

PRECONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL
RAPPROCHEMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE GREEK-TURKISH
RAPPROCHEMENT EFFORTS

A PhD. Dissertation

By

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September 2013

To my children,
Dimitri and Eva

**PRECONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL
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TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT EFFORTS**

**Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Ihsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
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In

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September 2013

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ABSTRACT

PRECONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL RAPPROCHEMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE GREEK- TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT EFFORTS

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The current study provides an in-depth analysis of four distinct cases of rapprochements that took place between Greece and Turkey. Two of these cases concern successful rapprochements, while the other two concern unsuccessful rapprochement cases. The goal of the study is to examine the factors that shaped the outcome of the rapprochement, and discuss which the main preconditions for a successful rapprochement are. The study examines a number of independent

variables, which derive mainly from the International Relations literature, as well as, other similar studies. The methodology employed in order to examine the explanatory power of these variables is structured-focused case comparison which was first proposed by Alexander George, coupled with process-tracing.

The research concludes with a comparison of all four rapprochement cases that are based on the following three different axes; a contrast of the pre-rapprochement periods, an evaluation of the impact of the process on the rapprochements' definitive indicators, and an assessment of the impact of each independent variable on the outcome of the rapprochement. Of the 8 independent variables that are put to test, it is 'leadership' and 'state identity' that are observed to be causing variation on the dependent variable across all four cases. On the contrary, the GRIT strategy did not influence the outcome of the rapprochement in any of the cases discussed.

Keywords: Greek-Turkish relations, rapprochement

ÖZET

BAŞARILI YAKINLAŞMANIN ÖN KOŞULLARI: YUNAN – TÜRK YAKINLAŞMA ÇABALARININ KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZİ

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Bu çalışma, Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasında yaşanan dört ayrı yakınlaşma durumunun derinlemesine bir analizini sunmaktadır. Söz konusu yakınlaşmalardan iki tanesi başarılı, diğer iki tanesi ise başarısızdır. Çalışmanın amacı, yakınlaşmanın sonucunu şekillendiren faktörleri incelemek ve başarılı bir yakınlaşma için gereken ön şartların neler olduğunu tartışmaktır. Çalışma Uluslararası İlişkiler literatürünün yanı sıra benzer çalışma alanlarının literatürlerindeki bir takım bağımsız değişkenleri incelemektedir. Anılan değişkenlerin açıklayıcı gücünü incelemek için

kullanılan metot “süreç-izleme”nin yanı sıra ilk olarak Alexander George tarafından önerilen “yapısal-odaklanmış durum karşılaştırması”nı kullanmaktadır.

Araştırma üç ayrı eksen üzerine yapılandırılmış dört yaklaşma durumunun tümünün karşılaştırılması ile sonuçlanmaktadır; yaklaşma öncesi durumların karşılaştırılması, sürecin yaklaşma göstergelerine olan etkisinin değerlendirilmesi ve herbir bağımsız değişkenin yaklaşmanın sonuçlarına olan etkisinin değerlendirilmesi. Dört yaklaşma durumunun tamamında, test edilen toplam sekiz bağımsız değişkenden ikisi, liderlik ve devlet kimliği, bağımlı değişkenin değişmesine neden olmuştur. Öte yandan GRIT stratejisi tartışılan vakaların hiçbirisinde yaklaşmanın sonucunu etkilemiştir..

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk-Yunan ilişkileri, yaklaşma

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Identifying the Phenomenon

International relations is, indeed, an exciting field. Newly emerging issues, such as globalization, transnational terrorism and nuclear proliferation pose fresh challenges to IR scholars who try to develop models and theories in order to analyze and understand these phenomena. In a constantly changing world, the research focus of the field has broadened considerably and currently covers a much wider agenda. That is not to say that the focus of some of the most persisting issues in the field of international relations has diminished. For instance, questions regarding the ways states interact, why they choose to cooperate, or, on the contrary, why they end up competing or fighting against each other, continue to cause heated debates and attract scholarly interest. The answers to these questions vary considerably not only because the scholars examining them depart from one

another in theoretical approach, but, even more importantly, because they are highly dependent on the scholars' perceptions about how the world works and, particularly, what the driving forces behind states' actions are.

The current dissertation discusses the phenomenon of "rapprochement", a notion not that popular in the field and, certainly, one of the least well-defined ones. As it will be discussed in detail later on, the rapprochement process is characterized by an era of improvement in relations between a dyad of states.

1.2. The Main Problematique

The definition of a rapprochement case, or a rapprochement process, is not standardized by scholars. Typically rapprochement involves two states, which more than likely have common borders (e.g. Turkey and Greece), but might also be two regional players without a shared borderline (e.g. Turkey and Israel), or two global powers (e.g. USA and China). In addition, and more often than not, the rapprochement process is defined by a key event, which marks an important positive development in the relations between the two states. The nature of the positive development varies across cases and includes a variety of actions. The general pattern, however, is that rapprochement is inaugurated by smaller developments in dyads where relations are quite strained and visa-versa.

Given the diversity in the literature regarding rapprochement, there is a need to provide a comprehensive definition of the phenomenon. Nonetheless, this is not the main theme of the current research. Even though a working-definition is

provided, the main focus of the study is to understand the contributing factors leading to the success or failure of a rapprochement process. As such, the research question is: “What are the preconditions for successful rapprochement?”

In order to answer the research question the study will compare four rapprochement cases. All selected cases concern the same dyad, Greece and Turkey, and, hence, deal with the long lasting Greek-Turkish conflict. The cases selected spread across almost 80 years. Two of the cases concern successful rapprochement processes, during the 1930s and after 1999, while the other two concern unsuccessful rapprochements, in the early 1950s and in 1988.

1.3. A Brief History of the Greek-Turkish Relations

Greece and Turkey are two states that are strongly connected not only by geography but also by history. Especially after the rise of nationalism in the Balkans, the two nations perceived each other as enemies, and fought a number of wars which further exacerbated the feelings of enmity and mistrust. Such feelings are so strong that some scholars have supported the following:

...the Greek-Turkish differences – the objective conflict of interest – are but the tip of the iceberg. What has made these differences impervious to a settlement are (a) the weight of history, mainly imagined history based on chosen glories and traumas that are buttressed by their respective national narratives, (b) coupled with their chosen collective identities which are built on slighting and demonizing the other party (Heraclides, 2011: 7).

In general, Greek-Turkish relations are a well-studied subject and have attracted the attention of scholars not only from these two countries but, also from

outside countries (for instance see Clogg, 1983; Bertrand, 2003, Ker-Lindsay, 2007). It is important to note that the specific characteristics of the conflict amplify the interest of scholars who, on occasion, point to the unique characteristics of the Greek-Turkish relations. There are two most notable examples in this regard. The first is Hercules Millas (1991: 22), who noted that:

By a rare and perhaps unique coincidence, each nation had fought against the other for national recognition. The Greeks first, then a century later the Turks, fought for liberation, each perceiving the other as an obstacle and a menace.

The second is from Ambassador Bolukbasi (2004), who suggested that the Greek-Turkish differences in the Aegean constitute a unique case in International Law due to the regions' unique geographical consideration, as well as, its complex and singular structure.¹

Looking at the relations between Turkey and Greece over the last decades it is hard to imagine that these two Mediterranean countries have, at times, been strong allies. Nevertheless, there have been periods when relations between the Turkish and Greek states had reached a level of cooperation that is not usually observed within international relations. On the other hand, after 1955 and especially after 1974, relations between Greece and Turkey significantly deteriorated, while a number of newly emerging issues further complicated the situation and reduced the chances of mutually accepted solutions to be found. Furthermore, the prolonged

¹ It must be mentioned in this case that Bolukbasi's ideas are heavily influenced by the arguments and positions of the Turkish State concerning the Greek-Turkish conflict in the Aegean Sea.

² It must be stressed at this point that unlike Armstrong's evaluation, it is the duration rather than the

stalemate, especially after 1974, contributed to the slow, yet steady, crystallization of maximalist positions on both sides, which pose a considerable obstacle to dialogue.

Today the Greek-Turkish conflict includes a number of bilateral issues which, at their simplest, can be grouped into three different sets: the Aegean issues (i.e. disputes related to the seabed, the air, the waters and the exercise of rights upon them) the Cyprus issue, (although an international conflict it has severely affected bilateral relations), and, finally, the issues concerning the minorities' rights and well-being (for a more elaborate and largely impartial presentation of the issues constituting the Greek-Turkish conflict see Heraclides, 2010).

1.4. Organization of the Study

The following chapter, the "Literature Review", addresses some of the questions that were posed in this introduction. The purpose of the literature review is two-fold. First is to provide a better understanding of the "rapprochement" phenomenon with the help of a number of examples from other cases. This also helps underline some of the main indicators of the rapprochement process. In addition, the difference between rapprochement and other phenomena is discussed, and a coherent working definition of the term is provided. The second purpose is to look into the IR theories and research that can inform the current study in terms of identifying independent variables that can be used later on to explain what makes a rapprochement successful.

The third chapter, “Methodology”, provides a detailed account of the research design used. The main method this study employs is a structured focused case comparison and process tracing. Another contribution of the Methodology chapter is that it provides a codebook of the dependent and independent variables, and provides a roadmap, or guideline, for what kind of information the study ought to focus on during the analysis of each case.

Chapters four, five, six, and seven, examine and analyze each of the case studies in depth. The case studies are presented in chronological order; hence, chapter 4 focuses on the 1930s, chapter 5 on the early 1950s, chapter 6 on the Davos process and, finally, chapter 7 on the rapprochement that was initiated in 1999. The discussion of each case follows a similar framework. Each chapter includes a brief historical background, an overview of the reasons leading to the rapprochement, the main incentives for the initiation of the rapprochement, a discussion of the indicators and the assessment of the rapprochement.

Chapter eight provides a comparative assessment of all the cases. The comparison is based upon three axes. First, the pre-rapprochement periods are compared, in order to explore whether the processes preceding the rapprochement are important for the outcome of the rapprochement process. Second, the study compares the four cases in terms of the process’ indicators. Finally, but most importantly, the comparison of the four case studies focuses on the independent variables. Each of the independent variables is examined across each case and its overall impact on the outcome of the rapprochement process is assessed.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

Relations between states are rarely stable. More often than not, interstate relations range from close cooperation and strategic partnership to rivalry and catastrophic war. Even among the same actors, across time, relations can suffer serious fluctuations. It is not rare to see the relations between the same two states improve or deteriorate, depending on a variety of conditions. The questions of why this changeability exists, and even more importantly how can positive transformations be supported and negative downfalls avoided, are some of the most intriguing ones in the fields of international relations and conflict resolution.

The current study aims at developing a better understanding of Greek-Turkish relations especially by focusing on one particular aspect of this relationship: the rapprochement processes. In the following pages the theoretical background for the concept of rapprochement will be established through an

elaborate review of the literature. Second, the current chapter provides a framework within which the rest of this thesis is based. Lastly, in this chapter I develop a set of independent variables that could play a role in determining the success or failure of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement processes, which will then be assessed in the following chapters.

2.2. Conceptualization

Even though the literature on rapprochement is abundant most of the work mainly focuses on case studies. Very few – if at all – do scholars provide a theoretical background of the term. In most cases, the meaning of rapprochement is taken for granted. Researchers do not provide explanations of what their perception and understanding of rapprochement is. Specifically, description of the process and, most importantly, the key aspects of the relationship's progression, meaning the areas where the rapprochement has mainly touched upon, vary significantly across cases.

The lack of clear cut definitions brings a degree of uncertainty to the discussion, which is also exacerbated by the existence of other –in this case well defined– terms in the literature. The meanings of these alternative terms seem to overlap with that of rapprochement. In order to distinguish rapprochement from other similar terms this study, first of all, proposes a new definition of rapprochement and, then, discusses how rapprochement is different from other similar concepts. In the following pages I examine a number of case studies and

extract the key points of a rapprochement process as a first step towards creating a comprehensive definition of rapprochement.

In most cases rapprochement is understood as the process of normalization of relations between two parties. However, the very understanding of normalization is not concrete. In a number of cases rapprochement is taken to mean the resumption of diplomatic relations between two states. For instance, accounts of the Brazil-Cuba rapprochement of 1986, is considered as the beginning of the recommencement of diplomatic envoys from one country to the other, even though unofficial meetings and other cultural relations had started before that (see for example Nazario, 1986). Resuming diplomatic relations, although limited to cases where the states had broken diplomatic communications, is also mentioned in other cases of rapprochement as the first step towards establishing better communication between two states.

Nonetheless, it is quite obvious that there are cases of rapprochement where the states involved did not have broken diplomatic channels to begin with. These cases mainly involve states whose relations had been frozen for a period of time, such as in the case of the India-US rapprochement in the late 1990s. The transformation of the relations between the United States and India is quite interesting because it involves a great shift in the behavior of these two states which for six decades had been characterized by frosty relations, enmity, mistrust and unwillingness for cooperation (Kapur and Ganguly, 2007). As such, this case is similar to the Greek-Turkish rapprochements, or at least the last one in 1999.

Other scholars describe rapprochement as a remarkable improvement in the relations between two states, just as the new era of relations between England and China from circa 1927 and 1931 (Fung, 1983). The case of the Sino-British rapprochement is also remarkable because it refers to a process of negotiation that two states entered into in order to explore the possibilities of cooperation in a newly forming environment, meaning the changes in China's politics. Indeed, the rapprochement is marked by the successful outcome of the aforementioned negotiations that prepared the ground for further cooperation. In this sense, the Sino-British rapprochement shows that, first of all, process is important and, more importantly, that literature on negotiations could be useful in order to understand the outcome of a rapprochement process.

In most cases rapprochement is characterized by an increasing level of cooperation and goodwill that develops between conflicting parties, as that which has developed in between Greece and Turkey since 1999 (Ker-Lindsay, 2000). However, it should not be assumed that these changes happen automatically, or within a short period of time. Most examples show that in a process of rapprochement, while the main focus is on multilevel cooperation and building stronger ties, the process itself is often slow, as the parties usually follow a gradual and cautious approach. Good examples of such gradual advance in the relations of two states are the Sino-Indian and the Sino-US rapprochements.

Moreover, the literature points out that a rapprochement could be observed at different levels of body politic. In order to make the discussion more practical we

can distinguish three different levels. To start, changes can be observed in state-to-state relations which refers to mainly diplomatic levels of communication, agreements signed between states, military cooperation, etc. The examples of rapprochements that have been mentioned already are fine examples of how a rapprochement process influences state-to-state relations. Secondly, a change may be initially observed in party-to-party relations, as was in the case of the Sino-Vietnamese rapprochement. In this case the fact that both countries were ruled by communist parties played an important role in the normalization process (Tonesson, 2003). As a final point, rapprochement can also involve the leadership level, as happened between Ismail Cem and George Papandreou (Ker-Lindsay, 2000). The personalities and the will of the leaders played an important role in the case of the US-India rapprochement, when Bill Clinton followed politics that signaled to India that he was not blindly in favor of Pakistan (Kapur and Gonguly, 2007).

Apart from the official and state levels, it must be noted that a rapprochement process is also likely to include the societal level. Concerning this issue, we can distinguish two trends. The first one refers to cases where rapprochement happens at the top-level and then, following this, communication, economic relations, and cultural exchanges flourish. In the second case communication between two states' entrepreneurs, grassroots leaders, and/or civil society increases, and eventually pushes policy makers towards seeking cooperative policies, as was in the case of Cuba and Brazil (Nazario, 1986).

Consequently, the definition of rapprochement should be comprehensive enough to include all of the above noted characteristics. However, because the characteristics of rapprochement included in the above case studies are still vague, the new definition should move towards creating a more clear description of the term. A working definition that can serve the purpose of the proposed study, while satisfying the abovementioned criteria, can read as follows:

Rapprochement is a period of time when relations between two or more states encounter significant normalization and improvement, followed by a noteworthy increase in the will to cooperate, possibly experienced simultaneously at different levels of the body politic and the respective societies.

2.3. Operationalization

At this point it is also critical to further discuss the specifics of the working definition. One of the most important dimensions of rapprochement is that it is a period of time, which, although it has a distinct beginning, is transient in nature. Its initiation launches a series of processes and is by no means an end state. As such, even though the processes leading to the initiation of a rapprochement process is essential, the state of affairs between the states that initiate the process is largely irrelevant. Concretely, relations between the approaching parties before the rapprochement might vary from armed conflict to diplomatic aloofness. Even so, this abstraction is not purposefully planned in order to make the selection of the case studies for this research easier. It has strong roots in research and to a

certain point it, once again, stresses the lack of agreement between scholars who deal with rapprochement.

The most challenging part of the definition is how to operationalize an improvement in relations between the parties and increase their will to cooperate. To begin with, resuming diplomatic relations is an indicator of improvement in the relations between two states. Opening diplomatic channels of communications shows that the parties have the will to solve their problems through dialogue. Actually, in cases where states halted diplomatic communication, recommencement of these relations may mean the rapprochement itself. For example, in the case of China and Japan, following the Japanese Prime Minister's visit to Peking, Japan closed down its embassy in Taipei, and established a new Embassy in Peking. The next year the People's Republic of China opened an embassy in Tokyo (Kim, 1975).

A second strong indicator of improvement in relations between states is the increasing number of visits made by high-ranking officials. History offers many examples of such visits that have remained as bright examples of rapprochement. Tanaka's above mentioned visit to Peking is only one of them. Mao's declaration of will to receive Nixon in China in 1970, and Kissinger's secret visit to the Chinese capital in July of 1971, are considered important steps, if not catalysts, of the rapprochement process (Jian, 2003). In the case of Sino-Indian relations, Al-rfouh characterizes the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China as "the major breakthrough in the process of normalization of Sino-Indian relations" (Al-rfouh, 2003: 21). In general, we could describe these kinds of visits as the next step to

diplomatic proximity, or ambassadorial talks. Meetings between prime ministers or between ministers of foreign affairs could, in most cases, constitute a strong indicator that the parties have the will to take further steps towards cooperation and that they consider rapprochement as a priority of their foreign policy strategy.

A third way to operationalize normalization and improvement of relations is to look at agreements that are signed between the parties. Typically, these kinds of agreements are signed during the official meetings of high-ranking representatives. These agreements offer a new ground for cooperation, and, in most cases, provide the framework for further cooperation, such as in finance and trade relations. For instance, in the case of the Russia-Ukraine rapprochement of 2001, meetings between the leaders happened frequently (e.g. Putin's visit to Kiev in the celebration of Ukraine's independence), a number of bilateral agreements were signed, and as a result the trade volume between the two countries increased considerably (Moshes, 2002). Another example, also concerning Russia's relations to its neighbors, is the case of the Russo-Pakistani rapprochement. During Musharraf's visit to Moscow in 2003, these governments signed a number of agreements concerning: transnational crime, Russian economic activities in Pakistan, and the restructuring of the Pakistani financial debt to Russia (Katz, 2005).

The Russo-Pakistani rapprochement case brings forth another act that strongly indicates improvement in relations. After signing the agreements, Putin made a statement highlighting the fact that the relations between Russia and

Pakistan improved “since Pakistan joined the international antiterrorist coalition” (Katz, 2005: 139). Similar statements were also made by General Musharraf. In the case of India and China for instance, improvement of relations also included official announcements of a series of commitments to good neighboring. These commitments were made clearer after the two states signed the “Declaration of the Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation” (Amprosio, 2005: 405). These kinds of joint statements or announcements by leaders are important for mainly two reasons. On the one hand, they point toward a change in the way one party perceives the other. Changes in attitudes are important in better understanding the process of rapprochement. On the other hand, official statements could serve as a vehicle to transfer positive mood of rapprochement to the rest of the society.

In some cases, improvement in relations could also mean that one party starts seeing the other party as a possible third-party actor that could assist it in settling its differences with another state. For instance, during the Russia-Pakistan rapprochement, general Musharraf expressed his hope that Russia could play an active role in helping Pakistan to bridge its differences with India (Katz, 2005). This example shows that improvement of relations could also follow or lead to an increase of trust between the parties.

Another important part of operationalization is to create boundaries between rapprochement and other similar terms. In this case, it is especially necessary to distinguish rapprochement from pre-negotiation and de-escalation. Pre-negotiation has been defined as a phase which begins when one or more parties consider

negotiation as a policy option and communicate this intention to the other parties, and ends when the parties agree to hold formal negotiations, or when one party abandons the consideration of negotiation as an option (Zartman, 1989: 20). The kick off of a pre-negotiation phase is generally marked by a turning point in the relationship of the parties (Stein, 1989: 239), which motivates parties to expand their alternatives and, therefore, consider negotiation seriously within their plans. In most cases, the turning point is either a recent crisis or an attempt to avoid an impending crisis (Stein, 1989: 240).

Pre-negotiation is characterized as the period when parties move from conflicting unilateral solutions to a search for cooperative multilateral or joint solution (Zartman, 1989: 20), hence the similarities between pre-negotiation and rapprochement are clear. However, there are important differences between the two terms. At the outset, pre-negotiation is understood as a process, which is bound by formal negotiations, since its very definition is dependent on the existence of a negotiation process. On the other hand, rapprochement, while it could lead to formal negotiations between the conflicting parties is not always linked to a negotiation process. A rapprochement does not necessarily have official negotiations as its endpoint. Its substance and procedures can be more broadly defined. A simple way to set pre-negotiation apart from rapprochement is to say that pre-negotiation is a possible outcome or precursor of rapprochement.

As far as de-escalation is concerned, the distinction is less clear. To begin with, de-escalation is quite a broad term including a variety of characteristics. Louis

Kriesberg (1991: 3), for instance, explores at least three different aspects of de-escalation which are: a) the reduction in one or more dimensions of the intensity of the conflict behavior between adversaries, b) a contraction in the extend of the conflict, including the number of the parties and, c) efforts to move toward a settlement of the dispute. Once again the resemblance with the notion of rapprochement is apparent. Nonetheless, there is still a distinction to be made. De-escalation is mostly understood as part of a conflict timeline, which refers to the different phases of a conflict. For instance, Rubin, Pruitt and Kim (1994) suggest that de-escalation follows the stalemate phase because the parties are tired of escalation, acknowledge their interdependence, and are searching for alternative ways of settling the conflict. In contrast, rapprochement does not necessarily refer to a stage of conflict. It could follow a stalemate phase, or any other phase of a conflict, however it can also take place in the absence of conflict. On the other hand, rapprochement can be observed between two parties that have decided that they want to upgrade their relations to a higher level, without previously being involved in a violent conflict.

Finally, as the research question deals with successful rapprochement, special reference ought to be made to what the current study considers successful and unsuccessful. According to Collier et al. (as cited in Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006), evidence shows that within the first five years following the end of hostilities the risk of reverting to violence is high. This risk considerably falls after a decade. This data on post-conflict environment can also be used in this study in

order to create a framework of what can be called successful and unsuccessful rapprochement. Thus, as far as this research is concerned, when relations revert to what they were before the rapprochement, within a five years time from the beginning of the rapprochement, it will be considered an unsuccessful effort. When the conditions crafted during the rapprochement continue, or transform into a higher level of cooperation, beyond a period of ten years then it will be considered a successful effort.

2.4. Variables Explaining the Success or Failure of Rapprochement

The current chapter will continue with a discussion on variables and examine how scholars have tackled the issue of rapprochement in order to explain its successful occurrence. Looking into the set of variables that have already been used in order to study rapprochement is essential and, will also serve as a guide to the selection of the independent variables for this thesis.

The current study is different from former studies on rapprochement in two key aspects. Firstly, up to now, the literature has treated rapprochement in a cross-sectional manner rather than in a longitudinal study. Usually, rapprochement is pinpointed to a specific chronological point, when particular events mark the occurrence of the rapprochement. On the contrary, the current study separates the initiation from the process of rapprochement. As such, there indeed is a point in time which marks the beginning of the rapprochement, however, what follows initiation, for the current work, is a part of the rapprochement process. Secondly,

the focal point in the present study is to find the causes leading to the success or failure of the rapprochement process. This is an important difference from the rest of the literature, which mainly focuses on the causes of the initiation of the rapprochement, or in some cases, the reasons that the initiation did not take place.

The differences in research perspective, as indicated above, do not mean that it is pointless to look at the rest of the literature while searching for independent variables. Indeed, an overview of how other scholars tackled research questions can provide valuable insights, such as what type of theories scholars have used in order to examine rapprochement cases. Some of the variables used in previous research to explain the initiation of the rapprochement could also be relevant to explain the success or failure of a rapprochement process. Review of similar works might disclose variables that are suitable, whether slightly changed or in their originality, for the present study. Finally, a synopsis of the relevant literature will provide a solid ground upon which the independent variables for the current research can be based upon.

Concerning more theoretical studies in rapprochement, special mention should be made of two studies, Stephen Rock's book *Why peace breaks out: Rapprochement in historical perspective* and Tony Armstrong's *Breaking the ice: Rapprochement between East and West Germany, the United States and China, and Israel and Egypt*. Both of these studies analyze preconditions that lead to successful rapprochement. Although their research question is similar to the one posed by the

present work, differences in conceptualization and operationalization of the terms “rapprochement” and “successful” create a considerable distinction.

In both Stephen’s and Armstrong’s studies success or failure refers to the initiation of the rapprochement, while both scholars use “process” in order to describe the period preceding, rather than the period following, the initiation of the rapprochement. Furthermore, the current study examines rapprochement longitudinally. Finally, the present work studies rapprochement in a context which has not been studied before; Greek-Turkish relations, two middle-sized powers that are engaged in an intractable conflict.

In Stephen Rock’s study, the rapprochement process is examined comparatively by focusing on major powers; the Anglo-French rapprochement at the end of the 19th century and the Anglo-American rapprochement at approximately the same time. In addition, the author also examines, though more briefly, two cases of unsuccessful rapprochements; Great Britain and Germany, via 1898-1914 and, Germany and the United States, via 1898-1914. Rock poses and tests four hypotheses which establish why rapprochement among states is more likely in some situations than in others. In brief the first three hypotheses are as follow:

a) Rapprochement is more likely when the states are heterogeneous in their exercise of national power.

b) Rapprochement is more likely when the states are heterogeneous in their exercise of economic activities.

c) Rapprochement is more likely when the states are homogeneous in their exercise of social attributes.

Heterogeneity here refers to states not having geopolitical goals or economic activities, wherein the pursuit of which is seen as a major threat to the other's vital interests. Homogeneity refers to states having a significant number of common ideological or cultural attributes (see book review by Sears, 1990: 1321). Simply put, rapprochement is less likely to happen when there is conflict of interest between two states, especially concerning their exercise of foreign and economic policies, while it is more likely to take place among states with only minor cultural divergences.

Rock's first three hypotheses, although supported by the findings of his research have some built in fallacies that are difficult not to take into consideration. To begin with, it is very difficult to measure notions such as heterogeneity or homogeneity in absolute values. Hence, it is a very challenging task to establish when two states are homogeneous and when they are heterogeneous in the areas that Rock looks upon. This type of ambiguity makes it difficult for Rock's hypothesis to be tested or falsified by further research. In addition, as the author asserts, his assumptions seem to be applicable only in cases where both states possess "unifying ideologies", meaning that each state respects the other's sovereignty and does not claim authority over persons or states outside their borders. However, Rock in this case seems to overlook the fact that states tend to

perceive the other states as possible threats, even when the “others” have not shown signs of threatening behavior.

Other than that, Rock’s first three hypotheses can be seen as a synthesis of the realist and the cost/benefit analysis approaches. The heterogeneity of national power could be translated as, two states not having serious concerns about their national security, while the economic, cultural and ideological incentives for peace could also signal the possibility for high rapprochement benefits. Rock’s fourth hypothesis (Rock, 1989: 18) postulates that:

...even if the exercise of power, economic activities and societal attributes favor pacific relations, some catalytic event may be required to set the process of reconciliation in motion. The most probable candidate for this role is an acute crisis between the two states.

The idea that unforeseen and unanticipated events can bring the rapprochement process to an abrupt end, or further strengthen it, is a very interesting one as it introduces a factor that is vague by definition, which is nevertheless present in most cases. In the case of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, for instance, there have been a number of studies looking into the impact of the earthquakes in Kocaeli and Athens as what precipitated the ensuing process of rapprochement (see for example Evin, 2004; Ker-Lindsay, 2000; Yalcikaya, 2003, also on findings concerning the “disaster-induced rapprochement phenomenon” see Akcinaroglu, DiCicco and Radziszewski 2007).

Armstrong’s research focuses on three cases of rapprochement; East and West Germany, United States and China, and Israel and Egypt. All three cases embody, according to Armstrong, successful instances of rapprochement, meaning

that the rapprochement process was actually initiated.² Armstrong sets five assumptions and “each assumption stipulates certain conditions or behavior, and the basic logic of inquiry is to determine whether those stipulations are met in all three (successful) cases” (Armstrong, 1993: 19). The five major assumptions of his work are:

1) Initiatives to improve relations will succeed when, first, the costs of maintaining hostile policies are growing or threatening to grow and, second, the prospects of gain through such policies are significantly diminished in comparison to previous expectations.

2) The initial strategy employed in a successful rapprochement will be consistent with the central prescriptions of the GRIT (Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction).

3) Major issues are fractionated in negotiations that successfully lead to a rapprochement between hostile governments.

4) Negotiations that successfully lead to a rapprochement are conducted at a high level, are non-public and involve the fewest possible participants.

5) The negotiating strategy engaged in a successful rapprochement initiatives is to initially take uncompromising positions on the major issues of

² It must be stressed at this point that unlike Armstrong’s evaluation, it is the duration rather than the initiation that make a rapprochement successful in the current study.

contention, then offer concessions on a reciprocal basis, finally agreeing to disagree or seeking ambiguous formulations on matters of central principle.

The first assumption is established on the basic premises of the cost/benefit analysis approach. There is not much to add, rather than pointing out that its inclusion in Armstrong's research once again points to the importance of the rational or cost/benefit equilibrium in the decisions of policy makers. Nonetheless, the other four assumptions reveal a novel approach to rapprochement. Armstrong divides the rapprochement process into strategies and formal negotiations (Armstrong, 1993:20), and thus, the posed hypotheses here reflect these two components. The second assumption refers to the strategies; and the third, fourth, and fifth assumptions refer to the specifics of the negotiations.

Armstrong's novel approach should be taken into consideration. However, the author does not give any definition for what rapprochement is. Although this is typical in the existing rapprochement research, in the case of *Breaking the Ice* it creates additional problems. With no definition of rapprochement the selection of cases seems biased. Indeed, the case of the two-Germanies has little in common with the case of the Sino-American or the Israel-Egypt rapprochement. Moreover, the lack of definition leads to confusion when the discussion concerns the negotiation part of the process. In many rapprochement cases, as well as in the ones that our study is concerned with, rapprochement does not necessarily mean "getting to the table." As such, Armstrong's propositions must be tailored accordingly, in order to be used in the current study.

Armstrong's and Rock's works provide useful insights to the study of rapprochement. Firstly, they both rely on theories of international relations in order to answer their research question. Indeed, the use of IR theories in order to understand several aspects of the rapprochement process is a necessity, as the issue of rapprochement is closely linked to state behavior. IR scholars have persistently tried to answer questions such as: "Why do states fight?" or "Why do states make peace?" and, indeed, a number of different approaches have been developed in order to provide answers to those questions. Examining these approaches selectively in light of rapprochement could offer important insights in the effort to understanding as to why some rapprochement processes succeed and others fail.

Secondly, both Armstrong and Rock discuss the role of the international system and the role of the process in order to explain why rapprochement is initiated or not. Such distinction, which is made clear by the variables each scholar uses, is clearer in Rock's work. In Armstrong's book, the motives for rapprochement imposed by the international and domestic conditions are also included in the cost/benefit equilibrium. While, on the other hand, the variables concerning the process include, in large, the type of negotiations that take place prior to the initiation of the rapprochement (i.e. the GRIT strategy, negotiations between high-ranking officials, etc.). Furthermore, it should be pointed out that Armstrong's first variable derives from IR theories, while the rest are mostly grounded in other fields of study (e.g. negotiation theory and/or conflict resolution).

Even though it is essentially different from Stephen's and Armstrong's works, in the next session an overview of the IR theories are discussed first and are then followed by other process factors. Particularly, as far as the current study is concerned, the focus is on how such changes (in this case process is understood as the development and progression of the rapprochement from its initiation to its end) could lead to the success or failure of a rapprochement.

2.5. Factors Influencing the Success or Failure of a Rapprochement Process

One of the most useful insights from the review of Armstrong's and Rock's studies was that, in order to find possible factors influencing the success or failure of a rapprochement process, it is necessary to examine IR theories and other process-related subjects that IR theory does not cover. Looking into these two theoretical backgrounds will provide a backbone for this comprehensive analysis.

2.5.1. Looking into the IR Theories

IR theories provide a number of different explanations on how the international system and domestic politics shape the foreign policy of a state. In the pages that follow it will be discussed how different approaches may explain state behavior in regards to rapprochement. This discussion will focus on how ideas developed by IR scholars can be used to explain not the initiation, but the success or failure of a rapprochement process. The discussion covers the three main schools of thought in relation to rapprochement: realism, liberalism and constructivism.

2.5.1.1. Realism and the Study of Rapprochement

Realists' ideas can be traced back to Thucydides' *"The History of the Peloponnesian War,"* Machiavelli's *"Prince"* and Hobbes' *"Leviathan,"* and how they blossomed in the late 1930s and 1940s as a reaction to the -until that time- prevailing "idealism" (Bull, 2000: 60). Realism emphasizes the anarchical nature of the international system which refers to the lack of an authority capable of arranging relations among nations (see Waltz, 1979: 102-128; Donnelly, 2000: 81-106). Realist theory of international relations includes three separate schools of thought: 1) classical realism, which is based on the work of Morgenthau (1985) and Carr (see Carr and Cox, 2001: 97; Vasquez, 1998: 35), 2) structural realism, introduced in Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979) and, 3) neoclassical realism, which was initially identified by Rose (1998), and introduced the role of domestic politics in international relations (for instance see Scheller, 2006; Christensen, 1997).

According to Realists, states' actions are always aiming at the protection of their national interests. These interests are defined in terms of power and are unaffected by time and space, while their protection is freed from moral restraints (see Morgenthau's six principles of political realism, 1985: 4-17). In turn, Waltz added that the decisive independent variable, as far as relations among states are concerned, is the structure of the international system, meaning its anarchical nature and the distribution of capabilities among its units (Waltz, 1998; Waltz, 1990: 29-30). Under these given conditions, Realists have distinguished two practices that

states must follow, the first one is balancing, which involves two or more states aligning in order to balance a threat from another state or group of states. The second one is band-wagoning, which refers to alignment with the source of threat (on balance of power within the realist school see Nicholson, 1998; Walt, 1997).

The realist approach to international relations provides possible explanations on why rapprochement between two states might succeed or fail. Realism, for instance, suggests that if the balance of power changes in a way that does not favor the improvement of relations between parties going through a rapprochement process, then the chances for failure increase as these states will try and find different alliances in order to protect their interests better. As states have high incentives to sustain their integrity, independence, and national security, the success or failure of a rapprochement process depends on how well it serves these incentives.

2.5.1.2. Liberalism and the Study of Rapprochement

Liberal theories of international relations have their roots in the preaching of the Enlightenment, which spreads faith in humans to progress and improve based in their capacity. As far as political developments are concerned, democratization and the spread of liberal values are understood as the main vehicles towards the achievement of a world peace, especially by certain political thinkers such as Rousseau, Locke, and particularly Kant. Concerning the realm of economics, since the 17th Century liberal economists and thinkers, such as Adam Smith and Jeremy

Bentham, supported that free international trade and market capitalism would eliminate wars, as most wars were fought in order for states to achieve their mercantilist goals (on the evolution of the liberal thinking see Burchill, 1996; Zacher and Matthew, 1995). Currently there are two main theoretical approaches building on the Kantian approach to international politics; liberal international relations theory, and neoliberalism or neoliberal institutionalism.

Liberal theorists have highlighted the importance of actors, the interaction between state and non-state actors, and the idea that state preferences are the outcome of such interactions (for a summary of main liberal assumptions see Slaughter, 1985: 508; Moravcsik, 1997). Perhaps one of the most significant theories within liberalism has been the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), which argues that liberal democracies do not engage in war amongst themselves. The DPT can be traced back to Kant, but its modern variant is based on the work of several scholars such as Doyle (1983, 1986, and 1995) and Russett (1993). Although in practice, quantitative studies have supported the DPT claims (see for instance Maoz and Russett, 1993; Oneal and Ray, 1997) realist scholars have raised significant methodological and theoretical concerns (see for instance Layne, 1994; Mearsheimer 1990; Rosato, 2003).

Neoliberals, on the other hand, have stressed the role of institutions in the international arena. Indeed, the role of the institutions is so central to the neoliberal view that sometimes the approach is referred to as liberal institutionalism³.

³ In essence liberal institutionalism is one of the four main branches of liberal internationalism, the other three being structural liberalism, liberal reformism and liberal cosmopolitanism (see McGrew,

Institutions are presumed to contribute to the international system by bringing a degree of safety and certainty as far as contacts among states are concerned. In essence institutions reduce the costs of making and enforcing agreements (Keohane, 1998; Nau, 2007; for a six-fold account of institutions' functionality in shaping international behavior see also Keohane and Hoffman, 1993)⁴. Furthermore, international interdependence –referring to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries resulting from the international flows of money, goods, people and messages– has also been central to neoliberal thought (Keohane & Nye, 1989: 8-9; also see Keohane & Nye, 1988; Keohane & Nye, 1998). Neoliberals suggest that interdependence increases the complexity of the system and imposes higher costs to the actions of states or non-state actors (Keohane & Nye, 1998: 730). In general, institutions and interdependence together alter the assumptions of the realists' 'game models' by influencing three important levels of the 'game:' 1) the payoff structure⁵, 2) "shadow of the future", in other words the way institutions tend to extend the governments' expectations of the effects of their current actions in future issues, and 3) the number of actors, meaning the number of "players" and how their relationship is structured. (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Axelrod & Keohane, 1986).

2002).

⁴ Assumptions deriving by post-Cold War Europe

⁵ In a typical realist game such as Prisoner's Dilemma the payoff structure suggests that the cost of defection (D) is always lower than the cost of cooperation (C), so that $DC > CC > DD > CD$. However, liberals suggest that this payoff structure is not typical in world politics and that strong institutions and interdependence make cooperative games possible.

As far as the success or failure of the rapprochement is concerned, the neoliberal assumptions, that interdependence and institutions increase incentives for cooperation, become very relevant. Without doubt, if during the rapprochement process interdependence between the parties increase, then the motivation for continuing the rapprochement also increases. Similarly, strong institutions reduce security dilemmas, which is typical in all realist games, and, hence, make steps for solidifying the rapprochement process less risky for the involved states. These two assumptions will be further discussed in the following pages, where the possibility that they can all fit in an all-inclusive cost-benefit variable will be examined.

2.5.1.3. Constructivism and the Study of Rapprochement

Constructivism involves a “sociological social psychological form of systemic theory of international politics in which the identities and the interests are the dependent variable” (Wendt, 1992: 394). In essence, constructivism is adding to what the Neoliberals and the Neorealists seem to have ignored; “the content and sources of state interests and the social fabric of world politics” (Checkel, 1998: 324). According to Kolodziej (2005:261):

Constructivists claim to explain or at least provide provisional evidence to show how political actors –you, me, states, political parties, international organizations, et al.– acquire their identities and, more pointedly, how these identities generate the material and non-material interests of those actors.

As identities are socially constructed, the interests and behaviors of political agents are also dependent upon the contextual interpretation of the world.

Rationality, it follows, is not objective, but rather depends “on collective human enterprises and interactions” (Adler, 1997: 329). As one of the most important scholars of this approach pointed out, “Anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992; on constructivism see also Hopf, 1998).

Rapprochement scholars who follow a constructivist approach have mainly looked at the process of rapprochement by adopting a more or less historical analysis. The focus of their interest is to examine how perceptions and interests change over time and how this change increases/decreases the likelihood of rapprochement. The most important research of a rapprochement case in the constructivist tradition is Evelyn Goh’s work on the United States’ rapprochement with China, from circa 1961 to 1974 (Goh: 2005). Goh starts with a brief discussion on “conventional” approaches to rapprochement, and criticizes them not only for failing to answer the “how” questions, but also for lacking historical context. Goh supports that according to the premises of the rationalist and structural approaches, the rapprochement between the US and China should have happened immediately after the breaking of the Sino-Soviet relations, which was obvious, since 1962.

Goh’s research shows how important the Constructivists’ ideas are for the current study. As Turkish and Greek peoples shared the same land for centuries, fought each other many times and have gained their independence from each other, issues of identity, enmity, mistrust, negative images and historical traumas are potential threats to the success of a rapprochement process, by hindering its smooth progress.

Another useful insight from the constructivist school to the study of rapprochement is the notion of security communities. A security community is a group of nations⁶ positively identifying with the welfare of one another as such that one perceives the other party as a cognitive extension of the Self rather than an independent being (see Wendt 1994). In such situations, “the other is seen as a cognitive extension of the self rather than independent” (on security communities see also Bellamy, 2004; Adler and Barnett, 1998). If the rapprochement reaches one such level of cooperation, then a kind of collective or subordinate identity is created which transcends structural limitations. Such collective identity can deepen a rapprochement process and make it a successful one.

2.6. Theoretical Framework and the Variables

The discussion of the main theories that explain state behavior and states’ actions are useful in providing a general theoretical framework within which the independent variables for the current study are based upon. Issues such as the protection of national security and sovereignty, interdependence between the two states, or the construction of new state identities and interests are relevant for this study.

Although the discussion on the IR theories has provided a good idea of what kind of independent variables are relevant to the research question, it is obvious that in order for a rapprochement process to succeed the incentives suggested by IR

⁶ The sentence refers to International Relations and a “group” can either be bilateral, regional or global

theories are, most likely, not enough. The ways in which the rapprochement is developing are also significant factors that could determine the success or failure of the process. The analysis of the process is concerned with issues that are largely left untouched by the IR theories. As such, motivations and obstacles, which are relevant to the process, are, in essence, complementary to those that have already been discussed and are relevant to the IR theories. In the following pages, I examine these process-related variables in detail.

The evolution of the rapprochement process itself is a decisive factor determining its success or failure. A rapprochement that goes deeper as the time goes by is more likely to become a successful case. This is because positive developments will provide further momentum and motivation for the continuation of the process, while overcoming the possible obstacles will become easier. On the other hand, when relations remain superficial after the initiation of the rapprochement and decisive steps are not taken, it is likely that the initial momentum will be lost and eventually the process will die out.

An important question that immediately emerges is, what “deep rapprochement” means, or, in other words, which factors determine the “depth” of a rapprochement process. In order to answer this question the indicators for rapprochement that were proposed earlier in this chapter will be used. These are: 1) summit-level meetings, 2) agreements signed, 3) military cooperation, 4) economic cooperation, 5) positive gestures or statements, and 6) grassroots level participation in the process. All of these indicators are expected to be part of a rapprochement

process; however, their degree of importance for the process varies. In some cases meetings between high-ranking officials are the main point of focus, in others, priority is given to economic cooperation and the improvement of financial affairs. In cases of rapprochement whereby progress is observed in most of these areas, if not all, the likelihood of success increases.

Another important factor influencing the success or failure of the rapprochement process is the occurrences of unexpected events, which are relevant to the rapprochement process or which are not directly linked to the rapprochement process but influence it nonetheless. The use of the term “unexpected events” is quite vague and, indeed, can be used to describe a large spectrum of incidents—be it the death of a leader, a cataclysmic natural phenomenon, the emergence of a new controversial issue, or an unexpected “hot” episode. In the field, a high importance is given to the existence of crises that increase the cost of maintaining hostile relations and eventually leads to the rapprochement initiation.

The important role of such unforeseen events is also highlighted in Rock’s work wherein unexpected and unplanned catalytic events play a role in the initiation of rapprochement; an idea that has also been raised by other scholars. These kinds of events could have an impact on two levels: the policy makers and the society. As far as policy makers are concerned, a catalytic event disturbs either the power balance or the cost/benefit balance, creating new conditions that require the adoption of new policies. What is more interesting, however, is the impact of such events on the society.

Finally, as far as the process is concerned, it is important to examine how the issues between Greece and Turkey are negotiated during the rapprochement. The question of how negotiations between the two sides are made and how they influence the initiation of the rapprochement is introduced by Armstrong. However, as the initiation of the rapprochement rarely means that a solution to the problem has been reached, it is likely that negotiations between the parties entering a rapprochement continue after the initiation of the process.

2.7. Choosing the Variables

It is important to make a clear distinction between the independent variables and the dependent variable. The dependent variable for this study is successful and unsuccessful rapprochement. Independent variables can be understood as all those factors that influence the success of a rapprochement. Rephrased otherwise, independent variables are key as to whether, or not, a rapprochement will be successful. Each theoretical approach to the study of rapprochement comes up with a peculiar way of designating independent variables, which have already been discussed in this thesis next to those specific independent variables that were put in place by, especially, Armstrong's and Rock's work on rapprochement.

In the following pages, the analysis will focus on organizing the frame of the discussion by appointing eight well-defined independent variables, which, in return, will be employed to examine various case studies under consideration.

- The impact of the international system on national security

Even though it is mainly Realists that are pre-occupied with highlighting the importance of national security for a state's mode of action, national security is in fact constitutive of all other IR theories, as well. The study of the rapprochement is, too, related to this topic as that, arguably, if the international system and national security concerns dictate further cooperation between two states, then a rapprochement is more likely to occur. However, for the reason that the current study is concerned with the success or failure of the rapprochement process, rather than its initiation, just stated argument must be adjusted accordingly. Therefore the question is: in what way do changes in international systems affect the rapprochement process?

In order to answer this question it first must be made clear that changes in international system can only be either favorable or unfavorable to the rapprochement process. Here favorable is to mean that changes create such conditions in which the continuation of the rapprochement becomes more essential to the parties' pursue of satisfying their national security needs. The emergence of a third-party state with a threatening posture to the security of both states engaging in a rapprochement process is a good example of such a change. Unfavorable changes are then those events that offer counter motives for the continuation of the rapprochement process, such as the elimination of a common threat.

The proposition that can be made for national security is, the likelihood for success increases as long as changes in international system are favorable to the

rapprochement process, while the likelihood for failure increases when changes are unfavorable to the rapprochement process.

- State identity

The short discussion on constructivism earlier in this chapter made it clear that, according to constructivists, notions such as national security or international structure are only meaningful when seen as part of a wider normative and cultural context. Even the most advantageous structural or systemic conditions may not be enough if both of the two states in rapprochement don't develop a new identity that will allow them to see one another, not as a continuous possible threat, but, instead, as a possible long-lasting ally. In Hopf's words (1998),

The identity of a state implies its preferences and consequent actions. A state understands others according to the identity it attributes to them, while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practice.

The issue of state identity is very relevant for the current study as it involves two states, or more precisely two peoples, with a long and predominantly non-cooperative past. As such, putting aside old hatred, negative images, irredentism, mistrust and suspicion, and creating new state identities for both Turkey and Greece towards a mutually cooperative scheme, is expected to increase the likelihood of a successful rapprochement. On the contrary, if old identities persist even after the initiation of the rapprochement process, then the likelihood of a successful rapprochement decreases.

- Costs and benefits equilibrium

One of the main points discussed in the literature review was that rapprochement is far from being a one-dimensional process. Rather it influences all levels of the society and impacts its various sections. What can be inferred from this assumption is that the political decision to further on, or abandon, a process of rapprochement is not to be taken lightly. Instead there are a number of issues to be considered concerning the negative and positive effects of this decision.

The decision to continue the rapprochement process or terminate it bears some costs and benefits. Thus, it is the balance between these costs and benefits that influence the success or failure of rapprochement. For instance, political cost due to public opinion's disapproval of the rapprochement process can co-exist with significant benefits gained from trading agreements as a result of the same rapprochement process.

As the balance between the costs and benefits influences the incentives for the continuation of rapprochement, it is only safe to assume that the likelihood of a successful rapprochement increases inasmuch as that the benefits outnumber or outweigh the costs during the process. On the contrary, the likelihood of keeping with the rapprochement process decreases if perceived costs prevail over benefits.

- Interdependence

The role of interdependence in international relations is mainly emphasized by liberal institutionalists. Even though there is no universally agreed definition of

interdependence (Rosecrance & Stein, 1973; Kroll 1993), interdependence is closely linked to the theme of interstate cooperation and peace. De Vries (1990: 429) explains this correlation by highlighting three different explanations, a) interdependent nations are more likely to take each other's interests into consideration, b) as the international system becomes more structured, interests are increasingly affected by conflict, and c) interdependent nations recognize the consequences of their actions for other states, and of other states' actions to their own interests.

As far as the current study is concerned, interdependence should be understood as creating strong economic, trade, and military bonds. The question is whether interdependence influences the successful or unsuccessful outcome of the rapprochement. Based on the literature it is expected that high interdependence between Turkey and Greece would increase the likelihood of a successful rapprochement, while in other cases where interdependence remains low the likelihood of a successful rapprochement decreases.

- Leadership

Although it is widely acknowledged that rapprochement can affect all levels of the body politic and the society, it is most of the time a top-down process initiated by political leaders. It is therefore only logical to wonder how the leaders' attitude and actions cause variations in the dependent variable. The incentive to look into the role of the leaders in the success or failure of the rapprochement is

also amplified by the liberal and constructivist positions on the potential role of leadership and agency in international relations.

The main issues that matter to the current study are the specific actions of the Greek and Turkish leaders, as well as their overall support for the process. Did they support the process and how did this affect the outcome of the rapprochement? What were the leaders' actions that helped the rapprochement? Were such actions vital to the continuation of the rapprochement? It must be made clear that leaders' actions are not always supportive of the process' continuation. Hence, leaders' actions that constitute an obstacle to the continuation of the rapprochement process must be identified and underlined as well.

- Depth of the process

How the pace and depth of a rapprochement process impacts the outcome was discussed earlier in this chapter. In short, as the process becomes deeper, the possibility of a successful rapprochement increases, if the process remains superficial the likelihood of unsuccessful rapprochement rises. In order to measure the "depth" of the rapprochement process, each of the case study chapters will include information for each of the rapprochement indicators; summit level meetings, agreement signed, military cooperation, economic cooperation, statements/gestures, impact on societal level. In addition, a table will be included in each case study chapter to demonstrate the frequency of each indicator and its importance in the rapprochement process.

- Turning points

Turning points is a term used in conflict resolution in order to describe “an event or processes that mark passages from one stage (of the negotiation) to the next, signaling processes from earlier to later processes” (Druckman, 1999: 92). Although Daniel Druckman conceptualizes the term “turning points” to describe and analyze the negotiation process, turning points have been used to describe fluctuations in the relations amongst states (see for instance Gazit, 1998), and we believe that they could influence the process and outcome of a rapprochement. After all, even though there is a partial agreement among scholars on the definition of turning points, there seems to be less agreement on the operationalization of the term (for a comparative study of 34 cases of international negotiation, as well as for examples of turning points see Druckman, 2001). In general, we can distinguish between two types of turning points:

the ones that occur after a period of no progress and those that occur after the threat to the sustenance of the talks...Both types of turning points are inflections in a trend, or “upturns” that represent either sudden progress or a return to a period of stability (Druckman, 1986: 333).

As for the current study, turning points will be treated as independent variables that include those unexpected incidents or events that have a shocking effect on the rapprochement process. This effect can either be positive or negative. An event is considered as “positive” when it increases the motivation for the continuation of the rapprochement process, creates better conditions in order for the process to deepen, pushes public opinion or policy makers forward to engage in the

rapprochement process. On the contrary, an incident is considered “negative” when, and if, it retards the viability of the rapprochement process.

Overall, the expected impact of turning points on the rapprochement process is, on the one hand, to favor the continuation of the process if they are positive, and, on the other hand, to limit the prospects for rapprochement’s success if they are negative.

- The GRIT (Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction) strategy

The idea that a GRIT based strategy could increase the likelihood of successful rapprochement has already been put forth by Armstrong (1993).

According to Lindsfold, & Collins (1978: 679):

Osgood’s GRIT strategy is a program for achieving tension reduction, managing conflict, and bringing about mutual beneficial cooperation. Grit is an acronym for Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction, and was proposed as a means for reducing the possibility that the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union would become hot...[However] the strategies one which appears useful in conflicts of lesser magnitude.

GRIT strategy pays heed to the importance of a series of small steps that a nation takes under the limitations of its defined security for the purpose of easing tension and, also, for eliciting reciprocity from the other state. If the first stage of reciprocity is obtained: then the margins for risk-taking behavior widen, and larger steps can be taken (Druckman, 1990: 555). In practice the literature shows that the GRIT-based strategies are effective, not only because the initiator is cooperative or because there is some tit-for-tat responsiveness...[but also because] it makes

explicit, through communication the interdependency of the two parties in the pursuit of their long-range interest, and makes the trustworthiness of the initiator highly credible (Lindskold, Walters & Koutsouris, 1983: 522).

Apart from the independent variables there are also control variables, which are constant in all four cases and, thus, cannot account for the variation in the dependent variable. These are:

- *Parties*: All four cases are concerned only with the Greek – Turkish conflict and, as such, the parties involved are only Turkey and Greece for all the selected cases.

- *Conflict issues*: Although small variations might exist, in general, the problems between the parties either issue from security, territory, minority issues or a combination of these.

- *Regime type*: As the regime status of either Turkey or Greece did not change during any of the rapprochement periods examined in this study, democratic peace can be considered a control variable.

2.8. Concluding Remarks

The current chapter's first goal was to create a concrete definition of the term "rapprochement" by placing it on the grounds of past researches on rapprochement cases around the globe. In addition, a clear-cut distinction was made between what constitutes a successful or failed rapprochement. The discussion on these two points—what is a rapprochement and what makes it successful endeavor,

was necessary so as to clarify the two main concepts included in the research question. The definitions and clarifications provided in the first part of this chapter will serve as a reference point for the rest of the study, and especially at the assessment and case selection parts.

The second part of the chapter focused on a discussion on the independent variables and examined how the issue of rapprochement has been approached so far in the literature. Two main approaches have been identified, the first one being the domination of IR theory on the study of rapprochement, and the second, the importance given to the process as a leading factor determining the initiation, or the absence of, a rapprochement process. Both of these approaches were discussed, followed by a discussion on how their assumptions can be altered in order to be able to answer the research question of the current study. The chapter was concluded with the presentation of the independent variables that will be tested in the current study.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

3.1. Introduction

One of the most important principles of scientific research is that it ought to make its procedures public (Collier, Seawright & Munck, 2010: 34). Indeed, a scholar has to make his research design known so that the readers are able to “judge the quality of the research and the plausibility of its conclusions” (p.35). The objective of this chapter is to present the methodology that the current research uses and to discuss the rationale for choosing the research design. The discussion is about how to collect and then analyze data, how to choose case studies, and what the independent variables are.

3.2. Research Strategy

In order to answer the research question the current work analyzes and compares two successful and two unsuccessful cases of rapprochement. The first step is to explain what might constitute a “case”. Overall, a case can be any of the following phenomena: such as wars, social movements, peacekeeping operations, revolutions, and so on. One of the most comprehensive definitions of what constitutes a “case” is provided by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett. According to George and Bennett (2005: 17-18) a case can be defined as:

an instance of a class of events. The term “class of events” refers here to a phenomenon of scientific interest, such as revolutions, types of governmental regimes, kinds of economic systems, or personality types that the investigator chooses to study with the aim of developing theory regarding the causes of similarities or differences among instances of that class of events.

A case study is an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units (Gerring, 2004: 342). In general, case studies are considered by many scholars as weak means of research because of the difficulties in relation to generalizing findings and contributing significantly to the scientific dialogue (concerning this debate and a defense of case study research see Flyvbjerg, 2006). Nonetheless, it is an undeniable fact that some of the most important works in political science have adopted case studies as their main research strategy (such as Barrington Moore’s *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, and Theda Skocpol’s *States and Social Revolutions*).

According to Yin (2003: 1) case studies are the preferred strategy when “how” and “why” questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control

over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context. The above statement is also true for the current research because the research question can be formulated as a “why” question (why some rapprochement efforts fail while others succeed). In addition, according to Barnett and Elman (2007: 171), qualitative research and especially case studies have gained wide popularity in the IR research and its subfields because they:

often involve interaction effects among many structural and agent-based variables, path dependencies, and strategic interaction among large numbers of actors across multiple levels of analysis with private information and strong incentives to bluff or deceive other actors.

3.3. Research Design

One of the most difficult problems in qualitative comparative studies is to establish causality. Political scientists have developed different strategies to tackle this methodological problem. However, it still seems that most of the proposed alternatives are based on Mill’s ideas on the method of agreement and the method of disagreement (for a presentation of these methods see Ragin, 1987: 36-42 & Skocpol 1984: 73-80), or, as they are usually referred to as the Most Similar Systems Design (MSS) and the Most Different Systems Design (MDS) (see Przeworski and Teune, 1970). There are two problems to be solved with both MSS and MDS research designs.

To begin with, it is not an easy task to find cases that are similar in every aspect but their dependent variable and only one of the independent variables and vice-versa. The focused research question forces very specific limitations on the

case selection, thus, there are only a limited number of cases that could fit in those limitations. Moreover, when small number of cases is coupled with large number of independent variables, as is the case for the current study, the impact of each independent variable on the dependent variable is very difficult to configure. In order to overcome these difficulties the present study will employ two different, yet mutually complementary, strategies (on the ways to overcome these difficulties see also Lijphart, 1971 and Lijphart 1975). The first is the structured-focused comparison and the second is process training.

3.4. Structured-focused Case Comparison

Structured-focused method, originally proposed by Alexander George (1979), is an alternative way to organizing comparative case studies. According to George and Bennett (2005: 69):

The method and logic of structured focused comparison is simple and straightforward. The method is “structured” in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked for each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The method is “focused” in that it deals with certain aspects of the historical cases examined. The requirements for structure and focus apply equally to individual cases since they may later be joined by additional cases.

Building upon the previous works of Alexander George and his colleagues, Kaarbo and Beasley (1999) identified six separate steps that a structured-focused case comparison must follow. These six steps were offered as guidelines to those researchers that purport to conduct comparative case studies in their respective

fields, ranging from politics to psychology, and to political psychology. The first step (p. 378) concerns the selection of the research question. In structured-focused case comparison, it is essential to develop a focused research question, which in turn will help a researcher identify the most important variables as means of avoiding the possibility of including too many independent variables (see also Lijphart, 1971).

The second step according to Kaarbo and Beasley (p. 379) is to identify variables according to the literature. For the current study, the task of configuring those independent variables that are more relevant to the question of successful or unsuccessful rapprochement was undertaken in the literature review chapter, wherein a number of factors that possibly influence the outcome of a rapprochement process were introduced. In addition, Kaarbo and Beasley suggest that a "...researcher should also make explicit which of the variables to be investigated are hypothesized to be most important for explaining the phenomenon." As the most important and difficult part of the research, the discussion on the independent variables should also include a type of hierarchy—if only such is possible based on the existing literature.

The third step of structured-focused comparison is the selection of cases, which is (p. 379). Kaarbo and Beasley further divided this step into three separate tasks that have to be fulfilled by the researcher. Firstly the selected cases must be comparable, at least on those parameters that are relevant to the study. Secondly, the cases should have a variation in the dependent variable, because otherwise "the

researcher cannot make any causal inference about the phenomenon because the same explanatory variables may be present in cases in which the phenomenon is absent” (p. 380). Finally, the last step in case selection is to use cases across population subgroups. This task is not presented as obligatory; however, it can be useful depending on the goals of the researcher concerning the explanatory power of his study.

The fourth task is to operationalize the variables and construct a case codebook. The operationalization of the variables is a powerful tool as it helps the researcher identify the data useful to the study. The operationalization is necessary for both the independent and the dependent variables. As far as the current study is concerned, the operationalization of the dependent variable was undertaken in the literature review chapter, while the coding of the independent variables will be discussed later in the present chapter.

Step five concerns the way each case should be written. According to Kaarbo and Keasley, the narrative is the most commonly used practice among researchers in their case studies, however, the presentation of data in coded form, such as a table, also constitutes a powerful tool for case demonstration. In the current study the narrative of the four case studies is presented in such a way that the empirical data is linked to the theoretical data. In addition, several tables are also included which summarize, in a coded manner, the main points of each case study.

The final step refers to the comparison of the case studies. The main goal of the comparison is to identify patterns and processes across the cases (p. 386), and

thus, make assumptions on the explanatory power of each of the independent variables. Furthermore, once the initial assessment of the theoretical implication is made, the case study analyst may want to "return" to the cases to investigate candidate explanations for the relationships discovered. In other words, certain interpretations arising from the initial conclusions can often be discounted or suggested by analyzing the "extra" material included in the case studies (p. 387).

3.5. Process Tracing

Even if studies that examine a limited number of cases have the inefficiencies mentioned earlier, the small-n⁷ opens the prospect to the researcher to make a much more in-depth analysis of the cases; in essence it allows the researcher to perform a within-case analysis. A within-case analysis has been proposed as a powerful tool that increases the viability of the small-n analysis (Collier as cited in George, 2005: 179). George (2005) differentiates between two different types of within-case analyses, namely the congruence method (i.e. starting with a theory and then assess its ability to explain the outcome in a specific case) and the process-tracing method. The proposed research will be using the process-tracing method in order to answer the research question.

The main idea behind the process-tracing method is that the researcher tries to find the course of actions and events that occurred and led to a specific outcome, whilst he tries to examine and explain how the narrative he provides links the

⁷ N here refers to the number of cases

outcome with the process (for a discussion on process tracing methodology see also

Bennett and Elman, 2006: 459-460). As Alexander George (2005: 207&215) puts it:

Process-tracing forces the investigator...to consider the alternative paths that are consistent with the outcome and the process-tracing evidence in a single case. In more cases, the investigator can begin to chart the repertoire of causal paths that lead to a given outcome and the conditions under which they occur – that is to develop a typological theory...Process-tracing can identify single or different paths to an outcome, point out variables that were otherwise left out of the initial comparison of cases, check for spuriousness, and permit causal inference on the basis of a few cases.

Another account of how process-tracing works is provided by Bates et al.⁸ (1998) who suggest that modeling the processes that produce specific outcomes can be helpful in capturing the essence of the narratives. Although their approach is basically actor-centric (i.e. examining narratives from rational-choice perspective), the idea of “identifying actors, the decision points they faced, the choices they made, the paths taken and shunned, and the manner in which their choices generated events and outcomes” (Bates et al, 2005 : 13-14), could also be said about process-tracing methodology.

Furthermore, process-tracing will help acquiring high levels of internal and external validity. Simply put “internal validity is when the hypothesized independent variable alone affects the dependent variable. Variables other than the treatment that affect the dependent variable are threats to internal validity” (Neuman, 2006: 259). Therefore, internal validity is achieved when the researcher has eliminated all the potential independent variables that could be affecting the

⁸ Bates et al. call their methodology “analytic narratives”, however their methodology is different from process-tracing only in the sense that it focuses on the logic of the processes that generate different phenomena by using rational choice theory.

dependent variable, and tests only the independent variable or variables whose causal effect on the dependent variables he tries to establish.

Internal validity is difficult to establish as it is threatened by a number of factors (for lists of potential threats see Cook and Campbell, 1979). Various experimental methodologies have traditionally been seen as the best methodological alternative in order to overcome internal validity concerns (see Gerring, 2007: 151-171), and usually the issue of internal and external validity is addressed together with experimental designs in methodology textbooks (see for example Druckman, 2005 and Neuman, 2006). Nonetheless, although internal validity is an integral part of every scientific research, there are cases, as for example the current research, to which experimental designs cannot be applied.

Internal validity is especially difficult to establish in case studies due to the many confounding causal factors that might exist, which cannot be eliminated by a pure research design or by quantitative techniques (Gerring, 2007: 172). Thus, how to establish internal validity in a case study becomes a complicated issue. To begin with, the process-tracing method itself ensures a high level of internal validity as it allows the gathering of a wide range of observations. These observations can be used in order to construct a consistent train of thought that could ideally establish a strong link between the cause and the outcome. However, Gerring proposes two more preconditions that make internal validity process-tracing achievable. As he puts it:

Process-tracing is convincing insofar as the multiple links in a causal chain can be formalized, that is, diagrammed in an explicit way (as a visual

depiction and/or a mathematical model) and insofar as each micro-mechanism can be proven (Gerring, 2007: 181).

Hence, it is of vital importance not only to uncover the processes that lead to a specific outcome, but also to explain how these processes interact with one another and how one leads to the other.

3.6. Research Question

This chapter will follow Kaarbo and Beasley's first three steps for conducting a structure-focused case comparison.⁹ The first task is to discuss the research question. The RQ of the current study is: "What are the preconditions for successful rapprochement?" It has already been apparent from the literature review that this research focuses more on the variables that are connected to the assumptions of some basic IR theories and, also, some important variables that concern the process of rapprochement and have attracted the interest of scholars who study the phenomenon of the rapprochement.

3.7. Selection of Cases

The third step according to Kaarbo and Beasley, is the selection of cases. The selection of the cases should not be random, but instead, it should serve a specific purpose within the overall scope of the inquiry (Yin, 2003: 47). The question of how to select the best cases has troubled many scholars and, indeed,

⁹ Fourth step was part of the discussion in the literature review chapter, while steps five and six concern the writing of the case studies

there are a number of different techniques for case selection as far as qualitative and quantitative studies are concerned (for instance see Bennett and Elman, 2007; Searight and Gerring, 2008). In general, small-n, qualitative studies, such as the current study, have been accused of not being able to provide causal explanations due to the case selection being made based on the dependent variable; yet, several responses to this concern have been provided by varying qualitative researches (for a more analytical overview of this debate see Mahoney, 2007; moreover, on selection bias see in qualitative research see Collier & Mahoney, 1996).

Keeping in line with George and Bennett's definition of a case, as well as, keeping with Kaarbo and Beasley's directions for case selections in a structure-focused case comparison¹⁰, the "case of event" for the current study is rapprochement. In total four different cases of rapprochement are discussed and compared. All four cases concern the Greek-Turkish relations (for a detailed account of the problems between Greece and Turkey see Bolukbasi, 2004; Theodoropoulos, 1995). Two of these cases concern successful rapprochement outcomes and the other two concern unsuccessful rapprochement outcomes.

The two successful cases are the 1930s Greek-Turkish rapprochement covering roughly the period from June 1930 to the emergence of the Second World War, and the last Greek-Turkish rapprochement which started in 1999. The two unsuccessful cases are the 1950 rapprochement, which abruptly ended in September 1955, and the short lived Davos case of 1987.

¹⁰ Meaning that cases should be comparable and there should be a differentiation on the dependent variable.

3.8. Creation of Codebook

Much about the independent and dependent variables were discussed in the literature review chapter, where a detailed operationalization of the dependent and independent variables was carried out. The next step is the construction of a codebook that will explain exactly which pieces of information the study must include and what indicators are used to define the variables. The current study uses Kaarbo as a model (1996: 516-517).

Table 3.1.

Codebook Summary		
Variables	Coding Categories	Questions/Indicators
Dependent Variable: Successful rapprochement	Successful/unsuccessful	What was the duration of the process? If the rapprochement continues for 10 years after the initiation of the rapprochement then successful if not then unsuccessful
Independent Variables		
1. Impact of the international system on national security	Favorable/non-favorable	Does the international system continue to provide motivations for cooperation? Changes in the system, existence of common threats, threats from revisionist powers
2. State identity	Cooperative/non-cooperative	Does a new state identity that does not hinder cooperation develop?/ Existence of enemy images, stereotypes, changes in perceptions security

		communities
3. Costs and benefits equilibrium	Benefits>costs/ Costs>benefits	Does the balance between benefits and costs provide motives rapprochement process?/Bilateral issues, minorities, political costs
4. Interdependence	High/low	Does high interdependence develop after the initiation of the rapprochement?/ Economic diplomatic and political partnerships
5. Leadership	Supportive/non-supportive	What were the specific action from politicians that contributed to the continuation or the collapse of the process/Speeches, letters, gestures
6. Depth of the process	Deep/superficial	How much were the rapprochement process indicators influenced by the process?/frequency and importance of summit level meetings, military cooperation, agreements signed etc
7. Turning points	Yes/no	Were there any important events that influenced the course of the rapprochement process/Natural disasters, unexpected international problems, other unanticipated phenomena that impact the rapprochement
8. GRIT strategy	Yes/no	Did the parties use GRIT strategy during their vis-à-vis negotiations?/small steps aiming at tension reduction

An important clarification on the above table regards the depth of the process, and specifically what the terms “frequency” and “importance” of the indicators mean. Frequency (coded as high/low) refers to the rate an indicator is present in the process compared the period before the initiation of the rapprochement. Low frequency refers to an indicator of the rapprochement process showing same or lower regularity when the pre-rapprochement period is compared to the period after the rapprochement. High signifies an increase in the occurrence of that indicator. Importance (coded as high/medium/low), refers to the extend a specific rapprochement indicator has been substantial to the process. If the indicator is prominent in the process shaping a big part of it, then its importance is valued as high. If the indicator has no profound manifestation over the rapprochement process its importance is valued as low. In the case when an indicator is only important only during a small part of the process, or its prominence during the process was neither substantial nor negligible, then its importance its coded as medium.

3.9. Data Collection

Even though the case study research is not associated exclusively with any type of evidence or data (see for instance Yin, 1981), there are several data collection tactics that have been preferred by the scholars who conduct these types of case studies. Yin (2012: 10) for instance identifies 6 common sources of evidence in case studies. These are: a) direct observations, b) interviews, c) archival records, d) documents, e) participant-observation, and f) physical artifacts. Similarly,

Eisenhardt (1989: 534) states that case studies typically use data collection methods such as interviews, questionnaires, observations, or a combination of these. The current study collects data from three different sources: namely second-hand literature, archives, and interviews.

To begin with, there is an impressive volume of studies on the Greek-Turkish relations. Indeed, the Greek-Turkish conflict, including the Cyprus question, has attracted much attention and a lot has been written on it, covering the entirety of the chronological periods that the current work is interested in. As such, this literature will be used in order to get information that will provide answers to the questions posed. Furthermore, the existing literature also includes memoirs of people who were the protagonists of the rapprochement process, such as, Ismail Cem's book, which includes a section on the Greek-Turkish rapprochement of 1999.

Secondly, the current study uses a variety of historical archives. Newspaper articles are used to identify rapprochement indicators, such as signing of agreements, summit level meetings, and grassroots cooperation. In addition, the way the news is presented in the newspapers will provide a good source on how politicians, the press and people viewed the rapprochement process as it took place. For instance, it is important to know what type of tone the press is using in order to describe the rapprochement process or the kind of vocabulary political leaders use in order to address each other in their public statements.

Newspapers' archives are used for all four case studies. For the 1930s Greek-Turkish rapprochement this research will use mainly Greek newspapers and,

specifically, *Athinaika Nea*, *Elefthero Vima*, *Oikonomikos Taxidromos* and *Kathimerini*. All four of these newspapers have been completely digitalized. The first three are available on www.tovima.gr, under paid subscription and are part of the DOL (Lamprakis Journalistic Organization – Δημοσιογραφικός Οργανισμός Λαμπράκη) Historical Archive, while the fourth is available without subscription on www.kathimerini.gr. The Turkish newspaper that was used as a source for the first case was *Cumhuriyet*, whose archive is available online at www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com under subscription. The second and third case studies use the same Greek newspapers, yet, it should be noted that *Athinaika Nea* was replaced by *Ta Nea* and *Elefthero Vima* was replaced by *To Vima* following the Second World War. In addition, the study also uses data from the Turkish newspaper *Milliyet*, whose archive from 1950 onwards is available on www.milliyet.com.tr. The fourth case study, in addition to the abovementioned newspapers, will also use internet based news resources such as the *Hurriyet Daily News* available at www.hurriyetdailynews.com.

There are two main historical archives that will be reviewed. The first one is the Eleftherios Venizelos archive which is available online by the National Research Foundation's "Eleftherios K. Venizelos" digital archive (<http://www.venizelosarchives.gr/>). The archive includes documents such as personal correspondence, letters, etc, which will be used in the first case study. The second archive is the Turkish General Directorate of State Archives (Devlet Arsivleri Genel Mudurlugu - DAGM), which contains data concerning both the first

and second case studies, while for the period the third and fourth cases cover, the archives of DAGM remain undisclosed.

Other than the data sources mentioned above there are additional supplementary sources that have been used as was needed. These include, but are not limited to: UN documents, available at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/index.shtml>, documents or statements published on the websites of the Greek and Turkish Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Greek National AudioVisual Archive (Εθνικό Οπτικοακουστικό Αρχείο) available at <http://mam.avarchive.gr/portal/>, documents of the Greek Parliament available at www.hellenicparliament.gr and the European Parliament available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/>.

3.10. Scope of Research

The current study contributes to the understanding of a particular phenomenon: rapprochement. The originality of the current work is mainly due to its approach to the study of rapprochement, which is studied in a longitudinal manner rather than an instant in the relations between states. This dissertation will contribute to the better understanding of rapprochement, and provide convincing explanations on why some rapprochements fail while others succeed after initiation.

Although the small number of cases do not allow for generalizations or theory building, the proposed study could constitute a building block for future researchers studying rapprochements processes. Moreover, the research will come

up with original data, and explore new directions in understanding rapprochement, that can be used by future scholars in order to better comprehend the cases that will be studied. Finally, in the following chapters the study will discuss in detail four separate cases of successful and unsuccessful rapprochements, and as such, the case studies here can be incorporated into other databases that could, for example, be used in a quantitative study relating to the rapprochement processes.

3.11. Concluding remarks

The main goal of the methodology chapter was, on the one hand, to provide a description of the main methodologies that the current study will use, and, on the other hand, to set the guidelines upon which the rest of the study will be based on. Each of the next four chapters will examine one case study, and each case study is structured so as a comparison concerning the independent variables, in the comparison chapter, is practicable.

CHAPTER 4

THE 1930 GREEK-TURKISH SUCCESSFUL RAPPROCHEMENT

4.1. Introduction

The aftermath of the war in Asia Minor¹¹ between the Greeks and the Turks created a new reality in the Aegean that both countries had to live with. On the one hand, Greece, the defeated party, had to deal with significant and massive problems that mainly concerned the accommodation of the refugees, a devastated economy, and important political issues. On the other hand, Turkey, the successor to a demised Empire, was a newly founded state whose leaders faced the huge task of reorganizing the whole of society within new, modernizing and western-oriented norms. Apart from their internal problems both Turkey and Greece had to redefine their roles and positions within the post-WWI international arena.

The Lausanne Treaty, that the two states signed in 1923, appeared to be a solid basis upon which the two countries could develop a closer relationship.

¹¹ Asia Minor campaign for the Greeks, War of Independence for the Turks

However, this was not the case. The rapprochement could only come after seven years, in 1930, when Greece and Turkey signed a series of agreements which laid the foundations for an honest and deep relation to exist. The new era of relations between the two countries, which started in 1930, lasted until the Second World War and, as such, is considered a successful case of rapprochement based on the guidelines that were presented in the literature review chapter. The current chapter examines this successful case and analyzes the underlying factors that have played a role in the successful outcome of the rapprochement.

4.2. Historical Background

The agreement signed in Lausanne settled issues that were of primary importance for both parties, such as the mapping of the borderline and the exchange of populations. Moreover, as it will be discussed in detail later, both countries faced significant problems in their internal affairs and had adopted similar foreign policy strategies in order to ensure the states' integrity and security. For all these reasons, it is fair to say that the prevailing conditions of that time were such that an immediate rapprochement between the two states was highly probable and expected. Nevertheless, the initiation of the rapprochement did not happen until the end of the decade.

The reasons that the rapprochement did not occur, in the aftermath of the Asia Minor war, are many. For example, the animosity that the war created and the sheer violence that was used by both sides, was a preventive factor to the

establishment of a friendship between the two states. However, these kinds of factors are difficult to calculate or determine. First and foremost, it is apparent that the problems, arising after the Lausanne's treaty was signed, prevented the two countries from signing bilateral agreements. Concretely, the most important problem was to find a solution that would settle the issue of the properties that the exchanged populations had left behind, as well as the issue of the Istanbul Greeks that had left the city during the war. The solution of these problems became more difficult to solve due to the lack of a strong government in Greece. Problems concerning the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul, as well as, the Pangalos' dictatorship in Greece between 1925-6 further delayed any positive initiatives.

The first important development in the relations between the two countries took place in June of 1925, after a serious deterioration in the Greek-Turkish relations that was caused by the expulsion of Patriarch Constantine VI from the Turkish territory on January 30, 1925 by the Turkish police (Psomiades, 1961). The deadlock that was created was finally resolved after Greece's appeal to the League of Nations (LoN), which softened Turkey's position on the issue. The solution, however, did not come from the LoN, but on the contrary, it was negotiated directly between Turkey and Greece. The discussions that took place ended with the abdication of Patriarch Constantine VI on May 26th¹², and the assurance by the Turkish authorities that the election of a new patriarch would be made in an orderly and proper fashion (Psomiades, 1961).

¹² The date that the abdication was accepted by the Turkish authorities

Having solved the issue of the Patriarch, both Greece and Turkey signed the Ankara Accord on June 21st, 1925. The agreement stated that the 30.000 Greeks who fled from Istanbul, and who did not possess Turkish passports, could not return to Turkey. Instead, within 4 years their domains would be sold off. In return, Greece was granted the right to buy the Muslim domains in Western Thrace, granted that they were need to help cover the needs of refugees. Likewise, Turkey also reserved the right to buy the Greek domains located within her territory (Hatzivassiliou, 1999: 59). After the signing of the agreement, the two counties established normal diplomatic relations and Cevat Bey became the first Turkish appointee to be sent to Greece (Gonlubol and Sar, 1966: 66).

On December 1st, 1925 Turkey and Greece signed a new agreement in Athens, which replaced the one that had been signed in Ankara six months earlier. This agreement also granted Turkey the right to buy the Greek domains within its territory and Greece the right to buy the Muslim domains within its territory (Article 1&2) (for the full text of the agreement can be found at Benaki Museum Archives, Eleftherios Venizelos Archives, folder 047 – 16)¹³. Nonetheless, strong opposition from the refugees, different interpretations and divergences as to the agreements' specifics, the difficulties concerning the realization of the agreements, and the Pangalos' dictatorship in Greece caused a serious deterioration in the Greek-Turkish relations and dissuaded the parties from the application of the agreements¹⁴ (see Anastasiadou, 1982; Hadjivasileiou, 1999).

¹³ Available on line by the National Research Foundation "Eleftherios K. Venizelos" digital archive

¹⁴ It should be noted that Pangalos had also objected the Lausanne Treaty

In general, it is difficult to put a label on the Greek-Turkish relations between 1923 and 1928. It seems that both countries were willing to proceed to a closer relationship; but, the problems dividing them, as well as the complexity of these problems, blocked any efforts toward rapprochement. Anastasiadou (1982: 13) claims that the Turks were more eager to sign a friendship agreement with Greece, independently from the ones that were signed in Ankara and Athens, but the Greeks were more reluctant as they thought that in order for a friendship agreement to acquire meaning, an agreement on the financial issues should be signed first. Such an agreement was not reached until June 1930.

4.3. The Initiation of the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement

Changes in the state of affairs between two countries are not random nor do they happen by chance. Although chance could at times be a factor, it is usually international, political and domestic factors that instigate such changes. The most important of these factors were discussed in the literature review section, thus it is important to see which of these factors were also relevant for the Greek-Turkish rapprochement in the 1930s. The current section will discuss the initiation of the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece by focusing on two different aspects, namely, the procedures that preceded its initiation and the triggers that contributed to its successful commencement.

4.4. Procedures Leading to the Initiation of the Rapprochement

A new era of Greek-Turkish relations was inaugurated in 1930, when a series of agreements between the two parties were signed in June and October, and contributed substantially to the improvement of bilateral relations. The political will for improving bilateral relations had grown stronger since 1928 and, especially, after Eleftherios Venizelos' election as the Prime Minister of Greece in August 1928. Up to that point, and until the signing of the Ankara and Athens agreements in the mid-1920s, there was no progress in the Greek-Turkish relations that is worth mentioning.

The change of leadership, which took place in Greece in the summer of 1928, and more importantly, the changes of political attitudes in both Greece and Turkey that followed, were the most important factors that contributed to the initiation of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement in the 1930s. Venizelos, who had recently returned to politics and took over the leadership of the Liberals' party in May of 1928, became a strong advocate of rapprochement. His intentions vis-à-vis Turkey were clarified during his pre-election speech in the city of Thessaloniki in July 1928, where he stated:

I wish to repeat this evening, that Greece, honestly and without reservations, accepts the peace treaties through which the Great War ended. We wish to ensure not only good neighboring relations with democratic Turkey, but relations that are friendly to the greatest possible degree. We know that she does not have any desires for our territory, and she has to be certain that we don't hold any aspiration for her territory. But [besides] it is obvious that both states will constitute important agents if they manage to adjust their relations on the basis of a warm-hearted understanding, which after all will allow the development of commercial and financial relations in the benefit of both countries....We are ready to sign an agreement of friendship and arbitration, which will be long-term and broad (Elefthero Vima, 23/7/1928).

Venizelos' new approach regarding the Greek-Turkish affairs was a part of his wider foreign policy outlook. During the same speech he noted that he would follow similar political solutions with regards to Greece's relations with Bulgaria, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and with Romania, as he was looking for friendly relations with all these Balkan countries.

Venizelos' speech is important to the rapprochement process because it contributed significantly to the trust building process in two respects. First, he ended any Greek irredentist policies, otherwise known as the Megali Idea. Denouncing any claims for territories that were within the Turkish state's borders was, indeed, a precondition for convincing Turkey about Greece's future objectives. In addition, Venizelos made it known to the Turkish leadership and to the Greek public that Turkey had no aspirations for any of the Greek territories, and hence, tried to eliminate another issue that could reduce trust between the two sides. It should also be pointed out that, apart from its impact on the trust-building process, the confirmation that territorial claims were not part of the agenda eliminated an issue that, even though it was not for negotiation, it was a worrisome concern. Secondly, Venizelos expressed an optimistic view of what he perceived as a desirable status for the Greek-Turkish relations and took some basic steps on how this status could be achieved. His straightforwardness was an assurance of his commitment in the process and, hence, further boosted trust in the process.

In August of 1928, Venizelos won the Greek national elections with a landslide victory, and it was the "first time since 1922 that Greece acquired a strong

government able to shoulder the responsibility of taking far-reaching decisions” (Alexandris, 1992: 174). The concurrent existence of both strong and pro-cooperation governments in Turkey and Greece created a dynamic combination that soon resulted in landmark initiatives. Just ten days after his election, as the new Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos sent a letter to Prime Minister Ismet Inonu analyzing his intentions and explaining his prospects on the Greek-Turkish intentions. As he wrote:

At the moment that the Greek people trusted me, by giving me a strong majority for the next four years, I would like to inform you that my only desire is to contribute to the settlement of the relations between our two countries, through ensuring a strong friendship and through the adoption of a friendship, non-aggression and arbitration agreement, that would be as broad as possible.

I am fully aware of the fact that Turkey has no aspiration for our territories and, in that order, it has been repeatedly stated in public during the election campaign that does not aspire to Turkish territory and accepts the peace treaties, honestly and with no reservations. Therefore, I could not doubt that this agreement for the settlement of our relations abides to the willing of Your Excellency (Alexandris, 1992:175)¹⁵

Venizelos also sent a similar letter to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Rüşti Aras¹⁶. The letters of the Greek Prime Minister to the Turkish

¹⁵ Translated from the French original text with the help of Thomai Iasonidou

¹⁶ Parallel to his Turkish “opening” Venizelos visited Rome (September 23rd) and signed a friendship agreement with Italy (Συνθηκη Φιλίας, Συνδιαλλαγής και Δικαστικού Διακανονισμού). After Rome, Venizelos travelled to Paris straight away (26-29 of September) and reassured the French leaders that Greek-Italian approach did not mean that Greece was changing its stance towards France. Afterwards, the Greek Prime Minister travelled to London (September 30th) in order to convince the British that his foreign policy had good intentions. While in Paris, Venizelos also met with the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Marinkovich, and with the help of France, which did not want to see Greece dragged behind Italy, the two men agreed to normalize the Greek-Yugoslav relations (See the minutes of the February 1934 of the meeting of the Greek political parties’ leaders, text available at Benaki Museum Archives, Eleftherios Venizelos Archives, folder 064 – 45, available on line by the National Research Foundation “Eleftherios K. Venizelos” digital archive also see Svolopoulos, 1992: 213-216)

leaders had trust building effects similar to those in his pre-election speech a few months earlier, yet, their main importance is that they constitute the first positive gesture towards initiating a rapprochement process. Unlike public political speeches that may often be overenthusiastic for domestic consumption reasons, personal correspondence is a much more credible way of communication among political leaders. In addition, Venizelos managed to put pressure on the Turkish leadership, which now had to reciprocate, and in turn, reveal their plans and aspirations as far as the Turkish-Greek affairs were concerned.

The answer from Ismet Inonu arrived a month later, on September 28th, 1928. In this letter Inonu agreed with Venizelos that the future of the two states should be based on mutual understanding and honest friendship. The willingness for a cooperative solution to the Greek-Turkish issues was also demonstrated earlier in September when, during a speech given by Inonu in the city of Malatya on September 13th of 1928, he said that if the two sides were approaching each other with good intentions it would be possible for them to resolve the problems that separated them. He added that the Turkish leadership was under the impression that Venizelos wanted to recommence honest negotiations concerning the unresolved issues, and stated that he would write a letter to Venizelos as soon as he returned to Ankara (cited in Gonlubol and Sar, 1996: 66; Demirozu, 2008: 315).

At this point it is essential to stress the similarities between the Greek and Turkish maneuvers, both jointly leading to the initiation of official negotiations between Greece and Turkey. As it is evident in Inonu and Venizelos' public

speeches, both men made it clear that not only did they *not* have hostile intentions, but also that they did not perceive each other as enemies, but as possible strategic allies. Similarities concerning the language and expectations also exist when the correspondence is compared. As discussed in the literature review chapter strong and positive statements by political leaders is, apart from strong indicators of relations' improvement, an important step towards changing the negative perceptions of one party vis-à-vis the other.

The two governments seemed to agree on what their future relationship should resemble and the negotiations between Greece and Turkey resumed in December of 1928. The negotiations lasted for two years until June of 1930. Yet, despite the goodwill, the negotiations that followed were particularly hard, making it difficult to estimate whether the outcome of the talks would have resulted in an agreement or not (see Elefthero Vima, 15/12/1928)¹⁷. Mistrust, politics, and refugees' objections¹⁸ contributed not only to delaying the conclusion of the talks, but they also brought a halt to the negotiations. The relations between Greece and Turkey hit rock bottom in the summer of 1929, when maneuvering of the Turkish Army along

¹⁷ According to the Greek press of the time, most of the Turkish press was expecting that the talks would reach to a satisfactory solution concerning the issues that divided the Greeks and the Turks. The only exception was Cumhuriyet newspaper which considered that the talks were pointless as long as Greece did not implement her obligations, meaning her obligations from former treaties and agreement.

¹⁸ For instance, during the negotiations "in May 1929, the Turkish government decided that the property that belonged to the Greek Orthodox who were formerly of Ottoman nationality but were sent to Greece in the population exchanged be determined, evaluated and purchased. The decision said that the Turkish government had the right of purchasing property of this kind" (see Bilgic, 2006: 29). In addition, reaching a positive agreement was hindered by the reaction of the refugees in Greece who strongly opposed the rumors that the fortunes of the exchanges populations would be expunged by balancing each other (see Anastasiadou, 1992: 22).

the Greek border and the reconditioning of the naval ship “Yavuz,” made the atmosphere very tense (Bilgic, 2006; also for a narrative of the negotiations progression based on the archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs see Hadjivasileiou, 1999: 60-65).

Nonetheless, as of December the situation started to change. Turkey’s realization of Venizelos’ sincerity was a catalyst towards improvement (Karamanlis, 1995: 83). In addition, the Greek political leadership was convinced that Turkey did not pose a threat to Greece’s security as the former had no aspiration to occupy any Greek territory. During a speech in the Greek Parliament some months before the final agreement, Venizelos, after repeating Greece’s commitment to the international treaties stated:

While I was in Lausanne...I had the good fortune to come to direct contact with the leader of the Turkish Government Ismet Pasa. When the discussion concerned the Western Thrace for which autonomy was requested he [Ismet Pasa] told me “Mr. Venizelos you can be certain that not only we shall not risk war in order to expand towards Europe, but even if the Balkan countries bestowed one part of their lands for us to expand, we would thank them for the donation, but we would turn it down because it is not to our benefit”

I don’t have only this reassurance...I also have another proof. You know that when I went to Lausanne to negotiate the peace treaties and Turkey stated her claims towards Greece...while until the time of the Great War Turkey claimed the sovereignty of the Asia Minor coast adjacent islands, when she stated her claims she asked to remain under her sovereignty only Imvros and Tenedos, and she raised no other claims for the other island (Elefthero Vima, 11/2/1930)

Venizelos’ speech in the Parliament, apart from openly suggesting that his personal relations with Inonu were an important factor to the process, largely explains why the negotiations did not fail, but instead led to the initiation of the rapprochement process in 1930. It was the commitment of the political leadership at

the top level which resisted difficulties and stood by the political spirit and planning that prevailed in September of 1928.

The actions of the political leadership at the top levels were the driving force behind the initiation of the rapprochement. As is illustrated in Table 1 these actions basically constitute a step by step progress, beginning with positive statement and gestures and concluding with the signing a series of agreements in 1930, which marks the beginning of the rapprochement process. In the following pages, the discussion will focus on the incentives that provide the answer to the question of: “Why did the political men who were involved in this process decided to take these decisions?”

Table 4.1.

Action/ Event	Venizelos pre-election speech	Venizelos wins Greek elections	Venizelos letter to Turkish leaders	Inonu response letter	Commencement of negotiations	Leaders actively support negotiation
Time	July 1928	August 1928	August 1928	September 1928	December 1928	December 1928 - June 1930
Effect	First step - building trust	Strong Greek Government - GT Pro-Cooperation Governments	Positive Gesture - Trust building	Reciprocation – Positive gesture	Effort to touch to real problems	Negotiations continue and lead to agreement

4.5. Main Incentives for the Initiation of the 1930s Rapprochement

Up to this point it has been made clear that political will and especially the decisive stance of the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers were not only the driving force behind the initiation of the Greek-Turkish 1930s rapprochement, but also the sole reason for its successful commencement. Considering that political leaders are rational players seeking to maximize benefits for their countries and constituencies, strong incentives dictating a cooperative political behavior prevailed from 1928 to 1930. In order to explore these incentives the following discussion will employ the theoretical assumptions analyzed, in length, in the literature review chapter.

Undoubtedly, the concerns that both Turkey and Greece had for their national security were the primary motive in dictating the political will for rapprochement. To a great extent, Greece and Turkey were acting within a similar international environment, whose main characteristics were the lack of balance of power, and the existence of many players who were trying to take a leading role. Also in the Balkans, states such as Yugoslavia (also used for Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) started to see themselves as the new key players, while others, such as Bulgaria, were holding persisting irredentist ideas and perceived themselves as the “losers” of the post-war distributions. As such, the possibility of a Greek-Turkish rapprochement that included political, financial, and military/defense cooperation offered the Turkish and Greek politicians an opportunity to balance the playing field.

In that sense, classical political realism provides the strongest explanation for the 1930s rapprochement. This is hardly surprising taking into consideration that real politik became the dominant understanding of international politics during the interwar period. The search for national security was a major factor influencing political decisions and dictating foreign policy options. Especially for Greece, the need to normalize relations with Turkey was urgent as the former had failed to normalize relations with the rest of its neighbors across its northern frontiers¹⁹. Security was a major concern for Turkey as well, as not only did it share borders with most of the Great Powers of the time, but, in addition, it had unresolved business with them such (e.g. the Mosul question with Britain).

Apart from the pressure that the international system was putting on political leaders, the domestic factors strengthening the political will for rapprochement should also be taken into consideration. The role of domestic politics in a state's foreign policy has caused much debate in the field of international relations, and has mainly been advocated by the *Innenpolitik* approach. *Innenpolitik* scholars, who generally belong to the liberal or defensive realist schools of thought, have supported the primacy of domestic politics (Primat der Innenpolitik) vis-à-vis the primacy of foreign policy (Primat der Aussenpolitik)

¹⁹ On the one hand, Greek-Bulgarian relations had worsened after the Greek parliament did not proceed to the ratification of the Politis-Kalfop protocol that was signed in Geneva on September 29, 1924 and arranged minority issues between the two countries. Relations were further worsened following a border incident in 1925, when the killing of two Greek soldiers drove dictator Pangalos to order an invasion of a Bulgarian border town (see Vlahos, 2006a). On the other hand, relations with Yugoslavia were also strained, as the latter had denounced the Greek-Serbian alliance Treaty of 1913, while the series of agreements that were signed in 1926 between Greece and Yugoslavia met the reaction of the Greek political elite (Siousiouras, 2003)

(on this discussion see for instance Zakaria, 1992; Jacobsen, 1996). Nonetheless, as far as the initiation of the 1930 Greek-Turkish rapprochement is concerned, *innenpolitik* offers a weak explanation. Instead, realism, and in particular neoclassical realism, which accepts domestic politics' impact but only as a secondary factor, provides a more convincing theoretical framework. Indeed, in the Greek-Turkish rapprochement domestic conditions offered only supplementary motivation for the initiation of the rapprochement, while the main incentives were due to security concerns.

Regardless, it should be mentioned that the quest for political stability and the need for social reforms in both Turkey and Greece required a period of peace, thus making rapprochement even more desirable. Stability in Greek-Turkish relations would allow the policy-makers to proceed with important changes within their respective countries. Pressures due to domestic factors were more urgent for Turkey, whose leaders had concluded that their ultimate goal would be to elevate their country to the level of contemporary civilization (see Heper, 1985; 48). Thus, the late 1920s would constitute for Turkey a decade of groundbreaking reforms ranging from constitutional amendments to social transformations (for an analytical account of these reforms see Lewis, 2002; Rustow, 1955; Tachau, 1984; Ahmad, 2000)²⁰. Greece experienced a high level of political conflict in the 1920s (Liberals vs. Royalists), while military involvement with politics also persisted after the end of the Asia Minor war (Karamanlis, 1985: 24).

²⁰ Indeed, the variety of changes was such that scholars have characterized the Turkish revolution as cultural (Yalman, 1972), social (Mardin, 1997), or political (Ozbudun, 1981).

As far as financial issues are concerned, it is hard to estimate whether, or not, they had a positive impact on rapprochement. Greek researchers tend to agree that Turkey was focusing most of its attention on economic benefits, while Greece was focusing on territorial integrity. The argument supporting this claim is that at their opening speeches before the signing of the October 1930 agreements, besides the mutual complimentary remarks, it is clear that the main issue for Turkey was to avoid new debts, while Venizelos' speech was more focused on guaranteeing the status quo (Anastasiadou, 1992: 39).

Apart from the abovementioned motivations, the role of the refugees as a "veto-player" to the initiation of the rapprochement must also be mentioned as a significant counter-motivation. In Greece the refugees, who were supporting Venizelos, became very displeased with the provisions of the June 1930 agreement. Their dissatisfaction was raised in the parliament by refugee parliamentarians during the heated debate regarding the Greek-Turkish agreement that took place in late June.

4.6. Breaking Down the Rapprochement Process

The agreement between Greece and Turkey that arranged once and for all the issue of the exchanged populations' fortunes and domains, was signed in Ankara on June 10th, 1930, almost two years after Venizelos' first letter to Ismet Inonu and Tefvik Rüştü Aras. After this economic agreement, the most important obstacle to the improvement of the Greek-Turkish relations ceased to exist and the

road towards an honest and strong rapprochement was open. Even though the intention of this agreement was no more than to solve the economic issues between the two parts, it paved the way for the initiation of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement.

a. Summit level communication

The agreements signed in October 1930 covered a large spectrum of the bilateral relations, as they touched upon financial issues and issues of foreign and domestic affairs. As such, a strong basis was laid in place from which to build a solid and sincere friendship. In the following years, the progress of Greek-Turkish relations was indeed sharp and the two states experienced a decade of cooperation and collaboration. At moments the relationship that developed was so strong that actually surprises, or even, overwhelms the researchers.

The change in attitudes began after the signing of the financial agreement in June 1930. Until Venizelos visited Ankara on 27th October, the change was such that the press wrote “never again had the government of the Turkish Republic welcome someone in such a celebratory atmosphere, as that of the day of the Venizelos and Michalakopoulos’ visit” (*Elefthero Vima*, 2/11/1930). Even the Greek press that stood in opposition acknowledged the unprecedented warmth that the Greek delegates received. The Greek press noted that “the Greek delegation received the warmest welcome by the Turks” while it quoted Revfik Rüşti saying “the two states united will constitute a major power” (*Kathimerini*, 28/10/1930).

The enthusiastic atmosphere did not fade away quickly. A year later Ismet Inonu accompanied by Turkish ministers reciprocated the visit, and arrived in Athens on October 3rd, 1931. The scenes that unraveled in the Greek streets, all the way from the port to the hotel where the Turkish delegation settled were indeed extraordinary (Cumhuriyet, 4/10/1931). Thousands of Greek citizens rushed to the streets in order to welcome the Turkish officials. The press made the following comments:

A historic day rose today for the Greek capital city; for the Greek soul. Two flags that were covered with so much blood, two battle-hardened flags, that sometimes were raised to the win and other times were lowered to the loss, that had become rags from the fights, the hostility and the hate that separated the two nations, wave today in the attic sky new as being born again by the ashes, untouched, smiley, happy and reconciled, symbols of the new day that rises to the life of the two nations. Thus, Athens started today a celebration of innovation. For the first time in its history the dawn found her bedighted by Turkish flags (Athinaika Nea, 4/4/1931, see also similar comments from Kathimerini 4/4/1931)

In general, meetings between officials became more frequent than before, while personal relations between Greek and Turkish leaders also improved. Especially the relationship Inonu had with Venizelos was quite friendly and personal. A very good example of this closeness is an incident that took place in late May 1932, when on their way to Rome, Inonu accompanied by Tevfik Rüştü Aras stopped by Athens. As their ship had to stay at the port of Piraeus for one and a half hours the Turkish officials expressed their wish to see Venizelos and Michalakopoulos. However, even though the two Greek politicians had scheduled this meeting, PM Venizelos felt ill and had to stay at home. When Ismet Inonu was informed about Venizelos' indisposition, he insisted on visiting him and stated "it is

not possible for me to come to Piraeus, learn that my friend Venizelos is ill and stay unconcerned". The Turkish officials stayed at Venizelos' place for more than half an hour, during which time they agreed that the rapprochement was beneficial to both parties. They also discussed financial issues and issues of disarmament, and arrived at the conclusion that the views of both countries coincide (Athinaika Nea, 23/5/1932). On their way back from Rome the Turkish leaders stopped by Greece again (Athinaika Nea, 1/6/1932).

It is also important to note that the atmosphere during the official meetings was also very warm and friendly. The minutes of the October 1931 meeting among the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs show that the discussion took place among friends and within a cooperative spirit (Benaki Museum Archives, Eleftherios Venizelos Archives, folder 358 – 79). At first, the Turkish officials analyze Turkey's relations with the Great Powers. Afterwards the discussion revolved around the Balkan issues and the discussants agreed that the Greek-Turkish understanding, although special, it should be open to the rest of the Balkan states. The discussion shows that the trust that the Turkish leaders have towards the Greek leaders and vice-versa, allows the discussants to adopt a, more or less, common roadmap for the Balkans.

Neither the spirit of cooperation nor the rapprochement process was disturbed by the change of government in Greece. Indeed, the Greek Ambassador in Ankara Polychroniadis informed the Turkish Government that the newly elected Greek Government would continue to support the Greek-Turkish friendship

(DAGM 030.10/255.715.14.). Greece was stepping into a period of political instability. People's Party (Laiko Komma) headed by Panagis Tsaldaris won the elections on September 25, 1932, and managed to form a government after a second round of elections on March 5, 1933 (Vakalopoulos, 1993: 395). What is important is that during the election's campaigns no political leaders argued against the Greek-Turkish rapprochement (Anastasiadou: 1992).

On September 10, 1933 the Greek Prime Minister visited Ankara where he received a warm welcome (Athinaika Nea, 11/9/1933). Official visits continued frequently. For instance, Ismet Inonu visited Athens on several occasions, and Greek press always regarded his visits from a positive point of view (See Athinaika Nea, 29/12/1936; Athinaika Nea, 24/5/1937). The new Turkish Prime Minister, Celal Bayar, also visited Athens in order to sign another Greek-Turkish agreement. On this occasion the Greek press commented on the fostering relations stating that "the unprecedented fact with the Greek-Turkish reconciliation is that it gets stronger as time passes by" (Athinaika Nea, 27/4/1933).

b. Signing of agreements

First and foremost, the June 10th, 1930 Agreement that leaders signed in Ankara ushered in a new round of rapprochement process, thus carries a special importance. This agreement decisively settled important issues between Turkey and Greece, which had been a serious impediment to developing any type of cooperation between the two states. With the Articles 1 & 2 the estate and property of the Muslims and Greeks, which had been abandoned by the exchanged

populations, passed on to the ownership of Greece and Turkey respectively. The articles 10-13 concerned the issue of the Greek population in Istanbul, while the Articles 14-17 arranged the property issues of the Western Thrace Muslims. The articles 20-21 were also important they held as Greece liable to pay 425.000 English Liras, to Turkey (For the full text of the Agreement in Turkish see Cumhuriyet 11/6/1930, also on the Ankara Agreement see Anastasiadou, 1992: 47-48; Gioltsoglou, 2006: 654-660, Firat, 2008: 346-347).

The agreement caused bitterness among large portions of the Greek populace, the refugees, who saw their dream of ever being reimbursed for their lost properties ending. Also the opposition severely criticized the final agreement, and condemned the Prime Minister Venizelos for giving up too much in order to achieve the financial agreement. On June 24, the discussion for the ratification of the treaty begun in the Greek parliament, and the refugee members of the parliament, attacked Venizelos verbally for the agreement he made (On the discussion see newspaper Kathimerini June 25, 1930; for some of the statements that were made by the refugee parliamentarians see Kathimerini June 25, 1930)²¹.

In October 1930, during Venizelos' visit to Ankara the two parts signed a friendship agreement that constituted the capstone of the rapprochement's positive

²¹ Venizelos knew beforehand that the Agreement would spoil his ties to the refugees. As he had pointed out the loss of their vote would be less painful for him than their destruction. As Mavrogordatos (1983) points out Venizelos "was willing to risk such pain because he was convinced that the question of the compensation of the refugees should be terminated once and for all. Otherwise, the country would be pushed to economic bankruptcy and civil war" (p.207). Indeed part of the refugee vote left Venizelism, and even supported the Communist party which at the time "demanded the ultimate in terms of demagoguery: both full compensation and total cancellation of all refugee debts, as well as abolition of the refugee rents!" (p. 220)

development. The Friendship, Neutrality, Reconciliation and Arbitration Agreement (Σύμφωνο Φιλίας, Ουδέτερότητας, Διαλλάγης και Διαιτησίας – Dostluk, Tarafsizlik, Uzlasma ve Hakemlik Antlasması), obliged the two countries not to sign any political or economic agreements that would turn against the other, while they would have to solve their differences at the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Hague (Art. 1). Moreover, according to article 2, each part was obliged to remain impartial in the case that the other part was attacked by a third country (See Anastasiadou, 1992: 49-50; Gioltsoglou, 2006: 660-661, Firat, 2008: 347-348).

Apart from the friendship agreement, Turkey and Greece also signed a “Residency Agreement” (Σύμφωνο Εγκατάστασης) according to which the citizens of the signatory parties were capable of entering freely, travelling and residing at the territory of the other party, without being subjected to any kind of limitations, other than the limitations that the natives of that state are or will be subjected to (for more information on the content and the meaning of this agreement see Gioltsoglou, 2006: 663-665).

Greece and Turkey continued their close cooperation with an unreduced zeal even after Venizelos lost the Greek national elections. During the new Greek Prime Minister Panayis Tsaldaris’ visit to Turkey, in September 1933 (For a detailed schedule of Tsaldaris’ visit as well as his meetings with Turkish officials see DAGM 030.10/255.717.3), he concluded with his Turkish counterpart an Agreement of Sincerity (Samimi Anlaşma Belgesi) which aimed at increasing both

states' security vis-à-vis the threat of the revisionist Bulgaria (Firat, 2008: 349). According to the Article 1 the two states mutually guaranteed the inviolability of their borders (Elefthero Vima, 15 September 1933; also a complementary agreement of the September 1933 and the October 1930 agreements were signed by Celal Bayar and Metaxas in Athens on April 17, 1938, see Elefthero Vima 28 April 1938). Moreover, on December 22, 1933 and October 10, 1934 Turkey and Greece signed two compensation agreements (Συμφωνίες Συμψηφισμού – Takas Antlaşması).

The aforesaid bilateral agreements were not the only important agreements that Greece and Turkey signed in this specific period. There were also a set of multilateral agreements that bind Turkey and Greece together. Thus, they were immensely important for Greek-Turkish cooperation. In that sense, the signing of the Balkan Pact was the most important development affecting the course of relations among the Balkan states. The idea that the Balkan states should form a type of alliance was nothing new. In fact it preceded the Greek-Turkish rapprochement. The seeds planted in 1929, when during the Global Peace Congress in Athens (Παγκόσμιο Συνέδριο Ειρήνης – Evrensel Barış Kongresi), Greece's former Prime Minister Papanastasiou proposed such a plan (Firat, 2008: 350). His ideas were accepted as the separation between revisionist and pro-status quo states, made such an agreement very attractive to all Balkan States (Yilmaz, 2008: 204).

During the next years, a series of conferences took place, starting in Athens on October 5, 1930, with the participation of Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania,

Albania and Yugoslavia. It took another three years and three more conferences before four of these countries (Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania) finally signed an agreement and established the Balkan Entente (Βαλκανικό Σύμφωνο – Balkan Entente) on February 9, 1934 (Cumhuriyet, 10/2/1934; also for the details on the conferences that preceded the signing of the Balkan Entente see Gonhubol and Sar, 1996: 99-101).

The February agreement that was finally signed by Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Romania, aimed at establishing peace in the region and the preservation of the status quo, through mutual guarantee of the signatories' borders. Nonetheless the fact that Bulgaria, from which the agreement was actually meant to protect, was not part of the deal, created further issues and soon both the Greek and the Turkish governments rushed to clarify that the agreement was binding only in the case that a signatory was attacked by another Balkan state, and not just any other state (see Koliopoulos, 2002:305-307). Bulgaria, however, joined the Balkan Entente on July 31, 1938 (Athinaika Nea, 31/7/1938).

c. Military cooperation

During the first rapprochement, military cooperation mainly involved signing of agreements for the purpose of reassuring the other party that any emergent dispute will be solved through peaceful means. In that sense there were very few occasions when military cooperation took place on the field, just as in the case of the 1999 rapprochement whereby Greece and Turkey would common military training and organize joint forces under NATO.

The first step towards building a common understanding of the military affairs was taken during Venizelos' visit to Turkey, in October 1930. Turkey and Greece on this specific occasion signed the Protocol for the limitation of naval armaments. Hatzivassiliou (2007: 89) argues that the main driving force behind the naval protocol was:

the realization that both were conservative states, committed to the status quo in the Balkans. Since they were no longer divided by territorial disputes, they had an interest in avoiding an expensive naval race - and in the interwar years it was widely held that an 'arms race' was not only a source of financial difficulties, but also one of the actual causes of wars.

The signatories to the protocol agreed to avoid ordering or buying naval military vessels. In case of a new order of such equipment, the buyer had the responsibility to make his intentions known to the other side six months ahead of time (Elefthero Vima, 31/10/1930). Military cooperation became stronger after the signing of the Balkan Pact of 1934. Few months after the Pact was signed the Greek Minister of Military Affairs visited Turkey and met with Turkish officials and military officers. The Greek press noted that the trip gave Turks and Greeks a chance to elaborate on military cooperation (Athinaika Nea, 9/5/1934).

Furthermore, visits between military men were not unusual. For instance, in September 1935 part of the Greek fleet went to Istanbul, while in December 1936, part of the Turkish fleet arrived in the port of Athens. The Turkish fleet was carrying the Turkish Admiral Sukru Okan (Elefthero Vima, 4/12/1936). Likewise, in June 1937 the Turkish battleship "Hamidiye" carrying Turkish cadets stopped at the Faliro port in Athens. During its stay in Athens the commander of the ship visited the city and met with Greek officers, while he also laid a wreath at the statue

of the Unknown Soldier. In addition the Turkish cadets and officers visited the Greek Naval Academy (To Vima, 6/6/1937).

d. Economic cooperation

Apart from the political level and bilateral relations, economic ties became stronger as well. On the one hand, economic benefits were the immediate outcome of the June 1930 agreement, especially for Turkey. Greece benefited mainly by the commercial agreement on the issues of importing brandy and soap. The same agreement benefited Turkey as far as animal taxation was concerned (Anastasiadou, 1992: 60-61). The Greek press supporting Venizelos also saw the commercial agreement as an opportunity to refresh their commercial relations (Oikonomikos Taxidromos, 2/11/1930, front-page. The same article also provides a short assessment on what Greece benefited from the commercial agreement).

On the other hand, good relations that the rapprochement built perhaps came back to create better conditions for strengthening economic bonds between the two countries. One of the most important of these developments was the foundation of the Turkish-Greek Bureau of Commerce (Ελληνοτουρκικός Εμπορικός Σύνδεσμος – Türk -Yunan Ticaret Bürosu) in Istanbul, in May 1934 (Firat, 2008: 350). The two states went on and signed a series of commercial agreements in the 1930s, such as the agreement in Athens in May 1933 (Oikonomikos Taxidromos, 7/5/1933), the agreement in September 1935 (Oikonomikos Taxidromos, 29/9/1935), and the agreement in May 1938 (Oikonomikos Taxidromos, 6/6/1938). All these agreements had the goal of creating better conditions in order for the commerce

between Turkey and Greece to develop further. Nonetheless, this was not an easy task regardless of the good will from both sides. It is clear in Table 4.2. that the Greek-Turkish commerce remained more or less unchanged in terms of the value of exchanged goods (Data is taken from the speech of Mr Pesmatzoglou, President of the Greek-Turkish commercial Organization (Bureau of Commerce), Oikonomikos Taxidromos, 8/5/1939).

Table 4.2.

	Import (from Turkey)		Export (to Turkey)	
	Thousand tons	Million Drachmas	Thousand tons	Million Drachmas
1934	156	253	3	51
1935	96	217	5	61
1936	94	177	3	40
1937	67	202	5	55
1938	47	273	6	55

Economic cooperation also took further boost from the Balkan Pact. As such, the heads of the Balkan Banks held a meeting in Athens in order to discuss ways to promote economic cooperation between the Balkan countries, while there were similar meetings concerning tourism and merchant shipping (Elefthero Vima, 16/2/1937).

e. Statements made by officials and good will gestures

On several occasion Greek and Turkish officials made statements that confirmed the atmosphere of strong cooperation and trust that prevailed between

the two states. A characteristic example of such statements is Kemal Atatürk's address to the Grand National Assembly on November 1, 1930, after the signing of the Friendship Agreements. Atatürk stated:

I am particularly pleased with the official visits to Ankara of the Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs' Minister of our neighbor and friend Greece. The higher interests of Turkey and Greece have completely ceased to run in opposite directions. The sincere friendship of these two countries provides security and strength for both of them. The documents, which contract the new principles of the new period beginning between the two republics, have been presented for our final approval (as cited in Demirozu, 2008: 323-324)

Apart from statements, a special reference should be made to some important events that are indicative of all the aforementioned developments in the Greek-Turkish relations, ensuing the 1930's agreements. In late 1930²² Venizelos sent a letter of recommendation to the Nobel Prize committee and proposed the Turkish President for the Peace Nobel Prize (full text of the letter is available at Benaki Museum Archives, Eleftherios Venizelos Archives, folder 283 – 71). In June 1933, after the assassination attempt against Venizelos life, İnönü sent a very affable telegram sending his best wishes to Venizelos (copy of the telegram is available at Benaki Museum Archives, Eleftherio Venizelos Archives, folder 348 – 106). Finally, when Atatürk died, the Greek press made extensive spaces in their front-pages to describe the tragic event with sorrow²³. They also referred to Atatürk's friendly feelings towards Greece and his contribution to the Greek-Turkish rapprochement (*Athinaika Nea*, 11/11/1938). The Greek Prime Minister

²² Anastasiadou assumes the date could range from December 1930 to January 1931

²³ The comment refers to *Kathimerini*, *Elefthero Vima*, and *Athinaika Nea*

went to Ankara to attend the funeral, while he was followed by a Greek military contingent that joined the parade (Athinaika Nea, 21/11/1938).

f. Rapprochements' influence on the societal level

In the case of the 1930 rapprochement the attitude of the society is of special importance for two specific reasons. On the one hand, it was less than a decade that the two states had fought a deadly war during which many people lost their lives, their loved ones and their properties. On the other hand, the refugees that the war in Asia Minor created had seen their hopes of return or compensation shattered by the 1930 agreement. Thus, it is very interesting to examine the way the Greek and Turkish nations reacted to the rapprochement process.

It is difficult to understand the way public opinion in both countries perceived the rapprochement. However, several references in the press exhibits that people were then very positive and supportive of the rapprochement process. For instance, on the occasion of Ismet Inonu's visit to Athens in late May 1937, the Greek press wrote, "The Greek Public opinion joyfully salutes the Prime Minister of a friendly and ally state, considering itself blissful to host, even for a short amount of time, Mr. Ismet Inonu, the architect of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement" (Athinaika Nea, 24/5/1937). On another occasion, when Tevfik Rüşti Aras, who on his way back from Paris where he was negotiating the issue of Alexandretta, stopped by Greece, the press wrote:

The Greek people feel particularly contended to host again in the capital city such a loved contributor to the Greek-Turkish cooperation and the Balkan understanding. The special bonds of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs to this country and his frequent trip to it made him so well-known and

sympathetic that the Greek public opinion considers him as being one of them (Athinaika Nea, 29/12/1926).

In addition, there are three more strong indicators of public's support for the rapprochement process. The first one is the warm welcome that Greek and Turkish officials received when they visited the other party. Ismet Inonu's visit to Athens in 1931, for example, became a cause of celebration for the Greek people. The second indicator is that the opposition parties never contested the Greek-Turkish rapprochement in Greece. Thus, there seems to have been no significant parts of the society that opposed the rapprochement process. The third indicator is a telegraph that the Greek Union of War Invalids²⁴, sent to Ismet Inonu while he was stopping by Greece in June 1932 for a short stay. In the telegraph the representatives of the Union expressed their warm feelings towards Inonu and their hope that the Balkan Entente would soon become a reality (GASM 030.10/254.714.4).

Finally, as far as communication between the Turkish and Greek societies is concerned, it should be pointed out that student exchanges between the two states took place (Anastasiadou, 1992), while sports events between Greek and Turkish teams were organized (See for example Athinaika Nea, 3/7/1931 for an article concerning the cancelation of such an event where there is also a reference on the good relations between Greece and Turkey in the sports section) Turkish professors visited Athens University for its centenary, while Greek professors also visited Turkish Universities (see DAGM 030.10/256.721.26; DAGM 030.18.01.02/73.28.7). Meetings also included groups of professionals, such as

²⁴ Ένωση Αναπήρων Πολέμου Ολοκής Ανικανότητας & των Φίλων της Ειρήνης

Table 4.3.

Rapprochement Process			
Indicator	<u>Main events</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Importance</u>
Summit level meetings	October 1930 Venizelos' visit, October 1931 Inonu's visit, September 1933 Tsaldaris visit	High	High
Agreements Signed	June 1930 Economic agreement, October 1930 friendship agreement, September 1933 Sincerity agreement 1934 Balkan Entente	High	High
Military cooperation	Mainly in the form of guaranteeing agreements, exchanges also take place	High	High
Economic cooperation	Cooperation strengthened, agreements signed, foundations of institutions (Bureau of commerce)	High	Medium
Statements/Gestures	Several statements confirming the good will/atmosphere take place, several good will gestures from both sides	High	Medium
Societal level	Grassroots exchanges, support from public opinion and media	High	High

press representatives (see DAGM 030.10/256.270.29. for a telegraph from Mr. Zarifis president of the Greek Press Representatives' Union to Ismet Inonu).

4.7. Assessment of the Greek Turkish rapprochement

The discussion on the rapprochement process clearly indicates that the progression of Greek-Turkish relations in 1930s was not only successful in terms of duration, but also it delivered a positive impact on all of the indicators that were examined. This success was not the outcome of a single cause, but, on the contrary, a number of different factors contributed to the positive outcome of the process. In the following pages the discussion will focus on the independent variables that were introduced in the literature review chapter, and examine the role of each of those variables in the successful outcome of the rapprochement process.

- **Impact of the international system on national security**

The structure of the international system was favorable to the initiation of the rapprochement process as it provided Turkey and Greece with strong incentives for a closer relationship. It goes without doubt that developments in the international system facilitated a strong rationale for both states to pursue the permanence of the rapprochement process: thus, it positively contributed to the success of the process. A major development in the international arena was the adoption of revisionist policies by Germany and Italy during the 1930s, which made the Greek-Turkish rapprochement and, also, the Balkan Entente valuable. The division of Europe and the Great Powers into two opposing camps, brought a wave of uncertainty concerning the future, and as such, the significance of alliances increased considerably.

Apart from the structural changes in the international arena, special reference must be made as to how the Greek-Turkish rapprochement process altered power balance in the Balkan Peninsula, generating beneficial systemic changes on a regional level. Consequently, the most important development concerning the two states' security arrived with the establishment of the Balkan Entente in 1934. The Entente itself is considered as a direct outcome of the new reality that the Greek-Turkish rapprochement created in the Balkans. After 1930 the two countries combined their powers towards the creation of a Balkan Agreement that would include as many Balkans states as possible. As Venizelos, in 1931, put it:

The importance of the Greek-Turkish agreement is special. We are in the position to say that the Balkan Union started through the Greek-Turkish friendship. Nothing divides the two states any more. We would proceed as far as possible, and if the rest of the Balkan states were ready then we could proceed very far. In any case, we are ready to accept to our union any other Balkan state, without any exceptions (Mpenaki Museum Archives, Eleftherios Venizelos Archives, folder 358 – 79)

Similarly, in an article of Tevfik Rüşdü, which he wrote for the Greek newspaper "Elefthero Vima", the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs noted that the Greek-Turkish friendship should build the first momentum needed for the realization of a broader understanding, which would include the Balkan states, and this union would, in turn, be a first step towards a union of European states (Elefthero Vima, 7/10/1931).

Apart from the Balkan entente of 1934, the rapprochement created the conditions that heartened Turkey and Greece to coordinate their policies and defense structures against common threats, with Bulgaria and Italy being the important of them. This was mainly achieved through the agreement that was

signed in Ankara on September 14, 1933. With this agreement the two countries mutually guaranteed their common borders. The agreement at this capacity was about relegating the Bulgarian threat, at least, at the beginning, making reference only to diplomatic or political responsibilities. However, in October 1937, the General Staffs of both countries signed the Ankara Protocols, which concerned the common fortification and defense of Edirne/Adrianoupolis (Nikolaou, 1996: 358-360).

- State identity

The alteration of state identity was clearer on the Greek side and it had already begun before the initiation of the rapprochement process. The termination of the “Megali Idea” by Venizelos was a major alteration in Greek foreign policy and definitely provided further space for future cooperation between Turkey and Greece. After the initiation of the rapprochement there were further positive changes in the way the two countries viewed themselves and the other. These positive changes made the rapprochement process a much more natural and stable one. In short, the shaping of new state identities that started before the initiation of the rapprochement, but also continued during the process, positively influenced the success of the first Greek-Turkish rapprochement.

Specifically, there are two main assumptions concerning state identity that are equally true for both Turkey and Greece. On the one hand, each of these two states started considering itself as a pro-status quo state, at least as much as their

common borders were concerned. This was made clear by official statements that were constantly making clear that both Greece and Turkey had no aspirations on each other's land, or the land of any other Balkan state. On the other hand, Greece and Turkey managed to develop such a state identity that allowed them to view the other side as a valuable friend, rather than a possible threat. The two states had no reservations about trusting each other or acting in harmony. The level of trust and cooperation was back then high enough that the relation can be described as a "security community", borrowing the term from Constructivists' theoretical toolset (Wendt 1994; Bellamy, 2004; Adler and Barnett, 1998).

- Costs and benefits equilibrium

Concerning the cost/benefit analysis, high costs of a possible deterioration of relations, and considerable benefits from the rapprochement significantly strengthened the incentives for each party to seek for the continuation of the process. Apart from the issues of security, benefits of the rapprochement mainly concern the improvement of living conditions for the minorities. However, it is itself a benefit that Turkey and Greece could construct a discourse according to which they committed themselves to the peaceable and mutually acceptable ways of sorting out emergent disharmony of interests. Nonetheless, there was a complete lack of considerable costs of continuing the rapprochement process.

The frequent visits on the highest level, trustful environment and the mutual will for cooperation created a condition that was highly beneficial for both states.

The first to benefit from such a political proximity was the members of the minorities²⁵. A direct outcome of the rapprochement process was that the living conditions for the minorities improved on both sides. The new spirit in the relations was manifest in the treatment of the minorities. Both Greek and the Turkish governments adopted a broader-minded attitude towards their respective minorities (Alexandris, 1992: 180). Indicative of the new attitude was the visit of Venizelos to the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul on November 1, 1930. This was the first time in history that a Greek Prime Minister was allowed to visit the Patriarchate (Alexandris: 1992: 194; for the full coverage of Venizelos' visit see also Elefthero Vima, 2/11/1930). Return to the previous state of relations would mean that living conditions for the minorities would deteriorate, and thus the cost of interrupting the rapprochement process increased.

Apart from the minorities, on the bilateral level, the aforesaid new approach in the relations prompted these two states to handle emergent frictions through rapid and consensual methods. There are two examples that are worth mentioning. The first one concerns Turkish Law of 2596/3.12.1934 that involved forbidding the priests of various religions to appear in public wearing their religious dressing. The previous days, the Greek press had been concerned that the banning would include the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, but in the final version of the law was made a special exclusion for the Patriarch while it included the rest of the religious leaders (see

²⁵ At least during the end of the 1930s, which is the time period the current chapters examines. Concerning the ill-treatment of the minorities during the 1940s see next chapter.

Athinaika Nea, 30/11/1934, and 4/12/1934)²⁶. The second example is related to the cooperation between Greece and Turkey concerning anti-Kemalists, members of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace, who propagated against the Turkish regime (see Anastasiadou, 1992). Greek administrators provided shelter to religious leaders, including the last Şeyhülislam, who fled Turkey after 1923, hoping that they would keep Greece's Muslims away from the nationalistic influence of the Turkish Republic (Huseyinoglu, 2010). This practice changed after the initiation of the rapprochement.

- Interdependence

Concerning the sphere of economics, the new era in Greek-Turkish relations was marginally beneficial to both states. The economic benefits of the rapprochement should not be overvalued or exaggerated. Financial benefits, although existent, were not great for any of the parties. Even so, throughout the 1930s the two states were able to discuss and arrange financial and commercial issues in a way that they were beneficial for both. As such, economic cooperation and the prospect for a better future as far as commerce is concerned were significantly improved compared to the situation before the initiation of the rapprochement.

²⁶ On this issue Alexandris (1991) mentions that while the Patriarch was indeed excluded, but the rest of the religious leaders were excluded as well. Patriarch Fotios II', avoided exiting the patriarchate as a protest to his escort being dressed with a secular outfit.

- Leadership

The role of the Greek and Turkish leaders to the rapprochement was of great importance. To begin with, the initiation of the rapprochement process was only made possible due to the strong will of Venizelos and Inonu, who acted with determination and managed to overcome the essential obstacles that had prevented the rapprochement until 1930. This is especially true for Venizelos, who was acting in a much more competitive political environment, and, most importantly, was under the pressure of large portions of the Greek population, the refugees, who had for years expecting that a future arrangement between Greece and Turkey would allow them to return to their homes, or, at the minimum, would be reimbursed for their lost properties. It goes without doubt that had there been a Greek politician other than Venizelos ruling Greece, he would not be able to sign an agreement similar to the June 1930 Ankara Agreement.

During the rapprochement the role of political leaders in the success of the process was positive as well. During the first years after the pioneers of the rapprochement's initiation, Inonu and Venizelos, continued working hard and made important breakthroughs that further increased trust and strengthened the process. Apart from the official level, and what was already been discussed in the previous pages, actions such as Venizelos' nomination of Kemal Ataturk for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1934, or the granting of his wife's house to the Turkish state to be used as the new Turkish Embassy are indicative of leaders' efforts to strengthen the rapprochement process. On another occasion, Venizelos and his wife donated 5000

Turkish Liras to Türk Ocağı during their stay in Ankara in 1931 (see DAGM 030.10/254.712.39.)

- Depth of the process

As it is clear in Table 4.2 all the indicators relating to the rapprochement were influenced during the process. Frequent summit level meetings, the signing of many important agreements, military and economic cooperation, various positive statements and gestures, and, lastly, support and participation of the Turkish and Greek societies are all proofs that the 1930s rapprochement was a deep and meaningful process. The fact that the process impacted all of the indicators had positive effects in the success of the process.

- Turning points

The period during which the rapprochement stayed vibrant is characterized with the lack of turning points that would otherwise cause a deceleration or interruption of the process. The absence of turning points that could have interrupted the rapprochement can be attributed, apart from good fortune, to several factors. Primarily, the unchanged political support was an important factor that safeguarded the process. This issue concerns Greece more than Turkey, as the former experienced more changes during the 1930s. In that sense, it is very essential that Tsaldaris, Kondylis and Metaxas that ruled Greece after Venizelos, supported the Greek-Turkish friendship and even strengthened it with their policies.

Support from the public opinion and the press throughout the process, the lack of big changes relevant to the process in the international arena, and the fact that the two states had managed to solve their most important differences early-on in the process should also be considered as factors that minimized possibilities for negative turning points to appear.

- The GRIT strategy

Firstly, the issue of negotiations is not of primary importance for the process of rapprochement. Indeed, most of the negotiations between Greece and Turkey had already taken place before the initiation of the rapprochement. Before the rapprochement started, previous to the June 1930, the two states had already signed the bilateral agreements. These agreements solved practically all of the important issues that divided Greece and Turkey at the time. Hence, communication after the initiation of the rapprochement did not concern negotiations on issues of contention, but mainly discussions on further collaboration and improvement of relations. In that sense, it is clear that the GRIT strategy, which among others suggests a gradual approach to problem solving was not used in the 1930s rapprochement, at least not as far as the main core of the Greek-Turkish differences were concerned.

4.8. Concluding Remarks

To sum up, the current chapter offered a summary of the first rapprochement between Turkey and Greece in 1930. Some of the most important factors that led to this rapprochement and, most importantly, those ones that helped the continuation of the process were identified. Further breakdown of these data will take place in the analysis chapter, where data from all case studies will be evaluated, compared and analyzed.

CHAPTER 5

THE 1950 GREEK-TURKISH UNSUCCESSFUL RAPPROCHEMENT

5.1. Introduction

The previous chapter described how the Greek-Turkish rapprochement of 1930 created the conditions for peaceful co-existence and fruitful cooperation between the two states. The first rapprochement between Turkey and Greece was a very successful example of how two states, despite a past filled with conflicts, managed their all-too-real differences to proceed along an era of collaboration. The spirit of rapprochement permeated not only the political and official levels, but also the social life and the peoples' attitude towards one another. It is important to point out that the rapprochement did not end officially, as it was not broken abruptly by a disagreement that surfaced between Greece and Turkey. On the contrary, the Second World War (WWII) created a new state of affairs within which every country had to rearrange its priorities and interests.

The world order that came about soon after the end of WWII was very different from the one existing before. The world was split between two opposing camps, each of which was dominated by one of the two remaining superpowers, namely the USA and the USSR. Within this newly emerging world order, Turkey and Greece had to redefine their priorities and re-examine their positions in a way that would serve their interests best.

In this chapter the focus will be on the Greek-Turkish relations after WWII and especially the time between 1950 and 1955. During this time Greece and Turkey managed to improve their relations considerably, while they also signed a number of significant agreements on various topics.

Before reviewing the Greek-Turkish short-lived rapprochement of the 1950s, it is important to notice that the 1930s rapprochement, which was discussed in the previous chapter, although it benefited both countries at the time, functioned as a spoiler for the future relations in two different ways. On the one hand, the agreements that were signed during the 1930s created several obligations, such as mutual guarantee of the borders, for each party towards the other. When WWII started, these obligations became very difficult to honor²⁷, thus, after the war, a certain degree of distrust made its stage debut in between the two states on whether the agreements that were signed or were to be signed would be reliable. On the other hand, changes that took place during the time of good relations posed a problem when the relations deteriorated. For instance, in 1931 Greece extended its

²⁷ Especially for Turkey meeting its obligations would mean to enter the War on the side of Greece without previously been attacked by Germany or Bulgaria

airspace to the 10 n.m. with the Law No. 5017, but due to good neighbor relations Turkey did not oppose such an extension (Inan and Gozen, 2009: 181). However, the extent of the Greek national airspace caused friction between the two states, and continues to do so until today.

5.2. Historical Background

It is important to note that relations between Turkey and Greece did not deteriorate to a point that would resemble the pre-1928 period. Although, during the 1940s new problems arose between them, the two states managed to maintain a minimum degree of understanding that allowed a certain level of cooperation. For example, during WWII when much of the Greek population was suffering from famine, Turkey helped in several occasions. In 1940, 15 tons of sugar was sent with the permission of the Turkish government to Greece, while in 1941 Turkey sent 10.000 doses of tetanus serum and the Turkish Red Crescent Society sent comestibles on various occasions. Moreover, food was transferred with the ship “Kurtulus”, and when “Kurtulus” was sunk, a ship named “Dumlupinar” was used for the same purpose (Hatipoglou, 1997: 253; for a detailed presentation of the Turkish help to Greece between 1940 and 1942 see Macar, 2009). Greece also received help from Turkey during its civil war (Unal, 2008: 429).

Nonetheless, several issues still transpired in the 1940s to cause friction between Greece and Turkey. To begin with, Athens was being skeptical towards Turkey because of the latter’s stance during the WWII (for Turkish argumentation

concerning its legal obligations deriving from the 1930s Balkan Pact see Oran, 2008). In addition, the issue of the Dodecanese islands caused temporary coolness as Turkey had expressed its interest in the islands even before the end of the WWII, and even when the liberation time arrived, Turkey acted at the backstage in order for the islands to be split between the parties (Alexandris, 1991: 115). Finally Turkey agreed to the transfer of the Dodecanese to Greece in 1947, as part of the peace treaty it signed with Italy (Hale 2000: 124).

Problems also sprang from the ill-treatment of the Greek-orthodox population during the Second World War. As part of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey, the Greek Orthodox population became the target of two policies drafted by the Turkish government, 1) the Capital Tax (Varlık Vergisi) that was introduced in November 11, 1942 and, 2) the formation of the work-battalions (amele taburları) which are also known as “20 Classes” of minority youth from May 1941 to September 1942²⁸ (Cetinoglu, 2012). Those arbitrary measures that the Turkish government exalted on the Greek population of Istanbul created feelings of resentment in Greece, which prohibited a Greek-Turkish rapprochement. Similarly, the Turkish government continued being suspicious of the Istanbul Greeks and the role of the Patriarchate (Alexandris, 1991: 114).

²⁸ The classes were actually released from their sentences on July 27th, 1942. It is also important to point out that Ismet Inonu, one of the architects of the first rapprochement, was also the Turkish President (1938-1950) who implemented these policies.

5.3. The Initiation of the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement

Even though the problems discussed above constituted obstacles to a full normalization of relations between Greece and Turkey, the conditions that the international politics of the time posed to both states proved much stronger for anyone to prefer rapprochement to conflict. In other words, the beginning of the Cold War was forcing the two states to overcome their problems and proceed to a rapprochement. Thus, from 1945 onwards, snatches of efforts towards the improvement of relations can be traced.

5.4. Procedures Leading to the Initiation of the Rapprochement

A notable characteristic that differentiates the 1950 rapprochement from the three other cases studied in the current dissertation is that it took place at a time when Greece and Turkey did not have any major unresolved issues dividing them. The agreements that were signed during the 1930s rapprochement had settled most of the issues, which could otherwise cause bitterness between the two countries, and no other major question arose between Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, as global politics was developing towards the creation of a bipolar system, it was also becoming obvious that Greece and Turkey would be part of the same camp, and hence, the two countries would have much similar objectives as far as the exercise of their foreign policy was concerned. These two factors made the initiation of the rapprochement a much simpler process compared to the other three cases.

On July 27th, 1945 the Turkish Ambassador to Athens Enis Akaygen let know a Greek colleague of his that the friendship between the two nations constituted a cornerstone for the Turkish foreign policy (Alexandris, 1991: 114). Enis Akaygen also helped the Greek community in Iran while he was an Ambassador in Tehran and received a letter of thanks from them in 1939²⁹. In addition, a dinner was organized in his honor, on the “Averoff” battleship by the King of Greece, the Archbishop, and the Bishop of Athens in 1945 where he also received the Medal Of Greek State (<http://www.turkishgreeknews.org/bir-konsolosluk-hikayesi.html>).

The confirmation by the Turkish ambassador of Turkey’s good intentions toward Greece was an important step towards the initiation of the rapprochement and it played a similar role to Venizelos’ pre-election speech in July 1928. Such statements create an environment of trust, while they also constitute a first step towards improvement of relations or have an ice breaking effect. The gracious treatment of the Turkish envoy by the Greek state was similarly a positive step towards the initiation of the rapprochement. The just mentioned steps gained further currency considering that Enis Akaygen was also the Turkish Ambassador to Athens during the 1930s and had also been part of the first Greek-Turkish rapprochement.

On December 19th, 1946 the Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Tsaldaris arrived at Washington and asked for financial and military assistance. Among the terms the Americans posed in order to provide assistance was the strengthening of

²⁹ The original document of the letter can be found at <http://www.azinlikca.net/Evren-Dede/bir-konsolosluk-hikayesi.html> (accessed 20/9/2013)

relations between Greece and Turkey. Similar pressure was already built on these states, but this time around, by England (Alexandris, 1991:113). Finally, on March 12th, 1947 President Truman gave a speech to the US Congress, stressing the need to provide financial assistance to both Greece and Turkey, at the amount of \$400 Million, the majority of which would go to Greece. He also asked for authorization to dispatch military and political personnel to both countries (for the full text of Truman's speech see To Vima, 13/3/ 1947).

The US by putting its terms in such fashion, basically conditioning financial help on Greece's gravitating towards Turkey, should have been the first building bloc of a working rapprochement process in 1950s. Apart from the incentives that Greece and Turkey had in order to further improve relations vis-a-vis, the US and Britain applied further diplomatic pressure in order for the rapprochement to take place. Furthermore, the "carrot" of financial assistance was offered in a time that was well needed by both countries, especially Greece. The Greek government at the time was also depending on American and British assistance in order to win the civil war against the communist guerillas. As such, the international pressure for cooperation should be considered as an important factor that led to the initiation of the rapprochement.

After the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, the Greek-Turkish relations followed a positive path and reached a high-point after 1950 until 1955. Concretely, two months after Truman's speech to the Congress, a special committee for the promotion of the Greek-Turkish Cooperation was established in Athens, under the

aegis of the Greek Government's vice-president, Sophocles Venizelos (Alexandris, 1991: 119). In August 1947, Sophocles Venizelos gave an interview to the Turkish newspaper "Vatan", where he stated that in order for the Greek-Turkish friendship to solidify, the spirit of cooperation must prevail. To that end, he stressed the need for further cooperation between Greek and Turkish academicians, students, scientists and the like (To Vima, 2/8/1947).

Also in the summer of 1947, the Turkish and Greek General Staffs inaugurated a dialogue on issues of common defense, which was closely monitored by Washington and London (Alexandris, 1991: 119). On July 22, 1947 an agreement on aerial transportation was signed in Ankara (see Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs – www.mfa.gr). In October 1948, the two governments signed a financial agreement, while cultural exchanges increased considerably (Alexandris, 1991: 119).

Table 5.1.

Action/ Event	Enis Akaygen confirmati ons – Greek side honoring him	Truma n Doctri ne	Establis hment of GT Coopera tion Commit tee	Minor agreements and low- level cooperation	End of civil war in Greece – Change of Government in Turkey	Joint application to NATO
Time	1945	March 1947	May 1947	1947-1949	1949-1950	1950
Effect	First step – Trust building - reciprocation	Intern ational pressu re for cooper ation	Trust building	Trust building – preparing the ground	GT pro- cooperation and strong governments	Coordination of foreign policy

The establishment of the Cooperation committee, the urge for grassroots and professionals' cooperation, as well as, the minor agreements on low politic issues contributed more to the trust building process. Furthermore, all these actions were preparing the ground for the initiation of the rapprochement process.

5.5. Main Incentives for the Initiation of the 1950-55 Rapprochement

As it has already been mentioned earlier in the current chapter, the second rapprochement was initiated in a very different environment compared to the first one. However, this does not mean that the incentives for the initiation were fundamentally different. Indeed, several of the motivations discussed in the previous chapter were also present in 1950. Nevertheless, the discussion on the incentives for the initiation of the rapprochement must start by pointing out the influence the first rapprochement had in terms of providing the foundations for a new rapprochement between Turkey and Greece.

By the time the second rapprochement began, in 1950, Greece and Turkey had already experienced a decade of good relations (1930-1940), and both had enjoyed the benefits of such a relationship. Policies against the Greek minority in the early 1940s constituted a significant spoiler to Greek-Turkish relations and increased levels of mistrust between the two states. Nonetheless, the experience and impact of the first rapprochement on both states remained strong. In that sense, the improvement of the Greek-Turkish relations was, more or less, a natural development between the two states that which are partially freed from the most

significant points of friction. Furthermore, when the new era started, there is a good reason to think that their attitudes toward one another was amicable. Hence, the fact that the foundations of a strong relationship that the first rapprochement had established were still valid in 1950. Such positive background must be considered as the foremost incentive for the second rapprochement.

The idea that Greece and Turkey were allied states was also exacerbated by the new world order that prevailed after WWII. Greece and Turkey belonged to the same 'camp' and they shared significant defense and security concerns, considering they were both neighboring with communist states. Specifically, Greece found itself neighboring with three communist countries to the north after WWII. Its relations with Bulgaria and Albania were tense. Bulgaria denied giving the full amount of the war compensation that was asserted to it by the 1946 Paris Treaty. In addition, the spectacular increase of the Bulgarian army and Sofia's close relations with Moscow further strengthened Greece's fears and anxiety. Greece and Albania remained in a state of war, at least from the legal point view. Greece had demanded the annexation of northern Epirus (Southern Albania), which hosted large Greek populations. Nonetheless, in December 1952, Greek Prime Minister Papagos officially declared that his government refrained from any use of violence and pursued its goals only through legal means (see Valinakis, 1989: 55-56).

Turkish foreign policy did not see considerable changes in the early 1950s. The basic principles that guided Turkish foreign policy after WWII (1945-1950) continued after 1950 as well (Aktas, 2008). In post-WWII setting, the most

important feature for Turkey was the systems' bipolarity, which was limiting Turkey's options compared to the period before the war (Hale, 2000: 109). Menderes and his colleagues were even more west-prone than Inonu (Hale, 2000: 111). In the period between 1950 and 1960, Turkish foreign policy and security policies was part of NATO's effort to contain the Soviet Union (Sovyetleri Çevreleme) (Unal: 2008: 427). In general, security concerns were, similar to the first case, providing strong motivation for a Greek-Turkish rapprochement and, thus, should be considered as one of the main incentives for the initiation of the rapprochement.

Domestic politics also offered strong incentives for rapprochement as the early 1950s are characterized as a time of instability, in the case of Greece, and change, in the case of Turkey. In Greece, after the end of the war, elections were held on March 5, 1950, only to be followed by a new period of instability during which various combinations of parties were forming the majority in the parliament. Finally, centrist parties managed to form a government on April 15, 1950, with Nikolaos Plastiras serving as both the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs³⁰. The Plastiras Government stayed in power for only four months and it was replaced by three Venizelos' governments (August 21, September 9, and November 3). On September 9, 1951 a new round of elections was held, where the Greek Rally Party, led by recently dismissed General Papagos collected more than 36% of the votes but did not manage to form a majority government. The

³⁰ Also as Minister of Press and Information

government was to be formed by Plastiras whereas Sophokles Venizelos was assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs³¹. The Plastiras Government ruled for a year, during which NATO membership was fulfilled, and the improvement of relations with Turkey assumed a prior place, a major axis of Plastiras' foreign policy. Finally, with the elections that were held on November 16, 1952, General Papagos' Greek Rally won a landslide victory, gathering 49,2% of the votes and 247 of 300 seats in the parliament. This was the first single-party government in post-war Greece, and stayed in power for another 11 years (See Sampatakis, 2006a, Sampatakis 2006b)³².

Turkey experienced major changes concerning its domestic politics, towards the end of the 1940s. Inonu gave a speech before the National Assembly on November 1, 1945, to stress the need for a new political party that would challenge the governing CHP. Two months later, the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti - the DP) was formed under Celal Bayar's leadership. Although the DP lost the 1946 elections, it managed a decisive victory in the elections of May 14, 1950, getting 53,3% of the vote (Ozbudun, 1999). The shift to a multiparty regime was completed smoothly, but , such did not bring with it diffusion of power across social groups and classes. It was merely a reallocation of political power from one group of the ruling Kemalist bloc to another (Yilmaz, 1997). Menderes government would try to enforce a very ambitious plan, at the center of which lied the economic development and modernization of the rural areas of Turkey. This included a sharp rise in public

³¹ Also the vice-President

³² Also including the ERE party that succeeded it

investments in an effort to increase agricultural productivity and the integration of peasants into the national economy (Sayari, 2002). In addition, Democrat Party gave promises that it would proceed with constitutional amendments and institutional innovations aiming to consolidate democratic rule in Turkey. Even though these promises were not kept, and the main efforts of the DP focused on weakening the Republican Party (Karpas, 1972: 353), it is clear that the early 1950s were a time of great changes in Turkey at many levels.

Finally, as far as economics are concerned, a rapprochement-leaning motive gained ground as a result of the need of both states to improve their finances and achieve economic growth. This need was higher for Greece as it was, at the end of the 1940s, going through one of the worst moments of its modern history. The disasters that WWII and the civil war caused, both in terms of human victims and property damages, were immense. During the war, approximately 16.000 people lost their lives in the front, 7000 people died during bombings and 70.000 people were executed. Furthermore, 300.000 people lost their lives because of famine (Vakalopoulos, 2003: 435). The civil war added another 158.000 people to the victim count, while an estimated 50-100.000 crossed the borders and escaped to neighboring states (Vakalopoulos, 2003: 438). In addition, 1.700 villages had been destroyed; oil production had been reduced by 80%, wheat and raisin production by 66% and the production of tobacco and cotton by 90%. The merchant fleet, one of Greece's most important enterprises, was reduced from 600 ships (1.800.000) tons capacity to a number of 130 ships (50.000 tons capacity). In total, the national

income decreased by 41% compared to the pre-WWII income, which was already quite low (Vakalopoulos, 1993: 435; also on Greek economy in the 1950s see Hekimoglu 2006a, Hekimoglu 2006b, Hekimoglu 2006c). For Turkey, the DP managed to create the conditions for strong economic growth. Economic data demonstrates that this growth was faster during the first half of the 1950s, it continued, however, throughout the decade. In addition aggregate labor productivity showed a strong increase up until 1953, following the governmental plan that favored agriculture and private enterprise (Altug and Filiztekin, 2006).

5.6. The Rapprochement Period

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when the 1950s rapprochement between Turkey and Greece started. As it was discussed above, sporadic efforts towards improvement of relations had started from mid-1945 onwards, but until the end of the 1940s no substantial development became visible. However, after 1950, the changing conditions allowed for a more realistic effort towards rapprochement. this study henceforth suggests that the year 1950 must be considered as a turning point for the rapprochement's initiation. There are three main developments that occurred in 1950 that support this argument.

Firstly, the previous year the Greek civil war ended with the defeat of the communists and the preponderance of the government forces with the support of the US and the Britain. Immediately after that point Greece followed policies that would bring it closer to the Western camp and, more concretely, would include it in

the western defense (Hatzivasilleiou, 2006: 11). Secondly, the change of leadership in Turkey, even if it did not produce major changes in Turkish foreign policy, benefited the rapprochement, as the Democrat Party (DP) was more committed to the West and to American way of economic liberalization (Hale, 2000: 111). According to Alexandris, Menderes government sought contacts with the Greek leadership, and in general, the DP's coming to power signaled an advance in regards to the Greek-Turkish relations (Alexandris, 1991: 120). Thirdly, in the spring of 1950 the two countries jointly applied for NATO membership. Even though the Americans were not forthcoming, the joint application was indicative that Greece and Turkey had coordinated their policy against the Soviet bloc (Hatzivasilleiou, 2006: 11).

Leaving aside the aforementioned changes, there was also a verbal agreement that signifies the beginning of the new era in the Greek-Turkish relations. In early June 1950, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs met the Greek Prime Minister Plastiras in Paris, where they decided to initiate a productive and close cooperation (Alexandris: 1991: 120)

5.7. Breaking Down of the Rapprochement Process

In the first chapter a set of indicators concerning what constitutes a rapprochement process was put together and discussed. At this point, how these characteristics should be applied to the Greek-Turkish rapprochement process, from

circa 1950 to 1955, will be the main theme of discussion within the rest of this chapter.

a. Summit level communication

The discussion of the 1930s Greek-Turkish rapprochement showed that visits of high-ranking officials between Turkey and Greece became so frequent that they were almost a banality. During the second rapprochement Greek and Turkish leaders continued official visits. Although the frequency of the visits decreased compared to the first case, for instance there are no informal visits or stopovers, the meetings were still made within a friendly and cooperative spirit. Moreover, the agenda of the visits attests the high level of cooperation and trustfulness.

On January 29th, 1952 the Greek Vice-president and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sophocles Venizelos visited Istanbul (Milliyet, 30/1/1952) and on the next day he arrived in Ankara. His visit concerted great importance from the Turkish Government (Milliyet 31/1/1952). During a speech he gave in Ankara, Venizelos addressed to the Turkish nation saying, "I bring to the Turkish nation the warm greetings of the Greek nation. I came to your country in order to reassure the friendship that was established by two historic men, Ataturk and my father Venizelos" (Milliyet 31//1952)

In less than three months after Sophocles Venizelos' visit, the Turkish Prime Minister Menderes visited Athens accompanied by his Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuat Koprulu. When the Turkish ship "Ankara" arrived in Piraeus with its passengers, the Greek crowd warmly welcomed him, which in many ways was a

reminiscent of Inonu's first visit that he made twenty-two years ago. In his welcoming speech Sophocles Venizelos stated:

I express my joy for the arrival of the Turkish officials, and I am sure that this visit will seal what was accomplished during my last visit in Turkey, in a way that the commencing friendship, the work of two great men, will constitute a turning-point towards the strengthening of relations between the two states, which we are certain both states deeply desire (Ta Nea, 26/4/1952)

During this five-day visit, the two sides agreed upon a closer Greek-Turkish military cooperation within the western alliance framework, while they also decided to improve their relations with Yugoslavia (Alexandris, 1991: 120). During the time of the Menderes' visit at Athens, Greek and Turkish officials were agreeing on a cooperation plan on the tobacco issue. They also agreed upon cooperation on the areas of tourism and visas. These agreements were to be reviewed by the two governments later on (To Vima, 2/5/1952).

On Sunday June 8th, 1952 the King and the Queen of Greece arrived in Istanbul to be enthusiastically celebrated by a crowd of thousands of Greeks and Turks. According to the Greek press, this was the first time Turks were giving such a welcoming posture to a foreign leader (Ta Nea 9/6/1952). The visit of the Greek Royal couple to Turkey had great significance not only because it was King Paul's first official journey after his enthronement, but also because it was the first king that had ever visited Istanbul since the end of the Byzantine Empire (Alexandris, 1991:121). An interesting comment was made by the Greek newspaper "Kathimerini", which read the king's visit as "...a triumphal consummation of the

Greek-Turkish friendship: A true apotheosis of the Greek King in Istanbul. Greeks and Turks cheered and applauded in a delirious state” (Kathimerini June 14/6/1952).

The series of visits that took place in 1952 was closed by the visit of the Turkish President Celal Bayar to Greece in late November, who returned the King’s visit to Turkey. The honors that were attributed to him clearly reveal that Greek-Turkish relations had reached a zenith. Two Greek destroyers were sent to accompany the Turkish ship “Savarona” which was carrying the Turkish President. The Greek ships met “Savarona” close to the Greek island of Lemnos and accompanied it all the way to Athens. In addition, in order to honor the Turkish President, squadrons of jet-fighters flew upon his arrival. At the harbor of Piraeus, nautical and sports clubs asked for permission to form a welcoming formation of approximately 75 ships, in order to honor the Turkish visitor (To Vima 26/11/1952).

During his visit, President Celal Bayar was announced a citizen emeritus of Athens, while the enthusiastic crowd filled the Town Hall Square. Bayar also inspected the Greek fleet at Eleusina, and a unit of the Greek Army close to Thessaloniki (Sedes). Upon his arrival at the city of Thessaloniki, Bayar once again received a warm welcome from the Greek crowd. After Thessaloniki, Bayar visited the city of Komotini where he inaugurated a Turkish high-school named after him (Celal Bayar Türk Lisesi, also on Bayar’s visit to Greece see Ta Nea 28/11/1952, To Vima 28/11/1952, To Vima 2/12/1952, To Vima 26/11/1952). Nevertheless, it should still be held in mind that no negotiations or any form of political agreements were signed during Bayar’s visit to Greece (To Vima 5/12/1952).

In June 1953, General Alexandros Papagos, who at the time was the Greek Prime Minister, followed by members of the Greek government visited Turkey and met with Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar, while in June 7th, 1954, Menderes accompanied by his minister of Foreign Affairs visited Athens on his way back from the US (To Vima 19/6/1953; Milliyet, 19/6/1953)³³.

Apart from the abovementioned summit level visits, separate reference should also be made to relations between the Turkish officials and the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul. Few days after Menderes' and Koprulu's visit to Athens, Bayar and the Turkish Prime Minister sent an official invitation to the Patriarch. Following the Patriarch's visit to Ankara, Menderes visited the Greek Patriarchate, in June 1952, two days before King Paul's visit to Istanbul. This was the first visit of such a high-ranking Turkish official to the Patriarchate in the history of the Turkish Republic³⁴. During this visit the Turkish Prime Minister offered the Patriarch 5,000 Turkish Liras in support of a Greek hospital (To Vima 7/6/1952). Good relations between the Turkish leadership and the Patriarchate, continuing until 1955, can be deemed as a side-product of a rapidly improving Greek-Turkish relations. For instance, President Bayar met again with Patriarch Athinagoras in Istanbul in 1953 and had dinner with him (Ta Nea 10/1/1953).

³³ Kalaitzaki (2005: 110) citing Ferenc Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), mentions another Celal Bayar visit to Athens in January 1954. However, no other reference of this visit was found.

³⁴ Until June 1952 there were only two other visits of a Turkish official to the Patriarchate. The visit of the Grand Vezir Midant Pasa in 2/1/1877, and the visit of Ahmet Riza Pasa, one of the leaders of the Young Turks movement on 10/7/1908.

b. Signing of Agreements

During the 1950s rapprochement, Turkey and Greece signed a number of agreements with the view of relegating financial and social issues, enhancing military cooperation and supporting intercultural dialogue. Apart from those that have already been mentioned, the two states also signed an agreement on fishery issues on June 21, 1952. The specifics of this agreement were discussed during King Paul's visit to Turkey a few weeks earlier (Turan, 2008: 475-476). An agreement on education was signed on April 20, 1951. The Koutouma-Akdır Agreement, as it was called, arranged issues of minority education in both countries, and foresaw the exchange of teachers and teaching material for the minorities' schools (Alexandris, 1991:137). An agreement on cultural issues was signed in 1952 (Kültür Antlaşması) (Firat, 2008: 592). In September 1953, the Greek Minister of Public Works, Konstantinos Karamanlis and his Turkish counterpart Kemal Zeytinoğlu, inaugurated the construction of a bridge at the Evros/Meriç River at the Greek-Turkish border (National Audiovisual Archive, Annotation of Asset D2531).

Nonetheless, two agreements that also included Yugoslavia were by far the most important for the Greek-Turkish rapprochement. The first one was the Friendship and Cooperation Agreement (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Yunanistan Krallığı ve Yugoslavya Federatif Halk Cumhuriyeti arasında Dostluk ve İşbirliği Antlaşması – Συνθήκη Φιλίας και Συνεργασίας μεταξύ της Τουρκικής Δημοκρατίας, του Βασιλείου της Ελλάδος και της Ομόσπονδης Λαϊκής Δημοκρατίας της

Γιουγκοσλαβίας) which was signed in Ankara on February 28, 1953, by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia.

In the introduction section of the Balkan Agreement, the three states declared their conviction to the United Nations' principles, and their determination to live in peace. The Article 1 was concerned with the cooperation among the signatories and arranged that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs would meet, at least, once in a year in order to examine the course of international politics and, if necessary, take decisions to safeguard the aim of the Treaty. In the Article 2, the signatories agreed to continue common efforts towards establishing peace and security in their territories, and examine measures of common defense. The Articles 3 and 4 entailed cooperation in military issues and other areas (education, commerce and technical problems). The Article 5, on the other hand, stated that the parties should solve any conflict among them through peaceful means, according to the Map of the United Nations. They should also abstain from interfering with each other's internal affairs. The next 3 articles (6, 7 and 8) discussed the agreements' technicalities such as, conflict with other signatories' obligations etc, while article 9 stated that the treaty is open to other states, as long as they agreed with its principles. Finally, the last article (10) stated that the Balkan Agreement would be valid for 5 years from the time of its ratification (For the full text of the treaty see To Vima 1/3/1953).

The Balkan Agreement as having been finalized in Ankara, in 1953, was important because it helped create an environment of peaceful coexistence for Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Council which was

established with the first article, constituted an important safety net, reassuring/warning each party that should an issue transpire among the signatories, it will be solved through dialogue—but not through the use of force. In addition, the agreement encouraged further cooperation, which in turn would make the Greek-Turkish rapprochement stronger.

The second important agreement that Greece and Turkey signed also included Yugoslavia, and can be considered as the high point of the tripartite inter-Balkan cooperation (Alexandris, 1991: 123). The Coalition Treaty (Συνθήκη Συμμαχίας, Πολιτικής Συνεργασίας και Αμοιβαίας Βοήθειας – Ittifak, Siyasal Isbirliği ve Karşılıklı Yardım Antlaşması) was signed at Bled, on August 9, 1954. The Treaty which was mainly concerned with issues of security, once again attested the signatories' faith to the United Nations Charter, their will to promote peace, security and international cooperation, and their determination to ensure their territorial integrity and political interdependence (introduction).

The most important assumptions of the Treaty were summarized in Articles 2 and 6. The former stated that the signatories agreed that any armed offence against one of them would be considered an attack against all, and thus, the parties had the right of collective defense according to the UN Charter, article 51. The latter made an indirect mention of the obligations that Greece and Turkey were holding against NATO at the time. Article 6, stated that if a third state, that any of the three signatories has obligations of mutual assistance was under military attack, the

signatories would meet in order to decide on their actions (For the full text of the treaty see To Vima 10/8/1954).

Apart from the signed agreements, an interesting fact is that good neighbor relations allowed Greece and Turkey to seek bilateral negotiations that would settle the terms of a delimitation agreement, based on the principles agreed between Italy and Turkey by the December 28, 1932 Accord. Such a request was made by Greece in mid-1953, and Turkey replied positively in early 1954, however, no progress was achieved at that point. Later on, Greece made another attempt to negotiate the boundaries of the Dodecanese islands by a *note verbale* to Ankara in mid-1955, but the end of the rapprochement forced Turkey to unofficially reject the Greek request (Inan and Gozen, 2009: 185).

c. Military cooperation

The 1952 NATO membership for both Greece and Turkey not only enhanced military cooperation, but also constitutes one of the most significant elements of the 1950s rapprochement. As of 1952 Turkish and Greek foreign policies became almost fully coordinated and, military cooperation acted as a boost for the rapprochement process as a whole³⁵.

³⁵ On the downside, Krebs (1999: 360), argues that, membership in NATO rendered irrelevant Greek and Turkish national efforts to ensure their security vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc, providing these relatively small states with incentives to ride free on the efforts of their more powerful allies and to shift the focus of their foreign policy from the Soviet threat to their more parochial conflicts...After 1952, with the Atlantic alliance guaranteeing its security, Greece believed itself able to pursue its long time dream of union with Cyprus, and, shortly after its accession, the Greek government, which had considered enosis its eventual goal but had long resisted domestic pressures for immediate action toward that end, officially endorsed that policy. Had Greece remained outside the alliance, it could hardly have devoted the resources or foreign policy attention to so peripheral an aim.

Hence, cooperation between the Greek and Turkish armed forces is one of the most important aspects of the 1950s rapprochement. The military cooperation was vital as the two states were following a common defense approach against the Soviet threat from the North. Military cooperation had its roots in the NATO membership that Turkey and Greece jointly sought in 1950. The outbreak of the Korean War helped disperse any disagreements against Greece' and Turkey's membership and on October 15-17 Turkey's and Greece's accession to NATO was confirmed in London, and membership procedures concluded in February 1952. From that point onwards the two states constituted NATO's southeast wing (Hatipoglu, 1997: 289). The Americans saw Greece and Turkey "as useful and mutually reinforcing outposts" (Hatzivassiliou, 2006: 11) and thus they supported the efforts for military cooperation.

Apart from some examples of military cooperation that have already been mentioned (the 1947 meeting of General Staffs, and Celal Bayar's supervision of Greek army units at Salamina and Sedes), there are also other examples that strongly confirm that the level of cooperation between the Greek and Turkish armed forces was very high. On August 6, 1950 a Greek delegation led by the second in command of the Greek Miliraty, Kitrilakis visited Ankara for consultations. The talks on tactical issues continued in Athens (Alexandris, 1991: 120). In August 1952, common Turkish and Greek naval exercises took place, while at the same time the Turkish rear admiral Altigan paid a formal visit to Greece where he met with Greek military officials, the Greek Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense

(To Vima 20/8/1952). In April 1953, the Greek Chief of Staff, accompanied by high-ranking officers, visited Turkey and met with Turkish military leaders (ToVima 8/4/1953). A few months later, in June 1953, delegations of the Greek, Turkish and Yugoslav General Staffs met in Athens. The talks centered on the selection of the defensive locations in case of an offence, the engaging units and the defense of Thrace (Hatzivasilleiou, 2006: 38). In September 1954, the Turkish and Yugoslav Chiefs of Staff visited Athens and met with their Greek counterpart lieutenant general Kitrilakis (National Audio Visual Archive, Annotation of Asset D3933).

The collaboration among military officials was the result of the NATO membership but it was further strengthened by the Article 3 of the 1953 Friendship Agreement and the spirit of the 1954 Coalition Treaty. In general, Greece and Turkey were regarded as two forces that, when combined, could pose a countable defense against a possible Soviet offensive. In May 1952, after these two states joined the NATO, the Greek Prime Minister Plastiras said during an interview to a Turkish journalist: "The military cooperation between Greece and Turkey will constitute within NATO a competitive force, capable to face any threat against peace, due to its strategic position and the strength of the two armies" (To Vima, 2/5/1952).

d. Improvement in economic relations

The issue of further financial cooperation was always a sought-after topic as of the beginning of the rapprochement. The parties understood closer economic relations as a complementary element to furthering political rapprochement. In

1950, when Plastiras and Koprulu met in Paris they agreed that “especially” economic cooperation should be one of the important areas of focus for both countries (Milliyet, 7/6/1950). The need for stronger economic ties was further stressed with the Article 4 of the 1953 Friendship Agreement.

The most important breakthrough concerning financial cooperation was made in November 1953, when Greece and Turkey signed a bilateral commercial agreement. The commercial agreement fixed the amount of Greek exports to Turkey at the amount of \$10 Million (excluding the value of goods for which the export to Turkey was free). This was an important development considering that Greek exports to Turkey were \$2,780 Million in 1952, \$887 Thousands in 1951, \$1,119 Million in 1950 and just \$600 Thousand in 1949. Greece’s main export goods were concrete (\$3,000,000), fabric and textiles (\$2,500,000), agricultural machinery (\$1,000,000), chemical fertilizers (\$300,000), glass panels (\$300,000) and 60 tons of Chios mastic. Turkey was gaining by the lifting of some limitations on its exporting goods to Greece, mainly pulses, fish and meat, (To Vima 13/11/1953; for the full text of the agreement in Turkish see DAGM 030.10/219.478.14).

e. Public statements made by officials

In the literature review chapter of this study, public statements made by political leaders were mentioned as one of the key parameters to evaluate a rapprochement process. Statements that affirm leaders’ confidence in the rapprochement process also increase the level of trust between the parties, positively preoccupy the public over the process and elucidate the importance of the

rapprochement effort. In several occasions statements, and especially the ones included in speeches which are given during official visits in exchange of amiabilities is a commonplace. But they hardly mean anything more than being compliment paid to other party. However, there are occasions that official statements can make huge advances towards the rapprochement process. For example in the 1950s rapprochement, the statements that were made by Plastiras and Köprülü in Paris, can be considered as a turning-point in the Greek-Turkish relations.

Apart from those that have already been mentioned, there are several other occasions when Turkish and Greek political leaders made strong statements regarding the high importance and priority they confer on Greek-Turkish rapprochement. In 1950, Köprülü gave an interview to a Greek newspaper and he stated:

There is no disagreement. We have the best feelings towards Greece. We believe that your politicians also share those feelings, and as until now, in the future they will continue the same policies towards Turkey. The Greek-Turkish friendship constitutes a solid basis for the well-being of the two nations and the global peace. I will personally work towards the strengthening of our ties (To Vima, 26/5/1950)

In March 1952 General Plastiras gave an interview to the Turkish newspaper Milliyet, where he asked specifically about the Greek-Turkish friendship and his thoughts about the rapprochement. In his answer he said:

These two nations must be united, they have to be one...I believe in the Greek-Turkish friendship and union. And I can see that with your actions you want to give more value to this closeness (Milliyet, 8/3/1952)

In addition, going beyond the official statements, there were other occurrences in which parties mutually demonstrated their high level of amity,

indicating prevalent mood of amity between Turkey and Greece at the time. For instance, On May 14, 1954 the Turkish Ambassador to Athens Mr. Taray was awarded with the Certificate of Honorary Chairman of the Greek-Turkish Association as recognition for his contribution to the Greek-Turkish friendship (To Vima, 15/1/1954). Another important gesture of good will was the change of title from “minority schools” to “Turkish schools” (Türk İlkokulları) with law 3065/1954 which was initiated by General Papagos (Firat, 2008: 592-593).

f. Rapprochement's influence on the society level

While the rapprochement on the political, military and economic fronts between Turkey and Greece drastically grew, contacts between the Greeks and Turks at the grassroots level, too, flourished. There are several examples of such contacts, including contacts between civil-society actors, athletes, artists, intellectuals, students, institutions etc. According to Alexandris (1991; 119), cultural exchanges between Greece and Turkey increased significantly after 1948.

Student exchanges between Turkish and Greek schools and universities became quite common. In the summer of 1950 for example, a group of 76 female students from the Kozani high-school visited Turkey and were hosted by Çapa Lisesi (Milliyet, 24/5/1950). In early August 1952, a group of 30 Turkish students visited the cities of Athens and Thessaloniki where they were warmly welcomed (To Vima, 8/8/1950). In April 1952 University of Athens' rector accompanied by a group of students visited Istanbul during the Easter Break (Milliyet, 25/4/1952).

Additionally, on December 20, 1952 the Turkish intellectual Ismet Mardan gave a lecture in a Turkish theatre before a predominantly Greek audience in Athens. On this special occasion, Stratis Mirivilis, a well-known Greek author, was present and actually made the opening remarks (Ta Nea, 22/12/1952). A few days later Mardan gave another speech regarding the role of women in the Turkish society at the Greek-American Educational Institute in Athens (To Vima, 30/12/1952). Ismet Mardan had in the past translated Greek theatrical plays to Turkish, which were then played in Turkey with a great success (To Vima, 26/5/1949). In 1954, the Greek National Theatre arranged a number of performances in Istanbul and Ankara, while the Turkish National Theatre was also invited to visit Greece. A number of Greek plays had planned to perform in Turkey during the summer and autumn of 1954 (To Vima, 26/5/1949). In March 1955 Turkish singer Safiye Ayla gave a performance of Turkish folk music at the Kotopouli Theatre in Athens (To Vima, 20/3/1955).

Civil-society organizations and quasi-officials were also active during the early 1950s. In early May 1951, members of the Greek-Turkish board (Ελληνοτουρκικός Σύνδεσμος) met with the speaker of the Turkish Parliament Refik Koraltan (To Vima, 4/5/1951). At the same time the mayor of Istanbul hosted members of the Athens Doctors Association at the Yildiz Palace (To Vima, 4/5/1951). On April 7, 1954, a group of mayors from Athens visited Istanbul where they received a warm welcome. During their visit they met with Turkish officials, the Patriarch and the Greek Consul (To Vima, 8/4/1954). In July 1954, the “Κέντρο

Κωνσταντινουπολιτών” (People from Istanbul Centre) was founded in Athens. The organization aimed, among others, to support the Greek-Turkish rapprochement (Ta Nea, 17/5/1954). Other organizations, such as the “Pancretan Greek-Turkish Friendship Association”, took initiatives for the strengthening of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement (Ta Nea, 3/12/1952).

On March 18, 1953, an earthquake occurred in the Marmara Sea causing many deaths and disasters. Greece was one of the first countries to come up with help to Turkey. The Greek Red Cross sent medical equipment, food and supplies, while a number of volunteers from Greece also participated in the mission (National Audiovisual Archive, Annotation of Asset D2491).

Finally, on several other occasions, sports games were organized with the participation of Greek and Turkish athletes. For instance, in April 1951 Greek-Turkish sports games were organized in Athens with participation of Greek athletes and Turkish athletes of Fenerbahce and Demirspor (To Vima, 21/4/1951). Moreover, in several occasions the friendly football matches were played between Greek and Turkish teams (army teams, youth teams etc) (see for example Milliyet 20/12/1950; Milliyet 19/12/1951).

Table 5.2.

Rapprochement Process			
Indicator	<u>Main events</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Importance</u>
Summit level meetings	S. Venizelos' visit in 1952 Menderes' visit to Athens 1952 King and Queen of Greece visit 1952 Celal Bayar's visit to Greece 1952 Papagos' visit 1953 Menderes' visit 1954	High	High
Agreements Signed	Friendship and Cooperation Agreement in 1953, Coalition Treaty in 1954, and a number of other minor agreements	High	High
Military cooperation	Mainly within NATO framework, also included consultation, joint exercises, and meetings among high ranking officers	High	High
Economic cooperation	The most important development was the signing of the commercial agreement	Low	Medium
Statements/ Gestures	Several positive statements and gestures	High	Medium
Societal level	Communication between societies increase considerably and cover many different activities such as sports, education, civil society	High	High

5.8. The End of the Rapprochement

The improvement of relations that Turkey and Greece experienced during the first years of the 1950s came to an abrupt end in September 1955. On September 6, ten minutes after midnight, a bomb situated in the courtyard of the Turkish Consulate in Thessaloniki, a building adjacent to the house wherein Kemal Atatürk was born, exploded. Beginning at around 5:00pm, Turkish mobs devastated the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish districts of Istanbul, killing approx. 37 Greeks and causing damage on minority properties and worship places (Zayas, 2007: 138). The September Pogrom, as it was later revealed, was plotted by the Turkish Government in order to add extra pressure on the Greek delegation that was at the time discussing the Cyprus question at the London Conference (Weiker, 1980). Soon after Greece passed a new nationality law, the Greek Nationality Code (law 3370/1955), which stripped Greek nationality from citizens of non-Greek descent (*αλλογενείς*) who were leaving the country (article 19). According to Sitaropoulos (2004: 205-206) 60,004 Greek citizens lost their nationality between 1955 and 1998.

The unfortunate events that happened in Istanbul deeply shocked Greek government and the public, while the coverage in the Greek media continued for many days after the events. On September 10, only few days after the Istanbul pogrom, American officials recognized that the Greek-Turkish friendship did not exist anymore (Ta Nea, 10/9/1955).

The pogrom against the Greek minority in Istanbul, and other cities in Turkey, should be seen as a spinoff of the Cyprus question. Ultimately it was the disagreements between Turkey and Greece on the future of Cyprus that ended the 1950s rapprochement. As Coufoudakis (1985: 190) puts it, “the foundations of the Greek-Turkish détente were not strong enough to withstand the shock waves of the growing Cyprus dispute”. In addition, it should be added that although the September 1955 Istanbul events constituted the gravestone of the 1950s rapprochement, it was apparent that Greece and Turkey’s interests had been clashing over Cyprus since autumn 1954. A 1954 article observes that:

...whatever the two governments may proclaim, the Turko-Greek union is none too solidly based. The two countries have conflicting interests and the present undercurrent of rivalry over Cyprus, fishing interests, and other minor matters, is not too happy an augury for the future (Helm, 1954: 439).

5.8.1. The Cyprus Question Factor in the Greek-Turkish Relations

The island of Cyprus was captured by the Ottomans in 1571, and was part of the Ottoman Empire until 1878. At that time it was assigned to Great Britain through the Convention of Defensive Alliance that the two parties signed on June 4, 1878³⁶. Although Britain unilaterally annexed Cyprus in 1914, Turkey ratified the British annexation with the Sevres Peace Treaty, and also in 1923 with the Lausanne’s Treaty (for the original documents see Hakki, 2007: 5-7). As the post-world war era favored self-determination and decolonization, voices from the Greek

³⁶ Also an annex to this Convention was signed on July 1st

Cypriots for “enosis” (the union of the island with Greece) started becoming stronger³⁷.

Greece was reluctant to open a Cyprus debate, not out of fear of the Turkish side, but in order to not upset its relations with Britain. Thus, in the Paris Peace Conference there was no mention of the Cyprus question by the Greek Government (Crawshaw, 1978: 57). Nonetheless, in March 1947, the Greek parliament unanimously expressed the hope that the union with Cyprus would be realized (Crawshaw, 1978: 58). Nonetheless, until the end of 1949 the Greek government was too preoccupied fighting the communist guerillas to pursue the Cyprus issue (Xydis, 1966: 3).

In 1950, the same year that the Greek-Turkish rapprochement started, two events further strengthened the struggle of the Greek-Cypriots union. In January, a plebiscite was organized by the Ethnarchy³⁸, where more than 97% of those who voted expressed themselves in favor of “Enosis” (Xydis, 1966). In October, Archbishop Makarios III was elected and took on the union cause. He stated, “No offer of a constitution or any other compromise would be accepted by the people of Cyprus” (Crawshaw, 1978: 50-51).

Nevertheless, the Greek government was still reluctant to pursue the issue, fearing that the conditions at that time, did not allow for much optimism. Prime Minister Papagos for instance, on a speech to the parliament on December 17, 1952,

³⁷ Although it should be noted that an unsuccessful uprising against the British occupation had also occurred in 1931

³⁸ Archdiocese of Cyprus

stressed the importance of the Greek-Turkish friendship, and mentioned that the Cyprus issue would be dealt within the framework of current realities (Crawshaw, 1978: 67-68). Earlier that year, in June, Makarios had visited Athens and had gotten a promise from Sophocles Venizelos that he would examine the possibility of taking the Cyprus issue to the United Nations. However, he added that any decision would have to take into account the wider necessities of Greek foreign policy (Holland, 1998: 38).

In the meantime, Turkish interest on the issue also started to grow and on several occasions Turkish officials warned their Greek counterparts that Turkey would not accept a future union of Cyprus with Greece. In 1951, Köprülü had warned the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs that Greece should not open the Cyprus question and that if it did it would find the whole of Turkey against it, and, furthermore, that the Greek-Turkish friendship irrevocably damaged (Mutercimler and Oke, 2004: 293). In addition, “the Turkish Ambassador in Athens had informed the Greek government that Turkey desired to maintain the status quo on Cyprus, that any negotiations on the island should include Turkey and that the debate in the UN would undermine Greek-Turkish relations” (Xydis, 1966: 10). In 1954, before a meeting between Papagos and Menderes in Athens, the Turkish Ambassador adjured Kyrou³⁹ against mentioning the Cyprus issue to the Greek Premier, saying that such a conversation would have extremely unpleasant consequences on the Greek-Turkish alliance (Xydis, 1966: 12).

³⁹ Greek Ambassador to the UN

Finally, Greece decided to take the Cyprus issue to the United Nations in 1954. In April of 1954, the Greek government warned the British that if bilateral talks did not begin before August 20, they would go to the UN. Yet, the British response was not positive. On June 29, the British Foreign Office issued a basic statement about the Cyprus question; stating that “any British statement of policy for Cyprus should declare self-government and not self-determination to be the ultimate goal. Cyprus should remain a Commonwealth fortress” (Holland, 1998: 36).

The negative British response led the Greek Government to appeal to the United Nations. Joseph (1997: 36), who analyzes the Cyprus question within the analytical context of the Greek-Turkish relations, observes that the Greek appeal to the UN Assembly constituted a turning point in the Greek and Turkish involvement in Cyprus. Indeed, as talks proceeded, not only was it made clear that the Greek and Turkish positions were incompatible, but it was also the first time Greece and Turkey publicly disagreed on such an important topic. As a rebuttal to the Greek claims for union, the Turkish representative pointed out that the Greek case was based on the false assumption that Cyprus was Greek, while on the contrary it was an extension of Anatolia. He also stressed that Turkey would not accept any change in the status of Cyprus which did not have its whole-hearted consent (Crawshaw, 1978: 87).

The beginning of the armed struggle led by the Greek Cypriot organization EOKA (Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών) in April of 1955, created new

circumstances on the island. The British Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, decided to call a tripartite conference in London among Britain, Greece, and Turkey, with no Cypriots participating, in order to discuss the future of Cyprus. The conference, which produced no results whatsoever, within a few days managed to accomplish what was avoided for several years. The Cyprus quarrel had shifted from an Anglo-Greek one to a primarily Greco-Turkish one (Holland, 1995: 39). It was during the London conference, on September 6th and 7th, that the events against the Greek minority in Turkey took place.

5.8.2. Other Variables that Influenced the End of the Rapprochement

Apart from the Cyprus question and the pogrom against the Greek population of Istanbul and other Turkish cities, another event that happened approximately at the same time also influenced the Greek-Turkish rapprochement negatively. In 1953 Stalin died, and 1955, one year after the Bled coalition treaty, was marked by considerable improvement in the Soviet-Yugoslav relations. On May 26, 1955, a Soviet delegate led by Khrushchev, visited Belgrade and the two sides signed the “Belgrade declaration”, and agreed on mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs (Bjelakovic, 1999; 110). Combined with the developments in the Greek-Turkish front, the Balkan Pact would remain inactive and all the processes that the treaty envisaged were paused (Valinakis, 1989: 55).

5.9. Assessment of the 1950s Greek-Turkish Rapprochement

The rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, that happened in early the 1950s and ended in 1955 constitutes a failed effort of rapprochement, as the two countries were not able to extent their good relations for more than a few years. Even though the two states managed to make considerable progress on almost all of the rapprochement process' indicators, they were not able to prevent the collapse of the process. In addition, the agreements that were signed, and that were one of the main outcomes of the rapprochement process, became ineffective as soon as the relations between the two states deteriorated in early September of 1955. In the following pages, the contribution of each of the independent variables to the unsuccessful outcome of the rapprochement process will be discussed.

- **Impact of the international system to the national security**

It has already been pointed out that one of the main incentives for the initiation of the rapprochement was the challenge posed by the post-WWII international environment on both Turkey and Greece. These conditions not only continued for the period following the initiation of the rapprochement, but also became even more prevalent as the competition between the two major powers intensified in the early 1950s and the Korean War, which lasted from 1950 to 1953, emerged. Under these conditions, the incentives for continuing the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey increased, as rapprochement increased the security levels for both these states.

In order to elaborate the above point better, it must be pointed out that the armies of Turkey and Greece combined constituted a much stronger deterrent against a possible attacker. In addition, the Greek and Turkish General Staffs had managed to develop close cooperation in the first half of the 1950s, and the Coalition treaty further enhanced this cooperation. This fact allowed a common planning of defense strategies, which, in turn, made military cooperation even more efficient. Failing to continue the rapprochement process meant that the two states would also have to sacrifice much of their security towards their northern neighbors.

The unsuccessful outcome of the rapprochement, despite the increased motives for its continuation provided by the international system, shows that this variable did not influence the outcome of the rapprochement process.

- State identity

Unlike the first rapprochement, the second rapprochement took place between two states that, more or less, perceived each other as friends and not as possible threats. The foundations for such perceptions were largely based on the impact of the positive relations that prevailed during the 1930s, and more generally put, on the positive experience that the first rapprochement constituted. The ill treatment of the non-Muslim minorities, by the Turkish state during WWII, caused some skepticism, but was not enough on its own to create prevalent negative images among the Greek population against the Turks.

Another issue that must be raised is that, during the period that the current chapter covers, state identities were largely, if not exclusively, shaped by the international structure. For states like Turkey and Greece, which belong to the western world, communism was the “great evil” and, hence, the main state identity developed was anti-communistic and pro-western. This is quite clear if one takes a look at the Greek and Turkish newspapers between 1950 and 1955. The existence of a common enemy for Greece and Turkey further helped the creation of positive images between the two states by constructing the image of two states fighting together against a common threat. In that sense, communism played a role similar to the one Bulgaria and the revisionist powers played in the 1930s.

As far as the state images are concerned, their impact on the failure of the rapprochement is hard to estimate. It is true that the positive images that prevailed during the first half of the 1950s changed sharply after the events in Istanbul in September of 1955. However, it is equally true that some changes also took place before that time, and after the incompatibility of the Greek and Turkish goals concerning Cyprus became clear, sometime in the summer of 1955. In that sense, the change of state identities did not cause the end of the rapprochement, but instead, it much more likely that it was in large part due to the pogrom against the Istanbul Greeks.

- Costs and benefits equilibrium

The costs/benefits equilibrium did not play a role in the abrupt ending of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement process. On the contrary, the benefits from the process and the low costs of maintaining a close relationship would have been expected to positively impact the process and create high incentives for both states to try and keep the rapprochement going. In other words, the main assumption deriving from the examination of the 1950s rapprochement is that at the time the rapprochement ended the benefits outnumbered the costs, and that both Greece and Turkey lost significant benefits when the rapprochement process ended in September 1995.

Similar to the first rapprochement case, the first to benefit from the rapprochement were the minorities. Indeed, much like the 1930s, the conditions of the minorities improved. The general assumption for the minorities is that their living conditions followed the developments of the Greek-Turkish relations. As it was already mentioned, during the first half of the 1950s relations between the Turkish government and the Patriarchate reached their peak after the establishment of the Turkish state, while Greece approved the use of the term “Turkish” in order to describe minority institutions in western Thrace, a decision that caused problems for Greek governments that followed (Coufoudakis, 1985).

- Interdependence

Economic benefits resulting from the rapprochement process were clear for both states. The volume of trade between Turkey and Greece increased, and the policy makers worked towards this direction. The financial benefits that could derive from friendly relations were not only highlighted by political leaders at the beginning of the rapprochement, as it was discussed earlier, but also became the subject for analysis. In an article that appeared on the Greek press (*Oikonomikos Taxidromos*, 2/9/1954), for instance, Professor Lung from the University of Zagreb, analyzed the importance of a closer tripartite economic cooperation and arrived at the conclusion that the possibilities of a Turkish, Greek, and Yugoslav economic cooperation could endorse many more activities than trade alone.

The developing economic relations and the prospects for future benefits, however, were not enough to lead to a successful rapprochement, and, definitely, not enough to prevent the failure of the rapprochement process. The main assumption is that despite the increase in trade volume and the willingness for further cooperation in this sector, interdependence was not a significant enough factor in relation to the success or failure of the rapprochement case, as far as the 1950s case is concerned.

- Leadership

Compared to the first rapprochement, the role of the leaders was less important for the initiation of the process. This is mainly because, unlike the 1930s, in the 1950s rapprochement, Turkey and Greece had no important issues to solve,

and, hence, the political decision for a rapprochement had no complicated repercussions. Nonetheless, when looking at leadership as an independent variable, the assumption is that affected the failure of the process, meaning that Greek and Turkish political leaders could have possibly prevented the rapprochement process' failure, but failed to do so.

As far as the Greek side is concerned, Greek politicians had failed to deal with the emerging Cyprus issue in a way that would take Turkey's interests under consideration, even though they had been warned several times by their Turkish colleagues. As it was mentioned earlier, Greek leaders, such as Papagos and Sophocles Venizelos, had been very careful in dealing with the Cyprus question and had publicly expressed that the Greek-Turkish friendship should not be interrupted because of Cyprus. After 1954, however, the Greek government was not able to resist the public sentiment and followed a more decisive approach, which although it was aiming against the British colonial rule, greatly dissatisfied Turkey.

Likewise, Turkish leaders had the chance to save the rapprochement process, but were unable, or, unwilling to do so. Their main responsibility lay on the fact that they failed to protect the Greek population of Istanbul during the events of September 1955. As these events were the decisive and final blow to the rapprochement process, it is only logical to assume that had they been avoided the rapprochement process might had the chance to continue and become a successful case.

- Depth of the process

In the literature review chapter it was argued that when the rapprochement process has an important impact on all of the rapprochement's indicators, then the process' chances for success increase. Nonetheless, this was not the case for the second Greek-Turkish rapprochement. On the one hand, as it is clear from table 5.2, the rapprochement process influenced all of the indicators of the rapprochement process, including the summit level meetings, military cooperation and the society. On the other hand, the considerable progress of the rapprochement process did not manage to prevent the failure of the rapprochement, as the problems causing its collapse could not be overcome.

- Turning points

It has been made clear that a series of unexpected and unfortunate events were the main reasons leading to the failure of the rapprochement process. The Cyprus problem is considered by far the main factor in ending the 1950s rapprochement. Though it still remains uncertain why the Greek government did not heed the Turkish warnings that the Turkish officials voiced numerous times throughout the years, the most plausible explanation is that Papagos simply ignored the Turkish interests in Cyprus, as it is supported by a number of indications (Coufoudakis, 1985). One of the indications is that the considerably close relations between Greece and Turkey created the impression to the Greek policy makers that

eventually the Turkish reaction would be mild, especially because neither of the countries considered the other as a potential threat.

The events in Istanbul in September of 1955, constituted a blow to the rapprochement process in two ways. On the one hand, they shocked the Greek public. It is true that the Cyprus issue had already caused some unfriendly feelings in both the Greek and Turkish public opinions before 1955. Tachau (1959: 259) notices:

[In Turkey]...public discussion of the Cyprus issue in the summer of 1955 became permeated with sentiments of anger and frustration. By the time Turkish interests in the dispute were recognized with the calling of the Tripartite Conference in London late in August, feeling within the country had reached fever pitch.

However, the September events created a much stronger trauma and feelings of enmity than the ones that had been prevalent in the Greek public opinion up until that point. On the other hand, the September events weakened an actor, the Greek minority in Istanbul, which had supported, and could have continued to do so, the rapprochement process.

Finally, the strengthening of relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, although of secondary importance, should also be considered as an event that contributed to the unsuccessful outcome of the rapprochement. Not only were the tripartite agreements of 1953 and 1954 weakened, but also the possibility for Yugoslavia to play a mediating role in the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus had diminished.

- GRIT strategy

Similar to the first case, the use (or not) of the GRIT strategy during negotiations is an irrelevant independent variable in respect with the success or failure of the rapprochement. During the early 1950s there were no negotiations between Greece and Turkey as there was no real conflict between them. Most of the problems between the two countries had been resolved before 1930, and during the 1950s discussions between leaders mostly focused on how to further develop cooperation, rather than on how to solve issues.

5.10. Concluding Remarks

Besides the promising cooperative trends that were achieved in the late 1940s and throughout the first half of the 1950s, Greece and Turkey did not manage to create a solid basis that could withstand the frustrations caused by the Cyprus question. From 1955 onwards, the Greek-Turkish relations would never reach the level of cooperation that was achieved in the 1930s and during the 1950s unsuccessful rapprochement. On the contrary, as it will be discussed in the next chapter, the Cyprus question became a major problem and a source of continuous friction between Turkey and Greece, and the two countries, in fact, came to the brink of war several times before the next effort for rapprochement was attempted in 1987.

CHAPTER 6

THE 1988 GREEK-TURKISH UNSUCCESSFUL RAPPROCHEMENT

6.1. Introduction

The Cyprus issue which became the main cause of the failure of the 1950's rapprochement should not be perceived as "just another problem". Indeed, its importance and its overall impact on the Greek-Turkish relations has been greater than any other issue between the two states. In aftermath of 1955, and especially after 1974, the situation in Cyprus is the main factor shaping Greek-Turkish relations⁴⁰. In a way Cyprus woke up feelings between Greeks and Turks that had been buried for decades. It offered a new ground for contest and new space for irredentism to develop. In a way Cyprus became a second Asia Minor, a battlefield for another clash between Greek and Turkish nationalisms.

Consequently, even though few things relating to the pre-1955 status quo between Turkey and Greece changed, the Cyprus issue constituted such a strong

⁴⁰ This is the case for both the third and the fourth rapprochements

catalyst, that Turkey and Greece started perceiving each other as competitors engaged in a zero-sum game. In turn, new issues arose relating to the Aegean Sea waters and airspace, while the conditions for the minorities worsened as well. During the decades following the 1950s, all these issues were compiled in order to form what is currently our understanding of the Greek-Turkish conflict.

Although, the relations between Greece and Turkey improved briefly in the early 1960s after the signing of the London agreements, establishing an independent Cyprus state, the first real effort for a new rapprochement occurred only in 1988, when the Turkish Prime minister Turgut Özal, and his Greek counterpart Andreas Papandreu met in Davos, and tried to initiate a new era for the Greek-Turkish relations, what is now remembered as “the Davos spirit”. In this chapter, the 1988 rapprochement will be discussed, and the reasons for its failure will be examined.

6.2. Historical Background to the 1988 Rapprochement

Before examining the 1988 rapprochement, it is important to discuss developments in Greek-Turkish relations in the previous years. Undoubtedly, the most serious blow to the relations between Turkey and Greece came in 1974 with Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus following the unsuccessful attempt by the ruling junta in Greece to overthrow the Cypriot president Archbishop Makarios. Concomitantly, from 1973 onwards the tension in the Aegean Sea began to rise and reach its zenith in 1976 when the two states reached the brink of a war. In 1976,

following a number of meetings between Greek and Turkish experts an agreement was finally signed in Bern on November 11, which arranged a framework for future negotiations between Turkey and Greece. The agreement was kept secret from the media (art. 5), while the two signatories agreed to abstain from any action that would threaten the negotiations (articles 6 & 7) (for the full text of the agreement see *To Vima* 29/3/1987). From 1977 until 1981, a number of meetings—including five experts meetings and 11 meetings at the level of Foreign Ministries' Secretary Generals, and a summit level meeting between the Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis and his Turkish counterpart Bulent Ecevit, on March 11 & 12 1978 in Montreux—took place. However, no progress came of the said meetings.

In 1981 all negotiations between Greece and Turkey collapsed as a result of the change of government in Greece. The newly elected Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, had in the past used hardliner rhetoric on Turkey, and his party officially defended a position according to which negotiations were useful only when both parties have something to claim, and as Greece did not claim anything from Turkey then no negotiation between the two states should take place. While in opposition, Papandreou had continuously criticized the New Democracy government for engaging in negotiations with Turkey. Moreover, during the 1976 crisis Papandreou issued a call to "Sink the Hora"⁴¹, an action that would most

⁴¹ Hora is the oceanographic Turkish vessel involved in the Summer 1976 Aegean incident

likely result in war between Greece and Turkey if it had been implemented by the Greek government (Clogg, 1987: 139).

Hence, it was not surprising that Greek-Turkish relations further deteriorated during the first years of the 1980s. In December 1982, following repeated Greek allegations of Turkish infringements of the Greek airspace, Papandreu handed out personally a memorandum detailing the Turkish infringements at the NATO ministerial council meeting. In September 1983, Greece boycotted the NATO military exercise "Display Determination '83" in an expression of protest for the Turkish insistence that the island of Lemnos should be demilitarized. In addition, the unilateral declaration of independence of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, on November 15, 1983 and the Greece newly adopted defense doctrine, which considered Turkey rather than the Warsaw pact as the main source of threat, in December 1984, brought Greek-Turkish relations to a new low. The puzzle of hostile relations in the 1980s was completed by two border incidents. The first one in 1984 concerned allegations that Turkish destroyers fired against Greek destroyers observing them from within Greek territorial waters during an exercise. The second incident took place in December 1986 when Turkish and Greek border patrols exchanged fire on the Evros river, resulting in the death of two Turkish and one Greek soldier (on Greek-Turkish relations prior to 1987 see Rizas, 2006; Rozakis, 1991; Herakleides, 2007; Bolukbasi, 2004; Bahceli, 1990; on the 1980s see Clogg, 1991: 18-19).

6.3. The March 1987 Aegean Crisis

The short review of the relations between Greece and Turkey before 1988 clearly indicates the high level of tension between the two neighboring states. This built-up tension was finally released in late March 1987 when Turkey and Greece engaged in another crisis in the Aegean Sea that once again dragged them on the brinks of violent conflict. The 1987 Aegean crisis is important as it made clear to both parties that if they did not try to improve their relations, not only the likelihood of future crises would be high, but also the scenario of engaging in warfare was possible. Thus, immediately after the end of the March 1987 crisis, steps were taken to initiate an effort that would result in a Greek-Turkish understanding.

The road towards the crisis opened in February 1987 when a new exploration program for oil was announced by Denison Mines Ltd, a company at that time was partially owned by the Greek Public Oil Company (10% of its shares). Although Denison had been conducting oil surveys since 1976, this time the exploration targeted an area beyond the Greek territorial waters, at the Bambouras location, 10nm within the international waters of the Aegean Sea (Dimitrakis, 2007: 102). At the same time the Greek government drafted a law that would allow it to take control of the majority of Denison Mines' shares and thus control its exploration program.

It was not the first time that research for oil in the Aegean Sea and its exploration was causing friction between Turkey and Greece. Apart from the problems that arose between 1973 and 1976, also in the 1980s Greek exploration

activities were alarming to the Turkish government. In 1982, the Greek government, answering Turkish complaints, gave assurances that it would comply with the 1976 Bern Agreement and invoked a “force majeure” provision of the concession agreement in order to cease exploration activities (Bolukbasi, 2004: 298)⁴². Similar demarches were made by the Turkish side after 1984, concerning exploration rights the Greek government had granted to the national petroleum company including areas beyond Greek territorial waters, close to Thermaikos and Strymonikos gulfs (Bolukbasi, 2004: 298).

The Greek literature supports that the crisis was the outcome of a misunderstanding, as the decision of the Greek government to acquire the majority of Denison’s shares was aiming to stop the company’s exploration activities beyond Greece’s territorial waters (UN documents S/18766). Turkey, on the other hand, became convinced that the Greek government was planning to proceed with the exploration and exploitation activities beyond the 6 nm limit (See for example the letter sent by the Turkish permanent representative to the UN Ambassador Ilter Turkmen, UN documents S/18759). Turkey’s distrust was exacerbated after several statements made by Greek officials that the “how, where, and when” exploration and exploitation activities will take place is a decision that the Greek government,

⁴² At this point it should be noted that on several occasions the PASOK government had declared that it did not recognize the Bern Agreement. In March 1982, the deputy minister of foreign affairs had informed the Greek Ambassador to Ankara that “...the Greek government considers inalienable its rights to conduct research drilling and mining within the Greek Aegean Shelf”. Also in June 23, 1983 Yannis Kapsis, deputy minister of foreign affairs, informed the Turkish ambassador Mr. Alacam that the Bern Agreement does not mean anything to Greeks, while in September 1985 Kapsis repeated the same to Turkish Ambassador Mr. Akiman who replaced Alacam. See Andreas Papandreou speech at the Greek parliament, see Ta Nea 6/10/1985

and nobody else, will take (UN documents S/18766). Lack of understanding between the Turkish Ambassador Mr. Akiman, and Greek deputy MFA Mr. Kapsis was also one of the reasons that prevented the diffusion of the crisis (Dimitrakis, 2007: 104). Finally, Stephen Roman, the Denison's Chairman, contributed to the creation of the misunderstanding by (dis)informing President Özal that the Greek government intended to nationalize the company in order to proceed with oil surveys beyond her territorial waters (Dimitrakis, 2007). On February 24, Denison announced that the drilling at Bambouras location had already been agreed with the Greek government (Ta Nea, 25/2/1985), something that the Greek government denied.

The crisis peaked on March 26, when Turkey published a map including areas of the Aegean Sea where the Turkish government was granting exploration and exploitation rights to the Turkish national oil company TPAO in the government newspaper (Resmi Gazete). These areas included parts of the Aegean Sea, to the west of the Greek islands of Lesbos and Lemnos (Ta Nea 27/3/1987). On the same day the Turkish Security Council met and decided to send the "Hora" to the Aegean for oil surveys (Milliyet, 27/3/1987)⁴³. Several harsh statements by both Greek and Turkish officials followed this only to further deteriorate the situation, while a meeting between Ambassador Akiman and Mr. Kapsis fell too short to yield any result. On March 27, the Greek Navy was already in its combat position. The Greek destroyers patrolled to the east of Lemnos island, waiting

⁴³ The Hora was at that time renamed as Sismik 1

overthere for the Sismik and its escorts to arrive. Similarly, the Greek air force sustained a 3, 5 minute preparedness level and land forces were quickly settling into a battle position across the Evros river (Ta Nea, 28/3/1987). Papandreou made a statement saying that Greece would protect its rights over the Aegean Sea, and that the Greek armed forces would give a bitter lesson if Turkey continued its provocations (Milliyet 28/3/1987). On the other hand, Özal, who was at the time visiting England, appeared calmer and stated on BBC that “There is the Bern Agreement. We have to comply with it... I am not interested on this issue any more, we will see what happens” (Milliyet 28/3/1987). The crisis was finally diffused on March 28, and the press in both Greece and Turkey perceived its ending as a win of their respective states (Milliyet 29/3/1987; Ta Nea 30/3/1987; see also Kapsis, 1990, for an extended narrative of the crisis from a Greek perspective).

6.4 The Initiation of the Rapprochement

The Aegean crisis that occurred in March 1987 was the starting point for a number of developments that finally led to the initiation of the third Greek-Turkish rapprochement 10 months later, in January 1988. There is little information on the exact events that took place during these 10 months as all parties involved were very cautious so that there are no leaks concerning the process. In general, what can be said is that the situation was similar to the 1928-30 negotiations period, although in a different context. Given the hostile relations between the two states and the lack of public support for a possible understanding between Greece and Turkey, the

negotiations remained secret, involved a very limited number of people and were extremely topic specific.

6.5. Procedures Leading to the Initiation of the Rapprochement

The most decisive moment that took place during the crisis was Papandreou's meeting with the Turkish ambassador Nazmi Akiman, which took place on the morning of March 29 after the Greek prime minister's invitation. This meeting had a huge impact both on the diffusion of the crisis and what followed the months after. According to Akiman⁴⁴, Papandreou welcomed him not in his office but in a bungalow that was also part of the property. The two men were alone without the presence of other diplomats, advisors etc. The Greek Prime Minister served the Turkish ambassador some whisky and explained to him that he believed "he could do business with Mr. Özal", and that the next step should be to discuss a protocol on what the next steps must be and what is to be discussed. He also added that "if Venizelos and Inonu were successful, we can also be successful".

Based on Akiman's description of his meeting with Andreas Papandreou it is clear that the Greek prime minister tried to take the first step by opening to the other side. The unofficial and friendly tone that Papandreou gave during the meeting, by seeing Akiman in the bungalow and serving drinks himself, must also be considered as an indication of a step-back from his previous hard rhetoric. In order to remove the crisis and open the lines of communication with Turkey,

⁴⁴ Interviewed by the author

Papandreou had to “lose face” and also confess the disappointment that Mr. Kapsis, whom he had appointed, had caused him. In a way, the opening of the meeting produced a similar effect with Venizelos’ speech which ended the Megali Idea. In a similar way, the meeting with Akiman signaled the end of Papandreou’s intransigence and the adoption of a new outlook regarding the Greek-Turkish relations.

The meeting also had a great trust-building effect. Papandreou’s admission that he believed he could come to terms with Özal was an important step to that direction. Earlier that morning Özal also instructed Akiman to reason with Papandreou directly⁴⁵, as the Turkish Prime Minister also believed that Papandreou would do his best to moderate the crisis. The developing understanding between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers was important to the trust-building process. It should be also emphasized that the only other person involved in the communication between Papandreou and Özal was Ambassador Akiman⁴⁶, who travelled several times between Athens and Ankara to personally deliver the notes each prime minister sent to the other.

Following the first meeting an unusual type of shuttle diplomacy started between the Greek and Turkish prime ministers. This process resembles correspondence processes in other rapprochement cases. For instance, there are commonalities with the personal correspondence between Venizelos and Inonu in

⁴⁵ This call was very likely recorded by the Greek secret services and it is probable what caused Papandreou’s invitation about an hour later

⁴⁶ There is no information of any participation of the Greek Ambassador during the shuttle diplomacy phase

1928, or between George Papandreou and Ismail Cem in 1999. There are of course differences between the 1987 process and the other two, most notably the duration that the period of exchanging letters took. Nonetheless, the goal, which was to prepare the ground for the initiation of the rapprochement, was common across these three cases.

To sum up, leaving the special conditions that shaped the 1987 pre-initiation period aside, it is clear that some of the basic steps leading towards the initiation of the rapprochement process were present in this third case as well. Taking the first step, trust-building and preparing of the ground were steps that were followed in 1987, as they have also been followed in the other cases, although they were manifested in various ways.

Table 6.1.

Action/ Event	Aegean Crisis	Papandreou meets Turkish ambassador	Papandreou meets Turkish ambassador	Message diplomacy
Time	March 1987	March 29, 1987	March 29, 1987	March 1987- January 1988
Effect	Pressure for cooperati on	First step towards a dialogue	Trust- building	Trust- building – preparing the ground

6.6. Main Incentives for the Initiation of the 1988 Rapprochement

As two neighboring countries with a leading role to play in the South East Europe, Greece and Turkey had several stakes in advancing their relations to a higher level. Hostile relations between the two states deprived them of valuable resources and were costly. As the past experiences already proved, improved relations offered significant benefits. Domestic political situation in Turkey and Greece for instance favored rapprochement as the two prime ministers were facing urgent issues that were seeking solution. One of the main tasks Özal had to undertake was the smooth “civilianization” of Turkish political life (on this issue see Evin, 1994). The other major issue, that of security, was created by the rise of Kurdish nationalism and the armed struggle that the PKK and the Kurdish rebels started at the South-East part of Turkey (see Taspinar, 2005). Other than that, Özal stood for a modern society that would be moral, religiously pious and respectful to traditional value (Kalaycioglu, 2002). In Greece, during the last two years of PASOK’s rule (1987-1989), in which is included the period of the rapprochement, the party was increasingly fragile to the ongoing allegations about various scandals, including the infamous Koskotas scandal and Papandreou’s affair with the much younger stewardess Dimitra Liani. In turn these scandals caused instability to the government not only because a number of ministers quitted or were being dismissed, but also because the opposition parties started pressing for early elections (Mendrinou, 2006; Close, 2002, Clogg).

Economic considerations were also favorable for a Greek-Turkish rapprochement. The 1980s was a time when Turkey tried to stabilize and open its economy (Onis, 1991). ANAPs (Anavatan Partisi) plan for economic revival was a mixture of maintaining the stabilization measures that had been adopted by the military government and liberal policies supporting the entrepreneurial spirit and limiting the state's engagement in commerce and industry (Ilkin, 1991). In general, the economic policies adopted in the 1980s were quite fruitful, leading to a dramatic increase in exports of goods and services (Saracoglu, 1994). In Greece, following the 1985 elections, an effort for stabilizing the economy was assumed by adopting austerity measures, tight income policies, and efforts to control the public deficit. A new set of institutional/structural reforms that emphasized the liberalization of the banking system, the flexibility of the labor market and the promotion of the stock market were also adopted (Tsalakotos, 1998: 118; on PASOK's economic policies see also to Pagoulatos 2006: 137 and Hekimoglou, 2006).

As far as the foreign policy strategies are concerned, rapprochement was favored by Özal's ideas, who favored an effort for normalization of relations so much with the countries to the east as well as with the ones to the west of the Turkish borders. Foreign policy in Özal's era was led by the economic and political interest rather than ideology (Steinbach, 1994). According to Birand (1991: 27), especially concerning the policy vis-à-vis Greece:

The Turkish Prime Minister (Turgut Özal) introduced for the first time a policy aimed at changing the public opinion and the subconscious idea of

the “establishment” and the methods of approach, while at the same time trying to understand “the other side”. He decided to destroy the deeply rooted anti-Greek sentiments in his country, thereby undoing the taboos set aside by the Greek-Turkish disputes. Greece was now confronted with a whole new set of ideas and Özal made his courageous attempt to review the problem under a whole new light

In general, Özal is considered as a promoter, or even the leader, of the neo-ottomanism doctrine which dictated Turkey’s active engagement both in the East and the West (See Ataman, 2002; Cengiz Candar’s article, *Sabah*, 28/4/1992). As for Greece, much of the discussion on PASOK’s foreign policy focuses on how Papandreou shifted to a more pragmatic position towards those issues that matter to Greece’s foreign affairs (See for instance Coufoudakis 1983; Coufoudakis, 1988; Couloumbis and Yannis, 1983: 370-372). This change was mainly an outcome of the PASOK’s development from a small anti-junist movement to a governing party between 1974 and 1981. However, to the extent that relations with Turkey were concerned Papandreou remained relatively consistent with his pre-1981 ideas. This inflexible approach towards Turkey continued after the 1985 elections, even though, emerging economy and security concerns favored an even more realistic view on foreign policy. As Coufoudakis (1988) states:

On the core issues of Greek foreign policy, however, PASOK remained firm. Until the end of 1986, no direct negotiations were undertaken with Turkey despite pressures from the U.S., the EC, and the conservative opposition in the Parliament, as long as PASOK’s preconditions for a dialogue with Turkey were not met. Greece also continued its nonparticipation in NATO exercises in the Aegean that questioned established command and control structures and other Greek sovereign rights; and continued to object to the normalization of Turkey’s relations with the EC unless Turkey revoked discriminatory measures against the Greek minority of Istanbul

The previous discussion leads to the assumption that some basic incentives for rapprochement were present both within the previous two cases and the present

case, which surfaced from 1988 onwards. However, it must be pointed out that none of these incentives actually played a role. The explanation is that relations between them had reached such a low point that Greece and Turkey were prepared to bear the costs of continuing hostile relations than cooperate. The option to cooperate was only explored after the March 1987 crisis, which made it apparent to both states that, if failed to improve their relations, the likelihood of an armed conflict between them could by no means be completely eliminated.

Hence the Aegean crisis must be considered as the foremost, if not the only, incentive for the 1988 rapprochement. The rapid escalation caused a shock to both Turkey and Greece. It simultaneously made obvious that the two states were lacking even the basic communication channels that could contribute at times of crises so that issues could be solved in a peaceful manner.

6.7. The Rapprochement Process

At this point it is important to clarify that unlike the previous two cases of Greek-Turkish rapprochement, the one in 1988 was taking place at the time when great hostility and mistrust dominated the relations between them. Given that the two states could just avoid an armed confrontation in 1987; even a small, but essential, improvement can be counted as a rapprochement according to the definition provided in the second chapter. This is because even a conservative approach towards cooperation can be considered as a “*significant normalization and improvement, followed by a noteworthy increase in the will to cooperate*” when

the previous state of affairs is warlike relations. The initiation of the rapprochement happened in the last day of January 1988, approximately ten months after the March crisis.

The meetings between Andreas Papandreou and Nazmi Akıman were not kept secret from the public, but selective information was leaked to the press concerning the content of the messages that the two Prime Ministers exchanged. According to Akıman (2002: 27) most of the times the two men “worked on a text that would explain to the public why the two countries decided to start a dialogue, what would be the subject matter of this dialogue, and what the mechanism for it would be”. As the “message diplomacy” continued, the idea that a dialogue could be beneficial to both parties started taking root. For instance, after another meeting between Papandreou and Akıman in July, the head of the Prime Minister’s Diplomatic Office stated:

Mr. Prime Minister welcomed today the Turkish Ambassador Nazmi Akıman, who delivered the Turkish answer to the message that the Greek side had sent...[T]oday’s answer by the Turkish side is part of a process, and it gives hopes for the continuation of this process to the benefit of both neighboring countries (Ta Nea, 23/7/1987)

On the same issue Papandreou stated:

It (Özal’s message) includes new elements and it gives hopes that it aims towards the benefit of the people of the two neighboring states (Milliyet, 23/7/1987)

6.8. Breaking Down the Rapprochement Process

By the end of 1987 it was apparent that communication between Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Özal was paying off and it was expected that 1988 would bring important developments to the Greek-Turkish relations. Before the end of 1987, a meeting to bring together Papandreou and Özal in Davos, at the end of the January 1988, had been arranged, without announcing such to the public on both sides (To Vima, 3/1/1988). However, the expectations before the meeting were not particularly high.

Within the next pages we are going to explore how the indicators of the rapprochement, which were put forth in the literature review chapter, apply to the Greek-Turkish 1988 rapprochement.

a. Summit level communication

One of the most interesting characteristics of the 1988 rapprochement was that it was initiated during a meeting between the Prime Minister of Turkey Turgut Özal and his Greek counterpart Andreas Papandreou at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos. The meeting was the outcome of a long lasted communication via messages (talking papers) that were exchanged between the two men.

The meeting itself constituted a major breakthrough for the for Greek-Turkish relations, considering that even the hard-liners, such as Papandreou, adopted after 1981 concerning negotiations did not allow for any dialogue to take place, even though efforts were made by the Turkish side. Two years before the Davos Summit, in 1986, the two leaders were attending another Davos Forum and

pressure was put on Papandreou by the WEF organizers and the Turkish side, especially the Turkish businessman Şarik Tara, for him to arrange a meeting with Özal (To Vima, 2/2/1986). The Turkish press previously reported about an upcoming meeting in between two leaders. But, instead, Özal and Papandreou met only briefly and did nothing but shake hands and have a brief talk (Milliyet, 1/2/1986; Milliyet 2/2/1986).

On the contrary, during the 1988 WEF, Özal and Papandreou met six times in total from Saturday January 30 to Monday February 1, 1988. The meetings were successful in establishing a personal relation between the two Prime Ministers and create an atmosphere of trust which would allow a fruitful dialogue to develop. After the meetings Papandreou was asked whether he believed the “ice” was broken between Greece and Turkey. He answered:

On the personal relations level, yes. As far as the two nations are concerned, which I believe both of them desire peace, it will take some time to overcome the stereotypes of the past and create new ones (Ta Nea, 2/2/1988).⁴⁷

Establishing better relations, even if this was limited to the decision making level, was one of the main goals of Davos in the first place. At the time there was the impression on both sides (but especially on the Turkish side) that once a minimum level of trust developed, then it would be easier to discuss the problems concerning the Aegean Sea, Cyprus, the minorities etc. As Özal put it:

The problems had piled up and unfortunately very few efforts were made for their resolution. The problems continue to pile up and at some parts of the two nations several harsh positions relating to the Greek-Turkish problems had been noted. We understood that the solution to the problems is not easy,

⁴⁷ In this case PM Papandreou means positive stereotypes

on the contrary it is very hard... We know that there are different views for the same problem in each nation, and, thus, in order to find a solution we first need to melt the ice between the two states (Ta Nea, 2/2/1988)

Similarly, Papandreou noted:

I think on both sides we want to emphasize the fact that the course has now changed. The course now is clearly peaceful. The goal is to overcome our difficulties to the degree that this is possible or leave them aside and work for the benefit of the two nations, towards development and good neighboring relations, which will give the opportunity for both countries to take decisions on their own and not being paternalized by third parties (Ta Nea, 2/2/1988)

Özal and Papandreou met two more times in Brussels during the NATO summit, which occurred in March 1988. The two Prime Ministers managed to reassure that the Davos spirit was still alive. The first meeting occurred on March 3, lasted for 90 minutes and the journalists were not allowed to attend. Following statements were also short, and in general they pointed out to the spirit of good will and cooperation that prevailed during the meeting. During the meeting the two Foreign Ministers, Mr. Papoulias and Mr. Yilmaz were also present. The following day, however, a detailed common statement was drafted and then shared with the press with a richer content of information on what Papandreou and Özal had discussed, and what decisions they took⁴⁸.

It is clear from the common statement that unlike what had happened in Davos, the two Prime Ministers in Brussels decided to discuss the essence of the problems between Greece and Turkey, or at least some of the problems. Thus, issues such as the fortune of the Greek citizens living in Turkey, the military aircraft

⁴⁸ The content of the statement will be discussed later in this chapter

flights over the Aegean and Cyprus were discussed. After the second meeting, which lasted three hours, Papandreou maintained:

We have just started on a long road to overcome the problems. Özal is providing all the indications that he is honest and objective. We have established a "hot line" in order to soften the problems that might arise. Our goal is a long-lasting peace at our relations, so that the fear that the one country is a threat to the other will decline. With Özal we agreed that no war shall happen (Ta Nea, 5/3/1988; on Brussels meetings see also Ta Nea 4/3/1988; Milliet 4-5/3/1988).

Although the results of the meetings were encouraging and it was apparent that both Papandreou and Özal supported what they accomplished in Davos, expressions like "no war" are indicative that the rapprochement effort was happening at a time when relations between Greece and Turkey were still quite fragile. Accordingly, in order for the rapprochement to be successful, it would take immense efforts to reverse the hostile images that were constructed over the past years.

The third, and last, time that Papandreou and Özal met was during the latter's visit to Athens in June 13-15, which was decided in Brussels. Özal's visit to Greece, which was the first visit of a Turkish Prime Minister after Menderes' visit, caused mass demonstrations especially by Greek-Cypriots living in Greece. For the protection of the Turkish officials 8,000 police officers were conscripted, in one of the biggest police mobilization that Greece had ever experienced (Ta Nea, 13/6/1988).

The two prime ministers met twice on June 13th for a total of two hours in parallel with the meeting of the Economy Committee⁴⁹. The Greek government

⁴⁹ The committee will be discussed in detail later

spokesperson stated that the atmosphere was better than before, but added that there was no solution or agreement on any of the problems in Greek-Turkish relations (Ta Nea, 14/6/1988). Nonetheless, by the end of the second day of Özal's visit, it was quite obvious that the two parties' views were still very far. The problems that came to fore were about the all-known agenda of the Greek-Turkish conflict. As Özal also stated, of the problems between Turkey and Greece were the issues of the length of international space, the width of territorial waters, the militarization of the East Aegean islands and the Flight Information Region (the FIR).. This view was directly opposed by Athens, which stuck to the original line that the delimitation of the continental shelf was the only issue between the two countries (Ta Nea, 15/6/1988). The lack of any development was immediately publicized by the Greek and Turkish press. For instance, Milliyet's main title on the visit was "No result from the visit" (Milliyet, 15/6/1988), while after Özal left Greece the Greek press reported "the ghost of Davos", implying that whatever was achieved until that time was ruined by the Athens meetings.

Even though Papandreou and Özal started discussing the Greek-Turkish problems, the divergence of their positions was so stark that the two Prime Ministers anxiously pushed their point to a point of rendering the rapprochement process in dormancy. This is quite clear in Papandreou's statement on the last day of the visit. As he stated:

I would like first of all to say that the meeting at Athens is the third of a series of meetings that started in Davos, and that, certainly, there will be other meetings to follow. There is an exaggeration on the press headlines, and I don't only mean the Greek ones but also the Turkish, as far as the

possibilities and the quality of these meetings. Whoever insists that with three meetings between Papandreou and Özal all the Greek-Turkish problems will be solved, of course he has no idea with the whole story...Was there any progress? It is natural that we don't expect problems to be solved miraculously in these types of meetings (Ta Nea, 16/6/1988)

Likewise, Özal stated:

The series of meetings between Papandreou and me was realized in an environment of mutual understanding and in respect to the benefit of the two nations. The course we initiated in Davos was continued here with the same orientation, and it is without doubt that the meetings of the two commissions in Ankara and Athens the following September, as well as, Papandreou's visit to Ankara next fall, will go even further and solidify our work (Milliyet, 16/6/1988)

It is apparent from both the above statements that Papandreou and Özal were well aware that their work in bridging the Greek and the Turkish views was hard. However, they did not share –at least not completely– the views expressed by the press, which saw the visit to Athens as an abrupt end to the Davos process. Finally, it should be mentioned that during his visit, Özal, met with the head of the opposition party Mr. Mitsotakis and the Greek President Mr. Sartzetakis. Moreover, on the second day of his visit he laid a wreath to the Unknown Soldier monument at Syntagma square.

b. Signing of agreements

Although the rapprochement process of 1988 did not last long there were several issues agreed between the two sides. In accordance with the Davos spirit which dictated that breaking the ice and establishing trust is the first step towards rapprochement, the agreements that were signed between Greece and Turkey were mainly concerned with procedural issues and aimed at creating the conditions for

building a strong foundation upon which future negotiations could be based. In general, the agreements can be categorized into two groups. The first one includes decisions or commitments that were discussed between the two prime ministers, and were communicated through the common announcements that the two parties drew up together during their meetings. The second group included written agreements that were signed by the two parties.

One of the most important decisions that were taken after the Davos meetings was the establishment of two separate committees (See Davos common announcement Ta Nea, 1/2/1988). One of the committees would focus on issues relating to the economic and social level cooperation, such as business collaboration, commerce, tourism communications, and cultural exchanges (paragraph 7). The second committee was given the task of recording the problems and, if possible, exploring the possibilities for the closure of the gap between the two countries (paragraph 7). Özal and Papandreou would personally supervise the progress of each committee. In the mean time, they also agreed to encourage meetings between military, press, and businessmen representatives, as well as establishing a common chamber of commerce (paragraph 7).

The two Prime Ministers also decided that they should meet at least once per year and exchange visits. Apart from the visits Özal and Papandreou agreed to establish a “hot line” of communication that would allow for immediate action in case of a future crisis (paragraph 8). It is interesting that when Özal was asked by Turkish correspondents what the “colour” of the line would be, he replied “Blue,

because this is the color of the sea between the two countries” (Milliyet, 1/2/1988). In addition they agreed that their representatives in international organizations should meet more often so as to establish cooperation (paragraph 8). Heraclides (2007: 155) suggests that the Davos announcement was a groundbreaking text for the context of Greek-Turkish relations’ at that time, and that could open a new era for the relations between Greece and Turkey, even if the spirit of the text, alone, was applied.

The second common announcement that followed the Brussels’ meetings also involved a series of agreements on the critical issues that divided Greece and Turkey (For the full text of the announcement see Ta Nea, 5/3/1988). This is because, as it has already been pointed out, in Brussels the two Prime Ministers discussed these problems. Firstly, it was decided that both countries should abstain from any actions that could undermine the prevailing good atmosphere (paragraph 3). Secondly, it was decided that a sub-commission of the political commission, established at Davos, would meet within March, in order to discuss issues related to the national military exercises, as well as, those problems that are linked to the military airplanes’ flights over the Aegean Sea. Diplomats and military experts would form this sub-committee (paragraph 4). On the Cyprus issue that was especially urgent for the Greek side, it was decided that the missing persons’ committee, which included people from both the Cyprus’ communities and members of the International Red Cross should be re-activated. There was also

exchange of information concerning the missing persons, which was provided by Greek and Turkish Cypriots (paragraph 5).

The following two paragraphs (5&6) are also important as they show another strategy that was used during the negotiation, what is known as tit-for-tat. Turkish side announced (paragraph 5) that after the lifting of the 1964 decree which was announced in January 1988, before Davos, Greek citizens of Turkey were allowed to invest the incomes derived from their properties in Turkey. It was also declared that the Turkish government would take all necessary actions to restore all rights of Greek citizens in accordance to the Turkish law⁵⁰. This development allowed Greece to give her consent so that the additional protocol of the 1964 Ankara Association Agreement would be signed before the meeting of the Association Council in April 25, 1988 (paragraph 7). Greece finally signed the protocol on March 22, 1988 (Stephanou and Tsardanides, 1991: 218).

Unlike the announcements that were made after the meetings at Davos and Brussels, the two parties faced a lot of difficulties drawing up a text that would be acceptable to both sides, after the meeting between Papandreou and Özal in Athens. The difficulty of finding an acceptable way of phrasing caused Özal to delay his press conference for two hours. Özal himself was under the impression that there would not be a common announcement when he started the press conference but,

⁵⁰ The issue concerns decree 6/3801/2.11.1964, which is known among Istanbul Greeks as the "Kararname". The decree forbade transactions of the Greek citizens' residing in Turkey belongings and especially of their estate in Turkey. Since mid-1986 the Greek Government set the lifting of the 1964 decree as a prerequisite for her to lift her objections to the reactivation of the 1964 Association Agreement between Turkey and the European Community (see Alexandris, 1991: 511-512 ; Clogg 1991: 21).

meanwhile, the Mr. Makris Greek Ambassador at Ankara and the Turkish Ambassador at Athens Mr. Akiman somehow infused their views into a one single text. Nonetheless, the final announcement did not mention any of the major issues that divided Turkey and Greece and it was limited to making general comments concerning the good will atmosphere and the satisfaction with the ongoing work (Ta Nea, 16/6/1988).

The second group of agreements includes the signed agreements between the two parties. The only agreement that can fit under this group is the Papoulias-Yilmaz memorandum that was signed in Athens on May 27, 1988 (For full text of the memorandum see Ta Nea, 28/5/1988). The memorandum reflected the work of the Political committee that was established in Davos and assembled for the first time in Athens between 24th and 26th of May. With the memorandum, the two parties committed to respect each other's sovereignty as well the rights to open sea and international air space (article 1). In addition, the two parties agreed that during national military exercises within international waters and airspace, they would abstain from any action that might come to obstruct navigation and air traffic, according to international laws and regulations (article 2). With regard to military exercises the signatory parties agreed, furthermore, that the issue of warning notices (the NOTAM) should refrain from a) isolating an area b) commit areas for long time periods c) taking place during high touristic period or national and religious celebrations (article 3). Finally, the memorandum noted that diplomatic channels

should be used more often and that its content should be held in harmony all the time with what was decided in Davos (articles 4&5).

The common announcement that came out was to reveal that the two ministers agreed to establish two working groups. The first group led by the Greek deputy MFA Mr. Kapsis and his Turkish counterpart Mr. Kandemir, discussed confidence building measures (CBMs) and common NATO infrastructure shares. The second led by the Greek Foreign ministry general secretary Ambassador Georgiou and the general secretary of the Turkish department of bilateral relations Ambassador Akbel, discussed the lifting of visa requirements for Turkish diplomatic and state passports, as well as, cooperation in areas of drug trafficking, terrorism etc. In fact, the first person to benefit from the lifting of visa requirement was Prime Minister Özal, who visited Greece two weeks later, while for example Mesut Yilmaz had to validate his passport during his late May visit to Athens (Ta Nea, 28/5/1988).

Some years after the Davos meetings Greek sources suggested that Papandreou and Özal inked an agreement in 1988, which foresaw the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus. This information was first presented by Papoulias in 2000, who also pointed that Özal himself worked on the agreement, and that the agreement would have been implemented if it wasn't for Özal's untimely death⁵¹. Ambassador Nazmi Akiman however, denied knowledge of such an agreement, and

⁵¹

<http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=299&article=6166>

suggested that it most likely did not happen⁵². (On the decisions reached in Davos see also Athanasopoulos 2001, Hale 2008, Akiman 2002)

c. Military cooperation

The issue of military cooperation was part of the agenda that which gained a concrete form during the meetings between Papandreou and Özal. When Özal was asked by journalists whether we thought that what was accomplished in Davos could also bolster military cooperation he answered:

I believe it (Davos process) will have positive implications. As you can see in the common announcement our Ambassador at international organizations, the UN, the NATO, the OECE will have closer contacts. But for visits of military men we can see today that even between opposing camps there are visits. Our Chief of Staff has visited the Soviet Union and they have visited us. Also there are a lot of visits going on at NATO meetings. But I am talking about bilateral visits not only at the Chief of Staff level but also Chief of Army, Chief of Naval Forces etc, so that there is better understanding (Ta Nea, 2/2/1988).

On another occasion Özal stated that,

Concerning military there is much to be done. The way I am sensing it, what I would propose is that our military men have to come in terms with each other. They have to try and solve some of these issues, which are in majority of technical and not political nature (To Vima, 16/5/1988)

It is quite clear that military cooperation during the 1988 rapprochement was rather aiming at finding a *modus vivendi* between the two sides, than engage a type of cooperation that would include for instance, joint military exercises or other types of joint action. Indeed, sources from the Greek government assured there was mention of joint military exercises in Davos or Brussels (Ta Nea, 22/3/1988).

⁵² Interview by author

The idea of a meeting of experts on military issues, however, became a topic of discussion between Özal and Papandreou, and a sub-committee of the political committee met in Athens for 3 days, between March 30 and April 1. This sub-committee was presumed to discuss national military exercises and military aircraft flights. The Turkish group included 13 members and was headed by vice-admiral Omer Akbel and the head of the Turkish department of Aeronautic Affairs, Ugur Ziyal (Ta Nea, 29/3/1988). The Greek group also included high ranking military men and diplomats (Ta Nea, 30/3/1988). After the end of the three-day meeting no specific results were announced, however, an announcement was made saying that the work of the sub-committee would be presented to the meeting of the political committee, which was planned to take place in two months in Athens (Ta Nea, 2/4/1988). Thus, it was almost certain that some of the positions that were adopted by the Papoulias-Yilmaz memorandum were initially discussed by the sub-committee that summoned in March⁵³.

d. Economic cooperation

By the year 1988, space for economic cooperation between Greece and Turkey was extensive. The commerce between the two countries accounted for a mere 1% of their total commerce, and out of 893 foreign businesses that operated in Turkey only three had some Greek participation (Oikonomikos Taxidromos, 21/4/1988). The Greek-Turkish commerce had remained stagnant from 1983 to 1985, and while it rose in 1986, it still remained under 100\$ million. In 1988, it was

⁵³ This is because some of the issues that the memorandum touched upon were also issues that the sub-committee discussed

expected that the bilateral trade would reach 200\$ million (To Vima, 7/2/1988). In addition, the tremendous possibilities of Greek-Turkish economic cooperation is also evident at the statement of the president of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) Ali Coskun, who in 1988 said that by 1990 the trade volume between Greece and Turkey could double (Milliyet, 2/3/1988)⁵⁴.

It is therefore absolutely undisputed that a successful rapprochement between Greece and Turkey in 1988 would be financially beneficial for both of them. This was well understood by Papandreou and Özal, who also believed that once economic cooperation was established it would be easier to discuss the significant problems in the two states' relation. A month before his visit to Athens, Özal said to a Greek journalist:

I have said so, and I repeat that on many areas, outside those where there are problems, we could start cooperating. For example, with visits of businessmen...they could agree to collaborate, or even to establish joint commercial and industrial enterprises...or maybe on tourism, there could be tourists' visits...This will create an atmosphere of full trust (To Vima 16/5/1988)

Efforts to improve economic cooperation had started years before the political rapprochement, since the beginning of the 1980s. The efforts were initiated by the Turkish side, and especially businessman Sarik Tara, who in various occasions came in touch with Greek businessmen, among whom Costa Karras. At the same time the president of Istanbul Chamber of Commerce Mr. Yasar, tried to keep in touch with the Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry Mr. Efraimoglu.

⁵⁴ This statement was made during a meeting Mr. Coskun had with the president of the Greek-American Chamber of Commerce Mr Politakis

During these initial contacts the possibilities of an approach between Özal and Papandreou were explored. The meetings between Greek and Turkish businessmen, which had started in May 1984, stopped in January 1985, after Kyprianou and Denktaş meeting failed (To Vima, 9/2/1988).

Both sides common desire to elevate economic relations with one another became clear in Davos when the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers decided to establish a committee that would discuss issues relating to economic collaboration (paragraph 7 of the common announcement). In addition, Turkish and Greek businessmen held a separate meeting at Davos, where they discussed issues relating to imports and exports, tourism, communications and transportations etc. Some of the participants of this meeting were Sarık Tara, and the president of the Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (TISK) from the Turkish side and Mr. Papalexopoulos, President of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises on the Greek side (Milliyet, 2/2/1988).

The efforts for economic cooperation created a number of committees geared to discuss and promote economic cooperation. Firstly, two committees, one Turkish and one Greek, were formed by businessmen. The Turkish one was called Turkish-Greek Business Council (Türk-Yunan İş Konseyi) and was headed by Sarık Tara (Milliyet, 2/3/1988) and, the Greek one, the Council of Greek-Turkish Business Cooperation (Συμβούλιο Ελληνο-Τουρκικής Επιχειρηματικής Συνεργασίας) was headed by Mr. Papalexopoulos. The two committees⁵⁵ met twice

⁵⁵ It should be noted that occasionally they are mentioned as one body

in 1988, once in April in Athens and once in early October in Istanbul (Milliyet, 20/4/1988 and 8/10/1988). In addition, Papalexopoulos met with Özal during the latter's visit to Athens in June (Ta Nea, 16/6/1988).

Secondly, two committees, one for each side, were formed in order to discuss economic issues according to the decisions that were taken in Davos. Together the two committees formed the economic committee, which met in parallel with the political committee. The main task of the economic committee, and what differentiated it from the businessmen initiative, was to try and establish the basic principles upon which the "Davos spirit" could realize (To Vima, 17/4/1988). The first meeting of the joint committee took place in Ankara, between 24 and 26 of May. The discussion touched upon three main issues a) the institutional and legal framework, b) infrastructure issues and c) cooperation by different sectors. A number of decisions, such as, increasing cooperation on the issue of road transportation, improving the telecommunications network and promoting collaboration on the areas of trade, banking tourism etc were taken (Ta Nea, 27/5/1988). The second meeting of the joint economic committee also proceeded in parallel to the political committee in early September. The second meeting was in Athens and did not produce any results worth of mentioning here.

In general, despite the good will for cooperation which was stressed by both sides, few things were finally accomplished as far as economic cooperation is concerned. It was because of the shared mood in both sides that economic matters will be again sacrificed for political issues, thereby they simply saw no point in

pressing for business related issues before a correspondent advance could be made. Specifically the Greek party was motivated by this same logic. The Turkish side made a number of suggestions, such as the establishment of a Greek-Turkish bank or a plan to promote investments, but the Greek side remained cautious and dilatory (To Vima, 19/6/1988; Ta Nea 3/9/1988; Ta Nea, 7/9/1988).

e. Public Statements made by officials

In the 1988 Greek-Turkish rapprochement case, public statements at the top political level played an important role. As the three key moments of the rapprochement were an international forum, a NATO summit and an official visit of a prime minister, the initiators of the rapprochement, meaning the two prime ministers and their environment, were able to give many interviews and make public statements that attracted much attention. Special attention was given by both Papandreou and Özal to stress out in every chance that the atmosphere within which the discussions and the communications took place was pleasant and responsive. This is made obvious not only in various statements by both of the leaders but also on every joint announcement that followed the various meetings.

As some important statements have already been quoted, it would be beneficial to present some statements that show how the protagonists of the 1988 rapprochement tried, occasionally to connect their efforts to the 1930 rapprochement between Venizelos and Atatürk. For instance, during a reception the Greek Ambassador in Ankara Mr. Makris gave at the Ankara Palace, Özal stated:

In this building the agreements between between Kemal Atatürk and Eleftherios Venizelos were signed in 1930. In the same building the Greek

Ambassador gives a reception. I think there is a symbolism. I am optimistic that something positive will arrive for the Greek-Turkish relations (Ta Nea, 31/3/1988)

On another occasion Özal had also stated that:

I don't see any reason why we cannot realize today the cooperation that started at the time of Atatürk and Venizelos (Milliyet, 16/2/1988)

Finally, during the meeting of the military experts, in March, the head of the Turkish delegation, Admiral Isik Biren, visited the Venizelos Museum in Athens. After his visit he stated:

Maybe now the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece is difficult, but it was even more difficult (meaning in 1930s). However, it was achieved due to the efforts of Venizelos and Atatürk (Ta Nea, 2/4/1988)

The abovementioned quotes prove the impact of the 1930s rapprochement which became a reference point for Greek-Turkish relations in the 20th century. In addition, the reference to the 1930s, mainly by Turkish officials, constitutes an indication of the preferred level of cooperation that Turkey was craving for.

The 1988 rapprochement between Turkey and Greece offers an example of how statements made by officials can cause negative reflections to the other side and endanger the rapprochement atmosphere. For example, statements were made by Mr. Yılmaz and also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' spokesperson Mr. Batu, concerning the presence of the Turkish military in Cyprus and Denktaş' jurisdiction and responsibilities, caused much skepticism on the Greek side, to the extent that the Greeks wondered whether Özal's visit could actually take place under these circumstances (Ta Nea, 23/4/1988)⁵⁶. Finally, few days before his visit to Athens,

⁵⁶ It should be pointed out that Mr. Yılmaz and Mr. Batu's statements were in full conformity with Turkish official line on the Cyprus issue at the time. However, it was expected by the Greek side that Özal would proceed with a good will gesture on the Cyprus issue before his visit to Athens.

Özal stated that there couldn't be any substantial progress in the Greek-Turkish relations because of Greece upcoming national elections, in 1989 (Ta Nea, 8/6/1988). This statement was spotlighted by the Greek press. However, the Greek government tried to downplay it and added that Papandreou would ask for clarifications.

f. Rapprochement's influence at the society level

It is difficult to assess the influence that the Davos process had on the Greek and Turkish societies. Due to time limitation, this round of rapprochement does not allow for measuring its affect at the grassroots level. In general, however, it can be said that the inter-societal interactions were not very common either before or after the Davos process. After all, it should be stressed that the 1988 rapprochement was a top-down process, where the impact at the societal level was of secondary importance. Apart from the stated time limitations, which perhaps help rapprochement from reaching the society level, media's nationalistic rhetoric throughout the months that followed the meetings at Davos, and negative images that were created by the events in Cyprus, should also be considered as two important factors that prohibited rapprochement between the Turkish and the Greek societies.

Public opinion polls that were made at the time showed the mistrust between the Greek and Turkish people. A poll among Greek high-school students, which was publicized immediately after Özal's visit to Greece, showed that close to a 70% of all students in that school considered Turkey as the most hostile country

(Milliyet 16/6/1988)⁵⁷. Nonetheless, in early 1988 polls indicated that both Turks and Greeks were in favor of a rapprochement between the two countries. Concretely, in a poll that took place simultaneously in Greece and Turkey by the Turkish magazine "NOKTA" and the Greek "PONTIKI", 77% of the Turks and 58% of the Greeks said that they would be supportive of a rapprochement process and peaceful resolution of the problems between Greece and Turkey (Politakis, 1987).

Other than that, any efforts for improving cooperation between the Greek and the Turkish societies were mostly undertaken by elite individuals, such as artists or writers. Two of these efforts are worth mentioning. The first is the Greek-Turkish friendship committee. The committee, which consisted of a Turkish and a Greek committee, was created in late 1986. Its goal was to support the Greek-Turkish rapprochement and to help the creation of those conditions that could support the easier resolution of the problems between Greece and Turkey (Ta Nea, 13/12/1986). The establishment of the committee(s) was the idea of Aziz Nesin, a leading Turkish author, while from the Greek side the contribution of Mikis Theodorakis, a well-known Greek composer, politician and political activist was invaluable. In addition to these, the initiative was supported by a number of academicians, journalists, artists etc (Ta Nea, 26/11/1986). The work of the committee focused mainly on the organization of joint events such as concerts, book presentations, film festivals⁵⁸ and the like.

⁵⁷ The poll was made by the Greek magazine "ENA"

⁵⁸ For instance the committee organized a Greek Film Week in Turkey in December 1988, see Ta

Table 6.2.

Rapprochement Process			
Indicator	<u>Main events</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Importance</u>
Summit level meetings	Ozal & Papandreou meeting in Davos Özal & Papandreou meeting in Brussels Özal's visit to Athens June 13-15 1988	High	Medium
Agreements Signed	Agreements mainly in form of common announcements, Papoulas –Yilmaz Memorandum	High	Medium
Military cooperation	Sub-committee on military issues meeting in Athens from March 30 to April 1	Low	Low
Economic cooperation	Several committees formed to discuss possibilities of economic cooperation	Low	Low
Statements/ Gestures	Several positive statements made by political leaders especially after the official meetings	High	Medium
Societal level	No major breakthroughs Limited mainly among elites	Low	Low

The second was the “Abdi İpekçi” awards of Greek Turkish friendship which was founded in September 1979 in the memory of the Turkish journalist Abdi İpekçi, a supporter of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, who was

assassinated earlier the same year. The award was given to the authors of journalistic or literary articles that supported the Greek-Turkish rapprochement (To Vima, 24/9/1979).

Nonetheless, it is clear that both the Greek-Turkish Friendship Committee and the Abdi İpekçi Peace and Friendship Awards were initiated before the 1988 rapprochement and continued their work while the rapprochement lasted.

Finally, according to Clogg, following Davos, there was an increase in Greek nationals visiting Turkey by some 170%, to approximately 360.000 visitors. Clogg attributes this increase to the lifting of visa requirements for Greeks by the Turkish state; however, it should be made clear that the visa requirement was lifted in 1984, shortly after Akiman's arrival to Athens. Actually, the lifting of the visa requirement was a goodwill gesture made by Özal, while appointing a new ambassador to Greece (Akiman, 2002).

6.9. The end of the Rapprochement

There are different opinions as to why and when the 1988 rapprochement between Greece and Turkey ended. In most cases, a number of factors that acted simultaneously are offered as an explanation to the end of the Davos spirit. These factors mainly concerned exogenous obstacles that appeared in late 1988. By the same token, factors imbedded in the process of the rapprochement are also responsible for its short duration. As to when the rapprochement ended, there are two different views (see Heraclides, 2007: 156). The most pessimistic of those

views sustains that the spirit of Davos ended with Özal's visit to Athens, while more optimistic accounts consider that the rapprochement ended after the second, and the last, meeting of the political committee in September 1988.

The September of 1988 is a more convincing alternative for one to chronologically situate the end of the rapprochement. This is for mainly three reasons. First, the assembly of the political committee in early September not only failed to produce any results, but also revealed that the two parties had different understandings of the process. Greece and Turkey had their own interpretations on what their dialogue should include. The frustration was mainly caused by Greece's preparedness to discuss only some of the issues while neglecting others, coupled with Turkey's insistence to add issues to the agenda. One day before the end of the political committee's proceedings Mesut Yilmaz stated:

Contrary to the Davos spirit, Greece does not discuss issues such as the territorial sea and air space limits, the fortification of her islands and her minority issue, claiming that these issues concern sovereignty rights. A dialogue that does not include these issues is not possible to lead to permanent solution, which is the goal of both states (Ta Nea, 7/9/1988)

Second, Andreas Papandreou's health sharply deteriorated in August 1988 and he left for England in order to have an open-heart surgery. Papandreou's health adventure forced him to abstain from the political life for several months, and it was the main reason for the cancellation of Papandreou's visit to Turkey that two sides agreed to hold in 1988. Finally, a major financial scandal broke out in the second half of 1988, destabilizing the PASOK government and putting Greece in a long pre-election period.

In 1989, there were two elections held in Greece (June 18 and November 5) and both of them failed to elect a one-party majority government. It was not until April 1990 elections that Konstantinos Mitsotakis managed to form a majority government and became the new prime minister (on how the PASOK Government found a rapid end and left its place to Greek elections see Anastasiadis, 1993; Mendrinou, 2006). As such, during this time there was no development in the Greek-Turkish relations. Indeed, it could also be argued that there were setbacks as a meeting between Papandreou and Özal at the NATO summit in May 1989 produced no results and clearly showed that Davos spirit had faded away (To Vima, 28/5/1989).

Mitsotakis who had in the past criticized Papandreou for engaging Turkey in a wider dialogue rather than discussing only the delimitation of the continental shelf, uplifted the Cyprus issue to the number one problem between Greece and Turkey, and sustained that no progress could be made without tackling Cyprus (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 27). Mitsotakis met with Özal on August 25, 1990 at the European Democracy Union meeting in Antalya (To Vima, 20/8/1990) and in Davos in 1992 (To Vima, 2/2/1992)⁵⁹, however, the two leaders were not ready to revive the Davos spirit or start another similar process that would improve relations between Turkey and Greece.

⁵⁹ This was the first official summit level meeting between Greece and Turkey after Özal's visit to Athens in 1988.

6.10. Assessment of the 1988 Greek-Turkish Rapprochement

After the failed rapprochement of the 1950s, and following more than three decades of strained relations, the 1988 case constituted another failed rapprochement process between Turkey and Greece. Although the two countries, and especially the two prime ministers, were successful in sustaining a positive atmosphere for several months and managed to create expectations and hopes for a peaceful coexistence, the Davos spirit was not able to survive even the end of the year. In the following pages the discussion will focus on whether, and in what ways, each of the independent variables influenced the outcome of the rapprochement process.

- Impact of the international system to the national security

Unlike the 1955 rapprochement which is mainly seen as part of Greece and Turkey's efforts to eliminate their security concerns, the Davos process, unanticipated as it was, is mainly attributed to situational factors relating to the two states realistic aspirations of a vis-à-vis normalized relation. As such, the impact of the international system to the initiation, development and failure of the rapprochement is quite limited.

Special mention, however, should be made to the ways the European Economic Community (EEC⁶⁰) offered significant incentives for a successful rapprochement, especially to the Turkish side. Even though Greece and Turkey had

⁶⁰ Later EU

signed association agreements with the EU since the early 1960s (June 9, 1961 and September 12, 1963 respectively), Greece submitted her full membership application on 12th, 1975 and became effectively a full member on January 12, 1981 (See Stephanou and Tsardanides, 1991). Having been delayed by domestic political concerns, Turkey could not submit her application for full membership before 1987, only a couple of weeks after the Aegean crisis (for a short chronology of Turkey-EU relation see Erdemli, 2003). In general, the literature suggests that Greece's membership to the EU was not beneficial for Greek-Turkish relations specifically in the period of time previous to 1999 (Rumelili, 2004). As it is, this does not contradict the fact that if Turkey wanted to fulfill her EU aspirations, she had to come in terms with Greece, as the latter's veto power could block Turkey's membership indefinitely. According to Rumelili (Celik and Rumelili, 2006: 216)

EC membership was perceived as and valued for having provided Greece with bargaining advantages in its dealings with Turkey. As a result, Greece's membership has created and sustained the understanding in Turkey that the EC/EU has become 'captured' by Greece, and therefore, cannot be impartial with respect to Greek-Turkish issues.

- State identity

Undoubtedly, state identity played an important role in the failure of the third Greek-Turkish rapprochement. During the decades preceding the initiation of the rapprochement, both sides constructed one another in the image of an enemy. The negative images and mistrust, dominating the space in post-1960s, were by large the outcomes of the outbreak of the Cyprus problem. Nonetheless, other issues especially concerning the Aegean Sea, too, came up in the 1970s by adding

further material to the construction of enemy images between the Greeks and the Turks. Especially on the Greek side, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus constituted a great shock, emboldening Greek perception of Turkey as a hostile occupying force.

Special mention ought to be made to the ways Andreas Papandreou had, until 1987, encouraged the creation of negative images against the Turks, by adopting a hardliner political rhetoric against Turkey when he was the leader of the opposition party. Papandreou who was a harsh critic of the United States and the EU, tried to compensate his declaratory to his operational policy on foreign affairs soon before and, also, after he became the prime minister. However, to the extent that relations with Turkey were concerned, Papandreou remained relatively stable to his pre-1981 ideas. This inflexible approach towards Turkey continued after the 1985 elections, even though, emerging economy and security concerns favored an even more realistic view on foreign policy. As Coufoudakis (1988) mentions:

On the core issues of Greek foreign policy, however, PASOK remained firm. Until the end of 1986, no direct negotiations were undertaken with Turkey despite pressures from the U.S., the EC, and the conservative opposition in the Parliament, as long as PASOK's preconditions for a dialogue with Turkey were not met. Greece also continued its nonparticipation in NATO exercises in the Aegean that questioned established command and control structures and other Greek sovereign rights; and continued to object to the normalization of Turkey's relations with the EC unless Turkey revoked discriminatory measures against the Greek minority of Istanbul

The impact of the state identities, which were shaped during the years before the rapprochement, had a great impact on the process and its outcome, especially in two distinct ways. On the one hand, both political leaders had to deal with the criticism of the opposition and the public opinion. This criticism not only

increased the political costs for Özal and Papandreou, but also made it difficult for the political leaders to move forward faster than they may wish to do. The fact that their correspondence was kept secret, and that their meetings were held without the presence of journalists clearly indicate that the two leaders were considerate of possible reactions either from the public opinion or other political parties.

- Costs and benefits equilibrium

Even though the third Greek-Turkish rapprochement lasted for a limited amount of time, this process still left behind substantial benefits to be reaped by the states.. Both Turkey and Greece, to start with, now had the opportunity of improving the relations with one another, thus found themselves well-positioned to significantly improve their national security. As previously touched upon, the efforts for the initiation of the rapprochement started immediately after the crisis, which was about to consume both of them into a bloody conflict. And, these pre-existing efforts indicate that both Greece and Turkey thought of rapprochement as a way of escaping from an imminent conflict. The signing of the Papoulias-Yilmaz memorandum showed that the rapprochement process had from early on benefited the two states as far as their security was concerned.

Moreover, there were good indications that if the rapprochement had continued the benefits from the process would have been even greater for both parties. Theodoropoulos, a very experienced Greek diplomat and an acute observer of Greek-Turkish relations, suggested on a newspaper article that hostile relations

with Turkey were costly for Greek diplomacy as they forced Greece to monopolize her foreign policy focus (To Vima, 4/12/1988). For Turkey, normalization of relations with Greece would also mean positive repercussions on her relations with the US' Congress after hitting the lowest-possible-point in 1974. At the same time, Ankara would be able to concentrate her security concerns on the situation in the South-east (Kramer, 1991).

As far as the costs of the process are concerned, there were not any considerable costs for Turkey and Greece. The only costs were the political costs that the political leaders had to withstand, but those were not relevant to the states, but only to politicians.

Despite the considerable benefits that accrued to both parties, encouraging each of them to anticipate even further benefits in the future, their impact on the rapprochement process' outcome was minimal. Indeed, the benefits from the process provided with the involved parties extra motivation go along the dialogue phase.. But, these motivations were obviously not strong enough to keep Greece and Turkey as players vested in the continuation of the game. On the other hand, the costs from the continuation of the rapprochement were not significant enough to be considered as the causes of the process' failure.

- Interdependence

As with some of the previous independent variables the short time that the rapprochement process lasted gave little space for any interdependence to develop.

Although for instance the improvement of relations was expected to increase economic cooperation and, in turn, trading volume between the two countries there was no considerable process made while the rapprochement lasted.

According to the discussion in the literature review chapter, high levels of interdependence are generally seen as beneficial for the rapprochement process, whereas the absence of interdependence does not bode well for the viability of rapprochement. The Greek-Turkish rapprochement of 1987, for that matter, did not produce high levels of interdependence. However, it is rather doubtful that this played an important role in the emergence of unsuccessful ending. Indeed, there is no indication to believe that the lack of interdependence had a role to play in the way the rapprochement process came to a halt, or that it produced adverse an impact on an otherwise successful endeavor.

- Leadership

Similarly to the cases discussed so far, the political leaders played an important role to the initiation of the rapprochement and while that lasted. The most notable difference of the 1987 case should be that the two prime ministers, Özal and Papandreou, monopolized the process and, hence, the success or failure of the rapprochement, at least seemed to be, dependent on the leaders' ability to manage the difficult task of repairing Greek-Turkish relations. It is quite characteristic that Papandreou had asked from the Turkish Ambassador to fly in person to Ankara and update his superiors about what they discussed in Athens, between March 1987 and

January 1988. In the fear of leaks, no phone calls or other type of communications were used. Consequently, leadership must be considered one of the independent variables that had an important impact to the unsuccessful outcome of the process.

To begin with, it must be pointed out that both Papandreou and Özal tried hard in order for the rapprochement process to succeed. They had carefully planned their steps during the previous year through the exchanges of personal notes, they both took advantage of their personal power and prestige and they were both willing to bear the political costs that the Greek-Turkish rapprochement would bring. Thus, it is not an exaggeration to say that the fact that the Davos spirit lasted, even for the short time that happened, was due to Papandreou and Özal's personal efforts and commitment to the process.

Nonetheless, problems that the two prime ministers faced during after mid-1988 forced them to loosen their commitment to the rapprochement process. Firstly, according to Birand (1991: 33-34) Greek and Turkish bureaucracies started putting pressure on both Papandreou and Özal, demanding a more careful and less enthusiastic approach. From the Greek side the problem was that the Cyprus issue was left out of the talks, while in the Turkish side much reluctance was present, concerning Greece's willingness or commitment to meet her obligations.

In addition, developments in domestic affairs caused supplementary concerns to the Prime ministers, making their commitment to the rapprochement process weaker. This is especially true for Papandreou who at the end of 1988 experienced serious health issues that led to the cancelation of his trip to Turkey in

late 1988, which had been agreed upon by the two prime ministers earlier that year. Personal and domestic political problems for Papandreou prohibited him from proceeding with major foreign decisions, while domestic political developments in Turkey were also troubling Özal (Coufoudakis, 1991).

- Depth of the process

The 1988 rapprochement remained a relatively superficial process. This is an outcome of its short duration, the way the process developed, but also the general historical context that the rapprochement took place. In short, during the few months whereby the rapprochement was still robust, the main locus of the process remained on the top political level. In addition, not only did the process fail to engage, or gain support, from a larger part of the population, but it failed to deliver significant results on the level that it actually took place. The political leaders that initiated and supported the rapprochement did not manage to provide solutions to the Greek-Turkish problems, and it was these problems that constituted a significant obstacle to the success of the rapprochement.

The failure to produce results on the Cyprus issue for instance worked to negate the entirety of the rapprochement process. The Greek-Cypriots both in Cyprus and Greece, were skeptical of the rapprochement and considered that their interests were not fully served by the process. As it has already been mentioned, Cypriots demonstrated their bitterness against Özal during his visit to Athens, while similar demonstrations took place when the Mayor of Istanbul visited Athens in

early May, 1988 (Pridham, 1991: 83). It should be mentioned, however, that the beginning of the Davos process coincided with the election of George Vasiliou as the new president of the Republic of Cyprus, a man who represented a rather moderate face and, to some extent, received support from the communist AKEL⁶¹. Even though Vasiliou met with Denktaş in August 1988 and a certain level of enthusiasm did exist, the negotiations soon proved unproductive, and talks ended in failure in March 2, 1990 (Bolukbasi, 1995: 465). In general, the lack of progress on the Cyprus problem should be considered as an obstacle to the continuation of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement.

Apart from Cyprus, lack of progress in dealing with the problems in the Aegean Sea and minority issues also caused for the initial enthusiasm to fade away quite rapidly. The non-solution of the problems led to the collapse of the rapprochement process in two ways. First, further the problems remained unresolved, more did they cause friction between Greece and Turkey as the dialogue was still continuing. Coufoudakis (1991) distinguishes three such points of friction⁶² that came forth, especially, in 1989:

- I. The growing number of Turkish violations of the Greek airspace
- II. Provocations regarding the Muslim minority in Western Thrace
- III. Turkey's failure to take steps towards restoring property rights of the Greek minority of Istanbul

⁶¹ Although independent

⁶² As seen from the Greek side

Second, as there was no progress by the summit level meetings as well as the several committees that had been formed, belief to the process started evaporating, as did the trust to the “other’s” commitment to the process.

- Turning points

As it was mentioned earlier in the current chapter, the 1988 rapprochement process did not end abruptly, but, on the contrary, after May 1988 it started losing momentum and subsequently became impalpable. It is, hence, clear that the end of the rapprochement was not the result of an unexpected event, but rather the outcome of diminishing support and interest from the engaged parties. As such, turning points is an irrelevant independent variable as far as the third Greek-Turkish rapprochement is concerned.

- The GRIT strategy

The 1988 Greek-Turkish rapprochement is the first case of a situation in which the two states engage in negotiations after the initiation of the rapprochement in order to solve significant issues that set them apart. Due to the fact that the discussions that took place during the meetings were largely confidential, and only selective information was leaked to the press, it is not possible to know with certainty what was the nature of the negotiations, what type of issues were raised, and what type of approach that Papandreou and Özal assumed during the negotiations. Nonetheless, from the leader’s statements it can be inferred that the

two sides had completely different expectations from the process, and hence, their approach to the negotiations were also quite far apart.

On the one hand, if one examines Özal's interviews before and after Davos, one can see that Özal did not care about discussing the Aegean Sea issues or minority problems. On the contrary, he understood that these issues were so complex and difficult to resolve that it would take several years of negotiation to reach a mutually acceptable solution. Past negotiations between Greek and Turkish representatives were a proof that Özal's concerns were not unfounded. Özal believed that economic cooperation was what should be established first, in order to create an atmosphere of collaboration and trust. Then there could be a discussion of the Aegean Sea, the airspace etc. This view was also reflected to the Turkish businessmen supporting the Greek-Turkish rapprochement.

On the other hand, Papandreou was eager to produce tangible results that would be presentable to the public. For instance, it was important for Papandreou to consolidate with Turkey a joint stance towards Cyprus, especially concerning the withdrawal of the Turkish armed forces. The Greek prime minister did not oppose the idea of economic cooperation, but he also understood that such should be given no priority ahead of much more pressing political issues. However, it should be pointed out that the Greek side was eager to discuss the issues that she considered as problems or as part of the agenda.

6.11. Concluding Remarks

The progress that was made in 1988 by Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Özal did not last for long. Soon relations between Greece and Turkey turned back to its 'customary' mode—that is defined by enmity and competition. By the early 1990s relations had deteriorated so much that even the initiators of the 1988 rapprochement were not seen as trustworthy by the other side. For instance, on a letter sent to the UN General Secretary in February 19, 1991 Greece accused Özal of directly threatening to use military force against Greece (UN Documents S/22243, for the Turkish answer to the Greek accusations see UN Documents S/22297). A meeting between Mr. Mitsotakis, the new Prime Minister of Greece and Mesut Yilmaz the new Prime Minister of Turkey in September 1991 in Paris⁶³ did not produce any results either. In fact, it did not even come anywhere close to continuing the effort that Papandreou and Özal had initiated in Davos. On the other hand, Mitsotakis and Yilmaz should not be blamed for the end of the rapprochement process, as the rapprochement had faded away much earlier.

⁶³ See historical review in 1999 rapprochement chapter

CHAPTER 7

THE 1999 GREEK-TURKISH SUCCESSFUL RAPPROCHEMENT

7.1. Introduction

Shortly after the Greek-Turkish rapprochement that took place in 1988, world politics experienced a great shift: that is, the Communist Bloc collapsed paving way for the establishment of multitude of new states in Turkey's and Greece's neighborhoods. Despite the immense changes that took place, however, the frosty relations that prevailed at the end of 1988 continued for the first half of the 1990s. Then came a sharp deterioration after 1995, which brought the two states on the edge of a war. It therefore can be said that the 1999 rapprochement, similarly to the one in 1988, follows a period of tense relations. Nevertheless, it is a far more complicated and prolonged process than how it looks at the first brush, as it covers a period of several notable progress and some occasional setbacks from the mid-1999 until to this date.

The fourth Greek-Turkish rapprochement is largely epitomized by the role of the European Union. Turkey's decisiveness to join the Union provided Ankara with extra incentives for the peaceful resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict, whereas Greece's strategy to use the EU as an external balancing mechanism against the Turkish 'threat' also contributed towards this end (see Tsakonas and Tournikiotis 2003; on the role of the EU on the Greek-Turkish conflict see also Oguzlu, 2004; Onis 2001; Aybet, 2009). The attention that the EU received from the scholars studying Greek-Turkish relation is indeed justifiable. The EU is not just another international institution, or another NATO. Despite the fact that before Greece was admitted the EU had declared that it would not be a party to the Greek-Turkish conflict (Aydin, 2004), the EU was able to shape the framework of the Greek-Turkish relations through two different ways. On the one hand, Greece used its membership "to impede progress in EU-Turkish relations" (Bahcheli, 2004: 112). Secondly, both states had to "Europeanize" their foreign policies, a shift that made the rapprochement more welcoming.

Nevertheless, in order for it to succeed, the 1999 rapprochement needed more than the motivations the EU had to offer. Thus, charismatic and daring leaderships on both sides, important decisions that changed the foreign policy strategies and honest efforts for cooperation with support coming from different strata of the Turkish and the Greek societies, also played an important role in the initiation and the successful outcome of the 1999 rapprochement.

7.2. Historical Background

As of the early 1990s relations between Greece and Turkey remained tense. Several events contributed to the building up of tension between the two states, finally leading to the complete deterioration of relations and a “near-miss” reconciliation opportunity in the first months of 1996. The departure from the Davos spirit sheerly surfaced itself when Konstantinos Mitsotakis, the Greek Prime Minister met with his Turkish counterpart Mesut Yilmaz in Paris, in September 1991. The meeting did not produce any tangible results other than causing harsh criticism of Mitsotakis by significant portions of the Greek national press (See for instance *To Vima* 15/9/1991, *Ta Nea* 13-14-15/9/1991). The only positive outcome from the Paris meeting was that of Mitsotakis’ mention of his preparedness to change the article 19 of the Citizenship Law (KEI) of 3370/1955, which hitherto allowed the stripping of the citizenship from Greek Muslims under special conditions⁶⁴.

Two years after the Mitsotakis-Yilmaz meeting in Paris, under a new PASOK government, in November 1993, Greece and Cyprus announced a joint defense pact. This pact was about helping coordinate Greek and Greek-Cypriot military strategies, bring parties together within joint military drills and embolden/synchronize their military equipments. Turkey reacted to this by announcing that it would offer a similar type of assistance to the Turkish Cypriots.

⁶⁴ However, it should be pointed out that the law 3370/1955 was annulled much later, in 1998, by law 2623/1998.

See [http://eudo-citizenship.eu/NationalDB/docs/GRE%203370%201955%20\(original\).pdf](http://eudo-citizenship.eu/NationalDB/docs/GRE%203370%201955%20(original).pdf) (accessed 20/9/2013)

In 1995, Greece ratified United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS), which became effective on July 21st, 1995 (See Government Newspaper, A/136/1995). The Article 2 of the Law 2321/1995, which ratified the convention, confirmed Greece's right, according to the Article 3 of the UNCLOS to extend her territorial waters up to 12nm, at a time of her choosing. On June 8th, 1995, only 8 days after Greece had ratified the Convention, the Turkish National Assembly issued a resolution granting full authority to the Turkish government to employ any means, including the use of military force, to maintain and protect Turkey's interests in the Aegean in case Greece extended its territorial waters to 12nm (casus belli threat).

In the late January 1996, while important domestic changes were taking place in both Turkey and Greece, a major crisis, the biggest after 1974, took place. A month earlier, on December 26, 1995, the Turkish ship Figen Akat ran aground a small islet in the Eastern Aegean. The captain of the ship refused Greek assistance, arguing that he was within Turkish territory. The Turkish ship was, finally, assisted by the Greeks after communication with the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while notes were exchanged between the Turkish and Greek Ministries of Foreign Affairs concerning each party's views on the Imia/Kardak Islets' status. This incident was some days later leaked to the Greek press, culminating in the raising of the Greek flag on one of the Islets, by a group of citizens led by the mayor of the nearby Kalymnos Island. The Greek flag was taken down by a group of *Hurriyet* newspaper journalists and was replaced by the Turkish one. The situation soon

spiraled up, as nationalistic rhetoric dominated the media in both countries. The two countries, and especially Greece, managed to concentrate considerable firepower around the islets, and a warlike situation rapidly developed in the area (the view that Greece had managed to concentrate superior forces is expressed by Limperis, 1997). The diffusion of the crisis was only made possible through vigorous the USA mediation during the night of January 30-31.

A year after the Imia/Kardak crisis, another crisis occurred relating to the purchase and installment of Russian-made PMU-1 (S-300) missile system, in the Republic of Cyprus. The plans of the Cypriot government alerted Turkey, which perceived the actions of the Greek-Cypriots as a political and military provocation. On the other hand, the Greek-Cypriot leadership considered the installation of the missiles as its inalienable right. The S-300 crisis, though not as serious as the Imia/Kardak one, became one of the dominant issues in Greek-Turkish relations during 1997, and until the end of 1998, when Clerides, the Greek-Cypriot president decided for the missiles to be installed in Crete, instead of Cyprus. The S-300 crisis is evident that the Cyprus question continued constituting a key component of Greek-Turkish relations, and a constant threat to stability. For instance, the demonstrations on the Green Line in summer 1996, which resulted in the murder of two Greek Cypriots⁶⁵, had also caused friction between Greece and Turkey.

At the end of 1997, the EU Luxemburg Summit did not include Turkey in the list of official candidates. The assumptions of the Summit mentioned:

⁶⁵ Also a month after the events a Turkish Cypriot was found dead

The European Council recalls that strengthening Turkey's links with the European Union also depends on that country's pursuit of the political and economic reforms on which it has embarked, including the alignment of human rights standards and practices on those in force in the European Union; respect for and protection of minorities; the establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey; the settlement of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the International Court of Justice; and support for negotiations under the aegis of the UN on a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.⁶⁶

The results of the Luxemburg summit caused much disappointment to the Turkish side⁶⁷ and actually caused further distress in Greek-Turkish relations, rather than forcing Turkey to approach Greek position. In addition to Turkey's hardening stance, Denktaş broke off contacts with Clerides⁶⁸, rendering bi-communal contacts extremely difficult.

The final blow to the relations between Greece and Turkey was the arrest of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in Kenya, in February 1999. Amidst Ankara's official plea to the international community for his return to Turkey, Öcalan entered in Greece carrying a Greek-Cypriot passport and took a shelter in the Greek Embassy in Kenya in run-up to his subsequent arrest. The Öcalan incident put the Greek Government to a very difficult position, as it was not Simitis' will to provide help with the Kurdish leader. In fact, Simitis had met with Mesut Yılmaz in Antalya in October 1998, and had reassured the Turkish Prime Minister that Greece would

⁶⁶ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/032a0008.htm (accessed 20/9/2013)

⁶⁷ See Turkish government's official statements, <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume2/December1997-February1998/STATEMENT.PDF>, and <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume2/December1997-February1998/STATEMENT2.PDF> (accessed 20/9/2013)

⁶⁸ See official statement <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-republic-of-northern-cyprus-government-statement.en.mfa> (accessed 20/9/2013)

not provide political refugee status to Öcalan, who had already left Syria (To Vima, 21/2/1999). The revelation that Öcalan found safe haven, even for a while, in a Greek diplomatic mission further infuriated the Turkish side amidst accusations against Greece for allegedly supporting terrorism⁶⁹. In Greece, the Öcalan imbroglio led to the dismissal of three ministers including, but not limited to, Mr. Pangalos, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was a well-known hardliner. George Papandreou, the son of Andreas Papandreou, who later initiated the Davos process, was appointed in his position.

Among the abovementioned events that contributed to the steep deterioration of the Greek-Turkish relations, few efforts were made to achieve normalization, but none of them managed to make considerable process. There are two cases that are barely worth mentioning. The first one is the Madrid Declaration signed between Turkish President Demirel and Greek Prime Minister Simitis during a NATO Summit in July 1997. The agreement was engineered by the US Foreign Minister, Madeleine Albright, and covered six basic principles to designate the future discourse of the Greek-Turkish relations. These, briefly, included mutual commitment to peace, respect for each other's sovereignty, respect for international law, respect for each other's legitimate and vital interests, commitment to refrain from unilateral acts, and commitment to settle disputes through peaceful means on the basis of mutual consent⁷⁰.

⁶⁹ See for instance reports on the Turkish press, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=the-greek-pkk-connection-qampa-1999-02-20>, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=ankara-keeps-quiet-on-greece-at-least-for-now-1999-02-18> (accessed 20/9/2013)

⁷⁰ See <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=us-new-beginning-for-turkey-and-greece->

The second step towards cooperation was made by the Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem who on February 12, 1998 sent a letter to his Greek counterpart Mr. Pangalos. The letter elaborated on a possible solution to all of the issues related to the Aegean Sea and called for high level talks to begin by the end of March 1998⁷¹. Greek side came to conclude that Cem's proposal did not bring in anything new, but only reproduced Turkey's longstanding view favoring bilateral negotiations, thus politely rejected his overtures⁷². Ismail Cem sent a second letter, in March 11, to push one more time for a re-consideration of his former request, and the Greek Foreign Minister once more turned him down on the same basis⁷³. (On the Greek Turkish relations prior to the rapprochement as well as accounts of the abovementioned crises see Veremis, 2001; Ker-Lindsay, 2007a; Herakleides, 2001; Herakleides, 2007; Simitis, 2005; Cem, 2001; Bolukbasi, 2004; www.mfa.gov.tr; www.mfa.gr)

7.3. The Initiation of the Rapprochement

The year of 1999 started with the worst conditions for the Greek-Turkish relations. The Greek involvement in the Öcalan Case caused much bitterness on Turkish side, which went beyond the policy-making elites to spread across the different segments of the society. It was at that time that even individuals and

[1997-07-10](http://www.mfa.gov.tr) (accessed 20/9/2013)

⁷¹ See full text of the verbal note <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/a-call-for-peace-from-turkey-to-greece-br-february-12-1998.en.mfa> (accessed 20/9/2013)

⁷² Apart from the point proposing the formalization of the Madrid declaration.

⁷³ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/p-the-reply-of-ambassador-necati-utkan-the-foreign-ministry-spokesman-to-a-question-addressed-to-him-br-march-30-1998-p.en.mfa> (accessed 20/9/2013)

groups from the Turkish side, otherwise in favor of rapprochement, grew hesitant towards reconciliation with the other side of the Aegean. For instance, almost the entirety of the Turkish part of the Greek-Turkish Forum withdrew, and the Forum was only saved because one Turkish member decided not to abandon dialogue. Nevertheless, the conditions changed dramatically in the months that followed Öcalan's arrest. When the summer came around corner the Greek-Turkish relations started to improve, surprisingly, at a quick pace, preparing the ground for the initiation of the fourth Greek-Turkish rapprochement.

7.3.1. Procedures Leading to the Initiation of the Rapprochement

It is generally held that the first step towards the fourth round of Greek-Turkish rapprochement came about with letter of Ismail Cem to George Papandreou on May 24, 1999 (for the full text of the letter as well as Papandreou's reply, see Ker-Lindsay, 2007a: Appendix A). In it the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs suggested that the first step to ameliorate bilateral relations should start from concluding an agreement on combating terrorism. In addition, Cem suggested that a plan for reconciliation should also be arranged. Papandreou's reply, which was sent to Cem on June 25th, was a lengthy one. Papandreou welcomed Cem's willingness for improving bilateral relations in the letter, and suggested a number of issues that he believed this cooperation should premise upon. More specifically, Papandreou pointed out six topics covering everything from culture to tourism, from environment to crime, and from economic cooperation to ecological issues.

Furthermore, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed their will to meet Ismail Cem in person whenever a convenient opportunity appears in the horizon. This answer, obviously pleasing Ismail Cem, reassured him about that “things were possible.” (Cem, 2001: 182)

The letters that Cem and Papandreou exchanged were significant for the initiation of the process. Their initial communication was quite similar to the exchange of letters that Venizelos exchanged with Inonu in 1928. Nonetheless, apart from Cem’s first step and Papandreou’s reciprocation, one can mention of a burgeoning process of trust-building in between these two countries. Indeed, bearing in mind that Cem had already sent two letters to Pangalos in short notice, only to be turned down by the Greek side, his decision to send a yet another, similar letter to the new minister of foreign affairs shows that Cem anticipated Papandreou to react differently.

An opportunity for the two ministers of foreign affairs to meet in person soon arrived, on June 30. Their venue of meeting was New York, in the margins of UN’s “friends of Kosovo” meeting, wherein the two decided to put together a team of Turkish and Greek high-ranking officials in hopes of discussing matters of low-politics. Among the topics to be handled by this committee were “tourism”, “environment”, “trade”, “culture”, “regional cooperation”, “organized crime”, “drug trafficking”, “illegal migration”, and finally “terrorism”. Tourism, environment and trade issues apparently took a prior place with parties appointing them as the

subjects of discussion during the first meeting in Ankara, on 26-27 July 1999, while leaving the rest to the following summit in Athens, on 29-30 July 1999⁷⁴.

Papandreou and Cem's meeting in New York, significantly contributed to the trust-building process, as the two men had the opportunity for the first time to meet in person and exchange their thoughts on the future of Greek-Turkish relations. The establishment of the committees clearly indicates that the dialogue that took place was not superficial, but in fact authenticates the overall willingness of Cem and Papandreou to move forward. Alternatively, the committees can be considered as a tactical move to prepare the ground for the initiation of a more decisive step taken in the direct of a Greek-Turkish reapproachment, which would, for instance, include the signing of agreements between the two sides.

In August 17 a catastrophic earthquake measuring 7.5 on the Richter scale struck Turkey's Izmit district, by the Marmara Sea causing massive destruction. Fifteen minutes after the earthquake the Greek Embassy in Ankara received a plea from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for help. In less than half an hour, Papandreou had contacted Cem and assured him about his governments resolve to offer whatever help Turkey may have needed. Be noted that this was the first answer from international community to Cem's request for help (Ker-Lindsay, 2000). Indeed, Greece immediately sent the Greek Emergency Rescue Team (EMAK), fully equipped and accompanied by sniffing dogs. In addition, two

⁷⁴http://www.mfa.gov.tr/press-release-regarding-the-understanding-reached-between-turkish-and-greek-foreign-ministers_br_july-22_-1999.en.mfa (accessed 20/9/2013)

mobile hospital units together with a team of doctors, and a team of seismologists were also dispatched to Turkey (Ker-Lindsay, 2000).

Nonetheless, it should also be noted that, besides the official response by the Greek state, the response by the Greek society was also quick and attentive to the humanitarian tragedy that wrecked a havoc on Turkey. The Greek Church in accordance with the Patriarchate offered humanitarian help. The mayors of Athens, Thessaloniki, Piraeus and Patras and Heraclion met in order to better coordinate their common efforts for help. The academic communities of two Universities in Athens decided to give a helping hand to the victims of earthquake, as well. Other NGOs such as the Médecins Sans Frontières, the Trade Union Centre of Thessaloniki, and the Greek Women's Association, too, did not fail to stand by the side of Turkey in the face of the said natural disaster. Finally, the Daily Newspaper Editor Union sent a letter to the Istanbul and Ankara Journalist Unions to express their sincere condolences, while Mr. Koutsikos, the president of the Greek-Turkish Business Association also sent letters with similar content to the Turkish business community, citing the will of the Greek businessmen to help Turkey recuperate from the resultant humanitarian and material loss (Ker-Lindsay, 2000; also see Ta Nea, 19/8/1999). Greek assistance was reported in the Turkish media in a way they all praised Greece's timely offered help (see for instance Sami Kohen's article on Milliyet, 25/8/1999, page 18; also Ta Nea, 23/8/1999).

Just in a matter weeks, this time around Athens fell victim to a similar earthquake. Even though the emergent damage was incomparable to what had

happened in Turkey, the Turkish state and Turkish citizens eagerly voiced their willingness to assist their Greek neighbors. A team of the Turkish Emergency Rescue Team (the AKUT) lost no time to establish connection with the Greek Ambassador in Ankara only minutes after the earthquake to offer help. The AKUT departed for Greece immediately after the earthquake to commence on its first mission outside Turkey (Ker-Lindsay, 2000). The Turkish President Suleyman Demirel, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and Ismail Cem sent their condolences to the Greek government (Ta Nea, 9/9/1999). Additionally, many Turkish citizens informed the Greek consulate in Istanbul they are prepared to give support to their neighbors hurt by a similar disaster. A few days after the Athens earthquake the Greek Prime Minister stated:

The presence of the Turkish rescue team, as well as the presence of the Greek rescue team during the earthquakes in Turkey is indicative of the solidarity and the friendship that nations in the area must have, and in general all nations, in order to proceed in peace (To Vima, 9/9/1999).

The earthquakes' relative weight within the initiation of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement might have been a bit overstated. As also indicated in the official statements by Ismail Cem and, especially, George Papandreou; a proven solidarity, one nation showed to the other, at a time of great distress, became a force for pushing the momentum to the 'right' direction (see for instance Gundogdu, 2001).

Papandreou (2001: 6) accordingly opined that

Tragedy generated a genuine feeling of human warmth between two peoples involved in historical strife. Spontaneous and dramatic acts of fraternity and solidarity were expressed between the citizens of Greece and Turkey. These acts short-circuited elaborate diplomatic strategies and exerted powerful pressure on our governments to move ahead boldly. Our mandate became clear. Our peoples desire to live in peace together

Yet, the 'exploitation' of the earthquake for even noble political causes soon started to lose its steam. Overall, it is not the earthquakes that unaided initiated the political will for cooperation. Instead, before these natural disasters occurred, the political will was already there and communicated between the two governments. However, the help that each nation offered to one another, in turns, invoked in both sides of the Aegean a sense of empathy and sympathy. These feelings offered the decision makers a historic opportunity to take big steps forward safe in knowledge that they now have the support of their people for a rapprochement..

The third major change that occurred in 1999 and propped up the solidification of the rapprochement's initiation was the lifting of Greek objections to Turkey's EU membership. Such constituted a major change in the traditional Greek foreign policy that, to that far, aimed to somehow impede Turkey's EU prospects. According to Simitis (2005: 75-6) after the Imia/Kardak crisis it became clear that there was need for a new strategy in which to re-examine the bilateral-bipolar nature of the Greek-Turkish relations through new lenses that goes beyond the simplistic logic of problem-solving by the means of violence. This new thinking was to become an important strategic choice after the 1996 elections in Greece.

The change of Greek foreign policy's perspective allowed Turkey to attain a candidate status for full membership to the EU, thus fulfilling a time-honoring goal of the Turkish state⁷⁵. According to Tsakonas (2010: 23-24), the Helsinki Summit was the outcome of an "ideational change" that occurred in Greece's foreign policy

⁷⁵ For instance see <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-of-prime-minister-bulent-ecevit-in-helsinki-on-turkey-s-candidacy-to-the-eu-br-december-11-1999-en.mfa> (accessed 20/9/2013)

especially regarding the latter's relations with Turkey. This shift was an outcome deriving as much from a more Europeanized Greek foreign policy as from a visibly sharp pragmatist turn in the foreign policy making mentality of Greece. As for the said pragmatic shift in Greece perception of Turkey, it suggested that "successful interconnection of the two states' interests with legitimate international rules and standards –as for example that of European integration- is both feasible and realistic."

Hence, other than satisfying Turkey's objectives, the Helsinki Presidential Conclusions (for the full text of the conclusions see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hell1_en.htm) were extremely satisfactory to the goals of the Greek diplomacy as well. On the one hand, the resolution of the Cyprus problem was no more a precondition for accession to the EU (paragraph 9b). On the other hand, if Turkey wanted to become a full member of the EU, she should have to solve her problems with Greece (On this issue also see Rumelili, 2004). Much quoted paragraph 4 of the Conclusions stated that

... In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004...

The Helsinki Summit made cooperative attitude more appealing not just for Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots but also for Greece and the Greek-Cypriots, provided that the solution of the Cyprus problem *per se* was no longer deemed as a

precondition for Turkey's accession, too (Loizides, 2002), (For possible outcomes of cooperative non-cooperative policies see Loizides, 2002: 433).

Table 7.1.

Action/ Event	Series of crises	Letter from Cem to Papandreou	Papandreou's letter to Cem	Earthquakes in Turkey and Greece	Helsinki summit
Time	1996-1999	May 24, 1999	June 1999	August – September 1999	December 1999
Effect	Brought the two states to the brink of war	First step – Ice breaking	Reciprocatio n, trust- building	Positive gestures – Positive feelings	Internation al pressure – Positive incentives for cooperatio n

7.3.2. Main Incentives for the Initiation of the 1999 Rapprochement

The fourth case resembles more to the 1987 Greek-Turkish rapprochement as far as the incentives for the initiation of the rapprochement are concerned. The series of crises discussed above had alarmed politicians in both states as they made clear that Turkey and Greece had to work on their problems in order to avoid an armed conflict. Once again the element of threat seems to render two states insecure with each other's potential intentions by creating incentives strong enough to convince the political leaders from both sides to decide in favor of a rapprochement.

Other than the threat to national security, it is specific to Turkey that Ankara's willingness to join the European Union must be considered as a critical

motive for the rapprochement. Meaning, Turkey had to normalize its state of affairs with Greece as this normalization was the only way to secure Greece's backing of Turkey's bid for full membership.

Other than these major incentives the domestic politics in Greece (see Koliopoulos et al, 2010) and Turkey (see Carkoglu, 2000; Hale 2002), as well as the financial situation of Greece (Hekimoglou, 2006: 409) and Turkey (Onis, 2003) did not provide any considerable incentives for a Greek-Turkish rapprochement.

7.4 Breaking Down the Rapprochement Process

Similar to the rapprochement of 1930s, normalization of relations between Turkey and Greece was supported by the decision-makers and the public in both countries, while the motivation was also strong enough to push it further. In the succeeding pages, the development of the Greek-Turkish relations from the year 2000 onwards will be discussed, and the rapprochement process will be broken down to its basic components.

a. Summit level communication

The Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey were meeting quite often, even before the beginning of the rapprochement, in the margins of NATO meetings or other summit level meetings of various international organizations. Such was the Heads of Government of the Countries of South-Eastern Europe summit meeting, which took place in 1997 for the first time in Greece. The meeting, among other issues, aimed to create those conditions that are needed for the prosperity of the

participating nations in a framework of peace, security, good neighborliness and stability (UN Documents S/1997/910). Simitis (2005: 89) mentions his meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz during this convention, adding that the Turkish Prime Minister insisted on an open dialogue that will include all issues, while the former proposed a step-by-step approach. Later on, Simitis concluded that meetings between the Prime Ministers became material for Turkish domestic opposition to exploit, thus there was almost no room back then for rapprochement.

Thus, during the future occasions when Simitis met with Turkish Prime Ministers (for instance he met again with Yilmaz during the 1998 Heads of Government of the Countries of South-Eastern Europe summit meeting in Turkey, and with Bulent Ecevit in Istanbul during the OSCE summit meeting), yet, no significant progress could be made. Simitis' strong belief that meetings between Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers will be no means fruitful, was the reason why, during the first years following the initiation of the rapprochement process, he neither accepted any of the several invitations to visit Ankara (Simitis, 2005: 89), nor did he extend one such invitation.

The victory of the Justice and Development party (the AKP) in the 2002 Turkish national elections became a turning point concerning the summit level meetings between Greece and Turkey. Soon after, Simitis communicated through diplomatic channels his wish to meet the leader of AKP Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Simitis, 2005). Erdoğan accepted the invitation and visited Athens on November

18, 2002⁷⁶. Erdoğan's visit to Athens was of great importance, as during the visit he was still not in office due to domestic legal obstacles. As Greece was the first out of the seven countries of Erdoğan's tour, the Greek government showed her support to the Turkish leader, while leaks by Erdoğan's associates admitted that Erdoğan was very pleased by the Greek invitation (To Vima, 19/11/2002).

Simitis (2005) states that Erdoğan gave him the impression of a leader who was determined to precipitate developments in Greek-Turkish relations. Later on, during the Ministerial Council he admitted that he believed Erdoğan was "well-intentioned and positive"⁷⁷. However, during their meeting the two Prime Ministers did not share views on whether the EU should postpone giving Cyprus full candidate status until June 2003 Summit in Thessaloniki⁷⁸. Before he left Greece Erdoğan also met with Kostas Karamanlis, the leader of the opposition party and with Mr. Avramopoulos, the mayor of Athens with whom he became friends when Erdoğan was they mayor of Istanbul (To Vima, 19/11/2002).

Erdoğan visited Greece again in late June 2003⁷⁹ during the European Council in Thessaloniki. Even though this was not an official visit, it is important to note that during his stay Erdoğan visited the Turkish Consulate in Thessaloniki, wherein he went to the house Kemal Ataturk was born. This was the first visit of a

⁷⁶ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=ak-party-to-tour-eu-countries-to-rally-support-2002-11-18> (accessed 20/9/2013)

⁷⁷ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=simitis-sees-no-prospect-for-joint-ventures-with-turkey-2002-11-21> (accessed 20/9/2013)

⁷⁸ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=erdogan-has-surprised-athens-2002-11-20> (accessed 20/9/2013)

⁷⁹ In the meanwhile Simitis and Erdoğan had met in Belgrade

Turkish Prime Minister to the house of Kemal Atatürk⁸⁰. It is also noteworthy that the permission for the visit was provided with hesitation due to security concerns. The fact that Erdoğan was, finally, permitted to visit Atatürk's house should be interpreted as Greece's support made available for him, as this visit strengthened his profile as a leader who is not at variance with Republican heritage. During the Thessaloniki Summit Erdoğan met with Simitis, but there was no progress concerning Greek-Turkish issues.

In 2004 Prime Minister Erdoğan was to make an official visit to Greece, his first as the Prime Minister of Turkey, and the first visit of any Turkish Prime Minister since Özal's visit in 1988. His host was the newly elected Greek Prime Minister, Kostas Karamanlis. During his visit Erdoğan met with several officials as well, such as the initiator of the rapprochement George Papandreou who at that time was the leader of the main opposition, the leaders of all opposition parties, the president of the Greek Parliament and the President of the State (Ta Nea, 8/6/2004).

Erdoğan's official visit to Greece in May 2004 is important for several reasons. To begin with, the visit was indicative that Greece's strategy on Greek-Turkish relations had not shifted after the government change, at least not dramatically⁸¹. It was not only the visit which took place, but also the statements made by both Erdoğan and Karamanlis that affirmed the persistence of the rapprochement spirit. For instance, Karamanlis pointed out that

We have had good times and bad times. Circumstances, mistakes and short-

⁸⁰ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=erdogan-returns-satisfied-from-thessaloniki-2003-06-23> (accessed 20/9/2013)

⁸¹ This issue will be discussed in detail later in this chapter

sighted choices have brought hardships to both nations and widened the divide. Of course, the two sides should not dishonor their past by forgetting or distorting what has gone before, but I believe it is time to make a big decision. We have to teach future generations that both nations have the desire for development and welfare that will benefit all those living on both sides of the Aegean⁸².

Similarly, Erdoğan stated:

What we say is that we have to look at the future. Leave the incidents of the past to the past. We should keep in mind the generations to come and not what we lived. Because we don't wish for the coming generations to live through what we have lived through (To Vima, 8/5/2004).

Secondly, during Erdoğan's visit to Athens, the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers had the chance to strengthen their personal relations. The two men had met on several occasions in the past, and were known to have a very good rapport towards one another (Ker-Lindsay, 2007b). In Athens Karamanlis invited Erdoğan to his house, and with their spouses they had dinner which was of private nature⁸³. The private dinner lasted for three and a half hours and from the Greek side leaked that nothing concerning politics or diplomacy was discussed (To Vima, 7/5/2004). Good personal relations between Erdoğan and Karamanlis were also confirmable by the fact that, few months later in July 2004, Karamanlis was to participate in Erdoğan's daughter's wedding ceremony, in fact, as one of the two witnesses.⁸⁴

However, the most important aspect of Erdoğan's official visit to Athens was his short visit to Western Thrace and meeting with people from the minority. This visit, which was the first one of the kind since Bayar's visit 52 years earlier⁸⁵,

⁸² <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=erdogan-visit-turns-new-page-in-ties-with-greece-2004-05-10> (accessed 20/9/2013)

⁸³ Also the Greek MFA and Turkish Minister Aydın with their spouses attended

⁸⁴ http://www.grtnews.com/gr/publish/article_263.shtml (accessed 20/9/2013)

⁸⁵ In 1967 Demirel had visited Alexandropolis by the Turkish borders

had caused concerns to Athens and much discussion as to whether it should take place or not. Finally, not only did the visit to Western Thrace take place⁸⁶, but with his attitude Erdoğan eased Greek side's worries and further strengthened the rapprochement spirit. During his visit at the city of Komotini, Erdoğan talked to the people who had gathered outside the Turkish Consulate and said "My presence here must be a lesson [of friendship] for all people...", while later on he stated "I'm especially addressing my brothers. You will, without doubt, protect your special identity. Nobody is telling you to lose or give up your Turkish identity, but remember that you are citizens of Greece"⁸⁷. Comments concerning Erdoğan's visit to Western Thrace by the Greek press were very positive, while they acknowledged soothing undertones in Erdoğan's statements (For Instance, see Ta Nea, 10/5/2004, Kathimerini.gr 11/5/2004).

Another major breakthrough for the Greek-Turkish rapprochement came about during Karamanlis' visit to Turkey in 2008. The visit of a Greek Prime Minister to Turkey, a very rare occasion in itself, also verifies the good level of bilateral relations and the success of the rapprochement process. It has already been mentioned that Simitis, who was the Prime Minister until 2004, had avoided visiting Turkey, before and after the initiation of the rapprochement. The hesitation of Greek Prime Ministers to visit Turkey, especially after 1974, is explained by the public disgrace that would cause an official visit to a country that is seen by the

⁸⁶ Even though it was labeled as a private visit

⁸⁷ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=erdogan-visit-turns-new-page-in-ties-with-greece-2004-05-10> (accessed 20/9/2013)

Greek people as the occupation force of an important part of Hellenism. It is therefore not a surprise that last official visit of a Greek Prime Minister to Turkey, before the 2008 Karamanlis visit, had taken place 49 years ago by Karamanlis' uncle Konstantinos Karamanlis. Such makes Karamanlis one of the third Greek Prime Ministers who have ever paid an official visit to Turkey⁸⁸.

According to the Greek press, Karamanlis' visit to Turkey was originally planned for 3 years earlier. However, due to an incident close to the Imia/Kardak islets slightly prior to a visit by the Greek Foreign Minister Molyviatis to Turkey, which Greece perceived as a planned provocation, he postponed his visit. Therefore, during Karamanlis' visit an unofficial agreement between the Turkish and Greek militaries to avoid any confrontation that could initiate an unpleasant incident over the Aegean took place (Kathimerini.gr, 24/1/2008)⁸⁹. A week before his visit to Turkey, Karamanlis justified his action during a speech given before the Greek Parliament by saying:

Greece and Turkey have a very long history and a very long difficult history. Our relations with Turkey are not straightforward; they have their ups and their downs. They have moments of tension and moments of abatement. There have been several efforts since the time of Kemal Atatürk and Eleftherios Venizelos, some went better some went worse. We follow a strategy with the eye to the future and not as a hostage of the past. We are looking for a gradual restoration of mutual trust. We are working on the full normalization of our bilateral relations, which, of course, presupposes, a solution on the Cyprus issue. With these crystal clear thoughts, this return visit of mine to Turkey is being planned. There is neither excessive optimism nor pessimism. There is realism. There is a sense of duty.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ The third one was Venizelos

⁸⁹ On the Greek fear of provocation see also <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=why-all-the-fuss-regarding-karamanlis-visit-to-turkey-2008-01-23> (accessed 20/9/2013)

⁹⁰ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=unease-marks-backdrop-of-karamanlis-visit-2008-01-21> (accessed 20/9/2013)

As both Erdoğan and Karamanlis had recently reelected, the visit raised expectations among many who saw this as an opportunity for both leaders to set aside a long history of mutual distrust. As it is, Karamanlis' trip to Turkey did not produce any spectacular results; it was, however, satisfactory. Apart from the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan, the Greek Prime Minister also met with the Turkish President Abdullah Gul and the leader of the main opposition party, Deniz Baykal⁹¹. During his stay Karamanlis visited Atatürk's Mausoleum, and gave a lecture at Bilkent University. As an importance anecdote, he used the France-Germany example as a model that Greek-Turkish relations could/should follow (Kathimerini.gr 25/01/2008). The most important outcome of the meeting was the agreement to intensify the exploratory talks, which became less substantive during Molyviatis time at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to one meeting every two months (Enet.gr, 25/1/2008).

One of the most important parts of Karamanlis' official visit to Turkey, at least from the Greek perspective, was his visit to the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul. The visit which fell under Karamanlis' private schedule according to the protocol⁹², offered a chance to the Greek Prime Minister and the Patriarch to highlight the constructive role that the Patriarchate could play not only to the further improvement of the Greek-Turkish relations but also to EU-Turkey

⁹¹ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=greek-pms-landmark-visit-begins-amid-concerns-2008-01-24> (accessed 20/9/2013)

⁹² <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=greek-pm-karamanlis-gears-up-for-ankara-plans-to-pay-private-call-on-fener-patriarchate-2008-01-22> (accessed 20/9/2013)

relations⁹³. Karamanlis defined the patriarch as “the firm European voice in Turkey, despite all adversities and disappointments”, while Bartholomew, the Patriarch, stated:

The patriarchate always aims for the building of harmonious and peaceful relations between those living in the same geopolitical area, the peoples of Turkey and of Greece, and believes that both can always live peacefully and fraternally under the same sky which we hope will never be overshadowed by clouds of conflict⁹⁴.

The two official visits, plus Erdoğan’s visit as the leader of AKP, that took place in the ten years since the initiation of the rapprochement process⁹⁵, are not enough to judge for the completion of the rapprochement process considering the extent to which a rapprochement process may demand. However, it should be underlined that, unlike the 1988 case, the 1999 rapprochement, especially until 2004, was a process mainly driven by the Greek and Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs—but not the Prime Ministers. Indeed, after their first exchange of letters in mid-1999, Papandreou and Cem met a number of times on several occasions. The relationship they developed, their frequent communication, their willingness for collaboration and the support of backchannel Greek-Turkish working groups was the driving force behind the rapprochement process.

⁹³ For instance see <http://www.skai.gr/news/politics/article/72036/%CE%95%CF%80%CE%AF%CF%83%CE%BA%CE%B5%CF%88%CE%B7-%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B7-%CE%9C%CE%B5%CE%B3%CE%AC%CE%BB%CE%B7-%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85-%CE%93%CE%AD%CE%BD%CE%BF%CF%85%CF%82-%CE%A3%CF%87%CE%BF%CE%BB%CE%AE/> (accessed 20/9/2013)

⁹⁴ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=bartholomeos-makes-no-mention-of-hevbeliada-seminary-2008-01-26> (accessed 20/9/2013)

⁹⁵ Please note that this chapter covers the rapprochement until the end of 2009. Erdoğan’s visit to Turkey which took place in 2010 is not covered in this paper.

b. Signing of agreements

The decade in aftermath of the initiation of the rapprochement experienced a significant increase in the number of bilateral agreements that were signed between Turkey and Greece. According to Ganapati⁹⁶ (2010), Greece and Turkey had, since 1923 and until 1999, signed a total of 19 bilateral agreements. Of these, 10 were signed before and during the first rapprochement and 8 were signed before and during the second rapprochement. The only agreement between the two states between 1955 and 1999 was the Agreement on International Road Transport signed in 1970. It is therefore important to note that, after 1999, Greece and Turkey signed 33 bilateral agreements, including protocols, memorandums of understanding, while they have adopted 24 confidence building measures (Ganapati, 2010: 173).

The signing of those agreements between Turkey and Greece, which mainly concerned issues associated with “low politics”, has been the outcome of the cooperative atmosphere that prevailed since the very beginning. It has already been mentioned that during their meeting in New York, on June 30, 1999, Papandreou and Cem decided to create a group of Turkish and Greek high-ranking officials, who would discuss cooperation in six different fields. After the first meetings that took place within the final days of July, the Greek and Turkish officials met again for a second round in Athens (9 and 10 September 1999) and Ankara (15 and 16 September 1999), even arranging a follow-up meeting to hold in the late October.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Data based on UN Treaty Collection

⁹⁷ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-communique-signed-after-the-meeting-of-high-officials-of-the->

The effectiveness of those meetings became apparent during Papandreou's official visit to Turkey from 19 to 22 January, 2000. Papandreou's visit, a milestone in itself considering that the last visit of a Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs to Turkey was in 1962 by Averoff⁹⁸, bore the fruit with four bilateral agreements signed in between the parties (For full text of all four agreements see Greek Parliament official record, Plenary session 27/3/2001, www.hellenicparliament.gr). Those included a) agreement for cooperation on environment protection which also encouraged scientific, legal and technical cooperation, as well as cooperation between Greek and Turkish NGOs, b) Cooperation between the Turkish Ministry of Interior and the Greek Ministry of Public Order to form a common front against illegal trans-border activities, especially terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and illegal immigration. This agreement referred to the exchange of information between Greek and Turkish services especially. c) Cooperation on tourism and d) agreement for the mutual promotion and protection of investments, which created a solid legal framework for the Greek investments in Turkey and vice-versa.

Papandreou's visit to Turkey was followed by Cem's visit to Athens a few weeks later. This visit was labeled as historic by the Greek press due to the fact that a Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs for the first time made her/his way to Greece since 1960. During Cem's official visit to Athens, Greece and Turkey signed five more agreements on February 4. These include⁹⁹ a) cooperation on the areas of

foreign-ministries-of-turkey-and-greece_br_september-16_-1999.en.mfa (accessed 20/9/2013)

⁹⁸ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=papandreou-coming-to-ankara-to-sign-four-agreements-2000-01-19> (accessed 20/9/2013)

⁹⁹ For full text of all five agreements see Greek Parliament official record, Plenary session

science and technology under the supervision of TUBITAK and the Greek General Secretariat for Research and Technology, b) agreement on economic cooperation which also included the establishment of common Greek-Turkish financial committee (article 5) which would promote and make bilateral economic cooperation easier, c) cooperation of customs administration aiming at more efficient tax calculation and proper/fair application of customs legislation, d) Cultural cooperation, which mainly encouraged cooperation on education, including cooperation between universities and exchange of professors and teachers, e) agreement on cooperation in maritime transport with an eye on strengthening Greek-Turkish cooperation in the maritime field as well as contributing to the development of international shipping.

Although all these agreements were part of low politics, their importance should not be undervalued. After all, the two meetings in Athens and Ankara constituted the highest level of diplomacy the two states have ever had in history. Cem (2001: 183-184) defended the importance of the nine agreements by advancing:

... We have accomplished in 6 months more than what had been done in 40 years... The current talks and the nine agreements signed are substantial. All are of equal relevance... If what we have already achieved in six months were "minor-confidence-building measures" why then they were not realized in 40 years?

Finally, next to the nine agreements, during Papandreou's visit to Ankara in January 2000 the parties concurred with that Greece should provide Turkey with technical know-how on EU (acquis) related issues (Heraclides, 2001: 24).

In the years that followed, Greece and Turkey signed a number of agreements that covered cooperation on several issues such as health (signed in Athens in September 2005), justice (protocol was signed during Turkish Minister of Justice to Athens in June 2005), transportation (highway connecting Greece to Istanbul and second bridge over the Evros/Meriç river), agreement for cooperation on veterinary issues (signed in November 2000), cooperation on agricultural issues (Protocol signed in June 2000 in Ankara), cooperation on plant protection (also signed in November 2000), and emergency relief (protocol for the formation of a joint disaster response unit). On top of these agreements, the two countries also agreed on two other matters which in the author's view convey even more importance. These are; the Readmission of the Illegal Immigrants Protocol (implementation of the Article 8 of the previous agreement concerning fighting crime, which was signed in Ankara) and the memorandum encouraging cooperation between the Greek Diplomatic Academy and the Turkish Foreign Ministry's Training Centre¹⁰⁰ (on Greek-Turkish agreements see Ker-Lindsay, 2007; Heraclides 2001).

In addition, a number of agreements dealing with strengthening economic and business cooperation were also signed after 2000, while 24 confidence building measures, which mainly concerned military cooperation and tension reduction, were signed¹⁰¹.

¹⁰⁰ On Greek-Turkish agreements see also <http://www.agora.mfa.gr>, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_1_12/06/2005_146941 (accessed 20/9/2013)

¹⁰¹ Will be discussed in following sections

c. Military cooperation

Military cooperation between Greece and Turkey was a key component of the rapprochement process. By the end of the 1990s both countries were maintaining strong militaries, while dogfights were a common occurrence over the Aegean Sea. Even if such confrontations can be considered superficial, they could easily lead to more serious events in case of an accident. Strengthening military cooperation could lead to tension reduction over the Aegean, thus minimizing the likelihood of incidents that could provoke a crisis or, in general, endanger the rapprochement process.

Military cooperation was closely related to the discussion around confidence building measures (CBMs) which were first put on the negotiation table in early 2000¹⁰². The Turkish side insisted on the adoption of a number of military related CBMs, while the Greeks believed that the CBMs could also include other areas of interest as well. Finally, Greece and Turkey decided to discuss three separate categories of CBMs. The first would be measures that had already been agreed in the Pappoulis-Yilmaz Memorandum, during the previous rapprochement, in May 1988 (see previous chapter). These CBMs would be discussed by the Greek and Turkish representatives at NATO. The second and third categories included measures of tension reduction and good neighborhood respectively, and would be

¹⁰² The sentence refers to the period after the initiation of the rapprochement process. Prior to it, Greece and Turkey, encouraged by the General Secretary of NATO Javier Solana, had discussed CBMs. See http://www.mfa.gov.tr/agreement-reached-by-turkey-and-greece-regarding-the-confidence-building-measures-in-the-aegean_br_june-5_-1998.en.mfa (accessed 20/9/2013)

discussed between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (for an analytical review of those CBMs see Tsakonas & Ntokos, 2006: 140-1).

Finally, Greece and Turkey signed twenty-four confidence building measures, most of them aiming either to strengthen cooperation between the two militaries, across all levels of command and all army branches, or to create the conditions for tension reduction over the Aegean Sea. On the first group the two states agreed on the CBMs such as; arranging regular visits between chiefs of staff (discussed between Babacan and Bakoyanni at Athens in 2007), exchange visits between officers of all three branches and visits military academies' cadets (agreed between Papandreou and Cem in late May 2003 in Crete), invite officers to monitor other state's military exercises once a year (one of the first CBMs that Papandreou and Cem agreed upon in November 2001), and mutual briefing in relation to the planned military exercises (the first agreed CBM in December 2000). A number of joint forces or units were also established.

The second group includes agreements such as establishing a direct line of communication between the chiefs of General Staff and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, expanding the flight moratorium from June 14 to September 14, instead of the Two Month (July-August) Moratorium that was arranged by the Papoulias-Yilmaz memorandum, "red-line" between the combined air operation centers in the Turkish city of Eskisehir and the Greek city of Larissa. In addition, a big step towards creating a trustful environment appeared with the signing of the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines and that of the Olympic Truce (on the CBMs

see Tsakonas & Ntokos, 2006; Turkey's EU annual progress reports from 2000-2009; press reports during Foreign Ministers' official visits).

In total, the CBMs that Turkey and Greece jointly agreed on had a positive impact on the rapprochement process. There are at least two incidents that could lead to crisis, but, in both of them, tension was rapidly defused through those mechanisms that the CBMs had established. The first incident refers to Turkey's plans to proceed with seismic surveys with the "Piri Reis" vessel¹⁰³. The Greek concerns were eased out through multiple phone communications between Papandreou and Cem (Ta Nea, 31/5/2001). The second event concerns the tragic incident of two fighter jets colliding over the Aegean Sea. In the minutes that followed the crash the Greek Chief of Staff Hinoftis called General Özkök, and they agreed to land all fighters in order to avoid further unpleasant developments (Ta Nea, 24/5/2006).

The cooperation between the Turkish and Greek militaries that the CBMs encouraged, also allowed for several mutual visit of high-ranking military officers. Thus, General Büyükanıt visited Greece two times, one as the Chief of Turkish Army (Land Forces) in June 2005 hosted by the Chief of the Hellenic Army General Staff Lieutenant General Douvas (To Vima, 22/6/2005), and the other as the Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces in November 2006. During his second visit he stated:

What is important is to isolate the atmosphere that could create crises in the Aegean. It is important for deterioration to take place. We will try to

¹⁰³ It should be stressed out that Piri Reis did not belong to the Turkish republic but to University of Izmir

accomplish this. Off course two military men cannot solve all the Greek-Turkish problems. What they can do is to arrange for the politicians a safe environment...¹⁰⁴

Similarly, the Greek Admiral Hinofotis paid an official visit to Turkey in July 2006 and hosted by General Özkök, only weeks before the latter's retirement. Hinofotis, who was the first Chief of General Staff to visit Turkey after 1974, was warmly welcomed in Turkey, while the Turkish media noted that this was the first time whereby Turkish military's honor guard played the Greek national anthem¹⁰⁵.

In contrast, there happened a negative event caused by the CBMs. On April 11, 2004 a group of two Turkish officers and 5 cadets arrived to Athens, following an invitation by the Greek Military Academy. The invitation was part of an agreement that Cem and Papandreou initially signed on May 26, 2003. Over the night of April 12, the Turkish group found in their room a half destroyed Turkish flag with insults written on it in English. The Turkish group as a result was instructed to leave Greece and it did so immediately¹⁰⁶.

d. Economic cooperation

Economic cooperation between Greece and Turkey followed the development of Greek-Turkish relations after 1987. As such, although only few companies were active across the borders, those business councils that were established after Davos, which were discussed in the previous chapter, were still active. Nonetheless, relations among business associations deteriorated sharply

¹⁰⁴ <http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=753598>

¹⁰⁵ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=greek-general-hinofotis-hosted-by-turkish-chief-of-general-staff-ozkok-2006-07-27> (accessed 20/9/2013)

¹⁰⁶ www.nooz.gr

after the Öcalan case, echoing the general spirit of mistrust that prevailed among the Turkish people. In February 1999, two of the most important Turkish businessmen, Rahmi Koc and Sarik Tara, declared that they would inhibit the operations of the Greek-Turkish Cooperation Council and boycott Greek products, while Mr. Koc, who was the president of the Council resigned from his position. Previously, on February 22, Turkish businessmen had sent a letter to the European Employers Union accusing Greece of pandering terrorism (Ta Nea, 4/3/1999).

Even then, by the end of 1999, business relations started to bounce back. Notably, the Greek and Turkish business communities always constitute one of the main pillars of the rapprochement process. The first official meeting after the initiation of the rapprochement between Turkish and Greek businessmen took place in Athens in mid-October where it was decided that “workshop groups should be founded to develop relations and cooperation between the two countries’ business communities”¹⁰⁷. The Turkish businessman Sarik Tara became the new President of the Greek-Turkish Cooperation Council, and was the host of the Papandreou-Cem meeting on January 22, 2000, while other important Turkish businessmen and the President of the Greek-Turkish Business Cooperation Council, Mr. Koutsikos, also attended (Milliyet, 23/1/2000).

From 2000 onwards economic relations between Greece and Turkey significantly increased, while the cooperation between Turkish and Greek businessmen became much more frequent. Collaboration on the business level was

¹⁰⁷ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=turco-greek-business-meeting-results-positively-1999-10-14> (accessed 20/9/2013)

based on a variety of initiatives, which aimed at bringing together businessmen from the two sides in order to identify the obstacles on the road towards a more intensified cross-border commerce and publicize products (For some important initiatives from 2004-2009 see at www.grtrnews.com under economy section). For instance, in February 2000, around 150 Greek and Turkish businessmen held a conference in Istanbul. In addition, in March 2000, the Greek-Turkish Business Forum was held (Ta Nea, 7/3/2000) and sustained its activities incessantly within upcoming years, as well. The Forum and other meetings among Greek and Turkish businessmen attracted also political interest, extending initiation to various prominent politicians.

Banking sector was one of the most important links in business cooperation between Turkey and Greece during the rapprochement process. From the very early stages, banks supported inter-border business by providing funding to those businessmen who wanted to conduct business with the other side. During the aforementioned Istanbul businessmen conference in March 2000, the Greek and Turkish Bank Unions signed a “Principles Paper” with which they agreed upon 6 points of cooperation (Ta Nea, 16/3/2000). These included exchange of information, cooperation in correspondent banking and common issuing of large loans. In 2006, the National Bank of Greece became the majority holder of Finansbank, acquiring 46% of normal shares and 100% of the latter’s founders’ shares (<http://www.finansbank.com.tr/en/pdf/announcements/20060818.pdf>)¹⁰⁸. This deal, valued at around \$2.8 billion, plus another \$2.25billion in 2007,

¹⁰⁸ This percentage was later doubled according to the agreement

skyrocketed Greek foreign direct investment to Turkey for 2006 and 2007, which was until then negligible. From 2004-2008 Greece ranked as the third biggest source of FDI in Turkey after Holland and the USA (Kutlay, 2009). Finally, plans to establish a Greek-Turkish Bank (Aegean Business Bank - ABB) were put forth since 2005¹⁰⁹, however, until now they have failed to realize (For more information on economic cooperation and its prospects see Liargovas, 2004).

Apart from the efforts made in the private sector, the political vision to support economic cooperation was also strong from the very beginning of the rapprochement process. Three of the nine agreements that Cem and Papandreou signed in January and February (economic cooperation, protection of investments and tourism) aimed at strengthening economic ties and economic interdependence between Greece and Turkey. Especially the agreement on economic cooperation mentioned a variety of sectors such as; energy, telecommunication and ship building, where cooperation between the two states was possible and should be encouraged.

The importance of economic cooperation for the policy-makers was also apparent during the two-way official visits. During Erdoğan's visit to Athens in May 2004, an official dinner took place to which many businessmen attended as well. During the dinner Karamanlis pinpointed that trade volume between Turkey and Greece had reached \$1.3 billion, now three times more than what was it in 1999. He also marked that many Greek enterprises were expanding to Turkey, while

¹⁰⁹ http://www.grtnews.com/gr/publish/article_582.shtml (accessed 20/9/2013)

there were 77 investment programs, running at different sectors (To Vima, 9/5/2004, also for more information on cross border trade and foreign direct investments see Papadopoulos, 2009). Likewise, during Karamanlis visit to Turkey, the two Prime Ministers attended the Greek-Turkish Business Forum which took place at the same time in Istanbul¹¹⁰. During the Forum, Erdoğan stated that “the cooperation of businesses, institutions and NGO’s are pushing politicians forward to cooperate and create common policies. The contribution of the business world is especially vital in this partnership”¹¹¹. Apart from the summit level, business cooperation was also encouraged during meetings among Greek and Turkish officials, just as in those meetings of the Joint Greek-Turkish Economic Committee which brought together ministries in 2002¹¹².

The most important achievement of the official efforts for economic cooperation became realized in December 2003 when the two states agreed upon the construction of a pipeline that would run from Komotini to Karacabey, connecting the Turkish and Greek natural gas networks and threading a link for the transportation of natural gas from Asia to Europe. This project, as extensive as 86.6 kilometers, forms one of the greatest deals between Greece and Turkey. The construction was launched by Karamanlis and Erdoğan at the Greek-Turkish borders in July 2005 (To Vima, 3/7/2005), and the same Prime Ministers

¹¹⁰ http://www.ertnews.com/gr/publish/article_901.shtml (accessed 20/9/2013)

¹¹¹ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=greece-turkey-aim-to-strengthen-business-ties-2008-01-26> (accessed 20/9/2013)

¹¹² <http://news.in.gr/economy/article/?aid=360164> (accessed 20/9/2013)

inaugurated the operation of the pipe in late 2007 (www.desfa.gr, see press release 18/11/2007).

e. Statements made by officials

Previous to the initiation of the rapprochement, almost all statements by Greek and Turkish officials came to put additional tension and friction to the already worsened relations between the countries. The best example of such is a statement by Pangalos in late September 1997 when he accused the Turks of being “thieves, rapists and murderers” on Greek television. The statements of the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs invited immediate reaction from the Turkish media as well as the Greek media that is in support of then the opposition party (See for instance *Milliyet*, 26-27-28/9/1997). The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement accusing Mr. Pangalos of being delusional, a racist and a fascist.¹¹³ Likewise, the Greeks were also reacting to various statements, made by Turkish officials, which they found provocative, offensive or threatening¹¹⁴.

As far as the period following the rapprochement is concerned, official statements in general did not play an important part of the process. True, many public statements concerning the new era in the Greek-Turkish relations were made both by Cem and Papandreou, the initiators of the rapprochement, and later on by the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers. Nonetheless, these statements were not

¹¹³ http://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-issued-by-the-turkish-foreign-ministry-regarding-the-recent-calumnies-by-greek-foreign-minister-pangalos-against-turkey_br_january-10_-1998.en.mfa (accessed 20/9/2013)

¹¹⁴ See for example reaction on Ciller’s threats on use of military force *Ta Nea*, 17/12/1996; Also on several occasions, Greek reacted to Turkish threats for annexing the TRNC

creating positive developments but rather followed them. In other words, there were no such strong statements that would advance the rapprochement a step forward. On the other hand, the lack of provocative or insulting statements should itself be appreciated as an indicator of the strength of the process specifically if one compares the present to the situation in pre-1999 era. Occasionally, however, certain portions of the media in both countries did not fail to isolate certain parts of statements to be able to present what is left of to the public as a provocation from the other side¹¹⁵.

In this light, there are two official statements that are relevant to the rapprochement and should be mentioned here. The first one concerns Erdoğan's first visit to Greece as the leader of AKP in 2002. During his stay in Athens Erdoğan stated (To Vima, 19/11/2002):

We should not perceive Greece as a competitive country anymore. Greece is not our opponent...we should continue the cooperation that the great Atatürk and Eleftherios Venizelos had started

The second statement actually refers to the message that Karamanlis wrote in the quests' book after the wreath ceremony at Atatürk's Mausoleum during his official visit to Turkey. As he wrote (Kathimerini, 25/1/2008):

Kemal Atatürk and Eleftherios Venizelos had the political courage, the will and the insight not to let the conflicts and the tragedies of the past become an obstacle to the efforts for building a better future of peace and cooperation to the benefit of both our peoples.

Both Erdoğan's and Karamanlis' statements provide, once again, strong evidence of the 1930s rapprochement's influence on the Greek-Turkish relations,

¹¹⁵ For example Greek media would regularly present Turkish statements on Cyprus as provocations, even though they were just repeating Turkey's official view on the Cyprus problem

meaning how Venizelos' and Atatürk's achievements became a reference point for future Greek and Turkish political leaders.

f. Rapprochement's influence on the societal level

One of the most characteristic features of the 1999 rapprochement is that it also gained traction from different levels of the Greek and the Turkish societies. This is partly because of the empathy and sympathy feelings that the earthquakes invoked. However, there are other factors to be considered as well. The fourth Greek-Turkish rapprochement takes place at the time of globalization, when travel and communication across borders is easier than ever before. The rapprochement also takes place when civil society is stronger compared to the past, even if not as strong in Greece and Turkey as in the rest of the western world. Thus, from 1999 onwards an impressive number and variety of Greek-Turkish initiatives became part of the rapprochement process. If these initiatives are juxtaposed against other similar events, it can be easily grasped that the issue under consideration should be separated and then discussed under three main categories—that are, quasi official, professional, and grassroots cooperation.

Cooperation between quasi-officials has its roots at the work of American scholars and practitioners who engaged key people representing conflicting parties in unofficial dialogue, as means of accessing the root causes of the conflict. This approach, which is now more commonly known as track-II diplomacy, has been put to use since very early stages, but especially in the 1990s in Cyprus, but not between Greece and Turkey. Undoubtedly, the most important group of this kind

was the Greek-Turkish Forum (the GTF), an initiative that materialized even before the initiation of the rapprochement. It did not stop but continued its activities even beyond the year of 1999 (for more information see Kotelis, 2006). The Forum acted as a backchannel of communication between the two states at a time when no official dialogue between the two sides was in place. It was formed by key individuals from Turkey and Greece, including academics, retired diplomats, advisors to policy-makers and businessmen. The GTF discussed several bilateral issues and even communicated some policy proposals to the political leaders.

A similar, but more institutionalized, approach was the initiation of exploratory talks between Turkey and Greece in 2002. The exploratory talks started on March 12, 2002. Typically, in each round of discussions the participants were two Greeks and two Turks. In the first round, the Turkish team included Ambassadors Ugur Ziyal and Deniz Bolukbasi, and the Greek team Ambassador Skopelitis and Professor Argiris Fatouros¹¹⁶. The exploratory talks, as they were perceived by Athens, were not negotiations, nor a dialogue on all issues (Herakleides, 2007: 201). According to Simitis (2005: 102) they merely aimed at understanding the real intentions of the other side. Nonetheless, as the talks were held behind closed doors and were confidential, there is very little knowledge on what discussed or agreed during the meetings. Even though at times the Greek and Turkish press mentioned that the sides were close to completing an agreement on the territorial waters and the Aegean Sea shelf, these sorts of information have

¹¹⁶ Fatouros had been a member of the Greek-Turkish Forum before

never been confirmed officially. During an interview in 2003, Papandreou actually denied that there was a secret agreement between Greece and Turkey, but added that the exploratory talks were continuing within a positive spirit¹¹⁷.

Cooperation between professionals covered a large number of initiatives that were organized after the initiation of the rapprochement. Apart from the meetings among Turkish and Greek businessmen that have already been discussed, there were numerous, occasional group meetings. Such were, for example, the journalist's initiative which organized meetings between Greek and Turkish journalists in order to discuss how to promote the rapprochement and tone down the nationalistic rhetoric in the press (see in detail Kotelis, 2006; also on the change of Greek press' rhetoric see Lazarou, 2009). In addition, a strong basis of cooperation transpired in the field of tourism, especially between the business and agents on the Turkish Aegean coast and on the Greek islands by it¹¹⁸. Cooperation on tourism aimed at increasing the number of Greeks visiting Turkey and vice-versa, and moreover, creating the conditions for strengthening both Turkey's and Greece's touristic competitiveness¹¹⁹. Disaster-related collaboration is also an interesting example that took place among professionals. Apart from the help provided on the governmental level, the 1999 earthquakes put forward an opportunity for a number of Greek and Turkish teams to cooperate. These include the Radio Amateur

¹¹⁷ <http://www.papandreou.gr/papandreou/content/Document.aspx?d=6&rd=7739474&f=1361&rf=1293666608&m=3612&rm=22204335&l=2> (accessed 20/9/2013)

¹¹⁸ See www.ertnews.com for such initiatives

¹¹⁹ See for instance the Greek-Turkish protocols on Tourism that were signed between the two countries: <http://news.in.gr/economy/article/?aid=435812> (accessed 20/9/2013), <http://www.skai.gr> 12/11/2006

Association of Greece (the RAAG) and their Turkish counterpart, the Turkish Amateur Radio Emergency Communication Service (*Telsiz ve Radyo Amatorleri Cemiyeti* - TRAC)¹²⁰, the Turkish Red Crescent Society (Kızılay, TRCS) the Turkish Confederation of Fire Rescue Agencies (Tüm İtfaiye Teşkilleri Birliği), Turkish Federation of Search-and-Rescue Associations (Arama-Kurtarma Dernekleri Federasyonu) and their Greek counterparts (Ganapati et al, 2010: 167-168). Equally important initiatives among scientists, teachers or mayors were also organized. In June, 2006 economist journalist Bruce Clark coined the term “the baklava effect” in order to describe the “sweet” atmosphere that started to prevail over the moods of both Greeks and Turks during the organized seminars.¹²¹

Finally, contact and cooperation on the grassroots level has also been quite substantial. An important step towards strengthening ties at the grassroots level was the establishment of several University departments, especially in Greece, that were dealing, in one way or another, with Turkey¹²². These departments created a new generation of Greeks who were eager to know their neighbors better, and above all, they were learning the Turkish language. In Turkey, the most significant similar effort was the initiation of a master’s diploma on Greek-Turkish relations at Bilgi University. Apart from that, there is a variety of other initiatives on cultural issues, such as music concerts, fashion exhibitions, book presentations etc, where Turks

¹²⁰ These two organizations had also cooperated in the past after the 1992 and 1995 earthquakes at Erzincan and Dinar respectively.

¹²¹ http://news.kathimerini.gr/4Dcgi/4Dcgi/w_articles_civ_1182736_28/10/2006_202950 (accessed 20/9/2013)

¹²² At the moment there are five such departments in Thessaloniki, Florina, Komotini, Athens and Rhodes.

Table 7.2.

Rapprochement Process			
Indicator	<u>Main events</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Importance</u>
Summit level meetings	Erdoğan's visit to Athens 2002 Erdoğan's visit to Athens 2004 Karamanlis' visit to Turkey 2008	High	Medium
Agreements Signed	33 bilateral agreements mainly on low-politics	High	High
Military cooperation	Agreement on a variety of CBMs Buyukanit's two visits to Greece Hinofotis' visit to Turkey in 2006	High	High
Economic cooperation	Various initiatives organized by Greek and Turkish businessmen, significant increase of trade volume, important agreements signed	High	High
Statements/Gestures	Several statements made by official rather follow positive developments rather than creating them	High	Low
Societal level	Several initiatives among professionals, students, artists, journalists etc	High	High

and Greeks have the opportunity to meet, share views and work together¹²³. In addition, internet has offered another option for Greek-Turkish teamwork, web

¹²³ See for instance <http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/AuthoritiesAbroad/Europe/Turkey/EmbassyAnkara/el-GR/Bilateral/Cultural/> (accessed 20/9/2013)

pages and internet groups such as “Kalimerhaba” shaped a connection link between Turks and Greeks and, thus, support the rapprochement. Cooperation at the grassroots level was supported by the Civil Society Development Program, which was initiated in 2002 and included an 8 Million Euro budget for two years to enhance civic dialogue and empower NGOs in Turkey. Further funding was provided by the European Commission to promote cross-border cooperation between Greece and Turkey (for more information see Onis and Yilmaz, 2008; for a detailed analysis of civil society cooperation between Turkey and Greece see Birden and Rumelili, 2009).

7.5. The Future of the Rapprochement

The current study covers only the first ten years of the rapprochement from June 1999 to June 2009. At the end of the process, relations between Greece and Turkey improved considerably when compared to the period prior to the rapprochement. Even though little process has been achieved as far as the important problems still continue to divide two states, Turkey and Greece have reached a level of communication that allows for furthering cooperation on many areas. At the same time the fear of war has decreased considerably as the Greeks and Turks have proven in practice that they are capable of resolving crises fast, without allowing further escalation to take place. It is also true that the rapprochement process has lost some of its early momentum; however, this was anticipated given the prolonged process.

Against this backdrop, the immediate future seems quite promising for Greek-Turkish relations. In late 2009, the PASOK won the Greek parliamentary elections and George Papandreou, who had assumed leadership of the party in 2004, became the new Greek Prime Minister, while he also took office as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Papandreou proceed to a highly symbolic gesture only days after his election, when he decided to visit Turkey in order to attend the informal meeting of foreign ministers of South-East European Cooperation Process. This was Papandreou's first trip abroad after his election. During his time in Turkey Papandreou visited Ismail Cem's grave where he left an olive branch, while he also met with the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan¹²⁴.

Moreover, in 2010, Erdoğan paid an official visit to Athens, which is his second as Turkey's Prime Minister. During his visit, Turkey and Greece signed 21 agreements (including memorandums and joint declarations). Those agreements sealed the inauguration of the Greek-Turkish High-Level Cooperation Council, and covered a number of areas including economic and business cooperation, environment, commerce and energy¹²⁵. The High-Level Cooperation Council was planned to have a meeting every year, chaired by the two Prime Ministers and with the participation of many ministers¹²⁶.

¹²⁴ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=greces-new-pm-in-turkey-on-1st-foreign-trip-2009-10-09> (accessed 20/9/2013), see also positive reception by the Turkish press (newspapers covers) at http://www.grtnews.com/gr/publish/article_1086.shtml

¹²⁵ <http://www.tovima.gr/default.asp?artid=331706&ct=32&mid=2&dt=14/05/2010> (accessed 20/9/2013)

¹²⁶ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkish-pm-seeks-new-era-with-crisis-hit-greece-2010-05-14> (accessed 20/9/2013)

7.6. Assessment of the 1999 Greek-Turkish Rapprochement

The Greek-Turkish rapprochement of 1999 along with the 1930s rapprochement counts as the only successful effort for normalization of relations between Greece and Turkey. The two states managed to maintain friendly relations for a long period, while there is a continuous effort for finding new ways to broaden cooperation. Of course, and this should be considered the main drawback of the process, none of the important issues concerning the Aegean Sea, the minorities or Cyprus were solved during the rapprochement. As for the status of Cyprus, the best chance for re-unification was lost in April 2004, while a major part of the problem has been transferred to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Conditions for minorities have certainly improved, but again, part of the problem is transferred to the ECHR. Nonetheless, even though the rapprochement process did not lead to solution, it was still successful to the extent that it created an environment that will at least not easily permit problems to escalate into crises. Furthermore, the process allowed for a sincere dialogue to take place on all issues via the exploratory talks for the first time.

- **Impact of the international system to the national security**

The 1999 rapprochement takes place in a relatively stable and secure international environment. It is a fact that both Turkey and Greece needed to deal with certain problems in their neighborhood, such as the Kosovo issue, Greece's issues with its northern neighbor FYROM, or Turkey's growing anxiety towards the

situation in Iraq. Nevertheless, none of these problems constituted an imminent or direct threat to either Greece's or Turkey's national security. In that sense, the 1999 rapprochement case is similar to the 1988 failed rapprochement as such that in both of these cases, the main threat for the parties was the other side and not a third, jointly perceived, hostile party. Concisely, the impact of the international system on the two states' national security was fairly minimal.

- State identity

The negative images that persisted during the 1988 rapprochement continued during the 1990s, as well, and even came to prevail over the countries' mood amidst the 1999 rapprochement process. Moreover, as the time went by and the problems between Turkey and Greece remained unresolved those negatives images crystallized into negative stereotypes. The series of crises that took place after the mid-1990s exacerbated those images, so that right before the initiation of the rapprochement, Greece and Turkey simply perceived one another as an 'Other', which risked a potential an armed conflict or even a full scale war.

A significant remedy to the negative images and stereotypes, at least among the Turkish and Greek public opinions, was the two major earthquakes that took place in 1999, and the feelings of empathy that they created. The earthquakes provided the politicians with the space they needed in order to achieve fast growth in the early stages of the rapprochement. As useful as this was it did not lead to a change of state identities. On the contrary, that change constituted a much slower

process, and it had leisurely started developing before the initiation of the rapprochement. The change was not dramatic, it developed slowly, but it was, however, positive. The backchannel negotiations, the frequent visits and the overall cooperation on several fields, made clear that even though problems remained the two countries were capable to discuss their problems in a civilized manner.

On the Greek side a lot has been written on Greece's new approach which came into complete contrast with the policies followed in the past. The new thinking, which largely made the Greek-Turkish rapprochement possible, has been the subject of much scholarly discussion on this new pattern of policy's motives and/or effectiveness. In general, most scholars agree that changes in Greek foreign policy are part of the Europeanization process (for an extended literature review on the Europeanization process of the Greek foreign policy see Stavrides, 2003). According to Economides (2005) "...in essence the real Europeanization has occurred in the domain of translocation of Greek foreign policy preferences in at least two key issue areas, Turkey and Cyprus, into the EU agenda".

The change of Greece's foreign policy is also attributed to the alteration of the state's "agentic culture", which was possible when the modernizer's ideas became dominant within PASOK. According to Tsakonas (2010: 109-110):

Driven by an agentic "resolution culture" Greece's active socialization strategy had aimed at linking process on Turkey's candidacy/membership with the resolution of its border dispute with Greece...This had in turn provided Greece with a potent negotiating leverage for putting an end to what Greece considered as mostly unilateral claims by Turkey against its sovereign rights in the Aegean

- Costs and benefits equilibrium

The diplomatic pandemonium that prevailed in the early 2000 led to the signing of a number of agreements that were discussed in detail in this chapter. Later on, the two states signed more agreements, covering a number of issues. Signing of agreements became a crucial part of the process and made it clear that cooperation on some issues was beneficial to both Greece and Turkey, thus the cost of defecting from cooperation was increasing for both sides.

The cost of defecting was climbed up as a result of Turkey's and Greece's overlapping interests at the time when the rapprochement took place. The most commonly cited example to make a case for this argument is the link between Greek foreign policy and the Kosovo issue, something that by destabilizing the Balkans drove Turkey and Greece closer to one another. However, there were other urgent issues as well that required Turkey's and Greece's closer cooperation to disappear. Such were, for example, the fight against terrorism and organized crime, illegal immigration and, in general, issues that neighboring countries usually manage through joint policies.

- Interdependence

Economic benefits were also important for both countries. Even though Greek-Turkish commerce was also rising before 1999, the improvement continued after the initiation of the rapprochement. The volume of Turkish imports and exports to Greece for example had increased from \$273,8 million in 1994 to \$709,8

million in 1999 and \$897,4 million in 2002 (Evin 2004: 16). Apart from that, cooperation among businessmen and enterprises created a dynamic that was positive for both sides, and especially for Turkey which benefited by the Greek FDI especially after 2006. Finally, number of Greek and Turkish tourists to Turkey and Greece respectively increased significantly, from 311.000 in 2001 to 776.000 people in 2006 (Couloumbis and Kentikelenis, 2007; also on economic cooperation see Tsarouhas, 2009).

Rapid improvement of relations during the first of the rapprochement process led to the consolidation of political interdependence (see Couloumbis and Kentikelenis, 2007). Overall, interdependence might have not been a primary motive for the continuation of the rapprochement, but it must be taken into consideration as one of the factors contributing to the rapprochements success.

- Leadership

Similar to all other previous rapprochement cases, that this study includes, the role of political leaders was important to the rapprochement process. However, there is a notable difference between the fourth rapprochement case and the other three cases. In 1999 the prime ministers did not play an active role, and it was the Greek and Turkish ministers of foreign affairs, George Papandreou and Ismail Cem, that embraced the task of improving the Greek-Turkish relations. The role of agents to the initiation of the rapprochement process is clearly acknowledged by Heraclides (2007) who correctly notes that the policy makers that took the

important decisions towards the improvement of relations with Turkey, were a crucial factor, as others would not have taken such decisions had they been in their shoes.

Nonetheless, apart from the role they may have played within the initiation of the process, the support of political leaders often came in follow-up to an already initiated process of reconciliation, which was nevertheless constitutive of the success of the fourth rapprochement period. This is especially true as far as the first years of the rapprochement are concerned, when the process was still fragile, and the likelihood of its success highly debatable. Cem and Papandreou took important steps within a very small time frame, and hence, provided relatively strong foundations for the rapprochement process before much skepticism or criticism had the time to develop. The positive developments on the political front were so fast that surprised even the people who had started working on improvement of the Greek-Turkish relations even before 1999¹²⁷.

- Depth of the process

It is clear from Table 7.2 that the 1999 rapprochement was a deep process that managed to touch upon all of the indicators that characterize a rapprochement process. The signing of bilateral agreements, the meetings among politicians, the

¹²⁷ This point refers to the information provided by members of the Greek-Turkish Forum (GTF), who pointed out that improvement in Greek-Turkish relations was so rapid that the Forum, even though backchannel, could not keep up to the developments. This information was acquired through personal interviews of the author with members of the GTF while he was writing his master's thesis. See Kotelis, 2006

improved communication between the Turkish and Greek military high-ranking officers are all strong indications to prove that this rapprochement process was sufficiently genuine and far from being superficial. Similarly, developments in indicators relating to the economic cooperation and societal level show that the Greek-Turkish rapprochement was supported by the most productive parts of the Turkish and Greek populations, such as university students, businessmen, artists, local politicians etc.

The fact that the 1999 rapprochement managed to gain depth and width as a process undoubtedly produced positive impact on its own likelihood. A notable example that proves this point is the mid-air crash between a Greek and a Turkish fighter jet on May 23, 2006, which resulted to the distraction of both planes and the death of the Greek pilot. Had this incident occurred before 1999, it was very likely that it would have caused a dangerous crisis between Turkey and Greece. However, this was not the case in 2006. What played an important role was the direct communication between the two Chiefs of Staff, Ozkok and Hinofotis, and, also, between the two ministers of foreign affairs, Gul and Bakoyanni. Both of these communications were possible thanks to the important progress that rapprochement process achieved in terms of military and political cooperation¹²⁸.

¹²⁸ On the May 23, 2006 incident see for instance, Kathimerini archive on-line http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_24/05/2006_185085, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_1_24/05/2006_185083, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/w_articles_politics_2_24/05/2006_185086, Milliyet Archive on-line <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/05/24/son/sonsiy16.asp>.

- Turning points

Turning points were an important factor for the 1999 rapprochement process but only as far as its initiation was concerned. The Imia/Kardak crisis, the Öcalan case, the two earthquakes were all important and unexpected events that forced the two countries to seek new ways of normalizing their relations. After the initiation of the rapprochement, however, there emerged a lack of turning points that could pose an obstacle to the process or prevent its failure. Thus, turning points were not an important factor to the success of the fourth rapprochement case.

- The GRIT strategy

At the time of the rapprochement's initiation Turkey and Greece were divided by a number of important issues. The two states not only disagreed on the possible solution of these problems, but they also did not share a common understanding of what these problems were, thus, it was missing from the beginning as to what kind of dialogue between the two sides should include if ever such a dialogue at some point started. In addition, both Greece and Turkey had developed strong arguments in support of their positions deducing them from their interpretations of the International Law. Finally, maximalist positions referring to each states' rights were prevalent for an extensive amount of time in both camps and highly assimilated by the Greek and Turkish public opinions.

All these factors were an obstacle to the commencement of official negotiations between Greece and Turkey that would revolve around the real issues

between the two countries. Indeed, the efforts from the beginning of the rapprochement were focused on finding a new “modus vivendi” between the two states, rather than trying to provide a solution to the Greek-Turkish problems. In other words, the process was aiming to highlight the commonalities than bringing the differences under the spotlighting. As such, any negotiations between the two states remained unofficial and did not produce any essential results within the period the current chapter study.

As it can be inferred from this landscape, the fourth rapprochement is characterized by the lack of official negotiations, despite the presence of important issues that begged for a solution. The successful outcome of the rapprochement was not the product of the use of a specific negotiating approach, but rather the decision of both states not to discuss the issues that could pose a threat to the good relations.

7.7. Concluding Remarks

Greece and Turkey have come a long way during the last years, achieving in the last decade what seemed to be improbable in the early 1999. The flourishing cooperation between them has reached at a point that allows for one to nurse moderate optimism as regards to the future of the Greek-Turkish relations. However, as long as the problems that divide the two sides remain unresolved, the rapprochement process couldn't be fulfilled. Nor could it constantly persist, collapsing at some point under the weight of these problems.

CHAPTER 8

COMPARISON OF THE CASE STUDIES

8.1. Introduction

The study of each case in the previous chapters clearly shows that rapprochement is a complicated process, the success or failure of which depends on various factors and events. Even when the rapprochement process concerns the same two states, as has been the case in the current study, outcomes may still vary greatly. The present chapter undertakes the task of identifying resemblances and dissimilarities between the four cases of rapprochement in the Greek-Turkish affairs by comparing the information provided in the previous chapters. Firstly, pre-rapprochement periods will be compared in order to explore if the driving forces of the rapprochement present significant similarities and whether the incentives for the initiation of the rapprochement influenced the outcome of the process. Secondly, the discussion will focus on comparing the rapprochement process itself, including each of the rapprochement indicators that were examined in the case studies. The

discussion on differences and similarities among the rapprochement process of each case study will eventually assess the impact of the eight variable set forth in the methodology chapter.

8.2. Cross-case Comparison of Pre-rapprochement Periods

In the literature review chapter, it was mentioned that the state of affairs between states before they enter the rapprochement process is not relevant to whether this process should be characterized as a rapprochement or not. While the above observation is valid, it should be pointed out that it refers to the starting conditions, rather than the process or the politics behind the initiation of the rapprochement. For example a rapprochement might follow after a war, or a period when the parties are at the brink of war. Contrary to the initial state of affairs, the processes preceding the initiation of the rapprochement are not only relevant, but, in cases, could also play a role in the success or failure of the process. The following part will compare the similarities and differences among the processes that prelude the four Greek-Turkish rapprochements discussed in detail in the previous chapters.

8.2.1. Comparing the Pre-initiation Periods

A reading of all four cases indicates that there are specific similarities concerning the processes leading to the initiation of the rapprochement. The

rapprochements do not just happen. Instead, they are the outcomes of certain actions, motivations, and circumstances, all acting together and resulting in the commencement of the process. In the following pages, the data from the case studies referring to the pre-initiation period will be discussed and coded in a table so that direct comparison across cases can be made possible. Specifically, the data that will be looked into are the actions leading to the initiation of the rapprochement process, the international pressure towards rapprochement, and the security concerns that pushed Turkey and Greece towards a rapprochement.

Actions leading to the initiation of the rapprochement

To begin with, a first look into the tables on each case study (Tables 4.1., 5.1., 6.1., 7.1.) reveals similarities regarding the actions of political leaders and the effects of their actions on the process leading to the rapprochement's initiation. Thus, trust-building efforts, positive gestures and return of those gestures, ice breaking attempts, and similar tactics are present in all cases with minor differentiations. Likewise, the manifestation of these tactics is also similar across cases, with personal correspondence and public speeches being the most common channel to communicate one side's intentions to the other side. In order for the analysis to be more comprehensive, the actions of politicians have been divided into first step, reciprocation, and ground preparation.

In all four cases there was a positive first step made that opened the way towards the initiation of the rapprochement. In 1928, it was Venizelos' speech which, apart from stating his willingness to alter the Greek foreign policy strategy,

signaled towards Turkey his eagerness to improve relations between the two states, while clearly stating that Greece had no territorial claims over Turkey. Venizelos' public speech had a trust-building effect as it assured the Turkish political leaders of Greece's aspirations regarding the Greek-Turkish relations. For the second rapprochement the actions and statements of the Turkish ambassador in Athens Enis Akaygen, and his confirmations regarding Turkey's willingness to build good relations with Greece had similar effects. Likewise, in 1987 the meeting between Andreas Papandreou and another Turkish Ambassador in Athens, Nazmi Akiman, served as both a chance for the Greek Prime Minister to gain the trust of the Turkish side and as an effort towards the improvement of the Greek-Turkish relations. During that meeting Papandreou assured Akiman that Greece had no intention to engage in an armed conflict with Turkey and that he was ready to change his long standing hard line positions towards Turkey¹²⁹. Finally, in 1999 a first step towards trust-building was made by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem, who sent a letter to his Greek counterpart.

The commonalities in all of these first steps are many, even though the context and prevailing conditions varied considerably. The first step tries to fulfill one, or more, of the following three goals. Firstly, the person or state taking the first step wants to make its intentions and expectations, concerning the future relationship with the other side, clear. As such, first steps are expressions of the willingness for further cooperation and a push towards improvement of relations.

¹²⁹ Interview with Nazmi Akiman

Secondly, first steps also aim at exploring the other party's thoughts on the relationship. Hence, the first step is planned in such a way that it "throws the ball" to the other side. This is obvious in all cases, apart from the second one where it is less clear. For instance, Cem's letter to Papandreou, apart from expressing his views on the Greek-Turkish relations also intended to make Papandreou's views known. Cem had already tried to explore the Greek positions a year earlier with his two letters to the Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos, however, at that time his ideas were not well received. Finally, first steps are sometimes used as a chance to introduce a possible roadmap for the solution of the problems, or, a set of principles upon which future contacts will be based.

The actions following the first step, described as reciprocation, are similar to the ones discussed for the first step, though they concern the other side. In the first rapprochement reciprocation from the Turkish side came through the speech of İsmet İnönü in Malatya and also his answer letter to Venizelos. Similarly, in the fourth case reciprocation also took the form of personal correspondence in Papandreou's answer to İsmail Cem's letter, while in the third case, Özal's intentions were conveyed to Andreas Papandreou through the Turkish Ambassador, Nazmi Akıman. The only instance of the four cases where reciprocation is not clear is the second case. However, in this case the first step was also not as strong as it was in the other cases. This inconsistency is explained by the fact that the 1950s' rapprochement took place at a time when Greek-Turkish relations were better compared to the other three cases.

The goals of reciprocal actions are also similar to those of the first step, apart from trying to explore the other side's views, which has already been achieved, politicians who reciprocate also make their intentions known to the other side and present their own views on the future of the relationship. Together, first step and reciprocation contribute decisively to the building of trust between the leaders and the states, thus eliminating one main obstacle to the initiation of rapprochement.

Between the first step and reciprocation, during which parties break the ice and increase trust, and the initiation of the rapprochement there is a phase when both states work together in order to prepare the ground. This phase highly depends on the context regarding the form it takes. In the 1930s' case preparing the ground for the rapprochement to take place meant that the two parties should engage in formal negotiation as the main obstacle to the initiation of the rapprochement were the unresolved issues relating to the implementation of the Lausanne Treaty. In the second rapprochement, preparing the ground meant to strengthen grassroots cooperation and to sign agreements on low-politics issues. In 1987, preparing the ground for the rapprochement was longer in duration than the rapprochement process itself. Papandreou and Akiman worked together for almost 9 months and had several meetings in order to agree on how they would present the process to the people, what would be the issues in the agenda etc. Finally, in the fourth case, the agreement between Cem and Papandreou to launch a joint committee that would discuss low-politics issues was also aiming at preparing the ground. Nonetheless, in

this case the big difference was made by the earthquakes, which created positive images between the Greek and Turkish peoples and, thus, decisively contributed to preparing the ground for the initiation of the rapprochement.

The discussion regarding the actions of politicians during the pre-rapprochement period clearly indicates that the steps taken constitute a form of GRIT strategy. The first step, reciprocation and preparing the ground were in essence a way to gradually reduce tensions between Turkey and Greece so that the initiation of the rapprochement would be made possible. The leaders were engaged in a situation when one of the parties made a small step, and the other party reciprocated with a similar positive gesture. The importance and effectiveness of these steps slowly increased until the initiation of the rapprochement between the parties was possible. The fact that GRIT strategy was used in all four cases indicates that its importance to the initiation of a rapprochement process was high.

Another major observation deriving from the above discussion on the actions of politicians is that in order for a rapprochement process to initiate there must be political will for the rapprochement from both governments simultaneously. The existence of political will for rapprochement as a precondition for its initiation is evident in all four case studies, and it is only after there are pro-rapprochement governments in both Greece and Turkey that the road for the initiation of the process opens. In the 1930s' case it was the rise of Venizelos, while in 1950 it was Menderes' victory that created such conditions. In 1987 and 1999, it was the change of Greece's foreign policy strategy by Andreas Papandreu and

George Papandreou respectively that led to Greece and Turkey having pro-rapprochement governments at the same time.

Oddly enough, other aspects of domestic politics such as strong government, leader popularity, and public opinion support do not play a decisive role in the initiation of the rapprochement. There are not consistent data that show a causal relationship between the strength of the government, the leader's popularity, and the support of public opinion to the initiation of rapprochement. Ecevit's government in 1999 for example was a stable yet a coalition-based government. Likewise, Papandreou in 1988 was much less popular than when he first became the Prime Minister in 1981. Moreover, the majority of the Greek public were against a Greek-Turkish rapprochement in 1988, as was made apparent by the demonstrations that followed Özal's visit to Athens in 1988.

International pressure and security concerns

Apart from the purposeful actions of political leaders that aim at creating the conditions for the initiation of the rapprochement, other factors beyond the grasp of the politicians also influence the initiations of the rapprochement processes. Comparison of all four cases clearly indicates that there are two variables, not completely irrelevant to each other, that are most commonly observed across cases. These two factors are the international pressure and security concerns.

In short, international pressure is understood as the motivations for rapprochement posed by either foreign powers or the structure of international system. These motivations take two forms either as direct demands dictated to

Turkey and Greece, or as systemic stimuli creating incentives for rapprochement as an answer to increasing security concerns. In the second case, the most notable example is the direct pressure from the US and Britain for Greek-Turkish cooperation, mostly provided in the form of financial and military aid that gave further motivations for the initiation of the rapprochement.. Systemic incentives were equally important. Regarding the first rapprochement, the rise of Bulgarian irredentism as well as German and Italian revisionism were catalytic for the initiation of the process. The last two rapprochements are largely epitomized by the role of the EU which offers both systemic incentives and pressure, especially to Turkey. The role of the EU became even more substantial after 1998 when Greece changed its strategy and used Turkey's willingness to become a member as a tool that would lead the two countries to a closer relationship.

As far as the issues of security are concerned, one cannot help but notice that in three out of the four cases discussed in the current study the willingness for rapprochement is amplified by the grounded concern that the alternative to rapprochement is armed conflict. In other words, relations between the states are such that if they do not try to enter a rapprochement phase, they increase the risk of a Greek-Turkish war. Such security concerns are very clear both for the 1988 and the 1999 rapprochements. The Aegean crisis in March 1987 made it clear that the two states were missing the mechanisms that would allow them to prevent an escalation of the crisis. Hence, both countries were risking an armed conflict if they failed to normalize their relations or at least create a framework for the solution of

crises. Much of the process actually focused on establishing tension reduction mechanisms (e.g. CBMs). Similarly, the 1999 rapprochement follows a number of crises which had a similar effect. Changes were more prominent to the Greek side which, after the Ocalan incident, was faced with harsh criticism not only from Turkey but from the international community as well. The immediate result of the Ocalan crisis was the removal of the Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos and the appointment of George Papandreou who was a moderate politician. In the 1930s' rapprochement, although there was no crisis, there was always a fear that failure of the negotiations could bring Turkey and Greece to the brink of war.

8.2.2. Comparison of the Indicators of the Rapprochement Process

After exploring the similarities across the cases as far as the period before the initiation of the rapprochements is concerned, the following pages will include a comparison of the rapprochement process itself. In order for such comparison to be as structured as possible, the indicators of the rapprochement process, as they were put forth in the literature review chapter, will be examined one by one.

Summit level meetings

The comparison of the four rapprochement processes revealed significant similarities across cases. All of the four rapprochements share a critical component. They were all top-to-bottom processes, meaning that they were the product of political decisions taken by the Turkish and Greek political leaders who were determined to initiate the rapprochement processes. In the previous pages, it was

discussed how specific actions and persistence of political leaders made the initiation of each rapprochement case possible. After the initiation of the rapprochement, summit-level meetings between Greek and Turkish politicians played an important and primary role in the process. As it is apparent in the following table (Table. 8.2) frequency of summit-level meetings is high for all the cases, while the importance of the meetings varies between medium and high.

Table 8.1.

	<u>Summit Level meetings</u>		
	<u>Main events</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Importance</u>
First case	October 1930 Venizelos' visit, October 1931 Inonu's visit, September 1933 Tsaldaris visit	High	High
Second case	S. Venizelos' visit in 1952 Menderes' visit to Athens 1952 King and Queen of Greece visit 1952 Celal Bayar's visit to Greece 1952 Papagos' visit 1953 Menderes' visit 1954	High	High
Third case	Ozal & Papandreou meeting in Davos Ozal & Papandreou meeting in Brussels Ozal's visit to Athens June 13-15 1988	High	Medium
Fourth case	Erdoğan's visit to Athens 2002 Erdoğan's visit to Athens 2004 Karamanlis' visit to Turkey 2008	High	Medium

Summit-level meetings increased in frequency immediately after each initiation. During the pre-rapprochement periods summit-level meetings were much more scarce and, most often than not, they took place during international fora. In the 1930s' case, there were several official visits, while there were several other unofficial ones which further established better communication, and even friendship, between Greek and Turkish leaders,. In the second case, official visits were even more frequent than during the 1930s. There were, however, no unofficial visits. Even so, during the first half of the 1950s the visits included visits made by the Heads of States, meaning King Paul's visit to Turkey and President Bayar's visit to Greece. During the third rapprochement there was only one official visit, namely that of Özal to Athens, but the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers had the chance to meet in Davos and Brussels too. The frequency of summit-level meetings is considered high considering the virtually non-existent communication in the years prior to the rapprochement, The Davos and Brussels meetings were important and substantial to the rapprochement process. Finally, despite Simitis' initial hesitation to accept an invitation from Turkey or extend one to his Turkish counterpart, summit-level meetings were kept to a satisfying level after 2004.

Apart from comparing the frequency of summit-level meetings it is more imperative to compare their importance for the process, and discuss why their effects had been more immediate in some cases than in others. A first glance on Table 8.1. shows that the importance of summit-level meetings was higher in the first two cases than the last two. Indeed, both in the 1930 and 1950 rapprochements

the summit-level meetings were highly essential to the process. The meetings were not superficial and the issues discussed led to the deepening of cooperation and the rapprochement process. Furthermore, the visits included aspects that transcended protocol and served as extra verification of the excellent level the Greek-Turkish relations had reached. Bayar's inspections over Greek military units for instance were such events. Finally, more often than not, summit-level meetings during the first and second rapprochements offered the opportunity to the public to express emphatically their support for the process, and hence, give incentives to the political leaders to continue the rapprochement process.

In the last two rapprochement cases, the impact of summit-level meetings on the process was less significant, though not completely trivial. In the 1988 case the summit level meetings were the biggest part of the process, and as was mentioned, the beginning of the rapprochement coincided with the first meeting between Özal and Papandreou. Nevertheless, Özal's official visit to Athens also revealed the major obstacles that divided the two states. The two leaders did not manage to keep the rapprochement momentum, or transfer their initial enthusiasm to the public, or even their own political parties. In the fourth rapprochement case, the efforts to keep the rapprochement going was undertaken by the foreign ministers rather than the prime ministers, at least until halfway through the process. After 2004, the official visits and the summit-level meetings were a new positive development but cannot be considered as a major breakthrough for the process. Finally, it should be pointed out that both in the third and fourth rapprochement

cases, summit-level did not enjoy the mass public support of the first two rapprochements.

Agreements signed

Signing of agreements was an important part in all the Greek-Turkish rapprochement processes the current study examines. These agreements included a variety of different documents ranging from multiparty international treaties to common statements and agreements on low politics issues. The main focus of the agreements was to increase security of both Greece and Turkey, either against each other or against third states such as Bulgaria. Such was, for example, the utility of the Balkan Pact during the first rapprochement, but also of the CBMs in the last two rapprochements. In addition, agreements also constitute an effort to expand cooperation so that it covers more topics or more areas of social life, but they also serve as an effort to solve problems that might exist between Turkey and Greece.

In all four cases, the signing of agreements is a common phenomenon. The two states sign a number of agreements during all rapprochement processes. Even during the short-lived 1988 rapprochement, Turkey and Greece managed to agree on a number of ideas even though those ideas were mainly incorporated in the joint announcements that followed Papandreou and Özal's meetings, and did not take the form of an officially signed document that would, for instance, go through parliamentary procedures and become Turkish and Greek law. It should also be stressed out that, apart from the years covered by the four rapprochement cases, there is only a handful of agreements signed between Greece and Turkey.

Table 8.2.

Signing of Agreements			
	Main events	Frequency	Importance
First case	June 1930 Economic agreement, October 1930 friendship agreement, September 1933 Sincerity agreement 1934 Balkan Entente	High	High
Second case	Friendship and Cooperation Agreement in 1953, Coalition Treaty in 1954, and a number of other minor agreements	High	High
Third case	Agreements mainly in form of common announcements, Papoulias – Yilmaz Memorandum	High	Medium
Fourth case	33 bilateral agreements mainly on low-politics	High	Medium

An important point regarding agreements is that the first rapprochement is the only case when the rapprochement was initiated after the two parties signed an important agreement that essentially solved the most basic bilateral issue. During the years following the initiation, the two countries signed a number of other agreements on various issues. However, none of that would have been possible if the June 1930 Greek-Turkish Economic Agreement had not preceded. The 1950s' rapprochement between Greece and Turkey was similar. Although it did not start with an agreement, it took place in a period when the two parties had solved all of

the important bilateral issues that could cause serious friction¹³⁰. The lack of such problems ensured a high level of trust between the Greek and Turkish governments, and created an environment within which essential and mutually beneficiary agreements could be signed. This is how the signing of imperative treaties, such as the Balkan Entente of 1934 and the Coalition Treaty of 1954, was made possible. The impact of these agreements on the rapprochement process was high as they created important bonds between Greece and Turkey and increased substantially the benefits of the process.

By contrast, the third and fourth rapprochement processes took place at a time when the Greek-Turkish relations had been marked by the impact of the Cyprus question and great mistrust existed between the two states. The level of relations between Turkey and Greece did not allow the signing of important agreements similar to those signed during the first two rapprochements. Instead, the agreements signed had different objectives. They tried to increase the trust levels between the two states, decrease security concerns, and reduce the risk of a future crisis. Such was for example the utility of the Papoulias-Yilmaz memorandum signed in 1988. On the other hand, the agreements were efforts to solve small and secondary issues between Greece and Turkey and, thus, they served as examples of how the rapprochement process was mutually beneficial.

¹³⁰ Excluding the Cyprus question, which, however, was not officially raised by the Greek government until 1954 and the Greek appeal to the UN

Military cooperation

Cooperation on military issues greatly varied among the four rapprochement cases, not only with regard to its importance, but also concerning the forms it took. In general, military cooperation mainly appeared in the form of agreements concerning military affairs, such as common military action against a state that may launch an attack either on Turkey or Greece, exchange of visits between high ranking military officers and Chiefs of Staff, joint military exercises, and the signing of confidence building measures concerning military issues, or, at least, aiming to reduce military tensions.

In the first rapprochement case, cooperation on military issues mainly appeared in the form of guaranteeing agreements, and greatly reflected Greece's and Turkey's concerns regarding the insecurity posed to them by the international system. The two states, and later other states in the Balkans, understood very quickly that in order to better ensure their safety and independence they had to combine their military forces against common enemies, such as Bulgaria. As such, even though it was not manifested in a variety of ways, the importance of military cooperation during the 1930s was high.

The 1950s' rapprochement took place within a much different international environment. The beginning of the Cold War not only brought Turkey and Greece under the same alliance, but it also tuned both of them into frontline states. As such, not only military cooperation reached its highest level, but also it was the most important indicator of the second rapprochement. The role of NATO was catalytic

because within the NATO framework military cooperation became much more institutionalized and included a variety of actions such as joint military exercises, meetings among military officials and exchange of visits, consultation on military issues and the like.

During the 1987 rapprochement, the hostile environment and the limited time that the rapprochement process lasted did not allow for much cooperation on military issues to take place. The efforts of the political leaders focused more on tension reduction rather than on other forms of military cooperation such as joint exercises or contacts between military staff. Although Papandreou and Özal tried to reduce the tension between the Turkish and Greek militaries by creating the sub-committee on military affairs, the results of the sub-committee's meeting in Athens were poor and the influence of military cooperation on the third rapprochement was basically non-existent.

Finally, during the fourth rapprochement, several efforts were made towards the strengthening of military cooperation. Such cooperation mainly took the form of exchange of visits between the Chiefs of Staff and the signing of several CBMs. Similarly, the third case initiatives regarding military cooperation focused on tension reduction more than on other aspects. However, this should also be attributed to the decreased need for more essential military cooperation, given that the Cold War had ended.

Another important issue that concerns military cooperation between Greece and Turkey is the difference in the goals of such cooperation that exists between the

first two and the latter two rapprochement cases. In the first two cases the aim of military cooperation was mainly to increase safety for both Turkey and Greece against third countries (Bulgaria, Italy, Germany, communist countries etc). As far as the 1988 and the 1999 rapprochements are concerned, this was hardly the case. On the contrary, military cooperation, in the two rapprochement cases that followed the eruption of the Cyprus question, basically aimed at reducing the risk of armed conflict between Greece and Turkey.

Table 8.3.

	<u>Military Cooperation</u>		
	<u>Main events</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Importance</u>
First case	Mainly in the form of guaranteeing agreements, exchanges also take place	High	High
Second case	Mainly within NATO framework, also included consultation, joint exercises, and meetings among high ranking officers	High	High
Third case	Sub-committee on military issues meeting in Athens from March 30 to April 1	Low	Low
Fourth case	Agreement on a variety of CBMs Buyukanit's two visits to Greece, Hinofotis' visit to Turkey in 2006	High	Medium

Economic cooperation

Economic cooperation between Greece and Turkey never constituted the reference point of their relationship. Efforts to improve financial relations and improve volume trade were always part of the rapprochement processes. Nevertheless, the results of such efforts were not as fruitful as the two states might have expected. Across all cases the major ways to strengthen economic cooperation between Turkey and Greece were two, a) the signing of bilateral agreements that focused on trade and other forms of financial cooperation and b) the efforts to institutionalize economic cooperation through the establishment of special committees and bureaus.

During the first rapprochement, the efforts to advance economic cooperation was strong, although it never became the major issue in the process. Although, as it was pointed out in chapter 4, the main financial benefits were achieved at the beginning of the rapprochement with the signing of the June 1930 agreement, Greece and Turkey managed to agree on a number of other issues that dealt with trade and taxation, hence achieving mutual benefits. Similarly, financial cooperation during the second rapprochement did not manage to become the highlight of the process. Despite the politicians' agreement that the strengthening of economic ties would be one of their main concerns, the most important development between 1950 and 1955 was the signing of the commercial agreement in November 1953.

Table 8.4.

	<u>Economic Cooperation</u>		
	<u>Main events</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Importance</u>
First case	Cooperation strengthened, agreements signed, foundations of institutions (Bureau of commerce)	High	Medium
Second case	The most important development was the signing of the commercial agreement	Low	Medium
Third case	Several committees formed to discuss possibilities of economic cooperation	Low	Low
Fourth case	Various initiatives organized by Greek and Turkish businessmen, significant increase of trade volume, important agreements signed	High	High

The third and fourth rapprochement cases are different compared to the first two as the strong interest of the private sector in the improvement of the Greek-Turkish relations is also clearly manifested. Indeed, in both of these cases, businessmen were part of the process and were eager to grasp the new opportunities that an improvement of the Greek-Turkish relations would bring. In that respect, the third rapprochement was a complete failure as it created no such opportunities, while any other effort to improve economic cooperation remained superficial. Conversely, the fourth case managed to create the conditions for strengthening economic ties, and among the rapprochement processes in the current work studies, this is the case when economic cooperation played the most important role. Overall,

a significant increase in Greek-Turkish trading volume was achieved, while a number of important bilateral agreements were signed.

Finally, the assumption derived from the comparison of all four cases is that economic incentives, although were always part of the process, never really were the leading motive behind the rapprochement process nor exhibited the potential to become a “game-changer”.

Statements/Gestures

The importance of public statements and positive gestures to the initiation of the rapprochement was discussed in the previous pages. Those statements and gestures were the most significant part of the GRIT strategy Greece and Turkey employed in order to engage each other. Positive statements and gestures were also frequent after the initiation of the rapprochement, although their importance faded. The decrease of their importance is mainly due to the fact that their main function, signaling intentions to the other party and trust-building, had already been achieved by the initiation of the rapprochement.

After the initiation of the rapprochement process, public statements were used by politicians as a method to signal their intentions to the other side and the public opinion. In general, they were used as a tool that would contribute to the advance of the rapprochement. It is also important to point out that the first rapprochement became a reference point for the rest of the cases and there are several public statements mentioning how Turkey and Greece should try and improve their relations as they did in the 1930s.

During the 1930s' rapprochement, public statements were important. Although they were not the driving force behind the process, they were useful to certify the excellent relations between the two countries. In retrospect, the strong statements of friendship and some important gestures, such as Venizelos nomination of Kemal Ataturk for the peace Nobel prize , and the granting of the house of Venizelos' wife to the Turkish state in order become the new Turkish embassy in Athens, are undeniable proofs of the high cooperation level Greece and Turkey achieved the 1930s. The second rapprochement is very similar to the first in that political leaders used positive statements and gestures in order to confirm the willingness of both the Greek and Turkish sides to improve their vis-a-vis relations.

The 1988 rapprochement was somewhat different compared to the other three cases. The importance of public statements sharply increased, and they became one of the main tools Papandreou and Özal used in order to increase public support for the rapprochement process, especially the public statements made after the summit-level meeting which constituted an effort to convey the cooperative spirit that prevailed during the meetings to the Greek and Turkish public. It is also quite important that, given the increased tension between Turkey and Greece that prevailed at the time the rapprochement took place, unfortunate public statements by officials also harmed the process.

Finally, the fourth rapprochement is not characterized by strong gestures and statements that would create advances to the rapprochement process. Some statements and gestures were made but, as mentioned earlier, they followed rather

than triggered any developments. What must be stressed concerning the fourth rapprochement is the considerable change of public statements when the pre-rapprochement period and the period following the initiation of the process are compared. Hence, statements like the one made by the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs who accused Turks of being thieves and murderers were not repeated after the initiation of the rapprochement.

Table 8.5.

	<u>Statements/Gestures</u>		
	<u>Main events</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Importance</u>
First case	Several statements confirming the good will/atmosphere take place, several good will gestures from both sides	High	Medium
Second case	Several positive statements and gestures	High	Medium
Third case	Several positive statements made by political leaders especially after the official meetings	High	Medium
Fourth case	Several statements made by official rather follow positive developments rather than creating them	High	Low

Societal level

Society's support to the rapprochement was important to all cases except for the third one. Before assessing the role of civil society, an important point that must be highlighted is that civil society got stronger as time passed by. Coupled with the technological advancements which made cross-border communication and travel easier, this strength was translated into a greater variety of initiatives at the societal level. So, unlike the first two cases where societal participation was largely limited to sports, and elite groups, the fourth rapprochement included a much wider spectrum of initiatives, such as internet groups and online communities.

The comparison of the cases shows that public support encouraged political leaders to intensify the rapprochement process and contributed to the deepening of the process by including more people from different strata of society, while it widened the areas where the rapprochement process focused. A major assumption deriving from the study of the four rapprochement cases is that the influence of the process on the societal level was mainly influenced by the overall relation between the two countries. Society was much more active when the rapprochement took place between two friendly countries, as was the case in the 1930s, and much less enthusiastic when Turkey and Greece had developed hostile relations, such as in the 1988 rapprochement.

The role of the refugees must also be discussed as one of the main societal forces that influenced Greek-Turkish rapprochement processes. The role of the refugees became clearer before the initiation of the first rapprochement when they

strongly opposed the June 1930 Greek-Turkish agreement. The reaction of the refugees was not pointed towards the improvement of the Greek-Turkish relations per se, but rather to the agreement's provisions, which essentially shattered their hopes of ever being compensated.

Table 8.6.

	<u>Societal level</u>		
	<u>Main events</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Importance</u>
First case	Grassroots exchanges, support from public opinion and media	High	High
Second case	Communication between societies increase considerably and cover many different activities such as sports, education, civil society	High	High
Third case	No major breakthroughs. Limited among elites	Low	Low
Fourth case	Several initiatives among professionals, students, artists, journalists etc	High	High

8.3. Influence of the Independent Variables

The literature review chapter introduced and discussed a set of eight independent variables which became the main focus of the current study. A codebook was constructed in the methodology chapter that further defined those

variables and explained what indicators must be looked upon while analyzing the case studies. Each of the eight variables was also discussed separately in each chapter, with the analysis focusing on the independent variables' contribution to the outcome of each rapprochement case. In the following pages the discussion will continue with what might be considered the most important part of this research, namely the comparison of each independent variable across cases and the disclosure of its explanatory power in regard to the variation on the dependent variable.

In order to make the analysis clearer, it is imperative that a table should be introduced first which will include all of the eight independent variables and their influence on the dependent variable, case by case. The table follows Kaarbo's (1996: 518) pattern. Influence for each variable is coded with Y (when the variable played a role to shaping the outcome of the rapprochement) and N (when the variable did not play a role to shaping the outcome of the rapprochement). Again following Kaarbo's design, a variable will overall be considered that caused variation on the dependent variable if it has done so in at least 75% of the cases (both successful rapprochement and one unsuccessful or both unsuccessful rapprochements and one successful)¹³¹. The discussion that will follow the table

¹³¹ It should be mentioned that Kaarbo uses 8 cases in her analysis, and she considers a hypothesis supported if the variable was present in 75% (3 out of 4) of the cases with one value on the dependent variable and at least 50% (2 out of 4) of the cases with the other value on the dependent variable (pp. 515). As this design is impossible to follow exactly due to the limited number of cases the current study uses, which is half of Kaarbo's cases, the overall influence of each independent variable will be decided under the criteria mentioned in the text.

will contribute significantly to the understanding of each variable's behavior and contribution.

Table 8.7.

Variable	Influence	Support	Overall support
Impact of the international system to the national security	Successful: 1) Y 4) N Unsuccessful: 2) N 3) N	50% 0%	25%
State identity	Successful: 1) Y 4) Y Unsuccessful: 2) Y 3) Y	100% 100%	100%
Costs and benefits Equilibrium	Successful: 1) Y 4) Y Unsuccessful: 2) N 3) N	100% 0%	50%
Interdependence	Successful: 1) Y 4) Y Unsuccessful: 2) N 3) N	100% 0%	50%
Leadership	Successful: 1) Y 4) Y Unsuccessful: 2) Y 3) Y	100% 100%	100%
Depth of process	Successful: 1) Y 4) Y Unsuccessful: 2) N 3) Y	100% 50%	75%
Turning points	Successful: 1) N 4) N Unsuccessful: 2) Y 3) N	0% 50%	25%
GRIT strategy	Successful: 1) N 4) N Unsuccessful: 2) N 3) N	0% 0%	0%

a) The impact of international system on national security

The low impact of this variable could come as a surprise to many IR scholars and especially those who favor structural realism. Some skeptics would argue that all the rapprochement cases discussed in the current dissertation took place at times when systemic pressure existed and at times when a threat was posed on the national security of both Turkey and Greece. A deeper analysis of the cases, however, suggests that although systemic pressures existed, they were not a sufficient factor for the success of a rapprochement process. It is also important to note that what is important for the evaluation was not the presence of a factor, but whether this presence leads to the success or failure of the process.

The overall impact for the first proposition, which concerned the impact of the international system on national security, was 25%, translating to observed impact on the first case only and no impact on the other three cases. Regarding the first two cases, there are few differences as far as the insecurities imposed by the system are concerned. During the 1930s, insecurity was caused by the emergence of countries such as Italy or Bulgaria which were either revisionist or irredentist. In the early 1950s insecurity was caused by the emergence of the Cold War and the creation of a bipolar system dominated by two antagonistic super-powers. Regardless of these differences, it is a fact that for both Greece and Turkey that systemic pressures on their national security were strong, and one of the primary reasons leading to the initiation of the first two rapprochements.

The question to be answered then is why similar impacts on national security by the international system did not lead to similar variation on the dependent variable. The answer to this question is that, as far as the second case is concerned, and in spite of the impact of international system on the national security which seemed to positively contribute to the continuation of the rapprochement process until at least 1954, other variables proved much stronger catalysts, leading to the end of the process. The assumption deriving from the study of the 1950-1955's unsuccessful rapprochement is that, in the absence of other problems, international system would have provided adequate incentives for the continuation of the rapprochement process, as it had done so until 1954. Hence, the second rapprochement did not fail because of the absence of systemic pressures on Greece's and Turkey's national security, but in spite of them.

The third and fourth rapprochement cases must also be looked together due to the similarities they present. Both these cases take place in a much more stable and secure international system, at least for Greece and Turkey, compared to the one prevailing at the time the first two rapprochements took place. Therefore, the international system did not play an important role in any of the latter two rapprochements. Nonetheless, this is not to say that national security did not play a role. Indeed, it did both in 1988 and 1999. However, in these cases the threat to national security for Turkey and Greece was caused by the possibility of a Greek-Turkish armed conflict and not the international system.

b) State identity

State identity was one of the most supported hypotheses, as the analysis shows it played a role on all cases (overall impact 100%), impacting the outcome of the rapprochement. In the successful cases it was the development of a new positive state identity that made the rapprochement processes much easier and smoother. In the unsuccessful cases it was the development of competing state identities (1955) or the failure to create a new state identity that would allow for the rapprochement process to continue (1988). As such, this independent variable behaved across cases exactly like the proposition in the literature described.

As far as the successful cases are concerned, the immediate observation is that during the rapprochement process state identities were shaped in such a way so that the other side was not considered a threat, or at least a much lesser threat. Especially referring to the fourth rapprochement when the starting conditions were far worse compared to the 1930s rapprochement, new state identities included the prospect that Turkish and Greek interests were not incompatible by definition, and that rapprochement could benefit both states. The development of such a state identity, or its considerable strengthening, must be considered as an important factor for a rapprochement process at least for the successful cases that were discussed.

Concerning the unsuccessful cases, the pattern is not so clear. During the first years of the second rapprochement, Turkish and Greek state identities were not much different from the ones formed during the 1930s. Feelings of friendship

prevailed between Greeks and Turks, while a shared western and anti-communist identity also developed. Nevertheless, those identities changed sharply after 1954, when the Cyprus issue surfaced and especially after the 1955 events in Istanbul.

As far as the third case is concerned, the trauma that the Cyprus issue had left on both Greeks and Turks was too resentful and too big to be overcome. As it was already pointed out in the sixth chapter, the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus had caused much resentment to the Greeks, who after 1974 saw Turkey as an occupation force. The existence of enmity and negative images between the two societies affected the process in a variety of ways, but most importantly it increased political costs for the political leaders who wanted to continue the rapprochement.

c) Costs and benefits equilibrium

One of the most important observations regarding the costs/benefits/variable is that in all cases, successful and unsuccessful alike, the benefits outweighed the costs. Hence, the rapprochement must be understood as a positive process that was beneficial to both parties. In general, the rapprochement processes offered several benefits to both Greece and Turkey, which mainly had to do with bilateral issues, such as for instance the minorities' concerns that were easier to be solved while the rapprochement lasted. Similarly, the cost of maintaining good relations was low across cases for both states.

This analysis showed that this independent variable is not a precondition for a successful rapprochement, as its overall impact was 50%. Nonetheless, there are

important clarifications to be made. Although costs and benefits had a positive impact on the rapprochement process, by providing further incentives for its continuation, their overall impact should not be exaggerated. Even as far as the successful cases are concerned the impact of costs and benefits was rather limited. The benefits that arose from the process provided further motivation to the parties, but this was only a fraction compared to the motivation that other variables offered.

The secondary role of the costs/benefits variable becomes even clearer when the unsuccessful cases are examined. Like in the successful cases, the benefits for the two parties outweighed the costs in the unsuccessful rapprochements as well. However, the benefits' impact was not possible to prevent the end of the rapprochement process. Hence, it becomes clear that this variable played a secondary role, as its impact was regulated by other more important factors.

d) Interdependence

Interdependence should be seen a natural outcome of the rapprochement process. As relations between two states normalize and cooperation increases, it is highly likely that stronger economic, diplomatic and political ties will develop as well. As such, it is more a question of how much interdependence will develop rather than if interdependence develops at all. Regarding the four Greek-Turkish rapprochement cases, a significant degree of interdependence developed in all cases apart from the third case.

The behavior of this variable is very similar, if not identical, to the costs and benefits equilibrium variable discussed above. It also scored 50% on the overall impact, 100% for the successful and 0% for the unsuccessful rapprochement cases. This should not come as a surprise as these two variables partly overlap, or at least they create similar motives for the continuation of the rapprochement process.

In the two successful cases, the 1930 and the 1999 rapprochements were a factor that contributed to the success of the rapprochement, even though not a primary one. On both these cases economic activity and cooperation increased significantly, while the prospect for further improvement was apparent, especially as far as the fourth case is concerned. Regarding the two unsuccessful cases the most interesting case is the 1955 rapprochement, as in 1988 there was no time for any interdependence to develop, and, as such, this variable was largely irrelevant. In the early 1950s, however, Turkey and Greece were able to improve considerably their vis-a vis financial activities. Similarly in the successful cases the two states managed to increase trade volume, and they both had reasons to support further improvement. Nonetheless, unlike the successful rapprochements, the developing interdependence was not a factor that was strong enough to halt the breaking down of the rapprochement process.

In total, as it has already pointed out, interdependence was not a game changer either to the successful or the unsuccessful cases. It provided extra motivation for the continuation of the rapprochement, but it never constituted a game-changer for the rapprochement process.

e) Leadership

Leadership was the second variable, after state identity, that not only proved to be a precondition for a successful rapprochement, but it also influenced the dependent variable on all four cases, successful and unsuccessful alike. The main point regarding leadership that must be stressed out is that all the four Greek-Turkish rapprochements were, besides their big differences, top to bottom cases. Indeed, as it is clear from the discussion earlier in the current chapter, it was the political leaders that initiated and significantly contributed to the establishment of the process during its first steps. Moreover, at least for three out of four cases, it is widely accepted that they are "Nixon goes to China" moments, meaning that the leaders involved were so important to the process, that the process would not be have started or continued if they had not been involved.

As far as the successful cases are concerned, Turkish and Greek political leaders played a key role in the success of both the first and the fourth rapprochement cases. Many commonalities exist in the ways political leaders supported the process and decided to bear the political costs of their decisions. In addition, in both cases the architects of the rapprochement process were very active early in the process and did a great job in supporting the rapprochement long enough so that the process could be well established. Nonetheless, there was also an important difference between the two successful cases. On the one hand, regarding the first rapprochement, the two leaders that initiated and supported the process were the Greek and Turkish prime ministers. On the other hand, the 1999

rapprochement was largely made possible due to the work and good will of Ismail Cem and George Papandreou, who were at that time serving as the Turkish and Greek ministers of foreign affairs respectively.

The two unsuccessful rapprochement cases also presented several similarities, not only between them, but to the successful cases as well. When the two unsuccessful cases are compared, the role of political leaders in the initiation and support of the process becomes more obvious in the 1988 rapprochement. Although, in the early 1950s the political leaders were very active and also very supportive of the process, 1988 was the case where leadership became the dominant variable influencing the outcome of the rapprochement. Indeed, as was analytically described in chapter 6, leaders' actions and process are closely connected. Finally, for both the unsuccessful cases, lack of support by the political leaders contributed to the failure of the process, although, again the causality is much more straightforward in the 1988 case.

To summarize, the analysis of the cases showed that leaders through their actions and supporting behavior can contribute to the success of a rapprochement process, while lack or minimum support can lead to a failed rapprochement.

f) Depth of the process

A major point differentiating the current work from other studies on rapprochement is that rapprochement is studied in a longitudinal manner, focusing on the post-initiation process rather than on the initiation itself. Hence, a big part of

the current research discussed and analyzed the six indicators of the rapprochement process. The assessment parts in the case chapters discussed eloquently each of the rapprochement indicators, while a comparison of the indicators across cases was included earlier in this chapter. The detailed discussion on the indicators revealed that the depth of the process had an overall impact of 75%, influencing the value of the dependent variable in both successful and in one of the two unsuccessful cases.

Contrasting the two successful cases shows significant similarities on the ways this variable behaved. Both the 1930 and the 1999 rapprochements concern a deep process that managed to heavily impact all of the indicators. High depth played a positive role in the successful outcome of these rapprochements by providing strong foundations to the process. In both cases, the process was far from superficial; it managed to engage people from various spectrums of society and included a wide range of actions and events. The connection between depth and success of the rapprochement is much clearer in the fourth case where the challenges to a successful rapprochement were numerous and more difficult to overcome.

In the early 1950s Greece and Turkey managed to achieve significant progress on most of the indicators that the current work looked upon. In that respect, the second case was quite similar to the first one. Noticeable advances were made on all the indicators, apart from the economic cooperation where progress was moderate. Nonetheless, the 1950s' rapprochement failed because, besides the high depth, stronger factors were able to cause the termination of the process.

Contrary to the other cases, the 1988 rapprochement remained a much more superficial process, and apart from the summit-level meetings, which covered most of the process, little was achieved concerning the rest of the indicators. Hence, the failure of the process must also be attributed to the low depth it reached. The 1988 case constitutes a typical example of process' depth importance. The rapprochement died out because the process was largely depending on the political leaders, and because it failed to expand to the other indicators that could further progress the leaders' advancements.

In total, the comparison of the cases indicated that a deep rapprochement process usually leads to a successful rapprochement; however, other variables (in the 1950s case a significant turning point) might have a stronger effect and, hence, overshadow its impact. Likewise, as was made clear by the 1988 rapprochement, when a process remains shallow and superficial, the likelihood of a successful process decreases.

g) Turning points

Turning points caused a change on the value of the dependent variable only in one of the four cases. Their overall impact was 25%, which translates to 0% for the successful cases and 50% for the unsuccessful cases. This independent variable, hence, was not a precondition for a successful rapprochement, at least as far as the Greek-Turkish rapprochements were concerned. Nonetheless, there are some very crucial points to highlight concerning this variable.

To begin with, in all the three cases no impact of turning points on the outcome of the rapprochement was observed, meaning that in the 1930s, 1988 and the 1999 cases, there were no turning points whatsoever. This means that the unchanged value of the dependent variable was not due to the rapprochements being resistive to turning points, but rather to the absence of turning points. This is a much different observation than the one where turning points would be present in all the cases. It is important to understand this difference because the analysis of the second case clearly shows how turning points could have a huge impact on the outcome of a rapprochement process.

Looking at the second rapprochement, which took place in the early 1950s, a safe assumption is that, in many aspects, it was not much different from the first rapprochement. Relations were very friendly, there was political will for cooperation; the Turkish and Greek public opinions supported the friendship between the two states; there were significant agreements signed and, in general, there were many incentives for continuing the rapprochement for both Greece and Turkey. The fundamental difference was that a very strong turning point, the Cyprus issue, surfaced and it was, on its own, enough to destroy what was otherwise a very promising rapprochement process. The second case hence, constitutes a clear example of the power turning points have, when they do happen, on altering a rapprochement's outcome.

It is also important to point out that in the three cases that turning points did not influence the outcome of the rapprochement process, they did play a role in the

initiation of the process. These turning points took exclusively the form of a crisis and significantly contributed to a change in attitudes that led to the initiation of the rapprochements. For the third case, the March 1987 Aegean Crisis was a decisive moment that opened the way leading to Davos. Similarly, the initiation of the fourth rapprochement was only made possible by the change of political attitudes which, in turn, was caused by the series of crises that unfolded between 1996 and 1999. The halt of the negotiations that took place before the initiation of the first rapprochement should also be considered as a crisis, although not as strong as the two mentioned earlier that contributed to the initiation of the rapprochement.

h) GRIT strategy

The importance of GRIT strategy to the initiation of all four rapprochement cases was highlighted earlier in the current chapter. The idea that GRIT strategy during negotiations between two parties increases the likelihood of a successful vis-a-vis rapprochement belongs to Armstrong who suggested in one of his five assumptions that the initial strategy employed by the parties must be consistent with the basic GRIT prescriptions. As Armstrong research also looks at the initiation of the rapprochement, it is important to point out that his assumption regarding GRIT is also verified by the current study.

Nonetheless, as far as the success of the process is concerned, the current study did not make such observations. The independent variable relating to the GRIT strategy did not influence the dependent variable in any of the four cases

discussed in the current research and, as such, it scored 0% overall. The differences in the way this variable behaves, being very important to the initiation but unimportant to the process, raises further questions regarding what factors determine its behavior. There are two important observations to be made in this regard.

On the one hand, GRIT strategy became a useful tool for the leaders when relations were at a very low level. All the first steps and the reciprocation steps took place when there was not much room for other types of communication. Similarly, GRIT strategy was used in order to make one party's intentions known and to explore the intentions of the other sides, and hence, taking small steps was the required strategy. After the initiation of the rapprochement though, the parties had already achieved a level of cooperation and understanding and were already prepared to take more essential steps in order to further improve their relationship.

Another important issue to be pointed out is that Greece and Turkey were not engaged in negotiations after the initiation of the rapprochements. They had either solved the most important bilateral issues before the initiation of the process, as was the case in 1930 and 1950, or they decided to continue with the process despite the existence of bilateral issues, as was done in 1999. Even when some negotiations took place between Greece and Turkey, such as the 1988 and 1999 cases, negotiations took place behind closed doors and it is impossible to evaluate them. The lack of need for negotiations or the willingness to proceed with negotiations, eliminated one of the main areas where GRIT strategy could be used,

and, hence, it constitutes this variable which is largely irrelevant to the outcome of the rapprochement.

8.4. Concluding Remarks

The current chapter compared the four cases of Greek-Turkish rapprochement that were discussed in the four previous chapters. The comparison was divided into three different parts; comparison of the pre-initiation period, comparison of the rapprochement process, and, finally, assessment of how each of the independent variables fared with regard to the research question. As such, this chapter completes the most important part of the discussion that was the central topic of the current study. The next, chapter will include a brief overview, some final remarks and some ideas on where future research on rapprochement should focus on.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

9.1. Summary

The current study began with a simple question; “what are the preconditions for successful rapprochement”? In order to answer this question, the research followed a very specific roadmap. Initially, some conceptual foundations were laid. The concept of rapprochement was closely examined and discussed, a working definition was provided and the independent variables to be tested were introduced. Furthermore, a detailed account of the study’s methodological approach was provided and concerns relating to methodological issues were also discussed.

The study continued with the analysis of the case studies that were chosen for examination. Each of these case studies was analyzed mainly on three axes; the pre-rapprochement period, including the actions and steps that led to the initiation of the rapprochement, the rapprochement process, which was further broken into

eight indicators, and the assessment of the influence of each of the independent variables to the success or failure of the rapprochement.

Finally, the comparison chapter provides a comprehensive cross-case comparison and arrives at significant conclusions regarding the explanatory power of each of the independent variables that were put forth early in the study.

9.2. Main Findings

The thorough analysis of the case studies and the discussion in the comparison chapter revealed some very interesting assumptions that can be drawn for each of the independent variables. Variables that are well researched and constitute a cornerstone in international politics' theories did not exhibit strong explanatory power as far as the dependent variable is concerned. It is also important to note that all but one independent variable, GRIT strategy, influenced the outcome of at least one of the cases.

The realist assumption that systemic pressures on national security are one of the profound forces shaping states' actions and decisions only influenced the outcome of the rapprochement process in the first rapprochement case. Regarding the early 1950s rapprochement, high pressure from the international system did not manage to provide strong incentives for the continuation of the rapprochement. For the last two cases, system's pressure on national security was not very strong even before the initiation of the rapprochement. In those cases, Greece and Turkey became the major threat to each other's security.

Interdependence and cost/benefit analysis only influenced the outcome of the rapprochement in the two successful cases. Overall, both these independent variables behaved very similarly across cases. In all four cases, interdependence increased after the initiation of the rapprochement and the benefits outweighed the costs. Hence, incentives for the continuation of the rapprochement were increased by those two variables across cases. Nonetheless, those incentives were not strong enough to prevent the failure of the process in the two unsuccessful cases. As far as the successful cases are concerned, although interdependence increased and significant benefits arose during the rapprochement, the contribution to the success of the process was positive but rather limited.

The urgent question that immediately arises is why those variables did not influence the outcome of the rapprochement process. The answer to this question is given when one takes a look at the independent variables that did cause variation on the dependent variable. The analysis in the previous chapter strongly suggests that as far as the rapprochements between Turkey and Greece are concerned, the variables that were related to the process of the rapprochement constituted the strongest catalyst to the outcome of the process. As such, the formation of a new state identity, the efforts of the leaders, and the depth of the process were the main independent variables influencing the value of the dependent variable.

Overall, the discussion on the influence of the independent variables as well as the discussion and analysis that was made for every rapprochement case leads to one major assumption. Regarding Greece and Turkey, a dyad with long history,

unresolved bilateral issues and high levels of mistrust, the biggest obstacle to the success of a rapprochement process is not the lack of strong incentives for cooperation, either from the benefits that arise, the economic profits that increase or the increased security against third states. Similarly, the rapprochement is more likely to succeed when the two states actively support the continuation of the process either through the actions of the political leaders, the substantiation of the process, or the creation of a new cooperative state identity that focuses on the future of the relationship rather than on the past.

9.3. The Future of the Relationship

The historical overview of the Greek-Turkish relations clearly reveals that the two states have been enemies longer than they have been allies. Heraclides (2004: 67) assesses that from 1901 to 2000 Greece and Turkey have experienced seven years of armed conflict, 57 years of strained relations (with and without violent outbursts), and only 30 years of cordial relations. The question that comes up then is whether Turkey and Greece are predestined by history and geography to be enemies.

The current study answers this question with an emphatic “no”. The historical analysis of the Greek-Turkish relations suggests that the two countries were able to develop friendly relations and strong cooperation. Important lessons can be learnt especially by the first rapprochement, which was the most successful case both in terms of developing cooperation and strengthening ties. The analysis of

the case suggests that solving the important bilateral issues before the rapprochement is one of the keys to success for two reasons. On the one hand lack of bilateral issues allows the parties to focus on issues of common interest rather than issues where their interests diverge. On the other hand, the existence of bilateral issues after the initiation of the rapprochement may trigger situations that will pose a threat to the process, hence, making the rapprochement less likely to succeed.

The 1999 rapprochement continues until the present (2013), but unfortunately the two countries have not managed to solve their bilateral issues. They have just learned to live with them, and cooperate despite them. In order to increase the chances for continued good neighborly relations Turkey and Greece must sooner or later find a solution to the bilateral issues that divide them.

9.4. Policy Implications

The current research offers significant lessons to policy makers that either aim at initiating a rapprochement process or want to lead a successful rapprochement process. Even though the analysis of the case studies suggests that actions of leaders were in large case-specific, depending on the special needs of each situation, there are some general lessons that may be deducted.

- Take small yet important steps: Before the initiation of the rapprochement the leaders should avoid taking high risks. Small gestures indicating their intentions suffice. It is also important that the first step be planned in such a way that it

obligates the other party to reveal its intentions. Personal correspondence is the simplest way to achieve this goal

- Solve as many issues as possible before initiation: This point has already been discussed at length in the previous pages. Unresolved issues are always points of frictions and it is good to be eliminate them from the beginning.

- Be quick in the early stages: The early stages of the rapprochement process must constitute a “shock therapy”. Progress on all indicators must be achieved in order to build strong foundations for the process. In particular, the discussion on the third case indicates that failure to influence all of rapprochement’s indicators constitutes the process vulnerable.

- Support the process at all times: The deeper the rapprochement becomes over time, the less it is dependent on the support and actions of leaders. Nonetheless, the leaders must be alert at all times because there may be unexpected factors (such as turning points) that will threaten the success of the process.

9.5. Implications for Future Research

One of the first contributions of the current study was that it created a concrete framework for the study of rapprochement processes, including a concrete definition which can be used as a guide for selection of new cases. This theoretical framework can be used by scholars for the study of other rapprochement cases, for both descriptive studies and exploratory research. In addition, the framework that was developed by this study can be used in order to test a number of variables,

which are not necessarily the same as those the current study chose to test. Finally, the framework is not only applicable to cases that are similar to the Turkey- Greece dyad, but to all cases of rapprochement,

Furthermore, the big bulk of the current study concerned testing the eight independent variables which were selected after the thorough review of the related literature. At the end some assumptions were reached on how each of the independent variables influenced the success or failure of the rapprochement process. Testing the same variables on other rapprochement cases would offer more data, and ultimately could lead to a better understanding of the factors that cause a rapprochement process to fail or succeed.

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