

**THE LIFE AND IDEAS OF AN 18TH-CENTURY OTTOMAN
BUREAUCRAT: SÜLEYMAN PENÂH EFENDİ AND HIS "ORDER
OF THE CLIMES"**

by
ERKİN BULUT

Submitted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Sabancı University
August 2020

**THE LIFE AND IDEAS OF AN 18TH-CENTURY OTTOMAN
BUREAUCRAT: SÜLEYMAN PENÂH EFENDÎ AND HIS "ORDER
OF THE CLIMES"**

Approved by:

Assoc. Prof. Tülay Artan
(Thesis Supervisor)

Asst. Prof. Yusuf Hakan Erdem

Assoc. Prof. Mehmet Mert Sunar

Date of Approval: August 10, 2020



ERKİN BULUT 2020 ©

All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT

THE LIFE AND IDEAS OF AN 18TH-CENTURY OTTOMAN BUREAUCRAT: SÜLEYMAN PENÂH EFENDİ AND HIS "ORDER OF THE CLIMES"

ERKİN BULUT

HISTORY M.A. THESIS, AUGUST 2020

Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Tülay Artan

Keywords: Süleyman Penâh Efendi, Ottoman reform literature, Ottoman modernization, Ottoman centralization, Ottoman mercantilism

This thesis investigates the life and ideas of an 18th-century Ottoman bureaucrat Süleyman Penâh Efendi. Penâh Efendi was born in the Morea in 1722 and grown in the dynamic cultural atmosphere of the peninsula. He held various positions in the Ottoman state from the 1750s, mostly in the financial offices. In the Morea Rebellion of 1770, Penâh Efendi was present, and he wrote his memoirs during the rebellion in his History of the Morea Rebellion. During and after the Russo-Ottoman War 1768-1774, he held high posts in the bureaucracy, commissioned to the after-war diplomatic negotiations, and participated in numerous councils held in the capital following the Russian annexation of the Crimea. Shortly before his death, he wrote a treatise mentioned in this thesis as the Order of the Climes as an addendum to his history which reflects the contemporary Ottoman state's pursuit of reform. He wrote his reform suggestions in the topics from military affairs and state finances, to the bureaucratic organization and center-province relations. In the second chapter of this thesis, this treatise was investigated, and his ideas were discussed. Taking his work as a modernization program, the thesis concludes that Penâh Efendi's reforming ideas are targeting three main goals; centralization, interior expansion and mercantilism. The centralization was constituting the core of his reform program as all other issues were determined by it.

ÖZET

BİR 18'İNCİ YÜZYIL OSMANLI BÜROKRATININ YAŞAMI VE GÖRÜŞLERİ: SÜLEYMAN PENÂH EFENDİ VE "NİZÂM-I EKÂLİM'E DÂİR" RİSÂLESİ

ERKİN BULUT

TARİH YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, AĞUSTOS 2020

Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Tülay Artan

Anahtar Kelimeler: Süleyman Penah Efendi, Osmanlı reform yazını, Osmanlı modernleşmesi, Osmanlı merkezileşmesi, Osmanlı merkantilizmi

Bu çalışma bir 18. yüzyıl Osmanlı bürokrati olan Süleyman Penah Efendi'nin hayatını ve fikirlerini incelemektedir. Süleyman Penah Efendi 1722'de Mora'da doğmuş, Mora'nın dinamik kültürel ortamında büyümüş ve 1750'li yıllardan itibaren Osmanlı bürokrasisinde, ağırlıklı olarak maliye departmanında çeşitli görevler almıştır. 1770 yılında Mora'da gerçekleşen isyan sırasında orada kadar bulunmuş, hayati tehlike atlatmış, isyan süresince yaşadıklarını "Mora İhtilali Tarihçesi" adını verdiği verdiği bir eser altında kaleme almıştır. İsyanın ardından 1768-1784 Rus-Osmanlı Savaşı'nda ve devamında yüksek bürokratik görevler almış, savaş sonrası Rus ve Habsburg Avusturya'sı elçileriyle diplomatik görüşmelerde bulunmuştur. Rusya'nın Kırım'ı ilhakının ardından yapılan sayısız meşveret meclisinde dönemin saygın devlet adamlarından biri olarak yer almıştır, fikirlerini paylaşmıştır. Ölümünden hemen önce, kendisinin nizam-ı ekalime dair risale olarak andığı ancak isim vermeyip önceki Mora İhtilali Tarihçesi eserinin sonuna dahil ettiği ve Osmanlı devletinde askeriyeden maliyeye, taşra yönetiminden bürokratik teşkilata kadar yapılmasını önerdiği reformları içeren bir eser kaleme almıştır. Çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde Süleyman Penah Efendi'nin işbu risalesi incelenmiş, görüşleri yorumlanmıştır. Çalışmada Penah Efendi'nin eseri bir modernleşme programı olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Penah Efendi'nin reform önerilerinin üç ana gündem altında toplanmaktadır. Bunlar; merkezileşme, içe dönük genişleme, ve merkantilizm olarak belirmektedir. Merkezileşme nosyonu Penah Efendi'nin düşüncelerinin ana çekirdeğini oluşturmakta, diğer tüm başlıklar bir biçimde bu çekirdeğin etrafında biçimlenmektedir.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to express my special gratitude to my advisor Tlay Artan, for her great patience and unfading encouragement. During my research, she shared her scholarly insights and constructive criticism with me. She gave a great deal of her time for reading, discussing, and correcting the various parts of my thesis. Beyond that, she provided me with emotional support when I needed and showed her compassionate tolerance to me. I would like to also thank the members of my thesis jury, Hakan Erdem and Mehmet Mert Sunar for their immense contributions by reading my thesis and sharing their comments.

I would like to thank faculty members of Sabancı University who contributed my learning process, namely Halil Berktaş, Ferenc Csirk s, Ay e Ozil, and Sel uk Ak ın Somel. Through their insightful and intriguing courses, these two years had some profound effects on me. Such as my understanding of history and a great increase in my enthusiasm for being a historian. I am also grateful to Bahadır Srelli, not just for teaching Ottoman paleography to me and my friends, but also for his friendship and emotional support he offered to us when we needed it. His presence as an instructor in the faculty helped me overcoming my lack of confidence.

I am also grateful for the members of my class at Sabancı University. All the moments that I have spent with them were both illuminating and fun. I owe special thanks to İsa U urlu who helped me reading the Ottoman manuscripts and shared his knowledge in various topics from his research when I needed it. I am very grateful to Erik Aldritch Charle Blackthorne-O'Barr for his irreplaceable help for my English. I am also thankful to Talha Katırcı who always offered his support and shared his knowledge, especially on the Greek intelligentsia. I am very grateful to my dear friend Furkan I ın for his generosity to share his hours with me helping both reading and transliterating Ottoman manuscripts, and for his cheerful friendship as well. I would like to thank my dear friends Mehmet Hamdi  z and Fatma Esen for their friendship and endless support for the years we have spent together. Especially I am very indebted to Fatma, if she was not there when I needed her help, this thesis even might have not been finished. Finally, I owe special thanks to my roommate Mert  en who encouraged my curiosity and enthusiasm and did not hesitate to offer his full support for one year of our graduate education.

In addition to the archival documents, I have utilized many sources that I could not reach without the help of certain libraries that I would like to express my gratitude,

these are: Sabancı Information Center, ISAM, and METU Library.

I would like to thank my family, my parents Memduh and Nihan Bulut, and my sisters Elif Kangal and Esin Kılınç for their endless and priceless support for my whole life. If I did not feel their loving support, I could not have shown any courage to enter a new path in my life. My two nephews Bulut and Deniz reserve a special thanks because of the love and the joy they brought to our family's lives. Both of them still increase my hope and optimism for the future. I will always be grateful to my deceased grandmother Nevin Karayel who passed away in 2019. If she did not finance my accommodation in Istanbul, I could not have embarked on such an adventure. She was a lovely human being who had an outstanding sense of humor with a shrewd mind.

Finally, I would like to thank my dear girlfriend Gülin Çavuş. I am grateful for her tremendous support and limitless patience that made this work possible. Especially, she showed great endurance during my excited history monologues which sometimes was in the expense of her sanity. I feel lucky for having her love which makes my world beautiful.



*In memory of my beloved grandmother
Nevin Karayel*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES	xi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xii
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. The Long Peace of the 18th Century	3
1.2. The Late 18th-Century Crisis.....	8
1.3. Penâh Efendi in Ottoman Historiography	11
1.4. Thesis Outline	17
2. THE MAKING OF SÜLEYMAN PENÂH EFENDİ	20
2.1. Family and the Homeland	21
2.1.1. Penâh's Family	21
2.1.2. Penâh's Homeland: the Morea in the 17th and 18th Centuries	25
2.1.2.1. Evliyâ Çelebi's observations on Morea and Gastouni	26
2.1.2.2. The Morea under Venetian control, 1685-1715	27
2.1.2.3. After the return of the Ottomans	30
2.2. Early Career	33
2.2.1. The Path of a Young Scribe.....	33
2.2.2. First Years in the Capital	35
2.2.3. A Glimpse of Power	37
2.3. Penâh in the Morea Rebellion of 1770	44
2.3.1. Initiation of the Rebellion.....	46
2.3.2. Escape from Home	50
2.3.3. Suppression of the Rebels	51
2.4. Return to the Capital.....	52
2.4.1. Penâh at the Top of the Imperial Finance Office	56
2.4.2. After-War Period.....	59
2.4.3. Following the Russian Invasion of Crimea.....	62
2.4.4. The Last Phase of Penâh's Life	68
3. "ORDER OF THE CLIMES"	73

3.1. Approaches to the State and Politics	75
3.2. Military Reforms.....	83
3.2.1. The Janissary Corps	84
3.2.2. Provincial Cavalry.....	93
3.2.3. The Imperial Navy and the Cavalry of the Coastal Garrisons .	94
3.2.4. The Non-Janissary Garrisons in Rumeli	97
3.3. Enhancing the Central Power in the Provinces	98
3.3.1. Provincial Administration and the Local Notables.....	98
3.3.2. Subjugation of the Peoples and Outer Lands	106
3.4. Economy and State Finance	113
3.4.1. Tax Collection and State Finance.....	113
3.4.2. Mercantilism and Substitute Production.....	120
3.4.3. Precious Metals and Monetary Policy.....	123
3.4.4. Demographic and Agricultural Planning	127
4. CONCLUSION	130
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	135

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1. Map 1. The Province of Morea in 1800 (Birken 1976, 62) 28



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A.DVNSNMH.d	<i>Bâb-ı Âsafî Collection, Nâme-i Hümayûn Defterleri</i>	134
AE.SMST.III	<i>Ali Emîri Collection, Mustafa III</i>	134
C.ADL	<i>Cevdet Collection, Adliye</i>	134
C.AS	<i>Cevdet Collection, Askeriye</i>	134
C.DH	<i>Cevdet Collection, Dâhiliye</i>	134
C.ML	<i>Cevdet Collection, Mâliye</i>	134
DABOA	<i>Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi</i>	134
EV.VKF	<i>Evkaf Collection, Vakfiyeler Evrâkı</i>	134
HAT	<i>Hatt-ı Hümayûn</i>	134
TS.MA.d	<i>Topkapı Sarayı Collection, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi Defterleri</i>	134
TS.MA.e.	<i>Topkapı Sarayı Collection, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi Evrâkı</i> . .	134

1. INTRODUCTION

The subject of this thesis is the life and ideas of Süleyman Penâh Efendi, an Ottoman bureaucrat who held several high-ranking positions, mostly in the finance office, from the 1750s until his death in 1786. He lived for 64 years, between the first and last quarters of the 18th century; a period which, unfortunately, remains largely neglected by Ottoman historiography. He was a member of a generation which rose to power during a period of relative domestic stability, external peace and economic growth, and which ended with the catastrophic shock of the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War and the urgent demand for reforms in the wake of Ottoman defeat.

After graduating from a degree in labor economics, I found myself increasingly interested in Ottoman history; Süleyman Penâh Efendi, and his most renowned work, the History of the Morea Rebellion, soon caught my attention with his ideas on the Ottoman state finances and the economy in general in its second part. His mercantilist approach foreign trade, expressed forcefully in his treatise, represented a significant divergence from the generally-accepted “Ottoman economic mentalities” suggested by Mehmet Genç; namely, provisionalism, traditionalism, and fiscalism. During my research, I realized that similar ideas were already prevalent among 18th-century Ottoman intellectuals and bureaucrats, and perhaps had been since the previous century. In other words, when one looks at the works of the other political writers of the late 18th century, Penâh Efendi’s ideas regarding the economy and state finances were not entirely unique. Yet Süleyman Penâh Efendi was distinguished from the other writers of his time by the scope and depth of his proposals. Indeed, his economic ideas were a part of a broader program of reform, produced in reaction to the late 18th-century crisis of the Ottoman Empire, and thus cannot be thoroughly understood apart from his other ideas on the state, center-province relations, and the military. For this reason, I have here preferred to study his ideas comprehensively, without limiting the scope of this thesis to the study to a certain topic; this choice, naturally, came with both advantages and certain repercussions.

There are, of course, some limits to a biographical study. As Menchinger has correctly stated;

“A biographer on one hand has the impossible task of evoking a past life in many cases one far from his own in time, gender, mentality, and culture, and lived in a complex web of social relations. There can be no total biography, just as there can be no total history. It goes without saying that major and minor gaps will remain no matter how carefully one reconstructs a subject’s upbringing, career, opinions, and wider socio-cultural context. Sources, subjective experience, and the distance of time pose barriers that no one can fully overcome. At the same time, biographers run the risk of feeling too close to subjects as they dispel their initial ignorance – they risk trading simple for compound vices and trusting too much in the limited scope of their knowledge.” (Menchinger 2017, 1)

Moreover, because this study is limited to a certain time frame, I was unable to include primary sources from the archives of the province of Morea, such as land registries and local court records, in the sections describing his family and his life in the peninsula; I have instead confined myself to making some speculations about certain aspects of Penâh’s family roots. Likewise, although there are plentiful sources in the archives about Penâh’s two sons, Yusuf Âgâh Efendi (d. 1822) and Morah Osman Efendi (d. 1817), I did not elaborate upon these in the text for the same reason. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this study will offer a wealth of information about the life and thought of Süleyman Penâh Efendi and will correct some common misconceptions found in extant historiography on the subject.

In the chapters of this thesis that discuss Penâh Efendi’s ideas, I have tried to discuss his proposals within the context of the 18th-century Ottoman Empire, in addition to underlining their similarities with the intellectual developments of his European contemporaries¹. However, this thesis does not claim to be a full-fledged comparative study or to locate Penâh Efendi in the broader context of the global or European history of political thought. Although situating him within the context of the Ottoman bureaucracy, and noting the sources upon which he drew in his work, this thesis also does not offer a comparison between Penâh Efendi and other 18th-century Ottoman political writers, a subject which requires a great deal of further research. This thesis is, in itself, the product of a learning process: as such, sections of the text are more minutely detailed, while others offer a broader, more descriptive analysis.

Ultimately, this study aims to contextualize Süleyman Penâh Efendi by investigating and highlighting the main aspects of his reform agenda. In this regard, the study first focuses on the biographical details of his life, to clarify the social and economic

¹All translations are done by the author if otherwise is not mentioned.

conditions that from which he emerged. Following this, by elaborating upon his career in state officialdom, this study tries to shed light on his intellectual milieu, and the networks, factional relations and experiences in state office which shaped his ideas. In other words, by describing his life in detail, I attempt to show the basis of his thought and to locate his ideas within the broader context of the 18th century. Indeed, this study aims to answer several outstanding questions, such as: was his treatise a general proposal of reform, or the government program of a particular political faction, of which Penâh was a member? Who were his audience? Did the reform agenda of Süleyman Penâh Efendi represent his own ideas, those of his intellectual network and/or political faction, or did they include the aspirations of some of the economic and political groups that emerged in the 18th century, and to which he was affiliated?

Moreover, by investigating his ideas, this study aims to explore a number of issues regarding the nature of his proposals. First of all, what was the main aim of Süleyman Penâh Efendi in writing such a reform proposal? Was he aware of the latest developments in 18th-century Europe, whether in terms of military technique, state organization, or the economy? If he was aware of these developments, to what extent? Furthermore, was he arguing for the direct importation of European reforms methods, or did he have a selective approach towards new programs, practices, and contemporary European concepts? Particularly in regard to his economic mentality, what do Penâh Efendi's ideas say about the perceptions and priorities of the Ottoman financial bureaucracy, both in terms of the economy and state finance? In other words, were they aware of the contemporary economic problems of the empire, and did they offer reasonable measures to deal with them? Or were they simply drifting into a more complex world that they did not understand? Finally, what can we deduce from his ideas about the balance of power in the late 18th-century empire, between political actors like the Janissary corps, provincial elites, the bureaucracy, and the Sultan himself?

1.1 The Long Peace of the 18th Century

Before starting to investigate his life, it will be helpful to give some brief information about the 18th-century Ottoman world. The 18th century had begun with the Ottoman Empire in fairly fortunate circumstances: despite several severe confrontations with Russia, the Habsburgs, and the forces of Nadir Shah, the Ottomans did

not suffer any serious territorial losses until the 1760s. On the contrary, the Empire had even achieved some territorial expansion, and had reconquered previously lost lands, such as the Morea and Caucasia, in the first quarter of the century. Furthermore, the Ottoman economy witnessed a considerable period growth and flourishing throughout the century, including in domestic and foreign trade. While much of this was due to improvements in transportation technology, which served to connect large domestic and foreign markets, changing consumption patterns – caused by increased urbanization and the expansion of the middle classes – also fostered economic growth. State interventions also encouraged economic activity, such as the amelioration of the roads, the revitalization of the obsolete *hans* and post stations, and assigning of guards to defend trade routes from bandits. In addition to this, at the beginning of the century, the Ottoman state began to circulate a new official silver coin, which was widely considered to be secure in value; this ensured considerable stability in the currency throughout the century. In addition to population growth, these positive economic developments enhanced and expanded markets throughout the imperial realms, facilitating the emergence of new cities in all of the regions of the Empire. It has been suggested that beneficial climatic developments related to the end of the Little Ice Age also stimulated a considerable rise in agricultural production. Moreover, there was a significant increase in manufacturing, especially in regard to the production of textiles: these ranged from indigenous cotton, silk, and woolen textiles, to imitations of Indian and Iranian products, and were produced in certain industrial centers like Bursa, Diyarbakır, Mosul, Chios, Thessaly, and some of the Balkan cities in contemporary Bulgaria. Some of the textile facilities, such as those intended for the manufacture of wool, silk, and sailcloth, were mostly established and supported by the state. The increase in the production of Ottoman cotton textiles was to such an extent that state revenues from cotton exports increased by nearly three times between 1720 and 1800².

Although France was the most important trading partner of the Empire throughout the century, the Ottomans also maintained considerable trade relations with other countries, such as the Habsburgs, Britain, the Dutch Republic, and Venice in the West, Russia in the North, and Iran and India in the East. India, above all, continued to be the main source of Ottoman imports, such as textiles, spices, and other luxury goods. Other export products, such as wool, mohair, wax, oil, rice, wheat, dried fruit, and soap, also constituted a significant proportion of Ottoman foreign trade. Further, it is important to note that the Ottoman Empire was still the world's main supplier of coffee during the 18th century. The flourishing of trade between Europe and the Ottoman Empire was accompanied by the emergence of a new phenomenon

²(Yaycioğlu 2016, 36; Genç 2017, 235-251; Faroqi 2006, 365-375; Pamuk 2000, 159-170)

of Greek Orthodox merchants, which would play a crucial role in the subsequent cultural, economic, and future political transformations throughout the vast region from the Balkans to the Mediterranean³.

As had been the case in previous centuries, the *cizye*, the poll tax levied on non-Muslims, was collected by state agents: either salaried officials, or contractors called *muhassıl*. However, the Ottoman state mostly delegated the collection of other state revenues to certain contractors, called *mültezim*. These contractors were given authority over the tax collection of revenue units called *mukâta'a*'s, and were responsible for making regular payments to the state each year (İnalçık 1980, 327-333; 1994, 66-69). From last decade of the 17th century onwards, in order to recoup the heavy burden that several difficult wars had imposed upon the imperial treasury, the Ottomans instituted the *mâlikâne* system; according to this system, the revenues of certain tax farms would be sold as life-time possessions to particular individuals in exchange for a lump sum payment, determined by auction. This advance payment was called the *mu'accele*. *Mâlikâne* owners agreed to pay the state an annual fixed amount of the *mukâta'a*'s revenues, called *mâl*, along with some other official payments, called *kalemiye*, in several installments. *Mu'accele* prices were determined by auction, with the base price determined by the state in accordance to the revenues of the *mukâta'a*'s. Although the *mâlikâne* owners had bought lifetime rights to collect taxes from their *mukâta'a*'s, and could even sell these rights to others, this was not private property in the strict sense of the term: they could not, for example, pass their tax farms to their heirs. By giving out the usufruct rights of areas of land to certain individuals, the state was also delegating some of its administrative authorities to them as well. The possessors of the *mâlikânes* were given a certain independence in their decision-making, except in regard to judicial affairs, and this was guaranteed by the state with a warrant that was given to them in return for the *mu'accele* (Cezar 1986, 32-33, 43-45; Genç 2017, 100-106). Most of the *mâlikâne* owners chose to stay in the capital, however, and instead subcontracted revenue collection to local individuals who knew the region better. The system was thus extremely beneficial for local power brokers, who were able to increase their political and economic clout in the provinces. *Mâlikâne* zones, with their somewhat independent structure, fostered the transformation of state lands into de facto private holdings, called *çiftlik*s. *Çiftlik*s were originally commercial agricultural estates, mostly granted to state officials in return for past services, and were almost akin to private property; although the amount of *çiftlik*s had been increasing since the late 16th century, they became especially common in the 18th century, alongside both the rise of the provincial notables and the expansion of commercial agricultural production due to increasing

³(Yaycıoğlu 2016, 35-36; Eldem 2006, 311-335; 1999, 13-33; Faroqhi 2006, 365-369; Stoianovich 1960)

domestic and foreign trade⁴.

Local taxes - namely, the *imdâd-ı hazariyye* (urgent peacetime contributions) and *imdâd-ı seferiyye* (urgent war contributions) - had first appeared in the late 17th century as emergency taxes, levied on provincial subjects to recoup the expenses of troops under the command of local governors. During this period, local governors were able to levy these taxes whenever circumstances required, strengthening their own positions at the cost of causing potential unrest among their subjects. In order to stem the increasing power of the governors, the Ottoman center in Istanbul started to determine the annual *hazariyye* and *seferiyye* sums for the provinces itself, and encouraged the local notables to be involved in both levying and collecting the taxes by appointing some of them to official positions. As a consequence of Istanbul's efforts to move the locus of power from the provincial governors to the local notables, over the course of the 18th century the office of the governor became less and less important, and the local notables - the *a'yân*s - gained prominence as representatives, leaders, and administrators of local communities. In the 18th century, these taxes were levied and collected by local communities through a process called *tevzî'* (apportionment) which was conducted in local courthouses with the mediation of local judges, and with the participation of imperial and local officials, tax-farmers and contractors, and urban and rural community leaders. In these meetings, the participants negotiated their share of the local tax-burden and distributed out funds for expenses such as road maintenance, the postal service, and the accommodation expenses of travelling state officials. On occasion, the central and/or local payments were paid out by the local notables in advance, and the negotiations occurred afterwards. The institution of apportionment, which was recognized and encouraged by the state, paved the way towards a new model of provincial politics, "in which some local notables known as *a'yân* competed to secure support from their communities to win managerial positions."⁵ Thus, the century witnessed the rise of the provincial notables as important actors in provincial administration, starting with tax-collection, *mâlikâne* management, and finally expanding to encompass every field of governance. As the number of these local strongmen increased, it was accompanied by their rising influence in state affairs; they gained imperial titles, and were even granted with the highest positions in the state bureaucracy, with titles such as governor or vizier, and posts in all of the regions of the Empire. In the 18th century, the provinces of Anatolia, Rumeli, and Damascus constituted the core of the empire; other provinces had looser connections with the Ottoman cen-

⁴(Yaycıoğlu 2016, 29-30; İnalçık 1991, 19-28; Genç 2017, 107-108). On the relation between the rising foreign trade and emergence of the *çiftlik*s also see; (Veinstein 1991)

⁵(Yaycıoğlu 2016, 25; İnalçık 1980, 313-337; 1977, 27-45).

ter, ranging from somewhat autonomous rule to vassal status, with their own ruling dynasties⁶.

During this period, the decree of the sultan played a major role in imperial regulations as a source of law. As the state became the stage of factional struggles and rivalries, “the sultans’ powers were dispersed and contested”. Moreover, while the administrative quarters witnessed a certain level of “civilianization” during this time, according to Findley the sultans became “almost immobile figures in an endless pageant of court ceremony and religious ritual, although their powers were in theory not reduced” (Findley 2006, 66-67). On the other hand, the growing trend of the Ottoman financial and diplomatic bureaucracy, which had begun in previous centuries, was continued in the 18th century; these offices were soon transformed into a body separate from the imperial household and gained an autonomous character. The expansion of the financial offices was especially remarkable: by the 1790s, 650 out of a total of 1,500-2,000 scribes in the entire bureaucracy were employed just in the finance department. The numerical increase of the bureaucracy was followed by an expansion in their role in the organization of the state; as the “*efendi-turned-paşa*” phenomenon, as defined by Itzkowitz, demonstrated, civilian bureaucrats started to be appointed as provincial governors, and even as grand viziers, positions which had formerly been reserved for members of the military class⁷. As will be seen in the second chapter, alongside this expansion of the central bureaucracy, the decision-making process of the Empire became increasingly collective and participatory by the end of the century, carried out via *meşveret* councils which included the various members of the Ottoman establishment. On the other hand, following the implementation of an annual reappointment system (*tevcîhât*), official posts also turned into commodities, and taking bribes or gifts from the lower ranks in return for their appointments to higher positions became a customary and significant portion of the annual incomes of high officials. With the commodification of official posts, more and more provincial notables entered into the highest ranks of the state bureaucracy by buying various offices, and “the historical distinction between ruler and subjects became further blurred.” (Findley 2006, 75).

The Janissaries, too, represented a major social and political force during this period. With their numbers reaching up to 100,000 in Istanbul and its environs, and with the economic networks that they established around the corps, the Janissaries had become a massive socio-military group during the 17th and 18th centuries, often claiming to represent popular will during their regular revolts. By the 18th century,

⁶(Yaycıoğlu 2016, 25-28; Adanır 2006, 170-178; Masters 2006, 189-202; McGowan 1994, 658-679)

⁷(Itzkowitz 1962, 84-94; Findley 2006, 70-71; Yaycıoğlu 2016, 24; Saliyannis 2013, 112-116; Yeşil 2011, 13-50).

in addition to their military character, they had gained some of the characteristics of a political party, “able to translate its claims into a common language of rights of the people.”⁸ However, according to Aksan, the Ottoman military successes of the start of the 18th century, such as the recapture of Belgrade and Azov, blinded the Ottoman state to deficiencies in their military organization; especially during the long peace of the middle of the century, the Ottomans lagged behind in adopting the military innovations of the Seven Years War of 1756-1763 (Yaycıoğlu 2016, 31-32; Aksan 2006, 97-101).

Yet despite increasing social diversity and the rise of new, politically demanding classes, the Ottoman political elite somehow managed to maintain the balance of power with the Empire until the beginning of the next century, even in the midst of the late 18th-century crisis. In addition to constituting the ideological basis for the more peace-focused foreign policy of the Ottoman state during this period, it can be said that, as Itzkowitz has suggested, the ideological framework that the historian and author Mustafa Na‘îmâ developed at the beginning of the century also encouraged peaceful relations among members of the Ottoman elite. During this period, as Tezcan has asserted, it seems that the Ottoman ruling class “finally learned to share power”. Although tensions between state actors continued, the new balance of power was maintained and the system suffered no catastrophic breakdowns, at least when compared to those of the 17th Century. Hence, when the late 18th-century crisis arose, the high-ranking state cadres were mostly constituted from a generation which had spent the twenty years previous in a period of peace and prosperity like, as Menchinger’s has written, “an Edwardian summer of feasts, garden parties, and entertainments.”⁹.

1.2 The Late 18th-Century Crisis

However, during the second half of the century, this situation became reversed. Successive defeats in two major wars - with Russia, between 1768-1774, and with Russia and the Habsburgs between 1787-1792 - and simultaneous insurrections in the Morea, Balkans, Egypt, and the Arab lands, dragged the empire into a fierce crisis

⁸For more about the changing character of the Janissaries in the 17th and 18th centuries, see: (Kafadar 2007); and (Tezcan 2010), especially between pages 191-226.

⁹(Itzkowitz 1977, 25; Tezcan 2010, 196; Menchinger 2017, 6).

affecting both its economic, fiscal, military, and political systems. In the end, the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774 demonstrated the inefficiencies of the Ottoman army. The Ottoman army, including the Janissaries, imperial cavalry and irregular recruits, was comprised of undisciplined, ill-equipped, and disorganized groups of soldiers. Aksan describes the condition of the Ottoman military in the wars of this century as characterized by “raw recruits, fractious elites, incompetent leadership and obsolete equipment” (Aksan 2005, 164-170).

The high cost of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774 and the compensation payments that the Ottomans were forced to pay the Russians after their defeat compelled the Ottoman state to initiate new fiscal measures. The condition of the imperial treasury was, indeed, so dire that the Ottomans started to discuss the possibility of accruing foreign debt, whether from Muslim states like Morocco or non-Muslim states such as France, the Netherlands, and Spain. The initiative to Morocco was failed, however (Cezar 1986, 89-92). In order to increase state revenues, the most important new fiscal measure introduced was the *eshâm* (shares) system. This system included a special type of *mâlikâne mukâta‘a*, in which tax revenues (remaining after the *mâl* and *kalemiye* payments had been made) were divided into numerous shares and sold to individuals who took their shares as an annual interest income for life. A *sehm* was priced by the state according to its estimated five-year revenue, and thus, a *sehm* holder usually began to make a profit after five years. The standard amount of interest designated by a *sehm* was 2000-2500 *guruş*, but it was possible for individuals to buy 1/2, 1/4 or even 1/64 of a *sehm*. As a method for accruing domestic debt, the *eshâm* practice was very risky for the state, because the annual rate of interest that the state had to pay to the shareholders every month was over 15%. Nevertheless, since the revenues produced from the sales of *eshâm* shares were already higher after ten years than the revenues produced by the *mâlikâne* after 90 years – mostly due to the enlarged pool of financiers - the state continued to practice the system until the mid-19th century. Furthermore, while the decentralization of the fiscal administration reduced the burden to the state treasury, it also highly empowered the provincial elites, eventually leading to a decrease in the fiscal power of the center. In addition to the enlargement of the *eshâm* system, the authorities tried to increase the center’s share of revenues through confiscations and monetary debasements, but such practices brought with them the heavy costs of more political and monetary instability¹⁰.

Itzkowitz once wrote, “the Ottomans were awakened from their lethargy by the defeat at the hands of the Russians in 1774.” (Itzkowitz 1977, 25). In fact, the reality of

¹⁰(Genç 2017, 184-193; Cezar 1986, 79-88, 103-111; Pamuk 2000, 170-171).

this “lethargy” is a matter of debate; considering that the last three powerful grand viziers of the century were against engaging in war with Russia and Habsburgs, asserting certain deficiencies in both the Ottoman military and state finances, it would seem that the Ottoman bureaucracy was well aware of the Empire’s situation and its limitations. Nevertheless, it is certainly clear that the annexation of the Crimea by the Russians in 1783, a province with a predominantly Muslim population, created a tremendous shock among the Ottoman elite. Thus, by the end of the century, Ottoman elites from all political factions were looking for certain reforms or remedies that could save the empire from such a fate; this contributed to a great flourishing of Ottoman reform literature during this period. In other words, after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, the need for reforms became widely discussed among the Ottoman elite, “... who gradually began to realize the inadequacy of the old ideology” (Aksan 1995, xii).

The period after 1774, then, witnessed a vast growth in the number of political advice treatises, which offered various proposals for state and military reform. The number of the treatises peaked during the reign of Selim III, who requested that high-officials write their ideas regarding which reforms were necessary and took these proposals as the foundation of the broader *Nizâm-ı Cedîd* (New Order) political program. In addition to this, envoys were sent to various European countries, and these diplomats wrote treatises on the organization of the European states and armies. During the reign of Selim III, several new treatises were circulation, both for and against the New Order reforms. These writers were not only from among the ranks of the Ottoman bureaucracy; among them also included some ulemâ members and provincial elites (Beydilli 2014, 25-64; Aksan 1993, 53-64).

Although military reforms occupied a considerable portion of these treatises, they were not limited to this subject, and indeed covered topics ranging from domestic production, foreign trade, taxation, public security, center-province relations, education, the judiciary, and more. Although the ideas represented in these treatises differed in terms of their priorities and methods of dealing with these issues, it can be said that these texts more or less clustered around three main themes: European style military reforms, financial and bureaucratic rationalization, and state centralization. Although it is not clear how the evaluation process of the treatises functioned, it can be assumed that audience of these works encompassed the entire class of high officialdom, including the Sultan himself; the authors of these texts were, in this sense, writing for each other¹¹. It also seems to be the case that New

¹¹Ergin Çağman published a book the including most of the reform treatises that are submitted to Selim III with both summaries, transliterations and facsimiles; (Çağman 2010). Also the compilation of the parts on the military reform of those treatises is published as a book too by Ahmet Öğreten which includes a

Order was shaped under the influence of these treatises and their writers. Süleyman Penâh Efendi was one of the earliest examples of the writers of such reform treatises, although he did not live to see the reign of Selim III and the New Order. But it is clear that his ideas were the product of the same period, and his thoughts can be understood as a harbinger of the New Order reform program.

1.3 Penâh Efendi in Ottoman Historiography

The first detailed depiction of Süleyman Penâh Efendi in Ottoman historiography was written by Aziz Berker in 1942. He published the transliteration of Süleyman Penâh Efendi's manuscript in six separate issues of the Turkish journal *Tarih Vesikaları*, over the course of 1942 and 1943 (Berker 1942-1943). In his work, before coming to the transliteration, he introduces the manuscript, author, and content of the treatise. Berker used the manuscript of the treatise as his source, which is still kept in the Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphânesi (National Library of Manuscript Works) and catalogued as document no.563, "*Mora İhtilâli*" (The Morea Rebellion). According to Berker, the original name of the manuscript was *Penâh Efendi Mecmuası* (Penâh Efendi Compilation) and included three main topics: the start of the Morea Rebellion, the suppression of the rebellion, and the ideas of the author regarding the general condition of the Morea and the reform of contemporary military and state affairs. Berker takes the manuscript as one monolithic treatise, under the title of *Mora İhtilâli Tarihçesi* (Historical Treatise on the Morea Rebellion) and dates the text to 1769. The information that he gives about Süleyman Penâh Efendi is mostly drawn from Mehmet Süreyya's late 19th-century biographical encyclopedia of the Ottoman period, the *Sicill-i Osmanî*. Berker excludes certain parts of Penâh's manuscript in his transliteration; however, the random nature of the excluded portions seems to imply that this was an oversight rather than an intentional omission.

More than 40 years after Berker's transliteration, in two separate works published in 1986 and 1988, Yavuz Cezar returned to Penâh's work; in particular, the sections concerning the economy and state finances. In his well-known book on crisis and change in 18th-century Ottoman state finances (Cezar 1986), Cezar briefly investigates some of Penâh's ideas on the topic, such as the practice of the *mâlikâne* system and taxation. In his second work, a journal article devoted entirely to Penâh

short passage from the treatise of Moralı Osman Efendi, one of Penâh's sons; (Öğreten 2014).

Efendi (Cezar 1988), he depends largely upon Berker's transliteration and discusses Penâh's work as one monolithic treatise; however, he also includes some of his ideas on other issues. According to Cezar, Penâh Efendi wrote the work for the benefit of his fellow statesmen. He investigates Penâh's ideas quite comprehensively, including his perceptions of the West, theories on education, agricultural and industrial production, the duties of the state and qualities of statesmen, the source of wealth, urban planning, state finances, land regimes, domestic and foreign trade, monetary policies and the value of precious metal. Cezar puts an emphasis on some particular features that he attributed to Süleyman Penâh Efendi; notably, according to Cezar, Penâh was already aware of the comparative superiority of the West and concepts such as progress and development, and should thus be taken as one of the pioneers of secular thought in Ottoman-Turkish society. Moreover, Cezar suggests that Penâh was already aware of some modern economic concepts, and a supporter of a balanced foreign trade, protectionism, and import substitution. In his ideas and definition of Ottoman monetary policy, Cezar suggests, Penâh was already very close to perceiving the principles of Gresham's Law. Cezar was perhaps overreading Süleyman Penâh Efendi's writings; it was surely far too early for an Ottoman bureaucrat to think the West incomparably more advanced. Moreover, it is a bit hard to imagine that an Ottoman financial bureaucrat was already thinking in terms of progress and economic development. Indeed, although such bureaucrats used terms like "*ma'mûr etme*" and "*şenlendirme*" to talk about certain regions, in the sense of "to make inhabited and prosperous," it seems that they did not have a systematic conceptualization of how to implement these programs.

Another study of Penâh Efendi's work was carried out by Cahit Telci, who focused solely on Penâh's ideas regarding the state and statesmen (Telci 1999). Telci was the first to use Ahmed Vâsîf's history as a source of biographic information on Süleyman Penâh Efendi, in addition to Süreyya's work. Thus, in comparison to other studies, he gives more information on the life of Penâh. Following this biographical section, he also mentions some of the previous studies of Penâh's work, such as Cezar's, and the topics of the second treatise. Although Telci titled his study "The Ideas of Süleyman Penâh Efendi on State Order", he describes all of the sections of Penâh's work, from his thoughts on military affairs to bans on imports, excepting those sections on state finances already studied by Cezar. After describing all of the sections of Penâh's work, Telci underlines some significant points; as he argues, Penâh was aware of the corruption of the state and the need to protect the subjects. Moreover Telci suggests that, although the other writers of late 18th-century Ottoman reform literature focused mostly on military affairs, Penâh was focusing on problems of a larger scope, ranging from relations between the center and the provinces to the

spread of the sciences (Telci 1999, 178-186).

In his study on the ideas of 18th-century Ottoman intellectuals regarding the organization of the imperial judiciary (Atik 2002), Kayhan Atik further investigates Penâh's ideas on the subject. Before his analysis of Penâh's thought, he gives some information about Penâh Efendi, albeit relying only Süreyya's *Sicill-i Osmanî*. Afterwards, Atik details the sections from Penâh's work about local judges: these include problems such as the illegal appointments of deputy judges in place of the principal ones, the inappropriate behaviors of the judges towards the subjects, the alliances that judges made with local strongmen, and the sale of judicial posts. Atik wrongly interprets the *hâcegân* as a part of the Ottoman '*ulemâ* class, and thus includes Penâh's ideas on the *hâcegân* within his study. Finally, Atik mentions the parts of Penâh's work in which he emphasizes the importance of building libraries and mosques in the provinces and the proliferation of sciences such as geography through the publishing of translated European works (Atik 2002, 51-52). Telci's and Atik's studies can be taken as essentially descriptive rather than analytical, and they mostly highlight certain topics that Penâh mentions in his work.

On the other hand, there are studies such as *A History of Ottoman Economic Thought*, written by Fatih Ermiş, which aim to shed light on the economic thought of prominent Ottoman philosophers and political writers. Ermiş includes Süleyman Penâh Efendi in his section on "Economic Thinking at the End of the Classical System", and compares Penâh's ideas to those of another late 18th-century Ottoman statesman, Ebûbekir Râtib Efendi. Thus, he depicts Penâh's ideas on several issues, such as state finances and taxation, the role of the state, private property, foreign trade, substitute production and import bans, as well as on urban planning, the importance of the spread of the sciences, the necessary qualities of the members of the bureaucracy, and the problems of nepotism, bribery, and corruption (Ermiş 2014, 127-150). Ermiş, however, inaccurately interprets the term *hâcegân* to refer to an educational post, such as a professorship (Ermiş 2014, 139). As he aimed to introduce Ottoman ideas to an international audience, Ermiş's work also remains mostly descriptive; because he grounded his work in the acknowledgement of the uniqueness and stability of Islamic economic thinking and Mehmet Genç's "classical mentalities", he does not elaborate on specific issues and instead confines himself to making some generalizations.

Hakan Erdem is another historian who took on the subject of Süleyman Penâh Efendi and his work in eight newspaper articles, published between 2017 and 2019¹². Erdem was the first historian to correct a mistake about Penâh's life and work

¹²(Erdem 2017c, 2017a, 2017b, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d, 2019a, 2019e).

which stemmed from an error in the Sicill-i Osmanî; that is, Penâh Efendi did not write one monolithic work, as has been claimed, but wrote two separate treatises at different times, which were later compiled together. Thus, he suggests, Penâh might have written his work on the Morea Rebellion of 1770 at an earlier date; however, according to Penâh's own text, the second treatise must have been written between 1785-1786. Erdem calls the second treatise "*Esbâb-ı Tedbir-i Nizâm-ı Ekâlim*" (The Means of Measures of the Order of Climes), referencing Penâh's own words at the beginning of the second treatise (Erdem 2017c). Erdem speculates about the possible sources that Penâh Efendi drew upon in his treatise and points out some of the similarities between his ideas on statecraft with his contemporaries in Europe: namely, enlightened absolutists of the Habsburgs, Prussia, Russia, French revolutionaries, and the physiocrats. Erdem highlights the somewhat colonialist and perhaps even nationalistic aspects of Penâh's ideas, and puts an emphasis on his plans for the cultural and linguistic assimilation of the Albanians by comparing them to the practices of European colonialism and the concept of the "white man's burden" (Erdem 2017a, 2017b, 2019c).

After a two-year interlude, Erdem continued his research in five subsequent columns by focusing on Penâh's economic approaches to the contemporary Ottoman world. First, he mentions Penâh's complaints about the large amount of coins which were flowing to the Indian realms from the Ottoman Empire and notes the mercantilist character of Penâh's thoughts. In addition to this, Erdem notes the consistency between Penâh's mercantilist ideas and his views on bullion and precious metals (Erdem 2019e, 2019a). Erdem also underlines Penâh Efendi's ideas and suggestions regarding private property, demographic planning, and agricultural planning, and his criticisms of provincial administration during this period (Erdem 2019c). According to Erdem, Penâh Efendi was an advocate for the centralization of the empire and abolishment of a'yânship. Indeed, like many other late-18th-century Ottoman reformists, Erdem argues that Penâh was suggesting an internal expansion, a sort of the reconquest of the certain Ottoman lands. Thus, Penâh was an opponent of those who advocated for further external expeditions. Erdem elaborates on Penâh's proposals by noting his proposals for the administration of Egypt, Baghdad, Basra, and the neighboring empire of Abyssinia (Erdem 2019d, 2019b).

In 2018, Abdullah Zararsız published a much better transliteration of the same manuscript that Berker had used, including a facsimile of the text at the end of the book (Penâh Efendi 2017). In the beginning of his book, in addition to using Ahmed Vâsîf's history, Zararsız extends the available information about Penâh Efendi by using, for the first time, some of the archival material in which he is mentioned (Penâh Efendi 2017, 15-22). Then, he introduces both sections shortly before the

transliteration (Penâh Efendi 2017, 23-45). Throughout the transliteration, Zararsız corrects several reading errors that have appeared and adds several parts which were unread and not transliterated in Berker's original work. Zararsız's study will be our main text as this paper discusses Penâh's narrative of the Morea Rebellion and his ideas about systemic reform.

In 2019, Marinos Sariyannis published a voluminous work entitled "A History of Ottoman Political Thought up to the Early Nineteenth Century", in which he comprehensively studies the main concepts and debates of Ottoman political thought, including its economic and social aspects (Sariyannis 2018). Sariyannis divides the 18th-century Ottoman political writers into two groups, in a somewhat old-fashioned way: that is, he separates them into traditionalists and westernizers. Sariyannis explains that his main reason for this grouping is to distinguish the latter as those whose works "are marked by an urgent sense of the need to introduce European-style institutions and practices, usually pertaining to army." Noting the balance of power between the bureaucracy and other institutions, such as the Janissary corps, Sariyannis argues that many of these reformists instead saw "no reason to argue for a total reconfiguration of the administrative and economic structure of the empire: they merely had to proceed peacefully with their experiments." (Sariyannis 2018, 333). These writers he labels as the traditionalists.

Hence, Sariyannis describes Süleyman Penâh Efendi as one of the traditionalist writers of the 18th century; indeed, he refers to his text as "one of the most original specimens of 'traditionalist' political advice of the eighteenth century." The information Sariyannis gives about Penâh's life is mostly from Berker, and thus a little problematic, but he detects (as Erdem does) that there are two separate treatises in the form of a single manuscript; the narrative of the 1770 revolt in the Morea, and the other text on "ordering of the countries". (Sariyannis 2018, 346-347) Sariyannis makes some educated guesses about the probable sources that Penâh Efendi used in writing his work, and details some of the posts that Penâh held in the capital. He makes it clear that, when one considers his positions, Penâh was likely a follower of the Grand Vizier Halil Hamid Paşa (Sariyannis 2018, 347). By emphasizing Penâh's theories of the state and politics, Sariyannis suggests that Penâh was a "fervent Khaldunist" who used the works of Kâtip Çelebi and Na'îmâ in developing his ideas (Sariyannis 2018, 349-350). Sariyannis describes Penâh's ideas on provincial administration and the people, and indicates that Penâh had a distrust of provincial peoples due to his background (Sariyannis 2018, 350-351). Following this, Sariyannis gives an overview of the various topics that Penâh discusses, including reform of the pay-rolls of the Janissaries, military reforms, state finances, the abolishment of the *tîmar* system, and regulations concerning private property, urban planning,

the production of substitutes for imports, monetary policy and precious metals, and Penâh's linguistic and cultural project for the assimilation of the Albanian people (Sariyannis 2018, 351-359.)

According to Sariyannis, the ideas in Penâh's work reflected the political discourse of the late 18th century, and indeed even the 19th century, including his focus on topics such as the economy and commerce, the administration of the realms, and the imitation of the European practices. On the other hand, Sariyannis likens Penâh to the former Ottoman chronicler Mehmed Hâkim Efendi (d. 1770) in regard to his depicting of issues such as urban planning, measures against fires, and so forth at "street-level". Finally, Sariyannis suggests that, although he mentioned European military tactics, Penâh never suggested "the wholesale adaptation of the European military model". Thus, Sariyannis argues, Penâh's treatise should be taken as work of one who was neither a westernizer, nor a revivalist of the old laws, and suggests to take his ideas as, but rather a writer's whose thoughts represent "a continuation of the paths opened by Kâtib Çelebi and Na'îmâ." (Sariyannis 2018, 360-361).

Although Sariyannis's work represents an important contribution to the field, his classification of 18th-century Ottoman political writers as either traditionalists or westernizers seems to be problematic. In other words, drawing a hard boundary between Ottoman writers based upon how urgently they argue for the introduction of "European-style institutions and practices, usually pertaining to army" is somewhat misleading, because the permissibility of adopting Western military techniques and technologies was not the most controversial issue of the time, nor did advocating for such necessarily make these writers "westernizers". In addition to this, all of these writers framed their reform proposals more or less in accordance with Ottoman social and political traditions, including foreign advisors; this respect for entrenched political norms did not make them "traditionalists", either. In this thesis, I take the position that the proposals of Ottoman political writers in the late 18th Century should not be differentiated not on the basis of their supposed affinity to tradition or Western concepts, but rather on their more practical aspects.

Furthermore, in attempting to locate Süleyman Penâh Efendi within the broader context of the 18th century, Sariyannis falls short because he does not spend enough time on Penâh Efendi's personal connections and individual contributions, and instead reaches some summary conclusions. For instance, Sariyannis counts Süleyman Penâh Efendi as a member of Halil Hamid Paşa's reform faction, an assertion which – as this thesis will show – is based on nothing more than the fact that both of them were reformist bureaucrats. Furthermore, he defines Penâh Efendi as a "fervent Khaldunist" who largely follows Kâtib Çelebi's and Na'îmâ's framework; however,

as I shall attempt to show in the third chapter, Penâh clearly distinguishes himself from his predecessors in his work.

There are also some studies which focus solely on Penâh's first treatise on Morea Rebellion of 1770. One of them is Yuzo Nagata's work, "Greek Rebellion of 1770 in the Morea Peninsula: Some Remarks through the Turkish Historical Sources"¹³; another is Birol Gündoğdu's dissertation, entitled "Ottoman Constructions of the Morea Rebellion, 1770s: A Comprehensive Study of Ottoman Attitudes to the Greek Uprising" (Gündoğdu 2012). There is also a Greek translation of Penâh's manuscript, written by Neoklis Sarris in 1993¹⁴. Moreover, there are other recent works which briefly mention Penâh's ideas; Ali Yaycıoğlu, for example, in his book "Partners of Empire", mentions Penâh's emphasis on the importance of domestic industry, his opposition to the practices of confiscation, execution, and exile, and his narrative about the tensions between the Greek and Albanian communities in Morea (Yaycıoğlu 2016, 42-45). In a study which is named after a sentence in Penâh's work, Şakul describes Penâh's ideas regarding provincial usurpers, and the Albanians (Şakul 2017, 131-133). Finally, there is one more study which claims to be about Süleyman Penâh Efendi, but it seems that the author confused him with a certain 15th or 16th-century Ottoman poet named Süleyman Penâhî (Yiğit 2015).

1.4 Thesis Outline

This study is composed of two long main chapters. In the upcoming chapter, I will start by investigating into Süleyman Penâh Efendi's family life, in an attempt to deduce his socio-economic roots. In the same vein, I will try to reconstruct the Morea in which he lived, starting from the late 17th century with help of Evliyâ Çelebi's writings. Passing through the short period of Venetian rule, I will continue with the return of Ottoman rule over the peninsula and highlight possible changes that might have occurred in the Morea during these exchanges. The section will conclude by locating the Morea peninsula within the broader context of the 18th century. After this, I will focus on Penâh's early career, attempting to reconstruct

¹³Yuzo Nagata, "Greek Rebellion of 1770 in the Morea Peninsula: Some Remarks through the Turkish Historical Sources," in *Studies on the Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire* (Izmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1995) after Gündoğdu (Gündoğdu 2012, 25).

¹⁴Penâh Efendi – Sarris, Neoklis, Προεπαναστατική Ελλάδα και οσμανικό κράτος: από το χειρόγραφο του Σουλεϊμάν Πενάχ Εφέντη του Μοραΐτη (1785) [Pre-revolution Greece and the Ottoman State: From Moreot Suleyman Penah Efendi's Manuscript (1785)], Athens 1993 after Sariyannis; (Sariyannis 2018, 346).

his education and the conditions of first employment in the state offices. Following his arrival in Istanbul, I will attempt to trace him and his social and intellectual networks using period chronicles.

Subsequently, I will elaborate upon the Morea Rebellion of 1770, depending mostly on Penâh's own narrative, whilst also trying to locate him within the context of the dynamic events of the rebellion. With the help of scattered information that he mentions during the course of events I will also try to make clear his socio-economic background and local networks. Following the rebellion, I will continue with his return to the capital during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774 and his duties during the period, ranging from his positions as the head of the finance department to his participation in the peace negotiations. After the war, I will continue by following his steps in the state quarters and tracing his activities in the general councils and factional struggles of the 1780s, following the annexation of the Crimea by the Russians. The second chapter closes with his death in 1786, and a brief investigation into his descendants and the *vakıf* that he bequeathed to his son Yusuf Âgâh Efendi.

In the third chapter, I will focus on Süleyman Penâh Efendi's treatise; here, I will refer to it as *The Order of the Climes*. I will start the third chapter by mentioning the possible sources which Penâh might have used in writing the treatise. I will investigate the rest of the treatise in four parts. In the first part, I will focus on his ideas regarding the state, politics, and statesmen, comparing them with to the ideas of his predecessors, Kâtip Çelebi and Nâ'imâ. In the second part, I will elaborate upon his ideas regarding military reform, detailing his proposals for the Janissary corps, the provincial cavalry, the imperial navy, and the non-Janissary frontier garrisons which Penâh had suggested being established in the Balkans. In this section I will investigate to what extent Penâh Efendi was influenced by contemporary European developments in the field. Furthermore, considering the Janissary corps' position in its relations with the Sultan's authority, I will try to locate his ideas regarding the corps into the context of his broader centralization program.

Following this discussion of his ideas regarding military reform, I will continue by describing his ideas regarding the provincial administration and center-provincial relations. Firstly, I will take into consideration all the of elements of provincial administration as Penâh introduces them in his text, and then I will investigate his ideas in the context of the late 18th century. Moreover, I will try to highlight which points of the provincial administration system Penâh was opposed to, and which points met with his approval. After this part, I will elaborate upon one of

the most peculiar ideas of Penâh Efendi, which is to say his assimilation project for the Albanians; a project which, in several respects, resembles the practices of European colonialism. Additionally, I will investigate Penâh's proposals for more distant provinces, such as Egypt, Baghdad, and the former Ottoman provinces of Montenegro and Abyssinia.

Finally, in the last part of the third chapter, I will focus on his ideas regarding the economy and state finances; these will be analyzed under four separate headings. In the first section, I will investigate his ideas regarding the economic conditions of his time, and the rationalization processes he deemed necessary for Ottoman taxation policies and organization, both in the provinces and the center. In the second section, I will focus on aspects of his ideas that evoke the concept of the balance of trade and can be evaluated as mercantilist in nature. Furthermore, as an aspect of his mercantilist ideas, I will investigate his suggestions regarding government support for the production of substitutes for imported goods, especially in the textile industry. In the third section, I will investigate his ideas regarding monetary policy, and the role of the precious metals or bullion in the economy. In doing so, we I aim to indicate some of the monetary policy instruments that the Ottoman financial bureaucrats put into practice during the 18th century. Finally, in the fourth section, I will focus on his ideas on demographic and agricultural planning, and discuss their similarities with cameralism, an 18th-century Central European school of political and economic thought.

2. THE MAKING OF SÜLEYMAN PENÂH EFENDİ

Unfortunately, sources of information regarding Süleyman Penâh Efendi remain extremely sparse and scattered. Especially in regard to his personal life, we know remarkably little. Despite its brevity, the most important source about his life is a short passage from a contemporary's work, namely the *Charms and Truths of Relics and Annals* (*Mehâsinü'l-Âsâr ve Hakâikü'l-Ahbâr*) which was written by the famous late 18th-century court historian Ahmed Vâsîf Efendi (d. 1806). Ahmed Vâsîf Efendi was an Ottoman official, who was younger than Penâh by about twelve years. However, they knew each other well, as their career paths and intellectual interests were aligned in many respects; indeed, they crossed paths several times during the period of imperial crisis which began with the 1768-1774 Russo-Turkish War. Vâsîf added some information about Süleyman Penâh Efendi's life after recording his death in the *Charms and Truths*. According to the court historian, Süleyman Penâh Efendi was born in 1135 H. (1722-1723) as the son of a certain İsmail Efendi, who was one of the residents of the town of Tripoli in the Morea (Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 363).¹

On the other hand, in Mehmed Süreyya's work *Sicill-i Osmânî*, Penâh's birth date is given as 1153 H. (1740) (Süreyya 1996, 1550). It would seem that the date given by Süreyya is incorrect, however, because he also gives the birth date of one of Penâh's sons, Yusuf Âgâh Efendi, as 1157 H. (1744) (Süreyya 1996, 1685). Furthermore, in a state document dated to 1786, just after Penâh's death, which included instructions to determine his remaining assets, ensure his debts were paid, and seal the estates during the process, three of Penâh's sons were mentioned as living. According to the document, at that time, two of these sons were already in their thirties and were members of the *Divân-ı Hâcegân-ı Hümayûn*.² As a result, it is clear that Âgâh was alive and a member of the *Hâcegân* at that time (Yalçınkaya 1999); the document also confirms 1744 as Âgâh's year of birth, which would make him 42 years old in 1786. Thus, Süreyya's two dates are incompatible and Vâsîf's dating of Penâh's

¹"*Mumâ-ileyh Mora cezîresinde vâki' Trablîçe kasabası sükkânından İsmail Efendi nâm kimesnenin oğlu olup...*" (Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 363).

²(DABOA.HAT.1451.64 29 Zilhicce 1200/23 October 1786).

birth year seems more accurate.

2.1 Family and the Homeland

2.1.1 Penâh's Family

Süreyya gives the name of Penâh's father as İsmail Efendi of Tripoli, just as Vâsîf did (Süreyya 1996, 1550). Furthermore, in a state document dated to December 1785, nearly a year before his death, Penâh Efendi was mentioned as the son of Hacı İsmail Efendi.³ This too is a matter of some confusion, because Penâh Efendi gave his father's name as Mustafa in his own work (Penâh Efendi 2017, 57). It is entirely possible that he went by both names, but no further information regarding this could be found in the archives. Although these two sources do not mention the birthplace of Penâh, since he described himself as "originally from the Morea" (*Moravîyü'l-asl*) in his own work, it can be assumed that he was born in the peninsula.⁴ Indeed, in the first part of his work, which focused on the Morea Rebellion of 1770, he mentions a specific place in the peninsula as "our town" (*diyârımız*) named *Gaston*, which may refer to his birth place (Penâh Efendi 2017, 57, 62; Erdem 2017c; Vlachopoulou 2007, 132). It is likely that *Gaston* refers to Gastouni (Sezen and Torun 2017, 278), the still-extant name of a settlement in the northwestern region of the Morea Peninsula, near the Ionian Sea, in modern Greece.

When the lack of archival information is taken into account, one can assume that Penâh's father never attained a high-ranking position in the state. However, it must be presumed that he was a considerably wealthy individual, if he was to have afforded the expenditures necessary for his son enter the scribal offices. Considering Vâsîf's note that Mustafa İsmâîl was a resident of Tripoli, it is likely that he was one of the local notables of the city, such as one of the local tax farmers, *tîmar* holders, or merchants. In this regard, there are two lists in Zarinebaf's study that give the names of the tax-farmers of both the rural and pastoral tax-farms, for the various

³(DABOA.EV.VKF.25.5 29 Zilhicce 1200/23 October 1786).

⁴Berker asserted that Penâh was born in Istanbul, citing Süreyya's *Sicill-i Osmanî* as his source, but as Erdem has suggested, no such information can actually be found in the text. Unfortunately, Cezar and Atik have made the same mistake in regard to Penâh's birth place by citing Berker (Berker 1942-1943, 63; Cezar 1988, 111; Atik 2002, 48-49).

districts of the Morea in 1731. According to first list, there was a certain Mustafa Ağa Halife who held the tax-farm of Tripoli and its dependencies as *Mukâbeleci* of the Morea, alongside an El-Hac Mehmed Efendi from the bureaucracy. Furthermore, as the second list shows, the same Mustafa Ağa Halife held the tax-farm for the sheep taxes of Tripoli as well, alongside Mehmed Efendi. His first title, “Ağa”, was mostly given to the senior attendants of the palace, and to the commanders of both the Janissary Corps and Cavalry Troops of the Porte (Bayerle 1997, 2); his second title, “Halife”, was a term that will be investigated further in the following section, but in short implied that he was a member of the bureaucracy as “a junior scribe of the imperial chancery” (Bayerle 1997, 74). These two titles seem to imply that he was a Janissary-cum-bureaucrat, who might have come to the peninsula as a Janissary commander in the Ottoman assault of 1715 and became a local administrator in the process. There is also an İsmail Ağa on both lists who held the same tax-farms for the Kalavryta district, along with the title of *Voyvoda* of Kalavryta (Zarinebaf, Bennet, and Davis 2005, 36-37). Although Mustafa Ağa Halife seems to be a promising candidate for the identity of Penâh’s father, further research is needed to speak more conclusively on this issue.

We know little about Penâh’s family. There were five signatures on a petition which was written by Penâh’s family to Sultan Mustafa III in 1765, for the purpose of requesting a pardon and his return from the exile to which he was sent for being a follower of the executed Grand Vizier Köse Mustafa Paşa. These signatures were “Âişe Vâlide”, “Yusuf”, “Mehmed”, “Osmân” and “Velî”⁵. According to Abdullah Zararsız, this “Vâlide”, which means “a female parent, mother”, refers to the mother of Penâh Efendi (Penâh Efendi 2017, 16). In fact, the text was written by the men, who had their signatures below the request, and she only was mentioned in the petition as “*büyük vâlidemiz câriyeleri*”. “*Büyük vâlidemiz*” can be translated simply as “our grandmother”. The word “*câriyeleri*” is the plural form of “*câriye*”; literally, “female slave”. Here, however, it is used for introducing or mentioning women to highly reputable individuals, as humble servants of the sultan. Furthermore, she was described in the document as older than 80 years old, which implies that she should have been born before 1685. Unfortunately, we have no further information about Penâh’s mother beyond her name, ‘Âişe. However, considering that she was explicitly mentioned in the document, with her name and her signature, it is possible that she may have come from some sort of nobility. Indeed, she may have been a former slave of the imperial harem who was manumitted from service. According to İpşirli, manumitted female slaves in the Ottoman imperial harem could enter the Ottoman ruling elite via marriage. Furthermore, İpşirli suggests that the majority

⁵(DABOA.AE.SMST.III.70.5226 13 Recep 1179/26 December 1765) after Zararsız (Penâh Efendi 2017, 16).

of the husbands of the manumitted female slaves of the imperial harem were from the *askerî* class and, between 1699 and 1731, most of these men had the title of *ağa*, like Mustafa Ağa Halife of Tripoli and İsmail Ağa of Kalavryta (Argıt 2009, 117, 122-123). I have not encountered any information about his wife, however, and the absence of Penâh's father's name in the petition might imply that he was not alive by that time.

Penâh had five sons, and the names of four of them were written under the petition mentioned above. In particular, Yusuf and Osman were well-known state officials who held rather high positions in the capital, as members of the "*Divân-ı Hâcegân-ı Hümayûn*". The first of these sons was Yusuf Âgâh Efendi, who came to be considered the most famous of the *Penâhzâdes* - the descendants of Penâh - in Ottoman history. He became a member of the *hâcegân* in the correspondence office of the grand vizier in 1774, and from that date onwards he held a number of high-ranking positions, including "*Sadâret Kethüdâlgî*" (the grand vizier's second in command). Yusuf Âgâh was the first permanent ambassador of the Ottoman Empire. He was appointed as the Ambassador to London by Selim III on July 23, 1793 and he maintained this tenure for nearly four years.⁶ Yusuf Âgâh Efendi died in 1822.⁷

His second son, Osman, is known as Morah Osman Efendi in Ottoman historiography. Mehmed Süreyya suggests in his *Sicill-i Osmânî* that Osman Efendi was older than Yusuf Âgâh Efendi, and that they came to Istanbul together with their father Penâh Efendi in 1755/56 (Süreyya 1996, 1685). However, Mütercim Ahmed Âsım Efendi suggests the opposite in his history, writing instead that Osman Efendi was the youngest brother of Yusuf Âgâh when he was appointed to the former position of his elder brother on May 1, 1808 (Âsım Efendi 2015, 1124). Osman Efendi also held very important positions in the bureaucracy, such as *Nişancı*, *Defterdar*, and *Sadâret Kethüdâsı*. Osman Efendi died in 1817. (Süreyya 1996, 1291; Kalıpcı 2015, 259-264). They both served the daughters of the Sultan Abdülhamid I (d. 1789) as *kethüdâs*; Yusuf Âgâh served Hibetullah Sultan (d. 1841) and Osman Efendi served Esmâ Sultan (d. 1848) (Yalçinkaya 1999, 681; Süreyya 1996, 1685-1686, 2191).⁸

Our knowledge about his other sons is scarce. Since these two men did not hold crucial positions in state officialdom – or, indeed, positions at all – it seems unlikely that one would come across them in the archival record. As an example, I could not find anything about Velî in both the archives and in other primary sources, except

⁶For more information about Yusuf Âgâh Efendi's ambassadorial tenure, see: (Yalçinkaya 1993).

⁷(Yalçinkaya 1999, 681-682; Afyoncu 2000, 146-148; Süreyya 1996, 1685-1686; Unat 1968, 168-176).

⁸The fact that Penâh's two sons were in the service of the Sultan's daughters implicitly supports my speculation that Penâh's mother Âişe might have been a manumitted female slave of the Sultan's palace.

for the aforementioned document signed by the entire family. In case of Mehmed, we have just one official document which mentions him: an order to determine his share in the Tobacco Customs revenue following the notification of his death. His full name appeared in the document as “Mehmed Muharrem Efendi”.⁹

There was another son whose signature did not appear on the family petition; this was Ahmed Kâmil Efendi. It is likely that he was not yet born, or was at a very young age, when the petition was signed in 1765. In the two documents from Afyoncu’s compilation which were produced just after Penâh’s death, Ahmed Kâmil was mentioned as one of Penâh Efendi’s sons, a *kîsedâr* (purse bearer), and a *hâlife* (deputy scribe) in a certain state office who was eligible for a share of Penâh’s inherited estate. Ahmed Kâmil’s right to this share was renewed depending on his duty until 1794 (Afyoncu 2005, 177-178). Another document, dated to August 18, 1792, six years after Penâh’s death also mentioned Ahmed Kâmil, alongside his brother Yusuf Âgâh Efendi. The document stated that the shares of the tobacco customs of Thessaloniki, Kavala, Komotini, and Volos, to which Ahmed Kâmil and his brother were entitled, were to be renewed.¹⁰ There is no other record of Ahmed Kâmil after 1794, which could imply that he died before that date; this would be compatible with Mütercim Âsım Efendi’s statement that Osman Efendi was the youngest brother of Yusuf Âgâh Efendi in 1808.

In the first part of his work, in which he narrated the events that he lived through during the Morea Rebellion of 1770, Penâh mentioned a brother and some of his relatives, albeit without giving their names. During the siege of Kalavryta by the rebels, he notes that his brother and relatives were in the town at that time. Since Gastouni was one of the first targets of the rebels, Penâh was able to send a message to Kalavryta to warn his brother and relatives. Consequently, when the rebels came, the Muslims of the town were properly prepared to resist them. However, Penâh did not specify if his brother and relatives were living there permanently or not (Penâh Efendi 2017, 70). With the help of this passage, it is clear that he had, at the very least, a brother and a group of relatives who were still living in the Morea at that time. Moreover, Penâh did not mention his mother or his own household as participants of the events in the Morea Rebellion, although he described it very thoroughly. It is possible that the ones who were alive at that time might have been with him throughout the rebellion. Nevertheless, he might have found it unnecessary to speak of such details, which had no effect on the broader course of events.

Before completing the section on Penâh’s family, it is important to mention Seyyid

⁹(DABOA.C.ML.749.30547 23 Şevval 1193/3 November 1779) after Zararsız (Penâh Efendi 2017, 19).

¹⁰(DABOA.AE.SSLM.III.00218.12801 29 Zilhicce 1206/18 August 1792).

Ali Efendi, who was suggested to be Osman Efendi's brother-in-law in Maurice Herbert's "*Une Ambassade Turque sous le Directoire*". If true, this would also make him Süleyman Penâh's son-in-law (Herbette 1902, 11). However, apart from Herbert's work, I did not come across corroborating information anywhere else in the course of my research; indeed, we do not know if Penâh even had a daughter or not. Nevertheless, we know a fair amount of biographical information about Seyyid Ali Efendi. He was born in 1757, and in September 1796 he was appointed as the first permanent ambassador of Ottoman Empire to Paris. Seyyid Ali was an active supporter of the "Friends of Ruse" (*Rusçuk Yârânı*), and participated in the *coup d'état* against Mustafa IV which brought Alemdâr Mustafa Paşa to the grand vizierate. Moreover, he was one of the signatories of the 1808 Deed of Alliance (*Sened-i İttifak*), which was a short-lived political agreement between the sultan and an array of provincial notables. After the Janissary rebellion which overthrew and killed Alemdâr Mustafa Paşa, Seyyid Ali Efendi and his friends fled from the capital. Despite all of this, he was pardoned and appointed as Commander of the Fort of Dardanelles, where he was killed on July 6, 1809 at the command of Sultan Mahmud II.¹¹

2.1.2 Penâh's Homeland: the Morea in the 17th and 18th Centuries

To understand more clearly the world in which Penâh was born, we should look back a little into the history of the Morea. The Ottoman presence in the Morea dated back to the 1450s. However, Ottomans would have to wait until the 1540s to attain complete control over the region, with the notable exception of the peninsula of Mania, a relatively poor area in the mountainous south-east that was never thoroughly subjugated by the Ottomans. Thanks to the pernicious resistance of the war-seasoned Maniots who, due to their peculiar style of architecture well-adapted to the harsh geographic conditions of the region were able to take advantage of its defensive qualities, Mani maintained its somewhat autonomous character under both Ottoman and Venetian rule (Kiel and Alexander 2005, 283; Saitas 1990, 22-24).

Though it was fruitless, the siege of Vienna by the Ottomans in 1683 terrified the European world. Hence, in 1684, three European powers, namely the Holy Roman Empire, Poland, and Venice, hastily constituted the Holy League to prevent any

¹¹(Beydilli 2009, 45-47; Kalıpçı 2015, 259-260; Unat 1968, 179-180).

possible repeat incursion of the Ottomans into the Central Europe. The Holy League conceived of battle on two possible fronts. The first was a line from Central Europe to the Northern Balkans, which would be maintained by the Habsburgs, and the second was the entire Greek sphere, which was left for the Venetians to defend. At the early stages of the War of the Holy League, which would last for 16 years, Venetians incrementally conquered almost all of the peninsula (including, to some extent, Mania¹²) between 1685 and 1687. With the Treaty of Karlowitz, which was signed when the war finally ended in 1699, both parties recognized Venetian authority over the Morea, and thus the Morea entered the 18th century under Venetian control. However, this control would last only a short time, and soon after Şehîd Ali Paşa put an end to the period of Venetian rule by entering the peninsula with a large army under his command in 1715. From that time until the Greek War of Independence, Ottomans would continue to rule the Morea Peninsula (Kiel and Alexander 2005, 283; Malliaris 2007, 97).

2.1.2.1 Evliyâ Çelebi's observations on Morea and Gastouni

Our knowledge on Penâh's hometown Gastouni, as well as the other districts of the Morea under Ottoman authority, remains quite limited. For the late 17th century, we have observations of the famous Ottoman traveler Evliyâ Çelebi (b.1611- d. ca. 1686). From his writings, it is understood that the Morea was a prosperous province of the Ottoman Empire in 1667, when he visited the region. In addition to its fertile lands and plentiful water resources, it had favorable commercial connections with European markets via Venice. Evliyâ mentions cotton, figs, grapes, and wheat as the region's most common agricultural products. Regarding industry in the peninsula, he makes particular note of textile and dye production, as well as shipbuilding. (İlgürel 1995, 529-531; Evliyâ Çelebi 2003, 123-166).

In comparison to the other districts of the Morea, Evliyâ Çelebi noted that Gastouni was distinguished by the extremely fertile lands in its vicinity. The town also served as the governor of the Morea's personal tax farm, with a revenue of an estimated 300 *akçe*.¹³ Gastouni was about two hours distant from the coastline and was built upon a vast fertile plain. The town consisted of four main neighborhoods. At the time

¹²(Saitas 1990, 23).

¹³Although Evliyâ did not mention a period for the revenue, when we consider the value of the total amount, he must have been describing the area's daily tax revenue.

Evliyâ visited, there were nearly 200 houses, each capacious, covered with tilework, and surrounded by vineyards and orchards. There were two large mosques in the bazaar and several small mosques in the neighborhoods. Evliyâ counted a *medrese*, 2 schools, 100 shops, an inn, a bath, and 4 lodges (*tekkes*) in the town. He makes particular note of two of the lodges; one of them was chaired by a Kadirî sheikh, which had a hundred disciples, and the other one was affiliated with the Halvetîs (Evliyâ Çelebi 2003, 134-135). According to Evliyâ, the inhabitants of the town spoke a language named “*Urumşa*”¹⁴ which seems to be a term that Evliyâ coined himself (Evliyâ Çelebi 2003, 135).

Evliyâ continued by noting the other features of Gastouni. The plain of Gastouni was the largest and the most fertile of the Morea, such that it was provisioning the whole of Venice and other parts of the Europe with its wide range of products. According to Evliyâ, the honey, (olive) oil, succulent fruits and water buffalos of the peninsula were highly praised at the time, but the most prized product of the region were its cherries (Evliyâ Çelebi 2003, 135). Based on the information that Evliyâ gave, it seems clear that Gastouni was a wealthy and crowded city in the late 17th century. Its economy depended on agriculture, but this was not limited to subsistence production. In fact, Gastouni was producing for both domestic and foreign markets.

2.1.2.2 The Morea under Venetian control, 1685-1715

Twenty years after Evliya left, however, the Morea would be invaded by a Christian power: Venice, one of the members of the Holy League. In the early years of the War of the Holy League, Venice occupied the Morea. As might be expected, this shift resulted in several important changes to the population of the peninsula. Venetians administered the Morea by dividing it into 4 provinces and 22 *territorios*. There exists some intriguing research, conducted in the 1970s, regarding the “post-war desertion” of the peninsula; this research is based on a Venetian record dated to around 1702. The document in question shows the numbers of inhabited and destroyed villages for each *territorio* in the form of a list. According to this list, out of a total of 1804 extant villages, 295 had been destroyed, corresponding to

¹⁴Develi suggests that, based on the linguistic examples that Evliyâ gave, “Urumşa” referred to a local Turkish dialect which was spoken among the Turkish population of both the Morea and Greece in 17th century, and which had changed to some degree through exposure to the Greek language and by having spread all over the Balkans (Develi 2011, 136-140).

4. Das Eyalet Mora um 1800 (nach Pouqueville u. Hammer – Purgstall)




Figure 1.1 Map 1. The Province of Morea in 1800 (Birken 1976, 62)

16.6 percent of the total. Wagstaff suggests that three of these *territorios* were quite prominent due to their considerably high percentage of destroyed villages; these were Gastouni (*Castugni*), Kalavryta (*Calaurita*) and Corinth (*Corinto*). In Kalavryta, 36 of the 154 original villages were destroyed. The numbers for Gastouni and Corinth were 44 out of 215 and 46 out of 159, respectively (J. M. Wagstaff 1978, 295-297).

According to Wagstaff, the area was one of the main theatres of the war, because the

location of the region's main fortress was very close to the entrance of the peninsula from the continental part of Greece, and the mountain passes to Argos were the main base of the Ottoman forces during the engagements of 1686. After the fall of Patras in July 1687, which created great anxiety and panic among the Muslim population, many of the area's Muslims gathered in Corinth alongside the retreating Ottoman army. As they fled from the peninsula, Muslim bands set fire to villages and houses. Furthermore, in 1689 and 1692, Ottoman forces made two additional attempts to infiltrate the Morea through Corinth. Considering its location in the middle of war, Wagstaff suggested, the remarkably high numbers of destroyed villages in Corinth was understandable. However, perhaps a more likely reason for the destruction of the settlements in Corinth and Kalavryta was that they had simply been deserted by their local Muslim inhabitants. According to Wagstaff, during the first stages of the war, the Muslim inhabitants of these two settlements likely fled to the fortresses of Castell Tornese, Patras, and Castle of the Morea (Rhion), and after the fall of Patras they probably joined the other refugees who were evacuating the peninsula¹⁵ (J. M. Wagstaff 1978, 300).

As a consequence of the high number of abandoned settlements in the peninsula after the war, Venetian authorities immediately began to repopulate the vacant areas under their rule in an attempt to colonize the region. As a result, a considerable population flow materialized from other Greek areas to the Morea, from both lands under the control of the Ottomans and from those of the Venetians. Alongside these migrants, Italians, Croats, Dalmatians, and Germans who came to the peninsula as mercenaries in the Venetian army stayed and started new lives as farmers. Though the first waves of migration had already started with the early successes of the Venetian army, they reached their highest point during the period between 1687 and 1700. The Venetians had gained experience in moving massive populations ever since the Ottoman expansion had begun to involve the Greek colonies in the Aegean. However, according to Malliaris, this case was a little different, and considerably more difficult, in comparison to the earlier examples; here, most of the immigrants were coming from the areas that were not under Venetian control, and thus they were completely alien to the Venetian system of governance. Indeed, the strength of the cultural identity of the Morea, which had taken shape in the long period of Ottoman rule, inhibited the Venetian attempts to establish their own cultural hegemony in the peninsula (Malliaris 2007, 98-99).

There were various groups of immigrants, from wealthy Athenians to ordinary farmers. Because of their special features, like their powerful economic and social po-

¹⁵ After nearly eighty years, the people of both Gastouni and Kalavryta would follow exactly the same steps in the course of the rebellion which will be discussed in the following section.

sitions, as well as their strong connections to commercial activities, the Venetians considered the Athenians as crucial settlers in the region. These wealthy Greeks chose largely to settle in Patras, Gastouni, Nafplion, and Mystras. Ordinary farmers and shepherds were sent to the lands which they could cultivate throughout the whole peninsula. After the first years of the Venetian conquest, Patras and Gastouni were already filled with new inhabitants. However, during the last decade of Venetian control in the Morea, peasants started to flee from the peninsula, due to the heavy taxes which were imposed upon them by local governors. Despite all the precautions which were taken by Venetian authorities, this outflow could not be stopped. Moreover, the Ottomans gave aid to these immigrants, such as a concomitant inducement which entailed that those who returned would be forgiven and given back the lands they had abandoned; such measures facilitated the flight of the peasants, and as such this process continued until the Ottomans reconquered the area (Malliaris 2007, 99-100, 105-106).

2.1.2.3 After the return of the Ottomans

Following their return, Ottoman rule in the peninsula continued under the command of the local governor (*Mora Vâlîsi*) who was both the political and military authority over the area; two councils also functioned under his authority. One of them was the *Mora divânı* (the high council of Morea) which included administrative employees such as the deputy of the governor (*kahyâ*), the head of the provincial treasury (*defter kahyâsı*), the controller of the provincial documents (*mukâbeleci*), judges (*kadıs*), and so forth. The second council included two representatives of both the Christian and Muslim notables of the peninsula, as well as the dragoman of the Morea. These local notables enjoyed both political and economic privileges, such as “the collection of tax revenues, the distribution of regular and extra-ordinary tax-weights, the implementation and maintenance of beneficial public work, and the management of community, juridical and civil affairs (wills, marriage contracts etc.)” (Stamatopoulos 2007, 150-151).

In addition, Şehîd Ali Paşa’s dramatic landing in the Morea and the subsequent Veneto-Ottoman confrontations led to further demographic change in the peninsula. As they were evacuating the Morea, the Venetians set fire to the fortresses and settlements, just as the Ottomans had thirty years earlier; this caused considerable damage to the area. According to a study using the Ottoman cadastral survey of

Navarin (*Anavarin*), dated to immediately after the Ottoman takeover 1716, there was a significant decrease in the number of houses, including the Greek residents and the total population. The survey reported that one-third of the all possessions were unoccupied *mezra'as*. Taking Navarin as a representative example for the other districts in the whole of the peninsula at that time, one must assume that when the Ottomans returned to the Morea, it had been devastated under both the economic, social, and demographic burdens of two wars within a 30-year period (Zarinebaf, Bennet, and Davis 2005, 18-19).

After the reconquest, Ottomans promptly began to take the necessary measures to reinvigorate the economy and state revenues in the peninsula by encouraging the former inhabitants who had fled from the Venetians to return, and by distributing the vacant lands to those Janissaries who had participated in the recapture. For the restoration of the peninsula, the revenues of the Euboea were assigned to the Morea (Zarinebaf, Bennet, and Davis 2005, 19). On the other hand, a process of transformation in the land regime had been taking place in the peninsula, as well as in other parts of the empire, since the late 16th century. This process was characterized by the concentration of lands in the hands of local military and bureaucratic officials in the form of private estates (*çiftlik*) and the privatization of the collection of the taxes in the form of lifetime tax-farms (*mâlikane*). Hence, in accordance with this, there was a considerable increase in the number of *çiftliks* in the peninsula in the second half of the 18th century (Zarinebaf, Bennet, and Davis 2005, 29-39).¹⁶

Based on her study of the land registers of Navarin, Zarinebaf states that the dimensions of the *çiftliks* varied from between 10 to 1500 *dönüms*, with an average of 25-50. According to Zarinebaf, there were some differences between the villages and *çiftliks* in Navarin, in that while the former were usually found in the higher parts of the district, the latter mostly appeared on the coast which, as she argues, implies that these *çiftliks* had a commercial character (Zarinebaf, Bennet, and Davis 2005, 43). We can use these findings for Navarin as a reference to understand the general features of the land regime in other parts of the peninsula, such as Gastouni. Indeed, alongside its aforementioned fertility, one should also note that Gastouni was a town which was located adjacent to the sea, at an altitude very close to sea level, which made the town more advantageous for trade by sea.

On the other hand, the same period witnessed the emergence of a new class as a

¹⁶İnalcık suggests that *çiftliks* were usually comprised of “waste or abandoned lands (*mevat*) outside the areas under” the traditional Ottoman land regime “*çift-hâne* system” which became arable lands through a reclamation process (İnalcık 1991, 19). In the case of the Morea, the process was likely fostered primarily by the presence of abandoned lands, which were a consequence of the peasant desertions following the two destructive wars and subsequent massive movements of populations in the peninsula.

consequence of the rising maritime trade in Mediterranean; namely, the Greek merchants. From the 1650s onwards, Ottoman Greeks strengthened their positions in the political, religious, and commercial affairs of the empire. Their rising significance was marked by the emergence of a new profession, the dragomans (*tercümânlık*), in various central departments such as the Sublime Porte and Imperial Navy. With the help of this new, highly advantageous political monopoly, Greek merchants extended their control over the trade between Europe and the Levant. From the Seven Years' War to the American War of Independence and the French Revolution, which limited French trade in the Mediterranean, historical events paved the way for the Greek commercial success. As Stoianovich suggests, "By bringing grains to Marseilles during the French Revolution, Greek merchants and shippers - muleteers of the sea - amassed much wealth and some became 'millionaires'" (Stoianovich 1960, 269-276).

In the first part of the 18th century, the external trade of the Morea was likewise in the hands of the French merchants. However, both Muslim and non-Muslim local merchants were dominant in the internal trade of the peninsula. In particular, the Greeks engaged in coastal trade, while the Muslim and Turkish communities operated in the sector of speculative monetary activities (J. M. Wagstaff and Frangakis-Syrett 1992, 79-81). The void that emerged in the Mediterranean trade by the withdrawal of the French and British merchants because of the Seven Years' War was filled with Greek merchants, in addition to the Dutch, and it brought the Morea into a more important position in Mediterranean commerce. After the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman war, Greek merchants bought Russian ships for good prices and continued to enhance their networks by taking advantage of decreasing French activity following the revolution, well until the end of the century (J. M. Wagstaff and Frangakis-Syrett 1992, 81-85). Hence, in 1722, when Penâh was born, the Morea was an Ottoman district which was in the process of recuperating following an exhaustive period which had likely seriously inflamed tensions between its communities. On the other hand, the Morea would soon also play an important part in the 18th-century growth of the Ottoman Empire, due to its increasing importance in the Mediterranean trade and commercial agricultural production, along with the increasing numbers of quasi-private agricultural estates, *çiftlik*s.

2.2 Early Career

2.2.1 The Path of a Young Scribe

According to Ahmed Vasıf Efendi, after his training in “the art of literary composition” (*fenn-i kitâbet*) which continued until he “became able to recognize the difference between the existent and non-existent”, Penâh entered Küçük Mustafa Paşa’s household as a scribe in his high council (*divan kâtibi*) and with the help of his patronage and recommendation, Penâh soon became one of the members of the *Hâcegân* class. (Vâsıf Efendi 1994, 363). Although Vâsıf did not give any details about his early training period, we have a considerable amount of information about the phases of scribal training in the 18th-century Ottoman Empire. In the 18th century, there was a certain track that young scribe candidates had to follow. At the age of 5 or 6, they began their careers in the elementary schools which were established in the neighborhood mosques to teach children how to read the Qur’an, and learned writing skills limited to the usage of the Arabic alphabet and producing duplicate copies of existing texts. A boy who was 7 or 8 years old and had adequately learned to read in the elementary school then applied to become an apprentice with a petition to the relevant office under the *Divân-ı Hümayûn*. During the application process, he should have been helped by a financially well-positioned adult, who could be a patron or a family member; in most cases, it was likely his father who secured the necessary documents and paid the required fees. (Findley 1970, 345-346; Ergin 1977, 65, 83-86).

Being an apprentice meant starting training under an experienced scribe, generally a member of the *hâcegân*. After an exhausting and destitute five or six-year period in which they worked for no compensation, if their efforts were evaluated as appropriate, they were granted a miniscule yearly stipend. Afterwards, for a position in the clerkship (*kitâbet*) with a more respectable salary, they had to work at least ten more years in the office. For the majority of the apprentices, the aim was to become a member of *hâcegân*¹⁷, but this was only truly possible for a few of them (Findley 1986; Aksan 1995, 3). After they completed their education in the Council of the

¹⁷It seems, even at the time that they became a member of *hâcegân*, their frugal conditions continued, as demonstrated by an equivoque in Turkish mentioned by Hâkim Efendi in his history: “Hoax: After one said to a member of *hâcegân*: ‘The servants of the Exalted State are aptly named. Your name is *hâcegân* and you are all in the form of scholars. What do you teach (okudursuz)? It is redundant for you to know grammar and Persian’, ‘Yes, we are *hâcegân*. When we are dismissed from our posts, we sell (okuduruz) fur (coat). We sell horses and saddlery. After these are gone, we sell our homes’ he answered.”(Hâkim Efendi 2019, 1140).

State (*Divan-ı Hümayûn*), they were given a pseudonym, a pen name which they bore for the rest of their lives (Ergin 1977, 65). Süleyman Penâh Efendi's pen name was Penâh, which meant "a protector, one to whom one flies for refuge". Unfortunately, we have no information as to why this name was given to him, or indeed if it was chosen by him.

Throughout this period of apprenticeship, education continued for the young scribes. Aksan suggests that there were "two prerequisites for entrance into the scribal elite": "the acquisition of an *âdâb* education" and "kinship or household patronage" (Aksan 1995, 2-3). For the Ottoman world in the 18th century, Aksan defined *âdâb* as "the tradition of intellectual inquiry and the corpus of literature" and distinguished it from religious education by suggesting that, in addition to the "knowledge of Qur'an, the hadith and commentary apparatus, Islamic jurisprudence", acquired through their education process as apprentices, young scribes were exposed to "three distinct categories of information: textbooks on decorum (*âdâbü'l-küttâb*), encyclopedic works (comprehensive collections of Islamic cultural writings which assumed the common Muslim background), and collections of writings of famous scribes and statesmen (*münşeât*)" (Aksan 1995, 4-10). As men of *âdâb*, scribes were made familiar with the Arabic, Persian, and Greek political traditions, which made them crucial agents of the Ottoman state. As a result of the education process they underwent, and because it was especially necessary in their posts, they were, as a class, "more pragmatic, secular-minded, and open to cultural interaction in terms of their way of thinking in comparison to the cadres of the *ulemâ* and army" (Yeşil 2011, 22).

Secondly, in order to become a scribe, a young candidate should submit a warrant of authorization that introduced and recommended him to the office. The candidates whose fathers were already scribes were luckier than the others in finding an important person who would write such a warrant for them. Finally, joining a grandee household (*intisâp*), which could have resulted from either kinship and marriage or ethnic and geographic connections, was the main actor in both entrance to the bureaucracy and rising in office. In the households of high-ranking officials, the scribes "translated from the perhaps not-so-educated words of the *paşas* to the strictly regulated language of Ottoman diplomatics."¹⁸

¹⁸(Yeşil 2011, 23; Findley 1970, 345-346; Atiyas 2013, 192-193).

2.2.2 First Years in the Capital

After completing his education, it is probable that Penâh started to look for a patron for the purpose of joining a grandee household. Unfortunately, I have found no information about where, exactly, Penâh began his career. However, during my research, I discovered that the first part of Süleyman Penâh Efendi's career intersected with those of two strong statesmen, Küçük Mustafa Paşa (d. 1764) and Köse Mustafa Paşa (d. 1765). According to Vâsîf's suggestion, Penâh's first patron was Küçük (junior) Mustafa Paşa, and Köse Mustafa Paşa. However, during my research, I came to realize that Vâsîf's suggestion might be problematic in certain respects. Thus, although I will remain loyal to Vâsîf's order in the following section, I will also show some of the problems with it and assert a different perspective in the process.

Küçük Mustafa Paşa

Küçük Mustafa Paşa was also known by different pseudonyms as “*Sinek*” (fly), which probably bore a pejorative meaning; this can be seen in the attitude of Şem'dânizâde towards him in *Mürî't-tevârih*¹⁹, and “*Tevkî*” (chancellor) which referred to the post that he had been appointed to in 1757 (Hâkim Efendi 2019, 553, 633). Küçük Mustafa Paşa was the nephew of the former Grand Vizier Nevşehirli Damad İbrahim Paşa and younger brother of the Tevkî Ali Paşa who was the son-in-law of the Sultan Ahmed III. Küçük Mustafa Paşa was also a son-in-law of the Sultan, as he had married his daughter Zeyneb Sultan. After the marriage, he was granted the post of *Rumeli Beylerbeyliği* (Military Governor of the Rumeli) with the title of “Paşa” on May 22, 1728. In the following year, he was granted with title of the vizierate. After being appointed to lower positions in the provinces for nearly 25 years following the dethronement of Ahmed III in the Patrona Halil Rebellion in 1730, with the accession of his brother-in-law Mustafa III to the throne in 1757, he was given the posts of Mora *Muhassıllığı* (the tax collector of Mora) in addition to the *Nişancılık*²⁰ (chancellery)²¹. Penâh might have entered into his household at this time. Küçük Mustafa Paşa continued to be both the tax collector of the Morea and *Nişancı* (chancellor) at various points until his death on February 11, 1764.

¹⁹(Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.1 168; Vol.2A 15, 43-44, 58, 60, 64).

²⁰According to Hâkim, in the same period Küçük Mustafa Paşa was granted with the title of Tevkî too, as we mentioned above (Hâkim Efendi 2019, 633). From the sources, it is difficult to concretize the differences between the offices of the Tevkî and Nişancı, these usually might have been used as the same.

²¹(Râşid Efendi 2013, 1596-1597, 1605, 1615; İzzî Efendi 2019, 252, 477, 767, 822; Hâkim Efendi 2019, 28, 66, 553; Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.1 168; Vol.2A 15).

Although he was given duties in the provinces, he did not leave Istanbul after 1759, and in 1762, he was further appointed as Grand Admiral of the Ottoman Fleet and continued in this position for nearly one year.²²

According to an archival document which was described by Erhan Afyoncu, at the time Penâh Efendi was appointed to the second fortifications office (*küçük kal'a tezkireciliği*)²³ and granted *hâcegân* status in 2 May 1762, he was also one of the scribes in the council of Küçük Mustafa Paşa. On the other hand, according to same document it is known that, before gaining *hâcegân* status, Penâh had been a scribe in the Grand Vizier's Correspondence Office (*Mektûbî Kalemi*)²⁴. In the document, he was mentioned as one of the *halîfes* of the head of correspondence office (*Mektûbî efendi hulefâsından*) (Afyoncu 2000, 118). Since he gained his promotion to the second fortifications office in 1762, we can assume that Penâh had already been in the capital and gained a post in the correspondence office under the Grand Vizier's household several years before. Because we have never encountered his full name in the archives before 1762, we can assume that he was given his pen name Penâh during his tenure in the correspondence office of the Grand Vizier.

Considering that he was 40 years old at the time that he was appointed to the second fortifications office in 1762, and the length of the regular career track of an ordinary scribe that was mentioned above, it can be argued that Penâh must have finished his scribal education long before 1757, which was the year that Küçük Mustafa Paşa was granted the Morea. Furthermore, when one considers the posts that Küçük Mustafa Paşa held before, it seems very likely that Penâh had not been in his household until that date. Therefore, although we have no information regarding the career path that Penâh followed until his late thirties, we can assume that, when he came to Istanbul ca. 1757, he was well-educated and had enough support to be granted the status of a *hâcegân* in a short period of time. Taking into account all of the above, it seems open to question whether or not Vâsîf's record was correct in stating that Penâh's first patron was Küçük Mustafa Paşa. I will return to this issue later.

Vâsîf also mentioned in his history that Penâh's appointment to the second fortifications office happened during the grand vizierate of Köse Mustafa Paşa, however,

²²(Hâkim Efendi 2019, 560, 632, 675, 805, 855, 928, 946, 957, 1014, 1021,1071, 1081-1082, 1104, 1109, 1129; Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.2A 63).

²³It was an office under the authority of defterdar and responsible for the remittance of the salaries and other expenditures to some certain forts and castles, and keeping the records of these (İ.H. Uzunçarşılı 1988b, 351).

²⁴The correspondence office of the grand vizier (*Mektûbî-i sadr-ı âlî*) was responsible for inscribing grand vizier's correspondence including the decrees which were sent to provinces, private letters, and summarizing the received letters and reports which were coming from provinces and other offices for the use of grand vizier (İ.H. Uzunçarşılı 1988b, 260-261).

at that time, Mustafa Paşa was not holding the grand vizierate post. He gained the post - for the third time - on November 1, and returned to Istanbul on December 8, 1763. Shortly after his appointment as *küçük kal'a tezkirecisi*, Penâh became the *kethüdâ kâtibi* (the scribe of the grand vizier's second in command) of Köse Mustafa Paşa in ca. 1763-64, which would open the doors of power to him in the future²⁵.

2.2.3 A Glimpse of Power

Köse Mustafa Paşa

Köse (Bald) Mustafa Paşa was born in Çorlu, in the eastern part of Thrace. He was the son of Abdurrahman Paşa, who has been *kethüdâ* of a former Grand Vizier, Çorlulu Ali Paşa. His career started when he entered the household of the grand vizier Nevşehirli Damad İbrahim Paşa, and he quickly rose through the ranks such that he soon became the first master of the horse (*mirâhûr-ı evvel*), and was then appointed as grand vizier in July 1752.²⁶ After three years in this post he was dismissed, and in June 1755 he was granted the *Mora Muhassılığ*. The next year he was appointed as grand vizier for the second time.²⁷

At this point, it seems pertinent to return to the question of the identity of Penâh Efendi's first patron. Considering Süleyman Penâh Efendi's first tenure in the correspondence office of the grand vizier, he might have entered into the household of Köse Mustafa Paşa during his duty in the Morea between 1755 and 1756. It seems more likely that Penâh would have come to the capital with Köse Mustafa Paşa when he was appointed as grand vizier, and thus been granted a position in the correspondence office by him. This suggestion is compatible with the information in the *Sicill-i Osmânî*, which offers that Yusuf Âgâh Efendi came to the capital in 1756 with his father and brother (Süreyya 1996, 1685). Furthermore, there is an archival record that I encountered during my research, dated to November 20, 1758, when Köse Mustafa Paşa was the governor of Egypt, which mentioned a certain Süleyman Efendi as his former official representative (*kapı kethüdâsı*²⁸) during the time that he

²⁵(Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 363; Hâkim Efendi 2019, 1124, 1126; İlgürel 2006, 346).

²⁶(İzzî Efendi 2019, 926-928; İlgürel 2006, 345; Çobanoğlu 1966, 1-3).

²⁷(Hâkim Efendi 2019, 240-241, 372; Sağlam 2014, 52; Çobanoğlu 1966, 7-8, 11; İlgürel 2006, 345).

²⁸Kapı Kethüdâsı was a term which was used for the official representatives of the provincial governors who stayed in the capital in order to follow their patrons' business and keep them informed about contemporary

was the tax collector of the Morea (*Mora muhassılı*). This means that this Süleyman Efendi was in Istanbul in sometime between 1755 and 1756²⁹. Although I could not completely verify that the Süleyman Efendi in this document was Penâh, when we remember that he acquired his pen-name in this office and when we take his close relationship with Köse Mustafa Paşa into account, it seems quite likely that this was indeed Penâh. In addition, this interpretation seems to be coherent with the section on Süleyman Penâh Efendi in Mehmed Esad Efendi's *Bağçe-i Safâ-Endûz*. Although he did not mention any of his sources, Esad Efendi suggested that Köse Mustafa Paşa made Süleyman Penâh Efendi one of the secretaries of the Council of the State when Paşa was in the Morea as the governor of the district (Esad Efendi 2018, 82). Therefore, Vâsıf's note describing Küçük Mustafa Paşa as Penâh's first patron would seem to be incorrect.

Köse Mustafa Paşa's second term in the post of the grand vizierate lasted only a very short time, and he was dismissed on the 12th of January, 1757.³⁰ Despite some serious claims regarding the reasons behind his dismissal he was not subjected to any imperial confiscation, and instead was sent to Rhodes. Furthermore, he was allowed to go to Rhodes in the company of forty to fifty of his servants, to take his necessary wares along with him, and his family, treasurer, slaves, and other servants who resided in his various palaces in the capital were not subjected to any interrogation.³¹ On account of the new grand vizier Koca Ragıp Paşa, nearly 7 months after his dismissal, he was excused and appointed to Karlılı in August, 1757. After remaining a year in this post, Köse Mustafa Paşa was appointed as the governor of Egypt on June 11, 1758.³²

At the time that Köse Mustafa Paşa became the governor of Egypt, the district was going through a troublesome period, characterized by some crucial changes in the power balance of the province.³³ Ever since the murder of the *şeyhü'l-beled*

affairs (Canatar 2002, 332-333; Bayerle 1997, 94).

²⁹(DABOA.C.AS.01188.53067 19 Rabiulevvel 1172/20 November 1758).

³⁰(İlgürel 2006, 345; Hâkim Efendi 2019, 428-429; Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.2A 11; Sağlam 2014, 91; Çobanoğlu 1966, 13).

³¹(Hâkim Efendi 2019, 429; Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.2A 11; Sağlam 2014, 91; İlgürel 2006, 345-346).

³²(İlgürel 2006, 346; Çobanoğlu 1966, 15-17; Sağlam 2014, 117; Hâkim Efendi 2019, 675).

³³From the 17th century on, the members of the local military class, namely the Mamluk beys, eventually overwhelmed the Ottoman authorities in the district and became the actual rulers of Egypt in the late 18th century. Although the Ottoman governors who were appointed from the capital were representing the sultan's authority, in fact, they were extremely weak vis-à-vis these beys and the Mamluk *emîrs* were able to force the Ottoman governor to confirm the decisions which they had already made in their own council. In the second part of the 18th century, there were thirteen Mamluk beys who had nearly equal power, and since there were no intermediaries to regulate their adverse interests, during times of disagreement, bloody confrontations resulted (Shaw 1958, 5-6; Marsot 2006, 41-42).

(the sheikh of the city) İbrahim Kethüdâ in 1754, who was the leader of a powerful Mamluk family which had gained power in 1744 after a period of anarchy and had brought order to Egypt, the province had been in a state of considerable unrest (Shaw 1958, 6-7). Köse Mustafa Paşa started to take measures against the crisis immediately after his arrival in the province (Hâkim Efendi 2019, 707-708). It seems, however, that the troubles in Egypt related to taxes that should have been sent to the capital and the provisioning of the holy cities were not solved during his tenure, despite the measures that the new governor implemented, and thus in the following year the Ottoman center intervened to maintain order (Hâkim Efendi 2019, 724-726; Sağlam 2014, 173-174). We do not know exactly if Süleyman Penâh Efendi was within the group that was departed from the capital with Köse Mustafa Paşa to go to Egypt in 1757. However, considering Penâh's writings on maintaining order in Egypt in the second part of his work, and his level of knowledge about both the situation in the district and the geography of the region, it is highly possible that Penâh might have been there with Köse Mustafa Paşa during his post in Egypt (Penâh Efendi 2017, 133-134; Erdem 2019b).

Two years after his appointment to Egypt, in June 1760, Köse Mustafa Paşa was appointed as the governor of Jeddah, but he refused to go and, with some excuse, stayed in Cairo. Furthermore, after the dismissal of the next governor of the province, Kamil Ahmed Paşa, in January 1762, the *emîrs* of the province decided to give this duty to Köse Mustafa Paşa instead; this was in direct contrast to the tradition prevailing in the area, according to which Mamluk *emîrs* should have elected someone among themselves as the representative of the governor (*kâ'im-makâm*). The decision of the Mamluk *emîrs* shows that Köse Mustafa Paşa had entrenched his position and established good relations with the Mamluk *emîrs* in Egypt during his governorate, and presumably this had raised a certain level of anxiety in the capital. To solve the problem, some of the representatives of the Mamluk *emîrs* went to Istanbul to undertake negotiations with the Sublime Porte. After the negotiations, in an attempt to remedy the situation, in January 1762 the governor of Aleppo El-Hâc Ebûbekir Paşa was appointed to Egypt as the governor of the district, and Aleppo was granted to Köse Mustafa Paşa. However, Köse Mustafa Paşa refused to go there and continued to stay in Egypt. It has been suggested that he refused these posts because of his fear of execution, due to the claims regarding his participation in the alleged poisoning of *Şehzâde* Mehmed, one of Sultan Mustafa III's brothers. Finally, after he was given an assurance of safety from the sultan himself, he moved to Aleppo to serve as the governor of the district. He maintained his position as the governor of Aleppo for a while and then, on November 1, 1763, he was granted the grand vizierate for the third time and returned to the capital on December 8,

1763.³⁴

Penâh was already in Istanbul when Köse Mustafa Paşa arrived in the capital and continued his tenure in both the second fortifications office and the council of the state. As we mentioned before, according to Vâsîf, Penâh was allied to Küçük Mustafa Paşa at that time. We do not know exactly when Penâh left Köse Mustafa Paşa's household and entered Küçük Mustafa Paşa's, or if he even did so. Furthermore, considering the positions that were given to Penâh in the third grand vizierate of Köse Mustafa Paşa, it is very doubtful that he really left his court. In fact, if he had gone to Egypt with Köse Mustafa Paşa, Penâh might also have been among the group of the representatives of the Mamluk *emîrs* who came to Istanbul, acting as a representative of the Paşa. In any case, nearly a month after the arrival of Köse Mustafa Paşa, on 11 February 1764, Küçük Mustafa Paşa died in his 80s.³⁵

It is likely that even a guarantee from the sultan was not enough for Köse Mustafa Paşa to feel completely secure in the capital. Considering the old allegations about his involvement in the suspicious death of *Şehzâde* Mehmed, and his recurrent non-compliance with the orders of the Sultan when he was in Egypt, it is perhaps understandable why he felt this way. After arriving in the capital, Köse Mustafa Paşa initiated a sort of purge of the inner chambers of the state. The grand vizier dismissed the grand admiral (*kapudân-ı deryâ*) Karabağlı Süleyman Paşa and executed admiral's second in command, Ali Kethüdâ. Furthermore, he dismissed *sadrâzâm kethüdâsı* Mehmed Emîn Efendi and *re'isü'l-küttâb* Nu'mân Efendi. He removed a number of high-ranking officials and filled their positions with new names.³⁶ It seems that to preserve his position in the heart of the state, the grand vizier decided to fill the highest ranks of the Sublime Porte with loyal allies.³⁷ Furthermore, on April 24, 1764, Mustafa III married his daughter Şah Sultan to Köse Mustafa Paşa, despite her young age. Following this, on July 1, 1764, a sumptuous circumcision feast was organized for the children of the grand vizier, alongside nearly 4000 children of

³⁴(Hâkim Efendi 2019, 954, 1014, 1055, 1109, 1124; Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.2A 62; Sağlam 2014, 211-212, 233-234; İlgürel 2006, 346; Çobanoğlu 1966, 17, 19). In the part in which he recorded Köse Mustafa Paşa's dismissal from the grand vizierate and his subsequent execution in 1765, Vâsîf explicitly expressed his confusion and disgruntlement about Paşa's appointment to the post for the third time despite the Paşa's repeated intransigence, such as refusing to go Jeddah and staying in Egypt. (Sağlam 2014, 271).

³⁵(Hâkim Efendi 2019, 1129; Sağlam 2014, 236; Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.2A 63).

³⁶(Hâkim Efendi 2019, 1127-1128; Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.2A 63; Sağlam 2014, 235-236).

³⁷According to Şem'dânizâde, the grand vizier chose to work with "old-minded dervishes" (...dervişân diye köhneye itibâr ederdi) who were totally incapable, and they brought him inauspiciousness (Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.2A 75-76). In this, Şem'dânizâde was explicitly emphasizing his inner circle's affiliation with a certain religious order, however, he did not give a name or further information about it. Nevertheless, since Köse Mustafa Paşa was a prominent follower of the Nakşibendî Müceddidî order, we can imagine that they were likely members of the same order. In addition, Vâsîf remarked that Penâh was affiliated with a certain sûfî religious order and had some works of tasavvuf in both Arabic and Turkish, but did not mention any names or titles (Sağlam 2014, 363).

the poor, on the order of Sultan Mustafa III. It was a huge show of power which lasted for 5 days, featuring appearances from all of the statesmen of various ranks and offices, and was attended by the people of the capital. It appears that Mustafa III wanted to enhance his relationship with his powerful grand vizier, however such actions likely engendered discontent among the adversaries of Köse Mustafa Paşa.³⁸

As a member of the inner circle of Köse Mustafa Paşa, in 8 April 1764, Penâh was appointed as the second secretary of the grand vizier (*tezkiye-i sâni*) and it is likely that at the end of the same year he was appointed as the secretary to the grand vizier's second in command (*Kethüdâ Kâtibi*) (Hâkim Efendi 2019, 1139, 1173; Sağlam 2014, 239). We have previously encountered two other names in the sources that should be understood as members of the inner circle of Köse Mustafa Paşa. Firstly, one of the other members of the grand vizier's inner circle was Ahmed İzzet Efendi.³⁹ He had been the master of ceremonies (*Teşrifatçı*) at the time when Köse Mustafa Paşa was appointed as the grand vizier for the third time. Ahmed İzzet was first appointed as *Çavuşbaşı* (the chief of the halberdier corps of the Sultan's bodyguard) in September 1764⁴⁰, and after only two and a half months, he was given the post of *Sadâret Kethüdâhlığı* in December, 1764.⁴¹ The second among the courtiers of Köse Mustafa Paşa was Ebûbekir Vahdetî Efendi, who had been known as the younger brother of the former grand vizier and chief of the scribes (*reisü'l-küttâb*) Nâ'ilî Abdullah Efendi. Ebûbekir Efendi was appointed as the first secretary of the grand vizier (*Tezkire-i evvel*) on April 8, 1764, at the same time as

³⁸ (Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol. 2A 66-67; Hâkim Efendi 2019, 1140, 1151-1152; Sağlam 2014, 241, 243). We can picture the rising level of discontent in the quarters at the top of the state from the complaints of Vâsîf, which he expressed when he described the dismissal of Mehmed Emîn Efendi from the Sadâret Kethüdâhlığı by the grand vizier: "Because; causing despair, frustration, and vexation in the hearts of other dignitaries of the state by restricting the ranks of the Sublime State to a few men was the peculiar temperament of the new grand vizier, with confirming the notion of 'I change and change, and I arrive in a house full of fools (In Arabic)', he dismissed Mehmed Emîn Efendi who..." (Sağlam 2014, 235) It can be assumed that Penâh also was among the "few men" that Vâsîf mentioned, those who were appointed to high-ranking positions in the state.

³⁹ According to Enverî, Ahmed İzzet was from Kütahya and he emphasized from time to time that he was a descendant of the Germiyanoğulları, which was an Anatolian principality that was founded in the late 13th century and ended by the Ottomans in the 15th century. When he reached the age of discretion, he came to the capital and after a short time, he started to work in the service of a certain Âkîf Bey, who was the *teşrifâtî* at that time. He became a *halife* in the office of the *teşrifâtî*, which would later lead (Çiçek 2018, 995-996).

⁴⁰ His appointment as *Çavuşbaşı* can be taken as an attempt to make his future appointment to the post of *Sadâret Kethüdâhlığı* compatible with tradition. In the first part of the 18th century, promotions of men holding the office of *Çavuşbaşı* to the position of *Sadâret Kethüdâsı* were very common. For the list of Kethüdâ Beys with their former posts from the first quarter of 18th century, see; (Doğan 1995, 32-38) According to Şem'dânizâde, Köse Mustafa Paşa appointed Ahmed Efendi in the post of *Sadrâzam Kethüdâhlığı* because he believed that Ahmed İzzet Efendi would have helped him to cover his illicit activities (Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.2A 75).

⁴¹ (Hâkim Efendi 2019, 1159, 1167; Sağlam 2014, 265, 267; Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.2A 73). The promotions of Ahmed Efendi were so rapid that, according to Şem'dânizâde's narrative, when he was appointed as *sadrâzam kethüdâsı*, Teşrifâtî Akîf Efendi was among the officials of the Sublime Porte who came to offer their greetings to the new kethüdâ. Akîf Efendi had been the master of Ahmed İzzet for many long years. For this reason, the moment had a certain tragic quality for both men (Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.2A 73).

Penâh was appointed as the second (Sağlam 2014, 239).

The fall of Köse Mustafa Paşa's faction started with the dismissals of Vahdetî Ebûbekir and Süleyman Penâh Efendi from their posts in March, 1765.⁴² It is important to mention here that, after the dismissal of Penâh from his post, İbrâhim Efendi, who was the former holder of the office, was reappointed as *Kethüdâ Kâtibi*. Following this, Ahmed İzzet Efendi was dismissed from the *Sadâret Kethüdâlığı* on March 29, 1765⁴³, despite his position being approved in the *tevcîhât* only two days earlier. After his dismissal from the post, Ahmed İzzet Efendi was appointed as *Defter Emîni*, while Mehmed Emîn Efendi was appointed as *Sadâret Kethüdâsı*; he, who had previously been dismissed from that position in the earliest stages of the third grand vizierate of Köse Mustafa Paşa.⁴⁴ Taking into consideration the return of Mehmed Emîn Efendi and İbrâhim Efendi to the posts that they had previously held, I suggest that Köse Mustafa Paşa failed in his attempt to remove some of the old cadres from the central positions.

On March 30, 1765, Köse Mustafa Paşa was dismissed from the post of the grand vizierate. After the imperial seal was taken from him, he was held in the palace for a couple of days and then expelled to Lesbos.⁴⁵ One day after his dismissal, his courtiers – whom Vâsîf described as the ones “who were famous for their extreme closeness and commitment to the former grand vizier”⁴⁶ – were thrown into the dungeons of Yedikule; these courtiers were Ahmed İzzet, Vahdetî Ebûbekir and Süleyman Penâh Efendis, and a certain *Divitdâr* (Keeper of the Inkstand) *Tiryâki* (addict) Ahmed Ağa. After a couple of days, when they had started to fear for their lives, Ahmed and Ebûbekir Efendis were expelled to Lemnos, and Penâh and *Divitdâr* were exiled to Cyprus to be held in the fortress of Famagusta⁴⁷.

There are other suggestions regarding the reasons for the dismissal of the grand

⁴²Zararsız suggested that Süleyman Penâh Efendi was dismissed from the post of *Kethüdâ Kâtibeti* after the dismissal of the grand vizier Köse Mustafa Paşa (Penâh Efendi 2017, 16). However, the dismissal of Penâh was mentioned in both Hâkim and Vâsîf, as it happened a couple of weeks before the grand vizier's own dismissal (Hâkim Efendi 2019, 1173; Sağlam 2014, 268).

⁴³According to Şem'dânizâde, the demotion of Ahmed İzzet Efendi from the office of *Sadâret Kethüdâsı* to *Defter Emîni* was the result of a couple of reasons. Firstly, some certain high-ranking officials in the capital had felt bitter about the appointment of Ahmed İzzet Efendi as second in command from day one. Secondly, it was rumored that he was involved in embezzlement, and that this had been the cause for his serving the grand vizier. Unfortunately, Şem'dânizâde did not give any further information about the accusations regarding the dismissal of Ahmed İzzet Efendi, however, he noted that after the dismissal of Ahmed İzzet Efendi, more of his corrupt activities were exposed, including those which implicated his patron (Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.2A 74).

⁴⁴(Hâkim Efendi 2019, 1173, 1175-1177; Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.2A 74; Sağlam 2014, 268-269).

⁴⁵(Hâkim Efendi 2019, 1177; Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.2A 74-76; Sağlam 2014, 269-271).

⁴⁶“*Sadr-ı sâbika şiddet-i ittisâl ile te'alluk ve intisâb şöhetini veren...*” (Sağlam 2014, 269).

⁴⁷(Hâkim Efendi 2019, 1177-1178; Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.2A 75; Sağlam 2014, 269-270).

vizier. Firstly, it is known that there had been continuous problems in Cyprus, due to the heavy tax burden imposed on the island by the grand vizier against the Sultan's will. Secondly, he was accused of bribery, and of causing some serious losses to the treasury by starting the construction of several buildings in the capital that were not necessary.⁴⁸ Hâkim mentioned that he was in debt to many people in the capital and that the majority of them were merchants. Because of his debts, complaints continued to come to the court in the form of petitions long after he was expelled to the Lesbos (Hâkim Efendi 2019, 1182; Çobanoğlu 1966, 20). Unfortunately, I could not find any further information about his creditors and these petitions.

On the other hand, it is known that Mustafa III had been a proponent of the war with Russia, in part by establishing an alliance with Prussia at the beginning of his reign, but the Grand Vizier Koca Ragıp Paşa, an experienced and influential statesmen, prevented the sultan from pursuing this aim with his cautious approach to the issue. After Râgıb Paşa's death, the Sultan sent Ahmed Resmî Efendi to Prussia in order to establish an alliance. However, Prussia refused the offer and the message came to the capital with Ahmed Resmî Efendi in July 1764, when Köse Mustafa Paşa was holding the post of grand vizierate.⁴⁹ In the same month, the Khan of the Crimea, Kırım Giray Hân, was dismissed due to his repeated raids towards the lands of the Christian states (in particular, Russia) and his cousin Selim Giray Hân was appointed as a more even-tempered Khan. Again, in July 1764, an envoy was sent to Russia to congratulate Catherine the Great for her acquisition of the new title "the Empress of Russia". However, the envoy sent to Russia died before arriving in February 1765 (Hâkim Efendi 2019, 1151, 1163). The steps that were taken by the Sublime Porte show that Köse Mustafa Paşa was willing to follow Koca Ragıp Paşa's policy of peace, even if it meant going against the Sultan's wishes. Considering both Köse Mustafa Paşa's unexpected appointment, and his sudden dismissal, it is possible that these might be related to Mustafa III's search for a grand vizier that was a proponent of war.

Mustafa III subsequently ordered a certain Osman Ağa, who was responsible for taking the grand vizier to the Lesbos, to execute him. His head was brought to the capital and buried in the Nakşibendî Lodge, which he had built during his first reign

⁴⁸Yet again, according to Hâkim, there were a mere two construction orders which were given during the administration of this grand vizier. The first was the restoration of the Üç Şerefeli Camii in Edirne, which was part of the program of the Sultan, and the second was a small masjîd in the Kadirga Dock area. There were also two completed palace construction projects during the period, but their orders of initiation were given months before the third administration of Köse Mustafa Paşa (Hâkim Efendi 2019, 1133. 1153, 1165-1166).

⁴⁹(Hâkim Efendi 2019, 1153; Beydilli 2006, 281; Aydın 2005, 238-242).

as Grand Vizier.⁵⁰ Although we have no further details about the conflict, it can be suggested that there was a certain factional dispute between two groups during the third administration of Köse Mustafa Paşa. It is obvious that first group was led by the grand vizier himself. It is more difficult, however, to discern the leader of the second faction. Nevertheless, it is clear that *Sadâret Kethüdâsı* Mehmed Emîn Efendi was included as one of their leading members. Ultimately, Köse Mustafa Paşa and his courtiers, including Süleyman Penâh Efendi, lost the power struggle and the trust of Sultan Mustafa III, eventually costing the grand vizier his life and others their careers.

2.3 Penâh in the Morea Rebellion of 1770

After the faction was dispersed, with several exiled and the former grand vizier Köse Mustafa Paşa meeting a bitter end, Süleyman Penâh Efendi found himself in Famagusta, Cyprus. On December 26, 1765, as mentioned earlier, Penâh's family wrote a petition to the Sultan asking for his pardon and release (*afv ve ıtlak*) or at least for permission to live in a place near the capital (*afv ve bir karîb mahalle nakl*). From this petition, we come to know that Penâh had been writing letters to his family from Famagusta for a while, and in his last letters, he had indicated that he was not able to get along with the climate of the island and had become embroiled in weakness and misery.⁵¹ In the petition, Penâh's sons also mentioned their grandmother, who was already in her eighties, as being in a mournful and desolate mood because of her son's exile. Ultimately, they were successful in impressing the Sultan with their petition, and he finally agreed to order Penâh Efendi's transfer from Famagusta to Bursa for the following part of his punishment.⁵²

Although I could not find any further information about Penâh's time in Bursa, Vâsîf stated that after nine months in Famagusta, he spent another nine months in Bursa. From his own work on the Morea Rebellion of 1770, it is understood

⁵⁰(Hâkim Efendi 2019, 1181-1182; Sağlam 2014, 270-271; Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.2A 75; Çobanoğlu 1966, 20-21; İlgürel 2006, 346). It is understood that Köse Mustafa Paşa was a prominent follower of the Nakşibendî Müceddidî order. In his first grand vizierate period, he bought an estate in the Eyüp district of Istanbul and built a Nakşibendî lodge in there. There was a ceremony which was performed before the construction started that Nakşi Sheikh Muradzâde Mehmed Murad appeared in with the special invitation of the grand vizier Köse Mustafa Paşa (Hâkim Efendi 2019, 45-50).

⁵¹(DABOA.AE.SMST.III.70.5226 13 Recep 1179/26 December 1765) after Zararsız (Penâh Efendi 2017, 16).

⁵²(DABOA.AE.SMST.III.70.5226 13 Recep 1179/26 December 1765) after Zararsız (Penâh Efendi 2017, 16).

that at the time when a Russian spy, Hacı Murad, came to the peninsula with the intent of inciting of a riot in 1179 H. (1765-1766), Penâh was already in the Morea.⁵³ Considering Vâsîf's statement about the second half of Penâh's punishment in Bursa, he must have returned to the Morea sometime in May, 1766. Unfortunately, there is no information as to why and how he returned to the Morea, and I have not encountered any record in the archives detailing any official positions that might have been granted to him until 1768. On the other hand, within the list of tax farmers in the Morea given by Zarinebaf there is a certain El-Hac Süleyman Efendi, who held the tax-farm of Kalavryta and its dependencies together with a certain Seyyid Mehmed Ağa in 1771. Moreover, he held the tax-farm of the poll-taxes of Arcadia and its dependencies on his own. El-Hac Süleyman Efendi was depicted in this list as having origins in the bureaucracy (Zarinebaf, Bennet, and Davis 2005, 37). Although I have not encountered the title of "El-Hac" in any other source, taking into account Penâh's statement about his relatives in Kalavryta, it is possible that the Süleyman Efendi in the list might be Penâh. In the remaining part of this chapter, instead of discussing the Morea Rebellion of 1770 in a comprehensive manner, I will limit my scope to the events that Penâh Efendi himself witnessed, and underline some of his own approaches to the events in question.

Considering that Penâh spent almost two years in the Morea without an official post, the question arises as to how he maintained his and his family's livelihood there. Although this is a very speculative answer, his frequent emphasis on Gastouni as their home, and his references to certain Venetian friends of his who were resident in Zakynthos, a Venetian island at that time, makes one think that he may have possessed a *çiftlik* in Gastouni, and was somehow engaged in trade with Venetian merchants (Penâh Efendi 2017, 57, 62). Furthermore, in the course of my research, I encountered two documents in the archives which show that the connection between Penâh's family and Gastouni continued even a couple of decades after his death. One document, dated to January 3, 1813, describes the transfer of one of six shares of the *çiftlik*s of the mother of Mustafa Necip Efendi (Süleyman Penâh Efendi's grandson from Yusuf Âgâh Efendi) in Gastouni to her two children, as a result of her death⁵⁴. The other document, which is dated to June 11, 1815, is a petition from Yusuf Âgâh Efendi, who was the guardian of the orphans of Hatmanzâde Şemseddin Efendi (a scholar from the Morea who died in 1811 (Süreyya 1996, 1581)). In the petition, Âgâh Efendi complains about problems with some locals regarding the *çiftlik*s of

⁵³(Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 363; Penâh Efendi 2017, 16, 61; Erdem 2017c). Berker correctly asserts that Penâh had been in the Morea since before the rebellion, but I could not find any evidence about whether he had come to the Morea on military duty as Berker suggested (Berker 1942-1943, 64).

⁵⁴(DABOA.HAT.277.16283 29 Zilhicce 1227/3 January 1813).

the orphans of Gastouni which were inherited from their father⁵⁵. Considering these documents, it can be suggested that Yusuf Âgâh Efendi, at least, was a member of the community of *çiftlik*-owners in Gastouni; this perhaps supports speculation that Süleyman Penâh Efendi, too, might have been a *çiftlik*-owner. Nevertheless, confirmation of this hypothesis requires further research.

2.3.1 Initiation of the Rebellion

As mentioned above, Penâh had returned to the Morea by 1766, and he witnessed the arrival of a certain Hacı Murad⁵⁶ in the peninsula. According to Penâh's narrative, Hacı Murad was an agent of Russia⁵⁷ who was trying to instigate a riot; however, in doing so, he did not in fact visit all of the districts of the Morea. Instead, he contacted only some of the people of Mania and a few of the Greeks whom he trusted to be discreet, and then he disappeared without a trace. After Penâh Efendi heard about the activities of Hacı Murad, he went to Mütesellim (the deputy lieutenant-governor and local collector of the taxes or tithes) Ali Efendi and a certain Gördüslü (from Corinth) Yusuf Bey⁵⁸, who had been managing affairs in the region; due to their ignorance and obliviousness, however, they were slow to take action, and thus Penâh decided to go to Tripoli and write directly to his friend Sarim İbrâhim Efendi, who was holding a post in the finance office in Istanbul at that time (Süreyya 1996, 789; Penâh Efendi 2017, 61-62).

After receiving his friend's report, Sarim İbrâhim Efendi showed it to Mirzazâde Mehmed Said Efendi (a member of ulema, and *şeyhül-islam* between 1770-1773) (İpşirli 2005) to whom Tripoli was granted as *maişet* (personal revenue) at that

⁵⁵(DABOA.C.ADL.2.92 3 Recep 1230/11 June 1815).

⁵⁶In Western sources about the rebellion, he was mentioned as a Greek named Papazoğlu Yorgo Mavromihali who was a Russian officer and comrade of the Orlov Brothers (Gündoğdu 2012, 227).

⁵⁷At that time, the Russian Empress Catherine II was conducting a strategy that aims to capture the representation of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire which was called "the Greek Project" and the Morea was not their only target in the lands of empire that they tried to conduct her strategy on (Gündoğdu 2012, 225). For a useful discussion on "the Greek Project", see; (Ragsdale 1988).

⁵⁸Gördüslü Yusuf Bey was an alaybeyi (a military rank connected with a fief) and a powerful *a'yân* (provincial notable) in the Morea, and the brother and successor of the former alaybeyi Halil Bey who was dismissed and executed in 1758 for the accusations on him about his oppression on subjects (Hâkim Efendi 2019, 661). Halil Bey was a powerful *a'yân* who had controlled almost all tax farms in the peninsula and formed an alliance with the famous Maniot bandit chief Theodorakes Koumoundouros on the booties that were gained from the raids in the Peninsula. According to John Christos Alexander, thus he was at the top of his power in the period when Köse Mustafa Paşa was the governor of the Morea that Mustafa Paşa did not even tried to encounter with him (Alexander 1985, 40-43).

time. Mirzazâde found the report important and sent it to his proxy judge (*naib*) in the Morea. However, because his *naib* was afraid of the reaction of powerful local officials, he chose not to do anything about it. Subsequent unsuccessful efforts made Penâh desperate to warn the local governors in Tripoli, and after acquiring information from some of his acquaintances among the “illustrious” members of the Greek schools (*dest-resimiz olan bazı mekâtib-i Rumiyye müfahhamlarından*), he returned to his home in Gastouni⁵⁹. Around this time, on February 23, 1768, he was appointed as *Mâliye Tezkirecisi*⁶⁰ (the secretary of the finance office) (Afyoncu 2000, 119). Presumably in the same year, alongside his new position in the finance office, he was granted the tax farming revenues of the *tîmars* and *zeâmet*s in *Sis*, a subdivision of Adana province according to a document dated to December 25, 1768.⁶¹ Hence, we can assume that his efforts to warn state officials in the capital about the incitement of a riot in the Morea might have brought him a new position in the state bureaucracy several years after his dismissal. Nevertheless, despite the position he was granted, he continued to stay in the Morea.

He did not stop there, however, and continued to gather information about the Russian efforts to instigate a riot. To this end, Penâh got in contact with his Venetian friends who were resident in Zakynthos. In addition to the letters he received from Zakynthos, one of his Venetian friends decided to come to the Morea himself. What the Venetian him told was even more alarming. Underlying the tension between the Venetian authorities and their Greek Orthodox subjects in Zakynthos and Cephalonia, his Venetian friend told that they were likewise afraid of a riot in their lands, and warned him that their subjects would certainly travel to the Morea to take part in a possible riot there in the future. However, Penâh could not do anything with this information, because Hasan Efendi, who was the *mütesellim* of the Morea at that time, forbade discussion on this issue⁶² (Penâh Efendi 2017, 62). Penâh further

⁵⁹(Penâh Efendi 2017, 61-62; Erdem 2017c; Vlachopoulou 2007, 133).

⁶⁰In Sicil-i Osmânî, Süreyya suggests that, after his appointment to the finance office Penâh has joined the expedition with the army to the Morea (Süreyya 1996, 1551). However, according to Penâh’s own writings, he has already been in the Morea for a couple of years before the appointment. On the other hand, considering that he has continued to stay in the Morea and the Balkans after his appointment to the office, we can assume that he was commissioned in the army for procuring the provisions within the vicinity of the frontline.

⁶¹(DABOA.AE.SMST.III.21.1403 29 Zilhicce 1182/6 May 1769).

⁶²It seems that Mütesellim Hasan Efendi did, belatedly, take the rumors of a rebellion with the help of the Russians seriously, because we know that a month before the first appearance of Russian ships offshore, he sent a petition to the capital that asked for permission to fortify the defenses of the Morea in September 1769 (Gündoğdu 2012, 214). Furthermore, despite the narrative thrust of Penâh Efendi’s account, in fact, there were many decrees that were sent to the Morea by the center to ensure that the necessary precautions were being put in place. On December 12, 1768, an order was promulgated which coercively collecting the guns of the Christian subjects in order for them to be sold to the Muslim soldiers or kept in a safe place. The order was implemented, and a large number of guns were collected from several villages and districts of the Morea. For the information about the registers of the guns collected from the settlements, see; (Gündoğdu 2012, 213-217).

mentioned that the Dragoman of the Morea of the period⁶³ had also tried to warn the *Mütesellim* about the oncoming rebellion six months before, but he had failed to evoke any sort of response from the Ottoman administration (Penâh Efendi 2017, 65-66).

In Şâban 1183 (November/December 1769), when a group of Russian ships appeared in the gulf of Gastouni, Penâh sent a man that he trusted among the Greek subjects to the ships on two occasions, with the aim of gathering further information about their objectives. When the Greek man returned, he told Penâh all of the information that he had received from the village, and Penâh immediately shared it with the *Mütesellim* of the Morea Hasan Efendi. However, because the man was as much of “an animal as the natives of America⁶⁴” Hasan Efendi did not give credence to what Penâh said. Although Mustafa Ağa and Ahmed Ağa⁶⁵, who were known as the descendants of great local military families, believed Penâh, they too did not do anything, because they were afraid of Hasan Efendi (Gündoğdu 2012, 229-230; Penâh Efendi 2017, 63).

Due to bad weather, the Russian ships departed from the gulf of Gastouni and sailed instead to the island of Zakynthos, 18 miles distant. While the ships were spending several days in Zakynthos, the rumors surrounding them gained strength, but the Voyvoda of Gastouni Hacı Hüseyin and *na'ib* of the *kadı* of Gastouni, “the blind” (*bî-şu'ûr*) Ömer Efendi, decided to ignore them. Furthermore, the Hasan Efendi began to accuse Penâh Efendi and his companions of fabricating these rumors to absolve them of their responsibilities to maintain the hard tack (*beksimât*) that the state demanded from them⁶⁶ Hasan Efendi underlined that, if they continued

⁶³His name was Pantaleon, and he held the post from 1764 to 1781, the date he was executed (Stamatopoulos 2007, 154). In his treatise, Penâh describes him in a protective manner. According to Penâh's narrative, despite his early warnings about the rebellion, during the Ottoman assault on Tripoli at the end of the rebellion, his mansion was sacked, and his daughter was raped by the Ottoman soldiers. In a gathering after the rebellion, he rebuked those present and asked “What is my crime? Or, is it my reward because I have warned *Mütesellim* Ağa six months before (the rebellion)?” (Penâh Efendi 2017, 65-66)

⁶⁴“...Mora'da *a'yân olacak behâim-i kavm-i Amerikan mütesellim-i mûmâileyh...*” (Penâh Efendi 2017, 63). Penâh frequently used the image of native American peoples, which were described as barbaric and primitive in contemporary European discourse, to refer to the ignorant Ottoman officials that he encountered or other peoples that he has saw as similar (Erdem 2017a).

⁶⁵Mustafa and Ahmed Ağa's might be the tax-farmers of the dock of Chlemoutsis in the South West of Gastouni, according to the Zarinebaf's list (Zarinebaf, Bennet, and Davis 2005, 38).

⁶⁶At that time, Penâh was continuing his tenure at the finance office as a scribe and, as we understand from a group of documents in the archives, he was commissioned with the provisioning of the galleons *Gazal-i Bahri* (the Gazelle of the Sea), *Nusret-nümâ* (the Victory Evoker) and others which were sent to the Mediterranean by the Grand Admiral İbrahim Paşa. The order for the preparation of the provisions for the galleons was given in November 1769, and the mission was accomplished on February 15, 1770. After nearly two months, these galleons would have been ordered to help the suppressing of the rebellion in the Morea (DABOA.AE.SMST.III.83.6179 29 Zihicce 1183/25 April 1770; DABOA.AE.SMST.III.83.6180 29 Zilhicce 1183/25 April 1770; DABOA.AE.SMST.III.84.6230 29 Zilhicce 1183/25 April 1770; Gümüş 2019, 63). The words of *Mütesellim* Hasan Efendi mentioned Penâh's narrative show that at least some of the dignitaries in Gastouni had the means to produce hard tack for the state. These hard tack producers were most likely the *çiftlik*-owners. Penâh himself might have been one of these producers of hard tack, which would corroborate my previous speculation that Penâh might have been an estate owner in Gastouni.

to speak about these calamitous rumors, they would be punished. Hasan Efendi's threats was announced in both the streets and marketplaces by town criers (Penâh Efendi 2017, 63).

Mütesellim Hasan Efendi called one of Penâh's friends, Hatmanzâde Mustafa Ağa⁶⁷ to Tripoli as a punishment for their discussion of a future rebellion, yet just one hour before his expected arrival Hasan Efendi made him to return for the preparation of the previously ordered hard tack. While Mustafa Ağa was on the road to return to Gastouni, 5 hours distant from Tripoli, he was attacked by the rebels and obliged to turn back to Tripoli. By this time, even the Greek *kocabaşıs* (the headmen of the non-Muslim dominated villages) were explicitly warning the administration about the imminent rebellion, but the Ottoman officials in the Morea continued to dismiss these warnings and even threatened to execute the *kocabaşıs*. Penâh and his companions decided to gather and bring an army without an official decree and to achieve this aim, they sent some men to several different directions throughout the peninsula. But due to the fear of being accused of instigating a riot, they soon hesitated and called their men back. As a result, the rebellion began and the rebels started to besiege the towns of the peninsula, one after another (Penâh Efendi 2017, 63-65).

The commanders of the Russian forces, the Orlov Brothers, had planned to instigate a rebellion on several islands in the Aegean at the same time, and by December 1769 they had arrived at Zakynthos. Alexis Orlov's ultimate plan was to blockade the Dardanelles, in order to prevent any relief effort by the Ottoman navy. However, his plan was interrupted by the bad weather conditions that emerged in February 1770, forcing five or six Russian ships under the command of Grigory Andreyevich Spiridov to harbor at Mania. The Maniots who were waiting to initiate the rebellion mistakenly took this as a signal, and thus the rebellion started before it had been planned to. According to Penâh, the Maniots, alongside other local subjects and the those who had come from the lands under Venetian rule, joined the frontlines and within a day had simultaneously besieged all of the towns of the Morea (Penâh Efendi 2017, 66; Gündoğdu 2012, 231-232). Just a few days before the rebellion started, Penâh had been appointed as *Sipah Kâtibi*⁶⁸ (scribe for the *sipah* units in the imperial cavalry) on February 16, 1770⁶⁹ (Afyoncu 2000, 119). His

⁶⁷Hatmanzâde Mustafa Ağa was most probably a *çiftlik*-owner and a relative of Hatmanzâde Şemseddin Bey, whose children and *çiftlik*s were under protection of Penâh's son, Yusuf Âgâh Efendi, after Penâh's death.

⁶⁸The duty of the office was to control the lists of *sipah* units in the imperial cavalry, and to purge any redundancies, as well as to distribute the new esames (muster rolls, salary cards) to the troops (İ.H. Uzunçarşılı 1988b, 356).

⁶⁹Berker, depending on the limited information provided by Süreyya's *Sicill-i Osmanî*, asserts that Penâh might have held the posts of *sipah kâtipliği*, *mevkufatçılık*, and *süvârî mukâbeleciliği* when he was in the

appointment to a military-financial position can be taken as an indicator of the continuing preparations of the Ottoman authorities against the expected riot in the Morea.

2.3.2 Escape from Home

Gastouni was besieged by the rebels during the very first stages of the rebellion. Penâh and his companions banded together in 4 or 5 houses with their muskets, and they strengthened their defenses by improvising some solid battlements. Their preparations prevented the rebels from entering for several days, but there were only about five hundred Muslims in the town, with women, children and the elderly amongst them, and they were vastly outnumbered by the rebels; furthermore, rumors had spread that the rebels were bringing cannons to batter down the defenses, terrifying Gastouni's Muslim residents. The town residents managed to escape on March 2, 1770, by forging a letter which stated that Ottoman relief forces were imminent; the rebels panicked and fled the area, allowing the townsmen to escape to Patras. However, they found the people of Patras unaware and unprepared for the rebellion (Penâh Efendi 2017, 66-68).

After a ten-day engagement with the rebels in the suburbs of Patras, the refugees from Gastouni and the people of Patras fled into the city's castle, even as the rebels were besieging it and plundering the suburbs. At that time, the dragoman of the Venetian embassy suggested that Venetian galleys could prevent the rebels from coming from the Venetian lands via the strait. In order to make this plan work, the dragoman asked the Muslim inhabitants of the town to provide for him a legal deed which would guarantee that the Venetian galleys would not be targeted by Ottoman forces. However, the people of Patras did not accept his offer, and threatened that if any Venetian galley were to draw near to the city, such an act would be taken as a violation of the agreement between the Ottomans and Venice. Penâh argued that the town should accept the offer, noting that if the Venetians had malicious intentions, they would not have asked for a legal deed from the Ottoman authorities. However, he could not convince them. The siege of the castle of Patras continued for nineteen harsh days, beset by recurrent violent clashes and shortages of both

Morea. In regard to the *sipah kâtipliği*, he was correct; however, in the case of the *süvâri mukâbeleçiliği*, Penâh was not granted the post until several years later, after he returned to the capital. Furthermore, I have not encountered any document that references Penâh's appointment to the office of *mevkûfatçı*, in the Morea or elsewhere (Berker 1942-1943, 64; Süreyya 1996, 1551).

food and water⁷⁰. The siege of the castle of Patras would continue to the end of the rebellion and Penâh stayed here to the end (Penâh Efendi 2017, 69).

In the section on the Morea Rebellion, Penâh also wrote about the events that took place in other parts of the Morea, which he did not witness. Some of these were written in a very detailed manner, such as the events in Kalavryta, where some of his relatives lived⁷¹. Indeed, events were much the same in the other towns of the Morea, where Muslims were either sheltering in place and trying to resist attack in their *çiftlik* households or in the guard towers that had been built on their estates, or attempting to escape from their towns to the castles that were still in the Ottoman control or fleeing to Rumelia (Penâh Efendi 2017, 69-74).

2.3.3 Suppression of the Rebels

At the beginning of the Russo-Ottoman War in October 1768, as the main front of the war commenced on the shores of Danube, the former grand vizier Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa, who was dismissed from his post because of his opposition to the war, was appointed as the defender of the castle of Nafplion on the western side of the peninsula. Following the start of the Morea rebellion in 1770, he was appointed as the commander-in-chief of the Morea and he immediately called the local *a'yân*s for help with the suppression of the rebellion (Nagata 2006, 49). In the meantime, Penâh was still trapped in the castle of Patras, besieged by the rebels. Due to a shortage of provisions such as food and water, the people of Gastouni and Patras were in desperate circumstances. For this reason, they decided to send a Greek subject out from the castle to call for military aid from Rumelia; and, remarkably, he succeeded. Thus, after a siege lasting nineteen days, Albanian relief forces finally arrived and drove the rebels beyond the suburbs of Patras. There, they found a cache of provisions which the rebels had collected for Easter celebrations. The discovery of this cache was, according to Penâh, a blessing from God. Penâh gave

⁷⁰ According to Penâh, these shortages were the fault of the people of Patras. Because they had not gathered the necessary provisions in the castle before they retreated into it, in order to prevent the rebels from noticing their weakness, they had also not cleared the castle's wells of accumulated dirt and rocks (Penâh Efendi 2017, 69).

⁷¹ I should highlight here his positive attitude towards a *kocabaşı* named Zaimoğlu and the Orthodox priests of a church named *İspiloz*, which was dependent on their efforts to pacify the situation and protect Muslims during the rebellion (Penâh Efendi 2017, 70-71).

the date of the liberation of Patras as Friday, the 13th of April, 1770⁷². Afterwards, Penâh expressed a great deal of regret regarding the unpreparedness of Ottoman forces, and departed from Patras towards İnebahtı, on the other side of the gulf of the Corinth (Penâh Efendi 2017, 74-77).

The towns which were invaded or besieged by the rebels were eventually relieved, one by one, by soldiers called forth by several Rumelian *a'yâns*, who themselves had been rallied by Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa a couple of weeks earlier. The center of the province, namely Tripoli, was delivered from the rebels on April 19, 1770.⁷³ Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa's success in the Morea would eventually lead to his promotion to the governorship of Bosnia, and he would eventually become commander-in-chief of Rumelia. At that time, he was placed in command of over 40.000 soldiers, and subsequently he would be granted the post of the grand vizierate for the second time on November 28, 1771 (Nagata 2006, 49).

2.4 Return to the Capital

During the same period, Penâh's old companions Ahmed İzzet Efendi and Vahdetî Ebûbekir Efendi, who had been banished from the capital with the dismissal of their patron, former grand vizier Köse Mustafa Paşa, were re-appointed to important positions in the state. From Enverî, we learn that Ahmed İzzet Efendi was taken captive by the Russians at sea in 1770, as he travelled from Egypt to Istanbul, and was kept prisoner for three months. After his release, Ahmed İzzet Efendi wrote a short treatise to the sultan on the conditions of the Ottoman and Russian armies, and the necessary measures that should have been taken to defeat the Russians (Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.2B 59). Because the sultan was very impressed by his work, which I have not been able to find in the course of my research, Ahmed

⁷²After the liberation of the castle of Patras, Penâh found a list of provisions that was prepared by the rebels, showing that they were providing provisions for 24,000 people daily (Penâh Efendi 2017, 77). This statement shows that Penâh knew Greek well enough to read such a list (Erdem 2019c).

⁷³Although the rebellion was defeated, it left Morea devastated. A report dated to May 17, 1771 gives us a sense of the scope of the destruction. The report was written by a certain Ahmed, who was probably a servant of the owner of a *mukâtaa* that was mentioned in the document. The report described the contemporary condition of several *çiftlik*s in both Gastouni and Andrusa, giving the numbers of *çifts* and *oraks* for each village. The word *orak* literally means reaper, but in this context, it seems to be used for the subject peasants who were cultivating the land on behalf of the possessor. Hence, according to the report, before the rebellion, in the total of eight villages, there were 266 *çifts* and 633 peasants working them. However, after the rebellion, only 149 of the *çifts* and 328 of the peasants were left. The writer of the report stated that some of these *çifts* would not be able to reach such heights of production again for more than a decade (DABOA.TS.MA.d.5257 20 Safer 1185/4 June 1771).

İzzet Efendi was immediately appointed to the post of *Sadaret Kethüdâhlığı* on December 3, 1770. A short time after he gained this post, he was further granted the office of vizier, given the title of *paşa*, and appointed as the commander-in-chief of Babadağı, near the Danubian frontlines, on February 22, 1771. Sources described this appointment as inevitable, given that there was no other vizier who was familiar enough with warfare to fill this role⁷⁴. The predecessor of Ahmed İzzet Paşa, was Mehmed Paşa, who had been killed by the Janissaries in February 1771. At the same time, Süleyman Penâh Efendi was sent to Ruse to determine and record Mehmed Paşa's remaining assets. Although he completed his work on April 6, 1771, according to a state document, he seems to have stayed there for 10 more days to pay Mehmed Paşa's debts from his remaining assets⁷⁵. We understand that Ahmed İzzet Paşa and Süleyman Penâh Efendi met up in Ruse at the time that Penâh was sent there, from another decree which was sent by the center to both Ahmed İzzet Paşa and Penâh. This decree ordered them to determine the remaining assets of Sarim İbrahim Paşa, who was also an old friend of Penâh, and to take what provisions were necessary for the army from the remaining assets of Mehmed and İbrahim Paşas, and to send what remained to Shumen (*Şumnu*) and Istanbul⁷⁶. Simultaneously, Vahdetî Ebûbekir Efendi, a year after his dismissal from the *teşrifatî* post, was appointed as *defter emîni* (the director of the registry of landed property) on February 17, 1772 (Çalışkan 2000, 219, 305). It seems that the old companions from the faction of Köse Mustafa Paşa were regaining power in the center of the empire.

The decision to call back the old cadres and reappoint them to high-ranking positions can be taken as an indicator of the lack of experienced staff in the state. Additionally, these officials had needed to prove themselves to regain their positions in the state. As in the case of Ahmed İzzet Paşa, who advanced in his career after submitting a treatise to the sultan, Penâh's "the History of the Morea Rebellion" might have functioned to prove his abilities and loyalty to the state. The return of Köse Mustafa Paşa's faction during the administration of Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa, a prominent proponent of a more pacifistic foreign policy, supports my supposition that Köse Mustafa Paşa was likely dismissed for being against the more hawkish policies of Mustafa III.

Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa

In the first part of his treatise on the Morea Rebellion, there is a chapter on

⁷⁴(Çalışkan 2000, 191-192, 217; Şem'dânizâde 1976, 1978, 1980, Vol.2B 63).

⁷⁵(DABOA.C.ML.549.22599 3 Muharrem 1184/29 April 1770).

⁷⁶(DABOA.AE.SMST.III.2.101 29 Zilhicce 1184/15 April 1771) after Zararsız (Penâh Efendi 2017, 16).

the topic of “the Qualities of the Aristo-like-Vizier Commander-in-Chief of the Morea Muhsinzâde”⁷⁷. In this chapter, Penâh emphasized the perfect qualities of Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa, such as his zealousness (*gayûr*), patience (*sabûr*), wisdom (*‘âkıl*), and patriotic zeal (*hamiyyet*) and described him as an exceptional vizier (*vezîr-i bî-nazîr*). He praised the Paşa’s role in the suppression of the rebellion and added that if he had appointed as the commander-in-chief of the Morea two or three months before the rebellion, it is likely the rebellion would not have even broken out. In addition to his praise of the vizier, he also displayed a certain negativity towards the grand vizier, noting that he had not reported all of the incidents which were occurring in the Morea to the Sublime Porte, because he still resented being dismissed from the grand vizierate a couple of years earlier. Finally, he prayed for the praiseworthy vizier to be protected from all kinds of misfortunes (Penâh Efendi 2017, 83). From this prayer, we understand that Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa was alive at the time Penâh wrote his work. Moreover, considering Penâh’s usage of the title “Commander-in-Chief of the Morea”, Muhsinzâde was most likely still performing his duties in the Morea at that time. It is clear, then, that Penâh must have written his history of the Morea Rebellion of 1770 in the period between February 1770, when the Morea Rebellion began and Muhsinzâde was appointed to the post, and December 1770 (Nagata 2006, 49), when Muhsinzâde was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of Bosnia⁷⁸.

In addition to the aim of recording the events that he experienced during the rebellion, by writing a treatise on the Morea, Penâh likely intended to find and impress a new patron. Considering the emphasis given to Muhsinzâde throughout the treatise, it can be suggested that Penâh was seeking his patronage, in particular; indeed, it appears as though Penâh achieved his goals. In fact, according to a state document dated to July 24, 1771, Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa’s personal *kethüdâ* Çelebi Mehmed paid Süleyman Penâh Efendi’s debt, amounting to 1400 *guruş* (168.000 *akçe*), to a moneylender named Dimitri of Chios⁷⁹. He then took the bill that was issued for the debt, and gave it to Yusuf Âgâh Efendi, the son of Penâh Efendi⁸⁰ indicating perhaps that the closeness between Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa and Süleyman Penâh Efendi might have reached a high level several months before the

⁷⁷“*Evsâf-ı Ser-‘asker-i Mora Vezîr-i Aristo-tedbîr Muhsinzâde*” (Penâh Efendi 2017, 83-84).

⁷⁸Erdem states that we should date this work 1200 H. (1785-1786) as well, considering the preface of Penâh’s work, in which said he states that he ventured to write an addendum to his work on the Morea Rebellion about the order of the climes; he thus might have reviewed or even rewritten the former work from 1785-1786, when he finished his treatise, *The Order of the Climes* (Erdem 2017c).

⁷⁹Dimitri of Chios or Dimitrios Skanavis, who was known as the personal moneylender of Esmâ Sultan, the sister of Abdülhamid I, was a famous and wealthy moneylender in Istanbul who had strong affiliations with many statesmen. Dimitri was executed in 1788 due to an accusation of treason (Ünlü 2018, 108, 121-125).

⁸⁰(DABOA.TS.MA.e.509.28 11 Rabiulahir 1185/24 July 1771).

appointment of Muhsinzâde as the grand vizier.

It is claimed that Penâh's new patron, Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa, was born in Istanbul. He was the son of a former grand vizier, Muhsinzâde Abdullah Paşa. The family name, Muhsinzâde, came from his grandfather, Muhsin Çelebi, who was a merchant from Aleppo. Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa entered state officialdom in 1737, as the superintendent of the ushers (*kapıcılar kethüdâsı*), when his father was appointed as the grand vizier; then, after a year, he was appointed as the governor of Maraş and granted the title of vizier. Afterwards, from 1746 to 1765, he was assigned the governorships of several provinces across the empire. On June 23, 1758, he married Âsime Sultan⁸¹, the daughter of Sultan Ahmed III. Finally, after the dismissal of Köse Mustafa Paşa, he was appointed as the grand vizier on March 30, 1765.⁸² Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa continued as grand vizier for three years. During his period, Muhsinzâde was known as a champion of the attempts to centralize power away from the provincial notables, and as an advocate for maintaining peace with Russia. These positions put him at odds with the Sultan, and consequently he was dismissed from his post on August 7, 1768 and exiled to Bozcaada, and then to Rhodes. Finally, on July 20, 1769, he was appointed as the governor of the Morea. It seems that Süleyman Penâh Efendi and Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa are unlikely to have met before the latter's appointment to the Morea as governor.

At the time Penâh went to İnebahtı, he was still holding the post of *sipah kitâbeti*. I have not encountered any information about the period that he was in this office after he departed from the Morea. It is likely he continued in his duty as a finance official commissioned in the army in the Balkans, where several engagements were ongoing between the Russian and Ottoman armies. After holding this post for two years, he was appointed as *başmuhasebeci*⁸³ (chief accountant of the finance office)

⁸¹Nagata gave her name as Esmâ (Nagata 2006, 49), but according to Hâkim, her name was Âsime (Hâkim Efendi 2019, 956).

⁸²(Nagata 2006, 11, 27, 48-49; İzzî Efendi 2019, 269, 275, 389, 477, 728, 788, 875, 956; Hâkim Efendi 2019, 15, 69, 95, 173, 560, 677-678, 701, 704, 732, 789, 1014, 1021, 1180; Sağlam 2014, 113, 117-118, 159, 187, 201-202, 233, 264, 269, 313-314).

⁸³According to Uzunçarşılı, the office of the chief accountant was the most important of the finance offices of the Ottoman state. It was responsible for recording of all revenues and expenditures of the empire. There were several other departments under its authority, such as the offices of *tophâne emîni* (the head of the imperial arsenal), *matbah emîni* (the head of the kitchen of the Sultan's palace), *tersâne emîni* (the supervisor of the dockyards), *arpa emîni* (the comptroller of the supplies of barley for Istanbul and the Sultan's stables), *baruthâne emîni* (the head of the imperial powder mill), *nüzûl emîni* (the office of the provisions for a march or a journey of the army), *kasabbaşı* (the chief butcher and the director of the sheep tax), and *bina emîni* (the official in charge of construction). In addition, the head of the office of the life-term tax farms was also one of the appendants of the chief accountant. Furthermore, the office designated those scribes who were responsible for defraying military expenditures for war munitions, armory storage, arsenal equipment, and supplies for wagons and pavilions. Alongside the contracts for the supplies that were bought by the state, which were kept in the chief accountant's office, official memorandums were dispatched from there, and accounts were inspected and managed by officials who were the appendants of the chief accountant. Finally, the zimmet kalemi (the debts office), which was responsible for debts owed to the state, and the muhalledat dairesi (the office of the inheritances of the state officials) were both under the administration of the office of the chief accountant. Uzunçarşılı has suggested that, after the scope of

by the grand vizier Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa on January 18, 1772 (Sağlam 2014, 481; Afyoncu 2000, 119).⁸⁴

2.4.1 Penâh at the Top of the Imperial Finance Office

The same year, on the 30th of May, the Russian and Ottoman armies began a three-month armistice organized by the direct initiatives of Grand Vizier Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa and Field Marshal Petr Aleksandrovich Rumiantsev. Peace negotiations followed in August. The initial meetings failed to produce a result, but Rumiantsev and Muhsinzâde were both in favor of continuing the peace negotiations. Following the first round of failed negotiations, on October 7, 1772, a meeting was held in Istanbul to discuss the recent reports from the frontlines. In this meeting, Muhsinzâde succeeded in replacing the first plenipotentiary of the failed negotiations, Osman Efendi, who was known for his reluctance to conclude a peace treaty, with *Re'isü'l-küttâb* Abdürrezzak Efendi, a prominent member of the peace party.⁸⁵ According to Enverî, “two persons among the dignitaries of the Exalted State who had a valid ability of observation in both writing and discourse” were assigned to the entourage of the Abdürrezzak Efendi: these were Süleyman Penâh Efendi⁸⁶ and Ataullah Efendi, the first and second consultants, respectively (Çalışkan 2000, 362; Sağlam 2014, 512).⁸⁷

the authority of the chief accountant's office had expanded so significantly, defterdars began to lose their control over the office in the late 18th century (İ.H. Uzunçarşılı 1988b, 354-355).

⁸⁴(DABOA.C.DH.168.8387.0 28 Safer 1186/31 May 1772). Enverî gives the date as 13 Zilkâde 1185/17 February 1772 (Çalışkan 2000, 304-305), but, according to a state document that was mentioned by Afyoncu, the appointment was effected in Şevval, 1185 (7 January - 4 February 1185) (Afyoncu 2000, 119; DABOA.C.DH.168.8387.0 28 Safer 1186/31 May 1772, 3). Therefore, I decided to use Vâsîf's date, which seemed to be more accurate. On the other hand, Zararsız gives the date as January 7, 1772, using the document mentioned by Afyoncu as his reference, however, he does not cite any other sources for the exact date that he suggests (Penâh Efendi 2017, 16-17). Before his appointment, Penâh wrote a petition to the Sultan to be granted some zeâmet (large fiefs) in certain villages along the shore of the Danube, namely near Silistra, Nikopol, and Harşova. The Sultan approved his petition the same day, on January 18, 1772, and he was given the imperial warrant for the fiefs on June 24, 1772. The total tax revenue of the grants was recorded as 26.253 *akçe* per year (Afyoncu 2005, 177).

⁸⁵(Aksan 1995, 158-160; Menchinger 2017, 43-49; Sağlam 2014, 512; Çalışkan 2000, 361-362; Nagata 2006, 49).

⁸⁶Enverî described Süleyman Penâh Efendi as the Chief Accountant of the Imperial Army, which implies that Penâh had continued his duties on the frontline. It is likely that he had followed along with grand vizier Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa (Çalışkan 2000, 362).

⁸⁷In an imperial order dated to October 1772, Penâh was noted as a member of the cautious and well-minded dignitaries. According to the edict, he had gained in prominence because of his extraordinary rectitude and prudence. Furthermore, in addition to his loyalty and honesty, he was known for his intelligence, astuteness, robustness of mind and eloquence in simplifying problems and solving disputes. It was because of these qualifications that, among his peers, the sultan had chosen him for this duty. This document tells us that, less than a decade after his exile to Cyprus, Penâh had become a highly regarded statesman, who

The entourage of Abdürrezzak Efendi departed from the grand vizier's tent on October 22, 1772 and set out for Bucharest⁸⁸. They arrived in the city in on November 7, and the first meeting was held on the 9th. It was decided that the negotiations were to last 5 months⁸⁹ (Sağlam 2014, 513-514; Çalışkan 2000, 364-366). At the time that these negotiations were ongoing, on January 31, 1773, the sultan confirmed the appointments of all of the gentlemen in the entourage, including Süleyman Penâh Efendi, and the ceremonial robes that were granted to them were subsequently sent to Bucharest (Sağlam 2014, 516; Çalışkan 2000, 371).

Neither Enverî nor Vâsîf mentioned Penâh's name in the sections in which they discuss the negotiations. We do not know if they avoided mentioning Penâh for a specific reason. Nevertheless, we can assume that he probably played a rather important role in the negotiations, considering his position as the first consultant of Abdürrezzak Efendi. The meetings between the two parties were held two times a week, for a total of 38 meetings. The Ottomans had specified three primary topics that were to be resolved in the negotiations; one of them was the duration of the negotiations, which was decided at the first meeting. The other two were the status of the Crimean Khanate, and trade between the two empires. The former was the most difficult topic, and the one which eventually doomed the negotiations. The Russian plenipotentiary Obreskov offered to accept the total independence of the Khanate. According to his offer, future khans would be elected by the Tatar tribes amongst themselves, without the need for the permission of the Ottoman sultan. After strenuous negotiations, they agreed that the Ottoman sultan's name would continue to be read first in the Crimean mosques during Friday sermons, the Ottoman sultan would give permission for future khans to be elected by the Tatar tribes, and that judges in the Crimean Khanate would be appointed by the Ottoman chief military judge without compensation.

However, a staunch disagreement soon arose regarding the issue of the fortresses in Crimea. Obreskov stipulated firmly that Kerch Port and the Yeni Kal'a in the northern part of the port, at the entrance to the Sea of Azov, should be left to Russians. He added that the rest of the fortresses could be possessed by Tatar forces.

was honored by the sultan himself (DABOA.A.DVNSNMH.d.9.21 Receb 1186/ 27 September-27 October 1772). According to Vâsîf, he was included in the entourage on October 8, 1772 as the secretary to the negotiations (Sağlam 2014, 512; Menchinger 2017, 49).

⁸⁸Penâh Efendi and Ataullah Efendi got rations for the duty in same amounts which were the largest ones after Abdürrezzak Efendi's (DABOA.C.HR.145.7213 13 Receb 1188/19 September 1774) after Zararsız (Penâh Efendi 2017, 17).

⁸⁹While Abdürrezzak Efendi was insisting on designating the period of negotiations as six months, Russian plenipotentiary Obreskov inflexibly insisted on four months and three days. At last, Abdürrezzak Efendi succeeded in convincing his counterpart to negotiate for five months and three days (Sağlam 2014, 513-514; Çalışkan 2000, 364-366).

The offer thus implied that Crimea would be abandoned by the Ottoman army and the entrance to the inland sea would be left to the control of the Russians. Abdürrezzak Efendi indicated that it was impossible to convince Istanbul to accept such conditions, but Obreskov insisted that he should at least inform the Ottoman capital and ask for their opinion. Abdürrezzak Efendi sent the second consultant, Ataullah Efendi, to the grand vizier, with a report explaining the standstill at which the negotiations had arrived. Ataullah Efendi brought the report to Shumen, where the Grand Vizier Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa was residing at that time. After the arrival of the report, a meeting was held in the presence of the Grand Vizier with the high officials and the Janissaries. At the meeting, it was underlined that the most crucial part of the terms was the request for the port of Kerch and the Yeni Kal'a. The other matters in Obreskov's offer were described as mere sophistries. Everyone at the meeting noted that the agreement represented the sort of offer that the Ottoman state would not have been secured even if the war were to continue for ten more years. For this reason, at the end of the meeting, they decided to write a letter suggesting that it would be good to accept the terms, albeit with some small changes; this letter was signed by everyone who had participated the meeting. However, in the capital the terms were found unacceptable and dishonorable and were rejected. The document was thus sent back to the front with significant changes to the terms, which the Russians would almost certainly find difficult to accept. Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa decided not to press the issue with Istanbul and sent the document that included the new terms to Bucharest. The new terms, when proposed by Abdürrezzak Efendi at the negotiating table, provoked a strong reaction of the part of the Russians. Obreskov refused to continue negotiations under such circumstances and demanded that the Ottomans leave the town. Hence, Abdürrezzak Efendi and his entourage departed from Bucharest on Monday, March 22, 1773. This marked the complete breakdown of negotiations, and the recommencement of the war (Çalışkan 2000, 372-376; Sağlam 2014, 516-521).

Following the failure of the Bucharest negotiations, military engagements between two states resumed. Eventually, over the course of the next summer, Ottomans were compelled to bear a heavier burden under the stress of continuous severe losses. Hence, on July 26, 1774, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca was concluded between the two states, which finally ended the devastating Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774. The new treaty was built on the terms of the Bucharest negotiations, but the conditions were far more onerous than the previous one for the Ottomans. The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca was a drastic shock to the Ottoman statesmen, and would encourage and accelerate future efforts at reform. It is certain that Süleyman Penâh Efendi was among those devastated by the outcome, for he had spent the

last days of the war under siege in Shumen with Grand Vizier Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa (Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 92). However, he seems to have gotten over the shock rather quickly and began to think more optimistically. Indeed, Penâh depicted his optimism regarding the future of the Ottoman Empire in a section at the end of his treatise on the Morea Rebellion, by explaining a dream that he had seen during the after-treaty negotiations with the Russian ambassador in Istanbul:

“The dream of the poor one that was seen at the time when the Muscovite ambassador came to the exalted capital for ratification of the peace⁹⁰: I was in Beyoğlu and there were great pavilions which supposedly had been built for the ambassador as a gift. And the ambassador was an old man, about eighty-years-old, who was sitting on a chair in a high pavilion. And the high officials of the exalted state were on the ground and serving him in haste, showing great attention and respect to him. And every musical instrument and ornament, and shadow shows, and bears and monkeys, and other toys in the capital were performing their shows. After a while, the ambassador abandoned his human form and assumed the form of an enormous lion, colored in a sombre, tile-red. And when I came near to the pavilion for inspecting the surroundings and saw the ambassador in the form of a lion, because I saw the exalted state in such humiliated condition, I started to cry under a tree, saying, ‘It is the sign of the power of the Muscovite!’. At that time, a man came near to me and said to this poor one, ‘Do not lament, that form you saw is not a real lion, it is cardboard, made of paper. If some water were to be poured on it, it would dissolve and disappear.’ When that man finished speaking, this poor one, I was illuminated with happiness too. May God – May his name be exalted – confirm it for the sacredness of the most honorable beloved⁹¹. *Amîn bi-hürmeti seyyidi’l-mürselîn*” (Penâh Efendi 2017, 84)

2.4.2 After-War Period

Following the signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, Grand Vizier Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa died on the way back to the capital, on August 4, 1774 (Nagata 2006,

⁹⁰According to the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, Russia would open an embassy in Istanbul (Beydilli 2002, 526).

⁹¹The Prophet Mohammad.

49). Presumably, Penâh was in his company when he died. We do not exactly know what the grand vizier's death meant to Süleyman Penâh Efendi. However, we know that he could not maintain his position at the top of the finance office for long after his patron's death. Indeed, sometime between the end of 1774 and the beginning of 1775, he was dismissed from the office (Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 363). After his dismissal, he was appointed as the prefect (*şehremîni*) of the capital. Although I could not find anything regarding the exact date that he was appointed to this post, there is a state document dated to March 23, 1776, which implies that he had already held the post for some time by that date. From this record, we know that in 1776, he was also still in possession of the tax farm of Sis and its vicinity⁹² (Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 363; Penâh Efendi 2017, 17). It is likely that after his dismissal from the office of the chief accountant, and probably when he held the office of *Şehremîni*⁹³, a village named Kızıl in Aydın province was added to Penâh's *zeâmet*s on August 7, 1775 upon his request (Afyoncu 2005, 177). According to Vâsîf, he was appointed to this position for two terms (Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 363). It seems that he maintained this post for two years, before he was dismissed on October 27, 1778 and re-appointed as *sipah kâtibi*, a post he would hold for two additional years⁹⁴ (Afyoncu 2000, 119).

On September 23, 1781, Süleyman Penâh Efendi was appointed as *Anadolu Muhasebecisi* (the chief accountant of Anatolia)⁹⁵. From state documents, we understand that he continued in this post for two years, and that as he held this post, the imperial warrants which had been given to him before for his *zeâmet*s in the Balkans and Aydın were renewed on January 13, 1783 (Afyoncu 2005, 177). In September, 1783, he was appointed as *Matbah Emîni* (Superintendent of the kitchen of the Sultan's palace)⁹⁶. During this period, because the offices that Penâh held were responsible for provisioning the city, the palace kitchens, and the army corps, it seems that he

⁹²(DABOA.C.ML.784.31973 2 Safer 1190/23 March 1776) after Zararsız (Penâh Efendi 2017, 17). In his work, Zararsız suggested that the tax farming of Sis subdivision of the Adana province, was granted to Penâh for his new position as the prefect of the city (Penâh Efendi 2017, 17). But, Penâh has been holding the tax farming of the Sis since 1768 as we mentioned before.

⁹³In the 18th century, the prefect of the city was responsible for the constructions, repairs, provisions, and recording of the accounts in the city. Furthermore, he was working like some kind of a secretary of the Sultan's palace and managing the expenses of the palace life including the constructions and repairs inside the palace area (Ergin 2007, 23-33).

⁹⁴(DABOA.A.RSK.d.1620 Şevval 1192-Şevval 1193/October 1778-November 1779, 26) after Afyoncu (Afyoncu 2000, 119) and Zararsız (Penâh Efendi 2017, 17). While he was holding this post, he lost one of his sons Mehmed Muharrem Efendi in 3 November 1779. From the state document that reported Mehmed Muharrem's death, we understood that he had shares in the tobacco customs at the time he died (DABOA.C.ML.749.30547 23 Şevval 1193/3 November 1779) after Zararsız (Penâh Efendi 2017, 19).

⁹⁵(DABOA.A.RSK.d.1617 4 Şevval 1195/23 September 1781) after Afyoncu (Afyoncu 2000, 119) and Zararsız (Penâh Efendi 2017, 17). *Anadolu muhasebeciliği* was an high-ranking financial post responsible for keeping the records of financial transactions from customs, agricultural estates, and other tax farms in Anatolia, preparing official certificates for the duties, and inspecting the foundation activities (İ.H. Uzunçarşılı 1988b, 347, 356).

⁹⁶(DABOA.C.SM.170.8510 14 Şevval 1197/12 September 1783) after Zararsız (Penâh Efendi 2017, 17).

was given authority over considerable financial resources. We can assume, thus, that Süleyman Penâh Efendi enjoyed several rather lucrative positions in the after-war period, even if he was not at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy.

Gazi Hasan Paşa of Algeria

In the period following the death of Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa, Süleyman Penâh Efendi seems to have found a new patron: Gazi Hasan Paşa of Algeria, one of the most powerful men in the empire in the late 18th century. Gazi Hasan Paşa was a Caucasian origin slave-cum-statesman, who is believed to have been born around 1714 and was bought and raised by a Muslim merchant family from Tekirdağ. He was called “*Cezayirli*” after a period in which he ran a coffeehouse in Algeria, sometime around the 1740s. As perhaps one of the most intriguing individuals of the Ottoman 18th century, he then travelled from Algeria through Spain and Naples, a period of his life which needs further research. In the 1760s he entered the Imperial navy as a captain and advanced his career in the navy such that when the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War broke out, he had already become one of the most prominent admirals in the fleet. Due to his services during the war, including confrontations with the Russian fleet under the command of Orlov brothers, he was appointed as the grand admiral of the imperial navy (*Kaptan-ı Derya*) on March 18, 1771⁹⁷.

After the war, he was tasked with suppressing several local rebellions, and his success with these missions (Karahan 2017, 27-36) helped him to secure his position and establish a closer connection with Sultan Abdülhamid I. One of these missions was to the Morea, where he set about managing the incessant conflicts between the local inhabitants and the Albanian soldiers who had come to suppress the 1770 rebellion. As we read from Süleyman Penâh Efendi, this represented a major problem in the region (Penâh Efendi 2017, 106-114). The grand admiral ended the mutiny by convincing some of the Albanian groups to leave the peninsula under certain conditions and defeating the others in Tripoli in the summer of 1779. Because of his success in the Morea, in addition to the grand admiralty, he was given the administration of the Morea on August 8, 1779, and he stayed in the peninsula until returning to the capital on November 22 (Karahan 2017, 36-39; Aydın 1993, 502). Although he might have first met Penâh when he was tasked with provisioning the navy in the late 1760s, it is more likely that 1779 was the year that the relationship between Gazi Hasan Paşa and Penâh Efendi commenced. In his *Order of the Climes*, Penâh mentioned Hasan Paşa two times, each instance loaded with praise. In the part on the Albanian issue, after describing the problems in which had afflicted the Morea, he wrote:

⁹⁷(Aydın 1993, 501-502; Karahan 2017, 4-21; İ. Uzunçarşılı 1940, 17-21).

“... It (the issue) was cleaned as late as the arrival of his excellency our master the just *gâzi* vizier grand admiral with the divine favour, the prosperous courtesy of the sovereign, and the diligent efforts of the aforesaid (Hasan Paşa) (Penâh Efendi 2017, 116). ”

And in the section of the text in which Penâh made suggestions regarding reform of the imperial navy, he wrote about the grand admiral:

“...However, he is as bright as the sun in the minds of everyone. His ardour and zeal are extraordinary. Our master, the merciful benefactor, the most munificent Gazi Hasan Paşa’s interior (*zâhir*) and exterior (*bâtın*) are both flourishing and his *gazâ* and jihad are at a degree that the angels admire. His service, persistence, and khedive-like fidelity to the exalted state and the imperial navy are impossible to deny. May God keep his noble body from faults, bestow him long life, and make His divine guidance and assistance a companion to him in all his needs, *amîn*. (Penâh Efendi 2017, 106)”

In the fall of 1776, Russian forces occupied the Crimea, asserting violations of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. The Ottomans’ attempts to support the Tatar tribes against the Russian forces failed and on March 21, 1779, with the mediation of the French and British ambassadors, the Aynalıkavak Convention was signed between the two states. According to the convention, the Ottomans acceded to a pro-Russian khan ruling the khanate for his lifetime. In return, the Russians agreed to withdraw from some of the territories that they had previously occupied⁹⁸. The peace would not last long, however, and Crimea would soon be the center of crisis again.

2.4.3 Following the Russian Invasion of Crimea

The year before Penâh’s appointment to the palace kitchens, on April 8, 1783, Russia fully annexed Crimea, using the increasing conflicts among the Tatar tribes in the region as an excuse. This was the second great shock for the Ottoman bureaucracy in a decade, and aroused new disputes in the imperial quarters. While the loss of such a large Muslim territory created deep frustration, the increased Russian presence in

⁹⁸(Karahan 2017, 53-54; Menchinger 2017, 66-70; Aksan 1995, 171-177).

the Black Sea evoked instead extreme fear about the defense of the capital. At the time of the annexation, Halil Hamid Paşa had been the grand vizier since December 31, 1782 and the Ottoman bureaucracy had been split into two major factions. One of them was headed by the grand vizier himself, and the other was led by the grand admiral Gazi Hasan Paşa⁹⁹. However, as both Neumann and Menchinger suggest, it seems that these factions were not particularly different regarding their political programmes. Instead, the dispute between these two factions were more practical in nature and related to the career goals of their members and allies. Furthermore, as Menchinger has correctly asserted, the leaders Halil Hamid Paşa and Gazi Hasan Paşa had very similar ideas regarding the foreign policy of the empire and necessity of reforms. Nevertheless, under the pressure of the Russian annexation of Crimea, the bureaucratic factions of the Ottoman state apparatus lost themselves in endless discussions and in repeated, fruitless meetings¹⁰⁰. It seems that Süleyman Penâh Efendi was a prominent member of these councils, and he actively participated in the discussions.

At the first council, which was held by the Grand Vizier Halil Hamid Paşa in the summer of 1783, under the strong influence of the Grand Admiral Gazi Hasan Paşa and Şeyhlülislam Dürrişâde Mehmed Ataullah Efendi it was decided to protest the Russian annexation of Crimea. However, the grand vizier strongly opposed this decision, for he believed that it could lead to a disastrous war with Russia. He succeeded in delaying the motion until the end of the year. Despite the divergences in the meeting, both the grand vizier and the grand admiral agreed to seek foreign mediation, especially from the French and British. However, even as the Russians refused to accept the mediation of the other European states and urged the Ottomans to give them a title deed demonstrating their acceptance of Crimea's new status, the French and British¹⁰¹ ambassadors were also pressing the Ottoman center to accept Russian demands regarding Crimea¹⁰² as a *fait accompli*.

The last meeting with the Russian Ambassador Bulgakov on December 15, 1783 increased the pressure on Istanbul. For this reason, by the order of the Sultan Abdülhamid I, the grand vizier decided to hold a new council to discuss the issue.

⁹⁹ According to Neumann, Halil Hamid Paşa was the leader of the faction which previously had been led by Silâhdâr Mehmed Paşa until his death in February 1781 (Also known as Karavezir Mehmed Paşa, and before securing the title of vizierate Seyyid Mehmed Ağa (Sarıcaoğlu 2001)), who had held the grand vizierate post for two years between August 1779 and February 1781. Neumann also had a helpful schema of the potential members of the factions with their known relations with each other (Neumann 1993, 32-33).

¹⁰⁰ (Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 25-32; Bağış, 11-14; Karahan 2017, 54-57; İnalçık 2002, 454; Neumann 1993, 32-33; Menchinger 2017, 71).

¹⁰¹ While the grand vizier was conducting the meetings with the French Ambassador, St. Priest, the grand admiral was conducting ones with the British Ambassador Sir Robert Ainslie (Aksan 1995, 182).

¹⁰² (Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 32-34, 58-59, 78-82; Bağış 1984, 11; Aksan 1995, 180-181; Menchinger 2017, 90).

However, before the meeting, some of the participants of the prospective council were instructed to give their opinions individually, in order to prevent them from refraining to express their true ideas and from perhaps derailing the course of future negotiations¹⁰³. One of them was Süleyman Penâh Efendi, and he said:

“This time is incomparable to the previous ones. Since the shores of the Black Sea are under the Russian possession and it is heard that there are 150 vessels, both large and small ships, in the Sea of Azov and on the shores of Kerch, Yeni-Kale Fortress and Ochakiv, and their soldiers are ready and waiting on [our] borders and their cursed battalions are facing [our] frontiers. As soon as the definite answer is given to the Muscovite ambassador and he will return to his state, apparently, the war will take place. What happens if there is any assault carried out by the ships of the infidels from the Black Sea and by their forsaken soldiers to our frontiers, like bands of plunderers? If provisions and necessary supplies were to not come to this city [Istanbul] for 40 days, there would be a great tumult and we would be deeply occupied with our own issues. Yet, even though there is no difficulty at the moment, many people are [already] complaining, saying ‘[Our] bread is black!’, ‘There is a lack of firewood and coal!’ and such. Since we have no ship that is able to confront the enemy’s ships in the Black Sea, if, all of a sudden, a couple of the vessels of the enemy were to fire several cannon-shots at the provinces, there would be a vociferous cry in the capital and the people would start to make us to lose our way by starting to quarrel with each other. This is the secret of why I said this one is incomparable to the previous ones. In the previous one and before, the Muscovite had no fleet in the Black Sea. In my humble opinion, all at once, striving for the doors of the war not to open one at a time is necessary. Because it would be possible to convince the [Russian] ambassador in the upcoming negotiation without giving the definite answer, it is crucial and essential to postpone [any decision] to a future negotiation and by having the general council (*Meclis-i umûm*) held again, and to take future acts according to the plan that was decided [by the council] through unanimous agreement.” (Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 86)

When we consider the titles of the officials that Vâsîf described as being consulted¹⁰⁴,

¹⁰³(Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 79-90; Menchinger 2017, 92). Before their ideas on the issue were asked from the officials, a transcript of the conversation between the Grand Admiral Gazi Hasan Paşa and the British Ambassador Sir Robert Ainslie conducted on December 6, 1783 was displayed. In that conversation, by pointing out the insufficient preparedness of the Empire, the British Ambassador strongly advised the Ottomans to accept the Russian demands on Crimea and to avoid a war. On the other hand, he added that “after getting the provisions and preparations completely ready, and gaining the capacity to resist [the Russians] along all the borders, it is possible to put into execution the desire of the Exalted State just like the liberation of the Morea.” (Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 78-79; Bağış 1984, 16).

¹⁰⁴Those were; the chief accounting officer (*Muhasebe-i Evvel*) Süleyman Feyzî Efendi, the director of the registry of landed property (*Defter Emîni*) Ahmed Nazîf Efendi, *Tevkîî* Çelebi Mehmed Efendi, the chief clerk of the office of financial transactions (*Rûzname-i Evvel*) Bekir Paşa-zâde Süleyman Beyefendi, the

it seems probable that Süleyman Penâh Efendi was one of the more influential officials in the state during this time. In fact, it appears that everyone on the list had concerns similar to those of Penâh Efendi regarding a possible unintended confrontation with Russia, and a tendency to accept the Russian demands became clear among the Ottoman elite (Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 82-87).

On December 18, 1783, Halil Hamid Paşa held a very large council to decide on war or peace. After a lengthy summary was given by the grand vizier to the participants regarding the conditions of the Ottoman Empire and its enemy, and underlining the importance of the issue, Halil Hamid Paşa asked the participants to give their ideas. The atmosphere of the meeting was somewhat strained. Halil Hamid Paşa and Gazi Hasan Paşa acted together¹⁰⁵, continuously urging the participants to express their ideas on the issue. However, their actual goal appears to have been convincing the other Ottoman statesmen to join their position, and to prevent any possible future opposition to their ideas by making them “take part in the crime”. Süleyman Penâh Efendi was one of the first speakers at the council, and advocated for peace by referencing the frustration he experienced during the Siege of Shumen in 1774, where he was trapped with the former Grand Vizier Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa:

“Here, the conditions of our soldiers and treasury became known from the documents that were read and, in fact, these conditions are known thoroughly by everyone. At the time of the grand vizierate of the late Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa, when the sacred banner and the imperial army was in Shumen, although the city of Edirne was but a step away from Shumen, we were [nevertheless] under siege for 31 days and neither a person nor a paper was able to come from Edirne. Indeed, let alone coming to our help, the people of Edirne were so completely preoccupied with their own troubles that they began look to secure the means of [their own] escape from the city. At that time, the enemy was solely the Muscovites, but now Austria is in agreement with them, and they are both strong enemies.” (Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 92).

At this point, Penâh’s words were interrupted by Gazi Hasan Paşa, and the grand admiral added that the enemies were not just two in number but three or four, since Venice and the Principality of Georgia were ready to join a possible Russian

former grand vizier’s second in command (*Kethüdâ-yı Esbak*) Lâleli Mustafa Efendi, Şeyhülislam and other high ranking ulemâ members, the officials in the docks and the grand admiral Gazi Hasan Paşa.

¹⁰⁵ According to Aksan, Gazi Hasan and Halil Hamid Paşas were “finally in agreement about the current Ottoman inability to wage effective war against the Russians.” (Aksan 1995, 181). On the other hand, it is likely that they shared a common anxiety and did not wish to take individual responsibility for the loss of Crimea, as those officials did who had signed the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca.

attack. Then Penâh Efendi continued speaking and repeated his forecasts on the prospective issues that he had previously mentioned, including the provisioning of the capital and possible civil unrest in the event of a war. During the meeting, the majority of the participants spoke in favour of peace and the members of the *ulemâ* in the meeting legitimized it, defining peace as “the lesser of two evils.” The council had been a decisive success for the peace faction¹⁰⁶.

After the general council, there was a high council, held in the office of *Sadaret Kethüdâsi*¹⁰⁷ with only four “distinguished experts of consultation” (*mûte’ayyinân-ı erbâb-ı meşveret*), to decide if the status of the Tatar tribes who chose not to live under Russian authority and to leave Crimea should be included in the memorandum that would be given to the Russians as a sign of the Ottomans’ exit from the region. The Ottomans proposed to write a separate article, to be included in the memorandum, which would determine a certain period - a month - for those tribes to leave Crimea, with the safety of their life and property guaranteed by the Russians. The participants of this high council were the first director of the empire’s finance office Feyzî Efendi, the chief accountant Süleyman Feyzî Efendi, and Süleyman Penâh Efendi. Although his name was not mentioned among the participants, since the council was held in his office, we can assume that Kethüdâ Bey was the fourth official consulted. According to Vâsîf’s records, during the meeting, only Penâh and Süleyman Feyzî Efendis decided to speak. In their previous talks with Russian Ambassador, Süleyman Feyzi Efendi mentioned that Bulgakov had indicated that if such an article were added to the memorandum, it would need much more time for discussion, and since the Russian Army was encamped on the Ottoman frontier - costing 200.000 *guruş* per day to the Russian treasury - he had threatened that the Ottoman would regret any such delaying tactic. The chief accountant added that a replication of the offer could be a source of disgrace to the exalted state (Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 101-102), to which Süleyman Penâh Efendi agreed. Penâh then added that, “giving the present memorandum that has been read (without any new article included) is better than permitting and accepting [such a] disgrace”, he said. Further, he argued,

“Because Tatar tribe was independent in the past, we did not intervene in their affairs. Now, they have submitted to Muscovites, God curse

¹⁰⁶(Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 90-99; Menchinger 2017, 92-94; Aksan 1995, 182-184).

¹⁰⁷Vâsîf did not mention the Kethüdâ Bey’s name, but according to the last appointment mentioned in Enverî’s work, it was probably es-Seyyid Mehmed Hayrî Efendi at that time (Çiçek 2018, 1191-1193). Mehmed Hayrî Efendi was one of the two secretaries to negotiations with his colleague Ahmed Vâsîf Efendi in Abdürrezzâk Efendi’s retinue during the failed peace conference in Bucharest between the Russian and Ottoman states in 1772-1773 (Menchinger 2017, 49).

them! They are a fickle tribe and in fact, they themselves acquired this independence anyways. If a confrontation were to occur, in the case that the Exalted State persisted [with the article] and the Russians continued to reject it, the Ottoman Empire would be incapable of defending itself in such a confrontation at present time. In addition, if the obligation to jihad is constrained by feasibility, then we are excused [from pursuing it].” (Vâsıf Efendi 1994, 102)

Penâh’s exasperation regarding the Tatar tribes, which is quite explicit in the passage above, was not peculiar to him. Such exasperation with the faction-ridden Tatars was, in fact, a collective response commonly found among the Ottoman officials of that period, which emerged as a result of the continued issues in Crimea after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (Aksan 1995, 172). Further, we can understand Penâh’s last statement as an attempt to legitimize a peace treaty with an hostile empire, similar to the aims of the majority of Ottoman statesmen at the time (Menchinger 2017, 88-95).

In the next part of the meeting, Penâh Efendi extended his remarks on the relationship between feasibility and war, giving the example of Muslim captives in Malta. As he argued, because it was impossible to free them at the present, a feigned approval (*mümâşât*) had been regarded as acceptable. Hence, he suggested that if the article regarding the safe evacuation of the Tatar tribes from Crimea were to be proposed to the Russian Ambassador, in the case of his disapproval, the Ottoman plenipotentiaries should not take it any further and simply sign the memorandum after emphasizing that the Ottoman Empire refused any responsibility for future scandalous circumstances. Finally, Süleyman Feyzî suggested that the article be added to the memorandum in red ink, and thus if it was not accepted by the Russians, they could simply continue using the previous form of the treaty which had already been approved by all of the participants of the council. Thus, the memorandum signed in Aynalıkavak between the plenipotentiaries of the both parties was without any new article regarding the Tatars, and afterwards the escalation between two states ceased (Vâsıf Efendi 1994, 103-106).

Sometime after the resolution of the Crimea crisis, the Habsburgs demanded a certain amount of land near Bosnia and near Harşova, in the vicinity of the Danube. The Habsburgs claimed that there had been continuous violations of the previous agreement regarding the border of Bosnia along the Una and Sava rivers, and their custom office in Harşova was exposed regular threats from the Ottoman side of the border. The Ottomans insisted on delegating the discussion of these problems to the local authorities in the region, leading to a successful resolution of the incident. During this relatively small crisis, two councils were held by the grand vizier with

high officials, and a meeting was arranged with the Habsburg plenipotentiary on June 8, 15, and 21, 1784, respectively. Süleyman Penâh Efendi was present at all of these meetings. Penâh Efendi continued to be a determined advocate of peace, and attempted to reign in escalation with other powers¹⁰⁸ (Vâsıf Efendi 1994, 167-174).

2.4.4 The Last Phase of Penâh's Life

In the subsequent period, Halil Hamid Paşa initiated an extensive reform program with the help of foreign officers and technicians – mostly French. He reactivated the former naval engineering school, which had been founded in 1775¹⁰⁹. Furthermore, he enlarged the light artillery corps, which had been established by the Sultan Mustafa III, and ensured the establishment of regular drills. Beyond this, the most controversial step that he initiated was an attempt to reform the Janissary corps by rearranging their rolls (*esâme*) to remove inactive members from the payment system¹¹⁰. However, after the amelioration of the Crimea crisis, the temporary coalition between the Grand Vizier Halil Hamid Paşa and the Grand Admiral Gazi Hasan Paşa started to shatter. With the initiation of the reform program, Halil Hamid Paşa started to strengthen his position as the center of all state affairs by replacing bureaucratic posts with new officials, raising a certain degree of discontent within the state quarters (Karahana 2017, 69-70).

It would have come as no surprise that the first target of this massive purge were officials close to the grand admiral, and naturally Süleyman Penâh Efendi was among those quickly replaced: on August 22, 1784, he was dismissed from the *Matbah Emâneti*¹¹¹ (Vâsıf Efendi 1994, 185). Despite his dismissal from the office of the palace kitchen, however, his imperial warrants for the *zeâmet*s in Silistra, Nikopol,

¹⁰⁸In the first council, at the time of discussion on Habsburgs' demand of land near the Bosnian border, Süleyman Penâh Efendi asked; "Is it not possible to give them another land which is equivalent to the one in Bosnia?" (Vâsıf Efendi 1994, 170).

¹⁰⁹French military expert Baron de Tott managed the foundation of the naval engineering school upon Gazi Hasan Paşa's request in 1775. It underwent some regular changes according to the grand admiral's instructions until the grand vizierate of Halil Hamid Paşa (Beydilli 1997, 317; Karahana 2017, 129-131).

¹¹⁰(Menchinger 2017, 96; Beydilli 1997, 317-318). The attempt on rearranging the Janissary rolls might have revealed an unrest among the corps. However, the idea was not new among the members of the bureaucratic apparatus of the Ottoman state, including Süleyman Penâh Efendi who mentioned the issue with his suggestions on that in his work that we will investigate further in the next chapter (Penâh Efendi 2017, 87-91).

¹¹¹In a document dated to November 10, 1784, Süleyman Penâh Efendi was mentioned as the former superintendent of the palace kitchen (DABOA.C.SM.128.6425 26 Zilhicce 1198/10 November 1784) after Zararsız (Penâh Efendi 2017, 18).

and Harşova were renewed sometime between December 1784 and January 1785. In the document that reported the renewal, Süleyman Penâh Efendi was mentioned as one of “the 30-odd *gediksiz* officials” of the imperial registry office (*defterhâne-i âmire*) (Afyoncu 2005, 177-178). The conflict between the grand admiral and the grand vizier might have become personal when Halil Hamid Paşa’s reforms extended to the Imperial Navy. In accordance with the consultation of the Swedish Ambassador Ignatius Mouradgea D’ohsson and the French Ambassadors Saint-Priest and later Choiseul-Gouffier¹¹², Halil Hamid Paşa attempted to make some improvements to the navy which deeply exasperated Gazi Hasan Paşa, such that he defined the grand vizier’s attempts as “solely for ostentation” and “extravagant” (Karahana 2017, 71-72).

The rising conflict between the factions eventually led to a bloody end for the grand vizier, who was dismissed from his post on March 31, 1785 and executed the following month. Other members of his faction suffered the same fate: The Governor of the Euboea, Raif İsmâil Paşa, and the former Janissary commander Yahya Ağa, were both dismissed and executed, and the *Şeyhülislam* Dürrişâde Ataullah Efendi died in exile¹¹³. According to contemporaneous sources, there were also rumors of a plot which was being organized by Halil Hamid Paşa and his faction to replace Sultan Abdülhamid I with his nephew Selim III, which the sultan had come to be informed about (Beydilli 1997, 318; Menchinger 2017, 102). However, definite proof of this remains elusive. Şahin Ali Paşa, who was the commander of the Ochakiv Fort at that time, was appointed as the grand vizier, and until he arrived in the capital the imperial seal was entrusted to Gazi Hasan Paşa as the representative of the grand vizier (Taylesânizâde 2003, 63). Immediately after the dismissal of Halil Hamid Paşa, a purge was launched in the bureaucratic posts. In the appointment records of August 9, 1785, 54 of the total 85 appointments were comprised of different officials than those who had been present during the last phase of Halil Hamid Paşa’s

¹¹²At this point, I should note that while Halil Hamid Paşa had a close relationship with the Swedish and especially the French Ambassadors (Karahana 2017, 69, 71-72; Beydilli 1997, 317), Gazi Hasan Paşa had a similar relationship with the British Ambassador Sir Robert Ainslie. Further research is needed to understand the tensions between these factions more comprehensively. Sir Ainslie mentioned his close relationship in his correspondence with the authorities in London during his ambassadorship. For some examples of Ainslie’s correspondence, see; (Bağış 1984, 6, 30). On the other hand, on February 1, 1786, while he was representative at the post of the grand vizierate and hosting guests among the ulemâ members in his court, he showed them a rare and expensive Quran which was made of yellowish glaze paper. As they appreciated the item, he told them that he had taken it from a certain English Ambassador who had ordered it brought from India by an English captain. The English Ambassador who was mentioned in the grand admiral’s short story was most likely Sir Robert Ainslie, since Ainslie was appointed to the post in 1775 (Bağış 1984, 2; Taylesânizâde 2003, 127-128). Such foreign entanglements make one wonder whether this factional dispute was, in some way, also a reflection of French-British rivalry in the 18th century. I should also note that there was a certain competition in trade along the Ottoman coasts between Greek and French merchants at the same time, and so it would not be a surprise if the Grand Admiral took the side of the rising Greek bourgeoisie in the Aegean in their disputes with the French; this too, requires further research.

¹¹³(Menchinger 2017, 101-102; Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 231-235, 237, 240-242, 243-248, 255-257; Taylesânizâde 2003, 63-66).

administration (Karahan 2017, 78). Süleyman Penâh Efendi was, however, one of the first among Gazi Hasan Paşa's inner circle to return to his former position in the bureaucracy, and indeed he was reappointed as the chief accountant of Anatolia (*Anadolu Muhasebecisi*) on May 11, 1785¹¹⁴.

During the same period, an additional crisis emerged in the province of Egypt. The rising power of the Mamluk notables *Şeyhülbeled* Ibrahim Bey and his partner Murad Bey had concerned the Sublime Porte since the mid-1770s, and their confrontations were causing great destruction in the province. The Ottomans thus decided to reestablish order by destroying these rebellious Beys, and commissioned Gazi Hasan Paşa with this task. He arrived at Alexandria with a fleet on June 7, 1786 and stayed in the province for more than a year. He drove the rebel leaders out of Cairo and secured the annual tax payments to the center. However, despite his considerable success, he was not able to completely destroy their power base during this appointment and was forced to return to the capital due to the outbreak of the 1787-1792 Russo-Ottoman War¹¹⁵. Penâh Efendi, in the meantime, was dismissed from his post on August 9, 1785 and then was appointed to the post on July 1, 1786 that he would continue to hold until his death. Vâsîf did not mention Süleyman Penâh Efendi as participating in the councils held to discuss the Egyptian crisis but considering that he described these meetings as being quite large, it seems likely that Penâh was present at most of them. However, according to Vâsîf, Süleyman Penâh Efendi died in his early sixties on Wednesday, the 6th of September, 1786, in his early 60s by way of the black death (*derd-i cân-kâh-ı tâ'un*). Süreyya states that he was buried in Mahmudpaşa, Istanbul.¹¹⁶

It seems likely that Penâh held an important post in the capital when the grand admiral sailed to Egypt. Penâh's writings on the necessary measures that he thought the Ottoman state should have taken become more meaningful in this context. In his writings, Penâh Efendi explicitly advocated for the Ottomans to reestablish control over Egypt, by persuasion or force¹¹⁷. According to Erdem, however, Penâh seems to have been unaware of the early successes of Gazi Hasan Paşa in Egypt, such as his expulsion of the rebel Mamluk Bey from Cairo and his capture of the

¹¹⁴(Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 252; Penâh Efendi 2017, 18). Taylesânizâde gave the date of the appointment as 14 May 1785 (Taylesânizâde 2003, 69). Although he uses Vâsîf's as I have here, Zararsız gives the date as 18 May 1785, probably due to a mistake he made in converting the Hegira calendar to the Gregorian. (Penâh Efendi 2017, 18).

¹¹⁵(Crecelius 2008, 82-85; Aydın 1993, 502; Karahan 2017, 82-89; Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 208-209, 219-226, 266-273, 346-349; Görgün 2000, 285-286).

¹¹⁶(Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 283, 352, 363; Varlık 2011, 176; Süreyya 1996, 1551).

¹¹⁷His suggestions on the issue will be investigated comprehensively in the next chapter with the ones on other issues.

city on June 7, 1786. Erdem therefore wonders whether Penâh wrote his treatise before the expedition or not. Furthermore, he asks if Penâh's suggestions regarding the reestablishing the Ottoman authority on Egypt had a decisive influence on the actions of the Porte (Penâh Efendi 2017, 133-134; Erdem 2019b). Penâh's invocation of "the retired corner" might be taken to refer to his period of unemployment following the dismissal from his previous post. Therefore, he might have written his second treatise between the dates of August 9, 1785 and July 1, 1786, which would also explain his ignorance of the achievements of the grand admiral there. In any case, it can still be assumed that Penâh's remarks on the Egypt issue had some influence on the ongoing discussion of the matter in Istanbul.

In addition to recording a summary of his career and death, Vâsîf noted that Penâh had an inclination towards Sufism, and had developed a close bond with a certain sûfî sheikh; however, he did not give the names of any particular sheikhs or lodges. Furthermore, he wrote Turkish and Arabic poems, in both poetic rhyme and verse, and theological works opposing a certain Yunus Dede, who was probably a *Mevlevî* sheikh. For these reasons, Vâsîf ended his passage by defining him as both provident and talented (Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 363). Esad Mehmed Efendi also described him as talented in both verse and prose. He added that Penâh Efendi's intellect, comprehension, and aptitude when speaking were commonly known (Esad Efendi 2018, 82). Süreya notes Penâh's affiliation with a certain lodge but does not mention its name. He also states that he was the composer of some hymns and verse (Süreyya 1996, 1551). In the course of my research, I could not clarify his connection with any particular religious lodge, but we know that his first patron Köse Bâhir Mustafa Paşa was one of the more prominent members of the Nakşibendiyye lodge, and another of his patrons, Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa, was one of the lead sheikhs of the Cerrahîyye lodge. This lodge had spread throughout the bureaucracy under the leadership of Sheikh Morevî Yahyâ Efendi (Yahyâ Efendi of the Morea), who was also a member of the *Hâcegân-ı Divan-ı Hümayûn* himself from the mid-1700s onwards (Yola 1993, 417). This connection could form the basis for future research.

Although I could not find any detailed information about Süleyman Penâh Efendi's assets when he died, there is some scattered information which deserves to be mentioned here. According to a state document, on December 23, 1785, he founded a *vakıf* in Yenipazar (Novi Pazar) with an endowment of 1200 *esedî gurus* (Dutch thalers), which was equal to more than 144,000 *akçe* at the time. The foundation was managed by the *kapudan* (commander of the local militia) of Yenipazar, Kurdish Mehmed Bey, who is described as the son of a certain Mehmed Paşa, and to whom testimony was later given by two servants of Süleyman Penâh Efendi, namely Osman Ağa of Podgoriçe (Podgorica) and Mehmed Ağa. Penâh Efendi wanted the

vakıf to lend out a sum at interest rate of 15% (*onu on bir buçuktan istirbâh ve istiğlâl olup*) and use this interest revenue for the expenses of a local school, including its teachers and students, in a fort town in Yenipazar named Dugo Bolan (Dugo Poljana). Furthermore, he wanted the *vakıf* to organize a large feast for the students of the school and the tanners of the town on the 6th of May each year. Yusuf Âgâh Efendi - as the older son of Penâh - was listed as the first attorney of the *vakıf*, with a per diem of 3 *akçe*. Finally, it was emphasized that the second, third, and fourth generations of the family's rights to the *vakıf* should be secured¹¹⁸. A day after his death, on September 7, 1786, his *zeâmet*s in Silistra, Nikopol, and Harşova were granted to his sons Osman and Ahmed Kâmil as half shares, as a condition of their duties as state officials (Afyoncu 2005, 178, 185). In fact, in a document dated twenty years after his death, it was stated that Penâh had more *zeâmet*s in some villages around Iași, Ioannina, and Trikala. Although there is little information regarding these additional holdings, it is clear that Penâh died a rather wealthy man.

¹¹⁸(DABOA.EV.VKF.25.5 29 Zilhicce 1200/23 October 1786).

3. ORDER OF THE CLIMES

“... my poor sea of thoughts has fluctuated, and my humble desire concerned with writing some means of measures on the order of the climes...”

— Penah Efendi 2017, 85

Penâh’s work focuses on an extensive array of topics, starting with military affairs and moving on to state finances and economy. As will be seen in following section, his knowledge of practical matters was mostly grounded in the experiences that he gained through his bureaucratic career. He mentions the names of only two members of the 18th-century Ottoman literati in the *Climes*¹: namely, the famous Ottoman historian Nâ’imâ (d. 1716), and the Hungarian-born Ottoman diplomat İbrâhim Müteferrika (d. 1745). From his references, we understand that he had read Nâ’imâ’s history (*Târih-i Nâ’imâ*), as the effect of Nâ’imâ on his ideas can be deduced easily throughout his text (Ermiş 2014, 47). Moreover, although he does not mention any of the works of İbrâhim Müteferrika, when one considers the section on the reforms of Peter the Great of Russia at the beginning of his treatise on the Morea Rebellion, it is clear that he must have been familiar with Müteferrika’s *The Rational Bases for the Order of Countries* (*Usûlü’l-hikem fî nizâmi’l-ümem*). Furthermore, considering the information he utilized and some of the narratives that he mentioned the Spanish West Indies in the Climes, it is likely that he had read the study of the New World published by the Müteferrika press, namely the anonymously-written *History of the West Indies as Heard From New Information* (*Târih-i Hind-i Garbî el-müsemma bi-hadîs-i nev*). Likewise, although Penâh does not mention the 17th-century Ottoman polymath Kâtip Çelebi, (d. 1657), considering Penâh’s ideas on the relationship between state and society, we can assume that he was at least somewhat familiar with Kâtip Çelebi’s *The Chronicle of Histories* (*Takvîmü’t-tevârîh*) (Sariyannis 2018, 347, 348; Erdem 2017a).

On the other hand, Penâh Efendi mentions another source at the end of his treatise, a Greek priest whom he trusted and described as a loyal supporter of the Ottoman

¹We will mention his work as “the Climes” from that point on.

Empire. He states that, after perfecting the Greek sciences, the priest had gone to the Habsburg realms to study the sciences in Latin and Italian and had stayed there for 15 years. When he returned to Ottoman soil in 1192 H. (1778-1779), he met with Penâh Efendi and discussed the various practices and methods (*tavr ü tarz*) of the Habsburgs. According to Penâh Efendi, the priest tearfully told him that, when he was there, he saw more than 500 thousand Ottoman subjects who had fled from Rumeli and had settled to the Habsburg lands and founded numerous towns, villages, and farms, making the Balkans prosperous. When Penâh asked if they could be made to return, he said that it was impossible, because they were well protected by the Habsburgs (Penâh Efendi 2017, 158). Unfortunately, I could not find any further information regarding this Greek priest. Nevertheless, he remains an important interlocutor for Penâh, serving to develop his ideas on the protection of provincial subjects and the necessity of military reform. On the other hand, as Erdem suggests, considering his positive relations with the Greek priests of the Morea in the 1770 Rebellion Penâh's knowledge about the world and "obviously enlightened" ideas might have been influenced by not just one individual, but rather by a whole class of Greek priests (Erdem 2017a, 2019c).

It should be kept in mind, however, that since he was at the center of the Ottoman bureaucracy at that time, his proposals regarding military affairs were also largely a product of the 1769-1774 Russo-Ottoman War. Furthermore, although he mentions the circumstances in the Morea more than any other province, he does often reference the situation in the Balkans, as well as nearly all of the Ottoman realms. In other words, although giving importance to the Morea, he did not intend to describe this province exclusively.

Although we do not know how extensive his relationship was with the European diplomatic corps, since he was involved in several high-level diplomatic negotiations, Penâh Efendi must have learned about developments in Europe from them as well. One of the European diplomats is especially worthy of mention: namely, the British orientalist and numismatist Sir Robert Ainslie, who was the British Ambassador in Istanbul between 1776-1793 and was known for his close relations with the Grand Admiral Gazi Hasan Paşa of Algeria and Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Paşa. It seems that Ainslie was also acquainted with Penâh Efendi's elder son Yusuf Âgâh Efendi, since he played some role in the appointment of the latter as the first Ottoman Ambassador to London in 1793, just before his return to Britain (Bağış 1984, 126). Moreover, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Penâh Efendi was acquainted with a wide variety of people, from members of the Greek schools in the Morea to Venetians resident on the islands of the Adriatic Sea, from high-ranking officials of the Ottoman state to the humble *kapudans* and tanners of Bulgaria, and we can

thus assume that he was part of several different networks of knowledge transmission (Erdem 2019c).

The *Climes* is written in a somewhat colloquial manner. Penâh Efendi does not put his ideas into words in a systematic way, and his rare theoretical expressions are scattered amongst lengthy sections focused on more practical matters. Some parts also have no clear connection with the topic that they are supposedly organized under (Cezar 1988, 112). The style of the text also tells something about its audience. Considering the period in which Penâh wrote his treatise, it can be suggested that he aimed to reach an audience of Ottoman state officials who had considerable information about state organization and therefore easily comprehended his suggestions for reforms. Furthermore, following the execution of Halil Hamid Paşa, Koca Yusuf Paşa, who was one of the prominent members of Gazi Hasan Paşa's faction, became grand vizier; it is possible that Penâh might have written the text as the political platform of his faction. In order to understand the work more clearly, this thesis chooses to use its own organizational structure independent from Penâh's original.

3.1 Approaches to the State and Politics

In a section of the text entitled “On the Military Class”, Penâh Efendi references the historical schema of the famous Ottoman historian Na'imâ (d. 1716): that is, that states progressed through stages of “emergence”, “stagnation”, and “decline”. Moreover, Penâh continues, the historian had analogized the development of states to the human body. However, to some extent, Penâh disagrees with Na'imâ, noting that although the entry of a state into the third stage of decline might be inevitable, the state is not exactly akin to a human body, because it is not granted death. Indeed, if states were to respect the rules that they had imposed, to act wisely in accordance with changing conditions in the world, and to make alterations from time to time as necessary, they would be safe from decline (Penâh Efendi 2017, 88; Erdem 2017c). Regarding the stages of states, Penâh mentions the famous Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun's (d.1406) concept of the “cycle of dynasties,” which was first introduced and systematically adapted into Ottoman philosophical history² by Kâtip Çelebi (d.

²In his framework, namely “the cycle of dynasties”, Ibn Khaldun argued that all dynasties have a lifetime of four generations (120 years) before their destruction. After its introduction, this framework became very popular among the Ottoman literati of the 18th century, with the help of the printed works of İbrahim Müteferrika's (d. 1745) press in the first half of the century (Sariyannis 2018, 347-348). It comprised a useful basis for the Ottomans to build their own concepts of decline and reform (Aksan 1993, 54)

1657). Despite citing Na'imâ, Penâh uses Kâtip Çelebi's version of the concept.³ Sariyannis has suggested that this was because "the purpose of Penah's account of the historical stages is to advocate reform of the military class, rather than to advocate peace as Na'imâ did in his history" (Sariyannis 2018, 349). However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Süleyman Penâh Efendi was indeed a prominent advocate for a more pacifist foreign policy after the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War. Moreover, in his treatise, he underlines that - due to the contemporary condition of the army - going to war would be a grave mistake, suggesting instead appeasement as a safer strategy (Penâh Efendi 2017, 103). It is possible that his assumed readership was entirely aware that a prolonged period of peace was necessary to implement his desired reforms, and as such he de-emphasized the importance of peace in the text itself.

Additionally, Penâh gives his own version of the stages of the state. According to this narrative, during the stage of emergence, due to the expansion of the state through recurrent conquests, soldiers are kept happy with redistributed lands and attractive spoils and thus, without much effort, stay obedient and act in harmony. During this stage, when the state is still being established, the rulers of the state pretend not to see the soldiers' faults and the soldiers do not act rebellious towards the rulers; Penâh suggests that this situation is probably peculiar to this stage. Because they understand the situation, men of insight (*erbâb-ı basîret*) start to approve the inappropriate actions of some of the soldiers. However, when a state acquires maturity and strength, its people will become inclined towards gaining pleasure, comfort, power, and ornament, and thus all the townspeople and even the peasants will begin to act according to their own desires and develop a different attitude and temperament (Penâh Efendi 2017, 85-86). This is the turning point of Penâh's narrative, and when it begins to diverge from Na'imâ's schema. As the state matures, the men of insight begin to realize that there are some problems with the orderliness of the people and their employment in the state services, and as such they divide the population into several classes and bind these classes to certain conditions. In the ideal version of this system, everyone, including the rulers, respects these conditions, and with meticulous care these conditions are maintained and altered as necessary (Penâh Efendi 2017, 85-86; Erdem 2017c). Although clearly related to the political thought of Kâtip Çelebi and Na'imâ, (Sariyannis 2018, 288, 311-313), from

³Kâtip Çelebi analogized the state to the body of a human, and just like man, the life of a state had three stages; growth (*nümûv*), stagnation (*vukuf*) and physical decline (*inhitât*). There were certain symptoms for each stage, and all measures to "redress the conditions of the commonwealth (*umûr-ı cumhur*)" must be taken according to these signs as in medical practice (Sariyannis 2018, 290). However, although Na'imâ copied Kâtip Çelebi's anthropomorphic theory, he extended the stages from three to five and provided more detailed explanations for every one of the stages, which were as follows: establishment and victory, consolidation and independence, peace and prosperity, contentment and tranquility, and finally, disintegration (Sariyannis 2018, 311-312; Itzkowitz 1977, 24).

this point onwards Penâh writes a very different narrative that, as Erdem suggests, is based on rather unclear historical examples⁴ (Erdem 2017c). Considering his objection to the analogy of the state with the human body, it seems likely that Penâh intentionally neglected the last stage - the “deferrable but inevitable” end of the state - which appeared in both Kâtîp Çelebi’s and Na’îmâ’s frameworks⁵. He replaced this with a different narrative, in which enlightened officials realize imminent problems and intervene in the course of the state. These men of insight (*erbâb-ı basîret*) were Penâh’s ideal statesmen (*erbâb-ı devlet*).

Penâh Efendi suggests that states, by definition, have only three duties. These are the conservation of the treasury (*sıyânet-i hazîne*), the welfare of the subjects (*refâhiyyet-i reâyâ ü berâyâ*), and the maintenance of order in the army (*râbita-i asker*)⁶. The state has no essential role beyond these three areas.⁷ According to Cezar, with the definition of these three duties, Penâh located the state in the center of the economic development, but as a regulatory agent (Cezar 1988, 118). It is noteworthy that, although these duties seem strikingly similar (Ermiş 2014, 123-124), Penâh does not mention the concept of the “circle of justice”⁸, which had been “a foundational element in the empire’s ideology and a key to [the Ottomans’] transformation” and can be found in many works of Ottoman political literature,

⁴Erdem wonders whether Penâh Efendi was referencing Cleisthenes’ and Solon’s reforms, which were enacted in classical Morea, or the French regulations of the *états généraux* (Erdem 2017c).

⁵As Sariyannis suggested, “...the medical vision of society serves as a bridge for the introduction of the Khaldunian notion of the “state stages” into the Ottoman philosophy of history: a society is like a man, with various ages and an unavoidable end. Nevertheless, Katib Celebi wants to stress that old age may be extended and health restored, albeit temporarily.” (Sariyannis 2018, 295) Like Kâtîp Çelebi, Na’îmâ had suggested certain measures to extend the life of the state before its inevitable end (Sariyannis 2018, 314-315).

⁶On the other hand, the duties that Penâh entrusted to the state find a certain analogy in the liberal conception of the state, such as Adam Smith’s conceptualization of “natural liberty”. As Smith wrote in *The Wealth of Nations*; “According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend to (...): first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly (...) an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain publick works and certain publick institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit could never repay the expence of any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society.” (Roncaglia 2006, 151). The level of similarity begs the question of whether this was truly coincidental, or whether Penâh might have somehow come across Smith’s work or some of his ideas. Even if he did, considering his audience, it is likely that Penâh did not feel the need to mention Smith’s name, as he was most probably largely unknown among the Ottoman literati. Penâh and Smith were contemporaneous, in that Smith was born in 1723 and died in 1790. His celebrated work *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, published in 1776, immediately had a strong effect among the British intellectual and political quarters (Ross 2010, 286-287), ten years before Penâh wrote his *Climes*. Penâh’s connections with Venetian and Greek mercantile and intellectual networks, or indirect affiliation with the British Ambassador Sir Robert Ainslie, who was from Scotland like Smith, might have made Smith’s work or ideas available for him; however, this requires further research.

⁷(Penâh Efendi 2017, 95; Erdem 2017a; Ermiş 2014, 123).

⁸In Linda T. Darling’s words; “The circle of justice is an ancient Middle Eastern political concept, ..., a concept of social justice based on interdependence of power and obvious conflicts of interest and that holds society together when such conflicts would pull it apart”. This was commonly known through a quat written by the sixteenth-century Ottoman scholar, statesman, and poet Kınalızâde Ali Efendi (d. 1572); “No power without troops, troops without money, money without prosperity, prosperity without justice and good administration.” (Darling 2013, 2).

including Kâtip Çelebi and Na'imâ (Darling 2013, 127, 148-149). In another part of his work, he writes that there are no other necessary duties for “us” (*bizlere göre*) except for the provisions of war (*levâzımât-ı seferiyye*), the amelioration of the dominions (*imâr-i memâlik*), and the welfare of the subjects (*refâh-i bâl-i reâyâ ü berâyâ*) (Penâh Efendi 2017, 124). As can be seen from this quote, Penâh both outlined these theoretical concepts in a more practical manner here and included himself and the reader as stand-ins for the state: a telling remark, to which I will return later in this chapter.

Penâh also compared the state to a man with an income of 40 *kise*. If the state could secure control of its revenue, then it would live prosperously. But if it could not, then malignant parties would be revealed, would seize the important positions, and the state would eventually lose control over its financial base. Penâh Efendi asserts that this is the main reason for the collapse of states, both in the past and the present, and indeed in the foreseeable future (Penâh Efendi 2017, 88). Like Kâtip Çelebi, Penâh analogizes the state to a human being, but in a manner reflecting an economic, rather than medical, perspective. In other words, Penâh's state is an economic unit, not an organism. Furthermore, he does not give importance to the four humors⁹ as his predecessors did. Considering the balance of power that had been established between the bureaucracy and the Janissary corps, and which had come to dominate the better part of 18th century political culture, the importance given to the notion of a state in ‘balance’ might have somewhat decreased in comparison to the previous, tumultuous century. Even when the urgent need for military reform became clear, after the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War, the notion of a state being in “balance” appears to have lost a great deal of explanatory power and was largely ignored (Sariyannis 2018, 332-333). Rather than proposing to decrease the size of the military, however, Penâh suggests instead ways to maintain the order of the army, which he argues should be enlarged and strengthened to make it able to confront its European counterparts.

Penâh Efendi states that oppression is the cause of riots, disobedience, and distress, which can all be seen as signs of a state in decline; if such tyranny is not avoided, he argues, “no one can find the way to his home.” Penâh states, however, that the people of the contemporary age take these problems of the time as the necessities of the century. He strongly objects to any claim that the Ottoman state was flawless

⁹ As a part of his medical analogy, Kâtip Çelebi adapted the contemporary medical theory of the four humors; that is, blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile. According to this analogy, just as the state resembled the human body, the four pillars of the state and society - namely the scholars (*ulemâ*), the military, the merchants, and the peasants - corresponded to each of the four humors, respectively. Thus, to lengthen the life of the body, a balance should be maintained among the humors. (Sariyannis 2018, 291-292, 301) Na'imâ copied Kâtip Çelebi's theory of the four humors in his own history (Sariyannis 2018, 310).

in the chaotic events of the century, arguing instead that the responsibility for problems lies with the administration. In this regard, he sets forth some norms for the “*erbâb-ı devlet*” (men of state, statesmen), who, as the administrators of the state, were responsible for its problems. According to these norms of conduct, statesmen should be rigorous in their affairs, even for business with a value of just one *akçe*, because that one *akçe* might become a gold coin or a purse of coins in the future. Secondly, all state affairs should be done robustly, from beginning to end. Unwariness, negligence, and nepotism are illicit when it comes to the state affairs. Finally, he criticized the greed within the state bureaucracy, arguing that putting oneself in danger for worldly pleasures and personal desires is irrational. The ones who do such wrongs weaken and look down upon both the state and the Muslim community, something Penâh argues is equal to treason (Penâh Efendi 2017, 132-133).

Furthermore, the relationship between the state and the servants of God (*ibâdullah*) who were entrusted to the men of the state by God, should resemble that of a gardener and his garden. After quoting a couplet from Sheikh Sâdi of Shiraz (d. 1292), which states that God will bless those who serve the ruler well as his own servants¹⁰, he argues that statesmen should likewise devote themselves to the service of the servants of God (*ibâdullahın hıdmetine hasr etmelü*). Therefore, men of patriotic zeal (*erbâb-ı hamıyyet*) should renounce the sable-furs and the posts which they had gained through disgrace and sin, because true manliness came from contenting oneself with an *abâ* (a cheap and common woolen cloth). But, he continues, if there is one who has integrity and patriotic zeal (*istikâmet ve hamıyyet*) and who does what he can for God, this is akin to signing a contract with the God and no one would be able to charge him.¹¹

It is perhaps worthwhile to explore more deeply the term *erbâb-ı hamıyyet*, which he uses in his treatise several times. In another part of his treatise, he explains his affection for the Ottoman lands by writing;

“With the help of God, no more land is necessary than the dominions of the Exalted State. Like the Greek saying ‘*Epangelia tis yis*’ (*ı* - the promised land) that is to say Rumili, Anatolia, and some of the parts of Arabia, with their climates, crops, equilibrium, and cleanliness,

¹⁰ According to Zararsız, Penâh’s quotation from Sadi was “*Hikmet mehzist eger lutf-i cihân-âferîn/Hâs koned bende-i maslahet-i umerâ*” (Penâh Efendi 2017, 132). Zararsız takes the word “*umerâ*” as some form of “*umûm*,” which literally means public and, in this form, God praises the ones who serve public affairs (Penâh Efendi 2017, 132). Although congruent with the thrust of Penâh’s words after the quote, the last word of the couplet is probably a misspelling, and should be read as *ûmerâ*, the plural form of *emîr* (ruler).

¹¹ (Penâh Efendi 2017, 132-133, 140-141; Cezar 1988, 120-121; Ermiş 2014, 136).

and especially Istanbul, may the most glorious God protect them from all disasters. God's glory appears on them." (Penâh Efendi 2017, 123; Erdem 2019d)

Considering his emphasis on patriotic zeal, the passage cited above suggests that Penâh Efendi was not only a propagator of this sort of patriotism, but himself embodied it. However, this patriotism was obviously not of the secular, nationalistic type, nor was it particularly concerned with the common people of the Ottoman realms. For instance, he did not use the same term to describe his priest friend who went to the Habsburg realms, but rather referred to him as a loyal supporter of the state. It seems that for Penâh, patriotism was rather an identity for the statesmen, the elites of the empire, or in other words the servants of the state and religion.

According to Penâh Efendi, order cannot be maintained only through execution, banishment, and confiscation; instead, it demands a level of art. Indeed, he criticizes those who understand the problems of the state as the result of clear and obvious causes, or who attempt to solve issues solely with violence; referencing a saying of the Prophet Mohammad, he argues that "Men are ambitious for the things that they are prevented from". He proceeds to describe the "art" of statesmen as the concealment of their real intentions from the public, in order to prevent the populace from being alarmed, and the distraction of the public with other, less important issues. Thus, the desired matter will naturally be put into order (*tabîatiyle*) and the common people will be unable to notice where this order originated from¹² (Penâh Efendi 2017, 86, 118; Erdem 2017c). In using the term "art" (*sanat*) to describe a method of administration, Penâh Efendi was likely referring to the art of politics. However, his perception of politics in and of itself is generally limited to deceiving the common people about the real aims of the state, in order to prevent them from acting as obstacles to the implementation of desired programs. Indeed, Penâh criticizes contemporary political discourse in the Empire, and argues that unless the Exalted State endeavored to act in a more regular and systematic fashion, imperial decrees and edicts (*hutûd-ı şerîfe ve evâmîr-i 'aliyye*) would be unnecessary, or even disadvantageous. It is, he argues, useless for the state to say, "they should not do this or that", for such regulations require clear limits, practical methods of application, and understandable conditions (Penâh Efendi 2017, 124; Erdem 2019b).

As is clear from the previous chapter, during the period in which Penâh wrote, there were many councils being held in Istanbul, which enjoyed broad participation from the members of the Ottoman bureaucracy, judiciary, and military. Thus, the "us"

¹²Kâtîp Çelebi makes a similar point regarding the ineffectiveness of violence in changing popular custom. As he argues, violence brings only dissent and strife (Sariyannis 2018, 298-299).

of the text, the “*erbâb-ı devlet*”, can be taken to represent both the participants in those councils and the audience of Penâh’s work. It appears that Penâh considered the state to be a high collective of statesmen who shared both responsibilities and interests. Penâh, in this sense, does not use the term “state” with the broader meaning that Kâtip Çelebi gives it¹³, yet he does use it, in a more constrained political and practical sense, to distinguish the realm of the social. In his conceptualization, he views the state as a separate element overseeing society, and which intervenes and shapes the affairs of both. According to Penâh, the state consists not of human society, but the society of statesmen. Indeed, he appears to take the state – which is to say, the statesmen at its core – as the only conscious and active agent of history.

This is more evident in the section in which he elaborates upon the identity of the *erbâb-ı basîret*. According to Penâh Efendi, some exceptional individuals can know fully the important affairs of a moment, a year, or a sequence of events, due to their particular aptitude. The majority of people are not able to understand even an ongoing conversation in which they are present, if asked to retell the conversation after an hour. If, from the Flood until now, everyone were of the same (low) quality, no one would know astrology (*felekiyât*), mathematics (*hendese*), and astronomy (*heyet*), or would have invented the compass (*pusula*), gunpowder (*barut*), printing (*basma ile tevfir-i kütüb*), and other tools and sciences. However, in history, there are exceptional men - namely the *erbâb-ı basîret* – who devote themselves to the maintenance of the state that they are “under the auspices of” (Penâh Efendi 2017, 110; Erdem 2017b). Penâh’s perception of the state is essentially characterized by a sort of political elitism. The “natural” elites are those who are more competent than the common people, and they are the cause of developments in several sciences. In Penâh’s conception, these are the ones who should rule.

Hâcegân-ı Dîvân-ı Hümayûn

Following this, he comes to topic of the central bureaucracy: namely, the *Hâcegân-ı Dîvân-ı Hümayûn*.¹⁴ Penâh Efendi emphasizes its significance in statecraft, and indeed considers it as the embodiment of the state itself, such that he defines the members of the *Hâcegân-ı Dîvân-ı Hümayûn* as the bearers of the burden of the

¹³Kâtip Çelebi states that while the word devlet (state) literally meant saltanat (dynasty) and mülk (dominions), according to different opinions, it refers to human society more broadly (*içtimâ-i beşeriyyeden ibârettir*). He thus used the word devlet in a broader sense than Ibn Khaldun, who used it to refer merely to particular dynasties. Kâtip Çelebi coupled it regularly with “communities” and “societies” (devlet ve cemiyet) referring to society wholesale (Şariyannis 2018, 290).

¹⁴The *Hâcegân-ı Dîvân-ı Hümayûn* was comprised of the high-ranking members of the Ottoman bureaucracy. In addition to the chiefs of the offices of both the Imperial Chancellery and the Sublime Porte, the scribes of the finance office and Janissary Corps, the *tersâne emîni* (supervisor of the dockyards), the *arpa emîni* (comptroller of the supplies of barley), the *matbah emîni* (head of the kitchen of the Sultan’s palace), the *darbhâne emîni* (the master of the mint), the *teşrifâtçı* (master of ceremonies), and the supervisors of Imperial Arsenal, powder mills, and so forth were appointed among the members of the *Hâcegân-ı Dîvân-ı Hümayûn* (İ.H. Uzunçarşılı 1988b, 68).

service of the Exalted State (*bar-keş-i hüdmet-i Devlet-i ‘Aliyye*), the protectors of the honor of the Exalted Sultanate (*muhârisîn-i nâmus-ı Saltanat-ı Seniyye*), the stewards of the khalif of the Earth (*ümenâ-yı halîfe-i rûy-ı zemîn*), and the champions of the essential rules of the high officials of the Exalted State (*te’yîd-i kavâ‘id-i esâs-ı erkân-ı Devlet-i ‘Aliyye*). According to Penâh Efendi, these definitions apply to other states as well (Penâh Efendi 2017, 147). The characteristics that Penâh attributes to the *Hâcegân* reflected a phenomenon which found its roots in the mid-17th century, but reached its peak in the 18th century before the rise of the modernizing and centralizing state of the 19th century; that is, the autonomy of the central bureaucracy. As professionalization emerged in the state quarters, the space for autonomous policy making likewise expanded. According to Sariyannis, the members of the central bureaucracy “developed a common and self-conscious culture that praised its own role in the government of the empire” in this period, and came to identify themselves with the state (Sariyannis 2018, 331).

As the backbone of the state, Penâh Efendi suggests, a member of the *Hâcegân* should be wise and virtuous, a man of letters and acquainted with the philosophy of the scribal office. Furthermore, he underlines that the *hâcegânlık* should be granted only to the most able, and that nepotism is extremely detrimental to the state.¹⁵ Thus, he suggests a method of admission to the *hâcegân*. As he argues, one should be granted with the *hâcegânlık* only after a demonstration of one's qualities in both writing and speaking, in the presence of the Chief of the Scribes¹⁶ (*Re‘isü’l-küttâb*); such an examination will demonstrate whether the prospective official is reasonable or sensual, a hypocrite or a sycophant. Moreover, those who have been granted the title before, in both capital and provinces, should likewise prove their qualities in the presence of the *Re‘isü’l-küttâb*, and the titles of the ones who refuse should be revoked. No one, including the scribes of the great viziers’ councils, should be taken as an exception, and those who have not been in the service of the state for a certain period of time should not be granted other ranks either.¹⁷

Despite this apparent emphasis on meritocracy, he also states his reservations regarding the incorporation of provincial people into the state bureaucracy. As he argues, because they are used to a *‘yân*-ship, the people of the provinces do not recognize the

¹⁵Penâh Efendi gives Hasan Efendi as a bad example of the *Hâcegân*, who was appointed as the *Mütesellim* of the Morea after being granted the title of *hâcegânlık*, and harshly criticized him. He described Hasan Efendi as the reason for the destruction during the rebellion in 1770, because of his apparent mistakes (Penâh Efendi 2017, 148).

¹⁶We should note that when Penâh was writing these lines, the *Re‘isü’l-küttâb* was Mehmed Hayri Efendi, who was appointed to the office second time on January 8, 1786 (Vâsıf Efendi 1994, 311-312). He was another prominent member of Gazi Hasan Paşa’s political faction, and one of the Penâh’s companions during the councils and diplomatic negotiations of the Crimea crisis.

¹⁷(Penâh Efendi 2017, 147-148; Cezar 1988, 120-121; Sariyannis 2018, 350).

honor of the state and high officials. He pejoratively calls them farmers (*çiftçiler*), and states that because they are used to the flavor of eggs and chickens, and the nature of their rustic selfishness and pride, no matter whatever rank is granted to them, they are unable to change and continue to act as if they were still in the provinces. In fact, he continues, the majority of those who have worked hardest for the expansion and maintenance of the Exalted State have always been those from the high officials of the state (*ricâl-i Devlet-i ‘Aliyye*) and the ones who are appointed to the vizierate among the palace servants (*saray-ı hümayûn hademesi*).¹⁸ It seems that at some point, his political elitism and his strong dislike of the provincial notables became enmeshed

3.2 Military Reforms

“Because we are in the sleep of indolence; the infidel comes, burns, ruins, and leaves.”

— Penâh Efendi 2017, 105

According to Penâh Efendi, the administration of the Exalted State was a delicate matter, and because of the vast size of its realms even the great rulers of the ancient world, such as Alexander the Great (*İskender*), Jamshid (*Cemşid*), and Darius the Great (*Dara*), would be little more than vassals next to it. Indeed, he argues that all the forces of the Christian states were nothing in comparison with those of the Exalted State; it was only because ongoing structural problems had not been solved, that the Ottomans had come to be ashamed of themselves when they saw the Europeans. He further notes that the relative military success of the Europeans was clearly because of their prudence in managing state affairs, and they were thus able to fight fearlessly over both land and sea, and strictly control all of their regions. He describes the Ottoman Empire’s contemporary condition as unbearable for the *erbâb-ı hamîyyet*. However, according to Penâh Efendi, if the Exalted State intended to, it could put its affairs in order a thousand times better than the Christians (Penâh Efendi 2017, 105).

In the case of 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War, he points to ongoing ministerial deficiencies as the reason for the defeat. As he writes, when the Muscovites entered

¹⁸(Penâh Efendi 2017, 149; Yaycıoğlu 2016, 43-44; Sariyannis 2018, 350-351).

the Ottoman realms by crossing the Danube, the Ottomans should have been able to surround them, cut their provisioning routes, and destroy them by attacking from all sides. However, the Ottomans were in “the sleep of indolence” when the Muscovites arrived, and thus the infidels came, burned, and left the Ottoman lands in ruins. He underlines that the common people and soldiers are not able to understand misgovernment as the reason for their defeats, and they therefore attribute it to the strength of the enemy; this causes further confusion among the ranks, leading to the total defeat of the army (Penâh Efendi 2017, 105-106).

3.2.1 The Janissary Corps

In regard to the reform of the army, Penâh Efendi starts by mentioning the measures of the European states. He states that the Europeans divide their armies into groups, which they called *regimend* (regiment), and which consist of a thousand or more soldiers.¹⁹ These regiments, Penâh Efendi continues, are constantly drilled everyday by their commanders, in order to increase the coordination of the soldiers. The soldiers and common people understand these drills merely as techniques to overcome the enemy in battle. However, Penâh continues, these drills are also very crucial for maintaining the discipline of the troops. With the help of these daily drills, a commander becomes more able to control the regiment, like a driver who puts a halter on a camel and then drives it. Furthermore, if any of the soldiers transgresses the rules, he can punish them properly (Penâh Efendi 2017, 86; Sariyannis 2018, 353). It is clear that Penâh was aware of contemporary developments in military thinking in Europe. During the second half of the 18th century, under the influence of Prussian methods, drill became one of the most important aspects of military thought in Europe. As Penâh correctly states, in addition to increasing the war capabilities of the regiments, the idea of drills was to make soldiers into the minute gears of a massive military machine, rather than to make them into individually remarkable warriors. In other words, through the replication of certain

¹⁹The regiment that Penâh mentioned was a much more complicated military unit, part of a broad divisional system that was itself a product of military thought in enlightenment Europe. The two long wars of the 18th century - namely, the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) and the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) - had a great influence on the formations of the European armies during this time, in that all of them were more or less affected by the ongoing changes. This entailed a certain level of standardization of both warfare and military organization. The new divisional system was designed to control the gigantic armies of the 18th century by dividing them into smaller units that a human mind could easily understand and schematize (Yeşil 2011, 251-252; Wilson 2005, 200; Black 2003, 153-154). On the other hand, Sariyannis suggests that Penâh may have copied the section on European regiments from İbrâhim Müteferrika's treatise, *Usûlü'l-hikem fî nizâmi'l-ümem* (Sariyannis 2018, 360).

moves and figures for a certain period of time, modern drills aimed to both increase the firepower and speed of the armies and ensure the obedience of the soldiers to orders.²⁰

Penâh continues by grounding his suggestions regarding military affairs upon his conception of the life stages of a state. As he writes, after the stage of emergence, the state can no longer control the army as if it were all one color. Therefore, to control a group of soldiers with another group, the *erbâb-ı basîret* divided the army into several classes²¹ (Penâh Efendi 2017, 86). However, because the Ottoman state was preoccupied with numerous wars and extending the borders of the state at that time, some weak spots nevertheless remained. Hence, in the capital and especially in the provinces, many “*reâyâ* types” who are dwellers in the cities, towns, boroughs, and villages, made themselves into Janissaries in order to free themselves from the oppression of the local authorities; the Janissary *ağas* likewise take in local recruits (*sekbân*) in return for a certain amount of *akçes*.²² He makes clear that these types of soldiers cannot ever be disciplined, and when all these people gather under the same flag and become Janissaries, the order of the army dissipates.²³ Penâh states that it is impossible to control such an army, to bring it to battle, to make them fight, and to prevent them from leaving the front without permission (Penâh Efendi 2017, 87,91; Sariyannis 2018, 352).

The false expansion of the Janissary corps without any actual increase in the fighting ranks, was due to the entry of fraudulent names into the muster rolls of the

²⁰(Yeşil 2016, 104-105; Black 2003, 149-152; Nimwegen 2010, 178).

²¹The division and sub-division of the armies and the re-arrangement of military administration according to the new divisional lines were common practices among the European states in the 18th century (Black 2003, 152-154). This process was followed by a considerable professionalization and increase in the number of military officers. In case of Habsburg Austria, from the mid-18th century onwards, a number of military academies were opened which provided the basis for a professionalized military officer corps (Black 2003, 130). In the late 18th century, the number of military officers including non-commissioned ones and the ratio of officers to rank-and-file were considerably lower in the Ottoman army compared to their Habsburg counterparts (Ágoston 2010, 133).

²²Penâh was here describing a well-known problem of the Janissary corps, which had been known to Ottoman intellectuals since the late 16th century; that is, the inflation of the muster-rolls of the Janissary corps (Aksan 2012, 325-326).

²³“The Janissaries had merged with local communities and could no longer be required to rotate from city to countryside, or fortress to fortress. As local elites, and bullies, they were at the center of political rivalries and largely unreliable for other than police work. Most operated in the marketplace in trades well outside their primary responsibility as soldiers; many were involved in extortion and protection rackets. Nonetheless, the regiments (*ortas*) still took care of their own, maintaining separate treasuries, investing their money collectively, insisting on the right of return of ten percent of the estates of dead comrades, and generally attending to the well-being of regimental brothers at war. Discipline was the responsibility of the regimental officers. Not even the sultan or the grand vizier could intervene unless state crimes such as a murder occurred.” (Aksan 2012, 326) The convergence of the Janissary corps with Ottoman civil society turned the Janissaries into small merchants and tradesmen with some rewards and tax immunities and who were, if scarcely, also paid by the state (Aksan 1998, 26). The privileges of being a Janissary created an allure around the corps, and as such many ordinary people sought to make themselves a part of the Janissary corps.

Janissaries, namely the *esâmes*²⁴ (Aksan 2005, 167). For this reason, Penâh Efendi suggests some reforms of the *esâme* system as well. He indicates that the *esâmes* of his time did not include the places where the soldiers were assigned to. When a soldier arrived at the place that he was assigned to, it was enough for him to tell the name of the place verbally. Thus, the soldiers congregated in large groups in certain areas, turning them into sources of unrest. Therefore, according to Penâh Efendi, these documents should mention the deployment locations of the soldiers, including the *eyâlet*, *sancak*, and *kazâ*, and an *esâme* of a soldier should include the soldier's name, a depiction of his appearance, and his father's name. All of the information in the *esâme* should also be recorded in the state registers in the same form. Thus, it could be known exactly how many Janissaries were located in each *kazâ*, *eyâlet*, or *sancak*, and in time of need, some or all of them could be swiftly moved with an *emr-i 'âlî* and a letter from the Janissary commander (*ağa mektubu*) mentioning the relevant location of a regiment. He notes that the soldiers bound to this sort of order will not desert (Penâh Efendi 2017, 88-89; Sariyannis 2018, 352).

Penâh Efendi complains about the *esâme* trade, in which, he argues, the *esâmes* were bought and sold like commodities or bonds, with a price of 8 or 10 *guruş* for a daily stipend of one *akçe* of at that time. Many men were buying Janissary pay-tickets for stipends of a hundred, three hundred, and even more *akçe*, and this was causing tremendous losses to the treasury. He describes the trade in *esâmes* as a great shame for the state, and as grave danger. For this reason, he suggests that the selling of *esâmes* should be banned, albeit “with good measures” and the cooperation of the high officials of the Janissary corps, and the fraudulent *esâmes* should not be renewed upon the death of the owner but rather kept in the treasury. After this reform, the registers of the Janissaries in all of the *eyâlets* and *sancaks* should be re-recorded according to the principles he outlined, and all those who have never gone to the front, are not eligible for war, and the members of the *reâyâ* class should be removed from the registers. The officers who are appointed to the new

²⁴ *Esâme*, literally “names”, was the name given to the pay-tickets of the janissaries, and the muster-rolls were called the *esâme* defteri. These bills were given to the soldiers after their names were recorded in the Janissary registers. Only those who had these bills in their hands could get the designated Janissary stipend, and the names of those who were dead, exiled or executed were erased from the registers. Copies of the *esâmes* were kept in the clerical office of the Janissary corps (*Yeniçeri efendisi dâ'iresi*) (Özcan 1995, 355-356). Although these had already been traded before, from the reign of Mahmud I (1730-1754) onwards *esâmes* started to be sold legally on the market, including ones belonging to the dead and deserters, as “stock or bond certificates” or as “guarantees of access to what amounted to a social welfare system”. Ottoman administrators, bureaucrats, and palace officials benefited from these sales as much as Janissary officers, and perhaps more. The issue of the fraudulent *esâmes* was addressed by the Ottoman government from time to time. For instance, in 1688, 20,000 names were removed from the Janissary registers, and in 1771, 30,000 more were erased; nevertheless, three quarters of the state's revenue were still being spent on military expenses in 1784-1785 (Aksan 2012, 325-327; 1998, 26-27; 2005, 167-168). The problem would continue to exist until the eventual annihilation of the Corps in 1826. The chief of the clerical office of the Janissary corps was called the *Yeniçeri Kâtibi* (Janissary Scribe) or *Yeniçeri Efendisi* (Janissary Master). Those who were appointed to this post were chosen among scribes outside the corps since the reign of Mehmed II. Appointments and dismissals from the post were under the authority of Grand Vizier (İ.H. Uzunçarşılı 1988a, 384-389).

registers should investigate all of the men in minute detail, and the suitable ones should be given new *esâmes*, which would be registered according to the new order after the old ones have been removed. (Penâh Efendi 2017, 90, 96). Penâh does not elaborate further upon the “good measures” that should be taken, but we can infer that he is suggesting here to act cautiously and carefully, by convincing the high-ranking Janissary officers that such reform is necessary. Indeed, the fact that he was not suggesting to collect the fraudulent *esâmes*, but simply to not renew them after the deaths of their owners, is a clear sign of his cautious approach. In addition to not provoking the Janissaries, it is likely that he was afraid of retribution from high-ranking state officials who themselves held hundreds of *esâmes* in their hands.

Penâh finds the issue of punishment in the Janissary corps rather simple. He states that if a soldier were to desert, there were a number of methods of punishment which could be used, but it would be enough to remove the deserter’s name from the registers of the corps (*cerîde-i yeniçeriyân*). With the help of these detailed registers, the deserter would be known as a criminal in his province as well, and since every soldier would prefer death rather than falling into the hands of the *voyvodas*, *mütesellims*, and *zabitân*, no one would thus choose to desert. Furthermore, he notes that there will be plenty of others ready to replace those expelled. Finally, he comes to methods of recruitment. From now on, he suggests, new recruits should be selected by the local Janissary officer amongst the best in the existing stock of soldiers, and a list compiled of the names of the new recruits should be submitted to the Chief of the Janissary corps, who will afterwards submit it to the Sultan. Then, with an *emr-i ‘âlî* and a letter from the Chief (implying the mutual approval of both the Grand Vizier and the Chief) the new recruits would be registered and given their *esâmes*. Penâh emphasizes that these rules would have to be strictly held to, even by the Sultan himself (Penâh Efendi 2017, 89). Moreover, he argues, every Janissary *orta* should keep their registers separate, in order to know and record the number of their troops, and anyone from the corps were to die, the local *ağa* should immediately report the names of the dead to the office of the Chief of the Corps. These names would be recorded, and a summary report would be delivered to the Sultan every six months. There would thus be a regular purge of dead or expelled janissaries from the registers (Penâh Efendi 2017, 95-96).

After implementing the new regulations, Penâh writes, the discharge or replacement of any soldier, the change of any code, and the decision regarding whether to revoke or bestow an *esâme*, should depend on the Sultan’s decree. If those decisions were to be left to the mediation of the representatives, this would ultimately prove problematic, as military officers were rotated out every couple of years. Disorder would

break out as the officers lose their influence over the soldiers (Penâh Efendi 2017, 86-87). Since merely sending imperial decrees and official orders to the provinces would not be enough to maintain order, Penâh suggests instead that a Plato-like, wise, honest, farsighted, and respected Janissary commander (*ağa*), accompanied by a sufficient number of scribes, should be sent to each region, and after instituting the new order in the provinces, they would send the registers to the Sublime Porte along with a general report on the situation. According to Penâh, the registers sent to the capital should be produced with two copies; one should be kept in the office of the Chief of the Janissary Corps, and the other in the Sultan's court (Penâh Efendi 2017, 95). Furthermore, Penâh Efendi suggests that at least one *ağa* should be appointed to each and every *eyâlet*, *sancak* or fort, and these *ağas* should be placed in charge of only the local units to which they were appointed. Furthermore, the distribution of the soldiers' salaries (*'ulûfe*) should be overseen by a local financial bureaucrat, named the *salyâneci* (an officer who collects the annual taxes), and any possible deficits in the total should be recouped from the revenues of nearby settlements (Penâh Efendi 2017, 89-90).

Penâh also mentions the problems with the local recruitment of soldiers. Soldiers from the improvised *nefîr-i âmm* (a general levy of all able-bodied men for public defense)²⁵ were poorly organized, undisciplined, and had displayed only confusion, weakness, and lethargy on the battlefield. Moreover, the endless revenue spent to maintain them was almost entirely wasted (Penâh Efendi 2017, 87). Furthermore, Penâh Efendi notes that during wartime, some *ortas* were being recruited from the local men by some Janissary and volunteer commanders (*serdarlar ve serdengeçtiler*) rather than from those Janissaries who were actually assigned to go to war. According to Penâh Efendi these "overnight regiments" scattered like a flock of partridges the next day on the battlefield. (Penâh Efendi 2017, 92). Because of the problems they have caused, he suggests that soldiers should not be brought by *serdars* and *serdengeçtis*.²⁶ In every *eyâlet* and *sancak*, some persons should be assigned as *serads* (literally, captain), who will be responsible for going to war with their soldiers

²⁵Those locally recruited soldiers that Penâh mentioned were commonly known as levends. The levends were locally mustered soldiers who had become an important part of Ottoman warfare, especially by the second half of the 18th century. These troops were recruited by local authorities who were appointed by the capital, locally recognized officials such as ayans, and military entrepreneurs, such as the Janissary commanders which were mentioned by Penâh and financed directly by the state or by provincial authorities. This type of recruitment was extremely prevalent during the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War. Aksan suggests that, according to the state documents, 100,000-150,000 levends might have arrived at the frontlines over the course of 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War. Considering the desertion and death rate of the Ottoman army, it is likely that twice this number was mobilized. Despite their extensive numbers, however, Penâh suggests that they caused difficult issues during the war "because they showed up as independent bands, with unreliable leadership, and had a habit of fleeing after the first exchange of fire." (Aksan 2012, 328; 1998, 27-29)

²⁶The abolishment of military entrepreneurship and the private ownership of regiments was a gradual process, which was also ongoing in contemporary Europe, especially in Habsburg Austria from the 1740s onwards (Black 2003, 129-131).

and standing for official duty. Every one of them should bear a flag, symbolizing 100 or 120 soldiers along with their attendants. When the soldiers at the front, he continues, the *ser-sads* should be paid for their travel expenses. Penâh argues that soldiers organized in this manner would not desert and could be easily controlled during both wartime and peace time. Following these steps, *başağas* (head commanders) should be assigned for every hundred and thousand soldiers as well (Penâh Efendi 2017, 95). According to Penâh Efendi, provincial regiments should be assigned to other regions or frontiers for designated duties in times of peace, and their deployments would last a certain period, such as six months; furthermore, they would be allowed to trade goods between the locations in which they had been assigned (Penâh Efendi 2017, 92).

Penâh Efendi finds the excessive numbers of the Janissaries in the capital dangerous, and one of the main causes of the scarcity of provisions in the city; he suggests decreasing this population to a more adequate number by distributing it throughout the provinces. However, he argues, the new regulation should first be firstly implemented in the provinces²⁷ and with a great degree of skill. For this reason, the Janissaries of a *sancak* should first ask for these regulations in a petition written to the Sublime Porte. When the permission is given, a wise counselor should be sent to the *sancak* to manage the process. Once the new order was instituted in a single region, the other provinces would come to demand it and the new order would thus gradually expand across the Empire. After being instituted in the provinces, a way would be found to initiate it in the capital. Penâh notes that Istanbul represents a particular case: because serious troubles could arise there, the affairs of the capital would have to be managed meticulously by all the men of the state, including the Sultan himself (Penâh Efendi 2017, 90-91, 93).

Penâh suggests that the same order, in terms of organization and registration, should be maintained in the other divisions of the army, such as the *topcuyân* (artillery), *humbaracuyân* (bombardiers), and *cebeciyân* (armorers). In addition to this, Penâh suggests a special drill for the artillery and bombardier corps. As he writes, every year, a couple of men from these corps in every *eyâlets* and *sancaks* should come to capital and join the maneuvers there. When they return to their duty places, they should train other troops from their regiments in front of the local state and military officers (Penâh Efendi 2017, 95-96).

Penâh also puts emphasis on the uniforms of the soldiers. In fact, he was the first member of the Ottoman literati to do so (Yeşil 2011, 256). It seems that Penâh was

²⁷Penâh suggests that they begin with Morea, İnebahtı (Lepanto), and Ağrıboz (Euboea).

aware of the importance of uniforms for contemporary European armies²⁸ and provided a detailed proposal for the military clothing of Janissaries. He wrote that the Janissary commanders should wear *nîm-ten* and *potur*.²⁹ Every soldier in each class should be dressed in the same color assigned to his class, including the commanders, and the civilians should not be dressed in the colors of the divisions. For instance, the artillery troops should wear red garments, because it is a flamboyant color which will make them looking terrifying when they are firing the artillery. According to Penâh Efendi, the uniforms will increase the respect of the common people towards the soldiers, and in peacetime, it will form a part of their drills and make the soldiers more obedient. (Penâh Efendi 2017, 91-92, 96).

Penâh Efendi also criticizes the actions of the moneylenders of the Janissary corps.³⁰ He suggests that, since the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Corps is not a place of trade, the Jewish moneylenders in the Corps should immediately be dismissed. Furthermore, Penâh describes the contemporary holder of the post and his predecessors as “the ones who believe according to the customs of the Jewish kind that it is good to betray, deceive, and damage other people”.³¹ An ordinary man should be employed in the post, he argues, on the condition that he should never lend *akçe* to the Janissary commanders on the frontiers and intervene in military affairs, such as the distribution of the salaries, the registration of the troops, and the provisioning of the garments of the corps. Such tasks should instead be assigned to a high official within the corps. Penâh Efendi indicates that to be a commander at that time, a Janissary needed to pay a certain amount of *akçe* to the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Corps, and the moneylender of the Corps was providing loans for those who were in need. Following their appointments, in order to pay back their loan installments, the commanders were seizing portions of their soldiers’ salaries and leaving them in austere conditions. According to Penâh Efendi, “this

²⁸In contemporaneous European armies, military uniform was the clothing that represented order, obedience, and the hierarchy of the soldiers. It was a part of the large-scale rationalization of the military, ongoing in the continent from the late 17th century onwards, and including other measures, such as standardized regiments, armaments, and command strategies. (Black 2005, 10; 2003, 216).

²⁹*Nîm-ten* was defined in the Redhouse Turkish-English Lexicon as “a short-bodied coat, a kind of jacket with elbow-length sleeves”. *Potur* was defined in the same source as “full gathered knee-breeches worn with tight leggings”.

³⁰The moneylenders were wealthy men who were appointed to the Janissary Corps, and bore certain responsibilities for the financial affairs of the Corps. For instance, the distribution of the salaries of the Janissaries on the frontiers was realized through the mediation of these moneylenders. In return, they took a certain share from the local tax revenues. Moreover, they provided loans for those Janissary officers who were assigned to the frontier, in exchange for a certificate of debt. These loans were paid later from the revenues of the Corps. The post was held mostly by members of certain wealthy Greek and Jewish families, often for years at a time. The property, registers, documents, and treasury of the Corps were kept in the office of the moneylender (İ.H. Uzunçarşılı 1988a, 407; Kılıç 2015, 151).

³¹Two years before Penâh wrote the Climes, the Jewish moneylender of the Corps İsak was executed shortly after he was banished, first to Jerusalem and then to Rhodes, due to being accused of embezzling money from the Janissary salaries in 1784 (Kılıç 2015, 154; Ünlü 2018, 108, 117).

game” should be ended and even the word “money” should not interfere in the relations between soldiers (Penâh Efendi 2017, 97).

Penâh Efendi also proposes a ceremony for the newly registered soldiers. After being recruited, the soldier should wear a *potur* and present themselves, in their new garments, in front of the high officials of the Janissary Corps, such as the elder commanders of his *orta*, and the *kul kethüdâsı* (the second-in-command of the chief commander of the Janissary Corps). He even proposes a new hymn, which will be said by the Janissaries during the ceremony: “Damn the one who corrupts the order, manner, and shape of the corps, and makes a habit of disobedience.” (Penâh Efendi 2017, 96). Furthermore, in order to ensure that the terminology of the new order comes to be known among the common people, he suggests that a book should be written, copied via the press, and distributed throughout the country, such that everyone should know the rules and behave in accordance with them. Penâh mentions the European “*foyeta*” (feuilleton) as an example. He describes the purpose of these newsletters as simply to educate and cautions that the European states educate their people using such “toys” (*melabelerle*).³²

Finally, after maintaining the new order in the provinces, several *emr-i ‘âlîs* should be decreed in the capital according to the requests of the Commander-in-Chief and the other high officials of the Janissary corps. He even writes a draft of the imperial order from the pen of the Sultan;

“Both in respect to my imperial and the Janissary corps, the Janissaries were my respected and loyal servants, and they have made a habit of obeying and serving my Exalted State. And they have not accepted any rogue and malice-inhabited ones in their ranks. To protect the law of my exalted dynasty, they have not accepted as their comrades those who have any designs against the purity, property, and lives of both the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, deserted from my imperial campaigns, and showed disobedience to their officers, and have discharged them. For a certain period of time, due to the negligence of the deputies and commanders in the provinces, the incapable ones mingled with the class of the Janissaries and the order of the corps was spoiled. Even my loyal servants were spent in vain and became unknown. Since it would not be apt for my throne to withhold my high opinions from my loyal servants and my imperial decree does not concern (*taalluk etmemeğle*) the order of my Janissary servants in the frontiers and provinces, the class of the Janissaries (*zümre-i yeniçeriyân*) should be advised as it has been from time immemorial. Thus, hereafter, if any malice-habited and incapable

³²(Penâh Efendi 2017, 97; Erdem 2017a; Cezar 1988, 113; Sariyannis 2018, 353).

ones were to appear in their ranks, their oath, conditioned upon not allowing those mentioned into their corps as comrades, should be bound with a legal title-deed (*hücce-i şerîyye*), and after the order is maintained in this way, it should be taken as the rule until the Day of Judgement.” (Penâh Efendi 2017, 91; Sariyannis 2018, 352)

Three particularly compelling aspects of Penâh’s decree proposal are important to emphasize here. Firstly, according to Penâh Efendi, the *emr-i ‘âlî*s should be issued on the request of the high-ranking officials of the Janissary corps. Secondly, in his suggested decree, the Sultan clearly recognizes that he has no authority to decide the order of the corps, and puts himself in the position of an adviser; this relationship between the Sultan and the corps is described as traditional. Thirdly, Penâh offers a legal title-deed which will be endorsed by both sides to maintain the new order. Penâh adds that, to attract and lure the elders of all the *ortas* to favor of the new order, they should be granted certain guarantees (Penâh Efendi 2017, 96).

Ultimately, it is important to highlight some of the aspects of the Penâh’s reform proposals, because of the special position that the corps held within the system of Ottoman power relations. It seems that Penâh Efendi was well aware of the contemporary social character of the Janissary corps and knew that these reforms could have infuriated both the soldiers and the broader social networks surrounding the corps. Therefore, he suggested that the reforms should be implemented only gradually, with the consent of the high-ranking officials and the elders of the corps, and by simultaneously deceiving the broader community about the real aims of these reforms. Furthermore, while acknowledging the relative autonomy of the corps in its internal operations, he firmly argued that the Sultan’s consent was required for all promotions, appointments, assignments, recruitments, punishments and any changes to the rules of the corps. Especially in regard to the financial affairs of the Corps, Penâh advocated for strict central control via the financial bureaucrats. On the other hand, while he explicitly criticized the capability of the *nefir-i âmm* soldiers during wartime, he by contrast regularly praised the courage and religious zeal of Janissaries several times in the text. Thus, his plans for the reform of the Janissary corps were focused on increasing the discipline and coordination within the ranks, as well as maintaining central authority over the corps, both politically and financially.

3.2.2 Provincial Cavalry

According to Penâh Efendi, if a *tîmar* system had not been constituted during the early stages of the empire, and if instead there had only been salaried (*esâmelü*) cavalry, countless *akçes* would have accrued from the *tîmars* and four times the number of soldiers could have been recruited. However, he states, because the system has existed since ancient times (*kadîmi bulunmağla*), reform, rather than abolition, is needed. Penâh Efendi suggests that, because the *alaybeyis* (provincial military officers) were being rotated around every two or three months and being appointed from the rabble by bribery, they were the main cause of disorder in the corps; indeed, the provincial cavalry were breaking their customs, intermingling in illegal affairs, and disobeying - and even harassing - the Sublime Porte (Penâh Efendi 2017, 97-98; Sariyannis 2018, 354).

Thus, Penâh Efendi suggests, the *alaybeyis* of every *sancak* should be appointed among the large *zeâmet* owners of that *sancak*, and not from outside. His *zeâmet* should be bound upon the condition of continuing to be an *alaybeyi*, and if he does not act against the canonical law of Islam (*hilâf-ı şer-i şerîf*), or against the illustrious law (of the Sultan) (*mugâyir-i kânun-ı münîf*), then it should be granted for life. Penâh also criticizes those *zeâmet* owners who were staying in the capital rather than being residents of the *sancaks* in which their *zeâmet*s were located. Penâh argues that these men should be given, at most, three months to return to their *sancaks*, and the ones who do not comply should be understood as traitorous to religion and the state, and should be compelled to go whether they are among the rich or not. He suggests that they should be sent to their *sancaks* with their families and, if they refuse to go, their *zeâmet*s should be taken back from them and given to others, who will be appointed as *alaybeyis* in their stead. Penâh Efendi theorizes that those *alaybeyis* appointed with great *zeâmet*s will be wealthy enough not to “be in need of the cavalries’ coffee” (*sipâhîlerin kahvesine muhtâc olmaz, muhteşem bir ağa olur*). He further notes that despite there being at least 12,000 cavalries in the Rumeli, less than 6,000 actually appeared on the battlefield. All of Rumelia and the other realms of the Empire, including the Aegean Archipelago, should be regularly inspected, in order to ensure that the *alaybeyis* and other *tîmar* and *zeâmet* owners were dwelling in the places to which they had been assigned. Furthermore, Penâh Efendi suggests that local judges, through their official notifications (*i’lâm*), and local people through their petitions, should inform the Sublime Porte as to their whereabouts. Indeed, even *alaybeyis* should send registers of those *tîmar* and

zeâmet owners under their jurisdiction to the capital.³³

Furthermore, Penâh continues, some of the *zeâmet* owners add new *tîmars* to their possessions through bribery or the intercession of some strongmen. He compares these *tîmars* to the *esâmes* of the Janissaries, in that they are both traded on the market. Penâh describes this as a terrible form of maladministration, arguing that it is “as if these soldiers were needed only for once in the conquest of the lands and there was no need for them after, there is no order left among the (*tîmarlı*) soldiers, as if affairs could be managed using talismans.” (Penâh Efendi 2017, 98-99). Moreover, Penâh notes that cavalry, assigned to a particular region, needed official permission to leave the area. According to Penâh Efendi, *ağas* were selling such permission papers for profit, in alliance with the *alaybeyis*. Thus, when cavalymen were assigned to go to a particular place, they believed that this was not for the service of the state, but only for *akçe*, and it was the source of much confusion and discord among the ranks. Instead, he suggests, from now on, the chiefs should be banned from selling permission papers to soldiers, and the *alaybeyis* and cavalymen who do not follow the rules should be dismissed and their *zeâmet*s and *tîmars* revoked (Penâh Efendi 2017, 99-100). Considering this open and somewhat radical proposals regarding the reform of the Ottoman *tîmar* system, it seems as though he viewed the issue as a problem of provincial administration, more than one of military affairs.

3.2.3 The Imperial Navy and the Cavalry of the Coastal Garrisons

Penâh starts this section by emphasizing the strategic advantage of the Ottoman Empire in the defense of the Mediterranean, arguing that, although the Christian states had one or two points at most connected to the sea, the Ottoman dominions possessed numerous coasts from the Bosnia to Anatolia, and from Egypt to the Black Sea. Furthermore, the isles and islands of the Mediterranean made it considerably easier to transport material from land to sea, and vice versa, such that the sea was almost like the courtyard of the Ottoman Empire, allowing it to wreck enemy fleets by throwing stones from the sides. However, because Ottoman soldiers on both land and sea were hiring and sending men to fight in their stead, even as the Christian powers were crossing oceans, the Ottomans could not control their ships

³³(Penâh Efendi 2017, 98-100; Cezar 1988, 125; Sariyannis 2018, 354).

even within their own docks. He argues that, since the troops of the navy were constituted mostly from novices and laborers, defeat by the professional navies of the European states was inevitable (Penâh Efendi 2017, 104-105).

According to Penâh Efendi, like the cavalry of the other realms, the *sipâhîyân-ı deryâ* (cavalry of the coastal garrisons) were paying a certain fee to state officials in order to free themselves from serving in the army, and because of this there was no need for coastal guards in the provinces to be within the *Deryâ Kalemi* office.³⁴ Thus, after abolishing the fees, all of the *tîmar* and *zeâmet* owners in the *Deryâ Kalemi*, including those of Morea, Cyprus, Rhodes, and other islands, and the *sancaks* on the coast such as *Karlı-ili*, Lepanto (*İnebahtı*), and Euboea (*Ağrıboz*), should be assigned to the imperial navy, whether as gunners (*topçu*) or sailors (*kalyoncu*). Penâh Efendi is sure that these men would thoroughly acquire seamanship (*fenn-i deryâ*) in a couple of years, and a navy with such permanent soldiers³⁵ would be strong enough to properly confront “the navies of the infidels” (Penâh Efendi 2017, 101, 104).

War at sea, he argues, was not comparable with war on land, because it was conducted solely with cannon. Therefore, the majority of the troops should be gunners (*topçu*), and all of the troops, including the navigators, should always be drilling. They should, at no time, be allowed to hire men in their place. They should never be given permission to leave their duties, except when they become sick or permanently invalid. On the other hand, since the both sea warfare and seamanship were difficult to carry out, he proposes that seamen should be granted some special privileges in regard to customs and similar commercial affairs. There should be no *akçe* taken from the captains for their assignments and appointments, and a barracks should be constructed in the Imperial Dockyards for them.³⁶ Penâh Efendi suggests that the seamen should likewise wear uniforms in a specific color: the gunners of the navy should wear red, like those on land, and the captains should wear *potur* similar to the ağas of Janissaries (Penâh Efendi 2017, 103, 104).

Penâh Efendi proposes to organize the Imperial Navy in the form that he had

³⁴The *tîmars* and *zeâmet*s of the *sancaks* of the Kaptan Paşa Eyâleti, that is to say some of the coastal provinces in Rumelia and Anatolia under the jurisdiction of the Grand Admiral of the Imperial Navy. The coastal guards that Penâh mentioned were *mensûhat efrâdı* (the troops of the abolished corps) who were the owners of the *tîmars* and *zeâmet*s of these *sancaks* that had been assigned to the soldiers of the former *yaya* and *müssellem* corps, which had already been abolished by that time. (İ.H. Uzunçarşılı 1988b, 420-425).

³⁵At that time, *kalyoncuyân* were not permanent soldiers, but were rather recruited from certain provinces in the wartime and paid during the war. They returned to their homes after their service in the war. Some of them were resident in the bachelor’s houses of the capital in times of peace (İ.H. Uzunçarşılı 1988b, 485-487; Karahan 2017, 134).

³⁶In fact, at that time, there was indeed a barracks in the Imperial Dockyards in the capital, which had been constructed by the Grand Admiral Gazi Hasan Paşa (Karahan 2017, 134-136).

suggested for the Janissary corps, starting with the appointments of a *kalyoncuyân ağası* and *kalyoncuyân efendisi*, both of whom will dwell in the Imperial Dockyards in Istanbul. Furthermore, he suggests that the sailors should be registered using the same procedure as the Janissaries, with the registers made in two copies; one, to be kept in the office of the *kalyoncuyân ağası*, and the other in the Sultan's court. For the military registers, an office with enough scribes should be constituted in the Sultan's court (Penâh Efendi 2017, 102). For the seamen in the navy, Penâh Efendi suggests that there should be designated salaries, according to their positions as *dümençi* (steersman) or *yelkençi* (sailor), in both wartime and peacetime. The *esâmes* should be given to the sailors as well as the Janissaries, and all salaries should be recorded in the registers in both the Sultan's court and office of the *kalyoncuyân ağası*³⁷ (Penâh Efendi 2017, 102-103).

Additionally, Penâh proposes some fortifications to be constructed for the maritime defense of the Mediterranean. The forts should be constructed, he writes, in Mani (Morea), Rethymno (Crete), and Cyprus, with the ports, certain revenue sources, and soldiers assigned from nearby locales. Those forts should be granted to *alaybeyis* and should host fleets comprising of 4 *karavelas* (caravel), 2 *çekdiris* (galley) and 2 *firkates* (frigate) each. He suggests that the *alaybeyis*, together with their fleets, will separately take part in the defense of the Mediterranean in winters, and join the fleet of the Grand Admiral in summers. After these measures have been taken, the soldiers and the local people would thoroughly learn the arts of seamanship, such that seamen will emerge who treat the oceans as if they were tiny lakes (Penâh Efendi 2017, 101-102, 104).

Finally, Penâh Efendi emphasizes the importance of the contemporary sciences for seamanship, with geography given particular attention. As he writes, despite their "short mindedness and ignorance", because the peoples of the Christian states took great care in such sciences and learned these very well, they were able to find the New World (*Yenidünya*) and a way to the coasts of the East Indies (*Hind-i Şarkî*), sail to both, and build the necessary fortifications on land and sea necessary to protect their new realms. Therefore, he suggests that two great printing houses (*basmahâne ve tasvîrhâne*) should be established in the Ottoman lands, which will publish numerous books affordable to both the poor and the rich. He proposes that the books which will be published in these presses should be from one half to one quarter the size of ordinary books and affixed with officially designated prices. In addition to publishing

³⁷It should be noted that, during the time of Grand Admiral Gazi Hasan Paşa, the registers of the sailors were recorded in a manner very similar to that which Penâh suggested for the Janissary Corps. In the registers, there could be found both the sailor's and his father's names, and the places of their residences. The soldiers were gathered for roll-calls both at the beginning and the end of the expeditions, and the dead, deserters, and other absent men were recorded in the registers properly (Karahana 2017, 123-124).

the Quran and collections of hadith, descriptions of other countries, maps, and translations from Greek, Latin, Italian, French and other languages would prove tremendously beneficial. With all of the people aware of past events and the whole world by land and sea, they will become enlightened and acquire both the knowledge of the present and the capacity to learn about the affairs of the future. Penâh Efendi assures his readers that such education will make the people even more obedient. Penâh expresses his confidence that, if these steps were initiated, sciences which were very rare in the contemporary world would flourish in the Ottoman capital.³⁸

3.2.4 The Non-Janissary Garrisons in Rumeli

Penâh also complains about the brigands and irregular soldiers in the Balkans who, he writes, were ruining the region more than the enemy. In order to bring the anarchy to an end in the region, he argues for the construction of several fortifications in certain strategic locations. Permanent high officials should be appointed to *Özi* (Ochakiv), *Silistre* (Silistra), *Gümülcine* (Komotini), an unknown *sancak* in Rumeli³⁹ and *Tekfurdağı* (Tekirdağ); namely, governors for the first two locations, and *beylerbeyis* for the latter ones, with some additional *sancaks* in the vicinity given over to their jurisdiction. If the local revenues of the *sancaks* under their current authority were not enough, the revenues of some other *kazâs* or *sancaks* could also be added.⁴⁰ These high officials should be given some infantry under their command, led on the ground by a *piyadegân ağası*, in order to permanently patrol the region.

Furthermore, he writes, the system of travelers' inns should be resuscitated. For this purpose, he suggests that *hans* should be rented out by the state from their owners and transferred to the authority of some *bölükbaşıs* (sergeants), each commanding a segment of soldiers. The *bölükbaşıs* and their soldiers will stay in the inns and be responsible for ensuring the safety of the travel routes, both day and night. Moreover, according to Penâh Efendi, the *bölükbaşıs* should be given permission

³⁸(Penâh Efendi 2017, 149-150; Cezar 1988, 114-115; Erdem 2019a; Saryannis 2018, 360). Penâh might have taken his approach on scientific knowledge as the solution to a variety of problems from Kâtip Çelebi, who “emphasized the need and usefulness of natural sciences, placing emphasis on geography and astronomy.” (Saryannis 2018, 286).

³⁹Although something like Bec-terîn is written in the manuscript, I could not find a *sancak* with such a name. (Penâh Efendi 2017, 139).

⁴⁰Penâh underlines that, in the times of need, local taxes should not be raised in these territories, because it will ruin the local inhabitants. Rather, new *kazâs* should be added to the authority of the relevant officials (Penâh Efendi 2017, 139).

to engage in trade along the routes that they patrol, and even encouraged to open shops, such as groceries, in the inns. They should be taxed an annual fee of 500 *guruş* for their enterprises, producing an additional source of revenue for the treasury. The salaries of the soldiers were to be paid from the local budgets of the provinces.⁴¹

3.3 Enhancing the Central Power in the Provinces

“Everyone in the provinces does and says everything they want to. They are opportunists and have no fear of the state.”

— Penah Efendi 2017, 123

3.3.1 Provincial Administration and the Local Notables

Governors

According to Penâh Efendi, all *eyâlets* (province), *sancaks* (sub-province), and *kazâs* (district) in the empire should be properly listed, and a certain amount of *hazariyye* and *seferiyye* should be assigned to the governors of each province, and afterwards recorded separately in the Office of the Imperial Registers (*Defterhâne-i Âmire*). Penâh Efendi suggests that expenses like accommodations (*mevrûşât-bahâ*) should not be added to the apportionment registers (*tevzûi*), as well as and other costs, such as individual expenditures of the governors (*vüzerâ ve mürmürân*), gifts, and payments (*hidmet ve me’kûlât*) for investigators (*mübâşirân*) sent to the provinces by either the center or the governor.⁴² Instead, the expenses of the *mübâşirân* should

⁴¹(Penâh Efendi 2017, 138-139; Cezar 1988, 126; Sariyannis 2018, 357).

⁴²In fact, covering the expenses of the governors was among the responsibilities of the local people. However, in the eighteenth century, imposing all the expenses of their mansions and retinues in the name of their rightful levies such as *kudumiye* (accommodation expenses), *teşriîye* (welcoming fee), and *mevrûşât bahası* (furniture expenses) was not an uncommon practice among the governors. In addition to these expenses, most of them were trying to impose the costs of the gifts that they had to present some of the high-ranking officials in return of certain favors such as appointments or promotions (Georgieva 2007, 6). On the other hand, the disagreements in the apportionment gatherings were very common and at such times the central inspectors (*mübâşirân*) were being involved in the processes (Yaycıoğlu 2016, 131). With mentioning the ones behaving obstinate, Penâh was probably referring to the ones who were locking the negotiations without any solid reason.

be covered by the person who is the cause of the investigation, whether because they are behaving obstinately or are causing trouble; it is only when the agent has been sent to manage the affairs of the center that his expenses should be included within the apportionment. To make the local budget able to afford these expenses, certain revenues should be assigned to them in every province, and the records of these revenues should be kept in both the local and central registers (Penâh Efendi 2017, 114-115). Penâh's suggestions regarding the collection of the *hazariyye* and *seferiyye* taxes seem to be the same as the regulations implemented in the 1710s (Cezar 1986, 55). Penâh might have felt a need to repeat these regulations because they had been corrupted during the war.

He further argued that there should be a limit to the accommodation expenses afforded to each governor's office, which should be designated according to the rank of the post and then recorded in the imperial registers. However, this amount should only be requested once until their dismissal from the post. If the mansion of a governor is in need of repair, for example, the expenses should be covered by the local residents of the relevant province. However, the repair costs should require the approval of the central administration, via an *emr-i âlî* decreed after an estimation of the cost. Penâh Efendi argues that taking things from the local people, without the sanction of an *emr-i âlî*, should be conclusively banned by a *hatt-ı şerîf*⁴³ (Penâh Efendi 2017, 114-115). Moreover, Penâh Efendi suggests that new dismissals and appointments should be made in the summer, in order to avoid causing unnecessary difficulties for dismissed governors, their staff, and local residents (Penâh Efendi 2017, 115).

A'yâns

In the case of the local notables, Süleyman Penâh evinces a clear distaste; he defines the *a'yâns* solely as instruments of oppression for their subjects. According to him, the rise of an *a'yân* meant the devastation of a *kazâ* or a village. He indicates that to be an *a'yân* of a *kazâ* in Rumeli, it was enough to give 30 *kises* to the governor of the province. The ones who were made into *a'yân* by a *buyuruldu* (official order decreed by a governor), after arriving in the *kazâ* that they were assigned to, disproportionately imposed their own expenses upon the local inhabitants and at times took far more. From now on, he suggests, no *a'yâns* should be appointed to any province, neither by the Sultan's decree (*bâ-fermân-ı âlî*) nor with a *buyuruldu*. The affairs of a *kazâ* should be overseen by committee, including *voyvodas*, local

⁴³The *emr-i âlî* was the generic name for decrees with the Sultan's signature, which were written about state affairs and sent to state officials, mostly in provinces. On the other hand, the *hatt-ı şerîf* was actually the name of the small passage written on the top of some of the *emr-i âlîs* by the Sultan himself; an *emr-i âlî* with a *hatt-ı şerîf* was thus extremely important (Kütükoğlu 1995, 400; 1997, 485-486). Thus, the latter was more compelling than the former.

notables (*vücut-hı belde*), estate owners (*ashâb-ı çift*), military officers, *kocabaşıs*, and other representatives of the subjects (*re'âya vekîlleri*) and they should manage the apportionment of the centrally assigned expenses by gathering in a certain place together (Penâh Efendi 2017, 115). It seems that Penâh Efendi was not unhappy with the whole system of apportionment, but only with the *a'yâns* sitting on top of it. In other words, the system should be continued, except without the *a'yâns* in charge. In his treatise, he did not mention any position which would take up the role of the *a'yâns*, should they be abolished. Yet Penâh's proposal was in fact realized in April 1786, through an Imperial decree written by the contemporary Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Paşa, which abolished and replaced *a'yânship* with town stewardship (*şehir kethüdâlığı*). All provincial functions operated by the *a'yâns* became instead the responsibilities of the town stewards, who were elected by the local communities. The system of town stewardship was abolished, however, due to its ineffectiveness during the 1787-1792 Russo-Ottoman War; before being tested adequately, then, *a'yânship* was restored in 1792.⁴⁴

Furthermore, he suggests constituting an office in the capital to check these local apportionments. After the establishment of this office, an *emr-i âlî* should be promulgated in *rûz-ı hızır* (May) of every year, which will be sent to all the *kazâs* in the empire by a government courier (*tatar*). According to the *emr-i âlî*, the provincial authorities will be instructed to compile a book of judicial notifications, written in detail, at the meetings of the annual apportionments of each *kazâ*. These books should be delivered to the governor of the *kazâ* every summer, after being sealed by the local judge. Following an examination by the governor, it should be brought to the capital by the courier. In addition to being examined by the scribes in the new office, such books should be checked by the Sultan himself. If any fraud is discovered, those responsible, including the judge who sealed the registers, should be punished.⁴⁵ Furthermore, he argues, if the governors connive to defraud others or demand money in order to examine the books, the local people, including the judges, should report such abuses to the capital (Penâh Efendi 2017, 115-116). *a'yâns* were often the targets of accusations that they added things to the apportionment lists

⁴⁴ (İnalcık 1977, 50-51; Adanır 2006, 179; Yaycıoğlu 2016, 137). It is important to note that Penâh's former patron and Grand Vizier Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa was an early opponent of *a'yânship* as well. In 1765, during his first tenure in office, he bound the appointment of a selected *a'yân* to the Sultan's approval, requiring a thorough check by the Grand Vizier and the authorization of local governors. However, this attempt was likewise ended prematurely in 1779, due to the system's ineffectiveness during the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War (İnalcık 1977, 48-49; Adanır 2006, 174-175). Furthermore, before its abolishment by Koca Yusuf Paşa, his predecessor Halil Hamid Paşa had promulgated a reform in which the Grand Vizier was allowed to select or change the *a'yân* of a region in the case that local leaders could not agree on any particular candidate (İnalcık 1977, 49; Yaycıoğlu 2016, 136).

⁴⁵ At this point Penâh gives the example of Belgrade which, although required to provide only 70 *kise* to the center as tax revenue, in fact was being crushed under the weight of over 700 *kise* in local taxes (Penâh Efendi 2017, 116).

on their own behalf, which should not have been recorded in the registers. To solve this problem, an imperial edict was decreed in 1784 which made it compulsory to send a copy of the court records to the capital twice a year, in order for them to be examined and approved (Yaycioğlu 2016, 131-132). Thus, Penâh Efendi was suggesting that the practice instituted in 1784 be maintained, with the addition of a new office to audit such records and with the period for the delivery of such documents extended to a year.

Voyvodas

In the 18th century, the estates of the members of the Ottoman dynasty as well as many vakıfs were contracted out to local managers, called *voyvodas*, “who were supposed to coordinate administration, revenue collection, and remittances.” (Yaycioğlu 2016, 78). As in the case of *a’yânship*, *voyvodas* were selected by the local people. They employed their own men in the collection of revenues and maintained a number of locally recruited troops (*sekbân*) for the security of the lands under their jurisdiction. İnalcık suggests that the *voyvodas* played a serious role in the rise of the *a’yâns* in the 17th and 18th centuries, such that the terms *a’yân* and *voyvoda* were able to be used interchangeably (İnalcık 1977, 36).

It is thus perplexing that, while expressing a strong disdain towards *a’yânship*, and indeed occasionally describing the *voyvodas* as local usurpers, Penâh Efendi generally approached the institution of the *voyvodas* in a rather more positive manner. In his treatise he underlines that, in the *kazâs* in which a *voyvoda* was present, the subjects were being properly protected. However, in the *kazâs* where there was no *voyvoda*, the judges and *a’yâns* were building jails in their courts and mansions, using numerous chains (*zencir*) and stocks (*tomruk*), and were arbitrarily imprisoning and torturing subjects. Therefore, he suggests, from now on no one should be imprisoned in the courts or the mansions of local notables. Instead, a *voyvoda* should be appointed to every *kazâ*, and these *voyvodas* should implement all necessary punishments (Penâh Efendi 2017, 120-121; Cezar 1986, 144). Penâh Efendi clearly considered the *voyvodas* to be different from the *a’yâns* and underlined the importance of the ministerial role that the *voyvodas* assumed in the provinces. It seems that he considered the *voyvodas* as a check against the rising power of the *a’yâns*, or else simply distinguished them from the others due to their role in the administration of the imperial estates. In addition to this, by giving the *voyvodas* responsibility for the implementation of punishments, Penâh drew a line between the local judicial and executive authorities.

Kocabaşı was one of the generic terms used for local notables in Ottoman terminology, in addition to *a'yân*. However, in the eighteenth century, it came to be defined as the local offices in the *kazâ* which were held by Christian individuals, who were collectively nominated by local communities. In other words, they were strong Christian men who were “empowered by local electoral politics, functioned like *a'yâns*, and sometimes... termed representatives of the Christian community (*vekîl-i re'âyâ*)” (Yaycıoğlu 2016, 77, 149). Despite clear similarities to *a'yâns*, as in the case of the *voivodas*, Penâh Efendi regarded the *kocabaşı* institution rather positively.⁴⁶

Penâh Efendi indicates that there were also usurper *kocabaşıs* in all of the *eyâlets* and *sancaks* of Rumeli, who, in alliance with malicious governors, judges, military officers, and *a'yâns*, oppressed the population and extorted arduous and disproportionate taxes from them. It was urgent that these groups be put in order, and a *hatt-ı şerîf* was needed to address this issue as well. Thus, Penâh Efendi suggests, the people of every *kazâ* should ask for a signed legal deed (*bâ-hüccet-i şer'iyye*)⁴⁷ such that from then on, they themselves would nominate two or four *kocabaşıs* (according to the size of each *kazâ*) in the *rûz-ı Hızır* of every year, relying entirely upon the candidates' qualities to judge them. Moreover, these *kocabaşıs* should be given an annual stipend of 250 *guruş* each. However, the period of office for every *kocabaşı* should be limited to one year. Even if the local people are happy with their *kocabaşı*, they should nominate another person in the next *rûz-ı Hızır*, and they should not be allowed to nominate the same *kocabaşı* for the next five years. Penâh Efendi argues that preventing the *kocabaşıs* from continuing in their posts for more than one year will stop them from accruing wealth by exploiting their subjects, or by forming alliances with provincial usurpers. He notes that originally, the *kocabaşıs* were drawn from among the subjects, and they were thus beneficial to the *re'âyâ* class.⁴⁸ After all the steps that he has advocated for are implemented, Penâh proposes that a number of government inspectors, recruited among the most loyal palace servants, should be covertly sent to the provinces to ensure that the new regulations are being properly carried out (Penâh Efendi 2017, 142). Penâh Efendi seems to imply that these spies would be under the direct command of the Sultan

⁴⁶His positive depiction of the *kocabaşı* institution can also be seen in his narration of the 1770 Morea Rebellion, which was discussed in the previous chapter.

⁴⁷It's important to note that, as in the case of the Janissary corps, Penâh suggested a legal “social” contract between the state and the *kazâ* communities for the regulation of the electoral process of their representatives. How central authorities maintained their rule over certain communities via legal contracts in the Ottoman period is a subject that requires further research.

⁴⁸(Penâh Efendi 2017, 141-143; Cezar 1988, 123; Sariyannis 2018, 351).

himself.

Local Judges

As one of the “principal institution of the provincial order”, the local judicial courts were necessarily also one of the subjects of Penâh Efendi’s treatise. These institutions were supervised by judges (*kadı*), who were appointed from the graduates and scholars of the imperial colleges. In addition to judicial affairs, they carried out notary functions. Furthermore, by the 18th century, courthouses had become teeming public spaces “where representatives of the communities congregated to settle public expenditures, as well as to deliberate, negotiate, vote, register, and pronounce on other public affairs.” The judges prepared the documents resulting from these gatherings and kept them in the courthouses, which functioned like local archives. On the other hand, these institutions also functioned as symbols and nodes of centralized authority, and gatherings were also held in which imperial edicts were read aloud in the presence of local representatives (Yaycıoğlu 2016, 124-125).

Penâh Efendi states that, on occasion, a judge would send a judicial memorandum to either Istanbul or the provincial governor, claiming that it had been written with the consent of the local notables and *kocabaşıs* of the *kazâ*, when in fact nobody in the area was aware of it. To prevent this from happening, he suggests, henceforth such judicial documents should include the signatures of the attendants with their names and titles. Since the *emr-i âlî* that will be sent to the governor of the *kazâ* in response to the judicial document will also include the same names, it will reveal whether or not the judge was intending to defraud the state. (Penâh Efendi 2017, 120).

Penâh Efendi further argued that those judges who were sending deputies (*nâ’ib*) to their appointed regions in their stead should be compelled to go to their posts. This new order should be promulgated throughout the entire Ottoman Empire by a Sultan’s decree (*bâ-hatt-ı hümayûn*), and after a month or two in which the judges should be allowed to travel to their assigned positions, all those who remained should be dismissed. If a judge has a legitimate excuse, such as a severe disease, he should inform the Sublime Porte and ask for official permission to stay in the capital. Only after the official permission is given should a deputy judge, who should be present in the capital at that time and be known to have good qualities, be appointed to the post with an *emr-i âlî* in hand. The appointed deputy should be granted the revenues of an office (*emânet*) rather than a land-based tax farm (*mukâtaa*). If a deputy goes to a *kazâ* without an *emr-i âlî* in his hand, the people of the *kazâ* should not recognize him as their judge and should report him to the capital immediately. According to Penâh Efendi, the appointment of the deputies to judicial

posts in the provinces had become a trade, in which the official representatives of the provincial administrators (*kapı kethüdâları*) and moneylenders (*sarraflar*) were both involved. Therefore, he suggests that moneylenders and representatives should be banned from being involved in the affairs of a deputy by Sultanîc decree (*bâ-hatt-ı hümayûn*) (Penâh Efendi 2017, 117-118; Atik 2002, 51-52). The judges appointed to the provinces were often reluctant to leave Istanbul, since staying in the capital offered important opportunities to seek powerful patrons and secure higher offices. For this reason, they often asked local candidates to stand in for them as proxies. Assigning proxies from the local people was likely rather beneficial for the judges. However, as with the governors and *a'yân*s, these proxies could gradually entrench themselves in local affairs and, by making common cause with strongmen, could oppress and extort money from the populace. By insisting upon sending judges to their assigned posts, Penâh aimed to break this cycle and ensure that the local courts were proper representatives of central authority.

Furthermore, Penâh criticizes the henchmen of *a'yân*s and other local usurpers, who, he states, encamped themselves outside courthouses and intimidated poor or less powerful petitioners. Penâh notes that these strongmen were paid high daily wages, even higher than what the judges themselves earned, and as such they were difficult to remove. Therefore, he suggests that an *emr-i âlî* should be promulgated banning such individuals from congregating around courthouses without an excuse. If they still come to the courthouses, the local people should inform the capital. Penâh warns that the reports coming from the provinces reporting the good behavior of these individuals should not be trusted. Furthermore, Penâh Efendi suggests that no one should be allowed to attend court on behalf of someone else (Penâh Efendi 2017, 119-120; Atik 2002, 51-52). Penâh's statements regarding the vicinity of the courthouses attest to their dynamic character as public spaces.

Taking the *kazâ* of Trikala (Tırhala) as an example, Penâh Efendi makes some suggestions regarding judicial fees. In Trikala, he points out, judges were becoming involved in fraudulent activities with malicious *a'yân*s and *kocabaş*s and taking a fee of 10-13 *kise* just to seal a book of apportionment (*tevzîi defteri*).⁴⁹ From now on, he writes, the judges should take only half an *akçe* for every *guruş* in the apportionment books that they seal. They should take 5 *akçe* for each judicial document that they write in response to *emr-i âlî*s and *buyruldu*s. In trials in which compensation is paid, if the damages of the claimant are not valid, the judge and military officer should not take any fees. Only if the damages are valid should the judge and the military officers each take one-twentieth of the compensation payment. Moreover,

⁴⁹ According to Penâh, some judges were even not allowing people to bury their dead, and keeping the corpses, because they could not pay the fees necessary to submit the appropriate forms (Penâh Efendi 2017, 119).

they should not take any fees from elder heirs, and even one *akçe* more than the designated fee from younger heirs (Penâh Efendi 2017, 119).

Imperial Orders Sent to the Provinces

After giving his thoughts on the courthouses, Penâh Efendi makes some suggestions regarding the evaluation of central orders in the provinces. Penâh Efendi states that, in general, couriers who were bringing the *emr-i âlîs* and *hatt-ı şerîfs* to the provinces were first delivering these official documents to the *a'yân*. Then the *a'yân* would bring it to the local judge and seal it before letting anyone hear of its arrival; in this way, both the judge and the *a'yân* were deceiving the state and local community. According to Penâh Efendi, the *emr-i âlîs* and *hatt-ı şerîfs* arriving from the center should be read aloud in the local courts, in the presence of all the local notables, estate owners, (*ashâb-ı çift ve arâzî*), *kocabaşıs*, influential local persons, metropolitans and Greek bishops in that province, including even the small districts (*nâhiye*) of some *kazâs*. Furthermore, after being read, these central documents should be signed by all attendants and kept in the court registers. Then, one copy should be given to the each of the *kocabaşıs* for storage (Penâh Efendi 2017, 156-157).

Imperial Postal Services - Menzils

Another topic discussed by Penâh Efendi was the post office of the empire, *menzil teşkilâtı* in Ottoman Turkish. In the eighteenth century, the postal service was organized around various stations in the provinces, called *menzilhânes*, which were situated along main transportation routes and were overseen by entrepreneurs, the *menzilcis* or *deruhdecis* (contractors), who were selected and employed by the local communities on an annual basis. The local communities in the districts were accountable to the state for supplying necessary provisions to the stations, including horses and fodder, and these annual expenditures were regularly audited by the center. The *menzilcis* resided in the stations and were responsible for the care of the horses, for ensuring that an adequate amount of provisions was available, for providing horses for the couriers, and for employing a sufficient number of drivers at the station. On the other hand, the couriers only benefited from the services of the *menzilcis* if they possessed a *menzil* order prepared by the central authorities. The prices of the horses were calculated per hour of riding distance, and the charges for official use were paid out by the center annually. However, the services of the *menzilhânes* were not limited to official use, and they were open to anyone who could afford the prices in advance (Çetin 2009, 152-174; Halaçoğlu 2004, 159-160).

According to Penâh Efendi, the contemporary *menzilhânes* and the *menzil* organiza-

tion more broadly were in poor shape, due to the presence of brigands on local routes and because local usurpers, like *a'yâns*, proxy judges, and tax farmers, dressed their own servants as official couriers and deceived the local people. Furthermore, he notes that some unscrupulous couriers were selling the official decrees that had been assigned to them to the usurpers, who came to control and benefit from a trade in such orders. Because of these fraudulent behaviors, a *menzil*, which could have been sent for 2,000 *guruş*, was at that time hardly deliverable for 10,000 *guruş*, and the losses to the Imperial Treasury from this situation were more than the revenues of certain states (Penâh Efendi 2017, 130-131). The trade in *menzil* orders was common in the Ottoman realms, and that individuals who bought the outdated and open-dated orders from corrupt couriers were able to use the horses in the stations for free (Çetin 2009, 221).

Penâh Efendi suggests that, in order to avoid such fraud, the title of the courier, his and the names of his connections (*müte'allık*), and both his point of departure and destination, should be written into the *menzil* orders. Furthermore, he suggests that a *menzilhâne* and an adjacent “cook’s shop” should be built in every province. The couriers should pay for the price of their own meals. Penâh Efendi notes that, although some of the couriers make considerable income, they refuse to pay the *menzilcis* for the horses that they take, and if the keepers complain, the couriers injure the horses or dock the animals’ ears, tails, and so forth. From now on, he argues, the officially commissioned couriers should pay 10 *akçe* and the others should pay 20 *akçe* per hour for each horse that they take from the stations. Moreover, Penâh suggests, the keepers should be permitted to rent their horses to anyone else for 20 *akçe* an hour, helping them to increase their revenue (Penâh Efendi 2017, 130-132; Cezar 1988). Penâh’s suggestions regarding the imperial postal service seem to have been not particularly different from already implemented practice. Nevertheless, it is possible that the disorganization and corruption revealed by the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War inspired him to emphasize this issue.

3.3.2 Subjugation of the Peoples and Outer Lands

Albanians

In the late 18th century, Albanian bandits were one of the most significant contributors to instability in the Balkans. These groups were mostly comprised of Muslim bandits but did not hesitate to plunder Muslim settlements in addition to those of

the non-Muslims. According to Anscombe, there were no regions in the Balkans free from the depredations of Albanian bandits, and Macedonia, Morea, southern Greece, and Serbia were most severely affected. On the other hand, in the places where government authority was the strongest, the officers and soldiers were also mostly Albanian in origin too (Anscombe 2006, 88-92). In other words, the political situation in the Balkans was in many respects determined by the Albanian issue.

When discussing the issue of Albanian brigandage, Penâh Efendi proposes a grand plan which rather resembles the policies of contemporaneous European colonialism. He starts by defining the problem in the Albanian regions and explaining some of the features of the Albanian peoples. According to Penâh Efendi, the Albanian people were generally well-mannered. But the people of Delvine (Delvinë) and Avlonya (Vlorë) were involved in pillage and brigandage; the former were perhaps easier to manage, and indeed there had been tranquility in Delvine for some time. Penâh Efendi then gives a short depiction of these *sancaks* and the people. As he writes, these *sancaks* were not connected with Ottoman towns, and their societies were very introverted, such that they did not intermarry with outsiders. They did not travel regularly to the capital and were not involved in either trade or craft. Even if someone was a tradesman, such as a butcher, grocer, or baker, he was despised by the others. Although trade and craft were despised, burglary was not.

However, Penâh does not blame the Albanians for this behavior; instead, he argues, because the population was excessive and the land was barren in both of these *sancaks*, the peoples were compelled to behave as such. Thus, no one has attempted to order these regions for over four centuries, and the people have continued to be savage and ill-mannered, and lacking the knowledge of customary practices. However, they were also very hospitable to needy travelers passing through their villages and towns. Furthermore, there were some examples of more civilized individuals, such as an Albanian notable named Salih Bey from a tribe called the Karamuradlı, who operated numerous inns and bakeries and hosted Albanian *paşas* for free. Nevertheless, despite the existence of such well-mannered Albanians, the opposite was considerably more predominant⁵⁰.

It seems that Penâh Efendi correctly attributed the prevalence of banditry among the Albanian population to both social and geographic conditions. As he stated, the regions where the Albanians lived were extremely densely populated, while the amount of available fertile land was very limited. Furthermore, according to Anscombe, the spread of *çiftliks* (private estates) in the region at the expense of the *tîmars* and *ze‘âmet*s contributed to a further restriction of the amount of cultivated lands avail-

⁵⁰(Penâh Efendi 2017, 106-107; Erdem 2017a; Ermiş 2014, 144; Sariyannis 2018, 358).

able to the majority of the Albanian population. In addition to this, there were epidemics constantly circulating in the region, in particular malaria in the vicinity of Vlorë; some of the epidemics which devastated the region were believed to have originated from the movements of Albanian bandits, such as the plague which afflicted Ioannina in 1784-1787 (Anscombe 2006, 92-99).

However, he argued, it would be possible to educate the Albanian peoples and change their behavior. On the basis of his observations and the experiences he underwent in both the Morea and Rumeli, Penâh stresses the importance of language in the refinement of cultural conduct; he notes that while the Greek-speaking Albanians were gentle, polite, humble, and obedient, the speakers of the Albanian language were, due to its unpleasant nature, accustomed to violence and pillaging, and were inevitably ignorant and crude. If they could be made to stop speaking in Albanian, he was sure that their manners would quickly change. Furthermore, because they did not know Turkish, they were deprived of the pleasure of its “touching conversation” (*es-sohbetü’l-müessire*) and were unable to gain the virtues of sagacity and knowledge (*metâ‘-ı ferâset ve ‘irfân*) from other realms, causing their introverted nature. Indeed, he argues that in order to totally educate (*terbiye*) a nation (*kavm*), it is necessary that the people speak the language of the ruling state⁵¹. Thus, he proposes, by persuading some of the respected ‘ulemâ and sheiks of the Albanian community, in accordance with the saying “The people are on to the faith of their kings”⁵², speaking Albanian should be banned, except in times of necessity, via an *emr-i âlî*. After the ban, he suggests, with the help of the religious leaders, notables, and governors, the broader population will quickly forget Albanian. Penâh emphasizes that these measures were very serious, and statesmen should enact even more drastic measures to discipline the various kinds of people under their authority⁵³. As we have seen above, Penâh knew that the subjugation of various peoples was not possible without their indoctrination. Thus, Penâh then suggests that endowments for schools, libraries, and mosques, which had mostly been carried out in the capital until that time, should instead be donated by their patrons (*sâhibü’l-hayrât*) to towns and cities in the provinces, including Albanian towns. This would have two benefits: in addition to familiarizing the people of the provinces with the various sciences and with the norms of civilized conduct, it would also reduce the population

⁵¹ According to Erdem, this statement shows that Turkish had already been recognized as the official language of the Ottoman state in the late 18th century (Erdem 2017a).

⁵² *En-nâsu ‘alâ dîni mülûkîhim*. Erdem notes that this phrase quite closely resembled the principle which was invented for the Augsburg Settlement of 1555, as a solution to the bloody Protestant-Catholic wars (Erdem 2017b).

⁵³ (Penâh Efendi 2017, 108-109; Erdem 2017a, 2017b).

of students in the capital and lessen the burden of maintaining them there⁵⁴.

To give an example of a successful model of indoctrination, Penâh Efendi describes the Spanish practices in the West Indies (*Hind-i Cedîd*). When the Spanish discovered the Americas (*Iklâm-i Amerika*), he writes, the indigenous people that they encountered were even more ignorant than the Albanians⁵⁵. For this reason, the Spanish brought numerous Native American women to Spain, married them, and employed their sons - who knew both Spanish and Native American languages - as translators in the Spanish West Indies. The people of America gradually forgot their own languages and learned Spanish with the help of these children. As in the case of Spain, Penâh Efendi suggests that the Ottomans should bring a thousand boys from Delvine and Avlonya to the capital, place them somewhere outside the city walls, assign to them a bare level of subsistence and educate them. Furthermore, the sons of every Albanian notable more than fifteen years old should be enlisted and sent to work in the service of viziers and *beylerbeyis* in Rumeli, Anadolu, Egypt, and Baghdad, in order to be trained as apprentices⁵⁶. As Erdem correctly asserts, by using the term *terbiye*, Penâh was not only implying a sort of general education of the masses, as Ermiş has suggested, but was more likely referring to a deeper process of assimilation, causing them to forget their original language and culture. As was the case in contemporary Europe, he described the peoples in the colonized areas as ignorant uncivilized masses, imposing upon the Ottoman state a sort of early *mission civilisatrice*⁵⁷.

Penâh Efendi gives a crucial role to trade and industrial production in his “education” program for the Albanian people. Thus, he suggests that via an *emr-i âlî*, a number of men of industry (*erbâb-ı sanâyi*) from the boroughs of Portarya (Portaria), Makrinice (Makrinitza), Tirnova (Tirnavos), Kiliseli (Alasonya), and Yenice (*Yenice-i Rûm- Agrafta*) in the *kazâ* of Yenişehir (Larissa) should be transferred to the major Albanian towns - by force, if necessary - on condition that they will stay there for about 3 years and train the local people on the use of the lathe (*çirkrik*) and the production of *astar*, *boğası*, *alaca*, and other fabrics or goods. Penâh underlines that this plan clearly requires intensive state support, but argues that once it is realized it will both pacify the Albanian people and produce a new source of

⁵⁴(Penâh Efendi 2017, 157; Cezar 1988, 120; Sariyannis 2018, 358, 360).

⁵⁵To demonstrate the level of ignorance of the Native Americans, he describes how, when they first witnessed a Spaniard on horseback, they were shocked to discover that what they had assumed to be one monstrous creature was nothing more than a man and an animal (Penâh Efendi 2017, 113). It is known now that the incident in this narrative did not actually happen (Erdem 2017b).

⁵⁶(Penâh Efendi 2017, 109-110, 112-113; Erdem 2017b; Ermiş 2014, 128).

⁵⁷(Erdem 2017a, 128; 2017b; Şakul 2017, 132-133; Sariyannis 2018, 358-359).

revenue for the treasury (Penâh Efendi 2017, 113-114; Erdem 2017b).

Penâh Efendi's last mechanism to discipline the Albanians was the military. To keep the region safe from brigandage and anarchy, and to fortify the defenses of the Rumelian border, Penâh Efendi suggests that some regiments should be recruited from Albanian soldiers and posted to various parts of the Empire. He proposes that 4,000 infantrymen should be sent to Delvine and Dukagin (Dukagjin), 5,000 to Avlonya, and 5,000 cavalymen to İşkodra (Shkodër). He emphasizes that the soldiers to be sent to Delvine and Avlonya should be recruited from the southern tribes, those to Dukagin from the northern tribes (*Kega*), and the cavalry of *İşkodra* should be recruited from among the local people. The organization of these regiments should be in the hierarchical order he had previously proposed for the reformed Janissary corps, but here he describes it in more detail: an *ağa* as the chief commander, *binbaşı*s (major), *yüzbaşı*s (captain), and *onbaşı*s (corporal) in adequate numbers, an *alemdâr* (standard-bearer) and a *çavuş* (sergeant) for every hundred soldiers, and two scribes for maintaining the registers. Moreover, 3,000 seamen should be recruited from *İşkodra*, Bar, and Ülgün (Ulcinj), half of whom will be gunners, and the other half sailors. This naval regiment will be organized in the same manner, with an *ağa* as the grand admiral, and so forth. From one third to the entirety of the regiment will join the fleet of the Grand Admiral of the Imperial Navy every year. He suggests that these Albanian regiments will maintain order in the region and be useful in times of war (Penâh Efendi 2017, 107-108; Erdem 2017b).

Egypt

Penâh Efendi also suggests a way to assert control over Egypt, too. As was mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, the province of Egypt suffered from continuous turmoil throughout the 18th century because of power struggles among the Mamluk *emîrs*. It can be assumed that Penâh Efendi was closely acquainted with the troubles in Egypt, since his first patron, Köse Mustafa Paşa, had held the governorship of the province in the 1750s, and one of his closest companions, Ahmet İzzet Efendi, had travelled there for an official mission in the late 1760s. Thus, in his treatise, Penâh Efendi proposes a plan to end the unrest in the province. Penâh Efendi starts by claiming that the Mamluk *emîrs* of Egypt were among the most irrational people in the world. They had no ease and comfort, because they were constantly killing each other and leaving the sons of their rivals as orphans. To maintain order in the province, Penâh Efendi suggests that some of the wiser *emîrs* could be persuaded to accept Ottoman authority by pointing out the futility of their current situation. However, if this cannot be done gently, then it should be done by force. First, those

Arab sheikhs in the provinces to whom the emîrs could flee should be brought into the Ottoman orbit, and then the emîrs should be suppressed. After the subjugation of the *emîrs*, the province should be divided into 80-100 small *mukâta'as*, which will be distributed to the dispossessed emîrs. Because their numbers will be too great and their assigned lands too small, the emîrs will not be able to make common cause nor seriously threaten the state. After instituting order in the province, Penâh states that the Egyptian regiments should be organized according to the new rules he outlines elsewhere⁵⁸.

Baghdad

Penâh makes similar suggestions for another Mamluk regime, in Baghdad. Because the distance between Baghdad and Basra is considerable, he suggests that the region be divided into several *paşaliks*⁵⁹ which will help the state to control the region and will raise available tax revenues (Penâh Efendi 2017, 133; Erdem 2019b). Since the start of the century, Baghdad had been ruled by the same family, which, like the Mamluks in Egypt, had established its power through marriages with military slaves. Despite their similarities with Egypt, the governors of the Baghdad did not revolt against the Ottoman sovereignty, most likely due to the threat of neighboring Iran; thus, the province had not been the scene of constant power struggles, and there was only one Mamluk household. Although Basra was also under the control of the Baghdadi Mamluks, because of its distance, strategic location and the emerging British presence in the region, the governors of that city had considerable independence in their affairs (Masters 2006, 200-201). Although Penâh does not elaborate upon his suggestions regarding the region, it seems that he was uncomfortable with the vast lands from Baghdad to Basra being under the control of a single Mamluk household. Nevertheless, in contrast to Egypt, the Ottoman state did not attempt to divide Iraq in the years following Penâh's death.

Abyssinia

Another southern region which Penâh discussed was Abyssinia (*Habeş*). As he writes, there was no reason for Abyssinia to remain independent, as it could subjugated with little effort. He argues instead that Abyssinia should be subjugated and divided into several *sancaks*. Every *sancak* should be granted to someone local for life, and upon his death the *sancak* should be granted to his oldest son. In other words, as in the Egypt, he suggests that *sancaks* be granted to certain local households. Following this, a certain amount of annual taxes should be assigned

⁵⁸(Penâh Efendi 2017, 133-135; Erdem 2019b; Sariyannis 2018, 351).

⁵⁹An Ottoman subdivisional territory that is ruled by a *paşa*, a military-governor.

to every *sancak*, and an army should be constituted from soldiers sent from other Ottoman realms and from regiments recruited from the local people. Finally, a high-ranking vizier should be appointed there as governor for five years, and tasked with ensuring that the Nile remains free from blockages and conducive to boat traffic⁶⁰ (Penâh Efendi 2017, 134-135; Erdem 2019b). According to Erdem, since Penâh Efendi described the subjugation of these lands, it is not possible that he in fact meant the formally Ottoman territories of Masavva and Sevakin when using the term *Habeş*. Instead, it is clear that Penâh advocated for the annexation of the whole of Abyssinia, and that he believed it would become a considerable source of revenue for the treasury. As Erdem argues, it is difficult to understand why Penâh believed that a territory which was not able to cover even its own governor's expenditures in the past, like Abyssinia, would contribute to Istanbul's treasury. Erdem suggests that Penâh might have had an illusion regarding the continental resources of Africa, just as the European colonialists did (Erdem 2019b).

Montenegro

The last region Penâh discusses is Karadağ (Montenegro), which he argues should be brought under control by persuading (*san'at ile ele getürüb*) ten or twenty of the local notables, called boyars, to accept Ottoman authority. These boyars should be given a number of soldiers under their command, and a governor should be from the Rum (Greek) population, as had been done in Wallachia⁶¹. The governor should be accommodated in a fort constructed for this purpose, and he should be assigned a certain amount of revenue for his personal and official expenses. According to Penâh Efendi, even the *Isklaven* (?) countries in Rumeli, as well as the islands of Zakesna (Zakynthos) and Kefalonya (Kefalonia) in the vicinity of the Morea, could have been conquered using such methods⁶².

⁶⁰As we mentioned in the previous chapter, Penâh even might have been in Egypt during Köse Mustafa Paşa's governorship. Considering his level of knowledge about the Nile river, it seems highly possible.

⁶¹It should be noted that, at the time when Penâh wrote his treatise, the Voyvoda of Wallachia was not a member of the Phanariot families, but a different Greek notable, named Nikolai Mavroyani (d. 1790). This individual was very close to Gazi Hasan Paşa and was the former Dragoman of the Imperial Navy. Mavroyani was appointed as the Voyvoda of the Wallachia with the help of Gazi Hasan Paşa and Koca Yusuf Paşa (Karahana 2017, 180-181; Ünlü 2018, 119-121; Vâsîf Efendi 1994, 332). Considering this, Penâh Efendi here likely was referring not to the Phanariot families, but to some other notable Greek families or men who had good relations with Gazi Hasan Paşa's faction.

⁶²Most likely, by mentioning the Morea expedition, he was referring to the one conducted by the former Grand Vizier Şehid Ali Paşa (d. 1716) in 1715.

3.4 Economy and State Finance

3.4.1 Tax Collection and State Finance

Penâh Efendi argues that information related to the taxes collected directly by the state - namely the *cizye* (poll-tax levied on non-Muslim subjects) and the ‘*avâriz*’ (poll-tax levied on Muslim subjects) - should be put into order and recorded in the Imperial registers, district by district. Every province and sub-province should be defined as a *muhassılık* (a local unit with an authorized tax collector - *muhassıl*) and a total should be calculated for each; land belonging to pious foundations should be bundled together with the others. *Defterdârs* (finance administrators) would thus know the amount of revenue coming from a province or a sub-province, greatly reducing the burden of unnecessary paperwork (Penâh Efendi 2017, 124; Cezar 1988, 123).

He complains that corrupt *muhassıls* and *cizyedârs* were selling the papers (*evrâk*) which had been given to them by subjects as a receipt for their tax payments, such that when they arrived in the provinces, they were unable to give receipts to all those who needed them, causing great difficulties for these subjects when they travelled across the Empire. To stop the trade of these papers, Penâh Efendi suggests that papers should include the year of tax collection and the name of the respective *eyâlet* or *sancak* (Penâh Efendi 2017, 125).

Penâh Efendi displays a great deal of resentment towards previous officials, who split up the registers of different districts and villages under the pretext that they were protecting the rights of their subjects; these officials spoiled the registers and made them extremely difficult to use. As Penâh Efendi writes, “manhood is found in protecting all villages in all districts, not just protecting one and leaving the others in ruins”. Thus, all *cizye* and ‘*avâriz*’ registers in the provinces and sub-provinces, including the previously separated districts and villages, should be wrapped up in a bundle and given to the *muhassıl* of each administrative unit. When the *muhassıl* arrives at his assigned post, he should gather within a single codex the registers of all the *çiftlik*s and villages in the district with the help of the local people; after the judges seal the book, he should collect the taxes according to it. If, at the time that the *cizye* is collected, a subject registered in a different region is permanently residing in a new district, the response varied according to the subject’s location: if found in a village or *çiftlik*, he should pay the tax there; if residing in a town, the

governor's office should not be involved, but instead the local *muhassıl* or *cizyedâr* who collects the taxes of the town should take the subject's *cizye* for the expenses of his own office (Penâh Efendi 2017, 126-127, 130).

Penâh suggests that *mübâya'acıs* (local purchasing agents), *cizye muhassıls* (tax collectors of the poll-tax on the Christian subjects), and *mütesellims* (deputy governors) should not be appointed from the indigenous people of an area, because they tend to make common cause with the local usurpers and oppress the people. Instead, someone from the capital or another province should be appointed to these posts. If some official notifications or complaints come from the locals concerning this practice, these should be ignored, because it is likely that the usurper *a'yân*, *hükkam* (judges), and *kocabaşuyân* ordered them sent in order to recover their former positions. Furthermore, the *muhassıls* and *cizyedârs* should cover their personal expenditures, such as accommodation and comestibles, from their own budgets, not from the budget of the local administration. Moreover, the deputy collectors in the districts and other subdivisions (*kazâlar ve kollar*) who will be assigned by the *muhassıls* should secure a guarantee from the local communities⁶³.

From this time on, he suggests, the institutions of the *cizye* and *'avârız* should also not be sold as tax farms. For every province and sub-province, an official among the *Hâcegân-ı Dîvân-ı Hümâyûn* who resides in the capital should be appointed as the collector of these taxes. Thereby, the state revenues can be collected without oppressing the subjects, the *hâcegân* can earn a living, and the state can be cognizant of provincial affairs. Because the *hâcegân* are not drawn from the class of tax farmers but are servants of the state, they can prevent troublesome local notables from interfering in the collection of the *cizye*. (Penâh Efendi 2017, 124-125; Cezar 1988, 123).

Penâh Efendi continues by detailing his ideas regarding the reform of the *mâlikâne* system. According to Penâh Efendi, the *mâlikâne* system had been a mistake from the beginning. He explains his thought with the example of the tax-farm of the tobacco customs revenue, which was divided and distributed in shares (*sehim/eshâm*) to several tax-farmers. Before it was added to the *mâlikâne* system, it had generally been given as a tax-farm (*iltizam*) for 3,000 *kise* annually. After it was added to the *mâlikâne* system, 5-*kise* shares were given to the *mâlikâne*-owners in return for 25 *kise*, which was equivalent to five years of the revenue of a share; thus, a total of 600 shares were given out for 15 years, in return for a one-time payment of 15,000 *kise*. Due to this system, Penâh argues, the state took in 15,000 *kise* in revenue at the start of a 15 year period, rather than the 45,000 *kise* they would have re-

⁶³(Penâh Efendi 2017, 122-123, 127; Cezar 1988, 122).

ceived had they sold the tax farms on an annual basis: furthermore, since not all of the *mâlikâne* owners would die during this period, the state would be unable to sell the shares again after 15 years and the loss would be very detrimental for the treasury⁶⁴. Nevertheless, he suggests that reforms of the *mukâta'ât* could be carried out without any harm to the interests of the *malikâne* owners (Penâh Efendi 2017, 127-129, 133; Cezar 1986, 145). Penâh Efendi, who had previously suggested the abolishment of *a'yân*ship, seems to have found the idea of abolishing the *mâlikâne* system too radical to contemplate.

Furthermore, he criticizes the practice in which a district was divided into several separate *mukâta'as*, with some of the villages in certain districts ending up in the *mukâta'as* of different districts. Moreover, in some towns, such as Izmir and Thessaloniki, the sheep-tax and some other small customs revenues were defined as independent *mukâta'as* separate from the main account. Penâh Efendi finds these practices very detrimental to the state, and suggests that there should be only one *mukâta'a* designated in a single district, including the sheep-tax and minor customs revenue (Penâh Efendi 2017, 129; Cezar 1986, 144).

Penâh Efendi suggests that cash-tax farms, such as *celeb-keşân* (herder) and *beksimât* (hard tack) taxes, should not be given out as *mâlikâne*. Where this has already occurred, the *mâlikâne* should not be renewed after the owner's death. Rather, these cash taxes should be given to the *muhassîls* of the *cizye* and *'avârız*. Furthermore, from this time on, *mâlikâne* owners should give their *mukâta'as* only to those contractors/tax farmers (*mültezim*) who were selected by the local people, had extensive experience, and had arranged a certain guarantor (*kefillü intihâb olunmuş mücerrebü'l-etvâr*), and to take interest only from these trustworthy individuals. Moreover, he notes that many *mâlikâne* owners had been raising interest rates on their *mukâta'as* annually, expecting that the costs would be recouped by extracting ever more tax revenue from the populace; this practice was devastating the local economy. From now on, he proposes, the interest rate for every *mukâta'a* should be estimated and recorded in the Imperial registers, and the owners should raise their interests in accordance with these official projections⁶⁵. Penâh also proposed that tax collectors should be prevented from residing in their assigned provinces; it seems that was worried such tax collectors would be corrupted by local patronage networks if they resided there permanently.

⁶⁴Considering that he described a *mâlikâne mukâta'a* with six hundred shares, it seems that he was referring to a *mukâta'a* sold in the *eshâm* (shares – the plural form of *sehm*) system. According to Cezar, the one of the most significant problems of the *eshâm* system was that the state guaranteed interest payments to the shareholders under any conditions, even if the revenues of the *mukâta'a* had decreased (Cezar 1986, 84-86). However, Penâh Efendi did not mention such a problem in his criticism of the system.

⁶⁵(Penâh Efendi 2017, 127-128; Cezar 1986, 144-145).

Penâh Efendi also writes that the practice of collecting tax revenues in advance at the beginning of the year was detrimental for everyone, except for the moneylenders who made fortunes from the interest revenues they extracted from the subjects⁶⁶. Thus, the revenues from the *mukâta'ât*, *cizye* and *'avâriz* should be collected in installments after the first six months of every hijra year, and collection of taxes before that time should be banned by imperial decree. Banning this practice, he continues, will even decrease interest rates, which were about 5-7% in Europe at that time (Penâh Efendi 2017, 130).

Furthermore, the *mâlikâne* owners should take their interest revenue from their *mukâta'as* every *rûz-ı Hızır*, not before, and the *mâlikânes* of those who take it before should be seized. The state revenues on their *mukâta'as* (*mîrî ve kalemiyeleri*) should be collected by *muhassıls*, not by the *mâlikâne* owners, and the *mültezims* should pay a certain amount to the *muhassıls* for the dispatch of the state revenues. Thereby, if the subjects have problems with the local authorities, they can easily report these to the *muhassıls*, preventing local strongmen from oppressing them. However, state revenues from the *mukâta'as* should be collected in three installments, in *rûz-ı Hızır*, *rûz-ı Kasım* (November), and *Kânûn-ı evvel* (December), respectively. He underlines that collecting tax revenues in advance, even as an emergency measure, can never increase the amount collected; tax policy should be forward-thinking, not impulsive (Penâh Efendi 2017, 128-129).

Penâh Efendi writes that the rule books for tithes and taxes, as well as the books recording the revenues of all the *mukâta'ât*, sheep-tax, *tîmar*, *ze'âmet*, and so forth, were kept in the Imperial registers. To prevent interference and protect the subjects, he argues, the center should send up-to-date rules and limits regarding tax collection to the provinces each year, and tax collectors should act in accordance with these rules. All of the *mâlikâne* owners, *mütevellîs* (trustees of the pious foundations), *kâ'immakâms* (deputy governors), administrators of the Sultan's domains (*hâsslar*), and *mültezims* should compile the registers of their *mukâta'âs* and give a copy of the books to the *kocabaşıs* of their subjects. Moreover, *tîmar* and *ze'âmet* owners should be warned to behave in accordance with the registers too. The *emr-i âlîs* sent for these reforms should be read in public in the local courthouses, and even in smaller towns they should be read aloud in the presence of all local notables, *çiftlik* owners, people of the larger villages, *kocabaşıs*, metropolitans, and bishops (Penâh Efendi 2017, 135-137).

As we have also seen in the previous section, Penâh Efendi was trying to ensure

⁶⁶The moneylenders were one of the most important participants in the tax-farm and *mâlikâne* system, in that they provided financing for the owners of the tax farms and collateral for the state (Bölükbaşı 2014, 19; Yaycıoğlu 2019, 382-383).

the participation of the *kocabaşıs*, as the representatives of the subjects, in the tax collection process. By making the *kocabaşıs* aware of the rules and regulations regarding taxation, they could act as ombudsmen and report any corrupt activities by local officials. Beyond this, however, Penâh Efendi's approach reflected a common mentality regarding taxation within the Ottoman bureaucracy. Throughout the 18th century, the state increasingly promoted mechanisms to ensure the participation of local people in taxation, governance, and public finance on the district level, rather similar to the notion of physiocracy emergent in France and Spain during the same period (Yaycıoğlu 2016, 117-118).

Indeed, this was not the only aspect of Penâh's recommendations that bore a striking similarity of the practices of the European physiocrats (Erdem 2019c). In the Climes, for instance, Penâh Efendi attaches a critical importance to the landowners in an economy;

“The landowners (*ashâb-ı arâzî*)⁶⁷ are the primary substance of the prosperity of the World (...) The prosperity of the World and the Imperial treasury depend upon the landowners and they deliver all revenues. There is no doubt that the well-being of the men of industries and crafts, and all of humanity, depends on the comfort of the landowners.” (Penâh Efendi 2017, 143)

To compare Penâh Efendi's ideas with those of the physiocrats, I will take the risk here of briefly digressing to consider their ideas. The physiocrats were a group of 18th-century French intellectuals and statesmen, led by François Quesnay (d. 1774) who “attributed a key role to the development of agriculture, which they considered the only sector capable of producing surplus.”⁶⁸ Quesnay was opposed to the contemporary French mercantilist economic policy of “supporting commerce and manufactures by liberalizing the importation of raw materials and duties on manufacturing imports.” He argued that this policy was decreasing the profitability of agricultural products and obstructing the development of agriculture. As he maintained, the agricultural products needed a price sufficient “not only to cover production costs, but also to favor the financing of investments by ensuring adequate returns.” (Roncaglia 2006, 96-99) Thus, the state should support the demand

⁶⁷Sariyannis states that the term *ashâb-ı arâzî* generally meant the *tîmar* owners, but, he argues, Penâh uses this term to refer to the peasant-farmers (Sariyannis 2018, 354). However, I have here preferred to use a literal translation of the term.

⁶⁸According to Quesnay, “taking account of the situation prevailing in France at the time: given the prices of agricultural products and manufactures on the world markets, with recourse to the best technologies farmers can obtain a product whose value exceeds production costs, while manufacturers simply recover their costs (including subsistence for manufacturing entrepreneurs).” (Roncaglia 2006, 97).

for agricultural products while doing the opposite in regard to luxuries and manufactured goods. He distinguished between those states in which the “primary resources lie in agriculture”, and those which were “lacking the capacity to produce a reliable agricultural surplus”. The former countries, such as France, should orient their economic policy towards a reliance upon agricultural production, whereas the latter should follow trade. While Quesnay did not neglect the benefits of the manufacturing, he underlined that the wealth which manufacturing produces had some disadvantages for the state in comparison to agricultural surplus (Hochstrasser 2006, 429-432).

Although the similarity between Penâh’s statement regarding the landowners and the views of the physiocrats cannot be denied, I should note that Penâh’s emphasis on the landowners, as I shall detail further, did not come at the expense of the international trade in manufactured goods. Although, as Cezar has suggested, he did give some priority to agricultural products (Cezar 1988, 119), Penâh’s approach was not as rigid as Quesnay’s; in another part of his work, for example, he argues that there is no harm in a state and subjects depending upon four different resources for the state’s revenue, such as *arz* (soil), *hayvanât* (animals), *eşcâr* (trees), and *metâ’* (goods).⁶⁹ However, he argues that the resources assigned apart from these would harm some people, as the apportionment of unnecessary expenditures. On the other hand, it seems that although Penâh Efendi distinguishes between these resources in regard to the regular tax accounts in the Ottoman state finances, it is apparent that Penâh only considered indirect taxes; he does, for example, include any of the poll-taxes among the harmless revenue sources he describes, making it ambiguous if he was against the collection of direct taxes or not.

Penâh Efendi continues by outlining some proposals for the reform of land ownership practices in the Ottoman Empire. As he argues, since estates, unlike orchards and gardens, were unable to be passed down to female heirs by means of a *tapu*⁷⁰, usurpers such as *a’yâns* and *zâbitâns* have been able to accrue large amounts of land. Due to this situation, *mültezims* had been able to make considerable fortunes

⁶⁹(Penâh Efendi 2017, 150; Cezar 1988, 118-119; Ermiş 2014, 127).

⁷⁰ *Tapu*, in Ottoman financial terminology, meant a contract which was given to the peasants by the state and which defined the usufruct right of the state lands for small family farms. With the *tapu* contract, the possessors could not own land, but had only the usufruct right to state lands in return for certain personal obligations, such as paying taxes or providing certain services to local officials. *Tapu* contracts were sold by state agents to the peasants in return for a certain fee in the presence of local judges. The possessors of state lands, with a *tapu*, were able to transfer their rights to other farmers and bequeath it to their sons. Upon the sale of the land or the death of the possessor, the *tapu* was transferred to another person, via a hearing in the presence of a local judge and with the permission of the local authorities. However, only the sons of the possessor were able to be considered as rightful heirs until the 1600s. From that time on, in some regions, daughters were included among the rightful heirs in return for a special tax called the *resm-i tapu*. On the other hand, houses, gardens, vineyards, orchards, and vegetable patches were defined under the title of private property in Islamic religious law, and were thus able to be sold, rented, and inherited freely (İnalçık 1994, 106-114) (Faroqi 2006b, 381-382).

at the expense of the heirs of the land, with little clear benefit to the state or to the owners of the *mâlikânes*. Writing from his own experience, Penâh Efendi argues that, because there was no method to transfer a *tapu* between women and from fathers to daughters, when a woman possessing lands with a revenue of 5-10 *kise* died, her lands were often escheated by local â'yâns and zâbitâns and her family would be left in miserable conditions. Therefore, Penâh Efendi suggests, the Exalted State should end the *tapu* practice entirely, with a decree that permits subjects to take lands as their private property (*temellük*) and transfer them to their heirs without restrictions, as in the case of orchards and vineyards. He emphasizes that this reform will solve several social problems in the Empire and cause no loss to the state treasury and *mâlikâne* owners. Penâh Efendi suggests that these reforms first be implemented in the Morea, Karlili, İnebahtı (Lepanto), Ağrıboz (Euboea), Tırhala (Trikala), Yanya (Ionina), Selanik (Thessaloniki), Avlonya (Vlorë), and Delvine (Delvinë), and afterwards would expand gradually throughout the Empire⁷¹.

The tîmâr and ze'âmet owners will also benefit from these new regulations, as alongside the continued payment of tax revenue from the landowners, the new system would encourage an increase in crop productivity and value. However, Penâh warns, the sipâhis should be ordered not to give their tîmârs and ze'âmet to certain *mültezims*, and to thus allow the â'yâns and other usurpers to turn these lands into *çiftlik*s. Thus, an order should be decreed that those *çiftlik*s which had been villages previously should be restored to their former state, and the lands that the local usurpers had seized should be expropriated back by the state⁷². However, Penâh does not elaborate on the issue of private property beyond this; for instance, he does not explain how the state will be able to prevent the estates, after being declared private property, from simply accumulating in the hands of the â'yâns or other wealthy notables. Penâh Efendi suggests that in cases where the lands had not been given out as private property, a *tapu* should be given to the landowner's heirs, whether male or female, to ensure that the families and their lands would not be separated. If there are no heirs and the lands are in escheat, they should be given to all of the people in the deceased landowner's village or *çiftlik*, whether they be Muslim or Rum. If the lands were already given out as private property, however, Penâh proposes something different; when someone sells his or her lands to another, the judge should take 2 *guruş* for each *çift* for notification of the deed. When the landowner dies, the judge should take 1 *guruş* for each *çift* from the heirs for the *resm-i kısmet* (the tax of division), and if a landowner dies with no heirs, the land should be given to the people of the village, and the judge should take 5

⁷¹(Penâh Efendi 2017, 143; Cezar 1988, 123-125; Ermiş 2014, 128; Sariyannis 2018, 354).

⁷²(Penâh Efendi 2017, 144; Cezar 1988, 125; Sariyannis 2018, 354).

guruş for each *çift* for the new *tapu*. In this way, he argues, everyone's lands will be protected and there will be no injustice. Moreover, no matter the condition of the land, turning them into *vakıf* endowments should be prohibited by imperial decree. If the reform is to be initiated by the state, an *emr-i âlî*, including the new rules, should be sent annually via courier to the governors, judges, military officers, and the landowners in the provinces⁷³.

3.4.2 Mercantilism and Substitute Production

In the section entitled “The Circumstances of Trade and Goods”, Penah Efendi embarks upon defining the basic principles of wealth, by posing the question: “How can a state and its society become wealthy?”⁷⁴ He continues by answering:

“In addition to the revenue that is generated from its own dominions; they become wealthy by investing in crafts which will ensure that wealth is drawn from other sides (countries) by means of art and production, and by preventing its coins from going to other climes by having fabrics produced in its own provinces.”⁷⁵

As Cezar has suggested, this statement was expounding the concept of balance-of-trade, and Penâh begins his argument with a practical narrative. He notes that, when the French, English, Venetian, Spanish, Neapolitan, Netherlandish, and, on some occasion, the Habsburg merchants come to the Ottoman realms for trade, they sell their goods and buy different things with the same coins that they earn; thus, they do not – for the most part – contribute to the outflow of gold and silver coin from the Ottoman realms. However, other merchants bring goods and sell them, but do not buy anything from the Ottoman lands and take their coins home with them⁷⁶. In other words, Penâh argues that the way in which a state or society can become wealthy is by encouraging the export of manufactures, and by limiting

⁷³(Penâh Efendi 2017, 144-146; Cezar 1988, 124-125; Erdem 2019c).

⁷⁴Although Smith's answer to issue was much more complex, the similarity with the title of his famous book *The Wealth of Nations* is obvious.

⁷⁵(Penâh Efendi 2017, 152; Erdem 2019a; Ermiş 2014, 140).

⁷⁶(Penâh Efendi 2017, 150-151; Cezar 1988, 127; Erdem 2019a; Ermiş 2014, 142; Sariyannis 2018, 357).

imports by investing in the domestic production of substitutes for certain foreign fabrics. As I have mentioned earlier, this was somewhat contrary to the principles of physiocracy, but rather closer to an older economic mentality, mercantilism, which had been the subject of heavy criticism by the physiocrats. Before elaborating upon Penâh's ideas, it may prove beneficial to look at the definition of the mercantilism. In the Princeton Encyclopedia of the World Economy, mercantilism is defined as;

“A school of economic thought developed in 16th and 17th-century England, mercantilism argued that a country's primary economic objective should be the achievement of a trade surplus with the associated inflow of gold. The central idea was that trade was a zero-sum game and that a country could amass gold through balance-of-trade surplus only at the expense of another country. Mercantilism is therefore a form of economic nationalism, with foreign trade used to enhance the wealth and power of one country at the expense of others.” (Bowles 2009, 757)

It is important to emphasize certain aspects of this definition: the mercantilists of the previous centuries saw trade as “a zero-sum game” and thus assumed that a country could only become rich at the “expense of others.” We do not know from his writings whether or not Penâh regarded trade similarly. In the case of trade with Europe, he argues, a more or less equal balance of trade was beneficial for the empire. Nevertheless, considering the emphasis he places upon maintaining such a balance, we can still consider his proposals as a form of mercantilism. Penâh's perception of the value of foreign trade was not novel in the 18th-century Ottoman world. At the beginning of the 18th century, the Ottoman historian Nâ'imâ described the issue of the balance-of-trade in exactly the same words, and indeed Penâh may have borrowed his ideas on the matter from Nâ'imâ's text (Ermiş 2014, 149-150; Erdem 2019e). Nevertheless, we should note that there was a considerable rise in the expression of mercantilist ideas among Ottoman intellectuals in the years after Penâh Efendi (Erdem 2019a).

We can infer from Penâh's text, that Ottoman financial bureaucrats were aware of the levels of foreign trade in the empire. For instance, until the end of the 18th century, the Ottomans maintained a positive balance of trade with both France and Britain (Eldem 2006, 329, 331). Penâh Efendi mentions furs as an example of a good which contributed to the Ottoman trade deficit. He suggests that, since the trade in furs could not be entirely banned⁷⁷, suitable kinds of furs should be exclusively

⁷⁷Probably because the role of the robe of honor (hil'at) which was mostly made of fur bearing in the Ottoman state (Karaca 1998, 25-27), Penâh should have seen it hard, even impossible to ban the fur to be sold or purchased.

assigned to high-ranking officials (*erbâb-ı mertebe*) and prohibited for the rest of the population, whether in the capital or the provinces. Furthermore, garments made of Indian fabrics such as *şâlîs* (a fabric made from mohair), *destârs* (napkins), and *kuşaks* (sashes) should be completely and strongly prohibited, and those who do not follow such rules, even officials, should be fined and punished. Penâh criticizes contemporary Ottoman society's passion for excess, which, he writes, developed in the last forty years; he argues that those who would take pride in a 500-*guruş* sash have "not even the slightest degree of wisdom" and suggests that 5-*guruş* sash is essentially no different. Moreover, strife and discord arise because everyone cannot afford a 500-*guruş* sash. Penâh Efendi continues by suggesting that, because Indian fabrics were in high demand throughout the Ottoman Empire, vast amounts of *akçes* were flowing to the Indian realms, eventually bankrupting the Ottoman population. Thus, the complete prohibition of Indian fabrics is necessary to stop the outflow of currency and preserve the Ottoman economy⁷⁸.

He argues that the production of substitutes for certain foreign imports should be supported by the Ottoman state. The people of the Ottoman domains should be encouraged to produce fabrics made of from cotton yarns produced in the Morea and Rumeli, similar in form to those imported from India and Tunisia. Within a short time, he wrote, the quality of goods produced in the Ottoman Empire would become equal to those imported from abroad. Penâh Efendi also notes that the importation of coffee from Yemen was yet another reason for the loss of vast quantities of *akçes* abroad. If this crop could be planted in the vicinity of Egypt, Basra, and Jerusalem, it would undoubtedly flourish; he notes how France had invested in the cultivation of coffee in the Americas and had, as a result, gained vast amounts of wealth⁷⁹. Penâh Efendi points out that European states pay attention to both agricultural and industrial production (*gerek eşcâr gerek metâ'*). From this, he argues that the development of Ottoman industry should be encouraged; if enough time and resources are invested in the ceramic industry at Kütahya, for example, the porcelain produced there will soon exceed Habsburg products in quality, and could even become on par with Indian exports. If this is done, the *akçes* currently being exported to the Habsburg realms will stay in the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, Penâh argues, the Habsburg products were of such low quality that they crumbled into dust as soon as they broke; by contrast, the inherent quality of Kütahya products

⁷⁸(Penâh Efendi 2017, 151-152; Erdem 2019a, 2019e; Ermiş 2014, 142-143; Sariyannis 2018, 357).

⁷⁹The colonial products were increasingly appearing among the French export goods in its trade with the Ottoman Empire during the 18th century such as coffee, sugar, indigo, and cochineal. However, according to Eldem, coffee's impact was more spectacular on the Ottoman world (Eldem 2006, 315-316).

is evident⁸⁰.

3.4.3 Precious Metals and Monetary Policy

Penâh Efendi proceeds to define what constitutes a public (*zarar-ı ‘âmm*) and private loss (*zarar-ı hâss*) in economic life. As he writes, no matter how high the price of a good, the loss incurred by its trade is not shared by the broader public. The transaction will be solely between the seller and the buyer; the seller profits, and the buyer loses his cash in exchange for the product. However, this is not the case when it comes to the production of silver and gold threads, which were used in the manufacture of luxury clothes. The usage of these materials in these products is a loss for all humanity, both in the present and in the future, because it consumes precious metals and causes a scarcity of coinage. He theorizes that if the scale of the global production of such clothes could be calculated, it would likely be larger than the value of all the gold and silver extracted for coinage throughout the world. Penâh Efendi suggests that all of the kings and rulers agree to ban the production of these threads for the common good⁸¹. According to Penâh Efendi, the producers of the silver and gold threads should produce luxury fabrics manufactured from cotton, wool, and silk, which could still be sold for excessive prices without causing a loss to the public. Indeed, Penâh Efendi estimates that, should the production of such threads continue to expand, in short time there would be serious coin shortages and global public unrest. Such a catastrophe would have occurred even sooner, had the gold and silver reserves of the Americas not been discovered; as there is no second America, however, prompt action on this issue is necessary⁸².

⁸⁰(Penâh Efendi 2017, 146-147, 151-152; Cezar 1988, 116-117, 128; Erdem 2019a; Ermiş 2014, 141-143; Sariyannis 2018, 357).

⁸¹In the medieval and early modern world, in addition to their monetary uses, gold and silver bullion were also in demand for decorative purposes and as liquid assets. In fact, these two uses were largely interchangeable, as such goods could easily be melted and made into bullion, and vice versa. As Kohn writes, “Because of the general lack of liquid financial assets, the hoarding of bullion was the best or even the only alternative for most people. Changes in hoarding behavior tended to reinforce any change in the underlying abundance of bullion: an increase in its scarcity and a rising value tended to encourage hoarding, and this further increased its scarcity; an increase in the abundance of bullion and a falling value, tended to encourage dishoarding, and this further increased its abundance. Because hoards were large relative to the quantity of coin in circulation, the impact of hoarding and dishoarding on the overall abundance of bullion was significant.” (Kohn 1999, 7). In the late 18th century, the production of gold and silver threads as a means of hoarding precious metals was one of the major problems that the Imperial mint had to overcome. The producers of such cloth (*simkeş*) gathered gold and silver bullions from the market by offering higher prices than the imperial mint. To stop this practice, the state took certain precautions, from designating a maximum quantity of bullion purchases to limiting their legal work hours. The shops of some tailors were even shut down by state officials (Bölükbaşı 2013, 97-98).

⁸²(Penâh Efendi 2017, 152-153; Cezar 1988, 128-129; Erdem 2019a; Ermiş 2014, 150; Sariyannis 2018, 357-358).

Penâh Efendi further argues that, because the nominal values of the *guruş* and other silver coins are higher than their real value⁸³, such coins are not leaving the Ottoman realms⁸⁴. Thus, he continues, to prevent the Istanbulite and Egyptian *zer-i mahbûbs* (literally “the gold of the beloved”, a small Ottoman gold coin) from leaving the Empire, either their nominal value should be increased, or their gold content should be decreased. For example, he suggests that for the *funduk altunu* (literally “nut gold”, an Ottoman gold coin) a reasonable value would be 5 *guruş*. Furthermore, since the real value of the coins would be lower, no one will smelt them into gold bands or bracelets, and thus a shortage of bullion could be prevented (Penâh Efendi 2017, 154; Ermiş 2014, 150).

As we mentioned above, Penâh Efendi argues that the relative success of the *guruş* during the century was dependent on the condition that its nominal value was kept higher than its real value⁸⁵, which implied the debasement of the currency. Although he did not mention it directly, it seems that Penâh saw debasement as necessary to prevent Ottoman coins from flowing out of the country. The method Penâh Efendi suggested is called defensive debasement, a practice which aims to “defend the coinage from the competition of foreign mints able to offer better prices due to their own debasements. . . .” (Allen 2016, 42). This practice could also work in reverse: mints could offer better prices with the help of debasements as well. Although the global production of bullion depended on the number of active mines, the local supply was fed by the flows of bullion between borders. In other words, the provision of bullion was mostly realized by trade rather than by mining, because the sources were local while the demand was global (Kohn 1999, 9). On the other hand, Carlo Cipolla has argued that one of the reasons why states practiced the depreciation of their currencies in medieval Europe was to produce “a long-term increase in the demand for money, related growth in population, income, or monetization that could only be met by increasing the nominal value of a given weight of bullion” (Allen 2016,

⁸³The real value of a coin means the value of the quantity of its material on the market; however, the nominal value means the exchange rate of the coin on the market, which is determined by the state and used by other economic agents.

⁸⁴At the beginning of the 18th century, the Ottomans minted a large silver coin named the *guruş*, which - despite its silver content decreasing by 40% from the 1720s to the 1760s - remained relatively stable in value during the century. In the same century, the Ottomans centralized the mint activity in the empire's realms and almost limited it to the capital, which enabled the state to increase its control over the currency. Although the scarcity in coinage persisted during the century, it seems that the output levels of the mints kept pace with the growth of the economy. In part, this was because the revival of the Ottoman silver mines in this period boosted domestic production, but this was also because the active trade balance with Europe allowed the Ottomans to tap in to the growing glut of silver on European markets. Thus, the *guruş* became the leading currency of the Ottoman realms, from the Balkans to Iraq, replacing both its indigenous and European counterparts (Pamuk 2000, 159-166).

⁸⁵In fact, the nominal value of every coin was higher than the market value of the silver that was included within it because of seigniorage revenues, which mints seized in the name of the ruler every time they struck coinage. However, because the market prices of bullion were determined by supply and demand, they could gradually rise above the mint prices (Kohn 1999, 14).

41). This type of debasement was necessary for all currencies from time to time, even the most stable ones. Compared to aggressive debasements, which aimed to produce large revenues from serious seigniorage by decreasing the bullion content of coins by up to 50%, defensive debasements were rather more modest in scale, ranging from 10-15% every fifty years or so. Moreover, although aggressive debasements greatly boosted the inflow of bullion into the mint, this was only a very temporary increase (Kohn 1999, 16-18).

Cipolla's argument seems to be rather coherent with Penâh's statements. In other words, the data provided by Pamuk shows that, with the changes in the silver content of the *guruş* in the 18th century⁸⁶ (Pamuk 2000, 162-164), and with the repetitive debasements practiced during this century, the Ottoman finance officers were trying to ensure the flow of coins and attempting to keep up with economic growth and market expansion by stimulating inflation. It seems that, in addition to encouraging the export of indigenous manufactured goods and the production of substitutes for imported goods, the Ottoman financial bureaucrats had another economic policy: to prevent coins from flowing outside, which can be understood as a kind of monetary policy⁸⁷. Thus, Penâh Efendi suggested the same "tested" policy for the gold coins. But the debasement of gold coins was very risky, for while such coins were rarely used due to their great value, there were plenty of substitutes that could be found in the markets (Kohn 1999, 19-20). After repetitive debasements, it was likely that the Ottoman gold coins would be replaced by a relatively more stable foreign coin, such as the Venetian ducat. Nevertheless, it seems the Ottomans in fact did implement the same policy, especially after the 1780s, with the imperial gold coins (Pamuk 2000, 168).

However, he suggests that this policy could not be enacted for those coins which were already in circulation. He notes that if the prices of the Ottoman *zer-i mahbûb* and *funduk* were to rise to 10 *guruş*, the Venetian gold would also rise to 15 *guruş* as well, although it was exchanged in Venice for 155 para (3.85 *guruş*)⁸⁸. *Nemçe dökmesi* (a gold coin from Habsburg Austria), he continues, were exchanged for 77.5 para in the Habsburg empire, and they did not let it be exchanged for more elsewhere. Furthermore, should a new European coin appear on the market, it should be weighed meticulously, and a price should be designated for it which enables a profit to be

⁸⁶In addition to this, prices in Istanbul during the 18th century appear to have been relatively stable (Pamuk 2000, 236).

⁸⁷Although I acknowledge here that the Ottoman Empire had no developed institutions in this regard, as with much of the early modern world, the policy of the mint can be taken as a proxy for monetary policy (Kohn 1999, 12).

⁸⁸Para was a medium coin valued between the *guruş* and the *akçe*. After 1730s, an Ottoman *guruş* was exchanged on the markets for 120 *akçe* or 40 para (Pamuk 2002, 458).

made when it is re-minted by the imperial mint. Therefore, he argues, the coin issue demands the careful attention of Ottoman statesmen. From now on, he writes, the exchange rates should be fixed as follows: Venetian and Hungarian gold coins for 5 *guruş*⁸⁹, *Nemçe dökmesi* for 2 *guruş* or 90 para (2.25 *guruş*). Moneylenders and merchants should charge no more than these rates and be punished if they do so. Moreover, governors, local military officers, and judges should be informed of these new rates via an *emr-i âlî* or a *hatt-ı şerîf*. He concludes this argument by noting that these exchange rates would both satisfy the Habsburgs and keep Ottoman coins inside imperial borders (Penâh Efendi 2017, 154, 156).

Next, he argues that the circulation of broken gold coins should be completely prohibited. The governors and local judges should be instructed to have these coins brought to the imperial mint (*Darbhâne-i âmire*) and should pay attention to the issue⁹⁰. Those individuals who use broken coins should be fined by the local authorities. *Muhassıls*, *voyvodas*, the supervisors of the customs (*gümrük ümenâları*), and moneylenders (*sarraflar*) should send the broken coins to the Imperial mint after determining their total value⁹¹. After putting the *cizye* collection and *mukâta'âs* in order, their revenues should be sent to the capital as cash, not as *poliçe* (bills of exchange). because the former is ultimately cheaper. In addition to this, when heavy *akçes* came from the provinces, they were to be recut, allowing the state treasury to make a profit. He notes that, because of the *poliçe* system, profits were instead being siphoned off by “Jewish types” (i.e., Jewish moneylenders) during this period. Moreover, Penâh Efendi argues that when Ottoman coins are properly secured, production costs (*mahsûlât bahâmız*) will decrease and exports will increase. Thus, state agents should be sent to Ottoman provinces like Egypt, İzmir, Damascus, Aleppo, Basra, Baghdad, and Mecca, in order to ensure that all Ottoman coins are minted according to the same values (Penâh Efendi 2017, 154-156). It seems that Penâh Efendi was well aware of the fact that debasement, especially of silver coins, served to make exports more profitable and to decrease labor costs (Kohn 1999, 23). Nevertheless, as Cezar notes, Penâh Efendi does not say anything about the relationship between money and market prices (Cezar 1988, 129).

⁸⁹In 1788, the Hungarian gold coin was exchanged on the Ottoman markets 5 *guruş*, as Pamuk demonstrates (Pamuk 2000, 168).

⁹⁰Broken or clipped coins were one of the major problems of the Ottoman financial system and were frequently banned by decree. The imperial mint was responsible for ensuring the removal of broken coins from the markets. The moneylenders also had an active role in removing broken coins from the markets in both the provinces and the capital (Bölükbaşı 2013, 101-102).

⁹¹Based on Penâh's statements, we can assume that the Ottoman state used customs officials and moneylenders as instruments of monetary policy. These institutions might have helped the state to control the exchange rates between indigenous currencies and foreign ones.

3.4.4 Demographic and Agricultural Planning

When describing the vacant lands in the vicinity of Danube, Rumeli, and other provinces, Penâh notes that, because of the sparseness of the population, the farmers were cultivating only those areas that they chose to. Thus, Penâh suggests that vacant lands should be inspected, recorded in the registers and distributed to the indigenous local people for free. Furthermore, new subjects should be recruited from Poland and other (European) countries, and the newcomers should be given a *çift* of land each for free with a state-guaranteed title deed (*mîrî senediyle*). Moreover, some part of the vacant lands in the same region should also be given to Muslim subjects, such as the poor inhabitants of Albania and Sarıgölü, and together with their families they should be given a *çift* of land each. If they do not go willingly, poor people levied from every nearby town and village should be forced by a Sultan's decree (*bâ-fermân-ı âlî*) to inhabit the region. These Muslim families will make the region prosperous and serve as soldiers to defend it. Thus, there should be no vacant land all the way up to Hotin (Khotin)⁹².

Penâh Efendi further argues that landowners should pay attention to the cultivation of grains and trees, in accordance with the requirements of the climate of the country. For instance, if the climate of the country is suitable for the growing of mulberry trees, they should sow between forty and fifty trees around each house. They should ensure that there is abundant silk, olive oil, and sugar. They should also sow olive trees and graft them to each other. They should plant almonds, hazelnuts, pistachio nuts, and other fruits, and the Christian subjects in particular should plant extensive vineyards. In the regions where water is abundant, the landowners should plant rice. Imperial couriers should compile a book from every province, signed by the local judge, with registers describing what is planted, where, and in what quantity. The newly sown lands should continue to be the possessions of their owners, but the state should take tithes of their agricultural products. In addition to increasing the prosperity of the lands and the welfare of the subjects, such measures will mean new sources of revenue for the state⁹³.

When we consider these suggestions, it seems possible that Penâh might have heard of the cameralistic policies ongoing in contemporary Europe, especially in Habsburg Austria and Prussia. Cameralism refers to “the state's interest in its resources, in better administration and in common good, the purpose being in order to increase

⁹²(Penâh Efendi 2017, 145; Cezar 1988, 125-126; Erdem 2019c; Sariyannis 2018, 357).

⁹³(Penâh Efendi 2017, 146; Cezar 1988, 115; Erdem 2019c; Sariyannis 2018, 357).

the prince's incomes, establish a sustainable development of economy, and create a well-ordered state." Although cameralism is often taken simply as the German version of mercantilism in economic historiography, these two early modern doctrines nevertheless exhibited certain differences. Firstly, in regard to the economy, cameralism largely neglected international trade, but focused instead on "the organization of domestic production" and the "effective exploitation of local sources". Thus, according to the cameralists, state officials should come to know the fundamentals of the rural and urban economy from growing plants, mining, forestry, and husbandry. Secondly, cameralism developed into a broader science of state management, covering "the functioning and practices of state governance, economy and society" as a whole, rather than focusing solely on economic policy. In the 18th century, it became a prerequisite for officials to learn the so-called cameralistic sciences in order to hold a post in the bureaucracy of several central and southern European states (Seppel 2017, 1-9; Tribe 2006, 264-265). Despite the similarity of his ideas to those of the cameralists, Penâh does not carry his ideas regarding agricultural production, or any other production for that matter, nearly as far; he does not define it as a science nor does he suggest educating the people in its methods. Instead, he limits himself to suggesting possible state policies. Nevertheless, considering that he describes state administration as an "art" several times in his work, it is possible that he was influenced by the policies of the cameralists and their ideas, particularly as implemented in the Habsburg empire.

In regard to the capital, Penâh Efendi writes that an office called the *binâ emîni* (superintendent of constructions) should be constituted, who will manage the construction affairs of the city. Thus, when someone wants to build a house in the city, he should have at least 1000 *zir'a* (app. 750 m)⁹⁴ in land upon which to build his estate: 250 *zir'a* for the building and 750 *zir'a* for the courtyard or garden. There should be borders designated for Üsküdar, Galata, and other neighborhoods, and no one should be able to build a house beyond these borders. Penâh Efendi complains that such regulations should have long before been instituted. If they had been, the city's air would be pure, and there would not be the various kinds of diseases, the chronic overpopulation, the extreme need for provisions, such high prices in the markets, and the constant disorder which afflict the city in his time. Furthermore, since there would have been no empty land for new buildings, the wealthy and the poor would not have come to the capital, the former for protecting his wealth and the latter for finding shelter. The size and number of fires would also be greatly decreased. Therefore, he concludes, from now on, permission for new buildings should

⁹⁴It is interesting that Penâh Efendi uses a unit of length while mentioning an area. I wonder if he had a square field in mind.

be given by the *binâ emîni* in accordance with regulations⁹⁵.

Furthermore, Penâh Efendi writes, there were plenty of paradisiacal places in the Ottoman realms which, had some attention been paid to them, would have developed into great cities like Thessaloniki, and would have provided the empire with enormous tax and customs revenue. He gives the names of two *kazâs* as examples: Ereğli (today's Çorlu) and Orfano (Missolonghi). Among these, Ereğli had possessed a fort in the past, and its port could operate as seaport of Edirne. For Orfano, a large city could be constructed two hours distance from the mouth of the river, and populated by both Muslim and non-Muslim subjects enticed there with the promise of tax relief (Penâh Efendi 2017, 94; Sariyannis 2018, 356).



⁹⁵(Penâh Efendi 2017, 93-94; Cezar 1988, 119-120; Ermiş 2014, 127; Sariyannis 2018, 356).

4. CONCLUSION

Süleyman Penâh Efendi was the son of Mustafa İsmâil Efendi, a former Janissary *ağa* who arrived in the Morea after its recapture by the Ottomans in the 1710s and gradually worked his way in the local bureaucracy, and of his mother, ‘Âiše, who was most likely a manumitted female slave from the Sultan’s palace. His family seems to have had close relations with both the local *çiftlik* owners in the Morea, and with those who had lived in Sultan’s palace for generations. Penâh grew up in a region that was both culturally and commercially distinctive, and he had benefited from the broad economic growth of the 18th century. He developed relations with producers in certain manufacturing sectors across the Morea and the Balkans, in addition to intellectual connections to the contemporary Greek intelligentsia and notables in the Venetian realms. All told, he spent more than thirty years of his life in the Morea, and the province had a strong influence on Penâh’s bureaucratic career; all of his later patrons had held positions in the Morea, including as the governor of the province for a certain period.

During his career, Penâh was a member of the pro-peace faction of Ottoman officialdom, especially after the Russian annexation of Crimea; like the majority of the Ottoman bureaucracy, he soon became an advocate for urgent reforms. During and after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774, probably due to his experience in international relations, he was appointed as a diplomatic negotiator. Considering his long presence in both the diplomatic negotiations and imperial councils, it is clear that by the 1770s he had already become an important member of the central bureaucracy. Like most Ottomans of his time, he felt a strong antipathy towards Russia. On the other hand, it seems that he might have been somewhat pro-British in his foreign policy; he was a member of Gazi Hasan Paşa’s more Anglophile political faction, and such sympathies might have helped his son Yusuf Âgâh Efendi to be appointed as Ottoman Ambassador to London. Considering the ideas that he expressed in the *Climes*, it can be asserted that Penâh was not, by inclination, a philosopher, a theoretician, or even an intellectual, but rather a bureaucrat with a strong practical mind and a provincial background, which enabled him to select and clearly evaluate new European or established Ottoman governmental concepts

in the context of the late 18th-century Ottoman world.

The *Climes* was a proposal for Ottoman modernization focused mainly on three issues: centralization, interior expansion, and mercantilism. Among these issues, the most crucial one - that is to say, the spirit or theme that encompassed all the others - was centralization. Almost all of the topics in the treatise are either grounded upon or emphasize the need for further state centralization. As a financial bureaucrat, he dwelled particularly upon the issue of financial centralization. Indeed, the only field for which he advocated centralization in its fullest sense were the state finances, including taxation and monetary policy. In the case of military or provincial administration, while advocating for the implementation of the European military technics and an expansion of central power, he nevertheless argued that gradual transformation was preferable, and remained largely faithful to traditional practices. In other words, Penâh's centralization project did not extent to include the Janissary corps or other semi-independent political actors, even as it weakened some provincial institutions, such as the power of the *a'yâns*.

Süleyman Penâh Efendi was aware that the centralization of power could only be realized with the help of an expanded and competent central bureaucracy. In the course of this aim, he revised the views of some his predecessors – notably, Kâtip Çelebi and Na'îmâ – regarding the role and development of the state. He objected to the inevitability of the end of the state, as asserted in the Khaldunist schema, by arguing that a state could continue indefinitely so long as reforms congruent with the requirements of the age could be implemented in due time. In his understanding of Ottoman history, there was no "golden age" nor a descent into subsequent corruption, but rather successive crises which were attributed to the changing attitudes of the state, and the misguided priorities and lack of insight shown by certain state officials. Moreover, he described the state in a more practical manner, as a society and a collective organism comprised of statesmen, and as an economic unit which must to manage its resources and expenditures wisely. On the other hand, he abandoned the explicit usage of the concept of the "circle of justice" as a parameter of just rule, as well as the medical analogy between the bodily humors and the segments of the social body. Indeed, he described the *hâcegân* as the sole main pillar of the state and advocated that the state should increase the number of permanent salaried soldiers as much as possible. These all indicate that Penâh Efendi represented something of a break from the medieval Islamic conceptualization of state administration, and an innovator in the broader process of Ottoman state modernization.

When imagining the ideal statesman, Penâh Efendi described the “men of insight,” who were natural elites gifted with uncommon talents of understanding, wisdom

and foresight, and who were the historical reason of all discoveries, inventions, and scientific developments from time immemorial; a proposition which reminds one somewhat of the Kantian “genius”. In describing the state as a society of statesmen, he developed a notion of Ottoman patriotism, with the clear expression of love for the Ottoman realms serving to cement the society of statesmen together. His notion of patriotism is limited, however, to the Ottoman state elite, and not extended to the common people. Indeed, in this conception even the provincial elite were excluded from his ideal bureaucracy and this sense of patriotism. The same elitism can be seen in his approach to politics. He described politics as the practice of deceiving the common people in order to prevent them from understanding the real intentions of the state; this seems to replace, for him, the medieval Islamic conception of the politics as the means of maintaining social order and tranquility.

His suggestions for the modernization and rationalization of the state extend to include both the military and civil bureaucracy; he argues for predictability in administrative conduct, maintained through the implementation of strict rules which would have to be followed by everybody, including the sultan. He also argued for the expansion of the central – and especially the financial - bureaucracy to the provinces. However, in suggesting this, he did not argue for the consolidation of power in the hands of the Sultan, as was the case in the contemporary enlightened monarchies of Europe. Rather, it seems, based upon his experiences of collective decision making during and following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774, he argued that the consultative role of Ottoman high officialdom should be accompanied by an executive sultanate, legislating by imperial decree. In addition to the apparent aim of increasing the strength of the empire against foreign powers, his military and bureaucratic reform program aimed to decrease the power of the provincial elites. In this regard, Penâh advocated for the increasing participation of local people in local administrative processes, which would serve to balance the power of the provincial elites; at the same time, it would provide the state with an excuse to intervene in times of conflict.

Although he was strongly against any further military expeditions against the West, he also advocated for the maintenance of strict military control over the Ottoman provinces, including former regions of the Empire. In other words, he advocated for an internal military consolidation and expansion of imperial power, rather than engaging in wars with the stronger European powers. In the southern parts of the Empire, Penâh was particularly focused on Egypt, Baghdad, and Abyssinia; in the west, he proposed the consolidation of Albania and Montenegro. While suggesting a policy of “divide and rule” for Egypt and Baghdad, in the case of Albania, he instead suggested a remarkable project to assimilate the Albanian people and prohibit the

Albanian language, which in many respects resembled European colonialism and the early *mission civilisatrice*. As part of the same project, Penâh argued that trade and commercial relations had a civilizing role and suggested that plantations be established in predominantly Albanian areas. Beyond this, he also suggested constituting large regiments from Albanian soldiers to use in the defense of the Balkans. Even as it focused on an interior vision, however, considering his ambitious expansion plans and his discussion of the maritime discoveries of the West, it can be said that he had a somewhat imperialistic vision as well.

As a classic supplementary element of the centralizing early modern states, Penâh Efendi suggested implementing mercantilist policies. His mercantilist approach was not as rigid as its European counterparts, since he did not take foreign trade as a zero-sum game and he did not propose high tariffs in order to protect domestic production by overemphasizing a foreign trade surplus. Rather, Penâh Efendi underlined the importance of an active balance of foreign trade and suggested the substitute production of certain imported products - both manufactural and agricultural - that contributed to the foreign trade deficit. Moreover, he suggested that the cultivation of agricultural production should be encouraged, which would add value to the Ottoman lands; it is possible that this idea arose under the influence of cameralistic policies in the contemporary Habsburg realms. In addition to focusing on the priorities of the state, his close relations with agricultural and manufacture producers in the Balkans lead us to wonder if his mercantilism might have also reflected the desires of the rising local bourgeoisie. His mercantilist approach was supported by a strong emphasis on the importance of bullion, which seems to have been deep-rooted in the Ottoman financial tradition. Penâh Efendi suggested keeping the nominal value of the Ottoman currencies higher than their real value with repetitive defensive debasements, with the aim of drawing foreign currencies to fill the Ottoman mints and preventing precious metals from being hoarded in the form of luxury goods; this was a policy which appears to have been successful during the century. In maintaining these two policies, Penâh put a strong emphasis on the circulation of a single monetary unit throughout the whole empire, with constant auditing of changes in its nominal and real value.

ARCHIVAL SOURCES

DABOA.A.DVNSNMH.d.9.21. Receb 1186/ 27 September-27 October 1772.

DABOA.AE.SMST.III.21.1403. 29 Zilhicce 1182/6 May 1769.

DABOA.AE.SMST.III.83.6179. 29 Zilhicce 1183/25 April 1770.

DABOA.AE.SMST.III.83.6180. 29 Zilhicce 1183/25 April 1770.

DABOA.AE.SMST.III.84.6230. 29 Zilhicce 1183/25 April 1770.

DABOA.AE..00218.12801. 29 Zilhicce 1206/18 August 1792.

DABOA.C.ADL.2.92. 3 Receb 1230/11 June 1815.

DABOA.C.AS.01188.53067. 19 Rabiulevvel 1172/20 November 1758.

DABOA.C.DH.168.8387.0. 28 Safer 1186/31 May 1772.

DABOA.C.ML.549.22599. 3 Muharrem 1184/29 April 1770.

DABOA.C.ML.605.24969. 11 Rabiulahir 1220/9 July 1805.

DABOA.EV.VKF.25.5. 29 Zilhicce 1200/23 October 1786.

DABOA.HAT.277.16283. 29 Zilhicce 1227/3 January 1813.

DABOA.HAT.1451.64. 29 Zilhicce 1200/23 October 1786.

DABOA.TS.MA.d5257. 20 Safer 1185/4 June 1771.

DABOA.TS.MA.e.509.28. 11 Rabiulahir 1185/24 July 1771.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adanır, Fikret. 2006. *Semi-autonomous Provincial Forces in the Balkans and Anatolia*. Vol. 3 New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 157–85.
- Afyoncu, Erhan. 2000. “Osmanlı Müverrihlerine Dair Tevcihat Kayıtları I.” *Türk Tarih Kurumu Belgeler* 20(24): 77–155.
- Afyoncu, Erhan. 2005. “Osmanlı Müverrihlerine Dair Tevcihat Kayıtları II.” *Belgeler* 30: 148–158.
- Aksan, Virginia. 1993. “Ottoman Political Writing, 1768–1808.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 25(1): 53–69.
- Aksan, Virginia. 1995. *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783*. Leiden: Brill.
- Aksan, Virginia. 1998. “Whatever Happened to the Janissaries? Mobilization for the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War.” *War in History* 5(1): 23–36.
- Aksan, Virginia. 2005. “Ottoman War and Warfare, 1453-1812.” In *War in the Early Modern World 1450-1815*, ed. Jeremy Black. London: Routledge pp. 147–175.
- Aksan, Virginia. 2006. “War and Peace.” In *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi. Vol. 3 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp. 81–117.
- Aksan, Virginia. 2012. “Ottoman Military Power in the Eighteenth Century.” In *Warfare in Eastern Europe, 1500-1800*, ed. Brian Davies. Leiden: Brill pp. 315–347.
- Alexander, John Christos. 1985. *Brigandage and Public Order in the Morea, 1685-1806*. Athens: Imago.
- Allen, Martin. 2016. “Currency Depreciation and Debasement in Medieval Europe.” In *Money in the Western Legal Tradition: Middle Ages to Bretton Woods*, ed. David Fox, and Wolfgang Ernst. New York: Oxford University Press pp. 41–52.
- Anscombe, Frederick F. 2006. “Albanians and “Mountain Bandits”.” In *The Ottoman Balkans, 1750-1830*, ed. Frederic F. Anscombe. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers pp. 87–113.
- Argıt, Betül İpşirli. 2009. Manumitted Female Slaves of the Ottoman Imperial Harem (Sarayıs) in Eighteenth-Century Istanbul PhD thesis.
- Atik, Kayhan. 2002. “XVIII. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Aydınlarına Göre İlmiye Teşkilatındaki Çözölmeye İlişkin Tespit ve Teklifler.” In *Türkler*, ed. Hasan Celâl Güzel, Kemal Çiçek, and Salim Koca. Vol. 11 Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları pp. 45–51.
- Atiyas, Ekin Emine Tuşalp. 2013. Political Literacy and the Politics of Eloquence: Ottoman Scribal Community in the Seventeenth Century PhD thesis.

- Aydın, Mahir. 1993. "Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 7 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 501–503.
- Aydiner, Mesut. 2005. Koca Râgıb Paşa Hayatı ve Dönemi PhD thesis.
- Bayerle, Gustav. 1997. *Pashas, Begs and Efendis: A Historical Dictionary of Titles and Terms in the Ottoman Empire*. Istanbul: ISIS.
- Bağış, Ali İhsan. 1984. *Britain and the Struggle for the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire: Sir Robert Ainslie's Embassy to Istanbul, 1776-1794*. Istanbul: ISIS.
- Berker, Aziz. 1942-1943. "Mora İhtilâli Tarihçesi veya Penah Efendi Mecmuası." *Tarih Vesikaları* 2: 63–80, 153–160, 228–240, 309–320, 385–400, 473–480.
- Beydilli, Kemal. 1997. "Halil Hamid Paşa." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 15 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 316–318.
- Beydilli, Kemal. 2002. "Küçük Kaynarca Antlaşması." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 26 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 524–527.
- Beydilli, Kemal. 2006. "Mustafa III." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 31 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 280–283.
- Beydilli, Kemal. 2009. "Seyyid Ali Efendi." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 37 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 45–47.
- Beydilli, Kemal. 2014. "Küçük Kaynarca'dan Tanzimât'a Islâhât Düşünceleri." *İlmi Araştırmalar: Dil, Edebiyat, Tarih İncelemeleri* (8): 25–64.
- Birken, Andreas. 1976. *Die Provinzen des Osmanischen Reiches*. Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag.
- Black, Jeremy. 1984. "Sir Robert Ainslie: His Majesty's Agent-Provocateur? British Foreign Policy and the International Crisis of 1787." *European History Quarterly* 14(3): 253–283.
- Black, Jeremy. 2003. *European Warfare, 1660-1815*. London: UCL Press.
- Black, Jeremy. 2005. "Introduction." In *War in the Early Modern World 1450-1815*, ed. Jeremy Black. London: Routledge pp. 1–23.
- Bowles, Paul. 2009. "Mercantilism." In *The Princeton Encyclopedia of the World Economy*, ed. Kenneth A. Reinert, Ramkishen S. Rajan, Amy Joycelyn Glass, and Davis Lewis S. Princeton: Princeton University Press pp. 757–759.
- Bölükbaşı, Ömerül Faruk. 2013. *18. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Darbhâne-i Âmire*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Bölükbaşı, Ömerül Faruk. 2014. "İstanbul Sarrafları (1691-1835)." *Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi* (30): 19–96.
- Canatar, Mehmet. 2002. "Kethüdâ." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 25 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 332–334.

- Cezar, Yavuz. 1986. *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi: XVIII. yy dan Tanzimat'a Mali Tarih*. İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık.
- Cezar, Yavuz. 1988. "Osmanlı Aydını Süleyman Penah Efendi'nin Sosyal, Ekonomik ve Mali Konulardaki Görüş ve Önerileri." *Toplum ve Bilim* (42): 111–132.
- Creceus, Daniel. 2008. "Egypt in the Eighteenth Century." In *The Cambridge History of Egypt Volume 2: Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the twentieth century*, ed. M. W. Daly. Vol. 2 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp. 59–86.
- Darling, Linda T. 2013. *A History of Social Justice and Political Power in the Middle East: The Circle of Justice From Mesopotamia to Globalization*. New York: Routledge.
- Develi, Hayati. 2011. "Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi'nin Verilerine Göre 17. Yüzyıl Yunanistan'ında Dilsel Dağılım." In *Evliya Çelebi Konuşmaları/Yazılar*, ed. M. Sabri Öz. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları pp. 160–170.
- Doğan, Muzaffer. 1995. *Sadâret Kethüdâlığı (1730-1836)* PhD thesis.
- Eldem, Edhem. 1999. *French Trade in Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century*. Leiden: Brill.
- Eldem, Edhem. 2006. "Capitulations and Western Trade." In *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqi. Vol. 3 New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 283–335.
- Erdem, Yusuf Hakan. 2017a. *Osmanlı Avrupası'nda Kolonyal Esintiler*. Karar Gazetesi. 28.05.2017. Last Accessed: 05.10.2019: <https://www.karar.com/yazarlar/hakan-erdem/osmanli-avrupasinda-kolonyal-esintiler-4102>.
- Erdem, Yusuf Hakan. 2017b. *Penâh Efendi: Bundan Sonra Arnavutça Konuşulmaya...* Karar Gazetesi. 04.06.2017. Last Accessed: 10.07.2020: <https://www2.karar.com/yazarlar/hakan-erdem/penah-efendi-bundan-sonra-arnavutca-konusulmaya-4155>.
- Erdem, Yusuf Hakan. 2017c. *Süleyman Penâh Efendi'nin Esbâb-ı Tedbir-i Nizâm-ı Ekâlîm Adlı Risâlesi*. Karar Gazetesi. 21.05.2017. Last Accessed: 19.08.2019: <https://www.karar.com/yazarlar/hakan-erdem/suleyman-penah-efendinin-esbab-i-tedbir-i-nizam-i-ekalim-adli-risalesi-4047>.
- Erdem, Yusuf Hakan. 2019a. *Beş Kuruluşluk Şal da Aynıdır*. Karar Gazetesi. 28.07.2019. Last Accessed: 16.07.2020.: <https://www2.karar.com/yazarlar/hakan-erdem/bes-kurusluk-sal-da-aynidir-10864>.
- Erdem, Yusuf Hakan. 2019b. *Habeş İklimi de Boşuna Durur*. Karar Gazetesi. 19.08.2019. Last Accessed: 22.09.2019: <https://www.karar.com/yazarlar/hakan-erdem/habes-iklimi-de-bosuna-durur-11048>.

- Erdem, Yusuf Hakan. 2019c. *Yerli Mali Osmanlının Mali*. Karar Gazetesi. 21.07.2019. Last Accessed: 16.07.2020: <https://www2.karar.com/yazarlar/hakan-erdem/yerli-mali-osmanlinin-mali-10798>.
- Erdem, Yusuf Hakan. 2019d. *Önce Taşrayı mı Fethetsek?* Karar Gazetesi. 11.08.2019. Last Accessed: 16.07.2020: <https://www2.karar.com/yazarlar/hakan-erdem/once-tasrayi-mi-fethetsek-10989>.
- Erdem, Yusuf Hakan. 2019e. *İmparatorluk Olarak Modernleşmek*. Karar Gazetesi. 04.08.2019. Last Accessed: 06.10.2019: <https://www.karar.com/yazarlar/hakan-erdem/imparatorluk-olarak-modernlesmek-10926>.
- Ergin, Osman Nuri. 1977. *Türkiye Maarif Tarihi cild: 1-2*. İstanbul: Eser Kültür Yayınları.
- Ergin, Osman Nuri. 2007. *İstanbul Şehreminleri (İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanları) 1855-1928*. Vol. 117 İstanbul: İşaret Yayınları.
- Ermiş, Fatih. 2014. *A History of Ottoman Economic Thought: Developments Before the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Routledge.
- Esad Efendi, Mehmed. 2018. *Bâğçe-i Safâ-Endûz*. Kültür Eserleri Dizisi Ankara: T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı.
- Evliyâ Çelebi, Derviş Mehmed Zillî. 2003. *Evliyâ Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*. Vol. 8 İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.
- Faroqhi, Suraiya N. 2006a. "Declines and Revivals in Textile Production." In *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi. Vol. 3 New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 356–375.
- Faroqhi, Suraiya N. 2006b. "Rural Life." In *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi. Vol. 3 New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 376–390.
- Findley, Carter Vaughn. 1970. "The Legacy of Tradition to Reform: Origins of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1(4): 334–357.
- Findley, Carter Vaughn. 1986. "A Vision of a Brilliant Career." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* (76): 95–101.
- Findley, Carter Vaughn. 2006. "Political Culture and the Great Households." In *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi. Vol. 3 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp. 65–80.
- Genç, Mehmet. 2017. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Devlet ve Ekonomi*. İstanbul: Ötüken.
- Georgieva, Gergana. 2007. "Administrative Structure and Government of Rumelia in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries: the Functions and Activities of the Vali of Rumelia." In *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760-1850: Conflict, Transformation, Adaptation*, ed. Antonis Anastasopoulos, and Elias Kolovos. Rethymno: University of Crete pp. 3–19.

- Görgün, Hilal. 2000. "İbrâhim Bey." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 21 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 285–287.
- Gümüş, Şenay Özdemir. 2019. "Osmanlı Devleti'nin Akdeniz'de Kış Muhafazası." *Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi/The Journal of Social Sciences* (34): 54–70.
- Gündoğdu, Birol. 2012. Ottoman Constructions of the Morea Rebellion, 1770s: A Comprehensive Study of Ottoman Attitudes to the Greek Uprising PhD thesis.
- Halaçoğlu, Yusuf. 2004. "Menzil." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 159–161.
- Herbette, Maurice. 1902. *Une ambassade turque sous le Directoire*. Perrin.
- Hochstrasser, Timothy. 2006. "Physiocracy and the Politics of Laissez-faire." In *The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought*, ed. Mark Goldie, and Robert Wokler. New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 419–442.
- Hâkim Efendi, Mehmed. 2019. *Hâkim Efendi Tarihi (Osmanlı Tarihi 1166-1180/1752-1766)*. Vol. 1-2 of *Tarih ve Toplum Bilimleri Serisi* İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı.
- Itzkowitz, Norman. 1962. "Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities." *Studia Islamica* (16): 73–94.
- Itzkowitz, Norman. 1977. "Men and Ideas in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire." In *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, ed. Thomas Naff, and Roger Owen. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University pp. 15–26.
- Kafadar, Cemal. 2007. "Janissaries and Other Riffraff of Ottoman Istanbul: Rebels without a Cause?" *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 13(12): 113–134.
- Kallek, Cengiz. 2007. "Okka." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 33 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 338–339.
- Kalıpcı, Mahmud Esad. 2015. "Müsadere Kurumunda Islaha Dair Bir Teklif: III. Selim Dönemine Ait Bir Vesika." *Marmara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Hukuk Araştırmaları Dergisi* 21(2): 211–242.
- Karaca, Filiz. 1998. "Hil'at." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 18 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 25–27.
- Karahan, Ali. 2017. Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa'nın Hayatı ve Faaliyetleri (1714?-1790) PhD thesis.
- Kiel, M., and J. Alexander. 2005. "Mora." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 30 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 280–285.
- Kohn, Meir. 1999. "Medieval and Early Modern Coinage and Its Problems." *Dartmouth College, Department of Economics Working Paper* (99-02).
- Kütükoğlu, Mübahat S. 1995. "Ferman." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 12 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 400–406.

- Kütükoğlu, Mübahat S. 1997. "Hatt-ı Hümayûn." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 16 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 485–488.
- Kılıç, Musa. 2015. "Yeniçeri Ocağı ve Yahudiler Arasındaki İlişkiye Dair Bazı Tespitler." *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi (AID)* 10(2): 143–164.
- Malliaris, Alexis. 2007. "Population Exchange and Integration of Immigrant Communities in the Venetian Morea, 1687-1715." *Hesperia Supplements* 40: 97–109.
- Marsot, Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid. 2006. "Power and Authority in Late Eighteenth-Century Egypt." In *Society and Economy in Egypt and the Eastern Mediterranean, 1600-1900: Essays in Honor of André Raymond*, ed. Raouf Abbas, and Nelly Hanna. Cairo: Oxford University Press pp. 41–49.
- Masters, Bruce. 2006. "Semi-autonomous Forces in the Arab Provinces." In *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqi. Vol. 3 New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 186–206.
- McGowan, Bruce. 1994. "The Age of the Ayans, 1699-1812." In *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, ed. Halil İnalcık, and Donald Quataert. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp. 637–757.
- Menchinger, Ethan L. 2017. *The First of the Modern Ottomans*. Cambridge University Press.
- Nagata, Yuzo. 2006. "Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 31 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 48–50.
- Neumann, Christoph K. 1993. "Decision Making without Decision Makers: Ottoman Foreign Policy circa 1780." In *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Caesar E. Farah. Missouri: Truman State University Press book section 3, pp. 29–38.
- Nimwegen, Olaf Van. 2010. "The Transformation of Army Organisation in Early-Modern Western Europe, c. 1500-1789." In *European Warfare, 1350–1750*, ed. Frank Tallett, and David J. B. Trim. New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 159–180.
- Pamuk, Şevket. 2000. *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pamuk, Şevket. 2002. "Kuruş." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 26 Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 458–459.
- Penâh Efendi, Süleyman. 2017. *Mora İhtilâli (1970)*. Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları.
- Ragsdale, Hugh. 1988. "Evaluating the Traditions of Russian Aggression: Catherine II and the Greek Project." *The Slavonic and East European Review* 66(1): 91–117.
- Roncaglia, Alessandro. 2006. *The Wealth of Ideas: a History of Economic Thought*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ross, Ian Simpson. 2010. *The Life of Adam Smith*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Râşid Efendi, Mehmed. 2013. *Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli*. Vol. 3 İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları.
- Saitas, Yanis. 1990. *Greek Traditional Architecture: Mani*. Athens: Melissa Publishing House.
- Sariyannis, Marinos. 2013. "Ruler and State, State and Society in Ottoman Political Thought." *Turkish Historical Review* (4): 92–126.
- Sariyannis, Marinos. 2018. *A History of Ottoman Political Thought up to the Early Nineteenth Century*. Leiden: Brill.
- Sarıcaoğlu, Fikret. N.d. "Karavezir Mehmed Paşa." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 24 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 477–478.
- Sağlam, Nevzat. 2014. Ahmed Vâsıf Efendi ve Mehâsinü'l-Âsâr ve Hakâiku'l-Ahbâr'ı 1166-1188/1752-1774 (İnceleme ve Metin) PhD thesis.
- Seppel, Marten, and Keith Tribe. 2017. *Cameralism in Practice: State Administration and Economy in Early Modern Europe*. Woodbridge: Boydell Press.
- Sezen, Tahir, and Arif Torun. 2017. *Osmanlı Yer Adları*. TC Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü.
- Shaw, Stanford Jay. 1958. *The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798*. Princeton Oriental Studies Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Stamatopoulos, Demetrios. 2007. "Constantinople in the Peloponnese: The Case of the Dragoman of the Morea Georgios Wallerianos and Some Aspects of the Revolutionary Process." In *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760: Conflict, Transformation, Adaptation*, ed. Antonis Anastasopoulos, and Elias Kolovos. Rethymno: University of Crete pp. 149–164.
- Stoianovich, Traian. 1960. "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant." *The Journal of Economic History* 20(2): 234–313.
- Süreyya, Mehmed. 1996. *Sicill-i Osmanî*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı.
- Taylesânizâde, Hâfız Abdullah. 2003. *İstanbul'un Uzun Dört Yılı (1785-1789)*. İstanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı Yayınları.
- Telci, Cahit. 1999. "Bir Osmanlı Aydınının XVIII. Yüzyıl Devlet Düzeni Hakkındaki Görüşleri: Penah Süleyman Efendi." In *Osmanlı Ansiklopedisi*, ed. Güler Eren. Vol. 7 Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları.
- Tezcan, Baki. 2010. *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tribe, Keith. 2006. "Cameralism and the Sciences of the State." In *The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought*, ed. Mark Goldie, and Robert Wokler. New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 525–546.

- Unat, Faik Reşit. 1968. *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri*. Vol. 8 Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi.
- Uzunçarşılı, İsmail. 1940. "Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa'ya Dair." *Türkiyat Mecmuası* (7): 17–44.
- Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı. 1988a. *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Kapıkulu Ocakları*. Vol. 1 Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi.
- Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı. 1988b. *Osmanlı Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları.
- Varlık, Nükhet. 2011. "Tâun." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 40 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 175–177.
- Veinstein, Gilles. 1991. "On the Çiftlik Debate." In *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, ed. Çağlar Keyder, and Faruk Tabak. Albany: State University of Newyork pp. 35–53.
- Vlachopoulou, Anna. 2007. "Like the Mafia? The Ottoman Military Presence in the Morea in the Eighteenth Century." In *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760: Conflict, Transformation, Adaptation*, ed. Antonis Anastasopoulos, and Elias Kolovos. Rethymno: University of Crete pp. 123–135.
- Vâsîf Efendi, Ahmed. 1994. *Ahmed Vâsîf Efendi: Mehâsinü'l-Âsâr ve Hakâikü'l-Ahbâr*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu.
- Wagstaff, J. M. 1978. "War and Settlement Desertion in the Morea, 1685-1830." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 3(3): 295–308.
- Wagstaff, J. M., and Elena Frangakis-Syrett. 1992. "The Port of Patras in the Second Ottoman Period: Economy, Demography and Settlements c. 1700-1830." *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 66(1): 79–94.
- Wilson, Peter. 2005. "European Warfare 1450-1815." In *War in the Early Modern World 1450-1815*, ed. Jeremy Black. London: Routledge book section 8, pp. 177–205.
- Yalçinkaya, M. Alaaddin. 1993. The first permanent Ottoman-Turkish embassy in Europe: the embassy of Yusuf Agah Efendi to London 1793-1797 PhD thesis.
- Yalçinkaya, M. Alaaddin. 1999. "Yusuf Ağâh Efendi." In *Yaşamları ve Yapıtlarıyla Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi*, ed. Ekrem Çakıroğlu. Vol. 2 İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Kültür Sanat Yayınları pp. 680–681.
- Yaycıoğlu, Ali. 2016. *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Yaycıoğlu, Ali. 2019. "Perdenin Arkasındakiler: Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Sarraflar ve Finans Ağları Üzerine Bir Deneme." In *Özer Ergenç Armağanı Part II*, ed. Cemal Kafadar, and Gönül A. Tekin. Vol. 52 of *Journal of Turkish Studies* Harvard University: Şen Yıldız Yay. pp. 375–396.

- Yeşil, Fatih. 2011. *Aydınlanma Çağında Bir Osmanlı Kâtibi: Ebubekir Râtib Efendi, (1750-1799)*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Yeşil, Fatih. 2016. *İhtilâller Çağında Osmanlı Ordusu: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sosyoekonomik ve Sosyopolitik Değişim Üzerine Bir İnceleme (1793-1826)*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Yiğit, Bilge Kaya. 2015. "Süleyman Penâhî'nin Nasihatnamesi." *Gazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 2(3): 105–141.
- Yola, Şenay. 1993. "Cerrâhiyye." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 7 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 416–420.
- Zarinebaf, F., J. Bennet, and J. L. Davis. 2005. *A Historical and Economic Geography of Ottoman Greece: The Southwestern Morea in the 18th Century*. Vol. 34 of *Hesperia Supplement* Princeton, New Jersey: The American School of Classical Studies at Athens.
- Ágoston, Gábor. 2010. "Empires and Warfare in East-Central Europe, 1550-1750: the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry and Military Transformation." In *European Warfare, 1350–1750*, ed. Frank Tallett, and David J. B. Trim. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Âsım Efendi, Mütercim Ahmed. 2015. *Âsım Efendi Tarihi, (1218-1224/1804-1809)*. İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı.
- Çalışkan, Muharrem Saffet. 2000. Enverî Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihinin I. Cildi'nin Metin ve Tahlili (1182-1188/1768-1774) PhD thesis.
- Çağman, Ergin. 2010. *III. Selim'e Sunulan Islahat Lâyiğaları*. İstanbul: Kitabevi.
- Çetin, Cemal. 2009. Anadolu'da Faaliyet Gösteren Menzilhâneler (1690-1750) PhD thesis.
- Çiçek, Hikmet. 2018. Sadullah Enverî Efendi ve Tarihi'nin II. Cildinin Metin ve Tahlili (1187-1197/1774-1783) PhD thesis.
- Çobanoğlu, Mübeccel. 1966. Mustafa Bâhir Paşa (Köse) Bitirme tezi.
- Öngören, Reşat. 2008. "Rûmiyye." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 35 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 240–242.
- Özcan, Abdülkadir. 1995. "Esâme." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 11 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 355–356.
- Öğreten, Ahmet. 2014. *Nizâm-ı Cedîde Dâir Askerî Lâyiğalar*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu.
- Ünlü, Ertan. 2018. "18. Yüzyılda Sarraf Katlleri: "Devlet Malına Haleb" 'in mi, Hizipleşmenin mi Kurbanları?" *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* (52): 99–133.
- İlgürel, Mücteba. 1995. "Evliya Çelebi." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 11 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 529–533.

- İlgürel, Mücteba. 2006. "Mustafa Paşa, Köse." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 31 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 345–346.
- İnalçık, Halil. 1977. "Centralization and Decentralization in the Ottoman Empire." In *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, ed. Thomas Naff, and Roger Owen. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University pp. 27–53.
- İnalçık, Halil. 1980. "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700." *Archivum Ottomanicum* (6): 283–337.
- İnalçık, Halil. 1991. "Emergence of Big Farms, Çiftliks: State, Landlords, and Tenants." In *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East: Globalization, Revolution, and Popular Culture*, ed. Çağlar Keyder, and Faruk Tabak. Newyork: SUNY Press pp. 17–34.
- İnalçık, Halil. 1994. "The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300-1600." In *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, ed. Halil İnalçık, and Donald Quataert. New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 9–409.
- İnalçık, Halil. 2002. "Kırım Hanlığı." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 25 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 450–458.
- İpşirli, Mehmet. 2005. "Mirzazâde Mehmed Said Efendi." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 30 İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı pp. 169–170.
- İzzî Efendi, Süleyman. 2019. *İzzî Tarihi (Osmanlı Tarihi 1157-1165/1744-1752)*. Tarih ve Toplum Bilimleri Serisi İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı.
- Şakul, Kahraman. 2017. "The Ottoman Peloponnese Before the Greek Revolution: "A Republic of Ayan, Hakim, and Kocabaşı" in "the Sea of Humans and Valley of Castles"." In *Insularity in the Ottoman World*, ed. M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, and William M. Blair. Princeton Papers Princeton: Princeton University.
- Şem'dânizâde, Fındıklılı Süleyman. 1976, 1978, 1980. *Şem'dâni-zâde Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi Tarihi Mür'it-Tevarih*. İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaası.