

A FOUCAULDIAN ANALYSIS OF BARACK OBAMA’S NATIONAL
SECURITY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM DISCOURSE

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ABSTRACT

A FOUCAULDIAN ANALYSIS OF BARACK OBAMA’S NATIONAL SECURITY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM DISCOURSE

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This study is on a qualitative analysis of Barack Obama’s discourse of counterterrorism strategy. With a theoretical subscription to Michel Foucault’s approach to discourse it tries to make an understanding of how Barack Obama reorganized the American counter-terrorism discourse as well as norms of security within American society. By taking key speeches by Obama on national security throughout his presidency (2009-2017) and executive orders as well as memoranda produced under his administration, this study tries to answer questions such as what sources of information did he use in reshaping his national security policy? How did he construct the problematic in American national security? What did he include or exclude in the US counter terrorism terminology? Which identities did he try to make desirable and which he did not? What is normalized and what it pathologized? This thesis hypothetically claims that the only consistent part of Obama’s counter terrorism discourse was his distinguishing Muslim from terrorist and Islam from terrorism. By rhetorically destroying the image of US as an invasive power Obama tried to reinstate the US hegemony through more prudent mechanisms

Keywords: Obama, Terrorism, War on Terror, Foucault, Discourse Analysis

ÖZ

BARACK OBAMA’NIN ULUSAL GÜVENLİK VE TERÖRLE MÜCADELE SÖYLEMİNİN FOUCAULTÇU BİR ANALİZİ

Kasım İleri

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Bu çalışma Barack Obama’nın terörle mücadele ve ulusal güvenlik söyleminin kalitatif bir analizine odaklanır. Foucault’un söyleme yaklaşımından yola çıkarak, Obama’nın ABD terörle mücadele söylemini ve Amerikan toplumundaki güvenlik normlarını nasıl tekrar organize ettiğini anlamaya çalışır. Obama’nın başkanlığı döneminde (2009-2017) ulusal güvenliğe ilişkin yaptığı önemli konuşmaları, Başkanlık Kararnameleri ve Genelgelerini ele alarak, şu sorulara yanıt arar: Obama ulusal güvenlik politikasını oluştururken hangi bilgi kaynaklarından faydalandı? Amerikan ulusal güvenlik problematiğini nasıl inşa etti? ABD’nin terörle mücadele terminolojisinde neleri dahil edip neleri hariç bıraktı? Hangi kimlikler tasvip edilir kılıp hangilerini tasvip edilemek kıldı? Neyi normalize edip, neyi patolojize etti? Bu çalışma hipotez olarak Obama’nın terörle mücadele söyleminde süreklilik arz eden tek olgununu terörist ile Müslüman arasına, İslam ile terör arasına koyduğu ayrım olduğunu iddia eder ve Obama, retorik olarak ABD’nin işgalci imajını yıkarak Amerikan hegemonyasını daha ölçülü mekanizmlarla tekrar inşa etmeye çalıştığını öne sürer.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Obama, Terörizm, Teröre Karşı Savaş, Foucault, Söylem Analizi

To my father



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CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1. Introduction

This study analyzes the US President Barack H. Obama's (2009-2017) national security and counter terrorism discourse from a Foucauldian perspective. The attacks on World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Arlington on September 11, 2001 and the events following these attacks have had deep implications in the field of International Relations. Besides, bringing about two invasions namely those of Afghanistan and Iraq, 9/11 attacks also redefined the concepts security and counter terrorism. A group of radicals for the first time brought the fight into the US while many of their previous attacks were merely against US diplomatic missions and forces. Therefore, the measures that the US took after 9/11 including the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, establishment of Guantanamo Bay detention center, systematic use of torture as a method interrogation and the discourse that employed to legitimize these, while at the same time creating certain subjectivities or institutionalizing counter terrorism have been subject of volumes of books and academic studies. There is a vast literature on Obama's predecessor, the US President George W. Bush's (2001-2009) discourse and comparison between the two American leaders as well. However, from its legal implications, to the geopolitical ones the US counter terrorism strategy since 2001 which was called by Bush *global war on terror* and by Obama *countering violent extremism* is still worth of studying.

Solely Obama's counter-terrorism discourse has also been subject to many academic works. However, the vast majority of those works have been done during his early years at the White House. Therefore, there is a gap in literature on Obama's

discourse being reshaped with the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014. This work, intends to contribute to the literature with that particular period, that is, the last two years of Obama in the office. It handles more than a dozen speeches delivered by Obama throughout his presidency as well as several executive orders and memoranda in order to trace where Obama ended discursively.

Theoretically, this thesis applies Foucault's discourse analysis. Conceptually the main departure point of this thesis is Foucault's theorizing the link between power and discourse/knowledge. It extends into genealogical formation of socio-historical facts, mechanisms and systems. Foucault's specific emphasis on power relations in construction of discourse play an important guidance to the analysis in this paper. In other words, from a Foucauldian perspective this study unpacks Obama's exercise of power as a discursive tool and also the justifications he employed for them. Obama's imagination of terrorist subject, the subjectivity he attributes to Muslims, his characterization of US employment of power are crucial to analyze through an engagement with the relation between power and discourse.

This work is divided into four chapters. The first chapter consists of introduction, the theoretical frame work, methodology, sources as well as the literature reviews. It tries to bring in as many as possible perspectives on terrorism and its definition besides war on terror. Then it reviews a vast literature on language and its use, in particular Saussure's structuralist approach that revolutionized the approach to language. It also reviews the post structural approach to language and discourse where critical discourse analysis and Foucauldian discourse analysis are engaged. Besides a deep engagement with Foucault, works of Wodak, Wittgenstein, Bourdieu, Derrida, van Dijk, Powers, Jackson, Giddens, Fairclough, Chouliaraki, and Bigo are examined as part of the analysis of discourse.

The second chapter, is solely devoted to the study of discourse. A summary of discourse under two main methodological approaches, namely structuralism and post-structuralism—are summarized in that chapter. Then, an array of discussions under post-structuralist approach are handled. From there, the chapter moves to Foucault's contribution the study of discourse and Foucauldian discourse analysis. Despite significant differences among the approaches to the concept of discourse, the common premise is that language is used not only to represent physical, social or mental

phenomena, but it is also employed in the construction of those realities. So, this peculiarity of discourse analysis is key to the analysis of Obama's discourse. This study avoids to provide a definition of discourse but Foucault's understanding of discourse as something emerging out of the interaction between power and knowledge fits better into the context of this study particularly in handling Obama's construction of his definitions of terrorism, the terrorists as well as his way of dealing the problem of terrorism.

The third chapter, summarizes the power relations in American politics and the implications of these relations on the definition of terrorism. Besides, the chapter goes through the main tenets of Obama's predecessor Bush's national security and counter terrorism discourse and compares it with that of Obama. The main purpose of this chapter is to provide the base for the next chapter which solely focus on Obama's discourse.

The fourth chapter engages Obama's discourse from 2007 to 2017 which covers his speeches from his announcement of running for presidential election to his last national security speech. Obama has made more than a thousand speeches in 8 years and approximately a hundred of these have specific national security references in them. This chapter analyzes Obama's speeches into three phases: First is the adoption phase. This part engages his speech where he announces his presidential bid, his inaugural speech and Cairo speech in 2009. These three key speeches are foundational for Obama's speeches up to his second term. Thus, analysis of them are crucial. In his second term, particularly with the use of controversial technologies Obama adopts a discourse which aims to legitimize the means of domination and emphasizes the balance between security and ideals. This is the evolution phase and this study analyzes particularly the targeted killings and mass surveillance as Obama's panopticon. It claims that the use of drones had some discursive implications into Obama's national security. It also hypothesizes that the mass surveillance which had been in place long before Obama, became a discursive tool for Obama only after it was leaked by Edward Snowden because the knowledge of such a wide spread wiretapping of private phone conversation both in the US and abroad created a panopticon type mechanism for people. The third phase is the shifting phase which handles speeches after the rise of ISIS and tracks down how Obama's discourse has changed with ISIS

and what part of his discourse remained consistent. This study puts forward that Obama has returned back to the discourse of reconstruction of American global power with the rise of ISIS and his depiction of ISIS are similar to, even at some point goes beyond, that of Bush. He pathologizes ISIS subject and the group itself but the consistent part of his discourse is his portrayal of Muslim and Islam in an endeavor to distinguish Muslims and Islam from ISIS.

1.2. Theoretical Framework

As a theoretical approach, this thesis adopts French social scientist and thinker Michel Foucault's discourse analysis. Foucault's approach to discourse is distinguished with its specific emphasis on power relations within a given discourse. Foucault's genealogical study constitutes the base for this form of analysis. According to Foucault power and discourse are interconnected with each other and have constitutive relationship. In other words, power is connected to the formation of discourse and vice versa. This approach will help this study to understand how Obama's counter terrorism strategy is shaped through a relative discursive binocular which in turn becomes a part of the strategy/power itself.

Foucauldian discourse analysis as is close to social constructivism, it is also possible to trace it in the work of Jack Derrida and his de-constructivist approach as well as psychoanalysis and critical theory. This notion of discourse put forward that discourse constructs knowledge by categorizing it as well as converging texts to reconstruct power as well as discourse/knowledge. As it could be best seen in Foucault's *Archeology of Knowledge* as well as in *Discipline and Punishment* whatever being said, and any information presented are somehow playing within the power relationships and end up reorganizing itself within that aura.

Another the key element in Foucauldian discourse analysis is the issue of exclusion and inclusion. The selected words/actions/impositions reflect the power that will employ the discourse on one hand; it redefines both power focuses and knowledge on the other. According to Foucault:

In every society, the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over events to evade its ponderous formidable materiality

(1981, p. 52).

That being said, Foucault talks about certain exclusions or prohibitions on speech, which is factored by institutions, social formations or the power itself.

As this study is going to focus on Obama's counter terrorism discourse, for a critical examination of the counter terrorism discourse, the work of Michel Foucault is a promising platform for its critical stance and its remarkable focus in power and historical circumstances. It will attempt to make use of Foucauldian theory on discourse analysis to examine how Obama reshaped the discourse of the war on terror.

Conceptually the main point of departure of this thesis is Foucault's theorizing the link between power and discourse/knowledge. It extends into genealogical formation of socio-historical facts, mechanisms and systems. Thereof, Foucault conceptualizes power's mechanisms of creation, containment and control of *the other* such as discipline, bio-politics and etc.

1.3. Research Questions and Methodology

This study is going to engage Obama's remarks and his policies through Foucault's approach to discourse in order to make an understanding how he reorganized the American counter-terrorism policy as well as norms of security within American community. On its way to that inquiry this study will also ask following questions:

- a. What sources of information did he use in reshaping his national security policy?
- b. How did he construct the problematic in American national security?
- c. What did he include or exclude and what did he foreground or background in the US counter terrorism terminology?
- d. Which identities did he try to make desirable and which he did not?
- e. What is normalized and what it pathologized?

1.4. Sources

This study is going to analyze up to 14 speeches delivered by Barack Obama throughout his presidency as well as several executive orders and memoranda. Those three speeches are selected based on some particular reasons. Obama's speech on

announcement of presidential candidacy in 2007, his inaugural address in 2009 and his speech in Cairo were key pillars of his counterterrorism discourse. So, there are used in the part where his adoption of the discourse is analyzed. The rest of the speeches are making references back to those three speeches in terms of analyzing how Obama shaped the discourse. Several of Obama's speeches from 2014 on were also specifically handled because, they show the level of evolution in his discourse. In addition, those speeches also reflect Obama's definition and characterization of ISIS. Moreover, Obama's executive orders and memoranda that are related to national security and counter terrorism. Besides those the policy and policy documents that are related to drone policy and mass surveillance will also be part of this study.

When it comes to the secondary sources, mainly Michell Foucault's works such as *Archeology of Knowledge*, *Discipline and Punish*, *History of Sexuality*, *Society Must Be Defended* are the specific sources where the analysis of the mentioned speeches will be built on. These works are considered to be key studies of Foucault on power and discourse. In *Archeology of Knowledge* he primarily focuses on history of ideas. Inspecting historicity of articulated ideas in *Archeology* Foucault actually opens a new discussion about discourse. He refines and makes discourse subject to analysis and rewrite the history of discourse. Therefore, in discourse analysis *Archeology* can be considered as one of the key works. *The Discipline and Punish*, on the other hand, specifically details the construction, use and execution of power. The relationship between power and knowledge is the central focus to this work. It elaborates on power relations within the state and how it constitutes itself. Foucault's archeology and genealogy works are key here in this study, but his governmentality works such as *Society Must Be Defended*, and *Security, Territory, Population* as well as his interviews are also going to be referred here. Apart from that, works of Wodak, Wittgenstein, Sassure, Bourdieu, Derrida, van Dijk, Powers, Jackson, Giddens, Fairclough, Chouliaraki, Bigo will be referred in analysis of discourse. These works will help this study to locate discourse and apply it into the speeches that will be analyzed.

1.5. Literature Review

1.5.1. Terrorism as A Historical Term

Terrorism, an overheard concept in everyday life, has a centuries long history and experienced several changes semantically throughout that long past. Although the term is associated with use of violence and the fear that the respective violence causes, there has yet to be an academic and a legal definition with determined criteria accepted by all. There is a common perception that an intended targeting of civilian population is an act of terror. Terrorism is generally handled from that perspective but in international relations discussions over terrorism rest upon some sophisticated power relations within the international community. Also, throughout history as terrorism is associated with different acts of violence there is not a common ground for all to accept a definition for the term. For instance, a state calls a group as a terrorist organization while many others do not accept so and some may even enjoy good relations with that group. Therefore, many times to have an act declared as an act of terrorism or a group defined as a terrorist organization have a lot to do with discursive convincement of many parties of international community (Hoffman, 2006).

Historically, in the Western academia the word “terrorism” first became popular during the French Revolution, according to Bruce Hoffman. In his book *Inside Terrorism* Hoffman says that terrorism had a positive connotation in late 18th Century as it was “a revolutionary or anti-governmental activity undertaken by non-state or sub-national entities,” and then it became “an instrument of governance wielded by the recently established states” following the French Revolution (2006, p. 4). These attributions lasted up until 1930s when ideologically oppressive regimes emerged across the Europe. As political opponents of those regimes faced physical abuses such as torture, killings or exiles, particularly in Stalin’s Russia, Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany, the concept of terrorism swung to a negative connotation. The term terrorism was used in explaining “arbitrary use of violence”, “repressive practices” by regimes against their citizens (Hoffman, 2006, p. 4). Fear or terror was the common characteristic of those regimes.

After the Second World War, there was a relatively settled international order, but instability raged in the decolonizing regions in Africa and the Middle East. The

use of violence by non-state actors to terrorize the colonial dominance brought about a new discussion on terrorism. Many discussed that terrorism in that context as actually not an ideological but a tactical choice. Thus, “one’s terrorist can be another’s freedom fighter” (Grant, 1989, p. 3). There is a fertile literature contextualizing terrorism on the axis of justification and legitimacy (Laqueur, 1978; Hoffman, 2006; Falk, 1988). But it can be said that amid the revolts against colonization and imperialism after the Second World War terrorism regained its revolutionary connotation to some extent.

Discussions around the attacks against American diplomats mostly in the Middle East in 1980s constitute the foundation of today’s perception of terrorism (Levitt, 1988). Although 9/11 attacks is considered “a mile stone in history of terrorism”, the latest perceptions of terrorism dates back to 80s (Martin & Walcott, 1988, p. 47). Between 1979 and 1988 more than a dozen incidents targeted American diplomats in Iran, Kuwait, and Libya. This wave of anti-Americanism accompanied with a dichotomist reading of the world as the West vs. the rest. Thereof, many of the meanings historically attributed to the terrorism were abandoned and the movements targeting the neo-liberal western world order were somehow brought under the umbrella of terrorism with new forms such as “state sponsored terrorism” and “radical Islamic terrorism” (Martin & Walcott, 1988, p. 46). However, there is a significant criticism to this approach as well.

In the wake of September 11 attack and US invasions in the Middle East critical approach by scholars such as Noam Chomsky and Edward Hermand revisited under the brand of critical terrorism studies (CTS). Led by scholars such as Richard Jackson, Jacob L. Stump, Jeroen Gunning, Marie B. Smith CTS emerged as a new scholarship moved away from conventional terrorism approaches’ “emphasis on problem-solving theory to a focus on critical scholarship” (Stump, 2007). The CTS argues that terrorism studies takes the concept of terrorism as such and fails to address the role of state in violence and the implications for those identified as “terrorists”. Addressing those issues CTS prevails the production of knowledge as well as methodological and disciplinary pluralism (Jackson, 2007). The group launched a journal in that line of commitment named *Critical Studies on Terrorism*.

Critical theory scholars also have a parallel argument with CTS. For example, Chantal Mouffe puts forward that the international order has lacked a running

pluralism and “the absence of an effective pluralism entails the impossibility for antagonisms to find agonistic, i.e. legitimate, forms of expression” (2005, pp. 82-83). Mouffe draws a connection between neo-liberalism and the rise of terrorism saying “the lack of political channels for challenging the hegemony of the neo-liberal model of globalization is, I contend, at the origin of proliferation of radical negation of the established world order” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 83). There is a bulk of discussions in line with Mouffe’s hypothesis particularly in the context of terrorism raging in the Middle East. Some sees terrorism as a “reactionary fundamentalism” challenging a sweeping globalization (Barber, 2001, p. xii). World-system theorists also share a similar angle. They discuss that terrorism has come up as a “reactionary force” against the system built upon western-led globalization or some views religion as an alternative system to the neoliberal world order (Ali, 2002, p. 312).

The main focus of this study is Obama’s discourse of counterterrorism but mentioning historical approaches to the term of terrorism helps to understand what a complicated term it is. However, due to the foresaid complexities and as the term is politically charged this study will refrain from defining terrorism. The main purpose here is to analyze Barack Obama’s engagement with the American war on terror and his understanding of terrorism and security but the term is going to be frequently used in the study. Those usages are not based on an exclusive definition resonated from this study. They are taken as granted by the person saying it or meaning it. Therefore, rather than getting into the business of definition, through a Foucauldian approach this study will discuss what Obama meant when he used terrorism, how he used the terms, how he differed from the previous administration.

1.5.2. Global War on Terror

The event that gave rise to concept of *global war on terror* or shortened by many as *war on terror* was the attacks on World Trade Center’s twin towers in New York City and the US Defense Department building, The Pentagon, in Washington on September 11, 2001. At the wake of September 11 (9/11) attacks then President of the US George W. Bush uttered the term “war on terror” while describing the US response to the tragic attack causing death of thousands. Bush said: “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has

been found, stopped and defeated.” (2001). Those remarks did not only declare a new and long war that the American military would undertake but also brought about a discussion around the tragic attack whether it was a criminal act, or an act of war.

In following months and years, the discussion about categorizing the 9/11 attacks might not have a significant number of audiences on the American soil because the American public was terrorized and thus the public and media preferred to codify 9/11 as an act of war. On the other hand, in academia while there were some who analyzed the attacks as an act of war some other, considered it more of a terrorist crime (Megret, 2002) and some other termed it as a crime against humanity calling for international organizations to handle it (Slaughter & Burke-White, 2002). Despite the discussion around the terms still continues there is a clear fact that Bush’s conceptualization of 9/11 has brought about two wars waged by American military in Iraq and Afghanistan, dozens of controversial political decisions, a set of new definitions to the national security and a new terminology in US counter-terrorism strategy.

After remaining eight years at the helm of the US government, Bush left presidency to newly elected Democratic President Barack Obama in January 2009. In contrary to Bush’s ne-conservative ideological background Obama was a leftist liberal (Rogak, 2007). His presidential campaign was based on an anti-war discourse. He discussed to change in many of the controversial regimes that Bush administration implemented such as torture as an interrogation method, military tribunals used in trial of terrorism suspects and preemptive invasive attacks abroad. Obama during his inaugural address he defended that Al-Qaida threat does not require the US to bypass its commitments under international law saying: “We reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals” (2009c). On his second day in office he issued three executive orders in line with what he expressed. According to those Executive Orders military tribunals’ operation in Guantanamo Bay prison was suspended, torture was outlawed, Guantanamo was decided to be closed in one year. Also, the orders stipulated for closure of Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) secret prisons overseas. (White House, 2009a) (White House, 2009c). It also should be noted that one of the first term that Obama administration abandoned was the “global war on terror” coined by George W. Bush administration. After three months in the office, Obama

administration issued a memorandum within the administration recommending the use of “overseas contingency operations” in reference to the US operations across the globe particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan (Wilson, 2009).

It is a matter of question where Obama ended in his national security strategy during his eight years’ tenure as US president, but it is clear that the US war on terror is far from being over. Despite aforementioned reforms he declared in his first week at the White House CIA’s drone strikes in Pakistan continued more aggressively, foreign wiretapping by National Security Agency under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) remained the same while the surveillance was extended internally wiretapping millions of migrants and community leaders (Savage, 2015, p. 13). Moreover, the dilemma between security and reform that raged on within Obama administration came to an end before he finished his first year at the Oval Office following and attempted bombing on board a plane over Detroit on December 25, 2009 (Savage, 2015). A young man named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab nearly blew up a plane of Northwest Airlines flying from Amsterdam to Detroit with a bomb in his underwear. But as the underwear was wet, he was noticed before igniting the plastic explosives and the chemicals (O’Connor, 2009). The event ignited a long debate within the US over security on American soil which left the newly elected administration with constraints. Therefore, there is a strong belief that “having promised *change* the new president [Obama] seemed to be delivering something more like a mere adjustment – *a right sizing* of America’s war on terror” (Savage, 2015, p. 14). In line with this understanding, it is important to analyze how Obama sustained the continuity and what he changed because the main narrative of war on terror remained more or less the same while Obama got into an effort to reinvent it.

Legality of the US war on terror rests a juxtaposed, most of the times interconnected and sophisticated power relations in Washington. The Congress, consisting of a 100 seat Senate and 435 seat House Representatives, is the mere source of legality in the US while the President has an executive power that can bypass the Congress and push the Congress to pass a legislation in line with his executive orders. Furthermore, the military, the intelligence community, media as well lobbies also have complexly set relations with both the Congress and the President. Those institutions are some sort of nodes of power constituting the balance between the Capitol and the

White House.

When it comes to legitimacy, in American politics the legitimacy of the war on terror is merely based on the narrative or language used. In other words, understanding of threat, safety, security and the meaning attributed to terrorism as a term has a lot to do with coherently linking the actions such as military operations with a constructed paradigm within politics. Given that the complex set of relations mentioned above the President, or the Congress or any of the institutions and interest groups above may have a role in construction of the paradigm. This sophisticates the relation between legality and legitimacy, at the same time, making it unclear which comes first in the US (Edwards, 1999). Complexity of relations in Washington makes analysis of statements or the remarks delivered very crucial in finding out continuity and discontinuities in US' war on terror under Barack Obama and how did he discursively construct his war on terror.

1.5.3. Discourse Analysis

The study of discourse, very like that of terrorism, is a slippery ground due to the variety of approaches to the concept of discourse and definitions attributed to it. In social sciences, this concept has not a clear-cut meaning, rather there are theoretical articulations and attributions to the concept of discourse that evolved in the second half of the 20th century (Mills S. , 1997). As a concept and a field of study, discourse emerged in 1960s along with several other interdisciplinary fields such as semiotics, psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics and pragmatics it deals with a set of insights, assumptions, and concepts that have emerged across those disciplines (van Dijk, 1985, p. 1).

Works of scholars such as Ferdinand de Saussure, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Jürgen Habermas, Stuart Hall, Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau, Norman Fairclough and Michel Foucault pioneered most of the theoretical approaches to discourse (van Dijk, 1993). Despite significant differences among those approaches, the common premise is that language is used not only to represent physical, social or mental phenomena, but it is also employed in the construction of those realities (Kelberg, 2002, p. 2). This approach to language that emerged in the second half of the 20th century was called by Richard Rorty "the linguistic turn" in social sciences (Rorty,

1992, p. 3). Although, it is difficult to track it down to a categorization within the theoretical range of meanings it has, it can be said that theories of discourse are commonly divided on basis of structuralist and post-structuralist approaches to language (Mills, 1997, p. 3). Both approaches take language as the main route to reality. Furthermore, both approaches agree that as the representations for reality are unfolded through language; they are “never mere reflections of a pre-existing reality but contribute to constructing reality” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 8-9). However, while structuralists attest a fixed meaning or representation to signs in language and consider that distinguishing element of a sign is its difference and distance from the other signs, the post-structuralists say that each sign may have a different meaning in different settings. The post-structural approaches to language are mainly categorized under the critical discourse analysis (CDA). Foucault’s works are considered to be a significant source of inspiration for CDA (Macdonnell, 1986). A summary of historical evolution of the study of discourse is going to be part of the First Chapter but it is critical to mention some of the key elements of CDA and Foucault’s role in its development.

1.5.4 Critical Discourse Analysis

A significant characteristic of CDA is that it has implications for the relation between the emergence of discourse and power relations. CDA is embedded within critical theory, a paradigm resonated from the works of in the Frankfurt School scholars, especially Jurgen Habermas. But in terms of its scope CDA has an interdisciplinary nature which synthesizes anthropology, linguistics, philosophy, psychology and communication studies. Unlike emancipatory assertions of critical theorists’ focus on the hidden message of domination within a stated text or talk CDA is in an effort of unpacking systematic mechanisms of reproduction of power. A significant characteristic of CDA is that it has implications for the relation between the emergence of discourse and power relations.

Some scholars such as Teun van Dijk, elaborates on discourse as a structure through which practices of power, dominance and social inequality as well as the struggle against those practices are mediated (van Dijk, 1993). While some others such

as Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak and Stuart Hall consider discourse as “a social practice” (Fairclough, 2013, p. 15) and put forward that language and social conditions have a determinant influence on each other. Despite some methodological difference the central node of their discussion is based on the relation between language and exercise of power relations as well as abuses of power through language (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 2).

One of the key scholars who formulized CDA is Norman Fairclough. Fairclough in his *Language and Power* analyzes formal texts as an area where ideological forms are devised into a hegemonic strategy with the use of “common sense” (Fairclough, 2013, p. 76). In other words, the sovereign is making its discourse acceptable as a common sense by submerging it into the text. The text, in turn, reinvent the sovereign discourse and empowers it. Therefore, Fairclough’s CDA approach focuses on functions of linguistic elements such as grammar, vocabulary and semantics where he tries to trace implications, presuppositions in text. Thus, he gives a significant importance to the role of media as a tool to reproduce power. Thereof, he takes discourse not only as a language text or statement but also a social and sociocultural practice (Fairclough, 2013, p. 24). Fairclough’s concerns, in that context, is the major sociopolitical changes and the role of discourse in those changes. He suggests that the role of discourse in social practice cannot be taken as such. Rather it needs to be investigated because this role may change from event to event or from context to context. (Fairclough, 2000). According to Fairclough discourse shows up in social practices in three ways. First, may be a part of the social activity. For example, in representing an institution or governing a country one needs to use the language in a particular way. Second, it may be part of producing representations of a social practice. And third, it may be part of constructing identities (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999).

Another important contribution of Fairclough to the study of discourse analysis is that for him changes in social structures have a lot to do with power relations, at the same time both power relations and upcoming changes can be traced within discourse. Also practices such as social structure changes and shifting power relations are important in analyzing discourse. With an inspiration from Foucault’s idea of order of discourse Fairclough put forward that at different levels of social structures there are different types of power relations and different types of discourses

emerge (2013).

Ruth Wodak is another academic who has a key approach to CDA. She considers her study of discourse as an interdisciplinary approach because it covers not a mere linguistic one but more of a historical and social linguistics (Wodak, 2009). Wodak thinks that physiological, sociological as well as psychological dimensions such as the audience, the situation, time and setting are involved in the production of a text. Furthermore, she also thinks that discourse and social practices are dialectically related and says “discourses as linguistic social practices can be seen as constituting non-discursive and discursive social practices and at the same time as being constituted by them” (Weiss & Wodak, 2007, p. 22).

Finally, another contemporary academic who has a significant role in CDA literature is Teun A. van Dijk. Van Dijk has several books and dozens of articles in the study of discourse analysis. Although his main focus is on racism and abuse of political power he elaborates on the relation between language and social cognition (van Dijk, 2008). Very like Wodak and Fairclough, van Dijk also thinks that ideology controls discourse and the relationship between ideology and discourse reflects in social practices. However, what he adds to this approach is that he underlines that semantic, lexical and rhetorical levels of discursive structures are needed to be studied within the study of discourse (van Dijk, 2006).

1.5.3.2. Foucauldian Discourse Analysis

Foucault plays a key role in the evolution of discourse/power dialectic. The concept of discourse can be traced down in major works of Foucault with different approaches and methodologies. Foucault's works are divided into three periods or phases, in accordance with his methodological approaches, namely archeological, and genealogical and ethical or governmentality writings (Jørgensen & Phillips, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 2002). His early works such as *Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences* (1966), *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969), are considered as his archeological works, while other major works such as *Discipline and Punish* (1975) and first volume of *History of Sexuality* (1976) are considered his genealogical writings. His lectures and interviews in late 1970s such as *Power/Knowledge Selected Interviews and Other Writings* (1977) and *Society Must Be*

Defended: Lectures at the Collage de France (1976-7) are considered to be his ethical or governmentality writings.

What distinguishes Foucault for this study is that as this study engages Barack Obama's discourse of national security and counter-terrorism strategy both his archaeological and genealogical approach to discourse will help a lot to unpack Obama's terminology of national security as well as tracing power relations within it. Moreover, Foucault's work is considered milestones in the study of discourse analysis. Works of most of the post-structuralist scholars including those mentioned above owe some to Foucault, because Foucault is the one who located historical meaning for discourse but also handled it as a practice that "systematically form the object of which they speak" (Foucault, 2002b). Foucault's analysis of retrospective relationship between discourse/knowledge and power/sovereign is key to the study of discourse.

However, Foucault does not propose a linear or hierarchical methodology for discourse analysis, nor does he do for many of the concepts he engages. Although discourse, for Foucault, is an issue of use of language that becomes important in terms of its role in tying discursive and non-discursive elements such as "rules and processes of the appropriation of discourse" (2002b, p. 68). Notwithstanding, Foucauldian discourse analysis cannot be limited to the use of language. Foucault is also aware of the complications in the concept of discourse. In his *Archeology of Discourse*, he confesses:

Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word 'discourse', I believe that I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements. (2002b, p. 80)

Foucault's theory of discourse constitutes bulk of his early writings which are considered as archaeological period works such as *The Order of Things* and *Archeology of Knowledge*. Those works play a key role in locating historical epistemology of discourse. He analyzes the rules and principles that define which knowledge or information is considered as "meaningful and true in a particular historical epoch" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 13).

In *The Order of Things* Foucault engages with sciences emerged in 19th Century such as philology, economics and biology and assuming that they have their own structural principles he comes up with the idea that human sciences must have its principles as well which he calls an episteme. Although many argue that he employs structuralism in this approach, some other suggest that actually he points finger at “the limits of structuralism” (Flynn, 2005, p. 32). According to Foucault collection of unconsciously patterned ideas are key to locate the accepted knowledge or discourse in a specific time. From time to time he calls this as historical a priori and the effort to excavate that process as history of ideas. Underlining that his effort is not a study of history in traditional sense rather it is archeology, he says:

What I am attempting to bring to light is the epistemological field, the *episteme* in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational value or to its objective forms, grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility; in this account, what should appear are those configurations within the space of knowledge which have given rise to the diverse forms of empirical science (2002a, p. xxiv).

In his *Archeology of Knowledge* rather than tracing discourse through a unified study of historical experiences, Foucault emphasizes that the statements or texts should be relieved from all historical experience and continuity. For Foucault, analysis of statements and texts in their discontinuities will eventually lead to the reflection of history through discourse (Foucault, 2002b). Foucault also tries to define discourse. Although he does not propose a static definition he draws some boundaries he says:

We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation. [...] it [discourse] is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form [...] it is, from beginning to end, historical – a fragment of history [...] posing its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its temporality (2002b, p. 117).

Against Ferdinand de Saussure’s theory of merely systematic and fixed meaning making role of linguistic structures, post-structuralists put forward that there is also a social dimension of those linguistic formations which have “their ‘conditions of possibility’ in the historical and political relationships in which they are embedded in” (Chouliaraki, 2008, p. 675). In other words, fixed grammatical, lexical or semantic

structures are not enough to attain a meaning out of a linguistic formation. Rather there are historical junctures which each formation passes through and gets into relation with different non-linguistic or social formations and influence as well as is influenced by those formations. Foucault has a significant role in this approach. But what distinguishes Foucault is that he requires discursive elements to be handled in their discontinuous nature while putting them into relation with social, historical or political non-discursive elements. Foucault says:

The conditions necessary for the appearance of an object of discourse, the historical conditions required if one is to 'say anything' about it, and if several people are to say different things about it, the conditions necessary if it is to exist in relation to other objects, if it is to establish with them relations of resemblance, proximity, distance, difference, transformation- as we can see, these conditions are many and imposing (2002b, p. 44).

However, it should be noted that Foucault's idea of historicity is different than that of traditional approach where historians create huge causative chains of political events. Conversely, he believes that discursive elements should be freed from that particular causative historicist approach. Rather discourse for him is a historical a priori. That is to say, he calls for dismantling of discursive elements such as statements, books or remarks and speeches from the historian's depiction of chains of events and handle them as a "pure description of discursive events" and then converge them together to find out unities within it. Foucault calls this, at some point, "the history of ideas", or "the history of thought", or "the history of knowledge" (2002b, pp. 26-27). Besides archaeological works where he engages with structuralism's linguistic turn Foucault's genealogical works also plays a key role in the study of discourse. Genealogy is a keyword in describing Foucault's philosophical world. Very like Derrida's "deconstruction" or Lacan's "psychoanalysis" Foucault's "genealogy" is a key concept in post-structuralism. According to Seantel Anais genealogy exposes the deep and mutual relation between discourse and social practice. "Genealogy uncovers the reciprocal constitution of discursive and non- discursive practices without privileging one over the other," she says (2013, p. 124). In other words, genealogy reveals that discourse and practices in the social sphere construct one another with a similar role. Anais continues:

Historical investigations of the emergence of certain epistemological structures and their associated discourses, as well as how knowledge, power, and claims to truth interact both to form cascades of practice and to reinforce the discourses that they emanate from (2013, p. 125).

There are deep discussions on historicity of discursive elements such as terms or concepts. Post-structuralist approach to this issue is that every term or definition is subject to change within the course of history and this change happens discontinuously. As mentioned above this is what Foucault also thinks. Penny Powers claims that Foucault was influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein's approach to all philosophical problems "as manifestations of tensions between and within intra- and interdisciplinary discursive practices." (2007, p. 25). That is to say, discursive issues should be handled from a viewpoint that they came about amid the tensions among discourses. However, Foucault adds one layer to this approach by claiming that the discursive occurrences also has a lot to do with power relations and exercise of power. Thus, Foucault's work was not only "influenced by this notion of the historical aspect of definitions and definition-producing discourse from Wittgenstein, but also the historical and power components of definitions from Nietzsche. (Powers, 2007, p. 28).

Power and discourse are the central nodes to Foucault's genealogical works, because emergence of institutions such as prisons and hospitals and social formations and identifications has a lot to do with power and its regime of truth. In other words, discourse, here, is not only a process of producing knowledge through language but also through practice. Thus, it can be said that power and discourse imply one another for Foucault. Foucault discourse refers to "the capacity of meaning-making resources to constitute social reality, forms of knowledge and identity" in a social sphere and amid power relations within that given sphere. (Chouliaraki, 2008, p. 674). Thus, Foucault's approach to discourse can be used to explore the power relations and power effects inherent in discourses. Although there is a delimitation of social sphere (non-discursive) and discourse, Foucault's approach to power is the link between these two spheres in terms maintaining the influence of the two on one another. In other words, the Foucauldian discourse builds up a relationship between discursive and non-discursive spheres through the relations between meaning and power.

In *History of Sexuality*, Foucault argues that power is omnipresent just because comes about amid multiple fractions among multiple forces. He adds:

It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies (1978a, p. 93).

Within this spectrum discourse has multiple roles. On one hand, it may be an instrument or effect of power but on the other hand it may be the staging point for resistance. “Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (Foucault, 1978a, p. 101). So, every move to meaning-making comes about from a position of power- a power that is both structuring and is structured by the social positions available within the practice. Thus, in Foucault, rather than who possesses power, it is important how it is exercised. Unlike Marxists who elaborate on sovereign state, class structures, or ideology Foucault focuses on the effects of power and powers discursive extensions.

A similar approach is also clear in *Discipline and Punish* as well. Foucault handles power something as “active relations rather than a possession or static state of affairs” (2010, p. 26). Thus, the exercise of power is not only a reflection of those relations but also some sort of expression of those relations. In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault is obsessed with shift of punishment from classical times to modern times. Foucault puts forward that any exercise of power in modern times at some point have more to do with disciplining the masses or population through a penal system or a specific way of confinement. Foucault says:

Today, criminal justice functions and justifies itself only by this perpetual reference to something other than itself, by this unceasing reinscription in non-judicial systems. Its fate is to be redefined by knowledge. [...] A corpus of knowledge, techniques, ‘scientific’ discourses is formed and becomes

entangled with the practice of the power to punish (2010, p. 22).

In other words, power and knowledge is embedded in production of discourse. Power is exercised systematically based on a specific knowledge with a specific rational and that specific exercise produces reproduces new form of knowledge as well as effects of power. To sum up, Foucault's study of discourse elaborates on how knowledge is produced and, administer the truth, create identities and rule them. Foucault's proposal of dual relation between power and discourse feeds a large spectrum of analysis not only in social sciences but also in medicine.

1.5.5 Foucault And War on Terror

There is a wide range of literature analyzing the US' war on terror from a Foucauldian perspective. However, vast majority of them either does not extend into the era of Barack Obama or those handling Obama's war on terror do not cover the last two years when heavy US military engagements in Middle East revisited with the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Without including the fight against ISIS, it cannot be said that the analysis of Obama's war on terror is complete because both discursively and militarily Obama re-engaged the US in the Middle East against a similar enemy with that of Bush. Thus, as this study comes out after Obama's rule at the White House, it also encompasses Obama's discourse against ISIS.

Before getting into studies that handled the discourse of war on terror using Michel Foucault's discourse analysis tracing the concept of war in Foucault's works would be beneficial. Foucault has engaged the concept of war, its genealogy, its extension and role within a community throughout his key works. However, each time he handled the concept he came up with a different analysis of it. In *Discipline and Punish* (1975) he elaborates on "the role and development of military sciences in the disciplining of individual bodies" (Reid, 2008, s. 66). Thereof, war (or battle) in *Discipline and Punish* is used as a model to make an understanding of social relations. In *Society Must Be Defended Lectures at Collège de France* (1975-76), on the other hand, the sole focus is on the institution of war and its extensions. In other words, there

is an investigation into the genealogy of war in *Society Must Be Defended*. In *History of Sexuality* (1976), war is not used as an epistemological concept, rather it's quite practical. Foucault discusses war as a strategy of integrating power relations in the context relations with biopower. Those three works of Foucault can be used as a spotlight for the analysis of the use of war in US politics as in the war on terror. However, it should be noted that Foucault's engagement with the concept of war does not end with those works. In governmentality lectures such as *Security, Territory and Population* (1977-78) he unpacks the extreme ends of war such as state racism and from that point on he moves from war to governmentality.

When it comes to war on terror, as Teresa Degenhardt argues, the concept of war on terror has blurred "the demarcation between war and crime control"; therefore, Foucault's approach to war, the discourse and institution of war as well as power and governing of the society through "the fight against the outlaw" throughout his academic career helps significantly in unpacking how the disguise between war and crime come about (2013) Degenhardt adds:

The debate around whether military action and counter terrorism operations constitute war, a rudimentary form of international criminal justice system and law enforcement, or conversely state crimes highlights how far the notion of crime and war are involved in funding and shaping the borders of the political community (2013, p. 32).

Furthermore, she discusses that Foucault considers war as the foundation of the "social order" and war is strictly linked to the law. Conventional war among states is not focal point of this study. This study deals with more of a redefinition of counterterrorism and use of war as a discursive element in this context. Foucault rejects Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben's approach which puts forward that the western liberal democratic institutions have some limits to accommodate the discourse and policies of war; thus, an extreme condition such as war is handled as exceptional. He asserts that "political power does not begin where war ends." (Foucault, 2003, p. 50) According to Foucault political structures in history including states, empires or monarchies emerged out of wars. Also, he puts forward "war obviously presided over the birth of states: 'rights, peace and laws were born in the blood and mud of battles' (Foucault, 2003, p. 50). In other words, war has been a dominant discursive element in creation

and codification of laws and policies. For Foucault, extreme conditions like wars play a key role in subjectification and creating identities.

There are many studies that handle war on terror in line with this argumentation. Michael Dillon, for instance, discusses that US war on terror emerged “out of a generic bio-politics of contingency in the west, and is being conducted according to its political technologies and governmental rationalities” (Dillon, 2007). He claims that the concept of war on terror is an effort to make terror governable and bring it within the domain of politics so that existing security technologies can be used to deal with the fear of terror. However, after bringing terror into political domain to govern it, the discourse developed over the fear of terrorism, in return begins to govern life, policies as well laws in the west (Dillon, 2007, p. 8). Referring to Foucault, Dillon says that the practices against terror are “as much biopolitical as they are geopolitical” (2007, p. 8). In other words, contingency creates a vast area of ambiguity. A large number of regulations, strategies, manipulations and calculations come about within the context of contingency and ambiguity. He explains this situation with Foucault’s concept of *security dispositif* (Dillon, 2007).

In his *Security, Territory Population*, actually Foucault depicts three modalities where he differentiates security from disciplinary mechanisms. The first modality consists of a penal law and punishment against breaking of the penal law. The second modality consists of penal law, punishment and surveillance to prevent any violation to happen. Then the third modality besides encompassing the mentioned two modalities focuses on statistical evaluation and ratios of the possible violations; conditions under which the predictions regarding violations may change; potential effects of those violations and etc (1978b, p. 19). According to Foucault while the first two modalities fall under the disciplinary mechanism “the third form is not typical of the legal code or the disciplinary mechanism, but of the apparatus (*dispositif*) of security” (1978b, p. 20). However, Foucault puts forward that any disciplinary action taken to punish or correct a crime has message to the possible future occurrences; thus the disciplinary system, for Foucault “includes a whole series of dimensions that absolutely belong to the domain of security” (Foucault, 1978b, p. 21).

Applying this approach of Foucault, Andrew W. Neal comes up with a similar conclusion with Dillon, In his book co-edited with Michael Dillon (2008) he discusses

that the idea of politics as a continuation of war “has played a role in the constitution of collective political subjectivities such as dissident, revisionist and minority groups” (2008, p. 43). He claims, therefore, there is a relationship between political subjectivities and the discourse of war. Neal, in another article where he handles the abuses in US’ Guantanamo Bay prison, rejects the idea of exceptional practices under circumstances. Handling 9/11 attacks he problematizes the consideration that an exceptional event causes instating exceptional measures while at the same time prevailing a certain sovereign discourse within those exceptional conditions. He claims that designation of events as “exceptional” are to justify exceptional practices such as imprisoning terror suspects in an isolated military prison like Guantanamo. He criticizes Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben’s exceptionalism through Foucault’s archeological approach. Neal discusses that “discourses of exceptionalism reify a certain vision of sovereignty” (2006, p. 36). Using Foucault’s terms, he puts forward that there is a “hidden discourse”, or “return of the same” or a “transcendental act that give them origin” (Foucault, 2002b) in those discourses of exceptionalism.

With a similar approach Louise Amoore handles US Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology also known as US VISIT program. US VISIT is a custom and border protection system that encompasses a large database including US deemed terror suspects, criminals or illegal immigrants to cross check biometric data of people visiting the country. The program is now called Office of Biometric Identity Management. Amoore analyzing the program conceptualizes it as “biometric border” in the war on terror (2006, p. 337). Through a Foucauldian approach she proposes that as a practice of war on terror discourse biometric categorization brings about a phenomenon where biopower encodes bodies of migrants and travelers as boundaries. In other words, subjects are objectified and divided into categories based on their gender, profession or identities as well legal personalities such as immigrant, illegal, criminal, terror suspect and etc. (Amoore, 2006, p. 338). All in all, several other scholars have handled measures taken by the US government under the war on terror discourse applying Foucault’s notions of power, biopolitics, security dispositif, alignment of discourse and power (Walters, 2006; Muller, 2008; Bigo, 2002).

CHAPTER 2

THE STUDY OF DISCOURSE AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

2.1. Introduction

Merriam Webster dictionary defines the word *discourse* in its literal form as “the use of words to exchange ideas” or “a long talk or piece of writing about a subject.”¹ But the dictionary also gives two archaic meanings of it as “the capacity of orderly thought or procedure” or “a mode of organizing knowledge, ideas, or experience that is rooted in language and its concrete contexts” such as history or institutions. However, in social sciences this concept has not a clear-cut meaning and it has been a vast area of study which scholars from Ferdinand de Saussure, Jacques Derrida, Ludwig Wittgenstein, to Michel Foucault, Jurgen Habermas, Jack Lacan, Chantal Mouffe, and Ernesto Laclau –the list goes on– have engaged to. With theoretical attributions and articulations to it in the 1960s, discourse evolved into a field of study along with several other interdisciplinary fields such as semiotics, psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics and pragmatics. It deals with a set of insights, assumptions, and concepts that have emerged across those disciplines (Mills, 1997; van Dijk, 1985).

In this chapter, a summary of discourse under two main methodological approaches, namely structuralism and post-structuralism– will be given. Then, an array of discussions under post-structuralist approach will be handled. From there, it will move to Foucault’s contribution the study of discourse and Foucauldian discourse analysis. Despite significant differences among the approaches to the concept of discourse, the common premise is that language is used not only to represent physical,

¹See <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/discourse>

social or mental phenomena, but it is also employed in the construction of those realities (Karlberg, 2012, p. 2). This approach to language in the second half of the 20th Century was called “the linguistic turn” in social sciences (Rorty, 1992). Both structuralist and post-structuralist premises toward language is that they take language as the main venue to reality and as the representations for reality are unfolded through language, they are “never mere reflections of a pre-existing reality but contribute to constructing reality” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 8-9). However, still it is difficult to track it down to a categorization for discourse within the theoretical range of meanings it has (Mills S. , 1997). Thus, this study will avoid to define the concept of discourse, but Foucault’s understanding of discourse as something emerging out of the interaction between power and knowledge fits better into the context of this study as it will focus on how Barack Obama constructed his definitions of terrorism, the terrorists as well as his way of dealing the problem of terrorism in the US.

2.2. Saussure’s Contribution to The Study Of Discourse

Ferdinand de Saussure’s work on language constituted the foundations of structuralism as well as modern linguistics. Saussure pioneered the understanding that language is a system and the reality that it refers to has not a determinant impact on it (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 9). His ideas opened a wide venue for studies not only on language but also on the study and analysis of discourse. Michel Foucault and a wide range of poststructuralist school thinkers from Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes, Judith Butler to Gilles Deleuze, Julia Kristeva, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe are the ones who are generally referenced as pioneers of discourse analysis but it is undeniable that Saussure’s revolutionary engagement with language and its relation with the things it represents have inspired the post-structuralist school’s work on discourse.

In the first place, Saussure considers language as “the norms of all other manifestation of speech” (1986, p. 9). He suggests that language is confused with speech just because speech is an essential part of it. The dialectical line he draws between speech and language “has proved of fundamental importance to the development of linguistics in general and of structuralism in particular” (Hawkes, 2003, p. 9). Saussure’s conceptualization of languages is as follows:

It is both a social product of the faculty of speech and a collection

of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty. Taken as a whole, speech is many-sided and heterogeneous; straddling several areas simultaneously-physical, physiological, and psychological-it belongs both to the individual and to society; we cannot put it into any category of human facts, for we cannot discover its unity. Language, on the contrary, is a self-contained whole and a principle of classification (1986, p. 10).

In other words, he puts forward that the structure of language is a social product that has a lot to do with the society, in which it is crafted or carved out despite being subjectively used by the individual. At the same time, it is also a body of necessary conventions adopted by society to enable members of society to use their language faculty. Moreover, he claims that individual can only use the linguistic patterns provided by the society and does not have a way to breakthrough the constructed structure to change those patterns. Although individual makes various combinations of signs or linguistic elements, social forces uphold the main system of language (Saussure, 1986). In his conceptualization of language although its structure is tied to a specific system language itself is not static and a fixed phenomenon. Steven Seidman argues:

Saussure abandoned the standard view of language as a neutral medium through which the mind mirrors the world. In contrast, Saussure argued for a notion of language as a system of signs whose meanings were generated by their relations of difference. Saussure thought of language as an active, dynamic social force that shaped both the mind and the world. As a self-sufficient system, language can be studied as it is organized and functions in the present. (1994, pp. 196-197)

This departure from the mainstream approach to language can be said to have constructed the basis for discourse as a theory or a philosophical concept (Karlberg, 2012). Another key to Saussure's approach is that there is a systematic relation between language and the social formation. For Saussure all social identities, realities and relations are embedded within language and their articulation in one way or another is called *discourse* (Saussure, 1986). Therefore, "changes in discourse are a means by which the social world is changed," and "struggles at the discursive level take part in changing as well as in reproducing the social reality" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 9-10). On the other hand, according to Saussure the relation

between language (sign) and the object (signified) is not an ontological one, rather it is an epistemological and arbitrary relation. (Saussure, 1986). Based on this structuralist assumption John Dryzek describes discourse as “a shared way of apprehending the world’, which “enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts” (Dryzek, 1997, p. 8). In other words, every discourse is based on certain assumptions or judgments that assign meanings to the social, cultural, natural or physical objects or phenomena. Dryzek suggests that apart from its independent existence, an object or phenomenon has certain articulations and subjectively positioned significance in terms of its relation with the different subjectivities. Thus, besides being a group of ideas or patterned way of thinking, discourse can also be located in wider social structures.

In sum, it can be said that thanks to Saussure’s pioneering work the term *discourse* is used in a way to signal a break with the views that see language as a transparent tool of communication. He believes that language is structured by the social forces surrounding it to allow individuals who are part of that social structure can use their language faculty. What is more, he claims that language has an organizing role and social realities and relations as well as identities are embedded in it. Although post-structuralism questions structuralism’s “inquiry into the organizing principles of a language system” it has built on it (Radford & Radford, 2005, p. 61). Thus, the break with the approach that handles language just as a neutral tool is much clearer with Foucault and the post-structuralist tradition. In post-structuralism, apart from its constitutive relation with reality that it refers to, language was also handled in reference to “the power inherent in social relations” which actually post-structuralists call discourse. (Powers, 2007, p. 18).

2.3. Roots of Post-Structuralist Discourse Analysis

As mentioned above Saussure study of language has paved the way for post-structuralist analysis of discourse because Saussure’s theorized the language as a “meaning making system that is organized around the relationship of opposition and combination” (Chouliaraki, 2008, p. 674). However, although they build their theory

of discourse on Saussure, post-structuralists discuss that meaning making relations among linguistic structures are not merely systemic but they also have social conditions in which they are embedded in some political or historical relations (Chouliaraki, 2008).

The epistemological roots of post-structuralist theory of discourse go back to Ludwig Wittgenstein's "linguistic turn" and social constructionism, a methodological approach in social sciences that come out of a synthesis of phenomenology and hermeneutics. Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigation* (1953) in which he rejects the idea of language as a mere tool kit used to reflect the outside world is one of his key works that engaged language (Wittgenstein, 1958). In the first place, he would not accept language as a unified set of systems, rather "a whole set of different parts with different roles" (Potter, 2001, p. 39). Secondly, he argues that philosophical problems arise primarily out of a misunderstanding of grammar. Thus, he suggests an investigation to clear the misunderstandings "concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language" (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 43).

Wittgenstein's key metaphor that is appealed to many discourse theory philosophers is the metaphor of "language games" (1958, p. 5). He discusses that the speaker gives a role to the word he/she uttered and utterance of the very same word by different speakers gives it another role like in a game. In other words, for Wittgenstein language is a social entity and has a role on the object it refers to. Thereof, in meaning-making he focuses on the setting or context of the utterance of a word. (Potter, 2001). Therefore, as it is tied to the setting surrounding it, meaning itself "inherently unstable and contingent upon the social rules of human interaction," (Chouliaraki, 2008, p. 40). As Wittgenstein's metaphor of linguistic game and the concept of linguistic turn contributed to Saussurian understanding of language it contributed to paving the road ahead for post-structuralist approach to language and its theorizing of discourse as well.

Another name that influenced the post-structuralist conception of language and discourse was J. L. Austin. Austin in his *How to do things with Words* (1962) similar to Wittgenstein finds the notion of language a functional reference problematic. He argues that saying a word is not just a description of something or defining it as true

or false but it is “part of doing of an action which again would not normally be described as saying something” (Austin, 1962, p. 5). Austin consider utterance of sentence or stating a phrase as a performative act, which also known as his speech act theory.

Very like Wittgenstein he discusses a number of factors other than linguistic structures themselves that have a role in meaning making. However, Potter draws one difference between the two:

As with Wittgenstein, Austin was fundamentally concerned with the flaws in philosophical conceptions of language and in particular with its treatment of language as an abstract referential system. Both emphasized the practical, active uses of language, but the most striking difference between them is in their overall conception of language, whereas Wittgenstein has language fragmented into a huge number of diverse language games that are likely to defy a precise overall characterization, Austin’s aim was specifically to give an overall, systematic account of this active language (2001, p. 43).

Benefited largely from emancipatory endeavors of both Wittgenstein and Austin regarding language, social constructionism also contributed significantly to the emergence of discourse as a study. Although they differ a lot, the common premise of social constructionist thinkers regarding language is that linguistic structures and “patterns of language use emerge as people talk and interact with one another” (Chouliaraki, 2008, s. 682). However, it should be noted that social constructionism is a very large umbrella which covers scholars from Schutz, Heidegger, Gadamer, Derrida to Habermas, Giddens, Bakhtin, Mead, Derrida, Barthes, Butler to Deleuze, Kristeva, Laclau, Mouffe and Foucault and etc. (Berger & Luckmann, 1991). All those scholars place a specific importance on language use and emergence of discourse out of social interaction, but except for post-structuralists, specifically Foucault, and critical theory scholars who are generally associated with either neo-Marxism or Frankfurt School such as Habermas, social constructionists have not paid sufficient attention to the influence of power relations within the social sphere on discourse. Foucauldian discourse analysis which details the inherent influence of discourse and power on one another will be used in this study. Thus; Foucauldian discourse analysis will be amplified under a separate subtitle but a short summary of views of aforementioned scholars on discourse will help us contextualize discourse as a study.

For Mikhail Bakhtin, expression in a context is the main factor that defines the meaning (Bakhtin, 1986). Bakhtin calls it “utterance” and in the process of an utterance the speaker selects words from “the system of language in their neutral, dictionary form” or “other utterances,” however; that neutral word taken from dictionary or other usages is individualized and contextualized while used in a live conversation. (1986, s. 87). Therefore, he thinks that discourse as a string of utterances is “dialogic” and historically contingent (Bakhtin, 1986, s. 90). In other words, any utterance actually comes out of a “social struggle”, is historical and “highly evaluative and ideological” (Maybin, 2001, s. 67). In that sense Bakhtin is one of the closest social constructionists to Foucault in terms of his understanding of construction of language. In other words, when an individual constructs discourse s/he also produces texts as well as identities.

Anthony Giddens, similar to Austin as well as Bakhtin, discusses that social world is constructed out of daily conversation. He rejects positivist understanding that social life is based on certain laws or rule. Rather, he puts forward that based on daily interaction it cannot be predicted in advance (Giddens, 1984). Giddens’ theory of *structuration* and his idea of “post-traditional society” is based on the premises that “people’s social relations and identities are no longer based on stable social positions, but are rather created through negotiations in everyday interaction” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 87). As an addition to Sigmund Freud’s concept of “unconsciousness” Giddens introduces “practical consciousness” (Giddens, 1984, p. 6). As a fundamental to his theory of structuration he argues human faculty of language and his practice are hand in hand; a fact that, he claims, structuralists are blind to. Giddens says:

I do not intend the distinction between discursive and practical consciousness to be a rigid and impermeable one. On the contrary, the division between the two can be altered by many aspects of the agent’s socialization and learning experiences. Between discourse and practical consciousness there is no bar; there are only the difference between what can be said and what is characteristically simply done (1984, p. 7).

As Giddens individualizes the use of language he also introduces a new form of politics as “life politics” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 159). The weakness of this assumption

is that discourse is so subjective that it is considered to have been developed out of a total anarchic atmosphere. In other words, he disregards the power relations among individuals as well as institutions.

Far from exhaustive, those basic premises toward language have paved the way to a power-oriented discussion of discourse. One of the key scholars who introduced the role of power on knowledge production is Jurgen Habermas. A Frankfurt School thinker and a critical theorist Habermas is key scholar in discourse analysis and is commonly compared to Foucault. Although Foucault and Habermas' understanding of discourse are considered to be antithetical to one another the only point where their perspectives come to the same line is that both refuse the idea that language is independent of power (Chouliaraki, 2008; Hanssen, 2000).

Habermas perceives discourse as an exchange among actors in an "ideal speech" setting where any utterance is free of "coercive and hegemonic power" (Wall, Stahl, & and Salam, 2015; Habermas, 1984). Habermasian discourse analysis tries to determine "conscious and unconscious hegemonic participation in communication" (Cukier, 2009). In other words, it tackles the problematique of dominating ideology and tries to find out whether an author or speaker resort to manipulation to hide the purpose of communication (conscious) or does s/he take the dominating ideology as for granted. It mainly engages and traces domination and hegemony.

There are a lot of overlaps among post-structuralist scholars particularly in their analysis of power and domination. However, in their analysis of discourse of power they differ significantly. Another key approach to discourse analysis that has taken a lot from Foucault is critical discourse analysis. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), as its name also suggests, is embedded in critical theory. It has implications for the relation between the emergence of discourse and power relations, but in terms of its scope CDA has an interdisciplinary nature which synthesizes anthropology, linguistics, philosophy, psychology and communication studies.

Some scholars such as Teun van Dijk, elaborates on discourse as a structure through which practices of power, dominance and social inequality as well as the struggle against those practices are mediated (van Dijk, 1993). According to van Dijk, "critical discourse analysts take explicit position, and thus want to understand, expose, and ultimately resist social inequality." (van Dijk, 2001, p 352). Thus, he argues that

CDA is not a school or specialization field among discourse studies. However, some others such as Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak and Stuart Hall consider discourse as “a social practice” (Fairclough, 2013, p. 15) and put forward that language and social conditions have a determinant influence on each other. Despite some methodological difference the central node of their discussion is based on the relation between language and exercise of power relations as well as abuses of power through language. (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 2). In other words, it accounts “for the relationships between discourse and social power” (van Dijk, 1996).

2.4. Foucauldian Discourse Analysis

2.4.1. Challenges with Foucauldian Discourse

Michel Foucault’s work is considered a milestone in the study of discourse analysis. Works of most of the post-structuralist scholars including some mentioned above owe some to Foucault because he is the one who considered discourse as a practice that “systematically form the object of which they speak.” (Foucault, 2002b). Furthermore, Foucault’s genealogical approach to power and its exercise has a significant contribution to the study of discourse. Foucault’s work opened the way for the analysis of discursive practices of societies and institutions and the way they produce knowledge (Anaïs, 2013, pp. 126-127). Thus, Foucault is considered “as one of the influential authors within the tradition of discourse theories” (Wrbouschek, 2009, p. 36).

On the other hand, there is a widespread understanding that “despite the apparent indebtedness of many such methods of discourse analysis to Foucault, there exists no strictly Foucauldian method of analyzing discourse. (Hook, 2001, p. 521). Discourse is a recurring concept in Foucault’s academic career, but he does not propose a linear or hierarchical methodology for discourse analysis, nor does he do for many of the concepts he engages. Although discourse, for Foucault, is an issue of use of language that becomes important in terms of its role in tying discursive and non-discursive elements such as “rules and processes of the appropriation of discourse” (Foucault, 2002b, p. 68) some put forward that linking “analysis to motifs of power” to Foucault does not make it Foucauldian because there is not a coherent description of

Foucauldian discourse analysis (Graham, 2009). Furthermore, Foucauldian discourse analysis cannot be limited to the use of language. Foucault is also aware of the complications in the concept of discourse. In his *Archeology of Knowledge*, he says:

Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word 'discourse', I believe that I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements (2002b, p. 80).

Another key challenge with Foucauldian discourse analysis, he refutes the idea of history that depicts a linear evolution of social morality. Foucault resists against monolithic historical analysis of social morality both in his genealogical and archeological works. He says that the tendency of “describing the history of morality in terms of a linear development-in reducing its entire history and genesis to an exclusive concern for utility” is wrong (Foucault, 1998, p. 52). He considers genealogy as a factor retrieving an “indispensable restraint” and suggests that it should take every single event “outside of any monotonous finality.” Unlike history Foucault give a role to genealogy that:

It must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history-in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts; it must be sensitive to their recurrence, not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles (1998, p. 52).

In other words, what Foucault challenges here is the traditional practice of history. For example, his analysis of issues such as madness, crime, punishment and sexuality or utilization of human body are all part of his inquiry into the linear historicist and official accounts. In that respect, he calls his *Discipline and Punish* “a correlative history of soul” and “a genealogy of the present” (Foucault, 2010, p. 23). He challenges universal dispositions or explanations about how mankind reached its current level of knowledge. His *The Archeology of Knowledge* can be said to be a work where Foucault extensively engages traditional historian understanding. At the very beginning of the book he says:

For many years now, historians have preferred to turn their attention to long periods, as if, beneath the shifts and changes of political events, they were trying to reveal the stable, almost indestructible

system of checks and balances, the irreversible processes, the constant readjustments, the underlying tendencies that gather force, and are then suddenly reversed after centuries of continuity, the movements of accumulation and slow saturation, the great silent, motionless bases that traditional history has covered with a thick layer of events (2002b, p. 3).

However, he puts forward that rather than those long periods the main focus should be on the rapture or discontinuity. In other words, he believes that the layers or hierarchies or networks and teleological phases for every single science should be revealed. (Foucault, 2002b, pp. 4-5). That is why, he distinguishes his study of history of ideas from that of other traditional historians by calling it *archeology*. Foucault reads historical accounts to understand how a term is approached in a given period and how this approach affected the understanding of that community in the past towards itself. He suggests

Archaeology tries to define not the thoughts, representations, images, themes, preoccupations that are concealed or revealed in discourses; but those discourses themselves, those discourses as practices obeying certain rules (Foucault, 2002b, p. 138).

Another challenge of using Foucault discourse analysis is that he specifically and intentionally avoids generalizations. This is also connected to his approach to the traditional historical analysis. He is suspicious towards “universal truths.” (Rabinow, 1984, p. 4). In Foucauldian understanding here is not a “fixed center or perspective that controls reality formations” (Rabinow, 1984, p. 4). So, any understanding is limited to the period and the society it emerged in. This is extensively criticized for it boxes ideas, forms and themes to a multilayered context. However, it is undeniable that Foucauldian discourse is built on that this peculiarity of him. Because he argues that discourse builds up a reality within the convergence of fragmented or multiplied perspectives. Very like his suggestion of archeology as an alternative to traditional history, Foucault suggests genealogy as an alternative to universal truth. Methodologically these challenges might create some sort of obscurity but as Foucault suggests, this approach of him provides an “effective historical perspective” (Foucault, 1998, p. 380). Those challenges also provide an opportunity, because it allows a disruptive reading into universalized discourse of terrorism in the US. With

Foucauldian microscope, this study is revealing how subjectivities are constructed within a semi-hegemonic, discursive war.

2.4.2. Discourse in Foucault: From Archeology To Genealogy

The central node in Foucault's discourse analysis is, as Hook suggests, based on "the rules, systems and procedures which constitute, and are constituted by, our 'will to knowledge'" (Hook, 2001, p. 523). However, up to that final point, Foucault engages discourse with different methodologies. As mentioned above, in his archeological, genealogical and governmentality works he revisits the concept of discourse, but it is engaged under different themes. Notwithstanding, each phase of analysis complement and embodies Foucauldian discourse analysis.

Foucault's early writings such as *Order of Discourse* (1971) and *Archeology of Knowledge* (1972) played a key role in locating historical and cultural meanings for discourse. Foucault's work opened the way for the analysis of discursive practices of societies and institutions and the way they produce knowledge (Anaïs, 2013, pp. 127-128). Foucault's theory of discourse is actually part of his archeological phase, where he tries to formulate the determinants that define statements "as meaningful and true in a particular historical epoch (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 12). In his *Archeology of Knowledge* he calls discourse "a group of statement in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation" (2002b, p. 117). In other words, the number of statements that constitute discourse are limited to the conditions in which they emerge. He suggests that rather than being an "ideal" or "timeless form" discourse is historical and part of history. This approach of Foucault paves the way for his understanding that there is not a universal truth that goes beyond its historical reality. Similar to a constructionist premise, Foucauldian understanding of discourse also proposes that our knowledge does not necessarily reflect reality. Moreover "truth is a discursive construction and different regimes of knowledge determine what is true and false" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 13).

For Foucault, besides systematic and fixed meaning making role of language, there is also a social dimension of linguistic formations which have "their 'conditions of possibility' in the historical and political relationships in which they are embedded" (Chouliaraki, 2008, s. 675). In other words, fixed grammatical, lexical or semantic

structures are not enough to attain a meaning out of a linguistic formation. Rather there are historical junctures which each formation passes through and gets into relation with different non-linguistic or social formations. There, they both influence and is influenced by those formations. Therefore, he requires discursive elements to be handled in their discontinuous nature while putting them into relation with social, historical or political non-discursive elements. Foucault says:

The conditions necessary for the appearance of an object of discourse, the historical conditions required if one is to 'say anything' about it, and if several people are to say different things about it, the conditions necessary if it is to exist in relation to other objects, if it is to establish with them relations of resemblance, proximity, distance, difference, transformation- as we can see, these conditions are many and imposing (2002b, p. 44).

However, it should be noted that Foucault's idea of historicity is different from that of traditional approach where historians create huge causative chains of political events. This is exactly what distinguishes Foucault from a historian. Unlike historians, he believes that discursive elements should be freed from that particular causative historicist approach (Foucault, 2002b). Rather discourse for him is a historical *a priori*. That is to say, he calls for dismantling of discursive elements such as statements, books or remarks and speeches from the historian's depiction of chains of events and handle them as a "pure description of discursive events" (Foucault, 2002b, p. 27) then converge them together to find out unities among them. Foucault calls this "the history of ideas", or "the history of thought", or "the history of knowledge". (Foucault, 2002b). However, the word that describe this effort better and also holds a key place in Foucault's philosophical world is archeology. This effort does not only describe a certain set of practices but also it excavates out subjectivities, identities and at some point, the modalities ruling them. Foucault diverges archeology from history in four main differences which he describes as "the attribution of innovation, the analysis of contradictions, comparative descriptions, and the mapping of transformations" (Foucault, 2002b, p. 138).

Foucault suggests that archeology does not define "thoughts, representations, images, themes or preoccupations that are concealed or revealed in discourse" rather it defines discourses and the rules they obey. (Foucault, 2002b, p. 138). He cautions that discourse is not a discipline of interpretation. That is to say, Foucault's archeology

does not handle discourse as a sign of something else or an opaque description of a hidden message. Foucault's archeology is not in an effort to find out continuity or transition among discourses like historians do as well. Foucault suggests:

On the contrary, its problem is to define discourses in their specificity; to show in what way the set of rules that they put into operation is irreducible to any other; to follow them the whole length of their exterior ridges, in order to underline them the better. It does not proceed, in slow progression, from the confused field of opinion to the uniqueness of the system or the definitive stability of science; it is not a 'doxology'; but a differential analysis of the modalities of discourse (2002b, p. 139).

In other words, relieving a statement from its validity, he digs the statement one by one in their sole presence. Archeology is not after discovering the thing within the discourse that legitimizes assertions; it disregards the intentional or imposed circumstances in which statements come out (Foucault, 2002b). When it comes to the *discursive practice*, it is not dependent on the individual, rather as described above it is dependent on the specific time. Foucault defines it as "a body of anonymous, historical rules in a determined in the time and space that have defined a given period, and for a given social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area" (2002b, p. 117).

In archeological phase Foucault digs out the discourse piece by piece and takes it with its specific location then focuses on the methodology of combining those pieces. Then, there is genealogical phase. Genealogy exposes the deep and mutual relation between discourse and social practice. "Genealogy uncovers the reciprocal constitution of discursive and non- discursive practices without privileging one over the other," (Anaïs, 2013, p. 125). In other words, genealogy reveals that discourse and practices in the social sphere construct one another with a similar role.

Inquiry into the emergence of "epistemological structures" and the discourse related to it; the relations between power, knowledge and the claim to the truth are the main concerns in Foucault's genealogical analysis (Anaïs, 2013, p. 127). Therefore, it can be said that in archeological phase Foucault suggests that discursive issues should be handled from a viewpoint that they came about amid the tensions among discourses. However, in genealogical phase Foucault adds one layer to this approach by claiming that the discursive occurrences also have also a lot to do with power relations and exercise of power. In genealogical phase Foucault digs social structures and

institutions out of discourse. Power plays a key role in this phase. Power has a determinant influence of both construction of social institutions as well as subjectivities and the discourse that define those institutions and subjectivities.

Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* and *History of Sexuality* -particularly the first volume- are two major works where he introduces his genealogical methodology with a specific focus on power, knowledge and body. He defines *Discipline and Punish* as "a correlative history of the modern soul and of a new power to judge" and "a genealogy of the present scientifico-legal complex from which the power to punish derives its bases" (2010, p. 23). That power according to Foucault extends its effects through "justifications and rules" and thereby covers its utmost sovereignty. It should be noted that Foucault developed his genealogical methodology by using Friedrich Nietzsche's analysis of the correlation between morality and power a starting point. From there he develops his analysis of power relations, their implications for modern day's institutions and even the body of human being. It can be said that by doing this Foucault both in *Discipline and Punish* and *History of Sexuality* re-problematizes power.

Foucault, by analyzing power's operation through knowledge and construction of bodies of knowledge such as sciences and institutions, comes up with the idea that discourse is the space where power and knowledge actually imply one another. In that respect he is distinguished from tradition theories of power which focus on its use and its implications such as domination. Foucault's analysis of power will be detailed below but in summary, Foucault's genealogical approach is key in defining power as a diverse and complex matter. Rather than a dichotomic point of view which situated power in between the ruler and the rules, the oppressor and the oppressed, he suggests that there are many ways where power relations comes about. It is something transmittable and mutually effective (Foucault, 2010). Through a network of power relations, identities, behaviors and practices are adopted and rather than oppression these may come about through an apparent freedom. Digging these extensions of power and unpack the complex relations within power network is the main concerns of Foucault's genealogy.

2.4.3. Foucault's Genealogical Analysis Of Power And Discourse

As mentioned above Foucault does not equate power with domination or oppression applied by the agents of a social body. He tries to describe how “a corpus of knowledge, techniques, ‘scientific’ discourses are formed and becomes entangled with the practice of the power to punish (Foucault, 2010, p. 22). He suggests:

We should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests. Perhaps we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that, by the same token, the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge. We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations (2010, p. 27).

Foucault perceives a dialectical interaction between discourse and power. Unlike Laclau and Mouffe who believe that discourse is embedded in social practice and constitutive or Althusser and Gramsci who think that discourse is constituted; Foucault argues that as discourse is not only constituted by power, it is, at the same time, embedded in it and shapes it ” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 19-21). There is also a struggle to seize discourse very like power. Foucault, in his *Order of Discourse* tries to depict this aspect of discourse. He handles the constitutive role of discourse and its impact employed on and by *desire* and *institutions*. He puts forward that *desire* wants it to be an everlasting transparent tool placing every element including individuals in a form that is expected by desire and at some point, let “truths” to emerge within that “transparence.” (Foucault, 1981, p. 52). It shall be noted that desire here is the key component of the power. In other words, it is the will of individual as a sovereign entity in his personality or subjectivity. Therefore, for Foucault discourse is not simply a tool that “manifests (hidden) desire.” Not only does it articulate the systems of domination but also it is something “for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized” (Foucault, 1981, p. 53).

With respect to institutions, they represent the will of the power within a broader social body. In an analogy between individual and society, in fact desire and

institutions represent each other in the bodies. Thus, institutions representing the power to a significant extent try to seize discourse and articulate power of the sovereign through it. According to Foucault “the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures” whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over events to evade its ponderous formidable materiality (Foucault, 1981, p. 52).

That being said, Foucault talks about certain exclusions or prohibitions on speech, which is factored by institutions, social formations or the power itself. The first prohibition is imposed by the power and Foucault describes it as three intersected exclusions: “the taboo on the object of the speech and the ritual of the circumstances of speech and privileged or exclusive right of speaking” (Foucault, 1981, p. 52). The second exclusion, Foucault points out, is division or rejection between two acts of speech or words of two people contextually. He exemplifies it with the madness and reason or the attitude toward the words of a madman. As the words of a madman were not organized in a sense that others perceive it in certain social, contextual and/psychological organization, they are considered as “void”, “worthless as evidence of law” and “inadmissible in the authentication of deeds or contracts” (1981, p. 52). He says that this division is currently revealing itself through institutions or agents like hospitals and psychologists. The third exclusion is based on a division between true and false, Foucault says. Summarizing the historical evolution of truth and falseness Foucault claims that in classical times the discourse “pronounced by men who spoke as of right and according to the required ritual” was considered the “true discourse” which “inspired respect and terror and to which one had to submit because it ruled” (1981, pp. 54-55). According to Foucault this understanding has historically changed. In classical age, with Plato for example, the division between the true and false discourse, rather than the rule it represent or the thing it was able to do, was established through “the utterance itself”, “its meaning” and “its relation to its reference” (1981, p. 54). In nineteenth century the will to the truth rests on “an institutional support” (Powers, 2007, p. 26). It is renewed through various changing institutional agents and agencies such as books, libraries, academic circles as well as laboratories. In other words, the theory of power-knowledge relation comes out of these institutional interactions. As mentioned above Foucault is not interested in handling those agents

as the ones that structure, categorize, dominate or oppress their subjects, rather he is analyzing how power is implemented through these agents.

When it comes to knowledge, based on its interaction with power it becomes discourse. To put it in another way, discourse is the consequence of the power/knowledge relation. Discourse produces subjects as well as definitions for objects (Hook, 2001). Thus, although Foucault does not challenge whether there is a universal truth or not, he argues that it not possible to access it as it is not possible to refer to it from outside of discourse. At this point, Foucault introduces the notion of *truth effects*, that is to say, the things we hear as truth are actually embedded in discourse and come out with a characterization based the interaction between knowledge and power. Hook claims the entire social system is based on this embedded discursive practice. He claims “to be outside of them is, by definition, to be mad, to be beyond comprehension and therefore reason” (2001, p. 524).

In archeological phase the procedures for the production of statements or the way that statements are related is understood as truth. However, in genealogical phase Foucault links truth to the exercise of power. As something embedded in power, for Foucault, it is not even reasonable to chase the truth, but it is worthy of analysis to track the production of the effect of truth within discourse (Foucault, 2010). Discipline, in this context, emerges out of discourse and is being employed to produce subjects (Tadros, 1998). For Foucault the matter is not of “imposing laws on man” but using tactics to organize things in a way to get to a certain end. In other words, via discipline everything has a disposition (Tadros, 1998, p. 92). “Once the governmental technology was put in place, the law began to be exercised in order to adjust the relationships between individuals qua individuals” (Tadros, 1998, p. 93). Data collected by an institution at some point can be used to instruct, to observe and even to control subjects out of the institution. For example, a data collected by a hospital can be used to take measures within a community, or behavioral observation of pupils, can tell the conditions of the family life of a student. Also, a student’s behaviors at home gives the parent an ability to observe the school. Foucault call this “*dispositif*”. Each of those disciplinary settings are supplemented by other different disciplinary regimes. Each subject goes through those regimes and in case of failures they are subject to additional corrective regimes such as prisons, and psychiatric institutions. Once the corrective

measure completed the disciplinary regimes continues. The disciplinary *dispositif*, then, reproduces itself by providing the solutions to its own failures. (Tadros, 1998, p. 95).

2.5. Security, Terrorism and Foucault

2.5.1. Security

Security has been a concern of humanity as it is existential to human species. However, Security Studies is a post-World War II phenomenon. The term security means different things in different fields of studies, but there is a fact that “security is unavoidably political” and in International Relations (IR) it is a key determinant in the way the world is governed. (Williams, 2008, p. 1). All mainstream IR theories such as realism, neorealism, liberalism and neoliberalism have their understandings of security. However, this study is subscribed to the poststructuralist approach to security which both overlaps with the mentioned theories and encompasses specific theoretical fields such as critical theory, international political sociology.

Arnold Wolfers is one of the pioneering scholars who introduced a definition for the concept of security. Wolfers called security as “the absence of threats to acquired values.” (Wolfers, 1952, p. 485). Bary Buzan definition of security is similar to Wolfers. Buzan defines security as “pursuit of freedom from threats” (Buzan, 1991, p. 18). Both of these definitions are not only ambiguous but also very broad. What is a threat? What is included in acquired values? Who decides threat to the acquired values? Who decides and how is the absence or presence of a threat is determined? Responses these questions posed to this definition has created a field of study called security studies (Baldwin, 1997). There are up to a dozen of subtopics to the Security Studies such as national security, economic security, social security, water security, energy security, environmental security, international security and newly introduced cybersecurity. In other words, in line with technological, political and social evolution the number of values has increased and so does the meaning of security.

There is a wide consensus among IR scholars that the line between security and insecurity is not a clear cut one. It is not like a nation, a person or a value is either secure or insecure (Buzan, 1991; Baldwin, 1997). This is the problematique of the

concept of security in IR theories. For example, classical realist thinkers such as Robert Gilpin, suggest that human being's greedy nature leads to the accumulation of power, competition and finally cause wars (1981). According to this approach the whole idea of security is based on the measure taken based predictions against the outsider or rival. A key offensive realism thinker John Mearsheimer suggests something that produces similar outcomes. In his analysis of making sense of great power politics Mearsheimer says that the more the great powers accumulate power the more insecure they feel because the rival states would get into an effort to compete with it. Thus, he argues, states pursue power maximization which end up into a sophisticated interactional order (Mearsheimer, 2001). Constructivists, on the other hand, suggest that "security is a social construction," and it is "a site of negotiation and contestation, in which actors compete to define the identity and values of a particular group in such a way as to provide a foundation for political action" (McDonald, 2008, p. 67). Within Constructivism, the Copenhagen School comes up with the concept of securitization, a key concept in Security Studies. Securitization theory is a key tenet of Copenhagen School and it was outlined by Ole Waever as "a discursive construction of threat" (1995, p. 59). According to Waever, when an actor or a key figure articulates an issue or a group of people as a threat this discursive effort, if adopted by the audience, creates an exclusive dynamic to treat the threat. This approach ends up in bypassing politics or at some point rule of law. By articulation "a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it," Waever puts forward (1995, p. 55). In the wake of 9/11, this approach was one of the key sources of global war on terror. The theory of exceptionalism resonates from securitization discourse.

In mid-1970s after poststructuralism had become a featuring philosophy in social sciences, Security Studies also benefited from it. Poststructuralism's main topics of interest such as "power, structures, and the disciplining effects of knowledge" appealed to the Security Studies experts (Hansen, 2017). In 1980s when the détente process between Soviet Union and the US faded away and the two nuclear powers began to point their nuclear missiles to one another, American academia was overwhelmingly obsessed with the Soviet power which led them fail to foresee the collapse of the Soviet Union (Cox, 2009). Interestingly, poststructuralists during that

time were discussing something totally different. Nuclear threat was not something that a state would attain as a manner, poststructuralist argued. Rather it could be discursive self-assertion (Klein, 1994). In other words, as a means of deterrence the nuclear weapons was never meant to be used; thus, it was not a real threat. Based on securitization or in Foucauldian sense exclusions, a certain discourse of threat was employed in parallel with nuclear arm race in order to create condition of stability or balance. Nuclear power fed the discourse of threat and vice versa. Particularly in the post-Cold War era the poststructuralist analysis of Cold War came out to be the most credible description of the late Cold War heightened environment. Moreover, the most crucial contribution of poststructuralist analysis was to show:

How utterances as well as practices such as the procurement of nuclear weapons relied upon and produced particular subject positions as good/evil, legitimate/ dangerous, threatening/threatened and so on (Hansen, 2017).

Foucault's contribution to poststructuralist analysis of security is immense. Foucault's genealogical approach to history as a product of exclusions and his correlational analysis of discourse and power have been a key part in the foundation of poststructuralist theory in Security Studies. Foucault's works provide material to explain what is going on in the Cold War, how the positions, identities and contingencies are constructed. The dichotomies of good vs evil, self vs other and danger vs legitimacy were all constructed out of discursive practice accompanied by strategic power race.

Foucault depicts three modalities in his *Security, Territory Population* where he differentiates security from disciplinary mechanisms. The first modality consists of a penal law and punishment against breaking of the penal law. The second modality consists of penal law, punishment and surveillance to prevent any violation to happen. Then the third modality besides encompassing the mentioned two modalities focuses on statistical evaluation and ratios of the possible violations; conditions under which the predictions regarding violations may change; potential effects of those violations and etc. (1978b, pp. 19-30). According to Foucault while the first two modalities fall under the disciplinary mechanism "the third form is not typical of the legal code or the disciplinary mechanism, but of the apparatus (dispositif) of security" (1978b, p. 20).

During the Cold War, US-Soviet dichotomy made it easier to define the other,

or the evil. Violations and basic measures against those violations were clearer. But in the aftermath of the Cold War and particularly at the wake of 9/11 “increasingly, the demarcation between war and crime control has become blurred.” (Degenhardt, 2013, p. 32). In line with that the definition of security became a more complicated one, because the physical means of discourse, the Cold War was not there anymore. With the disappearance of the physical threat, security have become a total discursive concept. In other words, with the end of the Cold War the American rhetoric of danger or threat was revealed to be dependent on the definition of the *Other*. The Other in return defined the identity of the state. Thus, as the Other’s threat helped the state to constitute an identity for itself and the state felt the need to protect its identity against the other’s threat. Based on this complex relation many scholars argue that security has become part of the state identity and thus ontological for the state (Campbell, 1992; Connolly, 1991; Hansen, 2017).

Foucault introduces his conceptualization of security in 1978 during his lectures at Collage de France. As a part of his notion of governmentality Foucault brings up security, “as a new form of power” and new way of “governing life and people’s living conditions (bios), specifically in terms of prevention, population, regulation, and risk” (Schuilenburg, 2011). Foucault chronologizes power as something being exercised by sovereign in a direct, public punishment to a mean of disciplining in *Discipline and Punish*. In other words, the exercise of power moved from public executions (sovereign society) to the invention of prisons and panopticons where rather than the direct impact of power, the effect power employed through different technologies within a process that disciplined and treated the outlaw (discipline society). In his conceptualization of security, a new form of power, Foucault adds two more layers to the exercise of power. Here, power is exercised through preventive actions based on calculations, possibilities and risk evaluation (security society). However, this does not mean that these are successive periods. In that context Foucault warns:

There is not a series of successive elements, the appearance of the new causing the earlier ones to disappear. There is not the legal age, the disciplinary age, and then the age of security. Mechanisms of security do not replace disciplinary mechanisms, which would have replaced juridico-legal mechanisms. In reality you have a series of complex edifices in which, of course, the techniques themselves

change and are perfected, or anyway become more complicated, but in which what above all changes is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the system of correlation between juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, and mechanisms of security (1978b, p. 22).

In *Security, Territory, Population* the strongest references to security is outlined in his description to the treatment of smallpox. The first level of handling the smallpox was valorization and vaccination as a preventive measure. Throughout a statistical evaluation of a medical phenomenon, a procedure of vaccination was employed and identified areas of the city that are contaminated were destroyed (Foucault, 1978b, p. 86). As benefited from the statistical evaluation vaccination process encompass the society as a whole rather than excluding the ill ones. Thus, the life conditions of a population as a whole become part of a “national policy” (Schuilenburg, 2011, p. 73). According to Foucault in this way “basic biological features of human species became the object of a political strategy, of general strategy of power” which he calls “bio-power.” (1978b, p. 16). In today’s world, based on wide spectrum of risk not only in health, but also in economy, finance, cyber, and social domains have led to a web of statistical measures as a security apparatus.

Terrorism, however, particularly being associated with war, has brought about a new debate. Particularly in the aftermath of 9/11 one of the key theoretical discussion is on whether a terrorist attack is a crime or an act of war. The contextualization of terrorism in security will be detailed below but as mentioned above the lines between war and crime control has blurred due to the discourse of counter terrorism. Therefore, Foucault’s views of security dispositif, and bio-political analysis have helped analysts to make sense about “policies and practices of governance of terror by means of war” (Barder & Debrix, 2011, p. 777). Laws resonate out of war, according to Foucault. From the real battles of the past to today’s discursive battles the space for the law makers has expanded immensely. “The ‘historico-political discourse’ of war is transformed into what Foucault calls an ‘epistemic web’ that ensures that the political and social utility of war can be infinitely reused, transferred, or recycled” (Barder & Debrix, 2011, p. 785).

2.5.2. Terrorism and Biopolitics As A Countering Apparatus

Terrorism is associated with use of violence and the fear that the respective violence causes. Although, historically the meaning attributed to terrorism has shifted, at least there is a common perception that targeting civilian population is considered as an act of terrorism. There has yet to be an academic and a legal definition with determined criteria accepted by all; thus, terror is defined by actions and political discourse. In IR, discussions over terrorism rest upon some sophisticated power relations within the international community. It seems to be easy to identify terrorism or an act of terror but when it comes to a question like who is terrorist, the answer changes from actor to actor regardless of the level of violence. For instance, a state calls a group a terrorist organization while many others do not accept so and some may even enjoy good relations with that group. Therefore, many times, to have an act declared as an act of terrorism or a group designated as a terrorist organization has a lot to do with convincement of many parties of international community (Hoffman, 2006).

Historically, in the Western academia the word “terrorism” first became popular during the French Revolution, according to Bruce Hoffman. In his book *Inside Terrorism* Hoffman says that terrorism had a positive connotation in late 18th Century as it was “a revolutionary or anti-governmental activity undertaken by non-state or sub-national entities,” and then it became “an instrument of governance wielded by the recently established states” following the French Revolution (2006, p. 4). These attributions lasted up until 1930s when ideologically oppressive regimes emerged across the Europe. As political opponents of those regimes faced physical abuses such as torture, killings or exiles, particularly in Stalin’s Russia, Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany, the concept of terrorism swung to a negative connotation. The term terrorism was used in explaining “arbitrary use of violence”, “repressive practices” by regimes against their citizens (Hoffman, 2006, p. 4). Fear or terror was the common characteristic of those regimes.

After the Second World War, there was a relatively settled international order, but instability raged in the decolonizing regions in Africa and the Middle East. The use of violence by non-state actors to terrorize the colonial dominance brought about a new discussion on terrorism. Many discussed that terrorism in that context as actually not an ideological but a tactical choice. Thus, “one’s terrorist can be another’s freedom fighter.” (Grant, 1989, p. 3) There is a fertile literature contextualizing terrorism on

the axis of justification and legitimacy (Laqueur, 1978; Falk, 1988; Hoffman, 2006). But it can be said that amid the revolts against colonization and imperialism after the Second World War terrorism regained its revolutionary connotation to some extent.

Discussions around the attacks against American diplomats mostly in the Middle East in 1980s constitute the foundation of today's perception of terrorism. Although 9/11 attacks is considered "a mile stone in history of terrorism", the latest perceptions of terrorism dates back to 80s (Martin & Walcott, 1988, p. 47). (Levitt, 1988). Between 1979 and 1988 more than a dozen incidents targeted American diplomats in Iran, Kuwait, and Libya. This wave of anti-Americanism accompanied with a dichotomist reading of the world as the West vs. the rest. Thereof, many of the meanings historically attributed to the terrorism were abandoned and the movements targeting the neo-liberal western world order were somehow brought under the umbrella of terrorism with new forms such as "state sponsored terrorism" and "radical Islamic terrorism" (Martin & Walcott, 1988, p. 46).

As the main topic of this study is counter-terrorism discourse of the US President Obama, it is important to mention the US definition of terrorism and terrorist. US Department of State publishes terrorism trends every year. The first one was published in 2001 and until 2004 it was titled "Patterns of Terrorism" then from 2004 up to today the annual report come out as "Country Report on Terrorism". In the introduction of every such document, the Department of the State acknowledges "No one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance," (United States Department of the State, 2001) but it adopts the definition of terrorism in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) which reads:

The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism (United States Department of the State, 2001).

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 adopted in 2004 defines terrorism as:

Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with

the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act (United Nations , 2004).

For an act to be defined as terrorism by the US it should have a political message, be exercised by non-state actors on civilians with the purpose of reaching out to an audience. On the other hand, for the UN it should be done with the intent of injury or death or taking hostage to cause fear and be intended to push a government or an international organization to do or not to do something. As clearly these definitions suggest the concept of terrorism is a discursive one and terrorism is much of a discursive practice.

For Foucault, terrorism very like madness does not have an existence independent of discourse and is part of the power relations. (Foucault, 2010). The autonomous part of terrorism is violence because people are being killed or injured during an act of violence. However, violence is not the only defining element of the terrorism. Only when violence is accompanied by political motivations, perpetrated by a clandestine group, with the objective of making itself hear, then it becomes terrorism. In other words, as Bruce Hoffman puts it, use of terrorism as a concept “implies moral judgement” (2006, p. 31). Contemporarily, it is used with a highly negative connotation most likely to define an enemy (Hoffman, 2006). However, no single group which is designated as a terror group by a state or international organization would call itself a terrorist group. Thus, there is a dually working problematic in understanding terrorism. The terrorist of every state or group of states is different from the others and each group designated as terrorist has a different narrative of itself. This makes discursively production of the term terrorism crucial in understanding a states counter-terrorism discourse.

According Dillon, in Western philosophy terror has been figured as a “generative principle of formation for the modern political self-hood,” and “governing the terror” for Dillon, has implications for “global security efforts” (2007, p. 7). The US’s global war on terror describes Dillon’s conceptualization perfectly. Terror within western public was never as visible as it was at the wake of 9/11 attacks. The 9/11 was also one of the most stark and visible act of violence which gave an ever better visibility to al-Qaeda who claimed the responsibility for 9/11. The attacks happened

in the mid-day at the heart of New York City and was captured on live TV channels as the hundreds of meters tall towers collapsed down. In other words, the terror that was felt by the people at the World Trade Center and streets in its neighborhood was also felt in the whole country.

Global war on terror has been the way to govern the terror. Apart from the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq as well as other covert overseas operations by the US military overseas at home in the western world the war on terror was utilized in bringing “within the political rationalities and calculative control of western security technologies” to ultimately eliminate the terror (Dillon, 2007, p. 8). Foucault’s analysis of power provides a wide explanation how the fight countering the outlaw is being employed in governing society and it sheds light on a similar usage in maneuvering the global politics. There are maybe volumes of books to explain the concepts such as war, terrorism or crime and the difference among them but the debate on whether and act is a war or terrorism, or a crime is totally a political one. In other words, these debates have some implications for “shaping the borders of the political community” (Degenhardt, 2013, pp. 39-40). Foucault suggests that war is the foundation of the social order and war and political power are at work simultaneously. He asserts:

The organization and juridical structure of power, of States, monarchies and societies, does not emerge when the clash of arms ceases. War has not been averted. War obviously presided over the birth of states: ‘rights, peace and laws were born in the blood and mud of battles’ (2003, p. 50).

In other words, Foucault considers war as the continuation of the politics and vice versa. In *Discipline and Punish* he argues that very like war, politics is also conceived as a “means of preventing civil disorder” (2010, p. 168). However, the politics of war and war of politics have extended its influence from the confrontation among nations to the disciplinary mechanisms within a state which claim control over bodies and individual behaviors. Foucault suggests that Western societies are characterized by a discourse of law, an organizational mindset based on public right and disciplinary mechanisms to ensure the civil order. This, in Foucauldian sense, is called self-governing citizen subjects or docile bodies (Foucault, 2010). Modern time institutions

including prisons, army barracks, classrooms, clinics and etc. are founded for the biopolitical production of those subjects. Subjectivities and identities are created within the process of this discursive practice and disciplinary mechanisms tied to it. To sum up, for Foucault “discourses about the self-governing subject and the actual production of self-governed life within particular modern spaces” were part of biopolitics (Sparke, 2008, s. 36).

2.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, a summary of study of discourse and discourse analysis under two main methodological approaches, namely structuralism and post-structuralism has been given. Saussure’s structuralist approach to language has paved the way for the linguistic turn in second half of the 20th Century. It can be said that thanks to Saussure the concept of discourse began to be used in a way to signal a break with the views that see language as a transparent tool of communication. As a field of study, discourse emerged along with several other interdisciplinary fields such as semiotics, psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics and pragmatics. It is difficult to track discourse down to a categorization within the theoretical range of meanings it has, but it can be said that theories of discourse are commonly divided on basis of structuralist and post-structuralist approaches to language. It deals with a set of insights, assumptions, and concepts that have emerged across those approaches. Thus, an array of discussions under post-structuralist approach is handled in this chapter. From there, it moves to Foucault’s contribution the study of discourse and Foucauldian discourse analysis.

Foucault suggests that discourse is a practice that “systematically form the object of which they speak.” (2002b). Therefore, works of most of the post-structuralist scholars owe some to Foucault. Foucault’s archeological approach to language and genealogical approach to power as well as the exercise of power have a significant contribution to the study of discourse. Foucault’s work opened the way for the analysis of discursive practices of societies and institutions and the way they produce knowledge. This chapter suggests that Foucault’s both archaeological and genealogical approach to discourse will help to unpack Obama’s terminology of

national security as well as tracing power relations within it. However, this chapter also reveals that there several challenges with the Foucauldian discourse analysis.

First of all, discourse is a recurring concept in Foucault's academic career, but he does not propose a linear or hierarchical methodology for discourse analysis. Secondly, he refutes the idea of history that depicts a linear evolution of social morality both in his genealogical and archeological works. Thirdly, he specifically and intentionally avoids generalizations. This is also connected to his approach to the traditional historical analysis. He is suspicious towards universal truths. In other words, any understanding is limited to the period and the society it emerged in. This is extensively criticized for it boxes ideas, forms and themes to a multilayered context. However, it is undeniable that Foucauldian discourse is built on that peculiarity of him. Because he argues that discourse builds up a reality within the convergence of fragmented or multiplied perspectives. Very like his suggestion of archeology as an alternative to traditional history, Foucault suggests genealogy as an alternative to universal truth. Methodologically these challenges might create some sort of obscurity but this approach of him provides an effective historical perspective. Those challenges also provide an opportunity, because it allows a disruptive reading into universalized discourse of terrorism in the US. With Foucauldian microscope, this study is revealing how subjectivities are constructed within a semi-hegemonic, discursive war.

This chapter, then, analyzes Foucault's archeological and genealogical approach to the concept of discourse. Foucault's theory of discourse is actually part of his archeological phase, where he tries to formulate the determinants that define statements as meaningful and true in a particular historical condition. In archeological phase Foucault digs out the discourse piece by piece and takes it with its specific location then focuses on the methodology of combining those pieces. In genealogical phase he exposes the deep and mutual relation between discourse and social practice. In other words, genealogy reveals that discourse and practices in the social sphere construct one another with a similar role.

The chapter also engages with the concept of security, war and terrorism and trace these concepts in Foucault's works. Foucault's contribution to poststructuralist analysis of security is immense. Foucault's genealogical approach to history as a product of exclusions and his correlational analysis of discourse and power have been

a key part in the foundation of poststructuralist theory in Security Studies. As a part of his notion of governmentality Foucault brings up security, as a form of power and a way of governing contingencies in human life. Based on handling risks, preventing disorder, regulating the population an immense exercise of power comes about, he suggests.

When it comes to terrorism, for Foucault, terrorism very like madness does not have an existence independent of discourse and is part of the power relations. The autonomous part of terrorism is violence because people are being killed or injured during an act of violence. In other words, it is being defined and designated as part of exercise of power and named amid power interactions. In that sense it is linked to the human contingencies and has a significant role in creating subjectivities as well as identities. War also has a similar connotation for Foucault. He brings up the idea that war is a continuation of politics and it is a way of preventing civil disorders. All in all, the concepts such as war, terrorism, security are all defined within discourse and has implications for power relations.

CHAPTER 3

TERRORISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS: FROM BUSH TO OBAMA COUNTER TERRORISM

3.1. Introduction

Barack Obama's predecessor George W. Bush's presidency is identified with his concept "global war on terror" and the policies undertaken within the discursive boundaries of this concept including "torture of detainees, the incarceration of suspects in 'black sites' and at a prison camp in Guantanamo Bay, the warrantless surveillance of US citizens and prolonged and costly military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq" (Malley & Finner, 2018, p. 58). Excessive use of force by Bush was one of the factors that led to the political rise of Obama and this fact makes the analysis of Obama's counter terrorism discourse worthy of analysis because his opposition to Bush brings about a question of how he dealt with the whole idea of terrorism.

Many analysts argue that Obama was well aware of the terror threat and clear-cut guidelines particularly in use of military force and dealing with civilian casualties. However, especially in his second term, 2012-2016, as Malley and Finner put it, he "expanded the fight against terrorist to new theatres" (2018, p. 58) including use of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) and a set of technologies in the fight against ISIS in last two years of him at the White House. US' *war on terror* did not come to an end with Obama taking over the White House, but the discourse of terrorism as well as political landscape have shifted significantly with Obama. Therefore, analysis of Obama's campaigning rhetoric, his counter terrorism discourse during the first term of his presidency and the fight and discourse against terrorism in his second term is very important.

Most of the studies in Obama's war on terror focus on his early years in the office and some deals with the implications of his strategy to use drones in the fight against groups designated as terrorist organizations by the US. Although lately there are some studies that include Obama's counter-ISIS strategy, there is a vast gap in literature on his eight years of counter terrorism discourse as a whole.

This chapter will initially try to locate and describe terrorism in US national security strategy since 9/11 attacks. It will analyze national security strategy documents as well as quadrennial defense reviews done by US administrations every four years, presidential speeches and legislations introduced to locate the understanding of terrorism in US politics. It will also tackle the question when and how terrorism discourse became a key paradigm in national security.

In order to make a better understanding of Obama's counter terrorism and national security discourse, this chapter will also summarize Bush's discourse of *war and terror*. It will engage the introduction of Global War on Terror (GWOT), its implications at home and abroad as well as perceptions regarding the term both within American and global public opinion. What was it meant for American political elite and public? How did it establish itself and how did it unfold? What did it legitimize? How did it contribute to the US power assertions across the globe as well as at home? Who was the main target? All these questions will be engaged as this concept introduced by Bush had some implications in counter terrorism discourse under Obama.

A portion this chapter will be devoted to the Obama's national security and counter terrorism discourse. From his presidential campaign in 2008 to his last day in the White House, January 20, 2017, Obama's discourse of security and terrorism has gone through an evolution. Discursively there is a long way to go from his emphasis on civility and promise of ending US wars in the Middle East during presidential campaign to his constant reference to himself as "Commander in Chief" in the context of countering terrorism in his late years. Obama's predecessor Bush was the one who came up with the idea of global war on terror. The reasons for why he wanted to call it a war may be many but this concept opened up a fight against a vast geography with a very vague addressee. A never-ending invasion took place particularly in the Middle East. Although Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for 9/11, the answer to the question

who has the potential to attack the US was never fully answered. But among common suspect were “Islamic radicals”. Hundreds of thousands of US troops were deployed to the Middle East and Central Asia besides sporadic deployments across Africa and Southeast Asia.

Obama, beginning during his late years in Senate came up with his problematic of Bush’s national security and counter terrorism strategy. One of the key premises of Obama was the identity of the terrorist. Perception of “terrorist subject” was very vague for him. Not only does the Bush administrations’ perception of terrorist made the entire Muslim world a target for the US it also caused major legal problems at home and abroad, such as racial profiling, interrogation of suspect in dark sites and etc. There is almost a consensus among Obama analysts that he at least at the rhetorical level tried to revive liberal approach of the US to the world politics (Gerges, 2012; Klaidman, 2012; Malley & Finer, 2018; McCrisken, 2010; Sanger, 2013). Therefore, within his national security strategy he abandoned the usage of reductionist terms such as “Islamic terrorism” or “Islamic radicalism” in his speeches. Strategically, he put forward, that there is no military solution to the issue of terrorism. Thus, he preferred to single out the terror groups within Muslim world, tried to gain support from Muslims in denouncing terrorism and counter the message of terrorist, promised to close Guantanamo Bay prison and prohibited torture. At the same time, he developed the strategy of killing terrorists in precision strikes via unmanned aerial vehicles, UAV or drones which brought about a more complicated legal discussion to the table. His administration came up with National Security Agency’s (NSA) wiretapping everyone on US soil and every suspect on foreign soils.

This chapter will provide a comparison between Bush and Obama discourse of national security and counter terrorism, it will also investigate the place of terrorism in US National Security Strategy. It will also summarize how and when terrorism changed the paradigm in the US foreign policy.

3.2. From Bush to Obama War On Terror

3.2.1. Power Relations and Discourse In American Politics

Power discourse has been a key component of the US foreign policy due to historical reasons, internal structure and the role of defense industry in politics. At the first place, the US is built on an independence revolution of and a post-civil war fought by people of different cultures and backgrounds. It has always needed a “representational practices of being” and thereof, a “discursive myth has been reproduced and reinforced by the country’s founding fathers, political elites, historians, school textbooks, popular culture and so forth” (Pan & Turner, 2017, p. 82). As a virtue, the US has represented itself as the beacon of universal values. But the discourse of virtue in foreign policy has led to a way to seek power. In other words, in American discourse of power the state asserts itself in way as if it is entitled to power. It is interesting that the search for power in American politics has been perceived as necessary in an “evil world” so, “the construction of a virtuous America necessarily implies the existence of evil and/or barbarism” (Pan & Turner, 2017, p. 84). In other words, rhetoric of virtue particularly since the Second World War, has discursively fed the US search for global hegemony as well as justifying use of force.

Other than the need for representation, internal political structure of the US also makes power discourse crucial in the country and plays a role in its search for power globally. The American political structure seems to have been relatively stable and continuous since the Civil War in 1860s but there is at the same time a continuous change within those structures which makes the power relations indispensably crucial in American politics. American federal and local political systems are analogues to each other. In 50 states there is a governor, a two chambered congress and a judicial body. At the federal level, there is the President of the United States, The US Congress with Senate and House of Representatives and the US Supreme Court. Decisions are taken either with Executive Orders of the President or through a legislation passed by both Senate and House and signed into law by the President. Every Executive Order by the President other than declaring a war may be subject to the ruling of federal courts or the Supreme Court.

What makes this process interesting is that at all levels there is continuous change. Every two years the 435 seats of the House and one third of the 100 seats of Senate go to polls. Thus, the relations between the President and the Congress or a chamber of the Congress is continuously subject to change. The balances between the Senate and

House are also changing. The relations between the President, the Supreme Court as well as federal district courts are also fluctuating. Furthermore, mass media has a vast leverage in politics thanks to the Constitution's First Amendment which makes a strong commitment to the freedom of speech and civil society. What is more, multinational companies and financial sector has also a say in American politics via their lobbying power (Vile, 2007).

American power discourse emerges out of the rivalry among those constantly changing power focuses. For example, a sovereign decision by the President, has to survive a lasting pressure from the Congress, the courts and media. At the Congress although there is a bipartisan system namely Republican and Democrat and the President is also part of one of the two parties it does not always mean that he can get whatever he wants from lawmakers. The two chambers are not always divided along partisan lines so the President may seek support from the opposing party. The President may also need to ally with the media or a group in media. The decision may also need to evade a judicial ruling against it so the President might seek approval from judiciary. In domestic politics those power relations become more and more complicated, but this is more or less the picture in foreign policy. Therefore, it can be said that power is highly decentralized in American politics and what makes it visible is the discourse emerging out of the power relations.

Another factor that makes discourse crucial in American politics particularly in national security policy is the role of defense industry. Defense industry's role in American politics goes back to President Dwight D. Eisenhower's era (1953-1961). Eisenhower is known for his famous warning about "military-industrial complex" (Porter, 2018). In other words, the mega-corporations in defense sector besides producing and upgrading arms and weapon systems are also lobbying to keep US foothold overseas. Those corporations' ability to extract revenue out of the US government is predominantly depended to their relations with the national security institutions (Porter, 2018). At some point, there is a potential that rhetoric of a lobbying body or its influence on the government or a part of the government might play in US national security discourse.

The US Defense Department has an average budget of \$700 billion, a nearly 50% of the President's \$1,5 trillion discretionary budget. According to Gareth Porter,

military-industrial complex of today “has justified its enhanced power and control over the country’s resources primarily by citing threats to US security posed by Islamic terrorists” (Porter, 2018). He argues that after the Cold War, the influence of defense industry on military revealed itself through privatization of military operations such as employing contractors. Then he claims with “the war on terrorism” this influence got to its permanent phase. In other words, particularly with the drone strikes initiated by Barack Obama, the US found itself in a permanent war across the globe which in turn benefited the defense industry in the country (Porter, 2018).

3.2.2. Terrorism in Post 9/11 US National Security Strategy Documents

Theoretically there is hardly a consensus on the definition of terrorism. However, legally the US government has its definition of terrorism in the Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) which reads:

The term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. The term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. The term “terrorist group” means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism (United States Department of the State, 2001).

This definition is still serving the US government to determine which act is of terrorism and which person is terrorist. However, the US administrations use National Security Strategy document to define the threats of their time and come up with their own particular characterization of threat and terrorism.

The US administrations are entitled to prepare National Security Strategy report every year under and the Defense Department Reorganization Act enacted in 1986. However, particularly over the last two decades presidents preferred to come up with this report as they feel necessary. These documents do not only lay out Washington’s security priorities it also set the discursive means for the strategy. Administrations define and characterize the threat against the country and lay out the means that they would be using in dealing with those threats. Therefore, national security strategy documents are good sources of analysis of discourse.

George W. Bush (2000-2008) and Barack Obama (2009-2016) administrations had produced two National Security Strategy document each. The Obama era National Security Strategy documents are also primary sources of this study. However, a short comparison of both presidents' National Security Strategies would help to see how the US administrations' characterization of terrorism has changed over time. It will also serve to track where Obama took American discourse of terrorism from and where he headed it to.

Bush released his first National Security Strategy document one year after 9/11 on September 17, 2002. The document frequently stresses the concept of "terrorist of global reach" and calls for a global "war" on it. The most striking point in Bush's first National Security Strategy is that it defines terrorism as "the enemy." It reads "The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism" (Bush, 2002). This definition is problematic, because the concept of terrorism is a tactic, a way of expressing an ideology, a demand, a hatred or an anger (Hoffman, 2006). Enemy is more of an adversary, an entity, a person or a group of persons. Moreover, he identifies terrorism with Muslims by constantly calling it "radical Islamic terrorism." So, based on the use of those terms, the discursive outcome of Bush's first National Security Strategy was this: The US has an enemy which is unnegotiable, evil, radical and Muslim. Furthermore, a globally waged war is needed to deal with the threat of this enemy. Although the perception of 9/11 within both American government and American public is of a war-like situation, Bush administration's preference of the term of war instead of fight, countering or combatting is rhetorically purposeful. Bush, benefiting the idea of exceptionalism, built a discourse of war in his strategies and launched comprehensive sets of measurements against both foreigners and US nationals under the pretext of the global war on terror. This will be tackled in more detailed way below when Bush and Obama's understanding of war on terror is compared.

In his second national security strategy document, which came in 2006, Bush gives up his characterization of "radical Islamic terrorism". (Bush, 2006) Instead, he uses the term "global terrorism" frequently and he uses "Islamic radicalism" once in the 50-page document. There are a few factors that might have played into this shift. First, The US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan faced a backlash within the Muslim

world and was used as a means by radical groups for recruitment. According to US Director of National Intelligence after 2003 thousands of foreign fighters flocked to Iraq and by 2005 there were more than 2,000 foreign fighters who joined the Iraqi insurgency (Office of Director of National Intelligence, 2006).

Another factor was that Bush administration's characterization of "a global terrorist" did not gain an international recognition and US was almost failing in Iraq. Moreover, there was a harsh disagreement about the definition of "Islamic terrorism" at home too. There are experts who argue that Bush's excessive use of force and reductionist discourse led to the rise of Barack Obama (Malley & Finer, 2018). So, the Bush administration preferred not to highlight its previous characterizations. Instead the text calls for cooperation with the partners and allies as well as global powers. With more of a globalist approach the text promotes help nations build infrastructure of democracy to deal with tyranny which Bush administration put forward to feed terrorism.

Barack Obama administration produced its first National Security Strategy in May 2010. The striking thing in that document was its classifying terrorism as "one of the hazards threatening the US" (Obama, 2010). However, the most important aspect of Obama's first National Security Strategy document was its rejection of war on terrorism. The document reads:

We will always seek to delegitimize the use of terrorism and to isolate those who carry it out. Yet this is not a global war against a tactic—terrorism or a religion—Islam. We are at war with a specific network, al-Qa'ida, and its terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack the United States, our allies, and partners (2010).

Another important aspect of this document was that it replaced the term "war on terror" with terms "overseas contingency operations." Although the document does not introduce a new definition to terrorism, it recharacterizes the US' response to it. It gives up the terms such as "enemy" or "war" and brings the issue more into the political space. The document also singles out terrorist groups within a community, that is Muslim community.

This document was not the first document on national security produced by Obama's White House. Just two months before that the Defense Department released

its *Quadrennial Defense Report* (Feb. 2010). In this document as well, there was not any definition of terrorism but “counterterrorism” and “counter insurgency” were the two terms used dozens of times in the document replacing the war on terror. Therefore, it can be said that the first national security strategy document and defense report that Obama administration produced in 2010 were up to a significant shift in national security discourse. What did this shift entail; what were the implications of this shift are the questions to be answered in upcoming parts of this study.

The second National Security Strategy produced by Obama administration was released in 2015. In other words, it came at time when Obama’s strategy of withdrawal from Iraq largely failed and a new terrorist group called ISIS emerged within Al-Qaeda and took over one third of Iraq and one third of Syria in a short period of time. In this document Obama national security team introduces a conceptualization “the persistent threat posed by terrorism” (Obama, 2015). The document does not define what “persistence” stands for, but it says that the terrorist threat toward American homeland has diminished but “still persists”. It is not clear why Obama’s team preferred to use the term persistent threat, but successful emergence of ISIS might have played a role and the national security team might have used that term so that the Obama’s prudent counterterrorism effort make sense. The document underlines that Obama has shifted US policy away from fighting costly and large-scale wars and adopted “a more sustainable approach” which prioritizes “targeted counterterrorism operations” and preventive actions with foreign partners to stop the growth of “violent extremism” (Obama, 2015). So, Obama’s discourse of singling out terrorist is played out here too but amid a violent war ongoing in the Middle East with a very high capacity of spilling over into other regions including Europe we can see discursively Obama gives the sense of perpetuality in the fight against terrorism, that is, a perpetual measure against a persistent threat.

Another significant aspect to point in Obama’s last National Security Strategy is that the administration brings in a new concept: “violent extremism”. This discursive characterization is yet to have a definition. It can be discerned that it refers to ISIS and Al-Qaeda type organizations that hold up a strategy which entails using force and violence as a way of expression, but it still brings about a new set of questions such as: Is there non-violent extremism? Which group or individual is non-violent

extremist? What does it mean for US policy? The document also mentions “home grown violent extremism”. It reads:

We have emphasized community-based efforts and local law enforcement programs to counter homegrown violent extremism and protect vulnerable individuals from extremist ideologies that could lead them to join conflicts overseas or carry out attacks here at home (2015).

The notion of extremism and violent extremism and those that are grown at home has significant discursive implications. It leads the way into every aspect of lives of people through surveillance and other law enforcement programs. In this document, Obama again draws a distinction between his and Bush’s strategies by saying “we reject the lie that America and its allies are at war with Islam” (Obama, 2015). Also, he insists on bringing the fight against terrorism into political space. The document reads “We will continue to act lawfully. Outside of areas of active hostilities, we endeavor to detain, interrogate, and prosecute terrorists through law enforcement” (Obama, 2015).

To sum up US administrations adopts the definition of terrorism from Title 22 of US Code, every administration comes up with its unique approach to the concept and the measures against it. It can be said that Bush administration characterization of terrorism was more radical and based on reductionist generalizations, Obama’s approach to the terms is more sophisticated and discursively complex. Obama also used the tool introduced by Bush, but it is arguable if Obama’s approach penetrated less into daily life of people in the US and abroad.

3.3. Conclusion

George W. Bush was the architect of the concept of “the war on terrorism”. He used the term for the first time on September 16th, 2001 at the wake of 9/11. In response to a question that the Attorney General had asked for enhanced law enforcement authority to surveil and disrupt terrorist plots Bush said:

We need to be alert to the fact that these evil-doers still exist. We haven't seen this kind of barbarism in a long period of time. No one could have conceivably imagined suicide bombers burrowing into our society and then emerging all in the same day to fly their aircraft - fly U.S. aircraft into buildings full of innocent people - and show no remorse. This is a new kind of - a new kind of evil. And we understand. And the American people are beginning to

understand. This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while. And the American people must be patient (2001).

Bush was not only telling the World that the US is initiating a long war ahead, he was also trying to justify the vast response that would reach to a war by emphasizing that the 9/11 events were unprecedented and needed an unprecedented response.

A key tenet of Bush's security discourse was the emphasis on the sense of threat. Characterizations are important to note here. Bush disciplines American people's sense of threat by telling them "evil-doers" who exercise "barbarism" attacked innocent people after "burrowing into" American society. A discursive triad of threat has been uttered here. It is not clear whether Bush is aware of it or not but this statement tells American people that the attackers are not only a threat to their life, but also to their society and civilization. They are evil and has already penetrated into the American society. What is more, he characterizes the war against this evil as a "crusade", in other words, a sacred war to protect the society and the civilization.

On September 20, 2001 when he addressed the Congress Joint Session, Bush defined the perpetrators of 9/11 as "enemies of freedom" and the 9/11 attacks as "an act of war" (Bush, 2009). He reiterated that the attacks on World Trade Center and the Pentagon were unprecedented by saying:

Americans have known wars — but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war — but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks — but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day — and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack (2009).

In the same speech, he used the war on terrorism and signaled the length to war that the US would wage when he said "our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated" (Bush, 2009). When combined with the sense of threat felt by the American people it was not actually difficult to discern that Bush's war on terror would end up in an expansive and contingent as well as disciplinary form of legitimacy rather than a just tactical move to address a terrorist attack with a heavy hand.

The Bush doctrine was also outlined on feeding the sense of threat. It was based on a “a definition of the threat based upon what it sees as the combination of ‘radicalism and technology’” (Record, 2003, p. 4) (Bush, 2009). In a Foucauldian understanding, *radicals* are the ones who act out of the norm and even attack the people who want to live up to the norm. Besides, the people and the countries who are *moderate* are well engaged with the technology. They both produce and use it. The *radicals* also have a similar access to that sphere. So, they have the ability to use the very same technology to threaten *moderates*. However, ironically, although 9/11 was conducted by hijacked airplanes, it is yet to say the developments in warfare technology has contributed to terrorist tactics. As Bruce Hoffman states, terrorist organizations act in a technological vacuum and still rely on bombs and guns (Hoffman, 2006).

Another tenet of Bush’s security discourse was his definition of adversaries as “non-negotiable”. Bush constructed “the Global War on Terror” (GWOT) with an ideological conviction that there is an evil enemy which is non-negotiable out there attacking the US and he, in self-defense of the country, has to wage a just war (Jackson, 2005). The narrative of a just war against a non-negotiable evil enemy has become foreign policy determinant throughout Bush’s presidency. The contrast between a non-negotiable evil enemy versus a good US did not only rewarded Bush’s counter-terrorism measures with a moral aspect but also dehumanized terror suspects. This narrative resulted in unilateral, preemptive, at some point extra judicial, indiscriminate and endless use of force (Jackson, 2011). Therefore, from invading Afghanistan and Iraq to establishing black sites overseas to by-pass US judicial systems, to tortures during enhanced interrogations, all controversial actions were product of the evil enemy versus good US discourse (Gerges, 2012). Many of the actions that Bush took abroad under the war on terror overseas were predominantly military actions but practices such as establishment of Guantanamo Bay prison, biometrics, surveillances or characterizing suspects as “enemy combatants” were part of discursive aspect of it.

Bush’s characterization of the respective enemy again works directly toward the sense of threat within public. The 2002 national security strategy document reads:

Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of

individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us. The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. [...] America will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorists— because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization. (2002)

A few characterizations are striking here as well. First, it tells the public that the enemy does not need a significant fund to strike the American soils. Second, they are not visible. Third, they are organized and can easily penetrate. Fourth, they can very well use technology. Fifth, they are supported by the states which are enemies of civilization, (in reference to the Western civilization).

The most significant outcome of Bush's discourse of war on terror was providing "a rhetorical (if not an empirical) rationale for the invasion of Iraq." (Reese & Lewis, 2009). However, amid disciplining public's sense of threat through definition and characterization of the threat, Bush administration also introduced an "institutional formation" at home (Aradau & Van Munster, 2007, p. 90). The US Congress with a recommendation from Bush administration passed USA PATRIOT (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Interrupt and Obstruct Terrorism) Act just weeks after 9/11. The legislation expands the scope and means for the administration to deal with terrorism. The biggest impact of this legislation was that it crippled privacy by allowing law enforcement agencies to wiretap and expanding their authority in surveillance. This legislation came out as part of the doctrine of pre-emption. In other words, the government would take some potential measures to strike at a threat before it posed to the country. However, it encompasses the discourse of contingency, threat and exception at the same time. It falls at an intersection of biopolitics, law or a configured map of power relations because this legislation allows a wide range of government entities with their intelligence branches to take preemptive measures toward the whole society. For instance, besides allowing eavesdropping the most private or the most casual conversations of everyone on the streets the law enforcement agents can execute their detention rights based on reasonable suspicion. So, while law has its boundaries defined the PATRIOT Act brings about an articulation and allows state agents to

redefine those boundaries in real time or bring in his/her perception into the boundaries of the law.

PATRIOT Act was a key legal measure in Bush's war on terror. In line with that legal move, the US government also amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) which brought domestic law enforcement into the business of foreign intelligence. As part of that legal step Terrorism Surveillance Program (TSP) was established. This program was also a preemptive task that would include anyone into the suspect list.

Barack Obama used all those tools that his predecessor established except for prohibition of torture. PATRIOT Act and TSP remained in force. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) which were established by Bush following 9/11 attacks remained and continued to be funded. What Obama did was to "de-emphasis of military power" and to "call for a restoration of American moral authority after Iraq war" (Pan & Turner, 2017, p. 86). Despite his criticism of Bush's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the divergence from Bush's domestic politics, it is still arguable to claim that Obama administration was a "fundamental break with neo-conservatism per se" in foreign policy (Pan & Turner, 2017, pp. 88-89). Continuation of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Obama administration's surge in troop numbers in Afghanistan in 2009 showed that Obama would barely change the events on the ground. Obama also remained in the dilemma of American values or virtue and American power. For instance, in his latest National Security Strategy of 2015

America must lead. Strong and sustained American leadership is essential to a rules-based international order that promotes global security and prosperity as well as the dignity and human rights of all peoples. The question is never whether America should lead, but how we lead. (2015)

What differed Obama was his approach to the execution of the counterterrorism and management of the discourse in that respect. One of the key divergences, was the dropping of global war on terror from use. The administration came up with an alternative term called "Overseas Contingency Operations" (OCO) (Guelke, 2010, p. 7). The administration also abandoned *radical Islamic terrorism* and used *radicalism* or *extremism* and very lately *violent extremism*. Some experts call this shift a rhetorical

one that “reflected a shift in emphasis” (Stern, 2015, p. 2). Stern even goes further to claim that coining new terms was to “mask similarities” with Bush era practices because the use of deadly force continued with full speed giving the example of drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen which left more almost 3,000 people dead (Stern, 2015, p. 2).

All in all, this study suggests that Obama’s discourse is distinguished by his emphasis of the shift and his characterization of the threat. Based on this discursive attempt Obama came up with new measures and technologies. Thus, Obama’s drone strike strategy can also be considered a part of this shift in emphasis. In other words, regardless of its outcome Obama adopted drone strikes as a strategy as part of his discourse alienating or singling extremists out of Muslims society.

CHAPTER 4

BARACK OBAMA'S DISCOURSE SWINGING BETWEEN VALUES AND AMERICAN GLOBAL POWER POLITICS

4.1. Introduction

Barack Obama took over the White House in Jan. 2009 amid a deep global financial crisis and at a time when the US was waging two wars – in Afghanistan and Iraq. When Obama got sworn in as the 44th American president, the US had over 200,000 troops in Afghanistan and Iraq for more than five years. Thousands of casualties and a kind of stalemate situation in both Iraq and Afghanistan had already exhausted American public's patience besides billion dollars of taxpayer money being poured into those two stalemates. So, it can be argued that it was easy for Obama to convince American public for a shift in approach but discourse very like politics has three addressees. On one hand, he had to re-characterize the security discourse and have American society adopt it, on the other he was to employ this discourse over American adversaries and posture it within American power in the global arena. In other words, the discursive shift has implications for Americans, American adversaries and the rest of the world.

In contrary to Bush's neo-conservative ideological background Obama was a leftist liberal (Rogak, 2007). The main difference between liberal and conservative discourses in the US politics is that the liberals put a significant emphasis on the "importance of Enlightenment ideals over the religious ones" (Horvath, 2009). This does not mean that conservatives overcast secularism and liberals omit religion from their discourse. Liberals also gives a significant attention to freedom and equality but as it coincided with the Marxist narrative, Democrats particularly in second half of the 20th Century, when the Cold War was raging on, came up with a narrative focused on

American problems such as segregation and civil rights.

Besides those liberal ideals, Obama's presidential campaign was based on an anti-war discourse. He discussed the need for change in many of the controversial regimes that Bush administration implemented such as torture as an interrogation method, military tribunals used in trial of terrorism suspects and preemptive invasive attacks abroad. Obama, during his inaugural address, defended that Al-Qaida threat does not require the US to bypass its commitments under international law saying: "We reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals" (2009c). On his second day in office he issued three executive orders in line with what he expressed. According to those Executive Orders military tribunals' operation in Guantanamo Bay prison was suspended, torture was outlawed, Guantanamo was decided to be closed in one year. Also, the orders stipulated for closure of Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) secret prisons overseas. It is arguable where Obama ended in his national security strategy up after his eight years' tenure as US president, but this chapter is to tackle how Obama constructed his discourse of shift and where he ended discursively.

It is worthy of being noted that one of the first term that Obama abandoned was the "global war on terror" coined by George W. Bush. After three months in the office, Obama administration issued a memorandum within the administration recommending the use of "overseas contingency operations" in reference to the US operations across the globe particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan (Wilson, 2009). This is a significant discursive shift that has several themes underpinned. On the other hand, the dilemma between security and reform that raged on within Obama administration came to an end before he finished his first year at the Oval Office following and attempted bombing on board a plane over Detroit on December 25, 2009 (Savage, 2015). So, the discursive shift to contingency operations and its connection with the security/reform dilemma debate is interesting to be analyzed.

With the rise of ISIS in the Middle East and the collapse of Obama's strategy in Iraq, the discourse was employed with new means and policies. Thus, it is important to analyze how Obama shifted the discourse and at the same time sustained the continuity in US national security. In other words, his understanding of threat, safety, security and the meaning he attributed to terrorism has a lot to do with coherently linking his actions such as military operations with a constructed paradigm within

politics. This chapter is devoted solely to the analysis of Obama's discourse, its evolution and means as well as its shifts and failures. Obama's speeches and the documents produced under his presidency will be engaged in depth with a Foucauldian power/discourse correlation understanding. Obama's inaugural address, his national security speeches and his key address at Cairo University will be primary sources of the analysis of this chapter besides the national security strategy documents, legislations and executive orders related to the national security.

In the first part, this chapter will focus on Obama's adoption of his national security discourse. Besides, his conceptualizations regarding security, safety, threat, war, terrorism and national security will be brought to the attention. In the second part, the techniques and technologies Obama used to employ that discourse will be analyzed in detail. Drone policy, bringing terror suspects into US justice system, NSA eavesdrops against American public as well as people in foreign countries will be analyzed. The connection between those techniques and technologies and Obama's discourse of national security will be engaged. The end results of those technologies will also be touched upon. The third part will handle the rise of ISIS and its impact on Obama's discourse. It will get into details of how Obama depicted ISIS members and ISIS extremism. Hypothetically this chapter claims that Obama's discourse swung between American virtue, value and historical narrative to the American hegemonic narrative and rise of ISIS played a critical role. This chapter will try to answer questions such as, how Obama's national security discourse evolved? What means he used to construct and justify it? How it shifted in eight years?

4.2. Adoption: Early Years of Obama's Discourse

4.2.1. Presidential Bid and Inaugural Speeches

There is a consensus that Barack Obama revised the American administration's approach to the foreign affairs. Alongside a rhetorical emphasis on values such as promoting democracy, prosperity and human rights he suggested military solutions to American public's sense of threat while departing from a reductionist view of radicalism (Gerges, 2012; Klaidman, 2012; Malley & Finer, 2018; McCrisken, 2010; Sanger, 2013). Obama's criticism of Bush's use of force contributed his political rise,

but this doesn't mean that Obama was not aware of terror threat (Malley & Finer, 2018). There is also a significant literature claiming that the war on terror was so embedded in American culture and politics that it would have been surprising if Obama rejected the idea of broader fight against terrorism or if he had rejected the idea of American hegemony employed through the war on terror (Jackson, 2011, p. 401). There are even some who claim that the war on terror has been a truth regime in American politics which would be nearly impossible to change (Zalman & Clarke, 2009; Croft, 2006).

Obama's discourse of national security was not one that evolved overnight. He was a Democrat and his opposition to George W. Bush's policy of war was out there. He was against the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, establishment of Guantanamo and other US operated interrogation sites. However, this study takes Obama's speech when he declared his presidential campaign in 2007 as a starting point for the evolution of Obama's national security discourse because this speech was his proposal of projecting power. Obama laid out his causes to be elected as the sovereign, so this speech is his first claim and discursive material.

Obama was a Democrat senator from Illinois when he declared his bid for presidential candidacy. In his speech on Feb. 10, 2007 while defining the challenges ahead of the country he mentioned Bush's GWOT policy and characterized it as a "war with no end" (Obama, 2007). Commemorating the 9/11 attacks Obama actually laid out his strategy of national security. He says:

We can work together to track terrorists down with a stronger military, we can tighten the net around their finances, and we can improve our intelligence capabilities. But let us also understand that ultimate victory against our enemies will come only by rebuilding our alliances and exporting those ideals that bring hope and opportunity to millions around the globe. (2007)

He mentions a "strong military" to track down terrorists, which is a divergence from invasions. As in Foucault's depiction of taking those with leprosy into quarantine, he suggests tackling the problem of terrorism by singling out terrorists from the rest of the community. He proposes tightening "the net around their finances" and improving intelligence. After the threatening subjects are dealt with then he suggests some mechanisms of containment in this way. By improving intelligence and preventing

those threatening American interests from accessing to financial sources he aims to keep the threat away or contain it so that it does not spread. Finally, he proposes building alliances and exporting “ideals”. From a Foucauldian perspective concepts like madness, delinquency, terrorism, gender, ideals, values and etc. are all discursive, produced and enunciations. They do not have an essential existence; they are part of the power relations and the political or the legal systems defining them (Foucault, 2010, pp. 280-282). So, the ideals that Obama mentions are the ones that American political power produced, and Obama suggests that exporting those ideals through alliances would teach or discipline the communities from which the threat to US national security emanates. Thus, one of the principle themes of Obama’s campaign was that al Qaeda threat “did not necessitate or justify the previous administration’s departure from America’s commitment to uphold basic international norms on torture and the treatment of prisoners” (Guelke, 2010, p. 7) and the US has some other options to deal with it.

Presidential campaign promises would not have been significant if Obama failed in the election in 2008. They would remain mere rhetorical assertions with not clear ties to power and governance. However, as he won the election, in terms of the way those rhetorical assertions transpired into action and their implications in the American global power projections they can be said to be the basis of Obama’s discourse or a starting point of evolution of Obama’s discourse. These assertions would be revisited throughout this chapter below.

Another key speech in the adoption of Obama’s discourse is his inaugural speech on January 20, 2009. Just a few weeks before Obama took office, a 23-year-old Nigerian called Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, boarded a plane heading to Detroit on Christmas Eve with explosives in his pants. However, he failed to detonate the device and caused a small fire inside the aircraft. The event called “Christmas Day plot” has a definite impact on Obama’s rhetoric. Although it reflected less in inaugural speech it was significant that Obama said in his inaugural address that the US is “at war” which is thought to be due to this plot (McCracken, 2011, p. 784).

It should be noted that Obama did not use the words such as “terrorist”, “terror” or “terrorism” even once in his inaugural address. The inaugural address outlines the crisis ahead of the US and emphasizes American history and values as the solution to

those challenges. The theme of the address rests on his call to restore American power both at home and in the world. Basing his argument on taking “strength from our heroic past” he emphasizes ideals such as “tolerance, curiosity, loyalty and patriotism” (Horváth, 2009, p. 49). Reference to history and his reading of history is important here. American history, very like any nation’s history is woven with wars and massacres. From colonial wars to the World War II and to the First Gulf War the search for domination and power has prevailed over values that Obama defends. So, here, as Foucault would argue, there is a tendency of describing the values “in terms of a linear development in reducing [their] entire history and genesis to an exclusive concern for utility” (Foucault, 1998, p. 52).

Obama, starts his remarks with the expression “My fellow citizens” (Obama, 2009c) instead of “my fellow Americans”. This is a departure that has some implications in his national security discourse. If he had said “my fellow Americans” it would have been an address to those who would identify themselves as *American*, but when he says “my fellow citizens” it addresses to definitely a larger group of people and includes those who are subjects of American state but would not identify themselves as American. In other words, emphasis on citizenship is a way of “grass root diplomacy” (Horváth, 2009, p. 50). This assertion unfolds itself down in the speech as a way of singling out those threatening American national security. For instance, when he addresses the issue of counter terrorism, he says “our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred” (Obama, 2009c). So, he does not use Bush era’s characterization of “radical Islamic terrorism”. He does not identify a group or an identity. Rather he characterizes the threat as violence and hatred.

He expresses a critique to those whom he calls “cynics”. He says, they have failed to “understand that the ground has shifted beneath them” and “the stale political arguments that have consumed us for so long no longer apply” (Obama, 2009c). One of the key political argument he refers to is the neo-conservative national security discourse because this critique comes in the conjunction of the speech where he moves to national security and countering adversaries of the US. So, he implies a paradigmatic shift has unfolded itself and the characterizations that have been used up to date are stale in today’s world. What is more, in the context of national security he

characterizes his presidency as “hope” versus “fear” by saying “on this day we gather because we have chosen hope over fear, unity of purpose over conflict and discord” (Obama, 2009c).

He suggests that he would leave Iraq to Iraqis and bring a sustaining peace to Afghanistan. So, he portrays an America which is not run by fear but by hope of peace. A striking sentence of him in this context reads, “As for our common defense we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals.” He creates a *dispositif* here by saying “our common defense” and defines a limit to this pervasive contingency by calling the choice between safety and ideals false. This is important because the question of where the common defense starts and where it ends and the dilemma over security and ideals have long been a debate in the aftermath of the 9/11.

His answer to the dilemma between safety and ideals is a disciplinary one. He says:

Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with the sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use. Our security emanates from the justness of our cause; the force of our example; the tempering qualities of humility and restraint. We are the keepers of this legacy, guided by these principles once more, we can meet those new threats that demand even greater effort, even greater cooperation and understanding between nations (2009c).

There are three points that need to be engaged here. First, he emphasizes that the actual hard power would not be enough to deal with the current threat. He suggests that the US must create alliances as a control and precautionary countering measure then convince communities in an enduring way. So, showing hard power as a deterrence, supporting countries as agents of disciplining mechanism and teaching communities that US hegemony is better for them is the global governance strategy that Obama advocates. In other words, he exerts projecting power not only through deterrence but also through disciplining and global governance.

Second, he acknowledges that the US hegemony can grow through “prudent use”. That is to say, instead of using it arbitrarily, he suggests using power in such a way to govern the risk that he acknowledged before and discipline the addressees of that power. The more prudently power is used the better it serves to itself and govern

the risks against it. Thus, taking into consideration Foucault's comparison of Middle and Early Modern Ages' way of exerting power with modern way of executing power in *Discipline and Punish*, prudent use of power that Obama mentions is more pervasive and sustaining.

Third, in Foucauldian sense risk is actually a *dispositif* to govern social issues. The *dispositif* consists of a large array of things including discourses, institutions, legal measures, laws or philosophical propositions (Foucault, 1980). It is a "network of power relations which articulates how a power is not based upon classical conception of sovereignty manifests itself" (Frost, 2015). Obama's another statement here to analyze is "our security emanates from the justness of our cause". Obama uses security rather than safety. Throughout his tenure he used these two terms interchangeably and it can be said that when he talks about a threat to people which addresses the fear among masses he uses safety but when he talks about threats toward American state or global power then he uses security. Here he prefers security over safety; thus, he is referring to the wellbeing of American global power. So, the wellbeing of American global power, he suggests, emanates from the justness of cause, that is, discourse. In other words, the way you characterize the things going on in the world and locate yourself into them would have implications on your dominance. As a result, security *dispositif* feeds the power, for Obama. What is more, instead of "just war" he uses "justness of our cause." Discursively it is a great shift from previous administration's rhetoric. He does not impose a war on the world by calling it "just" rather he imposes a "cause" which has a more perpetual meaning and encompasses a large spectrum of measures.

4.2.2. Early Executive Orders and Memoranda

On January 22, 2009, his second day at the White House Obama signed three Executive Orders regarding his counter terrorism policy. The first was titled "Ensuring Lawful Interrogations". The executive order was regarding prohibition of torture as a means of interrogation and orders the closure of all CIA prisons. The rationale behind Obama's over is stated in the Executive Order numbered 13491 laid out as "in order to improve the effectiveness of human intelligence-gathering", "to promote the safe, lawful, and humane treatment of individuals" and "to take care that the laws of the

United States are faithfully executed” (White House, 2009a). First, Obama thinks that torture is not effective as a method of intelligence gathering, so banning it would improve the human intelligence gathering. In a Foucauldian sense, for Obama the punitive treatment should contribute to effective governance. Second, he is concerned about subjectivity of individual’s personality thus it should be banned for the sake of safe, lawful and humane treatment of individual. In the text of the order it is also mentioned that any interrogation should be mindful of “human dignity” as well. Human body, no matter whose body it is, has a subjectivity and part of humanity as a species and very like one’s dignity it should not be exposed to intentional extreme conditions. Third, he bans torture to ensure US laws are executed properly. US laws represent US power and has a lot to do with the US discourse of virtue as well as US’ “just cause” mentioned above.

The second Executive Order regarding national security and counter-terrorism discourse, was titled “Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities.” This Executive Order required all prisons operated by the Defense Department and CIA to be closed and those agencies of the government to report to the Attorney General of the US regarding the disposition of the detainees under their custody (White House, 2009b). This Executive Order is also crucial because with this order Obama targets the discourse of “exceptionalism” and aims to bring all detainees into American legal system. So, he binds legitimacy of the custody of these detainees to the legality of it. On the same day, he signed another Executive Order titled “Review of Detention Policy Options” (White House, 2009c). This Executive Order, orders the establishment of a task force that will review the disposition of every individual detained on the grounds of terrorism and defines the roadmap for US government to detain people in relations to an armed conflict.

These Executive Orders were the first steps that Obama took regarding his counter terrorism policy. Discursively, they have reflections from Obama’s “just cause” discourse and American global power virtue. They have traces of US power politics, but they do not define terrorism and characterize the disposition of those detained at Guantanamo. However, it changes the idea of containment that was put forward by previous administration. Bush administration was advocating to keep

Guantanamo open for those detainees as a way of containment. Obama conversely argue that transparency and accountability would contain the terror threat and be effective in counterterrorism efforts. On the other hand, some people also argue that bringing detainees into American legal system might have risks. It might seem as a measure to evade Bush's *exceptionalist* containment but there are people who also argue that the detainees of armed conflict may influence the other detainees in local prisons, or try to benefit from some loopholes in American legal system (Mukasey, 2009). In other words, they take Guantanamo prison not only as a punishment but also a larger preventive measure.

After his second month at the White House, Obama issued a memo to the Department of Defense and asking the department to use "Overseas Contingency Operations" instead of "Global War on Terror". (Scott & Kamen, 2009). This was also one of the early signs of adoption of the new discourse. Obama administration abandoned the view that the US is "involved in a war" so that rather than procedures of war the administration could employ judicial procedures against the suspects of terrorism (Mukasey, 2009, p. 955). By shifting the name of the US global operations against insurgent groups Obama defines counter terrorism efforts not as a war but as a contingency.

Contingency is a central concept of Foucault's analysis of history and its implications on the present time. For Foucault a key portion of current practices and established norms were actually been constructed in order for managing certain risks or governing certain social factors in a way to govern social realities. This notion in Foucault goes also into the construction of selfhood and basic subjectivities such as gender (Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume I an Introduction, 1978a). By that, Foucault problematizes the present day and destabilizes the notion of normality, necessity or naturality. Thus, Foucault claims that the present practices are constructed contingently.

Obama's use of contingency here actually refers to the fact that upcoming practices are going to construct the counter-terrorism practice of the US of future. Although it is perceived that dropping the concept of war on terror was softening the use of hard power, it does not. By calling it contingency Obama erases the boundaries of counter terrorism that is limited to the war on terror. He means a contingent

construction of terrorism problem that will be brought into the political rationality by the use of any necessary means in order to take terrorism under control of American security mechanisms. It is actually governing the risk of terrorism thus in a way a security *dispositif*. It is arguable if Obama managed to re-construct the problematic of terrorism, but by building on the existing technologies he extended the scope of counter terrorism practices.

4.2.3. The First National Security Speech

What Obama was suggesting was a new approach to the national security and a new set of technologies of containing “extremists” in their own hinterlands. Although he had said he would end the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in his first speech on national security on May 21, 2009 again he said actually the US is “at war with al-Qeada” (Obama, 2009b). However, conceptually the war he meant was different from a conventional invasion. Very like any American president calling himself the Commander in Chief, Obama said in his May 21 speech:

My single most important responsibility as President is to keep the American people safe. It's the first thing that I think about when I wake up in the morning. It's the last thing that I think about when I go to sleep at night (2009b).

In a Foucauldian sense politics administers the fear among subjects and translate it into political gains as well as a governance tool. What Obama tried to do differently was trying to navigate or rule not only the fear but also the threat as well. He said again in his famous first national security speech “that our government would need new tools to protect the American people, and that these tools would have to allow us to prevent attacks instead of simply prosecuting those who try to carry them out” (Obama, 2009b). In other words, he was talking about preventive measures and governing the risk of terrorism. He was against using bulk number of troops invading countries and causing massive destruction. He was opposing the idea of interrogating terror suspects or in Bush’s phrase “enemy combatants” with techniques such as waterboarding and holding a massive number of suspects in a prison like Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. So, he was not technically against the war on terror. Rather Obama was asking for more sustainable and governable tactics. After his one hundred days in the White House he describes the changes he did in national security policy:

To protect the American people and our values, we've banned enhanced interrogation techniques. We are closing the prison at Guantanamo. We are reforming military commissions, and we will pursue a new legal regime to detain terrorists. We are declassifying more information and embracing more oversight of our actions, and we're narrowing our use of the state secrets privilege. These are dramatic changes that will put our approach to national security on a surer, safer, and more sustainable footing (2009b).

It can be said that what he did was actually a kind of cleaning the mess that blurred the American national security discourse while at the same time taking the tool from the hands of adversary groups, which they used for recruiting fighters. Actually, he expresses it explicitly in the very same speech. He describes the above-mentioned tactics as:

They serve as a recruitment tool for terrorists, and increase the will of our enemies to fight us, while decreasing the will of others to work with America. They risk the lives of our troops by making it less likely that others will surrender to them in battle, and more likely that Americans will be mistreated if they are captured. In short, they did not advance our war and counterterrorism efforts -- they undermined them, and that is why I ended them once and for all (2009b).

It is arguable to what extent he was successful in his strategy but it should be noted that the starting point of Obama's counter terrorism policy was discourse. He built up his national security strategy on rearranging the information and changing the tools that lead to a certain kind of information that indirectly has an impact on national security. By declassification of certain documents and information, abolishing violent interrogation tactics as well as efforts to close Guantanamo help the strategy to sustain itself both within the American society and across the globe. They also built up defenses within the adversaries. Realigning all those policies with new tools becomes a weapon to be used on the adversaries.

4.2.4. Cairo Address: A New Page with Islamic World

Apart from those early documents and speeches there is a key speech by Obama that mark his national security discourse, in particular his reflections on war on terror: His address at Cairo University. On June 4, 2009, Obama addressed the Muslim world from Cairo. He contextualizes his speech by mentioning the tensions between Muslim world and the west. He criticizes the West due to its colonial policies which denied Muslims

their rights and then he asserts that during the Cold War Muslim countries were viewed as just proxies without self-aspirations (Obama, 2009a). Obama also claims that globalization and modernity has led a tension between the West and Muslim world because Muslims view those values as hostile to Islamic tradition. It can be either a criticism or a characterization of the west's depiction of the Muslim world. The striking point in this part of Cairo speech is that Obama says, "violent extremists have exploited these tensions in a small but potent minority of Muslims" (Obama, 2009a). There are two important characterizations here. These are "violent extremism" and "a small but potent minority of Muslims." These characterizations suggest that Obama imagines Muslims in three subjectivities. One is ordinary Muslims who are majority, the other is potent Muslims who are minority and the third is violent extremist Muslims who exploit the tension within the potent minority. Obama prefers extremism rather than terrorism.

Extremism philosophically may have volumes of references but as a concept in International Law it was for the first time defined in UN's Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism on June 15, 2001.

The convention defines extremism as:

An act, aimed at the forcible seizure of power or forcible retention of power, as well as a violent change of the constitutional system of the state and a violent encroachment upon public security, including the organization of the above purposes of illegal armed formations and participation in them, and pursued under criminal law in accordance with the national legislation of the Parties (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2001).

Terrorism also falls close to this definition. But, Obama specifically avoids using terrorism to define even a small group of Muslims. Blaming extremists for 9/11 attacks, Obama claims that this very small group of people has created a negative connotation of Muslims. The fear and the mistrust within the Western world toward the entire Muslim society stems from the actions of a small group of people, he suggests.

Another important characterization that Obama does is that he calls for a new beginning with Muslim world and says it should be based on "mutual interest" and "mutual respect" (Obama, 2009a). It is important that he sees an equality between the US and the Muslim world. Rather than an interventionist Western oriented or at some

point orientalist point of view, Obama does not characterize the Middle East or the Muslim world an area of domination or a subordinate polity.

There is another interesting characterization that Obama does in this speech. He “America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition” (Obama, 2009a). He perceives Islam as a collection of values that represent the Muslim world and America as the ideals that represent the US or the west in general. Speaking of his own experience he marks another representation by saying “I know civilization’s debt to Islam” (Obama, 2009a). This sentence actually distinguishes the political rhetoric and the traces of western-oriented discourse in Obama’s remarks. It stands highly problematic in Obama’s discourse. The term “civilization” has attracted a long debate among social scientists. Clearly there is not a single meaning attributed to it and the reason for this is that there is a strong political connotation attached to it. There are two main lanes of civilization theories. One of them argues civilization as a cumulation of social norms developed over a historical period (Huntington, 1997). Within the frame of this theory there are different civilizations in different geographies. They have both historical and spatial roots. The other one, in line with the European enlightenment and colonial endeavors considers civilization as single and unitary system of norms and values. Anthony Pagden defines it as:

A state, social, political, cultural aesthetic – even moral and physical – which is held to be the optimum condition for all mankind, and this involves the implicit claims that only the civilized can know what it is to be civilized (1988, p. 33).

Obama uses the term civilization in line with this Euro-centric reflection of western hegemony, while at the same time claiming that America and Muslims world need to make a new beginning based on mutuality. Moreover, his predecessor, George W. Bush used the same term in describing the 9/11 attacks. Bush, nine days after 9/11 calls on the world that the response to the 9/11 should be considered as the “fight for civilization” (Bush, 2001a). So, a broader power-relations play out in Obama’s usage of civilization. That is to say, he speaks of a hegemonic set of representations which he claims Islam has also contributed to.

Despite of his contradiction in remarking civilization and Muslim world, in another key characterization, he goes against the spatial representation of Islam and

says: “Islam is a part of America” (Obama, 2009a). Particularly in Western political literature Islam is identified with the broader Middle East. From Bernard Lewis, to Samuel Huntington Islam is spatially a Middle Eastern case. Particularly after 9/11, Bush’s characterization of “radical Islamic terrorism” was the main discursive representation of the Middle East. However, Obama comes out and asserts that Islam is a part of America. By doing so, taking into consideration of his rejection of using radical Islamic terrorism during his entire tenure, it can be said Obama actually does not attribute spatial representations to Islam and specific subjectivities to the Middle East.

Here, Obama’s remarks from his announcement of presidential bid to the early months of his presidency as well as some of his memoranda and executive are analyzed as the basis of his discourse. His articulation of security, safety, threat, war, terrorism and national security have been touched upon. Obama’s conceptualization of values and ideals as well as his attributions and representations regarding Islam, America, Muslim population, terrorist and extremist subjectivities have been engaged. Below, Obama’s usage of those enunciations will be engaged alongside some of practices he adopted as part of his discourse will be handled.

4.3. Evolution: Legitimized Means Domination: Obama’s Panopticons

Over the years at the White House it can be said Obama sustained his discourse regarding the image of Muslim subject. The means he used were selective and in line with that discourse although it cannot be said that he changed the course of US dominative foreign policy and hegemonic understanding within the American state. The dilemma between ideals/values and security has become key to Obama’s security discourse. It is not something surprising because as Bigo, expresses, “the prism of security” is popular among a large spectrum of analysts including politicians, military experts, journalist, social service analysts, technology companies, cyber experts, law enforcement, judiciary and even “significant fraction of public opinion” (Bigo, 2002, p. 63). Such a wide range of interest in security bring about a continuous unease thanks to their inputs. So, this parabolic momentum combined with individual incidents cause the leadership that govern the risk and fear to use legitimacy granted to him for

targeting terrorists or criminals in a way to establish domination (Bigo, 2002). In Obama's case, thanks to the pressure from the respective large spectrum of the interested groups, Obama tried to come up with new technologies of domination particularly return to the use of drones and NSA's widespread wiretaps. Thus, in Obama's security discourse, his characterization of drone policy and wiretaps are crucial.

As mentioned above, during his presidential bid and early years as President, Obama singled out "terrorist" subjects from the Muslim community and expressed that those whom he called "extremists" have distorted the message of Islam. After characterizing his norms, he uses certain technologies as disciplinary mechanisms to prevent or punish those going off limits. In order to contextualize this, Foucault security modalities should be referred here. Foucault depicts three modalities in his *Security, Territory Population* where he differentiates security from disciplinary mechanisms. The first modality consists of a penal law and punishment against breaking of the penal law. The second modality consists of penal law, punishment and surveillance to prevent any violation to happen. Then the third modality besides encompassing the mentioned two modalities focuses on statistical evaluation and ratios of the possible violations; conditions under which the predictions regarding violations may change; potential effects of those violations and etc. (Foucault, 1978b, p. 16). According to Foucault while the first two modalities fall under the disciplinary mechanism "the third form is not typical of the legal code or the disciplinary mechanism, but of the apparatus (dispositif) of security" (Foucault, 1978b, p. 19). However, Foucault puts forward that any disciplinary action taken to punish or correct a crime has message to the possible future occurrences; thus, the disciplinary system, "includes a whole series of dimensions that absolutely belong to the domain of security" (Foucault, 1978b, p. 21). In this context, drone strikes as part of Obama's discourse of singling out terrorist subjects and widespread wiretapping as part of his discourse of surveilling the possible risk were Obama's disciplinary mechanisms of governing the risk. In Foucauldian terms these technologies can also be termed as Obama's panopticon and they were key parts of the evolution of Obama's discourse.

4.3.1. Targeted Killings as Discourse

There is a consensus within academia that the US war on terror is far from over with Obama at the White House. Rather, literature shows and as mentioned above, only the discourse of war on terror and the means of that discourse has changed with Obama. Targeted killing/drone policy was one of the key elements here. As a disciplinary mechanism, drone program was the message of Obama not only in terms of reflecting the discursive characterizations he made but also in terms of his expression and exercise of the US hegemony.

Unmanned aerial vehicles were used by Obama's predecessor Bush as well but in a very limited way. From 2005 to 2008 US reportedly conducted 50 drone strikes and killed about 200 to 700 terror suspects (David-Hanson, 2013). But during the Obama's first term, US forces conducted 300 strikes and killed 2,500 to 3,000 people in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Some would even argue that drone policy was not different from torture or detention at Guantanamo as it was also one of "[the] violent mechanisms legitimated in the light of the state of exception that the war on terror epitomises." (Degenhardt, 2013, pp. 43-44). However, the discussion on drone strikes were not only centered around civilian casualties but also the idea that this technology as used by Obama has brought a new dimension to the concept of war (Guelke, 2010; Degenhardt, 2013; Stern, 2015). It was not just an unmanned version of a fighter overhead the frontline where war was going on, but as it was used in a extremely large area including the areas far away from battle field it also created the effect of American power over an entire region. It was a hidden eye overhead by which Obama would discuss the US would inflict fear into the heart enemy of America (David-Hanson, 2013).

Obama's key speech on use of drone program as a means of national security strategy came in 2013. At a speech at National Defense University, he detailed his strategy of use of drones. Referring to drone program he says: "In an age when ideas and images can travel the globe in an instant, our response to terrorism can't depend on military or law enforcement alone" (Obama, 2013). Drones were actually used by the military and the intelligence, but Obama puts it in a way to mean an unconventional force "to win a battle of wills, a battle of ideas" (Obama, 2013). The battle of wills

was against the adversaries of the US while the battle of ideas was against the critics at home who claim that the US has lost ground in the globe. To put it differently, Obama asserts that drone policy is battle against the will of Al Qaeda to fight the US as it creates a panopticon like canopy overhead even in the most distant desert. He also puts forward that this mechanism refutes the ideas that the US is losing ground by pulling back because drones provide an omnipresence to the US in the Middle East. Therefore, besides being a mere tool of punishment or a disciplinary mechanism drones were also a message of Obama's security apparatus. He characterizes drones strikes not as a tool "to punish individuals" but one that used to contain terrorism which has a continuous threat to the US.

In terms of justification of this technology of domination there are some striking preferences and comparisons that Obama makes. On civilian casualties, he says:

Nevertheless, it is a hard fact that U.S. strikes have resulted in civilian casualties, a risk that exists in every war... But as Commander-in-Chief, I must weigh these heartbreaking tragedies against the alternatives. To do nothing in the face of terrorist networks would invite far more civilian casualties — not just in our cities at home and our facilities abroad, but also in the very places like Sana'a and Kabul and Mogadishu where terrorists seek a foothold. Remember that the terrorists we are after target civilians, and the death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian casualties from drone strikes (2013).

He prefers one form of life over the another, as Bigo would characterize it (Bigo, 2002). However, the life that he includes into the risk is not the denounced one or the off limit one such as a terror suspect or terrorist leader but a civilian very like the ones he prefers. In other words, death of civilians in the vicinity of terror suspects' compounds is preferred over the death of civilians in other parts of the world. Notwithstanding, by mentioning the civilians in US and those in Middle Eastern cities he shows his persistence in rejecting the exceptionalist view against Muslim community.

In the same speech, his legitimization of the drone policy is also striking. He says that with the fall of Berlin Wall, democracy took hold abroad and peace came to the US. But with 9/11 a new form of war was brought to the US, he suggests. He adds "No armies came to our shores, and our military was not the principal target. Instead,

a group of terrorists came to kill as many civilians as they could.” (Obama, 2013). Contrasting, the post-Cold War triumph of the US-led West over communist Soviet with the 9/11 events he draws a thick redline tracing over main American sentiment of fear and threat. By mentioning that it was not a conventional sort of war where two armies clashed but a group came to kill as many as civilians who are irrelevant with the US military actions, Obama makes a discursive contrast in order to legitimize the employment of drone strikes in hitting terror suspects.

The entire text builds up the sense of threat and the legitimate reaction to it by making comparisons and contrasts. The speech does not only tap on legitimacy or just war discourse but also security and legality of the means used. In other words, it paves the ideological foundation of justification. The legal basis of drone program was outlined as part of the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) of 2001. It is a legislation that gives the president the authority to use any force necessary against those responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001. Therefore, although the strikes were individual in a broad theater Obama administration characterized it as part of the ongoing war rather than assassinations. Obama and his legal team would not classify drone program as a norm but an exception but over time it became the norm. As Foucault would put it, “rights, peace and laws were born in the blood and mud of battles” (Foucault, 2003, p. 50). In 2014, when ISIS took control of a large swathe of territory in Iraq and Syria, drone strikes and airstrikes became the main tool of Obama to enforce US power in the mayhem of war in the region.

All in all, narrative of war has a significant impact on shaping not only political reactions but also sociopolitical realities. Images of violence coming out of Syria and circulating on media, haunted American public and 9/11 type of catastrophes were revisited in the US. Combined with Obama’s criticism of inconclusive devastations in Iraq and Afghanistan led Obama to come up with perpetual means of war without making too much concession from his early discourse. That was the re-implementation of drone program alongside manned aircraft strikes. Hence, the process of legitimization of drone program did not only justified perpetual violence but also formed a sociopolitical reality in the Americans’ mind (Hodges, 2011; van Dijk, 1998).

4.3.2. Mass Surveillance and Obama's national security discourse

Foucault's almost entire academic work at some point end up at the shore of his theme of power-knowledge relation. As mentioned in previous chapters, from sciences like history, architecture, psychology, genealogy to specific topics of sexuality or discipline or punishment, all have a central node that is the relation between power and knowledge. Surveillance, in Foucauldian terms, is of key significance in the relation between power and knowledge. In other words, in order to enforce a power or power effect on a population and govern the risks towards that power, surveillance and data collection are indispensable. It can be said that surveillance is both part of power and that of knowledge.

The US government's mass surveillance was going on covertly since 2001 but it is important to note that it became part of national security discourse after it was leaked by a former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden. In other words, only after it was discovered by the population it began to serve as a panopticon for the masses. It might not be intentional, but Snowden crisis somehow served the Obama administration's national security discourse. Therefore, apart from its application to the entire American public as well as many foreign countries' leadership and security bureaucracy, the knowledge of its existence made the mass surveillance and metadata case an important means of discourse for Obama.

As a background, in June 2013, British daily Guardian published a document leaked by Snowden unveiled that the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) ordered the communication company Verizon to deliver the call record of its customers to NSA (Greenwald, 2013). Later on, it came out the FISC has issued the same order to all other telephone line carriers. The government claimed that it was not collecting the content but the identity of the caller, whom s/he called, where the both persons at the end of each line located etc. (Mornin, 2014). Legal justification, according to the government, was resting within the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), a post 9/11 legislation that gave a vast power to the government against terror threat. In terms of justification the government would claim that it was necessary for countering threat that the nation face.

It came out further later that actually the system was not just a basic phone call record rather it had a deeper intervention into the privacy of individuals. There were two massive surveillance programs, one called Prism, the other Mascular Prism. Prism was collecting open source data on the Internet while Mascular Prism was a system getting into unencrypted data from major software and internet operators such as Google or Yahoo “by hacking into their internal networks” (Mills J. L., 2015). Through these collected data a program called XKEYSCORE would search for selected key words to identify suspects to be deeply surveilled. It was in a way a filter of the metadata collected.

The way it was applied is somehow analogues of Foucault biopower, because it is at some point an engagement into the very private contents of an individual. The only difference was that it was not done on body or biological behavior but social or technological behavior of individuals. However, this was not an Obama era case. It had been going on for a decade when discovered and Obama was just into his second term when it came out. Rather than its application the discursive effect of it was used by Obama. In other words, the knowledge of being surveilled made the it to be a panopticon and this was initiated by Snowden crisis.

As part of the analysis of how mass surveillance became a panopticon, Obama’s early reactions to the NSA controversy is important to touch upon. Regarding the controversy Obama leaves people in a discursive paradox saying that he made two commitments which were “to keep American people safe” and “to uphold the constitution” which include the right to privacy. His commitment to uphold the Constitution was actual one that stemmed from the previous administration non-constitutional actions in countering terror suspects. The dilemma between security and values or law is played out here by Obama as a justification. He claims that the contents of phone calls are not tracked but by sifting through those records, the intelligence may catch up somebody who is after some sort of terrorist action against the US and he continues:

You'll remember when I made that speech a couple of weeks ago about the need for us to shift out of a perpetual war mindset, I specifically said that one of the things that we're going to have to discuss and debate is how are we striking this balance between the need to keep the American people safe and our concerns about privacy? Because there are some tradeoffs involved (2013).

The message to the public here is striking. He says that he had been in an effort to get out of the perpetual war which was waged through military means but at the same time within this effort there would be some issues with the balance between security and privacy. He adds that there would be some tradeoffs, that is to say, concessions. American public, in that context, are asked to give up their partial privacy in exchange for a temporary security (Mornin, 2014). Obama explicitly expresses that as well by saying “[...] you can’t have 100 percent security and then have 100 percent privacy and zero inconvenience. We are going to have make some choices as a society” (Obama, 2013). In addition to that, he tries to convince the public that they should prefer security over privacy because “in evaluating these programs, they make a difference in our capacity to anticipate and prevent possible terrorist activity” (Obama, 2013). Another important quote to refer to in Obama’s remarks regarding the NSA controversy is that includes himself as a subject of the program as well. He says:

I will leave this office at some point, sometime in the last -- next three and a half years, and after that, I will be a private citizen. And I suspect that, on a list of people who might be targeted so that somebody could read their emails or listen to their phone calls, I'd probably be pretty high on that list. It's not as if I don't have a personal interest in making sure my privacy is protected (2013).

By saying that he actually gives an omnipotence to power. In other words, the NSA surveillance is not something of personal preference, rather in order to maintain security and preserve American power everyone including the person at the helm of the power should admit and be subject to it he means. This is the power of discourse. It can be some sort of rhetorical practices but at the same time the utmost power that create, identify and characterize those rhetorical practices. The discourse at some point creates the basis for social or political order but at the same time is being constructed within the same social or political crises.

To sum up, the effect of certain leaks regarding surveillance was limited because many people would consider that as a conspiracy theory employed to create a certain amount of power effect. Moreover, not the entire public was aware of those leaks. However, when documents in that regard began to circulate on mass media, people not only at home but also abroad began to read those leaks with the volumes of

previously circulating conspiracies. That is to say, the effect of Snowden leaks were multiplied with the conspiracy theories. Because of the exposure of the mass surveillance, some polls show that nearly half of American internet users said they had changed their online behavior in 2016 when Obama left the White House. Besides, a vast majority of American adults (82%) found the government surveillance acceptable in a late 2014 survey (Geiger, 2018). This means that the mechanism has been internalized to a great extent by the masses.

4.4. Shifts in Obama's Discourse with The Rise Of ISIS

This study does not specifically aim to define a failure or a success for Obama's counterterrorism policy because the focus is not on the policy, but discourse and it is difficult to attain failure to a discourse. However, uncalculated changes in certain structures or policies, which might be called failure by many have created constraints for discourse and led it to shift. So, this part will focus on the course of Obama's discourse amid changes in the security environment. It will particularly handle the speeches since 2014 after the rise of ISIS which is a significant change in the security environment. By doing that it will tackle to constraints on Obama's national security discourse constructed in 6 years and see if there has been any shift.

Without getting into the circumstances that breed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), as a summary ISIS, in June 2014, began an invasion campaign in Iraq's second largest city Mosul and destroyed the entire Iraqi Armed Forces lines in Northern Iraq. The group occupied a large swathe of territory in Iraq, captured American equipment from Iraqi Armed Forces, stolen millions of dollars from Central Bank of Mosul and haunting images of violence started to flow in through media. With one third of Iraq and half of Syrian territory fallen to the terror group many experts characterized the events going on in the Middle East as Obama's failure to end the war on terror (Stern, 2015; Craig, 2016; Savage, 2015; Porter, 2018). The rise of ISIS, although in its initial phase had not a direct impact in the US, as the haunting images of beheadings and humanitarian crisis that a minority group in Iraq called Yazidis suffered surfaced on media it brought about a sense of threat among the public, also alarmed the security bureaucracy in the US.

In his reaction to the ISIS' sudden overrun in Iraq Obama for the first time in his tenure used the word jihadist to define ISIS. He said: "I don't rule out anything, because we do have a stake in making sure that these jihadists are not getting a permanent foothold in either Iraq or Syria, for that matter" (Obama, 2014a). Shortly after those remarks the US began to launch massive airstrikes in Iraq against the terror group.

The entire counter terrorism paradigm was designed to prevent a group to launch another attack on the US like the one on 9/11. However, ISIS, which called itself a Caliphate with ambitions of erasing the borders in the region, was then threatening the status quo in the Middle East besides threatening the West. In other words, ISIS at some point for American security bureaucracy was not only as a terror group but also a threat to the America's global power.

4.4.1. ISIS and Reconstruction of American Global Power

4.4.1.1. Rise of ISIS and Obama's Portrayal of ISIS Subject

The rise of ISIS brought about a massive pressure on Obama's counter terrorism discourse and thus constrained it significantly. It can be said that Obama made a major shift to his characterization of the terrorist subject. At the same time, addressing the concerns regarding the US global power and its execution on that a newly grown on up terror group was crucial in Obama's discourse. During the Bush era, reconstruction of American global power was one of the most prevailing narrative which justified and opened the way for invasion of Iraq and Syria. Al Qaeda, thus affected not only the making of US foreign policy in early 2000s but also defined it (Siniver & Lucas, 2016). Obama built up his discourse challenging this particularity of Bush era. However, rise of ISIS brought back the question of reconstruction of American values and power.

Obama's first discursive reaction to the rise of ISIS was his effort to name it. The group is believed to be an offshoot of Al-Qaeda and was established in Iraq in 2006 but it became famous when it declared chaliphacy over territories in Iraq and Syria. It was calling itself Islamic State of Iraq and Sham in reference to Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine. This was translated by many as Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Markoe, 2015). The group amid confusions

in the world about its name shortened its name as “Islamic State” in late 2014. Obama’s engagement in a counter-messaging with ISIS based on its name was key in his anti-ISIS discourse and important in terms of continuity of his already ripened discourse. This study prefers the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) because the group mainly operates and projects power in Iraq and Syria.

Naming, as something that characterizes or defines is crucial because it creates social realities. At the same time “language affects perception, cognition and emotion, it inevitably also affects concrete actions,” (Jackson, 2005, s. 23). Name has important connotation to the scope of action, targets and many other strategic decisions. For instance, calling it only Islamic State as the group does call itself would create challenges with respect to the entirety of the Islamic World. It might be understood as a war on Islam as ISIS would prefer it to be understood like that. Calling Islamic State of Iraq and Syria would also at that time turn the attentions to Syria which was in the middle of a civil war at that time that Obama would prefer to avoid. So using “Levant” instead of “Syria” would disguise the geographical scope from American public’s sight because Levant is not a part of geographical imagination of American people.

Then Secretary of State John Kerry, even came out and suggested the name Daesh for the group. Although it was the Arabic abbreviation of ISIS, Kerry meant apostate when he referred to the group. At a Senate hearing he said, “I prefer Daesh because I know that the Arab world has a real meaning with that, and I think we ought to respect that.” (Kerry, 2014). Kerry also says that in the Middle East people call it Daesh because “they believe very deeply it is not a state, and it does not represent Islam” (Kerry, 2014). This is important and it gives signals of Obama discourse of singling out terrorist and their ideology from the Muslim community and Islam.

The strategy was a bit clear when the events in Iraq went out of control. In the wake of rise of ISIS Obama, introduced Counter Terrorism Partnership Fund (U.S. Department of State, 2014) to be established under the State Department to fund US partners in the world to help the US in its counter terrorism efforts. Combined with naming endeavor, it was clear that Obama would build a discourse to keep ISIS into a quarantined geography dealt with by forces aligned with the US. Denying of ISIS to

claim on Islam and Muslims community recurred itself throughout Obama's remaining two years tenure.

As part of his singling out the ISIS within the Muslim community Obama makes an inhuman image of ISIS members and the group more of a danger to the entire humanity. In one of his early remarks on the group, he said:

ISIL speaks for no religion ... ISIL has no ideology of any value to human beings ... They may claim out of expediency that they are at war with the United States or the West, but the fact is they terrorize their neighbors and offer them nothing but an endless slavery to their empty vision, and the collapse of any definition of civilized behavior (2014b).

It should be also noted that this characterization comes after ISIS beheaded American journalist James Foley in Syria and published the video of the beheading act on the Internet. Here, in an effort to single out ISIS, as a terror group not really related to the Muslim community, Obama, defines ISIS as not representative of any religion, any ideology, any human value and a group beyond a stereotypical imagination of terror suspects. He identifies the groups' mission as terrorizing Muslims more than anybody else, enslaving them to their "empty vision" and demolishing "any definitions of civilized behavior." Therefore, war on ISIS by Obama is depicted as an effort to prevent destruction of civilized world's values by an inhumane group.

Acknowledging the bloodshed ongoing in the Middle East, Obama in another speech says, "In a region that has known so much bloodshed, these terrorists are unique in their brutality" (Obama, 2014d). His discourse is centered around an image of uniqueness in brutality which drives a difference between Bush's terror suspects and his terrorist subjects in order to legitimize the use of force. In the same speech he defines ISIS as a cancer saying "it will take time to eradicate a cancer like ISIL" (Obama, 2014d). A cancer erupts into a body. So for Obama, ISIS as a cancer is threatening the entire World and civilization and is destructive illness that need to be addressed. During his address at United Nations General Assembly in 2014, Obama made a statement which remarkably brought him close to the Bush's discourse. He says:

There can be no reasoning -- no negotiation -- with this brand of evil. The only language understood by killers like this is the language of force. So the United States of America will work with a broad coalition to dismantle this network of death (2014f).

Recalling from the previous chapter, discursively the outcome of Bush's first national security strategy was this: The US has an enemy which is unnegotiable, evil, radical and Muslim. When it comes to the enemy of Obama's US, it is unnegotiable, evil, brutal, a network of death but not Muslim. In other words, in the first three months of ISIS violence, there is not much difference between Obama's definition of ISIS terrorist and Bush's Al-Qaeda terrorist subject.

Obama's portrayal of Muslim image was one of the consistent part of his national security discourse. In 2015 when a Muslim couple perpetrated an attack on civilians in San Bernardino, California, Obama made a key speech on terror. The interesting part of San Bernardino shooting was that the attackers had no connection with an overseas militant group. Obama, confirming this fact, says the two attackers "had gone down the dark path of radicalization, embracing a perverted interpretation of Islam that calls a war against America and the West" (Obama, 2015). He also warns that the Internet is erasing the border and there has been a growing threat of terror groups "to poison the minds of people" (Obama, 2015). So, there are two metaphors here. He characterizes ISIS' rhetoric as a perverted version of Islam. This terminology would recur itself in his remarks on terrorism. He called radicalization with the perverted version of Islam as "poisoning". The metaphor of illness has been a key part in Foucault's discourse analysis. San Bernardino shooters together with Orlando shooter who killed 50 people in a gay bar in Orlando Florida in 2016 were then called to be "home-grown terrorists" or "self-radicalized". However, Obama was consistent about distinguishing terrorism, radicalism from Muslims and Islam.

4.4.1.2. Reconstruction of American Hegemony

From the very first day he announced his presidential bid Obama was critical of Bush that he degraded the American credibility in the world. As mentioned above he emphasized the American values and historical narrative as a critical element of American power in the world. He was not for a US leading every crisis, rather American power should "lead from the behind" as one of his advisers put it during the intervention in Libya in 2011 (Krauthammer, 2011). By rhetorically destroying the image of US as an invasive power Obama tried to reinstate the US hegemony through more perpetual mechanisms. However, it is still arguable if this played out that way.

In his early years, Obama's idealist discourse was contaminated with drone policy and mass surveillance. With the rise of ISIS, which constrained the policies at a significant level, the discourse of American hegemony recurred itself in discourse as well.

In his characterization of ISIS, he articulates the American power in dealing with it. He makes some sort of contrasts between the evil ISIS vs good American image and says: "Abroad, American leadership is the one constant in an uncertain world. It is America that has the capacity and the will to mobilize the world against terrorists" (Obama, 2014d). So the reconstruction of US global power is somehow identified within the Obama's counter-ISIS discourse. He calls dealing with global problems as a burden for America which some point this goes further up to a colonialist discourse articulated in Rudyard Kiplin's *White Man's Burden*. Kipling in his controversial poem he wrote 1899 about Philippine-American War while there was a debate in the US to retain control of Philippines. Kipling, in support of US to assume colonization of Philippine islands writes that it is the burden of White Man to deal with Philippinoes whom he defines as "Your new-caught, sullen peoples, / Half-devil and half-child" (Hitchens, 2004). A connotation close to this is employed by Obama as well. He says:

It is America that has rallied the world against Russian aggression, and in support of the Ukrainian peoples' right to determine their own destiny. It is America — our scientists, our doctors, our know-how — that can help contain and cure the outbreak of Ebola. It is America that helped remove and destroy Syria's declared chemical weapons so that they can't pose a threat to the Syrian people or the world again. And it is America that is helping Muslim communities around the world not just in the fight against terrorism, but in the fight for opportunity, and tolerance, and a more hopeful future. America, our endless blessings bestow an enduring burden. But as Americans, we welcome our responsibility to lead. From Europe to Asia, from the far reaches of Africa to war-torn capitals of the Middle East, we stand for freedom, for justice, for dignity. These are values that have guided our nation since its founding. (2014d)

He describes the US efforts in global and regional crises. Then calls on America "our endless blessings bestow and enduring burden" and welcomes the responsibility to lead. Combining these controversial remarks with his imagination of ISIS fighters, the long discourse of American hegemony shows itself up.

It can be said that Obama had swung a long distance between being critical of American hegemonic assertions to returning to the discourse of America leading the

world in every crisis. Some have characterized Obama's presidency as psychological realism (Hallams, 2011) with an imagination of imposing American moral narrative and interest through an idealist discourse. With the rise of ISIS and US response to the group it came out to be the case as Obama began to articulate the discourse of his predecessors.

4.4.2. Where Did Obama Arrive: The Last Speech on National Security

In order to trace the evolution of Obama's national security discourse his last speech on terrorism is important to engage here. Many of his other speeches he made from the Cairo address up to the last speech on national security have been addressed throughout the chapter but this last speech he made on Dec. 6th 2016 is important to trace down where he ended up. He recaps his entire counter terrorism efforts with his definitions and characterizations.

The war in Afghanistan is far from over, but Obama's depiction of al-Qaeda is interesting. He says the group is now by any measure "is a shadow of its former self" as its leader Bin Laden has been killed and the group has been disrupted thanks to American drone strikes (Obama, 2016). However, claiming that al-Qaeda is "decimated" in South Asia, it has "metastasized" in the Middle East and North Africa. Very like decimation, metastasis is a medical term referring to the eruption or spread of a cancer in another part of the body. So, he seems to implicitly employ his metaphor of cancer to define terrorism.

His definition of metric of success against terrorism needs to be noted here. He says:

We will not achieve the kind of clearly defined victory comparable to those that we won in previous wars against nations. We won't have a scene of the Emperor of Japan and Douglas MacArthur in a surrender. And the reason we won't have that is because technology makes it impossible to completely shield impressionable minds from violent ideologies. And somebody who is trying to kill and willing to be killed is dangerous, particularly when we live in a country where it's very easy for that person to buy a very powerful weapon (Obama, 2016).

He is talking about a world of technology where anyone who has access to it can inflict damage or claim power. This is actually the acknowledgement of the fall of his panopticon. No matter what discourse and power the US employs it would not be

able to have every subject in its sight and create a control over them. Technology does not only work for security apparatus of the states, but it also works for non-state violent groups to infest violence in the minds that are open to it. His reference to the extremists as somebody who is “willing to be killed” is also crucial, because he means discursively it’s a way of challenging the power.

He compares terrorism with Emperor of Japan, Douglas MacArthur and down into the speech with Soviet communism to show the level of danger but he also admits that terrorism does not pose a threat to the world order and nation states by saying “Today’s terrorists can kill innocent people, but they don't pose an existential threat to our nation, and we must not make the mistake of elevating them as if they do” (Obama, 2016). No matter what this statement implicates rhetorically, it is discursively an acknowledgement of the well being of power at the face of the threat. This power may not necessarily be the US power, but it may be the world order under US hegemony. His justification for his counter terrorism policy is also interesting. He says, “we have to fight terrorists in a way that does not create more terrorists” (Obama, 2016). Interestingly, he challenges his discourse of virtue, values and historical narrative regarding the mechanisms he employed to fight the issue of terrorism and now he is explaining it as a way to prevent a backlash which would allow extremists to recruit.

4.5. Policy Implications Of Obama’s Counter-Terrorism Discourse

The most important policy implication of Obama’s counter terrorism discourse detailed above is the strategy of “no-boots on the ground.” In other words, with Obama, the US would not send any bulk number of troops in combat role to invade or take control of a territory. No boots on the ground strategy at the same time contributed to Obama’s justifications for his counter terrorism practices. Large number of US casualties during Bush era brought about an extensive internal pressure on the administration. Also any failure in that regard was attributed to the US military as an organization and at the same time a central node in power relations in Washington. Failure or large number of casualties would at the same time bring defense budget into

question which would also touch upon the interests of two other major power focuses in the US, that is, the Congress and defense industry.

Decision to launch an invasion is more complicated than launching a contingent operation with a small number of Special Forces. Thus, by no boots on the ground strategy Obama also secured his evasive use of force without causing a complex discussion in US politics. Hence, it can be said that Obama has shifted US policy away from fighting costly and large-scale wars and adopted “a more sustainable approach” which prioritizes “targeted counterterrorism operations” and preventive actions with foreign partners to stop the growth of “violent extremism” (Obama, 2015).

Another policy implication of Obama’s counter terrorism discourse is his categorizing terrorism. This move allows him to be selective in his actions. Obama uses two terms in reference to terrorism “extremism” and “violent extremism”. These discursive characterizations are yet to have definitions in American politics. Violent extremism can be discerned as reference to ISIS and Al-Qaeda type organizations that hold up a strategy which entails using force and violence as a way of expression. However, it still brings about a new set of questions such as: Is there non-violent extremism? Which group or individual is non-violent extremist? What does it mean for US policy? Besides those questions, these terms bring Ku Klux Klan and other types of white supremacist extremism under the spotlight. In other words, Obama’s characterization of extremism politically creates an umbrella for extremist ideologies as a whole and a smaller one for the ones that have direct attack against US forces and interests. This also has an impact on US policy toward Iran backed Hezbollah and Afghanistan’s overthrown extremist group Taliban. Under Obama, the US military did not directly engage Taliban or Hezbollah. It is not clear if Obama was imagining Taliban and Hezbollah as non-violent extremist groups or not, but the idea of violent extremism gave the administration flexibility in engagement.

Obama’s understanding of threat, safety, security and the meaning he attributed to terrorism have a lot to do with coherently linking his actions such as military operations with a constructed paradigm within politics. With his divergence from invasions he calls for a technologically strong military to track down terrorist subjects and leaders. His suggestion of creating alliances with communities in inflicted areas is actually an emphasis that using hard power would not be enough to deal with

the threat. So, hard power is just a deterrent in support of creating alliances and teaching communities that US hegemony is better for them.

Moreover, Obama believes that torture is not effective as a method of intelligence and banning it would improve human intelligence gathering. So, in terms of policy an emphasis on human intelligence or way that would not create more terrorists prevails limited but destructive methods. All in all, What Obama was suggesting was a new approach to the national security and a new set of technologies of containing “extremists” in their own hinterlands with limited use of US hard power.

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter handled Barack Obama’s key speeches and measures in his eight-year tenure as the President of the United States in order to analyze how he developed his national security discourse and how it shifted in eight years. The main tenets of Obama’s discourse were based on his rhetorical emphasis on values such as promoting democracy, prosperity and human rights. However, he also built up on technologies to deal with American public’s sense of threat which discursively justified his departure from a reductionist view of radicalism. So, the only consistent portion of Obama’s discourse by the time he left office was his portrayal of Muslims and distinguishing between terrorist and Muslim, terrorism and Islam. The rest of his discourse shifted significantly.

Obama issued several executive orders including all black sites to be closed, torture to be prohibited as an interrogation means and establishment of a task force that will bring the terror suspects into American legal system. He also issued a memo to rename the Global War on Terror as Overseas Contingency Operations. He never used his predecessor Bush’s characterization of “radical Islamic terrorism” and specifically avoided to bring Islam and terrorism together. He would call radicalism as extremism and only after the rise of ISIS he called it jihadism.

Obama’s portrayal of America is also important. He imagines America as a place not run by fear but by hope of peace. He emphasizes that he rejects the choice between safety and ideals dilemma. Furthermore, instead of “just war” he uses “justness of our cause.” Discursively this is a great shift from previous administration. He does not impose a war on the world by calling it “just” rather he imposes a “cause”

which has a more perpetual meaning and encompasses a large spectrum of measures. Respectively, after the Snowden crisis he comes up and says that the balance should be found between the two and 100 percent ideal and 100 percent safety is not possible while defending the wiretaps. Thus, this study finds out that, as a measure the wiretaps were going on for a decade but when it was leaked by Edward Snowden it was utilized discursively by Obama to create a panopticon.

Another panopticon type of technology that Obama used was drone policy. Although it is a practice aiming to single out terrorist from ordinary public the knowledge of it creates a panopticon for Obama. besides being a mere tool of punishment or a disciplinary mechanism drones were also a message of Obama's security apparatus. He characterizes drones strikes not as a tool "to punish individuals" but one that used to contain terrorism which has a continuous threat to the US.

The rise of ISIS brought about a massive pressure on Obama's counter terrorism discourse and thus constrained it significantly. With the rise of Obama made a major shift to his characterization of the terrorist subject. Although he rarely made a characterization for al-Qaeda terrorist subject, he portrays ISIS as a group with empty vision and demolishing any definitions of civilized behavior. Besides likening the group to a cancer, he also characterizes it as unnegotiable, evil, brutal, a network of death. The only difference with Bush's portrayal of al-Qaeda was that Obama specifically distinguished it from the Muslim community. In his characterization of ISIS, he articulates the American power in dealing with it. He makes some sort of contrasts between the evil ISIS vs good American image and emphasize the US leadership in dealing with ISIS crisis as it did in other crises across the world. Therefore, it can be said that Obama had swung a long distance between being critical to hegemonic assertions to returning to the discourse of America leading the world in crisis, While Obama built up his discourse challenging this particularity of Bush era, rise of ISIS brought back the question of reconstruction of American values and power.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

Obama's national security and counter terrorism discourse was based on his rhetorical emphasis on American ideals and values such as promoting democracy, prosperity and human rights but he built up on technologies of previous administration both to deal with American public's sense of threat and discursively justify his departure from a reductionist view of radicalism. Tracking down his marking speeches in his 8 years in the office and his candidacy announcement speech as well as his Executive Orders and memoranda, this study finds out that the only consistent portion of Obama's discourse by the time he left office was his portrayal of Muslims and distinguishing between terrorist and Muslim, terrorism and Islam.

This study is subscribed to the post-structuralist understanding of discourse in particular Foucault's discourse analysis in unpacking Obama's discursive practices. Foucault's work opened the way for the analysis of discursive practices of societies and institutions and the way they produce knowledge. Furthermore, discourse for Foucault, is an issue of use of language that becomes important in terms of its role in tying discursive and non-discursive elements with one another. Foucault, by analyzing power's operation through knowledge and construction of bodies of knowledge such as sciences and institutions, comes up with the idea that discourse is the space where power and knowledge actually imply one another.

This study finds out an analogy between the concept of terrorism and Foucault's concept of madness, illness or abnormality. Terrorism very like madness does not have an existence independent of discourse and is part of the power relations. In other words, it is being defined and designated as part of exercise of power and named amid power interactions. In that sense it is linked to the human contingencies and has a significant role in creating subjectivities as well as identities. Thus, Foucault's analysis of power and knowledge shed light in the analysis of the definition

and perception of terrorism in the American society and politics, Obama's engagement with that perception and efforts in reconstructing it.

A key finding of this thesis is that discourse has been a key component of the US foreign policy due to historical reasons. At the first place, the US is built on an independence revolution against colonialist British Empire and a post-civil war fought by people of different cultures and backgrounds. Thus, it has always needed a representational practice of being the US and thereof, a discursive myth has been reproduced and reinforced by the country's founding fathers, political elites, historians, school textbooks, popular culture and so forth. Thereof, discursively, the US has represented itself as the beacon of universal values as a virtue. But the discourse of virtue in foreign policy has led to a way to seek power at the same time. In other words, in American discourse of virtue the state asserts itself as if it is entitled to power. The search for power has been perceived in American politics as necessary in against the "evil" in the world so, the construction of a virtuous America necessarily implies the existence of evil and/or barbarism. The interdependence between virtue and power has recurred itself in Obama's discourse as well.

Obama's discourse is handled in three phases here. The first phase is called adoption which covers his early years. Obama in his early years departs from Bush's policies as well as discourse. The starting point of Obama's counter terrorism policy is discourse. He built up his national security strategy on rearranging the information and changing the tools that lead to a certain kind of information that indirectly has an impact on national security. By declassification of certain documents and information, abolishing violent interrogation tactics as well as efforts to close Guantanamo help the strategy to sustain itself both within the American society and across the globe. Obama's discursive engagement with national security was an utmost exercise of American power targeting the recruitment tools of US adversaries.

In his first term, Obama's rhetoric and in line with that his counter terrorism discourse barely changed. He emphasized values and ideals; defended singling out terror suspects and differentiate Muslim and terrorist images from one another. Obama imagines Muslims in three subjectivities. One is ordinary Muslims who are majority, the other is potent Muslims who are minority and the third is violent extremist Muslims who exploit the tension within the potent minority. Based on that premise he defies the

perception in the US to classify the entire Muslim world and the religion of Islam identified with terrorism. He prefers to use extremist instead of terrorist in order to identify the radical subjects. In particular, during his address at Cairo University he calls for a new beginning with the Muslim world which he establishes the basis of that beginning on mutual interest and respect. So discursively, by foregrounding the American ideals and comparing them with those of Islam he re-frames the relations with the Muslim world. This study finds out that in his early years he barely identifies a group or a specific identity as the adversary of the US. Instead, he portrays a tactic, that is violence and hatred as the enemy.

In terms of his imagination of America, he portrays an America which is not run by fear but by hope of peace and rejects the choice between safety and our ideals. So, he defines a limit to the US force's pervasive contingency by falsifying the choice between security and ideals. He suggests that the US must create alliances as a control and countering measure then convince communities in an enduring way. So, showing hard power as a deterrence, supporting countries as agents of disciplining mechanism and teaching communities that US hegemony is better for them is the global governance strategy that Obama advocates.

He exerts projecting power not only through deterrence but also through disciplining and global governance and he acknowledges that the US hegemony can grow through "prudent use". What is more, the wellbeing of American global power, he suggests, emanates from the justness of cause. Instead of "just war" he uses "justness of our cause." He does not impose a war on the world by calling it "just" rather he imposes a "cause" which has a more perpetual meaning and encompasses a large spectrum of measures. So, he was not technically against the war on terror. Rather Obama was asking for more sustainable and governable tactics.

These points dislocated from their historical, contextual circumstances are analyzed in comparison to his rhetoric into his presidency to locate a linear discourse. From a Foucauldian perspective, making references to his early speeches and policies this work ties his mechanisms of power with his discursive practices. In the evolution period, two key elements of his security policy are held under the microscope. One of them is drone policy, the other is mass surveillance. Both technologies were used by previous administration as well. However, Obama used them as discursive tools too.

This study terms these two technologies as Obama's panopticons. Use of drones not only played out as a way of distinguishing the undesirable elements, that is the terrorist subject, from the desirable one, that is Muslim subject, it also systematized the US power overhead of its adversaries. Obama asserts that drone policy is battle against the will of Al Qaeda to fight the US as it creates a panopticon like canopy overhead even in the most distant desert. He also puts forward that this mechanism refutes the ideas that the US is losing ground by pulling back because drones provide an omnipresence to the US in the Middle East. Therefore, besides being a mere tool of punishment or a disciplinary mechanism drones were also a message of Obama's security apparatus. He characterizes drones strikes not as a tool "to punish individuals" but one that used to contain terrorism which has a continuous threat to the US. When it comes to the mass surveillance through wiretapping private phone calls of the entire American public and a vast majority of people abroad, this work hypothesizes that the mass surveillance which had been in place long before Obama became a discursive tool for Obama only after it was leaked by Edward Snowden because the knowledge of such a wide spread wiretapping of private phone conversations created a panopticon type mechanism for people. Therefore, the dilemma between ideals/values and security has become key to Obama's discourse in the evolution phase.

The third phase which handles speeches after the rise of ISIS and tracks down how Obama's discourse has changed with ISIS and what part of his discourse remained consistent is the shifting phase. This phase is crucial, as mentioned above, while Obama avoided to identify a specific identity to the terrorist subject in his early years at office, the rise of ISIS with its brutal tactics, pushed Obama to identify the group. This study puts forward that Obama has returned back to the discourse of reconstruction of American global power with the rise of ISIS in order to legitimize his use of force in the Middle East. His depiction of ISIS are similar to, even at some point goes beyond, Bush's depiction of Al Qaeda. He pathologizes ISIS subject and the group as a cancer and foregrounds American power the only one able one to lead the world mobilized against that cancer. However, the consistent part of discourse here is his portrayal of Muslim and Islam. He calls ISIS to have distorted the message of Islam and specifically characterizes Muslims as ally in the fight against ISIS.

This study as mentioned in the first chapter theoretically rests on Foucault's

theme of power-knowledge relation. Apart from all conclusions made here, it has also two theoretical conclusions with respect to Obama's discourse. First, knowledge about American surveillance, in Foucauldian terms, is of key significance in employing power because surveillance and data collection are indispensable for enforcement of power over a population and governing the risks towards that power. In that respect, surveillance is both part of power and that of knowledge.

Besides being used as part of rhetorical practices, for Foucault, sovereign's discourse is at the same time the utmost power itself, which creates, identifies and characterizes those rhetorical practices. In that way it is foundational for social or political order but at the same time is being constructed within the effort to create social or political order. Thus, in this study Foucault's analysis of power and knowledge shed light on the analysis of the definition and perception of terrorism in the American society and politics, as well as Obama's engagement with that perception and efforts in reconstructing it. So, the second conclusion in that respect is that, discourse constructs knowledge by categorizing it as well as converging it in a way to reconstruct power. As it could be best seen in Foucault's *Archeology of Knowledge* as well as in *Discipline and Punishment* whatever being said and any information presented are somehow playing within the exercise of power and end up reorganizing itself within that aura. So, Obama's description of ISIS and ISIS members and the information produced in the US in line with Obama administration's perception disregarded all other aspects such as root causes of rise of ISIS but defined the group as an existential security problem to the entire Western civilization. It in a way shadowed most of the other possible descriptions of ISIS. Foucault problematizes this relationship between power and discourse by emphasizing the issue of exclusion and inclusion in the formation of a discourse. In other words, the selected words/actions/impositions reflect the power that will employ the discourse on one hand; it redefines both power and knowledge on the other. Hence, Obama's description of ISIS at the same time defined a certain way of engagement with the group.

All in all, as an answer to the research question about sources of information that he used in reshaping his national security policy, this study suggests that Obama made strong references to history and American founding values as well as certain allegoric and hegemonic perception that goes deep into American history. Values that

America identifies with itself such as humanism, freedom, human rights were employed by Obama both in order to justify prudent of power and justify his opposition to Bush's reductionist view of terrorism. At the same, he uses Biblical or Quranic references to build up on the value-based discourse of power.

When it comes to how he constructed the problematique in American national security, bringing up historical references to American values Obama problematizes Bush's national security approach and by taking on failure of Bush's strategy he creates the problematique of national security and the need for its reconstruction. So, he creates a critique of the reductionist approach to the threat and the means to deal with it and put emphasis on need to shift the characterization of the threat. Beginning with re-characterization of threat he re-construct the entire power and security discourse.

When it comes to the question of inclusion and exclusion. Foucault perceives power in two forms: namely constructive and destructive. In its constructive version positions, identities and contingencies are all constructed based on certain exclusions and inclusions. The dichotomies of good vs evil, self vs other and danger vs legitimacy were all constructed out of discursive practice. So, Obama, objects the exclusive use of power as a punitive means; excludes American destructive domination from the security discourse and employs certain technologies that would feed his value-based rhetoric to create a systematic, prudent domination which in turn construct identities and realities.

Finally, with respect to the desirable and despicable identities, he constantly makes a contrast between a good America with humanitarian values while reflecting terror subject particularly ISIS subject to be a perverted, violent, unnegotiable cancer infected Muslim community. By pathologizing ISIS or terror subject contaminated Islamic values and Muslim community he also makes Islam and Muslim identity more desirable than it was portrayed by his predecessor Bush.

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APPENDICES

A: TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

Bu alıřma ABD Bařkanı Barack Obama'nın ulusal gvenlik ve terrle mcadele sylemini Foucaultu bir perspektifle analiz eder. 11 Eyll 2001'de New York'taki Dnya Ticaret Merkezi Kulelerine ve Arlington'daki ABD Savunma Bakanlıęı binası Pentagon'a ynelik saldırılar ve bu saldırıları takip eden olayların uluslararası iliřkiler analında olduka derin yansımaları oldu. Afganistan ve Irak'ın iřgalini beraberinde getirmesinin yanı sıra 11 Eyll saldırıları aynı zamanda gvenlik ve terrle mcadele kavramlarının yeniden tanımlanmasına yol atı. Daha nce Amerikan diplomatik misyonlarına ok sayıda saldırı yapılmıřtı ancak bu kez bir grup radikal ilk kez savařı Amerikan topraklarına tařı mıřtı. Irak ve Afganistan'ın iřgali, Guantanamo hapishanesinin kurulması, sorgulama yntemi olarak iřkencenin yaygın olarak kullanılması ve tm bunları meřrulařtırmak iin kullanılan ciltlerce alıřmaların konusu olmuřtur. Obama'nın selefi ve "terre karřı kresel savař" stratejisinin ilk uygulayıcısı George W. Bush'ın terrle mcadele sylemi de oka irdelenmiř bir konudur. Yine Bush ile Obama'nın karřılařtırıldıęı alıřmaların sayısı da azımsanmayacak okluktadır. Obama'nın terrle mcadele strateji ve sylemine dair de ok sayıda alıřma vardır ancak bu alıřmaların kahir ekseriyeti Obama'nın bu alıřmalar Obama'nın ilk yıllarını esas alıyor. Bu nedenle, Obama'nın ulusal gvenlik sylemine iliřkin literatrde 2014'te DEAř'ın ykseliři ile birlikte Obama'nın terrle mcadele syleminde sz konusu olan deęiřimi kapsamamaktadır. Bu alıřma, Obama'nın DEAř ile mcadele sylemini de dahil ederek Obama dnenimin toptan bir analizini yaparak literatre katkı saęlamaktadır. alıřma Obama'nın sylemsel olarak bařkanlıęının sonlarında vardıęı noktayı ortaya koymak adına Obama'nın

başkanlığı döneminde yaptığı ondan fazla konuşma metnini, Obama'nın yayınladığı Başkanlık Kararname ve Genelgeleri inceliyor.

Bu çalışma kuramsal olarak Michel Foucault'nun söylem analizini esas almaktadır. Kavramsal olarak çıkış noktası Foucault'nun iktidar ile bilgi/söylem arasındaki kurduğu ilişki ve bu ilişki üzerinden ortaya kuramsallaştırmasıdır çünkü Foucaultçu bakış toplumsal ve tarihsel gerçeklerin, siyasal mekanizma ve sistemlerin geneolojik olarak ortaya çıkmasını kadar uzanır. Foucault'nun söylem inşasında iktidarın rolüne vurgu yapması bu çalışmanın analizinde önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Bu sayede bu çalışma Obama'nın iktidarı bir söylem aracı olarak kullanması ve dolaylı olarak da uyguladığı gücü meşrulaştırmasını analiz etmek için Foucault'dan faydalanmıştır. Obama'nın, terörist kimliği tahayyülü, Müslümanlara atfettiği kimlikler, ABD'nin askeri ve siyasi gücünü kullanma şekli söylem ve iktidar arasındaki kurucu ilişki üzerinden incelenmiştir.

Günlük yaşamda çokça duyduğumuz bir kavram olan terörizm, yüzyıllara dayanan bir geçmişe sahiptir ve bu uzun geçmiş boyunca anlamsal olarak birçok değişikliğe uğramıştır. Terim, şiddet kullanımı ve ilgili şiddetin neden olduğu korku ile ilişkili olsa da, bu terimin henüz herkes tarafından kabul edilen akademik ve yasal bir tanımı henüz yoktur. Sadece, Sivillere yönelik saldırının bir terör eylemi olduğu yönünde ortak bir algı vardır. Terörizm genellikle bu perspektiften ele alınır, ancak uluslararası ilişkilerde terörizm üzerine tartışmalar, uluslararası toplumdaki bazı karmaşık güç ilişkilerine dayanır. Ayrıca, terörizm farklı şiddet eylemleriyle ilişkilendirildiği için tarih boyunca herkesin terimin tanımını kabul etmesi için ortak bir zemin yoktur. Örneğin, bir devlet bir grubu terör örgütü olarak adlandırırken, birçoğu bunu kabul etmez ve hatta bazıları bu grupla iyi ilişkiler kurabilir. Bu nedenle, bir eylemin terör eylemi olarak ilan edilmesi veya bir grubun terör örgütü olarak tanımlanması uluslararası toplumda kabul etme meselesidir.

Tarihsel olarak, Batı akademisinde “terörizm” kelimesi ilk kez Fransız Devrimi sırasında popüler hale geldi. Terörizmin 18. yüzyılın sonlarında “devlet dışı veya ulus-altı yapılar tarafından üstlenilen devrimci veya hükümet karşıtı bir etkinlik” olarak olumlu bir çağrışıma sahipti. Daha sonra ise Fransız Devrimi'nin ardından “yeni kurulan devletler tarafından bir yönetim aracı” aracı olarak kullanıldı. Bu atıflar, Avrupa genelinde ideolojik olarak baskıcı rejimlerin ortaya çıktığı 1930'lara kadar

sürdü. Bu rejimlerin siyasi muhalifleri, özellikle Stalin'in Rusya, Mussolini'nin İtalya ve Hitler'in Almanya'sında işkence, cinayet veya sürgün gibi fiziksel istismarlara maruz kalınca, terörizm kavramı olumsuz bir çağrışıma evrildi. Bu bağlamda terörizm terimi, vatandaşlarına karşı rejimler tarafından “keyfi şiddet kullanımı”, “baskıcı uygulamaların tanımlanmasında kullanılmıştır çünkü korku ya da terör bu rejimlerin ortak özelliğiydi.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra nispeten yerleşmiş bir uluslararası düzen vardı, ancak Afrika ve Orta Doğu'daki sömürge bölgelerinde istikrarsızlık arttı. Sömürgecilerin egemenliğini terörize etmek için devlet dışı aktörler tarafından şiddet kullanılması terörizm üzerine yeni bir tartışmayı beraberinde getirdi. Pek çok kişi bu bağlamda terörizmin ideolojik değil taktiksel bir seçim olduğunu tartıştı. Böylece, “birinin teröristi başkasının özgürlük savaşçısı olabilir” tartışması da buradan çıkmıştır. Bununla birlikte 1980'lerde çoğunlukla Orta Doğu'da Amerikalı diplomatlara yönelik saldırılarla ilgili tartışmalar, günümüzün terör algısının temelini oluşturmaktadır. 11 Eylül saldırıları “terörizm tarihinde bir milat” olarak görülse de, en güncel terörizm algısı 80'li yıllara dayanmaktadır. 1979 ve 1988 arasında bir dizi saldırıda İran, Kuveyt ve Libya'daki Amerikalı diplomatları hedef alındı. Bu anti-Amerikancılık dalgasına, dünyanın Batı ve geri kalanı olarak ikiye ayrılması eşlik etti. Bunun üzerine, tarihsel olarak terörizme atfedilen anlamların birçoğu terk edilmiş ve neo-liberal batı dünya düzenini hedefleyen hareketler bir şekilde “devlet destekli terörizm” ve “radikal İslami terörizm” gibi yeni biçimlerle terör şemsiyesi altına getirilmiştir. Ancak, bu yaklaşıma da önemli bir eleştiri vardır. 11 Eylül sonrasında, Noam Chomsky ve Edward Hermand gibi bilim adamları ABD işgallerini eleştiren çalışmalar ortaya koyunca terörizm çalışmalarında eleştirel terörizm olarak da bilinen yeni bir alan ortaya çıktı. Bu grup terörizm çalışmalarının terörizm kavramını belirli bir şekilde ele aldığını ve devletin şiddetteki rolüne ve “terörist” olarak tanımlananların etkilerine değinmediğini savunmaktadır. Tabi bu durum eleştirel teoride de söz konusudur. Chantal Mouffe uluslararası düzenin çoğulculuktan yoksun olduğunu ve bu nedenden dolayı da çatışma halindeki fikirlerin agonistik olarak kendilerini ifade etme fırsatı bulamadığını ifade ediyor. Mouffe, liberalizm ile terörizmin yükselişi arasında ilginç bir paralellik olduğunu iddia ederek Müesses küresel düzenin olarak ortadan kaldırılmasına yönelik radikalliğin yaygınlaşmasının

temelinde, küreselleşmenin neo-liberal modelinin hegemonyasına karşı koyma kanallarının kapalı olmasının yattığını ifade ediyor.

Bu çalışmanın ana odağı Obama'nın terörle mücadele söylemidir, ancak terörizm terimine yönelik tarihsel yaklaşımlardan bahsetmek, ne kadar karmaşık bir terim olduğunu anlamaya yardımcı olur. Öngörülen karmaşıklıklar nedeniyle ve terimin politik olmasından dolayı, bu çalışma terörizmi tanımlamaktan kaçınıyor. Bununla birlikte Barack Obama'nın ABD'nin terörle mücadelesi ve terörizm ve güvenlik anlayışını analiz etmektir, dolayısıyla bu terim çalışmada sıkça kullanılıyor. Bu kullanımlar, bu çalışmadan kaynaklanan münhasır bir tanıma dayanmamaktadır. Bunu söyleyen veya anlamlandıran kişi tarafından verildiği gibi ele alınıyor. Bu nedenle, Foucault'çu bir yaklaşımla tanım işine girmek yerine, bu çalışma Obama'nın terörizmi kullandığında ne anlama geldiğini, terimleri nasıl kullandığını, önceki yönetimden nasıl farklı olduğunu tartışıyor.

Foucault söylemin “konuştukları nesneyi sistematik olarak oluşturan” bir pratik olduğunu ileri sürer. Bu nedenle, post-yapısalcı akademisyenlerin çoğunun çalışmaları Foucault'ya bu konuda borçludur. Foucault'nun dile arkeolojik yaklaşımı ve iktidar ile geneoloji ilişkisi bakımından yaklaşımı söylem çalışmalarına önemli bir katkı sağlamaktadır. Foucault'nun çalışmaları, toplumların ve kurumların söylemsel uygulamalarının ve bilgi üretme yöntemlerinin analiz edilmesinin yolunu açıyor. Dolayısıyla, Foucault'nun söyleme hem arkeolojik hem de geneolojik yaklaşımının Obama'nın ulusal güvenlik terminolojisini analiz etmeye ve güç ilişkilerini gözlemlemeye yardımcı oluyor.

Bu tez söz konusu konuyu 4 ana bölümde analiz etmiştir. Birinci Bölüm, giriş, kuramsal çerçeve, metodoloji, kaynaklar ve literatür taramasından oluşuyor. Birinci bölümde terörizm ve teröre karşı savaş kavramlarına yönelik olabildiğince fazla sayıda yaygın görüş ve perspektifleri ele alıyor. Ayrıca, dil ve dilin kullanımına yönelik kuramsal yaklaşımları ele alıyor. Özellikle de Ferdinand de Saussure'ün yapısalcı yaklaşımlarının yanı sıra, post-yapısalcılık düşünürlerin dile ve söyleme yaklaşımını ele alıyor. Burada de eleştirel söylem analizi ve Foucault'nun söylem analiz spesifik olarak ele alınıyor. Ayrıca, Wodak, Wittgenstein, Bourdieu, Derrida, van Dijk, Powers, Jackson, Giddens, Fairclough, Chouliaraki, ve Bigo gibi düşünürlerin çalışmaları da söylem analizi konusunda ele alınıyor.

İkinci Bölüm ise tamamen söylem analizine ayrılmıştır. Yapısalcı ve post-yapısalcı olmak üzere söyleme yönelik iki metodolojik yaklaşımın özetinden sonra post-yapısalcı ekol kapsamındaki tartışmalar ele alınmaktadır. Buradan ise Foucault'un söylem analizine yaptığı katkı ele alınmaktadır. Yaklaşım olarak aralarında önemli farklılıklar bulunmasına rağmen, söyleme dair tüm yaklaşımların ortak noktası, dilin artık sadece fiziksel, sosyal veya zihni olayları tanımlamak üzere kullanılan bir araç olmayıp aynı zamanda bu realitelerin inşasında da kullanıldığının ileri sürülmesidir. Bu temel yaklaşım Obama'nın söyleminin incelenmesi konusunda bu çalışmaya önemli katkı sağlamıştır. Bu çalışma, söylemi tanımlama girişiminden kaçınmaktadır. Ancak Foucault'un söylem için iktidar ile bilginin ilişkisinden ortaya çıkan bir kavram tanımlamasını esas almaktadır, çünkü Obama'nın terörizm ve terörist tanımı terörizm sorununu ele alma yönetimini de ortaya koymuştur.

Üçüncü Bölüm, Amerikan siyasetinde güç ilişkilerini ve bu ilişkilerin terörizmin tanımlanmasına yansımaları özetliyor. Bu kısım ayrıca, Obama'nın selefi Bush'un ulusal güvenlik ve terörle mücadele söylemini de ele alıyor ve bunu Obama'nın terörle mücadele söylemi ile karşılaştırıyor. Bu bölümün amacı temelde tamamen Obama'nın söyleminin analizi için ayrılan bölümün zeminini hazırlar. Aynı zamanda ABD'nin kullandığı terörizm tanımını ile Birleşmiş Milletler'in kullandığı tanımlara da odaklanıyor.

Dördüncü bölüm ise, Obama'nın Başkanlığını ilan ettiği 2007 yılından görevinin son bulduğu 2017 yılına kadar yaptığı konuşmaları, Başkanlık Kararname ve Genelgelerini ele alır. Obama, 8 yıllık başkanlığında binden fazla konuşma yapmıştır. Bunların yüzden fazla özellikle ulusal güvenlikle ilgilidir. Bu çalışma, Obama'nın ulusal güvenlik konusunda yaptığı 14 konuşmayı ve birçok Başkanlık Kararnamesini ele alarak Obama'nın söylemini üç aşamada inceler. Birincisi, söylemi inşa aşamasıdır. Burada Obama'nın başkan adaylığını açıkladığı konuşması, başkanlık görevine başlama konuşması, 2009'daki Kahire konuşması ele anılıyor. Bu üç konuşma Obama'nın ikinci dönemine kadar ulusal güvenlik söyleminin temellerini oluşturuyor. Obama'nın bu süreçte kullandığı dil ve kavramların çerçevesi bu üç konuşma ile çizilmiştir. İkinci aşama ise evrim aşamasıdır. Obama özellikle de ikinci döneminden başlamak üzere, tartışmalı sayılan bazı teknoloji ve yöntemleri kullandı ve dolayısıyla, baskı araçlarını meşrulaştırma ve değerlerle güvenlik arasındaki

dengeye vurgu yapmaktadır. Bu aşamada özellikle de insansız hava araçları ile bireysel saldırılar ve kitlesel telefon dinlemelerini analiz ediliyor. Bu çalışma, Foucault'çu bir bakış açısı ile bu iki teknolojinin Obama'nın panoptik araçları olduğunu ifade eder. Diğer bir ifade ile, bu çalışma söz konusu iki teknolojinin söylemsel etkilerinin olduğunu ileri süre. Özellikle de Obama döneminden çok önceden itibaren kullanılmaya başlanmış olan telefon dinlemeleri Edward Snowden'ın ifşaatlarından sonra Obama için kritik bir söylem aracı haline geldi. Çünkü, hem ABD'de hem de yurtdışında kitlesel dinlemelerin yapıldığı bilgisi insanlar için panoptik bir düzenek haline geldi. Üçüncü aşama ise değişim aşamasıdır. Bu aşamada, Obama'nın DEAŞ'ın yükselişinden sonraki konuşmalarını ele alıyor ve Obama'nın söyleminin DEAŞ ile nasıl değiştiğini ve söyleminin hangi bölümünün tutarlı kaldığını inceliyor. Bu çalışma, Obama'nın DEAŞ'ın yükselişi ile Amerikan küresel gücünün yeniden yapılanması söylemine geri döndüğünü ve onun DEAŞ tasvirinin Bush'unkisi ile bir noktaya kadar benzer olduğunu hatta bazı noktalarda daha ötesine gittiğini ileri sürüyor. Obama, DEAŞ sorunun ve örgütün kendisini patolojikleştirdiğini iddia ederken burada Müslümanları ve İslam'ı DEAŞ'tan ve DEAŞ ideolojisinden ayırma çabasının tutarlı olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Bu çalışmanın sonuç ve çıkarımlarına gelince, bu tez ABD'de terörizm kavramı ile Foucault'nun delilik, hastalık veya anormallik kavramı arasında bir benzerlik bulmaktadır. Delilik gibi terörizm de söylemden bağımsız bir varoluşa sahip değildir ve güç ilişkilerinin bir parçasıdır. Başka bir deyişle, iktidarın bir parçası olarak tanımlanır ve güç etkileşimleriyle adlandırılır. Bu anlamda, insan olasılıkları ile bağlantılıdır ve öznelliklerin yanı sıra kimlikler yaratmada önemli bir role sahiptir. Bu nedenle, Foucault'nun güç ve bilgi analizi, Amerikan toplumunda ve siyasetinde terörizmin tanımı ve algısının, Obama'nın bu algı ve yeniden yapılanma çabalarına katılımının analizinde ışık tuttu.

Bu tezin önemli bir bulgusu, güç söyleminin tarihsel nedenlerden ötürü ABD dış politikasının önemli bir bileşeni olduğudur. İlk etapta ABD, sömürgeci İngiliz İmparatorluğu'na karşı bir bağımsızlık devrimi ve farklı kültür ve kökenlerden insanların katıldığı bir iç savaş sonrasında inşa edildi. Bu nedenle, her zaman ABD olmanın temsili bir pratiğine ihtiyaç duyuldu, söylemsel bir mit ülkenin kurucu babaları, siyasi elitleri, tarihçileri, okul ders kitapları, popüler kültür ve benzeri odaklar

tarafından yeniden üretildi ve güçlendirildi. Dolayısıyla, söylemsel olarak ABD kendisini bir erdem olarak evrensel değerlerin yol göstericisi olarak temsil etti. Ancak dış politikada erdem söylemi, aynı zamanda iktidar arayışına da yol açtı. Başka bir deyişle, erdem söyleminde devlet, küresel güce hakkı varmış gibi kendini ileri sürer. İktidar arayışı Amerikan siyasetinde dünyadaki “kötülük” e karşı gerekli olduğu şekilde algılanmıştır, bu nedenle erdemli bir Amerika'nın inşası mutlaka kötülük ve / veya barbarlığın varlığını ima eder. Bu Erdem ve güç arasındaki karşılıklı bağımlılık Obama'nın ulusal güvenlik söyleminde söz konusudur.

Burada ortaya konulan sonuçların yanı sıra, bu çalışma Obama'nın söylemiyle ilgili iki teorik sonuca da varıyor. Birincisi, ABD'nin izlediği ve telefonları dinlediği bilgisine ilişkin olarak bilgi, iktidar icrasında kilit öneme sahiptir, çünkü gözetim ve veri toplama, bir toplum üzerinde iktidarın icra edilmesi ve bu güce yönelik risklerin yönetilmesi için vazgeçilmezdir. Bu açıdan, Foucault'nun ifadesiyle izlenme ve dinlenme bilgisi hem gücün hem de bilginin bir parçasıdır. İkincisi, retorik uygulamaların bir parçası olarak kullanılmasının yanı sıra, Foucault için egemen söylem, aynı zamanda bu retorik pratikleri kuran, tanımlayan ve karakterize eden gücün ta kendisidir. Bu şekilde sosyal ya da politik düzenin temeli ama aynı zamanda sosyal ya da politik gerçekliklerin inşa edilmesi ile başlıyor. Bu nedenle, bu çalışmada Foucault'nun güç ve bilgi analizi, Amerikan toplumunda ve siyasetinde terörizmin tanımı ve algısının analizine ve Obama'nın bu algı ve Amerikan gücünü yeniden yapılandırma çabalarına sunduğu katkıya ışık tuttu. Dolayısıyla, bu açıdan ikinci sonuç, söylemin bilgiyi kategorize ederek ve gücü yeniden inşa edecek şekilde dönüştürerek inşa etmesidir. Yani, her türlü bilgi bir şekilde iktidar egzersizi içinde ortaya konuluyor ve kendini bu bağlam içinde yeniden organize ediyor. Dolayısıyla, Obama yönetiminin algısına paralel olarak ABD'de DEAŞ'a yönelik üretilen bilgi DEAŞ'ın yükselişinin temel nedenleri gibi diğer tüm unsurları göz ardı etmiş, grubu tüm Batı medeniyeti için varoluşsal bir güvenlik sorunu olarak tanımlamıştır. Bu bilgi bir bakıma DEAŞ'ın diğer olası tanımlarının çoğunu gölgelemiştir. Foucault iktidar ve söylem arasındaki bu ilişkiyi, bir söylemin oluşumunda “dışlama” ve “dahil etme” konusunu vurgulayarak sorunsallaştırır. Başka bir deyişle, seçilen kelimeler / eylemler/imalar söylemi bir taraftan kullanacak güç olarak yansıtır; diğeri taraftan ise

hem gücü hem de bilgiyi yeniden tanımlar. Bu nedenle, Obama'nın DEAŞ tanımı aynı zamanda örgütle ilgili bilgiyi de tanımlamıştır.

Bu çalışmada, Barack Obama'nın ulusal güvenlik söylemini nasıl geliştirdiğini ve sekiz yıl içinde nasıl değiştiğini analiz etmek için ABD Başkanı olarak sekiz yıllık görev süresinde yaptığı önemli konuşma ve önlemler ele alındı. Obama'nın söyleminin ana ilkeleri demokrasiyi, refahı ve insan haklarını teşvik etmek gibi değerlere yaptığı retorik vurgusuna dayanıyordu. Bununla birlikte, Amerikan halkının tehdit anlayışıyla başa çıkmak için radikalizme indirgemeci bir bakış açısına karşı söylemini meşru bir şekilde haklı çıkaran teknolojiler geliştirdi. Ancak bu çalışmanın önemli tespitlerinden biri Obama'nın görevinden ayrıldığındaki söyleminin tek tutarlı kısmının Müslümanları tasvir etmesi ve terörist ile Müslüman, terörizm ve İslam'ı ayırt etmesiydi. Söyleminin geri kalanı önemli ölçüde değişti.

Obama'nın nasıl Amerika'yı tasvir ettiği bu çalışmanın üzerinde durduğu önemli bir noktadır. Obama Amerika'yı korku ile değil barış ve huzur vaadiyle yönetilebilecek bir yer olarak hayal ediyor ve ABD'deki güvenlik ve idealler ikilemi arasındaki seçimi reddettiğini vurguluyor. Dahası, “adil savaş” yerine “davanın haklılığının” vurgulanması gerektiğine dikkat çekiyor. Söylemsel olarak bu, önceki yönetimden büyük bir ayrışmadır ve dünyaya “adil” diyerek bir savaş dayatmak yerine, daha kalıcı bir anlamı olan ve geniş bir tedbir yelpazesini kapsayan bir “neden” dayatıyor. Bu bağlamda, Snowden krizinden sonra dinleme olaylarını savunurken yüzde yüzde yüz gizlilik ve yüzde yüz güvenliğin mümkün olmadığını söylüyor. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma, dinleme konusunun aslında on yıl öncesinde başladığını, ancak Edward Snowden tarafından sızdırıldığı zaman, Obama tarafından bir panopticon oluşturmak için söylemsel olarak kullanıldığını ortaya koyuyor.

Obama'nın kullandığı bir diğer panopticon teknolojisi de drone politikasıydı. Teröristleri sıradan halktan ayırmayı amaçlayan bir uygulama olmasına rağmen, bilgisi Obama için bir panopticon yaratıyor. Sadece bir cezalandırma aracı ya da bir disiplin mekanizması olmanın yanı sıra dronlar da Obama'nın güvenlik aygıtının bir mesajıydı. Drone saldırılarını “bireyleri cezalandırmak için” bir araç olarak değil, ABD için sürekli bir tehdit olan terörizmi içeren bir araç olarak nitelendiriyor.

Diğer taraftan bu çalışma IŞİD'in yükselişinin, Obama'nın terörle mücadele söylemi üzerinde büyük bir baskı yarattığını ve böylece söylemi önemli ölçüde

kısıtladığını varsayıyor. IŞİD'in yükselişi ile Obama'nın teröristi karakterize etmesinde önemli bir değişiklik oldu. El Kaide teröristleri için nadiren bir tanımlama yapsa da, Obama IŞİD'i boş bir bakış açısına sahip ve uygar davranışların tüm tanımlarını yıkan bir grup olarak tasvir ediyor. Grubu bir kansere benzetmenin yanı sıra, onu tartışılmaz, kötü, acımasız, bir ölüm ağı olarak nitelendiriyor. Bush'un El Kaide'yi tasvir etmesindeki tek fark Obama'nın onu Müslüman toplumundan ayırmasıydı. IŞİD'in tanımlamasında Amerikan gücünü onunla başa çıkmada önemli bir unsur olarak ifade ediyor. Kötü IŞİD'e karşı iyi Amerikan imajı arasında bir tür tezat oluşturuyor ve ABD'nin dünyadaki diğer krizlerde olduğu gibi IŞİD kriziyle de başa çıkmada liderliğini vurguluyor. Bu nedenle, Obama'nın hegemonik iddialara eleştirel olmak ile Amerika'nın krizde dünyayı yöneten söylemine dönme arasında uzun bir mesafe kat ettiği söylenebilir, Obama Bush döneminin bu özelliğine meydan okuyan söylemini oluşturmuşken, IŞİD'in yükselişi Obama'yı tekrar Amerikan değerlerinin ve gücünün yeniden yapılandırılması konsuna geri getirdi..

Sonuç olarak, tezin araştırma sorularına gelecek olursak, Obaman'ın bilgi kaynaklarına ilişkin soruya yanıt olarak, ulusal güvenlik politikasını yeniden şekillendirirken Obama'nın tarihe, Amerikan kurucu değerlerine, bazı alegorik ve hegemonik algılara güçlü referanslar yaptığı gözlemlenmiştir. Amerikan tarihine. Amerika'nın hümanizm, özgürlük, insan hakları gibi kendisiyle özdeşleştirdiği değerler Obama tarafından Amerikan iktidarı meşrulaştırmak ve Bush'un indirgemeci terörizm görüşüne karşı ortaya koyduğu muhalefeti haklı göstermek için kullanıldı. Obama'nın aynı zamanda, değerlere dayalı iktidar söylemini geliştirmek için İncil veya Kuran'dan referanslar da verdiği not edilmelidir.

Amerikan ulusal güvenliğinde sorunsallığı nasıl oluşturduğuna gelince, Amerikan değerlerine tarihsel referanslar getirerek Obama, Bush'un ulusal güvenlik yaklaşımını sorunsallaştırıyor ve Bush'un stratejisinin başarısızlığıyla ulusal güvenlik sorununu ve Amerikan gücünün yeniden yapılanmasına dair ihtiyacı ortaya koyuyor. Böylece, tehdide yönelik indirgemeci yaklaşımın ve onunla başa çıkma araçlarının bir eleştirisini ortaya koyar ve tehdidin tanımının değiştirilmesi ihtiyacına vurgu yapar. Tehdidin yeniden tanımı ile başlayarak, tüm güç ve güvenlik söylemini yeniden yapılandırıyor.

Dışlama ve dahil etme konusunda ise, Foucault, yapıcı ve yıkıcı olmak üzere gücü iki şekilde tanımlar. Yapıcı durumlarda, kimlikler ve olasılıkların tümü belirli istisnalar ve içermeler temelinde inşa edilir. İyiye karşı kötü, bize karşı öteki, tehdide karşı meşruiyet gibi ikilemler söylemsel pratiklerden inşa ediliyor. Dolayısıyla, bu bağlamda Obama, gücün münhasıran cezalandırıcı bir araç olarak kullanılmasına itiraz ediyor; Amerikan yıkıcı tahakkümünü güvenlik söyleminden dışlıyor ve sistematik ve ihtiyatlı bir tahakküm yaratmak için değer temelli söylemini besleyecek belli teknolojileri kullanıyor. Sonuç olarak gücün yıkıcı etkisini kenara çekip yerine yapıcı etkisinin kullanılmasını öneriyor.

Son olarak, kabul gören ve patolojik olarak tanımlanan kimliklere gelince, Obama iyi bir Amerika ile sapkın, şiddet yanlısı, müzakere edilemeyecek bir kanser olan DEAŞ arasında bir tezat oluştururken özellikle de Müslüman toplumun maruz kaldığı DEAŞ kanseri ile ancak ABD'nin liderlik ettiği bir dünyanın mücadele edebileceğini iddia ediyor. Diğer taraftan, DEAŞ'ı hastalık gibi patetik bir kimlik olarak görürken Müslüman kimliğini ve İslam'ı da Bush'un tasvir ettiğinden daha cazip hale getiriyor.

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