaced person
CIREFCA	: International Conference on Central American Refugees
ISS	: International Security Studies
LTTE	: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MOU	: Memorandum of Understanding
NKAO	: Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
NGOs	: Non-governmental organizations
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ODIHR	: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OAU	: Organization for African Unity
OSCE	: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OAS	: Organization of American States
R2P	: Responsibility to protect
RSFSR	: Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
SSR	: Soviet Socialist Republic
SPLM	: Sudan People's Liberation Movement
ICRC	: International Committee of the Red Cross

NRC	: Norwegian Refugee Council
USCRI	: U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
IASC	: UN's Inter-Agency Standing Committee
US	: United States
USSR	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
UN	: United Nations
UNCHR	: United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNDP	: United Nations Development Programme
OCHA	: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs



LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1. South Caucasus Population according to 1897 General Census	30
Table 1.2. Distribution of total population in Transcaucasia by ethnic groups (1917).....	31
Table 1.3. South Caucasus Population (Thousand) in the USSR (1950-1970)	32
Table 1.4. Ethnic distribution of Nagorno-Karabakh (1840-1987)	32
Table 1.5. Armenian and Azerbaijani views on the history of Albania	84
Table 2.1. International security studies perspectives.....	162
Table 2.2. Top ten countries producing both IDPs and Refugees (1995).....	217
Table 3.1. Existing political parties in Azerbaijan.....	303

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1. Physical map of North Caucasasia.....	17
Figure 1.2. Physical map of North and South Caucasasia.....	18
Figure 1.3. Nagorno-Karabakh and seven occupied districts.....	19
Figure 1.4. Nagorno-Karabakh and areas captured by Azerbaijan.....	20
Figure 1.5. Nagorno-Karabakh after the Autumn 2020 War.....	21
Figure 1.6. Borders and casualties per location after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020.....	132
Figure 1.7. Borders demarcated after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.....	133
Figure 2.1. Action, event and effects in Securitization Theory.....	201
Figure 2.2. Number of IDPs and Refugees (1990-2019).....	216
Figure 2.3. Total number of IDPs by the end of 2019.....	218
Figure 2.4. Internal displacement by conflict, violence and disasters per region (2021).....	219
Figure 2.5. Conflict and disasters: Ten countries with the highest number of IDPs worldwide as of the end of 2021.....	219
Figure 3.1. The first smart village of Azerbaijan in Zangilan District.....	360
Figure 3.2. Google Earth Imagery of Aghali in 2018 and 2020.....	360

ABSTRACT

In this study, the securitization process of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which emerged between Azerbaijan and Armenia before the dissolution of the Soviet Union is examined and the role of the displaced people in this process are investigated. These people, who had to flee from Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding regions that were occupied by Armenia in the conflict broke out from 1988 to 1994, and dispersed to different cities of Azerbaijan, have a very basic status that forms the backbone of this study: Being internally displaced people (IDPs).

According to the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPIDPs), these people are not subject to the same rules of international law and do not have the same rights and responsibilities as refugees. They have had to migrate within the borders of their home countries, and their government has a responsibility to provide them the necessary assistance and protection.

Refugees have a life that continues in another country after a breaking point often associated with war. IDPs, on the other hand, are those who have been forcibly displaced within the borders of their country of origin due to armed conflict, generalized violence, human rights violations, and human-made or natural disasters.

While there is huge amount of work in the literature on refugees and the securitization process of refugees, less reference is made to IDPs. IDPs are often confused with refugees and some of their specific needs and demands for safety are not given due consideration. Studies in which IDPs are examined in the context of the concept of securitization are rarely encountered. In fact, as these people continue to be citizens of the country in which they live, they take place as subjects of securitization in each of the military, political, social, economic, and even environmental security sectors. However, their roles in the securitization process may change depending on the context and political will. In this respect, the study deals with the less explored disadvantageous group, IDPs, within the framework of securitization theory and aims to make an important contribution to the literature.

The study examines Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which is a subject that is widely discussed in the context of military security based on realist assumptions in the current literature, with its historical, cultural, and legal features as a whole. This holistic approach involves understanding and interpreting the problem in depth, rather than merely identifying the problem. It tries to grasp the origins of some historical realities and hostilities/misperceptions and othering efforts without ignoring them. Thus, it aims to provide a perspective for the solution in future studies.

In this respect, the dissertation tries to analyze the issue through a constructivist term, beyond the limitations of the realist paradigm as mentioned above. Written from a constructivist point of view, which positions itself at the middle point in the discussion of positivism and post-positivism, this dissertation stands close to critical thinking in this spectrum due to the importance it attaches to historical events, its emphasis on identity-related elements, and its effort to understand the subject.

The researcher has a very difficult task in analyzing objectively an ethnicity and territory based conflict in which identity debates are intense and historical enmities prevail. When the securitization dimension of the subject is included in the analysis, the researcher should be more careful and sensitive in acting on moral and ethical principles while approaching the problems.

In order to achieve this, attention has been paid to presenting the views of Azerbaijanis and Armenians in an equal and fair manner in every topic discussed throughout the study. The terms or historical data in the study were used not depending on the preference of the researcher, but to serve a better understanding of the subject and depending on its prevalence in the literature.

Throughout the study, quantitative data and qualitative data were used to support each other or to question their accuracy. For example, when different figures are reached regarding the population movements in this geography, especially the number of displaced persons, the said data is presented together in a way that allows comparison. A similar situation applies to matters that are often based on qualitative data, over which there is much disagreement. When it comes to these issues, the arguments of the parties are given comparatively and the reader is provided to cross-read. The issues that are frequently the subject of conflict between the parties and that are most distorted are actually the issues that are most exposed to the securitization discourse. Therefore, even this situation can be shown as proof that the conflict is securitized at the highest level by increasing the discourses of threat and hostility over the points of disagreement.

Since the application of the theory in the study is based on a case study, first of all the concepts (securitization and internal displacement) are investigated in detail and even a chapter is devoted to these two topics. In addition, the criticisms against the theory were carefully reviewed and it was examined whether similar criticisms were also in question in the securitization of Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

Speech texts of leaders were examined and their effects on the securitization process were questioned. Historical themes of hostility, real or perceived threats, and stereotypes developed for the other have been tried to be understood through the events or phenomena that securitizing leaders frequently emphasized in their statements.

Nagorno-Karabakh issue is a highly securitized ethnic conflict as part of the centuries-old ethnic and land-based policies of Russians over the region, historical dynamics and political culture. Soviet divide and rule policy, nationalities policy and Sovietization efforts continue to show themselves in the deadlock in the internal security problems of the states that gained independence in the wake the dissolution of the Union.

The role given to Russia, which played such an important role in the formation and rooting of the problems in Nagorno-Karabakh, historically and politically, regarding the peaceful resolution of the problem seems ironic. Thanks to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia is trying to make both Azerbaijan and Armenia dependent on itself for the “solution” of the problem, even after independence, and strengthens its presence in its backyard with the soldiers it has deployed in the region to monitor peace.

The threats perceived by Azerbaijan to its sovereignty and territorial integrity in Nagorno-Karabakh issue have a real basis in bilateral state relations or at the regional level. First, Azerbaijan was a state that lost 20% of its territory before the 2020 war due to the Armenian occupation. There is no more real threat than that. However, in addition to real threats, there are alarming perceptions arising from hostile rhetoric, which keep military threats alive and strengthen them. Real or perceived threats between Azerbaijan and Armenia also threaten regional stability, leaving these two states more vulnerable to foreign interventions.

Nagorno-Karabakh issue, which has been at the top of their political agendas since their independence, can be a matter of great pride or great destruction/humiliation for Azerbaijan and Armenia. It is not surprising that the rise and fall of Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders coincided with their success or failure in the war.

In addition to this, it is possible to benefit from the existence of the issue in domestic politics. Firstly, a failure in Nagorno-Karabakh can turn into a crisis of regime security and legitimacy. The strength of the winner in war seems legitimate. It is thought that the loser in the war is not able to rule the country.

Secondly, Nagorno-Karabakh issue can be a maneuvering tool used by the opposition to overthrow or weaken the government. Therefore, in the securitization of this issue, the opposition has a great interest as well as the government.

Thirdly, Nagorno-Karabakh issue was effective in seeing other internal security problems of Azerbaijan, which had serious socio-economic problems after independence, as secondary. It is widely believed that prioritizing other issues without overcoming Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which is a survival issue, can have distracting and even challenging/threatening aspects. The securitization of the issue has a great facilitating role in downplaying other issues and avoiding responsibility.

Fourthly, will the problems of the IDPs in Nagorno-Karabakh issue or the threats they allegedly create in their new settlements be discussed? This issue is actually related to where IDPs are situated in the securitization process. It is observed that the role of IDPs in securitization discourses varies according to the perspective towards them.

IDPs can first be defined as those directly under threat. IDPs are a group that has seen the destructiveness of the war in the face of the Armenian occupation, had to leave their homes, and is still under the threat of attack, both operationally and in the form of propaganda, like all other Azerbaijani citizens.

If it is thought that what is threatened in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the security of the state/regime, the role of the IDPs in the securitization act can also be seen as a functional actor. Functional actors are groups that can affect positively or

negatively the securitization process with their presence, unless they are included in the threatened group.

IDPs are also audience because they are citizens of that country. They are audiences who endorsed the securitization move, consented to the extraordinary measures implemented by their charismatic leaders.

In addition, IDPs may be perceived as a threat in their new settlement areas or in their homelands to which they have returned. This may lead to the emergence of a new securitization process at the societal level. In fact, it is not possible to talk about such a securitization move in the political and social security sector in the example of Azerbaijan. However, it has been argued that there are some contradictions in the way local people view IDPs.

IDPs are a good example of indicating the duality of identities. If you are a displaced person, you can be a “comrade, war victim, victim, warrior, hero”, or you can be described as “someone who has fled the war,” “plunders resources,” “deprives local people of job opportunities,” and “disrupts order.” Dual identities, which can change according to interests and conditions and are open to be manipulated, are attributed to these people.

All these data indicate that the securitization process in Nagorno-Karabakh issue is not unique to one charismatic actor in Azerbaijan, but that there is a constantly self-producing securitization process of historical and cultural differences and points of disagreement borrowed from predecessors and structures. Moreover, this securitization process does not only arise from the rejection of the other, but also strengthens through the discourses produced by the other. Therefore, while the study was being prepared, not only the discourse and policies of the Azerbaijani leaders were emphasized, but also speeches of Armenian leaders were examined.

IDPs have always been groups that have not been fully integrated into the society and are dreamed of one day returning to their homeland, no matter how much aid is provided by the Azerbaijani state. This period, in which the return of IDPs due to the military victory of Azerbaijan after the 2020 War is discussed, verifies the importance given by the state to their displacement.

The memories were kept alive through the existence of IDPs, the nationalist and patriotic feelings were strengthened, the existence of the enemy was cursed, and it was told that these people would regain their homes and lands on the day of Great Return. Currently, smart villages are established in the territories, which have been liberated from Armenian occupation, and return is encouraged.

Return should take place on a voluntary basis and in safety, in accordance with international law and norms, in particular the Guiding Principles. As you can see, displacement is not a one-time process that ends when these people return to their old homes. It also covers the processes of resettlement, integration, and return.

In Nagorno-Karabakh example, it can be predicted that problems may arise during and after the return of these people. Who will be eligible to return? Will they be able to find their abandoned homes and other properties in their proper place? Will there be problems in adapting to economic and social life in the places they return to? The Armenian side is concerned that the Azerbaijani citizens returning to their homeland will form a majority in the region and cause a change in status in a

possible referendum. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, creates ways to make the return attractive.

In South Caucasus, especially in Nagorno-Karabakh, where patriotism and longing are the subject of literary works, stories have both destructive and healing power. It can be assumed that the stories of IDPs will continue to spark any political action to securitize or desecuritize the region. No political leader would want to give up such a narrative power that blends with the fire of trauma.



ÖZET

Bu çalışmada, Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan arasında henüz Sovyetler Birliği çözülmeden önce ortaya çıkan Dağlık-Karabağ sorununun güvenlikleştirilme süreci incelenmekte ve bu süreçte yerinden edilmiş kişilerin rolü araştırılmaktadır. 1988-1994 yılları arasında yaşanan çatışmada, Dağlık Karabağ ve çevresindeki Ermenistan tarafından işgal edilen yedi bölgeden Azerbaycan'ın farklı şehirlerine kaçmak zorunda kalmak suretiyle bu insanlar, bu çalışmanın belkemiğini oluşturan bir statüye kavuşmuştur: Yerinden edilmiş kişiler (YEK).

Birleşmiş Milletler'in (BM) Ülkesinde Yerinden Edilmiş Kişilere İlişkin Kılavuz İlkeler'e göre bu insanlar, mültecilerle aynı uluslararası hukuk kurallarına tabi değildir ve aynı hak ve sorumluluklara sahip değildir. Onlar, kendi ülkeleri sınırları içerisinde göç etmek zorunda kalmışlardır ve hükümetlerinin kendilerine gerekli yardım ve koruma sağlama sorumluluğu vardır.

Mültecilerin, genellikle savaşla ilişkilendirilen bir kırılma noktasından sonra bir başka ülkede devam eden bir hayatları vardır. YEK'ler ise silahlı çatışma, yaygın şiddet, insan hakları ihlalleri ve insan eliyle ya da doğal sebeplerle gerçekleşen felaketler dolayısıyla bulundukları ülke sınırları içinde zorla yer değiştirmiş kimselerden oluşmaktadır.

Literatürde mülteciler ve mültecilerin güvenlikleştirme süreci ile ilgili oldukça fazla çalışma var iken YEK'lere daha az değinilmektedir. YEK'ler, çoğunlukla mültecilerle karıştırılmakta ve bazı özel ihtiyaç ve güvenlik taleplerine gereken önem verilmemektedir. YEK'lerin güvenlikleştirme konsepti bağlamında incelendiği çalışmalara ise nadiren rastlanmaktadır. Aslına bakılır ise bu kişiler, bulundukları ülkenin vatandaşları olmaya devam ettikleri için gerek askeri, gerek siyasi, gerekse de toplumsal, ekonomik ve hatta çevresel güvenlik sektörlerinin her birinde güvenlikleştirme öznesi olarak yer almaktadır. Ancak bağlama ve siyasi iradeye bağlı olarak güvenlikleştirme sürecinde üstlendikleri roller değişebilir. Bu bağlamda çalışma, daha az değinilen bir dezavantajlı grup olan YEK'leri güvenlikleştirme kuramı çerçevesinde ele almakta ve literatüre önemli bir katkı sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Çalışma, mevcut literatürde yaygın olarak, realist varsayımlardan yola çıkarak askeri güvenlik bağlamında ele alınan bir konu olan Dağlık Karabağ çatışmasını tarihsel, kültürel ve hukuki özellikleriyle bir bütün olarak ele almaktadır. Bu bütüncül yaklaşım, sorunu sadece tespit etmekten ziyade onu derinlemesine anlamayı ve yorumlamayı içermektedir. Soruna sebep olan bazı tarihsel gerçeklikler ve düşmanlıkları/yanlış algılamaları ve ötekileştirme çabalarını görmezden gelmeden bunların kökenlerini anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Böylece bundan sonraki çalışmalarda çözüm için de bir perspektif sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Bu bakımdan tez, yukarıda bahsedildiği üzere realist paradigmanın sınırlamalarının ötesinde, konstrüktivist bir terim üzerinden meseleyi analiz etmeye çalışmaktadır. Pozitivizm ve post pozitivizm tartışmasında kendini orta noktada konumlandıran konstrüktivist bakış açısından kaleme alınan bu tez, tarihsel olaylara verdiği önem, kimlikle ilişkili öğelere yaptığı vurgu ve özneyi anlama çabası nedeniyle bu yelpazede eleştirel düşünceye yakın durmaktadır.

Kimlik tartışmalarının yoğun olduğu ve tarihsel düşmanlıkların hüküm sürdüğü etnisite-toprak temelli bir çatışmayı objektif bir gözle analiz etmede araştırmacıya oldukça zorlu bir görev düşmektedir. Konunun güvenlikleştirilme boyutu da analize dahil edildiğinde araştırmacının sorunlara yaklaşırken ahlaki ve etik ilkeler üzerinden hareket etmede daha özenli ve hassas davranması gerekmektedir.

Bunu başarabilmek için çalışma boyunca ele alınan her konu başlığında Azerbaycanlıların ve Ermenilerin görüşleri eşit ve adil bir şekilde sunulmaya çalışılmıştır. Çalışmadaki terimler ya da tarihsel veriler araştırmacının tercihinine bağlı olarak değil, konunun daha iyi anlaşılmasına hizmet etmek için ve literatürde yer verilme yaygınlığına bağlı olarak kullanılmıştır.

Çalışma genelinde niceliksel veriler ve niteliksel veriler birbirlerini desteklemek ya da doğruluğunu sorgulamak amacıyla kullanılmıştır. Örneğin, YEK'lerin sayıları başta olmak üzere bu coğrafyada gerçekleşen nüfus hareketleri konusunda farklı rakamlara ulaşıldığında söz konusu veriler karşılaştırma yapılmasına imkan verecek şekilde bir arada sunulmuştur. Benzer bir durum, üzerinde çok fazla anlaşmazlık olan, genellikle niteliksel verilere dayanan meseleler için de geçerlidir. Bu meseleler söz konusu olduğunda tarafların argümanları karşılaştırmalı olarak verilmiş ve okuyucunun çapraz okuma yapması sağlanmıştır. Taraflar arasında sıklıkla uzlaşmazlık konusu olan ve en çok çarpıtılan konular, aslında güvenlikleştirme söylemine en fazla maruz kalan konulardır. Dolayısıyla bu durum bile çatışmanın, anlaşmazlık noktaları üzerinden tehdit ve düşmanlık söylemlerini artırarak en üst düzeyde güvenlikleştirildiğinin kanıtı olarak gösterilebilir.

Çalışmada teorinin uygulanması bir vaka incelemesi üzerinden gerçekleştiği için öncelikle kavramlar (güvenlikleştirilme ve yerinden zorla edilme) detaylı bir şekilde araştırılmış ve hatta bu iki konuya bir bölüm ayrılmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra teoriye yönelik eleştiriler titizlikle incelenerek benzer eleştirilerin Dağlık Karabağ meselesinin güvenlikleştirilmesinde de söz konusu olup olmadığı irdelenmiştir.

Liderlerin konuşma metinleri incelenmiş ve bunların güvenlikleştirme sürecine etkisi sorgulanmıştır. Güvenlikleştiren liderlerin açıklamalarında sıklıkla vurguladıkları olay ya da olgular üzerinden tarihsel düşmanlık temaları, gerçek ya da algılanan tehditler ve ötekisi için geliştirilen stereotipler anlaşılmalı çalışılmıştır.

Dağlık Karabağ meselesi, Rusların bölge üzerinde yüzyıllar süren etnisite ve toprak temelli politikalarının, tarihsel dinamiklerin ve politik kültürünün bir parçası olarak yüksek derecede güvenlikleştirilmiş bir etnik çatışmadır. Sovyetlerin böl ve yönet politikası, milliyetler politikası ve Sovyetleştirme çabaları, Birliğin çözülmesinin ardından bağımsızlığını kazanan devletlerin iç güvenlik sorunlarındaki çözümsüzlükte kendini göstermeye devam etmektedir.

Dağlık Karabağ'da tarihsel ve siyasi olarak sorunların oluşumunda ve köklenmesinde bu denli önemli rol oynayan Rusya'ya sorunun barışçıl çözümüne

ilişkin verilen rol ironik görünmektedir. Dağlık Karabağ çatışması sayesinde Rusya, bağımsızlıktan sonra bile hem Azerbaycan'ı hem de Ermenistan'ı sorunun "çözümü" konusunda kendine bağımlı kılmaya çalışmakta ve barışı gözlemek için bölgeye yerleştirdiği askerleriyle arka bahçesindeki varlığını güçlendirmektedir.

Azerbaycan'ın Dağlık Karabağ meselesinde egemenlik ve toprak bütünlüğüne yönelik algıladığı tehditlerin, ikili devlet ilişkileri ya da bölgesel düzeyde reel bir zemini bulunmaktadır. Her şeyden önce Azerbaycan, 2020 savaşı öncesi topraklarının %20'sini Ermeni işgali dolayısıyla kaybetmiş bir devlettir. Bundan daha gerçek bir tehdit olmasa gerek. Ancak gerçek tehditlerin yanı sıra, düşmanlık içeren söylemlerden doğan endişe verici algılar vardır ki bunlar askeri tehditleri sürekli canlı tutmakta ve güçlendirmektedir. Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan arasında gerçek ya da algılanan tehditler, bölgesel istikrarı da tehdit etmekte, bu iki devleti dış müdahaleler karşısında daha savunmasız bırakmaktadır.

Bağımsızlıklarından beri siyasi gündemlerinin en üst noktasında duran Dağlık Karabağ meselesi, hem Azerbaycan hem de Ermenistan için büyük gurur ya da büyük yıkım/aşağılanma konusu olabilmektedir. Azerbaycan ve Ermeni liderlerin yükseliş ve düşüş hikâyelerinin savaştaki başarı ya da başarısızlıklara denk gelmesi şaşırtıcı değildir.

Bunun yanı sıra, meselenin varlığından iç siyasette de faydalanma durumu söz konusu olabilmektedir. İlk olarak, Dağlık Karabağ'da yaşanan bir başarısızlık, rejim güvenliği ve meşruiyet krizi meselesine dönüşebilmektedir. Savaşta kazananın gücü meşru görünmektedir. Savaşta kaybedenin ise ülkeyi yönetmeye muktedir olmadığı düşünülmektedir.

İkinci olarak, Dağlık Karabağ meselesi muhaliflerin iktidarları devirme ya da zayıflatmada kullandıkları manevra araçları olabilmektedir. Dolayısıyla bu konunun güvenlikleştirilmesinde iktidarın yanı sıra muhaliflerin de büyük çıkarı vardır.

Üçüncü olarak, Dağlık Karabağ meselesi bağımsızlıktan sonra ciddi sosyo-ekonomik problemler yaşayan Azerbaycan'ın diğer iç güvenlik problemlerini ikincil önemde görmesinde etkili olmuştur. Bir beka sorunu olan Dağlık Karabağ çatışmasının üstesinden gelmeden diğer sorunlara öncelik vermenin dikkat dağıtıcı ve hatta zorlayıcı/tehdit edici yanları olabileceği kanısı yaygındır. Meselenin güvenlikleştirilmesinin diğer sorunları ikincil önemde gösterme ve sorumluluk almaktan kaçınma üzerindeki kolaylaştırıcı rolü büyüktür.

Dördüncü olarak, Dağlık Karabağ meselesinde YEK'lerin problemleri mi yoksa onların yeni yerleşim yerlerinde yarattıkları iddia edilen tehditler mi tartışılacaktır? Bu konu aslında, güvenlikleştirme sürecinde YEK'lerin nerede konumlandırıldığı ile ilişkilidir. YEK'lerin güvenlikleştirme söylemlerindeki rolünün onlara yönelik bakış açısına göre değiştiği gözlemlenmektedir.

YEK'ler, ilk olarak direkt tehdit altında olan unsurlar olarak tanımlanabilir. YEK'ler, Ermeni işgali karşısında savaşın yıkıcılığını en yakından görmüş, evlerini terk etmek zorunda kalmış ve hala da diğer tüm Azerbaycan vatandaşları gibi hem operasyonel anlamda hem de propaganda şeklinde saldırı tehdidi altında olan bir gruptur.

Dağlık Karabağ çatışmasında tehdit edilenin devlet/rejim güvenliği olduğu düşünülür ise YEK'lerin güvenlikleştirme eylemi içindeki rolleri fonksiyonel aktör

şeklinde de görülebilir. Fonksiyonel aktörler, tehdit edilen grup içinde sayılmadıkça varlıkları ile güvenlikleştirme sürecini olumlu ya da olumsuz anlamda etkileyebilen gruplardır.

YEK'ler aynı zamanda o ülkenin vatandaşları oldukları için dinleyici konumundadırlar. Güvenlikleştirme hamlesinin kabul edilip rızalarının alındığı ve karizmatik liderlerinin hayata geçirdiği olağanüstü tedbirlere onay veren dinleyicilerdir.

Bunlara ek olarak, YEK'ler yeni gittikleri yerlerde ya da geri döndükleri eski yerleşim yerlerinde tehdit olarak algılanabilmektedir. Bu da toplumsal düzeyde yeni bir güvenlikleştirme sürecinin doğuşuna sebep olabilir. Aslına bakılır ise Azerbaycan örneğinde siyasi ve toplumsal güvenlik sektöründe böylesi bir güvenlikleştirilme hamlesinden bahsetmek mümkün değildir. Bununla beraber, yerel halkın yerinden edilmiş kişilere bakış açılarında bazı zıtlıklar olduğu ileri sürülmektedir.

YEK'ler, kimliklerin ikiliğine işaret etmesi bakımından iyi bir örnektir. Eğer YEK iseniz “yoldaş, savaş mağduru, kurban, savaşçı, kahraman” da olabilirsiniz, “savaştan kaçmış, kaynakları yağmalayan, yerel halkın iş olanaklarını elinden alan, düzen bozan” biri olarak da tanımlanabilirsiniz. Bu kişilere çıkarlara ve şartlara göre değişen ve manipüle edilmeye açık ikili kimlikler atfedilebilmektedir.

Tüm bu veriler, Dağlık Karabağ meselesinde güvenlikleştirilme sürecinin Azerbaycan'da sadece tek bir karizmatik aktöre özgü olmadığına, tarihsel ve kültürel farklılıklar ve anlaşmazlık noktalarının önceki liderlerden ve yapılardan ödünç alınan ve sürekli kendini üreten bir güvenlikleştirme sürecinin varlığına işaret etmektedir. Üstelik bu güvenlikleştirme süreci sadece ötekinin reddedilmesinden doğmamakta, ötekinin ürettiği söylemler üzerinden de güçlenmektedir. Dolayısıyla çalışma hazırlanırken sadece Azerbaycanlı liderlerin söylem ve politikalarına vurgu yapılmamış, Ermeni liderlerin söylemleri de incelenmiştir.

YEK'ler, her ne kadar Azerbaycan devleti tarafından yardımlar yapılsa da hep topluma tam entegre edilmeyen ve bir gün anavatanlarına dönüşü hayal edilen gruplar olmuştur. 2020 Savaşı sonrasında Azerbaycan'ın askeri zaferinin etkisiyle YEK'lerin dönüşünün konuşulduğu bu dönem, devletin yerinden edilmeye verdiği önemi doğrular niteliktedir.

YEK'lerin varlıkları üzerinden hafızalar canlı tutulmuş, milliyetçi ve vatanperver duygular güçlendirilmiş, düşmanın varlığı lanetlenmiş ve Büyük Dönüş gününde bu kişilerin evlerine, topraklarına kavuşacağı anlatılagelmiştir. Şu an Ermenistan işgalinden kurtarılan bölgelerde akıllı köyler kurularak geri dönüş özendirilmektedir.

Geri dönüş, Kılavuz ilkeler başta olmak üzere uluslararası hukuk ve normlara uygun olarak gönüllülük esasına dayalı şekilde ve güven içinde gerçekleşmelidir. Görüldüğü üzere yerinden edilme, bir defa olan ve bu insanlar eski evlerine döndüklerinde sona eren bir süreç değildir. Yeni yere yerleşme, entegrasyon ve geri dönme süreçlerini de kapsamaktadır.

Dağlık Karabağ örneğinde bu kişilerin geri dönüşü sürecinde ve sonrasında da problemler yaşanabileceği öngörülebilir. Kimler dönmeye hak kazanacaktır? Terk ettikleri evlerini ve diğer mülkiyetlerini yerinde bulabilecekler midir? Döndükleri yerlerde ekonomik ve sosyal hayata uyum sorunları yaşanacak mıdır? Ermeni tarafı,

vatanına geri dönen Azerbaycan vatandaşlarının bölgede çoğunluk oluşturmamasından ve olası bir referandumda statü değişikliğinin yapılmasına sebep olmalarından endişe etmektedir. Azerbaycan ise dönüşü cazip kılmanın yollarını oluşturmaktadır.

Güney Kafkasya’da, özellikle de vatan sevgisi ve özlemin edebi eserlere konu olduğu Dağlık Karabağ’da hikâyelerin yıkıcı ve iyileştirici gücü vardır. YEK’lerin hikâyelerinin, bölgede güvenlikleştirmeye ya da güvenlikdışılaştırmaya yönelik her siyasi eylemin kıvılcımı olmaya devam edeceği varsayılabilir. Hiçbir siyasi lider, travmaların ateşiyle harmanlanan böylesi bir hikayeleştirici güçten vazgeçmek istemeyecektir.



INTRODUCTION

*Karabakh is getting plundered
Their hair falls on their face
If you leave, return as soon as you can
Someone is waiting for you¹*

South Caucasia is a region of frozen conflicts and long-standing disputes. The conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Ossetia, and Chechnya are the examples of ethnic turmoil in which deep-rooted hatreds and conflicting interests play crucial roles. The region has inherited a troublesome legacy from Soviet Union in which ethnic clashes were intentionally incited and provoked. There are some reasons behind this tension. During more than 70 years of rule, Soviet Union drew the borders arbitrarily and created artificial enclaves to divide the region ethnically and to make these titular nations vulnerable to territorial claims. Russians altered the profile of the region not only geographically but also demographically with an effort lasting for centuries. Both Tsarist Russia and then Soviet Union had the local population to migrate forcibly. As a result, the ethnic distribution of population dramatically changed and identity-related issues have gained prominence. Therefore, today, whatever happens in the region seems an outcome of a well-designed and long-standing Russian policy with imagined territories and populations.

Even the geographical terms used to describe the region is contradictory and biased. For a scholar or researcher who aims to conduct a scientific research on the historical and political facts of the region, it is extremely difficult to pass the minefield of geographical names without an explosion or accident. The preference to use these terms such as the names of region, cities, and even some land formations is considered a consciously initiated political act. This tradition has also been based on Russian practices. Russians define the backyard of their country in line with their

¹A writer and diplomat from Susha, Yusis Vazir Chamanzaminli's poem (1887-1943).

own political purposes. Calling the region as “Transcaucasia,” which is South Caucasia, means transcending Russian mainland, an extremely Russian-centric view. Preferring Transcaucasia in written or verbal language is something like keeping Russian vision and great ambitions alive and serving the interests of Moscow. In such a case, it is claimed that one who uses this term offers a view of regional developments from the lenses of Moscow.

A tiny version, but the same war game of “geographical names with political connotations” has been played in “Karabakh” as well, which is frequently referred as “Nagorno-Karabakh” in the current Western-dominated literature. Calling the region Nagorno-Karabakh and separating the region as mountainous and plain areas means dividing the nations living there in historical and ethnical terms, as Azerbaijanis and Armenians respectively. From Azerbaijani perspective, the use of term Nagorno-Karabakh means supporting the arguments of Armenians based on territorial claims of so-called Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, a country that has not been recognized in the world of sovereign states. Azerbaijan officially declared to use the term “Karabakh” for the entire region, including the surrounding seven regions, which were seized in the 2020 war.

Another name game is carried out on the city “Hankendi” as “Stepanakert” which is the so-called capital of today’s de-facto Nagorno-Karabakh administration. In sum, the change of geographical names is seen as a political leverage for both parties. It is argued that while describing the geography, even the language determines the stance of one who speaks about Nagorno-Karabakh. The terms or all kinds of geographical names are like the passwords to enter the minds and dominate there. In any case, these terms are useful to understand the very nature of conflict. In this dissertation, these terms are used interchangeably by providing the arguments of the parties. The references to these terms are provided as in the original sources or as commonly used. However, throughout this study, considering the not recognized status of this entity worldwide and the sensitivity of the context, the expression “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” has been used together with the word “so-called”. In this dissertation, any term usage or information does not represent a view of researcher or does not connote a political opinion that will overshadow neutrality.

In South Caucasia in general and in Nagorno-Karabakh in particular, there is a problem of belonging to a definite territory and population. The sovereign power

changed throughout history in these territories. The ancestors of today's inhabitants were frequently threatened by losing their homelands and families. In this sense, the people, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians and all the others, need a specific geography, specific history, a specific group, or a specific hero to describe who they are. To achieve this, these ethnic groups deny and even falsify each other's arguments. Both Azerbaijanis and Armenians seek after their own roots and legacies in Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh. By doing so, they aim to prove that they had lived there with their religious practices, ancient scripts and monumental artifacts. They tried to create and reinforce memories. They need the past in order to justify that they deserve to stay in these territories today. They need to embrace and identify themselves with the region.

Apart from Azerbaijani and Armenian identities, there is another identity, which constitutes the main element of this dissertation: Nagorno-Karabakhian identity. Before discussing the Nagorno-Karabakhian identity, it could be useful to explain the roots of the conflict in the region. It is commonly believed that the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijanis and Armenians is ethnic and territorial. Although there are some aspects based on religious differences, they are not as strong as ethnicity and territory-related ones. Despite the fact that the first clashes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis took place in 1905, the ethnic and territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh is going back to the late years of Soviet Union, in 1988. From 1988 to 1994, the parties were involved in bloody clashes where thousands of people died and hundreds of thousands people had to displace. After the ceasefire in 1994, there were some violations, but in 2016 and 2020, these small-scale clashes turned into conventional wars.²

Nagorno-Karabakh having a deep historical tradition and cultural tenets seem to borrow many aspects from both Azerbaijani and Armenian ethnicities but also have differed from these two. To be a Nagorno-Karabakhian, it is necessary to be part of this region, historically, geographically or demographically. In other words, one who comes from this region may describe himself/herself with his/her ethnicities and affiliations with territory and population. By doing so, he/she becomes "Nagorno-Karabakhian Armenian" or "Nagorno-Karabakhian Azerbaijani". In other

² International Crisis Group, "**De-escalating the New Nagorno-Karabakh War**," October 2, 2020 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-conflict/containing-violence-south-caucasus> (Retrieved on 19.11.2022).

words, Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijanis of Nagorno-Karabakh have been seen different from being an Azerbaijan in Baku and an Armenian in Yerevan in terms of their languages, their cultural practices, and their habits.

Interestingly, throughout the history, Nagorno-Karabakhian people have been embraced by Azerbaijanis and Armenians especially when they have been threatened by a rival or enemy. In other words, military, political, or societal threats have had an impact on unifying among both Azerbaijani people and Armenian people around a Nagorno-Karabakhian identity, but separately. In this respect, Nagorno-Karabakhian identity turns into something to be preserved for both Azerbaijan and Armenia. From this perspective, Nagorno-Karabakhian identity is considered as an inseparable part of being Azerbaijani and Armenian.

What if the identity description is narrowed and made more specific? Is it possible to say the same for a Nagorno-Karabakhian Azerbaijani who is from a disadvantageous group like internally displaced people (IDPs)? In this context, being a Nagorno-Karabakhian Azerbaijani internally displaced person (IDP) can be also an element of otherness in the eyes of local people. IDPs, who had to displace forcibly due to the bloody clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since 1992, have been the other of local people that they had to live together in their new settlement areas. In this respect, being an IDP can be used as a litmus paper to understand the way of identifying himself/herself in the region. IDPs can be both comrade and outsider, both a citizen and foreigner, and both one who is threatened and threat. In case of Nagorno-Karabakh, IDPs reveal the dichotomy of identities. They have been in the intersection set of these mutually exclusive identities. IDPs that have been ignored for many years not only by local authorities, but also by international community, in fact, play a crucial role to unveil the identity-related policies.

Since the independence, thousands of soldiers and civilians, which is roughly 20,000-25,000 people, in Azerbaijan and Armenia, lost their lives during the skirmishes in Nagorno-Karabakh.³ Azerbaijanis had to displace from Nagorno-Karabakh and seven districts which were under the occupation of Armenia. These people had the status of IDPs in legal sense. Since 1988, there were initially 300,000 refugees coming from Armenia to Azerbaijan. However, it was known that 600,000

³ Laura Kirvelytė, "The Dilemma of Azerbaijan's Security Strategy: Energy Policy or Territorial Integrity?," **Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review**, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2012, p. 216.

to 800,000 people were internally displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh and mostly, from its surrounding areas before 2020 war. Azerbaijan had to provide shelter for between 1,000,000 and 1,200,000 people. When the total population of Azerbaijan was less than seven and a half million at the beginning of 1990s, 10 to 15 % of the society in a country was consisted of displaced persons.⁴ The population in Azerbaijan is 10 million according to 2019 census;⁵ this means that at least 6 % of total population is still IDPs. These people lack permanent accommodation or assistance and are still living in tented camps, out-crowded dormitories, schools and other public buildings.

No armistice, peace treaty or any political framework has resolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and satisfied the parties, Azerbaijanis and Armenians so far. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a frozen conflict and even beyond that. As the conflict is about who came, settled and expanded first in Caucasian Albania, which was established in the 3rd and 4th BC,⁶ it is like inherited from the dusty pages of history in which the key for the settlement has been lost on the way. It represents a long-standing historical enmity between old friends in disputed territories where the clashes may spark at any time. Any provocation or manipulation of this conflict seems enough for little sparkling. This causes high level of insecurity and instability in the region. Even now, while writing these sentences, the tension among Azerbaijan and Armenian forces has escalated and the news agencies announced that soldiers were killed in ceasefire violation.

In this dissertation, securitization theory⁷ of Copenhagen School is discussed on the basis of the securitizing act of Nagorno-Karabakh issue -in which state/ regime is existentially threatened and extra-ordinary measures are taken in order to eliminate the threat - and the role of IDPs in this process. This concept, securitization, reflects a constructivist view that relies on some basic assumptions of realism such as the primacy of state in international arena, and stands in between positivist and post-

⁴ Shannon O'Lear, "Azerbaijan: Territorial Issues and Internal Challenges in Mid-2001," **Post-Soviet Geography and Economics**, Vol. 42, No. 4, 2001, pp. 307-309.

⁵ The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, **Population of Azerbaijan**, <https://www.stat.gov.az/source/demography/ap/?lang=en> (Retrieved on October 26, 2022).

⁶ Nora Dudwick, "The Case of the Caucasian Albanians: Ethnohistory and Ethnic Politics," **Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique**, Vol. 31, No. 2/3, April-September 1990, pp. 378-380.

⁷ The securitization named as "theory" in the current literature is actually a "concept" which is still being tested in different geographies and cases. In this work, "theory," "concept" or "approach" will be used interchangeably for securitization. For securitization Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, **Security A New Framework for Analysis**, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998.

positivist traditions. However, in this range, this dissertation provides a very critical look, and consequently post-positivist approach to the conflict rather than a mere realist paradigm, which focuses on material capabilities and zero-sum games among the states. Instead, this critical theory perspective provides an insight into grasping the role of identity, culture, and history in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Aiming to eliminate historical enmity stereotypes, the critical approach investigates the likelihood of creating a peaceful environment in the region as well.

This dissertation is based on these following questions: Is Nagorno-Karabakh issue securitized in Azerbaijan? Is there any role played by IDPs in the securitization process of Nagorno-Karabakh issue? If so, what is the function of the existence of IDPs in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its securitization process?

As mentioned above, this dissertation applies the securitization theory of Copenhagen School to Nagorno-Karabakh which is an example of conflict which is a highly politicized in both national and international area with its deep-rooted ethnic and historical references. It examines the securitization process of Nagorno-Karabakh issue and the role of IDPs in Azerbaijan, which had to relocate forcibly during the clashes. It is interesting to note that IDPs may be instrumentalized for both the settlement and escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This seems to depend on the intention and acts of political leaders.

Although it has secondary importance for this dissertation, Nagorno-Karabakh and internally displaced people bring new questions for securitization theory. When does a securitizing act in Nagorno-Karabakh issue start? With a charismatic and strong leader's attempt or with an issue which has been already accepted as a security problem for a long time? In other words, is it just a securitizing act realized in a definite period or a product of discourse that is frequently repeated over time? In Azerbaijan, the securitizing actors always change but the securitized issue has remained the same.

There are three main purposes of this dissertation. Firstly, by reading securitization theory with a critical approach, this dissertation focuses on the societal and political aspects of the conflict beyond military ones and on IDPs who become the subjects of different security sectors in Copenhagen School's terms. It investigates the role of IDPs, which can be considered as referent objects (the entity

that is threatened), threats, audience, or functional actors in securitization process depending on the context. Therefore, it provides a holistic and comprehensive approach to the conflict. Secondly, this dissertation aims to draw attention to IDPs that have been discussed rarely as compared to refugees in the current literature. Thirdly, it aims to provide a multi-dimensional analysis for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and IDPs by focusing on its historical, legal, and theoretical aspects.

One who tries to understand Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should analyze the issue with its different aspects. Physical conditions or statics such as geography, demographic profile, casualties, and number of IDPs do not completely explain the story. In other words, it is not possible to understand the very nature of this conflict by only examining the numbers. The statics do not tell anything about the roots of enmity among Azerbaijani and Armenian populations. The numbers do not mean anything without historical facts and cultural differences based on religion and ethnicity. One who wants to comprehend why Nagorno-Karabakh issue is a frozen and long-standing conflict in post-Soviet area may look into history. However, history is insufficient to grasp the nature of conflict since both Azerbaijanis and Armenians may distort historical facts. Therefore, we need a legal basis to decide which is true and who can be right. In this sense, one who has all statistical data, scrutinizes history, and understands culture, now has to focus on state structures, legal documents and mediation efforts.

As indicated above, the numbers are useful to attract attention and prove the significance of the issue. However, without political intentions and perceptions, they do not mean something. In the ethnicity-based conflicts in South Caucasus, governments have usually been hesitant to enable IDPs to integrate; instead, they have aimed to make them return to their homelands in order to restore order and control in the territories lost by conflict. Great Return is the main objective of Azerbaijani government.⁸ Therefore, where territorial disputes have continued for many years, Azerbaijani national authorities have remained reluctant to integrate their displaced persons into the society. In other words, national authorities use the existence of IDPs and their return to their homes as a way to maintain sovereignty on the secessionist or occupied territories from where these people fled.

⁸ Trend News Agency, “**Great Return Program is Being Successfully Implemented,’ President Ilham Aliyev,**” December 31, 2022. <https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3689984.html> (Retrieved on 31.12.2022.)

The return of displaced populations in Azerbaijan to their homeland is a nightmare for Armenians. The return of a specific ethnic group to a particular territory is usually perceived as a threat to the political designation of that territory. The return of IDPs after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, for example, has been objected by Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh who were afraid of losing their majority in this region. If Azerbaijani population increases in Nagorno-Karabakh in near future and a referendum is held, the status of Nagorno-Karabakh may be determined in favor of Azerbaijanis. Nagorno-Karabakh authorities harshly criticized even Armenians in Yerevan and warned them not to make any compromises on the issue.

Nagorno-Karabakh represents pride and honor for both Azerbaijanis and Armenians. The loss of this territory has been seen as humiliation for the parties. In both of these countries, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has seriously threatened sovereignty and state/regime security. This frozen conflict has been frequently sparked and ceasefire has been violated for several times since the last years of Soviet Russia. For both Baku and Yerevan, the successes and failures in dealing with this frozen conflict, ensuring stability and achieving peaceful settlement had always have great impact on rise and fall of political leaders. In other words, any failure in Nagorno-Karabakh war has caused the fall of a political leader in Baku and Yerevan so far. Nagorno-Karabakh issue is a death and life struggle in military and political sense in this geography.

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a war not only in battlefield, but also in discourse. Azerbaijani and Armenian authorities often blame, threaten to each other, and use provocative discourse. Therefore, this issue has been securitized. What do we mean by being securitized? If an issue is securitized, this means that it is taken out of normal politics area. In normal politics, the conflicting parties may come together and try to find a political solution to a security issue. However, if an issue is securitized, this necessitates extraordinary policies and speech acts sometimes with full of accusations, menaces or propaganda. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been subject to these securitizing acts and IDPs have been discussed in this framework.

As mentioned above, this dissertation tries to provide a comprehensive approach to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with all aspects from historical, cultural, political, and theoretical ones. It is not easy to conduct a research in an issue, which

had been highly politicized for centuries. It is like to untie a knot. Both Azerbaijanis and Armenians, in a very hostile attitude, have completely contradicting and conflicting arguments on the emergence, evolution, and settlement of the conflict. In such a situation, the main aim of this dissertation is to provide a neutral, scientific, and critical look to the topic in question. The main purpose is not to simply describe the reality, which is the conflict, in this case, but to analyze and interpret it on the basis of changing and evolving social relations by identifying structures and processes and investigating what constitutes our knowledge. Therefore, the aim is to reveal the possibilities of emancipation for further research, which can be desecuritization process in this context.

The hypotheses of this dissertation are as follows: Nagorno-Karabakh issue has been securitized in Azerbaijan since independence. IDPs play significant and changing roles in the securitization process of Nagorno-Karabakh issue in Azerbaijan and ensure the continuity of the securitization process.

Based on this background on the IDPs and securitization, this study necessitates a multidisciplinary and complex approach that provides insight into context, text, and knowledge. The methodology used in this dissertation, which provides deep understanding of historical and cultural elements regarding to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, rests upon a critical discourse analysis (CDA) inspired qualitative content analysis.

In the third part and second chapter of this dissertation, the speeches of Ilham Aliyev in the UN General Assembly from 2003 to 2021 are analyzed within the framework of CDA inspired qualitative content analysis in order to investigate the securitization of Nagorno-Karabakh issue and understand the role of IDPs in this process. Aliyev's addresses to domestic audience are added to the analysis when necessary especially following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War to update and evaluate his speech act in context. The statements of Armenian leaders and the leaders of so-called Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh are also examined with the aim of understanding the real and perceived threats as the factors that reinforce the discourses of securitization in Azerbaijan.

In discourse analysis, different methods are used, such as analysis of context, gestures, meaning, rhetoric, speech acts, political speeches of leaders and so on.⁹ Content analysis is a group of research that focuses on procedures for examining the contents and themes of written or transcribed documents.¹⁰ Content analysis can be qualitative and quantitative. Qualitative method of discourse analysis is based on interpretation of data and different from traditional content analysis, which is based on quantitative data comprised of coding of discourse in this sense.¹¹

Krippendorff argued, “*Content analysis entails a systematic reading of a body of texts, images, and symbolic matter.*”¹² According to his view, the receiver makes specific inferences from data. Therefore, both the receiver and the context play important role in understanding the content. Lincoln and Guba also underline the role of the analyst (data processor) in this process.¹³ In most of this study, the works of Teun A. van Dijk, who is one of the leading scholars in this field, is used. As it will be discussed in detail in the related chapter, Van Dijk’s emphasis on macro-structure, context and latent/manifest meanings¹⁴ are applied to the analysis of Ilham Aliyev’s speech act.

The research question for qualitative content analysis in this research is “Does Ilham Aliyev, the Azerbaijani leader, securitize Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and instrumentalize the existence of IDPs in this process by his discourse?” To answer this question, Aliyev’s addresses are categorized under five main themes or topics

⁹ Teun A. Van Dijk, “Discourse and Migration,” in Ricard Zapata-Barrero & Evren Yalaz (Eds.), **Qualitative Research in European Migration Studies**, SpringerOpen, IMISCOE Research Series, 2018, pp. 227-229.

¹⁰ Gary S. Insch, Jo Ellen Moore, and Lisa D. Murphy, “Content Analysis in Leadership Research: Examples, Procedures, and Suggestions for Future Use”, **Leadership Quarterly**, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1997, p. 2.

¹¹ Van Dijk, “**Discourse and Migration**,” pp. 227-228.

¹² Klaus Krippendorff, **Content Analysis An Introduction to Its Methodology**, London: Sage Publications, Inc., 2004, p. 3.

¹³ Yvonna S. Lincoln & Egon G. Guba, **Naturalistic Inquiry**, London: Sage Publications, Inc., 1985, p. 338.

¹⁴ Van Dijk, “**Discourse and Migration**,” pp. 227-245.; Teun A. Van Dijk, “Monographic Article: Racism, Elites, and Conversation,” **Atlantis**, Vol. 14, No. 1/2, 1992, pp. 201-257.; Teun A. Van Dijk, “Discourse Studies and Education,” **Australian Review of Applied Linguistics**, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1980, pp. 1-28.; Teun A. Van Dijk, “Narrative Macro-Structures Logical and Cognitive Foundations,” **PTL: A Journal for Descriptive Poetics and Theory of Literature**, Vol. 1, 1976, pp. 547-568.; Teun A. Van Dijk, “Discourse, Ideology and Context”, **Folia Linguistica**, Vol. 35, No. 1-2, 2001, pp. 11-40.; Teun A. Van Dijk, “Discourse, Context and Cognition,” **Discourse Studies**, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2006, pp. 159-177.; Teun A. Van Dijk, “The Mass Media Today: Discourses of Domination or Diversity?”, **Javnost - The Public**, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1995, pp. 27-45.; Teun A. Van Dijk, “Discourse and Manipulation,” **Discourse & Society**, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2006, pp. 359-383.

which are respectively territorial integrity and sovereignty, negative images attributed to Armenians and having global meaning, peaceful settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, IDPs and the Status of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Methodologically, the main aim of this dissertation is to understand the latent meaning of Aliyev's speech acts in context and macro-level beyond their textuality. In this sense, CDA inspired qualitative content analysis method may help to find adequate answers to the main research questions and evaluate the findings regarding to the ultimate aim of this dissertation.

There are some significant contributions of this dissertation to the current literature. Firstly, this dissertation attaches great importance to include historical facts, identity-related issues, and legal principles to the analysis. Secondly, the actors other than states such as leaders, individuals, and organizations that play a significant role in the conflict are taken into account. Thirdly, it attaches great importance to theory and practice. IDPs, which are relatively less examined issue in the current literature, have been studied within the framework of securitization theory. Examining IDPs in Azerbaijan provides insight into the criticisms directed to the securitization theory. Theory is being applied to a non-Western geography and tested in an ethnicity-related conflict. In addition, the audience-securitizing actor relations are investigated within the framework of internal displacement.

This dissertation is consisted of three main parts: Part I is titled as "Politicization of Ethnic History: Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict with its Historical, Societal and Legal Aspects." Part II is titled as "Theoretical and Conceptual Framework: Securitization and Internally Displaced People (IDPs)" and Part III is titled as "Securitizing Acts on Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and the Role of Internally Displaced People (IDPs)."

Part I is divided to three chapters. In the first chapter, under the title of "**Being in Nagorno-Karabakh**", firstly, geographical borders of Caucasia and Nagorno-Karabakh are examined, and political ends and connotations behind the use of different geographical definitions are investigated. Secondly, population movements and demographic aspects of South Caucasus and Nagorno-Karabakh are discussed. Thirdly, the historical process of Nagorno-Karabakh from the Antiquity to the decline of Russian Empire is summarized. In this part, special emphasis is given to

Caucasian Albania where Nagorno-Karabakh is historically located as well as the states or khanates after the fall of Caucasian Albania.

In the second chapter titled as **“Being a Nagorno-Karabakhian”**, the conflicting and overlapping arguments of Armenian and Azerbaijani scholars and historians on Caucasian Albania have been discussed in detail on the basis of its population, ethnic structure, governance, religion, language, and some historical ruins. Secondly, historical enmities, territorial disputes, and ethnic violence between Azerbaijanis and Armenians have been examined. Thirdly, the dynamics of politicization of ethnicity have been investigated.

In the third chapter titled as **“Being Right in Nagorno-Karabakh”**, the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh and disagreements among the parties concerning the legal status of region have been provided. Firstly, historical documents on the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh have been examined, and then the concepts of territorial integrity and self-determination in international law have been investigated. Secondly, peace settlement and mediation efforts of third parties, international and regional actors have been provided. Lastly, border conflicts and ceasefire violations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have been discussed.

The second part also is consisted of two chapters. In the first chapter of Part II, **“Securitization Theory, Main Assumptions and Criticisms”** discussed securitization and desecuritization approach. It is consisted of two sections. The first section, named as “The Origins of Securitization Concept and its Fundamental Assumptions” firstly opens the discussion by explaining the national security concept in the discipline of international relations. Then, new security concepts such as military, environmental, economic, societal, and political sectors are examined. Lastly, the process of constructing security and insecurity which is called as securitization/desecuritization is explained. Then, the main components of securitization theory such as referent objects, existential threats, securitizing actors, speech act, and audience are explained in detail. In the second section, under the title of “The Criticisms to Securitization”, the criticisms towards securitization theory in the current literature are discussed.

In the second chapter of Part II titled as **“Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in the Global Context”**, the IDP definition in legal terms is given, and IDP

population around the world is provided year by year and/or region to region. The historical roots and fundamental tenets of the most important legal document on IDPs, Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons (GPIDPs) are explained in detail. In this chapter, the differences between IDPs and refugees and the protection of these two groups of people by international organizations is discussed. Causes and consequences of internal displacement are provided in detail in order to draw attention not only to the severity of security problems of IDPs, but also to their solutions. Implementation of the GPIDPs by UN Agencies, regional organizations and individual states are evaluated. In this framework, the changes in the understanding of sovereignty are discussed within the framework of new concepts such as internal versus external and negative versus positive sovereignty. The concepts of sovereign responsibility, non-intervention/intervention and responsibility to protect (R2P) are explained and some cases –especially some examples from African continent- are provided.

In the last part, the securitizing actors in Azerbaijan and Armenia and their securitizing policies and discourses are analyzed, under the titles of **“Insecurity in Nagorno-Karabakh: Real and Perceived Threats for Azerbaijan”** and **“Securitizing Actors, Speech Act and Policies”** respectively. In this section, the security issues in South Asia in general, and Azerbaijan in particular are analyzed. The political figures as securitizing actors in Baku and Yerevan are introduced with their professional background and characteristics. The main aim is to understand how Nagorno-Karabakh issue had have an impact on their political careers, in other words, affected the rise and fall of political leaders in both Azerbaijan and Armenia, and therefore, how these leaders determined their policies regarding to the conflict and its settlement. The statements of Armenian leaders are just provided as a factor that reinforces threat perceptions in Azerbaijani leadership. The speech act of Ilham Aliyev is evaluated in detail. IDPs in Azerbaijan are discussed and the role of IDPs in the securitization process of Nagorno-Karabakh issue in Azerbaijan is examined.

PART I: POLITICIZATION OF ETHNIC HISTORY: NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT WITH ITS HISTORICAL, SOCIETAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS

I. “BEING IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH”: A GEOGRAPHICAL, DEMOGRAPHIC AND HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT

Nagorno-Karabakh is a region in the south of the Caucasus, where fertile lands and culturally, economically and historically important cities have been located, which is home to mostly Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples. Azerbaijani and Armenian groups have faced each other many times in Nagorno-Karabakh due to territorial disputes and historical enmities; they are still in a frozen conflict. This conflict was inherited from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) period, which ruled the region called South Caucasus for more than 70 years. It has turned into a violent conflict, especially since the end of the 1980s. Following the disintegration of the USSR, in the early 1990s, thousands of people lost their lives or were forced to migrate. The frozen conflict between the states of Azerbaijan and Armenia has become a phenomenon that their respective communities have also internalized. In this respect, a solution or deadlock is possible both at the political and social level.

The conflicting parties, Azerbaijan and Armenia claim that the region, where territories of Nagorno-Karabakh lie, belonged to their own people throughout the history. In the following chapters, in order to grasp the nature of the conflict and parties' arguments, geographical, demographic, and historical aspects of the region will be evaluated.

A. Geographical Borders of Caucasia and Nagorno-Karabakh

1. Natural Geography of Caucasia

The Caucasus has been a border region throughout history. The Caucasus Mountains form a natural border of the mountainous Middle East lands, which include the Armenian and Persian lands, the western extension of the Himalayan Mountains.¹⁵ The entire Caucasus is an area of 440,000 m², and most of this area is mountainous.¹⁶ The region is divided into north and south. The North Caucasus consists of more mountainous and rough terrain while South Caucasus has more flat terrains. Due to these geographical formations, communities with different ethnic origins have been able to keep their own cultures alive by being protected from invasions in these lands throughout history.

The Caucasus has an important place in terms of both ancient and modern geographical conceptions. The word Caucasus and Caucasus was used for the first time by Aeschylus, one of the Ancient Greek thinkers. This region is mentioned in the tragedy called *Prometheus Bound*, which he wrote in 490 BC.¹⁷ This Greek tragedy speaks of the Caucasus as the most remote region of the untouched world. Located in the Caucasus geography and having great importance for Armenians today, the Ararat Mountains (the region called “Urartu” by the Assyrians, today Agri and its surroundings) are also described by the Bible writers as a very little known, remote, and mountainous place where Noah could protect his ship from the flood.¹⁸ During the biblical Great Flood, the waters rose so high that even when the disaster was over, the people of Noah’s ark were saved thanks to the fact that the ark remained on the top of the high Ararat Mountain, while the whole place was under water. These two mythical and divine narratives, which give deep clues about the

¹⁵ William Edward David Allen, Paul Muratoff, **Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border 1828-1921**, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 3.

¹⁶ Allen, Muratoff, “**Caucasian Battlefields...**,” p. 6.; Encyclopaedia Britannica, **Caucasus**, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Caucasus> (Retrieved on May 20, 2021).

¹⁷ This tragedy contains very important information about Caucasus and its communities in ancient times. Aiskhylos, **Zincire Vurulmuş Prometheus**, Azra Erhat, Sabahattin Eyüboğlu (trans.), İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2015, pp. 30-31.

¹⁸ B. B. Piotrovskii, *The Ancient Civilization of Urartu*, New York: Cowles Book Co., 1969, p. 13 cited in Adam T. Smith, “Prometheus Unbound: Southern Caucasia in Prehistory,” **J World Prehist**, 2005, 19, p. 230.

past of the Caucasus, actually reflect the difficult conditions of the Caucasus geography, the vital choices and characters of the people living here.¹⁹

Amazon women, strong warriors, who are rumored to live in the North Caucasus, are another myth, which gives clues about this geography. The ancient Greeks describe how warrior Amazon women cut off their right breasts to teach their daughters how to use arrows. According to the legend, when Alexander the Great launched an expedition to the Caucasus, Thalestris, the queen of three hundred thousand Amazons, offered hundreds of warriors to the emperor and his men. However, in return, she demanded their warrior daughters back as a condition.²⁰

These legendary and mythological stories told in the Caucasus geography help to understand the thoughts of local people or enemies about being “Caucasian” in a broad sense. The Caucasus is a region where women who give birth to a baby and are generally known as peaceful, turn into merciless warriors who kill people without any hesitation. History is full of countless stories of fighter, insurgent and rebellious Caucasian peoples who are fond of their freedom and independence.

The south of the region, which is the crossing point of human movements and wars between empires, serves as a bridge that provides the north-south connection in trade and transportation. Its southern parts have been a buffer zone between Arabs, Persians, Russians, and the great states founded by the Turks throughout history.²¹ The South Caucasus, which has a strategically important location, has been a conflict zone of different powers throughout history.

¹⁹ As mentioned in the first book of Torah, in Genesis, the Noah’s ark is the ship that Noah ordered by God to be built in order to protect his family and a couple of animals in the world from the Great Flood. Having completed the shipbuilding with the help of divine power, Noah survived the great flood disaster that lasted for 150 days by staying in the water and the ship settled on Mount Ararat after the waters receded. Tevrat, **Yaradılış 9** <https://kutsalkitap.info.tr/?q=yar%209> (Retrieved on 02.10.2022).; In mythology, Zeus, to take revenge on Prometheus, who disobeyed his orders and humiliated him, nailed him to the mountains of Caucasus and sent an eagle to eat a piece of his liver every day. However, since the liver of Prometheus, who was immortal, renewed itself every day, with the arrival of the eagle, his suffering increased once again. Prometheus tried to get out of this difficult situation. The myth of Prometheus, set in the Caucasus Mountains, symbolized the power of reason, intelligence, creativity, resistance, and courage. Aiskhylos, “**Zincire Vurulmuş...**,” pp. 30-31.; Encyclopaedia Britannica, **Prometheus**, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Prometheus-Greek-god> (Retrieved on 02.02.2020).

²⁰ Patrick Karam, Thibaut Mourgues, **Les Guerres du Caucase: Des Tsars à la Tchétchénie**, Paris: Perrin, 1995, p. 13.

²¹ Ali Ottaman, “Le Désenclavement de l’Asie Centrale et du Caucase, Rôle Inédit pour une Ere Nouvelle,” **Cahiers d’étude sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le Monde Turco-iranien**, No. 18, Juillet-Décembre 1994, pp. 201-204 cited in Ali Faik Demir, **Türk Dış Politikası Perspektifinden Güney Asya**, İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 2003, p. 60.

a. North Caucasia

The North Caucasus is located in a region extending parallel to the Kuban and Terek plateaus, separated by Stavropol, and lying on the Transcaucasian basin in the southern part.²² In the North Caucasus, there are Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan Autonomous Republics of the Russian Federation today. In addition, there is Stavropol Krai, which is a historical border region rather than a republic.²³



Figure 1.1. Physical map of North Caucasia²⁴

b. South Caucasia and Nagorno-Karabakh

The South Caucasus is a geography located in the south of the Caucasus, between the Black Sea and the Caspian seas, and has borders with Russia, Turkey and Iran. In terms of its location, it connects these three countries as a “region” with historical, demographic, and economic ties. However, South Caucasia does not have a homogeneous civilization. The peoples living in this geography have many different languages and religions.²⁵ The South Caucasus today includes three

²² Iranicaonline, **Caucasus and Iran, Physical Geography, Population, and Economy**, <https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/caucasus-i> (Retrieved on 04.07.2020).

²³ Zachary Laub, “Instability in Russia’s North Caucasus Region,” **Council on Foreign Relations**, 13 October 2005. <https://www.cfr.org/background/instability-russias-north-caucasus-region> (Retrieved on 10.02.2021).

²⁴ Eurasian Geopolitics, **North Caucasus Maps**, <https://eurasiangeopolitics.com/north-caucasus-maps/> (Retrieved on 06.07.2020.)

²⁵ R. Gachechiladze, “Geopolitics in the South Caucasus: Local and External Players,” **Geopolitics**, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2002, p. 114.

independent republics, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and three disputed regions within them: Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh.²⁶



Figure 1.2. Physical map of North and South Caucasasia²⁷

Nagorno-Karabakh is a region located in the south of the territories called as South Caucasus. From a broad perspective, the Karabakh region stretches along Azerbaijan's Western border with Armenia and covers a total area of 16,000 km².²⁸ When considered in a narrow sense, the autonomous region, which constitutes a quarter of the historical Nagorno-Karabakh region, constitutes the southwestern cities of Azerbaijan and spreads over an area of 4388 km².²⁹ With another geographical definition, Nagorno-Karabakh was used for the area outside the Zangezur plains and the area pointing to the southeast of Lake Sevan. This definition of geographical area included the Shahumyan and Getashen regions, the majority of

²⁶ Smith, "Prometheus Unbound...", p. 232.

²⁷ Eurasian Geopolitics, **North and South Caucasus Maps**, <https://eurasiangeopolitics.com/south-caucasus-maps/> (Retrieved on 06.07.2020).

²⁸ Aygün Attar (Haşimzade), **Karabağ Sorunu Kapsamında Ermeniler ve Ermeni Siyaseti**, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2012, p. 1.

²⁹ Demir, "Türk Dış Politikası Perspektifinden...", p. 161.

which were Armenian villages in Azerbaijan that were destroyed in 1989 and 1990, and remain a disputed piece of land today.³⁰

In our recent past, it has been observed that there are some disagreements on the definition of the region that Azerbaijan and Armenia refer to as Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijanis understand the former Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan as the Nagorno-Karabakh region, while Armenian sources include not only the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, but also the places they occupied in 1993-1994, with reference to so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.³¹ Azerbaijan and Armenia's disagreements on the status quo is a product of political efforts to re-read history and geography beyond the conflict between the parties in military sense.



Figure 1.3. Nagorno-Karabakh and seven occupied districts³²

³⁰ Christopher J. Walker (Ed.), **Armenia and Karabagh, The Struggle for Unity**, Londra: Minority Rights Publications, 1991, pp. 71-72.

³¹ Laurence Broers, "Recognising Politics in Unrecognised States: 20 Years of Enquiry into the de facto States of the South Caucasus," **Caucasus Survey**, Vol.1, No.1, 2013, p. 11.

³² Nationalia, **Azerbaijan Launches New Offensive against Karabakh, Occupies Border Areas**, 28.09.2020. <https://www.nationalia.info/brief/11338/azerbaijan-launches-new-offensive-against-karabakh-occupies-border-areas> (Retrieved on 27.10.2022).

After 2020 War, which is called Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh have been dramatically changed. Azerbaijanis took control of the surrounding seven occupied districts and Armenians withdrew from these territories.




Figure 1.4. Nagorno-Karabakh and areas captured by Azerbaijan³³

³³ BBC News, “Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Killed 5,000 Soldiers,” December 3, 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55174211> (Retrieved on 24.10.2021).




Figure 1.5. Nagorno-Karabakh after the Autumn 2020 War³⁴

2. Geographical Definitions of Caucasia with Political Inferences and Connotations

a. Ciscaucasia, Predkavkazy, Shimali Qafqaz

Muslim geographers, going back to the Babylonian period, saw this region as the region between the civilized south and the dark north and defined it as the place where the famous Qaf Mountain is located. The word Caucasian derives from *al-Kabk* in Arabic, *Kafkah* in Persian, that is, Mount Qaf. In Ferdowsi's *Shahnameh*, the Caucasus is called *Kuhe kaf*.³⁵ It is said that the word *kap kap* in the Old Persian language means "Great Mountain".³⁶ In Turkish terminology and generally with the

³⁴ Deutsche Welle, **Azerbaijan Reports Soldier Killed in "Armenian Attack"**, December 28, 2020. <https://www.dw.com/en/azerbaijan-reports-solider-killed-in-armenian-attack/a-56074570> (Retrieved on 23.02.2021).

³⁵ Mohammad-Reza Djalili (Ed.), *Le Caucase Post-soviétique. La Transition dans le Conflit*, Bruylant: Brüssel, 1995, s. 1-6 cited in Demir, "Türk Dış Politikası Perspektifinden...", p. 59.

³⁶ Thomas V. Gamkrelidze, "Transcaucasia" or "South Caucasus"? Towards a More Exact Geopolitical Nomenclature*, http://www.parliament.ge/files/327_2288_943216_caucasus.pdf (Retrieved on 17.05.2019).

use of Arabs, the mountains that are referred to as the Caucasus/Caucasia are also called North/*Shimali Qafqaz* for the north, *Mavera-i Qafkaz* and South/*Cənubi Qafqaz* for the south.

The Caucasus region is a region established on the great Eurasian geography, located between the Black Sea (West) and the Caspian Sea (East) where Europe and Asia meet. The mountains in the region stretch from northeast to southeast in two rows, the “Greater Caucasus”, which is called *Bolshoy Kavkaz* in Russian, and the “Lesser Caucasus”, which is called *Maly Kavkaz*. The name Caucasus is the Latinized version of the word *Kaukasos*, which is used by ancient Greek geographers and historians and comes from the same root with the Russian word *Kavkaz*. The lands located in the north of the Greater Caucasus are referred to as *Ciscaucasia*, *Predkavkazye* or Hither Caucasia, while the south is called Transcaucasia, *Zakavkazye* or Father Caucasia.³⁷ The influence of Russians, who have been present in the region for centuries, is quite high in the geographical and political definitions of the Caucasus.

It is known that the Greeks established a colonial empire on the shores of the Black Sea in the 7th century BC in Caucasus. Therefore, the ancestors of the first Minoan Seas Empire established in the Black Sea Basin were also Greeks. Indeed, there is evidence of an advanced Bronze Age civilization in the Kuban Valley and possibly the Southern Caucasus Valleys. In the 5th century BC, Aorsi who were the predecessors of the wealthy tribes who controlled the area between Volga and Don Rivers formed the groups that would become stronger in the Caspian and Volga in the future. Aorsi were coming from Sarmatian people having Persian origins.³⁸

Another influential community in the Caucasus was the Scythians (Sakas). The Ancient Scythian Empire, which existed between the 8th and 3rd centuries BC, stretched between Danube in the west and Don in the east. However, beyond this, the Caucasus geography with southeast extension, known as the Scythian road, was also

³⁷ The word “Caucasia” is used for the region in the Western literature and the word “Caucasus” is used for the mountains, and “Kavkaz” is used for the region in the Russian literature. Encyclopaedica Britannica, “**Caucasus.**”; Allen, Muratoff, “**Caucasian Battlefields...**,” p. 6.; The region between Don and Volga rivers in Caucasus is called the “Step Caucasus”, and the region at the foot of the Caucasus mountains in the south of the steppes is called the “Greater Caucasus”. Besides these, the third region is Transcaucasia and Lesser Caucasia, which includes Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. See Demir, “**Türk Dış Politikası Perspektifinden...**,” p. 60.

³⁸ W.D.E. Allen, “The Caucasian Borderland,” *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 99, No. 5/6, May-June, 1942, p. 229.

occasionally joined to the lands of the Scythians. The Black Sea was the southern border of the Scythians.³⁹ The Cimmerians, who formed a strong tribal union in the Black Sea coast, the Crimea and the Northwest Caucasus in the first century BC, are known as the oldest community settled in the North Caucasus.⁴⁰

The Caucasus was a geography that was flooded by civilizations from all directions through the great waterways stretching across the wide Eurasian plains. This region has been under the influence of the Arabs since the 7th century. In this century, along Volga and Kama rivers, Khazar and Bulgarian states, which show similarities with the Russian-origin river states, became stronger. Khazars, who dominated Lower Volga River, were the first of the Volga forces. Then, after Khazars, Kipchaks took over the administration. However, Kipchaks were defeated by the Mongol Golden Horde State. Russia, the last and most powerful Volga power, which emerged in the 15th and 16th centuries in the area between Upper Don and Volga rivers, continued its advance towards Caspian Sea and Caucasus.⁴¹

The capture of Kazan Khanate by Russian Tsardom in October 1552⁴² was an important step for the access of Russians to Caucasia. After taking over Kazan, Russians captured Astrakhan in 1554 and emerged as a permanent power in the Caucasus.⁴³ By the end of 16th century, Russians had strengthened in Volga and they defeated Turks who wanted to prevent their transit to the south in 1570. During the following century, Don Cossacks struggled against Turkish control of Sea of Azov. From the shores of Caspian Sea, Terek Cossacks fought with the Muslim tribes of Dagestan.⁴⁴

For Russians, Caucasus was seen throughout history as a piece of land where they could expand their sphere of influence and implement their policies. Russian domination in Caucasus and the struggle of local groups against Russians has been determinant in shaping the political history and geography from the Russian perspective.

³⁹ Renate Rolle, **The World of the Scythians**, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980, p. 11.

⁴⁰ Kadir I. Natho, **Circassian History**, New York: Xlibris Corporation, 2009, p. 44.

⁴¹ Allen, "The Caucasian Borderland...", p. 229.

⁴² Jaroslav Z. Pelenskyj, **Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438–1560s)**, The Hague: Mouton, 1974, p. 84.

⁴³ Edward Louis Keenan, Jr., "Muscovy and Kazan: Some Introductory Remarks on the Patterns of Steppe Diplomacy," **Slavic Review**, Vol. 26, No. 4, December 1967, p. 557.

⁴⁴ Cossacks, warrior people of Slavic descent. Allen, "The Caucasian Borderland...", pp. 229-230.

b. Transcaucasia, Zakavkazje, Cenubi Qafqaz

Before the arrival of Russia in the region, only a part of Georgia had certain autonomy in Transcaucasia, which was generally under Persian rule and the rest was under Ottoman rule. This political picture changed when Russians set foot in the Caucasus in the 18th century.⁴⁵ Russians first occupied the North Caucasus, then annexed Georgia in the 19th century and gained dominance in Transcaucasia.⁴⁶ Transcaucasia has been of key importance especially in terms of the Russian state's policy of gaining access to the Mediterranean, which can be summarized as developing trade, establishing its political and cultural superiority and seizing world domination.⁴⁷ The Russian presence in Caucasus, which first started with Russian Tsardom and then continued with the Soviet domination, lasted for more than two centuries until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

From a geopolitical point of view, Transcaucasia was located in an important geography where Russians could implement the policy of gaining access to the warm sea in a region inhabited by Christian minorities in the north of Iran and east of Turkey, in a region with Trabzon port in the Black Sea and Hakkari in the southeast of Anatolia. After more than a century of domination, Tsarist Russia tried to gain influence in three different regions of Caucasus: North Caucasus (the Russified region in the northwestern Caucasus), the mountainous region in the northeast of Caucasus where Muslims consisted the majority of population, and Transcaucasia where nationalist movements which were similar to those in the Balkans appeared in the south of mountains.

The words *Maveray-ı Caucasus*, Transcaucasia and *Zakavkazje* mean beyond/across Caucasia and indicate a geographical location from the perspective of Russia. Transcaucasia has been a concept preferred by Russians during and after the Soviet period.⁴⁸ The word Transcaucasia is actually a translation of the Russian word *Zakavkazje*, which in Western languages means "an area beyond the Caucasus mountain range". In fact, when the region -the southern part of the Greater Caucasus Mountain Range- where Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are located is called

⁴⁵ A. O. Sarkissian, "Soviet Transcaucasia," **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 14, No.3, April 1936, p. 526.

⁴⁶ Please see for further information Emily Yearwood-Lee, "Few Lead Roles for Minorities," **The Province**, August 26, 2002, s. B5 cited in Bruce Baum, **The Rise and Fall of the Caucasian Race A Political History of Racial Identity**, New York: New York University Press, 2006, p. 28.

⁴⁷ Sarkissian, "Soviet Transcaucasia..."

⁴⁸ Demir, "Türk Dış Politikası Perspektifinden...", p. 61.

“Transcaucasia”, these lands are viewed from the perspective of the North, that is, Russia. More precisely, Transcaucasia, which is used instead of the word South Caucasus to define the same geography, has a special connotation for Russians, a certain political coloring meaning.⁴⁹

The concept of Transcaucasia is the product of a Russian foreign policy approach that reflects the preferences of Russians regarding the political and administrative division of this region. The use of this concept shows that the interests of the Russian state are seen above the interests of local peoples and their economic, cultural, and other social connections. It means that the lands, which are in the south of the Caucasus Mountains, do not belong to the Caucasus, but are “beyond” and “away from it”. Therefore, the concept functions as a means of expressing and to some extent achieving the main political goal of Russian Empire in the region: to separate and divide the local peoples living in the north and the peoples living in the south.⁵⁰

c. Nagorno-Karabakh or “Artsakh”?

It can be argued that there is a political connotation in the geographical and historical definition of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is a part of the Southern Caucasus, as in the case of Transcaucasia. It is argued that until the 12th and 13th centuries, when the name of Karabakh was given to the region, the land was called by various names in different sources such as Utik, Kara, Artsakh etc.⁵¹ The region, which was called as Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast in the Soviet language, consists of the Turkish word “kara” meaning black and the Persian word “bag” (bagh) meaning “garden, vineyard”. Oblast means region in Russian and symbolizes the administrative structures of the Soviet Union. The land now referred to as Nagorno-Karabakh is actually only part of a larger area historically known as Karabakh.⁵²

According to the information in another source, the expression “Kara” in the word “Karabagh”, which is a combination of two words, was used in old Turkish as

⁴⁹ Gamkrelidze, “‘Transcaucasia’ or ‘South Caucasus’...”

⁵⁰ Eldar Ismailov, Vladimir Papava, “A New Concept for the Caucasus,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2008, p. 287. In this study, the concept of Transcaucasia and South Caucasus are used interchangeably in accordance with the preferences of the authors.

⁵¹ Attar, “**Karabağ Sorunu Kapsamında Ermeniler...**,” p. 3.

⁵² Ceylan Tokluoğlu, “Azerbaycan,” in İsmail Aydıngün, Çiğdem Balım (Ed.), **Bağımsızlıklarının Yirminci Yılında Azerbaycan, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna, Türk Dilli Halklar-Türkiye ile İlişkileri**, Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, 2012, pp. 31-32.

“colour,” “bad,” “anxious,” “unfortunate,” “North,” or even “president”, “big” and “strong”. In some regions of Azerbaijan, the elder brother is also called “Kara”. On the other hand, “bagh” includes meanings such as “thread,” “knot,” “genealogy of lineage”, “part of the people” or as mentioned above “vineyard (vineyard-garden)”. With these meanings, it can be argued that Karabakh means “strong, great, chief of the people” in Turkish.⁵³

Today, in the South Caucasus, both Armenians and Azerbaijanis have made an effort to erase the names that are considered not be suitable for their national traditions from history in order to remove the traces of Russian imperialism. Under the influence of nationalism that gained momentum after independence, Azerbaijanis and Armenians tried to change their place names. The effort to get rid of the Soviet past even led to the attempts for redrawing of the borders, especially in and around Karabakh. Today, there is a disagreement and contention between Armenians and Azerbaijanis regarding geographical names in Nagorno-Karabakh region. This conflict about place names first appeared at the end of the 19th century, although the name change was under the control of the Russian administration at that time. Before the first Armenian-Azeri conflict broke out in 1904-1905, there were comments and discussions about place names as “Armenian/not Armenian” or “Azeri/not Azeri”.⁵⁴

Armenians argue that Artsakh is the medieval name of Nagorno-Karabakh. According to their view, it roughly coincides with today’s Karabakh region. The name Karabakh has also been known by Armenians since the middle ages, but as this name comes from Persian, it is not preferred among Armenians.⁵⁵ There were four

⁵³ Gaffar Çakmaklı, “Dağlık Karabağ’ı Azerbaycan’dan Ayırma Girişimleri,” in Cavid Kasımlı, Ertan Efegil (Ed.), **Dağlık Karabağ Üzerine Yazılar**, İstanbul: Gündoğan Yayınları, Aralık 2014, pp. 99-100.; It is known that colors were also used to express directions in different periods of Turkish history. Each of the four directions is shaped with a different color. Black means north, red means south, sky means east, white means west. For example, Turks named the sea in the north of Anatolia as the Black Sea, the west as the Ak-Sea (Ak means white in Turkish), and the south as the Red Sea. Likewise, Huns who entered Europe are known as the Black-Huns in Hungarian sources because they are considered as descendants of the Northern Huns. In Ottoman history, the north of Moldavia (Bogdan) was called as Kara-Bogdan. Many other geographical formations such as mountains, hills, rivers, seas and cities in Turkish geography were given names based on these colors. Mustafa Kafalı, “Türk Kültüründe Renkler,” **Yörtürk Dergisi**, No. 42, March-April 2002, p. 39.; Sencer Divitçioğlu, **Kök Türkler (Kut, Küç ve Ülög)**, İstanbul: Ada Yayınları, 1987, p. 114 cited in Ahmet Kütük, “İslam/Türk Devlet ve Toplum Geleneğinde Renkler ve Anlamları,” **Türkiyat Mecmuası**, Vol: 24, Autumn 2014, p. 162.

⁵⁴ Artak A. Dabaghyan, “Place Renaming Practices in Post-War Karabakh/Artsakh,” **Acta Ethnographica Hungarica**, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2011, pp. 408-412. The first Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict took place in 1905-1906. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.

⁵⁵ Rouben Galichian, **Historic Maps of Armenia The Cartographic Heritage**, London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004, p. 119 cited in Dabaghyan, “Place Renaming Practices...,” p. 414.

administrative regions in Nagorno-Karabakh, called Hankendi by Azerbaijanis in the center- Mardakent in the north and Martuni and Hadrut in the south. The population of Hankendi which was called by Armenians as “Stepanakert,” which is claimed to be the capital of the “Artsakh Kingdom”, was predominantly Armenian.⁵⁶ The reason for this is that Armenians have a historical claim to the lands in question. According to Armenians, the name Karabakh is associated by Armenians with two cities in the northeast of historical Armenia: Artsakh and Utik. These cities are in the area between Lake Sevan in the northwest, Kura River in the north, and Aras River in the south and are part of the Greater Armenia Kingdom.⁵⁷

The debate on whether important cities such as Utik and Artsakh belonged to Armenians in history has not ended. Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict in Karabakh has important political, economic, and cultural components. Disputes about land are actually the ones that come to the fore most symbolically and emotionally. The debate on whether the cities of Utik and Artsakh in Azerbaijan, which is the territory of Karabakh, and the cities of Siunik, the old name of Zangezur, which is located in the territory of today’s Armenia, are included in Caucasian Albania, and whether Azerbaijanis take their ethnic origins from Caucasian Albania continues. This debate is about who can claim Karabakh as an inseparable piece of land today.⁵⁸ More detailed information will be given in the following pages about the ongoing debate between Azerbaijanis and Armenians about the Kingdom of Albania, its origins and its peoples.

The word Artsakh has a different political and ideological significance in defining the region for Armenians. As a matter of fact, in the 19th century, this concept began to take an important place in the cultural and literary awakening of Armenians. Behind the use of this name by Armenians, the aim of making the other side accept that the name was unique to the region before Christianity lies. Firstly, Artsakh is seen as a genuine and authentic Armenian regional name, which again provides a link between the present lands and the origin of the ancient Armenian communities. There is a perception that this name gives information about the first owners of the region. Secondly, a so-called purification act is aimed with this term.

⁵⁶ Demir, “**Türk Dış Politikası Perspektifinden...**,” p. 161.

⁵⁷ Patrick Donabédian, “History of Karabagh from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century,” in Levon Chorbajian, Patrick Donabédian, Claude Mutfian (Ed.), **The Caucasian Knot: The History & Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh**, London & New Jersey: Zed Books, 1994, p. 51.

⁵⁸ Dudwick, “**The Case of the Caucasian Albanians...**,” p. 380.

The name “Karabakh” is seen as flawed by Armenians as it evokes Persian and Turkish influences on this piece of land. There is no Armenian element in the name Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore, those who use the word Artsakh consciously try to rid these lands of “foreign” influences and show Armenian as superior to other languages.⁵⁹

The debate about geographical place-names continues beyond Nagorno-Karabakh over other regions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Similar to the fact that Armenians prefer to use the name Artsakh instead of Karabakh, Azerbaijanis also prefer to use the name “Gokce-Zangezur Region” for the southeast of Armenia. Instead of the names “Arax” or “Yeraskh” historically associated with Armenia, Azerbaijanis named Aras River as “Araz”. Armenians claim that the name Azerbaijan is of Arab, Greco-Macedonian, and Persian origin. It is also stated that the name Baku is of Persian origin. Azerbaijanis do not accept that the capital of Armenia, Yerevan (Revan in some sources) comes from the Urartian name “Erebuni”, and they claim that the name Yerevan comes from the name of a Muslim ruler in the same region in Middle Ages.⁶⁰ As can be seen, there is an ongoing political-based struggle between Azerbaijanis and Armenians on issues such as the origins and originality of place names in the region, especially in Nagorno-Karabakh. This debate is directly related to who came to the region first and ruled it.

B. Demographic Aspects of North Caucasia, South Caucasia and Nagorno-Karabakh and Ethnic Groups

1. General Overview

Caucasus has always been a geography where people from different ethnic origins mixed with each other under the influence of the occupying powers. It is possible to find traces of many Asian origin cultures, especially from Middle East, in Caucasus.⁶¹ Indeed, the entire Caucasus, including the North and South Caucasus, has been a mystical geography where human communities settled, hid, took refuge, and fought for centuries. The mountainous landforms in the Caucasus served as a natural protection ethnologically. Caucasus is geography in the valleys and

⁵⁹ Gerard Toal, John O’Loughlin, “Land for Peace in Nagorny Karabakh? Political Geographies and Public Attitudes Inside a Contested De Facto State,” **Territory, Politics, Governance**, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2013, pp. 162-163.

⁶⁰ Dabaghyan, “**Place Renaming Practices...**,” pp. 414-415.

⁶¹ Allen, “**The Caucasian Borderland...**,” p. 230.

mountains where there are about 70 dissimilar languages and more than a hundred languages are spoken. Thirty of them belong to Indo-European, Semitic, and Turko-Mongolian groups. This linguistic diversity has also been the subject of mythological legends. According to a legend, God gets tired while scattering the languages, and when he sits down to rest, his bag is opened and spilled over Caucasus, and all languages are sprinkled on this geography. For this reason, this region was called “language mountain” in ancient times.⁶²

In another source, today, Caucasus is one of the richest regions in the world in terms of cultural diversity, where there are about fifty ethnic groups⁶³, about forty languages and dialects, and no less than five religions. People in Caucasus can be divided into certain ethnic classes: Caucasian origins, such as Georgians, Chechens, Abkhazians, Circassians, Ingushs, Adyghe, Avars, Kabardians (Kabartays), Lezgins, who have been in the region since prehistoric times. Persian origins, such as Kurds, Indo-Europeans such as Armenians and Ossetians. Russians whose numbers increased in Caucasus in the 18th century. Finally, Turkish origins such as Azeris, Kumyks, Karachays and Balkars.⁶⁴ Azerbaijan Turks, Georgians, Armenians, and Chechens constitute the majority of the indigenous nations in Caucasus.

Circassians, one of the ethnic groups in the Caucasus, are spread over a wide area. Circassians, who were an important part of the Crimean population until the 18th century, were settled in the northwest of Caucasus and in the Kuban basin until Russians came to the region in the middle of the 19th century. It is known that very old Russian documents refer to Circassians as Cossacks. Ossetians, located in Central Caucasus on both sides of the embankment between two river basins, have a very complex structure anthropologically, but speak a language belonging to the Indo-European language family. Their language probably consists of remnants of German expressions in the South Russian steppes during the first century AD. Georgians are the most populous and most civilized community in South Caucasus. Georgia is divided into West and East due to landforms. Western Georgians speak the Megrelian dialect of the Georgian language and are often referred to as the Svan-

⁶² Karam, Mourgues, “*Les guerres du Caucase...*,” p. 15.

⁶³ Tahir Tamer Kumkale, *Tarihten Günümüze Türk-Rus İlişkileri*, Ankara: İrfan, 1995, p. 91 cited in Mahir Garibov, *XX. Yüzyılda Ermenistan-Azerbaycan, Dağlık Karabağ Sorunu*, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2017, p. 7.

⁶⁴ François Thual, *Le Caucase Arménie, Azerbaïdjan, Daghestan, Géorgie, Tchétchénie*, Paris: Dominos Flammarion, 2001, pp. 19-20.

Kolh group. Eastern Georgians, on the other hand, are the first groups that came to the Kura River from Anatolia in the 7th and 5th centuries BC. There are also Kurds, who are a very mixed race, in the region. The Kurmanji language used by the Kurds is classified as an Indo-European language.⁶⁵

The language of Armenians is considered among the Indo-European languages. Azerbaijanis, known as the Turkish or Tatar population, are settled in the valleys and plateaus in the east of the South Caucasus. Despite some differences, the Azerbaijani language is close to the Chagatai Turkish of Central Asia and has many Persian words and idioms.⁶⁶

As mentioned above, among the Turkic peoples of North Caucasus, there are Karachays, Balkars, Kumyks, Nogais, and Turkmens. There are also many Meskhetian Turks who migrated from the Fergana Valley in North Caucasus. In addition to this, Greeks have been living in Caucasus since ancient times. There is also an Armenian population in North Caucasus. Tragedies in Nagorno-Karabakh mostly lie behind the Armenian migration to the region.⁶⁷ According to some unofficial data, around 2.5-3 million Armenians live in Russia.⁶⁸

Table 1.1. South Caucasus Population according to 1897 General Census⁶⁹

	Population	Percentage
Total Tatar population	1,442,888	29,24%
Total Georgian population	1,340,602	27,17%
Total Armenian population	1,079,059	21,87%
Total Russian population	221,633	4,50%
Other Muslims and various sects	683,096	13,84%
Other Christians	136,551	2,77%
Jews	20,854	0,41%
Total Population of the South Caucasus	4,934,600	

⁶⁵ Allen, "The Caucasian Borderland...", pp. 230-232.; Kamil Veli Nerimanoğlu, "Kafkaslar Tarihsel, Kültürel, Etno Sosyal, Politolojik Araştırma," *Yeni Türkiye*, 71, 2015, p. 33.

⁶⁶ Allen, "The Caucasian Borderland...", pp. 232-234.

⁶⁷ Nerimanoğlu, "Kafkaslar Tarihsel...", p. 33.

⁶⁸ Diaspora, "Russia", <https://diaspora.gov.am/en/pages/15/russia> (Retrieved on 10.09.2022).

⁶⁹ George Bournoutian, "The Population of the South Caucasus according to the 1897 General Census of the Russian Empire," *Iran & the Caucasus*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2017, p. 338.

Table 1.2. Distribution of total population in Transcaucasia by ethnic groups (1917)⁷⁰

Armenian Apostolic	1,722,500
Armenian Orthodox	2,200
Armenian (other faiths)	56,900
Georgian Orthodox	1,641,000
Georgian Muslim	139,300
Russian Orthodox	352,600
Russian Secterian	99,500
Mountaineer, Muslim	117,000
Mountaineer (Other beliefs)	46,900
Shia Muslim	1,485,200
Sunni Muslim	817,200
Kurd, Muslim	97,100
Yezidi	40,400
Gypsy	40,200
Jew	65,900
European	50,200
Other Christian	198,600

In the table above, it is difficult to obtain precise information about the Azeri Muslim population, as the Muslim population is divided according to ethnicity, sect, or where they live. However, it is seen that the Shiite Muslim population constitutes roughly 21% of the total population at the beginning of 20th century in Transcaucasia.

Azerbaijani and Armenian population in South Caucasus for the years 1950-1970 is shown in Table 1.3. as follows.

⁷⁰ Richard Hovannisian, **The Republic of Armenia: The First Year, 1918-1919**, London: University of California Press, 1971, p. 66.

Table 1.3. South Caucasus population (Thousand) in the USSR (1950-1970)⁷¹

	1950		1960		1970	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
USSR	180,075	100	214,329	100	242,756	100
Caucasia	7,777	4,3	9,921	4,6	12,393	5.1
Armenia	1,354	0,8	1,867	0,9	2,518	1
Azerbaijan	2,896	1,6	3,894	1,8	5,166	2,2
Georgia	3,527	2	4,160	1,9	4,709	1,9

Table 1.4. Ethnic distribution of Nagorno-Karabakh (1840-1987)⁷²

Titular Nation	1840	1959	1970	1979	1987
Armenians	81,480	110,053	121,068	123,076	140,400
Azerbaijanis	58,100	17,995	27,179	37,264	37,800
Russians	420	1,790	1,310	1,265	1,200
Others	-	568	756	576	600
Total	140,000	130,406	150,313	162,181	180,000

Looking at Nagorno-Karabakh in particular in Table 1.4 above, it is claimed that Armenian population was predominant in Nagorno-Karabakh from the mid-1800s to the last periods of the USSR. In 1840, it is seen that 58% of the population was Armenian, and in 1987, this rate increased to 78%. The percentage was 41% in 1840 and 21% in 1987 for Azeris, respectively. In summary, Armenian population increased in Nagorno-Karabakh, but Azeri population gradually decreased. Policies regarding ethnic population distribution and settlement, including the Tsarist Russia and Soviet Union periods, played a major role in this. These policies and changing ethnic distribution in the region as a result of these policies will be discussed in detail in the next section.

⁷¹ Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, **Decline of an Empire, The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt**, New York: Newsweek Books, 1979, p. 89.

⁷² P. L. Dash, "Nationalities Problem in USSR: Discord over Nagorno-Karabakh," **Economic and Political Weekly**, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1989, p. 73.

2. Azerbaijanis

Before talking about the existence of an Azerbaijani population in the region, it is necessary to talk about whether or when this expression was used as an identity. It is claimed that as early as the 1900s, the word Azerbaijan was still just a geographical definition that separated Russia and Iran. As a group identity, Islam was more dominant within the framework of the *ummah* understanding.⁷³ Indeed, there are studies asserting that the term “Azerbaijani” was not used until nationalist consciousness emerged among intellectuals at the end of the 1800s. Muslims in South Caucasus were referred to as “Tatars” before this date.⁷⁴

The Volga and Ural Tatars were a mixture of different ethnic groups. In fact, the ancient people of Volga and its environs were of Finno-Ugrian origin. In the 4th century, when Huns came to the Pontic steppes, to what is now southern Russia, Bulgarians of Turkish descent migrated with them. Some of them settled in Balkans and took the name of today’s Bulgaria. In the 7th century, another group of Bulgars appeared in the upper Volga, at the confluence of the Kama River, and founded the Kingdom of Volga Bulgars there. When a Bulgarian prince converted to Islam in 922, Islam began to spread in the north. The group of Volga Bulgarians who did not accept Islam chose Paganism and called themselves Chuvash. The Islamic Bulgarian State, which lived under the Golden Horde state until the 14th century, met new Turkish and Mongolian groups during the Mongol invasion. One of the Mongolian tribes, who are Tatars, called the people of Turkish descent living there as Tatar.⁷⁵ This name is still used today, especially by foreign sources, to describe Turks in the region.

It is claimed that the expressions “Azeris” and “Azerbaijani” started to be used with the short-term Republic of Azerbaijan established in 1918, and as argued above, these people called themselves “Caucasian Tatars” or “Tatars” before that. While Armenians emphasized their ethnic and cultural differences, Azerbaijanis did not deny their similarities with Turks and Iranians. Azerbaijani identity and consciousness began to strengthen at the end of the 19th century, and the struggle

⁷³ Levon Chorbajian, **The Making of Nagorno-Karabagh: From Secession to Republic**, Londra: Palgrave, 2001, p. 34.

⁷⁴ Mark Malkasian, **Gha-ra-bagh! The Emergence of the National Democratic Movement in Armenia**, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1996, p. 149.

⁷⁵ Serge A. Zenkovsky, **Rusya’da Pan-Türkizm ve Müslümanlık**, İzzet Kantemir (trans.), Ankara: İpek Matbaası, 1971, pp. 21-22.

against Armenians contributed to this process to a great extent. Pan-Turkism movement, which emerged as a reaction to the Russification policy of the Tsarist Russia towards Azerbaijanis among Azerbaijani intellectuals from the end of the 1870s, turned into a secular nationalism under the Ottoman rule, which began to lose its power at the end of the 19th century. In this period, the pioneers of this movement tried to bring together all Turks from Balkans to the east of China under the umbrella of ethnicity, language, and history.⁷⁶

Azeri Turks make up the vast majority of the 13,199,311 population (7,029,000 [1989] in the Soviet Union, 6,012,000 [1986] in Iran) living in Azerbaijan today. Apart from Baku (1,772,000), the capital city of Soviet Azerbaijan, other important cities are Ganja (Kirovobad, 278,000), Lankaran, Nakhchivan, Sumgait and Mingechaur. In Soviet Azerbaijan alone, 80% of the 168,000 population (1983 est.) living in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (4400 km²) consisted of Armenians. Azeri Turks constitute more than 95% of the population of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) (5500 km²), which is 278,000 (1987 est.). Iranian Azerbaijan is divided into two administrative units, East and West Azerbaijan, in terms of administration. The center of East Azerbaijan, which is separated by eleven provinces, is Tabriz (894.377), and the center of West Azerbaijan, which is separated by nine provinces, is Urmia (548.946).⁷⁷

As indicated in Table 1.4, 37,800 of 180,000 Nagorno-Karabakh population in 1987 were Azerbaijanis. The conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh region for the first time forced Azerbaijani groups to leave Armenia at the end of the fall of 1987.⁷⁸ Inter-ethnic violence, which gained momentum in November 1989, first started in Azerbaijan and then spread to both republics. In January 1990, a large Armenian population living in Baku had to flee. Since 1991, 450,000 Armenians living in Azerbaijan (excluding those living in Nagorno-Karabakh) had to migrate either to

⁷⁶ Michael Croissant, **The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications**, Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998, pp. 7-8.

⁷⁷ Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, “Azerbaycan,” <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/azerbaycan> (Retrieved on 20.03.2020).

⁷⁸ Aytan Gahramanova, “Internal and External Factors in the Democratization of Azerbaijan,” **Democratization**, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2009, p. 782.

Armenia or to other parts of the Soviet republics. In general, 160,000 Azerbaijanis living in rural areas in Armenia also were forcibly displaced to Azerbaijan.⁷⁹

Due to the violent events in Nagorno-Karabakh from 1991 to 1994, Armenians had to migrate from Azerbaijan to Armenia, Azerbaijanis from Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijani lands under Armenian occupation to Azerbaijan, and received the status of displaced person. In some sources, this figure is given as 1,160,000 as 850,000 from Azerbaijan and 310,000 from Armenia.⁸⁰ Due to the conflict, 200,000 Armenians living in Azerbaijan had to flee their homes, mostly to Armenia and Karabakh. 45,000 Armenians fled to Russia. 185,000 Azerbaijanis and 11,000 Muslim Kurds living in Armenia were forced to migrate to Azerbaijan together with 47,000 Karabakh Azerbaijanis. In addition, around 500,000-600,000 Azerbaijanis had to flee their homes in Aghdam, Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Kalbajar, Gubadly, Lachin and Zangilan regions.⁸¹ Data from different sources say that the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh caused 1,400,000 refugees. 850,000 of them are in Azerbaijan, 400,000 in Armenia and 100,000 in Russia.⁸²

As can be seen, the figures for displaced persons vary. In some sources, this number is given as 600,000 in Azerbaijan. These figures for the displaced people do not include Armenians fleeing from Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis fleeing from Armenia, each of which is around 200,000-300,000 or the victims of natural disasters after the 1988 earthquake in Armenia.⁸³ Towards the end of 2002, it was determined that there were 783,200 refugees and displaced persons in Azerbaijan, which corresponds to one-seventh of the country's population.⁸⁴ As of the end of 2016, the number of people displaced in Azerbaijan due to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem was 582,000. This figure corresponded to 5,9% of the total population of Azerbaijan. In Armenia, the number of displaced persons was 11,000, which was 0,3% of the

⁷⁹ Nora Dudwick, "Postsocialism and the Fieldwork of War," in Hermine G. De Soto and Nora Dudwick (Ed.), **Fieldwork Dilemmas Anthropologists in Postsocialist States**, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2000, p. 19.

⁸⁰ Dennis Sammut, "Population Displacement in the Caucasus-an overview," **Central Asian Survey**, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2001, p. 57.

⁸¹ Edmund Herzig, **The New Caucasus Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia**, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999, p. 66.

⁸² Pavel Baev, **Russia's Policies in the Caucasus**, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997, p. 15.

⁸³ Thomas Greene, "Internal Displacement in the North Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia," in Roberta Cohen, Francis M. Deng (Ed.), **The Forsaken People: Case Studies of the Internally Displaced**, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1998, p. 233.

⁸⁴ Anar Valiyev, "Azerbaijan: Islam in a Post-Soviet Republic," **Middle East Review of International Affairs**, Vol. 9, No. 4, December 2005, p. 2.

total population.⁸⁵ In the latest report of IDMC which is published in 2022, the IDP population in Azerbaijan is 655,000.⁸⁶ This is more than 6% of total population in Azerbaijan.

3. Armenians

The history of Armenians is generally studied as two separate periods. The first is the ancient and medieval eras (6th century BC-14th centuries AD) and the second is the modern national rebirth from the 18th century to the present. According to Armenian sources, the gap between the 14th and 18th centuries is the period when Muslims invaded Armenian lands and tried to erase the traces of Armenians from their historical homeland. It is argued that there was a temporal and spatial change in the emergence and awareness of Armenian consciousness between these centuries. Armenians, having to leave Eastern Anatolia in the modern period, dispersed to the region.⁸⁷

As shown in Table 1.1. above, according to 1897 General Census, Armenian population consisted 21,87% of South Caucasus population with 1,079,059.⁸⁸ According to the data at the beginning of the 20th century, 25% of the population in South Caucasus consisted of Armenians. According to Kavkaskii Kalendar of 1917, the distribution of the total population of 6,973,800 in South Caucasus, of which 1,781,600 consisted of Armenians, is as shown in Table 1.2.⁸⁹ In 1840, the population of Armenians was 81,480 in Nagorno-Karabakh, and this number gradually increased in 1950s and 1970s as indicated in Table 1.4.⁹⁰

Nagorno-Karabakh, which has a majority Armenian population, is located in a geography surrounded by Azerbaijan with Muslim population. The current location of Nagorno-Karabakh makes it impossible to unite with Armenia; because the closest border between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh is separated by about 70 km of Caucasus hills. Therefore, the only affinity between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh

⁸⁵ IDMC, **Country profiles, Armenia**, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/armenia/> (Retrieved on 6.6.2018).

⁸⁶ IDMC, **Global Report on Internal Displacement 2022, Children and Youth in Internal Displacement**, April 2022, p. 82.

⁸⁷ Ronald Grigor Suny, **Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History**, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993, p. 54.

⁸⁸ Bournoutian, "The Population of the South Caucasus....," p. 338.

⁸⁹ Hovannisian, "The Republic of Armenia....," p. 66.

⁹⁰ Dash, "Nationalities Problem in USSR....," p. 73.

has been their ethnic ties.⁹¹ These strong ethnic references raise the question of who belongs to Nagorno-Karabakh, to Azerbaijan or to Armenia. It is also questioned whether there is a separate Nagorno-Karabakhian identity from Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the next section, historical data and arguments will be discussed while focusing on these issues related to identity.

C. Caucasian Albania from Ancient Times to 20th century and History of Nagorno-Karabakh

1. Political History of Nagorno-Karabakh from the Ancient Times to Russian Domination

In the territories where Nagorno-Karabakh lies, a state called as Caucasian Albania ruled. Ancient Greek historians referred to the Caucasian Albania and mentioned the Nagorno-Karabakh geography in their works. Caucasian Albania is also called “Arran/Aran” in Persian language or “Agvank” in Armenian language.⁹² Although there is very little information about the antiquity, the history of Nagorno-Karabakh, or Artsakh as Armenians call it, is associated with Caucasian Albania, which was founded in the 3rd and 4th centuries BC. The first information about Caucasian Albania was found in the Battle of Gaugamela between Alexander the Great and Darius III in 331 BC.⁹³

The famous historian Strabo stated that Caucasian Albania or Albanian Kingdom was established between Caspian Sea and the territory of Georgia and stretched to Caucasus Mountains in the north and Aras River in the south. According to him, the city of Artsakh was one of the provinces of Caucasian Albania between Kura and Aras Rivers.⁹⁴ Among the other important provinces of the kingdom, the cities of Siunik and Utik can be counted.⁹⁵ Caucasian Albania had an important place

⁹¹ Dash, “Nationalities Problem in USSR...,” p. 72.

⁹² Rouben Galichian, **The Invention of History, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Showcasing of Imagination**, Second, revised and expanded edition, London: Gomitas Institute, 2010, p. 35.

⁹³ Aliev K. –Antichnaia Kavkazskaia Albaniia (L’Albanie du Caucase antique), Baku, Ed. Azerbaijan dovlet neshriyyati, 1992, p. 166 cited in Fazıl Zeynalov, **Le Conflict du Haut-Karabakh une Paix Juste ou une Guerre Inévitable**, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2011, p. 27.

⁹⁴ Strabon, **Géographie**, Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie, 1867, Livre XI, Chapitre IV, point 1.

⁹⁵ Aliev K. –Antichnaia Kavkazskaia Albaniia (L’Albanie du Caucase antique), Baku, Ed. Azerbaijan dovlet neshriyyati, 1992, p. 166 cited in Zeynalov, “**Le Conflict du Haut-Karabakh...**,” p. 27.

in the political history of the region until it was destroyed by Arabs in the 8th century.⁹⁶

Having a confederative structure, Caucasian Albania stands out in the history of the region in terms of gathering different groups under a single rule and creating unity. Caucasian Albania was established in a relatively small piece of land to the north of Kura River and settled by up to 26 tribes living in this geography. Lezgins, Udis and small communities of Northern Azerbaijan and Southern Dagestan are shown among the peoples coming from Caucasian Albania. Influenced by Armenian, Georgian, Arab, and Persian cultures throughout history,⁹⁷ Caucasian Albanians have lived as human communities with their own cultural, religious, and linguistic structures.⁹⁸ The spread of Christianity in Albania provides important data for the history of the region and human communities living there. According to many sources, Albania started to become Christian in the 4th century.⁹⁹ Christianity in Albania was first adopted by Georgian and Armenian leaders.¹⁰⁰

Before Arabs came to the region, Caucasian Albania was the battleground of Persians and Romans. Although Albania was strong in terms of its political structures, institutions and religious practices, like other states in the region, it could not always be independent and had to submit to large states from time to time. The Kingdom of Albania tried to protect its independence in internal affairs by paying taxes to Roman Empire, Sassanids, and Khazars, followed a policy of balance by forming alliances in difficult times and maintained its political existence in this way.¹⁰¹ Caucasian Albania largely maintained its power and dominance over the region until Sassanids advanced to North Caucasus.¹⁰²

⁹⁶ Aliev K. –Antichnaia Kavkazskaia Albaniia (L’Albanie du Caucase antique), Baku, Ed. Azerbaijan devlet neshriyyati, 1992, p. 166 cited in Zeynalov, “**Le Conflict du Haut-Karabakh...**,” p. 27.

⁹⁷ Dudwick, “**The Case of the Caucasian Albanians...**,” p. 378.

⁹⁸ Heiko Krüger, **The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Legal Analysis**, London: Springer, 2010, p. 4.

⁹⁹ Dudwick, “**The Case of the Caucasian Albanians...**,” p. 378.

¹⁰⁰ Léon Poliakov, **The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in Europe**, London: Chatto Heinemann for Sussex University Press, 1974; Peter van der Veer, **Imperial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in India**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001 cited in Baum, “**The Rise and Fall...**,” p. 28.

¹⁰¹ Zeynalov, “**Le Conflict du Haut-Karabakh...**,” p. 27.

¹⁰² Farda Asadov, “Caucasian Albania: A Contact Zone of Sedentary Population and their States with Eurasian Nomadic People (V-VII centuries CE),” in Michel Espagne, Hamlet Isaxanli, “A Long-term History of Cross Cultural Transfers in the Caucasus,” **Khazar Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences**, Special Issue, 2018, p. 14.

Between the 6th and 7th centuries, South Caucasus in general turned into a geography where Turkish and Persian domination and competition was experienced.¹⁰³ Albania suffered the most from this competition and gradually lost its power. At the beginning of the 8th century, Arabs occupied whole Albania, including the region known as Artsakh by Armenians, and tried to make Islam as an adopted religion by the people living in the region.¹⁰⁴ After Caucasian Albania, which was weakened by Arab invasions, those who established dominance in Nagorno-Karabakh constantly changed: Byzantines, Seljuks, Mongols, Turkmens, Ottoman Turks, Safavids, and finally Russians.¹⁰⁵

Until the beginning of the 11th century, Armenian and Georgian kingdoms and principalities managed to survive among many Muslim states in Caucasus. Muslim and Christian marriages took place between the ruling classes of different religions.¹⁰⁶ However, Turkish influence in the region showed itself to a great extent when Great Seljuk Empire, one of the most important states established by Turks throughout history, invaded the region called Artsakh in the middle of the 11th century and entered the political history of Caucasus. Seljuks, who belonged to the Qiniq tribe from the twenty-four Oghuz families, settled in the upper Syr Darya.¹⁰⁷

The states that played an important role in the history of South Caucasus after Seljuks are Mongols and their successors. The Mongol Emperor Genghis Khan, who gathered the nomadic tribes in Mongolia in the first years of the 13th century, headed for Central Asia and Caucasus in 1220. The Mongol invasion of South Caucasus began in 1234. Mongols began to plunder the southeast of present-day Azerbaijan. The north of Armenia was subjugated in 1234, sometimes by force and sometimes by treaties. In the following years, Georgia and Arran were suppressed by Mongols and the occupation of the south of Kura River was completed in 1240.¹⁰⁸ When the

¹⁰³ For further information, and as a note of the author please see Emily Yearwood-Lee, "Few Lead Roles for Minorities," **The Province**, August 26, 2002, s. B5 cited in Baum, "**The Rise and Fall...**," p. 28.

¹⁰⁴ Patrick Donabédian, "History of Karabagh from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century," in Chorbajian, Donabédian, Mutaflan (Ed.), "**The Caucasian Knot...**," pp. 58-59.

¹⁰⁵ Walker, "**Armenia and Karabagh...**," p. 71.

¹⁰⁶ V. Minorsky, *Studies in Caucasian History* (Cambridge, 1953), p. 22-24. cited in Andrew C. S. Peacock, "Nomadic Society and the Seljūq Campaigns in Caucasia," **Iran & the Caucasus**, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2005, p. 209.

¹⁰⁷ Oghuzs lived in the region between Syr Darya and the east of the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea in the 10th century. Erdoğan Merçil, **Müslüman Türk Devletleri Tarihi**, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997, p. 43.

¹⁰⁸ Frederik Coene, **The Caucasus - An Introduction**, London: Routledge, 2010, pp. 114-117.

Mongol Emperor Möngke Khan died in 1259, Mongol Empire was disintegrated and Genghis Khan's grandson Hulagu established Ilkhanate state in the southwest of the empire. Ilkhanids took over the control of whole of present-day Azerbaijan, including Arran.¹⁰⁹

According to some sources, Artsakh began to be called Nagorno-Karabakh after it was captured by Mongols in the 1230s.¹¹⁰ There are also some studies suggesting that the name Karabakh first appeared in Persian, Armenian and Georgian annals in the 14th century, before the establishment of Karabakh Khanate, which will be discussed later.¹¹¹ It is reported that during the Ilkhanate period, Artsakh region in Arran was called Karabakh, which was a Turkish name.¹¹² According to another source, the name Karabakh was used for the first time by a German traveler Johann Schiltberger, who was convicted by Ottomans in the 15th century.¹¹³ The name Karabakh became known during the semi-independent Karabakh Khanate under Persian rule in the middle of the 18th century.¹¹⁴

While discussing the political history of Nagorno-Karabakh, it is necessary to include the Caucasus expeditions of Timur, the founder of the Timurid Empire, which had great impact in the region. These invasions first started in the territories of Armenia and Georgia in 1386. After Timur's death, the region witnessed the struggle of Qara Qoyunlu State, who were Timur's enemies and took Arran under control, and Aq Qoyunlu State that took over Armenia. Georgia, on the other hand, was stuck between Muslim states with the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul in 1453, disintegrated over time, and divided into different kingdoms and principalities at the end of the 15th century. The Kazan, Astrakhan, and Crimean Khanates were separated from the Golden Horde State, a Turkish-Mongolian Khanate, and the Golden Horde State was dragged into a civil war. With the weakening of the Golden Horde State, Ottomans

¹⁰⁹ Cemalettin Taşkıran, *Karabağ Meselesi*, Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1995, p. 58. cited in Ercan Karakoç, "Geçmişten Günümüze Karabağ Tarihi Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme," **International Journal of Human Sciences**, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2011, p. 1005.

¹¹⁰ Tim Potier, **Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, A Legal Appraisal**, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001, p. 1.

¹¹¹ It is stated that Persian historian Hamidullah Kazvini used the name Karabakh as the settlement area of the Ilkhanid khans. Hamklullah Kazvini, *Nizhetü'l-Global*, Leyden, 1919, p. 174 cited in Attar, **"Karabağ Sorunu Kapsamında Ermeniler..."**, p. 7.

¹¹² Christopher J. Walker, "The Armenian Presence in Mountainous Karabakh", **Transcaucasian Boundaries**, John F. R. Wright, Suzanne Goldenberg, Richard Schofield (Ed.), UCL Press, London 1996, p. 92, cited in Karakoç, **"Geçmişten Günümüze..."**, p. 1005.

¹¹³ Toal & O'Loughlin, **"Land for Peace..."**, p. 163.

¹¹⁴ **Ibid.**

and Russians began to increase their influence in the Black Sea and entered into a power struggle.¹¹⁵

According to some sources, Caucasian Albania disappeared in the 6th century and became one of the border provinces of Persian lands under the Sassanid rule. Between the 10th and 12th centuries, this country was erased from maps and history books, and thereafter, from the 12th century, the region was ruled by the Khachin family, which was allegedly Armenian. This family is also known as Aranshahs. Even after the Mongol invasion, the Khachin family, who got along well with the Mongols, maintained their presence in the region.¹¹⁶ According to the information provided by Armenian sources, in the book named *Tarikh-e Qarabagh* (History of Karabakh) written in Persian by the famous Karabakh historian Mirza Jamal Javanshir Qarabaghi (1773-1853), Khachins and the kings who ruled them were from Armenian families.¹¹⁷

Khachin Melikdom formed part of the kingdom of Arran. Established in an area that is very difficult to reach, this principality is actually like the re-emergence of old Albania on a smaller piece of land. It is claimed that Khachin was part of Albania, Prince Hasan Jalal was Armenian and Khachin Melikdom was Armenized. Melikdom lived its golden period during the reign of Prince Jalal from 1215 to 1261. Jalal was called as “King of Albania”, “Lord of Albanian regions” “Prince of the Khachin and Artsakh country”.¹¹⁸ In 1261, Hasan Jalal was assassinated due to the order of the Mongolian prince Argoun, and his son Atabek succeeded him. Atabek ruled the country until 1287, and in the same year the Kingship of Khachin disappeared.¹¹⁹

After the 16th century, Caucasia was dominated by Ottoman Empire and Turkish Safavid and Afshar dynasties established in Persian territories.¹²⁰ In general, Ottomans and Persians followed an indirect administration policy in Caucasus

¹¹⁵ Coene, “**The Caucasus-An Introduction...**,” pp. 117-118.

¹¹⁶ Galichian, “**The Invention of History, Azerbaijan, Armenia...**” p. 35.

¹¹⁷ Mirza Jamāl Javānshir Qarabāghi, *Tarikh-e Qarabakh*, Manuscript B712/11603 (Baku, Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan), 4 English translation entitled *A History of Qarabagh* by George Bournoutian (Costa Mesa CA: Mazda Publishers, 1994), 15, 16 ve 37 cited in Galichian, “**The Invention of History, Azerbaijan, Armenia...**” p. 37.

¹¹⁸ Vagif Piriev, “Le Karabagh, Ame de l’Azerbaijan,” **IRS Karabagh**, Vol. 2, No. 4, Summer 2014, pp. 57-58.

¹¹⁹ Piriev, “**Le Karabagh...**,” p. 59.

¹²⁰ Dursun Yıldırım, Cihat Özönder, **Karabağ Dosyası**, Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, Second Edition, 1991, p. 2.

borders. Armenian kings, Tatar khans and other kingdoms in the southeastern Caucasus and eastern Georgia swore allegiance to Persians. Circassians in the Southwest Caucasus and some Muslim-Georgian khans in Adjara and Lazistan swore allegiance to Ottomans.¹²¹

During the 17th century and until the middle of the 18th century, there was a struggle for dominance over Caucasian countries between Qajar dynasty in Persian lands and Ottoman Empire. The wars between the Ottomans and Persians – also called as Iranians- generally broke out for sectarian reasons. This struggle ended with the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin Treaty signed between the parties in 1639. Thus, Ottoman Empire gave up its claims on Azerbaijan and determined its eastern border, and a long period of peace began between Ottomans and Iranians.¹²²

2. Political History of Nagorno-Karabakh under the Rule of Tsarist Russia

Tsarist Russia, which started to become a multinational empire in the middle of the 16th century, began to penetrate Caucasus after gaining power. The driving force behind the Russian expansionism on this geography has been geopolitical and strategic reasons beyond ideology. Russians fought most of the wars of the 18th and 19th centuries against two other great powers in the region between Black Sea and Caspian Sea: Ottoman Empire and Persia. Caucasus, and especially South Caucasus, was a buffer zone between Orthodox Christian Empire in the north and Muslim communities in the Middle East. The progress of Russian Tsardom accelerated with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the weakening of Persia.¹²³ Taking advantage of the power vacuum in the region, the Russian Empire captured a large part of Transcaucasia and then the interior of North Caucasus. The spread of Russian Tsardom in these lands was realized sometimes through wars and sometimes through lands won following diplomatic victories.

Transcaucasian policies of Russians in the 18th and 19th centuries can be evaluated in three stages. At the first stage, a security zone was created by the Cossacks along Kuban and Terek Rivers. Continuing to spread towards the center and east after this date, Russians captured Georgia and Tbilisi in the early 1800s.

¹²¹ Allen, Muratoff, “**Caucasian Battlefields...**,” pp. 8-9.

¹²² Mehmet Saray, **Türk-İran İlişkileri**, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2006, p. 79.

¹²³ Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Security Interests and Policies in the Caucasus Region,” in Bruno Coppieters (Ed.), **Contested Borders in the Caucasus**, Brussels: VUB University Press, 1996, p. 92.

Then Baku, Nakhchivan, and Yerevan were occupied. The second stage was the years when Russian and Persian struggle over Transcaucasia began. With the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813, Russia took most of Persian lands. With the Turkmenchay Treaty in 1828, Persians relinquished control over the left side of Aras River to Russians. Ottoman Empire was defeated in the Ottoman-Russian War that started in this period, and with the Treaty of Edirne signed in 1829, Russians landed on the Caspian Sea coast and South Caucasus via the Derbent Pass. In the third stage, Russians began to be interested in the peoples of the region. The fact that most of the northern peoples were Muslims did not pose a problem for Russians, but they took care to create subordinate groups in Muslim countries.¹²⁴ Russians implemented a policy of intimidation and “divide and rule” of the peoples under their rule.¹²⁵

The most important development in the history of Karabakh in the 18th century during the Tsarist Russia period was the establishment of a khanate with the word “Karabakh” in its name (1747-1805). Two khanates were established under the rule of Safavid and then Ottoman Empire. One of them was Karabakh Khanate and the other was Ganja Khanate.¹²⁶ Karabakh Khanate, whose first Karabakh Khan was Panah Ali Khan Jawashir and whose headquarters was in Shusha¹²⁷, was one of the Turkish dynasties established in South Caucasus with the weakening of the central authority when the Persian Afshar Turkish state shah Nadir Shah was killed in 1747. The period of the Khanates is accepted as the beginning of the independence period of Azerbaijan, which lasted for a century.¹²⁸

There was a power struggle between Qajars in Persia and Russians regarding the domination of the Karabakh Khanate. The region changed hands twice in a very short time, between Russians and Persians. The Qajar Dynasty, which came from a branch of the Qajar tribes of the Azerbaijani Turks in Persian territories, ruled the country from 1796 to 1925.¹²⁹ With Persians coming to the fore in their struggle

¹²⁴ Demir, “Türk Dış Politikası Perspektifinden...,” p. 66.

¹²⁵ Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Security Interests and Policies in the Caucasus Region,” in Coppieters, “Contested Borders...,” p. 92.

¹²⁶ Gaffar Çakmaklı, “Dağlık Karabağ’ı Azerbaycan’dan Ayırma Girişimleri,” içinde Kasımlı & Efeğil, (Ed.), “Dağlık Karabağ Üzerine...,” p. 100.

¹²⁷ Ziya Bünyadov ve diğerleri, **Azerbaycan Tarixi**, I. Cilt, Bakü: Azerbaycan Devlet Neşriyatı, 1994, pp. 530-541 cited in Araz Aslanlı, “Kafkasya için Yürütülen Mücadele ve Karabağ Sorununun Doğuşu,” içinde Bahadır Bumin Özarıslan (Ed.), **Kanayan Yara Karabağ**, Ankara: Astana Yayınları, 2016, pp. 52-53.

¹²⁸ Yıldırım, Özönder, “Karabağ Dosyası...,” p. 2.

¹²⁹ Türk İslam Ansiklopedisi, “Kaçarlar,” <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/kacarlar> (Retrieved on 10.06.2021).

against Russia, Karabakh Khanate came under Qajar rule in 1797. While the Russian armies continued their eastern advance by taking Derbent, Baku, Salyan, Talysh and Shamakhi (Shamakhi), the campaign could not be completed and Paul I opposed the expansionist policies and demanded the evacuation of Caucasus. Agha Muhammed Khan (1794-1825), the founder of the Qajar Dynasty, saw the Russians' withdrawal as an opportunity and started to prepare for a new Caucasus expedition. With the withdrawal of the Russian armies, Qajars took over Georgia. The Qajar army reached the Soltaniyeh region in Azerbaijan in June 1797. Agha Muhammed Shah expelled Jawashir from the region and established Qajar authority in Karabakh Khanate. However, Persian domination over the Khanate did not last long and the Karabakh Khanate was abolished by Russia in 1805.¹³⁰

Qajars went down in history as a state that resisted the expansionist policies of Russians in South Caucasus. Known for his works on Turkish and Central Asian history, Jean Paul Roux presents Agha Muhammed Khan, who declared himself as the shah in 1794, as a successful Turkish ruler who united Qajars (1794-1925) under his rule and conquered Persian territories. During the reign of his nephew, Feth Ali Shah (1797-1843), who succeeded him after his death, the advance of Russians to Caucasus was tried to be stopped. Feth Ali Shah moved the capital from Rey to Tehran in order to follow Russians better. In fact, there was a struggle between Russians and Qajars to dominate the newly discovered oil fields in Baku at that time. However, Feth Ali Shah and his successors gradually lost power against Russians and British in the following period. Qajars could not seize the natural resources of Baku and had to leave the lands north of Aras to the Russians.¹³¹

Panah Ali Khan Jawashir's son Ibrahim Khan was afraid of losing his lands due to the struggles between Ottomans and Persians over Azerbaijan, Russian occupations, and Persians' declaration of war against Russia in 1804.¹³² Under these conditions, Ibrahim Khan tried to secure himself by signing the Kurakchay Treaty with Russia in 1805. However, this treaty had devastating consequences for Karabakh Khanate. With this treaty, Russia declared that the Khanate would

¹³⁰ Kaveh Farrokh, **Iran at War: 1500-1988**, New York: Osprey Publishing, 2011, p. 176.

¹³¹ Jean-Paul Roux, **Türklerin Tarihi Pasifik'ten Akdeniz'e 2000 Yıl**, İstanbul: Kabalcı Yayınevi, 2015, p. 417.

¹³² İ. Özçelik, Karabağ Tarihi ve Karabağ'da Ermeni Olayları, Ankara: Bilge, 2003, p. 71 cited in Zühre Nur Pehlivan, "Rusya'nın Ermeni Devleti Kurma Politikasının Sonucu: Karabağ Sorunu," **Asia Minor Studies**, Vol. 4, No. 8, July 2016, p. 97.

maintain its independence, provided that it paid taxes to Russia and allowed it to maintain a Russian garrison in Shusha.¹³³ Concerned that the Khanate would be subject to Russian rule, Persians attacked Karabakh. Suspicious of the Karabakh Khan's attempt to re-establish good relations with Persians, Russia abolished the Khanate and removed Khan's family in 1805.¹³⁴

The political existence of Karabakh Khanate, which was stuck in the regional power struggle between Persia, Russia, and Ottoman Empire, and which had a very important geostrategic position for these three states, was closely related to which of these powers would prevail. In order to protect its own existence against these powers, the Khanate tried to make alliances or agreements with them. However, this situation prevented it from having a fully independent political structure. As a matter of fact, at a time when Russians were in decline, Persians filled the power vacuum and, although they did not abolish the Karabakh Khanate, they subordinated it to themselves. After the death of Karabakh Khan Panah Ali Khan Jawashir, his son Ibrahim Khan took over the administration. However, as mentioned above, Russians did not allow Karabakh Khanate to become stronger.¹³⁵

As can be seen, there were Turkish rulers in Karabakh Khanate during the period when Russia gained power in the region. The presence of Turkish rulers in Karabakh Khanate was proved by Qajars, who were Turks themselves, with the information given by Roux. However, after Russians captured Karabakh, they followed a resettlement policy to increase the number of Armenians. In fact, as early as 1805, when Russian Empire occupied the Muslim-ruled Karabakh Khanate, many Muslims living in the region migrated to the Persian-controlled lands in the south. Many Christians - mostly Armenians- settled in the lands of Karabakh Khanate.

¹³³ C. Taşkıran, *Geçmişten Günümüze Karabağ Meselesi*, Ankara: Genelkurmay, 1995, p. 68 cited in Pehlivan, "**Rusya'nın Ermeni Devleti...**," p. 97.

¹³⁴ İ. Özçelik, *Karabağ Tarihi ve Karabağ'da Ermeni Olayları*, Ankara: Bilge, 2003, p. 72 cited in Pehlivan, "**Rusya'nın Ermeni Devleti...**," p. 97.; In 1804, Russia added the Ganja Khanate to its territory on the grounds that it belonged to Georgia, which it had occupied in 1801. See George A. Bournoutian, *Ermeni Tarihi: Ermeni Halkının Tarihine Kısa Bir Bakış*, İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2006, pp. 190-191.

¹³⁵ Asim Jannatoglu Jannatov, "A Brief History of Karabakh and the Armenian Azerbaijani Relations: Before the First Armenian-Muslim Clash (1905-1906)," *Vakanüvis International Journal of Historical Researches*, Special Issue on the Middle East, Vol. 1, 2016, pp. 158-160.

From the middle of the 19th century, Karabakh began to be a predominantly Armenian region, but continued to be home to a significant Muslim minority.¹³⁶

Founded in 1747, Yerevan Khanate, like Karabakh Khanate, was a part of Persian lands until it was completely dissolved by the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828, but was ruled by Turks. Yerevan (*Revan* in Turkish sources), also known as Erivan, which was dominated by Timur in the past and then came under the rule of Aq Qoyunlu and Qara Qoyunlu, was an important cultural center in the region. Afterwards, Shirvanshahs, Georgians, and Safavids dominated the region.¹³⁷ The name of the city was mentioned for the first time in the Ottoman archives when Selim I stayed in front of Yerevan walls after the Battle of Chaldiran. In these records, it was reported that in 1514, the city of Yerevan joined the Ottoman lands.¹³⁸

Between the 16th-18th centuries, the city of Yerevan constantly changed hands between Ottoman Empire and Safavids. In 1583, Yerevan was completely taken under control by Ottomans. However, as mentioned above, as a result of the long-lasting Persian-Ottoman struggles, with the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin signed in 1639, Ottomans left Yerevan to Persians, gave up their claims on Azerbaijani lands,¹³⁹ and a long-term agreement was reached between two states regarding the borders. With the decrease of Persian influence in the region over time, the period of independent khanates including Yerevan Khanate began. Russians tried to seize Yerevan Khanate as an extension of their expansionist policies in Caucasus, but failed to take control in 1805 despite the support of Ganja and Karabakh Armenians.¹⁴⁰

In 1749, Yerevan Khanate had been attacked by the Karabakh ruler Panah Ali Khan and Etchmiadzin was plundered. The pressure of Karabakh Khanate on Yerevan Khanate continued in later times. Thereupon, Armenians in Yerevan Khanate asked for help from Georgians and Russians. Russians attacked Yerevan for several times but failed to take control. However, in 1828, Yerevan Khanate passed into the hands of Russians with Turkmenchay Treaty. With the order dated April 2,

¹³⁶ James S. Kessler, **Echoes of Empire: An Accidental Historian's Journey Through the Post-Ottoman World**, Raleigh: Lulu Publishing Services, 2016, p. 162.

¹³⁷ Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, "**Revan**," <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/revan> (Retrieved on 03.06.2020).

¹³⁸ Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, **Osmanlı Devleti ile Azerbaycan Türk Hanlıkları Arasındaki Münasebetlere Dair Arşiv Belgeleri I (1575-1914)**, Ankara, 1992, p. 28.

¹³⁹ Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, "**Revan**," <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/revan> (Retrieved on 03.06.2020).

¹⁴⁰ Bournoutian, "**Ermeni Tarihi...**," pp. 190-191.

1828, Nakhchivan and Yerevan Khanates were abolished, and an Armenian province was formed.¹⁴¹

As can be seen, the Russian- Persian rivalry in South Caucasus in the 18th-19th centuries was determinant for the fate of the khanates in the region. The first Russo-Persian War took place from 1804 to 1813. The reason for the war was Persians' desire to stop the Russian advance in Caucasus. However, in this war, Persians was powerless against Russians, the Azerbaijani khanates were divided among themselves and most of Azerbaijan was captured by Russians. The people of Azerbaijan, who suffered the most from this struggle between Russian and Persian armies, were subjected to oppression and plunder by both sides.¹⁴²

As mentioned above, in 1813, at the end of the war, negotiations between Persians and Russians started in Gulistan. With the Treaty of Gulistan, the territory of Azerbaijan was divided into two as north and south. While Southern Azerbaijan remained in Persian lands, Russians captured Northern Azerbaijan and Karabakh Khanate came under the control of Tsarist Russia.¹⁴³ Karabakh Khanate was completely dissolved in 1822, military administration was established in its lands, and the implementation of the articles of the Kurakchay Treaty ended.¹⁴⁴ With the Treaty of Gulistan, not only Karabakh, but also Ganja, Shirvan, Sheki, Kuba, Baku and Talysh Khanates were left to Russia.¹⁴⁵

The second Russo-Persian war started with the invasion of Karabakh by Persians at the beginning of 1826 and lasted for two years. In the 1820s, Russian Tsardom had gained dominance of the Caspian coast until the Lankuran Khanate. However, Persians still held the kingdoms of Yerevan and Nakhchivan. Russia defeated Persians in Ganja and made a final invasion to the east of the

¹⁴¹ Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, “**Revan**,” <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/revan> (Retrieved on 03.06.2020).

¹⁴² Telman Guliyev, **Rusya'nın Azerbaycan Siyaseti (1801-1813)**, Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Türk Tarihi Ana Bilim Dalı Genel Türk Tarihi Bilim Dalı, Master Thesis, İstanbul 2010, pp. 104-105.

¹⁴³ Vahid Rashidvash, “History of Iran: The Circumstances of Signing Golestan and Turkmanchy Treaties and its Contents,” **International Review of Social Sciences and Humanities**, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2012, pp. 258-259. Azeri Turks, who are similar to Turks in terms of race and language, are close to Iranians in terms of their adoption of the Shiite sect of Islam. See Richard Pipes, “Demographic and Ethnographic Changes in Transcaucasia, 1897-1956,” **Middle East Journal**, Vol. 13, No. 1, Winter 1959, p. 44.

¹⁴⁴ Bahruz Balayev, **The Right to Self-Determination in the South Caucasus: Nagorno Karabakh in Context**, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013, p. 18.

¹⁴⁵ Bournoutian, “**Ermeni Tarihi...**,” p. 191.

Transcaucasian lands in the spring of 1827. In June, Russians besieged Yerevan, and a Russian force advancing along Aras River captured Etchmiadzin, the holy city of Armenians and the home of the Patriarch. Then Russians took control of Nakhchivan.¹⁴⁶ According to Russians, Nakhchivan province was an administrative region of Yerevan, but Artsakh and Zangezur were part of the Caspian region.¹⁴⁷

The second Russo-Persian war ended with Turkmenchay Treaty signed in 1828. With this treaty, the Khanates in Northern Azerbaijan were gathered under Russian rule as Azerbaijani territory. Karabakh and Yerevan Khanates were described as Azerbaijani (Muslim) Khanates by Russians and Qajars, who were the parties to the agreement. With this treaty, Karabakh Khanate came under the rule of the Russian Tsardom.¹⁴⁸ Russia captured Yerevan and Nakhchivan Khanates, the east of Aras, the Talysh Khanate, and the mouth of Kura-Aras River in Caspian Sea in the south. Thus, Russians completed the process of seizing the east of the entire Transcaucasia geography.¹⁴⁹ With Turkmenchay Treaty, Aras River became the new border between Persians and Armenians.¹⁵⁰ This treaty removed Persians from being a determinant factor in Transcaucasian politics. Thus, the influence of Persians, which has had a cultural and political influence in Caucasus for the last two thousand years, has been reduced.¹⁵¹

It is known that in the war between Russians and Persians, Muslims resisted and rebelled against Russians, and Armenian population sided with the Russian garrisons. Armenian groups formed by volunteers in Georgia and Karabakh joined the Russian forces with the newly designed Armenian flag.¹⁵² Armenian volunteers played a key role during the Russo-Persian war. The historical ties between Russians and Armenians aimed to be proved how reliable Armenians were in the eyes of Russians. When the Russo-Persian War ended, Armenian leaders expected Russians to establish an Armenian province. Armenians started a campaign for the

¹⁴⁶ Allen, Muratoff, "**Caucasian Battlefields...**," pp. 20-21.

¹⁴⁷ Arman Sarvarian, "The Artsakh Question an Analysis of Territorial Dispute Resolution in International Law," **Melbourne Journal of International Law**, Vol. 9, 2008, p. 4.

¹⁴⁸ Araz Aslanlı, "Kafkasya için Yürütülen Mücadele ve Karabağ Sorununun Doğuşu," in Özarslan "**Kanayan Yara Karabağ...**" pp. 17-18.

¹⁴⁹ Allen, Muratoff, "**Caucasian Battlefields...**," pp. 20-21.

¹⁵⁰ Bournoutian, "**Ermeni Tarihi...**," p. 192.

¹⁵¹ Allen, Muratoff, "**Caucasian Battlefields...**," p. 21.

¹⁵² Bournoutian, "**Ermeni Tarihi...**," p. 192.

establishment of an Armenian homeland under the auspices of the church and Russia.¹⁵³

Treaty of Turkmenchay gave the right to migrate to the peoples living in Persian and Russian lands wherever they wished. In order to encourage Armenians on the Persian side to migrate, Russia exempted Armenians from taxation for 20 years. Tsarist Russia settled 70,000 Armenians who were migrated from Iran to Russia in Yerevan and Nakhchivan, most of which was Karabakh.¹⁵⁴ According to another source, more than 30,000 Armenians returned to eastern Armenia during the population exchange along Aras River. The majority of them were settled in the province of Russian Armenia¹⁵⁵, which was established in 1828 after the systematic Armenian migrations. Tsar Nicholas I declared that he had established an Armenian oblast, which included the lands of the Yerevan and Nakhchivan Khanates, where Armenians settled.¹⁵⁶

Both Persians and Russians have seen ethnic groups as elements that can be used against each other through their resettlement policies. Behind the settlement of Armenians in Turkish-populated provinces of Caucasus during the period of Tsarist Russia lies the desire to prevent a certain ethnic group from being a majority on any piece of land. Thus, Armenian groups with whom Russia has good relations were placed in border regions and strategic points, and political and security-related concerns about minorities were tried to be minimized.¹⁵⁷ In a geography dominated by Muslim states, it has been very important to receive Armenian support for Russians and Russian support for Armenians.

Bilateral agreements, which caused large population movements in the region, had effects on and even changed the balance of power. The region underwent another serious demographic change with the 1829 Edirne Treaty, which was signed at the end of the 1828-1829 Ottoman-Russian war. With this treaty, Akhalkalaki and Ahalcik regions in western Georgia remained under the rule of Russians. About

¹⁵³ Bournoutian, “*Ermeni Tarihi...*,” pp. 192-193.

¹⁵⁴ Esat Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*, Second Edition, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1987, pp. 623-624.

¹⁵⁵ Armenian leaders and Russian supporters worked to ensure that Armenians who were exiled to Persian lands during the reign of Safavid ruler Shah Abbas would return to their homeland. Bournoutian, “*Ermeni Tarihi...*,” pp. 192-193.

¹⁵⁶ George Bournoutian, “Atlas of the Ethno-Political History of the Caucasus by Arthur Tsutsiev and Nora Seligman Favorov,” *Iran & the Caucasus*, Book Review, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2016, p. 257.

¹⁵⁷ Helena Rytövuori-Apunen, *Power and Conflict in Russia's Borderlands: The Post-Soviet Geopolitics of Dispute Resolution*, London: I.B.Tauris, 2020, p. 147.

20,000 Armenians left Kars, Ardahan, Beyazıt and Erzurum and came to Yerevan, Nakhchivan and Tbilisi. About 50,000 Persians, Kurds, and Turks who left Eastern Armenia also migrated to the present day Iran and Ottoman Empire. Many Armenians returned to Yerevan, Ganja, and Karabakh from temporary exile areas in Georgia. As a result of these migration waves, Armenians were able to form a majority in their homeland, albeit still with a small margin at that time.¹⁵⁸

According to the data of another source, as a result of the wars between Ottoman Empire and Russian Tsardom in Caucasus and agreements signed in 1828-1829, 18,000 Armenians in 1825-1826, 50,000 Armenians in 1828¹⁵⁹ and 84,000 Armenians with the Treaty of Edirne were brought to the Karabakh region.¹⁶⁰ According to another source, more than 40,000 Iranians and 84,000 Turkish Armenians were immigrated to South Caucasus in two years between 1828 and 1830, and they were settled in Karabakh, Ganja, Nakhchivan and Yerevan provinces and Borchaly regions of Tbilisi province where the Armenian population was low. In the middle of the 19th century, apart from 124,000 Armenians who were officially settled in the region by Tsarist Russia, the population of Armenians who were unofficially settled in the region exceeded 200,000. More than one million of Armenians, who were 1.3 million in Caucasus at the beginning of the 20th century, were not native people of this region, but were migrated to the region by Tsarist Russia.¹⁶¹

The demographic structure of Karabakh, which was a central region in terms of Armenian history in the Middle Ages, has been a highly controversial and open to political manipulation. It is seen that detailed ethnographic information covering Nagorno-Karabakh could only be reached in the 19th century. The most important data are obtained from the 1823 tax inquiry of Tsarist Russia and the rural population

¹⁵⁸ Bournoutian, “**Ermeni Tarihi...**,” p. 193.; Russians, who were victorious in the Ottoman-Russian war, landed on the Caspian Sea coast with the 1829 Treaty of Edirne and in the South Caucasus through the Derbent Pass. Persians lost the Yerevan and Nakhchivan Khanates, and Turks had to give Meskhethia – Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki – and south of Aras, to the Russians. Russians, who made great progress in Transcaucasia, started to deal with the northern peoples, most of whom were Muslims, and followed a policy that took regional balances into consideration in order to create subordinate groups in Muslim states during this period. See Demir, “**Türk Dış Politikası Perspektifinden...**,” p. 66.

¹⁵⁹ Araz Aslanlı, “Kafkasya için Yürütülen Mücadele ve Karabağ Sorununun Doğuşu,” in Özarslan “**Kanayan Yara Karabağ...**” p. 18.

¹⁶⁰ Reşid Göyüşov, Qarabağın Keçmişine Seyahet, Azərbaycan Devlet Neşriyyatı, Bakü, 1993, p. 75. cited in Araz Aslanlı, “Kafkasya için Yürütülen Mücadele ve Karabağ Sorununun Doğuşu,” in Özarslan “**Kanayan Yara Karabağ...**” p. 18.

¹⁶¹ Nikita Nikolayeviç Shahrov, Novaya Ugroza Russkomu Delu v Zakafkazy; Predstoyashşaya Raspradoja Mugan İnarodstvam (Kafkasya’da Rus faaliyetlerine Karşı Yeni Bir Tehdit), St. Petersburg, 1911, p. 63 in Garibov, “**XX. Yüzyılda Ermenistan-Azerbaycan...**,” p.10.

survey of 1886 and the 1921 agricultural census conducted by Soviet Azerbaijan.¹⁶² Unfortunately, the most well-known Tsarist Russia and USSR censuses made in 1897 and 1926 do not include any settlement information in this region.¹⁶³

As a matter of fact, the population of Karabakh has changed, not only due to the constant displacement of nomads due to war or famine, but also to looting, taxation or disease. In 1805, when Karabakh Khanate came under the rule of Russians, it was known that the population of Karabakh consisted of 10,000 families; however, after the Russo-Persian war of 1806-1812, it decreased to 3000 families. In 1817, it is claimed that 7872 families lived in Karabakh. It is said that 2000 families were resettled in Karabakh in 1820. In the census made by the Russian authorities in 1823, it is known that there were 18,000 families in Karabakh Khanate. Among the settled population, 3845 families were registered as Armenians and 3339 families as Tatars.¹⁶⁴

According to the data based on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, only 1500 of the 20,000 families in Karabakh were Armenian families in 1823. However, this picture has changed drastically after these settlement policies mentioned above. While Azeris constituted 64,8% of the total population of Karabakh in 1832, this percentage was 34,8% for Armenians.¹⁶⁵ According to another source, in 1823 and 1827, Azerbaijanis made up 91% of the total population, while Armenians made up 8,4%. 18,000 Armenian families came from Iran and the southern regions of Azerbaijan and settled in Northern Azerbaijan, including Karabakh, in 1826-28. According to the 1832 census, 13,965 of the 20,546 families in Karabakh were Azeri and 6491 were Armenian.¹⁶⁶

In another source, it is recorded that 81,480 of the total population of 140,000 in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1840 were Armenians and 58,100 were Azeris.¹⁶⁷ It can be assumed that these statistical differences are due to the fact that the area covered by

¹⁶² Arsène Saparov, **From Conflict to Autonomy in the Caucasus: The Soviet Union and the Making of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh**, New York: Routledge, 2015, p. 118.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹⁶⁵ Azərbaycan Dışişleri Bakanlığı, “Settlement of Armenians in Karabakh,” <http://mfa.gov.az/en/content/804> (Retrieved on 20.10.2019).

¹⁶⁶ Vision of Azerbaijan, “**Karabakh Under Russian Rule, History**,” Summer 2007, Vol. 2-3, <http://www.visions.az/en/news/130/a2c4b9d0/> (Retrieved on 03.02.2020); Araz Aslanlı, “Kafkasya için Yürütülen Mücadele ve Karabağ Sorununun Doğuşu,” in Özarslan “**Kanayan Yara Karabağ...**” p. 13.

¹⁶⁷ Dash, “**Nationalities Problem in USSR...**,” p. 73.

the Nagorno-Karabakh region in these sources is not the same. While some sources include the mountainous parts of Nagorno-Karabakh in their data, some sources also include the surrounding regions in the analysis. In addition, both parties may tend to show numerical data differently to justify their thesis.

Some sources close to the Azerbaijan thesis argue that Russians worked for the Armenianization of Karabakh region due to their political interests, but they did not fully succeed in this despite their comprehensive resettlement policies. It is argued that despite intense Armenianization policies of Russians, Karabakh Region continued to remain as Azerbaijan region (depending on the Ganja Khanate) until the post-Bolshevik Revolution period, that is, until the collapse of Russian Tsardom.¹⁶⁸

While Azerbaijanis were divided into two with the Gulistan and Turkmenchay Treaties, Armenians became more conscious of their ethnic identity. The problems created by the division among Azerbaijanis have deepened with the existence of two separate Azeri communities in the region, one independent and the other under Persian rule. The deportation of Armenians changed the ethnic population distribution in the region, including Karabakh, became a clear indication of the cooperation between Armenians and Russians. The historical repercussions of the regional struggle between Russians and Persians and the Ottoman Empire's loss of power in the eastern provinces against Russia and the effects of these historical developments on the Nagorno-Karabakh problem continue today.

¹⁶⁸ Araz Aslanlı, "Kafkasya için Yürütülen Mücadele ve Karabağ Sorununun Doğuşu," in Özarslan "Kanayan Yara Karabağ..." pp. 20-21.

II. “BEING A NAGORNO-KARABAKHIAN”: AN ACT OF REBUILDING HISTORY AND POLITICIZING ETHNICITY

A. Azerbaijani and Armenian Claims over Caucasian Albania: The Myths Feeding Historical Enmities

Armenian and Azerbaijani researchers, who are in disagreement about the ethnic origins of groups living in Albania and Karabakh, which is a part of Albania, have developed some myths in order to justify their territorial claims on Nagorno-Karabakh, which they consider to be an integral part of their homeland historically. When these myths based on land and ethnicity are examined, it is observed that both sides make their own history reading which is reinforced by the past, memories, values, traditions and stories in the region. Ethnic origin myths are often expressed in order to support the thesis of being indigenous in Nagorno-Karabakh and to exclude one another from there. Karabakh imagination of the parties, based on territory, ethnicity, and cultural elements such as religion and language, intensifies the struggle over the region. Therefore, examining the ethnic background is of great importance in terms of understanding the nature, emergence, and evolution of the conflict.¹⁶⁹

The ongoing debate between Armenian and Azerbaijani historians is concentrated on three different approaches in the literature. The first of these is the disputed borders, the second is the population, ethnic structure, and administration, and the third is the arguments put forward in terms of cultural elements. This study will discuss these arguments under two titles, as there are many overlapping points in the debates on territory, population, and ethnicity. The first of these is territorial boundaries, ethnic population and administration, and the second is religion, language and monumental remnants in the context of cultural elements. In the following part, the myths created by Azerbaijanis and Armenians on Nagorno-

¹⁶⁹ Ohannes Geukjian, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in the South Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Legacy of Soviet Nationalities Policy*, Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2012, p. 29.

Karabakh will be evaluated in the axis of these main discussion topics in the literature.

1. Disputes over Territorial Borders, Ethnic Groups and Governance:

Imagining the Unknowable

a. Armenian View: “We are the First Comers, Settlers and Rulers!”

The stories of the emergence of the first Armenians are based on very old times, even some legends. Armenian historian Movses Khorenatsi (Moses of Khoren), who lived in the 5th century, claimed that the origins of Armenians dated back to Noah and even to Adam. According to this view, the fact that one of the old cities of the Garden of Eden, which was mentioned as the place where Adam and Eve lived in the Bible, was in Armenia, and that the four rivers in this garden still pass through Armenian lands, proves that the origins of the Armenians date back to ancient times. Armenians called themselves “Hayk” and their country “Hayastan” after Hayk (Haik), who came from the sons of Noah. According to Movses Khorenatsi, Hayk saved Armenians from tyranny by breaking them off from the Mesopotamian plateaus and allowing them to move to cold but free mountains.¹⁷⁰

Mount Ararat, where it is believed that Noah’s ark landed, is of great importance for Armenians. In a Persian legend, it is stated that Mount Ararat (located close to Lake Van on the eastern border of what is now Turkey, in the center of Armenia in ancient times) was the cradle of the human race. According to another legend, Armenians are the first human race to appear in the world after the biblical flood.¹⁷¹ In general, elements such as being the first and the initiator of everything dominate in Armenian sources.¹⁷²

According to the researchers who examined the migration movements, with the disappearance of the Assyrians and the Urartu Kingdom as of the 6th century BC, Armenians emerged as a mixture of these groups.¹⁷³ Herzig and Kurkchiyan state

¹⁷⁰ Ara Baliozian, **The Armenians Their History & Culture**, New York: Ararat Press, 1980, pp. 4-5.

¹⁷¹ **Ibid.**

¹⁷² Louise Nalbandian, **The Armenian Revolutionary Movement, The Development of Armenian Political Parties throughout the Nineteenth Century**, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963, p. 2.

¹⁷³ Stephan H. Astourian, “In Search of their Forefathers: National Identity and the Historiography and Politics of the Armenian and Azerbaijani Ethnogenesis” in Donald V. Schwartz and Razmik Panossian (Ed.), **Nationalism and History: The Politics of Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994, p. 44.

that the first Armenian name appeared in the 6th century BC. Today, Armenian culture is the product of an intercultural fusion dominated by Persian, Semitic, and Caucasian peoples in a geography stretching from Eurasia to Western Europe and from there to India.¹⁷⁴

According to Greek historian of the 5th century BC, Herodotus, Armenians, who were originally from Thrace, passed through Thrace to Phrygia in Asia Minor. After settling in Phrygia, they moved to the west of Euphrates River, taking the name Armenia in the future. According to Strabo, a historian and geographer who lived at the end of the first century BC, Armenians came from two directions: from Phrygia in the west and from the south, Zagros region.¹⁷⁵

The word Armenia was first encountered in the Behistun Inscription in 521 BC. In this inscription, Persian King Darius I who reigned between 521-486 BC referred to a tribe that rebelled in Ergani-Elazig as “Armina” and “Arminia”.¹⁷⁶ Darius the Great described the elimination of a threat to the Achaemenid Empire in three languages (Old Persian, Assyrian, and Elamite) in this inscription and for the first time called the lands inhabited by Armenia as Armina or Armaniya.¹⁷⁷ It is claimed that the word “Armanie” comes from the ancient Semitic language and means the land of Ararat. It is also known that other names were given to the region in the past. According to some writers, Assyrians called Armenians Urartu and Hebrews called them as Ararat.¹⁷⁸

Ararat is seen geographically as the center of the Armenian country. It is a symbol of national aspirations and desires. Only once in Armenian history, the whole region was united under the rule of a single king, Tigran the Great (Tigran II, 95 BC-55 BC).¹⁷⁹ After Tigran’s rule, Armenia entered into a cycle of occupation, collapse, and renascence. In the following periods, Armenians managed to create a *modus vivendi* against Persians, Parthians, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, and then Ottomans

¹⁷⁴ Edmung Herzig & Marina Kurkchiyan, **The Armenians Past and Present in the Making of National Identity**, London: Routledge Curzon, 2005, p. 3.

¹⁷⁵ Bournoutian, “**Ermeni Tarihi...**,” p. 23.

¹⁷⁶ Uras, “**Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi...**,” p. 11.

¹⁷⁷ Baliozian, “**The Armenians Their History...**,” p. 6.

¹⁷⁸ A. Hulki Saral, *Ermeni Meselesi*, Ankara: Genelkurmay Bsm, 1970 p. 55 cited in Halil Metin, **Türkiye’nin Siyasi Tarihinde Ermeniler ve Ermeni Olayları**, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1992, p. 11.

¹⁷⁹ Nalbandian, “**The Armenian Revolutionary...**,” p. 2.

and Russians through some diplomatic capabilities, territorial concessions, political compromises, bribery, or extortion.¹⁸⁰

Greek and Roman historians state that Caucasian Albania covered the eastern Caucasus lands in their studies. In these studies, it is recorded that there were interaction between Albanians and Armenians.¹⁸¹ Greek and Roman writers confirm that the lands of Nagorno-Karabakh were part of Armenia until the 5th century AD, and that Kura formed Armenia's northern border and separated it from Caucasian Albania. Among the advocates of this view are Strabo (1st century BC and II century AD), Pliny the Elder (1st century AD), Plutarch (1st-2nd century AD), Ptolemy (2nd century AD), and Dio Cassius (2nd-3rd century AD) can be counted. Some Armenian historians and sources, especially Agathangelos, Koriun, pseudo-P'awstos Buzand (5th century), Gahnamak and Zoranamak documents or Ashkharhatsuits (7th century), and Movses Khorenatsi (5th century) also advocate similar views.¹⁸²

In the studies of Arab and Persian geographers, it is seen that the definition of Albania, like Armenia, changed over time.¹⁸³ Some scholars, such as the 9th century Persian historian and geographer Ibn al-Faqih, claimed that Albania was part of Armenia.¹⁸⁴ However, in the works of Arabs, there is no definition of a great Armenia in which the lands of Armenian, Albania, and Georgia are shown together. In fact, their geographical definitions are ambiguous. According to Arabs, the north is a combination of Armenia, Albania, and Azerbaijan. In many Arabian sources, it is stated that the caliph ruled the North as a single province, and while they usually include Azerbaijan in this geographical definition, they exclude Georgia and do not name the entire northern territory as Armenia.¹⁸⁵

As mentioned above, many Greek and Roman writers such as Strabo, Pliny, Plutarch, Ptolemy, and Dio Cassius stated that the cities of Utik and Artsakh in the Nagorno-Karabakh region until the 5th century AD belonged to Armenians and that Kura River crossed the northern border of Armenia and separated Armenia from

¹⁸⁰ Baliozian, "The Armenians Their History...", p. 11.

¹⁸¹ Encyclopædia Iranica, "Albania" <https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/albania-iranian-aran-arm> (Retrieved on 07.11.2022).

¹⁸² Patrick Donabédian, "History of Karabagh from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century," in Chorbajian, Donabédian, Mutaflan (Ed.), "The Caucasian Knot...", p. 54.

¹⁸³ Alison Vacca, **Non-Muslim Provinces under Early Islam: Islamic Rule and Iranian Legitimacy in Armenia and Caucasian Albania**, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 62.

¹⁸⁴ Ibn Al-Faqih 1885, 291 cited in Vacca, "Non-Muslim Provinces...", p. 64.

¹⁸⁵ Vacca, "Non-Muslim Provinces...", pp. 64-65.

Caucasian Albania.¹⁸⁶ Armenian historian Sebeos mentioned that there were two cities named Tigranakert and founded by the Armenian King Tigran II (95-55 BC): One of them was Artsakh and the other was Utik.¹⁸⁷ In the 7th century AD, Armenian Atlas Ashkharhatsuits showed Artsakh as the 10th province of Greater Armenia, while Utik was shown as the 12th province, and its princes (Gardman, Utik, Second Siunik, and Tsavdek) were recorded as nobles and military persons.¹⁸⁸

According to Armenian scholars, the south of Kura River, where the cities of Utik, Artsakh, and Siunik are located, has been ethnically Armenian since the 6th century BC.¹⁸⁹ They argue that ethnically Armenian cities of Utik, Artsakh, and Siunik, south of the Kura River, were part of the first Armenian Kingdom between the 4th-2nd century BC.¹⁹⁰ Armenians assert that the cities of Utik and Artsakh cover the present day Nagorno-Karabakh lands, and Siunik covers the present Zangezur in Armenia.¹⁹¹

For Armenians, knowing the borders of Caucasian Albania and the people living in this region is very important in terms of proving their existence in the region. Therefore, Armenian historians have made detailed studies on the ethnic origins of the peoples living in Caucasus in ancient times. The map, which was the result of the work of Suren Yeremian, a member of the Armenian Academy of Sciences, which was first published in 1960, edited in 1980, shows the borders of the historical Urartian Kingdom. In this study, it is claimed that Armenian civilization was born in the Urartian lands, which existed between 860-590 BC, stretching from Eastern Anatolia to northwest Iran. This period, when different states were established for 4000 years, is shown as the golden age of Armenian history.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁶ Walker, “**Armenia and Karabagh...**,” pp. 73-74.; Patrick Donabédian, “History of Karabagh from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century,” in Chorbajian, Donabédian, Mutfian (Ed.), “**The Caucasian Knot...**,” p. 53.

¹⁸⁷ Patrick Donabédian, “History of Karabagh from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century,” in Chorbajian, Donabédian, Mutfian (Ed.), “**The Caucasian Knot...**,” p. 53.

¹⁸⁸ **Ibid.**

¹⁸⁹ Armenian Academy of Science, 1988 cited in Nora Dudwick, **Memory, Identity and Politics in Armenia**, University of Pennsylvania, Phd Dissertation, 1994, p. 124.

¹⁹⁰ Dudwick, “**The Case of the Caucasian Albanians...**,” p. 379.

¹⁹¹ **Ibid.**, p. 378.

¹⁹² Suren Yeremian conducted a research on the history of Agvank and Aran (Arran/Aran/Aghvank/Aalan) and the people who lived there in his two-volume study on Soviet history published in 1939. This work is accepted as one of the important studies on the history of Albania. The author examined the borders of Albania for the first time in Soviet historiography in his book titled Atlas, published in 1952. Suren Yeremian, 1980 Suren Yeremian Map of the Ancient

For many Armenian sources, the name “Artsakh” first appeared in the Urartian inscriptions that appeared on the stage of history in the 9th-6th centuries BC.¹⁹³ “Urtekhe” or “Urtekhini” written on these inscriptions to describe the left side of Kura River and the right side of Aras River is considered a predecessor of the name Artsakh, the old name of Karabakh.¹⁹⁴ Armenian historians such as Seboes and Movses Dashkhurantsi argued that the cities of Utik and Artsakh were part of Armenia in the history.¹⁹⁵ Bournoutian states that Urartians formed a new state by uniting different tribes on the Armenian plateau, and that around the 9th century BC, Urartians who introduced themselves as Biaini – also known as the “Kingdom of Van” by some historians – established the first kingdom that would later become Armenia (870-575 BC).¹⁹⁶

Piotrovsky also stated that Urartian Kingdom dominated the Armenian lands in the 9th century BC. Its capital was close to Lake Van¹⁹⁷ and the power of the Urartian state reached beyond South Caucasus.¹⁹⁸ It is claimed that the Urartian Kingdom, which was established between Caspian Sea, Mediterranean, and Black Sea, is called Ararat in Hebrew.¹⁹⁹ In the 8th-7th centuries BC, new groups dominated and occupied Urartian territories. According to Herodotus, these new invaders were Phrygian tribes known as Armenians.²⁰⁰

Despite this view, some sources suggest that Phrygians may actually be associated with Greeks rather than Armenians.²⁰¹ It is argued that as time passed, Armenian-Phrygian tribes imposed their own Indo-European languages on Urartians,

Armenian Kingdom of Urartu Antique.; Edic Baghdasarian, “**Caucasian Albania, Azerbaijan Expansionism and Crime**,” Toronto, ISBN: 978-1-927860-42-7, p. 11.

¹⁹³ Artak Movsisyan, **The Writing Culture of Pre-Christian Armenia**, Yerevan: Yerevan University Publishers, 2006, pp. 263-265.

¹⁹⁴ Walker, “**Armenia and Karabagh...**,” p. 73.

¹⁹⁵ Patrick Donabédian, “History of Karabagh from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century,” in Chorbajian, Donabédian, Mutaflan (Ed.), “**The Caucasian Knot...**,” p. 52.

¹⁹⁶ Bournoutian, “**Ermeni Tarihi...**,” p. 17.

¹⁹⁷ H.R. Hall, *The Ancient History of the Near East*, London, reprinted 1952, pp. 458-459 cited in Nalbandian, “**The Armenian Revolutionary...**,” p. 3.

¹⁹⁸ B. Piotrovsky, “Excavations of the Urartian Citadel on the Karmir-Blur,” Papers Presented by the Soviet Delegation at the XXIII International Congress of Orientalists, Iranian, Armenian and Central-Asian Studies, Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences, 1954, pp. 172-173 cited in Nalbandian, “**The Armenian Revolutionary...**,” p. 3.

¹⁹⁹ Baliozian, “**The Armenians Their History...**,” p. 4.

²⁰⁰ Herodotus, VII, 73 cited in Nalbandian, “**The Armenian Revolutionary...**,” p. 4.

²⁰¹ Robert Ellis, **The Armenian Origin of the Etruscans**, London: Parker, Son, and Bourn, West Strand, 2015, pp. 20-21.

and the mixture of these two peoples created Armenians.²⁰² However, some researchers investigating the mass migration of Armenians in a comparative philological study assert that these migrations probably took place in the middle of the 2nd century BC via Balkans and Aegean region. Therefore, they claim that Urartians, who are an ethnic group settled in the Armenian homeland, are not actually Armenians.²⁰³

After the fall of Urartians (6th century BC), the region passed into the hands of the Medes and Persian Achaemenids.²⁰⁴ The Achaemenid Empire, which ruled between the 6th-3rd centuries BC, has an important place in the history of Albania. As mentioned above, the first reference to Albanians was made in the Battle of Gaugamela (331 BC), which took place between the Achaemenid Emperor Darius III (336-330 BC) and Alexander the Great (336-323 BC).²⁰⁵

Astourian points out the existence of a distinctive people, called Armenians, who directly ruled Nagorno-Karabakh from the 6th century BC until the occupation of the “Artsakh Kingdom” by Sassanids in 424.²⁰⁶ For Sassanids who fought against Byzantine Empire in Caucasus, especially in Armenia, Viruzan and Arran, Albania was a very strategic region like Aturpatakan (Azerbaijani lands in Iranian sources) and Armenia.²⁰⁷ As a result of their struggles with Romans, Sassanids increased their influence over South Caucasus. In 387, the lands of Armenia were divided between Romans and Sassanids, and the right wing of Kura River was included in Albania up to Aras River.²⁰⁸ Thus, after the lands called as “Great Armenia” by Armenian sources were divided between Byzantine Empire and Iran, the cities of Utik, Artsakh, and Siunik passed under Persian control. In 428, Sassanids divided the lands of South Caucasus into three administrations as Iberia, Albania, and Armenia. The cities of

²⁰² René Grousset, *Histoire de l'Arménie, des origines à 1071*, pp. 69-73 cited in Nalbandian, “**The Armenian Revolutionary...**,” p. 4.

²⁰³ Lang, David M. *Armenia: Cradle of Civilization*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970, pp. 91-93. For an elaborated history of Urartu as Armenia's first state formation, see pp. 85-111 cited in Geukjian, “**Ethnicity, Nationalism...**,” p. 21.

²⁰⁴ Patrick Donabédian, “History of Karabagh from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century,” in Chorbajian, Donabédian, Mutaflan (Ed.), “**The Caucasian Knot...**,” p. 52.

²⁰⁵ Kaveh Farrokh, Javier Sanchez-Gracia, Katarzyna Maksymiuk, “Caucasian Albanian Warriors in the Armies of pre-Islamic Iran,” *Historia i Świat*, Vol. 8, 2019, p. 22.

²⁰⁶ Stephan H. Astourian, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Dimensions, Lessons, and Prospects,” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 4, Autumn 1994, p. 87 cited in Chorbajian, “**The Making of Nagorno-Karabakh...**,” p. 33.

²⁰⁷ Farrokh, Sanchez-Gracia, Maksymiuk, “**Caucasian Albanian Warriors...**,” p. 24.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

Albania, Utik, and Artsakh were gathered under a separate administrative unit as “New Albania”.²⁰⁹

Since the beginning of the 7th century, the land of Albania, located to the north of Kura River, was divided into separate principalities. Armenians refer to this large administrative unit, which spreads on both sides of Kura River and generally covers the south, as “New Albania” to distinguish it from Albania in the north of Kura River. Therefore, a significant number of Armenian historians argue that the cities of Utik and Artsakh were not actually part of the Albanian culture. However, according to them, this region was New Albania, which became Armenian over time.²¹⁰ Armenians reduce Albanians to a small piece of land outside of Karabakh and thus oppose the idea that an Albanian ethnic identity is dominant in Karabakh. It is claimed that the Albanian tribes lived outside the cities of Utik, Artsakh, and Siunik. Therefore, they were the first to come to today’s Nagorno-Karabakh and thus introduced it to civilization.²¹¹

While Armenians claim that Armenian Kingdom covers a wide geography including Karabakh and Nakhchivan, Azerbaijanis claim that Albanian Kingdom, including these two regions, is the ancestor of today’s Azerbaijan homeland.²¹² Donabédian rejects the Azerbaijani view that the lands extending between Lake Sevan and Kura River and including Karabakh are the ancestors of Soviet Republic Azerbaijan, not Armenia since ancient times. According to Armenian thesis, Nagorno-Karabakh was under the rule of a local nobleman until the Russian occupation in the 19th century. Armenian (Armenian-Albanian) princes from the end of antiquity to the Middle Age, Armenian meliks from the 16th to the 19th centuries, and Turkish khanates from the mid of the 18th century to the beginning of the 19th century, ruled Nagorno-Karabakh.²¹³ Hewson also states that from the end of the first

²⁰⁹ Dudwick, “**The Case of the Caucasian Albanians...**,” p. 379.

²¹⁰ **Ibid.**

²¹¹ Dudwick, “**Memory, Identity and Politics...**,” p. 125.

²¹² Ceylan Tokluoglu, “The Political Discourse of the Azerbaijani Elite on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (1991–2009),” **Europe-Asia Studies**, Vol. 63, No. 7, 2011, p. 1231.

²¹³ Patrick Donabédian, “History of Karabagh from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century,” in Chorbajian, Donabédian, Mutfian (Ed.), “**The Caucasian Knot...**,” pp. 52-54.

century to the 18th century, the geography was constantly ruled by Armenian elites that were known as meliks by Persians in the 17th century.²¹⁴

Chorbajian claims that the Turkish presence in Karabakh only took place with the Seljuk invasions in the 11th century. He states that before the second half of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, Turks had never ruled Karabakh, did not even experience as statehood before 1918. He argues that Azerbaijani historians oppose the Armenian presence in South Caucasus in a politically motivated way and do not accept the Armenian tradition of statehood. Caucasian Albanians of the southeastern Caucasus converted to Islam and then Turkified, but those in the western part of Albania, including Nagorno-Karabakh, were mostly dominated by Armenians and to a lesser extent by Georgians.²¹⁵

According to Galichian, Azerbaijanis' view that Caucasian Albanians are their ancestors is not only an example of a failure to test historical fact, but also reflects their own contradictions. Galichian states that this claim contradicts the pan-Turkist and Pan-Turanist ideology of Azerbaijanis. According to this ideology, Turkish-speaking Azerbaijanis are of Turkish descent and have Turkish heritage. According to the author, in order to gain the sympathy of Turkey and pan-Turkists, Azerbaijanis claim that Aq Qoyunlu, Qara Qoyunlu, Safavids, and others have Turkish roots and they themselves descend from them. However, these theses contradict the claims of Azerbaijanis that they are descended from Albanians. According to Galichian, this indicates two different origins, both geographically and ethnically.²¹⁶

Last but not least, there are debates as to whether the name "Armenian" or "Armenia" refers to a geographical location or a community. Although it does not mean the country where the people we call Armenians live today, it is only used as a geographical region name, like Anatolia, Mesopotamia. It is argued that when Herodotus and Darius the Great used the name Armenian, they wanted to describe a specific region, not a specific race. Therefore, according to some authors, the name

²¹⁴ Robert Hewson, "The Meliks of Eastern Armenia," *Revue des Etudes Armeniennes*, part I, Vol. IX, 1972; part II, Vol. X, 1973-74; part IV, Vol. XIV, 1980 cited in Chorbajian, **"The Making of Nagorno-Karabagh..."**, p. 33.

²¹⁵ Graham Smith (Ed.), **The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union**, London and New York: Longman, 1990, p. 167; Audrey Altstadt, **The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule**, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992, p. xi, 2-6; Chorbajian, **"The Making of Nagorno-Karabagh..."**, p. 35.

²¹⁶ Galichian, **"The Invention of History, Azerbaijan, Armenia..."** pp. 10-11.

Armenia was used for the region even before the Armenian community settled there.²¹⁷

b. Azerbaijani View: “Arran Was Ours and We Ruled It!”

Some sources claim that Turkish domination in the region called “Agvank” in Armenian sources and “Albania” in Greek and Latin sources began before the emergence of Christianity and lasted for 600 years.²¹⁸ However, Jean-Paul Roux states that the first people to settle in the land of Azerbaijan were Saka Turks (Scythians) who came from Central Asia in the 7th century BC. After Saka Turks, other Turkish tribes came to the region, and some Turkish tribes reached Anatolia by using the Derbent Pass. In his work, Roux points up a Turkish world stretching from the Black Sea to the Pamirs, or at least a Turkish world on the way to Turkification. He speaks of the increasing numbers of nomadic Turks in the steppes of southern Ukraine and characterizes the Sarmatians and Sakas as the heirs of the Scythians.²¹⁹ Sakas played an important role in bringing together tribes politically and in the settlement of new ethnic groups in the region.²²⁰

Azerbaijani ethnicity studies explain the origins of Azerbaijanis with the Median/Atropatenian theory. According to those who argue this, the Medes, who were of Indo-European origin, were one of the powerful states established in the historical lands of northern and southern Azerbaijan.²²¹ According to the Med theory, the origins of Azerbaijanis go back to Iran (southern Azerbaijan). The Medes, who were thought to be the first ancestors of Azerbaijan, as an Indo-European people,

²¹⁷ Yavuz Ercan, **Tarihi Belgelerin Işığında Ermeni İddiaları**, Tarih Boyunca Türklerin Ermeni Toplumu ile İlişkileri Sempozyumu 8-12 October 1984 Erzurum, Ankara, 1985, p. 208.

²¹⁸ Mirza Bala, **Azerbaycan Tarihinde Türk Albanya**, Azerbaycan Kültür Derneği Yayınları 7, Ankara: Ankara Yeni Cezaevi Matbaası, 1951, pp. 4-5.

²¹⁹ Jean-Paul Roux, **Türklerin Tarihi Pasifik’ten Akdeniz’e 2000 Yıl**, İstanbul: Kabalıcı Yayınevi, 2015, p. 156.

²²⁰ Attar, “**Karabağ Sorunu Kapsamında Ermeniler....**,” p. 5.; In the middle of the 7th century BC, the Sakas, the Turkish tribes mentioned by Herodotus, approached the Derbend strait, following the Caucasian mountain ranges, and spread to Asia to aid Assyria against the Media, through the Albanian land. After this expedition that lasted for 28 years, which Herodotus also wrote, Sakas, whose commanders were defeated by the King of Media, returned to their homeland using the same road. Some recent archaeological studies in Northern Azerbaijan suggest that the Sakas did not completely withdraw from the region and perhaps settled in large groups in Albania. It is suggested that geographical names such as Si, Sisakan, Sakasen, and Şaki are evidence of Saka settlements in Albania. Bala, “**Azerbaycan Tarihinde Türk Albanya....**,” p. 17.

²²¹ Charles Van der Leeuw, **Azerbaijan: A Quest for Identity**, London: Curzon Press, 2000, pp. 25-26.

settled around Hamadan and Isfahan, in the eastern regions of today's Iran, in the 9th century BC and established a state.²²²

Although there is no precise information about ethnicities and languages of groups living in Azerbaijan since ancient times, it is claimed that Turkic tribes existed in *Atropatene* in the 3rd and first centuries BC.²²³ According to Altstadt, *Atropatene* was founded by a Persian in the 4th century BC (320 BC) when Alexander the Great reached the southern Azerbaijan.²²⁴ Atropates, a satrap (ruler) of a province of the Medes and a vassal of the Achaemenid Empire, ruled the territory of today's Iranian Azerbaijan. Aras River stretched in the north of the country and included the mountainous part of Caucasian Albania.²²⁵ In fact, as mentioned above, Albanians were under the rule of Atropates in the Battle of Gaugamela, where the name of Albanians was first mentioned, and that the Median Satrapy included the Medes, Sakas, and Cadusians.²²⁶

The name *Atropatene* derives from the name satrap under the Achaemenid Empire and was used to describe the region in Persian in ancient and medieval times.²²⁷ According to Hasanlı, the name *Atropatene* was used mostly by Turks and Arabs to express Iranian Azerbaijan. The region of Azerbaijan in Greek sources, covered an area from Aras River in the north to Hamedan in the south, from the border of Turkey and Iraq in the west to the eastern parts of Zanzan in the east. These boundaries have decreased or expanded over time, but have remained largely unchanged until today.²²⁸

In written sources, the name of Azerbaijan is mentioned for the first time as *Atarpata/Aterepata* in Elam inscriptions and Zoroastrian holy book *Avesta* in 550 BC. Thus, it is claimed that the name Azerbaijan did not come from the name of the person Atropates, the satrap of Media, and it was used as a geographical place name before that. The origin of the name is disputed. It means “mountain country”, “land of fire”, or “land of wealthy gentlemen”. This name has been used since the 4th

²²² Tamara Dragadze, *Azerbaijan*, London: Melisende, 2000, p. 18.

²²³ Zeynalov, “*Le Conflict du Haut-Karabakh...*,” p. 44.

²²⁴ Audrey Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks, Power and Identity under Russian Rule*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992, p. 2.

²²⁵ Antoine Constant, *L'Azerbaïdjan*, Paris: Karthala, 2002, p. 40.

²²⁶ Farrokh, Sanchez-Gracia, Maksymiuk, “*Caucasian Albanian Warriors...*,” p. 22.

²²⁷ Zeynalov, “*Le Conflict du Haut-Karabakh...*,” p. 47.

²²⁸ Cemil Hasanlı, *Soğuk Savaşın İlk Çatışması İran Azerbaycanı*, Ekber N. Necef (trans.), İstanbul: Bağlam, 2005, p. 21.

century BC to cover the entire region.²²⁹ The names *Adurbadagan* or *Adirpatyan*, *Andirpatianu* are known as the first expression of the name Azerbaijan in the Persian language.²³⁰

As mentioned above, there is different definition for the south and north of Azerbaijan. Hasanov also states that the name Azerbaijan was used for the first time with different pronunciations (for example, *Aderbadgan*, *Aderbaygan*, *Azirbican* and *Azerbaijan*) for the territory of southern Azerbaijan, which today constitutes the northern region of Iran. In some Islamic history books, the region up to Derbend is defined as Azerbaijan.²³¹ Caucasian Azerbaijan was mostly called Albania, Aran/Arran and Shirvan in history. However, from the beginning of the 18th century, the geographical definition of Azerbaijan was used to cover both the north and south.²³²

Contrary to Armenian theses, Albania is mentioned as one of the ancient states of Azerbaijan in Azerbaijani sources. Albanian state turned into a centralized state towards the end of the 4th century BC, after Alexander's Empire collapsed. Albanian state was ruled by local families in ancient times. With the name of the first ruler of Albania, this ruling family is known as Arranians in history. However, there is very little information on this.²³³ It is interesting to note that Azerbaijanis refer to Armenian historians to support their theses. Armenians, however, try to verify their arguments by referring to mostly historians of Persian and Arab origin.

Some historians argue that the region between Lake Sevan and Kura River did not belong to Armenia in ancient and medieval times, but to Caucasian Albanians, the ancestors of modern Azerbaijan.²³⁴ The lands of Azerbaijan were the lands of Caucasian Albania to the north of Aras in ancient times.²³⁵ Azeris derive their ethnic origin from the Albanian community, the ancient Caucasian peoples who became Turkic due to the invasions of Turkic tribes from the north of Caspian Sea.²³⁶ Since most of the present Azerbaijan lands formerly belonged to the Kingdom of Albania,

²²⁹ Hasanlı, "Soğuk Savaşın İlk Çatışması...", p. 21.

²³⁰ Zeynalov, "Le Conflict du Haut-Karabakh...", p. 47.

²³¹ Behram Hasanov, *Azərbaycan'da Din Sovyetler'den Bağımsızlığa Hafıza Dönüşümləri*, İstanbul: İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi (İSAM) Yayınları, 2011, p. 17.

²³² Hasanlı, "Soğuk Savaşın İlk Çatışması...", p. 21.

²³³ Vaqif Abışov, *Qədim Azərbaycan dövləti – Albaniya*, No: 18 (1386) 27 yanvar-28 yanvar 2017 <http://web2.anl.az:81/read/page.php?bibid=vtls000525398> (Retrieved on 06.11.2021).

²³⁴ Walker, "Armenia and Karabagh...", p. 74.

²³⁵ Constant, "L'Azerbaïdjan...", p. 9.

²³⁶ Thual, "Le Caucase Arménie...", pp. 87-88.

Azerbaijanis argue that Albanians are their ethnic predecessors/ancestors. Accordingly, they state that Christian inhabitants of today's Karabakh were not Armenians, but descended from Albanians.²³⁷ Therefore, historians who support this view argue that Azerbaijan is the heir of these territories, current Karabakh and its culture, and eastern Armenia (former Siunik).²³⁸

Turkification of the region took quite a long time. When Arabs came to the region, Turkish peoples were an important element of the society. According to some sources, the mixture of those who adopted the religion of Islam among Albanians and the groups that came to the region constituted the Azerbaijani people. Similarities between groups in terms of religion and language accelerated this process.²³⁹ However, before the arrival of Arabs and spread of Islam, the lands of Azerbaijan had already begun to be filled with Turkish tribes, which were effective in the Turkification of the region.²⁴⁰

In ancient and medieval sources, a part of Karabakh is introduced as the land of Gargar.²⁴¹ Gargars were among the largest Azerbaijani tribes that later formed the Albanian Kingdom.²⁴² As one of the Saka tribes, Qajars, whose origins are being discussed as Turkish or Persian, draw attention in terms of being one of the first tribe settled in the region.²⁴³ As a result of the migration and population movements of Sakas, Karabakh, which remained in the heart of the geography in question, became the largest and oldest winter quarters of Turks and a place where Dede Korkut stories were told.²⁴⁴

According to Azerbaijani historiography, Nagorno-Karabakh, previously called Arran, is the Albanian territory of Persian Empire.²⁴⁵ As mentioned above, Armenians claim that the area between Kura and Aras River was historically part of Armenia, while Azerbaijanis claim that they had already settled there. Some of these

²³⁷ Dudwick, "Memory, Identity and Politics...", p. 127.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Zeynalov, "Le Conflict du Haut-Karabakh...", pp. 46-47.

²⁴⁰ Hasanlı, "Soğuk Savaşın İlk Çatışması...", p. 22.

²⁴¹ R. Göyüşov, Karabağ'ın geçmişine seyahet, Bakı, 1993, p. 5 cited in Attar, "Karabağ Sorunu Kapsamında Ermeniler...", p. 5.

²⁴² Attar, "Karabağ Sorunu Kapsamında Ermeniler...", p. 5.

²⁴³ K.G. Aliyev, "K voprosu o gargarah i territorii ih rasseleniya," DAN AzSSR, 1981, N: 1 cited in Attar, "Karabağ Sorunu Kapsamında Ermeniler...", p. 5.

²⁴⁴ Muharrem Ergin, *Dede Korkut Kitabı*, İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 2017.

²⁴⁵ Histoire de l'Arménie de Faustos Bouzandatsi, Erevan, 1953, p. 14 cited in Hadjibeyli Timoutchine, "La question du Haut Karabagh, Un point de vue azerbaïdjanais," *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée*, No. 48-49, 1988.

lands were Nagorno-Karabakh. Albania stretched from Caucasus Mountains to Aras River and Caspian Sea. As mentioned above, it is argued that the area between Kura and Aras River was not reconnected to the Kingdom of Albania after it was divided between Sassanids and Romans in 387 and Armenian over time. Therefore, Albanian kingdom does not cover a separate area from the left bank of Kura River. Azerbaijanis, on the other hand, claim that the lands on the right coastline were occupied and temporarily reconnected to Albania in the 2nd century BC.²⁴⁶

As mentioned above, Seljuks and Safavids existed in Karabakh between the 11th and 18th centuries.²⁴⁷ Since the 11th century, the geography of Iran turned into a geography where there were complex relations between Turks who came to the region later and Persians who were settled. In these centuries, the lands of Azerbaijan and Iran were governed under a single unit. The administration was provided by Turkish-Persians, with representatives of the Oghuz (Western Turkic groups).²⁴⁸ Azerbaijanis underline that in this 800-year long administration, Persian lands were governed by Turks rather than Persian rulers. Among them, there were Seljuks, Qara Qoyuns, Aq Qoyunlus, Safavids, Afshars, and Qajars. Some scholars argue that Turks and Turkic-speaking peoples had a high social class in Persian territories since the occupations in medieval period. It is claimed that there is evidence that even the language used in the courts was Turkish when the Safavids began to rule these territories in the 15th and 16th centuries.²⁴⁹

According to some historians, the khanates in the south and north of Azerbaijan were located in the geography of present-day Iran and were originally Turks. Towards the middle of the 17th century, with the weakening of the central power in Iran, the period of khanates began in Azerbaijan. Shaki Khanate, Karabakh Khanate, and Ganja Khanate were established. Although the majority was consisted

²⁴⁶ Constant, "L'Azerbaïdjan...", pp. 46-47.

²⁴⁷ Since the 18th century, Persians left the region to the Ottomans and Russians, who were in conflict with each other. Alec Rasizade, "L'imbraglio du Karabakh: Une Perspective Azérie," **Centre d'études et de recherches sur le Proche-Orient**, No. 101, 2011, pp. 84-85.

²⁴⁸ Emil Souleimanov & Ondrej Ditrych, "Iran and Azerbaijan, A Contested Neighborhood," **Middle East Policy Council**, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2007, pp. 101-102.

²⁴⁹ Firouzeh Navahandi, "Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan: The Historic Origins of Iranian Foreign Policy," ed. B. Coppieters, *Contested Borders in the Caucasus*, 1996 cited in Souleimanov & Ditrych, "Iran and Azerbaijan...", p. 4.

of Muslim people, there were also a small number of Christians and Jews in the khanates.²⁵⁰

When Armenian and Azerbaijani theses about the borders of Caucasian Albania and the past of Nagorno-Karabakh are examined comparatively, it is seen that there are contradictory historical readings. While Armenians generally deny the history of Albania and claim that Armenians were the first people in this region, Azerbaijanis accept the existence of Caucasian Albania and seem closer to the thesis that the region adopted the religion of Islam and became Turkic over time.

2. Cultural Aspects

a. Religion

i. **Armenian View: “First Christians Were Armenians, so Were the Albanians!”**

Traditionally, the main religions in Caucasus are Islam, Eastern Orthodox among Georgians, Armenian Apostolic Church, and Judaism.²⁵¹ While Sunni Islam is dominant in the north and west of the region known as South Caucasus and in North Caucasus, the Shiite sect is widespread in the southeast of Azerbaijan since this region previously belonged to Persian Empire. Russians and Georgians, including some Ossetians and Abkhazians, are Orthodox. It is possible to meet some very old small Jewish communities in the north and south of Caucasus.²⁵²

Armenians, Georgians, and Albanians, who were under the influence of Zoroastrianism, lived on the territory of Albania. Similar to Persians, Armenians worshiped the sun, moon, fire, water, and earth in the past.²⁵³ As mentioned above, Caucasian Albania met Christianity in the 4th century and the main religion of the kingdom was declared as Christianity. This information is generally accepted among both Azerbaijani and Armenian historians. Although Armenians are affiliated with the Orthodox Christianity sect, along with Russians and Georgians, they differ from

²⁵⁰ Muriel Atkin, *The Khanates of Eastern Caucasus and the origins of the First Russ-Iranian War*, phd dissertation, 1976, Yale University UMI, University Microfilms International, pp. 61-62 cited in Hasanov, “*Azerbaycan’da Din Sovyetler’den...*,” p. 21.

²⁵¹ Encyclopaedia Britannica, “**Caucasian peoples**,” <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Caucasian-peoples> (Retrieved on 16.10.2019).

²⁵² Thual, “*Le Caucase Arménie...*,” p. 20.

²⁵³ Metin, “*Türkiye’nin Siyasi Tarihinde Ermeniler...*,” pp. 19-20.

these two communities as it has a different branch of the Christian faith,²⁵⁴ and theologically, they have little in common with Muslims, with whom they live together for centuries.²⁵⁵

Armenians were the first community to accept Christianity as a state religion. The clergy Tertullian and Eusebius claimed that Christianity was practiced in Armenia at the beginning of the 2nd century. Eusebius mentioned an exchange of letters with religious reference between Jesus Christ and Armenian King Abkar V of Edessa (9-46 AD). In addition, Armenians point to the fact that the tombs of the apostles Bartholomew, Simon, Thaddaeus and Jude were on their land as legendary facts.²⁵⁶

Grigor Lusavorich (also called as Gregory the Illuminator) spread the religion of Christianity among Armenians. From 288 to 301 Gregory the Illuminator was subjected to great torture for rejecting Pagan religion. In 302, he was appointed as bishop and in 303, he founded the Etchmiadzin Cathedral, near Mount Ararat, where the Patriarch, who is the head of the present Armenian Church, is located. It is known that during this period, Gregory the Illuminator spread the messages of Bible to other Caucasian peoples and baptized the kings of Iberia (Georgia) and Albania.²⁵⁷ It is stated that the Albanian church, like the Iberian church, took an oath of allegiance to the Armenian church.²⁵⁸

Church organization in Armenia took place under the influence of the feudal system. The patriarch was Gregory the Illuminator, later the patriarchate began to pass from father to son. In the following period, the church, which became stronger in Armenia, contributed to the formation of a unique Armenian identity. Armenians, who converted to Christianity, thus abandoned their Eastern and Persian heritage and created a distinctive Christian doctrine that enabled them to connect the West.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁴ Hovhannes Hovhannisyan, "Religion and Religious Institutions in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Does the Religious Factor Play a Role?," **Religions in Armenia**, July 23, 2016.

<http://www.v1.religions.am/eng/articles/religion-and-religious-institutions-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict--does-the-religious-factor-play-a-role/> (Retrieved on 11.09.2019).

²⁵⁵ Pipes, "Demographic and Ethnographic...," p. 44.

²⁵⁶ Baliozian, "The Armenians Their History...," p. 30.

²⁵⁷ **Ibid.**

²⁵⁸ Patrick Donabédian, "History of Karabagh from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century," in Chorbajian, Donabédian, Mutaflan (Ed.), "The Caucasian Knot...," p. 57.

²⁵⁹ Bournoutian, "Ermeni Tarihi...," pp. 56-60.

For Armenian leaders, Christianity is a divine belief against Zoroastrianism. Although paganism among Armenians continued to exist for a while after they accepted Christianity, the religion of Christianity was later made compulsory for everyone. Missionaries spread Christianity all over Armenia, Georgia, and Albania.²⁶⁰

Sassanids, who were loyal to the Zoroastrian religion, did not want to leave religious dominance in the region to Christianity easily. As a matter of fact, it is known that Sassanid King Yazdegerd II called Christian peoples to accept the Zoroastrian religion in 449.²⁶¹ However, this call of Yazdegerd led Armenians and Georgians to unite against the Sassanids. Although Armenians and their allies, Albanians and Georgians, were defeated by Sassanids in the Battle of Avarayr in 451, this war had gained a very important place in history in terms of defending Christianity against Zoroastrianism.²⁶²

In the Council of Chalcedon convened in 451, -this is also the year when Armenians completed the translation of Bible- Armenians were called monophysites. According to the monophysites, Jesus did not have two separate natures as human and the divine, but in Mary's womb Jesus existed neither as the divine nor human, but as divine-human.²⁶³ The Albanian, Armenian, and Georgian churches which had similar views on the interpretation of Christianity, joined the Dwin Council convened in the 6th century and rejected the diophysite dogmas of the Council of Chalcedon. By doing this, they distanced themselves from Greek Orthodox understanding.²⁶⁴

In 552, the heads of the Albanian church moved from Derbend in the north to Barda in the south. Thus, the Armenian influence over the Albanian church, whose jurisdiction was extended throughout the cities of Artsakh and Utik, also increased over time.²⁶⁵ It is argued that with this capital change, the official language of the state and the church became Armenian.²⁶⁶ Armenian church emerged and developed

²⁶⁰ Bournoutian, "**Ermeni Tarihi...**," p. 59.

²⁶¹ Farrokh, Sanchez-Gracia, Maksymiuk, "**Caucasian Albanian Warriors...**," p. 26.

²⁶² **Ibid.**, pp. 26-27.

²⁶³ Baliozian, "**The Armenians Their History...**," pp. 31-32.

²⁶⁴ Patrick Donabédian, "History of Karabagh from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century," in Chorbajian, Donabédian, Mutaflan (Ed.), "**The Caucasian Knot...**," p. 57.

²⁶⁵ **Ibid.**

²⁶⁶ It is argued that starting from the 8th century, Armenians gradually engaged in cultural, linguistic, and religious assimilation in Albania, especially in the cities of Utik and Artsakh. The Albanian church was forced to adhere to the Armenian church. However, Albanian ethnic identity was preserved. It is even said that an Albanian renaissance emerged in the 13th century. Dudwick, "**The**

as a separate entity from the Albanian Christian church became more effective afterwards.²⁶⁷

The influence of Christianity began to wane when Caucasian Albania fell into the hands of the Arab caliph in the 7th century. With the arrival of Arabs, Islamization process began.²⁶⁸ In the 8th century, the whole region was now under Arab rule, and after the 11th century, Turkic tribes began to come to South Caucasus in large groups.²⁶⁹ Although the majority of the society converted to Islam and was influenced by Islamic culture, especially those who held the religion of Christianity became increasingly Armenian under the influence of the church.²⁷⁰

Some argue that Albanians converted to Christianity and became Armenian in the first period of their appearance on the stage of history. It is claimed that the Albanian settlement was a direct Armenian settlement.²⁷¹ Chorbaijan argues that Caucasian Albanians were Christianized by Armenians in the 4th century and then Islamized and assimilated by being invaded by Arabs. In the low-lying regions of Southeast Caucasus, the religion of Islam was accepted and then the people living there were Turkified. Armenians to a great extent and Georgians to a lesser extent had an impact on Western Albania, including the region known as Nagorno-Karabakh and these territories remained under the influence of Christianity.²⁷²

Similarly, some scholars argue that the highlands of Nagorno-Karabakh, where the Utik and Artsakh provinces were located, before the advent of Islam, could be described as an Armenianized region rather than being fully Armenian. What is meant by “being Armenian” is to accept the Christian faith and to be close to Armenian culture. Scholars who claim that especially Utik and Artsakh can be strongly associated with Armenians in terms of religion and culture show Armenian churches and historical artifacts dating back to the 4th century in Karabakh as evidence for the presence of Armenians in the region. After Muslim occupations, the

Case of the Caucasian Albanians....,” p. 379.; It is said that the increasing Turkish raids in the 6th-7th centuries had an effect on the relocation of the capital to Barda. Bala, “**Azerbaycan Tarihinde Türk Albanya....**,” p. 10.

²⁶⁷ De Waal, Thomas, *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War*, New York and London: New York University Press, 2003, p. 156 cited in Geukjian, “**Ethnicity, Nationalism....**,” p. 28.

²⁶⁸ Geukjian, “**Ethnicity, Nationalism....**,” pp. 27-28.

²⁶⁹ Dudwick, “**Memory, Identity and Politics....**,” p. 124.

²⁷⁰ Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks*, p. 7 cited in Geukjian, “**Ethnicity, Nationalism....**,” p. 28.

²⁷¹ Krüger, “**The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict....**,” p. 5.

²⁷² Chorbaijan, “**The Making of Nagorno-Karabagh....**,” pp. 34-35.

people living in the mountainous lands of the region adhered to Christian faith, while those living in the steppes converted to Islam.²⁷³

Donabédian argues that in Armenian history, Albania had a religious meaning over time. The first stage was Albania, the former Albania, which was located in the north of Kura River from the 5th century to the 7th century. In the second stage, Albania annexed the southwestern part of Kura River, which was the Armenian territory, to the Albanian territory in the northeast, during Armenianization process. In the third stage, the northeast territories began to be Islamized and come out of the influence of Albanianization. The lands in the southwest were called as Albania. In the fourth and final stage, starting from the year 1000, the name Albania started to be used only by Armenian writers and had a regional and religious meaning. After this date, the definition of Albanian in Armenian sources defined the Christians in the previous Albanian lands. In other words, it referred to Armenians and Armenianized Albanians in the cities of Artsakh and Utik. As a matter of fact, according to Donabédian, Armenian patriarch in the Gandzasar Monastery in Artsakh, although Albania had ceased to exist long before, carried the title of Albanian Cathogigo until the end of the 19th century.²⁷⁴

According to Suny, Albanians were Christianized people close to the Armenians. When the Seljuk Turks reached the region in the 11th century, Albanians in the mountainous regions remained largely Christian. Albanians in the eastern plains towards the Caspian Sea mixed with Turkish peoples and became Muslims.²⁷⁵ According to some sources, the people living in the region known as Karabakh between Kura and Aras Rivers since the 14th century were completely Armenian in terms of language, belief, and culture, and they defined themselves as such.²⁷⁶

Minassian states that both in ancient times and in the middle ages the region consisted of the Armenian principalities of Utik, Siunik, and Artsakh. When these principalities disappeared, Nagorno-Karabakh, which was subordinated to Tatar states or Persians, became an escape place for Christians. The region continued to

²⁷³ Leonidas T. Chrysanthopoulos, **Caucasus Chronicles Nation-Building and Diplomacy in Armenia, 1993-1994**, Princeton: The Gomidas Institute, 2002, p. 8.

²⁷⁴ Patrick Donabédian, "History of Karabagh from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century," in Chorbajian, Donabédian, Mutaflan (Ed.), **"The Caucasian Knot..."** pp. 63-64.; "Cathogigo" means the highest religious and administrative leader of the Armenian church.

²⁷⁵ Ronald G. Suny, "What Happened in Soviet Armenia? Ronald G. Suny interviewed by Joe Stork", **Middle East Report**, No. 153, July-August 1988, p. 37.

²⁷⁶ Chrysanthopoulos, **"Caucasus Chronicles..."** p. 8.

enjoy extensive autonomy with local Armenian aristocrats. According to Minassian, Armenian feudalism in Karabakh lasted until the Russian occupation and disappeared in the 1830s and 1840s. In Minassian's work, the fact that important Armenian writers, artists, intellectuals, clergy and soldiers lived in Nagorno-Karabakh for centuries is presented as an evidence of the Armenian presence in this region.²⁷⁷

ii. Azerbaijani View: "We Are Just Islamized Albanians!"

The lands of Azerbaijan have hosted societies with different belief systems that coexisted in harmony with each other. Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Islam with different sects, Judaism and Orthodoxy were the religions accepted by the peoples living in Azerbaijan.²⁷⁸ As indicated above, it is argued that Azerbaijani people were the Medes in their origin. From the first century BC, different ethnic groups mixed with the Indo-European Medes and became a Persian-speaking community influenced by Persian culture and institutions.²⁷⁹ From a religious point of view, the influence of the Medes on other tribes was quite large. The official religion among the Medes was Zoroastrianism, symbolized by fire.²⁸⁰

Although Azerbaijanis admit that some of Albania was Christianized and Armenian, they argue that the rest was Muslims.²⁸¹ The population in the region converted to Islam between the 5th and 7th centuries. However, the process of being fully Muslim and Turkified continued in the 11th and 12th centuries.²⁸² By the 14th-15th centuries, Sunni-Shafi'i Muslims lived both in Persian lands and in Azerbaijan.²⁸³ After Shiism was accepted as the official sect in the Safavid State at the beginning of the 16th century, it was adopted in the entire part of the Azerbaijan region.²⁸⁴

²⁷⁷ Anahide Ter Minassian, *La République d'Arménie*, Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1989, p. 131.

²⁷⁸ Antoine Constant, *L'État et le Fait Religieux en Azerbaïdjan*, CEMOTI, Cahiers d'Études sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien, No. 38, 2004, pp. 147-169.

²⁷⁹ Stephan H. Astourian, "In Search of their Forefathers: National Identity and the Historiography and Politics of the Armenian and Azerbaijani Ethnogenesis" in Schwartz & Panossian (Ed.), *"Nationalism and History..."*, pp. 54-55.

²⁸⁰ Dragadze, *"Azerbaijan..."*, p. 18.

²⁸¹ Tokluoglu, *"The Political Discourse..."*, p. 1231.

²⁸² Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks*, p. 173 cited in Geukjian, *"Ethnicity, Nationalism..."*, p. 28.

²⁸³ Oqtay Efendiyev, *Azerbaycan Safeviler Dövləti*, Bakı: Azərbaycan Dövlət Neşriyyatı, 1993, p. 49 cited in Hasanov, *"Azerbaycan'da Din Sovyetler'den..."*, p. 18.

²⁸⁴ Hasanov, *"Azerbaycan'da Din Sovyetler'den..."*, pp. 18-19. There were some sectarian conflicts between Ottoman State, which saw itself as the protector of Sunnism, and the Shiite Safavid state.

Artsakh –as Armenians called as such- which was Christianized in the 4th century and a part of the Albanian Kingdom, became a Persian satrap named Arran in the 5th century. During this period, Armenian culture spread to the Artsakh region. The Arab occupation in the 7th century led to an increase in the number of principalities, some of which had been influenced by Armenian and Christian cultures. These groups preserved their identity in the face of the spread of Islam. Therefore, as mentioned, Armenians oppose the claims of Azerbaijanis as being the successors of Christian Albania, and argue that they were the heirs of the Aran/Artsakh region. However, Azerbaijanis claim that Albania was established in the territory of present Azerbaijan, and inherited some cultural elements from them.²⁸⁵

Azerbaijanis object to the argument of Armenians that Artsakh and Utik were Armenian cities. Although these cities were ruled by Armenians for a very short time in the second and first centuries BC, they came under the rule of Albanian Kingdom afterwards. The borders expanded towards Aras River. Some scholars argue that the ancient Albanians had a separate ethnic origin. They state that the first state to accept Christianity in South Caucasus was Albania, not Armenia.²⁸⁶

While the Azerbaijan thesis is that Albanians were their ancestors, Armenians claim that Albanian population in Karabakh was Christian and therefore Armenian. This claim tried to be disproved by the 12th century writer Kirakos Gandzaketsi, Armenian historian of the 13th century, who made a distinction between Albanians and Armenians. Kirakos Gandzaketsi made a distinction between Albania and Armenia. According to him, in the 13th-14th centuries, Karabakh was a region with mountainous and flat regions, located in the center of Arran, and had no relation with Armenia. The Christian population of the region was Albanian.²⁸⁷

Armenians, opposing the claims of Albanian heritage of Azerbaijanis, define Azerbaijani ethnicity on the basis of Islam in general. Some of them even see Azerbaijanis, who were introduced to Islam by Arabs, as groups who were joined some Persian-speaking communities consisting of Kurds, Tats, and Talyshs.

²⁸⁵ Rasizade, “L’imbroglio du Karabakh...,” p. 84.

²⁸⁶ Dudwick, “Memory, Identity and Politics...,” p. 126.

²⁸⁷ Piriev, “Le Karabagh, Ame de l’Azerbaidjan...,” p. 63.

According to them, Azerbaijanis were just Iranianized or Islamized Armenians, Georgians, and Albanians.²⁸⁸

b. Language

i. Armenian View: “We Created the First Alphabet!”

Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh speak the eastern dialect of Armenian. Turks, called Caucasian Tatars or Azerbaijanis, are located in the lowlands of the northern and eastern regions, and speak the Turkish language called Azerbaijani.²⁸⁹

In the field of language and culture, both Azerbaijani and Armenian historians seek to establish linguistic connections with their own ethnic groups and produce theses that exclude the other from Nagorno-Karabakh.²⁹⁰ The representation of the past and the legendary expression of their origins dominate the discourse of Armenian nationalism. As mentioned in the previous sections, Armenians claim that their origins date back to the Urartians, who ruled from 900 to 600 BC and spoke the language of Hurrians. Based on this linguistic similarity, it is argued that the regions once dominated by Urartians were Armenian.²⁹¹

The Greek historian Strabo wrote that Albania was a confederation in which 26 languages were spoken. These languages are from the Iberian-Caucasian language family. It is known that the dynasty that ruled these territories in the second and first centuries BC was a Persian Parthian government, as in Armenia. The Parthian Empire gave a wide autonomy to the provinces. However, Persian rulers also tried to impose their own culture on the native Caucasians and they mixed with the peoples over time. It is known that local rulers in the region managed to stay in power by accepting Roman and Persian vassal dominance in the later periods.²⁹²

The Armenian language has always attracted the special attention of philologists, because it is the only representative of a different branch of the Indo-European language family, most likely the Thracian branch spoken by the Urartians.

²⁸⁸ Dudwick, “**Memory, Identity and Politics...**,” p. 128.

²⁸⁹ Patrick Donabédian, “History of Karabagh from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century,” in Chorbajian, Donabédian, Mutaflan (Ed.), “**The Caucasian Knot...**,” p. 52.

²⁹⁰ Tokluoglu, “**The Political Discourse...**,” p. 1231.

²⁹¹ Levon Abrahamian, “Mother Tongue: Linguistic Nationalism and the Cult of Translation in Postcommunist Armenia,” **Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series**, Summer 1998, pp. 6-7.

²⁹² Constant, “**L’Azerbaïdjan...**,” p. 46.

An alphabet of 36-37 letters (two separate signs were added later) was created by Mesrop Mashtots around 400 AD. Mesrop Mashtots also created the Georgian and Albanian alphabets.²⁹³ As a result of Mashtots' studies, a Georgian alphabet of 36 letters and an Albanian alphabet of 52 letters in 422 were created between the years 409-411. Mashtots aimed to create an alphabet, which could be suitable for every language. He also developed learning methods for the translation of Bible.²⁹⁴ Referring to the activities of Mashtots, Armenians state that historical, legal, and religious literature of Albania was written in Armenian language, as if it was proof that New Albania was Armenianized.²⁹⁵

Threat perceived from other states and fear of assimilation played an important role behind the desire of Armenians to create an alphabet. When the kingdom, which was shared between Sassanids and Byzantines in 428, called the "Artsakh Kingdom" by Armenians, but usually referred to as the Kingdom of Albania in many sources, disappeared, Armenians faced the threat of converting to Zoroastrianism by Persians and assimilation by Greeks. Therefore, Bible was distributed and verbally explained in the Armenian lands. In other words, under these conditions, transcription of the Armenian language and translation of Bible into the Armenian language were seen as a necessity.²⁹⁶

Some researchers argue that there was already an alphabet in Caucasian Albania before Mesrop Mashtots renewed the alphabet and created a new one in the 5th century.²⁹⁷ The expression "renewal" used by the biographer of Mashtots, Koryun, is shown as evidence that an alphabet had already being used in Caucasian Albania, although not many works remain today. As a matter of fact, in 1937, Professor Ilya Abuladze found an Albanian script in an Armenian manuscript of the 5th century BC. Albania used Aramaic script and language, the lingua franca in the Middle East, including Armenia and Iberia. It is known that the language and written

²⁹³ Baliozian, "**The Armenians Their History...**," p. 38.

²⁹⁴ Jean-Pierre Mahé, a philologist and historian of Caucasus, revealed the similarities of the three Caucasian alphabets, Albanian, Georgian, and Armenian. Marianne Beerle-Moor, "Bible Translation as Witness to a Forgotten Language: The case of Caucasian Albanian," in Marianne Beerle-Moor & Vitaly Voinov (Ed.), **Language Vitality through Bible Translation**, New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2015, p. 191.

²⁹⁵ Dudwick, "**The Case of the Caucasian Albanians...**," p. 380.

²⁹⁶ Beerle-Moor, "**Bible Translation...**," p. 190.

²⁹⁷ Murtazali S. Gadjevi, "The Writings of Caucasian Albania Facts and Falsifications," in Philip L. Kohl, Mara Kozelsky, Nachman Ben-Yehuda (Ed.), **Selective Remembrances: Archaeology in the Construction, Commemoration, and Consecration of National Pasts**, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007, p. 104.

works as well as the records for foreign affairs in Albania under the rule of Parthian Dynasty from the end of the 3rd century BC to the beginning of the 3rd century AD, were Parthian, and the system is based on Aramaic writing. Although the alphabet created by Armenians was used in Albania, Persians continued to have a great influence on language and writing in early medieval Albania.²⁹⁸

It is stated that Ancient Armenian sources were influential in the compilation of paragraphs from the holy book during the worship in Caucasian Albanian churches. Old Albanian inscriptions are in harmony with old Armenian syntax. The similarity of the alphabet used in Caucasian Albanian writings to the Armenian alphabet draws attention, and it is claimed that most of the words in technical or religious expressions such as public, synagogue, church, teacher are taken from old Armenian or modeled from it.²⁹⁹

Considering Nagorno-Karabakh in particular, Armenians claim that they always existed in the lands extending from the right tributary of Kura River. Armenian scholars argue that for the 7th and 8th centuries, there was an Armenian dialect spoken in Artsakh. In a grammar book, an Armenian writer named Stepanos Siunetsi mentioned one of the dialects, which was Artsakhian. This dialect was also restated in the work of the thinker named Essayi Nshetsi in the 14th century. It is argued that the Armenian dialect in Nagorno-Karabakh was quite strong and one of the most important Armenian dialects in terms of both the area it covered and the number of speakers.³⁰⁰

As can be seen, the claims of Armenians to be the first settler in the region also manifest themselves in the field of language. According to Armenians, all elements belonging to Albania are actually Armenians. Furthermore, in Nagorno-Karabakh, linguistically and culturally, being Armenian has its own unique elements.

²⁹⁸ Murtazali S. Gadjiev, "The Writings of Caucasian Albania Facts and Falsifications," in Kohl, Kozelsky, Ben-Yehuda, "**Selective Remembrances...**," pp. 104-106.

²⁹⁹ Jost Gippert & Wolfgang Schulze, "Some Remarks on the Caucasian Albanian Palimpsests," **Iran & the Caucasus**, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2007, pp. 207-210.

³⁰⁰ Patrick Donabédian, "History of Karabagh from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century," in Chorbajian, Donabédian, Mutfian (Ed.), "**The Caucasian Knot...**," pp. 57-58.

ii. **Azerbaijani View: “Albanians Had Their Own Alphabet and Language!”**

Azerbaijani historians and some Russian ethnographers state that non-Armenian communities were settled in Caucasian Albania and it is not correct to describe the Karabakh population (Albania) as simply “Armenian” in terms of cultural and linguistic elements. *“The population of Karabakh (Albania), which practiced Armenian-Gregorian faith, but who were descendants of mountainous and Turkic tribes, and who Armenianized only 3–4 centuries ago.”*³⁰¹ It is also claimed that these people were Gregorian Turks, those who chose Armenian religion and language. According to historians close to the Azerbaijani view, very few of the Albanian tribes, which were taken control by the Turkish tribes that came to the region in the 11th century, remained Armenianized or Georgian. The ethnic argument of Azerbaijan in the region is based on common religion, Turkish-speaking tribes, Islamized Persian speaking groups, Islamized Armenians and Georgians, and Armenianized and Georgianized Albanians under Persian influence.³⁰²

It is argued that Kingdom of Albania was at a high level of civilization equal to Armenia and Georgia and had their own language, alphabet, and literature.³⁰³ Armenians emphasize that Albanian tribes lacked a common language and alphabet, but Armenians had. Azerbaijanis argue that Albanians were as civilized as Armenians were in terms of language and culture in the region. While the defenders of the Azerbaijan thesis portray Albanians as a single and highly civilized people, they are actually trying to refute the Armenians’ claims of being the “first”.³⁰⁴

Albanian language is very close to the language of the ethnic group known today as Udis in Azerbaijan.³⁰⁵ It is argued that the language of Udis is a dialect of Albanians.³⁰⁶ It is claimed that the Udi ethnic group is descendant of Albanians.³⁰⁷

³⁰¹ Adil Baguirov, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Competing Legal, Historic and Economic Claims in Political, Academic and Media Discourses,” **Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs**, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2012, p. 142.

³⁰² Dudwick, “**The Case of the Caucasian Albanians...**,” p. 378.

³⁰³ Dudwick, “**Memory, Identity and Politics...**,” p. 126.

³⁰⁴ **Ibid.**, p. 127.

³⁰⁵ Murtazali S. Gadjiev, “The Writings of Caucasian Albania Facts and Falsifications,” in Kohl, Kozelsky, Ben-Yehuda, “**Selective Remembrances...**,” p. 100.

³⁰⁶ According to Arab sources, Aran (Albania) is a state with its own people and language. Arabic and Persian were often used by merchants and property owners. The Turkish language, Azerbaijani, replaced the Albanian language, but the Arabic alphabet continued to be used. However, according to Azerbaijani sources, written sources and literary works were systematically eliminated at the beginning of the 8th century. Zeynalov, “**Le Conflict du Haut-Karabakh...**,” p. 43.

Linguists argue that the Udi language, which is an Iberian-Caucasian language and very close to the language spoken in the city of Utik, is still spoken in western Azerbaijan. In 1938, a 52-character alphabet used on the tablets was found in the Mingachevir region.³⁰⁸ These findings in Mingachevir revealed that Albanians had already their own language and a proper alphabet.³⁰⁹

According to Azerbaijanis, there is not any written works in the Albanian language, because Armenians first translated the originals and then destroyed them. Mesrop Mashtots provided Albanians an alphabet, but consequently Albanian language was lost. Azerbaijanis accuse Armenians of presenting Albanian culture as a part of their own culture. Azerbaijani researchers argue that some Albanian inscriptions exist, but criticize that none of them have survived. There are very few inscriptions left in Albania from the 6th and 7th centuries, especially in the north of Kura. According to them, Armenian gradually replaced Albanian as the language of the church and state.³¹⁰

Azerbaijanis further claim that the Albanian church was forced to join the Armenian church and that Armenians assimilated Albanians starting from the 8th century. According to Azerbaijanis, Albanians experienced a brief renaissance at the beginning of the 13th century. The Gandzasar Monastery was built during this period, with Albanian historians such as Moses Kalankatuatsi and Mkhitar Gosh leaving important written works. These proved that Albanians were an advanced civilization. However, Armenians claim that the history and culture of Albania belongs to them, because they created the alphabet and argue that both the architectural and written works of the Karabakh region are evidence of their very ancient presence in the region. They argue that these works were produced after Armenians converted to Christianity.³¹¹

³⁰⁷ The last members of this group lived in northern Azerbaijan until 1988, are now located in a village in Georgia. Patrick Donabédian, "History of Karabagh from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century," in Chorbajian, Donabédian, Mutfian (Ed.), **"The Caucasian Knot..."** p. 57.

³⁰⁸ Constant, **"L'Azerbaïdjan..."** p. 47.

³⁰⁹ Zeynalov, **"Le Conflict du Haut-Karabakh..."** pp. 42-43.

³¹⁰ Patrick Donabédian, "History of Karabagh from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century," in Chorbajian, Donabédian, Mutfian (Ed.), **"The Caucasian Knot..."** p. 57.

³¹¹ Dudwick, **"Memory, Identity and Politics..."** pp. 129-130.

c. Monuments and Stone Crosses

i. Armenian View: “The Khachkars Proved We Were There!”

Armenians try to prove their existence in Nagorno-Karabakh with some architectural and monumental works. Armenians aim to strengthen their claims on the region through some monastic architectural structures such as Dadivank and Gandzasar Monasteries (13th century) as mentioned above, churches, castles and finally, as mentioned above, khachkars that were built in the region from the 6th century to the 8th century.³¹²

Khachkars, a carved, memorial stele bearing a cross are monumental stones that have an important place in Armenian culture. Antique or medieval crosses have survived to the present day, usually in the form of carvings of stones. Most of them, “cross stones”, are called khachkar in the Armenian language. Armenians claim that there are tens of thousands of these monumental stones in places where they lived. These stones are generally used as tombstones, monuments, and decorations in religious buildings or cemeteries. In ancient times, khachkars were carved more simply, but by the middle ages more details and decorative ornaments were seen on these stones. During this period, various geometric and floral images were added to both crosses and their backgrounds.³¹³

Khachkars are known as one of the five important elements in Armenian identity - the others are the world as a garden depiction, holy mountain, temple, and book.³¹⁴ The conversion of Armenians from Zoroastrianism to Christianity as of the 4th century, and the acceptance of Christianity as a state religion by the influence of the Armenian Apostolic Church in 301 opened a new era in national consciousness. During this period, Armenians defined themselves as different from Zoroastrians for several reasons. These include the discovery of Armenian alphabet, the abolition of previous pagan churches, and the appointment of Gregory the Illuminator as the head of Armenian Church. Gregory the Illuminator gave instructions for the construction of the first khachkar in order to reveal the difference of Armenian identity and protect it. It was believed that the cross on khachkars was a symbol for mediation

³¹² Chorbajian, “**The Making of Nagorno-Karabagh...**,” p. 33.

³¹³ Galichian, “**The Invention of History, Azerbaijan, Armenia...**” p. 65.

³¹⁴ Levon Abrahamyan and Nancy Sweezy, *Armenian Folk Arts, Culture and Identity, USA*: Indiana University Press, 2001, p. 38. cited in Lilit Mnatsakanyan, **The Stone Lab: Decoding Shikahogh Khachkars**, Westminster Research, Master Thesis, March 2007, p. 9.

between Christianity and paganism. Over time, Khachkars were recognized as a unique Armenian artifact that appeared everywhere, in cemeteries, monasteries, cathedrals, residences and roadsides.³¹⁵

With the creation of the Armenian alphabet, which replaced the Aramaic and Greek alphabets, many plants, geometric shapes, and religious figures were carved on the Khachkar stones on which Armenian writings were written. Khachkars symbolized the end of Arab domination and the formation of a new national identity. For Armenians, Khachkars are not just monumental stones; it is a story of how they defend their identity through their beliefs.³¹⁶

Khachkars, one of the most important elements of historical memory among Armenians, have been revealed in Georgia, Agvank in the South Caucasus, Volga basin and Crimea, Moldavia, Carpathians, Iran, Jerusalem and many other places, especially through the work of the diaspora.³¹⁷ Outside the territory of Armenia, khachkars first appeared as small wall khachkars around Cilicia and Jerusalem in the 12th century. In Cilicia, 8-9 plates with the sign of the cross were found. In Jerusalem, 287 wall khachkars were found.³¹⁸

On a Khachkar found in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1182, the following is written: *“Following good Lord’s guidance and graces, and the relentless power he has put in my arms, I departed to the land of the unknown and put to work all my skills, all my resources to find and bring about this blessed Khachkar, that is a manifest of my unshakable belief in the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost.”*³¹⁹ This inscription is considered very important, because the word Khachkar was used for the first time in Nagorno-Karabakh region. The inscription was excavated from a place called Azu, whose exact location is currently unknown, and was later transferred to Dadivank and placed there, although the transport and technical details are unclear.³²⁰

³¹⁵ Mnatsakanyan, “**The Stone Lab...**,” pp. 16-17.

³¹⁶ Adriano A. Novello, *Armenians: 2000 Years of Art and Architecture*, France, 1995, p. 272 cited in Mnatsakanyan, “**The Stone Lab...**,” p. 17.

³¹⁷ Mnatsakanyan, “**The Stone Lab...**,” p. 30.

³¹⁸ Patrick Donabédian, **Small Mural Khachkars in Medieval Armenian Communities of Crimea, Galicia, Podolia, and Bessarabia**, On the borderline between the East and the West. Materials of the International conference dedicated to the 90th anniversary of Y. Dashkevych, Dec 2016, Lviv/Lvov, Ukraine, p. 324.

³¹⁹ Mnatsakanyan, “**The Stone Lab...**,” p. 48.

³²⁰ **Ibid.**

During the Artsakh archaeological exploration carried out by the Archeology and Ethnography Institute of Armenian Academy of Sciences from 2006 to 2011, it was recorded that many khachkars with the sign of a cross in a ring on the upper parts were found in the city of Tigranakert in the former Artsakh territory.³²¹ In addition, in a place close to Tigranakert, Christian burial temples with circled crosses were found. The true path of the crucified Jesus, which metaphorically symbolizes the path to salvation, is depicted on these khachkars as a pilgrimage. It is known that crosses are also found on the walls of churches, on the exterior parts of churches and in cemeteries. In the burial temples at Tigranakert, it is seen that there are Greek or Armenian inscriptions on the fully circled or semi-circled crosses. In addition, they are decorated with some bird and flower pictures.³²² It is noted that a stone with sign of a Cross circled was found in the Holy Hakob Metsaranits, the most famous monastery of Artsakh.³²³

ii. Azerbaijani View: “All Are Part of Albanian History!”

At a conference held in Baku in 1985, Azeri archaeologist Davud A. Akhundov stated that the Armenian khachkars found in Nagorno-Karabakh are actually Albanian monuments.³²⁴ According to this view, the names of stones on which typical and distinctive Armenian crosses were engraved changed from the word “khach-kar” to “khach-dash”. This situation is a product of the effort to replace Armenian names with Turkish ones. Thus, the first word khach (meaning cross in Armenian) was preserved, but the second word, “dash”, that is, “stone” in Azerbaijani language was altered.³²⁵

As mentioned above, Armenian researchers state that a Christian Albanian-Azerbaijani culture consists of the artifacts and monuments of Armenians. It is claimed that these include churches with Armenian inscriptions and numerous khachkars, which are similar to those in the rest of Armenia. Armenian writers state that Khachkars are monumental stones reflecting Armenian art. Medieval historians

³²¹ Hamlet Petrosyan, “Similarities Between The Early Christian Armenian Monuments And Irish High Crosses in The Light of New Discoveries,” in Maxim Fomin, Alvard Jivanyan, Séamus Mac Mathúna (Ed.), **Ireland and Armenia: Studies in Language, History and Narrative**, Washington D. C. Journal of Indo-European Studies, 2012, pp. 171-172.

³²² *Ibid.*, p. 172.

³²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 172-174.

³²⁴ Pavel M. Dolukhanov, “Archaeology in Russia and its Impact on Archaeological Theory,” in Peter J. Ucko (Ed.), **Theory in Archaeology: A World Perspective**, London: Routledge, 2005, pp. 330-331.

³²⁵ Galichian, “**The Invention of History, Azerbaijan, Armenia...**” p. 9.

Movses Daskhurantsi, Mkhitar Gosh (12th century) and Krakos Gandzaketsi (13th century) stated that these stones reflected the Armenian identity. According to Armenians, Azerbaijanis argue that the cultural and societal ties of this geography with Armenia have not existed historically, and that it is only about being Albanian, which can be related to being Azerbaijani.³²⁶

According to Galichian, Azerbaijan try to convince the new generation, through state propaganda, official literature, and textbooks and history books, that Armenians came to the region later and took the lands from Azerbaijanis, who were formerly natives of the region. As mentioned above, Azerbaijanis claim that they are descendants of Albanians who were previously Christians. By doing so, they aim to prove that the remaining Christian monumental remnants are not Armenian, but Albanian.³²⁷ Armenians rejected this thesis and argued that Azerbaijanis destroyed the monumental remnants and artifacts including khachkars in the region.³²⁸

According to Azerbaijanis, Armenians continued the policy of deliberately destroying the architectural heritage belonging to Azerbaijan after the occupation. As can be seen in the cultural appearance of Shusha and the settlements in Karabakh, by damaging the statues, changing their architectural features and doing some “archaeological” excavations, Armenians try to remove everything that gives information about the origin of Azerbaijanis.³²⁹ As can be seen, Azerbaijan and Armenia are making statements accusing each other about the destruction of monuments and architectural works. Both sides argue that historical monuments were built by their own communities, but destroyed by the other; the presence of these monumental stones or other architectural elements is shown as evidences for the existence of their respective communities in the region for a long time.

³²⁶ Patrick Donabédian, “History of Karabagh from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century,” in Chorbajian, Donabédian, Mutaflan (Ed.), *“The Caucasian Knot...”* p. 64.

³²⁷ Galichian, *“The Invention of History, Azerbaijan, Armenia...”* pp. 9-10.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.; Armenian sources claim that Khachkars in the cemetery in Julfa region in Nakhchivan were dismembered, then transported by land, and some were loaded into trucks and dumped into the Aras River. *Ibid.*, pp. 87.

³²⁹ UNESCO Republic of Azerbaijan, **“Destruction and desecration of Azerbaijani historical and cultural heritage resulting from the continuing aggression of the Republic of Armenia against the Republic of Azerbaijan,”**

http://www.unesco.az/files/image/files/Destruction_of_Azerbaijani_cultural_heritage.pdf (Retrieved on 28.05.2020).

d. Shared Views and Disagreements

The historical readings of Azerbaijan and Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh with different geographical definitions and imaginations contradict each other. The thesis that the region was under the rule of Caucasian Albania in the past, that Caucasian Albanians were neither Azerbaijani nor Armenian, but that they joined these two ethnic communities by converting to Christianity and then adopting the religion of Islam, seems the most reasonable explanation. Christianity was accepted earlier in the region and Armenians contributed to the historical and cultural history of the region for centuries. The existence of Turkic communities at the administrative level shows that principalities and khanates developed under Turkish influence, but at the society level, these communities lived together for centuries.

Understanding the nature of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict requires an awareness of political aims and implications of this contentious reading of history. In making this evaluation, it is useful to determine the differences of opinion between the parties.

In Table 1.5, the views of Armenian and Azerbaijani historians and researchers on the history of Albania are given in a comparative form:

Table 1.5. Armenian and Azerbaijani views on the history of Albania³³⁰

	ARMENIAN VIEW	AZERBAIJANI VIEW
	TERRITORY	
	* The south of Kura River, where the cities of Utik, Artsakh, and Siunik were located, was ethnically Armenian since the 4th century BC. * Nagorno-Karabakh lands were part of Armenia, and Kura River, which formed the northern border of Armenia, separated the Armenian lands from Caucasian Albania. * Starting from the 6th century BC until the occupation of “Artsakh Kingdom” by Sassanids in 424, there was a people called Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh * In 428, Sassanids divided the lands of South Caucasus into three administrations as Iberia, Albania, and Armenia, and the cities of Albania, Utik and Artsakh were gathered under a separate administrative unit as “New Albania”. * The cities of Utik and Artsakh were not part of the Albanian culture, this region was New Albania, which became Armenian over time.	* Although the cities of Utik and Artsakh were ruled by Armenians for a very short time in the second and first centuries BC, they came under the rule of Albanian Kingdom after a very short time. * The lands of Azerbaijan were the lands of Caucasian Albania to the north of Aras in ancient times. The region between Lake Sevan and Kura River did not belong to Armenia in ancient and medieval times, but to Caucasian Albanians, the ancestors of modern Azerbaijan. * Since most of the present Azerbaijan lands belonged to Albanian Kingdom, Azerbaijanis argue that Albanians were their ethnic predecessors/ancestors. Azeris’ ethnic origins root in Albanian community, the ancient Caucasian peoples who became Turkic due to the invasions of Turkic tribes from the north of Caspian Sea.
	RELIGION	
	* Armenians were the first community to adopt Christianity as a state religion. * Albanians converted to Christianity and became Armenian in the first period of their appearance on the stage of history.	* The first group to accept Christianity in South Caucasus was Albanians, not Armenians. * Although a part of Albania become Christianized and Armenian, the rest remained Muslim.
	LANGUAGE	
	* The Albanian alphabet was created by Armenians. * The historical, legal, and religious literature of Albania was written in Armenian language, as if it were proof that new Albania was Armenianized.	* Albanians already had their own language and alphabet before Armenians created the alphabet. * The reason why there are no written works in the Albanian language is that Armenians first translated them and then destroyed the originals. * Starting from the 8th century, Armenians began to assimilate Albanians.
	KHACHKARS MONUMENTS	
	* Khachkars, monuments and various architectural works with Armenian expressions and Christian symbols on them are proof that Nagorno-Karabakh geography belonged to Armenians in history.	* Artifacts on the territory of Albania belonged to the history of Albania. The history of Albania is also the history of Azerbaijan. Armenians lay claim to the Albanian culture.

³³⁰ Compiled from the works of the authors referenced in this chapter.

B. The Dynamics of Politicization of Ethnicity in Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

1. The Legacy of Soviet Policies towards Ethnic Groups

The influence of Soviet policies and structures in the frozen conflict zones of South Caucasus, including Nagorno-Karabakh, is undeniable. The indigenization policy implemented within the scope of the nationality policy of the USSR - first united the people defined by certain ethnicity categories, gave them a sense of belonging and identity, and then aimed to create a Soviet man. In addition, as the borders were drawn with an arbitrary “divide and rule” understanding, the instability in the former Soviet geography became inevitable. USSR could not unite all nationalities within the framework of the concept of Soviet people, but it was very effective in making peoples conscious of their own identities and separating them from each other.

In South Caucasus, there were no social cleavages, which were artificially created before the Tsarist Russia and the USSR rule among the peoples. The political, social, cultural, and linguistic policies of the USSR, which followed the Russification/Slavicization policy of Tsarist Russia mostly over ethnic and religious elements and progressed rapidly towards the purpose of Sovietization, ultimately exacerbated the elements of conflict between ethnic groups and led to their re-emergence in the post-Soviet period.

In this section, the policies of Soviet Union towards ethnic groups will be discussed in terms of their effects on the politicization of ethnicity in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These policies will be discussed under the titles of “divide and rule”, “nationalities policy” and “Sovietization”.

a. Divide and Rule Policy

The main ethnic groups in the USSR were Slavs and Turco-Tatars. Slavs were divided among themselves as Russians, Ukrainians and White Russians and covered most of the European and Siberian parts of the country. White Russians and Ukrainians were generally located in the west and southwest. Turco-Tatars such as Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, and Kazakhs were the main inhabitants of Central Asia, while Tatars were settled in Crimea. Tatars and Bashkirs lived along Volga River.

Turks lived in the eastern Transcaucasia. Armenians, Georgians, Chechens, and Ossetians were settled beyond Caucasus Mountains.³³¹

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) had mixed status in terms of nations. Some “nations” had become independent states. These were federated republics. Others were in the form of “autonomous republics”, which had the appearance of a small state, but were not sovereign, on the grounds that they had smaller structures and did not meet necessary conditions for independence. Some “nations” were recognized as ethnographic groups and protected their cultures and national lands, even though they could not become a nation suitable for definitions due to their ethnic characteristics. These groups had opportunity to maintain their national culture under the name of “autonomous region” or “national territory”. Republics were equal before the law. There was no legal obstacle for them to leave the union whenever they wanted. However, under the centralized Soviet rule, no one dared to exercise this right.³³²

Ethnic conflicts in Caucasus derive their origins from the political modernization process that lasted throughout the 20th century. The political modernization policies of Soviets led to the creation of ethnically defined homelands that received the status of autonomous regions or union republics. National communities were defined as peoples with political privileges forming the Soviet federal structure in ethnically defined federated states. The politicization of ethnicity through the discriminatory distribution of political privileges to ethnic groups has brought the right of self-determination of these nations to some extent. Many objective criteria among ethnic groups, such as the size of the population and its position in the USSR, actually show that there is an inequality between them. For example, large nations such as Tatars or Chechens, who were not in the external borders of the USSR, could not have union republic status due to political and security concerns.³³³

In the USSR, which consisted of multinational and mixed communities, nationalism based on territoriality could have dangerous consequences if not

³³¹ Chauncy D. Harris, “Ethnic Groups in Cities of the Soviet Union,” **Geographical Review**, Vol. 35, No. 3, July 1945, p. 466.

³³² Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, **Parçalanın İmparatorluk**, İstanbul: Sisav Yayınları, 1984, pp. 29-30.

³³³ Bruno Coppieters, “The Politicisation and Securitisation of Ethnicity: The Case of the Southern Caucasus,” **Civil Wars**, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2007, pp. 79-80.

prevented. Therefore, Stalin and post-Stalin regimes avoided giving full national status to communities. This policy was based on granting temporary privileges to large groups, but actually propagated “unity” with the aim of spreading Russian culture.³³⁴

Within the applied regional autonomy system, Bolsheviks did not want Soviet citizens to identify themselves with their ethnic origins and to express this identification collectively. Soviet rulers prevented bourgeois leaders to lead the nationalist movements. Therefore, Lenin and the first Bolshevik leaders opposed any federative structure organized as ethnic geographical units. Stalin’s dream was geographical units that were ethnically neutralized, completely free of ethnic ties, had class consciousness, and served a universal identity. This assimilation-based policy was intended to replace nationalism, which had proven to bring hostility and conflict in the past. Based on this Soviet policy, the largest minority groups, including Armenians and Azerbaijanis, were organized into republics and their cultural and linguistic rights and territorial status were guaranteed. Smaller minorities were designed as autonomous republics and regions or as autonomous oblasts within other union republics such as Nagorno-Karabakh.³³⁵

Stalin regionalized and politicized nationalism by making ethnic identity and ownership of land the basis of access to power and services. Stalin deliberately placed in each republic one or more minorities who needed Moscow’s protection so that they would serve as Moscow’s agents. In the context of Azerbaijan and Armenian SSR, firstly, with the “divide and rule” approach, Moscow enabled Azerbaijanis to define themselves as distinctive titular nations. Secondly, Moscow drew borders in both Armenian and Azerbaijani lands, leaving significant Armenian and Azerbaijani minorities in each other’s territories. Thirdly, Moscow pushed the region into a deadlock by creating an Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) within and under Azerbaijan and a largely Azerbaijani Nakhchivan Autonomous SSR surrounded on three sides by Armenia but not under its rule.³³⁶

³³⁴ Alexander J. Motyl (Ed.), **Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities**, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, p. 33.

³³⁵ Chorbajian, Donabédian, Mutafian (Ed.), “**The Caucasian Knot...**,” pp. 23-24.

³³⁶ Paul A. Goble, “Coping With the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis,” **The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs**, Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 1992, p. 20.

Demographically, sociologically, and administratively, the order established in Transcaucasia was as follows: Stalin created Nagorno-Karabakh, which was surrounded by Azerbaijan and had a considerable Armenian population, and Nakhchivan, an Azerbaijani enclave, which was territorially separated from Azerbaijan by Armenia. Therefore, he succeeded in dividing both Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples. Both lands were subject to the law of the Azerbaijan SSR.³³⁷ In sum, by giving the status of autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh, which consisted of mostly Armenian population, and creating an autonomous region, Nakhchivan exclave, which ruled by Azerbaijan Autonomous SSR in the west of the country between Armenia, Iran and Turkey,³³⁸ the Soviet administration implemented a divide-and-rule policy by drawing arbitrarily the borders without considering ethnic minorities.

During the Gorbachov era in the Soviet Union, there were changes that deeply affected nationalities due to liberalization movements called as *glasnost* and *perestroika*. In 1987, Gorbachev followed a series of liberalization policies at the oblast and local level in the republic, which would continue with the 1990 elections.³³⁹ However, these policies further fastened the process of Soviet collapse and exacerbated nationalist movements within the Union. The surge of nationalism and separatism in the Soviet geography caught Gorbachev and his entourage off guard, demonstrating the lack of institutions that would arbitrate the conflict between local peoples and the center's priorities. Neither Soviet Constitution nor Marxism-Leninism found solutions to the nationalist demands of Caucasian and Baltic peoples.³⁴⁰

The Soviet nation-building process also had long-term effects on post-Soviet states. Firstly, ethnicity was often incorrectly equated with territory, and there was a strong feeling that each nationality should have its own territory, even its own administration. Secondly, within these units, titular nations (which give the autonomous structure its name) had certain advantages and privileges, and ethnic

³³⁷ Svante E. Cornell, "The Devaluation of the Concept of Autonomy: National Minorities in the Former Soviet Union," **Central Asian Survey**, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1999, p. 188.

³³⁸ Nicoletta Varani, "Azerbaijan Frameworks: Geopolitical and Socio-economic Considerations," **Geopolitical, Social Security and Freedom Journal**, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2018, p. 48.

³³⁹ Michael McHaul, "A Precarious Peace Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy," **International Security**, Vol. 22, No. 3, Winter 1997/98, pp. 11-12.

³⁴⁰ Gail W. Lapidus, "Gorbachev's Nationalities Problem," **Foreign Affairs**, Fall 1989, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/1989-09-01/gorbachevs-nationalities-problem> (Retrieved on 03.05.2020).

minorities were actually subordinated to the dominant nationality of the republic or region. Diaspora populations had been encouraged to return to their so-called “homeland”. Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan became ethnically more homogeneous over time, and even Russian community gradually began to withdraw from the Caucasus. In each republic, Communist elites systematically gained power and privilege by implementing policies for the benefit of their own citizens.³⁴¹

b. Nationalities Policy

While in Tsarist Russia, religion was determinant factor in differentiating people, it was ethnicity in Soviet Union. Turning ethnic and cultural differences into coherent political projects that helped to build national identities was the achievement of 19th century intellectuals. Ethnic identity was formally created under the Soviet rule³⁴² and nation-building gained momentum with the Bolsheviks’ policies. Soviet policies strengthened national loyalty and ethnic identities. The consolidation of nationality was an integral part of Soviet-style political modernization, but not an intended part.³⁴³ The Party’s adherence to Lenin’s principle of national self-determination and its reading of a pseudo-federal system of administration - the creation of the first ethnic-based territorial units - strengthened ethnic and national feelings in the territory of USSR.³⁴⁴

Immediately after the 1917 Revolution, Bolsheviks opposed the claims of superiority of Tsarist Russia and praised leaders such as Imam Shamil of Caucasus and Khan Kennasary Kasimov, who had resisted the Russian occupation.³⁴⁵ In 1922, the RSFSR was established and independent republics came under the rule of this federation.³⁴⁶ After the year of 1922, USSR, which aimed to ensure that the national republics were governed by their own cadres and aimed to glorify national cultures, implemented the policy of “indigenization” (*Korenizatsiya*). According to the policy of indigenization, national cadres should definitely come from within the respective

³⁴¹ David D. Laitin, Ronald Grigory Suny, “Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Karabakh,” **Middle East Policy**, Vol. 7, No. 1, October 1999, pp. 145-176.

³⁴² Martha Brill Olcott, **Central Asia’s Second Change**, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, p. 25.

³⁴³ Bruno Coppieters, **Federalism and Conflict in the Caucasus**, Central Asian and Caucasian Prospects, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001, p. 31.

³⁴⁴ Ronald Grigor Suny, “Nationalist and Ethnic Unrest in the Soviet Union,” **World Policy Journal**, Vol. 6, No. 3, Summer 1989, p. 506.

³⁴⁵ D’Encausse, “**Parçalanın İmparatorluk...**” p. 40.

³⁴⁶ D’Encausse uses the expression “people’s prison” when describing this Soviet administration, which has thus brought different nations under its rule for over seventy years. **Ibid.**, p. 20.

nation. USSR supported that every nation had the right to promote its own culture and speak its own language. For example, within the scope of this policy, a literacy campaign was initiated.³⁴⁷

Stalin's aim was on the one hand to glorify national feelings and on the other hand, to be ready for a common cultural heritage that would take place on the Soviet axis in the future.³⁴⁸ These indigenization policies were effective in creating double loyalty by ensuring that local leaders who were loyal to both the Soviet administration and their own local constituency. Communist Party continued to hold the monopoly of strict control over which rights would be enforced. However, the politicization of ethnicity through the discriminatory distribution of political privileges to certain ethnic groups gave rise to demands of titular nations for right to self-determination.³⁴⁹ Soviet nations became compact, conscious, and mobilized communities with national intellectuals and political elites within the framework of their own cultural and political agendas.³⁵⁰ USSR's contribution to nation-building processes by initially strengthening people's commitment to their ethnicity eventually led to inter-ethnic conflicts and dreams of independence. This situation, which was effective in the dissolution of the USSR, also affected the nation and state building processes of newly independent states.

In sum, the policy of nationalities determined the fate of the peoples in Central Asia and Caucasus, fueled ethnic conflicts and played an important role in the conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh. This policy, in which Soviet economic, social, and educational policies aimed to bring all nationalities together under the roof of "Soviet man" without any distinction of nation or class, aimed to create a fully socialist society.³⁵¹ However, in the disintegration process of the local communities, which became aware of their national consciousness and gained power with these policies, nationalism rapidly escalated, separatist demands were voiced, and historical enmities and conflicts of interest appeared.

³⁴⁷ D'Encausse, "**Parçalanın İmparatorluk...**" pp. 30-35.; Bohdan Nahaylo, Dohdan Nahaylo, Victor Swoboda, **Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR**, New York: The Free Press, 1990, pp. 14-16.

³⁴⁸ D'Encausse, "**Parçalanın İmparatorluk...**" pp. 30-35.; Nahaylo & Swoboda, "**Soviet Disunion...**," pp. 14-16.

³⁴⁹ Coppieters, "**The Politicisation and Securitisation...**," pp. 79-80.

³⁵⁰ Suny, "**Nationalist and Ethnic Unrest...**," p. 510.

³⁵¹ Alex Stringer, "Soviet Development in Central Asia: The Classic Colonial Syndrome?" in Tom Everett-Heath, **Central Asia Aspects of Transition**, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p. 158.

c. Sovietization

Soviet Union tried to gain the support of non-Russian peoples by asserting the right of nations to self-determination until the 1920s, but it backed away from this policy when nationalist movements started to pose a threat. Since 1921, the leaders of the nationalist movements began to be detained, the political purge process was started, and all nations were included in the Soviet federation.³⁵²

After the early 1930s, at the height of the *Korenizatsiya* policies, Stalin's industrialization policies and personal autocracy changed the attitude towards ethnic groups. Persecution of non-Russian communities increased during Stalin dictatorship, their national Communist leaders were either imprisoned or executed, their national writers and artists were tortured, and some small ethnic groups were exiled to other lands. Religion, patriarchy, and village traditions, that is, important components of ethnic culture, were weakened by Soviet policies of forced modernization, industrialization, and collectivization in agriculture.³⁵³

The policies of *repressiya* (punishment) and *deportatsiya* (exile) of Soviet Union against the people especially with the terror of Stalin-Beria and Bagirov drew reaction of some Communist Party administrators. These practices were found to be contradictory to the main principles of the Party administration. Therefore, an opposition movement emerged within Azerbaijan Communist Party as early as 1924 and 1927 to end oppression on the republics in general and interventions in their internal affairs in particular. However, Moscow's response to this movement was very harsh. In 1928, many intellectuals were dismissed from their positions in the party, Soviet Assemblies, schools, and literary and artistic societies. After that, it was decided that the duties of the First Secretary of Azerbaijan Communist Party would be carried out by appointments made directly from Moscow. Thus, the policy of *Korenizatsiya*, which was carried out by Soviet Union since the early 1920s, aiming

³⁵² Kathleen Collins, **The Logic of Clan Politics in Central Asia, The Impact on Regime Transformation**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 90.

³⁵³ Nikloai Bougai, **The Deportation of Peoples in the Soviet Union**, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1996, pp. 5-7.; James R. Millar, "Mass Collectivization and the Contribution of Soviet Agriculture to the First Five-Year Plan: A Review Article," **Slavic Review**, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1974, pp. 754-755.

to train the administrative staff suitable for titular nations, to find solution of their problems and to prevent national conflicts, was abandoned.³⁵⁴

By the early 1930s, Stalin had eliminated all dissidents. After that, there was no obstacle for him to deal more comfortably with the issue of nationalities. The 1936 constitution took a different form than the 1924 constitution and had a real federal character. Theoretically, the number of established national organizations increased, the hierarchies of nations and nationalities expanded, and the rights granted to them were widened. However, Stalin, who supposedly respected to federal institutions, did not give nationalism any opportunity to exist at all. Stalin did not refrain from using violence to neutralize all national values. Stalin systematically purged the intellectuals of the 1920s who remained loyal to national values and created his own intellectuals.³⁵⁵

At the beginning of the 1920s, the peoples who used various alphabets such as Arabic and Mongolian for their languages were forced to use the Latin alphabet. Towards the end of the 1930s, Cyrillic, the alphabet of Russian script, was made compulsory in all Russia.³⁵⁶ By the transition from the Latin alphabet to the Cyrillic alphabet, it was aimed to bring together different dialects of Russian language, at least to ensure unity in the written language, and a general cultural Russification was aimed.³⁵⁷

Before the Second World War, Russians no longer opposed the concept of Russian supremacy, which was despised in the past, as vigorously as before.³⁵⁸ The attraction of being Russian began to be articulated overtly and a policy of Sovietization was implemented. The policy of collectivization was the product of this Sovietization effort, in which non-Russian was dissolved and therefore everything was mobilized for unity. Interestingly, as nationalist sentiments were suppressed by Stalin and ethnic traditions were dissolved, the idea of nationalism among non-Russian nations continued to flourish. National elites became stronger and began to reject the control of Soviet rulers within their republics. Russification efforts and

³⁵⁴ Nesrin Sarıahmetoğlu Karagür, "Azerbaycan'da Stalin Dönemi," in Emine Gürsoy Naskali, Liaisan Şahin, **Stalin ve Türk Dünyası**, İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 2007, pp. 137-139.

³⁵⁵ D'Encausse, "**Parçalanın İmparatorluk...**" pp. 38-39.

³⁵⁶ Khansuvarov, "Latinizatsiia, orudie Leninskoi natsional'noi politiki", Moskova, 1932, s. 32 cited in D'Encausse, "**Parçalanın İmparatorluk...**" p. 39.

³⁵⁷ **Ibid.**, p. 39-40.

³⁵⁸ Lowell Tillet, "The great friendship," Chapel Hill, p. 322, cited in D'Encausse, "**Parçalanın İmparatorluk...**" pp. 40-41.

assimilation-based pressures in education policies in Transcaucasia were resisted by compact and slowly developing national communities.³⁵⁹

Another policy of Soviet Union that damaged economic, social, and political life in titular nations was collectivization. With collectivization policy, 1,800,000 peasants were exiled, 6 million of them starved to death, and hundreds of thousands of them died during the exile.³⁶⁰ Although the decision on collectivization was taken in 1927, Azerbaijan was acquainted with the system in question before. With a decree issued on May 5, 1920, Bolsheviks had declared that they nationalized all lands, animals, buildings, and houses in Azerbaijan and prohibited private property. All of the revenue was confiscated by the state, and the peasants were left with little crop as a reward for their labor. Azeri peasants were exiled, and Russian immigrants brought from Russia were settled in the lands and private properties of these peasants.³⁶¹

Azerbaijanis started an armed resistance against this collectivization policy implemented by Russians. The people, who were fighting against the Red Army by retreating to the mountains in Ganja and Karabakh, Shaki, Zagatala, Shirvan, Kuba and Lankaran, boycotted, did not work in agricultural lands or worked very slowly.³⁶² In the shadow of the cult of Stalin, which had strengthened since 1934, the pressure on the Azerbaijani people increased. In 1937-1938, 40,000 people were punished by Stalin in Azerbaijan. In 1937-1940, on average, 12,000 people were imprisoned every year. In the 1930s-1940s and early 1950s, 70,000 people were sentenced, 29,000 of which were intellectuals. Those who had to migrate from the lands of birth to Siberia and Central Asia during these years are not included in these figures.³⁶³

The political atmosphere that emerged after the Second World War gave Stalin an opportunity to implement his destructive policies on nations. Between October 1943 and June 1944, six small nations that were accused of treason were uprooted from their native lands and forced to migrate to Central Asia and Siberia. They

³⁵⁹ Suny, "Nationalist and Ethnic Unrest...", p. 507.

³⁶⁰ Nicolas Werth, *Histoire de l'Union Soviétique: de l'Empire Russe à la de Lénine à Staline: 1917-1953*, 10e édition, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995, p. 50.

³⁶¹ Belkıs Ulusoy, "Kolektifleştirme Stalin döneminde Azerbaycan'da Kolektifleştirme," in Naskali & Şahin, "Stalin ve Türk Dünyası...", p. 154.

³⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 154-155.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 144-145.

joined Germans who were exiled there in 1941. In 1939, at least 1 million people, including 407,690 Chechens, 92,074 Ingushs, 75,737 Karachays, 42,666 Balkars, 134,271 Kalmyks, more than 200,000 Crimean Tatars, 380,000 Volga Germans, were accused of committing crimes. In a declaration published in 1946, it was officially announced that the national lands of Chechens, Ingushs, and Tatars were taken away. For ten years, these nations had no official presence; they were not represented in any Soviet institution. Stalin aimed to categorize nations as good and bad. According to him, the superior nation was Russians who were intelligent and patient. Thus, the idea of equality of nations was completely abandoned in an irreversible way.³⁶⁴

It is known that there are currently 1,970,000 refugees and displaced persons in the former Soviet countries in Caucasus. These people are in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Prigododny Region, and Chechnya, where ethnic conflicts took place after the collapse of USSR. In addition to these, there are Meskhetian Turks who were forced to migrate to Central Asia in the 1940s with the exile policies of Stalin as mentioned above. 50,000 Meskhetian Turks were forcibly displaced to the Fergana Valley in the late 1950s and are now living in Azerbaijan, Georgia and other countries.³⁶⁵

By the 1950s, all national heroes, people who had fought against colonialism and leaders of popular resistance were removed. Titular nations' histories were seen as unimportant; their existence seemed only possible through their relations with Russian nation. These nations could only have a chance to live within a single and uniform cultural model with some limited use of their language. For example, if technical words could not be found in their national languages, they had to be transferred from Russian language. When grammatical forms and syntax rules of these words were not suitable, Russian language had to be used directly. While Russian culture was praised, the epic of Azeris, "Dede Korkut" and the epic of Uzbeks, "Alpamish" were tried to be forgotten.³⁶⁶

After Stalin, as mentioned before, the leaders of Soviet Union, especially Khrushchev, tried to erase the effects of Stalin's destructive policies. In the Gorbachev era, there was an effort to face the facts of Stalinist era. As a matter of

³⁶⁴ D'Encausse, "Parçalanın İmparatorluk..." pp. 47-48.

³⁶⁵ Sammut, "Population Displacement..." p. 56.

³⁶⁶ D'Encausse, "Parçalanın İmparatorluk..." pp. 49-51.

fact, Gorbachev used the following expressions: *“We can never tolerate or justify what happened in 1937 and 1938, nor do we have the right to do so. Never! Responsibility for this rests with those in power at the time. ... We know what results the years 1937 and 1938 led to, and what kind of damage the party cadres, intellectuals, and military cadres suffered because of these results.”*³⁶⁷ Soviet policies and discourses based on ethnicity and hatred have had an impact on the state and nation-building processes of post-Soviet states. The traumas relating to Soviet period have continued to be effective until today. Social traumas are so deep and memories of exiles are still alive in these territories.

2. The Rise of Nationalism in Azerbaijan and Armenia and Post-Soviet Order

With the weakening and disintegration of Soviet Union, ethnic conflicts in Caucasus broke out, as did the period following the collapse of Russian Empire between 1918 and 1921. The loss of power of Warsaw Pact, which constantly emphasized the threat from the West during Cold War and secured socio-economic development of the coalition by defending socialist system, changed all the balances. Eastern Bloc began to accept Western-type free market economy model. The weakening of central communist control also meant the end of shared ideological interests among different national elites, which constituted Soviet Union. South Caucasus republics (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) wanted to get rid of Moscow's influence. The federative structure of USSR, which was divided into administrative units based on ethnic and territorial principles, was seen as an obstacle for these national elites.³⁶⁸

In the post-Soviet period, while national groups asserted their rights, they fell into an institutional vacuum. Concerned about their own security and survival, national minorities sought to maintain administrative control over their lands, and in order to do this they sought assistance from the centre, similar ethnic groups living across the border, and/or neighboring republics. They aimed to expell foreign

³⁶⁷ Mihail Gorbaçov, **Glasnost Asıl Neyi İstiyorum?**, İstanbul: Dönemli Yayıncılık AŞ, 1987, pp. 141-142.

³⁶⁸ Alexei Zverev, “Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus 1988-1994,” in Coppieters, **“Contested Borders...,”** pp. 13-14.

nationals from their lands with government troops sent to suppress rebellions in some cases.³⁶⁹

Along with the collapse of Soviet Union, the politicization of ethnicity and the securitization of political agenda had very dramatic results in newly independent states. The political elites came from the Soviet culture, where the issues had been securitized. It is part of this political culture to be fixated on state interests, to ignore economic and social interests of the grassroots, to lack the capacity to come to terms with political opponents, and to be ready to mobilize all resources in order to achieve their goals, no matter how devastating their impact on the general well-being of society. The agenda in the post-Soviet geography has mainly been to ensure security and to prioritize sovereignty and territorial integrity of newly independent states.³⁷⁰

Scholars working on ethnic mobilization argue that memory is an important part of identity. Memory plays an important role in the development of group identities and collective myths. In these studies, special attention is paid to the role of shared traumas in order to increase group solidarity. For a memory to be accepted as a political phenomenon, the importance of two processes is emphasized. The first of these is the socialization process in which historical memory is passed from generation to generation. The second is that historical memory is always used by elites for political purposes. The state, which legitimizes and rationalizes the policies it pursues, retains power to manipulate memory.³⁷¹ Today, in the post-Soviet order, it is seen that memories are manipulated and instrumentalized by state leaders in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Nagorno-Karabakh, which has caused the parties to have negative images and perceptions against each other due to historical hostilities and anger, creates a memory for both Azerbaijani and Armenian political leaders. The fact that Azerbaijani IDPs, who had been forced to leave the region due to ethnic conflict and political reasons and could not return to their homeland, shows that this issue is still open to political manipulation. In the following part, political leaders and political

³⁶⁹ Alexei Zverev, "Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus 1988-1994," in Coppieters, **"Contested Borders..."**, p. 14.

³⁷⁰ Coppieters, **"The Politicisation and Securitisation..."**, pp. 81-82 .

³⁷¹ Rachel Anderson Paul, "Grassroots Mobilization and Diaspora Politics: Armenian Interest Groups and the Role of Collective Memory," **Nationalism and Ethnic Politics**, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2000, p. 27.

parties that gained power in both Azerbaijan and Armenia in the post-Soviet period will be provided.

The policies of these leaders on Nagorno-Karabakh and how they were affected by this issue will be investigated in the last part of this thesis. The discourses of these leaders can be also reached in that part.

a. Azerbaijan

i. Azerbaijani National Awakening

In response to the efforts of Armenians to organize against Azerbaijanis, a similar spirit of solidarity emerged in Azerbaijan. It is widely accepted that ethnic and religious differences have played an important role in Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict. In addition, socioeconomic differences were a significant factor in Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict beyond cultural-religious dimension. These socio-economic differences were mainly competitive barrier faced by Azerbaijani bourgeoisie and conflicting interests of “Tatar” workers and Armenian employers and merchants in the region.³⁷²

Some authors do not agree with the thesis that the sense of nationalism among Azerbaijanis, who were known as Tatars until the early 1900s, has emerged only as a struggle against economic problems they have experienced with Armenians. Azerbaijani nationalism had become also more evident in the last years of Soviet Union, with the repetition of clashes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.

National feelings and thoughts in Azerbaijan spread more strongly after the establishment of national printed press, and generally through printed journals published by the intellectuals. The first newspaper in Azerbaijani Turkish was Hasan Bey Zardabi’s weekly *Ekinci* publication, which existed between 1875 and 1878. Although *Ekinci* did not go beyond the borders of Azerbaijan, it played an important role in the awakening of Muslim peoples of Transcaucasia with a circulation of 800-900. After *Ekinci* magazine, *Ziya* (1879-81), *Ziya-i Kafkasya* (1881-84) and *Kesul* (1884-91), which were generally short-lived and distinguished, were published. Transcaucasian Muslims did not have opportunity to express their ideas in Russian until the 1905 revolution, with the exception of the daily *Kaspîi* (Caucasian)

³⁷² Lisa Khachaturian, **Cultivating Nationhood in Imperial Russia: The Periodical Press and the Formation of a Modern Armenian Identity**, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009, p. 67.

magazine, which was founded in Baku in 1881. *Kaspîi*, which was previously under the control of Russians, was a small-scale publication. However, Zeynalabdin Taghiyev, who was wealthy businessman and charitable man, bought the magazine. When Russian editor of the magazine died in 1895, a Muslim lawyer and prominent politician, Alimardan Bey Topchubashov, who would play a very important role in Azerbaijani freedom movement, replaced him.³⁷³

From 1873 on, Turkish newspapers began to penetrate gradually into Russia, and their role in the development of nationalist thought among Muslims in Russia was considerable.³⁷⁴ Among the most important of these newspapers, there was *Tercüman*, the publication that Ismail Gasprinsky laid its foundations in Bahcesaray after Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 and in a political atmosphere where Russians celebrated the 100th anniversary of the occupation of Crimea in 1883. Cooperation with the West, reforms in education and creation of religious/spiritual and political unity among Muslim Turks (“unity in language, thought, work”) were among the main thoughts of Ismail Gasprinsky, who played a very important role in awakening Turkish nationalist aspirations among Muslims in Russia. Gasprinsky’s translation of *Tercüman* was first published in Russian and Tatar, then only in Tatar.³⁷⁵

With the idea of the unity of the Turkish peoples, which was called Pan-Turkism, Ismail Gasprinsky tried to create a language that all Turks, from Balkans to China, could understand in *Tercüman*. The language of publication was Ottoman Turkish. Apart from *Tercüman*, common dialect was also supported in the curricula of contemporary or Jadid Muslim schools in Russia.³⁷⁶

Azerbaijanis, which were under Russian, Iranian and Shiite influence for a long time, remembered their Muslim and Turkish identity. This process, which accelerated mostly with printed media, continued at the beginning of the 20th century.

³⁷³ Alexandre Bennigsen, Chantal Lemerrier, **La Presse et le Mouvement National chez les Musulmans de Russie avant 1920**, Paris: Mouton & Co, 1960, pp. 27-32.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

³⁷⁵ Ismail Gasprinsky, who was born in a small noble family in the village of Gaspra in 1851 and was a Tatar, went to Moscow to study after graduating from the school in his village. Returning to Crimea as a Russian teacher in 1871, Ismail Gasprinsky stayed in Paris for two years. Ismail Gasprinsky was influenced by the liberalism of the West and as a young Muslim he supported the cooperation of the West and the East. Bennigsen & Lemerrier, “**La presse et Le Mouvement...**,” pp. 35-40.

³⁷⁶ Jacob M. Landau, **Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation**, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 9.; Mustafa Toker, “İsmail Gaspıralı ve ‘Dilde Birlik’ Fikri Üzerine,” **Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi**, No. 16, 2004, p. 33.

Founded in 1906 under the name of Molla Nasraddin, the humor magazine *Allahsyz* (Godless) symbolized an anti-Iranian and anti-Shiite tradition. Ali Bey Huseynzade, a writer and political leader who spread liberal ideas and Turkish nationalism in Azerbaijan and who was educated in Baku and Petersburg, started to publish the weekly *Füyuzat* in 1905 in Baku.³⁷⁷ After 1905, many printed publications such as *Hakikat*, *Yeni Hakikat*, *İkbal*, *Malumat*, *Güneş*, *Terakki* and *Nejat* were published, but they did not last long either due to financial reasons or censorship. Only *Kaspîi* continued to be published with the support of Taghiyev until Bolshevism spread to Baku.³⁷⁸

Azerbaijani socialists, known for their stance against inequality and injustice, were organized around *Hummet*, which was founded in 1904. Although this group came together under the name of Muslim Social Democratic Party, it had demands for political rights, education and economic development rather than highlighting Islam in their work. A group that left Russian Social Democratic Labor Party created a discussion platform in 1903 and launched some public propaganda activities. Its leaders included Russian Social Democratic Party members such as M.G. Movsumov, Sultan Majid Afandiyev, Asadullah Akhundov, and people who did not stand out with their political connections such as Mammad Amin Rasulzade, Mammad Hasan Hajinski, and Abbas Kazimzade.³⁷⁹ Nariman Narimanov and Mashadi Azizbeyov were in the administration team of *Hummet*.³⁸⁰

Hummet's greatest activity in 1905 was to rely on the Tsar's commitments and work for some constitutional guarantees. It is known that Alimardan Bey Topchubashov had expectations from Tsarist Russia about some fundamental rights and freedoms. In this period, Uzeyir Hajibeyov made a call under the name of "Open Letter to the Muslims of Caucasus" and criticized the reluctance of Muslims to take their place in Duma. In 1905, All Muslims Congress of Russia was convened under the leadership of intellectuals who were mostly educated in the west. At the congress, Azerbaijani Turks expressed their demands on issues such as political unity of all Turkish Muslims living in Russia, equal representation rights of Muslims with Russians, rule of law, freely elected public representatives, establishment of their

³⁷⁷ Zenkovsky, "Rusya'da Pan-Türkizm...", p. 145.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

³⁷⁹ Tadeusz Swietochowski, *Müslüman Cemaatten Ulusal Kimliğe Rus Azerbaycanı 1905-1920*, İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1988, p. 80.

³⁸⁰ Zenkovsky, "Rusya'da Pan-Türkizm...", p. 149.

own schools and publication of books and journals. Topchubashov was the co-founder of Muslim Alliance formed in the Congress and simultaneously allied with Constitutional Democratic Party (Cadets).³⁸¹

Under the Tsarist Russia's rule, Muslims thought that they were deprived of many political, social, and cultural rights as a minority. All Muslims of Russia Movement developed in such an environment as a reaction to Russian pressure. This movement was considered as a civil attempt to achieve equal rights rather than merely following Pan-Islamic ideas. All Muslim Congresses of Russia were held four times, the first one was on August 15, 1905, the second on January 13-23, 1906, the third on August 16-20, 1906, and the last one on June 1914.³⁸² For the fifth time, with more organized and wide participation of about nine hundred Muslim delegates, Muslims came together on May 1, 1917. This meeting, which lasted for 11 days, was named "The First Congress of All Muslims of Russia".³⁸³

At this fifth congress, Azerbaijani leader Mammad Amin Rasulzade supported federative and autonomous organization, arguing that the most powerful national group in Russia was Turkish-Tatars -noting that twenty-nine million out of thirty million Muslims in Russia were Turks- and all Islamic nations could thus easily form a cultural federation within Russia. Rasulzade stated that Turkish people in Russia had been divided for centuries and demanded autonomy for Turks, arguing that they were determined not only to unite but also to impose their own existence.³⁸⁴ All Turkish tribes living in Russia expressed their opinions in this congress, but no results could be obtained because unity could not be achieved.³⁸⁵

While these developments took place in Baku, the situation in Ganja was somewhat different. In Ganja, the political spectrum was narrower and there was no serious socialist movement. However, nationalist sentiments were strong especially due to the concern about the militancy and territorial demands of Armenian Dashnak Party. Interestingly, while those in Baku still referred to themselves as Tatars, those in Ganja were in favor of using Azerbaijani name. Compared to Baku, the political

³⁸¹ Alstadt, "The Azerbaijani Turks: Power..."

³⁸² Vügar İmanov, Ali Merdan Topçubaşı (1865-1934) Lider bir Aydın ve Bağımsız Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti'nin Temsili, İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2003, pp. 36-57.; Zenkovsky, "Rusya'da Pan-Türkizm...", p. 147.; İslam Ansiklopedisi, "Müslüman Kongreleri," <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/musluman-kongreleri> (Retrieved on 04.04.2020).

³⁸³ İslam Ansiklopedisi, "Müslüman Kongreleri..."

³⁸⁴ Zenkovsky, "Rusya'da Pan-Türkizm...", pp. 218-225.

³⁸⁵ İslam Ansiklopedisi, "Müslüman Kongreleri..."

rhetoric in Ganja could be interpreted as being more anti-Russian. The first group in Ganja set out in 1905 by defending the “Muslim, Georgian, Armenian Union” against the Russian administration. Ganja thus became the center of the national movement.³⁸⁶

Azerbaijani Turks called Turks, Georgians, and Armenians for fighting together against Russia under the umbrella of the organization called *Difai* (Defence), which they founded in Ganja in the autumn of 1905. Thus, the pioneers of this organization aimed to create unity in Caucasus. In the declarations published secretly, *Difai* blamed Russia for the blood spilled between Armenians and Azeris and stated that Armenian violence would be responded to with violence.³⁸⁷ Ahmet Agaoglu (Ahmed Agayev) who was a prominent Azerbaijani politician also joined this group from Baku.³⁸⁸

The former members of *Hummet* established a secret society under the name of *Musavat* in 1912.³⁸⁹ Contrary to the radical past of its founders, *Musavat* accelerated its activities with pan-Islamist feelings instead of a pan-Turkist approach within the framework of ummah consciousness. *Musavat* wanted Islam to regain its former power. Supported mostly by intellectuals, students, merchants and businessmen, the association was based in Baku and organized throughout Transcaucasia. In a short time, *Musavat* started to show itself as a Party. Mammad Amin Rasulzade started to lead *Musavat* with his strong personality and authority in 1913.³⁹⁰ *Musavat*, which started its activities as the first Azerbaijani political party, became known as a left bourgeois party under his leadership.³⁹¹

ii. Newly Independent State: Azerbaijan, National Elites and Leaders

While Armenian communist leaders acted together with Armenian elites in the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, Azerbaijani communist elites tried to reach a solution by cooperating with Moscow. This behavior of Azerbaijani elites, who ignored nationalist tendencies in Azerbaijan and acted together with Moscow, led to the establishment of Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF) in spring of 1989. APF

³⁸⁶ Alstadt, “The Azerbaijani Turks: Power...,”

³⁸⁷ Tadeusz Swietochowski, *Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: The Shaping of a National Identity in a Muslim Community*, New York: Cambridge, 1985, p. 44.

³⁸⁸ Swietochowski, “Müslüman Cemaatten Ulusal Kimliğe...,” p. 72.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 107-109.

³⁹¹ Zenkovsky, “Rusya’da Pan-Türkizm...,” p. 152.

brought together some writers, journalists, and intellectuals from many different views. In January 1990, the central authority in Azerbaijan lost power and APF began to dominate local cadres in the country. In order to support Azerbaijan Communist Party, on January 20, 1990, Moscow sent Soviet armies to Baku, attacked more than 130 civilians, most of whom belonged to APF, and jailed their leaders. As a result of this event, many Azerbaijani citizens burned their Communist Party cards and this simple act of burning was interpreted as a rejection of the Soviet system. Azerbaijani society did not accept this pressure of USSR, which remained silent when similar nationalist events occurred in Yerevan in 1987, on the nationalists in Azerbaijan.³⁹²

On October 18, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan adopted the constitution on the Declaration of Independence of Azerbaijan. The issue was discussed in the nationwide referendum held on December 29, 1991 and 95% of the population voted in favor of the independence of the country. October 18, 1991 is celebrated as the Independence Day in Azerbaijan. The Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan underlines that the independent Azerbaijani state is legally the successor of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, which existed in 1918-1920. This independent and democratic state of Azerbaijan has been an important force for the national independence movement of Azerbaijan, and has constituted an ideological basis for the newly independent state in the post-Soviet transition period.³⁹³

Nagorno-Karabakh problem has played a critical role in the political life of Azerbaijan. The escalation of conflicts in 1992-1993 deeply affected politics in the country. A series of military defeats in and around Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan caused the first pro-Soviet president, Ayaz Mutallibov, to leave office in March 1992. Although Mutallibov returned to office for a short time in May, he had to leave his seat to Abulfaz Elchibey in June 1992 with the elections held.³⁹⁴

After the fall of pro-communist regime in May 1992, APF became the most important political party in the country, with its leader Abulfaz Elchibey. Elchibey wanted to create a European-style society in Azerbaijan and to make the newly

³⁹² Republic of Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, **A Glance at the Tragedy of 20 January 1990**, <http://www.mfa.gov.az/en/news/909/4633> (Retrieved on 24.03.2020).

³⁹³ Leila Alieva, "The Institutions, Orientations, and Conduct of Foreign Policy in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan," in Adeed Dawisha, Karen Dawisha (Ed.), **The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia**, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1995, p. 289.

³⁹⁴ Baev, "Russia's Policies..." p. 11.

independent state a part of the international system.³⁹⁵ Elchibey accepted the motto of Azerbaijani nationalist party Musavat as “Turkification, Modernization, and Islamization”. Elchibey’s government tried to create a secular, independent and democratic country based on market-economy and a parliamentary political system and followed a pro-Western and pro-Turkish policy.³⁹⁶

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which broke out in the first years of independence, from 1988 to 1994, strengthened feelings of loyalty to the state among Azerbaijanis.³⁹⁷ However, the question of nationalities was an important issue of political life in Azerbaijan at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of independence. The losses in the war against Armenia raised hopes among other separatist national minorities of the country. Despite of this, apart from Armenian minority in Nagorno-Karabakh, no other separatist movements were seen in Azerbaijani territories until the 1993 Talysh uprising. The minorities in Azerbaijan, Talyshs, Lezgins, Tats, and Kurds are considered Azerbaijani as a state policy.³⁹⁸

The loss of a quarter of Azerbaijan’s lands as a result of Azerbaijan-Armenia war caused Azerbaijani leaders to worry about the survival of the state and led them to seek support in the face of Russian-Armenian cooperation. As it will be discussed in the last part in detail, the course of the war determined the fate of the leaders both directly such as the failures on the battlefield and indirectly such as the deterioration of economy. The loss of Shusha and Lachin at the front and Khojaly tragedy caused the fall of the communist leader Mutallibov. The collapse of Elchibey accelerated with the occupation of Aghdam region by Armenians. Military defeats, economic problems, and influx of refugees created a sense of distrust in Azerbaijani society that APF was unable to rule the country.³⁹⁹

In this troublesome period, a military rebellion broke out against Elchibey in June 1993 under the leadership of Colonel Suret Huseynov. Colonel Alikram Hummatov, his close associate Huseynov and the leader of Talysh nationalists seized

³⁹⁵ Aryeh Wasserman, “A Year of Rule by the Popular Front of Azerbaijan,” in Yaacov Ro’i (Ed.), **Muslim Eurasia Conflicting Legacies**, London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1995, p. 143.

³⁹⁶ Leila Alieva, “The Institutions, Orientations, and Conduct of Foreign Policy in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan,” in Dawisha & Dawisha, **“The Making of Foreign Policy...,”** p. 289.

³⁹⁷ Mehran Kamrava, “State-Building in Azerbaijan: The Search for Consolidation,” **Middle East Journal**, Vol. 55, No. 2, Spring 2001, p. 220.

³⁹⁸ Aryeh Wasserman, “A Year of Rule by the Popular Front of Azerbaijan,” in Ro’i, **“Muslim Eurasia Conflicting...,”** p. 145.

³⁹⁹ Leila Alieva, “The Institutions, Orientations, and Conduct of Foreign Policy in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan,” in Dawisha & Dawisha, **“The Making of Foreign Policy...,”** p. 290.

power in the south of Azerbaijan and declared a new republic in Lankaran, which lived very shortly between June and August 1993. It was claimed that there was Russian support in the emergence of this separatist movement. The policies of Elchibey, who followed an anti-Russian and pro-Turkish policy, weakened the government's position in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and against Talysh separatist movement. In June 1993, Elchibey was replaced by Heydar Aliyev, the Chairman of the Supreme Assembly of Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and one of the leading members of Soviet Communist Party Politburo.⁴⁰⁰

Aliyev made Azerbaijan a member of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1993, brought it closer to Russia, and tried not to contradict Russian interests, especially when it comes to separatist regions and republics, during her tenure.⁴⁰¹ Under the rule of Heydar Aliyev, foreign policy was tried to be built on principles such as peace, international judicial norms, respect for territorial integrity and inviolability of borders, and cooperation. Aliyev stated that he wished to improve Armenia-Azerbaijan relations within the framework of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, he also underlined that if it was not possible to solve the problem by peaceful means, force should be used.⁴⁰²

When Heydar Aliyev came to power in mid-1993, the country was in danger of division and there were internal instability. Aliyev, trying to ensure peace at the front in order to ensure stability, signed the ceasefire agreement in Nagorno-Karabakh on May 12, 1994. Aliyev, who started working with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other international organizations to solve the problem, adopted basic elements such as ending the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, granting maximum autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh and ensuring security of Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition, Aliyev government accelerated its lobbying activities against Armenian expansionism. Aliyev declared a nationwide mobilization in order to get rid of the problems arising from the conflict, accepted a development plan to improve the country's economy, and increased military expenditures.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰⁰ Coppieters, "The Politicisation and Securitisation...", p. 74.

⁴⁰¹ Coppieters, "The Politicisation and Securitisation...", p. 75.; Laitin & Suny, "Armenia and Azerbaijan...", p. 156.

⁴⁰² Peter Marko Tase, **Ancient Monuments and Treasures of Nakhchivan, Republic of Azerbaijan**, Wisconsin: Lulu Enterprises, Inc., 2016, p. 188.

⁴⁰³ Kasımlı & Efeğil, (Ed.), "Dağlık Karabağ Üzerine...", p. 15.

Since 2003, Azerbaijan has been ruled by his son Ilham Aliyev, and a policy that does not exclude Russia in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and displays a conciliatory stance continues to be followed. Since Ilham Aliyev's career and the policies he followed in Nagorno-Karabakh will be given in detail in the last part of the thesis, the brief political history of Azerbaijan is provided in this part.

b. Armenia

i. Armenian National Awakening

For Armenians, adherence to religious values is a kind of nationalism. Gregorian sect is religious formation unique to Armenians. For Armenians, language, religion, and ethnicity are intertwined. Catholicos, who were at the head of the churches while there was no political independence yet, were seen as a means of reflecting demands of peoples and providing communication between Armenian diaspora and people living in Armenian lands.⁴⁰⁴ Armenians constantly commemorate Tigran the Great, Grigor Lusavorich (with the rhetoric "Armenia is the first Christian nation") and Holy Vardan (known as Vardan Mamikonian, Armenian military martyr and Armenian church saint).⁴⁰⁵

In the 18th century, many Armenians had lost almost most of their national culture as a result of mixing and assimilation with different nations. Knowledge of Armenian history was known and spread by a small group of priests who were constantly copying ancient texts. In the face of this social backwardness, cultural destruction, and political weakness, the first Armenian nationalist movements started with the revival of Armenian letters. The first major work on this was carried out by Armenian Catholic community in San Lazaro, founded by Mkhitar Sebastatsi (1676-1749) in 1717. Haykazian Bararan, a two-volume Armenian dictionary, was published in 1749-1769. Thus, Armenian language had a comprehensive dictionary. Mekhitarists, known for their publishing of old Armenian forms of ancient Greek texts and their work on classical and modern Armenian language, worked intensively to reconstruct Armenian history.⁴⁰⁶ Armenian diaspora also supported Armenian national awakening. The most prominent example is that Harutyun Shmavonyan who published the first Armenian newspaper, *Azdarar* in Madras in 1794. Istanbul

⁴⁰⁴ Nalbandian, "The Armenian Revolutionary...", pp. 30-31.

⁴⁰⁵ Suny, "Looking Toward Ararat...", p. 55.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

Patriarch Hovhannes Kolot (1715-1741) carried out some cultural and educational works.⁴⁰⁷

Armenians in Russia became one of the first nations to be affected by nationalist movements in Europe. In 1780, an Armenian printing house was established in Petersburg. In the second half of the 19th century, Armenians opened schools in Nakhchivan and Astrakhan. In 1815, the famous Lazarian Institute, which had a very large Armenian library and printing house, and was active in the field of education, was established in Moscow. Many Armenian intellectuals studied in this institute.⁴⁰⁸

After the second Russo-Persian war, Armenians hoped to establish an autonomous state under the auspices of Russia, but Tsar Nicholas I did not accept this. From 1828 to 1840, Tsar united Yerevan and Nakhchivan Khanates for a short time, giving them the status of “oblast” administered by a military governor. In 1840, Eastern Armenia was divided into two separate Transcaucasian provinces. The former lands of Yerevan, Nakhchivan, and Ganja Khanates became part of Georgia-Imeretia province. Karabakh was included in Khazar province. Thus, Tsar made it clear that he did not prefer to define an Armenian province.⁴⁰⁹

The disappointment and resentment among Armenians towards Russians deepened when tsarist administration confiscated the properties of Armenian Church in Caucasus within three years, starting from 1900, within the scope of its policy focused on eliminating religious differences rather than ethnic ones.⁴¹⁰ Therefore, Armenian-Russian relations were damaged due to this policy. However, later, Tsardom returned the properties of Armenian Church in 1905 and the relationship between Russians and Armenians improved.⁴¹¹ All these developments had an impact on Armenian national awakening.

⁴⁰⁷ Suny, “**Looking Toward Ararat...**,” p. 57.

⁴⁰⁸ Bournoutian, “**Ermeni Tarihi...**,” p. 231.

⁴⁰⁹ **Ibid.**, pp. 227-228.

⁴¹⁰ Richard G. Hovannisian, “Russian Armenia. A Century of Tsarist Rule,” **Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge**, Bd. 19, H. 1, 1971, pp. 42-43.; Onur Onol, **The Evolution of Tsarist Policy on the Armenian Question in the South Caucasus (1903-1914)**, Phd Dissertation, Birkbeck, University of London, 2014 (Unpublished).

⁴¹¹ Jeremy Smith, “Nagorno Karabakh under Soviet Rule,” in Mikko Palonkorpi (Ed.), **The South Caucasus beyond Borders, Boundaries and Division Lines Conflicts, Cooperation and Development**, Turku: Juvenes Print – Suomen yliopistopaino Oy, 2015, pp. 11-12.

Armenians continued to express themselves in literature and art throughout the second half of 1800s. Armenian writer and opinion leader Khachatur Abovyan (1805-1848) contributed to the cultural, linguistic, and political development of Armenians. In his work named “Wounds of Armenia”, Abovyan described anarchy that emerged after the Russo-Persian war and distress that people experienced due to foreign occupations for years.⁴¹² This work was important in terms of praising Armenian language. The works of Khachatur Abovyan and Kapriel Badganyan (1802-1889) were written in a spoken language of Ararat region.⁴¹³

In 1869, in Alexandropol (Gyumri), Armenian liberals formed a society defending the freedom of motherland. The main place of activity of Armenian intellectuals in this period was Tbilisi. Armenian conservatives, led by Bedros Simonian, the director of the Nersisian School, an Armenian educational institution established in Tbilisi, started publishing the newspaper *Megu Hayasdani*, which advocated that the church should preserve its role for the community. The newspaper supported by Western Transcaucasian Armenians was *Mışağ* (Rencber), which was founded in 1872 by Grigor Artsruni (1845-1892). Grigor Artsruni and other liberal Armenian newspapers in Russia argued that the awakening of Armenians should not be limited to the cultural dimension, but also it should also cover socio-economic and security issues.⁴¹⁴

The first Armenian political party was Armenakan. Armenakan, a party founded in Van in August 1885, was influenced by radical views of an Ottoman Armenian educator, Mekertich Portukalian. The name Armenakan comes from the name Armenia, whose newspaper was founded in Paris in 1885. Although Armenakan Party had branches in Iran, South Caucasus, and even the United States (US), it was actually a local party. According to the views of Armenakan Party, Armenians should radicalize and revolutionize in order to gain their freedom.⁴¹⁵

The resettlement policies implemented during the rule of Tsarist Russia led to some organizational activities by ethnic groups. Armenian revolutionary communities began to organize in Eastern Anatolia in the early 1880s. The influence

⁴¹² Nalbandian, “**The Armenian Revolutionary...**,” p. 38.

⁴¹³ Bournoutian, “**Ermeni Tarihi...**,” pp. 232-233.

⁴¹⁴ **Ibid.**, pp. 227-234.

⁴¹⁵ Razmik Panossian, **The Armenians from Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars**, London: Hurst & Company, 2006, pp. 201-202.

of these organizations extended to America, France, Switzerland, and Austria. While Verakazmial and Ramgavar, among these groups, were more moderate and less influential, the Hunchak Committee established by Armenian nationalists in Geneva in 1887 and the Dashnak Committee -Dashnaksutyun Committee- established in Tbilisi in 1890 were socialist and revolutionary.⁴¹⁶ In the early 1900s, Armenians were inclined to support either their Social Democratic Hunchak party or more nationalist Armenian Revolutionary Federation known as Dashnaksutyun.⁴¹⁷

ii. Newly Independent State: Armenia, National Elites and Leaders

Armenia's path to independence started with the dissolution of Soviet Union as well. Declaration of Independence of Armenia was adopted on August 23, 1990 at the first session of the Supreme Council of Armenia. This document abolished the Armenian SSR and proclaimed the independent Republic of Armenia.⁴¹⁸ In the summer of 1991, Supreme Soviet passed a law providing a referendum on independence. With this law, the legislative and executive powers were strictly separated and a presidential office with executive powers was established.⁴¹⁹ In the referendum held in September 21, 1991, 94,99% of the people voted yes for independence. Two days later, the country's Supreme Council declared Armenia an independent state.⁴²⁰

Levon Ter-Petrossian, who was arrested as the leader of Karabakh Committee in 1988 and the spokesperson of the Armenian Supreme Soviet⁴²¹ won the presidential elections in 1991 with 83% of the vote. In December 1991, Ter-Petrossian officially sat on the chair of the presidency.⁴²² Paruyr Hayrikyan, who was against independence, won 7% of the votes. The remaining votes were split between the communists, the Dashnak or the Revolutionary Federation of Armenia and the

⁴¹⁶ Roderic H. Davison, "The Armenian Crisis, 1912-1914," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 53, No. 3, April 1948, p. 484.

⁴¹⁷ Nalbandian, "The Armenian Revolutionary...", pp. 104-31; Swietochowski, "Müslüman Cemaatten Ulusal Kimliğe...", p. 65.

⁴¹⁸ Agos, "Ermenistan Bağımsızlığın 30. Yılı Kutluyor," September 21, 2021. <https://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/26188/ermenistan-bagimsizligin-30-yilini-kutluyor> (Retrieved on 30.10.2022).

⁴¹⁹ Gerard J. Libaridian, *Ermenilerin Devletleşme Sınavı, Bağımsızlıktan Bugüne Ermeni Siyasi Düşünüşü*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık A.Ş., 2001, p. 27.

⁴²⁰ Siranush Ghazanchyan, "Armenia Marks 31st Anniversary of Independence," *Public Radio of Armenia*, September 21, 2022. <https://en.armradio.am/2022/09/21/armenia-marks-31st-anniversary-of-independence/> (Retrieved on 30.10.2022).

⁴²¹ Baev, "Russia's Policies...", p. 11.

⁴²² Brent Hierman, *Russia and Eurasia 2017-2018*, The World Today Series 2017-2018, 48th Edition, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017, p. 213.

independents. When USSR collapsed at the end of 1991, the independence of the republics of former Soviet Union, including Armenia were recognized.⁴²³

Armenian political life after independence can be read through two different groups. The first of these was Ter-Petrossian and Armenian National Movement. This first group aimed to start normalization process for Armenia and Armenian people, to get rid of excessive value loadings of the past, to avoid ideological restrictions and to follow a pragmatic path. The second group attributed to Armenia and Armenian people the role of achieving a “higher” vision, ideal, mission, and status. Vazgen Manukyan’s National Democratic Union Party, Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Armenian Communist Party, and Democratic Party of Armenia have been parties that glorified this national ideology.⁴²⁴

According to Ter-Petrossian, Nagorno-Karabakh war was a defensive war, not a war of expansion. For Armenian National Movement, the essence of Nagorno-Karabakh problem was security and collective rights of Nagorno-Karabakh people. It was believed that these rights could be achieved through unification with Armenia in 1988. By 1992, this target was revised according to post-Soviet realities. Although Nagorno-Karabakh was a very special and critical issue, it was only one of the main problems of Armenia. Ter-Petrossian thought that only an economically, politically, and socially strong Armenia would be effective in defending Nagorno-Karabakh lands and people. According to him, if a solution to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict found, embargoes on Armenia could be ended and Armenia would be in a stronger position with the opening of communication channels and transportation routes.⁴²⁵

After the collapse of the USSR in Armenia, some environmental groups turned into nationalist organizations. The most influential among them, Karabakh Committee, was founded by intellectuals with high nationalist sentiments under the leadership of Ter-Petrossian. Karabakh Committee had a very nationalist discourse.⁴²⁶

The general trend in South Caucasus until the mid-1990s was to stabilize existing state structures, partially restore public order, and achieve a slower pace of

⁴²³ Libaridian, “**Ermenilerin Devletleşme Sınavı...**,” pp. 27-28.

⁴²⁴ **Ibid.**, pp. 103-104.

⁴²⁵ Libaridian, “**Ermenilerin Devletleşme Sınavı...**,” pp. 105-106.

⁴²⁶ Mark R. Beissinger, **Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 343-344.

reform and democratization. However, post-Soviet political leaders and institutions in both Armenia and Azerbaijan remained under the influence of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, the victories in Nagorno-Karabakh war, which started with the capture of Shusha and Lachin in May 1992, and the expansion of the front with a ceasefire in the spring of 1994, provided Armenian government a temporary relief.⁴²⁷

The armistice signed with Azerbaijan in 1994 allowed Armenian government to turn its attention to state building and establishment of its institutions. Constitutional preparations were also completed after the ceasefire. The constitution, which was prepared in three years, was adopted in 1995. Compared to the legislative acts of 1991, the 1995 constitution increased some powers of the president and reduced others. Elections for the National Assembly were also held in 1995. Presidential elections took place in 1996. According to this election results, National Assembly was dominated by the Republican Bloc under the leadership of Armenian National Movement, and Ter-Petrosian was re-elected for the second term with a narrow margin, although the opposition and international observers stated that the elections were rigged.⁴²⁸

Ter-Petrosian struggled with many problems such as Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, the destruction caused by the 1988 earthquake, influx of thousands of refugees, and economic depression. Ter-Petrosian's government, which became increasingly marginalized with the argument of national security and silenced the opposition, gained power as the head of the executive and the state after the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, but had to resign in 1998 due to economic difficulties and opposition pressures.⁴²⁹

The national liberation movement in Armenia is at the center of the project of unification with Nagorno-Karabakh. According to Armenians, Nagorno-Karabakh is seen as a part of Armenian history.⁴³⁰ In Nagorno-Karabakh, government and army leaders are seen as having ultimate responsibility for representation. For this reason, Armenian National Movement did not open a branch in Nagorno-Karabakh even

⁴²⁷ Laitin & Suny, "Armenia and Azerbaijan...", p. 154.

⁴²⁸ Libaridian, "Ermenilerin Devletleşme Sınavı...", pp. 29-30.

⁴²⁹ Simon Payaslian, **The Political Economy of Human Rights in Armenia Authoritarianism and Democracy in a Former Soviet Republic**, London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2011, p. 110.

⁴³⁰ Coppieters, "The Politicisation and Securitisation...", p. 73.

when it was at its strongest period and was in close cooperation with Nagorno-Karabakh leadership. The two parties that were officially registered and opened branches in Nagorno-Karabakh were the Communist Party and Armenian Revolutionary Federation. However, these parties did not have alternative programs to Armenian National Movement.⁴³¹

In Armenia, a group such as the Yerkrpahs (Yerkrpah Veterans Association) sought a place in political life. Initially made up of soldiers who had fought in the war, this organization received the support of Defense Minister Vazgen Sargsyan. They did not have a political party program of their own, but they supported Ter-Petrosian. They later merged with Republican Party.⁴³² From an organizational point of view, “Krunk” (Durna), which was described as a separatist-terrorist organization, stood out in Nagorno-Karabakh. The “Miatsum” (Unification) Movement emerged as a result of the activities of this organization.⁴³³

Robert Kocharian, whom Ter-Petrosian invited to become the prime minister of Armenia in 1997, took office as the vice president in accordance with the constitution and won the election in the second round of the presidential elections held in April 1998.⁴³⁴ The consolidation of authoritarian rule in Armenia continued during the periods of Kocharian, who served from 1998 to 2008, and Serzh Sargsyan, who served from 2008 to 2018.⁴³⁵ In 2018, Armen Sarkissian became the President of Armenia. Armen Sarkissian resigned on February 1, 2022. After a very short tenure of Alen Simonyan, Vahagn Khachaturian was elected as Armenian President in March 2022.⁴³⁶

The professional backgrounds, policies, and statements of Armenian leaders will be provided in detail at the last section of this dissertation.

⁴³¹ Libaridian, “**Ermenilerin Devletleşme Sınavı...**,” p. 131.

⁴³² Libaridian, “**Ermenilerin Devletleşme Sınavı...**,” p. 132.

⁴³³ Yakub Yakubov, “SSCB’nin Dağılması Sürecinde Ermeni Siyasi Düşüncesinin Temel Yönleri ve Dağlık Karabağ Sorununun Başlaması,” in Kasımlı & Efegil, (Ed.), “**Dağlık Karabağ Üzerine...**,” p. 75.

⁴³⁴ Payaslian, “**The Political...**,” pp. 31-32.

⁴³⁵ Payaslian, “**The Political Economy...**,” p. 110.

⁴³⁶ Jam News, “**New president of Armenia: who is he and what does he intend to do,**” March 3, 2022. <https://jam-news.net/new-president-of-armenia-who-is-he-and-what-does-he-intend-to-do/> (Retrieved on 03.03.2022).

III. “BEING RIGHT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH”: LEGAL STATUS OF NAGORNO KARABAKH AND CONFLICTING ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

Special nation-building processes within Soviet Union had played a significant role in defining Azerbaijani and Armenian identities. *Glasnost* and *perestroika* policies implemented in the last period of Soviet Union became a driving force behind strengthening of nationalist tendencies among Azerbaijanis and Armenians, resulting in independence. Modern debates on nation have centered on maintaining political control over a particular territory, including disputed territories such as Nagorno-Karabakh, which is predominantly Armenian, and Nakhchivan, which is predominantly Muslim.⁴³⁷ As a matter of fact, as seen in this study, the claims of Azerbaijan and Armenia on Albania confirm this. Being Armenian and Azerbaijani has evolved from broad definitions such as “Christian”, “Muslim”, “Soviet people” or “Caucasian civilization” to narrower and more exclusive definitions of community characterized by ethnic nationalism over time.⁴³⁸

In this section, the emergence and escalation of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh will be examined in line with the USSR Constitution, the CIS Convention, United Nations (UN) Conventions and the OSCE principles. Then, the settlement process will be discussed briefly.

A. The Emergence and Escalation of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

1. First Conflicts between Azerbaijanis and Armenians

The hatred between Azerbaijanis and Armenians took place in the form of clashes and killings since 1905. However, there are different explanations for the causes of these first events. The first explanation is the socio-economic differences

⁴³⁷ Laitin & Suny, “Armenia and Azerbaijan...,” p. 146.

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

between Azerbaijani and Armenian communities. The second one is that the ongoing Russian-Armenian cooperation. The third one is the increase in Armenian population in South Caucasus as a result of settlement policies since Russian Tsardom. This situation poses a threat to other nations in the region. It can be misleading to focus on just one factor when considering the causes of conflicts. In most cases, these causes are intertwined.

Firstly, some socio-economic reasons can be shown as the cause of the 1905 events. Armenians, who took a very important place in the local economy and were in better position than Azerbaijanis in terms of salary and qualified personnel caused uneasiness especially among Azerbaijanis from Baku. The murder of a Muslim in the chaotic environment led Azerbaijanis to burn and destroyed Armenian properties. In a short time, conflicts spread to Karabakh, Yerevan, Susha, Tbilisi, Nakhchivan, and Ganja.⁴³⁹ The events escalated due to the attacks of Armenians. The acts of violence in Baku in February 1905 spread to Karabakh and to all regions in a short time. It is claimed that during these events, Armenians received support from Russian garrison in Karabakh and Tbilisi.⁴⁴⁰

Secondly, Armenians sympathized with tsarist administration, which they thought it saved them from Muslim rule. Armenians showed their devotion by joining Russian army or other public services in Russia.⁴⁴¹ It is claimed Armenians, who received Russian support, engaged in various gang activities in which Armenian youths raised in Russia organized violent acts against Turks in Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia.⁴⁴² As a matter of fact, it is emphasized in some Azerbaijani sources that the year 1905, when Russian-Armenian relations improved, coincided with the years when Armenian Dashnak groups took action against Turks in Caucasus. From 1905 to 1907, in Baku, Ganja, Karabakh, Yerevan, Nakhchivan, Ordubad, Sharur-

⁴³⁹ Geukjian, "Ethnicity, Nationalism...", pp. 43-44.

⁴⁴⁰ Reha Yılmaz, "Kafkasya'da Çözülemeyen Kördüğüm: Dağlık Karabağ Sorunu," **Çankırı Karatekin Üniversitesi Uluslararası Avrasya Strateji Dergisi**, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 75.

⁴⁴¹ Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, "Doğu Anadolu'da Ermeni Sorunu (1900-1920)", Tarih Boyunca Türklerin Ermeni Toplumu ile İlişki Sempozyumu, p. 228, cited in Yıldırım, Özönder, "**Karabağ Dosyası...**," p. 11.

⁴⁴² **Ibid.**

Dereleyez, Tbilisi, Zangezur, Gazakh and elsewhere, Armenians, attacked civilian Azerbaijani people.⁴⁴³

Thirdly, some Azerbaijani sources showed mass Armenian migrations as the reasons of land occupations and the acts of violence against Azerbaijani people. As mentioned above, the establishment of an Armenian province with the center of Yerevan by Russians after the Gulistan and Turkmenchay Treaties and the initiation of Armenian migration to the region changed the existing demographic balances in the region.⁴⁴⁴ Armenians, who were settled in the lands of the Yerevan, Nakhchivan, and Karabakh khanates, created administrative structures called Armenian province, although they were a minority compared to Azerbaijanis. This Armenianization effort, which included the efforts to rewrite Armenian history, formed the basis of the ideas of “Greater Armenia”. Therefore, the first conflict between Azerbaijani and Armenian groups, which broke out in Baku in 1905 and spread to the settlements of Azerbaijan was seen as a step towards realizing this ideal.⁴⁴⁵

The tension between Armenians and Azerbaijanis was closely related to the political and economic developments throughout the Russian Tsardom. In January 1905, workers’ strikes began in Petersburg, Russia, which was struggling with a great economic crisis and depression. On January 22, 1905, soldiers opened fire on a crowded group gathered in front of the Tsar’s palace, and hundreds of people were injured and lost their lives. These events, which were accepted as the beginning of the 1905 strikes, were called “Bloody Sunday”. As the strikes grew and participation increased, tsarist regime took a step back.⁴⁴⁶ Although it was completely suppressed in a few years, the most important achievement of socialists as a result of these uprisings was the establishment of some constitutional arrangements and a semi-

⁴⁴³ Jeremy Smith, “Nagorno Karabakh under Soviet Rule,” in Palonkorpi, **“The South Caucasus....”** pp. 11-12.; Elçin Ahmedov, “Ermenistan’ın Devlet Terörü Politikası ve Azerbaycan’a Karşı Saldırganlığının Sonuçları,” in Kasımlı & Efegil, (Ed.), **“Dağlık Karabağ Üzerine....”** p. 90.

⁴⁴⁴ Özlem Yılmaz, “Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti Siyasi Gelişmeler (1991-2010)” in Necati İyikan (Ed.), **Orta Asya Güney Kafkasya Siyasi Gelişmeler: 1991-2010**, İstanbul: Hiperlink Yayınları, 2011, p. 96.

⁴⁴⁵ Hidayet Orucov, **Haydar Aliyev ve Azerbaycan’da Milli Siyaset**, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2014, p. 45.

⁴⁴⁶ Abraham Ascher, **The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray**, California: Stanford University Press, 1988, pp. 74-80.

constitutional monarchy with the declaration of the October Manifesto and new Constitutional Laws in 1905 and 1906.⁴⁴⁷

While Russia was dealing with social and economic problems, First World War, which had devastating effects for the whole world, started in the summer of 1914, and Russian Tsardom found itself in a new war this time. While the war was still going on, new uprising movements emerged that overthrew Tsarist Russia in February 1917 and liberal elites and socialists established Provisional Government. However, Bolshevik wing of Russian Social Democratic Labor Party carried out a new revolution in October 1917 and ended Provisional Government under the name of Soviet rule. With this new development, Bolsheviks completely took over the administration of the country.⁴⁴⁸

After February Revolution of 1917, new Russian administration established Special Transcaucasian Committee to administer Transcaucasia on March 22, 1917. After October Revolution of 1917, Transcaucasian nations, which could not agree with the center, established Transcaucasian Commissariat (*Zakavkom*, *Zakafkazskiy Komissariat* in Russian) on November 28, 1917. Ottoman and Russian commanders signed Armistice of Erzincan on December 18, 1917 in the Caucasus Front, ending three-year war. When Armistice of Erzincan was signed, Transcaucasian Commissariat consisting of Georgian, Azeri, and Armenian representatives was administrating Transcaucasian Seim.⁴⁴⁹

It is argued that the weapons which were left by Russian soldiers withdrawing from the Caucasus front of First World War and fallen into the hands of Armenians and Georgians was a threat for the people of Azerbaijan. Opinion leaders and politicians of the period thought that the best way for Azerbaijani people to get rid of this threat was to fill the political vacuum in the region by Ottoman Empire. In front of nationalist winds brought by French Revolution and the rise of ethnic uprisings, Ottoman intellectuals wanted to prevent the collapse of the empire with the ideas of Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism at that time. Ottoman Turkish intellectuals supported the idea of Turkism rather than Ottomanism-Islamism during the period of

⁴⁴⁷ Mark D. Steinberg, **The Russian Revolution, 1905-1921**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 14-15.

⁴⁴⁸ **Ibid.**

⁴⁴⁹ Mustafa Sarı, "Kafkas Murahhaslarının İstanbul Seyahati ve Kafkasya Cephesi (1918)," **Kafkasya Çalışmaları Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi**, Vol. 1, No. 2, March 2016, p. 77.

Union and Progress Party, which was a political movement, founded in 1889 and took over the administration of the country between 1913 and 1918. Therefore, the call of Azerbaijanis could be received positively in the political atmosphere prevailed in Ottoman Empire.⁴⁵⁰

Some Azerbaijani intellectuals, who trusted the intellectuals of Turkism movement under Ottoman rule, sent a representative to Istanbul in mid-January 1918 to ask for help from Ottoman Empire. Simultaneously, Ottoman Empire stated that it wanted to hold peace talks with Transcaucasian Commissariat as of January 1918. Although the Commissariat did not take kindly to this at first, it accepted this peace offer upon the successful continuation of Ottoman operation, which started on 12 February. Thus, the parties agreed to hold a conference in Trabzon in early March.⁴⁵¹

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed on March 3, 1918, changed the course of events. Russian civil war, which lasted from 1917 to 1920, caused Bolsheviks to focus primarily on maintaining order and ensuring security in the country. Bolsheviks, who considered the First World War as a chaos in which Russian Tsardom dragged the country, declared that they were withdrawing from the war by signing Brest-Litovsk Peace with the warring states on March 3, 1918. With this treaty, Russia, Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, Ukraine, and Belarus lost part of their lands.⁴⁵²

Russia's withdrawal from the war without compensation and annexation by signing Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had some important consequences for Ottoman Empire and Caucasus. For those who supported Turkism in the Committee of Union and Progress, Russia's withdrawal from the war would open the way for Ottomans to Caucasus and Central Asia. Since Russian obstacle was removed, Enver Pasha, one of the leaders of Committee of Union and Progress, immediately started working to move towards Caucasus. According to Enver Pasha, the issue of *Elviye-i Selase* (three provinces) that the fourth article of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk gave Ottomans the right to annex Kars, Ardahan and Batumi constituted a justification for this progress. Accordingly, Kars, Ardahan, and Batumi were liberated from the

⁴⁵⁰ Ali Mert Dündar, **Panislamizm'den Büyük Asyacılığa Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Japonya ve Orta Asya**, İstanbul: Ötüken, 2006, pp. 83-86.

⁴⁵¹ Sarı, "Kafkas Murahhaslarının...", pp. 78-86.

⁴⁵² Oral Sander, **Siyasi Tarih İlkçağlardan 1918'e**, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1989, pp. 391-392.

protection of Russia and the right of “self-determination of the peoples”, which was adopted as a principle by Bolsheviks, was given to these sanjaks.⁴⁵³

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed between the new Soviet regime and Central Powers and Turkey, dragged Caucasus into chaos. Between March 30 and April 2, 1918, Bolshevik and Armenian forces carried out a major attack to take over the administration of Baku. It has been recorded that thousands of Azeri civilians were killed in these attacks in cities such as Lankaran, Salyan, Shamakhi, and especially in Baku. Karabakh Armenians planned to unite with Baku Bolsheviks. When the news that Baku was captured by Bolshevik and Armenian forces reached Ottomans, the preparations for Caucasian Army of Islam initiated by Enver Pasha and commanded by Commander Nuri Pasha accelerated.⁴⁵⁴

As can be seen, the origins of the conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis are not limited to the events of 1905. Azerbaijanis remind that Armenian and Bolshevik forces came together to attack Muslims in Baku in March 1918. Armenians claim that Muslims attacked thousands of Armenians in May 1918.⁴⁵⁵ It is argued that May events were a revenge of March events. Azerbaijanis recall the activities of the Armenian national hero, General Andranik, who tried to exterminate Muslims in the independent Republic of Armenia, which existed between 1918 and 1920, and forced Muslims to migrate, especially from Zangezur, a disputed region in Armenia. Armenians evoke the casualties in Nagorno-Karabakh, Nakhchivan and memories of the loss of the city of Shusha, which was important for both Armenian and Azerbaijani culture in the pre-Soviet period. In summary, the tendency to take revenge and blame each other is felt intensely on both sides.⁴⁵⁶

While all this was going on, Transcaucasian Seim stated that it did not recognize the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and that it wanted to draw the border by negotiating with Ottoman Empire.⁴⁵⁷ On April 14, 1918, the Seim declared war on Ottomans, but could not hold on against the Empire. Ottoman troops entered Batumi on the same day and arrived in front of Kars in a short time. Transcaucasian Seim,

⁴⁵³ Mustafa Çolak, “Osmanlı- Alman Rekabeti Çerçevesinde Kafkas Müslümanlarının Bağımsızlığı ve Bakü Meselesi (1917-1918),” *Journal of History Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1, January 2014, p. 30.

⁴⁵⁴ Sarı, “*Kafkas Murahhaslarının...*,” pp. 89-90.

⁴⁵⁵ Suny & Stork, “*What Happened in Soviet Armenia?...*,” p. 38.

⁴⁵⁶ Nora Dudwick, “Postsocialism and the Fieldwork of War,” in De Soto & Dudwick, “*Fieldwork Dilemmas Anthropologists...*,” p. 21.

⁴⁵⁷ Çolak, “*Osmanlı- Alman Rekabeti...*,” p. 30.

wanted to make peace with Ottoman Empire. Although Ottomans accepted this peace offer, it added Kars to its lands. The peace talks that took place on May 11 failed and Ottoman Empire entered to Gyumri on May 15-16 and continued its advance.⁴⁵⁸

Realizing that they could not show any more resistance against Ottomans, the Seim decided to dissolve itself. Together with Azeri Turks, Georgians and Armenians, who were organized with the desire for independence, had first established Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic and declared its independence on April 22, 1918. However, this formation only survived for 32 days.⁴⁵⁹ Georgians declared independence from Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic on 26 May. Azerbaijan declared independence on 28 May and Armenia on 29 May.⁴⁶⁰ The short-lived independence periods of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia from 1918 to 1920 started with these successive announcements.

On June 4, 1918, various agreements were signed in Batumi between Ottoman delegates and Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and North Caucasus delegates. Ottoman Empire annexed Akhaltsikhe (Ahıska) and Akhalkalaki (Ahilkelek) based on this agreement.⁴⁶¹ Meanwhile, Ottoman forces under the command of Nuri Pasha entered into Baku and this was greeted with enthusiasm in Azerbaijan.⁴⁶² Nuri Pasha, who left Istanbul at the beginning of April, first entered Ganja on 25 May via Mosul, Tabriz. However, the 5th Caucasian Division which served as a reinforcement force for Caucasian Islamic Army could not take over Baku. Ottoman Empire, which carried out the first Baku offensive on 1 August, was not successful; its second attack was carried out on 14 September and they entered the city on 15 September. However, although Ottoman State, which later turned its direction to the north, acquired some lands, it had to evacuate these areas in accordance with Armistice of Mudros signed on 30 October 1918.⁴⁶³

With the withdrawal of the Ottoman army from Azerbaijan, Britain entered Baku. The departure of British forces from Azerbaijani lands left Azeri Turks

⁴⁵⁸ Sarı, “Kafkas Murahhaslarının...,” pp. 90-91.

⁴⁵⁹ Ismailov & Papava, “A New Concept...,” p. 284.

⁴⁶⁰ Demir, “Türk Dış Politikası Perspektifinden...,” p. 68.

⁴⁶¹ Alessandro Vagnini, “Great War in Transcaucasia: From Ottoman Occupation to the Treaty of Kars,” *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 3, No. 2, May 2012, p. 96.

⁴⁶² Abdulhaluk Çay, “Azerbaycan Dosyası,” *Tercüman*, 12 Nisan 1988 cited in Yıldırım, Özönder, “Karabağ Dosyası...,” p. 22.

⁴⁶³ Vagnini, “Great War in Transcaucasia...,” p. 96.

defenseless against Russian threat. Based on the meeting with President Wilson in 1919, when Azerbaijani delegates returned, they re-established a confederation with Armenians with the withdrawal of Georgians, but this weak confederation, which had no military power, disintegrated when Russian forces entered the country.⁴⁶⁴ Crossing the border on April 26, 1920, Red Army began to advance to Baku. The new administration established under the presidency of Nariman Narimanov declared Soviet Azerbaijan on April 28, 1920.⁴⁶⁵

In 1920-1921, when South Caucasus was united with Soviet Union, the borders between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia were not yet determined. The uncertainty of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhchivan regions prevented the drawing of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and pushed the parties into a political struggle.⁴⁶⁶ At the end of November 1921, Political Bureau of Russian Communist Party adopted a decree to establish Caucasus Federation. On December 1, 1922, First Congress of Caucasian Soviet was convened in Baku, and the short independence period of the Caucasian countries was ended with the establishment of Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in this Congress.⁴⁶⁷

Bolsheviks declared Nakhchivan as part of Azerbaijan and Zangezur as part of Armenia in 1921. Nagorno-Karabakh, which belonged to Azerbaijan until 1921, was granted autonomous *okrug* status under the administration of Azerbaijan SSR. Although Bolsheviks promised to unite Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia after Bolshevik Revolution, in 1923, it granted higher autonomy than before, giving it the status of an autonomous oblast.⁴⁶⁸ Therefore, Moscow did not keep its promise to Armenians. Soviet Union declared the establishment of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region within Azerbaijan SSR on July 7, 1923.⁴⁶⁹ Nakhchivan, which lies between Iran in the south and Armenian SSR in the north, was also declared as Autonomous SSR of Azerbaijan on February 9, 1924.⁴⁷⁰ In November 1936, the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic disintegrated and a new era

⁴⁶⁴ Mehmet Saray, **Türkistan Türkleri Rus ve Çin İdaresinde Yaşayan Türklerin Milli Mücadele Tarihleri**, İstanbul: Veli Yayınları, 1984, pp. 55-56.

⁴⁶⁵ Abdulhaluk Çay, "Azerbaycan Dosyası," Tercüman, 12 Nisan 1988 cited in Yıldırım, Özönder, **"Karabağ Dosyası..."**, p. 22.

⁴⁶⁶ Svante E. Cornell, "Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered," **Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol. 20, No. 4, Summer 1997, pp. 2-4.

⁴⁶⁷ Garibov, **"XX. Yüzyılda Ermenistan-Azerbaycan..."**, p. 40.

⁴⁶⁸ Minassian, **"La République d'Arménie..."**, pp. 260-261.

⁴⁶⁹ Chrysanthopoulos, **"Caucasus Chronicles..."**, pp. 8-9.

⁴⁷⁰ Walker, **"Armenia and Karabagh..."**, p. 113.

began in which each of these Caucasian countries became a Soviet Socialist Republic.⁴⁷¹

Soviet regime followed policies in Nagorno-Karabakh, contrary to the sensitivities of both sides, and that would drag the groups into ethnic and territorial conflicts. In 1921, Stalin's incorporation of Nagorno-Karabakh, a predominantly Armenian settlement, into the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, drew reaction of Armenians. For Armenians, Azerbaijan tried to increase its population in the region. In the early 1920s, Armenians opposed the change of Karabakh population distribution to the detriment of Armenians and they were organized against Azeri Turks. Soviet administration's Armenianization policy was criticized by Azerbaijani authorities.⁴⁷²

The efforts of Nagorno-Karabakh to unite with Armenia were in the form of protest waves that broke out under the rule of Soviet Union. After the events of 1905, the first uprising took place in Nagorno-Karabakh on March 23, 1929 with the support of Armenian SSR. A few months before Armenian revolt in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan Communist Party revolted and attempted to overthrow the government, but was unsuccessful. It is said that Moscow, which was trying to weaken Azerbaijan in this situation, prepared Nagorno-Karabakh rebellion by collaborating with the leaders of the Armenian Social Democratic Party.⁴⁷³ Upon the uprising of Armenians, the General Staff of Azerbaijan mobilized the army to suppress the rebels.⁴⁷⁴

Another important event related to population change in the region took place at the end of the 1940s. On December 23, 1947, the Council of Ministers of the USSR decided to displace Azerbaijani population from Armenian SSR and force them to migrate to Kura and Aras River valleys of Azerbaijan SSR. As a result of this decision, approximately 150,000 Azerbaijanis were expelled from their historical lands, especially from Yerevan and its surrounding regions, in 1948-1953.⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁷¹ Garibov, "XX. Yüzyılda Ermenistan-Azerbaycan...", p. 40.

⁴⁷² Paul, "Grassroots Mobilization...", p. 32.

⁴⁷³ Hüseyin Baykara, "Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti'nin İki Askeri Zaferi," *Türk Kültürü*, 1965, No. 35, p. 830.

⁴⁷⁴ Yıldırım, Özönder, "Karabağ Dosyası...", p. 21.

⁴⁷⁵ Audrey Altstadt, *The Politics of Culture in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1920-40*, London: Routledge, 2016, pp. 51-52.

During forty years, the region was relatively silent. However, the conflicts between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which flared up again in the last period of Soviet Union, have continued until today. For Armenians, the most important problem was Nagorno-Karabakh, which was seen as part of their ethnic lands and “orphaned” by the neighboring republic Azerbaijan. For Azerbaijan, the most serious threat was aggressive expansionism of Armenia, which was encouraged by Russians.⁴⁷⁶ These conflicts will be discussed in chronological order in the following section.

2. From Historical Hatreds to Ethnic Conflict (1988-1991)

The conflicts between Azerbaijan and Armenia due to Nagorno-Karabakh will be examined in four different periods since the dissolution of Soviet Union. The first of these is the period from 1988 to 1991, when historical disagreement and some hostilities turned into an ethnic conflict among the parties. The second one is the period from 1991 to 1994 when ethnic conflicts turned into violent and bloody events, civilians were killed and forcibly displaced. The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh from 1994 to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 is called as “frozen conflict” in which the ceasefire was violated for many times. Finally, the fourth phase will be discussed in the light of new developments in 2020 and beyond.

There was a period of relative silence in Nagorno-Karabakh under Soviet rule due the effects of the oppressive regime. As a matter of fact, after the events of 1929, the first large-scale protest was started in October 1987 for handing over of Nakhchivan and Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. Soviet administration remained unresponsive to these protests.⁴⁷⁷ At the beginning of 1988, The City Council decided to submit a proposal to Moscow to make Nagorno-Karabakh a part of Armenia. This request was thought to be one of insignificant developments within the country’s borders, of which there were dozens of similar ones under Soviet rule. Both republics were part of the USSR, and this act, which was not expected to have international consequences, was seen as an administrative change. Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh believed that this request would gain legitimacy and Soviets would welcome it if it was presented officially and supported by a mass demonstration.⁴⁷⁸

⁴⁷⁶ Suny, “Nationalist and Ethnic Unrest...,” p. 508.

⁴⁷⁷ Demir, “Türk Dış Politikası Perspektifinden...,” p. 162.

⁴⁷⁸ Libaridian, “Ermenilerin Devletleşme Sınavı...,” pp. 24-25.

Mass nationalist movement, the Karabakh movement, which had two branches, one in Yerevan and the other in Stepanakert –Hankendi as Azerbaijanis call- played an important role in these protests. On February 19, 1988, several thousand people came together in the Theater Square of Yerevan in order to show their support for Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh's demand was supported by very crowded demonstrations in Yerevan. Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh had also come together in another square and demanded unification with Armenia. Transferring Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomus Oblast to the jurisdiction of Armenia was the first step of this demand. The second step was the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh.⁴⁷⁹ These demonstrations in Yerevan attracted worldwide attention and became the first examples of popular movements that took place in the Soviet bloc.⁴⁸⁰

As underlined above, the belief that the demand of Nagorno-Karabakh to join Armenia would be welcomed by Soviets was strong both among Armenians in Yerevan and local authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh. It was reminded that the USSR had made arrangements on administrative borders for many times in the past, and it was thought that Moscow would definitely say yes to widespread popular support. *Glasnot, perestroika* and the policies of making Stalin forgotten have a great role in this optimism. If some corrections were made in the political and economic system imposed by Stalinism, "it was reasonable to believe that the internal borders system, which was the third pillar of the Soviet order, which was unfair to many ethnic groups, could also be changed."⁴⁸¹

On February 20, 1988, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, with 110 votes against 17, notified the Supreme Soviets of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the USSR that they wanted to join Armenia. This decision was not welcomed by Azerbaijanis and tensions between ethnic groups increased. It is argued that upon the spread of news that two Azerbaijanis were killed in the events that took place in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijanis started to attack Armenians in Sumgait.⁴⁸² It is claimed that more than

⁴⁷⁹ Elen Grigoryan, Sona Margaryan, "Memory of Politics: the Post-Soviet Memory Landscape in Yerevan," **Caucasus Edition**. <https://caucasusedition.net/memory-politics-the-post-soviet-memory-landscape-in-yerevan/> (Retrieved on 25.04.2020).

⁴⁸⁰ Libaridian, "Ermenilerin Devletleşme Sınavı...", pp. 24-25.

⁴⁸¹ **Ibid.**, p. 49.

⁴⁸² Demir, "Türk Dış Politikası Perspektifinden...", p. 162.

100 Armenians were killed in February 1988.⁴⁸³ The events in Sumgait in late February and early March polarized public opinion in these two republics and made the issue a political one. According to some sources, one million people gathered at the demonstrations from time to time. The first Karabakh Committee, which consisted of well-known intellectuals of Soviet Armenia close to Moscow, failed to overcome the crisis.⁴⁸⁴

Karabakh Committee was replaced by some political figures in May 1988. Linguist and historian Levon Ter-Petrossian, Yerevan State University Mathematics professors Vazgen Manukyan, Babken Ararkysyan, ethnologist Hambardzum Galstyan, physicist Rafael Ghazaryan, Communist Party Youth Branch member Ashot Manucharyan, writer Vano Siradeghyan, Davit Vardanyan, Samvel Gevorkyan, Samson Gazaryan, and Aleksan Hakobyan were among them. This group led the political and organizational leadership of the popular movement.⁴⁸⁵ The escalation of tensions led to the strengthening of the radical Karabakh Movement, which demanded Armenian control of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.⁴⁸⁶

The petition of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh to leave Azerbaijan on March 23, 1988 was rejected by Soviet authorities. However, the demands of Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh for independence fueled the fire of hostility between Azerbaijani and Armenian populations.⁴⁸⁷ Unable to resolve this political conflict, Moscow found the solution by making an arrangement between Armenia and Azerbaijan that brought about population exchange, excluding Nagorno-Karabakh. Upon this decision, 170,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis were forced to leave Armenia and sent to Azerbaijan. Nearly 300,000 Armenians living in Azerbaijan went to Armenia, Russia, and Central Asian republics.⁴⁸⁸

Among the disturbances of Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh in the events of 1988, there was the consumption of the resources of their region by Baku

⁴⁸³ Goble, "Coping With the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis....," p. 21.

⁴⁸⁴ Libaridian, "Ermenilerin Devletleşme Sınavı....," p. 25.

⁴⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁶ Grigoryan & Margaryan, "Memory of Politics....," The Azerbaijani Parliament canceled the autonomy status of Nagorno-Karabakh on November 27, 1991 and changed the name of the capital Stepanakert to "Hankendi". Armenia considered this decision as a reason for war. Cumhuriyet, "Azerbaycan, Dağlık Karabağ'ı Yuttu," November 28, 1991. <https://www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/katalog/192/sayfa/1991/11/28/11.xhtml> (Retrieved on 12.04.2019).

⁴⁸⁷ Emma Klever, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan: An Overview of the Current Situation," Brussels, *European Movement International*, September 24, 2013, p. 4.

⁴⁸⁸ Libaridian, "Ermenilerin Devletleşme Sınavı....," pp. 25-26.

and ignoring of their cultural rights. Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh expressed their discomfort by claiming that the arrival of Azerbaijanis in the region was supported in order to change demography and that Armenians were pressured to leave the region in the long run. The first demand of Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh was to be freed from the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan and to be subject to Armenian law.⁴⁸⁹

On June 15, 1988, Armenian Supreme Soviet decided to unite with Nagorno-Karabakh.⁴⁹⁰ Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan rejected the request of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh to unite with Armenia on June 17, 1988, arguing that there was a violation of its territorial integrity.⁴⁹¹ During this period, there were 150,000 Armenians and 50,000 Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh. After this declaration, it is known that Azerbaijani minority in Armenia was expelled from the region and the acts of violence took place among the communities. These developments led these two states to an undeclared conflict with each other.⁴⁹²

Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh did not give up their demands for independence and insisted on this issue with the support of Armenia. In December 1989, Armenian Supreme Soviet and Karabakh National Council declared that Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia were united, and this decision turned into a demand for independence over time.⁴⁹³ On January 10, 1990, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the resolution named as “On the nonconformity with the USSR Constitution of the acts on Nagorno-Karabakh adopted by Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet on December 1, 1989 and January 9, 1990.” According to this resolution, Armenian SSR’s demand on the unification was not accepted by Soviet authorities, and it was announced that this could only happen upon Azerbaijan SSR’s consent.⁴⁹⁴

Karabakh Committee decided that Armenian state should take over the administration. Karabakh Committee institutionalized its activities under the

⁴⁸⁹ Herzig, “**The New Caucasus Armenia...**,” p. 66.

⁴⁹⁰ Demir, “**Türk Dış Politikası Perspektifinden...**,” p. 163.

⁴⁹¹ **Ibid.**

⁴⁹² Leila Alieva, “The Institutions, Orientations, and Conduct of Foreign Policy in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan,” in Dawisha & Dawisha, “**The Making of Foreign Policy...**,” p. 293.

⁴⁹³ Herzig, “**The New Caucasus Armenia...**,” p. 66.

⁴⁹⁴ Eurasian Times, “**Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Why Armenia Needs to Pull-Out from Occupied-Regions of Azerbaijan: OPED**,” September 29, 2020. <https://eurasianimes.com/armenia-azerbaijan-conflict-why-armenia-needs-to-pull-out-from-occupied-regions-of-azerbaijan-oped/> (Retrieved on 01.10.2021).

umbrella of Pan-Armenian National Movement. The elections held in May and July 1989 resulted in the success of the coalition led by Armenian National Movement. Armenian National Movement established the government of Soviet Armenia in August 1990. Ter-Petrossian was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and immediately appointed Vazgen Manukyan as prime minister. Other members of Karabakh Committee and the secondary leaders of the movement gradually came to important positions in Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers.⁴⁹⁵

Soviet authorities tried to maintain Communist Party control in the face of separatist movements, especially events in Azerbaijan and Armenia, including the Gorbachev era. This meant the adoption of a different approach in each of the national movements. This approach may vary depending on the extent to which national movements could be controlled by local Party groups, how much influence their leaders have in Kremlin, and the economic capacity of the republic in question. The pressure exerted by the democrats or those who did not compromise on the issue in Kremlin was also important. Kremlin generally stood against the separatist movement in Nagorno-Karabakh. Because during this period, the movement in Nagorno-Karabakh went beyond the central control and there was even concern that it might threaten the communist regime in Azerbaijan and Armenia.⁴⁹⁶

3. From Ethnic Conflict to Violence (1991-1994)

In April 1991, the conflict between Armenian and Azerbaijani groups intensified and turned into an atmosphere of chaos. On October 18, 1991, Azerbaijan declared its independence, and abolished the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh on November 23, 1991. Thereupon, on December 10, 1991, Nagorno-Karabakh held a referendum for independence and wanted to be independent from Azerbaijan at a rate of 99,89%, with the participation of 82,2% of the registered regional voters in the elections.⁴⁹⁷

Demands for independence increased conflicts between the parties. Armenians living in villages in the north of Nagorno-Karabakh claimed that in April 1991 Soviet

⁴⁹⁵ Libaridian, “**Ermenilerin Devletleşme Sınavı...**,” p. 26.

⁴⁹⁶ Alexei Zverev, “Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus 1988-1994,” in Coppieters, “**Contested Borders...**,” p. 16.

⁴⁹⁷ Chrysanthopoulos, “**Caucasus Chronicles...**,” p. 11.

Azerbaijani forces attacked them. It is stated that the people of 24 villages were deported during this period. Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenian authorities organized armed groups that would form the core of the Karabakh army as a result of these bloody events.⁴⁹⁸ Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence on September 2, 1991 upon a referendum. Thereupon, the Azerbaijani forces advanced towards Nagorno-Karabakh, and Armenian forces responded to this advance.⁴⁹⁹

Nagorno-Karabakh declared officially its independence in January 6, 1992. Azerbaijan reacted to this situation.⁵⁰⁰ With this announcement, Nagorno-Karabakh Republic has emerged, which no state has ever recognized, but which claims to be independent.⁵⁰¹ Armenian leader Ter-Petrosian did not recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. Ter-Petrosian believed that a permanent solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be a solution that both sides agreed on by making concessions. He believed that the recognition of the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia would block all negotiations.⁵⁰² The only reason behind this decision cannot be only negotiations. Armenia might also hesitate due to the international reaction.

In early 1992, Nagorno-Karabakh transformed from an issue on the territory of the former Soviet Union to a war between two sovereign states, Azerbaijan and Armenia. In this period, it is possible to examine the military conflicts between the parties in four stages. The first of these is the period when Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence between January-May 1992 and then faced an Azerbaijani attack. The aim of Azerbaijanis is to break Armenian resistance and take the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh. In return, Armenians attacked Khojaly, where Azerbaijanis were concentrated, in February 1992 with the support of the 366th regiment of the Russian army.⁵⁰³

According to official figures, 613 Azeris, including 63 children and 106 women, lost their lives in the attack where Armenian forces entered the town of Khojaly in Nagorno-Karabakh on the night of February 25 to February 26, during the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Nearly 100 civilians were seriously injured

⁴⁹⁸ Libaridian, "Ermenilerin Devletleşme Sınavı...", p. 27.

⁴⁹⁹ Demir, "Türk Dış Politikası Perspektifinden...", p. 163.

⁵⁰⁰ Klever, "The Nagorno-Karabakh...", p. 4.

⁵⁰¹ Herzig, "The New Caucasus Armenia...", p. 66.

⁵⁰² Libaridian, "Ermenilerin Devletleşme Sınavı...", pp. 52-53.

⁵⁰³ Geukjian, "Ethnicity, Nationalism...", pp. 189-197.

and more than 1,250 people were taken prisoner.⁵⁰⁴ Khojaly massacre was recognized as an act of genocide by 23 US states and many other states. In addition, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Turkic Council have recognized the bloody events as an act of genocide.⁵⁰⁵

The second phase of the war is the period from June to December 1992. Azerbaijan launched attacks on Mardakert and Shaumyan in northern and central Nagorno-Karabakh on June 12, 1992 and was successful in capturing most of Nagorno-Karabakh. In September 1992, Azerbaijani security forces concentrated their attacks on Lachin and Shusha, but Armenians counterattacked and did not allow Lachin corridor to be captured.⁵⁰⁶ Lachin corridor, which is a wide land corridor created by Nagorno-Karabakh forces in 1993, is of vital importance for the people of the region in terms of breaking the Nagorno-Karabakh blockade and providing access to Armenian lands. In this period, Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh created a large buffer zone by destroying the strategically important Azerbaijani villages and towns.⁵⁰⁷

The third phase of the conflict was the period between March and October 1993 when the events escalated to such an extent that it threatened international peace. In April 1993, Armenians captured the villages in Mardakert region of Nagorno-Karabakh, Kalbajar in the west and Fuzuli in the southeast, so the advances of the Azerbaijani forces in 1992 were largely repulsed.⁵⁰⁸ While all this was going on, even the ceasefire signed in Sochi in 1993 under the mediation of Russians was not enough to stop Armenians. Armenians continued to occupy Fuzuli, Jabrayil, and Aghdam in July 1993.⁵⁰⁹ By the end of 1993, one-fifth of Azerbaijan's lands were under the control of Armenians.⁵¹⁰ Thus, Armenian forces had occupied Nagorno-

⁵⁰⁴ Mustafa Bag, "Hocalı Katliamı'nın Yıl Dönümü: Katliam mı 'Soykırım' mı? Kim Nasıl Kabul Ediyor?", *Euronews*, February 26, 2022. <https://tr.euronews.com/2022/02/26/hocali-katliami-28-yil-donumu-neler-yasandi-katliam-soykirim-mi-daglik-karabag-azerbaycan> (Retrieved on 28.05.2022).

⁵⁰⁵ President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, "**Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict**," <https://president.az/en/pages/view/azerbaijan/karabakh> (Retrieved on 1.11.2022).

⁵⁰⁶ Geukjian, "**Ethnicity, Nationalism...**," pp. 189-197.

⁵⁰⁷ Nora Dudwick, "Postsocialism and the Fieldwork of War," in De Soto & Dudwick, "**Fieldwork Dilemmas Anthropologists...**," p. 20.

⁵⁰⁸ Geukjian, "**Ethnicity, Nationalism...**," p. 197.

⁵⁰⁹ Aljazeera Turk, "**Öncesi ve Sonrasıyla Karabağ Savaşı**," <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/dosya/oncesi-ve-sonrasiyla-karabag-savasi> (Retrieved on 28.02.2019).

⁵¹⁰ Virtual Karabakh, "**Ermenistan- Azerbaycan, Dağlık Karabağ Sorunu**," <http://www.virtualkarabakh.az/tr/post-item/28/48/ermenistan-azerbaycan-daglik-karabag-sorunu.html> (Retrieved on 10.04.2020).

Karabakh and seven surrounding regions. The connection road between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia was opened.⁵¹¹

The fourth phase covers the period from December 1993 to May 1994. The peace, which was signed on December 18, 1993 under the leadership of the OSCE Minsk Group and Russia, was violated for several times. Azerbaijani forces captured some strategic points in Mardakert and Aghdam, despite great losses. On May 12, 1994, the parties signed the Bishkek Protocol under the chairmanship of Russia and declared a ceasefire.⁵¹²

When the ceasefire was signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia, both sides were interested very much in the ceasefire, but the understanding of the ceasefire by the parties was very different. For Armenians, the new ceasefire line could allow Armenia to concentrate its invasions in the new “security zone” around Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore, Yerevan welcomed all attempts to create a peacekeeping force and the efforts of Moscow to deploy peacekeepers to the region, as it did in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, Azerbaijanis tried not to make the ceasefire line running through the lands legally belonging to them permanent. Therefore, they prevented the deployment of a Russian peacekeeping force in 1994 and rejected any action that would strengthen the OSCE’s monitoring mandate. Baku saw the ceasefire line as one of the few pressure elements against Armenians and frequently reminded that it continued to be in a state of war.⁵¹³

The fact that Nagorno-Karabakh, despite having an existing institutionalized autonomous structure, wanted to unite with the neighboring state to which it was close in terms of ethnicity is the only example in the post-Soviet conflicts. The new states established in the post-Soviet period did not experience a stable and peaceful period while trying to get rid of the influence of Soviet structures and policies in the rapid nation-building processes. Ethnic tensions and regional conflicts of interest have accompanied this difficult process, created a complex structure in which problems have been intertwined, as in the Nagorno-Karabakh example.⁵¹⁴ The

⁵¹¹ Elkhan E. Nuriyev, “Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Influences in the Caucasus: An Azeri Perspective,” **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2001, p. 157.

⁵¹² Geukjian, “**Ethnicity, Nationalism...**,” pp. 203-205.

⁵¹³ Thomas de Waal, “Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process,” **Survival**, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2010, pp. 166-167.

⁵¹⁴ James Hughes & Gwendolyn Sasse, “Conflict and Accommodation in the Former Soviet Union: The Role of Institutions and Regimes,” **Regional & Federal Studies**, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2001, p. 232.

historical and political dimensions of the conflict, the presence of Nagorno-Karabakh politicians in Armenia who have come to the fore with their separatist ideas and have gained strength, and Russia's support for Armenians in military operations have been the obstacles encountered in resolving the conflict.⁵¹⁵

Azerbaijan and Armenia have adopted different strategies in their attempts to resolve the conflict. Armenians tried to normalize the status quo, in the hope that Nagorno-Karabakh, like Kosovo, would gain international legitimacy over time. They focused on establishing a de facto state. However, Azerbaijani side tried to isolate so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, and to find support from international society about preserving its territorial integrity. In addition, by keeping its armed forces ready to use it at any time, it did not abandon its policy of reclaiming the occupied lands. It does not seem possible for international mediation efforts to be successful in such a frozen conflict environment where both sides are not willing to compromise.⁵¹⁶

Azerbaijan and Armenia have seemed to understand that even victory would not bring peace and prosperity. The conflict has become intolerable, because the pain of war is still felt by both sides. The most obvious example for this is the IDPs. The living conditions of the displaced people are very difficult. These people, whose material and moral losses are quite high, keep the social trauma alive by telling new generations what they had before and what they have lost now. These people, who have lost their property and been uprooted from their lands, think that they are also deprived of international aid. Not only Azerbaijanis, who lost their lands and were displaced, but also Armenians are not satisfied under these conditions. What is described as victory has neither brought jobs, nor developed their industries, nor opened their borders for trade. The vast majority of Armenians think that their future is under the shadow of Nagorno-Karabakh. Some of Armenians, who were extremely disappointed, immigrated to Russia or the US, especially Los Angeles, for better living conditions.⁵¹⁷

The next period will be referred to as the post-truce period until the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 and will be explained in detail below. In this period,

⁵¹⁵ Hughes & Sasse, "**Conflict and Accommodation...**," p. 235.

⁵¹⁶ De Waal, "**Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh...**," pp. 166-167.

⁵¹⁷ Laitin & Suny, "**Armenia and Azerbaijan...**," pp. 168-169.

Azerbaijan and Armenian forces continued to enter into armed conflict and violated the ceasefire with border clashes from time to time.

4. A Frozen “No War, No Peace” Situation (1994-2020)

Armenian forces were able to keep Azerbaijanis out of most of Nagorno-Karabakh and occupied seven regions around Nagorno-Karabakh. The conflict since 1988 has resulted in thousands of refugees and displaced persons from both sides. Despite of changing numbers in different sources, there are approximately 700,000 Azerbaijanis fleeing from Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding occupied territories. There are approximately 350,000 Armenians who left Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh.⁵¹⁸

As mentioned above, the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which intensified since 1992, ended with the ceasefire signed in 1994. Despite this ceasefire agreement announced with the encouragement and initiatives of international and regional actors, conflict between the parties continued. Azerbaijan demanded Armenia to withdraw from the lands it seized as a result of its attacks to Azerbaijani territories.⁵¹⁹ Azerbaijan sees the Nagorno-Karabakh problem as a separatist act provoked by Armenians and points out Armenia rather than Nagorno-Karabakh as the biggest enemy. As a matter of fact, the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh is not included as an independent entity in the ongoing peace negotiations is a product of this understanding prevailing on the Azerbaijani side.⁵²⁰

Negotiations and mediation efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh region revolve around the status. However, at crucial points, Armenia and Azerbaijan have differences of opinion. Azerbaijan does not make any compromise that will threaten its territorial integrity. Baku does not accept Nagorno-Karabakh people to determine the final status of region.⁵²¹ Mediation efforts and violations of law will be covered in detail in the last part of this Chapter.

Since 1994, the conflict has occasionally caused the death of soldiers in the border region and the escalation of inter-communal tensions. The most serious one

⁵¹⁸ Libaridian, “**Ermenilerin Devletleşme Sınavı...**,” p. 28.

⁵¹⁹ Nuriyev, “**Crossroads and Conflict...**,” p. 157.

⁵²⁰ Broers, “**Recognising Politics...**,” p. 9.

⁵²¹ Argam DerHartunian, “Negotiation and Settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh: Maintaining Territorial Integrity or Promoting Self-Determination,” **Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal**, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2007, p. 296.

was the four days war broke out between April 2 and 5, 2016. In this war, both sides used heavy weapons and dozens of soldiers and several civilians were killed.⁵²² As a result of the Four Day War, Azerbaijan took over two strategic hills, a village, and a total of about 2,000 hectares of land which were invaded by Armenia during the war.⁵²³

5. Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and Ceasefire (2020)

The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War started on September 27, 2020 and ended on November 10, 2020. Six weeks of bloody armed conflict in 2020 concluded with a ceasefire mediated by Russian Federation in the early hours of November 10. While the agreement was insufficient to ensure sustainable peace, it ended the conflict that left more than 7,000 soldiers and nearly 170 civilians injured in the region and many more. Under the agreement, Azerbaijan began to control seven regions adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh, which had been captured by Armenian forces since the previous war. It also took control of a significant part of Nagorno-Karabakh. The rest are monitored by a Russian peacekeeper, but still ruled by self-proclaimed local officials.⁵²⁴

⁵²² Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, Maciej Falkowski, "The Four-day War in Nagorno-Karabakh," **OSW Center for Eastern Studies**, June 6, 2016 <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-04-06/four-day-war-nagorno-karabakh> (Retrieved on 02.11.2021).

⁵²³ Gunay Hajiyeva, "Azerbaijan Remembers Four Day War," **Caspian News**, 5 April 2020 <https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/azerbaijan-remembers-four-day-war-2020-4-1-29/> (Retrieved on 11.10.2021).

⁵²⁴ International Crisis Group, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Visual Explainer," 17 May 2022 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer> (Retrieved on 10.06.2022).

After the Second Karabakh War in 2020, new borders are as below:




Figure 1.6. Borders and casualties per location after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020⁵²⁵

⁵²⁵ International Crisis Group, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Visual Explainer,” 17 May 2022 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer> (Retrieved on 10.06.2022).




Figure 1.7. Borders demarcated after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War⁵²⁶

B. Historical, Political and Legal Documents on Nagorno-Karabakh

1. Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

The legal dimension of Nagorno-Karabakh issue is discussed from different perspectives and opinions. One of them is based on the question of whether Nagorno-Karabakh really declared its independence from Azerbaijan SSR or Azerbaijan Republic. From this point of view, the issue opened the discussion over legitimacy in terms of time and way of separation of Azerbaijan from Soviet Union. The local authorities of so-called Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia claim that Armenian people in the region declared their independence within the scope of the “people’s right to self-determination”.⁵²⁷

⁵²⁶ Radio Free Europe, “Aliyev Says Won’t Recognize Armenia’s Territorial Integrity Unless Peace Deal Signed,” 22 April 2022 <https://www.rferl.org/a/aliyev-armenia-recognition-peace-deal/31816395.html> (Retrieved on June 8, 2022).

⁵²⁷ Sir Brian Fall, “Conflict in the South Caucasus,” *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2006, p. 198.

The 1924 Constitution of Soviet Union stated that the state had a federal structure. Theoretically, “union republics” were parts of the federal republic, and the constitution spoke of the right to secession, although it did not specify what form it would take. In the Soviet of Nationalities, one of the organs in the legislature, delegates represented national groups based on their size and status, regardless of their national consciousness. However, the constitution, which was adopted in Stalin era in 1936 and known as the “Stalin Constitution”, constituted a state organization that was “national in form but socialist in content”. In other words, the unions forming the federation did not have political and economic power. Soviet Union was highly centralized and ruled by a hierarchical and tightly organized Communist Party in Stalin years.⁵²⁸

Soviet government, in Article 72 of 1977 Constitution, granted the right to secede from the union to the republics. The law in 1990 determined the way of using this right. In the Secession Law (“Law on Procedures for Resolving Questions Related to the Secession of Union Republics from the USSR” or in short “Law of Secession”, it was stated that Union Republics had the right to secede through a referendum.⁵²⁹

Article 87, paragraph 3 of the 1977 USSR Constitution which divided the USSR into many horizontal and vertical units recognized that Nagorno-Karabakh was an autonomous region under Azerbaijan SSR. Autonomy was generally understood as cultural autonomy, and cultural autonomy was understood as people’s use of their own language and the development of their culture. The laws were proposed by Soviet regional government; however, it was being passed by Baku. Nagorno-Karabakh was sending a delegate to Azerbaijan SSR, which had a legislative body. Nagorno-Karabakh was constitutionally subordinated to Azerbaijan SSR.⁵³⁰

When Supreme Soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region wanted to join Armenia on February 20, 1988, this request was rejected by Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan in accordance with Article 78 of the 1977 USSR Constitution. Although

⁵²⁸ Margot Light, “Nationalism and Identity in the former Soviet Union,” **METU Studies in Development**, Vol. 27, No. 3-4, 2000, p. 48.

⁵²⁹ Michael Ajemian, “Territorial Stalemate: Independence of Nagorno-Karabakh following the Dissolution of the Soviet Union, and Its Lingering Effects Decades Later,” **Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev.**, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2011, p. 385.

⁵³⁰ Krüger, “**The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict...**,” pp. 27-28.

the authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh based this demand upon Article 70 within the framework of “people’s right to self-determination”, Article 78 clearly states that a piece of land could only be changed with the joint consent of the parties concerned and this change must be approved by the USSR. On July 28, 1988, the Presidency of Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the highest authority of that time, confirmed that Nagorno-Karabakh was an autonomous region within Azerbaijan. As mentioned above, according to the Soviet constitution, the union republics had the right to secede from the USSR. Because autonomous republics had their own constitutions; however, autonomous regions (oblasts) such as Nagorno-Karabakh did not have a constitution. Therefore, it can be argued that the claims and decisions of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region have no legal basis.⁵³¹

Armenians and Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh often refer to the 1990 Law on Secession. According to this law, they argue that Nagorno-Karabakh declared itself as an independent republic on September 2, 1991, approved it in a referendum, and thus fulfilled the requirements of Soviet Secession Law. However, it is argued that Nagorno-Karabakh did not declare its independence by fulfilling the requirements of the law. Furthermore, theoretically, since the separation of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan under USSR’s jurisdiction took place at the very moment when Law on Secession of the Soviets began to lose its validity, this situation started the independence process on August 30, 1991. Consequently, it is claimed that it did not result in any consequences affecting the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, which declared its own constitution in October 18, 1991. According to this view, Law on Secession should be considered nullified after Azerbaijan gained its independence.⁵³²

When Soviet Union collapsed on November 21, 1991, Baku abolished the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh responded to this move of Baku with a referendum on December 10, 1991, and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh voted yes for independence in this referendum. The referendum was boycotted by Azerbaijani minority. Afterwards, the disagreement between the parties intensified and turned into a bloody conflict as mentioned above.⁵³³

⁵³¹ Cornell, “Undeclared War...,” p. 18.

⁵³² Krüger, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict...,” pp. 24-25.

⁵³³ Pal Kolsto & Helge Blakkisrud, “Living with Non-recognition: State and Nation-building in South Caucasian Quasi-states,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 60, No. 3, 2008, p. 487.

Kolsto states that political entities such as Nagorno-Karabakh, which could not complete their state formation, create the myth of coming together against the “common external enemy”. Even if the ethnic conflict is related the past, the state that is opposed and demanded to secede from itself maintains its existence. This state may claim to have legal rights over the separated one. In this way, the state, which is opposed to the separated state, actually strengthens its existence. The new political entity tries to be homogenized. Generally, those who associate themselves ideologically or ethnically with the state where the separation took place cannot find a place for themselves in this new state and flee from its territories. As a matter of fact, in Nagorno-Karabakh, in 1988-1991, the entire Azerbaijani population had to leave their places of residence. Armenian population in the territory of Azerbaijan was forced to flee to the borders of Armenia.⁵³⁴

While Azerbaijanis argue that Nagorno-Karabakh should be evaluated within the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, Armenians argue that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh should be redefined. The issue of evaluating Nagorno-Karabakh within the scope of the principle of “self-determination of the peoples” seems controversial. Although it is claimed that Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast can exercise this right under the provisions of Soviet Secession Law according to Armenians, there are many counter-arguments. The reason for these differences of opinion is also related to the starting point of the conflict. Azerbaijan claims that this conflict broke out in 1988, but Armenia traces the origins of the conflict to 1918. In 1988, Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was a part of Azerbaijan SSR, but in 1918, Karabakh was autonomous in the eyes of Armenians, albeit controversial.⁵³⁵

Ajemian argues that Azerbaijan does not have a legal right over Nagorno-Karabakh lands since the separation of Azerbaijan from Soviet Union is against both Soviet constitution and international law. According to this view, the legal claim of Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh during Soviet Union period should not be considered valid, since the separation of Azerbaijan from Soviet Union occurred before the official dissolution of Soviet Union. Therefore, according to Ajemian,

⁵³⁴ Pal Kolsto, “The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States,” **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 43, No. 6, 2006, pp. 730-731.

⁵³⁵ Potier, “**Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh...**,” pp. 83-84.

Nagorno-Karabakh has the status of an autonomous oblast within Soviet Union and it is not correct for Soviet Azerbaijan to claim a right on Nagorno-Karabakh.⁵³⁶

As can be seen, the parties are in disagreement on many issues, especially in terms of date of the emergence of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the date/manner of gaining independence of Azerbaijan and so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Interestingly, as historical facts, legal issues seem to be distorted. In other words, all historically and culturally controversial issues in Nagorno-Karabakh have been also interpreted differently by the parties from the legal perspective.

2. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Treaty

CIS is a regional organization led by Russia in its establishment, which emerged as a result of Gorbachev's efforts to restore the power of Soviet Union. First of all, the activities of CIS, which was established with a declaration signed by Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine on December 8, 1991 for the purpose of comprehensive economic cooperation, were not limited to this. Article 7 of "Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States" included the conduct of activities in many areas such as foreign policy, creation of a common economic space, transportation and communication systems, environmental protection, immigration policy and prevention of organized crime. In addition, CIS members have also signed many agreements envisaging cooperation in the field of military and security. CIS Convention, ratified by heads of state in February 1993, includes these provisions.⁵³⁷

CIS is an organization that mirrors the former centralized Soviet Union, with each member showing a desire to create a minimally institutionalized union. Even the structure of CIS institutionalized by the Convention today, in fact, has many features that distinguish it from traditional intergovernmental organizations, and these reveal that CIS has in fact failed to complete itself legally and institutionally. However, CIS bears the essential features of an intergovernmental organization. These features can be listed as follows: 1. Being established on the basis of an international agreement in accordance with international law 2. Membership of

⁵³⁶ Ajemian, "Territorial Stalemate...", p. 397.

⁵³⁷ Richard Sakwa & Mark Webber, "The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991-1998: Stagnation and Survival," **Europe-Asia Studies**, Vol. 51, No. 3, 1999, p. 381.

sovereign states 3. Continuity of activity 4. Bodies 5. Coordination purpose in cooperation of member states in specific fields.⁵³⁸

After the collapse of Soviet Union, one of the most discussed issues in the CIS was territorial integrity. The newly independent states in the former Soviet geography have fallen into a number of border disputes. If territorial claims became widespread and legitimized, all independent states in Soviet Union would be on the verge of chaos and disintegration. Therefore, states developed a reflex not to see any territorial change as legitimate demand. The administrative borders of Soviet republics were accepted as the inviolable borders of the successor states. This principle is included in the founding documents of CIS, in its Convention, in the declaration of 1994 emphasizing the inviolability of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and state borders (Observance of Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and Inviolability of State Borders of CIS States). In fact, the defense of sovereign rights and the principle of inviolability of borders are cited as one of the most important contributions of CIS to the post-Soviet order. As a matter of fact, even Armenia, while supporting the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, did not officially recognize this independence, which contradicts this principle.⁵³⁹

Article 3 of the CIS Convention states that the organization will establish relations between the member states in accordance with the following principles, which are interrelated and equivalent to each other, in accordance with international law and norms of the Helsinki Final Act:

“Respect for sovereignty of member states, for imprescriptible right of peoples for self-determination and for the right to dispose their destiny without interference from outside; inviolability of state frontiers, recognition of existing frontiers and renouncement of illegal acquisition of territories; territorial integrity of states and refrain from any acts aimed at separation of foreign territory; refrain from the use of force or of the threat of force against political independence of a member state; settlement of disputes by peaceful means, which can cause no danger to international peace, security and justice; domination of international law in the interstate relations; non-interference into domestic and foreign affairs of each other; ensurance of human rights and

⁵³⁸ Sergei A. Voitovich, “The Commonwealth of Independent States: An Emerging Institutional Model,” **European Journal of International Law**, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1993, pp. 406-415.

⁵³⁹ Sakwa & Webber, “**The Commonwealth of Independent States...**,” pp. 390-391.

fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, ethnic background, language, religion, political and other views; (...) development of mutually beneficial economic, scientific and technical cooperation, the expansion of integrational processes; spiritual unity of their peoples, which is based on respect for their uniqueness, close cooperation in preservation cultural values and cultural exchange."⁵⁴⁰

Armenia signed Tashkent Treaty, which constituted the collective security agreement between CIS states, on May 15, 1992. Yerevan, especially Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, wanted Russia to have a political and military presence in Nagorno-Karabakh. Georgia and Azerbaijan did not join this organization. However, Russia wanted all former Soviet countries to become members of CIS. For this purpose, it intervened in Nagorno-Karabakh issue and forced Azerbaijan to become a member of the organization. Towards the end of the first half of 1993, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh intensified, and Ebulfaz Elchibey, who stayed away from CIS, was dismissed and Haydar Aliyev took his place. Azerbaijan also turned its face to Russia and became a member of CIS under the leadership of Heydar Aliyev.⁵⁴¹

As stated above, one of the most basic principles of the CIS agreement, of which Azerbaijan and Armenia are members, is the principle that states that are parties to the agreement cannot violate each other's borders. However, as it is known, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh held a referendum on the decision to secede, declared independence, and even applied to CIS as an independent state. No country, including Armenia, has recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent entity, since these attempts of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh are against CIS principles.

Russia transformed CIS into Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2002 to limit Western influence in the region. There were seven CIS members under the umbrella of this new organization: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. CSTO was of great importance in

⁵⁴⁰ Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States (with declaration and decisions) Adopted at Minsk on 22 January 1993, Vol. 1819, 1-31139.
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201819/volume-1819-I-31139-English.pdf>
 (Retrieved on 03.04.2020).

⁵⁴¹ Joseph R. Masih, Robert O. Krikorian, **Armenia: At the Crossroads**, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999, p. 105.

terms of security, especially for Armenia, which felt surrounded by Turkey and Azerbaijan.⁵⁴²

3. International Law and United Nations (UN) Charters

The right of peoples to self-determination emerged at the end of the First World War in 1918, when Woodrow Wilson used this term for the first time. In the international arena, however, the right of peoples to self-determination was not seen as a principle of international law until the Soviet Union's insistence on the issue at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. This principle was not included in the Charter of the League of Nations.⁵⁴³

Among purposes of the UN as declared in Article 1 of the UN Charter, the principle of self-determination is mentioned:

*“1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; 2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; 3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.”*⁵⁴⁴

Article 55 provides more detailed information on the right of peoples to self-determination:

⁵⁴² Ohannes Geukjian, **Negotiating Armenian-Azerbaijani Peace: Opportunities, Obstacles, Prospects**, London: Routledge, 2014, p. 44.

⁵⁴³ Frederic L. Kirgis, “The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era,” **The American Journal of International Law**, Vol. 88, No. 2, April 1994, p. 304.

⁵⁴⁴ United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I Purposes and Principles, Article 1 <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art1.shtml>

*“With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”*⁵⁴⁵

The right to self-determination of peoples was not included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. However, in the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” of 1960, the right of self-determination of peoples was discussed in detail.⁵⁴⁶ Article 1 of the 1966 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that all peoples have the right to self-determination. Accordingly, peoples have the right to freely determine their political status and their economic, social, and cultural rights.⁵⁴⁷

There are some legal documents that impose limitations on the principle of self-determination and explain this principle. In UN General Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the UN dated 24.10.1970 and numbered 2625 (XXV)⁵⁴⁸ and the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action adopted at the World Conference on Human Rights numbered 157/24⁵⁴⁹ dated 25.06.1993 stated that the principle of self-determination cannot be utilized in states that have a government that represents the whole society without making any discrimination.

⁵⁴⁵ United Nations, Chapter IX — **International Economic and Social Co-operation**, Article 55, <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art55.shtml>

⁵⁴⁶ United Nations, **Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples**, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, New York, 14 December 1960, <https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/dicc/dicc.html>

⁵⁴⁷ United Nations, **International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights**. Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 19 December 1966, Article 1 <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf>

⁵⁴⁸ United Nations General Assembly, **Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations**, Annex to GA Res. 2625, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970), reprinted in 9 ILM 129. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/202170>

⁵⁴⁹ UNHCR, **World Conference on Human Rights**, 14-25 June 1993, Vienna, Austria, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/about-us/history/vienna-declaration> (Retrieved on 02.06.2020).

The claims of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh are based on the right of the peoples to self-determination, which is Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as mentioned above. However, as confirmed in the UN Security Council, the right of peoples to self-determination cannot be implemented in a way that violates the territorial integrity of sovereign and independent states.⁵⁵⁰

While the international community recognizes the right of peoples to form a sovereign state based on ethnicities, they do not agree with the idea that every ethnic group should have a state or peoples' right to self-determination requires an independent state structure. According to this view, when Nagorno-Karabakh is considered in particular, the fact that these lands are settled by Armenians or Azerbaijanis should not directly lead to territorial demands. A greater number of a group can only make that group more dominant culturally and historically. In this case, it can provide an advantage in terms of the demands for becoming a state and gaining its independence. However, this should not be necessarily happen.⁵⁵¹

The right of peoples to self-determination has been a problematic issue against the principle of territorial integrity of states. Modern international law recognizes the right of self-determination for colonized peoples and annexed territories; however, it argues that this right cannot be exercised for territories within internationally recognized states or national minorities.⁵⁵² The most important reason for this is to prevent a possible war between the states whose borders were drawn incompatible with the ethnic composition by the colonial and imperial powers. Another reason is to protect the rights of minority groups and to save them from ethnic cleansing. As a matter of fact, states with recognized borders in the international arena such as Azerbaijan and Georgia stood against separatist movements by asserting the principle of territorial integrity.⁵⁵³

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is also addressed in terms of refugees and displaced persons in the context of international law. There are many international mechanisms that allow the international community to intervene in the protection of refugees and displaced persons. These include the UN Convention and associated

⁵⁵⁰ Cornell, "Undeclared War...", p. 20.

⁵⁵¹ Laitin & Suny, "Armenia and Azerbaijan...", p. 148.

⁵⁵² Alexei Zverev, "Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus 1988-1994," in Coppieters, "Contested Borders...", p. 16.

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*

instruments for international human rights protection, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and its 1967 Protocol,⁵⁵⁴ and European Convention on Human Rights.⁵⁵⁵ Recently, “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” dated as 1998 has also emerged as an important legal document on the protection of IDPs.⁵⁵⁶ This document, which forms the backbone of this study, serves as a guide for understanding the status and current situation of the displaced people due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

In fact, the international system and its legal institutions encourage and support existing state structures and policies. Current international standards on the rights of ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, and tribal peoples give little consideration to legal issues regarding their collective rights. Francis Deng, a South Sudanese politician and diplomat who has come to the fore with his work in this field, and Roberta Cohen, a researcher known for his work in this field, have argued that the concept of sovereignty is a state responsibility. According to this understanding, a state can comply with international law if it effectively fulfills its responsibilities in protecting and providing vital support to its citizens. Failure to do so means that some traditional elements of sovereignty are not fulfilled, and this political vacuum justifies the intervention of international community.⁵⁵⁷

4. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Principles

After Cold War, the issue of security in Eurasia gained a new dimension. The most distinctive feature of the post-Soviet period has been the demands of some ethnic groups, which have different elements in their identity due to regional, linguistic, or religious affiliation, to secede from the state they are subject to. Especially in the conflicts that took place in the former Soviet geography and Yugoslavia, territorial and self-determination claims were widely expressed. In this context, the OSCE was established with the aim of resolving conflicts after Cold War and aimed to fill a gap in the field of security. As a matter of fact, since the late

⁵⁵⁴ UNHCR, 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Resolution 2198 (XXI) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, <https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html> (Retrieved on 20.03.2020).

⁵⁵⁵ European Court of Human Rights, European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (Retrieved on 04.06.2020).

⁵⁵⁶ United Nations OCHA, **Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Introduction: Scope and Purpose**, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, OCHA/IDP/20004/01, June 2001.

⁵⁵⁷ Payaslian, “The Political Economy....,” p. 246.

1980s, the OSCE has been involved in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in Europe.

The first studies on the establishment of the OSCE are based on the Helsinki Summit, where 35 countries came together in Helsinki on 31 July-1 August 1975. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as it was called at that time, was actually a structure established as a result of a series of negotiations and conferences. The countries participating in the summit accepted that 10 principles are decisive in interstate relations with the Helsinki Declaration signed at the end of the summit. These can be listed as follows:

*“1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; 2. Refraining from the threat or use of force; 3. Inviolability of frontiers; 4. Territorial integrity of States; 5. Peaceful settlement of disputes; 6. Non-intervention in internal affairs; 7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief; 8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples; 9. Co-operation among States; 10. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.”*⁵⁵⁸

In Principle 8 titled as “Equal Rights and Self-determination of Peoples,” it is written: *“By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.”*⁵⁵⁹

In the Helsinki Final Act, it has been accepted that security has three interrelated dimensions (political-military, humanitarian and economic-environmental). However, the activities of the Organization in the period until the end of Cold War focused mainly on political-military dimension.

With the 1990 Paris Charter, which symbolized an important turning point in the Helsinki process, it was decided that CSCE should be institutionalized through political consultation mechanisms and a series of permanent bodies, and at the 1992 Helsinki Summit, the institution and foundations were laid. At the 1994 Budapest

⁵⁵⁸ OSCE, **Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe Final Act**, Helsinki, 1975.
<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/c/39501.pdf>

⁵⁵⁹ **Ibid.**

Summit, the CSCE was transformed into an international organization and was renamed as the OSCE.⁵⁶⁰

The most controversial issue for the OSCE since the end of the Cold War has been that the principle of “self-determination of peoples” and the principle of “territorial integrity” sometimes create conflicting situations. Although the OSCE recognized the states that gained independence after the dissolution of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, it did not find the claims of statehood of the regions separated from them as legitimate based on the principle of self-determination. OSCE’s role in dealing with these disputed territories was to ensure the official territorial integrity of its member states, while maintaining the limited autonomy of national minorities and separatist regions.⁵⁶¹

C. Measures, Mediation and Solutions

1. Mediations by Russian Federation and CIS

The most important actor in the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is Russia. The heads of state of Russia and Kazakhstan first met in 1991 for the peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, the negotiations were not successful. Russia then tried to bring the parties together with Iran. Although a short-term ceasefire was achieved, a permanent solution to the conflict could not be found. Russia, as peace-broker, led the ceasefire on May 12, 1994 separately from Minsk group. At the Budapest Summit in December 1994, Minsk group formed the co-chairmanship system and Russia took part in this formation together with Sweden as co-chairman. However, Russia continued bilateral talks independently of Minsk group.⁵⁶²

As mentioned above, in 1994, with the mediation efforts of Russia and pressure from the UN Security Council, Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a ceasefire agreement. The ceasefire agreement prevented the conflict from accelerating, but it could not prevent violence in the region. In addition, Nagorno-Karabakh continued to exist as a so-called republic with its own government and elections, and maintained a

⁵⁶⁰ OSCE, **Budapest Summit marks change from CSCE to OSCE**, Summits/Ministrial Councils, 5 December 1994

<https://www.osce.org/mc/58703> (Retrieved on 03.05.2020).

⁵⁶¹ Terrence Hopmann, **Building Security in Post-Cold War Eurasia: The OSCE and U.S. Foreign Policy**, Washington: United State Institute of Peace, 1999, pp. 8-9.

⁵⁶² DerHartunian, **“Negotiation and Settlement...”**, p. 312.

very close relationship with Yerevan. However, as underlined above, Armenia refuses to recognize the independence of self-proclaimed state in Nagorno-Karabakh, fearing the reaction of the international community.⁵⁶³

After the collapse of Soviet Union, Russia kept troops in troubled regions such as Moldova, South Ossetia, and Tajikistan under the name of “peacekeeping.” Russian presence in the region enabled Russia to regain its power over the region rather than solving the problems. In many cases, Russia did not act as a neutral arbiter, but rather became an actor in the conflict. Russia’s involvement in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is a result of its policy of making both sides more dependent on itself. In addition, Russian presence in Caucasus in mid-1993 contradicted the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the CIS states. The most obvious example of this was the military coup against the President of Azerbaijan, Ebulfaz Elchibey, who withdrew from CIS, rejected Russian proposals regarding Nagorno-Karabakh and turned to Turkey for support.⁵⁶⁴

Russia seems to come first among the other mediators in international and regional area. Moscow does not want to lose its influence over the region and intervenes to the conflicts as “peace-maker” even though its position is debatable. It is not surprising that the six-week war in 2020 ended with a Russian-brokered ceasefire. With this ceasefire, Armenian troops withdrew from the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, which were controlled by Armenia for decades. In addition, Russia deployed about 2,000 Russian peacekeepers to monitor the process after the truce.⁵⁶⁵

2. The Initiatives of International and Regional Actors

a. Proposals of United States (US)

Like other members of international community, the US primarily aimed to establish a ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh and then to ensure peace. Although peace talks are being conducted under the OSCE Minsk Group, there are international mediators and high-level officials meeting with both Azerbaijan and Armenia.

DerHartunian, “**Negotiation and Settlement...**,” p. 300.

⁵⁶⁴ Paul Kubicek, “End of the Line for the Commonwealth of Independent States,” **Problems of Post-Communism**, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2016, p. 19.

⁵⁶⁵ Al Jazeera, “**Mass Grave from 1990s War Found in Nagorno-Karabakh: Azerbaijan**,” 5 October 2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/5/mass-grave-from-1990s-war-found-in-nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan> (Retrieved on 25.10.2022).

Mediators voice their suggestions for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. However, the efforts of international actors, including the US, have not yielded results.⁵⁶⁶

Baker Rules, named after US Secretary of State James Baker and declared in 1992, accepted Azerbaijan and Armenia as the principal parties, and so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as an interested party in the conflict.⁵⁶⁷ Baker Rules provided an important basis for conflict resolution within the OSCE. However, American Freedom Support Act, which was enacted in this period and regulated the aid to the former Soviet countries, caused US intervention in the issue to become quite complicated. Sanctions were imposed on Azerbaijan in accordance with Section 907 of this law. It is claimed that at the time this law was passed, Azerbaijan blocked Armenia and launched an attack against Armenia, and that Armenian-American lobby, which is very strong in the US, ensured the implementation of these sanctions against these moves of Azerbaijan.⁵⁶⁸

Another important US proposal was the Goble Plan, spearheaded by Paul Goble, who served in the US State Department. According to this plan, the exchange of lands between Armenia and Azerbaijan is envisaged. Armenia would take back Nagorno-Karabakh and would obtain a land connection in the Lachin corridor. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, would regain other occupied Azerbaijani lands except Nagorno-Karabakh and the connection road with Nakhchivan. However, Goble Plan was not adopted and implemented by the parties, mainly due to internal political pressures. The next US plan for the Nagorno-Karabakh solution was the Key West negotiations, which were put forward in 2001 during the Bush era. In these negotiations, US followed a very active mediation strategy and the parties came very close to each other in the peace talks.⁵⁶⁹

⁵⁶⁶ Thomas Ambrosio, "Unfreezing the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict? Evaluating Peacemaking Efforts under the Obama Administration," *Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2011, p. 97.

⁵⁶⁷ Javid Huseynov, "Karabakh Peace Process Must Be Fully Inclusive," *Radio Free Europe*, September 1, 2009.
https://www.rferl.org/a/Karabakh_Peace_Process_Must_Be_Fully_Inclusive_/1812056.html
 (Retrieved on 02.11.2022).

⁵⁶⁸ Ambrosio, "Unfreezing the Nagorno-Karabakh...", p. 98.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

b. OSCE-MINSK Group Involvement

One of the actors involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the OSCE. In 1994, the OSCE did not participate in the “Pax Russica” discussions, sent its observers to Nagorno-Karabakh and became another actor of the peaceful solution besides Russia, which appeared to be the sole arbitrator of the conflict.⁵⁷⁰ OSCE plays an important role in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and maintaining peace. OSCE has 50 members in Europe, Mediterranean, Caucasus, Central Asia, and North America. MINSK group was created by the OSCE to ensure security and coordination. Operating under the co-chairmanship of France, Russia and US, the Minsk Group is an entity that also includes other participating states, including Belarus, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. So-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, on the other hand, participates in the meetings as an interested party.⁵⁷¹

Three ambassadors (US, France and Russia) co-chairing the Minsk Group in order to find a peaceful solution to the conflict conduct shuttle diplomacy between the conflicting parties. The so-called Line of Contact, which separated Armenian and Azerbaijani forces, is watched by six observers. Although the Minsk Process seems to have succeeded several times, it is actually stuck in a constant cycle of disillusionment with peacemaking. It can be argued that the ceasefire continued mainly on the basis of the good intentions of the two sides and because it would not be in their interests to fight again. However, as mentioned above, the ceasefire has been frequently violated so far.⁵⁷²

A meeting was held in Lisbon in December 1996 within the OSCE and Azerbaijan’s position in the peace talks was strengthened at this meeting. At the Lisbon Summit, three principles regarding conflict resolution were set forth. One of them was the recognition of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, including Nagorno-Karabakh. France became co-chairman with Russia at this summit. Azerbaijan stated that it was uncomfortable with the co-presidency of France due to the large Armenian minority in France. After this disturbance, the US was appointed as the third co-chairman of the Minsk group. Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh were not also satisfied with the new negotiation conditions. Ter Petrossian’s loss of power in

⁵⁷⁰ Kubicek, “**End of the Line for the Commonwealth...**,” p. 22.

⁵⁷¹ DerHartunian, “**Negotiation and Settlement...**,” p. 306.

⁵⁷² De Waal, “**Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh...**,” p. 160.

domestic politics weakened Yerevan's position in the negotiations after Lisbon Summit. However, at this summit, Armenia, believing that it would be very difficult for Nagorno-Karabakh to be recognized internationally, supported gradual talks and did not sign Lisbon document.⁵⁷³

The principles underlined at Lisbon summit can be summarized as follows: *“territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic; legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh defined in an agreement based on self-determination which confers on Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan; guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its whole population, including mutual obligations to ensure compliance by all the Parties with the provisions of the settlement.”*⁵⁷⁴

Hughes & Sasse argue that OSCE's mission has remained limited because the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity conflict with each other. In fact, in practice, the OSCE acts as a representative of state bodies and state interests. When it comes to conflict resolution, the OSCE seems to support the autonomy status in the former Soviet geography. Thus, indirectly, the OSCE's proposals cannot go beyond the Soviet legacy and autonomy in the institutionalized regions and even strengthen these structures. OSCE is also seen as an organization associated with Western influence rather than being a neutral actor in conflict resolution.⁵⁷⁵

According to Package Deal, which was put forward in June 1997, it was foreseen that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and other occupied regions would be resolved at the same time. In Phased Solution Package presented to the parties in October 1997, it was envisaged that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the other occupied regions would be dealt with separately and resolved. The third proposal was put forward under the leadership of Russia in November 1998 under the name of Common State Plan. In this plan, it was suggested that Azerbaijan and so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic would establish a common state, the latter would have its own army and constitution, and be able to veto the decisions taken by National Assembly of Azerbaijan. The first two proposals were rejected by Armenia and the third by Azerbaijan. Following these unaccepted proposals, Minsk Group has created

⁵⁷³ DerHartunian, “Negotiation and Settlement...,” p. 313.

⁵⁷⁴ OSCE, **Lisbon Document 1996**, 3 December 1996 DOC.S/1/96 <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/0/39539.pdf> (Retrieved on 2.11.2022).

⁵⁷⁵ Hughes & Sasse, “Conflict and Accommodation...,” p. 235.

“Draft for Basic Principles” that would address the main concerns of the parties in order to ensure at least one level in the solution process. This draft, which was presented to the parties in November 2007 and also known as the Madrid Principles, did not enter into force due to the indecisive stance of Armenia.⁵⁷⁶

In the settlement of the conflict, international and regional actors are eager to find solution and play more active roles. However, there has been no peace plan or resolution that could satisfy all parties in the conflict so far. Russia seems to monopolize the settlement process of this conflict and eliminate Western influence. Any plans could not exclude Moscow in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, there are some doubts about the role of Russia. It is frequently asked whether Russia is real peace-broker or an actor who benefits from the escalation of conflict. This question can be also asked to all parties involving in the conflict. Who benefits from conflict, who benefits from settlement? In this sense, the legality is something secondary in Nagorno-Karabakh. All seems political. Legal facts are advocated if they support the political one.

⁵⁷⁶ Shamkhal Abilov, “OSCE Minsk Group: Proposals and Failure, the View from Azerbaijan,” **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2018, pp. 143-164, pp. 146-155.

PART II: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: SECURITIZATION & INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDPs)

I. SECURITIZATION THEORY, MAIN ASSUMPTIONS AND CRITICISMS

A. The Origins of Securitization Concept and its Fundamental Assumptions

1. Traditional vs. New Security Understanding: A Conceptual Framework

a. National Security Concept in International Relations

The term of national security, like national interest, has deep roots in the political discourse of international relations. Since the concept of national security is well established in international politics for centuries, even the ordinary citizen understands the same thing. When the people complain about insecurity or when the government demand excessive sacrifices for the sake of enhancing security, it is known that this is for “national security.” The people feel generally insecure when the state underestimates the external threats undermining national security.⁵⁷⁷ The mainstream international relations theories overwhelmingly focus on the concept of national security in their analysis. As the concept of national security has emanated from the political and organizational dynamics of the West, it reflects a pure Western understanding of political units and security.

National security is directly related to the threat perceived from the other entity, primarily from another state in traditional sense. Arnold Wolfers who argues that national security is an ambiguous and emotion-laden term says that the objective definition of the concept of security is something about the existence or absence of

⁵⁷⁷ Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,” **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol. 67, No. 4, December 1952, p. 483.

hostile motives and threatening behaviour of the others. Escaping from these kinds of stances and treatments has crucial importance. As the most effective and less expensive way, security is ensured when the aggressive state is prevented to threaten the very existence of another state.⁵⁷⁸ Buzan criticizes the article of Arnold Wolfers on the ambiguity of security. Buzan finds that Wolfers's perspective is based overwhelmingly on national security and this state-centric approach creates a stalemate based on irresolvable character of the security dilemma that will be discussed in the following pages in detail.⁵⁷⁹

National security policies comprise decisions and actions to protect domestic values from external threats. National security policy necessitates analyzing foreign as well as domestic factors that constitute foreign policy. American diplomatic history stresses a great divide between domestic and external ones. Realist historians argue that diplomatic behavior should respond mainly to the distribution of power in the international system. Revisionist and corporatist scholars emphasize the importance of domestic economic forces and social structures. However, the dynamics of both factors, the distribution of power and domestic factors should be analyzed together in determining foreign policy behavior. In other words, if foreign threats are directed to internal core values, the national security is seen at stake and a more comprehensive approach is needed. The national security approach stresses upon power, which is the driving force in shaping foreign policy behavior, and the functioning of international system. According to national security approach, a nation's power is closely tied to its political stability, social cohesion, economic power, and military capability. A much wider synthesis is possible by adding political economy, military policy, and defense strategy to the greater picture. This approach also acknowledges the fact that the perceived foreign threats are outcomes of both real dangers in outside and ideological tenets, cultural attributes, and misperceived images.⁵⁸⁰

Security is about the destiny of human collectivities, and secondarily personal security of individuals. The sovereign territorial state is the standard unit for security.

⁵⁷⁸ Wolfers, "National Security..." p. 496.

⁵⁷⁹ Barry Buzan, "Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 21, No. 2, Special Issue on Alternative Defense, June 1984, pp. 110-111.

⁵⁸⁰ Melvyn P. Leffler, "National Security," *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 77, No. 1, June 1990, pp. 143-144.

The ideal type is the nation-state. States and nations do not necessarily fit in many places, so, nations can be an important unit of analysis. Since the structure of international system is anarchic, this means that there is no central authority. Therefore, states are common units and national security is the central issue.⁵⁸¹

In most historical narratives, elites are the ones who are responsible for providing security. When they encounter new security problems, elites determine foreign policy goals and policy choices. Elites usually tend to maintain the status quo. In some cases, they are responsible for choosing strategic cultural traditions and changing foreign policy behavior beyond the accepted boundaries. It is supposed that elites are usually good at using culture and reformulate what is probable or not in important discourses on foreign and security policy.⁵⁸²

There are three important factors determining the right behavior of elites or in a more general term, decision makers. Firstly, decision makers have to deal with the moral problem. Among the values that deserve protection, national independence is seen as the most important one. By ensuring national independence, they do not only provide this, but also guarantee the values like liberty, justice, and peace. The second question for decision makers is to determine the level of security. It is the suitability and adequate capability to achieve this. Lastly, they should determine the means that necessitate a calculation regarding to moral values in order to provide security they promise.⁵⁸³

Since values, power, and foreign threats are intertwined to each other, the national security approach examines geopolitical and strategic issues in relation to political economy and ideology. Policy makers identify means and ends to each other and balance commitments and resources to provide security. Therefore, scholars should use an interdisciplinary approach by analyzing domestic and international factors. For example, understanding threat perceptions necessitate psychological approaches. Grasping core values needs to scrutinize theories of decision-making, organizational behavior and insight for culture and ideology in a given entity.

⁵⁸¹ Barry Buzan, **People, States and Fear, An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era**, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Second Edition, 1991, p. 19.

⁵⁸² Jeffrey S. Lantis, "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy," **International Studies Review**, Vol. 4, No. 3, December 2002, p. 107.

⁵⁸³ Wolfers, "'National Security'..." pp. 500-501.

Besides, analyzing the exercise of power necessitates an understanding of corporatist, realist, and world system approaches.⁵⁸⁴

In the realist reading of international politics or in Schmittian view of power relations, states survive in an anarchical state of war, in a power struggle between us and them. Although the peaceful relations among states are possible in real world, states seek to maximize their interests.⁵⁸⁵ Realists view the international politics as a zero-sum game. This means that international system is overwhelmingly conflictual and one nation's security gains are possible only at the expense of other actor or actors. Scholars, who believe that national power should be minimized, assert that the security of all nations can be increased by some cooperative efforts. As the stability of system is seen as a value to be achieved for all actors at the national level as well in order to ensure simultaneously security of all actors, these scholars examine the ways of seeking security by constraining national power of individual states and increasing security for all.⁵⁸⁶

In the post-Second World War era, the concept of national security was widely used among the scholars. However, during the Cold War, national security concerns were mainly based on external threats that were perceived from ideologically hostile countries, and some economic problems at home. This focus on external threats introduced a new security concept, international one. International security has not replaced the concept of national security, but became more influential in giving the discipline its name as compared to national security. This internal/external security divide has been debated more frequently in the post-Cold War period.⁵⁸⁷ Since International Security Studies (ISS) was established during the Cold War, the works of ISS scholars overwhelmingly discussed the military (conventional and nuclear) capabilities of enemies. Therefore, national security was used as a synonymous concept with military security. However, other kinds of security threats related to societal, economic, environmental, health, development, and gender were also added

⁵⁸⁴ Leffler, "National Security...", p. 149.

⁵⁸⁵ Andreas Behnke, "'Postmodernising' Security," **Paper for Presentation at the ECPR Joint Sessions**, Mannheim, 26-31 March 1999, p. 9.

⁵⁸⁶ P. G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz (Rev.) "The Emerging Field of National Security," **World Politics**, Journal Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, October 1966, p. 125.

⁵⁸⁷ Barry Buzan, Lene Hansen, **The Evolution of International Security Studies**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 11.

to the scope of international security studies⁵⁸⁸ as it will be discussed in the following pages.

National security is developed in a political atmosphere where the US and the West perceived a threat from Soviet Union. In the security dilemma as John Herz mentioned in his work, the need for more security of an actor causes the reaction of another to obtain more military capability. This created a situation in which the states seek more security and power accumulation called as security dilemma. According to Herz, the struggle for dilemma is emanated from one person or small group level to a large group level. Families and clans, larger groups and nations always face to their rivals in their internal conflicts among each other. This causes an inevitable security dilemma in the conflicts among political units of power.⁵⁸⁹

Herz argues that in an anarchic environment, the security dilemma was a prevalent issue for people and their leaders regardless of their largeness and influence throughout the history. The people were afraid of any threats in the form of attack, domination, or annihilation by other groups. They considered that the most effective way for eliminating these kinds of threats and menaces was to gain more power. However, this behavior compelled the others to prepare themselves for the worst scenarios. Therefore, no one feels completely secure in this midst of competition. The vicious circle between desire for ensuring security and accumulating more power create an impasse in international arena.⁵⁹⁰

Robert Jervis, who examines perceptions and misperceptions among states in his book, underlines that when states aim to defend themselves, they can achieve it too much or too less. It is too much, because they gain ability to continue their aggression and try to maximize their power in order to continue their behavior. However, on the other hand, other states that feel threatened will increase their arms; so, this will reduce the first state's security. Even a status quo power prefer to improve its military capabilities as an aggressor state does unless there is not a huge gap between being offensive and defensive in terms of type and extent. Others cannot conclude whether military preparation of a state is for a real attack or not. As they cannot know the intentions of other state, they need to be ready for the most

⁵⁸⁸ Buzan & Hansen, "**The Evolution...**," p. 12.

⁵⁸⁹ John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," **World Politics**, Vol. 2, No. 2 January 1950, pp. 157-158.

⁵⁹⁰ **Ibid.**, p. 157.

unfavorable situation. Therefore, they will develop their own military capacity in order to feel secure.⁵⁹¹

There is also a danger of being highly dependent on national security. This can be a useful tool for political figures in power to connect their regime security to national security. Governments can prioritize their own interests beyond the interests of states they represent. The main political function of national security is the use of force. If domestic security is strictly tied to national security, the government may easily justify its use of force and some excessive measures.⁵⁹²

Buzan criticizes Herz's realist paradigm. According to him, Herz focuses primarily on national security, so, like realists, he emphasizes the character of states, not the character of international system. Since he emphasizes state, the concept of security is inevitably seen from the lenses of security dilemma. Although the concept contributes to identify what is the problem and how we can describe it, it also prevents the development of the concept. According to Buzan, Herz sees security as an outcome of power relations, rather than a direct motive for power relations. Therefore, in his opinion, Herz could not provide any challenges against the realist orthodoxy.⁵⁹³

In the Cold War era, the US tried to deter Soviet attack through nuclear weapons by preventing it from first strike capability. However, power accumulation in one actor strengthened threat perceptions of the other and caused more armament in both parts. This attitude was mainly based on military security understanding. In the 1990s, the concept of security was broadened with the works of Copenhagen school. The main logic is that there are new referent objects, threats, and dangers other than the state and some new extreme measures to be taken.⁵⁹⁴

Buzan and Hansen argue that national security was considered as "state security," in other words, state's security and nation's security were seen intertwined concepts and were used interchangeably in the Cold War dynamics. The main reason that a nation supports a strong state was to feel secure in return in terms of duties and responsibilities of this state for protection of their values and interests. This has been

⁵⁹¹ Robert Jervis, **Perception and Misperception in International Politics**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 64-65.

⁵⁹² Buzan, "**People, States and Fear...**," p. 89.

⁵⁹³ Buzan, "**Peace, Power, and Security...**," pp. 110-111.

⁵⁹⁴ Buzan & Hansen, "**The Evolution...**," pp. 12-13.

the most important feature of state and/or government-society relations. Within the framework of this discussion, external threats are considered as important as internal ones as security is directly related to state sovereignty.⁵⁹⁵

In the 1990s, the world has increasingly turned into a global village and the fates of all nations have been tied to each other. Traditional security understanding has remained inadequate to understand these intertwined relations. The old understanding of national sovereignty has disappeared in front of new challenges in a global context. Collective security has gained more importance and states have increasingly aimed to overcome their common problems under some collective security institutions.⁵⁹⁶

In these years, non-traditional security studies have gained importance and the concept of security has been widened with a non-military and non-state perspective comprising identity and cultural factors. From this perspective, military power is not seen as the only source of national security and it is understood that non-military issues may also threaten states and individuals. Economic problems, diseases, environmental hazards, drug abuse, and migration are among some of these non-military security threats. In the past, national security was defined by foreign frontiers. The military capability was seen necessary to overcome the dangerous enemies. However, in our era, the frontier of national security has widened. For example, terrorism has dramatically changed the traditional understanding of security and broadened the boundaries of national security.⁵⁹⁷

As the things have started to change in the early 1990s, military power was not seen enough by itself to secure state anymore. However, some scholars rejected this view. For example, Stephen Walt, in his article named as “The Renaissance of Security Studies” criticizes the broadening concept of security. Walt states that although non-military issues such as environmental or societal problems are added to the agenda, this creates a risk of widening the research area of security studies too much, damaging its intellectual coherence, and complicating to make a choice about

⁵⁹⁵ Buzan & Hansen, “**The Evolution...**,” p. 11.

⁵⁹⁶ Theodore C. Sorensen, “Rethinking National Security,” **Foreign Affairs**, Summer 1990, Vol. 69, No. 3, Summer, 1990, p. 3.

⁵⁹⁷ Philip Zelikow, “The Transformation of National Security: Five Redefinitions,” **The National Interest**, No. 71, Spring 2003, pp. 21-28.

which one is important.⁵⁹⁸ According to him, broadening security issues and distracting the attention of scholars from the real-world issues was so risky. He argued that *“in the countries where the national security issues were underestimated, there was a great danger of paving the way for a disaster, because misguided policies could not be stopped easily.”*⁵⁹⁹

According to Walt, the renaissance of security studies means the return of national security issues to the attention of scholars in the field of international politics. By referring Kenneth Waltz’s book “Theory of International Politics”, Walt claims that Waltz’s assumptions reformulate the realist perspective. The other works in the field of international political economy such as Robert Gilpin, David Lake, and Joseph Grieco reinforced the realist paradigms in international politics. Although liberal theories gained increasing popularity in the era of détente with their emphasis on cooperation, these realist views re-underlined the permanent significance of anarchy and war as the restraints on state behavior. Walt also underlines that, in this period, scholars grasped the impact of internal affairs, misperception, and structure on the likelihood of war. Some works outlined the importance of alliances and strategies of cooperation. Scholars aimed to test their new findings and applied their new perspectives to specific policy problems. Therefore, according to Walt, the renaissance of security studies was beyond a limited policy research.⁶⁰⁰

Copenhagen School has found a place for itself between state-centric approaches of traditionalists and emphasis of individual or global security of peace studies’ researchers and critical theorists.⁶⁰¹ Buzan’s analysis is seen a synthesis of neorealism and constructivism. As a neorealist, he accepts that the international system is an anarchy, which means that the main characteristic of international system is the lack of overarching authority. However, he rejects the main assumption of realist thinking that security is just a struggle for power. According to him, this is

⁵⁹⁸ Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 35, No. 2, June 1991, p. 213.

⁵⁹⁹ Walt, “**The Renaissance of Security Studies...**,” p. 229.

⁶⁰⁰ **Ibid.**, p. 219.

⁶⁰¹ Buzan & Hansen, “**The Evolution...**,” p. 213.

a narrow view preventing scholars from understanding security issues in a more comprehensive manner.⁶⁰²

The context of anarchy enforces three primary conditions on the term of security. Firstly, as the highest source of governing authority, states are the principal referent objects of security. The national security dominates security agenda. Secondly, the dynamics of national security are relational and interdependent between states. National security of a state can be only understood in relation to the security of others. Thirdly, under the anarchical system, security can be only relative, never absolute. Competitive relations are inescapable.⁶⁰³

As mentioned above, the notion of security has been widely understood within the framework of realist paradigm, according to the assumptions of Machiavellian political philosophy on the one hand. On the other hand, Copenhagen School provides a new security understanding. Copenhagen School evaluates society, economy, and environment within the scope of security. However, in both perspectives, security represents logic of preservation or maintenance of a pre-established entity.⁶⁰⁴ In both cases, within realism or in the criticisms of Copenhagen School, a given entity is understood as something to be protected from external danger and threat.⁶⁰⁵ This is the state within political realm.

Buzan does not deny the importance and primary role of state in the international system. The modern state is the highest form of organizations. It has the capacity to control and command its territories where the individuals live, has power for use of force, and serves as the basis of a distinguishable system of relations on a global scale. However, since relations between states are often competitive, the system has a problem of insecurity. Insecurity is not about only the relations between states, but also the relations between governing powers in a country and some substate organizations.⁶⁰⁶ Buzan also acknowledges the fact that anarchy and arms race continue to dominate the agenda of security issues of states. However, he argues

⁶⁰² Marianne Stone, "Security According to Buzan: A Comprehensive Security Analysis," **Groupe d'Etudes et d'Expertise "Sécurité et Technologies,"** Security Discussion Papers Series 1, Spring 2009, p. 3.

⁶⁰³ Buzan, "**People, States and Fear...**," pp. 22-23.

⁶⁰⁴ Andreas Behnke, "The Message or the Messenger? Reflections on the Role of Security Experts and the Securitization of Political Issues," **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 2000, pp. 90-91.

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁶⁰⁶ Buzan, "**Peace, Power, and Security...**," pp. 111-112.

that any concept defined as being fixed, in other words, as not being a removable factor in the problem of insecurity causes excessive realism of social Darwinism. Thinking only in idealist terms is also extremism. A new framework is needed in order to avoid this polarization between these theoretical arguments.⁶⁰⁷

In the international arena, the concept of interdependence created a challenge to Realism. The main motivation behind this approach was deepening of American economic problems in the early 1970s and emphasis made by non-Marxist practitioners on the impact of economic issues on world politics. Therefore, military considerations have been increasingly considered marginal to outcomes involving interdependence issues.⁶⁰⁸

Alexander Wendt who aims to build a bridge between the realist-liberal and rationalist-reflectivist debates developed a constructivist argument. He challenges the neorealist assumption that self-help is given by anarchic structure exogenously to process. He argues that self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy. Self-help system is not because of the structure, but it is something about the process. Self-help and power politics should be evaluated as institutions. They are not essential characteristics of anarchy. The states make of anarchy themselves.⁶⁰⁹ Buzan and his colleagues acknowledge the fact that while social constructivism represents a new school as an alternative to rationalist and realist paradigms, it still gives priority to pre-given entities and identities. In this sense, it has some problematic ontological commitments coinciding with realist paradigms.⁶¹⁰

Constructivism is also divided within itself. According to Buzan and Hansen, Conventional Constructivism underlines the importance of ideational elements such as culture, beliefs, norms, ideas, and identity. In this sense, it reveals a different reading against materialist analyses. However, since it usually analyzes state behavior, it reflects positivist as well as post-positivist epistemologies. Their assumptions mainly reflect the US order. Critical Constructivism pursuing post-positivist methodologies examines other collectivities beyond the state; however, it

⁶⁰⁷ Buzan, **"Peace, Power, and Security..."**, p. 116.

⁶⁰⁸ Buzan, **"People, States and Fear..."**, p. 9.

⁶⁰⁹ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," **International Organization**, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 394-395.

⁶¹⁰ Behnke, **"Postmodernising' Security..."**, p. 7.

does not disregard military security in its analysis. Although its origins are based on the US, since the late 1990s, it started to explain the security issues in Europe as well.⁶¹¹

Copenhagen School broadly describes threats and referent objects and attracts attention from many scholars especially upon its assumption on societal/identity security and securitization (the social practices in which people form something as a threat). Therefore, it provides a different security understanding other than the materialist threat analysis of traditional Strategic studies. Copenhagen School is widely discussed in Scandinavia and Britain, but also influential in most of European critical security studies. Critical Security Studies, which is generally accepted in Britain, use post-positivist methodology. It is similar to Peace Research in terms of its normative claims, especially regarding to its emphasis on human security rather than state security. It is a branch of Critical Theory in IR. The main contribution of this approach is the concept of emancipation. Post-structuralist Security Studies focus on the concept of discourse rather than ideas. According to poststructuralist theorists, state sovereignty and security are the products of political practices. It argues that state-centrism itself limits the possibilities for being referent objects in the security realm. Post-structuralism appeared in North America in the mid-1980s and became stronger in Europe since the early 1990s.⁶¹²

According to Buzan, Strategic Studies is embedded in the field of International Studies. These two fields overlap at many points. Buzan resembles the embedded character of Strategic Studies within International Relations to a major organ within a living body. International Relations without Strategic Studies would misleadingly represent the most important realities among states. Strategic Studies apart from International Relations would see the whole picture as conflict among states and miss the whole reality, because Strategic Studies mostly see international context from the lenses of military threats and use of force among states.⁶¹³

In the Table 2.1 below, different international security studies perspectives are provided on the basis of some basic features.

⁶¹¹ Buzan & Hansen, “The Evolution...,” pp. 35-36.

⁶¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

⁶¹³ Barry Buzan, **An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations**, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1987, pp. 2-3.

Table 2.1. International security studies perspectives⁶¹⁴

ISS Perspective	Referent Object	Internal/External	Sectors	Views of Security Politics	Epistemology
Strategic Studies	The State	Primarily External	Military (use of force)	Realist	Positivist (from quite empirical to formal modeling)
Neo(realism)	The State	Primarily External	Military-political	Realist	Rationalist
Poststructuralist Security Studies	Collective-individual	Both (constitution of boundaries)	All	Change of Realism possible, but not Utopian/Idealist	Deconstructivist and discursive
Critical Security Studies	Individual	Both	All	Transformative (emancipation)	Critical Theory (hermeneutics)
The Copenhagen School	Collectivities and the environment	Both	All	Neutral	Speech act Analysis
Conventional Constructivism	The state	External	Military	Transformation Possible	Soft-positivist
Critical Constructivism	Collectivities	Mostly external	Military	Transformation Possible	Narrative and Sociological

Traditional security studies are realistic in defining security issues. It discusses what the real threats are, what the ways to overcome them are, and how actors are able to manage them according to their intellectual or bureaucratic failures. The state is the primary and eternal unit as power-seekers in an anarchic system where the balance of power and arms race theory is dominant. Critical security studies view the system in constructivist terms. The state dominates the agenda; however, this is not something taken for granted. Based on the concept of emancipation that will be shortly discussed within the framework of criticism toward securitization in the following pages, it is possible to change the understanding of state and society. However, on the issue of security, critical security studies are less constructivist. Critical security studies often emphasize the importance of other security issues like environmental hazards, poverty, and unemployment. According to them, security is related to a threat and the analyst can describe whether an issue is a security problem or not and security issue is for whom. This approach contributes a lot to the concept of securitization. The securitization approach of Copenhagen School is radically constructivist regarding security. For Copenhagen School, security is a self-

⁶¹⁴ Buzan & Hansen, “**The Evolution...**,” p. 38. In original table, the authors also examine Post-colonial Security Studies, Peace Research Human Security, and Feminist Security Studies.

referential phenomenon. Buzan and his colleagues claim that in terms of general social relations, they are less constructivist as compared to critical security studies. They take identities as socially constituted, but according to them, these identities sometimes stop changing and become relatively constant elements.⁶¹⁵

In the following part, the main assumptions of Copenhagen School will be evaluated. New security concepts will be analyzed in detail and the main concepts of Copenhagen School will be explained.

b. New Security Concepts: Military, Environmental, Economic, Societal and Political Sectors

In the last three decades, many scholars worked on the new security fields beyond military one. Joseph S. Nye and Sean M. Lynn-Jones point out in their article dated in 1988 that in the last decade, there was a growing interest in emphasizing history, psychology, and security aspects of economic interdependence in international security studies.⁶¹⁶ Richard Ullman argues that we are traditionally get used to think security in terms of military threats emanating from the borders of a country. However, according to him, this view is misleading. It causes to disregard non-military threats that may pose a threat to the stability of many nations. The assumption that, sometimes, the threats arising from outside can be more dangerous than domestic threats is misleading.⁶¹⁷

According to Ullman, to define something as a security, there are some preconditions. Firstly, the standards of citizens's life are dramatically threatened in a very short time. Secondly, the issue may decrease the policy choices of government or other entities within a state.⁶¹⁸ In this sense, in the first category, the threats range from wars against other states, civil revolts, economic sanctions, lack of raw materials, damages caused by natural disasters and diseases. In the second category, the threats come from restrictive policies of actors who have power at their hands.

⁶¹⁵ Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, "Security A New Framework...", pp. 203-204.

⁶¹⁶ Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field," **International Security**, Vol. 12, No. 4, Spring 1988, p. 15.

⁶¹⁷ Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," **International Security**, Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer, 1983, p. 133.

⁶¹⁸ **Ibid.**

The abolition of civil and political liberty, decline in quality of life or decrease of policy options may also threaten the individual sphere.⁶¹⁹

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, in their book “Security A New Framework for Analysis” introduce new framework for the widening of security agenda to comprise other non-traditional sectors beyond the traditional military and political ones. Firstly, by adding, the economic, environmental, and societal security sector, the security agenda is broadened. According to Buzan and his colleagues, this does not mean that all issues are classified separately from each other. They state that there is a still strong link to traditional security studies. Traditional security studies are more or less mono-sectoral. The use of sectors closes the gap between new and old security approaches. Therefore, it would be misleading to think that there is a sharp distinction among them. Instead, the sectors facilitate to integrate new security approaches to the old one. Secondly, each sector has its own elements for discourse such as sovereignty, identity, and sustainability based on different values and emphasis on power struggles. The rhetoric of sectors is a part of securitization process, which will be discussed in the following parts in detail. Although some features of security issues are same in all sectors, each sector has its specific actors, referent objects, dynamics, and disparities.⁶²⁰

According to Buzan and his colleagues, within the world of sovereign states, security is traditionally about survival. They argue that an issue may create dangers and risks that can be called as existential threats to a determined referent object. In a traditional sense, but not necessarily, this referent object can be the state, government, territory, and society. The specificity of these security threats became justifications of taken extraordinary measures to deal with them. Use of force is legitimized under the pretext of ensuring security and extending powers of state authorities.⁶²¹

Mainly based on European security, it is seen that classical security theory or traditional understanding of security does not provide any explanation for the issues such as nationalist movements, ethnicity-based conflicts in East-Central Europe and

⁶¹⁹ Ullman, “**Redefining Security**,” pp. 133-134.

⁶²⁰ Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, “**Security A New Framework...**,” pp. 195-196.

⁶²¹ Ole Wæver, “Security, the Speech Act,” unpublished manuscript, 1988.; Ole Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (Ed.), *On Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995 cited in Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, “**Security A New Framework...**,” p. 21.

exodus of people. This was a theoretical challenge. These issues were missing in the classical state-centric theory. Identity-related security issues are not represented in this traditional way of thinking security. Buzan and Waever argue that, their aim was to examine societies that were defined in terms of their identity as referent objects for some cases of securitization. In this sense, the thing to be preserved or intended not to be lost is identity rather than sovereignty. For state, sovereignty is seen at stake in front of an existential threat, because the state survival is seen crucial in classical security thinking. For society, it is the identity, since identity determines who we are and whether we continue to be what we are. In the assumptions of classical understanding of security, the unit is state and the main concern is the interaction of units and survival against the threats posed by others. However, Buzan and Waever claim that their aim is to define a new kind of unit. According to them, the referent objects cannot be necessarily the states for a security discourse.⁶²²

In the discipline of International Relations, the functional differentiation was firstly initiated by Kenneth Waltz. As the founder of neorealism, Waltz built a materialist, not a social, theory of international politics. Waltz's theory, with its level of analysis, is based on political functional differentiation in an anarchic world. His understanding of units, which operate at the system, state and individual levels exclude the social one from the discussion. Therefore, neorealist debate about functional differentiation has remained within the boundaries of political sector.⁶²³

Buzan and Waever argue that the re-engagement of International Relations with differentiation started with three lessons learned from the critique of Waltz. Firstly, according to them, the use of differentiation brings the assumptions for society on the security agenda. Secondly, they need to use functional differentiation to look outward into the international system/society across sectors, and political sector is only one functionally differentiated part of this greater picture. Thirdly, they need to analyze this differentiation based on the intersection among the domestic and international levels.⁶²⁴ Buzan and his colleagues argue that it is important to ask not

⁶²² Barry Buzan & Ole Wæver, "Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School Replies," **Review of International Studies**, Vol. 23, No. 2, April 1997, p. 242.

⁶²³ Barry Buzan & Mathias Albert, "Differentiation: A Sociological Approach to International Relations Theory," **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2010, pp. 322-323.

⁶²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 326.

only how the individual units are differentiated internally, but also how the international system/society as a whole is differentiated.⁶²⁵

Buzan and Albert state that sectors are determined through the inferences in speeches on security in question. Each sector has its own usages. Therefore, there is a close link between the numbers of sectors and sector-specific discourses. In other words, as new discourses emerge, new sectors can be developed. They say that unless the usage is not established, there is no other benchmark for identifying sectors.⁶²⁶

Buzan and his colleagues draw attention to the relationship between functional differentiation and sectors. A functional differentiation indicates that securitization is a social practice occurred within the political system as a functionally differentiated dimension of modern society. However, according to Buzan and his colleagues, securitization is the attempt to change settled rules of politics and defines the issue as a certain kind of politics or as beyond politics. Securitization may occur in other functionally differentiated realms, but then may take another form. According to Copenhagen School, securitization is realized within the political system. However, it is important to understand how political system is gradually evolved and differentiated. Therefore, the broadening of security agenda does not only mean the identification of new sectors, but also reveals how the sectors are evolved internally. Traditional focus of security examines the elements of segmentation (into states and nations) and stratification (hegemony, empires, regional powers, etc.). Besides them, securitization process as a form of political communications to all security sectors shows that functional differentiation has gained more importance within political system at both the unit and system level.⁶²⁷

The discourses pertaining to political sector do not represent the entire structure of international society. Identity securitization is in relation to distinct, complementary, but also competing kinds of segmentary differentiation (state and nation), and partly to stratificatory differentiation between weak and hegemonic cultures, and partly functional differentiation within state and system. For international relations in general and international security in particular, it is

⁶²⁵ Buzan & Albert, “**Differentiation: A Sociological**,” p. 326.

⁶²⁶ Mathias Albert & Barry Buzan, “Securitization, Sectors and Functional Differentiation,” **Security Dialogue**, Vol. 42, No. 4-5, August-October 2011, p. 415.

⁶²⁷ Albert & Buzan, “**Securitization, Sectors...**,” pp. 422-423.

important to grasp the interplay of differentiations in these two levels. An insight to understand differentiation makes possible to understand the changing structure of international system and society. Observing units becomes an important tool to grasp how and why sector representing most of the agenda and gained importance in security studies.⁶²⁸

National security is a systemic security problem in which individuals, states and the system play a part and economic, societal, and environmental aspects are as far-reaching as political and military ones. Therefore, the levels and sectors are useful to understand security issues from different perspectives instead of limited policy analysis based on only some aspects.⁶²⁹ Buzan argues that focusing on individuals, states and the international system is promising beginning for an investigation, however, none of these levels are able to represent an eventual category for the term security on their own. It is possible to think the same for the sectors as well. However, the sectors would not be meaningful when one of them monopolized the whole agenda. What makes an inquiry on security fruitful is to monitor the interplay between these different units, not a domination of one of them.⁶³⁰ Thus, according to Buzan, military, economic, political, societal, and environmental security cannot be fully understood apart from each other.⁶³¹

Security has been historically associated with military and political security and the political system is structured and described along nation-state lines. The different agendas in economic, environmental, and sociocultural fields prove the significance of functional differentiation within political system. In contrast to Waltz's idea based on the assumption that functional differentiation can and should be analyzed within the political system, Copenhagen School asserts that a more comprehensive and wider structural change within and beyond the political system of international society is possible. It focuses on functional differentiation of society as a whole on both unit and system/society levels.⁶³²

Threats are differentiated from each other according to the types of sectors. However, there is also an interaction among them. Firstly, in military sector, it is

⁶²⁸ Albert & Buzan, "Securitization, Sectors...", p. 423.

⁶²⁹ Buzan, "People, States and Fear...", p. 368.

⁶³⁰ **Ibid.**

⁶³¹ **Ibid.**

⁶³² Albert & Buzan, "Securitization, Sectors...", pp. 423-424.

obvious that military threats are important for national security. Any military action can be read as a threat to state. However, state's military power is also protective for all kinds of human achievements. Secondly, political threats are directed to the organizational stability of the state such as forcing the state to adopt a particular policy, overthrowing the government, and igniting secessionism etc. Political threats are mostly emanated from some ideological differences, traditions, or structures, which mean the differences of the organizing principles. Thirdly, societal threats may be confused or intersected with the political ones. If there is a threat or even attack to national identity, societal and religious identity, it is possible to talk about societal security. Fourthly, in economic sector, the threats are targeted to the physical base of a state and connected to military capabilities. It is also related to the organizing ideology and institutional components. In addition, economic power is related to domestic stability as well. Finally, ecological threats to national security can damage physical base of the state, even the ideology and institutions. The disasters such as earthquakes, storms, epidemics, floods, tsunamis, and droughts can cause severe damage on the physical base of a state. Besides, there are also ecological disasters caused by human activity.⁶³³

Strategic Studies having narrow military agenda does not have a comprehensive outlook for all kinds of political, societal, economic, and ecological threats while International Security Studies provides a broader understanding in this sense. As it is explained above, there is a linkage, security interdependence between these threats regarding to their sectors. Therefore, all of them are related to each other.⁶³⁴ To explain functional differentiation and the sectoral distinctions, Buzan and his colleagues describe sectors as such:

“The military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion, and the ability of actors to fight wars with each other (...) The political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status and recognition (...) Some might wish to differentiate a legal sector from the political one (...) The economic sector is about relationships of trade, production and finance (...) The societal or socio-cultural sector is about the sustainability of collective identities (...) The environmental sector is about the relationship between human activity and

⁶³³ Buzan, **“People, States and Fear...,”** pp. 116-134.

⁶³⁴ **Ibid.,** pp. 19-20, p. 134.

the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend."⁶³⁵

In military security sector, for states as primary actors, the most important thing is perception and intentions toward each other's acts and developing offensive or defensive strategies accordingly. In political security sector, stability of states as institutions and robustness of systems of government and ideologies that legitimize their rule are critical. In economic security sector, it is crucial to access to resources, financial tools, and markets that provide states a degree of welfare and power. In societal security sector, maintaining and preserving cultural habits and traditions related to language, ethnicity, and religion are accepted crucial for societies. In environmental security sector, it is important to sustain and protect local and global ecological system. As mentioned above, these sectors do not isolate from each other. Although each has its own priorities, they are linked to each other.⁶³⁶

Buzan's another conception is regional security. By referring regional security, in between national and global one, Buzan offers a new conceptualization to evaluate security issues at another level. According to Buzan, security is a relational phenomenon. Since security is relational, in order to understand security at the national level, it is necessary to understand the international pattern of security interdependence. Regional security can be understood on the basis of power relations as the pattern of amity and enmity among states. Amity among states means friendship or expectations of protection or support. Enmity is based on suspicion and fear. Historically, the dynamics of amity and enmity have been rooted in balance of power. However, enmity takes its roots in some cases from the historical hatreds among people. Balance of power would be insufficient to explain these historical cleavages and complex relationships. There are other factors affecting amity and enmity relations such as border disputes, ethnic bonds, ideological alignments, and so on.⁶³⁷

Buzan introduces the concept of security complex. Security complex is "*a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one*

⁶³⁵ Albert & Buzan, "**Securitization, Sectors...**," pp. 418.

⁶³⁶ Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century," **International Affairs**, Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-, Vol. 67, No. 3, July 1991, p. 433.

⁶³⁷ Buzan, "**People, States and Fear...**," pp. 189-190.

another."⁶³⁸ Stressing upon the relation between security and regions, Buzan says that since security is a phenomenon, which can be described as being relational, national security cannot be fully grasped unless security interdependence in global system is revealed. According to him, a comprehensive security understanding should examine in detail the interplay between unit and system levels, and focus on the role of region, as another mediating level in between.⁶³⁹

It is important to understand the referent objects and securitizing actor in a security complex. In extreme cases, there are referent objects with stable spokespersons in security complexes. The state and sovereignty can be referent objects. In some cases, different securitizing actors are linked to each other by contesting for the portrayal of the same referent object. The most important question is who can initiate security for the sake of or on behalf of what? The experts analyze the "states" and the system, which constitute the group of states as a whole, as the units in front of a security problem. Besides, regional security is the aggregation of national securities or consisted of security interdependence of a group of states.⁶⁴⁰

The attempt of securitization is not the same at all level of analysis according to the sectors. In other words, the relative density of sectors should be dependent on the degree of securitization; however, this is closely related to the relative importance of types of issues in each sector. For example, as compared to the others, economic sector is the least successful securitization. Actually, economic factors have primacy at the regional level; however, economic sector is likely the most globalized. However, the degree of securitization is not the only component to focus on. It is important to note that military-political sector, which has the priority in traditional security studies, is seen the most important sector as compared to other sectors at all levels. In general, it is seen that regional security complexes dominate military, political, and societal sectors. They are strong in economic and environmental sectors. The global level is very prevalent in economic sector; however, global dynamics themselves may stimulate regionalization in some cases. Environmental sector at the global level depends on the level of debate. According to the issue to be dealt with, environmental sector can be much more significant at the local, regional,

⁶³⁸ Stone, "Security According to Buzan...", pp. 6-7.

⁶³⁹ Buzan, "People, States and Fear...", pp. 187-188.

⁶⁴⁰ Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, "Security A New Framework...", p. 45.

and global ones. The most successful securitization in environmental sector is realized at the local level.⁶⁴¹

It is argued that there should be some linkages across sectors. What if security dynamics are regional, but the regions are different? Military Europe cannot be similar as Europe in political and societal sense as well. These sectoral subsystems can be evaluated in terms of the level of overlapping to each other and forming coherent regions on a descriptive basis. The question whether the regional security complexes intersect across sectors is responded in part by examining which sectors are linked to one another. Although each sector represents different agenda, values and discourses, these sectors focus on the same region in these security complexes.⁶⁴²

In this sense, Buzan and his colleagues argue that analytical sequence should be given special emphasis in the securitization act, which will be explained in detail in the following pages as well. An analysis of security should not divide the world into sectors. According to them, the sequence should be as follows. Firstly, it should be accepted that securitization has a distinctive character. Secondly, the referent objects, which are under threat, and securitizing actors who are capable to securitize should be clarified as legitimate units in the securitization act. Thirdly, any pattern among these units that affect to each other is called as security complex.⁶⁴³

2. Main Components of a Securitization Process

The concept of securitization is one of the components of the Copenhagen School in security studies alongside the sectors and regional security complexes. The concept is rooted in the works carried out in the late 1980s.⁶⁴⁴ However, the concept of securitization entered International Relations after Ole Wæver, who is accepted as the founder of the concept, drawn its framework in the mid-1990s and developed in the 1998 book “Security: A New Framework for Analysis” with Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde. This concept is developed in the context of research on European security dynamics.⁶⁴⁵

⁶⁴¹ Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, “Security A New Framework...,” pp. 165-166.

⁶⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 166-167.

⁶⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 168-169.

⁶⁴⁴ Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Léonard, Jan Ruzicka, “‘Securitization’ Revisited: Theory and Cases,” *International Relations*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2016, p. 496.

⁶⁴⁵ Matt McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2008, p. 566.

To understand securitization, it is necessary to underline the difference between politicization and securitization. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde say as below:

*“‘Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure).”*⁶⁴⁶

The three main conditions are needed for securitization according to Wæver: *“(i) the internal construction of the security speech act as a plot with an existential threat, a point of no return and a possible way out; (ii) the position of authority of the securitizing actor; and (iii) conditions historically associated with the threat.”*⁶⁴⁷ The fundamental elements of securitization are securitizing actor, existential threats, and referent objects. In addition, the reasons behind securitization, its effects and results and the condition in which securitization is realized are important components.⁶⁴⁸

a. Referent Objects

Referent objects are *“things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival.”*⁶⁴⁹ Buzan scrutinizes security problems from micro to macro and tries to understand the social dimensions of security and the way of creating or “securitizing” an issue at the societal level. In this sense, Buzan follows traditionally English School; however, his understanding of security is beyond this. He broadens his analysis of security and applies his theory to current issues, such as war on terrorism. Although in Buzan’s work, the main referent object

⁶⁴⁶ Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, “Security A New Framework...,” pp. 23-24.

⁶⁴⁷ Claudia Aradau, “Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation,” **Journal of International Relations and Development**, Vol. 7, 2004, p. 395.

⁶⁴⁸ Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, “Security A New Framework...,” p. 32.

⁶⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

is still the state, he provides a wider understanding from individual to society. He stresses upon that nothing is given. In this sense, his epistemological methodology is something new in the discipline of International Relations.⁶⁵⁰

A kind of security legitimacy to have an assertion in terms of survival should be attributed to referent object. There are some socially defined and changing restrictions to become a subject to be securitized. Security analysis concentrates on successful examples of securitization, which means the referent objects that received the consent and approval of society in an intersubjective process.⁶⁵¹

There is strong link between existential threats and the character of referent objects in question. In different security sectors, the existential threats and referent objects separately differ from each other. In the military sector, the referent object is mostly the state. There can be other political entities such as armed forces or existing government or its policy, which can be threatened. In the political sector, existential threats are traditionally described within the framework of sovereignty principle, or in some cases, state ideology. Sovereignty can be under an existential threat by anything that inquiries recognition, legitimacy, or ruling authority. In the economic sector, it is difficult to determine the referent objects and existential threats. However, firms, national economies, or even global economy can be referent objects. In the societal sector, large collective identities such as nations and religions can be given as examples of referent objects. In the environmental sector, the referent objects range from individual species and types of habitat, which are more concrete to abstract and widespread issues such as planetary climate and biosphere.⁶⁵²

There is a distinction between securitizing actor and referent object; however, in case of a state as a referent object, the issue is debatable. In other words, in many examples the securitizing actor differs from the referent object, however, in case of a state, the referent object is represented through its authorized rulers.⁶⁵³ The government and state are used interchangeably in this respect since government has claims to defend national security and protect civilians in face of any threat.⁶⁵⁴ As securitization is practiced, referent object is constituted through discursive acts in

⁶⁵⁰ Stone, "Security According to Buzan...", p. 2.

⁶⁵¹ Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, "Security A New Framework...", p. 39.

⁶⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 21-23.

⁶⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁶⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

which security is determined and actors show their ability to manage the processes.⁶⁵⁵

b. Existential Threats

Existential threats are the threats, which are real or perceived in a context. Existential threats can be only grasped in relation to specific feature of a referent object. The fundamental quality of existential threats may differ across sectors and levels of analysis. Therefore, the nature of existential threats also alters.⁶⁵⁶ Buzan and Wæver stress upon this fact: *“Security is a generic term that has a distinct meaning but varies in form. Security means survival in the face of existential threats, but what constitutes an existential is not the same across different sectors.”*⁶⁵⁷

In the context of securitization, a widely discussed issue among society can be put on the spectrum from being non-politicized to being securitized. If the issue is non-politicized, this means that it is a part of public policy and requires government decisions, acts, or resources. If an issue is securitized, as mentioned above, it is introduced as an existential threat and necessitates emergency measures. While implementing some extraordinary policies to overcome the threat, securitizing actor should justify the reasons behind being out of normal politics.⁶⁵⁸ However, for a successful securitization, existential threats are not sufficient for securitization. For a successful securitization, existential threats that legitimize non-compliance to rules or violating them are needed.⁶⁵⁹

c. Securitizing Actors

Securitization studies examine how security issues are created by actors who claim that a referent object is threatened and some extraordinary measures should be taken in order to eliminate these threats.⁶⁶⁰ Securitizing agents are *“actors who securitize issues by declaring something –a referent object- existentially threatened.”*⁶⁶¹ Securitizing actors can attempt to declare and constitute anything as a

⁶⁵⁵ Lene Hansen, “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2000, p. 288.

⁶⁵⁶ Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, “Security A New Framework...,” pp. 21-22.

⁶⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

⁶⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁶⁶⁰ Carsten Bagge Laustsen & Ole Wæver, “In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2000, p. 708.

⁶⁶¹ Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, “Security A New Framework...,” p. 36.

referent object. However, securitizing actors are more successful in some referent object as compared to the others due to the constraints of facilitating conditions.⁶⁶²

A securitizing actor is an individual, or a group, who carries out the security speech act. They are usually political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups. These actors cannot be seen as referent objects; however, by making something a security issue, in some cases, they can rarely need to defend their own survival. For example, governments or firms can speak about their own survival.⁶⁶³

What makes something a security issue? What is the response given to and what are the measures taken against it if something is accepted as a threat? Realism and neorealism argue that the use of force is necessary, and the states are always suspicious to each other. However, in securitization theory, there should not be necessarily the objective criterion for describing something as security issue. Instead, reciprocal action between a securitizing actor and audience can be determinant for “securityness” of an issue. Therefore, making something as a security issue is possible in many sectors of social life. This means that military realm cannot be attributed as the sole security sector. Communities may also under risk of an existential threat.⁶⁶⁴ As mentioned above, securitization is an intersubjective process in which the approval of audience is demanded about the existence and acceptance of a threat and exceptional measures.⁶⁶⁵

In securitization theory, there is a strong emphasis on the difference between normal politics and security politics, in other words, between the “exceptional and the non-exceptional.”⁶⁶⁶ A securitizing actor uses the rhetoric of existential threat and takes this issue out of normal politics. For Balzacq, in securitization process, every instrument such as metaphors, policies, images, feelings, and stereotypes are used by political actors to securitize an issue. Therefore, it is aimed that the audience is

⁶⁶² Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, “Security A New Framework...,” p. 36.

⁶⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁶⁶⁴ Balzacq, Léonard & Ruzicka, “‘Securitization’ Revisited...,” p. 496.

⁶⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 495.

⁶⁶⁶ Ulrik Pram Gad & Karen Lund Petersen, “Concepts of Politics in Securitization Studies,” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 42, No. 4/5, Special issue on The Politics of Securitization, August-October 2011, pp. 319-320.

emotionally and ideationally influenced and persuaded about the weaknesses of one that is threatened and the needs for immediate response.⁶⁶⁷

Securitization is a specific discourse process. Survival is presented as something crucial and if this security issue at hand is not overcome, it will be too late, and there will be no chance for remedy. Securitization is described by extraordinary defensive measures. These immediate and extraordinary actions, which mean deviating normal political rules, will be taken by institutions and different security actors.⁶⁶⁸ Therefore, not every securitization attempt is successful. To introduce an issue as an existential threat, a securitizing actor should stress upon a given issue and claims: *“If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant, because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way.”*⁶⁶⁹ This initial step is called as a securitizing move. A securitizing move should convince the audience so that the next attempt, probably extraordinary measures and emergency actions, is legitimized in the eyes of public and securitization process starts, as it is desired.⁶⁷⁰

Identifying actors is not easy in a security speech act. A speech act does not always provide definite information about who speaks. The organizational logic of the speech may help to determine securitizing actor.⁶⁷¹ The security act has been agreed between the securitizer and audience. The securitizing actor has permission to violate rules that would be otherwise complied, because it is considered that the threat cannot be overcome in a normal way.⁶⁷²

There are also some other actors in securitization process called as functional actors by Buzan and his colleagues. Functional actors have ability to affect the dynamics of a sector. They are neither audience nor securitizing actor, but their influences in terms of affecting decisions on security are considerable. For example, in the environmental sector, a polluting company can play an important role.

⁶⁶⁷ Balzacq, Léonard & Ruzicka, “‘Securitization’ Revisited...,” p. 495.

⁶⁶⁸ Aradau, “Security and the Democratic Scene...,” p. 391.

⁶⁶⁹ Rita Taureck, “Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies,” **Journal of International Relations and Development**, Vol. 9, 2006, p. 55.

⁶⁷⁰ Taureck, “Securitization Theory...,” p. 55.

⁶⁷¹ Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, “Security A New Framework...,” p. 41.

⁶⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 26.

However, it is neither a securitizing agent nor something to be existentially threatened, but functional actor.⁶⁷³

d. Speech Act

In security discourse, an issue is exaggerated and introduced as an issue of greatest importance; thus, by presenting it as a security issue, a securitizing actor argue that there is a necessity to deal with the issue with extraordinary means and they have reason to do that in such a way. For the analyst, it is important to understand that this issue cannot be necessarily an issue that will threaten the referent object in a real sense, however, it is the process of a common understanding of a threat which is collectively considered and responded. The process of securitization is a speech act in language theory. The issue is not to present something as more real, the articulation of it is realized within speech act.⁶⁷⁴

In its explanations at the beginning, Wæver defined security as speech act, which describes securitization as a term referring to linguistic representation that constituted a specific issue as an existential threat. Wæver and Buzan increasingly emphasized the role of audience in backing up speech acts.⁶⁷⁵ Linguistic construction of security issues is the most important finding in terms of the impact of securitization on security issues. With the aim of explaining how social issues are designed, this process has been discussed by many other scholars, historians, sociologists, and philosophers. Copenhagen School has contributed to this process by introducing the conceptualization of securitization.⁶⁷⁶

In securitization theory, it is accepted that security is not considered a real condition, but a consequence of distinct social processes. A security issue is socially constructed with all elements such as securitizing agents, threats and threatened ones. Securitizing speech acts reveal the context and processes in which threats are accepted and constituted. In other words, the issues are securitized by speech acts, which do not only define a security problem, but also create a security issue through a successful representation of it.⁶⁷⁷

⁶⁷³ Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, "Security A New Framework...", p. 36.

⁶⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁶⁷⁵ McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction...", p. 566.

⁶⁷⁶ Balzacq, Léonard & Ruzicka, "'Securitization' Revisited...", p. 496.

⁶⁷⁷ Michael C. Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 4, December 2003, p. 513.

Balzacq also says that Copenhagen School theorizes the language as a performative act. In other words, by articulating the concept security, the state of affairs alters. The context is modified through the utterance of security and the success depends on applying necessary and appropriate rules to make this linguistics act to yield desired results. This means that when the speech act is succeeded under the definite rules, the context changes, and a secure environment previously turns into an insecure place.⁶⁷⁸

As mentioned above, the approach of speech act to security necessitates making a distinction between three types of units, which are elaborated in security analysis: referent objects, securitizing actor, and functional actors.⁶⁷⁹ The most important internal conditions of a speech act are to use the grammar of security, to indicate an existential threat, and to convince the others that the existential threat does not allow to behave in a different way; because in each sector, different referent objects are at stake. The external dimension of a speech act has two fundamental requirements. One of them is the social capital of the securitizing agent who must have an authority, not necessarily an official authority. The other external condition is about the threat. A security threat can be more easily accepted if certain objects are more threatening like military equipment, expressions revealing enmity, or polluted waters. These objects do not make for securitization, but they are facilitating conditions.⁶⁸⁰

These facilitating conditions for a securitizing move consist of three elements. Firstly, if there is a demand internal to the speech act to pursue the grammar of security, this can be a facilitating condition. Secondly, the social conditions between the securitizing actor and audience determine the success of securitization. In other words, the relationship between the securitizing actor and people who are subject to his/her discursive act and the possibility of this audience to approve claims, which are made for securitization attempt, constitute these social conditions. Thirdly, the main characteristics of threats may also affect the likelihood of a successful securitization. The features of these may promote or prevent securitization.⁶⁸¹

⁶⁷⁸ Thierry Balzacq, "A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants," in Thierry Balzacq, **Understanding Securitisation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve**, London: Routledge, 2011, p. 11.

⁶⁷⁹ Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, "Security A New Framework...", pp. 35-36.

⁶⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁶⁸¹ *Ibid.*

e. Audience

In traditional security understanding, security policies are mainly understood as “the imposition of will,” and these politics depend on the motivation of the actor. From this perspective, securitization is an act that is accepted by an audience, is something taken as given. The speech act does not play a role in this interpretation. An audience is not part of the production of meaning. The speech act may have an impact on successful securitization; however, it is though something separated from the intention of the speaker.⁶⁸²

Copenhagen School stresses that for a successful securitization, a securitizing actor should convince the audience with his/her speech act performance. Intentions and acts are only meaningful if they are evaluated in an intersubjectively defined context. This interaction is important to grasp the production of meaning. Therefore, for successful securitization, the act of securitizing actor is not enough, but intersubjectively defined context plays a significant role.⁶⁸³

According to Buzan and his colleagues, “*Security is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue –not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat.*”⁶⁸⁴ In this sense, Buzan and Wæver state that securitization occurs in an intersubjective and socially constructed process. If referent object has a commonly acknowledged legitimacy as something that should exist, and securitizing actors can underline the importance of its survival and describe some threats directed to the very existence of this referent object, the more likely a securitization act is accepted and audience convinces that some necessary measures can be tolerated.⁶⁸⁵ “*A successful securitization thus has three components (or steps): existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules.*”⁶⁸⁶

Wæver says that an issue is presented out of area of normal politics and described something that need urgent and necessary measures. The securitizing actor consciously defines the situation as such, because by doing so, he or she can claim to implement extraordinary policies. The success of this securitizing attempt is closely

⁶⁸² Gad & Petersen, “**Concepts of Politics in Securitization...**,” p. 318.

⁶⁸³ **Ibid.**

⁶⁸⁴ Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, “**Security A New Framework...**,” p. 24.

⁶⁸⁵ **Ibid.**, p. 31.

⁶⁸⁶ **Ibid.**, p. 26.

related to the audience's eagerness to accept this issue as critical as the securitizing agent describes. Therefore, security is beyond objective (existential threats) or subjective (perceptions) phenomenon, rather it is intersubjective and political. A securitizing actor, a threat, a referent object and any effects emerged from this political move provide sufficient conditions for securitization. Securitization is realized through speech acts to make an issue a security problem that needs to be addressed immediately and imperiously.⁶⁸⁷

In sum, to securitize an issue, a securitizing actor uses the rhetoric of existential threats and takes the issue out of normal politics. To understand securitization process, it is necessary to examine discourse and political constellations. In order to convince the audience to tolerate violations of rules, which they have to obey in normal times, a rhetorical act is necessary. The audience should believe that the priority and urgency of an existential threat is so much, and the securitizing actor should break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by. However, for a successful securitization, the acceptance or approval of the audience is crucial. In other words, a discourse, which is used to present something as an existential threat to a referent object, is not enough for a complete securitization. The audience should accept it as such by coercion or consent depending on the situation. Otherwise, without the acceptance of audience, this would be only a securitizing act.⁶⁸⁸

For scholars of Copenhagen School, the aim is not to widening the agenda of securitized issues. On the contrary, the ideal of securitization approach is *ceteris paribus*, de-securitization, that are issues are not seen above normal politics anymore. Desecuritization can be also read as a process of returning to democratic ways of handling the issues as securitization brings some anti-democratic policies to the table.⁶⁸⁹ Wæver underlines that desecuritization should not be necessarily better than securitization. In its abstract form, desecuritization can be preferable, however, in some cases, where concrete steps to be taken, securitization need to be addressed. However, in the long-run, securitization can be costly, so desecuritization can be more attractive policy option. However, these all depend on the context, case in

⁶⁸⁷ Laustsen & Wæver, "**In Defence of Religion...**," p. 708.

⁶⁸⁸ Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, "**Security A New Framework...**," pp. 24-25.

⁶⁸⁹ Laustsen & Wæver, "**In Defence of Religion...**," p. 708.

question and political will.⁶⁹⁰ In sum, desecuritization is not simply the opposite version of securitization. Both policies can be preferred on the basis of the context in which the securitizing actors operate.

B. The Criticisms to Securitization

The criticisms towards securitization theory have been evolved around three main debates in the last three decades. They are based on the politics of securitization. The structure and nature of securitization have some systematic political implications. Analysis of the politics of securitization is different from both the study of political practices of securitization and examinations of competing concepts of politics among security theories. These debates are about what can kinds of analysis the theory can generate and whether such analysis has systematical influences on real political struggles. In other words, securitization theory is seen as an act in political sense through three structural characteristics that systematically form the political effects of applying the theory. The emerging debates within the framework of securitization theory are concentrated around responsibility, ethics and desecuritization; transformations in modern society; and post-Western security theories.⁶⁹¹

Wæver summarizes the politics of securitization as such: “*‘Political securitization practices’ [knowledge about politics], ‘the political in securitization analysis’ [how to define politics], and ‘the politics of securitization theory [how to theorize politically]*”.⁶⁹² The first research question, political securitization practices, is about exploring the phenomena to which it refers. The empirical research on the politics of securitization investigates who initiates what kind of securitization, in which ways and with how much achievement and what are the undesired or unexpected results, and if it is challenged by whom etc. Buzan and Wæver mostly explain the politics of securitization. The second research, the political in securitization theory carried out mostly by critical scholars focuses on the Schmittian nature of the theory.⁶⁹³ In this sense, it is investigated what can be accepted as “political” which necessitates emergency measures above normal politics

⁶⁹⁰ Ole Wæver, “Politics, Security, Theory,” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 42, No. 4-5, 2011, p. 469.

⁶⁹¹ Wæver, “*Politics, Security, Theory...*,” pp. 465-466.

⁶⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 466.

⁶⁹³ *Ibid.*

in securitization theory.⁶⁹⁴ Third research question, the politics of securitization theory, investigates how a theory can be political. It investigates the role of analysts or academicians in the process of securitization. In other words, it is argued that by exploring and accepting something as a security issue, the analysts become part of the question and have impact on securitization move. This research try to explain what does a specific theory do politically.⁶⁹⁵

In the following part, these three main research questions will be examined within the framework of the criticisms towards securitization theory.

1. Political Securitization Practices: Agenda Setting, Securitizer and Audience Problématique

Most of the authors who criticize securitization try to understand the kinds of securitization, the securitizing actors, the ways of securitizing an issue, the level or likelihood of success, its results, and the challenges against it. In other words, the discussion is mainly the empirical studies of political processes of securitization and desecuritization, which can be described as knowledge about politics.

Léonard and Kaunert discuss that an issue is being securitized only after an issue has been accepted by the audience. The debate is going around who is audience and how its approval can be obtained. The Copenhagen School's explanations about the exact role of the audience in the securitization process are inadequate. It lacks precision and clarity. On the one hand, Copenhagen School gives the audience an important role in the securitization process as securitization process is presented as an essentially intersubjective process. However, on the other hand it underestimates the role of audience in other parts of security. In this sense, by declaring the actor as the one who determines existential threats, it gives priority to securitizing agent rather than the audience. Therefore, it contradicts to itself by arguing that a successful securitization is not decided by the securitizing actor, but by the audience who accept the speech act. However, it is not clear what kind of approval is expected from the audience and how it could be identified in practice. Furthermore, it is not clear this acceptance imposed or not.⁶⁹⁶

⁶⁹⁴ Wæver, "Politics, Security, Theory...", p. 466-467.

⁶⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 467.

⁶⁹⁶ Sarah Léonard & Christian Kaunert, "Reconceptualizing the Audience in Securitization Theory," in Balzacq, "Understanding Securitisation Theory...", pp. 57-58.

Theorizing on securitization raises some questions on conceptual problems. It is argued that securitization theory is unable to reveal why some examples of securitization influence the agenda but not the others. In this sense, Eriksson proposes an agenda setting theory to grasp this situation. However, agenda setting theory does not focus on the political implication of classifying issues, or of discursive acts in general. According to him, by combining agenda setting and securitization theory, it is more probably to develop more comprehensive understanding of security agenda setting.⁶⁹⁷

According to Ericksson, framing and agenda setting are two confused concepts in securitization and agenda setting discourse. They do not refer to the same thing. Securitization can be fulfilled while the issues remain out of the agenda, and desecuritization can be done as the issue puts on the agenda. Framing may have impact on agenda setting, but it is rarely the only explanatory factor and its affect is difficult to envisage. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the interaction of political rhetoric and agenda setting, but these two should be kept in different analytical categories.⁶⁹⁸ Ericksson argues that the acceptance of audience is vague conceptualization of Copenhagen school. Instead, issues that are accepted and put on the agenda of the government as “security threats” are appropriate benchmark of politically important securitization. Securitization or desecuritization moves can be done by anyone, but only some of them affect the governmental agenda.⁶⁹⁹

The main question about participants in securitization processs is who brings an opinion or an issue onto the agenda, regardless whom this opinion comes from. Ideas may evolve during many years. However, only some of them attract the attention of the people who accept them to include to the agenda. The primary participants can be called as policy entrepreneurs. In theory, an agenda is constituted by policy entrepreneurs within the government (cabinet, assembly, public servants) as well as from non-governmental actors (interest groups, academicians, press, and public opinion).⁷⁰⁰ Taureck argues that securitization theory has been largely based on power and capability. In this sense, it is inadequate to explain all units and the subjective threats related to these units. In terms of securitization, the security issues

⁶⁹⁷ Johan Eriksson, “Agendas, Threats, and Politics Securitization in Sweden,” Paper to be presented at the ECPR Joint Sesssions, workshop ‘Redefining Security’, Mannheim, March 26-31, 1999, p. 2.

⁶⁹⁸ Eriksson, “**Agendas, Threats, and Politics...**,” p. 3.

⁶⁹⁹ **Ibid.**, p. 4.

⁷⁰⁰ **Ibid.**, p. 11.

are wide, but there are no restrictions in terms of securitizing actors. It is “*neither unmanageable nor incoherent.*”⁷⁰¹

In his reply to the criticisms of Eriksson, Wæver says that it is necessary to investigate what is characteristic of security in each sector: what are typical referent objects, dynamics, and dilemmas? According to him, in a concrete political situation, it is necessary to be cross-sectoral to understand the situation as faced by political actors.⁷⁰² Wæver also claims that the rules of securitization are definite and these steps for securitization prevent the widening of security. He says, “*Security is tied to a particular figure, that of securitization. This was how securitization theory ‘solved’ the widening impasse.*”⁷⁰³

Stritzel argues that three elements of Copenhagen School to develop a more comprehensive theory of security, 1) the speech act, 2) the securitizing actor and 3) the audience, are not sufficient to conceptualize sufficiently and clearly the real relationship between the actor and the audience. It is obvious that Copenhagen School sees securitization as an intersubjective act between securitizing agents and a significant audience. Thus, Copenhagen School divides the actor into two components: the securitizing actor launching a securitizing move by carrying out a security speech act, and the audience approving or rejecting this move. This means that the interpretation and representation of a definite threat is “negotiated” between a securitizing agent and the relevant audience. In other words, a securitizing agent may suggest a recognition and representation of a certain threat, but it is the audience which decides to recognize it as a common problem and accept whether this proposal will be accepted in an intersubjective process.⁷⁰⁴

Stritzel warns about the securitizing actor and audience problem. According to Stritzel, it is not clear to determine which audience is relatively more relevant, in other words, which audience should be considered as the most important and appropriate. The repercussions and impact are also unclear in case that there are several audiences. One cannot claim the exact time of receiving the approval of an audience. Is it possible to be sure that the audience gives necessary consent?

⁷⁰¹ Taureck, “**Securitization Theory...**,” p. 55.

⁷⁰² Ole Wæver, “Securitizing Sectors? Reply to Eriksson,” **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1999, pp. 335-336.

⁷⁰³ Wæver, “**Politics, Security, Theory...**,” pp. 469-470.

⁷⁰⁴ Holger Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond,” **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2007, p. 363.

According to him, the argument of intersubjectively constructed securitization process of Copenhagen School is also problematic. Is it considered intersubjectively and voluntarily held or may there be any coercion, oppression, or intimidation especially in case that an authoritarian leader is a securitizing agent? In non-democratic countries, the interaction between audience and speaker cannot be occurred within the similar dynamics of Western democratic countries where this theory emerged. Stritzel also criticizes Wæver who rejects the traditional way of communication between audience and actor such as merely sending and receiving messages, but reduce the process in securitization to speaker-audience model.⁷⁰⁵

According to Eriksson, introducing new sectors by Copenhagen School inevitably cause some political consequences. Wæver's main counterargument is that the presentation of five sectors is an analytical typology rather than a claim about the empirical existence of sectors. However, Eriksson considers this counterargument inadequate and irrelevant.⁷⁰⁶ Wæver argues that given their preference (*ceteris paribus*) for desecuritization over securitization, they would not bring up new sectors on their own initiative. "Wider concepts of security" and "new forms of security" discussions have been presented for at least two decades and criticized a lot. He claims that they just structured this discussion for and against wider concepts. This is just a way of turning the analytical question into an empirical one. He adds that they did not try to be state-centric or aimed to widen to concept. They just conceptualized and created a formal concept.⁷⁰⁷

The normative aspects of securitization of an issue will be discussed in the following pages. What is important is that even though Copenhagen School stresses upon the concepts of speech act, actors, and audience, it remains silent about the exact mechanisms among these three elements. The School is even insufficient to explain the substance of these terms. Stritzel further argues that Copenhagen School should make more explanation about the impact of speech act on the one hand, and the intersubjectivity of a securitizing actor and audience on the other hand. He also

⁷⁰⁵ Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization...", p. 363.

⁷⁰⁶ Johan Eriksson, "Debating the Politics of Security Studies Response to Goldmann, Wæver and Williams," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1999, p. 349.

⁷⁰⁷ Wæver, "Securitizing Sectors?...", p. 335.

draws attention to the inconsistencies of the founders' different works in terms of audience-actor relationship.⁷⁰⁸

By emphasizing the neglect of "externalism" in the concept of securitization, Stritzel criticizes speech act of Copenhagen and claims that an actor start and carries out a securitization process depending to the social context it has emerged. In other words, a priori situation makes them significant in the securitization of a particular issue. Meaning and power used in speech act is embedded to these social relations.⁷⁰⁹ Therefore, *"the basic idea of security as a speech act itself is too limited to allow a scholar to study 'real-world' securitizations. In reality, the speech act itself (...) will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it."*⁷¹⁰

Floyd is another author scrutinizing the role of audience in securitization process. According to her, a securitization theory cannot operate as an effective discursive act and be based on the speech act's approval by the relevant audience at the same time since the way of giving utterances denies meaningful role for the audience.⁷¹¹ She proposes to separate the audience from securitization process. According to her, the audience is not an analytical concept, but rather a normative one. Securitization is already started when a securitizing actor warns an aggressor or promise to protect a referent object. The success of this move depends on changing behavior of others, which are related to the threat itself. Floyd calls this second stage as security practice and summarizes what she says with a formula: *securitization = securitizing move + security practice.*⁷¹²

Williams argues that approaching security as a speech-act leads a remarkable broadening of analysis. However, securitization theory also aims to narrow the security agenda. According to him, as a speech act, securitization has itself put limits theoretically unlimited nature of security.⁷¹³ These limitations can be summarized as follows. Firstly, although it seems that a securitizing actor can declare everything as a referent object, in reality, not everything can be made a securitizing issue to the same degree. The capacity of actors may differ, the level of acceptance or the

⁷⁰⁸ Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization....," p. 363.

⁷⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 367.

⁷¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 377.

⁷¹¹ Rita Floyd, "Can Securitization Theory Be Used in Normative Analysis? Towards a Just Securitization Theory," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 42, No. 4-5, 2011, p. 428.

⁷¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 428-429.

⁷¹³ Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies....," p. 513.

probability of persuading the audience can be different. In sum, not all securitizing moves are socially effective and not all actors have the same degree of capacity to influence the others. Secondly, the forms in which a securitizing act is realized, the objects that are referred, and social positions affect the likelihood of effective claims and the success of a securitization move. Thirdly, empirical context and claims can be effective tools for providing significant resources and references to which actors may address in a securitization move.⁷¹⁴

As it is stated by Copenhagen scholars, securitization is successful when the securitizing agent and the audience have consensus upon a shared perception on an issue in terms of being a security issue or not. This means that there is no security issue except through specific rhetoric, which is used. Therefore, how security problems exist is exclusively dependent upon how we describe them in our language. However, according to Balzacq, this does not reflect truth all the time. Language does not constitute the reality; it shapes our perception about the reality. Furthermore, it is not useful in theoretical sense nor it is credible in empirical sense to rely on what we say about an issue would be determinant factor for its essence.⁷¹⁵

Securitization is a pragmatic performance, which has some claims and arguments and aims to persuade the audience about the existence of a problem, which needs an urgent response.⁷¹⁶ Securitization is criticized not to be impartial and objective. In addition, speech act is found problematical in terms of its methodological flaws. *“The upshot is that security cannot be wholly self-referential; instead, it frequently executes a kind of reference -though this might be partial or biased. Further, the claim that security is a speech act may be intuitively strong, but it is theoretically restrictive and methodologically unfruitful.”*⁷¹⁷

Balzacq criticizes Copenhagen School in terms of production of meanings. According to him, Copenhagen School is excessively relativist and does not have enough capability to understand non-discursive structures. In his opinion, politics

⁷¹⁴ Williams, **“Words, Images, Enemies...”** p. 514.

⁷¹⁵ Thierry Balzacq, “A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants,” in Balzacq, **“Understanding Securitisation Theory...”** p. 12.

⁷¹⁶ Thierry Balzacq, “Constructivism and Securitization Studies,” in Myriam Dunn Cavelty & Victor Mauer, **Handbook of Security Studies**, Oxon: Routledge, 2010, p. 60.

⁷¹⁷ **Ibid.**, p. 59.

depends on the specific structures of security environments. These structures may be reproduced, not only discourses produce them.⁷¹⁸

According to Knudzen, the most distinctive feature of Copenhagen School is the concept of securitization. Theory does not say something new, and is based mostly on Buzan's arguments.⁷¹⁹ According to Knudzen, emphasizing the role of politicians and decision makers in the process of agenda-setting and securitization underestimate the significance of real problems out there. Perceptions and images are arbitrary and distract the attention away from the significance of issues. Therefore, there is a distance between theory and policy produced by Copenhagen School. This is also an impact of excessive emphasis on epistemology and meta-theoretical issues.⁷²⁰

Knudzen thinks that securitization is an ambiguous concept because in Copenhagen School's understanding, securitization refers to two things at once. He explains them as such: *"On the one hand, it refers to the act (or process) of removing an issue from and raising it above politics, taking it out of the limelight. On the other hand, it points to the act (or process) of taking an issue out of obscurity or neglect and placing it on the political agenda. Hence, the same term refers at the same time to more or less inverse types of phenomena."*⁷²¹

As described above, conditions for a successful speech are consisted of two categories, internal, linguistic-grammatical and the external, contextual and social.⁷²² The speech act may be performed under some facilitating conditions.⁷²³ However, in Buzan and his colleagues' book, the facilitating conditions are not described in detail. McDonald, in his criticism to securitization theory, claims that, firstly a broader construction of security is analytically and normatively important. The set of issues or dynamics is mentioned less in the framework of securitization, especially in the context of the speech act. The dynamics such as facilitating conditions and audience is not evaluated in detail in theory. Secondly, the securitization approach remains inadequate to explain why some specific representations of threat are

⁷¹⁸ Gad & Petersen, "Concepts of Politics in Securitization...", pp. 318-319.

⁷¹⁹ Olav F. Knudzen, "Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization," **Security Dialogue**, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2001, p. 358.

⁷²⁰ **Ibid.**, p. 361.

⁷²¹ **Ibid.**

⁷²² Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, "Security A New Framework...", p. 32.

⁷²³ **Ibid.**

considered more influential in some particular communities and how the securitizing actors become stronger or weaker in their security discourse.⁷²⁴

McDonald finds securitization framework is problematic in three basic senses. Firstly, the construction form of security is based on a narrow definition and mostly emphasizes the speech of dominant actors, which are consisted of political leaders. Other forms of representations are mainly disregarded, and if other actors involve in the process, their discursive practices are seen only legitimate if they speak o behalf of the state. Secondly, the contex of the act in which securitization takes place is defined narrowly. The only focus is on the intervention. However, securitization is an incremental process in which the elements are constructed over time. There is also no answer for the question of why some representations are more important for some audiences while the others do not resonate any group. Lastly, the securitization has a narrow framework since the act is only understood in terms of designated a threat to security.⁷²⁵

2. “The Political” in Securitization Analysis

The arguments and criticisms in “the political” in securitization analysis focus on change in the definition of security according to the actors who build it. The question is how the concept of politics implies in securitization theory and how to define politics within the framework of securitization process. In other words, securitization of an issue is considered as a political act by itself and its impact on the process is discussed. In this sense, this part will discuss the definition of state and society in the securitization approach. Does Copenhagen School inherit its main conceptualizations merely from realist political thought? How is it considered security? Does it develop a more comprehensive and promising understanding of society and identity? Or does it remain state-centric as the most of the mainstream theories? In this part, the scholars try to answer to these questions.

a. Schmittian Understanding in Securitization Approach

Copenhagen School having roots in Realist tradition adopts a form of social constructivism. Above all, as Realist thinkers, the primary actor for Copenhagen School’s theorists is the state. Knudzen criticizes the state-centrism embedded in the

⁷²⁴ McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction...,” p. 564.

⁷²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 563–587

assumptions of Copenhagen School. He says that while Copenhagen authors criticize state-centrism, they continue to rely on the state as the primary actor. Their approach to state is misleading and confusing.⁷²⁶

For many authors, the central concept of Copenhagen School, the securitization, is engaged to the radical form of *realpolitik* developed in the 1920s and 1930s by Carl Schmitt that provided a basis for the post wars realists such as Hans Morgenthau. In this sense, Copenhagen School recognizes the analytic and intellectual legacy in the apprehension of the bases of securitization theory even though it is not associated with the authoritarian politics of Schmitt.⁷²⁷

Critical scholars discuss securitization theory by arguing that it is Schmittian and problematic in sense that whether it expresses an admiration for normal politics instead of emergency measures or not.⁷²⁸ According to Huysmans and Williams, Copenhagen School is based on a Schmittian view of security as danger and the exceptional character of security politics. Both realists and post-structuralists question Copenhagen School's Schmittian like approach to sovereignty. What are the reflections of this conceptualization on security and state identity? Does the state continue to depend on hostilities to preserve identity and maintain control over its population? Is there any possibility that this mentality to change in a post-Schmittian security framework?⁷²⁹

Existential threats in securitization theory connote Schmitt's opinions on the specificity of "politics" as described by exclusion and antagonism. The description of securitization as being "beyond normal politics" echoes Schmitt's emphasis on decision and the politics of emergency. The concept of "security" in Copenhagen School is seen identical to the concept of "the political" of Schmitt. In Schmitt's thinking, whether an issue is seen political or not depends on the ways in which these issues have moved from being political to non-political rather than the nature of issues themselves. In other words, according to Schmitt, the political is found in a particular way of relating to the issues, not in the issues by themselves. An issue is politicized by the actors who are eager to do so. This intense relationship between the political and an issue at hand is something about the division between friend and

⁷²⁶ Knudsen, "Post-Copenhagen Security Studies...", p. 362.

⁷²⁷ Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies...", p. 512.

⁷²⁸ Wæver, "Politics, Security, Theory...", pp. 466-467.

⁷²⁹ Buzan & Hansen, "The Evolution...", p. 217.

enemy within the framework of a given issue. The political is the most intense and extreme enmity. Every religious, moral, economic, and ethical issues turn into a political issue if it is enough strong to group human beings based on the spectrum ranges from being friend to enemy.⁷³⁰ In sum, Williams argues that there is a close relationship between Schmitt's political and Copenhagen Schools's securitization. In securitization, as it is in the political one, an issue can be dramatized and exaggerated to the level it is introduced and recognized as an existential threat.⁷³¹

According to Behnke, there are many conceptual and theoretical problems of Copenhagen School. Firstly, Wæver separates sovereignty/security from politics and cannot explain the internal relationship between these concepts. In Schmittian understanding, politics always require a friend/enemy distinction based on sovereignty decision about determining who is for cooperation or exclusion. Wæver's eligibility for "politicization" as an alternative process to securitization needs a status of the insider/friend as well. However, he does not explain how this status can be attained and how the access can be agreed upon through negotiations in a non-sovereign way. Secondly, the sovereignty in Wæver's explanations is not mentioned explicitly unless it does not provide necessary circumstances for politics. Thirdly, Wæver assumes that security always necessarily invokes sovereignty. Although this is reasonable, it is now something new, since in our modernist thinking of politics, security is always related to sovereignty.⁷³²

As it is seen, the main assumptions of Copenhagen School are seen as the extension or reflection of modernist thinking of state and sovereignty. Therefore, it is discussed that securitization only justifies what has been already known. Under the following title, the perspective of Copenhagen School on society and identity will be discussed.

b. Society and Identity in Securitization Approach

The attempts by Copenhagen School to incorporate "societal security" into the security studies agenda have generated some criticisms. The societal dimension is examined as a sector of the state, but also granted a new status as an object of security. McSweeney states that there is a duality of state security and societal

⁷³⁰ Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies...", p. 515.

⁷³¹ *Ibid.*

⁷³² Behnke, "'Postmodernising' Security...", pp. 19-20.

security in securitization approach. State security is having sovereignty as its ultimate criterion, and societal security is considered being together around the concept of identity. In this sense, society gains a new and higher status as an independent object of security. The security of society is distinct from that of the state, but also in interaction with the state.⁷³³

Copenhagen School's distinction between societal security and international security has been criticized. It is argued that societal security of Copenhagen School is described as "about individuals", so it is not about referent objects in a collective sense as it happens in the realm of international security, and overwhelmingly economic rather than being "security." Providing societal security or neglecting it, are something related to crime or unemployment. Therefore, this is not security meant in international security. Economic and societal security were significant factors in forming the Cold War concept of national security. In fact, in Krause analysis, including societal security to the field of security studies in terms of prosperity and the relationship between militarization and economy are crucial for state and regime legitimation.⁷³⁴

State security seems to preserve its superiority at least traditionally as compared to the societal one. Hansen argues that the securitizing act is always connected to the claim of the existence of an existential threat. This causes to make a distinction between international security and social security. In international security, security is about survival. It is when an issue poses a threat to a designated object such as the state, government, society, or territory. Social security issues are not seen as military ones within the framework of danger, urgency, and survival.⁷³⁵

Buzan and Waever argue that the distinction between state and society is an important step for restructuring security studies. They argue that security studies require an approach to the duality of security: state security that is based on sovereignty, and societal security, which is something about with identity. Societal security concerns the roots, structures, and dynamics of collective identity formation and the relation between identities and interests as well as the threats directed to them. According to Waever and his colleagues, social identity, using "we" is a means

⁷³³ Bill McSweeney, "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School," **Review of International Studies**, Vol. 22, No. 1, Jan., 1996, p. 82.

⁷³⁴ Buzan & Hansen, "**The Evolution...**," pp. 215-216.

⁷³⁵ Hansen, "**The Little Mermaid's...**," p. 289.

of collectively the “thing” to be secured. However, it is discussed that social identity cannot be reduced to an aggregation of individuals nor made synonymous with the state. This would cause misunderstandings of many contemporary security dynamics.⁷³⁶

Lapid and Kratochwil argue that by equating identity with society, Buzan and Waever create another variant of statism and neorealist structuralism. McSweeney attracts the attention to the same thing: by claiming there is a link between identity and society, “identity” becomes, by definition, the security concern of a “society.” However, Copenhagen School remains silent to the question how this society has obtained this identity and ensured its security. One can infer from the assumptions of Copenhagen School, both society and identity become fixed objects, and, therefore they are described as being exempted from an evaluation of internal dynamics. In Copenhagen School’s thinking, the identity describes the society. Society is the social construction of identity. We cannot change societal identity, because it is seen as fixed. We cannot replace them.⁷³⁷

Wæver underlines that they expect the analytical power of the theory would increase in terms of future societal evolution and expects that science help to reformulate securitization. Trine Villumsen Berling stresses upon this disregarded issue of how scientific arguments and “facts” play significant roles in securitization. Gibbons, Weingart and their colleagues argue that the scientific changes in terms of its nature and society’s view to science signal systematic alterations in securitization as well.⁷³⁸ Therefore, a fixed term not only for society but also for other components of securitization cannot be acceptable.

McSweeney asks the meaning of “society” and “societal security” in Waever and his colleagues’ works and criticizes them at some points. According to him, Waever and his colleagues descriptions of society is merely objectivist and positivist. It relies upon an understanding of “a set of institutions with sense of common identity.” This definition does not seem to embrace the entire society and does not make clear that what kind of culture is shared by whom.⁷³⁹

⁷³⁶ Keith Krause & Michael C. Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods,” *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 40, No. 2, October 1996, p. 243.

⁷³⁷ Krause & Williams, “**Broadening the Agenda ...**,” pp. 244-245.

⁷³⁸ Wæver, “**Politics, Security, Theory...**,” p. 474.

⁷³⁹ McSweeney, “**Identity and Security...**,” pp. 82-83.

In the works of Wæver and his colleagues, both society and identity are presented as objective realities, out there to be explored and analyzed. The values rooted in the collectivity of individuals and social groups are absent in their work.⁷⁴⁰ By stressing the problematic definition of society in Copenhagen School analysis, McSweeney argues that according to them, identity is seen a property of society. Identity is seen an element used to describe the society, and society is constituted by this identity. It is seen something out of human beings. As it is not constructed by themselves, there is no need to correct it. Copenhagen School considers that it stands just there as it is. McSweeney criticizes their identity view in term of being too stuck to particular way of thinking and warns that this kind of strict, fixed, and unchanging description can be threatening in a security analysis and may even lead to racism.⁷⁴¹

According to Copenhagen School, society is considered as a social fact, with the same objectivity and ontological status of the state. The authors' definition and analysis of society is seen essentially Durkheimian. For many authors, they seem to misunderstand the definition of identity. Actually, this misunderstanding emanates from the definition of society. They view collective identity as a social fact and this collective identity envisages the image of a collective self to be explored: we are who we are. The more philosophical discussion on identity, for example, we are who we want to be, is out of discussion.⁷⁴²

Buzan and his colleagues respond to McSweeney who argues that Copenhagen School imposes a fixed, objectivist and near positivist approach to identity on the society. They reply to those who consider that in their securitization perspective, there is no value attached to identity, rather it is just an intersubjective construction process.⁷⁴³ They state that they see the individuals seeing themselves as the members of society and try to understand the stances of these societies in face of identity-related issues.⁷⁴⁴

Buzan and his colleagues underline that they cannot tell what the correct identity is, they can just guess some interactions in security mode. However, they say that the question of who we define us will become an important topic in identity-

⁷⁴⁰ McSweeney, "Identity and Security...", pp. 81-93.

⁷⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 90.

⁷⁴³ Buzan & Wæver, "Slippery? Contradictory?...", p. 245.

⁷⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

related issues in every sector and there is a need to draw attention to identity. However, they do not believe that the explanations of critical thinking on how communities construct their identities overcome all identity-related issues.⁷⁴⁵

As it is understood, the concept of societal security has been one of the most significant and harshly criticized sector in Copenhagen School. Although McSweeney acknowledges that while Copenhagen School attempt to stress societal security as a critical issue in security relations in our world, its concept of both society and identity is theoretically and practically problematic. By presenting society in terms of identity, the concept of societal security is treated as if it refers a society as a single identity. By doing so, the fluidity and diversity of social identities are ignored. Actually, this creates a kind of reification of social identity. Besides, by depicting society as an entity that holds an identity, and by defining societal security within the framework of the preservation of this identity, Copenhagen School creates a very risky environment in which there is a danger that the identities conflict to each other.⁷⁴⁶

Williams says that under the conditions of existential threat and securitizing discursive acts of actors directed to identities, a Schmittian understanding of friends and enemies reappeared. The politics of exclusion follows afterwards. In this process, an identity issue and situation may be securitized, some elements may be politicized, and some elements may be open for discussion and negotiation. To securitize an identity successfully, there should be the capacity to define the borders of that identity.⁷⁴⁷

Williams further claims that the analytical framework such as the multisectoral approach is not politically neutral construction. According to him, the political implications of sectoralization should be seriously examined. Otherwise, many important aspects of security practices will remain hidden and unexplained.⁷⁴⁸ In this sense, Hansen opens another issue to the discussion. She argues that gender issues are not discussed within the framework of criticisms directed towards the Copenhagen School's conceptualization of society and identity. This does not mean merely the absence of gender-based insecurity in Copenhagen School, but aims to

⁷⁴⁵ Buzan & Wæver, "**Slippery? Contradictory?...**," p. 247.

⁷⁴⁶ Williams, "**Words, Images, Enemies...**," p. 519.

⁷⁴⁷ **Ibid.**

⁷⁴⁸ Eriksson, "**Debating the Politics...**," p. 350.

show the barriers of Copenhagen School towards gender related issues in terms of their construction of security theory.⁷⁴⁹

Hansen uses the term “the silent dilemma of the Little Mermaid” in order to reveal that speech act of Copenhagen School excludes gender. According to her, “security as silence” takes place when insecurity cannot be expressed loudly. This means that depicting something as a security issue in this field is not possible or maybe even increases the threat encountered. There may be some overlapping identities when gender issues are included to the analysis such as national and religious ones. This creates a kind of division in gender identities. This decreases the potential of gender’s producing collective identities. Therefore, gender remains within the boundaries of individual and is considered less critical as a security problem.⁷⁵⁰

For Hansen, the lack of gender in securitization analysis does not mean that gender is simply disregarded or is seen under the title of individual security. It should be seen within the framework of security as silence and security that does not involve gender issues.⁷⁵¹ Gender identity loses its significance in front of collective identities such as ethnic, religious, national and class. Gender is seen as an exclusive identity, mainly as women’s community. As gender related issues are seen inseparable from religious and ethnic identities, they are not presented as gendered referent object by themselves.⁷⁵²

The lack of gender is obvious in the speech act epistemology of the Copenhagen School. The focus on the discourse makes difficult to understand “security as silence.” Who can hear the “securityness” of an issue if it could not be voiced?⁷⁵³ In addition, in Copenhagen School, the description of referent object is crucial. This definition may put some limits to what kinds of issues are accepted as security issues. This means that the definition of the referent object is part of the problem in Copenhagen School’s theorizing attempt. Determining referent object

⁷⁴⁹ Hansen, “**The Little Mermaid’s...**,” pp. 286-287.

⁷⁵⁰ **Ibid.**, p. 287.

⁷⁵¹ **Ibid.**, p. 294.

⁷⁵² **Ibid.**, p.299.

⁷⁵³ **Ibid.**, p. 294.

according to the threats perceived, created or existed, whatever it is, may block the recognition of some issues as a security issues.⁷⁵⁴

Waeber and his colleagues do not have also any explanation on how they see the continuity between societal identity and national identity and the identity crisis.⁷⁵⁵ Furthermore, Huysmans and Williams criticize that the security speech and practices of state elites are able to remove the distinction between “the exceptional” and “the normal.” In this sense, securitization theory cannot fully understand the emergence and evolution of new security issues and politics. Theory is seen also unable to grasp developments apart from a specific form of governance, primarily nation-state.⁷⁵⁶

For some, the concept of securitization has been criticized for its inability to determine, in Lene Hansen’s terms, “the silent security dilemma.” Methodologically, the ambiguity in securitization theory is that appealing the word “security” cannot be a criterion to decide what security is and securitization might consist of “only metaphorical security reference.” In other words, the explicit articulation of security is an epistemological and methodological criterion for security issues, and the theory tends to focus on more explicit verbal speech act methodology. Wilkinson points out that the “security as silence” problem is about Western-centric assumption in securitization theory, because it supposes that free speech and political structures guarantee individual protection against arbitrary and/or systematic violence.⁷⁵⁷

Bigo and Huysmans argue that the conceptualization of securitization through discourses of drama and emergency cannot fully comprehend the bureaucratic practices and the continuous impacts of power (not exceptional ones). Bigo’s conceptualization of security is also discursive, but in our day, monitoring and controlling the citizens causes the emergence of a security issue. The governments and their bureaucracies try to have control over the political processes sometimes at the expense of democratic institutions.⁷⁵⁸

⁷⁵⁴ Hansen, “**The Little Mermaid’s...**,” p. 297.

⁷⁵⁵ McSweeney, “**Identity and Security...**,” p. 91.

⁷⁵⁶ Gad & Petersen, “**Concepts of Politics in Securitization...**,” pp. 316-317.

⁷⁵⁷ Buzan & Hansen, “**The Evolution...**,” p. 216.

⁷⁵⁸ **Ibid.**, p. 217.

3. The Politics of Securitization Theory

Securitization theory can be a political act by itself. What are the political moves invested in the theory? In other words, what is the political act involved in designing and/or applying securitization theory? Is it possible to theorize politically? In this part, the politics of securitization theory will be discussed on three main debates, post-western perspective, the role of analyst in the securitization process, and ethics/normative issues pertaining to securitization.

a. Securitization as a Western Theory and Post-Western Debates

Post-western view has increasingly gained importance, non-Western voices have been heard so frequently and the nature of international relations is evolving. Security has been something created or constituted by those who feel threatened under specific circumstances. New security actors emerge and new security problems rise. Weak states develop their own security arguments against great states. The debates over securitization are fed mostly by skepticism towards Western practices.⁷⁵⁹

Not only those criticize securitization theory, but also Wæver seems to grasp the need of developing a new understanding and even supplementary theories, which focus on new threats in our post-Western world. He argues that they need to find new ways of enhancing securitization theory with new understandings, concepts, even theories in order to appeal to the non-Western countries, which are dramatically different from the theory's origin. He says, "*Non-Western theorizing is needed, not necessarily to provide alternatives or corrections to securitization theory, but to offer increased understandings of what it means to use the theory in given situations. Ethno-centrism is probably more at secondary layers of the theory, like the sector specifications.*"⁷⁶⁰

According to Bigo, the explanations of Wæver reflect the prevalent Western security understanding and formation. Wæver's search for the meaning of security is based on national security, which is enshrined in Western thinking.⁷⁶¹ Buzan and his colleagues accept that the earlier illustrations for security are for liberal democratic

⁷⁵⁹ Wæver, "**Politics, Security, Theory...**," p. 476.

⁷⁶⁰ **Ibid.**, p. 475.

⁷⁶¹ Jef Huysmans, "Language and The Mobilisation of Security Expectations. The Normative Dilemma of Speaking and Writing Security", **Paper for the ECPR Joint Sessions**, Workshop Redefining Security, Mannheim, 26-31 March 1999, pp. 9-10.

society. They believed that there are also some rules in other societies, but they need to be examined.⁷⁶²

Copenhagen School has many publications on regional security complex theory, and the relationship between regions and global security. In explaining US-European difference, it has been discussed more frequently in Europe although there are some attempts to apply this theory to other parts of the world. Societal security and securitization are the most important concepts with their contributions to the theoretical debates.⁷⁶³ However, both of these concepts have also remained within the boundaries of Western perspective and do not properly provide insight into non-Western societies.

Booth argues, *“Copenhagen School does not move far enough in the direction of ‘real people in real places’, that it mistakenly ties together security and survival, and that it is state-centric, elite-centric, discourse-dominated, conservative, politically passive, and neither progressive nor radical.”*⁷⁶⁴ Copenhagen School may be explanatory in a positivist (American) social science, but in other parts of the world, it is weak to explain what happens in security realm.⁷⁶⁵ Securitization is accepted successful to explain the security issues and dynamics in Europe, but outside Europe, especially in the authoritarian regimes, the assumptions are still need to be tested. Therefore, the explanatory power of the theory is problematic according to some authors. In this sense, some authors need more analytically operational criteria for successful securitization; the others investigate the explanatory power of the theory beyond the West.⁷⁶⁶

Theories generated from the West, and their theoretical implications for the post-Western world have been severely criticized. Securitization is considered as one of these Western theories. Barkawi argues that securitization theory is part of the understanding the world from Western lenses especially in its defensive liberal politics of war. Although there are some works on Third World, they do not represent the bulk of publications.⁷⁶⁷

⁷⁶² Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, *“Security A New Framework...,”* p. 24.

⁷⁶³ Buzan & Hansen, *“The Evolution...,”* p. 212.

⁷⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

⁷⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁶ Gad & Petersen, *“Concepts of Politics in Securitization...,”* p. 316.

⁷⁶⁷ Tarak Barkawi, “From War to Security: Security Studies, The Wider Agenda and the Fate of the Study of War,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2011, pp. 715-716.

Mona Sheikh also illustrates the non-Western challenge within the framework of religion and says, “*The difficulties involved in providing a universal definition of religion are apparent from the fact that its isolation from other spheres of society (politics, security, economy) is most natural in hegemonic western discourses that draw on the European modernisation narrative alienating religion from desirable ends such as development peace and science.*”⁷⁶⁸

Bilgin underlines that securitization theory has limited analytical purchase beyond Western Europe and North America. It is overwhelmingly based on Eurocentric ethnocentrism. The concepts of securitization and desecuritization have been rooted in the analysis of the Cold War’s ending Europe. The concept of societal security was developed as a response of Western European societies to the challenges of European integration. Furthermore, for many years, securitization theory has been applied to the empirical cases in Europe. Therefore, it is criticized that securitization theory merely explains the state-society relations in Western Europe and is not able to understand the state-society dynamics other than Europe.⁷⁶⁹

b. The Role of Analysts in Securitization Process

Another criticism to securitization theory’s identity and security understanding is in normative sense. McSweeney argues that it is necessary to indicate which interests are at stake and who has interests to follow them in as securitizing move.⁷⁷⁰ Evaluating why the topic is chosen for a securitization act and who have interests embedded in the securitization act may give clue about the moral implications of the process. In this sense, researcher or scholar who investigates securitization processes has responsibility to analyze the reason and consequences of securitizing act properly.

According to Buzan Wæver and de Wilde, analyst plays a role in construction or deconstruction of security issues. However, it is not in his/her responsibility that some threats represent a “real” problem. Actors and their audiences securitize some issues as a particular form of political act. Securitizing actors do not necessarily mention security. Similarly, their use of the term security does not necessarily

⁷⁶⁸ Mona Kanwal Sheikh, “The Religious Challenge to Securitisation Theory,” **Millennium: Journal of International Studies**, Vol. 43, No. 1, September 2014, p. 271.

⁷⁶⁹ Pinar Bilgin, “The Politics of Studying Securitization? The Copenhagen School in Turkey,” **Security Dialogue**, Vol. 42, No. 4-5, 2011, p. 401.

⁷⁷⁰ McSweeney, “**Identity and Security...**,” pp. 90-91.

constitute a security act. The main criteria of Buzan and his colleagues is addressing “politics of existential threats” with the argument that an issue takes priority over anything else and therefore allows for a breaking of the rules. Therefore, the securitizing agents initially design what constitute a security threat, not analysts. However, analysts analyze political actors’ actions and investigate whether these actions accomplish the security criteria. In other words, it is the analyst who observes whether the securitizing actor is successful in gathering support for this security reference. Lastly, the analyst studies the impact of a securitizing act on other units. Therefore, the actor decides whether an issue is to be dealt with as an existential threat. According to speech act approach, it is the actor who securitizes an issue and if audience accepts this claim, something becomes security issue and securitization began. According to Buzan and his colleagues, analyst cannot and should not replace the securitizing actor.⁷⁷¹

Wæver explains the securitization process, its securitizing agents, and its impact with the Figure 2.1 below:




Figure 2.1. Action, event and effects in Securitization Theory⁷⁷²

⁷⁷¹ Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, “Security A New Framework...,” pp. 33-34.

⁷⁷² Wæver, “Politics, Security, Theory...,” p. 477.

In this scheme, the role of analyst is neglected. However, by attracting attention to a specific issue, the analyst may also play a crucial role in securitization process. For some author, the analyst reconstitutes political reality and cannot be neutral or impartial in speaking and writing about security. Huysmans claims that the analyst reproduces the security agenda when she/he defines how securitization works. This is the normative side of describing and explaining the security issues by the analyst. In other words, in his/her texts and speeches, the analyst becomes a part of speech act. This speech act becomes successful if the security issue is commonly accepted by the scholars and policy makers. Wæver admits that the security analysts cannot escape from the fact that their writings and speaking contribute to the securitization process.⁷⁷³

These debates bring us to the question of Guzzini's suggested focus on causal mechanism: Who does securitization and what securitization does? These causal mechanisms make the securitization and desecuritization interesting for people. Therefore, theory has systematic political impact, drawing attention on these mechanisms and thereby initiates desecuritization according to a given issue at hand. According to Wæver, by attempting to suggest desecuritization, the theory makes a political investment, a big investment where the political input is chosen at a distance as a general input to numerous concrete situations.⁷⁷⁴

c. Ethics and Normative Issues in Securitizing and Desecuritizing an Issue

The political and ethical implications of Copenhagen School, "the speech act" theory of security, have been severely criticized by many authors. This is paradoxical, because it is exactly one of the advantages of the approach to open up those kinds of questions. In the mainstream security studies, there is no such agenda, because they simply determine "how it is really is." Critical security studies aim to go beyond false constructions of hegemonic security discourses to overcome the "real" security problems. Securitization approach deals with the inherently political nature of any designation of security issues and by doing so, it creates an ethical question for analysts, decision-makers and political activists: "*Why do you call this a security issue? What are the implications of doing this -or of not doing it?*"⁷⁷⁵ Eriksson asks, "*Some but not all securitization moves influence the governmental*

⁷⁷³ Taureck, "Securitization Theory...", p. 57.

⁷⁷⁴ Wæver, "Politics, Security, Theory...", p. 469.

⁷⁷⁵ Wæver, "Securitizing Sectors?...", p. 334.

*agenda. Why do people in and around government pay serious attention to some issues but not to others, and, in the process of doing so, how do they classify issues—as threats or as something else?”*⁷⁷⁶

Traditional groups consider that security is the highest point of a political problem, which necessitates “exceptional measures” and “measures beyond law.” The security process itself needs the mobilization of political discourses and of practices of securitizing actors based on threat and emergency. Most of the studies on security skip this primary work of political mobilization, which leads to securitization. At the analytical level, the discourses of the “hardliners” or security professionals are produced again. According to those who view security as “*a different realm from politics,*” or “*particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues,*” security is like a sphere dealt with the army and other experts on security. Therefore, these studies agree with the security professionals on the view that security is an “*explanation of the security process and not a discourse to be challenged.*”⁷⁷⁷

The main contribution of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde to theoretical debate and security studies is societal security. Societal security is limited to the referent object directed to two collective units, state, and society and mostly excluded from the individual and global unit levels.⁷⁷⁸ Buzan argues that societal security is a crucial issue between center and periphery. Migration and religious differences which are discussed as clash of civilizations are always examined in the field of societal security, since they are considered as threats to communal identity and culture.⁷⁷⁹ Buzan and the other scholars introduced military discourses on societal or internal security into the academic field. For example, they claimed that after the end of Cold War, immigration evolved as an existential threat to national identity, although migrants do not constitute direct threat to the state.

Bigo considers that the distinction between state and societal security is not a useful analytical tool. This distinction contributes to the reproduction of discourses in among security professionals and their aim to create a hierarchy of dangers that

⁷⁷⁶ Eriksson, “**Agendas, Threats, and Politics...**,” pp. 1-2.

⁷⁷⁷ Didier Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,” **Alternatives**, Vol. 27, 2002, p. 72.

⁷⁷⁸ Buzan & Hansen, “**The Evolution...**,” p. 213.

⁷⁷⁹ Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security...,” pp. 447-448.; Laustsen & Wæver, “**In Defence of Religion...**,” p. 709.

create the legitimization of their competition over resources. In this sense, securitization is not usefully defined as a discursive practice constituting “exceptionalization” although it takes its roots from this practice. Buzan and other scholars do not have deep insights into the daily practices, and of the bureaucracies that are critical to comprehend how discursive acts have impact in practice.⁷⁸⁰

Immigration is the most commonly discussed issue within the framework of securitization and in terms of its normative implications. Didier Bigo examines this issue and argues that the securitization of immigration help to far right parties’ propaganda and the rise of racism. In this sense, it is not only the result of them. The most successful leaders who are good at persuading the people are those who come from state and society. Securitization of immigration poses a great danger for both state and society. This act makes the fears of the leaders about losing their control over the territory they rule more apparent.⁷⁸¹ According to Bigo, the securitization of immigration takes place between successful speeches of securitizing actors, mobilized groups, and some security professional such as police, intelligence or other military people and technology experts. Therefore, it is reinforced with a collective effort.⁷⁸²

Williams argues that securitization of an issue is an intersubjective process. He explains it as such: *“It is important to recognize that stressing the role of decision in securitizations focuses attention on the creative side of political action, on the interaction between the actor and the process, and on the intersubjective relationship between the speaker and the audience. In so doing, it also raises directly the question of ethics and responsibility for these acts, an issue to which it is now necessary to turn.”*⁷⁸³

Huysman emphasizes that security is made by the agents. However, it does not depend on cognitive processes of an agent to construct threat perceptions. The emergence of a security problem is understood as a social phenomenon. It is beyond the motives and control of the individual’s acts. According to him, the security

⁷⁸⁰ Bigo, “Security and Immigration...,” p. 73.

⁷⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁷⁸² *Ibid.*

⁷⁸³ Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies...,” p. 521.

studies always has normative dilemma. In the context of immigration, this issue is more obvious.⁷⁸⁴

Immigration as a security issue is not a natural phenomenon, but socially constructed. If immigration turns into a security question for a society, this means that it mobilizes particular institutions. Any written or verbal practices on security are not an innocent act. There is always a danger of exacerbating fascist tendencies and security gap discussions. However, this danger is real, because security analysis always takes place in highly politicized contexts. Therefore, social constructivists face a normative dilemma. Any security talk over migration contributed to securitization of this issue.⁷⁸⁵

Floyd, who was inspired by just war theory and the right intention in her security analysis, argues that three main criteria determine the moral rightness of securitization. According to her, securitization can be accepted as morally right only if all three criteria are met at the same time. In other words, a normative understanding of securitization theory requires the application of these criteria so that analysts hold securitizing actors accountable and the theory will be more policy relevant.⁷⁸⁶ These criteria of Floyd are listed as such. Firstly, there should be an objective existential threat to the survival of an actor or order. Secondly, the referent object should be morally legitimate. Thirdly, the security measure must be appropriate to the threat. This means that the security response should be in accordance with the capabilities of an aggressor state and the securitizing agent must be genuine in his/her intentions.⁷⁸⁷

Wæver responds to Floyd's criticisms made over the ethics and responsibility by saying that he does not agree on what normative analysis is and ought to be in terms of securitization. He does not believe that a philosophical-scientific analysis, which is far away from real political struggles, can explain normative side of securitization as legitimate and valid. For Wæver, the role of academics is also limited in this sense.⁷⁸⁸

⁷⁸⁴ Huysmans, "Language and The Mobilisation...", p. 4.

⁷⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

⁷⁸⁶ Floyd, "Can Securitization Theory...", p.425.

⁷⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸⁸ Wæver, "Politics, Security, Theory...", p. 473.

If security is merely a particular form of social practice as a speech-act linked to existential threat and a politics of taking extraordinary measures, anything can be seen as a “security” issue. As a result, any kinds of politics including the ones in which violence and force are used or irrationalist ones must be treated as another form of “speech act” and understood as “objectively.” This means that securitization theory uses methodological objectivism that is politically irresponsible and lacks a critical analysis of threat, enmity, and emergency.⁷⁸⁹ Buzan and his colleagues themselves warn that there are some places where secrecy and violation of rights are common, and the security arguments are used to legitimize these acts.⁷⁹⁰

Williams suggests that the idea of security as a speech act is more important beyond being simply an instrument of social explanation. Securitization, as a speech act needs to be evaluated on the basis of discursive ethics which aims to prevent the excesses of a decisionist account of the securitization. However, Copenhagen School is inadequate to develop this kind of ethics of securitization, but they link to some of the most interesting current analysis of the practical ethics of social-constructivism.⁷⁹¹

According to Williams, *“Focusing, for example, on how a successful securitizing act is related to the social and institutional position of the speaker, and thus to forms and relations of power well beyond the linguistic element of the speech-act itself, clearly links securitization theory to the focus on epistemological, normative, and processual structures, and to questions of ‘logics of appropriate action’ and institutional legitimation.”*⁷⁹²

Securitization brings a different logic, mainly based on logic of urgency and exceptionalism. Securitization is not merely a speech act for survival to attract attention to this issue, but accepts exceptionalism in political life. It investigates which kinds of politics to be asked. This exceptionalism and decisionism of Copenhagen School activates the understanding of Schmittian politics. Williams argues that the specificity of security as a particular kind of speech-act supports an understanding of the politics of enmity and emergency which reflects Schmittian understanding of political order. Huymans states that securitization leads to

⁷⁸⁹ Williams, “**Words, Images, Enemies...**,” p. 521.

⁷⁹⁰ Buzan, Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, “**Security A New Framework...**,” p. 24.

⁷⁹¹ Williams, “**Words, Images, Enemies...**,” p. 522.

⁷⁹² **Ibid.**, p. 525.

reordering of social relations according to the logic of political realism. The exceptional politics of securitization put the democratic order in a danger. Some may benefit from the threats and extraordinary results which are out of normality. Behnke also claims that the strategy of securitization may suspend democratic process. Therefore, desecuritization may be an ethical-political choice which prevents democratic politics from exceptional politics.⁷⁹³

As it is seen, securitization and desecuritization have been debated on the basis of its normative political implications. Securitization does not facilitate actors' analysis. Instead, securitization is seen as a political method from the point of view of securitizing actor. Taureck argues, *"Here securitization undoubtedly becomes an ethically and morally laden issue that by its very nature is stigmatized as bad."*⁷⁹⁴ In some cases, such as minority rights and AIDS, it is morally debatable whether securitization/desecuritization is a viable option.⁷⁹⁵ McDonald criticized that although desecuritization is supported by Wæver himself as a normative imperative, this side of securitization theory is almost disregarded.⁷⁹⁶

Critical security studies have conceptualized "emancipation" as an alternative to constructions of security. This can be used instead of securitization, because two concepts are related to each other in terms of constituting alternatives to certain social practices. Unlike desecuritization, emancipation is based on intellectual tradition of Frankfurt school and a critical approach for social change and resistance. Emancipation is the concept used for "democratization of security." In Tim Dunn and Nicholas Wheeler's definition, emancipation is a voice for the silenced, the "security have-nots."⁷⁹⁷ Copenhagen school is criticized by the scholars due to its inability to choose a normative stance between securitization and desecuritization.

Aradau argues as below:

"If securitization orders social relations according to the logic of political realism and institutionalizes an exceptionalism of speed, extraordinary measures and friend/enemy, desecuritization is a normative project which reclaims a notion of democratic politics where the struggle for

⁷⁹³ Aradau, "Security and the Democratic Scene...", pp. 392-393.

⁷⁹⁴ Taureck, "Securitization Theory...", p. 56.

⁷⁹⁵ Gad & Petersen, "Concepts of Politics in Securitization...", p. 316.

⁷⁹⁶ McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction...", p. 566.

⁷⁹⁷ Aradau, "Security and the Democratic Scene...", p. 397.

emancipation is possible. To do so, it not only has to tackle the politics of enmity and exceptionalism that securitization institutes, but also its decisionist facet. Securitization is enacted through the non-democratic constitution of authority in various institutional locales, where decisions about the dangerous are made and put into practice."⁷⁹⁸

Buzan and Hansen point out that "security silence" problem concerns the Copenhagen School's normative privileging of desecuritization. Securitizing an issue might be problematic, even dangerous strategy, because political leaders gain privilege and legitimize the suspension of civil and liberal rights. However, some argue that desecuritization also may not be normatively desirable if it merely shows the repression of an issue. Therefore, desecuritization should be treated as the possibility of politicization rather than causing a security silence.⁷⁹⁹

Knudzen questions whether states "really" face dangers from other states or groups or this threat is merely the perception of an actor. In Copenhagen School's assumptions, threats are emanated from the actors' own fears, or paranoid political actions triggered by these fears. He says that this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading concept of threat.⁸⁰⁰ If there are no objective security threats, this means that securitizing actors can argue that anything may constitute a security issue. Why the securitizing actors are allowed to make anything as a security issue if the perceived threats are in their and therefore the audience's mind?⁸⁰¹

Some author support desecuritization as a preferable way to overcome moral dilemma.⁸⁰² However, for some authors, desecuritization as a normative strategy is problematic. Underestimating the importance of an issue at the expense of desecuritizing it may also result unexpected results. If an issue produces a real threat, does the attempt of desecuritizing this issue, merely dropping it from the agenda, mean neglecting or ignoring it? Who does this and what is the purpose behind it? This opens a new discussion regarding to securitization.

⁷⁹⁸ Aradau, "Security and the Democratic Scene...", p. 406.

⁷⁹⁹ Buzan & Hansen, "The Evolution...", pp. 216-217.

⁸⁰⁰ Knudzen, "Post-Copenhagen Security Studies...", p. 359.

⁸⁰¹ Floyd, "Can Securitization Theory...", p. 436.

⁸⁰² Aradau, "Security and the Democratic Scene...", p. 406.

II. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDPs) IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

A. Conceptual, Historical and Institutional Framework for IDPs

1. Who are IDPs?

a. Describing IDPs: Who Escaped How Far Away?

Internal displacement is not a new phenomenon in the world; however, its conceptualization is relatively new as compared to the terminology used for describing the refugees that have been on the agenda since 1950s. It has been only 30 years since the first discussions going on internal displacement. There is a strong correlation between who are IDPs⁸⁰³ and their main factors to be displaced. The issue of internal displacement is not about only its beginning, it is also about its persistency, in other words, post-displacement process.

The reasons for forcibly displacement and the factors facilitating and impeding the return of IDPs vary. While civil conflicts and clashes between hostile parties where the state itself can be a part of the conflict is seen the main driving force behind the internal displacement today, natural or human-made disasters can be also important factors although less attention is paid to them as compared to the former. The question of when the internal displacement ceases to exist remains as a debate depending on the reason of displacement and the cases themselves. In some countries/regions where the displacement or its continuance is caused by the states themselves due to political aims, the issue becomes much more complicated.

The first question on internal displacement is: Who are these internally displaced persons (IDPs), or even though it is rarely used, internal refugees?⁸⁰⁴ Why

⁸⁰³ In this work, the abbreviation used for those who are internally displaced is “internally displaced persons (IDPs)” or “internally displaced person (IDP).” IDPs and IDP are interchangeably used.

⁸⁰⁴ UNHCR, “Internally Displaced People,” The State of the World’s Refugees <https://www.unhcr.org/4444afce0.pdf> (Retrieved on 26.05.2021.)

they are internally displaced? There was not a universally agreed definition of IDPs who needed to be assisted and protected by the international community for many years. Although internal displacement started to draw attention in the late 1980s especially due to the high numbers of IDPs around the world, the endeavors to conceptualize this reality emerged in the early years of 1990s. In a United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) report issued in 1992 by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali⁸⁰⁵ who dealt with many humanitarian crisis during his tenure including the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Rwandan genocide, IDPs are defined as such: *“Persons who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters, and who are within the territory of their own country.”*⁸⁰⁶

This initial description preserved the fundamental aspects of internal displacement in the GPIDPs of 1998, which address the specific needs of IDPs worldwide and identify rights and guarantees that ensure protection and assistance of IDPs during their displacement, return, resettlement, and reintegration. In the GPIDPs that will be explained in detail in terms of its historical evolution and main tenets in the following pages, these people are described as *“Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.”*⁸⁰⁷

As it can be understood from the GPIDPs definition, IDPs are those who are forced to leave their home, but unlike refugees, they stay within the borders of their

⁸⁰⁵ Boutros Boutros-Ghali was an Egyptian politician and diplomat who was the sixth Secretary-General of the UN from January 1992 to December 1996. A scholar and former Vice Foreign Minister of Egypt, Boutros-Ghali served for the UN during the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Rwandan genocide, two important human right crisis in the world.

⁸⁰⁶ Commission on Human Rights, **Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons**, E/CN.4/1992/23 (United Nations, February 14, 1992), para. 17.

⁸⁰⁷ United Nations OCHA, **Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Introduction: Scope and Purpose**, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, OCHA/IDP/20004/01, June 2001, p.1; Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, **Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement**, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 11 February 1998, p. 5.

own countries.⁸⁰⁸ This aspect is very crucial, because remaining within the borders of their own country during/after a forcibly displacement differentiates IDPs from refugees on political, social and legal grounds.

In the huge literature of internal displacement that emerged in the last three decades, the effort of describing IDPs and their problems are remarkable. This literature was created by mainly the responsible people under the UN bodies and other international organizations that were charged with determining the status of IDPs and engaged in the settlement process of IDP related issues. The works of Francis Mading Deng, who is a politician, diplomat and South Sudan's first ambassador to the UN from 2012 to July 2016 and the UN's first Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs; of Roberta Cohen who is a specialist in human rights, humanitarian, and refugee issues, and a leading expert on IDPs and the co-founder and former co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement; and of Walter Kälin who served as Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs (from 2004 to 2010) and was appointed in December 2019 as a member of the Expert Advisory Group for the UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement constitute the main publications on internal displacement.

Forced Migration Review (FMR), Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), The Brookings-CUNY Project on Internal Displacement, and U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, Relief (USCRI) are the leading institutions that have contributed to academic works and publications on forced migration and internal displacement.

Despite these works, there are still some ambiguities in describing the IDPs. Firstly, as it can be clearly understood under the GPIDPs alongside political and socio-economic reasons, natural and man-made disasters were counted as the most important causes of displacement and the protection of human rights during natural disasters were considered under the main responsibility areas of concerned authorities.⁸⁰⁹ However, the discussions on whether armed conflicts based on ethnic

⁸⁰⁸ Jessica Wyndham, "A Developing Trend: Laws and Policies on Internal Displacement," Published by Digital Commons, American University Washington College of Law, **Human Rights Brief**, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2006, p. 1.

⁸⁰⁹ United Nations General Assembly, **Report of the 13th Special Session of the Human Rights Council**, A/HRC/S-13/2, 27-28 January 2010, p. 3.

and political struggles create forcibly/involuntarily internal displacement while the other reasons such as natural or human made disasters remain in the category of voluntary displacement or not, have not been concluded with a satisfactory and widely accepted answer yet. Secondly, the world has changed a lot since the emergence of the concept so the reasons of forcibly displacement do. Therefore, some argue that the concept should be revised accordingly. Roberta Cohen underlines the necessity of a more comprehensive and updated approach on internal displacement with these words below:

*“The addition of the words, ‘in particular’ was intended to make the definition more elastic, enabling it to encompass new IDP categories that might arise but were unanticipated at the time the Principles were drafted. One such group was those uprooted by slow-onset natural disasters (e.g. drought, desertification, land degradation, rising sea levels). Unlike those uprooted by sudden-onset disasters (earthquakes, floods, hurricanes), they traditionally were seen as voluntary migrants (as opposed to forced migrants). However, the growing impact of climate change has begun to call this assumption into question and some, particularly those who can no longer return to their homes, are beginning to be seen as forced migrants or IDPs.”*⁸¹⁰

In this sense, the reasons behind displacement and possible consequences are questioned again. Some scholars prefer to limit the term to people who left their houses because of large-scale movement based on the reasons that force humans to migrate. Some scholars limited the concept to the people who are forcibly displaced within their own country but involuntarily especially as the result of environmental and industrial disasters or large-scale development plans. However, the legal framework makes some distinction on receiving the status of IDPs.⁸¹¹

Roberta Cohen and Francis Deng criticized the narrow definition of refugees excluding persons uprooted by natural disasters. In some disasters, governments implement discriminatory policies against some definite groups or neglecting them on political and ethnic grounds or violate their human rights. They gave an example

⁸¹⁰ Roberta Cohen, “Lessons Learned from the Development of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,” **The Crisis Migration Project, Institute for the Study of International Migration**, Georgetown University, Working Paper, October 2013, pp. 8-9.

⁸¹¹ Promod Nair, “Towards a Regime for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons,” **ISIL Year Book of International Humanitarian and Refugee Law**, Vol. 1, 2001, p. 189.

from Ethiopia in the mid-1980s when Ethiopian government forcibly relocated hundreds of thousands of Tigreans who are considered as political opponents. The natural disaster in this case was only an excuse. In the same years, the western and eastern part of Sudan was suffering from drought-related famine; however, the authorities were reluctant to take an action against it, even to accept the existence of the problem until it was forced by international community to declare state of emergency. In other countries as well, people have been forcibly displaced because of racial, social, and political factors under the pretext of natural disasters. These all examples indicate that special protection may be needed for the persons subject to disasters. Human made disasters, such as nuclear or chemical accidents, should be treated in the same ways. Even though the governments and the international community assist the persons displaced by such disasters, in some cases, these people may need protection at global level due to persecution, neglect, and systematic violation of their human rights.⁸¹²

Cohen and Deng explains the limits of initial definition as such:

*“The 1992 definition overlooks two important factors, however: the time and the number involved. If the term ‘internally displaced’ refers only to those forced to leave their homes ‘suddenly or unexpectedly,’ or ‘in large numbers,’ many serious cases of internal displacement will be excluded. (...) The term ‘forced to flee’ is also too narrow. (...) There are also cases in which persons feel ‘obliged’ to leave because of impending conflict and other disturbance.”*⁸¹³

David Korn whose book constitutes one of the leading works on internal displacement asks that victims of natural disaster or human-made disasters are not qualified as refugees even though they crossed a border. These people usually receive aid from their government; however, if their governments do not have enough resources, the others provide necessary assistance to them in a voluntary base. If the disaster-related problems cause also some severe neglect or abuses of human, political and civil rights, international community may intervene.⁸¹⁴

⁸¹² Roberta Cohen & Francis M. Deng, **Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement**, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1998, p. 16.

⁸¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁸¹⁴ David A. Korn, **Exodus within Borders: An Introduction to the Crisis of Internal Displacement**, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1999, p 12.

Some development agencies have suggested widening the definition of IDPs to those who migrate due to extreme poverty or other economic problems. Economic injustice, marginalization, and systematic violence of economic rights can be a reason to be displaced. To be identified as an IDP, the coercion that cause their displacement, the human rights abuse they suffer as a consequence of their displacement and lack of protection for them within their own countries are counted as the criteria.⁸¹⁵

Although the GPIDPs include disaster related displacements, human rights problems that victims may encounter such as “*unequal access to assistance, discrimination in aid provision, enforced relocation, gender-based violence, forced return and property restitution*” are diverse and needed to be overcome. To provide adequate solution to the problem, in June 2006, the Operational Guidelines on Human Rights Protection in Situations of Natural Disaster were adopted by Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which is an inter-agency forum of UN and non-UN humanitarian partners founded in 1992. These guidelines have been drafted to develop a rights-based approach to disaster relief.⁸¹⁶

The second frequently asked question about IDPs is when they ceased to be displaced. It is widely accepted that the voluntary return of the displaced people to their homes or their reintegration elsewhere put an end to internal displacement. However, if protection is not possible in these areas and their lands and homes have been already occupied by others, may internal displacement end?⁸¹⁷ Would not be misleading and too assertive to state that the reintegration of IDPs ceases internal displacement? The reintegration process is troublesome and dynamics ensuring this process may require a case by case analysis. Furthermore, what if the integration of IDPs to their new environment is impeded by the authorities themselves? In other words, what if IDPs are not allowed to start a new life in their new locations with equal rights and duties as other citizens have, but at the same time, their return to their own homelands is not possible? These questions are still open to discussion.

⁸¹⁵ Cohen & Deng, “**Masses in Flight...**,” p. 17.

⁸¹⁶ Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, “Special Rapporteurs as Law makers: The Developments and Evolution of the Normative Framework for Protecting and Assisting Internally Displaced Persons,” **The International Journal of Human Rights**, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2011, p. 294.

⁸¹⁷ Nair, “**Towards a Regime...**,” p. 193.

The need for conceptualization of IDP and all legal attempts to determine their needs and rights emerged from a necessity to describe these people whose numbers suddenly and tremendously increased since the first half of 1990s. IDP population outnumbered refugees in a very short time and have turned into a humanitarian crisis that the international community could not ignore anymore. In 1994, genocide that took place in Rwanda where 800,000 people were slaughtered by ethnic Hutu extremists in just 100 days⁸¹⁸ revealed the reluctance and inability of international organizations to intervene to the conflict, but those who were killed and forced to displace during and after the clashes finally managed to attract attention of international community to the severity of the crisis.

Since inter-state wars and civil conflicts broke out around the world in the post-Cold War period, the numbers of IDPs tremendously increased during the 1990s. In 1982, when they first counted, their numbers were 1.2 million in 11 countries.⁸¹⁹ By 1986, IDP numbers increased from 11.5 million to 14 million with 20 countries affected. In 1993 and 1994, an estimated 10,000 persons in a day were forced to flee their homes by either crossing borders or becoming displaced inside their own countries.⁸²⁰ By 1997, IDP population became 20 to 25 million in more than 40 countries and outnumbered refugees.⁸²¹ In the last two decades, the trend in IDP population explosion continued. By 2019, IDMC declared that the number of IDPs was approximately 46 million, while the refugees were 26 million people in the world.⁸²² In the table below, the IDP and refugee population between 1990 and 2019 are demonstrated comparatively.

⁸¹⁸ BBC News, "Rwanda Genocide: 100 days of Slaughter," April 4, 2019 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506> (Retrieved on 19.06.2021).

⁸¹⁹ Roberta Cohen, **Sovereignty As Responsibility: The Guiding Principles On Internal Displacement**, A Public Lecture by Roberta Cohen, Co-Director of the Brookings Institution-Johns Hopkins SAIS Project on Internal Displacement Hosted by the Calcutta Research Group and the Refugee Studies Centre of Jadavpur University Calcutta, December 5, 2003.

⁸²⁰ Cohen & Deng, "Masses in Flight...", p. 3.

⁸²¹ Cohen, "Sovereignty As Responsibility..."

⁸²² IDMC, "Global Internal Displacement Database," <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data> (Retrieved on 09.05.2021).

Number of IDPs and refugees

Source: IDMC for IDP data; UNHCR and UNRWA for refugee data (2019 figures not yet available)




Figure 2.2. Number of IDPs and Refugees (1990-2019)⁸²³

In the most recent IDMC report, the number of IDPs around the world reached a record of 59.1 million at the end of 2021, up from 55 million a year earlier.⁸²⁴

Internal displacement is a global crisis; however, some regions are more unfortunate in terms of hosting huge numbers of IDPs. IDPs have been mostly concentrated in the African continent. Over half of the world's internally displaced population try to survive in Africa. At the end of 1990s, half of the world's IDPs population -more than 9 million- were in Africa. In 1995, a considerable number of IDPs were living in at least 14 countries. Four of them, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan hosted a million or more displaced persons. Three countries, Mozambique, Rwanda, and South Africa had about a half million displaced. Four states, Burundi, Kenya, Somalia, and the Democratic of the Congo (at the time, Zaire) counted 200,000 to 400,000 internally displaced. In Ghana, Uganda, Nigeria, and Algeria, there were smaller but significant number of IDPs.⁸²⁵ Internal displacement is not the only problem in the continent. Beside IDP population increased day by day, Africa has about 3 million refugees.⁸²⁶

⁸²³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Global Internal Displacement Database," <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data> (Retrieved on 09.05.2021).

⁸²⁴ IDMC, "Global Report on Internal Displacement 2022...", pp. 11-12.

⁸²⁵ Cohen & Deng, "Masses in Flight...", p. 40.; "Countries that have also been much affected in Africa include Sudan, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia (where the crisis is compounded by state collapse). The problem on the continent, however, is far more pervasive than these examples indicate." Francis M. Deng, "Divided Nations: The Paradox of National Responsibility," *Macalester International*, Vol. 19, Article 12, 2007, p. 81.; The State of the World's Refugees 2006, report published by the Office of the UNHCR, 2006.

⁸²⁶ US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI), *World Refugee Survey 2007*, USCRI, Washington DC, 2008, pp. 30-31.

In other sources, it is declared that in the early years of 2000s, 13.5 million IDPs were in Africa. Sudan, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) continued to host IDP populations in millions. Uganda, Nigeria, Burundi, and Somalia remained other African countries where half million IDPs had been surviving. However, IDPs are everywhere, not only in Africa. In Colombia, Indonesia, Turkey, Afghanistan, IDP population is counted by millions. In Iraq, Azerbaijan, Sri Lanka, Burma, and India, there are over half a million IDPs. Although in some countries such as Burundi or Lebanon, IDP numbers are not described by millions, the ratio of the displaced people to the national population is very high, nearly 10%.⁸²⁷ In other words, in some countries, even though IDP population seems relatively less as compared to other IDP populations around the world, if their ratio is high as compared to other citizens who are not displaced in those territories, the visibility of IDP is high and their problems caused by internal displacement become much more severe.

In Table 2.2, the top ten countries in terms of hosting IDP and refugees are ranked according to the data in the mid-1990s.

Table 2.2. Top ten countries producing both IDPs and Refugees (1995)⁸²⁸

Country	Number of internally displaced	Number of refugees	Total
Sudan	4,000,000	448,100	4,448,100
Afghanistan	500,000	2,328,400	2,828,400
Bosnia	1,300,000	905,500	2,205,500
Rwanda	500,000	1,545,000	2,045,000
Turkey	2,000,000	15,000	2,015,000
Angola	1,500,000	313,000	1,813,000
Liberia	1,000,000	725,000	1,725,000
Iraq	1,000,000	622,900	1,622,900
Sierra Leone	1,000,000	363,000	1,363,000
Azerbaijan	670,000	390,000	1,060,000

Figure 2.3 shows that Syria placed to the first rank in terms of internal displacement after 23 years while African countries have preserved their places to

⁸²⁷ Janie Hampton Anonimo, **Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey**, Norwegian Refugee Council, Second Edition, London: Earthscan Publications Limited, 2002, p. 4.

⁸²⁸ U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1996. cited in Cohen & Deng, “**Masses in Flight...**,” p. 30.

some extent. Despite 400,000 death tolls⁸²⁹, 6.2 million IDPs, including 2.5 million children,⁸³⁰ and 6.6 million Syrian refugees worldwide, of whom 5.6 million hosted in countries near Syria⁸³¹ the conflict is not over in Syria. The other countries that host huge numbers of IDPs following Syria were Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Afghanistan, El Salvador, and Yemen.

Country	Total number of IDPs (Conflict and violence) (as of 31 December 2019)	Total number of IDPs (Disasters) (as of 31 December 2019)	New displacements (Conflict and violence) (1 January - 31 December 2019) ▼	New displacements (Disasters) (1 January - 31 December 2019)
1 Syrian Arab Republic	6,495,000	2,900	1,847,000	17,000
2 Dem. Rep. Congo	5,512,000	168,000	1,672,000	233,000
3 Ethiopia	1,414,000	390,000	1,052,000	504,000
4 Burkina Faso	560,000		513,000	
5 Afghanistan	2,993,000	1,198,000	461,000	117,000
6 El Salvador			454,000	1,900
7 Yemen	3,635,000	400	398,000	31,000
8 Mali	208,000	6,300	284,000	6,600
9 South Sudan	1,352,000	246,000	259,000	294,000
10 Nigeria	2,583,000	143,000	248,000	157,000
11 Libya	451,000		215,000	4,600
12 Somalia	2,648,000	600	188,000	479,000
13 Philippines	182,000	364,000	183,000	4,094,000
14 Colombia	5,576,000	1,600	139,000	35,000
15 Iraq	1,555,000	300	104,000	37,000

Figure 2.3. Total number of IDPs by the end of 2019⁸³²



The figures below, Figure 2.4 and 2.5 show internal displacement by region in 2021 and comparatively display the numbers of IDPs in different countries. According to the Figure 2.4, 38 million IDPs worldwide are consisted of 14.4 million people who had to displace by conflict and violence and 23.7 million by disaster.

⁸²⁹ Oz Katerji, "Assad's Violence Started a Conflict That Will Burn for Decades," **Foreign Policy**, March 19, 2021. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/19/syria-protests-civil-war-anniversary-assad/> (Retrieved on 28.04.2021).

⁸³⁰ UNHCR, "Internally Displaced People, Syria," <https://www.unhcr.org/sy/internally-displaced-people> (Retrieved on 6.06.2021).

⁸³¹ UNHCR, "Syria Emergency," <https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html> (Retrieved on 20.06.2021).

⁸³² IDMC, 2019 Internal Displacement Figures by Country, <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data> (Retrieved on 9.05.2021).



b. Preliminary Studies: Needs-Based or Rights-Based Approach?

The fundamental legal sources of protection for IDPs are human rights law and humanitarian law. Refugee law generally applies for those who cross the border. Humanitarian law generally applies to armed conflicts. Human rights law guarantees fundamental rights of all human beings. The International Bill of Human Rights, composed of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant

⁸³³ IDMC, “Global Report on Internal Displacement 2022...,” pp. 11-12.

⁸³⁴ Ibid.

on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, represents the corpus of human rights law which is applicable to IDPs. Other legal instruments such as the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families have provisions guaranteeing a wide range of human rights. Some regional human rights legal documents, including the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the American Convention on Human Rights also provide some guarantees for IDPs.⁸³⁵

Within the framework of humanitarian law, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 underlines the principle that in cases of armed conflict those who do not directly involved in the hostilities shall be treated humanely.⁸³⁶ Articles 49 and 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 17 of Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions, entitled "Prohibition of Forced Movement of Civilians", and Articles 51 (7 and 85 (4) (a) of Additional Protocol I prohibited forced migration.⁸³⁷ The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is mandated by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to provide assistance to victims of armed conflicts, including IDPs and to help governments in case of necessity. Although the ICRC has undertaken the responsibility and conducted activities for the well-being of IDPs, internal displacement necessitates a more comprehensive and direct response by international community.⁸³⁸ In addition, these initial attempts to determine the status and rights of the forcibly displaced population

⁸³⁵ Francis M. Deng, **Protecting the Dispossessed A Challenge for the International Community**, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1993, pp. 4-6.

⁸³⁶ United Nations, **Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts**, A/32/144/I.L.M. 1391, 1977.; United Nations, **Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts**, A/32/144/I.L.M. 1442, 1977.

⁸³⁷ United Nations, **Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949**, Doc.33_GC-IV-EN; United Nations, **Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)**, of 8 June 1977, Doc.34_AP-I-EN.

⁸³⁸ Robert Kogod Goldman, "Internal Displacement: The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement-Normative Status, and the Need for Effective Domestic Implementation," **ISIL Year Book of International Humanitarian and Refugee Law**, Vol. 7, 2007, p. 266.

had mostly concentrated on refugees who cross the borders during their displacement.

The GPIDPs reveal the inadequacies of human rights and humanitarian law to provide adequate protection to the plight of IDPs. Before the creation of the GPIDPs, Deng and Cohen underlined four major weaknesses in human rights and humanitarian law, which needed to be dealt with. Firstly, there was a need to remove the gap between human rights and humanitarian law that could emerge in the transition period between peacetime and wartime. Secondly, there should be duties for non-state actors. Thirdly, even though some states did not approve international treaties, they needed to be encouraged in terms of protection of human rights. Fourthly, similar protection guarantees as it was under the Refugee Convention should be provided.⁸³⁹

The founders of GPIDPs seemed to grasp that traditional understanding of human rights protection derived mainly from European legal frameworks could not provide an efficient way to deal with the changing and evolving problems of IDPs which were mostly concentrated on African continent that was far away not only in geographical sense but also as a mentality from Westphalian state system and its institutions.

The Representative of Secretary General and group of international lawyers were persuaded that discussion on a binding international treaty was neither achievable nor preferable.⁸⁴⁰ Their decision to prioritize “soft-law” over a binding international treaty was based on different considerations.⁸⁴¹ First, it was thought that treaty-making in the field of human rights was quite complex and took time, but the displacement needed usually urgent responses.⁸⁴² Secondly, there was still risk of slow ratification process and reservation even though if an official document was concluded. Thirdly, the issue of internal displacement should be evaluated in two different legal regimes, human rights and humanitarian law. Therefore, it was

⁸³⁹ Hannah Entwisle, “Tracing Cascades: The Normative Development of the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,” *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 3, Spring 2005, p. 373.

⁸⁴⁰ Walter Kälin, “How Hard is Soft Law? The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the Need for a Normative Framework”, in *Recent Commentaries about the Nature and Application of the Guiding Principles in Internal Displacement* (Ardsley, NY: The Brooking CUNY Projec on Internal Displacement, 2002), 4–7. cited in Abebe, “**Special Rapporteurs...**,” p. 289.

⁸⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 289-290.

⁸⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 290.

necessary to merge them. Fourthly, it was also argued that the current international legal tools bestowed a limited scheme for protection and assistance.⁸⁴³

The founders of Guiding Principles were aware of the fact that there was a need for establishing a more sustainable and inclusive legal protection for IDP. Francis Deng and his fellows aimed to create a legal framework that encouraged states that were suffering from internal displacement to participate voluntarily in the resolution process instead of merely imposing some rights and duties to them. This understanding was crucial in terms of persuading most of these states that have been more jealous of their sovereignty in their troublesome state-building and nation-building processes. Furthermore, the challenges and needs of IDP that have differed from those of other vulnerable and disadvantageous groups, as argued above, have required special solutions which may need to change over time as well. So, a more comprehensive and flexible need-based approach is preferred instead of a more concrete right-based approach which have been dominant for more than four decades in the existing human rights literature and mostly connoted interventions and sanctions.

The GPIDPs provides a legal basis on needs and provide a structure for categorizing potential response mechanisms. In these Principles, the immediate and long-term needs of IDPs and their protection are well described. These needs are identified with the current legal structures within the scope of human rights, humanitarian and refugee regimes.⁸⁴⁴ Robert Kogod Goldman, who was a member of the team, which worked on legal terms, suggested this needs-based approach. For him, determining the needs of IDPs was much more important than discussing on which law adequately addressed to those needs. The study of the GPIDPs was anticipated by the formation of key texts principally the Comprehensive Study and the Compilation and Legal Analysis. In *Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms*, it is stated: *“Internal displacement after all, ...often breaks up the nuclear family, cuts off important social and cultural community ties, terminates stable employment relationships, precludes or forecloses formal educational opportunities, and deprives*

⁸⁴³ Abebe, “**Special Rapporteurs...**,” p. 290.

⁸⁴⁴ Marc Vincet, Sorensen Birgitte Refslund (Eds.), **Caught Between Borders: Response Strategies of the Internally Displaced**, London: Pluto Press, 2001, p. 10.; The acceptance of the GPIDPs brings new questions to the table: *“How are the rights of IDPs to be protected? By whom? With what funds? Is there a penalty for failing to protect the rights of IDPs? Who is monitoring compliance with the instrument?”* Wyndham, “**A Developing Trend...**,” p. 2.

those in need of special protection, such as infants, expectant mothers, and the sick, of vital public/private sector services.”⁸⁴⁵

Goldman suggested looking beyond hard law, which is legally binding agreements, to customary law, court decisions, resolutions, and other soft law instruments in creating and improving the standards for internal displacement. This approach challenged the rights-based approach, which was proposed by other lawmakers, especially European legal experts who advocated the implementation of hard law to the IDPs.⁸⁴⁶

In order to develop legal protections, one should firstly understand the needs of IDPs. Goldman explains the main approach behind the *Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms*, which constitutes initial works on displacement and which cases cover internal displacement. This legal framework embraced a needs-based approach rather than right-based one, because the fundamental needs of the IDPs were to be determined first. After this first step, international human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law were examined in terms of meeting these needs. Human rights law was applicable in cases of disasters. Humanitarian law and other human rights guarantees were applicable in cases of non-international armed conflicts. Thirdly, humanitarian law and other fundamental human rights norms were applicable in case of inter-state armed conflicts.⁸⁴⁷

By combining these two, Kälin underlined that the *Compilation and Analysis* “*approaches displacement from the perspective of the actual needs of internally displaced persons*”⁸⁴⁸ in terms of security, movement, accommodation, personal identification, property and etc. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the UN Bodies exerted great effort to determine these needs. The GPIDPs underlines the specific needs of the IDPs.⁸⁴⁹

⁸⁴⁵ United Nations, **Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms**, Part I; and Part II, Legal Aspects Relating to Protection Against Arbitrary Displacement, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/, 1998; United Nations, **Analytical Report of The Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons**, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/23, 1992, para. 91.

⁸⁴⁶ United Nations Commission on Human Rights, **Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons**, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/52/Add.2, 1995.

⁸⁴⁷ Goldman, “**Internal Displacement...**,” p. 268.

⁸⁴⁸ United Nations Commission on Human Rights, **Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms**, Part I; and Part II, Legal Aspects Relating to Protection Against Arbitrary Displacement, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/, 1998.

⁸⁴⁹ Cohen, “**Lessons Learned...**,” p. 6.

Indeed, as time has passed, it has been widely accepted that IDPs do have some special needs. These needs became more visible. Persons who were forcibly displaced from their homes endure higher rates of mortality as compared to the overall population, sometimes as much as 50 times greater, and are more frequently subject to physical attack, sexual assault, abduction, and disease.⁸⁵⁰ IDPs as families have trouble to reach some life's essentials such as shelter, food, medicine, education, community, and livelihood. These people are marginalized and discriminated by other ethnic and religious groups within their own countries.⁸⁵¹ The ICRC has determined four important protection issues that IDPs face and increase their vulnerability: *“risk of tension between host communities and displaced persons; increased risk of sexual violence; increased risk that families will be split apart and that children, in particular, will be separated from their parents or other relatives; and use of displacement as a tool or even a method of warfare by parties to a conflict.”*⁸⁵²

Is putting IDP to a special category in terms of their status and challenges that they face a kind of discrimination or special treatment as compared to the other disadvantageous groups? Some argue that it is necessary to focus on the vulnerability of these people instead of differentiating IDP as a special category. However, even the ICRC in its latest IDP policy declared in 2006 acknowledged that IDPs had distinct and sometimes urgent needs than the other groups in society and that there should be a balance in the treatment toward the IDPs in particular and the other segment of population in general.⁸⁵³ The plight of the IDPs has been well monitored and recorded; however, the discussion on whether there should a different treatment for IDPs is still going on. There has been a concern that privileging one group over other may create inequality, uneasiness, and even conflict. The same was considered for a distinct category of displaced persons.⁸⁵⁴

⁸⁵⁰ Roberta Cohen & Francis M. Deng, “Mass Displacement Caused by Conflicts and One-sided Violence: National and International Responses,” **SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Security and Conflicts**, 2009, p. 17.

⁸⁵¹ Cohen & Deng, “Mass Displacement...,” p. 17.

⁸⁵² ICRC, **ICRC Position on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)**, May 2006, p. 3. https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/2006_idps_en_icrcexternalposition.pdf (Retrieved on 12.06.2021.)

⁸⁵³ **Ibid.**

⁸⁵⁴ J. Borton, M. Buchanan-Smith and Ralf Otto, “Support to Internally Displaced Persons – Learning from Evaluations,” **Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency**, July 2005, pp. 14-15.

Every IDP has its own humanitarian problems or security needs which require immediate response. IDPs (like refugees) can be mixed with the other people; however, there is a risk that their specific needs may be disregarded. In addition, the displacement situations also differ from each other. Therefore, the UNHCR has adopted a more effective approach. According to this approach, IDP protection is seen as the most fundamental responsibility, and people living in IDP populated areas and areas of IDP's return will be attached greater importance.⁸⁵⁵

In sum, the GPIDPs is an outcome of a long process where lawyers, statesmen, and the representatives from international organizations discuss, exchange their ideas and conclude their remarks on which approach is the best to appeal the needs and problems of IDP. This approach is still to be developed, improved, and evolved as new problems or solution recommendations on internal displacement are added to the agenda.

c. Introduction to Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPIDPs)

The historical background of developing the principles on internal displacement has three stages. First period is relatively short and most of the scholars do not include this period to their analysis. It began with the international conferences and workshops in the late 1980s. This period is very important, because, these attempts attracted the attention of international community to the existence of internal displacement problem. The second period was from 1992 to 2004 in which Francis Deng was inaugurated as the first Representative of Secretary General and started to develop the Guiding Principles on IDPs. In this period, the concerns about sovereignty and non-interference within the CHR were very high. Therefore, defining the scope of the problem and the idea of taking actions against the problem also created new concerns and these all put some limitations to yield concrete results about internal displacement to a great extent. In the third period that began in 2004, Professor Walter Kälin was nominated as Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons. In that period, a more imperative stance has been adopted against the plight of IDPs, the concrete actions

⁸⁵⁵ Erika Feller, "UNHCR's Role in IDP Protection: Opportunities and Challenges," **Forced Migration Review**, Brookings-Bern Special issue, December, 2006, p. 12.

against internal displacement were considered urgent and necessary and observation and scrutiny of international actors over national authorities increased accordingly.⁸⁵⁶

After the end of Kälin's tenure in 2010, Dr. Chaloka Beyani, who is a Zambian citizen, a senior lecturer in International Law, legal advisor, consultant and expert to a number of UN agencies, the European Union (EU), the Commonwealth Secretariat and the African Union, was appointed as Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons by the Human Rights Council in September 2010 and carried out this duty from November 2010 until October 2016.⁸⁵⁷

The current mandate holder is Cecilia Jimenez-Damary of the Philippines who was nominated Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons by the Human Rights Council in September 2016 and assumed the mandate on November 1, 2016. She was a lawyer in human rights and international humanitarian law with an expertise in forced displacement and migration.⁸⁵⁸ It is interesting to note that common educational and professional background of Rapporteurs on the human rights of IDP is mainly international law and human rights. Nationalities differ across continents, however, despite Walter Kälin, the Rapporteurs have been mostly from underdeveloped countries in Africa and Asia.

In the first period, which began in the late 1980s, as mentioned above, international community began to draw attention to internal displacement. International conferences and workshops had been significant instruments to bring this issue to the agenda of political actors and international organizations in that period. Afterwards, the actors in governmental or non-governmental organizations and opinion leaders played a crucial role in developing new concepts in relation to internal displacement and determining actions to solve this problem. The issue of the reintegration of IDPs has been discussed in these two prominent conferences: the 1988 Conference on the Plight of Refugees, Returnees, and Displaced Persons in Southern Africa, and the 1989 International Conference on Central American

⁸⁵⁶ Abebe, "Special Rapporteurs...", p. 288.

⁸⁵⁷ OHCHR, **Dr. Chaloka Beyani, Former Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons**, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IDPersons/Pages/ChalokaBeyani.aspx> (Retrieved on 23.05.2021.)

⁸⁵⁸ OHCHR, **Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons About the Mandate**, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IDPersons/Pages/IDPersonsIndex.aspx> (Retrieved on 22.05.2021.)

Refugees.⁸⁵⁹ Similarly, in 1989, the UN General Assembly called upon the Secretary-General to contemplate mechanisms for coordination of relief programs for IDPs.⁸⁶⁰ In 1990, the UN Economic and Social Council demanded that the Secretary-General launched a comprehensive review of UN bodies, in relation to relief and the protection of refugees and the IDPs.⁸⁶¹

Despite these efforts mentioned above, it would not be misleading to state that for many years, both national authorities and international organizations did not respond to the IDP issue effectively. The appointment of a Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis Deng became a turning point in terms of determining who is responsible for the solution of the problem. In the second period which was significant in terms of the evolution of legal framework for IDPs, Francis Deng and his successor, Walter Kälin developed international standards for IDPs - the GPIDPs mentioned above- and worked on their adoption by national legal and policy frameworks.⁸⁶²

The GPIDPs is the fundamental international document on internal displacement worldwide. Deng presented his initial works on the international standards of internal displacement in 1993 upon the request of the CHR. In a broader two-volume study presented in 1996 and 1998, Deng concluded that the rights of IDPs were protected generally; however, there were still some areas to be improved. With the support of a team of international legal scholars chaired by Walter Kälin, he aimed to fill the gaps in these gray areas. The final document, GPIDPs was submitted to the CHR in 1998. Increasing number of States, UN agencies, regional organizations, and NGOs accepted these principles as the standard on internal displacement.⁸⁶³

As mentioned above, the GPIDPs are not binding upon states. The GPIDPs encourage the states to incorporate these principles into their domestic legislative framework.⁸⁶⁴ Based on international human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law, the GPIDPs are consisted of 30 principles determining IDPs'

⁸⁵⁹ Deng, "Divided Nations...", p. 84.

⁸⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶² Wyndham, "A Developing Trend...", 2006.

⁸⁶³ OHCHR, *International Standards*,

<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IDPersons/Pages/Standards.aspx> (Retrieved on 08.11.2022).;

Goldman, "Internal Displacement...", p. 270.

⁸⁶⁴ Wyndham, "A Developing Trend...", p. 1.

needs prior to displacement (or protection against arbitrary displacement), during displacement and during return or resettlement and reintegration. The purposes of Guiding Principles are: “1) *define persons forcibly uprooted within their own countries*; 2) *identify the rights to which they were entitled*; and 3) *set forth the obligations of governments, international organizations and non-state actors to these populations*.”⁸⁶⁵ The GPIDPs explain the different causes of internal displacement, including natural disasters, human-made disasters, conflict, and violations of human rights.⁸⁶⁶

The Brookings Project on Internal Displacement was founded particularly to bolster the mandate, and in 1994, Deng was incorporated by Co-director Roberta Cohen. The development of a comprehensive approach in worldwide for aid and protection for IDPs has been independently created and funded since that time.⁸⁶⁷ Since 1993, CHR has consistently renewed the mandate of the representative for two and three-year periods. Deng sent annual reports to the commission and at least once in two years to the General Assembly. Publications, researches, policy analysis, and workshops on internal displacement are diverse. This means that the works on internal displacement are mainly academic and field studies.⁸⁶⁸

Third period, for some who do not count the first preparatory period, the second one began with the mandate of Walter Kälin. In Kälin’s period, the UN and regional organizations started to emphasize the implementation of the GPIDPs. Although these principles are still non-binding, a common wisdom has started to spread that every state has responsibility to improve and implement them and take necessary measures. It is considered that even the states that do not sign this document have this responsibility. In March 2005 the UN Secretary-General’s report, “In Larger Freedom,” encouraged Member States to adopt the principles as “*the basic international norm for protection*” of IDPs.⁸⁶⁹ Similarly, heads of state and governments summoned at the World Summit in New York in September 2005

⁸⁶⁵ Cohen, “Lessons Learned...,” p. 2.

⁸⁶⁶ Wyndham, “A Developing Trend...,” p. 1.

⁸⁶⁷ Thomas G Weiss, “Internal Exiles: What Next for Internally Displaced Persons?,” **Third World Quarterly**, 2003, Vol. 24, No. 3, p. 430.

⁸⁶⁸ Weiss, “Internal Exiles...,” p. 430.

⁸⁶⁹ Secretary-General, **In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All**, Report of the Secretary-General, 210, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005, March 21, 2005.

accepted the GPIDPs as “*an important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons.*”⁸⁷⁰

After the UN Secretary-General appointed a representative on internally displaced persons, the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) became important in terms of coordinating aid and protection for IDPs in 1997. In addition, a special Internal Displacement Unit was established to give support for the ERC in this mission. In 2007, this Division described the role of each operational agency to improve the life conditions of the IDPs. For example, the UNHCR became the main body for protection, camp management, and emergency shelter. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was seen responsible for recovery. Other organizations worked in the field of health, sanitation, nutrition, and other areas. The IDPs with different disadvantageous groups like women, children and elderly people, need multi-agency involvement as refugees do.⁸⁷¹

In 2018, in its report prepared for 20th anniversary of Guiding Principles, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of IDPs investigated the progress made, the obstacles, and actions that were necessary to be taken. In October 2018, the Special Rapporteur, together with UNHCR and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) introduced the GP20, a three-year multi-stakeholder plan of action to decrease and overcome internal displacement through prevention, protection, and solutions for IDPs in line with the GPIDPs.⁸⁷² In 2019, the Special Rapporteur reported to the Human Rights Council on the GP20 Plan of Action and an overview of the activities to be carried out. In October 2020, a seminar was realized and the implementation of the principles was discussed.⁸⁷³

The GPIDPs determine the duties of state authorities and non-state actors towards the IDPs. The Representative of the Secretary-General also aimed the GPIDPs to become a very practical document to draft national legislation framework regarding to the IDPs.⁸⁷⁴ Indeed, the GPIDPs have turned into a fundamental legal

⁸⁷⁰ General Assembly, **Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005**, Res. 60/L.1, 132, U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1, September 15, 2005.

⁸⁷¹ Roberta Cohen, “Response to Hathaway,” **Journal of Refugee Studies**, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2007, p. 373.

⁸⁷² OHCHR, **International Standards**, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IDPersons/Pages/Standards.aspx> (Retrieved on 08.11.2022).

⁸⁷³ **Ibid.**

⁸⁷⁴ United Nations OCHA, **Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Introduction: Scope and Purpose**, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, OCHA/IDP/20004/01, June 2001.

document for laws and policies in at least 16 countries. In all regions of the world, there is a tendency to develop laws and policies on internal displacement. The national authorities in the countries from different continents such as Colombia, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Turkey, aimed at turning the provisions of the GPIDPs into directives. This act is a significant step proving that the national authorities assume the responsibility for the protection of IDPs as it is underlined in the GPIDPs as well.⁸⁷⁵

The needs-based approach and inclusion of individual states to the establishment and consolidation of rules and norms on internal displacement have seemed to yield positive results almost three decades after preliminary works and the declaration of Guiding Principles. This is a new phenomenon in human rights and humanitarian law history that is mainly based on right-based approach and may open new ways for further research.

2. Security Problems of IDPs and Implementation of Guiding Principles

a. IDPs and Refugees: Common Needs, Different Rights

As it can be seen from the historical background mentioned above, it was not until the early 1990s that attention was first drawn to the protection and safety of IDPs.⁸⁷⁶ This means that until the last decade of the 20th century, the internal displacement was not discussed in the international agenda. Before this date, only the refugees, the people who crossed the border due to ill-treatment and violence became the subject of discussion. In the wake of Second World War, an international system emerged to protect and provide assistance to refugees. A convention and organization, the UNHCR was created. A refugee convention in Africa and a declaration on refugees in Latin America followed this development. Although there were some obstacles in practice, this international legal framework for the people who seek asylum was a great advance.⁸⁷⁷

The reasons of staying within the borders of a country can be diverse. There should be geographic formations which do not permit, intensity of the conflict, physical conditions of the people who need to displace, or just their motivations to stay in their own territories. Whatever the reason is these people are not considered

⁸⁷⁵ Wyndham, “A Developing Trend...,” p. 1.

⁸⁷⁶ Cohen & Deng, “Mass Displacement...,” p. 23.

⁸⁷⁷ Cohen, “Sovereignty As Responsibility...”

under the umbrella of this protection. In case of a civil conflict, the ICRC may provide assistance if it is allowed to operate in this country. In some cases, the UN would enable the UNHCR to perform its duties in the territories in question just it happened in Sri Lanka. However, in all of these cases, internally displaced people are not part of the process. Moreover, traditional concerns on state sovereignty dominate the governments who consider that they are responsible for the well-being and safety of its citizens. The intervention of international community is seen as the weaknesses or inability of the government to carry out this duty.⁸⁷⁸

The 1951 Refugee Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol does not cover the IDPs who remained within the borders of their own country. Therefore, the UNHCR does not have a system to provide assistance to them. Although the ICRC has had experiences for helping the refugees, it was not familiar with the processes of internal displacement. As United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund's (UNICEF) former Executive Director, James Grant, underlined in 1993, *"The world has established a minimum safety net for refugees. Whenever people are forced into exile...refugees can expect UNHCR to be on the scene in a matter of days or on the outside, a matter of weeks. This is not yet the case with respect to internally displaced populations."*⁸⁷⁹

The IDPs have trouble for living in a safe environment. While the UNHCR creates necessary conditions for protection of refugees on the basis of legal right to asylum and non-refoulement, the IDPs does not have this kind of protection. In other words, the forcibly displaced people who had to displace within their own countries were not subject of this international refugee protection system. For the IDPs, there is no international agreement or an international body to provide this protection. UN's Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) declared an IDP policy in 2000 which was concentrated mainly on the physical security of IDPs. This policy comprised the fundamental needs of the IDPs and some social, cultural, civil, and political rights.⁸⁸⁰

IDPs have to seek assistance and protection from their own governments. However, the individual states often lack this assistance or unwilling to provide it.

⁸⁷⁸ Cohen, "Sovereignty As Responsibility..."

⁸⁷⁹ Cohen, "Lessons Learned...", p. 1.; Goldman, "Internal Displacement...", p. 266.; Cohen & Deng, "Mass Displacement...", p. 24.; Thomas G. Weiss and Amir Pasic, "Reinventing UNHCR: Enterprising Humanitarians in the Former Yugoslavia, 1991–1995," *Global Governance*, Vol. 3, No. 1, January-April 1997, pp. 51-52.

⁸⁸⁰ Cohen & Deng, "Mass Displacement...", p. 28.

Therefore, international community increasingly began to understand that there is a protection system for the IDPs as well. The GPIDPs were developed to achieve this purpose.⁸⁸¹ Cohen explains the necessity of international response as below:

*“Nor do many IDPs enjoy the protection of their own governments. It should be recognized that protection for IDPs in civil wars or other situations of internal strife cannot be assigned to the very authorities that may have been the cause of their persecution and displacement in the first place. While it is true that the international community may not have the same ‘unqualified ability’ to come to their aid as it does in the case of refugees, counter-insurgency or ethnic cleansing campaigns carried out by governments or non-state actors often require an international response.”*⁸⁸²

According to Walter Kälin, the GPIDPs have some conceptual basis. First of all, the IDPs changed their location, homes, but not country unlike refugees. This means that they have right to enjoy human rights under their national jurisdiction and guarantees of international humanitarian law. Secondly, IDPs have specific requirements. Although they are not called in a distinct category in international law, their specific needs necessitates granting them a legal status and identification of these needs. Thirdly, there is a necessity to make some clarification in the existing international law by modifying it according to the needs of IDPs.⁸⁸³

It would not be misleading to say that refugees have more opportunities in terms of protection as compared to the IDPs and war victims. This inequality is not derived from the reluctance of the UNHCR in terms of providing necessary protection. The IDPs and war victims have mostly rely on the implementation of international humanitarian law or human right law of local authorities which remain inadequate in many cases.⁸⁸⁴ The international mechanism does not work enough for the IDPs and war victims. The UNHCR is unable to monitor “in-country protection” or intervene in these kinds of situations where internal displacement took place to the

⁸⁸¹ United Nations OCHA, **Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Introduction: Scope and Purpose**, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, OCHA/IDP/20004/01, June 2001.; Cohen & Deng, “**Mass Displacement...**,” p. 24.

⁸⁸² Cohen, “**Response to Hathaway...**,” p. 371.

⁸⁸³ Walter Kälin, “The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement- Introduction”, **International Journal of Refugee Law**, No. 557, 1998, pp. 559-560.

⁸⁸⁴ Weiss & Pasic, “**Reinventing UNHCR...**,” p. 52.

same extent that it does for refugees.⁸⁸⁵ *“Human rights protection will invariably be better for refugees than for other categories of civilian victims in war zones.”*⁸⁸⁶

Although they are less known compared to the refugees, actually, the IDPs who are under great risk firstly look for assistance within their own countries. If the risk is getting greater, they tend to migrate to another country. In addition, most of the IDPs are ex-refugees who have been displaced for the second time after they return to their homes.⁸⁸⁷ The IDPs which are called sometimes as “internal refugees” have already outnumbered the refugees. Therefore, the UN bodies sought the ways of assisting these people with a comprehensive approach and assume responsibility for both refugees and IDPs.⁸⁸⁸

The collapse of Soviet Union and the end of Cold War caused many civil wars, proxy wars, and mass displacement into Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. As these people were forcibly displaced, regardless of being refugee or IDPs, their problems became more visible. Post-Soviet world faced the reality that there was not any international regime that put these people under protection. As mentioned above, at least, refugees had an established legal framework, but IDPs were challenged not only by security problems and lack of resources, but also their traumas of dislocation.⁸⁸⁹

The discussion about IDP definition is whether it should be narrow or comprehensive and whether it should be considered beyond refugee definition.⁸⁹⁰ 1969 Organization for African Unity (OAU) –it replaced by AU in 2002- Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, two important regional organizations broadened the definition of this concept. Suggested extensive definition of refugee is *“persons uprooted by armed conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations.”*⁸⁹¹ For many people, refugee definition does not comprise all the reasons of displacement. The other reasons, such as natural disasters (earthquakes, floods) and

⁸⁸⁵ Weiss & Pasic, “**Reinventing UNHCR...**,” p. 52.

⁸⁸⁶ **Ibid.**

⁸⁸⁷ Nair, “**Towards a Regime...**,” p. 186.

⁸⁸⁸ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, **Division of International Protection, UNHCR’s Operational Experience with Internally Displaced Persons**, Geneva: UNHCR, September 1994.

⁸⁸⁹ Cohen & Deng, “**Mass Displacement...**,” pp. 23-24.

⁸⁹⁰ Cohen, “**Lessons Learned...**,” p. 8.

⁸⁹¹ **Ibid.**

human-made disasters (chemical or nuclear accidents) should be added to the scope of definition. The people who experience these disasters are involuntarily displaced and need protection. Governments respond to these disasters, however, in some cases, they discriminate or ignore certain groups on the basis of their political affiliations and ethnic ties.⁸⁹²

OAU Convention made a revision on the definition of refugees. In the earlier version of the refugee definition, an individual who wants to apply for refugee status had to prove that he or she was under the fear of being persecuted. In some cases such as persons fleeing from the Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia, or Portugal's African territories, persecution was obvious. However, in some cases, this is not so obvious. Refugees who escape from war or civil conflict do not flee from persecution. They may be indirectly the victims of an armed conflict. Therefore, a new category was added to the OAU Convention. In this new version, "*all persons who feel compelled to flee across national borders to escape violence of any kind or even foreign domination generally, and whether or not in fear of persecution, will be equally entitled to the status of refugees.*"⁸⁹³ The OAU Convention does not rely on persecution to define refugees, but accepts individuals who have had to displace "*owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order.*"⁸⁹⁴

Natural disasters that seriously put the society under risk may cause environmentally displaced people who flee their homelands by crossing the borders. Therefore, the need to describe these people as refugees emerged.⁸⁹⁵ The adoption by the African Union in 2009 of a Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa ("the Kampala Convention") remind the states about their obligations regarding to the IDPs. The basis of this Convention is the Guiding Principles and forces states to "*protect and assist persons who have been*

⁸⁹² Cohen, "Lessons Learned...", p. 8.

⁸⁹³ Philip E. Chartrand, "The Organization of African Unity and African Refugees: A Progress Report," *World Affairs*, Vol. 137, No. 4, Spring 1975, p. 272.; African Union, **OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa**, Adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its Sixth Ordinary Session, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 10th September 1969, In Accordance with Article XI Text United Nations, Treaty Series No. 14691.

⁸⁹⁴ African Union, **OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa**, Adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its Sixth Ordinary Session, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 10th September 1969, In Accordance with Article XI Text United Nations, Treaty Series No. 14691.

⁸⁹⁵ Roberta Cohen & Megan Bradley, "Disasters and Displacement: Gaps in Protection," *International Humanitarian Legal Studies*, Vol. 1, 2010, p. 106.

*internally displaced due to natural or human-made disasters including climate change.*⁸⁹⁶

Similarly, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration underlines that a refugee may be displaced due to “*events seriously disturbing the public order,*” or “*massive violations of human rights.*”⁸⁹⁷ Although the International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) report delineating the Cartagena Declaration indicates that victims of natural disasters are not put under protection within the framework of the provisions on events threatening public order, some scholars claimed that the victims of “human-made” disasters associated with climate change could grant refugee status according to the Declaration. In addition, the people who are forced to cross borders because of natural disasters could be considered as refugees under the Cartagena Declaration’s provisions on the basis of massive violations of human rights.⁸⁹⁸ The Cartagena Declaration aimed to broaden the protection areas in humanitarian situations which were described narrowly in the 1951 Convention. “*The Cartagena Declaration also covers the indirect effects of the five situational events – including poverty, economic decline, inflation, violence, disease, food insecurity and malnourishment and displacement.*”⁸⁹⁹

b. Security Concerns of IDP & IDPs as Security Concern

i. Causes of Internal Displacement

The civil wars and internal displacement that followed these wars had already started at the end of 1970s and 1980s. Ethiopia and Somalia in the late 1970s and Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, El Salvador, and Guatemala in the 1980s are the territories where the internal displacement was widespread.⁹⁰⁰ As the Cold War ended, great powers started proxy wars, armed conflict among two states or non-state actors that are not directly involved in the clashes, caused internal displacement, but

⁸⁹⁶ African Union, **Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)**, Adopted by the Special Summit of the Union Kampala, Uganda 23rd October 2009, Entry into Force 6th December 2012.; Cohen & Bradley, “**Disasters and Displacement...**,” p. 109.

⁸⁹⁷ UNHCR, **Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees**, adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, Section 111(3), 22 November 1984.

⁸⁹⁸ Cohen & Bradley, “**Disasters and Displacement...**,” p. 106.

⁸⁹⁹ UNHCR, **Expert Roundtable Interpretation of the Extended Refugee Definition Contained in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees**, Montevideo, Uruguay 15 and 16 October 2013 Summary Conclusions on the Interpretation of the Extended Refugee Definition in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration, p. 3.

⁹⁰⁰ Cohen & Deng, “**Masses in Flight...**,” p. 19.

the plight of IDPs did not draw attention immediately. With the end of these geopolitical wars, the results of the internal displacement were discussed. Since the bipolar world disappeared and the countries were not protected by a superpower, the events that took place in these countries became the subjects in which international community was involved.⁹⁰¹

Deng explains Cold War dynamics and its impact on internal conflicts by saying that internal and regional conflicts broke out as proxy clashes between the superpowers during the Cold War. Accordingly, domestic and regional crisis and their humanitarian repercussions were handled by these superpowers within the framework of bipolar mechanisms. These great powers were supporting the most weakest and vulnerable ideological allies of themselves. Consequently, the internal catastrophic situations such as plight of the IDPs was not clearly seen from outside. However, the end of Cold War and the disappearance of strategic interests pertaining to bipolar world signaled a beginning of new era in which these conflicts became increasingly visible in their national and regional context.⁹⁰²

International community concentrated on the IDPs in order to overcome refugee flows in the aftermath of Cold War. During the Cold war, states were motivated to accept refugees for political reasons. However, in the 1990s, they aimed to limit the entry of refugees. Western or non-Western countries were more reluctant to receive large numbers of refugees in the post-Cold war era. Protecting and assisting persons displaced within their own countries gained much more importance. By doing so, the states attempted to discourage these displaced people from seeking asylum abroad. As a result of these efforts to some extent, as of the mid-1990s, the number of IDPs outnumbered the 13.2 million refugees of concern to the UNHCR.⁹⁰³

The IDPs attracted more attention thanks to the advancement in the field of telecommunication in the mid-1980s as well. For instance, in 1984 and 1985, the media broadcast the plight of hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians who were starving and tens of thousands who were forcibly displaced. The media had an impact on the provision of international aid although Ethiopian government attempted to mitigate the crisis. At the same time, in Sudan, people were reported fleeing from drought and famine, but the government did not accept that there was an emergency issue.

⁹⁰¹ Cohen & Deng, "**Masses in Flight...**," p. 4.

⁹⁰² Deng, "**Divided Nations...**," p. 83.

⁹⁰³ Cohen & Deng, "**Masses in Flight...**," p. 3.

However, the media and pressure put by international community forced the government to accept the problem and allow the international community to provide assistance.⁹⁰⁴

Political and territorial struggles emerged due to the nationalism and turned into bloody events that cause mass displacement. The collapse of Soviet Union and the declaration of independence of Central Asian, Caucasian and Eastern European states is an example for the rise of nationalism. Under the communist system, nationalist movement and ethnic disputes were prevented. However, the dissolution of the communist system caused political and territorial disputes to emerge in Central Asia and Caucasia.⁹⁰⁵ As an example of intrastate conflict, the bloody clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia caused mass displacement. Alongside the racial, ethnic, cultural, and religious differences, socio-economic problems led ethnic clashes and then mass displacement.⁹⁰⁶

In Yugoslavia, political, ethnic, and religious differences resulted with the same clashes and problems in state-society relations.⁹⁰⁷ The primary reasons for internal displacement are the division of society into groups based on race, ethnicity, language, or religion. These different identities erode national identity. Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda and Burundi, the Arabized Muslim north and the more indigenous African South in Sudan, and Muslims, Serbs, and Croats in the former Yugoslavia, can be given as some examples for national crisis.⁹⁰⁸

Civil wars, state collapse, and ethnic strife caused internal displacement in African countries as well.⁹⁰⁹ In African continent, the internal displacement occurred mostly due to the domestic armed conflicts during the 1990s. Actually, Africa is a continent where most of internal displacement is experienced. In 2002, more than one quarter of the continent's 53 countries suffered from ethnic conflicts. More than one million IDPs, which was three-quarters of worldwide internal displacement, affected by the protracted wars in Angola, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The conflicts in Liberia, Republic of Congo, and Nigeria at the beginning of

⁹⁰⁴ Cohen & Deng, "**Masses in Flight...**," p. 3.

⁹⁰⁵ **Ibid.**, p. 20.

⁹⁰⁶ **Ibid.**, p. 22.

⁹⁰⁷ **Ibid.**, p. 20.

⁹⁰⁸ Korn, "**Exodus within Borders...**," pp. 7-8.

⁹⁰⁹ Cohen & Deng, "**Masses in Flight...**," p. 40.

2002 can be added to this list.⁹¹⁰ African countries are the most vulnerable countries to economic problems, scarcity, and internal displacement.⁹¹¹ These countries have trouble in their nation-building processes. The governments are unable and ineffective to manage situations and maintain their authority.⁹¹²

Civil wars are the problem of other continents as well. In Latin America, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua experienced very severe civil wars and hundreds of thousands people were forcibly displaced after these wars. The US and Soviet Union, by providing weapons in these wars fuelled the hostilities and deepened cleavages in society.⁹¹³

Another cause for internal displacement is severe human right abuses. These abuses can be emanated from identity-related issues such as race, ethnicity, religion and language as it happened in Rwanda case.⁹¹⁴ Rwanda population was approximately 8 million, however roughly 2 million people were displaced within the borders of their own country during 8 months. Another 2 million people escaped from the country and became refugees. The first group, approximately 300,000 people fled to Tanzania at the end of April 1994. The second group, 1.4 million people fled to temporary protection zone called as “Zone Turquoise” established by France in south-western Rwanda.⁹¹⁵ Similarly, hundreds of thousands of blacks fled to Bantustans in South Africa.⁹¹⁶ The resettlement of blacks by the regime that was consisted of white minorities created mass displacement within the country.⁹¹⁷ In addition, as an another example, from 500,000 to 1 million people had to displace in Myanmar (Burma).⁹¹⁸

Although they are all related to each other, another reason behind internal displacement is the lack or scarcity of economic resources, inequality, and discrimination among different segments of society and marginalization of internal displacement. As a result of these, internal displacement became inevitable.⁹¹⁹ To

⁹¹⁰ Anonimo, “**Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey**,” p. 25.

⁹¹¹ Cohen & Deng, “**Mass Displacement...**,” p. 19.

⁹¹² **Ibid.**, p. 40.

⁹¹³ **Ibid.**, pp. 19-20.

⁹¹⁴ **Ibid.**, p. 22.

⁹¹⁵ Larry Minear and Randolph C. Kent, “Rwanda’s Internally Displaced: A Conundrum witing a Conundrum”, in Cohen & Deng, “**The Forsaken People...**,” pp. 62-63.

⁹¹⁶ Cohen & Deng, “**Masses in Flight...**,” p. 22.

⁹¹⁷ **Ibid.**, p. 40.

⁹¹⁸ **Ibid.**, p. 22.

⁹¹⁹ **Ibid.**, p. 5.

clarify this, in some societies, some groups may be economically advantageous. There can be traditionally, historically or socio-economically different ethnic groups in a society. However, if minority is prosperous and wealthy, this usually attracts the attention of those who are majority and feel themselves in a very disadvantageous position. This may create sense of hostility and conflicting interests that may lead to civil conflicts and internal displacement.

Natural disasters and development projects can be another source of internal displacement. Millions of people were forcibly displaced because of the environmental issues. Whether they are natural or human-made disasters, there are attempts to add these categories to the definition of refugees and IDPs. Geographical restrictions such as being a person who crosses the border make refugee definition so narrow. Natural or human-made disasters or development projects may cause internal displacement. However, these people are mostly ignored, discriminated or their rights can be violated by their own governments. The same tendency can be observed in case of economic problems. Those who had to migrate due to the economic reasons are also considered as being out of refugee definition.⁹²⁰

The idea of being an IDP due to some environmental disasters challenged the long-standing debates on the current literature. As it is mentioned, international protection regimes established for refugees and IDPs exclude those who have to displace due to these disasters. The main question is about whether these people are accepted refugees or voluntary migrants. New terminology is needed to extend the definition of forcibly displacement.⁹²¹

Displacement related to environmental issues is problematic from two ways. Firstly, in some cases, when the people are displaced to other areas, local people or host communities may disturb due to their settlement because they have to share their resources and livelihood with these new people. Secondly, tension may arise between the IDPs who are disaster victims and conflict victims. Governments and charity organizations tend to help disaster victims as compared to those displaced by civil wars.⁹²²

⁹²⁰ Cohen, “Sovereignty As Responsibility...”

⁹²¹ Cohen & Bradley, “Disasters and Displacement...,” p. 98.

⁹²² *Ibid.*, p. 122.

It is necessary to remember that the GPIDPs do not include the people who leave their homes due to economic, social, and cultural reasons in a voluntary basis. However, these principles include those who had to displace because of natural or man-made disasters and development projects. This does not mean that these people receive necessary assistance. In many cases, they are ignored by national authorities and subject to human right abuses.⁹²³

ii. Consequences of Internal Displacement

The problems that IDPs encountered do not cease to exist after they are displaced. New problems emerge. These people may find themselves under comparatively safe conditions after displacement, but they loss their houses, jobs and incomes. They may face persecution and other ill-treatments in their exile areas. Furthermore, IDPs are mostly associated with a hostile clan or political group and looked with suspicion by the government. On the one hand, they are forced to support one of the existing groups militarily or politically, on the other hand, they are under threat of being accused of treason. In sum, for IDPs, it is extremely difficult to remain neutral. These people may even be subjected to physical attacks. Their camps come frequently under attack by warring parties who are worried about some military instruments to be hided in the shelters. Furthermore, in some cases, where refugees and IDPS stay together, they may even fight to each other.⁹²⁴

In many cases, IDPs are seen as enemy in the new settlement areas especially if a state is dominated by a specific group or groups.⁹²⁵ Cohen and Deng say, *“When governments become directly involved in uprooting minority populations they often see those they are uprooting not as their citizens but as ‘the other’. This process of dehumanization enables authorities to more easily explain away the high number of those killed or uprooted.”*⁹²⁶ This otherness can be derived from different reasons. As mentioned, IDPs may be seen close to some insurgent groups or opponents based on their ethnic, religious and political backgrounds.⁹²⁷

⁹²³ W. Kälin, Origin, Content and Legal Character of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in R. Cohen & W. Kalin (Ed.), *The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and The Law of The South Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan* (American Society of International Law 2003), p. xv, xxv. cited in Goldman, *“Internal Displacement...,”* p. 271.

⁹²⁴ Nair, *“Towards a Regime...,”* pp. 196-197.

⁹²⁵ Cohen & Deng, *“Masses in Flight...,”* p. 6.

⁹²⁶ Cohen & Deng, *“Mass Displacement...,”* p. 20.

⁹²⁷ Cohen & Deng, *“Masses in Flight...,”* p. 6.

IDPs are under threats of attack from the armed forces of their own governments or by non-state actors. These unarmed civilians are mostly accused of supporting terrorist activities even though there is not any proof and “one-sided violence” is directed to them.⁹²⁸ In this kind of violence, the victims are not part of the conflict. In some cases, as indicated previously, victims can be associated with some warring parties. In case of IDPs, it is difficult to determine who flee from violence or who is engaged in armed conflict. Civilians may find themselves in the conflict while they are looking for safer places. If civilians have become subject of violence consciously and displacement, they are less eager to return their homelands as compared to those who have just witnessed the conflict.⁹²⁹

In post-conflict situations, when civilian people were seen as allies of enemies, the authorities violated human rights and new displacements took place. For instance, in Kosovo, Serbs fled during the return of Kosovo Albanians in 1999, because they feared of being persecuted as revenge.⁹³⁰ There are also some double standards implemented by international community in terms of being refugees towards some communities.⁹³¹

In Afghanistan, civilian members of the Pashtun community were attacked because of their ethnic affiliation with the Taliban regime.⁹³² Similarly, in Rwanda, IDPs were considered as the criminals who committed to genocide. In this case, IDPs were accused of occupying fertile lands and being economically better than the other members of community were. The remaining parts of society did not receive humanitarian aids while IDPs were provided this international support. This created resentment among society. In Rwandan case, the national authorities were always suspected of the activities carried out by international relief organizations and threatened because of this foreign presence in their territories.⁹³³ Humanitarian assistance is prevented in many cases due to insecure conditions and poor

⁹²⁸ Cohen & Deng, “Mass Displacement...,” p. 20.

⁹²⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹³⁰ Anonimo, “Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey,” p. 7.

⁹³¹ Roberta Cohen, “Nowhere to Run No Place to Hide,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 58, No. 6, November 2002, p. 37.

⁹³² Anonimo, “Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey,” p. 7.

⁹³³ Larry Minear and Randolph C. Kent, “Rwanda’s Internally Displaced: A Conundrum within a Conundrum,” in Cohen & Deng, “The Forsaken People...,” p. 67.

infrastructure.⁹³⁴ International organizations may even have trouble to reach IDPs if the area in question is fully landlocked.⁹³⁵

Institutional problems emanated from the displacement are severe and diverse. They can be counted as such:

*“Fear that advocating for IDP rights could interfere with close working relationships with governments on political, humanitarian and development programmes; insufficient support from headquarters for raising protection concerns; lack of training in practical protection methods or in the diplomatic skills needed to advocate for the broad range of rights to which IDPs are entitled; lack of capacity to deploy experienced staff quickly and expand presence; lack of clarity about who is responsible for protection; and concern about the risks involved in undertaking protection activities.”*⁹³⁶

Although there are some general rules directed to the refugees and IDPs, they are not clear enough. For example, freedom of movement is guaranteed as a human right norm, however, whether the refugees in a safe location can benefit from this right or not is not clearly indicated. Ill-treatment in a cruel and inhuman way is forbidden, however, there is not any norm preventing the return of IDPs to risky areas. In addition, there are many international laws prohibiting discrimination, however, it is not clear whether authorities will implement them to IDPs or not. Furthermore, the arbitrary detention is forbidden, however, the preconditions for IDPs in case of detention in camps are not known. In addition, health conditions for IDPs, especially displaced women are not sufficient.⁹³⁷ It is known that the majority of the IDPs are women and dependent children⁹³⁸ who constitute the most vulnerable groups among IDPs. However, their living conditions in temporary shelters are not improved. In addition, in the current international law, there is a lack of regulation on the right to restitution of property or compensation for its lost in the wake of displacement, right to reach necessary resources for protection and assistance during the displacement and right to have personal documentation.⁹³⁹

⁹³⁴ Anonimo, “**Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey**,” p. 28.

⁹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁹³⁶ Cohen & Deng, “**Mass Displacement...**,” p. 29.

⁹³⁷ Goldman, “**Internal Displacement...**,” pp. 268-269.

⁹³⁸ Korn, “**Exodus within Borders...**,” p. 14.

⁹³⁹ Goldman, “**Internal Displacement...**,” p. 269.

There are some gaps in the implementation or ratification of legal processes. Firstly, human rights law is binding for states, but non-state actors who are involved in the conflict itself. Secondly, in the implementation process of humanitarian law, in some cases, there is lack of sufficient protection. Thirdly, legal protection for IDPs is still problematic, because most of the states do not still ratify the fundamental human rights conventions such as Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms was created to fill this gap. This document underlines the general principles of protection in detail and aims to identify some grey areas. Francis Deng and his team aimed to clarify all norms in a single document in a coherent way.⁹⁴⁰

As mentioned above, IDPs are mostly called as “internal refugees” since they mostly find shelters within their own countries. However, being a citizen of a country where a person is displaced necessitates special treatments and understanding to his/her needs. Just like refugees, there should be some provisions that prevent these people sending to their homelands or other areas if they are under danger, which can be summarized as internal refoulement. These people lost their homes, properties, families, and friends and they may have encounter with tremendous obstacle to regain them. IDPs generally lost their personal documents or have the official documents again due to the lack of information and other impediments. They cannot be even register as voters, because this registration can be only done in their original places. The mortality rates, malnutrition rates, and sexual violence are very widespread among IDPs. In addition, there are some other problems such as restrictions on movement, violations of property rights and difficulties to access education and employment opportunities.⁹⁴¹

Another problem for internal displacement is the reluctance of government to take action for the well-being and protection of IDPs. There can many different reasons behind it. In a protracted war, the government mobilizes all resources to win it. National infrastructure is destroyed and the government cannot be responded efficiently to the needs of its people. For example, no one could expect that a collapse state such as Somalia could assist to its displaced people in war times. Even though there are some decisions taken or regulations in humanitarian issues, there may be some problems in terms of their implementation. Besides all, there may be

⁹⁴⁰ Goldman, “**Internal Displacement...**,” p. 269.

⁹⁴¹ Cohen, “**Response to Hathaway...**,” p. 374.

lack of political will behind not assisting IDPs despite the available resources at hand. For instance, Angola had been criticized not to implement policies on the provision of needs of the IDPs and their security.⁹⁴²

Community relations and structures are negatively affected from displacement as well. Families are separated and family savings are lost during displacement. IDPs lost their skills since there did have not any resources to use.⁹⁴³ Older men have to find jobs. Women who are economically weak and vulnerable have great trouble to head their families. Children could not have educational opportunities.⁹⁴⁴ Community members fall apart in almost two years, patriarchal relations, problem-solving mechanisms and property rights disappear. People take over the lands evacuated or distribute them among their supporters. For instance in Afghanistan, agriculture, and farming have been destroyed, and the IDPs could not find humanly living conditions in the new settlement areas.⁹⁴⁵

In a Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, it is underlined:

*“Internal (...) displacement nearly always generates conditions of severe hardship and suffering for the affected populations. It breaks up families, cuts social and cultural ties, terminates dependable employment relationships, disrupts educational opportunities, denies access to such vital necessities as food, shelter and medicine, and exposes innocent persons to such acts of violence as attacks on camps, disappearances and rape. (...) The internally displaced are among the most vulnerable populations, desperately in need of protection and assistance.”*⁹⁴⁶

Cohen draws attention that the structure and size of households, family patterns, and gender roles dramatically change by displacement. 75% of total IDP population is women and children. Women had to play more active role in the houses since many men were killed in wars or they had to hide from enemies by fleeing to

⁹⁴² Anonimo, “Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey,” p. 10.

⁹⁴³ Cohen & Deng, “Masses in Flight...,” p. 25.

⁹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁹⁴⁶ Commission on Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, **Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng**, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39, Economic and Social Council, Fifty-fourth session, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 11 February 1998.

rural and mountainous areas.⁹⁴⁷ However, women and children remain the most vulnerable groups in society in terms of rape, sexual assault, and forced labor. In Sierra Leone, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Uganda, Burundi, Afghanistan, Colombia, Burma, and Iraq, children had to work. In Burundi, 14,000 internally displaced children forced to serve for army.⁹⁴⁸

The displacement also causes some economic problems. After their displacement, these people flee to rural areas and damage forests and grasslands in order to survive. In Rwanda, the damage done to Akagera National Park by IDPs and refugees provides an example for the long-term environmental consequences of displacement. Urban centers are also harmed due to the displacement. Urban populations tremendously increase and urban infrastructure remain insufficient to meet the needs of newcomers in terms of social and health services and water supplies.⁹⁴⁹

Besides these, there are some environmental reasons behind displacement such as “drought, desertification, rising sea levels, extreme temperatures, deforestation, and land degradation.”⁹⁵⁰ Migration from these disasters is considered “voluntarily,” however displacement due to these reasons is increasingly perceived as “forced.”⁹⁵¹ In disaster related displacement, it is unlikely to see armed conflicts. However, in some cases, the groups competing for scarce resources can also fight to each other.⁹⁵² Sudan, Ivory Coast, and Burkina Faso can be shown as examples where ecological problems and water scarcity were exacerbated by the governments and led to clashes.⁹⁵³ UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has warned that “*violence in Somalia grows from a similarly volatile mix of food and water insecurity. So do the troubles in Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso.*”⁹⁵⁴

⁹⁴⁷ Nina M. Birkeland and Alberta Uimbo Gomes, “Angola: Deslocados in the Province of Huambo,” in Vincet & Refslund, “**Caught Between Borders....**,” p. 25.

⁹⁴⁸ Anonimo, “**Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey**,” p. 7.; p. 28.

⁹⁴⁹ Cohen & Deng, “**Masses in Flight....**,” p. 25.

⁹⁵⁰ UN OCHA and IDMC, “Monitoring Disaster Displacement in the Context of Climate Change”, 22 September 2009 cited in Cohen & Bradley, “**Disasters and Displacement....**,” p. 97.

⁹⁵¹ Cohen & Bradley, “**Disasters and Displacement....**,” p. 97.

⁹⁵² **Ibid.**, pp. 97-98.

⁹⁵³ **Ibid.**, p. 98.

⁹⁵⁴ Ban Ki-Moon, “A Climate Culprit in Darfur,” **Washington Post**, 16 June 2007. Also available at <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/articles/2007-06-16/climate-culprit-darfur> (Retrieved on 10.10.2022).

Displacement may last for many years as it happened in Burundi⁹⁵⁵ and it does not necessarily end when IDPs return or resettle. During the process of return, insecure conditions may last for a very long time. When they return, IDPs may find their lands or homes taken over by some others. These people may not welcome IDPs. They can be a hostile ethnic group.⁹⁵⁶ The scenario is not always pessimistic. In some examples, IDPs may also integrate to their new settlement areas. For instance, in Sudan, IDPs living in Khartoum had escaped from their homelands to this area. As the years passed, they found more economic and social opportunities in the host territories and developed good social networks.⁹⁵⁷

Cohen and Deng consider that the internal displacement does not end when IDPs voluntarily return their home and the circumstances that caused the displacement end. According to them, return to home is not the only condition that ends internal displacement. As mentioned above, economic and social integration of IDPs is possible in some cases and return cannot be a criterion for them. The national authorities, international agencies, or NGOs may encourage the safe return; however, these people may still feel themselves under risk.⁹⁵⁸ In order to prevent new displacements, returnees should feel secure and have opportunities for starting new life.⁹⁵⁹

c. Regional and Individual States' Initiatives to Apply Guiding Principles

i. UN Initiatives

In recent years, internal displacement has attracted greater attention from international community. Firstly, the displacements of millions of people do not only mean a humanitarian problem, but also is a regional and international security problem that seriously threatens stability. There is a danger that conflict may spill over to other regions. Secondly, the return and integration of IDPs and refugees is an inseparable part of reconstruction process of war torn societies. Without the settlement of these people who constitute a third or a half of country's population, peace is not something achievable. Thirdly, the developed countries aim to stop

⁹⁵⁵ Anonimo, "**Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey**," p. 36.

⁹⁵⁶ Korn, "**Exodus within Borders...**," p. 17.

⁹⁵⁷ Karen Jacobsen, Sue Lautze and Abdal Monim Kheider Osman, "The Sudan: The Unique Challenges of Displacement in Khartoum," in Vincet & Refslund, "**Caught Between Borders...**," p. 78.

⁹⁵⁸ Cohen & Deng, "**Masses in Flight...**," p. 36.

⁹⁵⁹ **Ibid.**, p. 37.

refugee flow to their territories. Therefore, they work to keep these people in the territories they stay. In other words, IDP status for many countries is better than granting refugee status within their own borders.⁹⁶⁰

IASC, which was established in 1992 to serve as an inter-agency forum of the UN and non-UN humanitarian partners helped to reinforce humanitarian assistance. The Emergency Relief Coordinator is chair of IASC and the leading figures in humanitarian and development organizations such as UN agencies, the Red Cross Movement, The World Bank, and the International Organization for Migration, take part of this organization. Under this organization, their purpose is to strengthen coordination in emergency issues. The “collaborative approach” adopted by IASC is to coordinate assistance and protection provided to IDPs by government, local authorities, UN agencies as well as global and local NGOs.⁹⁶¹ The paper adopted by the IASC in December 1999 determined a very large area for strategic activities ranging from spread of Guiding Principles to advocate the rights of IDPs. It aimed to promote and develop assistance programmes including 3 Rs: return, resettlement and reintegration.⁹⁶²

In July 2000 of the Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement was created. Based on a collaborative approach, this unit recommended establishing the Internal Displacement Unit within OCHA.⁹⁶³ The ERC and the Representative of Secretary General put their signature on a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in April 2002. With this memorandum, an operational co-ordination had been assigned to the Geneva-based Internal Displacement Unit (IDU) within OCHA⁹⁶⁴ in January 2002. The main duty of IDU was to coordinate the affairs of agencies. OCHA operates 16 field coordination offices.⁹⁶⁵ In 2004, the unit defined its objectives and activities as follows: *“improve predictability and transparency in international response to internal displacement, increase system-wide accountability for IDPs,*

⁹⁶⁰ Cohen, “Sovereignty As Responsibility...”

⁹⁶¹ Vincet & Refslund, “Caught Between Borders...,” p. 3.

⁹⁶² Inter-Agency Standing Committee, **Protection of Internally Displaced Persons**, Inter-Agency Standing Committee Policy Paper, New York, December 1999.

⁹⁶³ FM Review, “The Internal Displacement Unit – OCHA,” **FMR20**, p. 44.

<https://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/sustainable-livelihoods/ocha.pdf> (Retrieved on 04.06.2021).

⁹⁶⁴ United Nations, **Memorandum of Understanding Seals Agreement to Improve UN Assistance To Internally Displaced**, HR/4584-REF/1172, 18 April 2002.

⁹⁶⁵ Weiss, “Internal Exiles...,” p. 435.

improve confidence in and implementation of the collaborative approach at the field level, increase protection of IDPs.”⁹⁶⁶

UNHCR is the main institution for refugee protection. UNHCR advocated the right to asylum and non-refoulement of refugees. However, IDPs are considered that they enjoy some rights in their own countries. The GPIDPs has drawn considerable attention from international community, however, it is not still an internationally recognized legal framework like the Refugee Convention. In addition, protection of IDPs includes physical safety of these people during and after displacement, in return or resettlement. For monitoring and reporting activities, a large number of organizations worked in the field, but engaging in such operations necessitate security of these staff as well. Therefore, a protection mechanism for not only IDPs but also agencies working in the camps or temporary shelters to assist these people is required.⁹⁶⁷

The distinction between refugees and IDPs is not only made on the basis of definition, but the urgent measures to be taken. UNHCR underlines that its protection for IDPs should not impede the protection of refugees. In other words, the protection of IDPs does not mean that their right to seek refuge abroad is prevented. Governments are reluctant to accept refugees and use in-country protection activities as a pretext for rejecting asylum. Cohen says, *“But inhospitality to refugees has many other causes and should not be allowed to interfere with efforts to promote protection for the far larger numbers of people who remain uprooted within their home countries. (...) Both refugees and IDPs may fit into separate legal regimes but operationally it often makes little sense to distinguish between the two.”*⁹⁶⁸

As it is seen, the main responsibility is taken by intergovernmental organizations to overcome IDP issue around the world. However, these attempts do not yield positive result without the contribution of regional organizations and the effort of individual states. In the following pages, these contributions will be discussed.

⁹⁶⁶ FM Review, “**The Internal Displacement Unit – OCHA...**”

⁹⁶⁷ Roberta Cohen, “UNHCR: Expanding its Role with IDPs,” **Forced Migration Review IDP Supplement**, October 2005, p. 10.

⁹⁶⁸ Cohen, “UNHCR: Expanding its Role with IDPs...,” p. 10.

ii. Region-Based Initiatives

From the very beginning, the UN Secretary General encouraged the individual states to monitor the GPIDPs in case of mass displacement and to develop national laws and policies, which comply with these principles. Many leading international humanitarian, human rights, and development organizations implement these principles. At the regional level, there are many organizations that use these principles in the field: “In the Americas, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States; in Africa, the Economic Community of West African States, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the African Union; and in Europe, the Council of Europe, and OSCE. There are also some works in Asia to SAARC and ASEAN in line with UN resolutions calling upon regional organizations to work with the Representative to promote the Guiding Principles.”⁹⁶⁹ In Europe, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has encouraged its members to adopt the GPIDPs to their national law and OSCE has accepted the Principles as a “useful tool” in designing national policies on internal displacement.⁹⁷⁰

AU, the Economic Community of West African States, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in the Horn of Africa and within the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have formally declared the importance of the Guiding Principles and used these principles for responses to internal displacement. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights referred to these principles while monitoring internal displacement in Colombia and Peru.⁹⁷¹ In May 2000, the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) organized a regional workshop in Tbilisi collaborating with the Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement and the Norwegian Refugee Council. The workshops and seminars are also arranged in Africa, Asia, and the Americas.⁹⁷²

African continent provides best example in terms of declaring binding regional treaties for the protection of IDPs in line with the Guiding principles. The AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in

⁹⁶⁹ Cohen, “Sovereignty As Responsibility...”

⁹⁷⁰ Goldman, “Internal Displacement...,” p. 275.; Abebe, “Special Rapporteurs...,” p. 292.

⁹⁷¹ Goldman, “Internal Displacement...,” pp. 275-276.

⁹⁷² Francis M. Deng, “The Global Challenge of Internal Displacement,” *Washington University Journal of Law & Policy*, Vol. 5, 2001, p. 148.

Africa, which was ratified in October 2009, became the first regional treaty in internal displacement. The 2006 Great Lakes Region Protocol was also an important step. Guiding Principles had a great impact on the promulgation of both the Convention and the Great Lakes Protocol. The Convention is established on the provisions of the GPIDPs and Secretary General Walter Kälin was involved in the drafting process.⁹⁷³ Similar attempt was seen in the Kampala Convention which was a treaty of the AU on internal displacement and signed by 15 states in 2012.⁹⁷⁴ Kampala Convention is important, because it strengthened the legal significance of Guiding Principles by making binding its provisions at the regional level.⁹⁷⁵

As it is seen, most of the works carried out on internal displacement is based on academic writings, workshops, conferences, and reports. It is interesting to note that an issue, which necessitates a real fieldwork, combines with that kind of huge literature. For example, special rapporteurs on IDPs are appointed by Organization of American States (OAS)'s Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Council of Europe (CFE). As mentioned above, OSCE brought the experts to discuss on internal displacement in special meetings. Similarly, special workshop was organized in Addis Ababa within AU to motivate the states to embrace the Guidelines and implement them. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also organized workshops on internal displacement.⁹⁷⁶

As for NGOs, the NRC provides huge literature on internal displacement. USCRI began to use increasingly the term IDPs in annual works. Human Rights Watch (HRW) launched a special campaign entitled "The Challenge of the New Millennium: Protecting the Internally Displaced." The Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children focused on internally displaced women and children in their reports. There are also many books, which were published and are prepared on internal displacement.⁹⁷⁷

There are some other non-governmental groups who deal with the problems related to IDPs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and such

⁹⁷³ Abebe, "Special Rapporteurs...", pp. 294-295.

⁹⁷⁴ African Union, **Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)**, Adopted by the Special Summit of the Union Kampala, Uganda 23rd October 2009, Entry into Force 6th December 2012.

⁹⁷⁵ Cohen, "Lessons Learned...", p. 13.

⁹⁷⁶ Weiss, "Internal Exiles...", pp. 435-436.

⁹⁷⁷ **Ibid.**

local NGOs as the Ecumenical Commission for Displaced Families and Communities (ECDFC) in the Philippines, the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA) in Sri Lanka, and the Grupo de Apoyo a Organizaciones de Desplazados (GAD, in English: Support Group for Displaced Person Organizations) in Colombia.⁹⁷⁸

iii. Country-Based Initiatives

The needs-based approach in the formulation of the GPIDPs encourages the states to incorporate these principles into their national legal frameworks. IDPs have been mostly concentrated in the underdeveloped and developing countries. These states have still memories inherited from their colonial past. Therefore, for these states, maintaining state authority and sovereignty is very crucial. The initial reason for the adoption of these non-binding principles may be different such as financial or political interests. However, the norms attracted greater attention through international pressure and national support from the states. As Guiding Principles have turned into stronger norms, this also shaped the states' identities on the basis of protection of rights of IDPs within their borders.⁹⁷⁹

The 2005 UN General Assembly accepted these norms as the important legal framework for protection and assistance of IDPs. The International Law Commission also worked in the codification of protection of persons who suffered natural disasters. This international confirmation urged the states to adopt these principles in their national legislations. In some cases, states simply verified that the GPIDPs were binding for their national law. In Africa, for instance, countries such as Uganda, Angola, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique have already started to use legally the GPIDPs in their domestic legislations and policies.⁹⁸⁰

As these principles are non-binding, the states are free in their choices on whether they accept these principles as binding or incorporate some provisions of the Principles into their national law. In Colombia, for instance, the Constitutional Court cited the GPIDPs as a basis for two of its judgments on internally displaced persons. In Angola, the government took the provisions in the Guiding Principles as the basis of its law on the resettlement of IDPs. In Georgia, the government declared that it

⁹⁷⁸ Weiss, "Internal Exiles...", p. 434.

⁹⁷⁹ Entwistle, "Tracing Cascades...", p. 386.

⁹⁸⁰ Abebe, "Special Rapporteurs...", p. 287.

would comply with the Principles in its law-making process and began to do so. Other governments like Burundi, Colombia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Uganda have addressed to the Principles as a framework for national policies. In Afghanistan, the Principles have been taken an important source to draft a decree for the safe return of IDPs. Even non-state actors started to acknowledge the importance of Principles. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), for instance, prepared a draft for policy on internal displacement based on the Guiding Principles, while the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka received some training on the Guiding Principles.⁹⁸¹

B. IDPs under Scrutiny: The Problématique of Sovereignty and Protection of People at Risk

1. Discussion on Changing Nature of Sovereignty at a Glance

The word sovereignty is derived from the Latin word "Supra." In political theory, sovereign is the holder of ultimate power. In the Westphalian international system, sovereign is the state. According to the Westphalian definition, the state is under the legal influence of no superior power, sovereignty resides in the state. In other words, there is no higher authority other than the state. In this sense, human rights are considered as a domestic issue, and are not evaluated within the framework of international concern. This absolute notion of sovereignty is discussed in Aristotle's Politics, and the classic body of Roman Empire. In the Politics, Aristotle underlines that there should be a supreme authority within the state and this power is mostly at the hands of few, not many.⁹⁸² The main components of state sovereignty are authority, state's monopoly on coercion and territoriality.⁹⁸³

Sovereignty, in its legal content, is often thought that it did little change. In other words, the concept is mostly considered as a static and fixed one. However, the definition of sovereignty has been improved and some different concepts have been produced. There are two different definitions of sovereignty: internal and external ones. Internally, sovereignty means the exercise of supreme authority by states

⁹⁸¹ Cohen, "Sovereignty As Responsibility..."; Deng, "Divided Nations...", p. 96.

⁹⁸² Francis Kofi Abiew, *The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 25.

⁹⁸³ Janice E. Thomson, "State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 2, June 1995, pp. 222-227.

within their own territorial borders. Externally, it means the equality of status between states, which are components of the society of states. Therefore, sovereignty means both supremacy in a territory and equality of status in the international environment.⁹⁸⁴ In other words, the responsibility of a sovereign government is both external to other sovereigns and internal to its citizens.⁹⁸⁵

As mentioned above, state sovereignty is often described within the framework of internal control and external autonomy. However, in international politics, instead of control and autonomy that are considered to decline, some scholars tend to describe sovereignty as authority (the right to rule over a delimited territory and the population residing within it). Degrees of control and autonomy can vary in particular cases; however, the right to rule is the constant component of sovereignty. In other words, even control and autonomy are undermined, the right to rule remains. This kind of definition admits that sovereignty has both internal and external dimensions. In other words, sovereignty cannot be merely defined in internal terms. The state should be recognized by other states in order to assert their sovereignty. Therefore, recognition by community of states and constitution of sovereignty by international norms are important in an international system where power is unequally distributed.⁹⁸⁶

Thomson states as below:

*“Sovereignty is best conceptualized in terms, not of state control, but of state authority. State control has waxed and waned enormously over time, regions, and issue-areas while the state’s claim to ultimate political authority has persisted for more than three centuries. (...) With sovereignty, states do not simply have ultimate authority over things political; they have the authority to relegate activities, issues, and practices to the economic, social, cultural, and scientific realms of authority or to the states’ own realm-the political.”*⁹⁸⁷

Another conceptualization of sovereignty is negative versus positive sovereignty. It is derived from the cognate ideas of negative and positive liberty,

⁹⁸⁴ Abiew, “The Evolution of the Doctrine...,” pp. 24-25.

⁹⁸⁵ Robert H. Jackson, **Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World**, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 28.

⁹⁸⁶ M. Ayoob, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty,” **The International Journal of Human Rights**, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2002, p. 82.

⁹⁸⁷ Thomson, “State Sovereignty...,” p. 214.

which was popularized by Isaiah Berlin. According to those who support this view, as liberty is possessed by individuals, sovereignty is a property of states.⁹⁸⁸ Negative sovereignty can be defined as freedom from outside interference. Therefore, non-intervention and sovereignty are two sides of the same coin. *“Negative sovereignty is the legal foundation of upon which a society of independent and formally equal states fundamentally rests.”*⁹⁸⁹

Sovereignty has historically undergone a dramatic change since its inception. Sovereignty that was firstly represented by the Treaty of Westphalia has been in its initial phase when the sovereign reigned supreme domestically and internationally. Secondly, following the Second World War, sovereignty has been eroded with the democratic values and institutions both at home and abroad on the basis of human rights and humanitarian standards. As these values attracted more attention following the end of the cold war, the third phase started in which the states reacted if their sovereignty was challenged and their performance in internal affairs was investigated by international community. The fourth phase is the today’s pragmatic attempt at harmonizing state sovereignty with responsibility especially in African countries that had trouble in dealing with their racial, ethnic, and religious diversity and have been suffering from a post-colonial transition and democratization process.⁹⁹⁰

In the post-World War, the erosion of sovereignty had been widely discussed by the application of the right to self-determination principle, which granted a framework for the process of decolonization. One of the significant examples that show international response to the narrow concepts of absolute sovereignty is the measures taken against apartheid South Africa. Both internal and external pressures had led to the collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa. The increasing wave of democratization has been another challenge to state sovereignty. The evolution of increasing demands for democratic values, institutions, and practices have led to question the traditional notion of sovereign will and authority to the people who are rejecting the dictatorship of unaccountable government.⁹⁹¹

⁹⁸⁸ Jackson, “Quasi-States: Sovereignty...,” p. 26.

⁹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁹⁹⁰ Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, I. William Zartman, **Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa**, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996, p. 2.

⁹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

Kofi Annan, the seventh Secretary-General of the UN describes sovereignty as below:

*“State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalisation and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty (...) has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the [UN] charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.”*⁹⁹²

One who examines state sovereignty in the post-Cold War era will conclude that states are clearly dependent on other states for diplomatic recognition and admission to international institutions. Territorial borders are not threatened compared to the past. In this new era, international organizations are more active, especially the UN; however, these institutions are built on state sovereignty which is sacred in the UN's Charter. State continues to operate in multilateral institutions. Individuals are still loyal to the state, not to another entity. Collective decision-making mechanism in the League of Nations, the UN, NATO, and EU may be considered as a decline of state power within the framework of policy-making and legal procedures but does not mean the erosion of state sovereignty. With the end of Cold War, Great Powers have violated unilaterally the non-intervention norm, especially if they have interests to do so, however, this was not to destroy a sovereign state but to support or overthrow a particular government.⁹⁹³

The basic tenet of international state system is that non-intervention in the internal affairs of states principle are to be protected as an international norm.⁹⁹⁴ However, in reality since the Ancient Greeks, some states intervened in the internal affairs of others to pursue their own interests. In the French Constitution of 1793, it was declared that French people do not intervene in the internal affairs of other nations, and they do not allow that the others interfere in their affairs. Since then, the discussion has been concentrated on legitimate and illegitimate interventions and non-intervention as a principle. In December 1965, the UN General Assembly adopted a “Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs

⁹⁹² Kofi A. Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty”, *The Economist*, 18 September 1999.

⁹⁹³ Thomson, “**State Sovereignty...**,” pp. 229-230.

⁹⁹⁴ Ayooob, “**Humanitarian Intervention...**,” p. 84.

of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty” which prohibits any direct and indirect intervention.⁹⁹⁵

Foreign intervention to save ethnic or religious minorities had been seen in the past and continued to our day. In the 19th century, Great Britain and Russia competed to each other for intervening in the other states’ internal affairs to pursue their own interest. In the 20th century, the US and Soviet Union intervened in other states’ domestic issues with same motivation and purposes.⁹⁹⁶ However, there has been always a dilemma between sovereignty, interdependence, and human dignity. The documents, the International Bill of Human Rights, composed of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights constitute the basis of human rights law and norms stressing the significance of human dignity and equality.⁹⁹⁷

There may be two reasons to intervention. Firstly, states can prefer to intervene, because the internal affairs of other state may endanger its existence through increasing the possibility of conflict between states or targeting their regimes’ legitimacy. Secondly, interventions are considered necessary and unavoidable when values and human dignity is seen under threat. The UN interventions are based on this second reason, which is considered for the sake of humanity.⁹⁹⁸ Although in some cases humanitarian intervention is encouraged, for many others, humanitarian intervention is considered defective in moral terms, because most importantly the governments have obligations to comply with international law. International law prevents the use of force and the governments who intervene in the internal affairs of another violate the central tenet of international legal system.⁹⁹⁹

When the international system is threatened by an aggressor state, the adherence to the doctrine of non-intervention is questioned. It is very important that the hegemon power in the international system that has enough power to intervene in

⁹⁹⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene,” **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 45, No. 3, April 1967, pp. 425-426.

⁹⁹⁶ **Ibid.**

⁹⁹⁷ Deng et al., “**Sovereignty as Responsibility...**,” p. 4.

⁹⁹⁸ Abiew, “**The Evolution of the Doctrine...**,” pp. 21-22.

⁹⁹⁹ Fernando R. Tesón, “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention,” **Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper**, No. 39, November 2001, p. 24.

the others' internal affairs declare its commitment to this principle. The US did not undertake any responsibility in front of German, Italian, or Japanese aggression prior to the Second World War. Instead, the US often invoked the doctrine of non-intervention to justify its passivity.¹⁰⁰⁰

There are two historical factors that have contributed to the formulation of contemporary US intervention policy. Firstly, the Monroe Doctrine proved that protective intervention, which was unilaterally undertaken by the US provokes enmity and conceals abuses. Secondly, the historical experiences revealed that the reliance on standard rights of self-defense and indiscriminate adherence to the doctrine of non-intervention are not enough to protect the states against an aggressor. These learned lessons have contributed to the contemporary policy of US, which relies mostly on collective intervention. Therefore, the unilateralism of the Monroe Doctrine and the absolute non-interventionism have been relinquished.¹⁰⁰¹

Cynthia Weber underlines two important points in terms of sovereign authority and intervention:

*“Intervention practices direct analysis to the question of when, from a reputedly global perspective, sovereignty is or is not invested in a particular state. When state practices do not fit supposed intersubjective norms of what a sovereign state must be, then intervention by a sovereign state into the affairs of an ‘aberrant’ state is deemed to be legitimate by a supposed international community. On the other hand, when state practices do accord with intersubjective norms of being, intervention is prohibited and, when carried out, condemned by the supposed community of sovereign states.”*¹⁰⁰²

2. Definition and Scope of Sovereign Responsibility to Protect

a. Sovereign Responsibility and IDPs

The concept of sovereign responsibility has been evolved over time with the historical developments and needs. As indicated previously, after Cold War, the growing number of IDPs and refugees signaled the severity of human crisis around

¹⁰⁰⁰ Richard A. Falk, “The United States and the Doctrine of Nonintervention in the Internal Affairs of Independent States,” **Howard Law Journal**, Vol. 5, No. 2, June 1959, p. 179

¹⁰⁰¹ Falk, “**The United States...**,” p. 180.

¹⁰⁰² Cynthia Weber, “Reconsidering Statehood: Examining the Sovereignty/Intervention Boundary”, **Review of International Studies**, Vol. 18, No. 3, July 1992, pp. 200-201.

the world. However, the existing structure has not been adequate to respond this crisis. The notion of sovereignty has changed a lot and the international community began to intervene in the governments that are unable or unwilling to ensure security and well-being of their displaced people. Furthermore, the refugee advocates who focused on the similarities at the beginning started to treat the IDPs as the second class victims afterwards. The concept of responsibility to protect has been derived from the need to prevent civilians from being victims of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, not from the desire to help IDPs.¹⁰⁰³

The attitude towards IDPs has changed to a considerable degree. Why? Firstly, the millions of people who suffered from civil wars, were not only disrupting the stability of their own countries, but also endangered the regional and international security. In Rwanda in the Great Lakes region of Africa, in Sierra Leone in West Africa, and in Bosnia in the former Yugoslavia, the conflict and forced displacement transcended borders by causing a refugee flow to the neighboring countries and even induced the regional wars to break out. As UN Secretary General Kofi Annan underlined, if these issues of conflict and displacement cannot be dealt with through efficient measures, political and economic turmoil may spread to entire region. Secondly, the change in notion of sovereignty is important. In the 1970s, human right advocates underlined the fact that the rights of people were beyond borders. By the end of Cold War, humanitarian organizations demanded access to people whose lives are at risk in their own countries. In 1989, the UN aggressively negotiated Operation Lifeline Sudan to provide aid to starving people and humanitarian agencies in other countries also insisted that governments and insurgents allow the entrance of food and supplies. Thirdly, as the people became more intolerant to the refugees, the willingness to help IDPs increased. The states were more reluctant to admit the refugees. Protection of IDPs in their own countries has become more preferable instead of dealing with the millions of asylum seekers.¹⁰⁰⁴

Westphalian system has undergone a normative change through advocacy within donor governments, inter-governmental organizations, and NGOs since the second half of 20th century. Therefore, new literature on human rights emerged with the works of these organizations.¹⁰⁰⁵ Deng's earlier work on Sudan and Africa had

¹⁰⁰³ Cohen, "Response to Hathaway...", p. 372.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Cohen, "Nowhere to Run...", pp. 38-39.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Weiss, "Internal Exiles...", p. 432.

laid the foundations of the concept “sovereignty as responsibility.”¹⁰⁰⁶ According to sovereign responsibility concept based on positive sovereignty understanding, humanitarian intervention is possible if the states cannot fulfill its duties and responsibilities to protect its civilians. Francis Deng explains his approach with these words: *“I approach sovereignty not as a negative concept by which states barricade themselves against international scrutiny and involvement, but rather as a positive concept entailing responsibility for the protection and general welfare of the citizens and of those falling under state jurisdiction.”*¹⁰⁰⁷ Weiss clarifies this point by saying that in case that human rights abuse are so severe, sovereignty concept loses its significance and this paves the way for humanitarian intervention including deployment of foreign forces.¹⁰⁰⁸

According to this principle, if government prevents access to the populations who suffer from starvation and other abuses, international community has right, and even a responsibility, to provide help to those who need.¹⁰⁰⁹ However, it is argued that right to humanitarian intervention violates the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.¹⁰¹⁰ In this sense, it is considered that this concept modifies the concept of sovereignty as a form of state responsibility. According to this responsibility, states have the primary responsibility to assist and protect their IDP population. However, if they are not capable to do this, international intervention is required.¹⁰¹¹ In sum, state sovereignty is socially constructed. Policy makers, diplomats, parliamentarians, charity organizations workers and intellectuals created sovereignty. If a state cannot assist its internally displaced people and protect their fundamental human rights, sovereignty becomes something secondary, and intervention is accepted possible.¹⁰¹²

Deng’s main purpose was to formulate the concept of sovereignty as a type of responsibility towards all citizens and to harmonize a state’s responsibility to international humanitarian action in favor of IDPs. According to this doctrine,

¹⁰⁰⁶ Francis M Deng, “Frontiers of Sovereignty: A Framework of Protection, Assistance, and Development for the Internally Displaced,” **Leiden Journal of International Law**, Vol. 8, No.2, 1995, pp. 249-286; Deng et al., “Sovereignty as Responsibility...,”

¹⁰⁰⁷ Deng, “The Global Challenge...,” p. 144.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Weiss, “Internal Exiles...,” p. 432.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Cohen & Deng, “Mass Displacement...,” p. 26.

¹⁰¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

¹⁰¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹⁰¹² Thomas G. Weiss, “Whither International Efforts for Internally Displaced Persons?,” **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 36, No. 3, 1999, p. 371.

governments have to provide fundamental livelihood and protection. However, if they fail to provide them, they will accept assistance from international community. If these governments insist on preventing access to the IDPs or danger their lives, therefore, international society may express its uneasiness and concern. International involvement can take several forms from diplomatic dialogue, to negotiation of access for foods and other supplies, international presence, political pressure, sanction and even military intervention.¹⁰¹³

As described above, sovereignty as responsibility is based on the assumption that national governments have responsibility to provide minimum standards of security and social welfare to its citizens and they should be accountable both in national and international area. In this sense, African region provides many examples revealing the fact how the performance of governments is significant in sovereignty as responsibility perspective. South Africa, which has turned into a non-racial and democratic model, can be treated as an exceptional case. However, the countries like Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan that are characterized by severe ethnic conflicts and civil wars and a lack or deterioration of governance, public order, and individual and national security are placed in the opposite side of the spectrum. Economic problems, starvation, and state collapse are mostly common problems. In some African countries, it is not even possible to survive and maintain order without international assistance.¹⁰¹⁴

Deng explains the situation in Africa as below:

“Although economic and social development are among the major challenges facing Africa, a process of self-sustaining growth and development is not possible without the enabling environment of peace, security, democracy, stability, and respect for fundamental human rights. Conflict management clearly, therefore, is fundamental. The urgency of seeing sovereignty as responsibility in relation to the challenges of preventing, managing, or resolving conflicts is underscored by the fact that most contemporary conflicts in the world are predominantly internal and Africa is the region most affected. Internal conflicts in Africa, as elsewhere in the world, often involve racial, ethnic, cultural, or religious cleavages that reflect severe, sometimes zero-sum,

¹⁰¹³ Roberta Cohen, “Humanitarian Imperatives are Transforming Sovereignty,” **ILSA Quarterly**, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2008, p. 16.

¹⁰¹⁴ Deng et al., “**Sovereignty as Responsibility...**,” p. 211.

*crises of national identity, usually manifested in a wide discrepancy between group identities and the official identity structures or frameworks of the state.*¹⁰¹⁵

In many African countries, the sources and causes of conflict are rooted from the traumatic experience of colonial state-formation. By dividing the borders arbitrarily and remaining the society disintegrated, colonial powers left a very devastating legacy in these territories. The independence from colonial powers did not bring peace and order to this region; instead, once the nationalists seized the power and control of the old institutions, lust for power caused new conflicts. The conflicts in African countries were not only inherent to the domestic dynamics of these countries, but also they were extensions of superpower rivalry and ideological confrontation. Superpowers did not try to solve the conflicts, but aimed to intensify them by providing military and economic assistance to their allies. The end of Cold War put an end to this external factor, but also removed the moderating role of the superpowers, both as third parties and mutually neutralizing allies. Liberia, Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique, and Sudan have suffered a lot from brutalization and human rights violations due to the reasons mentioned above.¹⁰¹⁶

Most of the African countries are quasi-states according to the definition of Jackson. The ex-colonial states do not have statehood experience and their societies are not aware of the advantages related to independent statehood. Only a narrow group of elites acknowledges the benefits of having clearly defined borders, but most of the population cannot establish a link between their prosperity to independence. Their ruling authorities lack political will and organizational capacity to protect human right and socioeconomic opportunities. These states do not have definite and well-established rules.¹⁰¹⁷

According to the latest report of IDMC of 2002, the IDPs in Sub-Saharan Africa constituted 37,1% of IDPs around the world by the end of the year 2021.¹⁰¹⁸ This high ratio indicates that there may be close relation between state sovereignty and internal displacement. In African continent, the states are unable to provide

¹⁰¹⁵ Deng et al., “Sovereignty as Responsibility...,” pp. 211-212.

¹⁰¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹⁰¹⁷ Jackson, “Quasi-States: Sovereignty...,” p. 21.

¹⁰¹⁸ IDMC, “Global Report on Internal Displacement 2022...,” pp. 11-12.

necessary aid and support to their IDP population and cannot overcome the emergence of new plights.

b. Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

The notion of intervention has undergone a change since the late decade of 20th century. Since the beginning of the 1990s, sovereignty includes the notion of responsibility. To be sovereign, the state should provide a standard of human rights to its citizens. The state is responsible for ensuring these human rights to both its own citizens and international community and establishing institutions to protect them. In this sense, for a sovereign state, it is not sufficient to receive the consent and support of their people, but also it should be approved by other states and international organizations.¹⁰¹⁹ The increase in civil conflicts since the end of Cold War and sufferings of civilian people also reinforced the idea that states had responsibility to overcome these crises.¹⁰²⁰

In the new interventions as compared to those in the past, the traditional legal significance of the consent of the states is less important and this directly affects global peace.¹⁰²¹ Firstly, intervention is increasingly defined in terms of purposes or goals. New goals of humanitarian intervention are more humanitarian and universal in character rather than political and strategic in nature, which was used to be before the 1990s. Secondly, intervention took place on behalf of the “international community” rather than by a state or a coalition of states to achieve their own goals. States that intervene declare themselves as agents of the international community.¹⁰²²

The background for intervention was provided by Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the UN, by his call to prevent another Rwanda at the General Assembly meeting in 1999. In this meeting, he appealed to the international community by stressing upon the need for a consensus and plan of action to overcome humanitarian tragedies.¹⁰²³ In UN’s annual report in 1999, it was declared:

¹⁰¹⁹ Ayoob, “**Humanitarian Intervention...**,” p. 84.

¹⁰²⁰ Thomas G. Weiss, “Researching Humanitarian Intervention: Some Lessons,” **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 38, No. 4, July 2001, p. 420.

¹⁰²¹ Morgenthau, “**To Intervene or Not...**,” pp. 425-426.

¹⁰²² Ayoob, “**Humanitarian Intervention...**,” p. 83.

¹⁰²³ United Nations, **Secretary General’s Annual Report to the General Assembly**, Press Release SG/SM7136, September 20, 1999.

*“Under normal circumstances, states are expected to, and do in fact, discharge those responsibilities. If they cannot discharge those responsibilities for lack of capacity or resources, they are expected to seek, or at least welcome, international assistance. If, on the other hand, they fail to meet their obligations or fail to welcome international assistance, and masses of their people suffer humanitarian and human rights tragedies as a result, then they must expect the international community to show concern and perhaps even threaten intervention.”*¹⁰²⁴

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was announced at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000 by Canada’s Prime Minister, Jean Chretien and supported by Canadian government.¹⁰²⁵ For the ICISS, mass killings and ethnic cleansing were determined two important thresholds. For humanitarian intervention, the necessary conditions were determined: “right intention, last resort, proportional means, reasonable prospects of success, and the Security Council as the decision-maker.”¹⁰²⁶

The concepts of sovereign responsibility also become the basis for the new concept, the “responsibility to protect (R2P)”. In 2004, the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change underlined that despite the legacy of state sovereignty from a Westphalian order, today the state is obliged to protect the well-being of its citizens and fulfill its obligations to the international society. However, when the state is unable to do so, international community may undertake the responsibility.¹⁰²⁷ The World Summit Outcome document formally endorsed the responsibility to protect in 2005. In the document, it is declared, “*States are expected first and foremost to protect their own populations, but if they are unwilling or unable to do so, and their citizens are subjected to genocide, ethnic*

¹⁰²⁴ United Nations, **Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization**, U.N. Doc. A/54/1, 1999.

¹⁰²⁵ Jennifer Welsh, Carolin Thielking and S. Neil MacFarlane, “The Responsibility to Protect: Assessing the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,” **International Journal**, Vol. 57, No. 4, Autumn, 2002, p. 490.; The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001 cited in Deng, “**Divided Nations...**,” p. 88.

¹⁰²⁶ Thomas G. Weiss, “R2P after 9/11 and the World Summit,” **Wisconsin International Law Journal**, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2006, p. 744.

¹⁰²⁷ United Nations General Assembly, **Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change**, A/59/565, 2004, p. 17.

cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity, then responsibility shifts to the international community, which is expected to take collective action.”¹⁰²⁸

The acceptance of the concept of R2P in 2005 increased hopes that international community would take action against the refugees and IDPs who suffered from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. R2P is based on the concept of sovereignty as responsibility as mentioned above. Therefore, R2P is based on an understanding that the state should protect its citizens and has to call international community to support while fulfilling this duty. If the state fails to realize it, then international responsibility for “collective action” becomes possible.¹⁰²⁹ The main idea behind the R2P doctrine is that human beings may sometimes surpass sovereignty as it is underlined in UN Charter Article 2(7) with its focus on non-intervention principles in the domestic affairs of member states. Since it was introduced in the 2005 World Summit, the R2P drew considerable attention globally.¹⁰³⁰

There is always a gap between normative developments and political realities. Norm entrepreneurs may think beyond the realities.¹⁰³¹ At the early 1990s, there is synchronicity between the works of norm entrepreneurs and international/regional developments. For example, the humanitarian interventions in northern Iraq in 2001 and Somalia in 1992 were approved by the UN and there were not any serious concerns about them within the framework of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention discussion. Furthermore, the consensus over R2P steadily increased since the beginning of 1990s although political will and operational capacities in humanitarian intervention oscillated.¹⁰³² The world Summit in 2005 signaled the peak in terms of consensus of R2P.¹⁰³³ In fact, the gap in the approaches towards R2P between norm entrepreneurs and those who are in operation have continued to increase.

Darfur experience displayed all difficulties in implementing R2P doctrine. Sudan government gave permission for the entry of more than 14,000 humanitarian

¹⁰²⁸ United Nations General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005, 60/1. **2005 World Summit Outcome**, A/RES/60/1, October 24, 2005.

¹⁰²⁹ Cohen & Deng, “**Mass Displacement...**,” pp. 27-28.

¹⁰³⁰ Weiss, “**R2P after 9/11...**,” p. 743.

¹⁰³¹ **Ibid.**, p. 742.

¹⁰³² **Ibid.**

¹⁰³³ **Ibid.**, pp. 742-743.

staffs (1000 were international) to provide aid to more than 2 million IDPs living in the camps. 7,000 African Union troops were also allowed for monitoring ceasefire and protection of IDPs. In addition, the AU troops were authorized by the government to create buffer zones surrounding IDP camps with the purpose of protecting these people or observing their returns. Despite the eagerness of government to collaborate with international forces, humanitarian staffs operated under very dangerous conditions in Darfur. The government could not disarm militants who attacked IDP camps and prevented the AU to operate in the field.¹⁰³⁴ The UN Security Council adopted a resolution 1706 of August 31, 2006 to authorize the deployment of UN forces in Darfur with 20,000 military and police, but also to protect civilian and humanitarian workers. The actions taken in Darfur had been useful to frame the R2P concept.¹⁰³⁵

Cohen explains Darfur case with these words:

*“One reason the international community finds the Darfur problem difficult to address is that state reliance on excessive force against ethnic or racial groups seeking greater autonomy is not unique to Sudan. (...) A second reason for the lack of strong international response is the absence of tools and structures available to the international community to address internal crises. Other than the International Committee of the Red Cross, which is often denied entry into internal strife situations, there exists no international machinery readily available to protect civilians caught up in violence within their own countries.”*¹⁰³⁶

Humanitarian interventions have been harshly criticized. Many scholars and researchers, even ordinary citizens think that there are double standards while international community is choosing the territories to intervene. The most important criticism is the genocide in Rwanda. In Rwanda case, international organizations were accused of being in active. In the case of Kosovo, the actions of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) without international consensus and definite legal authority increased concerns about the legitimacy of this intervention. First of all, it was questioned whether NATO, a regional collective security organization, was a

¹⁰³⁴ Cohen, “**Humanitarian Imperatives...**,” p. 19.

¹⁰³⁵ **Ibid.**, pp. 19-20.

¹⁰³⁶ Roberta Cohen, “The International Response to Darfur,” **Forced Migration Review**, Vol. 23, May 2005, pp. 7-8.

legitimate force without a UN mandate. However, humanitarian crisis in Kosovo was so severe and it would not be moral to watch this crisis.¹⁰³⁷

There have been some learned lessons from Kosovo crisis. Kofi Annan explained them as such:

*“Firstly, intervention should be invoked only the use of force. The concepts of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction should be primary driving force for this intervention and these principles should be applied to all countries. (...) Secondly, the traditional notion of sovereignty is an obstacle to humanitarian intervention. However, the definition of national interests inherited from the past is equally problematic. There is a need for a new, broader definition of national interest in the new century, which is a collective interest as well. Thirdly, the UN Security Council should be the body that charged with authorising the use of force in case of humanitarian actions. Fourthly, (...) International forces should pay equal attention to the process in which lasting peace is secured even after the humanitarian crisis seems to end in a war-torn country to a great extent.”*¹⁰³⁸

As seen above, humanitarian intervention had been supported in the 1990s. However, it is difficult to observe that kind of euphoria towards this concept in 2000s. There are some reasons behind it. First of all, international society began to increasingly investigate and criticize humanitarian intervention in the wake of September 11 attacks. The widening of the war on terror to Iraq deepened concerns about R2P, which was criticized to be used as a pretext for imperialism. Secondly, the idea that human beings were more important than sovereignty helped the US to intervene in Afghanistan and Iraq consequently.¹⁰³⁹ The US and other states could not provide necessary conditions for human protection and new tragedies emerge. This created huge disappointment about the humanitarian interventions.¹⁰⁴⁰

3. Guiding Principles and Sovereign Responsibility to Protect IDPs

The roles of each stakeholder to play role on implementing the guidelines for internal displacement and protecting the IDPs started with the creation of the

¹⁰³⁷ Kofi A. Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty...”

¹⁰³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³⁹ Weiss, “R2P after 9/11...,” p. 747.

¹⁰⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 747-748.

GPIDPs. The establishment of specific institutions or organizations to supervise the implementation of policies and law, to enable effective coordination and to prevent some overlapping activities gained importance over time. To achieve this, the National Responsibility Framework which was created by the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement concentrated on the appointment of national institutional bodies for IDPs to maintain the provisions of laws and policies.¹⁰⁴¹

Protection of victims of armed conflicts took its roots from the 1934 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, a legal document in which sovereignty, authority, population, and independence is stressed.¹⁰⁴² Protocol II of the Geneva Convention comprises “the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts,” and includes the following provisions:

In Article 4, it is stated, “*All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious practices. They shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction.*”¹⁰⁴³ In Article 13, it is declared, “*The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations.*”¹⁰⁴⁴ Article 14 underlines the necessity of protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.¹⁰⁴⁵ In Article 17, “*Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the conflict,*” it is stressed.¹⁰⁴⁶

Since the beginning of 1990s, Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen work on their concept of “sovereignty as responsibility” within the scope of internal displacement.¹⁰⁴⁷ The GPIDPs underlines that main responsibility for IDPs is undertaken by the state, but that the international society has an important role to play when governments cannot fulfill these responsibilities. The Guiding Principles

¹⁰⁴¹ Brookings Institution-University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, p. 18 cited in Wyndham, “**A Developing Trend...**,” p. 4.

¹⁰⁴² Weiss, “**R2P after 9/11...**,” p. 744.

¹⁰⁴³ United Nations, **Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts**, A/32/144/I.L.M. 1442, 1977.

¹⁰⁴⁴ **Ibid.**

¹⁰⁴⁵ **Ibid.**

¹⁰⁴⁶ **Ibid.**

¹⁰⁴⁷ Cohen & Deng, “**Masses in Flight...**”; Cohen & Deng, “**The Forsaken People...**”; Weiss, “**R2P after 9/11...**,” p. 744.

clarifies that the international society has the right to assist when states are unable or reluctant to provide assistance to their displaced people. Aid organizations should pay attention to “the protection needs and human rights” of the displaced.¹⁰⁴⁸

The GPIDPs comprise the specific needs of the IDPs around the world by determining their rights and guarantees.¹⁰⁴⁹ The GPIDPs aim to find solution to all phases of displacement such as protection, return, resettlement and integration processes. The principles who explained protection during displacement (Principles 10-23) are examples of customary law. These principles merge basic international humanitarian law principles with some guarantees on human dignity and safety. The other principles are from transcriptions of provisions in humanitarian law treaties and applied to displacement. For example, Principle 6 stresses upon the right not to be forcibly displaced. This principle comes from freedom of movement and residence and humanitarian law provisions dealing with displacement of civilians during armed conflict. Similarly, the impact of several provisions of the Fourth (Civilian) Geneva Convention and the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions on these principles can be also seen in these principles.¹⁰⁵⁰

The GPIDPs are not binding. They differentiate from treaties, declarations, resolutions, or recommendations. As mentioned above, they were negotiated and generated through a process in which legal experts and scholars came together and discussed the main principles. It is not binding, but an example of soft-law. Their content, which is embedded in the existing international law, makes it a part of soft-law.¹⁰⁵¹

Despite of being an example of soft law, the GPIDPs have been embraced by individual states and regional organizations in recent years and determined how these actors behave their internally displaced people. For instance, in Darfur example, international actors condemned the relocation by referring to the GPIDPs.¹⁰⁵² It is interesting to note that the individual states adopted these principles such as

¹⁰⁴⁸ Cohen & Deng, “**Mass Displacement...**,” p. 27.

¹⁰⁴⁹ United Nations OCHA, **Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Introduction: Scope and Purpose**, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, OCHA/IDP/20004/01, June 2001.

¹⁰⁵⁰ ICRC, **Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949**, ref. 0421.; Goldman, “**Internal Displacement...**,” p. 272.

¹⁰⁵¹ W. Kälin, “The Guiding Principles as International Minimum Standard and Protection Tool”, *Refugee Survey Quarterly* (2005) [forthcoming]. cited in Goldman, “**Internal Displacement...**,” p. 274.

¹⁰⁵² Entwistle, “**Tracing Cascades...**,” p. 371.

Colombia, Uganda, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia and incorporated them into their national legal frameworks. The protection of civilians and the humanitarian interventions have been the most debated issues in international law. Despite this, the states' positive attitude towards the GPIDPs reveals the fact that a legal basis has been required for internal displacement and the GPIDPs filled a significant gap.¹⁰⁵³

At the regional level, the AU tries to develop a binding document based on the GPIDPs. At the sub-regional level, the member states of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region have already worked on a binding document -a Protocol on Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons- which forces states to comply with the principles and to adopt to their national legal framework. At the international level, UN bodies working on human rights always referred to these principles.¹⁰⁵⁴

The Principles of 3 and 25 underlined that sovereignty has limitations and states are transparent in front of international investigation. In addition, although this is not explicitly stated, if the state fails to fulfill its duties, it accepts international intervention to provide protection to its citizens.¹⁰⁵⁵

Principle 3 of Guiding Principles underlines: *“National authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction. Internally displaced persons have the right to request and to receive protection and humanitarian assistance from these authorities. They shall not be persecuted or punished for making such a request.”*¹⁰⁵⁶

Principle 25 requires States to accept humanitarian assistance if the state is reluctant or unable to provide adequate aid to IDPs.¹⁰⁵⁷ In Principle 28, it is declared, *“Competent authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country. Such*

¹⁰⁵³ Entwisle, “Tracing Cascades...,” p. 371.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Cohen, “Response to Hathaway...,” p. 373.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Entwisle, “Tracing Cascades...,” p. 374.

¹⁰⁵⁶ United Nations OCHA, **Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Introduction: Scope and Purpose**, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, OCHA/IDP/20004/01, June 2001.

¹⁰⁵⁷ **Ibid.**

authorities shall endeavour to facilitate the reintegration of returned or resettled internally displaced persons. Special efforts should be made to ensure the full participation of internally displaced persons in the planning and management of their return or resettlement and reintegration.”¹⁰⁵⁸

In Principle 29, it is written, “*Internally displaced persons who have returned to their homes or places of habitual residence or who have resettled in another part of the country shall not be discriminated against as a result of their having been displaced. They shall have the right to participate fully and equally in public affairs at all levels and have equal access to public services. Competent authorities have the duty and responsibility to assist returned and/or resettled internally displaced persons to recover, to the extent possible, their property and possessions which they left behind or were dispossessed of upon their displacement. When recovery of such property and possessions is not possible, competent authorities shall provide or assist these persons in obtaining appropriate compensation or another form of just reparation.*”¹⁰⁵⁹

In Principle 30, it is declared, “*All authorities concerned shall grant and facilitate for international humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors, in the exercise of their respective mandates, rapid and unimpeded access to internally displaced persons to assist in their return or resettlement and reintegration.*”¹⁰⁶⁰

The GPIDPs do not attempt to change, replace, or revise existing international or domestic law or rights. They aim to guide on how the law should be described and applied during all stages of displacement. The most importantly, these principles calls for respect for human rights and humanitarian law and remind obligations so that there will not be new cases for displacement in the future.¹⁰⁶¹

¹⁰⁵⁸ United Nations OCHA, **Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Introduction: Scope and Purpose**, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, OCHA/IDP/20004/01, June 2001.

¹⁰⁵⁹ **Ibid.**

¹⁰⁶⁰ **Ibid.**

¹⁰⁶¹ Goldman, “**Internal Displacement...**,” p. 272.

PART III SECURITIZING ACTS ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT AND THE ROLE OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDPs)

I. INSECURITY IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH: REAL AND PERCEIVED THREATS FOR AZERBAIJAN

A. General overview for South Caucasian security

The instability in South Caucasus or Transcaucasia with strategic, ethno-political, and cultural reasons is widespread. Security issues in the region affect not only three primary states in the region, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, but also Russia in the north, Iran in the south, Turkey, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Greece on the west, the Central Asian states Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan on the east. The US, EU and China have also interests in the region. Therefore, South Caucasus is vulnerable to destabilizing effects from outside. The main characteristics of the region are the diversity of ethnicities, cultural traditions, and religious identities of the population. Any conflicts can be sparked due to this diversity and may create larger problems. This means that cultural pluralism in South Caucasia can be an excuse for those who are interested in destabilizing the region.¹⁰⁶²

Apart from ethnic clashes, crime, corruption, terrorism, proliferation and narcotics trafficking were some common domestic security problems in post-Soviet South Caucasia. Internal and external affairs that affect the destiny of a country are intertwined to each other in the region. In other words, South Caucasia is a region where the great divide that the realists assert has been falsified.

As mentioned in detail in the first part, which examines historical roots of instability in the region, many ethnic and civil conflicts had broken out in South Caucasia in the post-Soviet era. These frozen conflicts, which were intense and long-

¹⁰⁶² Garnik S. Asatryan, "Armenia and Security Issues in the South Caucasus" **Connections**, Vol. 1, No. 3, September 2022, p. 21.

standing, have caused instability in the region. In this sense, Russia has played a significant role in the region by disregarding the historical, political, and ethno-cultural realities in the region and creating mini-empires (Azerbaijan, Georgia) strategically counterbalanced by political conflict zones (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh). Lenin himself distorted the ethno-historical boundaries of the area with its nationalist policies. The artificial borderline diasporas were created as a result of these nationalist policies: in Georgia, the Armenians (in Javakhk, South-West Georgia adjoining Armenia), and the Turkish-speaking population (in Marneuli, South-East Georgia adjoining Armenia and Azerbaijan); in Azerbaijan, the Lezgians (North Azerbaijan adjoining South-East Dagestan), the Avars (Belokany and Zakataly regions), the Talishis (Lenkoran, Zuvand, Astara, and part of Masala regions adjoining Iran).¹⁰⁶³

South Caucasian states are under the risk of widening the ethnic conflicts in their territories, because nationalist aspirations and ultranational views which can be easily provoked by bordering states. As mentioned above, Azerbaijan has some problems with ethnic groups in their own territories, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, Lezgians in the north, and Talysh in the south. Some ethnic Lezgians demanded to secede and join Lezgians residing in Russia's Dagestan, and established a separatist group called Sadval. On the other hand, some Talysh have called for autonomy and have lobbied for the legalization of a political party. The individual states have some trouble to afford arms races and the expenses of refugees and displaced persons. In addition to their military expenses and socio-economic burden related to the forcibly displaced people due to these conflicts, they have also trouble to deal with some economic problems emanated from the difficulties in trade and transport. Instability in the region does not allow these states to strengthen their economical ties.¹⁰⁶⁴

The conflicting parties in these abovementioned conflicts mostly disagree on the settlement of the conflict. In this sense, it does not seem probable that South Caucasian "frozen conflicts" are solved in the format of the negotiations. For example, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the separatist groups in their territories apparently

¹⁰⁶³ Asatryan, "Armenia and Security...", pp. 22-23.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Jim Nichol, "Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests," **Congressional Research Service**, 11 March 2010, p. 7.; Marianna Gurtovnik, "The 2005 Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan: Bridging the Divide?," **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 7, No. 3, July-September 2005, p. 118.

have mutually exclusive claims: While Baku and Tbilisi stress on the international law principle of territorial integrity (within the borders of the former Azerbaijani and Georgian Soviet republics), Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh demand that their territorial separation be allowed, and their causes be covered by their specific interpretation of the principle of the self-determination of peoples.¹⁰⁶⁵

Regional initiatives to overcome these problems are rare and mostly ineffective. Not only relations at the regional level, but also bilateral relations of the individual states are complex and tense. The authorities in South Caucasian states, which are culturally different from each other, have conflicting interests. Ethnic relations between Azerbaijanis and Georgians are less hostile as compared to the ones between Baku and Yerevan. The relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia are problematic due to some historical enmities and territorial disputes that have been obvious in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and have resulted with complete displacement of Azerbaijani people within their territories and ethnic Armenians from Azerbaijan. For both Armenia and Azerbaijan, these displaced people and the status of Nagorno-Karabakh are major security concerns.¹⁰⁶⁶

As seen above, South Caucasia is an inherently unstable and fragile region and the problems in different security sectors –military, political, economic, societal, and environmental in Buzan’s terms are diverse. However, in this work, the purpose is not to evaluate all domestic, regional and global security problems pertaining to these sectors that these states have faced in the post-Soviet era, as it is the case in most of the current literature, but to understand security problems related to Nagorno-Karabakh and IDP issue which mostly reflect the security dynamics of South Caucasia in general and Azerbaijan/Armenia in particular.

This part is consisted of two main sections within the framework of securitization theory. The first section examines real or perceived security threats to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, regime security/continuity and legitimacy in relation with Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The second section analyzes Azerbaijani and Armenian political figures as securitizing actors and their policies as well as statements on Nagorno-Karabakh since their independence. In this part, the

¹⁰⁶⁵ Martin Malek, “NATO and the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on Different Tracks,” **Connections**, Vol. 7, No. 3, Summer Supplement, Summer 2008, p. 50.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Nichol, “**Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia...**,” p. 6.; O’Lear, “**Azerbaijan: Territorial Issues...**,” pp. 307-309.; Kirvelytè, “**The Dilemma of Azerbaijan’s Security Strategy...**,” p. 216.

discourses of Ilham Aliyev will be analyzed within the framework of securitization theory's speech act and some statements of Armenian leaders will only be evaluated in terms of increasing threat perceptions of Azerbaijani leaders and strengthening Aliyev's securitization. It is argued that the security policies of political actors are claimed extraordinary or in other words, out of normal politics with the attempt of securitizing Nagorno-Karabakh and IDP issue.

B. Threats to Azerbaijan's Sovereignty/Territorial Integrity

In post-Soviet era, for Azerbaijan, there are two kinds of security threats. The first group is about traditionally identified threats to state security. These are the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the reemergence of Soviet practices such as the dependence on informal ways of control and the politicization of energy sources. The foreign policy orientation and Russian near abroad policy, which pose a threat to Azerbaijan's state security can be added to this category. The Russian influence has created a risk to prevent Azerbaijan from being fully independent since the collapse of Soviet Union. The second type of threat is the limited achievement in state building and economic development which is closely related to threat to regime security and legitimacy in Azerbaijan. In a weak state such as Azerbaijan, where the cult of personality of political leaders is so strong, the threats to state security are considered directly as threats to regime security and survival.¹⁰⁶⁷

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is at the center of threats directed to both state sovereignty and regime security/survival. In other words, it is a threat to internal and external sovereignty of Azerbaijan. It is considered as being a threat to internal security, because, the management of conflict has been always determined the fate of governments in Baku. In other words, the rise and fall of Azerbaijani governments have been directly related to the course of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As it will be explained in detail later, for example, Elchibey's removal from office preceded in April 1993 by the fall of Kalbajar, the first town in Azerbaijan taken by Armenian forces. Heydar Aliyev's rise to power was also related to his perceived ability to end the conflict. As a former KGB Chief and former Politburo member and chairman of Nakhichevan parliament, Aliyev favoured good relations with the leading regional

¹⁰⁶⁷ Tracey German, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia: Security Issues in the Caucasus," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2012, pp. 220-221.

players and finalized agreements with Turkey and Iran that helped to overcome the Armenian blockade.¹⁰⁶⁸

It is considered as being a threat to external security, because Nagorno-Karabakh conflict makes Baku and Yerevan fragile and vulnerable due to its military burden and dependency on the settlement of the conflict to third parties such as Russia and the West. Keeping these conflicts as “frozen” and having the opportunity to intervene when necessary provides great advantage for regional powers, primarily Russia. Thus, the question is about who benefits from Nagorno-Karabakh conflict rather than who is responsible for ending it.

In the following section, the security concerns of Azerbaijan will be evaluated. Baku’s security threats can be classified under three subtitles: Historical/territorial threats, perceptual threats, and regional threats. Historical and regional threats are real threats in Copenhagen School’s term while perceptual ones are not real, but have potential to turn into conflicts or trigger existing conflicts. To securitize an issue, the political leaders may need real and/or perceived threats. In other words, each group of threats can be elements of securitization.

1. Historical/Territorial Threats

Historical/territorial threats in Caucasus region are rooted in the political modernization that realized throughout the region during the 20th century. These Soviet policies created ethnically defined homelands which had the status of region (Autonomous Region) or states and state formations (Union Republics and Autonomous Republics). Titular nations were considered as holders of political privileges in these ethnically defined federated states. The politicization of ethnicity by a discriminatory distribution of political privileges to ethnic groups led an understanding that these nationalities had a right to internal self-determination at different levels.¹⁰⁶⁹

Those who want to gain more legitimacy benefited from the politicization of ethnicity. In this context, the policies of *korenizatsia* or indigenisation had been influential in creating double loyalties. This means that local leaderships had both ties

¹⁰⁶⁸ Rovshan Ibrahimov, Azerbaijan The State as Crossroads of Internal Policy and the External Interests, in Rachel Vanderhill, Michael E. Aleprete, Jr. **International Dimensions of Authoritarian Persistence: Lessons from Post-Soviet States**, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013, 125-129.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Coppieters, “The Politicisation and Securitisation...,” pp. 79-80.

to Moscow and to their constituencies. The politicization of ethnicity through the granting of sovereignty or of formal constitutional rights such as the right to self-determination was a part of Soviet policy. This policy was conducted under the firm control of the Communist Party. While Communist Part supported state-building on the level of federated states, it also repressed any perceived threats derived from nationalist aspirations.¹⁰⁷⁰

Thus, ethnic and national assertiveness did not decline due to Sovietisation under Soviet rule, on the contrast, as Hughes and Sasse explains below, they increased:

*“People not conversant with Soviet affairs sometimes expect that after seventy years of Sovietisation, ethnic and national assertiveness would be on the decline. (...) Paradoxically, ethnic assertiveness has increased. This is not only in response to threats of attempts at Russification of the minorities or, for the Russians, the weakening by the Bolsheviks of Russian culture itself. (...) The density of ethnic self-consciousness in more recent years has been nurtured by Soviet society itself. The regime has continually demanded of its intellectuals and artists at every level to express patriotism as the dominant ideology.”*¹⁰⁷¹

Post-Soviet states had to deal with multi-ethnicity, which was also a challenge for the totalitarian and authoritarian periods of Soviet power. Multi-ethnicity has been usually used for some political purposes in post-Soviet era. It can be argued that regional, cultural and economic complaints and conflicts emerged to replace the existing institutions which remained from Soviet era had been major issue to deal with.¹⁰⁷² Some conflicts that occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh, Crimea, Transnistria, and South Ossetia have had double regional implications since these territories are ethnic exclaves or external peripheries in between the border of successor host state and other adjacent state, which aimed to be united.¹⁰⁷³

Armenians and Azerbaijanis have experienced a transition from an identity, which is more inclusive such as “the Soviet People” or “Caucasian civilization” to

¹⁰⁷⁰ Coppieters, “**The Politicisation and Securitisation...**,” pp. 79-80.

¹⁰⁷¹ Tamara Dragadze, “The Armenian: Azerbaijani Conflict: Structure and Sentiment,” **Third World Quarterly**, Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1989, p. 70.

¹⁰⁷² Hughes & Sasse, “**Conflict and Accommodation...**,” p. 227.

¹⁰⁷³ **Ibid.**, pp. 228-229.

more exclusive identities, which are characterized as ethnic nationalities.¹⁰⁷⁴ In its state and nation building process, Azerbaijanis just like Armenians aimed to prove that they were the first comers, inhabitants, in other words, “owners” of this region.¹⁰⁷⁵ Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh are seen as the people who immigrated to this region from Persian lands with the encouragement of Russians and have been the majority for only 150 years. For many Azerbaijani people, Nagorno-Karabakh autonomy had been imposed by Soviets and was an insulation and threat to their territorial integrity. They claim that Azerbaijan had left Zangezur (land bridge between Armenia and Iran) in the 1920s and this balanced Armenia’s loss of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan refused the attempt of Armenians to create an ethnically homogenous region. Azerbaijani people also rejected cultural and religious repressions of Armenians as it happened at the past with Russification and communism.¹⁰⁷⁶

While creating the enclaves with ethnically different societies within the states, the official Soviet ideology in Nagorno-Karabakh was based mostly on friendship among nations and this prevented any debate on Azeri-Armenian bloody conflicts. However, with the end of Cold War, the elites in these countries tried to construct new national identities, which rescued from Soviet influence. This national awakening was retaining Nagorno-Karabakh for Azerbaijanis, but regaining these territories for Armenians. In other words, as a part of nation-building processes, both nations have aspirations over the same lands. Therefore, Nagorno-Karabakh became the new epic story and the other was characterized as enemy. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is an identity-related issue. Both Azerbaijanis and Armenians want to be ethnically dominated Nagorno-Karabakh for their respective communities and eliminate the effect of unfair and unjust Soviet policies.¹⁰⁷⁷

Supporting to each other, both Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenians in Yerevan have similar motivations and aspirations as Azerbaijanis in describing Nagorno-Karabakh as if it is their own territory with all cultural and historical aspects. A campaign in 1987-1988 led by the Armenian intellectuals in

¹⁰⁷⁴ Laitin & Suny, “**Armenia and Azerbaijan...**,” p. 148.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Arshi Khan, “Revisiting the Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia,” **The Indian Journal of Politics**, Vol. 54, No. 1-2, 2020, pp. 12-13.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Carol Migdalovitz, “Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict,” **CRS Issue Brief for Congress**, Order Code IB92109, December 26, 2001, p. 10.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Emil Souleimanov, “The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh,” IFSH (ed.), **OSCE Yearbook 2004**, Baden-Baden 2005, pp. 204-205.

Armenia was against corruption in the Communist Party of Armenia. The anti-corruption campaign comprised ecological, economic, ethnic and nationality issues in a very short time. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh was one of these issues. According to Armenian authorities, 150,000 ethnic Armenians living in these territories were oppressed and treated as second-class citizens. This concern constituted the main reason behind public demonstrations, which were held in Armenia. Armenian and Azeri inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the rest of Azerbaijan's population were concerned about the welfare of their own communities. Armenia supported the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh with an anxiety about their future in an Azeri-dominated country. Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh were eager to demand incorporation into the Republic of Armenia.¹⁰⁷⁸

As mentioned in the first part, the debates, demonstrations, and clashes over Nagorno-Karabakh had been already triggered under the Soviet rule. The underpinning of parties' arguments on societal and military security threats have been based on Soviet policies and some other historical facts.

Ironically, "the nationalities question" has long been officially concerned by the Soviet authorities as being "solved." Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness) had exacerbated the conflict between Azeris and Armenians, as well as conflicts between Abkhaz and Georgians, the Ingush and the Ossetians, and Chechens and Russians. Moreover, the collapse of Soviet Union in terms of political units and trading system increased economic problems in the late 1980s in Caucasus. Under the shadow of economic problems, political uncertainty and elite rivalry in Russia and Caucasus, the secessionist movements were supported by the nationalities of ethnic groups in the region, including Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh.¹⁰⁷⁹

With the aim of understanding the political situation in these years, Dragadze argues, the rule of Soviet Union left a totalitarian and centralized economy tradition to the region.¹⁰⁸⁰ For another author, the lack of strong and competent leadership had been major problem. The unexpected end of Cold War revealed the ideological

¹⁰⁷⁸ Hassan Mohamadi Nejad, "Turmoil in The Caucasus: The Azeri-Armenian Dispute," **International Law, And Conflict Resolution In The Post Cold-War World, Peace Research**, Vol. 27, No. 2, May 1995, pp. 37-38.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Nejad, "Turmoil in The Caucasus...", p. 37.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Dragadze, "The Armenian: Azerbaijani Conflict...", p. 62.

vacuum in Soviet territories. However, there were not any visionary and competent political figures in Transcaucasia. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict itself showed that leadership and governing institutions in both Armenia and Azerbaijan were problematic. In Azerbaijan, political instability, elite rivalry, and political fragmentation were the major problems.¹⁰⁸¹ In other words, the disintegration of Soviet Union left the ideological and power vacuum and the central government was incompetent and reluctant to solve the conflicts. In this context, the local Soviet authorities lost their credibility and new nationalist organizations (the APF and the Armenian Karabakh Committee) emerged. These organizations used the Karabakh issue to gain popularity and increase their influence. Their rhetoric was based on “true patriotism” as they claimed and they were less eager for negotiation and compromises.¹⁰⁸²

Although it is mostly stressed on the ethnic and territorial aspects of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in this work, in the current literature, the discussion on Nagorno-Karabakh is also concentrated on whether it is a religious conflict or not. Some scholars state that the conflict has some aspects based on religious differences between Azerbaijani and Armenian societies. For example, Abrahamian asserts, *“The participants in the conflict, as a matter of fact, never considered it a religious conflict. It was labelled as a religious war mainly (if not only) by foreign journalists, who used this definition as a convenient and effective means for articulating their reports from the conflict zone. Here we have an example of the way in which an ethnic conflict can develop into a religious war.”*¹⁰⁸³ Wilhelmsen warns that Nagorno-Karabakh can be escalated or provoked by stressing upon the religious factor.¹⁰⁸⁴

Although especially the unemployed young population in Azerbaijan is recently considered as the target of radical missionaries, and Azerbaijani government has carried a campaign against local terrorist groups, including Jayshullah, the Jamaat al-Muwahidun, the al Qaeda Caucasus international group, the Northern Mahdi Army, the Forest Brothers, the Islamic Party, and others, Islamic extremism is

¹⁰⁸¹ Nejad, “**Turmoil in The Caucasus...**,” pp. 39-40.

¹⁰⁸² Souleimanov, “**The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh...**,” p. 206.

¹⁰⁸³ Levon Abrahamian, “Typology of Aggressiveness and National Violence in the Former USSR,” **International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Special Issue on Ethnicity and Conflict in Europe and Beyond**, Vol. 4, No. 3/4, 1996/97, p. 273.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Julie Wilhelmsen, “Islamism in Azerbaijan: How Potent?,” **Studies in Conflict & Terrorism**, Vol. 32, No. 8, 2009, p. 738.

not on the top of security agenda in Azerbaijan.¹⁰⁸⁵ Despite the fact that most of the Armenians were Christian and most Azeris were Muslim, the conflict has been usually characterized by ethnicity-based political, nationalistic, and territorial ambitions instead of religious differences. One can argue that even in Soviet era where religion was suppressed, the ethnic conflict between Azeris and Armenians was intense.¹⁰⁸⁶ However, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not basically motivated by religious beliefs but mostly by nationalist aspirations.

Azerbaijani people who were threatened by Armenian hostility both in Tsarist and Soviet Russia has had also faced great hostilities and aggression from the Armenian side since the independence. From the very beginning of its independence from Soviet Union during August-October 1991, Azerbaijan Republic has had some trouble due to Armenian aggressions and occupation of territories. In three years, as mentioned above, Azerbaijan's territories, Nagorno-Karabakh and seven other provinces were occupied by Armenian forces.¹⁰⁸⁷ Armenian aggression had caused a massive flow of refugees. Azerbaijan's economic, political, and social structure has been damaged a lot.¹⁰⁸⁸

In December 1991, Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh having desired for reunifying with newly independent Armenia declared their independence as the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia has not recognized Nagorno-Karabakh's independence because recognition might spark a war with Azerbaijan and Turkey. On July 8, 1991, Armenia's parliament passed a decree, which rejected any international document indicating that Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan.¹⁰⁸⁹ So-called Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh became a de facto independent country, while its territory remained internationally recognized as part of the Republic of Azerbaijan.¹⁰⁹⁰

¹⁰⁸⁵ Nichol, "Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia...", p. 17.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Mehrangiz Najafizadeh, "Ethnic Conflict and Forced Displacement: Narratives of Azeri IDP and Refugee Women From the Nagorno-Karabakh War," *Journal of International Women's Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 1, Article 10, January 2013, pp. 162-163.

¹⁰⁸⁷ International Crisis Group, "Nagorno-Karabakh: Seeking a Path to Peace in the Ukraine War's Shadow," *Crisis Group Europe Briefing*, No. 93 Baku/Yerevan/Stepanakert/Brussels, 22 April 2022.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Cornell, "Undeclared War...", p. 22.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Migdalovitz, "Foreign Affairs, Defense...", p. 9.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Eurasia Review, "Why Karabakh Does Not Need Autonomous Status In Azerbaijan – OpEd," 20 May 2022. <https://www.eurasiareview.com/20052022-why-karabakh-does-need-autonomous-status-in-azerbaijan-oped/> (Retrieved on 7.06.2022).

Modern notion of state system is based on liberal principles of rights, dignity, and security of the individual. *“The acceptance of the real genocide, massacres, forced expulsion of the native people, forced settlement of alien people in the territories of the native population and denying the rights of the native population to return to their homeland”* are among the liberal principles of dignity.¹⁰⁹¹ Threats to territorial integrity by force, even propaganda and the existence of forcibly displaced people are in conflict with the basic tenets of modern state system. Therefore, Azerbaijan’s concerns on Nagorno-Karabakh have been derived from historical facts and based on real threats reinforced by either military operations or propaganda.

As Azerbaijan failed to win the war for Nagorno-Karabakh in the early 1990s, the permanent threat to its territorial integrity has ranked first in the security agenda of the country.¹⁰⁹² These threats are based on direct military attacks and invasion. However, it would be misleading to assert that the conflicts had been triggered only by some incidences in real life. In the following pages, perceptual threats, which have been derived from hostilities and misperceptions will be explained. To remind, to launch a successful securitization, the threats on which the political leaders are based their arguments can be perceived, real or combined by both. Therefore, it is very important to analyze these two categories of threats together in order to reveal their roles in securitization process.

2. Perceptual Threats

Historical hostilities and perceptions of Azerbaijani and Armenian people towards each other play a considerable role in the exacerbation of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijani political leaders, as it will be discussed in the second part of this Chapter, frequently stress negative images for Armenians in their addresses and statements directed to both international and national audience.

¹⁰⁹¹ Khan, *“Revisiting the Conflict...”* p. 2.

¹⁰⁹² Kirvelytè, *“The Dilemma of Azerbaijan’s Security Strategy...”* p. 200.; The security concerns and the main principles of the security strategy of Azerbaijan are described in the Concept of National Security which was adopted in 2007: *“Attempts against the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the Republic of Azerbaijan; Actions undermining performance of State functions of ensuring rule of law, maintaining public order and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms; Separatism, ethnic, political and religious extremism; Terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; Regional conflicts and transnational organized crime; Actions against energy infrastructure of the Republic of Azerbaijan; External political, military or economic dependence; Economic destabilization; Inadequate professional human resources; Regional militarization; Environmental challenges.”* National Security Concept of The Republic of Azerbaijan, approved by Instruction No. 2198 of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on 23 May 2007. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154917/Azerbaijan2007.pdf>

According to Abrahamian, an Armenian author, Azerbaijani people do not have stereotype for Armenians but also for themselves. He says that Azerbaijanis have a stereotype of an offended and oppressed people for themselves, the victims of the aggressive Armenians and continues as below:

*“In fact, this stereotype was confirmed later, in 1993, when Armenian troops occupied Azerbaijani territories which bordered on Karabagh. It is characteristic that the list of victims which Azerbaijanis used extensively, especially before the huge figures of the war victims began to appear, always began with two young Azerbaijanis shot in Askeran, Karabagh, during February 1988. They were participants in the first violent raid of ‘revenge’ from Aghdam to Stepanakert, which was stopped in the first Armenian village in Karabagh. Being victims in a broad philosophical sense, those died there hardly fit the image of innocent victims.”*¹⁰⁹³

It is interesting to note that in both republics, there are memories about deep, historical, primordial, and permanent hostilities and conflict on the one hand, and peaceful times of living together on the other hand. This means that counter-memories pervade to the relationship between Azerbaijanis and Armenians and created a kind of stereotype dilemma.¹⁰⁹⁴

Armenian and Azerbaijani identities are reinforced by “us” and “them” debate. Much of Armenian identity is shaped by the other, which is Turks described as great enemies. Deep enmities have also impact in real social life. For an Armenian nationalist, marriage with an Azerbaijani is seen as a betrayal to its own community. Similarly, those who deny Armenian’s existence and role played in Nagorno-Karabakh in history are seen as dissident and traitor to Armenian nation.¹⁰⁹⁵

The main characteristics of relations between Azerbaijanis and Armenians have been mutual suspicion, distrust, and animosity, which were fed by extremely nationalist ideologies. Furthermore, the propaganda based on ethnicity and nationalism on both parties has normalized hatreds and stereotypes. This propaganda reinforces collective memories, which are mostly based on antagonism. In this context, Nagorno-Karabakh war is considered as a zero-sum game since both sides

¹⁰⁹³ Abrahamian, “**Typology of Aggressiveness...**,” p. 272.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Laitin & Suny, “**Armenia and Azerbaijan...**,” p. 153.

¹⁰⁹⁵ **Ibid.**, p. 147.

see Nagorno-Karabakh as their inseparable part of their identity. The cornerstone of their national identity is highly ethnicized and exclusionary. The existence of other's identity is seen something negating or eliminating their own ethnic community.¹⁰⁹⁶

These negative stereotypes, which have been transferred from generation to generation, have bolstered perceived threats and provided a fertile ground for securitization of any issue related to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In other words, they are threats by themselves, but also support the idea that any action from other side carries a huge potential to turn into a real threat.

Nagorno-Karabakh is dependent on Armenia and Armenian diaspora activated through Armenia overwhelmingly. Nagorno-Karabakh's politics are shaped by a small group, which is under control of Yerevan. It would not be misleading to say that Nagorno-Karabakh is an informal region of Armenia, which is highly dependent on it in the realm of economic, social, and political issues. They maintain their separate entities, but in fact, they operate practically in all spheres together.¹⁰⁹⁷ Although Armenia has not been officially recognized Nagorno-Karabakh administration, this organic link cannot be ignored and Armenian political leaders do not deny their support to Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The defeat for Azerbaijan was not only in the battlefield. The war against Armenia is also conducted in the field of gathering and distorting information. In other words, Azerbaijan is not only threatened by military actions but also manipulation and propaganda from Armenian side. Armenian community has been very assertive in their attempt to justify the reason of Nagorno-Karabakh war.¹⁰⁹⁸ Even the geographical terms used to describe Nagorno-Karabakh is part of this propaganda and their use may justify some particular situations including territorial secession and occupation. Goltz explains this as such:

“Nagorno Karabakh, the disputed ethnic Armenian enclave inside Azerbaijan (...) There is so much wrong with that sentence (...) To begin with, Nagorno is nothing more than a Russian adjective meaning ‘mountainous’,

¹⁰⁹⁶ Farid Guliyev, “Armenia’s Velvet Revolution in the Discourse of the Azerbaijani Elite,” **Caucasus Analytical Digest**, No. 104, July 23, 2018, p. 10.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Razmik Panossian, “The Irony of Nagorno-Karabakh: Formal Institutions versus Informal Politics,” **Regional & Federal Studies**, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2001, p. 151.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Kirvelytë, “**The Dilemma of Azerbaijan’s Security Strategy...**,” p. 200.

and has a widely used equivalent in all the languages of the world, including Armenian, Azerbaijani and English. Sometimes it is accurately relabeled 'upper' as an alternative to 'mountainous', but the point is the same: if there is an 'upper' anything, logic demands that there is also a 'lower'. If there is a 'mountain', one presumes there is also an associated 'valley'. But when the non-Russian language speaker hears the Russian adjective 'Nagorno' appended to 'Karabakh', that part of western Azerbaijan becomes mystified into something quite different than the geographic reality of a region made up of both mountain and valley, and in terms of the awful conflict that raged particularly between the years 1991 and 1994, it was in the valley—lower Karabakh—that most of the human suffering occurred."¹⁰⁹⁹

It is interesting to note that, the English-language reporting in the New York Times, Washington Post, Philadelphia Inquirer, Manchester Guardian, Irish Times, in addition to news agencies from Reuters to the Associated Press all used the term "Nagorno." By doing so, they mystify the subject.¹¹⁰⁰ Similarly, using the term "enclave" for Nagorno-Karabakh region is a logical choice from Armenian side. Goltz states as below on this issue:

"Mountainous 'Nagorno' –Karabakh never qualified for either of those geographically definable categories, neither in history nor in today's understanding. (...) Turning the mountainous part of internationally recognized western Azerbaijani territory into the mysterious 'enclave' of 'Nagorno Karabakh' in international discourse has been a great success for Armenian spin-doctors, and is largely due to the fact that the Armenian propaganda machine worked, while the Azerbaijani machine did not. The world spoke and continues to speak in Armenian-elected terms, while the Azerbaijani side continues to play a catch-up game, ham-strung in trying to explain its perspective and the correct status."¹¹⁰¹

Propaganda is an effective tool to create and reinforce stereotypes not only for Azerbaijanis and Armenians, but also for third parties. Furthermore, propaganda plays a crucial role in causing new [mis]perceptions and creating or verifying

¹⁰⁹⁹ Thomas Goltz, "The Successes of the Spin Doctors: Western Media Reporting on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict," **Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs**, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2012, p. 187.

¹¹⁰⁰ **Ibid.**

¹¹⁰¹ **Ibid.**, pp. 187-189.

perceived threats. As discussed in the previous part, Azerbaijani propaganda is carried out with the discourses over victimization and negative images of Armenians. However, it seems that Armenian propaganda based on imposing geographical definitions and self-determination has been based on a long-term strategy and is more convincing in the international arena thanks to support of Armenian diaspora.

3. Regional Threats

For Azerbaijan and Georgia, secessionism by territorially-based ethnic minorities is a serious problem not only at the state but also international and regional level. As mentioned above, Nagorno-Karabakh, which has not been recognized country, is economically supported by Armenia and diaspora Armenians while Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which have been recognized only by Russia and other few countries, receive support from Russia.¹¹⁰² Azerbaijan concerns about Russian-Armenian cooperation and arm transfers that were considered to play a crucial role in Armenia's occupation of Azerbaijan's territories¹¹⁰³ and the support of Armenia for Armenians living in the disputed territories.¹¹⁰⁴

Kubicek argues that the peaceful resolution of the conflict may contribute to the regional stability as well. This is more obvious in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, Russian mediation efforts raise concerns about the deployment of Russian forces and manipulation. By being part of a solution, Moscow aims to increase its influence in the region and make both Baku and Yerevan dependent on itself for any possible settlement.¹¹⁰⁵ Russia does not even welcome any mediation role of third parties, which may exclude itself from negotiation process. For Russian leaders, post-Soviet territories are still the backyard of Moscow and they should be dependent on it. Any intervention both militarily and politically to this backyard cannot be accepted.

Encountering the dangers of Russian-Armenian cooperation and Russia's assertiveness in its sphere of influence, Baku has tried to diversify its policy options so far. Azerbaijan's engagement with USA, NATO and EU representatives and intellectual elites and its attempt to balancing the powers was part of this policy and disturbed Russian authorities. The Euro-Atlantic structures within which Baku

¹¹⁰² Nichol, "Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia...", p. 6.

¹¹⁰³ Nuriyev, "Crossroads and Conflict...", p. 157.

¹¹⁰⁴ Khan, "Revisiting the Conflict...", p. 2.

¹¹⁰⁵ Kubicek, "End of the Line for the Commonwealth...", p. 19.

currently participates—the NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the European Commission (EC), Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)— put pressure on Azerbaijan to realize some political, legal and economic reforms so that Baku complies with the standards and norms of Western institutions. Azerbaijan also became the fourth former Soviet republic (following Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Belarus) which joined the Non-Aligned Movement on May 25, 2011. This proves that Azerbaijan is interested in balancing and functional partnerships rather than relying on some allies.¹¹⁰⁶

As a natural resources rich country, Azerbaijan has economically benefited from this situation so far. However, this richness poses two risks. Firstly, great and regional powers having conflicting interests in the region especially on access to Caspian oil and gas reserves (Azeri-Chira-Gunashli/Shah Deniz) and transshipment routes threaten Azerbaijan's stability. Russia, Turkey, and Iran compete with each other in this region. Russia has benefited from the unstable status of Nagorno-Karabakh that enables Moscow to intervene to the conflict. Therefore, as mentioned above, based on its strategic significance, Azerbaijan has had to diversify its foreign policy options and secure itself through assistance of Euro-Atlantic partners.¹¹⁰⁷

Secondly, oil reserves and revenue help Azerbaijan to have a strong army that creates huge advantage in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in front of Armenia. However, this military capability and supremacy vis-a-vis Armenia pose also some military risks. As Azerbaijan attempts to increase its military power, this causes a security dilemma which means that when a state increases its power to ensure its security, this may in reverse decrease its security, because the neighboring state starts to perceive this situation as a security threat and invests in their military power. Therefore, arms race is escalated and creates an insecure environment for all players in the region.¹¹⁰⁸

¹¹⁰⁶ Jason E. Strakes, "Situating the 'Balanced Foreign Policy': The Role of System Structure in Azerbaijan's Multi-Vector Diplomacy," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2013, pp. 39-40.

¹¹⁰⁷ Strakes, "Situating the 'Balanced Foreign Policy'...", p. 39.

¹¹⁰⁸ Kirvelytë, "The Dilemma of Azerbaijan's Security Strategy...", p. 204.

C. Regime Security/Legitimacy Problem

1. “If Successful in the War, Your Power is Legitimate!”

The collapse of Soviet Union caused many problems for newly independent fifteen states including Azerbaijan. The management of territorially concentrated ethnic groups, which existed as autonomous units under the rule of Soviet Union, has been serious concerns. These minorities demand increased autonomy, outright secession or even the right to incorporate to a neighboring republic as it happened in Nagorno-Karabakh. These demands have been considered as threat to the state internal and external sovereignty. As explained in detail in the previous sections, generally, the view in Baku is that while Nagorno-Karabakh issue became a driving force for political mobilization in the early years of independence, it caused agonies, economic problems, and internal displacement in long-term.¹¹⁰⁹

Nagorno-Karabakh issue is very crucial for short and longer-term stability and sovereignty of Azerbaijan in both internal and external dimensions. On the one hand, the existence of this conflict has contributed to the legitimacy, authority/autonomy and control of Azerbaijani state as the challenges increased state's power.¹¹¹⁰ On the other hand, any failure in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and loss of territories threaten state and regime security, which cannot be considered separately in Azerbaijan and decrease legitimacy of governance in the eyes of Azerbaijani society.

Azerbaijan has implemented security strategies to find solution to Nagorno-Karabakh issue and enhance state security. However, in these kinds of states where the regime is seen the protector of state and leader as having cult of personality, everything about state is related to the regime itself. Therefore, in Azerbaijan, regime security is ensured by the strategies used to protect state security. Reducing internal challenges and achieving economic progress has become crucial in consolidating regime security.¹¹¹¹

¹¹⁰⁹ Tadeusz Swietochowski, “Azerbaijan: Perspectives from the Crossroads,” **Central Asian Survey**, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1999, p. 423.

¹¹¹⁰ O’Lear, “**Azerbaijan: Territorial Issues...**,” p. 307.

¹¹¹¹ Sim Li-Chen, “In Search of Security: Azerbaijan and the Role of Oil in the Caspian Sea,” **The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics**, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1999, p. 33.

Azerbaijan, in Buzan's term, can be categorized as weak state.¹¹¹² Adding the note that weak states are mostly found in the Third World, Buzan describes them as such:

*"Because they are still in the early stages of the attempt to consolidate themselves as state-nations, domestic violence is endemic in such states... Weak states may find themselves trapped by historical patterns of economic development and political power which leave them underdeveloped and politically penetrated, and therefore unable to muster the economic and political resources necessary to build a stronger state. ... Whatever the reasons for the existence of weak states, their principal distinguishing feature is their high level of concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the government; in other words, weak states either do not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and societal consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the domestic political life of the nation."*¹¹¹³

According to Buzan, weak states have trouble to protect the state from outside threat and interference, so they are unable to ensure their national security. These are the conditions that may be found in weak states: *"high levels of political violence; a conspicuous role for political police in everyday lives of citizen; major political conflict over what ideology will be used to organize the state; lack of a coherent national identity or the presence of contending national identities within the state; lack of a clear and observed hierarchy of political authority; a high degree of state control over the media."*¹¹¹⁴

As the example of high levels of political violence, since independence, Baku witnessed several failed coup attempts. Azerbaijani politics are dominated by the ethnic-territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. This conflict has been used as a leverage for political awakening and social mobilization in the last two years of Soviet Union. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has played an important role in determining regime longevity in Azerbaijan. As Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

¹¹¹² Buzan describes weak states as such : The governments of Third World states, particularly weak states, will often trade a degree of support for one side or the other in great power rivalries in return for political support and arms in both domestic and local conflicts. Barry Buzan, "The Southeast Asian Security Complex", **Contemporary Southeast Asia**, Vol. 10, No. 1, June 1988, p. 14.

¹¹¹³ Buzan, **"People, States and Fear..."**, pp. 99.

¹¹¹⁴ **Ibid.**, p. 100.

threatens military security of Azerbaijan, the political leaders who have problems to deal with this military threat are considered insufficient and incompetent. It led to such outbreaks as the anti-Armenian riots in 1991, the downfall of the presidency of Ayaz Mutallibov in 1992 and the military coup that overthrew the presidency of Abulfaz Elchibey.¹¹¹⁵ After Elchibey's rule, Heydar Aliyev was able to consolidate his regime thanks to the May 1994 ceasefire agreement.¹¹¹⁶ However, Aliyev was also subjected to a coup in September 1994 and several assassination attempts. In these government changes and military coups, the failures and mistakes in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have played a crucial role.

The view of Azerbaijani society has been hardened on the conflict as the settlement process took longer. For example, proposals for a settlement that were suggested in the 1990s, such as the creation of a "common state" and of a "package deal," have become increasingly considered as "defeatist."¹¹¹⁷ Both Armenian and Azerbaijani societies are very sensitive towards Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Any search for political situation or compromise is considered as the betrayal of the national interests. Therefore, the politicians need not to make any compromises regarding to Nagorno-Karabakh issue, because there is a risk of becoming unpopular and not to be elected again. There are not so many opportunities to settle the dispute in neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan, because compromises are considered as a long process based on mutual concessions.¹¹¹⁸

2. "Nagorno-Karabakh is a Leverage of Power Struggles"

The clans in Azerbaijan -for instance Aliyev's Nakhichevan clan, Elchibey's Ordubad sub-clan, Mutalibov's Baku clan, and Husseinov's Gyandza clan- have had great impact on Azeri political life even in Soviet times. Military coups in Azerbaijan were not only based on power struggles among the political or military figures but also among different clans. For instance, since Aliyev came to power, all national and regional posts were taken by his clansmen and family members. The most obvious example of this was that Aliyev's son Ilham would not be only the successor

¹¹¹⁵ Swietochowski, "Azerbaijan: Perspectives...", p. 421.; Nejad, "Turmoil in The Caucasus...", pp. 39-40.

¹¹¹⁶ Swietochowski, "Azerbaijan: Perspectives...", p. 421.

¹¹¹⁷ Arif Yunusov, "Azerbaijani Security Problems and Policies," **European Union Institute for Security Studies**, 2003, p. 144.

¹¹¹⁸ Kirvelytë, "The Dilemma of Azerbaijan's Security Strategy...", pp. 217-218.

but also the vice-president of the powerful State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR).¹¹¹⁹

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been used as leverage for political actors in their domestic power struggles. Musabayov explains this internal situation as such:

*“Whilst the disputes of clans and elites remain largely secret, political parties have to declare a public position on the Karabakh conflict. However, party positions vis-à-vis the Karabakh conflict are largely superficial and declarative, lacking specific suggestions regarding the format or content of the negotiations or the nature of possible compromises. Opposition parties such as Musavat, the Popular Front, the National Independence Party and the Democratic Party are less inclined to compromise than the ruling New Azerbaijan Party. (...) The highly numerous marginal parties and leaders are still more intractable, seeking to balance a grovelling attitude towards the authorities with a militant stance vis-à-vis Armenia.”*¹¹²⁰

In a survey, it is revealed that 34,1% of respondents in Azerbaijan think that Nagorno-Karabakh issue is used in the struggle for power in domestic politics.¹¹²¹ The impact of Nagorno-Karabakh on domestic politics is twofold. Firstly, Nagorno-Karabakh war has been used for opposition groups to gain more political power. In Shusha’s fall, for instance, the defense minister and APF deputy, Rahim Gaziev had been accused of complicity.¹¹²² Secondly, the opposition has been intimidated by the those in power who used the conflict as an excuse and therefore, tried to eliminate threats to their regime security. Li-Chen explains this situation as such: *“For instance, as a result of Aliyev’s allusion to illegal clan activity in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, many ethnic and clan leaders and of former government officials affiliated to the APF were arrested. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is seen advantageous for those who want to increase power and influence in internal power struggles.”*¹¹²³

¹¹¹⁹ Li-Chen, *“In Search of Security...,”* p. 28.

¹¹²⁰ Rasim Musabayov, “The Karabakh Conflict and Democratization in Azerbaijan,” *Accord*, Vol. 17, pp. 62-63.

¹¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

¹¹²² Donald V. Schwartz & Razmik Panossian (Eds.), *Nationalism and History: The Politics of Nation Building in Post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994, pp. 108-109.

¹¹²³ Li-Chen, *“In Search of Security...,”* pp. 29-30.

3. “Nagorno-Karabakh Hides Other Domestic Problems”

The collapse of Soviet Union and the destruction of the integrated economic system created disappointment about the economic prospects of the newly independent Azerbaijan despite of expectations derived from the country's energy reserves and skilled personnel. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the first blow to those who hoped that Azerbaijan would be a prosperous country. Refugees and IDPs flowed to the country and Azerbaijani authorities who were afraid of social explosion hesitated to launch a large-scale economic reform. These hard times were followed by the ceasefire and the signature of “deals of the century” in the field of energy. Some argued that this deal meant the exploitation of Azerbaijani energy sources. Energy sector constituted almost 90% of foreign investment. Therefore, Azerbaijan was under the risk of a serious “Dutch syndrome” which meant being economically dependent on the price of oil. The medium-sized production sector inherited from Soviet Union collapsed. Agriculture was also destroyed and Baku even began to import some foodstuffs.¹¹²⁴

Nejad explains Azerbaijan's first years of independence as below:

*“The war efforts consumed 70% of the national budget. Homelessness, disease, bankruptcy, inflation, war casualties, malnutrition and unemployment became rampant. Thousands of industrial and construction firms, schools, hospitals and dwellings, housing more than one-fifth of the population, were totally destroyed. The war has been both a human and an environmental tragedy. Hundreds of historical and cultural monuments were demolished or suffered irreparable damage. Heavy rocket artillery and bombardments caused phenomenal damage to the soil and water resources of the area. There were immeasurable losses to forests, farm lands and wildlife. (...) A most tragic outcome of the conflict has been the suffering of the refugees and internally displaced peoples.”*¹¹²⁵

In this situation, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been used by local authorities to cover domestic problems such as poverty, human rights violations, corruption, and

¹¹²⁴ Yunusov, “Azerbaijani Security Problems...,” p. 150.

¹¹²⁵ Nejad, “Turmoil in The Caucasus...,” pp. 41-42.

absence of rule of law.¹¹²⁶ By putting Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the top of security agenda, other economic and social problems have been disregarded. Securing state as well as regime and eliminating all threats related to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been used as an excuse to cover some domestic problems, especially ones that were related to soft security issues.

4. IDPs Have & IDPs Are Problems!

Most of the people think that all forced migrants can be classified as refugees regardless of their displacement within the borders of the country or across borders. As mentioned in the previous part, the difference between IDPs and refugees are important because those who have crossed an international boundary are called as “refugees” and benefit legally from the 1951 “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees” and its 1967 Protocol as well as from the institutional ministrations of the UNHCR. The IDPs attracted less attention as compared to refugees. Many regimes do not provide protection and assistance to the IDPs as an instrument to manipulate political actors and humanitarian agencies.¹¹²⁷

While refugees are under the protection of an international covenant, IDPs are under the responsibility of their own governments and do not automatically stimulate an international action. There is a danger of this. *“Refugee advocates feared that UNHCR’s involvement in providing in-country protection to internally displaced persons could provide an excuse for asylum countries to return refugees to their countries of origin. Indeed, Western European and other industrialized states were already denying asylum to refugees for whom they believed ‘internal flight alternatives’ or ‘in-country’ protection existed in their country of origin.”*¹¹²⁸

In the following pages, the problems of IDPs in general and in Azerbaijan will be explained in detail. Ironically, IDPs are both referent objects that are threatened and have social and economic problems, and threats that disturb the others, especially local people in the regions they moved.

¹¹²⁶ Nona Mikhelidze, “The Azerbaijan-Russia-Turkey Energy Triangle and its Impact on the Future of Nagorno-Karabakh,” *Istituto Affari Internazionali, Documenti Iai* 10, 18 September 2010, p. 8.

¹¹²⁷ Weiss, “*Internal Exiles...*,” p. 434.

¹¹²⁸ Human Rights Watch, **The Challenge of the New Millennium: Protecting the Internally Displaced**, Special Issues and Campaigns, Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Internally Displaced Persons, 2000.

There are some institutional and administrative obstacles that IDPs face. The government imposes legal restrictions regarding to the employment, accommodation, and schooling of these groups. Official documents are lost or damaged. The children, who were born in the territories that IDPs had to move, do not even have identity cards. Bureaucratic processes are complex, expensive, and inaccessible for IDPs who have difficulties to manage it. The protection of IDPs is also problematic in many developing countries. Institutional and administrative barriers impede IDPs, particularly women, to integrate labor market.¹¹²⁹ In this sense, forced displacement is not only a humanitarian crisis, but it has also significant developmental impacts on human and social capital, economic growth, poverty reduction efforts, and environmental sustainability.¹¹³⁰ These administrative barriers make life more difficult for IDPs in many aspects.

In the elections which were held in the OSCE region, it is seen that the IDPs commonly experienced these legal, political, and practical impediments to voting, including: *“lack of documentation; discriminatory practices; obsolete and restrictive residence requirements, i.e. propiska; inadequate arrangements for absentee voting; lack of timely, adequate and clear information about voting arrangements provided to IDPs, in a language they understand, as well as to election officials; and insecurity and acts of intimidation.”*¹¹³¹

The disenfranchisement of the IDPs violates their right to vote and this creates obstacles for their integration to the society in the areas to which they are displaced or after return to their places of origin or resettlement in another place. The IDPs are unable to affect the political, economic, and social decisions and impress the national and local authorities regarding to their plight. The inclusion of IDPs to the political process by means of elections is important for the legitimacy and national stability. Moreover, the inclusion of IDPs to the election process is also beneficial for effective reconciliation, sustainable peace, and stability. In some countries, the IDP population is so large and their exclusion from political process may probably cause a

¹¹²⁹ Artjoms Ivlevs & Michail Veliziotis, “Beyond Conflict: Long-term Labour Market Integration of Internally Displaced Persons in Post-socialist Countries,” **Journal of Vocational Behavior**, No. 105, 2018, p. 136.

¹¹³⁰ Niels Harild & Asger Christensen, “The Development Challenge of Finding Durable Solutions For Refugees and Internally Displaced People,” **World Development Report 2011**, July 30, 2010, p. 4.

¹¹³¹ Erin Mooney & Balkees Jarrah, “Displaced and Disenfranchised: Internally Displaced Persons and Elections in the OSCE Region,” **Ethnopolitics**, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2005, p. 44.

destabilizing effect not only nationally but also regionally. In sum, the IDPs should be able to have the right to vote and exercise this right freely both for human rights and national/regional stability.¹¹³²

IDPs select parliamentarians for their homelands, which comprise seven positions for the seven occupied districts and two for Nagorno-Karabakh during national elections. IDPs can participate in some elections, but not all of them. For example, IDPs participated in the elections process of president and parliamentarians in 2008 and 2010 respectively, but could not vote in the municipal elections in 2009.¹¹³³ *“IDPs, who are impeded from integrating locally and whose plight is actively highlighted as a means of reinforcing Azeri territorial claims in the conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, continue to be unable to vote in the localities in which they have resided for more than a dozen years.”*¹¹³⁴ In terms of political candidacy, IDPs are also restricted. IDPs are prohibited from competing in the political positions in the municipality, because they have different residence. The authorities concerned that if the IDPs were allowed to hold political positions in their temporary residence, they would not move to their original residences.¹¹³⁵

Although Azerbaijan has enjoyed relative stability and ongoing economic growth through oil development since independence, the political and economic situation, which has been deteriorated because of Nagorno-Karabakh, makes the country fragile and vulnerable. *“The end of the war, if near, could have a substantial impact on the region’s oil and gas transportation systems, on the re-establishment of traditional trade routes and communication links. It could also help Azerbaijan reclaim 20% of its territory and relocate the 10% of its population currently living as internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees in their own country.”*¹¹³⁶

The Azerbaijani government tries to improve the living conditions of IDPs but over 100,000 IDPs still live in government-constructed settlements, hundreds of thousands of other IDPs continue to live in temporary settlements.¹¹³⁷ There are some

¹¹³² Mooney & Jarrah, **“Displaced and Disenfranchised...,”** p. 30.

¹¹³³ Victoria Muga, “Agents or Subverters of Peace? Analyzing the Role of Internally Displaced Persons in Peacebuilding Processes,” Umeå University Department of Political Science, <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1569854/FULLTEXT01.pdf>, p. 29.

¹¹³⁴ Mooney & Jarrah, **“Displaced and Disenfranchised...,”** pp. 32-33.

¹¹³⁵ Muga, **“Agents or Subverters of Peace?...,”** pp. 28-29.

¹¹³⁶ Angeliki Spatharou, “The Political Role of Oil in Azerbaijan, 1989-1994,” **Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans**, Vol. 4, No.1, 2002, p. 30.

¹¹³⁷ Najafizadeh, **“Ethnic Conflict and Forced Displacement...,”** p. 173.

attempts to improve the lives of IDPs as well. In 1999, the Azeri government issued a law to guarantee “social protection of forcibly displaced persons.” By doing so, it provides free access to health care, schooling, and social services, however, not all the needs are sufficiently met. Similarly, Armenia passed a law in 2000 for IDPs who escaped from Azerbaijan. However, the most important thing for the parties should be to agree on compensation for abandoned property and they did not compromise on that.¹¹³⁸

Baku seems reluctant to integrate the IDP population because this is considered as a compromise before the conflict is settled as Azerbaijan demands. The territorial lost and the IDPs have become an impediment to Azerbaijan’s economic and political development. The IDPs are still living in extremely difficult conditions. As indicated above, IDPs in Azerbaijan continue to live in public government buildings, in tented camps, dormitories and other temporary shelters. Although IDPs find temporary shelters, their standard of living is very low. The main problems of Azerbaijan population is poor housing, unemployment, lack of access to clean water, lack of electricity, and heating in winter times, lack of proper sanitation in collective centers.¹¹³⁹

Due to these problems, IDPs may even politically radicalize over time. There is a feeling among IDPs that their situation does not attract attention, they are waiting for a peaceful solution without engaging in violent acts. For some authors, as the war is frozen one, in other words, there is no hot war between the parties, the effects of the conflicts are not spoken and the victims are mostly forgotten.¹¹⁴⁰ Bacon and Lynch explain the situation of IDPs as such:

“Their plight is real, and the sore festers. Although the Azerbaijani government has built some acceptable housing for displaced persons, most have remained for years in substandard hovels with irregular access to water and fuel. They live in abandoned box cars, holes dug in the ground, half-derelict Soviet-era apartment complexes, and make shift shanties. Old railway cars shelter the displaced persons we visited near Imishli and Saatli in south central Azerbaijan. An elderly woman explained that during the freezing

¹¹³⁸ Kenneth H. Bacon and Maureen Lynch, “Lost in Purgatory: The Plight of Displaced Persons in the Caucasus,” **World Policy Journal**, Vol. 19, No. 4, Winter, 2002/2003, p. 70.

¹¹³⁹ Muga, “**Agents or Subverters of Peace?...**,” pp. 25-26.

¹¹⁴⁰ Bacon & Lynch, “**Lost in Purgatory...**,” p. 67.

winters she and other residents use animal dung stored beneath the cars or deadwood from a nearby forest for fuel. They bake their bread over open fires between the parallel lines of boxcars; lack of access to water rules out truck gardening.”¹¹⁴¹

Today, as it is in the past, the most serious problems of Nagorno-Karabakh have been economic. Economic challenges that IDPs face are severe. High unemployment rates and poor standards of living are the most common problems.¹¹⁴² Unemployment is very high among IDPs due to lack of documentation and lack of necessary skills which is required for professional work.¹¹⁴³

It is interesting that despite these problems, the relation between Azerbaijani government and IDPs can be still characterized as solidarity.¹¹⁴⁴ Representative of the UN Secretary-General on IDP issues Francis M. Deng said:

*“The South Caucasus, particularly the countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, . . . give us a rather interesting model, in which because of the external dimension of the problem they are, people are, esteemed as citizens who merit protection and assistance. There is a solidarity between the governments and their displaced populations. But unfortunately, there is a situation whereby the political agendas, in particular the ongoing conflicts and the emphasis given on the goal of return, tends to make the IDPs hostages to the situation. The idea being that if the problems are solved, of the displaced populations, the pressure to find a solution so that people can return can be undermined, and as a result, people are left living under deplorable conditions without adequate shelter, no means of livelihood or self-reliance, and all in all having dreadful needs for assistance.”*¹¹⁴⁵

It would not be misleading to assert that oil rich country Azerbaijan can afford the expenses of IDPs and their relocation. However, Azerbaijani political authorities seem reluctant, because their successful integration would signal the end of problem

¹¹⁴¹ Bacon & Lynch, “Lost in Purgatory...,” p. 67.

¹¹⁴² Muga, “Agents or Subverters of Peace?...,” pp. 26-27.

¹¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹¹⁴⁴ Weiss, “Internal Exiles...,” p. 431.

¹¹⁴⁵ Hearing of the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) Held on **Internally Displaced Persons in the Caucasus Region and South-eastern Anatolia**, 10 June 2003.; George Tarkhan-Mouravi & Nana Sumbadze, “The Abkhazian-Georgian Conflict and The Issue of Internally Displaced Persons,” *Innovation*, Vol. 19, No. 3-4, 2006, p. 301.

and make their return out of discussion. This may create a kind of securitizing act vacuum. If not Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and IDP issue which lasted over a century in the security agendas of Soviet Union, Azerbaijan and Armenia, which topic deserves to be securitized in the region? As the most important issue in the post-Soviet era, Nagorno-Karabakh issue has priority in the securitization agenda. The IDP problem only makes this securitization as visible and persistent. As long as the IDPs and audience are there, the political actors remain at the scene and their securitization has probably more chance to be successful.

Lack of humanitarian assistance and impediments to freedom of movement are the most important security problems of IDPs.¹¹⁴⁶ Another important problem for IDPs is socio-economic integration in host communities. They lost their assets, human and social capital. Armed conflict and forced displacement also cause serious stressful and traumatic experiences. Uncertainty that IDPs faced caused a lack of aspiration, inactivity, and marginalization. This also creates difficulties for integration. In this sense, they differ from refugees. While having difficulties on continuing their ordinary lives in their countries of origin, some argue that unlike refugees, they do not face any challenges of cultural and linguistic integration at least and are not legally impeded to work or move within their own country. However, stigma, prejudice, discrimination, and lack of institutional support become other problems to establish a new life after conflict.¹¹⁴⁷

IDPs are those who witnessed violence or been subjects to violence, they have felt extremely insecure under the threat of death. They saw that their family members are injured or killed or have been victims of rape and sexual violence. The women among IDP population are amongst the most vulnerable groups due to sexual and emotional abuse and domestic violence.¹¹⁴⁸ They left behind their relatives or family members. Due to these factors, they have experienced severe psychological problems such as post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, fatigue, or sleeping problems. Their consumption habits and social status have been sharply changed, they have felt insecure about the future, and prejudice and discrimination have made their lives extremely difficult. The sense of detachment, helplessness and defeat,

¹¹⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch, **“The Challenge of the New Millennium....”**

¹¹⁴⁷ Ivlevs & Veliziotis, **“Beyond Conflict...,”** p. 132.

¹¹⁴⁸ Muga, **“Agents or Subverters of Peace?...,”** p. 26.

irrational fear, impaired judgment, and loss of self-confidence and identity are amongst the most serious psychological disorders.¹¹⁴⁹

Azerbaijani people have very traumatic experiences due to the brutality, forced displacement, and massive loss of human life caused by Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Nagorno-Karabakh issue preserved its importance in a daily basis on Azeri TV, radio, newspaper and public school textbooks. Azeri literary and poetic writings are consisted of the memorials and public observances of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In Azerbaijan, the monuments -commemorating the Khojaly massacre and honoring all Azerbaijanis who died in the war- is an important symbol of the brutality of war and human disaster. Nagorno-Karabakh is a nationalistic and emotional issue in Azerbaijan. These memories have also great impact on the ceasefire and peace-building process.¹¹⁵⁰

There are not so many options for IDPs under such conditions. They may search for new places for better living conditions, they may return homes, but they need to flee again when the conflict restarts, or they may cross an international border to become a refugee. It is not surprising to see that most of the refugees are former IDPs. Most of the IDPs experience a protracted displacement, because they wait that the conflict ends. However, as these conflicts are frozen ones, this cause a long period of uncertainty.¹¹⁵¹ The key impediments to permanent solutions for refugees and IDPs are described as below:

“-Rights to land, property and houses that belonged to the displaced are in many return situations contested, or the assets of the returnees have been taken over by others.

-Livelihoods are disrupted or dependent on humanitarian aid, and livelihood rehabilitation is critical if solutions to displacement are to become sustainable, both if the displaced return home or if they have to integrate elsewhere.

-Delivery of services such as security, education and health along with basic infrastructure are frequently inadequate or absent both in places of exile and upon return.

¹¹⁴⁹ Ivlevs & Veliziotis, “**Beyond Conflict...**,” p. 134.

¹¹⁵⁰ Najafizadeh, “**Ethnic Conflict and Forced Displacement...**,” pp. 166-167.

¹¹⁵¹ Ivlevs & Veliziotis, “**Beyond Conflict...**,” p. 134.

-Accountable and responsive governance and rule of law are often weak particularly at the local level, government capacity is limited, its legitimacy damaged, and social capital at the community level is impaired.”¹¹⁵²

The removal of immediate causes such as end of fighting or return from displacement does not mean that these people will be economically and socially reintegrated. The barriers to durable solutions as mentioned above should be removed to cease the displacement.”¹¹⁵³

In many cases, the local people do not easily welcome the IDPs, because firstly their displacement and settlement to their hometown means that they are obliged to share scarce resources of land and water and public services. Secondly, the flow of IDPs also means that competition for local jobs and decrease in wages. Thirdly, local people mostly consider that they are less well off and disadvantageous while IDPs receive humanitarian aid/government assistance. Moreover, members of host communities create some stereotypes for IDPs such as lazy, criminals, peasants and not truly displaced. They may discriminate or have prejudice against particular groups of IDPs on the basis of their racial and ethnic affiliations. Social cohesion and a sustainable market integration of IDPs are problematic.¹¹⁵⁴ For example, in the summer of 1998, in an interview carried out in Azerbaijan, the residents of Baku and Sumgait said that they would prefer Armenians to stay there, instead of the rural refugees and IDPs who were uneducated and took the homes of Armenians.¹¹⁵⁵

Under these difficult conditions, the IDPs may be seen as social basis for opposition to the government. The IDP population is radicalized as a new generation of Azerbaijani youth emerged. This new generation has not had any memories with Armenians and experienced the war itself; however, they insist that the territories invaded by Armenians should be included to Azerbaijani territories. Since 2001, public opinion polls and youth organizations have revealed that the radicalization of youth regarding to Nagorno-Karabakh issue increased.¹¹⁵⁶

The Azerbaijan community of Nagorno-Karabakh is considered disorganized and powerless, however, some non-governmental organizations are influential.

¹¹⁵² Harild & Christensen, “**The Development Challenge...**,” p. 4.

¹¹⁵³ **Ibid.**

¹¹⁵⁴ Ivlevs & Veliziotis, “**Beyond Conflict...**,” p. 135.

¹¹⁵⁵ Laitin & Suny, “**Armenia and Azerbaijan...**,” p. 153.

¹¹⁵⁶ Yunusov, “**Azerbaijani Security Problems...**,” p. 144.

Karabakh Liberation Organization (KLO) is amongst the vocal non-governmental organizations in Azerbaijan which represents the rights of IDPs. Another organization is the Humanitarian Society for Azeri Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons which provides service for gender and human rights training and charitable relief. The staffs are volunteers, but the organization relies on donor. The non-governmental organizations mostly focus on the women and children who are considered as the most disadvantageous and vulnerable groups.¹¹⁵⁷

Peace-building networks create opportunities for IDPs to participate in the process. Women's advocacy groups in Azerbaijan seem to be politically active and advocate themselves nationally and locally through these peace-building activities. When the IDPs are involved in peace-building networks, they find an opportunity to raise their voices for their own safety. There is a close link between peace-building activities of women's advocacy groups in Azerbaijan and their political participation. The National Network of IDP Women and the Coalition 1325 are the examples of women advocacy groups. Coalition 1325 works on gender quality and collaborates with different organizations. The National Network of IDP Women has members from internally displaced women both from Nagorno-Karabakh and other districts in Azerbaijan.¹¹⁵⁸

At the district level, IDPs are nominated by the president into local executive entities to manage policies on internal displacement. Those who are elected aim to sustain community structure and to facilitate the return for the executives.¹¹⁵⁹ It is interesting that IDPs who have preserved their status for more than 30 years, do not have still any organized political group that may advocate their rights. They do not even a strong leader that represents their community in national and international arena. Only some charity groups are working in the field, but they are not sufficiently conveying demands and meet requirements of IDPs.

As explained above, IDPs have some security problems that can be classified in Buzan's terms, within the framework of societal and economic security sectors. In this sense, IDPs might be considered as referent objects to which the threats are directed. Although the securitization of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is mostly based on the occupation and take-over of the region from Armenians, bad living conditions

¹¹⁵⁷ Muga, "Agents or Subverters of Peace?...", pp. 29-30.

¹¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

¹¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

and socio-economic problems of IDPs is the most important part of speech act of securitizing actors. In other words, Azerbaijani leaders aim to keep them as IDP until the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is settled as Azerbaijanis demand. Furthermore, the problems of IDPs are also open to be securitized by themselves apart from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

IDPs are also seen as the source of new security problems by the local people. In this sense, IDP may be also classified as real threats. Although this is not the case in Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijani society is divided into two as the audience considering IDPs either in a positive or negative way, the existence of IDP in the country is still problematic. In a positive way, they are comrades, war veteran, and even heroes in the eyes of people and need protection and assistance. In a negative way, they are considered to take the jobs of local people and create disorder and crime in society.

The changing status of IDP in the securitization process is even more interesting when their functional role in the securitization process is evaluated. IDPs have capacity to play functional actors' role in securitization process, interestingly, due to both their radicalization through the process and their contribution in peace-building. On the one hand, the radicalization of especially young generation may be manipulated by the political actors and facilitate their securitizing act. On the other hand, their contribution to peace-building activities may contribute to desecuritization of the process although this has not been proven yet.

II. SECURITIZING ACTORS, SPEECH ACT AND POLICIES

A. Securitizing Actors and Policies in Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan's politics was carried out by two articulate classes since the late Soviet period. The first segment one was nomenklatura, which was consisted of nominees for executive positions in the government and economic administration. The other segment was largely defined intelligentsia, an educated group that attached more importance to beliefs, attitudes, and opinions as compared to nomenklatura. Individuals from intelligentsia can be adopted into the the nomenklatura, however, there has been an endless rivalry among them in terms of gaining power in the governance. The presidency of Elchibey (1992–93) was a period where the intelligentsia could seize power, however, it lasted only more than a year. Elchibey could not maintain his rule without support of the nomenklatura, which was more experienced in government. The nomenklatura supported a broad autonomy within the Soviet/Russian imperial system while the intelligentsia demanded independence. These two segments competed to each other in the first years of independence. Despite differences, these groups have also some common features. Both groups were secular-minded which was seen important in a country where Islamic revival was growing. These two segments were committed to the idea of native statehood in the country which had not been experienced for a long time in the history.¹¹⁶⁰

In the early post-Soviet political history in Azerbaijan, the turning point in the establishment of an independent Republic of Azerbaijan was the Nagorno-Karabakh war. In other words, the war led to the creation of the APF, which mobilized the population against the Communist Party leadership in Azerbaijan in 1989. In February 1988, the Armenians demanded the transfer of the territories of Nagorno-Karabakh, which have been incorporated to Azerbaijan since 1921 to the jurisdiction of Armenia. This demand caused protests and bloody clashes

¹¹⁶⁰ Swietochowski, "Azerbaijan: Perspectives....," p. 420.

between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. These two communities had to displace forcibly during 1988 and 1989. The APF was established under these circumstances. In 1989 elections, Ebulfaz Elchibey became the chairman of the APF executive board. The APF announced its commitment to political, economic, and cultural sovereignty for the republic. Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, Nagorno-Karabakh's security, market economy, and environmental issues were among the major elements of APF's policy.¹¹⁶¹

Swietochowski underlines a reality about Azerbaijani politics: *"A special feature of Azerbaijani politics became the formation of parties around the personalities of leaders, rather than programs, platforms or ideologies."*¹¹⁶² Under the Aliyev regime, the ruling party was New Azerbaijan, which held most of the seats in the assembly in the wake of the 1995 elections. The number of all political parties was around 40, of which eight were in opposition to the government at that time. The main group in this category was the Party of the People's Front of Azerbaijan (a branch of the former APF) as mentioned above; the Party of National Independence was led by Etibar Mammadov and the Musavat, whose leader was Isa Gambar.¹¹⁶³

Table 3.1. Existing political parties in Azerbaijan¹¹⁶⁴

Order	Name of political parties	Registration date
1.	Azerbaijan National Independence Party	17.07.1992
2.	Azerbaijan Revival and Progress Party	24.07.1992
3.	Azerbaijan People's Democratic Party	11.08.1992
4.	Motherland Party	11.08.1992
5.	National Democratic Party of Cognition	11.08.1992
6.	Peasant Party of Azerbaijan	23.09.1992
7.	Civic Solidarity Party	03.11.1992
8.	Musavat Party	08.12.1992

¹¹⁶¹ Ceylan Tokluoglu, "Perceptions of State and Leadership in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan (1991–2009)," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2012, pp. 322-323.

¹¹⁶² Swietochowski, "Azerbaijan: Perspectives...", p. 421.

¹¹⁶³ Besides the parties, around 50 non-governmental organizations, seven human rights defense groups, and some 20 independent press publications actively participate in the political life of Azerbaijan—most of them are concentrated in Baku. Swietochowski, "Azerbaijan: Perspectives...", p. 421.

¹¹⁶⁴ Central Election Commission of the Republic of Azerbaijan, **Information on political parties included in state registration in the Republic of Azerbaijan**, <http://www.msk.gov.az/uploads/partiyalar/2019/GeneralInformation.php> (Retrieved on 24.05.2022).

9.	Unity Party	18.12.1992
10.	New Azerbaijan Party	18.12.1992
11.	United Azerbaijan National Unity Party	13.01.1993
12.	United Party of Azerbaijan	13.01.1993
13.	Democratic Azerbaijan World Party	10.02.1993
14.	Independent Azerbaijan Party	10.02.1993
15.	National Salvation Party	03.03.1993
16.	Compatriot Party of Azerbaijan	12.03.1993
17.	Azerbaijan Hope Party	05.05.1993
18.	“Gorgud” Party	10.11.1993
19.	Azerbaijan National Movement Party	02.03.1994
20.	Azerbaijan Communist Party	02.03.1994
21.	Party of Azerbaijan National Statehood	12.10.1994
22.	Azerbaijan Patriots Party	12.10.1994
23.	Azerbaijan Party of Democratic Entrepreneurs	17.05.1994
24.	Alliance Party for the Sake of Azerbaijan	22.06.1995
25.	Azerbaijan Democratic Enlightenment Party	04.08.1995
26.	Azerbaijan Social Welfare Party	04.08.1995
27.	Azerbaijan Liberal Party	14.08.1995
28.	Azerbaijan Social Democratic Party	01.09.1995
29.	Azerbaijan Popular Front Party	01.09.1995
30.	United Communist Party of Azerbaijan	19.09.1995
31.	Social Justice Party	11.12.1998
32.	National Convention Party	11.12.1998
33.	Unity Party	11.12.1998
34.	Azerbaijan Republicans Party	09.07.1999
35.	Azerbaijan People's Party	09.07.1999
36.	Azerbaijan Liberal Democrat Party	09.07.1999
37.	Azerbaijan Democratic Party	03.02.2000
38.	“Azerbaijani Fighters” Party	27.05.2000
39.	Justice Party	08.05.2002
40.	National Unity Party	08.05.2002
41.	Modern Musavat Party	08.05.2002
42.	Azerbaijan Free Republicans Party	08.05.2002
43.	Great Revival Party	12.08.2005
44.	Freedom Party	12.08.2005
45.	Azerbaijan Political Party of Democratic Reforms	12.08.2005
46.	Whole Azerbaijan Popular Front Party	12.08.2005

47.	Azerbaijan Progress Party	12.08.2005
48.	Great Azerbaijan Party	12.08.2005
49.	Azerbaijan Evolution Party	12.08.2005
50.	Civil Union Party	12.08.2005
51.	Classic Popular Front Party	31.01.2007
52.	Citizen and Development Party	10.08.2007
53.	Azerbaijan National Democrat Party	24.12.2008
54.	Party of Intellectuals	19.11.2009
55.	National Revival Movement Party	31.05.2011

The clans, which are usually called with the names of some political figures, play an important role to gain political support in the country. Swietochowski attracts attention to the impact of clans in politics: *“Another special feature of Azerbaijani politics is the significance of kinship ties and loyalties with regional-based clans functioning as effective pressure groups. This phenomenon is regarded as a residue of Azerbaijan’s past, reaching back to the centuries-long territorial fragmentation of the khanates (semi-independent principalities) period that preceded the conquest by Russia.”*¹¹⁶⁵

In the following section, the personalities of securitizing actors in Azerbaijan, namely state leaders and their statements with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh and IDP will be evaluated.

1. Ayaz Mutallibov

The last years of Soviet Union were full of political tension in Azerbaijan. The decision of Armenian Parliament to make Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Armenia in December 1989 was declared as null by Azerbaijani Parliament. Russia claimed that Azerbaijan used violence against Armenians and sent its troops to Baku on January 19-20, 1990. It was argued that Russia aimed to intimidate and remove the Popular Front which was seen a growing nationalist movement in Azerbaijan.¹¹⁶⁶ A number of Azeris were killed (133 people) and many were wounded (611 people) due to the intervention of Russia that claimed to end anti-Armenian riots. This became a turning

¹¹⁶⁵ Swietochowski, *“Azerbaijan: Perspectives...,”* p. 421.

¹¹⁶⁶ Vera Laska, “Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter’s Adventures In An Oilrich, War-Torn Post-Soviet Republic by Thomas Goltz,” *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol. 15, No. 2, June 1998, p. 84.

point for the greatly increased recognition of the Popular Front.¹¹⁶⁷ Martial law and curfew were imposed in Azerbaijan and some leaders of APF were arrested. This created a kind of resentment among Azerbaijanis towards Russia and the people understood that Russia was the real enemy and the only way to escape from this situation was the declaration of independence.¹¹⁶⁸ Baku events which were called as “Black January” was an important development in the political history of Azerbaijan since it increased pro-independence, anti-Russian and pan-Turkist feelings among the members of the APF. The APF criticized Moscow’s attitude and politics towards Nagorno-Karabakh. Widespread protests and mass demonstrations were launched.¹¹⁶⁹

On January 27, 1990 the First Secretary of Azerbaijan Communist Party Abdurrahman Vezirov was dismissed and Ayaz Mutallibov was appointed. On September 30, 1990 Parliamentary elections were held (Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet) and Popular Front that continued its struggle for democracy participated in these elections. However, Azerbaijan Communist Party won most of the seats. Despite this victory of Communist Party, the opponent parliamentarians who won approximately 30 seats were organized under the name of “Azerbaijan Democratic Bloc” and participated in the Parliament.¹¹⁷⁰

In August 1991, the conservative members of the Russian Communist Party and KGB made a military coup, which was attempted to force Gorbachev to withdraw from his presidency. Mutallibov, who was in Iran at that time, condemned Gorbachev and supported the military coup. In three days, the coup failed, the organizers were arrested, Gorbachev was replaced by Boris Yeltsin and Soviet Union began to collapse.¹¹⁷¹ The military coup in August was realized by a group who acknowledged that the dissolution of Soviet Union was inevitable and tried to prevent this. However, this attempt to preserve the Union created a reaction in the republics and fastened the dissolution. After this military coup, the republics began

¹¹⁶⁷ Shahla Sultanova, “Challenging the Aliyev Regime: Political opposition in Azerbaijan,” **Demokratizatsiya**, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2014, p. 16.

¹¹⁶⁸ Cavid Abdullayev, “Azerbaycan’da Anayasalaşma Süreci ve Benimsenen Sistemin Niteliği” **Avrasya Dosyası**, Vol. 7, 2001, p. 112.

¹¹⁶⁹ Tokluoglu, “Perceptions of State...,” pp. 322-323.

¹¹⁷⁰ Abdullayev, “Azerbaycan’da Anayasalaşma Süreci...,” p. 112.

¹¹⁷¹ Shamkhal Abilov & Ismayil Isayev, “Azerbaijan-Russian Relations: Azerbaijan’s Pursuit Of Successful Balanced Foreign Policy,” **OAKA**, Vol. 9, No. 19, 2015, pp. 117-119.

to declare their independence. In August 1991, Mutallibov reluctantly accepted the nominal independence of Azerbaijan.¹¹⁷²

On August 30, 1991 “State Independence Declaration of the Republic of Azerbaijan” and “The Constitutional Act on the State Independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan” on October 18, 1991 were declared. On September 8, 1991 the presidential elections in Azerbaijan was held and the only candidate Ayaz Mutallibov was elected.¹¹⁷³ Ayaz Mutalibov was elected in the wake of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms in January 1990¹¹⁷⁴ and amidst the events mentioned above. From another chronological view, three months before Soviet Union was officially dissolved, Mutallibov became Azerbaijan’s first president.¹¹⁷⁵

Mutallibov pursued a largely pro-Russian foreign policy¹¹⁷⁶ at least until the military coup in Soviet Union in August 1991. Abilov and Isayev explains Mutallibov’s rule as below:

“His rule from January 1990 to August 1991 was called by the local nomenklatura [the system of bureaucratic patronage in the former Soviet Union] as ‘enlightened authoritarianism’, by which he tried to merge communist ideology with the national symbols and traditions in order to safeguard his position. Ayaz Mutallibov was considered as a Gorbachev’s man; therefore, he became an early supporter of the Gorbachev’s New Union Treaty efforts in order to revive Soviet Union, whilst giving greater autonomous power to the union republics.”¹¹⁷⁷

Since the independence of Azerbaijan on October 18, 1991, the main challenge for Azerbaijan’s domestic and foreign policy was Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Mutallibov considered that the best way to overcome this problem was to maintain close relations with Russia. Russia’s role in the future of newly independent republics in political and economic spheres could not be underestimated. Therefore, like other republics, Mutallibov signed the Almaty Declaration which proclaimed the

¹¹⁷² Audrey L. Altstadt, “Azerbaijan and Aliyev: Along History and an Uncertain Future,” **Problems of Post-Communism**, Vol. 50, No. 5, 2003, p. 6.

¹¹⁷³ Abdullayev, “Azerbaycan’da Anayasalaşma Süreci...,” pp. 112-113.

¹¹⁷⁴ Radio Free Europe, “Azerbaijan’s First President, Ayaz Mutallibov, Dies At 83,” March 28, 2022, <https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-president-mutallibov-dies/31774654.html> (Retrieved 12.06.2022).

¹¹⁷⁵ **Ibid.**

¹¹⁷⁶ Giorgi Gvalia et al. “Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States,” **Security Studies**, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2013, p. 127.

¹¹⁷⁷ Abilov & Isayev, “Azerbaijan-Russian Relations...,” p. 117.

creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1991. However, this Declaration was not ratified by the Parliament due to the strong resistance from the opposition, mainly the People's Front of Azerbaijan until 1993.¹¹⁷⁸

The conflict with Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and military failures determined the fate of Mutallibov's rule. Kamrava explains the rule of Mutallibov under above-mentioned pressures as below:

*“For Azeris, the human drama unfolding in Karabakh crystallized, albeit in a raw and unrefined form, a strong sense of national and ideological identity which for many decades had not been allowed to evolve. The rapid demise of the Soviet system only deepened the compelling nature of the long-dormant identity. (...) By the time independence came, President Mutallibov had already exhausted his legitimacy in the popular eye long ago, and his championing of Azeri nationalist interests was bought by few outside of his immediate circle. Perhaps Mutallibov's fortunes would have been different were Azeri forces to score victories at the Armenian front, but there, too, he only met with repeated set-backs and territorial losses.”*¹¹⁷⁹

Mutallibov's rule was undermined by the occupation of Khojaly on the night February 26, 1992. The town of Khojaly which was largely populated by Azerbaijanis was attacked by Armenians. Armenians even expanded their military operations to other Azerbaijani territories outside of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armed Armenian military units with support of the 366th Russian regiment, which was situated in Karabakh at the time, targeted the civilian population. According to international sources, between 200 and 1000 inhabitants were killed, and the city was severely damaged. According to Azerbaijani sources, 613 civilians lost their lives, with a further 1250 captured and made prisoners. Many people had to displace forcibly and tried to find shelters in the eastern part of Azerbaijan.¹¹⁸⁰ In addition, 8 families disappeared; 56 people were brutally killed; only 1 person left in 27 families; 26 children lost both mothers and fathers; 130 children lost one of the

¹¹⁷⁸ Rovshan Ibrahimov, Azerbaijan The State as Crossroads of Internal Policy and the External Interests, in Vanderhill & Aleprete, **“International Dimensions...”**, p. 126.

¹¹⁷⁹ Kamrava, **“State-Building...”**, pp. 221-222.

¹¹⁸⁰ Rovshan Ibrahimov, Azerbaijan The State as Crossroads of Internal Policy and the External Interests, in Vanderhill & Aleprete, **“International Dimensions...”**, p. 127; Karabakh Center, **“Khojaly Genocide: A Horrific Page in the History of Humanity,”** <https://story.karabakh.center/en/khojaly-genocide-a-horrific-page-in-the-history-of-humanity> (Retrieved on 24.10.2022).

parents; 230 families lost a job holder; 487 people became disabled (including 76 children); 1165 hostages were freed; 150 people went missing.¹¹⁸¹ During this chaotic situation, the Armenians managed to create a corridor from Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, the so-called Lachin Link.¹¹⁸²

Mutallibov had to overcome the impact of Nagorno-Karabakh on his rule and opposition. Pro-independence groups called for the withdrawal from Russia-led organization, CIS, in order to prevent Russian influence and not to jeopardize the independence of their country. Boris Yeltsin had promised the disbandment of the 366th motorized infantry brigade, which would later play a critical role in Khojaly massacre while insisting on the membership of Azerbaijan to the CIS. As mentioned, the tragedy in Khojaly ended Mutallibov's presidential post. Just after the Khojaly tragedy, President Mutallibov offered his resignation to the Supreme Soviet and Yakub Mamedov, the Speaker of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan Republic became an acting president of Azerbaijan.¹¹⁸³

Surprisingly, six weeks later, Yakub Mamedov attempted to hand the office back to Mutallibov. The former communists in the Supreme Soviet did not accept Mutallibov's resignation. Mutallibov took his former seat at the head of the chamber and restored his presidency.¹¹⁸⁴ However, Mutallibov's return was short-lived.¹¹⁸⁵ It lasted only 4 days from 14 to 18 May 1992.¹¹⁸⁶ AFP was restored and its leaders refused the rule of Mutallibov and martial law. Under the command of a police colonel, Iskendar Hamidov, Popular Front forces intruded the Parliament building. Mutallibov escaped the city and fled to Moscow where he stayed afterwards.¹¹⁸⁷

What had given a second chance to Ayaz Mutallibov to restore its position as a head of government again? This was also closely related to the course of Nagorno-Karabakh war. The seizure of the Lachin corridor –the part of Azerbaijan proper that connects Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia- facilitated the access of Armenians to the region and fastened their progress. The occupation of Susha on May 9, 1992 by

¹¹⁸¹ Karabakh Center, "**Khojaly Genocide...**"

¹¹⁸² Laska, "**Azerbaijan Diary...**," pp. 84-85.

¹¹⁸³ Abilov & Isayev, "**Azerbaijan-Russian Relations...**," pp. 119-120.; Rovshan Ibrahimov, Azerbaijan The State as Crossroads of Internal Policy and the External Interests, in Vanderhill & Aleprete, "**International Dimensions...**," p. 127.

¹¹⁸⁴ Altstadt, "**Azerbaijan and Aliyev...**," p. 6.

¹¹⁸⁵ **Ibid.**

¹¹⁸⁶ Abdullayev, "**Azerbaycan'da Anayasalaşma Süreci...**," pp. 112-113.

¹¹⁸⁷ Altstadt, "**Azerbaijan and Aliyev...**," p. 6.

Armenian forces further worsened the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Shusha, known as “the hearth of Karabakh”, is the region’s capital in historical terms and has a significant role in revitalizing national feelings of both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Shusha has also strategic importance for the defense of the region.¹¹⁸⁸ When on May 14, Mutallibov reappeared in the parliament, he used the invasion of Shusha to dictate his rule and call himself as a dictator. He underlined his “readiness to step in if the country needs a dictator”, and pledged to take Azerbaijan into the Russia-led CIS.¹¹⁸⁹

In sum, the “Nagorno-Karabakh factor” was used actively by rival elites towards each other in Azerbaijan. These armed hostilities caused the rise and fall of political leaders in Baku. Khojaly massacre in 1992 was the beginning of the decline of Mutallibov, however, the subsequent fall of Shusha and Lachin made inevitable the end of Mutallibov’s regime since he lost power and could not be successful to restore his rule.¹¹⁹⁰ Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence from Azerbaijan in January 1992. Armenians became able to secure much of Nagorno-Karabakh and the region bordering Armenia. In July, Azerbaijanis launched an offensive attack and quickly pushed back Armenian defenders in Nagorno-Karabakh.¹¹⁹¹ Parliament decided that the presidential elections would take place on June 7, 1992. The nationalist APF led by Abulfaz Elchibey gained power in these circumstances and Elchibey won this election with majority.¹¹⁹²

2. Abulfaz Elchibey

As mentioned above, established in 1988, the Popular Front was led by a respected dissident, Abulfaz Elchibey, who had been even imprisoned because of his anti-Soviet activities in the 1970s.¹¹⁹³ Elchibey was born in 1938 in Nakhichevan, the Azeri enclave beyond Armenia. He was an orientalist professor at the university and member of the Communist Party. As he proposed Azeri instead of Russian as the

¹¹⁸⁸ Souleimanov, “**The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh...**,” p. 209.

¹¹⁸⁹ Abilov & Isayev, “**Azerbaijan-Russian Relations...**,” p. 120.

¹¹⁹⁰ Musabayov, “**The Karabakh Conflict...**,” p. 61.

¹¹⁹¹ Michael D. Mihalka & Mark R. Wilcox, “Unintended Strategic Consequences of Security Assistance in the South Caucasus,” **JFQ**, No. 57, 2nd quarter 2010, p. 28.

¹¹⁹² Abdullayev, “**Azerbaycan’da Anayasalaşma Süreci...**,” pp. 112-113.

¹¹⁹³ Kamrava, “**State-Building...**,” p. 221.

language of instruction, he expelled from the party. He was jailed for 18 months to work in a quarry.¹¹⁹⁴

On June 16, 1989, Abulfaz Elchibey was elected chairman of the Popular Front which became a strong rival against the Communist party. He put his signature on a protocol with Communist Party First Secretary Abdulrahman Vezirov on ten points, to legalize the Popular Front, to cease the military curfew, and to pass a new sovereignty law. This law was claimed Azerbaijan's right to challenge federal authority, and even to withdraw from Soviet Union.¹¹⁹⁵

As mentioned above, in March 1992, after the seizure of the city of Khojaly in the territory of Karabakh, President Ayaz Mutallibov was compelled to resign. In June 1992 new presidential elections took place in Azerbaijan and the leader of the APF, Abulfaz Elchibey, came to power. Elchibey promised to protect Azerbaijan's statehood and territorial integrity and overcome the stalemate in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.¹¹⁹⁶ By March 1992, neither the APF's popularity in Baku nor the army's humiliating losses in Nagorno-Karabakh could be disregarded. Elchibey was able to rant Russian manipulation in Khojaly massacre and like his predecessor, Mutallibov, used this tragedy to strengthen his rule.

The APF's platform largely reflected the ideology of its founder. "*A proponent of pan-Turkism, with hopes of the political unity of all Turkic lands from China to the Balkans, and a 'typical representative of the intelligentsia,' Elchibey was known 'for his closeness to Turkey, a preoccupation with Azeri compatriots in Iran, a somewhat moderate position on the conflict with Armenia, and a conciliatory attitude toward the nomenklatura.'*"¹¹⁹⁷ He condemned Gorbachev for interventions in the Baltic, in Tbilisi and Baku. Elchibey hoped a common Caucasian state. His model was Kemal Atatürk who modernized Turkey rather than Imam (Ruhollah) Khomeini was the Supreme leader of Iran. He recommended the introduction of the Latin alphabet into Azerbaijan.¹¹⁹⁸

As mentioned above, in contrast to his predecessor, Elchibey followed a policy of pan-Turkism and Azerbaijan's strategic partnership with Turkey during his rule.

¹¹⁹⁴ Laska, "Azerbaijan Diary...", p. 85.

¹¹⁹⁵ Sultanova, "Challenging the Aliyev Regime...", pp. 16-17.

¹¹⁹⁶ Tokluoglu, "Perceptions of State...", pp. 322-323.

¹¹⁹⁷ Kamrava, "State-Building...", p. 221.

¹¹⁹⁸ Laska, "Azerbaijan Diary...", p. 85.

*“Whereas Mutalibov was a typical Soviet politician having a strong affiliation with and links to Moscow, Elchibey was a former Soviet dissident and anti-communist leader who considered Russia to be the main threat to Azerbaijan’s independence and pursued the strictly anti-Russian, pro-Turkish policy accordingly.”*¹¹⁹⁹ Elchibey often underlined that Turks and Azerbaijanis were *“one nation, two states.”*¹²⁰⁰

For Elchibey, Russian-led organization, CIS, meant an impediment to the development of independent and multifaceted foreign policy orientations.¹²⁰¹ In 1992, within a few months of election that Elchibey won, Azerbaijan withdrew from the CIS which was recently established at that time. Elchibey aimed to establish closer economic and political relations with Turkey and other Soviet Republics.¹²⁰² *“Elchibey’s pro-Turkish foreign policy course disturbed Russia and Iran, with the possibility of rising Pan-Turkism within the Turkic states of Central Asia and in the territories of Russia and Iran, in areas populated by ethnic Turks.”*¹²⁰³

The APF carried out its policies in compliance with its liberal and democratic principles. Although it failed or led to disappointment sometimes, Azerbaijan experienced political freedom for the first time by the governance of Popular Front.¹²⁰⁴ However, the new pro-Turkish, nationalist government could not overcome the challenges that the new nation encountered. The democratic idyll in Azerbaijan’s transition to independence did not last long. The first blow to the APF came from the military defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh. Although the APF enjoyed popularity across the nation, it did not have experience or organizational skills to achieve military success in Nagorno-Karabakh.¹²⁰⁵

Some argues that the military failure in Nagorno-Karabakh was inevitable. *“Military bases in Nagorno-Karabakh was ruling by Azeri warlords and was considered their own private army. When these warlords withdrew their bases from front with the pressure of the external forces, the regular army of Azerbaijan government was too weak to stand against the Armenian forces. This had ended up*

¹¹⁹⁹ Giorgi Gvalia et al., *“Thinking Outside the Bloc....”* p. 127.

¹²⁰⁰ Zeyno Baran, “The Caucasus: Ten Years after Independence,” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2022, p. 226.

¹²⁰¹ Sakwa & Webber, *“The Commonwealth of Independent States....”* p. 401.

¹²⁰² Kamrava, *“State-Building....”* pp. 221-222.

¹²⁰³ Rovshan Ibrahimov, Azerbaijan The State as Crossroads of Internal Policy and the External Interests, in Vanderhill & Aleprete, *“International Dimensions....”* p. 127.

¹²⁰⁴ Anar M. Valiyev, “Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan: A Failed Revolution,” *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 53, No. 3, 2006, p. 18.

¹²⁰⁵ Sultanova, *“Challenging the Aliyev Regime....”* pp. 17-18.

with territorial loss in Nagorno-Karabakh and public protest against the new military failure.”¹²⁰⁶ Therefore, the APF gradually lost its power and could not govern the country. Elchibey’s power declined due to military defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh during the winter of 1992-1993 and Armenian control over the surrounding regions. In addition, economic problems and hostile attitudes of the Russian and Iranian governments played an important role in this decline.¹²⁰⁷

Musabayov stresses same difficulties that the Popular Front faced as below:

*“The Popular Front administration initially enjoyed considerable legitimacy, securing the departure of Soviet military forces stationed in Azerbaijan and creating a national army. However, the new leadership’s inexperience, and its inability to either force a military victory in Nagorno-Karabakh or have the courage and flexibility to seek a peaceful solution, resulted in widespread disappointment. ...Azerbaijan descended into anarchy and lawlessness, in which armed groups and criminality burgeoned; exploiting this situation Armenian forces were able to occupy a further five districts around Nagorno-Karabakh.”*¹²⁰⁸

Elchibey had trouble to command army that had a lack of command structure and was disloyal to his rule. Surat Huseynov, who was one of former prime ministers and commander as well as the presidential envoy in Nagorno-Karabakh at that time, rejected to take orders. Due to this refusal, he was removed from his position. In response to this, Huseynov quickly constituted a “private army” out of their barracks in Ganja by using military hardware remained from Russian army.¹²⁰⁹ Huseynov increasingly threatened Elchibey’s rule. Elchibey fled to his village and invited his Nakhichevan compatriot Heydar Aliyev, the former leader of Soviet Azerbaijan, a former member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, and a KGB general, to come to the capital. Aliyev came to Baku and made a deal with Huseynov.¹²¹⁰

Elchibey’s regime was affected by the further deterioration in relations with two important neighbors, Russia and Iran. As a result, Russia continued to put

¹²⁰⁶ Abilov & Isayev, “Azerbaijan-Russian Relations...,” p. 122.

¹²⁰⁷ Valiyev, “Parliamentary Elections...,” p. 18.

¹²⁰⁸ Musabayov, “The Karabakh Conflict...,” p. 61.

¹²⁰⁹ Sultanova, “Challenging the Aliyev Regime...,” pp. 16-18.

¹²¹⁰ Souleimanov, “The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh...,” p. 210.

pressure on Azerbaijan by supporting Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Iran followed the same course, expanding relations with Armenia in all spheres. Azerbaijan's economy had numerous difficulties during this period and Azerbaijan did not receive support for its political and economic reforms. Between the period of 1988 and 1994, Azerbaijan's economic power decreased substantially. From independence until 1996, Azerbaijan's GDP declined by 60%.¹²¹¹ In addition, Elchibey's pro-Western and in particular pro-Turkish foreign policy positions disturbed Azerbaijan's powerful neighbors, Russia and Iran, who both attempted to increase ethnic tensions among Azerbaijan's Talysh and Lezgin minority communities.¹²¹²

Elchibey's oil policies did not please anyone. He wanted to turn his face towards Western multinational companies for the extraction of Caspian energy sources. As other Azerbaijani leaders, oil revenues were seen critical for the future of Azerbaijan. However, the problem was how to allocate these resources and with whom Baku would cooperate. Many oil companies were called to participate in the consortium. However, as a part of pro-Western policy, Russia was not invited. Elchibey aimed to elaborate the three oil deposits, primarily, Azeri, Guneshli, Chirag, with the collaboration of western oil companies. In this respect, on September 7, 1992, an agreement was signed with British Petroleum (BP) and Statoil on the Chirag field and Shah Deniz promising structure. Another draft contract was signed together with Pennzoil and Ramco on 1 October. The final contract was signed between Baku and the various foreign oil drilling companies for Azerbaijani oil deposits in London in June 1993.¹²¹³

In June 1993, Huseynov removed the Popular Front, and replaced it with Heydar Aliyev. This event started the beginning of the Aliyev's family regime, which still rules the country today. Once again, the APF became the political opposition, however, this time under very difficult circumstances.¹²¹⁴ Aliyev himself became president of the parliament. Huseynov's military coup attempt revealed that Elchibey fled the country while Aliyev had been treated as a hero. A referendum was held in August 1993 and showed that 97,5% of Azerbaijani people did not trust

¹²¹¹ Rovshan Ibrahimov, Azerbaijan The State as Crossroads of Internal Policy and the External Interests, in Vanderhill & Aleprete, "**International Dimensions...**," p. 128.

¹²¹² Giorgi Gvalia et al., "**Thinking Outside the Bloc...**," p. 127.

¹²¹³ Abilov & Isayev, "**Azerbaijan-Russian Relations...**," pp. 122-123.

¹²¹⁴ Sultanova, "**Challenging the Aliyev Regime...**," pp. 16-18.

anymore Elchibey's regime. The Parliament approved the referendum results and decided that new presidential elections would realize on October 3, 1993. In this election, by receiving %98,8 votes,¹²¹⁵ Aliyev became the head of the republic and tried to improve national and international prestige of his country.¹²¹⁶

3. Heydar Aliyev

Heydar Aliyev who was born on May 10, 1923 was originally from the city of Nakhchivan. He carried out a career which was mostly concentrated on public sector. Aliyev attached great importance to his education while he was working for some state institutions. In 1939, in the wake of his graduation from Nakhchivan Pedagogical School, he started his education in Azerbaijan Industrial Institute (today's Azerbaijan State Oil and Industrial University), Faculty of Architecture, but he could not complete his studies due to the outbreak of the World War II. In 1941-1944, Heydar Aliyev headed a secret division at the Archive Department and was nominated as head of the General Department of the Council of People's Commissars of Nakhchivan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In his entire career, he carried out important duties in Azerbaijan SSR.¹²¹⁷

When the Soviet troops entered to Baku and committed crime on the night of 19-20 January 1990, Heydar Aliyev strongly condemned those who were responsible and demanded their punishment. To protest Soviet policy, he left the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in July 1991. At the same year, he was elected as chairman of the Supreme Assembly of the Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan and as deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Azerbaijan. He served for this position until 1993.¹²¹⁸

As mentioned earlier, in May-June 1993, under the risk of civil war, Elchibey had to invite Heydar Aliyev to Baku. On June 15, 1993, Heydar Aliyev became chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan, and he took the office of President on June 24, 1993. On October 3, 1993, Heydar Aliyev was elected as President of the

¹²¹⁵ Abdullayev, "Azerbaycan'da Anayasalaşma Süreci...", p. 113.

¹²¹⁶ Souleimanov, "The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh...", p. 210.; Musabayov, "The Karabakh Conflict...", p. 61.

¹²¹⁷ President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, "Heydar Alirza oglu Aliyev" <https://president.az/en/pages/view/azerbaijan/leader> (Retrieved on 20.05.2022).

¹²¹⁸ Kamrava, "State-Building...", p. 222.

Republic of Azerbaijan with 99% of votes.¹²¹⁹ Colonel Husseinov became the Prime Minister. Some argues that the elections results are exaggerated and do not reflect reality. However, it seems that Azerbaijani society needed a strong political figure that was able to solve their problems at that time. For this election, Kamrava says, *“In hindsight, the elections can be seen as a means for the Azeris to search for solutions to the seemingly insurmountable difficulties that confronted them at the time.”*¹²²⁰

The basic structure of Azerbaijan’s political system was based on one man, Heydar Aliyev who was seen as the father of nation. When Aliyev came to power, the AFP and Musavat were marginalized to a great extent.¹²²¹ His predecessors and rivals even increased Aliyev’s popularity. Kamrava described this situation as such: *“A known name and a savvy politician, the events of the past few years significantly facilitated Aliyev’s ascension to the presidency: Mutalibov had been too close to the Soviet system to have been accepted by most Azeris as a reformed neo-Communist; Elchibey had proven to be politically naïve and administratively incompetent; and Colonel Husseinov appears to have been tagged by Moscow as a coup leader but not a President.”*¹²²²

Some argues that the return of Aliyev put an end to the transition period to a democratic state in Azerbaijan. For Heydar Aliyev, political opposition and criticism meant disloyalty.¹²²³ He intimidated the journalist, sentenced and imprisoned opposition activists, arrested the leaders of the Lezgin separatist movement Sadval, prevented the activities of opposition parties, in particular those belonging to the APF, and demonstrations.¹²²⁴ Azerbaijan signed the ceasefire under these authoritarian policies at home. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict had turned into a deadlock, caused large-scale military expenditures, and was preventing the development of Azerbaijan.¹²²⁵

¹²¹⁹ President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “Heydar Alirza oglu Aliyev” <https://president.az/en/pages/view/azerbaijan/leader> (Retrieved on May 20, 2023); Coppieters, **“The Politicisation and Securitisation...”** p. 74.

¹²²⁰ Kamrava, **“State-Building...”** p. 222.

¹²²¹ Thomas De Waal, “Azerbaijan at 25: A New Era Of Change And Turbulence,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016, pp. 3-4.; Coppieters, **“The Politicisation and Securitisation...”** p. 74.; Mihalka & Wilcox, **“Unintended Strategic Consequences...”** p. 28.

¹²²² Kamrava, **“State-Building...”** p. 222.

¹²²³ Valiyev, **“Parliamentary Elections...”** p. 18.

¹²²⁴ Li-Chen, **“In Search of Security...”** p. 27.

¹²²⁵ Musabayov, **“The Karabakh Conflict...”** p. 61.

Aliyev's political figure was strong in Azerbaijan. It is argued that weak institutions had contributed a lot to the rise of such a strong political figure. Aliyev's character and personal relations with its society was very pervasive and dominant under his rule.¹²²⁶ The bureaucrats had been appointed by Heydar Aliyev himself in state structures and all power had been concentrated at the hands of Heydar Aliyev. Particularly those who were from Aliyev's Nakhichevan region were more advantageous under his rule.¹²²⁷ Aliyev was successful in establishing closer relations with elites and consolidate his power especially around Baku. Although Azerbaijani army failed in some attempts in Nagorno-Karabakh war, Aliyev preserved his popularity. He prevented a military coup attempt in October 1994 by his prime minister, Huseynov, disarmed some armed groups, and managed to overcome a number of assassination and coup attempts.¹²²⁸ On October 11, 1998, Heydar Aliyev won the presidential seat again with 76,1% of votes in a high turnout election.¹²²⁹

After the dissolution of Soviet Union, the main question was about which ideology would be used to organize the state. As mentioned in previous sections, Mutallibov declared to reform communism as the state ideology of Azerbaijan. The APF government's new state ideology had pro-Turkic and democratic tenets. According to the APF, all citizens were equal regardless of ethnic, linguistic, and religious background. Heydar Aliyev aimed to maintain the secular nature of the state and minimized the role of parties that underlined ethnicity-related issues. He even excluded some parties that had close relations with Turkey and Iran from the parliamentary elections of November 1995.¹²³⁰

Aliyev was known as an anticommunist and nationalist leader despite of his Soviet background. He was very pragmatic politician and aimed to balance Azerbaijan's foreign policy options. By signing the agreement for joining to the CIS on September 24, he pleased Russian authorities. In return, Aliyev received support from Russia for signing cease-fire in 1994.¹²³¹ Aliyev established close links with

¹²²⁶ Kamrava, "State-Building...", p. 218.

¹²²⁷ De Waal, "Azerbaijan at 25...", p. 4.

¹²²⁸ Laitin & Suny, "Armenia and Azerbaijan...", p. 157.

¹²²⁹ President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, "Heydar Alirza oglu Aliyev" <https://president.az/en/pages/view/azerbaijan/leader> (Retrieved on May 20, 2023).

¹²³⁰ Li-Chen, "In Search of Security...", p. 27.

¹²³¹ Abilov & Isayev, "Azerbaijan-Russian Relations...", p. 124.

Russia, neutralized Turkish fears, and developed relations with Iran.¹²³² Most importantly, Aliyev did not antagonize Russians and did not disregard Russian interests in the region, especially in the issues such as breakaway regions and republics.¹²³³ On the one hand, he approved the membership of Azerbaijan to the CIS, but on the other hand, he could be able to empathize with Azerbaijani nation that had deep anti-Russian feelings and objected Russian military presence in the region.¹²³⁴ Sultanova explains Aliyev's influence in the eyes of Azerbaijani society with these words below:

*“Aliyev's ability to promote stability, marked by the cease-fire with Armenia, and to increase Azerbaijan's international profile further reduced the credibility of the opposition in the eyes of the nation. Though it had once enjoyed enormous popularity, the APF became the subject of criticism, questions, and even ridicule. (...) Unlike the Popular Front's nationalist, ideological, and pro-Turkish leaders, Aliyev preferred to work with those who had been educated and employed in the same Soviet institutions as he had. (...) This characteristic of Heydar Aliyev was greatly appreciated by the Russian-speaking Azerbaijani elites, who felt isolated under the strong nationalist ideology of the previous government. At the time, they were the best educated people in society.”*¹²³⁵

Aliyev also tried to develop relations with the US. Actually, he was quite successful in doing this thanks to his anti-terrorist rhetoric and support for Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Therefore, he succeeded to remove the Sanctions Amendment (Section 907) to the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which had banned direct U.S. government aid to Azerbaijan.¹²³⁶

Aliyev did not hesitate to make some concession in order to accommodate Russia's interests. In addition to joining to the CIS as mentioned above, he invited Russian oil companies to take part in energy projects in Azerbaijan. In return, Aliyev aimed to receive Russian support on Nagorno-Karabakh and on the legal status of the

¹²³² Tokluoglu, “Perceptions of State...,” pp. 322-323.

¹²³³ Coppieters, “The Politicisation and Securitisation...,” p. 75.; Sakwa & Webber, “The Commonwealth of Independent States...,” p. 394.; Kubicek, “End of the Line for the Commonwealth...,” p. 16.

¹²³⁴ Laitin & Suny, “Armenia and Azerbaijan...,” p. 157.

¹²³⁵ Sultanova, “Challenging the Aliyev Regime...,” pp. 18-19.

¹²³⁶ Altstadt, “Azerbaijan and Aliyev...,” p. 4.

Caspian Sea. Aliyev's foreign policy advisor, Vafa Gulizade, said: "*Oil is our strategy; it's our defense and our independence.*"¹²³⁷ However, Aliyev could not be successful in gathering Russian support in Nagorno-Karabakh since 20% loss of Azerbaijan's total territory remained lost. He did not give up deepening relations with Russia while he engaged with the West especially. The involvement of multiple countries' investment in the oil and gas to bolster national security was his main purpose.¹²³⁸

In 1993, The Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) called upon eight Western companies, one Saudi Arabian company, and one Russian firm (Lukoil) to develop the country's offshore oil and gas fields.¹²³⁹ The negotiations were suspended. After improving relations with Russia and receiving support against Armenia, Aliyev reset negotiations with Western powers and signed "Deal of Century" on September 20, 1994.¹²⁴⁰ In 1995, Aliyev provided Russia the largest share in the development of the Karabakh oil field. However, he continued to diversify energy partners. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline to transfer oil and gas to Western markets through Georgia and Turkey were signed few years later.¹²⁴¹

As seen above, Aliyev's oil strategy was an instrument to gain power and legitimacy in Nagorno-Karabakh war. Oil has been also used to receive Russian support on the conflict. This strategy was also a clear example of balancing great and regional powers in his foreign policy.

Azerbaijan established significant institutions and determined most of its policies regarding to IDP population under Aliyev's regime. In Azerbaijan, a governmental institution, The State Committee for Refugee and IDP issues of the Republic of Azerbaijan, is responsible for dealing with the IDPs and their problems. In connection with the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan "On the status of IDPs and the refugees" adopted in 1992, in order to conform the name of the Committee to the requirements of the above-mentioned Law, due to Presidential decree dated January,

¹²³⁷ Inwook Kim, **Crude Security: Oil, Armament, and Alliance**, The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University, dissertation submitted in January 31, 2016, p. 1.

¹²³⁸ Giorgi Gvalia et al., "**Thinking Outside the Bloc...**," p. 128.

¹²³⁹ **Ibid.**

¹²⁴⁰ Abilov & Isayev, "**Azerbaijan-Russian Relations...**," pp. 124-125.

¹²⁴¹ Giorgi Gvalia et al., "**Thinking Outside the Bloc...**," p. 128.

5, 1993, “The State committee of Azerbaijan SSR on work with the people, compelled to leave their inhabitancy places” was renamed as “The State Committee for refugee and IDP issues of the Republic of Azerbaijan.”¹²⁴²

Within the framework of IDPs, two laws were issued so far. The first one is “Law on the status of refugees and internally displaced persons”¹²⁴³ and the other one is “Law on social protection of IDPs and persons equated to them.”¹²⁴⁴ Law on the status of refugees and internally displaced persons which was issued on May 21, 1999 distinguishes two basic concepts (refugees (*kaçkın* in Turkish/Azeri) and IDP (*məcburi göçkün* in Turkish/Azeri) as such:

“The term ‘Refugee’ shall apply to person who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return.

The term ‘Internally Displaced Person (IDP)’ shall apply to any person who has moved to another place being forced to leave his/her permanent residence within the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan in connection with military aggression, natural or manmade disaster. The IDP status can be granted according to decision of appropriate executive authority to the citizen of the Republic of Azerbaijan, being forced to leave the place of the permanent residence in the other country and coming to the Republic of Azerbaijan by the reasons, indicated in part 1 of this Article.”¹²⁴⁵

State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan announced that as a result of the work done, from 1993 to

¹²⁴² State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “History,” <http://idp.gov.az/en/content/1/parent/1>

¹²⁴³ State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan, **Qaçqınların və məcburi köçkünlərin (ölkə daxilində köçürülmüş şəxslərin) statusu haqqında**, <http://idp.gov.az/en/law/93/parent/15>

¹²⁴⁴ State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan, **Məcburi köçkünlərin və onlara bərabər tutulan şəxslərin sosial müdafiəsi haqqında**, <http://idp.gov.az/en/law/92/parent/15>

¹²⁴⁵ State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan, **Qaçqınların və məcburi köçkünlərin (ölkə daxilində köçürülmüş şəxslərin) statusu haqqında**, <http://idp.gov.az/en/law/93/parent/15>

2004, individual states, financial institutions, international humanitarian and development organizations provided more than \$ 640 million in humanitarian assistance to refugees, IDPs and low-income people on various projects. In 1999, at the request of the national leader to the headquarters of the UN World Food Program, the term of the organization's activities in Azerbaijan was extended as an exception until the end of 2005. According to the agreement signed between ACIP Azerbaijan, Italy's ENI and UNHCR in 1999, 253 houses and social facilities for 234 IDPs were built in Khanlar district, 124 houses and social facilities for 110 families in Beylagan district, water lines were laid for 5600 people in 35 villages in Agjabadi district (Takhtakorpu). In 1994-1995, \$ 70-75 million was spent annually on projects implemented by international, local humanitarian and development organizations established by them. In 2004, this amount was about \$ 34 million. In 2001, a number of international organizations stopped providing food assistance to refugees, IDPs and low-income people. However, taking into account the funds allocated from the State Oil Fund, the government did not allow reducing expenditures in this area, but increased them.¹²⁴⁶

The first initiative of Aliyev, as indicated above, was to negotiate a cease-fire with Armenia in May 1994 under the auspices of the OSCE. Aliyev made a decision by focusing on negotiations instead of military action with some strategic and political considerations. Firstly, as a strategic reason, Aliyev was aware of the fact that he could not defeat Armenians in the battlefield. Even though the Azerbaijani army became successful at some points, Russia that had trouble to deal with its own Muslim minorities in Daghestan and Chechnya would not be pleased of seeing this victory. Secondly, as witnessed at the past, warfare may create a military hero with political actions such as Colonel Huseynov. By concentrating on negotiation option, he minimized this possibility. By doing so, the President could eliminate all potential or actual military coup plotters as he succeeded in 1994 and 1995.¹²⁴⁷

Aliyev also used the steps taken under the guidance of Minsk Group. After the failure of the various Minsk Group proposals of 1997-1998, he surprised everyone by publicizing all of the proposals on the table and launched a parliamentary debate on the subject. Many participants expressed their support to government and pleased

¹²⁴⁶ State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan, "Statecare," <http://idp.gov.az/en/care/parent/21>

¹²⁴⁷ Kamrava, "State-Building...", p. 223.

how they were devoted to territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Political parties in the nationalist/reformist camp, such as the Popular Front and Musavat, paid no attention to the parliamentary debate by claiming that this was just an attempt to negate political discontent with the lack of progress in the negotiation process. Opposition leaders announced that they did not trust Aliyev's strategy of distributing oil contracts to great powers that was used as an instrument to decrease Armenian lobbies' impact. Despite the criticisms, Aliyev reached his aims. He informed the society and displayed that the opposition had no constructive proposal for the resolution of the conflict.¹²⁴⁸

In 2001, the three countries France, Russia, and the US, which served as co-chairs of the Minsk Group started to work for resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia made concession on Nagorno-Karabakh issue respectively on the status and the right for Azerbaijani IDPs to return. Heydar Aliyev agreed to take Meghri from Armenia in return for Nagorno-Karabakh. According to him, Nagorno-Karabakh should be completely part of Azerbaijan or be given up. In other words, Aliyev did not want an uneasy Armenian population in the region. Although Aliyev saw the land swap solution as the best option, Azerbaijani political elite did not support him on this. The differences between what Aliyev said privately and his public statements caused some reactions. Negotiations resumed in April 2004.¹²⁴⁹

Despite the inadequacies and failures in both battlefield and table, Aliyev achieved to preserve his image as a strong leader in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. He followed a balanced policy not only at home but also abroad. At home, he attempted to gather public support for his actions particularly in the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict despite the fact that he did not have to do so. In abroad, he aimed to diversify his foreign policy options and establish closer links with Turkey, Iran, and the West without jeopardizing relations with Russia. Although his deeds and words contradicted to each other sometimes and he was criticized because of this, Heydar Aliyev was able to manage his good public image until his death to a great extent and launched an Aliyevs' era that will continue with his son's policies and statements which are quite similar to the ones he pursued. Aliyev gave up his

¹²⁴⁸ Musabayov, "**The Karabakh Conflict...**," p. 62.

¹²⁴⁹ Salih Yılmaz, "Land Swap Formula in the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis Solution: Goble Plan and Lavrov Plan," **Bilig**, No. 100, Winter 2022, pp. 193-194.

candidacy in favor of Ilham Aliyev in connection with health problems in 2003 elections. On December 12, 2003, he passed away.¹²⁵⁰

4. Ilham Aliyev

Born in Baku on December 24, 1961, the son of Heydar Aliyev, Ilham Aliyev pursued a career in both private and public sector. He graduated from the department of International Relations and received his PhD degree on history. After giving some lectures, he started to work for business sector. From 1994 to August 2003, he served as vice-president and first vice-president of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR). In 1995 and 2000, he became a parliamentarian to the *Milli Majlis* (Parliament) of the Republic of Azerbaijan.¹²⁵¹ On August 4, 2003, he became Prime Minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan. On October 15, 2003, Ilham Aliyev won the presidential elections with more than 76% of votes. Five years later, on October 15, 2008, Ilham Aliyev won the elections again for the second term with 88,73% of votes. As a result of the presidential election held on October 9, 2013, Ilham Aliyev was re-elected as President with 84,54% of votes for the third time. Lastly, in the election held on April 11, 2018, Ilham Aliyev gained 86,2% of votes and has been re-elected as the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan.¹²⁵²

Ilham Aliyev, holding his post for the fourth time, is the sole political figure in Azerbaijan's history in the last 20 years. In 2009, there had been a controversial constitutional change abolishing term limits. A new constitutional referendum on September 26, 2016, proposed a further extension of the presidential term from five to seven years.¹²⁵³

As described in the previous section, Heydar Aliyev, by grasping that army was a great danger to his rule, tried to minimize military's role and was even successful to use the factions within military for its own political aims.¹²⁵⁴ Ilham Aliyev follows a policy, which is more or less similar to his father's policies.¹²⁵⁵ Both of these leaders claim that Azerbaijan is a democracy; however, Aliyev family

¹²⁵⁰ President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, "Heydar Aliyev" <https://president.az/en/pages/view/azerbaijan/leader> (Retrieved on May 20, 2023).

¹²⁵¹ President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, "Ilham Heydar oğlu Aliyev" <https://president.az/en/pages/view/president/biography> (Retrieved on May 20, 2023).

¹²⁵² *Ibid.*

¹²⁵³ De Waal, "Azerbaijan at 25...", p. 1.

¹²⁵⁴ Mihalka & Wilcox, "Unintended Strategic Consequences...", p. 28.

¹²⁵⁵ Tokluoglu, "Perceptions of State...", pp. 322-323.

implemented very authoritarian policies.¹²⁵⁶ For some authors, there is a difference between the stances of Heydar Aliyev and Ilham Aliyev to democracy and governance. Heydar Aliyev stressed the importance of democracy and human rights, however, he did not seem to be devoted itself to these principles. However, Ilham Aliyev seemed to be more sincere in his commitments to democracy.¹²⁵⁷

Many scholars think that Azerbaijan has its own democracy model. Gvalia and his colleagues explain Ilham Aliyev's democracy model as below:

*“Ideologically, Ilham Aliyev’s elites feel more comfortable with the Russian model of managed democracy. The idea of Putin-like ‘sovereign democracy’ is a proverb frequently used in government circles. (...) The current Azerbaijani model is based on two sets of ideas. The first is ‘a cult of personality’ for Heydar Aliyev, the founding father, as well as for the son. The second idea is ‘a strong presidency’ to retain political stability and ensure economic development.”*¹²⁵⁸

De Waal explains Aliyevs' rules with these words: *“Ruling Azerbaijan is a tougher assignment for the younger Aliyev first of all because he lacks the authority that his father had, as well as the experience and detailed knowledge of Azerbaijan—which is hardly surprising as he spent many years out of the country, studying and working. He has been forced to rely on a coterie of older advisers and ministers, many of whom also served his father.”*¹²⁵⁹ Despite of this, Ilham Aliyev was successful in establishing his authority in the country. Under Ilham Aliyev's rule, the Central Committee of the Communist Party maintained its existence in different forms as the presidential apparatus. In the regions, presidential appointees hold the authority in their hands. In Baku, the Cabinet of Ministers and the parliament are part of the presidential apparatus. In the regions, local municipalities do not have a significant role.¹²⁶⁰

Russian authorities supported Ilham Aliyev when he was elected as president in October 2003. In his first period from 2003 to 2008, Ilham Aliyev pursued a balanced foreign policy. This policy was inherited from his father, Heydar Aliyev

¹²⁵⁶ DerHartunian, **“Negotiation and Settlement...,”** p. 302.

¹²⁵⁷ Giorgi Gvalia et al., **“Thinking Outside the Bloc...,”** p. 129.

¹²⁵⁸ **Ibid.**

¹²⁵⁹ De Waal, **“Azerbaijan at 25...,”** pp. 3-4.

¹²⁶⁰ Yunusov, **“Azerbaijani Security Problems...,”** p. 151.

and its main component was to maintain good relations with Russia while the diversification of foreign policy partners were aimed at the same time.¹²⁶¹ It can be also argued that this pro-Russian policy was supported in Ilham Aliyev's period in a stronger tone. Just after 2003, *"Ilham Aliyev substantially changed his father's approach to foreign policy by further intensifying relations with Moscow. The new ruling elite downgraded relations with the EU and NATO, at least rhetorically, and changed its language from 'integration' to 'partnership.'"*¹²⁶²

In 2007, Azerbaijan launched its first Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO within the framework of a new mechanism defining the cornerstone of their cooperation. Azerbaijan is currently an associate member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.¹²⁶³ Ilham Aliyev's foreign policy orientation in his second term changed due to the invasion of Georgia by Russia as a result of 2008 August war. Turkey-Armenia rapprochement and changes in the US foreign policy priorities toward South Caucasus had also played a crucial role in this change.¹²⁶⁴ Valiyev and Mamishova explain this shift as such: *"The Russian victory in the Russian-Georgian war, as well as recognition of Abkhazia and Ossetia, provided Azerbaijan and other post-soviet states with an incentive towards pro-Russian bandwagoning behavior. That, in turn, resulted in the modification of their foreign policies towards recognizing Russia as a reaffirmed regional hegemon."*¹²⁶⁵

Ilham Aliyev had inherited "a bargaining chip" from his father in the form of a Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline to be completed, which meant a backdrop of increasing oil prices, promised massive revenue inflows to Azerbaijan. This oil card affected foreign policy options of Azerbaijan, including one with Russia.¹²⁶⁶ The interest of Western states on oil at the expense of democracy drew increasing attention in Azerbaijani society. A more pragmatic and sophisticated approach has been developed toward Western politicians and policies.¹²⁶⁷

¹²⁶¹ Abilov & Isayev, "Azerbaijan-Russian Relations...", p. 128.

¹²⁶² Giorgi Gvalia et al., "Thinking Outside the Bloc...", p. 128.

¹²⁶³ Anar Valiyev & Narmina Mamishova, "Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy towards Russia since Independence: Compromise Achieved," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2019, p. 279.

¹²⁶⁴ Abilov & Isayev, "Azerbaijan-Russian Relations...", p. 128.

¹²⁶⁵ Valiyev & Mamishova, "Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy...", p. 274.

¹²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶⁷ Rashad Shirinov, "A Pragmatic Area for Cooperation: Azerbaijan and the EU," *IPG* 3/2011, 2011, p. 77.

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline project has been directly related to the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Even energy security becomes increasingly dependent on the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. DerHartunian explains this link as below:

*“The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline has secured a means of transporting oil out of the region. The pipeline bypasses Armenia and has opened itself up to the instability of the Georgian state and Kurdish populated regions of Turkey. The politics of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline play a large role in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict because such a substantial portion of the Azerbaijani economy depends on oil; some four billion dollars have been invested into the project. Those who currently control the regions where oil flows and the surrounding areas have the ability to disrupt the pipelines, they have a significant influence in the profitability of the pipeline, and in turn adversely affect the Azerbaijani economy.”*¹²⁶⁸

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a threat directed to internal stability of Azerbaijan. Some argue that even Nakhchivan is another object of desire for Armenian nationalists.¹²⁶⁹ Any regional instability is a threat to energy security in the region. Therefore, Azerbaijani authorities need to ensure security of Nagorno-Karabakh region and pipelines. In addition, amidst harsh competition for oil projects, Baku may need to satisfy West and Russia and not exclude the latter in any case.

Apart from military, political, economic policies, Ilham Aliyev continued to provide aid to the IDPs during his tenure. State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan continued to carry out its activities under the rule of Ilham Aliyev as well. Some activities are listed as below:

- *“In accordance with the 2nd Clause of Decree No.298 of July 1, 2004 of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the approval of the “State Programme for Improving Living Conditions and Increasing Employment of Refugees and IDPs”, the eviction of IDPs from the public buildings, flats, land allotments, and other objects where they were settled in 1992-1998 (not*

¹²⁶⁸ DerHartunian, “**Negotiation and Settlement...**,” pp. 303-304.

¹²⁶⁹ Laska, “**Azerbaijan Diary...**,” p. 85.

depending on the type of the ownership) is stopped until their return to their native homes or temporary resettlement place in new settlements or houses;

- *In accordance with the Decree No.298 of July 1, 2004 of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, heads of private education establishments, high and comprehensive study schools were recommended to provide assistance in employment of refugees and IDPs and also to consider concessions in payment of tuition fees;*
- *According to the Decree of August 4, 2003 of President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, IDPs studying on fee based form at the state high educational and comprehensive speciality establishments are free of payment of tuition fees. According to the order of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan dated 14 September 2011 starting from the educational year of 2011/2012 the tuition fee for the IDPs newly admitted for the bachelor or magister degree stage on fee based form will be paid from the state budget;*

The IDP pupils in comprehensive schools are entitled for free textbooks;

The IDPs have the priority right to keep their jobs on the occasion of redundancies or cuts in the offices, enterprises and organizations;

The medications considered for free prescription by the Ministry of Health are paid for the IDPs by the state budget;

They are entitled for free medical examination and treatment;

They are free of charges when getting the citizenship IDPs;

They are free of court charges when appealing to the courts;

They are free of paying income tax for up to 55 fold of conditional financial unit;

*They are free of payment of notary charges when purchasing flats and residential houses.*¹²⁷⁰

¹²⁷⁰ State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan, "Privileges," <http://idp.gov.az/en/content/7/parent/21>

Azerbaijani government is eager to show that it takes care of IDPs and has projects for the well-being of this population. By doing so, Baku aims to be supported by its society and to prevent criticisms that can be directed to itself in domestic politics and international area.

In the next section, the statements regarding to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and IDP issue, which were made by Ilham Aliyev, the current securitizing actor, will be provided in detail and analyzed.

B. Speech Act of Securitizing Actor in Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev

Azerbaijani intellectuals and officials have had very traumatic memories of their defeat and loss of territory, especially between 1991 and 1994 and they have considered that this conflict was triggered by Armenians who has had aims of creating a “Greater Armenia.” Nagorno-Karabakh is an occupied territory, which belongs to Azerbaijan. Therefore, according to Azerbaijanis, Nagorno-Karabakh is an “occupation regime” and the only solution is to return its previous status. The status of the region must be de jure similar to one in Soviet times.¹²⁷¹ However, for Armenians, Nagorno-Karabakh is a territory that legally seceded from Azerbaijan SSR during the Soviet collapse in 1991.¹²⁷²

As mentioned above, after the ceasefire in May 1994, the situation in Azerbaijan was as follows: loss of 20% of its territory and almost one million citizens as IDPs. In the following years, the parties conflict to each other on the claims based on territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh.¹²⁷³ Although negotiation and mediation efforts have been concentrated on the status of region, Azerbaijan does not agree on any compromises on its territorial integrity or a referendum on determining the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh region.¹²⁷⁴ Authorities in Baku consider that granting Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh the highest level of autonomy can be a solution. Baku rejects any status other than autonomy that can be seen as compromising the territorial integrity of the

¹²⁷² Elena Pokalova, “Conflict Resolution in Frozen Conflicts: Timing in Nagorno-Karabakh,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2015, p. 73.

¹²⁷³ Yunusov, “Azerbaijani Security Problems...,” p. 143.

¹²⁷⁴ DerHartunian, “Negotiation and Settlement...,” p. 296.

republic. For Azerbaijanis, Nagorno-Karabakh is an integral part of the country and they cannot accept any status beyond that of regional autonomy.¹²⁷⁵

In 2020 war, Azerbaijan achieved to reach its aims and took over many occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. The negotiations have been overwhelmingly concentrated on the safe return of the IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions as being citizens of the region.¹²⁷⁶ The return of IDPs is the most important precondition for Azerbaijan and the rejection of this demand mostly impeded any long-standing peace process in Azerbaijan.¹²⁷⁷ Baku has also stated that they were ready to use force if they could not yield any result from negotiations. Azerbaijani authorities emphasized the sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding regions and the resolution to the political status of Azerbaijan should be matter of discussion later.¹²⁷⁸

Azerbaijan also insisted that this war occurred between two states, Azerbaijan and Armenia and it does not want that the international powers intervene to the conflict, especially for the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore, it does not want to see international peacekeeping attempts that might threaten its sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan claimed that it could not negotiate with the illegitimate Nagorno-Karabakh government. For Azerbaijani officials, Armenia's recognition of so-called Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh can be seen as a declaration of war.¹²⁷⁹

In this part, the speeches of Ilham Aliyev in the UN General Assembly from 2003 to 2021 are examined within the framework of CDA inspired qualitative content analysis in order to understand securitization of Nagorno-Karabakh issue and the role of IDPs in this process. His addresses to domestic audience are included to the analysis when necessary especially in order to update the statements after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020.

¹²⁷⁵ Panossian, "The Irony of Nagorno-Karabakh...", pp. 147-148.

¹²⁷⁶ DerHartunian, "Negotiation and Settlement...", pp. 304-305.

¹²⁷⁷ Nuriyev, "Crossroads and Conflict...", p. 157.

¹²⁷⁸ Cory Welt, Andrew S. Bowen, "Azerbaijan and Armenia: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict," **Congressional Research Service**, 7 January 2021, p. 4.

¹²⁷⁹ Migdalovitz, "Foreign Affairs, Defense...", p. 10.

Content analysis initially concentrated on Berelson's manifest content of communication which was described as objective, systematic and quantitative.¹²⁸⁰ However, the receiver may also make specific inferences from data¹²⁸¹ which can be described as latent meaning. Latent meaning in content analysis is referred as semantic analysis of meaning in the works of CDA. Semantic analysis is interested not only in what is explicitly expressed, but also in the inferences obtained from the explicitly expressed meanings.¹²⁸²

Content analysis can be done as quantitative or qualitative. According to Krippendorff, qualitative researches have some characteristics described as below:

*[Firstly] They require a close reading of relatively small amounts of textual matter. [Secondly] They involve the rearticulation (interpretation) of given texts into new (analytical, deconstructive, emancipatory, or critical) narratives. (...) [Thirdly] The analysts acknowledge working within hermeneutic circles in which their own socially or culturally conditioned understandings constitutively participate.*¹²⁸³

Discourse, as an ordered sequence of words, expresses coherent local and global meanings. The meaningful sequences are performed in a communicative social context and therefore speech acts and other forms of social action are achieved.¹²⁸⁴ The discourse is based on a macro-structure, which means an abstract underlying semantic structure of a discourse.¹²⁸⁵ A discourse can be summarized by a macro-structure. In other words, a discourse can form a coherent whole only if it has a macro-structure.¹²⁸⁶

All discourses emerged in a context. *"Contexts are not out there, but in here: They are mental constructs of participants; they are individually variable interpretations of the ongoing social situation."*¹²⁸⁷ Contexts are not observable.

¹²⁸⁰ Bernard Berelson, **Content Analysis in Communication Research**, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952.

¹²⁸¹ Lincoln & Guba, "Naturalistic Inquiry...", p. 337.

¹²⁸² Van Dijk, "Monographic Article," p. 223.

¹²⁸³ Krippendorff, "Content Analysis An Introduction...", p. 3. p. 17.

¹²⁸⁴ Van Dijk, "Discourse and Migration...", p. 228.

¹²⁸⁵ Van Dijk, "Discourse Studies and Education...", p. 4.

¹²⁸⁶ Van Dijk, "Narrative Macro-Structures...", p. 553.

¹²⁸⁷ Van Dijk, "Discourse, Ideology and Context...", p. 18.

Context becomes only observable by their results on discourse or by the impact of discourse on social situations.¹²⁸⁸

For a content analysis researcher, it is necessary to take into account intentions and goals of political leaders and elites while examining their speech acts. Elites are the leading people who hold the power of saying something and shaping the opinion of others.¹²⁸⁹ The elites may need to legitimize their actions by their discourses. Self-legitimation can be achieved by speech acts. Legitimation can be also occurred by means of other social and political acts such as elections.¹²⁹⁰

The audience is not always informed about the intentions of speaker. Intentions and goals are not always expressed clearly, but contextually attributed to the speakers by audience. Many forms of communication are not in favor of audience. It may be in the interests of speakers who have opportunity to manipulate and therefore, to violate the audience's rights.¹²⁹¹ Manipulative discourse may occur in a context through verbal or non-verbal discourses.¹²⁹²

The purpose of using CDA inspired qualitative content analysis in this dissertation is to determine the main axis of discussion on securitization of Nagorno-Karabakh and the role of IDPs in this process. Does the Azerbaijani leader, Ilham Aliyev, who holds the power of saying something in Azerbaijan, securitize Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and instrumentalize the existence of IDPs in this process by his discourse? Securitization is a speech act that necessitates the combination of a qualitative discourse analysis and to a lesser extent, CDA, which is interested in *"who (may, must) speak, when, to whom, on what occasion, in what circumstances and with what social or political functions and effects."*¹²⁹³

In Aliyev's speeches, some historical events, terms, and images are frequently reiterated. The most repeated words of Aliyev are determined, the discursive themes

¹²⁸⁸ Van Dijk, **"Discourse, Context and Cognition..."**, p. 164.

¹²⁸⁹ Van Dijk, **"The Mass Media Today..."**, p. 33.

¹²⁹⁰ Luisa Martín Rojo and Teun A. van Dijk, "There Was a Problem, and It was Solved!": Legitimizing the Expulsion of 'Illegal' Migrants in Spanish Parliamentary Discourse," **Discourse & Society**, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1997, pp. 528-531.

¹²⁹¹ Van Dijk, **"Discourse and Manipulation..."**, p. 363.

¹²⁹² **Ibid.**, p. 372.

¹²⁹³ Teun A. Van Dijk, **"Discourse and Migration..."**, p. 229.; Teun A. Van Dijk (1997), "Political Discourse and Racism, Describing Others in Western Parliaments", in S.H. Riggins (Ed.) **The Language and Politics of Exclusion: Others in Discourse**, p. 225 in Beyza Çağatay Tekin, "The Construction of Turkey's Possible EU Membership in French Political Discourse," **Discourse & Society**, Vol. 19, No. 6, 2008, p. 734.

are created, and the manifest and latent meanings of these themes are questioned at macro-level. The first group of terms is related to the threats directed to the statehood of Azerbaijan. The themes are “territorial Integrity”, “sovereignty”, and “occupation.” The second group of themes is based on the negative images and attributed to Armenians by Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev. In the third group, the theme is determined as “commitment to peaceful settlement.” The fourth group of themes is related to IDPs and these themes are “victimization,” liberation,” and “voluntary return.” Lastly, the fifth group of themes is on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. The words “Karabakh” and “No Political Autonomy” are the most reiterated discursive themes especially in recent years in this group.

In Aliyev’s speeches, territorial integrity and sovereignty have been frequently stressed as a legitimate cause to stand against Armenian aggression. Aliyev drew attention to the occupation of its territories by neighboring state, Armenia, and the establishment of a de-facto state in Nagorno-Karabakh by the efforts of separatist forces backed by Armenians. In macro-level, this separatism has been presented as a threat not only to Azerbaijan, but also to Westphalian order of sovereign states. Therefore, Baku has expected support from international community for the withdrawal of Armenian forces from its territories.

1. “Territorial Integrity”, “Sovereignty”, and “Occupation”

In Aliyev’s speeches, territorial integrity and sovereignty have been frequently stressed as a legitimate cause to stand against Armenian aggression. Aliyev drew attention to the occupation of its territories by neighboring state, Armenia, and the establishment of a de-facto state in Nagorno-Karabakh by the efforts of separatist forces backed by Armenians. In macro-level, this separatism has been presented as a threat not only to Azerbaijan, but also to Westphalian order of sovereign states. Therefore, Baku has expected support from international community for the withdrawal of Armenian forces from its territories.

Aliyev frequently reiterated that so-called government in Nagorno-Karabakh was unlawful and unrecognized entity in Azerbaijani territories. Furthermore, for him, the existence of this entity is a threat directed not only to Azerbaijan, but also to regional security. He said in 2004, *“The self-proclaimed, non-recognized so-called Nagorno-Karabakh republic is a constant threat to peace and security in the whole*

region.¹²⁹⁴ By calling so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as a non-recognized entity and a threat to peace and security in the region, he securitized this issue not only at the national level but also at regional and global level. He tried to convince the international and domestic audience about the severity and urgency of the problem and aimed to gather support from other actors.

Aliyev's emphasis on the concept of sovereignty aims to attract the attention of international community, which adopts the basic principle of modern state system. He said, "*Azerbaijan highly appreciates the principled stand of Member States on issues of vital importance for Azerbaijan pertaining to its sovereignty and territorial integrity.*"¹²⁹⁵ Aliyev drew red lines of Azerbaijani politics on Nagorno-Karabakh, and he said, "*Azerbaijan will never accept the occupation of its territory, the violation of its territorial integrity or the results of ethnic cleansing.*"¹²⁹⁶

It is very difficult to separate Aliyev's discourses on territorial integrity and sovereignty from those based on Armenian "brutal" and "illegal acts" and "crimes." In 2010, Aliyev said, "*It has been internationally recognized that the Republic of Armenia bears the primary responsibility for occupying Azerbaijan's territories, committing the most serious international crimes during the conflict, carrying out ethnic cleansing and trying to create a mono-ethnic culture in the captured Azerbaijani territories.*"¹²⁹⁷

When Aliyev came to power in 2003, the global war on terror had been already launched due to the September 11 attacks and terrorist activities were strictly monitored and punished around the world. American politicians were using rhetoric of securitization against terrorist groups and seemed to persuade international audience about the extraordinary measures to be taken in the fight against terrorism. In addition, in 2003, the US-led coalition invaded Iraq, which were seen as magnet for terrorist activities, and overthrew Saddam's regime. In these years, Aliyev used

¹²⁹⁴ United Nations, General Assembly, 59th session, 9th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2004, New York, A/59/PV.9

¹²⁹⁵ United Nations, General Assembly, 65th session, 12th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 23 September 2010, New York, A/65/PV.12

¹²⁹⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, 59th session, 9th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2004, New York, A/59/PV.9

¹²⁹⁷ United Nations, General Assembly, 65th session, 12th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 23 September 2010, New York, A/65/PV.12

frequently the word “terrorism” in his speeches in order to benefit from this global context to draw attention to the activities of Armenians in Azerbaijani territories.

For example, at the 58th session of General Assembly which was held on September 24, 2003, Ilham Aliyev stated as below:

*“Our country, which has fallen victim to the aggression, occupation and terror unleashed by Armenia, has for years been fighting terrorism on its own (...) We have to keep in mind that terrorist groups, created and developed by separatist and extremist forces, are usually based in illegally controlled territories, in the so-called grey zones that emerge as a result of acts of armed separatism and external aggression. One such uncontrolled grey zone is Nagorno-Karabakh and other regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan, occupied by Armenian military forces.”*¹²⁹⁸

The most vulnerable group in terrorist attacks is globally civilians. Aliyev drew attention to the deaths of civilians due to terrorist activities in Azerbaijan. He said, *“Armenia also targeted civilians far beyond the conflict zone, by masterminding terrorist acts against public transport and critical infrastructure, such as the bomb explosions in the Baku metro in 1994 and others.”*¹²⁹⁹

As mentioned above, in April 2016, four days long war destroyed the region with hundreds of death tolls from both sides.¹³⁰⁰ This increased the tension among the parties. However, even in small-scale skirmishes, Aliyev’s rhetoric based on “occupation,” “forced displacement” and “ethnic cleansing” always continued. Aliyev reiterated Armenian occupation and “ethnic cleansing” in his speech in 2017, *“Nagorno-Karabakh is an ancient and historical part of Azerbaijan. As a result of Armenian aggression, almost 20% of the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan is under Armenian occupation. More than 1 million of Azerbaijanis have become refugees and internally displaced persons. Armenia has conducted a policy*

¹²⁹⁸ United Nations, General Assembly, 58th session, 10th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, Prime Minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2003, New York, A/58/PV.10

¹²⁹⁹ United Nations, Security Council, 6765th meeting, Speech of Ilham Aliyev as the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 4 May 2012, New York, S/PV.6765.

¹³⁰⁰ International Crisis Group, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Visual Explainer,” 17 May 2022 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

of ethnic cleansing against Azerbaijanis in Armenia, in Nagorno-Karabakh and seven other regions of Azerbaijan.”¹³⁰¹

Aliyev continued to emphasize Armenian attacks on civilians in his speech in 2020 and said, *“Armenia carried out the ethnic cleansing against the Azerbaijani population in the occupied territories. All Azerbaijanis have been forcibly expelled from occupied territories. Armenia committed a number of war crimes and crimes against humanity against Azerbaijani civilians. Armenia established the criminal, terrorist puppet regime in these territories to hide its responsibility for occupation of our lands.”*¹³⁰² As mentioned above, Aliyev frequently underlined civilian deaths in his speeches by giving some examples. In 2020, he said, *“Deliberate attack by Armenia in 2017 led to death of 2 years old Zahra Guliyeva and her grandmother.”*¹³⁰³

Aliyev always separately mentioned Nagorno-Karabakh and other seven regions from where most of the IDPs had to flee. All of these territories are Azerbaijani territories; however, these seven regions occupied by Armenian forces are shown as an evidence of overt aggression. Aliyev called so-called government in Nagorno-Karabakh as “puppet regime” to underline the close relationship between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and dominance of Armenians on Nagorno-Karabakh politics.

Ilham Aliyev frequently underlines “Armenian occupation” and “illegal activities” in his speeches and stresses upon “external aggression,” “externally sponsored terrorism,” “extremism,” “armed separatism,” “military provocation,” “ethnic hatred,” “ethnic cleansing,” “war crime against humanity,” “genocide,” “fascism,” “vandalism,” and “Azerbaijanophobia.” Aliyev has created stereotypes for Armenians based on some historical events.

While Aliyev called for international efforts to settle the conflict, he also asserted that Azerbaijan would not hesitate to use force when necessary. By doing so, he warned that Azerbaijan would always keep using his army as an option in case

¹³⁰¹ United Nations, General Assembly, 72nd session, 7th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 20 September 2017, New York, A/72/PV.7

¹³⁰² United Nations, General Assembly, 75th session, 9th plenary meeting, Annex I Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2020, New York, A/75/PV.9

¹³⁰³ **Ibid.**

that Armenians insisted on their military provocations. He said, *“Azerbaijan is committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, but at the same time it will defend its citizens, in line with the Charter of the United Nations, if Armenian military provocations continue. If necessary, Azerbaijan will again punish the aggressor, as it did in April 2016.”*¹³⁰⁴

Aliyev called the take-over of Azerbaijani territories from Armenia as the “liberation” since the war in 2016. The use of the term liberation is important, because it also reminds Armenian occupation and aggression. The word liberation is aimed to draw attention to the fact that these territories belonged to Azerbaijan in the past, but attacked by Armenians. He said in 2017:

*“In April 2016, Armenia committed another war crime on the line of contact, attacking our cities and villages. In that attack, six Azerbaijani civilians were killed, among them one child, and 26 were wounded. Hundreds of our houses were destroyed. Azerbaijan had to defend its citizens. Through a successful counter-attack, Azerbaijan liberated some territories in the three occupied areas — Agdere, Fuzuli and Jabrayil —and installed its national flag in the liberated territories.”*¹³⁰⁵

As an example of the usage of “liberation,” in an interview given to Russian influential *Natsionalnaya oborona* magazine in September 2021, Aliyev addressed to his people as such:

“I used the expression ‘Iron Fist’ several times during my appeals to the Azerbaijani people, when I reported on the liberated cities and villages. I used this term several times and said that our ‘Iron Fist’ would smash the enemy’s head if they do not voluntarily leave all the occupied territories. And, as it

¹³⁰⁴ United Nations, General Assembly, 72nd session, 7th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oğlu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 20 September 2017, New York, A/72/PV.7

¹³⁰⁵ United Nations, General Assembly, 72nd session, 7th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oğlu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 20 September 2017, New York, A/72/PV.7; United Nations, General Assembly, 75th session, 9th plenary meeting, Annex I Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oğlu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2020, New York, A/75/PV.9

were, this term was received well in our society, and then I decided to formalize it, if I may say so, and give the operation this name.”¹³⁰⁶

Declaring Armenians as the responsible of the conflict due to their military attacks, underlining the use of force if necessary, and referring frequently to the numbers of casualties are some common aspects in Aliyev’s statements.

Aliyev aimed to justify his decision to declare war against Armenia by referring to Armenian activities. He stated in December 2020, three weeks later after the war ended as such: *“In July 2020, Armenia perpetrated military provocation along the state border to create a new source of tension in the region, to occupy new territories and damage Azerbaijan’s strategic energy infrastructure projects.”*¹³⁰⁷ In the same speech, Aliyev explained Armenia’s military strategy in the war as such:

*“On 27 September, Armenia launched large-scale military aggression against Azerbaijan. During 44 days, armed forces of Armenia heavily shelled Tartar and other cities of Azerbaijan situated along the frontline. Armenia fired ballistic missile against Ganja, Barda, Mingachevir, Gabala, Siyazan and other cities which are far away from frontline. They used heavy artillery, ballistic missiles, white phosphorus, cluster munitions to cause mass casualties and forced displacement among Azerbaijani civilians. 94 civilians, including 11 children were killed, more than 400 wounded.”*¹³⁰⁸

Aliyev declared in September 2021, *“Last September, addressing the UN General Assembly I drew your attention to continuing occupation of territories of Azerbaijan by Armenia and aggressive statements and actions of the Armenian government. Today, a year later, I proudly say that Armenia was defeated on the battlefield and Azerbaijan put an end to the occupation.”*¹³⁰⁹

¹³⁰⁶ Azertag, “President Ilham Aliyev’s interview with Russian influential ‘Natsionalnaya oborona’ magazine,” 24 September 2021. https://azertag.az/en/xeber/President_Ilham_Aliyevs_interview_with_Russian_influential_Natsionalnaya_oborona_magazine_VIDEO-1884395 (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

¹³⁰⁷ United Nations, General Assembly, 31st special session, 2nd plenary meeting, Annex V Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 3 December 2020, New York, A/S-31/PV.2

¹³⁰⁸ **Ibid.**

¹³⁰⁹ United Nations, General Assembly, 76th session, 11th plenary meeting, Annex V Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 23 September 2021, New York, A/76/PV.11

In the same speech, Aliyev stated, *“The Azerbaijani Army responded adequately and defended its citizens and territory and launched successful counter attack operation which resulted in liberation of large parts of our occupied territories. The military victory of Azerbaijan during the military operations forced aggressor to surrender and led to signing of trilateral statement of the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Russia and Armenia’s Prime Minister on 10 November, which provided liberation of other occupied territories.”*¹³¹⁰ By these statements, Aliyev aimed to underline the reasons to declare war against Armenians. There is an implicit meaning that under these conditions, the war was inevitable.

In September 2021, a year later after the war, Aliyev announced the results of devastating effects of war by stressing the liberation of Azerbaijani territories:

*“During 44-day war Azerbaijan liberated a large part of occupied territories, including cities of Jabrayil, Hadrut, Fuzuli, Zangilan, Gubadly and Shusha. In total more than 300 cities and villages were liberated on the battlefield. Armenia had to sign an act of capitulation on 10 November 2020. Accordingly, Armenia was obliged to withdraw its troops from the remaining part of Azerbaijan’s territories, namely Agdam, Lachin and Kalbajar regions.”*¹³¹¹

Aliyev was eager to start negotiations for peaceful settlement of the conflict and emphasized on mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity. He said:

“As the conflict is over, Azerbaijan has already announced its readiness to embark upon the border delimitation and demarcation between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and to start negotiations on peace agreement with Armenia, based on mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other. Such an agreement would turn our region into the region of peace and

¹³¹⁰ United Nations, General Assembly, 31st special session, 2nd plenary meeting, Annex V Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 3 December 2020, New York, A/S-31/PV.2

¹³¹¹ United Nations, General Assembly, 76th session, 11th plenary meeting, Annex V Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 23 September 2021, New York, A/76/PV.11

cooperation. However, we have not yet seen any positive reaction from Armenia regarding our proposal."¹³¹²

The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry proposed a five-step peace plan in 2022 to Armenia to establish a long-standing peace between Yerevan and Baku. This peace proposal was consisted of some principles such as "*sovereignty, territorial integrity, mutual recognition of international borders; the cessation of territorial claims against each other; an end to threats to each other's security in international relations; the demarcation of borders and establishment of diplomatic relations; and the opening of lines of transport and communications.*"¹³¹³ This document does not have any articles on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian politicians supported the plan on condition that the rights of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh and the status of region would be discussed in the course of negotiations.¹³¹⁴

Aliyev referred to the meeting he had participated in Brussels with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in April 6, 2022 and said, "*So the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan is recognized and Armenia renounces its territorial claims to Azerbaijan. In other words, if it accepts the five principles – as it was confirmed at the April meeting – then these are part of these five principles.*" As will be discussed later in detail, he did not answer to the question of what kinds of rights or security guarantees might be provided to the Armenians of Karabakh.¹³¹⁵ The victory in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War seemed to play a crucial role in insisting on red lines in Azerbaijani politics which are mainly territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Aliyev and Pashinian began to draft a bilateral peace treaty for the resolution of the conflict. They established a joint commission on drawing the borders during the meetings in Brussels. As mentioned above, Azerbaijan insisted on these five principles including non-violation of territorial integrity. Pashinian's statements on the acceptance of these principles caused harsh criticism from Armenian opposition.

¹³¹² United Nations, General Assembly, 76th session, 11th plenary meeting, Annex V Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 23 September 2021, New York, A/76/PV.11

¹³¹³ OC Media, "Pashinyan and Aliyev agree to establish border commission by April," 7 April 2022 <https://oc-media.org/pashinyan-and-aliyev-agree-to-establish-border-commission-by-april/> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022)

¹³¹⁴ **Ibid.**

¹³¹⁵ Heydar Isayev, "Azerbaijan Quiet as Karabakh Negotiations Progress," *Eurasianet*, 20 April 2022 <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-quiet-as-karabakh-negotiations-progress> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

The opponents said that Pashinian was ready to relinquish these territories in favor of accepting Azerbaijan's sovereignty.¹³¹⁶

In sum, Aliyev has constructed his rhetoric on some unquestionable terms globally such as "territorial integrity," "sovereignty," "war crimes," "crime against humanity," "genocide" "ethnic cleansing," "fascism," "occupation," "separatism," "terrorism," and "forced displacement." Aliyev has addressed to international and domestic audience to convince them about "the destructive and unlawful Armenian acts."

Some discursive strategies have been applied in Aliyev's speeches: polarisation between us and them, negative issues which was recognized as "aggressive," "unacceptable," "unlawful" by international community such as "occupation," "threat," "attack," "crime," "violence," "terrorism," "ethnic cleansing," and accusation of the enemy of these negative situations. Aliyev used local speech acts to implement and sustain the global ones by calculating their impact in context. He aims to legitimize his actions in the eyes of domestic and international audience and draws a picture in which the enemy is bad, but the actions of his government are always based on good intentions and reasonable grounds.

2. Azerbaijani View of Armenians: Universal Atrocious

In Aliyev's speeches, the expressions and images are interchangeably used for both Armenians in Armenia and Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. Aliyev has formed and reinforced some stereotypes for all Armenians. These stereotypes based on negative images are universally considered atrocious, which means that they cannot be morally and legally acceptable by international community. For example, the words used by Aliyev such as "aggression," "separatism," "fascism," and "racism" are condemned, deterred, or punished in international area. By using these negative images for Armenians, Aliyev seems to draw attention to the destructiveness of Armenian occupation not only for his country, but also for global order and calls other states for punishing Yerevan.

¹³¹⁶ Radio Free Europe, "Aliyev Says Won't Recognize Armenia's Territorial Integrity Unless Peace Deal Signed," 22 April 2022 <https://www.rferl.org/a/aliyev-armenia-recognition-peace-deal/31816395.html> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

With Aliyev's words, *"Armenian aggressors and Nagorno-Karabakh separatists are also exploiting natural resources in the occupied Azerbaijani territories and are attempting to engage overseas companies in their illegal business."*¹³¹⁷ Aliyev's statements referred again to the occupation and exploitation of the territories, which belonged to Azerbaijan at the past and created a very negative image for those who attempted to engage in illegal activities.

In 2012, Aliyev expressed his security concerns as such: *"The occupied territories of Azerbaijan represent a source of grave concern in terms of the linkage among terrorism, separatism, extremism and organized crime, including drug trafficking, money laundering and the illicit supply of arms to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan."*¹³¹⁸ These kinds of activities and crimes are considered dangerous for global order and violate the basic principles of international law. With these statements, Aliyev seems to depict a very negative image for Armenians and marginalize and isolate them at the global level. He tries to convince the other states to accept this negative image and make Armenians pay the price of their unlawful acts that he underlines.

The most important event that has aimed to reveal the negative image of Armenians is Khojaly massacre which took place in 1992. In Aliyev's speeches, Khojaly massacre has been shown as the proof of Armenian "ethnic cleansing policy." Aliyev said as follows: *"Those acts of cruelty culminated in February 1992 in the annihilation of the population of the town of Khojaly, where 613 innocent people perished, including children, women and elderly people. More than 100 women and 63 children were killed."*¹³¹⁹

Aliyev frequently emphasized the recognition of this event as "genocide" by some states. He said in 2017, *"Armenia committed genocide against Azerbaijanis in Khojaly. The Khojaly genocide is already officially recognized by more than 10*

¹³¹⁷ United Nations, General Assembly, 59th session, 9th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2004, New York, A/59/PV.9

¹³¹⁸ United Nations, Security Council, 6765th meeting, Speech of Ilham Aliyev as the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 4 May 2012, New York, S/PV.6765.

¹³¹⁹ **Ibid.**

countries. (...) One of those war criminals who committed that terrible crime against humanity is the current Armenian President.”¹³²⁰

In his speech in 2020, Aliyev also underlined, *“Armenia committed Khojaly genocide in 1992 killing 613 peaceful residents of Khojaly, among them 106 women and 63 children. More than ten countries have recognized the Khojaly genocide. Four UN Security Council resolutions demand immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from Azerbaijan’s occupied territories.*”¹³²¹

For the leaders of newly independent country after 70 years of long past under Soviet rule, recognition is very important. Aliyev always underlines that his country is a member of the system consisted of nation-states that respect to each other’s sovereignty and recognize each other’s existence. Stressing the legitimacy of Azerbaijani government in the eyes of international society reveals the illegitimate and unrecognized character of the other, so-called state in Nagorno-Karabakh. Even Armenia does not recognize this so-called and self-proclaimed state. Similarly, the recognition of a massacre has been seen as an important achievement in terms of gathering international support and verifying the negative image of the other.

Similarly, in 2021, Aliyev stressed upon once again that Khojaly was a genocide and reiterated the numbers with these following words:

“Armenia, for about 30 years, kept under occupation almost 20% of the territory of our country. The occupation was accompanied with notorious war crimes and crimes against humanity. Armenia committed Khojaly genocide in February 1992, killing hundreds of civilians including 106 women and 63 children. 1275 Azerbaijanis were taken hostage, out of which 150 are still missing. Khojaly genocide has been recognized by 13 countries. Ethnic

¹³²⁰ United Nations, General Assembly, 72nd session, 7th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oğlu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 20 September 2017, New York, A/72/PV.7

¹³²¹ United Nations, General Assembly, 75th session, 9th plenary meeting, Annex I Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oğlu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2020, New York, A/75/PV.9

cleansing carried out by Armenia resulted in more than one million Azerbaijanis becoming refugees and internally displaced persons.”¹³²²

In 2021, Aliyev stressed, “‘Azerbaijanophobia’ promoted by the government is on the rise in Armenia. Racist ideology cultivated in Armenian society based on ethnic hatred and demonization is the root cause of ethnic cleansing and unprecedented vandalism in the formerly occupied lands of Azerbaijan by Armenia”.¹³²³ The use of “Azerbaijanophobia” based on the fear, which had been derived from the hostility towards Azerbaijanis, refers to the violation of international law. In other words, it has been presented not only as a threat to Azerbaijanis, but to humanity.

Aliyev said, “We have around 4,000 citizens registered as missing persons from the first Karabakh War. Armenia must provide us with information about their fate. (...) In April 2021, remains of 12 civilians killed by Armenian war criminals have been identified in liberated Bashlibel village of Kalbajar district in a mass grave.”¹³²⁴ By arguing that Armenians committed crime in war times, Aliyev aimed to reinforce that Armenians violated international law and should be held responsible for this.

Aliyev often identifies the ideology of Armenians with the practices of Nazism, which is a common symbol of fascism in the world today. In his speech in 2020, Aliyev criticized Armenian National Security Strategy as below:

“Recently, Armenia has adopted its aggressive and offensive military doctrine and National Security Strategy. The National Security Strategy contains racist, chauvinistic and ‘Azerbaijanophobic’ ideas. The glorification of Nazism is the state policy of Armenia. Nazi general Garegin Nzhdeh has been turned into ‘national hero’. (...) Almost 6 meter high monument was built in the memory of Nzhdeh in the center of capital of Armenia. Members of a

¹³²² United Nations, General Assembly, 76th session, 11th plenary meeting, Annex V Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 23 September 2021, New York, A/76/PV.11

¹³²³ **Ibid.**

¹³²⁴ **Ibid.**

number of Armenian terror organizations like ASALA are glorified in this country.”¹³²⁵

Nine years later, in 2021, he referred to Nazism’s fascism by saying as follow:

“Despite the regime change in Armenia, the fascist ideology continues to dominate in the country. ... While the progressive world is fighting against the rise of neo-fascism, the then president of Armenia inaugurated the monument of Garegin Nzhdeh in capital Irevan in 2016. Azerbaijan defeated not only Armenian occupying forces, but also Armenian fascism. If we see again any danger to our sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of our people we will exercise our legitimate right to self-defence without any hesitation.”¹³²⁶

In Aliyev’s speeches, the emphasis on falsification of history and destruction of historical places and monuments are important. Because, by doing so, Aliyev points out that the issue is beyond military. In Aliyev’s speeches, it is underlined that Armenian aggression in Nagorno-Karabakh threatens not only Azerbaijani military forces or civilians, but also historical and cultural heritage of the world. He stated in 2004, *“Armenia is falsifying history and misappropriating the cultural and architectural heritage of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. Religious and historical monuments, ancient manuscripts and other cultural properties have been destroyed, refashioned, plundered or removed.*”¹³²⁷

Similarly, in 2020, he said, *“Cultural heritage of Azerbaijani people on the territory of today’s Armenia has been demolished and plundered. Armenia also destroyed all Azerbaijani historical and religious monuments in the occupied territories. The aim is to erase all Azerbaijani traces there.*”¹³²⁸

Although religion is not the main reason behind Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which is mainly based on ethnicity and territory, Aliyev, stressed uneasiness felt by Armenians’ stance toward Islam. Aliyev aimed to attract attention of international

¹³²⁵ United Nations, Security Council, 6765th meeting, Speech of Ilham Aliyev as the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 4 May 2012, New York, S/PV.6765.

¹³²⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, 76th session, 11th plenary meeting, Annex V Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 23 September 2021, New York, A/76/PV.11

¹³²⁷ United Nations, General Assembly, 59th session, 9th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2004, New York, A/59/PV.9

¹³²⁸ **Ibid.**

community to Armenian disrespect to Islamic values in one of his speeches in 2021. He said: *“Out of 67 mosques in the territories which were under Armenian occupation, 65 have been razed to the ground and the remaining 2 have been severely damaged and desecrated, including by being used as stables for pigs and cows in total disrespect to all Muslims of the world. Even the graveyards were desecrated, destroyed, and looted.”*¹³²⁹

By stressing total destruction of religious and historic monuments of Azerbaijan, Aliyev continued, *“During visits to liberated territories, foreign diplomats, representatives of international organizations and international journalists have witnessed the barbarism committed by Armenia. The facts of the full destruction of cities and villages, including the cultural and religious heritage sites of Azerbaijani people has been widely documented and broadcasted by international media and independent experts.”*¹³³⁰

While all negative images are attributed to Armenians, Azerbaijani leader aims to reinforce positive image of Azerbaijanis. For instance, Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan acted according to international law during wars despite of Armenian military provocations. In Aliyev’s speeches, there is an emphasis that despite violation of international law and war crimes, Azerbaijan did not respond to these attacks in the same way. Aliyev underlined, *“Abided by the fundamental principle of international humanitarian law on the distinction between combatants and civilians, Azerbaijan never reciprocated Armenia’s vicious war crimes by targeting civilians.”*¹³³¹

In Aliyev’s statements, all these negative images attributed to Armenians are based on the characteristics, which are universally accepted as bad, atrocious, and provocative. Underlying high level of threat from Armenians and reinforcing the negative image of them, Aliyev has created a suitable ground for securitization of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict at both national and global level.

¹³²⁹ United Nations, General Assembly, 76th session, 11th plenary meeting, Annex V Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 23 September 2021, New York, A/76/PV.11

¹³³⁰ **Ibid.**

¹³³¹ **Ibid.**

3. “Commitment to Peaceful Settlement” in Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

International recognition and prestige is very important for newly independent post-Soviet states such as Azerbaijan. The eagerness for peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh issue in the speeches of Ilham Aliyev should be evaluated as a way to gain this prestige. Ilham Aliyev repeatedly stressed upon Azerbaijan’s commitment to international rules and need for support of international community. In his speech of 2003, he said, *“Azerbaijan has on many occasions declared its commitment to the peaceful settlement of the conflict on the basis of norms and principles of international law. We are determined to continue with our efforts in this direction, and we count on the active participation of the international community.”*¹³³²

Aliyev has securitized Nagorno-Karabakh issue at the global level by claiming that in case of there was no settlement, this would threaten international peace and security. While declaring Azerbaijan’s commitment to the peaceful settlement, Aliyev has also underlined the possibility of use of force. By doing so, he warned the enemies and aimed to show his country’s military and economic capabilities. In his address in 2010, he said as below:

*“As a country suffering from the devastation of war and occupation, Azerbaijan strongly believes that faithful observance of universally accepted norms and principles of international law concerning good neighbourliness, friendly relations, cooperation among States and the fulfillment in good faith of the obligations assumed by States are of the greatest importance for the maintenance of international peace and security. The ongoing armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan still represents a major threat to international and regional peace and security.”*¹³³³

Aliyev welcomes international mediation efforts and supports peaceful resolution of the conflict according to international law; however, he clearly defines under which conditions this settlement can be realized. In 2003, as his father Heydar

¹³³² United Nations, General Assembly, 58th session, 10th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, Prime Minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2003, New York, A/58/PV.10

¹³³³ United Nations, General Assembly, 65th session, 12th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 23 September 2010, New York, A/65/PV.12

Aliyev, he underlined the necessity of the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijan's occupied territories as a precondition for the settlement. He said, *"Only after Armenia evacuates all the Azerbaijani territories and thus creates a basis for the peaceful settlement of the conflict can Armenia count on normal inter-State relations and cooperation with Azerbaijan. By rejecting our constructive proposals, based on the observance of international law, Armenia is demonstrating its genuine intention to seize and annex Azerbaijani territories."*¹³³⁴

In Aliyev's statement, the stance towards the IDPs in the settlement of conflict is consisted of two steps: responding to their urgent needs and supporting their returns. Aliyev frequently calls for international aid for refugees and IDPs in his country. By doing so, he aims to securitize and internationalize this issue. For Aliyev, the return of IDPs to their homelands is crucial for the settlement. Aliyev declared, *"We urge the relevant United Nations agencies and donor countries, as well as nongovernmental organizations, to boost their attention to the problems of the forcefully displaced Azerbaijani population and to respond adequately to their needs. As for the long-term resolution of this problem, it lies, of course, in the settlement of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and in the return of the refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes."*¹³³⁵

In another speech, Aliyev again called for international support for the return of IDPs. While describing them, he underlined "expelled", "forcibly displaced," "forcefully displaced" and "the most affected." In these words, there is an emphasis of coercion, involuntary act, and violation of fundamental human rights. In addition, there is a condemnation and accusation of those who caused this situation. Aliyev said, *"The return of Azerbaijan's displaced population to their homes remains one of our key priorities in the process of settling the conflict. But even before our expelled people, refugees and internally displaced persons come back home, there is still an urgent need for all the relevant United Nations agencies, donor countries and*

¹³³⁴ United Nations, General Assembly, 58th session, 10th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, Prime Minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2003, New York, A/58/PV.10

¹³³⁵ **Ibid.**

international humanitarian organizations to be actively involved in addressing the suffering of the most affected part of population.”¹³³⁶

Aliyev stressed upon the aggression of Armenia, occupied territories of Azerbaijan, expelled Azerbaijani population, and expectations from the UN Security Council in his address in 2004 as such:

*“Since the very day it became a member of the United Nations, Azerbaijan has constantly drawn the attention of the international community to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and to the occupation by Armenia of Azerbaijani territories. Azerbaijan expected the United Nations to compel the aggressor to move out of its land and to allow the expelled Azerbaijani population to return to their homes. I should like to recall that, in 1993, the Security Council unanimously adopted four resolutions — resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993) — in response to Armenia’s occupation of sovereign Azerbaijani territories.”*¹³³⁷

In his address to international society, Aliyev frequently stresses upon territorial rights of Azerbaijan and return of IDPs together. Aliyev expresses his unwillingness to compromise in these issues. He draws red lines and clearly identifies his intentions and aims with regard to IDPs. Aliyev stated in 2004 as such:

*“Those resolutions confirmed that the region of Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan, resolutely called for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and its internationally recognized borders, and underlined the inadmissibility of the use of force for the purpose of acquiring territory. The resolutions demanded an immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of occupying forces from all occupied areas of Azerbaijan and called for the establishment of conditions for the safe return of displaced people to their places of permanent residence.”*¹³³⁸

¹³³⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, 59th session, 9th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oğlu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2004, New York, A/59/PV.9

¹³³⁷ **Ibid.**

¹³³⁸ **Ibid.**

Aliyev's address in 2020 revealed the fact that Azerbaijan still insisted on the same demands such as the implementation of UN resolutions and the return of IDPs. He said:

*“Appropriate UN institutions must contribute to the territorial integrity, implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions and return of Azerbaijani internally displaced persons to their native lands. The UN Security Council resolutions are not timespecific. These resolutions are valid until they are implemented. Misinterpretation of UN Security Council resolutions is unacceptable. (...) Azerbaijan's territorial integrity has never been and will never be a subject of negotiations. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan must be completely restored. Nagorno-Karabakh is ancient and historical Azerbaijani lands. Karabakh is Azerbaijan.”*¹³³⁹

In his speeches, Aliyev often aims to describe Armenia as a country, which does not abide by international law and benefits from maintaining status quo at the expense of devastating effects of war. Aliyev prefers to display Armenia, which does not “respect”, “recognize”, does “ignore,” and in extreme case “violates” international rules and law.

Aliyev drew attention to the fact that the UN resolutions were not implemented by Armenia. In 2004, he said: *“None of those resolutions — which were intended to restore justice and peace and the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan — has been implemented by Armenia, which never respected or recognized the fundamental principles of international law contained in the resolutions that laid down the basis for the settlement of the conflict.”*¹³⁴⁰

In 2010, Aliyev said, *“Despite ongoing political efforts towards the earliest possible resolution of the conflict, activities in the occupied areas of Azerbaijan are in gross violation of international law and serve to further consolidate the current status quo of the occupation, securing the results of ethnic cleansing and*

¹³³⁹ United Nations, General Assembly, 75th session, 9th plenary meeting, Annex I Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2020, New York, A/75/PV.9

¹³⁴⁰ United Nations, General Assembly, 59th session, 9th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2004, New York, A/59/PV.9

colonization of the captured territories, and causing serious obstruction to the peaceful resolution of the conflict.”¹³⁴¹

In 2020, Aliyev stated that Armenia continued to disregard the resolutions. *“Armenia brutally violated its obligations and used military force against Azerbaijan. Armenia occupied Nagorno-Karabakh and seven other regions of Azerbaijan. Four Security Council resolutions adopted in 1993 demand the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from Azerbaijan’s occupied territories.*”¹³⁴²

In his speech of 2021, Aliyev reminded once again the violation of international law by Armenia, *“The UN Security Council adopted four resolutions in 1993 demanding immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of armed forces of Armenia from Azerbaijan’s occupied territories. However, these and all other similar decisions adopted by relevant international organizations, including the UN General Assembly, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Non-Aligned Movement, the OSCE, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and European Parliament were ignored by Armenia.*”¹³⁴³

Aliyev warned international community by saying that if the conflict did not end in accordance with international law, then, use of military force could become inevitable. Aliyev said, *“Thus, Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was resolved by military political means. In the absence of compliance with the international law it was inevitable to ensure the implementation of Security Council resolutions by force. As a result of which, the aggressor state was enforced to peace.*”¹³⁴⁴

For Aliyev, Yerevan did not only disobey the resolutions, but also caused deadlock in peace negotiations. According to him, one of the most important reasons

¹³⁴¹ United Nations, General Assembly, 65th session, 12th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 23 September 2010, New York, A/65/PV.12

¹³⁴² United Nations, General Assembly, 75th session, 3rd plenary meeting, Annex 10, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 21 September 2020, New York, A/75/PV.3

¹³⁴³ United Nations, General Assembly, 76th session, 11th plenary meeting, Annex V Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 23 September 2021, New York, A/76/PV.11

¹³⁴⁴ United Nations, General Assembly, 31st special session, 2nd plenary meeting, Annex V Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 3 December 2020, New York, A/S-31/PV.2

for deadlock after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War has been the provocative statements of Armenians. The statements of Armenian politicians “Karabakh is Armenia” have irritated Azerbaijanis. Armenian leaders’ discourse has created a kind of resentment, hatred, and anger among Azerbaijani leadership and this situation has created more incentives for securitization. Aliyev said before the 2020 war as below:

*“Armenia tries to derail the peace process under the mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairs. The aim pursued by Armenia is to maintain the current status-quo of occupation and to annex the occupied territories. Contrary to the constructive engagement of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of Armenia deliberately undermines the format and substance of negotiation process. His statement that ‘Karabakh is Armenia’ seriously damages the negotiations process. (...) The armed forces of Armenia must withdraw from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan. The entire world recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh as integral part of Azerbaijan.”*¹³⁴⁵

“Karabakh is Armenia” has caused huge uneasiness and threat perceptions in Azerbaijani society and led to the escalation of securitization rhetoric. In 2021, just one year after the war, Aliyev stressed upon “new aggression” and “new occupation” in Nagorno-Karabakh region. These words were aimed to remind the bloody events of the past. Aliyev said as such:

*“During the last 2 years of the conflict, Armenia deliberately destroyed the negotiation process. The Government of Armenia made a number of provocative statements and actions like saying ‘Karabakh is Armenia, and period’ and ‘Not an inch of occupied land back’. The then defence minister of Armenia openly threatened Azerbaijan with new aggression and occupation of new territories. Armenia put forward unacceptable and groundless so-called seven conditions and demanded to change the negotiations format, to start from the ‘zero point’ and to involve the puppet regime established by Armenia in the occupied territories in negotiation process.”*¹³⁴⁶

¹³⁴⁵ United Nations, General Assembly, 75th session, 9th plenary meeting, Annex I Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2020, New York, A/75/PV.9

¹³⁴⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, 76th session, 11th plenary meeting, Annex V Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 23 September 2021, New York, A/76/PV.11 ; see also United Nations, General Assembly, 75th session, 3rd plenary meeting, Annex

Another important point that attracts attention in Aliyev's speech is his criticism to international and regional actors that are expected to play role in the settlement of the conflict. For instance, Aliyev severely criticized the activities of Minsk Group. He said in 2004 as such:

*“The process of political settlement of the conflict that has been conducted within the Minsk Group of OSCE during the last 12 years has thus far yielded no results. No serious consideration has been given by the Minsk Group to the implementation of the Security Council's resolutions, to assessing the situation on the ground or to the illegal activities carried out by Armenia in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.”*¹³⁴⁷

Aliyev complained about the double standards regarding to the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions. He said in 2017, *“For 24 years, Armenia has ignored Security Council resolutions, and unfortunately it has not been punished for that. In some cases, Security Council resolutions are implemented within days. In our case, resolutions have gone unimplemented for 24 years. That is a demonstration of double standards, and it is unacceptable.”*¹³⁴⁸ In the same speech, he said:

“Armenia does everything in its power to maintain the status quo and block substantive negotiations. The co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group — France, Russia and the United States — have stated on several occasions that the status quo is unacceptable. How can such a corrupt, failed State, ruled by a despotic, medieval regime, violate international law for so many years and ignore Security Council resolutions and statements by the world's leading countries? Because there is a double standard. There is no international pressure on the aggressor, no international sanctions imposed on the Armenian dictatorship. That policy must end. It is not only a demonstration of

10, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 21 September 2020, New York, A/75/PV.3

¹³⁴⁷ United Nations, General Assembly, 59th session, 9th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2004, New York, A/59/PV.9

¹³⁴⁸ United Nations, General Assembly, 72nd session, 7th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 20 September 2017, New York, A/72/PV.7

injustice, it also creates the impression that the Armenian dictatorship can continue its policy of terror.”¹³⁴⁹

Aliyev mentions double standards of international community in 2021 as well. This speech is very similar to one given in 2017. He said, *“While some resolutions of the Security Council are implemented within days, in our case they remained unfulfilled for 27 years, which is a clear manifestation of double standards. There is a need to join efforts to elaborate mechanism of implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions in order to avoid selective approach.*”¹³⁵⁰

While describing Armenia as being “medieval,” “despotic” and “dictatorship” which violate the rules and destroy the order, Aliyev securitizes the existence of such a country as a threat to global order. According to him, international community should be aware of this threat and must persuade Armenia on the establishment of peace. He said, *“The international community should also play its positive role in this regard and urge Armenia to realize that peace has no alternative. Any acts directly or indirectly supporting revanchism and militarization in Armenia must be ceased.*”¹³⁵¹

In sum, firstly, Aliyev often expresses his country’s commitment to peaceful settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The explicit reason behind this seems to end the conflict. However, as an implicit meaning, Baku aims to be approved by the West through this behaviour. Aliyev aims to show that Azerbaijan is the respectful member of international order who obeys the rules and law.

Secondly, the lack of solution in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is shown as a threat to global order. By doing so, Aliyev tries to indicate the possible impact of this war on global order and to securitize this issue at the international level. In fact, the existential threat is to his regime security. However, he tries to globalize this local problem and gain international support.

¹³⁴⁹ United Nations, General Assembly, 72nd session, 7th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 20 September 2017, New York, A/72/PV.7

¹³⁵⁰ United Nations, General Assembly, 76th session, 11th plenary meeting, Annex V Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 23 September 2021, New York, A/76/PV.11

¹³⁵¹ **Ibid.**

Thirdly, the possibility of use of force is to deter Armenians and to protect Azerbaijani state/regime. In fact, Azerbaijan uses a discourse to reproduce its power and dominance. By stating that Azerbaijan may “use force when necessary,” Aliyev underlines the ability to defeat the enemy with economic power and military capabilities. In addition, he means that Azerbaijan tries not to escalate conflict, but Armenia is responsible for the aggression.

Fourthly, Aliyev calls for international organizations to support his country in terms of providing aids and funds to the IDP population. However, in his speeches, Aliyev means that if there is no support from international community, his government is able to help its own people since they have capacity and economic power to do so. Aliyev’s discourse again tends to produce power and dominance.

Lastly, Aliyev criticizes international organizations of being reluctant to find solution to the conflict and force Armenians to obey the rules. In this sense, he accuses international community of applying double standards. Aliyev knows that his statements attract attention to the conflict and strengthen his image at home and abroad as a strong leader who can even object to Western powers when necessary.

4. IDPs: “Victimization,” Liberation,” and “Voluntary Return”

Ilham Aliyev, in his speeches which are directed to international audience frequently refers to the IDPs. To remind, Aliyev often said that there was more than one million Azerbaijanis who became refugees and IDPs because of occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven other regions of Azerbaijan.¹³⁵² The way he addresses this issue is usually to dramatize while he also tries to show what kind of policies have been implemented to solve it. In 2003, when Aliyev was prime minister, he said as follows:

“The conflict has deprived almost one million Azerbaijanis of roofs over their heads. It is clear that the forthcoming winter will again become another hard test for the refugees and the internally displaced persons, hundreds of thousands of whom continue to live in tent camps. The Government of Azerbaijan, using its limited resources, spares no effort to mitigate their

¹³⁵² United Nations, General Assembly, 75th session, 9th plenary meeting, Annex I Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oğlu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2020, New York, A/75/PV.9

suffering. Recently, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan by decree allocated more than \$70 million to the construction of housing for refugees.”¹³⁵³

In this speech, the conditions of IDPs are described as homeless people living in tents and suffering winter conditions. Aliyev expressed Azerbaijani government’s eagerness to help these people, and even explained some of its policies towards IDPs, but underlined its limited resources.

Similarly, Ilham Aliyev said in 2004, *“Some of our actions sought to protect millions of innocent people, especially women and children, who still fall victim to brutal armed conflicts.”*¹³⁵⁴ Victimization in Nagorno-Karabakh War is one of the most frequently used discourses. The victims of the war as IDPs have been considered as the most vulnerable group. Furthermore, IDP women and children are in the category of the most disadvantageous people.

In Aliyev’s speeches, there is always an emphasis on the lack of financial support, and Azerbaijani’s loneliness in providing aids to IDPs. In 2017, he announced, *“With no foreign financial support, we have built almost 100 new settlements and towns for refugees and internally displaced persons affected by the Armenian occupation. We have thereby improved the living conditions of more than 250,000 people, providing them with new houses and flats and building 152 schools, 59 medical centres, and 60 kindergartens in their towns and settlements.”*¹³⁵⁵

During the disease that has deeply affected the world since 2019, Aliyev attracted the attention to IDPs. He said, *“Refugees and IDPs have become the most vulnerable group of the pandemic period. The return of these vulnerable groups to their native lands in safety and dignity gains great urgency.”*¹³⁵⁶

¹³⁵³ United Nations, General Assembly, 58th session, 10th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, Prime Minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2003, New York, A/58/PV.10

¹³⁵⁴ United Nations, General Assembly, 59th session, 9th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2004, New York, A/59/PV.9

¹³⁵⁵ United Nations, General Assembly, 72nd session, 7th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 20 September 2017, New York, A/72/PV.7

¹³⁵⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, 75th session, 9th plenary meeting, Annex I Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2020, New York, A/75/PV.9

In his speeches, as a security concern, Aliyev stated that Armenia followed a policy of illegal settlement of Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions. Aliyev securitized this issue by linking this illegal settlement issue with Armenian occupation and violation of law. Illegal settlement is shown as an existential threat to the Azerbaijani state. He said, *“Armenia consequently launched an outrageous policy involving massive illegal settlement of an Armenian population in occupied Azerbaijani territories. That also is a blatant violation of international law, and in particular of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.”*¹³⁵⁷

In 2020, Aliyev claimed that Armenians illegally settled Lebanese people of Armenian origin to the region and said as below:

*“In blatant violation of the international law norms, Armenia implements a policy of illegal settlement on the occupied territories. While the international community, including Azerbaijan is concentrating on eliminating the consequences of Beirut explosion, Armenia misuses the situation by settling Lebanese people of Armenian origin in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. The illegal settlement is a gross violation of international law, including the Geneva Convention of 1949. This is a war crime. The illegal settlement in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan cannot have any legal effect.”*¹³⁵⁸

Similarly, in 2021, Aliyev mentioned the illegal settlement of Armenian people:

“Furthermore, in gross violation of international law, including Geneva Conventions, Armenia was blatantly implementing the policy of illegal settlement of people mainly from Middle East with Armenian origin in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Encouraged by the long-lasting sense of impunity, Armenia was also announcing construction of new roads from

¹³⁵⁷ United Nations, General Assembly, 59th session, 9th plenary meeting, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2004, New York, A/59/PV.9

¹³⁵⁸ United Nations, General Assembly, 75th session, 9th plenary meeting, Annex I Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 24 September 2020, New York, A/75/PV.9

Armenia to occupied territories to further consolidate the result of its aggression and speed up the illegal settlement.”¹³⁵⁹

Aliyev underlined the successes of Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in one of his addresses to the UN General Assembly. He said, “During 44-day war Azerbaijan liberated a large part of occupied territories, including cities of Jabrayil, Hadrut, Fuzuli, Zangilan, Gubadly and Shusha. In total more than 300 cities and villages were liberated on the battlefield.”¹³⁶⁰ The word “liberation” in Aliyev’s speech connotes “occupation.”

In 2020, Aliyev claimed that Armenia destroyed historical and religious monuments that belong to the Azerbaijani people in the occupied territories.¹³⁶¹ It is argued that the occupied regions were destroyed during Armenia’s occupation and even after the ceasefire and reconstruction process was started by Azerbaijani government.¹³⁶² In an Azerbaijani newspaper, it was declared, “*The Culture Ministry completed the inventory of 1,376 historical and cultural monuments (...) in the liberated lands. (...) Almost all monuments and objects of historical, architectural, and archeological significance, cultural institutions have been completely demolished or vandalized.*”¹³⁶³

Take-over of seven surrounding region by Azerbaijan after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War has been considered as a new beginning for the return and settlement of IDPs to their homeland. Ilham Aliyev himself was eager to build transportation roads, airports, and villages to facilitate and encourage the return and settlement of IDPs.

¹³⁵⁹ United Nations, General Assembly, 76th session, 11th plenary meeting, Annex V Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 23 September 2021, New York, A/76/PV.11

¹³⁶⁰ United Nations, General Assembly, 76th session, 11th plenary meeting, Annex V Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 23 September 2021, New York, A/76/PV.11; Azertag, “President Ilham Aliyev: There is no administrative territorial unit called Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan,” 24 September 2021

[https://azertag.az/en/xeber/President Ilham Aliyev There is no administrative territorial unit called Nagorno Karabakh in Azerbaijan-1884245](https://azertag.az/en/xeber/President+Ilham+Aliyev+There+is+no+administrative+territorial+unit+called+Nagorno+Karabakh+in+Azerbaijan-1884245) (Retrieved on June 10, 2021)

¹³⁶¹ United Nations, General Assembly, 75th session, 3rd plenary meeting, Annex 10, Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 21 September 2020, New York, A/75/PV.3

¹³⁶² Mushvig Mehdiyev, “Internally Displaced Azerbaijanis May Soon Start Returning to Liberated Zangilan,” *Caspian News*, 22 October 2021

<https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/internally-displaced-azerbaijanis-may-soon-start-returning-to-liberated-zangilan-2021-10-22-0/> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

¹³⁶³ Azernews, “MFA: Azerbaijan Working to Ensure IDPs’ Return to Karabakh,” 6 September 2021. <https://www.azernews.az/nation/182980.html> (Retrieved on June 8, 2022)

In an interview, Aliyev mentioned the return of IDPs as soon as possible and aimed to show the destructive effects of war by comparing the territories with Lebanon: *“The main goal is to return the former refugees and displaced persons as soon as possible. They have waited too long. (...) The scale of the destruction is such that it is simply amazing. It is a territory equal in size to that of Lebanon. Just imagine – we will have to build, equip an area equal to the territory of a country that is not the smallest in the world – Lebanon.”*¹³⁶⁴

Azerbaijani government started to build plants, power stations, roads and railways in newly recaptured lands.¹³⁶⁵ Aliyev said in September 2021, *“Therefore, large-scale work is currently under way, primarily electrification. By the end of the year, we will fully provide all the liberated territories with energy. (...) Roads are being built in all directions. (...) In other words, there is a connection between these cities.”*¹³⁶⁶

Aliyev shared the allocation for this reconstruction: *“We have allocated \$1.3 billion this year for the program on the restoration of the liberated territories alone, of which, I would say, that about \$400 million has not been allocated yet, because we comply with all the bidding, planning and design procedures.”*¹³⁶⁷

Azerbaijani government aims to establish three international airports in these territories. The first one will be in Fuzuli, which was started in October 2021. The construction of Zangilan airport will start by the end of 2022. The Lachin airport is planned for 2024.¹³⁶⁸ Another project within the scope of transportation is Zangazur corridor. Aliyev announced in 2021, *“One of the areas that can serve as the cause of*

¹³⁶⁴ Azertag, “President Ilham Aliyev’s interview with Russian influential ‘Natsionalnaya oborona’ magazine,” 24 September 2021, [https://azertag.az/en/xeber/President Ilham Aliyevs interview with Russian influential Natsionalna ya oborona magazine VIDEO-1884395](https://azertag.az/en/xeber/President%20Ilham%20Aliyev%20interview%20with%20Russian%20influential%20Natsionalnaya%20oborona%20magazine%20VIDEO-1884395) (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

¹³⁶⁵ Radio Free Europe, “Despite Official Promises, Displaced Azerbaijanis Are Skeptical About Returning To Territory Won In Karabakh War,” 30 October 2021, <https://www.rferl.org/a/displaced-azerbaijan-return-karabakh/31537101.html> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

¹³⁶⁶ Azertag, “President Ilham Aliyev’s interview with Russian influential ‘Natsionalnaya oborona’ magazine,” 24 September 2021, [https://azertag.az/en/xeber/President Ilham Aliyevs interview with Russian influential Natsionalna ya oborona magazine VIDEO-1884395](https://azertag.az/en/xeber/President%20Ilham%20Aliyev%20interview%20with%20Russian%20influential%20Natsionalnaya%20oborona%20magazine%20VIDEO-1884395) (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

¹³⁶⁷ Trend News Agency, “By the end of the year, we will fully provide all the liberated territories with energy - President Aliyev,” September 24, 2021 <https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3488907.html> (Retrieved on 05.11.2022).

¹³⁶⁸ Jam News, “Ilham Aliyev: ‘If we are defining borders, what NK status is there to talk about?’” 27 May 2022. <https://jam-news.net/if-we-define-the-borders-then-what-status-of-nk-can-we-talk-about-azerbaijan-stated-that-the-conflict-over-nagorno-karabakh-has-been-resolved/> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

peace and cooperation is transportation projects. In this context, the Zangazur corridor connecting mainland Azerbaijan with its inseparable part Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and Turkey will create new opportunities for our region."¹³⁶⁹

Aliyev launched another project, which was named as "smart city" and "smart village." In 2021, he announced, *"As we have left the conflict behind, large-scale construction work is carried out in the liberated territories. Azerbaijan is building new cities and towns from the scratch by applying the modern urban planning and utilizing the concepts of "smart city" and "smart village".*"¹³⁷⁰

The reconstruction and restoration projects cost 2.2 billion manats (\$1.3 billion).¹³⁷¹ Smart village concept brings technology and innovation to rural areas. This concept aims to modernize and facilitate the lives of communities living in these regions. *"Digital technologies are designed to raise living standards, improve public services for citizens, ensure better use of resources, reduce environmental impact and create new opportunities for rural value chains in terms of products and improved processes."*¹³⁷² The Smart village project was launched in Aghali in April 2021, during Aliyev's visit to Zangilan District. Aliyev personally has attached great importance to this project. In the current situation, a residential block in this village has been constructed in an area of 110 hectares.¹³⁷³

The Aghali village consists of *"200 eco-friendly houses, four two-story non-residential buildings, a school designed for 360 students, a kindergarten accommodating 60 children, an outpatient clinic, and a hydroelectric power plant. Five key components of development have been outlined for the village: housing, production, social services, smart agriculture, and alternative energy. Meanwhile, the 'smart agriculture' concept in the Aghali village is supposed to open an all-new*

¹³⁶⁹ United Nations, General Assembly, 76th session, 11th plenary meeting, Annex V Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 23 September 2021, New York, A/76/PV.11

¹³⁷⁰ **Ibid.**

¹³⁷¹ Mushvig Mehdiyev, "Internally Displaced Azerbaijanis May Soon Start Returning to Liberated Zangilan," Caspian News, 22 October 2021 <https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/internally-displaced-azerbaijanis-may-soon-start-returning-to-liberated-zangilan-2021-10-22-0/> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

¹³⁷² **Ibid.**


¹³⁷³ **Ibid.**

chapter in Azerbaijan's agriculture sector.”¹³⁷⁴ Construction works were carried out by Turkish, Chinese, Italian, and Israeli companies.¹³⁷⁵



The first smart village of Azerbaijan in the Zangilan district located in the East Zangazur economic region, October 20, 2021 / President.Az

Figure 3.1. The first smart village of Azerbaijan in Zangilan District¹³⁷⁶



Google Earth imagery of Aghali from 2018 and an undated point since 2020.

Figure 3.2. Google Earth Imagery of Aghali in 2018 and 2020¹³⁷⁷

Aliyev further stated that there would be more projects for larger cities. He also underlined that Azerbaijan handled to providing loan process by its own. As mentioned above, he aimed to show that Azerbaijan was able to carry out the

¹³⁷⁴ Mushvig Mehdiyev, “Internally Displaced Azerbaijanis May Soon Start Returning to Liberated Zangilan,” Caspian News, 22 October 2021 <https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/internally-displaced-azerbaijanis-may-soon-start-returning-to-liberated-zangilan-2021-10-22-0/> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

¹³⁷⁵ Ismi Aghayev, “First Azerbaijani IDPs to return to Zangilan ‘in spring’”, OC Media, 3 February 2022 <https://oc-media.org/first-azerbaijani-idps-to-return-to-zangilan-in-spring/>

¹³⁷⁶ Mushvig Mehdiyev, “Internally Displaced Azerbaijanis May Soon Start Returning to Liberated Zangilan,” Caspian News, 22 October 2021 <https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/internally-displaced-azerbaijanis-may-soon-start-returning-to-liberated-zangilan-2021-10-22-0/> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

¹³⁷⁷ Ismi Aghayev, “First Azerbaijani IDPs to return to Zangilan ‘in spring’”, OC Media, 3 February 2022 <https://oc-media.org/first-azerbaijani-idps-to-return-to-zangilan-in-spring/>

production process. He said in September 2021, *“As for large cities, it will probably take some time, but we will plan it all in stages. There is a phased construction and settlement process. (...) We did not apply for any loans, and if anyone wants to help, of course, we will be glad. If not, this is what we must do ourselves.”*¹³⁷⁸

For Aliyev, the project that would enable people to return their ancestral lands had “great symbolic meaning”.¹³⁷⁹ Ilham Aliyev has played important role in the development of these projects to ensure the return of IDPs. The most frequently asked question is whether the IDPs who have been living for almost 30 years in their new settlement areas in Azerbaijan want to return to their homeland or not. In these three decades, they got used to live in their new settlement areas and found shelters and jobs even though they had some difficulties. It is debatable whether they are eager or reluctant to return to their homelands.

The state authorities met with the IDPs in Zangilan region on June 16, 2021 in order to develop dialogue and exchange views before Great Return. These people were informed about the smart village project. It was underlined that the return would be on a voluntary basis and safety of IDPs would be ensured. The inhabitants of Aghali village expressed their content about implementation smart village project in their homeland.¹³⁸⁰ Ilham Aliyev seems sure that IDPs are willing to return and resettle in the territories where they had to leave in the past. *“I was told that the vast majority of IDPs want to return,”* Aliyev said at a meeting with the residents of the village of Aghali, Zangilan district.¹³⁸¹ Aliyev’s statements in complete are as such:

“I am very glad that young people are also very eager to return to their ancestral homeland. (...) Thirty years, 27 years is a long time. For example, Zangilan was under occupation for 27 years, other cities and districts were under occupation for a little more and a little less. There are people who have already built a life and business elsewhere, they are satisfied with life and do

¹³⁷⁸ Azertag, “President Ilham Aliyev’s interview with Russian influential ‘Natsionalnaya oborona’ magazine,” 24 September 2021. https://azertag.az/en/xeber/President_Ilham_Aliyevs_interview_with_Russian_influential_Natsionalnaya_oborona_magazine_VIDEO-1884395 (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

¹³⁷⁹ Ismi Aghayev, “First Azerbaijani IDPs to return to Zangilan ‘in spring’”, *OC Media*, 3 February 2022 <https://oc-media.org/first-azerbaijani-idps-to-return-to-zangilan-in-spring/>

¹³⁸⁰ State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “Proposals of Zangilan region Aghali village residents about the Return have been studied,” 16 June 2021. <http://idp.gov.az/en/news/1217> (Retrieved on June 10, 2021).

¹³⁸¹ Report News Agency, “President says ‘vast majority of IDPs want to return’ to their native lands,” 27 May 2022 <https://report.az/en/domestic-politics/president-says-absolute-majority-of-idps-want-to-return-to-their-native-lands/> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

not want to go anywhere, live in the city, in Baku, Sumgayit. It is not so easy to return from a big city to a small town or village. (...) Given that the return must be voluntary, we must create conditions for everyone to be able to return.”¹³⁸²

Aliyev said that especially IDPs who wanted to live there permanently should be given the opportunity for return. He stated, *“Maybe someone doesn’t want to go. Therefore, why should we spend money on them if they won’t end up going, or if they go there for the weekend and still live in Baku or Sumgayit. Is this a solution to the problem? No. We need to help those who will live there.”*¹³⁸³

According to Azerbaijani officials, nearly half of the Azerbaijani IDPs population lives in Baku, a city of over 2 million people. Economic opportunities in Baku are very different from rural areas. Children, who were born in Baku and elsewhere after the 1988-1994 clashes constituted a great percentage of Azerbaijani population and hold the status of IDPs.¹³⁸⁴ According to some sources, some IDPs are not sure about the return. *“Despite the official promises of return, many potential returnees are skeptical, airing concerns that not enough houses, schools, and hospitals have been built. What worries some people the most is that in a region that for years has been mostly abandoned, there won’t be enough jobs.”*¹³⁸⁵

Garay Huseynov, a representative of the Aghali district authorities, said that the first IDPs forcibly displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions were welcomed by local people and provided the houses left by Armenians. However, as the years passed, their problems deepened. Unlike the refugees from Armenia -ethnic Azeris who left Armenia in the late 1980s- the return of these IDPs to their homelands were always encouraged. There are still some discussions on why

¹³⁸² Trend News Agency, “Absolute majority of internally displaced persons want to return, which made me very happy - President Ilham Aliyev”, 27 May 2022 <https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3601436.html> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022)

¹³⁸³ Aytan Farhadova, Isa Musayev, “Not quite how they imagined it - Azerbaijani IDPs’ return to Karabakh”, *Jam News*, 22 October 2021. <https://jam-news.net/not-quite-how-they-imagined-it-azerbaijani-idps-return-to-karabakh/> (Retrieved on June 2022).

¹³⁸⁴ Shahin Abbasov, Sitara Ibrahimova, “Azerbaijan: Emphasizing IDPs’ Right to Return over Right to Stay Put”, *Eurasianet*, 19 November 2013. <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-emphasizing-idps-right-to-return-over-right-to-stay-put> (Retrieved on May 22, 2022).

¹³⁸⁵ Radio Free Europe, “Despite Official Promises, Displaced Azerbaijanis Are Skeptical About Returning To Territory Won In Karabakh War,” 30 October 2021 <https://www.rferl.org/a/displaced-azerbaijan-return-karabakh/31537101.html> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

these people are living in the camps despite the fact that the economic resources of the country are enough to provide better living conditions.¹³⁸⁶

It was reported that when the war ended in November 2020, some IDPs tried to return to their homelands. They wanted to know what remained from their homes. They attempted to travel without any permission and some of them were killed by land mines¹³⁸⁷ left by Armenian forces. Aghali representative Huseynov said that he did not know all steps of the resettlement. He stated that the list of returnees must be fully confirmed and a resettlement plan must be determined. Huseynov said that within his knowledge, the old people would be initially sent and the families with children would be sent later after the schools were constructed.¹³⁸⁸

In Azerbaijan, some of IDPs are reluctant to return due to fears on unemployment. Murad Niftaliev, an IDP from the city of Zangilan, does not think as such. He said, *"Last year, we were given a comfortable furnished three-room apartment here. But I will be happy to return it to the state and leave for my native Zangilan."*¹³⁸⁹ However, Imran Tanryverdiev, an IDP from the city of Gubadly, does not want to return. He explained the reasons of his decision as such: *"I work as an engineer at an Azerbaijani-Turkish construction company. If I leave, I will hardly find a job with a high salary. But my elderly parents will return to our native city."*¹³⁹⁰ Samir Abdullaev, an IT specialist, explained his concerns with these words: *"I was a little boy when we left our native village. I grew up and studied in Baku, and I work here. If we leave, we will lose everything. My parents will return to the village, and we will often visit them on holidays and vacations."*¹³⁹¹

¹³⁸⁶ Radio Free Europe, "Despite Official Promises, Displaced Azerbaijanis Are Skeptical About Returning To Territory Won In Karabakh War," 30 October 2021 <https://www.rferl.org/a/displaced-azerbaijan-return-karabakh/31537101.html> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

¹³⁸⁷ President Ilham Aliyev said, *"But an even bigger problem is minefields. The few maps of minefields the Armenian side gave us are about 25% accurate. But they won't give us most of the maps of minefields, so this is a very time-consuming job."* Azertag, "President Ilham Aliyev's interview with Russian influential 'Natsionalnaya oborona' magazine," 24 September 2021. https://azertag.az/en/xeber/President_Ilham_Aliyevs_interview_with_Russian_influential_Natsionalnaya_oborona_magazine_VIDEO-1884395 (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

¹³⁸⁸ Radio Free Europe, "Despite Official Promises, Displaced Azerbaijanis Are Skeptical About Returning To Territory Won In Karabakh War," 30 October 2021, <https://www.rferl.org/a/displaced-azerbaijan-return-karabakh/31537101.html> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

¹³⁸⁹ Caucasian Knot, "In Azerbaijan, IDPs await return to their homeland after fighting in Karabakh," 12 November 2020, <https://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/52751/> (Retrieved on June 8, 2022).

¹³⁹⁰ **Ibid.**

¹³⁹¹ **Ibid.**

Economist Rovshan Agayev asserted, *“At the moment, there are about 700,000 hectares of agricultural land. It is necessary to announce what part of these lands will remain a municipal and state property and which one will be subject to privatization.”*¹³⁹² According to another economist Togrul Veliyev, in the return of IDPs, it is possible that some kind of compensation is paid. He said, *“Perhaps the internally displaced persons will be paid something but there is no question of compensation as such. Nothing has been allocated from the budget for these purposes, and there are no official statements on this matter.”*¹³⁹³

In sum, in Aliyev’s speeches, IDPs are defined as the most vulnerable and disadvantageous people in Azerbaijan’s territories, in other words, the victims of war. Despite of the lack of financial resources and inadequate support from international community, there is an emphasis that Azerbaijan allocated huge amounts of funds to the well-being of IDP population and has been able to manage this difficult situation. Despite all efforts of Azerbaijani government, Armenians have been accused of attempting illegal settlement and this act has been again related to gross violation of international law. In this sense, positive images of “us” and negative ones of “them” have been also used within the framework of internal displacement.

Aliyev’s emphasis on the return of IDPs in voluntary basis is important since GPIDPs also point up the same principle. His discourse has been always in line with international law since Aliyev aims to display his country’s eagerness and efforts to comply with well-established rules and norms while blaming Armenians for their aggressive and unlawful policies.

5. The Status: Only Karabakh! No Political Autonomy for Armenians!

After the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, there have been two important issues in the political agenda of Azerbaijan. The first one is the name of Nagorno-Karabakh and the second one is the status of Armenians in the region. Ilham Aliyev asserted that there was no territory called as Nagorno-Karabakh since they resolved the conflict. The resolution means that Azerbaijan achieved its aims by taking control

¹³⁹² Aytan Farhadova, Isa Musayev, “Not quite how they imagined it - Azerbaijani IDPs’ return to Karabakh”, *Jam News*, 22 October 2021. <https://jam-news.net/not-quite-how-they-imagined-it-azerbaijani-idps-return-to-karabakh/> (Retrieved on June 2022).

¹³⁹³ **Ibid.**

of its territories. In a speech given in 2021, he said that these territories belonged to Azerbaijan and should be called as “Karabakh”. Aliyev declared as below:

“Azerbaijan resolved the 30-year-long conflict and restored its territorial integrity and historical justice by military-political means. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was left in the past. There is no administrative territorial unit called Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. We have created Karabakh and Eastern Zangazur economic zones by the Presidential decree signed on 7 July this year. Using this occasion, I would like to call on all the UN Member States and the UN Secretariat to avoid using legally non-existing, politically biased and manipulative names while referring to our territories” said.¹³⁹⁴

In 2022, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev reiterated that there was “no Nagorno-Karabakh” and the region was part of “Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region”.¹³⁹⁵ He said, *“Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been resolved. As for the administrative territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, this name does not exist in the territory of Azerbaijan. Therefore, the word Nagorno-Karabakh is not in the lexicon of international organizations.”*¹³⁹⁶ For Aliyev, recognition of the name Karabakh for these territories by other states and international organizations has been seen very important. He called for the acceptance of this name in order to prevent the use of other names, which was considered misleading and manipulative.

European Council President Charles Michel in his speech underlined “the rights and security of the ethnic Armenian population in Karabakh.” It was argued that the usage of “Karabakh” as opposed to Nagorno-Karabakh, as in previous statements made by Michel, corresponded with the “Azerbaijani agenda.”¹³⁹⁷ Just after the meeting, which was held under the guidance of European Council, Aliyev talked about the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. *“The whole world, leading countries*

¹³⁹⁴ United Nations, General Assembly, 76th session, 11th plenary meeting, Annex V Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 23 September 2021, New York, A/76/PV.11

¹³⁹⁵ OC Media, “Charles Michel: Pashinyan-Aliyev meeting ‘frank and productive’”, 24 May 2022. <https://oc-media.org/charles-michel-pashinyan-aliyev-meeting-frank-and-productive/> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022.)

¹³⁹⁶ Trend News Agency, “If we define borders with Armenia, what kind of status for ‘Nagorno-Karabakh’ can we talk about? - President Ilham Aliyev”, 27 May 2022. <https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3601474.html> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

¹³⁹⁷ OC Media, “Charles Michel: Pashinyan-Aliyev meeting ‘frank and productive’”, 24 May 2022. <https://oc-media.org/charles-michel-pashinyan-aliyev-meeting-frank-and-productive/> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022.)

and leading international organizations have accepted the new realities. (...) Because if we define the borders, then what status of 'Nagorno-Karabakh' can we talk about? There is the Karabakh zone, the Karabakh region. This is the territory of Azerbaijan and everyone accepts it," Aliyev importantly noted.¹³⁹⁸

After the war in 2020, Azerbaijani officials started to talk about a “cultural autonomy” for Armenians, which meant like education and media in the Armenian language. According to this, Armenians will be just the citizens and have no additional rights. This means that they will have not political autonomy. In his November 2020 address declaring Azerbaijan’s victory, *Political autonomy was no longer an option,*” Aliyev said and continued, *“The status went to hell. It failed; it was shattered to smithereens. It is not and will not be there. As long as I am president, there will be no status.”*¹³⁹⁹

In October 2021, one pro-government member of parliament Zahid Oruj said that the government formally worked on a plan to integrate Karabakh Armenians into Azerbaijani society. *“But all this is predicated on Armenians accepting Azerbaijani citizenship and coexistence [with Azerbaijanis], and integration,”* he said.¹⁴⁰⁰ The state-run news website AzerNews published an article on April 15, 2022 and proposed that a “new interpretation” of the Armenian demands for rights for ethnic Armenians in Karabakh was possible. *“Yerevan has already come to the point of recognizing the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, with Karabakh included. (...) The nation will find out that the status subject is a relic of a bygone age, incapable of being of any practical value for contemporary needs and consigned to the overflowing dustbin of history.”*¹⁴⁰¹

Political analyst Shahin Jafarli said that Aliyev tended to accept cultural autonomy but not beyond this. According to him, there was not also any international pressure on Azerbaijan to provide political autonomy to Armenians. Similarly,

¹³⁹⁸ Newsam, “Aliyev: If we define borders with Armenia, what status of Nagorno-Karabakh can we talk about?!” , 27 May 2022. <https://news.am/eng/news/704300.html> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022). ; Trend News Agency, “If we define borders with Armenia, what kind of status for ‘Nagorno-Karabakh’ can we talk about? - President Ilham Aliyev”, 27 May 2022. <https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3601474.html> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

¹³⁹⁹ Heydar Isayev, “Azerbaijan Quiet as Karabakh Negotiations Progress,” *Eurasianet*, April 20, 2022 <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-quiet-as-karabakh-negotiations-progress> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022)

¹⁴⁰⁰ **Ibid.**

¹⁴⁰¹ Orkhan Amashov, “Readjusted Armenian reasoning: Status recalibrated. What is new?,” *Azernews*, April 15, 2022 <https://www.azernews.az/our-writers/192374.html> (Retrieved on June 11, 2022).

Azerbaijani analyst Fuad Shahbazov said that political autonomy was not on the table since Baku strengthened its hand after the 2020 war. According to him, it can be talked only about cultural autonomy with some privileges. Kamal Makili-Aliyev, a Sweden-based Azerbaijani analyst thinks differently. For him, *“a written recognition of territorial integrity, a common non-use of force clause, guarantees for security of Karabakh Armenians by Russian peacekeepers (...), political autonomy for Karabakh (...) and the return of all refugees/IDPs”* can be options for further negotiations.¹⁴⁰²

In a visit to the site of the international airport in Zangilan in May 2022, Aliyev noted that he did not think that Armenians had problems either in Karabakh or in other parts of the country: *“Representatives of many peoples live normally in Azerbaijan and enjoy all the rights. There has never been discrimination on national and religious grounds in Azerbaijan. Therefore, the rights and security of the Armenians living in Azerbaijan are as important as the rights and security of other peoples inhabiting the country.”*¹⁴⁰³

As it is understood from the statements made by Aliyev, thanks to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, which has been considered as a great victory, Baku is not eager to make any compromise on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not only a war in the battlefield, but also largely shaped by speech act and propaganda. The insistence of Aliyev on the geographical term Karabakh signals that Azerbaijan, just as Armenia, is dedicated to strengthen its position not only militarily but also politically.

In sum, the securitization of Nagorno-Karabakh and IDP issue as an important factor in this act has dominated the statements of Aliyev. The return of IDPs is crucial at that point, because in case of a referendum, the majority of Azerbaijanis seem to determine the fate of the region. Therefore, for Azerbaijanis, the return is ranked on the top of agenda. As mentioned in the previous section, there are some discussions going on whether these people who used to live in Azerbaijan's other cities, especially in Baku and found jobs there, are eager to return or not. Although

¹⁴⁰² Heydar Isayev, “Azerbaijan Quiet as Karabakh Negotiations Progress,” *Eurasianet*, 20 April 2022, <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-quiet-as-karabakh-negotiations-progress> (Retrieved on June 2022)

¹⁴⁰³ Jam News, “Ilham Aliyev: ‘If we are defining borders, what NK status is there to talk about?’”, 27 May 2022. <https://jam-news.net/if-we-define-the-borders-then-what-status-of-nk-can-we-talk-about-azerbaijan-stated-that-the-conflict-over-nagorno-karabakh-has-been-resolved/> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

the authorities are announced that the return would be in a voluntary basis, some argue that, for a state, which has pursued authoritarian policies since independence and continued its securitization on Nagorno-Karabakh issue, it would not be surprising to force these people to return.

There are Armenians living in the surrounding territories to Nagorno-Karabakh, and these territories were taken back by Azerbaijani forces after the war in 2020. This has created another discussion. What will be the status of Armenians in these surrounding regions? Will they have at least some guarantees in terms of their security and living conditions? They can be declared as neither IDP nor refugees in legal sense, because, these territories have been officially belonged to Azerbaijan, and the newcomers who moved there after the invasion now became ordinary citizens. According to Aliyev, Armenians will be citizens just as Azerbaijanis in other parts of the country. Granting legal rights and promising to ensure their safety is not a problem for Azerbaijan. However, long-standing hostilities between Armenians and Azerbaijanis and possible return of IDPs to these seven surrounding regions create a risk to spark a new conflict.

Nagorno-Karabakh issue has been securitized by Ilham Aliyev, who is the leading securitizing actor in Azerbaijan. Securitizing actors are those who influence audience by their speech act on a specific security issue to be taken out of normal politics. Securitizing actor has to convince audience about the necessity to take extraordinary measures to deal with the securitized issue. The securitization of Nagorno-Karabakh issue in Azerbaijan has been attempted at both global and local levels. The receiver in Aliyev's speeches -the audience in Copenhagen School's term- is both the international community and Azerbaijani people including IDPs who are ordinary Azerbaijani citizens and constitute 6% of his audience today. Aliyev has frequently referred to IDPs in his speeches and instrumentalized their existence in the process of securitization.

Securitizing actors may manipulate audience to persuade them and legitimize their actions by their speech act. Moreover, authoritarian states have more power and opportunities in securitization process, because their constituencies feel mostly obliged to comply with the rules of their leaders. In this respect, the consent of audience in securitization process carried out by Ilham Aliyev, the strongest, and the most charismatic political figure in the country, has not been necessarily expected or

looked for. In addition, it can be argued that since Nagorno-Karabakh issue has been already sensitive in the eyes of Azerbaijani people and Armenians have been perceived as enemy, the acceptance of this securitizing act by the society has been relatively easy.

There are three important findings in terms of content analysis of Aliyev's speeches. Firstly, the speech act over positive "us" and negative "them" and a general polarization between these two have strengthened the hands of Aliyev in both at home and abroad. Aliyev frequently uses the discursive strategy that can be called as argumentation, which is based on the other's negative evaluation that follows from the historical events.

Aliyev consciously insisted on the military and civilian deaths and destruction of historical and religious heritage of Azerbaijan during three decades long war. Being too specific and precise on suffers of Azerbaijani people, while being too vague on Armenian experiences is another discursive strategy used by Aliyev. As a result, tragedies, massacres, clashes, and victimization emanated from these traumas and the existence of IDPs have created the conditions that facilitate the securitization process in domestic politics.

At macro-level, the images attributed to Azerbaijanis as the victims of war have aimed to create an Azerbaijani stereotype in the eyes of international community. While Azerbaijanis have been described "a civilized, reconcilable, respectable people," the negative images of Armenians have been stressed. He has implied a macro speech act based on Azerbaijanis' good acts and Armenians' bad acts. In this sense, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has turned into a war of speech acts on stereotypes and a competition over propaganda between Azerbaijanis and Armenians. These images and propaganda have facilitated the securitization of Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

Secondly, it is observed that the discursive themes used in Aliyev's speeches have always a global meaning or connotation. "Territorial integrity" and "sovereignty" are two cherished principles of international system that states cannot abandon. Therefore, threats directed to territorial integrity and sovereignty of a state, which is a member of this system, have been presented as a menace to other states as well. Aliyev frequently warns about the danger of Armenians that dare to threaten

the global order. The elements in local speech acts implement and sustain the global ones.

Thirdly, Aliyev's speeches have been evaluated in context, which means that the global or national events have been taken into consideration in the analysis. For instance, the global war on terror and Iraq War had great impact on Aliyev's emphasis on "terrorist activities" of Armenians in Azerbaijani territories in his addresses to the UN General Assembly. Common enemy was the terrorists in these years and terrorism had been globally securitized particularly with US policies.

Similarly, victories or failures in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have had great impact on the discourse of Aliyev. Aliyev frequently reminded Khojaly massacre, violation of ceasefires, border clashes and civilian death and casualties in his speeches. Four days war in 2016 and Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 have undoubtedly reinforced the discourse of Aliyev. Aliyev condemned Armenians due to their violation of basic international principles in these wars, and especially after the later, his discourses began to be more assertive. Aliyev rejected the use of "Nagorno-Karabakh" for this region, instead he insisted on "Karabakh" to describe unlawfully governed Nagorno-Karabakh territories and seven surrounding regions that were taken back after the war. He found provocative and aggressive any use of Nagorno-Karabakh and "Karabakh is Armenia" statements and instrumentalized this rhetoric to strengthen the securitization process.

C. Armenian Political Leaders, Policies and Statements on Nagorno-Karabakh

For Armenians, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the most important security problem of the country since the independence as it is the case in Azerbaijan. The significance of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Armenian politics, as well as for regional dynamics can be summarized as follows. Firstly, as it is observed in Azerbaijan, there is a strong correlation between the rise and fall of political leaders in Armenia and the successes/failures in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. For both government and opposition parties, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict provides a fertile ground for debate and rival in Armenia. For opponents, it is an effective tool to criticize and even overthrow rivals. For those who rule the country, it is the shortest and best-known way to gain public support and power.

Secondly, for political leaders in power, as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the most important problem to solve in the country's security agenda, other soft security issues such as economic and societal ones can be easily disregarded. Thirdly, the impact of Armenians who held posts in the governance of Nagorno-Karabakh such as Robert Kocharian and who carried out important duties during Nagorno-Karabakh war such as Serzh Sargsyan on the politics of Armenia cannot be underestimated.

Last but not least, political discourse used by Armenian leaders to address Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and their policies increase threat perceptions based on historical enmities in Azerbaijan and strengthen the arguments of Azerbaijani leaders in their addresses to domestic and international audience. In this sense, it would not be misleading to say that the attitude of Armenian political leaders has played a facilitating role for securitization of Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

Political leadership in Yerevan has become an obstacle to democratic state development and the settlement of territorial conflict. Although they seemed to concentrate on high security issues, they had no solution to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. They did not have a concrete plan for the resolution of the conflict. Therefore, they seemed responsible for the uncertainty and instability in the region since 1991.¹⁴⁰⁴ The failures in negotiations have been emanated from local dynamics and the role played by domestic actors instead of international mediators and the format of negotiations. In other words, it would be misleading to say that mediators were unsuccessful. It is necessary to examine internal dynamics of these countries as well.¹⁴⁰⁵

The common point between Baku and Yerevan is that both leaderships have almost complete control over the peace process. The presidents want be completely involved in decision-making procedures and are eager to manage every step of negotiations. Waals explains this eagerness of control as such:

“They [The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan] are the joint conductors of the process, which proceeds at the tempo they dictate. ... At the same time, state-controlled television in both Armenia and Azerbaijan,

¹⁴⁰⁴ Nicole Gallina, “Puzzles of State Transformation: The Cases of Armenia and Georgia,” *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Winter 2010, p. 20.

¹⁴⁰⁵ De Waal, “Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh...,” p. 160.

overwhelmingly the main source of news for the populations in both countries, continues to transmit official patriotic messages about either a heroic Armenian victory which will eventually be confirmed by history or the tragic occupation of Azerbaijani land which will one day be reversed."¹⁴⁰⁶

Azerbaijanis and Armenians had different solution plans for Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Armenians aimed to normalize the status quo. They hoped that the self-proclaimed state would be recognized internationally like Kosovo in the future. Azerbaijanis attempted to isolate it and conduct lobbying activities to receive support for its territorial integrity. At the same time, Baku improved its military capacities in order to be ready for a war if necessary.¹⁴⁰⁷

Both Baku and Yerevan hesitate to accept the existence of peacekeeping forces or operation in the region. Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh do not trust any foreign forces in their territories. They reminded the UN mission in Srebrenica, which has been a worst scenario in terms of protecting civilians. For Azerbaijanis, international forces in their own territories are seen as a threat to their own security. Russia aims to maintain its presence in its backyard; however, Azerbaijan is reluctant and concerned to see any Russian troops in the region. In sum, the deployment of peacekeeping force did not please any one to varying degrees.¹⁴⁰⁸

In this section, the statements of Armenian leaders in Armenia and so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic regarding to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its settlement will be evaluated. Although there seems to be close cooperation between them in both political and military means, recently, there are also some disagreements between the parties on the way of negotiating with Azerbaijani leaders and handling the conflict. Thus, this section also provides the conflicting and diverging interests and disagreements between Armenians of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh at the political level.

¹⁴⁰⁶ De Waal, "Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh...", p. 163.

¹⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

¹⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

1. Leaders of the Republic of Armenia and Their Statements on Nagorno-Karabakh

a. Levon Ter-Petrosian (November 1991-February 1998)

In Armenia, the political figures who played important roles in Nagorno-Karabakh war gained power over time.¹⁴⁰⁹ Levon Ter-Petrosian, a Syria-born child of a repatriated diaspora family,¹⁴¹⁰ had been one of the pioneers of the 1988 Karabakh Movement in Yerevan, and attracted attention in nationalist movement with his support of Nagorno-Karabakh's unification with Armenia. Ter-Petrosian won the elections as the first non-Communist president of the Armenian Supreme Soviet in the summer of 1990, and as President of Armenia in October 1991.¹⁴¹¹

Ter-Petrosian continued to his post as the president for the second time after the elections that was held in September 1996. In this election, Ter-Petrosian received 51,75% of the votes while his rival Vazgen Manukian, who officially received 41,29% of the votes.¹⁴¹² The victory was questionable. International observers said that there were some abuses committed by the President's supporters in the elections.¹⁴¹³ It was argued, *"Ter-Petrosian stole the race, using force to quell popular demonstrations and arrest the opposition. Observers maintained that in the absence of widespread violations, opposition leader Vazgen Manukian would have won."*¹⁴¹⁴

Ter-Petrosian and the ruling party, Armenian National Movement had lost popularity due to socio-economic problems and widespread political corruption in the mid-1990s. The military victory in Nagorno-Karabakh and ceasefire signed in 1994 became influential in concentrating on socio-economic issues. To become stronger again, Ter-Petrosian appointed a respected prime minister who could improve the economic conditions. Armenian ambassador to Great Britain, Armen

¹⁴⁰⁹ Paul Stronski, "Armenia at Twenty-Five: A Rough Ride," **Carnegie Endowment for International Peace**, 2016, p. 2.

¹⁴¹⁰ Vicken Cheterian, "Armenia's Election: The Waiting Game," **Open Democracy**, 19 February 2008.

<https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/armenia-election/>

¹⁴¹¹ Panossian, *"The Irony of Nagorno-Karabakh..."*, pp. 152-153.

¹⁴¹² Vazgenmanukyan, "Ter-Petrosian Was Re-elected in 1996 in a Disputed Election," 12 November 1996. <https://vazgenmanukyan.am/en/ter-petrosian-was-re-elected-in-1996-in-a-disputed-election/>

¹⁴¹³ The New York Times, "Armenian Chief Is Winner," 30 September 1996. <https://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/30/world/armenian-chief-is-winner.html>

¹⁴¹⁴ Ian Bremmer, "Help Wanted for Armenia," *Csmonitor*, 25 February 1998. <https://www.csmonitor.com/1998/0225/022598.opin.opin.2.html>

Sarkissian was appointed on November 5, 1996. However, Armen Sarkissian had to resign due to health problems four months later. Ter-Petrossian appointed Robert Kocharian, the President of so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, as Prime Minister of Armenia on March 20, 1997. Kocharian's appointment has been an opportunity for Nagorno-Karabakh elites to gain more power in Armenian politics.¹⁴¹⁵

The decline of Ter-Petrossian was closely related to his unpopularity in Nagorno-Karabakh war, rumors that some concessions would be made to Azerbaijan in the conflict, and the rise of Nagorno-Karabakh political figures in Yerevan. Ter-Petrossian's legitimacy was weak after the debatable election results and all prepared the way for a palace coup in 1998. His advisors were mostly political figures in Nagorno-Karabakh and would affect Armenian politics in the next 20 years: Robert Kocharian, Vazgen Sargsyan, and Serzh Sargsyan.¹⁴¹⁶ Under these conditions, as his prestige declined mostly due to his acceptance of compromise on a peace plan with Baku, Ter-Petrossian was obliged to leave his post in 1998 by Robert Kocharian and his followers.¹⁴¹⁷

Ter-Petrossian carried out his duties under very difficult conditions. When his statements are evaluated, it is observed that he had to call for self-determination for Nagorno-Karabakh in international area since the very beginning of independence. In addition, he favoured direct negotiations between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh instead of Armenia. In 1992, Ter-Petrossian said in UN General Assembly meeting:

“Armenia has been pursuing that policy with respect to its fourth neighbour, Azerbaijan. Armenia harbours no territorial claims with respect to Azerbaijan, but we insist that the people of Nagorno-Karabakh not be relegated to the status of ethnic minority, that they not be denied their right of self-determination and that this population not be sacrificed on the altar of the principle of territorial integrity. It is indeed high time that the security of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh should be ensured with sound international guarantees. (...) Negotiations must follow, first between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, together with the

¹⁴¹⁵ Panossian, “**The Irony of Nagorno-Karabakh...**,” pp. 152-153.

¹⁴¹⁶ Svante E. Cornell, “Armenia's Crisis of Legitimacy,” **The American Interest**, 26 April 2018. <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/04/26/armenias-crisis-legitimacy/>

¹⁴¹⁷ Stronski, “**Armenia at Twenty-Five...**,” p. 2.

necessary international guarantees, and, secondly, between Azerbaijan and Armenia to resolve questions arising from the conflict.”¹⁴¹⁸

In 1994, after signing the ceasefire with Azerbaijan, while still emphasizing self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh, Ter-Petrossian underlined the importance of building and maintaining peace in the region:

“Armenia considers self-determination in its multitude of manifestations to be an inalienable human right. Armenia’s position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been clear and consistent from the start. Armenia has no territorial claims against Azerbaijan. The conflict is between the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, who are striving for self-determination, and the Azerbaijani Government, which is refusing to address the rights of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia provides moral, diplomatic and humanitarian assistance to the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, and it cannot accept a military solution which can only mean the genocide or deportation of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh.”¹⁴¹⁹

In his statements, Ter-Petrossian tried to minimize the role of Armenia and drew the limits for engaging in the conflict although in reality it was the contrary. He mostly underlined the role of international actors in the settlement of conflict. In 1994, Ter-Petrossian stated:

“The primary concern for Armenia has been, and remains, the security of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. Both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh have repeatedly expressed their readiness to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions. A lasting peace can be achieved only by ensuring the irreversibility of the peace process through the deployment of international security forces between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh until such time as a negotiated solution to the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh has been reached,

¹⁴¹⁸ United Nations, General Assembly, 47th session, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 8th Meeting, Address by Mr. Levon Ter-Petrossian, President of the Republic of Armenia, 30 September 1992, New York, A/47/PV.8

¹⁴¹⁹ United Nations, General Assembly, 49th session, 9th Meeting, Address by Mr. Levon Ter-Petrossian, President of the Republic of Armenia, 28 September 1994, New York, A/49/PV.9

with the full participation of Nagorno-Karabakh at the CSCE Minsk Conference.”¹⁴²⁰

Similarly in 1995, in his address to the UN General Assembly, he said:

*“The United Nations continues to play a constructive role in containing regional conflicts, for instance in the negotiations aimed at settling the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In this respect, I should like to reaffirm the resolve of the Armenian side to comply with the longstanding cease-fire and to transform it, as soon as possible, into a lasting peace.”*¹⁴²¹

As for the stance of negotiations, Ter-Petrosian was in favor of the “Package Solution” option; however, this option was not welcomed by majority of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh’s high rank political leadership. To remember, this proposal envisaged the inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan as a broadly autonomous national and territorial entity.¹⁴²² Ter-Petrosian was also in favor of the proposal, the “Step-by-Step” option; however, this proposal, which was based on “gradual return of the territories outside the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, security guarantees for Armenian populations, deployment of peacekeepers and the final determination of Karabakh’s legal status through negotiations,” was also rejected by Armenia’s senior leadership and Nagorno-Karabakh leadership.¹⁴²³ Lastly, the “Common State” proposal was introduced by Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov. This plan envisaged a common state constituted by Azerbaijan

¹⁴²⁰ United Nations, General Assembly, 49th session, 9th Meeting, Address by Mr. Levon Ter-Petrosian, President of the Republic of Armenia, 28 September 1994, New York, A/49/PV.9; As of 1 January, 1995, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) has a new name. In Budapest Summit, CSCE Heads of State and Government, determined to give the CSCE new political impetus, agreed to change the name to Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). OSCE, “CSCE becomes OSCE,” 3 January 1995. <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/52527>

¹⁴²¹ United Nations, General Assembly, 50th session, 40th Plenary Meeting, Address by Mr. Levon Ter-Petrosian, President of the Republic of Armenia, 24 October 1995, New York, A/50/PV.40

¹⁴²² Zourabian, “**The Nagorno-Karabakh...**,” p. 253.; Civil Net, A Recap of the 7 Plans Proposed for the Settlement of the Karabakh Conflict, 23 October 2021. <https://www.civilnet.am/en/news/637117/a-recap-of-the-7-plans-proposed-for-the-settlement-of-the-karabakh-conflict/>

¹⁴²³ Fariz Ismailzade, “Azerbaijanis see small chance for peace in Nagorno-Karabakh,” *Eurasianet*, 13 February 2006. <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijanis-see-small-chance-for-peace-in-nagorno-karabakh> ; Civil Net, “A Recap of the 7 Plans Proposed for the Settlement of the Karabakh Conflict,” 23 October 2021. <https://www.civilnet.am/en/news/637117/a-recap-of-the-7-plans-proposed-for-the-settlement-of-the-karabakh-conflict/>

and Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan rejected this plan before Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh had chance to object.¹⁴²⁴

As mentioned above, Ter-Petrosian, had favoured the Step-by-Step proposal, but he could not find support.¹⁴²⁵ Ter-Petrosian wanted to save Armenia's future from the hostage of Nagorno-Karabakh issue and ensure country's stability and security through this phased plan. However, he was rejected by mostly hard-liners in Armenia and Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. At that time, Robert Kocharian was prime minister and Serzh Sargsyan and Vazgen Sargsyan were defense and interior ministers, respectively. In the face of this opposition, Ter-Petrosian resigned on February 3, 1998.¹⁴²⁶

b. Robert Kocharian (February 1998-April 2008)

Nagorno-Karabakh leaders and opposition in Armenia had a direct or indirect impact on decision-making process in peace negotiations. Hard-liners in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh who do not want to make any compromise and draw red lines mostly determine the politics of Armenian government. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and any solution in relation to the settlement have carried huge potential to turn into a national crisis in Armenia and are considered within the framework of regime security and legitimacy.

Robert Kocharian became Acting President of Armenia on February 4, 1998 and President on April 9, 1998. His political stance was tougher as compared to Ter-Petrosian. His negotiating principles were the right of the Nagorno-Karabakh people to self-determination, guarantees of Nagorno-Karabakh security, a permanent corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.¹⁴²⁷

Kocharian favoured package solution "land for status" formula in the settlement of the conflict. The package solution envisaged an agreement on the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, as mentioned above, in Step-by-Step solution, the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh was to be decided later and a peace agreement that would satisfy the parties was prioritized. According to this solution,

¹⁴²⁴ Patricia Carley, "Nagorno-Karabakh: Searching for a Solution," *United States Institute of Peace*, 1 December 1998. <https://www.usip.org/publications/1998/12/nagorno-karabakh-searching-solution-0>

¹⁴²⁵ Zourabian, "The Nagorno-Karabakh...", p. 253.

¹⁴²⁶ Mihalka & Wilcox, "Unintended Strategic Consequences...", p. 28. ; Panossian, "The Irony of Nagorno-Karabakh...", pp. 153-154.

¹⁴²⁷ Carol Migdalovitz, "Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict," **Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress**, December 26, 2001, p. 6.

international security guarantees, the withdrawal of Nagorno-Karabakh forces from occupied territories, the return of IDPs to their homelands and normalization of political and economic relations in the region were demanded. In Armenia, the most debatable issue among politicians has become to choose one of these solutions.¹⁴²⁸

Kocharian's main aim is to improve Armenian economy and create a better political environment without making any concessions in Nagorno-Karabakh issue.¹⁴²⁹ In 1998, Kocharian said as below:

*“Unfortunately, at present, the negotiation process is at an impasse. We believe that the main reasons for this impasse are the unclear definition of Nagorno-Karabakh's status as a party to the negotiations; Azerbaijan's refusal to negotiate directly with the leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh; and its insistence on preconditions regarding the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh, which we believe must be negotiated. The international community must make every effort to overcome these obstacles. In our opinion, given the intensity and specifics of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, its resolution demands unconventional approaches based on the principle of equal legal rights for the parties to the conflict, an end to the enclave status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the provision of international security guarantees for its population.”*¹⁴³⁰

In 2000, Kocharian underlined the importance of establishing relationship between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh for negotiations. By doing so, he aimed to convince international society that so-called administration in Nagorno-Karabakh was an integral part of negotiations and Azerbaijan should not prevent this. Kocharian stated as such:

“We are ready to maintain direct contacts with Azerbaijan in order to search for compromises, although we think that direct negotiation between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh would be more productive. At the same time, we are convinced that it is already possible at this stage to advance economic cooperation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which would certainly facilitate and expedite the establishment of a lasting peace. Here, we

¹⁴²⁸ Zourabian, “The Nagorno-Karabakh...,” p. 253.; Laitin & Suny, “Armenia and Azerbaijan...,” p. 167.

¹⁴²⁹ Laitin & Suny, “Armenia and Azerbaijan...,” p. 167.

¹⁴³⁰ United Nations, General Assembly, 53rd session, 15th Plenary Meeting, Address by Mr. Robert Kocharian, President of the Republic of Armenia, 25 September 1998, New York, A/53/PV.15

*are convinced that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be resolved only on the basis of the legal equality of the parties to the conflict. The contemporary experience of conflict resolution reflects the changing nature of inter-State and intra-State relations. It clearly shows the need to go beyond the boundaries of conventional perceptions of sovereignty.*¹⁴³¹

In Key West Talks in 2001, the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and a road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia were the most troublesome discussion topics. The Minsk Group's previous proposal prepared initially in 1998 envisaged a common state, which meant a loose confederation between Azerbaijan and so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Armenia had approved this proposal; however, it had announced that it would not make any more concessions beyond this suggested plan. Azerbaijan had objected it by asserting that this solution was directed to its territorial integrity and legitimized the status quo.¹⁴³² It is argued that the main reason behind the failure of Key West Talks was inability of leaders to convince their people in making some concessions. Compromise agreement was discussed privately, but the respective societies did not have sufficient information.¹⁴³³

Kocharian declared his victory in the presidential elections in 2003. In order to be elected in the first run, a candidate for presidency should receive over 50% of votes according to the Constitution. If this is not possible, second round of elections take place two weeks later. In February 19 elections, none of nine candidates could win majority. Two prominent candidates, Robert Kocharian and Stepan Demirchian run against each other in the second round held on March 5 and Kocharian won the elections with 67,8%.¹⁴³⁴

c. Serzh Sargsyan (April 2008-April 2018)

Serzh Sargsyan, as his predecessors, was a leading political figure in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Three military chiefs -Armenian Minister of Defence Serzh

¹⁴³¹ United Nations, General Assembly, 55th session, 6th Plenary Meeting, Address by Mr. Robert Kocharian, President of the Republic of Armenia, 7 September 2000, New York, A/55/PV.6

¹⁴³² Tigran Martirosyan, "Key West Talks on Nagorno-Karabakh: Will The "Caucasian Knot" Be Cut?" **Cacianalyst**, 5 September 2001. <https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/7139-analytical-articles-caci-analyst-2001-5-9-art-7139.html>

¹⁴³³ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Nagorny Karabakh: Halting a Slide to Conflict," 28 March 2011. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/28/nagorny-karabakh-halting-slide-to-conflict-event-3218>

¹⁴³⁴ Lusine Sargsyan, "The Robert Kocharyan Administration: 1998-2008," *Evnreport*, 22 September 2021. <https://evnreport.com/magazine-issues/the-robert-kocharyan-administration-1998-2008/>

Sargsyan, his Azerbaijani counterpart Mamedrafi Mamedov, and the “commander of the army of Nagorno-Karabakh” Samvel Babayan- had signed the ceasefire that ended the conflict in 1994, and therefore promised to build a post-ceasefire environment with long-lasting peace.¹⁴³⁵ At that time, President Serzh Sargsyan played important role in the military establishments of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (1991-1994).¹⁴³⁶

Kocharian had gained more power as he appointed many key Nagorno-Karabakh officials to important positions. One of these political figures was Serzh Sargsyan, a Nagorno-Karabakh military commander who carried out many military duties in both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Sargsyan became Armenia’s president in 2008. This transition did not become easy. Ter-Petrosian attempted to challenge Sargsyan’s campaign with his opposition group. Ter-Petrosian and other opposition members claimed that they were mass vote rigging. Protests started and lasted ten days. When they ended, ten people had died and many more detained and arrested. This event became a bad reputation for the beginning of Sargsyan’s presidency.¹⁴³⁷

Serzh Sargsyan won three presidential elections in his political career. Prime Minister Sargsyan won 52,82% of total votes cast in presidential election on February 19, 2008. Levon Ter-Petrosyan received 21,2% of total votes.¹⁴³⁸ President Sargsyan was announced for the second term as president in February 2013. He received 58,64% of votes in this election.¹⁴³⁹ When his presidency term was finished in April 2018, Sargsyan was appointed as prime minister. Nikol Pashinyan, a member of parliament, launched protest against Sargsyan who wanted to stay in power. In the 11th day of protests, some military members joined. Sargsyan stepped down on April 23, 2018.¹⁴⁴⁰

¹⁴³⁵ De Waal, “**Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh...**,” pp. 166-167.

¹⁴³⁶ Aleksandra Jarosiewicz & Maciej Falkowski, “The Four-day War in Nagorno-Karabakh,” *OSW Center for Eastern Studies*, 6 April 2016. <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-04-06/four-day-war-nagorno-karabakh>

¹⁴³⁷ Stronski, “**Armenia at Twenty-Five...**,” p. 3.

¹⁴³⁸ Hetq, “Serzh Sargsyan Declared the Winner,” 23 February 2008. <https://hetq.am/en/article/39938>

¹⁴³⁹ Marianna Grigoryan, “Armenia: Does Post-Election Protest Initiative Have Legs?” *Eurasianet*, 27 February 2013. <https://eurasianet.org/armenia-does-post-election-protest-initiative-have-legs>;

France 24, “Armenian President Wins Re-election in Disputed Vote,” 19 February 2013. <https://www.france24.com/en/20130219-armenian-president-serzh-sarkisian-wins-reelection-disputed-vote>

¹⁴⁴⁰ Britannica, Independence of Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Armenia/Independence> (Retrieved on 12.10.2021).

Sargsyan was criticized of establishing a “Karabakh clan” in Armenian politics and destroying economy. He was also considered by Azerbaijani elites as one of the hardliners due to his role in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijani officials even demanded that Sargsyan should be judged at an international tribunal due to his responsibility for mass killings of Azerbaijani civilians in the town of Khojaly.¹⁴⁴¹ Sargsyan was challenged by global financial crisis in 2008, Russian-Georgian war in 2008, and Armenian-Turkish normalization, which nationalists harshly criticized.¹⁴⁴²

The dispute between Azerbaijanis and Armenians continue not only in the battlefield but also in the discourses they used. As it is underlined in the speeches of Ilham Aliyev, it was frequently asserted that Armenians were committed to “genocide” against Azerbaijanis. Serzh Sargsyan, in his statements, denied this accusation. In 2008, Serzh Sargsyan said, *“Armenia has done and will continue to do everything it can at the United Nations to provide for the continuous advocacy of the genocide Convention and its enforcement. Genocide cannot be the concern of one nation alone; genocide is a crime against humanity.”*¹⁴⁴³

In Sargsyan’s presidency, Madrid Principles, which were mostly formulated in Kocharian’s period, was discussed. This plan was based on three conditions (prevention of conflict, territorial integrity, and self-determination). According to these principles, Armenia should draw its troops from the territories that it invaded. Secondly, the withdrawal of the Armenian troops in Lachin and Kalbajar, the return of Azerbaijani immigrants, and the status of Nagorno-Karabakh would be discussed. Until the four days war in 2016, these principles were discussed and renewed.¹⁴⁴⁴

The most debatable issue among Azerbaijani and Armenian authorities was which one, status or withdrawal should start first. According to Azerbaijani authorities, first Armenian military forces should withdraw from Kalbajar and Lachin. However, for Armenians, this seems unfair. This means that Armenians will leave the territories without a concrete step on the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition, this sequence is seen in favor of Azerbaijanis. When the IDPs return to their homeland, there will be a large Azerbaijani population in the region. Armenians

¹⁴⁴¹ Guliyev, “**Armenia’s Velvet Revolution...**,” p. 11.

¹⁴⁴² Stronski, “**Armenia at Twenty-Five...**”

¹⁴⁴³ United Nations, General Assembly, 63rd session, 9th Plenary Meeting, Address by Mr. Serzh Sargsyan, President of the Republic of Armenia, 25 September 2008, New York, A/63/PV.9

¹⁴⁴⁴ Yilmaz, “**Land Swap Formula...**,” p. 188.; OSCE, Statement by the **OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries**, 10 July 2009. <https://www.osce.org/mg/51152>

concerned that Azerbaijani authorities may hold a referendum that may include the votes of returned IDPs.¹⁴⁴⁵ Azerbaijani authorities can only accept a referendum after the IDPs return to their homeland since they have right to be represented in these territories as equally as Armenians.¹⁴⁴⁶

For Sargsyan, as all other Armenian leaders, self-determination is a right of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. Sargsyan claimed that the people of Nagorno-Karabakh have been subjected to a “brutal war” as they demanded their legal rights as self-determination. In 2009, he said, *“The people of Nagorno-Karabakh, who followed the legal path in declaring their desire for self-determination, were subjected to a brutal war. For years they hovered on the brink of extinction. At that time, Nagorno-Karabakh was only an autonomous region with neither a regular army, arms and ammunition, nor any intention of or ability to occupy Azeri territory. I think it is at the very least unfair to label as ‘occupants’ people who fought for their right to exist; and yet, Azerbaijan has done just that, even from this high rostrum.”*¹⁴⁴⁷

In Kazan, a Russian city, the political leaders gathered to discuss the settlement of conflict on June 24-25, 2011. The withdrawal of Armenians in Azerbaijan’s territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, the right of return for displaced people, interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh with security and self-governance guarantees, an agreement to determine the final status were the main principles that would guide the future process in these discussions.¹⁴⁴⁸

On June 22, 2011 ahead of a speech to European parliamentarians in Strasbourg, Sargsyan said as below:

¹⁴⁴⁵ Caucasus Edition, “A New Look at Old Principles: Making the Madrid Document Work,” 1 April 2011.

<https://caucasusedition.net/why-nagorno-karabakhs-status-must-be-addressed-first/>; News.Am, “Robert Kocharyan: Madrid Principles Only International Document Stating Karabakh’s Right to Self-determination,” 18 September 2020. <https://news.am/eng/news/602907.html>; Caucasus Edition, “Madrid Principles: Basis for Conflict Settlement or War?,” 1 August 2010. <https://caucasusedition.net/madrid-principles-basis-for-conflict-settlement-or-war/>

¹⁴⁴⁶ Caucasus Edition, “Madrid Principles: Basis for Conflict Settlement or War?,” 1 August 2010. <https://caucasusedition.net/madrid-principles-basis-for-conflict-settlement-or-war/>

¹⁴⁴⁷ United Nations, General Assembly, 63rd session, 9th Plenary Meeting, Address by Mr. Serzh Sargsyan, President of the Republic of Armenia, 25 September 2008, New York, A/63/PV.9

¹⁴⁴⁸ Richard Solash, “Kazan Summit: Time for Breakthrough in Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process?,” *Radio Free Europe*, 24 June 2011. <https://www.rferl.org/a/nagorno-karabakh-kazan-summit-breakthrough-in-peace-process/24244645.html>

*“I will go to Kazan with optimism and will indeed wish for us to come to the common denominator, because both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are largely interested in the fastest solution. We need a solution that will bring about a fair and lasting peace. The document that will be discussed in Kazan is not the document that Armenia has dreamed about, but it gives us an opportunity to continue working toward a big agreement. So, if we meet with a constructive approach, if Azerbaijan does not advance new proposals, I think we can expect positive results.”*¹⁴⁴⁹

In September 2011, just few months after Kazan summit, Sargsyan reiterated his views on Nagorno-Karabakh issue, *“The people of Nagorno-Karabakh made the same choice two decades ago by exercising their right to self-determination, withstanding the war unleashed by Azerbaijan, and surviving bloodshed to earn their right to live in freedom.”*¹⁴⁵⁰ and accused Azerbaijani authorities of being irreconcilable and hardliner since they refused to be part of the solution suggested in Kazan summit by saying as such:

*“However, it is the negotiating parties, not the mediators, who have to reach an agreement. Azerbaijan’s utter unwillingness to reach an agreement and its everything-or-war position have stalled progress in the peace talks. Despite the expectations and high-level advice of the international community, Azerbaijan took yet another step backward during the last meeting in Kazan by rejecting the previously formulated arrangement and in fact trying to make the negotiation process break down.”*¹⁴⁵¹

Sargsyan insisted on self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh people in every occasion. With his words were directed to international audience, he aimed to draw attention to Armenian view regarding to the conditions for settlement of the conflict. In 2014, he stated as such:

“Despite the fact that each conflict is unique, fundamental human rights and freedoms, including peoples’ right to freely express their will and self-

¹⁴⁴⁹ Richard Solash, “Kazan Summit: Time for Breakthrough in Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process?,” *Radio Free Europe*, 24 June 2011. <https://www.rferl.org/a/nagorno-karabakh-kazan-summit-breakthrough-in-peace-process/24244645.html>

¹⁴⁵⁰ United Nations, General Assembly, 66th session, 19th Plenary Meeting, Address by Mr. Serzh Sargsyan, President of the Republic of Armenia, 23 September 2011, New York, A/66/PV.19

¹⁴⁵¹ **Ibid.**

determination, continue to evolve as a determinant in their resolution. The vote held a few days ago in Scotland once again proved that nowadays referendums are more and more widely perceived as a legal model for the peaceful settlement of ethnic conflicts. It was no coincidence that the right to decide one's own fate through a referendum is at the core of the proposal put forward by the co-Chairs of the Minsk Group of OSCE for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict."¹⁴⁵²

Sargsyan referred to the existing resolutions and blamed Azerbaijani authorities of their non-compliance to international law. In 2014, he said as such:

"While discussing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement, I must address the four Security Council resolutions — resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993) — adopted during the war, which every so often are exploited by the Azerbaijani authorities in order to justify their obstructionist policy. Those four resolutions demand, as a matter of priority, the unconditional cessation of all military hostilities. Azerbaijan has failed to comply. (...) The resolutions call on the parties to cease their bombardments and air strikes targeting the peaceful civilian population and to refrain from violating the principles of international humanitarian law."¹⁴⁵³

Similarly in 2015, he added as below:

"The peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem remains one of the most salient issues in our region. I must note that the aggressive policy pursued by Azerbaijan has resulted in the absence of any meaningful progress in the negotiations to reach a settlement of the conflict, and the situation has drifted towards increasing tension. The dictatorial regime of that country has used disgraceful repression as an instrument to strangle the people's wrath, as the oil-based economy obviously falters. (...) I would like to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that Azerbaijan, besides various other provocative actions, has now started to use heavy artillery, firing at the

¹⁴⁵² United Nations, General Assembly, 69th session, 6th Plenary Meeting, Address by Mr. Serzh Sargsyan, President of the Republic of Armenia, 24 September 2014, New York, A/69/PV.6

¹⁴⁵³ **Ibid.**

peaceful settlements of the bordering districts of both the Republic of Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.”¹⁴⁵⁴

Another important plan in terms of peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was draft proposals that Moscow submitted in autumn 2015, which observers began to refer to as the Lavrov Plan. It was informally called as Lavrov Plan since its founder was Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. This plan was to revive the peace progress through the withdrawal of Armenian forces from several occupied districts, and in return, to conclude a Nagorno-Karabakh interim status, and deployment of a peacekeeping force, and then, Azerbaijan would restore communication and transportation routes.¹⁴⁵⁵ Serzh Sargsyan rejected Lavrov Plan in October 2016. Russia proposed this option to the parties in April 2019, but new Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s administration declined it in April 2020.¹⁴⁵⁶

As mentioned above, in April 2, 2016, the most brutal fighting since 1994 took place in the region. There were more than three hundred people casualties in Nagorno-Karabakh region. Although in April 5, the ceasefire was signed, Armenian people were not happy for this.¹⁴⁵⁷ Both Sargsyan and Azerbaijani leadership threatened to each other by using military force if they continue to resort violence.¹⁴⁵⁸ The importance of this war was that both sides used all types of heavy weapons. Azerbaijan did not have great success in this war, but at least it deleted the memories of nation’s trauma at losing the previous war. Russia reinforced its position as “*de facto principal conciliator and guarantor of the ceasefire.*”¹⁴⁵⁹

¹⁴⁵⁴ United Nations, General Assembly, 70th session, 17th Plenary Meeting, Address by Mr. Serzh Sargsyan, President of the Republic of Armenia, 29 September 2015, New York, A/70/PV.17

¹⁴⁵⁵ International Crisis Group, “Nagorno-Karabakh: New Opening, or More Peril?,” Europe Report N°239, Belgium, 4 July 2016, 8. ; Laurence Broers, “Perspectives Did Russia win the Karabakh war?,” *Eurasianet*, 17 November 2020. <https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-did-russia-win-the-karabakh-war>; Civil Net, “A Recap of the 7 Plans Proposed for the Settlement of the Karabakh Conflict,” 23 October 2021. <https://www.civilnet.am/en/news/637117/a-recap-of-the-7-plans-proposed-for-the-settlement-of-the-karabakh-conflict/>

¹⁴⁵⁶ Civil Net, “A Recap of the 7 Plans Proposed for the Settlement of the Karabakh Conflict,” 23 October 2021. <https://www.civilnet.am/en/news/637117/a-recap-of-the-7-plans-proposed-for-the-settlement-of-the-karabakh-conflict/>

¹⁴⁵⁷ CFR Global Conflict Tracker, “Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” Updated on 12 May 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict>

¹⁴⁵⁸ AlJazeera, “Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis Escalates amid Threat of War,” 4 April 2016. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/4/4/nagorno-karabakh-crisis-escalates-amid-threat-of-war>

¹⁴⁵⁹ Aleksandra Jarosiewicz & Maciej Falkowski, “The Four-day War in Nagorno-Karabakh,” *OSW Center for Eastern Studies*, 6 April 2016. <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-04-06/four-day-war-nagorno-karabakh>

Due to deadlock in these meetings and Azerbaijan's attacks in 2016, Sargsyan tried to justify the use of force by Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh within the framework of self-defence. In 2017, in one of his speech, he said as such:

*“The new phase of the Artsakh people's struggle for self-determination began almost 30 years ago. The Armenians of Artsakh used peaceful calls to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination. Azerbaijan has always responded to such calls with the use of force. The policy of the Baku Government culminated in the massacre, ethnic cleansing and mass deportation of the Armenian population of Azerbaijan. (...) Government of Azerbaijan continues with its policy of systematically destroying the vast Armenian cultural and spiritual heritage on the territories under its control. It is obvious that in those circumstances the people of Artsakh have had no other choice than to resort to self-defence. Azerbaijan did not learn any lessons from the perilous war of 1992-1994, its aftermath and negotiations. Last year in April, Azerbaijan unleashed a four-day war, which proved that Azerbaijan's objective is to exterminate the people of Artsakh.”*¹⁴⁶⁰

In the same UN General Assembly meeting, Sargsyan added, *“For years hate speech against Armenians was made part and parcel of the Azerbaijan State policy. It is firmly part of its school curriculums and poisons the upbringing and thinking of its younger generation. For years a number of intergovernmental and other specialized organizations dealing with racism and xenophobia have raised the alarm. All of this leads us to the conclusion that the Artsakh people's exercise of the right to self-determination is of vital importance.”*¹⁴⁶¹

Sargsyan continued, *“The legal status of Artsakh, or, to be more precise, the lack of international legal recognition, is not an impediment to the exercise of the rights of the men and women living there.”*¹⁴⁶² And he added, *“Azerbaijan will recognize and respect the right of the people of Artsakh to decide their own future*

¹⁴⁶⁰ United Nations, General Assembly, 72nd session, 5th Plenary Meeting, Address by Mr. Serzh Sargsyan, President of the Republic of Armenia, 19 September 2017, New York, A/72/PV.5.; The name of the so-called and unrecognized Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh was replaced by so-called “Republic of Artsakh”. Type of government changed. The semi-presidential system was replaced by the presidential system. Agos, **“Karabağ'ın adı artık ‘Artsakh Cumhuriyeti’, Yönetim Şekli ‘Tam Başkanlık’”**, February 23, 2017. <https://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/17798/karabagin-adi-artik-artsakh-cumhuriyeti-yonetim-sekli-tam-baskanlik> (Retrieved on 23.10.2021).

¹⁴⁶¹ United Nations, General Assembly, 72nd session, 5th Plenary Meeting, Address by Mr. Serzh Sargsyan, President of the Republic of Armenia, 19 September 2017, New York, A/72/PV.5

¹⁴⁶² **Ibid.**

through the free expression of their will. All available international and domestic mechanisms should guarantee the security of the Armenian population of Artsakh.”¹⁴⁶³

As the destiny of all other Armenian presidents, four days war in April 2016 had affected very negatively the political career of Sargsyan. Armenians considered that it was a humiliating disaster. Armenia’s parliament constituted a commission to scrutinize the war. Sargsyan had to respond officially to a commission on why the army had failed in this war. The political atmosphere at that time was very hostile. There was a struggle between the country’s former authorities and their allies who rule so-called Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. In his declaration of opening the commission on May 20, 2019, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said, “*The time has come [...] to get answers to a number of questions that are of concern to us all.*”¹⁴⁶⁴

On March 31, 2018, Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, launched a protest march, which would turn into the Velvet Revolution that will be discussed in the following pages in detail. On April 23, 2018, Serzh Sargsyan resigned from office.¹⁴⁶⁵

d. Armen Sarkissian (April 2018-February 2022)

Armen Sarkissian was prime minister for four months in 1996 when Levon Ter-Petrossian was president. He also served as the Armenian Ambassador to the UK, Senior Ambassador of the Republic of Armenia to Europe (Deputy Foreign Minister) and represented Armenia as Ambassador to the EU, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the Vatican. Apart from his career on diplomacy, Sarkissian was an academician. He was Professor of Physics at Yerevan State University and subsequently Head of the Department of Computer Modelling of Complex Systems at the University’s Department of Theoretical Physics. Sarkissian had many publications in his field. In addition, he was Special Advisor to the

¹⁴⁶³ United Nations, General Assembly, 72nd session, 5th Plenary Meeting, Address by Mr. Serzh Sargsyan, President of the Republic of Armenia, 19 September 2017, New York, A/72/PV.5.

¹⁴⁶⁴ Ani Mejlumyan, “Armenia Begins Probe of 2016 War,” *Eurasianet*, 14 June 2019. <https://eurasianet.org/armenia-begins-probe-of-2016-war>

¹⁴⁶⁵ Armine Ishkanian, “Why Peace Looks a Long Way off in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” *LSE*, 8 October 2020. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2020/10/08/why-peace-looks-a-long-way-off-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict/>

President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and as a Governor of the EBRD from 1999-2000.¹⁴⁶⁶

Sarkissian was elected as the president of Armenia in March 2018. At that time, the parliament was overwhelmingly consisted of the members of Sargsyan's Republican Party. Sarkissian's election heralded the transition from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary system. In this new system, the president has just a ceremonial figure. One month later after the Velvet Revolution, Sarkissian became president and Nikol Pashinyan came to power as prime minister.¹⁴⁶⁷ Sarkissian's presidency began in the middle of political crisis at home between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.¹⁴⁶⁸

In his inauguration speech, Sarkissian said: *"Today no one should doubt that Armenia and the entire Armenian people will stand by Artsakh and fight for its legitimate rights: yesterday, today and tomorrow. Glory and honor to our people and our heroes. Glory to Armenia's victorious army!"*¹⁴⁶⁹

The stance of Sarkissian in Nagorno-Karabakh issue was not different from his predecessors. In an interview, he said as such: *"Nagorno-Karabakh is not a conflict but a struggle of the pride of the Armenian nation for its security, proud life and dignity vs killings, humiliations and suffering... The only recipe of survival for the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh is to acknowledge that Karabakh, with its reliable territorial connection to Armenia, can never be part of Azerbaijan."*¹⁴⁷⁰

Sarkissian did not always support the opinions of the prime minister's administration for example as it was observed in the dismissal of the head of armed forces during the protests. In addition, when Yerevan agreed to a ceasefire with Baku

¹⁴⁶⁶ Global Leadership Foundation, "Armen Sarkissian," <https://www.g-l-f.org/who-we-are/glf-members-listed-by-region/armen-sarkissian/> (Retrieved on 12.05.2021).

¹⁴⁶⁷ The Armenian Weekly, "President Armen Sarkissian Resigns amid Investigation into Secret Citizenship," 26 January 2022. <https://armenianweekly.com/2022/01/26/president-armen-sarkissian-resigns-amid-investigation-into-secret-citizenship/>

¹⁴⁶⁸ France24, "Armenian President Resigns Citing 'difficult times' for Nation," 23 January 2022. <https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220123-armenian-president-resigns-citing-difficult-times-for-nation>

¹⁴⁶⁹ Turgut Kerem Tuncel, "The Inauguration Speech of the Newly Elected Armenian President Armen Sarkissian: More of the Same Ideological Outlook," *Avim*, 17 April 2018. <https://avim.org.tr/en/Yorum/THE-INAUGURATION-SPEECH-OF-THE-NEWLY-ELECTED-ARMENIAN-PRESIDENT-ARMEN-SARKISSIAN-MORE-OF-THE-SAME-IDEOLOGICAL-OUTLOOK>

¹⁴⁷⁰ ArmenPress, "Armenia 'Will not Tolerate a Second Genocide,' President Armen Sarkissian Tells Kathimerini," 9 November 2020. <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1034410.html>

in November 2021, Sarkissian claimed that he was not well informed about the negotiations.¹⁴⁷¹ On February 1, 2022, Armen Sarkissian's presidency was ended with an official decree. Sarkissian resigned on January 23, 2022 by claiming that he was not able to have influence on government policies since his post increasingly became symbolic in face of increasing importance of executive power.¹⁴⁷² *"The President does not have the necessary tools to influence the radical processes of domestic and foreign policy in these difficult times for the country and the nation. At this difficult time for our state, when national unity is needed, the presidential institution should not be the target of gossip and conspiracy theories, thus diverting public attention from the most important issues,"* Sarkissian said.¹⁴⁷³

e. Vahagn Khachaturian (March 2022-)

After the resignation of Armen Sarkissian, Speaker of the National Assembly Alen Simonyan undertook the duties of the President for four months between April 2018 and February 2022.¹⁴⁷⁴ Vahagn Khachaturian became new president in March 2022. Khachaturian was an economist. He served as the mayor of Yerevan and an adviser to the President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrossian.¹⁴⁷⁵ He represented the Impeachment bloc in the 2007 parliamentary elections. The current Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was the leader of the bloc in the elections. In 2021, Vahagn Khachaturian became Minister of High-Tech Industry in Pashinyan's government.¹⁴⁷⁶

For Khachaturian, the limited powers of the president were not important. He said that the most important thing was to desire to work and his powers were enough to carry out this duty. Khachaturian underlined that the priority for Armenia should

¹⁴⁷¹ The Armenian Weekly, "President Armen Sarkissian Resigns amid Investigation into Secret Citizenship," 26 January 2022. <https://armenianweekly.com/2022/01/26/president-armen-sarkissian-resigns-amid-investigation-into-secret-citizenship/>; AlJazeera, "Armenian President Armen Sarkissian Quits over Lack of Influence," 23 January 2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/23/armenian-president-armen-sarkissian-resigns>

¹⁴⁷² Hetq, "Armen Sarkissian Officially Relieved as Armenian President," 1 February 2022. <https://hetq.am/en/article/140638>

¹⁴⁷³ Public Radio of Armenia, "Alen Simonyan Assumes the President's Duties as Sarkissian's Resignation Takes Effect," 1 February 2022. <https://en.armradio.am/2022/02/01/alen-simonyan-assumes-the-presidents-duties-as-sarkissians-resignation-comes-into-effect/>

¹⁴⁷⁴ **Ibid.**

¹⁴⁷⁵ Jam News, "New President of Armenia: Who is He and What Does He Intend to Do," 3 March 2022. <https://jam-news.net/new-president-of-armenia-who-is-he-and-what-does-he-intend-to-do/>; Public Radio of Armenia, "Vahagn Khachaturyan Officially Nominated for President of Armenia," 2 February 2022. <https://en.armradio.am/2022/02/02/vahagn-khachaturyan-officially-nominated-for-president-of-armenia/>

¹⁴⁷⁶ Jam News, "New President of Armenia: Who is He and What Does He Intend to Do," 3 March 2022. <https://jam-news.net/new-president-of-armenia-who-is-he-and-what-does-he-intend-to-do/>

be to maintain security and to increase the country's defense capability. According to him, there was close relation between security systems and economic prosperity. He said, *"We will achieve economic success only if our security systems work, when we feel that our borders are protected, when there is an atmosphere in the region that there is no danger of war."*¹⁴⁷⁷ Khachaturian's statements about Armenian security and stability in the region seem reconciliatory. He said, *"We must get rid of fears, understand that our region should become a platform for cooperation. We have neighbors, we must be able to live in peace with them. If society has a different vision, then we are leading the country to destruction."*¹⁴⁷⁸

f. Nikol Pashinyan

Presidential system was the form of government in Armenia until 2015. The president was elected independently of the Assembly, which is the national legislature. The presidents' tenure was seven years. However, the Armenian constitution was amended by a referendum. The powers of President were restricted, and a parliamentary system was established. Prime Minister elected by the Assembly gained more authority and power. The government is consisted of the executive authority in which the Prime Minister is the head and constitutes a Council of Ministers.¹⁴⁷⁹

Nikol Pashinyan, who was a journalist, jailed for 2 years from 2009 to 2011 for his role in involving in demonstrations against Armenia's elections in 2008. He became the head of the small "Civil Contract" party in Armenia's system of proportional representation (providing seats in the Assembly to representatives of parties polling at least 5% of the vote) and he was elected again for over a ten-year period. Nikol Pashinyan began to protest the Republican Party's act, which allowed Serzh Sargsyan to stay in power by providing him an opportunity to become prime minister after his presidency. Pashinyan started to act with the support of tens of thousands of Armenians who followed him. These people were angry with the

¹⁴⁷⁷ Jam News, "New President of Armenia: Who is He and What Does He Intend to Do," 3 March 2022. <https://jam-news.net/new-president-of-armenia-who-is-he-and-what-does-he-intend-to-do/>

¹⁴⁷⁸ **Ibid.**

¹⁴⁷⁹ Daniel L. Feldman & Haris Alibašić, "The Remarkable 2018 'Velvet Revolution': Armenia's Experiment Against Government Corruption," **Public Integrity**, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2019, p. 423.

corruption and discrimination in the regime, which symbolized with the long-dominant Republican Party.¹⁴⁸⁰

The transition after these events were named as the Velvet Revolution since both the protests and government's reaction was nonviolent. Sargsyan had to resign as Prime Minister on April 23, 2018 since he attracted the reaction of society. His deputy, Karen Karapetian from the Republican Party became an acting Prime Minister. However, Pashinyan was appointed as acting Prime Minister because of the protests on May 8 although there was no national election.¹⁴⁸¹

Velvet Revolution has awakened the feelings of freedom and justice in Armenian society. To describe the political atmosphere after the revolution, Feldman and Alibašić said, *"The Velvet Revolution was not only a political revolution, but also a revolution of values. The success of the revolution and the overthrow of the corrupt regime gave Armenians a deep sense of confidence and belief in their ability to affect change. Armenians, both in Armenia and Karabakh, view this war as one for freedom, independence, self-determination, and ultimately, sheer survival."*¹⁴⁸²

The protests in the streets of Armenia, at that time, did not break out only due to the eagerness of Sargsyan's to remain in power as Prime Minister as an example of an oligarchic system. The uneasiness had emanated from the humiliating memories of 2016 Four Days War. Azerbaijani army's seizure of Jojug Marjanli village in the Armenian-occupied Jabrayil region and the death tolls had a great impact on the demonstrations. While the result of this war was celebrated in Azerbaijan, Armenia had to face the reality that it lost 10% of the occupied territories. Economic problems and corruption were demonstrated as the reasons behind this failure as well.¹⁴⁸³ Shirinyan explains the situation as such:

"In fact, following the four-day war in April 2016, the dominating discourse turned to corruption as the major threat to Armenia's national security and the legitimacy deficit of consecutive Armenian administrations eating away at the country's international standing. The growing popularity of

¹⁴⁸⁰ Feldman & Alibašić, **"The Remarkable 2018 'Velvet Revolution'..."**, p. 425.

¹⁴⁸¹ **Ibid.**, pp. 420-425.

¹⁴⁸² Armine Ishkanian, "Why Peace Looks a Long Way off in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict," LSE, 8 October 2020. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2020/10/08/why-peace-looks-a-long-way-off-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict/>

¹⁴⁸³ Guliyev, **"Armenia's Velvet Revolution..."**, pp. 10-11.

these discourses challenged the narrative that Serzh Sargsyan, himself a Karabakh war veteran, was the only one who could ensure security and therefore was the irreplaceable leader, something that his close circle used to justify his continuous grip over power.”¹⁴⁸⁴

It is interesting to note that at the beginning of the protests, Azerbaijan hesitated to portray Nikol Pashinyan in a negative way. However, as Nikol Pashinyan expressed his radical views on Nagorno-Karabakh and revived the “Miatsum” agenda (unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia), Azerbaijani officials also began to criticize very harshly. On May 2, Pashinyan, stressing upon the right to self-determination, made his first statement on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, *“Long live the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which should become an inseparable part of the Republic of Armenia!”*, and continued, *“Mutual concessions would be possible only after recognition of the right of the Nagorno-Karabakh people to self-determination.*”¹⁴⁸⁵

Nikol Pashinyan’s visit to Nagorno-Karabakh on May 9, 2018, only a day after the Armenian National Assembly appointed him as Prime Minister, was to convince the Nagorno-Karabakh leadership and society that Armenia’s Nagorno-Karabakh policy remained the same.¹⁴⁸⁶ However, since Pashinyan became prime minister in May 2018, made many statements that could give clues about the updates of Armenian foreign policy on Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2018 and 2019, according to Pashinyan, *“Artsakh was Armenia”* and only Armenians can have the final say about the fate of region.¹⁴⁸⁷ In an article, it is said as such: *“The Armenian Prime Minister also led the crowd in a chant of unification as mentioned above. The remarks have been dubbed by some international observers as a hardening of Pashinyan’s*

¹⁴⁸⁴ Anahit Shirinyan, “Karabakh Discourses in Armenia Following the Velvet Revolution,” in Sona Dilanyan, Philip Gamaghelyan, Sergey Rumyansev, Pinar Sayan (Eds.), **Political Transitions and Conflicts in The South Caucasus**, Journal of Conflict Transformation, Caucasus Edition, Volume 3, Issue 2 2018, Brussel, p. 142.

¹⁴⁸⁵ Guliyev, “**Armenia’s Velvet Revolution...**,” pp. 8-11.

¹⁴⁸⁶ Shirinyan, “Karabakh Discourses in Armenia...,” p. 143.

¹⁴⁸⁷ Asbarez Staff, “‘Artsakh is Armenia,’ Says Pashinyan during Stepanakert Rally,” *Asbarez*, 5 August 2019.

<https://asbarez.com/artsakh-is-armenia-says-pashinyan-during-stepanakert-rally/>

previous positions on Nagorno-Karabakh and have come amidst a growing rift between the authorities in Yerevan and Stepanakert.”¹⁴⁸⁸

Pashinyan’s address to the UN General Assembly meeting, which was held in 2020, was as follows:

“In the meantime, we have witnessed attempts to exterminate the population of Artsakh, we have witnessed the release and glorification of the convicted murderer Ramil Safarov, in April 2016 we witnessed tortures and brutal killings of elderly and helpless people in Artsakh’s border settlements. Armenophobia has become a state policy and creed in Azerbaijan. ... By paying tribute to the memory of our innocent victims, I declare with all responsibility that we will not allow new attempts to exterminate or deport Armenians. The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Artsakh and all Armenians around the world will use their full potential to ensure the right of existence and peaceful development of the Armenian people in their historical motherland, including in Artsakh.”¹⁴⁸⁹

In the inauguration ceremony of Arayik Harutyunyan, President of so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, on May 21, 2020, Pashinyan referred again to self-determination as the right of Nagorno-Karabakh by establishing a link between Velvet Revolution and the fate of the region: *“A non-violent, velvet, people’s revolution must inevitably and imperatively lead to the de jure international recognition of Artsakh’s de facto self-determination.*”¹⁴⁹⁰ In his visit to Nagorno-Karabakh, Pashinyan announced the conditions for solving the problem: *“We can talk about compromises only when we receive a very clear message from Azerbaijan*

¹⁴⁸⁸ OC Media, “Pashinyan calls for ‘unification’ between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia,” 7 August 2019. <https://oc-media.org/pashinyan-calls-for-unification-between-nagorno-karabakh-and-armenia/>

¹⁴⁸⁹ United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 43rd Session, 24 February–20 March 2020 Agenda item 4, Annex to the note verbale dated 14 January 2020 from the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Statement by Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan on 30th Anniversary of Anti-Armenian Pogroms in Baku, A/HRC/43/G/7

¹⁴⁹⁰ Hetq, “Video - Arayik Harutyunyan Sworn In as New Artsakh President,” 21 May 2020. <https://hetq.am/en/article/117385> ; Fip, “Nikol Pashinyan’s Duality on Karabakh: How the Discourse Changed,” 19 April 2022. <https://fip.am/en/19044>; Dilanyan et al., “**Political Transitions and Conflicts...**,” pp. 143-145.

that Baku is ready to recognize the right of the people of Artsakh to self-determination.”¹⁴⁹¹

The Second Karabakh War in 2020 changed the rhetoric of Pashinyan. As mentioned above, the takeover of territories that Armenia controlled for many years and the deployment of Russian troops after ceasefire had considered a national humiliation.¹⁴⁹² For many Armenian authors, Pashinyan’s speeches are not tenacious as it was before. His speeches in a less assertive tone have been more complicated. For instance, in his statement given in parliament, Pashinyan said that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, was not a “territorial claim,” but instead, it was matter of “rights.” Pashinyan was also accused of not being sharing the information with Armenian society that the negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh were primarily carried out on the return to Azerbaijan of seven surrounding districts that were invaded in the first Nagorno-Karabakh War.¹⁴⁹³

Another change after the war in 2020 was a less-debated solution, remedial secession that was introduced by Pashinyan.¹⁴⁹⁴ While starting his election campaign of 2021, he promised that a policy of remedial secession for Nagorno-Karabakh would be followed.¹⁴⁹⁵ Armenpress announced that Pashinyan firstly mentioned this principle for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement in a Facebook message. He wrote: *“Remedial secession principle, which is the modern manifestation of the principle of self-determination of peoples, gives separate groups, peoples an opportunity to secede from any state when discrimination, large-scale human rights violations, or risk for genocide exists there, as well as to rule out the unification with a country, if it will lead to the above-mentioned consequences.*”¹⁴⁹⁶

¹⁴⁹¹ Fip, “Nikol Pashinyan’s Duality on Karabakh: How the Discourse Changed,” 19 April 2022. <https://fip.am/en/19044>

¹⁴⁹² The Moscow Times, “Russia to Assist Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Talks – Lavrov,” 9 June 2022. <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/06/09/russia-to-assist-armenia-azerbaijan-peace-talks-lavrov-a77955>

¹⁴⁹³ OC Media, “Pashinyan: ‘By Handing over Territories I Might Have Saved Thousands of Lives’”, 13 April 2022. <https://oc-media.org/pashinyan-by-handing-over-territories-i-might-have-saved-thousands-of-lives/>

¹⁴⁹⁴ Fip, “Nikol Pashinyan’s Duality on Karabakh: How the Discourse Changed,” 19 April 2022. <https://fip.am/en/19044>

¹⁴⁹⁵ Raffi Elliott, “Former Government Supporters Continue Civil Disobedience in Bid to Dethrone Pashinyan: Analysis,” *Mirrorspectator*, 10 May 2022. <https://mirrorspectator.com/2022/05/10/former-government-supporters-continue-civil-disobedience-in-bid-to-dethrone-pashinyan-analysis/>

¹⁴⁹⁶ Armenpress, “Pashinyan Offers ‘remedial secession’ Principle for NK Conflict Settlement,” 16 October 2020. <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1031813.html>

The option of remedial secession was initially declared by the first President Levon Ter-Petrossian's article "On the Recognition of Karabakh's Independence" that was published on May 6, 2016. In this article, it is stated that Armenian diplomacy should concentrate on the justification for Nagorno-Karabakh's independence in order to hold referendum for self-determination, which was envisaged in the Madrid Principles. This referred to the remedial secession, as a doctrine, which was newly emerged in international law in recent decades. Pashinyan said that it was necessary to focus on this principle to guarantee the security of Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and to make international society accept the recognition. Pashinyan said as such: "*Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh were under the risk of an existential threat, 'a risk of genocide', therefore, the remedial secession formula was relevant to the case of Nagorno-Karabakh.*"¹⁴⁹⁷

During his speech on December 24, 2021, he rejected any demands made by Azerbaijani authorities for the withdrawal from territories captured in the 2020 war, including the territories of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (the entire Hadrut region, several villages of the Martakert, Martuni and Askeran regions and Shusha city). Pashinyan considered that Azerbaijani people living in the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region had right to return and the seizure of Hadrut region, Shusha and other territories opened the way for this. Upon Pashinyan's speech, Poghosyan argued that Armenians currently living in Nagorno-Karabakh were in a danger as the new de facto newline of contact determined in the November 10 ceasefire constituted a very small entity, which made political and economic representation problematical. Pashinyan declared that Armenia would not demand independence for this tiny entity of 3000 km² and meant "*Nagorno-Karabakh lost all chances not to be part of Azerbaijan back in 2016*".¹⁴⁹⁸

In order to ensure security of Armenians living in Karabakh, Pashinyan said that he was ready to sign a peace treaty with Azerbaijan if some guarantees for security of Armenians were provided. It is argued that although there is no discussion on the status, it can be written guarantee in the peace treaty or status of cultural

¹⁴⁹⁷ Fip, "Nikol Pashinyan's Duality on Karabakh: How the Discourse Changed," 19 April 2022. <https://fip.am/en/19044>

¹⁴⁹⁸ Benyamin Poghosyan, "Pashinyan is Ready to Recognize Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan: What Next," *Armenianweekly*, 28 December 2021. <https://armenianweekly.com/2021/12/28/pashinyan-is-ready-to-recognize-artsakh-as-part-of-azerbaijan-what-next/>

autonomy for Nagorno-Karabakh within the border of the last peace treaty especially in the education or broadcasting in Armenian language.¹⁴⁹⁹ As Quinn underlines, it is discussed that rhetorically, Armenian leaders abandoned the territories, which were dominated by ethnic Armenians, controlled by Armenia at the past, and now deployed by Russian troops.¹⁵⁰⁰

Armenian government officials accepted that Armenians could not control of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan could gain full sovereignty in these territories. This created an uncertainty among Armenians about their future in Nagorno-Karabakh. Pashinyan underlined the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh by UN authorities as part of Azerbaijan and said that the rights of the former Azerbaijani inhabitants deserved respect.¹⁵⁰¹ Similarly, *“For us, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not a territorial issue, but a matter of rights,”* Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan had also said.¹⁵⁰²

The most debatable statement of Pashinyan was “lowering the bar.” Nikol Pashinyan introducing the 2021 Action plan report said in parliament on April 13, 2022, *“Today the international community clearly tells us. To be the only country in the world that does not recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, an ally of Turkey, is a great danger not only for Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) but also for Armenia.”* And continued, *“Today, the international community is telling us again: ‘Lower your bar on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh a little, and you will ensure great international consolidation around Armenia and Artsakh.’”*¹⁵⁰³ These statements were criticized a lot by the opposition and created a huge resentment especially among Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh.

¹⁴⁹⁹ Benyamin Poghosyan, “Pashinyan is Ready to Recognize Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan: What Next,” *Armenianweekly*, 28 December 2021. <https://armenianweekly.com/2021/12/28/pashinyan-is-ready-to-recognize-artsakh-as-part-of-azerbaijan-what-next/>

¹⁵⁰⁰ Colm Quinn, “Armenia and Azerbaijan Hold Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Talks,” *Foreign Policy*, 6 April 2022. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/06/armenia-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-war-peace-pashinyan-aliyev/>

¹⁵⁰¹ Joshua Kucera, “Armenia Signals Willingness to Cede Control over Karabakh,” *Eurasianet*, 1 April 2022. <https://eurasianet.org/armenia-signals-willingness-to-cede-control-over-karabakh>

¹⁵⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰³ First Channel News, “International community tells us to lower our bar on status of Nagorno-Karabakh a little, to ensure great consolidation around Armenia and Artsakh: Pashinyan,” 13 April 2022. <https://www.1lurer.am/en/2022/04/13/International-community-tells-us-to-lower-our-bar-on-status-of-Nagorno-Karabakh-a-little-to-ensure/701756>; Heydar Isayev, Joshua Kucera, Ani Mejlumyan, “EU Emerges as Major Player in Armenia-Azerbaijan Negotiations,” *EurasiaNet*, 25 May 2022. <https://eurasianet.org/eu-emerges-as-major-player-in-armenia-azerbaijan-negotiations>

Pashinyan answered to the criticisms directed to himself by the opposition who blamed him of “selling out” Nagorno-Karabakh by claiming that lowering the bar was not something new and even in the 1990s, there were similar discussions going on. He said, *“Such a call to lower the bar was also [discussed during] the OSCE 1996 Lisbon summit and then came the 1999 idea of a ‘common state.’ The 2001 Key West process also was such a call to lower the bar, so were the 2007 Madrid Principles, upon which the 2016 January, July and August proposals were based.”*¹⁵⁰⁴ Pashinyan stated as below:

*“Back in 1997, it was planned to divide the issue into parts, first was the Karabakh issue, then the peace agreement, and so is with the 2018 and 2016 packages. This package very clearly states that these initial principles are agreed upon, and then negotiations between the governments begin with the participation of the representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh... Even if a referendum was to take place, it should have been within the timeframe agreed between the parties. Azerbaijan was very clearly saying that there would be no referendum in the next 50 years: let the Azerbaijanis return to Karabakh, live side by side for 50 years, the Azerbaijani settlements be returned, and in hundred years we will see, we do not agree to any other conditions.”*¹⁵⁰⁵

With these statements, Pashinyan tries to show that lowering the bar issue and any other demand for the return of IDPs is not something new, but they have been discussing for many years. By doing so, he aims to minimize the reaction directed to himself. However, he does not seem to succeed to convince his audience. The debate over the return of IDPs and referendum continues to dominate the security agenda of Armenians.

2. Authorities of So-called Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and Their Statements on Nagorno-Karabakh

As it was mentioned in different parts of this dissertation, in December 10, 1991, Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh had said yes for independence in the referendum. On January 6, 1992, Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence but

¹⁵⁰⁴ Asbarez, “Pashinyan Again Addresses ‘Lowering the Bar’ on Artsakh Status,” 22 April 2022. <https://asbarez.com/pashinyan-again-addresses-lowering-the-bar-on-artsakh-status/>

¹⁵⁰⁵ Media Max, “Pashinyan: ‘We are Speaking about Armenia and Artsakh’s Being or not Being,’” 14 April 2022. <https://mediamax.am/en/news/politics/47119/>

has not been recognized. So-called president and prime minister for this self-proclaimed state were elected. They governed through the State Defence Committee, a quasi-military body that was abolished six months after the ceasefire of 1994. Afterwards, a so-called civilian government took place.¹⁵⁰⁶

In the last months of 1994, so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was transformed from parliamentary to presidential republic. On December 28, 1994, Robert Kocharian, who was very well-known political figure due to his role in Nagorno-Karabakh war was appointed to the so-called presidency. Kocharian established a so-called government with the ministers he appointed. New so-called parliamentary elections took place in April 1995 and the election of 31 people was completed. The first so-called presidential election was held on November 24, 1996 and Kocharian won with 89% of total votes.¹⁵⁰⁷

After Kocharian, the tenures of Leonard Petrosyan and Arkadi Ghukasyan were short-lived. Bako Sahakyan became so-called president three times from 2007 to 2020.¹⁵⁰⁸ Fifth so-called president, Arayik Harutyunyan sworn in May 21, 2020. In his inaugural speech, Harutyunyan made his most remarkable statement, “*Artsakh is Armenia and that’s it.*”¹⁵⁰⁹

Harutyunyan stressed upon the strong bonds between Armenia and so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. They worked together in many important issues. As mentioned above, for both Baku and Yerevan, the legal status and individual rights of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh was common concern. Armenians argue that Armenian population of Azerbaijan had been discriminated for many years under Azerbaijani rule and assert that they are afraid that if they are governed by Azerbaijan again, they will be discriminated and treated as a secondary citizen.¹⁵¹⁰

Despite of the converging interests and shared goals between the governance in Armenia and so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, there have been also some disagreements among them recently. The harsh criticism from so-called Nagorno-

¹⁵⁰⁶ Panossian, “**The Irony of Nagorno-Karabakh....**,” p. 148.

¹⁵⁰⁷ **Ibid.**, pp. 148-149.

¹⁵⁰⁸ Ermenihaber, “Bako Sahakyan Karabağ Cumhurbaşkanı seçildi,” 19 July 2017. <https://ermenihaber.am/tr/news/2017/07/19/Bako-Sahakyan-Karaba%C4%9F-Cumhurba%C5%9Fkan%C4%B1/109255>

¹⁵⁰⁹ Asbarez, “Arayik Harutyunyan Sworn in as Artsakh President,” 21 May 2020.

<https://asbarez.com/arayik-hautyunyan-sworn-in-as-artsakh-president/>

¹⁵¹⁰ DerHartunian, “**Negotiation and Settlement....**,” p. 302.

Karabakh Republic is that Armenia sells Nagorno-Karabakh in negotiations with Azerbaijan by making too much concession. In addition, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh assert that Armenian leaders have changed their discourses and seemed to give up territorial claims and self-determination.

Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev and Pashinyan discussed the implementation of the last ceasefire agreement. Baku proposed a five-point plan to Yerevan in mid-March 2022 to Yerevan. According to this proposal, both Baku and Yerevan would recognize each other's territorial integrity. This meant that Yerevan would accept that Nagorno-Karabakh as a part of Azerbaijan. In addition to this, the plan includes elimination of any threatening acts to each other, drawing definite borders without making any violations, and opening transportation routes. Pashinyan found that the proposal was acceptable. However, according to him, there should be some guarantees for the rights of Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh. This created uneasiness in Nagorno-Karabakh, because accepting territorial integrity of Azerbaijan meant giving up Nagorno-Karabakh.¹⁵¹¹ As mentioned in the previous pages, Armenian foreign minister Ararat Mirzoyan's speech, he had said "*The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not a territorial issue, but a matter of rights of the local ethnic-Armenian population*"¹⁵¹² and Pashinyan's rapprochement to Azerbaijan created a serious debate in Nagorno-Karabakh.

So-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic criticized Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and warned him against helping Azerbaijan take control over the Armenian-populated territory. "*Any attempt to incorporate Artsakh into Azerbaijan would lead to bloodshed and the destruction of Artsakh,*" said Davit Babayan, the so-called foreign minister, and added, "*After the destruction of Artsakh there would be no Republic of Armenia.*"¹⁵¹³ This clear-cut and trenchant statement has revealed once again that the politicians of Armenia and so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic see their destiny as being dependent to each other and never accept any Azerbaijani rule.

¹⁵¹¹ Ani Mejlumyan, "Armenian Opposition Rallies ahead of Pashinyan-Aliyev Meeting," *Eurasianet*, 6 April 2022. <https://eurasianet.org/armenian-opposition-rallies-ahead-of-pashinyan-aliyev-meeting>

¹⁵¹² Aljazeera, "Armenia, Azerbaijan Gear up for Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Talks," 7 April 2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/7/armenia-azerbaijan-gear-up-for-nagorno-karabakh-peace-talks>

¹⁵¹³ Susan Badalian & Artak Khulian, "Karabakh Leaders Warn Pashinian," *Azatutyun*, 14 Nisan 2022. <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/31803355.html>

In similar direction, by criticizing Pashinyan's "lowering the bar" statements as mentioned earlier, Babayan said, *"We have no bars anymore, we have only red lines drawn by blood"* and stressed, *"Our red line is that we will not be part of Azerbaijan. This is out of the question."*¹⁵¹⁴ Similarly, in a meeting held in April 2022, so-called President Harutyunyan, underlined that Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh would not give up their right to self-determination.¹⁵¹⁵

The so-called chairman of the parliament, Artur Tovmasyan also said during an extraordinary session on April 14, 2022 as such:

*"The forced annexation of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) to Azerbaijan will lead to the destruction of Artsakh and will become a historical and moral tragedy for the Armenian statehood and the Armenian people (...) Artsakh has never been and will never be part of independent Azerbaijan and any discussion of this issue is unacceptable to us. This is the 'red line' which no one has the right to cross. Forced annexation of Artsakh to Azerbaijan will lead to the destruction of Artsakh and will be a historic and moral geopolitical tragedy for the Armenian statehood and the Armenian people."*¹⁵¹⁶

All these statements pointed out that Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh -as well as Armenia's opposition- insist on the right to self-determination and independence. According to them, this issue is out of discussion and Pashinyan should not disregard these rights.¹⁵¹⁷

¹⁵¹⁴ The Armenian Mirror-Spectator, "Karabakh Officials Angrily React to Pashinyan Speech Asking for 'Lower Bar'" 21 April 2022. <https://mirrorspectator.com/2022/04/21/karabakh-officials-angrily-react-to-pashinyan-speech-asking-for-lower-bar/> ; On April 13, Pashinyan delivered a report to the National Assembly on the implementation of the government's program for 2021. In his speech, he had said, *"If earlier we put the status of Karabakh as a basis and, based on this, guarantees of security and rights, now we are laying the basis for guarantees and rights of security, based on this status. In other words, we state that the status in this situation is not a goal, but a means of ensuring the security and rights of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh."* Tomáš Baranec, "Pashinyan Begins to Face Criticism for Negotiations with Baku Home and in Nagorno-Karabakh," *Strategic Analysis*, 25 April 2022. <https://www.strategicanalysis.sk/strategic-analysis-caucasus-brief/>

¹⁵¹⁵ Azatutyun, "Karabakh Leaders Warn Pashinian," 14 April 2022. <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/31803355.html>

¹⁵¹⁶ Arka News Agency, "Forced Annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan Will Become Historical and Moral Tragedy for Armenian Statehood and People - Karabakh Parliament Chairman," 14 April 2022. <https://arka.am/en/news/politics/forced-annexation-of-nagorno-karabakh-to-azerbaijan-will-become-historical-and-moral-tragedy-for-arm/>

¹⁵¹⁷ Asbarez, "Karabakh Settlement Impossible Without Artsakh Armenians' Input, Says EU Rep.," 6 June 2022. <https://asbarez.com/karabakh-settlement-impossible-without-artsakh-armenians-input-says-eu-rep/>

Piligian explains the relationship between Armenians and Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh as below:

*“This is particularly evident today as Armenia is no longer led by individuals with strong emotional ties to Artsakh. There have been ominous rumors and public statements from the government about compromise and capitulations. ...The rhetoric of the government denies this, but fear of surrender is present in the general population. The Armenian government has diluted its position with wording shifting towards ‘security and rights’ verses ‘freedom and sovereignty.’ A question that Armenia must consider during this process is what type of future will the Armenians in Artsakh have under any type of Azerbaijani administration? ... A great deal has been written speculating that Pashinyan may already have agreed to a ‘peace’ agreement or that the pressure to surrender Artsakh is too great. What if he refused to sacrifice Artsakh? In practical terms, what would happen?”*¹⁵¹⁸

The reason behind Pashinyan’s reluctance to establish close relations with so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is its ties with the former regime in Armenia, which is consisted of the opponents to Pashinyan. As it is known, many politicians in Yerevan have their own heroic stories in Nagorno-Karabakh war. This opposition has always portrayed Pashinyan with his soft stance in Nagorno-Karabakh issue.¹⁵¹⁹ The politics in Nagorno-Karabakh has a direct impact on Armenia’s internal affairs. The existence of leaders who have strong connection with so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in Armenian Parliament makes impossible to distance Armenian leaders themselves from it, and also create some disagreements among Armenian politicians.

Despite of the existence of close friends in Armenian Parliament, the concerns of Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh on Azerbaijani-Armenian negotiations are based on the fear of being excluded from the process. Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh are always suspicious and want to know what is going on behind closed doors.¹⁵²⁰ So-

¹⁵¹⁸ Stepan Piligian, “Who Speaks for the People of Artsakh?” *Armenianweekly*, April 20, 2022. <https://armenianweekly.com/2022/04/20/who-speaks-for-the-people-of-artsakh/>

¹⁵¹⁹ Joshua Kucera, “Pashinyan Calls for Unification between Armenia and Karabakh,” *Eurasianet*, 6 August 2019. <https://eurasianet.org/pashinyan-calls-for-unification-between-armenia-and-karabakh>

¹⁵²⁰ Armen Press, “There is certain tactic in negotiation process, opposition can’t force leadership to deviate from that plans-Harutyunyan,” 2 June 2022. <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1084958/>

called President Harutyunyan said that Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should be well informed of any issue or documents and the feelings and concerns of Nagorno-Karabakh people should be taken into consideration. During a joint meeting of the Security Councils of Armenia and so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in Yerevan, Harutyunyan said, *“We see no direction to deviate from our right to self-determination, which we have laid as the basis of our movement since its first day.”*¹⁵²¹

In his speech in Armenian parliament in April 2022, Pashinyan underlined that there was an international pressure for stepping down the demands from Nagorno-Karabakh's status and recognizing Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Harutyunyan who criticized Pashinyan's speeches with Nagorno-Karabakh civil society members at a meeting, said that they caused a serious concern in Nagorno-Karabakh society. Harutyunyan declared that the authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh would continue to support the right to self-determination for Armenian population.¹⁵²²

The leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed in a Brussels meeting on May 22, 2022 to negotiate and advance on a peace plan for Nagorno-Karabakh. This development led protests in Yerevan based on the claim that Pashinyan was so soft.¹⁵²³ Even before the Brussels meeting, ten thousand protesters had gathered in Armenia's capital with the support of Armenian opposition parties. They demanded the resignation of Pashinyan government and called not to make any more concessions to Baku. According to the opposition parties in the parliament, Pashinyan seemed eager to accept Baku's attempt to take control over Nagorno-Karabakh without any official guarantees for status. According to them, this is also the great danger to Armenia's territorial integrity.¹⁵²⁴

According to many Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, Yerevan should maintain its security guarantee role and should not put any signature under an

¹⁵²¹ Arka News Agency, “Any Document Should be Discussed with the Artsakh Authorities and be Based on the Sentiments of the people – Arayik Harutyunyan,” 29 April 2022. https://arka.am/en/news/politics/any_document_should_be_discussed_with_the_artsakh_authorities_and_be_based_on_the_sentiments_of_the/

¹⁵²² Asbarez, “Artsakh Armenians Concerned About Pashinyan's Statement,” 13 April 2022. <https://asbarez.com/artsakh-armenians-concerned-about-pashinyans-statement/>

¹⁵²³ Reuters, “Azeri and Armenian leaders meet on Nagorno-Karabakh,” 23 May 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/azeri-armenian-leaders-meet-nagorno-karabakh-2022-05-22/>

¹⁵²⁴ OC Media, “Pashinyan and Aliyev Agree to Establish Border Commission by April,” 7 April 2022. <https://oc-media.org/pashinyan-and-aliyev-agree-to-establish-border-commission-by-april/>; Ani Mejlumyan, “Armenian Opposition Rallies ahead of Pashinyan-Aliyev Meeting,” *Eurasianet*, 6 April 2022. <https://eurasianet.org/armenian-opposition-rallies-ahead-of-pashinyan-aliyev-meeting>

agreement that could pose a risk for the rights of the Armenian people in the region.¹⁵²⁵ Emphasizing the unity between so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and Yerevan, the so-called parliament published on its website as such: *“We are certain that the republics of Armenia and Artsakh with the full support of the Armenian diaspora, merged into a single fist, together will be able to withstand regional challenges and stand up for its national interests.”*¹⁵²⁶

In order to understand social and political life in Karabakh, Libiridian created a metaphor for Nagorno-Karabakh named as “Karabakh Party”. This party has only one problem: Karabakh. Everything else is of little importance. Relations with Turkey, democracy, economic system, state structure never seem more important than Karabakh itself. The people of Karabakh know what they are against. It does not want to be under the rule of Azerbaijan. According to Libiridian, the only goal of Karabakh people is to get rid of Azerbaijan. They are so committed to this goal, but how to achieve is seen as a secondary issue.¹⁵²⁷

These statements have constituted suitable grounds for increasing threats and threat perceptions on the Azerbaijani state. The rhetoric used by Armenians seems to play a facilitating role on securitization of Nagorno-Karabakh issue in Azerbaijani politics.

¹⁵²⁵ Ani Mejlumyan, “Armenian Opposition Rallies ahead of Pashinyan-Aliyev Meeting,” *Eurasianet*, 6 April 2022. <https://eurasianet.org/armenian-opposition-rallies-ahead-of-pashinyan-aliyev-meeting>

¹⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵²⁷ Libiridian, “*Ermenilerin Devletleşme Sınavı...*,” pp. 128-129.

CONCLUSION

Nagorno-Karabakh issue having strong ethnic and historical references has been securitized in Azerbaijan in both national and international area. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and IDPs have been frequently stressed in the statements of state actors in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani leadership has benefited from this securitization agenda for their political purposes. The existence of IDPs has been manipulated and instrumentalized in this securitization process. IDPs in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have made securitization in Azerbaijan more probably successful. In this sense, IDPs in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is placed at the center of political discourse and acts in Azerbaijan. The references of ethnicity and nationalist discourse in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have been strengthened upon traumas of IDPs, which have emanated from political, social, and economic problems due to the prolonged displacement.

Azerbaijani government has invested a considerable amount of money to the well-being of this population so far. By doing so, Azerbaijani government has attempted to gain legitimacy and sympathy both at home and abroad. However, as a part of securitization act over Nagorno-Karabakh issue and emphasis on internal displacement, IDPs' full integration to Azerbaijani society has not been desired. The integration of IDPs to the society in the new settlement areas is considered as renunciation from the territories under Armenian occupation. Therefore, the government has always preserved its limits while supporting IDP population and the authorities have frequently reiterated in their statements that their return is the most important element of Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh policy. Politically, this issue is kept on the top of political agenda as Great Return.

Azerbaijani government has insistently supported the return of those who are Nagorno-Karabakhian and aimed to end their displacement. In the current situation, it seems that the securitization of Nagorno-Karabakh issue and keeping the IDPs as isolated has ensured Azerbaijani government to justify its arguments in legitimate ways. Although the impediments to integration of IDPs have been criticized a lot, Azerbaijani government proved that its policy was favourable especially following the victory in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020. Political authorities underline that this return will take place voluntarily and in safety. It seems that the return of IDPs is being conducted within the legal limitations and in a humanistic way.

According to Copenhagen School, the main questions for a securitization act to be asked and the appropriate answers in case of Azerbaijan are provided as below. These are the findings of this dissertation.

Who Securitizes? The main securitizing actor in Azerbaijan is the Presidents, the strongest and the most charismatic leaders. In this study, the speech act of Ilham Aliyev who has been the securitizing actor in power for 20 years is examined. However, in Nagorno-Karabakh issue, securitization seems to be inherited from the past. In this sense, it can be argued that Nagorno-Karabakh issue is a re-securitized since independence.

In this dissertation, the discourses of the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev are analyzed to reach a meaningful and useful data in terms of underlying the most frequently reiterated existential threats, referent objects, and stereotypes of Armenians. The discourse analysis derived from Aliyev's speeches is categorized under five themes based on specific discourse. In each themes, the content analysis is made regarding to the most reiterated words or group of words which are evaluated in context.

What do they securitize? The securitizing act of Azerbaijan is directed to Nagorno-Karabakh issue itself. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been based on military threats, which take their roots from historical and territorial claims. It has been proved for several times in the fight against Armenians. In this sense, they are real threats. Internal displacement is an outcome of the conflict, not only militarily, but also in the category of political and societal security. The disaster that IDPs have

experienced and their return have been frequently underlined in political leaders' addresses to international and domestic audience and aimed to be securitized mostly on the basis of real and perceptual threats. In this regard, IDPs in Azerbaijan is a group that always reminds military threat and Armenian lust for territory and become a significant element of the securitization process of Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

In overall Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the referent object is state/regime. However, depending on the context and threat, IDPs can be also considered as referent objects. Ironically, IDPs can be seen as threats to societal and political security in Azerbaijan, and even their existence has been manipulated and instrumentalized in many aspects. IDPs can be also counted as functional actors who are able to influence the trajectory of securitization positively or negatively. It is also interesting to note that IDPs can be also considered as audience since they are Azerbaijani citizens who are targeted by Azerbaijani leaders' speech act and directly affected by the extraordinary policies implemented within the framework of securitization. As seen, the role of IDPs in securitizing process is changing according to the roles they play or are entitled to play. That is why for a successful securitizing act, for political actors, the existence of IDPs is beneficial in any case.

IDP population in Azerbaijan lacks a strong leadership. It is interesting to note that there is not an influential opinion leader who advocates the rights of the population. Despite the fact that, after almost three decades, most of them are still living in temporary camps and have trouble to be employed and reach adequate living standards. They are not active in their search for better economic and social conditions. IDPs lack also full political representation in Azerbaijan.

It can be argued that IDPs' relations with Azerbaijani authorities are mostly based on solidarity, however, it has been recently observed that the youth generation tends to radicalize over time. Despite of some grievances, it is more likely that the authoritarian policies of Azerbaijani government may intimidate IDP population as the other segments of society. Local people's stance to IDPs is diverging. While some people, mostly among old generation, have embraced IDPs that they see as comrades and victims of Nagorno-Karabakh war, most of the people consider IDPs, as those who steal their jobs and create disorder in the society. Given the reasons above, IDP population in Azerbaijan has not been integrated. They seem to comply with national policies and mostly rely on strong political figures in power.

Azerbaijani political authorities seem to take into account IDPs and public opinion towards IDPs in their speeches.

Why do they securitize? It is interesting that Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has played a critical role for all political actors since independence as this issue has seriously threatened sovereignty and state/regime security in Azerbaijan. Firstly, paradoxically, for the leading political figures, the securitization of this issue has ensured to gain more power and legitimacy in the eyes of public. The leaders who are successful in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are usually supported by society and considered a strong and legitimate political figure to rule the country.

Secondly, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been instrumentalized in power struggles in domestic politics. This frozen conflict has been frequently sparked and ceasefire has been violated for several times. Any defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been considered as humiliation in Azerbaijani society. Therefore, each time, it has provided a suitable and fertile ground for opponents and rivals to criticize or even overthrow the regimes. The successes and failures in dealing with this conflict and ensuring stability and achieving peaceful settlement have had great impact on the rise and fall of political leaders.

Thirdly, as Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has dominated whole security agenda since independence, the political actors are more flexible in their attempt to overcome other domestic security problems such as economic, societal, and environmental ones. The common view is that without solving the most dangerous security issue of the country, it is meaningless to exert power for the others. This idea is also a source of incentive for further securitization, because it provides insight into Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a matter of life and death and underestimates other soft security issues.

With what results, under what conditions do they securitize? Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been securitized during and amidst three major wars, in 1988-1994 (called as First Nagorno-Karabakh War resulting a ceasefire), 2016 four-days war and 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (resulting a ceasefire) and numerous violations of truce. As a result of these clashes and wars, thousands of people died, injured and forcibly displaced so far. In addition, Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence in 1992, which is called as a separatist movement within the borders of

Azerbaijan. Securitization in Azerbaijan has been carried out under these devastating effects of war and hostilities and serious threat to territorial integrity and sovereignty.

This issue has been also securitized under the flux of IDPs in Azerbaijan. As mentioned in many different parts of this dissertation, the numbers is approximately 600,000 people, 6-7% of total population.

The novelty of this dissertation to the existing literature may be explained in three different aspects. Firstly, Nagorno-Karabakh issue is mostly examined in the current literature within the framework of military sector due to political and geopolitical reasons. However, this dissertation concentrates on the conflict with its historical, cultural, and ethnic aspects. In other words, by focusing societal and cultural aspects of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and identity-related issues, this dissertation aims to fill the gap in the current literature, which tends to escape the internal dynamics of a politicized conflict particularly on the basis of ethnicity.

Political leaders and IDPs are the main actors in the securitization process, rather than individual states, regional powers, and global powers etc. This does not mean that the level of analysis is not the state. It is the state. However, from a constructivist point of view, the role of political figures, institutions, and individuals are not underestimated.

Secondly, both Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and IDPs are rarely comprehensively examined within the framework of securitization theory. Moreover, there are not many references for IDPs not only in Azerbaijan but also globally. Indeed, while there are many articles, book chapters, thesis, or dissertations on the securitization of migration, IDPs who play an important role for turning societal security issues into political ones in the securitization process is rarely examined. As the number of IDPs globally increases, and these people became a subject of discussion at the political and societal levels, their traumas are more likely to be used in the political discourses of leaders. With the reasons explained above, the securitization and desecuritization processes of Nagorno-Karabakh issue provide a suitable theoretical background to explain the role of IDPs in Azerbaijan.

Thirdly, this dissertation, which applies securitization theory on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with particular emphasis on IDPs may provide a test for all criticisms directed towards the theory itself. The first criticism is that Copenhagen

School designs the concept of theory with the reference to political structures of Europe and US by taking into consideration of nation-state and democratic elements. In recent years, although Copenhagen School has attracted attention in other parts of the world, mostly in Asian countries such as Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, Bangladesh, and Turkey, this does not change the fact that the concepts are still Western. This thesis applies the securitization concept, which has been deeply criticized because of its Western nature, to a non-Western security issue in post-Soviet territories, Nagorno-Karabakh. In this sense, applying the securitization theory to a society, which is not Western and does not have democratic standards, is important to determine the limits and capacity of theory in terms of explaining and understanding the cases.

Second criticism is that examining the issues in which ethnicity and religion play important role is necessary within the framework of securitization. These kinds of issues play a crucial role in terms of creating strong collective identities and perceptions. Therefore, security issues emanated from ethnic and religious clashes is a significant test for theory and practice. Through this way, many historical, political, and cultural elements that facilitate securitization process may be included to the analysis. In this sense, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which is based on misperceptions and historical hatreds, provides a suitable ground for analysis and test of theory. These cultural factors and deep-rooted enmities facilitate securitization process while they may possibly harden any desecuritization attempt.

Third criticism is about investigating the role of actor and audience in the securitization process of Nagorno-Karabakh. The audience issue is problematic from two aspects. Firstly, many critical security theorists question “audience acceptance of extraordinary measures to overcome the issue which is securitized by securitizing actors” in non-democratic countries where no one can express freely their opinions. Actually, this criticism is directly related to the first criticism since it is about how to apply the theory, which is born in a Western society to non-Western societies. How can we talk about winning one’s consent over an issue to be securitized in a country where the political leaders have strong cult of personality and the only actor who decides? In this sense, it can be concluded that the audience in Azerbaijan usually tend to support their leaders. IDPs in Azerbaijan as the most vulnerable and disadvantageous group in the country prefer to support Azerbaijani leaders’ stance

towards the issue. The reasons behind this support may vary. It can be loyalty, interest, or just fear.

Secondly, the audience may have completely different reactions to the securitization and desecuritization process for some issues. Supporting desecuritization process may be more difficult than approving a securitizing act. Society may more easily approve a securitizing act in a conflict where ethnicity hatreds have played prominent role. In other words, for these kinds of sensitive issues, desecuritization process may be troublesome. Who will convince the domestic audience to discuss the issue in normal politics? This is debatable and can be subjects of further research in the future.

In the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, Azerbaijan took over the seven regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. The military defeat was harshly criticized in Armenia and raised concerns over the fate of region. Pushing the restart button for negotiations for settlement among the parties after the ceasefire on November 10, 2020 increased hopes for a peaceful resolution. However, in the course of negotiations, the parties have disagreed with each other on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the return of IDPs. In fact, for the parties, most of the debate is about possible return of IDPs and determination of status. However, the discussion is concentrated on the sequence. Taking into account the concerns and conflicting interest of the parties, three prospects on the future of Nagorno-Karabakh and IDP are provided below.

Prospect 1: “Karabakh is Azerbaijan, No Status!”

IDPs in Azerbaijan will return to the surrounding regions of Nagorno-Karabakh and the main territory where today so-called Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh exists in the future. There will be no status to be discussed, but only the cultural and language rights of Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani authorities may provide security guarantees as well as some cultural rights to Armenian population living there. However, there is no guarantee that Azerbaijanis will keep their promises in the future. No distinction is made between local Armenians and those who will settle after the war in this scenario. Political autonomy becomes out of discussion.

It can be argued that not all Nagorno-Karabakhian Azerbaijanis will return to their homelands. Some of them will continue to live in other cities of Azerbaijan. In addition, there will be new settlers who may want to settle in Nagorno-Karabakh. These people may not share common identity and cultural tenets with the local people. In addition, as described above, there will be Armenians who will live together with these people. Will this diversity erode the Nagorno-Karabakhian identity or make it multi-cultural? The identity of Nagorno-Karabakh may transcend ethnicities and bring the people together on the basis of geography, not identity. This may also facilitate desecuritization process in Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

For Nagorno-Karabakh leaders, without determining the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, any other proposal is not acceptable. They consider this issue as territorial claims and rights. They frequently declare that they will not accept any Azerbaijani rule and only possible solution is the international recognition of so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic's independence.

Prospect 2: First Return, Then Status

Azerbaijan supports a solution based on first return, and then discussion on the status. By doing so, Baku aims to increase Azerbaijani population in Nagorno-Karabakh region and affect the result of any possible referendum in the future in favour of Azerbaijanis. However, for many Armenians, this is unacceptable. It is known that Armenia has long tried to change the demographic profile of the region by settling Armenians.

Armenians want to see a concrete solution in terms of Nagorno-Karabakh status and then to discuss the return of IDPs. If IDPs in Azerbaijan return to their homeland before any agreement which is concluded on the status that satisfies the parties, this will create a catastrophic situation for those who have been settled there and carry considerable potential to change the result of a referendum. Furthermore, IDPs will have an opportunity to put pressure on the population living there, which may destabilize the current societal and economic dynamics.

For Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh is its own territory, so there is no need to talk about the status. In the course of time, Azerbaijan may continue to increase the number of Azerbaijanis in the territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Aliyev's government has already started to build villages in

surrounding districts for the people who want to return. It is not clear whether the families of IDPs will be considered in the scope of Great Return. There can be also other legal, political, and societal crisis to be emerged in case of a possible return in this scenario.

In these two prospects described above, the most debatable issues on IDPs are as follows:

The first discussion is based on these questions: Are IDPs willing to return? Will be they forced to return by Azerbaijani government? What will be the status of those who do not want to return? Does their IDP status end in this case?

In Principle 28 of Guiding Principle, it is announced, “*Competent authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country. Such authorities shall endeavor to facilitate the reintegration of returned or resettled internally displaced persons.*”¹⁵²⁸

In compliance with the international documents, Azerbaijani state also announced that the return would be voluntary and in safety. However, as the return and settlement is critical for the resolution of conflict and the fate of region, some concern that Azerbaijani government may oblige or, at least, encourage the return of IDPs. There is no explanation for the people who may prefer to stay in Azerbaijan. It is not clear whether they will preserve their IDP status or not. As the reasons to be forcibly displaced ended, these people may be guided to return and lose their IDP status. Therefore, they cannot benefit from assistance provided to IDPs. However, as described in the same principle, they may also resettle voluntarily in another part of the country.

The second discussion is based on these questions: Who will have the right to return? Who will have the right to participate in a referendum, which concludes the status of region?

This issue is debatable. IDPs who settled in Azerbaijan’s other territories founded families and their children were born in hosting territories. It is probable that

¹⁵²⁸ United Nations OCHA, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Introduction: Scope and Purpose, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, OCHA/IDP/2000/01, June 2001.

IDPs may be allowed to return with their families. Will new members of families who accompany their parents be allowed to vote in a referendum? Logically, if they will continue to live in these territories, they need to have a say. However, if this way is open for Azerbaijanis, Armenians should be also allowed to do the same. The question is open to discussion and there is not an official response yet. This can be another research subject for the future.

The third discussion is based on these questions: What will be the status of Armenians –local Armenians and settled Armenians? Who will have the right to participate in a referendum, which concludes the status of region?

According to Azerbaijani authorities, as discussed above, Armenians will be just citizens, as like other Azerbaijani people. However, they may have granted some cultural and linguistic rights. The people who lived in these territories may be entitled to vote in a referendum. Azerbaijani government will probably reject any participation or political representation of those who have been illegally settled in Nagorno-Karabakh region afterwards. In addition, as Azerbaijani took control over the territories, Armenians fleeing to Armenia from another territory, Azerbaijan, may be considered as refugees.

Ethnic hatred and historical enmities between Azerbaijani and Armenian people are so deep and due to long-standing perceived threats, everything is seen as a zero-sum game not only politically but also societally. Therefore, the shifting demographics in Nagorno-Karabakh may force Armenians to organize a referendum to join either Armenia or Russia. Therefore, these two scenarios seem to guarantee their relative security in the short to mid-term period, but the long-term perspective will remain volatile.

Prospect 3: Shared Sovereignty, Then Return

The involvement of Russia to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict complicates the situation in the region and makes impossible to accept one of these solutions: Armenia's demand for the international recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan's insistence on complete control over the region without any Russian existence. However, this scenario seems unrealistic. According to the ceasefire signed in 2020 Russian peacekeepers will stay in the region at least until November 2025. Russian forces can stay even longer if Azerbaijan and Armenia approve the

extension of Russian presence. Therefore, even though it seems difficult, the latest option can be “shared sovereignty” in Nagorno-Karabakh. In this option, Armenia and Azerbaijan may be the guarantors of their respective communities in Nagorno-Karabakh and Russian troops or international forces may continue to stay there. As the shared sovereignty is well-established, IDPs may return afterwards.

In all of these prospects, it seems that the return of IDPs may start desecuritization process. This means that if Nagorno-Karabakh issue cedes to be placed as a top security issue, which is out of normal politics, and any other issue related to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, including internal displacement can be discussed for negotiation. However, it should be noted that the return of IDPs may even create new political, economic, and societal problems. On the one hand, IDPs have potential to play a facilitating role in both securitization and desecuritization process and they seem to be part of a solution. On the other hand, it is a very large group that the political leaders may easily manipulate for their own purposes in the future as well. In other words, even Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is peacefully resolved, the return, settlement, and reintegration process of IDPs may pave the way for new securitizing or desecuritizing attempts that may lead the political figures to strengthen their position and secure their regime.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Official Documents & Sources

African Union, **Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)**, Adopted by the Special Summit of the Union Kampala, Uganda 23rd October 2009, Entry into Force 6th December 2012.

African Union, **OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa**, Adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its Sixth Ordinary Session, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 10th September 1969, In Accordance with Article XI Text United Nations, Treaty Series No. 14691.

Azərbaycan Dışişleri Bakanlığı, “**Settlement of Armenians in Karabakh**,” <http://mfa.gov.az/en/content/804> (Retrieved on 20.10.2019).

Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, **Osmanlı Devleti ile Azerbaycan Türk Hanlıkları Arasındaki Münasebetlere Dair Arşiv Belgeleri I (1575-1914)**, Ankara, 1992.

Central Election Commission of the Republic of Azerbaijan, **Information on political parties included in state registration in the Republic of Azerbaijan**, <http://www.msk.gov.az/uploads/partiyalar/2019/GeneralInformation.php> (Retrieved on 24.05.2022).

Commission on Human Rights, **Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons**, E/CN.4/1992/23 (United Nations, February 14, 1992), para. 17.

Commission on Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, **Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng**, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39, Economic and Social Council, Fifty-fourth session, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 11 February 1998.

Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, **Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement**, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 11 February 1998.

European Court of Human Rights, **European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms**, <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf> (Retrieved on 04.06.2020).

General Assembly, **Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005**, Res. 60/L.1, 132, U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1, September 15, 2005.

Hearing of the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) Held on **Internally Displaced Persons in the Caucasus Region and South-eastern Anatolia**, 10 June 2003.

ICRC, **Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949**, ref. 0421.

ICRC, **ICRC Position on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)**, May 2006. <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/2006_idps_en_icrcexternalposition.pdf> (Retrieved on 12.06.2021.)

Inter-Agency Standing Committee, **Protection of Internally Displaced Persons**, Inter-Agency Standing Committee Policy Paper, New York, December 1999.

International Crisis Group, **“The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Visual Explainer,”** 17 May 2022 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

International Crisis Group, **“De-escalating the New Nagorno-Karabakh War,”** October 2, 2020 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-conflict/containing-violence-south-caucasus> (Retrieved on 19.11.2022).

Ministry of Armenian Foreign Affairs, **“Overview,”** <https://russia.mfa.am/en/community-overview/> (Retrieved on 10.09.2022).

National Security Concept of The Republic of Azerbaijan, approved by Instruction No. 2198 of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on 23 May 2007. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154917/Azerbaijan2007.pdf>

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, **Division of International Protection, UNHCR’s Operational Experience with Internally Displaced Persons**, Geneva: UNHCR, September 1994.

OHCHR, **Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons About the Mandate**, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IDPersons/Pages/IDPersonsIndex.aspx> (Retrieved on 22.05.2021.)

OHCHR, **Dr. Chaloka Beyani, Former Special Rapporteur on the Human rights of Internally Displaced Persons**, <<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IDPersons/Pages/ChalokaBeyani.aspx>> (Retrieved on 23.05.2021.)

OHCHR, **International Standards**, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IDPersons/Pages/Standards.aspx> (Retrieved on 08.11.2022).

OSCE, **“CSCE becomes OSCE,”** 3 January 1995. <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/52527>

OSCE, **Budapest Summit marks change from CSCE to OSCE**, Summits/Ministrial Councils, 5 December 1994_<<https://www.osce.org/mc/58703>> (Retrieved on 03.05.2020).

OSCE, **Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe Final Act**, Helsinki, 1975. <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/c/39501.pdf>

OSCE, **Lisbon Document**, 3 December 1996. <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/0/39539.pdf> (Retrieved on 2.11.2022).

OSCE, **Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries**, 10 July 2009. <https://www.osce.org/mg/51152>

President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, **“Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict,”** <https://president.az/en/pages/view/azerbaijan/karabakh> (Retrieved on 1.11.2022).

President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, **Heydar Alirza oglu Aliyev** <https://president.az/en/pages/view/azerbaijan/leader> (Retrieved on 20.05.2022).

Republic of Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, **A Glance at the Tragedy of 20 January 1990**, <<http://www.mfa.gov.az/en/news/909/4633>> (Retrieved on 24.03.2020).

Republic of Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No:406/20, **Statement by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the Russian Federation (En/Ru)**, November 2020 <https://mfa.gov.az/en/news/no40620-statement-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-azerbaijan-the-prime-minister-of-the-republic-of-armenia-and-the-president-of-the-russian-federation-enru> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

Secretary-General, **In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All**, Report of the Secretary-General, 210, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005, March 21, 2005.

State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan, **Privileges**, <http://idp.gov.az/en/content/7/parent/21>

State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan, **History**, <http://idp.gov.az/en/content/1/parent/1>

State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan, **Qaçqınların və məcburi köçkünlərin (ölkə daxilində köçürülmüş şəxslərin) statusu haqqında**, <http://idp.gov.az/en/law/93/parent/15>

State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan, **Məcburi köçkünlərin və onlara bərabər tutulan şəxslərin sosial müdafiəsi haqqında**, <http://idp.gov.az/en/law/92/parent/15>

State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan, **Statecare**, <http://idp.gov.az/en/care/parent/21>

State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan, **“Proposals of Zangilan region Aghali village residents about the Return have been studied,”** 16 June 2021. <http://idp.gov.az/en/news/1217> (Retrieved on June 10, 2021).

State Committee for Affairs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Republic of Azerbaijan, **“Statecare,”** <http://idp.gov.az/en/care/parent/21>

The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, **Population of Azerbaijan**, <https://www.stat.gov.az/source/demography/ap/?lang=en> (Retrieved on October 26, 2022).

UN, **Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States** (with declaration and decisions) Adopted at Minsk on 22 January 1993, Vol. 1819, 1-31139. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201819/volume-1819-I-31139-English.pdf>

UNESCO Republic of Azerbaijan, **Destruction and desecration of Azerbaijani historical and cultural heritage resulting from the continuing aggression of the Republic of Armenia against the Republic of Azerbaijan**, <http://www.unesco.az/files/image/files/Destruction_of_Azerbaijani_cultural_heritage.pdf> (Retrieved on 28.05.2020).

UNHCR, **1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees**, Resolution 2198 (XXI) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, <<https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html>> (Retrieved on 20.03.2020).

UNHCR, **Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees**, adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, Section 111(3), 22 November 1984.

UNHCR, **Expert Roundtable Interpretation of the Extended Refugee Definition Contained in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees**, Montevideo, Uruguay 15 and 16 October 2013 Summary Conclusions on the Interpretation of the Extended Refugee Definition in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration.

UNHCR, **Internally Displaced People**, The State of the World's Refugees <<https://www.unhcr.org/4444afce0.pdf>> (Retrieved on 26.05.2021.)

UNHCR, **The State of the World's Refugees 2006**, report published by the Office of the UNHCR, 2006.

UNHCR, **World Conference on Human Rights**, 14-25 June 1993, Vienna, Austria, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/about-us/history/vienna-declaration> (Retrieved on 02.06.2020).

UNHCR, **“Internally Displaced People, Syria,”** <https://www.unhcr.org/sy/internally-displaced-people> (Retrieved on June 6, 2021).

UNHCR, **“Syria Emergency,”** <https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html> (Retrieved on 20.06.2021).

United Nations General Assembly, **Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations**, Annex to GA Res. 2625, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970), reprinted in 9 ILM 129. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/202170>

United Nations Commission on Human Rights, **Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons**, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/52/Add.2, 1995.

United Nations General Assembly, **Report of the 13th Special Session of the Human Rights Council**, A/HRC/S-13/2, 27-28 January 2010.

United Nations General Assembly, **Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change**, A/59/565, 2004, p. 17.

United Nations General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005, 60/1. **2005 World Summit Outcome**, A/RES/60/1, October 24, 2005.

United Nations OCHA, **Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Introduction: Scope and Purpose**, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, OCHA/IDP/20004/01, June 2001.

United Nations, **Analytical Report of The Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons**, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/23, 1992, para. 91.

United Nations, **Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization**, U.N. Doc. A/54/1, 1999.

United Nations, **Chapter IX — International Economic and Social Cooperation**, Article 55, <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art55.shtml>

United Nations, **Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I Purposes and Principles**, Article 1 <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art1.shtml>

United Nations, **Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms**, Part I; and Part II, Legal Aspects Relating to Protection Against Arbitrary Displacement, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/, 1998.

United Nations, **Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples**, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, New York, 14 December 1960, <https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/dicc/dicc.html>

United Nations, General Assembly, 31st special session, 2nd plenary meeting, **Annex V Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan**, 3 December 2020, New York, A/S-31/PV.2

United Nations, General Assembly, 47th session, **Provisional Verbatim Record of the 8th Meeting, Address by Mr. Levon Ter-Petrossian**, President of the Republic of Armenia, 30 September 1992, New York, A/47/PV.8

United Nations, General Assembly, 49th session, 9th Meeting, **Address by Mr. Levon Ter-Petrossian, President of the Republic of Armenia**, 28 September 1994, New York, A/49/PV.9

United Nations, General Assembly, 50th session, 40th Plenary Meeting, **Address by Mr. Levon Ter-Petrossian, President of the Republic of Armenia**, 24 October 1995, New York, A/50/PV.40

United Nations, General Assembly, 53rd session, 15th Plenary Meeting,
Address by Mr. Robert Kocharian, President of the Republic of Armenia, 25
September 1998, New York, A/53/PV.15

United Nations, General Assembly, 55th session, 6th Plenary Meeting,
Address by Mr. Robert Kocharian, President of the Republic of Armenia, 7
September 2000, New York, A/55/PV.6

United Nations, General Assembly, 58th session, 10th plenary meeting,
**Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, Prime Minister of the Republic of
Azerbaijan**, 24 September 2003, New York, A/58/PV.10

United Nations, General Assembly, 59th session, 9th plenary meeting,
**Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of
Azerbaijan**, 24 September 2004, New York, A/59/PV.9

United Nations, General Assembly, 63rd session, 9th Plenary Meeting,
Address by Mr. Serzh Sargsyan, President of the Republic of Armenia, 25
September 2008, New York, A/63/PV.9

United Nations, General Assembly, 65th session, 12th plenary meeting,
**Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of
Azerbaijan**, 23 September 2010, New York, A/65/PV.12

United Nations, General Assembly, 66th session, 19th Plenary Meeting,
Address by Mr. Serzh Sargsyan, President of the Republic of Armenia, 23
September 2011, New York, A/66/PV.19

United Nations, General Assembly, 69th session, 6th Plenary Meeting,
Address by Mr. Serzh Sargsyan, President of the Republic of Armenia, 24
September 2014, New York, A/69/PV.6

United Nations, General Assembly, 70th session, 17th Plenary Meeting,
Address by Mr. Serzh Sargsyan, President of the Republic of Armenia, 29
September 2015, New York, A/70/PV.17

United Nations, General Assembly, 72nd session, 5th Plenary Meeting,
Address by Mr. Serzh Sargsyan, President of the Republic of Armenia, 19
September 2017, New York, A/72/PV.5

United Nations, General Assembly, 72nd session, 7th plenary meeting,
**Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of
Azerbaijan**, 20 September 2017, New York, A/72/PV.7

United Nations, General Assembly, 75th session, 3rd plenary meeting, Annex
10, **Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of
Azerbaijan**, 21 September 2020, New York, A/75/PV.3

United Nations, General Assembly, 75th session, 9th plenary meeting, Annex I
**Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of
Azerbaijan**, 24 September 2020, New York, A/75/PV.9

United Nations, General Assembly, 76th session, 11th plenary meeting, Annex
V **Address by Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev, President of the Republic of
Azerbaijan**, 23 September 2021, New York, A/76/PV.11

United Nations, **Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949**, Doc.33_GC-IV-EN.

United Nations, **International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights**, Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 19 December 1966, Article 1 <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf>

United Nations, **Memorandum of Understanding Seals Agreement to Improve UN Assistance To Internally Displaced**, HR/4584-REF/1172, 18 April 2002.

United Nations, **Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts**, A/32/144/I.I.M. 1391, 1977.

United Nations, **Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)**, of 8 June 1977, Doc.34_AP-I-EN.

United Nations, **Secretary General's Annual Report to the General Assembly**, Press Release SG/SM7136, September 20, 1999.

United Nations, Security Council, 6765th meeting, **Speech of Ilham Aliyev as the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan**, 4 May 2012, New York, S/PV.6765.

US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI), **World Refugee Survey 2007**, USCRI, Washington, DC, 2008.

Books

ABIEW Francis Kofi, **The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention**, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999.

AISKHYLOS, **Zincire Vurulmuş Prometheus**, Azra Erhat, Sabahattin Eyüboğlu (trans.), İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2015.

ALLEN William Edward David, MURATOFF Paul, **Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border 1828-1921**, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

ALTSTADT Audrey **The Azerbaijani Turks, Power and Identity under Russian Rule**, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992.

ALTSTADT Audrey, **The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule**, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992.

ALTSTADT Audrey, **The Politics of Culture in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1920-40**, London: Routledge, 2016.

ASCHER Abraham, **The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray**, California: Stanford University Press, 1988.

ATTAR Aygün (Haşimzade), **Karabağ Sorunu Kapsamında Ermeniler ve Ermeni Siyaseti**, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2012.

AYDINGÜN İsmail, BALIM Çiğdem (Ed.), **Bağımsızlıklarının Yirminci Yılında Azerbaycan, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna, Türk Dilli Halklar-Türkiye ile İlişkileri**, Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, 2012.

BAEV Pavel, **Russia's Policies in the Caucasus**, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997.

BALA Mirza, **Azerbaycan Tarihinde Türk Albanya**, Azerbaycan Kültür Derneği Yayınları 7, Ankara: Ankara Yeni Cezaevi Matbaası, 1951.

BALAYEV Bahruz, **The Right to Self-Determination in the South Caucasus: Nagorno Karabakh in Context**, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013.

BALIOZIAN Ara, **The Armenians Their History & Culture**, New York: Ararat Press, 1980.

BALZACQ Thierry, **Understanding Securitisation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve**, London: Routledge, 2011.

BAUM Bruce, **The Rise and Fall of the Caucasian Race A Political History of Racial Identity**, New York: New York University Press, 2006.

BEISSINGER Mark R., **Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

BENNIGSEN Alexandre, LEMERCIER Chantal, **La Presse et le Mouvement National chez les Musulmans de Russie avant 1920**, Paris: Mouton& Co, 1960.

BERELSON Bernard, **Content Analysis in Communication Research**, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952.

BOUGAI Nikloai, **The Deportation of Peoples in the Soviet Union**, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1996.

BUZAN Barry, **An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations**, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1987.

BUZAN Barry, **People, States and Fear, An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era**, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Second Edition, 1991.

BUZAN Barry, WÆVER Ole, DE WILDE Jaap, **Security A New Framework for Analysis**, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998.

BUZAN Barry, HANSEN Lene, **The Evolution of International Security Studies**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

CAVELTY Myriam Dunn & MAUER Victor, **Handbook of Security Studies**, Oxon: Routledge, 2010.

CHORBAJIAN Levon, DONABÉDIAN Patrick, MUTAFIAN Claude (Ed.), **The Caucasian Knot: The History & Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh**, London & New Jersey: Zed Books, 1994.

CHORBAJIAN Levon, **The Making of Nagorno-Karabagh: From Secession to Republic**, Londra: Palgrave, 2001.

CHRYSANTHOPOULOS Leonidas T., **Caucasus Chronicles Nation-Building and Diplomacy in Armenia, 1993-1994**, Princeton: The Gomidas Institute, 2002.

COENE Frederik, **The Caucasus - An Introduction**, London: Routledge, 2010.

COHEN Roberta & DENG Francis M., **Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement**, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1998.

COHEN Roberta, DENG Francis M. (Ed.), **The Forsaken People: Case Studies of the Internally Displaced**, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1998.

COLLINS Kathleen, **The Logic of Clan Politics in Central Asia, The Impact on Regime Transformation**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

CONSTANT Antoine, **L'Azerbaïdjan**, Paris: Karthala, 2002.

COPPIETERS Bruno (Ed.), **Contested Borders in the Caucasus**, Brussels: VUB University Press, 1996.

COPPIETERS Bruno, **Federalism and Conflict in the Caucasus**, Central Asian and Caucasian Prospects, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001.

CROISSANT Michael, **The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications**, Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998.

D'ENCAUSSE Hélène Carrère, **Decline of an Empire, The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt**, New York: Newsweek Books, 1979.

D'ENCAUSSE Hélène Carrère, **Parçalanın İmparatorluk**, İstanbul: Sisav Yayınları, 1984.

DAWISHA Adeed, DAWISHA Karen (Ed.), **The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia**, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1995.

DEMİR Ali Faik, **Türk Dış Politikası Perspektifinden Güney Asya**, İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 2003.

DENG Francis M. et al., **Sovereignty as Responsibility**, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995.

DENG Francis M., KIMARO Sadikiel, LYONS Terrence, ROTHCHILD Donald, ZARTMAN I. William, **Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa**, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996.

DENG Francis M., **Protecting the Dispossessed A Challenge for the International Community**, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1993.

DRAGADZE Tamara, **Azerbaijan**, London: Melisende, 2000.

ELLIS Robert, **The Armenian Origin of the Etruscans**, London: Parker, Son, and Bourn, West Strand, 2015.

ERGIN Muharrem, **Dede Korkut Kitabı**, İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 2017.

EVERETT-HEATH Tom, **Central Asia Aspects of Transition**, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

FARROKH Kaveh, **Iran at War: 1500-1988**, New York: Osprey Publishing, 2011.

FOMIN Maxim, JIVANYAN Alvard, MAC MATHÚNA Séamus (Ed.), **Ireland and Armenia: Studies in Language, History and Narrative**, Washington D. C. Journal of Indo-European Studies, 2012.

GALICHIAN Rouben, **The Invention of History, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Showcasing of Imagination**, Second, revised and expanded edition, London: Gomitas Institute, 2010.

GARIBOV Mahir, **XX. Yüzyılda Ermenistan-Azerbaycan, Dağlık Karabağ Sorunu**, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2017.

GEUKJIAN Ohannes, **Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in the South Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Legacy of Soviet Nationalities Policy**, Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2012.

GEUKJIAN Ohannes, **Negotiating Armenian-Azerbaijani Peace: Opportunities, Obstacles, Prospects**, London: Routledge, 2014.

GORBAÇOV Mihail, **Glasnost Asıl Neyi İstiyorum?**, İstanbul: Dönemli Yayıncılık AŞ, 1987.

HASANLI Cemil, **Soğuk Savaşın İlk Çatışması İran Azerbaycanı**, Ekber N. Necef (trans.), İstanbul: Bağlam, 2005.

HASANOV Behram, **Azerbaycan'da Din Sovyetler'den Bağımsızlığa Hafıza Dönüşümleri**, İstanbul: İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi (İSAM) Yayınları, 2011.

HERZIG Edmund, **The New Caucasus Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia**, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999.

HERZIG Edmung & KURKCHIYAN Marina, **The Armenians Past and Present in the Making of National Identity**, London: Routledge Curzon, 2005.

HIERMAN Brent, **Russia and Eurasia 2017-2018**, The World Today Series 2017-2018, 48th Edition, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.

HOPMANN Terrence, **Building Security in Post-Cold War Eurasia: The OSCE and U.S. Foreign Policy**, Washington: United State Institute of Peace, 1999.

HOVANNISIAN Richard, **The Republic of Armenia: The First Year, 1918-1919**, London: University of California Press, 1971.

IMANOV Vügar, **Ali Merdan Topçubaşı (1865-1934) Lider bir Aydın ve Bağımsız Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti'nin Temsili**, İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2003.

IYIKAN Necati (Ed.), **Orta Asya Güney Kafkasya Siyasi Gelişmeler: 1991-2010**, İstanbul: Hiperlink Yayınları, 2011.

JACKSON Robert H., **Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World**, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

JERVIS Robert, **Perception and Misperception in International Politics**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

KARAM Patrick, MOURGUES Thibaut, **Les Guerres du Caucase: Des Tsars à la Tchétchénie**, Paris: Perrin, 1995.

KASIMLI Cavid, EFEGIL Ertan (Ed.), **Dağlık Karabağ Üzerine Yazılar**, İstanbul: Gündoğan Yayınları, Aralık 2014.

KESSLER James S., **Echoes of Empire: An Accidental Historian's Journey Through the Post-Ottoman World**, Raleigh: Lulu Publishing Services, 2016.

KHACHATURIAN Lisa, **Cultivating Nationhood in Imperial Russia: The Periodical Press and the Formation of a Modern Armenian Identity**, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009.

KOHL Philip L., KOZELSKY Mara, BEN-YEHUDA Nachman (Ed.), **Selective Remembrances: Archaeology in the Construction, Commemoration, and Consecration of National Pasts**, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007.

KORN David A., **Exodus within Borders: An Introduction to the Crisis of Internal Displacement**, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1999.

KRIPPENDORFF Klaus, **Content Analysis An Introduction to Its Methodology**, London: Sage Publications, Inc., 2004.

KRÜGER Heiko, **The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Legal Analysis**, London: Springer, 2010.

LANDAU Jacob M., **Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation**, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.

LIBARIDIAN Gerard J., **Ermenilerin Devletleşme Sınavı, Bağımsızlıktan Bugüne Ermeni Siyasi Düşünüşü**, İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık A.Ş., 2001.

LINCOLN Yvonna S. & GUBA Egon G., **Naturalistic Inquiry**, London: Sage Publications, Inc., 1985.

MALKASIAN Mark, **Gha-ra-bagh! The Emergence of the National Democratic Movement in Armenia**, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1996.

MASIH Joseph R., KRIKORIAN Robert O., **Armenia: At the Crossroads**, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999.

MERÇİL Erdoğan, **Müslüman Türk Devletleri Tarihi**, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997.

METİN Halil, **Türkiye'nin Siyasi Tarihinde Ermeniler ve Ermeni Olayları**, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1992.

MINASSIAN Anahide Ter, **La République d'Arménie**, Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1989.

MOTYL Alexander J. (Ed.), **Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities**, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.

MOVSISYAN Artak, **The Writing Culture of Pre-Christian Armenia**, Yerevan: Yerevan University Publishers, 2006.

NAHAYLO Bohdan, NAHAYLO Dohdan, SWOBODA Victor, **Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR**, New York: The Free Press, 1990.

NALBANDIAN Louise, **The Armenian Revolutionary Movement, The Development of Armenian Political Parties throughout the Nineteenth Century**, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963.

NASKALI Emine Gürsoy, ŞAHİN Liaisan, **Stalin ve Türk Dünyası**, İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 2007.

NATHO Kadir I., **Circassian History**, New York: Xlibris Corporation, 2009.

OLCOTT Martha Brill, **Central Asia's Second Change**, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005.

ORUCOV Hidayet, **Haydar Aliyev ve Azerbaycan'da Milli Siyaset**, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2014.

ÖZARSLAN Bahadır Bumin (Ed.), **Kanayan Yara Karabağ**, Ankara: Astana Yayınları, 2016.

ÖZDEMİR Hikmet, HALAÇOĞLU Yusuf, TURAN Ömer, ÇİÇEK Kemal, **Ermeniler: Sürgün ve Göç**, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2004.

PALONKORPI Mikko (Ed.), **The South Caucasus beyond Borders, Boundaries and Division Lines Conflicts, Cooperation and Development**, Turku: Juvenes Print – Suomen yliopistopaino Oy, 2015.

PANOSSIAN Razmik, **The Armenians from Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars**, London: Hurst & Company, 2006.

PAYASLIAN Simon, **The Political Economy of Human Rights in Armenia Authoritarianism and Democracy in a Former Soviet Republic**, London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2011.

PELENSKYJ Jaroslav Z., **Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438–1560s)**, The Hague: Mouton, 1974.

POTIER Tim, **Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, A Legal Appraisal**, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001.

RO'I Yaacov (Ed.), **Muslim Eurasia Conflicting Legacies**, London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1995.

ROLLE Renate, **The World of the Scythians**, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980.

ROUX Jean-Paul, **Türklerin Tarihi Pasifik'ten Akdeniz'e 2000 Yıl**, İstanbul: Kabalcı Yayınevi, 2015.

RYTÖVUORI-APUNEN Helena, **Power and Conflict in Russia's Borderlands: The Post-Soviet Geopolitics of Dispute Resolution**, London: I.B.Tauris, 2020.

SANDER Oral, **Siyasi Tarih İlkçağlardan 1918'e**, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1989.

SAPAROV Arsène, **From Conflict to Autonomy in the Caucasus: The Soviet Union and the Making of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh**, New York: Routledge, 2015.

SARAY Mehmet, **Türk-İran İlişkileri**, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2006.

SARAY Mehmet, **Türkistan Türkleri Rus ve Çin İdaresinde Yaşayan Türklerin Milli Mücadele Tarihleri**, İstanbul: Veli Yayınları, 1984.

SCHWARTZ Donald V. & PANOSSIAN Razmik (Ed.), **Nationalism and History: The Politics of Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994.

SCHWARTZ Donald V. & PANOSSIAN Razmik (Eds.), **Nationalism and History: The Politics of Nation Building in Post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia**, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994.

SMITH Graham (Ed.), **The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union**, London and New York: Longman, 1990.

SOTO Hermine G. De & DUDWICK Nora (Ed.), **Fieldwork Dilemmas Anthropologists in Postsocialist States**, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2000.

STEINBERG Mark D., **The Russian Revolution, 1905-1921**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

SUNY Ronald Grigor, **Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History**, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.

SWIETOCHOWSKI Tadeusz, **Müslüman Cemaatten Ulusal Kimliğe Rus Azerbaycanı 1905-1920**, İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1988.

SWIETOCHOWSKI Tadeusz, **Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: The Shaping of a National Identity in a Muslim Community**, New York: Cambridge, 1985.

TASE Peter Marko, **Ancient Monuments and Treasures of Nakhchivan, Republic of Azerbaijan**, Wisconsin: Lulu Enterprises, Inc., 2016.

THUAL François, **Le Caucase Arménie, Azerbaïdjan, Daghestan, Géorgie, Tchétchénie**, Paris: Dominos Flammarion, 2001.

UCKO Peter J. (Ed.), **Theory in Archaeology: A World Perspective**, London: Routledge, 2005.

URAS Esat, **Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi**, Second Edition, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1987.

VACCA Alison, **Non-Muslim Provinces under Early Islam: Islamic Rule and Iranian Legitimacy in Armenia and Caucasian Albania**, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

VAN DER LEEUW Charles, **Azerbaijan: A Quest for Identity**, London: Curzon Press, 2000.

VANDERHILL Rachel & ALEPRETE Michael E., Jr. **International Dimensions of Authoritarian Persistence: Lessons from Post-Soviet States**, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013.

VINCET Marc & REFSLUND Sorensen Birgitte (Eds.), **Caught Between Borders: Response Strategies of the Internally Displaced**, London: Pluto Press, 2001.

WALKER Christopher J. (Ed.), **Armenia and Karabagh, The Struggle for Unity**, Londra: Minority Rights Publications, 1991.

WERTH Nicolas, **Histoire de l'Union Soviétique: de l'Empire Russe à la de Lénine à Staline: 1917-1953**, 10e édition, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995.

YILDIRIM Dursun, ÖZÖNDER Cihat, **Karabağ Dosyası**, Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, Second Edition, 1991.

ZENKOVSKY Serge A., **Rusya'da Pan-Türkizm ve Müslümanlık**, İzzet Kantemir (trans.), Ankara: İpek Matbaası, 1971.

ZEYNALOV Fazıl, **Le Conflict du Haut-Karabakh une Paix Juste ou une Guerre Inévitable**, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2011.

Articles

ABDULLAYEV Cavid, "Azerbaycan'da Anayasalaşma Süreci ve Benimsenen Sistemin Niteliği" **Avrasya Dosyası**, Vol. 7, 2001, pp. 109-131.

ABEBE Allehone Mulugeta, "Special Rapporteurs as Law makers: The Developments and Evolution of the Normative Framework for Protecting and Assisting Internally Displaced Persons," **The International Journal of Human Rights**, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2011, pp. 286-298.

ABILOV Shamkhal & ISAYEV Ismayil, "Azerbaijan-Russian Relations: Azerbaijan's Pursuit Of Successful Balanced Foreign Policy," **OAKA**, Vol. 9, No. 19, 2015, pp. 113-143.

ABILOV Shamkhal, "OSCE Minsk Group: Proposals and Failure, the View from Azerbaijan," **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2018, pp. 143-164.

ABRAHAMIAN Levon, "Typology of Aggressiveness and National Violence in the Former USSR," **International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Special Issue on Ethnicity and Conflict in Europe and Beyond**, Vol. 4, No. 3/4, 1996/97, pp. 263-278.

AJEMIAN Michael, "Territorial Stalemate: Independence of Nagorno-Karabakh following the Dissolution of the Soviet Union, and Its Lingering Effects Decades Later," **Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev.**, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2011, pp. 375-401.

ALBERT Mathias & BUZAN Barry, "Securitization, Sectors and Functional Differentiation," **Security Dialogue**, Vol. 42, No. 4-5, August-October 2011, pp. 413-425.

ALLEN W.D.E., "The Caucasian Borderland," **The Geographical Journal**, Vol. 99, No. 5/6, May-June, 1942, pp. 225-237.

ALTSTADT Audrey L., "Azerbaijan and Aliyev: Along History and an Uncertain Future," **Problems of Post-Communism**, Vol. 50, No. 5, 2003, pp. 3-13.

AMBROSIO Thomas, "Unfreezing the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict? Evaluating Peacemaking Efforts under the Obama Administration," **Ethnopolitics**, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2011, pp. 93-114.

ARADAU Claudia, "Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation," **Journal of International Relations and Development**, Vol. 7, 2004, pp. 388-413.

ASATRYAN Garnik S., "Armenia and Security Issues in the South Caucasus" **Connections**, Vol. 1, No. 3, September 2022, pp. 21-30.

AYOOB M., "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty," **The International Journal of Human Rights**, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2002, pp. 81-102.

BACON Kenneth H. and LYNCH Maureen, "Lost in Purgatory: The Plight of Displaced Persons in the Caucasus," **World Policy Journal**, Vol. 19, No. 4, Winter, 2002/2003, pp. 66-71.

BAGUIROV Adil, "Nagorno-Karabakh: Competing Legal, Historic and Economic Claims in Political, Academic and Media Discourses," **Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs**, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2012, pp. 139-175.

BALZACQ Thierry, LÉONARD Sarah, RUZICKA Jan, "'Securitization' Revisited: Theory and Cases," **International Relations**, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2016, pp. 494-531.

BARAN Zeyno, "The Caucasus: Ten Years after Independence," **Washington Quarterly**, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2022, pp. 221-234.

BARKAWI Tarak, "From War to Security: Security Studies, The Wider Agenda and the Fate of the Study of War," **Millennium: Journal of International Studies**, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2011, pp. 701-716.

BAYKARA Hüseyin, "Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti'nin İki Askeri Zaferi," **Türk Kültürü**, 1965, No. 35, pp. 828-834.

BEERLE-MOOR Marianne, "Bible Translation as Witness to a Forgotten Language: The case of Caucasian Albanian," in Marianne Beerle-Moor & Vitaly Voinov (Ed.), **Language Vitality through Bible Translation**, New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2015, pp. 187-206.

BEHNKE Andreas, "The Message or the Messenger? Reflections on the Role of Security Experts and the Securitization of Political Issues," **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 2000, pp. 89-105.

BIGO Didier, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease," **Alternatives**, Vol. 27, 2002, pp. 63-92.

BILGIN Pinar, "The Politics of Studying Securitization? The Copenhagen School in Turkey," **Security Dialogue**, Vol. 42, No. 4-5, 2011, pp. 399-412.

BOCK P. G. and BERKOWITZ Morton (Rev.) "The Emerging Field of National Security," **World Politics**, Journal Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, October 1966, pp. 122-136.

BOURNOUTIAN George, "Atlas of the Ethno-Political History of the Caucasus by Arthur Tsutsiev and Nora Seligman Favorov," Book Review, **Iran & the Caucasus**, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2016, pp. 253-258.

BOURNOUTIAN George, "The Population of the South Caucasus according to the 1897 General Census of the Russian Empire," **Iran & the Caucasus**, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2017, pp. 324-340.

BROERS Laurence, "Recognising Politics in Unrecognised States: 20 Years of Enquiry into the de facto States of the South Caucasus," **Caucasus Survey**, Vol.1, No.1, 2013, pp. 59-74.

BROERS Laurence, "Recognising Politics in Unrecognised States: 20 Years of Enquiry into the de facto States of the South Caucasus," **Caucasus Survey**, 1:1, 2013, pp. 59-74.

BUZAN Barry & ALBERT Mathias, "Differentiation: A Sociological Approach to International Relations Theory," **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2010, pp. 315-337.

BUZAN Barry & WÆVER Ole, "Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School Replies," **Review of International Studies**, Vol. 23, No. 2, April 1997, pp. 241-250.

BUZAN Barry, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century," **International Affairs**, (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 3, July 1991, pp. 431-451.

BUZAN Barry, "Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations," **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 21, No. 2, Special Issue on Alternative Defense, June 1984, pp. 109-125.

BUZAN Barry, "The Southeast Asian Security Complex", **Contemporary Southeast Asia**, Vol. 10, No. 1, June 1988, pp. 1-16.

ÇAĞATAY TEKİN Beyza, "The Construction of Turkey's Possible EU Membership in French Political Discourse," **Discourse & Society**, Vol. 19, No. 6, 2008, pp. 727-763.

CHARTRAND Philip E., "The Organization of African Unity and African Refugees: A Progress Report," **World Affairs**, Vol. 137, No. 4, Spring 1975, pp. 265-285.

COHEN Roberta & BRADLEY Megan, "Disasters and Displacement: Gaps in Protection," **International Humanitarian Legal Studies**, Vol. 1, 2010, pp. 1-35.

COHEN Roberta, "Humanitarian Imperatives are Transforming Sovereignty," **ILSA Quarterly**, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2008, pp. 14-23.

COHEN Roberta, "Nowhere to Run No Place to Hide," **Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists**, Vol. 58, No. 6, November 2002, pp. 36-45.

COHEN Roberta, "Response to Hathaway," **Journal of Refugee Studies**, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2007, pp. 370-376.

COHEN Roberta, "The International Response to Darfur," **Forced Migration Review**, Vol. 23, May 2005, pp. 7-9.

COHEN Roberta, "UNHCR: Expanding its Role with IDPs," **Forced Migration Review IDP Supplement**, October 2005, pp. 9-10.

ÇOLAK Mustafa, "Osmanlı- Alman Rekabeti Çerçevesinde Kafkas Müslümanlarının Bağımsızlığı ve Bakü Meselesi (1917-1918)," **Journal of History Studies**, Vol. 6, No. 1, January 2014, pp. 27-43.

CONSTANT Antoine, **L'État et le Fait Religieux en Azerbaïdjan**, CEMOTI, Cahiers d'Études sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien, No. 38, 2004, pp. 147-169.

COPPIETERS Bruno, "The Politicisation and Securitisation of Ethnicity: The Case of the Southern Caucasus," **Civil Wars**, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2007, pp. 73-94.

CORNELL Svante E., "The Devaluation of the Concept of Autonomy: National Minorities in the Former Soviet Union," **Central Asian Survey**, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1999, pp. 185-196.

CORNELL Svante E., "Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered," **Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol. 20, No. 4, Summer 1997, pp. 1-24.

DABAGHYAN, Artak A., "Place Renaming Practices in Post-War Karabakh/Artsakh," **Acta Ethnographica Hungarica**, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2011, pp. 403-427.

DASH P. L., "Nationalities Problem in USSR: Discord over Nagorno-Karabakh," **Economic and Political Weekly**, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1989, pp. 72-74.

DAVISON Roderic H., "The Armenian Crisis, 1912-1914," **The American Historical Review**, Vol. 53, No. 3, April 1948, pp. 481-505.

DE WAAL Thomas, "Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process," **Survival**, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2010, pp. 159-176.

DENG Francis M., "Divided Nations: The Paradox of National Responsibility," **Macalester International**, Vol. 19, Article 12, 2007, pp. 79-111.

DENG Francis M., "Frontiers of Sovereignty: A Framework of Protection, Assistance, and Development for the Internally Displaced," **Leiden Journal of International Law**, Vol. 8, No.2, 1995, pp. 249-286.

DENG Francis M., "The Global Challenge of Internal Displacement," **Washington University Journal of Law & Policy**, Vol. 5, 2001, pp. 141-159.

DERHARTUNIAN Argam, "Negotiation and Settlement in Nagorno-Karabak: Maintaining Territorial Integrity or Promoting Self-Determination," **Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal**, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2007, pp. 295-321.

DONABÉDIAN Patrick, **Small Mural Khachkars in Medieval Armenian Communities of Crimea, Galicia, Podolia, and Bessarabia**, On the borderline between the East and the West. Materials of the International conference dedicated to the 90th anniversary of Y. Dashkevych, Dec 2016, Lviv/Lvov, Ukraine, pp. 324-335.

DRAGADZE Tamara, "The Armenian: Azerbaijani Conflict: Structure and Sentiment," **Third World Quarterly**, Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1989, pp. 55-71.

DUDWICK Nora, "The Case of the Caucasian Albanians: Ethnohistory and Ethnic Politics," **Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique**, Vol. 31, No. 2/3, April-September 1990, pp. 377-383.

DÜNDAR Ali Mert, **Panislamizm'den Büyük Asyacılaşa Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Japonya ve Orta Asya**, İstanbul: Ötüken, 2006.

ENTWISLE Hannah, "Tracing Cascades: The Normative Development of the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement," **Georgetown Immigration Law Journal**, Vol. 19, No. 3, Spring 2005, pp. 369-390.

ERIKSSON Johan, "Debating the Politics of Security Studies Response to Goldmann, Waever and Williams," **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1999, pp. 345-352.

FALK Richard A., "The United States and the Doctrine of Nonintervention in the Internal Affairs of Independent States," **Howard Law Journal**, Vol. 5, No. 2, June 1959, pp. 163-189.

FALL Sir Brian, "Conflict in the South Caucasus," **Asian Affairs**, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2006, pp. 198-209.

FARROKH Kaveh, SANCHEZ-GRACIA Javier, MAKSYMUK Katarzyna, "Caucasian Albanian Warriors in the Armies of pre-Islamic Iran," **Historia i Świat**, Vol. 8, 2019, pp. 21-36.

FELDMAN Daniel L. & ALIBAŠIĆ Haris, "The Remarkable 2018 'Velvet Revolution': Armenia's Experiment Against Government Corruption," **Public Integrity**, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2019, pp. 420-432.

FLOYD Rita, "Can Securitization Theory Be Used in Normative Analysis? Towards a Just Securitization Theory," **Security Dialogue**, Vol. 42, No. 4-5, 2011, pp. 427-439.

GACHECHILADZE R., "Geopolitics in the South Caucasus: Local and External Players," **Geopolitics**, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2002, pp. 113-138.

GAD Ulrik Pram & PETERSEN Karen Lund, "Concepts of Politics in Securitization Studies," **Security Dialogue**, Vol. 42, No. 4/5, Special issue on The Politics of Securitization, August-October 2011, pp. 315-328.

GAHRAMANOVA Aytan, "Internal and External Factors in the Democratization of Azerbaijan," **Democratization**, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2009, pp. 777-803.

GALLINA Nicole, "Puzzles of State Transformation: The Cases of Armenia and Georgia," **Caucasian Review of International Affairs**, Vol. 4, No. 1, Winter 2010, pp. 20-34.

GERMAN Tracey, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia: Security Issues in the Caucasus," **Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs**, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2012, pp. 216-229.

GIPPERT Jost & SCHULZE Wolfgang, "Some Remarks on the Caucasian Albanian Palimpsests," **Iran & the Caucasus**, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2007, pp. 201-211.

GOBLE Paul A., "Coping With the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis," **The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs**, Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 1992, pp. 19-26.

GOLDMAN Robert Kogod, "Internal Displacement: The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement-Normative Status, and the Need for Effective Domestic Implementation," **ISIL Year Book of International Humanitarian and Refugee Law**, Vol. 7, 2007, pp. 265-278.

GOLTZ Thomas, "The Successes of the Spin Doctors: Western Media Reporting on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict," **Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs**, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2012, pp. 186-195.

GULIYEV Farid, "Armenia's Velvet Revolution in the Discourse of the Azerbaijani Elite," **Caucasus Analytical Digest**, No. 104, July 23, 2018, pp. 8-14.

GURTOVNIK Marianna, "The 2005 Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan: Bridging the Divide?," **Insight Turkey**, Vol. 7, No. 3, July-September 2005, pp. 110-119.

GVALIA Giorgi, SIROKY David, LEBANIDZE Bidzina, IASHVILI Zurab, "Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States," **Security Studies**, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2013, pp. 98-131.

HANSEN Lene, "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School," **Millennium: Journal of International Studies**, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2000, pp. 285-306.

HARRIS Chauncy D., "Ethnic Groups in Cities of the Soviet Union," **Geographical Review**, Vol. 35, No. 3, July 1945, pp. 466-473.

HERZ John H., "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," **World Politics**, Vol. 2, -No. 2 January 1950, pp. 157-180.

HOVANNISIAN Richard G., "Russian Armenia. A Century of Tsarist Rule," **Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge**, Bd. 19, H. 1, 1971, pp. 31-48.

HUGHES James & SASSE Gwendolyn, "Conflict and Accommodation in the Former Soviet Union: The Role of Institutions and Regimes," **Regional & Federal Studies**, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2001, pp. 220-240.

INSCH Gary S., MOORE Jo Ellen, and MURPHY Lisa D., "Content Analysis in Leadership Research: Examples, Procedures, and Suggestions for Future Use", *Leadership Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1997, pp. 1-25.

ISMAILOV Eldar, PAPAVA Vladimer, "A New Concept for the Caucasus," **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2008, pp. 283-298.

IVLEVS Artjoms & VELIZIOTIS Michail, "Beyond Conflict: Long-term Labour Market Integration of Internally Displaced Persons in Post-socialist Countries," **Journal of Vocational Behavior**, No. 105, 2018, pp. 131-146.

JANNATOV Jannatoglu Asim, "A Brief History of Karabakh and the Armenian Azerbaijani Relations: Before the First Armenian-Muslim Clash (1905-1906)," **Vakanüvis International Journal of Historical Researches**, Special Issue on the Middle East, Vol. 1, 2016, pp. 151-162.

KAFALI, Mustafa, "Türk Kültüründe Renkler," **Yörtürk Dergisi**, No. 42, March-April 2002, pp. 39-41.

KAMRAVA Mehran, "State-Building in Azerbaijan: The Search for Consolidation," **Middle East Journal**, Vol. 55, No. 2, Spring 2001, pp. 216-236.

KARAKOÇ Ercan, "Geçmişten Günümüze Karabağ Tarihi Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme," **International Journal of Human Sciences**, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2011, pp. 1003-1026.

KEENAN Edward Louis, Jr., "Muscovy and Kazan: Some Introductory Remarks on the Patterns of Steppe Diplomacy," **Slavic Review**, Vol. 26, No. 4, December 1967, pp. 548-558.

KHAN Arshi, "Revisiting the Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia," **The Indian Journal of Politics**, Vol. 54, No. 1-2, 2020, pp. 1-20.

KIRGIS Frederic L., "The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era," **The American Journal of International Law**, Vol. 88, No. 2, April 1994, pp. 304-310.

KIRVELYTĖ Laura, "The Dilemma of Azerbaijan's Security Strategy: Energy Policy or Territorial Integrity?," **Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review**, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2012, pp. 199-233.

KNUDZEN Olav F., "Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization," **Security Dialogue**, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2001, pp. 355-368.

KOLSTO Pal & BLAKKISRUD Helge, "Living with Non-recognition: State and Nation-building in South Caucasian Quasi-states," **Europe-Asia Studies**, Vol. 60, No. 3, 2008, pp. 483-509.

KOLSTO Pal, "The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States," **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 43, No. 6, 2006, pp. 723-740.

KRAUSE Keith & WILLIAMS Michael C., "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods," **Mershon International Studies Review**, Vol. 40, No. 2, October 1996, pp. 229-254.

KUBICEK Paul, "End of the Line for the Commonwealth of Independent States," **Problems of Post-Communism**, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2016, pp. 15-26.

KÜTÜK Ahmet, "İslam/Türk Devlet ve Toplum Geleneğinde Renkler ve Anlamları," *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, Vol: 24, Autumn 2014, pp. 133-170.

LAITIN David D. & SUNY Ronald Grigory, "Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Karabakh," **Middle East Policy**, Vol. 7, No. 1, October 1999, pp. 145-176.

LANTIS Jeffrey S., "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy," **International Studies Review**, Vol. 4, No. 3, December 2002, pp. 87-113.

LAPIDUS Gail W., "Gorbachev's Nationalities Problem," **Foreign Affairs**, Fall 1989.

LASKA Vera, "Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter's Adventures In An Oilrich, War-Torn Post-Soviet Republic by Thomas Goltz," **International Journal on World Peace**, Vol. 15, No. 2, June 1998, pp. 82-89.

LAUSTSEN Carsten Bagge & WÆVER Ole, "In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization," **Millennium: Journal of International Studies**, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2000, pp. 705-739.

LEFFLER Melvyn P., "National Security," **The Journal of American History**, Vol. 77, No. 1, June 1990, pp. 143-152.

LI-CHEN Sim, "In Search of Security: Azerbaijan and the Role of Oil in the Caspian Sea," **The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics**, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1999, pp. 24-53.

LIGHT Margot, "Nationalism and Identity in the former Soviet Union," **METU Studies in Development**, Vol. 27, No. 3-4, 2000, pp. 45-62.

MALEK Martin, "NATO and the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on Different Tracks," **Connections**, Vol. 7, No. 3, Summer Supplement, Summer 2008, pp. 30-51.

MCDONALD Matt, "Securitization and the Construction of Security," **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2008, pp. 563-587.

MCHAUL Michael, "A Precarious Peace Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy," **International Security**, Vol. 22, No. 3, Winter 1997/98, pp. 5-35.

MCSWEENEY Bill, "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School," **Review of International Studies**, Vol. 22, No. 1, Jan., 1996, pp. 81-93.

MIHALKA Michael D. & WILCOX Mark R., "Unintended Strategic Consequences of Security Assistance in the South Caucasus," **JFQ**, No. 57, 2nd quarter 2010, pp. 24-32.

MILLAR James R., "Mass Collectivization and the Contribution of Soviet Agriculture to the First Five-Year Plan: A Review Article," **Slavic Review**, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1974, pp. 750-766.

MOONEY Erin & JARRAH Balkees, "Displaced and Disenfranchised: Internally Displaced Persons and Elections in the OSCE Region," **Ethnopolitics**, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2005, pp. 29-48.

MORGENTHAU Hans J., "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 45, No. 3, April 1967, pp. 425-436.

NAIR Promod, "Towards a Regime for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons," **ISIL Year Book of International Humanitarian and Refugee Law**, Vol. 1, 2001, pp. 183-206.

NAJAFIZADEH Mehrangiz, "Ethnic Conflict and Forced Displacement: Narratives of Azeri IDP and Refugee Women From the Nagorno-Karabakh War," **Journal of International Women's Studies**, Vol. 14, No. 1, Article 10, January 2013, pp. 161-183.

NEJAD Hassan Mohamadi, "Turmoil in The Caucasus: The Azeri-Armenian Dispute," **International Law, And Conflict Resolution In The Post Cold-War World, Peace Research**, Vol. 27, No. 2, May 1995, pp. 33-50, 51-57.

NERİMANOĞLU Kamil Veli, "Kafkaslar Tarihsel, Kültürel, Etno Sosyal, Politolojik Araştırma," **Yeni Türkiye**, 71, 2015, pp. 32-54.

NURIYEV Elkhan E., "Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Influences in the Caucasus: An Azeri Perspective," **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2001, pp. 153-164.

NYE Joseph S., Jr. & LYNN-JONES Sean M., "International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field," **International Security**, Vol. 12, No. 4, Spring 1988, pp. 5-27.

O'LEAR Shannon, "Azerbaijan: Territorial Issues and Internal Challenges in Mid-2001," **Post-Soviet Geography and Economics**, Vol. 42, No. 4, 2001, pp. 305-312.

PANOSSIAN Razmik, "The Irony of Nagorno-Karabakh: Formal Institutions versus Informal Politics," **Regional & Federal Studies**, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2001, pp. 143-164.

PAUL Rachel Anderson, "Grassroots Mobilization and Diaspora Politics: Armenian Interest Groups and the Role of Collective Memory," **Nationalism and Ethnic Politics**, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2000, pp. 24-47.

PEACOCK Andrew C. S., "Nomadic Society and the Seljūq Campaigns in Caucasia," **Iran & the Caucasus**, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2005, pp. 205-230.

PEHLIVAN, Zühre Nur, "Rusya'nın Ermeni Devleti Kurma Politikasının Sonucu: Karabağ Sorunu," **Asia Minor Studies**, Vol. 4, No. 8, July 2016, pp. 94-109.

PIPES Richard, "Demographic and Ethnographic Changes in Transcaucasia, 1897-1956," **Middle East Journal**, Vol. 13, No. 1, Winter 1959, pp. 41-63.

PIRIEV Vagif, "Le Karabagh, Ame de l'Azerbaidjan," **IRS Karabagh**, Vol. 2, No. 4, Summer 2014, pp. 54-64.

POKALOVA Elena, "Conflict Resolution in Frozen Conflicts: Timing in Nagorno-Karabakh," **Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies**, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2015, pp. 68-85.

RASHIDVASH Vahid, "History of Iran: The Circumstances of Signing Golestan and Turkmanchy Treaties and its Contents," **International Review of Social Sciences and Humanities**, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2012, pp. 246-261.

RASIZADE Alec, "L'imbroglia du Karabakh: Une Perspective Azérie," **Centre d'études et de recherches sur le Proche-Orient**, No. 101, 2011, pp. 83-96.

ROJO Luisa Martín and VAN DIJK Teun A., "There Was a Problem, and It was Solved!": Legitimizing the Expulsion of 'Illegal' Migrants in Spanish Parliamentary Discourse," **Discourse & Society**, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1997, pp. 523-566.

SAKWA Richard & WEBBER Mark, "The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991-1998: Stagnation and Survival," **Europe-Asia Studies**, Vol. 51, No. 3, 1999, pp. 379-415.

SAMMUT Dennis, "Population Displacement in the Caucasus-an Overview," **Central Asian Survey**, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2001, pp. 55-62.

SARI Mustafa, "Kafkas Murahhaslarının İstanbul Seyahati ve Kafkasya Cephesi (1918)," **Kafkasya Çalışmaları Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi**, Vol. 1, No. 2, March 2016, p. 75-100.

SARKISSIAN A. O., "Soviet Transcaucasia," **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 14, No.3, April 1936, pp. 526-529.

SARVARIAN Arman, "The Artsakh Question an Analysis of Territorial Dispute Resolution in International Law," **Melbourne Journal of International Law**, Vol. 9, 2008, pp. 1-27.

SHEIKH Mona Kanwal, "The Religious Challenge to Securitisation Theory," **Millennium: Journal of International Studies**, Vol. 43, No. 1, September 2014, pp. 252-272.

SMITH, Adam T., "Prometheus Unbound: Southern Caucasia in Prehistory," **J World Prehist**, 2005, 19, pp. 229-279.

SORENSEN Theodore C., "Rethinking National Security," **Foreign Affairs**, Summer 1990, Vol. 69, No. 3, Summer, 1990, pp. 1-18.

SOULEIMANOV Emil & DITRYCH Ondrej, "Iran and Azerbaijan, A Contested Neighborhood," **Middle East Policy Council**, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2007, pp. 101-116.

SOULEIMANOV Emil, "The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh," IFSH (ed.), **OSCE Yearbook 2004**, Baden-Baden 2005, pp. 203-220.

SPATHAROU Angeliki, "The Political Role of Oil in Azerbaijan, 1989-1994," **Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans**, Vol. 4, No.1, 2002, pp. 29-35.

STRAKES Jason E., "Situating the 'Balanced Foreign Policy': The Role of System Structure in Azerbaijan's Multi-Vector Diplomacy," **Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies**, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2013, pp. 37-67.

STRITZEL Holger, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond," **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2007, pp. 357-383.

SULTANOVA Shahla, "Challenging the Aliyev Regime: Political opposition in Azerbaijan," **Demokratizatsiya**, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2014, pp. 15-37.

SUNY Ronald G., "What Happened in Soviet Armenia? Ronald G. Suny interviewed by Joe Stork", **Middle East Report**, No. 153, July-August 1988, pp. 37-40.

SUNY Ronald Grigor, "Nationalist and Ethnic Unrest in the Soviet Union," **World Policy Journal**, Vol. 6, No. 3, Summer 1989, pp. 503-528.

SWIETOCHOWSKI Tadeusz, "Azerbaijan: Perspectives from the Crossroads," **Central Asian Survey**, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1999, pp. 419-434.

TARKHAN-MOURAVI George & SUMBADZE Nana, "The Abkhazian-Georgian Conflict and The Issue of Internally Displaced Persons," **Innovation**, Vol. 19, No. 3-4, 2006, pp. 283-302.

TAURECK Rita, "Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies," **Journal of International Relations and Development**, Vol. 9, 2006, pp. 53-61.

THOMSON Janice E., "State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research," **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 39, No. 2, June 1995, pp. 213-233.

TIMOUTCHINE Hadjibeyli, "La question du Haut Karabagh, Un point de vue azerbaïdjanais," **Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée**, n°48-49, 1988.

TOAL Gerard, O'LOUGHLIN John, "Land for Peace in Nagorny Karabakh? Political Geographies and Public Attitudes Inside a Contested De Facto State," **Territory, Politics, Governance**, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2013, pp. 158-182.

TOKER Mustafa, "İsmail Gaspıralı Ve 'Dilde Birlik' Fikri Üzerine," **Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi**, No. 16, 2004, pp. 31-45.

TOKLUOGLU Ceylan, "Perceptions of State and Leadership in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan (1991-2009)," **Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2012, pp. 319-343.

TOKLUOGLU Ceylan, "The Political Discourse of the Azerbaijani Elite on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (1991-2009)," **Europe-Asia Studies**, Vol. 63, No. 7, 2011, pp. 1223-1252.

ULLMAN Richard H., "Redefining Security," **International Security**, Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer, 1983, pp. 129-153.

VAGNINI Alessandro, "Great War in Transcaucasia: From Ottoman Occupation to the Treaty of Kars," **Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences**, Vol. 3, No. 2, May 2012, pp. 93-102.

VALIYEV Anar & MAMISHOVA Narmina, "Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy towards Russia since Independence: Compromise Achieved," **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2019, pp. 269-291.

VALIYEV Anar M., "Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan: A Failed Revolution," **Problems of Post-Communism**, Vol. 53, No. 3, 2006, pp. 17-35.

VALIYEV Anar, "Azerbaijan: Islam in a Post-Soviet Republic," **Middle East Review of International Affairs**, Vol. 9, No. 4, December 2005, pp. 1-13.

VAN DIJK Teun A., "Discourse and Manipulation," **Discourse & Society**, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2006, pp. 359-383.

VAN DIJK Teun A., "Discourse and Migration," in Ricard Zapata-Barrero & Evren Yalaz (Eds.), **Qualitative Research in European Migration Studies**, SpringerOpen, IMISCOE Research Series, 2018, pp. 227-245.

VAN DIJK Teun A., "Discourse Studies and Education," **Australian Review of Applied Linguistics**, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1980, pp. 1-28.

VAN DIJK Teun A., "Discourse, Context and Cognition," **Discourse Studies**, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2006, pp. 159-177.

VAN DIJK Teun A., "Discourse, Ideology and Context", **Folia Linguistica**, Vol. 35, No. 1-2, 2001, pp. 11-40.

VAN DIJK Teun A., "Monographic Article: Racism, Elites, and Conversation," **Atlantis**, Vol. 14, No. 1/2, 1992, pp. 201-257.

VAN DIJK Teun A., "Narrative Macro-Structures Logical and Cognitive Foundations," **PTL: A Journal for Descriptive Poetics and Theory of Literature**, Vol. 1, 1976, pp. 547-568.

VAN DIJK Teun A., "The Mass Media Today: Discourses of Domination or Diversity?", **Javnost - The Public**, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1995, pp. 27-45.

VARANI Nicoletta, "Azerbaijan Frameworks: Geopolitical and Socio-economic Considerations," **Geopolitical, Social Security and Freedom Journal**, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2018, pp. 44-65.

VOITOVICH Sergei A., "The Commonwealth of Independent States: An Emerging Institutional Model," **European Journal of International Law**, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1993, pp. 403-417.

WÆVER Ole, "Politics, Security, Theory," **Security Dialogue**, Vol. 42, No. 4-5, 2011, pp. 465-480.

WÆVER Ole, "Securitizing Sectors? Reply to Eriksson," **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1999, pp. 334-340.

WALT Stephen M., "The Renaissance of Security Studies," **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 35, No. 2, June 1991, pp. 211-239.

WEBER Cynthia, "Reconsidering Statehood: Examining the Sovereignty/Intervention Boundary", **Review of International Studies**, Vol. 18, No. 3, July 1992, pp. 199-216.

WEISS Thomas G, "Internal Exiles: What Next for Internally Displaced Persons?," **Third World Quarterly**, 2003, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 429-447.

WEISS Thomas G. & PASIC Amir, "Reinventing UNHCR: Enterprising Humanitarians in the Former Yugoslavia, 1991–1995," **Global Governance**, Vol. 3, No. 1, January-April 1997, pp. 41-57.

WEISS Thomas G., "R2P after 9/11 and the World Summit," **Wisconsin International Law Journal**, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2006, pp. 741-760.

WEISS Thomas G., "Researching Humanitarian Intervention: Some Lessons," **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 38, No. 4, July 2001, pp. 419-428.

WEISS Thomas G., "Whither International Efforts for Internally Displaced Persons?," **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 36, No. 3, 1999, pp. 363-373.

WELSH Jennifer, THIELKING Carolin, MACFARLANE S. Neil, "The Responsibility to Protect: Assessing the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty," **International Journal**, Vol. 57, No. 4, Autumn, 2002, pp. 489-512.

WENDT Alexander, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," **International Organization**, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 391-425.

WILHELMSEN Julie, "Islamism in Azerbaijan: How Potent?," **Studies in Conflict & Terrorism**, Vol. 32, No. 8, 2009, pp. 726-742.

WILLIAMS Michael C., "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics," **International Studies Quarterly**, Vol. 47, No. 4, December 2003, pp. 511-531.

WOLFERS Arnold, "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol," **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol. 67, No. 4, December 1952, pp. 481-502.

WYNDHAM Jessica, "A Developing Trend: Laws and Policies on Internal Displacement," Published by Digital Commons, American University Washington College of Law, **Human Rights Brief**, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2006, pp. 7-37.

YILMAZ Reha, "Kafkasya'da Çözilemeyen Kördüğüm: Dağlık Karabağ Sorunu," **Çankırı Karatekin Üniversitesi Uluslararası Avrasya Strateji Dergisi**, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 71-90.

YILMAZ Salih, "Land Swap Formula in the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis Solution: Goble Plan and Lavrov Plan," **Bilig**, No. 100, Winter 2022, pp. 177-209.

ZELIKOW Philip, "The Transformation of National Security: Five Redefinitions," **The National Interest**, No. 71, Spring 2003, pp. 17-28.

ZOURABIAN Levon, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement Revisited: Is Peace Achievable?" **Demokratizatsiya**, Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 2006, pp. 252-265.

Electronic Sources

Britannica, **Independence of Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict**, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Armenia/Independence> (Retrieved on 12.10.2021).

Diaspora, **Russia**, <https://diaspora.gov.am/en/pages/15/russia> (Retrieved on 10.09.2022).

Encyclopaedia Britannica, **Caucasian peoples**, <<https://www.britannica.com/topic/Caucasian-peoples>> (Retrieved on 16.10.2019).

Encyclopaedia Britannica, **Prometheus**, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Prometheus-Greek-god> (Retrieved on 02.02.2020).

Encyclopædia Iranica, **Albania** <https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/albania-iranian-aran-arm> (Retrieved on 07.11.2022).

Encyclopaedica Britannica, **Caucasus**, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Caucasus> (Retrieved on May 20, 2021).

Eurasian Geopolitics, **North Caucasus Maps**, <<https://eurasiangeopolitics.com/north-caucasus-maps/>> (Retrieved on 06.07.2020.)

Global Leadership Foundation, **Armen Sarkissian**, <https://www.g-l-f.org/who-we-are/glf-members-listed-by-region/armen-sarkissian/> (Retrieved on 12.05.2021).

IDMC, **2019 Internal Displacement Figures by Country**, <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data> (Retrieved on 9.05.2021).

IDMC, **Country profiles, Armenia**, <<http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/armenia/>> (Retrieved on 6.6.2018).

IDMC, **Global Internal Displacement Database**, <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data> (Retrieved on 09.05.2021).

Iranicaonline, **Caucasus and Iran, Physical Geography, Population, and Economy**, <<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/caucasus-i>> (Retrieved on 04.07.2020).

İslam Ansiklopedisi, **Müslüman Kongreleri**, <<https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/musluman-kongreleri>> (Retrieved on 04.04.2020).

Karabakh Center, "**Khojaly Genocide: A Horrific Page in the History of Humanity**," <https://story.karabakh.center/en/khojaly-genocide-a-horrific-page-in-the-history-of-humanity> (Retrieved on 24.10.2022).

TEVRAT, **Yaradılış 9** <<https://kutsalkitap.info.tr/?q=yar%209>> (Retrieved on 02.10.2022). (Retrieved on 02.10.2022)

Türk İslam Ansiklopedisi, **Kaçarlar**, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/kacarlar> (Retrieved on 10.06.2021).

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, **Azerbaycan**, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/azerbaycan> (Retrieved on 20.03.2020).

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, **Revan**, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/revan> (Retrieved on 03.06.2020).

Vision of Azerbaijan, **Karabakh Under Russian Rule, History**, Summer 2007, Vol. 2-3, <http://www.visions.az/en/news/130/a2c4b9d0/> (Retrieved on 03.02.2020).

OPEDs & Newspapers

ABBASOV Shahin & IBRAHIMOVA Sitara, **“Azerbaijan: Emphasizing IDPs’ Right to Return over Right to Stay Put,”** Eurasianet, 19 November 2013. <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-emphasizing-idps-right-to-return-over-right-to-stay-put> (Retrieved on May 22, 2022).

AGHAYEV Ismi, **“First Azerbaijani IDPs to return to Zangilan ‘in spring’,”** OC Media, 3 February 2022 <https://oc-media.org/first-azerbaijani-idps-to-return-to-zangilan-in-spring/> (Retrieved on 04.03.2022).

Agos, **“Ermenistan Bağımsızlığın 30. Yılı’nı Kutluyor,”** September 21, 2021. < <https://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/26188/ermenistan-bagimsizligin-30-yilini-kutluyor> > (Retrieved on 30.10.2022).

Agos, **“Karabağ’ın adı artık ‘Artsakh Cumhuriyeti’, Yönetim Şekli ‘Tam Başkanlık’,”** February 23, 2017. <<https://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/17798/karabagin-adi-artik-artsakh-cumhuriyeti-yonetim-sekli-tam-baskanlik>> (Retrieved on 23.10.2021).

Al Jazeera, **“Mass grave from 1990s war found in Nagorno-Karabakh: Azerbaijan,”** 5 October 2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/5/mass-grave-from-1990s-war-found-in-nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan> (Retrieved on 25.10.2022).

Aljazeera Turk, **“Öncesi ve Sonrasıyla Karabağ Savaşı,”** <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/dosya/oncesi-ve-sonrasiyla-karabag-savasi> (Retrieved on 28.02.2019).

Aljazeera, **“Armenia, Azerbaijan Gear up for Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Talks,”** 7 April 2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/7/armenia-azerbaijan-gear-up-for-nagorno-karabakh-peace-talks> (Retrieved on 12.10.2022).

AlJazeera, **“Armenian President Armen Sarkissian Quits over Lack of Influence,”** 23 January 2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/23/armenian-president-armen-sarkissian-resigns> (Retrieved on 24.03.2022).

AlJazeera, **“Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis Escalates amid Threat of War,”** 4 April 2016. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/4/4/nagorno-karabakh-crisis-escalates-amid-threat-of-war> (Retrieved on 15.10.2019).

AMASHOV Orkhan, **“Readjusted Armenian reasoning: Status recalibrated. What is new?,”** Azernews, April 15, 2022 <https://www.azernews.az/our-writers/192374.html> (Retrieved on June 11, 2022).

ANNAN Kofi A., **“Two Concepts of Sovereignty”**, The Economist, 18 September 1999.

Arka News Agency, **“Any Document Should be Discussed with the Artsakh Authorities and be Based on the Sentiments of the people – Arayik Harutyunyan,”** 29 April 2022. https://arka.am/en/news/politics/any_document_should_be_discussed_with_the_artsakh_authorities_and_be_based_on_the_sentiments_of_the_/ (Retrieved on 30.04.2022)

Arka News Agency, **“Forced Annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan Will Become Historical and Moral Tragedy for Armenian Statehood and People - Karabakh Parliament Chairman,”** 14 April 2022. https://arka.am/en/news/politics/forced_annexation_of_nagorno_karabakh_to_azerbaijan_will_become_historical_and_moral_tragedy_for_arm/ (Retrieved on 18.04.2022)

Armen Press, **“There is certain tactic in negotiation process, opposition can’t force leadership to deviate from that plans-Harutyunyan,”** 2 June 2022. <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1084958/> (Retrieved on 04.07.2022)

ArmenPress, **“Armenia ‘Will not Tolerate a Second Genocide,’ President Armen Sarkissian Tells Kathimerini,”** 9 November 2020. <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1034410.html> (Retrieved on 30.04.2022)

Armenpress, **“Pashinyan Offers ‘remedial secession’ Principle for NK Conflict Settlement,”** 16 October 2020. <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1031813.html> (Retrieved on 30.04.2022)

Asbarez, **“Arayik Harutyunyan Sworn in as Artsakh President,”** 21 May 2020. <https://asbarez.com/arayik-hautyunyan-sworn-in-as-artsakh-president/> (Retrieved on 24.04.2022)

Asbarez, **“Artsakh Armenians Concerned About Pashinyan’s Statement,”** 13 April 2022 <https://asbarez.com/artsakh-armenians-concerned-about-pashinyans-statement/> (Retrieved on 28.04.2022)

Asbarez, **“Karabakh Settlement Impossible Without Artsakh Armenians’ Input, Says EU Rep.”**, 6 June 2022. <https://asbarez.com/karabakh-settlement-impossible-without-artsakh-armenians-input-says-eu-rep/> (Retrieved on 30.06.2022)

Asbarez, **“Pashinyan Again Addresses ‘Lowering the Bar’ on Artsakh Status,”** 22 April 2022. <https://asbarez.com/pashinyan-again-addresses-lowering-the-bar-on-artsakh-status/> (Retrieved on 28.04.2022)

Azatutyun, **“Karabakh Leaders Warn Pashinian,”** 14 April 2022. <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/31803355.html> (Retrieved on 30.04.2022)

Azernews, **“MFA: Azerbaijan working to ensure IDPs’ return to Karabakh,”** 6 September 2021. <https://www.azernews.az/nation/182980.html> (Retrieved on 08.06.2022)

Azertag, **“President Ilham Aliyev: There is no administrative territorial unit called Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan,”** 24 September 2021 https://azertag.az/en/xeber/President_Ilham_Aliyev_There_is_no_administrative_terr

itorial unit called Nagorno Karabakh in Azerbaijan-1884245 (Retrieved on June 10, 2021).

Azertag, **“President Ilham Aliyev’s interview with Russian influential ‘Natsionalnaya oborona’ magazine,”** 24 September 2021. [https://azertag.az/en/xeber/President Ilham Aliyevs interview with Russian influential Natsionalnaya oborona magazine VIDEO-1884395](https://azertag.az/en/xeber/President%20Ilham%20Aliyevs%20interview%20with%20Russian%20influential%20Natsionalnaya%20oborona%20magazine%20VIDEO-1884395) (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

BADALIAN Susan & KHULIAN Artak, **“Karabakh Leaders Warn Pashinian,”** Azatutyun, 14 Nisan 2022. <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/31803355.html> (Retrieved on 25.04.2022)

BAG Mustafa, **“Hocalı Katliamı’nın Yıl Dönümü: Katliam mı ‘Soykırım’ mı? Kim Nasıl Kabul Ediyor?”**, Euronews, February 26, 2022. <https://tr.euronews.com/2022/02/26/hocali-katliami-28-yil-donumu-neler-yasandi-katliam-soykirim-mi-daglik-karabag-azerbaycan> (Retrieved on 28.05.2022).

BAGHDASARIAN Edic, **“Caucasian Albania, Azerbaijan Expansionism and Crime,”** Toronto, ISBN: 978-1-927860-42-7 (Retrieved on 15.04.2022)

BARANEC Tomáš, **“Pashinyan Begins to Face Criticism for Negotiations with Baku Home and in Nagorno-Karabakh,”** Strategic Analysis, 25 April 2022. <https://www.strategicanalysis.sk/strategic-analysis-caucasus-brief/> (Retrieved on 29.04.2022)

BBC News, **“Rwanda Genocide: 100 days of Slaughter,”** April 4, 2019 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506> (Retrieved on 19.06. 2021).

BBC News, **Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Killed 5,000 Soldiers**, December 3, 2020. <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55174211>> (Retrieved on 24.10.2021).

BREMMER Ian, **“Help Wanted for Armenia,”** Csmonitor, 25 February 1998. <https://www.csmonitor.com/1998/0225/022598.opin.opin.2.html> (Retrieved on 30.04.2022)

BROERS Laurence, **“Perspectives | Did Russia win the Karabakh war?,”** Eurasianet, 17 November 2020. <https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-did-russia-win-the-karabakh-war> (Retrieved on 25.05.2022)

CARLEY Patricia, **“Nagorno-Karabakh: Searching for a Solution,”** United States Institute of Peace, 1 December 1998. <https://www.usip.org/publications/1998/12/nagorno-karabakh-searching-solution-0> (Retrieved on 15.07.2022)

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, **“Nagorny Karabakh: Halting a Slide to Conflict,”** 28 March 2011. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/28/nagorny-karabakh-halting-slide-to-conflict-event-3218> (Retrieved on 15.07.2022)

Caucasian Knot, **“In Azerbaijan, IDPs await return to their homeland after fighting in Karabakh,”** 12 November 2020, <https://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/52751/> (Retrieved on June 8, 2022).

Caucasus Edition, **“A New Look at Old Principles: Making the Madrid Document Work,”** 1 April 2011. <https://caucasusedition.net/why-nagorno-karabakhs-status-must-be-addressed-first/> (Retrieved on 13.06.2022)

Caucasus Edition, **“Madrid Principles: Basis for Conflict Settlement or War?,”** 1 August 2010. <https://caucasusedition.net/madrid-principles-basis-for-conflict-settlement-or-war/> (Retrieved on 18.07.2022)

CFR Global Conflict Tracker, **“Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,”** Updated on 12 May 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict> (Retrieved on 15.07.2022)

CHETERIAN Vicken, **“Armenia’s Election: The Waiting Game,”** Open Democracy, 19 February 2008. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/armenia_election/ (Retrieved on 16.07.2021)

Civil Net, **“A Recap of the 7 Plans Proposed for the Settlement of the Karabakh Conflict,”** 23 October 2021. <https://www.civilnet.am/en/news/637117/a-recap-of-the-7-plans-proposed-for-the-settlement-of-the-karabakh-conflict/> (Retrieved on 15.07.2022)

CORNELL Svante E., **“Armenia’s Crisis of Legitimacy,”** The American Interest, 26 April 2018. <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/04/26/armenias-crisis-legitimacy/> (Retrieved on 10.03.2022)

Cumhuriyet, **“Azerbaycan, Dağlık Karabağ’ı Yuttu,”** November 28, 1991. <https://www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/katalog/192/sayfa/1991/11/28/11.xhtml> (Retrieved on 12.04.2019).

Deutsche Welle, **Azerbaijan Reports Solider Killed in “Armenian Attack”**, December 28, 2020. <<https://www.dw.com/en/azerbaijan-reports-solider-killed-in-armenian-attack/a-56074570>> (Retrieved on 23.02.2021).

ELLIOTT Raffi, **“Former Government Supporters Continue Civil Disobedience in Bid to Dethrone Pashinyan: Analysis,”** 10 May 2022. <https://mirrorspectator.com/2022/05/10/former-government-supporters-continue-civil-disobedience-in-bid-to-dethrone-pashinyan-analysis/> (Retrieved on 15.07.2022)

Ermenihaber, **“Bako Sahakyan Karabağ Cumhurbaşkanı seçildi,”** 19 July 2017. <https://ermenihaber.am/tr/news/2017/07/19/Bako-Sahakyan-Karaba%C4%9F-Cumhurba%C5%9Fkan%C4%B1/109255> (Retrieved on 15.07.2022)

Eurasia Review, **“Why Karabakh Does Not Need Autonomous Status In Azerbaijan – OpEd,”** 20 May 2022. <https://www.eurasiareview.com/20052022-why-karabakh-does-need-autonomous-status-in-azerbaijan-oped/> (Retrieved on 7.06.2022).

Eurasian Times, **“Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Why Armenia Needs to Pull-Out from Occupied-Regions of Azerbaijan: OPED,”** September 29, 2020. <https://eurasiantimes.com/armenia-azerbaijan-conflict-why-armenia-needs-to-pull-out-from-occupied-regions-of-azerbaijan-oped/> (Retrieved on 01.10.2021).

FARHADOVA Aytan & MUSAYEV Isa, **“Not quite how they imagined it - Azerbaijani IDPs’ return to Karabakh,”** Jam News, 22 October 2021. <https://jam->

news.net/not-quite-how-they-imagined-it-azerbaijani-idps-return-to-karabakh/ (Retrieved on June 2022).

Fip, **“Nikol Pashinyan’s Duality on Karabakh: How the Discourse Changed,”** 19 April 2022. <https://fip.am/en/19044> (Retrieved on 7.06.2022).

First Channel News, **“International community tells us to lower our bar on status of Nagorno-Karabakh a little, to ensure great consolidation around Armenia and Artsakh: Pashinyan,”** 13 April 2022. <https://www.1lurer.am/en/2022/04/13/International-community-tells-us-to-lower-our-bar-on-status-of-Nagorno-Karabakh-a-little-to-ensure/701756> (Retrieved on 30.06.2022).

France 24, **“Armenian President Wins Re-election in Disputed Vote,”** 19 February 2013. <https://www.france24.com/en/20130219-armenian-president-serzh-sarkisian-wins-reelection-disputed-vote> (Retrieved on 7.06.2022).

France24, **“Armenian President Resigns Citing ‘difficult times’ for Nation,”** 23 January 2022. <https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220123-armenian-president-resigns-citing-difficult-times-for-nation> (Retrieved on 7.06.2022).

GAMKRELIDZE Thomas V., **“Transcaucasia” or “South Caucasus”? Towards a More Exact Geopolitical Nomenclature*,** <http://www.parliament.ge/files/327_2288_943216_caucasus.pdf> (Retrieved on 17.05.2019).

GHAZANCHYAN Siranush, **“Armenia Marks 31st Anniversary of Independence,” Public Radio of Armenia,** September 21, 2022. <<https://en.armradio.am/2022/09/21/armenia-marks-31st-anniversary-of-independence/>> (Retrieved on 30.10.2022).

GRIGORYAN Elen, MARGARYAN Sona, **“Memory of Politics: the Post-Soviet Memory Landscape in Yerevan,”** Caucasus Edition. <<https://caucasusedition.net/memory-politics-the-post-soviet-memory-landscape-in-yerevan/>> (Retrieved on 25.04.2020).

GRIGORYAN Marianna, **“Armenia: Does Post-Election Protest Initiative Have Legs?”** Eurasianet, 27 February 2013. <https://eurasianet.org/armenia-does-post-election-protest-initiative-have-legs> (Retrieved on 2.04.2021).

HAIYIEVA Gunay, **“Azerbaijan Remembers Four Day War,”** Caspian News, 5 April 2020 < <https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/azerbaijan-remembers-four-day-war-2020-4-1-29/>> (Retrieved on 11.10.2021).

Hetq, **“Armen Sarkissian Officially Relieved as Armenian President,”** 1 February 2022. <https://hetq.am/en/article/140638> (Retrieved on 7.06.2022).

Hetq, **“Serzh Sargsyan Declared the Winner,”** 23 February 2008. <https://hetq.am/en/article/39938> (Retrieved on 7.06.2022).

HOVHANNISYAN Hovhannes, **“Religion and Religious Institutions in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Does the Religious Factor Play a Role?,”** Religions in Armenia, July 23, 2016. <http://www.v1.religions.am/eng/articles/religion-and->

religious-institutions-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict --does-the-religious-factor-play-a-role/ (Retrieved on 11.09.2019).

HUSEYNOV Javid, **“Karabakh Peace Process Must Be Fully Inclusive,”** Radio Free Europe, September 1, 2009. https://www.rferl.org/a/Karabakh_Peace_Process_Must_Be_Fully_Inclusive_/1812056.html (Retrieved on 02.11.2022).

International Crisis Group, **“Nagorno-Karabakh: New Opening, or More Peril?,”** Europe Report N°239, Belgium, 4 July 2016, 8.

ISAYEV Heydar, **“Azerbaijan Quiet as Karabakh Negotiations Progress,”** Eurasianet, 20 April 2022 <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-quiet-as-karabakh-negotiations-progress> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

ISHKANIAN Armine, **“Why Peace Looks a Long Way off in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,”** LSE, 8 October 2020. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2020/10/08/why-peace-looks-a-long-way-off-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict/> (Retrieved on 04.02.2021).

ISMAILZADE Fariz, **“Azerbaijanis see small chance for peace in Nagorno-Karabakh,”** Eurasianet, 13 February 2006. <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijanis-see-small-chance-for-peace-in-nagorno-karabakh> (Retrieved on 06.09.2021).

Jam News, **“Ilham Aliyev: ‘If we are defining borders, what NK status is there to talk about?’”** 27 May 2022. <https://jam-news.net/if-we-define-the-borders-then-what-status-of-nk-can-we-talk-about-azerbaijan-stated-that-the-conflict-over-nagorno-karabakh-has-been-resolved/> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

Jam News, **“New President of Armenia: Who is He and What Does He Intend to Do,”** 3 March 2022. <https://jam-news.net/new-president-of-armenia-who-is-he-and-what-does-he-intend-to-do/>; (Retrieved on 04.04.2022).

JAROSIEWICZ Aleksandra & FALKOWSKI Maciej, **“The Four-day War in Nagorno-Karabakh,”** OSW Center for Eastern Studies, 6 April 2016. <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-04-06/four-day-war-nagorno-karabakh> (Retrieved on 06.04.2021).

KATERJI Oz, **“Assad’s Violence Started a Conflict That Will Burn for Decades,”** Foreign Policy, March 19, 2021. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/19/syria-protests-civil-war-anniversary-assad/> (Retrieved on 28.04.2021).

KI-MOON Ban, **“A Climate Culprit in Darfur,”** Washington Post, 16 June 2007. Also available at <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/articles/2007-06-16/climate-culprit-darfur> (Retrieved on 10.10.2022).

KUCERA Joshua, **“Armenia Signals Willingness to Cede Control over Karabakh,”** Eurasianet, 1 April 2022. <https://eurasianet.org/armenia-signals-willingness-to-cede-control-over-karabakh> (Retrieved on 16.09.2022).

KUCERA Joshua, **“Pashinyan Calls for Unification between Armenia and Karabakh,”** Eurasianet, 6 August 2019. <https://eurasianet.org/pashinyan-calls-for-unification-between-armenia-and-karabakh> (Retrieved on 06.07.2021).

KUCERA Joshua, MEJLUMYAN Ani, **“EU Emerges as Major Player in Armenia-Azerbaijan Negotiations,”** Eurasianet, 25 May 2022. <https://eurasianet.org/eu-emerges-as-major-player-in-armenia-azerbaijan-negotiations> (Retrieved on 06.06.2022).

LAUB, Zachary, **“Instability in Russia’s North Caucasus Region,”** Council on Foreign Relations, 13 October 2005. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/instability-russias-north-caucasus-region> (Retrieved on 10.02.2021).

MARTIROSYAN Tigran, **“Key West Talks on Nagorno-Karabakh: Will The “Caucasian Knot” Be Cut?”** Cacialyst, 5 September 2001. <https://www.cacialyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/7139-analytical-articles-caci-analyst-2001-5-9-art-7139.html> (Retrieved on 12.09.2021).

Media Max, **“Pashinyan: “We are Speaking about Armenia and Artsakh’s Being or not Being,”** 14 April 2022. <https://mediamax.am/en/news/politics/47119/> (Retrieved on 26.07.2022).

MEHDIYEV Mushvig, **“Internally Displaced Azerbaijanis May Soon Start Returning to Liberated Zangilan,”** Caspian News, 22 October 2021 <https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/internally-displaced-azerbaijanis-may-soon-start-returning-to-liberated-zangilan-2021-10-22-0/> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

MEJLUMYAN Ani, **“Armenia Begins Probe of 2016 War,”** Eurasianet, 14 June 2019. <https://eurasianet.org/armenia-begins-probe-of-2016-war> (Retrieved on 06.09.2021).

MEJLUMYAN Ani, **“Armenian Opposition Rallies ahead of Pashinyan-Aliyev Meeting,”** Eurasianet, 6 April 2022. <https://eurasianet.org/armenian-opposition-rallies-ahead-of-pashinyan-aliyev-meeting> (Retrieved on 16.08.2022).

Nationalia, **Azerbaijan Launches New Offensive against Karabakh, Occupies Border Areas,** 28.09.2020. <https://www.nationalia.info/brief/11338/azerbaijan-launches-new-offensive-against-karabakh-occupies-border-areas> (Retrieved on October 27, 2022).

News.Am, **“Robert Kocharyan: Madrid Principles Only International Document Stating Karabakh’s Right to Self-determination,”** 18 September 2020. <https://news.am/eng/news/602907.html> (Retrieved on 06.08.2021).

Newsam, **“Aliyev: If we define borders with Armenia, what status of Nagorno-Karabakh can we talk about?!”**, 27 May 2022. <https://news.am/eng/news/704300.html> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

OC Media, **“Charles Michel: Pashinyan-Aliyev meeting ‘frank and productive’”**, 24 May 2022. <https://oc-media.org/charles-michel-pashinyan-aliyev-meeting-frank-and-productive/> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022=).

OC Media, **“Pashinyan and Aliyev agree to establish border commission by April,”** 7 April 2022 <https://oc-media.org/pashinyan-and-aliyev-agree-to-establish-border-commission-by-april/> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

OC Media, **“Pashinyan: ‘By Handing over Territories I Might Have Saved Thousands of Lives’”**, 13 April 2022. <https://oc-media.org/pashinyan-by-handing-over-territories-i-might-have-saved-thousands-of-lives/> (Retrieved on 13.09.2022).

PILIGIAN Stepan, **“Who Speaks for the People of Artsakh?”** Armenianweekly, April 20, 2022. <https://armenianweekly.com/2022/04/20/who-speaks-for-the-people-of-artsakh/> (Retrieved on 05.05.2022).

POGHOSYAN Benyamin, **“Pashinyan is Ready to Recognize Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan: What Next,”** Armenianweekly, 28 December 2021. <https://armenianweekly.com/2021/12/28/pashinyan-is-ready-to-recognize-artsakh-as-part-of-azerbaijan-what-next/> (Retrieved on 13.09.2022).

Public Radio of Armenia, **“Alen Simonyan Assumes the President’s Duties as Sarkissian’s Resignation Takes Effect,”** 1 February 2022. <https://en.armradio.am/2022/02/01/alen-simonyan-assumes-the-presidents-duties-as-sarkissians-resignation-comes-into-effect/> (Retrieved on 06.10.2022).

Public Radio of Armenia, **“Vahagn Khachaturyan Officially Nominated for President of Armenia,”** 2 February 2022. <https://en.armradio.am/2022/02/02/vahagn-khachaturyan-officially-nominated-for-president-of-armenia/> (Retrieved on 12.09.2022).

QUINN Colm, **“Armenia and Azerbaijan Hold Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Talks,”** Foreign Policy, 6 April 2022. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/06/armenia-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-war-peace-pashinyan-aliyev/> (Retrieved on 17.09.2022).

Radio Free Europe, **“Aliyev Says Won’t Recognize Armenia’s Territorial Integrity Unless Peace Deal Signed,”** 22 April 2022 <https://www.rferl.org/a/aliyev-armenia-recognition-peace-deal/31816395.html> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

Radio Free Europe, **“Azerbaijan’s First President, Ayaz Mutallibov, Dies At 83,”** March 28, 2022, <https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-president-mutallibov-dies/31774654.html> (Retrieved 12.06.2022).

Radio Free Europe, **“Despite Official Promises, Displaced Azerbaijanis Are Skeptical About Returning To Territory Won In Karabakh War,”** 30 October 2021, <https://www.rferl.org/a/displaced-azerbaijan-return-karabakh/31537101.html> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

Report News Agency, **“President says ‘vast majority of IDPs want to return’ to their native lands,”** 27 May 2022 <https://report.az/en/domestic-politics/president-says-absolute-majority-of-idps-want-to-return-to-their-native-lands/> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

Reuters, **“Azeri and Armenian leaders meet on Nagorno-Karabakh,”** 23 May 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/azeri-armenian-leaders-meet-nagorno-karabakh-2022-05-22/> (Retrieved on 06.10.2022).

SARGSYAN Lusine, **“The Robert Kocharyan Administration: 1998-2008,”** Evnreport, 22 September 2021. <https://evnreport.com/magazine-issues/the-robert-kocharyan-administration-1998-2008/> (Retrieved on 06.01.2022).

SOLASH Richard, **“Kazan Summit: Time for Breakthrough in Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process?”** Radio Free Europe, 24 June 2011. <https://www.rferl.org/a/nagorno-karabakh-kazan-summit-breakthrough-in-peace-process/24244645.html> (Retrieved on 14.09.2021).

The Armenian Mirror-Spectator, **“Karabakh Officials Angrily React to Pashinyan Speech Asking for ‘Lower Bar’”** 21 April 2022. <https://mirrorspectator.com/2022/04/21/karabakh-officials-angrily-react-to-pashinyan-speech-asking-for-lower-bar/> (Retrieved on 28.04.2022).

The Armenian Weekly, **“President Armen Sarkissian Resigns amid Investigation into Secret Citizenship,”** 26 January 2022. <https://armenianweekly.com/2022/01/26/president-armen-sarkissian-resigns-amid-investigation-into-secret-citizenship/> (Retrieved on 06.05.2022).

The Moscow Times, **“Russia to Assist Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Talks – Lavrov,”** 9 June 2022. <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/06/09/russia-to-assist-armenia-azerbaijan-peace-talks-lavrov-a77955> (Retrieved on 15.09.2022).

The New York Times, **“Armenian Chief Is Winner,”** 30 September 1996. <https://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/30/world/armenian-chief-is-winner.html> (Retrieved on 06.09.2021).

Trend News Agency, **“If we define borders with Armenia, what kind of status for ‘Nagorno-Karabakh’ can we talk about? - President Ilham Aliyev,”** 27 May 2022. <https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3601474.html> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022).

Trend News Agency, **“Absolute majority of internally displaced persons want to return, which made me very happy - President Ilham Aliyev,”** 27 May 2022 <https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3601436.html> (Retrieved on June 10, 2022)

Trend News Agency, **“By the end of the year, we will fully provide all the liberated territories with energy - President Aliyev,”** September 24, 2021 <https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3488907.html> (Retrieved on 05.11.2022).

Trend News Agency, **“‘Great Return Program is Being Successfully Implemented,’ President Ilham Aliyev,”** December 31, 2022. <https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3689984.html> (Retrieved on 31.12.2022.)

TUNCCEL Turgut Kerem, **“The Inauguration Speech of the Newly Elected Armenian President Armen Sarkissian: More of the Same Ideological Outlook ,”** Avim, 17 April 2018. <https://avim.org.tr/en/Yorum/THE-INAUGURATION-SPEECH-OF-THE-NEWLY-ELECTED-ARMENIAN-PRESIDENT-ARMEN-SARKISSIAN-MORE-OF-THE-SAME-IDEOLOGICAL-OUTLOOK> (Retrieved on 06.09.2021).

USC Dornsife Institute of Armenian Studies, **“Artsakh Vote: Arayik Harutyunyan is Elected President,”** April 15, 2020 <https://armenian.usc.edu/artsakh-vote-arayik-harutyunyan-is-elected-president/> (Retrieved on May 26, 2020).

Vaqif Abışov, **Qədim Azərbaycan dövləti – Albaniya**, No: 18 (1386) 27 yanvar-28 yanvar 2017 <<http://web2.anl.az:81/read/page.php?bibid=vtls000525398>> (Retrieved on 06.11.2021).

Vazgenmanukyan, “**Ter-Petrossian Was Re-elected in 1996 in a Disputed Election**,” 12 November 1996. <https://vazgenmanukyan.am/en/ter-petrossian-was-re-elected-in-1996-in-a-disputed-election/> (Retrieved on 06.10.2022).

Virtual Karabakh, “**Ermenistan- Azerbaijan, Dağlık Karabağ Sorunu**”, <<http://www.virtuallkarabakh.az/tr/post-item/28/48/ermenistan-azerbaycan-daglik-karabag-sorunu.html>> (Retrieved on 10.04.2020).

Reports & Working Papers

ABRAHAMIAN Levon, “Mother Tongue: Linguistic Nationalism and the Cult of Translation in Postcommunist Armenia,” **Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series**, Summer 1998.

ANONIMO Janie Hampton, **Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey**, Norwegian Refugee Council, Second Edition, London: Earthscan Publications Limited, 2002.

BEHNKE Andreas, “‘Postmodernising’ Security,” **Paper for Presentation at the ECPR Joint Sessions**, Mannheim, 26-31 March 1999.

BORTON J., BUCHANAN-SMITH M. and OTTO Ralf, “Support to Internally Displaced Persons – Learning from Evaluations,” **Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency**, July 2005.

COHEN Roberta & DENG Francis M., “Mass Displacement Caused by Conflicts and One-sided Violence: National and International Responses,” **SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Security and Conflicts**, 2009, pp. 15-38.

COHEN Roberta, “Lessons Learned from the Development of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,” **The Crisis Migration Project, Institute for the Study of International Migration**, Georgetown University, Working Paper, October 2013, 1-21.

COHEN Roberta, **Sovereignty As Responsibility: The Guiding Principles On Internal Displacement**, A Public Lecture by Roberta Cohen, Co-Director of the Brookings Institution-Johns Hopkins SAIS Project on Internal Displacement Hosted by the Calcutta Research Group and the Refugee Studies Centre of Jadavpur University Calcutta, December 5, 2003.

DE WAAL Thomas, “Azerbaijan at 25: A New Era of Change And Turbulence,” **Carnegie Endowment for International Peace**, 2016, pp. 1-8.

DILANYAN Sona, GAMAGHELYAN Philip, RUMYANSEV Sergey, SAYAN Pinar (Eds.), **Political Transitions and Conflicts in The South Caucasus**, Journal of Conflict Transformation, Caucasus Edition, Volume 3, Issue 2 2018, Brussel, pp. 140-154.

ERCAN Yavuz, **Tarihi Belgelerin Işığında Ermeni İddiaları**, Tarih Boyunca Türklerin Ermeni Toplumu ile İlişkileri Sempozyumu 8-12 October 1984 Erzurum, Ankara, 1985.

ERIKSSON Johan, “Agendas, Threats, and Politics Securitization in Sweden,” **Paper to be presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions**, workshop “Redefining Security”, Mannheim, March 26-31, 1999.

ESPAGNE Michel, ISAXANLI Hamlet, “A Long-term History of Cross Cultural Transfers in the Caucasus,” **Khazar Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences**, Special Issue, 2018. <https://jhss-khazar.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/A-Longterm-History-of-Crosscultural-Transfers-in-the-Caucasus.pdf> (Retrieved on 06.10.2022).

FELLER Erika, “UNHCR’s Role in IDP Protection: Opportunities and Challenges,” **Forced Migration Review**, Brookings-Bern Special issue, December, 2006, pp. 11-13.

FM Review, “The Internal Displacement Unit – OCHA,” **FMR20**, p. 44. <<https://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/sustainable-livelihoods/ocha.pdf>> (Retrieved on 04.06.2021).

HARILD Niels & CHRISTENSEN Asger, “The Development Challenge of Finding Durable Solutions For Refugees and Internally Displaced People,” **World Development Report 2011**, July 30, 2010.

Human Rights Watch, **The Challenge of the New Millennium: Protecting the Internally Displaced**, Special Issues and Campaigns, Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Internally Displaced Persons, 2000.

HUYSMANS Jef, “Language and The Mobilisation of Security Expectations. The Normative Dilemma of Speaking and Writing Security”, **Paper for the ECPR Joint Sessions**, Workshop Redefining Security, Mannheim, 26-31 March 1999.

IDMC, **Global Report on Internal Displacement 2022, Children and Youth in Internal Displacement**, 2022.

International Crisis Group, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Seeking a Path to Peace in the Ukraine War’s Shadow,” **Crisis Group Europe Briefing**, No. 93 Baku/Yerevan/Stepanakert/Brussels, 22 April 2022.

International Crisis Group, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Visual explainer,” 17 May 2022 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer> (Retrieved on 10.06.2022).

KLEVER Emma, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan: An Overview of the Current Situation,” Brussels, **European Movement International**, September 24, 2013.

MIGDALOVITZ Carol, “Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict,” **Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress**, December 26, 2001, pp. 1-16,

MIGDALOVITZ Carol, “Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict,” **CRS Issue Brief for Congress**, Order Code IB92109, December 26, 2001, pp. 1-16.

MIKHELIDZE Nona, "The Azerbaijan-Russia-Turkey Energy Triangle and its Impact on the Future of Nagorno-Karabakh," **Istituto Affari Internazionali, Documenti Iai 10**, 18 September 2010.

MUGA Victoria, "Agents or Subverters of Peace? Analyzing the Role of Internally Displaced Persons in Peacebuilding Processes," **Umeå University Department of Political Science**, <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1569854/FULLTEXT01.pdf>, pp. 1-56.

MUSABAYOV Rasim, "The Karabakh Conflict and Democratization in Azerbaijan," **Accord**, Vol. 17, pp. 60-63.

NICHOL Jim, "Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests," **Congressional Research Service**, 11 March 2010.

SHIRINOV Rashad, "A Pragmatic Area for Cooperation: Azerbaijan and the EU," **IPG 3/2011**, 2011, pp. 74-81.

STONE Marianne, "Security According to Buzan: A Comprehensive Security Analysis," **Groupe d'Etudes et d'Expertise "Sécurité et Technologies"**, Security Discussion Papers Series 1, Spring 2009.

STRONSKI Paul, "Armenia at Twenty-Five: A Rough Ride," **Carnegie Endowment for International Peace**, 2016, pp. 1-12.

TESÓN Fernando R., "The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention," **Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper**, No. 39, November 2001.

WELT Cory & BOWEN Andrew S., "Azerbaijan and Armenia: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict," **Congressional Research Service**, 7 January 2021.

YUNUSOV Arif, "Azerbaijani Security Problems and Policies," **European Union Institute for Security Studies**, 2003, pp. 143-158.

Thesis

DUDWICK Nora, **Memory, Identity and Politics in Armenia**, University of Pennsylvania, Phd Dissertation, 1994.

GULIYEV Telman, **Rusya'nın Azerbaycan Siyaseti (1801-1813)**, Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Türk Tarihi Ana Bilim Dalı Genel Türk Tarihi Bilim Dalı, Master Thesis, İstanbul 2010.

KIM Inwook, **Crude Security: Oil, Armament, and Alliance**, The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University, dissertation submitted in January 31, 2016.

MNATSAKANYAN Lilit, **The Stone Lab: Decoding Shikahogh Khachkars**, Westminster Research, Master Thesis, March 2007.

ONOL, Onur, **The Evolution of Tsarist Policy on the Armenian Question in the South Caucasus (1903-1914)**, Phd Dissertation, Birkbeck, University of London, 2014 (Unpublished).

ÖZGEÇMİŞ



TEZ ONAY SAYFASI

Üniversite : T.C. GALATASARAY ÜNİVERSİTESİ
Enstitü : SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
Hazırlayanın Adı Soyadı : Arzu TURGUT
Tez Başlığı : The Role of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in
Securitization in Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh Policy
Savunma Tarihi : 05/ 12 / 2022
Danışman : Doç. Dr. Ali Faik DEMİR

JÜRİ ÜYELERİ:

Unvan, Ad-Soyadı

İmza

Prof. Dr. Esra HATİPOĞLU

Prof. Dr. Mitat ÇELİKPALA

Doç. Dr. Beyza Ç. TEKİN

Doç. Dr. Menent Savaş CAZALA

Doç. Dr. Ali Faik DEMİR

Prof. Dr. Ulun AKTURAN

Enstitü Müdürü