Beyond First Glance: Exploring the Impact of Speed and Size in the Initial Deployments of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

by

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ABSTRACT

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In conflict-affected regions, international peacekeeping holds significant importance in alleviating violence and fostering lasting peace. This dissertation explores how the speed, size, and composition of initial deployments of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations impact violence and the duration of peace.

The initial deployment phase is crucial as it sets the foundation for the entire mission, shaping its trajectory and potential results. This phase plays a pivotal role in shaping the views and perceptions of local populations regarding the international community's dedication to resolving the conflict and the legitimacy of the peacekeeping forces. These perceptions significantly impact the mission's effectiveness in addressing conflict dynamics and supporting peace processes.

The theoretical framework of the dissertation is built on the speed and size components of initial deployments and emphasizes the crucial role of swift and substantial initial deployment. Theoretically, a fast and larger initial deployment enables seizing swift opportunities for intervention and enhances the credibility and legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission among the local population. These two mechanisms consequentially lead to prolonged peace and reduced battlefield violence. The dissertation proposes that fast and sizeable initial deployments contribute to reduced violence and longer-lasting peace.

Swift initial deployments build trust and avert a possible detrimental perception of weakness by the local population. In practical terms, by quickly establishing a physical presence and building relationships with the parties involved, peacekeeping forces can deter violence, gather essential information, and prevent power vacuums.

According to the rationalist bargaining model, the size and composition of peacekeeping operations are crucial factors in determining the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions. Larger missions with more resources, capabilities, and legitimacy are better equipped to have a greater capacity to deter conflicts, overcome commitment issues, and facilitate information-sharing between conflicting parties. By deploying a tailored personnel composition, peacekeeping missions can reduce the risk of peace failure and contribute to overall success.

By filling a critical gap in the existing literature, the dissertation utilizes newly collected global data for 55 UN peacekeeping operations over 28 years and adopts a comprehensive perspective that disaggregates the phases of deployment and the personnel types. The dissertation allows for a nuanced evaluation of peacekeeping effectiveness and takes a

systematic quantitative approach by employing survival analysis and negative-binomial regression. The findings have significant theoretical and practical implications for policymakers, practitioners, and scholars, providing valuable insights into the key determinants that inform future UN operations, improve their efficiency, and enhance the overall impact of peacekeeping efforts.

The dissertation empirically demonstrates that prompt initial deployments lead to reduced violence and extended periods of negative peace. However, longer time gaps between suggesting and adopting a UN Security Council resolution decrease the probability of a return to war, suggesting additional time in preparation allows for comprehensive conflict analysis and preparation.

Additionally, substantial initial deployments can prolong negative peace duration. The composition of the initial deployment also plays a role. An increase in troop personnel is linked to a decrease in the duration of peace, whereas more police or military observer personnel reduce the risk of peace failure. However, the findings underscore the importance of promptly deploying troops to minimize violence and bolster the peace process.

The dissertation underscores the crucial role of timely and substantial initial deployments in enhancing the legitimacy and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations for reducing violence and extending the duration of peace.

Keywords: United Nations, peacekeeping operation, initial deployment, speed, size, composition, peace duration, battlefield violence.

ÖZETÇE

İlk Bakıştan Öteye: Birleşmiş Milletler Barışı Koruma Operasyonlarının İlk Konuşlandırmalarında Hız ve Büyüklüğün Etkisini Keşfetmek

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Çatışmalardan etkilenen bölgelerde uluslararası barışı koruma, şiddetin azaltılması ve kalıcı barışın desteklenmesi açısından büyük önem taşımaktadır. Bu tez, Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) barışı koruma operasyonlarının ilk konuşlandırmalarının hızı, boyutu ve bileşiminin şiddeti ve barış süresini nasıl etkilediğini keşfetmektedir.

İlk konuşlandırma aşaması, tüm operasyonun temelini oluşturması, gidişatını ve potansiyel sonuçlarını şekillendirmesi açısından çok önemlidir. Bu aşama, yerel halkın uluslararası toplumun çatışmayı çözme konusundaki kararlılığına ve barışı koruma güçlerinin meşruiyetine ilişkin görüş ve algılarının şekillenmesinde hayati rol oynamaktadır. Bu algılar, operasyonun çatışma dinamiklerini ele alma ve barış süreçlerini destekleme konusundaki etkinliğini önemli ölçüde etkilemektedir.

Tezin teorik çerçevesi, ilk konuşlandırmaların hız ve boyut bileşenleri üzerine inşa edilmiş olup konuşlandırmaların hızlı ve büyük olmasının kritik rolüne vurgu yapmaktadır. Teorik olarak, hızlı ve büyük bir ilk konuşlandırma, müdahale için hızlı fırsatların ele geçirilmesini sağlamakta ve yerel halk arasında barış gücünün güvenirliğini ve meşruiyetini artırmaktadır. Bu iki mekanizma sonuç olarak barışın uzamasına ve savaş alanındaki şiddetin azalmasına yol açmaktadır. Tez, hızlı ve büyük çapta gerçekleştirilen ilk konuşlandırmaların azalan şiddet ve uzun süreli barışa katkıda bulunduğunu önermektedir.

Hızlı ilk konuşlandırmalar, yerel halk tarafından olası bir zayıflık algısının ortadan kalkmasına ve güvenin oluşmasına yardımcı olmaktadır. Uygulama açısından, barış güçleri hızlı bir şekilde fiziksel varlık göstererek ve ilgili taraflarla ilişki kurarak şiddeti caydırabilmekte, gerekli bilgileri toplayabilmekte ve güç boşluklarını önleyebilmektedir.

Rasyonalist müzakere modeline göre, barışı koruma operasyonlarının boyutu ve kompozisyonu, BM barışı koruma operasyonlarının etkililiğini belirleyen önemli faktörlerdir. Daha fazla kaynak, kabiliyet ve meşruiyete sahip büyük misyonlar, çatışmaları önleme, kararlılık sorunlarını aşma ve çatışan taraflar arasında bilgi paylaşımını kolaylaştırma konusunda daha donanımlıdır. Özelleştirilmiş bir personel kompozisyonuyla görevlendirilen barışı koruma misyonları, barışın başarısızlık riskini azaltabilmekte ve genel başarıya katkıda bulunabilmektedir.

Mevcut literatürdeki kritik bir boşluğu dolduran bu tez, 28 yıl boyunca 55 BM barışı koruma operasyonu için yeni toplanan küresel verileri kullanmakta ve konuşlandırma aşamaları ile personel türlerini ayrıştıran kapsamlı bir perspektif benimsemektedir. Tez, barışı koruma etkinliğinin incelikli bir değerlendirmesine olanak tanımakta ve sağkalım analizi ve negatif-iki terimli regresyonu yöntemlerini kullanarak sistematik bir nicel yaklaşım benimsemektedir. Elde edilen bulgular, politika yapıcılar, uygulayıcılar ve akademisyenler için önemli teorik ve pratik sonuçlar ortaya koymaktadır. Bu sonuçlar, gelecekteki BM operasyonlarını şekillendiren temel belirleyicilere, etkinliklerini iyileştirmeye ve barışı koruma çabalarının genel etkisini artırmaya yönelik değerli bir içgörü sunmaktadır.

Tez, hızlı ilk konuşlandırmaların şiddetin azalmasına ve negatif barış dönemlerinin uzamasına yol açtığını ampirik olarak ortaya koymaktadır. Bununla birlikte, BM Güvenlik Konseyi kararının önerilmesi ve kabul edilmesi arasındaki daha uzun zaman aralıkları, savaşa geri dönme olasılığını azaltmaktadır; bu da hazırlık aşamasında ek sürenin kapsamlı çatışma analizi ve hazırlığına olanak sağladığını göstermektedir.

Ayrıca, büyük çaplı ilk konuşlandırmalar negatif barış süresini uzatabilmektedir. İlk konuşlandırmanın kompozisyonu da bir rol oynamaktadır. Asker sayısındaki artış barış süresinin kısalmasıyla ilişkilendirilirken, daha fazla polis veya askeri gözlemci personel barışın bozulma riskini azaltmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, bulgular, şiddeti en aza indirmek ve barış sürecini desteklemek için askerlerin hızlı bir şekilde konuşlandırılmasının önemini vurgulamaktadır.

Tez, şiddeti azaltma ve barış süresini uzatma konusunda hızlı ve büyük çapta yapılan ilk konuşlandırmaların barışı koruma operasyonlarının meşruiyetini ve etkinliğini artırmada kritik rolünü vurgulamaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Birleşmiş Milletler, barışı koruma operasyonu, ilk konuşlandırma, hız, boyut, kompozisyon, barış süresi, savaş şiddeti.

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ABBREVIATIONS

A4P	Action for Peacekeeping
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
AMIS	AU Mission in Sudan
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
BRD	Battle-Related Deaths
CJEF	Combined Joint Expeditionary Force
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CRTS	Capability Readiness Tracking System
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMIL	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EUBG	European Union Battlegroup
EUFOR	EU Force
GED	Georeferenced Event Dataset
HIPPO	High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations
IPI	International Peace Institute
JEF	Joint Expeditionary Force
MID	Militarized Interstate Dispute
MILINDA	Military and Non-Military Interventions Dataset
MINUCI	United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINUJUSTH	United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti

MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MONUA	UN Observer Mission in Angola
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORDICAPS	Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support
NRF	NATO Response Force
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUC	UN Operation in the Congo
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
P5	Permanent-5
PCRS	UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
RDC	Rapid Deployment Capability
RDL	Rapid Deployment Level
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SEEBRIG	South East Europe Multinational Brigade
SHIRBRIG	Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade
SPLM	Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
STS	Standby Team System
TCCs	Troop Contributing Countries
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
UNAVEM III	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III
UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia
UNEF I	UN Emergency Force
UNEF II	Second UN Emergency Force
UNFICYP	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNMISET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNMOP	United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone

UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNOSOM I	United Nations Operation in Somalia I
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNPSG	United Nations Civilian Police Support Group
UNSAS	UN Standby Arrangements System
UNSC	UN Security Council
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
UNSMIS	United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTMIH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti
URNG	Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

In a country plagued by persistent violence, the anticipation of international intervention can feel like an agonizingly long wait. The urgent need for outside assistance to alleviate the suffering and restore peace seems to stretch indefinitely. The prolonged delay in international intervention worsens an already dire situation, prolonging the suffering of the affected population and further destabilizing the country. As the violence persists, the international community's lack of swift action intensifies the despair and hopelessness among those who long for an end to the turmoil. The protracted wait for assistance leaves the country trapped in a state of perpetual suffering, where each passing day without intervention feels unbearably long.

This dissertation aims to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of initial deployments in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, specifically in terms of reducing violence and prolonging peace duration. Quick and substantial deployments during the initial phase are critical in achieving fewer violent occurrences and extended peace duration. In comparison, protracted inaction and dribbling deployment prolong the suffering and any hope of trust in the international community and blue helmets.

UN peacekeeping operations play a vital role in international efforts to mitigate conflicts and promote peace in various regions worldwide. These operations involve deploying multinational forces to conflict-affected areas, aiming to establish stability, protect civilians, and facilitate post-conflict reconstruction. Recent peacekeeping studies have examined specific components of missions and utilized various methods to analyze short- and long-term effectiveness over different time periods. These studies have found that UN peacekeeping operations are effective in reducing various dimensions of conflict and increasing the duration of peace after civil wars (Beardsley, 2011, 2013; Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Fortna, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2008; Fortna

& Howard, 2008; Gilligan & Sergenti, 2008; Haas, 1986; Hartzell et al., 2001; Hultman et al., 2016, 2019; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2008; Walter, 1997, 2002).

Several factors influence the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions. This dissertation proposes the characteristics of the operations' initial deployments as one of the critical factors in determining the efficiency and legitimacy of peacekeeping operations. The effectiveness of these missions relies on the specific attributes and actions exhibited during the initial deployment phase. This crucial phase sets the tone for the entire operation and can significantly impact its outcomes.

Over the course of many years, the UN has dedicated significant efforts to establish and maintain the legitimacy of peacekeeping as a distinct approach to international intervention, separate from other forms of military force. This distinction is of utmost importance as it underpins the UN's role in promoting peaceful resolutions to conflicts and supporting the reconstruction of societies devastated by war. By emphasizing the legitimacy of peacekeeping, the UN aims to create an international framework that is widely accepted and trusted by both parties involved in a conflict, as well as the international community at large. This legitimacy provides a solid foundation for the UN to engage in peaceful dispute settlement, facilitate negotiations, and coordinate efforts toward post-conflict reconstruction. By promoting peacekeeping as a legitimate and respected tool, the UN is able to foster trust, garner cooperation, and mobilize resources effectively, ultimately working towards sustainable peace and stability in war-torn regions.

The legitimacy is stationed on very thin ice for UN peacekeeping operations in the eyes of the local population. When a peacekeeping mission is deployed to a conflict-affected region, it enters a complex social and political landscape with deep-rooted grievances and mistrust. The success of the mission greatly depends on how it is perceived by the local communities, as their support and cooperation are essential for the mission's effectiveness. The initial deployment of a peacekeeping operation plays a crucial role in shaping the first impression and determining the level of trust and legitimacy it garners.

The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) has faced severe protests from the locals due to delays in its initial deployment. Following a coup d'état in March 2013, the Central African Republic descended into a state of chaos and widespread violence. MINUSCA was established to protect civilians and support the transitional government, but its slow deployment of troops faced criticism from the local population and civil society groups. Protesters in the Central African Republic expressed frustration over the

delayed arrival of peacekeepers, as they felt abandoned and left vulnerable to attacks from armed groups. The protests emphasized the urgent need for the timely deployment of peacekeeping forces to restore security and protect civilians in conflict-affected areas. Although MINUSCA has achieved some positive outcomes, the mission has faced various challenges that have hindered its overall effectiveness and reputation.

When discussing the characteristics of initial deployments, several key factors come into play: speed, size, and composition. Regarding the speed at which the peacekeeping forces are deployed to the conflict zone, a swift deployment allows for the establishment of a secure environment and prevents the escalation of violence. It also enhances the credibility and legitimacy of the mission in the eyes of the local population, fostering trust and support.

The initial deployment's size is another critical component. Larger missions have more resources, capabilities, and legitimacy, which can aid in building local capacities and credibility in the peace process. This broader range of abilities and capabilities allows them to have a greater impact on the ground and to address the various challenges and needs of the conflict-affected area. By doing so, personnel size directly contributes to the short-term establishment of peace and long-term sustainability of peace.

The tailor-made composition of the initial deployment plays a significant role. The presence of specialized personnel composition, such as troops, police or military observers, can contribute to the success of the mission. The composition of the initial deployment ensures that the mission has the necessary capabilities to address the specific needs and challenges of the conflict at hand. By having a unique combination of personnel, the mission can effectively carry out its mandate, deter spoilers, and enhance monitoring and reporting mechanisms, among many others. Via these capabilities, personnel composition efficiently reduces the risk of peace failing and contributes to the mission's overall success.

The initial deployments do not solely determine the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions. Other factors, such as the timing of intervention, the allocation of resources, and the cooperation of local actors, inevitably play crucial roles. Nonetheless, understanding and optimizing the characteristics of initial deployments can enhance the chances of achieving positive outcomes in peacekeeping operations. Policymakers and UN officials can better design and execute peacekeeping missions to promote lasting peace and stability in conflict-affected regions by focusing on speed, size, and composition.

Think of the two UN peacekeeping operations: United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).

While the former received a quick deployment, the latter received a delayed deployment. What could be the effect of this delayed deployment?

MINURCAT's quick deployment played a crucial role in providing a secure environment for displaced populations, preventing further violence, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable communities. The presence of peacekeepers and civilian staff helped deter attacks on civilians, ensured the protection of refugee camps, and supported the efforts of humanitarian organizations in providing essential services. The timely intervention of MINURCAT contributed to stabilizing the region and mitigating the impact of the conflict on the civilian population. Despite the challenges faced by MINURCAT throughout its mandate, including limited resources and complex regional dynamics, the relatively quick initial deployment allowed the mission to have a tangible impact on protecting civilians and promoting stability in Chad and the Central African Republic.

ONUMOZ, on the other hand, faced significant delays in deployment, hindering its ability to quickly establish a presence on the ground and effectively carry out its mandate. The delay in the initial deployment of ONUMOZ had several negative consequences. It prolonged the insecurity and instability in Mozambique, allowing for continued violence and human rights abuses. The absence of a robust UN peacekeeping presence during this critical phase created a security vacuum, which armed groups exploited to perpetuate the conflict and undermine the peace process. Additionally, the delay in deployment hindered the mission's ability to monitor and enforce the ceasefire agreements, resulting in ongoing clashes between the warring factions. The delayed deployment of ONUMOZ also had implications for the political process. The peace negotiations, which had already been arduous, were further strained as the parties lacked confidence in the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operation. The lack of a visible and credible international presence on the ground undermined trust and hindered the implementation of peace agreements. While ONUMOZ eventually managed to deploy its troops and carry out its mandate, the delayed initial deployment had a detrimental impact on the peace process in Mozambique. It highlighted the importance of timely intervention and the challenges that can arise when there are delays in establishing a strong and visible peacekeeping presence.

This dissertation aims to systematically analyze the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions' initial deployments in reducing violence and prolonging peace duration. The theoretical argument suggests that quick and substantial initial deployments are crucial in achieving these objectives. While previous research primarily evaluates the effectiveness of

general peacekeeping efforts in consolidating peace after a conflict, this dissertation focuses on assessing whether peacekeeping efforts effectively reduce violence in ongoing conflicts and prolong negative peace durations. The argument is that rapid and sizable initial deployments create opportunities for swift intervention, establish credibility and legitimacy among the local population, and ultimately lead to reduced violence and a longer duration of peace.

Newly collected global data is employed to conduct this analysis. The data comprehensively examines the UN's initial deployment efforts in the ongoing conflict and post-conflict cases worldwide over 28 years. The results align with the expectations, demonstrating that the speed and size of initial deployments matter. The findings indicate that prompt deployments reduce violence and prolong negative peace periods, while larger initial deployments lead to more extended negative peace but has a tendency to increase battlefield violence. While rapid initial deployment and size alone cannot guarantee the success of a peacekeeping operation, it is the slow and small deployments that pose a threat to the operation's effectiveness.

In the remainder of this chapter, the research question is introduced, the significance of the dissertation is discussed, the theoretical mechanism is described, followed by the presentation of the methodology and findings, and lastly, a summary of the subsequent chapters is provided.

1.1. Research Questions

1. How does the *speed* of the initial deployment of UN peacekeeping forces influence the level of ongoing violence and the duration of negative peace?
2. How do the *size (and composition)* of the initial deployment of UN peacekeeping forces affect the level of ongoing violence and the duration of negative peace?

The research questions focus on how initial deployments' speed, size, and composition impact the duration of negative peace and ongoing violence in all newly established UN peacekeeping operations between 1991 and 2018. By examining the successes rather than the failures of international efforts, the dissertation aims to inform the development of future UN operations and enhance their efficiency. Understanding the effects of initial deployments is crucial for improving future UN operations. The dissertation aims to explore how initial deployments can contribute to the success of peacebuilding efforts and provide valuable

lessons for future missions by seeking to enhance our understanding of the key determinants that contribute to the success or failure of peacekeeping efforts.

The initial deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation is of utmost importance as it sets the foundation for success in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. However, the UN chronically faces challenges in efficiently and effectively deploying peacekeeping forces. Delays in the initial deployment can have serious consequences, including the escalation of violence and the loss of lives. The UN's bureaucratic procedures, logistical complexities, and coordination issues among member states can hinder the timely deployment of forces. These inefficiencies can undermine the UN's ability to establish a secure environment quickly, protect civilians, and prevent the resurgence of conflict. To enhance the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations, there is a pressing need to develop streamlined and efficient methods for rapid deployment, including improved coordination mechanisms, streamlined bureaucratic processes, and enhanced logistical capabilities. By addressing these challenges, the UN can ensure that peacekeeping forces are deployed promptly and effectively, maximizing their impact in mitigating conflicts and fostering sustainable peace.

1.2. Why Initial Deployments?

Studying the initial deployments of UN peacekeeping operations is crucial for gaining a comprehensive understanding of their effectiveness and impact. The initial deployment phase sets the foundation for the entire mission, shaping its trajectory and potential outcomes. It is during this critical phase that locals form their opinions and perceptions on the international community's commitment to the conflict and the sincerity of the blue helmets, which can significantly influence the mission's ability to address conflict dynamics, protect civilians, and facilitate peace processes. The dissertation identifies best practices and lessons that can inform future peacekeeping efforts by examining the factors that contribute to successful initial deployments, such as rapid response, appropriate size, and tailored composition. Additionally, analyzing the initial deployments allows for a more nuanced assessment of the challenges and opportunities faced by peacekeeping missions in their early stages, shedding light on the dynamics of conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and stabilization efforts. Ultimately, studying initial deployments enhances our understanding of how to effectively leverage UN peacekeeping operations to mitigate violence, foster peace, and support sustainable post-conflict transitions.

Delayed deployments have been a persistent issue in UN peace operations, leading to reduced political impact, operational effectiveness, and local commitment to peace accords (Durch et al., 2002). Insufficient resources often accompany these delays due to the dependence on member states' contributions. Important UN documents and reforms, such as the Brahimi Report (Brahimi, 2000), the Capstone Doctrine (UN, 2008), and the New Horizon reform document (DPKO/DFS, 2009), highlight the significance of rapid deployment for establishing stable peace and the credibility of peacekeeping missions. The Brahimi Report (Brahimi, 2000) was crucial in addressing the challenges faced by the UN in rapidly deploying peacekeeping operations. It recommended specific response durations and emphasized the importance of establishing security in the early phases of ceasefires. However, achieving the proposed timelines has proven challenging, and the UN recognizes that planning and deployment processes typically take six to twelve months.

Recent scholars have tested the effectiveness of UN operations with different methods, and have reached a consensus that UN peacekeeping operations can help stop conflict and make peace more durable (Beardsley, 2011, 2013; Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Fortna, 2003, 2004, 2004b, 2008; Fortna & Howard, 2008; Haas, 1986; Hartzell et al., 2001; Hultman et al., 2016; Gilligan & Sergenti, 2008; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2008; Walter, 1997, 2002). In contrast to this large body of work on peacekeeping, the literature on international organizations' response time to crises remains limited to assertions by several scholars and UN reports that responding to crises rapidly is important (Bellamy & Williams, 2005).

1.3. Chronically Tardy Initial Deployments

Tardy deployments have chronically plagued most UN peacekeeping operations. Political will, financial support, strategic planning, and practical cooperation at multiple levels are essential for successful rapid deployment. Overcoming barriers such as the commitment gap, free-riding, reliance on slow standby arrangements, and the need for reimbursement can contribute to improving the speed and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations. The willingness of member states to contribute personnel and resources heavily influences the UN's capacity for rapid deployment.

The UN has taken steps to improve its rapid deployment capabilities, including the development of the Rapid Deployment Level system. However, recent conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and other regions have demonstrated ongoing challenges in rapidly deploying

effective peacekeeping operations. While the rapid deployment of a large number of troops into crises is demanding, historical examples such as the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960, demonstrate that it is possible. Albeit current technological developments, member states' eagerness to contribute promptly are necessary for similar support in future peacekeeping operations.

1.4. Speed of Initial Deployments

The speed of initial deployment and the first few months of a UN peacekeeping operation are crucial in setting the tone and creating conditions for success in conflict zones. Rapid deployment is vital in establishing stability, building trust, and laying the groundwork for long-term peacebuilding efforts. By quickly establishing a physical presence and building relationships with the parties involved, peacekeeping forces can deter violence, gather essential information, and prevent power vacuums.

The speed of initial deployments is instrumental in reducing ongoing violence and achieving negative peace. It acts as a deterrent to further attacks, preventing the escalation of violence and protecting civilians. Rapid deployment enables peacekeeping forces to effectively enforce ceasefire agreements and provide crucial support such as medical assistance and humanitarian aid, thereby mitigating the impact of violence on local populations. By establishing security, stability, and the absence of direct violence, fast initial deployments contribute to the attainment of negative peace in conflict-affected areas.

Moreover, swift initial deployments have broader implications for long-term peace and stability. They build trust and confidence among the parties involved, preventing spoilers from undermining the peace process. Additionally, fast deployments create political momentum for peace negotiations and mobilize resources for post-conflict reconstruction and development. Quick initial deployments thereby foster lasting peace and stability in post-conflict areas by establishing a secure environment, attracting international support, and contributing to post-conflict efforts.

The impact of delayed responses in UN peacekeeping operations, whether in ongoing or post-conflict areas, is highly significant. Slow and inadequate deployment leads to severe consequences, including increased costs in terms of human lives lost and widespread suffering. It is crucial to prioritize prompt deployment to save lives and minimize the overall toll of the conflict. When responses are slow and personnel numbers are insufficient, it

undermines the legitimacy and credibility of the operation. The timely deployment of forces establishes the operation as a credible deterrent, while delays raise doubts about its effectiveness and erode support. Delays also limit the available opportunities to achieve desired outcomes, exacerbating the situation and contributing to further instability and violence. Furthermore, delayed deployment disrupts the momentum of peace processes. Slow deployments lead to frustration among combatants, potentially causing re-armament, ceasefire violations, and prolonged conflict. Therefore, the initial deployment phase shapes the environment for subsequent phases, and delays can pave the way for relapses of violence.

Overall, the consequences of slow responses in UN peacekeeping operations are devastating. They result in loss of life, diminished legitimacy, missed opportunities, and disruption of peace processes. To mitigate these consequences and enhance the likelihood of successful peacekeeping operations, it is imperative to prioritize prompt and efficient deployment. This ensures timely intervention and maximizes the chances of establishing peace and stability in conflict-affected regions.

The analysis of the speed of initial deployment involves examining the distinct phases of deployment, which is disaggregated into three milestones: the suggestion of a UN operation, the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution, and the initial deployment of personnel to the field. These three events, occurring within the timeline of an operation, collectively shape the concept of the speed of initial deployments.

1.5. Size of Initial Deployments

According to the rationalist bargaining model perspective, the size of peacekeeping operations has been identified as a crucial factor in determining the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations. Larger missions possess greater resources, capabilities, and legitimacy, which enable them to address the diverse challenges and needs of conflict-affected areas. Scholars argue that larger missions have a greater capacity to deter conflicts, overcome commitment problems, and facilitate information-sharing between conflicting parties (Bove & Ruggeri, 2015; Hultman et al., 2013, 2014, 2016, 2019; Koko & Essis, 2012; Ruggeri et al., 2012). With a broader range of abilities and capacities, these missions can have a more substantial impact on the ground, contributing to the short-term establishment and long-term sustainability of peace. The larger personnel size allows for building local capacities and credibility in the peace process, fostering trust among the local communities.

Similarly, the composition of the initial deployment plays a significant role in the success of peacekeeping missions. The presence of specialized personnel, such as troops, police, or military observers, is crucial in meeting the specific demands of the conflict at hand. The tailored composition ensures the mission has the necessary capabilities and expertise to effectively carry out its mandate. By employing a unique combination of personnel, peacekeeping missions can reduce the risk of peace failing and contribute to the overall success of the mission. Theoretically, this dissertation positions the composition of the UN peacekeeping operations as building upon the speed and size of the deployment, and analyzes composition within the size component.

It has been suggested that increasing troop deployments, in particular, can lead to decreased combat hostilities, increased civilian protection, improved combatant cooperation, longer durations of peace, enhanced mission capacity, and reduced time to negotiated settlements (Beardsley et al., 2018; Holt et al., 2009; Hultman et al., 2014, 2019; Kathman & Benson, 2019). Studies propose several causal mechanisms through which troop deployments contribute to increased efficiency (Kathman & Wood, 2016; Pushkina, 2006; Ruggeri et al., 2012; Thyne, 2009). Larger troop commitments are seen as politically costly to withdraw, signaling the UN's resolve for conflict resolution and helping to resolve the security dilemma between combatants. Additionally, a greater number of troops on the ground can enhance mission capacity against combatants and facilitate monitoring activities.

The dissertation delves into the theoretical puzzle of how variations in initial deployments affect the short- and long-term outcomes of UN peacekeeping operations regarding reducing or ending battlefield violence and extending the duration of negative peace. Emphasizing the critical role of the initial months in achieving durable negative peace and reducing violence, it is argued that a strong commitment at the outset can help ensure the success of the entire mission. Rapid and substantial deployments are crucial for demonstrating commitment and ensuring trust among the conflict's stakeholders, thereby leading to the success of UN peacekeeping missions.

1.6. Contributions of the Dissertation

Understanding the relationship between the characteristics of initial deployments and their impact on the ongoing violence and peace duration is of utmost importance for policymakers, international organizations, and scholars in the field of peacekeeping. This dissertation holds significant theoretical and practical implications for policymakers,

practitioners, and scholars involved in UN peacekeeping operations. By examining the characteristics of initial deployments and their effects on ongoing violence and peace duration, this dissertation aims to better understand the factors contributing to the success or failure of peacekeeping efforts. The findings can inform the development of evidence-based policies and strategies that enhance the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations. Moreover, understanding the challenges and limitations in deploying efficient peacekeeping forces can help identify practical solutions to overcome these obstacles and improve the overall efficiency of the UN's peacekeeping mechanisms.

This dissertation addresses a critical gap in the peacekeeping literature by focusing on the specific characteristics of initial deployments and their effects on conflict resolution and the establishment of lasting negative peace. The dissertation builds upon previous research that has evolved from assessing the mere existence of peacekeeping operations to exploring the specific components and challenges of managing durable and self-sustaining peace during and after missions. Previous studies have primarily examined the overall effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, but this dissertation narrows its focus to the crucial period of initial deployment and contributes to understanding the importance of initial deployment characteristics in achieving successful outcomes in UN peacekeeping operations. By delving into factors such as the speed and size of deployments and their effects on ongoing conflicts and the duration of negative peace, this dissertation offers original insights and practical implications for policymakers and the UN.

A noteworthy contribution of this dissertation lies in its emphasis on the importance of initial deployment characteristics for achieving successful outcomes in UN peacekeeping operations. By delving into the specific components and challenges involved in fostering durable and self-sustaining peace during and after missions, the dissertation adds depth and nuance to the existing knowledge in the field. Additionally, phases of deployment are differentiated and analyzed separately to thoroughly understand the effects of each phase on violence and peace.

In contrast to previous research that often imposed limitations in terms of time, geography, or categorical focus, this dissertation encompasses a wide temporal range from 1991 to 2018, including all newly established operations without geographical constraints. By embracing this expansive scope, the dissertation aims to capture the diverse nature of UN peacekeeping efforts across different contexts and periods.

Another notable contribution of this dissertation is its utilization of newly collected global data, which facilitates a detailed analysis of the various personnel types involved in UN peacekeeping operations. Recognizing that these operations are not uniform and vary in composition, the dissertation acknowledges the importance of disaggregating data and considering the unique contributions of different personnel categories. Therefore, this dissertation adopts a comprehensive perspective by examining the specific contributions of military, police, and civilian personnel in UN peacekeeping operations, allowing for a nuanced understanding of their respective roles and impacts.

Moreover, the dissertation adopts a systematic quantitative approach, avoiding the simplistic binary classification of success or failure in UN peacekeeping operations. Instead, it acknowledges the relative nature of violence and peace, allowing for an evaluation of the effectiveness of these interventions.

Focusing on the critical phase of initial deployment, this dissertation sheds light on the factors that influence the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations from the very beginning. The findings will contribute to a better understanding of how the speed, size, and composition of initial deployments impact ongoing violence and the duration of negative peace. The practical implications of this dissertation are far-reaching, as they can inform policymakers and the UN in making informed decisions and developing strategies to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping missions. Ultimately, the aim is to contribute to more successful conflict resolution efforts and establish lasting peace in conflict-affected regions worldwide.

1.7. Theoretical Framework: First Impression Matters

The theoretical framework of this dissertation is built on two components of initial deployments: speed and size.

The first months of a peacekeeping mission are crucial in establishing presence, credibility, and building relationships with the parties involved in the conflict. Rapid and efficient initial deployment can have several positive effects, including deterring violence, building trust, assessing the situation on the ground, setting the tone for the mission, preventing a power vacuum, and contributing to the longer-term success of the mission.

The consequences of slow responses in UN peacekeeping operations can be severe. Delayed deployment can result in increased human suffering and loss of life, undermine the

legitimacy and credibility of the mission, reduce available opportunities, and disrupt the momentum of peace. Timeliness in intervention is crucial in preventing crises from escalating and maximizing the chances of success. The lack of interest and will among member states, as well as the slow decision-making process, contribute to the problem of delayed deployments.

Regarding the size component of the missions, larger missions have a greater capacity to deter conflicts, overcome commitment problems, and facilitate information-sharing (Bove & Ruggeri, 2015; Ruggeri et al., 2016). Troop deployments are particularly significant in mitigating information asymmetries and facilitating commitment, leading to reduced combat hostilities, increased civilian protection, and longer-lasting peace (Beardsley et al., 2018; Holt et al., 2009; Hultman et al., 2013, 2014, 2016, 2019; Kathman & Wood, 2011, 2016).

From a theoretical perspective, the mechanism proposed in this dissertation suggests that fast initial deployments and large personnel commitments in UN peacekeeping operations can have a positive impact on short-term battlefield violence and long-term peace. These deployments create favorable opportunities for swift interventions and establish credible commitment and legitimacy in the eyes of the local population, leading to a decrease in the intensity of the conflict and a longer duration of negative peace. The initial deployment sets the tone and momentum for peacebuilding, fostering security and trust between the intervenor and conflicting parties.

The crucial concept of 'opportunities for swift intervention' refers to a range of actions that a well-equipped and sizable UN force can take. A strong and rapid initial deployment can break the cycle of violence and prevent spoilers from inciting further violence against civilians, military personnel, and UN peacekeepers. A strong force can also fill the security vacuum and avoid resentment and distrust among the conflicting parties by providing security and preventing the emergence of militias or rebel forces. A strong image and presence can also attract external support and encourage other actors to contribute to the peace process or deploy more personnel to the mission.

The local population is considered a significant actor in long-term peacebuilding, contrary to the tendency in the literature to overlook their perspectives. Creating credible commitment and legitimacy in the eyes of the local population is crucial for effective conflict management and the establishment of durable negative peace. The actions of UN peacekeepers settle the mission's reputation locally, and without a credible local presence, peacekeepers remain irrelevant to peacebuilding efforts. Maintaining local support, trust, and credibility is

vital for the success of peacekeeping operations. Engaging with local populations, representing their commitment, and considering their perspectives can improve the security situation, gather critical information, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, thereby enhancing the mission's overall success.

In both ongoing and post-conflict situations, fast and sizeable initial deployments are essential for establishing credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the locals, making them more inclined to trust and cooperate with international actors in peacebuilding and enforcement of peace agreements. This mutual interaction between the locals and international actors contributes to lasting results in the long term, making fast and large initial deployments a critical first step in becoming partners for peace.

The local population often views the initial deployment as a reflection of the mission's commitment, capabilities, and intentions. If the initial deployment is slow, inadequate, or fails to address immediate security concerns, it can undermine the legitimacy of the mission. The absence of a prompt response to escalating violence or human rights abuses may lead to skepticism and doubt about the mission's effectiveness and commitment to protecting the population. Conversely, a well-planned and timely initial deployment can make a positive impression and establish a sense of legitimacy. When an operation arrives swiftly and with adequate resources, it demonstrates a proactive approach to addressing the conflict and the needs of the affected population. This can generate trust and confidence among the locals, who may view the mission as a credible and committed actor in promoting peace and security. Trust is a significant determinant of the operation's perception and is a guiding remark of the proposed theoretical framework.

The initial deployment of a peacekeeping mission serves as a crucial defining moment that sets the tone for the entire operation where perceptions and expectations are shaped, making it vital for peacekeeping operations to prioritize a prompt, well-prepared, and responsive approach to maximize their chances of establishing sustainable peace. A swift and solid deployment establishes momentum and bolsters the mission's legitimacy, while a slow and insufficient deployment undermines credibility. The initial deployment is strategically pivotal in shaping the perception of the mission's legitimacy, establishing a physical presence, creating a secure environment, and building trust and credibility among the parties involved.

The effects of fast and large deployments have a lasting impact on the conflict dynamics and the attitudes of the involved parties. A robust deployment signals the seriousness of the international community in ending the conflict and protecting civilians. This serves as

a deterrent to further violence and increases the likelihood of compliance with peace agreements. Additionally, it builds momentum for peace talks and negotiations by providing a secure environment for dialogue. By establishing control over key areas and preventing the resurgence of violence, a large and fast initial deployment creates a conducive environment for implementing peace agreements, post-conflict reconstruction, and development plans. It also contributes to local institutions' capacity-building, law and order maintenance, and provision of essential services to the population, ensuring long-term peace and stability in the conflict-affected country.

The hypotheses focus on the impact of initial deployment speeds and sizes on the duration of negative peace and the intensity of ongoing conflicts in UN peacekeeping operations. The first set of hypotheses examines the effects of deployment speed and size on the duration of negative peace in post-conflict environments, suggesting that faster and larger initial deployments lead to more prolonged negative peace. The time intervals between the suggestion of the UN operation, the adoption of a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution, and the first deployment to the field measure the speed of deployment. The size of the initial deployment is measured by the total number of deployed personnel, and disaggregated into troops, police, and military observers.

For ongoing conflicts, battlefield violence is analyzed to assess the ability of UN peacekeeping operations to establish negative peace. The second set of hypotheses state that quicker and larger initial deployments lead to a decrease in battle-related deaths. Additionally, the dissertation draws on previous research indicating that larger troop deployments can reduce violence in civil wars. The hypothesis argues that prompt deployment of troops can increase the duration of negative peace and decrease the intensity of the conflict.

1.8. Design of the Dissertation

This dissertation adopts a comprehensive approach by analyzing the effects of UN peacekeeping operations on violence and peace through the use of large-N data analysis. The dissertation examines whether these operations contribute to a decrease in battlefield violence or extend the duration of negative peace. The comprehensive dataset encompasses a wide temporal range of 28 years, from 1991 to 2018, and includes all 55 UN peacekeeping operations established during this period across various regions.

The dataset used in the dissertation focuses on pairing a country's government with a rebel group on a monthly basis, resulting in 42 conflicts and 109 government-rebel group dyads. By incorporating data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED), the dissertation benefits from a highly disaggregated dataset that captures even minor changes in battlefield violence (Sundberg & Melander, 2013). Monthly observations of government-rebel group dyads and battle-related deaths serve as the foundation of the dataset, providing a nuanced understanding of the dynamics within conflicts. While previous studies have predominantly focused on post-conflict operations, this dissertation expands its scope to include ongoing conflicts as well.

The availability of publicly accessible archives from the UN, particularly the contribution fact sheets with monthly deployment numbers, enhances the accuracy and replicability of the analysis. By employing this robust methodology and comprehensive dataset, the dissertation aims to provide valuable insights into the effectiveness and outcomes of UN operations in diverse conflict settings.

In this context, the dissertation focuses on two primary dependent variables. The first dependent variable is dyadic battle-related deaths, which measures the intensity of battlefield violence. It captures the monthly casualties of direct combat between a government and a rebel group. The second dependent variable relates to peace duration and is analyzed using survival analysis methodology. It consists of the time to the event (in months) and the event itself, which denotes whether the conflict reactivates or not with more than 25 battle-related deaths. Using these dependent variables allows for a standardized and consistent evaluation of operations. These variables offer precise measurements to assess the impact of peacekeeping efforts across different operations and conflict settings. The UCDP GED ensures a reliable and comprehensive data source on armed conflict.

The speed is conceptualized based on three key events in UN peacekeeping operations: the suggestion of the operation, the adoption of a UNSC resolution, and the initial deployment of UN personnel. These events help establish the timeline and analyze the different phases of a peacekeeping operation, from its proposal to its deployment. The suggestion of a peacekeeping operation is typically declared through a formal document or speech by the Secretary-General, a UN member state, or a representative member of a state. UNSC resolutions are official statements or decisions made by the fifteen members of the UNSC. The UNSC resolution serves as a legal basis for the deployment of peacekeeping forces and defines the specific tasks and objectives of the operation. The term "initial deployment" refers

to the moment when UN personnel are first sent to the location of a peacekeeping operation. The initial deployment marks the start of the operation and is a crucial point in its timeline.

Three independent variables measure the speed of UN peacekeeping operations: the time between the suggestion of the operation and the adoption of a UNSC Resolution, the duration between the adoption of the UNSC resolution and the initial deployment of personnel, and the time between the suggestion of the operation and the initial deployment of personnel. These durations are measured in months and serve as indicators of the promptness of peacekeeping operations.

UN peacekeeping operations experience fluctuations in size, both within and between missions, as they adapt to changing circumstances. Factors like mandate scope, conflict level, resource availability, and political will of member states influence mission size. Flexibility is crucial to respond to new challenges effectively. The number of personnel involved in a mission reflects the international community's commitment, and contributions indicate the level of support and willingness to resolve the conflict. Data on personnel contributions until October 2018 is obtained from the International Peace Institute (IPI) database, and the rest is manually filled from the UN's monthly factsheets (IPI, n.d.). The dissertation considers different personnel types, including armed troops, conflict experts, formed police units, individual police, and observers, since each personnel type has varying tasks and capabilities.

The dissertation utilizes quantitative methods to analyze the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations. It employs two sets of large-scale analyses: survival analysis and negative binomial regression. Survival analysis, also known as hazard or duration analysis, examines the time until a specific event occurs. The analysis focuses on the duration of negative peace, which is the period between the termination of one conflict and the start of another. The Cox proportional hazards model, a semi-parametric model, is used to estimate the effects of independent variables on the risk of peace failing at any given time. The second set of analyses concentrates on the level of battlefield violence using negative binomial regression. This type of regression model is appropriate for count variables and is employed when there is over-dispersion in the data, meaning the variance exceeds the mean. The dissertation employs the zero-inflated negative binomial model, which accounts for excessive zeros in the data. The choice of these statistical models is based on their suitability for the data and research questions at hand. The dissertation does not assume a specific direction for the hazard function of peace failing and prefers the Cox model for its flexibility. Similarly, the

zero-inflated negative binomial model is deemed appropriate due to the count nature of the data, overdispersion, and the presence of excessive zeros.

1.9. Initial Deployment Makes a Difference

The analyses reveal that quicker deployment of peacekeeping forces leads to longer durations of peace, as it establishes a secure environment, prevents violence escalation, and enhances the mission's legitimacy. Delays in deployment are associated with shorter durations of negative peace and an increased risk of relapse into conflict. However, the dissertation also reveals that longer gaps between the suggestion and adoption of a UNSC resolution decrease the likelihood of returning to war. This suggests that the time gap allows for thorough conflict analysis and preparation. The dissertation also emphasizes that rapid deployment reduces battlefield violence.

A larger initial deployment contributes to longer durations of negative peace. However, an increase in troop personnel is associated with a decrease in peace duration. On the other hand, an increase in police or military observer personnel reduces the risk of peace failure. In contrast to expectations, larger initial deployments have a tendency to increase battlefield violence.

Furthermore, the dissertation highlights the critical role of the first ninety days of a peacekeeping mission in establishing a stable environment and securing long-term peace. It emphasizes the importance of quick troop deployment to mitigate risks and support the peace process.

The initial speed and size matter:

- Promptness in initial deployments mitigates violence and prolongs negative peace duration.
- Larger initial deployments extend negative peace duration.

The dissertation underscores that the speed, size, and composition of initial deployments significantly influence the success of UN peacekeeping operations, emphasizing the need for prompt and efficient deployment to ensure a more stable and peaceful environment.

1.10. Organization of the Dissertation

The dissertation is structured into several chapters that review the existing literature, develop theoretical arguments, empirically test hypotheses, and provide detailed discussions of the results. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive literature review on peacekeeping, introducing key concepts, discussing relevant theories, and summarizing existing research. The chapter introduces the concept of peacekeeping and lays the foundation for the subsequent chapters. It then shifts to the functioning of peacekeeping operations and examines the reforms implemented in the realm of peacekeeping and their impact on improving the effectiveness of these operations. One crucial aspect discussed is the timing of peacekeeping interventions. It explores the significance of timely intervention in conflict situations and its associated challenges. The chapter also highlights the UN's efforts to achieve rapid deployment of peacekeeping forces, emphasizing the importance of swift action in maintaining peace and preventing the escalation of conflicts. The chapter then goes over where the UN intervenes and delves into various dimensions of peacekeeping, including the contributions made by different countries to UN operations, factors influencing peacekeeping effectiveness, size and composition of operations, and the impact of peacekeeping on maintaining peace and addressing ongoing conflicts. Lastly, the local dimensions and perspectives of the "peacekept" are examined. It discusses the importance of local cooperation in peacekeeping efforts and the challenges that arise when such cooperation is lacking.

Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical framework of the dissertation. The chapter first examines the factors that affect the speed of initial deployment and the importance of speed in UN peacekeeping operations. The dissertation then poses why the first few months of the operations are critical in short- and long-term peace efforts and states the possible consequences of slow deployments. As the second component of the dissertation, the chapter delves into the size and composition's possible effects in the initial deployments. In combination with these arguments, the theoretical mechanism of the dissertation is formulated with a detailed analysis of the perception of weakness and its effects, and the proposed hypotheses are stated.

Chapter 4 explores the dissertation's research design, detailing data, variables, and the research methods employed. Chapter 5 presents the quantitative analyses of the duration of peace and battlefield violence. In most analyses, the theoretical expectations are verified with proven efficiency of the speed and size of initial deployments in reducing violence and prolonging peace.

Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by discussing its findings and their relevance to the academic literature on UN peacekeeping. It also explores the policy implications of the dissertation, offering a more nuanced understanding of peacekeeping effectiveness. The chapter concludes by providing possible avenues for future research.

Chapter 2

PEACEKEEPING AND THE LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review chapter focuses on the extensive growth in research regarding UN peacekeeping operations. It begins by analyzing different definitions of peacekeeping and how the literature has evolved in terms of the phases and types of operations. The functioning of peacekeeping will also be explained, including the timing of interventions and the speed of deployment. The chapter then delves into major topics related to UN peacekeeping operations, such as where the UN decides to intervene and who contributes and why to these missions. Assessing the effectiveness of peacekeeping is a significant concern in the literature, and this will be examined along with the effects of peacekeeping on maintaining peace and ongoing conflicts. Additionally, the size and composition of operations are assessed for their significance in achieving peacekeeping objectives. Finally, the chapter will discuss local dimensions of peacekeeping operations and perspectives of the peacekept.

2.1. What is Peacekeeping?

2.1.1. Definition of Peacekeeping

The term "peacekeeping" broadly refers to the deployment of international personnel to help maintain peace and security (Fortna, 2008). Although peacekeeping is an activity undertaken by different actors, this study focuses only on the UN's peacekeeping activities. In the absence of a UN definition of peacekeeping, several scholars have attempted to provide a definition of peacekeeping. Early scholars of Goulding (1993) and Diehl (1994) set out narrow definitions for peacekeeping. The following definition by Goulding is too narrow by excluding peace operations carried out by actors other than the UN:

> Field operations established by the United Nations with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided

> voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary (1993, p. 455).

Diehl's following definition is also too narrow by excluding all international missions not composed of lightly armed troops:

> Peacekeeping is […] the imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities, and with the permission of the state on whose territory those forces are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved (1994, p. 13).

Then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) central policy document defined peacekeeping as one of the four tools the UN could employ to prevent and resolve conflict:

> Peacekeeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace (1992, para. 20).

Boutros-Ghali's definition of peacekeeping was significant as it assumed that the UN is essential to peacekeeping efforts. He provided a broader conceptualization of the term by suggesting that peacekeeping is one of the ways that third parties can contribute to preventing, resolving, and managing conflict. This helped to emphasize the importance of the UN's role in peacekeeping efforts and the significance of involving third parties in conflict management.

Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin (2010) propose a more detailed definition of peace operations, taking into account the changing nature of conflicts and peacekeeping efforts. This updated definition recognizes that peace operations can encompass a range of activities beyond traditional peacekeeping, including conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding. The authors' definition provides a more comprehensive understanding of the various aspects of peace operations and highlights the need for a holistic approach to peacekeeping efforts:

> Peace operations involve the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (police and/or military) with or without UN authorization, with a mandate or programme for: (1) assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process; (2) serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; or (3) enforce ceasefires, peace agreements or the will of the UN Security Council in order to build stable peace (p. 18).

Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin (2010) categorize peace operations as one type of activity that can be utilized for preventing and managing conflicts. This highlights the versatility of peace operations and their usefulness in various stages of conflict management.

The definition of peacekeeping operations has undergone significant changes over time, in line with the evolving nature of practices and actions observed in UN peacekeeping operations. These changes have been driven by the changing nature of conflicts and the growing complexity of peacekeeping efforts. As such, it is important to understand the different phases of peacekeeping operations and the types of actions involved in each phase to gain a more comprehensive understanding of peacekeeping efforts.

2.1.2. Phases of UN Peacekeeping Operations and Literature

Three progressive phases of UN peacekeeping operations with varying denoted responsibilities reflect how scholars define, categorize, and study them. According to Fortna and Howard (2008), peacekeeping literature has developed in one small and two large waves that correspond closely to peacekeeping practices.

The first wave of peacekeeping literature emerged in the 1950s and focused on the early UN peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East and Congo. The second wave emerged in the 1980s and focused on the expansion of peacekeeping efforts to address internal conflicts, such as in Namibia, Cambodia, and El Salvador. The third and most recent wave emerged in the 1990s and has focused on the changing nature of conflicts and the evolving practices of peacekeeping, such as the shift towards multidimensional operations and the use of force to protect civilians. By understanding the different waves of peacekeeping literature and how they correspond to the evolving practices of peacekeeping, scholars can gain a better understanding of the challenges and opportunities faced in modern peacekeeping efforts.

The first phase of UN peacekeeping operations, known as ‘traditional peacekeeping,’ was initially developed as a means of containing regional conflict following a political settlement (Gordon & Toase, 2001). Traditional peacekeeping is premised on the holy trinity of the consent of the affected parties, impartiality, and minimum use of force (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004, p. 95). These operations typically occur between a ceasefire and a political settlement, and their goal is to assist in the creation and maintenance of conditions that can lead to long-term conflict resolution by the affected parties themselves (Bellamy et

al., 2010, p. 173). Examples of traditional peacekeeping include the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) in Egypt from 1956 to 1967 and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) from 1964 to the present. However, traditional peacekeeping faces two primary challenges: first, it often fails to achieve its objectives, and second, it is ineffective in wider goals of actively promoting conflict resolution (Bellamy et al., 2004, p. 109).

The first small wave of peacekeeping literature emerged during the Cold War and was closely tied to traditional peacekeeping practices. During this time, there were relatively few studies on peacekeeping, and scholars mainly focused on analyzing case histories of interstate traditional peacekeeping operations. This limited focus on interstate conflicts during the first wave of peacekeeping literature reflects the primary role of peacekeeping operations at that time, which was to keep peace between states. As such, the literature of this era provides insights into the challenges of traditional peacekeeping operations in preventing conflict between states. However, this limited focus on interstate conflicts also meant that there was little attention paid to internal conflicts, which have become more prevalent in recent decades.

The second brief phase of peacekeeping operations is encapsulated by the term 'wider peacekeeping' that covers the first half of the 1990s (Bellamy et al., 2010; Gordon & Toase, 2001). Wider peacekeeping is also referred to as 'second generation peacekeeping' (Mackinlay, 1996; Mackinlay & Chopra, 1992) or 'Chapter 6 ½ peacekeeping' (Bailey & Daws, 1995). This phase was marked by the expansion of the UN's mandate beyond traditional peacekeeping to address the new challenges posed by intra-state conflicts. Wider peacekeeping was characterized by missions that aimed to address the root causes of conflicts, such as poverty and inequality, and to promote peacebuilding and democratization. Still adhering to the holy trinity, peacekeepers took on wider tasks beyond those of traditional peacekeeping, such as delivering humanitarian aid, and organizing and supervising elections, within a context of ongoing violence within states in the 'new wars' (Bellamy et al., 2010; Doyle, Johnstone & Orr, 1997; Kaldor, 1999). Furthermore, wider peacekeeping missions witnessed the exponential growth of and the need to coordinate with the civilian humanitarian community, and these operations frequently had changing mandates (Bellamy et al., 2004, p. 130). UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995 and UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) from 1993 to 1994 are examples of wider peacekeeping. Overall, this phase marked a shift in the focus of peacekeeping operations from the containment of violence to the promotion of peacebuilding.

Suffering a significant gulf between means and ends and the ambiguous nature of 'Chapter 6 ½' operations are some of the claimed reasons that caused failures in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone (O'Shea, 2002). According to Bellamy et al. (2004), central problems associated with wider peacekeeping are inadequate and ambiguously worded mandates that could not be implemented and led to confusion over the rules of engagement, inadequate resources and logistics, and organizational problems with no proper coordination (p. 143-144). Despite these problems, as Rasmussen (1997) states, "the main difference between traditional peacekeeping and what some call 'second-generation' peacekeeping is that the latter seeks to implement peace, not just freeze conflicts in place" (p. 38-39). As such, peacekeeping operations should facilitate movement instead of preserving the status quo (Rasmussen, 1997; Rikhye & Skjelsbaek, 1990).

The second wave of peacekeeping literature commenced with the newfound interest at the end of the Cold War, and peacekeeping started to be acknowledged as an important international instrument for ending wars and maintaining peace mostly within, rather than between, states (Fortna & Howard, 2008). With the easing of bipolar deadlock within the UNSC, a brief period of optimism arose with the launch of new operations and then Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) outlining what the UN should be responsible for throughout the world. Nonetheless, scholars began to emphasize the lack of effectiveness following pivotal events like Rwanda and Srebrenica, with devastating failures of mass killings while UN peacekeepers stalled. By disregarding cases of success, studies focused largely on "failure, dysfunction, and unintended consequences" of peacekeeping (Fortna & Howard, 2008, p. 284). The increased pessimism by 'wider peacekeeping' operations in both media and peacekeeping literature, in tandem with the lack of support from contributor countries, led the UN to be unable to launch any significant missions until 1999.

In 2000, the 'Brahimi Report,' the common name for the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, made robust recommendations to improve the efficiency of UN peace operations (Brahimi, 2000). The Brahimi Report transformed the UN strategy from 'wide peacekeeping' to the third phase of peacekeeping operations, as complex multidimensional peacekeeping (Fortna & Howard, 2008; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, 2006). On top of traditional peacekeeping operations' fundamental aim of maintaining peace with such practical use of monitoring ceasefire lines and troop withdrawals, most of the operations established after the Report are designed as multidimensional that cover a wide range of issues, including more civilian tasks like human rights monitoring, running elections, and training police forces. The

main differences between traditional and multidimensional operations are that the latter consists of both military and civilian components and performs civilian tasks on top of traditional tasks of maintaining peace and security. These missions seek longer-term peacekeeping or peacebuilding that includes vital elements of economic, social, and political developments beyond short-term cures (Daniel, 2013). Therefore, many scholarly work distinguish operations as traditional or multidimensional (e.g., Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, 2006).

Following the Brahimi Report as a turning point, the third wave of peacekeeping literature emerged with a positive turn in practice and theory around the mid-2000s (Fortna & Howard, 2008). During this wave, scholars attempted to address several primary empirical questions, such as whether peacekeeping makes peace more durable or what conditions make some missions more successful than others. The first two waves of the literature lacked systematic causal arguments, but although the third wave's optimistic body of work remained largely descriptive, it was theoretically and methodologically more mature than those of its preceding works. Due to more precise methodologies and theoretical works in this strand of the literature, recent studies revealed that peacekeeping missions are effective policy tools despite their limitations. Following this optimistic mood and the consensus on the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in inter- and intrastate conflicts, UN peacekeeping operations grew in number in the last decade.

Initial systematic quantitative analyses of peacekeeping operations, like Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) and Fortna (2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2008), defined success or failure relative to former combatants' return to fighting, and these studies defined durable peace as the absence of an armed conflict. In doing so, these early quantitative studies focused on the negative peace that solidified an environment without battle casualties (Galtung, 1969). Recent research on peacekeeping missions has signified both negative and positive peace by showing the disaggregated effects of peacekeeping on the content and quality of peace concerning human, political, and economic rights. Furthermore, increasing detailed disaggregated data generation and availability led researchers to examine the sub-national impacts of peacekeeping (e.g., Ruggeri, Dorussen & Gizelis, 2016, 2017; Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015). Overall, the literature on peacekeeping has evolved from more simplistic, absolutist analyses to more disaggregated and detailed examinations of variations in peacekeeping and its effects.

2.1.3. Types of Peacekeeping Operations

With peacekeeping operations getting more complex and branched out throughout the years, several types of peacekeeping operations eventually became incorporated into the term of peacekeeping. Scholars differentiate operations under varying titles. For instance, in a recent study after the Brahimi Report, Fortna (2008) categorizes operations as observation, interpositional (traditional), multidimensional, and peace enforcement missions. Bellamy et al. (2010) categorize seven types of peace operations as preventive deployments, traditional and wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, assisting transitions, transitional administrations, and peace support operations. As one of the latest datasets on peace operations, Jetschke and Schlipphak (2019) categorize missions as peace enforcing, observer, peacekeeping, and other types that include election monitoring or the demobilization of rebel groups (p. 7-8). According to this dataset, the category of peacekeeping operations includes operations that have the prior consent of the affected parties, deployment of military personnel to the conflicting zone, and an active mediation between two or more conflicting sides (Jetschke & Schlipphak, 2019).

To fully comprehend the different types of operations, it is necessary to delve into their definitions. Observer missions have the prior consent of the affected parties, and they aim to monitor a peace agreement. Peace enforcement missions lack the consent of the target states, and this is cited as a Chapter VII situation in the mandate (Jetschke & Schlipphak, 2019). According to de Mello (2001), peace enforcement operations are the "antithesis of the traditional peacekeeping operation" (p. 116). The conception of peace enforcement's intellectual basis is the idea of collective security; as Bellamy et al. (2004) state, "the central idea is that the system's participants should work to preserve certain shared values, by peaceful means if possible and through the threat and use of force if necessary" (p. 147). Since these operations are authorized to use force, they are usually launched amid a conflict rather than after a peace agreement has been brokered. Although the UN has blurred the distinction between consent-based peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions with the Brahimi Report, some studies still distinguish between the two types and restrict the definition to only consent-based operations (e.g., Findlay, 2002). As a shorthand, studies usually distinguish the two types as Chapter VI and Chapter VII missions, respectively. Some examples of peace enforcement operations include the UN Operation in Somalia I and II (UNOSOM I and II) and Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia from 1992 to 1995. Since 1999, all UN peacekeeping operations have been authorized to use force under Chapter VII when necessary

(Howard & Dayal, 2018). In recent years, several proposals have been made to increase peacekeepers' ability to use force when necessary; examples include the High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO) (A/70/95; UN, 2015), the Kigali Principles (Kigali Principles, 2015), and the Cruz Report (Cruz, 2017).

Over time, the definition of peacekeeping operations has changed to reflect the different activities and approaches used in missions. Throughout this study, the term peacekeeping operation refers to all types of UN-authorized missions under Chapter VI or Chapter VII regulations, whether armed or unarmed, that involve sending personnel to manage ongoing or post-conflict situations, with the goal of preventing and resolving conflicts and maintaining peace and security. Rather than categorizing missions with rigid boundaries, it has to be acknowledged that these types of operations are not mutually exclusive, and with the ad hoc nature of operations, a single operation can move between categories (Bellamy et al., 2010). In addition, the political discourse on peacekeeping operations refers to a wide range of operations; in reality, operations take on a variety of functions simultaneously.

2.2. How Does Peacekeeping Work?

The bureaucratic framework of UN peacekeeping operations is outlined in the Charter of the UN. One of the primary aims of the UN is set out at the beginning of its Charter; in Article 1(1), its central purpose is stated as "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace" (UN, 1945, para. 1). This rationale is generally assumed to be the legal basis of peacekeeping (Bellamy et al., 2010).

The measures available to the UN for pursuing its central purpose are stated in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter. Chapter VI, "Pacific Settlements of Disputes," deals with measures that are pacific in nature and has the consent of the combatants. Chapter VII, "Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression," looks into enforcement measures, and Chapter VIII briefs about the UN's relationship with regional organizations. UN Charter does not explicitly provide a concept of peacekeeping, but it has evolved as an improvisation that stands between the actions envisioned by the Charter in Chapters VI and VII. Therefore, former Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's famous description of peacekeeping is "Chapter six and a half" (as cited in Nsia-Pepra, 2014, p. 26).

Prior to the 21st century, the UN authorized most traditional peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI, and much of the pacific measures available to the UN entail peaceful means of resolving conflicts such as negotiation, mediation, and arbitration, among others, as stated in Article 33(1). However, under Chapter VII, peacekeepers are authorized to use force beyond self-defense. The use of force by peacekeepers is a highly debated topic in the literature, and the UNSC must determine the existence of a threat to international peace and security to authorize enforcement measures (Betts, 1994; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Findlay, 2002; Von Hippel, 2000). The concept of what constitutes a threat to peace has evolved from traditional interstate warfare to include mass human rights violations and civilian massacres within a state, according to Bellamy et al. (2010).

2.2.1. Reforms

Several reforms and reports have been released to address the practical and bureaucratic issues of UN peacekeeping operations. The end of the Cold War marked a significant shift in the UN's understanding of peace and security. Then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) central policy document laid the foundation for the UN's role in peace and security by defining peacekeeping as one of the four tools that the UN could employ to prevent and resolve conflicts. According to Boutros-Ghali (1992), peacekeeping involves the deployment of UN personnel with the consent of all parties and encompasses both conflict prevention and peace-making (para. 20). The other three tools that Boutros-Ghali identified were "preventive diplomacy," which involves taking actions to prevent disputes arising between parties and conflicts becoming violent; "peacemaking," which entails resolving conflicts through peaceful means; and "post-conflict peacebuilding," which involves taking steps to build peace after a conflict has occurred in order to prevent its recurrence (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, para. 20-21). These four tools have been critical in shaping the UN's approach to peace and security in the post-Cold War era.

The Brahimi Report, published in 2000, presented various recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations. At the planning level, one of the crucial suggestions was to improve decision-making at the UN headquarters through better information flow and clearer mandates with clear wording of the requirements and realistic advice (Brahimi, 2000, p. 10-12). In the same vein, scholars such as Doyle and Sambanis (2000) argue that a well-designed mandate is essential for successful peacekeeping operations.

Similarly, Ndulo (2011) emphasizes the importance of a clear, practical, and well-funded mandate that accurately addresses the underlying cause of the conflict (p. 795). To illustrate this point, Ndulo (2011) cites the example of the Rwanda genocide, where an ambiguous mandate resulted in a failure to prevent the tragic event (p. 797). Thus, it is essential to have a clear understanding of the underlying causes and nature of the conflict to develop a robust mandate that can effectively address the issue at hand.

At the practical level, the Brahimi Report (Brahimi, 2000) emphasized that mandates should only be authorized if applicable and that financing for the deployment of forces should be secured beforehand to ensure the commitment of contributing countries. Important for the topic at hand, the Report also called for rapid and effective capacities and established the first standard timeline for the deployment of UN peace operations (Brahimi, 2000, para. 88-91; Durch, Earle, Holt & Shanahan, 2002, 2003; Spieker, 2000). The Report's rapid capacity recommendations will be analyzed in detail later.

The second reform was the *Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,* which established a broad framework for collective security (A/59/565; UN, 2004). The third reform came with the *2005 World Summit* and established the Peacebuilding Commission (A/RES/60/1; UN, 2005). Then, *Peace Operations 2010* document reformed the Department of Peacekeeping Operations' (DPKO's) strategy (UN, 2006). Emphasizing rapid and robust deployment, the *Capstone Doctrine* (UN, 2008) outlined important principles and guidelines for peacekeepers located in the field. In 2009, the *New Horizon* report also suggested the need for faster deployment and mainly assessed major policy and strategy problems with reinvigorating dialogue with all stakeholders in the global peacekeeping partnership (DPKO/DFS, 2009). A more recent report came in 2015 with then Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon establishing a *High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations* (A/70/95; UN, 2015), HIPPO in short, to assess emerging and current needs of UN peace operations. In 2017, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres proposed further reforms and placed politics at the center of the UN's work. Reiterating the importance of politics, the Secretary-General launched the *Action for Peacekeeping* (A4P) Initiative to mutually agree on principles and commitments related to peacebuilding, performance, partnerships, and politics, among other issues (Guterres, 2018).

2.2.2. Assembling a New UN Peacekeeping Operation

The process of creating a new UN peacekeeping operation involves several steps (UN, n.d.). Matters relating to international peace and security can only be raised before the UNSC by the Secretary-General, the General Assembly, or by the members of the UNSC. The UNSC consists of fifteen member states with five permanent members (China, Russia, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom) and ten non-permanent members on a two-year rotational basis (Bellamy et al., 2010; Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2019). After receiving a suggestion, several initial consultations are held to determine the appropriate response by the international community.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the main steps involved in assembling a UN peacekeeping operation, as explained by Smith and Boutellis (2013). The process begins with the deployment of a technical assessment mission to the conflict zone when security conditions allow it (Ndulo, 2011). Based on the findings of the assessment mission, the UN Secretary-General issues a report to the UNSC. If the UNSC decides that an operation is necessary, it issues formal authorization to deploy forces to the area. This authorization forms a UNSC resolution that outlines the mission's mandate, including the "broad objectives and specific instructions that define, limit, and guide a peacekeeping operation" (Ndulo, 2011, p. 784). The resolution also establishes the maximum number of personnel that can be deployed. In other words, the UNSC resolution provides the tasks and sets the personnel ceiling for the operation.

UNSC resolutions are binding on all UN member states, and member states are expected to assist in fulfilling mandates if asked by the UNSC. However, to adopt a resolution, at least nine members must vote in favor and concur with the Permanent-5 (P5) members. Even if a veto is not used, the mere possibility of its use can affect the UNSC's decision-making (Boulden, 2006). As the permanent representative of Jamaica states, "the mere presence of the threat of the veto or its possible use more often that not determined the way the Council conduct its business" (as cited in Hulton, 2004, p. 239). Some consider veto power unfair and a source of illegitimacy (Manusama, 2006). Therefore, as Ndulo (2011) proposes, "developing a mandate is an inherently political process […] while the language employed by the mandate drafters can have legal consequences, the rationale behind this language is almost completely politically driven" (p. 785-786).



Figure 2.1: UN Force-Generation Process for Mission Start-Up.

Source: Reprinted from Rethinking Force Generation: Filling the Capability Gaps in UN Peacekeeping (p. 8), by A. C. Smith and A. Boutellis, May 2013, IPI.

After the UNSC adopts a resolution to deploy a UN mission, senior officials are appointed, and the various components of the operation are planned. Once the UNSC authorizes a UN mission, the Secretary-General requests UN member states to contribute personnel to the operation (Bellamy et al., 2004). The Office of Operations then approaches a list of potential troop contributing countries (TCCs) for contributions. This list is based on several factors: "presumed TCC assets and desire to contribute, host-country acceptability, regional proximity, and other political concerns," without any formal guidelines (Smith & Boutellis, 2013, p. 11).

The selection of TCCs for UN peacekeeping operations is not always a straightforward process, as TCCs may have different national interests, domestic priorities, and capabilities. TCCs have the option to voluntarily participate in an operation and get reimbursed for their services or not contribute at all. This negotiation process can be time-consuming, especially when several TCCs are involved. In some cases, a lack of formal guidelines for this selection

process leads to criticism as selections could be based on expediency or the political influence of a member state (Smith & Boutellis, 2013, p. 11). Therefore, with the possibility of voluntary participation, countries have the ability to strategically select which operations to join. While the notion of 'collective security' underwrites the UN-led peacekeeping, the collective action problem creates a situation in which the intervention benefits the international community collectively, but individual states have incentives to free-ride (Malik, 2013).

Furthermore, TCCs have the freedom to choose what type of personnel and how many of each to contribute. Once the TCCs are identified, the UN begins the process of training and deploying the troops, which involves logistical planning and coordination, as well as ensuring that the troops are well-equipped and trained to carry out their assigned tasks. Pre-deployment assessments are conducted, and TCCs are briefed on the operational context and mandate of the mission to ensure that they are fully prepared to fulfill their roles. It is important to note that even though the deployed peacekeepers are under the operational command of the UN, they remain under the authority of their respective governments.

After the TCCs are identified and their contributions agreed upon, an advance team is deployed to begin the operation in the field. The duration of the initial deployment may vary depending on the specific peacekeeping operation, with some being deployed as quickly as possible and others being deployed gradually in phases. The decision on the timing of the deployment is based on the urgency of the conflict and the needs of the operation, as determined by the Secretary-General and the UNSC. However, the lead time to deploy also varies for each operation, and it mainly depends on the willingness of the member states.

Peacekeeping missions are not uniform and vary in terms of their overall numbers and types of personnel. The personnel component of each operation is strategically calculated and authorized based on the preceding conditions in the conflict area and the expected level of contribution from member states. The fulfillment of the personnel requirements of a mandate is dependent on the willingness of UN member states to contribute personnel.

UN peacekeeping operations generally consist of three types of personnel: armed troops, police units, and unarmed military observers. Each of these personnel types serves specific responsibilities and purposes to achieve the objectives of the operation's mandate. The size of an operation is not the only factor that affects its effectiveness; variations in personnel types also play a crucial role in determining an operation's effectiveness.

Since the Secretary-General provides periodical reports to the UNSC about the missions, operations' mandates can change or be supplemented throughout their existence with the approval of the UNSC (Ndulo, 2011). Revising mandates to reflect emerging local needs after deployment is needed and natural. Several reasons are discussed for why mandates change throughout time (Ndulo, 2011, p. 792). Sometimes, operations do not get sufficient feedback from the conflict zone until they are deployed in the field, leading to the need for modification. Another reason for modification is that a specific task within the mandate has been fulfilled and replaced by another one. Furthermore, operations frequently do not receive the initially promised resources to fully implement the mandate's objectives, leading to the need to change strategies in parallel to the resources received. Finally, conflicts are unpredictable and in flux, and this situation requires adaptation to prevailing circumstances. For instance, several operations moved from a Chapter VI to a Chapter VII mandate. Due to deteriorating security conditions on the ground, the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) experienced such modifications. Some conflicts also require follow-up missions, which may need the creation of a new operation instead of modifying an existing mandate. Examples of follow-up missions would be the operations in Somalia from UNOSOM I to UNITAF and then to UNOSOM II.

2.3. Timing of an Intervention and UN Rapid Deployment

The timing of deployment is a critical factor in the success of any peace operation, and the ability to deploy personnel and equipment rapidly and effectively to conflict zones is a demanding task. The term 'rapid deployment' refers to the capability of quickly moving armed or unarmed personnel and resources strategically to the operational area. However, UN peacekeeping operations face additional complexities and delays due to various tasks that need to be completed. Nonetheless, rapid deployment, especially with a functional team, is a crucial component of operation effectiveness. The duration of the deployment process has been largely overlooked in the literature for its contribution to peace operations' effectiveness, and there is a gap in the existing literature on the length of time it takes for UN peacekeeping operations to deploy their forces.

2.3.1. Timing of an Intervention

The appropriate timing of intervention is considered crucial in peace studies. According to Kriesberg (1991), de-escalation efforts must be executed at the right moment in the sequence of events (p. 4). One of the leading theories on this matter is the ripeness theory, pioneered by Zartman (1985, 2000, 2001, 2008), and supported by Haass (1988, 1990) and Stedman (1991), amongst many others. This theory claims that successful conflict resolution depends on undertaking intervention at the right time, considering contextual factors such as rough power symmetry, mutually hurting stalemate, and cost-benefit analysis (Zartman, 2000). As Zartman (1985) states, "Only time resolves conflict, but time needs some help" (p. 237). In other words, time factors are among a series of factors shaping the course of international mediation (Bercovitch, 1992). However, critics argue that time cannot be treated as an independent variable (Kleiboer & t'Hart, 1995). While ripe moment(s) may seem clear in hindsight, identifying them during the ongoing conflict is challenging, and the ripeness theory remains contested in the literature (Rubin, 1981).

Rubin (1991) suggests that third-party involvement is a crucial method for developing the ripe moment (p. 242). Rikhye (1991) similarly argues that the UN Secretary-General can play a vital role in moving combatants over the mutually hurting stalemate. For Hampson (1996), strong third-party involvement is necessary for fostering ripeness, which he describes as a "cultivated, not inherited, condition" (p. 210). As Rubin (1991) states, "Third parties not only can help to create ripeness, their introduction (at the behest of the disputants) *reflects* the motivation among the disputants to move toward agreement *now*" (p. 243, emphasis in original). This highlights the urgency of taking action toward de-escalating the conflict or implementing the conditions of a peace agreement. Hence, the quick deployment of a sufficient number of personnel to the conflict zone is critical for the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations. However, peace studies have largely neglected the study of the timing of UN interventions.

Timing also is crucial in the success of mediation efforts, and many scholars agree that the "timing in launching negotiations is often decisive" (Stein & Lewis, 1996, p. 467). Some argue that late entry into the conflict can increase acceptance of mediation efforts (Jackson, 2000; Northedge & Donelan, 1971; Rubin, 1981; Ott, 1972; Zartman, 1985), while others suggest that mediation should be initiated before the conflict reaches a threshold of violence at the early stages of a conflict (Bercovitch & Houston, 1996; Edmead, 1971; Kleiboer & t'Hart, 1995). For Crocker, Hampson and Aall (1999), mediation is most likely successful

when the conflict is most violent. Despite the lack of consensus on the best or ripe moment for mediation, good timing is considered one of the most significant factors contributing to the success of the mediation efforts (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 2003; Siniver, 2006).

Greig (2001), and Regan and Stam (2000) reveal that the timing of a mediation intervention has a curvilinear relationship for ending disputes. Regan and Stam (2000) suggest that the best time to end a war is soon after it begins, but intervening early can be challenging because combatant parties may be confident of victory, and governments may be hesitant to accept external intervention. In a later study, Regan (2002) argues that since costs and estimates of victory in a conflict vary with time, the timing of an intervention contributes to the willingness to settle or continue to fight and directly influences the duration of a conflict by its effect on expectations. In the early stages of a conflict, opposition movements may be small and lack public support, making them more vulnerable to military defeat, whereas after a period of consolidation, they may have higher prospects for victory (Regan, 2002, p. 61). Thus, an intervention supporting the government early on may lead to the opposition settling, while an early intervention supporting the opposition may prolong the conflict. However, Regan's (2002) analysis of 150 conflicts from 1945 to 1999 found little support for the timing of intervention's effect on conflict duration. Early intervention by the UN and its member states in a conflict with few battle casualties may have a higher probability of a shorter conflict. Surprisingly, Regan (2002) also finds that "neutral interventions are strongly associated with longer conflicts than are biased interventions" (p. 71). However, the time frame and types of interventions considered may have led to contrary results.

By selecting low-intensity African conflicts, Ruhe (2015) demonstrates that when neither combatant side is likely to succeed militarily, meaning in the case of a stalemate, high conflict intensity increases the probability of mediation onset. Nonetheless, if one side has a higher probability of prevailing militarily, then the conflicting parties will not be avid to engage in mediation by not seeing conflict intensity as costly. So, Ruhe's (2015) results show that conflict dynamics are relevant determinants in predicting suitable timings for mediation.

The involvement of third parties in a conflict can have a significant impact on its dynamics and duration. Analyzing the timing of third parties joining militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), Joyce, Ghosn and Bayer (2012) reveal several variables that influence when and which side third parties join in ongoing MIDs. While there is a small chance of a third party to bandwagon within the first three months of a dispute but no chance afterward, there is a large chance that third parties will balance within the first two years of a dispute but no

chance afterward (Joyce et al., 2012, p. 33). Furthermore, if a third party and an initiator are both democratic, the risk of joining the initiator increases early in a dispute and decreases as the dispute persists (Joyce et al., 2012, p. 28). So, studies show that the timing of intervention, regardless of the type, is an essential factor in the duration of conflicts.

2.3.2. Timing of a Peacekeeping Operation

When is the right time to deploy a peacekeeping operation? According to van der Lijn (2006, 2009, 2010), in addition to eight other factors, if the operation is deployed timely and at the right time, meaning if the conflict is ripe, the probability that a peacekeeping operation makes a positive contribution to durable peace increases (2006, p. 32). Due to limited policy tools available and the little time left to analyze the causes of conflict, intervening at a late stage when a crisis has been reached decreases the prospects for outside actors (van der Lijn, 2006, p. 32). Heldt (2002) supports this argument by stating that the longer the period from the start of the conflict to the deployment of the operation, the higher the chances of continued warfare (p. 129). In addition, Zenko (2004) argues that intervening early can be more effective in terms of casualties and the number of personnel involved than costlier interventions later in the crisis (p. 5).

On the contrary, Koko and Essis (2012) find that if the lag time between the start of a conflict and the deployment of a mission is longer, meaning the more time the UN prepares before intervening, the more likely that the operation is to succeed in successfully implementing its first mandate (p. 70). Similarly, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) claim that the longer a conflict has existed before the UN enters, the higher the chance for success, as war-weariness might increase the combatant parties' desire for peace (p. 787). These findings contradict conflict scholars claiming that early intervention in conflicts yields a higher probability of success (e.g., Bercovitch & Houston, 1996; Edmead, 1971). Via these different findings, scholars have not yet reached a consensus on the timing of peacekeeping operations.

2.3.3. UN Rapid Deployment Efforts

The first Secretary-General of the UN, Trygve Lie, recognized the need for a permanent standing UN force (Roberts & Zaum, 2007). Since then, the UN has implemented various initiatives to improve its rapid deployment capabilities. These initiatives include the

standby arrangements system, formed police unit standby initiative, standing police capacity, financial premiums and incentives, global field support strategy, enhanced rapidly deployable capacities, early mission headquarters, and partnerships for rapid deployment (Langille, 2014, p. 4). One of these initiatives, the UN standby arrangements system (UNSAS), is particularly noteworthy.

Boutros-Ghali first emphasized UNSAS in the *Agenda for Peace* (1992), and it was established within the DPKO in 1994 to identify requirements, establish readiness and assist in mission planning (Langille, 2014, p. 4). UNSAS is a database system that appoints TCCs that pledge the operational capabilities of individuals and operational and support units without any guarantee of actual commitment. Similar to contributing to an operation after a UNSC resolution requesting assistance from member states, UNSAS is a voluntary system; after a UN request for permission to use pledged specific resources, the decision to deploy resources remains as a national decision. UNSAS serves four objectives: knowing the available resources, facilitating mission planning and force generation, assisting with rapid deployment, and encouraging member states to contribute more (Langille, 2014, p. 5; Murphy, 2015). Timing is a critical element in the effectiveness of a rapid deployment capability mechanism (Rivlin, 1983). However, UNSAS has been unable to fulfill its aims due to the low participation of member states and lack of commitment to rapid deployment that inhibits UN's aimed timelines (Langille, 2014, p. 5; Smith, Boutellis & Selway, 2012, p. 15; Williams & Bellamy, 2007). Concerns over the limitations of UNSAS were also expressed by then Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2000):

> Our system for launching United Nations peace operations has sometimes been compared to a volunteer fire department […] The present system relies almost entirely on last minute, ad hoc arrangements that guarantee delay […] Although we have understandings for military standby arrangements with Member States, the availability of the designated forces is unpredictable and very few are in a state of high readiness. Resource constraints preclude us even from being able to deploy a mission headquarters rapidly (p. 49).

Based on a voluntary system and no binding obligations to respond, UNSAS has proven slow and unreliable. An incentive for lacking support might be due to not receiving reimbursements for capacities pledged to UNSAS, and at the political level, states might have little recognition for deploying more rapidly. So, there are no real incentives for TCCs to deploy rapidly or arrive prepared to the mission area. Furthermore, there are no negative consequences for poor performance, which creates no disincentives for TCCs to meet their commitments (Smith & Boutellis, 2013, p. 13).

The Brahimi Report (Brahimi, 2000) suggested that the UNSAS be reformed as part of broader changes in UN peacekeeping efforts. Following this, the HIPPO report (UN, 2015) reiterated that the UN has been unable to even get close to the targeted timelines set out in the Brahimi Report of thirty and ninety days accordingly for traditional and multidimensional missions, and "with rare exceptions, where Member States have self-deployed high capability self-sustaining units, the average deployment time for a UN contingent is six months" (UN, 2015, p. 51, para. 188). While the hope was that UNSAS would increase the predictability and promptness of force generation, as Smith and Boutellis (2013) note, with rare exceptions, it never met its envisaged purposes of planning and rapid deployment (p. 3). As the lessons learned from past experiences have demonstrated, delays in deployments can have serious consequences, including loss of lives and deterioration of human rights and security in conflict areas. To address these issues, various reform reports, including the Brahimi Report and HIPPO, have emphasized the importance of rapid reaction tools.

The UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) replaced UNSAS in July 2015. PCRS aims to enhance the management of commitments and to ultimately provide a single entity for selecting TCCs for deployment (Murphy, 2015, para. 11). Similar to UNSAS, PCRS also has a Rapid Deployment Level, where TCCs can pledge their capabilities for deployment within the proposed timetables (Murphy, 2015, para. 13). The UN was expecting PCRS to be fully operational at the start of 2018, but as stated at a recent report dated May 2019, specialized and high-performing capabilities, including those that are rapidly deployable, are still in short supply despite many units being registered in the PCRS (DPO, 2019).

In addition to the UN's efforts, the last few decades have witnessed major changes in the approach to regional security that favor the formation and deployment of regional mechanisms with rapid deployment capabilities for peace operations (Hardt, 2014; Okon & Williams, 2018). Rapid deployment capability (RDC) consists of a robust, trained, and well-equipped personnel unit that can be rapidly dispatched to regions of conflict. This force is capable of mobility, flexibility, interoperability, and efficiency, along with the capacity to anticipate and prepare for potential crisis situations (Langille, 2004; Okon & Williams, 2018; Yang & Liao, 1999). Regional RDCs have been established since the early 1990s.[1] Although

[1] E.g., Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) for UN peace operations established in 1996, Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDICAPS) established in 1997, South East Europe Multinational Brigade (SEEBRIG) in 2002, NATO Response Force (NRF) in 2002, European Union Battlegroup (EUBG) in 2003, the African Standby Force (ASF) in 2003, the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force

time has a central role in RDCs, the UN has the slowest readiness notice among the other RDCs with thirty and ninety days accordingly for traditional and multidimensional operations, and still, these requirements are hardly met.[2]

Although rapid deployment and rapidly deployable forces have been stated as necessities for operations' effectiveness since the *Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali, 1992), rapid deployment is still an unresolved issue deserving of utmost importance for almost thirty years. As Langille (2014) puts it, "the recurring impediments to progress in this respect tend to be within the insufficient political will, limited cooperation, inadequate UN funding associated with austerity and a zero-growth budget, and the reliance on slow and unreliable standby arrangements" (p. 3). In addition to Langille's (2014) proposed problematic mechanisms that hinder establishing effective rapid reaction mechanisms, there is also a mismatch between commitments on paper by TCCs and actual deployments (Koops & Novosseloff, 2017). The basis of this problem is the lack of member state political will and resource commitment (Koops & Novosseloff, 2017; Okon & Williams, 2018; Reykers, 2017; Ringsmose & Rynning, 2017). Another example that faces similar problems is the African Standby Force (ASF); it was declared operationally ready in 2016, but due to a dearth of political will, the interest of the member states, and poor funding, its originally designed form was compromised (Darkwa, 2017; Okon & Williams, 2018).

Apart from Langille's proposed issues, one of the challenges in establishing effective rapid reaction mechanisms is that member states often pledge the same troops and capabilities to different organizations, such as the UN, European Union (EU), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Koops & Novosseloff, 2017). Moreover, Koops and Novosseloff (2017) argue that TCCs might be reluctant to commit to operations that may not directly enhance their national interests during increasing pressures on member state defense budgets (p. 436). The challenge here is to harness these national interests for collective purposes. Difficulties easily arise in peacekeeping when the UN's goals and interests do not match with its contributors'. Lastly, there is a need for publicity and credit for sending troops to operations by member states (Koops & Novosseloff, 2017). Overall, although rapid deployment is essential, UN peacekeeping operations have chronically lacked in a strategic capability of

(CJEF) in 2010, and Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) in 2014 (Fetterly, 2006; Hendriks, 2014; Kaitera & Ben-Ari, 2008; Kasumba & Debrah, 2010; Koops & Varwick, 2008; Langille, 2000b; Okon & Williams, 2008; Saxi, 2011; Tagarev, 2003).

[2] SHIRBRIG readiness notice is 15-30 days, NRF is five days, ASF is 14 days, and EUBG is ten days after approval (Hendriks, 2014; Kasumba & Debrah, 2010; Koops & Varwick, 2008; Okon & Williams, 2018; Simon, 2010).

rapid deployment mechanism (Gowan, 2015; Koops & Novosseloff, 2017; Roberts, 2008; van der Lijn, 2009).

The timing of a deployment begets the question of how to transport. A popular conception is that the UN is dependent on powerful member states to provide transportation for its operations. However, as argued by Giletti (1998), the UN has the capacity to supply strategic lift with arrangements of movements of troops, equipment and supplies to support its operations. Despite this capability, van Kappen, a military adviser to the Secretary-General, claims that the process of organizing strategic lift takes around two to three months in reality (UN Chronicle, 1997). Apart from logistical support, the rapid deployment of personnel requires adequate material and equipment support (Ndulo, 2011).

Decision makers should be aware of the timing of UN peacekeeping operations and other interventions. Timing is vital for survival, as it can mean the difference between life and death for those involved in conflicts (Reychler, 2015, p. 232). For UN peacekeeping operations, bad temporal choices or lagged deployments result in missed opportunities, lost trust, and deadly delays. As Reychler (2015) states, "deadly delays, missed opportunities and the lack of proactive conflict prevention continue to impair sustainable peacebuilding" (p. 247). Despite its importance, timing in peacekeeping operations is not well studied, and there is no consensus on the effects of intervention timing. The speed and timing of deployment and intervention are major issues that need to be studied in further research. Although "rapid deployment had today become the norm rather than the exception" was stated back in 2003, rapid deployment has been and still is an exception (UN, 2003, para. 67).

2.4. Where to Intervene?

Scholars have questioned why the UN deploys peacekeeping operations to some conflicts and not others. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of UN peacekeeping operations has risen steadily. According to Gilligan and Stedman (2003), there are three common arguments regarding the UN's selection process for intervention locations:

> [First,] peacekeepers go where the permanent members of the Security Council have important national interests. [Second,] peacekeeping is imperialism in disguise and, ..., peacekeepers are sent where great powers have an economic interest. ... [Third,] peacekeeping since the 1990s embodies an ethos of democracy-building and that the great powers, who have an interest in increasing the number of

> democracies in the world, choose cases in which democracy is in short supply yet has the potential to take root (p. 37).

According to Gilligan and Stedman (2003), there are three main arguments for why the UN deploys peacekeeping operations to certain conflicts. The first argument is related to the national interests of the five permanent members of the UNSC. The second argument suggests that great powers have economic interests in certain conflict areas. The third argument is based on the idea that democracy building can lead to peace, and that rebuilding war-torn societies as liberal democratic states is a key reason for where peacekeepers go.

Related to the preceding third argument, many scholars have emphasized the importance of democratic peace theory in understanding the UN's decision to promote democracy worldwide (Andersson, 2000; Marten, 2004; Paris, 2003). According to this theory, democracies are less likely to go to war with each other, which is why the UNSC may be motivated to promote democracy as a means of enhancing international security (Andersson, 2000).

UN missions have been argued to play a significant role in promoting the quality of democracy in host countries (Blair et al., 2023). This effect is particularly notable when such missions are deployed with a larger presence of civilian personnel during times of peace, rather than in the midst of violence or conflict. Civilian personnel, with their expertise in areas such as governance, rule of law, human rights, and electoral processes, can provide crucial support and technical assistance to local authorities. By working closely with domestic institutions and stakeholders, they can help foster a conducive environment for democratic governance.

During periods of peace, when violence and conflict are relatively subdued, the focus of UN missions can shift towards capacity building, institution-building, and long-term development efforts. This enables a greater emphasis on democratic reforms, electoral processes, and the rule of law. By engaging in activities such as institution-building, providing training to local authorities, and supporting electoral processes, the UN missions can help bolster the quality of democracy in the host country.

The presence of civilian personnel also facilitates the establishment of connections between local communities and international actors, creating channels for dialogue, cooperation, and knowledge exchange. This interaction can foster a sense of ownership and empowerment among local populations, as well as enhance their understanding of democratic principles and practices.

2.4.1. Interests of the Permanent-Five Members

Many scholars have examined the reasons behind the deployment of UN peacekeepers and have found that the interests of the UNSC, particularly those of the P5 members, play a significant role in determining where peacekeepers are sent (Andersson, 2000; Beardsley, 2004; Berdal, 2008; de Jonge Oudraat, 1996; Gibbs, 1997; Jakobsen, 1996; Mullenbach, 2005). As Berdal (2008) states, "the Security Council's involvement in peacekeeping – as evidenced by the mandate(s) given and the resources allocated to a mission – continues to be shaped, for better and worse, by the strategic calculations of the P5 and, depending on the mission, key troop contributors" (p. 202). While these interests can vary from economic to colonial ties, empirical evidence suggests that UN missions are less likely to be deployed to places where the P5 have strong ties (de Jonge Oudraat, 1996; Fortna, 2008; Gilligan & Stedman, 2003; Mullenbach, 2005). Despite this, Stojek and Tir (2015) reveal that the P5 members' economic interests are significant in explaining which civil wars receive UN peacekeepers. Scholars have also suggested that classical imperialistic motives, such as access to primary commodities, may also factor in decisions to deploy peacekeepers (Gibbs, 1997). Despite these factors, Beardsley and Schmidt's (2012) analysis suggests that the severity of the conflict is the most important predictor of UN intervention.

Howard (2008) proposes three necessary conditions for the successful implementation of UN peacekeeping operations in civil wars: moderate levels of Security Council interest intensity, supported by consensus; the consent of the warring parties for the UN operation; and first-level organizational learning in the UN Secretariat (p. 327). These conditions are jointly sufficient for success, in which success is measured through the implementation of the mandate and the achievement of positive peace standards.

From a perspective of principal-agent dynamics, Allen and Yuen (2014) posit that powerful states constrain international bureaucracies. For civil war states with high P5 interests, the UN has the most autonomy in conducting the mission, whereas missions that suffer from P5 interests are more controlled. Ideally, peacekeeping operations cannot be deployed in favor of a preferred side; and traditionally, operations' neutrality and impartiality are "ensured by the multinational composition of the force, in addition to the limited nature of its armaments and its ability to use those armaments only in self-defense" (de Mello, 2001, p. 115). The UN is expected to remain neutral and impartial in its operations. Nevertheless, Benson and Kathman (2014) argue that there is a bias in UNSC resolutions, and an important determinant of UN troop deployment levels is when the UN's preferred side has higher

casualties. This indicates that conflict dynamics, along with country characteristics, influence the UNSC's decision to authorize a UN intervention. So, Benson and Kathman (2014) suggest that conflict dynamics, in addition to country characteristics, motivate the UNSC to sanction a UN intervention.

Binder and Golub's (2020) study examines the UNSC's agenda-setting speed for civil conflicts. Basing their argument on the fact that getting an item on the agenda rapidly is a precondition for early action, and in the case that early action is considered to be more effective, they develop a theoretical framework based on realist, constructivist, institutionalist, and bargaining theories to investigate the speed at which conflicts enter the Council's agenda. Their analysis of an original dataset using survival analysis demonstrates that the P5 members' parochial interests matter but do not solely determine the agenda-setting speed. Instead, the severity of the conflict, normative considerations, the interests of the elected members (E10) members, and preference heterogeneity among both the P5 and the E10 constrain P5 interests.

Shesterinina and Job (2016) present that UNSC resolutions are (re)adjusted throughout time to focus on the protection of specific civilian population groups, which creates the notion of particularized protection. Aral (2013) goes further, claiming that the UNSC has become a manipulation intermediary of great powers, and therefore has lost credibility. With the prior studies in mind, the interests of the P5 members appear to at least partly influence where and how peacekeepers are deployed.

2.4.2. Easy or Hard Conflicts

Another important factor in determining where to intervene is the humanitarian impulse argument, which suggests that conflicts with high levels of severity and longer durations are more likely to receive intervention (Beardsley, 2004; Bove & Elia, 2011; Gilligan & Stedman, 2003; Jakobsen, 2007). UNSC resolutions are designed after technical assessments according to the conflicts' specific needs. The 'needs' argument in literature tends to categorize conflicts as 'hard' or 'easy' based on factors related to the severity levels of conflicts, such as severe battlefield violence, large refugee populations, prolonged conflict durations, and the involvement of multiple conflicting parties (Beardsley & Schmidt, 2012; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Fortna, 2004a, 2004b, 2008; Gilligan & Stedman, 2003).

The UN has been accused of bias towards certain regions and regimes, favoring easier cases where success is more likely. Carter (2007) argues that the UN strategically selects cases where it can be successful, while Gilligan and Stedman (2003) found evidence of bias towards certain regions and regimes, emphasizing a selection of potentially easier cases. Despite this, the UN is sensitive to humanitarian principles and more likely to intervene in conflicts with high numbers of deaths or if the conflict drags on (Gilligan & Stedman, 2003). Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) and Jakobsen (1996) also conclude that the UN adheres to its Charter on humanitarian and security missions. Moreover, according to Hultman (2013), peacekeeping operations are more likely to be established in conflicts with high levels of violence against civilians. Melander (2009) also shows that peacekeeping operations are more likely where the risk of genocide is high. In addition, Beardsley, Cunningham and White (2015) propose that the UNSC does not cherry-pick cases for intervention, and can play a role in preventing self-determination disputes from escalating into civil wars (p. 694).

Gilligan and Stedman's (2003) study reveals that the UN is biased in its selection of where to intervene. They reveal that the UN is less likely to intervene in stronger states, meaning if the conflicting country has a large government army, and there is no significant evidence that the UN intervenes in primary commodity countries, low-level democracies or former colonies. They also assert that there is a strong regional bias in where peacekeepers go; the UN is more likely to allocate missions to Europe, then to Africa, and least likely to Asia. Fortna (2004) interprets Gilligan and Stedman's (2003) findings by stating that "their findings that peacekeepers are more likely after very deadly conflicts (which are more prone to recurrent warfare), but not in strong states (which may be at less risk) suggest that peacekeepers may select relatively difficult cases" (p. 275). Fortna (2004) examines Gilligan and Stedman's (2003) finding of the UN's high likelihood of intervening in long conflicts. After differentiating types of missions, she finds that after prolonged conflicts, a consent-based peacekeeping operation is more likely to be deployed, whereas an enforcement mission is less likely.

Both Fortna's (2004) and Gilligan and Stedman's (2003) studies align with the finding that the UN is unlikely to deploy missions to countries with large government armies. So, for the question of where peacekeepers go, Fortna (2004) has an answer: "Peacekeepers are usually deployed where there was no clear winner in the war" (p. 281). According to Fortna (2004a), this answer applies both to interstate and intrastate conflicts; "the more indecisive the military outcome, the more likely it is that peacekeepers will be deployed […] Peacekeeping

respond to need: they are more likely when they are most necessary" (p. 499). Distinguished from most of the early studies, Fortna (2008) also focuses on the standpoint of the 'peacekept,' and argues that these decision makers' demand for peacekeeping is important in determining where peacekeepers are deployed. For Fortna (2008), the concept of 'peacekept' only refers to decision makers within the government and rebel organizations, and not the local population per se. For Fortna (2004a, 2004b, 2008) then, peacekeepers are deployed to where they are needed.

De Jonge Oudraat (1996) argues that the UN intervenes in harder cases, and Beardsley (2004) empirically reaches this conclusion as well by testing where UN peacekeepers go. Beardsley (2004) tests endogenous relationships for operations established within the time period of 1945 to 2001, and he asserts that the UN tends to intervene in conflicts that are harder to resolve. Approaching from a mainly humanitarian perspective, the UN tends to intervene in more difficult or the so-called 'harder' conflicts, rather than the 'easier' ones that are already de-escalating (Beardsley, 2004; Beardsley & Schmidt, 2012; de Jonge Oudraat, 1996; Fortna, 2004a, 2008; Gilligan & Stedman, 2003; Hultman, 2010, 2013).

Hultman and Johansson's (2017) study on all intrastate armed conflicts from 1989 to 2009 and find that reports of sexual violence, particularly by non-state actors, increase the likelihood of UN peacekeeping operations. However, as Johansson and Hultman (2018) indicate, in general, UN peacekeepers' ability to reduce sexual violence is weak, and only the deployment of UN police reduces the risk of sexual violence by rebel groups. Even so, the number of peacekeepers is associated with a lower risk of sexual violence. Benson and Gizelis (2019) further denote that the effects of sexual violence on the number and level of UNSC resolutions are significant, predicating that sexual violence is a conflict attribute that drives the likelihood of UNSC resolutions.

Binder (2015) compares 31 humanitarian crises from 1991 to 2004 using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis and found that there is not a single path to explain the conditions for UNSC actions. Instead, a combination of factors such as a large extent of human suffering, previous involvement by international institutions, and negative spillover effects to neighboring countries are key explanatory conditions for UNSC actions (p. 724). Overall, then, the UN abides by its humanitarian principles of the responsibility to protect civilians and save lives, and intervenes mainly in hard cases.

2.5. Contribution to UN Operations

Contributing to UN peacekeeping operations is a voluntary process for UN member states. Countries decide whether or not to provide armed or unarmed personnel to UN missions based on a "calculus of interest and capability" (Durch et al., 2002, p. 16). However, this willingness to contribute can sometimes result in the deployment of under-equipped and poorly trained personnel to conflict zones, which can compromise the effectiveness and safety of UN peacekeeping operations. This is because some countries may prioritize their desire to be seen as a contributor to the UN over the need to ensure that their personnel are adequately prepared and equipped for the task at hand. This section delves into the characteristics of personnel contributing countries and explanations for contributions.

2.5.1. Characteristics of Personnel Contributing Countries

The characteristics of personnel contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations have undergone a shift in the last decades. In the 1990s, democracies and middle powers were the primary contributors of personnel, but since the turn of the millennium, non-democracies have become more involved than democracies (Andersson, 2000; Bellamy et al., 2010; Lebovic, 2004). This shift has led to a transfer of responsibility from wealthy Western nations to less powerful states, which can lead to the deployment of under-equipped and poorly trained personnel to conflict zones (Lebovic, 2004).

Developing countries, which are often internally conflicted, have been the main contributors of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations for the past two decades. India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh were the top personnel contributors in the first decade of the 2000s (Bellamy & Williams, 2013; Kathman, 2013). This figure of developing countries contributing more has not changed for the last two decades. As of 31 December 2019, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Rwanda, Nepal, and India were the top five contributors to UN peacekeeping operations by a landslide. Meanwhile, developed countries and democracies typically provide financial support to UN peacekeeping operations. However, according to Daniel and Caraher (2006), for the first four years of the 2000s, democratic, rich and middle income, and highly and lesser developed states constituted the majority of the contribution to peace operations (p. 303-304). The significant contribution of such countries for that period of time might be due to the optimistic expectations created through the application of the Brahimi Report's suggestions.

The fact that developing countries and non-democracies contribute more to operations challenges the democratic peace theory, which is a major influence on the concept of peacekeeping. As Bellamy et al. (2010) state, "in their attempt to construct zones of stable peace (Boulding, 1978), both the theory and practice of peace operations are informed by an often unspoken commitment to the liberal peace" (p. 23). The democratic peace theory, which is the most law-like theory in social sciences, endorses that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other (de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson & Smith, 1999). This theory is supported by former UN Secretary-Generals Boutros-Ghali (1992) and Annan (2005), who argued that democratic practices are essential for achieving peace and that the UN promotes and strengthens democracy worldwide.

2.5.2. Explanations for Peacekeeping Contributions

Two major general explanations for peacekeeping contributions are Realist- and Liberal-inspired accounts. Realist accounts suggest that countries contribute to peacekeeping operations as an exercise of foreign policy for self-interest reasons, such as to maintain the status quo or increase their position and prestige in the world (Bellamy & Williams, 2013; Neack, 1995). However, there are some criticisms of this view, as some countries may contribute to peacekeeping operations despite not having a significant say in the decision-making process at the UN. By analyzing India and Pakistan, Krishnasamy (2001) shows that contributions to peacekeeping operations do not match the participation of the UN bureaucracy in decision and policy making processes on peacekeeping issues.

In addition, at a general debate on the UN's rapid response, the representative of Pakistan called for greater representation for developing countries and TCCs in the DPKO, adding that "after all, troop contributors regarded themselves as integral stakeholders of a mission and their views would likely add value to those of the Secretariat" (UN, 2003, para. 57-58). This is because countries that contribute troops to peacekeeping missions consider themselves integral stakeholders of the mission and believe that their perspectives would add value to those of the UN Secretariat.

Research focusing on Realist perspectives indicates that countries tend to contribute to peacekeeping operations for self-interest reasons. Some of these reasons include former colonial ties or the ownership of strategic resources, such as oil (de Jonge Oudraat, 1996; Fortna, 2008). Additionally, countries may contribute troops to prevent conflict from spilling

across borders and to manage the flow of refugees or displaced people (Bove & Elia, 2011; Uzonyi, 2015). For instance, according to Uzonyi (2015), refugee flows can be used to predict which countries are likely to contribute troops and how many troops they will contribute to a particular conflict.

The Liberal account of peacekeeping operations suggests that democratic states are more likely to participate in peace operations than non-democracies (Bellamy & Williams, 2013). Democratic peace theory emphasizes three reasons for democracies' incentives for providing peacekeepers. First, since democracies are founded on liberal principles, they readily accept the rights of individuals that must be protected and promoted (Bellamy & Williams, 2013; Lebovic, 2004). Secondly, scholars argue that democratic leaders see democratic practices as inalienable from their self-interest, and they believe these principles can be exported and humanitarian objectives can be pursued (Bellamy & Williams, 2013; Lebovic, 2004). This is due to the democratic governments' shared interest in creating "economic, political, and security conditions in which peace, prosperity, and democracy can thrive" (Lebovic, 2004, p. 912). Thirdly, democracies are more likely than non-democracies to join international organizations and cooperate to achieve shared goals of peace and security (Bellamy & Williams, 2013; Mansfield & Pevehouse, 2006; Pevehouse, 2002).

The Liberal account of peacekeeping operations suggests that democratic countries are more likely to participate in such operations because they believe it will promote peace, democracy, and human rights (Bellamy & Williams, 2013; Owen, 1994). However, according to Bellamy and Williams (2013), the connection between democracy and contribution to peacekeeping operations is not definite but a likely one. This means that although democracies are more likely to contribute to peacekeeping operations, their disposition toward promoting peace and democracy does not always translate into actual contributions.

While Realist- and Liberal-inspired accounts have provided valuable explanations for why countries contribute to UN peacekeeping operations, they fail to present a comprehensive theory. Previous studies have focused on a limited number of causal factors, ignoring the complex interaction of various factors that influence decisions about contribution. Sezgin's (2022) recent study incorporates both theories in her analyses and reveals that no single theory can explain the contribution motives of the EU member states, as a wide range of interacting factors determines the decision to commit personnel to an operation. As a result, it is essential to consider multiple variables that shape the decision-making process when examining why countries choose to participate in peacekeeping missions.

Bellamy and Williams (2013) propose a framework to explain why states do or do not contribute to peacekeepers by determining broad rationales of either motivating or inhibitors constraining contributions (p. 423). They argue that a state's strategic culture and institutions shape its dispositions towards contributing to peacekeeping, which then interacts with policy standpoints to produce specific decisions (p. 433). Their framework considers various political, security, economic, institutional, and normative sectors. For the political sector, national prestige and voice in international affairs can motivate contribution, while alternative priorities and difficult domestic politics can inhibit contribution. For the security sector, states may have a rationale to resolve regional conflicts and contribute to global peace, but preference for non-UN solutions might inhibit contributions. In the economic sector, while financial rewards might motivate contribution, additional costs might work oppositely. In the institutional sector, gaining operational experience might work as a rationale for contributing, but military antipathy to or not having internal incentives for UN peacekeeping might inhibit contribution. Lastly, within the normative sector, support for the UN system and being a Good Samaritan with humanitarianism might provide a rationale for contribution, whilst discomfort with the normative agenda may inhibit contribution rates.

Another strand of why states contribute to peacekeeping operations is the argument of 'peacekeeping for profit,' which assumes that states can profit from the UN's reimbursement of costs for deploying personnel and equipment that can exceed the actual costs of developing countries (Berman & Sams, 2000; Blum, 2000; Bobrow & Boyer, 1997; Durch, 1994; Khanna et al., 1998). While studies differ on whether this applies equally to lower-income contributors, most studies suggest that providing peacekeepers is a benefit for developing countries and a cost for developed ones (Gaibulloev, George, Sandler & Shimizu, 2015; Kathman & Melin, 2017; Sheehan, 2011; Victor, 2010; Ward & Dorussen, 2016). While Bove and Elia (2011) suggest that "mercenarization" is among the main drivers of peacekeeping, Gaibulloev et al. (2015) base their argument on the public goods approach and further the "mercenarization" argument by suggesting that some countries specialize in supplying peacekeepers as a money-making venture (p. 738). However, Coleman and Nyblade (2018) argue that the narrative of 'peacekeeping for profit' has been overstated, and in fact, even for developing contributors, profiting from UN peacekeeping is highly restrictive. An alternative explanation suggested by Ward and Dorussen (2016) focuses on policy complementarities in explaining why countries provide a large contribution to specific missions, and they find supportive evidence that countries contribute more alongside their 'friends.'

From a different perspective, Boutton and D'Orazio (2019) argue that contributing states have gained leverage due to escalating costs of peacekeeping and the demand for personnel. They suggest that these contributors use their leverage to demand foreign aid concessions from major powers that have a strong interest in assembling missions. By analyzing almost 45 years of data, Boutton and D'Orazio (2019) find evidence that UN member states target contributors with foreign aid in order to induce them to either maintain or increase their contributions to the operations. Additionally, the authors find that contributors who suffer casualties receive higher aid as compensation, and aid from pivotal states significantly predicts the contribution size (p. 15). Passmore, Shannon, and Hart (2018) add to this by suggesting that the number of contributors to an operation is also a significant determinant of who contributes. When the number of contributors is larger and selective incentives are lower, contributing member states are more likely to free-ride in UN operations. This highlights the importance of understanding the dynamics of foreign aid and how it can be used as a tool for inducing contributions to UN peacekeeping missions.

Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) suggest that public tolerance for casualties in military operations is decreasing. They refer to this phenomenon as 'casualty aversion' or 'casualty phobia.' According to their research, the American public is more likely to support a mission when they expect it to be successful. Even small costs with few casualties may not be tolerated if the public expects the mission to fail. Peacekeeper fatalities can affect states' contributions to UN operations. As noted at a general debate, "safety was a paramount factor in obtaining the cooperation and consent of the Member States, with regard to the deployment of peacekeepers" (UN, 2003, para. 49). Analyzing UN peacekeeping operations between 1990 and 2011, Levin (2019) presents that peacekeeper fatalities have an overall negative effect on the contributor sizes. Wealthy countries tend to be more sensitive to casualties than poorer ones, with wealthy countries making larger decreases in their personnel contributions. However, examining 53 UN peacekeeping operations over 30 years, Sezgin (2022) finds that the EU member states tend to commit personnel significantly higher in the case of rising peacekeeper fatalities.

Two recognized examples of troop withdrawal in the face of casualties are the United States in Somalia and the Dutch in Rwanda (Zenko, 2004). Studying the 'body bag syndrome,' Raes, Du Bois and Buts (2019) find that casualties due to illnesses cause a decrease in personnel supply, but total casualties or casualties due to malicious acts do not show

significant results. Rogers and Kennedy (2014) suggest that accident and illness are more pressing threats than malicious acts.

Overall, the literature on peacekeeping suggests that a wide range of factors determines national decisions on contributions. Neither general theories of contribution nor specific explanations, such as peacekeeping for profit or policy complementarities, can fully explain why states choose to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations. Contributors may gain leverage due to escalating costs and demand for personnel and use this leverage to demand foreign aid concessions from major powers. Public tolerance for casualties in military operations is decreasing, and peacekeeper fatalities can affect states' personnel contributions. The interaction of many factors shapes national decisions on contributions, and there is no single explanation for why states choose to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations.

2.6. Assessing Peacekeeping Effectiveness

The scholarly literature on peace operations lacks a standard set of criteria for evaluating their effectiveness, and different studies have used various methods to measure success or failure. MacQueen (2008) identifies three main intellectual traditions in the analysis of peacekeeping effectiveness. The first tradition, known as the "peacekeeping process" approach, focuses on the tactical and legal aspects of peacekeeping operations and assesses their effectiveness based on the level of violence reduction and contribution to the longer-term peacebuilding process (MacQueen, 2008, p. 2). Scholars like Durch and Diehl are typical representatives of this approach. This tradition is associated with tangible and quantifiable criteria, making it popular among contemporary scholars who use quantitative methods.

The second tradition, known as the "peace studies" approach, sees peacekeeping operations as components of a larger and longer-term interconnected process of peacebuilding. The key issue in evaluating effectiveness is an operation's contribution to achieving permanent positive peace in the broadest sense (MacQueen, 2008, p. 2). Scholars like Fetherston, Richmond, and Woodhouse are associated with this approach. A forum evaluating peacekeeping missions sheds light on the preceding two traditions and their perspectives (see Druckman & Stern, 1997).

The third and final approach is the "world politics" school, which views peacekeeping as a component in the management of the state-based international system, and scholars like

James are representative of this tradition (MacQueen, 2008, p. 3). Overall, the different traditions of peacekeeping evaluation reflect the diverse perspectives and goals of scholars in the field, with some emphasizing the immediate tactical and legal aspects of peacekeeping, while others focusing on the broader and long-term processes of peacebuilding, and still, others analyzing peacekeeping in the context of the international political system.

Early research on UN peacekeeping operations often used a set of standards to measure success, but this approach has been criticized for two reasons (Howard, 2008). Firstly, it combines interstate and intrastate operations; secondly, it does not account for unintended or indirect effects (Howard, 2008, p. 6). Diehl and Druckman argue that peace operations have complex and varying effects across different dimensions, and relying on a narrow definition of success may lead policymakers to overlook important consequences (Diehl & Druckman, 2010, 2012, 2013, p. 13). Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2019) also criticize the absolutist approach, stating that threshold standards prevent partial successes from being recognized and absolute measures overlook the variation in peacekeeping's influence (p. 29-31). They argue that effectiveness in ongoing civil wars should be measured by achieving negative peace first, with other goals being attainable only after this step is achieved. Most earlier quantitative studies have opted for an absolutist approach, both in terms of their variables, meaning a dichotomous indicator of an operation's presence or not, and to the operations' results of either success or failure. In summary, scholars have noted that evaluating peacekeeping operations' effectiveness is complex and multifaceted, and the absolutist approach of binary success or failure measures overlooks important nuances and variations in outcomes.

Diehl and Druckman (2015) raise several important analytical concerns in evaluating peacekeeping effectiveness. The first concern is identifying the stakeholders involved in peace operations, which can range from international organizations to local communities. The second concern is determining the appropriate time frame for assessing the impact of a peacekeeping operation, whether it should be short-term or long-term (p. 4). The third concern is establishing a baseline to compare the effects of the peacekeeping operation against (p. 6). Lastly, a comparative assessment of different types of peacekeeping missions is necessary, and the best method to do this would be through the most similar systems design approach (p. 8). Rather than using a fixed set of standards, Diehl and Druckman (2015) suggest a more flexible and interrelated approach to evaluating peace operations considering these various analytical concerns. This approach involves a systematic analysis of the context in which the peacekeeping operation is taking place, the goals and objectives of the operation, the strategies

and tactics used to achieve these objectives, and the results achieved in terms of reducing violence, protecting civilians, and contributing to the longer-term process of peacemaking. By considering these factors in a comprehensive and integrated manner, policymakers and scholars can gain a more nuanced understanding of the effectiveness of peace operations and the challenges involved in assessing their impact.

Some studies have used mandate implementation as a measure of peacekeeping success, particularly when the study waits until the end of an operation (e.g., Bellamy & Williams, 2005; Bratt, 1996, 1997; Howard, 2008; Ratner, 1995). Howard (2008) uses two methods to measure peacekeeping success: mandate implementation and a more comprehensive evaluation of the recipient country after the UN intervention (p. 7). Mandate implementation is typically evaluated by assessing how many of the assigned tasks the UN was able to complete before leaving the field (Diehl & Druckman, 2018). However, some of the more recent and innovative mandates, such as those in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic, have become more complex and longer in duration, making them less implementable in reality (Guterres, 2018; Howard, 2019; Howard & Dayal, 2018). Additionally, some mandates are more comprehensive and intricate than others, making it challenging to satisfy the conditions of those mandates (Hultman et al., 2019, p. 14). As a result, mandate implementation may not always be an adequate measure of peacekeeping success.

Quantitative researchers have used various methods to measure the effectiveness or success of UN peacekeeping. By using different datasets and models covering different time periods and geographical areas, most of the recent studies reveal a largely positive effect of the operations. Yet, this consensus depends on the standards by which effectiveness should be weighted. Some studies focus on fulfilling mandated goals, while others assess the impact of peacekeeping on promoting democratization, improving economic conditions, containing and ending the conflict, and preventing conflict recurrence or prolonging peace duration (Bratt, 1996; Fortna, 2003, 2004b, 2008; Gilligan & Sergenti, 2008; Gilligan & Stedman, 2003; Pushkina, 2006; Ruggeri, Gizelis & Dorussen 2012; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2008).

Recent quantitative studies have shifted their focus toward examining the short-term and long-term effects of peace missions on conflict dynamics and peace survival (Di Salvatore & Ruggeri, 2017; Diehl & Druckman, 2015; Sambanis, 2008). Short-term analyses of peacekeeping missions usually examine their ability to reduce or contain conflict violence (e.g., Gilligan & Sergenti, 2008; Hultman, 2010; Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2013, 2014;

Ruggeri et al., 2016), while long-term analyses tend to concentrate on the risk of renewed conflict or the ability of operations to prolong peace (e.g., Diehl, Reifschneider & Hensel, 1996; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild, 2001; Fortna, 2003, 2008; Gilligan & Sergenti, 2008; Walter, 2002).

Qualitative studies on peacekeeping effectiveness generally paint a less optimistic picture than quantitative studies (e.g., Autesserre, 2010, 2014; Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Campbell, 2018; Paris, 2003; von Billerbeck, 2017; Williams, 2018). They often focus on failures and dysfunction rather than acknowledging the positive effects of peacekeeping operations on civil wars. In a recent study with process-tracing of three case studies, Howard (2019) assesses peacekeeping effectiveness with violent deaths, human development rates, conflict containment, and unintended consequences. The following sections will detail the scholarly findings of the short- and long-term effects of peacekeeping operations.

2.6.1. Factors for Success and Failure of UN Peacekeeping Operations

The literature identifies various factors that contribute to the success or failure of UN peacekeeping operations. These factors are broadly categorized into nine groups, according to van der Lijn (2006, 2009, 2010). One of these factors is the warring parties giving consent and being willing to the UN peacekeeping mission and the impartiality of the operation (Bratt, 1997; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Durch, 1993; Evans, 1993; Howard, 2008; Ndulo, 2011; Pushkina, 2004, 2006; van der Lijn, 2006, p. 29, 2009, 2010). Doyle and Sambanis (2006), for instance, argue that an operation is more likely to succeed if the parties involved have demonstrated their commitment to peace through a formal peace agreement. Pushkina (2006) further suggests that the success of a UN mission is positively correlated with the level of cooperation and consent received from the parties involved (p. 142).

The second factor that contributes to the success of UN peacekeeping operations is the cooperation received from outside parties, especially in providing a sufficient sense of security to the combatants (Bratt, 1997; Durch, 1993; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Evans, 1993; Ndulo, 2011; Pushkina, 2004, 2006; van der Lijn, 2006, p. 30, 2009, 2010; Walter, 1997). Studies have shown that peacekeeping operations have a greater chance of success when there is support from the international community, and neighboring countries play a vital role in this regard (Bratt, 1997; Pushkina, 2004). Security is of utmost importance for the success of peacekeeping operations. Ndulo (2011) specifies the needs of the UN for peacekeeping operations to succeed in reducing tension and averting conflict as follows:

> The UN needs clear, unwavering, strong, and sustained political support from the Security Council and member states. Lack of support can result in delays or impediments to taking action, as well as a lack of sufficient resources to effectively implement a course of action once it has been decided upon (p. 799).

As the third factor, the Brahimi Report highlights that a clear and achievable mandate is crucial for the success of a UN peacekeeping operation (van der Lijn, 2006, p. 31, 2009). Fourth, competent leadership and personnel with clear command structures are essential for the operation to achieve its goals (Diehl, 1994; Ndulo, 2011; van der Lijn, 2006, p. 33, 2009, 2010). Effective command structures are said to enhance the chances of success (Diehl, 1994). In addition, the contributed personnel to the operation should be well-trained and adequately equipped to carry out their tasks (Fetterly, 2006; UN, 2003, para. 36).

The fifth factor is the length of time the operation is active, with longer missions having a greater chance of success than shorter ones (Heldt, 2002; van der Lijn, 2006, p. 33, 2009, 2010). Heldt (2002) argues that missions with longer time spans have greater chances of success in comparison to shorter operations. However, an early departure from the conflict zone guarantees failure, as sufficient time is needed to address the causes of the conflict (Chesterman, 2004). According to Doyle and Sambanis (2006), though, only if longer UN missions are matched with an appropriate mandate can the UN has a positive influence on peacebuilding.

The sixth factor is the coordination of different policy instruments with regional and international organizations (Pushkina, 2004; van der Lijn, 2006, 2009, 2010). The seventh factor emphasizes the importance of providing local ownership in operation (van der Lijn, 2006, p. 34, 2009, 2010). The eighth factor involves paying sufficient attention to the causes of the conflict, while Ndulo (2011) suggests the need to address past and present human rights violations and gender issues (UN, 2003, para. 55; van der Lijn, 2006, p. 34; 2009; 2010).

Lastly, as aforementioned, the operation being deployed in good time and at the right time is a factor of success for UN peacekeeping operations (van der Lijn, 2006, p. 32, 2009, 2010). Deploying UN peacekeeping operations in a timely manner is important for their success, but this study argues that more is needed. In addition to being deployed at the right time, prompt deployment with larger personnel commitments at the initial stage is crucial for the success of UN peacekeeping operations. This means that the UN should not delay the deployment of peacekeeping forces and should send sizeable personnel at the beginning of the

mission. This approach can ensure that the operation is able to establish a sense of security and stability early on, which can lead to greater chances of success in the long term.

2.7. Peacekeeping's Effect on Maintaining Peace

The literature on peacekeeping operations has largely focused on the impact of these operations on maintaining peace, which is considered a critical factor for their efficiency and success (e.g., Diehl et al., 1996; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Fortna, 2004b, 2008; Gilligan & Sergenti, 2008; Gurses & Mason, 2008). Since most of the traditional peacekeeping operations were established in a post-conflict environment following signed peace agreements, scholars have depicted maintaining peace as an issue of utmost importance. This section will discuss studies that analyze the longer-term effects of peacekeeping operations on extending peace in post-conflict cases. The next section will focus on short-term analyses that examine the impact of peacekeeping operations established during ongoing conflicts on the trajectory of these conflicts.

Although the concept of "stable peace," coined by Boulding (1978), has been used by some scholars (e.g., Costalli, 2013; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, 2006) to describe the goal of peacekeeping operations, this concept involves various reconciliation processes among groups, and eventually "probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved" (Boulding, 1978, p. 13). In contemporary conflicts, achieving stable peace would require all conflicting parties to fully reconcile, and this is a developmental process in itself (Kacowicz & Bar-Siman-Tov, 2000). Instead, this study will use the concepts of durable and self-sustaining peace to describe the long-term goal of peacekeeping operations. Durable peace refers to peace that lasts for a significant amount of time, while self-sustaining peace refers to peace that can be maintained without the presence of peacekeepers. As Fortna (2004) indicates, "true success is not just preventing another war, but the ability to go home and still have peace hold; to create a self-sustaining peace" (p. 284). As a requirement for operational effectiveness, managing a durable and self-sustaining peace during the operation, and creating an environment where peace would last after the peacekeepers leave the field, is regarded as the most costly and important task of the operations.

Initially, scholars focused on whether the mere presence of a UN peacekeeping operation led to peaceful outcomes and mainly measured the effectiveness of operations by the survival of peace. Early case studies indicated that some peacekeeping operations were ineffective in achieving their tasks (Jett, 1999, 2019; Jones, 2001; Diehl et al., 1996). However, recent studies have taken a more nuanced approach, examining specific components of missions and utilizing various methods to analyze short- and long-term effectiveness over different time periods. These studies have found that UN peacekeeping operations are effective in reducing various dimensions of conflict and increasing the duration of peace after civil wars (Beardsley, 2011, 2013; Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Fortna, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2008; Fortna & Howard, 2008; Haas, 1986; Hartzell et al., 2001; Gilligan & Sergenti, 2008; Hultman et al., 2016, 2019; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2008; Walter, 1997, 2002). Deploying peacekeepers increases the likelihood of lasting peace by at least 50%, and peacekeeping is effective in keeping the peace between belligerents in civil wars as much as between sovereign states (Fortna, 2003, 2008).

Several studies have investigated the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations in extending post-conflict peace. One such study by Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) compares the effectiveness of UN and non-UN operations in 145 civil wars from 1945 to 1999. They find that UN operations have a significant positive effect on successful peacebuilding, while non-UN operations did not have a statistically significant effect. Another study by Doyle and Sambanis (2000) also shows that UN peace operations had a positive impact on peacebuilding in the short term. Sambanis (2008) conducts a survival analysis on 121 cases from 1945 to 2000 and reveals that UN missions had a robust positive effect on peacebuilding outcomes, particularly in participatory peace, and that this effect accumulates as peacekeepers remain on the field. These findings suggest that UN peacekeeping operations are effective in extending post-conflict peace and have a positive impact on peacebuilding outcomes.

Employing Doyle and Sambanis' (2000) dataset, Fortna (2004b) quite confidently reveals that peacekeeping helps maintain peace. Fortna (2004b) also examines other factors that can influence the durability of peace, such as the type of conflict and the level of violence. She finds that while peace tends to be stable after decisive victories, it is harder to maintain peace in identity conflicts and deadlier civil wars (Fortna, 2004b, p. 287). Moreover, peacekeeping is no less effective in keeping the peace between belligerents than states, so "the record of peacekeeping has been at least as good inside as out" (Fortna, 2003, p. 298). In addition, Fortna (2008) states that "peacekeeping cuts the risk of renewed war by 75%-85%.

[…] In short, peacekeeping works" (p. 9-10), making it an effective strategy for extending post-conflict peace. Nonetheless, Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) find that in post-conflict settings, UN intervention significantly reduces the hazard of war, but the same does not apply to in-war settings. As a recent study employing rationalist bargaining models of civil war with more refined data, Hultman et al. (2016) show that the deployment of military troops drives UN peacekeeping operations' ability to alleviate commitment problems, and this, in turn, leads to the effectiveness of post-conflict peacekeeping by extending peace.

With the operationalization of multidimensional peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report, peace lasts much longer than first-generation traditional peacekeeping operations. This is due to multidimensional operations' involvement in long-term simultaneous processes of economic, political and institutional developments, and state reforms through institutional reforms, infrastructure recoveries and security sector reforms (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Fortna & Howard, 2008; Pouligny, 2006). Therefore, applying democratization and durable peace as criteria for success, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) acknowledge that "the UN has a commendable record of success in these Second Generation, multidimensional peacekeeping operations as diverse as those in Namibia (UNTAG), El Salvador (ONUSAL), Cambodia (UNTAC), Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and Eastern Slavonia, Croatia (UNTAES), and most recently, East Timor (UNTAET)" (p. 198-199). However, their analyses present weaker evidence of observer and enforcement missions' ability to provide durable peace.

Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) emphasize that peacekeepers play an important transitional role in post-conflict situations until trust is restored and domestic institutions can take over (p. 7). Fortna (2004b) asks how and why peacekeeping is effective in establishing self-sustaining peace in interstate settings. Fortna and Walter (1997, 2002) suggest that disarmament monitoring and interposition between combatant forces are crucial aspects of post-conflict peacekeeping. Monitoring helps overcome the security dilemma by providing a sense of security, while interposition prevents the return to warfare (van der Lijn, 2006, p. 306). Fortna (2004b, 2008) identifies four mechanisms by which peacekeepers stabilize peace in interstate settings: by increasing the benefits of peace and raising the costs of returning to war, reducing uncertainty through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire, preventing triggering events that may lead to a return to warfare, and preventing abuses in the political reconstruction process. The first three mechanisms can be interpreted as addressing commitment issues and show that peacekeeping can stabilize peace not only in intrastate conflicts but also in interstate conflicts. Even though the UN tends to deploy peacekeepers to

'harder' conflicts, UN peacekeeping operations have a positive impact on the duration of peace and the severity of conflicts in post-conflict and ongoing conflict interventions.

2.7.1. Necessities for Maintaining Peace

Scholars have identified several factors necessary to maintain peace both during and after the deployment of peacekeepers. One critical element is the involvement of the local population in the peacekeeping process (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). In order for the operation to be legitimate from the local's perspective and for peace to be self-sustaining, the local population should take over the authority and processes as soon as possible. As Doyle and Sambanis (2006) state, "self-sustaining self-determination" is a peacekeeping operation's mark of success (p. 310). Fortna (2004) also emphasizes the importance of self-sustainability in UN peacekeeping operations. In addition to local involvement, promoting democratic political processes is another important factor in contributing to durable peace, according to Joshi (2013). This involves encouraging the development of inclusive political institutions capable of managing conflicts peacefully and providing the necessary social services to the population. By promoting democratic political processes, UN peacekeeping missions can help establish a stable environment conducive to sustained peace.

Some of the other necessary aspects that need to be accomplished in forming durable peace are economic reconstruction (Collier, 2007; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000), institutional reform (Von Hippel, 2000), and security sector reform (Collier, 2007). First of all, using the term 'successful' operations solely for creating an environment of durable peace, Von Hippel (2000) argues that in any military intervention, the reconstruction and development of local institutions is the determinant of success. In addition, civilians should be included in the processes of economic reconstruction and institutional reform. For some, successful economic reconstruction signals potential durable peace (Collier, 2007; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000).

The economic dimension of peacekeeping operations is rooted in the rational choice theory, which suggests that parties in conflict weigh the expected utility of fighting versus that of peace. Despite the fact that war may harm the overall population, certain individuals may still benefit from conflict, leading them to rationally choose to fight rather than pursue peace (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000), making war an outcome an expected utility calculation (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Collier and Hoeffler (2004), opportunity instead of grievances better explain rebellion, and the

availability of finance is a significant determinant of opportunity. This is especially true in primary commodity dependent states, where commodities offer financial opportunities for rebel groups, and a lack of developed industry and infrastructure makes fighting more profitable than peace. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) find that peacekeeping operations tend to fail in primary commodity dependent states, where the commodity creates a financial opportunity for the rebel groups. Scholars have found that primary commodity exports and natural resource wealth increase the risk and duration of civil wars, and the possession of contraband can further prolong conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Ross, 2004, 2006; Fearon, 2004). Additionally, the availability of people who can be recruited to fight is another opportunity for rebellion, especially in cases of low per capita income. Therefore, third-party interventions must address these economic opportunities for conflict in order to achieve lasting peace.

Collier, Elliott, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol and Sambanis (2003) suggest that once a country experiences civil war, it is likely to experience it again due to the same factors that led to the initial war. This is known as the conflict trap, a persistent dynamic that reverses economic development. According to Collier et al. (2003), the economy is a crucial factor that causes civil wars. As a result, breaking the conflict trap and achieving lasting peace requires addressing the economic causes of the conflict. The intervening third party must eliminate the factors that led to the initial war rather than simply addressing its symptoms to ensure the conflict does not recur. This could include implementing economic policies that address issues such as poverty and inequality, promoting economic growth, and providing opportunities for marginalized groups. Breaking the conflict trap is essential to achieving durable peace in post-conflict states.

According to Collier (2007), in order to achieve a lasting peace, both security and economic development are essential. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) similarly argue that economic resources are necessary for implementing a peace agreement and that economic aid and employment are important factors in disarming conflicting parties. Sambanis (2008) also emphasizes the role of economic factors in driving the long-term prospects of peace in post-civil war countries. Overall, there is a consensus among scholars studying peacekeeping and civil wars that economic development is a crucial determinant of durable peace after civil wars.

The Brahimi Report and the ideal concept of ‘multidimensional peacekeeping’ encapsulate what most scholars argued for self-sustaining, durable peace; institutional

reconstruction, security sector reform, and economic development. Therefore, success rates of UN peacekeeping operations have steadily increased following the Brahimi Report's certain recommendations in varying aspects. Hence, scholars broadly agree that UN peacekeeping operations are effective in their tasks and in creating self-sustaining and durable peace after conflicts.

2.8. Peacekeeping's Effect on Ongoing Conflicts

As the preceding section shows, a hallmark of the peacekeeping literature is a focus on peacekeeping operations in post-conflict conditions, assessing operations' ability to maintain peace. However, there has been limited research on the impact of peacekeeping on the duration of ongoing conflicts. This is due to the ingrained assumption that peacekeeping operations are generally established after a peace agreement or a ceasefire is signed and thus viewed as a phenomenon taking place during a time of peace. Nonetheless, after the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations are deployed both to ongoing conflicts and post-conflict environments, thereby making the term 'peacekeeping' a misnomer.

Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) suggest a positive association between external interventions and longer-lasting intrastate conflicts, but this does not necessarily imply a causal relationship (p. 10). In other words, the reason for the longer duration of conflicts could be either that interventions tend to occur more frequently in longer-lasting conflicts or that interventions lead to longer wars. Furthermore, Regan (2002) reaches a complementary conclusion that conflicts that are intervened last longer than those that are not intervened. Both studies confirm that this finding does not indicate any causality; rather, it may be explained by the high likelihood of outside intervention in longer conflicts. According to Regan (2002), though, due to increasing equality in the distribution of resources, neutral interventions lead to shorter durations of war than biased interventions, in which only one of the conflicting parties is supported.

Gilligan and Stedman (2003) claim that the UN tends to intervene in longer wars, but the issue of causality persists. Betts (1994) suggests that if the UN undertakes the role of an imperial impartial power, actively overpowering both sides, it could help to shorten the duration of civil wars. Hegre, Hultman and Nygard (2019) analyze several scenarios of peacekeeping effectiveness and conclude that peacekeeping operations have a clear conflict-

reducing effect. Likewise, Beardsley (2013) proposes that peacekeepers' presence can shorten the duration of violence once a war has started. According to Doyle and Sambanis (2000), multilateral enforcement operations that have the authorization to use force can be effective in ending ongoing violent conflicts.

While most quantitative studies suggest that peacekeeping operations contribute to peacebuilding and conflict resolution, some recent studies present a different perspective. Brosig and Sempijja (2018) examine peacekeeping operations in Africa after 2000 and find that conflict often persists despite the presence of peacekeepers. Focusing on the peacekeeping activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Costalli (2013) finds that peacekeepers were deployed where violence was most intense but had little impact on reducing subsequent violence. Townsen and Reeder (2014) analyze MONUC, the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and argue that peacekeepers are primarily deployed to deal with government-rebel confrontations and attacks on unarmed civilians rather than non-state violence. Like Costalli (2013), Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) find that while peacekeeping can stabilize peace in post-civil war conditions, it is ineffective in ending ongoing conflicts. These studies suggest that while peacekeeping operations may have some positive effects, their effectiveness in resolving conflicts is limited in certain contexts.

2.8.1. Effects of Operations' Size and Composition on Ongoing Conflicts

Several recent studies delve into the impact of the size and composition of UN peacekeeping missions on the duration of wars and ongoing violence. Kathman and Benson (2019) suggest that the size and composition of UN peacekeeping operations can have an impact on the duration of civil wars. According to their argument, larger deployments of UN troops can raise the costs of combat for belligerents, facilitate the exchange of information, and provide security assurances, which could lead to shorter conflicts and durations to negotiated settlements (p. 21-22). Meanwhile, Maekawa, Arı and Gizelis (2019) suggest that larger UN missions are more effective in supporting the implementation and sustainability of peace agreements.

Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014) indicate that an increase in the number of troops committed to a conflict results in a decrease in monthly battlefield deaths in civil wars. However, they note that if peacekeeping operations are unable to shorten the duration of civil wars, a decrease in battlefield deaths may still be associated with an overall larger number of conflict deaths. Even so, peacekeeping operations with a high capacity of military and police

commitments are effective in managing violence against civilians in ongoing conflicts (Hultman et al., 2013). Similarly, Nsia-Pepra's (2014) research indicates that the strength of mission size in 'robust peacekeeping' operations reduces civilian killings.

Preceding studies of Hultman, Kathman and Shannon are spatially and time-wise limited. Their recent extensive book, titled *Peacekeeping in the Midst of War* (2019), delves into how UN peacekeeping operations ameliorate the violence of civil wars, studying in terms of civilian and battlefield deaths. From a rationalist point of view, they conduct the first globally inclusive analysis of the UN's intervention efforts for ongoing civil wars in the post-Cold War era. They define peacekeeping effectiveness as the ability of an operation to achieve negative peace, which is the absence of violence both on the battlefield and for one-sided violence (p. 4, 16). To overcome the issue of absolute measures, they use continuous measures to achieve relative evaluations of violence and operations' constitution and capacity. So, by having success or failure as two ends of a continuum, "greater reductions of violence indicate more effectiveness" (Hultman et al., 2019, p. 16). Civil war is regarded as a form of political competition between the government and an insurgent group, and violence is an instrument of both groups to achieve their desired political goals (p. 5). Theoretically, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2019) argue that peacekeeping operations can reduce violence by increasing the cost of killing, making commitments more credible, facilitating information sharing among combatant groups, and protecting civilians from aggression (p. 16). They reveal that as the number of deployed armed UN troops to active conflict zones increases, battlefield and anti-civilian violence levels decline (p. 92, 121). Similarly, larger armed UN police deployments reduce one-sided violence (p. 121).

Bove and Ruggeri (2015) argue that diversity in the composition of a peacekeeping mission reduces violence against civilians. However, Howard (2019) disagrees and suggests that although the multinational makeup of peacekeepers enhances their acceptance and legitimacy, it may not necessarily ensure their effectiveness as a fighting force, interoperability, and compellence. Beardsley, Cunningham, and White (2018) find that mediation and greater numbers of peacekeepers, both together and independently, can reduce battlefield violence in African intrastate conflicts. Albeit this, Greig and Diehl (2005) argue that peacekeeping operations are successful in halting hostilities, but they are negatively associated with the likelihood of negotiations or mediation, and they may decrease the chances of a settlement. This situation is referred to as the peacekeeping-peacemaking dilemma.

Beardsley (2013) shows that the UN can succeed as a short-term peacemaker, but without follow-up with a UN peacekeeping operation, the UN struggles to achieve long-term self-sustaining peace. In other words, after negotiating a settlement during the conflict, the international community needs to authorize and deploy a UN peacekeeping operation quickly to protect their investments and prevent a return to the original conditions. As Beardsley (2013) puts it, "with peacekeeping, active UN involvement during conflict can promote long-term stability" (p. 370). This finding reiterates the Brahimi Report (Brahimi, 2000) and the Capstone Doctrine (UN, 2008), both of which stress the importance of authorizing and deploying a UN peacekeeping operation soon after a ceasefire or peace settlement.

Beardsley and Gleditsch (2015) argue that peacekeeping operations can have a geographical containment effect on conflicts, which is most effective when the missions are robust in terms of troop strength (p. 84). This containment effect can also limit the spread of conflict over time and space (Beardsley, 2011; Collier, Chauvet & Hegre, 2008). Additionally, Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis (2017) find that even a modest deployment of peacekeepers can reduce the duration of the conflict in conflict-prone areas. Although there is not yet a consensus among scholars regarding the overall effect of UN peacekeeping operations on ongoing conflicts, the weight of evidence suggests that they have a positive effect in shortening conflicts. This study aims to provide a fresh perspective on this issue by examining the impact of the initial size and composition and deployment of peacekeeping operations on active conflicts.

2.9. Size and Composition of Peacekeeping Operations

According to the rationalist bargaining model of war, since wars are costly, belligerents should find peaceful solutions to their grievances. However, wars occur and endure primarily because of information asymmetries and commitment problems (Fearon, 1995). Thus, the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations rests largely on three mechanisms of commitment, deterrence, and information flows (Bove & Ruggeri, 2015; Ruggeri et al., 2016).

According to Hultman et al. (2016), UN peacekeepers can overcome commitment problems and information asymmetries in two ways. Firstly, by separating the combatants and reducing their fears of immediate military threats. Secondly, increasing the number of

personnel committed to a mission is a crucial indicator of the UN's and its member states' commitment to establishing peace in ongoing or post-conflict environments (p. 236). As more personnel are deployed to the field, a mission becomes more robust in deterring, overcoming commitment problems, and sharing privately held information between combatant groups. Although the types of personnel deployed vary in their ability to hinder commitment problems and facilitate information asymmetries, the consensus is that the size of the mission is the most crucial factor in peacekeeping effectiveness (Bove & Ruggeri, 2015; Hultman et al., 2013, 2014, 2016, 2019; Koko & Essis, 2012; Ruggeri et al., 2012).

From a rationalist bargaining model perspective, the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations depends not only on their size but also on their composition. Recent studies suggest that both factors are critical for successful peacekeeping interventions (Benson & Kathman, 2014; Hultman et al., 2013, 2016, 2019; Pushkina, 2006; Ruggeri et al., 2012). According to Holt, Taylor and Kelly (2009), deploying a large number of peacekeeping personnel is a signal of credible commitment, and increasing troop numbers can enhance the capacity of missions to deal with insurgent groups. Hultman et al. (2016) argue that the size and composition of peacekeeping operations also affect the UN's ability to address information and commitment problems, which are crucial for securing lasting peace after a conflict. Hultman et al. (2016) find that "larger UN troop commitments reduce the risk of civil conflict recurrence. ... as the amount of UN troop personnel increases, the duration of peace after a civil war is extended" (p. 241). However, they could not find any support for having large numbers of UN military observers overcome information asymmetries. In addition, Hultman et al. (2019) present that UN police are more effective at reducing anti-civilian violence, while military observers are associated with increased battlefield violence and civilian killings (p. 94, 125). Therefore, the size and composition of UN peacekeeping operations are essential for mitigating information asymmetries and facilitating commitment problems, ultimately contributing to successful peacekeeping interventions.

Interceding on the battlefield with military troops is necessary to overcome commitment problems between combatants. These troops are trained and equipped to engage in combat on the frontlines and are strategically positioned to reduce violence by disarming and demobilizing combatants, enforcing compliance with peace agreements, and maintaining separation between the conflicting groups. Therefore, they have the most physical ability and best positioning to reduce violence (Hultman et al., 2019, p. 72, 84). As Holt et al. (2009) and Hultman et al. (2016, 2019) state, the more committed troops are deployed, the greater the

ability of the UN to thwart battlefield activities and reduce opportunities for combatants. With more committed troops, some of the increased abilities among many are patrolling larger territories, expanding buffer zones, and offering increased signaling of the UN's commitment to peace (Hultman et al., 2016, p. 236, 2019). As such, it is clear that UN troop deployments play a critical role in mitigating commitment problems and reducing violence in conflict zones.

As a famous remark of former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, "Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it" (as cited in Fortna, 2008, p. 5). Increasing troop deployments are associated with decreased combat hostilities (Beardsley et al., 2018; Hultman et al., 2014, 2019) and increased civilian protection (Hultman et al., 2013, 2019; Kathman & Wood, 2011, 2016), combatant cooperation (Ruggeri et al., 2012), duration of peace (Hultman et al., 2016), and reduced time to negotiated settlements (Kathman & Benson, 2019) with contained conflict contagion (Beardsley, 2011; Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015). Likewise, earlier case studies linked operation failure to resource deficiencies, such as limited troop capacities (Diehl et al., 1996; Jett, 1999; Jones, 2001). In addition, the number of peacekeepers, in general, is associated with a lower risk of sexual violence (Johansson & Hultman, 2018).

Several causal mechanisms have been proposed for this connection between larger troop commitments and efficient results. First, since large deployments are more politically costly to withdraw, larger troop commitments present a signal of the UN's resolve for conflict resolution (Kathman & Wood, 2016; Pushkina, 2006; Ruggeri et al., 2012; Thyne, 2009). In addition, a strong signal of commitment also helps to resolve the security dilemma between the combatants (Johansson & Hultman, 2018; Walter, 2002). Additionally, larger troop commitments can increase the capacity of missions against combatants and monitoring (Holt et al., 2009). Effective monitoring can help overcome the security dilemma by providing a sufficient sense of security (van der Lijn, 2006, p. 306). Thus, the size of a UN operation's personnel commitment indicates the UN and its member states' efforts to achieve a stable peace. Larger personnel commitments, particularly military troops, lead to more robust missions, which are more effective in resolving commitment problems and facilitating information asymmetries.

Notwithstanding the findings of the quantitative research, Howard (2019) contests the hypothesized causal mechanism of peacekeepers providing security guarantees through military force in the rationalist literature:

> Nowhere – not in these cases nor anywhere else – have peacekeepers provided military-based security guarantees as the main cause of their effectiveness in keeping the peace. Actual militaries may legitimately and effectively employ compellence, but not peacekeepers. Peacekeepers effectively and legitimately use other types of power (p. 186).

The effectiveness of peacekeeping operations is not only determined by the size and composition of the troops but also by their quality and diversity. Higher quality troops are more effective in protecting civilians and deterring violence while also having the ability to create buffer zones and monitor combatant behavior more efficiently (Haass & Ansorg, 2018, p. 756). Furthermore, the increased percentage of female military personnel is argued to be beneficial to operational effectiveness and hinders sexual exploitation and abuse (Bridges & Horsfall, 2009; Karim & Beardsley, 2015). However, Karim (2017) suggests that female peacekeepers cannot fully contribute to missions and hinder their full potential. For contributing states, gender diversity is not a primary goal but is mostly a by-product of force sizes (Crawford et al., 2015). Interestingly, Di Salvatore (2019) suggests that while large UN military deployments result in higher homicide rates, UN police moderate this effect. Therefore, the type and size of each personnel group in peacekeeping operations have varying effects on the success of the mission, both during and after the conflict.

The existing research on peacekeeping has established that the size and composition of peacekeeping missions significantly impact their effectiveness, with military troops being particularly valuable. However, for this mechanism to be successful, member states of the UN must provide the necessary resources to support these operations. When resources are realized as promised and delivered promptly, peacekeeping missions can be deployed quickly, leading to a reduction in violence and longer periods of peace.

2.10. Local Dimensions and Perspectives of the "Peacekept"

The dominant approach within the existing literature focuses on the country- or mission-level analyses, yet the subnational impacts of these operations are distinct from the aggregated outcomes. Local actors and their perspectives are often disregarded and not taken into account as a distinct unit of analysis in the peacekeeping literature (Hellmüller, 2018, p. 6). Fortna and Howard (2008), Fortna (2008), and Pouligny (2006) agree that most of the scholarly work on peacekeeping revolves around the peacekeepers rather than the experiences of different levels of society, including the local populations that are directly affected by the

operations. This gap in the literature, in a sense, reflects a shortcoming of actual peacekeeping missions, where peacekeeping operations are insufficient in recognizing the roles of local populations. Therefore, it is crucial to incorporate local perspectives and actors into the analysis of peacekeeping effectiveness to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the impact of these operations on various levels of society.

2.10.1. Benefits of Local Cooperation and Problems with Lack Thereof

Involving local actors in peacekeeping activities can have multiple advantages for peace operations. First, local resources and knowledge can complement the tasks of the peacekeepers and relieve them of some of their burdens. Secondly, as Diehl and Druckman (2009) state, "Cooperation in peace operation activities creates 'ownership' on the part of the local authorities and the population. This makes it more likely that efforts will be regarded as legitimate and therefore sustainable in the long run after the peacekeepers are withdrawn" (p. 20). Therefore, promoting local ownership can be beneficial to peacekeeping operations by strengthening the perception of their legitimacy among the local population.

While local and international cooperation benefits the operation, corresponding problems from the lack thereof outweigh its benefits. Local groups can actively work against peacebuilding efforts at one level if they see it as not in their interest (Diehl & Druckman, 2009). However, the larger issue is the failure of peacekeeping operations to effectively engage with local populations, which has been identified as a key reason for peacekeeping failures (Autesserre, 2014; Pouligny, 2006). According to these studies, without a credible local presence, peacekeepers remain mostly irrelevant to the process of building or maintaining peace. The loss of reputation for UN peacekeepers can erode local support, trust, and credibility for international actors. Autesserre (2010, 2019) points out that peacekeepers often adopt a top-down approach that ignores the local nature of conflicts and solutions. Autesserre (2014) also indicates that missions often move from one operation to another without adequately understanding the local contexts in which they operate. The invisible boundaries that emerge between local populations and peacekeepers hinder understanding of the situation and effective humanitarian assistance. Others are also critical of the failures of missions in integrating local actors in the peacebuilding processes (Richmond, 2014; von Billerbeck, 2017). As several scholars have noted earlier, part of the reason for peacekeeping failure is the lack of resources; but Autesserre (2019) states the larger problem as follows:

> The larger problem, however, is a fundamental misunderstanding about what makes for a sustained peace. The UN's strategy favors top-down deals struck with elites and fixates on elections. But that neglects what should be the other main component of their approach: embracing bottom-up strategies that draw on local knowledge and letting the people themselves determine how best to promote peace (p. 102).

The absence of a local perspective in peacebuilding has led to the emergence of two concepts: local ownership and hybridity. Qualitative studies, which generally fall under the constructivist scholarly tradition, have emphasized the absence of 'local ownership' as a significant source of dysfunction in peacebuilding efforts (Autesserre, 2010; Diehl & Druckman, 2009; Donais, 2012; Hellmüller, 2018; Hellmüller & Santschi, 2014; Pouligny, 2006; Thiessen, 2015; von Billerbeck, 2017). Local ownership is defined as "local actors taking ownership over internationally defined programs" (Hellmüller, 2018, p. 10). This definition implies an inherent bias towards international actors, in the sense that they are privileged with most decision-making power in the peacebuilding programs that originally local actors are supposed to own (Donais, 2009). While the UN promotes local ownership, its implementation can undermine its purported benefits, according to von Billerbeck (2017), who argues that this is because the UN brings the normative obligation of national self-determination and operational obligation of maintaining peace and security into conflict (p. 3). Due to this gap between promises and actions, the UN fails to persuade local actors to create legitimacy of an operation through discourse. The second concept, hybridity, acknowledges the heterogeneous nature of local and international forces and emphasizes the active role of local actors in shaping international programs (Richmond, 2012, 2014). Rather than viewing local and international actors as binary categories, hybridity recognizes their interaction and the need for collaboration between the two (Mac Ginty, 2011).

Legitimacy is essential in UN peacekeeping operations. While de Mello (2001) traditionally sees legitimacy as "derived from the consent of the warring parties" (p. 115), the legitimacy of the operation, at least partially, stems from the local's perception (Diehl & Druckman, 2009). Gow and Dandeker (2001) provide three elements for legitimation in peacekeeping (p. 188). The first element is the bases for legitimation, such as the mandate by the UNSC resolutions, regardless of what peacekeepers are actually doing. The second layer of legitimation is the performance of the UN personnel, which includes their behavior and effectiveness in carrying out the mandate. The third and final element is the support for the performance or the bases upon which the operation is legitimized.

To establish cooperation with the locals, Berdal (2008) and Bellamy et al. (2010) argue that peacekeeping operations should include local networks and respond to the needs of the local population. This is because the local perception of the operation's legitimacy is crucial for building trust and cooperation with the local population. Thus, in order to increase the chances of success, UN peacekeeping operations should aim to establish legitimacy not only through formal mandates and performance but also through local acceptance and support.

According to Gow and Dandeker (2001), 'defining moments' in operation define legitimation and, ultimately, success. A defining moment is "one in which opportunities are either opened up or closed off (depending on the approach and outcome), setting, or contributing to, the tone of the mission for the following period and providing the focal point around which discourse and support for the mission accumulate or dissipate" (p. 193). In practical terms, defining moments serve as strategic focal points that can either pave the way for the success or hinder progress, thereby impacting the legitimacy of the operation. For instance, the initial deployment of a peacekeeping mission can be considered a defining moment that sets the tone for the upcoming months. A swift and efficient initial deployment can create momentum and support, while a slow and inadequate deployment can lead to inertia and lack of progress. Therefore, from a different perspective, the initial deployment can be viewed as a strategically defining moment that shapes the legitimacy of the mission and ultimately determines its success.

Hellmüller (2018) argues that local and international peacebuilding actors should work together as partners, but for the case of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), their lack of cooperation was due to differences in their perceptions of resources, capacities, and legitimacy. Similarly, Müller and Bashar (2017) suggest that localized perceptions of conflict differ significantly from the operation itself, and in order to carry out major mandate requirements effectively, local knowledge should be included in operations. Howard (2008) finds that UN peacekeeping is more successful when peacekeepers actively learn from the deployed environment, implementing mandates based on cues from the local population rather than from UN headquarters. Bove and Ruggeri (2019) explore the impact of cultural and social distance between peacekeepers and the peacekept on the operational capabilities of a mission and find that higher cultural distances are associated with higher levels of violence, highlighting the importance of interoperability between UN personnel and the local population (Rubinstein, Keller & Scherger, 2008).

Fortna (2004b) emphasizes the ability of a country to sustain peace on its own after a UN intervention as a key factor in determining the success of the intervention. In addition, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) emphasize the self-determination principle as the core of a successful UN operation and argue that local participation is crucial in determining the success of peacekeeping operations:

> [The UN] needs to discover ways to generate *voluntary* cooperation from divided local political actors and mobilize existing local resources for *locally legitimate*, collective purposes. And it must do so *rapidly*. The crucial mark of the success of a peace operation is self-sustaining self-determination. The sooner that local forces can take over transitional international authority, the more successful the operation tends to be (p. 310-311, emphasis in original).

The lack of research on the perception of peacekeeping in local populations led scholars to shift their focus toward this area. Talentino (2007) examines different perspectives of local populations, including elites, spoilers, and citizens, and suggests that peacekeepers should implement an economic package that involves all segments of society to combat illicit trading by elites and spoilers. This approach aligns with the views of Collier (2007) and Doyle and Sambanis (2000), who highlight the importance of economic development in achieving sustainable peace and gaining support from local populations and political actors. By implementing such a package, Talentino (2007) argues that peacekeepers can address the root causes of conflict and help establish a stable and peaceful environment in the region.

In Howard's (2019) typological theory, peacekeepers have three forms of power - persuasion, inducement, and coercion - which they use to convince the peacekept, including warring parties, governments, and civilians, to behave in ways they otherwise would not. Persuasion involves using ideas to change behavior and was successfully used in the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia through mediation, shaming, public information, symbolic displays, education, and training (p. 78). Financial inducement, the second type of power, involves offering material incentives such as aid and employment, as the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) did in Lebanon (p. 2, 127). Coercion is the use of force or the threat of force, such as MINUSCA, the UN mission in the Central African Republic, which uses compellence, deterrence, defense, surveillance/monitoring, and arrest to limit the choices of the parties involved (p. 179-180). Howard argues that UN peacekeeping has been effective through the use of non-compellent means of power and that neither constructivists nor rationalists' arguments fully explain its success.

2.10.2. Local Impact of Peacekeeping Operations

Recent research has shifted its focus to the local impact of UN peacekeeping operations, particularly on the reduction of local level violence. Ruggeri et al. (2016) highlight that peacekeepers use various strategies such as monitoring, patrolling, mediation, credible commitment, deterrence, and enforcement to enhance the prospects for peace at the local level. While Costalli (2013) argues that peacekeeping deployment does not reduce subsequent violence, Ruggeri et al. (2016) demonstrate that even a modest deployment of peacekeepers can contain conflict locally and shorten the duration of conflict episodes. In addition, Smidt (2019) finds that intergroup dialogues organized by UN operations can mitigate communal violence. Kelmendi and Radin (2018) argue that local satisfaction with the mission depends on whether the mission supports the political agenda of an individual's social group. They suggest that missions should recognize and be responsive to the agendas of key social groups. This highlights the importance of understanding local perspectives and incorporating local knowledge in peacekeeping operations.

Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson (2019) show that local peacekeeping presence increases the effectiveness of civilian protection against rebel abuse but struggles to protect them from government forces. Similarly, Carnegie and Mikulaschek (2017) argue that peacekeepers have a greater impact on reducing civilian casualties inflicted by rebel groups, as they need to maintain good relationships with the host governments. By examining local actors' responses to peacekeeping, Dorussen and Gizelis (2013) find that rebels are more likely to respond aggressively to peacekeeping efforts, whereas government authorities tend to be more cooperative. Relatedly, Fjelde, Hultman and Bromley (2016) show that rebels are more likely to attack peacekeepers when rebels start to lose power against the government. These studies provide valuable insights into the impact of peacekeeping on local populations, but more research is needed to fully understand the perspective of the peacekept.

The following chapter will delve into the theoretical arguments and concepts on which the dissertation is based. The third chapter will provide details on the data and quantitative methods used in the study. The fourth chapter will present the findings of the research. The concluding chapter will summarize the main findings of the study and suggest policy contributions.

Chapter 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The primary objective of this research is to examine the impact of the speed and size of initial deployments of UN peacekeeping operations on the duration of negative peace and the intensity of ongoing conflicts. The theoretical puzzle that the study addresses is how variations in initial deployments affect the short- and long-term outcomes of UN peacekeeping operations regarding reducing or ending battlefield violence and extending the duration of negative peace.

The research emphasizes that the initial months of UN operations are critical in achieving durable negative peace or mitigating violent conflicts. A strong commitment at the outset can help ensure the success of the entire mission. Thus, the research argues that prompt and substantial initial deployments are crucial for demonstrating the commitment of UN peacekeeping operations and the international community to creating and maintaining peace.

The current research fills a gap in the peacekeeping literature by exploring the relationship between the initial deployment characteristics of UN peacekeeping operations and their effects on ending conflicts and creating durable negative peace. While previous studies have focused on the overall effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in managing conflict, this research narrows its focus to the critical role of the initial deployment period in establishing the success of the mission. By analyzing the impact of deployment speed and size on the intensity of ongoing conflicts and the duration of negative peace, this study offers new insights and practical implications for policymakers and the UN.

The literature on peacekeeping operations has evolved over time, with early research primarily focused on whether the existence of an operation was associated with peaceful outcomes through a focus on the survival of peace as the crucial dimension in studying an operation's effectiveness (e.g., Diehl et al., 1996; Doyle & Sambanis 2000, 2006; Fortna 2004, 2008; Gilligan & Sergenti 2008; Gurses & Mason 2008). As a requirement for operational

effectiveness, managing a durable and self-sustaining peace during the operation and creating an environment where peace would last after the peacekeepers leave the field is regarded as the most costly and important task of the operations (Fortna, 2004). More recent studies have taken a more nuanced approach and examined specific components of missions, recognizing that managing durable and self-sustaining peace during and after the operation is a critical and challenging task. This research builds on this foundation and adds to our understanding of the importance of initial deployment characteristics in achieving successful outcomes in UN peacekeeping operations.

Recent quantitative studies have highlighted the importance of both short- and long-term effects of UN peacekeeping operations. Short-term analyses focus on the ability of missions to reduce or contain conflict violence, while long-term analyses concentrate on the risk of renewed conflict or operations' ability to prolong peace (e.g., Diehl et al., 1996; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Fortna, 2003, 2008; Gilligan & Sergenti, 2008; Walter, 2002). These studies have found that UN peacekeeping operations are generally effective in their tasks of reducing violent dimensions of conflicts and increasing the duration of peace after civil wars (Beardsley, 2011, 2013; Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Fortna, 2003, 2004, 2004b, 2008; Fortna & Howard, 2008; Haas, 1986; Hartzell et al., 2001; Hultman et al., 2016; Gilligan & Sergenti, 2008; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2008; Walter, 1997, 2002).

This research aims to contribute to this literature by specifically examining the short- and long-term effects of initial deployments on the success of UN peacekeeping operations. By exploring the impact of initial deployment speed and size on the duration of negative peace and the intensity of ongoing conflicts, this research seeks to shed light on a previously unexplored aspect of UN peacekeeping operations and provide practical and policy-related contributions to the field.

3.1. Speed of Deployment

The theoretical framework of this research is built on two key components: speed and size of initial deployments. As the first component, the speed of initial deployment is a complex process that requires attention to various details, as a slight delay in any aspect can lead to significant setbacks. As the Secretary-General and the staff continuously monitor international developments, they possess extensive knowledge to improve global peace and security. Therefore, as highlighted by Rikhye (1991), this unique position leads to carefully

selecting the timing of an intervention and the process of de-escalation (p. 63-64). Once the timing is determined, the initial deployment must be sufficient and effective to positively impact the trajectory of the conflict being intervened and the operation's state of affairs.

The speed of deployment of UN peacekeeping operations can be influenced by various factors that need to be taken into consideration. First, political will and consent are crucial components that can significantly impact the deployment process. The willingness of the host government and other relevant parties to accept a UN peacekeeping mission is vital for the prompt deployment of the mission. However, if there are concerns about the mandate or composition of the mission or disagreements over critical issues such as the use of force, this can cause delays in the deployment process.

Second, security and logistical challenges can also impede the rapid deployment of peacekeeping troops. In many active conflict situations, the security situation can be volatile, which can make it challenging to deploy peacekeeping troops quickly. Additionally, logistical challenges such as poor infrastructure, inadequate transport, and limited resources can further slow down the deployment process.

The availability of troops and resources is another critical factor that can impact the speed of deployment. The UN relies on contributions from member states to provide troops and resources for its peacekeeping operations. If there are not enough troops or resources available to deploy a mission in a timely manner, this can cause delays.

Fourth, coordination with other actors is a complex process that can take longer than expected. UN peacekeeping operations often require coordination with a range of other actors, including humanitarian organizations, regional organizations, and local authorities. Delays can occur if there is a need for coordination or disagreements over the role and responsibilities of different actors.

Finally, the mandate and funding of the operation are key issues that need to be clarified before any deployment takes place. The speed of deployment can be affected by the clarity and specificity of the mission's mandate and the level of funding available. A clear and well-funded mandate can help to expedite the deployment process. Addressing these factors can help ensure that peacekeeping missions can be deployed promptly and efficiently to support peace and security in conflict-affected areas.

In Sezgin's (2015) thesis, the first systematic analysis on the factors that determine the speed of adopting UNSC resolutions and initial deployments, and the size and composition of initial deployments is conducted. Hypotheses from Realist and Liberal theories of international relations are tested. The analyses reveal that self-interest do not increase contribution rates or accelerate the deployment process, but conflicts that threaten international security receive quicker deployments. Recipient countries with long-standing intense conflicts receive slower deployments with lower initial participation rates, but humanitarian crises lead to more contributions and prompt deployments. Additionally, contributions decrease with the increase in distance between contributor and recipient countries. Finally, operations established after the Brahimi Report in 2000 receive faster formed resolutions and increased initial contributions mainly from non-democracies with prompt deployments. Following this line of work, Lundgren, Oksamytna and Coleman (2020) check the incentives, capabilities, and constraints of the TCCs. According to their findings, countries that depend on peacekeeping reimbursements by the UN, countries that are exposed to negative externalities from a particular conflict, and countries that lack parliamentary constraints on sending troops abroad deploy faster than others. The studies by Sezgin (2015) and Lundgren, Oksamytna and Coleman (2020) shed light on the complex factors that influence the speed and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations, including the political, geographical, and economic considerations of the contributing countries.

As Durch et al. (2002) state, "tardy deployments have plagued almost every major UN peace operation. Long lag times reduced their political impact and operational effectiveness, also cooling local commitment to peace accords" (p. 12). As the contribution of personnel and equipment to operations depends on the will of UN member states, most operations have faced insufficient resources in their already delayed deployments. As later emphasized in the New Horizon, "rapid deployment, which is critical to the early establishment of security and to the credibility of a peacekeeping mission, is ultimately a function of political will" (DPKO/DFS, 2009, p. V). Therefore, the importance of initial deployment and its timing has been reiterated in major UN documents and reforms, such as the Brahimi Report (Brahimi, 2000), the Capstone Doctrine (UN, 2008), and the New Horizon reform document (DPKO/DFS, 2009). As stated in the Doctrine (UN, 2008), "the first few months after a cease-fire or peace accord are often the most critical for establishing a stable peace and bolstering the credibility of a new operation" (p. 62). Supporting this statement, Doyle and Sambanis (2006, p. 132) recapitulate that peace interventions must happen quickly after a peace agreement is signed to be

successful. This underscores the importance of rapid deployment after a peace agreement is signed.

The Brahimi Report (Brahimi, 2000) was a significant milestone in the history of UN peacekeeping in identifying the challenges the UN faced in rapidly deploying peacekeeping operations. For the last decade of the 20th century, tardy deployments, and long lag times, in couple with ragged UN support for deployment, reduced the operations' political impact and effectiveness while cooling local commitment to peace accords (Durch et al., 2002, 2003). The Brahimi Report signified that support for deployment had been poor, necessitating member states' financial contributions and better quality, self-sustaining military forces to improve operations (Findlay, 2002, p. 342). The Report also recommended rapid and effective deployment within the first several weeks after a ceasefire, as this was crucial in establishing both a "stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers" (Brahimi, 2000, p. 15). This was because security was a fundamental prerequisite for establishing sustainable peace, as highlighted by van der Lijn (2006) in several cases where combatant parties requested rapid deployments during the initial phases of ceasefires.

The Brahimi Report of 2000 was a significant step forward for the UN's peacekeeping efforts as it established the first standard for the organization's capacity for rapid deployment. The Brahimi Report recommended response durations of 30 and 90 days for traditional and multidimensional operations, respectively, with the mission headquarters being fully installed and functional within 15 days for multidimensional ones (Brahimi, 2000, p. 15, para. 88-91). Most UN operations established after the report have been multidimensional, covering humanitarian causes and maintaining peace and security to facilitate political processes (Brown & de Jonge Oudraat, 2001; Daniel, 2013). Although the recommended initial deployment duration is 15 days, the UN expects a new operation's planning and deployment process to take six to twelve months, according to Langille (2014, p.4). However, the Brahimi Report cautioned that achieving the specific timeline goals would be challenging without significant changes in how the UN and its member states prepare to support operations (Brahimi, 2000, para. 88-90; Durch et al., 2002). Then Secretary-General Kofi Annan agreed with most of the Report's recommendations but expressed skepticism about the UN's rapid and effective deployment capacities. He suggested that the UN should deploy operations when they can make the greatest contribution, although he acknowledged the proposed timelines as ambitious (Annan, 2000).

As a military advisor to the UN DPKO, Major-General Frank van Kappen states that planning and deploying an operation is a complex process that involves a long list of tasks:

> The planning of peacekeeping operations is the ultimate challenge because you never know where you have to operate; you never know what they want you to do; you don't have the mandate in advance; you don't have forces; you don't have transport; and you don't have money […] We always have to start from zero. Each and every operation that we start, we start with nothing (as cited in Langille, 2000a, p. 219).

Rapid deployment of operations into conflict zones worldwide is a demanding process. As Sir Adam Roberts states, "by almost universal consent, improvement in the international community's rapid response capability is needed" (as cited in Langille, 2014, p. 2). So, the need for UN rapid deployment is not disputed overall; it has been a long-standing reform process with sporadic support. Hitherto, the UN does not have its rapid deployment capability.

Langille (2014) highlights the multi-faceted nature of rapid deployment, which involves political, financial, strategic, operational, and tactical considerations at several levels of authority (p. 2). Any shortcomings at any of these levels can hinder the overall success of the rapid deployment process. Political will, cooperation, and funding have all been identified as significant barriers to progress, with the UN often relying on slow and unreliable standby arrangements (Langille, 2014, p. 2-3). Ndulo (2011) similarly argues that a "commitment gap" frequently leads to deployment delays (p. 799). From the perspective of countries that might contribute to rapid deployment, the task may appear difficult and costly, with few immediate benefits. During a general debate on UN peacekeeping rapid responses, Brazil's representative stressed the importance of reimbursement, stating that political will alone is insufficient to encourage participation, and "the rapid deployment requirement should be matched by rapid reimbursement" (UN, 2003, para. 38). Nevertheless, rapid deployment with adequately staffed and equipped personnel is a vital first step towards achieving the long-term goal of self-sustaining peace.

It is important to note that despite the Brahimi Report's recommendations, the UN's rapid deployment capabilities face significant challenges. As Langille (2014) argues, the UN has struggled to establish a consistent and effective approach to rapid deployment, with planning and coordination often taking longer than expected. Additionally, as Durch et al. (2002) note, the UN's capacity for rapid deployment depends heavily on the willingness of member states to contribute personnel and resources, which political and strategic considerations can influence.

Furthermore, as new conflicts and crises emerge, the UN's ability to rapidly deploy operations has become even more critical. In response, the organization has taken steps to improve its capacity for rapid deployment, including through the development of the Rapid Deployment Level (RDL) system and the creation of the Standby Team System (STS) to provide trained personnel ready for deployment at short notice (Langille, 2014). Nonetheless, as recent conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere have demonstrated, significant challenges remain in rapidly deploying effective peacekeeping operations.

Although it is a challenging task to deploy a large number of troops rapidly into a crisis situation, it is not impossible. When states are at war, they manage to do so; and there has been several previous examples of UN rapid deployment: ONUC, the UN Operation in the Congo, that dispatched 14,000 peacekeepers in just five weeks in 1960 (Jones et al., 2009). For instance, in over half of the peacekeeping operations in which Turkey has participated, the country has been proactive and prompt in deploying its peacekeepers within the first month of the mission's establishment (Yalçınkaya et al., 2018). In addition, the UN managed to deploy initial forces (albeit small) to earlier missions: the first deployment to UNEF I in Suez (1956) took seven days, ONUC (1960) took three days, and to UNEF II (1973), the first deployment was within twenty-four hours (Smith & Boutellis, 2013, p. 3). Without current technological developments, eagerness to contribute to operations promptly overcame the demanding process' obstacles with ad hoc arrangements. What has changed, and how might similar support be rooted in future peacekeeping operations?

3.1.1. Importance of Speed

As Agné (2016) puts it, "in relation to crisis-like problems, reaction speed is one among several factors in the capacity of organizations to solve those problems. […] In many cases, effective solutions will be permanently lost if they come too late" (p. 577). In the face of a dire crisis, the speed of initial deployment and the following first few months of a UN peacekeeping operation are critical in setting the tone and creating conditions for success in conflict zones. During this period, the peacekeeping mission establishes its presence and credibility, assessing the situation on the ground and building relationships with the parties and local population involved in the conflict.

Critics of rapid response would argue that more time is needed to carry out a higher quantity or quality of operations. For instance, Coleman, Lundgren and Oksamytna (2021)

contend that the gap between initial deployment and full deployment can undermine peace operations, and argue that the UN should not focus on rapid deployment reforms (p. 470). Critics also would contend that protracted deployments may be better if they allow for additional time to secure a peace agreement. Ideally, a delayed deployment would gather more resources; however, in reality, delayed deployment does not necessarily guarantee a larger deployment, as many operations have witnessed. In addition, peacekeepers are typically deployed to more difficult cases than easier conflict situations where peace agreements have already been put in place and have been broken over time situations (Fortna, 2004a). Waiting for warring parties to sign a peace agreement in such cases may be futile, akin to waiting for a never-arriving Godot. Therefore, rapid deployment is necessary in such situations to ensure that peacekeeping missions can be effective in addressing the conflict.

There are several reasons why the first months of UN peacekeeping operations are critical:

1. The early deployment of peacekeepers helps to establish a physical presence on the ground, which can deter violence and create a more secure environment. This can build confidence among the parties involved in the conflict and lay the groundwork for future peacebuilding efforts.
2. During the first months of a peacekeeping operation, peacekeepers build relationships with the parties involved in the conflict, including political leaders, civil society groups, and local communities. This helps establish trust and open lines of communication, which are critical for the mission's success.
3. Peacekeepers also work to assess the situation on the ground, including the security situation, the population's humanitarian needs, and the conflict's political dynamics. This information is critical for developing a comprehensive strategy for the peacekeeping mission.
4. The early months of a peacekeeping operation set the tone for the entire mission. If the mission is able to establish a sense of stability and build momentum for peacebuilding efforts, it can contribute to the longer-term success of the mission. On the other hand, if the mission is slow to respond or unable to establish a sense of security, it can undermine its credibility and make it more difficult to achieve lasting peace.
5. The first months of a peacekeeping operation help prevent a power vacuum from forming in the wake of a conflict. When there is a lack of security and

> governance, various actors may attempt to fill the void and establish their power structures, leading to further violence and instability. Rapid deployment of peacekeeping forces can help prevent this by providing a stabilizing presence and creating a sense of security that can discourage violence and allow for political negotiations to take place.

Gow and Dandeker (2001) suggest that the success of a peacekeeping operation can be heavily influenced by 'defining moments' that impact the perception of its legitimacy. In this regard, the initial deployment of a peacekeeping mission can be considered a crucial defining moment that sets the tone for the entire operation. A swift and solid deployment can establish momentum and bolster the mission's legitimacy, while a slow and insufficient deployment may give the impression of passivity and undermine the mission's credibility. Therefore, the initial deployment can be regarded as a strategically defining moment pivotal in shaping the perception of the mission's legitimacy. It is not only critical for establishing the mission's physical presence and creating a secure environment but also for building trust and credibility among the parties involved in the conflict. The success of the mission hinges on its ability to establish a sense of stability and momentum from the outset, and the initial deployment is a crucial step in achieving this goal.

The speed of initial deployments of UN peacekeeping operations is a crucial factor in determining the success of the mission, particularly in relation to ongoing violence and the attainment of negative peace. A rapid initial deployment can have a significant impact on reducing ongoing violence in conflict-affected areas. The establishment of a secure environment by peacekeeping forces can act as a deterrent to further attacks, preventing the situation from escalating and spreading to other areas. Furthermore, a swift deployment can protect civilians from ongoing violence, providing a sense of security and protection to local populations. This reduces the risk of further violence and displacement, ensuring that civilians can carry on with their daily lives without fear of harm. A prompt initial deployment also enables peacekeeping forces to enforce ceasefire agreements effectively. By quickly deploying to the area, peacekeeping forces can monitor compliance with agreements and intervene if necessary to prevent violence from breaking out. This helps to maintain a stable environment, allowing the parties involved in the conflict to work towards a peaceful resolution. Moreover, peacekeeping forces can mitigate the effects of violence by providing medical assistance, humanitarian aid, and other forms of support. This can help to reduce the impact of violence on local populations and prevent further harm. By establishing a sense of security and providing support to those in need, peacekeeping forces can contribute to the

attainment of negative peace, which refers to the absence of direct violence in a conflict-affected area. In summary, the speed of initial deployments of UN peacekeeping operations plays a crucial role in reducing ongoing violence, protecting civilians, enforcing ceasefire agreements, and achieving negative peace. A rapid deployment can establish a sense of security and stability, paving the way for long-term peacebuilding efforts and the success of the mission.

The speed of initial deployments of UN peacekeeping operations is crucial in promoting longer-term peace and stability in post-conflict areas where negative peace is attained. A fast and prompt initial deployment can significantly impact various aspects of operations. Firstly, it can help to build trust and confidence between the conflicting parties and the local population. This trust is built through quickly establishing a secure environment and protecting civilians, which can demonstrate the intervening party's commitment to the peace process. Secondly, a fast initial deployment can prevent spoilers from undermining the peace process. Spoilers are groups or individuals who seek to disrupt the peace process and prevent conflict resolution. By quickly establishing a presence in the area, peacekeeping forces can deter spoilers from carrying out attacks or taking other actions to undermine the peace process, which can increase the chances of lasting peace. Thirdly, in the case of conflicts where an agreement is not signed but negative peace is attained, a quick initial deployment can create political momentum for peace negotiations. By extending a secure environment with no violence, peacekeeping forces can create a space for political dialogue and negotiation, leading to longer-term peace and stability. In addition, a fast initial deployment can efficiently mobilize resources for post-conflict reconstruction and development, a component of third-generation multidimensional peacekeeping operations. If peacekeeping forces can quickly establish a secure environment, this can attract investment and support from the international community, which can be crucial for post-conflict reconstruction and development. This, in turn, can help to promote longer-term peace and stability.

Overall, the speed of initial deployments is critical for preventing ongoing violence, protecting civilians, promoting political momentum for peace negotiations, preventing spoilers from undermining the peace process, attracting investment and support for post-conflict reconstruction and development, and prolonging negative peace duration. A fast and efficient initial deployment can set the tone for the entire peacekeeping operation, influencing the perceptions of the local population and the conflicting parties and ultimately contributing to the success or failure of the mission.

Considering the reasons for the first months' importance and how the speed of initial deployments matter separately for ongoing and post-conflict peace areas, there are several significant consequences of slow responses in both conflict settings:

1. The consequences of protracted deployment in UN peacekeeping operations can be devastating, resulting in human suffering and loss of life. Initial deployment delay and insufficient deployment can be deadly, and the longer the delay in deployment, the greater the cost to human lives (Hardt, 2014; Langille, 2003; Reychler, 2015; Zenko, 2004). Reychler (2015) calls this delay a 'deadly delay,' emphasizing the urgency of timely intervention. In a 2003 general debate on the UN's rapid response, speakers emphasized that a prompt response is crucial for saving lives and reducing costs (UN, 2003). For instance, if the UN had responded quickly with additional forces in Sierra Leone within 30 days after the signing of the 1999 peace agreement, as noted in the debate, it could have reduced the human and material costs of the conflict and shortened its duration (UN, 2003, para. 46). Therefore, rapid and efficient deployment of peacekeeping forces is essential for preventing further loss of life and reducing the overall costs of the conflict.
2. A slow response and inadequate personnel numbers can have detrimental effects on the legitimacy and credibility of a mandated operation and its supporters as the international community (Agné, 2016; Durch et al., 2002, 2003; Hardt, 2014; Langille, 2003; Ndulo, 2011). The effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation in establishing itself as a credible deterrent force in post-conflict situations heavily depends on the speed and adequacy of its initial deployment. As emphasized in the debate, "such a force positioned at the critical start of a peacekeeping operation would show that the UN 'meant business'" (UN, 2003, para. 70). The rapid deployment of a well-resourced and capable peacekeeping force is crucial for belligerents to assess the operation's ability and credibility to implement its mandate (Durch et al., 2002; van der Lijn, 2006). Without a prompt and sufficient deployment, the operation's legitimacy and credibility may be questioned, and the mission's effectiveness may be undermined.
3. A delayed deployment not only increases the costs of an operation but also reduces the available opportunities. Langille (2003) argues that opportunities available at the outset of an operation can diminish rapidly with time, making

it increasingly difficult to achieve the desired outcomes. In addition, delays can result in further destabilization and violence, exacerbating the situation and making it more challenging to resolve. Therefore, it is crucial to act swiftly and efficiently to maximize the opportunities available at the outset of an operation and prevent the escalation of violence and costs.

4. The delay in the deployment of peacekeeping operations can have severe consequences on the momentum of peace. As noted by Durch et al. (2002) and van der Lijn (2006), a slow deployment may cause the peace process to lose its momentum, leading to frustration among combatants, particularly among young rebels. This frustration can lead to re-armament, creating security vacuums, violating ceasefires, and further prolonging the conflict. Zenko (2004) suggests that the initial deployment phase of a peacekeeping operation, which is the first phase of a multi-phased operation, is critical, as it shapes and determines the environment for all subsequent phases. The UN representative for Sierra Leone stressed the importance of a timely deployment, stating that "delays often created frustrations on the part of combatants, particularly young rebels, encouraged re-armament, created security vacuums, provoked ceasefire violations, and further prolonged armed conflicts" (UN, 2003, para. 45). A tardy deployment can pave the way for the relapse of violence, causing even greater harm to the affected population.

Timeliness in intervention is the key element for efficiency in minimizing time to maximize productivity, and timeliness is one of the critical factors in "preventing an emerging crisis from erupting into a major war" (Kent & Malan, 2003, p. 73; Hardt, 2014, p. 4). Numerous case studies emphasize the significance of timely and swift action and highlight the inefficiency related to the slow response time of decision-makers. For instance, the Rwanda genocide in 1994 is still the starkest example of the international community's failure to take timely action, and still examples of Libya and Syria show the dire consequences of prolonged inactions by the international community (Hardt, 2014; Krasno et al., 2003; Roberts, 2008; Zenko, 2004). The studies also reveal the weaknesses of the existing UN standby agreements (Roberts, 2008, p. 109-111). The UN mission in Sierra Leone also witnessed the weakness of the UN's rapid response capabilities (UN, 2003). Nevertheless, the fundamental problem behind these issues is the lack of interest and will on behalf of member states (Roberts, 2008, p. 113). Moreover, Hardt (2009) contends that "a longer duration between when a request occurs and when an operation commences on the ground translates into a decreased likelihood

that an operation will prove successful in the long-term ceteris paribus" (p. 385). Therefore, operations should strive to establish effective operations rapidly. The primary reason for the tardiness in response rates was not logistics but the decision-makers' slowness in reaching a decision (Hardt, 2009, p. 385).

Protracted inactions not only hinder the establishment of effective operations but also create a weak intervening image of the UN. As van der Lijn (2010) noted, "Timely deployment of an operation is important, because late deployment may allow stable situations to destabilize again. […] The interval between the signing of a peace agreement and deployment of the operation needs to be kept at the minimum in order to maintain the momentum for peace" (p. 31). Meaning that timely deployment of operations is crucial to prevent stable situations from destabilizing and to maintain the momentum for peace. Analyzing the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) formed in March 2005, van der Lijn (2010) asserts that the operation was established at a ripe moment for resolving the conflict in which the combatants had reached a mutually hurting stalemate. However, although preparations were going on track, the deployment was delayed, and even one-tenth of the authorized personnel were hardly stationed half a year after the mission's authorization (van der Lijn, 2010, p. 50). Although the operation had crossed the critical boundary of less than the 20% vacancy rate required to operate effectively after a year, the operation needed to deal with its constructed impotent image (van der Lijn, 2010). It should be stressed that the UNMIS required almost a year to fulfill 80% of the authorized personnel number of 10,000, as stated in the UNSC Resolution 1590 (UNSC, 2005). These delays undermine the operation's ability to function effectively, and negatively impact its credibility and perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the parties involved in the conflict. Establishing and maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the local is crucial for the long-term success of operations because locals need to be invested in reclaiming their own security (Hardt, 2014, p. 33). As Group (2007) puts it, "outsiders cannot deliver human security, they can only help" (p. 9).

The research indicates that successful interventions require cooperation between international and regional bodies to facilitate prompt action. The involvement of regional actors can have both advantages in peacekeeping operations. Regional actors have a better understanding of local dynamics and cultures, which can enable them to implement a more context-sensitive approach. Additionally, they can provide more rapid responses and contribute to the legitimacy of the operation. Aboagye's (2001) case study on the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea highlights that the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

intervened swiftly and cooperated closely with facilitators from the UN and the EU. Although Aboagye's study does not center on military intervention, it emphasizes the crucial role of swift action in any type of intervention's success.

Hardt's (2009) analysis of three regional organizations, the EU, the African Union (AU), and the Organization of American States, reveals that the EU is slower to respond to conflicts than the AU, and this can be attributed to institutional design problems related to bureaucratic dysfunction. Since the end of the Cold War, the trend of regional peacekeeping has been on the rise, with the UN and regional organizations combining their efforts to enhance the legitimacy and capability of peacekeeping operations (Baba & Slotter, 2014; Morris & McCoubrey, 1999). Baba and Slotter (2014) note that while regional organizations fill the capability gap in implementing UN mandates, the UN strengthens the legitimacy of its operations through local awareness and operability of regional organizations, meaning by collaborating with local actors who are more familiar with the conflict dynamics and can employ a more context-specific approach (Ndulo, 2011, p. 797; UN, 2003, para. 65; van der Lijn, 2006, 2009, 2010). However, there are several potential drawbacks to involving regional actors, including reduced impartiality due to their proximity and differences in values and organizational cultures (Ndulo, 2011; Williams & Boutellis, 2014). Furthermore, differences in values and organizational cultures can also hinder effective collaboration between regional actors and the UN. Despite these challenges, the collaboration between the UN and regional organizations has proven to be an effective approach to peacekeeping, as it allows for a more nuanced understanding of the conflict dynamics and enables the utilization of local resources and expertise.

3.2. Size and Composition

Fearon's (1995) rationalist explanation of war posits that despite the high cost of conflict, wars may still occur, persist, and recur due to information asymmetries and commitment problems. In this view, conflict serves as a means for both sides to learn about the other party's resolve, but in such an environment, combatants may intentionally or unintentionally misrepresent information to achieve a more advantageous outcome (Fearon, 1995; Hultman et al., 2019; Wagner, 2000). Rationalists assume that the actors involved in the conflict are rational and that the side with the most capabilities has a decisive advantage (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008). Typically, governments require rebel groups to give

up their weapons and agree to a ceasefire to reach a negotiated settlement. However, since arms comprise a significant portion of a rebel group's power, they may opt to continue fighting rather than accept a ceasefire and make concessions in an agreement. This is because they cannot trust government officials to honor the terms of the agreement in the first place. As a result, commitment problems can easily lead to the initiation or resumption of conflict, and these problems have always been a major issue in civil wars (Powell, 2002, 2006).

Third-party intervention, particularly by organizations such as the UN, can help combatants commit to peaceful settlements and overcome obstacles of information asymmetries and commitment problems. The UN should overcome these bargaining obstacles to maintain peace afterward (Gilligan & Sergenti, 2008; Hultman et al., 2013). Rationalist explanations of war's implication on UN peacekeeping operations is that by sharing privately held information and providing security guarantees, UN peacekeeping operations can inhibit security dilemma spirals and maintain peace after a conflict has ended. Thereby, combatants may accept the termination of war through the involvement of a trustable third-party (Walter, 1997, 2002).

Studies that have found UN peacekeeping operations effective in establishing and maintaining peace are largely grounded in rationalist explanations of conflict (e.g., Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2008; Hultman et al., 2013, 2014, 2016, 2019). These studies have highlighted the security guarantee provided by peacekeepers as a key mechanism through which peace can be achieved. By inhibiting security dilemma spirals and overcoming commitment problems, UN peacekeeping operations can successfully facilitate the transition to a peaceful settlement and reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence (Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015; Hultman et al., 2013, 2014; Joshi, 2013; Ruggeri et al., 2012; van der Lijn, 2009).

The preceding discussions highlight the importance of commitment, deterrence, and information-sharing mechanisms in the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, according to recent studies (Bove & Ruggeri, 2015; Ruggeri et al., 2016). First of all, commitment is critical because it ensures that the parties involved follow the terms of the agreement. This can be achieved by peacekeepers on the field, which commits the leaders of the conflicting parties to respect the previously agreed-upon rules. However, this commitment must be reinforced by the means to enforce the terms of the agreement, including the willingness of UN member states to provide personnel commitments to the mission. Therefore, the concept of

commitment actually has two sides: commitment to a prior agreement and personnel commitment by the UN member states.

Deterrence is another important mechanism that prevents conflict spillover into non-combatant areas (Di Salvatore & Ruggeri, 2017; Fortna, 2008). This can be achieved by the use of force or by the mere presence of peacekeepers, which can deter potential spoilers from disrupting the peace process.

Finally, information-sharing is crucial as conflicting parties often lack information about each other's resolve, strengths, and plans (Hultman et al., 2019). Sharing information about the situation on the ground, including threats to the peace and violations of the peace agreement, can help build trust, prevent misunderstandings, and promote dialogue. Peacekeepers can obtain important information through their interactions with locals, and their presence can reduce uncertainty and promote cooperation (Bove & Ruggeri, 2015). Furthermore, peacekeepers, especially military observers, monitor and report parties' behaviors; thus, their local presence can reduce uncertainty and promote cooperation. Although the effectiveness of these mechanisms may take some time, the initial deployment of peacekeepers can signal a commitment to building peace and pave the way for future success.

The role of UN peacekeepers in providing the three crucial mechanisms of commitment, deterrence, and information-sharing supports sustainable and lasting peace. However, it should be noted that they are not the only factors that contribute to the success or failure of UN missions. Other factors, such as the political will of the parties involved, the mandate and resources of the mission, the security situation on the ground, and the overall political and social context of the conflict, can also play a significant role. Despite these additional factors, the abilities of peacekeepers to commit parties to an agreement, deter spoilers, and facilitate information flow are critical for establishing trust and promoting cooperation among conflicting parties. While these abilities may take time to become effective, the initial deployment of peacekeepers can signal the commitment to these mechanisms, paving the way for future progress.

According to the rationalist bargaining model perspective, the size and composition of peacekeeping operations play a critical role in their effectiveness. As the number of personnel deployed to the field increases, a mission's ability to deter, overcome commitment problems, and facilitate information-sharing between conflicting parties becomes more robust. Several scholars have jointly argued that larger missions are more capable of securing peace and

increasing the operation's effectiveness, even though the types of personnel involved may vary in their abilities (Bove & Ruggeri, 2015; Hultman et al., 2013, 2014, 2016, 2019; Koko & Essis, 2012; Ruggeri et al., 2012).

Besides overall size, Coleman, Lundgren and Oksamytna (2021) reveal that an initial presence of a brigade size is usually inadequate for carrying out the mandate, and it cannot be relied upon to hasten the complete deployment. Moreover, it poses risks to the peacekeepers involved. Therefore, a higher initial size in the initial deployment is necessary for sufficient mandate implementation.

In addition to the overall size of a mission, the size and structure of operations are predictors of operation efficiency and effectiveness (Benson & Kathman, 2014; Hultman et al., 2013, 2016, 2019; Pushkina, 2006; Ruggeri et al., 2012). Amongst the four types of UN peacekeeping personnel (troop, police, military observer, and expert), recent studies mostly reveal that troops are the most significant type affecting operation effectiveness by mitigating information asymmetries and facilitating commitment problems. Increasing troop deployments are associated with decreased combat hostilities (Beardsley et al., 2018; Hultman et al., 2014, 2019), increased civilian protection (Hultman et al., 2013; Kathman & Wood, 2011, 2016), combatant cooperation (Ruggeri et al., 2012), duration of peace (Hultman et al., 2016), the capacity of missions (Holt et al., 2009), and reduced time to negotiated settlements (Kathman & Benson, 2019) with contained conflict contagion (Beardsley, 2011; Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015).

Studies propose several causal mechanisms for the increased efficiency through troops. Claiming large deployments are more politically costly to withdraw, larger troop commitments signal the UN's resolve for conflict resolution (Kathman & Wood, 2016; Pushkina, 2006; Ruggeri et al., 2012; Thyne, 2009). Besides, a strong commitment signal can also help to resolve the security dilemma between the combatants (Walter, 2002). Moreover, more troops on the field can increase the capacity of missions against combatants and enhance monitoring activities.

In addition to the size, the composition of deployment is also important. The inclusion of troops from impartial countries or those with a history of successful peacekeeping operations can promote trust between parties and reduce the likelihood of violence. Similarly, troops with experience in conflict resolution and peacebuilding can be beneficial for promoting longer-term peace. However, including troops from countries with a history of involvement in the conflict or those perceived as biased can undermine the peace process and

lead to increased violence. This research assumes unbiased and approximately identical personnel deployed across all missions.

The theoretical framework of this research is built on two key components, the second of which is the size of the initial deployment. While recent studies agree on the beneficial outcomes of large peacekeeping deployments, initial deployment with a significant number of personnel can be the first crucial step in creating a perception of credible commitment from the international community. This can modify parties' incentives by increasing the costs of fighting, resolving information asymmetries, and mitigating commitment problems. Therefore, quick and effective initial deployment can signal the commitment of the international community to the success of peacekeeping operations.



Figure 3.1: Triangular Arrangement

The triangular arrangement depicted in Figure 3.1 represents the positioning of speed, size, and composition in this dissertation. The two essential components, speed and size, are depicted at the base of the triangle, as they form the foundation of the initial deployment in UN peacekeeping operations. Composition, represented at the apex of the triangle, builds upon the speed and size of the deployment.

Size is the primary requirement in the initial deployment, while composition adds nuanced factors to address the specific needs of the conflict. The composition of the peacekeeping mission, meaning the types of personnel deployed, is tailor-made according to the unique responsibilities of the personnel and requirements of the conflict. For example, one mission may necessitate a larger number of troops, while another mission may require an unintimidating smaller size of military observers.

Importantly, the theory does not argue that the deployment of specific personnel types, such as troops or military observers, is directly linked to the success of the operation. Instead, the emphasis is on the swift and sizeable initial deployment of peacekeeping forces. The study posits that the speed and size of the initial deployment is critical in establishing a secure and stable environment, which in turn contributes to the overall success of the peacekeeping operation. Ultimately, the proposed theory underscores the significance of speed and size in achieving successful peacekeeping outcomes while recognizing the role of composition in addressing conflict nuances.

3.3. Theoretical Framework and Mechanism

How do UN peacekeeping operations' initial deployment characteristics of speed, size, and composition affect ongoing violence and negative peace duration? The study's main argument is that UN peacekeeping operations with faster and larger initial deployments are associated with longer negative peace durations or less intense conflicts. The speed, size, and composition of the peacekeeping forces affect the level of security and trust between the intervenor and the local and conflicting parties, setting the tone and momentum of the operation as a defining moment. Within this framework, the initial deployment characteristics of UN peacekeeping operations are seen as important factors that can impact the success of the peacebuilding process, mitigate ongoing violence and create a sustainable, and inclusive peace.

The research focuses on the short- and long-term effects of initial deployments of UN peacekeeping operations established from 1991 to 2018. As Fortna (2008) and Howard (2008) propose, the most puzzling question in literature is why international efforts sometimes succeed rather than why they fail. The research aims to explore how future UN operations could be developed by seeing initial deployments as a significant component of operations' efficiency and potentially a major aspect of future lessons learned.

The research question is crucial for UN peacekeeping operations because, as is repeatedly stated by the UN in both the Brahimi Report and the Capstone Doctrine, "the first few months after a cease-fire or peace accord are often the most critical for establishing a stable peace and bolstering the credibility of a new operation" (UN, 2008, p. 62). Likewise, then under-secretary-general for peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno states the importance and recurring problem of initial deployments:

> Resources, mobilizing the world, deploying quickly, and in a timely manner—these are huge challenges to us. We see that if we dribble into a mission, then we project an image of weakness, and there is nothing more difficult than to recover from an initial *perception of weakness*. So we are looking for new solutions. We see that if we just repeat the solutions of the past, it's not going to work (2004, para. 23, italics added).

3.3.1. Perception of Weakness

An inadequate and unrepresentative initial deployment of peacekeepers, with a small component coupled with a slow deployment, pertains a perception of weakness of UN peacekeepers. This inadequate deployment is evaluated from both the conflicting parties and the local population. The constructed image of weakness of UN peacekeepers in turn leads to a series of long-lasting consequences for conflict-affected areas, be it may an ongoing conflict one or a post-conflict one.

Effects of Perception of Weakness on Battlefield Violence

The perception of weakness of UN peacekeepers both to the local population and conflicting parties have a significant impact on battlefield violence. First, if the local population perceives UN peacekeepers as weak or ineffective, this can lead to a loss of credibility for the peacekeeping mission. This can make it more difficult for peacekeepers to negotiate with parties to the conflict, enforce ceasefires, or take other actions to reduce violence.

Second, on behalf of both conflicting parties and local population, a slow and small deployment can lead conflicting parties and local population perceive the peacekeeping force as weak, and they may interpret it as a signal of lack of commitment by the UN and the international community to the peace process. This may lead them to doubt the sincerity of the mission and the potential benefits of engaging in peace negotiations. As a result, they may be more likely to resort to violence as a means of advancing their political goals.

Third, if spoilers, such as armed groups or other actors who are opposed to peace, perceive the peacekeeping force as weak or ineffective, this can incentivize them to carry out violent actions. Spoilers may see an opportunity to achieve their goals through violence if they do not perceive a credible threat from the peacekeeping force. Especially, if one or more conflicting parties perceive the deployed force as weak, this can embolden them to escalate their violent actions. Weak perception may incentivize rebel groups to escalate violence in

order to gain political or military advantages. Rebel groups may view the peacekeepers as unlikely to respond to their actions, which can embolden them to take more aggressive actions, such as attacking civilian populations or expanding their territorial control.

Fourth, weak perception of peacekeepers can put blue helmets at greater risk of attack by spoilers. Spoilers may see the peacekeepers as easy targets if they do not perceive a credible threat from them.

Fifth, a weak UN image can play a major role in power struggles. In some cases, the perception of weakness of the peacekeeping force may be intentional, as conflicting parties may seek to use the presence of UN peacekeepers to advance their own political goals. For example, rebel groups may intentionally provoke the peacekeepers to demonstrate their power or create a pretext for attacking their rivals. This can lead to a cycle of violence and undermine the effectiveness of the peacekeeping mission. Likewise, conflicting parties may also use the perception of weakness of the peacekeeping force to gain advantages in power struggles with their rivals. For example, a government may seek to demonstrate its own strength by publicly criticizing the UN mission or requesting a change in the peacekeepers' mandate. Rebel groups may also try to exploit the perceived weakness of the peacekeepers to gain control of territory or resources.

Additionally, weakness of peacekeepers through slow and small deployment can make a negative impact on local population. If the local population perceives the peacekeeping force as weak or ineffective, this can also have a negative impact on their perception of the peace process and the likelihood of long-term peace. This can create a sense of insecurity and distrust, which can be difficult to overcome.

Lastly, the perception of weakness of the peacekeeping force can also impact the conflicting parties' confidence in the ability of the UN to resolve the conflict. If rebel groups view the peacekeepers as ineffective or weak, they may be less likely to engage in negotiations or cooperate with the UN to find a peaceful solution. This can prolong the conflict and exacerbate battlefield violence. Additionally, conflicting parties may view the peacekeepers as a potential obstacle to their political or military objectives, and thus make strategic calculations based on the perceived strength or weakness of the UN mission. For example, if a rebel group perceives the peacekeepers as weak, it may be more likely to engage in attacks on government forces or civilian populations, as it may believe that the peacekeepers will not intervene effectively. Conversely, if the peacekeepers are perceived as strong and capable of

enforcing peace agreements, the rebel group may be more willing to engage in negotiations to achieve their goals.

In summary, the perception of weakness of UN peacekeepers can create incentives for escalation, undermine confidence in conflict resolution, and be exploited by conflicting parties for their own political gains. It is therefore important for peacekeepers to establish a credible and effective presence that can deter violence, build trust and cooperation with the conflicting parties and local population, and demonstrate their ability to enforce peace agreements and prevent violence impartially. This can help to reduce the risk of battlefield violence and contribute to a stable and peaceful environment.

Effects of Perception of Weakness on Duration of Negative Peace

The perception of weakness of UN peacekeepers to the local population can also have a crucial impact on the duration of peace. First, perceiving a weak peacekeeper deployment can diminish trust in the peacekeeping mission and the prospects for lasting peace. The local population may view the peacekeepers as unable to protect them, which can increase their vulnerability to violence and undermine their confidence in the peace process.

Second, the perception of weakness of the peacekeeping force can impact the peacekeepers' political legitimacy. If the conflicting parties and local population do not view the blue helmets as credible or effective, it can undermine their ability to influence the peace process and achieve their goals. This can make it more difficult to implement peace agreements and prevent the resumption of violence.

Third, a weak deployment in the eyes of the local population can reinforce the cycle of violence and perpetuate a culture of violence in the region. The local population may see violence as the only means of protection, which can lead to a lack of cooperation with the peacekeeping mission and an increase in violent acts. If the local population perceives the peacekeeping force as weak, it may send a signal to other potential conflict parties that the international community is not committed to peace and security in the region. This could embolden other groups to engage in violence, undermine the credibility of the UN, and make it more difficult to achieve peace in the future.

Fourth, having a slow and small deployment as the first step of a mission can lead to the deterioration of the social fabric in the region, in the sense that the lack of security and

stability can lead to the breakdown of social and economic systems, as well as the loss of livelihoods and displacement of populations.

Fifth, a crippling initial deployment and the related perception of weakness of the peacekeeping force can have long-term implications for reconciliation efforts. If the peacekeepers are unable to prevent violence and provide security, it can lead to resentment and distrust among the conflicting parties. This can make it more difficult to build lasting peace and undermine efforts to reconcile and rebuild relationships between communities.

Lastly, a weak initial deployment can lead local population to become disengaged from the peace process and the broader political and social institutions that support it. This can reduce the prospects for lasting peace and increase the risk of future conflicts.

The fabricated perception of weakness of UN peacekeepers affects the duration of peace via its effects on conflicting parties. First, if the conflicting parties perceive the peacekeeping force as weak, they may not respect their authority or their ability to enforce peace agreements. This can lead to a lack of compliance with peace agreements and a greater likelihood of violations and renewed violence.

Second, if the conflicting parties perceive the peacekeeping force as weak or ineffective, this can lead to a loss of credibility for the peacekeeping mission and its ability to support the peace process. This can undermine the prospects for lasting peace and reduce the willingness of the conflicting parties to engage in dialogue and negotiations.

Third, if the conflicting parties perceive the peacekeeping force as weak, this can send a negative signal to other actors in the region or internationally. This can reduce the likelihood of external support for the peace process and make it more difficult to address underlying issues and root causes of the conflict.

Fourth, the weak image of UN peacekeepers can perpetuate grievances and underlying tensions that led to the conflict in the first place. This can make it more difficult to address the root causes of the conflict and reduce the likelihood of a lasting and sustainable peace.

Fifth, conflicting parties may attempt to fill the security vacuum with their own forces or militias. This can lead to a breakdown in security and a resumption of violence, undermining the prospects for lasting peace. Thereby, they may also target peacekeepers with attacks or intimidation tactics. This can undermine the morale of the peacekeepers and reduce their effectiveness, leading to a greater likelihood of violence and instability.

Lastly, weak deployment directly affects local support for the peace process. If the local population perceives the peacekeepers as ineffective or weak, they may be less willing to cooperate with them or support their efforts to build peace. This can make it more difficult to build sustainable peace and reduce the prospects for long-term stability.

Overall, it is important for peacekeepers to establish a credible presence and demonstrate their commitment to reducing violence and promoting long-term peace through establishing a strong image and presence on the field to convince the local population and conflicting parties about their commitments and efforts on establishing and prolonging peace. Quick initial deployment with large numbers of personnel may be the first essential step in creating the perception of credible commitment from the international community that can modify parties' incentives by increasing the costs of fighting, resolving information asymmetries, and mitigating commitment problems. This can help to establish a solid foundation for lasting peace and stability in conflict-affected areas.

3.3.2. Theoretical Mechanism

From a theoretical perspective, the mechanism of this research is that fast initial deployments coupled with large personnel commitments will simultaneously create favorable opportunities for swift interventions and credible commitment in the eyes of the local population, decreasing the intensity of conflict in ongoing conflicts and leading to longer negative peace. Preceding discussions feed the theoretical mechanism of the research, displayed in Figure 3.2.

Having opportunities for swift intervention is crucial as one of the two complementary paths in the proposed mechanism. Opportunities for swift intervention is credited with facilitating the cessation of hostilities in the short term, which is a core component in building a long-term, stable environment where peace reigns. This concept of opportunities for swift intervention include a broad spectrum of actions. Having high amounts of personnel increases the opportunities for and effectiveness of the intervention. A strong and fast initial deployment can break a cycle or spiral of violence by operation's reach-out being practically enlarged and block any spoilers that could incentivize a potential weakness to carry out violent actions towards civilians, military personnel and even to UN blue helmets. A strong initial UN force can prevent violence and provide security, and thus can disable any lead to resentment and distrust among the conflicting parties. A swift intervention can also inhibit any attempt in filling the security vacuum with militias or rebel forces. Besides, a strong force would

intimidate targeting of peacekeepers to strategic political gains. In addition, a strong image can attract other actors in the region or internationally to receive external support for the peace process or more personnel deployment to the mission.



Figure 3.2: Theoretical Mechanism

Local actors and their perspectives, especially the local population's perceptions, tend to be disregarded and not taken as a distinct unit of analysis in the literature (Hellmüller, 2018). However, this research regards the local population as a significant complementary actor in long-term peacebuilding. As one of the two complementary routes in the proposed mechanism, creating credible commitment in the eyes of the local population is crucial for effective operations in mitigating conflict and managing a durable negative peace. The local population is not homogeneous, and there is no one local viewpoint. Instead, many groups and views exist (Auteserre, 2014; MacGinty, 2011). Here, a 'unified' local population perspective refers to at least some part of the population. On top of a short term relief in facilitating the cessation of hostilities, creating credible commitment and legitimacy in local's perception is a crucial component in building local capacities and having a stable environment in the long term.

The actions of the UN peacekeepers form the UN peacekeepers' and the mission's reputation locally. Without a credible local presence, peacekeepers remain mostly irrelevant to building or maintaining peace (Autesserre, 2014; Pouligny, 2006). The loss of reputation for UN peacekeepers can erode local support, trust, and credibility for peacekeepers and

international actors. Nevertheless, the local population, via their support and cooperation, is critical in the success rates of peacekeeping efforts and its long-term success. Failure to engage with local populations and underrepresenting the commitment to an operation can undermine the credibility of the mission. The support of local communities can improve the security situation by their offering of critical information about security threats and help to identify potential spoilers. Their support can also provide access to critical resources and help facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, which can contribute to the overall success of the mission.

Establishing legitimacy for UN peacekeeping operations in the eyes of the local population can be a challenging task. The success of a peacekeeping mission depends not only on its mandate and objectives but also on how it is perceived by the people it aims to assist and protect. The initial deployment of peacekeeping forces plays a crucial role in shaping the first impression and establishing credibility.

When a conflict erupts, local communities often experience fear, insecurity, and immense suffering. They look to the international community, represented by the UN peacekeeping mission, for immediate support and protection. Any delay in the initial deployment of peacekeeping forces can create a sense of abandonment and frustration among the local population. They may perceive the mission as indifferent to their plight or incapable of fulfilling its mandate effectively.

The first impression formed by the local population regarding the peacekeeping mission significantly influences their perception of its legitimacy. If the initial deployment is swift and robust, demonstrating a tangible commitment to the locals' security and well-being, it can generate a positive perception of the mission's intentions and capabilities. The timely arrival of peacekeepers can instill hope, restore a sense of security, and foster trust in the international community's efforts to bring peace and stability.

For ongoing violent conflicts, fast and sizeable initial deployments are important to the local population because such initial deployments can provide 'fast' security for their basic survival conditions. Everyday activities can be carried out without fear; markets can open again, people can safely go to their jobs, and schools can reopen. This kind of basic safety is crucial to survival. So, having such a fast and large deployment to an ongoing conflict is important for the locals and makes such a commitment credible and legitimate in the eyes of the locals.

Both for post-conflict and ongoing conflicts, the deployment of UN peacekeeping personnel is seen as the international community's highest form of commitment to a conflict

(Benson & Kathman, 2014). Therefore, when the local population and actors see such a commitment and regard international actors as legitimate, they will be more inclined to trust, respect their authority or ability in peacebuilding or enforcing peace agreements, and help international actors doing so (Hellmüller, 2018, p. 82). With prompt favorable results, locals will regard peacekeepers as legitimate and positive for the population's existence, and such a perspective will lead to a better interaction between the two groups and more lasting results in the long-term; making fast and large initial deployments as the first key step in local and international actors becoming partners for peace. These two paths support each other both in perception and with solid results of weakening conflict intensity.

Conversely, delays in the initial deployment can erode the perceived legitimacy of the peacekeeping operation. The local population may interpret these delays as a lack of prioritization or a sign of inadequate support. This can lead to frustration, disillusionment, and even protests against the peacekeeping mission, as people demand timely and effective action. In the worst scenario, if the peacekeepers arrive after a few months from the expected, and with insufficient numbers of personnel, their legitimacy and credibility will be diminished in the local's perception. At the very least, local security will not be as quickly constituted as fast and large deployment, and there will be more human suffering. On the other side of the coin, diminished credibility and legitimacy will lead to a loss of trust, thereby reducing local cooperation and taking longer to create a bond between the locals and international actors. So, as the best possible scenario, if the operation commences effectively with fast and sizeable deployments and thereby provides better life circumstances for the local population, international actors' legitimacy and credibility will be established from the local's perspective.

Lasting Impact

The effects of fast and large deployments of UN peacekeeping operations last because they can have a significant impact on the dynamics of the conflict and the attitudes of the parties involved. The first impression formed during the initial deployment sets the tone for the entire peacekeeping mission. It shapes the relationship between the mission and the local population, influencing cooperation, support, and participation in peacebuilding efforts. If the mission is perceived as legitimate from the outset, it becomes easier to build trust and engage with local communities, ultimately enhancing the mission's effectiveness.

A strong deployment signals to the parties involved that the international community is serious about ending the conflict and is willing to take action to protect civilians and enforce

ceasefires. This can act as a deterrent to further violence and increase the likelihood of compliance with peace agreements. In addition, a representative initial force can build momentum for peace talks and negotiations. By providing a secure environment, peacekeeping forces can create a space for dialogue and negotiation to take place, which can lead to longer-term peace and stability. Another highly important effect of initial deployments is enhancing the credibility of the peacekeeping operation and the international community more broadly and establishing legitimacy in the eyes of the local population and conflicting parties. If the UN is able to deploy quickly and effectively, it can demonstrate its commitment to the conflict and build trust with the parties involved. Likewise, a fast and large initial deployment can build confidence between the parties involved. If peacekeeping forces are able to quickly establish a secure environment, this can help to build trust and reduce tensions, making it easier for parties to engage in dialogue and negotiations. Besides signaling and perception, a large and fast initial deployment helps the UN to establish control over key areas, such as border regions or strategic locations, which can be crucial for maintaining stability and preventing the resurgence of violence. This can create a conducive environment for the implementation of peace agreements and the development of post-conflict reconstruction and development plans. It can also provide the necessary resources and personnel to build the capacity of local institutions, to maintain law and provide basic services to the population, thereby contributing to the long-term sustainability of peace and stability in the conflict-affected country.

A quick and larger initial deployment can help to establish a sense of stability and deter potential spoiler via the two complementary routes, which can contribute to the longer-term success of the mission with decreased hostilities and longer negative peace duration. The size and speed of initial peacekeeping deployments is particularly important in the early stages of a peace process, when there is a higher risk of violence and spoilers are more likely to disrupt the peace.

The initial deployment phase is the defining moment of a peacekeeping operation; it establishes the legitimacy of the mission and the momentum for the peace process across relevant local and conflicting parties. Coming in strong and prompt at the beginning of the operation makes the commitment to creating or keeping peace more valuable and credible, and then leads to effective commitment to the peace agreement by the combatants, deterrence, and information-sharing. What I argue by essence is that first sight matters.

3.4. Hypotheses

The dissertation addresses the question of the effect of initial deployment speeds and sizes on the duration of negative peace and the intensity of ongoing conflicts. The hypotheses are formulated to analyze the consequences of variations in initial deployments by testing if the initial deployments' speed, size and composition positively impact establishing negative peace and sustaining it through initial opportunities for swift intervention and signaling credible commitment to the locals.

Since all operations are included in the analyses, both active and passive conflicts are incorporated. Negative peace is the "absence of personal violence," whilst positive peace is the "absence of structural violence" (Galtung, 1969, p. 183). Negative peace is the mere absence of violence, and positive peace includes a wider range of structures of a peaceful society, including social, political or economical justice. So, negative peace is the first step in obtaining positive peace. Therefore, in statistical terms, negative peace is measured by nonviolence in a conflict-affected area.

For these purposes, I firstly formed two hypotheses based on post-conflict environments; the first hypothesis focuses on speed, and the second focuses on the size of initial deployments. These two hypotheses test the effects of speed and size of initial deployment on the duration of negative peace. Hypotheses are as follows:

Hypothesis 1a: The faster the initial deployment, the longer the duration of negative peace.

Hypothesis 2a: The larger the initial contribution, the longer the duration of negative peace.

In the steps to form a new UN peacekeeping operation, the first group of personnel is deployed to activate the operation on the field. As will be detailed in the research design section, the speed of initial deployment is measured by the number of months between three events: UN operation suggestion, adoption of a UNSC resolution, and the first deployment to the field. In this study, initial deployments within the first few months after the mission authorization are considered prompt deployments, while first deployments that take more than several months are considered late initial deployments. This distinction points out that some operations, or conflicts, do not stand out as urgent or crucial to be active as soon as possible to the international community.[3]

[3] While some operations are set out to be deployed as soon as possible, some are planned to be gradually deployed in phases in the UNSC resolutions. Planned late or phase deployments are not considered while doing the analyses because the research is trying to analyze the effect of speed no matter the plan.

For the size of the initial deployment, number of the deployed total personnel, and personnel types of troops, police and military observers are included. Except for recent studies like Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014, 2016, 2019), most of the studies disregard personnel types besides armed troops. Since the UN fact sheets classify the personnel contributions according to their types, the total number of each personnel type per mission is monthly coded and taken into consideration in the analyses as well.

Analyzing the duration of negative peace is one side of the coin; to see the whole picture, a different research method is applied for the cases of UN peacekeeping operations that are established during ongoing battlefield violence. Only studying the duration of negative peace assumes that the conditions of nonviolence is somehow attained and it is the peacekeepers' duty to maintain the sustainability of nonviolence. Nevertheless, after the Cold War, the UN started deploying operations to ongoing conflicts (Bellamy & Williams, 2015). Therefore, it is necessary to study operations not only for their capability to maintain negative peace, but also for their ability to establish negative peace in the first place. The abstract concept of establishing negative peace is to define decreasing or even ending battlefield violence, operationalized as the intensity of dyadic conflict by battle-related deaths. So, for peacekeeping operations deployed to ongoing conflicts, it is hypothesized that the violence decreases as the UN peacekeeping operations initially deploy quicker and commit more personnel.

Hypothesis 1b: The faster the initial deployment, the less the battle-related deaths.

Hypothesis 2b: The larger the initial contribution, the less the battle-related deaths.

3.4.1. Additional Hypothesis on Speed and Size

The effect of personnel compositions of the initially deployed forces on the negative peace duration and the intensity of conflict is an unexplored area. Although operations' designs are important, implementation in the field is emphasized in this study. Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013, 2014) find that larger UN troop deployments reduce the intensity of violence in ongoing civil wars due to their ability to prevent battlefield violence and mitigate commitment problems, but for one-sided violence, military observers produce the opposite impact. Since personnel types have different duties and effects on peace, the personnel types of troops, police, military observers, and experts on mission are incorporated into the study. Then, on similar grounds to Hultman, Kathman and Shannon's studies (2013,

2014), I argue that prompt deployment of high numbers of troops will increase the duration of attained negative peace and decrease the intensity of conflict with less battle-related deaths.

The prompt deployment of high numbers of troops in UN peacekeeping operations can potentially mitigate violence or extend negative peace in conflict-affected regions. First, the presence of a prompt and well-resourced peacekeeping troops can serve as a deterrent to potential aggressors, who may be less likely to engage in violent activities if they know that there is a strong and capable force monitoring the situation. This can help to prevent the escalation of violence and provide a sense of security to civilians. Relatedly, peacekeeping forces can help to protect civilians and vulnerable groups from violence, including physical attacks, forced displacement, and other forms of abuse. The presence of peacekeeping troops can provide a sense of security to local communities, which can help to build trust between conflicting parties and reduce the likelihood of renewed violence.

Furthermore, UN peacekeeping missions often involve a mandate to support political and diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts peacefully. The deployment of peacekeeping forces, especially troops, can help to create a secure environment for negotiations and dialogue, which can lead to lasting peace agreements. In addition, peacekeeping forces can monitor human rights violations and report on any abuses or violence that they observe. This can help to raise awareness of the situation and put pressure on perpetrators of violence to stop their activities. In some cases, UN peacekeeping missions may involve training and capacity-building programs for local security forces and institutions. This can help to build the capacity of local actors to prevent and respond to violence, and can contribute to long-term stability and peace. In summary, the prompt deployment of high numbers of troops in UN peacekeeping operations can potentially increase the duration of negative peace and decrease the battlefield violence, but it is not a guaranteed solution.

Hypothesis 3a: The faster the deployment of troop personnel, the longer the duration of negative peace.

Hypothesis 3b: The faster the deployment of troop personnel, the less the battle-related deaths.

Although neither speed nor size can guarantee operational success or solve crisis-like problems, they are both necessary and critical factors for the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations. The following chapter demonstrates how these components carries such importance in affecting outcomes of the operations.

Chapter 4

RESEARCH DESIGN

4.1. Data

Large-n data analysis allows for exploring UN operations' effects on violence and peace. The UN's ability to attain or extend existing negative peace is an empirical question that this study addresses by analyzing if UN peacekeeping operations decrease battlefield violence or if the operations prolong the secured negative peace duration. For this research, a large-n dataset forms the basis of the study.

Table 4.5 at the end of the chapter's apendix lists all 55 operations, with their region and country details, established within the 28 years included in the dataset. The limitations of a relatively small number of cases for quantitative analysis are realized. However, nonetheless, timewise and geographically, the three-decade-long time frame and the global reach of cases prove an attractive analysis. Since 1991, among the 55 UN peacekeeping operations established, 28 are in the Africa region, 9 in Europe, 8 in the Americas, 8 in Asia and the Pacific, and 2 in the Middle East.

The unit of analysis of the dataset is the pairing of a country's government with a rebel group on a monthly basis. The dataset compiles all government-rebel group dyads available for the UN peacekeeping operations established between 1991 to 2018, totaling 42 conflicts and 109 government-rebel group dyads. These dyads are incorporated into the dataset if a UN peacekeeping operation includes their dyadic conflict. The dataset employs the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) for the data on government-rebel group dyads (Sundberg & Melander, 2013). Dyads enter the dataset when they first appear in the UCDP GED. Even if dyads cease to exist in the UCDP GED with no battle-related deaths, they continue to appear in the dataset until they are right-censored in

December 2018. In this way, dyads are traceable both while they are active and after they turn passive, meaning in the case of non-existent battle-related deaths.

Earlier studies, such as Doyle and Sambanis (2006) and Fortna (2008), have examined the aggregate number of deaths in a conflict due to limited publicly available data. However, revealing casual relationships about UN peacekeeping operations with aggregated conflict-level data is rather difficult. The UCDP GED is the most disaggregated dataset covering individual events of organized violence, and it is preferred to grasp even the minor changes in battlefield violence thoroughly. By aggregating the individual battlefield casualty events to monthly data for each dyad, a government-rebel group dyad level monthly data on battle-related deaths is constructed. Monthly observations of government-rebel group dyads and battle-related deaths form the backbone of the dataset.

Earlier studies have primarily focused on post-conflict operations and studied post-conflict durations with conflict dyads that once crossed the 25 battle-deaths threshold and terminated later on. According to Kreutz (2010), there are three ways for a conflict to end: victory, negotiated settlement (e.g., peace settlement, ceasefire), or other outcomes, such as where the conflict ceases to reach the 25 battle-deaths thresholds in a year, or a party decides on a nonviolent strategy (p. 244-245). The depiction of the post-conflict environment in the peacekeeping literature mainly resulted from a concentration on traditional peacekeeping by the UN in the 1990s.

The main focus of this research is not limited to UN peacekeeping operations established solely in post-conflict environments. Instead, it takes into account operations deployed to ongoing and post-conflict environments. To distinguish between active and post-conflict scenarios, the study examines whether the conflict, involving single or several government-rebel group dyads, experienced violence just before the peacekeeping operation. The study defines any dyad that has had more than 25 battle-related deaths within the previous 12 months of the operation as an active conflict. On the other hand, if a dyad has had no violence or less than 25 deaths, it is classified as a post-conflict case. It is essential to note that the term ‘post-conflict’ used in this research does not necessarily imply the presence of positive peace, meaning a situation where there is a sustainable and peaceful relationship among the parties involved. Instead, it refers to the attainment of negative peace, in which there is no ongoing violence. This distinction is crucial because it provides a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of peacekeeping operations and the challenges they face in different conflict scenarios.



Figure 4.1: UN Peacekeeping Operations Deployed to Active and Post-Conflict Environments

Figure 4.1 presents the distribution of active and post-conflict UN peacekeeping operations over the years. Out of the 55 newly established UN peacekeeping operations, the dataset includes 37 active conflict scenarios and 18 post-conflict situations. Before the year 2000, the UN primarily established peacekeeping operations in post-conflict cases, which is indicative of the traditional approach to peacekeeping. However, from 1999 onwards, the UN began to intervene in active conflicts, marking the emergence of wider and more multidimensional approaches to peacekeeping. This shift in approach suggests that the UN recognized the need to address the root causes of conflicts and adopt a more proactive stance to prevent the escalation of violence.

The ending of the Cold War was a turning point in UN peacekeeping operations because the dissolution of the bipolar system led the international community to act freely. Consequently, the number of operations increased in the post-Cold War era. Data covers the post-Cold War period since it is possible to assume an ideal setting where states are free to participate in operations without any political obstacles. In addition, as Fortna (2004) states,

"Since the Cold War, the primary purpose of peacekeeping has been to prevent the resumption of civil conflict. It is therefore likely that the relationship between peacekeeping and the duration of peace changed with the end of the Cold War" (p. 271). Due to these reasons, selecting newly established operations in the post-Cold War world makes more sense to eliminate political intermediaries and other possible reasons for launching an operation. What is more, the UN's archives of contribution fact sheets with deployment dates and numbers start by the end of 1990. These archives are publicly accessible on the UN's website, easing the accuracy of the analysis and paving the way for replicable research.

4.2. Variables

The study includes two primary dependent variables and several independent variables. The three tables at the end of the chapter thoroughly present the descriptive statistics of the variables. Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics of constant variables; Table 4.3 shows descriptive statistics of yearly varying variables; and Table 4.4 displays descriptive statistics of monthly variables.

4.2.1. Dependent Variables

The dependent variable of dyadic *battle-related deaths* measures battlefield violence. The variable's observations are the number of monthly casualties directly resulting from combat between a country's government and a conflicting rebel group observed each month. Monthly observations for each government-rebel group dyad are the monthly aggregation of individual events at the UCDP GED. The monthly dyadic *battle-related deaths* range from 0 to 23,693 battlefield casualties, with a mean of 31.52 and a standard deviation of 331.97.

Dyadic battle-related deaths are used to measure the success of peacekeeping operations because they provide a clear and objective indicator of the intensity of the conflict between the government and rebel groups. One can assess the effectiveness of operations in reducing violence and protecting civilians by measuring the number of deaths resulting from direct combat between these groups. Lower levels of dyadic battle-related deaths suggest that peacekeeping efforts are succeeding in reducing violence and promoting stability in the conflict-affected area. Furthermore, measuring dyadic battle-related deaths allows for comparisons to be made across different peacekeeping operations and conflict settings. It enables researchers to identify patterns and trends in the effectiveness of peacekeeping efforts

over time and to compare the outcomes of different peacekeeping strategies. Overall, using dyadic battle-related deaths as a measure of success provides a standardized and consistent approach to evaluating peacekeeping operations and their impact on conflict-affected populations.

The UCDP GED is commonly used as a dataset for battle-related deaths because it is considered one of the most reliable and comprehensive sources of data on armed conflict. The dataset contains information on violent events, including battles, riots, and other types of violence in which at least one person is killed. The UCDP GED is updated yearly and has been used by many to analyze trends in armed conflict, making it a widely recognized and respected data source.

Figure 4.2 presents the yearly sum of conflict battle-related deaths where the UN is present, meaning all the conflicts with peacekeeping operations established from 1991 to 2018. The figure suggests that conflicts with UN intervention have become more violent, with a significant increase in battle-related deaths during the last decade. This trend reinforces the findings presented in Figure 4.1, which indicate that the UN started to deploy more to active conflicts after 1999. These results suggest that the UN is increasingly intervening in more violent conflicts, which may have contributed to the rise in battle-related deaths over time.



Figure 4.2: Yearly Sum of Dyadic Battle-Related Deaths

Figure 4.3 shows the density of government and rebel group dyad battle-related deaths between 1 and 500. The dependent variable of dyadic *battle-related deaths* is a count variable skewed with a large cluster of observations around zero. With a maximum observation of 23,693, the mean of dyadic battle-related deaths is 31.5, with a standard deviation of 331.97.



Figure 4.3**:** Histogram of Dyadic Battle-Related Deaths

To analyze peace duration, rather than using a binary concept of peace, the dependent variable is related to the applied methodology of survival analysis. The dependent variable in survival analysis is composed of two parts: the time to the event, in months, and the event, meaning the recording if the event of interest occurred or not. These two parts lead to an estimation of the survival function; the survival function is the probability at each time point that the event occurs after that time point. In survival analysis terms, if the event of interest is death, the survival function is the probability of surviving (not experiencing the event) as a function of time (Hosmer et al., 2008). In conflict terms, if the event of interest is 'conflict reactivating with more than 25 battle-related deaths,' the survival function is the probability of conflict not reactivating as a function of time.

Peace duration on a dyadic monthly basis ranges from 0 to 336 months. The most peaceful dyad has experienced negative peace for 28 years. On average, peace lasts for about

seven years, or 89 months, which is a noteworthy accomplishment given the typically violent nature of conflicts where UN intervention is required.

4.2.2. Independent Variables on Speed

Three events offer the milestones for the conceptualization of speed: UN operation suggestion, UNSC Resolution, and initial deployment of the UN operation.

When a peacekeeping operation is suggested or demanded, it is usually declared through a formal document or speech by the Secretary-General, a UN member state, or a representative member of a state. This declaration is typically recorded either in a resolution by the UNSC or in a report by the Secretary-General. Researchers can refer to these official and reliable documents to trace the date of the initial proposition of a peacekeeping operation. Specifically, the date of the document or speech that includes the declaration of the proposed operation is considered the date of the UN operation suggestion. This approach helps researchers accurately pinpoint the peacekeeping operation's timeline and analyze its various phases, from its initial proposal to its deployment and eventual conclusion.

UNSC resolutions are official statements or decisions made by the fifteen members of the UNSC that express their collective opinion or outline the required action to be taken. In the case of peacekeeping operations, these resolutions formulate the necessary components and actions to establish or maintain peace and security in the host country. The UNSC resolution serves as a legal basis for the deployment of peacekeeping forces and defines the specific tasks and objectives of the peacekeeping operation. Researchers can track the timeline of a peacekeeping operation by identifying the date of the UNSC resolution that established it. This information is crucial for understanding the scope and duration of the operation, its objectives, and its effectiveness in achieving peace and stability in the host country. The date of the UNSC resolution is coded for each UN operation according to their operation-establishing resolution.

The term 'initial deployment' refers to the point at which one or more UN personnel are first sent to the location of a UN peacekeeping operation. This marks the start of the operation and is a crucial moment in its timeline. The monthly factsheets released by the UN are the sole reliable source when tracking the dates of initial deployments for different peacekeeping operations. These factsheets contain information on each operation's latest developments and deployments, including the date on which UN personnel were first sent to

the location. By analyzing these factsheets over time, researchers can gain insights into the frequency, duration, and nature of peacekeeping operations, and assess their effectiveness in achieving their goals. The monthly initial deployment dates are directly from the UN's archives of monthly released factsheets.

Three independent variables measure speed in the context of UN peacekeeping operations: (1) the time between the suggestion of a UN operation and the adoption of a UNSC Resolution, (2) the duration between the adoption of a UNSC Resolution and the initial deployment of personnel to the field, and (3) the time between the suggestion of an operation and the initial deployment of personnel. These durations are measured by the number of months between the specified events. These durations are count variables that increase each month in that interim period, coded as a fixed observation across the peacekeeping operation's observations.



Figure 4.4: Timeline of the Delay Metric

The timeline in Figure 4.4 presents a means of visually representing this metric. The first point (t_1) is the time of an operation suggestion; the second point (t_2) represents the time of the adoption of the operation establishing UNSC resolution; and the third reference point (t_3) indicates the time of the initial deployment. The delay is measured as the difference between events via time points. In the case of duration between the operation suggestion to the UNSC Resolution (*delay_s_r*), the number of months between when the operation was

first suggested and the adoption of the UNSC Resolution is counted ($t_2 - t_1$). Likewise, the initial deployment speed is measured by the number of months between the two events of adoption of a UNSC Resolution and the first deployment to the field (*delay_r_d*) ($t_3 - t_2$). Lastly, the duration between UN peacekeeping operation suggestion to initial deployment (*delay_s_d*) is the total time from when an operation idea is introduced on a written piece of paper or in a speech to when the idea is physically deployed to the field ($t_3 - t_1$). The same procedure of counting months applies to the three speed variables.

For instance, in 1998, the Secretary-General suggested a UN peacekeeping operation in January (Secretary-General, S1998/61), the UNSC resolution 1159 of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) was adopted in March (UNSC, 1998), and its initial force was deployed in April. The independent variable of duration between the adoption of the UNSC resolution and the initial deployment (*delay_r_d*) is coded as "1" due to the deployment's delay of one month. The duration between UN operation suggestion to UNSC resolution (*delay_s_r*) is coded as "2," and the total duration of suggestion to initial deployment (*delay_s_d*) is coded as "3."

As detailed in Table 4.2, the durations of the interim periods present a broad picture of UN operations' promptness. The mean duration between suggestion and UNSC resolution is 0.64, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum observation of 5 months. Most of the UNSC resolutions are adopted within the same month or just one month after the suggestion of the operation. The duration between UNSC resolution and initial deployment is on average 2.01 months, with a minimum of -2 months and a maximum of 33 months. -2 months of initial deployment duration means the operation is deployed two months earlier than its UNSC resolution. Although rare, this early personnel deployment, before the UNSC resolution's adoption, can be done. Generally, this personnel is transferred from a nearby operation (can be from a UN operation or another organization's operation, as in being 're-hatted') and deployed as an advance team to launch the operation early on the field. Here, the case of two months early deployment is from the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), and the latest deployment of 33 months is United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). However, for UNSOM, no data is available from May 2013 to February 2016; accordingly, UNSOM is excluded from the analyses. After UNSOM, with 12 months of delay, the latest deployment was at United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). Overall, the duration between UNSC resolution to the initial deployment has a mean of 2.68, with a minimum of -2 months and a maximum of 34 months (or 12 months without UNSOM).

The duration between different events, such as the time between the suggestion of a UN peacekeeping operation and the adoption of a UNSC resolution or the time between the adoption of a resolution and initial deployment, can provide valuable insights into the perceived importance of a particular conflict and the UN operation established to address it. Adopting a UNSC resolution and establishing a UN operation without any overwriting P5 vetoes do not mean that all UN peacekeeping operations are established with similar importance levels per se. Through the given relative importance of conflicts and the operations of the international community, one can assess the perceived significance of the conflict and might assess how the international community would act in the future.

Table 4.6 at the end of the chapter's appendix presents a list of UN peacekeeping operations and their dates of suggestion, UNSC resolution adoption, initial deployment, and end dates, as well as the UNSC resolution numbers that established each operation. The duration variables are measured monthly, not daily or weekly, because UN mission fact sheets are publicly released monthly. While initial deployment information can be obtained with greater precision by checking various sources on at least a weekly basis, information on specific deployment dates is usually unofficial and difficult to verify. Hence, monthly data is preferred over daily or weekly data due to concerns about its validity.

Why would an active or post-conflict environment matter for UN peacekeeping operations? The presence of ongoing or post-conflict situations is relevant for UN peacekeeping operations. Even though 'peace-keeping' implies maintaining peace, UN peacekeeping operations are not limited to deploying to countries without violence. Instead, UN peacekeeping operations encompass all types of missions authorized by the UN with a certain amount of armed or unarmed personnel to an ongoing conflict or a post-conflict environment in order to prevent and manage conflict and maintain peace and security. Thus, peacekeeping operations have two distinct types, some deployed in violent situations, and others deployed in formerly violent areas. Consequently, it is reasonable to anticipate different impacts from these two opposite scenarios.

Figure 4.5 displays the means of duration between the suggestion of the UN operation, adoption of the UNSC resolution, and the first deployment in months, categorized into active and post-conflict environments. First, the duration between the interim period of suggestion to the adoption of UNSC resolution is strikingly different for the two environments, with more extended periods for active conflicts and shorter periods for post-conflict environments. This suggests that it takes more time to formulate necessary actions in active conflicts, while post-

conflict operations benefit from more precise approaches to maintaining peace. However, post-conflict operations have slower initial deployments on average than active conflicts, indicating that deploying to active conflicts is prioritized to achieve prompt results while post-conflict cases can afford to wait.



Figure 4.5: Means of Duration Variables Categorized by Active and Post-Conflict (Months)

Peacekeeping operations have significantly evolved from 1991 to 2018. Following the easing of bipolar gridlock with the ending of the Cold War, there was a brief period of hope among member states, which led to the launch of several UN operations. During this period, both traditional and wider peacekeeping approaches were adopted. Traditional peacekeeping involved securing the consent of the parties involved, being impartial, and using minimal force while helping create and maintain conditions for long-term conflict resolution by the parties themselves. Wider peacekeeping expanded on these tasks, while still adhering to these principles. However, the 1990s experienced subsequent failures and weak international support from the UN member states.

The millennium marked a significant turning point for UN peace operations, as the Brahimi Report was introduced to enhance their effectiveness (Brahimi, 2000). The report proposed significant improvements to the UN strategy by transforming traditional peacekeeping into more complex and multidimensional operations encompassing various tasks such as military and civilian components and civilian tasks (Fortna & Howard, 2008). As a result, comparing UN peacekeeping operations before and after 2000 is beneficial in identifying the effects of traditional and multidimensional operations.



Figure 4.6**:** Means of Duration Variables Categorized by Active and Post-Conflict and Pre- and Post-2000 Periods (Months)

Figure 4.6 depicts the average duration in months between the suggestion of a UN operation, the adoption of a UNSC resolution, and the first deployment, categorized by active and post-conflict environments for pre- and post-2000 periods. The most notable difference is a significant disparity between the pre- and post-2000 periods. UN peacekeeping operations established from 1991 to 2000 took shorter to form a UNSC resolution and deploy the initial component than those established after 2000. Secondly, the figure shows that, during the pre-

2000 period, active conflicts received speedy deployments, while post-conflicts were not regarded as significant operations that required prompt deployment. Although the speeds of active and post-conflict operations in the post-2000 period are somewhat similar, post-conflict operations still receive slower first deployments than active conflicts on average, indicating that the international community does not perceive the operation as urgent enough.

An essential factor to consider when analyzing ongoing conflicts that are trying to establish or have already achieved negative peace is the recent increase in violence. Spike in violence is a new addition to the literature and is measured dichotomously. Suppose the number of battle-related deaths in the year before the establishment of the operation exceeds the average number of deaths per year for the conflict. In that case, it is considered that the conflict has experienced a recent upsurge in violence. This upsurge indicates that the conflict is becoming more severe or resurging. It is crucial to identify whether the conflict is experiencing a worsening situation on the eve of the operation.



Figure 4.7**:** Means of Duration Variables Categorized by Spike (Months)

In Figure 4.7, the duration between the suggestion of a UN operation, the adoption of a UNSC resolution, and the first deployment in months is compared between conflicts that experienced a spike in battlefield violence just before the operation and those that did not. The figure indicates that a spike in deaths before the operation did not lead to a faster adoption of a UNSC resolution. However, conflicts that had experienced a recent upsurge in violence had quicker initial deployments on average, suggesting that member states prioritize responding promptly to recently escalated conflicts.

4.2.3. Independent Variables on Size

The size of UN peacekeeping operations varies greatly, not only between different missions but also within the same mission over time. This means that the number of peacekeepers deployed may increase or decrease as the situation on the ground changes and as new challenges or opportunities arise. The size of the mission is determined by a number of factors, including the scope of the mandate, the level of conflict, the availability of resources, and the political will of UN member states to contribute troops and funding. The fluctuation in mission size highlights the need for flexibility in UN peacekeeping operations to adapt to changing circumstances and respond effectively to new challenges.

The size of personnel involved in a UN peacekeeping operation is an essential indicator of the international community's commitment to resolving conflicts and establishing peace. The size measure is based on the number of UN personnel deployed to the operation each month, comprising the contributions of different UN member states. On average, 34 member states contribute to the operations included in the analysis, and the maximum number of countries that contribute to an operation per month is 74. The rates of contributions from the member states and the level of their personnel commitments indicate the degree of their willingness to support the operation and help resolve the conflict.

The data on personnel contributions for the UN peacekeeping operations until October 2018 is obtained from the Peacekeeping Database of the International Peace Institute (IPI), an independent, non-profit research organization (IPI, n.d.). However, the data for November and December 2018 is not available in the IPI database. Therefore, it is filled manually using the monthly factsheets the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations releases.

Earlier studies on quantitative peacekeeping have used aggregated total personnel contribution data. However, this dissertation considers different peacekeeping personnel types

since they have varying duties and effects on peace. Except for recent studies like Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014, 2016; 2019), most studies have also disregarded police, military observer, and expert personnel components, but this dissertation includes them. The peacekeeping personnel types considered in this research are armed troops, conflict experts, formed police units, individual police, and military observers. The total personnel contribution is still measured as a general framework of personnel commitments.

The tasks and responsibilities of troops in UN peacekeeping operations can vary depending on the specific mission and context. However, in general, troops in UN peacekeeping operations are tasked with maintaining peace and security in the areas of deployment, facilitating the implementation of peace agreements, protecting civilians, and supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance. More specifically, troops in UN peacekeeping operations may be involved in patrols and surveillance, protection of civilians, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), humanitarian assistance, and capacity-building. Troops are equipped with weaponry and are generally deployed to the frontlines. Troops may conduct patrols to monitor and deter any potential threats to the peace process, including armed groups or criminal activities. They may also conduct surveillance operations to gather information on security threats and report to mission headquarters. They are also responsible for protecting civilians from violence, abuse, or other threats. This may involve establishing safe zones, providing security escorts, or taking other measures to ensure the safety of civilians. In some cases, troops may be involved in the DDR of former combatants by collecting weapons, providing vocational training, and supporting the reintegration of former fighters into civilian life. Besides, troops support the delivery of humanitarian assistance to affected communities, such as providing security escorts for aid convoys or assisting with distributing food and other relief supplies. Lastly, troops may be involved in capacity-building efforts, such as providing training and support to local security forces, helping to establish or strengthen institutions, and supporting the development of civil society. Overall, the tasks and responsibilities of troops in UN peacekeeping operations are multifaceted and require various skills and expertise, including military, diplomatic, and humanitarian knowledge and experience.

Police serve different roles than troops and are generally located behind the frontlines. As lightly armed personnel, the role of police in UN peacekeeping operations is to help restore law and order in post-conflict areas and support the development of effective, sustainable, and accountable law enforcement institutions. Some of the key tasks and responsibilities of police in UN peacekeeping operations include maintaining public safety and order, training and

mentoring, community policing, supporting the rule of law, and electoral support. Police personnel is responsible for maintaining public safety and order in areas of deployment, which may include responding to criminal incidents and providing security for high-risk events or individuals. Police may provide training and mentoring to local police forces to improve their skills and capacity to maintain law and order. This may involve instruction on basic policing procedures, criminal investigation techniques, or human rights and gender issues. They may engage with local communities to build trust, encourage cooperation, and gather information on security threats. Police may support efforts to strengthen the rule of law by promoting human rights, ensuring access to justice, and protecting vulnerable groups. In some cases, police personnel may support the conduct of elections by providing security during the election process, assisting with voter registration, and helping to resolve electoral disputes. Overall, the role of police in UN peacekeeping operations is critical to ensuring the safety and security of local populations, supporting the establishment of effective and accountable law enforcement institutions, and building the foundation for sustainable peace and development.

Military observers are unarmed personnel the UN deploys to observe and report on military operations in conflict zones. They are typically unarmed and serve in a non-combatant role, providing independent and impartial assessments of military activities to help promote peace, stability, and security in conflict-affected areas. The primary responsibilities of military observers in UN peacekeeping operations may include monitoring and reporting on military activities, facilitating communication and dialogue, providing technical expertise, and liaising with local communities. Military observers monitor and report on military activities, including ceasefire violations, troop movements, and incidents of violence. They work closely with local military and civilian authorities to gather information and provide regular reports to the UN mission leadership. They may help to facilitate communication and dialogue between conflicting parties to help de-escalate tensions and reduce the risk of violence. They may also serve as neutral third parties in negotiations between the parties. Military observers may provide technical expertise in DDR, military justice, and human rights. They may also advise on military tactics and operations to help improve the effectiveness of local military forces. Finally, they may liaise with local communities to build trust, gather information, and promote a better understanding of the mission and its objectives. They may also work with local authorities to address security concerns and protect vulnerable groups. The role of military observers in UN peacekeeping operations is to support efforts to promote peace and security by providing independent and impartial assessments of military activities, helping to facilitate communication and dialogue, and providing technical expertise where needed.

The troop is the most deployed personnel to UN operations. *Troop* has a monthly mean of 5,816.06 with a maximum of 38,318. Formed police units and individual police are categorized as police, the second most deployed personnel type in UN operations. *Police* has a mean of 801.86 with a maximum of 5,511. Lastly, experts on conflict are counted as military observers in the data. As the least deployed personnel type, *military observer* has a mean of 149.09 and a maximum monthly observation of 1,049. *Total personnel* has a monthly mean of 6,768.25 and a maximum of 39,893.

Figure 4.8 displays how the total personnel types have been distributed over the years. During the 1990s, the international community became hesitant to contribute personnel to UN peacekeeping operations due to the disastrous outcomes of some missions. As a result, there was a substantial decline in troop contributions during the second half of the 1990s. However, in the following years, there has been a noticeable increase in the deployment of troops to UN peacekeeping missions. The number of police deployments has also increased during this period, while the levels of military observers and experts have remained relatively stable.



Figure 4.8: Total Personnel Types over the Years

4.2.4. Control Variables

The study includes several control variables. The first control variable is signing any *prior agreement* that supplies a cessation of violence or ceasefire in the conflict before the operation's launch. Prior agreements between warring parties can affect the success of peacekeeping operations. If there is already an agreement in place, it may indicate a higher likelihood of compliance and cooperation from the parties involved, leading to a lower level of battlefield violence and longer peace duration. On the other hand, if there is no prior agreement, the peacekeeping operation may face more challenges in enforcing peace and reducing violence, potentially leading to a higher level of battlefield violence and shorter peace duration. By including having a prior agreement as a control variable in the analyses, the study can isolate the effect of peacekeeping operations from the effect of having a prior agreement on the success of peacekeeping efforts. Peace agreement data is from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Davies et al., 2022). The binary variable is coded as 1 if the conflict has witnessed any signed peace agreement before the operation.

Second, *conflict duration* prior to the operation's establishment is taken into account because it is important to take into account the length of time that the conflict had been ongoing before the mission began. This is because conflicts that have been going on for a longer time may be more entrenched and difficult to resolve, affecting the success of a peacekeeping mission. By controlling for prior conflict duration, the study can better isolate the effect of the operation on the outcomes of interest, such as battlefield violence and negative peace duration. Additionally, more protracted conflicts may have more complex causes and dynamics since it has already spread across every layer of society. Controlling for prior conflict duration can help account for some of these complexities in the analysis. Conflict duration data is from the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (Davies et al., 2022). *Conflict duration* has a mean of 3.11 years, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 22 years.

Third, as a novel variable in the literature, a *spike* in battle-related deaths is controlled for in the analyses. The measure of a spike in deaths refers to a sudden increase in deaths just before a UN peacekeeping operation is established. To determine if a conflict has experienced a spike in deaths, the average number of deaths in the period before the operation is calculated. If the number of deaths in the year before the operation is higher than this average, then the conflict is considered to have experienced a spike in deaths. This suggests that the conflict was either escalating or experiencing a resurgence in violence, which could make it more difficult for a peacekeeping operation to be successful. If there was a recent escalation in

violence or an increase in deaths before the operation, it might indicate that the conflict dynamics were already volatile and complex before the UN intervention. This could make it more challenging for the peacekeeping mission to achieve its objectives and reduce battlefield violence or sustain peace in the long term. The inclusion of the spike in deaths before the operation as a control variable allows the analysis to assess the effectiveness of the UN operation relative to the situation on the ground while accounting for pre-existing conflict dynamics that may affect the operation's success as a potential confounding factor.

Fourth, the outgoing *refugee* population from the recipient country is included as a control variable to account for the spillover effects of the conflict on neighboring countries and the potentially destabilizing effects that the outflow of refugees can have on the host country and the region. As Bove and Elia (2011) state, large numbers of refugees can threaten international peace and security by creating spillover effects. The presence of a large number of refugees leaving a conflict zone can destabilize neighboring countries, leading to the creation of new conflicts or the expansion of existing ones. Additionally, the inclusion of this variable helps to account for the potential impact of humanitarian aid on the operation's success, as UN peacekeeping operations are often involved in providing support to refugees and displaced populations. This data is from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, n.d.). The refugee variable is logged to eliminate the effects of outliers. On a yearly basis, the outgoing *refugee* population has a mean of 92,797.56, with a minimum of 5 and a maximum of 1,078,280.

Fifth, the international community's interest might increase with the existence of fuel exports from the recipient country; therefore, *fuel* export as a percentage of merchandise exports is included as another control variable. The international community may be more interested in countries with abundant natural resources such as fuel because these resources can generate revenue and contribute to economic development. The presence of natural resources can also make a country strategically important for geopolitical reasons. As a result, countries with natural resources may be more likely to receive attention and intervention from the international community, including peacekeeping operations. Fuel data is from the World Bank (World Bank, "Fuel exports"). On a yearly basis, host countries' fuel export percentages of merchandise exports have a mean of 6.96, with a maximum percentage of 97.01.

Sixth, the host country's *population* is included as it might affect the success of UN peacekeeping operations in multiple ways. For instance, a larger population may imply a larger number of armed actors and an increased likelihood of armed conflict, thereby affecting the

intensity of battlefield violence and the probability of renewed conflict. Previous studies like Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Hegre and Sambanis (2006) reveal that population positively affects the likelihood of conflict. Likewise, as the population increases, the number of battle deaths may increase. It may also mean more complex ethnic or religious divisions, which could make peacekeeping operations more challenging. Therefore, including the host country's population as a control variable in the analysis can help to account for such. Population data is from the World Bank (World Bank, "Population, total"). The *population* variable is logged on a yearly basis to eliminate the effects of outliers.

Lastly, using mission types as a control variable allows to account for the differences in mandates, tasks, and density of contributions of UN peacekeeping operations. For example, different mission types, such as peace enforcement, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding, require different strategies and resources, which may affect their effectiveness in reducing battlefield violence and promoting peace duration. By controlling for mission types, the research can assess the impact of other variables on the success of UN peacekeeping operations while holding mission types constant. The categories of *mission types* are from the Military and Non-Military Interventions Dataset (MILINDA) (Jetschke & Schlipphak, 2019). Jetschke and Schlipphak (2019) differentiate four types of missions: peace enforcing, observer, peacekeeping, and other types. However, since there is only one peace enforcing mission among the 55 operations, peace enforcing and peacekeeping missions are combined into a single category with armed personnel. Observer missions involve unarmed military observers aimed at observing, monitoring peace agreements, or mediating between conflicting parties. Other missions are primarily focused on building institutional capacities. Overall, intervention types in this data are classified into two: peacekeeping operations, including peace enforcing missions, and observer type operations, including other missions. The variable *mission type* is coded as 1 for peacekeeping operations that require armed personnel and 0 for observer missions with unarmed personnel. Table 4.1 provides the frequencies of UN peacekeeping operations and intervention types based on the MILINDA categorization.

Table 4.1: Intervention Types of UN Operations

Intervention Type	Frequency
Enforcement	1
Peacekeeping	31
Observer	15
Other	8
Total	55

For analyses on battlefield violence, the *lagged dyadic battle-related deaths* is another control variable included in the analyses to account for the potential influence of past violence on the current conflict situation. By including this measure as a control variable in the analysis, it is aimed to adjust for the lagged effect of previous violence in the conflict and assess the effectiveness of the UN operation relative to this pre-existing condition. This variable is the one month lagged of *dyadic battle-related deaths*, as combat hostilities at time *t* are likely to be associated with the occurrence and magnitude of hostilities at *t-1*.

Table 4.2 goes through the descriptive statistics of constant variables; Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics of yearly variables; and Table 4.4 shows the statistics on monthly variables.

Table 4.2**:** Descriptive Statistics of the Constant Variables

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Conflict Duration (Years)	3.11	4.71	0	22
Spike[4]	0.32	0.47	0	1
Post-Conflict[5]	0.32	0.47	0	1
Prior Agreement[6]	0.78	0.41	0	1

[4] 18 cases experience a spike in battle-related deaths, and 37 cases do not experience any spike in deaths.
[5] 18 post-conflict and 37 active conflict cases.
[6] 43 cases with prior agreement and 12 with no prior agreement.

Prior UN Operation[7]	0.7	0.45	0	1
Consent	0.98	0.13	0	1
Duration of the Operation (Months)	45.17	43.15	3	191
Total Peacekeeper Fatalities	49.67	72.89	0	289
Chapter VII	0.47	0.5	0	1
Duration Between Suggestion – UNSC Resolution (Months)	0.64	0.93	0	5
Duration Between UNSC Resolution – First Deployment (Months)[8]	2.01	4.83	-2	33
Duration Between Suggestion – First Deployment (Months)	2.68	5.00	-2	34
Duration Between UNSC Resolution – First Deployment (Days)[9]	67.38	149.52	-61	1033
First Total Personnel Size	2635.09	4724.18	2	19685
First Troop Personnel Size	1423.25	3419.41	0	17745
First Police Personnel Size	151.07	299.76	0	1255

[7] 39 cases are follow-up peacekeeping operations, and 16 cases do not have a prior operation.
[8] -2 is MONUC; 33 is UNSOM (there is no data available from May 2013 to February 2016 for UNSOM; this mission has to be excluded from the analyses).
[9] -61 is MONUC; 1033 is UNSOM.

First Military Observer Personnel Size	46.03	113.94	0	716

Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics of Yearly Variables

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Refugee	92797.56	160031.1	5	1078280
Refugee (Log)	9.86	2.70	1.60	13.24
Fuel Export (%)	6.96	18.28	0	97.01
Population	2.70e+	4.68e+	1976699	2.48e+
Population (Log)	16.31	1.12	14.58	19.29

Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics of Monthly Variables

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Peace Duration (Monthly per Dyad)	89.02	87.67	0	336
Active Violence Events (Dyad)	0.12	0.32	0	1
Active Violence Events (Conflict)	0.12	0.33	0	1
Battle-Related Deaths (Dyad)	31.52	331.97	0	23693
Battle-Related Deaths (Conflict)	38.12	343.09	0	23693
Number of Contributors	34.72	16.83	1	74
Troop	5816.06	7556.20	0	38318

Police	801.86	1157.363	0	5511
Military Observer	149.09	179.64	0	1049
Total Personnel	6768.25	8213.34	1	39893
Authorized Personnel Number	8050.00	9028.41	5	45680
Delay of Increased Authorization[10]	4.07	8.95	0	45

4.3. Research Method

This study analyzes the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations using a quantitative approach. The analysis is divided into two sets of large-scale analyses. The first set of analyses examines the negative peace duration using survival analysis, and the second set focuses on the level of battlefield violence using negative binomial regression.

4.3.1. Survival Analysis

Survival analysis, which is also known as hazard or duration analysis, is a statistical method used to analyze the time until an event of interest occurs, such as death, disease recurrence, or recovery. This method is designed to explore the effects of covariates on the length of time, meaning the expected duration, an event will occur (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). It is commonly used to study the time to an event of interest, especially when the outcome of interest is not immediately observed but may be censored. Censoring occurs when the survival time of an individual is not fully observed. Survival analysis accounts for censoring in the analysis, allowing researchers to estimate the probability of survival at different times and identify factors associated with survival.

Survival analysis is conducted for the duration of negative peace to estimate the effects of the independent variables on the risk of peace failing at any point in time. The duration of negative peace is the time between a conflict's termination and another's start, counted as months. An advantage of survival analysis is that the researcher does not have to set off an arbitrary cutoff point; for example, a threshold of two years of peace to denote 'stable' or

[10] There are 138 instances of increase in authorized personnel numbers.

'successful' peace. Instead, it is possible to treat the duration of peace as a continuous phenomenon. When the monthly battle-related deaths for the government-rebel group dyad exceeds the 25 battle deaths threshold, then the negative peace fails in statistical terms.

Although the dataset covers 1991 to 2018, and since we do not know how long negative peace will last, 2018 onwards is considered right censored in statistical terms. This type of analysis does not assume that the negative peace that lasted until the end of the period will continue to do so.

Of the survival analysis models available, Cox proportional hazard models in the Efron method for ties. The Cox proportional hazards model is a semi-parametric model that can be used to examine the relationship between covariates and survival time. The model assumes that the hazard function (the rate at which events occur over time) is proportional over time, meaning that the relative hazard of two individuals remains constant over time, given that their covariate values remain constant. The Cox proportional hazards model estimates the hazard ratio, which measures the relative risk of experiencing the event of interest for individuals with different covariate levels, controlling for other covariates in the model. A hazard ratio greater than 1 indicates an increased risk of the event, while a hazard ratio less than 1 indicates a decreased risk. Besides, the Cox proportional hazards model allows for the inclusion of time-varying covariates, which are variables that may change over time. For example, the *population* of a host country is a yearly changing observation, and the Cox proportional hazards model can account for these changes.

Since we do not know the direction of the hazard function, meaning that we do not know if peace becomes more or less likely to last, the Cox model is preferred because it does not make any assumptions about the underlying hazard function of peace failing (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). Typically, survival analysis produces hazard ratios instead of coefficients. In Stata, coefficients can be presented in the results tables to make them more familiar to readers. Hazard ratio tables are also provided in the Appendix A. Some studies have used clustered analysis in survival analysis. However, this study does not employ this method because each government-rebel group dyad has unique features that are best left varying.

Instead of employing a single-failure survival time, the dataset is classified as multiple-failure survival time or recurrent event data, meaning that cases can experience multiple events of interest. In other words, government-rebel group dyads can experience the onset of violence with 25 or more battle-related deaths more than once over time.

4.3.2. Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression

The dyadic battle-related deaths variable is a count variable. Four statistical models deal with count outcomes: the Poisson regression model, the negative binomial regression model, truncated count models (zero truncated Poisson and zero truncated negative binomial), and zero modified count models. These models differ in their assumptions and specifications, and their suitability depends on the characteristics of the data and the research question.

The Poisson regression model is the most basic model that accounts for observed heterogeneity, meaning observed differences among sample members (Williams, 2021). The Poisson regression model assumes that the variance of the count variable is equal to the mean, and it models the expected count as a function of the predictor variables. This model is appropriate when the variance of the count is equal to the mean and there is no excess variation or over-dispersion in the data. So, the model underestimates the amount of dispersion in the outcome. If there is an overdispersion in the estimates, the model estimates are consistent but inefficient, and standard errors will be biased downward, resulting in spuriously large z-values.

The negative binomial regression model is a generalized linear model that relaxes the assumption of equal mean and variance and allows for over-dispersion in the data. This model is appropriate when the variance of the count is greater than the mean, indicating excess variation in the data. So, this model accounts for possible unobserved heterogeneity and contagion in the data (Williams, 2021). Contagion occurs when individuals with a given set of independent variables have the same probability of an event occurring, but this probability changes as events occur. Contagion violates the independence assumption of the Poisson distribution.

The third option, truncated count models, such as zero-truncated Poisson and zero-truncated negative binomial, are used when there are excess zeros in the data. These models assume that the counts are generated by a truncated distribution that starts at one, and they estimate the expected count for non-zero observations. These models are appropriate when there are a large number of zero counts in the data, and they account for the fact that a standard Poisson or negative binomial distribution does not generate the data. However, models for truncated counts do not apply to the data. Zero-truncated models are designed for situations where some observations with outcomes equal to zero are missing from the sample because of how the data are collected (Williams, 2021). For instance, a survey of how often people visit the shopping mall may be done to people who are currently at the mall.

Lastly, zero-modified count models are used when there are excess zeros in the data that the truncated count models cannot explain. These models assume that the zero counts are generated by a separate process, such as a logistic regression model, and a Poisson or negative binomial distribution generates the non-zero counts. The zero-modified count model assumes two latent groups (Williams, 2021). One group cannot go beyond zero; the other group may have a zero count. Zero-inflated models allow for this possibility and increase the conditional variance while increasing the probability of zero counts.

Out of the four count models, the zero-inflated negative binomial model is found to be the most suitable for measuring the impact of UN peacekeeping operations on battlefield violence. The Stata statistical software provides a command called 'countfit,' which compares the results of different count models such as Poisson regression, negative binomial regression, zero-inflated Poisson, and zero-inflated negative binomial regression models. The 'countfit' command produces results that strongly support using the zero-inflated negative binomial model over the other models. These results are presented in the Appendix B.

The zero-inflated negative binomial model is a suitable statistical method to deal with overdispersion in the count data of battle-related deaths. The *battle-related deaths* is a count variable with a variance greater than the mean, including excessive zeroes. The model assumes that the count data is generated by two processes, one for the occurrence of deaths and the other for the absence of deaths, i.e., a post-conflict environment. The two groups with zero deaths will look identical in the response variable but have arrived at the same outcome through different processes. The first group could have witnessed no deaths during the operation and afterward but have not experienced any deaths.

The second group is almost certain to have zero deaths in ideal conditions. The second group is referred to as the 'certain zero.' In this group, the number of zeroes may be inflated, and the number of deaths in the 'certain zero' group, meaning the post-conflict group, cannot be explained in the same manner as the group with more than zero deaths. The zero-inflated model accommodates this complication, as a standard negative binomial would not distinguish between these two processes and might produce biased outcomes. When analyzing data with excessive outcome zeroes and two possible processes that arrive at a zero outcome, a zero-inflated model could be the best model.

The zero-inflated negative binomial regression generates and combines two separate models (UCLA, n.d.). First, a logit model is generated for the 'certain zero' group (also referred to as the post-conflict group), predicting whether a case would be in this group. Then,

a negative binomial model is generated, predicting the counts for those cases that are not certain zeros. Lastly, the two models are combined. The model predicts count with all the control variables and predicts certain zeroes by considering having a prior agreement and the prior conflict duration.

Prior agreement and *conflict duration* variables are selected for the 'certain zero' group due to theoretical considerations of them making zeroes more likely and their observations inflated with zeros with standard deviations being larger than their means. Firstly, having a prior agreement could affect the probability of observing zero deaths during the peacekeeping operation. A prior agreement between conflicting parties could signal a decrease in the likelihood of violent conflict, which could result in fewer or zero battle-related deaths. Secondly, prior conflict duration could also influence the likelihood of observing zero deaths during the peacekeeping operation. For example, if the conflict has already ceased, it could be more likely that both parties are exhausted and willing to reach a peaceful agreement or already has, resulting in fewer or zero battle-related deaths during the operation. By including these variables in the analysis, we can account for their potential influence on the probability of observing zero deaths and improve the accuracy of the model's estimates. In this way, we can better understand the effect of the initial speed and size of UN peacekeeping operations on battlefield violence while taking into account the unique characteristics of the 'certain zero' group. It is also crucial to check the quality of the model and evaluate the effect of the inflation variables on its performance. One way to do this is to compare the model with and without the inflation variables using statistical tests, such as likelihood ratio tests. The statistical tests indicate that all models containing these two variables are significantly better.

4.3.3. Other Considerations

2-stage modeling is a statistical technique that involves estimating two separate models and linking them together. The first stage model estimates the probability or propensity of an event occurring, while the second stage model estimates the magnitude or intensity of the event if it does occur. This approach is often used when the dependent variable of interest is limited or censored in some way, such as in count data or survival analysis. 2-stage modeling is not preferred for analyzing the data in this dissertation because the main analyses are on active conflicts with ongoing violence and post-conflict cases with the duration of negative peace. To construct a 2-stage model, for instance, one needs first to identify coefficient(s) that affect why the operation is established and then separate coefficient(s) for the duration until

breaking out of violence. The second stage should consist of single or several variables that do not affect the first stage. Considering the research questions, distinguishing variables that do not affect the first stage but affect the second one is not applicable. Suppose one differentiates a variable for the selection phase, such as having a peace agreement before the operation establishment. In that case, the second stage omits operations that do not fit into the specified category. Here, the objective is not to analyze if the UN chooses harder cases to deploy but rather to analyze the effects of operations' components on the duration of negative peace and ongoing conflict.

The UNSC formulates resolutions based on the specific needs of conflicts after conducting technical assessments. These resolutions are tailored to address the dimensions of the conflict, which are generally post facto categorized as either easier or harder cases. The "needs" argument focuses on the dimensions of the conflict, generally characterizing conflicts as easier or harder cases. Studies have identified harder cases with high levels of battle-related deaths, large refugee populations, multiple combatants, and longer war durations (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Gilligan & Stedman, 2003; Fortna, 2004a, 2004b, 2008; Beardsley & Schmidt, 2012). Violent or complex conflicts might require larger personnel sizes, resulting in more personnel being deployed during the initial stages of the operation compared to easier cases. Beardsley (2004) tests endogenous relationships for UN interventions, and its results show that the UN is more likely to intervene if the conflicts are less likely to resolve. However, almost twenty years have passed since Beardsley's dataset,[11] and it is necessary to control for initial needs among conflicts requiring peacekeeping.

To control for the issue of endogeneity, a control mechanism is proposed, involving including data on the conflict starting from its beginning rather than just from the deployment of UN peacekeepers. This way, the analysis can control for prior conditions of the conflict, such as conflict intensity, duration, and refugee population. For instance, the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) was first suggested in June (S/1997/438), then its authorizing UNSC resolution was adopted by the end of June, and the initial deployment was in July. Instead of starting data observations from the date of deployment, observations for MONUA would start from the beginning of the conflict dyad. By doing so, the analysis can better capture the unique characteristics of each conflict and control for any potential endogeneity issues.

[11] Beardsley (2004) includes cases from 1945 to 2001.

The study has carefully chosen and utilized various quantitative analysis methods based on its theoretical framework, dataset's structure, variables included, and research questions. All analyses have been followed by the required post-estimation tests, as specified in the Appendix. The study is considered advanced as it has employed different cutting-edge quantitative methods based on the analysis requirements.

Table 4.5: List of Included UN Peacekeeping Operations

UN Peacekeeping Operation	Region	Country
MINUCI **United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire**	Africa	Ivory Coast
MINUGUA **United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala**	Americas	Guatemala
MINUJUSTH **United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti**	Americas	Haiti
MINURCA **United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic**	Africa	Central African Republic
MINURCAT **United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad**	Africa	Central African Republic/Chad
MINURSO **United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara**	Africa	Morocco
MINUSCA **United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic**	Africa	Central African Republic
MINUSMA **United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali**	Africa	Mali
MINUSTAH **United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti**	Americas	Haiti
MIPONUH **United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti**	Americas	Haiti
MONUA **UN Observer Mission in Angola**	Africa	Angola

MONUC **United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**	Africa	Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO **United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**	Africa	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ONUB **United Nations Operation in Burundi**	Africa	Burundi
ONUMOZ **United Nations Operation in Mozambique**	Africa	Mozambique
ONUSAL **United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador**	Americas	El Salvador
UNAMA **United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan**	Asia and the Pacific	Afghanistan
UNAMET **United Nations Mission in East Timor**	Asia and the Pacific	Indonesia
UNAMIC **United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia**	Asia and the Pacific	Cambodia
UNAMID **African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur**	Africa	Sudan
UNAMIR **United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda**	Africa	Rwanda
UNAMSIL **United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone**	Africa	Sierra Leone
UNAVEM II **United Nations Angola Verification Mission II**	Africa	Angola
UNAVEM III	Africa	Angola

United Nations Angola Verification Mission III		
UNCRO **United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia**	Europe	Bosnia Herzegovina/Croatia
UNIKOM **United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission**	Middle East	Iraq
UNISFA **United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei**	Africa	Sudan
UNMEE **United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea**	Africa	Eritrea
UNMIBH **United Nations Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina**	Europe	Bosnia Herzegovina
UNMIH **United Nations Mission in Haiti**	Americas	Haiti
UNMIK **United Nations Mission in Kosovo**	Europe	Serbia
UNMIL **United Nations Mission in Liberia**	Africa	Liberia
UNMIS **United Nations Mission in the Sudan**	Africa	Sudan
UNMISET **United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor**	Asia and the Pacific	Indonesia
UNMISS **United Nations Mission in South Sudan**	Africa	South Sudan
UNMIT **United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste**	Asia and the Pacific	Indonesia
UNMOP **United Nations Mission of Observers in**	Europe	Croatia

Prevlaka		
UNMOT **United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan**	Asia and the Pacific	Tajikistan
UNOCI **United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire**	Africa	Ivory Coast
UNOMIG **United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia**	Europe	Georgia
UNOMIL **United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia**	Africa	Liberia
UNOMSIL **United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone**	Africa	Sierra Leone
UNOMUR **United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda**	Africa	Rwanda
UNOSOM I **United Nations Operation in Somalia I**	Africa	Somalia
UNOSOM II **United Nations Operation in Somalia II**	Africa	Somalia
UNPREDEP **United Nations Preventive Deployment Force**	Europe	Serbia
UNPROFOR **United Nations Protection Force**	Europe	Bosnia Herzegovina/Croatia
UNPSG **United Nations Civilian Police Support Group**	Europe	Bosnia Herzegovina/Croatia
UNSMIH **United Nations Support Mission in Haiti**	Americas	Haiti
UNSMIS **United Nations Supervision Mission in**	Middle East	Syria

Syria		
UNSOM **United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia**	Africa	Somalia
UNTAC **United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia**	Asia and the Pacific	Cambodia
UNTAES **United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium**	Europe	Bosnia Herzegovina/Croatia
UNTAET **United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor**	Asia and the Pacific	Indonesia
UNTMIH **United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti**	Americas	Haiti

Table 4.6**:** List of UN Peacekeeping Operations' UNSC Resolutions, and Their Suggestion, Resolution, Initial Deployment and End Dates

UN Peacekeeping Operation	Date of Suggestion	UNSC Resolution	Date of Resolution	Date of Initial Deployment	Operation End Date
MINUCI	March 2003	1479	13 May 2003	June 2003	April 2004
MINUGUA	January 1997	1094	20 January 1997	January 1997	May 1997
MINUJUSTH	March 2017	2350	13 April 2017	October 2017	October 2019
MINURCA	February 1998	1159	27 March 1998	April 1998	February 2000
MINURCAT	August 2007	1778	25 September 2007	September 2007	December 2010
MINURSO	April 1991	690	29 April 1991	September 1991	Ongoing
MINUSCA	January 2014	2149	10 April 2014	May 2014	Ongoing
MINUSMA	March 2013	2100	25 April 2013	July 2013	Ongoing
MINUSTAH	April 2004	1542	30 April 2004	May 2004	October 2017
MIPONUH	October 1997	1141	28 November 1997	December 1997	March 2000
MONUA	June 1997	1118	30 June 1997	July 1997	February 1999
MONUC	November 1999	1279	30 November 1999	September 1999	July 2010
MONUSCO	March 2010	1925	28 May 2010	July 2010	Ongoing

ONUB	March 2004	1545	21 May 2004	June 2004	December 2006
ONUMOZ	December 1992	797	16 December 1992	January 1993	December 1994
ONUSAL	December 1990	693	20 May 1991	September 1991	April 1995
UNAMA	March 2002	1401	28 March 2002	October 2002	Ongoing
UNAMET	June 1999	1246	11 June 1999	August 1999	October 1999
UNAMIC	September 1991	717	16 October 1991	November 1991	March 1992
UNAMID	June 2007	1769	31 July 2007	November 2007	December 2020
UNAMIR	September 1993	872	5 October 1993	October 1993	March 1996
UNAMSIL	September 1999	1270	22 October 1999	October 1999	December 2005
UNAVEM II	May 1991	696	31 May 1991	May 1991	February 1995
UNAVEM III	February 1995	976	08 February 1995	February 1995	June 1997
UNCRO	March 1995	981	31 March 1995	April 1995	January 1996
UNIKOM	April 1991	689	9 April 1991	April 1991	October 2003
UNISFA	June 2011	1990	27 June 2011	August 2011	Ongoing
UNMEE	June 2000	1320	15 September 2000[12]	July 2000	Jul 2008

[12] On the 31st of July 2000, the Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea (S/2000/643) stated a decision on deployment, and an appropriate number of officers were deployed.

UNMIBH	December 1995	1035	21 December 1995	June 1996	December 2002
UNMIH	September 1993	867	23 September 1993	September 1994	Jul 1997
UNMIK	May 1999	1244	10 June 1999	June 1999	Ongoing
UNMIL	September 2003	1509	19 September 2003	September 2003	April 2018
UNMIS	January 2005	1590	24 March 2005	March 2005	Jul 2011
UNMISET	April 2002	1410	17 May 2002	May 2002	May 2005
UNMISS	NA[13]	1996	8 July 2011	August 2011	Ongoing
UNMIT	August 2006	1704	25 August 2006	August 2006	December 2012
UNMOP	December 1995	1038	15 January 1996	January 1996	December 2002
UNMOT	November 1994	968	16 December 1994	December 1994	May 2000
UNOCI	January 2004	1528	27 February 2004	March 2004	June 2017
UNOMIG	August 1993	858	24 August 1993	September 1993	June 2009
UNOMIL	September 1993	866	22 September 1993	September 1993	September 1997
UNOMSIL	June 1998	1181	13 July 1998	July 1998	October 1999
UNOMUR	May 1993	846	22 June 1993	June 1993	September 1994

[13] No date was found for the suggestion of UNMISS.

UNOSOM I	April 1992	751	24 April 1992	August 1992	March 1993
UNOSOM II	March 1993	814	26 March 1993	March 1993	March 1995
UNPREDEP	March 1995	983	31 March 1995	April 1995	February 1999
UNPROFOR	February 1992	743	21 February 1992	April 1992	December 1995
UNPSG	December 1997	1145	19 December 1997	March 1998	October 1998
UNSMIH	June 1996	1063	28 June 1996	August 1996	Jul 1997
UNSMIS	April 2012	2043	21 April 2012	April 2012	Aug 2012
UNSOM	April 2013	2102	2 May 2013	February 2016	Ongoing
UNTAC	February 1992	745	28 February 1992	February 1992	September 1993
UNTAES	December 1995	1037	15 January 1996	January 1996	January 1998
UNTAET	October 1999	1272	25 October 1999	October 1999	May 2002
UNTMIH	July 1997	1123	30 July 1997	September 1997	November 1997

Chapter 5

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

This chapter analyzes the research question of how the characteristics of UN peacekeeping operations' initial deployments, including speed, size, and composition, affect ongoing violence and negative peace duration. The study focuses on all newly established UN peacekeeping operations between 1991 and 2018 without geographical restrictions. The chapter starts with examining the effects of UN peacekeeping operations on the duration of negative peace using Cox survival analysis. Then the chapter proceeds to investigate the effects of operations on battlefield violence through zero-inflated negative binomial regression.

5.1. Effects on Peace

Do UN peacekeeping operations' speed, size, and composition components matter in prolonging peace? This part of the analysis focuses on the long-term effects of the initial deployments of UN peacekeeping operations by grasping the effects on the durability of negative peace.

The first part of the analysis employs Cox proportional hazards model to judge the effects of the covariates. As a semi-parametric model for survival analysis, the Cox survival model estimates the duration of negative peace to estimate the effects of the study's independent variables on the risk of peace failing at any point in time. So, the model tests the effect of the covariates in shortening or extending the duration of negative peace. The Cox model does not make any assumptions about the underlying hazard function of peace failing or the shape of the baseline hazard. In addition, the Cox proportional hazards model can handle censored data and allows for the analysis of time-varying covariates, which are variables that change over time. Several models with different specifications that have assumptions about

the shape of the baseline hazard are also employed, and the results were consistent across different models.

Rather than employing a concept of post-conflict peace with only UN peacekeeping operations established in post-conflict areas, the study covers a wide range of UN operations established to active and passive conflicts across three decades. Therefore, the concept of 'negative peace duration' is used instead of 'post-conflict peace duration.' Negative peace refers to the absence of personal violence in an area and represents a reliable and measurable absence of violence. This concept does not need to be quantified or approximated through proxies. The use of negative peace duration allows for an accurate analysis of the impact of UN peacekeeping operations on conflicts, regardless of their phase.

The dataset used in this dissertation is classified as multiple-failure survival time data (also known as recurrent event data), which means that individuals (in this case, government-rebel group dyads) can experience multiple events of interest (i.e., the onset of violence with 25 or more battle-related deaths) over time. Multiple-failure survival analysis is preferred over single-failure because by taking into consideration the recurrent peace disruptions that cover the longevity of the conflict instead of just a short period of time. There are hundreds of peace failures across the 42 conflicts included, and if only the first failure is taken into consideration, the analyses are limited to the first reaction of the conflict. Any theoretical argument, based on the duration of peace, could be made with multiple-failure survival analysis. However, if only single-failure is employed, the analyses would yield results for how long the negative peace would last for the first time. Nonetheless, the results prove similar with both analysis types.

The scale of the survival analysis is yearly, based on government-rebel group dyads. The dataset includes information on UN peacekeeping operations established from 1991 to 2018, and the data is right-censored in December 2018, which means that the survival analysis considers only the events that occurred before this date. The failure event of the survival analysis is passing the 25 battle-related deaths threshold.

The study's results are presented in tables containing coefficients instead of hazard ratios to make it familiar to the reader. Hazard ratio tables are also presented in the Appendix A. The coefficients in the tables illustrate the impact of each independent variable on the likelihood of the event (the end of negative peace). A negative coefficient signifies a decrease in the probability of negative peace ending, while a positive coefficient indicates a higher chance of violence breaking out.

The Cox model can distinguish between time-varying and time-constant covariates, and all the survival analysis models used in this study include both types of covariates. Time-varying covariates, such as host country population, refugee numbers, and fuel export percentages, are variables that change over time. Models with only time-constant covariates can undergo proportional hazards assumption tests, such as the Schoenfeld residuals test, which assesses the proportional hazards assumption based on Schoenfeld residuals after fitting a model with Cox survival analysis. However, when time-dependent or time-varying covariates are used, the model is no longer a 'proportional hazards' model but rather an extended Cox model. Therefore, conducting a proportional hazards assumption test on models that include time-varying covariates is not feasible.

Table 5.1 presents the results for hypothesis 1a, which suggests that a quicker initial deployment leads to a longer duration of negative peace. The table includes three Cox regression models that examine the three different measures of initial deployment's delay: the duration between suggestion to UNSC resolution, the duration between UNSC resolution to deployment, and the duration between suggestion to deployment. The results reveal significant support for the hypothesis. In Models 2 and 3, for the duration between UNSC resolution and deployment and the total duration between suggestion to initial deployment, the chance of reverting to war increases as the delay between the two events increases. In other words, as the delay in deployment increases, the negative peace duration decreases. The hazard ratios show that for every additional month of delay between UNSC resolution and initial deployment, the risk of another active conflict increases by 0.3%. Similarly, every one-month delay from operation suggestion to initial deployment increases the hazard of another war breaking out by 0.2%. Although these percentages seem small, it proves an effective result with speedy initial deployments being crucial in ensuring a longer duration of negative peace.

Model 1, which examines the duration between the suggestion and the UNSC resolution, contradicts the results of Models 2 and 3. The findings suggest that as the delay between the operation suggestion and UNSC resolution increases, the likelihood of returning to war decreases by 11%. This may be due to the time gap providing adequate opportunity for conflict analysis, planning, and preparation for the needs of the area in question. Proper preparation for an operation is expected to result in quicker and stronger initial deployments and longer negative peace durations. Several intervening factors could account for this finding; a ceasefire could have happened, the conflict could have turned stale, and it could also point to a better formulation of a UNSC resolution that addresses the needs of the conflict.

Regardless of size, speed is an essential element of UN peacekeeping operations; with regards to being a defining moment, the promptness of initial deployment increases the chances of a more extended period of nonviolence. The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) are two examples of peacekeeping operations with fast initial deployments and a longer preparation period for their UNSC Resolutions, leading to longer negative peace durations.

MINURCAT was established in 2007 with UNSC Resolution 1778 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to support the governments of Chad and the Central African Republic in addressing the challenges posed by the presence of armed groups in the region (UNSC, 2007). The primary objective of MINURCAT was to protect civilians and support the government in its efforts to promote peace, security, and stability. The mission had a wide range of tasks, including monitoring human rights violations, supporting disarmament and demobilization efforts, and promoting the rule of law (Karlsrud, 2005).

In 2010, the Chadian government announced that it would no longer support the mission, and MINURCAT was subsequently withdrawn from Chad and the Central African Republic. While the mission made significant contributions to the peace process in the region, its withdrawal was seen as a setback for ongoing efforts to promote peace and stability and highlighted the ongoing challenges faced by the region and the need for continued international support in addressing these challenges. The mission demonstrated the importance of working closely with local communities, engaging in dialogue with all stakeholders, and adopting a comprehensive approach to promoting peace and stability (Karlsrud, 2005).

Despite a small initial deployment of only three military observers and taking two months to adopt its UNSC Resolution, MINURCAT significantly promoted peace and stability in the region.[14] The mission reduced violence, protected civilians, supported efforts to disarm and demobilize former combatants, and promoted human rights and the rule of law (Karlsrud, 2005). In terms of negative peace duration, MINURCAT has a successful record. Although it came to a premature end, this was not due to the operation's lack of promoting or maintaining peace. By having a prompt deployment of only one month delay and a two month delay in adopting its UNSC Resolution, MINURCAT suits the results of the Cox survival

[14] In coordination with MINURCAT, EU troops of EU Force (EUFOR) were planned to be deployed for 12 months alongside the blue helmets in November 2007 but only deployed in February 2008, reaching its initial operational capability in March 2008 (EU ESDP, 2009). Therefore, MINURCAT's initial deployment is isolated from any effects on EUFOR.

analyses. MINURCAT initially deployed only three military observers (and continued with three personnel for the first three months) out of the 5525 personnel authorized in UNSC Resolution 1778. Although MINURCAT had a drippling initial size, the mission's prompt initial deployment and speed of intervention created a defining moment with opportunities for swift action, establishing credibility in the eyes of locals and leading to longer periods of negative peace.

As another supporting example for the Cox analyses of delay of initial deployment results, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was a UN peacekeeping mission deployed in Sudan between 2005 and 2011. The mission was established by the UNSC Resolution 1590, adopted on March 24, 2005, to facilitate the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) the same year (Hansen, 2015). The primary objective of UNMIS was to help facilitate the implementation of the CPA and promote peace, stability, and development in Sudan. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNMIS was authorized to take the necessary action to protect UN personnel and facilitations while protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. UNMIS had a wide range of tasks, including supporting the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants; providing technical assistance to the electoral process; and monitoring human rights violations (United Nations, 2005b).

UNMIS played a critical role in supporting the implementation of the CPA and promoting peace and stability in Sudan. One of the critical achievements of UNMIS was the successful holding of democratic elections in Sudan, including a peaceful and on-time referendum in Southern Sudan that led to the country's independence in 2011 (Hansen, 2015). The ceasefire mechanisms of bringing parties together and observing them were an integral part of the UNMIS, and the mission used these mechanisms to build confidence and address potential threats to the ceasefire. The mission also helped to facilitate the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants and supported the process of reintegrating them into civilian life. UNMIS played a significant role in monitoring human rights violations and in protecting civilians, particularly in Darfur, where it supported the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Although the situation in Darfur remained volatile throughout UNMIS's mandate, the secession of South Sudan, while a significant achievement, has also led to ongoing conflict and instability in the region.

In terms of negative peace duration, UNMIS can be regarded as a successful case by making significant contributions towards peace and stability in Sudan. Having peace to keep after the signing of the CPA, coupled with a prompt deployment of only one month delay and a three month delay in adopting the UNSC Resolution, UNMIS suits the results of the survival analyses. UNMIS was on the ground with 0.3% of its initially authorized mandate size with 38 personnel (30 troops and 8 police) out of the 10715 authorized in its first month after the UNSC Resolution adoption. In its second month, UNMIS reached 69 personnel; in its third month, UNMIS received 458 personnel. The reason for such a low turnout in initial deployment is associated with Sudan being a large country with poor infrastructure (Hansen, 2015). Although UNMIS initially had few personnel due to Sudan's poor infrastructure, its quick deployment did not give an opportunity for conflict to destabilize again. In addition, it was a timely deployment, right after the peace agreement and when the conflict was at a ripe moment. The deployment of a peacekeeping operation after the CPA has received the support of the conflicting parties through enhancing credibility with a prompt initial deployment. As Van der Lijn (2010) denotes, the UNMIS has enjoyed the support of the parties and provides ownership to the locals. Although the operation had crossed the critical boundary of less than the 20% vacancy rate required to operate effectively after a year, the mission's speed in deployment created a defining moment that provided opportunities for swift intervention and established credibility in the eyes of the locals and led to cooperation with the operation and longer attained negative peace durations.

UNMIS faced significant challenges during its mandate, including continued disputes between the Sudanese government and the SPLM. Despite these challenges, UNMIS contributed to the successful implementation of the CPA, such as the holding of democratic elections and the establishment of the Government of Southern Sudan. In 2011, following a referendum in Southern Sudan, UNMIS was replaced by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which was established to support the newly independent country of South Sudan. In the end, while UNMIS did not solve all of the problems in Sudan, it made significant contributions towards peace and stability by successfully keeping the conflicting parties from returning to war and laying the groundwork for future peacekeeping efforts. UNMIS's contributions to promoting peace and stability in Sudan highlight the importance of prompt deployment and the critical role of peacekeeping missions in supporting the implementation of peace agreements.

In Mozambique, the delay in deploying the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) resulted in local populations becoming cynical and fearful of renewed insecurity

(Salomons, 2003, p. 243). Salomons (2003) describes this delay to cause a loss of momentum and credibility for the ONUMOZ, as well as setting back the timetable for the peace process by a year. Although Mozambique eventually reached a peaceful settlement, this delay cost more lives and increased the costs of the peace process. The timing of entry is crucial for the success of peacekeeping operations, and delaying deployment can have severe consequences. Deploying quickly can be seen as a form of conflict prevention.

The analyses on speed and duration of negative peace suggest that time is a crucial factor in the success of UN peacekeeping operations. Specifically, the research supports the hypothesis that faster initial deployments of peacekeeping forces lead to longer durations of peace. From a theoretical point of view, the two complementary channels of opportunities for swift intervention and credible commitment and legitimacy in the local's perception are crucial in establishing prolonged peace durations because of quick deployments. There are two primary reasons for this. First, a quick and robust deployment of UN peacekeepers sends a clear message to warring parties that the international community is committed to preventing violence and protecting civilians, which can serve as a powerful deterrent. Rapid deployment can also prevent the resumption or escalation of violence by establishing a secure environment and preventing the spread of conflict to neighboring regions or countries. Second, a prompt response by the international community can help establish the legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission in the eyes of the local population and the parties to the conflict, which can increase their willingness to cooperate with peacekeepers and work towards a lasting peace.

Establishing peace is a complex process that involves building trust and confidence among various stakeholders. A quick deployment can ensure that the peacekeeping force is in place to provide timely support to other peacebuilding actors, such as humanitarian organizations, and to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements. Quick deployment of peacekeeping forces can act as a 'defining moment' that sets the tone for the entire peace process. It can create a positive cycle of confidence-building, cooperation, and stability that can lead to longer-lasting peace.

The two time frames between the suggestion to the adoption of the UNSC resolution and the duration between the UNSC resolution to deployment could be interrelated, in which receiving a more extended preparation period could lead to a shorter delay in deployment after the UNSC resolution. However, a more prolonged analysis of the conflict or preparation for the operation does not necessarily lead to a better or quicker deployment.

Several control variables were incorporated into the analysis, and they yield significant results. The first control variable examines whether there was a peace agreement among the combatant parties before the operation. The presence of a peace agreement could lead to mixed effects, as the effects of the operation could be conflated with the response to the signed agreement. Ideally, the presence of peacekeepers commits combatants to follow the previously agreed rules. However, the analysis shows that if there is a peace agreement before the operation, the chances of returning to war increase, leading to a decrease in the duration of negative peace by 30-40%.

The second control variable examines the conflict duration before the operation. The longer the conflict duration, the harder it is to maintain negative peace, as the conflict has infiltrated every layer of society. Here, as conflict duration increases, the risk of peace failing also increases by 13%. Earlier interventions in conflicts, therefore, produce better results in creating prolonged peace.

The third control variable considers the outgoing refugee population from the operation host country. Previous studies have found that large numbers of refugees can threaten international peace and security by creating spillover effects (Bove & Elia, 2011). The analyses show that as the number of refugees increases, the duration of negative peace also increases by 3%.

The fourth control variable examines the population of the operation-receiving country, as it can also affect the possibility of renewed violence. The study finds that as the population of the host country increases, the duration of negative peace also increases by 7%.

The fifth control variable considers fuel exports as percentages of merchandise exports. As a natural resource, fuel can increase the international community's interest in the conflict. The analysis shows that as the percentage of fuel exports from the host country increases, the duration of negative peace also increases by 1%.

The sixth control variable, which is a novel variable in the literature, incorporates a spike in battle-related deaths as a signal of an escalating or renascent conflict. A spike in deaths is associated with an increased duration of negative peace by around 42%. This finding suggests that the conflict could have reached a period of fatigue after reaching a climax in conflict.

Finally, the UN mission type is another control variable, as it could affect the density of contributions and since the operations are established according to the needs of the conflict.

If the operation is a peacekeeping or an enforcer mission, the duration of peace increases by around 43%.

Figure 5.1 displays a graph that represents the smoothed hazard estimate of the model with the duration between UNSC resolution and initial deployment. The hazard function is a statistical measure that represents the probability of an event occurring within a specific time frame. In this case, the event is the failure of peace. The figure presents the estimated hazard functions when the duration is delayed for a month, two months, and five months. Overall, the graph shows a wavy hazard rate with two peaks of fail risks at around 1.2 and 1.8 years. This indicates that the risk of peace failing is higher during these periods. However, once the first peak of 1.2 years is reached, the risk of peace failing decreases sharply. The risk of peacekeeping operations failing starts to rise again at around 1.6 years. The figure shows that the shorter the delay, the lesser the risk of peace failing. There is a substantial reduction in the likelihood of negative peace failing when the delay of deployment is shorter.



Figure 5.1: Smoothed Hazard Estimate of Duration between UNSC Resolution and Deployment

Two additional analyses were conducted alongside the main analysis. The first analysis examines how the nature of operations changed between the 1990s and 2000s. The Brahimi Report in 2000 played a crucial role in shaping the nature of peacekeeping operations. It highlighted persistent challenges and issues that needed to be addressed, leading to important reforms and changes in how UN peacekeeping missions were conducted. The focus was on understanding the shifts in approaches and strategies used in UN peacekeeping operations during these two decades. The analysis provides insights into the evolving nature of peacekeeping efforts and the lessons learned.

The second analysis investigated the diminishing effects of the main independent variables: speed and size. It aimed to assess whether the impact of these variables on the success of peacekeeping operations remained consistent over time or if their influence diminished. By examining historical data and trends, this analysis sought to determine whether the speed of intervention and the size of the peacekeeping force had a lasting effect or if other factors became more relevant in determining the outcomes of operations. The specific tables related to these additional analyses can be found in Appendix C and Appendix D, respectively.

Focusing on the UN peacekeeping operations established from 1991 to 2000, findings suggest that the likelihood of returning to war decreases as all the delays between the events increase. Overall, UN operations in the 1990s were mostly deployed to passive conflicts, and the UN was reluctant to react to active conflicts. Therefore, UN operations could have been deliberately deployed late to wait out the conflict to settle or cool-off, allowing tensions to decrease and deploy to an almost passive conflict. Some notable examples of the conflicts and their peacekeeping missions during the 1990s are Balkan Wars (1991-1999), Rwanda (1994), and Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002). Delays during these conflicts could be crucial for a reason. Delays in deployment after a UNSC resolution is adopted provide opportunities for diplomatic efforts, negotiations, and peace agreements to be pursued. These processes aimed to address the underlying causes of the conflicts, resolve grievances, and promote dialogue among the conflicting parties. By allowing for these processes to unfold, the delays in deployment contributed to a decreased likelihood of returning to war. It provided a window of opportunity for addressing the causes of the conflicts, while signaling the commitment to resolving the conflict, building peace infrastructure, and establishing conditions for sustainable peace. The survival analyses for the 2000s do not yield any significant results.

The analyses that test the diminishing effects of the delay variables show identical results. In fact, the effects of delays in deployment (after the adoption of the UNSC resolution

or after the suggestion of an operation) reveal an even increasing effect over time. As the delay from the suggestion to deployment or the delay from adoption of a UNSC resolution to deployment increases, the likelihood of a return to war increases. In contrast to total or resolution to deployment delay, the increase in the delay in adoption of a UNSC resolution shows a decreasing likelihood of a return to war. Instead of delay's effect on the duration of peace diminishing over time, the analyses show an increasing effect.

Table 5.1: Cox Analyses of Delay of Initial Deployments

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Time-Constant Variables			
Duration between Suggestion to UNSC Resolution	-0.116*** (0.0440)		
Duration between UNSC Resolution to Deployment		0.0276*** (0.00779)	
Duration between Suggestion to Deployment			0.0224*** (0.00788)
Prior Agreement	0.0193 (0.124)	0.350** (0.158)	0.256* (0.155)
Conflict Duration	0.136*** (0.00556)	0.121*** (0.00640)	0.128*** (0.00646)
Spike	-0.637*** (0.0865)	-0.538*** (0.0905)	-0.518*** (0.0928)
Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) Type	-0.519*** (0.0810)	-0.551*** (0.0713)	-0.611*** (0.0725)
Time-Varying Covariates			
Population (ln)	-0.0701*** (0.00688)	-0.0645*** (0.00679)	-0.0635*** (0.00693)
Refugee (ln)	-0.0182*** (0.00680)	-0.0207*** (0.00670)	-0.0250*** (0.00682)
Fuel	-0.00751*** (0.00120)	-0.00709*** (0.00120)	-0.00745*** (0.00120)
Observations	2283	2347	2283
Number of Subjects	105	109	105
Number of Failures	1191	1228	1191
Wald χ^2	920.44	905.02	902.96
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-5033.6479	-5258.5879	-5033.3898

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.2 shows the results of hypothesis 2a, which posits that a higher initial contribution by the UN peacekeeping operation leads to a shorter duration of negative peace. The results support this hypothesis, as Model 1 indicates that an increase in the total personnel of the initial deployment is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of a return to war. In other words, a larger initial deployment is more likely to lead to a longer duration of negative peace. This finding is consistent with the argument made by several scholars that larger missions are more effective in securing peace due to their increased capabilities (Bove & Ruggeri, 2015; Hultman et al., 2013, 2014, 2016, 2019; Koko & Essis, 2012; Ruggeri et al., 2012).

From the proposed theoretical mechanism standpoint, large initial deployments lead to opportunities for swift intervention that helps in facilitating cessation of violence in the short term and creating credible commitment and legitimacy in local's perception, which in turn helps in building local capacities and leading to long term sustainable negative peace duration. For several reasons, larger initial deployments of UN peacekeeping operations can be associated with significantly longer peace durations. A larger initial deployment can have a greater deterrent effect on the parties to the conflict, as it demonstrates a more substantial commitment by the international community to maintaining peace and security. This can make it less likely that the parties will return to violence, leading to longer-lasting negative peace. Besides, a larger peacekeeping force can provide better security for civilians, which can help to build confidence in the peace process and reduce the risk of violence. This can also help create the conditions necessary for other peacebuilding activities, such as delivering humanitarian aid and restoring basic services. In addition, larger peacekeeping forces can have greater capacities to carry out their mandate. This helps establish a more stable and secure environment, essential for building trust and cooperation between the parties. Furthermore, a larger peacekeeping force can also enhance the mission's legitimacy, which builds trust and ease of cooperation in the eyes of the local population and the parties to the conflict, as it demonstrates a more robust commitment to supporting the peace process. The deployment of a larger peacekeeping force can contribute to the effectiveness and robustness of a peacekeeping operation, resulting in a longer-lasting negative peace duration in a conflict-affected country.

Two exemplary UN peacekeeping operations signify the importance of initial deployment sizes. The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) was established in 1994 following the signing of the peace accords between the Guatemalan government and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), which ended

the 36-year-long civil war in Guatemala (Ross, 2015). With the UNSC Resolution 1094, the primary objective of MINUGUA was to verify compliance with the peace accords and to promote human rights and the rule of law. The mission had a wide range of tasks, including monitoring the demobilization of former combatants, supporting the reintegration of displaced persons, and investigating human rights violations (UNSC, 2004).

MINUGUA operated in a challenging environment with ongoing political, social, and economic challenges. Despite these challenges, the mission made significant contributions to promoting peace and stability in Guatemala (Ross, 2015). The mission helped reduce violence and build trust between different sectors of society, promote human rights and the rule of law, and support the implementation of peace accords and the reintegration of displaced persons and former combatants. Furthermore, the mission's monitoring and verification activities helped create an environment of transparency and accountability, contributing to the consolidation of democracy in Guatemala. In 2004, after ten years of operation, the mission was closed. While the mission made significant contributions to the peace process in Guatemala, the country continued to face ongoing challenges related to violence, crime, and social inequality (Ross, 2015).

Overall, MINUGUA can be considered a success case in promoting peace and stability in Guatemala and in terms of negative peace duration, with a prompt deployment and large initial deployment. MINUGUA had a prompt deployment, with only one month delay in both adoption of the UNSC Resolution and its initial deployment. The mission's initial deployment had 67 personnel (50 police and 17 military observers) out of the 155 initially authorized personnel (43.2% fulfilled mandate percentage), and it quickly became fully operational by reaching its mandated size in its second month. The mission's initial speed and size became an opportunity for success by creating an environment for swift interventions in the short term and creating credible commitment and legitimacy in the eyes of the locals. This allowed for sustainable peace in the long term by building local capacities and undisturbed negative peace.

The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was established in 1999 by the UNSC to help restore peace and stability to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) following years of conflict and violence. The UNSC Resolution 1279, adopted unanimously on November 30, 1999, was initially tasked with supporting the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and monitoring the ceasefire between the government and various rebel groups in the country (UNSC, 1999). Over time, the mission's mandate evolved to include supporting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants,

promoting human rights and the rule of law, and addressing the humanitarian crisis in the country. MONUC also played a key role in strengthening institutions, supporting the electoral process in the DRC, and helping to organize and monitor democratic elections in 2006 and 2011 (Doss, 2015).

At its peak, MONUC was one of the largest UN peacekeeping missions in history, with over 20,000 military personnel and nearly 6,000 civilian staff. The mission also included a robust police component and was supported by a number of international partners, including the AU and the EU.

MONUC was effective in supporting the peace process in the DRC. The mission helped to disarm and demobilize tens of thousands of combatants, supported the organization of democratic elections, and helped to address the humanitarian crisis in the country. The mission also played a critical role in protecting civilians, and the civilian component of MONUC helped to promote human rights and strengthen institutions. While there were setbacks and challenges, the mission made important contributions to the peace and stability of the DRC and helped to lay the foundation for ongoing efforts to address conflict, promote development, and protect human rights in the country (Doss, 2015). In 2010, MONUC was restructured and became the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), with a broadened mandate to support stabilization efforts and protect civilians. MONUSCO continues to operate in the DRC today.

Adopting the UNSC resolution within one month, followed by an initial deployment within another month with one-third of the authorized personnel deployed, led to long-term success in a continued peaceful episode. MONUC's prompt and sizeable initial deployment was critical to its success, as it enhanced the mission's credibility and led to sustainable peace. In terms of negative peace duration, suiting the results of the Cox survival analyses, MONUC can be regarded as a success case.

The personnel types deployed in UN peacekeeping missions have different roles and functions, which can have varying effects on the duration of post-conflict peace. In models 2 to 4, personnel types are disaggregated into the troop, police, and military observers. UN troops serve to prevent a resurgence of hostilities and are deployed to the frontlines, trained to engage in combat with arms and heavy weaponry. UN police conduct regular police services that serve and protect the local population. Military observers monitor and report on the behavior of combatant parties to reduce uncertainty and promote cooperation. Each of these personnel types has a distinct impact on the duration of peace after a conflict.

From a rationalist bargaining model perspective, the size and composition of peacekeeping operations are important factors in determining their effectiveness. Recent studies suggest that troops are the most significant type in this regard (Holt et al., 2009; Hultman et al., 2016). In Model 2, contrary to what was expected, an increase in the number of first deployed troop personnel is associated with a decrease in the duration of negative peace. Model 2 suggests that a larger number of first deployed troop personnel may not necessarily lead to longer peace duration, which contradicts the rationalist bargaining model perspective that emphasizes the importance of troop deployment in enhancing the effectiveness of peace operations. The explanation for this unexpected result could be due to various factors beyond the size and composition of peace operations.

One possible reason for this could be mission overstretch, where the deployment of too many troops can overwhelm the resources and capacity of the peacekeeping mission, leading to an inability to carry out its mandate effectively. This, in turn, can break the peace process, prolonging the duration of violent episodes. The fact that troop deployments are often made in the context of ongoing or recent violence may also explain this unexpected result. Another issue is that deploying troops to a conflict zone can signal that the situation is still unstable, and this can create a self-fulfilling prophecy that undermines the prospects for lasting peace. Moreover, a larger number of first deployed troop personnel can also increase the risk of escalation, particularly if the mission is perceived as too heavy-handed or biased. This can lead to a breakdown in trust and confidence in the peacekeeping mission, which can increase the risk of conflict. Furthermore, a larger number of first deployed troop personnel may also create a perception of dependence on external forces to maintain peace and security, and can undermine local ownership of the peace process. Lastly, a larger number of first deployed troop personnel can also increase the risk of political interference, particularly if the mission is seen as being too intrusive. These can erode trust and confidence in the peacekeeping mission and can increase the risk of conflict.

The findings of Models 3 and 4 suggest that an increase in police or military observer personnel can reduce the risk of peace failing in a UN peacekeeping operation. This finding that an increase in police or military observer personnel may be associated with a decreased risk of peace failing in a UN operation can be explained by several reasons. Firstly, the presence of more police or military observer personnel can act as a deterrent to potential spoilers who may want to disrupt the mission. The knowledge that more eyes are watching can discourage such actors from taking actions that could undermine the peace process, thereby reducing the risk of peace failing. Furthermore, the presence of more police or military

observer personnel in the initial phase of a peacekeeping operation can help in the early detection of any potential threats to peace. This can enable peacekeeping forces to respond more rapidly and effectively to any emerging conflicts or risks that could undermine the peace process, helping to prevent peace from failing. Besides, police or military observer also means more opportunities for engagement with local communities and stakeholders. This can help to build trust and increase communication, which in turn can help to identify potential issues before they escalate and facilitate the implementation of peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategies, which can reduce the risk of peace failing. Lastly, having more personnel on the ground proves an improved situational awareness, enabling peacekeeping forces to assess the overall situation better and identify any underlying causes of tension or conflict. This information can be used to inform the design of peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategies, further reducing the risk of peace failing.

Overall, the results suggest that the size and composition of peace operations should be carefully considered, taking into account the specific context of the conflict and the local actors' needs and preferences. A more nuanced understanding of the factors that influence peacekeeping effectiveness can help to develop more effective strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding.

For control variables, firstly, as the conflict duration in the host country increases, the duration of negative peace decreases by 13%. This means that the longer a conflict lasts, the shorter the period of negative peace that follows. Secondly, if there is a spike in the number of deaths before the peacekeeping operation, the duration of negative peace increases by around 50%. Thirdly, the type of mission also affects the duration of negative peace. Specifically, if the peacekeeping mission is a peacekeeping or an enforcer mission, the duration of peace increases by 40%. This suggests that the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission can have a positive impact on the duration of negative peace. Fourthly, an increase in the number of outgoing refugees or population in the host country leads to an increase in the duration of negative peace. For every unit increase in the number of refugees or population, the duration of negative peace increases by 3% and 7%, respectively. Lastly, if the host country is a fuel exporter, the duration of negative peace increases by 1%.

Figure 5.2 displays the smoothed hazard estimate graph of the first total personnel deployment model. The graph shows the hazard function representing the probability of the failure of peacekeeping operations with interrupted peace episodes through battle deaths. The figure shows the estimated hazard functions of the first total personnel size divided into three

quartiles. The first quartile is between 2 to 30, the second quartile is between 38 to 893, and the final quartile is the observations between 1090 to 19685. The graph generally shows a wavy hazard rate with two peaks of fail risks at around 1.2 and 1.8 years. This indicates that the risk of peacekeeping operations failing is higher during these periods. The risk of peace failing is the lowest in 1.6 years. The figure represents that the higher the initial contribution, the lesser the risk of peace failing. There is a substantial reduction in the likelihood of negative peace failing when the first total personnel size enlarges.



Figure 5.2: Smoothed Hazard Estimate of First Total Personnel Deployment Size

In the 1990s, all first deployed personnel sizes are associated with an increase in the likelihood of a return to war; a larger initial deployment is more likely to lead to a shorter duration of peace. Here, it is necessary to remind the violent nature of 'new conflicts.' Looking at the results for the 2000s, the findings prove the opposite; a larger initial deployment, regardless of the type, is more likely to lead to a longer duration of negative peace.

For the diminishing effect, it is evident that the effects of the first deployment of total personnel, troops, and police diminish over time. The results show that with the increase in

initially deployed sizes, the duration of negative peace decreases as well. Military observers do not give a significant result. Hence, contrary to initial deployment speed, the initial deployment size's effects diminish over time.

Table 5.2: Cox Analyses of Initial Contributions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time-Constant Variables				
First Total Personnel Size	-0.0000134* (0.00000725)			
First Troop Size		0.0000253*** (0.00000761)		
First Police Size			-0.000420*** (0.000123)	
First Military Observer Size				-0.001000*** (0.000249)
Prior Agreement	0.0361 (0.123)	0.0290 (0.125)	-0.0634 (0.125)	0.104 (0.124)
Conflict Duration	0.129*** (0.00579)	0.138*** (0.00573)	0.128*** (0.00554)	0.128*** (0.00553)
Spike	-0.689*** (0.0854)	-0.603*** (0.0875)	-0.666*** (0.0831)	-0.765*** (0.0870)
PKO Type	-0.558*** (0.0719)	-0.674*** (0.0771)	-0.534*** (0.0711)	-0.479*** (0.0738)
Time-Varying Covariates				
Population (ln)	-0.0703*** (0.00676)	-0.0673*** (0.00678)	-0.0697*** (0.00670)	-0.0735*** (0.00679)
Refugee (ln)	-0.0141** (0.00687)	-0.0220*** (0.00683)	-0.0122* (0.00679)	-0.0117* (0.00674)
Fuel	-0.00717*** (0.00120)	-0.00720*** (0.00119)	-0.00724*** (0.00120)	-0.00717*** (0.00120)
Observations	2349	2347	2347	2347
Number of Subjects	109	109	109	109
Number of Failures	1228	1228	1228	1228
Wald χ^2	897.46	903.59	905.80	911.50
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-5262.9405	-5259.3052	-5258.199	-5255.3469

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

5.1.1. Additional Analyses

The 90-day threshold is a critical period designated by the UN to establish an operational multidimensional peacekeeping operation because it represents a period of time during which the success or failure of the mission can be determined. During this period, the primary focus is on establishing a secure and stable environment for the local population, which includes setting up a presence in critical areas, building trust with the parties involved in the conflict, and implementing measures to protect civilians. The successful implementation of these efforts can create a more stable environment that is conducive to peacebuilding activities.

Another important aspect of the first 90 days is engaging with political leaders and other stakeholders to garner support for the peace process. This includes facilitating negotiations, building consensus around key issues, and addressing grievances and concerns that could potentially derail the peace process. If progress is made during this period, it can build momentum for the peace process and increase the likelihood of a successful outcome.

Securing funding and support from member states and other international actors is also crucial during the first 90 days. If the peacekeeping mission is perceived as effective and progressive during this period, it can build confidence in the mission and increase support for its continuation. Overall, beyond the initial deployment, the first 90 days of a peacekeeping mission set the foundation for success, and the ability of the mission to establish a secure and stable environment, build support for the peace process, and secure funding and support from key stakeholders can increase the likelihood of a successful outcome and contribute to longer-lasting peace.

Besides the 90-day threshold, according to Coleman et al. (2021), a rapid initial deployment does not necessarily lead to a rapid full deployment, and an extended gap between initial deployment and the arrival of the full force encourages spoilers and generates popular disappointment (p. 457, 467). This extended gap can also lead to a loss of momentum in peacebuilding efforts and diminish the credibility of the UN in the eyes of local populations and actors. Moreover, it may increase the likelihood of violence and harm to civilians, as well as make peacekeepers more vulnerable to attacks. The delay from initial deployment to the deployment of the majority of the authorized size can lead to increased costs and demoralize the peacekeeping staff, ultimately undermining the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operation.

Table 5.3 presents the findings regarding the impact of the deployment rates in the third month of the peacekeeping mission on the duration of negative peace. The results indicate that an increase in the total number of personnel or any type of personnel in the third month of the mission is associated with a lower probability of returning to war. In other words, as the third month's personnel size increases with any personnel type, the duration of negative peace is more likely to prolong. This suggests that the efficiency of the first 90 days of the peacekeeping operation is critical in establishing a stable environment that can lead to longer periods of negative peace.

The United Nations operation in Mali (MINUSMA) was re-hatted from African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), a regional security force, and the 6,161 personnel constituted 55% of MINUSMA's initial authorized strength. However, MINUSMA struggled with a slow deployment of full force being on the ground, in which seven months later, it still had almost half of the authorized personnel. According to Coleman et al. (2021), this gap undermined the mission's credibility and authority in supporting the Malian government, and it struggled to recover from its ineffective response to the security situation. Coleman, Lundgren and Oksamytna (2021) therefore pose that, while a partial deployment may be preferable to no deployment, there is no reason to prioritize rapid initial deployment over rapid full deployment. Here, the decreasing battlefield violence effect of the third month's deployment size indicates support to this argument, but the fact that the initial deployment speed, regardless of the size, has a stark effect on prolonging negative peace proves contrary to Coleman et al.'s (2021) arguments.

Additionally, the results reveal that certain control variables have a significant impact on the duration of negative peace. Specifically, if there is a spike in deaths or if the operation is a peacekeeping or enforcer mission, the likelihood of reverting to war decreases, and the peace extends. However, if the host country's prior conflict duration increases, the duration of negative peace shortens. Furthermore, increases in the fuel export, number of outgoing refugees or the host country's population are associated with increases in the duration of negative peace.

The analyses for the operations established in the 1990s prove the same results, except for police type showing a statistically insignificant finding. For the 2000s' operations, results are precisely similar to Table 5.3, showing that an increase in personnel in the mission's third month is associated with a lower probability of returning to war. The analyses reveal that the effects of the third month's personnel size diminish over time. As the third month's personnel

size increases with total, troop or police type, the duration of negative peace is more likely to shorten. Military observers do not prove a significant finding.

Table 5.3: Cox Analyses of the Third Month's Deployments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time-Constant Variables				
3rd Month Total Personnel Size	-0.0000348*** (0.00000530)			
3rd Month Troop Size		-0.0000384*** (0.00000599)		
3rd Month Police Size			-0.000221*** (0.0000417)	
3rd Month Military Observer Size				-0.00145*** (0.000216)
Prior Agreement	0.0825 (0.122)	0.0855 (0.122)	0.0227 (0.122)	0.181 (0.124)
Conflict Duration	0.130*** (0.00538)	0.129*** (0.00539)	0.137*** (0.00540)	0.129*** (0.00534)
Spike	-0.602*** (0.0831)	-0.618*** (0.0831)	-0.539*** (0.0848)	-0.644*** (0.0823)
PKO Type	-0.484*** (0.0710)	-0.486*** (0.0711)	-0.528*** (0.0705)	-0.506*** (0.0705)
Time-Varying Covariates				
Population (ln)	-0.0686*** (0.00668)	-0.0687*** (0.00668)	-0.0668*** (0.00670)	-0.0793*** (0.00680)
Refugee (ln)	-0.00854 (0.00674)	-0.00853 (0.00675)	-0.0133** (0.00668)	-0.00624 (0.00678)
Fuel	-0.00639*** (0.00120)	-0.00636*** (0.00120)	-0.00719*** (0.00120)	-0.00633*** (0.00120)
Observations	2349	2349	2349	2349
Number of Subjects	109	109	109	109
Number of Failures	1228	1228	1228	1228
Wald χ^2	942.25	940.32	925.29	946.22
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-5240.5443	-5241.5115	-5249.0268	-5238.5584

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.4 displays the results of Cox analyses for hypothesis 3a, which suggests that the negative peace duration is influenced by the speed of troop deployment. The number of observations drops compared to the previous tables. Previous analyses comprise all missions regardless of the personnel type deployed. However, for hypothesis 3a, the analyses focus on missions with troop deployments. Therefore, the observation size decreases with eliminating missions without troop deployments.

The table shows that as the delay in troop deployment increases, the probability of relapsing into war also increases. The analysis reveals that for every additional month of delay in troop deployment, the duration of negative peace decreases, supporting the hypothesis that quick deployment of troops leads to longer peace durations.

The delay in the deployment of peacekeeping troops can have various negative consequences, leading to an increased likelihood of a return to conflict. One such consequence is the creation of a security vacuum in the conflict-affected area. This vacuum can be filled by armed groups or other actors looking to exploit the situation for their own benefit, leading to increased violence and instability. Second, the longer the delay in the deployment of peacekeeping troops, the less effective they may be in deterring parties from returning to violence. This is because the parties may begin to perceive the international community's commitment to the peace process as weak or uncertain, making it more likely that they will attempt to reassert their control through violence. Third, a delay in the deployment of troops can also lead to a loss of momentum in the peace process. This can make it more difficult to build trust and cooperation between the parties, making it less likely that they will be able to reach a lasting peace agreement. Lastly, delayed deployment of troops can also lead to increased distrust between the parties and the peacekeeping mission. This can be especially true if there is a perception that the peacekeeping mission is biased and taking sides or not fulfilling its mandate effectively, leading to resentment and an increase in tensions.

Overall, ensuring the quick and efficient deployment of peacekeeping troops is critical to mitigate these risks and support the peace process. Failure to deploy troops quickly can create a range of challenges that can undermine the mission's effectiveness and increase the likelihood of a return to conflict. Therefore, it is important to establish a stable environment as early as possible and to work towards building trust and cooperation between the parties to achieve longer-lasting peace.

The Cox analysis presents that several control variables that also impacts the negative peace duration. Firstly, if there was a prior peace agreement or the previous conflict lasted for

a longer period, then the duration of negative peace is shorter. This suggests that the deeper-rooted causes and grievances have led to more entrenched positions and less willingness to compromise or cooperate, making reaching a lasting peace agreement more challenging. Secondly, if there was a spike in deaths before the operation, then the duration of negative peace is longer. In addition, the analyses reveal that as the population and fuel exports of the host country increase, the duration of negative peace decreases. This could be due to increased competition and conflict over resources in the post-conflict environment. Finally, if the UN operation is a peacekeeping or enforcer mission and if the outgoing refugee population increases, the duration of negative peace extends. This suggests that peacekeeping missions may be more effective in maintaining peace with higher international support.

While results for the 1990s do not reveal a statistically significant finding for the main independent variable, the delay of troop deployment is again associated with an increase in the likelihood of war. Looking at the diminishing effect of the delay of troop deployment, the effect does not diminish over time and continues to have an impact on the duration of peace.

Table 5.4: Cox Analyses of Delay of Troop Contributions

	(1)
Time-Constant Variables	
Delay of Troop Deployment	0.0315*** (0.0104)
Prior Agreement	0.782*** (0.238)
Conflict Duration	0.0671*** (0.0145)
Spike	-0.424*** (0.153)
PKO Type	-0.504*** (0.167)
Time-Varying Covariates	
Population (ln)	0.0398* (0.0217)
Refugee (ln)	-0.187*** (0.0201)
Fuel	0.00461** (0.00202)
Observations	795
Number of Subjects	70
Number of Failures	397
Wald χ^2	230.03
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-1141.9941

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

5.1.2. Wrap-Up

This part examines the impact of UN peacekeeping operations on the durability of negative peace and investigates whether the speed, size, and composition of such operations' initial deployments matter in prolonging peace. The analyses employ the Cox proportional hazards model to estimate the effects of independent variables on the risk of peace failing at any point in time. Table 5.5 summarizes this chapter's findings.

The speed of initial deployment of UN peacekeeping operations is a significant factor in prolonging negative peace (i.e., absence of violence). Faster initial deployments are associated with significantly longer negative peace durations. However, the analysis also

reveals that the duration between the suggestion of an operation and the UNSC resolution has a negative correlation with reverting to war. This time between UNSC resolution and operation suggestion allows for proper analysis of the conflict, planning, and preparation for the needs of the conflict-affected area. In turn, proper preparation for an operation should enable quicker and stronger initial deployments, leading to longer negative peace durations. Therefore, the dissertation emphasizes the significance of time and the disaggregated phases of deployment, showing that proper preparation of the UNSC resolution and quicker initial deployments lead to significantly longer peace durations.

The results indicate that higher initial contributions lead to longer negative peace duration, and larger missions are more effective in securing peace. However, the findings also reveal that contrary to the rationalist bargaining model, the initial deployment of troop personnel has a negative impact on the duration of negative peace. In contrast, increasing the number of police or military observers in the initial deployment has a positive effect on the duration of negative peace. So, unarmed personnel could be a better choice for the initial deployment. Nonetheless, the analyses demonstrate that the size of the third month's personnel, regardless of the type of personnel, is a crucial factor in prolonging negative peace. Essentially, the results highlight the importance of the size and composition of UN peacekeeping missions in achieving sustainable peace.

The findings have significant implications for policymakers and international organizations involved in peacekeeping operations. The UN can use these findings to improve its peacekeeping strategies and the chances of successful peacekeeping operations. Quick and effective deployment after the UNSC resolution is crucial for peacekeeping operations to be successful. In addition, time and proper preparation is necessary for effective peacekeeping operations. Therefore, the UN needs to work on improving the efficiency of its peacekeeping operations, such as by reducing bureaucratic procedures, streamlining logistical arrangements, and improving the training of peacekeepers.

The findings also highlight the importance of proper analysis, planning, and preparation before initiating a UN peacekeeping operation with a UNSC resolution. UN peacekeeping operations should not be rushed or initiated without proper analysis and planning, as this could lead to delays in deployment and reduce the chances of success. Relatedly, the findings can inform policymakers about the importance of proper UN resolutions in conflict resolution.

The analyses highlight the importance of prompt troop deployment. Delaying troop deployment increases the likelihood of reverting to war, with each additional month of delay associated with a decrease in the duration of peace. Policymakers and international organizations should prioritize the prompt deployment of troops to maximize the chances of achieving lasting peace.

Overall, the findings provide valuable insights into the factors that contribute to the success of UN peacekeeping operations. By taking these factors into account, the UN and policymakers can improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and contribute to a more peaceful world.

Table 5.5: Summary Results for the Duration of Negative Peace

Main Hypotheses		**Findings**
Hypothesis 1a	The faster the initial deployment, the longer the duration of peace.	Support
Hypothesis 2a	The larger the initial contribution, the longer the duration of peace.	Support
Additional Hypothesis		**Finding**
Hypothesis 3a	The faster the deployment of troop personnel, the longer the duration of peace.	Support

5.2. Effects on Battlefield Violence

Do the speed, size, and composition aspects of UN peacekeeping operations matter in mitigating violence and ending conflicts? If these components matter in the cessation of conflict, how significant are they? This part of the analysis investigates whether the speed, size, and composition of UN peacekeeping operations' initial deployments have a significant impact on violence. The focus is on the short-term effects of the initial deployments of these operations, taking into account the intensity of ongoing violence. The zero-inflated negative binomial model is employed to analyze the dependent variable of the monthly count of battle-related deaths of government-rebel group dyads. This model is suitable for over-dispersed count data when the variance exceeds the mean. It also separately correlates two possible processes that result in zero outcomes: the absence of violence, which is referred to as the

'Certain Zero' group (the post-conflict group), and the counts of violence for the case with nonzero battle-related deaths.

The results of the zero-inflated negative binomial models are presented in the following tables, which show the incidence rate ratios for both 'Battle-Related Deaths (BRD) Count' and the absence of violence or the 'Certain Zero' group. Incidence rate ratios greater than one indicate a positive effect, while ratios less than one show a negative effect. In the count stage, the dependent variable is battle-related deaths, and a ratio greater than one indicates more deaths, while a ratio less than one suggests fewer deaths. The magnitude of the effect is more significant as the ratio moves further away from one in either direction.

The dependent variable in the 'Certain Zero' group is the absence of violence in post-conflict cases. A coefficient greater than one suggests that a given explanatory variable makes violence less likely. The selection of inflation variables in the zero-inflated negative binomial regression involves identifying variables that explain the excess zeros in the data and the overdispersion of the count data. The two selected inflation variables are having a prior agreement and conflict duration.[15] *Prior agreement* and *conflict duration* variables account for their potential influence on the probability of observing zero deaths during the peacekeeping operation. A prior agreement between conflicting parties can signal a decrease in the likelihood of violent conflict, resulting in fewer or zero battle-related deaths. Prior conflict duration could also influence the likelihood of observing zero deaths during the peacekeeping operation if the conflict has already ceased. By including these variables, the model can better estimate the effect of the initial speed and size of UN peacekeeping operations on battlefield violence while taking into account the unique characteristics of the 'Certain Zero' group.

Table 5.6 presents the findings related to hypothesis 1b, which proposes that a faster initial deployment of UN peacekeeping operations leads to a reduction in battle-related deaths. The analyses reveal that battlefield violence decreases as the UN peacekeeping operation deploys faster. The two models included in the analysis, which assess the delay between the UNSC resolution and initial deployment, and the total deployment duration from operation suggestion onwards, provide evidence supporting hypothesis 1b. In other words, these

[15] It is important to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of the model and assess the impact of the inflation variables on the model's performance. This can be done by comparing the model with and without the inflation variables using statistical tests such as likelihood ratio tests. All models with these two variables prove statistically better models.

findings suggest that a quicker deployment of UN peacekeeping operations is associated with a reduced likelihood of battlefield violence.

Models 3 and 5 show that an increase in the delay between the UNSC resolution and deployment or between operation suggestion and deployment leads to an increase in the expected counts of dyadic battle-related deaths, provided that other variables are held constant. Specifically, there is a 7.1% increase in the expected counts of dyadic battle-related deaths for every unit increase in the delay between the UNSC resolution and deployment, and a 6.9% increase in the expected counts of dyadic battle-related deaths for every unit increase in the delay between suggestion and deployment.[16] Furthermore, the duration from the UNSC resolution to the initial deployment has a greater impact on battlefield violence than the overall delay. This is because, during the time period between operation suggestion to UNSC resolution, conflicting parties may not be aware of any UN activity, whereas combatants are fully aware that a UN deployment will occur as soon as possible after a UNSC resolution is adopted. Therefore, the findings support hypothesis 1b: the faster the initial deployment, the less the battle-related deaths. This is consistent with the arguments made by Durch et al. (2002) and Hardt (2009), which suggest that long lag times reduce operational effectiveness and decrease the likelihood of success in the long term.

As the UN peacekeeping operation's initial deployment deploys faster, a decrease in battlefield violence can happen for several reasons. First, rapid deployment of a peacekeeping force can act as a deterrent to the parties in conflict, signaling to them that the international community is committed to ending the violence. This can decrease the likelihood of further violence as they will know there will be consequences. Second, a quick deployment can also allow peacekeeping forces to establish an early warning and response system, which can help to prevent violence before it occurs. This can include monitoring the situation on the ground, identifying potential triggers for violence, and taking action to prevent escalation. Third, a quick deployment can allow peacekeeping forces to establish a presence in key areas, such as safe zones or escorting vulnerable populations, which can help protect civilians from violence. Fourth, a quick deployment can help build confidence in the peace process and the peacekeeping force. This can make it more likely that the parties will cooperate with the peacekeeping force and engage in negotiations to reach a lasting peace agreement. All in all, rapid deployment of UN peacekeeping forces can create a more stable and secure environment, leading to a reduction in battlefield violence. By establishing a presence on the ground,

[16] These percentages are retrieved from Stata's "listcoef, percent" code applied as post-estimation.

building trust and cooperation, and taking proactive measures to prevent violence, peacekeeping forces can lay the necessary foundation for lasting peace.

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established in 2003 by the UNSC Resolution 1509 to support peace and stability in Liberia after years of civil war and political instability. UNMIL aimed to achieve this goal by assisting in the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants, providing security for civilians and humanitarian workers, and supporting the development of national governance structures.

Initially authorized for one year, UNMIL's mandate was extended several times until it concluded its operations in March 2018, having successfully completed its mandate. During its over 14 years of operation, UNMIL accomplished significant successes in supporting peace and stability in Liberia. Some of its major accomplishments include; facilitating the disarmament and demobilization of over 100,000 former combatants, thereby helping to reduce the risk of renewed violence; supporting the organization of free and fair elections in Liberia in 2005, 2011, and 2017, which were widely considered to be transparent and credible; assisting in the establishment and strengthening of national governance structures, including the police and justice systems, and supporting efforts to promote human rights and the rule of law; helping to improve the delivery of basic services, such as healthcare and education, and supporting efforts to promote economic growth and development (Jennings, 2015). UNMIL was the largest and most complex peacekeeping mission in West Africa, with a peak deployment of over 15,000 personnel. Overall, UNMIL is considered a success story in terms of its contributions to peace and stability in Liberia (Jennings, 2015). The mission played a critical role in helping to end years of civil war and political instability, supporting the establishment of a more democratic and stable government, and creating the conditions necessary for sustainable peacebuilding and development in the country.

UNMIL had a small initial deployment (5 personnel deployed out of the 16115 mandated), and it reached 4487 and 5569 personnel in its second and third months. However, this personnel was re-hatted from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). In isolation from the size component, UNMIL's initial deployment was within one month from the UNSC resolution. Despite its small initial deployment, UNMIL's prompt initial deployment created opportunities for swift intervention, enhanced short-term relief, and formed a credible commitment to solving the conflict and establishing legitimacy in the eyes of the locals. The mission's quickness led to a decrease in ongoing violence and longer negative peace episodes. In fact, there has been a lack of major

battle events since UNMIL's presence as a blanket of deterrence against aggression by armed groups (Jennings, 2015).

The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was a peacekeeping mission established through the UNSC Resolution 743 in 1992 to help implement a ceasefire and protect civilians during the conflicts that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro). The mission was mandated to monitor and supervise the demilitarization of certain areas, provide humanitarian aid, and protect civilians from violence. UNPROFOR was one of the UN's largest and most complex peacekeeping missions, with a peak deployment of over 39,000 military and civilian personnel from more than 40 countries.

The mission faced significant challenges throughout its mandate, including the failure of peace negotiations, the failure of the parties to fully cooperate with UNPROFOR, and the targeting of UN personnel by local factions (Tardy, 2015a; Tardy, 2015b). Despite these challenges, UNPROFOR achieved some notable successes. First, UNPROFOR's primary objective was to protect civilians from violence. The mission established 'safe areas' for civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which helped provide protection for civilians trapped in the conflict zone. Second, UNPROFOR facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid to areas affected by the conflict (Tardy, 2015a). This helped alleviate the civilian population's suffering and prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. Third, UNPROFOR played a crucial role in facilitating peace negotiations between the warring parties, which eventually led to the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995. Lastly, UNPROFOR helped establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. So, UNPROFOR had limited stabilizing ability in some respects (Tardy, 2015b).

UNPROFOR was also criticized for some of its failures, including its inability to prevent the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995, during which Bosnian Serb forces overran the UN-declared safe area and killed more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys. UNPROFOR's mandate was terminated in 1995 following the signing of the Dayton Accords. UNPROFOR also faced other challenges, such as the lack of a clear mandate, inadequate resources and logistical support, and the reluctance of some member states to contribute troops. The mission also faced criticism for its perceived lack of impartiality and effectiveness, with some accusing it of being too closely aligned with one side or another in the conflict (Tardy, 2015b).

UNPROFOR had an initial deployment of almost 75% deployed (around 10,000 personnel) but lacked speed in deployment. The mission took three months to send an advance team to the conflicting area, shattering any hope of swift opportunities for intervention. The conflict area remained plagued by ongoing violence and instability throughout the mission. The lagged initial deployment disrupted any possibility of forming a credible commitment to solving the conflict or establishing legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. This led to ongoing violence and instability throughout the mission, with conflict erupting frequently and a lack of cooperation from the parties involved. UNPROFOR is argued to fail in facilitating any kind of trust between the conflicting parties, and hence the mission is confronted with a continuous lack of cooperation from the parties. In fact, no matter the various degrees of success in assessing the mission, all methods conclude that UNPROFOR was a failure (Tardy, 2015b). Of course, a drippling initial deployment is not the sole reason for this failure, but it is one of the reasons.

Table 5.6 presents control variables significantly correlated with battlefield violence, which were selected based on previous literature and their potential impact on the independent variables. The results indicate that having a prior agreement increases battlefield violence by around 161.7% to 182.4%. However, an increase in conflict duration and the presence of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations have the opposite effect, decreasing dyadic battle-related deaths by 3.2% to 3.6% and 35.1% to 41.4%, respectively. In addition to these control variables, the analysis includes the lagged battle-related deaths variable, a one-month lag of battle-related deaths. This is because ongoing combat hostilities at time t are likely related to the occurrence and magnitude of hostilities at t-1. The results show that an increase in lagged battle-related deaths leads to a 0.4% increase in battle-related deaths.

In the inflation models (‘Certain Zero’), having a prior agreement makes zero battle-related deaths more likely. Taken as a binary equation, an increase in the factor change in odds of always 0, the existence of a prior agreement increases violence by 83.3 to 110.4%, while conflict duration decreases battle violence by 22.8 to 24.6%. The increase in conflict duration makes any violence more likely.



Figure 5.3: The Predicted Number of Battle-Related Deaths as the Duration between UNSC Resolution and Deployment Increases

Although the statistical analysis indicates a significant effect of peacekeepers on reducing battle-related deaths, it is essential to consider if this effect is meaningful in practical terms. To better understand this effect, the estimated increase in battle-related deaths as the delay increases is plotted with fractional-polynomial prediction plots with 95% confidence intervals in Figure 5.3. The figure shows that the increasing delay in peacekeeper deployment from the time the UNSC passes the resolution has a substantive effect on reducing violence. For example, with a two-month delay in deployment, the average number of battle-related deaths is expected to be around zero. However, as the delay in deployment increases, the expected number of deaths increases exponentially. In the case of a seven-month delay, the number of deaths is expected to reach 100. This suggests that the timely deployment of peacekeepers is crucial in preventing or minimizing the escalation of violence in ongoing conflicts.

As mentioned in the previous section, an additional analysis is conducted in addition to the primary analyses. The analysis focuses on the changing nature of operations in the 1990s and 2000s, taking Brahimi Report as the milestone that changes the nature of operations and pinpoints the persistent issues to be solved. The tables for this analysis are in Appendix C.

Focusing on the UN peacekeeping operations established from 1991 to 2000, findings suggest that dyadic battle-related deaths decrease as all the delays between the events increase. This finding coincides with the 1990s results for the duration of peace, in which as the delays increase, the duration of peace shortens. These could be explained by the violent nature of conflicts in the 1990s and how the UN was reluctant in intervening to active conflicts and opted for more political and negotiation processes. In contrast to the 1990s, for the operations in the 2000s, as the delays from UNSC resolution to deployment and from operation suggestion to deployment increase, the dyadic battle-related deaths increase as well. UN has been intervening with multidimensional peacekeeping operations mostly in active and harder conflicts, especially after the Brahimi Report.

Table 5.6: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of Delays

	(1) BRD Count	(2) Certain Zero	(3) BRD Count	(4) Certain Zero	(5) BRD Count	(6) Certain Zero
Delay between Suggestion and UNSC Resolution	0.913 (0.0673)					
Delay between UNSC Resolution and Deployment			1.071*** (0.0168)			
Delay between Suggestion and Deployment					1.069*** (0.0172)	
Prior Agreement	1.251 (0.239)	1.833*** (0.213)	2.824*** (0.623)	1.951*** (0.238)	2.617*** (0.595)	2.104*** (0.258)
Population (ln)	1.007 (0.0238)		0.997 (0.0233)		1.007 (0.0236)	
Refugee (ln)	0.993 (0.0129)		1.016 (0.0128)		1.007 (0.0127)	
Fuel	1.001 (0.00219)		1.001 (0.00217)		1.002 (0.00218)	
Conflict Duration	1.000 (0.00967)	0.758*** (0.0113)	0.968*** (0.0107)	0.772*** (0.0110)	0.964*** (0.0114)	0.754*** (0.0114)
Spike	0.922 (0.115)		1.073 (0.141)		1.126 (0.149)	
PKO Type	0.642*** (0.0820)		0.649*** (0.0775)		0.586*** (0.0713)	
Lagged Battle-Related Deaths	1.004*** (0.000343)		1.004*** (0.000335)		1.004*** (0.000333)	
Constant	22.611*** (9.074)	1.093*** (0.115)	8.323*** (3.530)	0.962*** (0.121)	8.391*** (3.560)	1.000*** (0.119)
Alpha (ln)	2.743*** (0.042)		2.719*** (0.044)		2.733*** (0.041)	
N	20887		21190		20887	

Presented are exponentiated coefficients of zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses in "BRD Count" models, which should be interpreted as Incidence Rate Ratios. "Certain Zero" models present coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

In hypothesis 2b, it was assumed that a higher initial contribution would lead to fewer battle-related deaths. The findings presented in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 are statistically significant, but the coefficient rates are indifferent. The initial contribution is measured using four variables, namely total, troop, police, and military observer personnel sizes. These variables are presented in two tables. In Model 3 of Table 5.7, the results show that a higher initial contribution of troop personnel leads to a higher rate of battle-related deaths at a substantively negligible rate, while the other predictor variables in the model are held constant. The first total personnel size has a mean of 2,635 personnel, with a maximum of 19,685 personnel, whereas the first troop personnel size has a mean of 1,423 personnel, with a maximum of 17,745 personnel. The results presented in Table 5.8 show that the initial deployment of police and military observer personnel do not have statistically significant impacts on dyadic battle-related deaths. The first police personnel size has a mean of 151 personnel, with a maximum of 1,255 personnel, whereas the first military observer personnel size has a mean of 46 personnel, with a maximum of 716. Coleman, Lundgren and Oksamytna (2021) argue that a brigade-sized initial presence is rarely sufficient for mandate implementation. Here, the results show that a large initial deployment is almost ineffective in decreasing battlefield violence, and instead, speed shows a more significant covariate.

An example of persistent violence in the face of a drippling initial deployment size could be the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). UNOMSIL was established by the UNSC in July 1998 with Resolution 1181 to monitor a ceasefire agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group that had been fighting a civil war in the country since 1991. UNOMSIL was initially a small mission, with only 70 military and civilian observers authorized, but its mandate was expanded over time to include a broader range of tasks, such as supporting the DDR of ex-combatants, monitoring human rights abuses, and assisting with the conduct of national elections.

Despite facing significant challenges, such as the lack of a peace agreement and the continuing violence and instability in the country, UNOMSIL made some influential contributions to the peace process in Sierra Leone (Olonisakin, 2015). For example, the mission played a pivotal role in helping to broker a ceasefire agreement between the government and the RUF, which paved the way for a peace agreement in 1999. So, while UNOMSIL was a relatively small and short-lived mission, it helped to lay the groundwork for future stability and development in Sierra Leone. UNOMSIL was succeeded by UNAMSIL in 1999 with an expanded mandate following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement

between the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF rebel group. The change in mandate and name reflected the evolving situation in Sierra Leone and the need for a more robust and comprehensive peacekeeping presence.

UNOMSIL had a prompt initial deployment, but only with 14% of the authorized personnel (10 out of 70 authorized) deployed. However, the small size of the initial deployment may have hindered the mission's effectiveness in reducing violence, as the lack of a visible presence on the ground made the local population perceive the UN force as weak and incapable. The small existence of blue helmets disallows any opportunities for swift intervention. In addition, the image of a weak existence on the ground makes the local population perceive the UN force as an incapable force that does not need to be reckoned with. The example of UNOMSIL highlights the importance of not only prompt initial deployment but also an adequate number of peacekeepers to reduce violence and promote peace in conflict zones substantially.

The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was a UN peacekeeping mission established with the UNSC Resolution 1545 in May 2004, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in response to a request from the Government of Burundi for international support in promoting peace and stability in the country and to support the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. The mission was authorized for an initial period of six months, but its mandate was subsequently extended several times until its final closure in December 2006. ONUB's mandate included a range of activities, including supporting the ceasefire agreement between the government and rebel groups, monitoring the human rights situation, and helping to establish the rule of law in the country. The mission worked to support the implementation of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, which had been signed in August 2000 between the government and several armed opposition groups and aimed to end the conflict in Burundi and establish a democratic system of governance. ONUB had an authorized strength of up to 5,770 military personnel, as well as police officers and civilian staff.

ONUB made several important contributions to the peace process in Burundi (Boutellis, 2015). The mission played a fundamental role in supporting the successful holding of democratic elections in 2005, which marked a significant step forward in the country's transition to peace and democracy. ONUB also helped to promote dialogue and reconciliation between different political and ethnic groups and supported the establishment of a national truth and reconciliation commission. The mission operated in close coordination with the

government of Burundi, as well as with regional and international partners, to ensure a comprehensive and effective response to the conflict.

However, ONUB is generally not considered a successful case, as it faced significant challenges in its efforts to promote peace and stability in Burundi. Despite the mission's contributions to the peace process, it was not able to fully resolve the underlying political and social tensions that continued to fuel conflict and instability. During its mandate, ONUB faced a number of obstacles, including ongoing violence and insecurity, political tensions and divisions, and limited resources and capacity. The mission also faced criticism for its perceived inability to address human rights violations and protect civilians from violence.

One of the initial defining moments that contributed to ONUB's perceived weakness was its delayed deployment, which occurred two months later than its UNSC resolution. Furthermore, almost 43% of the authorized personnel size was deployed in the advance team, which consisted 2,472 personnel out of the 5,770 authorized. During ONUB's first six months, the bulk of the operation was composed of 2,612 re-hatted troops from the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). The heavy footprint of the mission in a small country like Burundi created high expectations among the population (Boutellis, 2015). However, the slow response from the UN force contributed to a perception of weakness, and once the blue helmets lack in swift interventions, the perceived image of weakness led to mistrust among the local population towards the international community and UN forces. This initial defining moment creates an image of operational weakness on behalf of the UN force and a perception of conflict's dismissal from the international community in the eyes of the locals. Thereby, the tardy initial deployment adds to the perpetuated violence in the region.

The African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) can be an example of late and small initial deployment and its consequences. UNAMID was established by the UNSC Resolution 1769 in 2007. It is a joint peacekeeping mission between the AU and the UN, with the primary goal of protecting civilians and facilitating humanitarian aid in the Darfur region of Sudan, which has been affected by armed conflict and violence since 2003. The mission's mandate includes tasks such as supporting the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, promoting the protection of civilians, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, and supporting the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups. At its peak in 2010-2011, UNAMID had a deployment of over 25,000 troops, police, and civilians.

UNAMID has been able to protect civilians in some areas, facilitate humanitarian aid delivery, contribute to the disarmament and demobilization of some armed groups, and

support the implementation of the peace agreement in Darfur. However, the mission faced significant challenges, including attacks on peacekeepers, obstacles to access in conflict-affected areas, and difficulties in implementing its mandate due to the ongoing violence and insecurity in the region. UNAMID has also faced criticism for its inability to prevent attacks on civilians and for not doing enough to hold perpetrators accountable. Most importantly, the mission was unable to protect civilians (Lanz, 2015). The conflict in Darfur has not been resolved yet, and despite several extensions to its mandate, the UNAMID mission ended its operation in December 2020 and fully withdrew from the region by June 30, 2021.

One of the main issues with UNAMID's deployment was the tardiness and insufficient initial deployment. UNAMID initially deployed 229 out of the 25,987 authorized personnel (0.8% fulfilled). The personnel reached 1,629 and 9,080 personnel in its second and third months. Rather than focusing on contributions from the international community, these troops were re-hatted from the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (Lanz, 2015).

Besides the first two months' insufficient personnel amounts, UNAMID was also delayed in adopting its resolution and its initial deployment. UNAMID was delayed two months to adopt its UNSC resolution, but the analyses show that this preparation period could be advantageous in establishing longer negative peace durations. The mission's first deployment took five months to reach the conflicting area. UNAMID had a chronic issue with delays; even after two years, it had only managed to deploy 79% of its authorized military personnel and 71% of its police contingent. The small and slow initial deployment may have given the impression that the international community did not consider the conflict in Darfur as important. If the UN peacekeeping force fails to intervene swiftly, it may be perceived as weak by both the local population and the international community, which could further erode trust in the UN's efforts. In addition, the intended credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the local population will not be established with tardy and small deployments. This initial delay, as a defining moment, can set the tone for a prolonged cycle of violence that went unchecked.

Furthermore, the analysis shows that having a prior agreement and an increase in the lagged battle-related deaths increase the expected count of dyadic battle-related deaths. On the other hand, having a spike in deaths or being a peacekeeping or peace enforcer operation decreases dyadic battle-related deaths by 4.6, 63.6 to 70.4%, respectively.

Regarding the inflation models, having a prior agreement before the operation reduces the likelihood of violence. Taken as a binary equation, an increase in the factor change in odds of always 0, the prior agreement increases the likelihood by 412 to 425%. However, the

increase in conflict duration makes the occurrence of any violence more likely, with a decrease in zero deaths likelihood by 24%.

The comparison analysis of the operations in the 1990s and 2000s shows that the operations in the 2000s reveal similar results to the overall findings. An increase in initial total and troop personnel sizes is associated with a higher rate of dyadic battle-related deaths. Other types of personnel and all the results for the 1990s do not reveal any significant results.

Table 5.7: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of First Deployments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	BRD Count	Certain Zero	BRD Count	Certain Zero
First Total Personnel Size	0.9999944 (0.0000118)			
First Troop			1.000044*** (0.0000156)	
Prior Agreement	1.323 (0.248)	1.673*** (0.191)	1.270 (0.238)	1.672*** (0.193)
Population (ln)	1.005 (0.0233)		0.992 (0.0236)	
Refugee (ln)	0.991 (0.0114)		0.994 (0.0115)	
Fuel	1.001 (0.00219)		1.001 (0.00218)	
Conflict Duration	0.995 (0.00961)	0.776*** (0.0109)	1.008 (0.00976)	0.775*** (0.0109)
Spike	0.841 (0.104)		0.814* (0.101)	
PKO Type	0.678*** (0.0845)		0.610*** (0.0738)	
Lagged Battle-Related Deaths	1.005*** (0.000345)		1.004*** (0.000341)	
Constant	20.252*** (7.965)	1.078*** (0.115)	23.092*** (9.182)	1.058*** (0.116)
Alpha (ln)	2.726*** (0.045)		2.739*** (0.044)	
N	21192		21190	

Presented are exponentiated coefficients of zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses in "BRD Count" models, which should be interpreted as Incidence Rate Ratios. "Certain Zero" models present coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.8: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of First Deployments (Continued)

	(3) BRD Count	(4) Certain Zero	(5) BRD Count	(6) Certain Zero
First Police	0.9998811 (0.0001866)			
First Military Observer			0.9996333 (0.000356)	
Prior Agreement	1.303 (0.244)	1.685*** (0.193)	1.372* (0.263)	1.691*** (0.194)
Population (ln)	1.006 (0.0234)		1.004 (0.0228)	
Refugee (ln)	0.992 (0.0115)		0.994 (0.0117)	
Fuel	1.001 (0.00218)		1.001 (0.00218)	
Conflict Duration	0.995 (0.00948)	0.776*** (0.0109)	0.994 (0.00922)	0.776*** (0.0109)
Spike	0.846 (0.105)		0.810 (0.104)	
PKO Type	0.673*** (0.0812)		0.688*** (0.0856)	
Lagged Battle-Related Deaths	1.005*** (0.000343)		1.005*** (0.000343)	
Constant	20.299*** (7.927)	1.079*** (0.114)	19.968*** (7.772)	1.076*** (0.115)
Alpha (ln)	2.723*** (0.045)		2.724*** (0.045)	
N	21190		21190	

Presented are exponentiated coefficients of zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses in "BRD Count" models, which should be interpreted as Incidence Rate Ratios. "Certain Zero" models present coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

5.2.1. Additional Analyses

Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 test the three-month deployment rates' effects on battlefield violence disaggregated into personnel types. The tables reveal statistically significant results, yet again at indifferent coefficient rates. The results indicate that the higher the third deployment's total and troop personnel size, the higher the number of battle-related deaths. However, increasing military observer personnel sizes is associated with a 0.2% decrease in the expected counts of deaths, whereas increases in total or troop personnel sizes have an indifferent effect on the expected counts of dyadic battle-related deaths.

The presence of a prior agreement and higher lagged battle-related deaths increases the expected count of dyadic battle-related deaths. On the other hand, if the operation is a peacekeeping or peace enforcer mission, then the dyadic battle-related deaths decrease by 4.4% to 7.9%.

The inflation models present that if there is an agreement in place before the operation, the likelihood of violence occurring is decreased. Taken as a binary equation, an increase in the factor change in odds of always 0, the prior agreement increases the likelihood by 397 to 472%. However, the increase in conflict duration makes the occurrence of any violence more likely, with a decrease in the likelihood of zero deaths by 25%.

Figure 5.4 illustrates the relationship between the increase in battle-related deaths and the third month deployment sizes. The figure is presented with fractional-polynomial prediction plots, along with 95% confidence intervals. The results suggest that the increase in personnel sizes beyond a certain point has no effect on battlefield violence. However, the figure indicates that having approximately 100 personnel on the field in the third month of the operation can make a significant difference in reducing battlefield violence. In other words, the results suggest that having a minimum of 100 personnel on the ground during the third month of a peacekeeping operation can have a positive impact on reducing the occurrence of battle-related deaths.

The comparison analyses of the 1990s and 2000s show almost the exact results. In both depictions of cases, while the increase in total and troop deployments of the third month also increases the battle-related deaths, an increase in military observer and police personnel sizes decreases battle deaths. Police personnel is only significant in the 1990s.

Table 5.9: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of the Third Deployments

	(1) BRD Count	(2) Certain Zero	(3) BRD Count	(4) Certain Zero
3rd Total Personnel Size	0.9999813*** (0.00000717)			
3rd Troop Personnel			0.9999763*** (0.00000829)	
Prior Agreement	1.382* (0.260)	1.665*** (0.190)	1.393* (0.262)	1.660*** (0.189)
Population (ln)	1.013 (0.0231)		1.015 (0.0232)	
Refugee (ln)	0.989 (0.0115)		0.988 (0.0115)	
Fuel	1.000 (0.00218)		1.000 (0.00218)	
Conflict Duration	0.994 (0.00894)	0.777*** (0.0109)	0.993 (0.00899)	0.777*** (0.0109)
Spike	0.898 (0.114)		0.905 (0.115)	
PKO Type	0.731** (0.0927)		0.742** (0.0948)	
Lagged Battle-Related Deaths	1.005*** (0.000344)		1.005*** (0.000344)	
Constant	17.521*** (6.857)	1.085*** (0.154)	17.081*** (6.686)	1.088*** (0.114)
Alpha (ln)	2.720*** (0.045)		2.719*** (0.045)	
N	21192		21192	

Presented are exponentiated coefficients of zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses in "BRD Count" models, which should be interpreted as Incidence Rate Ratios. "Certain Zero" models present coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.10: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of the Third Deployments (Continued)

	(3) BRD Count	(4) Certain Zero	(5) BRD Count	(6) Certain Zero
3rd Police	0.9999762 (0.0000483)			
3rd Military Observer			0.9992384*** (0.000273)	
Prior Agreement	1.317 (0.246)	1.675*** (0.192)	1.482** (0.286)	1.686*** (0.193)
Population (ln)	1.004 (0.0231)		0.997 (0.0224)	
Refugee (ln)	0.992 (0.0115)		0.991 (0.0115)	
Fuel	1.001 (0.00219)		1.001 (0.00218)	
Conflict Duration	0.997 (0.00908)	0.776*** (0.0109)	0.996 (0.00900)	0.778*** (0.0108)
Spike	0.847 (0.106)		0.835 (0.103)	
PKO Type	0.672*** (0.0811)		0.750** (0.0970)	
Lagged Battle-Related Deaths	1.005*** (0.000343)		1.005*** (0.000343)	
Constant	20.331*** (7.979)	1.077*** (0.115)	20.987** (8.025)	1.077*** (0.115)
Alpha (ln)	2.726*** (0.045)		2.718*** (0.045)	
N	21192		21192	

Presented are exponentiated coefficients of zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses in "BRD Count" models, which should be interpreted as Incidence Rate Ratios. "Certain Zero" models present coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$



Figure 5.4: The Predicted Number of Battle-Related Deaths as the Third Month's Total Personnel Size Increases

Table 5.11 displays the results of testing hypothesis 3b using a zero-inflated negative binomial model. The hypothesis is that the faster the deployment of troop personnel, the fewer battle-related deaths will occur. However, the main coefficient does not show any statistically significant result.

Some control variables show significant results, such as prior agreements and lagged battle-related deaths increasing the expected counts of dyadic battle-related deaths by 72.3, and 0.3%, respectively. On the other hand, an increase in outgoing refugee sizes, having a spike in deaths before the operation, and having peacekeeper and peace enforcer operations result in a decrease in the counts of battle-related deaths by 6.3, 59.2, and 45.8%. In the Certain Zero group, having a prior agreement makes zero battle-related deaths more likely, making any violence less likely to occur by 60.8%. However, conflict duration makes any violence more likely by 5.8%.

For the comparison analysis of the operations in the 1990s and 2000s, the analyses in the 2000s do not yield significant results. For the operations in the 1990s, as the delay of troop deployment increases, the dyadic battle-related deaths also decreases.

Table 5.11: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of Delays in Troop Deployment

	(1) BRD Count	(2) Certain Zero
Troop Deployment Delay	1.013 (0.0159)	
Prior Agreement	1.723** (0.391)	1.608*** (0.194)
Population (ln)	1.152 (0.117)	
Refugee (ln)	0.937*** (0.0224)	
Fuel	1.000 (0.00331)	
Conflict Duration	1.011 (0.0182)	0.942*** (0.00742)
Spike	0.408*** (0.117)	
PKO Type	0.542* (0.187)	
Lagged Battle-Related Deaths	1.003*** (0.00108)	
Constant	11.099*** (19.748)	1.181*** (0.202)
Alpha (ln)	1.468*** (0.271)	
N	5325	

Presented are exponentiated coefficients of zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses in "BRD Count" models, which should be interpreted as Incidence Rate Ratios. "Certain Zero" models present coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

5.2.2. Wrap-Up

This section of the dissertation focuses on examining the effects of the speed, size, and composition of UN peacekeeping operations' initial deployments in mitigating violence. Specifically, it analyzes the short-term impact of initial deployments on the intensity of

ongoing violence. To do so, the zero-inflated negative binomial model is employed, which allows for examining how the initial deployments of UN peacekeeping operations impact violence with the monthly count of battle-related deaths at the government-rebel group dyad level as the dependent variable.

As summarized in Table 5.12, the analyses show that rapid deployment of UN peacekeeping forces results in fewer battle-related deaths, while delayed deployment leads to more deaths. This finding highlights the importance of deploying peacekeeping forces quickly after the adoption of a UNSC resolution, as delays could lead to an escalation of violence, which could negatively impact the operation's long-term success. The dissertation emphasizes the need for policymakers to focus on improving the composition of peacekeeping forces to increase their effectiveness in mitigating conflicts. Additionally, meeting the initial size requirements of the mission quickly also leads to a reduction in battle-related deaths. These findings provide valuable insights for policymakers in their efforts to design and implement successful peacekeeping operations.

The control variables, such as having a prior agreement, outgoing refugee sizes, and fuel exports, have significant relationships with battlefield violence. Additionally, conflict duration, having a spike in deaths compared to no spike, and the use of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations all had significant impacts on decreasing the count of dyadic battle-related deaths.

The analyses conclude that initial deployment speed is crucial in mitigating conflict. A fast deployment can prevent violence from escalating further by quickly establishing a secure environment and discouraging spoilers. It can also help protect civilians from ongoing violence through peacekeeping forces providing a sense of security and protection to local populations and reducing the risk of further violence and displacement. If a prior agreement is in place, a fast deployment can support compliance with ceasefire agreements and prevent parties from violating them. Even if violence has already occurred, a fast deployment can help alleviate its effects. By providing medical assistance, humanitarian aid, and other forms of support, peacekeeping forces can help to reduce the impact of violence on local populations and prevent further harm. Additionally, prompt deployment can help to build trust with local communities and increase the effectiveness of subsequent peacekeeping efforts. Besides, a rapid deployment can prevent a power vacuum from forming in the wake of a conflict. If a well-resourced and rapid initial deployment occurs, it can be the defining moment and provide momentum for the peace process, resulting in greater chances of success in the long run.

In conclusion, the results significantly contribute to understanding the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations in mitigating conflicts. The insights have important implications for policymakers and practitioners designing, implementing, and evaluating peacekeeping operations. The findings prove that policymakers should prioritize deploying peacekeeping forces as quickly as possible to reduce the intensity of ongoing violence. These insights can help policymakers and practitioners design and implement more effective peacekeeping operations that can reduce violence and increase security in conflict zones. The importance of timely deployment is highlighted in seizing the opportunities for swift interventions, building trust with local communities, reducing the impact of violence on local populations, and enhancing the chances of success in the long run.

Table 5.12: Summary Results for Battlefield Violence Te

Main Hypotheses		**Findings**
Hypothesis 1b	The faster the initial deployment, the less the battle-related deaths.	Support
Hypothesis 2b	The larger the initial contribution, the less the battle-related deaths.	Contrary
Additional Hypothesis		**Finding**
Hypothesis 3b	The faster the deployment of troop personnel, the less the battle-related deaths.	No significant finding

The dissertation's analyses and findings are within certain scope conditions. First of all, the dissertation covers the period from 1991 to 2018, which provides a specific time boundary for analyzing the initial deployments of UN peacekeeping operations. This timeframe allows to examine the dynamics of conflicts and peacekeeping efforts during those years. If the future of peacekeeping beholds major changes, the results could easily change for better or worse.

Secondly, this period mostly covers the 'new wars' as Kaldor (1999) defines it. In the case of a change in the nature of conflicts, the UN's handling could change. Additionally, the UN's selection to deploy to these conflicts may be based on factors such as the intensity of violence, the involvement of the international community's interest, the availability of resources, or other specific focus. These focal points or additional criteria could change the nature of intervened conflicts.

Third, the power relations among the UNSC P5 members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and the E10 members can significantly influence decision-making and outcomes within the UNSC. First, the P5 members hold the unique privilege of veto power, which allows them to block any substantive resolution, including those related to peacekeeping operations, sanctions, or the authorization of the use of force. The veto power gives them significant influence over the Council's decisions and enables them to protect their national interests. In addition, the power dynamics between the P5 and E10 members can influence the bargaining and negotiation processes within the Security Council. The P5 members often have more leverage and can use their influence to shape resolutions, negotiate compromises, or rally support for their positions. Likewise, P5 members have a selective attention, in which they are more likely to involve the UNSC when their interests are at stake (Lundgren & Klamberg, 2023). Hence, if a member of the UNSC changes, their decisions could change and other conflicts that were previously not chosen or would not have been chosen could receive blue helmets.

Another important factor of P5 members is the historical influence. The P5 members, particularly the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom, have played influential roles in shaping the global order since the establishment of the UN. Their historical influence, including their contributions to the founding of the UN and their status as nuclear powers, has granted them significant political clout. An interesting topic would be analyzing which conflicts receive UN intervention after the Russo-Ukranian war in 2022 (although there have not been any formal war declarations). There is also a discussion on how this conflict paralyzes potential global actions (Dziedzic, 2023). Besides, power relations among the P5 and E10 members are also influenced by geopolitical considerations. The P5 members often have broader geopolitical interests and alliances, which can shape their positions on various issues. This can lead to alignments or divisions among them and influence the dynamics within the UNSC.

The E10 members represent different regions of the world and often advocate for regional perspectives and priorities. Their influence within the UNSC can vary depending on their regional alliances, diplomatic capabilities, and the specific issues being discussed. While the E10 members hold temporary seats on the UNSC, their ability to influence decisions is limited compared to the P5 members. The P5 members' permanent status and veto power grant them greater authority and decision-making power within the Council.

It is important to note that power relations within the Security Council can be complex and dynamic, shaped by various factors including geopolitical shifts, changing alliances, and global developments. The dynamics among the P5 and E10 members continue to evolve, and their interactions influence the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Security Council in addressing international peace and security issues.

The findings of the hypotheses are as follows:

Support for *Hypothesis 1a*: The faster the initial deployment, the longer the duration of peace.

Support for *Hypothesis 1b*: The faster the initial deployment, the less the battle-related deaths.

Support for *Hypothesis 2a*: The larger the initial contribution, the longer the duration of peace.

Contrary to *Hypothesis 2b*: The larger the initial contribution, the less the battle-related deaths. Results show that the larger the initial contribution, the higher the battle-related deaths (at an insignificant rate).

Support for *Hypothesis 3a*: The faster the deployment of troop personnel, the longer the duration of peace.

No significant finding for *Hypothesis 3b*: The faster the deployment of troop personnel, the less the battle-related deaths.

How do UN peacekeeping operations' initial deployment characteristics of speed, size, and composition affect ongoing violence and post-conflict peace duration? This research has reached robust conclusions on short- and long-term effects of peace operations on mitigating violence and prolonging negative peace.

The speed and size do matter, indeed. The answers are clear:

- Quicker deployment of peacekeeping forces leads to longer durations of negative peace and reduces battlefield violence.
    - However, longer gaps between the suggestion and adoption of a UNSC resolution increases the duration of peace.
- Larger initial deployment contributes to durable negative peace.
    - Increase in police or military observer personnel extends peace.
    - But, increase in troop personnel shortens the peace period and tends to increase violence. So, unarmed personnel can contribute to peace more.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

Communities ravaged by conflict cannot afford to wait for prolonged delays. The efficacy of multilateral interventions hinges upon the swift convergence, decisive decision-making, and rapid response of international organizations once minimum access conditions are met. However, institutions like the UN and the AU have yet to cultivate and deploy dedicated rapid reaction forces. Consequently, the onus falls on the UN to rely on the timely action of its member states. This reliance poses a significant challenge, as the responsiveness and readiness of member states can vary greatly. The absence of dedicated rapid reaction forces within these organizations necessitates a recalibration of strategies to ensure prompt and effective interventions in conflict-affected regions. The urgency of the situation demands a proactive approach, where international organizations actively develop and maintain rapid response capabilities, enabling them to swiftly address the pressing needs of affected populations. Only by enhancing their ability to expedite decision-making and response times can these organizations truly fulfill their mandate of safeguarding human lives and restoring stability in the face of adversity.

Initial deployments have been a neglected area in practical terms and literature. By being the first systematic analysis of speed and size components of initial deployments, the evidence in this dissertation indicates that quick initial deployments after and during a crisis can prolong peace duration and mitigate violence. In addition, larger sized initial deployments can extend peace duration. This makes initial deployment with its components of speed and size a severe concern. Rapid initial deployment or size cannot guarantee a peacekeeping operation's success, but slow and small deployments threaten it. Chapter 5 details how these factors can positively affect negative peace duration and adverse effects on battlefield violence. On theoretical grounds, the dissertation suggests that fast and large initial deployments can build credibility and trust with the local population and conflicting parties,

create a secure environment, deter spoilers, and facilitate negotiations, ultimately leading to longer-lasting negative peace.

This chapter summarizes the study's findings, offers recommendations for policymakers, and suggests directions for future research on peacekeeping operations and initial deployments. The first section summarizes the results of the study and its implications for the peacekeeping operations. The following section identifies specific implications for policymakers and provides recommendations for establishing peace operations in the future. Finally, the chapter concludes by suggesting potential avenues for future research based on the evidence presented regarding the efficiency of initial deployments in international operations.

6.1. Importance of Initial Deployments

The first months of UN peacekeeping operations are crucial due to several reasons. As the UN signals its likelihood to intervene by adopting several UNSC resolutions about the conflict, combatants improve their relative positions through anti-civilian violence; and as the signal strengthens, violence increases (Kathman et al., 2023). Early deployment establishes a physical presence that deters violence and creates a secure environment, fostering confidence and facilitating future peacebuilding efforts. Furthermore, the first deployments assess the ground situation regarding security, humanitarian needs, and help to develop a comprehensive strategy for the peacekeeping mission in political dynamics. First deployments have the ability to prevent power vacuums by providing security and governance, discouraging violence, and enabling political negotiations to take place. Additionally, the first months set the mission's tone, with the successful establishment of stability and momentum contributing to long-term success, while slow or ineffective responses undermine credibility and hinder lasting peace. The early deployments lead credibly perceived peacekeepers to build relationships and trust with conflicting parties, political leaders, civil society groups, and local communities, enabling effective communication channels.

6.1.1. Speed of Initial Deployments in Ongoing Violence

The speed at which UN peacekeeping forces are deployed in conflict zones is highly influential in determining the mission's success, especially concerning ongoing violence and the achievement of negative peace. For ongoing violence, by establishing a secure

environment, swift initial deployments deter further attacks and prevent the situation from worsening or spreading. Rapid deployments offer protection to civilians, instilling a sense of security and allowing them to resume their everyday lives without fear. While creating a safe environment, the rapid deployment of blue helmets establishes legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the local population. This, in turn, leads locals to trust the peacekeeping force to intervene in the ongoing conflict. Therefore, swift intervention is crucial to saving lives and minimizing the costs of the conflict.

The quick deployment also facilitates the effective enforcement of ceasefire agreements. Peacekeepers can closely monitor compliance and intervene if necessary to prevent any resumption of violence. This contributes to maintaining a stable environment, enabling the conflicting parties to pursue peaceful resolutions. Furthermore, peacekeeping forces provide vital assistance such as medical aid and humanitarian support to mitigate the impact of violence on local populations, preventing further harm. Through establishing security and providing support, peacekeepers contribute to the attainment of negative peace, which entails the absence of direct violence in conflict-affected areas. Ultimately, rapid deployments lay the foundation for long-term peacebuilding efforts and overall mission success.

6.1.2. Speed of Initial Deployments during Negative Peace

In the case of a negative peace era, the speed of initial deployments in UN peacekeeping operations plays a critical role in establishing a self-sustaining lasting peace. Firstly, swift deployment helps build credibility, legitimacy, trust, and confidence among the conflicting parties and the local population, while grasping the opportunities for swift interventions to establish a secure environment and protect civilians. The rapid deployment demonstrates the intervening party's commitment to the peace process and establishes a foundation of trust.

Secondly, rapid deployment can deter spoilers, individuals, or groups seeking to disrupt peace. By establishing a presence on the ground quickly, peacekeeping forces discourage spoilers from undermining the peace process through attacks or other disruptive actions. This increases the likelihood of sustaining peace in the long run.

Thirdly, in situations where formal peace agreements have not been signed but negative peace has been achieved, a rapid initial deployment creates political momentum for peace negotiations. Peacekeeping forces facilitate political dialogue and negotiations by

creating a violence-free environment, contributing to the establishment of longer-term peace and stability.

Additionally, a prompt initial deployment enables efficient mobilization of resources for post-conflict reconstruction and development, which is a crucial aspect of modern multidimensional peacekeeping operations. The ability to quickly establish a secure environment attracts international investment and support, providing the necessary resources for post-conflict reconstruction. This, in turn, promotes longer-term peace and stability by addressing underlying socio-economic issues.

Overall, the speed of initial deployments in UN peacekeeping operations is essential for building credibility, legitimacy, and trust in the eyes of the locals and grasping the opportunities for swift intervention, which in turn leads to deterring spoilers, facilitating peace negotiations, and mobilizing resources for post-conflict reconstruction, all of which contribute to the achievement of lasting peace and stability in post-conflict areas.

What would happen in the case of a slow and dribbling deployment? The consequences, whether in ongoing or post-conflict settings, are significant and far-reaching. Delayed deployments can result in severe human suffering and loss of life. The longer the delay, the higher the cost of human lives and the overall impact on the conflict. A slow response with inadequate personnel undermines the legitimacy and credibility of the peacekeeping operation and its supporters. A prompt and well-resourced deployment is necessary to establish the operation as a credible deterrent force. Besides, the mission's effectiveness and ability to implement its mandate may be questioned if deployment is delayed or insufficient. Moreover, delays in deployment diminish available opportunities and make it harder to achieve desired outcomes. Time-sensitive opportunities for resolving the conflict and stabilizing the situation can fade quickly. Delayed action can lead to further destabilization, escalating violence, and increased costs. Slow deployments can disrupt the momentum of the peace process, leading to frustration among combatants, especially young rebels. This frustration may result in re-armament, ceasefire violations, and prolonged conflict. The initial deployment phase sets the tone for subsequent phases, making establishing a timely and effective presence critical.

6.1.3. Size and Composition of Initial Deployments

According to the rationalist explanation of war, conflicts can persist due to information asymmetries and commitment problems. Studies have shown that UN peacekeeping

operations can effectively establish and maintain peace by providing commitment, deterrence, and information-sharing mechanisms. Commitment ensures that parties follow the terms of agreements, deterrence prevents conflict spillover, and information-sharing reduces uncertainty and promotes cooperation. The size and composition of peacekeeping operations play a crucial role in the peacekeeping operations' effectiveness. Larger missions with more personnel can better deter conflict and facilitate information-sharing. In particular, troop deployments are significant in mitigating information asymmetries and facilitating commitment problems.

A larger mission possesses a greater pool of resources, capabilities, and legitimacy, which in turn facilitate the development of local capacities and enhance credibility in the peace process. With a broader range of abilities and resources at their disposal, larger missions are better equipped to address the multifaceted challenges and diverse needs of conflict-affected areas. This enhanced capacity enables them to have a more significant impact on the ground, effectively contributing to both the short-term establishment of peace and the long-term sustainability of peace.

Similarly, the tailor-made composition of the initial deployment plays a crucial role in the success of peacekeeping operations. The inclusion of specialized personnel, such as troops, police, or military observers, brings distinct advantages to the mission. The composition of the initial deployment ensures that the mission possesses the necessary skills and expertise to effectively address the specific needs and complexities of the conflict at hand. By assembling a unique combination of personnel, the mission can efficiently carry out its mandate, deter spoilers, and enhance critical functions such as monitoring and reporting mechanisms. These specialized capabilities significantly reduce the risk of peace failing and ultimately contribute to the overall success of the mission.

6.2. Perception and Trust

The initial deployment of peacekeepers is essential for signaling a commitment to peace and establishing trust. The perception of weakness among UN peacekeepers, both by the local population and conflicting parties, significantly affect battlefield violence and the duration of negative peace. When the local population perceives peacekeepers as weak or ineffective, it diminishes the mission's credibility, making it harder to negotiate with conflicting parties, enforce ceasefires, and reduce violence. Slow and small deployments can be interpreted as a lack of commitment by the UN and the international community, leading

to doubts about the peacekeeping mission's sincerity and the benefits of engaging in peace negotiations. In turn, this can increase the likelihood of resorting to violence as a means of achieving political goals.

Spoilers, such as armed groups opposing peace, may perceive weak peacekeepers as an opportunity to carry out violent actions without facing a credible threat. This can incentivize them to escalate violence, gain military advantages, and expand territorial control. The perception of weakness also puts peacekeepers at a greater risk of attack by spoilers, who see them as easy targets. Conflicting parties may intentionally exploit the perceived weakness of peacekeepers to advance their own political goals, leading to a cycle of violence and undermining the effectiveness of the peacekeeping mission.

The perception of weakness diminishes trust in the peacekeeping mission and the prospects for lasting peace, increases vulnerability to violence, and undermines confidence in the peace process. A weak deployment can perpetuate a culture of violence, send a negative signal about the international community's commitment to peace and security, and make it difficult to achieve reconciliation and rebuild relationships between communities. It can also lead to the breakdown of social and economic systems, displacement of populations, and disengagement from the peace process. Trust guides the theoretical framework and is an important determinant of establishing sustainable peace.

Conflicting parties may disregard the authority of weak peacekeepers, leading to non-compliance with peace agreements and a greater likelihood of violations and renewed violence. The perception of weakness undermines the credibility of the peacekeeping mission, reduces external support for the peace process, perpetuates grievances and tensions, and may lead to the deployment of rival forces or militias, increasing the risk of violence and instability. The weak deployment also decreases local support for the peace process, making it harder to build sustainable peace and long-term stability.

A solution to blocking any negative consequence of perceived weakness and diminished trust is through the first impression. Peacekeepers must establish a credible presence and demonstrate their commitment to reducing violence and promoting lasting peace in the initial deployment. Quick initial deployment with a considerable number of personnel can create a perception of credible commitment, increase the costs of fighting, address information asymmetries, and mitigate commitment problems. This helps establish a strong image and presence on the field, fostering trust and cooperation with conflicting parties and the local population, and contributing to a stable and peaceful environment.

Timely and efficient deployments are essential for mitigating the impact of conflict, establishing credibility, seizing opportunities for peace, and maintaining momentum toward lasting peace. The initial deployment of a peacekeeping mission is therefore regarded as a strategically 'defining moment' that shapes the legitimacy of the mission, sets the tone for the upcoming months, and ultimately determines its success. A swift and efficient initial deployment can create momentum and support, while a slow and inadequate deployment can lead to inertia and lack of progress.

6.3. A Path to Peace

The dissertation proposes a theoretical mechanism where fast initial deployments and large personnel commitments can create favorable conditions for swift interventions and credible commitment, leading to decreased conflict intensity and longer periods of negative peace. Swift interventions play a significant role in bringing about a cessation of hostilities in the short term, which is essential for establishing a stable and lasting peace. These opportunities encompass a wide range of actions, and having a larger size of personnel increases the effectiveness of interventions. A strong and fast initial deployment enables a broader reach for operations, effectively preventing spoilers from carrying out violent actions against civilians, military personnel, and UN peacekeepers. It breaks the cycle of violence and fosters an environment of trust and cooperation among conflicting parties. The swift intervention also prevents the filling of security vacuums with militias or rebel forces and deters strategic targeting of peacekeepers for political gains. Furthermore, a strong image and presence can attract other actors, both regionally and internationally, to provide external support for the peace process and potentially deploy additional personnel to the mission.

Contrary to most previous work, this dissertation emphasizes the importance of the local population as a significant actor in long-term peacebuilding efforts. In the proposed mechanism, creating credible commitment and legitimacy in the eyes of the local population is crucial for effective conflict mitigation and establishing durable peace. With a credible local presence, peacekeepers have a more significant impact on peacebuilding efforts. The loss of reputation erodes local support, trust, and credibility for both peacekeepers and international actors. In turn, local support improves the security situation by providing critical information, identifying potential spoilers, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid.

Especially in ongoing conflicts, fast and substantial initial deployments are significant to the local population. Such deployments provide immediate security and enable primary

survival conditions, allowing everyday activities to resume without fear. This creates a sense of credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the locals. When the local population sees such a commitment by the international community, they are more likely to trust and respect the authority and ability of international actors in peacebuilding efforts.

The initial deployment has long-lasting effects on conflict dynamics and conflicting parties' attitudes. A fast and sizeable initial deployment contributes to longer-term peace by establishing credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the local population, seizing opportunities for swift intervention, establishing stability, deterring spoilers, building momentum for the peace process, and providing resources for local capacity building. The initial deployment phase is the defining moment that sets the momentum and legitimacy of the mission, and it plays a significant role in the commitment of parties to peace agreements, deterrence, and information-sharing.

6.4. From First Sight to Lasting Impact: Consequences of Initial Deployments Uncovered

The characteristics of UN peacekeeping operations' initial deployments, including speed, size, and composition, can significantly impact ongoing violence and negative peace in the host country. By examining all newly established UN peacekeeping operations between 1991 and 2018 without any geographical restrictions, it is evident that initial deployment's speed and size matter in mitigating violence and extending peace. The speed, size, and composition of UN peacekeeping operations' initial deployments can all affect ongoing violence and negative peace duration. A quick and credible deployment, with an appropriate size and composition, can help establish security and trust among the population, reduce the likelihood of violence, and contribute to the success of the peacekeeping operation.

6.4.1. Consequences of Speed

Time is one of the foremost essential factors in determining the success of UN peacekeeping operations. The dissertation finds robust evidence for the argument that quicker initial deployments of peacekeeping forces lead to longer durations of peace. Rapid deployment can establish a secure environment, prevent the escalation of violence, and increase the legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission in the eyes of the local population. Longer delays in deployment, measured with the duration from operation suggestion to initial deployment and from the adoption of the UNSC resolution to deployment, are associated with

shorter durations of negative peace. Each additional month of delay between the UNSC resolution and initial deployment increases the risk of another active conflict by 0.28%, while each one-month delay from operation suggestion to initial deployment increases the hazard of another war breaking out by 0.23%. These findings emphasize the importance of a prompt initial deployment in ensuring a longer duration of negative peace.

However, the results for the duration between the suggestion and the UNSC resolution contradict the results of the initial deployment. As the duration between the operation suggestion and UNSC resolution increases, the likelihood of returning to war actually decreases by 11%. This could be attributed to the time gap allowing for thorough conflict analysis, planning, and preparation to address the specific needs of the area. Adequate preparation is expected to result in quicker and stronger initial deployments, leading to longer durations of negative peace. Several factors may account for this finding, such as the occurrence of a ceasefire, the conflict becoming stagnant, or most importantly, a better formulation of the UNSC resolution that addresses the conflict's needs.

For ongoing conflicts, the results show that battlefield violence decreases as the UN peacekeeping operation deploys faster, again supporting the proposed argument. Rapid deployment of UN peacekeeping forces can act as a deterrent, establish an early warning and response system, protect civilians, and build confidence in the peace process and peacekeeping force. Henceforth, rapid deployment of UN peacekeeping forces can create a more stable and secure environment, leading to a reduction in battlefield violence and longer negative peace durations.

6.4.2. Consequences of Size and Composition

The size component supports the argument that a larger initial deployment leads to longer durations of negative peace, as larger missions have more resources, capabilities, and legitimacy, which helps build local capacities and credibility in the peace process. Contrary to expectations, the analyses reveal that an increase in the number of first deployed troop personnel is associated with a decrease in the duration of negative peace. The explanation for this finding may be due to mission overstretch, signaling of an unstable situation, risk of escalation, perception of dependence, and risk of political interference. On the other hand, an increase in police or military observer personnel reduces the risk of peace failing in a UN peacekeeping operation by acting as a deterrent to spoilers and increasing monitoring capabilities.

The dissertation suggests that a large initial deployment is almost ineffective in decreasing battlefield violence, and instead, speed shows a more significant covariate. A higher initial contribution of troop personnel leads to a higher rate of battle-related deaths, while the initial deployment of police and military observer personnel does not have statistically significant effects on dyadic battle-related deaths.

Additionally, the first 90 days of a peacekeeping mission are critical in establishing a secure and stable environment, building support for the peace process, and securing funding and support from key stakeholders. The success of the mission during this period can increase the likelihood of a successful outcome and contribute to longer-lasting peace. However, higher total and troop personnel sizes in the third deployment are associated with higher battle-related deaths, while larger military observer personnel sizes are associated with lower battlefield violence.

The dissertation also discusses the impact of troop deployment speed on the duration of negative peace and the intensity of battlefield deaths. The results show that delays in troop deployment lead to a higher probability of relapse into war. Delayed deployment of peacekeeping troops can have negative consequences, such as creating a security vacuum, decreasing the effectiveness of the mission in deterring parties from violence, loss of momentum in the peace process, and increased distrust between the parties and the peacekeeping mission. The findings reiterate the importance of quick and efficient deployment of peacekeeping troops to mitigate risks and support the peace process.

The dissertation concludes that the speed of initial deployment of UN peacekeeping operations is a crucial factor in leading to prolonged negative peace durations and fewer battle-related deaths. These findings emphasize the significance of deploying peacekeeping forces promptly after the adoption of a UNSC resolution to prevent the escalation of violence and enhance the long-term success of operations.

Furthermore, as the second component, the dissertation finds that higher initial contributions are more effective in securing peace. However, the composition of the initial deployment plays a role. The presence of more police or military observers in the initial deployment has a positive impact on peace duration, whereas troop personnel have a negative impact. The size of personnel in the third month of the mission, regardless of type, also positively influences peace duration. These findings highlight the significance of mission size and composition in achieving successful peacekeeping outcomes.

6.5. Contributions and Limitations of the Dissertation

This research bridges a gap in the literature on peacekeeping operations by focusing specifically on the characteristics of initial deployments and their impact on conflict resolution and the establishment of lasting negative peace. While previous studies have taken a broader view of peacekeeping missions, this research focuses on the critical phase of initial deployment. By exploring factors such as the speed, size, and composition of initial deployments and their effects on ongoing conflicts and the duration of negative peace, this dissertation offers new insights and practical implications for policymakers and the UN. The research has both theoretical and practical implications for policymakers, practitioners, and scholars in the field. It emphasizes the importance of establishing credibility, legitimacy, and emotional trust among the local population through swift and substantial initial deployments. The research highlights how the first impression made by peacekeepers can shape the perception of legitimacy and impact the overall success of a mission.

A key contribution of this research lies in its recognition of the importance of initial deployment characteristics for achieving successful outcomes in UN peacekeeping operations. By examining the specific components and challenges involved in fostering durable and self-sustaining peace during and after missions, the study enriches the existing knowledge in the field. In addition to size and composition components, the genuine contribution of this dissertation is the analysis of speed with phases of deployment disaggregated.

Additionally, the dissertation employs newly gathered data with a comprehensive approach by analyzing disaggregated personnel contributions and encompassing a wide temporal range from 1991 to 2018 without imposing geographical constraints. This inclusive perspective captures the diverse nature of UN peacekeeping efforts across various contexts and time periods.

Moreover, this dissertation goes beyond the simplistic binary classification of success or failure by adopting a comprehensive and nuanced perspective while accepting the varying nature of violence, peace, and peacekeeping operations. It examines the contributions of military, police, and civilian personnel, acknowledging their unique roles and impacts in peacekeeping operations. The utilization of newly collected global data and a systematic quantitative approach further enhances the depth and reliability of the dissertation.

One limitation of the study is the lack of precise and comprehensive information regarding the specific dates of initial deployments for the 55 included peacekeeping operations. This lack of detailed data on the timing of deployments may hinder a more in-

depth analysis of the relationship between deployment speed and the outcomes of the missions. It would have been beneficial to have access to reliable information on when exactly the peacekeeping forces were deployed in each case.

Additionally, the study acknowledges that the personal experiences and perspectives of ambassadors, staff, and blue helmets involved in these initial deployments could provide valuable insights into the practical challenges and realities of the deployment process. Such firsthand accounts could highlight any discrepancies between the theoretical models and frameworks that guide the design of initial deployments and the actual implementation on the ground. Understanding these practical challenges could have added a richer dimension to the analysis and provided a more nuanced understanding of how initial deployments operate in practice. Future research could consider incorporating qualitative methodologies such as interviews, surveys, or case studies to gather information and perspectives from individuals involved in initial deployments. This would help capture the complexities, obstacles, and real-world dynamics that influence the success or failure of initial deployments. Future research can produce a more comprehensive understanding of the subject matter by combining quantitative analysis with qualitative insights.

Lastly, this dissertation's theoretical framework does not provide a causal inference. Instead, it designates preliminary evidence that initial deployment affects ongoing violence and peace duration. Confidence that initial deployments matter is reinforced. However, in future research, theoretical mechanism can be studied in further ways with a field experiment or a kind of experimentation that could isolate the causal inference.

6.6. Policy Recommendations

This dissertation's evidence on how the UN acts at the beginning of a peace operation leads to several policy implications. It is evident that the UN should prioritize rapid deployment to the conflict zones to ensure that peacekeeping forces are deployed as quickly as possible after the adoption of the UNSC resolution. Besides, the UN should consider increasing the size of initial deployments to ensure a more effective and sustainable peacekeeping mission. Prompt and larger initial deployments have significant impacts on mitigating violence and prolonging negative peace. Composition-wise, the UN should ensure that personnel types are deployed according to conflict needs, are diverse, and have a mix of skills and expertise to deal with various challenges in conflict zones.

The implications of the study's findings are relevant for policymakers and international organizations involved in peacekeeping. It suggests the need for improved efficiency in peacekeeping operations, including streamlining logistical arrangements and enhancing peacekeeper training. Relatedly, prompt troop deployment is essential to maximize the chances of achieving lasting peace.

Proper analysis, planning, and preparation before initiating operations are crucial to success. Policymakers should also prioritize the formulation of effective UN resolutions for conflict resolution. Professionalism and employing experts on specific conflicts are essential for better preparation, necessitating a broader range of employees or consultants on behalf of the UN. Besides, the local population should be represented and heard in a UNSC resolution formulation to have a tailor-made resolution according to the needs of the locals and the conflict. The study provides valuable insights into the factors that contribute to the success of UN peacekeeping operations. By considering these factors and implementing appropriate measures, policymakers and the UN can enhance the effectiveness of peacekeeping efforts and contribute to a more peaceful world.

The starting point of the problem of deployment is the collective action problem that faces third-party interventions in civil wars. On the one hand, the international community has an incentive to stop civil conflicts, because these cause a lot of suffering and they pose risks (such as refugee flows or probability of conflict contagion) to other countries. On the other hand, each potential participant in a multilateral operation has an incentive to free-ride on the efforts of other states. Each state would prefer civil wars to end, but they would prefer if other states paid the financial and military costs of reaching that goal. By this argument, factors that make war more destructive have two opposing effects on third-party interventions. On the one hand, they raise the war's externalities and make an intervention more desirable for the international community. On the other hand, they make intervention more costly and individual states less willing to contribute. Based on such a context, member states should push self-interested realistic concerns into the background and focus on the efficiency of the peacekeeping operation while planning on deploying personnel. Operational decisions should not be delayed due to prolonged discussions with advisory bodies or calculated according to self-interested methods.

Recommendations aim to inform decision-makers on how to organize to maximize initial deployment efficiency. Some formal rules may need to be abandoned, changed, or created to streamline decision-making, as some formal rules can discourage prompt decision-

making or lead to bureaucratic impediments. New formal rules may be useful in streamlining decision-making. While some of these recommendations may be difficult to implement, they are included as they naturally follow the research's findings.

Decision-makers in the UN must recognize and act on the importance of speed for establishing long-term effectiveness in peace operations. It is a possibility to allocate more common budget resources to enhance rapid response mechanisms like the AU's African Standby Force. Member states could be convinced to meet their contribution minimums to this effort. The UN can make use of existing structures like the EU's Battlegroups. These existing structures can be benefited to be deployed quickly as advance teams. The best solution in this regard could be the partnership of the UN with other regional organizations. Despite fears of precedent-setting and losing prestige, the UN could take the risk of using these resources.

It is important for regional organizations to work more closely with the UN in peacekeeping operations. Scholars have emphasized the need for this partnership, which should be established throughout the stages of the interventions (Tardy, 2005). A clear division of labor and communication channels should be established to ensure a rapid response in times of crisis. Although some annual meetings and individual contacts take place amongst the organizations, the institutionalized links between regional organizations and the UN are weak, making it difficult to coordinate effectively. In order to better support the UN, new ways of providing assistance while maintaining control structures should be explored. The legitimacy that the UN provides for peacekeeping operations is essential. Therefore, it is recommended to establish formal channels of communication between regional organizations and the UN for better coordination and cooperation that can help both parties. The absence of such channels makes negotiations less efficient and transparent. Although regional organizations may act autonomously, maintaining open communication with the UN can be beneficial for receiving advice, expertise, and support on a particular crisis and vice versa. Moreover, the UN can serve as a model for creative decision-making procedures through informal meetings, such as expert group meetings, and informal negotiations with relevant actors. These meetings help decision-makers access maximum information on crises, engage a plurality of actors, and cultivate informal connections among key decision-makers.

The UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) is a set of standards and assessments that aims to enhance the readiness and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions. The PCRS is designed to ensure that UN peacekeeping missions have the resources, capabilities, and support to effectively carry out their mandates. The system covers areas such

as personnel, equipment, training, logistics, and planning. The PCRS includes a number of tools and mechanisms, such as the Capability Readiness Tracking System (CRTS), which monitors the readiness of troop- and police-contributing countries, and the Rapid Deployment Level (RDL), which maintains a list of contingents that can be deployed quickly in response to emerging crises. The PCRS is an ongoing effort to improve the quality and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions, and it is regularly reviewed and updated to reflect changing operational requirements and lessons learned from past missions.

The PCRS is still yet to function effectively, and it can be made more effective by taking some steps. Regular evaluations and updates are necessary to ensure that the PCRS remains effective and relevant to the evolving needs of UN peacekeeping operations. This could involve regular assessments of the readiness of TCCs and adjustments to the system as needed. A major necessity is providing incentives for countries to participate in the PCRS and contribute to operations (which is already in effect but could be noticeably increased). This could include financial incentives or other forms of support that would encourage more countries to participate in the system. Another significant improvement would be improving transparency around the PCRS by making more information available about the readiness of different countries and their contributions to peacekeeping operations. This could help to build trust and confidence in the system and encourage greater participation. Furthermore, the UN could work more closely with regional organizations to improve the effectiveness of the PCRS. This could involve sharing information and best practices, coordinating training and capacity-building efforts, and collaborating on peacekeeping operations. Lastly, the UN could invest more resources in training in topics such as conflict resolution, human rights, and the protection of civilians, and capacity-building for TCCs to improve their readiness and effectiveness in peacekeeping operations. By taking these steps, the UN could make the PCRS more effective and ensure that it can better support peacekeeping operations worldwide.

Alternatively, the UN can consider establishing rapid response planning committees of related peace and security committees. These committees would focus solely on planning for exercising existing rapid response mechanisms and how to efficiently accelerate personnel planning and deployments. This will ensure a quicker response and better efficiency in the establishment of peace operations.

6.7. Future of UN Peacekeeping Operations

While the exact trajectory may vary, the future of UN peacekeeping will likely involve several key trends and potential developments. First of all, UN peacekeeping operations may increasingly leverage emerging technologies such as drones, artificial intelligence, big data analytics, and remote sensing. These technologies can enhance situational awareness, intelligence gathering, and operational effectiveness while reducing risks to personnel.

Secondly, there may be a shift towards a more proactive approach, with a greater emphasis on conflict prevention rather than solely responding to ongoing or post-conflicts. This could involve early warning systems, mediation efforts, and addressing root causes of conflicts such as poverty, inequality, and governance issues. The protection of civilians is likely to remain a core principle of UN peacekeeping. Efforts to strengthen civilian protection measures, including early warning systems, rapid response mechanisms, and robust mandates, may continue to evolve.

Third, the UN may seek to enhance partnerships with regional organizations, such as the AU and the EU, to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping efforts. These collaborations can benefit from regional knowledge, expertise, and resources, fostering greater ownership and sustainability.

Fourth, there may be and should be a greater emphasis on empowering local communities and fostering local ownership of peacebuilding processes. This involves engaging with local actors, including civil society organizations, women's groups, and community leaders, to ensure their active participation and inclusion in decision-making.

Fifth, as a major component of the contemporary world, the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation can exacerbate conflicts and humanitarian crises. UN peacekeeping may increasingly incorporate environmental considerations and climate-related security risks into its operations, such as resource management, conflict-sensitive approaches, and sustainable development.

Sixth, as conflicts become increasingly complex and fluid, UN peacekeeping operations need to enhance their adaptability and flexibility. This could involve modular and rapidly deployable units, tailored mission structures, and the ability to respond to dynamic security situations.

It is important to note that the future of UN peacekeeping will be influenced by geopolitical dynamics, the evolving nature of conflicts, and the willingness of member states

to provide the necessary political, financial, and logistical support. The UN and its member states will continue to shape and adapt peacekeeping approaches to meet the evolving challenges of maintaining international peace and security.

It is possible to see a pessimistic view of what the future holds. Karlsrud (2023) argues that there has been a decline in UN peacekeeping operations over the past decade, while regional and ad hoc coalitions have gained prominence. The rise of these coalitions is attributed to increasing geopolitical competition and a shift away from liberal values in favor of national self-interests. The article suggests that these coalitions focus less on human rights, international humanitarian law, and the protection of civilians than UN peacekeeping operations. It also notes that China's influence in the UN and the African states' demand for more robust operations contribute to this shift. The article concludes that UN multidimensional peacekeeping may continue to decline, but the coalitions may receive logistical and administrative support from the UN peace operations.

6.8. Future Research

This dissertation provides the first analytical study into the consequences of initial deployments in UN peacekeeping operations, but it should not be the last. Future research is needed into all multilateral actors' speed, size, and composition. This dissertation aims to inspire scholars and policymakers to develop peace operations from a novel perspective.

There are several potential areas of future research related to UN peacekeeping operations and initial deployments. Future research could investigate how the characteristics of the troops provided by different countries (e.g., training, experience, cultural factors) affect the success of peacekeeping operations both for initial deployments and overall deployments. Deploying qualified personnel initially could be significant in establishing a solid presence in the conflict-affected area.

Additionally, in order to determine the causal inference and isolate the effects of initial deployments on the short-term effect of ongoing violence and the long-term effect of peace duration, a field experiment can be a valuable method. This approach involves manipulating the independent variable (in this case, the initial deployments) and observing the effects on the dependent variables (short-term violence and long-term peace duration) while controlling for other potential confounding factors.

Many peacekeeping operations involve collaboration between the UN and regional organizations, such as the AU. Future research could explore how the involvement of these organizations in initial deployments affects the success of peacekeeping operations. Scholars can also delve into how collaboration with other organizations and how the existence of re-hatted personnel in contrast to newly deployed blue helmets affect the initial deployments and their effects.

Political factors, such as the level of international support for a particular peacekeeping operation or the political will of the parties to a conflict, may affect the speed, size, and composition of initial deployments. Future research could investigate how these political factors influence the initial deployments and, relatedly, the success of operations.

Advances in technology may impact the speed and effectiveness of initial deployments, for example, using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or other remote sensing technologies. Future research could explore how these technologies are being used in initial deployments and their impact on the success of peacekeeping operations. Overall, continued research on UN peacekeeping operations and initial deployments is essential to better understand how these interventions can be made more effective in promoting peace and stability in conflict-affected regions.

6.9. Conclusion

In international peacekeeping, the initial deployment of UN peacekeeping operations holds immense importance in establishing legitimacy and inspiring hope among local communities. The challenges of establishing trust and credibility are not to be underestimated, as the wounds of conflict run deep. However, through timely and well-resourced deployments, the international community can profoundly impact the lives of those affected by violence and strife.

The evidence is clear: when the UN acts decisively, lives are saved, suffering is alleviated, and the seeds of lasting peace are sown. The results gathered in this dissertation underscore the critical nature of prompt action and substantial resources in achieving positive outcomes. When UN peacekeepers swiftly enter conflict zones and establish a visible presence, it instills a sense of reassurance and demonstrates the international community's commitment to safeguarding the well-being of the local population. Equally crucial are the peacekeeping forces, with specialized personnel such as troops, police, and military observers

playing vital roles in deterring spoilers and enhancing monitoring capabilities. Their expertise and vigilance contribute to the restoration of peace and stability, fostering a conducive environment for rebuilding shattered societies.

Contemporary studies provide a better understanding of international organizations' functions, objectives, and effects on peace operations. This dissertation delves deeper into how the UN responds to stress and the mechanisms of initial deployments. The dissertation not only uncovers the profound impact of speed and size but also holds the potential to save countless human lives and revolutionize the landscape of UN peacekeeping operations. Two important lessons are highlighted. First, the initial speed is critical in mitigating violence and sustaining negative peace. Second, the initial size of the personnel is crucial in decreasing battlefield violence.

By shedding light on the importance of speed and size, the dissertation fuels a paradigm shift in UN peacekeeping operations, envisioning a future where the blue helmets' effectiveness and impact take center stage, and where the trust and confidence of local communities become the foundation for enduring peace. By offering valuable insights into the impact of initial deployments, this research has the potential to revolutionize the field of peacekeeping, paving the way for a world where lives are saved, conflicts are resolved swiftly, and the UN achieves greater success in its mission to bring about sustainable peace.

Researchers bear a tremendous responsibility in the ever-evolving landscape of peacekeeping operations and international organizations. They must venture beyond the confines of conventional aspects of peacekeeping and explore critical phenomena that shape the trajectory of peace processes. Armed with the lessons from past operations, researchers and policymakers have the power to reshape the destiny of peacekeeping towards a new era of peace.

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Appendix A

A.1. Hazard Ratio Tables

Table A.1: Cox Analyses of Delay of Initial Deployments

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Time-Constant Variables			
Duration between Suggestion to UNSC Resolution	0.890*** (0.0392)		
Duration between UNSC Resolution to Deployment		1.028*** (0.00801)	
Duration between Suggestion to Deployment			1.023*** (0.00806)
Prior Agreement	1.019 (0.126)	1.419** (0.224)	1.291* (0.200)
Conflict Duration	1.145*** (0.00637)	1.128*** (0.00722)	1.136*** (0.00734)
Spike	0.529*** (0.0458)	0.584*** (0.0528)	0.596*** (0.0553)
PKO Type	0.595*** (0.0482)	0.577*** (0.0411)	0.543*** (0.0394)
Time-Varying Covariates			
Population (ln)	0.932*** (0.00641)	0.938*** (0.00637)	0.938*** (0.00650)
Refugee (ln)	0.982*** (0.00667)	0.979*** (0.00656)	0.975*** (0.00665)
Fuel	0.993*** (0.00119)	0.993*** (0.00119)	0.993*** (0.00119)
Observations	2283	2347	2283
Number of Subjects	105	109	105
Number of Failures	1191	1228	1191

Wald χ^2	920.44	905.02	902.96
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-5033.6479	-5258.5879	-5033.3898

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.2: Cox Analyses of Initial Contributions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time-Constant Variables				
First Total Personnel Size	0.9999756* (0.00000725)			
First Troop Size		1.000016*** (0.00000761)		
First Police Size			0.9998836*** (0.000123)	
First Military Observer Size				0.9994853*** (0.000248)
Prior Agreement	1.037 (0.128)	1.029 (0.128)	0.939 (0.118)	1.110 (0.137)
Conflict Duration	1.138*** (0.00659)	1.149*** (0.00658)	1.137*** (0.00629)	1.137*** (0.00629)
Spike	0.502*** (0.0429)	0.547*** (0.0479)	0.514*** (0.0427)	0.465*** (0.0405)
PKO Type	0.573*** (0.0412)	0.510*** (0.0393)	0.586*** (0.0417)	0.620*** (0.0457)
Time-Varying Covariates				
Population (ln)	0.932*** (0.00630)	0.935*** (0.00634)	0.933*** (0.00625)	0.929*** (0.00631)
Refugee (ln)	0.986** (0.00677)	0.978*** (0.00668)	0.988* (0.00671)	0.988* (0.00666)
Fuel	0.993*** (0.00119)	0.993*** (0.00119)	0.993*** (0.00119)	0.993*** (0.00119)
Observations	2349	2347	2347	2347
Number of Subjects	109	109	109	109
Number of Failures	1228	1228	1228	1228
Wald χ^2	897.46	903.59	905.80	911.50
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-5262.9405	-5259.3052	-5258.199	-5255.3469

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.3: Cox Analyses of the Third Month's Deployments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time-Constant Variables				
3rd Month Total Personnel Size	0.9999652*** (0.00000530)			
3rd Month Troop Size		0.9999616*** (0.00000599)		
3rd Month Police Size			0.999779*** (0.0000417)	
3rd Month Military Observer Size				0.99855*** (0.000216)
Prior Agreement	1.086 (0.133)	1.089 (0.133)	1.023 (0.125)	1.199 (0.149)
Conflict Duration	1.138*** (0.00612)	1.137*** (0.00613)	1.147*** (0.00619)	1.138*** (0.00608)
Spike	0.548*** (0.0455)	0.539*** (0.0448)	0.583*** (0.0495)	0.525*** (0.0432)
PKO Type	0.616*** (0.0437)	0.615*** (0.0437)	0.590*** (0.0416)	0.603*** (0.0425)
Time-Varying Covariates				
Population (ln)	0.934*** (0.00623)	0.934*** (0.00624)	0.935*** (0.00626)	0.924*** (0.00628)
Refugee (ln)	0.991 (0.00668)	0.992 (0.00669)	0.987** (0.00659)	0.994 (0.00674)
Fuel	0.994*** (0.00119)	0.994*** (0.00119)	0.993*** (0.00119)	0.994*** (0.00119)
Observations	2349	2349	2349	2349
Number of Subjects	109	109	109	109
Number of Failures	1228	1228	1228	1228
Wald χ^2	942.25	940.32	925.29	946.22
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-5240.5443	-5241.5115	-5249.0268	-5238.5584

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.4: Cox Analyses of Delay of Troop Contributions

	(1)
Time-Constant Variables	
Delay of Troop Deployment	1.032*** (0.0107)
Prior Agreement	2.187*** (0.520)
Conflict Duration	1.069*** (0.0155)
Spike	0.654*** (0.100)
PKO Type	0.604*** (0.101)
Time-Varying Covariates	
Population (ln)	1.041* (0.0226)
Refugee (ln)	0.829*** (0.0166)
Fuel	1.005** (0.00203)
Observations	795
Number of Subjects	70
Number of Failures	397
Wald χ^2	230.03
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-1141.9941

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix B

B.1. Countfit Models

B.1.1. Hypothesis 1b

Table B.1: Delay Between Suggestion and UNSC Resolution

NBRM	BIC= 18493.266	AIC= 18420.248	**Prefer**	**Over**	**Evidence**
vs ZINB	BIC=17767.523	dif=725.743	ZINB	NBRM	Very strong
	AIC=17661.316	dif=758.933	ZINB	NBRM	
	Vuong= 5.839	prob=0.000	ZINB	NBRM	p=0.000



Figure B.1: NBRM vs ZINB for Delay between Suggestion and UNSC Resolution

Table B.2: Delay between UNSC Resolution and Deployment

NBRM	BIC=19409.853	AIC=19336.526	**Prefer**	**Over**	**Evidence**
vs ZINB	BIC=18672.558	dif=737.295	ZINB	NBRM	Very strong
	AIC=18565.900	dif=770.626	ZINB	NBRM	
	Vuong=5.797	prob=0.000	ZINB	NBRM	p=0.000



Figure B.2: NBRM vs ZINB for Delay between UNSC Resolution and Deployment

Table B.3: Delay between Suggestion and Deployment

NBRM	BIC=18506.177	AIC=18433.160	**Prefer**	**Over**	**Evidence**
vs ZINB	BIC=17716.594	dif=789.583	ZINB	NBRM	Very strong
	AIC=17610.386	dif=822.773	ZINB	NBRM	
	Vuong=7.655	prob=0.000	ZINB	NBRM	p=0.000



Figure B.3: NBRM vs ZINB for Delay between Suggestion and Deployment

B.1.2. Hypothesis 2b

Table B.4: First Total Personnel Size

NBRM	BIC=19405.952	AIC=19332.624	**Prefer**	**Over**	**Evidence**
vs ZINB	BIC=18695.110	dif=710.842	ZINB	NBRM	Very strong
	AIC=18588.452	dif=744.172	ZINB	NBRM	
	Vuong=5.494	prob=0.000	ZINB	NBRM	p=0.000



Figure B.4: NBRM vs ZINB for First Total Personnel Size

Table B.5: First Troop Size

NBRM	BIC=19360.879	AIC=19287.552	**Prefer**	**Over**	**Evidence**
vs ZINB	BIC=18698.325	dif=662.555	ZINB	NBRM	Very strong
	AIC=18591.667	dif=695.885	ZINB	NBRM	
	Vuong=4.716	prob=0.000	ZINB	NBRM	p=0.000



Figure B.5: NBRM vs ZINB for First Troop Size

Table B.6: First Police Size

NBRM	BIC=19359.897	AIC=19286.570	**Prefer**	**Over**	**Evidence**
vs ZINB	BIC=18691.206	dif=668.691	ZINB	NBRM	Very strong
	AIC=18584.548	dif=702.021	ZINB	NBRM	
	Vuong=4.107	prob=0.000	ZINB	NBRM	p=0.000



Figure B.6: NBRM vs ZINB for First Police Size

Table B.7: First Military Observer Size

NBRM	BIC=19393.295	AIC=19319.968	**Prefer**	**Over**	**Evidence**
vs ZINB	BIC=18682.763	dif=710.532	ZINB	NBRM	Very strong
	AIC=18576.105	dif=743.863	ZINB	NBRM	
	Vuong=5.497	prob=0.000	ZINB	NBRM	p=0.000



Figure B.7: NBRM vs ZINB for First Military Observer Size

B.1.3. Hypothesis 3b

Table B.8: Delay of Troop Deployment Model

NBRM	BIC=10628.404	AIC=10557.442	**Prefer**	**Over**	**Evidence**
vs ZINB	BIC=10549.936	dif=78.467	ZINB	NBRM	Very strong
	AIC=10446.720	dif=110.722	ZINB	NBRM	
	Vuong=4.106	prob=0.000	ZINB	NBRM	p=0.000



Figure B.8: NBRM vs ZINB for Delay of Troop Deployment

Appendix C

C.1. Cox Regression Tables for 1990s

Table C.1: Cox Analyses of Delay of Initial Deployments for 1990s

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Time-Constant Variables			
Duration between Suggestion to UNSC Resolution	-0.202** (0.0940)		
Duration between UNSC Resolution to Deployment		-0.0759* (0.0427)	
Duration between Suggestion to Deployment			-0.0946** (0.0384)
Prior Agreement	0.808*** (0.288)	0.843*** (0.286)	0.806*** (0.286)
Conflict Duration	0.0728*** (0.0254)	0.0524** (0.0244)	0.0574** (0.0241)
Spike	0.327** (0.145)	0.415*** (0.144)	0.394*** (0.144)
PKO Type	-0.391*** (0.115)	-0.404*** (0.113)	-0.401*** (0.114)
Time-Varying Covariates			
Population (ln)	-0.304*** (0.0673)	-0.262*** (0.0649)	-0.285*** (0.0660)
Refugee (ln)	-0.0215* (0.0129)	-0.0269** (0.0129)	-0.0270** (0.0128)
Fuel	-0.102*** (0.0170)	-0.0843*** (0.0188)	-0.0805*** (0.0182)
Observations	793	793	793
Number of Subjects	38	38	38
Number of Failures	378	378	378
Wald χ^2	99.29	96.89	100.38

Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-1300.6274	-1301.8278	-1300.0845

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.2: Cox Analyses of Initial Contributions for 1990s

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time-Constant Variables				
First Total Personnel Size	0.000101*** (0.0000269)			
First Troop Size		0.000395*** (0.0000351)		
First Police Size			0.00574*** (0.000621)	
First Military Observer Size				0.00405*** (0.000883)
Prior Agreement	0.833*** (0.293)	0.713** (0.295)	1.744*** (0.321)	0.897*** (0.288)
Conflict Duration	0.0840*** (0.0258)	0.140*** (0.0268)	0.124*** (0.0273)	0.0253 (0.0248)
Spike	0.0453 (0.177)	-1.404*** (0.277)	-0.121 (0.175)	0.391*** (0.144)
PKO Type	-0.664*** (0.135)	-1.286*** (0.144)	-0.608*** (0.125)	-0.485*** (0.117)
Time-Varying Covariates				
Population (ln)	-0.133* (0.0750)	0.0991 (0.0753)	-0.0793 (0.0735)	-0.231*** (0.0653)
Refugee (ln)	-0.0140 (0.0139)	0.0101 (0.0138)	0.00375 (0.0154)	-0.0304** (0.0135)
Fuel	-0.153*** (0.0222)	-0.0751*** (0.0158)	-0.134*** (0.0175)	-0.0942*** (0.0171)
Observations	795	793	793	793
Number of Subjects	38	38	38	38
Number of Failures	378	378	378	378
Wald χ^2	110.35	233.75	173.42	111.67
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-1296.3954	-1233.4013	-1263.5652	-1294.4396

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.3: Cox Analyses of the Third Month's Deployments for 1990s

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time-Constant Variables				
3rd Month Total Personnel Size	-0.0000214** (0.0000104)			
3rd Month Troop Size		-0.0000226** (0.0000110)		
3rd Month Police Size			0.000403 (0.000396)	
3rd Month Military Observer Size				-0.00146*** (0.000390)
Prior Agreement	0.882*** (0.285)	0.883*** (0.285)	0.903*** (0.290)	0.955*** (0.286)
Conflict Duration	0.0584** (0.0241)	0.0587** (0.0241)	0.0633** (0.0247)	0.0536** (0.0241)
Spike	0.483*** (0.150)	0.486*** (0.150)	0.322** (0.154)	0.417*** (0.142)
PKO Type	-0.304** (0.121)	-0.302** (0.122)	-0.442*** (0.120)	-0.340*** (0.112)
Time-Varying Covariates				
Population (ln)	-0.316*** (0.0694)	-0.317*** (0.0695)	-0.234*** (0.0698)	-0.328*** (0.0660)
Refugee (ln)	-0.0261** (0.0127)	-0.0261** (0.0127)	-0.0216 (0.0133)	-0.0256** (0.0125)
Fuel	-0.0890*** (0.0183)	-0.0890*** (0.0183)	-0.111*** (0.0191)	-0.0904*** (0.0177)
Observations	795	795	795	795
Number of Subjects	38	38	38	38
Number of Failures	378	378	378	378
Wald χ^2	99.51	99.54	96.13	112.25
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-1301.8147	-1301.8028	-1303.5066	-1295.4487

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.4: Cox Analyses of Delay of Troop Contributions for 1990s

	(1)
Time-Constant Variables	
Delay of Troop Deployment	0.0312 (0.0251)
Prior Agreement	-0.332 (0.398)
Conflict Duration	-0.184*** (0.0434)
Spike	-1.936*** (0.322)
PKO Type	-1.329*** (0.256)
Time-Varying Covariates	
Population (ln)	-0.299** (0.131)
Refugee (ln)	-0.276*** (0.0374)
Fuel	0.243*** (0.0749)
Observations	287
Number of Subjects	19
Number of Failures	169
Wald χ^2	102.14
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-300.1583

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C.2. Cox Regression Tables for 2000s

Table C.5: Cox Analyses of Delay of Initial Deployments for 2000s

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Time-Constant Variables			
Duration between Suggestion to UNSC Resolution	-0.0469 (0.0794)		
Duration between UNSC Resolution to Deployment		0.0112 (0.0103)	
Duration between Suggestion to Deployment			0.00556 (0.0105)
Prior Agreement	-0.307* (0.165)	-0.0453 (0.238)	-0.255 (0.234)
Conflict Duration	0.163*** (0.00852)	0.149*** (0.00950)	0.162*** (0.00976)
Spike	-1.260*** (0.118)	-1.197*** (0.134)	-1.190*** (0.143)
PKO Type	-0.319* (0.168)	-0.319*** (0.109)	-0.400*** (0.113)
Time-Varying Covariates			
Population (ln)	-0.0787*** (0.00853)	-0.0729*** (0.00912)	-0.0761*** (0.00942)
Refugee (ln)	-0.0365*** (0.00975)	-0.0370*** (0.00997)	-0.0380*** (0.00999)
Fuel	-0.00281** (0.00122)	-0.00224* (0.00122)	-0.00282** (0.00122)
Observations	1490	1554	1490
Number of Subjects	67	71	67
Number of Failures	813	850	813
Wald χ^2	942.81	923.81	942.75
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-2901.0731	-3113.8826	-2901.1049

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.6: Cox Analyses of Initial Contributions for 2000s

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time-Constant Variables				
First Total Personnel Size	-0.0000372*** (0.00000993)			
First Troop Size		-0.0000355*** (0.0000109)		
First Police Size			-0.000740*** (0.000139)	
First Military Observer Size				-0.00146*** (0.000292)
Prior Agreement	-0.146 (0.146)	-0.136 (0.147)	-0.257* (0.142)	0.00730 (0.150)
Conflict Duration	0.143*** (0.00762)	0.145*** (0.00762)	0.140*** (0.00732)	0.140*** (0.00749)
Spike	-1.391*** (0.108)	-1.387*** (0.109)	-1.273*** (0.103)	-1.446*** (0.107)
PKO Type	-0.168 (0.111)	-0.176 (0.113)	-0.161 (0.108)	-0.128 (0.108)
Time-Varying Covariates				
Population (ln)	-0.0782*** (0.00823)	-0.0786*** (0.00827)	-0.0705*** (0.00818)	-0.0791*** (0.00828)
Refugee (ln)	-0.0286*** (0.00978)	-0.0295*** (0.00979)	-0.0328*** (0.00981)	-0.0278*** (0.00976)
Fuel	-0.00245** (0.00122)	-0.00250** (0.00122)	-0.00253** (0.00122)	-0.00220* (0.00122)
Observations	1554	1554	1554	1554
Number of Subjects	71	71	71	71
Number of Failures	850	850	850	850
Wald χ^2	937.64	933.81	953.66	951.28
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-3106.9687	-3108.8854	-3098.9595	-3100.1472

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.7: Cox Analyses of the Third Month's Deployments for 2000s

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time-Constant Variables				
3rd Month Total Personnel Size	-0.0000469*** (0.00000753)			
3rd Month Troop Size		-0.0000582*** (0.00000896)		
3rd Month Police Size			-0.000167*** (0.0000438)	
3rd Month Military Observer Size				-0.00109*** (0.000281)
Prior Agreement	-0.0102 (0.147)	0.0106 (0.147)	-0.176 (0.145)	-0.0332 (0.153)
Conflict Duration	0.147*** (0.00700)	0.145*** (0.00701)	0.156*** (0.00697)	0.150*** (0.00707)
Spike	-1.184*** (0.104)	-1.202*** (0.104)	-1.159*** (0.109)	-1.262*** (0.105)
PKO Type	-0.0399 (0.112)	-0.00973 (0.113)	-0.240** (0.108)	-0.169 (0.112)
Time-Varying Covariates				
Population (ln)	-0.0705*** (0.00827)	-0.0703*** (0.00826)	-0.0721*** (0.00837)	-0.0815*** (0.00837)
Refugee (ln)	-0.0313*** (0.00969)	-0.0309*** (0.00969)	-0.0347*** (0.00970)	-0.0297*** (0.00976)
Fuel	-0.00206* (0.00123)	-0.00197 (0.00123)	-0.00251** (0.00122)	-0.00212* (0.00122)
Observations	1554	1554	1554	1554
Number of Subjects	71	71	71	71
Number of Failures	850	850	850	850
Wald χ^2	964.01	967.69	938.36	938.34
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-3093.7862	-3091.9441	-3106.6073	-3106.6164

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.8: Cox Analyses of Delay of Troop Contributions for 2000s

	(1)
Time-Constant Variables	
Delay of Troop Deployment	0.0827*** (0.0137)
Prior Agreement	0.533 (0.413)
Conflict Duration	-0.000903 (0.0171)
Spike	0.171 (0.285)
PKO Type	0.409 (0.881)
Time-Varying Covariates	
Population (ln)	-0.182*** (0.0589)
Refugee (ln)	0.132** (0.0542)
Fuel	0.0159*** (0.00256)
Observations	508
Number of Subjects	51
Number of Failures	228
Wald χ^2	152.00
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-592.3769

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C.3. Negative Binomial Regression Tables for 1990s

Table C.9: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of Delays for 1990s

	(1) BRD Count	(2) Certain Zero	(3) BRD Count	(4) Certain Zero	(5) BRD Count	(6) Certain Zero
Delay between Suggestion and UNSC Resolution	0.530*** (0.0656)					
Delay between UNSC Resolution and Deployment			0.711*** (0.0374)			
Delay between Suggestion and Deployment					0.687*** (0.0319)	
Prior Agreement	2.601** (1.112)	1.80e-56 (7.17e-53)	2.005 (0.908)	9.58e-55 (2.69e-51)	2.626** (1.149)	4.85e-57 (1.96e-53)
Population (ln)	0.832 (0.146)		1.034 (0.174)		0.829 (0.136)	
Refugee (ln)	0.995 (0.0229)		0.905*** (0.0231)		0.912*** (0.0212)	
Fuel	0.964*** (0.00465)		0.968*** (0.00472)		0.967*** (0.00469)	
Conflict Duration	0.945 (0.0501)	101221172.3[17] (5.75336e+10)	0.901* (0.0482)	55003941.2 (2.20337e+10)	0.906* (0.0482)	120572928.4 (6.98212e+10)
Spike	0.275**		0.332**		0.243***	

[17] The reason for such a big observation is due to the insignificance of the Certain Zero model.

	*		*			
	(0.0854)		(0.0993)		(0.0714)	
PKO Type	0.842		1.594*		1.703**	
	(0.167)		(0.380)		(0.388)	
Lagged Battle-Related Deaths	1.027***		1.025***		1.024***	
	(0.00507)		(0.00496)		(0.00488)	
Constant	125.741*	-18.021	7.064	-16.968	217.188**	-17.947
	(340.504)	(568.395)	(18.017)	(0.04)	(550.412)	(579.079)
Alpha (ln)	4.373***		4.361***		4.351***	
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
N	11738		11738		11738	

Presented are exponentiated coefficients of zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses in "BRD Count" models, which should be interpreted as Incidence Rate Ratios. "Certain Zero" models present coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.10: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of First Deployments for 1990s

	(1) BRD Count	(2) Certain Zero	(3) BRD Count	(4) Certain Zero
First Total Personnel Size	1.000*** (0.0000573)			
First Troop			1.001*** (0.0000611)	
Prior Agreement	2.989** (1.360)	1.75e-57 (7.41e-54)	0.178*** (0.0985)	2.40e-08 (0.0000190)
Population (ln)	0.901 (0.168)		2.830*** (0.384)	
Refugee (ln)	1.044* (0.0261)		0.813*** (0.0224)	
Fuel	0.966*** (0.00467)		0.961*** (0.00457)	
Conflict Duration	0.873** (0.0502)	122322429.3 (7.41515e+10)	0.975 (0.0397)	0.605 (0.730)
Spike	11.06*** (8.038)		0.0383*** (0.0124)	
PKO Type	1.310 (0.309)		0.186*** (0.0398)	
Lagged Battle-Related Deaths	1.027*** (0.00497)		1.027*** (0.00518)	
Constant	10.285 (28.665)	-17.106*** (606.197)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.334 (0.317)
Alpha (ln)	4.349*** (0.04)		4.331*** (0.041)	
N	11740		11738	

Presented are exponentiated coefficients of zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses in "BRD Count" models, which should be interpreted as Incidence Rate Ratios. "Certain Zero" models present coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.11: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of First Deployments for 1990s (Continued)

	(3) BRD Count	(4) Certain Zero	(5) BRD Count	(6) Certain Zero
First Police	0.999 (0.00108)			
First Military Observer			1.002 (0.00227)	
Prior Agreement	1.852 (0.830)	1.39e-54 (4.05e-51)	1.701 (0.760)	8.49e-56 (2.93e-52)
Population (ln)	1.202 (0.201)		1.170 (0.194)	
Refugee (ln)	0.967 (0.0220)		0.972 (0.0221)	
Fuel	0.966*** (0.00464)		0.967*** (0.00468)	
Conflict Duration	0.906* (0.0512)	51098882.6 (2.13543e+10)	0.927 (0.0491)	77463025.0 (3.81475e+10)
Spike	0.523* (0.179)		0.457*** (0.137)	
PKO Type	0.844 (0.180)		0.849 (0.178)	
Lagged Battle-Related Deaths	1.028*** (0.00517)		1.028*** (0.00518)	
Constant	0.264 (0.659)	-16.92 (417.902)	0.372 (0.918)	-17.364 (492.461)
Alpha (ln)	4.383*** (0.04)		4.382*** (0.04)	
N	11738		11738	

Presented are exponentiated coefficients of zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses in "BRD Count" models, which should be interpreted as Incidence Rate Ratios. "Certain Zero" models present coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.12: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of the Third Deployments for 1990s

	(1) BRD Count	(2) Certain Zero	(3) BRD Count	(4) Certain Zero
3rd Total Personnel Size	1.000*** (0.0000232)			
3rd Troop Personnel			1.000*** (0.0000244)	
Prior Agreement	1.887 (0.906)	2.88e-56 (1.16e-52)	1.906 (0.915)	1.38e-54 (4.20e-51)
Population (ln)	1.090 (0.191)		1.082 (0.189)	
Refugee (ln)	0.952* (0.0252)		0.953* (0.0252)	
Fuel	0.966*** (0.00456)		0.966*** (0.00456)	
Conflict Duration	0.891** (0.0467)	83912344.3 (4.81902e+10)	0.891** (0.0467)	48277299.5 (2.10384e+10)
Spike	1.891 (0.981)		1.914 (0.995)	
PKO Type	1.075 (0.260)		1.087 (0.263)	
Lagged Battle-Related Deaths	1.028*** (0.00504)		1.028*** (0.00504)	
Constant	1.380 (3.509)	-17.058 (574.293)	1.514 (3.853)	-16.504 (435.782)
Alpha (ln)	4.361*** (0.04)		4.361*** (0.04)	
N	11740		11740	

Presented are exponentiated coefficients of zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses in "BRD Count" models, which should be interpreted as Incidence Rate Ratios. "Certain Zero" models present coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.13: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of the Third Deployments for 1990s (Continued)

	(3) BRD Count	(4) Certain Zero	(5) BRD Count	(6) Certain Zero
3rd Police	0.996*** (0.00100)			
3rd Military Observer			0.997*** (0.000632)	
Prior Agreement	1.691 (0.769)	8.63e-59 (5.12e-55)	1.522 (0.722)	1.68e-56 (6.92e-53)
Population (ln)	1.177 (0.207)		1.263 (0.214)	
Refugee (ln)	0.955* (0.0240)		0.933** (0.0258)	
Fuel	0.967*** (0.00457)		0.965*** (0.00456)	
Conflict Duration	0.867*** (0.0459)	191876390.8 (1.62512e+11)	0.928 (0.0478)	93815303.5 (5.53902e+10)
Spike	2.138 (1.250)		0.799 (0.308)	
PKO Type	0.863 (0.206)		0.917 (0.211)	
Lagged Battle-Related Deaths	1.029*** (0.00508)		1.029*** (0.00506)	
Constant	0.541 (1.398)	-17.850 (846.961)	0.183 (0.451)	-17.368 (590.418)
Alpha (ln)	4.364*** (0.04)		4.364*** (0.04)	
N	11740		11740	

Presented are exponentiated coefficients of zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses in "BRD Count" models, which should be interpreted as Incidence Rate Ratios. "Certain Zero" models present coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.14: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of Delays in Troop Deployment for 1990s

	(1) BRD Count	(2) Certain Zero
Troop Deployment Delay	0.755*** (0.0150)	
Prior Agreement	0.0429*** (0.0207)	0.329*** (0.0805)
Population (ln)	12.98*** (3.017)	
Refugee (ln)	1.106** (0.0566)	
Fuel	0.692*** (0.0552)	
Conflict Duration	1.370*** (0.0779)	1.037 (0.0325)
Spike	236.9*** (129.2)	
PKO Type	0.137*** (0.0315)	
Lagged Battle-Related Deaths	1.002*** (0.000502)	
Constant	1.76e*** (6.20e)	2.518*** (0.228)
Alpha (ln)	1.143*** (0.108)	
N	2497	

Presented are exponentiated coefficients of zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses in "BRD Count" models, which should be interpreted as Incidence Rate Ratios. "Certain Zero" models present coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C.4. Negative Binomial Regression Tables for 2000s

Table C.15: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of Delays for 2000s

	(1) BRD Count	(2) Certain Zero	(3) BRD Count	(4) Certain Zero	(5) BRD Count	(6) Certain Zero
Delay between Suggestion and UNSC Resolution	1.078 (0.106)					
Delay between UNSC Resolution and Deployment			1.085*** (0.0263)			
Delay between Suggestion and Deployment					1.100*** (0.0284)	
Prior Agreement	0.866 (0.191)	2.221*** (0.388)	2.217*** (0.654)	1.900*** (0.344)	2.419*** (0.728)	2.702*** (0.510)
Population (ln)	0.930*** (0.0242)		0.923*** (0.0240)		0.938** (0.0248)	
Refugee (ln)	1.019 (0.0214)		1.026 (0.0205)		1.015 (0.0205)	
Fuel	1.001 (0.00231)		1.001 (0.00229)		1.001 (0.00231)	
Conflict Duration	1.045*** (0.0124)	0.630*** (0.0273)	1.023* (0.0132)	0.702*** (0.0205)	1.016 (0.0143)	0.633*** (0.0267)
Spike	0.607*** (0.0943)		0.704** (0.125)		0.959 (0.177)	
PKO Type	0.708 (0.170)		1.125 (0.238)		0.845 (0.175)	
Lagged Battle-Related Deaths	1.005*** (0.000367)		1.005*** (0.000368)		1.004*** (0.000362)	
Constant	40.276*** (18.216)	0.755*** (0.154)	12.606*** (6.894)	0.469** (0.170)	9.274*** (5.139)	0.569*** (0.170)
Alpha (ln)	2.720*** (0.033)		2.726*** (0.034)		2.719*** (0.033)	
N	9149		9452		9149	

Presented are exponentiated coefficients of zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses in "BRD Count" models, which should be interpreted as Incidence Rate Ratios. "Certain Zero" models present coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.16: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of First Deployments for 2000s

	(1) BRD Count	(2) Certain Zero	(3) BRD Count	(4) Certain Zero
First Total Personnel Size	1.000001 (0.0000153)			
First Troop			1.000007 (0.0000174)	
Prior Agreement	0.955 (0.208)	1.615*** (0.271)	0.955 (0.207)	1.613*** (0.271)
Population (ln)	0.917*** (0.0233)		0.917*** (0.0234)	
Refugee (ln)	1.029 (0.0210)		1.028 (0.0209)	
Fuel	1.001 (0.00230)		1.001 (0.00230)	
Conflict Duration	1.047*** (0.0127)	0.701*** (0.0206)	1.049*** (0.0127)	0.701*** (0.0206)
Spike	0.480*** (0.0794)		0.494*** (0.0819)	
PKO Type	0.938 (0.193)		0.916 (0.189)	
Lagged Battle-Related Deaths	1.005*** (0.000372)		1.005*** (0.000372)	
Constant	45.701*** (20.384)	0.625*** (0.155)	45.057*** (20.152)	0.623*** (0.155)
Alpha (ln)	2.727*** (0.034)		2.727*** (0.034)	
N	9452		9452	

Presented are exponentiated coefficients of zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses in "BRD Count" models, which should be interpreted as Incidence Rate Ratios. "Certain Zero" models present coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.17: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of First Deployments for 2000s (Continued)

	(3) BRD Count	(4) Certain Zero	(5) BRD Count	(6) Certain Zero
First Police	0.9998145 (0.000199)			
First Military Observer			0.9998554 (0.000421)	
Prior Agreement	0.913 (0.205)	1.628*** (0.273)	0.975 (0.221)	1.620*** (0.272)
Population (ln)	0.920*** (0.0234)		0.917*** (0.0232)	
Refugee (ln)	1.030 (0.0211)		1.029 (0.0210)	
Fuel	1.002 (0.00230)		1.001 (0.00230)	
Conflict Duration	1.042*** (0.0125)	0.701*** (0.0207)	1.045*** (0.0124)	0.701*** (0.0207)
Spike	0.461*** (0.0706)		0.464*** (0.0784)	
PKO Type	0.975 (0.196)		0.965 (0.201)	
Lagged Battle-Related Deaths	1.005*** (0.000371)		1.005*** (0.000372)	
Constant	47.798*** (21.273)	0.629*** (0.154)	45.571*** (20.201)	0.625*** (0.155)
Alpha (ln)	2.724*** (0.034)		2.726*** (0.034)	
N	9452		9452	

Presented are exponentiated coefficients of zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses in "BRD Count" models, which should be interpreted as Incidence Rate Ratios. "Certain Zero" models present coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.18: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of the Third Deployments for 2000s

	(1) BRD Count	(2) Certain Zero	(3) BRD Count	(4) Certain Zero
3rd Total Personnel Size	0.9999835** (0.00000831)			
3rd Troop Personnel			0.9999783** (0.0000101)	
Prior Agreement	0.971 (0.213)	1.624*** (0.272)	0.974 (0.214)	1.624*** (0.271)
Population (ln)	0.919*** (0.0230)		0.919*** (0.0230)	
Refugee (ln)	1.029 (0.0210)		1.029 (0.0210)	
Fuel	1.001 (0.00227)		1.002 (0.00227)	
Conflict Duration	1.045*** (0.0115)	0.701*** (0.0207)	1.044*** (0.0116)	0.701*** (0.0207)
Spike	0.450*** (0.0678)		0.442*** (0.0674)	
PKO Type	1.081 (0.226)		1.103 (0.232)	
Lagged Battle-Related Deaths	1.005*** (0.000371)		1.005*** (0.000371)	
Constant	44.649*** (19.678)	0.629*** (0.154)	44.764*** (19.713)	0.632*** (0.154)
Alpha (ln)	2.723*** (0.034)		2.722*** (0.034)	
N	9452		9452	

Presented are exponentiated coefficients of zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses in "BRD Count" models, which should be interpreted as Incidence Rate Ratios. "Certain Zero" models present coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.19: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of the Third Deployments for 2000s (Continued)

	(3) BRD Count	(4) Certain Zero	(5) BRD Count	(6) Certain Zero
3rd Police	0.9999593 (0.0000479)			
3rd Military Observer			0.9990858** (0.000364)	
Prior Agreement	0.953 (0.208)	1.620*** (0.272)	1.126 (0.260)	1.663*** (0.280)
Population (ln)	0.918*** (0.0232)		0.904*** (0.0230)	
Refugee (ln)	1.029 (0.0209)		1.031 (0.0211)	
Fuel	1.001 (0.00229)		1.002 (0.00230)	
Conflict Duration	1.048*** (0.0118)	0.702*** (0.0207)	1.044*** (0.0116)	0.702*** (0.0207)
Spike	0.479*** (0.0700)		0.408*** (0.0664)	
PKO Type	0.975 (0.195)		1.174 (0.254)	
Lagged Battle-Related Deaths	1.005*** (0.000372)		1.005*** (0.000370)	
Constant	44.737*** (19.868)	0.621*** (0.155)	52.273** (22.980)	0.618*** (0.155)
Alpha (ln)	2.726*** (0.034)		2.720*** (0.034)	
N	9452		9452	

Presented are exponentiated coefficients of zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses in "BRD Count" models, which should be interpreted as Incidence Rate Ratios. "Certain Zero" models present coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.20: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model of Delays in Troop Deployment for 2000s

	(1) BRD Count	(2) Certain Zero
Troop Deployment Delay	0.993 (0.0138)	
Prior Agreement	0.277*** (0.101)	1115746.3 (743499795.5)
Population (ln)	0.847** (0.0618)	
Refugee (ln)	1.581*** (0.0625)	
Fuel	1.001 (0.00365)	
Conflict Duration	1.102*** (0.0227)	0.987 (0.0142)
Spike	0.171*** (0.0489)	
PKO Type	16.62*** (5.180)	
Lagged Battle-Related Deaths	1.008*** (0.00125)	
Constant	0.228 (0.283)	-13.915*** (666.371)
Alpha (ln)	2.316*** (0.115)	
N	2828	

Presented are exponentiated coefficients of zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses in "BRD Count" models, which should be interpreted as Incidence Rate Ratios. "Certain Zero" models present coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix D

D.1. Diminishing Effect Tables

Table D.1: Cox Analyses of Delay of Initial Deployments for Diminishing Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Time-Constant Variables			
Prior Agreement	-0.245* (0.148)	1.733*** (0.259)	1.360*** (0.231)
Conflict Duration	0.119*** (0.00752)	0.0627*** (0.00813)	0.0826*** (0.00827)
Spike	-0.718*** (0.115)	-0.105 (0.113)	-0.00866 (0.120)
PKO Type	-0.262** (0.103)	-0.486*** (0.0939)	-0.756*** (0.0966)
Time-Varying Covariates			
Duration between Suggestion to UNSC Resolution	-0.394*** (0.0428)		
Duration between UNSC Resolution to Deployment		0.0729*** (0.00568)	
Duration between Suggestion to Deployment			0.0662*** (0.00543)
Population (ln)	-0.0730*** (0.00838)	-0.0400*** (0.00811)	-0.0299*** (0.00836)
Refugee (ln)	-0.0184** (0.00872)	-0.0466*** (0.00885)	-0.0632*** (0.00910)
Fuel	-0.00466** (0.00186)	-0.00628*** (0.00199)	-0.00650*** (0.00195)
Observations	1382	1445	1382
Number of Subjects	109	109	109
Number of Failures	717	717	717
Wald χ^2	585.84	622.44	632.76
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-2843.4784	-3022.5586	-2820.0191

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table D.2: Cox Analyses of Initial Contributions for Diminishing Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time-Constant Variables				
Prior Agreement	-0.149 (0.149)	-0.144 (0.152)	-0.0552 (0.157)	-0.166 (0.150)
Conflict Duration	0.123*** (0.00830)	0.135*** (0.00816)	0.119*** (0.00793)	0.116*** (0.00777)
Spike	-0.712*** (0.115)	-0.577*** (0.120)	-0.743*** (0.115)	-0.726*** (0.118)
PKO Type	-0.646*** (0.0959)	-0.865*** (0.104)	-0.646*** (0.0970)	-0.628*** (0.0993)
Time-Varying Covariates				
First Total Personnel Size	0.0000131** (0.00000520)			
First Troop Size		0.0000428*** (0.00000561)		
First Police Size			0.000173** (0.0000825)	
First Military Observer Size				0.000158 (0.000161)
Population (ln)	-0.0677*** (0.00846)	-0.0587*** (0.00852)	-0.0687*** (0.00851)	-0.0688*** (0.00856)
Refugee (ln)	-0.0278*** (0.00943)	-0.0436*** (0.00933)	-0.0254*** (0.00932)	-0.0222** (0.00926)
Fuel	-0.00575*** (0.00191)	-0.00496*** (0.00185)	-0.00563*** (0.00189)	-0.00556*** (0.00189)
Observations	1445	1445	1445	1445
Number of Subjects	109	109	109	109
Number of Failures	717	717	717	717
Wald χ^2	454.04	500.49	452.13	448.81
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-3106.7622	-3083.5356	-3107.7146	-3109.3758

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table D.3: Cox Analyses of the Third Month's Deployments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time-Constant Variables				
Prior Agreement	-0.175 (0.150)	-0.171 (0.150)	-0.144 (0.151)	-0.154 (0.151)
Conflict Duration	0.117*** (0.00768)	0.117*** (0.00770)	0.109*** (0.00778)	0.114*** (0.00760)
Spike	-0.783*** (0.115)	-0.772*** (0.114)	-0.949*** (0.123)	-0.757*** (0.113)
PKO Type	-0.624*** (0.0941)	-0.618*** (0.0939)	-0.653*** (0.0946)	-0.596*** (0.0929)
Time-Varying Covariates				
3rd Month Total Personnel Size	0.00000848** (0.00000336)			
3rd Month Troop Size		0.00000764** (0.00000375)		
3rd Month Police Size			0.000153*** (0.0000262)	
3rd Month Military Observer Size				0.0000340 (0.000134)
Population (ln)	-0.0707*** (0.00846)	-0.0705*** (0.00845)	-0.0752*** (0.00858)	-0.0699*** (0.00854)
Refugee (ln)	-0.0250*** (0.00919)	-0.0241*** (0.00919)	-0.0251*** (0.00900)	-0.0205** (0.00921)
Fuel	-0.00605*** (0.00194)	-0.00596*** (0.00193)	-0.00616*** (0.00192)	-0.00560*** (0.00191)
Observations	1445	1445	1445	1445
Number of Subjects	109	109	109	109
Number of Failures	717	717	717	717
Wald χ^2	453.98	451.87	478.43	447.94
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-3106.7917	-3107.8452	-3094.5647	-3109.8093

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table D.4: Cox Analyses of Delay of Troop Contributions

	(1)
Time-Constant Variables	
Prior Agreement	1.080***
	(0.212)
Conflict Duration	0.0798***
	(0.0123)
Spike	-0.652***
	(0.135)
PKO Type	-0.396**
	(0.157)
Time-Varying Covariates	
Delay of Troop Deployment	0.0230***
	(0.00492)
Population (ln)	0.133***
	(0.0178)
Refugee (ln)	-0.242***
	(0.0178)
Fuel	0.000900
	(0.00194)
Observations	795
Number of Subjects	109
Number of Failures	717
Wald χ^2	447.94
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-3109.8093

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$