

**THE GENESIS OF KAZAK NATIONALISM
AND
INDEPENDENT KAZAKSTAN:
A HISTORY OF NATIVE REACTIONS TO
RUSSIAN-SOVIET POLICIES**

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Meryem Kırımlı

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**T.C. YÜKSEKÖĞRETİM KURULU
DOKÜMANTASYON MERKEZİ**

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
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
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Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu
(Thesis Supervisor)



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Prof. Dr. Nadir Devlet




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Prof. Dr. İsenbike Togan




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Asst. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal



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Dr. Akşin Somel



ABSTRACT

This manuscript is a study the political, social, and administrative past of the Kazaks who became independent at the last decade of this century, shouldering all the burdens and problems of being a subject people first to the Russian Tsarist order and later to the Soviet rule. It is a search to find solutions to the present-day problems by focusing to the historical roots of the matters. This study attempted to focus on issues vital for the very survival of the Kazaks who are now only a part of the population in the land called Kazakhstan.

The need to launch such a study stemmed from the fact of seeking an answer to the problems of the present-day Kazakhstan. Thus a historical account of the roots of the issues, such as land, population change, political participation, and dilemma of the native language were choosen as the topics of the work. Kazak economic and military dependence to its former center, Moscow, was another dimension of the difficulties, this new state face in its path towards an independent survival.

Kazak native elite and intellectuals became the symbols of a new nationalist trend in Kazakhstan. Thus short biographies of some fifty most prominent Kazak political, military, intellectual and administrative elite provided an important contribution. It is hoped that this work will help to draw the attention of the academic and political world to one important dimension, reactions of the native part of the society, during the last three centuries, in the actions, ideas, and activities of the native elite. It is believed that the future ethnic stability need such a focus if there is going to be a stable social and ethnic order in Kazakhstan. Thus it is an attempt to fill the gap in western literature with the most needed native account of the facts.

ÖZET

Bu araştırma, asrımızın son on yılında bağımsızlığını almış bir ülke olan ve son üç asır zarfında, önce Rus Çarlık idaresi, onun akabinde Sovyet idaresi altında bulunduğundan dolayı, bugün problemlerle karşı karşıya olan Kazakistan'ın siyasi, askeri ve ekonomik geçmişine ait problemleri konu edinmiştir. Bu çalışma Kazakistan'ın bugünkü problemlerine çözüm aramak için, olayların tarihi kökenini araştırmayı da konu edinmiştir. Bu araştırma, Kazakistan olarak adlandırılan bir ülkede, nüfusun sadece bir kısmını teşkil eden Kazakların varolma ve yokolmasıyla çok yakından ilgili birçok konunun irdelenmesini amaç edinmiştir.

Böyle bir çalışmaya başlamak, Kazakistan'ın halihazırdaki problemlerine çözümler aramak ihtiyacından doğdu. Kazakistan'daki toprak, nüfus problemi, siyasi katılım, Kazak dilinin meseleleri gibi birçok konuların geçmişte hangi şartlarda olduğu tarihi perspektifle irdelenmeye çalışıldı. Kazakistan'ı, eski merkez, Moskova'ya askeri ve ekonomik yönden bağlayan konular da onu bağımsızlığını engelleyen meseleleri teşkil ediyor.

Kazak aydın ve elit tabakası, bu ülkede yeniden kuvvetlenen milliyetçi bir akımın sembollerine dönüşüyorlar. Bu yüzden son üç asırda yaşamış ve halen yaşamakta olan en önemli Kazak liderlerinin ve Kazak aydınlarının elli kadarının çok kısa biyografileri bu tezin sonuna eklenmiştir. Bu tezin gayesi, akademik ve siyasi dünyanın dikkatini, önemli bir konuya çekmektir. Bu da, son üç asırda (Kazakistan'da vukuu bulan olaylara) Kazak aydın ve elit tabakasının görüşünü yansıtmak ve onların hareket, fikir ve aktivitelerinin ışığında Kazakistan'daki yerli Kazak tepkilerini göz önüne sermektir. Kazakistan'da sağlanacak etnik ve sosyal istikrarın temelini oluşturmak için olaylara bu açıdan bakmak gerektiğine inanılmıştır. Bu amaçla, batı literatüründe, Kazak yerli görüşüne yer veilmemesinden kaynaklanan boşluğun bu tezle doldurulduğu inancını taşımaktayız.

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I would like to thank to the Vice-Rector and the President of the Bilkent Library, Dr. Phyllis Erdoğan as well as Fatma Fişenk, Head of the Periodicals Department in the Library for their very helpful support of providing the researchers rare periodicals of the Turko-Muslims of pre-Revolutionary Russia and of periodicals of the present-day Kazakistan. Thanks to their effort, Bilkent Main Campus Library has a significant collection about Central Asia, in many languages, that are impossible to reach at most libraries in Turkey and even of Central Asia.

The ladies who work in our department and at our Faculty in Bilkent led by Kadriye Göksel, Sibel Ramazanoglu and Müge Keller; my friends in graduate studies, Dr. Emel Osmançavuşoğlu and Müge Kınacıoğlu, were always ready to lend their kind help.

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Finally, all the errors are mine.

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INTRODUCTION:

This study is an attempt to find the roots of Kazak nationalism and the struggle of their elite, as the most important decision-making group, particularly during the last three centuries, to help the Kazaks exist as an independent entity. This study originated in a search to understand the native voice and concern regarding the future of the Kazaks. Thus, as the title of the study indicates, the Kazak history in the last three centuries, will be analyzed, taking the ideas, actions and activities of the Kazak elite into account. Understanding the problems of the natives in Kazakhstan offers the hope of finding the correct solution in evaluating the true picture of this newly independent former Soviet Republic. This necessity stems from the following developments as well.

The last two decades of the twentieth century have been very different from the previous decades. The post-Cold war international system arrived with the collapse of the bipolar world and with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The old system with its competing two alliances presented a strategic balance of power. States interacted within a discipline of bloc politics. The roles, actions, and interests of the states on both sides of the world were usually defined within the boundaries of bloc interests. However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union brought new realities to international politics. Within less than three years in the early 1990s, more than ten republics became independent new entities carved out of the remnants of the Soviet Union.

The emergence of these newly independent states and their place in the post-Cold war international system set new puzzles for academics all over the world. Some of these newly independent, former Soviet republics became independent thanks to changes and forces beyond their reach, strength or will. Some of these republics were not even ready to accept and adapt themselves to any kind of change. The post-Soviet nations and their new states, willingly or unwillingly, found themselves as the key actors in the midst of an era of transformation in the USSR. Developments in that part of the world are bound to affect not only Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, but the whole world. Political realignments, new policies and the national interests of each new state will have a significant impact on contemporary international affairs.

The emergence of the new states from the remnants of the Soviet Union brought with it the beginning of another process, which we may call the **Soviet de-colonization** process. Analyses of the common characteristics of post-colonial societies indicates many similarities with the characteristics of the movements and factors in the former Soviet land. According to the Soviet perspective, it was only the former Tsarist system that used the principles of colonial regimes. However, the present situation and conditions, unarguably support the proposition that “Soviet practice was blatantly colonialist, in the classic sense of the word,”¹ and in some instances it went further than the classical colonialist practices enslaving the

¹ Shireen Hunter, *Transcaucasia in Transition*, Washington, D.C. : Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994. Author has presented a meticulous comparative analysis of the classical colonization with that of the Soviet de-colonization encountered presently by the Transcaucasian states.

regions to the center. The counter argument assesses the Soviet rule “as not quite colonial” taking account of the fact that the Soviet metropol collapsed together with its periphery. However, a major portion of the gains seized from the Soviet periphery were invested to support Soviet military ambition. The Soviet periphery was deprived of their share earned from many branches of the economy- agriculture, mining and other areas- to support such ambition. If the Soviet metropol seemed to have gained nothing from their seven decades old empire, it was because of their maladministration in investing the gains in the military arms race. The major portion of Soviet profits was spent to improve the Soviet military and on the nuclear arms race. After the demise of the Soviet Union, military power and the former Soviet military capability wasted away in the hands of the representatives of the former center, in Moscow.

When the Soviet Union disintegrated, most of the periphery, and in particular, Kazakhstan presented most of the common features encountered by third world ex-colonies. Kazakhstan had been under the total military control of Moscow, the center, with Russian troops present in the area. The natives had not been given equal opportunity in the most important branches of the military structure. In other words, the natives had been denied the military training necessary to maintain the security of an independent country. The highly interdependent economy in Kazakhstan lacked self-sufficiency. Not powerful elite had emerged except only the old party ‘nomenklatura,’ loyal and responsive to the center’s interests. Kazakhstan was under the cultural and social domination of the

center. The native language and its development was at its lowest level of survival. Kazakhstan's vast natural resources lacked enough financial backing to restore the economy which would be vital for the maintenance of nation-building. Kazakhstan needed huge amounts of foreign capital to recover from economic decline and maintain a decent survival. The 'Soviet' de-colonization process can be identified by the following fact: there were no armed struggles in the ex-Soviet republics to achieve independence. However, in the classical de-colonization process, armed struggle against the imperial power helped colonial peoples to forge a sense of unity and purpose. Kazak native intellectuals, aware of this fact, began to look back into history to recover native struggles against the colonizing power, first against Tsarist colonialism and then Soviet colonialism. The armed struggle of the classical de-colonization process provided the natives with the creation of leadership cadres who were popularly accepted and whose legitimacy was recognized. In the classical de-colonization struggle, towering figures such as Nehru, Gandhi, Jinnah, Nkrumah and Sukarno, with diplomatic skills and inexhaustible commitment, led their people towards independence. Kazakhstan lacked such a strong personality to represent the grievances of the colonized people in opposition to the center and against those loyalists of the center inside the republic. The division between the natives and those representing the colonial power was not as sharp as it was in the classical colonies. Thus, the nation-building process in Kazakhstan faces tremendous internal and external difficulties.

Many of the difficulties Kazakhstan has faced on its way towards the maintenance of the free statehood stem from the policies previously imposed upon it, first by the Tsarist and later by the Soviet administrations. One of them is the presence of ethnic Slavs in Kazakhstan, committed to Russia and to Russian political, military, and economic interests, more than they are committed to the Kazak state they are presently living in. Another fact is the emergence of extreme nationalist inclinations in Russia-the policies of the current Russian administration variously referred to as the Russian Monroe Doctrine, the Near Abroad, etc. The current dilemma of the Kazak people is not only a struggle of de-colonization, but also a struggle against the remnants of Soviet power which poses a bigger challenge to Kazakhstan.

On the one hand, many changes need to be studied with reference to tendencies in the global political environment. Soviet area studies, on the other hand, require the study of the regional situation as well. Studying the Kazak case involves matters such as nation-building and nationalism, “ethno-nationalism” and “ethno-territorialism.” The above subjects were largely a product of an imposed Soviet system of administration. The transition from Communism and the building of a new political-economic system have their unique challenges. Coupled with this, there is a lack of institutional foundations necessary for a successful establishment of democracy. The present territorial and inter-ethnic disputes, as well as the very high-level of economic dependency of this republic to its former center, Moscow, import particular difficulty to the process of nation-

building, democratization, and a successful integration of Kazakhstan into the global economy.

Studying the statehood in transition to democracy in the newly independent Kazakhstan, with a specific emphasis on the roots of many matters (such as ethnic, religious, and political identity) are important for the definition of the future path of this new entity. In order to define the place of Kazakhstan politically among the states of the world, and the probable causes of further instability in the republic, it is necessary to include the past, by studying the Russian colonization movement, pre-Revolutionary times, religious and nationalist tendencies among the Kazaks before the Soviet period and the legacy of the Soviet period which has left such a strong mark on the history of the now-independent Kazakhstan. It is hoped that this analysis of the above matters will shed some light on predictions about the future of Kazak politics.

Recent political developments within the Commonwealth of Independent States and in the Muslim-majority republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus who are strengthening their ties with the countries of the Middle East (Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, etc.) are also a factor prompting scholars to study linkages between Islam and national consciousness.

Discussion of the soviet de-colonization, the systemic tendencies of transition to democracy and the market economy, integration of the former communist countries into the global economy, the formation of statehood and nation-building will be discussed. In order to avoid excessive length in discussing

all of the above matters, our concentration will be on Kazakhstan particularly. A general discussion of all the above matters will be made only to clarify the related situation in Kazakhstan. It is also a unique chance for any scholar-sociologist, economist and political scientist-to observe and live through all of these changes. Studying the post-Soviet nations is also important for social scientists to enable them to test their basic theories of political change and development.

The future path of this republic, its history, its complicated problems, whether economic, political, military, ethnic, cultural or religious, have been the topics of a number of studies. There have also been a vast number of studies, articles, surveys, reports and observations about the current problems of this newly independent country. However, there seems to be a gap between these two forms of study. There is a lack of a comprehensive work which, by taking into account the past, looks at the roots of the problems and the current situation in the republic. In other words, the transition from past to present and how foundations of the past have served as a prelude to the future will be an additional focus of this work.

My contention is that first Tsarist colonial rule and later Soviet rule brought about the hardship and dilemmas of today's Kazakhstan. All of the present problems, in their political, economic, military, cultural and ethnic dimensions are the results of the policies carried out by the outside power, Russia, and their forceful imposition on the native people. In order to overcome the difficulties faced by the young independent state, native intellectuals are seeking a solution

by invoking the native past. Ignoring the native history and native past will deprive future scientists of a healthy and correct judgment of the situation in the republic. The strength of native concerns and grievances are important. I hope that the analysis of the past will bring clarity to the origin of the problems to be solved by the current administration. At the same time, it is important to know whether “the Soviet era succeeded in destroying the pre-Leninist past of the Kazaks and robbed Kazaks of their ability to resurrect precommunist identities, parties, and institutions”² or not. Despite the claims that the emergence of Kazakhstan as an independent entity “is an accident never intended to happen,”³ Kazakhstan is a reality. It is a country which is experiencing the most problematic aspects of de-colonization and its population still struggles to maintain a genuine Kazak identity. Thus, understanding the past of Kazak society will define the future of the new Kazakhstan, in which a process of nation-building, already started in pre-Revolutionary times, led by native intellectuals. Reactions to the Russian colonial movement on the Kazak steppe found supporters that felt the threat of the Russians towards their traditional way of life. The role of the Kazak intellectuals as some of the most influential actors in the society, both prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, and during the seventy years of Soviet rule and after the demise of the empire, is one of the subjects of this study. We believe that shedding light on

² Karen Dawisha, “Democratization and Political participation: Research Concepts and Methodologies,” *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, edited by Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997., p. 47.

³ Martha Brill Olcott, “Democratization and the Growth of Political Participation in Kazakhstan,” in *ibid.*, p. 201.

their activities will greatly help in understanding the behavior of present day Kazak society and its socio-political reactions. The nationalist intellectuals of Kazak society, before Bolshevik power, were the leaders of political movements. If that process had not been brutally interrupted by the Soviet regime, state-building and the transition to democracy would not have been so difficult as it is today.

The first chapter of this work will focus on a brief history of the Kazak lands, its administrative, military and political elite in the traditional sense, an assessment of the statesmanship of the traditional leaders in defense of their territory and the conditions leading to the Russian occupation of the Kazak lands. The main idea in including the history of the early emergence of a Kazak identity is to display the roots of present Kazak identity, roots which survived in spite of many forceful measures.

The second chapter will lead the readers to a discussion of many aspects of life in Kazak society and their gradual submersion under Russian domination. It is also an attempt to define the outcome of changes inflicted upon the nomadic Kazaks by the new administrators, the Tsarist colonial administration. The confiscation of Kazak land, the beginning of environmental degradation; changes in the traditional economy, the decline of the traditional way of life, nomadism, and interactions between native society and its overlords, the occupying power, will be the subjects of this chapter. At the same time, an attempt is also made to explain the native backlash against the politically, socially, religiously and

culturally repressive Tsarist regime in the Kazak lands. A quick review of the decisive first quarter of this century is necessary in order to understand the scope of the problems of today's Kazakhstan, which is now at another crossroads.

The third chapter deals with the seventy-year long Soviet overlordship and the developments during this period. It is an account of the Soviet measures attempting to turn Kazakhstan into a 'socialist' society by brutally suppressing, and silencing every form of free survival, starting from free-thinking and evaluating the changes objectively to improve the indigenous cultures according to the native need. Collectivization, industrialization, land confiscation, the end of the nomadic tradition, native population decline, alterations in demography, the mass execution of native intellectuals, artificial famine and the much-exaggerated achievements of the Soviet regime in the east of the Union concerning education and the development of this nation coincide with this period. The Virgin Land Campaign and the mass settlement of Slavic population in the Republic are also among the issues included in this part. Although marked by considerable stagnation, particularly in economic fields, the Brejnev era and the leadership under Kunayev helped to some degree to improve the native situation and supported an environment enabling natives to participate in administrative work.

The fourth chapter deals with the military, political, social and environmental problems of Kazakhstan. The Soviet era altogether was for the Kazaks an era of many sorrowful practices. Thus this chapter is an attempt to examine the results of some Soviet administrative practices that left negative

traces which endured beyond the actual demise of the Soviet empire. Answers to such questions as what will be the result of the growing national consciousness of the Kazaks and the strengthening nationalist inclinations of the ethnic Russians in the republic within a globalizing world will also be investigated. An attempt to look deeper into the matters related to political and economic independence, the formation of a national army, the revival and reinterpretation of national heritage and the forces behind the ethnic nationalism of the Kazaks and the Russians in the republic are among the matters that will be discussed. In this chapter, questions such as the following will give the reader a better understanding of the problems in the Kazak republic. Will the “post-industrialism, rather than rendering nationalism obsolete, furnish new bases for ethnic movements and cultures?”⁴ There will be an inescapable overlapping between domestic matters and those associated with foreign policy issues in this chapter.

The last chapter deals with matters related to the modifications of relations between independent Kazakhstan and the former Soviet republics led by Russia. Russian policy towards this newly independent state also has important dimensions for Kazakhstan in its formation of foreign ties. Kazak entrance to the international community is another vital milestone in the history of this state.

The concluding part will evaluate the problems faced by Kazakhstan. The experiences of the native past, former attempts towards establishing an

⁴ *Nationalism*, John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 287.

independent existence, the negative outcomes of the Tsarist and Soviet colonial regimes, and most important of all, the native activities, and the targets and desires of independent Kazakhstan will be questioned.

The appendix will include a chronology of the Kazak Hans and of important events in the history of the Kazaks. Short biographies of Kazak elite including political, military, administrative, intellectual personalities as well as the Soviet era partocrats who left their mark in recent history of this nation will be included. This part will particularly be striking to display the ties between generations who followed one after another, and how they bridged the gap between generations in becoming the voice of their people. A historical map of the Kazak land as well as a current map of the Republic of Kazakhstan will be provided as an additional help to the reader.

Russian scholars of Tsarist times, as well as Soviet and later Western researchers, have considered the Kazaks as a nomadic people without a written heritage. This conclusion has led many Russian, Soviet and Western researchers to ignore the work of earlier Muslim scholars. It has led many to disregard the ancient and medieval ties and roots of Kazak tribes within the Central Asian, Turkic, Muslim and even Mongol world. Tribes composing the present day Kazak people have had a long, complicated and intimate relationship with the Muslim world through various confederations and unification in Central Asia (the Karahanid, Gaznavid, Timurid, etc.) and in the northern Caucasus (the Golden Horde). The inability to read the oriental languages, as well as the indigenous

tongues, have also led many contemporary western scholars to omit if not ignore the use of native sources. It seems a serious failure to disregard the native material in analyzing the past, present and future of the region. For Central Asia, Russian was the language of the colonizing power and continued to perform the same role even during the Soviet period due to the fact that the majority of natives were using it as their only language of formal and informal communication. This fact, most logically, led many scholars to ignore the indigenous language. Nevertheless, it led many to ignore the arguments of the natives which are becoming ever stronger again.

Responsibility for this first goes to the practice of the Soviet administration in overassessing the role of the Russian language as “the” language of the so-called “international Soviet community.” The Soviet assigned value of the ideas of some nineteenth century native Kazak intellectuals “pointing to the Russian language and culture as the only means to enlighten the nomadic Kazaks of the steppe”⁵ also made its negative contribution to the exaggeration of the usage of Russian sources. At the same time, the successful Russian advance and settlement on the Kazak steppe, that created a Russian dominated society, forced those natives to bury their nationalistic ideas between the lines during the Soviet times. Thus, some Kazak language sources play a different tune that only native speakers are able to understand regarding national matters. In this context, native

⁵ The well-known Kazak scholar Şoqan Valihanov, the much publicized Kazak poet Abay Qunanbayev and the educator Ibray Altınсарın are examples of the practice that justified the

language sources, particularly the works of the native intellectuals, are heavily used in this dissertation. Kazak intellectuals, who played an important role in the attempt to win an independent existence for the Kazaks and for their relations, particularly as against the Russians, were important. Nevertheless, as a result of the brutal Stalinist killings almost none of the native Kazaks intellectuals were able to leave their memoirs. It is one of the most unfortunate cases in history. Except for Mustafa Çokay who left his country in the 1920s, all of the Alaş activists departed from this life without memoirs. Many important articles written by the Alaş intellectuals in the pages of pre-Revolutionary periodicals, and recent publications of the transliterated form of many works from their original forms, were used to fill this gap. This problem might be eased in the future due to the continuous search of present-day Kazak scholars to find alternative sources, providing additional accounts of events related to the first half of this century.

In this context, two books by the outstanding Başqurt scholar, the late Zeki Velidi Togan, which were published in İstanbul and Egypt-his *Hatıralar*, 'The Memoirs' and his *Türkistan*-are particularly important. He was a painstaking scholar and researcher of many unknown details of the pre-Bolshevik and Soviet eras, using his very intimate contact with almost all of the political activists in the Kazak lands, particularly for the period of pre-Soviet and early Soviet power in Central Asia. Covering all the subjects in Validov's (Velidi) works and memoirs goes beyond the scope of this thesis. An attempt was made to deal only with the

importance of the Russian language by many Soviet-era native and non-native writers of

matters related to Kazaks. The English language books and articles, generally dated after the independence period, were not included due to the fact that all of these are widely known to the scholarly world and offer nothing new. The Kazak language sources are also selected to reflect the changing practice and views towards the native past thanks to the changes that have taken place since the Gorbachov years and in the era of independence. Another innovative change in Kazakhstan is the reinterpretation of history and a new attitude towards the past. Scrutinizing the new trends in native publications will reveal the preferences of the native element in Kazakhstan. Besides, the ability of native intellectuals to reach Kazak society and their influence in the decision making bodies of the new Kazak state will also be tested.

An additional point concerns the transliteration of Kazak and Turkic words, names, terms and toponyms. Western research materials without exception take into consideration the Russian language in transliterating all Kazak and Turkic words. This practice has led to many misunderstandings and to mispronunciation of the original terms, leaving aside the destruction of the historical heritage of the people contained in the original term. Thus it seems an apt decision to use the transliteration of the original indigenous languages according to the Turkish rather than the Russian or English version of Russian transliteration. Thus, '**Kenesary**' will appear as '**Kenesarı**,' '**Alash Orda**' will appear as '**Alaş Orda**,' '**Bukeihanov**' will appear as '**Bökeyhanov**,' '**Kipchak**'

will appear as ‘Qıpçaq,’ ‘Bahit Kirey Kulmanov’ as ‘Baqıt Kerey Qulmanov’ and ‘Tynyshpayev’ as ‘Tınışpayev.’ This system will also be extended to the transliteration of toponyms reflecting another remnant of foreign rule in the history of Kazakhstan. Starting from Tsarist times till the end of the Soviet era, a ceaseless activity of replacing indigenous toponymic terms with Slavic ones has brought present day Kazakhstan face to face with the danger of toponymic illiteracy and the destruction of the historical heritage of the Kazak people. Thus Semirechie will appear as Jetisuv, Semipalatinsk as Semey or Jetitam, Petropavlovsk as Qızıljar, Perovsk as Akmeşit or Qızılorda (for the present-day). Nevertheless, there will be one exception, Kazakhstan will be used instead of Qazaqstan because of its wide publication and as a result of the official acceptance of this form by the present independent state organs.

CHAPTER ONE : KAZAKSTAN BEFORE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION

The sixteenth century marks the emergence of the Kazaks as an independent entity whose population, by their own free will, separated themselves from the rest of the inhabitants of Central Asia. In brief, they had their own state, established according to the unique characteristics of the people named Kazaks until the eighteenth century. The third decade of the eighteenth century marks the gradual beginning of colonialist Russian penetration into their life. Together with tens of millions of other Turko-Muslim people, Kazaks were forced to accept another form of Russian overlordship under the name of the socialist system at the beginning of this century in the early 1920s. Kazakhstan declared its independence as the last of the new Soviet Central Asian republics on 16th December 1991, after the demise of the Soviet Empire.

The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with background information to support an understanding of the ages long struggle of the Kazaks to exist as an independent realm. Thus a brief history of this people, the formation of their Khanate separate from their ethnic and religious brothers in Central Asia, the political and military structure of early Kazak society, and the successes and failures of their political/military elite before the Russian occupation will be discussed in this chapter. The traditional state structure of the Kazaks was formed mainly with regard to the needs of their nomadic society. The main occupations of traditional Kazak society were closely related to the well-being of their livestock. Thus tribal ownership of pastureland or grazing land was very important for

Kazak survival. At the end of this chapter, the last part will thus be devoted to analyzing the failure of their nomadic society to maintain unity and to form a militarily strong state to defend their land from outside forces. The political and military events surrounding the Kazak lands and the clash of internal power centers within Kazak society prepared the ground for Russian occupation. The Kazak lands fell to Russia's lot as a result of conditions stemming from the Jongar invasion, despite the courageous resistance of Kazak society against the enemy in the east for two-centuries. A consequential development was the maintenance of the Bolshevik power in the region at the beginning of this century. This led Kazakhstan to be one of the fifteen republics of the Soviet Empire for seven decades in the twentieth century.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE KAZAKS

There are two key terms in explaining the origin of the Kazaks. The first one is the term "Kazak," which has been explained by some as a social label describing a man who has left his group, tribe or state and been obliged to seek trouble.⁶ Other sources reveal the word "Kazak" as a term coming from various origins. A first speculation was that the term was derived from *qaz* (to wander) and a second speculation was that it was derived from a Mongol word *Khasaq* (a Mongol cart used by the Kazaks to transport their yurts). A third explanation was given as *aq qaz* (white goose), deriving from a Kazak legendary tale of a white

goose turning into a princess and giving birth to the first Kazak.⁷ At the same time, there is a term in Turkey, “kazak erkek,” to describe a despotic spouse.

“*Alaş*” is the second term mentioned in describing the origins of the Kazaks, representing the legendary forefather of the Kazaks. However, present-day Kazak intellectuals point to a Kazak term “*Altı Alaş*”⁸ depicting the six tribes among them; the Great, Middle and Lesser Hordes as well as Qaraqalpaq (who joined the Kazaks after the decline of the Noghay Horde), Kırgız (who joined the Kazaks during the time of Qasım Han), and Qurama⁹; each being a son of *Alaş*.¹⁰ At the same time, the war cry of all the Kazaks is also the same word *Alaş*.¹¹

The ethnic origin of the Kazaks comprised a mixture of all those different tribes and groups of tribes that composed various states existing at different

⁶ *Qazaqstan Tariyhı*, Almatı: Davir, 1994, p.148.

⁷ Martha Brill Olcott, in *The Kazakhs*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987, in page 4, quoted Şoqan Valihanov, *Sobraniye Soçineniy*, 5 vols.(Alma Ata, 1961-1968), Vol. 1., p. 207., and N. I. Grodekov, *Kirgizy I Karakirgizy Syr'-darinskoy oblasti*, Vol.1., p. 1. Late Prof. Nıgmet Mingjanulı, a Kazak from the so-called Sinkiang(East Turkestan) Uygur Autonomous Region, wrote that the term Qazaq as an ethnonym appeared very early in history. Please see, Nıgmet Mingjanulı, *Qazaq Halqınıń Qısqaşa Tariyhı*, Urumçı, 1987. Please also see, Qoyşıqara Salgaraulı, *Qazaqtıń Qıylı Tariyhı*, Almatı; Jalın, 1992.

⁸ Zeki Velidi Togan, in his *Türkistan* mentions Altı Alas as the Kazak and Kırgız people when he was depicting a fight between Başqurts and Kazaks in 1750. Please see, Zeki Velidi Togan, *Bugünkü Türkili Türkistan ve Yakın Tarihi*, İstanbul, 1981, p. 247.

⁹ Qurama is the term to describe group of people whose origin comes from different indistinguishable tribes. A contemporary Kazak historian Muhtar Magavin described Qurama as a group of people settled in Maveraünnehr and engaged in agriculture and felt themselves closer to the Kazaks. See, Muhtar Magavin, “Esim Han jane Onıń Zamanı,” *Qazaq Tariyhınıń Alıppesi*, Almatı: Qazaqstan, 1995, p. 42.

¹⁰ Qoyşıqara Salgaraulı, “Bizding Jılnamamız-Şejire: Ulı Jüz, Orta Jüz, Kişi Jüz,” *Qazaqtıń Qıylı Tariyhı*, Almatı: Jalın, 1992, pp. 137-267.

¹¹ The word *Alaş* was also mentioned as a war-cry in the poems of Mirjaqıp Duvlat in *Oyan Qazaq*, Ufa, 1909, as :

periods in the history of Central Asia since time immemorial. These were the Scythians (Saqtar), Üysin, Qanglı, Hun, Turgeş, Qarlıq (Karluk), Oguz as well as Qıpçaq (Kipchak), Qıymaq, Nayman, Argın, Kerayit, Qongırat, Jalayır, and Duvlat.¹² Many of these states and tribes have led tribal groupings or confederations at different times. They all made their contribution in shaping the ethnic and linguistic characteristics of the Kazaks. Turkic-speaking tribes emerged with their own unique social and political organizations and their own material civilization and art. Turkic rule during the time of the Avars, the Western Turkish Khanate, the Karahanid dynasty and the Karahıtay era have also made significant contributions to the origins of the Kazak nation. Earlier Mongol elements in the origin of large Kazak tribes such as Nayman and Kerayit, as well as Duvlat, Qanglı, Üysin, and Barlas, also prove the close contact between the Mongol and Turkic peoples and their civilizations in sharing Central Asian territory. The emergence of the Great Silk Road and the establishment of medieval towns in Central Asia also played an important role in the history of the people living on present-day Kazak territory. However, the **Qıpçaq (Kipchak)** influence was the greatest among the people of Central Asia, particularly during the tenth and eleventh centuries.¹³ During the later periods, Qıpçaq tribes lived mainly among the Kazaks. However, some parts of them also entered the ranks of the Uzbek,

Alaş dep uran estilse, kim burılmas qanına,
Fahimle dep aytamın, ferasattıń barine!

¹² *Qazaqstan Tariyhı*, Almatı: Davir, 1994., p.136.

¹³ “Qazaq”, *Qazaq-Sovet Ensiklopediyası*., Vol. 6., Almatı, 1975., p. 219-220.

Qaraqalpaq, Başqurt and Kırgız of today. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, unified nomadic peoples in Central Asia gradually attempted to settle down and to establish economic relations with sedentary people who improved their farming techniques.

The ethnic mixture of the Timurid, the Golden Horde (Altın Orda) and the White Horde(Aq Orda), as well as of the Şaybanid dynasty was complex and many different tribes accepted their rule. All those tribes were called by the same ethnic-political term the Uzbeks from the end of the fourteenth to the middle of the fifteenth century. During the first half of the fifteenth century, the political-ethnic mixture of the Uzbek Khanate was completed and the distinct characteristics of Mongol and Turkic tribes were homogenized. Many of these were Turkified tribes of Mongol stock and they inhabited the **Deşt-i Qıpçaq** (the Kipchak desert) and the southern Kazakstan region from medieval times onwards. Later, when the Kazak Khanate was established in the sixteenth century, many of these tribes entered the ranks of the Middle Horde of the Kazak people. According to *Tarih-i Raşidi*,¹⁴ tribes led by the Janibek and Kerey Sultans were first called Uzbek-Kazak and later Kazak. However, the term Kazak or Uzbek did not have any ethnic meaning in the fifteenth century. Only later, with the gradual formation of the Kazaks as a group, did the term acquire an ethnic meaning. The term began to be used as the established label to describe the Turkic peoples

¹⁴ Mirza Haydar Dughlat, *Tarikh-ı Rashidi: A History of the Hans of Moghulistan*, Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures: 38, English Translation and Annotation by W. M. Thackston, Şinasi Tekin and Gönül Alpay Tekin, eds., Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1996.

inhabiting the Deşt-i Qıpçaq steppes and Jetisuv as well as the southern regions of present-day Kazakhstan.

One should also accept the fact that there was not a distinct Kazak ethnicity at this stage. The term Kazak seem rather a name for nomads in Central Asia before the establishment of the Kazak Khanate later in the sixteenth century. The political character of the Kazak people gave the group (who were from the mixture of many tribes mentioned above) a unique character which the present-day scholars tend to call it as an ethnic group.

The territory of today's Kazakhstan was home to many ancient tribes. However, the land of the Kazaks, inhabited by the above tribes, changed according to the alliances and unification of groups and states. By the mid-thirteenth century, the whole territory of today's Kazakhstan came under the rule of the **Golden Horde**.¹⁵ Around the 1350s, the **Aq Orda** (White Horde)¹⁶ emerged and achieved its independence from the Golden Horde in the 1360s.¹⁷ "The Aq Orda state emerged on the eastern **Deşt-i Qıpçaq** (the Qıpçaq desert)¹⁸ during the mid-thirteenth century and survived until the first quarter of the fifteenth

¹⁵ "Altın Orda," *Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyası*, vol., p. 301-302, and particularly the map provided in the encyclopedia (p. 303) cover the whole area of today's Kazakhstan.

¹⁶ "Aq Orda," *Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyası*. Vol.I. p. 214.

¹⁷ According to *Qazaqstan Tariyhi*, p.104., "Between 1357 and 1380, some 25 hans ruled the Golden Horde."

¹⁸ According to the *RedHouse Turkish-English Dictionary*, **Deşt-i Qıpçaq**, is given as the Sarmatian Steppe, the country of the Golden Horde.

century.”¹⁹ The White Horde occupied the east of the territory of the **Çoçi’s** (Çingis’s son) **Ulus** (nation), the Golden Horde, the end of which came after the defeat of the Golden Horde’s Han, Toqtamış, by Emir Timur in the 1370s and 1380s. As a result of the weakening central control of the Golden Horde Khanate, the Aq Orda began to emerge. The center of the Aq Orda was located on the banks of the Ertis river around Alaköl. Later in the fourteenth century, the rulers of the Aq Orda established their control over the whole territory of present day Kazakhstan. Thus the political center of the Aq Orda moved to the South, to the city of Sıgnaq. With the coming of Timur and in the course of his fight with the Toktamış of the Golden Horde, the territories of today’s Kazakhstan, the Caucasus and the southern regions of the medieval Russian state suffered from this turmoil. Thus the rule of the Aq Orda began to weaken as a result of the Timurid power struggles in this territory.²⁰ As a result of the decline of the Aq Orda and of the internal struggles among the descendants of the Çoçi Han, the Şaybanid dynasty emerged as the strongest among the successors fighting on the Kazak steppe. It was known as the nomadic Uzbek Khanate or simply as the Uzbek Khanate. During the reign of Ebulhayır of the Şaybanids, for about forty years, the Kazak steppe was under his strong control, stretching from the Jayıq river in the west to Lake Balqaş in the east, and from the Sır Darya region in the south to the lower and middle-Tobıl and the river Ertis in the north.

¹⁹ *Qazaqstan Tariyhı*, p.109.

²⁰ *Qazaqstan Tariyhı*, p. 109-111.

As has been stated above, the Kazak territory has been defined by various late medieval scholars according to the land occupied by various Kazak hans in the course of the period between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. For example, during the time of the rule of Janibek and Kerey, the Kazak territory was described as the region in the south-western portion of the Jetisuv region, namely the area around Çu and Talas rivers. However, later, historians indicated an area further west, by stating that the area inhabited by the Kazaks was between the Edil (İdil) and Sır (Darya) rivers. Russian sources indicate Kazak territory as the lower Sır Darya region namely the Sarısuv, Ulutav and Sariarqa areas.

During the time of **Ulug Bek** (1394-1449), Baraq Han²¹ fought against Ebulhayır who was supported by Ulug Bek. From Ebulhayır came the emergence of the Şaybanid dynasty with which the descendants of Baraq Han fought to control the territory of the then declining Aq Orda. In other words, Baraq's son Janibek Han, and Janibek's once-removed cousin Kerey Han, were fighting against Şaybanid rule and formed the Kazak union in the mid-1460s. By the end of the 1450s and the beginning of the 1460s, a considerable portion of the tribes under the rule of Ebulhayır of the Şaybanids had moved close to the western border of Mongolia to the Jetisuv area from eastern Deşt-i Qıpçaq under the leadership of Janibek and the Kerey sultans. Ebulhayır died on his way to fighting

²¹ Baraq is the great grandson of Urus Han who is great grandson of Çoçı by Çoçı's son Orda. Georgiy Vladimiroviç Vernadskiy, *Istoriya Rossiya: Mongoly I Rusy*, Moskva: Agraf, 1997., p. 469 and 470. Chingiz - Çoçı - Orda - Urus Han -Qayırçaq - Baraq Han -Kerey and Janibek.

with those tribes that had left his rule in 1468. This date also mark the beginning for the Kazaks as a political group in the Central Asian region.

The Kazak union quickly attracted groups of Noghay, Uzbek and Mongol tribes who were eager to use the immense territory of the **Betpaq Dala**,²² the Deşt-i Qıpçaq the land of the old Aq Orda, as their flocks of animals needed pasturelands. Starting from the 1460s onwards, for about a century, the Kazak union on the steppe grew both in numbers as well as in territory acquired for tribal needs. During this time, the nomadic forces united under Kazak leadership grew increasingly military to defend their still-growing territory of new pasturelands. In the meantime, the first Kazak Han, Janibek died in 1480 and Buyunduq, Kerey's son, led the Kazak tribes and fought against Muhammed Şaybani, the founder of the Uzbek Khanate.

The formation of the Kazak Khanate is closely associated with the names of Janibek and Kerey of the fifteenth century. The well-known chronicler-historian Dughlati wrote the following about the root of the formation of the Kazak Khanate,²³

Abu'l-Khayr (Ebulhayır) Han dominated the entire Qipchaq Steppe. Any prince of Jochid lineage he suspected of having seditious thoughts he wanted to reduce to nothing. A group of Giray(Kerey) Han's and Jani-Beg(Janibek) Han's princes, as well as a few of Abu'l-Khayr Han's own men, took flight and went to Moghulistan. At that time the Khanate of Moghulistan was held by Esan-Buqa Han, who welcomed them and assigned them a corner of Moghulistan. They found it to be a secure spot and passed their days free of worry.

²² Betpaq means damned, please see, *Qazaq Tilining Tüsindirme Sözdigi*, Volume I, Edited by İsmet Kengesbayev, Almatı: Qazaq SSR Gılım Akademiyasının Baspası, 1959.

²³ Dughlati, *ibid*, p.177.

After the death of Abu'l-Khayr Han, contention broke out in the Uzbek nation, and everyone who could sought refuge for safety and security with Giray Han and Jani-Beg Han, and this gave them great power. Since they had first separated from the larger people and were wandering aimlessly without equipment, they were called *qazaqs*(Kazakhs). And the name stuck.

Their moves towards establishing a rule independent from the Şaybanids was supported by the aristocratic leaders of various Kazak tribes. Kazaks in the Qaratav and Sırdarya as well as in part of the region of Turkestan began to support this separation started by Janibek and Kerey in the 1540s and 1550s.²⁴ Thus, the Qaratav region and towns like Sozaq, Sıgnaq, and Savran in the Sırdarya region were controlled by the twin hans, Janibek and Kerey. Controlling the towns of the Sırdarya region played a key role in maintaining the separation of Kazak tribes from the rest of the Central Asian people. The Kazak separation from Şaybanid rule was a long process that continued for decades, even after the death of Ebulhayır of the Şaybanids in 1468. According to the *Tarih-i Raşidi*²⁵ the number of Kazaks that had accepted the rule of Janibek and Kerey reached 200,000 in 1468. The famous Central Asian historian Muhammed Haydar Dughlati gives the date of the formation of the Kazak Khanate as **Hicri-Hijra** 870, that is 1465 or 1466 on the current calendar.

During the time of Qasım Han, in the 1520s, the population of the Kazak Khanate reached one million.²⁶ When the descendants of Muhammed Şaybani

²⁴ *Qazaqstan Tariyhı*, p.153.

²⁵ Mirza Haydar Dughlati, *ibid*, p. 177, and also *Qazaqstan Tariyhı*, p. 154.

Han entered a power struggle with Muhammed Babur Şah in the South, Qasım Han established his control in the middle and upper Sırdarya region. At the same time, in the North of the then Kazak territory, tribes and clans that had left the Noghay Horde also joined the Kazak Khanate.

With the coming of Qasım Han to power in the early sixteenth century, the clear division between Kazak and Uzbek started. With this, the military potential of the united Kazaks improved and their division into three hordes emerged the **Ulu** (Great), the **Orta** (Middle) and the **Kişi** (Lesser) **Jüz**. Present day Kazak historians explain the emergence of the hordes as a system created to protect and administer the enlarging pasturelands and the population on it during the time of Qasım Han.²⁷ Qasım Han was also famous for his introduction of a new set of laws named the **Qasım Hanning Qasqa Jolı** (the Straight Custom of Qasım Han), which consisted of matters related to property, crime, military, diplomatic representation and community life.²⁸

Despite being the subjects of different rulers, the peoples of the lands of Kazak Khanate, in the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries had a unity in

²⁶ According to Dughlati; “Qasım Han brought the entire Qipchaq Steppe under his control in a way no one had since Jöchi Han. His army numbered upward of a million.” Dughlati, *ibid*, p. 177.

²⁷ Qoyşıqara Salgaraulı, *Qazaqtıng Qıylı Tariyhu*, p. 137.

²⁸ Qasım Han’s Custom law was related to the following principles:

- a) Property Law(land, livestock, and other properties),
- b) Crime and Punishment Law(stealing, murder, robbery, and assaulting),
- c) Military law (citizenship responsibility, formation of military units, etc.),
- d) Diplomatic representation law(unweariness, eloquence, courtesy.),
- e) Community law(customs on generosity, funeral banquet, wedding and other ceremonial festivities as well as responsibilities of every kind of guardsmen and postal patrol.)

language. This can be seen from the oral literature of the people, namely from the epics, myths and lyrical heritage of those times. Each Kazak horde had their routes, pasturelands and regions according to the above mentioned different rules on present day Kazak territory. The **Great Horde** inhabited the Sırdarya and Jetisuv region. The Üysin, Qanlı, Duvlat, Alban, Suan, Sirgeli, Istı, Oşaqtı, Şapıraştı and Jalayır tribes comprised this Horde. The **Middle Horde** inhabited the central and south-eastern region of Kazakstan with its Qıpçaq, Argın, Nayman, Qongırat, Kerey (Kerayit) and Qarlık tribes. The lower Sırdarya region, the banks of the Aral sea, and the area north of the Caspian Sea were inhabited by the **Lesser Horde**, which consisted of Alşın, Aday, Alaşa, Baybaqtı, Jappas, Tazdar, Qarasaqal and Qarakesek (Alımılı) tribes.²⁹

During the 1530s, the political activities of the Kazak rulers were concentrated in the east of their territory. There they fought against the Mongols and Oyrat in alliance with the Kırğız of the East. During the time of Haqnazar Han (1538-1580), the Kazaks entered a struggle with the Noghays, Başqurts, and Tatars to the North. According to Zeki Velidi Togan, Haqnazar Han was trying to extend the influence of the Kazaks towards the West.³⁰ Haqnazar Han established his control even on the left bank of the Jayıq river. However, an enlargement of Kazak territory further to the East was not possible. Following Haqnazar's death,

- "Qasım Hanning Qasqa Joli," *Abay Ensiklopediya*, Almatı; "Qazaq Entsiklopediyasının Bas Redaktsiyası, Atamura Baspası, 1995, p. 358.

²⁹ *Qazaqstan Tariyhi*, p.146.

³⁰ Zeki Velidi Togan, *Bugünkü Türkili Türkistan ve Yakın Tarihi*, İstanbul, 1981, p.151.

Şıgay Han came to power. Yet his son Esim Han (1598-1628) was more successful in establishing his control in the Sırdarya region and over the town of Taşkent. During the following two centuries, this area and Taşkent were under Kazak control. The town of Turkestan became the capital of the Kazak Khanate during the reign of Esim Han. Nevertheless, the seventeenth century did not bring firm unity to the Kazaks, but rather the gradual separation of Kazak Hordes began under the ambitious aristocratic leadership of each tribe. With the death of Esim Han, his son Jengir (Cihangir) took power in 1628. It is in this century that Jungar soldiers led by Galdan invaded Jetisuv, the southern region of Kazakhstan and the towns of Sayram, Mankent, Qaraaspan, Şımkent, and Taşkent.

During the time of Tavke Han (1680-1718), Kazak agreement with the Kırğız and Qaraqalpaqs hindered the Jungar invasion of Kazak territory for some time. The most important achievement of the time of Tavke Han was his work in collecting the **Jeti Jargı**, the Seven Pillars, which were the collection of laws and principles essential in administering the Kazak land.³¹ The **Jeti Jargı** consisted of both the **Adat** (customary judicial principles aimed at regulating the social relations of Kazak society) and rules of administration on the steppe, and included judiciary rules, taxes and religious principles.³² The Seven Pillars consisted of principles concerning the sharing of pastureland, the problems of levirate and sororate (jesir davı), laws on murder or other kinds of unlawful acts

³¹ "Jeti Jargı," *Abay Entsiklopediyası*, p. 251.

³² Saken Sozaqbayev, *Tavke Han-Jeti Jargı*, Almatı: Sanat, 1994, p. 24.

and its punishment. The present-day scholars claim that it also contained rules regarding the education of children and marriage laws, disagreements among different tribes, and the defense of the people or the nation.³³ At the same time, during the time of Han Tavke, an advisory council (**biyler kengesi**) was formed³⁴ and the Kazak Han was not able to put into practice his decisions without the approval of this body.

Kazak emergence and the continuous enlargement of its territory began to press on neighboring lands. Starting from the time of Qasım Han 1520s until the mid-eighteenth century. The Kazak Khanate fought with its neighbor, the Jongar/Moghul in the East. This two centuries of struggle between the two nomadic societies in the heart of Asia ended with a disaster for the Kazaks.³⁵ The early decades of the eighteenth century were years of blood and turmoil in the Kazak territory due to the continuing Jongar attacks on their land in 1681-1684, 1694, 1710-11, 1713, 1718, and finally in 1723-25, which were named the disastrous years of **Aqtaban-Şubırındı**.³⁶ This Kazak/Jongar fight between 1723

³³ (In the indigenous language, the word to describe the defense of the fatherland or the nation is “el qorgav, or jurt qorgav”. In contemporary Kazak language dictionaries, the meaning of the term el was given both as the people and the land, i.e., the state.) Please see, *Qazaq Tilining Tüsindirme Sözdigi*, Almatı, Gılım, 1959., p.184. “Elim dep engiregen azamat- is the term used to describe those nationalist Alaş intellectuals or the “batır” heroes such as Abılay, Bögenbay, Janibek or Kenesarı. The famous 18th century popular song “Elim-ay” (Oh my nation! Oh my people! Oh my land!) is one of the unique example of the feelingd of those sons who loved their country, land and the people.

³⁴ Sozaqbayev, p.10-11.

³⁵ Muhtar Magavin, “Eki Jüz Jıldıq Soğıs,” *Qazaq Tariyhıning Alıppesi*, Almatı: Qazaqstan, 1995, pp. 52-60.

³⁶ ibid. , and please also see, Z. V. Togan, *Turkıstan*, p.167-171.

and 1725, ended with the Kazak loss of Turkıstan, Savran and Tařkent. The whole territory in the South was added to the territory of the Jongar. Despite the Kazak victories at Bulantı (1728) and Angıraqay (1730), the division of Kazak society into the hordes began to crystallize.³⁷ Tavke Han's departure from life accelerated the separation of each Kazak Horde from the central authority of the han.

A more important subsequent damage in the Kazak history after the Jungar invasion of the Kazak land was the so-called Kazak acceptance of Russian overlordship.³⁸ Despite the Tsarist and later Soviet claim, it was not an action taken with the consent of all the Kazak people, but rather an individual agreement made by the Han of some tribes belonging to the Lesser Hordes, Ebulhayır, and řaqřaq Janibek Batır leading some tribes in Orta Jüz. Except the two leaders, the rest of the leaders and their tribes did not join this agreement. On February 19th. 1731, the Russian Tsarina, Anna Ioannovna, signed the imperial decree accepting the Kazaks as subjects of the Russian Empire on the petition sent by the Han of the Lesser Horde, Ebulhayır. A. Tevkelev, the Volga Tatar interpreter of the Imperial Foreign Affairs commission, led the Russian mission to Ebulhayır. Upon the assurance of Ebulhayır of the Lesser Horde, the Petersburg administration took it for granted that all the Kazak sultans and leaders accepted the protection of

³⁷ Muhtar Magavin, *ibid.*, p. 94-101 and 203.

³⁸ Zeki Velidi Togan stated that when the Kalmuks (a group among the Mongols) moved towards west, they had not only brought hardship to the people inhabiting the east and west banks of the Edil river but destroyed the (then) present day provinces of Bökey Horde, Samara, Orenburg and Ural. Those areas became uninhabitable and thus were captured by the Russians. Please see, Togan, *Turkistan*, p.158 and 166.

the Russians. However, the personal ambition of Ebulhayır in his power struggle against the other Kazak sultans (who are members of the ruling Kazak aristocratic family and who do not hold the title of Han) and hans, as well as his personal aims of improving his influence among the Kazaks, should be taken into account in this attempt. Nevertheless, Ebulhayır's acceptance of Russian protection did not result in the permanent halt of Jongar attacks from the East. Han Abılay fought against the Kalmuk/Jongar threat even after the 1730s. At the same time, the acceptance of Russian overlordship by all the Kazak regions was not complete until the 1820s and 1840s. It was realized only after a number of Russian imperial military measures had been taken. The third decade of eighteenth century was only the beginning of the process of Russian occupation which lasted 135 years, from 1734 to 1869. This is an accepted fact, even by Russian historians themselves.³⁹ A Kazak historian Sanjar Asfendiyarov stated, in his *History of Kazakhstan* published in 1935, the following: "The proclamation of the Kazak acceptance of Russian protection with their own free will is only a tale!"⁴⁰

Despite the above facts, another phase in the Kazak history started in the eighteenth century that led to Kazak subordination to the Tsarist colonial administration and later to the Soviet overlordship which lasted until 1991. From the 1730s until the end of Tsarist Russia in 1917. The Kazak lands and its people,

³⁹ Baymirza Hayit, *Türkistan: Rusya ile Çin Arasında*, İstanbul: Otag, 1975, p. 62., cited A. I. Makşeyev, *Istoričeskiy Obzor' Türkistana I Nastupatel'nago dvijeniya v evo russkih*, 1890, p.139.

gradually at the beginning and completely in the end, were subjected to the control of the Petersburg rulers. The Kazaks entered the eighteenth century as free nomads with their own rulers and witnessed the decline of colonial Tsarist Russia in 1917, together with their fellow-brothers in the Oasis area, in the Urals, in the Caucasus and in the Crimea, as one of the subject peoples. As a result of many complex and binding conditions introduced by the Tsarist administration in the colonized steppe region, Kazak attempts to form a native Kazak rule, the **Alaş Orda**, were unsuccessful even after the termination of imperial mastery in 1917. From the establishment of the Bolshevik control on the Kazak steppe after the 1920s until the end of the Soviet Empire in 1991, every single phase of Kazak existence was absolutely dependent upon the supervision of the center, Moscow.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE, POLITICAL AND MILITARY ELITE IN THE KAZAK KHANATE

Kazak intellectuals of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries stated that the traditional Kazak political administrative system was based on a structure of social democracy among the Kazak tribes.⁴¹ The Soviet-era scholars claimed

⁴⁰ Sancar Asfendiyarov, *İstoriya Kazakstana*, Alma Ata, 1935, p. 116 cited by Hayıt, in *ibid*, p. 62.

⁴¹ The findings of Ahmet Baytursunov and Teljan Şonanov on this subject were cited by Ermuhan Bekmahanov, *Qazaqstan XIX Gasırdıng 20-40 Jıldarında*, Almatı: Sanat, 1994. p.13. This is the translation of Bekmahanov's famous book into Kazak during the independence era. The original of this book was published in 1947 entitled *Kazakstan v 20-40 godı XIX veka*. It has instigated

that traditional Kazak society was one of a feudal community, and that there was class inequality among the Kazak society.⁴² Thus, during the whole Soviet era, the group called the “local bourgeois nationalists” was criticized for refusing to adopt the Marxist-oriented Soviet claim labeling traditional Kazak society as feudal. Kazak historians of the independence era argue with this kind of assessment, basing their debate on the fact that the Soviet tradition of history of nationalities aimed to prove that the nationalities actually did not have any history.⁴³

Political administration of the Kazak State was concentrated in the hands of the aristocratic families descended from Chingiz Han. This Kazak aristocracy were distinct as *Aq Süyek* (the white bone) from the rest of the population that were considered as *Qara Süyek* (the black bone). The Kazak aristocracy played an important role in the social and political life of society for centuries. The Kazak han used to be elected from among the members of these aristocratic families as the leader of the administration. Native sources of Kazakhstan claim the system as a meritocracy, selecting the leader according to the candidate’s distinctive personal merits, talent and ability of governing a society, and the necessary influence over his subjects.⁴⁴

strong criticism of the author and his work, which later became one of the taboo books prohibited to mention until the last decade of the Soviet Empire.

⁴² “Qazaq Jastarining Uyımdarı,” *Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyası*, p. 240-241., and many articles published in Volume 6 of the same source.

⁴³ Muhtar Magavin, *Qazaq Tariyhining...*, p. 5-6.

⁴⁴ *Qazaqstan Tariyhi*, p. 208 and Muhtar Magavin, “Qazaq Ordasındagı Han Saylav Dastüri,” in *Qazaq Tariyhining...*, pp. 185-197.

Some other members of the aristocratic family used to be appointed to lead tribal groups, according to their ability, prestige and authority among the society. These were called *sultans*, members of aristocratic family who did not bear the title of han. However, the authority of the Kazak hans or sultans was not entirely independent of the societal control, due to their appointment by the approval of the leaders of the general population of Kazaks. Traditionally, months before the election of a han, a decree named *savın aytuv* was announced to bring together all aristocratic and non-aristocratic leaders of the Kazak society. This kind of gathering was distinct from the usual annual gathering of the Kazak leaders at the *Han Ordası*, the royal house, to discuss necessary administrative, political, military and judicial matters. During the appointment of the candidate as Han, both members of aristocracy and members of non-aristocratic leaders were given the chance to praise or criticize him. The final decision was given after these kind of discussions ended and the candidate seated on a white felt and raised over the heads of the sitting participants by four influential members of the society (This ceremony was called *Aq Kiyizge Salıp Han Köterüv*). Those who had supported the candidacy of the newly elected han used to raise him again, over their heads, to publicize their confirmation. This ceremony continued until the end of all those hordes and groups of tribes that supported the han. There are of course many other details of this ceremony but the most significant point was the moment discussed above.

Kazak tribes played an important role in the political administration of their society through their *biys*, traditional Kazak judges who gained distinction among society through their unique oratorical ability as well as for their exceptional ingenuity in solving conflicting matters. Appointment of *biys* in the Kazak society was not hereditary, but through the personal achievement of each *biy* in his society. For example, Töbet Biy, during the time of Abılay Han was the great grandson of Buqa Batır (the warrior Buqa) of Jangir Han. *Biys* in Kazak society played an important role in both legislative and judicial matters. For example, during the composition of the *Jeti Jargı*, the Seven Pillar of Tavke Han, six *biys* representing the six sons of Alaş were appointed to set the rules for judicial matters in Kazak society.⁴⁵ Disagreements concerning the share of pastureland, the problems of levirate and sororate, cases of murder and punishment were all subjects that the traditional Kazak *biy* sought to solve. In other words, according to Kazak understanding: the “*Biy* is the seeker and the sword of justice, who publicizes the hidden thoughts of the people.”⁴⁶

The most important military aid to Kazak hans was provided by the Kazak *batır*, warrior, who gained distinction among the society only through his individual courage and bravery at the battlefield. For example, the legendary Kazak *batır*, Er Janibek, of the Kerey Tribe of the Orta Jüz, the Middle Horde was

⁴⁵ Töle Biy from the Great Horde, Qaz Davıstı Qazıbek Biy from the Middle Horde, Ayteke Biy from the Lesser Horde, Qaraş Biy from the Kirghiz, Muhamet Biy from Qurama and Sasıq Biy from Qaraqalpaq were appointed by Han Tavke.

an orphan, who during a battle with the Jongar gave his horse to Abılay Han⁴⁷ and saved the han's life. Later he was rewarded with a seat on the right side of the Han. Another Kazak warrior, Qarakerey Qabanbay of the Nayman tribe of Orta Jüz, come to the public eye for his exceptional bravery at a battle with the Jongars in the eighteenth century. The influence of these military leaders was especially important during the time of wars with neighboring states. Batırs from those tribes settled on the border areas of the Kazak society were particularly important and influential in Kazak society, throughout its history.

Except during the time of Qasım Han, Haqnazar Han, Tavekel Han and Esim Han, Kazak society did not keep a standing army. Only during the time of the above Hans, did Kazaks keep a standing army around the towns and citadels in the Sır Darya region in the South. Kazaks had a term called *alaman mindeti*, meaning that each Kazak family was required to provide at least one warrior to defend their land. The rules of *alaman mindeti* were settled by Qasım Han in his famous set of rules known as the Straight Custom of Qasım Han(Qasım Hannın

⁴⁶ *Bıylar Sözi: Şeşendik, Tolgav, Arnav, Dav*, collected by Tursınbek Kakişev, Almatı: Qazaq Universiteti, 1992., p. 3.

⁴⁷ Some most important aide-de-camp to Abılay Han were the following names in the poems of Buhar Jırav:

Qaldan menen urusıp, (When {Abılay Han} was fighting with Haldan)
Jeti kündeý sürisip (It lasted seven days)
Sondağı joldas adamdar: (His aide-de-camps were {the following})
Qarakerey Qabanbay, (Qabanbay from Qarakerey {tribe})
Qanjıǵalı Bōgenbay, (Bōgenbay from Qanjıǵalı sub-tribe of Argın-Middle Horde)
Qaz davıstı Qazıbek, (Qazıbek of goose-voiced)
Şaqşaqulı Janıbek. (Janıbek from Şaqşaq tribe)
Sirgeli qara Tilevke (Black Tilevke from Sirgeli)
Qaraqalpaq Qulaşbek,(Qulaşbek from Qaraqalpaq)
Tigeden sıqqan Esterbek, (Esterbek from Tige)

Qasqa Jolı) as early as sixteenth century. The military structure of the Kazak army was organized according to the tribal and sub-tribal structure. Each one hundred soldiers were composed according to the *tüzem* (column) order, and the military commander of each tribe and sub-tribe was their tribal leader. The tribal structure was essential, both for defining the land of each tribe according to their summer and winter pastoral needs, and for defending these lands. The strength of some big tribes was such that without their support, even hans were not able to gather enough strength. The strength and might of Abılay Han was derived from one of the big tribes of the Orta Jüz, the Argın.⁴⁸

Another influential group among the Kazak society was the poets (*aqın*) and the royal poets (*jırav*).⁴⁹ Their strength came from the unique awareness of the Kazak nation to the strength of *söz*, the word, the eloquent speech and the message carried by the speech.⁵⁰ The Kazak poetic heritage was the unwritten history of these nomadic people. Kazak poets were the messengers of past events.

Şapıraştı Navrızbay (Navrızbay from Şapıraştı tribe).... Please see, *Bes Gasır Jırlaydı*, Compilers Muhtar Magavın and M. Baydildayev, Almatı: Jazuvşı, 1989, vol., p. 98.

⁴⁸ Other examples: Baraq Sultan was supported by the Nayman tribe and Ebulhayır Han of the Lesser Horde derived his strength from both the tribes of Lesser and the some tribes of the Middle Horde. Ebulhayır Han was the Commander in Chief during the Battle of Bulantı in 1728, the decisive battle to overcome the Jongar invasion of the Kazak land, in eighteenth century. Ebulhayır and his followers did not join the unified Kazak army during the following Battle of Angıraqay in 1730, because of his protest against a unified decision not to elect him as the Han of the Kazaks after the death of Bolat Han. From that time onwards, Ebulhayır of the Lesser Horde began to take separate actions from the rest of Kazak society.

⁴⁹ Eloquent speech and artful description is an art in Kazak society. In order to describe the importance of each group of leaders, a Kazak described his nation as a *tulpar* (a fast running war-horse), his han as the halter of this horse, his *biy* as the bit of bridle, his *batır* as the whip and the poems of *aqın-jırav* (poet-royal poet) as the arrow to be sent to faraway targets.

Kazaks learnt their history orally from their poets generations after generations, until it was recorded by the Kazak intellectuals late in the nineteenth century. The first of these poets was Asan Qaygı, who lived in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. He came from the territory of the former Golden Horde to the Kazak lands to assist Janibek and Kerey Hans, the founders of the Kazak state. He became the champion of the young Kazak state.⁵¹ History, philosophical wisdom, justice and most other knowledge were provided to the Kazaks by their poets. The *jırav*, the royal poet, was not only the court historian that kept an account of state affairs through his poems, but was also an advisor to the Han.⁵² The poem was not used only by professional poets but by the *biys* as well. The famous Qazıbek Biy used his poetic ability to convince the Jongar Han to negotiate with the Kazaks when he went to Jongaria as part of the Kazak diplomatic mission in the seventeenth century.⁵³ During the negotiation, he described the Kazaks in the following words:

We the Kazaks are a people whose main occupation is husbandry,
However, we do not show any offense to anybody (around us).
As an omen to preserve our good-fortune and our unity,
As a sign to prevent any offensive move towards our territory,

⁵⁰ *Biylar Sözi: Şeşendik, Tolgav, Arnav, Dav*, collected by Tursınbek Kakişev, Almatı: Qazaq Universiteti, 1992.

⁵¹ *Bes Gasır Jırlaydı*, Compilers Muhtar Magavin and M. Baydildayev, Almatı: Jazuvşı, 1989, vol., p. 22.

⁵² During the time of Abılay Han, the well-known royal poet Buhar Jırav is reported to have advised the Han not to fight with the Russians and to go instead to the South, cross the Sır Darya and settle in Jiyledi-Baysın. Please see, Togan, *Türkistan*, p. 308., and *Bes Gasır Jırlaydı*, Compilers Muhtar Magavin and M. Baydildayev, p. 92-93.

⁵³ *Biylar Sözi: Şeşendik, Tolgav, Arnav, Dav*, collected by Tursınbek Kakişev, Almatı: Qazaq Universiteti, 1992., p. 33-42.

We attach the feather of eagle-owl to our weapons.
We are people that none of our enemies dare to treat us as inferior beings,
We are people that nobody dares to ridicule us.
We are people who can protect a friend.
We are people who can earn their food and show grace.
A son is not born to become a slave,
A daughter is not born to become a concubine.
We are people who cannot let this happen to our children!

If you are the Kalmuk, then we are the Kazak, we came to sunder (you)
If you are iron, then we are coal, we came to melt (you)
We came to make peace as the children of Kazak-Qalmaq.
We came to this strange land to meet,
If you do not accept to meet us, we came to plunder (you).
If you are a tiger, I am a lion, we came to wrestle.
I am a newly trained **tulpar** (war-horse) that came to race (with you).
Tell us if you agree to negotiate, or set a place (and date) if you want a
fight.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Biz Qazaq degen mal baqqan elmiz
Bıraq eşkimge soqtıqpay jay jatqan elmiz.
Elimizden qut-bereke qaşpasın dep
Jerimizding şetin jav baspasın dep
Nayzağa üki taqqan elmiz.
Eş bir duşpan basınbağan elmiz
Basımızdan sözdi asırmağan elmiz.
Dosımızdı saqtay bilgen elmiz
Dam-tuzımızdı aqtay bilgen elmiz
Atadan ul tuvsı qul bolamın dep tuvmaydı,
Anadan qız tuvsı küng bolamın dep tuvmaydı,
Ul men qızdı qamatıp otıra-almaytın elmiz.
Sen Qalmaq bolsang, biz Qazaq, qarpısqaalı kelgenbiz.
Sen temir bolsang, biz kömir, eritkeli kelgenbiz.
Qazaq-Qalmaq balası tabısqaalı kelgenbiz
Tanımaytın jat elge tanısqalı kelgenbiz.
Tanısuvga könbeseng, şabısqaalı kelgenbiz.
Sen qabılan bolsang, men arıstan, alısqalı kelgenbiz.
Janga üyretken jas tulpar, jarısqaalı kelgenbiz.
Berseng jöndep bitimingdi ayt, ne turısatın jeringdi ayt! Please see, *Bıyler Sözi; Şeşendik Tolgav, Arnav, Dav*, compiled by Tursınbek Kakişev, Almatı: "Qazaq Universiteti," 1992, p. 38.

TERRITORIAL DEFENSE AND STATE CONTROL OF THE KAZAK KHANATE

Kazak control over their territories and the principles of military organization were established fully during the time of Qasım Han. His famous set of laws known as the Straight Custom of Qasım Han (Qasım Hanning Qasqa Joli) is the solid proof of such a reality. Qasım Han brought order to the principles of military defense of the Kazak lands together with the principles of diplomatic representation. The responsibility for defending the border areas was placed on the shoulders of those tribes occupying the frontier lines of the state. Thus the tribal acceptance of the Han's rule and the Han's influence over the tribes inhabiting borderlands were particularly important for the Kazak Khanate.

As for the *alaman mindeti*, all the responsibilities of equipping, training and preparing such soldiers for war rested on each tribe and sub-tribe. Thus the influence of tribal leaders, *biy*, *batır*, or tribal *aqsaqal* (elderly, white-bearded wise person) was significant. The *sultans*, other members of the Kazak aristocracy, who led important tribes with the approval of the Han, were also responsible for the relations of the tribe with the Han Ordası and with other tribes. Each appointed sultan was responsible for protecting his group of people. The support was mutual. When a sultan got into conflict with the leader of another tribe, it was his tribe that would be the staunch supporter of their sultan. For example, when Sultan Baraq of Nayman tribe killed Ebulhayır Han of the Lesser

Horde during a duel in the eighteenth century, representatives of the supporting tribes of both sides gathered at Abilay Han's *Han Ordası* for the traditional trial.⁵⁵

RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORING STATES DURING THE KAZAK KHANATE

Starting from the formation of their Khanate, the Kazaks fought many times with the neighboring peoples, of the Noghay Horde in the West, the Sibir Khanate in the North, the Jongar-Oyrat groups in the North-east and Mongolia in the East and also against the Kazaks' ethnic and religious brothers in the South. During the time of Haqnazar Han (1538-1580), the Kazak Khanate established a military alliance with Abdullah Han of the Bukharan state to gain influence in the Sır Darya region. He wanted to establish a strong alliance in the South to gain strength for his fight in the North against the increasing attacks of Küçüm Han of Siberia.⁵⁶ After the establishment of this alliance, the Kazak Khanate gained control of the towns and cities in the region, including the towns of Savran and Türkistan. By the end of the sixteenth century, the Kazak Khanate controlled Taşkent and Samarkand as well. However, the enlargement of Kazak territories at the expense of the Bukharan state resulted in a Bukharan counter-attack and with the Kazak refusal to continue the alliance in 1583.

⁵⁵ Şoqan Valihanov, *İzbranniye Proizvedeniya*, Edited by Alkey Margulan, Academic of the KazakSSR Academy of Sciences, Alma Ata: Kazakskoye Gosudarstvennoye İzdatel'stvo, 1958, p. 209.

Kazak-Russian relations started with the establishment of diplomatic ties during the reign of Qasım Han (1511-1532).⁵⁷ Tavekel Han (1582-1598) also attempted to establish diplomatic relations with Russia and sent two diplomatic representatives in 1594 and 1595. Negotiations between the Russian state and the Kazak Khanate were carried out over the Kazak request for Russian help in their fight with neighboring lands of Abdullah Han of Bukhara to the South and of Kūçüm Han of Siberia to the North of the Kazak territory.⁵⁸ Tavke Han's main target was to find ways to obtain arms from the Russians. Although some historians claim that Tavekel Han, "wished to recognize the authority of the Russian tsar,"⁵⁹ Kazak hans wanted to gain strength by obtaining the alliance of a strong power to fight against their enemies. Native Kazak historians claim that Tavekel Han's diplomatic representative Oraz Muhammed sought to obtain rifles and cannon. Tavekel Han wanted to involve Russia against the Han of Bukhara, who had started to extend his influence over the region of Astrakhan, by drawing the attention of the Russians toward Abdullah's attempts. Tavekel Han sought to surround the Bukharan state by also sending diplomatic representatives to Shah

⁵⁶ *Qazaqstan Tariyhi*, p. 159; Muhtar Magavin, *Qazaq Tariyhinin Alippesi*, p. 29; Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, p. 24 and Togan, *Turkistan*, p. 151.

⁵⁷ "Qazaq Handıqtarının Sırtqı Sayasatı men Diplomatiyası," *Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyası*, Vol. 6., p. 387.

⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 387.

⁵⁹ Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, p. 29.

Abbas of Persia explaining the Kazak intention of forming an alliance against Bukhara.⁶⁰

As the need to defend the Kazak lands with more advanced weapons arise, the Kazaks found themselves desperate to obtain such weapons. This pressing need forced the Kazak hans to establish ties with states that had them. In general, the Kazak search was for an ally to counter-attack against neighboring countries and in particular, the Kazak attempt to establish ties with Russia, as the nearest strongest state, always coincided with increasing tensions with the neighboring regions. Tavke Han sent five diplomatic missions to Russia during his fight with the Mongols in the East. This was true even for the much-publicized champion of the Russian alliance, Ebulhayır of Kişi Jüz, who reportedly requested help from the Ottoman Empire through his representatives in Moscow during the 1730s. Ebulhayır's representatives asked the then Ottoman Ambassador in St. Petersburg to free the Kazaks from Russian overlordship and to accept the Kazaks as Ottoman subjects.⁶¹ This fact also makes clear the point that the Kazaks were not particularly enthusiastic to establish ties only with Tsarist Russia. They were ready to cooperate with any power to defeat their neighbors.

Another source reveals that Ebülhayır sought Russian support in order to win the struggle between the Kazaks and the Başqurts to the North. Seyitqul Qundagulov and Qutlımbet Köştayev, the diplomatic representatives of Ebülhayır,

⁶⁰ Magavin, *ibid.*, p. 36.

requested imperial help in defending the Kazak territories from outside invasion.⁶²

According to the native sources published in Soviet time, “the Kazak mass thought that the Kişi Jüz acceptance of Russian overlordship was an opportunity to live a more secure and peaceful life and that it would help to regain invaded territories from enemies.”⁶³

Apart from maintaining the territorial security of the Kazak realm, the Kazak Khanate was obliged to maintain economic ties with their neighboring states, particularly after the establishment of control over the towns in Sır Darya region. Kazak territory was home to caravan routes carrying goods back and forth from Russia in the north to the Oasis region in the south and to China in the east of the Kazak land. Traders usually engaged in barter trade with the nomadic Kazaks, though pastoral nomadic life satisfied most of the daily needs of Kazaks.

Relations of the Kazak Khanate with other states of the world was limited to her immediate neighboring states such as Bukhara, Hiva or the Khokand Khanates in the South, the Noghay Horde and the Başqurt people in the North and the North-west, and the Jongars in the East. Their relations went further with the exchange of diplomatic representatives with bigger powers such as Russia, China

⁶¹ Zeki Velidi Togan cited the document about this very matter to be in the archive of Torgay Provision, (*Pamyatnaya Kniga Torgayskoy Oblasti* za 1899, p. 359.) in his *Turkistan*, p. 175.

⁶² “Köştayev Qutlımbet,” *Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyası*, Vol. 6, p. 56, and for Qundagulov, Please see, “Kişi Jüzding Rossiyaga Qosıluı,” *ibid.*, p. 193. Qoybagar Köbekov was another diplomatic representative sent to S. Petersburg by Ebülhayır Han. Please see, “Qazaqstannın Rossiyaga Qosıluı” in “KazakSSR” *Qazaq-Sovet Ents.*, p. 262.

⁶³ “Kişi Jüzding Rossiyaga..” *ibid.*, p. 193.

and Persia. Relations of the Kazak Khanate intensified particularly during the time of crisis stemming from the threats to Kazak territorial integrity.

Nevertheless, the Kazak attempt to maintain ties with other countries in faraway places of the world was closely associated with its geographic location. Beyond that, Kazak self-sufficiency made it unnecessary to search for an ally or the protection of any state during peaceful times. It cannot be a fair conclusion to declare that the Kazak Khanate was not a state because of its failure to maintain ties with countries in faraway regions of the world. Considering the fact that landlocked remote regions such as Kazakhstan suffer from difficulties arising from their geographic location even in our age, it is quite understandable that the Khanate had foreign relations only with a limited number of states in its region.

THE CONDITIONS LEADING TO THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION

The Kazak failure to defend their territory resulted from the Kazak obsession with their pastoral life. Kazak satisfaction in leading a pastoral life slowed the process of Kazak engagement in the improvement of their military ability. On the other hand, any Kazak attempts to establish ties with Russia, at the Han's level, were later interpreted as the Kazak desire to obtain Tsarist Russian overlordship.⁶⁴ The main reason the Kazak leaders approached the Russian state, as the source of formidable military power and as a would-be supplier of the then newest types of military equipment, was always discounted.

The Han of Kişi Jüz, Ebulhayır satisfied his personal ambitions by obtaining the support of a strong power in his fight to gain authority in Kazak society. However, his supporters advocated the promised Russian support as a guarantee of Kazak victory against the Jongars.⁶⁵ Ebülhayır was the Commander-in Chief, of the unified Kazak *alaman* forces, at the battle of Bulantı in 1728, against the Jongar invaders. The Bulantı battle was decisive in that it marked the beginning of Jongar retreat from the Kazak land. Thus, due to his growing strength and fame, Ebülhayır hoped to be elected as the Han of all the Kazaks when Bolat Han died in 1728.⁶⁶ However, the political and military elite that was

⁶⁴ This kind of interpretation is usually found in native materials published in Soviet time. Please see, "Qazaq Handıqtarınǵa Sırtqı Sayasatı men Diplomatiyası," *Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyası* p. 387; "Qazaqstannıń Rossiyaga Qosılıwı," *ibid.*, p. 350, 352.

⁶⁵ Qabdeş Jumadıl, "Qarakerey Qabanbay," *Juldız*, Vol. 8, 1992, pp. 3-57, in p. 8.

⁶⁶ Togan, *Turkistan*, p.174.

assigned to elect the new Han did not want to have a strong and ambitious personality such as Ebülhayır. They chose to elect Ebülmambet as the new Han of the Kazaks. Ebülmambet was a more mild-tempered and easygoing personality to deal with for the majority of the aristocratic and non-aristocratic members of the Kazak political and military elite.⁶⁷ The consequences of such an event resulted in the withdrawal of Ebülhayır Han of Kişi Jüz, and his followers such as Şaqşaq Janibek Batır of Orta Jüz, from the unified Kazak attempt to drive the Jongars out of Kazak territory. Under the leadership of Ebülhayır Han, some Kişi Jüz tribes, and under the leadership of Şaqşaq Janibek Batır, some Orta Jüz tribes, accepted Russian protection. Ebülhayır Han was never forgiven for his individual attempt to request Russian protection on behalf of the whole Kazaks.⁶⁸ Thus he was killed by Baraq Sultan of Orta Jüz in 1748 during a duel between these two members of the Kazak aristocratic family.

The above incident provided an opportunity for the Russian imperial administration to implement their policies much more easily to the East of the Urals. The Russian state sought to implement more complex plans in her attempt to establish ties with the nomadic Kazaks of the steppe. If the Russian military and security concerns were the prime reason, the Russian economic concern of securing trade routes was the secondary reason. Russian imperial power first

⁶⁷ Muhtar Magavin, *Qazaq Tariyhının...*, p. 94.

⁶⁸ Togan mentioned in his *Türkistan*, p. 175 of Baraq Sultan's dislike of Ebülhayır and his sons, Nuralı and Eralı, because of Ebülhayır's acceptance of Russian protection. Qazaq sultans including Baraq Sultan of Orta Jüz considered Ebülhayır as "betrayers."

sought to find cooperative states in her fight with the regional forces in Siberia, such as the descendants of Küçüm Han. Russia needed to secure the trade routes further South through the Kazak steppe and through the Oasis area of Central Asia.

The twin pressure: from inside, the inner power struggle among the political/military elite of the Kazaks and the other from outside, the Jongar invasion of the Kazak territory brought these nomadic people of the steppe to the very edge of a new era, which started with the gradual Russian penetration of the Kazak Lands.



CHAPTER TWO: THE KAZAK LANDS UNDER TSARIST RULE

There is a disagreement about the beginning of Tsarist colonial rule on the Kazak steppe. The Russian and Soviet-supervised sources tend to accept 1730 as the beginning of a new era for the Kazaks under the Russian protection. Other sources tend to disagree with this due to the survival of Kazak freedom and a refusal to obey the Tsarist rulers until after the total defeat of Kenesarı Han in 1847, when he fought against Tsarist Russian forces and attempted to unify the Kazaks to form an independent Kazak state from 1838 to 1847.⁶⁹ An official Soviet source confirms that “the completion of the process of Kazak entrance to the Russian imperial rule lasted until the 1860s.”⁷⁰ A Russian administrative measure supports this argument. “All matters related to the Lesser Horde (Kışı Jüz) (in other words, to all the Kazaks according to the then Russian understanding) used to be handled through the Russian Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Lesser Horde was considered by Russian imperial rule as a foreign state until 1782. Kışı Jüz maintained its existence as a state, subordinated to Russian rule from 1730 till 1820.”⁷¹

In spite of the above, a new era began for the Kazaks in 1730. Russian rule, gradually at the beginning, started to affect Kazaks through imperial decrees and ever-increasing Russian penetration into the Kazak lands from the 1730s

⁶⁹ Muhtar Magavin, *Qazaq Tariyhının Alıppesi*, p. 205.

⁷⁰ “Qazaqstanıng Rossiyaga Qosılıvı,” *Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyası*, p. 263.

⁷¹ Baymirza Hayıt, *Türkistan: Rusya ile Çin Arasında*, p. 27.

onwards to the end of the imperial administration in 1917. Acceptance by one of the Kazak leaders (Ebülhayır) of Russian protection provided the Russian imperial rulers with the necessary legal base to launch the long-sought Russian penetration of Central Asia and the establishment of gradual Russian control there.

Present-day Kazak historians refer to Abılay Han as one of the chief individuals who realized the true Russian aim. He foresaw that the Russians were not going to satisfy the Kazak need for fire-arms and trained professional soldiers. He was reported to have said that the Russian administration even prohibited their merchants to sell iron or metal equipment such as hammers, sickles, spades, shovels and axes to non-Russian subject nationalities' to prevent native ironsmiths turning them into arms, however primitive.⁷²

There was more than an armed struggle against the forcible policies of the colonial administration. The biggest and the most durable opposition was led by one of the grandsons of Abılay Han in the nineteenth century. Han Kene's struggle against the new invaders proved the obvious weakness of colonial control. However, there was no restoration of the free Kazak state. Kenesari's struggle failed for a number of complex reasons. One of the reasons was the increasing Russian strength in the newly colonized area. Another reason was the lack of unity among the peoples of Central Asia. It was the Khanate of Hokand, in the end, that ended the life of the last legendary freedom fighter of the Kazaks. Some Kırgız, subjects of the Hokand Khanate murdered Han Kene and presented

his skull to the imperial rulers It is still kept at the Hermitage. Elimination of this threat enabled the imperial rulers to increase their control, not only on the entire Kazak steppe, but, in less than a quarter of a century, in the whole Oasis area as well.

THE KAZAK POLITICAL/INTELLECTUAL ELITE IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES

The descendants of the Kazak aristocratic family and ambitious members of the non-aristocratic elite of Kazak society began to establish ties with the Russian administration so as to be given titles and authority during the eighteenth century. After Ebülhayır Han, his brother-in-law, Şaqşaq Janibek Batır received the title of *Tarhan* (Knyaz-prince) from the imperial administration. Şaqşaq Janibek Batır was one of the most prestigious warriors of Abılay Han in the early eighteenth century.⁷²

Starting from the first half of the eighteenth century, many politically ambitious members of the elite in Kazak society attempted to gain a politically and economically privileged status by accepting Russian imperial overlordship. All such members of native elite were required to take an oath upon their acceptance of Russian authority and as a sign that they would obey the imperial rule.

⁷² Qabdeş Jumadıl, "Qarakerey Qabanbay," p. 14.

⁷³ "Janibek Tarhan," *Abay Entsiklopediya*, p. 249.

With the coming of the Russian power, during the nineteenth century, a number of new administrative positions were created in the Kazak society. Apart from the position of Han up to the 1820s, the Russian imperial administration gradually created other positions for the aristocratic and later publicly influential native leaders in Kazak society. Russian imperial officials hired native or Turkic-speaking translators, *Perevodçik*, and low-ranking officials as *Çinovnik* in the early period of their administration in the Kazak lands. As need arose and as the imperial rule began to establish military control of the steppe, Russia introduced new forms of native administrative staff. An *avul*, the smallest unit of family group, was to be led by a *Starşın*.⁷⁴ Ten or twelve *avul* composed a *volost*- the smallest rural district. A *Bolis* administered the district. The *Bolis* worked as a police-constable, who maintained peace and order in the district, and controlled the regular payment of taxes, and credits, as well as the maintenance of judicial matters. *Üyez*⁷⁵ was a term used for district composed of *volosts*. *Okrug* was the largest administrative unit and it was bigger than an oblast. By the mid-nineteenth century, there were, all together seven okrugs in Kazakstan. Each Okrug was administered by an *Aga sultan* (*Starşy sultan*- Senior or Higher sultan).⁷⁶

⁷⁴ *Starşın* came from the Russian word, *strajnik* meaning the police constable in rural areas of the Tsarist Russia.

⁷⁵ *Üyez* comes from the Russian word *uyezd*, a term for district in Tsarist Russia.

⁷⁶ Chingiz Valihanov (Son of Valı Han and grandson of Abılay Han) was the *Agasultan* of Amanqaragay(which later was moved to Qusmurun) for 19 years from 1834 to 1853. He was also elected as *Agasultan* of Kökşetav Okrug in 1857. See Samat Öteniyazov, *Şoqan men Qayta Kezdesüv*, Almatı: Qazaqstan, 1990, p. 82. Eseney Estimesov was elected as the next *Agasultan* of Qusmurun Okrug in 1853. Qongırqulja Qudaymendi was the *Agasultan* of Aqmola ; Ibrayım

Nevertheless, native life was miserable in the eyes of native intellectuals, one of whom described it as the following:

It is difficult to describe the heartrending existence of the Kazaks of those days. Ordinary Kazaks use to tremble before the lowest of the Tsarist officials and endure the most humiliating disgrace afflicted upon them. It was those ignorant and rude native interpreter-chinovniks and volost officials themselves who were responsible for the despicable life of the Kazak society. Heavy revenues were imposed upon the natives, bribery, the discourteous behavior of the officials, as well as gossipmongery, became regular events on the Kazak steppe.⁷⁷

During the second half of the nineteenth century, three most important towering literary figures emerged among the Kazaks. They were the pioneers of the new generation of Kazaks who were familiar with the Russian language, culture and politics. They were Şoqan Valihanov, Abay Qunanbayulı, and Ibray Altınсарın. The first two were the sons of the highest native administrative Kazak officials who cooperated with the imperial rule and served both, Kazak society and Russian imperial rule during their decades-long tenure. Chingiz Valihanov and Qunanbay Öskenbayulı were *Agasultans* in their regions. Şoqan Valihanov and Abay Qunanbay were raised in households very closely involved in crucial matters related to the life of Kazak society. At the same time, both grew up aware of the importance of the coexistence of both Russian administrative rule and the rule of their native people, for whom their fathers played a significant role. The times forced them to be enthusiastic learners of Russian culture, politics and

Jayıqbayev was the following *Agasultan* of Aqmola in 1864 (Öteniyazov, p. 107); Ahmet Jantürin (until 1855) and his brother Muqan Jantürin were elected as the *Agasultans* of Torgay Okrug (Öteniyazov, p.167) Another famous *Agasultan* from among the Nayman tribe was Qunanbay Öskenbayulı, father of the nineteenth century philosopher of Kazak steppe and poet Abay Qunanbayulı. See, "Qunanbay Öskenbayulı (1804-1886)," *Abay Entsiklopediyası*, p. 370-372.

developments. However, this fact later was used by pro-Russian circles to gain supporters for the Russian way of life from the Kazak society. Thus, during the following century, the literature of the Soviet period and the native media repeatedly continued to publicize the names and works of these three as the pioneers of promoting Russian culture on the Kazak steppe. The life and work of the three became a rather tiresome repetitive subject of political/literary publications about the Kazak land.

At the beginning of this century, except for Abay Qunanbay (died in 1904), the legacy of Şoqan Valihanov and Ibray Altinsarin was already history. Şoqan had died in 1865 and Altinsarin in 1889. The twentieth century brought new generation of Kazak intellectuals, whose work and influence had a more “nationalist” tone. They were a generation, born in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, mostly educated in Russian schools and raised aware of both the native sufferings under the imperial rule of Russia and of discussions and criticisms concerning imperial control. However their activities will be discussed at the end of this chapter, after other important subjects of the nineteenth century.

⁷⁷ Mirjaqip Duvlatov's interrogation material in 1929, cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 92-93.

COLONIAL POLITICAL MEASURES TO MAINTAIN IMPERIAL CONTROL

During the years following the acceptance of Russian overlordship, the descendants of Ebülhayır did not enjoy Russian protection for long. The Lesser Horde was divided into two in 1801 by an imperial decree, into the Lesser Horde and a newly created Inner Horde, or Bökey Ordası. The status of the Han of the Lesser Horde was abolished almost two decades after this in 1824, by another imperial decree.

The Han of the Middle Horde, Abılay Han (1771-1781), tried to take measures against a twin threat, first the ambitious Russian Tsarist threat to control the traditional Kazak pastureland and second, the emerging Chinese intention to invade Kazak territory from the East. Abılay Han tried successfully to engage both sides with the wise policy of promising the Russian side to accept the Russian protectorate and showing eagerness to the Chinese side to accept Chinese suzerainty.⁷⁸ His recognition by both Russian and Chinese officials as the Han of the Middle Horde, strengthened Abılay's position considerably.⁷⁹ Upon the death of Abılay Han, his son Valı also continued to follow the same line as his father. Nevertheless, the Russian imperial administration, this time, would not endure

⁷⁸ "Ebulmambet (1730-1771) and his successor Abılay Han (1771-1781)(son of Uvalı Han), united the tribes wandering in the Sırdarya and Maveräünnehr, and settled in Jetisuv. They, themselves (the Hans only) accepted Chinese citizenship (1760) and received official titles from the Chinese Emperor." Togan, *Türkistan*, p. 209-210.

⁷⁹ Muhtar Magavin, *Qazaqstan Tariyhıning Alıppesi*, Almatı: Kazakstan, 1995. and İlyas Esenberlin, *Köşpendiler*, Almatı: Jazuvşı, 1976.

this dual policy and decided to abolish the status of the Han of the Middle Horde in 1815.

Tsarist rule introduced another policy by which the peoples of the Middle Horde and, in part, of the Great Horde, began to be administered by the Siberian Governor-Generalship. Its center was Tobolski until 1839 and later the city of Omsk. From this date onwards, the Tsarist colonial administration on the Kazak steppe followed a multi-layered policy. The first was the introduction of imperial approval for newly-elected Kazak hans, which stemmed from the idea that Kazaks could not elect their leaders without Tsarist imperial endorsement. The earliest and strongest opposition to this policy came from Abilay Han of the Middle Horde who openly opposed this and distanced his rule from this imperial practice. To strengthen this practice, the Tsarist administration proclaimed a "Decree on the Siberian Kirgiz" in 1822, and thus attempted to introduce the new administrative Tsarist system on the Kazak steppe. However, these decrees were not able to help colonial Tsarist rule penetrate deeply into Kazak society.

The Russian colonial administration did not limit its policies only to forcible seizure of the Kazak land and its allotment to the landless Russian peasantry. Apart from the cultural and religious expropriation of the native people, Kazaks were administered by colonial administrative officials alien to the area. The highest position given to the native population in the colonial administrative system was the lowest rank, the **volost (bolis)**. On the other hand, the Governor General assumed absolute authority in his region and thus the

Kazaks called him **jartı patşa**, the “half-king.” According to article 15 of the Turkestan Administrative Statue, and article 17 of the Steppe Administrative Statue, the Governor General had the right to exile a politically untrustworthy person for five years. Even the **nachalnik**, the heads of *uyezds* (a term for district), had the right to imprison for a week without any interrogation subjects who did not respect the law or who did not follow the orders of an administrative unit. The **nachalniks** also had the right to impose fines.

The natives themselves used gaps in the colonial administrative judiciary to take revenge on compatriots. At the same time, these gaps were also used by the newly settled Russian population in their disagreements with the indigenous people. On many occasions, Russian peasants confiscated the herds and property of natives without the interference of any judiciary organ.⁸⁰

LAND CONFISCATION

Ebülhayır, the Han of Kişi Jüz aimed to regain the territories between the Edil and Jayıq rivers from the colonial rulers. He obtained support from ordinary Kazaks who wanted the area to use as grazing field, by promising them the above territory. However, the 1756 Russian imperial decree prohibited nomadic Kazaks from using the western banks of Jayıq river for grazing purposes. The Tsarist administration began to build military garrisons along the river to maintain the defense and well-being of the Russian immigrant population to the area. A famous

⁸⁰ Qoygeldiyev, pp. 67-73.

Kazak poet Murat Möngkeulı interpreted the Russian occupation of the Edil and Jayıq rivers as “The occupation of Edil is an attack of humiliation (as to molest a woman by pulling her skirt), the occupation of Jayıq is an attack of decapitation (as to insult a person holding him by the throat).”⁸¹

The construction of Russian army garrisons and Russian forts limited the use of traditional Kazak pastureland and forced the Kazaks to move into less fertile areas. Russian military measures to secure the Southern borders, by establishing defense lines along the northern regions of Kazakhstan, particularly put the Kazaks of the Middle Horde into a difficult position. It restricted the traditional Kazak pastureland in the bordering Kazak regions.

The major part of the Middle Horde and a number of regions in southern Kazakhstan were joined to the Russian empire only by means of the military measures of the Tsarist army. The Tsarist rulers had chosen to force the peoples and regions of Central Asia into the Russian state regardless of the will of the native peoples as a result of its desire to achieve further goals. Tsarist policy began to maintain its colonialist policies by pushing the nomads far from the fertile lands and settling the Russian landless **mujik** (Russian peasant) in their stead. The Russian state put into practice its colonization policy on Kazak land in full force.

⁸¹ Edildi tartıp alğanı, etekke qoldı salğanı.
Jayıqtı tartıp alğanı, jagaga qoldı salğanı.

During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the Tsarist state began to introduce some new administrative measures. The particular aim of these kinds of measures was to seize previously uncontrolled Kazak land. Thus the administrative divisions that were introduced in the Kazak lands were the beginning of a gradual seizure of the territories of the Middle and Great Hordes. Native Kazaks were having difficulty using their traditional pasturelands because of the Tsarist policy of settling Cossacks on the most fertile areas that had been taken from the indigenous people.

Russian colonial rule on the Kazak steppe introduced another measure to colonize the steppe region permanently, particularly after 1865. The emancipation of Russian peasants by imperial decree in 1861, and afterwards, forced the Tsarist rulers to provide the landless Russian peasantry with land and thus reduce tensions among Tsarist subjects to the West of the Urals. The solution to this problem was the settlement of landless Russian **mujik** (Russian peasant) on Kazak territory. The Tsarist administration sought another objective by this policy. It was to use these newly settled Russian subjects as the tools of the imperial administration in colonizing and further expropriating the newly acquired Kazak land. Another important tool in the early movements of the Tsarist colonial administration was, of course, the **Kazachestvo**, the Cossacks. Four centers of altogether eleven Cossack settlements in the border regions of the Russian empire were constructed on the western and northern borders of Kazak territory. The Cossack settlements surrounding Kazak territory were in the Ural, Sibir, Orenburg

and Jetisuv regions. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Siberian Cossack soldiers had taken 11,610, 484 **desyatina** (one desyatina: 1,09 hectare) of land, of which five million desyatina were in the Sibir region, six million in the Ural region and 610,484 in the Jetisuv region.⁸² The arrogance and bullying behavior towards the native population of the newly settled and newly privileged Russian subjects annoyed the natives further.

The Russian colonial administration exacted taxes from the indigenous population even on land just acquired from the natives and not practically used by either side. The Tsarist rulers promulgated a “Temporary Decree on the Administrative Principles of Ural, Torgay, Aqmola and Semipalatinsk (Semey) Oblast” on October 21, 1868. According to article 210 of this decree, the land inhabited by the Kırız (the Kazaks) was declared to be state land and thus would be assigned to the use of Kırız society only by the permission of the administration.⁸³ The forest area in Kazakhstan was also officially declared to be imperial property. Apart from ordinary Kazaks, even the descendants of the formidable Kazak hans, the then privileged, high native imperial officials were not able to use even one branch of a tree from any Kazak forest.⁸⁴

⁸² Sanjar Asfendiyarov, *Istoriya Kazakstana*, Alma-Ata, 1993, p. 187 cited by Mambet Qoygeldiyev, *Alaş Qozqalı*, Almatı: Sanat, 1994, p. 26.

⁸³ *Materyalı po Istoriy Politiceskovo Stroya Kazakstana*, vol., Alma Ata 1960. p. 337 cited by Mambet Qoygeldiyev, *ibid.*, p. 28.

⁸⁴ The official Russian imperial mayor and *Agasultan* Chingiz Valihanov was not allowed to have wood from forest areas to use as building material to renovate and extend his residency. The residency was built for the widow of the Russian-recognized Han of Orta Jüz, Valı in 1830s, by

On the other hand, colonial rule introduced a number of privileges for the newly settled Slavic population. For example, Kaufman, General Governor of the Turkestan region signed a decree entitled “Temporary Measures on the Settlement of Russian Peasants Arriving to the Jetisuv area.” It was aimed at relieving the newcomers from the burdens of settling a colonized land. According to this regional decree, each person was to be given 30 desyatina and those who would settle alongside the postal line would be given 45 desyatina of land. Those newcomers were also exempted from taxes for 15 years and one hundred roubles was to be given to those in need.⁸⁵

Rapid colonization of the Jetisuv region aimed at the realization of two strategic targets. The first was to define and secure the Tsarist border in the South against any kind of Chinese expansion by clearing the area of the soldiers of the Khokand Khanate and by constructing military forts and garrisons. The second was to wipe out the anti-Russian as well as the anti-colonial elements in the region and among the population who had been the staunch supporters of Kenesari Kashiimov. Thus an urgent increase of Russian elements and the deep penetration of Russian dominance into native life was the aim. In 1874, newcomers to the Aqmola region were given more than 18 and less than 30 desyatina of land to each man (as the head of each family), and centers (**uchastka**:

permission of the Russian imperial decree. See Samat Öteniyazov, *Şoqan men Qayta Kezdesüv*, p. 98-114.

⁸⁵ Qoygeldiyev, *ibid.*, p. 29.

settlement area) were prepared for the new comers equipped to settle at least 20 men (and their families).

The colonization of Kazak land by Russian peasants from Central Russia and Siberia was carried out in an intensive form from the 1860s to the 1890s. Some 251,779 desyatina of land owned by the native Kazaks was seized from them in Aqmola Oblast and 24 **selo** (villages) with 10,940 men and their families were settled between the years 1885 to 1893. In Jetisuv oblast, 63 peasant settlements with 35,569 Slavic inhabitants were established by 1895.⁸⁶

A new law of March 25, 1891, entitled “The Decree on the Administration of Aqmola, Semey, Jetisuv, Ural and Torgay Oblasts” enabled the colonial administrators to expropriate the Kazak land further. Articles 119 and 120 of the decree were aimed at facilitating the further use of Kazak land by the colonialist apparatus, as follows:

Article 119-territories and natural resources of the land inhabited by the nomads, including the forest areas are all declared to be state property.

Article 120- those territories presently inhabited by the nomads will be given for the use of their society.

An amendment introduced to this article brought more damaging results for the native population. According to this amendment, so-called **excess** land was required to be given over to the control of the state apparatus. As a result of this amendment, any ‘excess’ place was added to the Land Allocation Fund of the

colonial rule. To use the above article with full force, a so-called scientific expedition began with the aim of defining excess land on the native territory. It was led by F. A. Şçerbina and lasted for three years between 1896 and 1899 covering the twelve districts (uyezds) of Torgay, Aqmola and Semey provinces. According to the results of expedition, in the eight districts of the above oblasts, Kazaks previously had 45,889,000 desyatina of land. Only 23,297,000 (51%) were left to the Kazaks and 22,592,000 desyatina (49%) were declared to be excess land, and was given to the Land Allotment Fund for the newcomers.⁸⁷ The expedition suggested that an average Kazak with 24 horses needed 187 desyatina of land, and the rest of the land in use by the Kazaks was required to be seized by the colonial apparatus for the further settlement of Russian peasants. During the first decade of the present century, the work of Şçerbina's expedition was found to be not a fair judgment and new expeditions were organized. As a result of the new "scientific" expeditions, the land owned by each middle class Kazak family was reduced to 20-30 desyatina.⁸⁸ During this period, two million desyatina of land was declared to be excess land in the Öskemen district alone.

By 1917, about 17 million desyatina of land had been allocated to 3 million Russians in 500,000 families. The Land Allotment Fund had an additional 20 million desyatina of land for the further use of the still arriving Russian

⁸⁶ Qoygeldiyev, *ibid.*, p. 32.

⁸⁷ Qoygeldiyev, *ibid.*, p. 34.

⁸⁸ Qoygeldiyev, *ibid.*, p. 42.

settlers.⁸⁹ Another source claims that the colonial administration seized about 45 million hectares of Kazak land from the natives.⁹⁰

The earlier Agriculture and State Land Ministry was changed into the Land Settlement and Agricultural General Directory on May 5, 1905. The Land Allocation Fund was put under the control of this new directory. The main aim of this institution was to settle the native population and release as much excess land as possible. A certain Veletskiy, head of the Jetisuv Settlement unit, in his letter to the Turkestan governor-generalship on September 12th. 1906, stated the following: "Settlement of the newcomers is not important for themselves, but it is vital for the colonization policy. It is impossible to find excess land without the completion of the settlement of the Kirgiz (the natives). Allocation of land to the nomadic natives was not profitable for the colonial administration since nomadic life requires more land than the settled one. Thus it is necessary to persuade the natives to settle on the land."⁹¹

The land hunger of the Russian peasantry began to press harder on the Tsarist administrative officials during the years after the 1905 revolution. Thus the concerned Tsarist officials began to satisfy the land hunger of the Russian peasantry at the expense of the well-being of the nomadic Kazaks.

⁸⁹ Olcott, *The Kazakhs.*, p. 90

⁹⁰ Qoygeldiyev, p. 50.

⁹¹ Qoygeldiyev, p. 55.

THE EMERGENCE OF KAZAK NATIONALISM UNDER THE TSARIST REGIME

The colonization policy of Tsarist rulers in nineteenth-century Kazakhstan provoked a strong reaction from the indigenous people. Armed struggle against Russian colonial rule among the Lesser Horde started with Sırım Datov (1783-1797), as a result of the Tsarist decree prohibiting Kazak use of land on the west bank of the Jayıq river.⁹² At the same time, Russia had also limited the rights of the Kazak aristocracy and established the absolute rule of the Han of the Lesser Horde. Another revolt among the Kazaks was led by İsatay Tayman and Mahambet Ötemis in 1837-38.⁹³

The most important of these revolts was the movement led by Kenesari Qasimov, one of the grandsons of Abılay Han.⁹⁴ Kenesari Qasimov (1837-1847) started his struggle against the Russian colonial administration in order to restore the Kazak state to its position in the time of Abılay Han. His struggle and military action delayed the firm establishment of Russian colonial control on the Kazak lands for about two decades.

Sarjan Sultan,⁹⁵ son of Kasım Töre (one of the thirty sons of Abılay Han) attempted to unite the Kazaks in opposition to the Tsarist policy of depriving the

⁹² "Kişi Jüz Şarvalarının Köterilisi," *Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyası*, Vol. 6, p. 193-194.

⁹³ Iğılman Şörekov, *İsatay Mahambet: Dastandar men Ölengder*, Almatı: Jazuvşı, 1976.

⁹⁴ A. Zeki Velidi Togan, *Bugünkü Türkili Türkistan ve Yakın Tarihi*, İstanbul: Enderun, 1981, p. 312-320.

native people of their most fertile lands. Sarjan Sultan, brother of Kenesari Sultan, retreated south in his fight against the Tsarist military forces and hoped to gain the support of the (Beg⁹⁶) Han of Khokand further south.⁹⁷ Sarjan Sultan was killed (in cold blood) on the orders of the Han of Khokand in 1836. Thus started another phase (the Central Asian side) of the struggle for Kazaks who were in conflict with the colonial Russian administration.

It was the most important struggle against the establishment of Tsarist colonial rule on Kazak land of all the nineteenth and even the twentieth centuries. The Şekti, Tama, Tabın, Alşın, Şumekey and Jappas tribes from the Lesser Horde and the Üysin and Duvlat tribes of the Great Horde participated.⁹⁸ Among the fighters of Kenesari, there were individuals of Russian, Uzbek, Kırgız, Polish and Başqurt origin as well. The supporters of Kenesari even reached 40,000 families.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ The term sultan is used by the Kazaks for those princes who were the descendants of Chingiz Han from his son Çoçi and for those who were not elected as Han, but for those who were hopeful and suitable candidates. Muhtar Magavin, "Qazaq Ordasında Han Saylav Dastürü," *Qazaq Tariyhıning Alıppesi*, pp. 185-197. "Hans in Central Asia always maintained the support of at least four tribes which hold the "felt of the han" when he assumed power.", Togan, *Turkistan*, p. 201.

⁹⁶ According to Togan, the Begs of Hıyva and Khokand assumed the title of Han at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Togan, *Turkistan*, p. 203.

⁹⁷ Like Hıyva and Buhara, Khokandian rule in Central Asia drew its support both from the sedentary population and from nomadic tribes such as the Kırgız and other Qıpçaq tribes. However, in matters of utmost importance for their rule, they preferred to rely upon the sedentary population rather than those nomadic or semi-nomadic subjects. Togan, *Turkistan*, p. 216-218. Kenesari, in his attempt to win over the Kırgız to his side, planned to achieve a double success. The first was the maintenance of his authority on the territory of the Khokandian rule, which was a more easier force to deal with compared to the Russian threat. He wanted to create a safe heaven for his activities and for his followers to gather strength to fight off the Russian threat. Secondly, he wanted to carve up the nomadic Kırgız and Qıpçaq subjects of the Khokandian realm for his own advantage.

⁹⁸ Bekmahanov, *ibid.*, p.184

Representatives of all three Kazak hordes named Kenesari as Han in 1841, in the traditional way by raising him over their heads while he was sitting on a white felt mat in September 1841.¹⁰⁰ Kenesari's relations with the Khokand were tense, partly due to personal enmity and partly due to his effort to get rid of Khokand rule over the Kazak people. Later the Kazak historian Bekmahanov claimed that Kenesari Han, after being convinced of the Khokand's determination to keep the Kazaks among their enslaved subjects, made his decision to fight against the southern neighbor.¹⁰¹ However, the Kazak Khanate during the time of Kenesari had more favorable relations with the Bukharan Emirate and Khivan Khanate. The Khivan Khanate provided Kenesari with guns and ammunition from time to time. Kenesari Han tried to establish diplomatic contact with the leading administrative figures in Central Asia at the time. From his correspondence, one can see that his ideas, aims, demands and policies have been well-established.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ One of the most important documents is the memoirs of Sızdıq Sultan, a son of Kenesari, written by Ahmet Sultan Kenesariuli and translated into Russian by E. T. Smirnov. Sultan Ahmed Kenesarin, *Sultan Kenesari i Sadık*, Translated into Russian by E. T. Smirnov, Taşkent, 1889. It appeared in *Juldız*, No., 1991, p. 92.

¹⁰⁰ Bekmahanov, *ibid*, p. 255.

¹⁰¹ Bekmahanov., *ibid.*, p. 256.

¹⁰² One of Kenesari's letters read as follows: "You want us to be the subject of your emperor and of your empire. You wrote that we believe in the same god but we both belong to two different religions. You should note that your ideas do not suit to our understanding. If I accept your overlordship, I will act against God's order. I would be afraid of God's punishment and will be ashamed before other Muslim rulers... The Tsar promised that my grandfather would be the sole ruler of his (Abılay Han's) country. The current Russian lords occupied our ancestral territories of Esil-Nura, Aqtav, Urgat, Qarqaralı, Qarınlıq, Yarkain(?), Ubagan, Tobıl, Qusmurun, Hayan and Tursaq and territories up till Oral for building military garrisons." cited by Baymirza Hayıt, *Türkistan: Rusya ile Çin Arasında*, İstanbul: Otag Yayınevi, 1975, p. 185.

He showed the necessary diplomatic understanding when he received Russian diplomats and other Tsarist notables.

Kenesarı specified that if all the military garrisons established by Russia were destroyed, if all the confiscated Kazak lands were returned to their genuine and traditional owners, and if Tsarist harassment of the native Kazaks were stopped, then he might consider accepting Russian protection.

In 1847, Kenesarı Han with his 10,000 strong fighters entered into the Kırğız territory under Khokandian rule. However, he was not successful in fighting against the Kırğız and together with 32 Kazak sultans, he was killed in a battle near the Kırğız city of Tokmak. His struggle to eliminate colonial rule became an unforgettable memory in the minds of not only the Kazaks but of all the Central Asian peoples. Kenesarı's devotion to protect the interests of his people, his leadership abilities, his qualities as a unique and genuine politician, found many admirers among the people.¹⁰³ Kenesarı's failure to reach his aim of freeing the Kazaks from Russian colonial rule was also the beginning of the extension of Russian colonial policies to the whole of Central Asia. This was not realized by all the other Central Asian people (Five years after Kenesarı's defeat, Tsarist forces attacked Khokand territory from Aqmeşit in 1852.), and thus he was murdered by the Kırğız subjects of Khokand in Maytöbe on the upper Çu

¹⁰³ Please see Sultan Ahmed Kenesarin, *Sultanı Kenesarı i Sadık*, Translated into Russian by E. T. Smirnov, Taşkent, 1889. The Kazak translation of it has appeared in *Juldız*, No. 5, 1991., pp. 90-112. Other important material about Sızdık Sultan is the chapter written by the Russian historian N. Pavlov in *İstoriya Turkistana*, Taşkent, 1910, which again appeared in *Juldız*, No. 9, 1990, pp. 137-143.

river in 1847. He was understood, and probably it is partly true, as an ambitious leader that threatened the established authority of Khokand in the area. He was not recognized as a freedom fighter by other Central Asian rulers. However, in one of his letters to the Kirgiz manaps Ormon and Jantay, Kenesari wrote the following: "My aim to come here is not to fight or spill blood, (but) to unite the Kazaks and the Kirgiz to unyoke them from the Khokandian (rule) and free them from Khokandian repression... After receiving this letter, come before me to display your obedience and calm your anxiety. If you do not accept this suggestion and if you do not refrain from fighting, then the whole responsibility will rest on your shoulders."¹⁰⁴

Kazak enmity towards imperial rule was the result of policies of biased Russian officials. Mirjaqip Duvlatov attempted to explain this as such: "Kazaks have considered all the Russians as their enemies and thus the saying -"Carry your axe if you have a Russian friend"- was created among them. Disputes between the two nations were artificially created and supported by the administration. If a horse from a Russian newcomer was stolen, the neighboring Kazak avul was forced to pay the price. Poor Kazaks suffered most from the state taxes. The rich Kazaks who owned hundreds or thousands of herds were made equal to a poor Kazak in paying state taxes, in the eyes of colonial officials."¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Bekmahanov, *ibid.*, p. 330.

¹⁰⁵ Mirjaqip Duvlatov's interrogation material in 1929, cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 92-93.

A CHANGE IN DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION

The beginning of an attempt to settle the landless Russian peasants of Central Russia on to the Kazak land started to change the demographic balance on the Steppe. This was particularly noteworthy towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. There were 169,603 newcomer shares created between the years 1870 and 1905. However, 197,232 newcomer families came to the Kazak territory in the four years between 1906 and 1909. In other words, Russian colonialism seized Kazak land at a much faster rate in these four years, equaling the colonization of the previous last 35 years.¹⁰⁶ By 1910, the population of the Kazak territory had doubled and the population of Russian peasants on Kazak land had increased 15 times between 1894 and 1910. This was the result of an ambitious program to relieve the pressure on overcrowded Russian villages and to solve the agrarian problem in central Russia. By 1917, about 17 million desyatinas of land had been allocated to 3 million Russians in 500,000 families.

The Cossack settlements on the most fertile regions in Jayıq, Oy, Or, Ertis, Qaratal, Lepsi, Aqsuv and Ile had deprived the Kazaks of their traditional pasturelands. This practice resulted in more burdens for the Kazaks. Most important was the prevention of the agricultural development of Kazak society and the interruption of the Kazak tribal movement system in search of pastureland

¹⁰⁶ Alihan Bökeyhanulı(Bökeyhanov), *Qazaq*, 1913, No. 24, cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 43.

vital for the well being of the Kazak herds and thus for the very survival of Kazak society.

The casual attitude of the newly settled Slavic population towards the natural environment, wastefully using the natural resources, occupying a previously cultivated land and abandoning it in a very short time, following the same procedure in another newly captured area all over again in order to receive another set of privileges and exemptions allocated to newcomers from central Russia.

Kazak nationalist intellectuals were aware of the changing demographic composition of their land. "Strangers are coming to our society. What will happen to us when the outsiders come to live among us. If history has any value for human experience, one comes to the following conclusion; if the invaders are stronger than the natives, indigenous people usually suffer and perish in the end. If the indigenous people are stronger than the invaders, they can be assimilated into the native life. If both sides are equal then none will suffer. Both can survive and live side by side as twin nations."¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ "Orenburg. 10 Fevral," "*Qazaq*" *Gazeti*, Chief editor A. Nisanbayev, Reprinted and transliterated copy. Almaty: Qazaq Entsiklopediyası Bas Redaktsiyası, 1998, p.14. Only 265 issues of this newspaper were published during the five years of its existence. Microfilmed individual issues of the *Qazaq* can be found in many libraries and archives in the west before the demise of the Soviet Union. Thus individual researchers had to spend extra effort to reach those issues, which consumed quite a lot of time and money. At the beginning of the 1990s, a company in the USA gathered some issues of *Qazaq* together with a substantial collection of newspapers and journals published in Tsarist Russia before the Bolshevik revolution. As for the *Qazaq* newspaper, recently a group of academics, social scientists, and many other Kazak archivists republished some important articles appeared in this newspaper some 80 years ago. However, it is not a complete transliteration of the newspaper but rather a selection of materials. It has not been stated,

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

The careless attitude of the Russian peasant population in wastefully using natural resources was the beginning of the gradual environmental degradation of the Kazak land. As early as 1830s, Russian peasants and Russian soldiers began to plunder the natural resources of the Kazak land on which they were settled by the imperial administration. Apart from the land assigned to them officially, Russian settlers went even further in destroying the forest areas and grazing lands, set aside for the use of the native Kazaks. This started even in the mid-nineteenth century. For example, the Russian administration began an inspection only after a letter from Ayganım Hanşa, the widow of late Valı Han, arrived in 1837. It was officially ordered to find out whether Russian peasants really harvested the grass on the Kazak grazing lands and sold the excess grass for private profit.¹⁰⁸

Plunder of the Kazak land was extended to the country's other valuable resources, such as inspections to define gold and other precious metal or gem mines. Sensible Kazak leaders were very cautious in disclosing this kind of information to the colonialist administration in the nineteenth century.¹⁰⁹ The exploitation of the natural resources of the Kazak territory started first by the

in the book, what kind of criteria was used in the selection of articles for transliteration of the *Qazaq* newspaper.

¹⁰⁸ Samat Öteniyazov, *Şoqan men Qayta Kezdesüv*, p. 63.

¹⁰⁹ For example, according to Quliş Jaqipulı Valihanov, grandson of Chingiz Valihanov, his grandfather never forgave any Kazak who disclosed gold and silver mining areas in the Kazak land to any Russian geologist. Chingiz Valihanov use to severely punish (by secretly killing) the natives who disclosed such information to Russian colonialists for a reward. Ibid, p. 117.

carrying out of so-called geological explorations to define what kind of riches were buried on the Kazak land. This search led to many discoveries of precious metals and mines and supported the needs of Russian and later of the Soviet rulers.

The Kazak intellectuals' reaction to environmental degradation was voiced in poems, the best and the most efficient way to reach the Kazaks and draw their attention. Mirjaqip Duvlatulı wrote his famous book *Oyan Qazaq* (Ufa, 1909) about the Kazak plight regarding the Tsarist land confiscation. He wrote the following:

In the year of one thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight,
all the land was announced as the property of (imperial) treasury.
Thus our land shrank each year
And was added up to the towns of **mujık**(Russian peasant)
Our land and water are shrinking each year,
And they were added to the towns of mujik (the Russian peasant)
Where are your high mountains, crystal springs and big lakes?
The green mountain hills all went.
Bitter water and deserted areas are left to us,
No place is left to us to sow grain.
Where is your fertile soil?
Where are your silver lakes?
Where is your land-on which four types of cattle use to graze
And you, en masse, use to move freely on (it)?¹¹⁰

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Jılında mıng segiz jüz alpıs segiz,
Hazınalıq dedi jerding hammasıda
Tarılıp jıldan jılga jer-suvımız
Mujiqtıng ketti bari qalasına
Zangir tav, aqqan bulaq şalqar kölder,
Kettigoy betegeli biyik belder.
Aşçı suv bizge qaldı şöl dalalar,
Jaqsı jer qaldırmadı egin salar.
Kök maysa betegeli jering qayda?
Kūmistey tolqındagan eling qayda?
Ing-jıng bop jer qayısқан tört tūlikpen,
Jōngkilip kōşip-qongan eling qayda?

Mirjaqıp Duvlat was one of the staunchest defenders of Kazak rights over their land. He was reported to have written the following about the Kazak land even in the twentieth century during his interrogation by Soviet security officials: “...The most fertile soils of the natives was seized forcefully from the natives to be given to the Land Allocation Fund of the newcomers. Kazaks were driven to live on the desert areas.”¹¹¹

THE SHIFT FROM ANIMAL HUSBANDRY TO AGRICULTURE

As a result of the restrictions on the traditional Kazak pastureland by a number of military and administrative measures taken by the Russian imperial administration, nomadic Kazaks increasingly had less and less space for grazing their animals. The fertile grazing lands were seized by Russians to be given to landless mujik. The native population was prohibited from using these lands for agricultural purposes or for winter pasture. If the newcomers used the areas for agriculture or for other activities, they were exempted from taxes, and received other privileges and were freed from other responsibilities (non-military) for fifteen years.

Please see Mirjaqıp Duvlatov, “Qazaq Jerleri,” *Oyan Qazaq* (Awaken Kazak!), Ufa: Neşriyat Matbaası, 1909. Reprinted by Yaş Türkistan Yayınları: 20, pp. 28-32., and in p. 28. The book was devoted to matters of election, the land issue, and religious discussions. It was banned immediately after publication by the colonial authorities.

¹¹¹ Mirjaqıp Duvlatov’s interrogation material in 1929, cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 92-93.

The growing problem of Kazak need for pastureland decreased the number of livestock in the society. Individual families with no livestock began gradually to turn into **jataq**,¹¹² those Kazaks who were engaged in farming. They were the poorest in the society and engaged in a most primitive form of farming. Agriculture was a branch of the economy that was not attractive to a Kazak. Only out of sheer necessity, the poorest section was forced to engage in farming through tilling the earth with a wooden plough. Most of them did not find it necessary to irrigate the land.

There were also many individual cases of Kazak suffering as a result of the forced seizure of the native land. A group of Kazaks from the Qoşanay tribe in the Seventh *Starşın* of Targın *Bolısıq* in Uskamen *Uyezd*, complained that their land had been seized by the authorities. According to an article by Bökeyhanov, they were forced to rent hayfields from Russian peasants. They even rented grazing fields from Russian peasants as well. They use to pay ten *tyın*(cent) for each horse and five *tyın*(cent) for each sheep to graze on, the then Russian-seized, former Kazak pastureland.¹¹³ Although this case was made public in *Qazaq* in 1913, citing a discussion in the Third Russian Duma, it was documented during the Şçerbina expedition (1896-1901).

¹¹² Mirjaqip Duvlatov claimed that as a result of Russian seizure of the native land, Kazaks were turned to **jataq** (a poverty-stricken Kazak who was settled on a piece of land to engage in farming as a result of his poorness). Duvlatov, *Oyan Qazaq*, p. 31.

¹¹³ Qır Balası(one of the pen names of Bökeyhanov), “Üşinşi Duma Ham Qazaq,” “*Qazaq*” *Gazeti*, Reprinted copy, Almatı: “Qazaq Entsiklopediyası” Bas Redaktsiyası, 1998, p. 29.

Between 1907 and 1911, the then Russian Prime Minister, Pyotr Stolypin undertook an ambitious program of colonization in the eastern steppe region (Kazak territory) to relieve the pressure on the overcrowded Russian villages and to solve the agrarian unrest that the land shortage had caused.¹¹⁴ High-ranking officials such as Stolypin argued that the interest of the Russian state could not be sacrificed to the interest of one small group of people, the Kazaks.¹¹⁵ Thus the particular needs of nomadic life were openly disregarded to ease the difficulties of the center.¹¹⁶

The Russian peasants, freed by legislation from the responsibilities of communal land-ownership, were given generous allotments of land suitable for agricultural purposes in one of the steppe provinces, and were assisted by loans and other means to establish themselves permanently in their new homes. This entire operation was conducted by a special **Bureau of Resettlement (Pereselencheskoe Upravleniie)**. The land was obtained either by purchase or, more frequently by a transfer of ownership from the Crown, which claimed for itself most of the territories inhabited by the Turkic nomadic tribes, to the settler. The center of colonization was the Semirechie (Jetisuv) province, administratively as part of Turkestan, but settlements were also founded in the adjoining provinces. By 1915-1916 there were established on the Kazakh-Kirgiz territories 530 Cossack and peasant colonist settlements with 144,000 persons. By 1914 the government had distributed in the Semirechinsk province alone 4,200,000 desyatinas of land, a total of 31 million desyatinas available in that province, including most of the land of agricultural value.¹¹⁷

The sessions of the Third Russian Duma (1911), during the discussion to introduce an amendment to the 279th. article of the 1886 imperial decree with reference to the matters of the Kazak land, disregarded the plight of the Kazaks in

¹¹⁴ Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954, p. 83.

¹¹⁵ cited by Olcott, p. 89.

¹¹⁶ Boris Quvatov, *Otanımızding Tariyhi Tuvralı Sayasiy Engime*, Almatı: Bilim, 1993., p. 107.

¹¹⁷ Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, p. 83.

the Sırdarya region. Their land was also confiscated, ignoring the fact that the Kazaks had orchards, hayfields and had dug water canals to irrigate the land.¹¹⁸

The Kazak struggle to protest against the official policy concerning the land found an advocate in Baqıtjan Qaratayev, a Kazak deputy to the Second Duma in the twentieth century. He said the following during one of the Duma sessions:

Presently, The Vedomstvo (Directory-Agency) of Agriculture and Settlement is carrying out the practice of driving the native Kırgız out of their houses, organized in the form of **Poselke** and **derevniya** by force together with enthusiastically inviting the (Russian) peasants and settling them onto the Steppe provinces. As you see, the settlement process is being carried out in parallel with driving the natives who agreed (to give up nomadic life) settlement, from their houses in the most fertile regions. I can support this with official evidence. All of them believe that all the Kırgızs are nomads. No, gentlemen, there are nomadic and settled Kırgız. Settled Kırgız have inhabited the fertile parts of southern regions of the Steppe for decades. They have been living in their permanent houses together with animal keeping facilities of sheds and barns. Agriculture is an essential part of survival for the Kırgız of such. Keeping herds is an additional part of their living. Compared to agriculture, the pastoral life needs less labor. Thus the settled Kırgız held the most fertile areas decades ago. The Agency of Agriculture and Settlement engaged in deporting the Kırgız from their warm homes and from fertile lands and carrying out the settlement process (of the Russian peasants instead).

THE DECLINE OF THE NOMADIC LIFESTYLE

Towards the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth centuries, the population in the Kazak land was increasingly forced to choose one of the two main types of lifestyle. They were to choose either to settle on a piece of land and engage in animal husbandry or settle on a piece of land and engage in farming. This meant the end of the nomadic lifestyle. This gradual development began to be felt, for example, in Qostanay province from the decline in the

¹¹⁸ Qır Balası (one of the pen names of Bökeyhanov), “Üşinşi Duma Ham Qazaq,” “*Qazaq Gazeti*,” Reprinted copy, Almatı: “Qazaq Entsiklopediyası” Bas Redaktsiyası, 1998., p. 28.

number of sheep. At the same time, increasing demand for cattle-meat from the cities and towns of central Russia helped to increase the number of cattle in Kazakstan. Mirjaqıp Duvlatov wrote in Kazak, in satirical style, by asking whether “the Kazaks should graze their livestock an barren dirt, if they lose the remaining land?”¹¹⁹

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the nomadic economy and lifestyle was preserved only in regions such as Sırdarya, Central Kazakstan, the region around the Betpaq Dala, Manqıstav, Semey and Aqmola oblasts. As a result of demands from the newly settled Russian peasants to buy horses, rich Kazak families began to increase the number of horses and to decrease other livestock, such as sheep.¹²⁰

THE STATE OF EDUCATION

The basis of traditional education in Kazak society was according to the elementary knowledge of Muslim teaching. A mullah was hired by parents to teach children the basic pillars of Islam, reading the Koran and writing using the Arabic script, in the Kazak avul. Contemporary subjects of education were almost non-existent in the Kazak avul schools. Those Kazaks who could afford to have

¹¹⁹ Ayrılmaq qalğan jerden osı küngi, (If we loose the remaining land)
Topıraqqa maldı Qazaq jayasıng ba?(Are you, Qazaq, going to graze livestock on dirt?)
Tatti şöp tuşçı suvdıng bari sonda(Sweet grass, tasty water are all there)
Tabatın bugan hayla qayda erler?(Will there be a man to find a solution (to this)?
Please see, Duvlatov, *Oyan Qazaq*, p. 30.

¹²⁰ *Qazaqstan Tariyhı*, p. 241.

their children receive further education used to send them to madrasas. Most of the mullahs on the Kazak steppe used to come from the Tatars and Başqurts. Due to the lack of educational materials in the Kazak language, children used to learn everything mostly from books published in Tatar. Tatar-led educational facilities were convenient for the Russian colonial administration for the official reasoning that Catherine the Great accepted that the Tatars should spread Islam among the Kazaks.

After the agreement between China and Tsarist Russia¹²¹ on the definition of borders in the Central Asian region, the Tsarist government began openly implementing its religious missionary policy that aimed to Russify the natives gradually. The missionary activities of the colonial administration went parallel with the settlement of Russian population in the area, as well as the educational policy of opening of mixed Russian-Kazak schools. The aim of colonial rule was not the genuine humanistic concern to bring civilization to the area, but to use the Russian-educated Kazaks as the lowest level of servants for the Russian administrative apparatus as interpreters or volost officials. The isolation of Kazaks from Tatar influence that earlier had the effect of introducing Islam to Kazaks via the Volga Tatars, as well as the separation of the Kazaks from the more sedentary Islamic influence of the Central Asian Khanates, particularly that of Bukhara, was

¹²¹ For the delimitation of the border between the Chinese part of Turkestan (Sinkiang) and Russian Central Asia, two Treaties were signed. The first was The Treaty of Peking in 1860 and the second was the Treaty of Tarbagatay in 1864, that resulted with large losses on the Chinese part by the decision to follow "the line of the permanent pasture pickets." Harry Schwartz, *Tsars*,

also Tsarist policy. During the nineteenth century, a well-known Russian turcologist and missionary, Nikolay İlminskiy's activities related to the education of the people of Turkic and Muslim stock under the Tsarist administration deserves attention. Between 1861 and 1862, İlminskiy worked as the Professor of the Turcology Department at the Kazan University. His main target was to serve the Russian government by carrying out his missionary activities supported by his linguistic abilities in oriental languages. He developed his system of education by relying on the mother tongue of each group of people, and using it as the language of instruction.¹²² The tool of the İlminskiy ideas in promoting the use of the Kazak language as the medium of instruction was a nineteenth-century Kazak intellectual, İbray Altınşarın. He wrote the first Kazak grammar book and a Kazak-Russian dictionary. A contemporary Uzbek historian, Dr. Baymirza Hayit (who would like to be called rather a 'Turkistanian'), claimed that İlminskiy and his follower N. P. Ostroumov¹²³ worked together to create a **Sart**¹²⁴ language,

Mandarins and Commissars: A History of Chinese-Russian Relations, Garden City, N. Y. : Anchor Books, 1973, p. 58.

¹²² The best work about Nikolay Ilminski, in the West, was written by Isabelle Kreindler, "Educational Policies Toward the Eastern Nationalities in Tsarist Russia: A Study of Ilminski's System," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1969.

¹²³ N. P. Ostroumov was the editor of *Turkestanskiye Vedomosti* and the Chief Editor of *Turkistan Vilayetining Gazetesi* between 1887 and 1917. See, Baymirza Hayit, *Turkistan: Rusya ile Çin Arasında*, İstanbul: Otag Yayınevi, 1975, p.168-170.

¹²⁴ The word 'sart' is commonly used among the peoples of Central Asia as referring to the settled people of the Oasis or for those who were traders (tüccar). There were many attempt to explain the meaning of this word by well-known orientalist and scholars, such as Barthold, Radloff and Togan in the past. Zeki Velidi Togan, used the word and explained its historic and etimologic meaning in his *Turkistan* , 28 times. However, the Kazaks have a saying as "Özbek öz agam, sart sadagam," meaning Uzbek is my own brother, sart can be spent to save my life, as "sadaqa"(alms or charity money).

aiming to separate the people of the Oasis from Turkic influence by introducing non-Turkic Persian words heavily into the language of the Oasis people of Central Asia.¹²⁵

The consequence of all the above educational policies and practices was the alienation of the nomadic Kazaks from their native tongue by using either Tatar, when they wrote in Arabic script, or Russian. An article published in *Qazaq* in one of the 1913 issues, reveals that most of the educated Kazaks were ashamed of writing in their mother tongue. Their reasoning comes from the perception that Kazak language was not the language of belles-lettres. The article argues against this idea by stating that all of those who receive education either in Tatar madrasas or at Russian language schools actually were not able to improve the level of their mother tongue, but were restricted themselves to the language they received their education from.¹²⁶ This tendency prevented Kazaks from writing in their mother tongue and was the beginning of the dilemma of the major part of the Kazak educated class in present-day Kazakhstan, as well.

The first decade of this century brought some hopes for Kazaks in education. The Russian tsar allowed non-Russian subjects to educate their children in their mother tongue during the two years of their primary education by an imperial decree issued on the 14 January 1906. After this decree, it became evident that those who did not have their own unique alphabet were required to

¹²⁵Baymirza Hayit, *Türkistan: Rusya ile Çin Arasında*, İstanbul: Otag Yayınevi, 1975, p.168-170.

use cyrillic in preparing their class material. An article in the *Qazaq* interpreted the decree as pointing to the possibility of an official demand that peoples like the Noghay, the Başqurt and the Kazak use cyrillic alphabet in preparing the class material for their “national schools.”¹²⁷ Although usage of the cyrillic alphabet by non-Russian people was not put into practice in Tsarist times, it became a reality during the Soviet rule.¹²⁸ Ahmet Baytursun, a leading Alaş activist and educator created a unique Kazak alphabet in Arabic script, named as “Baytursun Ülgisi, Baytursın Alippesi,” (the method of Baytursun or the Baytursun Alphabet). He was also the author of *Til Qural* (The Tool of Language). Alaş intellectuals wrote other books such as *Esep Qural*, *Alippe*, *Qıraat Kitabı*, etc., at the beginning of this century.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ “Orenburg, 10 Fevral’,” “*Qazaq*” *Gazeti*, Chief editor A. Nisanbayev, Almatı: Qazaq Entsiklopediyası Bas Redaktsiyası, 1998, p. 14-15.

¹²⁷ “Şkoldarda Ana Tilimen Oquv,” “*Qazaq*” *Gazeti*, Chief editor A. Nisanbayev, Almatı: Qazaq Entsiklopediyası Bas Redaktsiyası, 1998., p. 165.

¹²⁸ Preparation of the ground for using the cyrillic alphabet in Kazak was made earlier in the second half of the nineteenth century, when İlminskiy was working with Ibray Altınсарın.

¹²⁹ Please see the list of books, announced for sale in “*Qazaq*” *Gazeti*, Chief editor A. Nisanbayev, Almatı: Qazaq Entsiklopediyası Bas Redaktsiyası, 1998., p. 191

THE NATIONALIST INTELLECTUALS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Kazak intellectuals at the beginning of the twentieth century were not many in number. The reason for this was the Tsarist educational policy of opening only secondary educational facilities for the Kazak people, rather than opening higher educational institutions to prepare Kazak professionals on the steppe. As one native intellectual put it; “the Russian Tsarist educational target was not the genuine cultural elevation of Kazak society to higher levels, but to keep Kazak society in a backward state.”¹³⁰ Mirjaqip Duvlatov reported the following about this subject: “The Tsarist government have exiled those natives who attempted to open schools on the Kazak land. (Qosçugulov¹³¹ and Navan Hazret¹³² were exiled in Yakutia for attempting to open schools.) The administration has prevented the natives themselves from building schools, let alone opening educational facilities for its native subjects.”¹³³

However, a decision to open a number of secondary level Russian-Kazak schools was necessary for the need of the imperial administration itself. It had two reasons; the first to “protect” the Kazaks from the Islamic preaching of mullahs and, second, to increase “Russian influence on the steppe.” Thus the colonial

¹³⁰ Mekemtas Mirzahmetov, *Qazaq Qalay Orıstandırıldı*, Almatı: Atamura-Kazakstan, 1993.

¹³¹ According to Togan, Qosçugulov is the deputy Şaymardan Qosçugulov of the State Duma after 1905, and he was also a supporter of Navan Hazret. Togan, *Turkistan*, p. 348.

¹³² According to Zeki Velidi Togan, Navan Hazret was Molla Palas oglu Navrızbay, the famous and influential intellectual from Kökşetav, who also had studied in Bukhara. Togan, *Turkistan*, p. 346.

¹³³ Mirjaqip Duvlatov’s interrogation material in 1929, cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 92-93.

administration was obliged to give a few scholarships to native Kazak students. Therefore a few Kazaks found the opportunity to study in the cities of Moscow, Petersburg, Kazan, Orenburg, Omsk and Warsaw. Kazak students who were lucky enough to receive higher education during the last decade of the nineteenth century later became the participants in political and intellectual activities in the Kazak steppe, especially after 1905. Moreover, all of those in the last list were members, or at least supporters of, the **Alaş Movement** in Kazakhstan.¹³⁴

During the first decade of the twentieth century, socio-political events and intellectual activities in the central cities of the empire helped Kazak student youth to improve their socio-intellectual development and to promote their political activities. The participation of Kazak youth in political activities in the Empire was not limited to Kazak students studying in the major cities of Russia. Young Kazaks studying at the regional seminaries, institutes and high schools, in cities like Omsk, Semey and Ural, also followed the political events of the Empire closely, and took part in the activities of various societies in their cities.¹³⁵ As a result of these kinds of activities, a number of Kazaks in Semey(Semipalatinsk) province were either imprisoned or exiled or entered into the ranks of those who are labeled as “untrustworthy” citizens of imperial Russia.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Qoygeldiyev, p. 87-88., and Kenges Nurpeyisov, *Alaş hem Alaş Orda*, Almatı: Atatek, 1995, pp. 216-219.

¹³⁵ Qoygeldiyev, p. 92.

¹³⁶ Mirjaqip Duvlatov, *Qazaq*, 1913, No. 28. cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 92.

POLITICAL FREEDOMS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

At the beginning of this century, Russian colonial officials observed closely the reactions of the native population to political and military events in the Russian Empire. Investigation by Tsarist officials of the political activities of the natives increased particularly after the Japanese defeat of the Russians during the Russo-Japanese war, in 1905. A certain *çinovnik*, local Russian official, representing the head of the Verniy district, wrote the following to the Military Governor of the area: "During my nineteen years of service to the Tsarist administration on the steppe, I observed a decrease in the colonial influence of the Russian empire particularly after the Russo-Japanese war. The Kirgiz (meaning the Kazaks) came to the conclusion that they had overestimated the might of the Russians before."¹³⁷

Clearly, decades long, hidden opposition of the Kazaks to the colonial policy burst out after the major political events that followed the 1905 war. Alihan Bökeyhanov, the most famous and influential, active Kazak intellectual, wrote that the steppe region was galvanized when the Russian Tsarist declaration, on February 18, 1905, was made, permitting the petitioning of the Tsarist authorities concerning the needs of the people, and when freedom of assembly was announced. According to Alihan Bökeyhanov, "During the 1905 revolution, the

¹³⁷ Qoygeldiyev, p. 94 .

whole steppe region was drawn towards the political arena and the whole steppe entered into the arena of the movement for independence.”¹³⁸

Native correspondence started on a massive scale to communicate the needs of the Kazak people. The Tsarist decree of April 17, granting religious freedom to minorities, further accelerated Kazak activities. Kazaks began to organize meetings to discuss the needs of their society during the summer of 1905, one after another. All the biggest Steppe fairs were turned into political arenas. During those meetings, the Kazaks discussed the matters to be included in the petitions that would be sent to “his royal highness.”¹³⁹

Thus, in the year 1905, a new phase in the development of the Kazak freedom movement started and it was elevated to a new stage. The political activities of Kazaks were limited to writing petitions to the Tsar and to the central authorities. Petitions were organized in almost every region of the Kazak steppe, Ural, Qarqaralı, and Jetisuv. A petition written by the Kazaks of the Lepsi district of Jetisuv Oblast (province) included the signature of 1,000 Kazaks. Another petition sent from Ural and Torgay provinces was signed by 44 Kazaks. The most famous of all was the one written in the Qoyandı fair of the Qarqaralı region that obtained the signatures of 14,500 Kazaks. It included eleven articles that covered the most pressing problems of Kazak society. The petition asked the authorities to

¹³⁸ Qoygeldiyev, p. 81 cited Alihan Bökeyhanov’s famous work *Kirgizi- Formi Natsiyonalnogo Dvijeniya v sovremennih Gosudarstvah*, 1910.

¹³⁹ Alihan Bökeyhanov, *Kirgizi- Formi Natsiyonalnogo Dvijeniya v Sovremennih Gosudarstvah*. Pod Redaksii, A. I. Kostelyanskogo. SP6, 1910..., p. 596-597. cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 95.

introduce new amendments, according to the particular needs of the Kazaks, into the regional administrative apparatus, judiciary system, and education. It also asked the Tsarist administration to grant Kazaks freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of the press and freedom to open printing houses, together with the replacement of the obsolescent Steppe Statute and the election of native officials to high executive organs. The most crucial matter for the Kazaks, the land problem, was not omitted in this famous Kazak petition to the tsar. The petition writers reminded the authorities that Kazak land, on which the blood of Kazak ancestors had been spilt in its defense, had been forcefully seized from the natives. Article 4 of the Kazak petition stated as follows:

“Article 4. Colonization of the Steppe carried out during the last fifteen years. The land owned by the Kazaks is shrinking as time goes on. Animal husbandry requires the extensive usage of land and thus it requires vast pastureland. However, the most fertile soil and the lands with rich water resources were seized by the authorities for the new *uchastkas* of the newcomers. Thus it is necessary to declare the land inhabited by the Kazaks as belonging to the natives.”

Alihan Bökeyhanov, Ahmet Baytursun and Jakıp Aqbayev were among the writers of the Qarqaralı petition. The Tsarist colonial administration was aware of the activities of Kazak intellectuals. Thus they began their retaliation with Alihan Bökeyhanov, on January 8, 1906. On his way to a meeting in Semey, he was imprisoned by the authorities. Bökeyhanov was going to Semey in

preparation for being elected as the Semey Representative to the First Russian State Duma, the parliament. Detailed discussion of this will follow.

GROWING KAZAK POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND PRESS FREEDOM

The October Manifesto of 1905 granted Kazaks the right to send their deputies to the Russian State Duma. Kazak intellectuals actively participated in the election of deputies to the State Duma and considered the Duma as the sole agency for affecting the colonial policy towards Kazak lands, and as the vital organ through which one could raise the problem of Kazak land. However, the Kazaks at this time suffered from Russian administrative practices and were given the right to elect only one Kazak deputy for each province. A petition to high Russian officials such as Graf Witte on this subject was ignored.

Kazak intellectuals participated in the heated debates of the election campaigns without any prior preparation of a political organization. Realization of this shortcoming compelled the Kazaks to organize meetings of candidate deputies of the Kazaks from five provinces before the end of 1905 in the city of Ural. Kazak delegations from Aqmola, Semey, Torgay, Ural and Jetisuv provinces gathered and announced their decision to establish the Kazak version of the "Constitutional Democratic Party."¹⁴⁰ Kazaks introduced a number of particular targets for the party:

¹⁴⁰ Qoygeldiyev, p.105. It seems an inaccurate conclusion of Prof. Martha Brill Olcott in assessing that "Creation of the State Duma gave Kazaks additional occasions to voice their indignation, both in election meetings and when they petitioned the new representatives... Two of these meetings

1. The necessity to adopt a law declaring that the land of Kazaks was solely their property;
2. The discontinuation of new Russian settlement on Kazak land;
3. Making laws which would provide Kazak workers with freedom, equal payment and rights, as well as protection of their rights,
4. Opening educational institutions for Kazak children.

However, Kazak attempts to form a political party were unsuccessful. It was partly due to the lack of preparation of Kazak society for entering suddenly into a politically active life. Second, it was not a priority for the central Kadet Party, to help to create a political organization that aimed at the freedom and equality of the Kazaks. However, the reason Kazaks supported the Kadet Party of imperial Russia was due to the decision of the All-Russian Muslim Congresses in 1905-1906.

For the First Russian Imperial Parliament, the Kazaks were required to elect altogether six deputies from Ural, Torgay, Semey, Aqmola, Jetisuv and Sirdarya Provinces. Alpisbay Qalmenov from Ural Oblast and Ahmet Birimjanov from Torgay Oblast were elected and went to participate in the First Russian Imperial Duma only one-and a-half months after the sessions had started. Due to his imprisonment during his candidacy for the elections for deputy in the Semey Oblast and due to the delay of the elections in that province, Alihan Bökeyhanov

were particularly noteworthy. The first, held in Uralsk in December 1905, drew representatives from five oblasts of Kazakhstan; it was at this meeting that the Alash Orda party was formed.....” Olcott, p.112.

arrived in Petersburg only a couple of days before the dissolution of the Duma. He had signed the **Viborg Manifesto**, a document protesting the dissolution of the First Imperial Duma, and thus was later prohibited from participating in the next Duma elections. Later he was imprisoned as well. One other Kazak deputy, Şaymardan Qosçugulov, the elected deputy to the First Duma from the Aqmola province, was rejected because of his inability to speak Russian. Deputy elections in the Jetisuv and Sırdarya Provinces were not complete when the First Duma was suddenly dissolved by the decision of the government after only 72 days of work. Thus only two Kazak deputies, Qalmenov and Birimjanov, attempted to voice the problems of about four million Kazaks and particularly their grievances about land, in cooperation with the Muslim faction.

The Second Russian Imperial Duma began its sessions on February 20, 1907, and Kazaks were represented by five deputies, all of them supporting and cooperating with the Muslim Faction in the Duma. Baqıtjan Qaratayev from Ural, Muhammetjan Tınışbayev from Jetisuv, Baqıtkerey Qulmanov from Astrakhan, T. Aldabergenov from Sırdarya and T. Nurekenov from Semey Provinces went to the Second Duma representing the Kazak nation.

The Second Duma became an arena for voicing criticism against the Tsarist government policies and thus was not able to win the favor of the Tsar and his government. It was dissolved by Imperial decree on June 3, 1907. The decree introduced substantial changes into the election system in the Empire. Most important of all was the decision to deprive the colonized people of the Steppe

and Central Asia of their universal manhood suffrage rights. The Tsarist government preferred not to have native deputies elected from the Kazaks, Kirgiz and Uzbeks.

During the short working opportunities of the first two Dumas, the introduction of any law that would inflict change on the colonized life of the Kazaks was possible. Kazak intellectuals, who were prevented from taking part in the Imperial Duma, began to concentrate their socio-political activities outside the Duma, by cooperating with the Muslim Faction, through Siberian Deputies and through leftist Kadet members in the Imperial parliament. Kazak intellectuals attempted to petition the major parties in the Third Duma and at the same time tried to persuade deputies in the Duma to pass a bill restoring the violated political rights of the Kazaks. During December 1912, deputies of the Kadet party proposed to introduce amendments to the then current election law, but unsuccessfully.

This was the end of the Kazak political activists' opportunity to participate in official Russian political institutions through their rightfully elected deputies. From this time onwards until the Bolshevik revolution, Kazak political activists used another method to bring Kazak problems forth to the attention of policy-makers by increasing the political and social awareness of the Kazak masses.

The first publication on the Kazak Steppe was *Turkistan Valayatining Gazeti* that appeared in 1870 as a supplement to the Russian language newspaper *Turkestanskiye Vedomosti*. In the beginning, it was published four times a month

and two issues were published in Kazak. *Dala Valayati*, a Kazak literary journal edited by B. Abulhayirov, began to appear in Omsk, as a supplement of *Akmolinskiye Oblastniye Vedomosti*, which was the official news organ of the regional administration. Contemporary Kazak scholars evaluate the work of the official Russian press organs, such as the *Turkestanskiye Vedomosti*, or the *Akmolinskiye Oblastniye Vedomosti* as the tool of the colonial rulers, rather than being the voice of the indigenous people.¹⁴¹ After the 1905 Revolution a second group of newspapers began to appear on the Kazak land. They were *Serke* (1907), *Qazaq Gazeti* (1907), *Dala and Qazaqstan* (1911-1913), as well as *Eşim Dalası* (1913). The first periodical in the Kazak language was *Ayqap* that began to be published in Troytsk in 1911 and ceased in 1915. The newspaper *Qazaq*¹⁴² was the most important organ on the Kazak steppe during the period between 1913 and 1918, and began to appear in Orenburg. It soon became the leading organ of the Kazak intelligentsia and nationalist movement. Within one year the number of subscribers to *Qazaq* reached three thousand, then eight thousand. There were subscribers to the newspaper from all the then Kazak territory, and from Fergana, Samarkand, Zakaspiy, Ufa, Kazan, Petersburg, Moscow, Tomsk, Chinese-Sinkiang (Eastern Turkestan), and even Ottoman Turkey.¹⁴³ It was edited by

¹⁴¹ Mirzantay Jaqıp, "Turkistan Valayatining Gazeti Jane Oris Baspasözi," *Juldız*, 12 Jeltoqsan (December) 1996, pp. 184-192., in p. 184.

¹⁴² Please see, "*Qazaq*" *Gazeti*, Chief editor A. Nisanbayev, Almatı: Qazaq Entsiklopediyası Bas Redaktsiyası, 1998. 560 pages. It also includes a biographic appendix for the editors, writers, and correspondents of the newspaper.

Ahmet Baytursun and its major writer was Mirjaqıp Duvlat. Alihan Bökeyhanov wrote very often in this newspaper. The newspaper received financial support from Kazaks belonging to different levels of income. The reason the Tsarist authorities permitted the publication of *Qazaq* was their demand from the editorial board that they publicize the internal and external policies of imperial rule, informing the Kazaks of decrees and decisions by the Steppe authorities and explaining administrative innovations. According to the *Qazaq* editorial board, the newspaper was to fulfill the following duties: 1. Publication of state decrees and laws regarding the Kazaks, 2. Publication of the activities of the State Duma and the Government, 3. Internal and foreign news items.

In the first issue of *Qazaq*, Baytursunov declared that “for the preservation of our national identity we must proceed toward enlightenment and develop our own literary language. It should never be forgotten that only that people who create a literature in their own native language have a right to independent existence.” Furthermore, Baytursunov explained the aims, of having an organ for the Kazaks as follows: ¹⁴⁴

First, the newspaper is the eyes, ears and the language of the people...Those people who do not own a newspaper are deaf-and-dumb and blind comparing to those who own a newspaper.

Second, the newspaper will support the public sense. The reason for this is that the educated, enlightened, experienced intellectuals will appear before the people (by writing in the newspaper) and lead them (to a better life).

¹⁴³ Information about the subscribers to the newspaper was published in the first issue of the year 1914. The subscription reached 3000 at that time. The news about subscribers to the newspaper even from the Ottoman Turkey is correct, based on the fact that copies of *Qazaq* were actually found by this author in the Hakkı Tarık Us Library in İstanbul not more than a decade ago. There were five subscribers to the newspaper from Ottoman Turkey already by 1913.

¹⁴⁴ *Qazaq*, 1913., No. 1.

Third, the newspaper serves as an organ to spread knowledge among the people. Fourth reason, the newspaper is the voice of the people. Those citizens (intellectuals-*azamat*) advocating the rights of their people, will speak up in the pages of the newspaper to defend their nation.

This newspaper emerged as the new tool by which Kazak intellectuals could elevate the political, social, and educational level of their society. It also served as the tool for organizing concerted action among the peoples of the Steppe as well as to strengthen Kazak unity and political awareness. The newspaper has provided researchers with valuable materials related to the life of Kazak society during the first two decades of the twentieth century. This publication that appeared during the developmental stage of the Kazak nationalist movement served to refine the ideology of the struggle for liberation. Thus, it is impossible to understand the principal aims and developing stages of the struggle carried out by nationalist Kazak intellectuals without the materials published in *Qazaq*.

The major subject of discussion of the few Kazak organs was concentrated on the most pressing issue, land, the so-called excess land, as well as the settlement of the native nomadic population alongside the Russian peasantry. The editorial board of *Qazaq* wrote that the land question¹⁴⁵ was the question of the very survival of the Kazaks. They also opposed the administrative measures

¹⁴⁵ There were 30 articles and news related to the *Qazaq* land question in the issues of the newspaper *Qazaq* published in the year 1913 only. For this, please see the index of the , "*Qazaq*" *Gazeti*, p. 461-465. Press material in the pages of the native Kazak media covered issues of international state interactions, international political matters; internal political, economic, cultural, and religious issues in the Russian Empire; matters related to Kazak history, literature, and ethnography. At the same time an extended detail of the Kazak press material would surpass the limit of this study. Even the analysis of the material published in *Qazaq* itself can be the subject of another doctoral or a major academic study.

concerning the settlement of the Kazaks alongside the Russian peasantry by arguing that this kind of policy would lead the Kazaks' being deprived of their land forever. In other words, this group did not oppose the settlement of nomadic Kazaks, but disagreed with the colonialist manipulation of naive nomadic Kazaks.¹⁴⁶ Alihan Bökeyhanov, Ahmet Baytursın and Mirjaqıp Duvlat did not agree with the Tsarist Russian policy of providing the Kazaks with only 15 **desyatina** of land. They demanded from the authorities to give Kazaks more than the above measure according to the need of each Kazak family to meet the essential amount of pastureland for their livestock. Baqıtjan Qaratayev and Muhametjan Seralin, on the other hand, agreed with the Tsarist decision to give Kazaks and those Russian peasants the above amount of land. Their reason for supporting this decision stemmed from their agreement to blame nomadism as the sole cause of the backwardness of the Kazak society.¹⁴⁷ At the beginning of this century, a Russian scholar P. Migulin wrote that the "historic duty of Russia is not expropriate the areas heavily inhabited, but to arrange for the habitation of the nomad's land in the East."¹⁴⁸ This statement clearly demonstrates the Russian aims behind occupying the nomadic Kazak land, that later would be exacerbated as a result of Soviet policies. This policy, by the last decade of the twentieth century,

¹⁴⁶ Quvatov, *ibid*, p.111.

¹⁴⁷ Abdijappar Abdakim, *Qazaqstan Tariyhi*, p. 185.

¹⁴⁸ *ibid*.

would make Kazakhstan partly belong to the Russian world because of its numerous Slavic inhabitants.

KAZAK INTELLECTUALS DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

During the establishment of colonial rule in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Tsarist administration agreed not to call up Muslims for military duty. This was confirmed by a law passed in 1886 by the Tsarist government. Thus when the First World War started, the Muslim subjects of Tsarist Russia were exempt from the duty of military service.

Nevertheless, Kazak intellectuals and the Kazak society obeyed their overlords in fulfilling their duties both as individuals and as a society when the World War started in 1914. They made contributions to the then newly established Temporary Muslim Central Committee, to help soldiers and their families at home, and in Petrograd (Petersburg). The committee organized various activities such as concerts or literature festivals to raise funds to carry out its charitable work. Kazak intellectuals collected money from the Kazaks, particularly during the fairs organized on the Steppe in the summer of 1915. Money collected from the Kazaks was also handed over to the Committee by the famous *Qazaq* newspaper as well.¹⁴⁹ A clinic to take care of the wounded soldiers was opened near the city of Ural sponsored by Kazaks who gave twenty-five

¹⁴⁹ 18,874 roubles and 98 Kopecks were collected among the Kazaks in Lbişin, Temir and Guryev area between May 9 to July 23 of 1915. By the end of August, money collected by the Kazak

horses and four camels. Kazaks from the Jubanıšköl area agreed to sponsor the salaries of medical staff of the clinic.¹⁵⁰ Kazaks from Torgay province collected 226,999 roubles and 74 kopecks between 1914 and 1917. During the first three-years of war, only from the Turkestan province, including today's Qızılorda, Şımkent, Jambul, Almatı and Taldıkorgan, 20,899 thousand pood¹⁵¹ of cotton, 300,000 pood of meat, 109,000 pood of cotton seed oil, 474,000 pood of fish, 229,000 pood of soap, 70,000 horses, 12,700 camels, 38,000 square meters of felt and 13,441 traditional Kazak felt-houses were collected. During 1914, only from Jetisuv province, agricultural products and other materials costing 34,000,000 roubles were taken for the war.¹⁵² A call in the pages of the *Qazaq* to help the Muslims of Kars and the money collected from the Kazaks became customary news items of this newspaper.¹⁵³

During the second stage of the First World War, when the Russian army was suffering from a manpower-shortage and was being defeated, the Tsarist "government decided to mobilize Muslims in labor battalions behind the lines,

newspaper was 22,615 roubles and 37 kopecks. *Qazaq*, 1915, No. 144 and 147, cited by Qoygeldiyev p. 170.

¹⁵⁰ Qoygeldiyev, p.170.

¹⁵¹ A traditional Russian weight of almost 20 kilograms.

¹⁵² Qoygeldiyev, p. 171.

¹⁵³ *Qazaq*, 1915, No. 107, No. 140. For more articles about this subject, please see the newly reprinted and transliterated copy of the "*Qazaq*" *Gazeti*,
 -"Qazaqtan Soldat Aluv," 1916, p. 261-262.
 -M. D. (Mirjaqıp Duvlat), "G. Duma ham Soldattıq Maselesi," pp. 269-270.
 -A. B. (Ahmet Baytursun), "Petrograd Hatı," pp. 272-273; 274-275; 276-277; and 279-281.

for the construction of trenches, barracks, and infirmaries.”¹⁵⁴ Uprisings started in areas suffering from economic hardship as a result of the continuing land seizure, endless demands for material contributions to the war, as well as the unfair organization of the list of draftees. Reaction to the mobilization of labor battalions was not limited to the Steppe region, but quickly spread to the Oases area as well. Asking Kazaks to serve a government who did not even provide the people of the Turkestan Khanates and of the Steppe with the basic right of representation in the Parliament was considered as unfair. Besides, asking them to serve behind the lines (as if they were all too untrustworthy to bear arms in defense of the state) seemed a humiliating action.¹⁵⁵ Thus started the most violent reaction to Tsarist rule in the twentieth century. The peoples of Central Asia, the Uzbeks, Kazaks, Kırgız, and Turkmens all participated in the uprising although to different degrees. Kazaks attacked Russian and Cossack settlements, military officials, as well as the natives who had collaborated with the Tsarist authorities in listing the natives as draftees. The colonial administration spent considerable effort in suppressing the uprising by using the local garrisons and other Tsarist military forces.

The role of Kazak nationalist intellectuals during the uprising is worth attention. The activities of intellectuals on the editorial board of the newspaper *Qazaq* during 1916 reveal their growing positive influence among the Kazaks.

¹⁵⁴ Serge Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967., p. 130.

Calls in the editorial articles of the newspaper for Kazaks to remain calm and to refrain from opposing the government forces, and their consequent organization of visits to the capital, as well as to the front, easing the hardship of draftees on the front, bore fruit later in the form of support from the ordinary people when the leading editors of *Qazaq* attempted to form the Alaş Orda government in 1917.¹⁵⁶

Kazak intellectuals dealt with the misery of their people resulting from the colonial policy of the Petersburg administration, particularly about the land problem. During the 1916 revolt, they voiced their open criticism of these rather unfair policies in the pages of Kazak language materials. Nevertheless, they cautioned the natives and tried to prevent them from opposing the Tsarist army. Specifically, the editors of the *Qazaq* newspaper proved their devotion to their people in trying to save them from the armed punishment of the colonial administration. Thus it is not possible to agree with the conclusion that the editorial staff of the *Qazaq* newspaper were “standing helplessly aside during the popular unrest in the summer and fall of 1916.”¹⁵⁷ The Kazak language materials of the Alaş intellectuals are of the utmost importance in understanding and analyzing the Kazak attempt to reach independence, although it was unsuccessful.

¹⁵⁵ Baymirza Hayit, *Türkistan Rusya ile Çin Arasında*, İstanbul: Otag, 1975, p. 207.

¹⁵⁶ Qoygeldiyev, “Kazak Demokratiyalık İntelligentsiyası Birinşi Düniyejüzilik Sogıs jane 1916 Jılgı Ult-Azattık Köterilis Tusında,” *ibid*, pp. 166-214. Please also see, “Orınbor 8 İyul,” “*Qazaq*” *Gazeti*, 1916, pp. 310-311.

¹⁵⁷ “The gazettes and their editorial staffs remained a lobbying group in the steppe until the Russian Revolution, when they established and staffed a short-lived Kazak autonomous government....These writers may have helped frame public opinion, but they were only one force and were more successful in harnessing popular fury than in preventing it. They were forced to stand helplessly aside during the popular unrest in the summer and fall of 1916.” Olcott, p.118.

It is also vital to realize the influence of Kazak intellectuals on the minds of native people, not only in the early decades, but also the later decades of this century. The Soviet period introduced a seventy-year long pause even in the discussion of most pressing problems of Kazak survival. Besides, the Soviet period made the situation worse with the Russification of the natives as well as turning Kazakstan into a Russian province. Open discussion of the subjects written by the Alaş intellectuals was prohibited during the Soviet period. The forceful confiscation of Kazak land, the settlement of Russian peasants on Kazak territory and the deteriorating state of the Kazak language were important threats from Soviet rule, taking deep root on the Kazak lands. If those discussions had been continued, and if the Alaş intellectuals had not been wiped out, the maintenance of free Kazak survival would not be so difficult in the present day.

THE NATIVE ATTEMPT TO FORM A NATIONAL STATE

A whole new phase started for the Kazak intellectuals after the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia. In other words, a new responsibility for struggle towards Kazak independence was placed on the shoulders of the native intellectuals. It was a major event for the Kazaks, first to free themselves from colonialist expropriation and humiliation. Second it brightened their hopes of finding an opportunity of administering themselves.

Alihan Bökeyhanov, Mirjaqıp Duvlatov, Mirzagazı Esbolov and Tel Jamanmurınov were in Minsk, helping Kazak draftees for the Tsarist army in labor battalions. In their telegram to the leading figures on the Kazak Steppe, which was published in the pages of *Qazaq*, they wrote the following:

“The day of liberty, equality and fraternity for all the nationalities of Russia has come. It is necessary for the Kazaks to organize support for the newly established government.... It is necessary to prepare for the elections to the all-Russian Congress.... You should also be prepared to raise the land issue. The form of government that we support should be “demokratičeskaya respublika.”¹⁵⁸

As a result of their close association with the Kadet Party of Russia, the Provisional Government appointed Alihan Bökeyhanov as the Commissar of Torgay Oblast, Muhametjan Tınışbayev as the Commissar of Jetisuv and Mustafa Çoqay as the Commissar of Turkistan Oblast.¹⁵⁹ On March 20, 1917, Alihan Bökeyhanov, together with Mirjaqıp Duvlatov and Mustafa Çoqay, wrote their famous letter to the “Sons of Alaş,” which was published in *Qazaq* and read as follows:¹⁶⁰

The day of liberty has arisen. God has let us to reach our aim. We were slaves yesterday, we are equal today... We are in the same ship with the just government of free Russia... We did not have any sympathy for Russia before. Now since we became equal to the Russian people, we should share their happiness and sorrow... Thus we should do our best to help the new government.

Starting from the first fortnight of March 1917, the old administrative organs and their officials began to be replaced with the new. The initiative for this

¹⁵⁸ *Qazaq*, 1917, No. 223 cited by Qoygeldiyev, p.216., also see, Alihan, Mustafa, Mirjaqıp, “Alaş Ulına,” Reprint “*Qazaq*” *Gazeti*, pp. 372-373; “Zor Özgeris,” *ibid.*, pp. 366-367.

¹⁵⁹ *Qazaqstan Tariyhı*, p. 302-303.

attempt was in the hands of the Russians in Kazakhstan, as in all the provinces of Russia. The natives this time tried to seize the opportunity for self-administration and began to organize Kazak Committees of Liberty. Starting from April 1 to May 7, a number of Kazak congresses were held. In Orenburg, there was the Congress of Torgay Kazaks; in Almaty, the Congress of Jetysay Kazaks; in Ural, the Congress of Ural Kazaks; in Semey, the Congress of Semey Kazaks and in Omsk, the Congress of Akmola Kazaks. The first of these congresses was held in Orenburg by the Torgay Kazaks on April 1, with the participation of 300 delegates and the Ural Congress was held from April 19 to April 22 and was the biggest with 800 delegates. During the Orenburg Congress of the Torgay Kazaks delegates from the Bökey Horde, Orenburg Province, Kazan, Ufa, and Tashkent, as well as the former deputies of the First Russian Duma, Alpysbay Qalmenov and Ahmet Birimjanov, participated. They discussed altogether thirteen matters, including the new form of administration, the land problem, and the maladministration of the colonial regime. They declared their preference for the form of government of the Russian state to be a “democratic parliamentary and decentralized republic.”¹⁶¹ The meaning of this was the aim of those native intellectuals to keep the decisive role in administering their land and the people in their own hands. Those provisional Kazak Congresses represented the Kazaks desire for self-rule and to have their own educational, judicial and military

¹⁶⁰ *Qazaq*, 1917., No. 225, cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 217.

¹⁶¹ *Qazaq*, 1917, No. 226, cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 222-224.

administration, after decades of hidden anger against the former Tsarist colonialist practices.¹⁶²

The decision to organize the First All-Kazak Congress was also made during the Torgay Kazak Provisional Congress held in Orenburg.¹⁶³ The First All-Kazak Congress was held in Orenburg, July 21-26 1917. As a result of the announcement made in the native press and through unofficial calls, twenty representatives from Aqmola, Semey, Torgay, Ural, Jetisuv, Sırdarya, Fergana, Orenburg and the Bökey Horde participated. Among the matters discussed, two were the most decisive: one concerned the political status of Kazakhstan, whether it should be an independent autonomous republic a view supported by Ahmet Baytursınov and Mirjaqıp Duvlatov or a national-territorial autonomous region in the Democratic Federative and Parliamentary Russian Republic, an idea supported by Alihan Bökeyhanov. Representatives accepted Bökeyhanov's

¹⁶² A. K. Boçagov, *Alaş Orda. Kratkiy istoričeskiy Oçerk o natsiyonal'no-burjuvaznom dvijeniye v Kazakstane periyoda 1917-1918.*, Qızıl Orda, 1927, p. 8, cited by Qoygeldiyev, p. 231.

¹⁶³ It is noteworthy to mention one point about the date of the First All-Kazak Congress. In some western sources, there seems to be a confusion on the date of this congress which was held for the first time in the summer of 1917, instead of spring time of the year. This is important due to the necessity of correctly placing the formation of the Alaş Party. The decision to form a Kazak political party was taken during the All-Kazak Congress held in Orenburg in the summer of 1917. Although it was realized mostly because of the influence of the Alaş intellectuals like Bökeyhanov, Duvlatov and Baytursunov, they were cautious enough in taking this kind of decision to seek the approval of the representatives of all the Kazaks. Thus it is difficult to number the Orenburg meeting of the Torgay Kazaks on April 8, 1917 as the First Congress of the Kazak National Party, Alaş Orda. However, although discussion about forming a Kazak political party was in the minds of the Alaş intellectuals, realization of this plan was not possible due to the membership of the leading Alaş activists, such as Bökeyhanov, of the Russian Kadet party. Bökeyhanov, during the spring and summer of 1917, was still a member of the above-mentioned Russian political organization. Therefore, it seems proper to label the First All-Kazak Congress as the one that took place in the Summer of 1917 and the second All-Kırız(Kazak) Congress as the one that occurred in December of 1917. (Please see, Society for Central Asian Studies, Reprint Series, No.; *The Revolution in Central Asia as seen by Muslim Bolsheviks*, Oxford, 1985, p. 12.)

proposal and declared that the Kazak provinces should be in the form of a territorial-national autonomy.¹⁶⁴ In reality, the First All-Kazak Congress was turned into the Congress of the Alaş movement. Thus the second important decision, to form the Alaş Party, was made during this Congress.¹⁶⁵

The Kazak land problem, the formation of military units, educational matters, judiciary institutions, religious affairs, the problems of women, preparations for the election of All-Russian People's Congress and to the forthcoming All-Russian Muslim Congress, as well as the formation of the first Kazak political party were discussed by the participating delegates at length. Tens of thousands of Kazaks who had fled the country after the 1916 events began to return. Harassment of all these natives by the veteran Russian soldiers and the Cossack cavalry, particularly in the Jetisuv area, was another matter discussed at the Orenburg Congress in July 1917.

In the meantime, the All-Russian Muslim Congress was also held in Moscow May 1-11, 1917. They organized a *Şura-i Islam*, a central committee consisting of 30 members and an Executive Committee consisting of 12 members. The Congress decided to give a five member share to Kazaks on the central committee. This was another part of the duty of the Kazak intellectuals, as members of the Muslim Community in the land of the Tsars.

¹⁶⁴ *Qazaqstan Tariyhtı*, p. 305.

¹⁶⁵ *The Russian Provisional Government-1917, Documents*, Robert Paul Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (eds.), Hoover Institution Publications, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961, Vol. I, p. 167.

Among the leading Kazak intellectuals and political activists that supported the Alaş Party were Alihan Bökeyhanov, Ahmet Baytursın, Muhametjan Tınışpayev, Mirjaqıp Duvlatov, Magjan Jumabayev, Şakerim Qudayberdiyev, Sultanmahmut Toraygırov, Halel Gabbasov, Alimjan Ermekov, Jihanşa Dostmuhammedov and Halel Dostmuhammedov. All of those listed above combined around the idea of liberating the Kazaks from colonial expropriation. Among them the most famous was Alihan Bökeyhanov, member of the First Russian Duma and one of the signatories of the famous Viborg Manifesto, as well as the first and last president of the Alaş movement on the Kazak steppe. Alihan Bökeyhanov was a staunch defender of the Kazak right on land-related questions against the Tsarist colonialist policy. His opposition to the Tsarist land policy in Central Asia was shaped during his two-year participation in the famous Şçerbina expedition that lasted for ten years. The Şçerbina expedition had consisted of a group of well-known scientists, military analysts, ideologists and theoreticians of the colonial system of Tsarist Russia.¹⁶⁶ Bökeyhanov was a member of the Russian Kadet party before the formation of the first Kazak political party. On March 28, 1917 he was appointed by the Kerensky Government as the Commissar of the Provisional Government in the Torgay Province.¹⁶⁷ However, he considered departing from the Kadets a long time before

¹⁶⁶ Tursın Jurtbay, "Talqı: Qazaqta Bası Artıq Jer Joq," *Juldız*, No. 4, 1997, pp. 3-40. This work was published as a book in 1988, though this author has not seen the published form yet. The author of this article spent five years in the archives and this article reveals important information about the Alaş intellectuals' activities, mainly during the first quarter of this century.

he put this idea into practice.¹⁶⁸ Bökeyhanov understood that the Kadet Party was against the idea of national autonomy and that their policy was not suitable for the “sons of Alaş,” who wanted to form a national autonomous region. At the same time, Bökeyhanov was against the proposal to allow Kazaks to have private property. He claimed that if Kazaks individually owned the land, they would in a very short period sell their properties to Russian peasants and face the same fate as the Başqurts who had experienced this earlier and had afterwards remained landless. Muhametjan Tınışpayev was another Alaş intellectual who became the first transport engineer of the Kazaks after studying in Petersburg. He was a member of the Second State Duma. Later he became the Prime Minister of the Hokand Autonomous Government and during the 1920s, he participated in the construction of the Türk-Sib Railway. Muhametjan Tınışpayev’s political opinion towards colonialist rule was shaped during his stay in the Tsarist capital both when a student and later as a member of the State Duma. In one of his letters to the President of the Ministerial Council of the Tsarist Duma, Tınışpayev presented Kazak grievances in a well-versed manner.¹⁶⁹ Another increasingly important figure among the Kazak intellectuals who formed the Alaş Movement

¹⁶⁷ *The Russian Provisional Government-1917, Documents*, Robert Paul Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (eds.), Hoover Institution Publications, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961, Vol., p. 167.

¹⁶⁸ Zeki Velidi Togan, *Hatıralar: Türkistan ve Diğer Müslüman Doğu Türklerinin Milli Varlık ve Kültür Mücadeleleri*, İstanbul, 1969, p. 147.

¹⁶⁹ Muhametjan Tınışpayev, *Qazaq Halqının Tariyhı*, Almatı, 1993, pp. 15-19 cited by Manaş Qozıbayev in *Qazaqstan Tariyhı*, Almatı: Atamura, 1994, pp. 5-9.

was Ahmet Baytursın.¹⁷⁰ He was a philologist, educator, poet, ethnographer and historian. Before actively participating in Kazak political life during 1917, he taught in various Kazak schools and wrote about problems related to the Kazak language and land matters, together with important evaluation of the work of the Tsarist Duma in the well-known Kazak journal of *Ay-Qap* (1911-1915).¹⁷¹ After 1909, he was first arrested and then expelled from the steppe region. Thus he was forced to live in Orenburg, where, between 1913 and 1918, he published the influential periodical *Qazaq* that later became the official organ of the Kazak national party Alaş Orda.

¹⁷⁰ There are a whole new set of articles and books published about Ahmet Baytursın in present-day Kazakhstan. The following list (which was cited by Saken Özbekuli in the foreword of the reprint of *Janga Nizam* by Ahmet Baytursunuli, Almatı: Jeti Jargı, 1996, p. 4) is only a part of this new movement, merely to present the new wave and new tendencies of current Kazak intellectuals and media:

- Rabiyga Sızdıkova, "Ahmet Baytursın," *Qazaq Adebıyatı*, 6 Qangtar, 1989
- A. Mektepov-G. Anesov, "Halıq Perzenti," *Örken*, 14 Qangtar 1989.
- Rımgalı Nurgalıyev, "Alıp Bayterek," *Qazaq Adebıyatı*, 21 Savır 1989.
- A. Mektepov-G. Anesov, "Ana Tılın Türlendirgen Ahang," *Jalın*, No. 2, 1989.
- Şamşıyabanu Setpayeva, "Ahmet Baytursunov," *Ahmet Baytursunov: Şıgarmaları*, Almatı: 1989.
- Rabiyga Sızdıkova, *Ahmet Baytursunov*, Almatı: 1990.
- Rabiyga Sızdıkova, "Ahmet Baytursunov: Ömiri men Qızmeti Tuvralı," *Tıl Tağlımı*, Almatı: 1990.
- J. Ismagulov, "Ahmet Baytursunov: Aqındıq jane Tarjımaşılıq Tağlımı," *Juldız*, No. 1, 1992.
- A. Qaydari-Ö. Aytbayulı, "Ult Madeniyetining Han Tangiri," *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 28 Qangtar 1993.
- S. Kakişev, *Ahang Tuvralı Aqıyqat*, Almatı: 1992.
- M. Mamajanov, *Asıl Mura*, Almatı: 1993.
- Rabiyga Sızdıkova, "Ahmet Baytursunov: Agartuvşı Galım, Qogam Qayratkeri," *Zaval*, Almatı: 1991.
- Tursınbek Kakişev, "Sın men Qıysın Sardarı," *Aqıyqat*, No. 12, 1994.

¹⁷¹ This journal was published between 1911 and September of 1915. Its editor was M. Seralin. Please see, *Ay-Qap*, Reproduced by "Qazaq Entsiklopediyası" Bas Redaktsiyası, Edited by Rımgalı Nurgalıyev, Almatı, 1995.

Together with Alihan Bökeyhanov and Mirjaqıp Duvlatov, Baytursın played a leading role in the process that led Kazak intellectuals to decide to proclaim the autonomy of the Kazak steppe and to elect an executive committee by forming the Alaş Orda Government in December 1917.

The Formation of the Alaş Orda Government

Soviet historians claim that the reason for the emergence of the **Alaş Party** and of the **Alaş Orda Government** was a reactionary-oppositionary bourgeois-nationalist movement against Bolshevik power. In reality, the rise of the **Alaş** movement stemmed from the ages-old longing of the Kazaks to express their desires, and from the weak central control and administration of the provisional government. Chaos and turmoil preceding the February Revolution, as well as a famine due to climatic conditions, had made the life of the Kazaks worse during 1917. It was coupled with the harassment of natives by Cossack cavalry units and soldiers returning from the front. Kazak intellectuals around the newspaper *Qazaq* were compelled to take the matters of the defense of their people and their territory into their own hands. They decided to call the “First All Kazak and Kırğız Congress” to make a decision to form military units for their own defense owing to the chaotic situation on the steppe. In Mirjaqıp Duvlatov’s words, it became a duty for the native intellectuals to dedicate themselves to guiding their people to defend their nation at a chaotic time when no authority existed on the

Kazak Steppe to restore order and establish authority.¹⁷² After discussing the current situation, a handful of Kazak intellectuals, including Alihan Bökeyhanov, Ahmet Baytursın, Mirjaqıp Duvlat and others, decided to organize the All Kazak and Kırız Congress on the 5th of December 1917. Another important matter to be decided in the congress was to form the **Ult Kengesi**, the National Council, to facilitate the administration of five million Kazaks on the Steppe. The All Kazak and Kırız Congress was held in Orenburg on December 5, 1917, with the participation of 82 delegates from all over Kazak society. It lasted for nine days.

The Congress formed the National Council (**Ult Kengesi**) and decided to name it the **Alaş Orda**. Thus the first Kazak government was born and among the 25 members of the government ten seats were given to non-Kazaks. Among those who were elected to the government were Validhan Tanaşev from Bökey Horde, Halel Dosmuhammedov from Ural, Aydarhan Turlubayev from Aqmola, Ahmet Birimjanov from Torgay, Halel Gabbasov from Semey, Sadıq Amanjолоv from Jetisuv, Mustafa Çoqay from Sırdarya, as well as Alihan Bökeyhan, Jahanşa Dosmuhammetulı, Alimhan Ermekulı, Muhametjan Tınışbayulı, Baqıtkerey Qulmanulı, Jaqıp Aqbayulı, Bazarbay Mamıtulı, Otınşı Eljanulı. Alihan Bökeyhanov was elected as the President of the National Council, winning 40 votes out of 79.¹⁷³ The National Council was assigned to form national military

¹⁷² "El Qorğav," *Qazaq*, 1917, No. 249.

¹⁷³ Qoygeldiyev, p. 332-333.

units, to establish a national educational system, as well to arrange the financial and budgetary affairs of the new government.

The Congress declared the formation of the **Alaş Orda Government** to include territories of the Bökey Horde, Oral, Torgay, Aqmola, Semey, Jetisuv provinces and some areas that were inhabited by Kazaks in Zakaspiy province and the Altay region. The Congress also defined the share of soldiers for each province as well as responsibilities for training and equipping the units. It was planned to obtain the financial support of the Kazak military units from taxes that were to be collected by the central authorities. It was also decided to ask help from the Orenburg Cossack units for training the native units.¹⁷⁴

THE KAZAK PERCEPTION OF THE WORLD AND THEIR CONTACTS

Kazak intellectuals were aware of their ethnic and religious differences from the Slavic and Orthodox world with which they shared the same umbrella, the Tsarist flag. Nevertheless, they were conscious that there would be no possibility of driving the imperial colonial rule out from their land without unification with other forces inside the empire. The doyen of the Kazak intellectuals, Bökeyhanov, was busy in the first decade of this century trying to find other forces at the empire-level to unite against the autocratic rule of the tsars. The Tsarist archives reveal that he participated in the organizing activity of

¹⁷⁴ *Qazaqstan Tariyhi*, p. 310. In Richard Pipes words : “Alaş Orda leaders established contact with the Orenburg Cossacks, who formed something of a third force in that area. In December, the Orenburg Cossacks made an alliance with the natives.” Pipes, *ibid.*, p. 84.

the all-Russian revolutionary groups at a meeting in Samara in 24 October 1912.¹⁷⁵ According to a young native scholar, Sultanhan Aqqululı, this meeting was organized by the Mason Society in Russia. Alihan Bökeyhanov's participation in the organization of this meeting was a result of his membership of the Mason Society of *Poliarnaya Zvezda* (the North Star or Pole Star) of St. Petersburg, earlier in 1908.¹⁷⁶ It is not surprising to see Alihan Bökeyhanov in a Masonic society. His influence was considerable as a member of the Kazak aristocratic family, a political activist, a member of the First Russian Duma and a member of the Russian Kadet party. He was the writer of many political and judicial analyses of imperial politics in newspapers and journals not only in Kazakhstan but in many organs at the imperial level.¹⁷⁷

The nationalist intellectuals had some contacts with other Turkic and Muslim intellectuals and societies, at least, in the form of bilateral agreements, though none reached success. They attempted to cooperate in the wake of the mounting events that occurred in the first quarter of this century in Russia. Cooperation with other Muslim groups and organizations was one way to pressure the official authorities on matters regarding Kazak life. Thus Kazak intellectuals attended every invitation for a Muslim gathering organized in Russia. The Kazak

¹⁷⁵ Documents from the State Archive of the Russian Federation was cited by Sultanhan Aqqululı, "Alihan Bökeyhan," *Juldız*, 1 January 1996, pp. 3-61, in p. 17.

¹⁷⁶ David Yusupoviç Bebutov, "Russkoye Masontsvo XX veka" in *Russkoye Masontsvo I Revolutsiya*, Yu. Fel'stinskiy, editor and compiler, Moscow: Terra, 1990., p.134. cited by Sultanhan Aqqululı, in *ibid.* p.18.

goal of having close contact with other groups, including the Muslims in Russia, followed the same aim of voicing Kazak concern and representing the Kazak point of view in all matters. Unfortunately, due to the lack of consensus among the Muslims of Russia on many matters, be it the future form of political administration or less important subjects such as the marriage age of a Muslim girl, gatherings of Turko-Muslims of Russia did not reach their targeted aim of taking concerted action, political or otherwise.¹⁷⁸ These attempts also proved the failure of Pan-Islamist ideas to bring unity to Russia's Muslims, whose populations lived scattered in quite different geographic regions in the Russian Empire. When the hopes of forming a strong center to organize concerted action among the Muslims of Russia was shattered, it was very easy for any militarily strong power to defeat each region one after the other. Problems stemming from diverse regional characteristics and interests, as well as different targets and aims, led each group of Turko-Muslim people to seek solutions unique to their own needs. For example the Başqurts chose to cooperate with the Kazaks, rather than with the Tatars of the Volga region. (The reasons for this action are, of course, not within the scope of this study.)

One of the most important contacts of Kazak intellectuals was established with the Başqurts under the leadership of Validov. Validov or Zeki Velidi Togan was one of the first who understood the real aim of the Bolsheviks towards the

¹⁷⁷ Bökeyhanov's articles appeared in *Reç*, the organ of the Russian Kadet party, and in *Naşa Jızn*. Please see, by Sultanhan Aqqululı, in *ibid.*, p. 18.

Turko-Muslim peoples of the former Tsarist land. The Bolsheviks were ready to sacrifice the Turko-Muslim masses for the sake of the overall success of the revolution. Validov also believed in Socialist principles, while trying to preserve the interests of his fellow-brothers, the Turko-Muslims. Thus he wanted to work together with the Soviets during 1918, together with the Alaş Ordists and later when he was in Turkestan. Togan accepted the idea of “socialization of the land” and thus wanted to cooperate at the beginning with the SRs (the Socialist Revolutionaries). However, after witnessing “the Russian chauvinism of the SRs, he stepped back from his earlier decision. He later formed the opinion that a **“Nationalist Socialist Party”** should be organized.¹⁷⁹ Validov’s ideas and connections with almost all the active political and literary figures to the East of the Urals, as well as the united attempt of Turko-Muslim intellectuals to obtain help from outside powers to support the nationalist attempts, alarmed the Bolsheviks.

During the Stalinist period, when almost all the Kazak intellectuals, be they Alaş Ordist or not, were interrogated, the key question asked by the Soviet security officials was about their ties and relations with Validov. Validov’s memoirs, published in Turkey in 1969, reveal important aspects of the then current political ideas and the reasons for the behavior of Kazak intellectuals in Russia. The significance of Validov’s memoirs is now clearly understood,

¹⁷⁸ Nadir Devlet, *Rusya Türklerinin Milli Mücadele Tarihi(1905-1917)*, Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1985. p. 291-297.

particularly after the Soviet disintegration, after which many materials related to the activities of the Alaş intellectuals began to be published in Kazakistan. Fascination follows when one sees the opinions Validov's memoirs, parallel to those of Alaş intellectuals whose works have been openly circularized after the independence of the Central Asian republics, particularly of Kazakistan.¹⁸⁰ The following is an excerpt from Validov's memoirs that reveals the close contact of Kazak intellectuals with Validov himself:

Kazak leaders, the author Ahmet Baytursın, a much respected elderly person and a descendant of Chingiz (Han), Şahingerey Sultan Bökeyhanov of Bökey Horde, Mustafa Çoqayoğlu from Taşkent, Jihanşa Dostmuhammedov from Oyl and others met (frequently) in Alihan Bökeyhanov's office (who was the Commissar of Torgay Province appointed by Kerensky government) during the last days of October and first days of November (1917). I was present at most of these meetings. It was during those days that the Soviets were becoming successful and were sabotaging the election preparations of the Constituent Assembly (uçreditelnoye sobraniye), as well as when whispers of dictatorship were spreading. Alihan announced his departure from the Kadet party of which he was until that time an official member and accepted the idea of the foundation of the (Kazak) autonomy under the name of Alaş Orda. Mustafa Çoqayoğlu wanted to stay in Orenburg because of the Soviet takeover of Taşkent on October 28. The Kazak elders advised me to deal with Başqurt matters and suggested that Çoqayoğlu return to Taşkent and remain there. The discussion that lasted for two days drew our destinies. We decided to remain faithful to the principles of democracy and the constituent assembly, never to accept Bolshevism, (and) to follow the Ukrainian way of autonomy, (W)e were to organize the All Kazak and All Başqurt Congresses in Orenburg at the same time, at the end of December, (and) support the autonomy of Turkıstan, (W)e were not going to publicize the matter of creating a single republic since Russian circles supporting the federation idea and of Orenburg, and Ural Cossacks who separately agreed with the autonomy of Turkıstan, Kazakistan and Başqurtistan, disagreed over the alternative (the united) form. These were the most important decisions we took during the 1917 revolution.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ Togan, *Turkıstan*, p. 361-362. He also wrote that they were not successful in forming a nationalist socialist party and decided to stay in the general national platform.

¹⁸⁰ See Validov's evaluation of socialist ideas and its suitability to the Turko-Muslim peoples East of the Urals and, just for the sake of an example, see Ahmet Baytursınov's letter to Lenin that very much resembles Validov's opinion. For this, see particularly of Validov's memoirs and his book on the history of Turkıstan. Ahmet Baytursınov's letter to Lenin was republished in *Qazaqstan Tariyhi: Hrestomatiya*, Compiler Manaş Qozıbayev, Almatı, 1994., pp. 100-105.

¹⁸¹ Togan, *Hatıralar*, p.184.

Kazak and Başqurt cooperation went even further than the above ideas and their contact extended in the following year. Validov's aim was to publicize the current political situation of Turkıstan, Kazakistan and Başqurtistan to the world through Japan. He also made an agreement with the Kazak leaders to accomplish this task with Kazak help as well. The Kazaks also accepted an attempt to reach the world public through Gulca-İle city, on the Chinese side of Turkıstan. Representatives and leaders of both sides met several times to realize their aim. The first of these meetings took place in Semey(Semipalatinsk), July 18-21 1918. The Başqurt side was represented by Seyid Girey Magaz and Kazak leaders including Alihan Bökeyhanov and Muhammetjan Tınışpayev were present there. Among the agreed matters, there was a point that revealed the Başqurt, Kazak and Turkıstani (Khokand) preference of keeping their national struggle within the borders of Russia. They wanted to establish contact with the Japanese diplomatic representatives in Siberia and Gulca rather than making ties with the Germans who, then, occupied Ukraine and who had attempted to make contact with Kazak leaders in Astrakhan. The reasons for this preference stemmed from following the same line as the Russians who, then, were an ally of Japan.¹⁸²

The second meeting between the Başqurt, Kazak and Turkıstani representatives took place in the late summer and early fall of 1918 in Orenburg and Samara. Alihan Bökeyhan, Ahmet Baytursın, Mirjaqıp Duvlat; the former Prime-Minister of the Khokand Government, Muhametjan Tınışpayev; Secretary

of Foreign Affairs Mustafa Çoqay and many others, together with Başqurt leaders gathered and exchanged opinions over the future of their country. They made a decision to form a South-East Federation of Muslims, to unite Başqurt and Kazak soldiers into a single army corps. A decision was also taken to suggest to the Russian organizations that a bigger federation, such as the Eastern Russian Alliance, with the participation of the governments of Sibir and Samara, as well as of Ural and Orenburg Cossacks should be formed.¹⁸³ Togan wrote that they later had to step back from this decision after understanding the White Army Commander, Admiral Kolçak's refusal to recognize the Başqurt and the Alaş Orda governments, and the Kolçak's intolerance of the two government's armies. They also did not see any reason to fight against the Taşkent communists. In the same manner, the Turko-Muslim leaders hope of obtaining arms and ammunition from the British and American representatives in Omsk also failed due to their need to acquire arms via Vladivostok.¹⁸⁴

On September 12, 1918, Kazak and Başqurt delegates met Yusuf Akçura, the famous pan-Turkist theoretician and then, the representative of the Red Crescent (**Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti**) Society. Alihan Bökeyhanov, Muhammetjan Tınışpayev, Mustafa Çoqay and Zeki Validov met him in Samara and intended for him to assume responsibility for the foreign affairs of the planned, future South-Eastern Muslim Countries Federation. Akçura, reportedly,

¹⁸² Togan, *Hatıralar*, p. 216-217.

¹⁸³ Togan, *Hatıralar*, p. 229.

refused to accept the proposal, owing to his acceptance of Turkish citizenship. Additionally, Akçura proposed to use as the name of the future state 'the Federation of Eastern Turks.' Alihan Bökeyhanov, arguing against this suggestion, followed a more cautious stance and pronounced his reluctance to use this label. Bökeyhanov did not want to alarm Russian circles by using anything that will sound to the ears like pan-turkism. He reportedly said that the time was not ripe to use such labels.¹⁸⁵ This is the perfect example of the sensibility, perhaps caution, of the Alaş leader with regard to the existing circumstances.

Nevertheless, under the leadership of Alihan Bökeyhanov, there were Alaş or Kazak intellectuals who supported and advocated the idea of Turkic unity, such as the poet Magjan Jumabayev. As in other parts of the Turkic and Muslim world the ideas that propounded the unity of Turks all over the world remained only in the poems of Magjan for the Kazaks. Any sensible Kazak was aware of the difficulty of realizing the dream of Turan, particularly, at those times, when the Bolsheviks, or to the Kazaks the former Tsarist tyranny dressed in a red coat, was gaining control of the whole Central Asia, including the Kazak steppe.

KAZAK IDENTITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

At the beginning of this century, on a more general level among the Turkic-Muslim peoples of the Tsarist Empire, there were three main different

¹⁸⁴ Togan, *Turkistan*, p. 376.

ideas discussed by the intellectuals: Pan-Turkism; Pan-Islamism, and the relationship of the Turko-Muslim groups with their overlords, the Russians. Intellectuals in the Kazak lands were not alien to these discussions. The search to find the most suitable path for the Kazaks also led native intellectuals to discuss and prefer certain of the above ideas according to the beliefs and personal experiences of each. Those graduates of the traditional madrasas in Kazan, Ufa, Bukhara, and Taşkent felt close to the ideas of pan-Islamism and the religious unity of their people with their Muslim brothers. This group wanted the Kazaks to turn their face towards the East. Their ideas can clearly be observed from their attempts to form societies such as **Ulu Turkistan, Turkistan Birleştigi and Şura-i İslami**. Another group of Kazak intellectuals preferred more ethnically oriented ideas and the ‘New-Method’ (the Jadidist) viewpoints. Their position was to adopt a more modern, western (but not altogether Russian) type of life, on the condition of preserving some unique characteristics of their people. There was a third group which felt closer to the second but differed from them by visualizing the development of the Kazak land through Russian culture and Russian language. The third group sided with the then newly-emerging Bolshevik ideas.

Different ideas on the future definition of the Kazak path began to take shape among Kazak intellectuals prior to and during the Bolshevik revolution. Some supported the idea of forming a “Qıpçaq type of state” in which many

¹⁸⁵ Togan, *Hatıralar*, p. 230-231. Yusuf Akçura did not mention in his work of his meeting with the Kazak and Bashkir delegates, in his work entitled *Osmanlı Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti Rusya Üzeri Murahhası Yusuf Akçura Bey’in Raporu*, Dersaadet(İstanbul), 1335.

Turkic-Qıpçaq speaking tribes and people, such as the Kazak, Kırgız and Qaraqalpaq, would unite under one flag. Another group wanted to form an “Ulu Qazaqstan” including the neighboring regions of Siberia. A third group wanted to form a “federation” of the three Kazak Hordes. Still another group suggested that a federation consisting of the Kazaks, Uzbeks, Başqurts and others should be formed. Almost a century afterwards, during the present-day, intellectuals have begun a new search regarding the future path of their country. All of the above ideas are still in play. Discussion of this will, however, be the subject of following chapters.

CLASH OF POLITICAL IDEAS

Each group of intellectuals in the Kazak lands tried to use the then modern tools of reaching the public. Education and journalism, as well as political activities, were their main professions. The leading Alaş intellectuals such as Alihan Bökeyhanov and Ahmed Baytursınov had always had a leading role in matters related to both journalism and education. The newspaper *Qazaq* was the organ of mass communication in the hands of the Alaş Ordists. They established their control over the Kazak people. Kazaks supported the Alaş Ordists, in some provinces, by 85.6 percent during the first quarter of the twentieth century.¹⁸⁶ They used the *Qazaq* newspaper to awaken the political, social and cultural consciousness of their people, aside from simply enlightening them in educational

¹⁸⁶ Mambet Qoygeldiyev, *Alaş Qozghalı*, Almatı, 1995, p. 317.

matters.¹⁸⁷ The enlightened Kazak elite attempted to organize on the basis of their faith, as well as on their ethnic, linguistic and territorial characteristics and to gain political power as the most effective way of controlling the political destiny of their people. This fact also proves as correct the idea of the well-known academician Anthony Richmond in his statement that “the teachers and journalists play an important part in this respect and are often among the strongest supporters of ethnic nationalism... Access to and control over the instruments of mass communication becomes an important issue.”¹⁸⁸

During the fall of 1917 another political party was formed by a different group of Kazak intellectuals alongside the Alaş Movement. Those who formed the *Üş Jüz* (The Three Horde) party described it as the “Socialist Party of the Kırğız (meaning the Kazaks).” It was formed by a handful of Kazak intellectuals who were influenced by some leftist groups in Russia. Regardless of a very small number of supporters, this kind of groupings emerged, not only among the Kazaks, but in other Turko-Muslim groups like the Başqurts and Tatars. The emergence of a small number of opposition leftist groups was not unique to Kazak society. On the contrary, it was a common phenomenon in all Russia. Discussions among the leading political activists and those who were aware of the

¹⁸⁷ The outstanding contemporary Kazak writer Muhtar Avezov evaluated the *Qazaq* newspaper as: “It was the newspaper *Qazaq* that celebrated all the Kazaks from bended old to the crawling baby, awakened them from their eternal sleep, revitalized their souls, energized them as the morning breeze of the fall and retrieve them.” cited by Altay Sarmurzin and Mambet Qoygeldiyev in “Haliqtıng Jariq Juldızı: Qazaq Gazetining Şıguv Tariyhınan,” *Juldız*, Vol. 9 (1990), p. 189.

¹⁸⁸ Anthony H. Richmond, “Ethnic Nationalism and Post-Industrialism,” in *Nationalism*, John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 289-300.

ideological struggle taking place in all of Russia offered different alternatives to the Turkic and Muslim society. The triumph of the Bolshevik power and the defeat of forces opposing it, both those who supported the White forces and those who belonged to more specific national movements, such as the Başqurt and Kazak liberation movements, obliged the Turko-Muslim leaders to consider a future cooperation with whoever was gaining the upper hand. This prepared the ground for a group of the natives to unite with the Bolsheviks. The outstanding Başqurt scholar and the most important Başqurt political theoretician Ahmed Zeki Velidi Togan, known in Russia as Validov, shed light on this very matter in his memoirs. The Başqurts informed the Kazaks of their decision of forming a Başqurt Socialist Party and Validov suggested that the Kazaks also should form a Kazak Socialist Party, instead of the Alaş Orda that was not supporting socialist ideas in its social and economic principles.¹⁸⁹ This was an alternate way of the Muslim and Turkic peoples of the area to cope with the changing circumstances in order to safeguard the survival of their people. Since both the Kazak and Başqurt intellectuals were united in their decision to make an agreement with the Soviet authorities,¹⁹⁰ it cannot be correct to label the **Üş Jüz Party** as a movement totally independent of the general current of the Kazak intellectuals.

The **Üş Jüz** party that was formed in October and November of 1917, attempted to cooperate with the Alaş movement during the very beginning of its

¹⁸⁹ Zeki Velidi Togan, *Hatıralar*, p. 247.

¹⁹⁰ Togan, *Hatıralar*, p. 243.

existence. But in a very short time after its emergence, it became one of the major critics of the socio-political and socio-economic program of the Alaş group. The leading activists of the **Üş Jüz** party were Kölbay Togusov, who worked as an amateur lawyer,¹⁹¹ journalist and dramatist; Şaymerden Eljanov, a public health worker and interpreter; Abilhayır Dosov, a student; Ishaq Qabekov, a porter; and Muqan Aytpenov a journalist. It is interesting that Eljanov, Aytpenov and Togusov occasionally wrote in the famous Kazak periodical *Ayqap* during the period between 1912 and 1915.

Kölbay Togusov had been subjected to Tsarist punishment in the period 1907-1912. He had also published a newspaper on 1916 in Taşkent entitled *Alaş*, in which any anti-governmental material is hard to find during its first year of existence. A revolutionary-democratic tendency began to be observed in this newspaper only after its twelfth issue appeared in February 24, 1917. Kölbay Togusov helped Mustafa Çoqay to form branches of the **Şura-i Islam** organization in small towns and other settled areas of Jetisuv province during March and April of 1917. He also became a member of the above organization's Taşkent branch. Thus he later participated in the All-Russian Congress of Şura-i Islam and was elected to the executive committee of the organization. But the activities of Kölbay Togusov were not unknown to the Alaş leaders. The Alaş leaders did not take Togusov seriously. They rather treated him as an

¹⁹¹ Kölbay Togusov did not hold a law degree but worked as an amateur lawyer in Zaysan uyezd after 1905. Please see Kenges Nurpeyisov, *Alaş Hem Alaş Orda*, p. 127.

inexperienced naive supporter of current movements. As early as 1916, Mirjaqip Duvlatov wrote an article reviewing Togusov's rather amateurish drama *Nadandıq Qurbanı* (Victim of Illiteracy). This fourteen page work of Togusov was severely criticized by Duvlatov in the *Qazaq* newspaper.¹⁹²

According to Zeki Velidi Togan the Üş Jüz party was a pan-turkist and socialist oriented organization.¹⁹³ Nevertheless, the main principles of the Üş Jüz party were quite similar to those of the Alaş Party. Only after the political situation in the country begun to be chaotic and only after the process of class struggle began to crystallize, did Üş Jüz start to separate its path from the Alaş movement and incline to identify itself with the Bolsheviks and other leftist groups. The open opposition of the Üş Jüz party to the Alaş movement started only after the October revolution of 1917.¹⁹⁴ In the words of Turar Rısqulov, "...those Kazaks who supported the Bolsheviks in the early days broke away from the Kazak masses."¹⁹⁵ The same Turar Rısqulov claimed that "the nationalist liberalist intellectuals (led by Bökeyhanov) basically advocated the interest of the representatives of the upper class and attempted to protect their ideas."¹⁹⁶

¹⁹² Madiyar, "Nadandıq Qurbanı," Reprint "*Qazaq*" *Gazeti*, pp. 281-284.

¹⁹³ Zeki Velidi Togan, *Bugünkü Türkili Türkistan ve Yakın Tarihi*, İstanbul, Enderun, 1981, p. 362.

¹⁹⁴ Nurpeyisov, p.129.

¹⁹⁵ Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, p.140. A Kazak communist leader who became one of the victims of Stalinist terror in 1937. Rısqulov worked in the very upper echelon of the Soviet leadership, in the People's Commissariat of Nationalities and during the early 1930s worked close to Stalin in Kremlin as well.

¹⁹⁶ Sultanhan Aqqululı, "Alihan Bökeyhan," *Juldız*, 1 January 1996, pp. 3-61, in p. 6-7.

Rısqulov labeled the Alaş intellectuals as bourgeois nationalists. Actually, it was Turar Rısqulov who supported the Bolshevik power more seriously than Kölbay Togusov. Turar Rısqulov's activities and his digestion of socialist principles helped him to rise to very high positions in the early Bolshevik period.

Native representatives of the so-called proletarian literature, such as Saken Seyfullin, Gabbas Togjanulı, and Sabit Muqanulı, began to attack Alaş intellectuals particularly during the late 1920s. Alihan Bökeyhanov belittled and ridiculed the enthusiastic supporters of the Soviet rule¹⁹⁷ and in some cases severely criticized the naiveté of some young poets in the press even after the establishment of Bolshevik power in Kazakhstan.¹⁹⁸ It was not politically possible for the Alaş activists to enter into a more open discussion with their native Bolshevik opponents during the 1920s.

Apart from the above list, Kazak intellectuals, reportedly, formed other parties such as “**The Erk Socialist Party** (1919) formed by Kazak Januzakov, Başqurt Validov (Zeki Velidi Togan) and the Uzbek activist Aripov.”¹⁹⁹ However, there is not enough information about them.

¹⁹⁷ Alihan Bökeyhanov described Saken Seyfullin as “Baygus Saken” the poor Saken, and as the “tout poet” in one of his letters to Ahmet Baytursun. This criticism resulted from Saken Seyfullin's repeated usage of Lenin's name to present himself as “poet of the revolution.” Sultanhan Aqqulı, “Alihan Bökeyhan,” *Juldız*, 1 January 1996, pp. 3-61. p. 39.

¹⁹⁸ *ibid.*, p. 38-39.

¹⁹⁹ Abdijapar Abdakimulı, *Qazaqstan Tariyhı*, Almatı, 1997, p. 253. Actually, the founders of the above mentioned party, were Abdülhamid Arifov, an Uzbek intellectual and Türekul Canuzakov, a Kırgız (not Kazak) intellectual. Please see, Zeki Velidi Togan, *Bugünkü Türkili Türkistan ve Yakın Tarihi*, İstanbul, 1981, p. 402, 407, 420-421, 473 and for Arifov, p. 376, 406, 407, 416, 418.

The total sum of all of these native intellectuals involved in political matters on the Kazak steppe was only a handful. Only around one hundred of the Kazaks²⁰⁰ received higher education or had to receive a higher education diploma. Some one thousand of them were graduates of secondary educational institutions such as gymnasiums or other types of pre-university educational facilities. A few thousand of them received education at traditional Madrasas. Nevertheless this handful of intellectuals shouldered mounting problems. It was because of the influence of this small group of intellectuals that Bolshevik power “met with the greatest difficulty in consolidating their power”²⁰¹ on the Kazak steppe.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

According to Mustafa Çoqay, the only Alaş activist who reached the free world, the national liberation movement of the Central Asian Turkic people “started as a result of opportunities ensuing from the revolution in Russia. (The Central Asian national liberation movement) did not begin at a defined particular time and in conditions suitable to the natives. As for the failure of the movement, Çoqay wrote that “the Turkestanese were not able to establish a solid united front despite awareness of the desperate need of such a unity.” Çoqay also admitted the

²⁰⁰ According to Togan, the Kazak intellectuals consisted of people quite highly educated than that of their other fellow-brotherly societies, such as Kırgız and others. “Asrı terbiye görmüş adamları nisbeten çok bulunan Kazakistan’da münevverler...”, Togan, *Türkistan*, p. 356.

²⁰¹ Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Modern History of the Soviet Central Asia*, London, 1964, p. 129.

weakness of Central Asian society in “using the opportunity resulting from the revolution to their advantage of realizing the national liberationist targets.”²⁰²

When the attempts of the Alaş Orda Government to form an alliance with the liberal counter-revolutionary Russian forces failed, they reluctantly agreed to cooperate with the Soviets. The nationalist Alaş intellectuals began communicating with the Bolsheviks in 1919. They agreed, later, to cooperate with the Bolsheviks. Only then, the Bolsheviks were able to establish control on the steppe. In May 1919, we see Ahmet Baytursın traveling to Moscow as the Alaş representative to sign an agreement with Lenin and Stalin to establish the First Kırgız Revolutionary Committee, the **Kirrevkom**. It was planned to be the nucleus of autonomous Kazak government. Later, on October 4, 1919, the decree of the Turkistan Revolutionary Military Committee pardoning those Alaş activists who had supported Bolshevik rule was released.²⁰³

The emergence of Bolshevik control of the former Russian Empire prevented the newly formed Kazak government from fully establishing their power. It also became clear that the solution of the destiny of the nationalities was not a primary matter for the Bolsheviks. The national misery of the Kazak people, starting from the Mongol conquest of their land in the eighteenth century and followed by the Russian colonial expropriation until the disintegration of the Russian Empire, was not ended with the establishment of the first native

²⁰² Mustafa Çokay, “1917 Jıl Estelikterinen Üzindiler,” *Yaş Türkistan*, No. 76, 1936; No. 90, 1937, reprinted in Turkish as *1917 Yılı Hatıra Parçaları*, Ankara: Yaş Türkistan Yayınları, 1988.

government, the **Alaş Orda**. Yet it was an attempt by a handful of Kazak intellectuals to seize the opportunity of reaching out to the most natural right of self-rule in their land. However, the times were not ripe for the movement to achieve success due to the overall condition of the Russian Empire. Forces beyond the power of five million Kazaks drew their destiny into a totally different path that we will try to discuss in the next chapter.



²⁰³ *Foreign War Intervention and Civil War in Central Asia and Kazakstan* (in Russian), Vol. 2, Almaty, 1963 cited by Qozibayev, p. 92-93.

CHAPTER THREE: KAZAKSTAN UNDER SOVIET RULE

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 marked the beginning of a new era for the people of Kazakhstan. It was to be an era that would shatter their hopes of self-rule. The Soviet administration replaced all the natives with non-natives. All of the native intellectuals were gradually eliminated regardless of whether their ideology was nationalist or communist. Starting from the 1920s, the central control of the Bolshevik administration began to tighten its grip on the republican leadership. The Kazak people came to the very brink of destruction as a result of the policies carried out by the central administration. Seven decades of Soviet rule proved to be the continuation of the tsarist political, economic, and cultural policies. But Soviet rule went even further than the Tsarist administration. Confiscation of the Kazak land; ending the nomadic tradition; destroying the traditional administrative structure; changing the demographic balance of the region to the benefit of the Slavic population; the transition to agriculture, though in forms dependent on the center; degradation of the natural environment; the creation of a whole new set of civil and military servants, loyal to the political system of the center, out of the native population; the elimination or burial of all those free, democratic thoughts among the native educated elite -all these were the “achievements” of the socialist system. The early Soviet rule, the Stalinist era, the Hrushchev era, the Brezhnevite years as well as the Gorbachev era that marked the end of Soviet rule will be the subjects of discussion in this chapter.

Throughout seven decades, the quality and quantity, as well as the characteristics, of the Kazak intellectual elite also changed. The nationalist native intellectuals, as well as the native Bolshevik leaders of distinctive quality, were wiped out during the 1930s. Starting from the end of the W.W. II, a new generation of the party elite began to emerge. All of them lived according to Soviet and party standards. After the disastrous years of the late 1930s, it took more than four or five decades before there was a new generation of native intellectuals (mostly men of letters and social scientists) to be the advocates of native grievances. Most of these were born during the dreadful years of the 1930s or later. All of them concealed their disagreements, if they had any, with the regime until the Gorbachev years and until the independence era. Although some genuinely sought to voice the Kazak plight, some supported the re-emergence of Kazak ethnic nationalism as a new tool to exploit for their personal gain. This last group contained native “partocrats”(party-bureaucrats) of the Soviet period.

Native social scientists, including officials working in the native press, academics of various rank, native men of letters, all became the champions of this new trend. This kind of change started during the Gorbachov rule. The native intellectuals began to present a critical approach towards the Soviet regime as the *aga buvin*, the senior generation, whose influence was/is the leading force shaping the now-ethnic (if not openly nationalist anymore) conscience of Kazaks. Behind them stood the whole native population of Kazakhstan who had not completely adapted themselves to the Russian way of life. However, the source of their native arguments, their land, number, language, environment, their economy had suffered serious damage as a result of 70 years of Soviet

rule. In other words, the nightmares of native intellectuals at the beginning of this century had become reality by the end of the century. Thus this chapter is important for understanding the details of changes that worsened the possibility of a free, independent Kazak existence in the 1990s.

The Maintenance of Soviet Control

According to Soviet sources, Soviet power began to be established in the major cities and towns of Kazakhstan between October 1917 and March 1918.¹ Many important events occurred before the republic was finally formed under the name of the Kirgiz² ASSR on August 26, 1920. However, the true picture of the area was as follows: "...the course of the entire Revolution and Civil War was deeply influenced by a traditional conflict between the native Turks and Russian colonists overland. Nowhere in the Empire did the national struggle assume such violent forms as here, where nationalism merged completely with class and religious antagonisms. From 1917 until 1923, these territories suffered all the horrors of what early Soviet accounts called, with much justice, "a colonial revolution."³ The Kazak steppe became the fighting arena of the White and the Red forces, as well as of the small number of nationalist liberationist native groups of those years. It was difficult for any group to establish a permanent control over cities like Orenburg or others for a long time. Neither the White forces nor the nationalist

¹ Qazaqstan Tariyhi, p. 307.

² This practice of calling the Kazaks as the Kazak-Kirgiz started by the Russian scholars and the Tsarist administration and continued for sometime, during the Soviet period.

³ Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, p. 82.

intellectual Alaş group, and in some places not even their combined forces were able to overcome the Bolshevik power permanently.

The integration and the formal consolidation of the Soviet territories into a single state was completed in 1922. The work of the Red Army, the completion of party branches all over Soviet territory and finally the consolidation of government authority prepared the grounds for the integration of the Soviet state. The name of Stalin and his steel power also began to climb to its zenith in the Soviet territories starting from the early 1920s. Much of the suffering and much political maladministration as well as the state terror, began to take root during these years, and all were associated with the name of Stalin. However, it is right to state that in Kazakstan “a stable administrative apparatus was not established until the very eve of the World War II.”⁴ Nevertheless, until 1923, early democratic principles in the communist party were not violated. Yet intimidation of those (most of all the native) activists who expressed their own opinion freely had already begun.⁵

NATIVE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE EARLY SOVIET PERIOD

It is clear that the former Tsarist civil servants, merchants, officers and wealthy farmers, in other words the Tsarist gentry in Central Asia and in the Steppe region, were the supporters of Soviet power. They cooperated with the Bolsheviks and viewed all Muslims as their main threat. Turko-Muslim intellectuals, and particularly those who felt

⁴ Olcott, p. 220.

close to the Bolshevik views concerning Tsarist oppression, were rather annoyed by this fact. The natives did not want to see their former oppressors in a new red cloth allied with the newly established power to which many had devoted their hopes of a brighter future than the one that had been overthrown. Thus, together with a handful of loyal communists under the leadership of Turar Rısqulov, many Kazak intellectuals decided to fight against the conditions that were still in the process of becoming established in order to safeguard the interests of their people under the new rule.

Nevertheless, the Bolshevik realization of the influence of the native intellectuals, the Alaş activists, over the indigenous population and the inclination of the native leaders to cooperate with the growing Soviet power, was one of the factors which facilitated the maintenance of native support for the revolution on the steppe. As a result of the mutual trust established between the native intellectuals and the Bolshevik administration in the center, contact was established between the two sides. Bolshevik leaders in the region such as Mikhail Frunze, the famous Red Army Commander in the area, offered all the Alaş supporters full amnesty if they would stop cooperating with the White forces and if they would begin to support the Communists. This was confirmed by the central authorities in Moscow as well. Alaş activists, supporters and intellectuals were declared to be included in this promise, which facilitated the Alaş participation in the Bolshevik administration of the steppe region. The responsibility for invigorating relations with the Bolsheviks was given to Ahmet Baytursun, as the Alaş leader of the Torgay province. He communicated with the local Bolshevik authorities through natives

⁵ Mambet Qoygeldiyev, "Ultşıldıqpen Küres Navqanı," *Sotsialistik Qazaqstan*, 7 Mamır 1991, p. 3.

such as Bayqadam Qaraldin.⁶ Thus, Ahmet Baytursun first held talks with A. Jangeldin and then went to Moscow to meet Stalin and discuss the future of the Kazak state on April, 1919.⁷ Lenin signed the decree which created the Kirgiz Revolutionary Committee (*Kirrevkom*) on June 10, 1919.⁸

The nationalist native intellectuals decided to support the growing Bolshevik power not for their own personal gain. On the contrary, they decided to coexist with the Bolsheviks for two main reasons. The first was to seize important positions in the local party organization in order to overthrow the domination of the colonialist gentry in the region. The second was to become acquainted with the top Bolshevik leaders in order to inform them of matters related to the Kazak masses, without using the mediation of the non-Muslim Bolshevik officials on the periphery. Local nationalists faced a dilemma in their attempt to realize the above targets due to the firm stand of Moscow, which was giving the top positions of all the organs of political power to officials appointed by the center. Problems between native and Russian party officials were not limited to the share of political power. Both sides had constant quarrels over economic issues as well. Among the direct appeals made to Lenin himself, a letter by Ahmet Baytursin read as follows:

1)The representatives, appointed by the central authorities to administer the Kirgiz land, do not have a crystallized idea, thus do not have a clear-cut plan (in their newly appointed jobs)....

⁶ Bayqadam Qaraldin was mediator between the Alaş Movement and Alibiy Jangeldin, a Kazak native communist. Please see, Kenges Nurpeyisov, *Alaş hem Alaşorda*, p. 207 and 205. Qaraldin was accompanying Ahmet Baytursun to Moscow to hold talks with the leading Bolshevik leaders. For this, please see, Ahmet Zeki Velidi Togan, *Hatıralar*, p. 251. However, it is interesting to see a certain Qaraldin among the Alaş activists and supporters' list provided by Kenges Nurpeyisov in the above book.

⁷ Kenges Nurpeyisov, *Alaş hem Alaşorda*, p. 197.

⁸ "Qazaq SSR," *Qazaq Sovet Entsiklopediyası*, p. 266.

2) Mutual understanding and trust was not established between the representatives of the center and of the people.

It is not possible for the Russians to gain the trust of the non-Russian subjects who have been familiar with the cunning Tsarist policy for ages, by wearing the internationalist-communist label overnight... It is possible that the natives might once again bury their enmity under their patience as they were doing for ages. However, this silence might continue until the day when an opportunity arises for the natives to voice their disagreement in certain ways.

Two alternatives exist for the Russian proletariat. The first is to appoint dictators, following the example of the Tsarist governors and governor-generals and force its overlordship upon the natives. The second alternative is to gain the trust of the toiling Kirgiz (Kazak) people. The first alternative is quite clear because it was experienced under the authoritarian-Tsarist rule to a sufficient level. The second alternative is more complex and needs some explanation. Besides, choosing the first alternative means destroying everything that was built in the name of the Soviet system....

The main problem lies here; there are a group of intellectuals, among the Kirgiz (Kazak), in whom people trust. It is possible for them to be mistaken or to fall into error. Yet, they will never betray their people for their personal gains.

For the Russian proletariat, the most successful way can be realized through these kind of native intellectuals. Yet it is necessary for those intellectuals to be in mutual trust with the Soviet government. The difficulty for the Kirgiz lies in the following matter: the mutual distrust between the Kirgiz, the colonized native and his former boss, the colonizer.⁹

This distrust among the natives towards the newly established power and particularly of its representatives on the steppe and in the Central Asian region is revealed by another Russian scholar. Georgiy Safarov, an early Soviet historian and a victim of the Stalinist purges in the 1930s, wrote as early as 1920 that “ the Soviet government in Turkistan was established by a handful of Russian workers around the railway line. That the sole possessor of the proletarian dictatorship in Turkestan can be the Russians is still the only valid opinion there even until today.”¹⁰ Safarov further stated that the advantages of the revolution were turned into the achievements of the Russian nation. Former Tsarist officials and the Russian people in Central Asia began to harass the native people.

⁹ Central State Archive of the Kazakhstan Republic cited by Manaş Qozıbayev, *Qazaqstan Tariyhi*, p. 100-105.

¹⁰ Georgiy Safarov, “Türkistan”, *Pravda*, June 20, 1920, reprinted in *Jıldız*, December 1991, p. 84-85.

They took advantage of the deficiency of the system and Russian population to support the centrally-imposed changes and used the revolution to their own advantage of further plundering natives and their resources. Safarov warned the Bolshevik leadership against the use of former Tsarist administrative personnel in promoting Bolshevik power in the former colonies of the old regime.¹¹ Safarov stated further that: "It is necessary to be very cautious in using specialists of Russian origin, because they were the practitioners of colonialist repression and colonialist exploitation."¹² Memoirs of the Premier-Minister of the Khokand Autonomous Government and one of the Alaş intellectuals, Mustafa Çokay, confirm Safarov's claim. Mustafa Çokay went to Taşkent on April 10, 1917 and participated in the meeting of the Taşkent Soviet of Workers and Soldiers, convened at the hall of the Palace of Turkestan Governor-Generalship in the city. When Çokay entered the hall, a speaker was uttering the following: "The revolution was realized by Russian revolutionaries, Russian workers and Russian soldiers. Hence the administration of the Turkestan region should be given to the Russians. the natives have to accept what we offer to them."¹³

It was more suitable and less costly for the central administrators in Moscow to sacrifice those who did not adapt to the defined general guidelines of socialist principles. Those general guidelines were defined according to the needs of the Russian peasantry,

¹¹ Safarov, "Revolutsiya jame Türkistandağı Ult Maselesi," *Pravda*, July 24, 1920, reprinted in *Juldız*, December 1991, p. 85.

¹² Safarov, "Ult Maselesining Evolutsiyası," *Pravda*, December 12, 1920., cited by *ibid*.

¹³ Mustafa Çokay, "1917 Jıl Estelikterinen Üzindiler," *Ibid*.

particularly in matters of agriculture. Thus peripheral rural societies were expected to behave like the Russian *mujik*. Therefore any argument, even by specialists, against the interference in the traditional Kazak livestock-breeding economy and related land distribution was disregarded by the administration. All of the appeals to halt the introduction of rapid change to the traditional practices were pushed aside until after the most severe depression occurred among the natives on the steppe in the 1930s.

THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY

During the early years of the 1920s, the steppe economy was in grave condition. The negative consequences of the world war, the 1916 revolt, the revolution and the civil war had brought the downfall of the steppe economy. It was particularly harsh for the landless Kazak nomads who were forbidden to graze their animals in the war-torn areas. Nomadic Kazaks particularly suffered from the absence of grain for their own survival and for fodder to feed their animals. Agricultural activities almost ceased to exist. The number of livestock also declined to less than in prewar years. Kazaks who were struggling to control their ancestral territories faced much harsher conditions after they began supporting the Bolshevik power. Thus famine began in 1920 and became worse during the winter 1920-1921.

During the mid-1920s, there was a slight improvement in the number of cattle on the steppe. This was owing to a one-step-backwards policy of the party. The Soviet administration had declared the completion of the renewal of economic life by the second

half of the 1920s and then started to restructure it according to the so-called New Economic Policy. Nevertheless, forced mass-collectivization, and the industrialization drive destroyed the steppe economy together with devastating the native population by the artificial famine created as a result.

Rapid industrialization of the heavy-industry sector and the collectivization of agriculture was linked to the elimination of anti-regime elements. It was carried out together with the maintenance of the administrative apparatus, centralization and a growing strength of the punishment mechanisms in the country. Thus, during this period, implementation of this campaign went parallel to the practice of forceful and violent measures by the administrative organs. The main financial support for industrialization was obtained from the ordinary citizens of the countryside, the peasants and workers. They were over-taxed in order to fulfill this campaign.

COLLECTIVIZATION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

A well-known Kazak writer and poet Oljas Süleymenov stated the following when he was referring to the collectivization: "...Who knows that there were six million Kazaks on their territory at the end of the 1920s, but only three million after collectivization."¹⁴ A western scientist wrote the following, quoting Oljas Süleymenov:

In the case of Kazakhs, some things will be hard to forget. During Stalin's collectivization drive, their nation was abruptly forced to abandon its traditional way of life. The campaign to transform the nomadic Muslim people breeders of livestock into a secular, agricultural group cost an estimated 1.5 million lives or between 15% and 20% of the Kazakh population. No wonder that at the writers' congress in Moscow the Kazakh author Olzhas Suleimenov asked how he and his compatriots could be expected to be open in their writing if they were not allowed to treat the collectivization period.¹⁵

Another article published in 1992 reported the following about the collectivization and industrialization drive: "During the years of industrialization, disregarding the resources and conditions of the (native) people, government began to build giant industrial complexes and railway lines. Maintenance of the workers and other personnel with food was shouldered by the native people. Instead of requiring the people of the newly-established towns to increase the production of agricultural goods, government officials confiscated livestock and the grain supply of the natives and peasants. An export policy for agricultural goods was also carried out in order to furnish giant industrial complexes with the necessary technical equipment. All of these measures were conducted

¹⁴ Sally Newman, "Suleimenov Promotes Study of Kazakh History," RFE/RL Archive Material, June 14, 1988., No. F-5632-533., p.1.

¹⁵ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Moscow Hears From the Kazakhs," *Wall Street Journal*, 22 December 1986.

by total confiscation of peasant properties in the avuls and in the peasant villages. Even during the worst years of famine, in 1931-32, fulfillment of meat and grain as well as other agricultural product plans and their shipment to the center was not halted.”¹⁶

The collectivization drive did not originate from the requests and desires of the masses; on the contrary, it started from an order imposed from the center. In order to carry out the collectivization and settlement campaigns, 8000 local activists and workers were drafted for the work, together with 1204, ‘25.000’ers (a unique Soviet style of naming certain activist groups), specially selected activists from Moscow, Kharkov and Leningrad. All of these had no idea of the importance and particularities of the settlement issue and of the mechanization of agriculture. Many centers did nothing but bring together all the livestock-breeders into one area that lacked sufficient water sources and grazing facilities. Particularly those activists from the center misunderstood the practicalities of the settlement of nomads in the form of the traditional Russian village. They forced the nomadic felt houses into the same order as Russian village houses: on straight street lines on the frozen earth. Thus they organized the settlement areas on square shaped village plans. When the number of felt houses was not enough to complete the square shape they ordered some more nomadic households to be brought from different areas. They were used to complete the square shape of the settled area in the form of Russian derevniya.¹⁷

¹⁶ Qaydar Aldajumanov and Juldızbek Ebilgojin, “Etnotsid,” *Egemendi Qazaqstan*, 30 Mamır 1992, p. 2.

¹⁷ *Qazaqstan Tariyhi*, p. 325-326.

The economic backwardness of Kazakhstan, one of the legacies of colonial times, shortages of equipment, financial support and the lack of local specialists, was the reason which hindered the accelerated revival of industry and the transport system. This lasted until 1927, by which time other parts of the Soviet Union had already entered the era of industrialization. According to the Party and the Soviet government, Kazakhstan was required to leap forward to the socialist stage of development without experiencing the capitalist stage. When industrialization took off, scientists had not completed surveys and feasibility studies of coal, oil, ferrous and non-ferrous metal resources of the region. Kazakhstan lacked oil, gas and ferrous metal refineries. There were no enterprises devoted to machine-tools, car spare-parts, tractors or the tools of agricultural machinery. Many consumer goods such as clothes and shoes used to be brought into the republic from other parts of the union due to the lack of necessary workshops to make those items. In addition to the transportation of coal, fuel and iron ore, salt, cotton, grain, wool, other agricultural products and raw materials were taken from Kazakhstan and Central Asia to the center. Machinery, mechanical devices, metal parts, cement and wooden products were brought to Kazakhstan from the center. This system took deep roots during the colonial period and was not changed during Soviet times, even after World War II. Kazakhstan still suffers from the negative effects of this lopsided economic development.

Like many other Turko-Muslim intellectuals, the Kazak elite were also disgusted by the discriminatory anti-native views of some of the Bolshevik officials as well as with their readiness to sacrifice small nations for the benefit of the revolution, without even

blinking an eye.¹⁸ Sadvaqasov, a senior native Bolshevik figure, was particularly critical of Zelensky, and later of Goloşçekin. Smagul Sadvaqasov¹⁹ argued against Zelensky (the Chairman of the Central Asian Bureau of the Party) concerning his plan to turn the Kazak steppe into an agricultural area. He said that industrial enterprises and industrial centers had to be established close to the agricultural areas, i.e., in Central Asia. Zelensky's idea was supported by Goloşçekin, a Bolshevik figure appointed by the center who later, in 1925 became First Secretary of the Kazak Communist Party and remained so until 1933. Zelensky wrote that it was more profitable to establish small scale enterprises in Kazakhstan rather than building big factories. Sadvaqasov argued that Kazakhstan needed bigger industrial enterprises than workshops for wool-washing, butter and grain refineries, and repair shops. At the same time, the development of agriculture, argued Sadvaqasov, required the development of industry, and thus neglecting the construction of industrial enterprises would be a serious mistake.²⁰ Sadvaqasov further argued that industrialization of the rural areas was carried out at a retarded pace, and he opposed the acceleration of (Slavic) peasant settlement on the Kazak land.²¹ Sadvaqasov's shrewd style of arguing in the Soviet press against the mighty theoreticians of the center obtained

¹⁸ Zeki Velidi Togan, *Hatıralar*, p. 305.

¹⁹ Although Smagul Sadvaqasov was described as a senior Bolshevik figure who was never associated with the Alaş movement by Olcott, *Kazakhs*, p. 212., in reality he was the son-in-law of Alihan Bökeyhanov.

²⁰ S. Sadvaqasov, "O natsiyonalnostiyah i natsiyonalah," *Bolşevik*, (1928), reprinted by Manaş Qozıbayev, *Qazaqstan Tariyhı*, pp. 165-178.

²¹ Abdakim, *ibid.*, p. 176.

for him the title of “nationalist- diehard” and soon he was silenced eternally, in Moscow in 1933. It was announced that he died from unknown reasons.

An article in the current Kazak press, entitled “etnosid,” evaluated the policies as follows:

However, it does not seem right to blame industrialization for the torment that Kazakstan went through during those years. The preconditions of the suffering took root right at the beginning of establishment of the regime. The artificial entanglements of class struggle continued on the one hand, while the confiscation of bays using terror methods was carried out on the other. During collectivization, kulaks and bays were totally eliminated from the society. The traditional economic system on the Kazak steppe was destroyed by forcibly collecting thousands of poor Kazaks into the kolhoz centers. It would have been possible to develop the private agricultural enterprises by reforming them according to the government requirements without any sacrifices. Those were the ideas expressed during the 1920s and 1930s, by the native intellectuals of Bolshevik and non-Bolshevik upbringing. Among them were Turar Risqulov, N. Nurmaqov, Smagul Sadvaqasov, and Z. Teregojin.²²

Between 1926 and 1940, a number of achievements were made in Kazakstan regarding the industrial development in the region. Among them were the development of the towns, the rise in the number of inhabitants in the cities, the improvement in the number of trained engineers and other technical cadres, and particularly of native cadres. Some 200 big industrial enterprises were built in Kazakstan in the years preceding World War II. “The Şmkent Lead factory provided 73,9 percent of the whole USSR’s smelted lead production. The Balqaş Copper Factory provided 51 percent of probably the whole union’s smelted copper before W.W. II. The Qaraganda coal mine provided 90 percent of Kazakstan’s coal production in 1940. Oil production in Kazakstan reached 700.000 tones

²² Qaydarbek Aldajumanov and Juldızbek Ebilgojin, Ibid.

in 1940, ranking third in the whole USSR, after Russia and Azerbaidjan.”²³ Particularly after the war, Kazakstan became one of the most important energy suppliers for the whole Soviet Union. Kazakstan occupied third place after Ukraine and the Russian Federation in grain production. There were 6715 kolhoz, 364 mts(motorized tractor stations), and 210 sovhoz as well as 25709 tractors and 12579 combines in 1946 in Kazakstan.²⁴

Native specialists in present-day Kazakstan belittle the achievements of the industrialization drive in the republic during the Soviet period. According to their arguments, republics such as Kazakstan, during Soviet times, were required by the center as sources of raw-materials, partly-colonized areas in which only second-class industrial enterprises could develop.²⁵

²³ Abdijapar Abdakim, *ibid.*, p. 177.

²⁴ “Qazaq SSR”, *Qazaq Entsiklopediyası*, p. 270.

²⁵ Talas Omarbekov, “Qazaq Nege Şıbinday Qırıldı?” *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 1 Tamız 1992, p. 5.

SOVIET LAND CONFISCATION

There was mismanagement in the redistribution of land in the steppe. Plain distribution of land without providing other necessary material help was not enough to eliminate the economic difficulties of the region. Agricultural equipment, transportation vehicles (or rather cattle for transportation), seeds and other essential materials were not provided by the authorities. This condition left even the average peasants, let alone the penniless, helpless in improving their economic conditions. Therefore, those who were provided with land allotments were not able to use the land efficiently and thus returned the parcels to their previous owners. There were obstacles to the distribution of the meadowlands as well. According to the newly introduced reform rules, meadowlands were distributed in proportion to the (male) head of each household. Previously, meadowlands were divided according to the number of livestock of each family or clan. Those poor people who dared to use the newly distributed meadowland that previously belonged to the rich came under the “moral pressure” of disregarding the “soul of the ancestors.” As a result of the confiscation of cattle, and the land and meadowland of the rich, the poor were not able to own sufficient numbers of cattle or enough land to start a new economically strengthened life. Cattle distributed among the poor were either slaughtered or sold and the land distributed among needy people was abandoned due to the shortage of equipment, seed and other material related to the start of proper farming.


THE END OF THE NOMADIC TRADITION

Bringing the so-called socialist order to traditional Kazak life required the destruction of traditional customs and traditional social, cultural, as well as genealogical types of kinship and of tribal bounds. In 1924, the settlement of nomadic and semi-nomadic people of the steppe was put into practice. The same year, Sirdarya and Jetisuv were given to Kazakhstan. During 1926-1929, sovietization of the Kazak avul began, together with the cleansing of the avuls of the *bays* (the rich). In 1928, 145.000 cattle were confiscated from the wealthy livestock breeders and divided up among the poor. Nevertheless, the confiscated and “equally” distributed cattle was not enough to improve the life of the poor. They were either sold or slaughtered soon after.²⁶ In other words, the confiscated cattle were not enough to meet the minimum necessity to support communities’ need for decent survival. Besides, there was a great shortage of fodder and confusion was widespread in the definition of grazing land. Confiscation was always publicized as a “better way” of cleansing the malicious elements, the “expropriator parasites” from the communal life. This method went further and average livestock breeders, with 300 to 400 animals were also subjected to confiscation. During 1927-28, another burdensome measure was put into practice on the steppe. The Kazak avul and villages were subjected to heavy taxes in order to finance the industrialization drive. It made worse the economic conditions far more than the previous years. The fulfillment of meat, wool, animal skin, as well as hoof and horn requirements, of the state plans

²⁶ *Qazaqstan Tariyhi*, p. 321.

followed, and all of those plans were over-fulfilled, while almost all the Kazak livestock, together with half of the Kazak population, was devastated as a result of famine in the 1930s.²⁷

Cattle were also collected into centers that lacked adequate shelter for the harsh winter. This was an unusual practice for the Kazaks, because each avul had their own grazing fields for their own cattle. It is not a wise practice for nomadic Kazaks to gather huge number of cattle in one center without adequate grazing fields or enough fodder-stock to feed the animals. As a result of such unwise measures, Kazak livestock which was collected in such centers, without sparing even a single animal, began to perish soon after. When the grazing areas were trampled, nomads who were forcibly brought to such areas began to escape disregarding the orders of any authority. The figures for the decrease in cattle and other livestock were as follows:



For the settlement of the nomads, the authorities had previously announced that they would give the necessary equipment, enough vehicles for transportation, as well as

²⁷ Manaş Qozıbayev, "Sagingdı Sınar Kün Tuvdı," *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 28 Navrız (March) 1996.

loans and exemptions from providing the state with meat and grain for two years. As a result of the crude and coarse policy, local organs had almost unlimited authority over the local people. Fulfillment of the orders given above was compellingly strict. Those who did not meet the demands to fulfill the meat, grain, wool, cotton, food and other plans were imprisoned and were punished without a fair trial. Wool ropes were untied and felt used for the yurt or for floor coverings was collected to fulfill the wool plan. Some who lacked all of the above materials were required to shear their sheep during the freezing winter time. For example, in 1930, in Balqas district in Almaty province, a requirement of around 300,000 livestock for the fulfillment of meat plan was announced notwithstanding the fact that the total number of livestock in the province was only 173,000. The same type of requirement was made in Irgiz, Sozaq, Abiralı, Şingıstav, Qarqaralı and other places. This instigated a strong reaction from local people.²⁸

NATIVE POPULATION DECLINE

Native communists disagreed and protested against the bias of the Russian party officials in the distribution of food and grain, which was offered for the use of the non-Muslim population in the region. It was during those early years of the 1920s that famine struck the Kazak steppe. The native population suffered the most owing to the loss of their cattle during 1916, during the turmoil of revolution and civil war. During the worst year of famine, some Bolshevik figures opposed aid to the starving Kazaks, arguing that the strengthening of military units was more important and that giving aid to the Kazaks

was rather a waste of money. For example, Jimpiytı **uyezd** of the Ural Province mainly consisted of native Kazaks and their number was 90,000 during the years 1917 and 1919. After the famine in 1921, the population had declined to 60,000.²⁹ It was during this kind of discussions that Turar Rısqulov, a senior native Bolshevik figure, showed his strongest indignation towards his Bolshevik comrades.

Other measures taken during the collectivization added to native population decline in Kazakstan. Some 180,015 people or 46,091 households from other parts of the Soviet Union came and settled in the republic during the campaign. During the summer of 1931 alone, the height of the famine, 150,000 Russian peasants were brought to Kazakstan and were settled in Esil, Qorgaljin, Aqmola, Şubartav, Telman, Abralı, Bayanavıl and Aqkelin districts. They were provided with 350,000 to 400,000 hectares of land for agricultural needs.³⁰ Between 1930 and 1931, 281,230 households left Kazak territory for China, Iran and Afghanistan.

Western sources such as Robert Conquest's *Harvest of Sorrow* reveal that the actual deaths in Kazakstan during the famine of the 1930s were at least one million. However, Conquest also included a cautious statement: " ...In fact, more recently available figures imply that the loss was even larger. The number of Kazak households declined from 1,233,000 in 1929 to 565,000 in 1936."³¹ However, native academicians

²⁸ Qaydar Aldajumanov and Juldızbek Ebilgojin, *ibid*.

²⁹ Mambet Qoygeldiyev, "Ultsıldıqpen Küres Navqanı," *Sotsialistik Qazaqstan*, 5 Mamır 1991, p. 3.

³⁰ Qoygeldiyev article, *ibid*.

³¹ "Among the Kazakhs the population deficit between the 1926 and 1939 censuses (even accepting the


such as Manaş Qozıbayev, claim that “During the famines of 1921-22 and 1931-32, some three million Kazaks perished.”³² A well-known Kazak scholar and historian, Mambet Qoygeldiyev, stated that the famine created in the Kazak steppe was much more devastating than that of *Aqtaban Şubırındı*, the ruination caused by the eighteenth century Mongol invasion. Qoygeldiyev claims that the losses of the Kazaks were much more overwhelming during the 1930s and that the previous disaster was surpassed, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Behind the apparent facts such as the decrease of Kazak population to half of its previous size and the destruction of traditional economic practices, there are other grave consequences. Kazaks as a young national unit were, at that time, trying to reach political freedom, they were hoping to become sovereign. All of these hopes were shattered by the then current system and the Kazaks were subjected to spiritual decline. Spiritual ties between the generations were also cut.³³

According to the sources at the Party archives of the Almatı Political and Administrative Institute and the Party archive materials in Moscow, the population of the Kazak countryside declined by 3,379,500 between 1930 and 1933. Native specialists attribute the decrease in the rural population almost totally to the Kazak share relying on the fact that 90 percent of the Kazaks were rural and only 6 percent of them were living

average (as we have done for the Ukrainians) gives us 948,000. But the 1926 population should have grown to 4,598,000 in 1939 (on the very conservative assumption that the average USSR growth rate of 15.7 % prevailed, whereas in fact other Soviet Muslim populations grew much faster). That is, the population should have been over 1.5 million higher than it was. If we allow 300,000 for unborn children and 200,000 for successful emigration from the areas closest to Sinkiang, we have a death roll of one million.” Robert Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow*, N. Y.: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 190.

³² Manaş Qozıbayev, “Düniye Jüzi Qazaqtarınǵı Qurıltayı: Ata Tariyhı Tuvralı Sır,” *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 3 October 1992., p. 2 and 6.

in the cities at that time. Although the number related to population decrease in the Kazak countryside might include emigrants, it is still huge enough to emphasize the horrors of mass famine in Kazakhstan. The following information was sent by the Kazak Central Agricultural Center to the related organs in Moscow and to the First Secretary of the Kazak Communist Party, L. İ. Mirzoyan. The actual population decline in the Kazak countryside between 1930 and 1936 was listed as³⁴:



<u>Years</u>	<u>Rural population in Kazak Countryside</u>
1930	5,873,000
1931	5,114,000
1932	3,227,000
1933	2,493,500
1934	2,681,800
1935	2,926,000
1936	3,287,900

³³ Mambet Qoygeldiyev, "Ultııldıqpen Küres Navqanı," *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 5 Mamır 1991, p. 3.

³⁴ Talas Omarbekov, "Qazaqtar Şıbinday Qırılıp Jatr," *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 13 July 1991, p. 2.

Native specialists in present-day Kazakhstan calculate that those who emigrated to neighboring republics and to the Chinese side of Turkestan amounted to 1,081,700 during the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s. Thus the number of those who perished as a result of starvation, i.e. from artificial famine in the republic, was 2,297,800. The same source claims that the number of the non-Kazak population decline was 20,000 as a result of starvation in the republic. There were 6,688,200 people living in Kazakhstan in the year 1930, and 4,012,900 of them were Kazaks. Official measures to prevent famine in Kazakhstan were taken only after the well-known Kazak Communist Turar Rısqulov's letter dated 9 March 1933 was handed to Stalin himself. Letters from various Kazak intellectuals and also of officials did not attract the attention of the party organs in the center and in the Kazak capital before this date. When the loss of the natives reached one million, which was one fifth of the total Kazak population in 1921, native intellectuals began to shower the center with telegrams and letters.³⁵

It seems that a mere set of figures related to the horrors of famine in Kazakhstan cannot illustrate the crime or rather genocide committed against the Kazak nation. Famine memoirs about the sufferings of native Kazaks from the disastrous Stalinist policy of forced collectivization, rapid industrialization, and confiscation of grain and meat from the poor Kazak nomads in order to fulfill the meat and grain plan, will in the future be the subject of many volumes. One cannot help but include some unnerving memoirs published in the native press during the last decade in Kazakhstan. Starving

Kazaks tried everything to escape famine. They ate mice, rats, sparrows, snakes and earthworms. Rotten meat, rotten or dried animal skin as well as bones gnawed by dogs also constituted the diet of the Kazaks.³⁶ There were also young women lying dead, who still had their living babies at their breasts. Parents used to wander in search of food locking their children in their houses or in their barns. Most of the time the parents died on the fields, in the streets and the children in their locked places. Sometimes parents had to choose to save a stronger child and sacrifice the weak one. A well-known Kazak historian, Mekemtas Mirzahmetov (born in 1930) was saved by his mother through the sacrifice of his infant sister when they were attacked by wolves in search of food while going from one village to the next. Native sources state that the children who perished during the famine were mostly those under four years of age. Another native source claims that “two-thirds of unweaned children and half of those between six and seven years old perished.”³⁷ According to Conquest, “In 1941, there were a million fewer seven year olds than eleven year olds in the schools... In Kazakhstan, the seven year old group was less than two-fifths the size of the eleven year old.”³⁸

During the collectivization drive, the native population displayed their discontent through various riots in the republic. Archive materials reveal that there were about 30

³⁵ Richard Pipes, *ibid.*, p.174.

³⁶ (Famine Memoirs) “Witness Eyes: Our Main Aim was Survival”, *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 30 Mamır 1992, p. 2.

³⁷ Abdijapar Abdakim, *Qazaqstan Tariyhi*, p. 194.

³⁸ Conquest, p. 297.

riots in 1929. The number reached 80 in the next two years. Altogether the number of riots against the then current policy reached 200 between 1929 and 1931.³⁹

STALINIST PERSECUTION OF NATIVE ELITE

Both nationalist-and Bolshevik-oriented native intellectuals struggled in the steppe and Central Asian region against similar problems in order to save their kinsmen from the bias and maladministration of Russian or Russified non-native local Bolshevik officials. Both of these groups, the Alaş and native Bolshevik intellectuals, attempted to voice their disagreement by trying to ask for the interference of the central Soviet authorities in Moscow. Unfortunately for the Kazaks, the central administration in Moscow remained opposed to any policy which sought Kazak recovery at the expense of the Russian peasantry. The regime did not want to understand the specific economic and agricultural problems concerning tradition or custom which had regulated the nomadic life for centuries. At the same time, the regime could not afford to treat the Kazaks as a special case owing to the fact that this kind of special treatment would have been followed by the demands of other nationalities and might create a new chain of problems in the newly established, multi-ethnic Soviet society. The application of general policies set by the center would become impossible in such circumstances.

As early as 1923, the centrally-appointed Bolshevik officials began to form their own “internationalist” opinion against the so-called regionalist view of the native Kazaks

³⁹ B. Tölepbayev, “Goloşçekinning Stalinge Hatı,” *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 30 March, 1991, p. 2.

in the party. E. M. Yaroslavski, representative of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee, spoke at the regional party congress in Orenburg, March 17-22, 1923. He claimed that the native communists in the Kırğız(Kazak) republic paid too much attention to nationality problems and thus measures to carry out the class struggle could not be properly fulfilled. The reason for this was, according to his judgment, the environment where the Kazak communists had their roots and where the struggle for nationalist independence played a very important role.⁴⁰ During the same meeting, A. I. Veinstein said that the native communists' attitude of giving priority to national unity and national concepts in advising the people about the social changes, was hindering the development of class consciousness among the poor.⁴¹ Smagul Sadvaqasov, a native Bolshevik in Kazakhstan, disagreed with the above statements and said that "the (Kazak) people do not need shaking off anymore but are desperate for peaceful work... The poor Kazaks suffer from joblessness and not from expropriation by anybody. Thus it is necessary to judge (the condition) of poor Kazaks from this point of view... Let the Kazaks have horses, fodder, and **kosilka** (mowing-machines). By doing this, let them improve their conditions. This will be one hundred percent more profitable than plainly dividing everything." This sounded like open opposition to the structure of the society according to the socialist order and thus Sadvaqasov was accused of having a rather **meşçantsvo** (petty-bourgeois or narrow-minded) attitude.⁴²

⁴⁰ Party Archive of the Kazak CP Central Committee, cited by Mambet Qoygeldiyev, "Ültışıldıqpen Küres Navqanı," *Sotsialistik Qazaqstan*, 5 Mamır 1991, p. 3.

⁴¹ibid, p. 3.

As can be seen from the above lines, an opinion began to be formed, particularly among the centrally appointed party officials, that these native communists were rather inferior, ill-educated, pseudo-intellectual nationalists who were not able to understand the achievements of great revolutionary changes. If this was one side of the coin, the other side was distrust toward the native communist activists. Among the native communists were Sultanbek Qojanov, Smagul Sadvaqasov and Jaqıp Mingbayev, each quite well-known personalities serving the newly established party apparatus in Kazakhstan. Stalin through his appointee Goloşçekin, sought to eliminate bourgeois nationalists and the Alaş Ordists from the party apparatus and to create a whole new generation of loyal communists of native stock. "Goloşçekin considered the native Kazak intellectuals (both the loyal communists and the Alaş Ordists) to be temporary comrades. He used them to win over the native population in rural areas and later threw them away when their help was no longer required."⁴³ Goloşçekin, during the first year of his appointment in Kazakhstan, formed the opinion that there was the bays ruled in the rural areas of Kazakhstan and that Soviet rule did not exist on the steppe.

Native communist intellectuals felt a disguised mistrust toward those centrally-appointed party officials who were out of touch with the character of the region. The native Kazak intellectuals attitude illustrates the findings of the western scholar Walker Connor about the "homeland people" who possess a primary and exclusive title to their homeland. As "the sons of the soil" this should put them in a privileged position relative

⁴² *ibid.*

⁴³ Abdakim, *ibid.*, p. 192.

to those 'interlopers,' 'staygrants,' or the 'sojourners'.⁴⁴ Thus during the late 1920s, a number of leading native communists were singled out and criticized for becoming the henchmen of bourgeois intellectuals.⁴⁵ The earlier laws and decisions, in which benefit to and characteristics of the native were taken into account, during the first years of the Soviet rule, were abandoned. The land and water reforms of 1921 and 1922 were not carried out to their planned end, and the aimed for results were thus not achieved. The native suggestion to give priority to the natives in the land allotment plan and a temporary halt of the settlement of Slavic peoples on the Kazak land, until the completion of land allocation to the Kazaks first, was neglected. On the contrary, confiscation of the Kazak land by the outsiders increased further during Soviet rule.⁴⁶

The conditions that enabled the Stalinist ideological apparatus to destroy the historic consciousness of peoples, by executing the national intellectuals, began to take root in the 1920s. As the totalitarian system began to become stronger the victims of it also began to be pointed out openly. Political persecution of the participants of the Alaş movement, as well as those leading native officials who criticized the central policy-makers' behavior towards the peripheral regions, concerning violations of rights of the indigenous peoples and concerning the speed and methods of reinvigorating economic life and constructing socialist ideology, started particularly after the mid-1920s. Socio-political conditions in Kazakhstan abruptly changed from this time onwards. Prominent

⁴⁴ Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, Princeton, 1994, p.78.

⁴⁵ Qoygeldiyev article, *ibid*, 8 Mamır 1991, p. 3.

⁴⁶ Abdakim, *ibid.*, p. 189.

native political figures were exiled from Kazakhstan after 1927 and 1929. Among them were Turar Rısqulov, N. Nurmakov, Sultanbek Qojanov, and M. Mırzagaliyev. The Kazakhstan Central Executive Committee Chairman Jaqıp Mıngbayev, the People's Commissar of Education, Smagul Sadvaqasov, and the People's Commissar on Land Related Matters, J. Sultanbekov were fired from their posts.

High party officials of Russian origin wrote to the center that all of the Kazak party cadres and all of the Kazak communists were poisoned by the idea of nationalism and by the struggle of cliques. They claimed that there was not even one clean party soul among them. Forty-four Alaş activists were arrested as bourgeois nationalists. Among them were Ahmet Baytursınov, Mirjaqıp Duvlatov, Magjan Jumabayev, Jüsipbek Aymavıtov and Halel Gabbasov. One year later, another group of 40 intellectuals including Muhametjan Tınışpayev, Halel Dosmuhammedov, Jihanşa Dosmuhammedov, Jaqıp Aqbayev, and Q. Kemengerov, were arrested. Despite the amnesty declared by the Soviet government in 1919 and 1920 for those participants of the Alaş movement, seven to eight years later, almost all of the Alaş activists were thus arrested. During the first half of the 1920s, they made enormous contributions to the improvement of science, education, literature, and art in the republic. They became victims of Stalinist repression as the “enemies of people” and thus were executed without any fair trial at different times throughout the 1930s.

As the difficulties in the social and economic development of the Soviet Union began to worsen during the late 1920s and early 1930s, the search for anti-Soviet

elements and underground organizations started to widen. Investigations to find nationalist enemies of the state were carried out. Responsibility was attributed to the “people’s enemies” whenever an unexpected accident occurred in the mines, enterprises, kolhozs or in sovkhoses. Following this kind of event, it became customary to start an investigation to discover the so-called anti-regime elements and anti-state organizations. Consequently, “counter-revolutionary organizations” were discovered in Kazakhstan. According to a native historian, some 10,000 Kazaks educated at various institutions were arrested and 31 anti-state organizations were “unearthed” in 1929, 82 in 1930 and 80 in 1931.⁴⁷

Cleansing the party ranks from harmful elements was also carried out after 1931. Party members who made minor mistakes were expelled from the party and were accused of being collaborators of the rightists or those who supported Trotsky. The numbers of those expelled from the party in Kazakhstan are as follows:⁴⁸

<u>1921</u>	<u>1929-30</u>	<u>1937-38</u>	<u>1939</u>
21000	58000	9223	154000

Prominent political and literary figures were slanderously accused and executed during 1937-38. Particularly in 1937, some 105,000 people were subjected to NKVD

⁴⁷ Hamit Madanov, *Qazaq Halqıning Argı-Bergi Tariyhi*, Almatı, 1995., p. 166.

⁴⁸ *Qazaqstan Tariyhi*., p. 340.

interrogation and 22,000 were shot in Kazakhstan.⁴⁹ A second source claims that “more than 30,000 educated native Kazaks were shot and thousands went through the hell of labour camps.”⁵⁰ Another source citing historian Manaş Qozıbayev claims that “during the Soviet rule, 101,000 educated Kazaks were subjected to interrogation and 27,000 of them were shot and only 40,000 of them were rehabilitated.”⁵¹ Kazak science and culture was subjected to irreparable damage by the execution of the Alaş intellectuals and those champions of the Bolshevik rule in Kazakhstan.⁵²

Saken Seyfullin was a well-publicized native Bolshevik figure. His commitment to party ideology ceased when the man-made famine of the early 1930s struck the steppe and killed millions of ordinary Kazaks. However, Saken Seyfullin’s name remained one of the most acclaimed, loyal communist figures. This was done without disclosing the truth that his life ended during the late 1930s under the Stalinist terror of intellectuals. His life was not ended as a result of natural causes but he was reportedly attacked by dogs when he was in the labour camp. Nevertheless, the mysterious death of this leading native Bolshevik still needs to be researched.

“Wives of many loyal Bolsheviks spent their term in ‘**ALJİR**,’ Aqmola Labour Camp for the Wives of Traitors. Among them were **Külendam Qojanova**, wife of Sultanbek Qojanov, the Second Secretary of the Kazkraykom; **Dameş Jürgenova**, wife

⁴⁹ Madanov, *ibid*, p.167.

⁵⁰ Manaş Qozıbayev, “Düniye Jüzi Qazaqtarınıñ Qurıltayı: Ata Tariyhı Tuvralı Sır,” *Egemen Qazaqstan*, p. 6.

⁵¹ Abdijapar Abdakim, *Qazaqstan Tariyhı*, p. 261.

of Temirbek Jürgenov, the Commissar of Culture of the Kazak Republic; **Mahinur Sarmoldayeva**, wife of Qabilbek Sarmoldayev, the Press Manager of the Kazkraykom; **Saqıpjamal Nazarova**, wife of Zarap Temirbekov, the editor of *Leninşil Jas* (Leninist Youth); **Künjamal Maylina**, wife of the well-known Kazak Writer, Beyimbet Maylin and **Aziza Rısqulova**, wife of Turar Rısqulov.”⁵³

THE STATE OF SOVIET EDUCATION

The so-called “cultural revolution” in the Soviet east among the toiling masses was evaluated by many as one of the major events in the history and the experience of creating the new man ‘Homo Sovieticus.’ Recent publications in the lands of the former Soviet Union reveal that the cultural revolution was one of the myths of ‘socialist development.’ Present-day Kazak social scientists seem inclined to blame this Soviet experience of creating the ‘homo sovieticus’ as the movement which destroyed traditional Kazak cultural life and the Kazak cultural stratum in the twentieth century.

“The ideological hoop did not allow the free development of Kazak culture. The central control of material and the financial system required the periphery to ask permission of those “aqsaqs” in Moscow for every single movement in this respect. Heralding the Kazak culture, literature, and art to world public opinion was conducted in very difficult conditions. Activists in arts and sciences, who were under the strict supervision of the party, the related ministry and state security organs, were not able to make a single movement, a single statement. Every single representative aiming to visit a foreign country was required to promise to talk only about the achievements of the economy and culture of Kazakhstan. He was to be listened to very carefully and was investigated thoroughly. Creative and scientific delegations used to be led by ‘reliable’ personnel of the Party, Soviet or Labour Unions. Free travel to foreign countries was strictly forbidden. Members of the social sciences were not allowed to establish contact with

⁵² *Qazaqstan Tariyhi.*, p. 341.

⁵³ Abdakim, *ibid.*, p. 242.

each other or to exchange views about Kazak history and developments after the October revolution.”⁵⁴

One of the well-publicized Soviet achievements in Kazakstan was in the rate of literacy among the indigenous people. As early as 1920-21, there were 2412 literary courses at which 72,232 people were taught in Kazakstan. The rate of literacy reached 25.2 percent in 1926 and rose to 83.6 percent of the total population in 1939.⁵⁵ However, despite the impressive official statistical information, conditions in Kazak schools were not very favorable. “There were 746 Kazak primary schools out of a total 1779 and 168 Kazak secondary schools out of a total of 701 in 1940. The majority of the primary and secondary schools were built in towns and in smaller settlement areas inhabited mainly by Russians.”⁵⁶ According to the *Engbekşi Qazaq* newspaper, there were 1600 Kazak schools in the republic, yet only 40 of them had adequate buildings in 1927. Most of the village schools lacked school-buildings, desks, books or many other necessary materials well into the mid-1960s.⁵⁷ Starting with the industrialization drive in the Soviet east, native people also began to be accepted to the newly opened facilities. Hard physical labour⁵⁸ was the main profession of most of the Kazak workers due to their lack of training in any industrial enterprises previously. The percentage of native blue collar

⁵⁴ Abdakim, *ibid.*, p. 209.

⁵⁵ Madanov, *ibid.*, p.172

⁵⁶ Abdakim, *ibid.*, p. 203.

⁵⁷ Madanov., p.173.

⁵⁸ The present President of the Republic of Kazakstan stated that the conditions at Temirtav Metallurgical Complex were unbearably harsh during the 1960s in his memoirs, partly published by the Republican *Egemen Qazaqstan* in 1991.

workers reached 33.8 percent only in 1939. Nevertheless most of them worked in the lowest rank of their professions and many as simple workers.⁵⁹

A general improvement in the level of education in the Steppe region brought with it the improvement in the number of published books. There were 96 books (with a circulation of 443.000) published in 1925 and five years later this total reached more than 200. However, most of the books were devoted to propaganda and were for official purposes.

THE CREATION OF “MANQURTS”⁶⁰ IN SOVIET KAZAKSTAN

The losses of the Kazak Republic during thirty years under the Stalinist iron fist far exceeded the achievements of the republic, considering particularly those interests which were more important to the indigenous population. First of all, Kazaks lost almost all of their intelligentsia who had promised a brighter future and to improve the cultural and linguistic needs of this long-oppressed colonized people. A new generation of cadres was created from among the remaining drops of what was left, if anything, from the Kazak intellectuals. The most important character of the newly created cadres was their loyalty and their obedience to party policies. In the words of Chingis Aytmatov, many behaved like *mangqurts* (a person who became alien to his origin through the forceful measures taken by an outside force) of the party.

⁵⁹ Abdakim, *ibid.*, p. 182.

⁶⁰ In his well-known novel, Chingis Aytmatov refers to an ancient story of a Kazak man enslaved by an invading enemy and through the torture he receives, he became a mangqurt who loses his memory and later

The bays with their thousands of livestock and herds had been destroyed long ago. Traditional Kazak nomadic life was history already. The native intellectuals who cared for their nation were all eliminated. Those who dared to question or dared to think and understand what was happening to themselves and to the society were silenced, almost en masse. The dream of the nationalist native intellectuals of educating their society came true with a significant difference. The Kazak people were educated according to socialist requirements and the Kazaks took their place among the toiling masses of the east. They were mainly educated in Russian. They found no proper school or proper job that would enable them to live a better life if they were not educated in Russian language schools. Almost all of those who were born after W.W. II and during the last years of Stalin, began to find it easier to express themselves in Russian rather than their own mother tongue. The Kazak language was in its death throes. Agricultural and industrial establishments built on Kazak soil were run by Russians, and the products of those establishments were sent to the center by Russian hands, recorded as the achievement of the center, to be used firstly according to the needs of the center. The fear of the Stalinist terror penetrated into the bones and blood of every single citizen and lasted until their last breath, even long after Stalin died. Many died as the genuine *mangqurts* of Stalin. Even many of those Kazaks who remained in the west after W.W. II, and began a new life in the west, led a timid, crouching and cowed life.

Stalin's end marked the beginning of the new era for the whole Soviet Union, although the remnants of Stalinist-era practices continued, until after the deaths of the

kills his own mother by the order of his master: *The Day Lasts More Than A Hundred Years*, translated by

many party apparatchiks and government officials who survived for decades after his death. In one of the sources of the current native Kazak press, the Stalinist era was evaluated as the era of assertive terror, criminal political adventurism (**aventyuristskiy**), and ungrounded repression. The Hruščev period was the era of “voluntarist assertiveness” which sought to solve all the existing problems, rural or otherwise, by force rather than on reasonable scientific grounds, and which brought the whole country and the economy to the very edge of total destruction. The Brejnev years were the era of stagnation, mass-dispassionate behavior, as well as the time of criminal administrative officials who occupied all the positions. **Brejnevščina** resembled the time of Stalin, with a slight difference. The Stalinist experience was a tragedy, the Brejnev experience remained only a disgraceful farce.⁶¹ During the whole seventy year period between 1922 and 1992, it is quite easy to see the fruits of the Soviet policy toward nationalities, and of the domineering practices of the central organs, from the list of Party leaders in Kazakstan.⁶²

Only three out of fourteen First Secretaries of the Communist Party of Kazakstan were native during the whole seven decades. Şayahmetov was ousted from his post due to Hruščev’s accusation that he was contaminated by the “virus of nationalism.” D. A. Kunayev twice assumed the job and the last, Nazarbayev, (the luckiest, for the time being) reached the years of independence. The other twelve First Secretaries of Soviet

John French; foreword by Katherina Clark., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983.

⁶¹ Abdijapar Abdakim, *ibid.*, p. 276.

⁶² Please see the list of the First Secretaries of the Kazak CP CC during the Soviet rule, in the attached appendix. Abdakim., *ibid.*, p. 277.

Kazakstan were from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds from Russian to Polish, Georgian, Armenian, Jewish, Ukrainian, and Uyгур.

The new party secretaries Hruşçev and Brejnev did not eliminate the injustices done to the Kazaks and to their land. During their times, the dilemma of the Kazaks exacerbated by new sources of exploitation of the Kazak Republic. The well-known leader of the Soviet Union during its stagnant years, Leonid Brejnev, followed Ponomarenko in administering the Kazak Republic.

In the current independent press, the years between 1954-1985 are evaluated as stagnant years in Kazakstan. Undeniably there were some developments regarding the education of the masses, exploitation of agricultural resources and the establishment of some industrial enterprises. The native Soviet press, however, used to describe only the achievements of the then current regime. One of such materials can be found in the *Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyası*, which read as follows⁶³:

The economy in Kazakstan was that of a colonized country of an underdeveloped sort before the October Revolution. Despite its rich natural resources, it remained a country whose economy fundamentally was based upon agricultural products. Developments in industry were very slow. The main industrial enterprises were built on a small scale. The *bays* and partly-feudal classes ruled the nomadic Kazak society. Kazakstan become unrecognizable due to the achievements during the Soviet period.

Unfair practices were carried out against the native people not only by the central administration. The new cadres began to alienate the native people by creating their new *sovhozes* away from the native-inhabited avuls in order to prevent the natives from taking advantage of the central help devoted to the campaign. Besides, nobody thought of

⁶³ "Qazaq SSR." *Qazaq Sovet Entsiklopediyası*, Vol. 6, p. 271-272.

returning to Kazakhstan those Kazaks, living in other regions of the USSR, and who had left Kazakhstan during the famine of the 1930s.

The last three decades of Kazakhstan up until 1986, were marked by the leadership of Dinmuhammed Ahmetuli Kunayev, with an exception of the years 1962-64 . He was the second Kazak appointed as the First Secretary of the Communist Party in the Republic's seventy years of Soviet history. He reigned in Kazakhstan for more than a quarter of a century. He was elevated to the top Soviet leadership circle of the **Politburo**, as one of the eleven foremost Brejnevite leaders.

MONOCULTURE OR THE VIRGIN LAND DEVELOPMENT

The Virgin Land Campaign was publicized as one of the greatest achievements of Soviet administration. It started as a big campaign and, at the beginning, produced astonishing results. It was launched in Kazakhstan at the expense of deterioration in the fertility of Kazak soil and at the expense of a decrease in traditional livestock breeding practices. This utopia of economic giantism, both in grain production, and in the increase in livestock and particularly cattle production, ended with the careless waste of Kazak soil. "The basic law of rational use of pastureland"⁶⁴ was violated.

⁶⁴ Carol Kerven and Roy Behnke, "Impacts of Decollectivization on Rangelands and Livestock Marketing in Central Asia," A Paper presented at the Workshop on Central Asia Animal Production Regional Assessment, and been published in *Central Asia Livestock Regional Assessment Workshop, Tashkent, Uzbekistan: Feb. 27-March 1*, Davis, California: Management Entity, Small Ruminant CRSP, University of California, (?1996), pp. 89-105, and in p. 91.

By the decision of Hruşçev in 1953, the Kazak pasturelands were opened to agriculture. The Moscow administration believed that the lands which had been used by the Kazaks as grazing areas for their livestock for ages had been underutilized. During the last years of Stalinist rule, and at the beginning of the 1950s, production of grain in the Soviet Union became insufficient to meet the growing needs of the state. Grain production was 31 million tonnes in 1953 and grain consumption reached 32 million tonnes. Livestock production was also low at that time. Thus, grain production was particularly needed to meet the food-crisis in the country. During the February-March Plenum in 1954, the Communist Party Central Committee made a decision to improve grain production by opening the virgin lands to agriculture in Kazakstan, Siberia (the Altay and Krasnoyar regions), Ural, Povolje, North Caucasus, and the Far East. During the plenum, a decision was made to produce 14 to 15 **tsentner** (100 kilogramme) of grain per hectare in the virgin lands in Kazakstan and in some regions of Siberia as well as to increase grain production by another one billion two hundred million **pood** (one pood is about 20 kilogrammes) during the following couple of years after launching the campaign.

The chief actor of the virgin land campaign, Nikita Hruşçev wrote about how he came to the decision to open the Kazak pastureland to agriculture. The first step of Hruşçev in putting his idea into practice was to fire the First Secretary of the Kazak Communist Party, Şayahmetov from his post. Hruşçev wrote the following:

... I formed the opinion that he had political motives for trying to discourage the Virgin Lands campaign. It was my increasingly strong impression- and the other comrades in the leadership agreed with me- that Şayahmetov was infected by the virus of nationalism. Since Kazakhstan was underpopulated, he was afraid that the expansion of cultivation

would necessarily mean an influx (of non-Kazakh farmers) into his Republic. We decided to replace Şayahmetov with Comrade Ponomarenko.

We undertook certain organizational measures in the Virgin Lands, such as setting them aside as a separate region with its capital as Tselinograd. The Virgin Lands region was given administrative autonomy and funded directly by the All-Union government. We didn't want to channel out investment through the Republic government or a planning commission because we were afraid that resources earmarked for the Virgin Lands might end up in other branches of the Kazak economy.⁶⁵

The Virgin Land campaign was carried out hastily and at full blast like those campaigns of the then recent 'Patriotic War.' After launching the campaign, Kazakhstan gave one billion or more **poods** (one pood is about 20 kilogrammes) of grain to the "state depot" six times. Those achievements, that once caused a great acclaim, were made only during those years when the climate was suitable. However, grain production considerably increased when one compares the periods 1949-1953 and 1959-1963. During the latter period, grain production on the Virgin Land in the whole country rose 227 percent per year. The increase was 167 percent in the regions of the RSFSR. It reached 500 percent in the northern regions of Kazakhstan where the campaign was most thoroughly carried out. Gradually Kazakhstan became the provider of 60 percent of the grain, of the whole Soviet Union.

During the first years of the campaign, Kazakhstan shouldered the responsibility of providing people with grain and grain products and of stabilizing the grain balance in the Soviet Union. The campaign was thus carried out using intensive methods of agriculture. During those years, ploughing huge amounts of land was valued as the "great heroism" of the party and the people. On the eve of World War II, grain production in Kazakhstan was 4.3 tsentner per hectare of land. It reached 7.3 tsentner per hectare at the beginning of the

campaign between 1954-1958. However, this trend later fell to 6.1 tsemtner per hectare between the years of 1961-1965. During the most active seven years (1954-1960) of the campaign, 25.5 million hectares of land in Kazakhstan and only 16.6 million hectares of land in the whole RSFSR was opened to agriculture. Part of the virgin land territory was overploughed due to the decision of the party plenum in 1954, to further extend the amount of virgin and idle land development by 28 to 30 million hectares until 1956. Kazakhstan fulfilled its plan of ploughing the virgin land one year ahead of the plan because of the careless work of overploughing three million hectares of land. Thus ploughing in the whole Union reached 29.7 million hectares by the year 1955. Kazakhstan's share reached 18 million hectares during this period.

This was an unfortunate case, particularly for countries like Kazakhstan whose people had traditionally used the land for animal husbandry. The eighteen million hectares of virgin land cost Kazakhstan the loss of fertile soil for grazing land. Thus the prophetic words of Alihan Bökeyhanov, written as early as 1910, became a reality:

During the continuous settlement of (Slavic) peasants on the Kazak steppe, it is quite possible to lose the fertility of the land by over-hasty policies before the whole farming collectives begin to use intensive methods. The Kazak land which will be stripped of its ages old soil fertility, and thus, will be arid and barren in the end. (The Kazak land) will stop giving fruitful results (in agriculture), if the current stage of agricultural technical methods continues to be used.⁶⁵

The 20th Session of the CPSU (The Communist Party of the Soviet Union), decided that the Republic should improve its grain production to five times the then

⁶⁵ *Khrushchev Memoir (Khrushchev Remembers)*, p. 120-121, and 124.

⁶⁶ Alihan Bökeyhanov's words were cited by Talas Omarbekov, "Ting Tımşalagan Şındıq," *Juldız*, Vol. 6, 1991, p.118.

current level by the year 1960. Kazak grain production was 4.750.000 tonnes in 1955. In other words, the center ordered Kazakhstan to produce 19 million tonnes of grain in five years. This kind of illusory target was made by the center thanks to the misdirection of some local party leaders. During the second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in February 1955, Leonid Brejnev claimed that the Republic was able to fulfill the plans for ploughing new parcels of land required by the center. Brejnev continued to boast about the future achievement of the Republic. During the All-Union Meeting of the Executive Officials of the Party and the Soviets in 1955 held in Moscow, Brejnev announced that Kazakhstan would give 600 million poods of grain to the state in 1956. This was a rather over optimistic due to the reason that, during 1955, grain production in Kazakhstan suffered from drought and wind erosion.⁶⁷ Brejnev believed in achieving this target even at the cost of ploughing new land. The next year, Soviet leaders were dazzled by the success of the Kazak fulfillment of the grain plan with 950 million pood of grain in 1956.

This new achievement encouraged the top Soviet leadership to introduce more novelty. During the December Plenum of the CPSU in 1959, it was announced that the target of the Virgin Land Campaign was met by shifting the center of grain production from the West to East of the Soviet Union. Thus the Soviet leadership decided to limit grain production in the RSFSR, Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Northern Caucasus. The above regions were required, from that time onwards, to specialize in producing different types of agricultural products other than grain and to modernize animal husbandry methods, particularly to improve swine-breeding. Thus Kazakhstan was turned into the

main provider of grain for those regions which did not prefer to remain grain producing areas. During the 1960s, Kazak grain quality proved to be very high and the cost of producing it became very economical for the whole USSR. Republics like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia sold their grain for 85 to 90 roubles per ton, while one ton of grain was sold to 130 roubles in the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltic Republics. Kazakhstan, on the other hand, sold its wheat for 65 roubles and 60 roubles per ton starting from 1965.

The Kazak plight during the Virgin Land Campaign was not unknown to Sovietologists. They also wrote about the negative effects of the campaign upon the native people. A famous sovietologist Bohdan Nahaylo wrote the following:

The Kazakhs experienced a second difficult period in the mid-1950s, when Khrushchev launched his famous scheme to boost grain production by cultivating the huge expanses of virgin and arable land in Kazakhstan and southwest Siberia. This led to an influx of manpower from the European part of the Soviet Union, which soon threatened to swamp the Kazakhs in a Russian-speaking sea. Local feeling was ignored. When anxious Kazakh communists and intellectuals began to express their concern their complains were dismissed as reprehensible vestiges of nationalism.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ *Qazaqstan Tariyhi*, p. 376.

⁶⁸ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Moscow Hears From The Kazakhs," *Wall Street Journal*, 22 December 1986.

Change in Demographic Composition

During the Virgin Land Development, the whole union's interests, instead of regional interests was taken into account. The interests of the Kazak nation were sacrificed for the sake of the whole Soviet people. The spiritual development of the owners of the Virgin Land territory was not important to the Soviet masses and to the leadership at all. This time again another prophetic observation of a pre-Revolutionary intellectual proved to be right. Zeki Velidi Togan had written that some Russian Communists believed that "realizing the imperialist targets of bigger nations is more practical than realizing dispersed targets of small nations."⁶⁹

With the start of the Virgin Land Campaign, hundred thousands of Slavic people began to pour on to Kazak land. The soldiers of the Soviet Army who had previously received agricultural professional training were released earlier than their appointed military duty term in order to work on the virgin lands of Kazakhstan. Many thousands from other parts of the Soviet Union were sent by the Party and on Komsomol orders. Convicts who had served most of their prison terms and who agreed to work on the Virgin Land were also sent to Kazakhstan. Deported Volga Germans living in other parts of the Soviet land were also brought to Kazakhstan. By the decision of Hruşçev himself 'girls' seeking for a husband and a 'job' came to Kazakhstan as well. In his memoirs, Hruşçev wrote the following about this:

When I got back to Moscow (after visiting the Virgin Lands in Kazakhstan), I spoke to the leadership of the Communist Youth League about the complaint (of those single men on the virgin land) I had heard. "Make special effort to recruit more girls" I

⁶⁹ Zeki Velidi Togan, *Hatıralar*, p. 305.

said. "Tell them they won't have any trouble finding either a job or a husband out there."

⁷⁰

"Thousands of Party cadres from other parts of Soviet Union were brought to Kazakhstan, to lend a hand to the campaign. All of them were cadres trained under the Stalinist repressive party discipline and alien to the regional, geographic and climatic characteristics of Kazakhstan. Their number reached 25.000 during the first two years in Kazakhstan. They were appointed to leading positions in the regional and oblast party committees as well as in the Central Committee of the Kazak CP and the related ministries."⁷¹ Directors of sovkhozs and MTS-units were also drawn from those newcomers. Professional cadres to use the mechanized agricultural equipment were also brought into Kazakhstan. Their number was 391,500. The Soviet administration did not think of the alternative of training native people instead of bringing non-natives to Kazakhstan.

The Virgin Land Campaign brought 'astonishing innovations' to the Kazak Land. The geographic, national, ethnographic, and ecological conditions on the Virgin Land changed irrecoverably. Hundreds of new settlement areas appeared on the geographic map.⁷² Almost all of them were named in Russian, such as *Astrahanskiy*, *Gorkovskiy*, *Dnyepetrovskiy*, *Baumanskiy*, *Rostovskiy*, *Simferopolskiy*, etc. The present capital of Kazakhstan, Aqmola whose name has recently been changed to Astana was previously

⁷⁰ *Khrushchev Memoirs*, p. 124.

⁷¹ Talas Omarbekov, "Ting Tumshalagan Şındıq," *Juldız*, Vol. 6, 1991, p. 118.

⁷² *Qazaqstan Tariyhi*, p. 377.

called Tselinograd. During 1954 and 1964, more than 200 rural districts were renamed in Russian or newly established with a Russian name.

Despite the high Kazak natural birth rate, the percentage of Kazaks among the population in the republic declined by **eight** percent during the 1950s. During the 1959 population census, Kazaks made up only 30 percent of the Republic's whole population while the Russian percentage reached 42.7. The total non-native population on the Virgin Land of Kazakhstan reached two million in 1965.⁷³ This brought more hardship for the native Kazaks during the coming decades. When requests to make the Kazak language the official language of the Republic were made, counter-arguments were put forward that the majority of the Republic's population did not speak Kazak. Consequently, the number of those people who regarded the northern parts of Kazakhstan as not belonging to the Kazaks began to grow.

Environmental Degradation after the Campaign

According to present-day native scholars, the Virgin Land campaign changed the ecological balance of northern Kazakhstan as well. Many rare kind of birds and wild creatures were pushed out from the virgin land territory. Desiccation of the lakes and rivers in the area was hastened. Qostanay once had 5,000 lakes, of which only 500 remained after the campaign. Some 56 small rivers once existed in the oblast; only 20 remain today. One million hectares of land became useless after wind erosion in Pavlodar

⁷³ *Khrushchev Memoirs*, p. 124.

Oblast.⁷⁴ At the same time, “in the whole Central Asia, 25 to 50 percent of the land is under severe threat of erosion.”⁷⁵

Soviet authorities did not pay attention to the climatic conditions of the area. The continental climate in Kazakhstan prevents intensive agriculture due to the low precipitation. Intensification of livestock-breeding meant an increase in the demand for fodder resources. More fodder meant violating the carrying capacity of the fields. The centrally-imposed policies of the Virgin Land development forced the people to use ecologically risky systems of opening large-scale feedlots and ploughing up huge amounts of fragile grazing fields for farming. Current scientific expeditions reveal the following, relying upon the findings of native agricultural specialists:

For range-land degradation, the following is to blame... Up to 60 % of arid areas of Central Asia are subject to desertification caused mainly by overgrazing and the cutting of fuel wood. ... Others point to arable farming as the source of damage, particularly the Soviet policy of increasing the cultivation of marginal land subject to wind erosion and the removal of crop residues for livestock feeds, a practice which has **reduced soil organic matter by an estimated 28 % in the last quarter of a century.**⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Omarbekov, *ibid.*, p. 127.

⁷⁵ Tjaart W. Schillhorn van Veen, “New Challenges for the Livestock Sector in Central Asia: Overcoming Old Legacies and Adapting to New Policies, Markets and Farmers,” in *Central Asia Livestock Regional Assessment Workshop, Tashkent, Uzbekistan: Feb. 27-March 1*, Davis, California: Management Entity, Small Ruminant CRSP, University of California, (?1996), pp. 106-128. , in p. 109.

⁷⁶ Asanov, K. A., Alimov, I. I., and Smailov, K. S., “Effect of Grazing on Soil and Plant Covers in North Kazakhstan,” *Problems of Desert Development*, 1992, Vol. 2, pp. 7-13 and Y. Maul, V. Garmanov and S. Rikoon., “Soil Conservation and Agricultural Land Use Issues in Kazakhstan,” *Journal of Soil and Water Conservation*, 1993., Sept./October., pp. 383-388. Both of these native sources were cited by Carol Kerven and Roy Behnke in *ibid.*, p. 99.

THE DECLINE OF TRADITIONAL HUSBANDRY

Traditionally raised Kazak livestock also suffered from the campaign. The number of sheep in the Republic decreased. The number of horses decreased to a third and the number of camel to fifth of the levels of the 1920s. The total number of sheep, goats, horses and camels was not more than 14 million. Between 1951 and 1965, the number of horses in the republic was only 365.700. Instead of these, swinebreeding rose to more than four times the previous level. The reduction of sheep-breeding on the Kazak land deprived it of its organic fertilizers. Chemical fertilizers replaced the organic fertilizer. The official target of the Republican administration set in 1959 hoped to achieve the number of animals in the first row of the following table. The actual achievement is given in the second row of the following chart:

	<u>Sheep</u>	<u>Cattle</u>	<u>Swine</u>	<u>Horse</u>	<u>Poultry</u>
1959 Target	75 million	7.5 million	2.6 million	1.8 million	30 million
1965 Achiev.	31.1 mill.	6.8 million	1.7 million	1 million	19.9 million

Thus the Hruşçev's claim that he would more meat and dairy products than the USA was not realized. The Soviet aim of reaching that target did not become possible during the Brejnev or even the Gorbachev time either.

The Further Alienation of Kazaks from Native Culture

In the course of the Virgin Land Campaign further russification of the Kazak society continued. Between 1954 and 1956, some 1500 teachers from other regions of the USSR came to Kazakstan. All found teaching positions in the Russian language schools. Closure of native Kazak schools, seizure of regional Kazak language newspapers and

journals, as well as their replacement with Russian language schools and Russian language newspapers and journals occurred during this period. All of these activities were valued as the “fruits of the principle of internationalism and of the peoples’ friendship. “ Those Kazak intellectuals who a couple of years earlier had been subjected to repression, were forced to praise the achievement of the Virgin Land Campaign. They were asked to glorify the Virgin Land, as the “planet on which one hundred languages” were spoken.

A Soviet-supervised native Kazak source, the *Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyası*, praised the so-called achievements of the campaign as such:

Present-day Kazakhstan is an industrialized giant of a socialist republic where the agricultural sector is heavily mechanized... The contribution of agriculture reached 25 % in the overall production of the republic... Kazak agricultural achievements made an enormous contribution to the development of agriculture in our homeland (the Soviet Union). As a result of the Virgin Land Development between the 1954 and 1960, with the help of the Soviet State and all of the Soviet people, 25.5 million hectares of land were opened to agriculture, and Kazakhstan become one of the main agricultural producing regions. Kazakhstan’s place in producing grain has particularly become important. During the Eighth Five Year Plan (1965-1970), Kazakhstan gave 61 million tonnes of grain to the (Soviet) state. During the first four years of the Ninth Five Year Plan (1970-1975) period, Kazakhstan produced 96 million tonnes of grain.⁷⁷

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE ECONOMY IN THE LATER SOVIET PERIOD

Although Kunayev was criticized for serious mistakes in administering the Kazak Republic when he was finally removed from the post of First Secretary, the Kazak economy and industry, at least in officially given figures remained quite high. Kazakhstan had produced electrical energy of 0.6 billion kW/h in 1940, this rose to 2.6 billion kW/h in 1950 and 10.6 billion kW/h in 1960. The Republic was producing 17.3 million tonnes

⁷⁷ “Qazaq SSR,” *Qazaq-Sovet Entsiklopediyası*, Vol. 6, p. 271-272.

of coal in 1950, which rose to 32.3 million tonnes in 1960. Coal production from Qaraganda and Ekibastuz by open-cast methods rose to 61 million tonnes annually in 1970. The industrial potential of the Republic rose to twice the previous level between 1961 and 1965. There were 729 big enterprises and 535 workshops before 1965. A further 445 big enterprises and workshops were opened after that time. Kazakhstan began to produce 18.2 million tonnes of iron ore in 1970, which was three times higher than in previous years. Oil production was 3 million tonnes in 1965; it rose to over 10 million tonnes in the next five years before 1970. Nevertheless, some branches of industry, particularly the machine and auto-building industry, lacked the necessary investment. Seventy-two percent of the Republic's need for auto spare parts were brought from other regions of the Soviet Union. Kazakhstan was dependent upon other regions and republics of the USSR for necessary auto spare parts, important instruments, electro-technical appliances and equipment.⁷⁸ Thus, "...trade between Kazakhstan and the rest of the USSR reflects some of the patterns of economic relations between colonial (or underdeveloped) countries and highly developed metropolitan countries. It also fits the classic Marxist (and Leninist) definition of colonialism. Most manufactured goods were neither owned nor produced by Kazaks. ...non-Kazaks occupied the most important positions in towns. A similar pattern was typical of many new developments in northern Kazakhstan, including those in the "virgin lands" area."⁷⁹ With the launching of the Virgin Land Campaign, the percentage of Kazak workers among the overall workers in the Republic

⁷⁸ *Qazaqstan Tariyhi*, p. 360-364.

began to decline. Kazak workers in the Republic's industrial sector represented 17.4 percent in 1957, a figure which declined to 11.7 percent by 1973. The number of Kazak workers were higher only in two sectors of industry. At the beginning of the 1970s, the number of Kazaks working in the oil production sector was 69.5 percent and in the natural gas production sector the figure was 53.6 percent. The number of Kazak workers in the Republic's oil refineries was 36.7 percent, in printing houses 27.8 percent, in food production 20.3 percent, in lumberjack stations and carpentry only 28.8 percent. The number of Kazak workers in energy equipment production was only 2.2 percent, in enterprises for appliances and spare parts 4.7 percent, in enterprises for electro-technical equipment 6.6 percent, and in the textile industry and tailoring trade 13.6 and 15.7 percent respectively.⁸⁰

The major reason for the poor Kazak participation in the industrial production sector was the decline in the overall Kazak population as a result of famine, war, repression and forced collectivization, worsened by the bringing of massive numbers of settlers to the Kazak land, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s. Those changes altered the ethno-demographic balance in the Republic and drastically reduced the Kazak chances of taking their place in all sectors of the economy. There were no official administrative measures taken to reverse the decline in the Kazak percentage of workers in various sectors of the economy. Particularly, the central administrative departments' neglected to train native specialists to work in the industrial sector of the Republic. The

⁷⁹ Zev Katz, "Kazakhstan and the Kazakhs," *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities*, New York 1975., p. 215.

⁸⁰ *Qazaqstan Tariyhi*, p. 370-371.

central organs in the Soviet Union found it much easier to bring such specialists from other parts of the USSR.

KAZAKSTAN TOWARDS THE END OF THE SOVIET UNION

During the first five years of the 1980s, the top leadership of the Soviet Union changed three times. When Brejnev died in 1982, Konstantin Chernenko and later Yuriy Andropov assumed the post of the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party within three years from 1982 to 1985. However, the two old leaders both died soon and a rather young leader, Mikhail Gorbachov, was appointed as the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist party. Gorbachov left his mark in Soviet Union by his much publicized attempts to reform the country's economy and to remove some old practices of censorship in the Soviet media. 'Glasnost' (Openness) and 'Perestroyka' (Restructuring) were the words used to describe these moves. In order to address the country's grave problems of economic decline and political stagnation, Gorbachov launched radical political reforms by removing the control behind the forces of democratization and decentralization. When he came to power in March 1985, Gorbachov began sacking hundreds of officials connected with Brejnev, whose rule from 1964 to 1982 was condemned as a period of stagnation in every sphere of life in the Soviet Union.

The Kazak Republic also received its share of criticism. The Soviet press began to criticize the top party leadership in Kazakstan for poor performance in management during the previous five years from 1980 to 1985. When Gorbachov visited Kazakstan in

September 1985, in Tselinograd (the former Aqmola and the present Kazak capital Astana) he refused to accept the 'bad-weather' excuse for the poor performance of the Republic's agriculture. The 'socialist republic's' obligation was to achieve the production of 29 million tonnes of grain for Kazakhstan while, in reality, only 24 million tonnes of grain was collected from the fields in 1985. Following Gorbachov's visit to Kazakhstan, western sources began to report the removal of party officials in Kazakhstan.⁸¹ The Seventy-four year-old Kazak Party chief, Kunayev, was removed from his Republican party post as first secretary in December 16, 1986. He was famed as one of the men close to Brejnev, and the new Party Secretary of the USSR, Gorbachov, criticized him for serious shortcomings in administering Kazakhstan. Kunayev was blamed for blatant corruption and poor economic performance in Kazakhstan. The management of industry was described as a dismal failure and housing and food supply as grossly inadequate. Western news agencies and correspondents reported at that time that Kunayev's removal was a further move for the new Soviet leader Gorbachov towards consolidating his power and to bringing his own men to run the Soviet Union.

Kunayev's removal from the Kazak party leadership instigated a national riot led primarily by Kazak students in Almatı, then Alma Ata. It was mainly sparked by Kazak

⁸¹ R. M. Brongasser, "Gorbatschow greift in Kasachstan rigoros durch," *Die Welt*, 21 December 1985. Under the subtitle 'Köpfe rollen', the German newspaper wrote the following:

Den als jetzt des Plenum des ZK der KPdSU von Kasachstan tagte, wurden die Konsequenzen gezogen. In einem knappen Beschluss wurde der Bevölkerung mitgeteilt, dass der Sekretaer and das Mitglied des ZK-Büros K.K. Kasybajew seiner Pflichten entbunden und ihm andere Aufgaben übertragen worden seien.

Gleiches widerfuhr dem ZK-Mitglied K.M. Auchadijew. Ebenfalls seiner Pflichten entbunden und in den Ruhestand entlassen wurde das ZK-Mitglied B.A. Ashimow. Und der ehemalige Erste Sekretar des Stadtparteikomitees von Alma Ata,

anger over the replacement of Kunayev with a Russian, Gennady Kolbin, who had had no previous contacts or any working experience in the Kazak republic. On December 17 and 18, 1986, demonstrations in Almatı were also fueled by long standing social discontent. The riot in Almatı was unusual because of its political character and because of the Soviet authorities' willingness to report it to the Soviet public and the world media. It was reported then that hundreds of Kazak students went shouting "Kazakstan for Kazaks!", "America is with us, Russians are Against Us!", "True Representation of Kazaks at the United Nations!" etc.

The outstanding Soviet expert and historian Richard Pipes reasoned that Gorbachov's move of appointing a Russian as the First Secretary of the Kazak Communist Party, was a "recognition of the fact that Kazakhstan has ceased to be a "Moslem" republic, now that its Slavic inhabitants outnumber Kazaks."⁸² Although the real reason behind Gorbachov's decision might be different than the above statement, it was a danger sign for the native Kazaks that their land would be recognized as part of Russia. However the reactions of the native Kazaks proved that they did not agree with the idea of the top Soviet leaders at that time. A well-known western Sovietologist, Bohdan Nahaylo, wrote the following in the pages of *The International Edition of the Wall Street Journal*;

...The protests provide a dramatic reminder of a fundamental fact about the Soviet Union too often overlooked in the West. The Soviet Union is the world's largest multinational state and its last great empire. The disturbances in the Kazakh capital also highlight the intractable and potentially explosive nature of the nationalities problem in the Soviet Union generally, and in Central Asia in particular.

A.D. Koischumanow; wurde sogar wegen "Fälschung seiner Personalien, Unbeschaidenheit und Amtsmisbrauch aus der KPdSU ausgeschlossen.

⁸² Richard Pipes, "the 'Glasnost' Test," *New Republic*, February 2, 1987.

The Soviet Union is, essentially, the former Russian empire, recast in a Soviet mold. Despite Soviet claims that the nationalities problem inherited from the czarist "prison of nations" has long been successfully resolved, and a harmonious federation of "free and equal" peoples established, important decisions are still made in Moscow. The Russians, who constitute barely half of the Soviet Union's population of 280 million, retain a position of political and cultural dominance.

...Tensions and resentment are exacerbated by Moscow's disregard for national sensibilities of non-Russians, particularly by the manner in which Russian is promoted.

Nevertheless, under the leadership of Dinmukhamed Kunaev, who was the Kazakh party chief for over two decades, the Kazakhs gradually began to come into their own again. Regarded as a Brejnevite crony by observers in the west, Mr. Kunaev in his own republic appears to have been something of a paternal figure. His removal was not entirely unexpected, but the tactless manner in which he was replaced by a Russian was interpreted as an insult to resurgent Kazakh pride.⁸³

When Kazakhstan was struggling to overcome its problems related to mal-administration and to the declining economy in the Republic, she was not alone. The Soviet state and its top leaders were also seeking ways to improve the Soviet economy. By 1990, crises stemming from further political disintegration and a failed reform for the recovery of Soviet economy from the collapse threatened the USSR. Decentralization gradually gave way to a more quicker phase of the power shift from the central governmental bodies to those in the republics. The dominant position of the Communist Party and the prestige of the Soviet armed forces began to decline drastically which led to the failed coup in August 1991 in Moscow. It has accelerated the process of disintegration and had the opposite result to that which the coup makers planned to achieve. They wanted to restore authoritarianism again. The Communist Party and its central administrative organs began to be dissolved and the USSR Supreme Soviet suspended the party's activities. The attempt to force the republics to bend before the center's authority had undermined its credibility. Starting with the declaration of

⁸³ Bohdan Nahaylo, "Moscow Hears From The Kazakhs," *Wall Street Journal*, 22 December 1986.

independence by the Baltic Republics on September 6, 1991, Armenia, Georgia and Moldavia followed.

This trend was opposed by another group of Soviet republics that preferred to renew their partnership by creating a transitional government that lasted for only three months. Its main function was to cut further the authority of the central administration including its ministries and agencies. In December 1991, it was announced that the Commonwealth of Independent States was to be created in the place of the Soviet Union. Thus decision concerning the destiny of one of the most important superpowers of the twentieth century and its hundreds of millions of people were taken by a meeting between the Slavic leaders of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the Byelorussian Republic. Those republics were three out of the four original signatories of the treaty that created the Soviet Union in 1922. Except for the Baltic Republics and Georgia, the rest of the former Soviet Republics later joined the newly established CIS, each having varying degrees of economic, military and other reasons for interdependence with each other. The main reason for joining this new association stemmed from the necessity of coordinating future policies in the military field, in economic, banking, energy, transportation and cultural affairs.

That action brought extraordinary challenges for all fifteen Republics of the USSR. It was particularly striking for the leaders of the Central Asian republics, who, except for the Kirgız president Akayev, were part of the nomenklatura that had ruled their regions according to orders from above. Although the USSR had collapsed, in certain respects, most importantly in economic and in military fields, the republics remained

totally dependent on each other. Leaders of the Central Asian Republics were under pressure from unavoidable burdens for which none had any previous preparation to prevent or overcome. In the simplest sense of the word, they were *forced* to become independent.

Most resistant among all of the republican leaders, was Kazakhstan's Nursultan Nazarbayev. He proved to be the most active leader in the attempt to revitalize or restore the lifeless-putrescent corpse of the USSR. This of course partly resulted from Nazarbayev's lack of assertiveness in seeking genuine national independence. Seven decades of Soviet rule left Kazakhstan virtually the most interdependent of all the fifteen Soviet Republics with Russia. Thus the high level of subordination to the center made Kazakhstan's road to independence a much tougher path.

KAZAK IDENTITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Almost a century after the emergence of the Alash movement, in the present-day, intellectuals in the Kazak society began to search new ways towards their future path. There are at least three ways, similar to the choices faced by the Kazak intellectuals prior to the October revolution. Today's independent Kazakhstan can choose to become a state associated with its regional Islamic and Turkic identities; secondly, a country closer to the western ideas of democracy and freedom, as well as preserving its Turkic and Muslim character; thirdly a country closer to the Russian world and perhaps inclined towards forming more intimate political, military, economic and cultural links with Russia and, in the future, through further integration, to become a part of great Russia. In

order to define the most suitable way towards their future, present-day Kazak intellectuals started a move to re-evaluate their history and build a new nation from the ruins left after the Soviet demise.

Since the Kazaks of the present day, at least most of the intellectuals, declare themselves both to be patriots and as “**ultjandı**” (nation-lovers not nationalist), in applying the concepts and explanations of most of the Kazaks towards their fatherland, “*atameken*,” one finds some confusing remarks. Any mature adult regardless of his nationality seem to find it difficult to define himself as a patriot in the now-old Soviet sense and nationalist by his ethnic origin and loyal citizen of his newly independent state.

When the discussion came to this point, the preferences of the “**ultjandı**”-nationalist Kazaks and ethnic Russians supported by Russified native elements began to form a clearer picture. The nationalist Kazak intellectuals wanted to restore the former native political and intellectual figures and their ideas. They supported the native claims about the declining status of the Kazak language. They began to criticize, during the years of Glasnost (openness) and Perestroyka (restructuring), the earlier policies carried out by the Soviet administration towards nationalist intellectuals and towards the Kazak masses. Before the end of the Soviet Union, a move had already started in Kazakstan to rehabilitate those Alas intellectuals. This was the beginning sign of the new nationalist trend paying tribute to the memories of and later, the ideas of the former nationalist intellectuals.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE STATE-BUILDING PROCESS AND THE SOVIET LEGACY IN INDEPENDENT KAZAKSTAN

The following chapter will further explain the dilemmas that the new Kazak Republic faces in trying to overcome the burdens left after the Soviet demise. The Republic of Kazakhstan entered independence as one of the most problematic republics. Problems stemming from the Soviet military, political, social and environmental policies will be the subject of discussion. This chapter will reveal the difficulties of the Kazak route towards independence.

Military matters, including the issues of nuclear arms and space installations, as well as their division between the old center and the Republic of Kazakhstan, will be discussed first. Kazakhstan is also facing problems related to its multi-ethnic demographic composition. This is another Soviet legacy. Discussion of current matters related to the use of the native language and the Russian language can also be found in this chapter. Environmental problems in Kazakhstan, which were largely a result of Soviet centrally-controlled policies, is another issue to which this new republic seeks a solution.

Understanding the military, economic and cultural dependency of Kazakhstan is the aim of the following chapter. The reactions of forces inside the republic, as well as its current ties with the former center, Moscow, both at governmental level and between the two major ethnic groups, the Russians and Kazaks, will also be investigated. New trends, particularly among the native population, and its interaction with the other part, the Slavic group, is included in the hope of defining the problems of society in Kazakhstan.

As for the native intellectual elite, they are a group of writers, scholars, scientists, journalists and teachers of Kazak language and history. The famous Kazak writer and poet, Oljas Süleymenov himself, advocated a confederation with the Russian Federation and rejected the grant of official status to the Kazak language. As the president of the People's Congress Party, Süleymenov attempted to win the votes of the Russian-speaking population in 1994.¹ However, his support of confederation with Russia and his rejection of granting the Kazak language official status reveals the conflicting ideas of even native intellectuals. This is also to state that some native Kazak intellectuals are inclined to make public announcements to achieve political gains as well. This is especially significant for those current native administrative officials in Kazakhstan in order to draw criticism from non-native circles. Regarding the past professional careers of most of the leading native administrators, as the tools of the former Soviet administrative system, such moves are understandable. They are the tools of indirect Russian rule in Kazakhstan. They were trained during one of the most formidable colonization processes in the area under the Russian overlordship.

The current native nationalist intellectuals writing in the Kazak language have many similarities with those Alas intellectuals at the beginning of this century. They are supporting and advocating similar concerns related to the survival of the Kazak nation. They are praised to become one of the strongest currents in Kazakhstan, not only for the present day but for the future as well. Most of the Kazak language media are controlled

¹ Oljas Süleymenov, "Bizding Muratımız Tagı da Sol-Tavlardı Alasartpay Dalanı Asqaqtatuv," *Qazaq Adebıyatı*, No. 7, 18 February 1994, pp. 6-7.

by them. They are publishing newspapers, books, both academic and otherwise, journals and even making movies in order to tell the Kazak plight of today and past. Most of their work is intended to educate future generations and most of these nationalist intellectuals are following a similar path to that of the Alaş intellectuals in voicing the concerns of their native people.

PROBLEMS INHERITED FROM THE SOVIET PERIOD

Military: Nuclear Arms, Nuclear Power and Space Installations

The process of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, particularly after the 1991 August coup attempt, brought a new phenomenon to world history. For the first time in the history of mankind, a military nuclear power and its whole nuclear might and potential was going to be distributed among the disintegrating Soviet republics. This fact has encouraged many military, political and administrative organs of the states of the world to attempt to find a solution. Most important for the world's security was the fact that four former Soviet republics possessed nuclear weapons or other types of nuclear stocks and installations on their soil: the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakstan.

Thus the most important function of the CIS was to find a suitable way to control the nuclear weapons and their proliferation to the world. Although the biggest portion of the nuclear stock was vested in the Russian Federation's hand-some 70 percent,- Kazakstan was among the other three Republics possessing some 25 percent of the former Soviet Union's nuclear force. In other words, "Kazakstan has about 3 percent of

the identified former Soviet Defense industry facilities, the largest military-industrial sector outside the Slavic republics.” (Uzbekistan has only one percent, Byelorussia has 5 percent, Ukraine 15 percent:

According to the Kazak Minister of Industry, the Kazak defence industry comprises over 50 enterprises. A plant in Petropavlovsk produces the SS-21 SRBM. Other Petropavlovsk plants produce ballistic missile support equipment, torpedoes, and naval-communications-equipment. Another major torpedo producer is located in Almaty. All these plants rely on inputs of components from other states, primarily Russia. A plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk produces nuclear power reactor fuel and beryllium products, and a plant at Aqtav(Şevçenko) processes uranium ore. In addition, Kazakhstan has the only known plant outside Russia designed for production of chemical and biological materials.

Kazakhstan's roughly one percent of the known former Soviet military R.D.T & E (Research, Development Technic and Equipment) facilities are much more significant than the count indicates. Kazak test ranges have played a vital role in the development and production of aerospace systems. The range at Vladimirovka is used for integration of aircraft with airborne weapons, the center at Sarıganaq is used for development and flight testing of strategic air defense missile and ballistic missile defence systems, and the center at Emba performs similar functions for tactical air defence missile systems. The facility at Tyuratam(Töretam) is used to launch spacecraft (including all manned missions) and to test liquid-propellant ICBMs. The Semipalatinsk Nuclear Weapons Proving Ground is one of the two facilities in the former Soviet Union where nuclear weapons were tested; in 1991, Kazakhstan banned further nuclear testing and announced plans to convert the installations to civil uses.

Kazak plants are key suppliers of such strategic materials as titanium, magnesium, tantalum, niobium, gold, silver, and alimuna. Up to 1984 at least, the Soviets imported ore-probably from Australia- for the Ust-Kamenogorsk titanium-magnesium plant, apparently in part because of delays in developing the nearby Qaraötkel ilmenite deposit. A plant in Pavlodar is one of the three largest producers of alumina in the NIS,-is a major supplier to Russia's aluminum plants in Siberia.²

Already in 1993, Kazakhstan joined the CIS agreement to place its strategic nuclear forces under the control of the joint CIS command. As early as 31 January 1992, “the press service of the president of the republic has distributed an announcement which says: People in Kazakhstan approve of the statement on Russia's policy in the area of limitation and reduction of weapons, since it corresponds to the interests of the people and the

² Donald Creacey, “The Defense Industries of the Newly Independent States of Eurasia,” in *The Former Soviet Union in Transition*, Richard P. Kaufman and John P. Hardt eds., Armonk: M. E. Sharp, 1993, pp. 783-790, and in p. 787.

republic. ... It has come about that Kazakhstan is a nuclear power, and not by its own will. For decades nuclear weapons were produced there as part of the USSR; test complexes and appropriate infrastructure were created.”³ All tactical nuclear weapons on Kazak soil were to be carried to Russia by 1992. The official decision to become a nuclear-free state is already an endorsed decision of the Kazak Supreme Council. Kazakhstan signed the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) treaty on May 23, 1992 to relinquish all strategic nuclear missiles before the century ends. Two days after signing the START I, Kazakhstan and Russia concluded a bilateral treaty that affirms existing borders and creates a united military and strategic zone. After signing the treaty, Nazarbayev said that Kazakhstan was under “Russia’s nuclear umbrella.” With this treaty, Kazakhstan and Russia strengthened their ties and proved their partnership that was documented a week earlier in Tashkent. The heads of states of the CIS countries met in Tashkent on 15 May 1992 to sign a collective security agreement, assuring each other that they would provide military assistance in case of aggression against any one of them. Kazakhstan was also home to the Soviet space launch facility at Baykongur/Töretam and the Sarııganaq test site for anti-ballistic missiles and the Soviet air defense system. Right after the Soviet disintegration, military analysts wrote that Kazakhstan had 104 SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with 1040 warheads, in Derjavinsk and Jangız Töbe. This type of missile was the largest Soviet type, carrying ten 550kt (kilotonnes) warheads. The Semey nuclear site was home to 40 Tu-95 Bear bombers.⁴ The Kazak parliament ratified the nuclear Non-

³ SWB, SU/1294 A1/4, 3 February 1994.

Proliferation Treaty on December 13, 1993, when they received the necessary assurances for the development and adoption of a Convention for the Strengthening of Guarantees of Non-Nuclear States' Security.⁵ Together with the removal of the last vestiges of nuclear power from the territory of Kazakhstan in 1995, the attention of the outside powers, such as the USA, began to shift from Kazakhstan. From that time onwards, the Kazakstani officials felt abandoned in their struggle to maintain economic security and social stability in their Republic.⁶

Not the last, but an important matter which brought misery to the lives of the inhabitants of Kazakhstan, was the Soviet testing of military-nuclear weapons on Kazak territory. A testing zone for military nuclear weapons was created in the region among the Semey, Pavlodar and Qaraganda oblasts, by the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 1948. The first nuclear testing was organized on August 29 1949 in the Soviet Union. According to the Soviet Ministry of Defense, there were 113 nuclear bomb tests carried out in the Semey **polygon** (the nuclear testing site) between 1949 and 1963. Each bomb's capacity ranged from a couple of kilotonnes to 100 kilotonnes. Soviet nuclear testing practices were carried out underground only after 1964. From that time onwards, 343 tests were carried out and each bomb's capacity reached 150 kilotonnes. Kazak medical personnel were aware of the increase in radiation in the regions

⁴ Bogdan Nahaylo, *Encyclopedia of Conflicts, Disputes and Flashpoints in Eastern Europe, Russia and the Successor States*, London: Longman Current Affairs, 1993, p.172.

⁵ Philip Petersen, "Security Policy in Post-Soviet Central Asia," *European Security*, Vol. 4, No.1(Spring 1995) p.160.

⁶ Murat Laumullin, *Foreign Policy and Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan*, Almaty: The Eurasia Foundation, 1997, p. 7.

neighboring the nuclear testing site, yet were forbidden to state the diagnostic medical results for those who died of ionized radiation.⁷ Thus one of the first pressing issues for the Kazak government was to stop the Soviet nuclear testing site in Semey during the first year of independence, and to declare the regions poisoned by radiation to be ecological disaster areas. Six *rayons* and two cities in Semey (Semipalatinsk) oblast, one city in Şıǵıs Qazaqstan oblast, and two *rayons*(region) each in Qaraganda and Pavlodar Oblasts were listed as disaster areas. Together with Semey nuclear testing site and Ural Oblast as well as other Soviet nuclear and other forms of mass destructive weapons testing sites, the disaster areas occupied 18 million hectares of Kazak land by the year 1980. The Semey nuclear testing site alone covered 8372 square kilometers of land. The Kazak argument stemmed from the fact that the central organs of the Soviet Union had occupied those areas for the use of the Soviet military without the consent of the Republican government or of the people in the Republic. According to the specialists' accounts, some 500,000 inhabitants in Semey Oblast were subjected to poisonous ionized-radiation during the years of nuclear testing. The number of people dying from oncological diseases increased seven times between 1975 and 1985 in the Semey region alone. There were 38 nuclear tests of varying capacity conducted in 27 spots in Kazakstan. A testing site in Atırav Oblast was used 17 times, the Ural region eight times, and the Aqtöbe, Aqmola and Southern Qazaqstan regions were also used for Soviet nuclear testing purposes. Barsakelmes Island in the Aral Sea was a site for testing bacteriological

⁷ *Qazaqstan Tariyhı*, p. 359.

weapons.⁸ The native press in Kazakhstan evaluates that Kazak independence played a key role in preventing further nuclear testing on Kazak soil. The Kazak public, led by the famous writer of *Az I Ya* or the tale of Prince Igor, Oljas Süлейменов, used the opportunities of Glasnost to form the **Nevada-Semey** antinuclear movement for rallying opposition to the Soviet testing of nuclear weapons.

As early as April 13, 1992, President Nazarbayev declared that the former Soviet nuclear test center near Semey was going to be a scientific research center. "A decree by Kazak president Nursultan Nazarbayev said the center's vast network of underground tunnels would be used for the destruction of missiles in accordance with the US-Soviet Treaty reducing long-range nuclear weapons. It said the center could also be used for specific industrial projects, such as the production of artificial diamonds by means of non-nuclear explosions."⁹ This Kazak stance was confirmed by a bilateral Kazak-Russian treaty, signed in Fall 1992, which read as follows:

The Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation will pursue a coordinated policy in the sphere of security, disarmament and arms control. They recognize the continued need for joint command over strategic forces and the retention of single control over nuclear weapons.

Recognizing the need for the maintenance and development of the scientific-technical potential created at the Baykonur cosmodrome, the Semipalatinsk testing ground and other defence installations in both states, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation will coordinate their scientific and production activities in the interest of science, the national economy and the maintenance of security. Both states will conduct a coordinated policy in the sphere of military cooperation, including the conversion of defence enterprises, the development of dual-purpose high-tech production facilities and the export of defence goods.¹⁰

⁸ *Qazaqstan Tariyhi.*, p. 401.

⁹ RFE/RL Archive Material, CN0119, 13 April 1992.

¹⁰ SWB; SU/1510, B/4, 13 October 1992.

Political: Problems of a Multi-Ethnic Society

After the declaration of independence, Kazakhstan was left with an ethnically mixed population of Kazak, Russian, German, Ukrainian, Korean, Uygur, and in total, some one hundred different nationalities in their republic. Most analysts regard it as sufficient to write about the difficulty of the ethnic composition in the Republic, relying mostly on the Russian language sources. The Kazak argument about the native rights over their fatherland was not given any strong voice in western literature about Kazakhstan written after 1991. The only priority in explaining the native attempt to restore their historical, cultural and linguistic legacy was to raise the alarm about the coming so-called pan-Turkism before a snickering pan-Slavism that was experienced during the last decades of the Tsarist time and after the Soviet demise. Kazakhstan was publicized as a country whose majority of inhabitants were of Slavic origin. This fact gave a simple reader the perception that Kazakhstan belong to the Slavic world of nations rather than to its Turkic and Muslim world. It was supported by the fact that about 40 percent of native Kazaks are fluent in Russian and were well-adapted to the Russian style of living.

Kazakhstan's captivity to its political geography forced the new Kazak government to try hard to keep good relations with its neighbors, particularly with Russia. Thus, the elites in Kazakhstan wanted to secure their independence by means of stressing territorial integrity in the face of a large number of Slavic settlers in the republic. The primary national security objective was given as the guarantee of independent status. The political danger of the unification of all the non-Kazaks against Kazaks was the point in maintaining the inter-ethnic consensus in the security field for the new Kazak state.

Ethnic 'self-determination' of non-natives was opposed by the Kazaks, as expressed by Ömirserik Kasenov, Director of the Center for Strategic Research in Almatı, "self-determination for Kazakhstan means decolonization, not special rights for ethnic groups that came to our territory as colonists."¹¹

Another problem lies in the definition of the status of those Slavic settlers in Kazakhstan. There seem to be an important confusion about their orientation of identity. It is important to determine whether they recognize themselves as the Russian diaspora, still feeling close to Russia rather than Kazakhstan, as an ethnic group whose origin belongs to another state and thus who prefer to keep up their ethnic and cultural ties with the citizens of the Russian Federation. Slavic settlers on Kazak territory used to live this kind of life during the Soviet period and thus yearn for their lost former status, despite the fact that this will undermine their loyalty to the current independent Kazak country where they are recognized as Kazakistani citizens. The Cossack claim of one-third of Kazak territory (as their ancestral homeland due to its occupation by the Slavic population during the last three centuries) thus seems an unacceptable demand. Although the Russian Federation officially does not support any ethnic separatism on the territory of Kazakhstan, individual unofficial demands do so are made both in Kazakhstan and among Russian society outside the Republic. Justification is thus given to the Slavic settlers' status and their rights on account of their previous undermining the rights and status of the indigenous people.

¹¹ Ömirserik Kasenov, an interview with him was carried out by a correspondent of *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 16 October 1996.

Correction of past mistakes or the mismanagement of the Tsarist and the Soviet administrations was thus downplayed by recent scholars' analysis of society in Kazakhstan. On the one hand, some western scholars claim that 'transnational themes such as pan-Turkism' are very unlikely to be recognized due to the acceptance and loyalty of each native citizen of the Central Asian Republics towards their distinct identity as Kazak, Kirgiz or Uzbek. On the other hand it is ignored that the Slavic population, despite being citizens of Central Asian independent states, do not accept their newly-evolved status, as the loyal citizens of each new state. Thus they consider themselves and were counted by nationalist Slavic analysts as the Russian 'diaspora' and are justified in supporting pan-Slavism, under the disguised label of the rights of 'ethnic minorities.' If one speaks of a growing Kazak nationalism in Kazakhstan, it is difficult to neglect the growing pan-Slavic tendencies or the Russian nationalism of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan and their loyalty to the Russian state. Seventy years of Soviet rule aimed to create an international society according to its ideological principles, but achieved many multi-ethnic states in which the Slavs were considered by the native people as "staygrants" or "sojourners."

President Nazarbayev's move to train Kazak cadres, who had been deprived of the basic right of assuming responsibility in administering their land, is also 'publicized' by western scholars and press as the 'nativization' or 'Kazakization' of the independent Kazak government, as if it were a sin equal to what the former administrations of the area carried out under the name of "internationalization." The present day policy of nativization of the cadres is not enough to eliminate all the remnants of the Soviet past

and cannot restore a genuine Kazak nation state. It does seem to arouse panic in the eyes of the world public. Western political scientists depict the present political and cultural elites of these republics as one hundred percent Turkic and as those who try to develop a purely Turkic cultural identity for their republics,¹² Nazarbayev is not a prophet for a movement to correct the historical injustices done to Kazaks, but he is the best of the worst in the eyes of the Kazak nationalists, for the time being. "Many Kazaks think that their national interests are not being asserted clearly enough vis-à-vis the ethnic minorities."¹³ Objection to the current Kazak leadership is based on its rather cautious policy of not alarming the non-native part of the population and those who seem to support them outside the republic. Kazak President Nursultan Nazarbayev's reluctance to issue the Kazak declaration of independence was the result of his concern about, or fear of, disturbing the balance between the Kazaks and the Russians in the Republic. He was also critical of any Russian move to annex Kazakhstan's northern territories to the Russian Federation. Recognition of the Slavic citizens of Kazakhstan, or of any other non-Slavic republic, as the Russian diaspora thus seems to be an asset in the hands of the Russian Federation to push and pull the former Soviet Republics to obey its decisions whenever it suits them best. It is necessary to be very careful to avoid overstatement of the facts, in either blaming Pan-Turkism or Pan-Slavism. Concerning this, a well-known Iranian-American scientist wrote the following:

¹² Shireen T. Hunter, "The Muslim Republics of the Former Soviet Union: Policy Challenges for the United States," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 3, Summer 1992, p. 60.

¹³ Sylvia Gressler, "Kasachstans schwieriger Weg in die Unabhängigkeit," *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, No. 12/1993, p. 35.

Western policies adopted on the basis of an inaccurate reading of the historical, ethnic, and cultural realities of these new states, or founded on an exaggerated preoccupation with one element in the overall situation, or prompted by short-term expediency without adequate attention to long-term consequences, would make the realization of worst case scenarios more likely.

By the same token, the opposite approach would diminish such dangers. Unfortunately, there is a real risk that current Western policies toward these republics are moving in the less fruitful of these two directions. Two conceptual underpinnings of Western policy stand out as especially wrong-headed. These are, first, inordinate fear of so-called Islamic fundamentalism and of Iranian expansionism, and, second, a reading of the ethnic, cultural, and historical realities of the ex-Soviet Muslim states that emphasizes only the Turkic element and consequently, a strategy based on Turkey to an excessive degree.¹⁴

The Kazak president Nazarbayev, on the other hand, described a Kazakstani citizen whose mother is Russian and father a Kazak, an image that posits a new breed or race that evolved from the melding of the European and the Kazak nations. It is partly true for the *homo sovieticus* type, one who cannot feel utterly loyal to either of the current official states, the Kazak or the Russian. He thinks, speaks and even dreams in Russian but yet due to his paternal ancestors considers himself a sort of Kazak. This type usually comes from the industrial-administrative towns and cities, where Russians and other Europeans are in the majority and modern city culture is the norm. If they feel closer to the Russian side, they are labeled by the nationalist Kazaks as *mangqurts*. Their definition of identity will decide the future path of the republic.

The second type of Kazakstani citizen constitutes those people who live on the “Virgin lands” to the north and east of the republic, inhabited mainly by Russian and other Slavic settlers, living on the large, mechanized state farms where Slav peasant culture is predominant. This group can be classified as the Kazakstani citizens who are ethnically closer to Russia and considered by the Russian Federation as their ‘diaspora.’

This type of people is not assimilated to the host's identity. It is this kind of tendency that will create a sense of irredentism and certainly will bring the surface a possible ethnic clash. What Nazarbayev is failing to count on is the level of loyalty of Soviet nationalities to their country. This loyalty, or what was termed as "Soviet patriotism," proved to be weak in the face of nationalism, including that of the Russian people during the last years of the Soviet Union. Nazarbayev is expecting the Slavic citizens of Kazakstan to be loyal to the new Kazak state and to display at least a certain level of patriotism to the Kazak land, which the Slavs have used as a home for at least two generations. If we accept Walker Connor's judgment that "nationalism customarily proves to be a far more powerful force than patriotism,"¹⁵ Nazarbayev's expectation from the Slavic population in Kazakstan will not be successful.

The third type of Kazakstani citizens comes from traditional Kazak areas where extended families (which once were organized into brigades) and village culture still flourish. They are the homeland people and believe themselves to be the 'sons of the soil.' Thus they feel that "their culture merits a privileged position relative to the interlopers."¹⁶ This is the group that support the moves of the present-day nationalist Kazak intellectuals. The independence era gave them the opportunity to express their long suppressed nationalist feelings. Ahmet Baytursun described this native psychology in his letter to Lenin in 1921 as the following:

¹⁴Hunter, *ibid*, p. 57-58.

¹⁵ Walker Connor, *ibid*, p. 196.

¹⁶ *ibid*. p.,78.

...It is possible that the natives might once again bury their enmity under their patience as they were doing it for ages. However, this silence might continue to the day when an opportunity arises for the natives to voice their disagreements in certain ways...¹⁷

Thus, during the seventy years under the Soviet star, three demographically and culturally distinct “Kazakstans” have developed on the “Golden Steppe of the Kazaks.” People have also begun to be divided into three groups in the shape of their opinions, language and lifestyles. The Kazaks, the Russians and the Mangqurts. Their political choices will define the future state of Kazakhstan as time evolves.

Another materialized cleavage in Kazakhstan primarily concerns the matter of dual-citizenship for the Slavic population. They are pressing hard to achieve it. This is also a prime example of the lack of loyalty of those Slavic groups to their newly-established independent state, Kazakhstan. This is largely emanating from the fact that, “...the Russian population of Kazakhstan is relatively newly-arrived; 38 percent of the present Russian population was born outside the republic, while the great majority of the remainder are either first- or, at most, second-generation.”¹⁸ This also reveals another fact that, almost half of the Russian population in Kazakhstan have relatives in other parts of the former Soviet Union. This Russian population, who by themselves or via their

¹⁷ Central State Archive of the Kazakhstan Republic cited by Manaş Qozıbayev, *Qazaqstan Tariyhi*, p. 100-105.

¹⁸ Martha Brill Olcott, “Democratization and the Growth of Political Participation in Kazakhstan,” in *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, edited by Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 207. Actually the western scientist are not in agreement with the date of the Slavic population in Kazakhstan in considering the date of their arrival to the Republic. Ian Bremmer stated that “Not only do Russians represent a majority of the north’s population, but few of those who live there are newcomers.” in his article entitled “Nazarbayev and the North: State-building and Ethnic Relations in Kazakhstan,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 17., No. 4, October 1994, pp. 619-635, and in p. 620.

ancestors were not directly involved in the process of the land occupation carried out by the Tsarist government, presently claim ownership of the Kazak land as their historic homeland. Their claim is based on the simple fact that the northern regions of Kazakhstan were inhabited by Russians. Definition of the Russian population as a group whose settlement to Kazakhstan goes at least a couple of generations back or whose settlement is a rather recent phenomenon will bring clarity to the genuine desire for irredentism or ethnic separatism in Kazakhstan. It largely stems from a deliberate move to turn the ethnic issue into a political issue.

Social: Problems of Education and Language

The foremost Kazak writer Oljas Süleymenov stated, during the years of Perestroyka, that “When I was in school in Alma Ata in the 1950s, we studied the history of Greece and Rome, but not a word about the history of the Kazaks!.. When I was in first grade, there weren’t any schools in Alma Ata which taught in Kazak... Who knows that there were six million Kazaks on their territory at the end of the 1920s, but only three million after collectivization!”¹⁹ As the above-statement shows the level of linguistic Russification is very strong in Kazakhstan. During 1989, some 60 percent of all the inhabitants of Kazakhstan considered themselves as bilingual. The educated classes and the majority of the Kazak elite is more comfortable in Russian than Kazak. The Soviet lifestyle created the necessity for an educated Kazak to speak fluent Russian and use it in

¹⁹ Sally Newman, “Suleimenov Promotes Study of Kazakh History,” RFE/RL Archive Material, June 14, 1988. No. F-532-533.

every sphere of life. Despite the Soviet claim of equality of all nationalities, the Kazak language was always given a second-class status throughout Soviet rule. Any disagreement with this policy was considered a “nationalist inclination,” and was subjected to punishment. Many unsuccessful moves were made to restore the declining popularity of the Kazak language during the later part of the Soviet rule. Kazaks who were aware of this situation pressured the administrative organs to declare Kazak to be the official language of the state. This has of course had the political consequence of rousing ethnic Russian concerns and claims that Russian has been placed in an inferior status.

Another socially pressing issue in independent Kazakhstan is education. The overall assessment of the Soviet educational system was addressed in a number of studies in the west.²⁰ Although literacy had become widespread in Kazakhstan during the Soviet period, the Kazak educated classes were subjected to Russification. The native population was forced to depart from their traditional culture and heritage, first by the imposed changes in their alphabet from Arabic to Latin in the late 1920s and about a decade later from Latin to the Cyrillic. Stalinist terror and execution deprived the Kazaks of their educated intellectuals. The following generation was professionally elevated to a higher status in so far as they adapted to Russian criteria, culturally and mentally. Native language schools drastically decreased and towards the end of the Soviet era some 40 percent of native Kazak youth were not able to communicate in their mother tongue. In a

²⁰ For a thorough study of this subjects, please see, Harley Balzer, “Science, Technology and Education in the Former USSR,” in *The Former Soviet Union in Transition*, edited by Richard Kaufman and John P. Hardt, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1993, pp. 889-908.

way, the Soviet Union succeeded in its policy of creating a so-called 'international' society at the expense of the Kazak culture. Kazak cadres were not given opportunities in high security jobs. Russians in Kazakhstan were usually the number one preference of the administrators to assume positions in important sectors of the Republic. The administration of sectors such as energy was directly ruled by Moscow. Native Kazaks were not given any important representation or opportunity to run the foreign affairs of the republic, even relations with neighboring republics were carried out via Moscow.

Environmental Problems: Nuclear and Industrial Pollution

"Kazakhstan was the junk heap where Russia threw its garbage," said Oljas Süleymenov, who organized the movement that called itself Nevada-Semipalatinsk, as a way of linking the Soviet nuclear testing ground to the site in the United States. "Moscow decided that it could, with complete impunity, send all of its filthiest industries to the east. What's more, 93 percent of the industries here belong to the center. So we suffer, but we don't even profit. We are left deserted with poisoned land."²¹ "...the city of Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan, and its inhabitants lived hard by a top-secret-site where, from 1949 to 1962, the Soviet military conducted approximately three hundred nuclear weapons tests without telling the civilian population that fallout might result and expose them to danger. After atmospheric explosions were banned under the Soviet-Anglo-American Limited Test Ban Treaty negotiated in 1963²², the blasts continued

²¹ Murray Feschbach and Alfred Friendly, *Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature under Siege*, N.Y.: Basic Books, 1992. p. 22-23.

underground, still hush-hush, but supposedly engineered to preclude any dangerous releases of radioactivity....”²³ In Suleymenov’s words, “Mothers in Kazakstan are drinking water so contaminated by mercury that their babies die. Our people can’t wait any longer for the government to help them. It can destroy. Only we can create.”²⁴

The problem of Kazak exposure to the ill-effects of radiation as a result of the Soviet nuclear testing was addressed by the international media as well. The following was published as early as 1993.

The power of that first Soviet bomb was 18 kilotons. Its radioactive cloud-one of the biggest in the history of nuclear explosions-drifted over eastern Kazakstan and the Altai Mountains, and thousands of people were exposed.

The explosion was set off at Semipalatinsk, an 18,000-square kilometer test site built in 1948. It’s biggest and best known of the many military testing grounds in Kazakstan-and the republic has plenty of them. Picture this: At 2.7 million square kilometers, Kazakstan’s land mass is equal to about four Frances; and, in aggregate, one of these “Frances” is completely occupied by military proving grounds. Some observers have calculated that half of Kazakstan’s arable land is monopolized by proving grounds.

All in all, the Soviets conducted 26 ground-explosion tests. Each explosion spread radiation over more than 800 Kazak settlements. The radiation level sometimes reached hundreds of rems at an output of 200 roentgen per hour. The Soviet Union’s Ministry of Health kept increasing the acceptable exposure limits for Soviet citizens..... Roughly one of every three explosions accidentally vented emissions into the atmosphere. In 30 cases, deadly radiation penetrated beyond the test site into populated settlements and areas where nomads herded sheep.... Radiation has been discovered in soil, food, water, and dwellings. Tests for the presence of radioactive particles in milk in Semipalatinsk show rates exceed the accepted norm by 25-530 times. The presence of the same particles in bones of animals exceeds the norm by 4.7-30.9 times.

The number of leukemia patients in the Semipalatinsk area grew by 2.3 times within eight years-from 51 people in 1980 to 118 in 1988. ...In 1988 the infant mortality rate around Semipalatinsk was 34.4 per thousand; the average for the republic was 29.9 per thousand.²⁵

²² The USA, the USSR and the United Kingdom of England signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty prohibiting nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water on August 5, 1963.

²³ Victor Kianitsa, “Test Anxiety,” *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 49, No. 8, 1993., pp. 37-39

²⁴ Murray Feschbach and Alfred Friendly, *Ibid.*, p. 239.

²⁵ Kianitsa. *ibid.*

Semipalatinsk is the most publicized region in Kazakhstan used for the Soviet nuclear testing purposes. As was mentioned before, there are other nuclear testing sites in the western part of Kazakhstan as well. Atrav region is one of the kinds where millions of hectares of land were used for various types of Soviet nuclear weapons testing. It has been reported that, in western Kazakhstan, the radiation level is several times higher than that of the Chernobyl area, in Ukraine.

Apart from the damage done to the Kazak population and the Kazak land by nuclear tests, other heavy industry sites also pose a serious danger to human health and to the environment in Kazakhstan. The harmful effects of heavy industry sites are poisoning the local population. "...sulphur and nitrogen emissions in 1993 in Kazakhstan Oblasts ranged from 4kg in Almatı to 483 kg in Pavlodar and 957 kg in Jezqazgan. The population of the Aral Sea basin has been affected by a combination of the desiccation of the sea, the release of salt, dust and sand into the food chain and water pollution from the inflow of herbicides, fertilizers and pesticides; the Caspian Sea has been affected by oil seepage; 1.5 million hectares of Kazak land was 'virtually destroyed' by missile launch emissions of heptyl."²⁶

PROBLEMS OF MAINTAINING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE

The Republic of Kazakhstan shared some common characteristics with the other CIS states after its declaration of independence in its attempt to maintain free statehood.

²⁶ Michael Kaser, *The Economies of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997., p. 20.

First and foremost, political independence depended largely on economic independence, which proved to be the greatest barrier to a more self-directed rule in Kazakhstan. Most of the problems stemmed from the Soviet legacy. The local elite had little experience in free decision making both in political and economic matters. All of the former Soviet Republics had an economic life isolated from the realities and practices of the global economy. Each former Soviet Republic ended up with a large dependency on inter-republican trade. Particularly the peripheral dependency on the center made the new independent republics vulnerable to the fluctuations of Russian economic policy. The "NIS inherited highly militarized and energy-wasteful industrial structures and enormous environmental degradation. The scale of environmental degradation, especially in Central Asia, has no counter-part in either the European NIS or Eastern Europe. There is also a great lack of a transportation network to link the new economies."²⁷ This makes it particularly difficult for landlocked Central Asia to sell its rich natural resources. Inefficiencies in running the economy cripple the republics rich with natural resources, such as Kazakhstan. Due to Kazakhstan's strong position in energy sources, one would expect the country to jump to a much higher level of development after the Soviet Union unleashed it. Although it is a net exporter of crude oil and coal, and a republic nearly self-sufficient in natural gas resources, Kazakhstan is powerless to meet the needs of its citizens. Kazakhstan does not have

²⁷ Bartholomiej Kaminski, "Introduction," in *Economic Transition in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, edited by Bartholomiej Kaminski., N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996. pp. 3-10. and also please see the extensive research conducted by Gertrude Schroeder, "Economic Transformation in the Post-Soviet Republics: An Overview," in *ibid.*, pp. 11-41.

enough refining or electric power capacity to satisfy its requirements and so must import petroleum products and about 15 percent of its electricity... Because former Soviet planners built energy facilities with little regard for republican borders, however, Kazakhstan is more dependent on other republics than its net export figures indicate. Most of its natural gas—primarily the sour gas from the Qaraşıganaq field in the western part of the country—is exported by pipeline to a gas treatment plant in Russia. The gas is used regionally on both sides of the Russo-Kazak border after treated. Most domestic consumers of natural gas, however, are situated in central and eastern Kazakhstan and rely on imports through pipelines from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Similarly the crude oil pipeline system built by the Soviets forces Kazakhstan to export much of the oil it produces in the western part of the republic to Russia and to import oil from Siberia for its refineries in the east. Kazakhstan's electric power system faces a similar situation—northern Kazakhstan is part of an electric power grid controlled in Moscow, while the remainder of the republic is supplied by a grid controlled in Tashkent, in neighboring Uzbekistan.²⁸

Moreover, worse than all the other former Soviet republics, Kazakhstan's economic sovereignty is under siege by the center. Moscow used to control 90 percent of the republic's enterprises. The other branches of the economy, namely agriculture, occupied a major place in the economy of Kazakhstan. More than 1.7 million people were employed in the agricultural sector in Kazakhstan in 1991. In other words, some 18 percent of the labor force worked in the agricultural field.²⁹ The agricultural-industrial economy of Kazakhstan produced mainly raw materials. The Moscow-controlled Kazak industry produced raw materials or at most only semi-processed products.³⁰ Agricultural output also consisted of primary raw-materials. The economy of Kazakhstan, at present, suffers from its remote location and its weak transportation network to the outside world, and thus lacks access to global markets. The Soviet Union exploited the natural resources of

²⁸ Jeffrey W. Schneider, "Republic Energy Sectors and Interstate Dependencies of the CIS and Georgia," in *The Former Soviet Union in Transition*, pp. 477-489.

²⁹ Richard Pomfret, *The Economies of Central Asia*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995., p. 80.

Kazakstan by using very primitive technology. The “Soviet system assigned Kazakstan only the task of initial processing, after which the raw materials were shipped outside the republic.”³¹ Central administrative organs ignored measures to protect the environment and the equipment necessary to produce consumer needs. The Kazak economy has a very low level of efficiency. Its only function was to supply raw materials. The standard of living is among the lowest in the whole former Soviet Union. Social and ecological problems threaten public safety and health throughout the republic.

Kazakstan faced difficulties in foreign trade after its declaration of independence. She did not have any hard currency to support economic development and to stabilize her monetary system. There were no trained professionals to work in foreign trade policy matters or experienced personnel for running the complicated international trade and payment mechanisms. Only on November 15 1993 was Kazakstan able to issue its own national currency, the **tenge**.³² Thereafter, it became possible for Kazakstan to conduct an independent economic policy and other necessary procedures of foreign trade transactions. The heavy burden of the Soviet demise forced Kazakstan to give priority to economic policy over politics.

³⁰ Aristan Esentugelov, “Kazakstan: Problems and Prospects of Reform and Development,” in *Central Asia in Transition: Dilemmas of Political and Economic Development*, edited by Boris Rumer, Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 1996, pp. 198-225.

³¹ Aristan Esentugelov, *ibid.*, p. 200.

THE FORMATION OF A NATIONAL ARMY AND STATE/TERRITORIAL SECURITY

First and foremost, Kazakhstan is dependent on Russia for its state and territorial security matters. Despite its declaration of independence in political terms, Kazakhstan is heavily dependent upon Russian help for military equipment. This was confirmed as the number one subject immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The Kazak Ministry of Defense and the Kazak armed forces were created in May 1992. The primary decision to form a small national guard with 2,000 soldiers had been made earlier that year. "By decree of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan the guard has been set up with the aim of ensuring sovereignty, the protection of citizens' constitutional rights and freedom and also other vital interests of life. The republic of Kazakhstan's republican guard will be a special military force and a reserve of the armed forces. The republican guard will be subordinated to the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Direct command will be given to the commander of the republican guards. The manning of the republican guard is to be carried out in accordance with current legislation on a voluntary basis from those citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan liable for military service."³² During the following months, it was announced that the border troops also were placed under Kazak command (August 1992). Kazakhstan also assumed control of the Jerzinskiy Military School of Border Troops, that was based in Almaty, in 1992. It was reported that the school and the native border troops units would be subordinate to the Kazak National Security Committee.

³² RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 219., 15 November 1993.

"In March 1993 President Nursultan Nazarbayev restructured the Kazakhstan armed forces into a smaller and leaner force which was less dependent on the USSR Line of Battle theory. ...Kazakhstan has its own air force, the Air Defense Corps based at Almaty. The 79th Strategic Air Division is based at Semipalatinsk... Details of Kazakhstan's military establishments are unavailable, although in Autumn 1992 the Russian forces stationed there numbered 63,000 ground troops. "³⁴ Other sources claim, by citing Kazakh military officials, that the Kazakh armed forces consist of at least 50,000 personnel.³⁵ According to the *IISS Military Balance 1997-98*, the total number of Kazakh army is 35,100 and the term of service is 31 months. Kazakh Army is consist of 20,000; the navy is 100 and the Air Force is consist of 15,000 soldiers.³⁶

A native Kazakh source admits that Kazakhstan still has difficult problems in forming its own national army due to several factors. The most important is the fact that all commanding officers of the former Soviet Army now serving in Kazakhstan were supposed to return to Russia according to an intergovernmental agreement. This mass exodus of military staff seems to have caused concern among the Kazakh administration. Kazakhstan was also deprived of a previous practice of selecting junior officers from other former Union republics. The Kazakh problem of maintaining an acceptable number of junior and senior officers for its new national army stems from this old Soviet practice.

³³ SWB, SU/1335, C4/4, 21 March 1992.

³⁴ Bogdan Nahaylo, *Encyclopedia of Conflicts, Disputes and Flashpoints in Eastern Europe, Russia and the Successor States*, London: Longman Current Affairs, 1993., p.172.

³⁵ *Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook 1993*, Detroit: Gale Research Inc., 1993., vol. I., p. 767.

The Soviet armed forces had only marginal Central Asian participation in its officer corps. Armed forces in Central Asia were effectively dominated by Russians and other European Slavs. Thus the percentage of Slavic officers and technical specialists in all of the local contingents in Central Asia was thus very high. In Kazakhstan only 3 to 4 percent of officers were ethnic Kazaks.³⁷

THE REVIVAL OF NATIONAL HERITAGE AND THE EMERGENCE OF KAZAK NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

With the coming of Glasnost, the Soviet press and Soviet intellectuals began to press for more freedom of publication, particularly regarding the Soviet past. Mikhail Gorbachev himself supported this movement by announcing that “there should not be any forgotten names and blank pages in Soviet history.”³⁸ Kazak writers and scholars were also encouraged by this movement and began to demand rehabilitation of key literary figures in their history. Oljas Süлейменов, the then First Secretary of the Kazak Union of Writers supported the move and stated his hope of republishing the works of Magjan Jumabayev and Şakerim Qudaybergenov as early as 1987. Both of these Kazak poets were executed by the Stalinist administration during the 1930s. It was the first sign of the Kazak intellectuals’ attempt to rehabilitate the past by using the opportunity offered to them by Gorbachev’s campaign of glasnost and of the trend towards removing

³⁶ *The IISS Military Balance 1997-98*, London: Oxford University Press, 1998., p. 156.

³⁷ Murat Lavmullin, *Foreign Policy and Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan*, Almaty: The Eurasia Foundation, 1997, p. 19.

³⁸ Ann Sheehy, “Call for Rehabilitation of Two Kazak Poets,” RFE/RL Archive Material, 9 June 1987.

the blank spots in history. Particularly, the Kazak demand to have Magjan rehabilitated was astonishing due to the fact of his association with the nationalist Alaş Party. The following year, articles began to appear in the native Kazak press calling for a return to native toponyms. For example a certain place in Qostanay was named after Goloşçekin until 1988 and a Kazak writer, Sırbay Mavlenov, drew attention to this fact.³⁹ Goloşçekin was the First Secretary of the Kazak CP during the collectivization drive in Kazakstan and was the foremost agent of Stalin's brutal killings on the Kazak steppe, and the creator of artificial famine in the 1930s. During 1988, a play written by Şerhan Murtaza about Turar Rısqulov's attempt to prevent artificial famine on the Kazak land by his appeal to Stalin was also put on the stage. Turar Rısqulov, the most prominent native communist figure, rose to a very high position in Kremlin during the 1930s and worked close to Stalin shortly before being executed. The Kazak intellectuals' attempts to rehabilitate native intellectuals victimized by the repressive Stalinist administration did not stop with these preliminary attempts. The next poet to be rehabilitated was Jusipbek Aymavıtov, who had written the "national anthem" of the Alaş Orda. This trend was only the tip of the iceberg buried for decades deep in the hearts of Kazaks who sought to remedy the past injustices done to them. From 1988 onwards, this trend continued with further rehabilitation of past literary and political figures of Kazak history. Particularly important was the rehabilitation of the chief Alaş activists, Alihan Bökeyhanov, Ahmet Baytursın, Mirjaqıp Duvlat and others. Academicians, writers, newspaper correspondents and the whole Kazak people supported it through publishing articles and sending letters

to the press. As early as 1987, the late Kazak writer Anvar Alimjanov wrote in the pages of the Kazak literary weekly, *Qazaq Adebiyatı* the following:

To say the least of it we should be able to compile a truthful history of our culture for the last seventy years since the Great October Revolution. Ultimately we must give a clear and precise evaluation of the creative work of representatives of Kazak culture whose names could not be mentioned up to now. Not to mention their names shows our irresoluteness and weakness in the face of the truth. Such a situation has always led to falsehood. One should not fear the truth. The creative work of these people is also our heritage from the past.⁴⁰

From the years of Glasnost onwards, the native Kazak press became very active in reassessing their history, reevaluating many unuttered matters related to the Kazak past. The colonial period and the Kazak struggle against the Tsarist administration first appeared earlier in the form of a novel, *Han Kene* (1971), written by İlyas Esenberlin and, later, another three-volume novel depicted the struggle of the nomadic Kazaks during the time of Abılay Han entitled *Köşpendiler* (1979) again by İlyas Esenberlin. Native Kazak intellectuals increased their search for the Kazak past, particularly after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Specifically, concerning the pre-Revolutionary activities of the Alaş intellectuals, hundreds of articles and tens of books began to appear in Kazakhstan. Many young scholars spent their years in the archives of the former Communist party searching for the traces of Kazak political and literary figures who perished during the Stalinist purges of the 1930s.

The declaration of independence in Kazakhstan strengthened the native Kazak attempt to rehabilitate their past. This trend of re-evaluation of the native past arose from the necessity of the search to find a national identity among the Kazaks. This historical

³⁹ John Soper, "From the Kazak and Kırgız Press," RFE/RL Archive Material, 15 July 1988.

self-criticism was also needed to form the future for the sons of the steppe. Many native Kazak intellectuals understood this move as a resurrection of the souls of the steppe. It was an answer to those claims of Kazak surrender to a much bigger and greater culture of Russians. Kazak disagreement against Russian overlordship was expressed very strongly, particularly in Kazak traditional poems. Poems of popular Kazak poets during the time of Tsarist annexation of the Kazak land began to appear in the Kazak press. Understanding and reading them reveals the strength of Kazak inner resistance to any outside power overlordship. This is important particularly for the assessment of the native Kazak reaction to any possible outside claim on Kazak territory in the future of the republic as well.

A well-known Kazak historian, Prof. Kenges Nurpeyisov, evaluated the understanding of history as a necessary process for the understanding of the present and future of a people. Another famous Kazak historian, Manaş Qozıbayev, stated that “scholars at the Institute of History and Ethnography of the republican Academy of Sciences began to concentrate on many matters related to Kazak history. The complicated problems of the Kazak people from its emergence to the present day, the origin of the Kazaks, the establishment of the Kazak state, Kazak nationalist freedom movements, problems related to the Kazak annexation by Tsarist rule, the Alaş Movement and the Alaş Orda Government, Stalinist political purges in Kazakhstan, and the tragic results of forced collectivization on the Kazak land were all matters to be re-evaluated in present-

⁴⁰ *Qazaq Adebıyatı*, 24 April 1987 cited by Ann Sheehy, in *ibid.*

day Kazakhstan.”⁴¹ Kazak social scientists wrote the following books, both in Russian and in Kazak, entitled:

1. *History of Qazaqstan: Blank Spots*, 2. *History and the Present-day*, 3. *Kazakhstan's Traditional Structure*, 4. *History of Kazakhstan from Earlier Ages to the Present*, 5. *Social and Demographic Development in Kazakhstan*, 6. *The Route of Caravans*, 7. *Ethnic Territory of the Kazaks*, 8. *Forced Collectivization and the Famine in the 1930s*, 9. *Cossacks in Kazakhstan*, 10. *(Bozdaqtar) The Great Citizens*, 11. *(Azalı Kitap) The Book of Sorrow*.⁴²

Kazak historians concentrate on the following problems when they evaluate the Soviet period. They are the problems of “historical geography, the transformation of the Kazak land into a mass all-Union prison camp, the history of peoples deported into Kazakhstan, the consolidation of the prison camp economy, the tragic destinies of the activists of the state, the party and culture, national mentality during the Soviet times and problems of religion.”⁴³ Kazak intellectuals in present-day Kazakhstan, led by academicians, journalists, teachers and by men of letters began to produce mounting numbers of articles and books devoted to the evaluation of the native past, both during the colonialist Tsarist times and the Soviet period. The works of Prof. Dr. Manaş Qabaşulı Qozıbayev, the outstanding Kazak historian; Dr. Muhtar Magavin, well-known writer and the editor of the *Juldız* literary journal; Prof. Dr. Rımgalı Nurgaliyev, Chief

⁴¹ “Tariyh Taglımı,” *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 25 September 1996.

⁴² Manaş Qozıbayev, “Ötkennen Gıybrat Alsaq, Keleşegimiz de Ayqın,” *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 19 Qangtar (January) 1996.

Editor of the Kazak Encyclopedia and editor of a number of other voluminous official publications ; Prof. Mambet Qoygeldiyev, one of the most skilled and thorough researchers in present-day Kazakhstan, Prof. Kenges Nurpeyisov, a well-known historian of Soviet Kazakhstan, and political activists such as Hasen Qoja-Ahmet, Sabetqazı Aqatay, Mekemtas Mirzahmetulı, Qoyşıqara Salgaraulı, moved the first key wheels to start this trend. Revival of the Kazak past, reinterpretation of their history with a more freer perspective, and the rehabilitation of the Alaş intellectuals, started with the works of the above intellectuals. Following the Kazak declaration of independence, a younger generation of scholars, such as Talas Omarbekov, Abu Takenov, Tursın Jurtbay, Saken Özbekulı Sozaqbay, and Marat Muqanov made important contribution in removing the “dark spots” in the history of the Kazaks. Many of the above spent months and even years in the party archives and in the libraries to clarify important matters related to the Kazak past. Many valuable articles and books were published in Kazak since the years of perestroyka and glasnost. Yet many did not reach the outside world. The inability of present-day Kazak intellectuals to reach a wider audience on the global scale is partly due to their lack of any foreign language skills other than Russian. The second obstacle was the corresponding inability and sometimes disinterest of foreign and western scholarly circles in using the native sources.

During the second year of independence, the Kazak parliament made a decision to undo some Russian toponymic changes made during the Soviet period. According to the 273rd Decree of the then Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Russian names

⁴³ ibid.

such as Blagodarnoye, Novoalekseyevka, Bessarabka, Oktiyabr, Prudki, Karl Marks, Sergeyevka, Roslavl, Kirov, Novorossiysk, Kalinin, Telman, Podgornoye, Budennovka, Novoivanovka, Golovanovka, Andreyevka, Vostochnoye, Çistiyakovskoye, Zaborovka, Komsomol, Lenin, Voroshilov, Çernovodsk, Stepnoye, Udarnik, Blinkov, Voznesenovka, Vladimirovka, İlyinka, Voenka, Antonovka, Visakoye, Budenniy, Kranokutskiy, Jidkovka, Jdanov, Şeremetyevka, Terenteyevka, Makovka, Marinovka, Nikolayevka, Voznesenovka, Yubileyniy, Novotroitskoye, İrinovka, Troitskoye, Pokrovka, Pokrovka, Uritskoye, Veseloye, were replaced with their original Kazak names.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ *Qazaqstan Respublikası Jogargı Kengesining Jarısı*, No.11-12 (2157), Decree No. 273., 30 (Mavsim)June, 1993. In **AQTÖBE OBLAST**, Blagodarnoye Selo became **Qızıljar**, Novo alekseyevka Selo became **Qaragandısay**, Bessarabka became **Sarıqobda**, Oktiyabr became **Qaynar**; in **ALMATI OBLAST** Prudki became **Aqqaynar**, Karl Marks became **Qaraarşa**, Sergeyevka became **Besmoynaq**, Kuybişev became **Qarasay**, Roslavl became **Matibulaq**, Kirov became **Ümbetali**, Novorossiysk became **Qasimbek**; in **JAMBIL OBLAST**, Kalinin became **Kökdönen**, Telman became **Jaqsılıq**, Oktiyabr-Çarva became **Qaraqat**, Podgornoye became **Qumariq**, Sverdlov became **Botamoynaq**, Budennovka became **Tüymekent**, Novo-ivanovka became **Jetibay**, Golovanovka became **Qostöbe**, Andreyevka became **Böltirik**; in **KÖKŞETAV OBLAST**, Volodor became **Ayırtav**, Vostochnoye became **Egindi-agaş**, Zaborovka became **Aydarlı**, Çistiyakovskoye became **Alqaterek**; in **ONGTÜSTİK QAZAQSTAN OBLAST** (Southern Qazaqstan), Lenin became **Qazıqurt**, Jerzinskiy became **Al-Farabi**, Voroshilov became **Qurmanata**, Kirov became **Qazıbek Biy**, Karl Marks became **Mahambet**, Qızıltang became **Qaqpaq**, Çernovodsk became **Qarasuv**, Stepnoye became **Aqjar**, Udarnik became **Qultuvma**, Blinnikov became **Tasariq**, Voznesenovka became **Tastumsıq**, Vladimirovka became **Jılandı**, İlyinka became **Kereyit**, Kalinin became **Qayırşaqtı**, Antonovka became **Kerşetas**, Voenka became **Qogalı**, Kuybişev became **Aqbiyik**, Visokoye became **Şaqpaqbaba**, Budenniy became **Jalangtös**; in **PAVLODAR OBLAST**, Krasnokutskiy became **Aqtogay**, Ermak became **Aqsuv**, Jidkovka became **Sarışıqanaq**, Jdanov became **Suvatköli**; in **SEMEY OBLAST**, Kriuşi became **Arşalı**, Şeremetyevka became **Jarıqtas**, Terenteyevka became **Qaratöbe**, Makovka became **Salqıntöbe**, Marinovka became **Bılqıldağ**, Nikoleyavka became **Kengtarlav**, Voznesenevka became **Birlik**, Aleksandr Nevskiy became **Qaraqoja**, Yubileyniy became **Böke**, Predgornoye became **Altınşoqı**, İrinovka became **Köközek**, Troitskoye became **Salqıntöbe**, Pokrovka became **Qarajal**; in **TALDIQORGAN OBLAST**, Andreyev became **Üygentas**, Kirov became **Köksuv**, Uritskoye became **Aqbastav**, Kirov became **Tasqudıq**, Pokatilovka became **Ekiäşa**, Antonovka became **Qoylıq**, and Veseloye became **Şatırbay**. Please also see SWB, SU/1490, B/4 19 September 1992, for a minimal list of the restoration of ancient place names in Kazakstan.

NATIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE ADMINISTRATION

The call for the rectification of past injustices done to the indigenous people is getting stronger among the native Kazak community and particularly in native intellectual circles. Although Kazakhstan had no preliminary preparation for achieving independence from the former center, the resurgence of Kazak hopes of building a Kazak state and activities aimed at achieving such a target have begun. The so-called “kazakhization” of the administrative cadres is seen by many natives as the establishment of natural social order. As the true “sons of the soil” Kazaks consider themselves to be the leaders of the administration by right. Despite Russian official and unofficial belief, and the western scholarly assessment of Kazakhstan as a multi-ethnic society, the sense of Kazak ownership of the Republic of Kazakhstan is getting stronger. The so-called ‘Kazakization’ of the republican administration has been labeled, particularly by non-natives, as a move to prevent non-natives from assuming administrative positions in the republic. None of the critics of the ‘Kazakization’ policy seem to understand the essence of the native move. According to the natives, the increasing Kazak participation in political administrative positions is the natural right of the Kazaks. The Kazaks were subordinated to outside rulers for centuries since the time of the Khanate. Examination of Tsarist administrative practices and the Tsarist educational policy reveals the inferior positions inflicted on the Kazak administrative elite. During the twentieth century, the Tsarist administration prohibited the freely elected Kazak deputies from participating in the imperial Russian parliament the Duma. The same attitude continued after the Soviet maintenance of power. Native intellectuals with any kind of political and administrative

ambition or with any inclination towards his native origin was immediately labeled with the “virus of nationalism.” It is the duty of any objective scholar or reader of the Kazak history, politics and administrative works to remember the injustice done to the natives in Kazakhstan, before assessing the current administration’s policy of “kazakization” in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

KAZAK NATIONALISM VERSUS RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

Kazak nationalism emerged as a reaction to foreign rulers on their land. The root of many problems thus lie in the past with the coming of the Tsarist colonial regime to the Kazak steppe. The infiltration of Tsarist rule into the Kazak land resulted in Kazak resistance, led by nineteenth-century freedom fighters such as Kenesary Kasimov, Sırim Datov, Mahambet Ötemisov, etc. Kazak resistance to the Tsarist administration flared with the settlement of Russian peasants on the Kazak land en masse during the late nineteenth century. The national awakening of the Kazaks in the late nineteenth century was coupled with the overall Turko-Muslim intellectual activities in Tsarist lands, as well as the events and activities that followed the 1905 Japanese defeat. Blocking Kazak entrance to the Russian state Dumas (excluding the first and the second) accelerated the Kazak tendency to publicize their grievances by other means, such as using other Muslim representatives at the Duma. Kazak sorrow under Tsarist Russian rule did not end with the coming of the Bolshevik regime. Thus part of the present-day Kazak claim of atrocities done to themselves has its roots in the Soviet period.

Kazak nationalism is rather a reactionary and defensive move against recurrent Russian nationalism both in Tsarist times and during the Soviet period. The escalation of Kazak nationalism usually emerged only after Russian pressure on the native Kazaks and after Russian claims related to the traditional Kazak land were made public. This is true for present day Kazakhstan as well. The Russian attitude of belittling the now-independent Kazaks, who were the subjects of once big Russia, is due to the “eurocentrism” of some in Moscow who cannot digest the changed circumstances.⁴⁵ One positive result of the forced Russification of the Kazaks appears as to be their perfect understanding of all the details and nuances of the Russian language. As a result of this fact, it is not possible for the Kazaks to misinterpret or misunderstand any nationalist claims of the Russians. The Kazaks do not miss the original message in any Russian text even if it is written between the lines.

However, it is not always necessary to spend an extra effort to understand the very direct Russian claims. An interview with the Russian writer Aleksander Soljenitsın, appearing in the pages of the *Komsomolskaya Pravda* on April 19, 1996, instigated strong reaction in Kazakhstan. Soljenitsın claimed that the majority of the population in Kazakhstan was Russian and thus Russians should have a stronger voice in the country and feel free to realize their aims of breaking up certain regions of Kazakhstan to join Russia. Soljenitsın also claimed that the current Kazak administration is isolating the Russians, preventing them to be elected to the parliament, cutting them off from Russian culture

⁴⁵ Akim Tarazi, “Avzı Qıysıq Bolsa da... Söylesin be?” *Qazaq Adebıyatı*, No. 36, 3 Qırküyek 1996, p. 3.

and impeding them contacting the Russian media.⁴⁶ Aleksander Soljenitsin reportedly encouraged the ethnic Russian in Kazakstan to be more demanding, stating the following:

Your (the Russian) departure from Kazakstan is scandalous. You are the majority in Kazakstan. It is dangerous that Kazakstan is a unitary state. But, at the same time, Russians are 82 percent and were a federative republic. We are letting the minorities have an autonomous state. You should not be afraid of this fact and use every possibility to develop your social organizations. I know that there is a very hard regime there, but I also know that the Cossacks are fighting. In Semirechie region, they are in a difficult position. They found power to fight. You have to fight for your rights and to unify. You are deprived of having access to the national parliament... It is.. chauvinistic policy. Nazarbayev understands that he cannot eat this 60 percent Russian people.⁴⁷

According to materials of the current Kazak press, many claims of the ethnic Russians in Kazakstan are supported by nationalist, neo-imperialist and chauvinistic Russian circles, if not openly by the official administration. The Kazak policy of declaring the native language to be the language of the state was evaluated in some Russian journalistic circles as a degrading move towards the Russian-speaking population in Kazakstan. An article in the pages of the main Kazak newspaper, *Egemen Qazaqstan*, stated the following Russian complaint, citing an article in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*: "It is not possible either for the Russians or for other non-native people in Kazakstan to be hopeful of assuming any position in the Republican administration, due to the fact that the "Kazakization" of the country is being carried out."⁴⁸ Another Russian journalist, G. Starçenkov wrote in *Aziya I Afrika Segodniya* complaining about the Kazakization of the

⁴⁶ *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 4 May (Mamır) 1996.

⁴⁷ "Qazaqstan Jazuvsılar Odağında: Soljenitsinnın Sandırığı ma, alde Zarı ma?" *Qazaq Adebıyatı*, No. 18, 30 Kökek 1996, p. 2.; "Kereng de Kerdeng Savegeyding Sandırığı Bite me?" *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 24 Savır(Aprıl) 1996.; and "Bizdi Eşkim de Janjaldaştırma-almaydı," *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 4 Mamır (May) 1996.

⁴⁸ Berik Abdigaliyev, "Sırttan Soyıl Soguv Areketteri: Sergek Boluvdı Talap Etedi," *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 16 Mamır 1996, p. 3., cited S. Kurginiyan's article in the *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 7. April, 1994.

media, the newspapers, journals, radio and television programs.⁴⁹ Nationalist circles in Russia continued further in their propaganda of agitation by supporting the irredentist claims of the Cossack groups in Kazakhstan, supporting the establishment of Cossack Autonomy on the Kazak steppe and the formation of a Cossack Army that aims to join the Russian armed forces.

The transfer of the Kazak capital from Almatı to former Aqmola, the present-day Astana, is another subject that excites ethnic tensions in Kazakhstan. This transformation is interpreted in certain circles as a means of preventing the annexation of the northern Kazak provinces by the Russian federation. Nevertheless, the geostrategic, ecological and economic reasons for the move never comes into discussion. Some materials appeared in the Russian media aiming to increase tension, not only in the relations between ethnic groups, but to relations within each ethnic group as well. This can clearly be observed from the discussion of a so-called tension between the three Kazak hordes. The current president's origin in the Great Horde is depicted, by some Russian journalists, as the dominance of this Horde over the other two, the Middle and the Lesser Hordes.⁵⁰ Articles in *İzvestiya* and in *Moskovskiy Komsomolets* claim that the transfer of the capital to the north will gradually increase the influence of the Middle Horde and diminish the influence of the other two.⁵¹ It was made public in the Kazak press that "those who wished to conquer the Kazaks from the time immemorial used to exploit Kazak tribal

⁴⁹ (This is only a one page article and thus page number is the same as in) *ibid*.

⁵⁰ *ibid*, citing *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 7 July 1994.

⁵¹ *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, 21 September 1994, cited by Berik Abdigaliyev in *ibid*.

division and conflicts by evil design and set fire among the Kazaks in order to subjugate the whole while they were in the throes of death. Those historians working on Kazak history and particularly on the Tsarist colonial period well understand the intricacies used by the outside powers over Kazak tribal differences and divisions. Tribal life is a method of state organization on the steppe, and is a necessity of communal life and an ages long tradition for saving the health of future generations. Now it is aimed to be used as a tool to divide up this nation.”⁵²

The native Kazak press sees attempts in the Russian media to destabilize Kazakhstan, and claims that it aims to strengthen Russian influence and drive the attention of western countries away from Kazakhstan. The article in *Egemen Qazaqstan* reads as follows:

Authors who report the irredentist activities in Kazakhstan aim to put into practice mainly two scenarios: firstly, the Tajik version that plans to establish Russian dependent agents by leaning on the support of the Russian forces; secondly, the Moldavian version, which aims to form a Russian protected autonomous Slavic republic through strengthening and supporting the irredentist tendencies in Kazakhstan. Those Kazakstani groups that aim to escalate tensions in the republic have the following purposes: first, they attempt to change the political situation in the Republic by imposing pressure upon the leadership; second, imposing pressure upon the government; third, winning support and coming to the power with the help of Russia by deliberately aggravating tensions further.⁵³

Manaş Qozıbayev, an academic of the Kazak Academy of Sciences, wrote that “Kazaks are one of the nations that have been broken on the wheel of fate and survived after many disastrous periods. It is possible to say that there is no poison that the Kazaks

⁵² Erjuman Smayıl, “İritki Saluvşılıq Bastaldı,” *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 24 Savır(April) 1996.

⁵³ Berik Abdigaliyev, “Sırttan Soyıl Soguv Areketteri: Sergek Boluvdı Talap Etedi,” *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 16 Mamır 1996, p. 3.

have not tasted. In this century, let alone the past, Kazaks have suffered from many difficulties. They were deprived of half of their population only during the 1930s and 1940s. There are thousands of sons and daughters of our people still buried under the frozen earth at hundreds of prison camp sites built in the Siberian region alone... Since our declaration of independence and since the demise of the Soviet empire, those self-identified inheritors of the colonialist still bark at us from different directions. They do not only bark, but snap or even sink their teeth and spill our blood. They do not even suffice to snap, but hit on the head and trip up from the heel and drive in the new colonialist system... Russian historians A. N. Saharov and V. İ. Buganov pointed to the nomads of the steppe as their historic enemies in their book devoted to 10th grade students as the history textbook for Russia.”⁵⁴

Kazak historians such as Talas Omarbekov,⁵⁵ Director of History and Political Sciences at El Farabi State University in Almatı, wrote that it is not an easy job to establish democratization and a lawful social state in a country such as Kazakhstan which has suffered under the bloody fist of a totalitarian administration. The foremost condition for reaching this target is to create a unifying all-Kazakstani state ideology and replace with it the dogmatic Leninist ideology that arrested our thoughts and sensibilities. Secondly it is a must to replace the authoritarian Soviet political system with democracy. The third condition is to depart totally from the centrally controlled and administered system into an independent market economy. It is an absolute must for the peoples of this

⁵⁴ Manaş Qozıbayev, "Sagingdı Sınar Kün Tuvdı," *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 28 Navrız(March) 1996.

republic that have been deprived of an independent existence for ages to form a national state that will establish relations on equal terms with the international community of states. If history is an example, the experience of those countries which transformed their regimes from authoritarian to democratic regimes sets forth the model that there is a necessary work of “de-ideologization” for us to carry out... The de-ideologization process has not reached its maturity in Kazakhstan, just as in all the other CIS countries. The immaturity or shallowness of Leninist-Stalinist ideology- its conservatism, its bigotry and demagogism-still need to be clearly stated, publicly.” This move, wrote the Kazak author, further requires to a reassessment of all the past injustices. Departure from previous ideology is the prior condition to establish full-democracy.

“... In order to accomplish such a task, the economic life of the country has to be straightened up and political stability should be preserved... In our opinion, the retention of social stability does not, as some claim, stem from the current equality of the native and the so-called European population, in number, in Kazakhstan. **The basic cause of social stability in Kazakhstan is in the character of the Kazak nation** who are unshunning, honest, lenient and good-natured people... Another vital matter is the creation of patriotism unique to Kazakhstan. The decades old concept of “Soviet patriotism” cannot be simply replaced by “Kazakstani patriotism” due to the fact that the Soviet principles of proletarian internationalism and Soviet patriotism were originally Russification, but nothing else for all those non-Russian citizens of the former Soviet empire. Kazaks felt that they were equal to all those nations and nationalities in the Soviet empire but the Russians due to their self-imposed superior status as “*aga halıq*” (the big brotherly status). Russian people in Kazakhstan are still suffering from the psychological misadaptation of this fact and thus are in the midst of spiritual and political crisis. They see three ways of overcoming this difficulty.

1. Returning to their historical homeland to start everything from scratch,
2. Recognition of Kazakhstan as their own homeland and recognition of Russia as their historic homeland,
3. Acceptance of the Kazak language, Kazak history and culture and accepting to co-exist with the original owners of Kazakhstan, the Kazaks.

Native Kazak intellectuals put the responsibility of building a genuine patriotism for all of the citizens of Kazakhstan partly on the shoulders of non-native people as well.

⁵⁵ Talas Omarbekov, “Ötpeli Kezengning Ötkir Maseleleri,” *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 16-17 Aqpan (February)

Native scholars request particularly from the ethnic Russian population that they “not look to their historic homeland timidly and repeatedly.” The Kazak elite is asking the non-natives to work and fight earnestly for Kazakhstan in the same way as the Kazaks do.

At the same time, native scholars have improved their ideas about the methods of building a democratic society. The presidential administrative power now ruling Kazakhstan is supported by the native intellectuals in the same manner as the Alaş intellectuals did earlier in this century. Talas Omarbekov wrote that:

the democratic intellectuals led by Alihan Bökeyhanov, at the beginning of this century sought to establish a presidential republic and a democratic and federative form of government under the leadership of the State Duma and thus entered this principle in the draft programme of the Alaş Party... In order to transfer the political system to a parliamentary democratic rule, the strong presidential rule in Kazakhstan should facilitate the growth of the political parties in parliament and it has to elevate and improve the role of the political parties. According to the experiences of the nations of the orient, a step backwards from this-democratic- stand will downgrade the influence of the political parties. The current presidential rule, then might turn into an authoritarian system. Another tendency common to the nations of the east is to concentrate the power at a single center. The practice of western nations on this matter is the reverse method: that is the division of power and authority. Although Kazakhstan declared its intention of following the western experience in this regard, she still needs to accomplish this task by putting it into full practice.”⁵⁶

1996., p. 3.

⁵⁶ Talas Omarbekov, “Ötpeli Kezengning..” p. 3.

CHAPTER FIVE: INDEPENDENT KAZAKSTAN AS A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF STATES

RUSSIA'S 'NEAR ABROAD' POLICY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR KAZAKSTAN

The independence period is the beginning of an unprecedented era for Kazakhstan. It marks the entrance of Kazakhstan into the international society of states. Never before, in its entire history, was Kazakhstan able to establish diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with such a number of member states of the world community. The native elite hope that this will help guarantee Kazakhstan's independent status. Native intellectuals are aware of the fact that any kind of state against state conflict involving Kazakhstan will be the subject of international law. Thus the interference of international institutions, in any future trouble regarding Kazakhstan and any outside power, would lead to a fair solution. This also reveals a historic Kazak concern of being pushed into a corner by a superior power, without being able to ask help from outside and for the fair judgment of objective world public opinion.

The Soviet disintegration deprived the Russian people not only of its "big-brotherly" superior status over the other Soviet peoples and nationalities but caused the end of its status as a colonial power after more than 200 years. This new reality forced the Russian government and the Russian people, regardless of the place they resided, to adapt

themselves to new circumstances. It required the reassessment of the concept of the new Russian state, new Russian borders and new Russian interests. Russia's own security matters and the security of its immediate neighbors in the south alarmed the Russian administration. On the one hand Russia wanted to preserve its dominant sphere of influence on its former periphery, and on the other hand, she wanted to play the role of being a responsible partner, with reasonable security concerns, on the international scene. Russian difficulty in adaptation to the changes instigated the re-emergence of its ages-old colonial instincts under the name of neo-imperialism. This controversy was apparent not only over individual political decisions, but over the political system and over the external relations of the country, including relations with the former peripheral countries. This controversy stemmed from Russia's indecisive stand over the future identity that would shape the country's foreign policy priorities.

In particular, Russian relations and policies concerned the members of the CIS, to which the term 'near abroad' was applied. One of the most important countries for Russia in the south, in the Central Asian region, is Kazakhstan. Both of these countries, Russia and Kazakhstan, have vital ties concerning their bilateral relations in many fields, from ethnic matters to security and economic matters. Kazakhstan is one of the countries that plays the role of buffer between Russia and its giant and most important neighbor, China. Kazakhstan is also important for Russia as a gateway to the Central Asian region and further to the South in Asia. The ethnic Russian presence, half of the population in Kazakhstan, is another strong bond between the two countries. Kazak ownership of rich natural resources and their sale on global markets involves considerable Russian

interference. In other words, Kazakhstan is Russia's "metaphorical 'underbelly.'"⁵⁷ This vital Russian interest, whether under geostrategic, political or economic labels, forced the Russian administration between 1993 and 1996 to return to its traditional power politics of keeping its former periphery of the "near abroad" under close Russian supervision and control. This policy shift became apparent with the replacement of the liberal and western-oriented former foreign minister of Russia, Andrey Kozirev, with a much tougher strict defender of Russian interests, Yevgeniy Primakov. According to the Russian view Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, is the most important area for Russian security interests. This reflected by the following excerpt from an article that appeared in the Russian *International Affairs*.

The Central Asian states of the CIS are located "in the underbelly" of Russia along a stretch of thousands of kilometers of its southern borders. This is an extensive region with an area of 4 million square kilometers and with a population of 50 million people. The geography itself and the multi-century history of this region are prompting conclusions about the principal, strategic importance of this region for Russia's national-state interests...

The Central Asian zone of the CIS is located in the so-called "area of instability" that includes the southern borders of the Commonwealth and separates Russia from the bloodshed of Afghanistan and Tajikistan, from the strengthening of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, all part of the "Islamic belt," and from a rapidly developing but overpopulated and nuclear-armed China. Therefore, military-political cooperation with the countries of this "buffer region" in the interests of long-term prevention of real and potential threats along its southern borders is certainly to Russia's benefit...

The Central Asian zone is also a shock absorber from the point of view of the penetration of the theory and practice of militant Islamic fundamentalism and extremism. The secular nature of the ruling elites in the states of Central Asia that has allowed and even encouraged Islam's expansion in its moderate forms is itself antagonistic to Islamic fundamentalism. This is also important when considered with the Islamic population of 20 million in Russia.

Military-strategic reasons, viewing Russia as a guarantor of the security of regional stability and the balance of force necessary to counteract through joint efforts the waves of destabilization rolling up from the South.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Dmitriy Vertkin, *Kazakhstan Security and the New Asian Landscape*, Bailrigg Paper 26, The Center for Defence and International Security Studies. Lancaster University, 1997., p. 26.

⁵⁸ Sergey Razov, "New Developments in Central Asia," *International Affairs*, Vol. 43, No. 3, 1997, pp. 55-64., and in p. 59-60.

In order to put all of the above into a nutshell, it is safe to state that Russian policy makers believe that the former Soviet republics and the present independent CIS states belong to Russia's sphere of influence and Russia will not agree to permit any external influence in these regions. Besides, both China and Russia are two military giants on the borders of Kazakhstan and will not tolerate any militarily or economically self-sufficient country very easily. Both sides will view this kind of development as a threat to their national interests in the area. Liberation from the Tsarist Governor-General or from a Communist Party Secretary did not help Kazakhstan to escape from Russian control. Presently there is another type of overlordship lingering over the heads of Kazaks, "the Russian rouble and Russian energy."⁵⁹ A new type of financial, economic and military yoke has started for this newly independent state.

THE REVISION AND RENEWAL OF ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND POLITICAL TIES WITH THE OLD CENTER AND THE NEIGHBORING STATES

The Soviet Union collapsed as a result of decades old economic inefficiencies that piled up throughout the Soviet period. Economic relations were the most important and vital link tying the former periphery, Kazakhstan and Central Asia, to its former center Russia. Thus, the decline in the economic system was felt more strongly in Central Asia than in any other former Union republics. The gross national product of Kazakhstan fell

from 83 percent to 63 percent from 1990 to 1995. The volume of industrial and agricultural production fell by 50 percent and the standard of living declined by 27.7 percent during the first half of the 1990s. The economic shock faced by Kazakhstan in particular and Central Asia in general affected Russia, which is still the biggest economic partner of all “five” in the region. However, the region continues to be important for Russia, if the following is of any proof:

The Central Asian “five” has an important place in the production of many kinds of industrial and agricultural production that are of interest to Russia. In 1995, for example, they mined 33 million tons of oil (including gas condensate), 87 billion cubic meters of natural gas, 87 million tons of coal; produced 675 million square meters of fabric, 5.9 million tons of cotton (95 percent of the cotton production of the CIS), and significant volumes of grain, meat and vegetables.⁶⁰

Top Russian officials thus believed that economic integration of the former Soviet republics was inevitable. This position, however, was opposed by another fact that the national identity of the former Soviet Central Asian republics is now a fact that cannot be denied. Thus the systemic transition of the former Soviet republics from communism has already started. Seven years after the declaration of independence, Kazakhstan still face difficulties of adjusting to the new conditions of economic administration. The new Russian foreign economic policy also aggravated the problems of economic life of the newly independent states. The Russian decision to drive the newly independent states from its rouble zone also forced these countries to issue their own national currencies.

Along with the decreasing Russian presence in the region, the role of global (the US, Japan, Germany, Great Britain) and regional (Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan) states has become noticeably more active... Russia still remains for all (without exception) countries of the Central Asian region their most important neighbor and partner in all

⁵⁹ Dmitriy Vertkin, *ibid.*, p.32.

⁶⁰ Sergey Razov, *ibid.*, p. 59.

parameters. It is a weighty guarantor of regional stability... Sovereignty and the gaining of political independence for the states of Central Asia didn't mean an automatic appearance of conditions for their economic independence. The structural specialization of the economy of the Central Asian region, which had existed within the framework of the USSR, was not remarkable for its rationality and suffered from being one sided: 60 percent of the volume of industrial production was in areas that produced raw materials and semi-finished products, and 65 percent of industrial resources were concentrated on 5 percent of the territory of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, while other territories, primarily with labor surpluses, were much less involved in industrial production.

Today, due to geography, particularly the absence of direct access to the sea, and due to the remaining orientation of the regional infrastructure, the main volume of export-import transactions of the Central Asian states still remains with Russia and other countries of the CIS. For Kazakhstan, for example, this amounts to 53 percent of its exports and 69 percent of its imports.

...the states of Central Asia will still experience close tightness to Russia, and often even dependence on it in many strategic, political, economic, military and other parameters for a long time.⁶¹

Kazakhstan and Russia signed an agreement of friendship and cooperation on May 25 1992; an economic protocol on economic collaboration, particularly for the year 1993, was signed by Andrey Nechayev, Russia's Minister of Economy and Tilevhan Qabdirrahmanov, Chairman of the Kazak State Committee for the Economy on September 15 1992.⁶² Another joint declaration to further develop cooperation was signed between the two sides on January 20, 1995. Kazakhstan and Russia signed still another agreement, on military cooperation, on March 28 1994 in Moscow, ratification of which by the Kazak parliament was made public on 1994.⁶³ The latest agreement signed between the two countries was on April 27 1996 in Almatı. It was announced as the Joint Kazak-Russian (Almatı) Declaration. It has defined the Kazak and Russian positions regarding the legal status of the Caspian Sea and about a decision to form a joint

⁶¹ Sergey Razov, *ibid.*, p. 57.

⁶² SWB, SU/1489, C2/1, 18 September 1992.

commission over the administration of the Bayqongır Space station.⁶⁴ During the Spring of 1992, a Russian-Kazak intergovernmental meeting led by the First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Government, Gennady Burbulis and the Kazak Prime Minister, Sergey Tereşçenko, discussed “the preservation and expansion of economic ties between Kazakhstan and Russia and interaction in the political and military areas.”⁶⁵ During this meeting the two sides signed a package of 16 documents on economic cooperation, a price policy and on the problems of the armed forces. The meeting was described as “a new step in strengthening military-political and economic cooperation between two fraternal states.”⁶⁶ On October 10 1992, Kazak President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Russian President Boris Yeltsin met in Kökçetav and exchanged a ratified document for the treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between the two sides. It declared the following:

1. The Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation will continue to attach the utmost importance to full-scale economic cooperation on the basis of the coordination of economic ties, a common customs and economic area based on the principles of free trade, monetary and credit policy, a single currency - namely the rouble- the elimination of unscrupulous competition in two-way trade, a coordinated protectionist policy, the arrangement of direct ties between economic organizations in both states, and the creation of diversified technological concerns and complexes.

Trade and economic cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation is to be coordinated by a bilateral intergovernmental commission. Both states will grant each other most favored nation status in the sphere of mutual cooperation and guarantee entrepreneurial freedom in the marketing, acquisition and movement of goods and services, coordinated use of air space and railway rolling stock, and coordination of customs duties and transit duties.

Bearing in mind the importance to each state of expanding foreign economic ties, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation will not allow actions which

⁶³ *Qazaqstan Respublikası Jogargı Kengesinin Jarısı*, No. 16-17 (2186), 1994.

⁶⁴ “Qazaqstanıng Aymaqtıq Strategiyalıq Jagdayı,” *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 13 May 1996.

⁶⁵ SWB, SU/1338, B/1, 25 March 1992.

⁶⁶ SWB, SU/1338, B/1, 25 March 1992.

encroach upon the other side's interests on the world market. This will be accomplished by the implementation of coordinated foreign economic activities....

5. In view of the historical tradition of good-neighborliness between our peoples, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation reaffirm the maintenance of the territorial integrity of states and the immutability of existing borders. They recognize the need for each other's interests to be heeded in the process of resolving conflict situations on the territory of the CIS.⁶⁷

Relations between the former Soviet Republics also have changed. Thus Kazakhstan, began to renew its ties with her neighboring republics and with other ex-Soviet republics. The leaders of Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian states met in Bishkek on April 22 1992 to discuss cooperation and to create a market economy infrastructure simultaneously, in order to coordinate policies for restructuring their economies.⁶⁸ The leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed a mutual assistance treaty on June 25 1992 in the city of Turkestan. Both sides agreed on cooperation on political, economic, cultural and ecological issues. The Kazak and Kirgiz Presidents, Nazarbayev and Akayev, signed a bilateral agreement on June 8 1993 in Almaty, to officially renew their ages-old ties in every field as well.⁶⁹ A Byelorussian government delegation led by Viyačeslav Kebiç, the then Chairman of the Byelorussian Council of Ministers, visiting Almaty, signed a number of agreements to maintain bilateral economic cooperation. The package of agreements included matters on deepening and further the development of economic and cultural relations, agreements on price-fixing policy, and mutual deliveries of goods and commodities.⁷⁰ During 1993, Kazakhstan signed agreements with Tajikistan,

⁶⁷ SWB, SU/1510, B/4, 13 October 1992.

⁶⁸ SWB, SU/1363, B/1, 24 April 1992.

⁶⁹ *Qazaqstan Respublikası Jogargı Kengesinin Jarısı*, No. 18 (2163), 1993.

Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Lithuania and with the People's Republic of China and North Korea to renew its diplomatic and economic ties as well.⁷¹

THE FORMATION OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC TIES

Starting from the very first days of the year 1992, diplomatic and official representatives of many countries began to pour into Almatı. One of the first visitors to visit the Kazak capital was the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei. After this visit, it was announced that Kazakstan and China had established full diplomatic relations. A decision to open ties at the ambassadorial level was made public by a joint communiqué issued in Almatı.⁷² Later on August 17 1992, the then Kazak Foreign Minister Tölevtay Süleymenov went to China and there signed seven intergovernmental documents related to developing Kazak-Chinese cooperation.⁷³ At the beginning of January 1992, it was announced by the US State Department that the then US Deputy Secretary Robert Fauver would go to Kazakstan to discuss economic cooperation between the USA and Kazakstan. On January 25 1992, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas visited the Kazak capital. Foreign ministers of Kazakstan and France signed a protocol to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. During the same month of 1992, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister visited Almatı and ordered arrangements to be made to open Iran's Embassy there. Japan also sent its group of economic experts to

⁷⁰ SWB, SU/1489, C2/1-2, 18 September 1992.

⁷¹ *ibid* and also No. 21-22(2167),1993.

⁷² RFE/RL Archive Material, CN0056, 4 January 1992.

Almatı, in order to meet officials in charge of economic affairs, on February 4 1992. The Afghan government has established diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan by signing a protocol during a visit by Afghan Vice President Abdulrahim Latif to Almatı on February 14 1992. The Kuwaiti Finance Minister, Nasir Abdallah Al-Rudan visited Almatı on February 29 1992 and expressed hopes of expanding economic relations with Kazakhstan. Kazak president Nursultan Nazarbayev visited India and Pakistan during the last part of February 1992. Foreign diplomatic ties were established by Kazakhstan with both India and Pakistan during this visit. The following month, in March 1992, countries like Bangladesh, Libya, and Oman established diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan, by their official representatives visiting the Kazak capital. On March 1 1992, the Republic of Kazakhstan and Iran signed a transport cooperation agreement to ship goods between Caspian Sea ports and an air agreement to link Teheran and Almatı. The establishment of these ties later led Kazakhstan and Iran to sign a total of nine bilateral agreements covering the fields of transportation, communication, energy, agriculture and banking on October 25 1993. Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Kazak President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a joint declaration in Bonn, to cooperate closely in future in the political, economic and cultural spheres, on September 22 1992. The next day, the Kazak president went to Paris to meet Francois Mitterand and signed the Paris Charter for a New Europe and a treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual understanding between the two countries.⁷⁴

⁷³ SWB, SU/1464, A1/1, 20 August 1992.

⁷⁴ SWB, SU/1495, A1/1, 25 September 1992.

Starting from 1993, the official organ of the then Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Kazakhstan began to publish international agreements ratified by the Kazak parliament. A Friendship and Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and France signed on September 23 1992 in Paris; a protocol between China and Kazakhstan to open diplomatic representation signed on August 10, 1992 in Peking; a protocol between Germany and Kazakhstan on financial investment matters signed in Bonn on September 22 1992; an agreement between the Byelorussian Republic and Kazakhstan about custom duties signed in Almatı on September 16 1992, and an agreement between Turkey and Kazakhstan about the protection of investment signed in Almatı on May 1, 1992 were ratified by the Kazak parliament.⁷⁵

Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Kazakhstan occupied a special place in the agendas of the two countries at the beginning of the 1990s⁷⁶. Hikmet Çetin, the then Turkish Foreign Minister spent six days in Central Asia and the Caucasus early in March 1992 and offered training for diplomats, administrators and company managers and help in reforming the banking system of the newly independent states. Establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries was documented by signing a protocol in Almatı on March 2 1992. Agreements on transport (including air and high-way transport), communication, education, science, culture, tourism, banking and sport were signed by officials of the two countries during the first eight months of 1992, altogether 14 different agreements and protocols. However, the

⁷⁵ *Qazaqstan Respublikası Jogargı Kengesinin Jarısı*, No. 4 (2149), 1993.

western media was partly responsible for exaggerating the Turkish role as a new model for the newly independent Central Asian and Caucasian republics. Starting from the first months of the year 1992, articles devoted to the role of Turkey in the former Soviet Muslim and Turkic republics began to feed new ungrounded hopes for the world public. Articles appeared attributing new labels to Turkish policy towards Central Asia, such as the “Stern des Orients,”⁷⁷ “The Bosphorus Bridgehead,”⁷⁸ “Pantürkismus als Menschenrecht?”⁷⁹ “Pantürkismus Oder Europa?”⁸⁰ “Der Traum Von Turan Per Satellit,”⁸¹ “Der Blick nach Osten,”⁸² “Ein Commonwealth von 200 Millionen Türken?”⁸³ “Wird das 21. Jahrhundert ‘das Jahrhundert der Türken’ ?”⁸⁴ “Klinkenputzen am Bosphorus,”⁸⁵ “Eine Brücke nach Westeuropa,”⁸⁶ “Bright Horizon in the east beckons

⁷⁶ Agreements between the Republic of Kazakstan and the Republic of Turkey began to be published in the Turkish Official Newspaper, the *Resmis Gazete*, from 1992 onwards.

⁷⁷ “Stern des Orients: Die Turkvölker der ehemaligen Sowjetunion suchen Hilfe am Bosphorus-Aufstieg der Türkei zur neuen Führungsmacht?” *Der Spiegel*, February 10, 1992.

⁷⁸ “The Bosphorus Bridgehead,” *The Wall Street Journal*, February 17, 1992.

⁷⁹ Bassam Tibi, “Pantürkismus als Menschenrecht? Die Muslime Mittelasiens auf der Suche nach Identität,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 19, 1992.

⁸⁰ Wolfgang Günter, “Pantürkismus oder Europa?” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 27, 1992.

⁸¹ Rudolp Chimelli, “Der Traum von Turan per Satellit,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 6, 1992.

⁸² Bassam Tibi, “Der Blick nach Osten: Pantürkismus und Politischer Islam-Bürde oder Aufwertung?” *Die Welt*, May 19, 1993.

⁸³ “Türkei: Auf den Spuren des Grossreiches; Ein Commonwealth von 200 Millionen Türken?” *Die Presse*, August 12, 1992.

⁸⁴ Almuth Baron, “Wird das 21. Jahrhundert ‘das Jahrhundert der Türken’?” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 2, 1992.

⁸⁵ Maria Huber, “Klinkenputzen am Bosphorus,” *Die Zeit*, July 10, 1992.

⁸⁶ Georg Hartmut Altenmüller, “Eine Brücke nach Westeuropa: Wie die Türkei ihr Verhältnis zu den mittelasiatischen ehemaligen Sowjetrepubliken sieht,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 21, 1993.

Ankara.”⁸⁷ On his official visit to Kazakstan on April 29 1992, the then Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, as the first western leader to come to Central Asia since its independence,⁸⁸ offered 200 million dollars of credit to Kazakstan.⁸⁹ The Turkish Prime Minister was accompanied by 200 people including members of parliament, officials, bankers, businessmen and reporters on his visit to Kazakstan and other Central Asian republics at that time. The Turkish Prime Minister also opened the first Turkish Embassy in Almatı and in other capitals of the Central Asian republics. Earlier than this, a group of 70 Turkish businessmen, led by the then Turkish Minister of Industry, Tahir Köse and State Ministers Ekrem Ceyhun and Mehmet Batallı, went to Almatı to seek opportunities for joint investment in food, mining, construction, agriculture and transport. In addition to all of these, a Turkish attempt to form a satellite television broadcasting to Central Asia was supported by many who argued that Turkey was going to play a major role in Central Asia. It was interpreted at that time that this move would improve Turkey’s linguistic and cultural advantages in Central Asia. “From the Azerbaijan capital of Baku across the Muslim-dominated Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kirghizia, Turkey is providing the model of a democratic nation-Muslim in spirit but secular in state- that, to the great relief of the West, most of the region wishes to emulate.”⁹⁰ Another western newspaper stated the common language used by both the

⁸⁷ Hugh Pope, “Bright Horizon in the East Beckons Ankara,” *The Independent*, June 1, 1993.

⁸⁸ John Murray Brown, “Turkish Premier to Bolster Links with Central Asia,” *Financial Times*, 27 April 1992.

⁸⁹ SWB, SU/ 1371, A4/1, 4 May 1992.

Turks in Turkey and the Turks or Turkic people in the former Soviet Republics.⁹¹ However, after six years of independence, the Central Asian states' ties with Turkey have not become as impressive as was foreseen during the first years of Central Asian independence. The Turkish satellite television attempt were not successful, and the move to encourage the Central Asian Turkic people to switch to the Latin alphabet reached its targeted aim in other Central Asian republics, but not in Kazakstan. The western news media, citing Turkish officials, publicized these attempts with a much exaggerated tone: "Thanks to the satellite feed and the agreements that Ankara has secured with all the Muslim republics for local broadcast, Turkey clearly has the edge in the alphabet war. For three hours each weekday and nine hours on Saturday and Sunday, Turkish television plans to run Latin alphabet subtitles with its programs."⁹² This Turkish attempt was ruined by the mismanagement of the Turkish television agency staff who did not have a clear cut policy in airing or transmitting good programs, and also, by the broadcasting time allowed to Turkish television in Central Asia, which was not at prime time. There are still many unsolved issues regarding the much discussed and debated oil pipeline project as well. A Turkish education project to receive one thousand university students from each of the four Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan also proved to be only partly successful. Some students from Central Asia returned home without completing the academic programs and some found it difficult to adopt to the Turkish lifestyle. The

⁹⁰ Tony Allen-Mills, "Turkish Trucks Blaze a Trail to Soviet Asia," *Sunday Times*, January 19, 1992.

⁹¹ "Führungsanspruch der Türkei in Zentralasien," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 30 January 1992., stated that "Die 56 Millionen Türken in der Türkei sprachen dieselbe Sprache wie die rund 60 Millionen Einwohner der zentralasiatischen Republiken und teilten eine gemeinsame Geschichte und Kultur."

western vision of Turkey's role in Central Asia began to fade away as early as 1993. Turkish diplomacy towards Central Asia was found by the westerners to be: "hesitant, reflecting a deep fear of being drawn into Central Asia's ethnic strife."⁹³ Official Turkish foreign policy followed a cautious policy regarding pan-Turkist and pan-Islamist tendencies between the two sides and feared entering into a conflict with Russia, as the biggest power in the region.

In the words of Kazak President Nazarbayev in an interview given to a correspondent of the *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, as early as May 1992, Kazakhstan was as follows:

Kazakhstan declared its independence on 16th December of last year. Whether we like it or not, before that we were loyal to the centre. During these past five months it has become clear that it is time for the republic to determine its geopolitical place and the strategy of its own development. If we do not determine these aims, we will be preoccupied with details and we will make mistakes. We now have to think about this subject and take advice from scientists and political experts.

So, what is our place in the world? China is our eastern neighbour and we now have a railway linking the two of us. The latest treaty, signed in Beijing by our premier Sergey Tereşchenko, promises good prospects of close cooperation and the possibility of access to the Asia-Pacific region via the shortest railway route. Relations with the East also mean relations with Japan and Korea. My trips to India and Pakistan in themselves testify to the importance of these regions for us.

We are also aiming to maintain good relations with European states, many of whom want to work in Kazakhstan. In the past, all routes to the East went through Moscow. Now, however, I am sure that the route will increasingly frequently pass through Kazakhstan. We have air communications with Frankfurt-am-Main, Istanbul and China. We are holding talks about opening up air routes through Beijing to Seoul and Tokyo. We are also making progress with our agreements with Iran and Turkey on linking up the main railway route I have already mentioned. That way a direct route to the Mediterranean Sea will be opened. We can have access to the ports of Iran through the Caspian Sea. We are working on a plan for an oil and gas pipeline into the Persian Gulf area. In this way we consider ourselves to be part of the whole world.

Now something about relations with our neighbours-the former union republics in particular. We attach the highest significance to ties with Russia. And that is understandable. For many years we lived side by side and we have many common tasks which we have to work on resolving. I believe that such good-neighbourliness is in the interests of both Russia and Kazakhstan. As for the Central Asian republics, which are our spiritual kinsmen and share our roots, there is nothing to divide us at all.

⁹² Blaine Harden, "Turkey Pushing Eastward- By Satellite," *The Washington Post*, 22 March 1992.

⁹³ Alan Cowell, "Turkey Seems Incapable of Filling Post-Cold War Central Asian Power Vacuum," *The New York Times*, 4 August 1993.

As you know, the Kazak people are a Turkic people, they are Muslims. So the fact that they are attracted to Turkey and the Arab states is natural. Soviet power barred us from a culture, a history and a language that are close to our hearts. That is why the process of rapprochement is natural.⁹⁴

MEMBERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Not more than a month passed after the declaration of its independence before Kazakhstan had applied for membership in the United Nations. The Kazak letter to David Hannah, the then Security Council President arrived on January 4 1992.⁹⁵ The second attempt of Kazakhstan was its application for membership in the International Monetary Fund. A letter from the then Kazak Prime Minister, Sergey Tereşchenko on January 12, 1992 sought to open ways for Kazakhstan to receive financial credits and economic advice from the international organization. Thus Kazakhstan became the 11th former Soviet Republic to apply for membership to the IMF and the World Bank.⁹⁶ The Organization of the Islamic Conference also proved its interest towards the newly independent Central Asian Muslim republics. "Information ministers from the 46 member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) have called for increased cooperation with the Muslim republics of the former USSR."⁹⁷ The then CSCE, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also admitted ten members of the CIS, including Kazakhstan as members on 30 January 1992, thus increasing its membership from 38 to 48.

⁹⁴ "Nazarbayev on the CIS, Kazakhstan, the Future," SWB, SU/1380, B/1-6, 14 May 1992.

⁹⁵ RFE/RL Archive Material, CN0009, 4 January 1992.

⁹⁶ RFE/RL Archive Material, CN0104, 29 January 1992.

Only after three years of its independent existence, some 114 countries of the world have recognized Kazakhstan's independence. By 1995, Kazakhstan had established diplomatic relations with 83 of them. Some 33 countries of the world have opened their embassies in the Kazakh capital.

Thus, for the first time in its history, Kazakhstan became a full member of the international community of states. This is a source of great pride particularly for native Kazaks and of their intellectuals. They believe that if their political administrators remain firm, Kazakhstan will never suffer and become a victim in any conflict of international scale. "Those times,-wrote a native intellectual Qabdeş Jumadilov,- are already history. A giant country like Kazakhstan whose flag is among the nations at the United Nations and as one who has been diplomatically recognized and has economic ties with many countries of the world, is a huge piece to be swallowed easily."⁹⁸

⁹⁷ RFE/RL Archive Material, CN0010, 17 January 1992.

⁹⁸ Qabdeş Jumadilov, "Bolaşaqtı Boljaganda," *Qazaq Adebıyatı*, No. 13., 1 April 1994., p. 3.

CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS FOR AN INDEPENDENT KAZAKSTAN

The present-day recognition of Kazakhstan as a multi-ethnic society reflects the ages-old forceful policies of an outside power, Russia. Thus, Kazakhstan is also recognized by some western academicians as a country whose indigenous people have had no state tradition. A study of native Kazak history, however, reveals an opposite conclusion. Nation formation in Kazakhstan, or at least attempts to establish law and order on the steppe were interrupted by Russian occupation and colonization. The emergence of Kazaks starts in the fifteenth century. The Kazaks had survived in Central Asia and on the steppe and had led a life under the leadership of their hans and rulers according to their traditional customs and lifestyles. Arguments that the nomadic Kazak were the wandering people of the steppe not obeying any ruler, cannot be a correct judgment for those who have studied the Central Asian history. The earlier Kazak Hans spent their lives in struggling to keep the unity of the Kazaks and combating other competing powers that cast their eyes upon the territory of the nomadic Kazaks. The emergence of hordes dividing Kazaks into three jüz was a necessity in defending and administering their pasturelands and population. The Jongar/Mongol invasion interrupted this process and forced the Kazak to seek a stronger power in their fight against the enemy. Russian penetration into the Kazak land thus started with the so-called Kazak acceptance of Russian overlordship. However, it was but an individual agreement made by the han of the Lesser Horde, Ebulhayır, in 1730.

A map attached to the biography of Kenesarı Han and a list of the Kazak tribes participating to the national-liberation struggle of the Kazak tribes against the Tsarist

administration in the nineteenth century is the proof of Kazak rejection of the political, military domination of an outside power. It is included to display the Soviet misinterpretation of historical facts.

Russian colonial pressure began to be felt by the Kazaks through limitations on traditional pasturelands when they were forced to move to less fertile areas as a result of the construction of Russian army garrisons and forts all along the Kazak border on the west and north of their territory. Russian administrative measures to annex the Kazak lands and further subjugate its people politically and militarily began at the beginning of the nineteenth century. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, Russian colonialists seized further Kazak lands, this time not for military or security reasons but for the settlement of landless Cossacks and newly emancipated Russian serfs. Political and administrative measures were also taken to control the Kazak society as a whole, including education and culture.

Until the beginning of the twentieth century, Kazaks together with other non-Russian subjects of the Tsarist Empire were deprived of their political rights and of any other intellectual activities. Only after the 1905 Revolution were Kazaks relatively free to engage in political discussion, and to enjoy the religious freedom granted to the minorities on the Tsarist lands, with the April 17 1905 imperial decree. In spite of this fact, Kazaks were not allowed to be represented at the State parliament, the Duma. Despite the severe restrictions, forces struggling for more freedom were unleashed by the 1905 revolution, and this gave opportunities to several Kazak intellectuals to improve their political understanding and the overall political awareness of their native brothers.

During the years when Russia was engaged in W.W. I and when later Russia was experiencing one of the biggest changes in her history, the Bolshevik revolution, Kazak intellectuals were busy in preparing the ground for a freer form of rule, for a possible opportunity arising in Russia. When Tsarist rule collapsed, the Bolsheviks realized that the handful of Kazak intellectuals, the leaders of the Alaş Movement, had become successful in gaining the trust of natives and thus cooperated with them to maintain Bolshevik control on the Kazak steppe, after their defeat and failure to receive support from either outside powers or from the Tsarist loyalist White forces. This native intellectual movement of the Alaş activists is now being studied by the current native Kazak scholars, academicians and writers, most probably with the hope of finding the most suitable form of administration for the people in Kazakhstan. If mere words are any example, the Alaş intellectuals preferred the future political form of Kazak government to be a democratic federative state. Alaş intellectuals, moreover, did not totally reject any form of acceptable cooperation with the Russian government. Thus, after they understood the impossibility of an independent survival, they agreed to cooperate with the Bolshevik power. Despite their disagreement with the Bolsheviks, all of the Alaş intellectuals except Mustafa Çokay chose not to leave their homeland, only to be killed less than two decades after the revolution.

Liquidation of the native intellectuals, regardless of their political preference, was another unfortunate tragedy for the political maturation of the Kazak society during Soviet times. Although this liquidation was not limited to the native peoples, it was particularly devastating for nations that have a small number of intellectuals comparing to

other nations in the Soviet Union. A nation deprived of the cream of its intellectual potential suffered also from the seizure from the people of their physical, material, religious, and spiritual wealth. Under the labels of collectivization, industrialization, denomadization and education, Kazaks were robbed of all of their valuables. Even ordinary people, who made the slightest hint of disagreement with the Bolshevik power and later with party policies, were punished by execution.

When Stalin died and Hruščev came to power, another phase of Kazak sorrow started with the Virgin Land Campaign. The fertility of the soil was damaged and the traditional animal husbandry was almost destroyed. It resulted in the closure of the Kazak language schools which led to the further russification of the native population who sought to improve their social, political and economic status by becoming integrated into the so-called “international” but, in reality, Russian way of life. After the Virgin Land Campaign, the land once called the home of Kazaks was unrecognizably changed even on the map’s surface due to the russification of toponyms according to the wishes of some further two million Slavic settlers in Kazakstan.

On the eve of its independence, Kazakstan was one of the countries that suffered most from environmental degradation caused by the nuclear and industrial as well as agricultural enterprises in the republic. The land, water and the human beings living in those areas were heavily contaminated by the toxic waste of all those nuclear and other branches of industry and agriculture.

Kazakstan, on the eve of its declaration of independence was a country that lacked any political experience in running a free country as an equal member of the international

community both in internal and external administration of state affairs. It did not have any means to prepare to defend its borders. Cadres in every sphere of administration lacked any kind of acceptable training for running a free country. Departure from the already collapsed former system left all perplexed in Kazakhstan.

Kazak economic life after the collapse of the Soviet Union resembled very much that of a post-colonial country that had just achieved its independence. They used to live an economic life totally isolated and away from the realities and practices of the global economy. Kazakhstan was a periphery in the true sense of the word in that it was militarily and economically dependent upon the former center, Moscow. Many of the industrial facilities had been built disregarding the republican boundaries during the Soviet period, which after independence left Kazakhstan quite vulnerable to the policy and system changes in neighboring areas. An example of this was the Kazak government's inability to provide for the needs of its citizens with natural gas. In addition to this, and unlike the other Central Asian republics, half of the population in Kazakhstan was ethnically Russian. This forced the country to be more subordinate to Russia. Soviet policy for seventy years had been to keep Kazakhstan mainly as a supplier of raw-materials and semi-processed products. Thus, Kazakhstan lacked advanced technology to process its rich natural resources.

The maintenance of an independent life, the formation of new and free relations with other states and international organizations as well as the attempt to overcome economic and military difficulties are the current processes taking place in Kazakhstan. Despite being a rich country in natural resources, after seven years of independence,

Kazakstan still cannot eliminate barriers to make the economic breakthrough which is essential for improving social stability. The remote location of Kazakstan from international markets and a weak transportation network built in the republic during the Soviet time prevents this young republic from effectively using the opportunities which come of having many important raw materials to sell on the global market.

Kazakstan never intended to become a nuclear state and it is very unlikely that this republic will threaten any of her neighbours by becoming a military giant, due to the simple fact of being busy enough maintaining its current territory. Kazaks are not in search of "lebensraum." No future offensive is expected from this country due to its geographic location between two of the world's giant states, Russia and China. The present-day Kazak administrators feel more comfortable in realizing their long-desired status of being a member of the international community of states. In case of any conflict between Kazakstan and any of her neighbours, the issue becoming a subject in international law seems to have had the effect of reducing anxiety in the hearts and minds of the current administrators.

The strong dependency on its neighbouring countries in many fields forces the current leadership in Kazakstan to follow a timid strategy. This seems however, an expected outcome experienced by most of the ex-colonial countries of the world. As time progresses, this generation will eventually pass from the scene and be replaced by another. The coming generation of administrators and leaders in Kazakstan will certainly be free in spirit and in action due to their different educational background compared to those leaders who had experienced the Soviet way of behavior, education, thinking and of

running their life. The declaration of independence in Kazakhstan accelerated the trend in this country to have the opportunity to receive education. The contact and influence of the new generation of Kazakstani students will have a beneficial effect upon their country's progress.

Besides this fact, the strength and endurance of native disagreements and concerns over their land was not stopped by eliminating a whole generation of Kazak intellectuals in the 1930s. A quick glance to the biographies of a number of Kazak political, military, intellectual elite in the appendix will reveal this fact. The present-day nationalist native intellectuals, working at various positions in today's Kazakhstan were those who were born during the 1930s when Stalin carried out his persecution of intellectuals in Kazakhstan and in the Soviet Union. It is the influence of this generation that the trend over many concerns regarding the indigenous population is becoming stronger in the country.

The problems of building a free society out of an ex-colonial land will continue for some time. The possibilities for this newly independent country to establish a stable order and to offer its citizens an acceptable life as well as to maintain economic, political and social progress also depends upon the practice of the current administration. Problems inherited from the colonial past are all big enough issues to tackle, let alone the possibility of the creation of new problems by the current leadership. If one such problem is the possible imposition of an authoritarian one-man rule in the country, the second, but not less important one, is the criticism of only one of the ethnic groups in the republic, the Kazaks, for their ambition to correct the past injustices done.

APPENDIX:

1. A CHRONOLOGY OF THE KAZAK HANS:

Kerey(Around 1456-1473)

Janibek [1473-1480]

Murındıq or Burındıq [1473-1511]

Qasım Han [1511-1518] (born in 1455)

Mamaş Han (1518-1523)

Tahir Han [1523-1533]

Buydaşı Han [1533-1534]

Qoja Mahmut (1534-1535)

Togım Han (1535-1537)

Aqnazar(Haqnazar) Han (Qasım's son) [1538-1582]

Şıgay Han (descendant of Janibek) [1580-1582]

Tavakkul Han (Tavekel) [1582-1598]

Esim Han [1598-1628]

Jengir(Cihangir) Han [1628-1680circa]

Tavke Han [1680-1718] famous for his Jetti Jargı (Seven Pillars)

Bolat Han (1718-1726)

Hans of the Lesser Horde

Ebulhayır(1718-1748)

Nuralı(1748-1786)

Eralı(1791-1797)

Esim(1795-1797)

Aysuvak(1797-1805)

Şergazi(1805-1824)

By the Tsarist Decree on March 11, 1801, the Khanate of the Lesser Horde was divided into two. A new Inner Horde, or the Bökey Horde, was created.

Bökey(1801-1815)

Şıgay(1815-1823)

Jengir(1823-1845)

Hans of the Middle Horde

Qayıp(1716-1719)

Sameke(1719-1734)

Ebilmembet(1734-1771)

Abılay(1771-1781)

Valı(1781-1819)

In 1815, the Tsarist rule has divided the Middle Horde into two with the purpose of humiliating Veli Khan who had not obeyed the Tsarist order, using as an excuse the growth of population in the Middle Horde.

Bökey(1815-1819)

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Kenesarı(1841-1847).

Qoyşıgara Salgaraulı, *Handar Kestesi*, Almatı: Jalın, 1992, p. 39-40.

2. A CHRONOLOGY OF THE KAZAK HISTORY:

- 1456 Formation of the Kazak Khanate.
- 1465 Population reached 200,000 under Kerey's rule
- 1470 Kerey and Janibek Hans Return to Sır (Darya) Region
- 1510 Kazak Control in Sır region maintained
- 1511-1520 Qasım Han's rule started and the Kazak population reached a million. The Straight Custom of Qasım Han was created.
- 1525 The Kazak-Jongar Fight started (and lasted for two centuries)
- 1579 Haqnazar Han occupied Turkıstan and Savran
- 1583-1589 Tavekel Han defeated Baba Sultan of Taşkent. Kazak Khanate reached the peak of its political/military strength
- 1598-1643 Esim Han's rule started. Taşkent city was returned to Kazak rule. City of Turkıstan became the Kazak capital. "Esim Hanning Eski Jolı," the Ancient Way of Esim Han, was created.
- 1643 Major Jongar Invasion of the Kazak and Kırgız territories.
- 1644 Salqam Jangir Han interfered into Jongar-Buهران fight.
- 1690 "Jeti Jargı," the Seven Pillars have been composed.
- 1714 Jongar defeat of the Kazaks
- 1717 Kazak forces led by Qayıp and Ebulhayır Hans were defeated by the Jongar forces at the Battle of Ayagöz.
- 1723-1725 Major Jongar defeat of the Kazaks. Turkıstan, Savran, Taşkent cities and the whole southern territories of the Kazaks were invaded by the Jongars. "Aqtaban-Şubırındı" started.
- 1728 The Battle of Bulantı. Jongar/Oyrat forces were driven out of Sarıarqa (the Golden Steppe).
- 1730 The Battle of Angıraqay.
- 1730 Influence of tribal leaders and the Hans of each Jüz began to grow.
- 1731 Ebulhayır's acceptance of Russian overlordship, together with his people consisted of some Kışi Jüz and Orta Jüz tribes.
- 1733 Kazak forces under Ebulmambet Han defeated the Jongar and twenty-years-old Abılay sultan began gain fame.
- 1741 Abılay Han defeated Jongar forces
- 1757 Kazak and Chinese diplomatic representatives made the Ayagöz treaty, Abılay Han send his representatives to Peking.
- 1771 Abılay Han was elected as the Han of all Kazaks in Turkıstan.
- 1801 Establishment of the Bökey Horde under Russian control.
- 1801-1822 Southern Kazakstan was occupied by the Khokandian rulers
- 1820 Abolishment of the status of Khanate in Kışi Jüz
- 1822 Abolishment of the status of Khanate in Orta Jüz.
- 1822 Tsarist Decree on the Siberian Kırgız(Kazaks)
- 1838-1847 Abılay Han's grandson Kenesarı's fight.
- 1868 Temporary Decree on the Administrative Principles of Ural, Torgay, Aqmola and Semipalatinsk(Semey) Oblasts.

1886	Imperial Decree in Reference to Kazak Land in Sirdarya
1891	Decree on the Administration of Aqmola, Semey, Jetisuv, Ural and Torgay Oblasts
1905	Russo-Japanese War. Russian defeat by the Japanese. New hopes for non-Russian people of the tsarist land.
1913	The <i>Qazaq</i> newspaper began to be published
1914	WWI
1916	Steppe Revolt
Feb. 1917	The February Revolution in Russia
July 21-26	The First All-Kazak Congress and Formation of the Alaş Party .
Oct.	Bolshevik Revolution
Dec. 5-14	The Formation of the Alaş Orda Government .
May 1919	The Alaş Representative A. Baytursun went Moscow to talk Lenin and Stalin
June 10	The Kirrevkom created by Lenin.
October	Decree of Turkistan Revolutionary Military Committee Pardoning Alaş Activists.
March 5	Liquidation of Alaş Orda by the Kirrevkom Decree.
Aug. 1920	Formation of the Kazak Republic under the name of the KırızASSR.
1924	End of the Nomadic Tradition Begin
1926-29	Industrialization in Kazakhstan and Sovietization of the Kazak Avul.
1929-31	Collectivization Campaign Carried Out Full Speed.
1931-33	Famine in the Kazak Steppe.
1930-1938	Persecution and Elimination of Kazak Elite
1953	Virgin Land Development.
1960-1962 and	
1964-1986	Kunayev Era in Kazakhstan
Dec. 1986	The Alma Ata Riots
Dec. 1991	Declaration of Independence.

3. SHORT BIOGRAPHIES OF KAZAK MILITARY, POLITICAL AND INTELLECTUAL ELITE DURING THE LAST THREE CENTURIES

TRADITIONAL POLITICAL/MILITARY ELITE OF THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

ABILAY HAN (1711-1780) Han of the Orta Jüz. His political influence was recognized by all the Kazak Hordes. A native source evaluated Abılay Han's role highly in his attempt to eliminate inter and intra-tribal conflicts between the Kazak society and uniting the Kazaks under one central rule (*Abay Entsiklopediyası*, p. 59). His name can be found among the wise-politicians and diplomatic figures in the history of the Kazaks. His fight against the Jongar invaders of the Kazak land in the eighteenth century resulted in many legendary tales about Kazak life. The oral Kazak literature and heritage reveal the strong impact of Abılay Han over his people. The support that this Han received from the Kazak elite and from the people became symbolic to display Kazak unity during the times of hardship. He lived among the Jongars as a prisoner-of-war in 1740-41. He had a distant relation with the Russian power and tried to preserve an equilibrium by maintaining close ties with the other super power, China. Abılay Han's influence is still strong among the Kazaks. The current Kazak President was honored by some native writers as a Kazak leader who have similarities with Abılay Han in order to motivate the latter to protect Kazak sovereignty and independence. (An interview with Nursultan Nazarbayev, "Elding Jayı Meni Qattı Mazalaydı," *Qazaq Adebıyatı*, No. 37, 16 September 1994, p. 2 and 3.)

QARAKEREY QABANBAY(Erasıl, İzbasar) (circa 1691-1969) A traditional military leader. One of the most famous warriors of Abılay Han in the eighteenth century. One of the organizers of the Kazak fight to drive the Jongar invaders out of the Kazak territory. He fought with the Jongars until 1758 that marks the demise of the Jongar Khanate. His bravery is legendary due to his public duel before several Kazak-Jongar battles when he killed famous Jongar warriors Öljejırgıl, Dalangqara, and Arsalang. Qabanbay's life and his services to his people lived among the Kazaks because of the oral literary figures such as Buhar Jırav, Aqtamberdi, Ümbetay, Duvlat and Tatiqara aqıns.

QANJIGALI BÖGENBAY BATIR (1690-1775) A traditional military leader and one of the most famous warriors of Abılay Han. He is from Qanjıgalı sub-tribe of Arın tribe of the Orta Jüz. He was elected as the Commander-in-Chief of the whole Kazak in 1710 in Qaraqum to lead the Kazak fight against the Jongars. He led the Kazaks in Angıraqay (1730) and Talqı Battles (1756-1758) against the Jongars. He was distinguished with eloquent speech and well-manner and thus been sent as the representative of Abılay Han

to establish diplomatic relations with China. He went to Urumçi with a Kazak diplomatic delegation led by one of the Abılay Han's sons, Adil in 1760. He died on his way back from Urumçi.

ŞAQŞAQLI JANİBEK (JANİBEK TARHAN QOŞQARULI) (1693-1752) A famous Kazak military warrior and leader who achieved distinction through his extraordinary bravery against the Jongar invaders in the eighteenth century. He killed a famous Jongar warrior at a public duel in 1710 when he was 17 years-old. He fought at the Kazak-Jongar Battles in 1717 in Ayagöz, in 1723, in 1723-1725. His bravery became legendary after his exceptional courage during the Angıraqay Battle in 1730. When Abılay Han was made a prisoner-of-war of the Jongars in 1740-41, it was Janibek Batır who freed him through his personal contacts with Ebülmambet Han, Ebulhayır Han and through the mediation of the regional Russian officials. He cooperated with Ebulhayır Han of Kişi Jüz in accepting Russian protection and was rewarded with the title of Tarhan (Knyaz-prince) by a special decree of the Russian Tsarina Elizaveta Petrovna in 11 July 1743.

EBULHAYIR HAN (died in 1748) Han of Kişi Jüz, and a strong military leader who was ambitious to lead all the Kazaks. He is famous with his acceptance of the Russian overlordship on behalf of all the Kazaks by his personal decision. He played a leading role as a military leader during the Kazak-Jongar Battles before 1730. He was killed by one of the members of the Kazak aristocratic family, Baraq Sultan in 1748.

BUHAR JIRAV (1685-1777) The royal-court poet of Abılay Han. He was also a political and social activist. One of the organizers helping Abılay Han to unite the Kazak hordes against the Jongar invaders of the Kazak land. His poems are not only an account of the Kazak history but also contain philosophical wisdom and social sensibility.

QAZDAVISTI QAZİBEK (1665-1765) The most famous traditional judge of Kazaks in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. His fame began to grow at his rather young age and thus participated into the traditional political life during the time of the Kazak Huns as Tavke Han, Sameke Han, Ebulmambet Han and Abılay Han. He became the public voice and inspirator of the Kazak unity against the invading Jongar army. He participated into the Advisory Council (Biyler Kengesi) of Tavke Han during the composition of Jeti Jargı, the Seven Pillars. He preferred to maintain peaceful relations with Russia and China.

AYTEKE BİY (AYTIQ BAYBEKULI) (1682-1766) The leading biy (judge) of Kişi Jüz. One of the advisors to Tavke Han, and one of the influential members of the Han Tavke's Advisory Council (Biyler Kengesi). "He participated into the unifying activity of the

Kazaks together with Töle Biy and Qazıbek Biy. He worked in this attempt to unify Kazaks by eliminating tribal and sub-tribal conflicts by his fair judgment. He participated to collect the Seven Pillar of Tavke Han.” (*Abay Entsiklopediyası*, p. 117).

TÖLE BİY (ALİBEKULI) (1663-1756) The most famous judge of Ulu (Great) Jüz. He participated into the unifying activities of Tavke Han of the Kazak society. One of the influential members of the Advisory Council of Tavke Han. He played an active role in compiling the Seven Pillars, *Jeti Jargı*.

POLITICAL/MILITARY ELITE DURING THE TSARIST RULE

SIRIM DATOV(1783-1797) Sırım Datov is another figure who led the reactionary armed struggle against the measures taken by the tsarist colonial administration. His main objective was to regain the land of Kişi Jüz occupied by the tsarist forces on the western side of the Kazak territories. His struggle lasted a decade from 1780s to 1790s.

İSATAY TAYMANOV(died in 1838) The leader of one of the most important organized resistance against the tsarist colonial administration in the nineteenth century.

MAHAMBET ÖTEMİSOV(1804-1846) He was one of the traditional poets of the nineteenth century. He participated in the reactionary struggle of the Kazaks led by İsatay Taymanov against the tsarist rule. After İsatay died in one of the battles, he continued his reactionary anti-colonial activities through his poems. Although this move did not bring any successful result, his poems remained in the memory of the Kazak people.

KENESARI QASIMOV(1802-1847) The most famous Kazak freedom fighter of the nineteenth century. His main target was to restore the Kazak state to its position in the time of Abılay Han. His struggle delayed the maintenance of Russian colonial control on the Kazak land for two centuries. Kenesarı Kasımov entered into history as the great figure who attempted to carry out the work of the Great Kazak Han Abılay, his grandfather. Then, in spite of the Russian military and administrative measures much of the Kazak territory was still free, though tsarist officials were threatening this freedom of the nomadic Kazaks and had begun to invade their lands.

Kenesarı Han managed to unite the three hordes under his flag.¹ The aristocratic leadership of all the Kazaks led by almost all the leaders of the Middle horde participated in the Kenesarı movement. Kazak historian Ermuham Bekmahanov provided the readers

¹ *Qazaqstan Tariyhi*, p.227.


with the following chart to show the wide support Kenesarı received from Kazak society, in his famous work, as follows:²

<u>Tribal Names</u>	<u>The Horde</u>	<u>Pasturelands</u> <u>Summer and</u>	<u>Winter</u>
Şekti	Lesser Horde	North-West Aral Sea Big Borsuq	Banks of Ural River
Kete	"	"	"
Alşın	"	"	"
Tabın	"	Borsuq Sand	Banks of Emba
Tama	"	"	"
Şömekey	"	Banks of Qaraqum, Sırdarya and Quvangdarya.	Banks of Tobıl and Ölkeayaq.
Şömişti-Tabın	"	"	"
Törtqara	"	Banks of Sırdarya	Banks of Irgız and Mugaljar mountain.
Şekti(incl.Jaqayım, Tilevqabaq)	"	South of Aral and banks of Sırdarya.	Bank of Or and Embi and Irgız.
Qarakesek	"	"	"
Jagalbaylı	"	Banks of Or, Suvandıq and Irgız.	Upper Oral, banks of Irgız and Or.
Altın	"	Banks of Sırdarya, Quvangdarya, Qaraqum.	Torgay, Banks of Ölkeayaq and Tobıl.
Jappas(incl.Qalqaman, Suvmurın, Şaltaq)	"	Banks of Sırdarya	Between Tobıl and Torgay, Troitsk area.
Kerey	"	Banks of Tobıl and Torgay Rivers.	Banks of Tobıl, Obagan and Togızaq. Lived with Argın and Qıpçaq tribes.
Serkeş(Alşın)	"	Banks of Caspian and area around Atrav.	Banks of Qaldıqayta and Buntura.
Qıpçaq	"	Left Bank of Ertis.	Aqmola, Aqköl and Taysanköl.
Baganalı	"	Qaraqongız basin Around and lower Sarısu	Esil, South of Atbasar station.
Altay	Middle Horde	Aqtav and banks of Atasuv.	Upper Esil, Nura, Şiderli, and Sarısu.
Qarpiq(Argın)	Middle Horde	"	"
Temeş(Argın)	"	Middle part of Sarısu and Betpaqdala.	Nura, Esil and Sarısu, East of Aqmola and south of Qarqaralı.
Argın	"	Banks of Torgay	Between Torgay and Tobıl Rivers.
Aydabol	"	Qızıltav and Dalba mntns.(south of Bayanavıl)	Banks of Şiderti and Ölengti.
Qozgan(Argın)	"	"	"

Kenesarı Han's struggle disprove another Soviet/Russian claim of the Kazak acceptance of the Tsarist overlordship by their own will. The above list of tribes who fought against Tsarist forces, under the leadership of Kenesarı is included in order to

² Ermuhan Bekmahanov, *Qazaqstan XIX Ǵasırında*, Almatı: Sanat, 1994., p.183-184.

THE RUSSIAN ANNEXATION OF THE KAZAK LAND



SOURCE: QIZIL-SOYUN DEVELOPMENT

display this reality. At the same time, a map published in a Soviet era encyclopedia in Kazakhstan is also worth examination. In this source, the Kazak territory in the North of the country was declared as the area that came under Russian/Tsarist control earlier than the nineteenth century. However, it was actually the territory of the above tribes who joined the Kenesari's fight.

Kenesari Han's influence still survives among the Kazaks due to an appeal by a group of Kazak intellectuals to the current Kazak president Nazarbayev as honoring the name of Kenesari by naming the Kazak Military School in Almatı after him. At the same time, the present-day Kazak intellectuals prefer his name to be announced as the traditional Kazak hero in opposition to the heroes of Socialist revolution, Heroes of the W.W. II, or heroes of the "socialist labor."

NATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE UNDER RUSSIAN RULE

ŞİNGİS VALİHANULI ABILAYHANOV (1811 - 1902) Grandson of Abılay Han and son of Valı Han, father of Şoqan Valıhanov. A graduate of the Russian Military School in Omsk. The Agasultan (senior sultan) of Amanqaragay Okrig for 19 years between 1834 to 1853, and the Agasultan of Kökçetav Okrig in 1857. He provided the Russian academic circles with information related to the traditional Kazak life and the Kazak oral heritage.

MUSA ŞORMANULI (1816-1885) The Agasultan of Bayanavıl and a graduate of the Russian Military School in Omsk. He worked for the tsarist administration throughout his life. He provided the Russian academic circles with information related to the traditional Kazak life and the oral Kazak heritage. He is the uncle of Şoqan Valıhanov through his sister Zeynep who married Şingıs Valıhanov. His son Sadvaqas Musaulı Şormanov was among the writers to the organ of nationalists, the Qazaq newspaper.

QUNANBAY ÖSKENBAYULI (1804-1886) A son of Öskenbay, a famous notable of the Nayman tribe in the late eighteen century. Qunanbay was the Agasultan of Tobıqtı sub-tribe of Nayman of Orta Jüz, and worked in collaboration with the tsarist administration. Qunanbay is the father of famous nineteenth century Kazak poet-philosopher Abay. This family's political, social influence was maintained until the Bolshevik revolution. Towards the end of his life, Qunanbay went to Mecca and afterwards gave up worldly activities. Two of his grandsons, Şakerim Qudayberdiulı Qunanbayev and Turagul Abayulı Qunanbayev were among the supporters of the nationalist Alaş movement.

INTELLECTUALS OF THE TSARIST TIME:

ÇOQAN VALİHANOV(1835-1865) Çoqan Valihanov, a direct descendant of the royal house of the Kazak aristocracy was educated mainly in the Russian Tsarist military schools, and died at the age of thirty. He wrote in Russian (although he was able to read and probably speak Persian, German and French other than Kazak) and displayed a very high scholarly quality in his works which bore him a membership in the Tsarist academic geographic society. According to Zeki Velidi Togan, Çoqan Valihanov,

“was the manifestation of the genuinely quality of the nineteenth century nomadic Turks encountering the European civilization... His intellectual ability improved under the influence of the ideas of Russian liberalists and of the society of Russian-German orientalist. He was the worshipper of the European civilization and thus viewed Russian civilization as the representative of it. As the direct and legal descendant of the Kazak hans, he disliked the influence of the *sayyids* (the *hocas*), descendants of the prophet Muhammed in Central Asia. He opposed the Kaşgar hocas, the agents of the Amir of Bukhara and Qulca who wanted to replace the traditional local Turkic customs and rules with Islamic rules and laws, on the steppe... Missionary activities of the tsarist administration on the steppe did not alarm him due to his firm belief of the endurance of Turkic culture and customs among the Kazaks. According to him, the mixed religion (with Shamanism and Islam) of the nomadic Kazaks, who arrange their life according to the “*yasa*” (the code of laws of the steppe, created by Chingiz Han) and take their spiritual nourishment from old national epics, was quite different from religion of the Tatars and the Bukharan subjects. Çoqan believed that despite being considered as barbarians by the Western societies, the Kazak ethical quality was quite high comparing to those so-called civilized people. They have a rich (oral) literature. It is the Kazaks who preserved best their society’s poetic ability and national literature among the whole Turko-Tatar tribes. The Kazak language is the richest comparing to all the other Turkic languages.”³

Çoqan was raised to be the han of the Kazaks, yet the then current Russian administration did not allow him to receive further education in improving his leadership abilities in the Russian army due to his origin. He died seven years after his graduation from military school. He was sharp, brave and hot blooded personality. His high self esteem and superiority is turned into a legendary myth among the intellectuals of the Soviet period by the following anecdote: While he was in St. Petersburg, enjoying the fruits of the aristocratic gatherings, he was introduced to an elderly aristocrat-army general, the person attempted to shake Çoqan’s hand by not taking off his gloves. Çoqan asking one moment of permission immediately put his gloves on and shook the general’s hand.

IBIRAY ALTINSARIN (1841-1889) The founder and the champion of Russian led educational facilities and much publicized tool of the pan-Russian education in the Kazak steppe. He was portrayed as the prophet of secular education particularly by the atheistic educational system and its tools during the Soviet period. Thus negligence of the publications in native language both during the tsarist times and later periods lead to inaccurate conclusions in elevating Altinsarin’s works. In this respect painting him as

³ Togan, *Türkistan*, pp.543-551.

“not a devout Muslim and a supporter of the belief secular education,”⁴ is the repetition of the Soviet claim if not an erroneous conclusion. Altınsarın actually wanted to teach the basics of İslam to the then reading public, with his book, published in Kazan (1884), entitled *Şarait-ül İslam: Musılmanşılıqtıng Tutqası* (Principles of İslam: Pillars of Muslims).⁵ This kind of information is not new to the native and Turkic scholars outside the Soviet Union. The Bashkir scholar Zeki Velidi Togan depicts Altınsarın as a devout Kazak nationalist and an admirer of the Central Asian and Kazak historic and literary heritage in the first edition of his well-known book *Türkistan* which was published in Egypt between 1928 and 1939 and in 1947 in İstanbul.

ABAY QUNANBAYULI (1845-1904). The most publicized Kazak poet of the nineteenth century. He spoke Arabic, Persian and Russian and read Russian writers such as Puşkin, Lermantov, Tolstoy, Turgenyev, Dostoyevskiy. He liked Byron through Lermantov and was influenced oriental poets such as Sadi, Navoi and Fuzuli. Abay was a religious but not a fanatic person, and painted the best picture of the nomadic Kazak life in his powerful lyrical style. He was both a nomadic folkloric poet (aqın) and a poet-philosopher on orientalist traditions.⁶ He was depicted as the prophet of Kazak literature, of all times, and his works are widely propagated among all of the Kazaks on earth. There are at least a couple of hundred books and thousands of articles (directly related to him or giving detailed citations from his works) about Abay and his works published in Kazakhstan during the Soviet period. The most well-known of them was of course the works of Muhtar Avezov, who became the greatest promoter of the works of Abay and his influence in the steppe. Avezov wrote his well-known historic novel, *Abay Jolı* in four volumes⁷ and *Abay Şıgarmaları* in two volumes.⁸ His nephew Şakerim Qudayberdiulı Qunanbayev and his son Turagul Qunanbayev were among the supporters of the Alaş movement through their literary, historic writings in the pages of the nationalist organ of *Qazaq* newspaper.

THE ALAŞ INTELLECTUALS

SANJAR ASFENDİYAROV(1889-1938) Political activist, historian, and medical doctor. A graduate of the Military Medical Academy in St. Petersburg. One of the founders of the Kazak pedagogical and medical institutes and the Kazak Academy of Sciences during the

⁴ Olcott, *ibid.*, p.106.

⁵ İbray Altınsarın, *Şarait-ül İslam; Musılmanşılıqtıng Tutqası*, Kazan : Kazan Universitesi Tabıǵhanası, 1884. The book was reprinted in *Juldız*, No.6., Almatı, 1991, pp. 3-28.

⁶ Togan, *Türkistan*, p.493.

⁷ Muhtar Avezov, *Abay Jolı*, Vol. I (1942), Vol.II (1947), Vol.III(1952) and Vol.IV (1956), Almatı.

⁸ *Abay Şıgarmaları*, Muhtar Avezov, ed., Kazak Academy of Sciences, Institute of Languages and Literature, Almatı: 1957.

early Soviet rule. Author of the famous books entitled *The Early Account of the Kazak History* and *The Problems of Kazak History*.

JAQIP AQBAYEV(1876-1934) One of the first Kazaks graduated from the Faculty of Law of the St. Petersburg university. He often wrote about the traditional customs and principles regarding the judicial matters in the Kazak society. He was announced as the Chief Procurator of the Alaş Orda government. He worked in courts of Semey and Sırdarya Oblast between 1919-1928. He became a victim of Stalinist execution and was shot in 1934.

MUHTAR AVEZOV(1897-1961) One of the two “repentent” Alaş fans who later became the classic of the Kazak literature through his voluminous books about the traditional Kazak life. He is famous with his work about the nineteenth century Kazak poet-philosopher Abay Qunanbayulı. He suffered from persecution many times but survived and died from natural causes in 1961.

JÜSİPBEK AYMAVITOV(1889-1931) Poet, writer, dramatist, educator, and researcher of Kazak literature. He worked as a teacher at various Russian-Kazak schools. He wrote in *Qazaq* newspaper. He worked as a writer in the Kazak press organs of the early Soviet time. He became a victim of Stalinist execution and was shot in 1931.

AHMET BAYTURSINOV (1873-1938) Another most important Kazak intellectual of the early twentieth century and one of the founders of the Alaş movement. Baytursın became aware of the colonialist oppression of the tsarist administration in his early years of boyhood when his father and uncle was exiled to hard labor in Siberia for 15 years. He graduated from the School of Teachers in Orenburg in 1895. From this time onwards, Baytursın was an active participant of anti-colonial and revolutionary movements. His efforts on matters of education of the Kazak society is particularly noteworthy. He was the chief editor of the *Qazaq* newspaper. In a society where number of properly educated intellectuals are scarce, Baytursın tried to fill the gaps by assuming many responsibilities from time to time as correspondent, turkolog, literary man, poet, translator, and political activist. During 1918-1919, he was the leading man in the Alaş movement and when the Kazak national political movement failed he joined the Bolsheviks hoping again to offer

his service to his people on the steppe. Between 1919 and until his first arrest in 1929, he worked as a member of Military-Revolutionary Committee, Commissar of People's Education in Kazakstan, a member of the All-Union Central Executive Committee. He became a victim of Stalinist execution and was killed in 1938.

AHMET BİRİMİJANOV(1870-1927) He went to the Altinsarn school in Torgay, graduated from Boys Gymnasium in Orenburg and entered into the Faculty of Law of the Kazan University in 1891, from which he graduated in 1896 with a gold medal. He was elected to the First and Second Russian Imperial Duma from Torgay Province between 1905-1906. He worked as legal prosecutor in Orenburg and Samara until 1917. He was a member of the Alaş Movement. He became a victim of Stalinist execution and was killed in 1927.

ALIHAN BÖKEYHANOV (1870-1937) The most famous of Kazak-Alaş intellectual of the twentieth century. He was also active as a journalist, literary-man, translator and economist. He graduated from the Technical College in Omsk in 1890 and graduated from the Faculty of Economics at the Imperial Institute of Forestry in 1894. He began to publish articles about Kazak social life and history of the steppe people in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He was the Kazak deputy to the First Russian Duma from Semey province and one of the signatories to the famous Viborg manifesto. A member of the tsarist Masonic Society of Polyarnaya Zvezda since 1908. His awareness of Kazak problems under the Russian colonial administration as well as his cognizance of Kazak misery under this administration related to the land problem was shaped during his participation to the tsarist geographic expeditionary mission. Bökeyhanov was a young man in his twenties when he was included into the famous Şçerbina expedition, between 1896-1901, that investigated 12 Kazak districts of Aqmola, Semey and Torgay. He was one of the authors of the famous book entitled *Russia. Complete Geographic Description of Our Homeland* edited by outstanding Russian scholars P. P. Semyenov-Tiyanşanskiy and V. İ. Lamanskiy. He became a victim of Stalinist execution and was killed in 1937.

HALEL DOSMUHAMMEDOV(1883-1939) A graduate of the Imperial Military-Medical Academy. Scientist, medical doctor, folklorist, journalist, political activist and professor. One of the founders and leaders of the Alaş Movement. He met Lenin in 1918 on behalf of the Alaş Movement asking autonomous status for the Alaş Orda

Government. His activities was limited to scholarly-educational work during the Soviet period. He became a victim of Stalinist execution and was killed in 1939.

SABİT DÖNENTAYEV(1894-1933) Poet, journalist. He wrote articles to *Qazaq* newspaper about education. He is one of the satirists in Kazak literature following the poetic tradition of Abay Qunanbayulı. He became a victim of Stalinist execution and was killed in 1933.

MIRJALIP DUVLATOV(1885-1935) Poet, writer, journalist, educator, and political activist. His articles first appeared in *Serke*(St. Petersburg-1907) and in *Ayqap*. He is famous with his books *Oyan Qazaq* (Ufa-1909) and *Baqıtsız Jamal* (Kazan-1910). He spent his years in Orenburg publishing the *Qazaq* newspaper. He was one of the leaders of “nationalist awakening of the Kazaks, the Alaş Movement, the Alaş Party, the Alaş Orda Government and the Alaş Orda Army. He wrote about Kazak history, literature, culture and political matters in the pages of the *Qazaq* newspaper. He became a victim of Stalinist execution and was killed in 5 October 1935 in the labor camp of Sosnovets near the White Sea by the Baltic Canal.

ALİMHAN ERMEKOV(1891-1970) One of the two “repentent” former Alaş activists. A mathematician who graduated from the Institute of Technology in Tomsk. He wrote articles about education, and organizing activities of the Muslim students in Tomsk in the pages of the *Qazaq* newspaper. He suffered from political repression but lived until 1970.

İLYAS JANSÜĞÜROV(1894-1938) One of the founders of the contemporary written Kazak literature. A poet, political activist and journalist. He graduated from the Tashkent Institute of Kazak-Kırgız Teachers in 1920. He wrote in the *Qazaq* newspaper. A victim of Stalinist persecution and was killed in 1938.

MAGJAN JUMABAYEV(1893-1938)A graduate of Madrasa Galiya in Ufa. His poems championed the great Turkic historic, ethnic and cultural unity which warmed the hearts of his fellow-brothers and alarmed those of their opponents. One of his poems entitled *Türkistan* describes the geographic characteristics of the region and reminds the historical

figures such as Afirasyab, Chingiz, Amir Timur, Mirza Ulug Bek, and even İbn-i Sina in a prodigious style which continues to inspire those who can read it in native tongue even today. Magjan was a poet who also felt close association to the Ottoman Turkey and thus wrote his another well-known poem *Alistağı Bavırma-* To My Brother in Faraway Land- during the World War I, when the Ottoman Empire was in its last days of survival. One can also clearly see the Kazak solidarity in İdil-Ural national struggle from his poem *Ural* in which he described Ural mountain as the bordering area, the western side resembling the night, darkness and as the nest of the blue-eyed evil and the eastern side as the golden steppe of the Turks. In his poems, he supported the pan-Turkic unity and claimed many of those cultural, historical, and literary figures of Central Asia, as the common heritage of the Turkic people. He became a victim of Stalinist execution and was killed in 1938.

BEYİMBET MAYLİN(1887-1933) Biymuhammet Jarmagambetuli Maylin is one of the founders of the contemporary Kazak literature. A writer and a journalist. He was educated at the Madrasa of Ağımbay Haji, the Madrasa of Vazifa in Troitsk and the Madrasa Galiya in Ufa. He wrote a poem devoted to the Alaş Party and other articles and news in the pages of the *Qazaq* newspaper. A victim of Stalinist persecution and was killed in 1933.

MUSTAFA ÇOQAY(1890-1941) Mustafa Çoqay is another phenomenal figure, whose maternal ancestors belong to the royal house Khokand and his grandfather was the **dadka**(regional administrator of the tsarist times in the Kazak steppe) of the Torgay province. He was a political activist, journalist, historian and publicist. He graduated from the Faculty of Law of St. Petersburg University. He worked in the Muslim Fraction of the Russian State Duma before 1917. He played a leading role in the formation of Hokand Autonomous Government. He choose to live in exile after 1920. He published *Yaş Türkistan* in Berlin between 1929-1939. He was trying to form the **Turkestan** Front against the Soviet Union by drafting “Turkestanese” war of prisoners in Berlin in 1941. He mysteriously became ill and died in December 27, 1941 in Berlin. Some sources and memoirs reject the causes of his death from natural results.

ŞAKERİM QUDAYBERDIULI(1858-1931) A poet, writer, translator and a historian. A close relative of Abay Qunanbayuli. He read the Ottoman Turkish, Arabic, Persian and Russian. He wrote articles about the Kazak history, culture, traditional customs and judiciary matters. A victim of Stalinist persecution and was killed in 1931.

MUHAMETJAN TINIŞPAYEV(1879-1937) A political activist and the “Prime-minister of the Khokand Autonomous Republic” in 1917. A graduate of the St. Petersburg Institute of Transport. One of the engineers of the Türk-Sib Railway during the early Soviet rule in Kazakhstan. He wrote articles in the *Qazaq* newspaper. A victim of Stalinist persecution and was killed in 1937.

NATIVE BOLSHEVIK INTELLECTUALS

SAKEN SEYFULLİN (1894-1938) One of the founders of the Kazak-Soviet literature. A poet and social/political activists. One of the most publicized Kazak writer and poet during the Soviet times. He praised Lenin, the “Sovetstan” and the achievements of the Bolshevik and of Socialist system. He openly criticized those Alaş activists as the “nationalists”. However, he was ridiculed by the leading Alaş intellectuals for his championship of the socialist regime. He became a victim of Stalinist persecution and died at a labor camp in 1938.

SABİT MUQANOV (1900-1973) A staunch supporter of the Soviet rule. He severely criticized the Alaş intellectuals during the late 1920s. A writer and one of the founders of the Kazak literature during the Soviet time.

NATIVE SOVIET PARTOCRATS

ALİBİY JANGELDİN (1884-1953) His name is very often mentioned as one of the native Bolshevik activists who worked to maintain the party rule in the Kazak steppe. Before the emergence of the Bolshevik rule, he was a native Kazak who was converted to the Orthodox fate and adopted the name of Stepnow (Mustafa Çoqayoglu, “Qazaqstanning On Yıllığı,” *Yaş Türkistan*, Year: 2., No. 11, 1930, pp. 1-11.) In the *Qazaq* newspaper, it was claimed that Jangeldin used to label all of his opponents as the supporters of the old regime in 1917. The nationalist *Qazaq* newspaper appealed to Torgay Kazaks not to support Jangeldin and not to believe to his propaganda. (Reprint *Qazaq* newspaper, p.403. year 1917) He was elected as one of the members of the Kazak CP Central Executive Committee in 1920.

TURAR RISQULOV(1894-1937) Rısqulov “joined the Russian Communist Party as early as September 1917 and became one of the first native revolutionaries of Central Asia. By 1918, Rısqulov was the chairman of the Regional Executive Committee of Avliye-Ata and a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Turkistan

Autonomous Republic.”⁹ His fame began to grow during the famine of 1918, following the 1916 revolt in the steppe region. Turar Rısqulov held positions like, People’s Commissar of Health, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan ASSR, Chairman of the Turkestan Musburo of the People’s Commissariat for Nationalities under Stalin, and leader of the Turkestani delegation to the famous Congress of the Peoples of the East held in Baku. His loyalty to communism did not hinder his passionate defense of his nation’s rights even against his fellow-Bolshevik comrades. He remained the staunch defender of the welfare of his people. He was always in the forefront of struggle concerning the relations of native Muslims and Russian Bolsheviks, particularly in matters related to the mal-administration of the latter upon the former. He accused the so-called “European” Bolsheviks of physically eliminating the native cadres from the party administration and of drawing all the benefits of the revolution solely to themselves. His sharp style of criticizing the most important tool of the Bolshevik power, the Red Army soldiers of plundering, robbing and assassinating the natives as well as the then party cadres of discriminating the indigenous people, was considered later by the Stalinist administration as “serious mistakes of nationalist character.”

KÖLBAY TOGUSOV His name is recorded due to his work as one of the founders of the Socialist oriented Üş Jüz party in Kazakstan during the 1917. He was known as an enthusiastic amateurish supporter of the new trends. He wrote a fourteenth page drama about the problem of illiteracy before the October revolution. There are also reports citing his association with the Alaş intellectuals such as Mustafa Çoqay. Togusov and his friends began increasingly critical of the Alaş intellectuals as the Bolsheviks began to gain the upper hand in Kazakstan.

SMAGUL SADVAQASOV (killed in 1933) He participated into the Alaş Party organizational work when he was a student in Omsk. He later rose to high party rank in 1920s. He was the President of the Kazak Rayon Committees. Smagul Sadvaqasov openly criticized the Stalinist policy of nationalities and its application in Kazakstan in the pages of an All-Union press, the *Bolshevik*. He also openly argued with the center-appointed Bolshevik high-ranking party leaders in Kazakstan over the party policies carried out in Kazakstan. He won the title of “nationalist-diehard.” He was son-in-law of Alihan Bökeyhanov. He died mysteriously in Moscow in 1933.

NURSULTAN NAZARBAYEV(1940-) The First President of the Republic of Kazakstan. His professional life as a engineer of metallurgy started after he graduated

⁹ *Revolution in Central Asia As seen by Muslim Bolsheviks*, Society for Central Asian

from the regular Secondary School. He worked in various levels of the Komsomol and the Party organization after 1960. He became the President of the Council of Ministers of the KazakSSR in 1984. He was elected as the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan when the country declared its independence in 1991.

DINMUHAMMED KUNAYEV(1912-1993) Kunayev was born in January 12, 1912 in Almatı to a family of the Great Horde. In his memoirs, published in 1992, he followed the traditional way of Kazaks in describing his ancestors by giving seven names of his six forefathers. Kunayev was the son of Mengliahmet who was the son of Jumabay. son of Qonay, son of Aznabay, son of Nurmambet and son of Jolım. His grandfather Jumabay went to Mecca through Turkey in 1904 and returned Kazakhstan through India and Afghanistan in 1905. In order to pay pilgrimage to Mecca, anytime in history for a Kazak in Central Asia, one needs to be extremely devoted to religion, and needs considerable amount of wealth to take the journey. Kunayev's father seem to be a regular follower of Islamic religion for which he mentioned that when he was a boy, his father use to take him to pray. Despite serving on the very top echelon of the atheistic Soviet rule, Kunayev remained aware of his Muslim origin. Some ordinary Kazaks had a sympathy on him even after his fall from power for his respect to the spirit of Ahmed Yesevi, a twelfth century *sufi*, mystic whose mausoleum was built by the Timur, in Kazakhstan. The mausoleum which is still considered as the "second Mecca" for the Central Asian Muslims, became a subject of discussion between Kunayev and Nikita Hruşçev, when the latter visited Kazakhstan in 1961.¹⁰ In addition to this, Kunayev in his childhood grew up together with Eskendir Tınışpayev, son of Muhametjan Tınışpayev, the first Kazak engineer and the former Prime Minister of the Khokand Autonomous Government and the Alaş Ordıst. Kunayev, in his memoirs, wrote that he was inspired by Muhametjan Tınışpayev's professional skills and wanted to follow Tınışpayev's path.¹¹

The political career of Kunayev started after his graduation from the Moscow Institute for Nonferrous Metals and Gold in 1936. He entered into the Komsomol organization while he was a student. He became a member of the Communist party in 1939. He worked as the Deputy Chairman of the KazakSSR Council of Ministers between 1942-52. He became a full member of the Kazak Communist Party Central Committee in 1949. Kunayev was the President of the KazakSSR Academy of Sciences in 1952 and left the position in 1955 when he was appointed as the Chairman of the KazakSSR Council of Ministers. Starting from 1960s onwards, Kunayev began to climb the stairs towards upper political echelons of the Soviet Party and Government apparatus. He became a full member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1956. Six years after that, he was a member in the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Kunayev was a candidate member to the CPSU CC Politburo between 1966 to 1971. The latter date marks his elevation to the full membership status to the CPSU CC Politburo. Kunayev

¹⁰ Dinmuhammed Kunayev, *O Moyem Vremeni*, Almatı: RGJR "Davir, MP "Intımaq", 1992. p. 134-135.

¹¹ *ibid.*, p.15.

became famous with his role in evacuation and reorganization of industrial enterprises to areas behind the lines in Kazakhstan during the W.W. II. He also mobilized and trained reservists. Between 1952 and 1955, he coordinated academic activities in the field of scientific and technical research at the Kazak Academy of Sciences. The most important reason for him to rise to the top of the Soviet leadership was his close association with Leonid Brejnev. It was established when Brejnev served as the First Secretary of the Kazak CP Central Committee between 1955 to 1957. He worked under Brejnev during the crucial years of launching the Virgin Land Campaign in Kazakhstan. Kunayev died on 22 August 1993 in Almatı at the age of 81. He was buried by a state funeral and “the entire Kazak leadership stresses Kunayev’s “enormous contribution” to the development of Kazakhstan’s economy and “his services to the people during the difficult period of the Communist experiment.”¹²

INTELLECTUALS OF MODERN TIMES

ERMUHAN BEKMAHANOV(1915-1966) A Soviet era historian who wrote about the nationalist-reactionary struggle of Kenesari against the tsarist colonial administration. He received severe criticism for his work. The Soviet prohibition of Bekmahanov’s work on Kenesari clearly reflected the Soviet sympathies for the tsarist colonial regime. Bekmahanov was forced to spend the rest of his life according to Soviet requirements and published nothing extraordinary after 1940.

QABDEŞ JUMADİLOV(1936) Famous writer in contemporary Kazakhstan whose ancestral background came from Eastern Turkestan, the Xinjiang. He is highly respected for his outstanding ability of writing in Kazak in historic, political and social subjects.

ABİŞ KEKİLBAYEV(1939) A contemporary writer and poet. He works on the political, social and historic issues of the Kazak society. During the independent era, he was appointed as the President of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

MANAŞ QOZIBAYEV(1931) A famous historian and academic of the Kazak Academy of Sciences. He is the author of numerous articles and many books about the history of the Kazaks. The leading activist of the new trend in the present-day Kazakhstan in history and political awakening. He is a gifted native orator, fluent in both Russian and Kazak languages. He works close to the current president of Kazakhstan.

¹² RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 162, 25 August 1993.

MUHTAR MAGAVİN(1940) Writer, a doctor of philology and a tedious researcher of the Kazak literary heritage. He works as the Chief Editor of the native literary journal *Juldz*. He is the author of many books and articles, including *Bes Gasır Jırlyadı*, *Alasapıran*, *Qazaq Tariyhining Alıppesi*. His most important contribution is his leadership ability in administering the *Juldz* journal. Many important materials related to the history and the plight of the Kazak society in the past and in the present, were published under his guidance.

MEKEMTAS MIRZAHMETOV(1930) A professor of Philology by profession. He writes about the plight of the Kazaks both in present-day and in the past. His book entitled *Qazaq Qalay Orıstandırıldı* (How the Kazaks were Russified) is particularly striking. He is one of the supporter of the native trend of re-evaluating the native history.

QOYŞIGARA SALGARİN(1939) A journalist and writer who wrote a dissertation about the Kazak philosopher Abay. His recent books and articles about the Kazak history are significant contribution to the new trend in Kazak social, political understanding.

ŞERHAN MURTAZAYEV(1932) A writer, dramatist. He wrote about the life of Turar Rısqulov in his famous drama *Stalinge Hat*, and in his well-known book entitled *Qızıl Jebe*. He is also a supporter of the Kazak social, political and demographic plight.

RIMGALİ NURGALİYEV(1940) A writer, literary critic, a professor of philology and a corresponding member of the Kazak Academy of Sciences. His work as the Chief Editor of the institution called “Qazaq Ensiklopediyasının Redaktsiyası” makes substantial contribution to the contemporary historic, social, political and administrative understanding of the Kazak society, by offering information to the public on the native past.

OLJAS SÜLEYMENOV(1936) A poet and writer. A mounting figure among the Kazak intellectuals. He worked as the head of the Kazak cinematographers society and as the first secretary of the Kazak Union of Writers during the Soviet times. He is the leading activist and president of the Nevada-Semey Anti-Nuclear Movement. He was also the president of the Peoples Congress Party, before he was appointed by Nazarbayev, as the Kazak Ambassador to Italy.

He is a gifted personality who has incredible charisma in native and non-native public eye in Kazakhstan. However, his fame is not limited to Kazakhstan only. One of his earlier poems, “Adamga Tabın Jer Endi” (Oh! Earth, now you should worship mankind!) devoted to the Soviet achievements in space. He was later much criticized for his another

work entitled *Az I Ya: The tale of Prince Igor*, for his claim of many Russian literary heritage owing to the Turkic heritage derived from Central Asia and from the Turkic world.



Oljas Süleymenov's support of the Russian language and his ideas about a possible confederation with the Russian or the Slavic world clearly publicizes the current dilemma of the Kazak intellectual society. When a severe criticism was directed to Oljas Süleymenov, in 1994, a famous native writer who prefers to write in Russian and the president of the present People's Congress Party, he criticized those Kazak nationalists as "the rural teachers isolated from the rest of the world and ignorant of the global chances."¹³ However, earlier during the last years of the Gorbachev rule, he was reported as the advocate of the Kazak plight.

¹³ Oljas Süleymenov, "Bizding Muratımız Tagı da Sol-Tavlardı Alasartpay Dalanı Asqaqtatuv," *Qazaq Adebıyatı*, No.7, 18 February 1994, pp.6-7.

LIST OF THE FIRST SECRETARIES OF THE KAZAK COMMUNIST PARTY

1920-1922	Redus-Zenkoviç
1922-1924	G. A. Korostelev
1924-1925	G. A. Tseyşvili (Georgian)
1925-1933	F. I.. Goloşçekin(Russian)
1933-1938	L. I. Mirzoyan(Armenian)
1938-1945	Nikolay Aleksandroviç Skvortsov(Russian)
1946-1954	Jumabay Şayahmetov(Kazak)
1954-1955	Panteleimon Kondrateviç Ponomarenko(Russian)
1955-1957	Leonid İlyiç Brejnev(Russian)
1957-1960	Nikolay İlyiç Belyayev(Russian)
1960-1962	Dinmuhammed Ahmetulı Kunayev(Kazak)
1962-1964	M.(İsmail) Yusupov(Uygur)
1964-1986	D. A. Kunayev(Kazak)
1986-1989	Gennady Vasilyeviç Kolbin (Russian)
1989-1992	Nursultan Abişulı Nazarbayev(Kazak)

KAZAKSTAN- LATE 13th-LATE 16th CENTURIES




AQ ORDA (THE WHITE HORDE)-LATE 14th-EARLY 15th CENTURIES

TIMURID TERRITORY-LATE 14th-EARLY 16th CENTURIES

MOGOLSTAN- MID 14th-EARLY 16th CENTURIES

BORDERS OF MOGOLSTAN AND BORDERS OF THE STATE ADMINISTERED BY THE DESCENDANTS OF HULAGU




BORDER OF THE KAZAK KHANATE-(circa) 1560-1570

BORDER OF THE KAZAK KHANATE-(circa) late 15th CENTURY

BORDER OF THE KAZAK KHANATE-(circa) early 16th CENTUR

BORDER OF THE KAZAK KHANATE-(circa) late 16th CENTURY

SOURCE: QAZAQ-SOVIET ENTSIKLOPEDIYASI



THE PRESENT-DAY KAZAKHSTAN
SOURCE: QAZIQ-SOVIET ENTSI KLÖPELI

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