

**OTTOMAN CORSAIRS IN THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN
AND THEIR PLACE IN THE OTTOMAN-HABSBURG RIVALRY
(1505-1535)**

A Master's Thesis

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June 2006**

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**The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
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by

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ABSTRACT

OTTOMAN CORSAIRS IN THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND THEIR PLACE IN THE OTTOMAN-HABSBURG RIVALRY (1505-1535)

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This thesis analyses the political deeds of the Ottoman corsairs in the Western Mediterranean between the years, 1505 and 1535. It tries to evaluate their place in the broader framework of the European politics of the time. It aims to analyze the perception of the both sides of the international struggle for the covered period, namely that of the Habsburgs and the Ottomans. Neither the preferences of the decision-makers of two sides, nor the power and effectiveness of the corsair rule established in the Western Mediterranean is immune to reconsideration for each period covered. Hence, both issues are tried to be discussed by calculating the changing balances of power as the division into three chapters also proves. In order to do that, in this period of the struggle of the 16th century Europe in which not only the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, but also all major or minor powers of the era were forced to take sides; we should not only analyze how Khayr al-Din Barbarossa rose to prominence to the extent that he could achieve the rank of a Kaptan-ı Derya, but also the reaction of the strongest ruler of

Western Mediterranean and of the Catholic World against this growing importance.

Key Words: The Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Dynasty, Arudj Reis, Khayr al-Din Pasha, Barbarossa, Charles V, Süleyman the Magnificent, Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry, Algiers, Tunis, Kaptan-ı Derya.

ÖZET

BATI AKDENİZ'DE OSMANLI KORSANLIĞI VE OSMANLI-HABSBURG REKABETİNDEKİ YERİ (1505-1535)

Gürkan, Emrah Safa
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü
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Haziran 2006

Bu tez, 1505 ve 1535 yılları arasında Osmanlı korsanlarının Batı Akdeniz'deki siyasi faaliyetlerini konu almaktadır. Zamanın avrupa siyasetinin şu daha geniş çerçevesinde bu korsanların yerini saptamaya çalışmaktadır. Ele alınan dönemdeki uluslararası mücadelenin iki tarafının, yani Habsburg ve Osmanlı karar mercilerinin korsanlığı nasıl algıladığını analiz etmek amacındadır. Ne iki tarafın karar mercilerinin öncelikleri, ne de Batı Akdeniz'de kurulan korsan egemenliğinin gücü ve etkinliği, ele alınan her dönem için yeniden değerlendirmeden mu'af değildir. Bu sebeble, her iki mevzu, bu tezin üç bölüme ayrılmasının da kanıtlayacağı gibi, değişen güç dengelerinin hesaba katılmasıyla artırılmaya çalışılacaktır. Bunu başarmak için, 16. yüzyıl Avrupası'nın, sadece Osmanlıları ve Habsburgları değil, dönemin irili ufaklı bütün kuvvetlerini taraf almaya zorlayan bir mücadelenin bu evresinde Hayreddin Paşa'nın nasıl Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Kaptan-ı Deryalığa yükselebilecek kadar önem kazandığını araştırmanın yanısıra, Batı Akdeniz'in ve Katolik Dünyası'nın en güçlü

hükümdarının bu artan öneme gösterdiği tepkiyi incelemek gerekmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Habsburg Hanedanı, Oruç Reis, Hayreddin Paşa, Barbaros, Beşinci Karl, Kanuni Sultan Süleyman, Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekabeti, Cezayir, Tunus, Kaptan-ı Derya.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BOA: Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri

ASV: Archivio di Stato di Venezia

EI²: Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd Edition

İA: İslam Ansiklopedisi

Gazavât: Seyyid Murâdi Re'îs, *Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, ed. Mustafa Yıldız, (Aachen, 1993)

“Bella gerant alii, tu felix austria nube”

INTRODUCTION

The Rise of a New World Power: The Habsburgs

The Ottoman Empire had already reached to the status of a world power in the sixteenth century when a new dynasty in the West rose to prominence. Having been founded in the marches of North-western Anatolia, Ottomans had succeeded in a gradual but steady expansion. In the first half of the fourteenth century, they had already succeeded to consolidate their position in the Bithynia region, southern part of the Marmara Sea to the detriment of the Byzantine Empire. In the second half of the same century, Ottoman forces were in Europe. In a short period of time, the power of this small principality grew ostensibly to the extent that by the end of the century, they were the most powerful state both in the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor. Despite a set-back caused by the defeat of 1402 against the army of *Timur* (r. 1370-1405), their expansion could not be contained. Ambitious and young Ottoman Sultan *Mehmed II* (r. 1451-1481) would conquer the capital of the Roman Empire in 1453. Even though the expansion was halted during the reign of *Bayezid II* (r. 1481-1512), his intrepid son *Yavuz Sultân Selim* (r. 1512-1520) would succeed in conquering the entire Eastern Anatolia and Fertile Crescent with one coup.

Sixteenth century Europe witnessed the rise of a new dynasty in Western Europe. It is hard to speculate the peculiarities of this power which had been enhanced gradually thanks to a combination of diplomatically arranged inter-dynastical marriages. The Habsburg Dynasty had already been holding the title of “Holy Roman Emperor” for three generations when *Maximilian I* (r. 1493-1519) died in 1519. The first of the Habsburg Emperors was the puny *Rudolf I* (r. 1273-1291) who was elected due to its feebleness, since it was calculated that he would not try to impose the central authority on the princes of the empire whose loose structure allows for autonomous local political bodies. There would be other Habsburg dukes who were elevated to the imperial throne: *Rudolf III* (r. 1306-7), *Albert I* (r. 1298-1308) and *Frederick I* (r. 1325-1330). Habsburgs had further consolidated their situation in the empire when *Albert II* (r. 1438-1439) was crowned emperor. From that day forward, Habsburgs succeeded to create a line of succession in the imperial office. Albert’s son *Frederick III* (r. 1440-1493) and grandson Maximilian I would also inherit the throne.

The power of the Habsburgs was not actually relying on the Empire in the sixteenth century. On the contrary, it may be assumed that the problems that the empire was facing presented a distraction for the family in their foreign policy. The gradual expansion of Habsburg family was due to a clever diplomacy of alliances based on royal marriages.

Maximilian I, at the time of his father’s emperorship, was married with the most promising bride of Europe: The heiress of the Duchy of Burgundy, *Mary of Burgundy* (r. 1477-1482). The duchy was the strongest and richest in all duchies of Europe. Once a kingdom, Burgundian dominions were divided between the West Carolingian and the

East Carolingian kingdoms. It would be a part of the French royal crown when *Philippe* (r. 1346-1361), the last Duke of Burgundy died in 1361 heirless. The French king *Jean II* (r. 1350-1364) decided to give the kingdom to his fourth son, another *Philippe* (r. 1364-1404). *Philippe le Hardi* added Flanders, Artois, Rethel, Nevers and Franche Comté to his duchy thus uniting “two Burgundies” thanks to his marriage with Margareth of Flanders. In 1385, his son *Jean* (r. 1404-1419) got married with another Margareth, of Bavaria and added Hainut, Holland and Zealand to his dominions. The growing importance of the Duchy finally created a clash between the two branches of the Valois dynasty. *Jean sans Peur* was secretly negotiating with England during the Hundred Years War. Yet, his son, *Philippe le Bon* (r. 1419-1467) overtly defied the authority of his suzerain and allied with England. He made peace with the King and appeared as an autonomous ruler as a result of the *Treaty of Arras*. *Charles le Téméraire* (r. 1467-1477) was planning to transform his duchy to a kingdom. Thus, he challenged the French king and struggle commenced once again. In 1477, at the *battle of Nancy*, the army of *Louis XI* (r. 1461-1483) crushed that of Charles thanks to the supremacy of cavalry over the infantry and the Duke lost his life. The French king succeeded in incorporating the core territories of the Duchy of Burgundy into the kingdom of France, yet other dependant possessions would escape from French sphere. There was only one heiress, Mary. She needed a protector against the growing ambitions of the French king and the court decided to resort to Maximilian since the power of the Habsburg family could counterbalance the French pressure. When Mary was dead in 1482, her dominions would pass to his son Philip of Habsburg and upon his death in 1507, to Charles.

Maximilian was as cunning as his father was, so he did not lose time to balance the French ambitions with diplomacy. He and his ally *Fernando of Aragon* (r. 1477-1516) decided to consolidate their alliance with a double marriage between their children. According to this, Maximilian's heir and Charles' father, Duke of Burgundy, Philip would marry to Juana, while Margareth of Austria would marry the heir of the Iberian crowns, Juan. These marriages would later pave the way for Charles' ascension to the thrones of Castile and Aragon. These kingdoms had already been united in 1479 due to the marriage of prince Fernando of Aragon with the Queen of Castile, *Isabella* (r. 1474-1504) who would appreciate the Aragonese help in the civil war she was facing. Thus, the heir of this marriage would be crowned for both of the kingdoms with the addition of the recently conquered territories in the southern part of the Peninsula. Yet, this would only be a possibility thanks to a combination of premature deaths. The heir to both of the thrones was Juan, the husband of Margareth of Austria. Yet, he died in 1497 at the age of 19 without an heir. In 1498, the second in the dynastic line Isabel also died and two years later his son and heir, Prince Miguel would follow him. Thus, Charles' mother Juana was unexpectedly the first in the line of succession. Finally, in 1506, Charles' father Philip died, leaving a melancholy for his wife that would eventually inflict a mental illness upon her. Isabella had already died in 1504, and Fernando appeared as the regent of Castile since his daughter was not suitable for such a task. Fernando, on the other hand, was absolutely not favourable to the idea of the Habsburg's gaining control of both of these kingdoms. This time he married Germaine de Foix in order to create an heir that would at least separate the kingdom of Aragon from the

Habsburg axis; however, their son Juan of Aragon lived only a couple of hours. When Fernando died in 1516, Charles appeared as the heir to both of the kingdoms.

Charles did not only take the possession of these two kingdoms. As a result of *Reconquista*, the last Muslim kingdom in the Peninsula was incorporated into the kingdom of Castile. Furthermore, the kingdom of Navarre was conquered from the ruling dynasty of Albrets and incorporated into the kingdom of Castile by Fernando in 1512. Apart from these dominions in the Iberian Peninsula, Charles had also inherited Aragonese possessions in Southern Italy, Kingdoms of Sicily and of Naples. After the marriage between Constance, the last descendant of *Robert Guiscard* (r.1059-1085) and the Holy Roman Emperor *Henry VI* of Hohenstaufen (r. 1191-1197), Southern Italy became an arena of international conflict. Henry's heir Emperor *Frederick II* (r. 1220-1250) followed his father in the region and reigned for 53 years between 1197 and 1250. Yet, Pope claiming suzerainty on the kingdom and denying the Hohenstaufen claims, decided to invest the kingdom to the brother of the French king *Louis IX* (r. 1226-1270), *Charles d'Anjou* in 1266. He was proclaimed king of Naples and of Sicily, and naturally Pope's vassal. Yet, the Angevin rule faced problems in Southern Italy. In 1282, as a result of the *Sicilian Vespers Revolt*, the Angevin Dynasty was replaced by that of Aragonese in the kingdom of Sicily. The result of the consequent war of the two dynasties would be the division of the kingdoms of Sicily and of Naples. The kingdom of Naples would fall into the Aragonese sphere when the Aragonese king *Alfonso el Magnamino* (r.1435-1458) conquered it in 1443 defeating the last Angevin pretender René. Upon his death in 1458, his kingdom was divided into two. His illegitimate child *Ferrante* (r.1458-1494) would be the king of Naples while Fernando's father, *Juan* (r.

1458-1479) would inherit the Catalan-Aragonese kingdom. French kings *Charles VIII* (r. 1483-1498) and *Louis XII* (r. 1498-1515) would invade the kingdom of Naples based on their dynastic rights on the kingdoms; yet the final victory would be of Aragon. With the treaties of *Blois* (1504-5), both crowns would pass to Fernando, then upon his death to Charles.

Yet, the original lands of the Habsburgs were the Archduchy of Austria. When Rudolf of Habsburg was elected emperor in 1273, he used his power to gain the control of the duchy of Austria and to secure it for his son. From that day on, this duchy became the nucleus of Habsburg powers since the original Habsburg dominions in Northern Switzerland was not worth mentioning. Charles gained the Duchy in 1519, when his grandfather died. Yet, this had never played an important role in his plans. After his election to the imperial crown, he decided to cede this Duchy to his brother and lieutenant in the Empire Ferdinand.¹

The young Habsburg prince who united a combination of crowns under the same head would also be elected Emperor. Maximilian was eager to secure the imperial crown for his grandson; he already started negotiations with the electors in order to do so by bribing them. However, his sudden death prevented him from completing his mission. The sovereignty in the empire had a medieval character; it consisted of disorganized and personal possessions formally vassal to the imperial crown, but in reality independent. Yet, the immense prestige of the seat was undeniable. So as the leader of the Habsburg dynasty Charles should bid for his grandfather's legacy.

¹ This was also due to a mutual agreement in which Ferdinand renounced his rights over the remaining Habsburg dominions. Ferdinand was always the favoured one in Spain and he was removed from the Peninsula when Charles arrived to assume the royal title. Furthermore, there were talks of French efforts to induce Ferdinand for an imperial candidacy against his brother. Charles had to write a letter to him indicating his amicable feelings towards his brother.

The imperial crown was theoretically open to every Catholic ruler. Other two powerful rulers of the continent were also candidates: *Henry VIII* of England (r. 1509-1547), and more important, Charles's future rival *François I* (r. 1515-1547) of France. In appearance, Charles was not at an advantageous position. He gained further advantage when Pope Leon X (r. 1513-1521), opposed by the Protestants in the Empire, declared his pro-French attitude overtly. Leon X and François tried everything to prevent the election of Charles; they even offered support to the Frederick the Wise of Saxony, one of the elector princes. Yet, he did not consent to such a project even in exchange for a cardinal cap that was offered to him.² On the other hand, Charles' agents were gaining ground everyday, mostly thanks to the bribes whose total amount was 852.189 florins.³ As Brandi puts it, "the only decisive argument was a lot of money"⁴. After all, he was the member of the last imperial dynasty, the grandson of extremely popular Maximilian. Finally, electors in Frankfurt decided to give the imperial crown to the young Habsburg. Now he was "the king of the Romans, Emperor Elect of Romans, always August"⁵.

The election of Charles (r. 1516-1558, 1519-1556) was important. He was always considered a second Charlemagne and appeared as the long-yearned figure of the Holy Roman Emperor since the death of Frederic II in 1250. Actually, there had always been the idea that one day another Frederic would rise which would give an impetus to

² Karl Brandi, *Carlo V*, trans. Leone Ginzburg and Ettore Bassan (Torino, 2001), pp. 96-7.

³ Ernest Belenguer, *El Imperio de Carlos V: Las Coronas y Sus Territorios* (Barcelona, 2002), p. 64. According to Carande, the total is 851.918 florins. Fuggers paid 543.585 florins, Welsers of Augsburg paid 144.333 and the remaining 165.000 was paid by others. Ramón Carande, *Carlos V y sus banqueros*, I (Madrid, 1957), pp. 42-9. Cf. Henry J. Cohn, "Did Bribes Induce the German Electors to Choose Charles V as Emperor in 1519", *German History*, 19/1 (2001), pp. 1-27.

⁴ Brandi, p. 89.

⁵ Brandi, p. 101.

the empire.⁶ Charles, with his vast resources would be the one and in a time of religious dissention, the Empire needed a strong Emperor to settle the dispute.

The title of “Emperor” had surely given Charles a huge prestige with which he was usually proud; but it did not bring as much as it took away. At the time of his accession, Holy Roman Empire was a decentralized political entity, with a symbolic crown whose authority relied on his personal capability and resources more than legal assurances. At the same time, it was also suffering from severe social crisis which resulted in the religious dissidence and thus Charles and later the Austrian branch of the Habsburgs not only inherited the problems of a decentralized empire who were suffering from the threat of a possible Turkish expansion; but also found themselves in the midst of theological debates.

However, Charles’ rule in other places was not that consolidated either. As Kamen puts it, Charles’ empire was “the union of various territories under one head”⁷, thus lacking unity. As indicated, they were acquired by dynastic rights and this affected the extent of the authority of Charles. Only in Castile, his authority was absolute thanks to his grandmother who successfully tamed the Castilian aristocracy. In other kingdoms, the authority of the crown was curtailed by the traditional institutions and thus the authority was being shared with the local *cliques*. In non-Castilian realms, king had to respect the laws of these realms (*fueros*). The importance of the local parliaments (*Cortes*) could not be neglected either, since the Emperor had to obtain their approval for the release of the most precious thing to him, taxes. Thus, in Charles’ empire, each

⁶ Belenguer, *El Imperio de Carlos V*, p. 42.

⁷ Henry Kamen, *Golden Age Spain* (New Jersey, 1988), p. 38.

unit succeeded to preserve its autonomy and traditional law. Charles also tended to think each of its patrimonial inheritance as an independent entity.

Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry:

Halil İnalcık in a short article analysed the place of the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century European politics.⁸ When Charles was elevated to the imperial crown in 1519, Ottoman Empire was the most important factor in the calculations. Both François and Charles declared their willingness to undertake a crusade in order to induce the electors. Mehmed II's attempt was curtailed by his death; yet, the threat was not totally contained. The kingdom of Hungary was weak, and this might cause problems in the future. However, Italy was the centre of the ambitions of Catholic rulers. Europe was divided and a common front could not be achieved. Charles' strength was unprecedented since the time of Charlemagne; yet his rival *Süleyman the Magnificent's* (r. 1520-1566) ambitions were not more moderate.

Many authors have discussed whether Charles was inspired by the idea of a universal monarchy or not. It was natural for such a power that his contemporaries would attribute such an ideology; yet, this was an exaggeration. This rejection was not only based on Charles' denial of universal pretensions in front of Pope *Paul III* (r. 1534-1549). His efforts were generally defensive as the result of all these wars to which he

⁸ Halil İnalcık, "The Turkish impact on the development of modern Europe" in *The Ottoman State and its Place in World History*, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (Wisconsin, 1974), pp. 51-60; Halil İnalcık, "Avrupa Devlet Sistemi, Fransa ve Osmanlı: Avrupa'da "Geleneksel Dostumuz" Fransa Tarihine Ait Bir Olay", *Doğu Batı*, XIV (2001), pp. 122-142.

was dragged was not more than the conquest of the Duchy of Milan and some places in Flanders. What he wanted to do was to conserve his patrimony and fulfil his obligations that the imperial office set forth for him. Thus his idea was to preserve the peace in and the coherence of *universitas cristiana* and thus his eminent enemies were Turks, heretics (i.e. protestants), and the neighbour princes (i.e. France). He defended *Ordinatio totius mundi* against France; *Concordia hominum* against Protestants and acted as *Defensor Fidei* against the Turks.⁹ His wars were the natural outcomes of his desire to establish peace within the Christian community and therefore to wage a holy war against the infidels.

Charles had to confront Ottoman expansion as the *Defensor Fidei* of the Catholic World. It is interesting to note that the idea of a crusade has played an important role in the imperial propaganda of the time. According to Montes, messianic beliefs in Spain around the personality of Charles and consequently the belief for his invincibility that were strengthened by the expansion of the Hispanic world resulted in a concrete idea of a Crusade.¹⁰ Castro asserted: “The emotion of holy war disappeared in France with the Crusades, while it was still vivid in Spain in the sixteenth century”.¹¹ Montes mentioned a three staged holy war in which North Africa appeared as the second.¹² This illusion of crusade was based on four pillars: The imperial dignity or the theoretic leadership of

⁹ Juan Sánchez Montes, *Franceses, Protestantes, Turcos. Los Españoles ante la Política Internacional de Carlos V* (Granada, 1995), p. 129.

¹⁰ Montes, p. 50.

¹¹ Américo Castro, *España en su Historia. Cristianos, Moros y Judios* (Buenos Aires, 1948), pp. 191, 202, 223, cited by Montes, p. 84.

¹² Montes, p. 98. The first was the *Reconquista* and the third would be the conquest of Jerusalem.

Christianity, his personal ardour for a war against the infidels, the medieval Spanish tradition¹³ and *presidios* situated in North Africa.¹⁴

Charles also explained his vigour for this “thing the most desired for us”, the holy War.¹⁵ He was the defender of the Faith as the Holy Roman Empire crowned by Pope. The primary task of such a ruler would be the defence of Christianity. He accentuated it several times, even though for political purposes. According to Montes, he aimed the restoration of *Universitas Cristiana* and “conceived the empire as the temporal support of an eternal category”, thus himself as the secular head of the Catholic world.¹⁶

This religious fervour for Crusade was most explicit in the Tunis expedition in 1535 and its afterwards. It should be noted that this victory was celebrated bombastically, being attributed a religious importance. When Charles descended to Italy after the conclusion of the Tunis expedition, he would be heralded as “the first combatant of Europe against Africa and Asia”, “Victorious Charles, the father of the Patria, victor in Africa, pacificator of the Nation”.¹⁷

The Ottoman Sultan, Süleyman I, on the other hand, was not only claiming supremacy over the Islamic world; but also explicitly declaring his pretensions for a universal monarchy.

¹³ It should not be forgotten that there was a similar tradition of Holy War also in the history of the Duchy of Burgundy. Thus it should be effective on Charles since he was brought up with the stories of his Burgundian ancestors in Flanders by his aunt Margareth. Hence, in my opinion, this Spanish-centred view of the author should be noticed and a double tradition of a Crusade should be mentioned.

¹⁴ Montes, p. 101.

¹⁵ Francisco de Laiglesia, *Estudios Historicos (1515-1555)*, I (Madrid, 1918), p. 438, cited by Montes, p. 86.

¹⁶ Montes, p. 129.

¹⁷ Brandi, pp. 358-9.

He was the leader of the Islamic world as the ruler of the most powerful Muslim state of the time. As İnalcık asserts, after 1453, Ottomans had already declared such supremacy based on the claim that no other Islamic ruler since the time of the four caliphs, had ever enjoyed such success in protecting and furthering the interests of Islam. The Ottoman Sultan was the *Halife-yi Rû-yi Zemîn* and *Halife-yi Müslimîn*. Furthermore, when Memluk State had collapsed as a result of Ottoman aggression in 1516-7, Ottomans became “the Servitor of the two Holy Sanctuaries”.¹⁸ According to Halil İnalcık, this concept of a world empire is explicit in two inscriptions dated 1538 and 1557:

“This slave of God, powerful with God’s power and his mighty deputy on the Earth, standing by the commands of the Qur’an and for the execution of them all over the world, master of all lands, and the shadow of God over all nations, Sultan over all the Sultans in the lands of the Arabs and Persians...”¹⁹

“I am a slave of God and I am the master in this world. ... God’s virtue and Muhammed’s miracles are my companions. I am Süleymân and my name is being read in the prayers of the holy cities of Islam. I launched fleets in the Mediterranean on the part of the Franks in Maghreb as well as in the Indian Ocean. I am the shah of Baghdad and Iraq, Caesar of the Roman lands and Sultan of Egypt. I took the land and crown of the Hungarian king and granted it to one of my humble slaves.”²⁰

Other Muslim powers could not match the power of the Ottomans. Safavid Rule in Persia was not only considered heretics by the Sunnite Islamic world; but also its expansion was contained by the Ottomans in 1514. The Muslims of India was fragmented and struggling to challenge the Portuguese expansion in the region. Even

¹⁸ Halil İnalcık, “State, Sovereignty and Law during the reign of Süleyman” in *Süleyman the Second and His Time*, eds. Halil İnalcık and Cemal Kafadar (İstanbul, 1993), p. 68.

¹⁹ İnalcık, “State, Sovereignty and Law”, p. 67.

²⁰ İnalcık, “State, Sovereignty and Law”, pp. 67-8.

though lesser in number, Portugal was able to control the regional trade of the whole area by a similar system to the Spaniards' *presidio* system. The descendants of Cenghiz Khan, rulers of the Golden Horde were not in a better situation. The integrity of the Golden Horde had been crumbled after the defeat of 1398 against the armies of Timur. One of its fragments, the Crimean Khanate had already recognized Ottoman suzerainty while the others would later disappear in front of Russian aggression. The Russian conquest of Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan in 1556 would appear as the natural consequences of the deterioration of their situation. Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, thanks to its military technology was the only Muslim state to challenge Christian world. There were calls for Ottoman intervention by those Muslim rulers who felt pressured by the expansion of Christianity.²¹ Even though they have failed to respond to all of these calls efficiently, Ottomans pursued "a worldwide active policy of supporting Muslim countries which were overrun or threatened by the European expansion in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, Indonesia, Africa and the Eurasian steppes."²²

Hence, Süleyman's pretensions for a universal monarchy were also palpable. He would play an active role in the Western Mediterranean, following Bayezid II's policies²³, organize an expedition to Gujerat in 1538, promise technical aid to the sultan

²¹ For an interesting example of the correspondence of the Muslim rulers in the Indian Ocean with Constantinople, see Razaulhak Şah, "Açı Padişahı Sultan Alâeddin'in Kanunî Sultan Süleyman'a Mektubu", *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 8-9 (1967), pp. 373-410. Also for the Ottoman policy in the Indian Ocean, see Halil İnalcık (ed.) with Donald Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: 1300-1600* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 319-40; Svat Soucek, "Ottoman Naval Policy in the Indian Ocean", in *X. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara, 22-26 Eylül 1986, Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler*, IV (Ankara, 1993), pp. 1443-6; Salih Özbaran, "Expansion in the Southern Seas" in *Süleymân the Second and His Time*, eds. Halil İnalcık and Cemal Kafadar (İstanbul, 1993), pp. 211-8; Salih Özbaran, "The Ottomans in Confrontation with the Portuguese in the Red Sea after the Conquest of Egypt", in *Studies on Turkish Arab Relations*, I, (İstanbul, 1986), pp. 207-214.

²² İnalcık, "State, Sovereignty and Law", p. 69.

²³ For more details on the active policy of Bayezid II in the Western Mediterranean, see H. J. Kissling, "II. Bayezid'in Deniz Politikası Üzerine Düşünceler: (1481-1512)", in *Türk Denizcilik Tarihi*, ed. Bülent Arı (Ankara, 2002), pp. 109-116.

of Sumatra and plan an unrealised campaign for the relief of cities of Kazan and Astrakhan.²⁴ However, Ottoman sphere of influence was not limited to the Muslim world. Ottomans had claims to the heritage of the Roman Empire and this was not limited to the eastern part of it. Since 1453, the conquest of Rome appeared in the imaginations of the Ottoman decision-makers. İnalçık considers the Ottoman support to France and the Protestants as a tool for the long-term policy of conquering Rome and uniting the Roman world. These separatist movements against the Holy Roman Emperor and Pope prevented the unification of Christian Europe against the Ottomans.²⁵

The idea of the universal monarchy was based on the Roman concept of the eternal empire and thus the existence of two empires was not acceptable for the Ottomans. Hence, Charles was not an emperor to the Ottomans but the king of Spain. İbrahim Paşa would address him as the “roy d’Hispaïnes et des terres dépendantes audict Hispaïnes”.²⁶ In another document dated 28 June 1533, preserved in Bibliothèque-National, a similar title was referred to: “Siz ki vilâyet-i İspanye ve ana tâ’bi olan yerlerin kralı Karlo”.²⁷ This is in accordance with the Ottoman claim that there should exist one emperor as there exists one God.²⁸

On the other hand, apart from the Ottoman expedition of 1532, Charles and Süleyman did not confront each other directly. In this rivalry, Europe was divided in two

²⁴ İnalçık, “State, Sovereignty and Law”, p. 69.

²⁵ İnalçık, “State, Sovereignty and Law”, p. 69. Also, see Fatma Müge Göçek, “The Social Construction of an Empire: Ottoman State under Süleyman the Magnificent”, in *Süleyman the Second and His Time*, eds. Halil İnalçık and Cemal Kafadar (İstanbul, 1993), pp. 97-8.

²⁶ Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, “Autour d’une Correspondence entre Charles Quint et İbrahim Paşa”, *Turcica*, XV (1983), p. 234.

²⁷ La Bibliothèque National. *Supplément Turc*, No: 816, cited by M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler Koleksiyonu ve Bizimle İlgili Diğer Belgeler”, *Belgeler: Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, V-VIII (1968-1971), p. 115.

²⁸ Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*, V, trans. Mümin Çevik and Erol Kılıç (İstanbul, 1990), p. 93.

camps and the struggle was mostly conducted by proxy forces.²⁹ Belenguer notes that the Ferdinand – Zapolyai and Doria – Khayr al-Din rivalry was the actual fields for this confrontation.³⁰ İnalçık also considers Mediterranean as one of the two fields in this struggle.³¹ Both emperors avoided direct confrontation, according to Veinstein.³² In this period of the struggle, hence corsairs appear as important elements in a war conducted by the proxy elements.

The rivalry between these two dynasties accompanied by a system of alliances in the 16th century Europe cannot be limited for the time period covered in this thesis. It is obvious that the Ottoman Empire would confront the Habsburgs also after 1535. An alliance between the king of France and Constantinople would even result in joint military operations in 1543. Ottoman Empire would constantly negotiate with the centrifugal elements of the Empire and the anti-Habsburg rulers in Europe. That is why Montes named his book as “French, Protestants and Turks”, three impediments against Charles’ ambitions.

This study, therefore will try to place the effect of one of these proxy forces on the general rivalry: that of corsairs. The nature of this struggle paved the way for the elevation of a corsair to a high ranked state official; yet the reasons for this rise in eminence went unnoticed. And in the international balance of power of the 16th century Europe, the peculiarities of this corsair would appear interesting.

²⁹ For a fine political evaluation of this rivalry in this context, see Özlem Kumrular, *Las Relaciones entre el Imperio Otomano y la Monarquía Católica entre los Años 1520-1535 y el Papel de los Estado Satélites* (Estambul, 2003).

³⁰ Belenguer, *El Imperio de Carlos V*, pp. 325-6.

³¹ İnalçık, “Avrupa Devletler Sistemi”, p. 129.

³² Gilles Veinstein, “Charles Quint et Soliman le Magnifique: le grand défi”, in *Carlos V. Europeísmo y Universalidad. Actas del Congreso Internacional celebrado en Granada. Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V* (S.E.C.C.F.II y C.V), III (Madrid, 2001), pp. 519-29.

In the first chapter, the period between the commencement of Spanish operations in North Africa and the establishment of an independent corsair state in Algeria will be analysed. The main characteristics of the geographical area, political map of North Africa with the nature and the roots of the conflict will be discussed in this introductory chapter. Moreover, this chapter covers a period before the Ottoman Habsburg rivalry. Yet, the history of the Spanish kingdoms after the *Reconquista* constitutes important aspects on the subject, since the roots of the conflict could be found before the commencement of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry. Fernando of Aragon's political agenda is not irrelevant to our topic. Furthermore, reasons behind the lack of an adequate response to the Spanish aggression on behalf of the local powers as well as behind the inability of Spaniards to follow their victories are important enough to be included in this thesis. This chapter also describes the first years of Barbarossa's activity in the region; that is to say their activities under the aegis of the ruler of Tunis.

In the second chapter, corsairs' bid for Algiers will be discussed. Barbarossas would gain the control of Algiers in 1516. Yet, they could not consolidate their power in the city until the conquest of the Spanish *presidio*, Peñon of Algiers. Corsairs struggled after this quick acquisition of the city. Spanish expeditions in 1516 and 1519, Oruç Re'îs' death (1518), Khayr al-Din's second conquest of Algiers (1525) from which he previously retreated (1520) and finally the conquest of Peñon (1529) will be diligently described. In the meantime, both the Habsburg-Valois and the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry would be outlined in order to put the North African politics in a general framework of a broader struggle in Europe. The incessant Italian Wars that had commenced in 1494 and disputed territory of Burgundy would then result in a conflict

between the two most powerful Catholic dynasties of the time. Likewise, the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry would start in the same period due to Hungarian defeat of 1526. While, Khayr al-Din was busy with consolidating his power in the detriment of local forces, his fate was more dependent on European politics than on that of North African.

In the last Chapter, we will witness Khayr al-Din's elevation to an eminence of an international actor. He did not only consolidate his rule in the region; but also was elevated to a high rank in the Ottoman military hierarchy. The reasons behind his appointment in such a task and the effect of the changing priorities of Ottoman foreign policy on such a decision would be discussed in this chapter. Furthermore, based on Ottoman sources and foreign correspondence, it will be tried to measure the extent of the growing importance of Khayr al-Din in international politics as well as to illustrate how he was perceived by the Ottoman decision-makers. Furthermore, details about the promotion of Khayr al-Din will be analysed. What is more important is the fact that, a long and detailed discussion on the Tunis campaigns of 1534 and 1535 will be done in this chapter. Based on the narrations of Sandoval and Illescas and the letters of Charles V to Spain, important details can be outlined concerning military as well as political history.

Finally, in the Conclusion, the place of Corsairs in the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry will be discussed. This leads us the researcher to the inevitable question of whether the emperor had relegated Mediterranean to a secondary importance or not.

“Non possono i fulmini, la rabbia de’ venti
La morte l’amor, sviarmi dal mar”
Un Ballo in Maschera
Giuseppe Verdi (1803-1911)

CHAPTER 1 (1505-1516):

THE WAR COMMENCES

1.1. Introduction

The war against Islam had not crossed the strait of Gibraltar in the 16th century. Portuguese had already begun to capture enclaves in the North African coasts in accordance with the needs that their desire for geographical exploration set forth. Furthermore, at the end of the century, *Reconquista* would be concluded in the Iberian Peninsula. This paved the way for two basic developments. First of all, there was an opportunity to export this holy war to another continent. There were vehement supporters of the continuation of the expeditions. As a result of *Reconquista*, the idea of a crusade was already deeply rooted in Castile; it was a matter of economics rather of devotion. The aristocrats considered the war as a means to enrich themselves through the booty of war. In addition, the Church saw it as an opportunity to compensate the Ottoman menace which was felt everyday more and more especially after 1453. The same feelings were shared by the Castilians. Fuller records: “the expansion of the Ottoman Empire had awakened distant memories of 711 and the many invasions

since”.³³ That was the reason why as soon as Isabella ascended the throne, a holy war was proclaimed against the Muslims in the peninsula. True it was that in 1492, the conquest of the whole peninsula was finalised; yet would that suffice? Whether to continue *Reconquista* would always be a matter of discussion among the decision-makers of Spain. Did the strait of Gibraltar constitute a physical boundary that could not be overcome, or could the expansion go on as Andrew Hess claims?³⁴ Secondly, on the other hand, Muslims of North Africa reorganised themselves in order to resist the Christian expansion. With the help of the exiled Muslims of the Peninsula, the corsary would target Iberian Coasts. Abdeljelil Temimi also accentuates their importance.³⁵ He records “the perfect *connaissance* of the enemy land, of which they speak the language”.³⁶ As would later be called, this “exile’s vengeance”³⁷, created concerns for the policy makers of the continent and decided their course of action.

In this chapter, the *ouverture* of the game will be presented. The main goal was to concentrate on the Ottoman corsairs and their place within the framework of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry. Thus it would have been natural to date as previous as 1516, if not the 1520s, instead of 1505 when the Habsburgs power axis was in no way confronting the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, even though in such an early date there was not such a rivalry, for the continuity of the subject, this period should also be covered. After all, the Spanish existence in North Africa was shaped in these years.

³³ J.F.C. Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World Volume I: From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Lepanto* (New York, 1987), pp. 531-2.

³⁴ Andrew C. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth Century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago, 1978), p. 4.

³⁵ According to Temimi, number of the Moriscos fighting against the Spaniards in 1516 with Oruç was 500. This number would increase under the administration of Khayr al-Din. See Abdeljelil Temimi, “Le Gouvernement Ottoman face au Problème Morisque”, *Revue d'Histoire Maghrébine*, 23-24 (November 1981), p. 256.

³⁶ Temimi, “Le Gouvernement Ottoman”, p. 256.

³⁷ Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Barbary Corsairs* (London, 1890), p. 8.

More surprisingly, an incessant series of expedition between 1507 and 1511 was realised; the only time when the Spanish ambitions were pursued in the region so consistently. In addition, the characteristics of the Muslim response were shaped in the same period. Finally, the establishment of the Ottoman corsairs as an efficient and independent political entity which was realised in 1516 marked the end of the chapter.

Two points are worth mentioning when speculating on the preferences of Spain. First of all, a united programme for both of the kingdoms cannot be pronounced. It should clearly be indicated that the union between the crowns of *Castilla y Leon* and that of *Aragon* was based on a marriage agreement rather than institutional bodies. Spain was consisted in two separate kingdoms with two separate rulers, customs and set of preferences. Castile was governed by a more authoritarian rule with a relatively suppressed aristocracy while in Aragon the effect of the *Cortes* and *fueros* were significant. Aragon was a Mediterranean state whose policy had always focused on Italy, while Castile had not only conquered Granada (and later Navarre in 1512); but also monopolised the trade with the New World. The aristocracy of Castile was a military one, a social class eager to prompt incessant expansion. On the other hand since the 13th century, Aragon had enriched a merchant class thanks to the naval trade and the wealthy urban class' priority was the continuation of a naval trade, contrary to wage war against North Africa. Their concern for the North African corsairs had a defensive character. The fallibility of the political unity appeared palpable following the death of Isabella when Philip of Habsburg and Fernando of Aragon challenged each other for the regency of Castile. Having always disliked the Habsburgs, Fernando of Aragon concluded a marriage with Germaine de Foix in order to assure the separation of two

crowns; a goal which could not be realized due to a dead-born heir.³⁸ Thus, while explaining the decision-making process, Spain cannot be considered a single unit; our model will be a dual one, at least in this period and while explaining the decision-making process and the set of preferences behind it.

Isabella as was explicit in her testament had always been favourable to the idea of a crusade.³⁹ It was not surprising that the later champion of the North African expeditions, Cardinal Jiménez was her confessor. On the other hand, Fernando rejected the idea of a further *Reconquista* since this would not suit his policy. He was not so much eager to jeopardize the maritime trade on which the richness of Aragon traders was built. He had several times tried to restrict the Aragonese piracy in the Western Mediterranean; a fact that shows his attention for a peaceful trade.⁴⁰ Furthermore, even had they wanted so, he would not have been able to do so with popular support and thus parliamentary-approved funding. Moreover, the realization of such a project would be harder a few years later when the Italian wars had recommenced.

Secondly, the decision-making process in this period cannot be depicted as consistent. The resources of a state in the 16th century could hardly meet the requirements set forth by the international politics. Thus, a choice had to be made between different war fronts. At the dawn of the geographical explorations and in the middle of complex balance of power politics whose theatre was the disunited Italy, both kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula had to reshape their preferences frequently. Hence, international balance of power should also be taken into account. Three years after 1492,

³⁸ Brandi, pp. 59-60.

³⁹ Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, p. 35.

⁴⁰ Godfrey Fisher, *Barbary Legend: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa, 1415-1830* (Westport, 1957), p. 30.

Fernando was dragged into European politics; the invasions of Italy by French kings Charles VIII and Louis XII had triggered an international war whose actors were Aragon, Papal States, France, Naples, Holy Roman Empire, Venice, Milan, Florence and other small duchies and city states of Italy. Meanwhile, Castile was busy with the re-organization of its kingdom. The end of the Muslim rule and the discovery of the new world coincided in the same year and both required attention. Furthermore, Isabella died in 1504, leaving her kingdom in disarray as a result of the struggle for power between Philip of Habsburg and Fernando. With the death of the former, Fernando gained the upper hand in the administration of the kingdom; however, still the existence of the aristocrats should not be discarded.

As for the Ottoman Empire, during this period, it was not an actor in this struggle. Bayezid II had always been a pacifist ruler when compared with his predecessor Mehmet II and successors Selim the Grim and Süleyman the Magnificent. At the first one and a half decade of Bayezid II's rule his European policy was shadowed by the fact that his brother and the contender for the Ottoman throne, *Djem Sultan* (d. 1495) was a prisoner in Europe.⁴¹ His existence has always been leverage in the negotiations between the European powers.⁴² Since there is no law other than the "God's will" regulating the dynastic inheritance in the Ottoman Empire, his pretensions for the crown were as legal as those of his rival.⁴³ Fortunately for the Ottomans at a time

⁴¹ For a monograph on the issue, see Nicolas Vatin, *Sultan Djem: un prince Ottoman dans l'Europe du xv. siècle d'après deux sources contemporaines: Vâkı'ât-ı Sultân Cem, Oeuvres de Guillaume Caoursin* (Ankara, 1997).

⁴² See Halil İnalcık, "A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy: The Agreement Between Innocente VIII and Bayezid II on Djem Sultan", *Journal of Turkish Studies*, 3 (1979-80), pp. 209-230; Halil İnalcık, "Djem", *EF*².

⁴³ In the Turkish tradition, there was not a law regulating the matter of inheritance. According to this, when a ruler was deceased, each of his descendants have the right to claim for the throne since the crown would be granted by the God. Thus, the civil war was justifiable and the outcome of the war was accepted

when Charles VIII was planning a crusade with his presence, Djem Sultan died. However, this did not change the fact that the Ottoman Empire did not pursue an active policy of Western Mediterranean. Halil İnalcık accentuated Kemâl Re'îs' activities in the Western Mediterranean.⁴⁴ Still, the Ottoman Empire, in that period, could not efficiently extend its influence to the Western Mediterranean. It had other concerns. It had fought against Venetians for the maritime domination in Levant in 1499-1503. Furthermore, with the appearance of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea, another problem arose for the Ottoman Empire. Finally in 1511, a civil war broke out which was finalised in 1513 when Selim the Grim had secured the throne after he had eliminated his brothers and possibly his father which he might have poisoned. His immediate action would be to prepare an expedition against the Safavid leader *Shah İsmail* (r. 1501-1524) whose policies disturbed the balance of power in the East. Luckily for the North African Muslims, Selim succeeded in his bid for the Middle Eastern hegemony in 1517, and thus expanding his sphere of influence up to the Western Mediterranean. This issue will be dealt later.

since it was considered the will of God. For further information on the issue, see Halil İnalcık, "Osmanlılar'da Saltanat Veraseti Usulü ve Türk Hakimiyet Telakkisiyle İlgisi", *Siyasi Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, XIV (1959), pp. 69-94.

⁴⁴ Halil İnalcık, "Osmanlı Deniz Egemenliği", in *Türk Denizcilik Tarihi*, ed. Bülent Arı (Ankara, 2002), p. 55.

1.2. *Reconquista* and its aftermath

In January 1492, the last Muslim state in the Iberian Peninsula vanished as a result of a treaty of surrender between the last Muslim ruler of Granada *Abu Abdullah* (r. 1482-1492)⁴⁵ and the Catholic kings, Isabella and Fernando. The remnants of the once powerful Muslim State in the region had already been weakened by the internal strives which the cunning Fernando did not hesitate to take advantage of. One of the contenders, Abu Abdullah appeared as the agent of Spain in the dynastic struggle. In 1487 Malaga was captured by the Spaniards, only to be followed by the total submission of Abu Abdullah in 1489. Nevertheless, due to the unrest among the population, he reversed his policy whose repercussions sealed the fate of the last Muslim kingdom in Iberian Peninsula. Fortunately for Muslims, the treaty between the people of Granada and the Catholic Kings allowed a certain level of tolerance (the right to retain property, free practice of religion, the acceptance of Islamic jurisdiction, etc.). The same year, it would be decided to expel the Jews from the peninsula if they choose to reject conversion. Nonetheless, Muslims did not suffer the same fate at first since they were granted religious freedom. Unlike Jews, the Muslim community in the Peninsula made up a large community whose economic importance was blatant. Furthermore, they were spread throughout both kingdoms. Thus, instead of expulsion, a policy of conversion would be followed.⁴⁶ Conversion was a goal of the Church; thus a campaign for the conversion was launched as a natural consequence. However, at the beginning, this was done with educational and evangelistic means. Faced by a severe resistance by the local

⁴⁵ Boabdil in Spanish sources.

⁴⁶ Andrew Hess, "The Moriscos: An Ottoman Fifth Column in the Sixteenth-Century Spain", *American Historical Review*, LXXIV (October 1968), pp. 3-4.

Muslim population, these efforts would be proven useless. When in Castile, Archbishop of Toledo, future Cardinal and Grand Inquisitor, Jiménez de Cisneros decided to accelerate the conversion process, his acts contrary to the treaty in effect created problems. Against the advice of Hernando de Talavera, archbishop of Granada who wanted to convert the Moriscos of Granada slowly by education, Jiménez introduced forced mass conversions. The Moriscos, although now nominally Christians, were neither willing to be assimilated by the Christian Spaniards nor were they accepted as equals by the latter. Jiménez' intervention was the direct cause of a Morisco revolt in 1499–1500, and he was largely responsible for making the Morisco problem insoluble. The punishment of the insurgence was the annulment of the 1492 treaty in 1501, thanks to the efforts of Jiménez. It was now obligatory for all Muslims to convert to Christianity and leave their customs and traditions. The edict that was originally promulgated by the Kingdom of Granada was introduced in the Kingdom of Castile a year later. Muslims of Aragon would face the same fate; yet a little later. The diverse nature of the population in this kingdom facilitated a co-existence of these two religions and thus such an experience was not as new as it was in Castile. Yet, in the revolt of Valencian Hermandad in 1520, rebels enforced the forced conversion of Muslims. In 1525, Moriscos of Valencia had also rebelled. Following their suppression, an edict extending the forced conversion to the kingdom of Aragon was also promulgated in 1526. The overt Muslim existence in the Peninsula was over, even though it would exist covertly until the seventeenth century, when Moriscos were finally exiled in 1609.

However, Muslims had already started to migrate to the North Africa as early as 1493. Nevertheless, a natural consequence of the annulment of the policy of tolerance

was the acceleration of this migration. Even though the number of these immigrants has always been speculated, Fisher indicates that in no document a number has been spelled.⁴⁷ These immigrants constituted the major part of what later would become a serious trouble for the Iberian coasts basically for two reasons. First of all, they were forced to leave their homeland and the result of migration was not necessarily satisfactory. Naturally, their co-religionists welcomed them; nonetheless they could not offer sufficient economic means for the well-being of the newcomers since a mass migration in the 16th century would result in severe socio-economic problems. Secondly, they were suitable to operate in a corsair ship because of their knowledge of the coasts and the area. They were also skilled in naval construction to the extent that Pfeffermann notes that after their departure, this industry in Cataluña totally collapsed.⁴⁸ At this point, Lane Poole adds a possible third cause, the “exile’s vengeance”.⁴⁹

The indigenous Muslim population that still resided in Spain also supported the Muslim corsairs and was later considered a “fifth column”,⁵⁰ for the Ottoman Empire. Naturally as a result of the intolerant policies of Jiménez, the remaining Muslim dwellers constituted a dissident social group. The edicts for the forced conversion could never fully be enforced; Moriscos always remained what they were. Their nominal Christendom was nothing but a chimera; they retained their culture, tradition and religion.⁵¹ However, this *de facto* situation had always been considered temporal for the Spanish bureaucracy, who found itself in the middle of the pressure of the Church and

⁴⁷ Fisher, p. 34.

⁴⁸ Pfeffermann, *Rönesans Papalarının Türklerle İşbirliği*, trans. Kemal Beydilli (İstanbul, 2003), p. 119.

⁴⁹ Lane-Poole, p.8.

⁵⁰ Hess, “The Moriscos”, pp. 5-6.

⁵¹ For the level of their acculturation see J. Maiso and R. Mario Blasco, “Aproximación al grado de aculturación de algunas comunidades moriscas en la fecha de la expulsión” in *Religion, Identité et Sources Documentaires sur les Morisques Andalous*, II, ed. Abdeljelil Temimi (Tunis, 1984), pp. 71-90.

that of the landlords who were defending mild policies since their lands were mostly cultivated by Moriscos. Moreover, Spanish bureaucracy had always feared a possible cooperation between the Muslims and Moriscos and such fear was by no means unrealistic.⁵² From the beginning of the Muslim invasion in the seventh century, there had always been close connections between Al-Andalus and Maghrib; and Muslims, being aware of the problems of the vigilance of coastal line, did not hesitate to cooperate with their co-religionist. The fall of Granada did not rule out the possibility of another Muslim invasion of the Peninsula since North African support proved effective twice in the past.⁵³

This inflow of Moriscos, eager and suitable for recruitment, changed the face of the struggle in the Western Mediterranean. It had always been difficult to differentiate war, trade and piracy in the region.⁵⁴ Yet, in the previous centuries, a certain level of co-existence and mildness could be observed. After all, Spain and the rest of Barbary could be considered a single unit for practical purposes of sea traffic.⁵⁵ Braudel indicates the noteworthy presence of Christian merchants in important trade centres of North Africa.⁵⁶ It is true that piracy existed, yet they were not state-sponsored. Hence they were pirates instead of corsairs⁵⁷ whose effect also cannot be matched with that of the latter.⁵⁸ In Western Mediterranean, cooperation was vital for economic purposes. European

⁵² For details see Francisco Marquez Villanueva, "El Mito de la Gran Conspiración Morisca" in *Religion, Identité et Sources Documentaires ser les Morisques Andalous*, II, ed. Abdeljelil Temimi (Tunis, 1984), pp. 267-84.

⁵³ Hess, "The Moriscos", pp. 1-2.

⁵⁴ Fisher, p. 24.

⁵⁵ Fisher, p. 25.

⁵⁶ Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II* (Paris, 1966), I, p. 425.

⁵⁷ Braudel differentiates these two notions. Braudel, II, p. 191.

⁵⁸ Lane-Poole, p.25 indicates that acts of Christian piracy which was more effective until the fifteenth century had always been repudiated by the Italian governments to the extent that they executed their own citizens.

industries were in constant need of furs and raw materials while on the other hand North Africans were eager to have the products of these industries. This ongoing economic cooperation resulted in several treaties and the “fairness, moderation and probity of African princes”. In Tunis and Ceuta, Italian city-states had already established their consulates in the 13th century, and furthermore, the existence of a private church for the Christians in Tunis as late as 1530 provides the air of tolerance in the region.⁵⁹

Nevertheless, with the approach of the sixteenth century, a polarization had commenced. According to Fisher, while in 1485 peace prevails in the Western Mediterranean and the merchant ships were the major power, a drastic change occurred as early as 1487: The conquest and the consequent exile of the people of Malaga and the establishment of the Inquisition in the region. “The civilised practices of war and the laws of humanity were severely shaken.”⁶⁰ The clouds of intolerance were darkened day-by-day especially after 1492 with the migration of the Moriscos, the primary victims of intolerance.

The policy of tolerance was revoked with the annulment of the 1492 treaty; however this was not the only consequence. Realizing the danger, Fernando started to pay attention to the issue. In Castile, the situation was always favourable. Not only the aristocracy, but also Isabella herself was willing the extirpation of Islam in North Africa as was explicit in her political will.⁶¹ Furthermore, the revolt of the Moriscos has been considered an alarming situation in Valencia and Andalusia where their number was considerable.⁶² It was a result of the efforts of conversion. Church was trying to convert

⁵⁹ Lane-Poole, pp. 22-23.

⁶⁰ Fisher, pp. 28-29.

⁶¹ Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, p. 35.

⁶² Fisher, p. 33.

people and the extreme deeds had provoked the populace. However, it also manifested the menace which an insurgent society might generate this time for both of the kingdoms. In addition, there were evidences of increasing aid from Maghrib to these areas.⁶³ Hence, with the explicit and valuable support of the Catholic Church which had always paid special attention to the issue, a more aggressive policy in the area could be introduced.

As for the situation in North Africa, internal warfare that had commenced in the middle of the 15th century had weakened the political coherence in the region. Tribal affiliations replaced the loyalty to the state in the rural areas while semi-autonomous cities had the opportunity to consolidate their *de facto* independence. The royal dynasties lost control over not only the agricultural lands, but also cities itself. The Hafsid Dynasty was no longer omnipotent in the region. Already during the reign of *Muhammed bin al-Hasan* (r. 1494-1526); the southern part of his state was defying the central authority while a member of the same dynasty had the control over Constantine and Bona.⁶⁴ The interior plains were ruled by Arabs while the mountains were under the control of the Berber sheikhs. The other important dynasty of the region, Zayanids of Tlemsen could neither resist the challenge. They would accept the Spanish vassalage. In Algiers, an independent city state was established under the governance of Sâlim al-Tûmî. The only part Hafsids could control was the northern part of Tunis with certain debility as the fact that Spanish protection was sought proves.

In addition to these internal weaknesses, it has to be pointed out that for economic reasons North Africa was not apt to resist a possible pressure that a further

⁶³ Fisher, p. 33.

⁶⁴ Ismaël Hamet, *Histoire du Maghreb* (Paris, 1923), p. 259.

Reconquista would inflict upon them. At this point, the importance of the military revolution should not be underestimated. Spanish army had already adopted itself to the needs of a modern warfare since they experienced the use of firearms. At the last years of *Reconquista* at a time when the Spanish armies had to face the tough geography of Granada, they reformed their army and detached it from the border system to a centralized army.⁶⁵ “*Reconquista*... implied new styles in the armed fight, this scenario being a real laboratory of experiences for the Christian troops to apply later.”⁶⁶ The introduction of gunpowder and cannon and most importantly improvements in their utilizations changed the warfare strategies. The cannon technology was gradually adopted in the fourteenth century; yet it took at least another century to develop it. From 1430 onwards, they were used in the sieges in order to crumble the defences. The improvements in its design and range made commanders of Europe resort to cannons more frequently in the sixteenth century. In order to provide an efficient defence against the destructive effect of the gunpowder, bastion system was introduced in Italy in which fortifications were not only equipped with its own artillery, but also redesigned. The depth of the walls was increased while its height decreased and the towers and gateways were reshaped into bastions.⁶⁷ In addition to the changing formations and bastion-based fortifications, the composition of the armies also changed when infantry replaced cavalry.

However, new technology created its own problems. Simply, it was too expensive. It increased the longevity of skirmishes and the number of troops deployed

⁶⁵ Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, pp. 19-20.

⁶⁶ Belenguer, *El Imperio de Carlos V*, p. 137.

⁶⁷ Geoffrey Parker, “The Gunpowder Revolution: 1300 – 1500”, in *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West*, ed. Geoffrey Parker (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 106-117.

on the battlefield. Moreover, the expenditure for the war equipment can also be considered a heavy burden.⁶⁸ It was what lacked the North African states more than the access to the new technology. Their economic power was curtailed by their lack of unity in a political environment of incessant internal struggle. This lack of unity had its effects on not only political, but also economical basis. Due to cohesive kin groups with no political centre, this structure hindered the central government to impose its bureaucracy and to create an efficient taxation system over the taxable area. Decrease in the revenues made the military reform impossible. Neither the tribes themselves could realize such a reform. Even though tribesmen enjoyed great prosperity, their economy was also fragile against the possibility of a bad weather or contagious animal diseases. In addition, they could not unite themselves such that a sufficient sum can be collected.⁶⁹ It should be remembered that Braudel considers the emerging of the larger states in the 15th century as a product of the need for more efficient financial system since a single city state could not afford the basic financial requirements of its time. “The rival of the city state, the territorial state, rich of space and people, proved itself the only capable who can satisfy the enormous costs of the modern warfare; it maintained the mercenary armies, supplied costly artillery materials and would soon enjoy the luxury of great naval wars”⁷⁰ It was still valid in the sixteenth century at a time when Europe was the theatre of conflicts between these large states.

When the modernized Spanish troops arrived, traditional armies generally consisting of tribal soldiers were the response of North Africans, or as Temimi would

⁶⁸ Parker, “The Gunpowder Revolution: 1300 – 1500”, p. 116.

⁶⁹ Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, p. 21.

⁷⁰ Braudel, II, p. 8.

prefer: “their own means of defence, practically nothing”.⁷¹ In addition to the technological inferiority, there was another difference between two powers. Spanish troops were strictly disciplined and had the ability to operate under a military hierarchy. On the other hand, loyalty of the tribesmen was precarious; addressed to their tribes rather than the army itself or the state. In addition, such an army inevitably would suffer from the supply problems since they could only fight in particular seasons, basically spring and summer. Afterwards, they were leaving the army to return to their homeland, not necessarily with permission from the central authority. Last but not the least, the lack of an institutionalized military hierarchy curtailed the efficiency and coherence on the battlefield. An army deprived of proper discipline, and of the ability of complicated manoeuvring could not compete with the regular and disciplined European armies.⁷²

On the other hand, the real response would be given by the corsair attacks. Muslim sailors now with the expertise of the Moriscos on the Iberian coasts benefited from the opportunity. North Africa had always been suitable for corsary. There existed natural harbours and lagoons which the latter helped the corsair ships to more easily flee from enemy ships. In addition, there was no deep port through the North African littoral. Hence, big ships could not approach to the shore easily, an advantageous situation for the small corsair ships.⁷³ The land production sufficed to feed the population, and thus the Muslim cities were self sufficient unlike the Spanish *presidios* that had to depend on imports from Spain. Even though there was no navigable river, the shortness of the watershed counterbalanced that disadvantage since it precluded the possibility of great

⁷¹ Abdeljelil Temimi, “Lettre de la Population Algéroise au Sultan Selim I^{er} en 1519”, *Revue d'Histoire Maghrébine*, V (January, 1976), p. 95.

⁷² Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, pp. 22-23.

⁷³ Lane-Poole, p. 16.

streams. Finally mountains rise steeply behind the shore. So, they were high enough such that Corsairs could detect the approaching ships from a long distance.⁷⁴

1.3. Spanish attacks to North Africa: 1505-1511

Fernando had finally given in the warfare lobby and consented for a series of expeditions on North Africa. In 1505, he was triumphant after years of warfare in Italy, having not only recovered the kingdom of Naples from French but also added it to his dominions after 9 years of warfare.

Younger branch of his family was ruling the kingdom of Naples since 1458 when his grandfather Alfonso of Aragon decided to leave it to his illegitimate child Ferrante, uncle of Fernando. However, the crown was not uncontested. The young and reckless French king, Charles VIII had decided to push for Angevin claims for the crown following the pretensions of the House of Anjou over the heritage of Queen Jane of Naples. He was waiting for a suitable opportunity to intervene. In the meantime, the Duchy of Milan was contested by two contenders; *Ludovico Sforza* (r. 1494-1500) and *Gian Galeazzo Sforza* (r. 1476-1494). The latter was married to the daughter of the King of Naples, and thus ensured his support. Ludovico was already a usurper and given the balance of power, he had no option but to call for French intervention. Charles VIII had already succeeded to buy the neutrality of Emperor-Elect Maximilian, English king *Henry VII* (r. 1485-1509) and Fernando thanks to a series of treaties throughout 1493. Thus he could respond to the call. French army crossed the Alps in the summer of 1494

⁷⁴ Lane-Poole, p. 20.

without even a serious resistance. He conquered the whole peninsula easily. Yet, such a quick victory had upset the balance of power in the region. In April 1495, a new anti-French league was established due to the “the duplicity of Ludovico the Moor, the complicity of Alexander VI, the encouragements of Fernando of Aragon and of Maximilian”⁷⁵. Even though the French king succeeded to cross the Alps with his army intact, the French presence in the Italian Peninsula was concluded by the end of 1496. *Status quo-ante* was established.

Yet, a second round was soon to follow. Charles VIII died in 1498, leaving the crown to Louis XII of Orleans whose claims to the duchy of Milan were far stronger than those of Charles VIII on Naples. He was the grandson of *Valentina Visconti* (d. 1408) and thus had the right to retain the Duchy from the usurper Sforzas. Taking advantage of anti-Milanese feelings of Venice he assured their support. Later, he bought the Pope by offering to his son *Cesare Borgia* (d.1507) the hand of Charlotte d’Albret and the Duchy of Valentinois. In August 1499, Italian peninsula once again was hosting French troops. Milan was conquered twice while Ludovico was taken prisoner and sent to the castle of Loches where he will spend the remaining eight years of his life. Up to this point, the war was trivial for both branches of the House of Aragon. Yet, the conquest was easy enough to inspire Louis for desiring more. In 1501, he attacked Naples; Fernando had to intervene in 1502 even though he formerly consented to Louis XII. The situation was worse when the pro-French pope, the famous Roderic Borja⁷⁶, *Alexander VI* (r. 1492-1503) died suddenly in 1503. Louis XII, by 1504, had to accept that Naples was lost for good. The kingdom would be the part of Aragon.

⁷⁵ *Histoire de France Vol.I : Des Origines à 1715*, ed. Marcel Reinard (Paris, 1954), p. 332.

⁷⁶ Often referred as Rodrigo Borgia.

In North Africa, Spanish operations started in 1505. Regiments that were set loose from the Italian wars were prepared and the Spanish navy anchored in front of Mars al-Kabir, the port of Oran. Corsairs that were situated there had been attacking the Iberian coasts. They had attacked Valencia, Elche and Alicante and even penetrated through the port of Malaga and burned the merchant ships in the port.⁷⁷ Fernando decided to send 10.000 troops to the region under the command of Diego Hernández de Córdoba. 7 galleys with 140 small ships would be at his service.⁷⁸ When the Spanish contingents arrived, the garrison commander in Mars al-Kebir realized that there will be no relief forces from Tlemsen and there was nothing to do but surrender the city. The ruler of Tlemsen would arrive when it was too late.⁷⁹ However, this expedition was proven fruitless. Like the conquest of Melilla in 1497, its success were not tried to be furthered. The supply problems also aggravated the situation of the ill-prepared Spanish expedition. On the other hand, back in Spain, the fate of the crusade against Africa was a matter of tricky intrigues. Isabella had died a year ago, leaving a political will whose primary advice was the continuation of *Reconquista*. Her death was followed by a power struggle between her husband Fernando and her son-in-law Philip of Habsburg in order to gain the regency which was left vacant due to the mental disorder of Juana, the heiress to the crown of Castile. Thus, this expedition should be considered the deed of the Castilian war party whose priorities have been addressed before. Nevertheless, even under these circumstances, Fernando did not refrain from interfering in this semi-autonomous initiative and forced the appointment of Diego Hernández de Córdoba as

⁷⁷ Aziz Samih İlder, *Şimali Afrika'da Türkler* (İstanbul, 1934), p. 61.

⁷⁸ İlder, p. 61.

⁷⁹ İlder, p. 61.

the general commander of the army. By no means, he wished to allow Cardinal Jiménez to undertake such a project independently.

Apart from the idea of the forced conversion of the Muslim masses in Spain, Jiménez had already been a fervent supporter of the idea of the Crusade. He was the guiding spirit behind the Spanish campaigns in North Africa, which did he not only help finance from his archiepiscopal revenues, but also participated in campaigns personally. Jiménez spent the last years of Isabella's reign mostly at her court as her principal religious and political adviser. It would not be very illogical therefore, to speculate a certain effect of him on her thoughts. However, as will be pointed out, Fernando's *penchant* towards Italian politics hindered the full realization of his projects.

In 1506, Philip of Habsburg died and the new regent of Castile was Fernando thanks to the efforts of Jiménez who stood against an intriguing political group that aimed to hand over the regency to the Emperor-Elect Maximilian, the father of the deceased Philip. Fernando was wise enough to have him on his side, in exchange with a cardinal seat that he would assure in 1507.⁸⁰ Now the situation had been tranquilized, yet the aristocratic war party was still pressuring Fernando whose Italian dominated foreign policy was not useful for Castile. Fernando gave in and authorized a North African expedition under the command of Pedro Navarro.

This Spanish commander had fought in important wars in North Italy, mainly recruited as a mercenary. Furthermore, he was in the army of Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba who successfully campaigned against French troops that invaded Naples. Being probably one of the finest military engineers of his time, his appearance in North Africa would not be for the first time; he also participated as a *condottiere* in the war

⁸⁰ Brandi, p.60.

between the Genoese corsairs and the North African Muslims. Besides, he fought against the Ottoman Empire; he helped the capture of Cephalonia by laying mines to breach the walls.

The first expedition of Navarro was against Peñon de Velez de la Gomera in 1508. This place was a corsair nest, mostly supported by the Moroccan rulers⁸¹. Their target was mostly the Iberian shores, and thus their extirpation from the North African shores was the main objective of the expedition. Navarro not only conquered the area; but also built a *presidio*, a typical Spanish fortress.

Presidios would appear as the common defensive bastions that Spaniards would prefer in North Africa in the future. They would always remain as the proofs of the hesitant Spanish policy concerning North Africa. Spaniards chose to establish these garrison posts and leave the interior lands to the indigenous people.⁸² Primary responsibilities of these bastions were to protect the coastline and commerce through them. They were also expected to intervene in the North African politics playing one tribe against another.⁸³ According to Abun-Nasr, economic goals were also intended from the *presidios*, that is active participation in the Sahara trade.⁸⁴ However, *presidios*, let alone profiting from this trade⁸⁵ and provide its own supplies, proved itself costly and highly dependant on the Iberian Peninsula for supplies and ammunitions. Correspondences between these *presidios* and Cardinal Jimenez depict their problems of

⁸¹ Fray Prudencia de Sandoval, *Historia de la vida y Hechos del Emperador Carlos V*, I, ed. Carlos Seco Serrano (Madrid, 1955), p. 33.

⁸² Jamil Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge, 1987), p.147.

⁸³ Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, p. 42.

⁸⁴ Abun-Nasr, p. 147.

⁸⁵ Braudel, II, pp. 185-6.

supplies. They record the supply of cannons from the *presidio* of Oran,⁸⁶ ammunitions, axe, ladder and bread from Malaga⁸⁷, war equipments like sword, spear, lance and muskets from Valencia⁸⁸ for the ill-fated expedition of Diego de Vera, an ex-lieutenant of Pedro Navarro,⁸⁹ against Algiers in 1516. Moreover, their lack of control over the hinterland made them remain isolated enclaves whose effectiveness was reduced, given the fact that most of the North African shores remained at the hands of Muslims. According to Braudel, it was even hard to find soldiers to send to these *presidios* due to the supply problems. For this reason, soldiers were not informed of their destination before their arrival. These *presidios* were places for exile.⁹⁰

As indicated earlier, these expeditions started at a time when the other powers of the Mediterranean were busy with the possible repercussions of the Portuguese appearance in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. Memluks and the Venetian Republic diverted their attention to finding a solution with the Portuguese domination in the Red Sea, while the Ottomans were also prompting this cooperation. Even though the Ottomans did not discard the situation of the Muslims, their main concern was either the Knights of St. John in Rhodes, or the alarming situation in the eastern frontier.

In 1509, according to Sandoval, Fernando considered personally leading his troops to the North Africa.⁹¹ However, it was impossible due to the war in Italy. Yet, still such rumours would be spread in order to debase the morale of the enemy. However, Jiménez insisted on such an expedition and Fernando had to authorize it.

⁸⁶ Muzaffer Arıkan and Paulino Toledo, *XIV. – XVI. Yüzyıllarda Türk-İspanyol İlişkileri ve Denizcilik Tarihimize İlgili İspanyol Belgeleri: Las Relaciones Turco-Españolas en los siglos XIV y XVI: Documentos Españoles relativos a la historia naval Otomana* (Ankara, 1995), pp. 148-9.

⁸⁷ Arıkan and Toledo, pp. 150-1.

⁸⁸ Arıkan and Toledo, p. 154.

⁸⁹ Salvatore Bono, *I Corsari Barbareschi* (Torino, 1964), p. 17.

⁹⁰ Braudel, II, p. 187.

⁹¹ Sandoval, I, p. 34.

Surprisingly enough, the expedition of this year was financed by Cardinal Jiménez, at the expense of the Church.⁹² On August 20, 1508, Cardinal Jiménez had been appointed “for the service of God and in order to prevent the evil and the damages that the Moriscos beyond was doing everyday in these kingdoms, especially Granada and Andalusia”.⁹³ However, Pedro Navarro was still the commander of the troops. 80 ships and 10 galleys transported 8000 foot soldiers and 3000 cavalry for the conquest of Oran.⁹⁴

The expedition was a total success. “For justifying the war more”⁹⁵, Jiménez offered terms of surrender to the Muslims which dictated that they should convert in return for retaining their liberty. Once rejected, troops under the command of Navarro had conquered Oran on 18 May 1509. The result was 4000 dead and a further 5000 brought to Spain as slaves with the booty totalling half million ducats.⁹⁶ Jiménez made his entrance to Oran and made some regulations which would enlighten the reader for the motives behind the North African expeditions at least at this early stage. He established two churches for the Catholics, two monasteries for missionaries, and appointed an Inquisitor. It was palpable that his former policies would also be implied in the region. Also logical it was, since the basic reason behind the desire of Jiménez for these expeditions was explicitly religious more than political. He financed a private war not in order to glorify the reign of Fernando; but rather to follow the Church’s interest and for that purpose to further *Reconquista* beyond the strait of Gibraltar. The extirpation of Islam from North Africa was the natural goal of such a policy.

⁹² Fisher, p. 34.

⁹³ Sandoval, I, p. 34.

⁹⁴ Fisher, p. 34.

⁹⁵ Sandoval, I, p. 34.

⁹⁶ Fisher, p. 34.

However, Jiménez immediately returned to Spain and left Navarro as the sole commander of the troops. At first glance it might appear that it was due to a struggle between the Church and the State. However, it was due to the conflicting interests of the two kingdoms. Jiménez was representing the interests of the Castilian nobles, while Fernando who was more driven by Aragonese motives did not want to give in to these demands. He might be forced to interfere in North Africa, yet he would do it according to his own agenda.⁹⁷ There had always been a disagreement between Navarro and Jiménez. Actually, Fernando like he did it in 1505, appointed Navarro as his agent in the expedition since he did not want to lose control of the border warfare. When, Pedro Navarro indicated that the control of Oran would belong to the State, but not to the Church, the disagreement was aggravated. Furthermore, Navarro explicitly pointed out that the expedition will not be extended to the hinterland, spoiling the dreams of the war-loving aristocracy for new lands. The result was the open conflict between the two figures. Naturally, Fernando backed Navarro and called Jiménez back to Spain.

Algerians wisely accepted to sign a treaty which reduced the city into vassalage to the Spain on January 10, 1510.⁹⁸ According to the treaty, Algerians would immediately return Christian slaves at their possession. They would also promise to prevent the corsair raids and deny them entrance to their port. In addition, they would pay tribute for 10 years. Spaniards would also like to assure the control of the city by requesting one of the four rocky islands of Algiers. They would erect a *presidio* there whose effectiveness cannot be doubted since artillery's range would reach the quarters in the city. This Peñon de Alger will later appear more frequently in this study.

⁹⁷ Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, p. 39.

⁹⁸ Mouloud Gaid, *Türkler İdaresi'nde Cezayir*, trans. Faik Melek (Ankara, 1996), p. 16.

Pedro Navarro, now the sole commander of the Spaniard troops, wintered in Formentara with his troops including those of the Cardinal. In the spring, he headed for Bougie with 15 ships and 14000 soldiers.⁹⁹ His instructions were to force an agreement upon the ruler of Bougie in order to prevent him from sheltering the Muslim corsairs in his ports. There would be resort to arms, only unless such an agreement could be concluded. However, Pedro Navarro had second thoughts when he learned the pestilence, dissention and internal strife from which the city suffered. There was a struggle for the crown between the two contenders, Abdurrahman and Abdullah. Navarro did not hesitate to take advantage of the situation and with the help of Abdullah, who accepted the Spanish vassalage, conquered the city.¹⁰⁰ Afterwards, a treaty was concluded by which Spain did not only secure two fortresses in the region that would be erected by the Bougians themselves; but also forced the new king to send two of his sons as hostages to Spain.¹⁰¹ Bougie had to welcome the Spanish suzerainty which would last until 1555.¹⁰²

The next target was Tripoli. The city was informed about the fall of Oran and of Bougie by Genoese agents and thus was occupied with the defensive preparations, while some of them preferred to transfer their precious belongings to the mountains.¹⁰³ However, the fortifications were in a poor position and the soldiers were unaware of the advantages of the gunpowder. Navarro, encouraged by the simple conquest left Tripoli on August 28, 1510, heading for the island of Djerba., a small island on the eastern

⁹⁹ Gaid, p. 15.

¹⁰⁰ Sandoval, I, p. 36.

¹⁰¹ Sandoval, I, p. 38.

¹⁰² G. Marçais, "Bidjaya", EI².

¹⁰³ Sandoval, I, p. 39.

section of the Barbary Coast. His aim was the same “tempt them for peace”¹⁰⁴; yet his three ambassadors had been slain. He arrived to the island on August 30, yet his army “for not obtaining drink and food”¹⁰⁵, remained exposed to the mercy of the summer heat and thus was defeated. “*Facile conquest*”¹⁰⁶ was over and the prestige of Spain suffered a heavy blow in from this disaster. Meanwhile, Ottoman corsairs had already established a base in Djerba.¹⁰⁷ The presence of the Ottoman corsairs in the island and the relatively better situation of the defences proved effective against the ill-supplied contingents of Navarro.

In 1511, Spaniards furthered their successes by reducing some important cities like Tenes, Cherchel and Mostaganem to tributary.¹⁰⁸ Yet, on the other hand, Spaniards decided to halt their expansion, which appears to be due to the failure of capturing of Querquenes on February 20, and the loss of several ships including their crew as a result of two tempests.¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, given the fact that Navarro would be sent to Italy once again, it is rational to conclude that the new pace of the Italian wars had induced Fernando to concentrate all of his forces in the region.

The war had already begun in Italy in 1509. The new pope *Jules II* (r. 1503-1513) had decided to punish Venice. Italy had been divided into three with French in the

¹⁰⁴ Sandoval, I, p. 40.

¹⁰⁵ Sandoval, I, p. 43.

¹⁰⁶ Fisher, p. 36.

¹⁰⁷ Abun-Nasr, p.148. Yet, this claim is based on the acceptance of 1504 as the advent of Barbarossas in the region which has been proved wrong by Soucek, see Svat Soucek, “The Rise of the Barbarossas in North Africa, *Turcica* 7 (1975), pp. 243-6. Within the context, Abun-Nasr presented these corsairs as the Barbarossas. However, in my opinion, these do not reflect the truth. True it was that corsairs were situated in the island; yet not necessarily including Barbarossas. Sandoval records: “There were in Djerba some corsairs who were damaging Sicily, Corsica and Calabria a lot” see Sandoval, I, p. 40. Also, according to *Gazavât*, Oruç went to Djerba when he decided to settle in Western Mediterranean. Seyyid Murâdi Re’îs, *Gazavât-ı Hayreddin Paşa*, ed. Mustafa Yıldız, (Aachen, 1993), p. 59, fol. 30a. This also proves the existence of corsairs before the advent of Barbarossas.

¹⁰⁸ Gaid, *op. cit.*, p. 16, İlter, p. 73.

¹⁰⁹ Sandoval, I, p. 45.

north and Aragonese in the south. Between the two there were room for only one and that should be Papacy.¹¹⁰ In December 1508, the anti-Venetian *League of Cambrai* was concluded between Louis XII, Maximilian and Jules II. Fernando would enter in the project in April 1509. The same month French declared war and in May, Venice suffered a terrible defeat at the *battle of Agnadello*. Yet, Jules II was satisfied with her humiliation and decided to pardon Venice after the conclusion of a humiliating treaty concluded in December 1510. Now the Pope decided that the French king Louis XII was much more troublesome for his policies. “Powerful he was useful, conqueror he became dangerous”.¹¹¹

A Holy League was concluded in October 1511 between Papacy, Aragon, Venice England and Swiss cantons. Fernando once again had to be involved in the war, an important point seriously affecting his ill-willed North African expeditions. A turning point occurred in 1512. At the *battle of Ravenna*, young and able French commander Gaston de Foix died even though French army enjoyed a clear victory over the Spanish troops. Yet, with his death, Fernando’s wife Germaine de Foix appeared as the rightful heir of the Duchy of Navarre. Fernando did not hesitate to resort to arms; he invaded the Duchy in 1512. Back in Italy, French was already defeated by 1513 and the situation was finally fixed in 1516 thanks to a series of treaties. French rights over Milan and the Aragonese rights on the Kingdom of Naples were mutually recognized. The struggle for Italian hegemony was not over; another round would sure follow; yet with other rulers. On the first day of 1516, Louis XII died leaving the crown to *François d’Angouleme*. Fernando would follow his example, and in the complex system of heritage, the most

¹¹⁰ John Julius Norwich, *A History of Venice* (New York, 1989), p. 395.

¹¹¹ Reinard, p. 334.

resourceful ruler since the times of Charlemagne would be his elder grandson Charles of Burgundy. However, this is the subject of another chapter.

1.4. The advent of Barbarossas: 1513-1515

According to the western sources, the arrival of the Barbarossas to the region can be dated back to 1504.¹¹² They were natives of Mytilene, ancient Lesbos, a Greek island in the Aegean Sea. Their mother, Catalina was the widow of a Greek priest while their father Yakub was an Ottoman officer in the region. Their date of birth has always been a matter of discussion. The name Barbarossa was originally used for Oruç, the allegedly elder brother according to the Western sources¹¹³, while *Gazavât* declares him as the second elder of the four brothers.¹¹⁴ There are claims that the name Barbarossa was due to his red beard (*barba rossa*) while some claim that it was a distorted version for Baba Oruç. After the death of Oruç, the same name had also been used for his brother. Probably it was also used as a family name by the Western sources. Both brothers were occupied with navigation in the Aegean Sea under the aegis of the Ottoman prince Korkud who was then the governor of Manisa, Afterwards, Selim the Grim in order to prevent the flight of his brother Korkud prohibited navigation in the Aegean Sea without his authorization.¹¹⁵ In the last years of the reign of Bayezid II, there occurred a struggle for the imperial throne among the candidates. There was no fixed rule for the heritage of

¹¹² R. Le Tourneau, “Arudj”, *EF*².

¹¹³ Soucek, “The Rise of the Barbarossas”, p. 249.

¹¹⁴ *Gazavât*, p. 47, fol. 5a.

¹¹⁵ *Gazavât*, p. 60, fos. 30b-31a. Furthermore, see İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, “II. Bayezid oğullarından Sultan Korkud”, *Belleten* XXX (1966), 583-90.

the imperial crown in the Ottoman Empire. According to Halil İnalcık “a tradition limiting succession to the throne to a particular member of the dynasty never existed in Turkish states” since the issue of succession “should be left to divine dispensation. In other words, the outcome of the civil war was considered the will of God and there would be “no further theological or legal question of his legitimacy.”¹¹⁶ Even though another Ottoman *şehzade*, Ahmed was the favoured one in the capital, Selim succeeded to prevail over him and secure the throne for himself by compelling his father’s abdication from the throne.¹¹⁷ Even though Ahmed was removed, there remained another contender, Korkud, with whom Selim reached to an agreement. Despite the agreement between two brother according to which Korkud was assured the governorship of the island of Midilli; Selim considered his presence as a threat at a time when he was preparing a major campaign in the East¹¹⁸ and secretly surrounded his palace in Manisa. Even though he managed to escape, he would be caught and executed in 1513.¹¹⁹

At this point, it should be noted that Soucek challenged the general idea in the Western sources that the advent of Barbarossas can be dated as early as 1504. According to him, these sources were written decades after the events and they include contradictory information even though indicated with considerable certainty. Thus, he argues that these sources confused the activities of another Ottoman corsair, Kemâl Re’îs with those of Barbarossas. Hence, it must have been him who settled in La

¹¹⁶ Halil İnalcık, “The Ottoman Succession and its Relation to the Turkish Concept of Sovereignty”, in Halil İnalcık, *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society* (Bloomington, 1993), pp. 40-1.

¹¹⁷ Halil İnalcık, “Selim I”, EI².

¹¹⁸ Halil İnalcık, “Selim I”, EI².

¹¹⁹ M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Korkud”, EI².

Goletta. Soucek asserts that Piri Re'îs, in his *Kitab-ı Bahriye* does not indicate the presence of Barbarossas in the Western Mediterranean. This is interesting since Piri Re'îs travelled not only with his uncle, but also with Barbarossas after the death of the former. In addition, he indicates that *Gazavât* implicitly asserts that Barbarossa's advent was in 1513. It was a book that was written at the request of the Ottoman Sultan Süleyman and there was no reason to misinform him in this manner. Actually, Barbarossa brothers were operating under the aegis of the rival of Süleyman's father. Thus it would be wiser to indicate an earlier date rather than vice versa in order to conceal the unpleasant fact that they were once at the service of Korkud.¹²⁰ Furthermore, Sanuto, whose records were contemporary, did not indicate the presence of Barbarossas until 1515.¹²¹ The argument that the late-fabricated Western chronicles confused these corsairs is thus plausible.¹²² It is also logical since given the active role they played in the region during the second decade of the 16th century; the silence of the same chronicles on their activities until 1512 provokes suspicion. Hence, it would be fair to conclude that they arrived before the first siege of Bougie and probably after the civil war started in the Ottoman Empire which their protector Korkud lost.

However, at this point, it should also be added that such a theory does not actually belong to Soucek. Four decades ago, Aziz Samih İlter speculated the same issue with basically similar arguments. He defended the validity of the year 1513; by analytically discussing the different versions of Piri Re'îs' *Kitab-ı Bahriye*.¹²³ What

¹²⁰ Soucek, "The Rise of the Barbarossas", p. 246.

¹²¹ Marino Sanuto, *I Diarii*, XX, eds. Federico Stefani, Guglielmo Berchet, and Nicolò Barozzi (Venice, 1879-1902), p. 309.

¹²² A good example for the confusions of the Western sources is the narration of Sandoval. He records an agreement between Charles Quint and Süleyman in 1519, while the latter was not on the throne. See Sandoval, I, p. 142-3

¹²³ İlter, pp. 70-71.

Soucek added to this theory is the overt reference to the Western sources including Sanuto and the assertion that the activities of Kemâl Re'îs was taken for those of Barbarossa.

The absence of Spanish pressure would facilitate Oruç's operations. Having just arrived, he started to play a more active role in the region. His efficiency soon improved due to the halt of the Spanish expansion. Allied with the other Ottoman corsairs in the region, his power grew ostensibly to the extent that he would attempt to capture a fortified city and dethrone a king as would happen in 1516.

Even though Oruç went to the Djerba at first, later he sailed west. He sought the protection of a North African ruler whose ports he could use. The ruler of Tunis, Abdurrahman, was happy to accept Oruç as his *protégé*, as long as he consented to pay one-eighth of the booty he brought to his ports, in addition to a two percent for the fee of the port.¹²⁴ The agreement was beneficial for both sides; Oruç would secure a shelter and a market place for his navy while the Tunisian Sultan would enjoy additional revenues. Thus, he granted Oruç the castle of Halk al-Vad, or as appears in the Western sources, La Goletta. Unlike Tunis, this place was located on the North African coast, and was well suited for corsairs.

The first Bougie expedition should be dated summer 1514.¹²⁵ Oruç's intervention was requested by the Hafsid governor of the city. He would enjoy a

¹²⁴ *Gazavât*, p. 61, fol. 33b.

¹²⁵ According to Lane-Poole, corsairs were laying siege to Bougie in 1512. See Lane Poole, pp. 40-44. However, he is mistaken since their arrival in the region has already been dated as 1513. Hence, we may either accept the dates that Hess and Fisher indicated or those that Abun-Nasr did, both contrary to Lane Poole. According to first claim, the first siege was conducted in 1514, while the second in 1515. Abun-Nasr with a slight difference placed the first siege to 1513. See Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, pp. 61-63; Fisher, 47; Abun-Nasr, 148. There is a unanimous opinion that the second siege was in 1515, this time with Sandoval's approval. See Sandoval, I, p. 98. Sanuto's record for the event is dated 1516 May, yet this is the date of the receipt of the information, thus a retard is acceptable. Sanuto, XXI, p. 381.

generous reward if he succeeded in eliminating the Spanish yoke. Thus he appeared in front of Bougie with 12 ships with cannons and thousand soldiers. He blockaded the port, while the deposed ruler of Bougie, Abdurrahman besieged the town with 3000 Moriscos also supported by Oruç's soldiers.¹²⁶ However, the attempt was unsuccessful. After 8 days of siege, corsairs had to withdraw after Oruç Re'îs had been shot from his arm. His brother Khayr al-Din took him to Tunis where his arm would be amputated.

The second round would be due to 1515. This time backed with a Hafsid land force from Tunis,¹²⁷ Oruç once again decided to respond to the call. Khayr al-Din, on the other hand, on the way to Bougie with 7 ships, having informed that Genoese had conquered Djidjelli, succeeded to liberate the city. Meanwhile, he sent an envoy, Muhiyiddin Re'îs, to Istanbul with presents for the Ottoman Sultan, Selim the Grim as well as the high Ottoman officials in the capital. This was the first indication of a communication between corsairs and the Constantinople. As *protégés* of Selim's rival, Korkud, they had to leave the Aegean Sea when Selim ascended the throne. However, Selim did not mention the incident and cheerfully welcomed this act of obedience.¹²⁸ Apart from supplying Muhiyiddin Re'îs' galleys, he awarded him with two war galleys.¹²⁹

The second round in the Bougie siege started successfully, corsairs managed to take the castle thanks to the help of the soldiers of Ahmad Bin al-Kâdî¹³⁰. On the other

¹²⁶ R. Le Tourneau, "Arudj", *EF*².

¹²⁷ Abun-Nasr, p. 148.

¹²⁸ "Hak Te'âlâ dünyâda ve âhiretde mücâhidîn lâlârîmun yüzlerin ag eyleyüb dâ'imü'd-dehr a'dâ-yı hâsirîn üzerine kılıçların keskün eylesün ve her halde Allâh-ı zu'l-Celâl küffâr-ı hâksârı makhûr u müdemmer eyleyüp berde ve bahrde 'asâkir-i İslâm üzerlerine mansûr u muzaffer eylesin", *Gazavât*, p. 77, fol. 63b.

¹²⁹ Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, p. 63; *Gazavât*, pp. 76-8, fos. 63a-66b.

¹³⁰ Bin al-Kâdî was a religio-tribal leader in Grand Kabylia, which Oruç had to ally himself in order to find local support. Kabyle tribes were divided into three in the period, and Ahmed bin al-Kâdî was the

hand, the inner castle resisted. When 5000 Spanish troops arrived under the command of Manchín de Ventura¹³¹, all Oruç could do was to ask help from the ruler of Tunis for gunpowder.¹³² Yet, the response, there was none, and corsairs had to withdraw for the second time. Bad weather and desertion of local troops had already created enough problems; there was no chance to resist the Spanish squadron without gunpowder. As a consequence, Oruç decided to withdraw. It should be added that this withdrawal was a hasty one, since there is a possibility that he burned seven of his vessels in order to prevent their capture by the enemy.¹³³

However, there is an important question which should be addressed: Why did the ruler of Tunis refuse to help? He was their protector and he showed willingness in the realisation of the first siege. The answer is that things had changed; he was already uncomfortable because of the active and aggressive policy that Oruç followed. Additionally, he might have calculated that it would not be wise to provoke Spanish aggression at a time when the pressure was lessened. Sheltering corsairs was another thing, taking up arms against the Spaniards another. Also the fact that Oruç did not return to Tunis and settle in the newly conquered Djidjelli might prove that the strife resulted in the termination of their mutual cooperation.

Oruç established a noteworthy prestige among the population of Bougie. Especially after 1512, he tried to win sympathy in the region. Repeatedly it could be observed that in the narratives, the insolence of the undisciplined corsairs had been

ruler of one of them, Kuku. This tribe was situated in the eastern part of Bougie and played important role in corsairs' expedition, especially given that the other two tribes sided with the Spaniards. See R. Le Tourneau, "Kabylia", *EF*².

¹³¹ According to Sandoval, his name was Machín de Rentería. See Sandoval., p. 98.

¹³² Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, p. 63.

¹³³ R. Le Tourneau, "Arudj", *EF*²; İlter, p. 74.

underlined. Probably these narratives were true since the loyalty of the population was not always favourable on Oruç's account. For instance, the Algerians would grow weary of his soldiers and try to expel them by a secret plot despite the words of praise and their depiction as saviours in a letter dated 1519, written by the Algerians to the Ottoman Sultan.¹³⁴ They were the ones who invited Oruç at the first place. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that Oruç did at least try to establish good relationships in the region. He supplied corn to the neighbouring tribes in order to appease them. He also acted as a mediatory between the conflicting tribes.¹³⁵

Despite these unfortunate Bougie expeditions, Barbarossas were an important power in the region. Their force grew ostensibly and surprisingly. Actually, interestingly enough, Spanish expeditions in the area had not been so costly. According to Godfrey Fisher, the three expeditions in which three important cities (Tripoli, Oran and Bougie) had been conquered by the Spaniards did not cost more than two and a half days and 350 casualties.¹³⁶ This alone might explain the reason why the Ottoman corsairs appeared so strongly to the extent of establishing their own kingdom, something they could not even dream of in the Levant. The local population of North Africa was not in a situation to defend themselves and the ruling dynasties chose to submit to the growing Spanish influence in the region in order to refrain from their aggression. As will be demonstrated, local forces of these pro-Spanish rulers did not win a single battle against the Ottoman corsairs unless backed by the modern Spanish troops. These corsairs should have never challenged a regular state, no matter how decentralised local rulers were.

¹³⁴ "Nâgâh-ı nâsır-ı din ve hâmi-yi müslimîn ve mücâhid fi sebili'llah olan Oruç Beg". Temimi, "Lettre des Algérois au Sultan Selim I^{er} en 1519", p. 98.

¹³⁵ R. Le Tourneau, "Arudj", *EF*².

¹³⁶ Fisher, p. 35.

Therefore, corsairs appear as the hope of the local population when they grew weary of the Spanish pressure. As their power increased, local rulers like those of Tunis and of Tlemsen would be restless and not hesitate to plot against them. Yet, they would never contemplate to confront them on their own.

1.5. Settlement in Algiers: 1516

In 1516, another call from another city had changed the course of events drastically. As had already been noted, since 1510, Spaniards reduced Algiers into the vassalage under heavy conditions and furthermore erected a *presidio* in Peñon of Algiers. Finally the new governor of this city-state, Sâlim al-Tûmî gave in to the pressure of the local population and sent a delegation to Djidjelli for demanding assistance against the Spaniard pressure. On the other hand, Fisher does not believe that Sâlim himself initiated such a project since also the immediate conflict that arose between him and Oruç prove so. According to him, such an invitation can have one reason: the tension between two factions, partisans headed by Sâlim and country Arabs including those belonging to the faction of bin al-Kâdî. He described Sâlim as a Spanish agent based on the fact that De Vera addressed him in a letter of condolence for his sons as honourable and loyal.¹³⁷ Lane-Poole argues on the other hand, that this offer was made when the tribute was rejected by the Algerians following the death of Fernando,

¹³⁷ Fisher, p.48, for the afore-mentioned letter, see also Arıkan and Toledo, p. 146. However, in my opinion, this last idea that Sâlim was a Spanish agent should not be solely based on this latter. De Vera was writing at a time when Sâlim was killed by Oruç and Spain was preparing an expedition in order to conquer the city. Thus, it was natural that a Spanish general wishing to use Sâlim's sons for political purposes would address them with a delicate manner.

and thus a causal relation is likely. Despite Fisher's contrary argument, I agree with Lane-Poole.¹³⁸ While Sandoval repeats Lane-Poole's story, Fisher refrains from explaining his argument. "Fernando was dead, with whom they –i.e. Algerians- held the peace for 10 years, they rose against the Spaniards of Peñon for not paying the tribute as they were obligated... and told Horruc Barbarossa...for him to liberate them from servitude and the tribute which they were paying to the Spaniards".¹³⁹

Oruç again with the company of his local ally bin al-Kâdî marched to Algiers. En route, he attacked Cherchel (Roman city of Caesarea) which was claimed to be occupied by a corsair named Kara Hasan by several sources. Oruç who were disturbed by his activities did not want to leave his flanks defenceless captured the city and decapitated the corsair.¹⁴⁰ However, İlter claims that there was confusion in this statement.¹⁴¹ As will be seen Khayr al-Din would attack Cherchel in 1525 in order to eliminate his ex-lieutenant who rebelled against him who was also called Kara Hasan. Thus even though it has to be acknowledged that Cherchel was conquered, the name offered may be erroneous due to anachronism.

Naturally, Oruç did not face any resistance and entered the city welcomed by the population. The first thing he did was the destruction of the traces of Spanish domination on the city, such as insignias and arms.¹⁴² However, the real mission was not their destruction but that of Peñon. Even though unlike the Algerians, Oruç had the opportunity to utilize artillery, their range was not sufficient enough to damage the walls of the fortress. On the other hand, response to this ill-fated attack was more effective,

¹³⁸ Lane-Poole, pp. 45-6.

¹³⁹ Sandoval, I, p. 99.

¹⁴⁰ Gaid, p. 21.

¹⁴¹ İlter, p. 75.

¹⁴² Sandoval, I, p. 99, Fisher, p. 49.

the range of the Spanish artillery could reach until the extreme confines of the city. This failure did not contribute to the popularity of Oruç among the local population that had already been damaged by the irresponsible acts of the Ottoman corsairs. Once welcome they were; yet soon Oruç was to discover a plot against him provoked by the Spanish agents in the area.¹⁴³ Sâlim was executed by the order of Oruç. Hence Oruç was then the ruler of Algiers.

¹⁴³ Gaid, p. 21.

CHAPTER 2 (1516-1528): STRUGGLE FOR ALGIERS

2.1. Introduction

Corsairs were elevated to a status of independence. This conquest changed the balance of power in the region and transformed the Barbarossa brothers from simple corsairs to a more menacing threat for the Spanish coasts. They were now self-sufficient; thus they could perform their actions without the shelter of North African ports and the whims of their owners. It is true that they were already effective under the aegis of the Tunisian Sultan when they were allowed to use La Goletta as their base. Also after their change of base, Djidjelli and the island of Djerba which was also granted to corsairs by the Hafsid dynasty¹⁴⁴ appeared as important bases for the corsair activities. On the other hand, the settlement in Algiers proved itself advantageous for corsairs. Now backed with important local allies like Ahmad bin al-Kâdî, their prestige increased in the region as well as their sphere of influence. This increase can be easily observed since Oruç and Khayr al-Din could and did consider the establishment of a

¹⁴⁴ J. Despois, “Djarba”, EI².

quasi-kingdom in the area where they would conduct not only their military operations, but also diplomatic maneuvers.

This settlement also re-triggered the attention of the Spaniards to the region. The expansionist policies of Jiménez had been halted in 1511. Peñon's alarming position, on the other hand, would compel Spain to take a stand against the growing power of the Barbarossas. Even though these brothers were a matter of concern since 1513; a more aggressive action than sending a relief force was not considered necessary since Spaniards proved themselves resistant in 1514 and 1515. However, as will be seen below, the situation can be depicted as critical, based on the correspondence between Peñon and Spanish officials. Hence, between 1516 and 1520, Spaniards would launch four expeditions to the region whose results cannot be considered conjectural, even though not decisive either. They challenged the corsair bid for Algiers twice and in another expedition succeeded to eliminate the elder of the two brothers.

However, after the introduction of Habsburg-Valois rivalry, Spain was dragged into the European wars once again. The whole third decade of the century would be spent under the shadow of this rivalry. Furthermore, there were internal problems for Charles V not only in the Empire, but also in Spain itself. *Comuneros* ravaged the Iberian Peninsula in 1520-1522 and even succeeded to capture the vicar of Charles V. Under such circumstances, a holy war was a luxury.

On the other hand, Ottomans had its own plans. Having been replaced his father, Süleyman chose to attack west; yet his immediate naval concern would be the extirpation of the Knights of St. John from the island of Rhodes. Even though, Algiers would nominally be under the aegis of the empire after 1519 when Khayr al-Din sent an

envoy to Selim; there was no direct military cooperation except certain grants that will be mentioned. Even though the effect of the contribution is impossible to calculate, it can be concluded that Algiers at that time was not seriously considered a province of the empire.

Barbarossa's expansionist policy was not successful in this period. They would be able to repulse two Spanish attacks to the city and expanded their dominance to Tlemsen. Yet, Oruç died in 1518 and two years later Khayr al-Din was forced out of Algiers, this time not by the Spaniards directly, but the combination of local allies. Khayr al-Din had to wait for another five years to return to Algiers gloriously and eliminate his local opponents. However, his bid for Algiers was still contested and unless he conquered the Spanish *presidio* in Peñon, he would not consolidate his rule in the city.

2.2. Spanish response (1516):

On the other hand, the bid for Algiers was not an easy task. After the execution of Sâlim, his son Yahya was rescued by certain Algerians who were wise enough to take him to Oran and submit to the governor, Diego de Córdoba.¹⁴⁵ Spaniards would not neglect to appreciate the value of such an opportunity.

How the new situation was perceived by Spain is a difficult question to ask. On January, Fernando died leaving Cardinal Jiménez as the regent for both of the kingdoms. The new king will be a young Habsburg prince from Flanders that did not haste to take

¹⁴⁵ Gaid, p.22.

over the rule. Until his arrival, it was Jiménez who ruled Spain and hence a quick response Barbarossas had to face. Jiménez planned a naval expedition against Algiers. He probably calculated that it would be easy to recapture Algiers with the help of the artillery force of Peñon. Given the fragile loyalty of the population, such a task was not a chimera. According to him, “no one will be able to be powerful on the terrain unless so on the sea”.¹⁴⁶ The cost of the preparation of the new fleet also proves his dedication to the issue of North Africa, 53.000 gold pieces per month.¹⁴⁷

The corsair presence in Algiers was a blow to not only the Spanish prestige, but also the security of its *presidio* in Peñon. The situation was considered alarming. Its commander Señor Quint¹⁴⁸ had already started to write letters to all governors of Spain indicating the supply problems from which his troops suffered, adding that he had to go to Majorca in order to provide food for the *presidio*.¹⁴⁹ Sandoval also records the cry for help.¹⁵⁰ The tone of Diego de Vera in one of his letters addressed to Peñon of Algiers already confirmed the pessimistic perception. He wanted the garrison to hold for 10 or 12 days since he wished to arrive for the reinforcements based on his calculation that 2000 soldiers would not suffice.¹⁵¹ Since he saw the necessity to encourage them for resistance, the panic on the Spanish side can be deemed flagrant. An officer wrote to Diego de Vera, the commander of the expedition, that the situation is critical since there is not enough water, soldiers or ammunition. Furthermore, he estimates that nine or ten thousand soldiers would suffice for a successful expedition.¹⁵² A certain Caprio depicts

¹⁴⁶ Brandi, p.62.

¹⁴⁷ Brandi, p.62.

¹⁴⁸ His name was Nicolas even though not mentioned in the document.

¹⁴⁹ Arkan and Toledo, p. 144.

¹⁵⁰ Sandoval, I, p. 94.

¹⁵¹ Arkan and Toledo, p. 145.

¹⁵² Arkan and Toledo, p. 157.

better the harsh conditions from which the Spanish garrison was suffering. There was only one month of food supplies, with no ammunition, and 80 soldiers who were not paid in the last two year would not be able to defend the castle, unless the reinforcements arrived immediately.¹⁵³ In another letter Agustin Velasquez indicated that there remained 4 quintals of gunpowder and food for 40 days.¹⁵⁴ Juan de Tudela wrote to De Vera that they were not paid for 18 months and informed him that the expedition will not be a surprise for Barbarossa since he already started to strengthen city's defences.¹⁵⁵ Hence, Braudel is sound in depicting the harsh conditions in these *presidios* due to the problems of salary, provisions and transportation.¹⁵⁶

The campaign itself was not perfectly planned. First of all, it also suffered from problems of supply. As late as September, Del Rio warned Jiménez that they could not move since the supply problem could not be solved.¹⁵⁷ De Vera had to ask for the cannons in Peñon claiming that the *presidio* could not utilize them since they do not have ammunition.¹⁵⁸ A logical solution would be to provide ammunition instead of taking cannons away; De Vera's choice should have been motivated by the immediate need for cannons for the navy. Also from the letters addressed to Jiménez, it can be deduced that there were disagreements among the commanders of the expedition. Del Rio did not hesitate to complain about De Vera¹⁵⁹, while Quinto expressed his total dissatisfaction with the decisions that had been taken. According to him, De Vera not

¹⁵³ Arıkan and Toledo, pp. 158-9.

¹⁵⁴ Arıkan and Toledo, p. 163.

¹⁵⁵ Arıkan and Toledo, p.161.

¹⁵⁶ Braudel, II, pp. 185-7.

¹⁵⁷ Arıkan and Toledo, p. 170.

¹⁵⁸ Arıkan and Toledo, p. 180.

¹⁵⁹ Arıkan and Toledo, p. 172.

only failed in bringing sufficient amount of troops but also deprived the *presidio* from artillery and soldier.¹⁶⁰

There were problems. Moreover, Jiménez pursued an obsessive policy of controlling everything. Given the average velocity of communication in the 16th century, such an attitude would cause problems. From the correspondence, it can be clearly understood that, the commanders of expedition, had to address every problem to Jiménez himself. De Vera sent the letters he dispatched to him for feedback¹⁶¹; such letters are also indicated in another document.¹⁶² He asks for his permission to take priests to the expedition with him.¹⁶³ Another document would appear as a more blatant example. In this letter De Vera requested from Jiménez to write a letter to the General Captain of the Galleys in order to ensure that he allows him to remove cannons from the galleys which would set sail for their winter quarters. Given that these ships would winter in their ports, he wanted to take the cannons which his ships lacked.¹⁶⁴ Finally from another document, it can be conceived that even for basic financial matters like salary payment, the approval of the Cardinal was essential.¹⁶⁵

This expedition should not only be considered a response to the installation of the Barbarossas in Algiers. It is true that, as also the correspondence prove, it was provoked by the event; yet on the other hand Jiménez' policy was not limited to the expulsion of the corsairs from Algiers. One of these documents clearly states that he also planned another expedition to the island of Djerba, another base for the Muslim

¹⁶⁰ Arikan and Toledo, p. 179.

¹⁶¹ Arikan and Toledo, p. 148 records: "I am sending the copies of the letters that I will send –i.e. to the king of Tenes and the son of Sâlim al-Toumî- in order for you to see them and correct if necessary".

¹⁶² Arikan and Toledo, p. 166.

¹⁶³ Arikan and Toledo, p. 152.

¹⁶⁴ Arikan and Toledo, p. 167.

¹⁶⁵ Arikan and Toledo, p. 169.

corsary. According to this, De Vera and Del Rio instructed their envoy for Jiménez that in case an expedition of Djerba would follow, letters should be addressed to the viceroys of Sicily and Naples for the supply preparations.¹⁶⁶

Spaniards did not lack the local support on the eve of the expedition. It was natural since the presence of Barbarossas was not a relief for the local rulers. The discomfort which the ruler of Tunis had displayed against the growing ambitions of two brothers had already been indicated. The ruler of Tunis did not hesitate to write to De Vera in August to assert his loyalty for Spain.¹⁶⁷ Furthermore, De Vera did not vacillate to apply diplomatic manoeuvres with the son of Sâlim, Yahya. In a letter addressed to him, he indicated his willingness to punish the murderer of his father, and asked him to cooperate in such a task.¹⁶⁸ The disloyal population of Algiers should also be added. Even though another document asserted that Barbarossas had won the loyalty of the population¹⁶⁹, it should be discarded since the plot against them in the past would be repeated in the future. Finally, the ruler of Tenes agreed to fight against the corsairs upon Spanish request.¹⁷⁰ Even though such an attack should be dated after the expedition itself, it proves the pro-Spanish agenda of the local rulers.

Finally, the navy arrived to Algiers on September 30, 1516. They were composed of 60 ships carrying 8.000 soldiers as well as Yahya al-Tûmî.¹⁷¹ The result was disastrous for the Spaniards. Upon their arrival, they thought that the soldiers outside the city would fight with them due to Yahya's presence. However when they

¹⁶⁶ Arikan and Toledo, p. 175.

¹⁶⁷ Arikan and Toledo, p. 153.

¹⁶⁸ Arikan and Toledo, p. 146.

¹⁶⁹ Arikan and Toledo, p. 157.

¹⁷⁰ R. Le Tourneau, "Arudj", *EF*.

¹⁷¹ Gaid, p. 23. Sandoval also records: "8000 men and a good fleet", Sandoval, I, p. 94.

landed, the situation was far different than was assumed. When guns were fired by soldiers outside the city which Spaniards considered their allies, they had to encamp unfavourably.¹⁷² Further disgrace was bad weather.¹⁷³ Oruç divided his forces,¹⁷⁴ and on October 4, attacked their encampment and inflicted a severe defeat over Diego de Vera. The repercussion of such a stern defeat was 3.000 dead and 400 captives.¹⁷⁵ Yahya, according to Gaid, was never heard of anymore.¹⁷⁶

2.3. The conquest of Tlemsen and the death of Oruç (1517-1518):

After this victory, Oruç decided to enlarge his newly acquired kingdom. In 1517, he occupied Tenes and Miliana. The nephew of the king of Tlemsen, had occupied Tenes with the help of the Spaniards. Yet, the fate of this Spanish agent¹⁷⁷ was sealed when Oruç decided to remove him after having received the call of the local population.¹⁷⁸ According to *Gazavât*, firstly Khayr al-Din descended upon the city where he met no resistance. Yet, as soon as he left the city, leaving a lieutenant,¹⁷⁹ the

¹⁷² Gaid, p. 23.

¹⁷³ “Karanuluk bir bârân fırtına kalkub şöyle kî göz gözi görmeyüb kâfirlerün başına böyle bir taş yağdı ki her tolu kaz yumurtası kadar var idi. Çok kâfirlerün gözi beyni çıkub fi’n-nâr fi’s-sakar oldular.” *Gazavât*, p. 90, fol. 88b. However, Sandoval does not record such a tempest for 1516 expedition. It is possible that there was a confusion between two expeditions of 1516 and 1519. *Gazavât* indicates the decisive role of the tempest in both of these expeditions. See also *Gazavât*, p. 105, fol. 117b.

¹⁷⁴ *Gazavât*, p. 89, fol. 88a.

¹⁷⁵ Sandoval, I, p. 94. However, *Gazavât* numbers the captives as 2700, *Gazavât*, p. 90, fol. 89b.

¹⁷⁶ Gaid, p.23.

¹⁷⁷ *Gazavât* accused him to serve for Spanish interests. “Ve her bâr zâd u zahîre gemilere yükledüb İspanya yakasına gönderir idi.” *Gazavât*, p. 92, fol. 94a.

¹⁷⁸ İlter, p. 79.

¹⁷⁹ *Gazavât*, p. 94, fol. 97a.

former ruler reinstalled his rule.¹⁸⁰ Oruç in a second effort would occupy the city once again.¹⁸¹

Another call for help fitted the growing territorial ambitions of Oruç. There was a dynastic struggle among the Zayanid princes in Tlemsen following the death of *Abu Abdullah Muhammed* in 1517. He was the one who accepted Spanish vassalage voluntarily after having considered that the growing Spanish influence in the region might be dangerous for his reign. His humble voice proves his compliance: “I consider myself your servant to a greater extent than any other Moorish ruler... I consider all the time that I have not spent in your service wasted”. Upon the request of the king, he did not only release 130 Christian slaves; but also sent 22 horses with certain gifts and a tribute of 60.000 *doblas*, taken by a certain Muhammed, his an ambassador to Burgos.¹⁸² His successor *Abu Hammou III* accepted Spanish vassalage and harsh economic conditions. The population requested from Oruç to remove the Spanish yoke. First of all, the tribute paid to the Spain which was equal to 1.200 ducats was burdensome for them. In addition, with this deal, they lost the revenue from the custom duties on Oran’s external trade.¹⁸³ Even though Andrew Hess adds that the religious class of the town was favourable to the idea of a *gaza*, the holy war,¹⁸⁴ this assertion is not backed sufficiently by the author himself. Given the nature of diplomacy in the region, where the loyalty of the local inhabitants was on a daily basis no less than that of Renaissance princes, such an affirmation might be problematic.

¹⁸⁰ *Gazavât*, p. 95, fol. 99b.

¹⁸¹ *Gazavât*, p. 96, fol. 100b.

¹⁸² For Spanish original and an English translation of the letter of the ruler of Tlemsen to Fernando, see Colin Smith, *Christians and Moors in Spain Volume II: 1195-1614* (Warminster, 1989), pp. 156-159.

¹⁸³ Abun-Nasr, p. 149.

¹⁸⁴ Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, p. 64.

Oruç succeeded in capturing Tlemsen and another important city called Kal'a without affronting any armed resistance. According to Sanuto, he did not have more than 350-400 soldiers. Even though such a number might seem as an undervaluation, still it might reflect the weakness of the city to defend itself. The ruler of Tlemsen first withdrew to the inner castle. Having realized that it would not be possible to resist, he fled. Oruç Re'îs with the support of the local population seized the city.¹⁸⁵ On the other hand, naturally, the local ruler sought help from his protector, Spain. Moulay Abu Hammou went to Oran, where he was welcomed by the garrison commander Marquis de Comares, afore-mentioned Diego Hernandez de Córdoba.¹⁸⁶ He was not only concerned with the growing prestige and political power of this simple corsair; but also disturbed when Oruç prohibited to the city of Kal'a providing supplies for Oran.¹⁸⁷ We have already noted the problems of supply that Spanish enclaves away from the Iberian Peninsula were facing. 300 soldiers from the garrison of Oran¹⁸⁸ with the participation of some local mercenaries¹⁸⁹ launched an expedition for the relief of the city.¹⁹⁰ At that time, according to *Gazavât*, Oruç had already sent three-quarter of his forces to Algiers, based on the assumption that this new kingdom might need a better garrison.¹⁹¹ However, this assertion can also be a late fabrication in order to depict Oruç as a man of

¹⁸⁵ Sanuto, XXV, pp. 279-80. *Gazavât* also records the popular support. The notables of the city addressed Oruç as follows: "Hoş geldinüz safâ geldinüz yâ Re'îsü'l-müvâhidîn ziyâretuna mübârek ehlen ve sehlen", *Gazavât*, p. 97, fol. 102b; "El hamdü'l-illâh şol zâlimin şerrinden bizi halâs eyleyüb beledimizi nûr ile münevver eyledinüz.", *Gazavât*, p. 97, fol. 103a.

¹⁸⁶ Sandoval, I, p. 100.

¹⁸⁷ *Gazavât*, p. 97, fol.103b; p. 99, fol. 105b.

¹⁸⁸ Sandoval, I, p.101.

¹⁸⁹ *Gazavât* numbers them as 20.000; a number which I would approach with suspicion. *Gazavât*, p. 99, fol. 106a.

¹⁹⁰ It should be added here that the loyalty of these local mercenaries was fragile. Thus, the commander of the garrison of Oran, Marquis de Comara had requested from the local mercenaries "33 noble children" as hostages since he did not want to rely on their loyalty. Sandoval, I, p. 101, also see *Gazavât*, p. 99, fos. 105b-106a.

¹⁹¹ *Gazavât*, p. 98, fos. 103b-104a.

courage, as well as re-portraying his ultimate defeat by the Christians which would cost him a life.

Khayr al-Din, on the other hand, was anxious in Algiers. He was informed of the situation. What he could do was to send a relief force numbering 2.000 under the command of his younger brother Īshak.¹⁹² However, Khayr al-Din preferred to remain in the city, probably given the loyalty of the population. Sandoval comments that he wanted to make sure “if Oruç falls, this kingdom does not.”¹⁹³

At this point, there are two different narrations. According to *Gazavât*, Oruç was besieged in Kal’a instead of Tlemsen. According to this, the combined enemy forces first conquered Kal’a. Oruç Re’îs decided to relieve the city and left Tlemsen while the former ruler of the city had re-occupied it at the absence of the corsair. Oruç, on the other hand, succeeded to capture Kal’a from the Spaniards. His intention was to spend the winter in the city. Yet, Spaniards sent another force against Oruç, exaggeratedly numbering “30.000 – 40.000”. Attackers had granted him safe conduct in return for the castle. Yet, when Oruç left the city, they followed and defeated him in a battle in which he was also slain.¹⁹⁴ On the other hand, Spanish documents present a different story. According to Sandoval¹⁹⁵, it was the reinforcements who were besieged in Kal’a. Spaniards tried to deny to corsair reinforcement passage towards Tlemsen. So, they besieged the contingents of Īshak. Yet, thanks to a double spy, the beleaguered corsairs defeated them. They had succeeded to lift the siege thanks to a surprise attack upon the attackers. On the other hand, another relief force was expedited to Kal’a under the

¹⁹² *Gazavât*, p. 99, fol. 107a.

¹⁹³ Sandoval, I, p. 101.

¹⁹⁴ *Gazavât*, pp. 99-102, fos. 106a-112b.

¹⁹⁵ Sandoval, I, pp. 100-101.

command of Martin de Argote. This force was relatively stronger; consisting of 2.000 infantry with some cavalry. He succeeded in capturing the city. Meanwhile, Oruç, with his ally, Ahmed bin al-Kâdî, was in Tlemsen, against the combined forces of the deposed ruler of Tlemsen and 300 Spanish soldiers. After the conquest of Kal'a, De Argote decided to join them with his forces. Having been informed by the recent defeat of the reinforcements, Oruç decided to flee the city in order to head for Algiers. He left his men in the castle while he escaped secretly with few soldiers. The ruler of Tlemsen was re-established in the city with the obligation of paying 4.000 *doblas* as a tribute.¹⁹⁶ Spaniards followed Oruç since he was carrying his treasure with him. Finally, he was trapped with his 30 men against 45 Spaniards. Garcia de Tinedo killed him in 1518.

On the other hand, *Gazavât* does not record the presence of two armies and insists that the death of Oruç took place after he left Kal'a. The reinforcements succeeded in meeting with the army of Oruç and the united force was besieged not in Tlemsen, but Kal'a. They were able to defeat an enemy army of 10.000 soldiers before they finally settled in the city. However, they were not powerful enough to resist the Marquis' army. They accepted the offer of safe-conduct since "being alive is better than being dead"¹⁹⁷. However, Spaniards did not respect the treaty. In my opinion, the Spanish narration is more plausible since it was based on not only the account of Sandoval, but also a letter of Charles V.¹⁹⁸ In addition, the notables of Algiers, in a letter dated 1519 and addressed to the Ottoman Sultan Selim the Grim, would mention that Oruç was killed in Tlemsen. However, at this point, it should be indicated that their

¹⁹⁶ Sanuto, XXV, p. 498.

¹⁹⁷ *Gazavât*, p. 101, fol. 111a.

¹⁹⁸ Arıkan and Toledo, pp. 185-6.

version of the story indicates that Oruç attacked Bougie instead of Kal'a.¹⁹⁹ Probably, in *Gazavât*, it was intended to distort the fact in order to lessen the humiliation of not only a defeat, but also an escape from the city. Instead of accepting that Oruç left the city secretly with his treasure, *Gazavât* preferred to assert an agreement of safe-conduct to which the infidels were not loyal. Hence, Oruç's death was a heroic one; he was slain since he did not want to surrender his arms after he left the castle. Nevertheless, he was actually caught by a Spanish contingent of 45 soldiers, after he deserted the city and left most of his men inside.

Surely, it was a heavy blow for Khayr al-Din. His situation was not consolidated even in Algiers itself; his forces were small. However, the conquerors of Tlemsen did not extend their expedition to Algiers. Troops were shipped back to Spain and Comara headed for Oran. This, Lane-Poole argues, was a "lost opportunity". With "one steady march" to Algiers, it would be possible to eradicate corsairs from North Africa, at such a fragile time when the founder of the miracle had perished. Yet, "incredible folly", was repeated again.²⁰⁰

Meanwhile, back in Spain, the new king, Charles V had second thoughts. He was pleased with the result when he was informed in Zaragoza; however, he was aware of the fact that as long as Algiers remained under the sovereignty of corsairs, the victory was not a complete one.²⁰¹ An expedition was authorized against Algiers under the command of the viceroy of Sicily since 1509, and "Captain General of the Sea and

¹⁹⁹ Temimi, "Une Lettre des Algérois", p. 98.

²⁰⁰ Lane-Poole, p. 53. Not only Lane-Poole, but also Fernand Braudel considers the failure of the Spaniards to implement a consistent policy of expansion in North Africa, following the conclusion of *Reconquista*. According to him, "once lost, the occasion will never present itself again" See Braudel, II, p. 181.

²⁰¹ Sandoval, I, p. 138.

Captain General of the Maritime Army and the Conquered Territory in North Africa”²⁰², Hugo de Moncada. In 1519, he started the expedition with 4.500 soldiers; however, his army was reinforced in Bougie by Perafán de Ribera and in Oran by the marquis of Comares. Ílter records that he also took veterans from Mars al-Kebir.²⁰³ Galotta records 80 sails and 6.000 soldiers based on Mafroni thus based on Spanish documents.²⁰⁴ Sanuto’s record is 10.000 Spanish soldiers; yet this round number is less reliable.²⁰⁵ When he arrived to Algiers, he wanted to attack as quickly as possible. However, a certain Gonzalo Marino de Rivera insisted that they should wait for the king of Tlemsen since he would come with “many Arab cavalry and foot soldiers”. These soldiers would not be useful for the siege work; however, their contribution would be vital in skirmishes against the local contingents of Algiers. Spanish forces bombarded the city for eight days. On the 8th day of the expedition, an unexpected storm changed the course; a striking north wind stormed the navy. Sanuto claims that they had already been embarking to the ships in order to leave.²⁰⁶ As a consequence, 26 ships and 4.000 soldiers were lost.²⁰⁷ Soldiers who could survive from the ships that sunk were further surprised by Moorish attack; there remained only 600 of them.²⁰⁸ There was nothing left to do but to lift the siege. So did Moncada and set for Ibiza with the remaining of his forces. The defeat was a relief for Khayr al-Din, apart from a huge blow to the prestige of the new king who identifies himself as the protector of the faith, *Defensor Fidei*. Lane-Poole argues that the failure of Moncada had actually strengthened the position of

²⁰² Fisher, p. 55.

²⁰³ Ílter, p. 85.

²⁰⁴ A. Galotta, “Khayr al-Din”, *EF*².

²⁰⁵ Sanuto, XXVI, p. 58.

²⁰⁶ Sanuto, XXVI, p. 58.

²⁰⁷ Sandoval, I, p. 138. Sanuto records the loss as 20 ships and 6.000 soldiers. Sanuto, XXVI, p. 58.

²⁰⁸ Sanuto, XXVI, p. 58.

Khayr al-Din, and paved the way for his expansion in the Middle Barbary. The result would be the conquest of Collo, Bona and Constantine.²⁰⁹ However, as shall be seen, their conquest was hardly caused by this victory, if dated 1521 and 1522 as Galotta asserts.²¹⁰ Khayr al-Din would have already lost Algiers by that time.

2.4. Incorporation of Algiers into the Ottoman Empire (1519):

In the last few years, the map of the Middle East had changed significantly. Unlike the pacifist policies of his father, Bayezid II who was deposed in 1512, Selim was a belligerent ruler. As soon as he ascended to the throne, he made his character flagrant. Before his ascension, he was the Governor of Trebizond, where he had the chance to observe the deeds of a newly emerged leader in Iran, Shah İsmail. Thus, Selim's primary target would be Safavids. After suppressing the Kızılbaş rebellion in Anatolia, he headed further east to confront Shah İsmail. The Ottoman army backed with the gunpowder technology, managed to resist the cavalry charges of İsmail. The result was a defeat for him from which he could never recover. The eastern parts of Anatolia as well as northern parts of Iraq were seized. However, Selim could not follow this victory. During his campaign against Shah İsmail, Memluks and their ally Dulkadiroğulları threatened the rear of his army. Selim first incorporated the Dulkadiroğulları territory to the Ottoman Empire and then attacked the puny Memluk State. As a result of two wars, the Ottoman army had succeeded to invade a wide region

²⁰⁹ Lane-Poole, p. 55.

²¹⁰ Galotta, "Khayr al-Din", *EF*².

from Syria to Egypt. It was a quick conquest in terms of Ottoman pace, given that the conquest of the Balkan Peninsula would take more than one and a half decades. Following this victory, dependent Arab lands including *Şerifs* of Mecca and Yemen changed its protector and accepted Ottoman suzerainty. Memluk State had disappeared and the Ottomans were now the only significant power not only in the Middle East; but also in the Islamic world.²¹¹

In 1519, also *de facto* vassalage of the corsairs to the Ottoman Sultan was legalised. Khayr al-Din sent an ambassador to the Ottoman Sultan Selim the Grim, to which he responded favourably. Barbarossas had already sent two envoys as an act of submission to the Ottoman Sultan. The first one, Muhiyiddin Re'îs who went to Edirne where he was warmly welcomed by the Ottoman Sultan²¹², and the second, a noted corsair, Kurdoğlu Muslihiddin who obtained audience in Egypt.²¹³ *Gazavât* records the name of the third envoy as Hacı Hüseyin Ağa.²¹⁴ Sanuto also gives the account of the arrival of an envoy from Algiers. However, he notes that his name was Sinan Re'îs instead of Hacı Hüseyin.²¹⁵ On the other hand, Temimi published the letter written by the Algerian notables in which the deeds of the corsairs were praised. This letter clearly indicates that Abu'l-Abbas Ahmed bin al-Kâdî was sent as an envoy.²¹⁶ In my opinion, it is not also possible to rule out the possibility of a joint envoy.

This way or another, Algiers had become an Ottoman province nominally. The incorporation of Algiers to the Ottoman Empire was completed. Selim sent an

²¹¹ Halil İnalcık, "Selim I", *ET*.

²¹² *Gazavât*, pp. 76-8, fos. 63a-66b.

²¹³ *Gazavât*, pp. 87-8, fos. 84a-85a.

²¹⁴ *Gazavât*, p. 114, fol. 135a.

²¹⁵ Sanuto, XXIX, p. 286.

²¹⁶ Temimi, "Une lettre des Algérois", p. 98

investiture decree, *hatt-ı şerif* and a standard, *sandjak*, while in Algeria; the Ottoman Sultan would be accepted as the overlord of the city. Selim also sent 2.000 janissaries, artillery and granted the privilege of recruitment of volunteers which would enjoy the same status with the janissaries.²¹⁷ In exchange, the name of the Ottoman Sultan would appear in the Friday prayers (*hutba*), while his figure on the minted coins.

Selim was probably pleased to see that such troublesome elements were away from his lands, conducting a holy war against the infidels. Yavuz was not only pleased to see corsairs harassing the Christian coasts instead of causing problems in the Aegean Sea, but also aware those corsairs' conquests would be a useful contribution to the Ottoman Empire. It was not only a matter of prestige; Barbarossas had succeeded to establish his rule in North Africa which now the more prudent Khayr al-Din offered it to the Ottoman Sultan. Selim, after the conquest of Egypt, had already started to consider these corsairs under his aegis and the lands they had or would conquer in his sphere of influence. That is why he pronounced *Maghrip* as one of his lands in the *fetihname* that he wrote to his son, Süleyman.²¹⁸

The reasons for Khayr al-Din's choice of submission were obvious. First of all, the Ottoman Sultan was the most prestigious ruler in the Islamic world. Their prestige had increased as a result of the recent conquests. On the other hand, Barbarossa brothers, or any other corsair in the region, were not only foreigners to the local population, but also ordinary soldiers of fortune with no legitimacy. Barbarossas could invade the whole North Africa; however, these successes would remain under the threat of a sudden collapse as long as they remain usurpers in the eyes of the local population.

²¹⁷ Galotta, "Khayr al-Din", *EF*² based on Haedo.

²¹⁸ İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, II (İstanbul, 1971), p. 48.

In North Africa, where the social composition was mostly religio-tribal, corsairs from Levant could not compel people to full obedience. Neither did the attitude of some insolent corsairs help the situation. Even though in their letter, Algerians praised the efforts of the Barbarossa brothers to Selim, this was mostly due to the imminent Spanish threat at that moment. Their attitude proves their disloyalty. They had plotted against Oruç soon after they had invited him to the city. The reason why Khayr al-Din could not leave the city in 1518 in order to help his brother against the Spanish forces was the fact that he could not rely on the loyalty of the majority of the population. A year later, he would have to withdraw from the city since he considered his situation was precarious.

Another reason for that cooperation was the situation of Khayr al-Din in the region. He was well aware of the blurriness of the future. Spaniards were still extant in the region; they were the rulers of important places like Oran, Bougie, and Tripoli. The new ruler, Charles V was far more ambitious and rich than his grandfather was. At the moment, he was busy with consolidating his rule in the Iberian Peninsula. Yet he inherited not only his grandmother's aspirations of a crusade, but also the imperial crown from his other grandfather Maximilian in 1519. Khayr al-Din, on the other hand, was not in an excellent situation. After the recent defeat of Oruç in the region, local rulers were against him and he was having a hard time to find worthwhile allies in the region. The rulers of Tunis and Tlemsen were eager to extirpate Ottoman corsairs from the region since they considered him a more serious threat than the Spaniard aggression was. Furthermore, they were provoking Spaniards. Moreover, in Algiers, the only problem was not the loyalty of the population; a strong Spanish *presidio*, Peñon of Algiers was facing his headquarters.

2.5. Redefined Foreign Policies:

2.5.1. Spain's decreasing interest in the region:

After the victory of the corsairs in 1518, Spanish pressure would decrease gradually. The sole exception would be the expedition to Djerba in May 1520²¹⁹ under the command of Hugo Moncada. He arrived to Djerba with 13 galleys, 70 ships and 10.000 infantry, according to Sandoval.²²⁰ Hess, on the other hand, numbers them as 13.000.²²¹ It is interesting to see such numbers since it would not be logical to think that an expedition of this calibre will be conducted with 10.000 infantry while more important expeditions with lesser soldiers. For instance the expedition against Algiers in 1516 was undertaken with 8.000 soldiers. The reason might be the discouragement of the last two expeditions against Algiers, if not a common fallacy of the afore-mentioned sources. As a result of this expedition against Djerba, the local chief was forced to surrender and pay tribute, which Sandoval records as 12.000 *doblas*.²²² However, this important success²²³ could not be consolidated.

This was most probably due to the complex problems that the dynasty-based empire of the new ruler of Spain, Charles V. He appeared as the most powerful ruler that Europe had seen since Charlemagne; yet he had inherited vast territories with serious problems. The arrival of the sixteen-year old king to Spain would be delayed for some time. When finally he arrived in the Peninsula in 1517, rivalry between his Flemish

²¹⁹ Fisher, p. 53.

²²⁰ Sandoval, I, p. 141.

²²¹ Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, p. 67.

²²² Sandoval, I, p. 141.

²²³ Brandi considers it "a great success against the corsairs". See Brandi, p. 137.

court and the local nobility expecting to fill the high ranks in Charles's court created further problems. As soon as he was proclaimed the king of Castille and of Aragon separately by respective national parliaments, the death of his grandfather had paved way for another challenge: imperial election. As indicated before, thanks to the decisive argument of money Charles inherited his grandfather's imperial crown in 1519.

However, with the imperial election, Charles' problems were not over. Spaniards did not welcome a foreign king with a foreign agenda and a Flemish court. In addition to a late arrival, soon the king would have to abandon his new kingdoms in order to settle the religious disputes in the Empire. After all, his reign would be marked with a universal agenda in the future. The result was the revolt of *Comuneros*. The menace was serious; it was not a bunch of rebels, but the towns who had turned against the new king. On April 16, a popular rebellion commenced. They have expelled royal agents from the city and elected a city committee. The movement did not remain limited to Toledo, it spread to other cities. An alternative Cortes, *La Santa Junta de las Comunidades*, was created. Charles's viceroy, the future pope, Adrian of Utrecht, decided to suppress the movement by arms, a task which he failed in accomplishing. He was taken prisoner by the rebels. The threat was growing everyday, rebels decided to challenge the legitimacy of Charles and offer the crown to its rightful owner, Charles' mother, Joan. She was already legally queen of Spain; yet due to her mental problems²²⁴, Charles was the ruler in force as the co-king for both of the kingdoms. However, she refused rebels' offer. Finally, Charles gave in to the demands of the nobles and the royalists succeeded in separating the noble support behind the rebellion. Rebellion was suppressed in 1522.

²²⁴ She was named Juana la Loca, Joan the Mad.

At that moment, the *Treaty of Noyon* of 1516, which was nothing but “a deceiving appearance”,²²⁵ failed in keeping peace and open hostilities re-started between Habsburg and Valois. The imperial forces were more successful than their rivals. Habsburg contingents succeeded in expulsing French from the Duchy of Milan, while on the other hand, French expedition to Navarre ended up fruitless. Furthermore, in December 1521, *Leon X* (r. 1513-1521) was dead and his successor was *Adrian VI* (r. 1522-1523), Charles’ tutor. Both the secular and spiritual authority of Europe was now united under these two Flemish. Charles succeeded to form a Europe-wide alliance against France in 1523, consisting of his brother Ferdinand, Henry VIII, Venice, Adrian VI, and other Italian states like Milan, Florence, Genoa, Siena and Lucca.²²⁶ Furthermore, he gained the loyalty of the French *connétable*, Charles de Bourbon who turned against his king due to a dispute over his dominions. In 1524, French army was pushed back in Lombardy and the way to invasion of France was open for the imperials. Yet, instead of following the route of Lyon where Charles de Bourbon would assure the loyalty of his former subjects, Charles preferred to attack from Provence. His armies were stopped in front of Marseille.²²⁷ François, on the other hand, marched beyond the Alps with a new army and besieged Pavia. When the Habsburg contingents arrived on 25th February 1525, the battle was decisive. The French king would be the prisoner of his former *connétable* and would directly be transported to Spain.

The emperor was now stronger than ever; however, the peace would not be assured so easily. In France, the regent, *Louise de Savoie* (d. 1531), the mother of François, had nothing to do but to ask help from the Ottomans on the eve of the decisive

²²⁵ Brandi, p. 65.

²²⁶ Brandi, pp. 196-7.

²²⁷ Reinard, p. 375.

Hungarian campaign of 1526.²²⁸ Finally, an agreement was reached between two rulers in January 1526. Yet, the more this *Treaty of Madrid* was favourable to Habsburg interests, the harder it was to execute it.

At the beginning, François left two of his sons to the emperor and parted for Paris where he promised to ensure the return of the contested territories of the Duchy of Burgundy. Nonetheless, such action would result in the disappearance of a coherent kingdom. Thus, the execution of the agreement was not plausible. Furthermore, things had changed. The Ottoman pressure would soon be felt on the eastern front. After the battle of Mohacs, the death of *Louis II* of Hungary (r. 1516-1526) enabled Ferdinand as the husband of the sister of the last king, to have claims on the Hungarian crown. However, a direct threat to the Archduchy of Austria was also obvious. Apart from this Ottoman pressure, Charles had lost his support in the European circle. English Prime Minister Wolsey was not sharing the unrealistic dreams of Henry VIII on the partition of France with the emperor. His primary objective was to hinder the growing power of the master of the Low Countries and of Spain.²²⁹ Moreover, desire of Henry VIII for the annulment of his marriage would create enmity between two dynasties. Catherine of Aragon was the aunt of Charles, and the emperor was by no means eager to see that the interests of his family be challenged. In addition, Wolsey was not the only one who felt challenged by the growing power of the Habsburgs. Italian states also considered that a Habsburg control in the South as well as in the North would upset the balances-of-power

²²⁸ She wrote in her letter: “Confugimus ad Te magnum Caesarem, ut tu liberalitatem tuam ostendas et filium meum redimas”, Hammer, V, p. 113. A French ambassador reached Constantinople in late 1525. See İsmail Soysal, “Türk Fransız Diplomasi Münasebetlerinin İlk Devresi”, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 3 (1951-2), p.66. For the reply of the Ottoman Sultan, see Halil İnalcık, “Haçlılar ve Osmanlılar: Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa Fransa’da”, in *Türk Denizcilik Tarihi*, ed. Bülent Arı (Ankara, 2002), pp. 127-8. For the french translation, see Annie Berthier, “Un Document Retrouvé: La Première Lettre de Soliman au François I^{er} (1526)”, *Turcica* XXVII (1995), pp. 263-66.

²²⁹ Brandi, p. 201.

in the region. Finally, he had lost his support in Rome a long time ago. Adrian VI died and Giulio de' Medici replaced him as *Clemente VII* (r. 1523-1534) in November 1523. He did not lose time to express his anti-Habsburg intentions.

Thus, the *League of Cognac* was signed in 1526 among Italian states, Henry VIII and François. François refrained from respecting the clauses of the *Treaty of Madrid*. Thus, a new war started in 1528 with a joint French and English attack. French contingents headed for South Italy where the Spanish viceroy could not perform a proper resistance. He would soon be killed in a naval battle and leave the kingdom in disarray. Naples was besieged by the French and the entire kingdom was about to fall to the French control. Yet, Charles succeeded to remove the naval blockade by bribing Andrea Doria and ensuring his *volte-face* on June 4. Next month, on August 16, the siege was lifted when the French commander Lautrec was dead on the battlefield.

The result of this round of Habsburg-Valois rivalry was the confirmation of the *Treaty of Madrid* except the restoration of Burgundy to the Habsburg dynasty. The *Treaty of Cambrai*, this *Paix des Dames* was signed in 1529 between the mother of François, Louise de Savoie and the aunt of the emperor, Margareth of Austria. Peace was restored in the heart of Europe at a time when the Ottoman armies were threatening Vienna.

2.5.2. Ottoman's foreign policy analysis in the third decade of the century:

Despite the diminishing Spanish threat and his recent victory against the Spaniards in 1519, Khayr al-Din faced serious problems in the third decade of the century. Even though the classical narrations indicate that Algiers was now a part of the Ottoman Empire, during the period under examination, there was not much cooperation between Khayr al-Din and Constantinople. Selim the Grim had accepted the overlordship offer; neither his son Süleyman was indifferent to the corsairs. However, the Ottomans were also busy with other projects. Hence, there was not a considerable support to Khayr al-Din, even when he had to abandon Algiers. Fisher indicates an Ottoman help in the re-conquest of Algiers in 1525²³⁰; nonetheless, this idea is without foundation. Relationship between the core and periphery developed rather slowly, to the extent that it can be concluded that Algiers's incorporation in 1519 was a symbolic gesture to the Ottoman Sultan in return for afore-mentioned grants. Recently enlarged Ottoman Empire and re-defined Ottoman ambitions who would find its conductor in the personality of Süleyman the Magnificent created a suitable environment for such a deal. Selim was soon dead in 1520, yet only to be replaced by his equally striving son, Süleyman. He was one of the most illustrated Ottoman Sultan known as *Süleyman the Magnificent* in the Western sources²³¹ and *Kânunî* in those of Ottoman.²³² Süleyman

²³⁰ Fisher, p. 54.

²³¹ Gilles Veinstein, "Süleyman", *ET*².

²³² Cemal Kafadar indicates that such a title was started to be used in the late Ottoman historiography. He pointed out that the earliest use was in Dimitrie Cantemir's *History of the Growth and Decay of the Ottoman Empire*, trans. N. Tindal (London, 1734-35), part I, book 3, p. 174. Cemal Kafadar, "The Myth of the Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness in the post-Süleymânîc Era" in *Süleymân the Second and His Time*, eds. Halil İnalcık and Cemal Kafadar (İstanbul, 1993), p. 41.

decided to confront the Western World; most probably alerted by the ascension of Charles to the imperial throne. Not only the usage of imperial title; but also the possibility of the realisation of a united Europe forced Süleyman to intervene in the West. “For the Ottoman rulers before Süleyman I, the Habsburgs were one of several forces”²³³; yet the new Ottoman emperor did not fail to renew his agenda. His immediate expedition was in 1521, against Belgrad, a key point for the conquest of Hungary. Unlike his great-grandfather, Mehmet II, he succeeded in capturing the city. This has been followed by the extirpation of the Knights of St. John from Rhodes and thus assuring the security in the Aegean Sea. At this point, it should be stated that the Ottoman expansion was probably discussed among the decision-makers of the empire in 1525.²³⁴ Surely, there would be an expedition to the West; but which route should be followed?

At this point, it should be indicated that such a decision might have been taken prior to 1526. Already in 1521, Süleyman was hardly persuaded not to lift the siege of Belgrad in order to attack Hungary directly. The five-year gap between two expeditions should then be considered due to the conquest of Rhodes in 1522, and the rebellion of Hain Ahmed Paşa in Egypt in 1524. The rebellion will be suppressed in the same year, following a reform program which was executed by the Grand Vizier İbrahim Paşa himself who resided in the region for 5 months.

There were two basic options. With the advantage of the newly conquered Belgrad, Hungary would be an easy prey. The kingdom was decentralised whose king was not even a *primus inter pares*; the frailty of his father was the reason of his

²³³ Palmira Brummet, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery* (Albany, 1994), p. 10.

²³⁴ Halil İnalcık, “Haçlılar ve Osmanlılar”, p. 128.

ascension to the throne.²³⁵ The glorious days of the king *Matthias Corvinus* (r. 1458-1490) was gone. Thanks to him and his father *John Hunyadi* (d. 1456), Hungarians have resisted successfully to Turkish invasions in the fifteenth century.²³⁶ But things had changed. After Corvinus' reign the nobility had succeeded to get any concession from the elected king. The special military tax that was introduced by Corvinus was abolished; a careless step which resulted in the disappearance of the strong army which was the backbone of resistance against the Ottoman threat.²³⁷ In 1514, a serious peasant rebellion had devastated the country. The response of the nobility was the introduction of an unlikely harsh code of laws, called *Tripartitum*. This proves the upper hand that the nobles had in the country. According to this, nobles would not pay taxes, duties or tolls and have military obligations only in times of defensive wars. King appeared as their superior; nevertheless, only as long as he respected these rules of decentralised nature.²³⁸

On the other hand, another possibility was an expedition from the sea, to be directed against the kingdom of Naples, under the authority of Habsburg viceroys. There was no unity in North Italy and possible alliances can easily be conducted. Italy has been a scene of war since 1495; an Habsburg rule had been hardly consolidated in the region. After all, was it not what Mehmet II would have done, had he not died suddenly?²³⁹ He already considered himself *Kayser-i Rum*, the Roman Caesar, after the conquest of Constantinople and he further desired to capture Rome in order to unify and

²³⁵ Denis Sinor, *History of Hungary* (New York, 1959), p. 134.

²³⁶ For details see Kelly DeVries, "The Lack of a Western European Military Response to the Ottoman Invasions of Eastern Europe from Nicopolis (1396) to Mohács (1526)", *The Journal of Military History*, 63 (July 1999), p. 545.

²³⁷ Sinor, p. 136.

²³⁸ Sinor, p. 142.

²³⁹ Halil İnalcık, "Mehammed II", *EF*.

revitalize the Roman Empire.²⁴⁰ 1480 expedition might have failed because of the unexpected death of Mehmet II, the following civil war and the captivity of Sultan Djem in Europe. Gedik Ahmed Paşa had succeeded to invade Otranto; and unless had the afore-mentioned events taken place, Ottomans next target would have been Italy. Yet, İnalçık indicates that the conquest of Italy at that time was not easy due to the Venetian defences in Dalmatian coasts and fleet in the Adriatic Sea. Moreover, Italian coasts were also fortified.²⁴¹

The choice was an expedition to Hungary, probably because of the weak situation of the decentralised kingdom. In addition, Halil İnalçık indicates that this was due to the position of the French king in the international arena.²⁴² According to Nasuh Matruki, a contemporary source, the reason for the Hungarian expedition is the French king who sought shelter from the Ottoman Sultan with *izhâr-ı ubûdiyyet*.²⁴³ We had already mentioned that the mother of the French king had requested the Ottoman help by writing a letter. In the response, Süleyman's tone was promising:

İmdi pâdişahlar sınmak ve habs olunmak aceb değildir, gönlünüzü hoş tutup azürde-hâtır olmayasız. Öyle olsa bizim âbây-ı kirâm ve ecdâd-ı izâmımız nevverallâhu merâkidehum daima def'-i düşman feth-i memâlik için seferden hâlî olmayub biz dahi anların tarîkine sâlik olub her zamanda memleketler ve sa'b ve hasîn kaleler feth eyleyüb gece gündüz atımız eğrlenmiş ve kılıcımız kuşanılmıştır. Hak subhâne ve ta'âla hayırlar müyesser eyleyüb ve meşîyyet ve iradeti neye müteallik olmuş ise husûle gele. Bâki ahvâl ve ahhâr ne ise mezkûr âdeminizden istintâk olunub ma'lûmunuz ola, şöyle bilesiz²⁴⁴

The calculation was correct. Nobody responded to the call of the Hungarian crown except Pope Clement VII, who was not powerful enough to contribute to a

²⁴⁰ Halil İnalçık, "Haçlılar ve Osmanlılar", p. 128.

²⁴¹ Halil İnalçık, "Haçlılar ve Osmanlılar", pp. 128-9.

²⁴² Halil İnalçık, "Haçlılar ve Osmanlılar", p. 128.

²⁴³ Halil İnalçık, "Haçlılar ve Osmanlılar", p. 128.

²⁴⁴ Halil İnalçık, "Haçlılar ve Osmanlılar", pp. 127-8.

decisive extent.²⁴⁵ The situation of Hungary as the defence of Christianity against Ottoman expansion was no longer important in the newly defined political agenda in accordance with the Valois-Habsburg rivalry.²⁴⁶ Thus, even Charles V did not exhibit the concern of his ancestors for the defense of Hungary.²⁴⁷ After the battle, the last Jagellonean king, Louis died, leaving no heir but his brother-in-law Ferdinand, the brother of Charles and his lieutenant in the duchy of Austria and the Holy Roman Empire.

This death created a struggle over the Hungarian crown. There were two pretenders. One was the brother of Charles V, Ferdinand who was his vicar for the Empire.²⁴⁸ His legal situation was complicated. According to a treaty between the penultimate king of Hungary, *Ulászló* (r. 1490-1516) and Emperor-Elect Maximilian in 1491; in case there remained no heir to the throne, Maximilian would be the regent. Even though not ratified by the *Diet*, this agreement could have functioned as a pretext for Ferdinand's claims to the throne. Nevertheless, there were stronger claims; the double marriage made also Ferdinand heir to the throne. In 1515 an agreement between the same actors was concluded. According to this, Ferdinand was to marry the sister of Louis, while Louis would take the hand of Ferdinand's sister, Mary of Hungary.²⁴⁹ Since Louis was dead, the crown would pass to Ferdinand. However, there was an impediment. In 1505, anti-Habsburg clique succeeded to pass a law that prohibited the

²⁴⁵ For reasons of the failure of European States to provide help to Hungary, see DeVries, pp. 544-45.

²⁴⁶ Pál Fodor and Géza Dávid, "Hungarian-Ottoman Peace Negotiations in 1512-1514", in *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent*, eds. Pál Fodor and Géza Dávid (Budapest, 1994), p. 38.

²⁴⁷ Dukes of Burgundy has always paid a special attention to the issue. Duke of Burgundy, Jean sans Peur fell prisoner of war in Nicopolis in 1396. Moreover, Philippe le Bon, in 1454-6 considered participating in a crusade against the Ottoman Empire.

²⁴⁸ Also, Charles granted his Austrian possessions to his brother due to treaties of Worms in 1521 and Brussels in 1522. For Ferdinand's office in the Empire, see Belenguer, *El Imperio de Carlos V*, pp. 194-5.

²⁴⁹ Even though the agreement was signed in 1515, both marriages were consumed in 1521.

election of a foreign king to the throne. Furthermore, custom was the election instead of inheritance for the royal tiara. The second contender was the leader of the anti-Habsburg clique, Voivode of Transylvania since 1511, *John Zapolyai* (r. 1526-1540). His position was far better than that of Ferdinand. He was the richest noble of the country with an intact army since he did not participate in Mohacs. He was elected by the Diet on November 1526; yet only to be followed by the election of Ferdinand by another Diet a month later. Had he not hesitated, he would have crushed the hopes of Ferdinand.²⁵⁰ However, he gave his opponent time and the next year, Ferdinand not only succeeded in appearing with new forces but also repulsing Zapolyai out of his kingdom. Zapolyai had no option but to search for allies. Ottoman Empire was also an option, at least a realist one, if not the most desired. Zapolyai thus resorted to this option and would then be gradually reduced to an agent of the Ottoman diplomatic manoeuvres. His envoys were in Constantinople, asking the protection of the Ottoman Sultan in 1527.²⁵¹ In return for the dismissal of Ferdinand from Budin, Zapolyai accepted to pay a tribute and become a vassal of the Ottoman Sultan.²⁵² However, this alliance had its own advantages. In 1528, he had already regained the recognition of nobles in Transylvania and Eastern Hungary. After all, Ferdinand had its own problems. German princes were refusing to participate in a war of aggression whose sole aim is to enhance the sphere of influence of the Habsburg dynasty, the last thing they would desire. Charles V was in no position to help his brother, either. In 1528, he was the one who was requesting help, when Naples was

²⁵⁰ Sinor, p. 152.

²⁵¹ Hammer, V, pp.62-3.

²⁵² “Böyle olıcak Yanuş Voyvoda dahî Sultân Süleymâna haber göderüb şöyle ki Pâdişâh-ı İslâm Beç kralını Budimden çıkarub kralluğun bana birecek olursa yıldan yıla Engürüs memleketinden haraç tarikiyle bu kadar bin altın vireyim dedi.” Lütfi Paşa, *Tevârih-i ‘Ali Osman* (İstanbul, 1341), p. 333.

“Ana binâen pâdişâhtan temennâ iderin şol şartla beni Budime begleyüb Budim içinde olan Firendmanuş adamların çıkarub bana teslim idecek olursanız yıldan yıla bu kadar bin altın harâc tarikiyle vireyim.” Lütfi Paşa, p. 336.

besieged by the French army. The real contribution of the Ottoman Empire was the 1529 campaign. Not only did Ottomans besiege Vienna, capital of Ferdinand; but also crowned Zapolyai as the king of Hungary in Buda on their return to Constantinople.

The Hungarian problem would not be solved in the time period which will be studied in here. Ottomans would pressurize Ferdinand once more in 1532. The problem always remained one of the most important foreign policy issues of the Ottoman Empire. After all, as will be seen, also this confrontation will play a significant role in the career of Khayr al-Din. His elevation to the Grand-Admiralty of the Empire was related to 1532 expedition. But this will be discussed later.

2.6. Khayr al-Din's retreat from Algiers (1520):

Algiers would not be the subject of inter-state relations for some time. Neither the Spanish pressure, nor the Ottoman help was there; corsairs' position was still not consolidated. Khayr al-Din was aware that he was encircled by hostile local rulers. What he did was to intervene in the dynastic struggle in the kingdom of Tlemsen. According to *Gazavât*, two brothers of the king of Tlemsen had arrived from Morocco accompanied with an army in order to gain the crown. However, they were defeated. There was not much to do, but to take shelter in one of the two powers that were trying to increase their sphere of influence in the region. Abdullah went to Oran in order to ask for Spanish help, while Mesud was at the court of Khayr al-Din. Khayr al-Din acted

swiftly; as his troops approached to the city, the ruler of Tlemsen fled from the city.²⁵³ However, within a couple of months relations between Mesud and Khayr al-Din worsened, mostly due to problems of tribute.²⁵⁴ Mesut started to act like a “second Pharaoh”²⁵⁵ and it was the time for its replacement. Khayr al-Din, this time, helped the second contender, Abdullah in return for a tribute of 10.000 ducats per year.²⁵⁶ Mesud followed the example of his dethroned brother and the troops of Khayr al-Din replaced him with Abdullah.²⁵⁷

In addition to the Tlemsen expeditions, Khayr al-Din retook Tenes in the spring of 1520, where his fleet also succeeded to defeat a 15 sailed Spanish squadron which was trying to reinforce the town.²⁵⁸

After these conquests, Khayr al-Din divided his kingdom into two administrative bodies like once Oruç did²⁵⁹, to which he appointed two local chiefs as governors. Ahmed bin al-Kâdî, the long time ally of the corsairs, was given the eastern part, of which Khayr al-Din had the responsibility in the past; while Muhammed bin Ali, became the governor of the western part.

The king of Tunis was not discouraged by the defeat of Tlemsen. He had already allied with the ruler of Tlemsen and was actually trying to seduce the most precious ally of Khayr al-Din, Ahmed bin al-Kâdî.²⁶⁰ According to *Gazavât*, bin al-Kâdî refused the previous offer and it was his son who accepted the offer.²⁶¹ Yet, such a claim went

²⁵³ *Gazavât*, pp. 118-20, fos. 144b-149a.

²⁵⁴ *Gazavât*, p. 121, fol. 150a.

²⁵⁵ *Gazavât*, p. 121, fol. 150b.

²⁵⁶ Galotta, “Khayr al-Din”, *EF*².

²⁵⁷ *Gazavât*, p. 123, fol. 153a.

²⁵⁸ Galotta, “Khayr al-Din”, *EF*².

²⁵⁹ *Gazavât*, p. 95, fol. 99b.

²⁶⁰ Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, p. 66.

²⁶¹ *Gazavât*, p. 125, fol. 157b.

unnoticed in other sources. In one way or another, such an alliance was concluded to the detriment of Khayr al-Din. It is not certain why such a clash appeared between two ex-allies, apart from a speculation from Sandoval. According to him, Ahmad bin al-Kâdî deserted Oruç on their retreat from Tlemsen. Thus, Khayr al-Din considered him responsible for his brothers' death even though he did not express it overtly for a while. One day, when he accused him of deserting his brother, bin al-Kâdî left the city²⁶² and naturally responded favourably to the tempting alliance offer of the ruler of Tunis. However, this story cannot be considered reliable since Sandoval's account generally tends to rely on legends and fiction when dealing with the internal politics of the region. Furthermore, were it to be true, *Gazavât* would touch upon the subject.

Another blow for Khayr al-Din would be the desertion of one of his lieutenants. Kara Hasan, who was also the garrison commander in Cherchel, had also joined the alliance. There are two versions for explaining his *volte-face*. One version claims that this was due to a personal clash between Khayr al-Din and Kara Hasan which occurred after a discussion in the Divan.²⁶³ On the other hand, Sandoval claims that this clash was due to the fact that Khayr al-Din imprisoned Kara Hasan accusing him with cowardice. Even though, he later pardoned him, Kara Hasan did not forget the insult.²⁶⁴

Khayr al-Din found himself in a difficult situation. *Gazavât* records many victories he managed to have against this alliance; yet their validity is conjectural. Probably they were once again created to lessen the humiliation of the withdrawal. Khayr al-Din was not defeated in an open battle. Bin al-Kâdî succeeded in besieging

²⁶² Sandoval, I, p. 139.

²⁶³ *Gazavât*, pp.130-1, fos. 168b-169a.

²⁶⁴ Sandoval, I, p. 139.

Algiers; yet since “the war of castle is not like the war of horses”²⁶⁵, he had to come to terms with Khayr al-Din and to withdraw.²⁶⁶ However, Khayr al-Din decided to leave the city, discouraged especially after discovering a local plot against him at the provocation of bin al-Kâdî.

The withdrawal from Algiers should be dated 1520²⁶⁷, while *Gazavât* claims that three years passed between the withdrawal and the re-conquest.²⁶⁸ According to this, since the re-conquest dates 1525, thus the withdrawal should be in 1522. The same account is repeated in Katip Çelebi.²⁶⁹ However, in this context, *Gazavât* cannot be considered reliable since his chronology is already full of mistakes. Moreover, it is known that Khayr al-Din had launched expeditions against Collo in 1521, and Constantine and Bone in 1522,²⁷⁰ from his base at Djidjelli.²⁷¹

2.7. Re-consolidation of Khayr al-Din’s power in the region (1521-1528):

He decided to settle in Djidjelli with his navy of 9 ships, from where he would lead his men for the following half decade. There he continued to compete for the hegemony of the region. In 1521, he conquered Collo and 1522 Bona and Constantine. In 1523, he met with other corsairs like Sinan the Jew²⁷², and Aydın Re’îs²⁷³ in Djerba.

²⁶⁵ *Gazavât*, p. 130, fol. 167a.

²⁶⁶ Gaid, p. 30.

²⁶⁷ G. Yver, “Djidjelli”, *EF*².

²⁶⁸ *Gazavât*, p. 130, fol. 167a.

²⁶⁹ Katip Çelebi, *Tuhfetü’l-Kibâr fi Esfâri’l-Bihâr*, ed. Orhan Şaik Gökyay (İstanbul, 1973), p. 54.

²⁷⁰ A. Gallotta, “Khayr al-Din”, *EF*².

²⁷¹ G. Yver, “Djidjelli”, *EF*².

²⁷² Ebreo or Judio in western documents.

²⁷³ Cacciadiavolo or Cachidiablo in western documents.

With these new allies, he increased his power drastically. Now with a navy of 41 fleet,²⁷⁴ he was ravaging the coasts of Western Mediterranean.

In 1525, he decided that he was then powerful enough to bid for Algiers once again. Apart from the afore-mentioned military successes, he strengthened his position with a local alliance he made with another Kabylia tribe. Abd al-Aziz of Banu Abbas was now allied with Khayr al-Din. The scene was set and it would be once again the population of Algiers who decided the time for the action. They did as they had once invited Khayr al-Din to Algiers since they were not content with the diminishing revenues as a result of the lack of corsair spoils. When bin-al Kâdî prohibited the entrance of corsair ships to the port of Algiers, Khayr al-Din decided to attack. Bin al-Kâdî did not prefer to be besieged and decided to challenge Khayr al-Din outside the city. The battle was decisive. Khayr al-Din enjoyed an easy victory while bin al-Kâdî was slain by his own soldiers who in return for 4.000 *doblas* had betrayed him. Khayr al-Din was once again the ruler of Algiers. Yet, even though Bin al-Kâdî was removed, his accomplice might cause problems in the future. Khayr al-Din decided to show no mercy for his ex-lieutenant and descended upon Cherchel immediately. The population responded to his offer and submitted Kara Hasan with his 13 men and he shared the same fate with his ally.

The next thing he did was to make sure that the ruler of Tlemsen, Abdullah pay the tribute that he did not pay during his exile from Algiers. He had to resort to aggression, since Abdullah whose loyalty to Khayr al-Din was not more than his other

²⁷⁴ Galotta, "Khayr al-Din", *EF*².

two brother refused to pay it. As a result, Khayr al-Din attacked Tlemsen and not only secured the tribute, but also doubled it.²⁷⁵

Khayr al-Din spent the following years in consolidating his position in the region by re-conquering the cities of Tenes and Constatine.²⁷⁶ In addition, Sanuto records that a lieutenant of Barbarossa conquered Bona once again, based on a letter dated September 3, 1525.²⁷⁷ Also, the same year, there might have been a failed expedition to Djerba.²⁷⁸ Furthermore, his lieutenants in the sea were ravaging Christian coasts. He was well aware of the fact that his position would never be secure as long as he was not immune to the Spanish pressure and a possible cooperation between Spaniards and the local population. And it was obvious that he would not be able to secure this immunity as long as a Spanish *presidio* was facing his base in Algiers.

It is hard to say how the return of Khayr al-Din was evaluated in the Habsburg decision-makers. Yet, given the start of Ottoman aggression that resulted in the disappearance of the last Jagellonean king of Hungary and paved the way for incessant incursions and political interventions of Constantinople, North Africa was not the primary issue. Charles V was in a relatively favourable situation thanks to the capture of the French king François in February 1525 and the consequent *Treaty of Madrid*.²⁷⁹ According to this agreement, he did not only force François to ratify his dynastic rights over the disputed territories including Burgundy, but also had him accept to participate in his future schemes against the Ottoman Empire. In the 20th article of the treaty, this

²⁷⁵ Galotta, "Khayr al-Din", *EF*².

²⁷⁶ İlter, p. 89.

²⁷⁷ Sanuto, XXXIX, p. 464.

²⁷⁸ According to this, the Sheikh of the island was unpopular and the corsairs wanted to use the dissention and division in the island. Having firstly retreated to the inner lands of the island, the Sheikh had finally prevailed since he was able to attract the support of the local Arabs. Also, corsairs had no experience in the land. Sanuto, XXXIX, pp. 464-5.

²⁷⁹ For the full text of the agreement, see Sandoval, II, pp. 138-159.

help was written down in details. Its aim will be according to the 20th and 22nd articles will be to “reach universal peace... and consequently intend an undertaking against Turks, other infidels and heretics.” Even though the mention to infidels could certainly be considered that corsairs were also acknowledged in the treaty, obviously the primary preoccupation of the emperor was the Ottoman Empire at that moment rather than the petty state of the corsairs. The agreement also intended to include other Christian powers, a common attribute of a Crusade plan. With the mediation of the Pope, their participation should be encouraged and a call for a crusade should be made at least for the following three years.

However, it should also be added that these two were not considered necessarily separated. Even though the level of cooperation between Constantinople and corsairs were not to a serious extent, the text implies the foreseeing of certain collaboration between corsairs and the Ottoman Empire. Actually, by the time the treaty was conducted, Ottomans’ next target was not obvious. Whether they would prefer to pressurize Habsburgs from Southern Italy or whether to abuse the weak situation of the kingdom of Hungary was not definite. Consequently, the 22nd article indicates a possible joint attack of corsairs and the Ottoman Empire against Italy²⁸⁰.

Yet, such an operation was not realized. Ottoman Empire will be occupied with the destruction of the kingdom of Hungary and later intervening in the consequent civil war between Ferdinand and Zapolyai. On the other hand, the rivalry between François and Charles V could not be prevented after the release of the French king. *Treaty of Madrid* was never implemented; its clauses being unrealistic. As indicated earlier, a

²⁸⁰ Even though it does not indicate so, obviously such an attack was expected to address the Southern Italy.

peace could not be consolidated until 1529, the year Khayr al-Din conquered Peñon of Algiers.

Yet, thanks to his rivalry, Charles V succeed to find himself a new ally that would prove helpful in the naval balance of power of the Western Mediterranean. In 1528, at a critical moment of the war, he assured the *volte-face* of the Genoese admiral Andrea Doria from his employer François.²⁸¹ Just like Charles de Bourbon a couple of years ago, the French king had lost an important ally; without his alliance, French naval power would not cause any concern for Charles V in the Mediterranean. Aside from the naval support, this agreement “had reopened to the imperials also the port of Genoa, reconquering the dominion of the city.”²⁸²

According to Sandoval, Andrea Doria had already problems with François.²⁸³ He was not satisfied with the amount as well as the regularity of the payments. Furthermore, French king chose a certain Antonio Rupefocaldi as his Admiral-General for the navy instead of the Genoese admiral. Moreover, he did not keep his promise to return Savona to Genoa. Under these circumstances it was hard to resist the tempting offer of the Habsburgs. According to his *asiento* with the emperor, Genoese independence would be guaranteed with the restored Savona. Doria will receive 6.000 ducats for every ship in exchange with the obligation to man each of them with 37 soldiers. Most important of all, Genoese merchants were given the right to trade everywhere within Habsburg

²⁸¹ Doria was born belonging to a small branch of one of the four important families of Genoa. After having served to the Papal States when he was young, he turned out to be a mercenary-captain and gained a considerable reputation by fighting against the newly emerging Muslim corsairs in the area. He did not accomplish much, due to the limited resources of Genoa; yet his role in the Habsburg-Valois rivalry cannot be underestimated.

²⁸² Brandi, p. 261.

²⁸³ Sandoval, II, pp. 316-7.

dominions.²⁸⁴

This would help the situation of Charles V against corsairs as well. He was suffering from the lack of a sufficient number of galleys. Neither had he the expertise and resources to build a new fleet especially given the deforestation of the Western and Central Mediterranean and the consequent timber problems.²⁸⁵ Thus, such a help would also help to the defences of the Iberian littoral.

²⁸⁴ Sandoval, II, pp. 316-7.

²⁸⁵ José Luis Betrán, “La llegada de los Austrias al trono”, *Historia de España Siglos XVI y XVII: La España de los Austrias* (Madrid, 2003), coord. Ricardo García Cárcel, p. 76.

CHAPTER 3 (1529-1535): AT THE SERVICE OF THE SULTAN

3.1. Introduction:

Two important events took place in 1529 that paved the way for a new era in which the place of Khayr al-Din should be redefined. Firstly, Khayr al-Din succeeded in removing the Spanish pressure on Algiers by conquering the Spanish *presidio*, Peñon. Following this success, he would not only rise to the prominence of an international actor in the sixteenth century international balance of power system, but also be appointed as the Grand Admiral of the Ottoman Navy in 1534. Secondly, in 1529, direct confrontation between the Habsburgs and the Ottoman Empire commenced with the siege of Vienna. Before that date, the Ottoman Empire had already crushed the kingdom of Hungary, the buffer state between the Ottoman Empire and the traditional Habsburg province, Archduchy of Austria. Yet, for the first time in 1529, this struggle was transformed into direct confrontation. This would affect the fate of the corsairs in two ways. Firstly, since the core lands of Charles V are far from the Ottoman lands, assistance of the corsairs became more valuable than ever with the augmentation of the conflict. They would be useful for the interests of the Ottoman Empire since corsary was

creating serious problems for Habsburg dominions in South Italy and the Iberian Peninsula. Thus, what might have happened in 1526, happened in 1529: Corsairs became an active and important part of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry. Secondly, corsairs did not only prove themselves useful in the *Ponente*. Behind the appointment of a simple corsair like Khayr al-Din to an important rank like Grand Admiral, there was not only a signal of growing Ottoman ambitions concerning the Western Mediterranean, but also a simple necessity. The Ottoman fleet failed in confronting imperial fleet in the Adriatic Sea and the able corsair would be called to the capital for that reason.

In 1535, the corsair power in the region became a serious threat for Charles V. Even though the Ottoman pressure was contained and a truce between the Sultan and at least emperor's brother Ferdinand was concluded in 1533, corsairs' pressure was troublesome. The Ottoman Empire might have diverted its attention to the East, but its decision-makers were wise enough to not only entrust the imperial fleet to a man of calibre, but also order him to continue his operations in the Western Mediterranean. While the Ottoman armies were occupied with the affairs of the East, its reconstructed navy under the command of Khayr al-Din enjoyed a quick victory over the ruler of Tunis and conquered the city.

This was one of the most important moments for the corsairs. The geographical situation of Tunis was more menacing than any other city in North Africa. Charles whose hands were relatively free felt obliged to undertake an expedition despite the negative attitude of his advisors. The importance he attributed to the event was obvious by the fact that he led his imperial troops in person. Apart from this attitude, his future

plans also demonstrated his intentions and long-term policies that he had in his mind for the region; yet European politics would delay the execution of such a plan.

3.2. The conquest of Peñon of Algiers (1529)

In 1529, Khayr al-Din finally decided to attack Peñon of Algiers. Siege commenced, when the commander Martin Vargas rejected to surrender the ill-supplied fortress. A relief force was expected.²⁸⁶ At that moment, Charles was relatively in a better position in Western Europe than he was in the last year. His alliance with Andrea Doria would relieve some of the pressure in the sea, while the peace with the Valois would ensure his formal coronation. Yet, the organization of a proper resistance against the Ottoman Empire which was besieging Vienna at that moment was a hard task. In consequence, reinforcements did not arrive; neither the expected expedition of Andrea Doria was realized even after the fall of the fortress.²⁸⁷ On May 27, the fortress could no longer resist.

Barbarossa had now removed Spanish pressure on the city ensuring a safe harbour for his navy.²⁸⁸ He also consolidated his position among not only his subjects, but also other Turkish corsairs in the region. They had already attended to the siege of

²⁸⁶ Sanuto, LI, p. 77.

²⁸⁷ Sanuto, LI, pp. 11-12 indicates the possibility of an expedition by Andrea Doria following the fall of the fortress.

²⁸⁸ Gaid, p. 32.

the fortress²⁸⁹; and with that victory they will start to operate under the aegis of Barbarossa. Khayr al-Din was now the centre of the Western Mediterranean piracy.²⁹⁰

The conquest of Peñon will not be the only corsair victory in 1529. A fleet under the command of Captain-General of the Spanish Fleet, Rodrigo de Portundo who was returning from Genoa where it had disembarked Charles, encountered a corsair fleet of 14 ships under the command of Aydın Re'îs whose destination was the Balearic Islands.²⁹¹ The result of the conflict was disastrous for the imperial fleet. Portundo died, 6 of his 8 galleys were caught including the Spanish flagship *Capitana*, while another one was burned²⁹². Spanish fleet was stronger at the beginning, yet 5 of its galleys remained in the rearguard and this denied them a uniform attack.²⁹³ Furthermore, Lane-Poole indicates that Portundo did not use his advantage of fire arms. According to him, he did not fire a single gun for he did not wish to sink any ships. He wanted to have the prize money for the fugitive Moors which he presumed that they were on the ships.²⁹⁴

In the Iberian Peninsula, a state of panic prevailed. Empress would admonish his husband that the balance of power in North Africa was changing, and both the Iberian coasts and the Spanish fortresses like Oran and Bougie would be under the corsair threat were serious precautions not introduced. She added that Barbarossa had grown stronger

²⁸⁹ Gaid, p. 32.

²⁹⁰ Gaid, p. 33. Sandoval also records the commencement of the cooperation. According to him, Barbarossa invited Sinan and Ali Caraman and they arrived with their fleets. The result of the invitation was the arrival of 70 ships. See Sandoval, II, pp. 379-380.

²⁹¹ Lane-Poole, pp. 57-8. Even though Katip Çelebi indicates that Khayr al-Din sent the fleet after having been informed that Charles was being transported; this is unlikely. He might have been informed since Charles did not leave the Peninsula secretly. However, such a daring expedition could neither be executed, nor be worth the risks taken. See Katip Çelebi, p. 55.

²⁹² According to a letter written by Duc of Calabria to the Empress, see Arkan and Toledo, pp. 200-1. Even though Lane-Poole indicates that the people of Algiers saw seven royal galleys; according to this letter, this number should be six since the seventh galley was burned. Lane-Poole, p. 58.

²⁹³ Arkan and Toledo, pp. 200-1. Sanuto indicates the number of ships that remained in the rearguard as 4 instead of 5. Sanuto, LII, pp. 208-9.

²⁹⁴ Lane-Poole, pp. 57-8.

than ever with ships he gained “from us” and the contributions of other corsairs that had now rallied around Barbarossa’s flag.²⁹⁵ The defeat was truly disastrous; it was “the most signal and notable victory that Barbarossa has had over Spaniards in a battle”²⁹⁶, if not “the greatest defeat that has ever been suffered by Spain in a galley war.”²⁹⁷

The following year, Andrea Doria’s most expected response would come. Instead of attacking Algiers, he descended upon Cherchel where he was able to surprise the fort and liberate the Christian slaves in the city. Doria disembarked 1.500 arquebusiers and corsairs numbering 500 had to withdraw to the inner castle leaving the city defenceless. He entered the city, liberating 1.000 Christian slave and acquiring 9 corsair ships. However, imperial soldiers did not obey the signal for onboard and continued ransacking the town, creating a suitable opportunity for a corsair counterattack. When this was realized, Doria refused to take the remainders to the ships and left them to their destiny. 314 of them would fall into the hands of the corsairs while Doria with the booty he gained decided to return to Genoa.²⁹⁸ Barbarossa, having had the recent news was waiting for the imperial fleet in the island of Provenza where he calculated that Doria must have come in order to re-supply his galleys.²⁹⁹ Yet, Doria preferred to return to Genoa.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁵ Arkan and Toledo, p. 2. Also for an example of increasing corsair pressure on Habsburg dominions during 1529-1530, see Lucilia Tomás Díaz, Julio Luis Quílez Mata, and Ana María Buil, “La Piratería en el Litoral Tarraconense Durante el Siglo XVI” in *El Mediterráneo: Hechos de Relevancia Histórico-Militar y sus repercusiones en España, V Jornadas Nacionales de Historia Militar (Sevilla, 9-12 de Mayo 1995)*, dir. Alberto Díaz Tejera (Sevilla, 1997), pp. 562-3.

²⁹⁶ Fisher, p. 59.

²⁹⁷ Henry Kamen, *Imperio: La Forja de España como Potencia Mundial*, (Madrid, 2003), p. 85, fn. 32 citing Roger Bigelow Merriman, *The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the Old World and in the New*, III (New York, 1918), p. 296.

²⁹⁸ Sanuto, LIII, pp. 286, 325.

²⁹⁹ Sanuto, LIII, p. 322.

³⁰⁰ Sanuto also expects him to descend upon Algiers; yet he did not risk such an expedition. See Sanuto, LIII, 286.

3.3. Ottoman Habsburg rivalry: 1529-1533

The rivalry between François and Charles had ended in 1529 with the *Treaty of Cambrai* whose clauses were similar to those of Madrid excluding the unrealistic clause on the restoration of the Duchy of Burgundy to the Habsburgs. At the same time, Ottoman armies, relying on the alliance with the contender for the Hungarian crown, John Zapolyai, were invading Hungary once again.³⁰¹ He received the crown of St. Stephen from the Ottoman Sultan in Buda. Ferdinand could not provide a serious resistance. Yet, soon it was discovered that the restoration of the crown to the favoured candidate was not the only objective of the campaign. Ottoman armies would soon appear in front of the gates of Ferdinand's capital.

Charles could not offer much help for his brother. Despite the conclusion of the Habsburg-Valois War in 1529, there were other issues. In 1530, he assured his official coronation in Bologna by pope Clemente VII; being the last emperor crowned by the Pope. Then, he tried to resolve the religious dispute that had shaken the already fragile unity of the empire for more than a decade. After the *Diet of Spire* of 1529, protestant princes were growing restless than ever; the *League of Smalcald* would be signed in 1531. Under these circumstances, now relieved by external struggles for a while, what

³⁰¹ Here it shall be noted that the real intention of the Ottoman Empire was not to conquer the kingdom of Hungary directly; but to contain Habsburg's ascension to the throne. Yet this should not mean that they do not have long term plans on the future of this kingdom; however, they might have chosen to rule over the kingdom indirectly by reducing it to the status of a semi-autonomous tributary state as was the case with other Ottoman provinces like Wallachia and Moldavia. It was considered that it would be difficult and expensive to establish direct control on the other side of the Danube. See Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire, Classical Age: 1300-1600* (London, 1973), p. 35. The real incorporation would be realized after Zapolyai's death. Halil İnalcık also considers the Hungarian policy of Süleyman one of the two-phased Ottoman conquest. Halil İnalcık, "Osmanlı Fetih Yöntemleri", in *Söğütten İstanbul*, eds. Oktay Özel and Mehmet Öz (Ankara, 2000), 447. For the original version of the article, see "Ottoman Methods of Conquest", *Studia Islamica*, 2 (1954), pp. 103-129.

Charles could do best was to consolidate his brother's position within the empire. In 1531, he induced the electors to elect him *King of the Romans*, his second and heir in the Empire.

The result of the siege of Vienna is uncertain. For the Ottomans, the siege was lifted because the campaigning season was over. Yet, at least, it should be accepted that necessity was acknowledged at that time that the public opinion should be appeased. Next year, there will be no more campaigns; but feasts in the capital.³⁰² On the other hand, the Christian world considered the event not a relief, but a victory. Victory or not, Ottomans were expelled, and the immediate danger was contained. However, in 1532, the decision-makers in the Ottoman capital decided to confront Habsburgs once again.

The aim of this campaign was not the conquest of Vienna, but to induce Charles for an open field battle.³⁰³ However, armies did not face each other. The Turkish incursions succeeded to ravage the Central Europe until Liechtenstein; yet there was no response on behalf of the emperor. The Ottoman armies had to withdraw without gaining a decisive victory.

In 6 years, 3 campaigns were directed against Hungary; and the success of the last two was open to discussion. If the aim was to inflict a decisive defeat over the Habsburgs, it failed; since neither was Vienna taken nor did Charles appear on the battlefield and thus suffered no more than humiliation.³⁰⁴

³⁰² Cemal Kafadar, "The Ottomans and Europe", in *Handbook of European History 1400-1600*, eds. Thomas A. Brady Jr., et al. (New York, 1994), p. 611.

³⁰³ Hammer, V, p. 98.

³⁰⁴ Cemal Kafadar, "The Ottomans and Europe", p. 610.

In 1533, Ferdinand's envoy in Constantinople had finally succeeded in assuring a truce between two powers.³⁰⁵ The stalemate in Hungary was satisfactory for the Ottomans, since not only the Habsburg expansion in the area was contained; but also was the majority of the kingdom assured for the Ottoman candidate to the throne. Since the emperor did not wish to challenge his rival on the battlefield; there was not much need for another costly, yet fruitless campaign against Hungary. There was also an eastern front. Thus, the Ottoman armies will molest the Safavid borders, while the centre of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry will shift from Central Europe to the Western Mediterranean, elevating Khayr al-Din to a high official in the Ottoman Empire.

Khayr al-Din's elevation to an important international actor can be dated as early as 1510s, when he was sending envoys to the Ottoman Sultan, conducting diplomatic manoeuvres in the region, hurting Spanish reputation by the defeats he inflicted upon them. Yet, this importance shall not be exaggerated. After the death of Arudj in 1518, corsairs in the region were mostly concerned with local affairs. Khayr al-Din had to leave Algiers in 1520 to come back five years later. Corsairs had continued to cause problems on the sea, yet, during this period, they had no role of which I could find documentation, in high politics, properly speaking in neither Habsburg-Valois rivalry, nor that of the Ottoman-Habsburg.

Yet, this would change with the conquest of Peñon of Algiers. Now the complete master of Algiers, his power increased immediately. As will be seen below, his lieutenants inflicted a defeat upon the same fleet that transported the emperor to Italy for his coronation, on its return. Furthermore, within a few years, Barbarossa would initiate cooperation with the French king which would be followed by another one between the

³⁰⁵ Even though Brandi asserts that it was a *pace perpetua* (Brandi, p. 348), it was a truce.

latter and the Ottoman Empire. Actually, he was the one who instigated the correspondence between the French King and the Ottoman Sultan.³⁰⁶ After his conquest of Tunis, he would send another delegation which also carried the letter of Süleyman to François. In exchange, the envoy of François, Jean de la Forêt would reach Constantinople via Algiers. All these can prove the intermediary position of Barbarossa in this alliance of utmost importance. Again, Barbarossa would be informed by Charles' intentions in 1535 by French agents.³⁰⁷ Charles was also aware of the situation. François had always tried to conceal the fact that in spite of being the “*Roi Tres Chrétien*”, he was actually collaborating with the infidels. However, he was not successful. Would the emperor not have to ask from Pope to pressurize François to give shelter neither to Barbarossa, nor to his men in his ports and not to provide them with provisions? Again, did he not ask Pope to do so in order to realize the “bad intentions and sinister deeds” of François, rather than actually hoping to achieve such help, thus indicating pessimistic view of François' intentions?³⁰⁸ Even *Gazavât* indicates a letter written by the emperor to the French king supplicating to stop collaborating with the corsair.³⁰⁹ The French king might have contributed to the imperial fleet in 1530, when Doria was preparing to attack Cherchel.³¹⁰ But this time, François left no room for doubt. He refused to help the emperor for the Tunis expedition, “because of the treaties he had with the Turk and Barbarossa”.³¹¹

³⁰⁶ İsmail Soysal, p. 71.

³⁰⁷ Sandoval, II, pp. 488-9. This information is provided by the French ships that the imperial fleet met on its way to Tunis. Sandoval, II, pp. 499.

³⁰⁸ Sandoval, II, p. 484.

³⁰⁹ *Gazavât*, p. 177, fol. 259a.

³¹⁰ *Gazavât*, p. 1777, fol. 259b.

³¹¹ Sandoval, II, p. 488.

According to Brandi, this cooperation between the corsair and the French king had forced Charles to recast his Mediterranean policy.³¹² Charles V himself accepted the growing importance of Barbarossa in this period. “Barbarossa with the enmity he has to our kingdoms and coasts, particularly more than any other infidels, as a subject of the Turk (i.e. Ottoman Sultan), and sent by him with the navy which he leads as his Grand Admiral, with the intelligence that he has with the king of France” was harder to reconcile since it would be “necessary to offer and certify him that we would help and favour him to become the master of Africa, especially the Western parts.”³¹³ Charles would come to an agreement with the pope for the defence of the Italian coasts in 1533³¹⁴; yet would that suffice to contain such a perilous collaboration? Barbarossa was surely a more serious concern for Charles than he had ever been before.

Increasing importance of the corsairs and their elevation to a level of international attention can also be observed in international treaties. In both the *Treaty of Madrid* and that of *Cambrai*, there was no explicit indication of the corsairs as a common enemy. The term used is “turks and other infidels”.³¹⁵ On the other hand, during the Habsburg-Ottoman negotiations in 1533 between İbrahim Paşa and the envoy of Ferdinand, Cornelius, Algiers and corsairs became an important issue. Cornelius offered İbrahim Paşa an interesting exchange. Coron could be returned to the Ottomans if Ferdinand’s rights over Hungary were acknowledged and Algiers returned to its former owners.³¹⁶ İbrahim Paşa also acknowledged the importance of the corsairs. From his attitude, it was explicit that during the negotiations, he considered them as useful

³¹² Brandi, p. 341.

³¹³ Sandoval, II, p. 481.

³¹⁴ Brandi, p. 339.

³¹⁵ Sandoval, II, pp. 149, 339.

³¹⁶ Hammer, V, p. 110.

tools for his ends. He claimed that he could neutralize Barbarossa for 3 months in order to make sure that Charles could send separate envoys to Constantinople.³¹⁷ He further claimed that Barbarossa was ordered to act in obedience to the French king, thus using him as leverage in the bargaining.³¹⁸

3.4. Khayr al-Din's promotion:

When the Ottoman forces were penetrating through Central Europe in 1532, what Charles would do at least was to try to divert warfare resources of the Ottoman Empire. Habsburgs were already expecting a naval frontier from their adversary³¹⁹; thus Charles ordered Doria to undertake an expedition in the Adriatic Sea against the Ottoman possessions.³²⁰ Doria, after having failed in conquering Modon,³²¹ successfully invaded Coron, Patras and Lepanto. The Ottoman Sultan had already foreseen such a possibility and sent a fleet to the Adriatic Sea.³²² Yet the Ottoman navy could not impede the imperial fleet since they had to return to the capital because of the lack of provisions. An Ottoman source indicates that the admiral of the fleet was “a frequenter of the tavern and a drinker of wine”. This comment might be a simplification; still its tone proves that the Ottoman decision-makers calculated that this defeat was due to the lack of skill on behalf of the Ottoman admiral. It was after all, because of his

³¹⁷ Hammer, V p. 115.

³¹⁸ Hammer, V p. 115.

³¹⁹ Sandoval, II, pp. 430-1.

³²⁰ Sandoval, II, p. 452.

³²¹ Peçevi, *Tarih-i Peçevi* (İstanbul, 1283), p. 172.

³²² “Pâdişâh-ı İslâm Sultân Süleymân dahi sefere gitmeden bunun tedârikin itmiş idi. Ya’ni bir ulu donanma denize göndermiş idi.” Lütî Paşa, p. 343.

“stupidity”.³²³ This defeat also demonstrated to the Ottomans their fragility of the Ottoman supremacy on the sea. The next year Ottomans sent a relief force as well as a navy in order to re-capture Coron. Yet, another failure would follow.³²⁴ Hence, the decision was made in the Ottoman capital: Khayr al-Din should be called.

Khayr al-Din received an imperial letter sent by the Sultan and brought by Sinan Ağa.³²⁵ He left Algiers in August 1533 with the company of Moulay Rashid, the brother of the ruler of Tunis.³²⁶ He left the administration to his adopted son, Hasan³²⁷ with a garrison of 4.000 soldiers.³²⁸ *En route*, he did not miss easy preys. He sacked Alba and gained 8 of 13 wheat ships that were heading to Sicily.³²⁹ Upon his arrival³³⁰, he enjoyed a grand ceremony and an audience by the sultan to whom he offered his presents: “21 male slaves, 2 *tavashis*, silver artefacts such as decanters and mugs, coloured clothes, a crown of coral, two clocks, and velvet, satin, woollen, and brocade clothes to the Sultan on 12 *Cemziyelevvel* 940 (29 November 1533)”³³¹ He introduced Rashid to the Sultan. Süleyman gave him 20.000 akçe and a robe of honour (*hil’ât*).³³² He was not only

³²³ “Lâkin baş ve bug olan kimesne har’âbat ehli ve şâribü’l-hamr olub gemilerin tedârikin idemeyüb hamâkatından gemileri bozub kendü İslâmbola dönmüş idi. Ana binâen kâfir dahî meydanı hâlî bulub bu hadiseleri itdi.” Lütî Paşa, p. 343.

³²⁴ “Pâdişâh-ı ‘âlem-penâh evvel nahâr olıcak nice pâre gemi donanmasın idüb dahî Koron üstüne gönderdi. Ve karadan dahî yeniçeri ve beglerden niçe beg gönderdi. Ta kim varub Koronı kâfir elinden alalar. Lâkin alamayub vurulurdu. Koron alınmayacak kâfirler girü gemilerle gelüb Koronda olan kâfirlere zâhire ve yeni yardımcılar getürüb pâdişâh-ı ‘âlem-penâh gemileriyle anda olan ‘asker mâni’ olmayub bir mikdâr gemiler alışub zafer bulmadılar.” Lütî Paşa, pp. 343-4

³²⁵ *Gazavât*, p. 193, fol. 292a.

³²⁶ Sandoval, II, p. 470.

³²⁷ Sandoval, II, p. 469

³²⁸ Sandoval, II, p. 709.

³²⁹ Sandoval, II, p. 470.

³³⁰ İdris Bostan indicates that the arrival of the corsair is dated in a Papal document as November 9, İdris Bostan, “The Province of Cezayir-i Bahr-ı Sefid” in *The Kapudan Pasha, His Office and His Domain*, ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon, 2002), p. 244, based on Arıkan and Toledo, p. 264. However, in the same source, the letter’s dispatch date from Constantinople is given as November 9 – December 15. And it is not explicit that the arrival date is November 9. Yet it should be noted that Arıkan and Toledo does not quote the whole document.

³³¹ BOA, Kamil Kepeci, 1863, p. 68, cited by İdris Bostan, p. 244.

³³² BOA, Kamil Kepeci, 1863, p. 75, cited by Bostan, p. 244, fn. 26

appointed as the Grand Admiral, *Kaptan-ı Derya*³³³, but also the Governor-General, *Beglerbegi* of Algiers.³³⁴ At that moment, the Grand Vizir İbrahim Paşa was in Aleppo and Khayr al-Din had to go to Aleppo in order to meet him there.³³⁵ In January, he reached to his destination. Afterwards he returned to the capital for supervising the preparation of a new fleet.

The expectations of the Ottoman Empire from Khayr al-Din were obvious. Ottoman navy was not strong enough to confront the enemy. It is not that the Ottomans' naval power was insignificant at that moment. Ottomans were a sea power since the reign of Orhan I. Colin Imber might have indicated that Orhan had no naval force since he had to resort to the help of the Byzantine Emperor in order to rescue his son from the captivity of the corsairs³³⁶; however, according to Halil İnalcık based on a contemporary source, Cantacuzenus, Orhan had a navy as early as 1333 in his blockade of

³³³ “Pâdişâh-ı ‘âlem-penâh dahî vâfir hazz eyledi andan Hayrî’-d-Din Paşaya kürk kaftân giydürüb Kapudân-ı Deryâ eyledi”, *Gazavât*, p. 203, fol. 311b. The office Kaptan-ı Derya should be considered an administrative responsibility. Its basic duties were the administration of the Arsenal, supervise raw materials and supplies for the navy, to govern the province granted to him by leasing their tax revenues to private tax-collectors, *mültezims*, so that the expenses of the navy can be met. See Salih Özbaran, “Kapudan Pasha”, *EF*²; in addition, for a study on Barbarossa’s duties in that office, see Gilles Veinstein, “La Dernière Flotte de Barberousse”, in *The Kapudan Pasha, His Office and His Domain*, ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon, 2002), pp.181-200. The term “Kapudan” had its Latin origin ironically while its match, Admiral in the Western languages had that of Arabic. It derives from the Latin word “capitanus” or “capitaneus”. Yet, it has to be added that the Persian origins of the word has been speculated. See György Hazai, “A Propos de l’Histoire du Titre Kapudan Paşa”, in *The Kapudan Pasha, His Office and His Domain*, ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon, 2002), pp. 3-6.

³³⁴ “Hayrî’-d-din Paşa Magribden İslâmbola gelüb pâdişâh-ı İslâmın elin öpüb ‘âli pişkeşler çekti. Ve pâdişâh-ı ‘âlem-penâh ana deryâ beglerbegiliğın virüb ve adı Hayrî’-d-din Re’is iken Hayrî’-d-din Paşa oldu.” Lütfi Paşa, p. 344.

³³⁵ “Müşârun-ileyh donanmasıyle rikâb-ı hümayûn-ı pâdişâhîye gelüb yüz sürdükde cümle ahvâl-i memâlik ve ‘ibâd-ı ser’asker-i İslâm-ı mekârim-mu’tâdın ârâ-yı sâ’ibeleriyle görülmek fermân olunmagın müşârun-ileyh dahî Halebe gelüb huzûr-ı mevfûrlarına mülâkât oldılar. Bir sulb ve sâdık enva’ ihsâna lâayık kimesne olduğu ve şâhâne fâhir hil’atlar giydürüb dahî yine kendüye Cezâyir memleketin beglerbegilik ‘üvânıyla ‘inâyet buyurdılar re’is iken nâmı beglerbegi olub kadri ‘ayyuka irişdi.” Peçevi, pp. 175-6.

³³⁶ Colin Imber, “Before the Kapudan Pashas: Sea Power and the Emergence of the Ottoman Empire”, in *The Kapudan Pasha, His Office and His Domain*, ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon, 2002), p. 49. This fact can only prove the debility of the naval forces of that time, not their inexistence.

Nikomedia.³³⁷ Naval power played an important role in the Ottoman conquests. Murad I conquered the Biga peninsula with the cooperation of the land and sea forces.³³⁸ A further development occurred when Bayezid I incorporated the Turkish principalities of Western Anatolia. Naval activities of *begliks* like Menteşeoğulları³³⁹, Aydınoğulları, Saruhanogulları and Karesioğulları were significant since the beginning of the fourteenth century.³⁴⁰ According to İnalçık, their naval activity had succeeded to eliminate the effects of the Papal blockade against the Islamic world that was proclaimed in 1291, following the fall of Akka.³⁴¹ Hence, the incorporation of the fleets belonging to these Western Anatolian *begliks* enhanced the efficiency of the Ottoman navy.³⁴² Yet, same İnalçık indicates that, still Ottoman navy was not able to bid for a naval supremacy. Gallipoli, Ottoman primary naval base at that time was protected by a wall in order to enable Ottoman navy to undertake hit and run tactics. Obviously, this proves that the Ottomans could not compete with Venetian navy at that time.³⁴³ Mehmet I would challenge the Venetian supremacy, yet unsuccessfully. Pietro Laredano succeeded to destroy the Ottoman fleet.³⁴⁴ Mehmet II would also rely on the power of the navy during his conquests in the northern Aegean Sea.³⁴⁵ Yet, his struggle to be the

³³⁷ İnalçık, “Osmanlı Deniz Egemenliği”, p. 52.

³³⁸ His admiral, İldutan is buried at the naval base in Aydıncık.

³³⁹ See Paul, Wittek, *Menteşe Beyliği*, trans. O.Ş. Gökyay (Ankara, 1944), pp. 44-6, 56-7, 72-3.

³⁴⁰ See Halil İnalçık, “The Rise of the Turcoman Maritime Principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium and Crusades”, *Byzantinische Forschungen*, IX (1985), pp. 105-126; Halil İnalçık, “Batı Anadolu’da Yükselene Denizci Gazi Beylikleri, Bizans ve Haçlılar”, in *Türk Denizcilik Tarihi*, ed. Bülent Arı (Ankara, 2002), pp. 73-90.

³⁴¹ İnalçık, “Osmanlı Deniz Egemenliği”, p. 53. Also see Şerafettin Turan, *Türkiye-İtalya İlişkileri I: Selçuklulardan Bizansın Sona Erişine* (Ankara, 1990), pp. 141-184.

³⁴² İnalçık, “Osmanlı Deniz Egemenliği”, p. 53.

³⁴³ İnalçık, “Osmanlı Deniz Egemenliği”, p. 53.

³⁴⁴ Halil İnalçık, “Mehmed I”, *ET*².

³⁴⁵ Halil İnalçık, “Mehmed II”, *İA*.

master of the two seas (*Hakanü'l-Bahyreyn*)³⁴⁶ remained unfulfilled despite his efforts to dominate the Aegean Sea between the years 1456-1479.³⁴⁷

The first real Ottoman challenge to the Venetian supremacy was the 1499-1503 War³⁴⁸ during the reign of Bayezid II, who according to Kissling was the first Ottoman emperor to realize that he had to establish a naval policy.³⁴⁹ The result of the war was an “uneasy peace”³⁵⁰ for the Venetians.

The Ottoman decision-makers would appreciate the collaboration of Khayr al-Din who was an expert on naval affairs since they calculated that his alliance would be useful for the enhancement of the naval forces of the empire.³⁵¹ The pressure of Andrea Doria in 1532 proved that the navy would need a reform as well as able captains in order to cope with the enemy. Corsairs had the ability to undertake both missions. According to a letter addressed to the Doge of Venice, Barbarossa was called to the capital and granted the office since it was expected from him the protection of the entire sea and the conquest of Algiers and of its vicinities.³⁵²

³⁴⁶ Mehmed II was using the title *Sultânü'l-Berreyn ve Hakanü'l-Bahreyn*, if a translation is essential: The emperor of the two lands and the master of the two seas. In this context, *berreyn* were Anatolia and the Balkans while *Bahreyn* were the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea. See İnalçık, “Osmanlı Deniz Egemenliği”, p. 55

³⁴⁷ Halil İnalçık, “Fatih ve Ege Denizi” in *Türk Denizcilik Tarihi*, ed. Bülent Arı (Ankara, 2002), p. 92.

³⁴⁸ İnalçık, “Osmanlı Deniz Egemenliği”, p. 53.

³⁴⁹ H. J. Kissling, “II. Bayezid’in Deniz Politikası Üzerine Düşünceler: (1481-1512)”, in *Türk Denizcilik Tarihi*, ed. Bülent Arı (Ankara, 2002), p. 111.

³⁵⁰ Norwich, p. 385.

³⁵¹ According to the version of the letter that can be found in *Gazavât*, it is possible to understand the motives of the Ottoman decision-makers for recruiting Khayr al-Din. “şöyle bilesin ki eger ‘avn ü ‘inâyet-i rabbânî olursa murâd-ı şâhânem İspanya Kralı mel’ûna bir iki şamar virmekdür. İmdi sen mücâhid kulum ol tarafların ahvâlin bilmekle emr-i şerîfim vusûlunda isti’câlen südde-yi sa’âdetime gelüb hâkpâyuma yüz süresin, zîrâ bu e’imme-yi mühimme husûsında bana lâzımlu kulumusun.”, *Gazavât*, p. 193, fol. 292b.

³⁵² “külliye deryâ cânîbinin hıfz u hırâseti ve Cezâyirin ve kenarların zabt ve siyâneti”, Archivio Stato di Venezia, Sala Regina Margherita, *Turchia Firmani*, Seri 4 XXXVI, No: 6. Even though in the beginning of the document, the date is 4 *Mazzio* 1535, it was corrected by Gökbilgin as 16-26 *Mart* 1535. M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler Koleksiyonu ve Bizimle İlgili Diğer Belgeler”, pp. 54-5.

It was not the first time that the Ottoman Empire was resorting to the cooperation of a corsair. For instance, Kemâl Re'îs not only participated in the Agriboz campaign in 1570 under the command of Mahmud Pasha; but also did he fight with the Ottoman navy against the Venetians during the 1499-1503 Ottoman-Venetian War.³⁵³ Concerning our period, cooperation between the core and the periphery had already started. The agreement of 1519 was mentioned before. Furthermore, even if it is hard to understand its real extent, the capital had always been informed by the developments in the Western Mediterranean. Sanuto records the call for Sinan Re'îs from Constantinople while Barbarossa remained in Algiers in 1530.³⁵⁴ According to two registers in Sanuto of February 1531, Barbarossa sent gifts to the Sultan and the Sultan wanted to make him his captain in the Western Mediterranean. Sanuto did not also fail to note that he was told not to attack the Venetians.³⁵⁵ Also, it could be deduced from several entries that a possible promotion of Khayr al-Din was already being discussed in Western Europe. According to these speculations, Ottoman navy backed by Barbarossa would undertake an expedition in the Adriatic Sea. Its objective was uncertain and speculated. The commander of the navy would be the "Pasha of the Gallipoli",³⁵⁶ (who was also *Kaptan-ı Derya*), yet Barbarossa would be the commander-in-force since he was more experienced.³⁵⁷ Katip Çelebi also indicates that Barbarossa plans to come to Constantinople in those years.³⁵⁸

³⁵³ Nejat Göyünç, "Kemâl Re'îs", *EF*².

³⁵⁴ Sanuto, LIV, pp. 228-9.

³⁵⁵ Sanuto, LIV, pp. 281, 348.

³⁵⁶ Until 1533, Gallipoli was the centre of the *beglerbegilik* of Rumeli and its *sandjak-begi* was the commander of the fleet. Halil İnalcık, "Gelibolu", *EF*².

³⁵⁷ Sanuto, LV, pp. 615, 617-8, 692; Sanuto, LVI, pp. 91, 207-8, 229-30, 270-1, 313, 318.

³⁵⁸ Katip Çelebi, p. 59.

However, it does not mean that Barbarossa was welcome for everybody in the Ottoman Empire. At this point, it should be noted that *Gazavât* records an anti-Khayr al-Din *clique* who was not content with the appointment of a corsair to a high rank within the Ottoman administrative system.³⁵⁹ These “*bazı münafikân*” would not be successful in their lobbying; however, their existence should be noted.

With this promotion, the petty corsair state in North Africa became part of the Ottoman Empire to a more extent than a symbolic act of incorporation would provide in 1519. With this promotion, corsair now became a part of the Ottoman administrative system. He would no longer be a simple corsair whose conduct of Holy War is collaterally beneficial for the Ottoman Empire. Both he and his lieutenants would become a part of the imperial ranks and play an important role in the rivalry between two powers in the sixteenth century. Since the scope and time period of this thesis is not to cover the whole issue, the later administrative development of the North African states (with also Tripoli and Tunis) will be left outside of the analysis.

Promotion and incorporation should have changed the core-periphery relationship rapidly to the detriment of the latter’s autonomy. Interesting it would be to note that as soon as the promotion took effect, Ottoman capital started to exert a certain level of control over corsair activities. In the summer of 1534, Venetians presented an ‘*arz*’ to the sultan in which they complained about corsary against the ‘*ahdname*’ granted to the *Serenissima Repubblica*.³⁶⁰ According to this, two corsair captains, Kulaksız Ahmed and Cuhud³⁶¹ Sinan’s activities in the Adriatic Sea should be punished.

³⁵⁹ *Gazavât*, p. 204, fol. 313b-314a.

³⁶⁰ Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi, E. 5934, cited by M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler Koleksiyonu”, pp. 143-6.

³⁶¹ Sinan Re’is was called the Jew, *Judeo*. This should be a distorted form of the word.

Kulaksız, who was the Captain of Modon, according to the document, had destroyed several ships, belonging to the Republic. In addition, he captured two big ships (*göğre*) on their way to Venice carrying cereals³⁶² and other commodities. Then he took one of the captains, a certain Agosto, to Modon and obtained a *hüccet* from the *kâdî* in order to prove that he did not acquire anything from the captain. Even though Agosto managed to escape, he would still demand compensation. The other captain, Nadalin, was less fortunate, he was decapitated with some of his men³⁶³ by the corsair. Sinan Re'îs' attitude was more mediocre. He caught 13 ships³⁶⁴ and despite the efforts of the Venetian *provvedditore*, refused to restore the seized goods.

Ottomans' response to the Venetian petition proves that a level of control over the corsairs existed as early as 1534. Sultan had already assured the *Signoria* that Barbarossa was ordered to refrain from damaging Venetian possessions.³⁶⁵ An imperial *hatt-ı hümayun* would be sent to Barbarossa³⁶⁶ in which he was ordered to investigate the issue and in case of its validity, to punish the violators and compensate the victims since their actions would be contrary to the '*âhdnâme* granted to Venice.³⁶⁷ Thus, corsairs would be considered under the obligation to observe the Ottoman foreign policy as this direct intervention in the internal affairs of Khayr al-Din's state can prove. They

³⁶² Cereals were generally transported from Anatolia to Venice. This trade became an important issue such that separate clauses were spared in international treaties for its regulation. In fact, Venetians were always concerned about such a trade. Since its importance is obvious in a world in which the basic means of substance was wheat, every state has to be concerned with its provision. Braudel, I, pp. 300-4.

³⁶³ Nadalin nâm reîsin başın kesüp ve dâhi gemi yazıcısının ve yedi nefer rençberlerin bile başların kesüp".

³⁶⁴ "İrûli, uvaklı gemilerimizi deniz yüzünden basub"

³⁶⁵ ASV, *Documenti Turchi*, Busta 3, no. 315.

³⁶⁶ ASV, *Documenti Turchi*, Busta 3, no. 330. For an Italian translation, see No. 331; M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Vesikalar Külliyyatında Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Devri Belgeleri", *Belgeler: Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, I (July 1964), p. 188.

³⁶⁷ "Venedik begleriyle olan 'ahd-i hümayûnum kemâkân mukarrer olup anların vilâyetine 'ahd-i şerîfime muhâlif dahl olunmağa emrim yoktur." For further documentation on the issue, see ASV, *Documenti Turchi*, Busta 3, no. 332 with its Italian translation in no. 333.

were under the direct authority of the Ottoman Sultan and since Ottoman Sultan “does not have an order” for such violation, acts of this sort should be contained.

However, such collaboration would not only mean new responsibilities for the corsairs. Ottoman decision-makers also considered them a part of their armed forces and expected from other states to cooperate with them as they did with the Ottoman Empire itself. The example of France is obvious. What can be added is the fact that it was overtly asked from Venice to collaborate with Khayr al-Din.³⁶⁸ The tone of Constantinople would become more serious six months later since the Venetians should have helped the corsair who recently had to evacuate Tunis, rather than simply informing the difficulties of him to Constantinople. Their eternal friendship should have included the Grand Admiral of the Ottoman Empire.³⁶⁹

3.5. Conquest of Tunis (1534):

At a time when the Ottoman forces were engaged in the East, campaigning against the Safavids, such an expedition would be a diversion and trouble for Charles who was not included in the truce signed between Constantinople and Vienna.

³⁶⁸ “Sizin gemileriniz dâhi anlar ile bile olub yek-dil ve yek-cihet olub düşmana müte’alik olan harâmi ve korsan gemilerini ele getirmek bâbında hüsn-i ittifâk ve ittihâd üzere olası.” ASV, Sala Regina Margherita, *Turchia Firmani*, Seri 4 XXXVI, No: 6; M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler Koleksiyonu ve Bizimle İlgili Diğer Belgeler”, p. 55. Also see ASV, *Documenti Turchi*, Busta 3, no. 315.

³⁶⁹ “Sizün kadîmi sadâkatinizden ve dostluğunuzdan böyle mi umulur idi hakîki dostluk buydu ki bunun gibi haber ma’lunuz oldukda kat’en te’hîr itmeyüb pâdişah-ı ‘alem-penâh hazretlerinin uğrunda kemâl maddûrınızı derîğ itmeyüb gereği gibi mu’âvenet ve müzâheretde bulunaydınız yohsa mücerred haber ile dostluk ma’lum olmaz” ASV, *Documenti Turchi*, Busta 3, no. 343. For an Italian translation see no. 344; Gökbilgin, “Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Vesikalar Külliyyatında Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Devri Belgeleri”, p. 162-3. Also see ASV, *Documenti Turchi*, Busta 3, no. 336 and for its Italian translation no. 337.

Khayr al-Din spent the winter of 1534 in the dockyards of Istanbul in order to prepare the imperial fleet for the forthcoming expedition.³⁷⁰ On August 1, he left the capital with his new navy that was reinforced. Bostan records that his navy was consisting of 100 ships: “35 *bastardas*, 53 galleys, 6 *kalyatas* and 7 rowing boats and 24.400 men, consisting of *alatçıs*, oarsmen, and warriors and 270 artillerymen.”³⁷¹

First he attacked Italian coasts in order to conceal the real objective of his expedition.³⁷² He first plundered San Lucido, where he had taken prisoner nearly the entire population. He then went to Cetraro having been informed that there was the construction of galleys. However, he found the town deserted and only thing he could do was to burn the 6 imperial galleys he found.³⁷³ From there he reached the Tyrrhenian Sea, ravaging the Gulf of Naples. In Sperlonga, the devastation was enormous. 162 houses were completely destroyed while 74 of them were damaged. Apart from the booty, a significant amount of slaves were captured; only 24 people were freed due to illness and age. In Fondi, the population was informed of the arrival of the corsairs and thus succeeded to place their precious belongings within the castle walls. On August 7,³⁷⁴ corsairs inflicted a serious damage on the city, burning 1.200 houses, killing hundreds of people and taking 500 slaves. From there, corsairs headed further North until the mouth of Tiber. According to Bono, contemporary records indicate that he

³⁷⁰ According to Lane-Poole, “the period of Turkish supremacy on the sea dates from Hayreddin’s winter in the dockyards”. Lane-Poole, p. 83. Even though an exaggeration, it still may be considered to witness the importance.

³⁷¹ Idris Bostan, “The Province of Cezayir-i Bahr-ı Sefid”, p. 246 based on BOA Kamil Kepeci, 1863, p. 204. Also he wisely adds that the Venetian documents verify the total number, 100, based on Arıkan and Toledo, p. 265. On the other hand, Sandoval records 80 galleys with 20 small ships, 800.000 ducats and 8000 soldiers alongside 800 janissaries. Sandoval, II, p. 473. Katip Çelebi indicates 84 ships. Katip Çelebi, pp. 64-65.

³⁷² Bono, *op.cit.*, pp. 140-2, Gonzalo de Illescas, *Jornada de Carlos a Túnez*, Madrid, 1804, 41pp., http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/historia/CarlosV/7_2_illescas.shtml.

³⁷³ Sandoval, II, p. 473.

³⁷⁴ Sandoval, II, p. 473.

would not find any impediments if he decided to attack the ancient capital of the Roman Empire. Illescas records that there was a great turbulence in the city since the corsair might have sacked it. Clemente VII was about to die and Cardinals had to exhaust the Papal treasury to finance defensive preparations in the city. Yet, the cunning corsair directly headed for Tunis since his intention was to deceive his adversaries in order to conceal his real objective.³⁷⁵

Finally, he appeared in front of Bizerta, the seaport of Tunis on August, 15. The port surrendered since Barbarossa declared the company of the brother of the ruler of Tunis, Moulay Rashid. The people in La Goletta had rebelled against the governor and expelled him from the city. Khayr al-Din was welcome. On August 22, the same attitude prevailed in Tunis. People were enthusiastic about the news of Rashid's arrival. The ruler of Tunis, Moulay Hasan did nothing but to kill or blind his relatives and then head for the Spanish *presidio* in Oran for requiring military assistance.³⁷⁶ The population was favourable to the invasion presuming that Khayr al-Din would put Moulay Rashid to the throne as he promised. Yet, Khayr al-Din had taken this brother of Moulay Hasan to Constantinople and left him there. When the people of Tunis realized that they were deceived, they took up the arms. In addition, they sent a delegation to the former ruler. Moulay Hasan also joined the rebels and Khayr al-Din found himself besieged. He decided to confront the enemy and succeeded in suppressing this insurgence in which he killed 3.000 in addition to a 5.000- 6.000³⁷⁷ injured. It was not possible for them "to resist cannon and muskets".³⁷⁸ Finally, the city-dwellers had to accept the sovereignty of

³⁷⁵ Illescas, *Jornada de Carlos a Túnez*.

³⁷⁶ Illescas, *Jornada de Carlos a Túnez*.

³⁷⁷ Sandoval, II, p. 474.

³⁷⁸ Katip Çelebi, p. 66.

the corsair under the name of the Ottoman Sultan in exchange for an uncertain promise of re-establishing Rashid in Tunis very soon.³⁷⁹ Khayr al-Din also did not punish the population since he was in need of local assistance. He would need supplies.³⁸⁰

3.6. Charles' Tunis Expedition (1535):

It was a serious blow to the Spanish prestige in the region. What made the conquest of Tunis more perilous such that the emperor himself would undertake an expedition was the geographical proximity of the city to the Habsburg dominions in Southern Italy, namely the kingdoms of Sicily and to a lesser extent that of Naples. Algiers was also an important foothold in North Africa, but the conquest of Tunis would facilitate corsairs' operation significantly since it was a key point controlling the trade between the Eastern and Western Mediterranean. That was why Knights of St. John in Malta was lobbying for such an expedition.³⁸¹ Charles himself indicated that Barbarossa's leaving this kingdom "would not be a little relief for our kingdoms of Sicily and Naples and coasts of Italy and other islands".³⁸² According to him, if Tunis remained to Barbarossa, all the shores from Messina to Gibraltar would be under the corsair threat "unless they are of French"³⁸³. If he was left alone there, he might increase his power in the region by concluding alliances with the local rulers and with the support of the newly gained Turkish forces and navy. *Presidios* would be in danger, and

³⁷⁹ Illescas, *Jornada de Carlos a Túnez*.

³⁸⁰ Sandoval, II, p. 474.

³⁸¹ Danişmend, II, p. 175.

³⁸² Sandoval, II, p. 477.

³⁸³ Sandoval, II, pp. 498-9.

an expedition should be carried out as soon as possible, especially when Süleyman was busy in the East with the Safavids.

The importance of such an action should be considered carefully since at a time of financial problems, Charles forced every possible resource in order to be able to launch this expedition. Tunis could be a second Algeria and given the geographical proximity, it could be very harmful to the Sicilian coast whose production of grain is of utmost importance in a world where issues of grain trade is administrated by clauses of international treaties. In addition, as the *Defensor Fidei* and the champion of a religious propaganda, in a time of relative stability when Ottoman expansion halted in the central Europe as a result of the 1533 armistice, he needed to fulfil his obligations. "...not only the imperial idea, but also the more elementary sense of obligations of a sovereign and of the humanity imposed on Charles the necessity of fighting".³⁸⁴ Charles himself declared that "the honour of a tribute to God, the well-being of Christianity, the necessities of his states, his own honour, and reputation demanded from him such an expedition"³⁸⁵ Karl Brandi insisted on his eagerness for this expedition asserting that he was not so eagerly interested in repulsing the Turkish pressure in the central Europe in 1532. He was on the field in 1532, "in retard and nearly unwillingly"³⁸⁶. Brandi even concluded that the emperor demonstrated special attention for the continuation of the peace with France in order to be able to undertake this expedition.³⁸⁷ He would not follow the advices of the Archbishop of Toledo, Cardinal Juan de Tavera.³⁸⁸

³⁸⁴ Brandi, p. 348.

³⁸⁵ Brandi, p. 354.

³⁸⁶ Brandi, p. 355.

³⁸⁷ Brandi, pp. 351-2.

³⁸⁸ Brandi, p. 354.

Charles was relying on local elements. The first thing he did was to send a spy to the city, called Luis de Presendes, whose fate was execution since the Morisco that accompanied him from Spain informed him to Barbarossa.³⁸⁹ Nevertheless, instructions given to him would blatantly demonstrate Charles' priorities in the region. His primary aim was to be familiar with Barbarossa and the ruler of Tunis with the help of his disguise as a merchant. If the ruler of Tunis was in the city, he should invent a way to provoke enmity between him and the corsair and try to induce him to expel Barbarossa from the city. He should create "dissention, suspicion and other forms of discontent" between Barbarossa and his entourage,³⁹⁰ in order to divide their opinions and create discord. Such discord would result in his destruction.³⁹¹ As a result of it, Barbarossa should be expelled with the most possible damage to himself, his forces and his navy in order to facilitate his destruction later. On the other hand, if the ruler of Tunis was expelled from the city, he should be encouraged to invade it. Help from the emperor should be guaranteed; yet the ruler of Tunis should be reminded that Tunis was tributary to the emperor.³⁹² When success was realized, a further cooperation between him and the corsair should be prevented. He should guarantee that the ports of Tunis would be closed to Barbarossa. These negotiations should be done discreetly since Barbarossa might come to terms with Moulay Hasan if he realized a possible cooperation between him and the emperor.

Additionally, he might try to induce the local population to turn against Barbarossa. Such a task would be easy given their fragile loyalty. He was instructed to

³⁸⁹ For instructions given to him, see Sandoval, II, pp. 477-482.

³⁹⁰ "Those who were most acceptable to him, whom he valued the most". Sandoval, II, pp. 478.

³⁹¹ "due to the little faith, affection or constancy infidels demonstrate to each other". Sandoval, II, pp. 478.

³⁹² "It would be necessary to ask from these kings, to remain our tributaries for such an aid and help". Sandoval, II, pp. 480.

offer Christian renegades residing in the city a good treatment, pardon for their great sin -i.e. renouncement of Christianity- and a safe return to Europe in return for their cooperation. Also bribing the local population would be useful.³⁹³

Charles started preparations as soon as possible. He sent letters to Italy to his Genoese admiral, Andrea Doria and the viceroy of Naples, Pedro de Toledo ordering that they work in collaboration in order to provide food provisions and artillery for the navy.³⁹⁴ Furthermore, he wrote to the Pope and the French king asking for their participation in this expedition “with the most possible speed and amount”.³⁹⁵ Pope should write to François, for the acquisition of 6 galleys and an open declaration of the cessation of cooperation with Barbarossa. François should declare Barbarossa his enemy. The French king rejected both of the proposals while Pope agreed to give 12 galleys and a quarter of the *beneficios* from the Church revenues.³⁹⁶

It would be an international expedition, yet with a predominantly Italian character since the defence of the Italian coasts was the objective.³⁹⁷ The imperial fleet would consist of 82 galleys according to Sandoval. Alvaro de Bazán, the Commander-General of the Spanish Fleet, would bring 15 galleys, while the Grand Admiral of the Imperial Fleet, Andrea Doria would attend with his 19 and his cousin Antonio’s 5 galleys. Pope, as he had promised, would contribute 12 galleys under the command of Virginio Ursino. The contribution of the Habsburgs was not limited to the galleys of the Spanish fleet. 6 galleys from Naples would be under the command of Garcia de Toledo

³⁹³ “Moors, Jews and other persons who would be a part of and useful for the realization of the aforementioned effects”, Sandoval, II, p. 479.

³⁹⁴ Sandoval, II, pp. 483-4.

³⁹⁵ Sandoval, II, p. 484.

³⁹⁶ Sandoval, II, p. 488.

³⁹⁷ Kamen, *Imperio*, p. 95

while 10 from Sicily under the command of Berenguel de Requesens. Furthermore, imperial allies would participate in the expedition. Genoa would contribute with 9 galleys, Monaco with 2 and Knights of St. John in Malta with 4 under the command of Aurelio Botigela.³⁹⁸ Apart from these forces, Portuguese were also present under the command of a Portuguese royal, the infant Louis, with 24 caravels.³⁹⁹ Furthermore, with other ships of minor size, the total volume of the navy exceeded 300 ships.⁴⁰⁰

The numbers in the land forces of the emperor were also indicated by Sandoval. According to this, the imperial fleet would carry 26.000 paid soldiers, 2.000 cavalry of diverse nations and c. 16.000 armed adventurers with 10.000 marines. The total number was equal to c. 54.000.⁴⁰¹ According to Kamen, there was some thirty thousand in the army,⁴⁰² this number being logical when irregular armed adventurers were excluded. Illescas still gives certain numbers. According to this, the emperor had 8.000 soldiers in Barcelona in addition to 700 cavalry which were his personal guards. The Portuguese prince Luis also brought 2.000 soldiers with him. Furthermore, there were 5.000 Italians and 8.000 Germans that was embarked from Genoa.⁴⁰³

At the head of the expedition, there were two Italians. Doria was the Admiral of the naval forces while Vasto was the commander of the army.

On the other hand, it is hard to examine Barbarossa's forces. Even though for imperial forces, numbers could be based on a Spanish chronicle, such a source is

³⁹⁸ Sandoval, II, p. 498. Also Henry Kamen gives likely percentages. According to him out of the same total number, 82, 18 percent were Spanish ships, 40 percent were Genoese ships whose majority belonged to Doria and the remaining 42 percent were the ships coming from Italian states. Kamen, *Imperio*, p. 95.

³⁹⁹ Sandoval, II, p. 490. Illescas numbers them as 25. See Illescas, *Jornada de Carlos a Túnez*.

⁴⁰⁰ Sandoval, II, p. 496. According to Illescas, their number was actually more than 700. Illescas, *Jornada de Carlos a Túnez*.

⁴⁰¹ Sandoval, II, p. 510.

⁴⁰² Kamen, *Imperio*, p. 95.

⁴⁰³ Illescas, *Jornada de Carlos a Túnez*.

inapplicable for Barbarossa's forces. It had already been indicated the total number of his soldiers -24.400- before he left Constantinople; however, given that he was engaged in armed conflicts before he conquered Tunis, it is not possible to indicate an exact number for that moment. According to Sandoval, the corsair had 7.000 Turks, 800 janissary and 7.000 archers, 7.000 spearmen and 8.000 Arab cavalry in Tunis and furthermore a garrison of 1.000 corsairs that was left in La Goletta.⁴⁰⁴ However, these numbers should be an exaggeration. The total of them exceeds the number originally indicated by the Ottoman sources for the commencement of the expedition. They were the estimates of an outsider, thus unreliable. Furthermore, Sandoval could not be objective in this manner since his basic duty is to glorify the deeds of Charles. It was probably already hard to accept that the emperor was actually leading an expedition in person against a corsair of humble origin. At least he could exalt the victory that the Defender of the Faith gained against this infidel. Anyway, he would increase this number later when both armies confronted each other in an open battle. He would pronounce 80.000 infantry accompanied by 20.000 cavalry.⁴⁰⁵ Illescas also indicates the same total.⁴⁰⁶ Strangely enough they are not alone to do so since Charles himself indicated the same numbers in a letter addressed to Marquis de Cañete, the viceroy of Navarre.⁴⁰⁷ It is still an exaggeration since such an army would be hard to feed and supply. However, at least it is obvious that there was a common exaggeration on the Spanish side. On the other hand, Hammer indicates that Barbarossa had confronted the imperial army after the conquest of La Goletta with 7.200 soldiers while 2.500 Arab

⁴⁰⁴ Sandoval, II, p. 502.

⁴⁰⁵ Sandoval, II, pp. 548-9.

⁴⁰⁶ Illescas, *Jornada de Carlos a Túnez*.

⁴⁰⁷ Sandoval, II, "Letter of Charles V to Marquis de Cañete dated 25 July 1535", p. 556.

cavalry abandoned the cause. Hence, the number he offered is 9700 at a later stage of war.⁴⁰⁸ *Gazavât* on the other hand, indicates that after the appearance of Moulay Hasan and the *volte-face* of the Arab cavalry, number of soldiers decreased to 5.000-10.000.⁴⁰⁹ After the defeat, this number would further be curtailed: 3.000-4.000.⁴¹⁰ Yet, it is still hard to conclude an exact number; what is possible is to understand that the numbers in Spanish sources are exaggerated.

Barbarossa also started war preparations since he was informed of the real destination of the imperial fleet. He strengthened fortifications, ensured supplies and asked help from the ruler of Tlemsen and other corsairs. Yet, he did not have enough time and resources for realizing an effective reconstruction of the fortifications. Since he was aware that his situation was not strong, he decided to fortify the fortress of La Goletta. He thought that the Emperor would not divide his forces and not directly lead them to Tunis while corsair forces remained in his rearguard. If he did so, corsairs would be able to jeopardize his lines of supply.⁴¹¹ Charles also would accept the situation in a letter addressed to Cañete.⁴¹² “To facilitate the expedition, it would be more convenient to lead on Tunis and besiege it, considering when this city is conquered, in La Goletta, there would remain no resistance”.⁴¹³ Yet, between the navy and the Tunis there were 9 miles and it would be hard to supply the army, when a fortified La Goletta was left behind. Khayr al-Din built walls along the port which he had to complete with wood, bags of wool and with other materials connected and

⁴⁰⁸ Hammer, V, p. 148.

⁴⁰⁹ *Gazavât*, p. 210, fol. 326a.

⁴¹⁰ *Gazavât*, p. 211, fol. 327a.

⁴¹¹ Sandoval, II, p. 504.

⁴¹² Sandoval, II, “Letter of Charles V to Marquis de Cañete dated 30 June 1535”, p. 526-9.

⁴¹³ Sandoval, II, p. 526.

chained together. This indicates the time problem even though Sandoval was surprised by the efficiency of this lame construction. Furthermore, he ordered the construction of a bridge over the canal both in order to facilitate the defence organization and the mobilization of the artillery from one side to another.⁴¹⁴

An expedition to La Goletta must be undertaken from the north side since there was not enough width between the lake and the bay. The land between the sea and La Goletta could be used as a shelter. Barbarossa placed a fleet of 12 galleys there in order to make sure that in case the imperial fleets suffers from a disaster, these galleys should be able to follow the victory. 6 of them were left in the canal, their rows being taken out, while the remaining 6 were waiting outside the canal.⁴¹⁵ Furthermore, he sent 14 galleys to Bona⁴¹⁶ and 12 galleys to Algiers, all full of riches. Last but not the least; he took some precautions in the city. According to Sandoval, did he not only bribe the population with 200.000 ducats but also imprisoned the Christian slaves in the city in order to prevent their possible uprising. Furthermore, he asked from those who did not

⁴¹⁴ Sandoval, II, p. 505.

⁴¹⁵ Sandoval, II, p. 505. Yet, Charles indicated their number as 10 or 11 in one of his letters to Marquis de Cañete dated 30th June 1535. See Sandoval, II, p. 526.

⁴¹⁶ *Gazavât* numbers them as 16. In addition, it claims that these ships numbering 20 at the beginning were sent by Khayr al-Din to commit corsary. Then they attacked Sardinian coasts and had to retreat to Bona, - when their number reduced to 16- instead of reaching to their final destination which was Algiers. The winter had approached. “Cezâyire toğrı giderlerken havalar kış olmagıla Cezâyiri tutamayub dahî pocalayub Beled-i Annâba –i.e. Bona- gelüb dâhil oldılar.” *Gazavât*, p. 209, fol. 324b. However, this narration should be discussed. In my opinion, *Gazavât* tries to explain the fact that Khayr al-Din took precautions against a possible defeat by diverting his forces. As was the case in the narration of Oruç’s death, it tries to cover the facts. For otherwise, why should Khayr al-Din send some of his navy to engage in corsary, when the imperial forces were approaching? It should be noted that in certain parts of *Gazavât*, a similar attitude can be observed. Especially in times of defeat, not only did it include distorted numbers –which we also encountered in Sandoval-; but also invented stories. In Chapter 2, we had already noted how it tried to conceal the fact that Oruç was killed while he was running away. Furthermore, for the same expedition, it indicated that Oruç sent some of his forces to Algiers while his position was less secure in Tlemsen. “İki yüz çadur benüm yanımda çok şeydür”, *Gazavât*, p. 98, fol. 103b. The same thing applies to this expedition. According to *Gazavât*, Khayr al-Din not only refused and sent back the reinforcements from Algiers; but also sent some of his own soldiers with these reinforcements; which is the last thing to do at such a moment. *Gazavât*, p. 207, fol. 320a.

wish to risk their lives to leave the city in order to lessen the number of people to feed.⁴¹⁷

The imperial fleet left Barcelona on May 30. They reached to the ancient city of Carthage on June 16. Del Vasto had been sent to scout La Goletta and its vicinity with 22 galleys while the entire infantry totalling 15.000 with some of the artillery was being disembarked. On June 17, disembarking was finalised with the landing of 8.000 Spanish cavalry forces and the rest of the artillery and other war materials.⁴¹⁸ The siege of La Goletta started on 18th June.⁴¹⁹ The emperor had decided to conquer the fortress before going directly against Tunis.⁴²⁰ The first series of skirmishes were generally of minor importance since corsairs evaded from leaving their shelter and the Emperor tried to refrain from useless aggression. There were furthermore, issues of discipline right from the beginning. On the second day, Emperor already had to issue an order in which he prohibited burning down the houses, cutting the trees or committing theft. A further problem was the voluntary regiments in the army; the same day they were ordered to register their name for the army in order to assure the discipline.⁴²¹

The siege was conducted with artillery bombardments and mutual skirmishes on a daily basis. In addition to these skirmishes which generally took place in the olive yards in the vicinity,⁴²² there was constant artillery bombardment on both sides. The commander of the garrison forces was Sinan Re'îs. He tried to repulse the attack several times but he could not succeed. The advantage of the fortress was the presence of the

⁴¹⁷ Sandoval, II, p. 502.

⁴¹⁸ Sandoval, II, p. 500.

⁴¹⁹ Sandoval, II, p. 506.

⁴²⁰ Sandoval, II, p. 504.

⁴²¹ Sandoval, II, p. 503.

⁴²² Sandoval, II, p. 511.

little ships that were providing supplies to the fortress from Tunis through the lake. Imperial forces, on the other hand, were facing serious supply problems.⁴²³

On June 22, there occurred a small skirmish between Moriscos and the imperial forces.⁴²⁴ The next day, 1.000 infantry and 80 cavalry from La Goletta made a *sortie* in which they succeeded in defeating a contingent of Italian soldiers. Italians were situated in front of the trenches in order to guard it, where the artillery was being established. When corsairs attacked, soldiers were already tired since they helped in the fortifications during the night. Furthermore, they did not actually defend it; but rather leave for an offensive fight.⁴²⁵ Corsairs faked a retreat and inflicted upon their adversaries a crushing defeat. Andrea Doria tried to help the Italian contingents; however, reinforcements that he sent arrived after corsairs had retreated to La Goletta. The count of Sarno, “the colonel of 1200 Italian soldiers” was among the casualties⁴²⁶ and the bastion was lost.⁴²⁷ The same night, another attack was attempted to another bastion guarded by the Spaniards. Even though the surprised and tired imperials suffered some casualties; this time, the attack was repulsed.⁴²⁸ The same day, encouraged corsairs decided to attack with two squadrons; 1.000 in the vanguard and a further 2.000 in the rear. First they retreated having heard the alarm bells ringing in the imperial camp. Then, when the imperials thought they had actually withdrawn, they appeared once again from where they were hidden. Even though inflicting a surprise attack, corsairs had to withdraw

⁴²³ Sandoval, II, p. 506. For an example to supply problems, see Sandoval, II, p. 511. According to this, the situation was such that a chicken cost 2 ducats while a cow 10. There was no fresh bread.

⁴²⁴ Sandoval, II, p. 512.

⁴²⁵ Sandoval, II, p. 527

⁴²⁶ Sandoval, II, p. 513.

⁴²⁷ Sandoval, II, p. 527.

⁴²⁸ Sandoval, II, p. 528.

when the imperials could present a uniform defence.⁴²⁹ On June 25, a small group of reinforcements had arrived from Italy and Spain. With the advent of Hernando de Alarcón, the imperials decided to halt the skirmishes and concentrate on the construction of the bastions with more forces.⁴³⁰

On June 26, Barbarossa tried to surprise the imperial forces by sending a contingent of Arab cavalry through the olive groves; yet the expedition failed. The imperials were informed of the surprise attack and they were already armed the night before the attack.⁴³¹ On June 28, bad weather hindered the military operations. The strong winds had resulted in a sand storm which impeded the sight of both armies. The sight between the land and naval forces was lost. At this moment, 200 corsairs made a *sortie* from La Goletta in order to raise the sand such that the winds would take them to the imperial camp and thus impeding their vision. Moreover, a larger contingent attacked imperial bastions but the resistance prevailed.⁴³² On June 29, Moulay Hasan appeared with 200 Moors in his company⁴³³, a number probably lesser than expected. Gazavât indicates that he promised to arrive with 50.000 – 60.000 Arab cavalry in his letter to the emperor.⁴³⁴ He tried to hire some local mercenaries with 20.000 ducats that

⁴²⁹ Sandoval, II, pp. 515-6.

⁴³⁰ Sandoval, II, p. 517.

⁴³¹ Sandoval, II, pp. 517-20

⁴³² Sandoval, II, p. 521.

⁴³³ Sandoval, II, p. 522. Brandi numbers them 300. Brandi, *op.cit.*, p. 357. Also, Charles indicated a further reinforcement of 900-1000 Moors that was promised by Moulay Hasan in a letter addressed to Marquis of Cañete, dated 30 June 1530. See Sandoval, II, p. 529.

⁴³⁴ *Gazavât*, p. 208, fol. 322b. Yet, the same source indicates that he kept his promise, even though he arrived late. See *Gazavât*, p. 210, fol. 325b. However, *Gazavât*, in this context is less reliable since the number mentioned is more than the ruler of Tunis could recruit in such short time. In addition, concerning this expedition, *Gazavât* tends to distort facts. For instance, while Sandoval gives numbers for the captured vessels (Sandoval, II, p. 543) backed by the letter of the emperor himself (Sandoval, II, pp. 543-4.), *Gazavât* claims that Khayr al-Din had already sent imperial fleets back to Constantinople. He was afraid to lose them. “Kim bildün, bir şey olursa adımız pâdişâh donanması zâyî’ etmiş çıkar. Hoş hakîr-i pür taksîr devlete on o kadar donanma yapacak mâl gönderdüm, ammâ hemân eyüsi gıtdügidür”.

he borrowed from Charles; but they did not appear claiming religious excuses for such behaviour even though they had taken the money willingly.⁴³⁵ Hasan was not the perfect ally. He could not provide an efficient armed force for the imperial army. Out of the reduced number he could provide, there would remain only 12 or 15 at the end of the war.⁴³⁶ Yet, despite his failure to provide soldiers, his contribution was decisive for the imperial campaign. Illescas enthusiastically addresses to his usefulness. He was grateful to his knowledge on the quality of the land, forces of the city, wells and cisterns which was so dear to the ill-provisioned imperial army. Furthermore, Moulay Hasan helped in constructing a military strategy. He advised the imperials to cut off olive groves in order to refrain from an ambush. He then guessed that Barbarossa would prefer an open battle and to leave the city in his rearguard instead of accepting the siege within the city walls. He would put his Moorish troops in the vanguard, while he and his core forces would wait behind them. Hence, in case of an easy defeat in the first line, the corsair would be able to leave the field immediately.⁴³⁷

In the first three days of July, there was not much fighting. On the imperial side, it was realised that skirmishes were nothing but the loss of time and resources. The main target was the fortifications of La Goletta. Thus, there were only works of trenches and bastions.⁴³⁸ Since there was nothing but sand in the region, there were also further problems of raw materials for the construction. The construction would be realised with timber; yet even for that there was the necessity of sending galleys 20 miles away.

Furthermore, neither did he lose remaining 20 ships since he also sent them to Algiers. *Gazavât*, p. 209, fos. 323b-324a.

⁴³⁵ Sandoval, II, pp. 528, 530.

⁴³⁶ Sandoval, II, p.244.

⁴³⁷ Illescas, *Jornada de Carlos a Túnez*.

⁴³⁸ Sandoval, II, p. 529.

Surely, corsairs did not consent to the pacific attitude of the imperials. They should attack and try to impede construction, so they did. Yet, there was not much success on their side; and the casualty would be less unless the imperial forces left their places so eagerly.⁴³⁹

On the 4th July, due to the lack of provisions for horses, the Emperor ordered the Duke of Alba to escort them. Having been informed, corsairs decided to attack since there would be fewer soldiers for the defences. What was less fortunate for the imperials was the constant eagerness of the imperial soldiers for leaving their defensive formation. Having seen corsairs out of La Goletta, they responded to the challenge. They succeeded to drive corsairs until the fortress. There was fierce struggle. The imperials finally decided to retreat since the casualties were considerable. The number of casualties would increase during the abortive retreat.⁴⁴⁰

On 8th July, the consul of war decided to present the most serious problem for the imperial army. Corsairs could successfully send forces and provision to La Goletta from Tunis through the canal and this should be hindered. It was decided that during the night, an investigation should be done near the canal in order to understand that whether it would be possible to sail small ships.⁴⁴¹ If they succeeded in such an operation, it would be a great blow to the corsair efficiency. Not only would they be deprived from provisions; but also would it not be possible for them to retreat safely in case of La Goletta's fall.⁴⁴² However, this plan was not executed.⁴⁴³

⁴³⁹ Sandoval, II, p. 530.

⁴⁴⁰ Sandoval, II, pp. 531-2.

⁴⁴¹ Sandoval, II, p. 534.

⁴⁴² Sandoval, II, p. 535.

⁴⁴³ Sandoval, II, p. 537.

On July 10, another spy was sent to Goletta and Tunis in order to seduce the renegades in La Goletta and Moors in Tunis. Yet he shared the fate of his predecessor.⁴⁴⁴ 4 ships arrived from Sardinia with provisions; however, these would not even suffice for the nobles.⁴⁴⁵ On July 12, Barbarossa attacked a watchtower at the control of the imperials since he was informed at the weak situation there. However, his forces had to retire before attacking when they saw the approach of the reinforcements.⁴⁴⁶

Finally, the decisive hour had come. At the dawn of July 14, preparations had started for a decisive assault. Charles and Louis of Portugal addressed the soldiers with encouraging speeches. Land forces were divided into squadrons backed by artilleries. There were 20 pieces of artillery with the Spaniards including a *culebrina*⁴⁴⁷ which was more than 27-feet large. Italians would attack with 16 pieces. There was a small trench in front of the imperial tent in which were situated 1.000 arquebusiers in order to check the possible arrival of the reinforcements from Tunis.⁴⁴⁸

The navy was also divided into squadrons. Andrea Doria was bombarding the tower, the new walls and the batteries of the coasts, while Virginio Ursino commanded tother galleys.⁴⁴⁹ Emperor ordered Garcia de Toledo and Alvaro Bazán to go to the cape of Carthage with 24 galleys in order to protect the rearguard of the army.⁴⁵⁰ After hours of bombardment and firing 4000 cannon bullets,⁴⁵¹ at two o'clock,⁴⁵² De Vasto and

⁴⁴⁴ Sandoval, II, p. 535

⁴⁴⁵ Sandoval, II, p. 536.

⁴⁴⁶ Sandoval, II, p. 537.

⁴⁴⁷ A large piece of artillery.

⁴⁴⁸ Sandoval, II, p. 539.

⁴⁴⁹ Sandoval, II, p. 539.

⁴⁵⁰ Sandoval, II, pp. 539-40.

⁴⁵¹ Sandoval, II, p. 540.

⁴⁵² "Two hours more than noon", Sandoval, II, p. 541

Doria decided that the time had come. By that time, Bazán also sent two messengers to the emperor indicating that the batteries of the navy had inflicted severe damage on the walls such that it would be possible to penetrate inside. With the permission granted, both land forces and those of sea had conducted a final assault to which the fortress could not resist, due to the newly opened cracks in the walls. Yet, the garrison commander Sinan Re'îs with some of his men was able to withdraw to Tunis in brigantines through the lake.⁴⁵³

There was not much to plunder for soldiers. Nonetheless, there were supplies; imperial army had acquired 400 pieces of artillery and great amount of gunpowder, all essential for the expedition. In addition, 42 galleys, 44 galeotas, brigantines and fustas with a further 27 round sails were seized in the canal.⁴⁵⁴

After the victory, there were talks of retreat in the imperial camp. Since La Goletta was seized including Barbarossa's ships; his power had been curtailed, his reputation reduced and thus the coastal security ensured. Withdrawal was a plausible option due to the miserable condition of the army. Supply problems have already been indicated. In addition, there was a considerable number of ill soldiers. The number of infantry will not suffice given the lack of crossbows and Christian cavalry were not strong enough to challenge 20.000 Arab cavalry with good horses. There were talks among Charles' officers: What were the chances of an army of 23.000 against such a big city and 80.000 enemies? Furthermore, the heat and the consequent thirst were other problems. The possibility of Barbarossa having poisoned the wells *en route* was also

⁴⁵³ Sandoval, II, p. 542.

⁴⁵⁴ Sandoval, II, p. 543.

considered.⁴⁵⁵ On the other side of the conflict, Barbarossa stood firm; he was not planning to retreat without losing a battle. If Emperor wanted more than La Goletta, he should pay the price; Barbarossa's plan would be to deprive the imperial army of provisions.⁴⁵⁶

Charles insisted on the march to Tunis. The fortress in La Goletta was reduced to a minor one in order to be able to defend it with fewer soldiers.⁴⁵⁷ Andrea Doria and the navy remained in the port. Their task was the continuation of the supply provision.⁴⁵⁸

On 18th July, the signal for departure was given; however, it would be postponed due to the unrest among the soldiers suffering from the lack of provisions. The emperor ordered Andrea Doria to supply the soldiers with water and bread from his ships.⁴⁵⁹ Finally, the march started on 20th July. The imperial commanders were diligent on the order of the march. The army was exhausted and there was only one person that they could rely concerning the topography of the area: the former ruler of Tunis. In the front of the army, there were two battalions of Spanish veterans from Italy,⁴⁶⁰ 4.000 soldiers each. In the right wing, near the lagoon, the commander was the prince of Salerno. In the left wing, through the olive groves, Del Vasto was commanding. These two wings were forced in prolonged formation since the land was stretched. The arquebusiers were situated in the vanguard. Between two wings, the Emperor had left space in order to put 12 pieces of artillery. In front of these battalions, the squadron of the "man of the court", 350 cavalries, with the imperial standard under the command of Charles V was

⁴⁵⁵ Sandoval, II, p. 545; Illescas, *Jornada de Carlos a Túnez*. It should be noted that these numbers are exaggerated.

⁴⁵⁶ Sandoval, II, p. 544.

⁴⁵⁷ Sandoval, II, p. 546.

⁴⁵⁸ Sandoval, II, p. 556.

⁴⁵⁹ Sandoval, II, p. 546.

⁴⁶⁰ Sandoval distinguishes Spanish squadrons as *viejos* and *bisoños*, old and new.

marching. In front of the right wing there was situated c. 100 light cavalry for their protection. An easy attack from the lagoon could be perilous for that wing. Behind these two battalions, there was another battalion of c. 6000 Germans in short formation unlike other battalions. Thus, they would be able to protect the back of the army. Behind this, there was the army train and “unnecessary people of the army”.⁴⁶¹ Furthermore, through the olive groves Marquis of Mondéjar was commanding 300 *jinetes*⁴⁶² and between these *jinetes* and the army train, there were pieces of hand artillery. The “inexperienced”⁴⁶³ Spanish infantry was protecting the rearguard in two squadrons under the command of Cervellón, and de Grado. Duke of Alba was also accompanying them with 200 spearmen. Former ruler of Tunis was accompanying the army train since he did not want to expose himself to peril. The marines were excluded from the expedition since they chose to plunder rather than fight, at the time of La Goletta’s fall.⁴⁶⁴

They advanced 5 miles without encountering the enemy.⁴⁶⁵ The distance between La Goletta and Tunis was 12 miles and there were no signs of water until the wells on the eighth mile were reached.⁴⁶⁶ Barbarossa in order to jeopardize their march decided to take the field against the forces of the emperor before they can reach the wells. It appears that, it was clever to do so. First of all, Barbarossa was not willing to be stuck inside the city walls and risk everything. That is why he had fortified La Goletta and remained in Tunis and later left Tunis at a time when the imperial army was

⁴⁶¹ Sandoval, II, p. 547.

⁴⁶² A type of cavalry.

⁴⁶³ The word used here is “bisoño”.

⁴⁶⁴ Sandoval, II, p. 547.

⁴⁶⁵ Sandoval, II, p. 548.

⁴⁶⁶ Sandoval, II, p. 556.

marching towards the city. In addition to that, given the fatigue and the lack of water from which the enemy was suffering, such a stratagem would make a victory not only possible, but also decisive. In case of the failure, the imperial army could no longer hope for the relief of Tunis.

Finally, they were able to reach the wells before the imperial army. At that point, Barbarossa stationed his men one mile in front of the wells, expecting Charles' reaction. In the front line, he situated his infantry, all armed in harquebus, in which he had all his hopes with 12 pieces of artillery.⁴⁶⁷ He situated cavalry forces on both sides. Unskilled soldiers would remain in the vanguard. He was optimistic given the supply problems of the army and the fatigue because of the hot and dry weather.⁴⁶⁸ Moreover, he either blinded or poisoned the wells.⁴⁶⁹

The imperial army also took the field. Along the lagoon, in the right wing, there were the forces of Salerno. Behind them were there the pikemen along the shore and near them a German battalion. Left wing was still held by Del Vasto accompanied by *jinetes*. In between these wings, there laid the artillery and around it the imperial standard was being carried. Inexperienced Spanish troops and the Duke of Alba with the spearmen were in the rearguard.⁴⁷⁰

When the battle commenced, it became obvious that the imperial artillery was very efficient. Barbarossa had no choice but to attack, since it was not possible to remain in defence. Yet, this attack was repulsed by the imperials. Furthermore, the Moorish cavalry tried to outflank the imperial army by reaching the vanguard through

⁴⁶⁷ Sandoval numbered them 9.000. Sandoval, II, p. 550.

⁴⁶⁸ Sandoval, II, p. 550.

⁴⁶⁹ Sandoval, II, p. 551.

⁴⁷⁰ Sandoval, II, p. 549.

the olive groves; however, “inexperienced” Spaniards resisted them. They withdrew turning their back and the harquebus fire was costly. Barbarossa and his captains tried to prevent the flight unsuccessfully. The defeat was certain.⁴⁷¹

At that time back in Tunis, two renegades named Francisco de Medellín and Vicente de Catoron⁴⁷² opened the gates of the dungeons of the tower which hosted 6.000 Christians, provoking them against Barbarossa, claiming that he was planning to bury them alive.⁴⁷³ Prisoners succeeded in gaining the control of the tower. Once the tower was lost, Barbarossa felt his position very insecure and decided to leave the city to its fate.⁴⁷⁴ Furthermore, he had lost most of his local contingents after the battle.⁴⁷⁵ He parted for Bona with the remaining of his soldiers and his lieutenants, Sinan, Aydın and Cafer.⁴⁷⁶

On the next morning, imperial army started to march in formation since they were not aware of the corsair’s retreat. The people of Tunis, on the other hand, had no other option but to negotiate in order to prevent the sack of the city. They supplicated from the emperor that for two hours no one enter the town and they furthermore offered 50.000 *doblas* to prevent the sack. Yet, the soldiers proved much more influential and

⁴⁷¹ Sandoval, II, p. 551.

⁴⁷² According to Illescas, his name was Francisco Catario. Illescas, *Jornada de Carlos a Túnez*.

⁴⁷³ According to Sandoval, such an offer was actually considered by the corsairs since their number exceeding 20000 was threatening due to the possibility of a revolt as the imperial armies were approaching to the city. Yet, Sinan Re’is prevented the attempt by inducing Barbarossa to put them in dungeons. This way, in case of defeat, it would be possible to burn them. Sandoval, II, p. 552.

⁴⁷⁴ Sandoval, II, p. 553. “Hayrû’d-Din Paşa girüsün özleyüb dönice meger hisârda habs olan körükci kâfirler bir tarîk ile habsden boşanüb hisârda olan müslümânları kırub hisârı zabt idüb kapusın Hayrû’d-Din Paşa yüzine kapayub top ve tufenge tutub hisâra yol vermediler.” Lütî Paşa, p. 356.

⁴⁷⁵ Sandoval records that there remained 12.000 infantry and 3.000 cavalry from 100.000 soldiers. Even though the numbers are exaggerated, still they would demonstrate the extent. Sandoval, II, p. 552. Hammer had already indicated desertion of local contingents before the battle. According to him, 2.500 Arab cavalry had deserted Barbarossa’s army. Hammer, V, p. 148.

⁴⁷⁶ Sandoval records them more than 7.000. See Sandoval, II, p. 553. Illescas also gave the number of 7000. See Illescas, *Jornada de Carlos a Túnez*. Yet according to a letter of Charles V addressed to Marquis de Cañete, viceroy of Navarre, 25 July 1535, their number is four or five thousand. Sandoval, II, p. 556.

gained the permission for the sack of the city, something they considered their natural right and prize after such a tiring expedition. Imperial army entered the city on 21st July; they succeeded where St. Louis of France had failed 265 years ago.⁴⁷⁷ The city was sacked brutally in which the famous library of Moulay Hasan was also burnt down.

On 6th August, Charles concluded an agreement whose conditions were harsh with Moulay Hasan. According to this, the king of Tunis would cede his legitimate rights over the cities of Bona, Bizerta, Africa and others that were once ruled by his dynasty to the emperor. This clause is strictly important since it shows the emperor's growing ambition for the continuation of expansion in North Africa. The calculation should be that this cession of legal rights would legitimize further Spanish expansion against the afore-mentioned cities which were occupied by corsairs. Furthermore, Moulay Hasan would cede La Goletta, realizing his weakness in defending it. The ruler of Tunis and their successors should not welcome the enemies of the emperor and his successors neither in their ports in their lands; neither would they accept Moriscos from Spain. Also Moulay Hasan would pay the emperor 12.000 golden ducats in two payments. There were benefits for the Christians in the city after this expedition of an air of a Crusade. All the Christian slaves in the city ⁴⁷⁸ should be liberated and provided free passage in order to facilitate their return to Europe. In the future, neither Moulay Hasan nor his successors would consent to the capture of slaves from the lands subject to the emperor and to his brother Ferdinand. The existence of churches would be allowed and Christians could perform their religion in a pacific way. There were also

⁴⁷⁷ Sandoval, II, pp. 553-5.

⁴⁷⁸ Their number was 16.000. Sandoval, II, p. 555.

other clauses of secondary importance regulating the situation of Christians in Tunis and their rights of trade.⁴⁷⁹

Khayr al-Din's retreat was further molested by the local bandits who were aware of the fact that corsairs were carrying precious goods in their wagon.⁴⁸⁰ They succeeded to rob "a good part" of the wagon that was left behind, killing 400 corsairs. Furthermore, the famous corsair Aydın Re'îs who was wounded from his leg died on the way of retreat.⁴⁸¹ Finally, corsairs had succeeded in reaching to Bona where a small fleet of 14 galleys were left.⁴⁸² Even though an imperial fleet of 15 galleys followed and reached corsairs, their commanders Adán Centurion and Joanin Doria hesitated to attack and withdrew.⁴⁸³ Andrea Doria was sent after him later; yet he could not catch Barbarossa. Instead what he achieved was the surrender of Bona in which he stationed a garrison of 600 Spanish soldiers.⁴⁸⁴

The imperials then decided to return to Europe. Barbarossa had fled, yet it would not be possible to chase him. Charles also insisted that it was the most suitable time. With the reputation of victory, such an expedition should be undertaken against a defeated and fleeing enemy. Yet, there were impediments which the emperor wrote to Marquis de Cañete.⁴⁸⁵ The summer was ending and campaigning season was almost over. Furthermore, the navigation between Tunis and Algiers was long, and thus the

⁴⁷⁹ Sandoval, II, 559-61.

⁴⁸⁰ According to Gazavât, Khayr al-Din was carrying 1.000.000 *akçe* when he fled from Tunis. *Gazavât*, p. 211, fol. 328b.

⁴⁸¹ Sandoval, II, p. 553. "Cachidiablo" in the text refers to Aydın Re'îs.

⁴⁸² Sandoval, II, p. 502.

⁴⁸³ Sandoval, II, p. 559.

⁴⁸⁴ Sandoval, II, p. 563.

⁴⁸⁵ Sandoval, II, p. 562, "Letter of Charles V to Marquis de Cañete dated 16 August 1535".

risks were high. Charles was more prudent than he would be in 1541.⁴⁸⁶ Moreover, soldiers were tired and their number was reduced as a result of deaths and injuries. The heat was insupportable, and the problem of supplies was worsened with the presence of the newly-freed Christian slaves. On the other hand, Barbarossa was doomed and he was calculated to have no more than 28 galleys in his hand.⁴⁸⁷ They believe that it would take some time for him to strike again; not necessarily a correct calculation. In another letter addressed to the council and *regidor*⁴⁸⁸ of Ubeda, emperor gives the similar reasons for the withdrawal: the lack of supplies, the fatigue of the troops, fever, the hard task of feeding the great number of freed Christian captives and the need for repair in the navy.⁴⁸⁹

The Tunisian expedition proved the intentions and plans of the emperor on the region. It was already demonstrated how he was distracted with European affairs: Incessant warfare with France, threatening Ottoman aggression, religious disputes in the heart of his empire. However, it should not be concluded that he was not interested in North African politics. This alone can be proven by the fact that he personally led an expedition from which his advisors tried to dissuade him. Yet, he insisted on undertaking such an operation that was considered by Kamen "the most impressive military expedition that Christian powers had organized in the long history of Western

⁴⁸⁶ Charles did risk an expedition after the campaigning season was over which resulted in total disaster for the imperial forces. Ironically, it was against the corsairs: Algerian expedition of 1541.

⁴⁸⁷ According to this Barbarossa had only 15 galleys that he brought from Bona with 11 in Algiers in 2 in Djerbe. Sandoval, II, p. 563.

⁴⁸⁸ Town councilor.

⁴⁸⁹ María Josefa Parejo Delgado, "La Política Mediterránea de Carlos I y Felipe II en la Documentación Municipal Ubetense", in *El Mediterráneo: Hechos de Relevancia Histórico-Militar y sus repercusiones en España, V Jornadas Nacionales de Historia Militar (Sevilla, 9-12 de Mayo 1995)*, dir. Alberto Díaz Tejera (Sevilla, 1997), pp. 530.

Mediterranean.”⁴⁹⁰ Furthermore, the agreement between the emperor and the Moulay Hasan was not the only proof of emperor’s unrealised intentions of furthering Spanish expansion in the region. In a letter, after describing the importance of the city of Africa in the region, emperor was complaining that it will not be possible to undertake an enterprise in that summer. Nevertheless, he clearly indicates his intentions on the city.⁴⁹¹

However, there were other issues. Bells were ringing for the next round in the Habsburg-Valois rivalry following the death of the last of the Sforzas, and the emperor would not be able to contemplate another move in the region until 1541. This lack of continuity in the North African politics would jeopardize the security of the Habsburg coasts.⁴⁹² Corsairs were expelled from a base where they would be able to reach Italian coasts very easily. Furthermore, after the capture of La Goletta, the fleet of Barbarossa was also captured by the imperials. The expedition was a relief for Tunis, and its success could not be underestimated. Even after the conquest of La Goletta, let alone that of Tunis, there were some who believed that this damage would suffice for corsairs. Even though this might have been caused by the lack of enthusiasm for furthering the expedition in such heat with problems of supply; still it reflects the truth. Yet, in the greater picture, the equilibrium in the Western Mediterranean had not changed. Corsairs started their operations as soon as they returned to Algiers and “the Mediterranean coasts remained once again exposed to their raids and more than ever to their vengeance”.⁴⁹³

⁴⁹⁰ Kamen, *Imperio*, p. 96.

⁴⁹¹ Sandoval, II, “Letter of Charles V to Marquis de Cañete dated the last day of August 1535”, p. 566.

⁴⁹² Betrán, pp. 93-4.

⁴⁹³ Brandi, p. 358. Also, see Betrán, p. 95.

However, at least, the corsair towards Tunis was successfully contained and the *status-quo ante* established.

“Yo navegué ocho veces por el Mediterraneo”

Charles Quint, 1555, Brussels

CONCLUSION

The Place of Corsairs in the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry:

It is not easy to demonstrate the extent of the damage done by corsairs and more important, how they were perceived such that they would affect the decision-making process for both empires.

At a time when the European powers were confronting each other, what could the effect of the petty state of Ottoman corsairs be in North Africa? Fernando of Aragon had not paid too much attention to the issue due to his engagements in European politics mostly based on the rivalry on the fragmented Italy. Charles was not more vigilant at the beginning. Jimenez had already launched an expedition against Algiers when corsairs succeeded to take the city. Even though both expeditions to Algiers in 1516 and 1519 failed; Spanish contingents succeeded to slay Arudj after expulsing corsairs from the allied town of Tlemsen. Yet, these moves did not prove decisive and Arudj's brother would continue to cause problems for the Habsburg dominions.

There are two questions that might be asked at this point. What was the extent of the damage done to the Habsburgs? And to what extent did Charles and/or his advisers consider corsairs a real threat? Thus what was the Mediterranean policy of the Emperor?

Firstly, it has to be indicated that Charles could not cope with the corsair damage and failed to contain it. This was mostly due to a lack of proper naval force on behalf of the Habsburgs. Neither Castille nor Aragon had a standing navy. That was the reason why *Reconquista* was conducted with land forces instead of trying to inflict attrition to the vulnerable shores. Even the scouting was conducted with Genoese ships at that time. The dynasty had never developed a sufficient fighting force before 1516; and the constant shortage of finances would discourage them to do so in the future. Charles himself did not refrain from confessing his debility: “Concerning the galleys, I do not believe that Spain, Naples and Sicily can avoid maintaining them for the usual vigilance of their states against Turks and Moriscos –i.e. corsairs-... It is thus necessary to have these galleys armed, not only to repress the incursions of corsairs; but also with a stronger reason, to be always able to repulse the enterprises of the French.”⁴⁹⁴ Had French not attacked Naples in 1528 with the cooperation of Doria’s navy after calculating that imperialists could not present a naval confrontation? Charles did not have a navy even in 1538-9 when he concluded an alliance with Papacy and Venice to undertake a naval expedition against the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁹⁵ Neither were there regional fleets if excluding those with *asientos*, a contract between the emperor and the entrepreneur which indicates certain conditions in exchange for the rental of the ships to the Habsburgs. Not only Andrea Doria, but also Captain-Generals of the Spanish fleet, like Portuondo and Bazán, were some sort of a sea *condottieri* rather than simple military officials.

An important change would take place in 1528, when Andrea Doria had shifted

⁴⁹⁴ Jurien de la Gravière, *Les Corsaires Barbaresques et la Marine de Soliman le Grand* (Paris, 1887), p. 140.

⁴⁹⁵ Belenguer, p. 144.

from French side to that of imperialists. The details of the *asiento* were already explained.⁴⁹⁶ Doria's effect could not be underestimated since after the commencement of this alliance, Habsburgs' naval operations would extend until the Adriatic Sea. Charles in his political testimony did not forget to address the issue. According to him, importance of the Genoese ships cannot be denied. He wrote to his heir Felipe that he had not "the intention of seizing Genoa neither for the time being nor in the future. You –i.e. Felipe II- should at that time make sure that the city stays devoted to you... to advise you at the cost of your money whatever it costs, to preserve the galleys of Genoa."⁴⁹⁷

Even though the efficiency of the imperial response was enhanced after 1528, so did the power of the corsairs. In 1529, Khayr al-Din was able to conquer the Spanish *presidio* in Algiers and consolidate its power in the region. Imperialists would respond with an abysmal expedition. Doria was not less clever than Italian *condottieri* and he was not willing to risk a direct confrontation unless he had to. In case of a total victory, there would be no need for his forces and a further *asiento* would suffer from that fact. Thus, he launched an expedition to Cherchel where he did not even bother to conquer the inner castle but to release Christian slaves in the city. Sanuto also recorded that Doria chose to refrain from confronting his adversary.⁴⁹⁸ Apart from the lack of a response, Khayr al-Din was in front of Barcelona in 1532. The defences of the Habsburg coasts were still problematic. Thus, even though Doria's cooperation provided a counterbalance to some extent, it was not decisive in the struggle.

Yet, still his importance is also blatant for his deeds were the reason behind the

⁴⁹⁶ See Chapter 2.

⁴⁹⁷ Gravière, p. 140.

⁴⁹⁸ Sanuto, LIV, p. 486.

alliance between Algiers and Constantinople. As a result of the increasing activity of the imperial fleet under the command of Andrea Doria and the conquest of Coron, Ottoman decision-makers felt the obligation to call Khayr al-Din to the capital and promote a simple corsair to a rank of considerable prominence.

Charles in his political testimony also addressed the issue of corsairs as mentioned before. “The usual vigilance of their states –i.e. of Spain, Sicily and Naples- against the Turks and Moriscos” was a hard task. Also from his instructions to his agent for Tunis in 1535, his perception of the threat can be outlined. According to the mightiest power in the Catholic world, the power of Khayr al-Din increased “as a subject of the Turk -i.e. Ottoman Sultan- sent by him with the navy which he leads as his Grand-Admiral” and because of “the intelligence which he has with the French king”.⁴⁹⁹ Furthermore, the expedition of Tunis itself proves the extent that the Emperor perceives a threat from the corsairs. True it might be that the Emperor neglected to address the issue for two decades; yet it was due to the fact that his resources could not match the responsibilities that his titles brought. Charles was dragged into European politics for more than a decade and the only thing he could do to contain the corsair threat was to conduct diplomatic manoeuvres and suffer from ill-fated naval expeditions in the region. Yet, in the *interim* of European wars, as soon as he felt his hands free, he insisted on launching an expedition which he would lead personally. According to him, corsairs that were backed by Constantinople became a more serious threat than ever especially after the conquest of Tunis. According to him, entire Habsburg shores in the Mediterranean Sea from Messina to Gibraltar would be under the threat, if some precautions were not introduced. If Khayr al-Din was allowed to consolidate his control

⁴⁹⁹ Sandoval, II, pp. 480-1

over the city, he would be able to further this conquest to the entire North Africa. In this case, Spanish *presidios* would not suffice to contain such a threat.⁵⁰⁰

A more vigilant eye, that of the Empress, could observe the situation better, since she was the one in charge of the Iberian kingdoms at the absence of the Emperor. She supplicated to her husband to “pay great attention to the danger of the events that took place in Africa, the kingdoms of Granada and Valencia, Andalusian coasts and islands of Mallorca and Ibiza and to the immense expenditure that is necessary even for a less than mediocre provisioning of these lands.” Likewise, she was inducing the Emperor to undertake an offensive attack since this would cost less than creating a special fleet in order to protect the afore-mentioned lands.⁵⁰¹ The response of the Emperor should be negative, given both the international situation of the time and the existence of another letter of the Empress addressing the same issue, dated 5 months later, 14th April 1530.⁵⁰² After informing Charles about the preparations of Barbarossa in Algiers, she insisted on the necessity of taking steps for the defence of North African *presidios* which were suffering from “brief provision and shelter” and remained prone to corsair attacks.

Existence of the Moriscos in Spain created another problem for the security of these coasts. It had already been indicated that the exiled Moriscos from the region were the driving power behind the corsair activities in the region. Also, those who remained in the Peninsula did not forget their co-religionists. The level of this cooperation has

⁵⁰⁰ Sandoval, II, p. 487.

⁵⁰¹ According to the letter of Empress following the death of Captain General Portundo after his defeat against Aydın Re’îs, dated 10th December 1529. Ernest Belenguer, *Del Oro al Oropel: I. La Hegemonía Hispánica en Europa*, (Barcelona, 1997), pp. 65-6.

⁵⁰² Belenguer, *Del oro al Oropel*, p. 66.

already been discussed by Andrew Hess.⁵⁰³ The fifth column of the Ottoman Empire in the region would create problems for the Iberian kingdoms through out the sixteenth century. Corsairs' cooperation with the local population was evident since these corsairs not only ravaging the Iberian coasts, but also transporting Moriscos to the North Africa. In *Gazavât* also, there are several indications of this cooperation.⁵⁰⁴ It explicitly describes the conditions under which Moriscos were living in the Peninsula, thus depicting the task of their transportation as an act of auspices.⁵⁰⁵

The preoccupations of the people residing in these shores can be a good witness on how the corsair threat was perceived. For instance, the people of Toledo admonished the emperor on the corsair threat. According to them, the frontiers in the kingdom of Granada were ill-provisioned in terms of soldiers who were badly armoured and insufficiently paid. It would be wise to solve this problem since the recent fall of two fortresses in the region demonstrated the necessity.⁵⁰⁶ The interesting point here is that the effects of the corsary had been felt even in a city like Toledo, remote from the coastal frontiers.

Charles sufficed to present an unrealistic solution. 50 galleys will be built which would guard the coastline. Each port in the region would construct a galley at its own cost and such a power would ensure the security. This alone demonstrates the hardness

⁵⁰³ Hess, "The Moriscos", pp. 1-25.

⁵⁰⁴ For instance, *Gazavât*, p. 67, fol. 45b; p. 78, fol. 66b ff.

⁵⁰⁵ For instance, consider the tone of the following narration. "İspanya yakasında Kırnata nâm mahalle varub bir burun ucında pinhân olub yatdılar. Ol Kırnata didükleri tağda Endülüsler olurdu. Endülüs didüğümüz şol tâ'ifedür ki ashâb-ı Resûl'illâh varub ol yirleri feth eylediklerinde cânları isteyen ümmet-i Muhammedden vâfir Müslümân kalmış idi. Sonra kâfirler fürce bulub tekrâr Müslümân ellerinden almışlar idi. Mescidlerin yıkub yirine kelisalar yapmışlar idi. Müslümânların tâbi' olanların harâca kesüb olmayanları katl eylediler rahmetü'llâhi 'aleyhim. Andan yeraltında mescidler yapub gizlice namâz kılub 'ibâdet iderler idi ve oğlancıklarına Kur'ân ta'lîm idüb gizlice okudurlar idi ev kızları olsa cebren ve kahren kâfirleri alurdu, İslâm çoğalmasın diyü birbirlerine virmezlerdi. Ve namâz kıldıkların ve Kur'ân okudukların ve oruç tuttukların bilseler amân zemân virmeyüb orda yakarlardı." *Gazavât*, p. 67, fols. 44b-45a.

⁵⁰⁶ Sandoval, II, p. 154.

of the task of coastal defence. 50 galleys should not be considered an exaggeration on behalf of the emperor in order to soothe the worries of the local population. Also, in 1530, Sanuto recorded that a *gentiluomo* concluded that the emperor should put at least 40 galleys together in order to provide that his subjects will be defended against infidels.⁵⁰⁷ Yet such an enterprise was far beyond the resources of the Emperor could provide. 13 months later, Sanuto would record that Sinan Re'îs would decide to make himself the "Master of the Seas" since there was not a strong navy to oppose him.⁵⁰⁸

Yet, Iberian coasts were not the only province that suffered from corsair aggression. Habsburg dominions in South Italy would also be under the severe corsair threat. Bono had also indicated the defence precautions in South Italy against these attacks.⁵⁰⁹ Additionally, it had been indicated that corsair existence in Tunis would be considered to create further problems for the region. Corsary could not be contained before 1534 either. On his way to Tunis, Barbarossa did not hesitate to undertake corsary in the region as described before.⁵¹⁰ The viceroys of Naples and Sicily were not more successful than their colleagues in the Iberian Peninsula regarding the containment of the corsair threat. Yet, the limits of the corsair threat were also extended to further North. Neither Tyrrhenian nor Ligurian coasts were immune to corsair threats. According to Guglielmotti, "every sailor could see with his own eyes the desolation of the Iberian, French and Italian coasts by the pertinacious infestations of the thieves".⁵¹¹ The corsair ships in 1534, did not only ravage the southern coasts, but also appeared in

⁵⁰⁷ Sanuto, LII, p. 477.

⁵⁰⁸ Sanuto, LV, p. 206.

⁵⁰⁹ Bono, p. 193-217.

⁵¹⁰ cited by Bono, p. 140pp. 140-2.

⁵¹¹ A. Guglielmotti, *Storia della Marina Pontificia*, III (Roma, 1886-1893), p. 191. For corsary in Tyrrhenian Sea in 1526, see Guglielmotti, p. 277. Both cited by Bono, p. 140.

the mouth of Tiber. They were now a serious threat for Rome. Moreover, Aydın Re'îs succeeded to defeat and kill the Captain-General of the Spanish fleet, Rodrigo de Portundo in 1529 in the Ligurian Sea. The fleet had recently disembarked the Emperor to Genoa which would be coronated by the Pope in Bologna. This success against such an important fleet also proves that corsairs extended their activities to this important area. Gravière is not more optimistic concerning the general framework: "This successor of Caesars –i.e. Charles V- proves himself incapable of protecting his hereditary states against the depredations of a bandit's marine."⁵¹² Moreover, according to Bennassar and Vincent, "the naval links between Spain and Italy, evidently essential, especially the route between Barcelona and Genoa was sometimes jeopardized by the daring corsairs".⁵¹³ In this case, it should also be added that, the route between Barcelona and Genoa was extremely important for communications in Charles' empire. This was the route which Charles had always chosen for his transportation to Italy. Hence, if it is presumed that as the geographical centre of Charles V's Empire, communication between Habsburg dominions in Spain, Italy and Central Europe can only be secured via this naval route;⁵¹⁴ we may prove "the increasing political importance of the sea power of the corsairs".⁵¹⁵

The account of Sandoval also reflects the pessimistic perception of the corsair threat and its aggravation after the promotion of Khayr al-Din. Sandoval records the conversation between Khayr al-Din and the Ottoman Sultan in Constantinople on the future strategies of the Ottoman naval forces. First, he calls attention to the potential

⁵¹² Gravière, p. 27.

⁵¹³ Bartolomé Bennassar and Bernard Vincent, *Le Temps de l'Espagne : XV^e-XVII^e siècles* (Paris, 1999), p. 123.

⁵¹⁴ Bennassar and Vincent, p. 123.

⁵¹⁵ Pfeffermann, p. 120.

contribution of the corsair to the Ottoman power since he was aware of the Spanish coasts and defences. Moreover, his knowledge on the political situation in Italy and North Africa was another factor. Sandoval records Khayr al-Din's speech. The corsair claimed that if he was adorned with a good navy, he would be able to defeat the imperial navy. Furthermore, he would successfully drive the Spaniards out of North Africa since their situation in the region was miserable. After conquering Spanish *presidios* in Oran, Bougie and Tripoli and defeating the ruler of Tunis, a Spanish ally; it would be easy to undertake an expedition for the re-conquest of the Iberian Peninsula as it had been done by the Almohads before. In addition, a navy of such calibre would easily conquer Mediterranean islands like Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia and Mallorca. Once Sicily is conquered, Genoa will die out of starvation as well as other Italian states dependent on Sicilian wheat. Hence, it would be easy for the Ottoman Sultan to conquer also the Italian Peninsula.⁵¹⁶

It is obvious that Sandoval cannot know the details of such a conversation. Hence, most of these detailed descriptions were based on the imagination of the writer. It does not have to be the imagination of the same Sandoval given that probably he copied the story from another source. Still, it reflects the pessimistic attitude towards such cooperation, so that the loss of Italy and Spain was feared. On the other hand, it is not possible to encounter the traces of such plans in Ottoman sources.

⁵¹⁶ Sandoval, II, p. 154.

Charles' Mediterranean Policy

Even though he was a prince from Flanders, Charles never neglected the Mediterranean in its political calculations. His vast empire had brought him a number of responsibilities; and his resources were far below the required level. Thus, his indeterminate policies concerning Mediterranean and North Africa cannot prove that he relegated the issue to a secondary importance. His rivalry with the Valois had occupied his forces throughout the third decade of the century. However, the same year that the first round of this rivalry was over, Ottoman armies were besieging the traditional Habsburg capital, Vienna. Hence, Charles was always busy with the more immediate threat. He had to defend his dynasty's rights over the contested territories like Duchy of Burgundy and Kingdom of Naples. He had to prevent Valois aggression through the northern borders of the nucleus of his empire.⁵¹⁷ Moreover, he had to defend his grandfather's capital where he had placed his own kin as his lieutenant. The Empire had already been suffering from the religious dissidence and the loose structure of decentralised nature. With the Ottoman armies appearing in front of Vienna, the fate of the Christianity, which he had to defend at all costs as its secular leader, was at stake.

Thus, it should be accepted North African policy was not considered a bigger threat than these. However, especially after the consolidation of the corsairs in the region finally in 1529, their importance grew ostensibly. The response did not arrive until Khayr al-Din, now backed by the Ottoman power and prestige, decided to provoke it in 1534. This was because Andrea Doria chose to disengage himself as much as he could since doing otherwise would hurt his own business. As long as the threat remained

⁵¹⁷ "Only my kingdoms of Spain can sustain me", Belenguer, *El Imperio de Carlos V*, p. 115.

valid, the Emperor would need him. After all, he was a private entrepreneur whose primary aim was to provide himself with good *asientos* rather than effectively to suppress the enemy. The emperor, on the other hand, even though he was tried to be discouraged by his entourage, did not refrain from undertaking a major expedition against the corsairs in 1535. Charles had always suffered from the lack of money to the extent that he would lease out his dominions' future revenues (*juros*) in order to finance his warfare. Did it not this lack of money prevent him from crushing Valois despite his decisive victories? Did he not have to turn down the financial requests of his brother even at the most troublesome moment of Ottoman menace? Would his constant policy of leasing out revenues not result in the triple bankrupt of his son Felipe II? Hence, why should he choose to undertake such a colossal expedition that would cost him enormous amount of money at a time when there was peace in Europe and the Ottoman aggression was temporarily contained? The only logical explanation would be that Charles considered the threat one of primary importance.

Habsburgs had to face a multi-faceted diplomatic manoeuvring in the sixteenth century. Apart from the mentioned struggles, the family had dynastical interests throughout the whole Europe. Thanks to a cunning diplomacy based on marriages, the family would reach its climax of its expansion. The queen of England, Catherine of Aragon was the aunt of Charles. Charles' sister, Mary of Hungary was the wife of the last Hungarian king, while the other one, Isabella was the queen of not only Denmark; but also all three Baltic states for a period of time. Leonor and Catalina would be sent to the Portuguese palace. As a result of these marriages, there were other issues to be settled. First of all, there was a strong Habsburg claim on Hungary. The last queen of the

kingdom was a Habsburg, as the last member of the dynasty was married to emperor's brother. Furthermore, Ferdinand had been elected to the crown by some nobles. Habsburgs' interest in the area was blatant even in the times of Maximilian since he actually was the one who arranged afore-mentioned marriages. Yet, Charles could not even come to the relief of Vienna, let alone support his brothers' bid for the throne. Secondly, King of England did not only turn against his old ally, but also decided to divorce from the emperor's aunt, Catherine of Aragon. The only thing Charles could do was to pressurize Pope from releasing the permission for the annulment of the marriage. Thirdly, Charles also failed to help his brother-in-law, *Christian II* (r. 1513-1523). This ambitious king had reunited the entire Baltic lands in 1520 for the first time since 1387. Yet, his success was short-lived since he would be deposed 3 years later. He had to ask for help from the Habsburgs. He even renounced Protestantism; yet, Charles could not do anything due to his busy agenda. Neither would he take any action when Christian would be deceived and incarcerated by his adversaries in 1531. True, by that time, Isabella was already dead; however legal rights of their children, thus of the members of the imperial family had been usurped. In 1533, when Frederick I of Holstein (r. 1523-1533) was dead, it was Dorotea, the nephew of the Emperor, who was the legal heir to the throne. Emperor had no response, since as his prime minister noted, it was not worth the pain.⁵¹⁸

Gravière may have exaggerated when considering the destruction of Algiers as *le premier devoir* of the emperor.⁵¹⁹ However, at least it was one of them. Hence, our conclusion should be that even though the issue of corsairs were not considered a threat

⁵¹⁸ Belenguer, *El Imperio de Carlos V*, p. 386.

⁵¹⁹ Gravière, p. 27.

as immediate as that of the Ottomans and of the Valois; however, it was not exactly relegated into a second plan. The dynasty had imperial issues all over Europe; even the remote and insignificant small-principality of Moscow had correspondence with the emperor.⁵²⁰ Yet, even under these circumstances, Charles chose to respond to the call for help from the ruler of Tlemsen; something he did not do for Christian II.

⁵²⁰ Belenguer, *El Imperio de Carlos V.*, p. 395.

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
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
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APPENDIX A




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APPENDIX B



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APPENDIX C



Source: Pitcher, Donald Edgar, *An Historical Geography of the Ottoman Empire: from earliest times to the end of the sixteenth century* (Leiden, 1972)

APPENDIX D



Ferdinand von Habsburg

APPENDIX E



Tiziano, *Portrait of Emperor Charles V Seated*, 1548, Alte Pinakothek.

APPENDIX F



Tiziano, *Portrait of Charles V*, 1533, Museo del Prado.

APPENDIX G



Tiziano, *Portrait of Emperor Charles V at Muhlberg*, 1548, Museo del Prado.

APPENDIX H



Jean Clouet *Portrait des Königs Franz I. von Frankreich*, 1525, Musée du Louvre.

APPENDIX I



Khayr al-Din Pasha