

DOKUZ EYLÜL UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
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MASTER’S THESIS

**UNSUCCESSFUL PEACE AGREEMENTS IN
PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
PROCESS: THE CASE OF MALI REPUBLIC (2006-
PRESENT)**

Sylvain Dagbegnon MEDESSOUKOU

Supervisor:

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Serap ARSLAN AKFIRAT

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE



DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this Master's thesis titled as "Unsuccessful Peace Agreements In Peacebuilding And Conflict Resolution Process: The Case Of Mali Republic (2006-Present)" has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honour.

.../.../2019

Sylvain Dagbegnon MEDESSOUKOU

ABSTRACT

Master's Thesis

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Sylvain Dagbegnon MEDESSOUKOU

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Scholars have constantly analyze the conflicts resolution mechanisms in Africa and see conflicts in the continent as one of the complex factors that weaken her socioeconomic and political development, and any solution to strengthen the continent's peace and security would require resolution processes, peace building, and an effective mechanisms to manage conflicts. Conflicts are of distinct type and the nature of any conflict need to be determined in order to aid mediators or the international community with what mechanisms to be employed in its resolution. Scholars view the Malian conflict with a historical eye suggesting that the conflict has brought attention to the African nations, but its history and culture are largely unknown to most outsiders. In order to fill this gap, this study aims at defining Mali's crisis in its cultural and historical context, and then identify the possible reasons behind the failure of the past peace accords in the course of bring back the absolute peace in the country. The main research question of the study is: "Why did the peace agreements failed in the peacebuilding and conflict resolution processes in Mali?" Because of the intergroup nature of the conflict, the study suggests, in the frame of social psychological theories, that the peace accords give little attention to the role of social/group identities in the conflict, – the mediators in the conflict resolution process failed to manage the identity issues in the conflict.

The data collection method utilized in the study is the qualitative method, which helps to gather adequate knowledge about the values, opinions, and social contexts Malian citizen involved in the Malian Conflict.

Key words: Africa; Conflict Resolution; Mali; Peace Agreements; Social Identity



ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

Barışın İnşası ve Anlaşmazlık Çözüm Süreçlerinde Başarısız Barış Antlaşmaları:

Mali Cumhuriyeti Örneği (2006-Halen)

Sylvain Dagbegnon MEDESSOUKOU

Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

İngilizce İşletme Anabilim Dalı

Anlaşmazlık Çözümü Programı

Araştırmacılar Afrika'daki çatışma çözme mekanizmalarını sürekli olarak analiz etmişler ve kıtadaki çatışmaları, sosyoekonomik ve politik gelişimini zayıflatan karmaşık etkenlerden biri olarak görmüşlerdir. Kıtanın barış ve güvenliğini güçlendirecek her türlü çözüm önerisinin başarısı bu çatışmaları etkili şekilde yönetmeyi ve, barış inşasını içermek zorunda gibi görünmektedir. Çatışmalar farklı tipte olup, arabuluculara veya uluslararası topluluğa çözümünde hangi mekanizmaların uygulanacağı konusunda yardımcı olmak için bu çatışmaların niteliğinin belirlenmesi gerekmektedir. Araştırmacılar, Mali'deki çatışmalara tüm Afrika ulusunu kapsayan tarihi bir perspektifle bakmaktadır ancak Mali'nin tarihi ve kültürü çoğu yabancı tarafından bilinmemektedir. Bu boşluğu doldurmak için bu çalışma Mali'nin krizini kültürel ve tarihi bağlamda tanımlamayı ve daha sonra ülkedeki mutlak barışı geri getirme sürecinde geçmiş barış anlaşmalarının başarısız olmasının ardındaki olası nedenleri belirlemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmanın ana araştırma sorusu: "Mali'de barış inşası ve çatışma çözme süreçlerinde barış anlaşmaları neden başarısız oldu?" sorusudur. Bu tez kapsamında bu soruya cevap bulmak adına resmi ve kurumsal dokümanların incelendiği niteliksel bir çalışma yürütülmüştür. Araştırmada kullanılan veri toplama yöntemi, Mali Çatışması'na dahil olan belirli popülasyonların değerleri, görüşleri, davranışları ve sosyal bağlamları hakkında

bilgi toplamaya yardımcı olan nitel yöntemdir. Sonuçlar çatışma çözüm sürecinde, barış anlaşmalarının, çatışmadaki sosyal / grup kimliklerini dikkate almadıkları çatışma çözme sürecindeki arabulucuların kimlik sorunlarını yönetemediğine işaret etmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Afrika; Çatışma çözümü; Mali; Barış Anlaşmaları; Sosyal kimlik



**UNSUCCESSFUL PEACE AGREEMENTS IN PEACEBUILDING AND
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ABBREVIATION

ADC	Democratic Alliance of 23 May for Change
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
ANSIPRJ	Alliance Nationale pour la Sauvegarde de l'Identité Peule et la Restauration de la Justice
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islam Maghreb
ASF	the African Standby-Force
AU	African Union
CJA	Congrès pour la Justice dans l'Azawad
CMA	Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad
CMFPR I	The Coordination of Patriotic Resistance Fronts and Movements
CPA	Coalition pour le Peuple de l'Azawad
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
EWS	Early Warning System
FLM	Front de libération du Macina
FLN	Forces de libération du Nord du Mali
GATIA	The Imghad and Allied Touareg Self Defense Movement
GSPC	Group for Preaching and Combat
HCUA	Haut conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad
HCA	Haut Conseil de l'Azawad
MAA	Arab Movement of Azawad
MAA-B	The Arab Movement of Azawad-Bamako
MAA-D	Movement arabe de l'Azawad – Dissident
MDP	The Movement for National Defense
MNLA	Mouvement National de Libération de L'Azawad
MSA	Mouvement pour le salut de l'Azawad
MUJAO	Mouvement pour l'Unité et Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest
MPSA	Mouvement populaire pour le salut de l'Azawad

MJL	Mouvement pour la Justice et la Liberté
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
PF	Peace Funds
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PW	the Panel of the Wise
SFG	Follow-up Group on the Situation in Mali
UN	United Nation



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INTRODUCTION

With its government debilitated by a long list of crisis coupled with the latest coup in 2012, the Malian political system – previously an acclaimed example of democratic progress in the region – has been unable to maintain peace and stability in the country. The political crisis and state fragmentation after several failed peace negotiations in Mali become a significant threat to domestic security and regional political stability (there are worrying signals that the radical militant presence in the northern Mali is already drawing in disaffected young people from elsewhere in the region). This study seeks to contribute to the prospective peace in Mali by analyzing the failed peace agreements in the conflict resolution process. More specifically, it tries to explain why different peace agreements failed in producing the anticipated result (rebuild a functional democracy with a lasting peace in Mali), as the armed insurgency and jihadist terrorism continue to undermine Mali's national sovereignty and security till now. An analysis of the failed peace agreements between the Malian central government and northern communities reveals that they have failed to address properly the identity concerns in the conflict and their support of local efforts to resolve the conflict were minimal. This study argues that the shortcomings of these failed peace agreements may be explained by two factors: 1) the role social identity plays in the re-escalation and a perpetual violence in the country, 2) unequal representation of the parties at the negotiations and mediation table.

Many scholars like Mwagiru (2000, 2011) and Mpangala (2000), through their constant analysis of the resolution of conflicts in Africa see conflicts in the continent as simple and complex ones that weaken her socioeconomic and political development of which would require resolution processes and peace building, and an effective mechanisms to manage the conflict. All the exertion to establish peace and stability in Mali failed to manage the intergroup relationship in their different initiatives, peace agreements and reconciliation processes, which possibly result in the failure of previous peace accords and give a way to a persistent violence and reescalation of the conflict.

This study aims to analyze why those efforts failed, in the frame of social psychological theories.

The last two peace agreements starting from the rebellion of 2006 and the organized coup against the central government in 2012 are important sources for the assessment of the historical causes and the reasons behind the failure of the accords. “Algiers Accords of 2016” included very few Malian focused mainly on the development of Kidal region, which does not address entirely the main issue behind the rebellion, the signatories of the agreement were the Government and the 23 May Democratic Alliance for Change. On the other hand, the Algiers agreement signed in June 2015, involved many parties (Platform Coalition, Coordinated Movement of AZAWAD), and at the same time, excluded others (Jihadist groups, and terrorist affiliated movements), which are seen as a threat to lasting peace agreement.

The conflict in Mali has gained the world’s attention and becomes stimulus for the important participation of many outsiders such as: UN, EU, AU, ECOWAS, France and many more for its stability and reign of peaceful atmosphere in Mali. International community’s interventions were crucial as the 2012 coup created an urgency to fill the existing power vacuum and establish a semblance of political order. EU, financially, has invested more than \$ 34 million to build peace and order in the country (EU, 2018). United Nation has deployed thousands of its peacekeeping forces (more than 11,000 troops) as ‘MINUSMA’, which was created under Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 in order to enhance the political norms in Mali and carry out a number of tasks for security purposes. The objective is to support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilization of the country in its transitional roadmap (UN Peacekeeping, 2013). The list continues as France also decided to intervene in the situation bilaterally by militarily deploying its special troops in the country (more than 5,000 French boots are on the Malian soil) to carry out operation against the terrorist in the north of the country. African Union and ECOWAS do not remain unnoticed in this struggle to bring back peace in the country that has been divided for decades under the influence of the rebellious intergroup conflict between the North and South.

The significance of this study searches for building peace in the Mali and the region

of Sahel, through the analysis of possible obstacles that favor the failure of different peace agreements. It highlights the intensity of the urgency for peace and security as well as the protection of the lives and property of mankind. The study clarifies the theoretical and practical significance of the need to reinstall peace and democracy in Mali. On the theoretical side, it helps to illustrate how the social identity can influence, if it is not managed properly in the conflict resolution process, the outcome of peace agreements and results to the re-escalation of intergroup conflict. Objectively, the study aims to analyse and explain the dynamic ways in which social identity effectively participate in enhancement of peace accords in conflict resolution process if managed efficiently. In practice, it is believed that this study will help in the development of a new strategies for political actors, analysts, policy makers, etc., to have a profound way of the dealings with intergroup conflict in national and international politics sphere; also it will aid academics, critics in the analysis of data for future purpose. It is also believed that this study will serve as useful material and incentives for future analysis of conflict resolution.

Our current research study will examine the required action for stabilization in Mali after the third (3rd) peace agreement [Algeria Accords of 2006] and the fourth (4th) peace agreement [Algiers accord 2015]. In that perspective, it examines why past peace agreements failed (focusing merely on the last two peace agreements) and how the failure can be related to unequal representation of the parties with different interests and goals at the negotiation table, uncoordinated actions of the international community during the mediation and negotiation process and uncoordinated follow up and lack of good intension from Bamako to fulfill its promises vis-à-vis the antagonist parties.

The methodology in this study follows the principles of qualitative research methodology and, the research approach exploited is inductive approach. In this approach the, it is more easy to collect data that are necessary for the study, with less emphasis on the analytical and the interpretation of the data. Official documents, from United Nation, African Union, French government and Malian government and other useful resources are considered to create a net link between the objective of the research and the result from the data. Since the objective of the study is to understand the

phenomenon “Why the peace agreements failed in Mali”, it does not focus on testing the hypothesis.

The present study is composed of five chapters. After the introductory part, the first chapter covers the case of Mali, highlighting the past and the current political situations of the country, and the involvement of the international communities. It also puts in perspective the last two peace agreements. The second chapter portrays how these unsolved conflicts have been analyzed by different disciplines, with particular focus on international relations and economy disciplines. The third chapter presents the theoretical approach of the study. It explores three social psychology theories: the realistic conflict theory; social identity theory, and Bar-Tal’s Approach to conflicts. The fourth chapter covers the methodology of the study. It consists of research approach, the data collection and its analysis. In the last chapter findings are discussed and concluded. The study ends with some recommendation for the peaceful settlement of the crisis.

CHAPTER ONE

THE CASE OF REPUBLIC OF MALI

1.1. THE PAST

1.1.1. Geographical Location and Historical Background of Mali

Figure 1: Mali's geographical location



Source: Atlas Map, March 2016

Today's Mali was once part the Mali Empire, one of three dominant empires in West African that greatly influenced trans-Saharan trade. At its peak in 1300 in its golden age period, the empire was flourishing in mathematics, astronomy and literature. Mali's landscape at the period was two time bigger than of today's France, and expanded to the other part of Africa toward the west coast. In the 19th century went

under the leadership of France as the colonial power when Africa was divided among the western countries and the region was known as French Sudan. French Sudan (in the history it is called the Sudanese Republic) allied with Senegal in 1959, and became the Federation of Mali in 1960. Shortly thereafter, as Senegal got out of the federation, it declared itself the Republic of Mali. The country was ruled for a long period of time by one-party ruling system, and system was interrupted by the 1991 coup, which led to the writing of a new constitution and the establishment of Mali as a democratic, multi-party nation. Mali gained its independence on the 22 September 1960 from France.


Mali is a Sahel state, which literally means that the country is landlocked and more than half of its territory is a desert or semi-desert. With a landscape of 1,240,192 square km, it borders with Algeria, Niger, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal and Mauritania. It is rich in many natural resources and the most important ones are: gold, phosphates, kaolin, salt, limestone, uranium, gypsum, granite, and hydropower. In addition, other natural resources are known but are not currently exploited.

The persistent drought over the past decades has forced many Tuareg to give up their primary source of income activities, which is the nomadic way of life. The Racial issues that create a division between the Arab, which are fair in complexion dominantly living in the north and black population living in the south has persisted till today. According to the statistics, over 800,000 people have slave root in their line. There has been a lot of backlash against the northern lighted-skin population known generally as Arabs and Tuaregs after the country got its independence, and as a result, the racial discrimination perpetuate from generations, this racial distinction also impacted many rebellious movements that the country neounter conflict.

Mali republic is an Islamic country where the majority (90%) are Muslim, they mostly belong the Sunni and Sufi affiliations, other religions such as Christianity are not common but do exist, Roman Catholic and Protestant Christian are just 5% and the rest 5% adhere to indigenous or traditional animist beliefs which are very common in most of the African societies.

1.1.2. Social Conditions of Mali

Figure 2: Ethnic groups in Mali



Source: 'Atlas Jeune Afrique 2010', in Bossard, L., *op. cit.*, OECD, Sahel and West Africa Club, 2015, 191.

The foundation of a deep-rooted mistrust between the minority northern communities (Touareg, Songhay and Fula) and the state, has been favored by French's colonial system which regarded these minority ethnic groups as noble than their black African peers. In the post-Cold War era, many theorists have emphasized economics and

identity because there is no doubt that ethnic identities have performed a greater role in civil war than previously and Mali Republic's case is not an exception.

The records have shown that one of the twenty-first century's challenges is the violent conflicts in societies where there is a diversity of ethnic group, and many case studies have particularly related this to the developing countries. Creating big gaps of inequalities can intensify the desire to engage in conflict among religious or ethnic groups in many dimensions such political, social, economic or cultural. The scholars invested a huge amount of time to identify policies that can reduce these gaps of inequalities and argue that such policies should now receive important consideration while implementing any development agenda. The division that is observed in the two parts of Mali is explicitly considered as limit between two distinct climates and two largely separated populations. About 90 percent of the populations of the country are southerners, with a huge number of Bambara communities who control and play key roles in the government and military. The territory of the north is composed of regions such as Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal. Timbuktu and Gao are the places where the ethnical diversity is huge due to the location of Niger River because the inhabitants' primary activities are farming and fishing, including few semi-nomadic ethnic groups such as Songhai and Peuls. When we move to the far north, above Niger River, the area is mostly deserted with very limited urban centers, the most important region in the north is Kidal. Tuareg and Arabs both dominate the region.

Internally, population of Mali is divided within groups. The organization of Tuareg communities is arranged into confederations, which are divided based on the caste and clan. The confederation that dominates the most in Tuareg community since early 20th century is Kel Adagh confederatio. It is important to highlight that the reason behind the dominance of Kel Adagh confederation is its alliance of the colonial master France during the colonial period to fight the confederation's most powerful competitor, the Iwellemmeden confederation.

Rothman (1997) emphasized, "When people's essential identities, as expressed and maintained by their primary group affiliations, are threatened or frustrated, intransigent conflict almost inevitably follows. For such conflicts, conventional methods of conflict

management are usually inadequate and may even exacerbate the problem”. This epitomizes the view that once intergroup conflicts become defined as “identity conflict,” conflict resolution particularly becomes problematic. Identity has been viewed by many scholars as one of the sources of intractable conflicts (Christenson et al. 1975, 24–30). Research on how intractable conflicts develop suggests that intractable conflicts starts when a there is a denial of group’s identity or if the other group invalidate the victimized group’s identity (Kriesberg, 2005; Northrup, 1989; Zartman, 2005). Given the central and protracted nature of such conflicts, beliefs about the causes and justification for the antagonism become deeply embedded shared societal beliefs (Bar-Tal, 1998, Rouhana & Ba-Tal 1998), which include a conviction and goals, delegitimization of out-group’s position, extreme ethnocentric self-perceptions, and victimization beliefs. As shared beliefs, these conceptualization of self and other become incorporated in the narratives of collectives of collective identity and group history by both parties (Hammack, 2006). Members of both parties in general understand that they would be collectively better off if they could find a better solution to resolve the conflict. Yet deeply held identity becomes an obstacle to negotiated resolution (Kelman, 1999, 2001). But this does still not explain the reason why people would prefer to turn to their ethnic group, rather than to any other types of collective. Certainly, people do not really seek protection at random among all social categories they are all affiliated to. They will give preference to those collectives from which they expect mutual recognition and solidarity. In this perspective, entrepreneurs of ethnic identity (Reicher, Hopkins, Levine, & Rath 2005) need to make it sound more relevant, first, that people’s fates are tied to the fate of their ethnic community and, second, that this type of community is more likely to provide them with protection and purpose than any other type of community. Further, the best way to convince community that people will act together in solidarity in the future is how that it has always done so in the past. This leads to clarify the previous argument that collective violence typically bring into being ethnic groups. What is sure is that the entrepreneurs of ethnic identity do not create ethnic categories out of nothing when violence break out. Past experiences, and how they are remembered, constrain the

versions of group identity that leaders or activists can make plausible in time of crisis. (Kelman, 2001)

The most straightforward attempts to link ethnicity and violence empirically can be found in a growing body of quantitative studies in the political science literature. It has become a routine now to include indicator of “ethnic fractionalization” or “ethnic polarization” in the analyses of large macro level datasets of armed conflict worldwide, with the aim of predicting the likelihood of an outbreak of violence. (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005; Vanhanen, 1999). A more subtle and widespread variant of the argument that interethnic relations cause violence is that armed conflicts are provoked by unresolved issues, grievances, or tension between ethnic groups. The general conclusion from these studies is then that more heterogeneity leads to higher risk of violence.

1.1.3 Economical Conditions of Mali

Table 1:Table 1. Malian Population

Key Indicators						
Population	M	18.0	HDI	0.442	GDP p.c., PPP \$	2117
Pop. growth ¹	% p.a.	3.0	HDI rank of 188	175	Gini Index	33.0
Life expectancy	years	57.5	UN Education Index	0.346	Poverty ³	% 79.0
Urban population	%	40.7	Gender inequality ²	0.689	Aid per capita \$	68.7

Sources (as of October 2017): The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2017 | UNDP, Human Development Report 2016. Footnotes: (1) Average annual growth rate. (2) Gender Inequality Index (GII). (3) Percentage of population living on less than \$3.20 a day at 2011 international prices.

According to World Bank indicators, Mali is among the poorest nations in the world; the country has been the victim serious socioeconomic difficulties. Because of its growing population, with the growth of 3% per year, Mali is affected by an increasing unemployment rate, which is very common among the young population, and still struggle to secure and overcome the challenges of the lowest education opportunity at

secondary and tertiary level. The economy of the country relies on the jobs generated by the private sector; plus the high rates of remittances from migrants. The country's economic outlook is favorably driven partly by more public investments and foreign aid, and by the agricultural and service sectors. Due to the increased number of internally displaced people coupled with the increase in the number of refugees and other people depending on humanitarian aid, the humanitarian situation remains a concern in the north. However, this favorable economic outlook of the country is subject to many risks – the potential collapse of the peace accords and the resurgence rebellions leading another conflict throughout the country, a regress in lapses in governance, bad behavior favoring the climate shocks and any further decline in world gold or cotton prices, the two main economic sectors that are considered the backbones of the country's major exports.

It is important to highlight in this section that the regions in the northern part of Mali has historically played a major role Mali's economic wealth. However, in the last decades, the south has dominantly taken the control of the country's economic growth, along with the major political power, and create a long-term division between both side of the country (north and south). The internal development that faced huge difficulties in terms technical and security challenges associated influence of external actors in the domestic affairs of Bamako consequently favored the economic interests of the south part of the country. At the end, the northern Mali become barren economic zone affected by the absence of basic security and unavailability of infrastructures that could possibly have strengthened an economy that is functioning. The south generates its income from agriculture, gold mining and benefits constantly from various funding from the external donors. The north largely relies on livestock and agriculture which makes the 42.7 percent of GDP. The lack proportional distribution of economic sectors geographically between the north and the south (where most of the important infrastructures are built in the south, leaving the north with non-functioning ones) makes the north more fragile economically. Out of many examples is the 2010 and 2012 food crisis, which have greatly affected northern population, which mostly rely agricultural food for their basic

nutrition. Different crisis such as drought at regional level have also affected significantly the economy of the north, particularly the exportation of livestock.

The degenerative state of security in the in the north following many terrorist operations and terrorist attacks has also taken part in the desertification of the north from any economic opportunity. Different economic activities such as tourism (a sector that generate approximately 140 million USD) experienced as sudden collapse after the increase of the activities of terrorist in the region. The collapse of the tourism sector created unprecedented unemployment problem in the north. The youth in particular are mostly affected by this phenomenon. There is no doubt that demographic growth can relatively worsen the economic situation of the country and probably generate tensions in the nearly future. More than 50 percent of Malian population is young, but sadly, that young generation does feel abandoned, not represented by political, traditional and religious leaders (Maliweb, 2015) The frustration increased among young people since it is with a lot of struggle and pain that they can only improve with the basic social need: jobs and marriage.

The geographical location and, the lack of necessary economic opportunities in north have favored trafficking in the region. This criminal-oriented type of economy, which surfaced in the past decades, has attracted the vulnerable young people under the influence of unemployment, and has been intensified with more diversification. UN Office on Drug and Crimes (2009) reports that there is an increase in illegal immigration, the trafficking of counterfeit products, drugs, cigarettes; in the northern Mali. The increasing corruption also poses a big threat for any opportunity of economic recovery for the northern Mali. Even though, the majority of the population is aware of the richness of the region in natural resources such as gold and oil, which could potentially benefit the inhabitants if it is effectively exploited, the personal gains associated with lack of long-terms perspective that the Malian political leaders adopted could significantly undercut this opportunity.

For decades, the combination inequalities observed both at economic and political level have fueled a big mistrust against the central government, in particular among the Tuareg, Arab and Fulani from northern communities. This double marginalization they

experienced somehow enlightened the consecutive struggles with the political authorities in Bamako, it also played a crucial role in the perpetual rebellious movements that started after its independence in 1960. The minority Tuareg in the northern community believe that, the naming Bamako as the capital of a new independent country in which they had felt excluded from, did very few to meet the local expectations. All the attempts to address crises of the north by the Bamako's political authorities have mostly been military-oriented focus, these have traditionally been incorporated in all the conflicts and post-conflict management frameworks initiated by the political authorities. The fact the central government, through its different measures, intentionally put aside the economic and political aspect of the conflict in a very low perspective, indirectly gave some groups and the northerners the perfect environment that can be exploited to as a perfect opportunity to raise the local population against the central states. Setting aside the first rebellions that took place immediately after the independence, the remaining that the country has experimented were all rooted in both economic and political accusations against the government.

1.1.4. Political Conditions of Mali

Lewis A. Coser in his book "The functions of Social Conflict (1956)" argues that the conflicts and violent actions generate from being rejected in society, with dignity put at stake, political access and power is really minimal or do not exist. Coser point to a remedy; he believes that the only way to solve this is by giving access to the political system. In his arguments he posits that, open channels of political communication through, a mean through which all parties can openly express their demands and concerns, are the chances high that the political exercise of violence can be successfully diminished (1967:106). This literally means that the willingness to satisfy needs for access can put an end to the violent conflict.

Edward Azar, in the same line with Coser explained that protracted conflicts deal with security, identity, not being recognized and being able to participate in political system, (Azar and Button 1986:29). Based on the theory of Azar and Coser, it is clear

that when the cause of any conflict is the refusal to meet particular needs, then the process to resolve this conflict must pinpoint those needs and develop a good mechanism to answer them. In the negotiations process efforts are always made to protect the political elites, and if in any circumstance the agreements do not address properly the particular issues fueling the conflict, the “agreements” do not last. According to Azar, the resolution of conflict requires decentralization of structures and ways in which psychological, economic and relational needs can be satisfied (Azar and Burton 1986:30-39).

Northern Mali is greatly composed of the communities of Tuareg, Arab, Songhay or Fulani all together forming inhabitants of three (3) million out of the general population of 18 millions. Historically, and till now they have been a profound division among these northern communities. It is believed that those internal divisions have impacted the unity of different rebellions negatively and create a difficult situation that prevent the ideal solution to the crisis. Disunity; lack of adequate military equipment; are considered to be a major weakness in previous Tuareg rebellion and it has been exploited to reduce the possibility any feasible unity .

During economic or political crises, there is an increase of insecurity among masses, as well as fear among elites to lose political power or control over economic resources (Wilmer, 2002). When we put these theoretical perspectives in our context, starting by highlighting the second peace agreement that encourage the integration of the former fighters (members of armed groups approximately 3,000 of them) into the army and administrative institutions, with the objective to provide a financial subsidies to 9,000 to 10,000 Of them. The public opinion views this initiative from different angle, and the action was criticized differently in the north and in the south. The northerners perceive the numbers of the beneficiaries as a little small, however, southerners believe that the number is very high. In the terms of disarmaments the government did not succeed in that, despite the commemoration of burning more than 3,000 weapons given up by armed groups. The idea of decentralization received more attention and many initiatives were taken to increase the number administrative units (commonly known in French system as communes) starting from 19 to 703 approximately, and in 1998, the first

communal elections was held. After the rebellion of 2006, under the mediation of Algeria, the peace agreement negotiated granted to the northerners more political autonomy. But unfortunately, as it is observed in the second peace agreement, just a few provisions in the agreement were fulfilled. Few years later, The former president in many attempts tried to improve development and security issues in the northern regions. “Special Program for Peace, Security, and Development in Northern Mali (Programme spécial pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement du Nord Mali, or PSPSDN)” is of the initiatives but, the initiative received a lot of critics due to the fact that implementation was very poor and critics say that it probably the reasons why the rebellion rise again in 2012. The repetitiveness of the peace agreements and the idea of them not to be able to satisfy the expectations of the parties raised the feelings that there has been no improvement so far starting the from the second peace agreement. Such feelings is somehow inappropriate because the agreements significantly generated some good reports, even if in some ways, the root causes of the rebellions are not well addressed, they did address at least partially some of them, while working toward the resolution of the underlying issues for future actions toward building peace in Mali.

When periods of political instability occur along with establishment of incontestable or hegemonic representations of other groups and their intentions (Bar-Tal 2004), criminal behavior, which in other circumstances would be interpreted as acts of individuals, is then likely to be constructed as “intergroup violence”, threatening the “ingroup” in its existence. As a consequence, in times of uncertainty and violence, social institutions and relationships appear to no longer function as they used to. People in that kind of environment feel existentially confused and neither know whom to trust, nor how to behave rightly. In situations in which violence threatens to spread, turning to “one’s group” then seems the most functional thing to do. Groups have prospective function for individuals exposed to political violence (Muldoon, Schmid, & Downes, 2009), and enable individuals to react collectively to perceived threat or disorder (Ajdukovic, 2007). Political violence not only dramatically changes what “they” (i.e., people categorized as enemies) mean to “us,” it also insidiously, but not less consequentially, change the way “we” are. It transmutes the normative and structural

context that constraints, directs, and sanctions those social interactions which make a distinctive collective out of people that happen to share a territory, a language, a religion or a series of customs.

Even though the political affiliation, associated with the diversity of regional interests of Tuareg and Arab have rooted deeply in their history, the political tactics used by the colonial and post-colonial powers to divide these ethnic groups have significantly complicated the dynamic in the north. These divisions between the communities best enlightened the proliferation of groups (particularly among Tuareg community), and in parallel create an obstacle for the implementation of adequate mechanisms for a viable resolution of the crisis. This political situation is partly accountable for the broken peace, and is represent the prominent factor in the current situation in the country. Meanwhile, when we check the background history of Songhai ethnic groups, they have historically contributed in great amount to the prosperity of Mali, and this can be shown by their strong political faithfulness to the Bamako, and they struggles to secure the territorial integrity of Mali. We can easily set out the Songhai's community political involvement in the central in the country's politic with some of his people occupying some important position in the government, – The former president Amadou Toumani Touré is a Songhai. All these prove that Songhai political identity in Malian society is far different from Tuareg and Arab communities. However, some members of Fulani community, principally dominant in the north, are also represented even if the number is restricted compared to other communities. – Adame Ba Konaré, Oumar Tatam Ly, Ali Nouhoum Dialo etc. those of few out of many Fulani political leaders playing important role in the Malian political sphere.

1.2. CURRENT ATMOSPHERE

1.2. 1. Political

The foreign interventions in other countries have become increasingly more prevalent on the global scale with the implications of these intrusions more relevant than ever before. Internal struggles and domestic conflicts are ultimately altered by the presence of third parties. The foreign powers have two policy tools at their disposal to modify the behavior of other nations: aid and sanctions. It is important to understand the reason behind the foreign powers acts of choosing to pursue either aid or sanctions and how that choice can affect the internal politics for shaping actions to promote national interest and peace. Civil conflict analysis generally lacks to consider the influence of external actors, for this reason, we judge it crucial to analyze the influences of the foreign actors (United Nation; African Union; and France) in the outcome of these serial unsuccessful peace settlements in Mali. Blattman and Miguel (2010, 30). Gershenson (2002) examines how sanctions affect civil conflict, finding that weak sanctions provoke the incumbent to fight, while strong sanctions result in an incumbent surrender. Chang et al. (2007) finds that third party intervention can be peace making or peace breaking, while Chang and Sanders (2009) show that third party support of an incumbent may or may not provide enough aid to deter rebellion.

The international community's politics were more directed toward sanctions and aids in the crisis of Mali. When the external actors move sequentially, the first mover holds a great deal of power. If it uses sanctions, this action can entice other countries to also use sanctions. Smaller nations who could not eliminate the commitment problem by themselves now have more incentive to provide sanctions. However, if the first mover provides aid to the incumbent, international sanctions are less likely. Aid would likely decrease the effectiveness of sanctions, as the aiding foreign power could act as an Intermediary for the target nation to trade with other foreign powers. Sanctions would have to both solve the initial commitment problem and counteract some of the provided aid. Under this scenario, sanctions would be unlikely to succeed.

When the international community move concurrently, the success of sanctions is dependent upon the ability to coordinate their actions. If they are able to coordinate their actions, then a group of foreign powers that could not individually use sanctions successfully could band together to increase the effectiveness of their combined sanctions. This increased effectiveness could eliminate the commitment problem, producing a peaceful outcome. Unfortunately, even if the international community could coordinate their actions, a different foreign nation could spoil the effects of sanctions. If one foreign power with very low costs to intergroup conflict aided the opposition, sanctions would become significantly less effective for the group of sanctioning nations. Then, the sanctions may no longer eliminate the commitment problem, and intergroup conflict might still occur. The inability to control for nations who have different policy preferences may prevent sanctions from being successful at stopping intergroup conflict.

1.2.1.1. United Nation

The UN came into being on the 24 October 1945 following the World War II. Having learned from the failures of its predecessor “League of Nation”, the UN was equipped with two main mechanisms for preserving peace: a collective security measures and a set of frameworks for the peaceful resolution of disputes. The importance of the collective security concept is that menace of collective force will deter aggressors, or failing deterrence, that the actual use of collective measures will defeat them. Chapter VII of the UN Charter establishes the basis of the collective security framework.

“Article 47 provides for the establishment of the permanent members, whose purpose was ‘to advise and assist the military requirements of Security Council in order to maintain the international peace and security, employ and command the forces placed at its disposal, regulate the policies of armaments, and disarmament’. The Security Council does not necessary need the consent of the parties to consider any conflict, which makes it rather unique among international conflict resolution methods. The article 34 gives the authority to the Security Council to carry out investigation on any dispute, or any crisis that might lead to international friction or engender a dispute, in order to have a clear vision about whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is most likely to put in danger the maintenance of international peace and security”.

The Security Council established MINUSMA under the Resolution 2100 in April 2013. The mandate of MINUSMA, which is renewed every year since 2013, has included every measure to reinforce security and stability in the Republic Mali, to protect the civilians, and support national dialogue and reconciliation. However, counter-terrorism is not part of the mission (MINUSMA n.d.). The budget that was dedicated to MINUSMA in 2014–15 supposed to be approximately \$830,701,700, with the capacity of 12,640 total uniformed personnel, excluding civilian personnel.

However, the actual resources allocated to the mission were below the original plan. For example, there were only 11,510 personnel in March 31, 2015, while the approved budget for July 2014 to June 2015 was \$628,724,400 (MINUSMA n.d.). As the mission continued to struggle, there have been great concerns to increase troops and equipment (UN News Centre, 2016). MINUSMA has significantly enforced the protection of civilians in northern Mali and the stabilization of the country, but the participation had deficiency that are essentially related to the limitations of the current international regime for dealing with violent conflicts. One prominent example that enlightens this state of affairs is the difficulty that the UN always has in mobilization of human and financial resources in a timely and sufficient manner for peacekeeping missions. The commander of the UN peacekeeping force in Mali in a briefing to the UN Security Council said that his force, which has been continuously targeted by jihadists, did not have the mandate, adequate and necessary equipment to fully operate against the counter-insurgency (UN News Centre 2015a). At least eighty-nine (89) UN peacekeepers have been subjected to death and 166 injured in Mali since 2003, which makes MINUSMA as the riskiest missions of UN peacekeeping operation (Carayol 2016: 23). Being an impartial peacekeeping force, MINUSMA's mandate has been quite restricted in terms of military engagement with the armed groups. As Arnaud Akodjenou, made it clear to the members of Mali's parliament, MINUSMA's "action is limited to patrolling, to monitoring the cease-fire, and other agreed-upon security arrangements. MINUSMA is not mandated to use force. Force can only be used in cases of imminent danger against MINUSMA and civilians" (Fainke and Sogodogo 2015: 1).

The most prominent challenge to individual states and the UN system in these situations is how to find the right policy tools and strategies to address terrorist threats and armed violence within sovereign states. The current UN system, which was created to deal with interstate conflicts after two devastating world wars, is still lacking adequate equipment, both militarily and doctrinally, to handle complex intrastate conflicts and violent extremism even though the UN General Assembly in 2005 officially endorsed the R2P norm. The inherent limitations of the UN system greatly impacted MINUSMA, limitations that reduce the UN's capacity to provide efficient global governance to ensure sustainable peace and security in a world that has become a global village. Thus, the limitations of the international system partly account for the limited and mixed outcomes of international interventions in Mali.

1.2.1.2. African Union

The prominent aims behind the establishment of an International Organization such as the African Union are unquestionably to maintain and secure regional and continental peace and security, and to enhance it with appropriate strategies to settle disputes between nations as well as intrastate conflicts (Le Roy and Malcorra, 2009). Following the succession of OAU in 2002, the continental organization was keen on addressing the security issues in the continent. Different security measures such as: EWS, PW, ASF, and PF, were taken in order to meet up with challenges that put the regional stability at stake. After the replacement of the OAU with the AU, there is no doubt that it was a new page in African history (AU/NEPAD, 2003a). Peace and security were not the only issues at center of the organization's concerns but the good investments in its people, the efficient management of the available infrastructures and the construction of new ones, a sustainable and economical development. There is no doubt that security is the principal mission because it will be extremely difficult to secure an investment, growth and development where conflict is permanent. In this vision, Peace and Security Council (PSC) was given an authority to intervene in cases any unconstitutional action taken by of government that does not follow the articles of the constitutions. However, it is

observed the organization does not have necessary means to fulfill its ambitions African nations. Surprisingly, much of its operations and mega projects rely on funds provided by the external actors to be carry out. (Paterson, 2012)

...over 90 percent of the AU's peace and security efforts are funded by external actors and the AU lacks influence over external interventions led by the United Nations Security Council and its five permanent members (P-5) – China, Britain, France, Russia, and the United States (US) – who often have their own more parochial interests, which most often result in undesirable outcomes for the region (Paterson, 2012: 12).

With the above context in mind, it is clear that AU has nothing much to do in Mali crisis. The AU, to contribute the resolution of the situation of Mali relies on the cooperation with ECOWAS and the UN. A particular importance was given to the implementation of the Algiers Accord that result from the fourth rebellion of Tuareg in 2012, with difficulties to figure out how to deal with the actors involved in the conflict and the ideal responses required, it develops its agenda under a diplomatic, political and military sphere to bring a solution to Mali's crisis.

Starting from 2012 after the overthrow of the central government with coup, many political and diplomatic actions were taken in order to attend Mali in the crisis. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) in joint with ECOWAS organized a number of summits and meetings to address the issues. The intense movement of the separatists and different armed group in the north trigger urgent meeting of PSC in the capital of the country, on March 20, 2013, to analyze the feasibility and possible result from a joint AU-UN tactical operations to establish a successful conflict resolution mechanism. (Magassa, H. 2017). The unconstitutional change of government (coup d'état) that occurred during the period when ECOWAS and the AU were battling to settle the issues relating to the rebellious movement in the north was greatly condemned by both organizations. They made joint efforts in order to restore the constitutional order in the country. (Pezard, S., & Shurkin, M. 2013). Subsequent meetings followed many initiatives implemented by the AU and ECOWAS, primarily with the appointment of Burkina Faso former president "Blaise Compaoré" to mediate the negotiation of the power transfer between the army and the central government in early April 2012. Secondly, with the cooperation of ECOWAS and UN, AU initiated the establishment

a “Support and Follow-up Group” (SFG). These initiatives encourage the building of a new government in Mali, since it is capital for a successful engagement of the international community in the country (Pezard, S., & Shurkin, M. 2015). Behind the scene the coalition of AU and ECOWAS supported by of UN initiated a dialogue with the rebels, at the same time, in parallel include the military option in support of the diplomatic one. All these efforts toward the establishment of peaceful environment in Mali were put at stake following the attempt of the armed groups to seize the south, and the subsequent international military intervention in early January 2013 (Shurkin, M. 2014).

The diplomatic and political efforts are the two strategic approaches that the AU and ECOWAS used in Malian situation. They prepare for a possible military intervention in case the diplomatic one fails. The AU put a lot of effort together with UN, and other partners to deploy military missions for the stabilization of the country with the active involvement of the central government, while urging for different armed groups to accept the call for negotiation.

“Thus, in accordance with the relevant decisions of ECOWAS, the PSC, and UN Security Council Resolution 2085 of December 20, 2012, it was decided to deploy AFISMA. The Mission was mandated, among other things, to support Mali in recovering its territories under the control of terrorist and armed groups, maintain security, and consolidate state authority throughout the country. It was also tasked with supporting the Malian authorities in creating a secure environment for the civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees. UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013) of April 25, 2013, transformed AFISMA into the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which was deployed from July 1, 2013, with an authorized troop ceiling of 11,200 military and 1,440 police personnel. It essentially absorbed the military and police personnel of AFISMA before integrating new elements, and was therefore a “re-hatting” process.” (UN Security Council Report 2013).

1.2.1.3. France

France was the colonial power in Mali before the country gained its independence in 1960. France involvements in its former colonies or anywhere in Africa are often subject to controversy about the country’s motivation and its alleged tight grip on its

former colonies (Andrew Hasen, 2007). During the 2012 crisis in Mali, France intervention unfolded first at diplomatic levels during 2012 and later at military level in 2013 with the launch of the operation Serval (Shurkin, M. 2014). To begin with, many perceive France as country of pacifists refraining to involve into military operation beyond its borders (Shurkin, M. 2013). However, this view misses the mark of specific France relations with former colonies especially in Francophone Africa. The label *Francafrique* coined by President Houphout Boigny in 1955 relate to an overreaching set of secret deals, controversial commercial agreements as well as hidden political network crafting France *précarré* in French spoken colonial Africa (Steven Erlanger, 2011; Nicole Atwill, 2011). That is the justification to the stipulations that state “France increase its influence in the sub-Sahara Africa and that action can not be commanded anywhere else in the world (Warson, J. 2017). France sphere d’influence and working method in Africa is summarized by the words of Sacozy’s secretary general of Presidency who asserted that ‘we are not going to fall out with those who do us great service’ (Chinedu Thomas Ekwealor. 2017). It is attention-grabbing that the rebellion in Northern Mali triggered in 2012, in the midst of France presidential election between Nicolas Sarkozy and Francois Hollande. Of course, Mali issues become a point of contention between the candidates. During the live presidential debate in May 2012 both Sakozy and Hollande seemed to agree that France needed to step up its involvements in order to help rescue destabilized Mali. However, when it comes to the nature and the level of the help, nothing is clear.

“The political chaos in Bamako and the military challenge in the north are undeniably related: confusion about who has legal authority and political power to rule the country hinders efforts to organize a credible effort to reintegrate the north (Thurston 2012: 4). Civil conflict leaves in its wake fragile states that are ill prepared to meet popular demands for security, freedom and prosperity and which may even destabilize the region and the world (Curtis 2013). It seems unlikely in the short run that Mali can survive intact as a territorial entity or return to a democratic path without international assistance, mainly from the West. But the international community’s strategy has been criticized as a standard formula”.

In partnership with African countries (G5-Sahel composed of: Burkina-Faso; Mali; Niger; Mauritania; and Chad), France initiated two military operations in Mali—Serval and Barkhane. In response to UNSC Resolution 2085, that took function in December

2012, and following the emergency military supports requested by the Malian government, there was a launched Operation Serval on January 11, 2013 by France. This operation, which continued till July 2014, changed the dynamic and resulted in the deployment of 4,500 French soldiers and African troops. Operation Serval had three main objectives: 1) assist Mali's army to stop the progress of the armed groups toward Bamako, 2) help Mali to preserve the integrity and unity of its territory by regaining control of the northern cities conquered by insurgents, and 3) facilitate the installment of international decisions by sending the convoy of two important missions that are very complementary, AFISMA and EUTM for Mali's armed forces (French Defense Ministry 2013). There was a high risk that letting the Tuareg and jihadist groups take control of the whole of Mali would have transformed the Sahara-Sahel region into free zone for Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups and a source of major threat to international security. David Francis (2013) claimed that, the French-led military intervention prevented a likely situation that occurs in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, Mali would have fallen under the control of jihadists determined to implement a strict and crude form of Sharia in northern Mali. Due to the fact that human rights have been violated, and the risk of regional and international insecurity, the UN Security Council, ECOWAS, and the AU-supported Operation Serval (UN Security Council 2012; Francis 2013; IRIN 2012; Ping 2014).

It may look like Operation Serval has been successful when it comes to the objectives that France has set in the first place. However, staying in different angles of picture, we can develop quite different perspectives about this claimed successful operation of France. For example, though the jihadists seemed to be defeated within Mali in 2013, French armies intervene in Mali looking at the situation from only one angle, (fighting the Jihadist terrorism) rather than considering the political unrest within the country. On top of that, the continued degradation of the security problem reported by UN sources in the north proved that the French, after recapturing the territory, could not protect the re-conquered territory against "the asymmetric and unconventional tactics of a dispersed terrorist adversary". The third shortcoming of the French military intervention was its intention "to destroy highly mobile transnational armed groups with

a campaign limited to one country that has completely open borders,” which simply result in the spread over of the salafist problem into neighboring countries (Reeve, 2015). French-led military operation in Mali was not as successful as many scholars believe. In fact, “stability in Mali will need a political settlement, not only between southern and northern ethnic groups but also within the Malian Army itself” and that “a mission is not over until the last unit is dismissed into its barracks and every piece of equipment has been turned in and accounted for” (Tramond and Seigneur, 2014). The short terms nature of the French success in Mali explains why Operation Serval was combined with the Chad-based Operation Epervier into a multilateral anti-terrorist operation with three thousand troops. French’s first operation under the nomination of “Barkhane” started its first operation on August 1, 2014 with the dual mission firstly to give a support to the regional forces called the “G5 Sahel countries” in their counterterrorism operation, also in the second place to prevent the reestablishment of terrorist network in the Sahara-Sahel region (French Defense Ministry, 2017). This was an important mission aimed at complementing the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali.

1.3. THE PEACE AGREEMENTS

1.3.1 Algiers Accords 2006

In a country with two or more groups, commitment problems exist when one group expects a future loss in power and would prefer to fight for control now than lose power later. Even though these groups would prefer to avoid war, the group gaining power has no way of credibly promising future policy. Fearon (1995) is one of the seminal contributions to the idea that commitment problems are the cause for intergroup conflicts. Problems of commitment have also been applied to describe interstate warfare in general (see Powell 2006 for a more complete description). Literature regarding the effect of third parties on intergroup conflict has been scant. Walter (1997) discusses the importance of third parties to help solve the commitment problem by making guarantees to opposition groups. Walter notes that third party guarantees are only credible if the


intermediate has a “self-interest” in upholding the promise, a “willingness to use force” to uphold its agreements, and the ability to “signal resolve.”

After the 1990s rebellion, if violence resumed in north of Mali in 2006 as a consequence of lack of commitment, the implementation of the former peace agreement was not effective, leading the group ADC to retake the arms in the kidal region. The group is mainly composed of deserted armies which are demanding the more concrete implementation of the clauses in last past agreements.

Bamako immediately initiated negotiations with Algeria as the third party. Algeria hosting a minority of Tueareg on its territory also fears facing the same fate (Tueareg rebellion) as Mali, which clearly portrays its interest in the negotiation, but the question here is how consolidated is the Malian democracy to prevent the use of force by these rebellious group after the negotiation of the peace accords. A democracy becomes consolidated when democracy becomes “the only game in town”, according to Przeworski (1991, 26). Fleshed out, a democracy is consolidated when no groups within a nation attempt to achieve objectives via force, when a majority of voters agree that democracy is the correct form of government under even stressful conditions, and when groups and individuals resolve conflicts within the bounds of the law (Linz and Stepan 1996 provide additional insight). Intergroup conflict is the ultimate failure of democracy, as an entire group has decided to ignore the democratic process and instead fight for state control, creating a separatist movements. The factors that result in democratic consolidation should result in lower levels of intergroup conflict, as democracy enables opposition groups to resolve injustices via nonviolent means.

1.3.2 Algiers Accords 2015

Figure 3: Signatory Inter-Malian Peace Accord



Source: *International Crisis Group, Report No: 267/AFRICA 13 December 2018*


The Government of Mali and different armed groups in 2014–2015 initiated a peace process under the mediation of the neighboring Algeria as key mediator. We have Platform Coalition composed of four members (MAA, CM-FPR, CPA and GATIA); the coordination of Azawad Movements with the composition of three member (MNLA, HCUA, and MAA-CMA), followed by the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA). The most challenging part in the Algiers Accord of 2015 is the composition of the participating groups in the signatory experience a lot of change at the course of time.

Different struggles and efforts to achieve a secure peace Mali have become really unthinkable due to the growing number of different armed groups with different agenda. Individual interests and group revalities weakened the idea of cooperation, even when

political agendas of these diverse groups match. “The Algiers Accord between the Malian government and the armed groups in the north in June 20, 2015, was pushed through by an international community tired of the unlimited wrangling between northern Mali’s armed political movements. As a consequence, it is widely regarded in the north as an imposed agreement that does not address the often subtle and deep-rooted grievances that fuel the ongoing conflict. The rebels see MINUSMA’s deployment, expensive in terms of both money and lives, as providing quiet support for Bamako’s efforts to take control of the north through proxies such as GATIA, while ignoring the concerns of rebel groups. Nevertheless, most of the armed groups in northern Mali can be brought together under one of five categorizations: Progovernment militias (the Platforme); pro-independence or pro-federalism groups (the CMA); dissident CMA groups that have left the coalition; Salafi-Jihadist groups; and ethnically oriented groups. Many of these groups break down further into brigades, or katiba”. According the report from Clingendael (Netherlands Institute of International relation) “Current difficulties in the Algiers peace talks are directly connected to those community divisions. The Platform and Coordination groups that are supposed to represent northern interests in the peace process do not have a common agenda, including on territorial matters (autonomy, federalism, decentralisation – among other issues). Those differences make it extremely difficult to agree on common discussion points and any viable solution to the crisis continues to be unattainable. Understanding the dynamics of northern groups is therefore crucial to achieving a long-term peace agreement and meeting local needs that are currently ignored or fulfilled by others, including terrorist organizations”.

Bellow is a proposed guide to the current armed groups involved in Mali’s situation:

Figure 4: The Parties in Malian Conflict



The Platform Coalition is generally composed of government supporters and believes in the idea of national unity; the coalition was formed in June 2014. Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance – Plateforme (CMFPR I); ‘The Coordination of Patriotic Resistance Fronts and Movements’ was established on July 21, 2012. Another prominent party in the platform is Groupe d’autodéfense des touareg Imghads et allies (GATIA), The Imghad and Allied Touareg Self Defense Movement. Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad-Bamako (MAA-B) The Arab Movement of Azawad-Bamako is another unquestionable progovernment faction of the MAA. The list of platform coalition continues as Mouvement pour la défense de la patrie (MDP) The Movement for National Defense also joined the battle. The last group to allied with Platform is Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad (MSA) The Movement for the Salvation of Azawad. The composition of Platform Coalition shows the dynamic of the group composition in the peace agreement. Despite their categorization under the same umbrella, they have different objectives and goals; in a simple term, supporting the same ideology does not necessarily means they are directed by the same goal.

Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) The Coordination of Azawad Movements coalition is composed of three main parties: Haut conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA) The High Council for the Unity of Azawa; Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad – Dissident (MAA–D) The Arab Movement of Azawad; Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) The Azawad National Liberation Movement. The movements have different claims and accusations against the central government and their claims are centred on: a special recognition of the status of the northern region of Mali, provide the northerners with important role in decentralization; initiation of different programs to promote the economical capability of the northern region; and most importantly to secure and integration of some rebel combatants in Malian administration and security forces.

The parties in CMA Dissident Groups in the past years were members of CMA groups but left principally due to the fact that the allies are promoting further violence rather than reconciliation. The movement is composed of two parties: Coalition pour le

Peuple de l'Azawad (CPA), and Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Résistance II (CMFPR-II) The Coordination of Patriotic Resistance Fronts and Movements II. The constituent of the groups are from different ethnic origin but mainly the Tuareg ethnic group and Arabes, the ethnic composition of the groups are one factor the agreements does not consider in the peace negotiation process, the reason why the proliferation of groups keep intensifying making the process of reaching an agreement more complicated.

Salafi-Jihadist Groups received no attention from regional and international communities but have greatly influenced the outcome of different peace agreements due to the radical ideologies behind their struggles to maintain their identity in the society. They are more eager to create a salafist state independent from the central government, ruled by the principles of Jihadism, but the struggle for social identity make it more complexe and create a division among the groups. The prominent Salafi-Jihadist groups in northern Mali are: MUJAO, AQUIM, FLM, ANSIPRJ, Ansa al-Din, Al Murabitu, and IS Sahara/Sahel. Despite their belonging to the same categorization, their goals and visions are different. Fulani and Songhai ethnic groups formed the Al Murabitu movements after the separation from AQUIM, mainly composed of Tuareg and Arabes.

Ethnically Oriented groups do not appear to be attention catching in the Malian conflicts but this does not withhold them from standing for their different claims. Even though they are restricted in number, that have also significantly affected the outcome of the peace agreement process. Intergroup conflict commonly arises within divided societies undergoing democratic transitions if one faction believes it will not have sufficient rights or participation within the rules of the new democracy. The inability for either side to commit to future power sharing agreements means it may be optimal for one faction to fight for a chance at power rather than subject itself to the will of the majority. This commitment problem may be the basis for the Malian conflict, where a minority ethnic groups (MPSA, FLN, CJA and MJL) are fighting now to keep power as it would to do poorly in any democratic system. Consociationalism (or power-sharing) has been known for decades to be effective at solving some of the issues of divided societies by promoting cooperation mechanisms among elites. While consociationalism

worked to promote peace in South Africa for instance, it failed to work in a number of other divided societies.



CHAPTER TWO

PERSPECTIVES OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL DISCIPLINES ON INTERGROUP CONFLICTS

2.1. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The question of what obstacle puts at stake reaching a prospective peace in Mali has been one of the principal topics studied by scholars of international relations in past years. This scholarship emerged as the result of series of weak peace agreements that did not alleviate the rebels' struggle for separation and restored peace. In fact, prominent legal scholars, Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin, recently argued that the reason why the peace accords failed in Mali can be attributed to the inaction of the central government to implement the agreed-upon clauses in the agreements. The scholars speak of the need for greater political inclusion, foreign security assistance, and integration of northerners into Mali's armed forces and administration.

The limitation of the observational study has shown that Mali's situation does not only revolve around the above-mentioned conditions to secure a lasting peace in the country. The prove that the failure of the peace agreements were not limited to the conditions raised by Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin will be discussed in the following lines.

Firstly, the Malian government conducted a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program with 600 former combatants who handed in their weapons in March 2007, with approximately 600 doing so in February 2009. Another measure targeted the militia of young Tuareg and Arabs who joined the military surge against the ATNM in early 2009. They were included in the socioeconomic reinsertion program for young ex-combatants and unemployed people set up by the Algiers Accords. Interestingly, the program targeted both categories so as not to seem to reward only the rebellion. However, Bamako never set up the local, regional, and interregional assemblies that were supposed to be established in the north. The special security units and other security provisions never materialized. The implementation of economic

efforts was disappointing as well. For example, the special investment fund called for by the Algiers Accords was never created (Wing, O. 2013)

Secondly, in July 2010, ATT made a belated effort to improve both development and security in the north by means of a program known as the Special Program for Peace, Security, and Development in Northern Mali (Programme spécial pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement du Nord Mali [PSPSDN]). An ambitious program in scope and funding (about \$60 million provided by several donors, including France, Canada, and the European Union), the PSPSDN was to focus development efforts on 11 strategic sites in northern Mali that would at the same time be secured by the Malian army (Kalillou, S. 2012). It was, however, criticized for being “too little, too late,” for bringing back the Malian army in areas where it was not welcome, and for not consulting sufficiently with local populations. The concept of building military barracks in the north on the strategic sites went directly against the efforts of the preceding 20 years to reduce the presence of the Malian army in the north and was criticized by Tuareg leaders as focusing more on security than on development, while being woefully inefficient against criminality. Overall, while international donors were providing funds for the PSPSDN in the hope that it would finally implement some of the promises made in the Algiers Accords, the program apparently antagonized local populations and is even seen as one of the reasons that the MNLA took up arms in January 2012.

Lastly, Many Malian politicians, civil-society leaders, and northern groups have reflexively argued that what Mali needs is more decentralization and more democracy, based on the assumption that insufficient quantities of both have contributed to Mali’s instability. The International Crisis Group, for example, noted that “decentralization today constitutes the favored reply by the government and its partners not only for responding to the feeling of marginalization in the north but also to engage in a greater reform of governance. In October 2013, the Malian government sponsored a national forum on decentralization (États généraux de la décentralisation), a large event that brought representatives from many diverse Malian communities to discuss the state of Malian governance. The consensus that emerged was, in brief, that Mali needed more democracy and more decentralization. Basically, the logic is that the more communes,

the more elected positions; and the more elected positions, the greater the representativeness, responsiveness, and legitimacy of the government. According to David G. (2007), decentralization also intensified the internal struggles for power within northern communities, with winner-take-all outcomes in resource and aid access. Further, the blanket form in which decentralization was implemented without taking into account how local northern institutions already operated continues to make success elusive.

With the hopes to cease armed violence and develop a new mechanism to handle the disputes and install peace, the peace agreements signed in Mali have failed in providing the anticipated peace and creating the awareness of limitations that consist an obstacle to its promises. The international relations discipline views the last peace agreements in Mali in the frame of “What”, “With whom” and “When” to negotiate. According to the discipline’s perspective, in order to negotiate peace there must be political compromises; and the idea of labeling some armed groups as terrorist, with the rejection of the opponents’ political nature can consequently create an obstacle to the installation of peace.

Zartman and William (2001) note that political willingness and the good indicator to see if armed groups can reach a political solutions that can lead to a lasting peace agreement. Critics have risen in the international sphere to question the readiness of the parties to start the negotiation. The theory of readiness explains further the ideology that can be comprised if the conflict raises motivation that does not move the negotiation toward the peaceful settlement of the conflict. The development of ripeness theory also go in the same line with readiness where Zartman develop an argument saying that the period in which the conflicting parties find out that they are not going to get any positive result when they keep on defending their individual interests, where the coercion is no longer perceived as appropriate way to claim the interest it is only at that moment that the political route through negotiations can be exploited. Other necessary steps that are required after the definition of readiness or ripeness stage are unquestionably the creation of unity within groups and parties taking part in the negotiation process and, coupled with a very clear strategic political goals that could back the disputes settlement,

and the capability to elaborate sufficient internal and external support in order to sign and maintain lasting agreements with a well define follow up.

What are we negotiating is the first question the discipline assess to well define the Malian crisis in its real context because it is believed that if the underlying issues of the conflict are not properly addressed that seek transformation of a conflict during the negotiation process, any reached peace agreements will void and fruitless. Dealing with the case of Mali, the underlying key issues are well defined: giving a special status to the north; restructure the constitution and give more power to the local governments in another terms, a good system to decentralize the power to the lower part of the pyramid; reduction and demilitarization of the northern part by removing the army garrisons; and the revitalization of the north economy with more funds backed with many development projects (Pezard, et al, 2015). These issues were touched upon in Algiers Peace Accords in 2015, but the sad reality is no concrete actions were taken toward resolving them and the majority remain untouched till present (Wiklund, Cecilia Hull and Nilsson, Claes, 2016). There have been many critics that stipulate that, while the counter productivity is a good step to create the regional assemblies, the process can also become the catalyst for the resolution of the conflict if the dynamics within the northern communities, as well as inter/intragroup tensions and conflicts in the north are not efficiently managed. (Reeve, Richard, 2014). Terrorism and trafficking were out of the deal during the negotiation process, and the Algiers agreement lack a strong policy examine the two key parallel conflicts which can jeopardize any possible reached agreement: the ideological challenge related to jihadist groupings in the name of Islam; and inter/intragroup conflicts within the northern community (Wiklund, 2016).

The next question that is very crucial in assessing the crisis in Mali is {with whom are we negotiating?} There are two important components that can help in this perspective to explain the reason why the last two peace agreements were not successful. Firstly, the multiplication of armed groups and the lack of accountability toward those parties which are involved in the negotiation process. While working toward the setting up of 2015 Algiers Accords, the process experienced different changes with the leaders of the armed group; their nominations even their alliances with other group were not

fixed. On top of that, lack of collective agendas along with intensifying rivalries among the group, coupled with repositioning of some groups in advance of the negotiation process itself, made reaching the agreement quite difficult, which consequently led to an unfruitful result. The northern communities were not feeling involved in the peace negotiation, reason why their support for the agreement was not well noticed in the Malian society (Wiklund et. al. 2016). The second component is the fact that some important actors were not included in the negotiation process. The groups of Platform and the Coordination were the principal participants of the peace negotiation, the other group that are affiliated to salafist-jihadist movements were completely removed from the list. These groups such as AQIM, and other jihadist affiliated groups, due to their radical ideology were considered as a threat to the national peace, thus, they were denied access to the negotiation table (Boutellis, Arthur and Zahar, Marie-Joëlle, 2017). The idea to include those groups was never welcomed by anyone at regional or international level because it is believed that such action could make the matters complicated in various ways. However, their exclusion entirely from any type of negotiation may also jeopardize the peace process.

There has been a lot of polemic around the question of “When to negotiate?” In the international sphere this question remains very difficult to answer. Zartman suggests the right time to enter in negotiation is the moment when the parties start evaluating the cost of the conflict and start looking for other alternative to pursue their goal other than fighting ‘ripe moments’. But unfortunately, the fact that the other group can perceive this step subjectively can create complication for determining when is the right time to negotiate. Indeed, as the conflict is perceived in a subjective manner dynamics and the interpretation of adversaries by the leaders make it difficult to determine when is the right time to negotiate. In the case of Mali, the groups are more interested in the negotiation process than peace itself. When it comes to disarmament, very few groups are ready to give up their weapons to the government, but the majority of the group still hold on their weapons simply because they can still reach their goal by fighting.

2.2. ECONOMY

According to the Voice of Africa report (2016), the World Bank states that it has accelerated its financial support for Mali as its economy has slowed down under the influences of political crisis and terrorists insurgencies. Surrounded by impoverished countries, the bank worries that a prolonged conflict in Mali could damage the region's already fragile economy. Mali today remains one of the poorest countries in the world, in the middle of one of the poorest regions in the world (Sahel). Both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund rank Mali and six of its seven neighbors among the world's 50 poorest countries.

“The crisis in Mali that has already drawn troops from France and Nigeria is making things worse economically for Mali and its trading partners. World Bank Vice President for Africa Mouktar Diop posits that Mali's a landlocked country and a lot of the economic activity is imports, based on either the truck industry in neighboring countries or the port. The Port of Dakar has a lot of activities linked to Mali so a slow down in port in Mali will affect a slow down in some of these activities. According to him, Mali's economic growth has already slowed considerably, and its neighbors like Ivory Coast and Senegal are suffering consequently and losing business. He continues in his arguments and explains that, a few products linked to low-income consumption, which was produced in neighboring countries and exported into Mali. So a slow down of that sector will affect those producers. The World Bank is still working enhance aid programs that were halted briefly in 2013 after a coup left the bank without a known government to support. The bank is as well working on a plan to lend direct support to Mali's national budget.”

“The economists believe that a real economic disaster - the one that could miserably make West Africa's population even poorer - will come only if the conflict drags on, increasing the number of displaced people and leaving the 350,000 already displaced dependent on aid to survive. But lately, according to World Bank report (World Bank, 2019) despite deteriorating security, economic performance remains strong, with robust growth. A strong performance in the secondary and services sectors

led to a projected growth rate of 5.4% in 2017 (versus 5.8% in 2016), despite volatile security conditions. Primary sector growth fell from 7.6% to 4.8% between 2016 and 2017, owing to decreased rainfall, while the tertiary sector has continued to grow as a result of renewed dynamism in the telecommunications sector, which has grown at a rate of around 6% since 2014. On the demand side, investment has risen sharply, climbing 8%, partly as a result of an increase in private investments for the first time since 2012, and partly as a result of the Government's efforts to reduce infrastructure gaps."

"The inflation rate rose to 1.8% in 2017 as a result of higher food prices and increased international oil prices. Notwithstanding a slight deterioration in the terms of trade (owing to increased oil prices and lower gold prices), the current external deficit (grants included) fell to 5.8% of GDP in 2017, compared to 7.2% in 2016, thanks to improvement in the balance of trade. Despite pressure on public expenditure, the authorities have managed to contain the budget deficit, which narrowed from 3.9% of GDP in 2016 to 2.9% in 2017, thanks to the rationalization of current expenditure and significant improvement in domestic revenue. Mali is a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), which keeps a peg between the CFA Franc and the Euro, manages monetary policy, a policy supported by the French Treasury. Growth is projected to hold steady at about 5% over the medium term."

Table 2: Mali's Economic statistics

Economic indicators		2013	2014	2015	2016
GDP	\$ M	12813.2	14004.1	12746.7	14045.1
GDP growth	%	2.3	7.0	6.0	5.3
Inflation (CPI)	%	-0.6	0.9	1.4	-
Unemployment	%	7.3	8.2	8.1	8.1
Foreign direct investment	% of GDP	2.4	1.0	2.2	0.9
Export growth	%	2.5	1.1	4.7	4.7
Import growth	%	5.9	5.5	5.7	3.5
Current account balance	\$ M	-374.7	-675.8	-	-
Public debt	% of GDP	26.4	27.3	30.7	35.9
External debt	\$ M	3445.7	3456.3	3688.7	3787.9
Total debt service	\$ M	101.9	99.1	106.1	122.3
Net lending/borrowing	% of GDP	-1.2	-1.2	-2.7	-
Tax revenue	% of GDP	13.5	13.0	14.5	-
Government consumption	% of GDP	17.2	16.7	16.6	16.5
Public education spending	% of GDP	3.4	3.7	-	-
Public health spending	% of GDP	1.1	1.6	-	-
R&D expenditure	% of GDP	-	-	-	-
Military expenditure	% of GDP	1.2	1.6	2.4	2.6

Sources (as of October 2017): The World Bank, World Development Indicators | International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military Expenditure Database.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO INTERGROUP CONFLICTS

3.1. REALISTIC CONFLICT THEORY

The study of intergroup conflict is of central concern to social scientists. Conflict seems inevitable result of human interaction under some conditions, and learning how to reduce or prevent destructive disputes is vitally important. Few theorists have contributed to the field to the extent of Muzafer Sherif, whose realistic conflict theory states that when the groups' interests are contradictory, this can generate intergroup conflict, the solution to reduce that and is to define the conflicting group under one umbrella which is "superordinate goals" through cooperation (Sherif, 1958). Blending psychological and sociological frameworks, his Robbers Cave experiment (which would form the basis of realistic conflict theory) remains influential to this day.

The famous "Robbers Cave study" forms the basis of Sherif's realistic conflict theory, showing that intergroup conflict is produced when goals are conflicting and the source is scarce, and it can be reduced with superordinate goals that can be achieved with cooperation. Intergroup relations therefore cannot be reduced to within-group relations or personality characteristics; the wider social and environmental context is crucial in shaping the relationship. When goals become competitive, such that one's success results in another's loss. Other different factors may include threat to group security (real or imagined), military might, social status, economic considerations, or general competition for scarce resources (Jackson, 1993; Sherif et al., 1988).

Studies that have been carried out in many other disciplines such as Sociology, Political Science, International Relations, Philosophy etc. has greatly supported the theoretical idea. Divale and Harris (1976), the well-known anthropologists conducted numerous researches on small societies, and the result showed that when groups compete over scarce resources, such as land, this can easily lead to intergroup conflict.

Scholars from Sociology discipline have argued that unequally distributed resources can potentially create a division, even if such resources exist in a larger quantity (Cummings, 1980). The array of combination of various methods, sourcing from different discipline, and international validation has convincingly validated the basic tenets of realistic conflict theory.

Many more recent psychological theories also draw from or build upon Sherif's realistic conflict theory. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) is based on the premise that intergroup conflict need not arise from interpersonal variables. This theory however diverges from the basic tenet of Sherif's theory: that conflict can arise simply due to the sheer existence of two groups, without the necessity of overt competition. Addressing the amelioration of conflict, the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1971; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) also aligns with Sherif's belief that contact alone is not enough to eliminate conflict. The contact hypothesis argues that in addition to superordinate goals, additional factors such as equal status, egalitarian norms, and cooperative independence are necessary to change cognitive representations of out-groups and to reduce conflict. These positive forms of contact may result in what has become known as a common in-group identity.

3.2. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY

The current research exploits one of social psychology theories that contributes to the understanding intergroup conflicts: social identity theory. Social psychologists in the last decades have developed many research questions trying to figure out why some groups easily initiate collective conflict while others don't, how status of diversity and non-diversity in societies can or can not contribute to intergroup conflict, and the possible characteristics explicitly clarify the fact that some groups try to be more cohesive as they enter in conflict while other groups do not.

Issues relating to identity have been broadly researched and accessed in different approaches, as a matter of fact, the role that identity can play in the issues relating to peace and conflict have been debated in many disciplines. In this scope, we refer to the

application of our knowledge of the theory of social identity in the context of the peace psychology framework. Peace psychology seeks to develop theories and practices aimed at the prevention and mitigation of direct and structural violence. If it is framed in a positive way, it can promote the nonviolent assessment of conflict and the pursuit of social justice, what we refer to as peacemaking and peacebuilding (Christie, Wagner, and Winter, 2001). With all the values we always attach to our group, a social identity theory to understand conflict and peace is unquestionably without any doubt of great relevance to our current century, where diversity in many aspect of the society such as: culture, religion, ethnicity, politic, and national affiliations seem to underlie most of the conflict we are experiencing today, like the case of Mali Republic. The current study attempts to provide a comprehensive theoretical and cross-cultural account of social identity theory applied to peace and conflicts. Our approach of social identity theory here does not merely focus on how it is attached to one of the causes of Mali crisis, but also how it can be applied to promote intergroup relations.

Social representations of the different groups in Mali crisis received less attention, but could be one of the backbones that perpetuate the conflicts in the country. The very easy way to create a conflict in a society is by maintaining a way of thinking that categorize the society members in the cluster of “Us” versus “Them”. Kalman underscores this point in his article entitled “ The role of national identity in conflict resolution. Social identity, intergroup conflict, and conflict reduction (pp. 187–212)”

“Historical narratives that remind people of the conflict must be supported and social representations as well as the perceptual filters through which people view the other group (Philips DeZalia & Moeschberger, 2014) must guide individuals towards the division and the need for continued conflict. Many of these social representations would fall into the belief-based category, which means they are not founded on facts or research but more attached to collective memory and a common sense feeling that this is from the beginning till now the way it is and always will be. Societies must find a way through any means to promote the cause of their collective struggle (Psaltis, Bydola, Filippou & Vrachimis, 2014). The conflict becomes the most salient part of the group identity and leads to a cycle of perpetual violence. In the course of this past history, not only the view of the other but the identity of each group [in the conflict] as well has come to be defined around this ideology: the other is my enemy and I am the enemy of the other. In short, group self-concept comes to the center on violent conflict with the other

group (Staub 2001, p.170). Although social representations can be used to continue a conflict, they may also be used to encourage reconciliations. Social identity, like social representation, must also change if reconciliation is going to take place after conflict. The stubborn resistance to change in collective identities is widely recognized and taken for granted. Yet identities have to change, or at least facially, if protracted conflicts are to be settled and certainly, if they are to be resolved in a way that transforms the relationship and opens the way to reconciliation (Kelman, 2001)."

Social Identity Theory (SIT) model as the theoretical framework for this study is crucial as the numbers of group (parties) involved in the crisis of Mali, considering their respective agendas and interests, can be accessed efficiently. If we have to categorize the number of the groups in a very restrictive way to bring every participant of Mali's crisis in the whole picture, we can come up with three main groups such as: international communities; Malian government; and the rebels groups (all combined). The idea here is to be able to see the complexity of the crisis through the formation different in-groups and out-groups, which are the biggest handicap for the settlement of the conflict in Mali. The peace agreements that started from 2006 till present do not involve the whole groups (especially from the rebel side) and their different interests and claims, which results in the recycling of rebellions and violence. Emotions can be defined as the degree to which society members support various courses of aggressive collective action (Coleman, 2003) If we want to deal with a conflict, we need to question the particular emotions that are driving the conflict and this leads us to another research question that can be subject to another further study: "Did the peace agreements take into account the collective emotions of each participant group in Mali's conflict?"

3.3. DANIEL BAR-TAL'S APPROACH

There is no doubt that the retrospect of the analysis of all intergroup conflicts in our modern society shows that they all start over natural resources, territories, power, economic wealth, self-determination, and/or basic values. Most of these conflicts rooted in the incapacity to find a common ground to goals, which are very contradictory. And any effort to reduce or prevent this conflict will result to a failure if it does not touch on the underlying disagreement over those goals. But it is very clear that a potential

solution could be found for the absence of any possible agreement if effort can be put together to diminish the various powerful forces which intensify and maintain the conflicts. These forces, which underlie the principal disagreements, are the called barriers that block any or become obstacle to any progress toward peaceful resolution of the conflict. They stand as major obstacles to commence the negotiation, to carry on with peace building process, to achieve an agreement and later to engage in a process of reconciliation. Political leaders and important authorities are found to be ones that cherish these barriers, in addition to society members that are involved in intergroup conflict (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). According to Bar-Tal's (2011) concept of social-psychological barriers to conflict resolution, these barriers are of special significance as they significant detrimental power in preventing and blocking peace making.

Literature review about the different barriers in social-psychological perspective reveals at least four different but complementary directions. What contents found societal beliefs? Those beliefs can potentially intensify the perpetually the conflict. Kelman (1987) suggested that when the victimized group perceives the relations with incumbent group in zero-sum terms, the denial of the other group's identity and the extremely negative and monolithic view of the adversary delay any progress toward successful negotiation. In fact this content approach can easily be found almost in every major study about serious and prolonged conflict such as the case of Mali. Nevertheless, there are many other type of barriers that can be added up to the list, and the most prominent ones in addition to the beliefs already above are the beliefs that pertain to self-moral glorification, overconfidence in own strength (the idea of saying that we can win the battle, we have means it takes to overthrow the opponent), sense of being a victim (The idea of being rejected in the society being discriminate against, not having any important place in the society), strong feeling of patriotism, being vulnerable, being helpless, and so on (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2007a; Coleman, 2003).

"Intergroup mistrust" is another important psychological phenomenon, which is presented as one of the most important barrier for the resolution of any conflict (Kelman, 2005; Kramer & Carnevale, 2001; Kydd, 2005). The mistrust between the parties can delay any possible solution when levels of what to expect from the other group in the

future behavior is unpredictable (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) and this situation can lead directly to refusal to take risks in negotiations and to support of conflict continuation (Lewicki, 2006). This fear of being betrayed or played by the opponent, gives room for doubt about any prospective idea to find a solution to the conflictual situation. From this angle, despite the fact that trust can be affective in some aspects, it has to be categorized into the long list of the obstacles that are based on the content, with a lot of concentration on the view of the adversary and his expected actions in the future behavior, which can possibly contribute to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Ross and his colleagues in the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation present findings about important studies that create a whole new view about socio-psychological barriers (Maoz, Ward, Katz, & Ross, 2002). They concentrate their focused on motivational processes as well as the cognitive process as principal barriers and/or obstacles in times of negotiating peace accord. According to their view, socio-psychological barriers are “cognitive and motivational processes that impede mutually beneficial exchanges of concessions and render seemingly tractable conflicts refractory to negotiated resolution” (Ross & Ward, 1995, p. 254). These barriers “governing the way that human beings interpret information, evaluate risks, set priorities, and experience feelings of gain and loss”

3.4. RESEARCH JUSTIFICATION

It is important to begin by emphasizing that the situation in Mali engenders great concerns at national, regional and international level. The crisis implicates a huge number of people with different ethnic identities associated with a complex social identity. As matter of fact, since the main objective set by this study is to obtain a deep understanding of a particular aspect the Malian crisis: why did the peace agreements fail in the conflict resolution and peace building process in Mali? It is crucial to use a data driven analysis method to gather necessary information in order not to provide a conclusive evidence of the stated problem, but to better understand the problem and leaving room for the next forthcoming research to have a narrow field of focus. The

Mali crisis is still a current and ongoing situation, with a less promise for the absolute resolution of the crisis, in this perspective; qualitative research method is the appropriate method because of the social nature of the phenomenon. The researches are still ongoing in the hope to pinpoint the exact causes of the conflict and the ideal solution, so a research with a conclusive solution as objectives will be subject to a bias. Conflict resolution discipline is continuously in evolution in order to enlarge in the rang of different aspect conflicts and in the different number of conflicts that are of interest-based ones. The methodology utilized in this study is appropriate to the field due to the fact that the cost associated to the failure and incapacity to stop the occurrence of disagreements keep emerging and Conflict Resolution discipline can develop an effective peace mechanism in order to encourage more constructive way of approaching the resolution of conflicts.

CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY

4.1. RESEARCH APPROACH

The research approach exploited in this study is inductive approach as it is necessary in analyzing data. The methodology in this study follows the principles of qualitative research methodology and, an inductive approach of analysis. In this approach, it is more easy to collect data that are necessary for the study, with less emphasis on the analytical and the interpretation of the data (Bernard H.R. 2011) Officials documents, from United Nation, African Union, French government and Malian government and other useful resources are considered to create a net link between the objective of the research and the result from the data. Since the objective of the study is to understand the phenomenon “ Why the peace agreements failed in Mali”, it does not focus on testing the hypothesis.

4.2. RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design in this study follows the “Exploratory Research” principles. The study explores the Malian crisis in its historical context starting from the background of the underlying issues that maintain the course of rebellions movement, and the consecutive peace agreements that do not accomplish the anticipated result. The study’s theoretical approach reveals that the incompatibility of goals, scarce of resources, economic and political inequality within a society can create tension that can lead to intergroup conflict. To verify the accuracy of such theories, the study explore past and the current the economical and political status of the Mali and their influence on the negotiated peace agreements. Other disciplines’ perspectives (international relations and economy discipline) were explored as well. The negotiation of any peace accord requires a third party involvement, as a result, the study analyzes the implication of the

international community, focusing on the United Nations, African Union, France and ECOWAS.

4.3. METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

The utilized method in this study follows the principles of qualitative method. Thus, this method refers to some collections of words, symbols, pictures, materials or artifacts that are collected by the person conducting the study and its data is of relevance to the social group under study. It is a very useful method that involves the in depth collection of information but from a relatively small number of cases (Burham et al., 2005). The nature of our study embraces the use of secondary source of data to interrogate the hypothesis we raised. One of the advantages of secondary source of data is that this kind of information is collected periodically; also it does not require the assistance and cooperation of the population about which data are being collected (Neuman, W.L. 2003)

In this perspective, the current study relied on institutional and official documents like the reports of United Nations, French Minister of Defenses, African Union official reports on Mali Crisis, Malian Government reports, Statistics from Human Right Watch and other governmental and non-government organizations, these are supported by other sources such as Journals, articles, textbooks and internet materials that dealt with the issues of Mali crisis, starting from the origin of the conflicts to different peace settlements (see Table 1). Twelve official documents were taken into account in the analysis process. Simple random sampling was used to select three out of ten considered documents from each category. The ten official documents are gathered from each source and a simple random sampling method was applied to select the twelve documents considered in the study. Three UN reports on the situation in Mali (**Doc:1** Report of Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (March 2019); **Doc:2** Human Right and Peace Process in Mali (Jan 2016- June 2017); **Doc:3** Report of Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (March 2013)). French Government Defense Ministry released a couple of reports and press papers on the situation in Mali, and three of these sources are

considered in the data analysis (Doc:1 Dossier de Press Barhkane (Feb 2019); Doc:2 Joint Force of the group of Five for Sahel (May 2018); Doc:3 French Defense Ministry: Operation Barhkane (August 2017); Another important continental organization that participate in Mali peace process is African Union. Three documents are selected to assess the contribution of the institution to the peacebuilding process in Mali (Doc:1 Statement of the chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, (June 2018); Doc:2 The report stating Declaration of the AU on the Situation in Mali (2013) ; Doc:3 “Emergency mini-summit of the ECOWAS heads of state and government on the situation in Mali.” (March 2012)). Malian government documents is the fourth source of the data collection and three documents were carefully selected to analyze the failure situation of peace agreement (Doc:1 Déclaration de la Politique Générale (April 2016); Doc:2 Accord pour la paix et la reconciliation au Mali (April 2015); Doc:3: Rapport sur l'état de mise en œuvre des recommandations des structures de contrôle:Exercice 2014)

The three reports from the United Nations are selected based on the valuable contribution of UN in the process of establishing peace and security in Mali. The document 1 is chosen because it highlights the social distance in Malian society, the possible causes behind the struggle of the northern communities to have independent state (Azawad). The document 2 puts in perspective the political and economic gaps within Malian society, emphasizes on the politics of “ divide and rule” utilized by the central government to create intra and inter-ethnic division within the society. The document 3 accentuates more on the role of UN missions to resolve the conflict and install peace in Mali. These reports become essential in the analysis of why the peace agreements failed in the peace building process because their primary objectives were more peace focus.

French government also plays an important role in the peace building process in Mali. It is ideal to take into consideration the findings generated through its different missions in Mali. Though the headlines of its efforts toward the reconstruction of a peaceful society in Mali were all peace focus, all the documents highlight instead the fight against the terrorist networks in the northern region. The docs 1, 2 and 3 are all on

the counterterrorism operations. The documents were selected to pinpoint the idea of how the process of securing the peace in Mali turned to a battle against the terrorism.

The peace and security issue of Mali received as well the attention of African Union. There are many reports filed on the peace building process, and the selected ones in our study focus on the analysis of the conflict, the causes and the required efforts from the prospect of peace in the country. The document 1 issued from Statement of the chairperson of the Commission of AU mainly focus on the development of a credible framework for the prevention of conflict and maintaining peace in Mali. The document 2 and 3 are result from the emergency meeting in 2012 and 2013. The peace agreements were discussed with a strong pressure put on the central government to call for a dialogue and negotiation with the rebels.

The list is long when it comes to the political, diplomatic and economical measures taken by the Malian government to settle the disputes and foster a sustainable peace in the country. Three important documents from the Central government are considered in this study to explore in detail our research questions and hypothesis. The document 1 highlights the new policies implemented to strengthen the Algiers Peace Accords. The document 2 is the Algiers peace agreements signed between the central government and the rebels. The documents are valuable due to the fact that they are essentially filed to address peace and security issues in the Mali.

4.4. DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

This study relies solely on qualitative descriptive analysis as a method of analyzing data. Asika (2006:118) perceives this method to analyze data as the best way to summarize the information that was generated in the research verbally so as to find out more about the relationships among variables. It is used to better understand the bottom reasons, opinions, and motivations, providing insights into the problem or helping develop ideas or hypotheses. Couple of documents from various sources is selected in order to find the relationships between the variables. The Table 3 gives the summary of the analysis of data collected. It summarizes the content of each document

relating their relevance to the social psychological theories considered in the study. The objective is to figure out how each one addresses or fails to address theoretical views of “Realistic Conflict Theory”, “Social Identity Theory” and “Bar-Tal’s Approach” to the conflict resolution and peace building. For instance the “UN documents mention some issues which have been stressed by realistic conflict theory, for example economical and political inequalities among ethnicities, and fails to mention some other issues which have been stressed by SIT –the concern of the minority Tuaregs and Arabs which represent the majority of the northern communities who have been isolated in the north”

Table 3:How the Documents Addressed the Social Psychological Factors

Documents	Content	RDT	SIT	Bar-Tal
UN 1	The documents highlight the “social distance” within the minority of the northern communities particularly (TUAREGS and ARAB ethnic groups) and the rest of the society in the south. The economic and political gaps between the two sets of region (North & South) have generated the struggles for division and separation.	The document recognized economical concerns but fails to show how cooperative goals can be set among the conflicting groups	Fails to recognize the needs of each group’s being recognized and respected	Fails to addresses some of the psychological barriers.
UN2	The composition of the Malian society with diverse ethnic groups, with Tuareg and Arabs highly discriminated against and excluded from the political and economic processes for decades by central government poses a great threat to the prospect of a lasting peace unless Bamako draft a new constitution in order to establish legitimacy among these minority ethnic groups.	The document recognized the right of every citizen to have equal access to the economical, political and social opportunities	Fails to tackle and implicate all the ethnic groups involved in the conflict	Fails to address the emotions that are driven the conflict

UN3	The parties are narrowly represented at the negotiation tables, especially within the armed rebels movements, which lead to a mistrust toward the central government. Politics at local level were also important motivators for rebellion since the ones in power have mostly the interest of the clans in heart.	Recognized the struggle for political power and fails to design adequate framework to solve the issue	Addresses the identity concern partly, not in whole	Fails to address the mistrust issues among clans and ethnic groups
France1	The implication of different terrorist organization in the Mali's crisis is a big challenge to settling the conflict between the north and south, and reaching a sustainable peace. The claims, interest and goals of the non-state armed groups lack coordination and result in a situation whereby satisfying the claim of one set of group can easily jeopardize the others. The main claim of Tuareg is independent AZAWAD, while the other Tuaregs wants important political power.	Fails to take into consideration the claim of certain group due their affiliation to terrorist organizations	Fails to properly address the identity issue "Separatists" "Rebels" "Jihadists"	Psychological barriers among the group were not mention
France 2	The peacebuilding process lacks to address the division among clans and groups involved in the conflict. Tuaregs and Arabs are divided among themselves (some are pro-government/ anti-separatists and other are pro-independent/ separatists), which create set of conditions that do not favor a lasting peace	Fails to address the different claims of Arabs and Tuareg against the government	Addresses the identity issues in the conflict	Fails to address social-psychological barriers in the conflict

France3	Victimization of the majority of the northern communities create different sorts of social beliefs and perpetuate the conflict. The society's view of Tuaregs and Arabs as the backbone of the perpetual rebellions in the north creates insecurity for their social identity. Delegitimization can delay any progress toward successful peace agreement.	Address the different disagreements that were highlighted at the negotiation table	Address the social identity issue in conflict	Fails to address to social barriers created by the political affiliation of the groups
AU1	The African Union Peace and Security Council requests from the Commission, the development of a credible framework for the effective prevention and management, as well as resolution of local conflicts, include inter-communal violence, transhumance, and land disputes, in collaboration with other relevant organizations and mechanisms. In this context, Council welcomes the organization of a ministerial conference on inter-communal violence, while also reiterates the need for the Commission to expedite the operationalization of the AU Humanitarian Agency. Land disputes are ones of the key issues in Mali crisis (AZAWAD in particular)	Addresses the territorial issues and struggles overs lands among the northerners	Fails to address intra and interethnic conflicts in the northern region of Mali	Fails in solving the psychological barriers

AU2	The colonial governance that Mali went under created a division among Malian population and the government that took power of the independence failed to address the identity issue. Malians, particularly in the remote areas, have a traditional way of local governance, rooted in their culture, that operate relatively independently without any interference of the state. They culturally established networks that provide mutual support in a situation where the central government faces a lot of difficulties to provide basic services. One or other ethnic group mostly leads these networks. while the rest of the communities thing that or victimize themselves to be discriminate against in the terms of their geographical location, economical and social opportunities.	Fails to address the RCT proposed approaches	Addressed the identity issues	Fails to address the social psychological barriers
AU3	The situation between north and south is more than the belief of Twaareg fighting for indepenence because it can contribute to further conflict in itself. Corruption and inequitable development in Mali, the idea of backing up and protecting some groups that engage in illicit operations from some political elites, have encourage the proliferation of illegal economic activities such as drugs, arms and humans trafficking	Addressed unequal economic gap between the north and the south	Fails to address the identity issue as secessionist is dominate the north	Fails to put into consideration the motive behind the social bias in the south

Malian Government 1	The sharing of economical and political power, and the decentralization are the main components of the two Algiers Accords (2006 and 2015). The main purpose of the decentralization is to attenuate Tuaregs' claims against the central government, and give more autonomy to the northern region, and meet with the protests of the separatists group. These efforts can be evaluated with the different development projects that have received the support of the international community.	Address the issues relating to the economic political struggles of armed group in the north	Address the issue relating to the social identity of minority Arab and Tuareg	Gives no attention to some of the psychological barriers
Malian Government 2	The central government failed to establish legitimacy among many northerners as Bambara and other Mandé ethnicities continue to be at the core of Malian national identity, which generate the feeling of exclusion from both Arabs and Tuareg's side. The last two peace accords encourage the integration of the rebel who fought against the government into country's armed forces but this principle has been inadequately implemented. This inadequate implementation result in continuous lack of security, the situation that strengthened the feeling to start building a new form confederation networks, such as clans, tribes, and ethnic groups, while neglecting the Malian army's authority	Address the underlying socio-economic and political challenges the prosperous peace is subject to with the special focus on the autonomy of the northern region	Address the identity issues on the paper work, but no practical actions are taken to legitimize the ethnic groups	Fails to address the social psychological barriers

Malian Government 3	The scrupulous analysis of the causes behind the Malian crisis reveals that tensions with the central government are only one cause of the conflict. Competition among northerners in order to propel their personal agendas coupled various interests of different groups also participate a significantly in the intensification the various rebellious movements that took place over many years in the country's history. Referring to arms is a way to show the economic and political advancement	Address the with the decentralization plan that aims to give autonomy to the northerners	Address the identity issue with a strong emphasis on the integration of rebels in the army	Address the psychological barriers
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4.5. Findings

The general outcome of the analyzed data reveals that different efforts to establish peace and security in Mali has barely touched up on the identity issues in the conflicts as most of the efforts are directed toward the political stability and security challenges. The documents considered in this study pinpoint how the lack of strong policies to manage the identity of the parties involved in the conflict results in the failures of different peace agreements.

The Document UN1 specifically addresses the human right and the peace process in Mali with particular focus on the democratization and unification of Mali. It fails to recognize the needs of each group's being recognized and respected, human rights' violation was at the center of the focus, leaving out the legitimacy claims of different ethnic groups involved the conflict. The ultimate goal was to ascertain unification of Mali with less focus on important tools (ethnic identifications of the conflict), which are necessary for the mitigation of violence in the future.

EXTRACT 1:

“The interim period provided for in the 2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali emanating from the Algiers process (the “Peace Agreement”), finalized in June 2015 by the Government of Mali and the armed movements of the Plateforme and the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), came to an end on 30 June 2017. The interim period was a pivotal moment in the peace process, as outlined in the Peace Agreement, “to favour the implementation of conditions conducive to reconciling Malians, and to lay the foundations for a new, democratic and unified Mali.” The end of the interim period also provided an opportunity to assess progress and setbacks in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, particularly with regard to the protection and respect of human rights.”

The document UN2 emphasize on the different policies developed by the United Nations Offices in Mali (UNOM) to approach the peacebuilding and the resolution of the conflict in Mali. The UNOM in consultation with the Malian authorities, political parties and civil society set up series of priorities that focus on the security concern, the primacy of politics, the need for national dialogue and reconciliation, and electoral reform and elections.

EXTRACT 2:

The security concerns:

“The need to restore the integrity of Mali’s territory and ensure the physical security of communities in the north has been identified as a central priority. Serious security challenges remain, including continued terrorist activities and military operations in some areas. Even when full territorial integrity is regained, many serious security risks will remain, including terrorist attacks, weapons proliferation, drug smuggling and other related criminal activities, which are likely to continue to undermine governance and development in Mali for the foreseeable future.”

The primacy of politics

“The coup d’état of 22 March 2012 and the crisis in northern Mali are, in large measure but not exclusively, manifestations of a crisis of governance that encompasses endemic corruption, weak State capacity to deliver basic services and the low level of legitimacy of State institutions and the political system. Strengthening State capacity and building the legitimacy of the State and the political system at the national, regional and community levels are long-term, protracted endeavours. But if they are not carried out successfully, there is a high risk of further political and security crises in the future.”

The need for national dialogue and reconciliation

“There is a high level of political and social polarization and antagonism between political actors as well as between and within communities. The cleavages are not only north-south but also within the north and within the south. Furthermore, there is a high level of trauma resulting from the rebellion,

the occupation of the north and the human rights abuses and atrocities that were committed, including conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence.”

Electoral reform and elections

“Although elections are essential to restore constitutional order and to establish the legitimacy and authority of the Government, there are some concerns that conditions are not yet ripe for the holding of free, credible and peaceful elections across the country. In the absence of reconciliation, there is little space for constructive political debate and elections could provoke further instability or even violence. Elections are not intended merely to provide an opportunity to cast a vote. More fundamentally, elections are an opportunity to debate and select political ideas, programmes and leaders. It will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to have a free and peaceful political competition in the north, particularly in refugee camps and among internally displaced persons.”

The document UN3 focused on the territory integrity with more representation of the northern communities and the implementation of government’s representatives in the areas that have been negotiated and regained. There were no policy that attend the needs of the constituents of the regions. There have been peace frameworks that are set to promote the decentralization without consulting the local community. What has been missing so far is a lack of representation, a problem that stems in part from mistaken assumptions about the representativeness of the rebel groups that have been parties to past peace accords, as well as from efforts to include northerners and legitimate northern voices, such as the traditional chiefs, that have been, in some northern eyes, inadequate.

EXTRACT 3:

“All interlocutors agreed that there is an urgent need to rebuild State administration in areas recovered, in the north in order to sustain Mali’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This requires strong institutions at the national level, while ensuring effective administration at the local level, as well as sufficient resources to sustain the reach of the State across Mali’s vast expanses and in remote geographical areas. Representatives of the civilian

administration have yet to return to the north, although the interim President confirmed the intention of the Government to deploy them as soon as possible.”

French’s efforts to resolve Mali’s crisis were all directed toward combating the terrorism, strengthening security and governance, it fails to address the root causes of the crisis such as the historical and the identity aspect of the crisis. Such efforts would be more effective if they invested more to tackle the root causes of the crisis, with a particular focus on the respect and inclusion of different locals in the peace building process. The situation of Mali is beyond democracy promotion and military assistance as far as the Malian Society still perceive the minority Arab and Tuareg as an obstacle to the stability of the country. The documents 1, 2 and 3 collected from French defense ministry illustrate the intervention of France in Mali to participate in the stability and nestling peace in the country.

EXTRACT 4:

“The case of Mali reveals critical challenges that are pervasive in many international security promotion efforts in Africa. Too often, international interventions aimed at combating terrorism fail to fully take into account domestic economic, political, and identity drivers of the violence. Moreover, international interventions tend to have missions that are not well aligned with the local roots of the political violence. Mali is a very good case of where terrorism dovetails with historical political and economic marginalization problems. Unfortunately, the international military intervention is largely driven by the global war on terror agenda. The case of Mali points to the importance of addressing socioeconomic grievances, aligning peacekeeping missions with the root causes of the conflict and promoting local ownership of the solutions to the conflict.”

African Union Security Council in coordination with ECOWAS contributed greatly to the stability of and prosperous peace in Mali, unfortunately, the efforts were in the same direction with the ones of its two important strategic coalitions partners UN and France. AU,

through its lack of adequate financial resources was left with only option: to comply with the decisions of UN and France. Most of the AU actions were also to reinstall the democracy after the coup and combat the jihadist network in the north. The summit and different missions of AU in Mali lack adequate policy to address the issue of the north and the south. The AU in association with the international community and Malian authorities approved the idea of “DECENTRALIZATION” as the most appropriate way to solve the conflict. Sadly the idea remains in paper work, even though some action were taken to implement it, it has shown an insignificant progress the stability of the country.

EXTRACT 5:

“The AU Stresses the importance of the early resolution of the crisis in Mali through efforts to ensure lasting peace and security in the Sahel. In this regard, Council reaffirms the need for an accelerated implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, issuing from the Algiers process, as an inclusive and consensual framework likely to enable the Malian parties to find solutions to their disputes;”

The Malian government has taken necessary steps to solve the crisis, while some of these efforts succeed in addressing the main causes of the conflict, majority failed to produce the anticipated result. Most of the promises still remain on the paper without concrete actions to fulfill them. Although the peace agreement encourage the equal representation of the parties, the strategy of grouping the parties under the umbrella of “Coalition” and “Plateforme” excludes other groups which are qualify as illegible to sit at the negotiation table. In the documents 1 and 2 the narrow representation of the parties is highlighted, and the clauses on the in the peace agreements is quiet the opposite of the reality on the ground today in Mali as the rate of domestic violence increases within the different clans and ethnic groups.

EXTRACT 6:

Measures designed to establish peace and national reconciliation

“The socio-political dimension of the cyclical crises which have buffeted Northern Mali requires a political solution. To this end, a Conference of National Consensus shall be organised during the interim period, with the support of the Monitoring Committee and with equal representation of the Parties, to enable a detailed debate between the components of the Malian nation on the underlying causes of the conflict. This debate shall address, among other things, the Azawad problem. It shall identify the elements of a solution which should enable Mali to transcend its painful ordeal, to value the contribution of its different components to the country’s identity, and to promote true national reconciliation. A Charter for Peace, Unity and National Reconciliation shall be formulated, by consensus, in order to take on board the commemorative, identity and historical dimensions of the Malian crisis, and confirm its national unity and national integrity.”

4.5. Discussion

Yet to be addressed here are the armed groups and the halting negotiations between them and the Malian state. One of the fundamental mistakes of previous peace negotiations and the resulting agreements has been the apparent assumption that the rebel groups involved in negotiations speak for everyone in the north, when they actually speak for particular fractions or coalitions of fractions that represent, at best, no more than minorities within minorities. To cite a Tuareg notable, “Ouagadougou represents a negotiation between the state and the rebellion,” while “the citizens have nothing to do with it. Moreover, it is clear that many resent rebel groups or the fractions associated with them. Anti-MNLA sentiment, for example, is strong in many regions, including Gao and Timbuktu, to the point that certain communities preferred to side with MUJWA because of its opposition to the MNLA. Fractional and ethnic lines shed some light on these divisions: The dividing line between the MNLA and MUJWA, as well as between them and the HCUA, following clear ethnic antagonisms, such as the conflict between Tilemsi Arabs (MUJWA) and Kuntas (HCUA) cited above or between Idnan and certain other Tuareg (MNLA) and Songhai (MUJWA).

The state has to negotiate with the rebel groups nonetheless, primarily for two reasons. One is that they retain enough military capacity and political clout to perpetuate insecurity and act as spoilers of any peace agreement. Another is that, like the elected officials and the traditional chiefs, they appear to represent some northerners, even if they represent far fewer than they claim. There is therefore a strong incentive to involve as many armed groups as possible and include them in agreements—and these groups do strive to coordinate and speak as one, with mixed success—while keeping in mind that they do not speak for the entirety of the northern population. Negotiated agreements with them are necessary but not sufficient for establishing durable peace.

The primary objective of this study was to establish the role of the identity in the failure of different peace agreements in Mali. The nature of the groups involved in the Malian conflict followed a complex pattern of division within groups and raised a question of whether all the groups are represented at peace negotiation table. The findings of this study suggest that, the identity of the groups (parties) are managed poorly during different peace agreements negotiated, as the focus of the agreements were more on saving the democracy and address the security vacuum created in the north by terrorist. The data showed that the group identity received less attention in peace building process but it was a conflict-driven factor that perpetuates the struggles for separation observed within different armed groups' movements.

Realistic conflict theory holds the assumption that intergroup conflict is rooted in the availability of economic resources. This theory argues that intergroup discrimination and competition emerge whenever there are scarce economic resources that are deemed necessary to obtain (Jackson, 1993). These economic resources may include, lands, political power, and employment only to mention few. The link of this study to the theory can be show through the fact that AZAWAD remain the disputed land between the separatists and the government till present. And the idea of different people fighting over the same land confirms the scarcity of the resource.

Social identity theory assumes that mere categorization of individuals into different groups is sufficient for intergroup conflict to occur (Tajfel et al., 1971). According to this theory, individuals who are randomly assigned into different groups on

the basis of minimal information where there is no history of group conflict or conflict of interest prior to interaction can display conflictual behavior against the member of the out-group. Tajfel and Turner (1979) stated that category members do not need to go through any bonding phase prior to interaction for them to identify with their in-group. This assumption argues that the act of mere categorization is internalized by individuals to form a single collective identity amongst group members (Gaertner, 2011).

The data supported the above notion raised by Social Identity Theory. The categorization of the groups into the clusters of CMA and Platform coalition at the negotiation table has created a tension of pro-government and anti-government, which automatically becomes an obstacle for any reached agreements. Moreover, the disintegration of CMA members into sub-groups generates another internal conflict of ideology and agenda that put at stake the equal representativeness of all parties. The data also reveal that the northern communities in Mali are divided in different ethnic groups such as Tuareg, Arabs, Fulani and Songhai. This ethnic-oriented identity becomes a corner stone that favor the division among the groups at the negotiation table.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1. SUMMARY

This current study sets to examine and analyze the reason why some peace agreements do not produce a sustainable and lasting peace during the peacebuilding and conflict resolution process, focusing on the case of Mali Republic. Hence, this generates the following question: “ Why did the different peace agreements failed during the peacebuilding and conflict resolution process?

In a very specific and explicit way, this study has as an objective to:

1. Judgmentally examine if the social identity of different groups (parties) do not participate to the re-escalation and a perpetual violence in the country.
2. Ascertain if all the parties are equally represented at the negotiations and mediation table.

We notice among others that the identity issue received less importance in the peace agreements process from the side of Malian government and international communities, which results in the proliferation of other social identity group in the northern Mali, and finally gives birth to Jihadist terrorist groups. This proliferation of groups and the involvement of terrorist group make the conflict resolution far more complex, as consequence we are assisting today a series unhealthy of peace agreements. It was this situation that formed the gap in the literature, which this study tries to fill.

We exploit the Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT), the Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Bar-Tal's Approach to examine the role of groups' identities in the failure of building a sustainable peace and a continued violence in Mali. These theories were respectfully developed by Muzafer Sherif (1958), Henri Tajfel (1970s), and Daniel Bar-Tel (1980), and were perpetuated in the contemporary theories by many scholars. Our method of data collection in this study is the qualitative method. Our principal source of data is secondary source of data. This source is obtained from the available data, which are in the form of achieves from governments and NGOs, survey results and books. In

the analysis of this study we utilize the qualitative descriptive method of data analysis. The limitation for this study primarily is, the unavailability of funding to carry out a field research in Mali for primary sources of information. The study principally relies on the secondary sources. The delimitation of the study is the fact that it attached the failure of reaching a sustainable peace in Mali to the social identities. While there might be other factors that contribute to the unsuccessful peace agreements in Mali, the study relies on the role of the identity in this parameters due to the fact that, according to many scholars, group identity or collective identity has often been implicated in the origin and maintenance of intergroup conflict.

5.2. RECOMMENDATION

The case of Mali puts into perspective series of challenges that are pervasive in many efforts allocated to sealing a lasting peace agreement in the country. Any future attempts toward the reconstruction of peace and stability in the country should retain from failing to fully take into account domestic economy, political, and identity drivers of the conflict. For the prospect of peace and security, (1) the peace accord should address the socioeconomic and identity grievances; (2) any intervention of the international communities should align with the root causes of the conflict; (3) the efforts to establish peace should encourage the local ownership of the resolutions to the conflict.

The economic and identity concerns that principally drive the armed group are poorly addressed. The root causes of the perpetual Tuareg rebellions must be addressed through policies, which are set to improve the political and economic governance, with a strong emphasis on the reduction of economic gaps between the North and the South as mentioned in the Algiers Accord. The central government should implement a development plan that favors the establishment of small business supported by adequate infrastructures in the northern regions.

International and domestic authorities should work together to fill the existing power vacuum and establish a semblance of political order. This will require more than

military pacification. Peace negotiations with domestic ethnic minorities – conditional on their disarmament – are essential for creating enough political space for all Malian peoples to express themselves. At minimum, the residents of the north, both within and beyond major population centers, will require opportunities to participate in political life without putting their lives at risk. In this regard, an international stabilization force under the United Nations – including police as well as soldiers – ought to be in place as long as the peace process lasts. The international community can offer incentives by helping to provide the equipment, training and benefits that the soldiers feel they were previously denied and which were triggering factors in the coup. Civilian leaders should seek to restore popular trust in the political system by building or strengthening institutions responsible for corruption control (for example, parliamentary oversight committees and independent commissions) and popular representation (like local government, political parties, and civic associations).

Malian citizens have important roles to play. The international community should fund, and NGOs should implement, a coordinated campaign of civic education to engage Malians in debates about the importance of building a collective peace and the need for constitutional reform. Special attention must be paid to enhancing the country's depressingly low representation of local people at the negotiation table and peace settlement of disputes and violences among the communities, for example by instructing citizens about their own responsibilities for building and sustaining local peace and equipping them with the necessary informational, organizational and lobbying skills. Public opinion research must explore the role of ordinary people in political change and socioeconomic development. In order to draw the correct lessons, policy makers need to examine their own past performance, especially as it relates helping to offset the stark inequalities in levels of economic and social development between the communities of northern and southern regions.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, it is clear that the current study examines the implications of identity groups in the failure of different peace agreements in Mali's crisis. There is no doubt that, despite the fact that there are many other factors that could possibly contribute to the unsuccessful peace agreements in peacebuilding and conflict resolution process in Mali, the group identity (social identity) of every single party involved in the conflict make the settlements of the crisis more complicated and unfruitful due their different agendas, interests and claims. Forming the coalition for the parties, which restricted many other parties from taking part in the negotiation process, has created a mistrust among those groups, which push them to hold on to their agendas.

The involvement the international communities changed the whole picture of the crisis. Their actions in the normal circumstances are supposed to be directed toward the settlement of the conflict and installing peace among the disputants (the parties), but they were rather oriented toward the counter-terrorism and peacekeeping operations governed principally by France's Serval and Barkhane operations and the MINUSMA operated by UN. Despite the good intentions behind these different interventions, which are mainly focused on the eradication of jihadist terrorist group in the northern part of the country, it shows that their success are still questionable even though they significantly contributed in stalling the jihadist and Tuareg insurgencies, because we are still assisting today many terrorist attacks and a persistent insecurity in Mali, which has become a big threat to the neighboring countries like Burkina Faso, Niger, and Côte d'Ivoire.

It is crucial to also need to bear in mind that, excluding the jihadist terrorist group from the negotiation table (which is a noble action), associated with uncoordinated actions of the external powers due to the lack compatibility in their agendas led to persistent violence that greatly jeopardized any possible attempts toward the settlement of the conflict. The international communities have failed in giving an adequate attention to the fundamental identity issues involved in the conflict, which the

serial peace agreements have not been able to resolve due to inadequate resources and strong political will.

The local population is out of the picture of crisis settlement, which can also play an important role because their partition either to the government or separatists can significantly influence the outcome. So, it is prudent to secure their cooperation through an effective communication and warfare strategies aimed at minimizing misunderstandings with them. Since peace and democracy are an inside job, which outsiders cannot impose, international communities with their different efforts should encourage local ownership of peace processes. In the case of Mali, it will be crucial to empower its populations to lead and own peacebuilding efforts that will adequately pinpoint the diverse drivers of the conflict, without excluding its ethnic, religious and cultural sources.

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