


To Yasemin Şenyurt,

Tore Fougner

and

all who suffered from the violence of modern man.



EGOCENTRISM AND VIOLENCE:
A CRITIQUE OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

ŞERVAN ADAR AVŞAR

144744

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

in

144744

THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA


September 2004

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.




Dr. Tore Fougner
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.




Asst. Prof. Pınar Bilgin
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.



Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences



Prof. Dr. Kürşat Aydoğan
Director

ABSTRACT

EGOCENTRISM AND VIOLENCE A CRITIQUE OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY

Avşar, Şervan Adar

MIR, Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Dr. Tore Fougner

September 2004

The main argument of this thesis is that democratic peace theory is violent at both the theoretical and practical level. This argument is developed by drawing on the ideas of French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas on egocentrism and violence. The advocates of democratic peace theory argue that democracies are peaceful in their relations with other democracies, whereas they are not peaceful in their relations with the states having any other type of regime. Therefore, democratic peace theorists claim that the spread of democracy is the basis of world peace. These central themes of democratic peace theory contain implicit egocentric and violent tendencies. First of all, democratic peace theory represents the primacy of the same by making democratic political system an ideal for all states. This is because there exists in democratic peace theory a fundamental narcissism of ego, which takes itself to be the centre of all meaning. Secondly, democratic peace theory is violent since it tries to

comprehend the other through thematization and conceptualisation. In other words, through the spread of democracy it reduces the other to the same.

Keywords: Democratic peace theory, egocentrism, violence, the other, ethics, Emmanuel Levinas



ÖZET

BENMERKEZCİLİK VE ŞİDDET BİR DEMOKRATİK BARIŞ TEORİSİ ELEŞTİRİSİ

Avşar, Şervan Adar

Master, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Tore Fougner

Eylül 2004

Bu tezin amacı Fransız filozof Emmanuel Levinas'ın benmerkezcilik ve şiddet üzerine düşüncelerini temel alarak demokratik barış teorisinin hem teorik hem de pratik bağlamda şiddet içerdiğini göstermektir. Demokratik barış teorisinin savunucularına göre demokratik devletler kendi aralarındaki ilişkilerinde barışçıl olsalar da diğer tür rejimlere sahip devletlerle ilişkileri aynı şekilde barışçıl değildir. Bundan dolayı bu tezin savunucuları demokrasinin yaygınlaştırılmasını dünya barışı için temel olarak görürler. Demokratik barış teorisinin bu saydığımız temel argümanları açık olmayan benmerkezci ve şiddet temelli eğilimler içerir. Öncelikle, demokratik barış teorisi demokratik yönetim biçimini herkes için bir ideal olarak sunması yoluyla 'aynı'nın (the same) üstünlüğünü temsil eder. Çünkü demokratik barış teorisinde kendini bütün anlamın merkezine yerleştiren ego'nun narsizmi söz konusudur. İkinci olarak, demokratik barış teorisi ötekini tematize etme ve

comprehend the other through thematization and conceptualisation. In other words, through the spread of democracy it reduces the other to the same.

Keywords: Democratic peace theory, egocentrism, violence, the other, ethics, Emmanuel Levinas



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I am grateful to my supervisor, Tore Fougner, who contributed a lot to the realisation of this thesis in a short period of time. Once again, I would like to thank to Tore for being both an excellent supervisor and a good friend.

I am also grateful to my mother since she has not complained about my untidy room during my work on the thesis.

Finally, I would like to thank Asst. Prof. Pınar Bilgin and Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam, both of whom agreed to take part in the examining committee.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZET	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	viii
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1: DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY AND ITS CRITICS	4
1.1 Democratic Peace Theory	4
1.1.1 Explanations Based on Norms and Culture	8
1.1.2 Institutional Constraints or Structural Explanations	11
1.2 Critiques of Democratic Peace Theory	13
CHAPTER 2: TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE CRITIQUE: LEVINAS ON EGOCENTRISM, VIOLENCE AND ETHICS	19
2.1 Introduction: Narcissism of Western Thought	19
2.2 On the Same and the Other: Disrupting Egocentrism	21
2.3 On Violence	25
2.3.1 Comprehension or the Grasping of the Consideration of the Other..	28
2.3.1 Passion of Murder	29
2.3.1 A Violence Typology	30
2.4 The Ethical in Levinas	32
CHAPTER 3: VIOLENCE OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY	40
3.1 Egocentrism and Democratic Peace Theory: Identifying the West by Democracy	41
3.2 Democracy and Violence	42
3.2.1 Comprehension	43
3.2.2 Murder	46
CONCLUSION	49
BIBLIOGRAPHY	54

LIST OF FIGURES

1.	Violence Typology of Johan Galtung	31
----	--	----



INTRODUCTION

Drawing on the ideas of the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas on egocentrism and violence, the main argument of this thesis is that democratic peace theory is violent at both the theoretical and practical level. In making and defending this argument, the thesis provides an original critique of democratic peace theory based on its egocentric and violent tendencies.

As a discipline that emerged after the First World War, International Relations has focused on the causes and nature of wars and developed its own understanding through different theories. One of them was the liberal internationalist theory of democratic peace which “has steadily gained ground, and has obtained reasonable acceptance among Western scholars and especially within American academia” (Nikolaos, 2003: 1) since the beginning of the 1980s. The popularity of democratic peace theory went so far in policy circles and within academia that scholar like Jack S. Levy argued that democratic peace theory turned into “an empirical law in international relations” (1989: 88).

The advocates of democratic peace theory argue that democracies are peaceful in their relations with other democracies, whereas they are not peaceful in their relations with the states having any other type of regime. Therefore, democratic peace theorists

claim that the spread of democracy is the basis of world peace. These central themes of democratic peace theory contain implicit egocentric and violent tendencies.

Levinas argues that Western philosophy has been an ontology characterised by the reduction of the other to the same. Therefore, Levinas names Western philosophy as an egology which asserts the primacy of the same and the suppression of the other. Being rooted in this philosophical tradition, democratic peace theory represents the egocentrism (the primacy of the same), and violence and power involved in ontology as first philosophy.

First of all, democratic peace theory represents the primacy of the same by making its political system an ideal for everybody. This is because there exists in democratic peace theory a fundamental narcissism of ego, which takes itself to be the centre of all meaning. Secondly, democratic peace theory is violent since it tries to comprehend the other through thematization and conceptualisation. Through the spread of democracy, it reduces the other to the same. In other words, the West reduces the other states to itself through the spread of democracy and comprehends by calling the other state as “non-democratic”.

In developing this alternative critique of democratic peace theory, the thesis has been structured under three chapters. The first chapter deals with democratic peace theory and its critics. By outlining the arguments of prominent democratic peace theorists and their critics, this chapter serves as form of literature review.

The second chapter deals with the thought of Emmanuel Levinas on egocentrism, violence and ethics. The main purpose of this chapter is to provide the necessary philosophical basis to be able to criticise democratic peace as being egocentric and violent. This chapter is divided into four sections, the first of which introduces Levinas's thought by discussing his critiques of Western philosophy. The second section deals with the self's relation to the other, and how the emergence of the other disrupts the egocentrism. The third section deals with different forms of violence with reference to both Levinas and Johan Galtung. Finally, the fourth section discusses the ethical in the thought of Levinas.

The third chapter is the analysis chapter and it attempts to show how democratic peace is violent in itself although it argues for the world peace through the spread of democracy. The chapter deals with the issue of violence at both the theoretical and practical level. After explaining how the West identifies itself with democracy, the chapter deals with violence inside the democratic peace theory under the subtitle "Comprehension" and violence in the acts derived from democratic peace theory under the subtitle "Murder".

In the conclusion, I provide an overview of the arguments made in the third chapter. Additionally, I attempt to open up the thesis by indicating a new way for international politics based on ethical peace.

CHAPTER 1

DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY AND ITS CRITICS

The purpose of this chapter is, first of all, to provide an account of democratic peace theory by drawing on the arguments of prominent democratic peace theorists. Secondly, the chapter will provide an overview of important critiques of the theory. The first part of the chapter deals with democratic peace theory and the explanatory variables used within the democratic peace theory to explain the absence of war between democracies. The second part of the chapter deals with both realist and non-realist critiques of democratic peace theory.

1.1 Democratic Peace Theory

Democratic peace theory regards the spread of democracy as the basis of world peace, and claims that democratic states are more peaceful than states having any other type of political regime. In other words, “the more democratic each state is, the more peaceful their relations are likely to be” (Bruce Russett et al., 1993: 314). However, democratic peace theory does not argue that democratic states are less war-prone than non-

democratic states. Instead, the theory suggests that democracies do not go to war with other democracies. Advocates of democratic peace theory argue that “rarely, if ever, have liberal democracies fought each other” (Nikolaos, 2003: 2). This is a remarkable finding according to them, and it “diminishes the authority of realism as the dominant theory of international relations” (Nikolaos, 2003: 2).

The basic tenets of democratic peace theory can be outlined as follows:

- a- Democratically organized political systems in general operate under restraints that make them more peaceful in their relations with other democracies.
- b- Democracies are not necessarily peaceful, however, in their relations with other kinds of political systems.
- c- In the modern international system, democracies are less likely to use lethal violence toward other democracies than toward autocratically governed states are toward each other.
- d- The relationship of relative peace among democracies is importantly a result of some features of democracy, rather than being caused exclusively by economic or geopolitical characteristics correlated with democracy (Russett, 1993: 11).

The statement that, in the modern international system, democracies have never fought each other represents a complex phenomenon for Russett (1993:4):

(a) Democracies rarely fight each other (an empirical statement) because (b) they have other means of resolving conflicts between them and therefore do not need to fight each other (a prudential statement), and (c) they perceive that democracies should not fight each other (a normative statement about principles of right behaviour), which reinforces the empirical statement.

Democratic peace theory draws on the ideas of Immanuel Kant. For him, “the moral element that helps the framework for peaceful relations between democratic states is

based on the common principles of cooperation, mutual respect and understanding” (cited in Özkeçeci, 2002: 1). The Kantian basis of democratic peace theory can be found in Kant’s *Perpetual Peace*. Kant’s concept of international right requires ”the abolishment of war and the salvation of humanity from its vast graveyard” (cited in Nikolaus: 4).

According to Nikolaus (4), Kant’s position can be summed up in the form of three principles of international right for “the development of a state of perpetual peace between all the nations of the world.” The first principle is that states should not interfere in the internal affairs of any state. Furthermore, every state should be republican since republican states need the consent of their citizens to wage war (Nikolaus: 4). Secondly, for Kant, independent states should form a federation “where the rights and the sovereignty of every individual member will be secured” (cited in Nikolaus: 5). This federation is called *pacific federation*. The third principle is the principle of hospitality according to which strangers should not be treated with enmity (Nikolaus: 5).

It was Michael Doyle who introduced these ideas of Kant to the International Relations literature. In his 1983 article “Kant, Liberal legacies, and Foreign Affairs”, Doyle challenges the dominant realist view of international politics by demonstrating that regimes and institutions do make a difference in foreign affairs. According to Doyle’s historical assessment of the wars of the last two hundred years, there has not been a conflict between democracies until our epoch.

The theoretical foundations of democratic peace can be divided into two: monadic and dyadic propositions. According to the monadic proposition, “the more democratic the state, the less violent its behaviour towards all other states, including both democracies and non-democracies” (Özkeçeci, 2002: 1). The dyadic proposition on the other hand, suggests that “the regime type of the opponent will crucially affect war decision and democratic states can be war-prone when facing non-democratic counterparts” (Özkeçeci, 2002: 2).

However, the similarity of form of government in general is not enough to explain the absence of war between democracies. If it was enough, then “we would expect to have seen peace between the Soviet Union and China” etc. (Russett et.al., 2004: 316). Thus, some scholars have pointed to other influences that are correlated with democracy. Scholars like Maoz and Russett have suggested that “the absence of conflict between democratic states could be due to factors other than shared democraticness” (cited in Siverson, 1995: 481). Layne (1994: 8) also sees the identification of the special characteristics of the democratic states that refrain them from going to war with other democracies as the key challenge. In other words, different explanatory variables within the theory have emerged. These can be summed up in two main categories: those that emphasise the structural constraints imposed on policy-makers in liberal democratic regimes, and those that argue that shared norms among liberal democracies are the key (Grayson, 2003: 3).

1.1.1 Explanations Based on Norms and Culture

It is generally argued that democracies are inherently more peaceful because of the political culture favouring the peaceful resolution of disputes. In democratic states, “resort to organized lethal violence, or the threat of it, is considered illegitimate and unnecessary to secure one’s ‘legitimate’ rights” (Russett, 1993: 31). These two statements represent one way of explaining the absence of conflict or war between democracies within the democratic peace theory drawing on norms and culture: The former referring to culture, and the latter referring to norms.

One of the important determinants of the pacific behaviour of democratic states is perception and the practises led by these perceptions that provide the peaceful resolution of the conflicts without using force or the threat of using force. This is because,

if people in a democracy perceive themselves as autonomous, self-governing people who share norms of live-and-let-live, they will respect the rights of others to self-determination if those others are also perceived as self-governing and hence not easily led into aggressive foreign policies by a self-serving elite (Russett, 1993: 31).

Therefore, one can say that “democratic states develop positive perceptions of other democracies” (Layne, 1994: 9), and their relations are based on mutual respect. These perceptions are facilitated by “the openness of society” and “the free flow of

information”, both of which are considered to be characteristics of democracy (Russett et al., 2004: 315).

Defenders of democratic peace theory argue, at the same time, that these restraints do not apply to non-democratic states or the states having any other type of regime. Because the leaders of non-democratic states have been regarded as “being in a permanent state of aggression against their own people, and thus also against foreigners” by the democratic peace theorists and policy makers. For Russett:

According to democratic norms, authoritarian states do not rest on the proper consent of the governed, and thus they cannot properly represent the will of their peoples... Rulers who control their own people by such means, who do not behave in a just way that respects their own people’s rights to self-determination, cannot be expected to behave better toward peoples outside their states...By this reasoning, democracies must be eternally vigilant and may even need to engage in defensively motivated war or pre-emptive action anticipating an immediate attack (1993: 32).

In a general perspective, John M. Owen (1994: 88) argues that “liberal ideas cause liberal democracies to tend away from war with one another, and that the same ideas prod these states into war with illiberal ones.” He adds:

liberal democracies are those states with a visible liberal presence, and that feature free speech and regular competitive elections of the officials empowered to declare war... liberal ideology and institutions work in tandem to bring about democratic peace. Liberals believe that individuals everywhere are fundamentally the same, and are best off pursuing self-preservation and material well-being Liberals believe that democracies seek their citizens’ true interests and that thus by definition they are pacific and trustworthy. Non-democracies may be dangerous because they seek other ends, such as conquest or plunder. (1994: 89).

To summarise these explanations based on norms and culture and their restraints on violent conflict among democracies, let us refer to Russett's analysis on normative/cultural model. He summarises this model as follows (1993: 35):

1. In relations with other states, decisionmakers (whether they be few or many) will try to follow the same norms of conflict resolution as have been developed within and characterize their domestic political processes.
2. They will expect decisionmakers in other states likewise to follow the same norms of conflict resolution as have been developed within and characterize those other states' domestic political processes.

A. Violent conflicts between democracies will be rare because:

3. In democracies, the relevant decisionmakers expect to be able to resolve conflicts by compromise and nonviolence, respecting the rights and continued existence of opponents.
4. Therefore democracies will follow norms of peaceful conflict resolution with other democracies, and will expect other democracies to do so with them.
5. The more stable the democracy, the more will democratic norms govern its behavior with other democracies, and the more will other democracies expect democratic norms to govern its international behavior.
6. If violent conflicts between democracies do occur, at least one of the democracies is likely to be politically unstable.

B. Violent conflicts between nondemocracies, and between democracies and nondemocracies, will be more frequent because:

7. In nondemocracies, decisionmakers use, and may expect their opponents to use, violence and the threat of violence to resolve conflict as part of their domestic political processes.
8. Therefore nondemocracies may use violence and the threat of violence in conflicts with other states, and other states may expect them to use violence and the threat of violence in such

conflicts.

9. Democratic norms can be more easily exploited to force concessions that can nondemocratic ones; to avoid exploitation democracies may adopt nondemocratic norms in dealing with nondemocracies.

1.2. Institutional Constraints or Structural Explanations

According to Russett (1993: 38), “democracies are constrained in going to war by the need to ensure broad popular support, manifested in various institutions of government”. The structural explanation of democratic peace basically argues that institutional constraints in a democracy like elections, division of powers and checks and balances limit the autonomy and discretion of leaders to launch war. 'Checks and balances' is one of the most important of these institutional constraints, for they constitute an important characteristic of liberal democracies. Even 200 years ago, Immanuel Kant argued that

checks and balances in government would act as a brake on the use of military force- as compared to autocratic governments where a single individual (or a small ruling group) could make war without regard for the effect on population (cited in Goldstein, 2004: 176).

As Layne (1994: 9) puts it, "states with executives answerable to a selection body,... with decision making responsibility spread among multiple institutions or individuals should be more highly constrained and hence less likely to go to war."

Another point is that leaders must mobilize public support in order to wage a war. The process of mobilization “requires time as leaders of various institutions are convinced and formal approval is obtained” (Russett et al., 2004: 316). Moreover, such delays allow the parties to engage in negotiation and other types of peaceful conflict resolution.

Democracies have reciprocal cooperative behaviour that makes them “accept third party mediations, or good offices in settling disputes, and generally to resolve conflicts peacefully” (Russett et al., 2004: 314). Therefore, one can argue that if leaders of democratic states consider other democracies to be slow to go to war because of similar institutional constraints, then they will not fear any attack from another democracy. One should also take into account that “if the price the conflict is high, democratic governments may fall victim to electoral retribution” (Layne, 1994: 9).

To summarise these explanations based on institutional constraints and their restraints on violent conflict among democracies, let us refer to Russett’s analysis on the structural/institutional model. He summarises this model as follows (1993:40):

A. Violent conflicts between democracies will be infrequent because:

1. In democracies, the constraints of checks and balances, division of power, and need for public debate to enlist widespread support will slow decisions to use large-scale violence and reduce the likelihood that such decisions will be made.
2. Leaders of other states will perceive leaders of democracies as so constrained.
3. Thus leaders of democracies will expect, in conflicts with other democracies, time for processes of international conflict resolution

to operate, and they will not fear surprise attack.

B. Violent conflicts between nondemocracies, and between democracies and nondemocracies, will be frequent because:

4. Leaders of nondemocracies are not constrained as leaders of democracies are, so they can more easily, rapidly, and secretly initiate large-scale violence.
5. Leaders of states (democracies and nondemocracies) in conflict with nondemocracies may initiate violence rather than risk surprise attack.
6. Perceiving that leaders of democracies will be constrained, leaders of nondemocracies may press democracies to make greater concessions over issues in conflict.
7. Democracies may initiate large-scale violence with non-democracies rather than make the greater concessions demanded.

2.2 Critiques of Democratic Peace Theory

In spite of its popularity, the democratic peace theory has not been left unchallenged. The main criticisms of the democratic peace theory have realist origins, since it challenges the influence of realism in International Relations. Thus, let us first look at realist critiques of democratic peace theory.

Realists argue that states are rational actors and try to maximize their national interest. Therefore, domestic factors like regime type are irrelevant and do not affect foreign policy decisions of states. In consequence, relations between democratic countries will not be different than the relations between non-democratic states. Another common criticism is that of realists arguing that the definition of democracy is not clear,

and that different definitions are used by state leaders for the sake of strategic considerations.

Realists claim that when power politics requires war with a democracy, liberals will redefine that state as a despotism; when power politics requires peace with a non-democracy, they will redefine that state as a democracy. That is, ideological labels are sugar-coating to make otherwise bitter policies easier to swallow (Owen, 1994: 120).

Also Layne's (1994:12) claim that "neither institutional constraints nor domestic political structure can explain democratic peace" can be considered under realist critiques. For him, if public opinion really has an effect, then democratic states will have peaceful relations with all states. He introduces the concept of "near misses" for his critique of democratic peace theory. According to Layne (1994: 13), "democratic peace theory, if valid, should account powerfully for the fact that serious crises between democratic states ended in near misses rather than in war." But based on his historical case studies of 'the United States and Great Britain in 1861', 'the United States and Great Britain in 1895-96' (the Venezuela crisis), 'France and Great Britain in 1898' (the Fashoda crisis), and 'France and Germany in 1923' (the Ruhr crisis) he argues that realism provides a "more compelling explanation" for the avoidance of war than democratic peace theory. In each crises, he claims that "war was not avoided because of the 'live and let-live' spirit of peaceful dispute resolution of democratic peace theory, but because of realist factors" such as "vital strategic" and "reputational interests" (Layne, 1994: 38).

Given how theorists of democratic peace generally employ statistical data to prove their claims about the absence of war among democracies, some of the important critiques of democratic peace theory concentrate on the statistical data. A case in point is Christopher Layne who argues that between 1815 and 1945 there were very few democracies in the world and, therefore the possibilities of a war involving democracies were negligible. He also adds that war is a relatively rare occurrence, and the fact that democracies rarely engage in war with each other may be the product of random chance. In this respect, David Spiro also argues that

the number of wars between democracies is not statistically different from what random chance would predict. Both wars and democracies are rare, and that is why there are not many wars between democracies (in Russett et al., 1995: 177).

Therefore, Spiro concludes that “the absence of war between democracies is statistically insignificant” (in Russett et al., 1995:178).

Another criticism comes from Nikolaos, who argues that democratic peace theory is a tool for analysing and justifying the foreign policy actions of Western states in general and the United States in particular. To make this argument clear, he refers to some of statements of the important decision-making figures:

Woodrow Wilson: “The war against Germany was to make the world safe for democracy”.

National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake: “America’s post-Cold War foreign policy should aim at expanding the zone of democratic peace because to the extent democracy and market economies hold

sway in other nations, our own nation will be more secure, prosperous and influential” (2003: 2-3).

Realists are not the only scholars criticising democratic peace theory. Thus, the rest of this section will deal with two different critiques of democratic peace theory introduced by Johan Galtung and Kyle Grayson.

Johan Galtung presents a different critique of democratic peace theory through an exploration of the linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy or, in his words, “democracy domestically, belligerence abroad” (1996: 49). He argues that “according to their self-image, democracies are not belligerent, engaging in war; and not even bellicist, inclined to resort to war. They are peace-loving, stressing the peaceful pursuit of their goal” (1996:49)¹. For Galtung (1996:49), however, war activities have most often been masked by using other names, and he talks about two traditions in this connection:

‘punitive expeditions’ (a British tradition for at least two centuries, participation in the Gulf War being only one in a long chain events); or ‘action to protect our citizens and economic interests abroad’ (a US tradition).

As Galtung (1996:50) rightly puts it, “after World War II the countries most frequently engaging in war have been the USA, the UK, France and Israel; all of them democracies. Most countries in the ‘US-led coalition’ against Iraq in the Gulf War were democracies.” Based on his arguments, democracy can be considered “compatible with large-scale

¹ In Galtung’s usage, *belligerence* means engagement in war and war-like acts, and *bellicism* means the general inclination to do so (the opposite of *pacifism*).

exercises of violence – bellicist, not only belligerent” (1996:50). As a result of his attempt to explain “democracy domestically, belligerence abroad”, he explores nine factors “as possible links between democracy as a way of doing domestic politics, and belligerence as a way of doing foreign policy” (1996:57). These nine factors are as follows (1996:57):

1. Individualistic, competitive, aggressive culture.
2. A history of inflicting traumas upon others.
3. High position in the world pyramid.
4. Isomorphism between domestic and world structure.
5. Shared decision-making.
6. Implementing human rights.
7. Inner power struggle.
8. Inner peace surplus.
9. Self-righteousness being a democracy.

For Grayson (1994: 3), “the nuances of democratic peace theory have been lost as it has become enmeshed with popular discourse in the West.” In consequence, the theory has been transformed into a number of assertions (Grayson, 1994: 3):

1. democracies are inherently peaceful unless unjustly attacked (or threatened) by authoritarian regimes,
2. use of force by democracies are justified because they are directed against real threat launched by rogue actors intent on undermining the ‘democratic way of life’,
3. democracies by definition cannot go to war with one another (as a result of assertion 1),
4. the best way to ensure global stability and peace is to promote the spread of democracy.

Upon these assertions, Grayson provides us with a different critique of democratic peace theory:

The power of these assertions is augmented by the fact that they are very easy to comprehend and thus disseminate to the population at large; they muster support and help to provide a basis of legitimacy for actions (including large-scale use of violence) that may have otherwise generated internal apathy if not opposition (2003: 4).

With reference to the arguments put forward by Roxanne Lynn Doty in her book *Imperial Encounters*, Grayson (2003: 4) argues for two important nodal points for democratic peace theory “around which to fix meaning and establish positions to make predication possible”². These nodal points are “democracy” and “war.” Grayson is critical of democracy for being an inherently American conception. In other words, “it does not reflect how democracy is practised in other states, and these differences in practice tend to be ignored in the literature unless the practice is considered ‘illiberal’” (Grayson, 2003: 4). With regard to the conception of war in democratic peace theory, it only recognises formal declarations of war and neglects attacks against ideology, religion, identity, and culture - as US interventions in Third World countries to overthrow the elected governments (Grayson, 2003: 5).

² For Roxanne Lynn Doty, ‘the hegemonic dimension of global politics is inextricably linked to representational practices, as hegemonic practices are those which seek to create a fixedness of meaning (in identity) that ultimately is impossible’ (Grayson, 2003: 4). Doty divides practice of representation into seven crucial elements which help to produce and reproduce difference: nodal points, naturalisation, classification, surveillance, negation, positioning, and the logic of difference (4). For more detail see Doty (1996).

CHAPTER 2

TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE CRITIQUE: LEVINAS ON EGOCENTRISM, VIOLENCE AND ETHICS

The aim of this chapter is to develop the basis for an alternative critique of democratic peace theory with reference to Emmanuel Levinas's ideas concerning the Same and the Other, egocentrism, violence and ethics. The first part of the chapter introduces Levinas's critique of the Western philosophical tradition, which characterizes his philosophy. The second part of the chapter focuses on the Same and the Other and how the emergence of the other disrupts the egocentrism of the Western philosophical tradition. The third part of the chapter deals with forms of violence with reference to both Levinas and Johan Galtung. Finally, the fourth part of the chapter deals with the ethical in the thought of Levinas.

2.1 Introduction: Narcissism of Western Thought

Colin Davis (1996: 1) describes the thought of Emmanuel Levinas as being "governed by one simple yet far-reaching idea: Western philosophy has consistently practised a suppression of the Other." The main criticism that Levinas directed to the history of Western thought was that the Other has been regarded as both separate from and

reconcilable with the Same. “What is same in all Western philosophy is the logic of sameness, namely the systematic enclosure of individuality within all-encompassing system” (Levene, 2004: 46). For Levinas, “the ontological event that defines and dominates the philosophical tradition from Parmenides to Heidegger consists in suppressing or reducing all forms of otherness by transmuting them into the same” (Critchley and Bernasconi, 2002:16). In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas argues that

A philosophy of power, ontology, as first philosophy, which does not question the Same, is a philosophy of injustice. ...Heideggerian ontology which subordinates the relation to the other being to the relation to being in general, remains under obedience to the anonymous and leads fatally to another power, to imperialist domination, to tyranny (1998: 46).

This is what we can call as the “*Hegemony of the Same*” in which “the idea of being is fundamentally adequate to and adjusted to the Same” (Peperzak et al., 1996: 12). In other words, “otherness or alterity appears as a temporary interruption to be eliminated as it is incorporated into or reduced to the sameness” (Davis, 1996: 3). In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas explains this situation:

Western philosophy has most often been an ontology³: a reduction of the Other to the same (or self) by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being. Thus, philosophy is an egology, asserting the primacy of the self, the same, the subject or being. The Other is acknowledged only in order to be suppressed or possessed (1998: 43).

³ For Levinas, to theory as comprehension of beings the general title ontology is appropriate. Ontology which reduces the other to the same, promotes freedom – the freedom that is identification of the same, not allowing itself to be alienated by the other.

History of this Western philosophical tradition can be summarised in a passage from Colin Davis as he argues:

The ontological imperialism of Western thought manifests itself in different forms, but the hidden purpose is always to find a means of offsetting the shock of alterity. The Platonic theory of knowledge as anamnesis (recollection) asserts that I already know what I seek to know, all knowledge is already contained within myself; Husserlian phenomenology, with its concepts of intentionality and representation, establishes the Ego as the source of all meaning and knowledge; the Heideggerian relation of beings to Being entails the exclusion of anything that might lie outside that relation. Thus, philosophy is an egology, asserting the primacy of the Same, the subject or Being (1996: 40).

For Levinas, philosophy has been characterised by its failure to think of the other as Other. This is because “Western thought has been a philosophy of the Same and that its aspiration rests in a fundamental narcissism of an ego which takes itself to be the centre and the all” (Peperzak, 1993: 49). In other words, in Western thought “the Same encompasses and envelops the Other; monism wins out over the pluralism of existent beings” (Peperzak, 1993: 53).

2.2 On the Same and the Other: Disrupting Egocentrism

What is there other than being? This question is central in two of Levinas’s books, *Totality and Infinity* and *Otherwise Than Being*. As Peperzak argues in his commentary on Levinas:

If all knowledge presupposes the experience of something that can be neither given nor wholly integrated by consciousness as such, then there must be something other than Being ... Instead of seeing all realities as unfolding or surrounding elements of one basic and central instance called “the Same”, which realises itself by appropriating them, the irreducibility of all Otherness must be recognised. This recognition supplants the overt or hidden monism of ontology by a pluralism whose basic ground model is the relation of the Same (le Même) and the Other (l’Autre) (1993: 19).

The other is something I cannot grasp, possess or consume. It is “free from any theme and contests any meaning I ascribe to him” (Hughes, 1998: 85). As the other is “constituted as and by that which only escapes ...we come to be involved with the other intimately as other, outside of any concept or thought of the other.” “The other is not part of my familiar world and does not share my home” (Hughes, 1998: 85). The other is an expression of infinity which escapes totalisation (Blum, 1983: 149). Thus, “the Other presents itself as human Other (Autri); it shows a face and opens the (l’Autre) dimension of height, that is to say, it infinitely overflows the bounds of knowledge” (Peperzak et al., 1996: 12).

The ‘I’ might see another as someone to realise certain wants or ‘I’ might try to further its boundaries by taking the other under its sovereignty since “the I establishes itself by absorption of elements, things, and events or by submitting them to the I’s government” (Peperzak, 1993: 24). But such perceptions do not allow the other to reveal itself. Because “all aspects manifested by a phenomenological description that starts from these perspectives are immediately integrated by my self-centred, interested, and dominating consciousness” (Peperzak, 1993: 19), which can be called as a form of

egology. As Theodore De Boer (1997: 132) also puts it, “otherness can never be recognised via understanding or perception; it can be recognised only in the confrontation with the other, as an infinite responsibility, as an obligation resting on me or as an ‘obsession’ as Levinas says in psychoanalytic terminology.”

Another central question on ‘the Same and the Other’ in Levinas is as follows: “Can the Same welcome the Other, not by giving the Other to itself as a theme (that is to say, as being) but by putting itself in question?” (Peperzak et al., 1996: 16). For Levinas the irreducibility of the Other must be recognised since it is beyond my comprehension or knowledge. In this respect, Levinas’s endeavour can be described as “to protect the Other from the aggressions of the Same, to analyse the possibilities and conditions of its appearance in our lives and to formulate ethical significance of the encounter with it” (Davis, 1996: 3). But ‘protection of the Other from the aggressions of the Same’ does not mean privileging the Other before the Same which lead to invasion of the Same by the Other.

If there are absolutely other beings then comprehension becomes a form of violence, because “the other transcends the limits of (self-) consciousness and its horizon; the look and the voice that surprise me are ‘too much’ for my capacity of assimilation” (Peperzak, 1993: 20). For Levinas, to preserve the Other as other it must not become an object of knowledge or experience, since the knowledge is my knowledge, and the experience is my experience. If you try to approach to Other by comprehension and knowledge, then you thematise it. However, the Other is not a concept or a design in mind. As Peperzak (1993: 21) puts it “the other does not permit

me to monopolise the world because the Other's greatness does not fit into an enclosure - not even that of theoretical comprehension." Trying to comprehend the other, to approach the other by comprehending it, will be by necessity to define it by our own words. As Levinas argues in *Transcendence and Height*:

The other resists my attempt at investiture, not because of the extent and obscurity of the theme that it offers to my consideration but because of the refusal to enter into a theme, to submit to a regard, through the eminence of its epiphany (Peperzak et al., 1996 : 12).

The other's emergence disrupts "the closed circle of solitude by speaking to me, by calling my solitary existence into question", and it brings "the separated bring out of egoist solitude and contentment." (Hughes, 1998: 84-85). Peperzak explains this situation as follows:

Another comes to the fore as other if and only if his or her 'appearance' breaks, pierces, destroys the horizon of my egocentric monism, that is, when the other's invasion of my world destroys the empire in which all phenomena are, from the outset, a priori, condemned to function as moments of my universe. The other's face of the other's speech interrupts and disturbs the order of my, ego's world (1993: 19-20).

For Levinas, "the manner in which the other (l'autre) presents himself, reaching beyond the idea I have of the other, we call ... the face." (1998: 50) In other words, "the other does not show it to the I as a theme. The epiphany of the Absolutely Other is a face by which the other challenges and commands me through his nakedness, through his destitution" (Peperzak et al., 1996: 17). Thus, the other is encountered as a face. Levinas's first reference to face comes in the following passage in *Totality and Infinity*:

For the presence before the face, my orientation towards the Other can lose the avidity of the gaze only by turning into generosity, incapable of approaching the other with empty hands. This relationship, established over the things hereafter possibly common, that is, susceptible of being said is the relationship of discourse. The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name face (nous l'appelons, en effect, visage). (1998: 50)

The face of the other, according to Avram (1996: 267), “is a mystery, a challenge, a threat, a teacher, and a subject of love – each in ways that refuse to be bound to knowing.” We do not mean a physical countenance or appearing by ‘the face of the other’. On the contrary, the other is “otherwise, irreducible to his appearing, and thus reveals himself precisely as face” (Burggraeve, 1999: 29). In Levinas’s account, “the primordial relationship to the other that one faces is ‘discourse’⁴. The non-totalising relationship to the face of the other is accomplished in a discourse, in a conversation which proposes the world” (cited in Robbins, 1991: 137).

2.3 On Violence

Regarding violence, Levinas’s philosophy can be considered as an effort “to give an analysis of human relations that preserves them from violence and totalitarianism” (Blum, 1983: 148). According to Levinas, “the other gives my freedom meaning because

⁴ Thus, discourse is a relationship with the other that maintains the distance of infinite separation “yet without this distance destroying this relation and without this relation destroying the distance. “ (Robbins, 137). For more on ‘Discourse and Ethics’ please see Levinas (1998: 64-70, 72-77, 204-212).

I am confronted with real choices between responsibility and obligation towards the other or hatred and violent repudiation” (cited in Davis, 1996: 49). Levinas discovers in evil his concern, ‘the reduction of the other to the same’. Levinas places this at the centre of all violence. Blum argues that,

the power and violence involved is that of reducing the "other" to the "same," Levinas' broadest expression for depriving individuals of their uniqueness in favor of their inclusion in a system of thought or the flow of history or some other kind of ‘totality’ (1983: 148).

Roger Burggaraeve (1999: 35) argues that “a first form of evil lies in considering the other as a potentiality or function of the establishment and affirmation of my ego, or I.” Therefore we can argue that “my spontaneous, natural consideration of others is always self-interested and self-involved” (Burggraeve, 1999: 36). According to Burggraeve, this self-interestedness can go so far that

the otherness of the other is no longer respected but, to speak with Kant, reduced to a mere means. Concretely, this happens whenever I try to make the other person subordinate to me as “food” or “power” or to press him into one or another form of service, hence to “consume” the other, to instrumentalise him and to use him (1999: 36).

This explanation on egocentrism and self-interested consideration shows us the source of all evil: the reduction of the other to the same. For Roland Paul Blum, the central concept in Levinas’s thought - reduction of the other to the same - takes two forms. He calls these forms as “solipsism” and “contextualism”. Blum explains the solipsistic view in the following passage:

In the *solipsistic* view of totality the "other," that is, the "other person" ... is robbed of his individuality and his peculiarities by being understood or approached only on the self's own terms. The concepts involved, *because* they are the *self's*, can never reveal the other person's essential otherness, the fact that he is not merely an aspect of the self, that he exists beyond the self's conceptual system. (1983: 148)

For Blum, the contextual view is as follows:

In the interpretation of totality as *contextual* the emphasis is more on the fact that both the self and the other are seen as aspects of one total system of explanation. The most obvious example here is the thought of Hegel, though he is rarely mentioned by Levinas. A thinker constantly under attack is Heidegger who is accused of treating persons as merely occasions for the revelation of Being, thereby depriving them of any reality of their own. (1983: 148)

While putting 'the reduction of the other to the same' at the centre of all evil, Levinas also distinguishes different forms in it. In this part, I will discuss two forms: 'Comprehension or the grasping of the consideration of the Other', and 'Passion of murder or the desire for the Other'⁵.

2.3.1 Comprehension or the Grasping of the Consideration of the Other

In *Transcendence and Height*, Levinas argues that "when the other enters into the horizon of my knowledge, it already renounces alterity" (Peperzak et al., 1996: 12).

⁵ This part draws extensively on Roger (1999).

Access to the other can be gained through “stripping him of his alterity via concepts, categories, and thematization” (Burggraeve, 1999: 36). Therefore, Burggraeve (1999:36) adds, “I can make images or photographs of the other person so that I suppose myself to know him.” I approach the other from my horizon and thematise (or describe) it by the words from my own vocabulary. By doing so, “the comprehending I, or ego, negates the irreducible uniqueness of the other and tries to conceive of him in the same way as he does the world” (Burggraeve, 1999: 36).

Thus, comprehensive knowledge becomes a violent phenomenon that makes I “gain not only access to the other” but also “power over him” by I’s “penetrating insight” (Burggraeve, 1999: 36). This is because “knowledge is something acquired, dispensed, and instrumentally used by us. Consequently, knowledge of others necessarily reduces the other to something we possess, something we have acquired, and something we will use” (Gottlieb, 1996: 2), since nothing may remain out of it. Sean Hand argues that

A Certain grasp: as an entity, being becomes the characteristic property of thought, as it is grasped by it and becomes known. Knowledge as perception, concept, comprehension, refers back to an act of grasping (1989: 76).

At this point, the other becomes known which is “understood and so appropriated by knowledge” and “freed of its otherness” (Hand, 1989: 76). “Knowledge as perception” is also an “act of grasping” for Burggraeve because “the very *perception* of another person threatens to be violent, since it brings him under the synthetic power of the perceiver’s

mind” (Blum, 1983: 148). All these, for Burggraeve, show how knowledge “brings evil for the other“ which he calls “the tragedy of human understanding” (1999: 32).

2.3.2. Passion of Murder

“Murder manifests itself not so much as a fact taking place once and for all, but as a passion driven by a well-determined intentionality - namely, to destroy the other totally”. (Burggraeve, 1999: 38). The following passage from Burggraeve explains murder in a Levinasian sense:

Murder, then, renounces absolutely all comprehension of the other, for one no longer wishes to include the other in the same, that is, in one’s own project of existing, but, on the contrary, to exclude him, because he is too much in the way of one’s struggle for identity. Murder manifests itself as the effort and realization of an inexorable struggle for omnipotence: The I plays not “all or nothing” but “all and nothing”. It promotes itself to “all” so that the other must be reduced to nothing or no one (1999: 38).

The other is the only one, which I wish to kill or to annihilate, since it is beyond my power. As Colin Davis (1996: 50) puts it, “the other resists my attempts at appropriation and domination; it escapes my power since I cannot possess or even understand it.”

Thus, annihilation remains as the only way of suppressing the other:

To kill is not to dominate but to annihilate; it is to renounce comprehension absolutely. Murder exercises a power over what escapes power. ...I can wish to kill only an existent which is absolutely independent, which exceeds my powers infinitely, and therefore does not oppose them but paralyses the very power of power. The Other is the sole being I can wish to kill (1998: 198).

According to Colin Davis, “I may succeed in killing the other or even innumerable others,”⁶ because “murder is the most banal incident of human history” (1998: 198), as Levinas argues. But the Other survives; “the Other remains inviolate and inviolable. The face appears in my world, but does not belong to it; I can do it no harm” (Davis, 1996: 51). “Violence, then, always ends or continues in failure. ...Violence can only be a second or secondary response to the revelation that I cannot kill the Other.” (Davis, 1996: 51) For Levinas, the original relation is peace.

2.3.3 A Violence Typology

There are two reasons to why I chose to employ the “Violence Typology” of Johan Galtung in a part dealing with violence in Levinas. The first reason is that Galtung has a broader understanding of violence. The second reason is that Galtung’s classification of violence into “direct” and “structural” violence is useful and brings a broader perspective in cooperation with two forms of violence in Levinas which I mentioned earlier.

According to Johan Galtung, forms of direct violence are instantly recognizable, but there are also hidden forms of violence. Galtung, in his work, proceeds from the following understanding of violence:

I understand violence as the *avoidable impairment of fundamental human needs* or, to put it in more general terms, the impairment of

⁶ Here the distinction between “the other” and “the Other” becomes crucial.

human *life*, which lowers the actual degree to which someone is able to meet their needs below that which would otherwise be *possible*. The *threat* of violence is also violence. (Galtung, 1998: 168)

This understanding of violence goes far beyond direct violence, in which one or more people inflict physical harm on other people. In addition to direct violence, Galtung (1990: 294) emphasizes another form of violence, namely *structural violence*, which is not carried out by individuals, but hidden to a greater or lesser extent in structures. An example of this might be the injustices of the worldwide system for the trade in goods, which creates more and more starving people every year.

Violence typology according to Galtung	Need Groups			
	Survival (Negation: death)	Well-being (Negation: poverty, illness)	Identity / purpose (Negation: alienation)	Freedom (Negation: oppression)
Direct violence	killing	Injury, siege, sanctions, poverty	de- socialization, re-socialization, underclass	repression, imprisonment, expulsion, deportation
Structural violence	Exploitation A	Exploitation B	Penetration, segmentation	Marginalization, fragmentation

Figure 1

Johan Galtung, Violence Typology

During the 1990s, Galtung supplemented his violence typology with another category by introducing the concept of *cultural violence*: “Cultural violence should be understood as those aspects of culture that can be used to justify or legitimate the use of direct or

structural violence” (Galtung, 1990: 293). The Stars and Stripes, Hammer and Sickle, flags, hymns, military parades, portraits of the leader, inflammatory speeches and posters might be the examples for this category.

2.4 The *Ethical* in Levinas⁷

“It may be that things allow themselves to be treated as elements subordinated to a global and hierarchical system, but do people not somehow resist this?” asks Peperzak (1993: 49) in his commentary on a Levinas’s chapter, *The Primacy of the Same, or Narcissism*. The answer to this question is worth thinking with respect to ethics in Levinas.

In Levinas, ethics is the first philosophy where ethics is described as the relation of infinite responsibility to the Other. It arises from the relation to the other because,

the immediate experience of another’s emergence contains the root of all possible ethics as well as the source from which all insights of theoretical philosophy should start. The other’s existence as such reveals to me the basis and the primacy sense of my obligations (Peperzak, 1993: 22).

It is the first philosophy since, it disrupts ontology and logocentrism. In other words it is the relation to the other which is ethical, “not an ethics that is instantiated in relations” (Critchley and Bernasconi, 2002: 12). In his words, Levinas (1998: 143) defines ethics

⁷ For another application of Levinas’s thoughts, especially his ethics to International Relations, please see David Campbell (1994) and David Campbell and Michael Dillon (1993).

as “putting into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other.” Here, his purpose is “to show the way in which any person other than myself, although metaphysically independent of me and I of him, has an absolute moral claim on me” (Blum, 1983: 147). At this point, let us refer to Levinas’s most quoted passage on ethics:

A calling into question of the same- which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same- is brought about by the other. We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics. The strangeness of the Other; his irreducibility to the :I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished as calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics. Metaphysics, transcendence, the welcoming of the other by the same, of the Other by me, is concretely produced as the calling into question of the same by the other, that is, as the ethics that accomplishes the critical essence of knowledge. And as critique precedes dogmatism, metaphysics precedes ontology (1998: 43).

Thus, one can say that Ethics is also critique for Levinas;

it is the critical *mise en* question of the liberty, spontaneity, and cognitive emprise of the ego that seeks to reduce all otherness itself. The ethical is therefore at location of a point of alterity; or what Levinas also calls ‘exteriority’, that cannot be reduced to the Same” (Critchley, 1999: 5).

To put it another way, “ethics takes place as the putting into question of the ego, the self, consciousness or what he calls, in the term he borrows from Plato, the same” (Critchley and Bernasconi, 2002: 15). Therefore, the same is called into question by the Other “who escapes the logic of sameness and domination” (Levene, 2004: 47). This putting into question of the self, argues Levinas, “is precisely a welcome to absolutely other” (Peperzak et al., 1996: 17), since it is possible due to the other’s strangeness and irreducibility to the I. In addition, “putting into question is a new tension within the I.

Instead of annihilating the I, putting into question binds it to the other in an incomparable and unique way.” (Peperzak, et al., 1996: 17)

“Traditionally, philosophy gives priority to knowing comprehension and treats ethics as derivative” (Avram, 1996: 265). But for Levinas, “knowledge cannot be the basis of ethical life - that is, of transcending concern for the other people, a concern untouched by our own needs, desires and attempts to control” (Gottlieb, 1996: 2). Thus, Levinas’s ethics introduces “a forgotten possibility into this traditional philosophical hierarchy ... in which none of the three (self, other, world) cannot be reduced to either of the others” (Avram, 1996: 265). By doing this Levinas “challenges the power with which philosophical comprehension has underwritten the intellectual enterprise of Western culture by drawing all forms of theory and practice into its thematic gaze” (Avram, 1996: 265).

We can see this ethical understanding in Levinas’s two major books, *Totality and Infinity*, and *Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence* which “are devoted to showing how phenomenology discloses an ethical alternative to what he variously calls Western philosophy, ontology, thematization, conceptualisation, theory, universality, interiority, and correlation - in short, totality” (Levene, 2004: 46). Thus, the central task of Levinas’s work can be defined as “the attempt to describe a relation with the other person that cannot be reduced to comprehension” (Critchley and Bernasconi, 2002: 8). “Levinas seeks to overcome the fundamental rationalist, egocentric presuppositions of Western philosophical ethics” (Gottlieb, 1996:1). The important point about his ethics is that it is

“potentially disruptive of thought, for thought fails when it stretches for concepts and metaphors by which it might comprehend the irreducibly Other” (Avram, 1996, 270).

Indeed, ethics may not be regarded as the correct term for the philosophy of Levinas; the term *ethical* might be more suitable, or what Derrida calls “ethics of ethics”. Because, “the ethical is the broader domain where ethical experiences and relationships occur before the foundations of ethics in the sense of philosophically established principles, rules or codes” (Davis, 1996: 48).

The ethical relation in Levinas revolves around the encounter between the Same and the Other. But “this encounter cannot be explained in exclusively ontological terms because it involves more than Being” (Davis, 1996: 48). In other words,

This encounter is, Levinas insists, ethical; and the ethical bond with the Other is the most fundamental subject for philosophical reflection because there is nothing that precedes it or has priority over it. It characterizes human relations at their most basic level (Davis, 1996: 48).

Levinas argues that this ethical relation to the other is “ultimately prior to his ontological relation to himself (egology)”, or “to the totality of things which we call the world (cosmology)” (Kearney, 1984: 57). “Our engagements with the other are always concrete – embodied and emplaced – but in a relationship that is prior to any significance that might be attached to it by philosophy, culture, politics or place” (Popke, 2003: 304). Thus, ethics is the first philosophy, as Levinas calls it, which is prior to any mediation or philosophy. In other words, ethics is otherwise than knowledge

or comprehension. Because, encounter is the moment when the self realizes and practices that he has no longer the power with him and also the encounter is an unusual occasion for the consciousness (Şenyurt, 2003: 1). The reason for this is the “fundamental difference in the way we apprehend a particular object, within the horizon of being and the way we approach the other” (Smith, 2003: 19).

Before the encounter, we are instrumental egoists whose relationship to the world is characterized primarily by enjoyment. So, the significance of the encounter is that “the other puts me into question by revealing to me that my powers and freedom are limited.” (Davis, 1996: 49) Davis continues so as to make it clearer (1996: 49): “The transcendental Ego would like to be the sole source of its own knowledge, actions and meanings; the encounter with the Other shows such freedom to be egoistical, arbitrary and unjustified.” “Thus the (ethical) encounter with the other interrupts the self’s habitual economy and its tendency to conceive of the world as a space of possibilities and power (*pouvoir*)” (Robbins, 1991: 137). The encounter with the other lies at the origin of the separateness of the self; only by discovering the irreducibility of the alterity of the other. The other makes me realise that I share the world that is not my unique possession. For Levinas, “my ethical relation for the other stems from the fact that the self cannot survive by itself alone, cannot find meaning within its own being-in-the-world, within the ontology” (Kearney, 1984: 60).

“The ethical relation to the other is described by Levinas in terms of infinity” (Critchley and Bernasconi, 2002: 14). Levinas’s idea of infinity has three sources: the

Bible, Plato and Descartes. For these sources let us refer to several passages from Blum's article (1983: 149-150):

From the Old Testament prophets Levinas takes the idea of the eschatological vision of a meaning or end to history that lies beyond history. Ultimately, though Levinas does not make the point, "infinity" can be seen as Jahweh, existing beyond history and beyond human conceptualisations, yet giving direction to human existence.

Levinas' second example of "infinity" is Plato's theory, in the *Republic*, that the Good is beyond Being. The forms are *ta onta*, those which are, but in looking "beyond being" Levinas seeks, "not (that which) *is in another way*, but (that which) *is other than Being*."

Levinas appeals to Descartes' analysis of the idea of infinity in the Third Meditation. For Descartes, Levinas asserts, "The idea of the infinite is exceptional in that its *ideatum* lies beyond its idea, whereas for objects, the total coincidence of their 'objective' and 'formal' realities is not excluded. For all ideas other than that of the infinite we could, ultimately, be solely responsible."

In Descartes Levinas finds the epistemological keynote to his entire theory. Descartes entertains the possibility that thought determines its entire content. In thinking infinity, however, as Levinas says, "We think more than is thought. This "more than" is transcendence, that which lies beyond any structure or "totality." "In the idea of the infinite one thinks that which always remains external to thought."

For Levinas, ethics arise first and foremost out of our fundamental responsibility for the other. "The other's facing me makes me responsible for him/her, and this responsibility has no limits." (Peperzak, 1993: 22) This responsibility in the first place is "taking care not to violate or destroy the other in his otherness, which is to say not to reduce the other to his countenance, but instead to recognize, respect, and do justice to him

in his otherness.” According to Levinas, “this responsibility arises because there is a certain form of violence involved in taking place of being” (cited in Popke, 2003: 304).

As Levinas puts it:

My being-in-the-world or ‘my place in the sun’, my being at home, have these not also been the usurpation of spaces belonging to the other whom I have already oppressed or starved, or driven out into a third world; are these not acts of repulsing, excluding, exiling, stripping, killing? (Hand, 1989: 82)

As Hand (1989: 85) argues, “my presence before the face is therefore an epiphany. It creates an asymmetrical indebtedness on my part towards the other’s moral summons which is based not on a prior knowledge ... but on the primacy of the other’s right to exist.” For Levinas, “in ethics, the other’s right to exist has primacy over my own.” (Kearney, 1984: 60)

The ethical relation to the other precedes the egoism and tyranny of ontology. Colin Davis (1996: 50) argues that “when the face erupts into our world, its first expression is a commandment: ‘You shall not kill’ which is taken by Levinas as the first and the most fundamental of laws and, from which all others derive.” This is because

the ethical exigency to be responsible for the other undermines the ontological primacy of the meaning of the Being; it unsettles the natural and political positions we have taken up in the world and predisposes us to a meaning that is other than Being, that is otherwise than Being. (Kearney, 1984: 59).

Therefore, “ethics is against nature because it forbids the murderousness of my natural will to put my own existence first” (Kearney, 1984: 60). Levinas’s subversion of nature and ontology can be found in his statements: ‘responsibility precedes essence’ and ‘the good transcends essence’.

For Levinas, the ethical relation is fundamentally asymmetrical and non-reciprocal, since the other does not share my powers and responsibilities. According to Levinas, “it would be a mistake for me to respect the other because I expect anything in return; my obligation and responsibility are not mirrored by the other’s reciprocal responsibility towards me” (cited in Davis, 1996: 51-52).

CHAPTER 3

VIOLENCE OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY

In this chapter, I will show how the democratic peace theory is violent in itself – this, in spite of how it argues for a peaceful world through the spread of democracy. In order to do this, I will explore the egocentric and violent tendencies that can be claimed to exist within the democratic peace theory by referring to Levinas’s philosophical insights on these issues.

As a modernist theory, democratic peace theory cannot be considered separately from the philosophical tradition in which it is rooted. This philosophical tradition has been characterised by the primacy of the self, the same, the subject or being. In other words, the philosophical tradition from Plato to Husserlian phenomenology or Heideggerian ontology has been “a philosophy of the same and that its aspiration rests in a fundamental narcissism of an ego which takes itself to be the centre and the all.” As Blum (1983: 148) puts it, “violence and totalitarianism have found their philosophical justification in this philosophical tradition dominated by the concept of totality.” As David Campbell, while mentioning on the holocaust, also argues that “there is no

escaping the recognition that modern political life lies heavily implicated in the instigation and conduct of this horror” (in Campbell and Dillon, 1993: 164).

3.1 Egocentrism and Democratic Peace Theory: Identifying the West by Democracy

By constituting itself as the Ego (Being, the same), the West becomes the source of all meaning or, as Derrida argues, the cape or headland for all civilisations. This can be called as the question of exemplarity. Since the end of the Cold War, as Fukuyama declared the end of the history and the triumph of Western liberalism, this exemplarity has been defined more and more with reference to democracy. In other words, the West as the Being identified itself with democracy.

As I mentioned earlier, democratic peace theory is rooted in the Western philosophical tradition and, in consequence, is therefore also characterised by the primacy of the self. In democratic peace theory, there exists a fundamental narcissism of ego, which takes itself to be the centre of all meaning. In other words, the dominant political system of West, namely democracy becomes an ideal for all other states. Although Fukuyama is not regarded a representative of democratic peace theory, his ideas on “the end of the history” and “the triumph of Western liberalism” had a considerable effect on serving the democracy as an ideal for all other nations after the Cold War. Therefore, at this point, let us refer to Fukuyama’s argument related to this issue. Fukuyama, in his famous article *the End of the History*, he argues that

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government (1989: 2).

Fukuyama's intention here can be considered as follows: Liberal democracy is the most satisfying form of government and it presents the final stage of human government. All other ideologies will fall in its wake. Therefore, all other states which are not liberal must move towards being liberal democracies to justify their rules.

Here, we see that the same is not questioned, whereas the otherness or the alterity of the other is seen as temporary only – that is, as something “which can be eliminated as it is incorporated into or reduced to the sameness” (Davis, 1996: 3). In other words, the alterity of the other state is temporary since it is considered to be on the way to becoming the same: liberal and democratic. To put it in yet another way, the other is considered as “a potentiality or function of the establishment and affirmation of ego, or I” (Burggraeve, 1999: 35); the affirmation as liberal, democratic and peaceful.

3.2 Democracy and Violence

Democracies perceive themselves as inherently peaceful and “peace-loving, stressing the peaceful pursuit of their goal” (Galtung, 1996: 49). Recent history displays the examples of wars engaged by democratic states like the USA, France, the UK and Israel. An

example in the last decade is the US-led coalition in both the First and the Second Gulf War. These cases show that, as Galtung (1996: 50) concludes, “democracy is compatible with large-scale exercises of violence.” Thus, the use of force by democracies is justified because “they are directed against real threat launched by rogue actors intent on undermining the ‘democratic way of life’” (Grayson, 2003: 3).

This part of the chapter deals with both the violence inside the democratic peace theory and the violence which exists in the acts informed by this theory. In more specific terms, the violence at the theoretical level is dealt with in the terms of comprehension while the violence in practice is dealt within terms of murder

3.2.1 Comprehension

The main concern under this title is the expansion of self-interest through identification of the other, which represents a hidden monism inside democratic peace theory. This hidden monism, which exists in democratic peace theory, proposes the enlargement of the identity of the West through the reduction of the other⁸. In order to bring a different perspective to “the enlargement through reduction”, let us quote a passage from Yasemin Şenyurt:

⁸ While making such an argument we should bear in mind that democratic peace theory was born in the West, drawing on the ideas of German philosopher Immanuel Kant, and introduced to International Relations literature by the Western scholars.

Man, who wants to take the nature and himself under his control, wants to further extend his boundaries by taking the other under his sovereignty. ...Hence, the man who sucks in all objects like a hurricane, also perceives the other as an object and wants to inhale it like a cigarette, to throw away its butt and then step on it. In other words, he wants to put his intelligent imprint on everything in life. (2003: 1)

The intelligent imprint, here, is comprehension, and it is therefore comprehensive knowledge which brings reduction. To put it in a different way comprehension (of the other state) constitutes the power of the West in this respect.

The other is beyond the knowledge or the power of the West, it comes from a dimension that surpasses the West. It is “free from any theme and contests any meaning” (Hughes, 1998: 85) that the West ascribes to it. To access the other, the West resorts to stripping the other of its alterity via concepts, categories and thematization. According to Levinas (1998: 47), “thematization and conceptualisation, which moreover are inseparable, are not peace with the other but suppression or possession of the other.”

In democratic peace theory, thematization is realised in *calling the other state as non-democratic* which reflects the vocabulary and, therefore, also the consciousness of the self. At this point we can argue that “when the other enters into the horizon of my knowledge it already renounces alterity” (Peperzak et al., 1996: 12). By calling the other state as non-democratic, the West disrupts the alterity of the other. Here, the West constitutes the comprehending I, or the ego which negates the irreducible uniqueness of the other and tries to conceive it in the same way as it does the world. Thus, all the

alternative futures for the other state have been destroyed, and democracy has been left as the only true option.

The West thematises the other because it wants to bring the other to its domain of consciousness (comprehension) and, therefore, to become able to dominate the other. As I mentioned earlier, comprehension is the power of the West in this respect. Comprehensive knowledge becomes a violent phenomenon that makes I gain not only access to the other, but also power over him. Because the knowledge is “something acquired, dispensed, and instrumentally used by us” (Gottlieb, 1996: 2). Consequently, knowledge of others necessarily reduces the other to something we possess, something we have acquired, and something we will use, since nothing may remain out of it. So, the West’s attempt to comprehend the other can be evaluated around the statement of “leaving nothing out of it”. By its exemplary mission, the West regards the world as its material and intellectual possession and, therefore, nothing should remain external to it. Thus, the other state should be reduced to a knowable object to stay within the West’s domain of grasp. The non-democratic state is the other which has become known, understood and thus appropriated by knowledge and freed of its otherness. It becomes a knowable object that can be suppressed. This violent act finds its justification in the Western philosophical tradition, which is dominated by the comprehension of being or the suppression of the other with reference to the primacy of the same.

3.2.2 Murder

As Burggraeve (1999: 38) puts it, “murder manifests itself not so much as a fact taking place once and for all, but as a passion driven by a well-determined intentionality—namely, to destroy the other totally.” Thus, murder does not propose the reduction of the other to the same but to nothing. In this section, I will deal with the spread of democracy — act informed by the democratic peace theory — as the reduction of the other to the same which can be then followed by murder, annihilation, since the other may resist the attempts at appropriation and domination.

Democratic peace theory regards the spread of democracy as the basis of world peace, since it claims that democratic states are more peaceful than states having any other type of regime. Instead of serving a peaceful end, the spread of democracy carries an implicit (or explicit) violent phenomenon: reduction of the other. Then spread of democracy becomes a tool of assimilation, by democratising other states — the non-democratic states - to the same, to being, ego, or to itself. In other words, the West creates alter egos (alter Wests) through the spread of democracy. The way of doing this is to reduce it to something like me. At this point we can argue that the reason why democratic states have positive images of each other, the reason to why democratic states “expect decision-makers in other states likewise to follow the same norms of conflict resolution as have been developed within and characterize those other states’ domestic political processes”, or the reason to why democratic peace theorists perceive the relations between the democracies as peaceful due to their certainty about

each other's intentions can be found in the West's reduction of the other(state) to something like itself.

As Colin Davis (1996: 50) puts it, "the other resists my attempts at appropriation and domination; it escapes my power since I cannot possess or even understand it." Thus, annihilation or murder remains as the only way of suppressing the other. Murder is "to exclude [the other], because he is too much in the way of one's struggle for identity" (Burggraeve, 1999: 38). In the murder, "the I plays not 'all or nothing' but 'all and nothing'" (Burggraeve, 1999: 38). The other is the only one, which I wish to kill or to annihilate since it is beyond my power. This is also driven by another factor which Levinas calls "desire". The emergence of the other answers the deepest desire motivating me. This desire is different from all forms of human need. The self desires the absolute and the infinite that does not fit into comprehension. This desire motivates the self to consume, to suppress the other, and to take it under his control. This desire motivates the West's enlargement through identification of the other.

Reduction of the other to the same or the spread of democracy to non-democratic state can be considered a form structural or indirect violence (see Galtung's violent typology on page 31). It is structural violence, because it is hidden in the structure; in the current make up of the international system, which is a modernist one based on the Western philosophical tradition which has been one of the main targets of this work. This indirect or structural violence can easily convert into direct violence accompanied by the wish not to include the other in the same anymore. The acts of the Western states

like the invasion of Iraq by the US and allied forces in the name of spreading the democracy can be an example.

The West may succeed in killing the other since “murder is the most banal incident of human history” (1998:198), as Levinas argues. However, the Other survives; “the Other remains inviolate and inviolable. The face appears in my world but does not belong to it; I can do it no harm” (Davis, 1996: 51). Violence, then, always ends or continues in failure. ...Violence can only be a second or secondary response to the revelation that I cannot kill the Other” (Davis, 1996: 51). For Levinas, the original relation is peace.



A CONCLUSION TOWARDS ETHICAL PEACE

How can Being justify itself? What is there other than Being? What may remain other to knowledge? What is there beyond my power? These are the questions, which are very central to Levinas's thought, are also employed as the central questions directing the main theme of this thesis. However, the difficulty underlying the employment of such questions in a work comprising interstate relations is that there is a need to project those questions onto states, and that always involves the danger of producing misleading answers and misleading interpretation of the philosophical thought. Therefore, I tried to start from the most basic one; the modern man, since the democratic peace theory is a modernist theory⁹. By doing this, I described a West that persists its being as sovereign, and is concerned to maintain the powers of its sovereignty by the enlargement of its identity through the reduction of the other.

Indeed, such a description of the West exists in democratic peace theory. In democratic peace theory, the West is described as self-interested which tries to expand through identification of the other, and which represents a hidden monism inside the theory. Therefore the modern state in the West - just like the modern man - is motivated by a deep desire to further its boundaries by taking the other under its control. The West

⁹ In the thesis, I project the peculiarities of the modern man onto the modern state.

as Being, as the ego, as the centre of all meaning and civilisation wants nothing to remain external to it or external to its knowledge. At this point, for the purpose of deepening the case, we should again refer to the characteristics of the modern man. The modern man believes that he can solve everything through his mind and, therefore, “downgrades and insults everything primarily his own body and also all of the other living creatures and other objects in the world” (Şenyurt, 2003: 1). In such a world, in which the self comprehends all the objects and living creatures, there is no surprise. Thus, as long as the West is not interrupted by the emergence of another, the other state which is external to its consciousness, the West continues to enjoy its supremacy both intellectually and materially.

Therefore, my first point of criticism was about the egocentrism which exists within the democratic peace theory. By declaring democracy as the best political system which is characterised by freedom and peace, the West attempts to consolidate its central position as the intellectual master of the world. In this respect, the other state is considered to be in a move towards being a democracy and thus comprehended in this way. In other words, the other state becomes a tool for affirmation of the ego when comprehended.

By arguing all these, we come to such a point that we establish a correlation between democracy and violence in today’s international system. Democracies perceive themselves as peaceful and pacific, and justify their violent actions by calling them something different than conflict. This peaceful perception of each other among the democracies give way to the idea of spreading democracy and, thus, making the world

peaceful. Can this really be achieved? If democracy was the basis of peace, then why could we not eliminate the violence inside democracies and inside their acts? Here we face with the idea of the other, the other state which is beyond the knowledge or the power of the West, and which comes from a dimension that surpasses the West. It is “free from any theme and contests any meaning” (Hughes, 1998: 85) that the West ascribes to it. Therefore, the other emerges with the possibility of peace and ethics in the world. This is because the emergence of another puts me into question, due to his or her strangeness and irreducibility. But against this picture, the West resorts to stripping the other of its alterity via concepts, categories and thematization. This thematization is realised in *calling the other state as non-democratic*, which reflects the vocabulary and, therefore, also the consciousness of the self. This shows the violence within democratic peace theory since the other state is robbed of its peculiarities, its alterity is destroyed and it becomes a property of the thought of the West through the thematization and conceptualisation.

The desire for the absolute and the infinite other is followed by a passion to destroy the other totally, as when the West does not want the inclusion of the other in the same. Prior to the passion of murder, the West attempts to reduce the other state through the spread of democracy. By doing this, it reduces the other state to something like itself and therefore can be sure about its peaceful intentions. To repeat an argument from the third chapter here again: we can argue that the reason to why democratic states have positive images of each other, the reason to why democratic states “expect decision-makers in other states likewise to follow the same norms of conflict resolution as have been developed within and characterize those other states' domestic political

processes”, or the reason to why democratic peace theorists perceive the relations between the democracies as peaceful due to their certainty about each other’s intentions can be found in the West’s reduction of the other(state) to something like itself.

As the other is resistant to my attempts at appropriation and domination, the murder remains as the last option for the West to suppress the other. But again, the West realises that it cannot kill the Other; violence fails in all attempts to kill the Other. The West can kill the other, this is a usual occasion since it has practised killing for centuries. As Levinas argues, the original relationship to the other is peace.

Consequently, I want to move onto a different discussion before concluding the thesis. The encounter with the other constitutes the very basis of ethical relationship to the other. This encounter puts me in question. In other words, it makes me realise that this world is not my unique possession, and both my power and freedom is limited. Can such an ethical understanding as the first philosophy be the basis of the world peace? Can the states see their existence as for-the-other? When states do not make the other as a knowable object, when they respect the otherness of the other, and when they respect another which is external to their thought, then the way to ethical peace in the international relations is opened up. Another important point here is that states should be aware of the fact that their separate existence is possible only with the existence of the other, the other state which is not reduced. All these bring respect for the differences, but not a respect monitored and supervised by a superior ego. If there is to exist such an ethical relationship, it should be the first philosophy for all states which is prior to all

law and rules. In such an international environment, I am always reminded by the Other that my freedom and powers are limited then this fundamental ethical relation leads to peace and a respectful international system.



SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Bernasconi, Robert and Simon Critchley (eds.) 1991. *Re-reading Levinas*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Campbell, David, and Michael Dillon (eds.) 1993. *The Political Subject of Violence*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Critchley Simon. 1999. *Ethics- Politics- Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary French Thought*. New York: Verso.

Critchley, Simon and Robert Bernasconi (eds.) 2002. *The Cambridge Companion to Levinas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Critchley, Simon. 1999. *The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas*. (2nd ed.) Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Davis, Colin. 1996. *Levinas: An Introduction*. Oxford: Polity Press.

De Boer, Theodore. 1997. *The Rationality of Transcendence: Studies in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*. Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben Publisher.

Direk, Zeynep and Erdem Gökyaran (eds.) 2003. *Metis Seçkileri: Emmanuel Levinas*. İstanbul : MetisYayınları.

Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 1996. *Imperial Encounters*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Galtung, Johan. 1996. *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. Wiltshire: Sage Publications.

Goldstein, Joshua S. 2004. *International Relations*. (Fifth ed.) New York: Longman.

Hand, Sean. 1989. *The Levinas Reader*. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.

Hastedt, Glenn P. 2003. *International Politics in a Changing World*. New York: Longman.

Kearney, Richard. 1984. *Dialogues With Contemporary Continental Thinkers*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Levinas, Emmanuel. 1987. *Time and the Other*. Richard A. Cohen, trans. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press.

Levinas, Emmanuel. 1991. *Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence*, Alphonso Lingis, trans. Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Levinas, Emmanuel. 1996. "Transcendence and Height." In Adriaan T. Peperzak et al., (eds.), *Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Levinas, Emmanuel. 1998. *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*. Alphonso Lingis, trans. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press.

Peperzak, Adriaan. 1993. *To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*. Indiana: Purdue University Press.

Robbins, Jill (ed.) 2001. *Is It Righteous To Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas*. California: Stanford University Press.

Russett, Bruce, Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella. 2004. *World Politics: The Menu for Choice*. (7th ed.) Wadsworth.

Russett, Bruce. 1993. *Grasping the Democratic Peace*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Wall, Thomas Carl. 1999. *Radical Passivity: Levinas, Blanchot, and Agamben*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Articles

Avram, Wes. 1996. "On the Priority of 'Ethics' in the Work of Levinas," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 24(2): 261-285.

Burggraeve, Roger. 1999. "Violence and the Vulnerable Face of the Other: The Vision of Emmanuel Levinas on Moral Evil and our Responsibility," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 30(1) Spring: 29-45.

Campbell, David. 1994. "The Deterritorialization of Responsibility: Levinas, Derrida and Ethics After the End of Philosophy," *Alternatives* 19: 455-484.

Chan, Steve. 1997. "In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise," *Mershon International Studies Review* 41(1): 59-91.

Chrysoloras, Nicolaos. 2003. "Democratic Peace Theory: The Remedy for War, or the Legitimisation of Western Foreign Policy?," *Revue Fédéralisme* 3.

Eskin, Michael. 1999. "A Survivor's Ethics: Levinas's Challenge to Philosophy," *Dialectical Anthropology* 24: 407-450.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. "The End of History," *The National Interest* 13, Summer.

Galtung, Johan. 1969. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3): 167-191

Galtung, Johan. 1990. "Cultural Violence," *Journal of Peace Research* 27(3): 291-305.

Gartzke, Erik. 1998. "Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace," *American Journal of Political Science* 1(1): 1-27.

Gottlieb, Roger S. 1994. "Ethics and Trauma: Levinas, Feminism, and Deep Ecology," *Cross Currents* 44(2).

Grayson, Kyle. 2003. "Democratic Peace Theory as Practice: (Re)reading the Significance of Liberal Representations of War and Peace," *YCISS working paper* no.22.

Hughes, Cheryl. 1998. "The primacy of ethics: Hobbes and Levinas," *Continental Philosophy Review* 31: 79-94.

- Layne, Christopher. 1994. "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19(2): 5-49.
- Levene, Nancy. 2004. "Levinas's Beginnings: Ethics, Politics, and Origins," *The European Legacy* 9(1): 43-54.
- Macmillan, John. 2004. "Liberalism and the Democratic Peace," *Review of International Studies* 30: 179-200.
- Owen, John W. 1994. "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19(2): 87-125.
- Özkeçeci, Binnur. 2002. "The Myth of Democratic Peace: Theoretical and Empirical Shortcomings of Democratic Peace Theory," *Alternatives*, 1(3).
- Popke, E. Jeffrey. 2003. "Poststructuralist Ethics: Subjectivity, Responsibility and the Space of Community," *Progress in Human Geography* 27(3): 298-316.
- Robbins, Jill. 1991. "Visage, Figure: Reading Levinas's Totality and Infinity," *Yale French Studies*, 0(79): 135-149.
- Russett, Bruce, Christopher Layne, David E. Spiro, and Michael W. Doyle. 1995. "The Democratic Peace," *International Security*, 19(4): 164-184.
- Şenyurt, Yasemin. 2003. "Encounter with the Other: Living the Other in Platonic Love," Unpublished paper.
- Siverson, Randolph. 1995. "Democracies and War Participation: In defence of the Institutional Constraints Argument," *European Journal of International Relations*, 1: 481-489.
- Smith, Michael. 2003. "Emmanuel Levinas's Ethics of Responsibility," *Mike Ryan Lecture Series*, Kennesaw State College.
- Word, Michael D., and Kristian S. Gleditsch. 1998. "Democratizing for Peace," *The American Political Science Review*, 92(1): 51-61.